

BEYOND MARGINALIZED AND VICTIMIZED:
AN EVERYDAY LIFE APPROACH TO ISLAMIST WOMEN



ESRA ÖZDİL GÜMÜŞ

İSTANBUL ŞEHİR UNIVERSITY

MAY 2016

BEYOND MARGINALIZED AND VICTIMIZED:
AN EVERYDAY LIFE APPROACH TO ISLAMIST WOMEN

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
İSTANBUL ŞEHİR UNIVERSITY

BY

ESRA ÖZDİL GÜMÜŞ

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
IN
SOCIOLOGY

MAY 2016

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Sociology.

Examining Committee Members:

Prof. Ferhat Kentel (Supervisor)

Assoc. Prof. Kenan ayır

Assoc. Prof. Eda Ünlü Yücesoy

This is to confirm that this thesis complies with all the standards set by the Graduate School of Social Sciences of İstanbul Şehir University:

Date

Seal/Signature

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

First Name, Last Name: EsraÖzgül Gümüş

Signature:



ABSTRACT

BEYOND MARGINALIZED AND VICTIMIZED: AN EVERYDAY LIFE APPROACH TO ISLAMIST WOMEN

Özdil Gümüş, Esra

MA Department of Sociology

Supervisor: Ferhat Kentel

May 2016, 106 pages

This thesis discusses the transformation of everyday life and consumption patterns of contemporary Islamist women who previously had marginalized and victimized images. Laicite as one of the founding principles of the Republic with its *sui generis* implementation brought a new and modern perception of religion, so the public visibility of religion was wiped away. In this era, modernization of woman's appearance and woman body as display cabinet in which the image of the state could be observed, pursued as a policy and with her outdated and obscurant appearance, Islamist woman was marginalized and forced to the private space.

During 1980's, the government-backed rise of Islamic capital paved the way for both the emergence of a new bourgeois class and a change in Islamists' relationship with the state. However, the closure of religious (imam hatip) secondary schools and prohibiting entrance of headscarved women to universities and public institutions as a result of 28 February coup, a publicly visible activist image of victimized women is created. In 2000's, this image is replaced with an image of, capitalist, consumerist, intellectual, working and producing an alternative to the modernity of Kemalism, beyond her marginalized and victimized identities.

Today, different from previous times, capitalism that was declared as archenemy because of contradicting with Islamic values, absorbed quite simply and this situation brought about the debates of whether Islamism is passed away. This thesis discusses the new upper-middle class Islamist women that live in Istanbul and the role of religion in the consumption patterns and references in terms of daily life experiences.

Keywords: Islamist woman, everyday life, consumption patterns, modernization.



ÖZ

MARJİNAL VE MAĞDURUN ÖTESİNDE: GÜNDELİK YAŞAM YAKLAŞIMIYLA İSLAMCI KADIN

Özgül Gümüş, Esra

MA Sosyoloji Bölümü

Tez Danışmanı: Ferhat Kentel

Mayıs 2016, 106 sayfa

Bu tez, önceleri marjinal ve mağdur imajı olan İslamcı kadının gündelik yaşam ve tüketim alışkanlıklarındaki dönüşümü tartışıyor. Cumhuriyetin kurucu prensiplerinden laiklik, Türkiye’de şahsına münhasır bir uygulamayla birlikte modern bir din anlayışıyla getirmiş, dinin kamusal görünürlüğü silinmiştir. Bu dönemde özellikle devletin imajının görülebileceği bir vitrin olarak kadın bedeni ve kadının görüntüsünün modernleşmesi bir politika olarak güdüldükçe demode ve gerici görünüşüyle İslamcı kadın marjinal kalmış ve özel alana itilmiştir.

1980’li yıllarda siyasi iktidar tarafından da desteklenen İslamcı kapitalin yükselmesi hem yeni bir burjuvanın doğuşuna hem de İslamcıların devletle ilişkisinde dönüşüme sebep olmuştur. Fakat bu dönemde de, orta dereceli imam-hatiplerin kapanması ve başörtülü üniversite ve kamusal kurumlara girişin yasaklanmasıyla birlikte kamusal alanda aktivist ve görünürlüğü artan bir mağdur edilen kadın imajı oluşmuştur. 2000’li yıllara gelindiğinde bu imajın yerini; marjinal ve mağdurun ötesinde, kapitalist, tüketim toplumu değerlerine entegre, okuyan, çalışan, ve Kemalist modernizme alternatif bir modernlik üreten kadın imajı ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Evvelki dönemlerden farklı olarak bugün, İslami değerlerle çatıştığı gerekçesiyle baş düşman edilen kapitalizm çok da kolay bir şekilde massedilmekte ve bu durum “İslamcılık öldü mü?” tartışmalarını da beraberinde getiriyor. Bu tez, İstanbul’da yaşayan orta-üst sınıfın gündelik yaşam tecrübeleri üzerinden dinin yeni İslamcı kadının gündelik hayatı, özellikle tüketim alışkanlıkları ve tercihleri üzerindeki rolünü tartışıyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İslamcı kadın, gündelik yaşam, tüketim alışkanlıkları, modernleşme



inancı yaşama gayesi olan tüm kadınlara...

to all women whose belief is the object of their living...



ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

All the praises and thanks be to Allah, the most gracious and the most merciful.

There are so many people to thank who have been journeyed with me during the recent years as I have worked on this thesis. First, I would like to thank to my advisor Prof. Ferhat Kentel for his guidance and patience over the last three years, and his greatest efforts during the process dissertation defense. Without his understanding, tolerance and thoughtfulness this dissertation would not be written. Secondly, I am grateful to jury members Assoc. Prof. Kenan ayır and Assoc. Prof. Eda nlü Yücesoy for their invaluable counseling. Special thanks to Assoc. Prof. Eda nlü Yücesoy who helped me with accommodating my concerns and turned them into academic study, andinvolved me as an assistant to Global Prayers' project "The Renegotiation of Boundaries Between Islam and the "Modern": Perceptions of Religious Women in Istanbul"that eventually lead to writing of this dissertation. I would like to extend my thanks to other members of the project, zge Aktaş and Zöhre Benli for their collegiality. I also thank to the chair of the Department of Sociology, Assoc. Prof. Nurullah Ardıç for his encouragement to all his students, to my other professors and dear classmates from whom I learned a lot. Moreoever, the informants'participation was essential; I want to thank them all for their time and help.

Of course, I would like to acknowledge with gratitude, the support and love of my family- my parents Abdurrahman and zgöl zdil; my dearest sister Zehra, her family Muhammed Safa and Ali Asaf; my aunt Mine; my mother-in-law Akile Sema and all others. They all kept me going, believe me and supported me in everyway that they can. During this long period, I appreciated the value of priceless friends Rümeysa Şişman, Saliha Şişman, Dilber Tanrıverdiler, Feride Atay, Edgü Güneysu, Esra Soybelli, Ayşegöl Çimen, Hicran Hamza Çelikyay, Nigar Tuğsuz, Merve Uçar Nurcan, Ayşe Altan, Rabia Tuba Görgülü, Ayşe Meryem Akbulut and many others.

I am highly indebted and thoroughly grateful to my beloved husband Yüce Gümüş and my lovely daughter Ayşe Reyyan Gümüş for their patience during this process and their all contributions to my life.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ.....	vi
DEDICATION.....	viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	x
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xii
CHAPTERS	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1. The Scope and the Purpose of the Study.....	1
1.2. The Rationale and the Questions of the Study.....	5
1.3. Concepts of this Research.....	9
1.3.1. Modern	9
1.3.2. Woman	9
1.3.3. Veiled Women	12
1.3.4. Islamist.....	13
1.3.5. Urban.....	14
1.3.6. The Upper-Middle Class.....	15
1.3.7. Everyday Life.....	17
1.3.8. Consumption.....	21
1.4. Literature Review	23
2. MODERNIZATION AND ISLAMISM.....	28
2.1. Turkish Modernization and the Positioning of Religion	29
2.2. Marginalized Islamist Women.....	38
2.3 Victimized Islamist Women.....	42
2.4. Moving Beyond the Scope of Marginalized and Victimized.....	48
3. EVERYDAY, RITUAL AND THE NEW MUSLIM.....	53
3.1. On Methodology.....	53
3.2. Findings From the Field- Tension Between Sacred and Profane	58
3.2.1. Eating and Drinking Habits	60
3.2.1.1. Alcohol and Pork Serving Restaurants	60
3.2.1.2. Representation of Veil.....	65
3.2.1.3. Starbucks	68

3.2.1.4. Trust Issues.....	69
3.2.2. Dress, Styling and Fashion.....	72
3.2.2.1. Fashion	74
3.2.2.2. Colorfulness.....	77
3.2.3. Usage of Credit Cards and Interest.....	79
3.2.4. Tourism and Holiday.....	81
3.2.4.1. Islamic Tourism and Holiday Culture	82
3.2.4.1. Holiday Preferences.....	88
3.2.4.3. Haşema	90
4. CONCLUSION	93
REFERENCES	99
APPENDIX.....	106

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
JDP	Justice and Development Party
USA	United States of America
MÜSİAD	Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği/Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association
UNWTO	The United Nations World Travel Organization



CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Scope and the Purpose of the Study

My mother has been working as a manager of a women-only beauty salon that serves to middle and upper middle class with only women personnel in Çamlıca (on the Anatolian side of Istanbul) for twelve years. Only by sitting in the saloon, one can obtain some idea about the everyday life practices and consumption culture of the segment of society it appeals. Beauty salon indicates complex patterns of 'new Islamic lifestyle' because it is a part of everydayness of women in which the consumption patterns and life styles could be observed. Hence, this twelve-year-long process of participant observing that specific beauty salon urged me to think about the lifestyle of the Muslim women and their bodily practices.

As the children of the 1980's, we grow up with the stories of heroic women images with their dark headscarves that cover most of their shoulders and chest and fight for their freedom to live their Islamic life. That was the image of Muslim women in 1980's and today we are experiencing a different wave of Islamism. Since 1980's, Islamist Movement in Turkey has transformed rapidly and Islamists experienced an evolution from the position of marginal Islamists to Islamic bourgeoisie. Islamists of 80's were very much against the logic of capitalism and they were positioning themselves against the life styles and consumption patterns of the West. Today, the movement has been moved not only beyond the scope of political movement, religious belief and private life, but also become visible by creating its own life styles and public spaces.¹ Interestingly, unlike the activist reactions of 80's, the emergence of this new kind of modern Muslim images and life styles absorbed by the Islamists without any substantial resistance. The new consumption practices are parallel to proliferation of Islamic spaces, such as fashion boutiques, women-only beauty

¹Nilüfer Göle, *Modern Mahrem*, (İstanbul: Metis, 2000), 13.

salons and fitness centers, Islamic holiday resorts, non-alcoholic cafes and restaurants, as well as the emergence of both print and new media, such as Islamic lifestyle and fashion magazines, Islamic blogs and social media. The idea that Islamic lifestyle is undergoing a transformation has also found support in the public discourse and the mainstream media particularly in the last decade, embodied in terms such as 'new', 'modern', 'moderate', 'normalized', 'new generation' Islam.

Not only the image of Muslims and especially Muslim women but also life styles are changing. Today women do not hesitate to wear colorful headscarves and clothes with brand names, using very expensive mobiles and cars, go to chic cafes and restaurants. The graduation parties, engagements, weddings were celebrated not in houses or modest saloons, but in the five star hotels. There has always been a practice of organizing events and selling tickets for high prices in which the total amount is sent for charity groups or NGO's, however the change came when these parties are organized just for fun. There is an emergence of an elite class who lives in dissipation and creates a lifestyle culture. The issues of visibility of women, perception of consumption, positioning in public space and everyday life practices is transforming radically. Being visible in the public space, this practice itself caused building of a new identity. Besides, the everyday practices of the women evolved and they started to create their own discourse of modernity and consumption culture. From clothing to shopping, from private life to public image, the Islamists experienced a thorough change in their lives.

Change is not peculiar to life styles and images, but the whole understanding of Islam and being an Islamist is evolving. The establishment of the laic Turkish Republic was a milestone for the relations of the state and the Islamist population. Since 2002, Turkey has been ruling by conservative Justice and Development Party (JDP) that is established by Islamists suffered from the laic regime. This power shift debilitated the fundamentally laic perceptions that left aside all other identities economically and politically. Internally changing economic and political policies combined with global modernization and capitalization movements, lead to occurrence of a so-called modern Islamic bourgeois.

This study aims to explain everyday life patterns of middle-upper class Islamist women that live in Istanbul in accordance with the face-to-face interviews and focus group researches. The data gathered from the field was immense and multi-sided that goes much beyond from the scope of this thesis. In this regard, this thesis is limited with the consumption patterns of the Islamist women and the factors that affect their preferences during economic transactions. Thus, places preferred for eating and drinking, cafes and restaurants; bodily practices like privacy, beauty, fashion, dressing, veil; holidays as a new classificatory; occurrence of a new individual and her usage of public space; credit card and interest usage will be analyzed for understanding Islamist's interpretation of modernization and capitalism. The gathered data is analyzed in the light of De Certeau's concepts of tactic and strategy.

In the first chapter, the scope and the purpose of the thesis, its rationale and limits are explained. In contemporary modern times, there is a global and thorough transformation of life styles, and Islamists are not indifferent to this wave. A newly arising class of wealthy modern Islamists and their transforming consumption patterns that stand out with especially with lifestyle of women with expensive headscarves, luxury cars, veil fashion, women-only holiday places lead to the writing of this thesis. Therefore, evolution of everyday life of the Islamist women is the scope of this research. Secondly, the rationale and the questions of the study are explained. How the movement of Islamization has shaped since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, what it has evolved with the flow of modernity and capitalism are the main questions to be discussed. Thirdly, the literature about the issue is reviewed to present why this study is meaningful.

According to Mardin, the history of modern Turkey is neither a conflict between republicanism and sultanate, nor a dispute that is framed by Islam and secularism. Instead, it is a complicated and multi-sided encountering between intermingling and transforming traditional powers and modernity. It is also a story of the creation of areas that these powers meet and transform. The *quotidian* base of social and political conditions and the specificity of the

historical processes is a way of defining the modernity.² Therefore, the historical background of the Turkish state and Islamists is still a crucial determinant for today's apprehension. The issue of relations of the state with religion in Turkey has always been a sensitive one and today's Islamists cannot be understood without understanding the history of the Islamic movement in Turkey. The revival of Islamism cannot be solely explained by religious determinants; it is a complicated process that has many ties with social life. Kentel claims that, the axis of tensions in Turkey touches to the main cornerstones, watchtowers of Turkish modernization. Modern Republic had been structured by creating an 'other' to itself, then, one of these others that you confined to private sphere and declared as illicit creates its actors and be as modern as you; and this is traumatic.³ This trauma of the Kemalist ideology is still cannot be got over and therefore, in chapter two; firstly, the historical background of the relations of Islam with the newly established Turkish state and how the ruling elite dealt with the Islam are presented. Secondly, the conduct of Islamism that depends on economic and political course of events and the role of women during the 1980's and 1990's are explained. Not undetached from the political course of events, the image of Islamist women was stuck between the labels of 'marginalized' and 'victimized'. Today, a new image and woman has been occurring beyond these labels and the social and political conjuncture that leads this change is another issue to be discussed in this chapter.

The third chapter is presentation of my fieldwork that analyzes transforming of Islamist woman from the 'marginalized' or 'victimized' woman and creating a different Islamist identity. During the thesis, the answer will be sought to the question of whether Islamists survived in the waves of capitalism. I assert that, with this new process, the Islamist women try to build their identities upon their religious values but with different interpretations from 1980's or 1990's. In that sense, 'the death of Islamization' statement that showed up in the last four years of 'especially with the rule of liberal

²Şerif Mardin, "Operasyonel Kodlarda Süreklilik, Kırılma ve Yeniden İnşa: Dün ve Bugün Türk İslami İstisnacılığı", *Türkiye, İslam ve Sekülerizm*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2015), 198.

³Ferhat Kentel, "Türk Toplumunu Adam Yerine Konmak İstiyor", *Cumhuriyet, Milliyetçilik ve İslamcılık*, (İstanbul: Küre, 2011), 94.

conservative JDP' is not valid; Islamization is not dead, but it has changed its shape and become a determinative factor of boundaries of Islamist women in public space by affecting her economic actions, consumption patterns and daily life. The transforming of Islamist women into modern figures that became actors in capitalist world order is not free from Islamic values. Still, there are boundaries for women in their everyday life, determined by religious conscience and moral values. The methodology and findings from the fieldwork is explained to support the asserted thesis.

1.2. The Rationale and the Questions of the Study

With the wind of capitalism and modernization, there has been a worldwide transition of values and beliefs that creates a rapid and immense change that is perceived in different rates and momentums by different societies and communities. In terms of social transformation, a laic-secular worldview has shown itself as a matchless phenomenon in the modern civilization and religion is affected by these occurrences as an intrinsic value of traditional society. The change is not a process only experienced by the Islamist women, but there is an *en masse* change that affects the whole world. For the last three decades, Turkey has been experiencing a rapid change in social, cultural, economic and political areas and this process of transformation affected all spheres of the societal life. Religion and the changing life styles accordingly, became one of the most important societal dynamics in which the transformation is distinctly visible. As the societal transformations affect the scope of religion, religion reciprocally affects the social structure. The religious actors, who cannot be indifferent to modernity during the facing of the traditional and the modern, began to adopt themselves to new modern social contexture. Inevitably, the religious perceptions and sensations of individuals are influenced directly.⁴

The debate of what is traditional and what is modern is a question that dates back to 19th century. With the establishment of the Turkish Republic, this issue was still concern of the new intellectuals of the time. Till 1980's, Islam had always disguised or had to be disguised, because both as a political discourse

⁴Özlem Avcı, *İki Dünya Arasında*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2012), 45.

and a way of living, it presented a menace to the Republic and Republican reforms. In those times, Islamists were perceived as marginals. Therefore, religion survived and tried to be visible by articulating to conservatism and nationalism discourses. 1980's and 1990's experienced a different wave of Islamization. With immense waves of migration, traditional localities turn into modern cities; as a result, new social forces began to flourish.⁵ Likely, the Islamic movements that enlarge and expand after 1980's, began to shift from periphery to city centers with mass migration waves and got new opportunities of secular education and upward social movement. This shift from periphery to centers, lead to the new groups' pursuit for the central areas and helped them to negotiate with modernity. Religion emerged as a way of life and became visible during these years.

Today, the life styles of Muslim actors are very different from previous time and this difference created another debate about whether the old Islamists fading away with the modernity. Especially with the rise and rule of the JDP, Muslim supporters began to incorporate neoliberalism and values of modernity as oppose to its historical disaffection of Western ideology of capitalism. The Islamic movement and the actors began to gain a certain amount of visibility in the public space and by this way, discourses created by the Islamic and non-Islamic actors created a focus for the debates that are still quite prevalent. Islamic movement gained a certain amount of legitimacy and beyond being solely a political reaction and being carrier of the Islamic-conservative fractions created and has been creating new strata in it. With this legitimacy, Muslim groups began to appear in the sectors like finance, banking, tourism, and education so that slowly shaped them according to religion. This situation, paved the way for a more livable and concretely observable religiosity in daily life. The visibility and legitimacy that are gained in political, cultural and following in social spheres fastened the transition of Islam into a societal movement.⁶ Post-1980 and 1990's witnessed the individualization of the Islamic actors, market economy, modernization and globalization movements;

⁵*ibid*, 59

⁶*ibid*, 13-15

that created transformations and ideational shifts in grounding dynamics of Islam.

Since 2002, the secular rule of the state, that had been victimized the Islamist women, has now transferred to a group of pre-Islamists who established the JDP that defines itself as a conservative party to differ itself from the all prior Islamic movements and groups. The JDP has been following an equitable policy for veiled women. Today, the ban is hardly prevalent in universities and it can be transgressed in many state organizations. The presence of conservative women in public space is now being normalized by the society. The emergence of the new Islamic lifestyles seems to prevent the tension between the secularist and Islamist politics over the issue of headscarf. However, another tension is showed up about the definition of the new Islamic life style.⁷

The image and the lifestyles of Islamist women who live in contemporary time are no longer similar to the image of Islamist women who were existed a few decades ago in Turkey. Consumption culture, usage of public space, the limits of privacy, the distinction between public and private sphere have changed and today, a different type of Islamist women emerged. To understand today's attributions of Islamism, which was a political movement before 1980's and then turn into a social movement, it is important to refer its place in the history of The Turkish Republic and how it grow in mass. Thus, in which ways the Islamic values and principles are put in the center of the daily lives and how capitalism, the most demonized concept of the Islamists of 1980's admitted and normalized by the society so quickly and smoothly should be understood and explained. Besides, how the macro level political occurrences and structures permeated women's daily lives in micro level and; affect, transform and shape them is the propellant question of this thesis.

In Turkish history religion has always played a crucial role in shaping even the smallest part of daily lives of the society. Islamic thought and lifestyles has gone through different phases during the history of the Republic. By being

⁷Özge Aktaş and Eda Ünlü Yücesoy, "The Renegotiation of Boundaries Between Islam and the "Modern": Perceptions of Religious Women in Istanbul." In *Global Prayers Contemporary Manifestations of the Religion in the City*, Ed. by Jochen Becker, Katrin Klingar, Stephan Lanz and Kathrin Wildner, (Zurich: Lars Mueller Publishers, 2013), 515.

aware of the change in Islamic way of life throughout the world, this thesis analyzes the transition of Islamic movement in Turkey and how it affects the daily lives of the religious women. What is questioned throughout this research is, how the Muslim women perform their religious practices sometimes as a political discourse and sometimes as daily life exercise in the modern and complicated urban life and how the religious practices become visible as a life style in this new world, what kind of tensions and discrepancies arose between the sacred and the profane; and what kind of solutions are found. The issues of daily life and leisure time activities, consumption habits, being a visible individual in public space and the meaning of being Muslim women are discussed with the interviewees and the consumption patterns are analyzed for this research.

Apart from their traditional roles of belonging to their homes, the conservative women now exist in the public space. Because of intense interest of society, presence of headscarved women in public space obligated them to question their perception of privacy, the relations with the men, and the relations with the society and prove themselves in this new area. Public space is a concept that is produced by the modern societies or a concept that goes parallel with the modernity in historical process. It corresponds to 'exceeding'. Public space is a space created by exceeding the old, the cultural belongings of the previous religious, ethnic etc. legitimacies for the salvation of modern capitalist relations.⁸ What is sacrificed for survival in the public space and why?

It has been argued that, 'Islamic knowledge, performances and selves are more and more mediated through commodified cultural forms and spaces' and this mediation lead to emergence of a new 'modern Islamic lifestyle' in Turkey.⁹ This study intends to unfold the complex patterns of 'new Islamic lifestyle' by investigating the religious women's perceptions, everyday life and experiences of 'modern' and 'commodified' Islamic practices and exploring the construction

⁸Ferhat Kentel, "Teorinin raconunu bozan "başörtüsü" - Bir direnişin anatomisi", Ed. by Neslihan Akbulut, *Örtülemeyen Sorun Başörtüsü: Temelboyutları Ile Türkiye'de Başörtüsü Yasağı Sorunu*, (İstanbul: Akder, 2008), 2-3.

⁹Banu Gökarıksel and Ellen McLarney, "Muslim Women, Consumer Capitalism, and the Islamic Culture Industry", *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies*, Vol: 6, No: 3, Fall2010, 2.

and re-construction of boundaries between Islam and the 'modern' in various urban spaces in Istanbul.¹⁰

The analyses that were made about conservatism and women in Turkey are very few, and most of them are stuck to post-1980s Islamist movement and ignores the contemporary transition, therefore they are so far from being prevalent. Despite some macro analyses, the micro particles of the belief, life, clothing, style, was not analyzed thoroughly and whole despite the personal heterogeneity of life styles, religious women were degraded to single category. This study intends to understand the peculiarities of the conservative women and what prevents them to be one of the common customers of the capitalist market and tries to grasp the point that holds religious women as religious. This study, by making a number of interviews, cannot explain the whole issue of modernization of Islamist women, but it aims to put a mirror into women's lives and see their boundaries against the incoming waves of modernity.

1.3. Concepts of the Research

This section explains the concepts of this research as they are discussed within the scope of research. Therefore instead of presenting the complexity of these concepts with their intimate relationship with each other, this kind of an itemization is preferred.

1.3.1. Modern

The concept of 'modern' in this thesis refers to a certain social and spatial practices that reflect a certain way of living, which are embodied in personal aesthetic preferences that intertwine with Islamic consumption culture. In this regard, the concept of 'modern' is embedded within Islamic lifestyle instead of being in a dichotomous relationship with Islam.¹¹

1.3.2. Woman

Modernization and secularism are two constitutive bases of the newly establishing Turkish Republic. In this modernization story, women have been

¹⁰ Aktaş and Yücesoy, "The Renegotiation of Boundaries Between Islam and the "Modern": Perceptions of Religious Women in Istanbul", 516.

¹¹ *ibid*, 515.

playing the leading role as display of the country. Kentel asserts that, the body of the woman is one of the most visible and most easily dominated phenomena of Turkish modernization. The state shows off its modernization through the medium of woman body. In that sense, the woman body becomes politicized.¹²Therefore, the image, dressing, education and daily lives of women have always been in the agenda, and carried political and social messages since the beginning of first modernizing movements.¹³ Therefore, the modern image of women was one of the fulcrums of Kemalist reformism and rights given by reforms were markers of the legitimacy and being one of the modern states of the time during the establishment of the country. These reforms were accepted as the most important elements of Turkish modernization among urbanized middle classes. They provided equal rights to women and men in education, business and political arena.¹⁴ With the constitutional reforms in the new Republic, women gained the rights in the public space like taking part in political demonstrations, writing in journals and newspapers, establishing associations to demand their rights in accordance with the foundation of the modern nation-states as an organic entity that casts women with new roles. For Westerner elites, the existence and participation of women to the public space were remedies to abolish backwardness.¹⁵

However, the modernization movements controlled by the elites did not did not let women movements to liberate with its own agenda, on the contrary, they limit liberalization movements within elite's envisaged framework. The roles of women are assessed as 'new motherhood' and 'housewives' in a frame of a new ideal of femininity while constructing the home and the family. This new positioning of women as 'mother' and 'wife' also drew the line of realm of freedom. Both Deniz Kandiyoti and Ayşe Kadioğlu define the Republican woman as a type of woman that becomes 'the citizen' before being an individual. This type of woman is modest, hardworking, single-hearted, Western looking but observant to tradition in private, dedicated to the principles of the Republic, good wife and self-sacrificing mother. In that sense, the image of Kemalist

¹² Kentel, "Türk Toplumunu Adam Yerine Konmak İstiyor", 98.

¹³ Ayşe Kadioğlu, *Zaman Lekesi*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2006), 31.

¹⁴ Ferhunde Özbay, *Dünden Bugüne Aile, Kent, Nüfus*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2015), 111.

¹⁵ Tezcan Durna, *Kemalist Modernleşme ve Seçkincilik*, (Ankara: Dipnot, 2009), 88.

woman reflects the pragmatism of Kemalist ideology and it occurs as a combination of confounding images. An educated business woman at work; organizer woman that has social mobility at social clubs, associations and organizations; a good wife and mother that is aware of her duties at home; a woman who has biologic function; a feminine woman that pleases her husband at parties and balls.¹⁶ In short, the republican women were idealized as well-educated, well-behaved daughters of the Kemalist fathers. These daughters were educated by modern methods and they can be socialized in men's society. In this context, the modernization of the clothing of the women became a presider to Turkish modernization; the Western-style clothing became a visible identity of progression. The characteristics of identities of women in one way based to modernization and in another, pushed to accept and adopt the societal roles prepared for them. As a result, the woman that is liberated by rights could not use these rights in the process of being a liberated individual and keep their control over institutions.

The preclusion of attempt to establish the first women's political party, Women's Public Party, by Nezihe Muhittin is one of the indications of the controlling desire. This situation led to occurrence of a woman image that holds dichotomized identities of conservative and modern; free and controlled; traditional and Western, laic and sectarian.¹⁷ Long hemline means *being a la turca*, short hemline associated to loose womanhood. Standing somewhere in between with skill of rope dancer, being modest and modern at the same time is one of the most challenging tensions of the upper-middle class Republican women.¹⁸ Therefore, since then, women of Turkey have always been accepted as figures to control about how to behave, how to dress, how to be modern. That governance of the state is inherent to the ruling ideology of the state and still the women, both religious and non-religious, are under the indirect controlling impetus of the state.

¹⁶Narınç Ataman, "Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Kadın Kimliğinin Oluşumu", (Master diss., Ankara University, 1999), 90-92.

¹⁷*ibid*, 102.

¹⁸Kadioğlu, *Zaman Lekesi*, 101.

