

HOW DOES THE MILITARY DOMINATE POLITICS IN EGYPT?

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## ABSTRACT

### HOW DOES THE MILITARY DOMINATE EGYPTIAN POLITICS?

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Egypt has been ruled with military authoritarianism since 1952. The short period of democracy trial finished with the military coup in 2013, which proved the military dominance over the politics. This study sheds light on the civil-military relations in Egypt. After understanding of civil-military relation theories essential frameworks, the theories of civil-military relations are inquired for the MENA politics. From this perspective, the praetorianism approach is used to examine the case of Egypt as a model country in the MENA region. The analysis of causal relationships between Nasserism and militarism revealed the reason of military invasion into politics. Egypt military's strategy of dominance over the politics along with various challenges are investigated by using eligible analysis and typologies. This thesis might be a preliminary study that provides insights to future researches on civil-military relations of Egypt and other countries of the MENA region.

Keywords: Civil-military relations, praetorianism, Egypt, MENA

## ÖZ

### ORDU MISIR SİYASETİNE NASIL HÜKMEDİYOR?

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Mısır 1952’den beri askeri otoriter bir rejim ile yönetilmektedir. Kısa süren demokrasi denemesi 2013’te yapılan askeri darbe ile sona erdi. Böylece ordunun siyaset üzerindeki baskın gücü tam anlamıyla ortaya çıktı. Mısır’daki sivil-asker ilişkilerine odaklanan bu çalışma sivil-asker ilişkilerinin teorik çerçevesini çizdikten sonra, MENA siyaseti üzerinden bu ilişkilerin analizini yapmaktadır. Bu açıdan Mısır, MENA bölgesinin bir model ülkesi olarak, praetorianism yaklaşımı kullanılarak incelenmiştir. Nasırizm ve militarizm arasındaki sebep sonuç ilişkisinin analizi ordunun siyasete müdahalesinin nedenlerini ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Mısır ordusunun siyasetteki baskın gücünün stratejisi ve zorlukları netelikli analizler ve tipolojiler üzerinden araştırılmıştır. Bu tez Mısır’da ve MENA bölgesindeki sivil-asker ilişkileri konu alacak olan gelecekteki çalışmalara bir kaynak özelliği taşımaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sivil-asker ilişkileri, praetorianism, Mısır, MENA

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Many great political events have taken place in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), however, none of these events have caused great “changes” during the last century in terms of the resilience of authoritarian regimes. 2011 and 2012 were the closest points where there was hope for the region towards positive change concerning the participation of the people to the governing system. The wave of protests across the Arab World was coined as the “Arab Spring” or “Arab Insurgences”, where millions of people gathered and raised their voices for “Bread, Justice and Dignity”. The wave of protests ended with the taking down of authoritarian rulers, such as Zine el Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen, and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. The protests, revolts, and regime changes still continue across the region.

Egypt was one of the most crucial regions of the wave of protests, where President Hosni Mubarak was forced to resign after massive protests. From 25 January to 11 February 2011, a two-week demonstration took place with the participation of more than two million people. The Egyptian people had been under the ruling of Mubarak for thirty years, so they acknowledged him as the main responsible person for corruption, unemployment, injustice, and regime brutality. Moreover, the crucial point of the demonstrations was the support of the Egyptian military in favor of change, which enabled a transition different from the Syrian case.

After Mubarak’s resignation, the governance was transferred to the SCAF (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces), which consisted of high ranks of military officers. The SCAF seized the power just after the revolution (resignation of Mubarak) on 25 February 2011. Later, the military council was not uncomfortable with being the sole power in Egyptian politics. However, the continual protests in the Tahrir Square compelled the military to go to election.

The first fair election in Egypt was thought to be a turning point in Egypt’s history and a great step towards democracy. The parliamentary election in 2011-2012 and the presidential election in 2012 resulted in the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, and its leader Muhammad Morsi became

the first elected president of Egypt. However, the protests in the Tahrir Square were ongoing, and the legitimacy of the government and the president were diminishing. Although the majority of the people voted for the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, the reaction of opponent groups merged with bureaucracy, mainly with the army. From this sense, the sole robust power in Egyptian politics remained to be the army, as previously.