1.3.3. Veiled Women

When Islamic societies faced with modernity, they questioned themselves and tried to create a peculiar type of reawakening movement.¹⁹ Men, who had the right to present substantially, discussed their problems and usually found gradual answers. However problems of women could not brought to the agenda because of intimacy concerns and prompted women to be one of the main actors in the debate between religion and tradition. Unlike men, who camouflaged them very successfully in accordance with changing rules of the time, the women stayed in focus because of their headscarves and become targets both in political and social life in Turkey.

The phenomenon of veil has been 'religionized' the women more than men. Women who are treated equally with men according to religious principles, including *tesettür* (Muslim style covering of body and hair according to professed Islamic codes²⁰, indifferent to gender) do not have the same chance in terms of contacting with the secular state. Correspondingly, while colorfulness and variegation of dress styles and *tesettür* of women became highly controversial, luxury dressing of men has not come to the fore.²¹ Therefore, the image of women has always been the locus of debate, and stuck at the boundary of traditional and modern.

Especially with the execution of the ban of headscarves in public spaces and universities the veiled women were forced to become main actors in debate between the Islamists and the ruling government. By this way, the sexuality and the body of the women were included in the scope of politics and still today, although the ban is widely no longer valid, the debates are. Besides, in the newly emergent "Islamic" culture industry, a series of images, practices, knowledge, and commodities are marketed specifically to "Muslim women."²² Moreover, because of privacy issues, veiled women have a women-only world that is unknown to macro analysis of religiosity and quite valuable for the everyday life

¹⁹Cihan Aktaş, *Türbanın Yeniden İcadı*, (İstanbul: Kapı, 2006), 353.

²⁰Banu Gökariksel and Anna Secor, "The Veil, Desire and The Gaze: Turning the Inside Out", *Signs* Vol. 40, No. 1 (Autumn 2014): 178.

²¹Mücahit Bilici, "İslam'ın Bronzlaşan Yüzü: Caprice Hotel Örnek Olayı", In *İslam'ın Yeni Kamusal Yüzleri*, ed. by Nilüfer Göle (İstanbul: Metis, 2000).

²²Banu Gökariksel and Ellen Mclarney, "Muslim Women, Consumer Capitalism, and the Islamic Culture Industry", *Journal Of Middle East Women's Studies* Vol. 6, No. 3, (Fall 2010), 2.

analysis.

'The headscarf came to signify that Islam is present and alive not only as an individual faith, but as a collective social and cultural set of principles guiding people, manners and styles of living.' says Yeğenoğlu. Therefore, the entrance of Muslim women to the public space with their Islamic headscarves implies the destabilization of the principles of Kemalist secularism and shakes the protected public form that is free from intrusion of the religious. Hence, the increasing number of female university students wearing headscarves came to signify publicly that Islam is present in people's life.²³ In that sense, headscarf and veil have a symbolic meaning in Turkey apart from its universal religious connotations.

The aim of this study is not evaluating religiosity. Therefore, tools and techniques for measuring the degree of religiosity and the questions of 'who is more religious who is less' are not in the scope of this thesis. The only criterion for deciding the interviewees is being veiled. All of the interviewees except two are veiled. *Tesettür*, and especially veil have a symbolic meaning that represents the Muslim women in the entire world. It is integral for proper *tesettür*. In Turkish, the term of headscarf is used instead of veil in direct translation. However, *veiling* refers to the covering body of women according to Islamic principles all over the world, that's why veil is used instead of headscarf in this thesis. It is not a criterion of religiosity; but it refers to a Muslim identity as a symbol. It is certain that there are tons of religious women that do not wear veil; but as a religious symbol that represents the identity of a Muslim, the interviews question the meaning of veil and *tesettür* in everyday life.

1.3.4. Islamist

Instead of defining the actors as conservative or Muslim, the term of Islamist is preferred during the study. The issue of terminology requires an explanation because Muslim, conservative, Islamic and Islamist could be alternated to each other. In recent years, conservatism as a term associated with JDP. However the Islamists have different voting behaviors both in general and

²³Melda Yeğenoğlu, "Clash Of Secularity And Religiosity: The Staging Of Secularism And Islam Through The Icons Of Atatürk And The Veil In Turkey", *Religion and the State*. London, GB: Anthem Press, 2013. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 31 March 2016, 233.

specific to the interviewees of this research. Besides, being a Muslim is a religious identity that has no reference to affecting the behaviors of the actors and this term is binding only for individuals, it defines neither religiosity, nor ideology. It should be acknowledged that for this research, Islamism should be understood as an identity that could show up by the facing of political attitude with Islamic perception. A new principle of dissociation that reorganize the public space emerges and Islamic interpretation of everything becomes possible; civil society, literature, music, media, trading, holidays, fashion, and even the leisure life.²⁴

Islam is a religion, not a political project. Islamism that borrowed its name from Islam is entirely a political thinking. That's why it has marched different tunes throughout history.²⁵In scope of this thesis, De Certeau's approach to belief is adopted in which belief is handled not as an object of believing, but as the subject's investment to a proposition; by taking this proposition as truth; it is the act of enunciation. In other words, belief is taken as 'a "modality" of the assertion and not its content'.²⁶So, in this thesis, interviewees' narrations, as acts of enunciations, are taken, as their investment of belief and the content of the proposition-Islam for this thesis- is not the scope of this research. Moreover, Islamists are not a uniform group of people that could be fall under the same category. In this sense, regardless of different interpretations of Islamic living, every formation that puts Islamic values and principles to the center of political attitude by embracing the Muslim individual represents Islamism for this thesis.²⁷

1.3.5. Urban

Since 1960's, as capitalism wanted people to harmonize with the modern life, it is also harmonized. In previous times, owners of the businesses were producing randomly for an ambiguous market. Later, some entrepreneurs realized the possibility affecting consuming by the means of consumption; which is also the possibility of organizing and structuring daily life. Therefore,

²⁴Dilek Yankaya, *Yeni İslami Burjuvazi*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2014), 16.

²⁵Kenan Çamurcu, "Sol, İslam ve Değişim," *Birikim* 179 (2004): 97.

²⁶ Michel De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life, Believing and Making People Believe*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 178.

²⁷ Avcı, *İki Dünya Arasında*, 54.

everyday life is divided into pieces and every piece is organized as if parts of a puzzle. Every piece of this puzzle belongs to a sum of organizations and institutions and operated rationally. The typical, meaningful phenomenon where this operation is written and read there and over it, is the new urban. This readable social text of the new urban—so long as knowing how to read it—records the organization of everyday life, division of it into parts (business life, private life, leisure time etc.) and rigorous and controlled organization of time.²⁸

As one of the most urbanized cities of Turkey, Istanbul is chosen as a field for the conduct of the study. It is also the biggest and most populous city of Turkey with its best education and all other social services. There are many districts from poorest to richest, but the districts mentioned in this research are usually the decent places that the conservative upper class lives. Moreover, as the biggest migration-receiving city, Istanbul accommodates the largest percentage of the universities in Turkey. Apart from the industrial and economic concerns, Istanbul is a center of attraction with its educational opportunities. In that sense, this city creates a profile of Turkey.

1.3.6. The Upper-Middle Class

As a Marxist philosopher, Henri Lefebvre asserts that after 1950's, capitalism and bourgeoisie gained back the initiative of the social movement thanks to the militarily defeated weakened Fascism. In this situation dialectical thinking stopped processing, it lost its way, he calls this conjuncture as the self-destruction of dialectical movement of history by turning against itself; that eventually caused to the worldwide meaning loss of a profoundly and certainly rooted seeming thinking and conscience. The role of the working class and with historical contributions its ideology is ambiguated. A new deception has arisen: middle classes will merely own the shades of the power, only bits and pieces of power will be fall to their share, but the scenario will be written around them. The 'values', and 'cultures' of the middle class overrode the values and cultures of the working class or they seemed so, because they are 'over'.²⁹

Within the context of class conscious with fashion, women and youth are

²⁸Henri Lefebvre, *Modern Dünyada Gündelik Hayat*, (İstanbul: Metis, 2013),71-72.

²⁹*ibid*, 53.

accepted as a target market depending on the data of women's superior class-consciousness then men they share same class and age with. This data is a clue of why women are better followers of fashion. In that sense, women do not only follow dressing trends to increase their sexual attraction but also follow different fashion waves that are spread to the society. As fashion presents distinctions between classes, keeping an updated wardrobe gives an impression of belonging to an upper class than one belongs because it requires a regular spending performance.³⁰

Considering that, the upper-middle class Islamist women that live in Istanbul are the scope of this thesis. In Turkey, 1980's are accepted as a milestone for the economic liberalization. In this era, with the support of Prime Minister Turgut Özal, businessmen were released to make their own commercial activities and free enterprise was promoted. With the economists and bankers brought from abroad, especially from the USA a new image of Turkey is created.³¹ Businessmen in Anatolian cities were supported to create a new religious and conformist capitalist class that was integrated to world system. The ideas of individualization and free enterprise transformed not only the economic, but also social life, practices and more importantly consumption patterns. This transformation brought a system that occurred from communitarianism to individualization, sharing to competition, compatibility with the system instead of resistance; by this way, Turkish society turned into a consumerist society.³² Newly arising societal actors became apparent in this conjuncture and youth began to form a new life style that looks like the life styles of preexisting elite in terms of apparel and consumption. Since the end of 1980's, the differences on life styles have expanded to eating drinking habits and to all spheres of consumption patterns. The growing body of businessmen as the members of the upper-class community with high capital by including different cultural habits began to seek for a life style to be dissociated from the society. By this way, in Istanbul, city had transformed and settlement, education,

³⁰Fatma Barbarosoğlu, *Şov ve Mahrem*, (İstanbul: Profil, 2012), 107.

³¹Sima Hakko Lodrik, *Ekonomik Ve Kültürel Sermaye Sahibi Sınıfın 1980-2000 Arası Tüketim Pratikleri*, (Master diss, Bilgi University, 2013), 2.

³²Alper Mumyalmaz, "Elitlerin Yeni Yüzü, İslami Burjuvazi," *Mustafa Kemal University Journal Of Graduate School Of Social Sciences*, Vol: 11, Issues: 27, (2014), 369.

shopping places were began to move in direction of changing.³³

In 1990's, the Islamists with the experience of institutionalization and incorporation had their own middle class, professionals and intellectuals. With the rule of JDP, the Islamic capital gained its most top-line position in central economy. So, these capital groups prospered especially in the periphery and created its bourgeois during the rule of JDP. The individualization, market economy and becoming actors of media and art worlds come with a transformation of Muslim elites. As in all media sector, the image of women gained its place with a new Islamic fashion industry and Islamic fashion shows in this transformation.³⁴ This transformation is inherently related to the everyday practices of women that were both shape the spaces they use and shaped by those spaces.

1.3.7. Everyday Life

Everyday life has been the concern of modern French cultural and Anglo-American cultural studies since 1960's. Despite exility of researches in Turkey, a great deal of writers, artists, philosophers, and social theorists analyze the patterns and rhythms of our daily activities. The notion of everyday life is determined by modernity, a life sphere that should be analyzed with modernity. Everyday life is a sphere in which the basic ideas that created the society gain wide currency and legitimacy. In this sphere, personal routines are important to understand the society. According to Highmore, everyday life is not merely the name that is given to a reality readily available for scrutiny; moreover, it is the name for aspects of life that lie hidden. To invoke an ordinary culture from below is to make the invisible visible, and such has clear social and political resonance.³⁵ In this thesis, the term of everyday is considered as a problematic, contested and opaque terrain, where meanings are not to be found ready-made.

According to Lefebvre, everydayness and modernism specifyies and conceals, legitimized and compensates reciprocally. It is not solely a routine, but it indicates a system that is behind the routine. This system defines how to live

³³ Hakko Lodrik, "Ekonomik Ve Kültürel Sermaye Sahibi Sinifin 1980-2000 Arasi Tüketim Pratikleri", 2.

³⁴ Talip Küçükcan and Ali Fidan, "İktisadi Kalkınmada Yerli Burjuvanın Sosyolojik Anlamı", *Çukurova Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Vol: 22, No: 2, (2013): 265.

³⁵ Ben Highmore, ed. *The Everyday Life Reader*. (USA and Canada: Routledge, 2002), 1.

well, what to eat in a diet, which clothes are trendy, in short, how to exist and in this thoroughly manipulated sphere, the system determines the quotidian in accordance with its aims and benefits and imposes it to the individuals by persuasion. In that sense, planned, structured and surveilled individual and her daily life become ideal objects for capitalism. Individual has to consume what she thinks she demand via this tacit and subliminal manipulation.³⁶

Therefore, while defining everyday life, determining the everydayness and modernity of the society we are living in, and the characteristics that led the birth of them is compulsory. The point is capturing the essentiality among apparently nonsensical phenomena and defining them with regulating, then describing the transformations and perspectives of the society. Thusly, everyday life moves beyond being a mere concept and this concept becomes a way of understanding the society when it is situated into globocity, state, technique, culture etc. In that sense, analyzing everyday life becomes one of the most rational ways of apprehending the society by permeating through it.³⁷

Michel de Certeau opposes complete passive role of the individual in such a manipulated sphere of everyday life and claims one can survive with tactics against the strategies determined by the system. What he calls strategy is 'the calculation(or manipulation) of power relationships which becomes possible when a subject of will and power (a business, an army, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated from. 'Strategy postulates a place that can be enclosed as proper and thus serve as the basis for generating relations with an exteriority composed of targets or threats (customers or competitors, enemies, the country surrounding the city, objectives and objects of research, etc.) can be managed. Every strategic rationalization initially quests to separate its own place, which is the place of its own power and will, from an "environment." In other words, 'it is an effort to delimit one's own place in a world bewitched by the invisible powers of the other'. It is also the typical attitude of modern scientific rationality, politics, and military strategy.³⁸

³⁶ Zehra Yiğit, "Modernliğin Arka Yüzü' Olarak Gündelik Hayat: Aşk-ı Memnu", *Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Vol: 14, No: 2, (2012): 127-128.

³⁷ Lefebvre, *Modern Dünyada Gündelik Hayat*, 364.

³⁸ De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, 35.

Tactics are calculated actions determined by the non-existence of a proper locus. They have no limits to separate 'the other' as a visible entity as it happens in a business, army or scientific institution. Tactics have to play on and with a terrain imposed on it and structured by the law of a foreign power. Hence, the space of tactics is the space of the enemy. Within its limits, tactic takes the advantage of the opportunities and depends on them. For sure, this placelessness enhances its mobility but this mobility has to accept the chance offerings of the moment and grab the possibilities that offer themselves at any given moment. Moreover, it has to take advantage of the cracks opened by particular conjunctions in the surveillance of the powers and by intruding them it should create surprises.³⁹

Simply, on the contrary of strategies, tactics do not have names. Strategies make simpler and put a name, tactics, with their all complexity and centuries' reservoirs, are the everyday themselves; practices or performances like walking, eating and speaking. To exemplify, the city is a strategy to be complied with; it is a culture that the immigrants from rural areas are expected to obey, traffic lights, green fields, working and living places. As a strategy, the experts plan the city, but pedestrians use it and while using they activate their tactics; they use short cuts, look around, stop and walk again. They are surrounded by the city planned by experts; they exist within that city, but the city, streets of the city, parks and gardens they imagined appear in different shapes. With their daily tactics, they change the roads they walk, upload different meanings and restructure the city unwittingly. Strategies always have to redefine themselves and the things they surround because of the mole drainage of tactics. In that sense, tactics are in a sense 'guileful ruses' against the powerfals, they are the art of the weaks that spoil and distort strategies.⁴⁰

For Baudrillard daily life as 'the locus of consumption' is not simply the sum of daily doings, the dimension of banality and repetition but it is a system of interpretation. In that sense, 'everydayness is the separation of a total praxis into a transcendent, autonomous and abstract sphere (of the political, the social, the cultural) and the immanent, closed, abstract sphere of the 'private'.'

³⁹*ibid*, 37.

⁴⁰ Ferhat Kentel, "Modernite, Gündelik Hayat ve Yeni Sosyal Hareketler", *Altüst*, 10 Nov 2011, <http://www.altust.org/2011/11/modernite-gundelik-hayat-ve-yeni-sosyal-hareketler1/>

Work, leisure, family, acquaintances: the individual reorganizes all these things in an involutive mode, this side of the world and of history, in a coherent system based on the closure of the private, the formal freedom of the individual, the securitizing appropriation of the environment, and misrecognition. Everydayness is, from the objective point of view of the totality, impoverished and residual, but it is, by contrast, triumphant and euphoric in its effort totally to autonomize and reinterpret the world 'for internal consumption'. It is here that there is profound, organic collusion between the sphere of private everydayness and mass communications. Everydayness as closure, as *Verborgenheit*, would be unbearable without the simulacrum of the world, without the alibi of participation in the world. It has to be fuelled by the images, the repeated signs of that transcendence.⁴¹

Religion as a political movement, as a sociological fact, and as a discourse, neither disappears, nor lived as an individual belief. On the contrary, it plays an important role in the establishment and organization of the public space; it is one of the most effective group demands and identity codes of late-modern times and the most hegemonic one among the predominant alternative modernity discourses. Religion as the one of the most important symbols of culture wars that symbolizes globalizing world is still living as one of the sovereign codes of today's political life. Religious discourse and movement, shows, has us watch and experience the intertwining and entangled relation between boundaries and frames we draw in social relations and by this way separate living quarters from each other.⁴² Moreover, religion is a system of meaning and explanation that is crucial and affective to determine identities, life styles, consumption patterns, socializing processes and the symbols to use. Islamcan stamp daily and social lifes with a discourse created as a life style, and could legitimize different perspectives and contents within its strata.⁴³

⁴¹Jean Baudrillard, *The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures*, (London: Sage, 1998), 36.

⁴²Fuat Keyman, "Küreselleşme, Gelenek, Din Türkiye Örneği", *Türkiye ve Avrupa'da İslam, Devlet ve Modern Toplum*, (İstanbul: Konrad-Adanauer-Stiftung, 2004), 45-46.

⁴³ G. Senem Gençtürk Hızal, "Bir İletişim Biçimi Olarak Moda: "Modus"un Sınırları," *İletişim Araştırmaları* 1, (2003): 72.

1.3.8. Consumption

With their affirmative and pejorative connotations, today consumption and consumerism are ineluctable realities of the modern times and used as sociological facts to differ contemporary society from traditional ones. Baudrillard calls this difference as 'a fundamental mutation in the ecology of the human species'. This ecology of human species today resembles to a 'proliferating vegetation, a jungle' in which the new wild man of modern times has difficulty recovering the reflexes of civilization'. He describes objects as a manmade fauna or flora that comes back to besiege and invade humans 'as it might in a bad science fiction novel'. According to him, today, humans of the age of affluence are surrounded by other human beings not so much as they were in all previous ages, but by objects. He claims in contemporary time humans live by 'object time', at the pace of objects, live to the rhythm of their ceaseless succession. In all previous civilizations it was timeless objects, instruments or monuments that outlasted the generations of human beings, however now, it is humans who watch them as they are born, grow to maturity and die. The formula he offers is describing these things as we see and experience them and realizing they are products of human activity despite their grandeur and profusion and are dominated by the law of the exchange-value instead of natural ecological laws.⁴⁴ Unlike pre-modern societies in which production was more important to explain the social structures and individuals, today, consuming –not as an economic but social activity- is one of the key features of the society. It is so intrinsic to the lives of individuals and that is why consumption patterns are interchangeably named as consumption culture and the society shaped by this culture is consumer society. The free market economists that presume more consumption leads to more production and more welfare dignify consumer societies. In that sense, consumer societies can only be realized in capitalist societies and can be explained, conceptualized and examined only through this perspective.⁴⁵

⁴⁴Baudrillard, *The Consumer Society*, 26-27.

⁴⁵Recai Çınar and İhsan Çubukçu, "Tüketim Toplumunun Şekillenmesi ve Tüketici Davranışları", *Atatürk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* 13 (2009): 279.

For Bocoock, during the last twentieth century, 'consumption as a set of social, cultural and economic practices, together with the associated ideology of consumerism, has served to legitimate capitalism in the eyes of millions of ordinary people'. Therefore, consumption should be seen not simply as a utilitarian and economic process, but may be, the social and cultural process involving signs and symbols. Hence, once people are influenced by the social and cultural practices associated with the ideology of modern consumerism, even they cannot afford to buy advertised goods they desire them. What consumption based increasingly is not simply upon needs, but upon desires.⁴⁶ The distinctive feature of consumer societies is consuming not according to the needs but consuming becomes an end in itself.

According to Henri Lefebvre, the existence of the society we are living is a result of a transformation; from deprivation to holding right of usage; from man with limited and scarce needs to a man with abundant and prosperous needs. However, as as all transformations, this process occurred under the affect of many forces, by trailing history behind, and uneasily. Early culture that depends on limitation of needs, economization, and regulation of scarcity is transforming into a new culture based on abundant production and extensity of consumption, however this process is realized over a generalized crisis. Within this conjuncture, the ideology of production and the meaning of producing turned into deology of consumption that gives priority to bourgeoisie. By erasing the image of effective man, replace it with the image of consumer, as a thing to attain happiness, as the norm of the most superior rationality, as the identification of real and ideal. In this picture, the important thing is not consumer or consumed; but the consumer's presentation of consumption performance as an art of consuming. What is achieved during this ideologic replacement and transformation process is adding ignorance, even destruction of the consciousness of alienation by adding new alienations to the old ones.

These global occurences have turned the whole world into a market place and mass communication technologies, fashion, advertisements, marketing strategies urged the customers to act homogenously in their economic activities. The perception of consumers as creatures living in 'a world

⁴⁶Robert Bocoock, *Consumption*, (London and New York: Routlegde, 1993), 1-2.

of materials' is the invention of the spirit of consumption society. World is being invaded by the consumption objects promoting ideology and the characters of the individuals can be analyzed by the things they possess. Despite for many cultures, even the possibility of insaturability of needs indicates to a social or moral illness, for the ones who lives according to consuming culture, it becomes a norm.⁴⁷

The contrast of this type of living with the Islamic norms of sharing, not squandering, being generous, considering the hereafter seesaw the Islamists. Moreover, within capitalist system, the forms of Islamic life style are objectified, commercialized and restructured in accordance with the norms of consumption culture. As values of popular culture and fashion invade the context of religious life style, the symbolic outlook refers to transcendent values. In the view of these facts, this thesis analyzes the consumption patterns of Islamists in a consumer society and finding out the points where belief holds people to act according to the norms of consuming societies.

1.4. Literature Review

In this part firstly, the facets of modernity and the reactions against it in the whole world were analyzed and secondly, how the issue is analyzed in Turkey is studied. This two-fold analysis signifies that, this study is a part of the contemporary studies that were done in different parts of the world and the reactions to modernity and its elements are not peculiar to religious women of Istanbul. The global change is experienced by different religious groups and by the Muslim groups that live in different part of the world in some way, and this study enables us to understand what is peculiar about Turkey, and also what is common with whole world. Moreover, the analyses that were made in Turkey about conservatism and women are very few, and most of them are stuck to post-1980s Islamist movement and ignores the contemporary transition, so far from being prevalent. Despite some macro analyses, the micro particles of the belief, life, clothing, style, was not analyzed comprehensively and whole despite the personal heterogeneity of life styles, religious women were degraded to single category. This study has no intention to narrate the charming secrets of

⁴⁷ *ibid*, 279

the private lives of women, but it tries to grasp the point that holds religious women as religious. This study, by making a number of interviews, cannot explain the whole issue of modernity, but it just aims to put a mirror into women's lives and see their boundaries against the incoming waves of modernity.

The relationship between Islam and capitalism has showed a marked change both in the substance and scale in the last few decades. Different manifestations of Islamic capitalism grow out of the simultaneous rising of Islamic movements and neoliberal capitalism. A new culture industry, branded as 'Islamic' created a new market for commodities, media, advertising and businesses. According to Gökarıksel and McLarney, representations of self-determined, independent, and professional Muslim women are suitable for the images of the ideal consumer. While the veiled images rewrite Islamic norms and identifications by emphasizing particular ways of being Muslim for women, they also change the very content and borders of Islamic piety and femininity.⁴⁸ Kopnina, Sandıkçı and Ger analyzes how veiling, a deviant practice stigmatized in the secular and urban mind-set, first became an attractive choice for some middle-class women and then transformed into a fashionable and ordinary clothing practice for many. Gökarıksel and Secor claim that the rise of the transnational veiling-fashion industry in Turkey has taken place within the context of neoliberal economic restructuring, the subjection of the veil to new regulations, and the resurgence of Islamic identities worldwide and their overarching argument is that controversies and practices surrounding veiling-fashion show how Islamic actors are adapting and transforming neoliberal capitalism at the same time as they navigate a complex geopolitical terrain in which Islam – and the iconic Muslim, headscarf-wearing woman – has been cast as a threatening 'other'. Thus the rise of veiling-fashion as a transnational phenomenon positions women and women's bodies at the center of political debates and struggles surrounding what it means to be 'modern' and Muslim today.⁴⁹ According to them, veiling-fashion is, in Baudrillard's terms morally ambivalent, caught between its function as modest covering according to Islam

⁴⁸Gökarıksel and McLarney, "Muslim Women, Consumer Capitalism, and the Islamic Culture", 3.

⁴⁹Banu Gökarıksel and Anna Secor, "New Transnational Geographies Of Islamism, Capitalism And Subjectivity: The Veiling-Fashion Industry In Turkey", *Area* 41 (2009): 7.

and its social signification. In their negotiation of this ambivalence, consumers of these styles turn veiling-fashion into an ethical practice, into part of how they form themselves in relation both to a moral code (Islam) and to the aesthetics, politics, and pleasures of their sociospatial environments. The ethical practice of veiling-fashion thus engages a complex spatial field of bodies, homes, streets, military or state spaces, and public arenas. So, veiled consumers describe their daily practices in terms of a problem of self-governance, or the management of *nefs*, the bodily or material desires aroused by consumption and its presentation. In this management of *nefs* through the technology of veiling-fashion these women form themselves as subjects of ethico-politics in Turkey today.⁵⁰

It should be noted that the transformation of the lifestyles are not specific to Turkey. Many Muslim countries, or Muslim communities in non-Muslim countries experienced similar processes and discuss what kind of a stance should be taken. Turkey is not indifferent to this worldwide modernization movement. Godazgar tries to answer the major question of whether modern Iranian society that is established as an Islamic state following the Islamic Revolution of 1979 has resisted consumerism, and therefore the ideas of individualism, pluralism, hedonism and romanticism through “self-thematizing Islamic religion”. Besides, the author asks the opposite question, whether modern Iran displays ecumenism of ideas and the “pluralization” of life-worlds through commodification of everyday life and accepting consumerism. His answers to these two questions are first, that modern Iran, under the “fundamentalist umbrella” of the state, is in a situation of irony in terms of the theses of Gellner, Ahmed, Turner and Campbell, which claim that Islam typically stands against consumerism and, therefore, postmodernism. Iran largely accepts consumerism and globalization, despite the strong desire of the Islamic government for the Islamization of society. Second, modern Iran is on the back of hedonism, leisure and pleasure, rather than otherworldly asceticism. Third, in Iran diversity of identities and differences of ideas and interests are being exhibited, which is theoretically in accord with “social constructionism” and practically associated more with pluralism and ecumenicalism than “a self-

⁵⁰Banu Gökariksel and Anna Secor, “‘Even I Was Tempted’: The Moral Ambivalence and Ethical Practice of Veiling-Fashion in Turkey”, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 102:4 (2011), 848.

reflective global system of cultural identity".⁵¹

Mathur focuses on how the contemporary society in India is marked by the consumer culture fueled by the rise of disposable incomes in the hands of a huge middle class and increasing availability of a large variety of commodities in the open market, including a growing number of shopping malls. She argues that after the economic liberalization of the 1990s, consumer goods appear to have become a crucial basis for re-defining status distinctions in Indian society and for negotiating interpersonal and inter-communal relationships within the seemingly antithetical categories of tradition and modernity and the 'new middle class' as an agency of consumption, engaged in a process that seems to be jeopardizing long held ideals of self-sufficiency, self-reliance and anti-materialism. She ends up with the thesis that, despite apparent changes in shopping habits and the emergence of blatant consumerism, the older moral tradition continues to oppose rising materialism and individualism, contributing to the limited success of shopping malls.⁵² In her fieldwork-based article, Metha portrays the deep influence exercised by modern media on the women in a Muslim neighborhood in Delhi during the past three decades. While visual media consumption was earlier largely tabooed and restricted, today's consumers of media products appear significantly influenced by a media-driven commodification of culture. The research findings indicate that a revision of 'traditional' assumptions about the lifestyles and thought patterns of Muslim women, at least in that particular neighborhood in Delhi, is required to understand the current daily realities of Muslim women's lives in South Asia.⁵³

As a Muslim from the USA, Riyaz Gayaseddin tries to find answers to how to balance Islam and life styles of Western world and how to keep faith in the Western world.⁵⁴ Jennifer Barnes, as well as Kimberly Huisman and Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, analyzes how dress matters in everyday life and what meanings do people attach to dress style and consumption. The traditions and

⁵¹Hossein Godazgar, "Islam versus Consumerism and Postmodernism in the Context of Iran", *Social Compass*, 54(3), 2007, 392.

⁵² Nita Mathur, "Shopping Malls, Credit Cards and Global Brands: Consumer Culture and Lifestyle of India's New Middle Class", *South Asia Research*, Vol. 30, No: 3 (November 2010), 212.

⁵³Shalina Mehta, "Commodity, Culture and Porous Socio-Religious Boundaries: Muslim Women in Delhi", *South Asia Research* 30 (2010): 4.

⁵⁴Riyaz Gayasaddin, "Keeping the Faith or Not Keeping the Faith? is the Question in a Western Secular Society," *Macalester Islam Journal* Vol. 2: Issue: 3 (2007).

Islamic principles also put into question during this transition of modernity. Gugler and Whaley put into question of the transition of religious practices from very different perspectives.

Among Turkish writers, Fatma Karabıyık Barbarosoğlu is one of the most productive writers who focused on the identity of modern Muslim women and discusses how they deal with the problems of the modernity. *Moda ve Zihniyet / Fashion and Mentality* (1995), *Kamusal Alanda Başörtülüler / The Veiled Women in Public space* (2000), *İmaj ve Takva / Image and Piety* (2002), *Şov ve Mahrem / Show and Private* (2006). In her books, she deals with the issues of dressing as an identity, the education of women, covering and fashion, the power and the aesthetic pleasure, the body and body care as an indicator of class, image of modern women, being a conservative women in the modern world etc. She has been aware of this change and questioned the modernity, the power, the women, the visibility and the public space. Cihan Aktaş is also tackled the issue of modernization of the headscarved women with her books of *Bacı'dan Bayan'a / From Sister to Lady* (2001), *Türbanın Yeniden İcadı / The reinvention of Turban* (2006), *Tesettür ve Toplum: Başörtülü Öğrencilerin Toplumsal Kökeni Üzerine Bir İnceleme / The Covering and the Society* (1991), *Mahremiyetin Tükenişi / The Death of Privacy* (1995). In her books, she analyzes how the headscarved women respond to her collocutors; modernity, the society, the state and the men in her own by analyzing two centers of Islamic societies, Turkey and Iran.

Nilüfer Göle is another academician who analyzes the recent shapes, discourses and lifestyles of Islamization with her books of *Modern Mahrem / Modern Privacy* (1991), *İslamın Yeni Kamusal Yüzleri / New Public Faces of Islam* (2000), *Mahremin Göçü / The Drift of the Privacy* (2011), *Melez Desenler / The Hybrid Patterns* (2000), *Seküler ve Dinsel, Aşınan Sınırlar / Secular and Religious, Corroding Borders* (2012). Göle analyzes the distinction of secular and religious from the point of the state and the public space and states that, today, both these concepts are transforming remarkably by conflicts and reconciliations and intermingling. All these writers and books make microanalyses. However İrvin Cemil Schick watch the picture from distant and creates a theoretical structure for the concepts of sexuality, body and society within its historical contexts with

his books of *The Erotic Margin / Batının Cinsel Kıyısı* (1999) and *Bedeni, Toplumu, Kainatı Yazmak* (2011).

Özlem Avcı, after in-depth interviews with 60 university students, drew the portrait of religious youth of Turkey in her books *İki Dünya Arasında/Between Two Worlds*.(2012) She provides an insight to issues of modernity and tradition; secularism and religiosity; being “the other” and “otherization”. Besides, she analyzes the lifestyles of Muslim youth, their life expectations and future plans. Dilek Yankaya addresses the issue from a different point of view and analyzes the Islamic financial bourgeois with the case of MÜSİAD (Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association). This association unites religious businessmen around an Islamist work ethic and offers a societal evolution different from Western style that is adopted with the establishment of the Republic. According to her, today, Islamic bourgeoisie embodies a peculiar life style and class spirit in their everyday lives and present their power, accomplishments and ideals as new criteria of dignity. In this sense, the occurrence of Islamic bourgeois in Turkey presents that modernity did not realized despite religion, but in reverse, it involved to process of drawing the boundaries of religious identity, its interpretations and experiencing; and has transform the performance of religiosity itself.⁵⁵ This integration of modernity by the radical Islamic movement to a moderate Islam is also concern of Cihan Tuğal who analyzes Sultanbeyli, a previously radical district of Istanbul in his book *Passive Revolution*.⁵⁶

⁵⁵Yankaya, *Yeni İslami Burjuvazi*, 248-253.

⁵⁶Cihan Tuğal, *Passive Revolution: Absorbing Islamic Challenge to Capitalism*, (California: Stanford University Press, 2009).

CHAPTER II

MODERNIZATION AND ISLAMISM

2.1. Turkish Modernization and the Positioning of Religion

The ongoing Islamic movement in the history of the Turkish Republic and today requires analyzing how it was positioned since the establishment of the country. The debates of how to deal with the newly arising ideas of nationalism, laicism, modernism and Westernization have always been in the agenda of the Turkish intellectuals since late 18th century. Political and structural evolution and transition to modernization can be understood in historical integrity and continuity. Although the debates of modernization and nationalism could be dated back much earlier time, the scope of this thesis takes the establishment of the Republic of Turkey as a new beginning to understand institutionalization and development of laicism. The founders of the new Republic established the state and the constitution on the principles of republicanism, nationalism and laicism, which meant a fundamental alteration on the essential identities of the people. This alteration is still very much embedded to today's apprehensions of Turkey. Both in past and still today, religious rules and values have the power to affect even the simplest particle of daily lives directly or indirectly. Therefore, this part is going to explain how the new state dealt with the issue of religion to understand contemporary circumstance.

In Western countries, secular ideas flourished gradually in accordance with the social, political, cultural and economic developments. Broadly, the Western modernization and secularization social scientists of 19th century assumed that, in societies that adopt and internalize modern values, social and political impact of religion would wear off and personal attendance to religious rites, prayers and rituals would regress in time.⁵⁷ This line of thought claims that almost in all of the modernizing countries, dependence to religion is decreasing with the acceleration of industrialization movements and authority to recourse

⁵⁷Talip Küçükcan, "Modernleşme ve Sekülerleşme Kuramları Bağlamında Din, Toplumsal Değişme ve İslâm Dünyası", *İslâm Araştırmaları Dergisi* 13 (2005): 109-110.

in survival battle touches down from the heavens. Therefore the answerers of the industrialized society are human beings not the God, and the employers that provide jobs and food to individual, independent from the nature are machines.⁵⁸ However today it could be observed that, in opposition to the expected, the relationship between modernization and religion is much complicated both in modern and traditional societies. The emergence, historical progress and types of execution of laicism that aimed to evolve the societies in accordance with its principles and arguments were different from Western societies in which these ideas were born. In some of the Muslim countries, secular tendencies that transform the society did not inclined serious problems in terms of social peace, in some, they did.⁵⁹

Turkey was one of the key experiments of modernist reformism. In Turkish case, Islam (not as a religion, but its institutions) could not resist the striking ideas coming from the West and generate perceptibly original, strong and viable responses to the severe storm. Therefore, losses of the Ottoman Empire were associated with religion by the founders of new Turkey. In the process of Turkish Westernization and Europeanization, there is a story of overcoming the defeats of the Ottoman Empire and Islamic world; by understanding, adapting, absorbing scientific and technological developments of Europe, modern political thoughts and concepts, new education system, mindset, life styles and even art branches; that could also be understood as a critique, reform and conversion period of Islamic world in the changing conditions.⁶⁰ Even though religion is replaced as a confrontation between traditional and modern, actually in Turkish context it is possible to observe how traditional, modern and religion are articulated to each other in different eras.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk the founder of Turkish Republic and the leader elites of modernization those were educated in the Western schools adopted secular Western culture as a modernization and social transformation project. Since then, modernization has been carrying out as a thorough project that has an impact upon every sphere of life: military, education, politics, law,

⁵⁸Nur Senter, *Dinde Siyasal İslam Tekeli, Siyasal İslam ve Demokrasi*, (İstanbul: Sarmal, 1997), 48.

⁵⁹Küçükcan, "Modernleşme ve Sekülerleşme Kuramları Bağlamında Din, Toplumsal Değişme ve İslâm Dünyası", 116.

⁶⁰İsmail Kara, *Din ile Modernleşme Arasında Çağdaş Türk Düşüncesinin Meseleleri*, (İstanbul: Dergâh, 2012), 12.

language, ethics, social life, science, civilization; and also religion. However, this period of modernization cannot be considered as a demand that comes from societal base; rather, ruling elite decided to civilize the society after looking for a solution to the question how to ensure the emancipation of the country in consequence of the military defeats against the West.

Early years of the Turkish Republic is an era of construction that can be considered as the first stage of modernization of Turkey and this is an era that the scope of term of modernization has such a far-reaching meaning that includes the building of Turkish society in every sense; urban, rural, provincial, educational, political, but utmost, societal. So, the necessity of modernization of the society is a decision from the top. According to this elitist approach, the people are considered as ignorant and vulgar; so they can be easily deceived by the mystical and religious superstitions made up by the ecclesiastics and in this way, they might usually decide against their own good by being fooled. Therefore, the people were envisaged as objects that need to be modernized and civilized instead of being political actors.⁶¹ Creation of the enlightened people was the essence of the system. This period of modernization could be summarized as 'raising the people to the level of modern civilization'. The modernization movements of this era are accepted as radical and revolutionist and this reading of the modernization grounds on the rapid purification of 'traditional', 'Ottoman' and 'religious' elements from the society. The dilemma of 'modern' versus 'conservative' evolves from this approach.⁶² Religion was the most thwarted conservative concept of the Republican approach that should be modernized.

The nationalist discourse required making a distinction between the global characteristics of modernism and domestic culture. According to this discourse, it is not only the political regime that is decayed and corrupted, but also the whole social structure and the only antidote is cutting away existing structures and building new ones instead. In every aspect, there was a problem of what to take from the West and what to reject. So, in modernizing movements, the soul of the national essence of new structures was not sought in

⁶¹Durna, *Kemalist Modernleşme ve Seçkincilik*, 15-17.

⁶² *ibid*, 27-118.

the Islamist tradition that stands close, but in a fancied past that remained very far away. Therefore, the presupposition of the backwardness of the domestic culture works as a justification of modernization project.⁶³ The formal attitude of the republic was denial of the checkerboard-looking structure of Anatolia and its people. Therefore, following generations that indigenized Republican ideology behaved domestic, religious and ethnic groups as if redundant remnants of dark times of Turkey and denied them.⁶⁴

Positivism of Atatürk was the ruling ideology of the country and one of the most significant demonstrations of this positivism was laicism. According to this ideology, social mechanisms are not results of a Godly order in reverse the society is a composite that creates its own laws. Atatürk assumes that this kind of instrumentation of scientism was one of the key features of the Westernization and he criticizes operation of religion as a politic tool. Religion should not be involved in political kind of issues. The theological era of history has ended, and its ruins are accepted to signals of historical backwardness that should be illuminated with the light of modern science. According to this frame, theology was put in opposeto reason, and the role of the new secular state was to abolishpower of religious ideas, laws and customs to enhance people to higher rationality by cleaning of superstitions.⁶⁵In that time, social order and Islam had a direct relation and this argument that is 'natural' for today was a revolutionary one. According to the Anatolian people, because Islam designated the social structure, it was impossible to rub out religion from politics.⁶⁶ Moreoever, religion had always been the strongest source of legitimacy for the relationship between the universe and human beings. However, Atatürk believes in the universe of the natural laws and replacement of religion with science was a hard task to achieve. Atatürk's effort to put natural laws to the core philosophy of the republic is an indication of regarding science as a civil religion.⁶⁷ This reformist politics of Atatürk focused on to creation of a collective identity by denying role taking of religion. These secularizing reforms were

⁶³Aksu Bora, "Hatırlananlar ve Unutulanlar: İslam Coğrafyasında Modernleşme ve Kadın Hareketleri", *Bilig* 53 (2010): 55.

⁶⁴Şerif Mardin, *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2003), 64-65.

⁶⁵Andrew Davison, *Türkiye'de Sekülerizm ve Modernleşme*, (İstanbul: İletişim,2002), 249.

⁶⁶Mardin, *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*, 191.

⁶⁷*ibid*, 231.

aimed to expand the independency of the individual among the society and emancipate her from the traditional eastern imbecility of community.⁶⁸

Following his path, the political authority in Turkey took a frosty distant stand against Islamic world and this stance is one of the reasons that created the complication, negligence and distortions of religion.⁶⁹ Ataturk and politicians on the track of him could speak openly of Islam as a backward-keeping force. The reforms carried out in Turkey in 1920's and 1930's became models both of secularization and of attempts to guide Muslims to use reason rather than tradition in approaching their religion. The modernist elite considered religion as a project to imply which stressed the compatibility of Islam with modern scientific technology and democratic constitutional government in the early twentieth century.⁷⁰

The new Republic was a certain break from the sultanate-caliphate and it declared a new secular constitutional system. Juristically the project of laicism was carried out gradually. The abolition of sultanate was followed by the abolition of caliphate. In Ottoman era, issues that were part of everyday life like birth, education, culture, marriage, death, heirloom were required the services of *ulema* (Muslim scholars). This act of abolition interrupts the religious impact on even smallest particles of everyday life.⁷¹ Subsequent enactment of the law on unification of education caused the closure of *madrasas* (education institutions of Ottomans).

Daily lives of people were dominantly shaped by religion and folk culture; dressing was reflecting backwardness. Baggy trousers and fez were not only derogatory to aesthetic pleasure, but also they legitimized by religious orders and symbolized suffocating authority of saprogenic folk culture and religion.⁷² Secular laws and a cultural Westernization program were in force to liberate people from folk values. The first regulatory law of the Republic on dressing came with head wearing. The law of hat wearing averted religious-

⁶⁸Şerif Mardin, *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 1991), 68.

⁶⁹İsmail Kara, *Din ile Modernleşme Arasında Çağdaş Türk Düşüncesinin Meseleleri*, (İstanbul: Dergâh, 2012), 27.

⁷⁰Michael M. J. Fisher, *Islam and the Revolt of Petit Bourgeoisie*, (Boston: American Academy of Arts and Science, 1982), 3

⁷¹Mardin, *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset*, 96.

⁷²*ibid*, 72-73.

rooted clothing differences and traces of the past. Regulation on clothing encountered immediate resistance. Protests caused opening of more independence tribunals (anti-democratic revolutionary courts that judges dissidents) and harsher responses, including execution in some parts of Anatolia. These incidents of hat wearing very well depict the laic politics of Turkey; because most of the dynamics and themes have never lacked from conceptual frame of modernization. Kemalists' target of being civilized has accused of being oppose to religious-cultural behaviors of Turkish public.⁷³

Still, the Republican People's Party kept including Turkey to Western style political, cultural, social and economic flow and pursued its program and desire for cutting out ignorant, bigot, backward, insulting past. Atatürk's dissatisfaction with the dressing and all other things symbolized with Islamic dressing can be observed from his Kastamonu speech, in which he introduced modern hat to people, given in 30 August 1925:

In some places I see women that cover their head with a piece of cloth, scarf of that sort of a thing and close their faces and eyes; when a man passes by, they turn their back to him or sit down and prostrate. What is the meaning, explanation of this attitude? Gentleman, do mothers and daughters of a civilized nation maintain such ridiculous and vulgar attitude? This is a situation that humiliates our nation. It should be reformed immediately.⁷⁴

Moreover, the governing of religious issues and endowments was taken over by ministerial directorates. Religious courts were abolished and the Swiss Civil Code was accepted. Religious sects put under a ban and Islam was no longer accepted as a religion of the state. Subsequently, the Arabic alphabet went out of use and Latin alphabet was accepted as the new script. In accordance with the Turkification of the language, *azan* (call to prayer) was translated to Turkish and original Arabic version was banned. According to Atatürk, the Arabic verses were not understandable and religion can be fructuous to people only in their own language. With this design he claimed:

The sacred pulpits of the mosques are the highest and the most fertile sources for the spiritual, moral nutriments of the people. By addressing to souls and minds from pulpits in a language that the people can

⁷³Andrew Davison, *Türkiye'de Sekülerizm ve Modernlik*, (İstanbul: Yayınları, 2002), 239-240

⁷⁴Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Atatürk Söylev Ve Demeçleri I-III*, ed. Nimet Arsan, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1989)

understand, the bodies of the Muslims revive, minds refine, beliefs strengthen and hearts empower.⁷⁵

In that sense, he was not a believer of traditional Islam, but he endeavored to effectuate a different Islam that is adopted to modern life and appropriate for the founding ideology of the state with the purpose of 'correct understanding and living of Islam and averting false interpretations under the name of religion'.⁷⁶ Attaining to the requirements of the contemporary civilization was the logic of these acts. However citizens' internalization process was not as easy to enactment. Science neither has a response to the construction of national identity nor did it deal with individual tendencies about social ideals.⁷⁷

The Kemalists adopted a cruel attitude to intake of religion to the public life. According to Bromley, the militant secularism of the state in fact meant a strict state control over religion; more than the institutional division of religion from the state or the recession of individual belief. Therefore, in Turkey, laicism that became one of the six arrows of Kemalist Republican Party in 1931 was never meant division of religious from state; but controlling and subordinating surveillance. With Kemalist reforms, the state might get rid of religion, but the other way around was not valid. Formally, the institutional power of religion had gone and juristically, mosque had separated from the state. However, laicism wanted more, it also required cultural and social break from religion. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his political allies conducted a deliberative campaign to debar Islam from its controlling power over public and private life. With the establishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the new religious institutions of the state were reorganized to control every religious aspect from above.⁷⁸ Vergin names this controlling mechanism and reformation of religion as 'desire to create a new religion' that has no direct relationship with laicism. According to her, the religion that is reformed would be an up-to-date, contemporary one that is convenient for realities of Turkey. Turkish reformists

⁷⁵Atatürk, *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, 225

⁷⁶ Gerçek Dindar Atatürk, *Bilim Araştırma Vakfı*, <http://www.bilimarastirmavakfi.org/html2/yayinlar/ataturkvedin.html>

⁷⁷ Mardin, *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset*, 64-66.

⁷⁸Davison, *Türkiye'de Sekülerizm ve Modernleşme*, 214-220.

wanted to constitute a religion that is specific to Turkey with reference to universal principles.⁷⁹

The intellectuals planned to create a modern Turkish Islam as minds that were equipped with the reasoning and science of the contemporary civilization.⁸⁰ Peyami Safa as one of the enlightened figures that made a major contribution to the traditional sphere of Kemalist modernization considers the people as 'ignorant' because they cannot comply with modernity and understand the values of today's world; and also locate them in an authentic and supreme position because they are bearers of the traditional values and the 'pure' culture of the society. Safa's definitions about the East and being an eastern reveals that belief of people present a totally determinist and submissive pattern; and this pattern can only be overcome by homogenizing the heterogenic structure with modern method and philosophy. For Falih Rifkî Atay, what really matters is not defeating the external enemies, but battling against the internal ones, the reactionist milieu that want to take the modernizing society back-to old days. This milieu sometimes becomes the whole society itself. If required, the whole society should be struggled to attain them to modern civilization.⁸¹ In that sense, it can be supported that according to the Kemalist discourse, religion should not be destroyed on the whole, but it should be rehabilitated and reformed. Accordingly, the culture of the people should be rationalized and civilized by interference to the dynamic cultural productivity and running of the public. This interference became a factor to limit intrinsic politic of the public and create radical breaks between the agenda of the elitist and the people.⁸²

This implementation that aimed to prevent a creation of a religious-state, in fact turned Islam into the state religion that cannot wriggle itself out to the political debates and still many religious issues become highly politicized and included into the scope of politics. The question of how the modernization attempts that is essentially devastates, debilitates and distorts religious sphere that is concentrated to tradition, at the same time acquired a religious standing

⁷⁹ Nur Vergin, "Din Devletinden Cumhuriyete", *Türkiye ve Avrupa'da İslam, Devlet ve Modern Toplum*, (İstanbul:Konrad-Adanauer-Stiftung, 2004), 36-37.

⁸⁰ Ziya Gökalp, *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak*, (Ankara: Akçağ, 2010), 34.

⁸¹ Durna, *Kemalist Modernleşme ve Seçkinlik*, 124

⁸² *ibid*, 222.

is a vital question as it was in yesterdays. In other words, the modernization movements, as far as fortifying secularization, also came up as religious movements, so modernization endeavors became parts of religion and efforts of interpreting religion.⁸³

While the remnants of the old regime were fading away, the withering values could not be replaced or exceeded by the Republic. Islam was a rich treasury of symbols and reasoning patterns. For most of the society, it provided tools to handle confrontations in their daily lives; it served them to regulate psychological tensions by crystallizing their identities. In short, religion was an inseparable part of individuals and society.⁸⁴New official religion of Turkey provides a legislative frame for the religion of the folks. Apart from striking a blow to the official religious institutions by enacting new laws, Atatürk spared too little time to impose new forms to the everyday life of the people. The replacement of laicism with official religion caused the lack of legitimacy and the religion of the people was put in a tolerated but unsafe and ambiguous position.⁸⁵Instead of renewing, refitting, amending itself by its internal power, modernization of Islam survived as a quite turbulent movement that arose in an excessively troubled times created by military defeats and impositions of cyclical situation.⁸⁶Therefore, a modern insight that conveys the profile of conservatism and religiosity in an intellectual structure, which grows in philosophical and aesthetical aspect, could not be developed. This positioning of religion also ignored that the cultural frame of Islam is a naturel essence and color of the society.As a result in this revolutionist-reactionary dispute, Muslim identity becomes a satirized model of 'reactionary' of caricatures by losing its intellectual and literary aspect.⁸⁷ In this placement, religion positioned to the direct opposite of every progressive idea of the Republic: 'old-fashioned', 'bigot', 'obscure'. Islam and implicitly Islamists are convicted to image of contradicting and even colliding with the modern.

⁸³Kara, *Din ile Modernleşme Arasında Çağdaş Türk Düşüncesinin Meseleleri*, 28.

⁸⁴Davison, *Türkiye'de Sekülerizm ve Modernleşme*, 248.

⁸⁵Mardin, *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset*, 163.

⁸⁶Kara, *Din ile Modernleşme Arasında Çağdaş Türk Düşüncesinin Meseleleri*, 190.

⁸⁷ Mehmet Altan, *Kent Dindarlığı*, (İstanbul: Timaş, 2011), 88-90.

2.2. Marginalized Islamist Women

Turkey is the only example of laic, democratic Muslim-populated state in the world. Unlike from the principles of laicism that requires the neutrality of state in terms of realization of freedom of thought and faith⁸⁸; in Turkey, religion was put under the control of state by adopting religion to the state. The republican Kemalist elite believed Islam is a religion that was suitable for the times it was born and the attempt to implement the rules of Islam equals to living in the darkness of the ancient times. Ayvazoğlu claims that, the elite of the Republic never pleased with Islamization component of Gökalp's project that could be summarized as Turkification, Islamization and modernization; so, they had a radical break from this main vein. The abolition of the caliphate, closure of madrasas and dervish lodges aimed to prevent conveyance of tradition and positivism had been forced upon the people as a kind of religion.⁸⁹ Hence, Islamic social and political system accused of being incompatible with contemporary world's needs and this incompatibility stems from the existence of social principles of Arab society in *Quran* (a holy book that is literal word of God as transmitted by the Angel Gabriel to the Prophet Muhammad). For believers, God warranted and promised to guard the text of the Qur'an from any possible alterations, revisions, deletions, or redactions, and therefore, while Muslims may disagree about the meaning and import of the revelation, there is a broad consensus among Muslims on the integrity of the text.⁹⁰ Claiming that holy books are true only if they are accepted to be sent by God⁹¹, Kemalist mentality degrades the holiness of Quran and turns the religion into human induced thought that could be corrected and changed. In that sense, it is claimed that the religion should be reformed and political sides of it should be rasped and reduced to individual sphere. Nur Serter as a strong supporter of Kemalism, academician and former deputy of Republican People's Party explains this rehabilitation in the name of "Turkish interpretation of Islam" and asserts that:

⁸⁸ Türk Dil Kurumu, *Büyük Türkçe Sözlük*, "laiklik", http://tdk.gov.tr/index.php?option=com_bts&arama=kelime&guid=TDK.GTS.56c1b3111d93a8.51015596

⁸⁹ Beşir Ayvazoğlu, "Türk Muhafazakarları Demokrasiyi Kabullemeli", *Cumhuriyet, Milliyetçilik, İslamcılık*, (İstanbul: Küre, 2011), 31.

⁹⁰ Khaled Abou El Fadl, "What is Shari'a?" *ABC Religion and Ethics*, 22 Mar 2011, <http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2011/03/22/3170810.htm>

⁹¹ Serter, *Dinde Siyasal İslam Tekeli*, 14.

Turkey made a choice with the establishment of Republic, I mean after 14 centuries of the birth of Islam. By deciding that the political system of religion after 14 centuries of the birth of Islam cannot sufficiently respond the needs of the young Republic and modern world and more important, it is not open change, it choose a non-political but moral Islam. In other words, it individualized religion; reduce it between the creator and the servant and present to its people as a Turkish interpretation... Everybody except a small group believed this Turkish version Islam and lived in peace on these lands.⁹²

According to this mentality religion is modifiable and believers are manageable. The elite aimed to prevent the so-called disadvantages of religion in society by replacing Islamic political system and law with modern state of law. Moreover, she asserts that this version of Islam is a unique one in the whole Islamic world because of its politics-free commentary of Islam. She adds that other Islamic states are discontented because of this tableau of Turkey and imported Islamic revolution models are attempted to destroy this exemplary, non-dogmatic version of Islam that could fit into institutions of modern world.⁹³ This thought marginalized people that are against the sanctions of state over the religion and put them in a position of political Islamists and radicals that are against the laic rule of state.

According to Yeğenoğlu, the new republic began erasing the visibility (if not the existence) of all religious signs and practices from the public domain. Creating a new united secular socius, the ultimate importance was placed upon appearances in the public space. This aim of secularization of the public and political domain was accompanied by a strong emphasis on transposing religion to a matter of private and individual faith. More important thing is, with these implementations, the public space has been thoroughly reshaped as a nonreligious sphere, and Islam and Islamists are wiped out from the public realm. Hence, the “protection” of the public from the intrusion of the religious and thereby the privileging and sacralizing of the public domain’s secular nature became the character of Kemalist secularism.⁹⁴ That’s why, still today the appearances of Islamists in certain places and positions are debated issues. In all these debates between laics and Islamists; veils of the women became the

⁹² *ibid*, 116.

⁹³ *ibid*, 118.

⁹⁴ Yeğenoğlu, “Clash Of Secularity And Religiosity: The Staging Of Secularism And Islam Through The Icons Of Atatürk And The Veil In Turkey, Religion and the State”, 227.

focus and symbol of the political Islamism apart from its religious connotations. Yeğenoğlu claims that ‘...this resulted in the formation of a Western-looking new republican elite group, who view those who do not conform to the new social and cultural decorum and punctilios as backward, traditional and Islamic.’⁹⁵

Distant remaining of the intellectuals and state elites to Islam started a process of not enrolling children to secular schools among Islamist community. Politicians that were educated at technical universities during 1940’s, like Turgut Özal, Necmettin Erbakan and even Süleyman Demirel, were the first who perform salaah and therefore they were labeled as ‘*takunyahılar*’ (*clog wearers* because they wear clogs to perform ablution).⁹⁶ Yılmaz Özdil, as one of the reputed Kemalist journalists, in one of his articles written in 2012, asks the question of ‘why there is no religious character in *Hababam Sınıfı* (a novel written during 1957 and filmed in 1975) although it includes characters from all segments of society; and answers because they were not existent. He claims, Turkey was still Muslim in that era, but there were no traders of religion, the ones are quite few to be counted by the fingers of one hand and they were marginal. If there is enough ‘*takunyalı*’ in society to worth a value, they will take their place in *Hababam Sınıfı* as other characters.⁹⁷ Kemalist mentality not only remains distant to, but also marginalizes the Islamist by ignoring and humiliating them.

In this context, according to Kemalist ideology, veil is ascribed a meaning of being anti-modern, anti-laic and bigot. For Serter, the veil has turned into a chronic disease of Turkey although it concerns only a very small percentage of women in Turkey and it is very wrong to present veil as a problem of all Turkish women. Moreover, veil is accused for changing the image of Turkey into an Islamic state; divide the society, estranging the youth.⁹⁸

According to the population census of 1907, late marriage for both women and men, relatively low fertility rate and nuclear family was commonly held among the Muslim population of Istanbul. The rate of plural marriage was

⁹⁵ *ibid*, 228.

⁹⁶ Cevat Özkaya, “28 Şubat Olmasaydı da İslamcılık Bir Dönüşüm Yaşardı”, *Cumhuriyet, Milliyetçilik, İslamcılık*, (İstanbul: Küre, 2011), 61.

⁹⁷ Yılmaz Özdil, “Hababam Sınıfı Uyanamıyor”, *Hürriyet*, 27 Temmuz 2010, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/hababam-sinifi-uyanamiyor-15395359>

⁹⁸ Serter, *Türkiye’de Siyasal İslam Tekeli*, 109-110.

very low, around %2.2 percent. Despite these data, the images of Muslim families of Istanbul are related with early marriage, polygamy and high fertility rate with an orientalist perspective in newspapers and journals; and late marriage and low fertility rates were encouraged in the early Reoublican era. Deniz Kandiyoti reads this contradiction as modernists' desire of keeping arm's length between the traditional and themselves and so create the 'other'. In as much as they could formulate their modern family project only by referring to the troubled and reform-needed assumed old situation. While doing that, the modernists did not mind whether the situation they assumed was prevalent or not.⁹⁹

Abovementioned insulting portrayal of Muslims continued even after the dissolution of the Empire. *Akbaba* is one of the first and long-lasting weekly political humor magazines of the republic. It had published between years of (1922-1931, 1933-1977). The magazine followed the path of the ruling Republican People's Party between the years of 1923-1955 and dissented to the opposing parties. Therefore, it lost audience and suspended between the years of 1931-1933 and 1950-1951. Lately, it lost this political idea and kept its identity as a humor magazine. This magazine is accepted as a popular one, appeal to the whole society, without addressing to a certain group of people.¹⁰⁰

One of the caricatures published in the commemoration day of passing of Atatürk, a woman in burqa, a man wearing old-fashioned baggy trousers, cassock and turban; and some other characters are plotted in front of Atatürk and he says: 'Don't weep over me, rather I weep over you!' to them.¹⁰¹ In another one, four characters are standing ahead the Ataturk's monumental tomb and say: 'You died and we were born' to Atatürk and he is drawn his eyes closed by his hands. One of these characters is a blowsy, devilish Muslim with shaggy beard and holding a rosary.¹⁰² In another caricature that is published in the day of celebration of Victory Day in which a Muslim man is followed by four

⁹⁹ Özbay, *Aile, Kent ve Nüfus*, 112.

¹⁰⁰Arda Özgen, "Akbaba Dergisi Ve Akbaba Dergisi'nin Türk Çağdaş Grafik Sanatındaki Yeri Ve Önemi", (Master diss, Ankara University, 2009) 32-34.

¹⁰¹ Akbaba, 9 Nov 1966, Vol: 44 Issue: 11 No: 46, <http://e-bulten.library.atilim.edu.tr/sayilar/2006-12/akbaba.htm>

¹⁰² Akbaba, 11 Nov 1970 Vol: 48 Issue: 19 No: 47, <http://e-bulten.library.atilim.edu.tr/sayilar/2006-12/akbaba.htm>

women in burqa; a child that wearing a fez is sitting on floor and reading on a lectern; another Muslim man with beard and rosary, is puffing away belly of a headscarved half-naked woman. Atatürk stares them and says: 'Did I consign this country to you in this way?'¹⁰³All these caricatures present the Muslim images as burlesque, outmoded figures and put them against the modern ideal of Atatürk. Yet another caricature presents the new Turkey by drawing an imam looking at the factory chimneys astonishingly and says: 'I cannot see clearly, don't these minarets have balconies?' another man in a modern suit answers him: 'No, they have glory hodja!'¹⁰⁴The leader figure of the Muslims is presented as ignorant and anti-modern with these drawings and many more.

2.3 Victimized Islamist Women

The political and societal impact of Islam in Turkey can be analyzed in two periods; the period of Islamism that corresponds to the pre-1980's in which religion is represented by political area and parties; and post-1980's Islamic movement period in which religion become visible by turning into representational forms and be observed from the daily lives of the actors in social life in addition to the political area. For a better understanding of today, it might be better to understand the pre-JDP government. The Islamic movements that enlarge and expand after 1980's, began to shift from periphery to city centers with mass migration waves and got new opportunities of secular education and upward social movement. By shifting from periphery to centers, the movements responded to the pursuit of new groups that put in a claim for the central areas and helped them to negotiate with modernity.¹⁰⁵

Struggle of the veiled women to wear veil as a political demand in Muslim countries and became the symbol of political Islam in 1970's. Veiling in Algeria signified a resistance to cultural imperialism of France and its domestic representatives. After 1979 Khomeini Revolution of Iran, veil meant opposition to Western impact and Shah Regime. In Turkey Muslim intellectuals tried to

¹⁰³ Akbaba, Abdullah Işık personal blog, <https://abdullahabdurrahman.wordpress.com/2015/04/19/milliyetciler-ile-sosyalistleri-ne-birlestiriyor-alintidir/>

¹⁰⁴ Akbaba, <http://www.seyriadem.com/portfolio/1934-akbaba-dergisi-2>

¹⁰⁵ Mardin, *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*, 62.

familiarize both Islam that should be saved and the West that should be saved from. In this era, women were became visible actors with their veils in public spaces, Quran recitation meetings, protests and printed media. The daily life of *Asr-ı Saadet* (the golden times of Islamic rule) was presented to women as the glorious social order to achieve. Barbarosoğlu claims that, this era witnessed to the acquaintance of the veiled women masses with new headscarf brands preferred by distinguished women. The advertisements gave the impression of working, successful, rich, beautiful, charming and powerful image of women although they were deprived of the rights to be educated at universities, have a career even they were educated and working. So, all the deprivations were promised to women with a headscarf brand.¹⁰⁶

Islam had treated in varied and growing number of publishing in 1980-1990's; many of them were critical about the up down imposing of reforms like modernization and laicism.¹⁰⁷One of the most important means of the Islamic movement was media. Daily newspapers, weekly and monthly journals, private radio and TV channels, movie and cartoon agencies were played an important role for the organization of the mass movement and enabled the rise of the Islamists to their today's position.¹⁰⁸This intense publication also created a vital means of critique against the ongoing rule and formed a demand for a fair and just order. *Yeni Asya (New Asia)*, as a media organ of *Nur Cemaati* started to publish in 21 February 1970 and closed with the coup d'état of 1980. Then it was republished under the name of *Yeni Nesil (Rising Generation)*. The usage of media was also very important for the organization of political power. *Milli Gazete(National Journal)* worked as a media of *Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party)* and then *Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party)* and then *Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)*. Apart from mainstream daily newspaper, there were many journals stem from the *Milli Görüş (National Outlook)* movement. *Akıncı Güç (Raider Power, 1979)*, *Şura (Council, 1978)*, *İslami Hareket (Islamic Movement, 1978)*, *Gölge (Shadow, 1976)*, *Sızıntı (Leakage, 1976)*, *Tevhid (Unification, 1978)*, *Mavera (1976)* were among these journals. These journals

¹⁰⁶Barbarosoğlu, Şov ve Mahrem, 101.

¹⁰⁷Beyza Bilgin, "Türkiye'de Kadın, İslam'da Kadın", *Türkiye ve Avrupa'da İslam, Devlet ve Modern Toplum*, (İstanbul: Konrad-Adanauer-Stiftung, 2004), 238-239.

¹⁰⁸Doğan Duman, "Türkiye'de İslamcı Yayıncılık", *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi* Vol:2, No:4-5 (1995): 77.

were questioning prevalent political system and invoked for an Islamic rule in the country instead of the Western democracy. The effect of the Islamic belief in everyday life radically reviewed while at the same time the political regime is damned for being anti-Islamic. Every sphere of life was reconsidered within the Islamic perspective and the “unislamic” way of living was harshly attempted to be eliminated from both social and political sphere.

Till the first fashion show that is organized by Muslims in 1995, Islamic women’s journals had a monolithic attitude towards fashion and fashion shows and they were regularly publishing criticisms against fashion. Especially *Kadın ve Aile* (Woman and Family) and *Mektup* (Letter) were critical of fashion by claiming it is a product of Western identity, it promotes squandering by creating artificial needs and because with the trend of wearing high heel shoes, tight and synthetic fabrics, fashion is deleterious to health. However, since the mid of 1990’s, these journals lost their active and agenda setting role that they have in 1980’s and passified.¹⁰⁹

The era of 1980’s can be accepted as a renaissance for the Islamic movement. The emotional support of the 1979 Revolution of Iran is also important to understand the context of those years. According to Duman, it is almost impossible to determine the number of the journals that have been published since 1980’s till today and the number reaches almost 600.¹¹⁰ Besides, many books written by Ali Sheriati, Seyyid Qutb, Hasan al-Benna, Mevdudi, Abdulkadir Udeh were translated to Turkish. In Turkey, writings of Abdurrahman Dilipak, Rasim Özdenören, Ali Bulaç, İsmet Özel became very famous among the Islamists.¹¹¹ These writers were strongly opposing the hegemony of the West and modernity in our lives and what they aim was warning the Muslim of the day to be cautious about the tricks of the modernity, capitalism and moral decline; in other words, the call of the Sheitan.

During 1980’s, the Islamic content of Turkish politics has expanded. The first national elections after the coup of 1980 were held in 1983 and The Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) came to power with the prime ministry of Turgut Özal. Since then, organizations of multi party rule have been shaping

¹⁰⁹Barbarosoğlu, Şov ve Mahrem, 103.

¹¹⁰Duman, “Türkiye’de İslamcı Yayıncılık”, 83.

¹¹¹*ibid*, 89

politics in which secular and religious segments of Turkish political culture are expressed jointly. However, reconciliation of modernization and Islam, the meanings of secularism and laicism and their practical purposes are still an intense debate in public. The modern secular nature of a Muslim populated country and the laic character of the early republican years were the basic subjects of these debates; they arise especially after the increasing vote rates of a religious Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) in general and local elections.¹¹²

Political ongoing was both affected and affected by the social movements. Ethnic, sexual, religious groups were organized as alternatives to state-supported homogenous secular groups and these identity-based movements found place in the new civil society. Women movements also accelerated during 1980's and 1990's, aftermath of military coup of 1980 and they were crucial steps towards democratization and the rebuilding of the public space. Islamist women movements are also got its share from this thorough organization. In that sense, 1990's, as an era that Islamists strengthened economically, politically and socially, are accepted as an important milestone for Islamic lifestyles and Islamic ideology. During these years, Islamist women whose role is limited with their home and neighbourhood began to transform its social role and explain themselves in society and in many aspects including politics, economics, education and culture. The dramatic rise of NGO's and organizations affected not only the visibility, but also reinforced their places in the public space. Yeğenoğlu calls this period as 'Islam's come back into the public domain' that has witnessed a rapid increase in the visibility of objects, discourses and issues that are marked as Islamic.¹¹³

According to Kadioğlu, till 1980's, there are three women groups that deny their sexual identity: veiled university students, socialist sisters of 1960-70s, and the Kemalist teachers of the early Republican era. She claims that these 'hardworking Republic girls' are, despite seem contradicting to each other, and are parts of grand societal projects that regard the women as asexual wardens

¹¹²Davison, *Türkiye'de Sekülerizm ve Modernlik*, 23.

¹¹³Yeğenoğlu, *Clash Of Secularity And Religiosity: The Staging Of Secularism And Islam Through The Icons Of Atatürk And The Veil In Turkey*, 229.

of family unit.¹¹⁴ The Muslim women of 1980's were aware of their gender and femininity, but it was a religious obligation to not show it in the public spaces. They always tried to live like the women of golden age of Islamic rule (*Asr-ı Saadet*), and fit into the definitions of Islam properly feel ashamed because they could not. In those times, public spaces were the places that they should not present, but forced to be in it. Therefore, they were masculinizing their position and purify their acts and attitudes from femininity. Their belief in being covered also strengthens this masculine place in the public space. An Islamist woman cannot accept to be seen as a reason of sedition by showing off her beauty and entice the men. For this purpose they were ready to uglify themselves and even remain spinsters.¹¹⁵ Beauty was accepted to be god given and changing it by make-up or other operations would be a great sin. For the soundness of their mission, they cannot look like corrupted Western women and they were very much against the rule and effects of capitalism. To get rid of the corrosive and abrasive effects of the outer world and protect her home in accordance with the principles of Islam, the women were called back to home and they got invisible in the public space by canalizing to private life.

Islamist women's first major challenge against the hegemony of secularism was being publicly visible through the use of the headscarf among female university students in the 1980s. In the following years, the prevention of veiled women from education institutions and public sectors became one of the most discussed issues of the late 1990's. On February 28, 1997, the military-dominated National Security Council issued a series of ultimatums, so-called recommendations, to the government on actions needed to protect secularism. These ultimatums included restrictions on religious freedoms. One of the ultimatums was "an eight-year uninterrupted education should be enforced to protect the young against "influence" and ensure their love of Ataturk ideals." The government subsequently mandated eight years of compulsory state education. This mandate eventually resulted in the closure secondary imam-hatip schools that give religious education in addition to the regular

¹¹⁴Ataman, "Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Kadın Kimliğinin Oluşumu", 102.

¹¹⁵Cihan Aktaş, *Bacı'dan Bayan'a*, (İstanbul: Kapı, 2005), 5

curriculum and they were turned into high schools. Besides, the graduate students were forced to keep their education only in faculties of theology.

The headscarf ban in universities began in October 23, 1998, with a circular issued by the rector of Istanbul University and carried out till 2010 in public and private universities. There were thousands of veiled students that are being educated in these universities. When they came to the schools, they faced with security forces; some of them were sued, many of them were suspended from the schools. In 1998, with the beginning of headscarf ban in universities, the students were forced accept either to unveil or drop out the university.¹¹⁶

De Certeau claims that every law has a hold on the body. Laws are permanently being written over the bodies; they are engraved upon the parchments made by the skins of its subjects. Then articulate them in a juridical corpus and they make their own book out of these bodies two complementary operations occur. First, through the medium of bodies, living bodies are 'packed into a text' by transforming into signifiers of rules (he says, a sort of 'intertextualization') and secondly, the reason or logos of a society creates itself in the flesh (he calls, an 'incarnation').¹¹⁷ So, in this book of the society textualized over the bodies; Islamist bodies were situated as victimized figures.

The political oppression created a social reaction against the Islamist women who have been blamed for being non-modern and ugly. This is an era that Islamist women had to give a fight to exist and be accepted in public space with their headscarves. With the headscarf ban in the *imam-hatip* high schools, hundreds of Muslim girls went abroad for university education and they increased the education level of the Islamist society. There were not any jobs for the veiled women, so they had to establish their own jobs; usually dependent to their handcrafts. The women created a third way for themselves and started to get organized around foundations and homes. For decades, they educate themselves in both Islamic knowledge other spheres and get organized in every sphere of life, and by the means of the organizations; the social ties were strengthened in the society. Since early 2000's, the upsurge of this movement

¹¹⁶Özge Genç and Ebru İlhan, *Başörtüsü Yasağına İlişkin Değerlendirme ve Öneriler*, (İstanbul: TESEV, 2012), 6.

¹¹⁷De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*. 139-140.

also brought the dispute of Islamist-secularist and the women were forced barrenly into the dilemmas of traditional-modern, Islamist-laic and reactionist-modernist. In the early 2000's, veiled women were labeled as unpleasant and frumpish women; both Islamist and secular men were blaming them for not knowing how to get dressed and they were recommended to consult to the French stylists.¹¹⁸Therefore they had to fight both against political inequalities and societal prejudices. With the ban of headscarf in public places, the women forced to become the subjects of discussions and also become objects of researches and disputes. The Islamist women of the time became active and visible symbols of a movement that aim to create an alternative to the Western modernization. This visibility of veiled women lead to questioning of both traditional Islam that portrays woman within private space and homogenous secular public space formed by the Kemalist elite.¹¹⁹

In 2001, Şişman wrote that during their struggle to take a place in public public space, veiled women frequently had to face with the paradox of 'normalization' and made a warning about adopting the discourse of the feminists of the time to be acknowledged by them. The Islamist women, who complain about not being visible in public space and facing societal and political oppressions for many years, canalize the discourse of 'women rights' to the struggle of veiling without mulling out, to be recognized by the society. However, the mere demand of recognition would incarcerate them to a kind of 'cultural identity'.¹²⁰ Today, the outcomes of this warning can be observed in respect to the contemporary state of Islamist movement. As veil is normalized by society, the symbolic meanings and values attached to it become the most crucial problematique of the movement.

2.4. Moving Beyond the Scope of Marginalized and Victimized

The Islamic movements of today are not caused by the revival of the tradition, but they are products of modernization. One of the essential behavior

¹¹⁸Aktaş, *Bacı'dan Bayan'a*, 65

¹¹⁹Kenan Çayır, "İslamcı Bir Sivil Toplum Örgütü: Gökkuşluğu İstanbul Kadın Platformu", In *İslamın Yeni Kamusal Yüzleri*, ed. by Nilfer Göle, (İstanbul: Metis, 2000), 42

¹²⁰Nazife Şişman, "Başörtü Yasakları ve Kadın Hakları Söylemi", *Tezkire* 19 (Şubat/Mart 2001): 40.

patterns of modernity in contemporary time is consuming. The identities that are built in modern societies are individuated by their consumption habits and outer appearance. The ties of the Muslim actors with tradition are quite weakened, they are educated in modern institutions and their professional education overshadows the religious education. Although they want to live as in the golden times of Islamic rule, *Asr-ı Saadet*, this desire of finding the origins of Islam does not present an ideational consistency and analogy with traditional. With the visibility of religious identities by discharging from privates to public spaces, religious fashion showed up and spread. Dressing and life styles began to change in accordance with the modernity, capitalism, consumption culture and material life rather representing religious functions.

This transition also brought self-criticisms and questionings both in Islamic and non-Islamic groups. The Islamists marginalized by the Republic created a counter-elite in 1990's and began to have a voice in media sector. With its strong economic infrastructure, this new capital owner group led the criticism of Turkish modernization with their demands of Islamic life style. For the first time in Republican history, Islamists stopped being a marginal group and by means of its political and economic power, it came to power and its mobilization caused Islam to be apparent in public life. As new actors of modernization process, these capital owners become representatives of a three-decades-last transformation. Although these actors showed up as an Islamist movement, they had no difficulty for integrating to criteria of globalization and capitalism because of secular characteristics of Turkish economy.¹²¹ The new actors that promoted the Islamic movement are urbanized groups whose education and life standards are improved.¹²² With enrichment, Islamic capital became a strong figure in capitalist system with their active role in banking and finance system and this situation caused some problems in social life. In this era, one of the most basic points of criticism of religious people is the loss of the divine, spiritual, sacred and even ethical values. In that way, symbolic values of Islam are redefined over material realities. Still, a new life style is shaped in accordance with religious belief and sensitivities with its specific fashion, social

¹²¹Mumyaz, "Elitlerin Yeni Yüzü, İslami Burjuvazi", 380.

¹²²Avcı, *İki Dünya Arasında*, 16.

domains, finance sectors, leisure and holiday options; and this new life style is not quite different from ordinary life style of other elite groups.

For a more precise conceptualization of secularism, Turner makes a simple distinction between 'political secularization' that he calls conventional differentiation and 'social secularization' that he defines as the anthropological thesis of commodification. Political secularization refers to the historical separation of religious affairs from the ongoing of state and prevalent differentiation of social system, nominately the specialization of the subsystems of society around politics, culture, the economy, religion and so forth. This concept of secularism is a macro separation of religion and the state as it has told in previous section. Social secularization, on the other hand, refers to religion in everyday life, means the secularization of belief and practice through democratization and commercialization. As it was mentioned, religions are not declining as secularization thesis had foreseen, in return, there is a religious revivalism. This revivalism is also compatible with commercialization and democratization of religion in the social sphere that renders religion and this transformation of role of religion is increasingly in tune with and an important part of the world of secular consumerism. Hence, Turner claims that, religion as consumption is a secular practice and therefore the dilemma between religious practices and 'the world' that create tension between doings of a Muslim has eroded to a large extent.¹²³ This tension between alleged Islamic virtues and the logic of consumer capitalism can be summarized as while Islamic virtues are defined as modesty, thrift, otherworldly devotion, spiritualism, and communitarianism, the logic of capitalism is perceived to cultivate self-indulgence, conspicuous consumption, this-worldly orientation, materialism, and individualism.¹²⁴

In that sense, commodification is particularly focused on the transformations of the religious sphere by the values, practices and institutions of the market. With differentiation and the transformation of religions- although religious principles do not change- they have to compete with other lifestyle choices. In the most general sense, life styles are the behavioral patterns that

¹²³Bryan Turner, *Religion and the State*. (London: Anthem Press, 2013). ProQuest ebrary. Web. 31 March 2016, 10-11.

¹²⁴Gökarıksel and Mclarney, "Muslim Women, Consumer Capitalism, and the Islamic Culture",4.

make differences between individuals. What is meant by life style is not the lives of individuals or groups; but the representations of them in the culture. The displays, stages, screens of modern societies are full of visions and discourses filled by lifestyles designed to consume. In that sense, the symbolic values laden to subject of consumption, represents the life styles of the consumer or offer a diversified pattern of life style to her.

Islam, as a religion, has a power to affect and shape all living practices from daily life practices to political preferences and doings of an individual. Religious demands and expectations of the actors become visible and find voice in the public space especially in cities. So, we can talk about a kind of consumption-based modernization that merges with religion and produce its own consumption patterns.¹²⁵ From fashion to modern consumption patterns, from intellectual interests to artistic works, many spheres reflect the compounds of religion and modernity that are realized over the Muslim subject. By this way, with this new consumption culture, the practices and values of religion redefined and offered to consumers. In that kind of a consumer society, 'people want goods, not gods, and to a large extent their desires have been satisfied by cheap money, easy mortgages and consumer credit. A new industry has emerged concerned with spiritual advice about how to cope with the modern world while remaining pious and pure. As a result, pious lifestyles are marketed by religious entrepreneurs who need to brand their products in the spiritual marketplace.'¹²⁶says Turner. In that sense, consumption culture is one of the tools of transformation of religious practices and adapting them to modern times. Like all consumption subjects, some religious values began to turn into symbolic subjects that are different from their real meanings and functions. What are transforming, forms and the meanings attached to them. This situation points out evolve of traditional values and symbols in modern sense.¹²⁷

New magazines, television programs, sports clubs, hairdressers, and clothing stores for and often by Muslim women have flourished in the last decades. Many have become entrepreneurs, establishing businesses that

¹²⁵Avcı, *İki Dünya Arasında*, 44.

¹²⁶ Turner, *Religion and the State*, 14.

¹²⁷ Avcı, *İki Dünya Arasında*, 48-50

combine economic and religious motives. They have engaged in the creation, labeling, and advertising of the objects, narratives, representations, and performances of Muslim womanhood that combine Islamic teachings and practices with new (and old) conceptions of piety, beauty, fashion, lifestyle, motherhood, professionalism, and citizenship. Muslim women have been identified as a niche market with particular needs and desires, mostly attributed to an essentialized Muslimness.¹²⁸

To conclude, contemporary Turkish society is taking its form with the new social actors and elites. These new social groups achieved to sustain their existence with their economic activities to public space thanks to liberalization movements of 1980. The Islamist elite never completely adopted an Islamic economy; on the contrary, they have a secular economic view. With the rule of JDP government since 2002, adaptation to global capitalist market accelerated and this prosperity led to a radical and contradictory transformation of Islamists during the last few decades. Capitalism is countered with the consumption culture of Islam and easily legitimized by Islamists. Because these two systems differ in ontology, epistemology and ethical priorities, their articulation points out to the specificity of the modernization process of Turkey.¹²⁹ Moreover, the women, as marginalized and victimized objects of the Kemalist rule, turned into independent subjects with a totally different life style and consumer culture.

¹²⁸Gökarıksel and Mclarney, "Muslim Women, Consumer Capitalism, and the Islamic Culture", 5.

¹²⁹Mumyıkmaı, "Elitlerin Yeni Yüzü, İslami Burjuvazi", 375.

CHAPTER III

EVERYDAY, RITUAL AND THE NEW MUSLIM

3.1. On Methodology

According to Michel De Certeau, consumers, with their signifying practices leave "indirect" or "errant" trajectories and paths that actually reflect their daily gestures and movements. In this extension, the trajectories of the consumers form unforeseeable sentences by going through these paths. Statistics contends with the classification, calculations and tabulation of the lexical units that create but cannot be reduced to these paths; and it makes this classification and assessment with its own categories and taxonomies. In that sense, this discipline, gathers the material of habits, manners and practices; however it has no idea about the substance of the material. Statistical inquiry, by breaking down "efficacious meanderings" into units, only reveals the homogeneity of the units that define itself and recreate the results of these divisions with the codes belong to it. Thus statistics recreate the system it belongs to and excludes many operations and stories that create the patchworks of the everyday life.¹³⁰

Therefore, this study adopted qualitative research methods and it is a product of a two-phased fieldwork that aims to understand and analyze the everyday practices and consumption habits of the middle-upper class Muslim women in Istanbul. This thesis is a product of a Global Prayers project, conducted by Eda Ünlü Yücesoy and Özge Aktaş and assisted by Zöhre Benli and me, that eventually turned into the paper of "The Renegotiation of Boundaries Between Islam and the "Modern": Perceptions of Religious Women in Istanbul."¹³¹ The scope of this Project was broader for a deep analyzes of daily life of women, but for this thesis the extent is limited to the consumption patterns.

The first phase consists of making in-depth face-to-face interviews with women in a beauty salon and the other phase is arguing in focus groups. The

¹³⁰ De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, 18.

¹³¹ Aktaş and Ünlü Yücesoy, "The Renegotiation of Boundaries Between Islam and the "Modern": Perceptions of Religious Women in Istanbul."

studies in the field began on December 2012 and concluded in February 2013. Additionally, for almost two years, since the beginning of 2012 to the end of 2013, I spare time for women gatherings and attended to wedding and henna parties for participant observation that gave me opportunity to gain additional insights through experiencing the phenomena.

This study is conducted in Istanbul and all of the interviewees are living in this city. As the biggest migration-receiving city, Istanbul accommodates the largest percentage of the universities in Turkey. Apart from the industrial and economic concerns, Istanbul is a center of attraction with its educational opportunities. In that sense, this city creates a profile of Turkey. During the research, the customers of a beauty salon and students of different universities are selected. All of the interviewees are veiled women with one exception.

What is expected to explored at the end of this research has three aspects; contextual, explanatory and developmental. The aim of the study is not merely making a descriptive analysis that reports changing everyday life practices of a newly arising upper class Muslim women. The focus is on the factors that lead this change and understanding how these change has happened. Beyond the apparent life styles, what lies beneath the practices and in what way it is manifested? For a deep understanding of social behaviors of women and why are they behaving in that particular way, explanatory questions were asked. It is a developmental research because the questions were intended to look how the new habits and life styles emerged with the power shift and the answers went beyond my predictions, the content of the research shaped by the answers.

For the first phase a beauty salon in Çamlıca, Üsküdar is visited. Most of the interviewees were expected to have higher life standards than the average of Turkey and live in Erenköy, Çamlıca, Acıbadem, Göztepe and in the coast of Bosphrous. Beauty salon was preferred for in-depth interviews because it is one of the best places in which everyday life practices could be observed and usually during their time spent in the saloon, women are available for interview. One can observe the women preparing for graduations, engagement ceremonies, henna parties, wedding ceremonies, baby showers and many other occasions. Additionally, not only in special days, but also routine bodily care of the women

tells a story about the daily lives of women. Which care is considered as luxury, what is requirement; which practices are included in the daily life, which belong to the rare occasions are all related to the consumption culture, economic welfare, and social status of the women in the society.

For many years, there were countless hair styling saloons in every district that serve to women but usually they were small-scaled enterprises that have two or three employees and the services they offered were limited to doing, dying and cutting hair and sometimes body waxing, manicure and pedicure. Besides, there were some upscale fancy saloons, however they were usually unisex saloons or had male personnel. Both types of saloons serve to veiled women, sometimes in small rooms or cells that were separated with a drapery from the saloon. Any minute a man can pass behind or open the drapery mistakenly. Besides inner sides of many saloons are extremely visible to outside although there are separate rooms for women with *tesettür*. Both situations are unsuitable for the privacy of the women and they do not feel comfortable in such places.

This salon was chosen for this research because it is one of the first women-only beauty salons that offer more services than hair care, in Istanbul. The prices demanded are above the average of the ordinary hair styling saloons and the services are not limited with hair styling but it also offers massage, skin and body care, epilation, solarium and all other services that can be considered as “luxury”. Therefore, the women who preferred the saloon are supposed to belong to middle or upper middle class. In the entrance, there is a hall in which men can lounge, that hall separates the waiting room from the saloon for protecting the privacy of the customers. There is also a prayer room in the basement that enables the customers to spend their time freely without distressing about missing their prayers. The saloon is closed only three days a year; the first two days of the *eid al-adha* and the first day of the *eid al-fitr*.

Non-probability sampling and flow populations method is used for population selection in the research. The interviewees are selected from the beauty salon to reflect particular features, like being a woman, belonging to a certain economic group, prefer to go to a woman-only saloon. So, the sample is not intended to be statistically representative, but instead, the characteristics of

the population are used as a basis of selection. These women are chosen from the saloon randomly. At first, I felt uneasiness about choosing the women because of trust issues, but at the end, I randomly ask the customers to interview and did with the ones who accepted. This study is planned as a small-scaled, in-depth study. Twelve women were interviewed. Homogenous sampling is used to give a detailed picture of the similar life styles. Because the criteria of choosing the women was limited to urbanized Muslim women that live in İstanbul, and no comparison or control groups are required, the sample size is supposed to be sufficient for the study.

The ages of women at beauty salon ranged from 23 to 44 with an average age of 33, mostly well educated, half of which are housewives, all living in the Anatolian side. Other than two, all were born in other cities in Turkey and have migrated to Istanbul at different periods. Middle-aged women are chosen because they might be an efficient sample for me to show the change from previous times. Former group can compare their previous experiences and the young group is expected to born into this kind of consumption culture. However the interviews indicated that, there is a difference occurred unintentionally between the women who experienced the period of 28th February and those who did not.

One exception to the random sampling is interview with the editor of *Âlâ* magazine. This magazine defines itself as “goodly life style journal” and it is a “Vogue” or “Elle” type of fashion magazine written by the Muslim women themselves and serves to Muslim women with its chic, expensive, branded clothes, high-heeled shoes and fashionable make-up. The magazine advertises itself as presenting the elaborateness of conservative dressing style to its readers as well as being informative about personal care, health, child development, decoration, special places to go, culture, art and many it defines the rules of courtesy in the society. It also claims that it is the first magazine in its track. Therefore, this interview is planned for deepening the scope of the research.

Although in qualitative data-collecting in-depth interviews and focus groups are grouped as forms of unstructured data collection methods that do not require pre-structured questions, carrying out this study necessitates a high

degree of planning about the overall shape of the interviews.¹³² So, this was a semi-structured study that does not have a proper research question but a set of issues. Considering the open-ended nature of the interviews, I had some concepts that revolved around some common themes such as general consumption patterns, perceptions on Islamic luxurious consumption, veiling fashion and Islamic life style magazines and spatial patterns. An outline of questions was prepared before going to the field, by this way, rambling and being stuck in when a commentary ends wanted to be overcome. It is conducted by interviewing with the women in an informal manner because speaking in an official manner might disturb the interviewee and put a distance between interviewee and interviewer. Besides, with ethical considerations all the interviewees are informed about the nature of the study, how the data will be used, how much time is required and it is openly declared that the participants agreed to interview voluntarily. Moreover, participants' consent to audio recording, taking notes and using the data they gave is received before the interview. In the process of writing, their names are hidden to protect their privacy.

As nature of the qualitative research, at a point, very little new information could be obtained from each additional fieldwork unit. In that saturation point, I felt the research is going to stick with one-to-one interviews and I decided to expand the study by shifting to focus group method which is expected to lead the participants to comment freely about their views. In this method, different from in-depth interviews, participants manifest their own ideas but they also hear from other people. They ask questions to each other, discuss on what they have heard and stimulate others to reveal more.¹³³ Accordingly, two groups with five participants were recruited and two moderators managed the discussions that were conducted in a proper room designed for focus group gathering in İstanbul Şehir University. The ages of women ranged from 22 to 34 with an average of 25, again mostly living on the Anatolian side, and most were born in Istanbul. Most of the participants were university students; both undergraduate and graduate.

¹³²Jane Ritchie and Jane Lewis ed., *Qualitative Research Practice A Guide For Social Science Students and Researchers*, (London: Sage Publications, 2003), 109.

¹³³*ibid*, 171

After a formal beginning that explains the personal introduction of the moderator, outline of the research topic, and the purpose of the study; informed consent of the participants was taken in return the promise of confidentiality and anonymity. Then, all the participants were asked to introduce themselves. The questions were not prepared but asked accordingly. Subsequently, the subjects of daily usage of the space and home, the boundaries that the veil draws in the everyday lives, the bending and sometimes disappearing of these boundaries and the defense mechanisms that developed against the bending of boundaries, being or becoming an 'other' in the society, consumption habits, visibility and so were discussed in the group. Instead of arguing about political and ideological issues in depth, it was a session that analyzes the everyday lives of the participants by personal memories and experiences. One unexpected issue realized during the session was, one of their common point veil resulted in another common point, which is, all of the participants once or more in their lives, experienced verbal or physical harassment because of their veil.

These two methods complemented each other and allowed us to compare perceptions of women with different backgrounds and demographic profiles. The first phase, individual interviews helped to generate data from relatively older, mostly married women, who are mostly migrated to İstanbul. On the other hand in the second phase, the focus of the group participants represented younger religious women that are mostly students, and are seen to be the main target population for "modern Islamic lifestyle". From the point of economic status, these two groups were not quite different from each other; all belong to the middle-upper class and thereby in a position to consume modern Islamic commodities.

In the process of analyzing the data and reporting, the audio recordings are put in a written form. Then the findings are classified in subjects and some main concepts are determined. The key findings that are convenient with this research are discussed in the final chapter of this study.

3.2. Findings From the Field- Tension Between Sacred and Profane

Risk and returns are usually only the decisive factors in the investing. Hence, despite criticisms, *homo-economicus* is a generally accepted figure of

contemporary economic models in which humans are accepted as rational and self-interested beings capable of making judgments towards maximization of self-benefit and profit. According to this theory, economic activities based to selfishness, interest and pragmatism drives of beings. *Homo-economicus* measure value with personal stimuli, appetite and choices. However criticisms to this theory proved that there are other factors and situations that affect the market actions of individuals other than risks and returns. Eren claims that religion is one of these factors that have power over the economy and economical action. This stems from both the principles of the religions and different human models that they create. Religion, affects and considerably changes and directs peoples' everyday lives, psychological aspects, cultural infrastructures, attitudes of working, rituals, production, consumption and spending habits; in short; almost everything that is related to individuals. It could change whole decisions by affecting the structure of mentality or it may urge them to adopt a different behavioral pattern.¹³⁴

The human perception of Islam is very different from the prevalent human model of contemporary economic literature. According to Eren, there are some basic differences between *homo economicus* and Islamic model of a human. Individuals have immaterial values as well as their material drives and they have ethical values in contrast to *homo economicus*. Individual in Islam takes afterlife into account while acting (because humans are not created for temporal life of world), the other does not. Unlike materialistic *homo economicus* who spends unlimitedly and ungenerous, individuals of Islam value morale as well as materiality and spend as needed, and generous. Therefore, individual of Islam decides for society's goods, in contrast with selfish others.¹³⁵ In that sense, for believers, Islam has rules to regulate and limit production, consumption, spending and she should not act as a *homo economicus*. In today's world, there occur a tension between profane everyday life and sacred religious norms about consumption, production, spending and especially outing preferences. Depending on different interpretations of sacred references,

¹³⁴ İsmail Eren, "Human Model In Islam's Economic Structure: A Comparative Evaluation With Homo Economicus", *Suleyman Demirel University The Journal of Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences*, 2013, Vol.18, No.1, pp.367-384.

¹³⁵ *ibid*, 380.

different life styles can find place under the root of belief; so Islamic rules and values, in some way or another become determinants to define the boundaries of Islamist women in everyday life. These tensions are reflected in construction and re-construction of boundaries that give way to constant negotiation of boundaries in everyday life. Especially economic activities about where to buy and how to spend are challenging issues for an Islamist.

The interviewees demonstrated that for most of the veiled women, being veiled has an impact over the preferences of where to go in the city.¹³⁶ Although religion is not the only reference of the interviewees, veil still attached to other meanings and has an affective power as a symbol. Hence, being an Islamist with veil creates moral boundaries that is flexed or stretched occasionally in public space. Are the boundaries flexible, if so, in which point these boundaries are enlarging or stretching, are religious sensitivities unalterable or is religion perceived as an entity of unchangeable rules; these questions are aimed to answered during conversations. This research is conducted by approaching to the daily lives of veiled Islamist women. A set of questions was prepared from social relations to privacy, from meaning of veil to social media usage to understand daily life of women in a wide range; yet only economic activities and consumption patterns were taken into the scope of this thesis. The method used for the research is semi-structured interviews and the list of the questions can be found at lists section at the end of the thesis. Economic activities refer to the relations they established with the places they buy goods and services. Eating and drinking habits, credit and credit card usage, holidays, leisure habits, shopping preferences, women-only place preferences of women will be analyzed.

3.2.1. Eating and Drinking Habits

3.2.1.1. Alcohol and Pork Serving Restaurants

This moral responsibility prevents or at least creates awareness for leisure activities of Islamist women. Going to cafes and restaurants as part of leisure is one of the new consumption habits of everyday life, but the question

¹³⁶ Ayten, (My veil) of course determines where I go. I do not want to go everywhere actually.

of what makes a café legitimate or appropriate for Islamist women come to light. Consuming alcohol and pork meat are forbidden according to Islam; therefore going to restaurants that serve alcohol and pork meat are entanglements that arose tension. During the interviews, it is observed that the restaurants that serve alcoholic beverages and pork meat are part of boundaries that shape everyday rituals of veiled women. Usually, the brand of meat, butter, oil, inclusion of alcohol are factors to concern¹³⁷ when choosing where to go. When the interviewees are asked about places to go frequently, some interviewees notably state that they never go to an alcohol-serving place, some claimed they prefer to go places do not serve alcohol.¹³⁸ Some interviewees find it stressing¹³⁹ and some rigidly deny being in an alcohol-serving restaurant in accordance with her religious conscience.

Because you know that there are alternative places... Going to alcohol-serving restaurants is not preferred although there are places that do not serve alcoholic drinks. Maybe this is a religious degree. After all, one can feel her guilty about going that places in spite of non-alcoholic alternatives. It is totally about conscience.¹⁴⁰

When the interviewees asked whether their veil is a determinant to places they prefer, some approved.¹⁴¹ According to one interviewee that believe going to a café is about religiosity, claim that personally she individually do not want to be there personally, not because she has drawbacks about being a veiled woman; but because of the atmosphere of that kind of places is not convenient for a Muslim. She says:

I do not think that my headscarf is an obstacle for me to go these places but I generally do not prefer to be there. The lifestyle, dressing style and behaviours of people who go there disturb me. Otherwise I do not have drawbacks about going there as a woman with tesettur but personally I do not want to be at such kind of places.¹⁴²

¹³⁷ Fatma, "I pay attention to the fat of meat, to whether alcohol is added or not and to the brand of meat."

¹³⁸Emel, "As it is close to my home, Bagdat Avenue, restaurants that do not serve alcohol... There was Café Crown for example before, now there are other places, Zamane Kahvesi, Pelit", İrem, "I don't prefer places that serve alcohol. Although they have the menu that does not include alcohol".

¹³⁹ Hacer, "When I go to an unknown place, I get stressed because I'm headscarfed. I don't want to go to the places servicing alcohol."

¹⁴⁰ "Çünkü şeyi biliyorsun yerine doldurulacak olanı varken, içkisiz olanı varken oraya gitmek, sonuçta bu dindarlık mertebesi belki de, insan tercih etmiyor, sonuçta kendisini rahatsız hissediyor. Niye eşdeğeri varken oraya gidiyorum diye. O tamamen vicdan yani." (Mine, 25)

¹⁴¹ Ayten, "(My veil) of course determines where I go. I do not want to go everywhere actually."

¹⁴² "Başörtülü olmam oralara gitmeme engeldir gibi düşünmüyorum ama orda bulunmayı genel olarak tercih etmiyorum. Oradaki insanların yaşam tarzı, davranışları, giyimleri beni rahatsız

Despite the ones that believe they do not belong to such places and deny going, some go there although believing their act is not proper. Even if they go alcohol-serving cafes, they cannot tell this contentedly but explain it with drawbacks. 41-year-old Halime who lives in Bağdat Street says:

Beforetime we frequently used to go to Midpoint and Kırıntı (cafes that serve alcohol and pork). However, now we try to be attentive to not to go and we do not prefer that places as much as we can. You know, their menus are very good, they are very crowded but it is not certain whether it is a pub or a place you can just eat something. Once in a while I miss something (about those cafes), but we strive for going less. We do not go there frequent as before anyway.¹⁴³

Some interviewees claim that going to alcohol-serving restaurants are related to conditions and personal choices. They claim that, people, depending upon different conditions might prefer going alcohol-serving places.

Our friends living in Alanya (touristic beach resort city on Mediterranean) spend time in places that serve alcohol because they have no alternative places to go. When they come to İstanbul, they can easily go these places because they have lost such kind of (religious) sensitivity. I mean it is a little personal and it is also up to conditions.¹⁴⁴

Another reason for going alcohol and pork meat serving restaurants is the affect of nonreligious friends. According to two interviewees, despite their religious sensitivities, for group gatherings, they do not resist although they believe the place is not convenient for them. In that sense, in some instances, friends are affective for preferences.

I went there after my classes at Faculty of Theology. Normally, we make a point of not going specifically, but I could not resist the insistance of my friend. These are my friends that don't have much sensitiveness and we have to go that places because they want to smoke there and say it is very shameful to smoke outside.¹⁴⁵

One of the interviewees that do not prefer to go cafes that serve alcoholic

ettiği için... Yoksa benim başörtülü olarak oralara girmekten bir çekincem yok ama öyle ortamlarda kişisel olarak bulunmak istemiyorum." (İrem, 23)

¹⁴³ "Bir dönem mesela Midpoint'e, Kırıntı'ya çok giderdik. Ama şimdi hani biraz daha dikkat etmeye çalışıyoruz, tercih etmemeye çalışıyoruz. Hani menüleri çok güzel, çok kalabalık ama hani bar mı yeme içme mekanını karıştırabileceğiniz bir yer. Bazen bir şeyleri özlüyorum ama nadir olmasına çalışıyoruz zaten. Eskisi gibi zaten devamlı gitmiyoruz." (Halime, 41)

¹⁴⁴ "Alanya'da yaşayan arkadaşlar başka seçenekleri olmadığı için içkili mekanlarda oturuyor. İstanbul'a da geldikleri vakit o hassasiyeti kaybetmiş oldukları için daha rahat gidebiliyorlar. Yani biraz kişisel, şartlara da bağlı bir şey." (Tülin, 26)

¹⁴⁵ "İlahiyattaki dersimden çıkıp oraya gitmişliğim var ama özellikle dikkat ediyoruz normalde, arkadaş ısrarına dayanamayıp gittim. Çok hassasiyeti olmayan arkadaşlarım bunlar ve ortada mı sigara içeyim çok ayıp dedikleri için mecbur gidiyoruz." (Mısra, 23)

beverages claimed that her husband even gets his friends up from a café or restaurant that serve alcohol once.

Before I got married, there were some places (that serve alcohol) but we did not used to go frequently. However, I have been in places serving alcohol because of peer influence when I was single. Especially after we got married, we draw a line under the places that serve alcohol. We said that let's this should be our beginning. I know that my husband get his friends up from places that serve alcohol.¹⁴⁶

Restaurants that serve alcohol are identified with being non-decent. Only one of the interviewees, who began to veil her ten days before the interview, had no problem with going to alcohol serving restaurants. She believes that everybody should behave in a respectful manner to each other.

I believe that faith is important in the first instance, appearance comes secondly. I go to places that serve alcohol, but I do not go to a bar or a pub. If someone drinks alcohol in front of me, this is his/her own choice. That is not my concern. I sit there and do not drink my whiskey, but my water. We should not engrave each other into the shells. Living together must be learned. It is (living together) present in Islam; Islam can live together. Islam is modern. Islam can eat everywhere. Islam is only a choice.¹⁴⁷

According to this comment, the modernity of Islam is about being appropriate to different conditions and respect to other life styles. In that sense, it does not prohibit going to a restaurant that serves alcohol, but being apparent in a bar is not proper for her.

The story of the change begins with a reference to an ideal, moral past that is now gone and missed. "In the old times" was one of the most frequently used phrases the interviewees referred. Unintentionally, almost all of the interviewees compare their daily life with their childhood or to clearly explain today's life, "before" or "in our mothers' times" are put as an unchanged, uniform past. One of the interviewees claimed that she used to go to cafes that serve alcohol and for the purposes of exposition calls her previous ideas as liberal, but now she decided to live as her religion commands. Moreover she is

¹⁴⁶ "Bu da bizim için bir başlangıç olsun dedik. Öncesinde de öyle bir kaç yer vardı sıkça gitmezdik ama bekarlığında arkadaş ortamları sebebiyle içkili mekanda oturmuşumdur. Bir de eklemek isterim ki içkili yerleri -özellikle evlendikten sonra- hayatımızdan çıkardık. Ben eşimi biliyorum, arkadaşlarını içkili yerlerden kaldırdığını." (Tülin, 26)

¹⁴⁷ "İtikadın önce önemli olduğuna inanıyorum, sonra şekil geliyor. İçkili yere giderim, bir bara gitmem. Karşımda birisi içki içiyorsa bu onun tercihidir. Beni ilgilendirmez. Ben orda oturup viskimi içmem, suyumu içerim. Birbirimizi kabuklara sokmaya çalışmamak lazım. Bir arada yaşamayı öğrenmek lazım. İslam'da bu var, bir arada yaşayabilir İslam. İslam moderndir. Her yerde yemek yiyebilir İslam. İslam bir tercihtir sadece. (Aslı, 30)

the only one who mentioned to the importance of supporting her coreligionists economically.

I guess I was more liberal back then. Because of my knowledge related to religion, I was considering it more different than now; I was more liberal. Unless employees disturb me, treat me badly, and belittle me when they do service, I do not care what other people thinks. But now I think that I should live according to my belief. If I live according to my religious belief, I should support people who think like me. Otherwise, this kind of places will be closed. I should support them to open better one.¹⁴⁸

Her religious belief about not going to the cafes that serve alcohol, urged her to make support to the people who think like her. In that sense, ideological affinity is a factor that affects the café preferences. Moreover, many interviewees mentioned to the different reactions their parents would give to the alcohol serving restaurants and they all claimed that the limits were much more strict in previous time; 15-20 years ago.

Previously, our fathers used to react too much to go to a place that serves alcohol, but now we can go easily.¹⁴⁹

I want to give my father as an example; he did not allow me to go the graduate ceremony including also alcohol service when I was in primary school. I was felt so sad in that time, but now I am so glad that he did not allow me. Recently he went to a restaurant that serves alcohol with his friends. I said that it was a place serving alcohol; still he praised the restaurant because its meals are very good.¹⁵⁰

While they react harshly when they see someone drinking alcohol, we might pass off by saying, "never mind".¹⁵¹

"Old" refers to a time in which limits are solid, now they seem to get blurred. Fatma calls this process as 'passing over':

We prefer conservative places but now we pass over this issue a bit. We can easily go to Bebek or so. Before we felt very uncomfortable in districts like

¹⁴⁸ "O zaman biraz daha liberal bakıyordum galiba. O zamanki birikimimle daha farklı bakıyordum, daha liberal bakıyordum. (İçkili mekanda) Hani o insanlar beni rahatsız etmedikçe, bana kötü bir şekilde davranmadıkça beni davranışları, hizmetleriyle aşağılamadıkça onların hesaplarının bir önemi yok." (Halime, 41)

¹⁴⁹ "Eskiden içki içilen bir mekanda babalarımız olsa çok daha tepki gösterirdi ama biz çok rahat girebiliyoruz." (Fatma, 26)

¹⁵⁰ "Ben size babamdan örnek vereyim, babam beni 5. Sınıfta mezuniyet törenine içkili diye göndermedi. İyi ki de göndermedi, o zaman üzülmeştüm ama. Geçen gün kendisi arkadaşlarıyla içkili bir restorana gitmiş. E, orası içkili diyorum, hadi ya, ama yemekleri çok güzeldi diye övüyor." (Tülin, 26)

¹⁵¹ "Onlar içki içen birini gördüklerinde de daha tepkililerken, biz boşver, deyip geçiştirebiliyoruz." (Emel, 24)

*Kadıköy, people used to react to us. Now we do not care about them either.*¹⁵²

Tülin calls it 'releasing'.

*How much we used to worry about what they would say or do to us. Then we are released and begin to take things easy.*¹⁵³

To sum up, regarding narrations of the interviewees it could be told that, alcohol and/or pork-serving restaurants create an almost clear boundary for Islamist's life. Even there are some, they feel uneasy about being in that kind of places. Most important factor that affects the non-going preferences of these women is their friends and environment. Although one of the interviewees claimed that her husband makes his friends leave the place; others usually claim that they obey to decisions of their friends. This obedience generally occurs during studentship; marriage strengthens the denial of going an alcohol-serving restaurant. Only one of the interviewees had no problem with alcohol; she explains her behavior in logic of reciprocal respect. She had no problem as long as they respect each other; because Islam is modern and it is tolerant. Regarding political ongoing in Turkey, it could be said that sphere of everyday is affected by the political with reference to the old and now comparisons of the interviewees. The previous times mentioned by the interviewees refer to pre-JDP era; it could be deduced that with the rule of current government, Islamists strict borders in public space loosened and drawbacks about going specific places in the city are eliminated.

3.2.1.2. Representation of Veil

According to Gençtürk-Hızal, as the process of expressing/recognition is also a process of challenging; the veil of the Islamist women can be interpreted as a challenging symbol to express who she is to 'the other'. Quite the contrary with the demanded in the public space, not their invisibility with the emphasis of visibility, but women increase their visibility with the produced and commercialized cloths, and in a way even challenges with her

¹⁵²"Muhafazakar mekanı tercih ediyoruz ama artık 'aştı biraz.' Bebek'te filan da rahat rahat oturuyoruz.Eskiden Kadıköy'de filan çok rahatsız olurduk, insanların tepkileri filan olurdu, biz de artık çok önemsemiyoruz." (Fatma, 26)

¹⁵³"Eskiden ne çok dert ederdik, ne diyecekler, ne yapacaklar. Sonradan hafif bir koyverme, rahatlama oldu." (Tülin, 26)

appearance.¹⁵⁴The issue of 'representation' involves at this point. For many interviewees, headscarf is 'representing' Islamic values attached to it. In this regard, it is observed that being visible as a religious person is perceived as a denominational requirement and responsibility for Islamist women. So they want to be visible in the whole social sphere endeavoring to reflect the images they represent and reflect it with their life styles.¹⁵⁵Therefore when someone wears headscarf, she has to take the burden of wearing it, therefore being in a place is not only about personal choice. Going to an inappropriate place mean putting your religious sisters to target. According to this approach in which personal and social sensibilities intertwined, veiled women should be exemplary characters in society.

The reason why I do not want to go to an alcohol-serving place is because I do not want to see that substance (alcohol). However, when you go abroad, you have to see necessarily. It does not disturb me abroad, but in Turkey it disturbs me because there are alternative places. I give religious lectures to high school students, last year I gave for example. If one of my students sees me there, she will say, 'Look, Miss Kerime, Kerime sister goes there!' I am afraid of that. I have some other kind of friends that I am responsible who can easily go there without any doubt. When they say, 'Let's go!' (to such kind of a place), I do not want to say no in the first instance. When I go to these places, I feel uneasy about being there. I feel anxious for an acquaintance would see me there. I do not feel that I belong to there.¹⁵⁶

The interviewee that makes this assertion is attached to a certain religious community and she is responsible of high-school students for giving religious lectures and supervising them about their educational and private lives. Therefore she believes that she should be acting properly, and going to an alcohol-serving place sets a bad example for her students. The answer to the question of what makes her anxious; her religious conscience or the gazes that judges her remain blurred. It is not easy to find out, but both are coexisting.

¹⁵⁴ Gençtürk Hızal, "Bir İletişim Biçimi Olarak Moda: 'Modus'un Sınırları'", 75.

¹⁵⁵ Abdullah Özbolat, Tüketim Bağlamında Dindarlığın Dönüşümü, *Birikim*, 12 Nov 2014.

¹⁵⁶ "İçkili yerlere gitmek istemememin nedeni o maddeyi görmek istememek, yoksa yurtdışına gittiğinde mecbursun yani orda bir yerde olmaya. Orda rahatsızlık vermiyor ama burada Türkiye'de alternatifin olduğu için. Bir de birisi beni orada görse, çünkü ben lise çocuklarına sohbet veriyorum mesela geçen sene vermiştim. Şimdi ordan bir öğrencim beni orada görse diyecek ki bak Kerime hoca, Kerime abla oraya gitmiş diyecek mesela. Onun korkusu var. Benim başka türlü arkadaşlarım da var hani öyle yerlere rahatlıkla gidebilen, ilgilendiğim insanlar mesela. Onlarla hadi gidelim dediklerinde yok gitmeyelim demek istemiyorum mesela ilk aşamada. Hani böyle yerlere gidişimde sürekli tedirgin, birisi görür yani rahat hissetmiyorum, oraya ait hissetmiyorum kendimi." (Kerime, 22)

During the conversation with the rest of the focus group, it was obvious that gaze of the society and the thoughts of others are playing quite important roles in public space for actions of women. According to one of the interviewees, by going such places, one may encourage other pious without being aware. Her existence may be an impulsion for others that have drawbacks and in this way, she may cause them to sin.

You see, I feel that, someone may see me there and say – although she does not know me, “Look, a veiled girl goes there, why do not I go there either”. So, you may involuntarily encourage someone to commit sin.¹⁵⁷

In that sense, an Islamist has to fulfill her responsibilities in the community she lives in stemmed from wearing veil. She does not behave in accordance with her own desires, but pay regard to the best of the community she lives in. Not only gaze of their own communities, but also the rest of the society play role over the actions of Islamists.

For example, a non-religious person may see you and may say; ‘Aha, they (she means herself) came here either.’ The idea to fall out of favor with that kind of people... Why should s/he sees me there, why I should be sharing the same place with them, this idea stresses me out. Because, I am sure that at least one person among hundreds over there think in this way. S/he definitely thinks like that.¹⁵⁸

This interviewee attaches too much importance to the gaze of the people that she does not share same belief with. She believes that sharing the same place with them may trivialize and degrade her and this idea is a stressor. One another claims that, the consciousness of being part of a community urged one to shoulder the wrong attitudes others present because she represents the rest of the community and she is thinks this is an attitude to be ‘overcomed’.

It is always attributed to... You bear the blame of others. You think that they will think in this way or that way.. Yes, it seems like that you represent them. I think that whole society should overcome this kind of things: we should not be subject to bad gazes anymore and bother the others.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷ “Şimdi şeyi hissediyorum evet orada birisi beni görecektir, diyecek başörtülü-hiç tanımasa bile beni, hani başka birinin yaptığı hareket- bak diyecek kapalı kız gitmiş neden ben gitmeyeyim ki? Başkasının günahına sebep olma şeyi de var.” (Hacer, 22)

¹⁵⁸ “Mesela orada oturan ehli-dünya bir insan da seni görüp aa bunlar da buraya gelmişler diyebilirler. Öyle insanların gözünde küçük düşmek fikri...orada beni niye görsün ben niye o insanla aynı ortamda olayım ki. O beni bir de strese sokar. Çünkü eminim oradaki yüzlerce insan içinden bir tanesi öyle düşünüyordur. Kesin düşünüyordur.” (Kerime, 22)

¹⁵⁹ “Her zaman bir yapılandırılıyor. Başkalarının yaptığı yanlışları da hataları da sen üzerine alıyorsun.Hani böyle düşünecekler, böyle yapacaklar gibi.Evet onu temsil ediyor gibisin. Bilmiyorum biraz toplumu biraz sosyolojik olarak bir şeyleri aşması gerekiyor ki ne o dik dik ,

As it could be deduced from the narrations of the interviewees, being a veiled woman confer the individual with responsibilities and a conscientious scruple about where to be seen although there is no written laws or principles about it.

3.2.1.3. Starbucks

The drawbacks created in daily lives do not only stem from religious prohibitions, but ideological reactions also affect spending actions. Despite their worldwide economic success, global brands may be perceived as symbols of cultural imperialism, threats to national sovereignty, and even enticements of infidel. Such interpretations could end up consumer resistance that is 'materialized in both subtle and overt consumer reactions ranging from individuals' refraining from a particular global brand to vandalization of businesses.'¹⁶⁰ In this research, name of one brand (*Starbucks*) became prominent spontaneously without any routing. Although there is no religious reference about preferences to go Starbucks for many interviewees, this brand has pejorative attachments. Even addicts that drink from Starbucks everyday name it as a bad habit or awful thing.

Usually I go to Capitol (mall) for shopping. Almost everyday, I go there to buy coffee, there is Starbucks in there. I have addictions that I got in Erenköy, awful, Starbucks... When I pass by there, I always used to buy a coffee from there (Starbucks). It caused an addiction unfortunately. I can not drink coffee from other places.¹⁶¹

Despite the company denies providing financial support to Israeli government or army,¹⁶² the interviewees share the idea that drinking from Starbucks means support to Israel for killing millions.

I consider it very ideologically. I am one of the few people who still consider it ideological. I have been there and I have drunk there. So, I am not so

kötü bakışlara maruz kalmalıyız, ne biz yapmalıyız ne onlar bence. Çünkü bizde yapıyor hani insanlar... zaten öyle bakış olmadığı zaman iki taraf da rahatsız olmayacaktır." (Mine, 25)

¹⁶⁰Elif Izberk Bilgin, "When Starbucks Meets Turkish Coffee: Cultural Imperialism and Islamism as 'Other' Discourses of Consumer Resistance", *Advances In Consumer Research* 35 (2008): 808-809.

¹⁶¹ "Burada da Capitol'den alışverişimi yapıyorum daha çok. Hemen hemen her gün gidiyorum oraya kahve almaya, Starbucks var orada. Erenköy'den kalma bağımlılıklarım var, çok kötü, Starbucks...Yürürken oradan (Starbucks)mutlaka kahve alıp geçiyordum oradan. O bağımlılık yaptı maalesef. Başka bir yerin kahvesini içemiyorum." (Ayten, 37)

¹⁶² Starbucks, Facts about Starbucks in the Middle East, <https://news.starbucks.com/views/facts-about-starbucks-in-the-middle-east>

*strict about it. But I don't want to give money to a group of people who kill thousands and millions of my cognates that I share same belief.*¹⁶³

In that sense, despite the nonexistence of prohibitions in Islamic principles about coffee drinking; the ideological position of a brand may become a determinant for peoples' choices.

3.2.1.4. Trust Issues

Today, ordinary consumers are no longer in a position of producing what they consume rather; many intermediaries in the food supply chain produce them. Within the contemporary food chain, consumers have a crucial role by being situated at the end of the chain. Consumers are both end users and also the beginning of the chain as inspirations of a consumer driven or market oriented chain organization and this positioning gives way to becoming of consumer demand and trust for safe and wholesome food and meat. As the consumers are unaware and of the intermediaries and food processing, trust becomes the utmost driving force for exchange.¹⁶⁴ During the interviews, it was observed that trust plays important role to define the places that interviewees prefer. Many report that, they do not trust to the places at first sight¹⁶⁵ or usually prefer to the places offered to them by their friends or relatives. Hatice claims:

*For example, there are a few places located in Cavuşbaşı, we go at the recommendation of our neighbor...the place that she knows and trusts in. We go to a farm located in Samandıra together with my family.*¹⁶⁶

As suggestions generate motives for preferring to the places they go, not trusting is also a preventive for them and their family. Hatice adds that:

I do not go to places that I do not know. I am careful (about the places that I do not know). For instance, I pay attention to hygienic issues. Since I do not trust everywhere, I do not go to everywhere. I also do not allow my

¹⁶³ "Çok ideolojik bakıyorum. Hala öyle bakan birkaç kişiden biriyim. Hiç gitmedim, hiç içmedim değil. O kadar katı değilim bu konuda ama bir yerlerde benim soydaşlarım, aynı inançları paylaştığım binlerce, milyonlarca insanın kanını döken bir grup insana para koymak istemiyorum." (Fahriye, 34)

¹⁶⁴ Xavier Gellynck, Wim Verbeke, Ber Vermeire, "Pathways to Increase Customer Trust in Meat as a Safe and Wholesome Food", *Meat Science* 74 (2006), 161.

¹⁶⁵ I do not trust at the first sight to the places that I do not know. (Hatice, 42).

¹⁶⁶ "Mesela, Cavuşbaşa yolundaki bir iki yer, komşunun tavsiyesiyle onun bildiği, güvendiği yer oraya. Ailemle beraber Samandıra'da bir yere gidiyoruz, çiftlik." (Hatice, 42)

*daughter to go everywhere. Now, in the recent times...I am not a coward but I think we have to be more careful.*¹⁶⁷

Religion is an influential factor on trusting to food choice. The impact of religion on food consumption is related to the teachings of the religion itself and on the extent to the followers. For the Muslims, beyond from quality, there is an additional guarantee is required in that only food deemed as halal is fit to be consumed. According to teachings from the Qu'ran and Hadith, Muslims cannot consume pork or its by-products, animals that were dead prior to slaughter, animals not slaughtered properly or not slaughtered in the name of Allah, blood and blood by-products, alcohol, carnivorous animals and birds of prey etc. So, halal food is apparently almost the same as other food, however its nature, technique of its processing involving the ingredients, handling, use of various methods from the beginning to the end, should be always the one approved and recommended by Islamic law.

In the 20th century, Muslims especially in the countries they are minorities, embarked on a quest for halal food. Many believers from different parts of the world believed in a requirement of regulations on food and ended up with halal certification that is a certificate given by trustworthy, competent and impartial institution to a food manufacturer to submit compliance of production to the halal standards according to a confirmed method.¹⁶⁸In that sense, quality management practices such as adopting halal certification can boost customers' confidence and hence can lead to their satisfaction. Unfortunately, today, the halal certificate solely cannot be a reference to the credence quality. To take advantage of the growing global market, a number of companies mislead consumers by falsely labeling their products as halal although they are not fully complying with halal guidelines.¹⁶⁹As a mostly Muslim populated country, in Turkey, these worries about the safety of food began during 1970's with the denial of margarin usage, preference of religious

¹⁶⁷"Bilmediğim mekana ben gitmem. Dikkat ederim. Mesela hijyen açısından bazı şeylere dikkat ederim.Güvenmediğim için dikkat ederim, her yere gitmem.Kızımı da bilmediğim her yere göndermem.Artık son zamanlarda... Korkak değilim ama daha dikkatli davranmak durumundayız diye düşünüyorum." (Hatice, 42)

¹⁶⁸Ali Batu, "Halal Food and Halal Food Certification System in Turkey", *Electronic Journal of Food Technologies* Vol:7, No:1, (2012): 51-61.

¹⁶⁹Abdul Mohani, İsmail Hashanah, Hashim Haslina, Johari Juliana, "Consumer Decision Making Process in Shopping for Halal Food in Malaysia, China-USA", *Business Review*, Sep. 2009, Vol: 8, No.9 (Serial no:75), 40-41

butchers and not eating meat in unreliable restaurants. Today, the number of pork and alcohol serving restaurants are increasing and people as customers demand certificates if they have trust issues.

*I prefer to go to the places that I trust or I generally ask the place that I go. I am attentive to the fat of meat, whether alcohol is added or not, and to the brand of meat.*¹⁷⁰

Hence, the criterion of trust becomes important for preference and if there is an alternative to the alcohol-serving restaurant, usually it is preferred.

*As we said there are alternatives, we go those places. We prefer alternatives. For example, Pelit is the one of places that we mostly prefer to go. Because, we are sure of the reliability of those places...*¹⁷¹

The discussion food preferences was not the scope of this thesis however while talking about the places that are preferred as a consumers, the issue of trusting to the places and food served come up as a haphazard factor that affect the choices of the Islamist women in Turkey. It was observed that, trusting to the place and the food served there is playing a crucial role in preferences and in that sense religion has an affect over the places to go in social life.

As transformations are mentioned, one other should be added which is about the performance of prayers in the public space.

*One of the most important transformations is the availability of prayer rooms and mosques- although they are bad and narrow places. Their existence is important for a Muslim, even in cafes. Since these facilities serve to Muslims, they spend much more time and they consume.*¹⁷²

By taking these statements into account, it could be said that, going to restaurants that serve alcohol and pork is a criteria that determine the economic and leisure activities of Islamist women. During the interviews, three different attitudes observed. First attitude is going to restaurants that serve alcohol and declare it openly. Only one of the interviewees that began to wear veil just ten days before the interview has this attitude and has no problem with going to a restaurant that serve alcohol despite she does not consume alcoholic

¹⁷⁰Güvendiğim yerlere gitmeyi tercih ederim ya da sorarım gittiğim yere. Yemeklerde etine yağına dikkat ederim, alkol katıp katmaması, etinin markası... (Fatma, 26)

¹⁷¹ "Artık dediğimiz gibi muadili var, tabi oralara gidiyoruz. Alternatifleri kullanıyoruz. Mesela Pelit en çok gittiğimiz yerlerden. Çünkü hani güvenilirliğinden emin olduğumuz için..." (Mine, 25)

¹⁷² "En önemli güzel değişimlerden biri namaz kılınacak yerlerin, dışarıda camide, ki kötü küçük olduğu yerlerdir. Her türlü kafede bile, bu mesela bir Müslüman için önemli bir şeydir. O yüzden bunun da Müslümanlar için olması, o yüzden insanlar daha çok vakit geçiriyor, tüketiyorlar." (Kerime, 22)

beverages by referencing to the tolerance and modernity of Islam. Still, she made a differentiation between pubs and restaurants and disapproves going to a bar. The second attitude is going to alcohol-serving places but disapprove this action. Two interviewees have this attitude and have reasons for going like the scarcity of proper restaurants that do not serve alcohol and the influence and insistence of friends. The third, and the general attitude about going restaurants that serve alcoholic beverages and pork is strictly rejecting except compelling reasons (such as going abroad). Reasons for rejecting vary, some grounded to religious reasons and some to societal impulses. Being disturbed by the life, dressing and behaving styles of other customers, the reluctance to see alcoholic beverages, the concern to be an exemplary Muslim in society, the gazes both from Islamist and non-Islamist people.

A 32-year-old interviewee Fahriye who experienced the coup of 28 February and the period of headscarf ban in universities claimed she does not only resist going to restaurants that serve alcohol, but also oppose going and consuming foreign-based trademarks. Starbucks became prominent during this debate and despite the lacking of religious references; ideologically it symbolizes support to Israel in their war against Palestine. It was observed that during the course of focus group, other participants appreciated Fahriye and envy her for living her religion 'properly'. The last criterion for place preferences is the existence of prayer rooms in the visited places or cafes. Because Muslims do not bother to go home for praying, they can spend much more time out and consume.

3.2.2. Dress, Styling and Fashion

Beyond its function as a vital need during history, today dressing is a social language that speaks of the identities of people and signals that identity to others and it is one of the languages that sociology has interested long since. Dressing styles and trends affect them make sense in contemporary time. Dressing is a code that embodies clues of who the wearers are, what they think, which religious or sub-culture groups they belong, their way of thinking, their

styles and many other messages they want to transmit.¹⁷³ However, using dress and consumption as symbols of identity is uneasy because of various reasons. Firstly, it is not certain how correctly observers decode the signals sent to them. Secondly, dress and the meanings attached could be culturally specific and wearers and observers may rely on different cultural meanings to interpret the language.¹⁷⁴ It is not only the observers, but also wearers should be aware of the message they carry on themselves. Otherwise clothing and dress make a fool of the wearer or put her in a position of poor wannaby. In that sense, as dressing is a sector built by the fashion designers and served over stylishness and marketed over gaining reputation it is also the most visible frontage of identity codes.¹⁷⁵ The decisiveness of religion as a part of identities over the clothing preferences has been a heated debate for many years and with the modernization movements, mostly by men about the dressing of women, interestingly.

Sumptuary and clothing regulations based upon religion are sometimes practiced deliberately on the score of religious orders and sometimes become subliminal components of domestic customs and dressing by being internalized during generations. In some instances, they are carried out shallowly and sometimes they are totally ignored; because undoubtedly, allowance or forbidding of religion do not entirely determine the daily lives of the believers. Therefore, regulatory of sumptuary regulations of dressing determined by Islam, could not fully explain the clothing of people that adopted Islam as religion.¹⁷⁶ Still, the question of whether religion has an affect over the clothing preferences of women. According to Barbarosoğlu, especially with the process began during 1980's a new version of Islamic life style has been created and 'Islamic version of everything' began to be produced thanks to the restructured consumption patterns for Muslims. Veiling (tesettür) or veiling fashion, which is

¹⁷³Fatma Bodur, "Gençlerin Giyim Tarzının Modernleşme Açısından Değerlendirilişi", (Master diss., Sakarya University, 2011), 19.

¹⁷⁴Jennifer Barnes, "Style and Consumption Among East African Muslim Immigrant Women: The Intersection of Religion, Ethnicity, and Minority Status" (2009). *Award Winning Sociology Papers*, Paper 3.)

¹⁷⁵Fatma Barbarosoğlu, "Kamusal Alanda Müslüman Erkekler", *Yeni Şafak*, 2 Nov 2015,

¹⁷⁶ İrvin Cemil Schick, *Bedeni, Toplumu, Kainatı Yazmak*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2014), 89

symbolized and commentated as Islamic dressing style, composes an important sphere of this version.¹⁷⁷

When interviewees are asked about dressing, they agreed that peoples' style of clothing is about the message they want to deliver to observers and attribute this behavior to the change of perception of visibility.

*The perception of being visible has changed perhaps. In our day, clothing is also a way of self-expression. People constantly express themselves with their appearance in some way. They try to make visible their exterior more than their interior. In some way, they are trying to make a cover for themselves. That, I think, urges people more to wear different from the others, being different and find different style of dressing.*¹⁷⁸

Dressing in a certain way is inexplicitly criticized for covering inner values of people and create a unique individual that tries to be different from the others.

3.2.2.1. Fashion

Fashion is an expression of the outlooks that an individual may has in accordance with her life style. Sharing impressions with others about who and what we are, are the components that regulate social relations and build identities. As consumption and life styles, the concepts of dressing and fashion also play important role for individual and collective expression of identities. In that sense, it is not possible to distinguish the context of fashion from body and body politics. Hence, body is not only a biological entity, but at the same time, a notion that is built by social processed and embodies different and multiple meanings.¹⁷⁹

Simmel discusses fashion in terms of dualistic nature of human beings and class distinction in his essay *Fashion* he wrote in 1904. According to Simmel, the nature of humanbeing is dualistic and fashion should be understood as a function of this humanly dualism. He defines fashion as 'a form of imitation and so of social equalization, but paradoxically in changing incessantly, it

¹⁷⁷ Fatma Barbarosoğlu, *İmaj ve Takva*, (İstanbul: Profil, 2010), 98.

¹⁷⁸ "Görünür olma algısı değişti belki. Sürekli insanlar kendilerini bir şekilde ifade ediyorlar dış görünüşleriyle. İnsanlar içlerinden ziyade dışlarını görünür kılmaya çalışıyorlar. Bir şekilde bir kapak yapmaya çalışıyorlar kendilerine. O bence insanları daha çok farklı giyinmeye, farklı olmaya, farklı giyim tarzları bulmaya itiyor." (İrem, 23).

¹⁷⁹ Gençtürk Hızal, "Bir İletişim Biçimi Olarak Moda: 'Modus'un Sınırları'", 67-69.

differentiates one time from the other and one social stratum from the other'¹⁸⁰, and this definition covers two essentials for establishing fashion; imitation and demarcation. For him imitation could be named as a 'child of thought and thoughtlessness' because it does not require great personal and creative application; moreover, satisfies the individual by the feeling of not standing alone in her actions. Hence, imitation transfers the demand for creative activity as well as the responsibility for action from oneself to the others.¹⁸¹

Another important factor of fashion is demarcation in addition to the imitation.¹⁸² Fashion's function in class distinction involves at this point; it unites those of a social class and segregate them from others. Fashion requires 'union on the one hand and isolation on the other'. The upper class initiates a fashion and when mass imitate for invalidate the external distinctions of class; abandons it and adopts a newer one and increase of wealth accelerates this process.

Since 1990's, not free from the increase of wealth, the concept of fashion that the Muslims had been critising and proud of keep aloof, became to the agenda of Islamist women. As veiling refers to covering, concealing and rejecting a bodily perception; fashion is, in contrast, attraction oriented and holds its power thanks to the people that prefer to attract and take pleasure with their body presentation. Hence, the term of fashion of veiling (*tesettür modası*) that is participated in daily language is a contradictory one. Accepted opinion about the fashion of *tesettür* is disapproval of it and regard with disfavor to the collocation of veil with fashion.¹⁸³

During the interviews it was observed that Islamist women do not want to be presented as fashion dolls. When interviewees were asked whether they keep up with the fashion, Halime answered:

*No I have my own line. I am trying to keep that line as simple and stylish as possible. In other words, I do not have concerns to buy that trendy cloth or wear this fashioned thing.*¹⁸⁴

¹⁸⁰George Simmel, "Fashion", *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol 62, No. 6, (May, 1957), 541.

¹⁸¹ *ibid*, 542.

¹⁸² *ibid*, 545.

¹⁸³ İrem, 23, *I do not take kindly to the presentation of tesettür as enormously fashion-oriented.*

¹⁸⁴ "Yok benim kendime göre çizğim var. O çizgiyi mümkün olduğu kadar sade ve şık tutmaya çalışıyorum. Yani benim şu moda olmuş şunu alayım giyeyim, bu moda olmuş alayım giyeyim diye bir şeyim yok." Halime, 41.

Although she claimed she is not a follower of fashion, still she attaches importance to being chic in accordance with her taste. Another point is that, despite their unwillingness to be seen as fashion buyers, they do not want to be seen as demoded either. Fashion can be considered as a marketing technique in the broadest sense. As an important concept of démodé that fashion carry with, or supervenes on, is confirmation of it. Concepts of mode and démodé have crucial functions to accelerate process of consumption. In every new season, fashion endeavours to create new bodies and this can be only achieved by the individual's demand of consuming new fashion and coordinately demand the perpetuation.¹⁸⁵

When they were asked what kind of clothes or which style they preferred, Hacer answered:

*Not like demode, but well groomed. At least, it needs to be loosefitting, more appropriate to tesettür, but on the other hand, you know, not so bad. Let it be something according to my heart's desire.*¹⁸⁶

Pardesü is an ankle-length flowing kind of topcoat that is usually sewn from dark fabric to hide bodylines. It was the common overcoat of the youth of 1990's but today fancy tunics and overcoats mostly replaced them. Fahriye opposes to the old-fashionedness of it and says:

*Associating pardesü with out moded is not pleasant. It does not need to be oldfashioned;do you become demode when you wear pardesü?*¹⁸⁷

It could be seen that Islamist women are against the idea of following latest fashion but also want to be approved by the society by being well groomed and avert from being demoded. Akile explains this situation as '...when I was a child, my mother was called as a "bigot", "back-ward minded" or "bug" (*yobaz, gerikafalı, böcek*), thus when we grow up, we try to compensate these insults by claiming that we are modern.'¹⁸⁸They want to be present in the society with their garments and do not want to be labeled as oldfashioned any more and that is why they want to have a modern appearance while keep up with Islamic principles of *tesettür*.

¹⁸⁵Gençtürk Hızal, "Bir İletişim Biçimi Olarak Moda: 'Modus'un Sınırları'", 69.

¹⁸⁶ "Demode gibi değil de bakımlı. En azından hem daha bol olsun, tesettüre yakın olsun bir taraftandan da hani fena da olmasın. Gönlüme göre olsun diye bir şey." (Hacer, 22)

¹⁸⁷ "Pardesünün demodeyle birleşmesi hoş değil. Demode olmak zorunda değil, pardesüyle olduğun zaman demode mi oluyorsun?" (Fahriye, 34)

¹⁸⁸Akile, 24.

3.2.2.2. Colorfulness

According to Barbarosoğlu, the image of Muslim women consists of little triangular shaped headscarves knotted under the chin, hairs can be seen in the front, formfitting cloaks skirt along below the knee and thick stockings during the years of 1960's and 70's. With 1970's, this style that is considered as 'the dressing of traditional religious women' is denied by the young Islamists that learn religion from its sources. Headscarves covered the whole hair, the tails of the loose-fitting cloaks lengthen to the ankles. Beginning with the second half of 1970's, cloaks turned into chador-seeming surcoats combined with large headscarves drape over shoulders. One other specificity of the dressing of the time is colors. Both surcoats and headscarves had to be in unobtrusive colors, like cream, beige and ashen, or in dark colors like black, dark blue or brown in order to be more devoted believer. Leader firms of the sector were also stuck to this style and did not produce in any color.¹⁸⁹ This idea of identifying dark colors with being pious still survives. Although none of the interviewees prefer to wear in darks, they all mentioned the issue of colorfulness with different interpretations. Seyhan claimed that:

Normally, in our religion, there should not be too much colorfulness. Normally, there should not be too much attractiveness. Besides, the bun should not be at the top. I mean, it should be like that but I do not know of course... For me, for instance... Okey, our religion instructs like that, but I cannot practice it. I wish I could. For instance, I like pink color very much, I like green very much, for example, I do not wear something in solid color. I cannot wear black shirt and black trousers. I cannot wear black headscarf, I will be distressed, bored. Normally I wish I can be like that, it will be more appropriate. Men also, should not be striking in our religion. But still, we, because we are veiled necessarily draw more attention. Besides, its vividness takes people's attention. Therefore, to not to attract a people, a man, you should not be in too much striking colors.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁹ Barbarosoğlu, *Şov ve Mahrem*, 94..

¹⁹⁰ "Dinimizde çok renklilik olmaması gerekiyor normalde. Çok çekicilik olmaması gerekiyor normalde. Sonra topuzun yukarda olmaması gerekiyor. Yani öyle (dine uygun) olması gerekiyor ama bilmiyorum yani tabii... Bana göre yani mesela... Tamam dinimiz öyle diyor ama ben onu uygulayamıyorum. Keşke uygulayabilsem... Mesela ben pembeyi çok seviyorum, yeşili çok seviyorum, mesela dümdüz bir renk giyemem. Siyah pantolon siyah gömlek giyemem mesela. Siyah eşarp takamam, ben daralırım boğulurum. Normalde keşke öyle olmuş olsam daha yerinde olacak. Erkeklerin dikkat çekici olmaması lazım dinimizde. O yüzden yine de biz ister istemez kapalı olmamız daha çok dikkat çekiyor. Bir de cıvılcıvılcı olması insanın dikkatini çekiyor. O yüzden yani bir insanı, bir erkeği etkilememek için çok çok dikkat çekici renkler olmamanız gerekiyor." (Seyhan, 32)

She blames dressing in vivid color because they strike people and seduce men and feel guilty for not preferring dark colours. While Seyhan has a guilty conscious for not dressing in accordance with the principles of Islam, Hacer thinks the issue of veil cannot be explained only in terms of color.

I think, for example, beyond color, of course color is an important matter, you catch attention suddenly, but degrading the whole issue to color is ridiculous. In this instance, the things that are pale but too tight or transparent could be worn. It is a matter that is up the nefs, conscience of the people. I do not know, it is such a matter.¹⁹¹

Although there are no written laws about the colors of the dress, women strive for the most proper one in accordance with their conscience. In that sense, Ayten claims that:

In a word, a modern veiled woman should not exaggerate too much. There is extravagancy, they have such heads, hairs and so, they have their hair arranged here too, but they do not care so much. I mean, it should be in a straight line. She should not wear too black either, and then she is labeled as black chadored. It is not a pleasant thing either.¹⁹²

For her, women should not have extravagant appearance but being in chador is also not good-looking. The absence of clear-cut definitions about veiling paved the way for different interpretations about color. Pale colours, depending on its interpretation of the 1970's, still keeps its place as a symbol of piety for some because they do not draw attention. In that time, pastel colours and non-assertiveness of clothes exclude them from the concerns of being mode and they could be worn for years because they were quite modest.¹⁹³ However, the impact of consumer capitalism resembled the dressing of the whole society including the Islamists and chador is marginalized. Moreover, opposing to degrading of veil to colors legitimizes today's style and it is argued that transparency, tightness, colors; all should be behold for a proper veil.

¹⁹¹“Bence mesela konu renkten çok tabi renk de önemli birden dikkat çekiyorsunuz ama tamamen meseleyi renge indirmek de komik oluyor. Bu sefer ne bileyim çok renksiz ama başka türlü dar olanlar veya ne bilim transparan bir şeyler de giyebiliyor. İnsanın nefesine, vicdanına kalmış bir şey. Bilmiyorum çok şey bir konu.” (Hacer, 22)

¹⁹² “Yani çok abartmaması lazım modern tesettürlü kadının. Abartı böyle, kafaları şöyle, saçlar maçlar, burada da yaptırıyorlar ama çok bakmıyorlar. Yani düz çizgide olması lazım. Çok kara giyinmemesi lazım onu hemen kara çarşafı diye yaftalıyorlar. O da iyi bir şey değil.” (Ayten, 37)

¹⁹³ Fatma Barbarosoğlu, *Şov ve Mahrem*, 98.

3.2.3. Usage of Credit Cards and Interest

This era witnessed the rapid growth and spread of interest bearing banking sectors and they have become integral parts of whole financing and trade systems with the changing production and consumption patterns, rapid growth of population, and communication and informatics systems. In terms of interest bearing, bank loans and credit cards are two most debated issue of for the Islamists.

As one of the short-term financing tools of contemporary time, credit cards satisfy the needs of the buyers by enabling them to shop without carrying cash as well as online transaction. The credit card issuer (usually banks) pays the proceeds of the transaction on behalf of the buyer and in return charges interest.¹⁹⁴The charge demanded in case of late payment means the practice of *riba* (usury or unjust, exploitative gains made in trade or business) and it is prohibited for Islamic laws by both Quran and *Sunnah* (the orally transmitted record of what the Prophet said or did during his lifetime, as well as various reports about the Prophet's companions.¹⁹⁵). While all believers agree about the prohibition of *riba*, there is a disagreement over meaning and scope of it by experts in Islamic law, depending on the comments about corporations' codes of practices. Therefore in the last years, the usage of credit cards has been one of the frequently discussed issues between both Islamists and Islamic law scholars and many of them, including the Islamic Fiqh Academy, present an opinion on the forbiddance.

When the interviewees were asked about their credit card using habits, it is observed that they behave timidly about interest and seek *fetwas* (A declaration in writing, by a competent authority, of the requirements of the Islamic law in any given case) for using.

There is such a thing about using credit card; without paying interest, if you do not use any kind of interest while using credit card, you know when you pay the minimum you have to pay interest, if you can pay your debt at once without owing to the bank, if you do not pay any kind of subscription fees, because they take a price of usage from you, if you do not pay it either,

¹⁹⁴Ilham Reza Ferdian et al. "The Practice of Islamic Credit Card: A Comparative Look Between Bank Danamon Indonesia's Dirham Card and Bank Islam Malaysia's BI Card." Paper submitted to IAEI International Conference, Surabaya, Indonesia, 1-3 August 2008.

¹⁹⁵El Fadl, "What is Shari'a?"

*then I think it is religiously permissible. I say it, because there are some hodjas who give a fetwa about it.*¹⁹⁶

What is observed during the interviews is this aversion to interest bearing transaction and reluctance to prefer conventional banks. Younger interviewees claimed that they use their parents' credit cards only in case of need¹⁹⁷. 'The case of need' is also a prevalent factor for the ones who uses credit card for shopping. In that sense,

*In order to avoid paying interest, we do not pay by credit card at once. We use the credit card while shopping only when it is necessary. Sometimes we pay in cash and sometimes we use credit card when we go shopping. We try to not to deal with bank as much as possible. We did not get credit when we bought our home.*¹⁹⁸

Hence, Muslim people who do not want to involve in *riba*, demanded an alternative interest-free credit card that complies with Islamic principles and offers same installment and pay-later opportunities as conventional credit cards at the same time.¹⁹⁹ In the whole Muslim world, Islamic banks seek to supply an alternative card. However, interestingly, none of the interviewees mentioned about these Islamic banks, free from interest (participation banks in Turkey). One of the interviewees mentioned about a tactic they created against the strategies of the banking and make a crack in the system. She claimed that:

*We buy houses to each other collectively with our friends. Ten-twelve persons. Everyone helps each other, makes loans to each other, buys houses, and then buys for another person. Like this way, we pay each other's debt. The ones we trust...*²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁶“Kredi kartı kullanmak hakkında şöyle bir şey var; faizine girmeden eğer kredi kartında herhangi bir faize girmiyorsanız minimum ödemeyi yapıp faiz biniyor ya o ödemeyi tek seferde yapabiliyorsanız, bankaya borçlanmıyorsanız, bankaya herhangi bir aidat ödemiyorsanız çünkü sizden kullanma bedeli alıyor, onu da ödemiyorsanız bankaya ben caiz olduğunu düşünüyorum. Düşünüyorum derken bu konuda fetva veren hocalar var.” (Halime, 41)

¹⁹⁷Esmâ, 18. (I use my mother's credit card.), İrem, 23. (I do not have a personal one, but in the case of need, I use my father's.)

¹⁹⁸ “Faiz vermemek için de, nakit çekim yapmıyoruz. Sadece alışverişte gerekli olduğu zamanlarda kullanıyoruz kredi kartını. Bazen nakit bazen kredi kartıyla alışveriş yapıyoruz. Çok fazla bankayla muhatap olmamaya gayret ediyoruz. Evimizi alırken bankadan kredi almadık.” (Hatice, 42)

¹⁹⁹İshak Emin Aktepe, Kredi Kartı Sistemi Ve İslâm Hukuku Açısından Değerlendirilmesi, Dinbilimleri Akademik Araştırma Dergisi Cilt 10 Sayı 1, 141.

²⁰⁰ “Biz böyle imece usulü birbirimize ev alıyoruz dostlarımızla on kişi. On-oniki kişi. Herkes birbirine yardım ediyor, borç veriyor, ev alıyor, sonra diğerine alınıyor. Bu şekilde birbirimizin borcunu ödüyoruz. Güvendiğimiz...” (Hatice, 42)

By this way, instead of integrating to the interest bearing banking system, they are organized in small groups and create a trust-based alternative to live, as they believe.

3.2.4. Tourism and Holiday

Tourism in general can be defined trips and temporary accommodation movements without change of residence for relaxation, entertainment, learning and visiting historical and natural beauties. In that sense, it is a wide ranging, multi-faceted phenomenon that includes business sectors of social and cultural activities, transportation, accommodation, eating and drinking, entertainment; moreover, the expenses of tourists in the destinations, introducing localities to tourists, local, social, cultural and economic relations.²⁰¹ According to the latest UNWTO Annual Report, 'International tourism propelled ahead in 2014 as the number of international tourists (overnight visitors) grew 4.4% with an additional 48 million more than in 2013, to reach a new record total of 1,135 million.' Moreover, it is claimed that, 'International tourism accounts for 30% of the world's exports of services and 6% of total exports, a contribution that is similar for both developed and emerging economies. As an export category, it ranks fourth worldwide, after fuels, chemicals and food, but notably ahead of automotive products. Furthermore, compared to fuels, earnings from international tourism also tend to generate more employment.'²⁰²

These data were referred to explain the role of tourism as a sector in the whole world, and accordingly Turkey. As tourism is accepted one of the most important service industries of a country in economic, social and cultural areas, the developed and developing countries that have potential in tourism aimed to invigorate their economies and prosper by distributing tourism receipt to the populace. As Çetintaş and Bektaş asserts, tourism directional growth hypothesis is accurate tourism affects economic development positively in the long run, and it is one of the most crucial growing sources of Turkey. In 1980, the contribution of tourism gainings to the Turkey's economic growth process was

²⁰¹ Abdulnasır Süt, Islam and Tourism, Turkish Studies, Volume 9/11, Fall 2014, p. 481.

²⁰² UNWTO Annual Report 2014, (2015), 11-14.

%0.8; in 2000, it was reduced to %3.8 and in 2005 to %5.²⁰³In 2015, Turkey hosted more than 41 millions of tourists and this number is almost double that it hosted in 2005.²⁰⁴Hence, tourism is a mentionable revenue industry of Turkey and as Tekin calls 'pious tourist (*mütedeyyin turist*)', person that make her tourism preferences in accordance with the Islamic principles becomes important actors for the Islamic branch of tourism.²⁰⁵Sehlikoglu and Karakas explain the importance of this sector by numbers by claiming that, 'With a capacity of about 30 thousand beds and a market volume of 80 million dollars, this emerging market has become the hot spot of tourism in Turkey and in the Middle East. At the global scale, the Muslim travellers' market represents more than 10% of the world tourism market and it has been growing very rapidly since the last decade'.²⁰⁶

3.2.4.1. Islamic Tourism and Holiday Culture

As an important business sector, generally, tourism mainly targets Muslim people are called Islamic tourism. In literature, terms of halal tourism and Islamic tourism are used interchangeably. In this study, Islamic tourism is preferred. Many researchers put emphasis on the different touristic activities that Islam supports to enhance religious and social functions. For Hamza, Islamic tourism has a universal principle that 'is about satisfying tourists looking for a destination that can fulfill their needs without being offensive in any way' because 'tourists can count on feeling safe and secure knowing that only family-centred activities can be accessed'. Moreover, Muslims 'can rely on having a completely halal good time without having to worry'. For him, tourism of many types are compatible with Islam and encouraged by many verses of the Quran that endorse travelling with a view to achieving spiritual, physical, and social

²⁰³Hakan Çetintaş and Çetin Bektaş, "The Long and Short Term Relationships Between Tourism and Economic Growth in Turkey, Anatolia", *Turizm Araştırmaları Dergisi* Vol: 19, No: 1 (2008): 42.

²⁰⁴Income, Expenditure and Average Spending of Tourism, (2003-2015) Table:3, *Republic of Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism General Directorate of Investment and Operations*, <http://yigm.kultur-turizm.gov.tr/TR,72942/turizm-gelir-gider-ve-ortalama-harcama.html>.

²⁰⁵ Ömer Akgün Tekin, "Islamic Tourism: An Investigation On General Situation In The World and In Turkey", *The Journal of International Social Research*, Vol:7 Issue:29, 755.

²⁰⁶ Sertaç Sehlikoglu and Fahri Karakas, "We can have the cake and eat it too: Leisure and Spirituality at 'veiled' hotels in Turkey", *Leisure Studies*, 35:2, (2014), 158.

goals. Of course, during these activities, adherence to provisions about conduct, dress, food, and prayer should be regarded.²⁰⁷

Tekin claims that according to Islamic principles, tourism is an act to have Allah's blessing and to be psychologically and physically and socially healthy and notable thing is not the destination or touristic motivation, but shaping of touristic consumption behaviours, sense of entertainment and life styles in accordance with Islamic principles. Moreover he calls Islamic tourism as flexible, logical, simple and balance focused. Flexible, because touristic activities like shopping, sanitation and keeping health, attending to sport activities and religious patterned activities are permissible in Islam. Logical, because Islamic principles recommends its followers to travel around and discover the world, visit friends and relatives and live in peace. It is simple because it brings ease to the obligations of people. Balance focused because the touristic activity is both a facility in this world and an investment for the other world in terms of intention.²⁰⁸

Sut opposes Hamza and Tekin in terms of the existence of phenomenon of tourism in today's perception in the primary sources of Islam. Although there is a close relationship between Islam and travelling, Sut claims recommended travels and trips in religious sources are meaningful ones directed towards a purpose, not for fun or vacation; however today, touristic travels do not always realized in this context. Hence, he differentiates travelling from vacation and claims that in Islam travelling is recommended for education, language learning, commercial activities, sight seeing in terms of knowledge acquisition, drawing lessons, knowing the creator and in some instances travelling itself is a worship-such as hajj and umrah. One another difference between Islamic perception and travelling and today's tourism is the issue of hospitality. In Islamic culture, entertaining guests and travellers is regarded as a mighty virtue; however in today's comprehension of tourism, tourists are assumed as commercial figures only. Moreover, vacation (*tatil* in Turkish) is originated from the word of *âtil* (standing idle, suspension of work); therefore approachment of understanding

²⁰⁷ Ingy M. Hamza, Rabab Chouhoud and Passent Tantawi, "Islamic Tourism: Perceptions and Possibilities in Egypt", *AJBER African Journal of Business and Economic Research*, Vol:7, No:1 (2012), 86-87.

²⁰⁸ Tekin, "Islamic Tourism: An Investigation On General Situation In The World and In Turkey", 755.

vacation in terms of idleness is not approved by the Islamic principles. Hamza adds that, Muslims have a right to rest, but they do not have right to spend free time in idleness by trapped to resort hotels during religious eids that are the basic dynamics of social cohesion and solidarity.²⁰⁹

Organizations that function by the Islamic perspective cannot be treated free from each other. Thus these organizations inholds a marketing perception that supports and fosters each other. Resort holidays and its by-products and ancillary services are the examples of the triggering of different sectors. Over the last 7 years, CrescentRating, a Singapore based company, that rates hotels, restaurants and many other touristic services claim they use 'insight, industry intelligence lifestyle, behaviour and research on the needs of the Muslim traveller to deliver authoritative guidance on all aspects of halal-friendly travel to organisations across the globe.'²¹⁰ By this way, tourism activities become more practical with the increasing knowledge about the reliability of destinations and hence, share of pious tourists are expanding in the global market. According to CrescentRating, share of total Muslim market in 2014 was \$145, it is moving up to between 12.5% and 15% in 2020, which translates into between 188 billion and 225 billion U.S. dollars, based on the rising share of Muslims in the world's population.²¹¹

Another standardization move was realized in 2012, with the organization of 1st International Islamic Tourism Standard Conference in Kuala Lumpur and it witness the first recipient of the Islamic Quality Standard Award. 'The recipients of this award must demonstrate that they have complied with the Islamic quality standard - a standard that has been designed for hotels that are interested to apply the basic Islamic practices in their operation.'²¹² is said in the homepage of the conference. As halal food certificates, crescent certificates were defined to assure halal standards are for the hotels, apart from stars.

²⁰⁹Süt, *The Relationship of Islam and Tourism*, 485-487.

²¹⁰ CrescentRating, <https://www.crescentrating.com/about-us.html>

²¹¹Iskra Pavlova, Bosnia Sees High Profile in Halal Tourism, SEE Country Profile, SEE Top 100, January 1, 2011, 121.

²¹² Universiti Teknologi Mara, <http://iitsc.uitm.edu.my>

Interestingly, Turkey-originated Caprice Hotel group that brings for the first time concept of modern Islamic holiday to Turkey in 1996, was the sponsor of this conference and the Caprice Hotel Bayrampaşa in Istanbul, took the first 7 Crescent Certificate of the world. Pavlova explains the distinct services of Islamic tourism as ‘the halal hospitality industry caters to the needs of Muslim families who abide by Sharia rules. The most strict halal hotels do not serve alcohol or pork, they have prayer facilities and separate swimming pools and spa facilities for men and women.’²¹³The hotel had all these facilities; moreover it does not have casino, but *masjid* instead in which prayer is calling five times a day. Its ceiling was designed as Qubbat as-Sakhrāh and it would be the second place that Quran was recited incessantly. According to De Certeau,

‘Believing is being exhausted. Or at least it takes refuge in the areas of the media and leisure activities. It goes on vacation; but even then it does not cease to be a captured object and processed by advertising, commerce, and fashion. In order to bring back some of these beliefs that are retreating and disappearing, businesses have begun to fabricate their own simulacra of credibility.’²¹⁴

What Islamic resorts promised to its customers is exactly this kind of a simulacrum with its fake image of holiness. For Bilici, opening of such a five-star hotel ‘... cannot be reduced to a mere embrace of consumerism disseminated by globalization, rather it requires an ideological justification which accompanies the re-organization of spaces life beaches.’²¹⁵ For the first time in Turkey, the beach of a hotel is divided into three sections; for families, for men and for women. Therefore, it is an important step towards the establishment of women-only holiday culture. So, as an ‘entrepreneurial attempt, Caprice Hotel finds its discursive explanation vis-à-vis established forms of construction of Islamic identity.’²¹⁶

Although Islamic tourism is a global movement with increasing shares, first luxury Islamic resorts in Turkey and especially Caprice Hotel was harshly criticized by the Islamic intellectuals especially because of its marketing strategy that is accused of exploiting morals of believers. Bulaç, one of the Islamist intellectuals claimed that, ‘this hotel is unacceptable in terms of Islamic

²¹³Iskra Pavlova, “Bosnia Sees High Profile in Halal Tourism”, *SEE Top 100*, 1 Jan 2011, 121.

²¹⁴De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, 180.

²¹⁵Mücahit Bilici, “Caprice Hotel: Transforming Islam on the Aegean Coast”, *Isim Newsletter* 6/00, Regional Issues.

²¹⁶*Ibid.*

law (*fiqh*). It is extravagance and it also triggers the rage of the ones that do not have the same economic income level. Women-only swimming pools and not serving alcohol is not criteria. The benchmark is the *Sunnah* of our Prophet; which is simplicity. Trade associations should mobilize.’ Dilipak adds that this is a commercial action, inconsistent in Islamic terms and cannot fit to an ideologic ground. Hatemi finds advertising immoral and claims it is both commercially unfair trading and disrespect to religion. He adds trade associations and chamber of commerce should prevent this kind of commercial usage of Islam.²¹⁷ Concisely, criticisms do not address the existence of Islamic resorts and resting of pious tourists; but luxury consumption and advertising Islam for benefit. As a customer of these hotels, one of the interviewees is critical of the hotels in terms of squandering food and privacy issues by claiming that:

*The Islamic resort hotels are capitalized in the same way. It is not only about the price, but also the behaviours of the people bothers. For instance, about the matter of swimming, even among women, it is a problem that women are not mindful enough about their privacy. Open-buffets are other botherations.*²¹⁸

Despite criticisms, fancy Islamic resort hotels have been popping up in Turkey since the opening of Caprice Hotel and they are not only preferred by the domestic tourists, but also became popular holiday destinations for the international pious tourists. For Sehlkoglul and Karakas, one of the main reasons of this rapid growth of Islamic resort hotels industry ‘is the legitimization strategy used by these hotels both to fit in the global capitalist system and to customise themselves to respond to the niche demands of female – mostly veiled – customers.’²¹⁹As one of the most distinct paradigms, luxury holiday styles enable us to observe the expansion of Islamic life style in modern consumption patterns. According to Zorlu, this is a transformation of scope of religious life styles to Western life styles. Religious life style has been expanding in the popular consumption culture and the traditional understanding of holidays are transforming from satisfaction of basic needs to the luxury

²¹⁷ “Otellerde 7 Yıldız-7 Hilal Savaşları”, *Turkish Forum Arşiv*,

<http://www.turkishnews.com/tr/content/2013/01/24/otellerde-7-yildiz-7-hilal-savaslar/>

²¹⁸“Onlar (muhafazakar oteller) da aynı şekilde kapitalistleşti. Ücreti değil, insanların oradaki davranışları da ayrı bir dert. Mesela denize girme hususunda, kadınların kendi arasında bile olsa mahremiyetine yeterince dikkat etmemesi ayrı bir dert. Açık büfeler ayrı bir dert.” (İrem, 23)

²¹⁹Sehlkoglul and Karakas, “We can have the cake and eat it too: Leisure and Spirituality at ‘veiled’ hotels in Turkey”, 158.

consumption and this expansion is the result desire to close the gap between religious life styles and Western life styles. This point can also be deduced from the narratives of the interviewees. Hacer claims that:

You go when you need it, I go too. What I mean by necessity is that, going to the swimming is a very pleasant thing, I go, I swim, but sometimes it comes to such a point that, going becomes a must, like, every summer, you must go to holiday, you must swim, you must go to a holiday resort. Every year, you should go to a cultural tour, if you do not, it is a lack. 'Oh my god, it has been three months since we last went abroad, let's go, et cetera.' It is not like showing off for someone but it becomes normalized.²²⁰

Emel agrees her by asserting that: 'Going to a vacation now almost seems like a necessity to people. Before, people used to somehow keep living.'²²¹

Zorlu attributes this transformation to two reasons. Firstly, different life styles are homogenized with the affect of modern powers-such as division of labor, urbanization, secularization- and differentiated with the aesthetization and information tools of advertisement, fashion and designment. The second reason is about secularism in terms of politics and religious pluralism; the structural transformations of relationship between religion and society caused by the lack of possession of religious traditions by a certain groups. In this pluralist system, religion should be sold to the customer that do not has to buy it; in that sense, religious morals and practices are presented to customer by redefining. This redefinition is the materialization and commercialization of religious practices and symbols; then they are offered to target market as consumption objects.²²² Sehlíkoglu names the commodifying this specific lifestyle as a tactic of capitalists to create a niche and capture a share in the international market.²²³

²²⁰"İhtiyacın olduğunda gidilir, ben de gidiyorum. İhtiyaç derken denize girmek çok güzel bir şey, gidiyorum giriyorum ama bu bazen öyle bir boyuta geliyor ki gidilirse olmaz. Her yaz tatile, denize gidilir, otele gidilir şeklinde. Her sene bir kültür turuna çıkılır, çıkmazsa eksik. Aman Allah'ım... üç ay yurtdışına çıkmadık oluyor. Hadi bir çıkalım falan gibi. Birine gösteriş yapmak için değil ama normalleşiyor." (Hacer, 22)

²²¹"Tatil neredeyse bir gereklilik gibi gelmeye başladı insanlara. Eskiden insanlar bir şekilde yaşamaya devam ediyordu." (Emel, 24)

²²²Abdulkadir Zorlu, "Batılı Bir Yaşam Tarzı Olarak Tüketim: Türkiye'de Tüketim Ürünlerinin ve Kültürünün Tarihi Gelişimi", Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyolojik Araştırmalar Dergisi (2003).

²²³Sehlíkoglu and Karakas, "We can have the cake and eat it too: Leisure and Spirituality at 'veiled' hotels in Turkey", 160.

3.2.4.1. Holiday Preferences

During interviews, it was observed that travelling or going to a vacation is not quite a new phenomena. Most of the interviewees narrated different stories about their holiday cultures. Going to thermal springs for health, visiting relatives that live in hometowns are part of traditional holiday culture of the many interviewees. One of the interviewees, Mısra, mentioned about their visits to hometowns:

My family has their own house at Tokat, Zile and they have a summer resort at uplands. They have a culture of staying at mountain house in summers and winter quarters in winters, however my father is from Kastamonu and they have no culture of moving like that. We went to Şile for the first time thanks to my uncle, but since then we go there constantly. My mother and her relatives got used to it. They have fruit trees and they prepare jams, fruit leathers at summerhouse. They stay there during summers because the weather is cooler. It is not for animals or so; it is arbitrary.²²⁴

Reyhan also mentions about their traditional mountain holidays: 'We have a dairy barn at uplands, because of ranching, at summer we go to uplands.' She says and adds:

My family used to be in the village, then they came and started to live here (Istanbul). The uncle of my father was an imam and he had a lodging, by enlarging it, they kept living in there. When their positions, financial situations improved, everyone moved to his/her own house. It was not like vacation, but with the occasion of business, they enjoyed having trips. I was very surprised, my grandfather, not naming it, but they quite used to travel. They used to enjoy travelling I mean.²²⁵

These narrations are in accordance with the purposeful travels confirmed by the religion as Süt explains. There is an obvious transformation in the holiday culture, it is not only about luxury resort hotels, but summerhouses also are parts of this new culture.

My mother is a Bogazici University graduate. When it was mentioned about a summerhouse at Yesilkoy, she heard the term of summerhouse for

²²⁴ "Benim ailemin Tokat Zile'de kendi evleri var, ama bir de yaylada yazlık evleri var ve onlarda daha yayla-kışlık ev kültürü var ama babam Kastamonulu ve onlarda böyle bir gitme gelme kültürü yok. İlk defa dayım sayesinde Şile'ye gittik ama o zamandan beri devamlı gidilir. Anne tarafımda yayla dolayısıyla daha alışkınlar. Orada meyve ağaçları, pestiller, reçeller yapılır, yazı daha serin diye orada geçirirler. Hayvan için filan da gidilmez, keyfi gidilir." (Mısra, 23)

²²⁵ "Benim ailem için öyle bir şey yok. Köydelermiş, sonra gelmiş burda yaşamaya başlamışlar. Babamın amcası imammış, onun bir lojmanı varmış, orayı genişleterek yaşamışlar. İşleri, maddi durumları düzeline herkes kendi evine taşınmış. Tatil gibi değil ama iş bahanesiyle gezmeyi seviyorlarmış. Ben baya şaşırılmıştım, dedem baya, tatil adı altında değil ama gezme adı altında, gezermiş yani. Gezmeyi severlermiş yani." (Reyhan, 25)

*the first time in her life but she put a bold face on. There was no practice like that. She even heard the word of summer resort for the first time.*²²⁶

Moreover, Tülin claims, previously, mother and children were used to go on vacations because fathers had to work; in that sense, holidays of the whole family are new routines for her.

According to Lefebvre, with the initiative of capitalism, the irrationality that defines the objects dominating daily life as 'scarce' or 'expensive' is placed by a much broader and deeper irrationality incomparable with the earlier times, that complements official rationality. With this way, tragedy would be unseeable because terror spreads to the whole society by fusion and hidden by the victorious rationality. Nature becomes distant; contact with the substance disappears during productive working with the enchainning deeds and behaviours. In this kind of a society, rational man would be recognized as normal. Normal becomes accustomed, in that way, accustomed unites with the natural and what is natural is identified with rational. A vicious circle occurs in that way. Within the naturalism that takes place of this significant logic, rationality, all dilemmas dissolve and rational becomes identical with rational.²²⁷

Holiday resorts of today can be termed as a part of the irrationality that is preferred, lived and accustomed by the modern society of today. It is a disengagement from geography and natural. Unlike traditional vacations mentioned by the interviewees -thermal springs, summer cottages, mountains- holiday resorts offer a virtual reality, a setting that could be created in anywhere. When a tourist arrives a resort, a designed environment welcomes her. There is no indication about the city or country it is built in; if the weather sunny, she would not recognize whether she is in Cape Town or Hawaii. Mostly international foods are served in restaurants, the whole outer resort is designed in accordance with the aesthetic pleasure, nature is tamed, activities are usually universal and mostly English-spoken workers are there to host. Some native figures could be added as flavours. Hence, resorts are kind of settings that are distant to the reality of the geography, culture, nature and people that it is built.

²²⁶"Benim annem de Boğaziçi mezunu, Yeşilköy civarında yazlık evden bahsedildiğinde ilk defa hayatında yazlık ev duymuş ve bozuntuya vermemiş ama öyle bir alışkanlık yokmuş. Yazlık kelimesini bile ilk defa duymuş." (Reyhan, 25)

²²⁷ Lefebvre, *Modern Dünya'da Gündelik Hayat*, 56-57.

Similar resorts with similar servicing could be found in almost all over the world.

The existence of that kind of places and life style can be explained by leisure time. It is beyond any doubt that leisure time has been gaining more importance as time passes. Leisure is being accounted among needs and it distorts the previously existing needs. The exhaustions of the modern life, requires enjoying, having good time and relaxing. Holidays as new phenomena across the society have changed this society, and by being primary concerns, they replaced the real concerns. Hence, leisure time can be named as an instant disengagement from the daily life almost for everyone. Leisure time is neither the gift of labour, nor an independent activity that is performed for itself; it is just a generalized show, and tourism is a part of this show.²²⁸

For Hacer, this new routine is about learning how to spend money and it is a footing to gain a higher status.

*We are learning to how to spend money, I suppose. You know the thing that, there is a status of the people, the rich used to go to the opera to gain status. Now, these holidays nearly came to that point. We are learning how to spend money, to spend money. 'Going to the hotel? Okay, let's go then. Should eat here, okay let's go too.'*²²⁹

In that sense, it could be told that living in small societies accelerated creation of a new life style. Envy and gaze to each other's life gave way to the imitation of practices and placement of holidays as a new leisure culture into daily life.

3.2.4.3. Haşema

The occurrence of fashion shows and veiling fashion since mid 1990's makes visible many different aspects of the tension between religious identity and the new prosperous religious identity. Holidays as new indicators to move up the social ladder gained recognition as a new style of leisure activity. This problematical time and place rearrangement paved the way for seeking for 'an alternative holiday' and 'an alternative swimming suit' since mid 1990's and this

²²⁸Lefebvre, *Modern Dünyada Gündelik Hayat*, 65-66.

²²⁹ "Galiba biz parayı nasıl harcayacağımızı öğreniyoruz. Hani şey vardır ya statü olur insanlar, zenginler statü kazanmak için operaya falan giderlermiş. Bu da şu an sanki o boyuta geldi. Para harcamak için nasıl paranın harcanması gerektiğini öğreniyoruz. Otele mi gidilir, ee biz de gidelim canım, işte ne bileyim burda yemek mi yenilirmiş tamam biz de gidelim." (Hacer, 22)

issue is set as a summer agenda of Turkey.²³⁰ With this new culture of seashore resorts and its presentation meant bermuda short-swimming suits for men and loose swimming suits that cover the whole bod and hair instead of faces, hands and foots for women were designed and their production become an inseparable sector for Islamic holiday. These Islamically proper new suits are called *Haşema* or *tesettür mayosu* (veiled swimming suits) because of the first brand that designed it. The first *haşemas* were usually in dark colors and when interviewees were asked about *haşema*, Halime claimed that:

*I find it horrible; nevertheless it had an enormous evolution. The first haşemas, you know, there were the lily-white Americans that worn in white, their eyes hollow, hooded, they used to kill the blacks like that. Haşema was like the black version of it, in a word, early on. But then, now it becomes quite good-looking, charming.*²³¹

In the first years of its production, it drew too much attention and Islamist women were harshly criticized; even the newspapers do not hesitate to write swimming of veiled women in a beach open to public as a new. This new preferences of the Islamists are regarded as a pressure to their sense of aesthetics. Tv channels went hunting of people with *haşemas* in the Caddebostan public beach opened by Kadıköy Municipality in 2005.

*My uncle used to tease us by saying, 'Why are you hanging around like black cormorants, you disturb my visul pleasure.' It is a bit about getting used to it. I do not like to swim with haşema, it becomes heavy, makes you uncomfortable.*²³²

says Reyhan, by referring to those days. In time, many different brands began to desing *haşemas* jauntier in different colors and models. Comparing with the previous days, Halime claims that:

In the time that I mentioned, there was not a soul when we went there, even there was no road to there. We were going through the vicinities like Kadıköy by car. Then, we were swimming with swimwear. Guess how long, for 19-20 years, I swam with swimwear. Then, I realized that, either I do

²³⁰Barbarosoğlu,Şov ve Mahrem, 108.

²³¹“(Haşemayı) Berbat buluyorum ama yine de çok büyük evrim geçirdi. İlk haşemalar hani zenci düşmanı Amerikalılar vardı beyaz giyerler, gözleri şöyle delik kukuletalı öyle zencileri öldürürlerdi. Onun siyahı yani ilk zamanlarda bu haşema. Ondan sonra ama şimdi baya bir hoşlaştı, bir güzelleşti.” (Halime, 41)

²³²“Amcam da bizimle dalga geçerdi, karabataklar gibi ne dolaşıyorsunuz ortalıkta, göz zevkimi bozuyorsunuz diye. Göz alışmasıyla ilgili biraz da. Sevmiyorum haşemayla girmeyi, ağır geliyor rahatsız ediyor.” (Reyhan, 25)

*not go swimming, or I wear that nylon staff. Because I cannot relinquish from the sea, I wore it. But it gave me freedom, now I can swim freely.*²³³

This freedom of going anywhere for holiday let Islamists to gain self-confidence and they become visible in all holiday resorts and beaches with their *haşemas*. Still, the concern of not looking to people whose swimming suits is inappropriate for Islamic principles affect holiday preferences. Tülin assert that:

*Now we can swim everywhere. Yet as a family, we do not prefer the places in which too many naked people present. Even we swim with haşema together, we do not prefer too crowded beaches; more peaceful, not quaggy, though not conservative, we prefer the places in which we can be more on our own.*²³⁴

Although *haşema* is an important step for realization of a new holiday culture and created a certain realm of freedom to Islamist women, still, it is not the best swimming suit and it has some disadvantages. Therefore, women unpleased with present *haşema*, like Aslı is in pursuit of new ideas about swimming suit:

*I even have a plan about it (haşema), how can I have it sewn, how to make it more proper. - I just talked with tailor, I said, 'what can we do, how can we do, I see the ones who wear it, this swimming wear balloons, its back also get uncovered you know. Let's sew it like a creeper, where to buy the texture' et cetera...*²³⁵

With its all advantages and disadvantages, *haşema* is an important turning point for the leisure activities of Islamist women. Previously, they were seeking for quiet places that cannot be seen by nobody or they worn inappropriate dresses and humiliated by the other people. Despite its unpleasant design, *haşema* liberated Islamist women and open a realm in public space that increases their visibility and performances.

²³³ "Bu benim bahsettiğim tarihte hiç Allah'ın kulu yoktu biz gittiğimizde, yolu bile yoktu oraların. Kadıköy gibi yerlerde arabayla geçerek gidiyorduk. O zaman mayoyla giriyorduk. Ne kadar düşünün, 19, 20 yıl kadar mayoyla girdim. Baktım ya denize girmeyeceğim ya o şeyi giyeceğim üstüme naylon şeyden. Denizden vazgeçemeyeceğim için giydim. Ama bana özgürlük verdi, çok rahat girebiliyorum mesela." (Halime, 41)

²³⁴ "Artık her yerde girebiliyoruz. Ama ailecek çok fazla açık insanın bulunduğu yerleri tercih etmiyoruz. Birlikte de haşemayla da giriyor olsak çok kalabalık sahilleri de tercih etmiyoruz, daha sakın, vıcık vıcık değil, muhafazakar olmasa bile daha kendi halimize olabileceğimiz yerleri tercih ediyoruz." (Tülin, 26)

²³⁵ "Onunla (haşema) ilgili hatta bir planım var şu anda, nasıl diktirebilirim, nasıl daha düzgün hale getirebilirim diye. Daha yeni konuştuk terziyle, ya dedim, ne yapsak ne etsek, ben görüyorum giyenlerden şişiyor bu mayo, arkası açılıyor da yani. Tulum halinde dikelim diye bir şeyler, kumaş nerden alınır filan diye..." (Aslı, 30)

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

“...in focusing upon what we have been and what we are now, what we might become is inevitably illuminated. Therefore, while it may not be the province of social scientists to predict our futures, they are, given not only their understandings but also their equal position as citizens, entitled to engage in public debates concerning future prospects.”²³⁶

As Tim May claims, what is aimed by writing this thesis, as a prospective social scientist, is not only an evaluation of today's everyday lives of Islamist women by referencing to the past; but inspire future apprehensions' of us and steering to the question of what the society might eventually become. As the composition of today's society is very much related to the founding principles of the state and understanding its history is crucial; explaining contemporary society also has quite importance to illuminate subsequent researches.

This thesis aims to make a micro-level analyze to contemporary consumption patterns of Islamist women whose daily life practices signifies a certain break from the previous images of marginalized and victimized women. Last few decades have been witnessed a power-shift in Turkey. Although Turkish republic was founded on the principle of secularism and it is the only example of laic, democratic Muslim-populated state in the world, it has a *sui-generis* characteristic. Unlike other secular states that separate religious dominion from the ruling of the state, in Turkey, religion was put under control of the state. This situation also affected the relations of Islamists with the state since its establishment, eventually, Islamists, and especially women with their headscarves became objects of modernization movements. Because women were accepted as displays of the countries; their appearance, dressing,

²³⁶ Zygmunt Bauman, *Work, Consumerism and the New Poor*, Ed. by Tim May (Berkshire: McGraw-Hill Professional Publishing, 2004). ProQuest ebrary. Web. 22 February 2016.

education and everyday rituals were important symbolic criteria of being developed and civilized for a newly establishing country. In this project of modernization, Islamist women were marginalized and blamed for being non-modern and incompatible with the values of contemporary era. More or less, till 1980's, the image of a veiled woman refers generally to an ignorant, provincial and uneducated individual.

During 1980's, economic liberalization policies and integrating to the capitalist global market affected consumption patterns in the whole country. With the support of state businessmen in Anatolian cities, a new religious and conformist capitalist class, a new Islamist bourgeoisie emerged. This was also the era that witnessed spread of political Islamism in international conjuncture and flourishing of a non-Western Islamist discourse and intellectuals. Turkish Islamists were not indifferent the happenings and with the coup of 1980's, the prohibition of veiled women from universities and public institutions also corresponds with this era. This political enforcement gave way to increase of public visibility of women in public space for demanding rights, organizing in social life as NGO's, going abroad for education and come in on the private sector to establish their own jobs. As a result, a modern Islamist women image occurred as an alternative to the defined modernity of Kemalism.

In early 2000's, a power shift occurred and previous so-called marginal Islamists came to rule. In time, the ban of headscarf in public institutions and universities was removed. This liberation fostered both the visibility and activity of veiled women in public and private spheres. Especially prosperous upper-middle class women, both economically and culturally, adopted a world-integrated lifestyle, shopping and eating preferences, spending and consumption patterns. This transformation generated discussions about the role of religion plays in everyday life of Islamist women and whether they become part of capitalist consumption system or do they still have drawbacks by religious motivation.

Michel de Certeau explains the theory of everyday life as a sphere in which individual has an active role and tools, namely tactics to survive against the strategies determined by the system. Strategy is 'the calculation of power relationships that becomes possible when a subject of will and power be

isolated from.’ Strategy postulates a place that can be enclosed as proper and thus serve as the basis for generating relations with an exteriority composed of targets or threats can be managed. By contrast, tactics are calculated actions determined by the non-existence of a proper locus within the space of enemy. Within its limits, tactic takes the advantage of the opportunities and depends on them. For sure, this placelessness enhances its mobility but this mobility has to accept the chance offerings of the moment and grab the possibilities that offer themselves at any given moment. Moreover, it has to take advantage of the cracks opened by particular conjunctions in the surveillance of the powers and by intruding them it should create surprises.²³⁷ It could be said that, Islamist women occasionally need to use tactics in their daily life to defend their belief against the capitalist system and distinguish themselves from common customers.

In-depth interviews with the customers of a de lux beauty saloon and two focus groups with upper-class women, mostly university students, provided immense amount of knowledge about daily lives of them. All of the interviewees, except one of them are veiled women. A wide range of issues were discussed such as space usage, the place of home, shortcuts to ease complicated city life, the impact of veil to the space usage, the boundaries driven by veil in daily life, bending and partly abolishing of boundaries and the defending tactics developed against them, being ‘the other’ and gaining self-confidence, consumption patterns, corruption in ethical values, the shift of power in Turkey and its effects over the transforming in veiling styles, lifestyles and religiosity. Instead of political and ideological discussions, analyzes are deduced from the interviewees’ personal experiences and memories that are in the scope of everyday life. As it is a multi-layered bulk of information, the scope of this thesis is limited with the consumption patterns; eating and drinking habits, dress, styling and fashion, usage of credit card and bank interest, tourism and holiday.

In terms of eating and drinking habits, alcoholic beverages and pork serving restaurants are one of the boundaries in daily life. It is observed that none of the interviewees except one prefer to go to such a place unless narrow circumstances –like being in a non-Muslim country. A few of them went a few

²³⁷De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, 175-180.

times because of their friends however it is not a normally admitted or preferred behavior due to religious conscience. Moreover, the idea of representation is another boundary for Islamist women. Many believe that veil has religious connotations and being in a place that is not convenient for a Muslim may encourage others to do so. Although they do not prefer to go, it is observed that the interviewees do not criticize the ones who go. Even if one preferred to go, respectful manners are quite important and she does not want to be disturbed by verbal or physical behaviors of the other customers or employers. Hence it can be claimed that going to an alcohol-serving place is not perceived as a forbiddance by religion, but it is not proper for an Islamist to go such places if there are alternatives. Starbucks is another drawback in spite of denial of providing financial support to Israeli government or army, still the company is perceived as an encounterer. Trust to the place and the existence of a prayer room in the café are other decisive factors that affect preferences.

Dress, styling and fashion are another areas to observe the impact of religion. It could be asserted that, generally Islamist women are against the idea of being fashionistas and criticize attraction-grabbing styles. Still they want to be approved by the society by being well groomed and avert from being demoded. Depending on their previous memories about being a non-modern, backward and ugly, they want to have a modern style that is in accordance with the religious norms of veiling. With regard to the usage of pastel and non-assertive colors as a symbol of Islamic style during 1980's and 1990's, colorfulness is a debated issue among women. As a result, it is mentioned that colors are not sole determinants of veil and veil should be regarded altogether with issues of transparency, tightness and attractiveness.

Contemporary tools of banking system, credit cards, credits and bank interest are asked to interviewees. General idea is aversion from interest bearing transaction and reluctance to prefer conventional banks. Credit cards are used only in occasional times and paid back before it goes to interest. As a tactic, some resist to banking system and taking credits by organizing insmall groups and help each other, so they create an alternative trust based system to buy houses.

The new consumption culture also transformed leisure activities and

holiday culture. Going holiday, as a recreation is not a new phenomenon and traditional vacation styles are explained by the interviewees such as going to thermal springs for health, going mountains and visiting relatives that live in hometowns. Today, Islamic resorts that do not serve alcohol or pork with prayer facilities separate swimming pools and spa facilities for men and women are spreading as alternatives of the traditional holidays. Religious life style has been expanding in the popular consumption culture and the traditional understanding of holidays are transforming from satisfaction of basic needs to the luxury consumption. Seeking for 'an alternative holiday' revived the necessity of 'an alternative swimming suit'. *Haşema*, this Islamically proper new suit, arouse too much attention and Islamist women were harshly criticized as a pressure to sense of aesthetics. This freedom of going holiday let Islamists to gain self-confidence and they become visible in all holiday resorts. The new holiday style with its by-products both led to discussions and conveniences at the same time.

It is observed that there are no homogenous codes in everyday lives of Islamist women. The heterogeneity among interviewees' perceptions on practice of Islamic lifestyle is an indicator of a tension between profane everyday life and the religious principles. So, it can be assumed that despite integrating to capitalist consumption culture, the only motivation of Islamist women is not their own benefit in the market, but religion still plays a role as a determinant for their consumption preferences. Although some women do not approve commodification of Islamic lifestyles because of religious views of moderate consumption, conscience, forbiddances and promotions, some support adaptation to contemporary circumstances and all are part of this new lifestyle with varying degrees and justify their stance through various premises. Due to the need of legitimization, new lifestyles, activities and behavior are performed by adopting religious orders, Prophet's words, hadith, Quran verses and etc., thereby a generation process, a constant re-interpretation of religious rules and sayings is repeated.

The new and so-called modern Islamic consumption is a form of distinction from certain traditional others in terms of dressing, holidays, eating habits and consumption patterns. In all spheres of everyday life performances,

interviewees referred to an ambiguous previous time to explain differences of contemporary time. Previous generations are accepted to be harsher than today about the Islamic principles and today these limits are flexed. Through new forms of Islamic consumption, participation in social life has increased. Women state that they go out more and choose diverse places. Moreover, it can be claimed that veil is gradually losing its political connotations of the 1990s, and is transforming into a modern commodity. To conclude, despite seemingly normalization of Islamists, religious belief does not wiped away from daily life and it is still a determinative factor in preferences of Islamist women. This thesis is a humble intention to analyze the society we live in and I hope that this restricted research will pave way for further studies.



REFERENCES

- Abdul, Mohani, Ismail, Hashanah, Hashim, Haslina and Johari, Juliana. "Consumer Decision Making Process In Shopping For Halal Food In Malaysia." *China-USA Business Review*, Volume 8, No.9 (Serial No.75) (2009). http://thehalalfood.info/upload/market/MY_perception.pdf
- Aktaş, Cihan. *Bacı'dan Bayan'a İslamcıların Kamusal Alandaki İlişkilerinin Değişimi Üzerine*. İstanbul: Kapı, 2005.
- Aktaş, Cihan. *Türbanın Yeniden İcadı*, İstanbul: Kapı Yayınları, 2006.
- Aktaş, Özge and Ünlü Yücesoy, Eda. "The Renegotiation of Boundaries Between Islam and the "Modern": Perceptions of Religious Women in Istanbul." In *Global Prayers Contemporary Manifestations of the Religion in the City*, Edited by Jochen Becker, Katrin Klingar, Stephan Lanz and Kathrin Wildner, Zurich: Lars Mueller Publishers, (2013):514-528.
- Aktepe, İshak Emin. "Kredi Kartı Sistemi Ve İslâm Hukuku Açısından Değerlendirilmesi." *Dinbilimleri Akademik Araştırma Dergisi* Vol: 10, No: 1 (2010): 133-157.
- Altan, Mehmet. *Kent Dindarlığı*. İstanbul: Timaş, 2011.
- Ataman, Nariñç. "Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Kadın Kimliğinin Oluşumu" Master diss., Ankara University, 1999.
- Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal. *Atatürk Söylev Ve Demeçleri I-III*, Edited by Nimet Arsan, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1989.
- Avcı, Özlem. *İki Dünya Arasında*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2012.
- Ayvazoğlu, Beşir. "Türk Muhafazakarları Demokrasiyi Kabullenmeli". In *Cumhuriyet, Milliyetçilik, İslamcılık*, İstanbul: Küre, 2011.
- Barbarosoğlu, Fatma. *İmaj ve Takva*, İstanbul: Profil, 2010.
- Barbarosoğlu, Fatma. *Şov ve Mahrem*. İstanbul: Timaş, 2012.
- Barbarosoğlu, Fatma. "Kamusal Alanda Müslüman Erkekler." *Yeni Şafak*, 2 Nov 2015, <http://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/fatmabarbarosoglu/kamusal-alanda-musluman-erkekler-2022765>
- Baudrillard, Jean. *The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures*. London: Sage, 1998).

- Barnes, Jennifer. "Style and Consumption Among East African Muslim Immigrant Women: The Intersection of Religion, Ethnicity, and Minority Status" *Award Winning Sociology Papers*: (2009).
- Batu, Ali. "Halal Food and Halal Food Certification System in Turkey." *Electronic Journal of Food Technologies* Vol: 7, No: 1 (2012): 51-61.
- Bilgin, Beyza. "Türkiye'de Kadın, İslam'da Kadın." *Türkiye ve Avrupa'da İslam, Devlet ve Modern Toplum*. İstanbul: Konrad-Adanauer-Stiftung, 2005.
- Bilici, Mücahit. "Caprice Hotel: Transforming Islam on the Aegean Coast." *Isim Newsletter* 6/00, Regional Issues, https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/17416/ISIM_6_Caprice_Hotel-Transforming_Islam_on_the_Aegean_Coast.pdf?sequence=1.
- Bilici, Mücahit. "İslam'ın Bronzlaşan Yüzü: Caprice Hotel Örnek Olayı." In *İslamın Yeni Kamusal Yüzleri*, Edited by Nilüfer Göle. İstanbul: Metis, 2000
- Bilim Araştırma Vakfı. "Gerçek Dindar Atatürk", <http://www.bilimarastirmavakfi.org/html2/yayinlar/ataturkvedin.html>
- Bocock, Robert. *Consumption*. Routledge: London and New York, 1993.
- Bodur, Fatma. "Gençlerin Giyim Tarzının Modernleşme Açısından Değerlendirilişi." Master diss. Sakarya University, 2011.
- Bora, Aksu. "Hatırlananlar ve Unutulanlar: İslam Coğrafyasında Modernleşme ve Kadın Hareketleri." *Bilig* 53, Spring 2010, Ahmet Yesevi Üniversitesi Mütevelli Heyet Başkanlığı.
- CrescentRating. <https://www.crescentrating.com/about-us.html>.
- Çamurcu, Kenan. "Sol, İslam ve Değişim." *Birikim*, 179 (2004): 93-99.
- Çayır, Kenan. "İslamcı Bir Sivil Toplum Örgütü: Gökkuşuğu İstanbul Kadın Platformu." In *İslamın Yeni Kamusal Yüzleri*. Edited by Nilüfer Göle. İstanbul: Metis, 2013.
- Çetintaş, Hakan and Bektaş, Çetin. "The Long and Short Term Relationships Between Tourism and Economic Growth in Turkey, Anatolia." *Turizm Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Vol: 19, No: 1 (2008): 37-44.
- Çınar, Recai and Çubukçu, İhsan. "Tüketim Toplumunun Şekillenmesi ve Tüketici Davranışları." *Atatürk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* 13 (1): (2009).

- Davison, Andrew. *Türkiye’de Sekülerizm ve Modernleşme*, İstanbul: İletişim 2002.
- De Certeau, Michel. *The Practice of Everyday Life*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.
- Duman, Doğan. “Türkiye’de İslamcı Yayıncılık.” *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, DEÜ Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, Vol:2, Number:4-5 (1995): 77-94.
- Durna, Tezcan. *Kemalist Modernleşme ve Seçkinlik*, Ankara: Dipnot, 2009.
- El Fadl, Khaled Abou. “What is Shari’a?” *ABC Religion and Ethics*, 22 Mar 2011, <http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2011/03/22/3170810.htm>
- Eren, İsmail. “Human Model In Islam’s Economic Structure: A Comparative Evaluation With Homo Economicus.” *Suleyman Demirel University The Journal of Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences* 18/1 (2013).
- Ferdian, Ilham Reza, Kartika Dewi, Miranti and Kurnia Rahman, Faried. “The Practice of Islamic Credit Card: A Comparative Look Between Bank Danamon Indonesia’s Dirham Card and Bank Islam Malaysia’s BI Card.” Paper submitted to IAEI International Conference, Surabaya, Indonesia, 1-3 August 2008.
- Fisher, Michael M. J. *Islam and the Revolt of Petit Bourgeoisie*. Boston: American Academy of Arts and Science, 1982.
- Gayasaddin, Riyaz. ““Keeping the Faith or Not Keeping the Faith?” is the Question in a Western Secular Society,” *Macalester Islam Journal* Vol: 2 Issue:3(2007).
- Gellynck, Xavier, Verbeke and Wim, Vermeire, Ber. “Pathways to Increase Customer Trust in Meat as a Safe and Wholesome Food.” *Meat Science* 74 (2006).
- Genç, Özge and İlhan, Ebru. *Başörtüsü Yasağına İlişkin Değerlendirme ve Öneriler*. İstanbul: TESEV, 2012.
- Gençtürk Hızal, Senem. “Bir İletişim Biçimi Olarak Moda: “Modus”un Sınırları.” *İletişim Araştırmaları* Spring 1: (2003).
- Godazgar, Hossein. “Islam versus Consumerism and Postmodernism in the Context of Iran.” *Social Compass*, 54(3), (2007): 389-418.
- Gökalp, Ziya. *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak*. Ankara: Akçağ, 2010.
- Gökarıksel, Banu and McLarney, Ellen. “Muslim Women, Consumer Capitalism, and the Islamic Culture Industry.” *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies*,

Volume 6, Number 3, Fall (2010): 1-18. Indiana University Press

Gökarıksel, Banu and Secor, Anna. "Even I Was Tempted': The Moral Ambivalence and Ethical Practice of Veiling-Fashion in Turkey." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol:102, No: 4, 2011: 847-862

Gökarıksel, Banu and Secor, Anna. "New Transnational Geographies Of Islamism, Capitalism And Subjectivity: The Veiling-Fashion Industry In Turkey." *Area* 41 (2009): 6-18.

Gökarıksel, Banu and Secor, Anna. "The Veil, Desire and The Gaze: Turning the Inside Out", *Signs* Vol. 40, No. 1 (Autumn 2014): 177-200.

Göle, Nilüfer. *Modern Mahrem*. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2000.

Hakko Lodrik, Sima. "The Consumption Practices of the Economic and Cultural Capital Owners' Class Between 1980-2000." Master diss. Bilgi University, 2013.

Hamza, Ingy M., Chouhoud, Rabab and Tantawi, Passent. "Islamic Tourism: Perceptions and Possibilities in Egypt." *AJBER African Journal of Business and Economic Research*, Volume:7, No:1 (2012): 85-98.

Highmore, Ben, ed. *The Everyday Life Reader*. USA and Canada: Routledge, 2002.

Income, Expenditure and Average Spending of Tourism, (2003-2015) Table:3, *Republic of Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism General Directorate of Investment and Operations*, <http://yigm.kulturturizm.gov.tr/TR,72942/turizm-gelir-gider-ve-ortalama-harcama.html>.

Izberk Bilgin, Elif. "When Starbucks Meets Turkish Coffee: Cultural Imperialism and Islamism as 'Other' Discourses of Consumer Resistance." *Advances In Consumer Research* 35 (2008): 808-809.

Kadioğlu, Ayşe. *Zaman Lekesi*, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2006.

Kara, İsmail. *Din ile Modernleşme Arasında Çağdaş Türk Düşüncesinin Meseleleri*, İstanbul: Dergâh, 2012.

Kentel, Ferhat. "Modernite, Gündelik Hayat ve Yeni Sosyal Hareketler", *Altüst*, 10 Nov 2011, <http://www.altust.org/2011/11/modernite-gundelik-hayat-ve-yeni-sosyal-hareketler1/>

Kentel, Ferhat. "Teorinin raconunu bozan "başörtüsü" - Bir direnişin anatomisi." In *Örtülemeyen Sorun Başörtüsü: Temel Boyutları ile Türkiye'de Başörtüsü Yasağı Sorunu*, Edited by Neslihan Akbulut, İstanbul: AKDER, 2008.

- Kentel, Ferhat. "Türk Toplumunu Adam Yerine Konmak İstiyor." In *Cumhuriyet, Milliyetçilik ve İslamcılık*, İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2011.
- Keyman, Fuat. "Küreselleşme, Gelenek, Din Türkiye Örneği, Türkiye ve Avrupa'da İslam." In *Devlet ve Modern Toplum*, İstanbul:Konrad-Adanauer-Stiftung, 2004.
- Küçükcan, Talip. "Modernleşme ve Sekülerleşme Kuramları Bağlamında Din, Toplumsal Değişme ve İslâm Dünyası." *İslâm Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 13, (2005): 109-110.
- Küçükcan, Talip and Fidan, Ali, "İktisadi Kalkınmada Yerli Burjuvanın Sosyolojik Anlamı.", *Çukurova Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Volume: 22, Number: 2, 2013.
- Lefebvre, Henri. *Modern Dünyada Gündelik Hayat*, İstanbul: Metis, 2013.
- Mardin, Şerif. *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset*. İstanbul: İletişim, 1991.
- Mardin, Şerif. *Türkiye, İslam ve Sekülerizm*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2015.
- Mardin, Şerif. *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*, İstanbul: İletişim, 2015.
- Mathur, Nita. "Shopping Malls, Credit Cards and Global Brands: Consumer Culture and Lifestyle of India's New Middle Class." *South Asia Research*, November 2010; vol. 30, 3: pp. 211-231.
- Mehta, Shalina. "Commodity, Culture and Porous Socio-Religious Boundaries: Muslim Women in Delhi." *South Asia Research* Sage Publications, February 2010, Vol:30/1, pp 1-24.
- Mumyakmaz, Alper. "Elitlerin Yeni Yüzü, İslami Burjuvazi." *Mustafa Kemal University Journal of Graduate School of Social Sciences* 27 (2014).
- Özbay, Ferhunde. *Dünden Bugüne Aile, Kent, Nüfus*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2015.
- Özbolet, Abdullah. "Tüketim Bağlamında Dindarlığın Dönüşümü." *Birikim*, 12 Nov 2014. <http://www.birikimdergisi.com/guncel-yazilar/1127/tuketim-baglaminda-dindarligin-donusumu#.VrhYSSTGryk>
- Özdil, Yılmaz. "Hababam Sınıfı Uyanamıyor." *Hürriyet*, 27 July 2010, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/hababam-sinifi-uyanamiyor-15395359>
- Özgen, Arda. "Akbaba Dergisi Ve Akbaba Dergisi'nin Türk Çağdaş Grafik Sanatındaki Yeri Ve Önemi." Master diss., Ankara University, 2009.

- Özkaya, Cevat. "28 Şubat Olmasaydı da İslamcılık Bir Dönüşüm Yaşardı." *Cumhuriyet, Milliyetçilik, İslamcılık*. İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2011.
- Pavlova, Iskra. "Bosnia Sees High Profile in Halal Tourism." *SEE Country Profile, SEE Top 100*, January 1, 2011.
- Ritchie, Jane and Lewis, Jane ed., *Qualitative Research Practice A Guide For Social Science Students and Researchers*, London: Sage Publications, 2003.
- Schick, İrvin Cemil. *Bedeni, Toplum, Kainatı Yazmak* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014.
- Sehlikoglu, Sertaç and Karakas, Fahri. "We can have the cake and eat it too: Leisure and Spirituality at 'veiled' hotels in Turkey." *Leisure Studies*, Vol:35, No:2 (2016): 157-169.
- Serter, Nur. *Dinde Siyasal İslam Tekeli*. İstanbul:Sarmal, 1997.
- Simmel, George. "Fashion." *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol 62, No. 6, (May, 1957): 541-558.
- Süt, Abdulnasır. "İslam ve Turizm İlişkisi." *Turkish Studies*, Vol: 9, Issue: 11, (Fall 2014): 479-497.
- Şişman, Nazife. "Başörtü Yasakları ve Kadın Hakları Söylemi." *Tezkire* 19: (Feb/March 2001)
- Tekin, Ömer Akgün. "Islamic Tourism: An Investigation On General Situation In The World and In Turkey." *The Journal of International Social Research*. Vol:7 Issue:29, www.sosyalarastirmalar.com, Issn: 1307-9581, (2014).
- Tuğal, Cihan. *Passive Revolution Absorbing the Islamic Challenge of Capitalism*. California: Stanford University Press, 2009.
- Turkish Forum Arşiv. "Otellerde 7 Yıldız-7 Hilal Savaşları." 24.01.2013. <http://www.turkishnews.com/tr/content/2013/01/24/otellerde-7-yildiz-7-hilal-savaslari/>
- Turner, Bryan. *Religion and the State*. London, GB: Anthem Press, 2013. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 31 March 2016, 10-11.
- Türk Dil Kurumu. *Büyük Türkçe Sözlük*. "laiklik." http://tdk.gov.tr/index.php?option=com_bts&arama=kelime&guid=TDK.GTS.56c1b3111d93a8.51015596
- Universiti Teknologi Mara. <http://iitsc.uitm.edu.my>
- UNWTO Annual Report. <http://www2.unwto.org/annualreport2014>, 2015.

Vergin, Nur. "Din Devletinden Cumhuriyete". In *Türkiye ve Avrupa'da İslam, Devlet ve Modern Toplum*, İstanbul: Konrad-Adanauer-Stiftung, 2005.

Yankaya, Dilek. *Yeni İslami Burjuvazi*, İletişim: İstanbul, 2014.

Yeğenoğlu, Melda. "Clash Of Secularity And Religiosity: The Staging Of Secularism And Islam Through The Icons Of Atatürk And The Veil In Turkey." In *Religion and the State*, Edited by Jack Barbalet, Adam Possamai and Bryan S. Turner. London: Anthem Press, 2013. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 31 March 2016.

Yiğit, Zehra. "Modernliğin Arka Yüzü' Olarak Gündelik Hayat: Aşk-ı Memnu" *Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* Volume: 14, Number: 2 (2012): 125-144 ISSN: 1302-3284 E-ISSN: 1308-0911.

Zorlu, Abdulkadir. "Batılı Bir Yaşam Tarzı Olarak Tüketim: Türkiye'de Tüketim Ürünlerinin ve Kültürünün Tarihi Gelişimi, Hacettepe Üniversitesi". *Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyolojik Araştırmalar Dergisi*, (2003).

Zygmunt, Bauman. *Consumerism and the New Poor*. Edited by Tim May. Berkshire, GBR: McGraw-Hill Professional Publishing, 2004. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 22 February 2016.

APPENDIX

GENERAL INFORMATION OF RESPONDENTS

Name	Age	Education	Marital Statu	Occupation	Residence	Previous Residence	Birthplace	Hometown
Fahriye	34	Undergraduate	Single	Postgraduate	Fatih	Fatih	Çorum	Çorum
Kerime	22	High School	Married	Undergraduate	İçerenköy	Bulgurlu	İstanbul	İstanbul
Hacer	22	Undergraduate	Single	Postgraduate	İzmir	Hisarüstü/İstanbul	İzmir	İzmir
Nil	25	High School	Single	Undergraduate	Rumelihisarüstü	Rami	İstanbul	Balıkesir
Mine	25	Undergraduate	Single	Executive Assistant	Erenköy	Erenköy	İstanbul	İstanbul
Reyhan	25	Undergraduate	Single	Postgraduate	Bahçelievler	Bahçelievler	İstanbul	Bolu
Misra	23	High School	Single	Postgraduate	Üsküdar	Üsküdar	İstanbul	İstanbul
Belgin	26	Undergraduate	Single	Postgraduate	Üsküdar	Hisarüstü	Ordu	Ordu
Emel	24	Undergraduate	Married	Unemployed	Çekmeköy	Erenköy	İstanbul	İstanbul
Tülin	26	Undergraduate	Married	Postgraduate	Çengelköy	Ümraniye	İstanbul	İstanbul
Halime	41	High School	Married	Housewife	Küçükçamlıca	Bakırköy, Florya	Konya	Konya
Hatice	42	Undergraduate	Married	Housewife	Çekmeköy	Fatih, Bulgurlu	Kayseri	Kayseri
Makbule	44	Primary school	Married	Housewife	Libadiye	Fikirtepe	İstanbul	Erzurum
Gamze	30	Undergraduate	Single	Statistician	Bulgurlu	Bulgurlu	İzmit	İzmit
Aslı	30	Undergraduate	Married	Interior Architect	Tepeüstü	Beşiktaş, Fatih	İstanbul	İstanbul
Esmâ	18	High School	Single	Undergraduate	Küçükçamlıca	Üsküdar	İzmir	İzmir
Belma	30	Undergraduate	Married	Unemployed	Kahramanmaraş	Bulgurlu/İstanbul	Kahramanmaraş	Kahramanmaraş
Seyhan	32	High School	Married	Housewife	Ümraniye	Bulgurlu	İstanbul	İstanbul
İrem	23	Post graduate	Single	Unemployed	Bulgurlu	Üsküdar	İstanbul	İstanbul
Ayten	37	Undergraduate	Married	Housewife	Beylebeyi	Erenköy	Etiler/İstanbul	İstanbul