After three days of the first anniversary of Morsi's presidency, on 3 July 2013, a coup d'état happened in Egypt that was prepared well and conducted skillfully. The protests were against Morsi and his governance, which were the main excuses for the intervention of the military. As a consequence, a three-day massive protest with the participation of thousands of protestors took place, and the military had enough reason to bring down the first elected president of the country. It was the right time to take the regime back via a coup d'état, which also would be assessed as a counter-revolution.

What came to the surface were the following incidences of the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa, particularly in Egypt, and the dominant political power became that of the military in politics. The revolution was hindered and Mohammed Morsi was overthrown by the military coup led by Abdelfettah al-Sissi on the 3 July 2013. Tunisia is an exceptional and successful case in the Arab Spring, the army favored change and the role of the military in politics has always been limited. For this reason, the role of the military in the politics of Egypt requires research in line with eligible theories and analysis.

### 1.1. Research Question

In this thesis, I will be searching for the roots and source of the dominant political power of the military in Egyptian politics. Although there were widespread protests with millions of participants, the state apparatus malfunctioned, there was an economic squeeze, political rights were restricted, and the authoritarian ruler had to resign, the dominance of the military in Egyptian politics remained the same; moreover, it extended its legitimacy and political power after 3 July 2013.

The main research question of this thesis is, "Why and how did the military as an institution come to be the dominant political actor in modern Egypt?" and other sub-questions will be asked under this umbrella question. Defining, explaining, and analyzing the dominance of the military in Egyptian politics will be the core of this

study. The ideological explanation of this dominance along with its legitimization inside the corps, how the military sustains its role and which methods and tactics military has been using will be scrutinized by means of using prominent and useful theories. To do so, a qualitative research method will be implemented.

#### 1.1.1. Supplementary Questions

In terms of this thesis, I will research answers to few supplementary research questions. Such as what are the origins of the political power of the military? How does the military legitimize itself while intervening in politics? What are the reasons for military dominance over the military, whether as an ideology of the state, or as a result of the substantial structure? Or are these reasons cultural? Which methods and reasons have been used by the military to sustain its position in Egypt? Is there a connection with other examples in terms of military politics relations in the MENA countries? These questions will be answered and analyzed in this thesis.

#### 1.1.2. The Framework of the Thesis

In chapter 2 the civil-military relations of the Middle East will be examined and analyzed by using different approaches and examples. While looking into the military and political relations in Egypt, the assessment of civil-military relation theories in light of the particular conditions of the MENA will provide the basic framework of this research.

Chapter 3 presents an inside analysis of the case of Egypt by using theoretical approaches. The Egyptian political culture and ideological background of military dominance will be examined and explained over Nasserism. The reason for military dominance in Egyptian politics will be evaluated within the historical context and sociologic origins. Then, transformation of Nasserism during the rule of Sadat and Mubarak will be analyzed.

In chapter 4, the strategy and means of military dominance over the politics will be explained by using eligible theories in civil-military relations. These dynamics would present us the fundamental ways of the military in politics, so that understanding the military rule in Egyptian politics would be possible as a political institution, economic empire, media control and international context. Then, opposition groups and challenges to the military regime will also be described.

Throughout this research, different perspectives to the Egyptian case will be examined by means of theories, typologies, and approaches, in order to analyze the position of the military in Egyptian politics. The regional and international explanations are an important part of this thesis. I will investigate the internal dynamics, and the sociological and historical explanations as to the political dominance of the military in Egyptian politics. The outcome of this inquiry will be a regional part of a great puzzle in the international system. For this reason, the interpretation of this thesis cannot be disconnected from regional explanations. These concepts will provide the theory and conceptualization of the dominance of Egyptian military in politics, as well as its connection to precedents in the MENA region.

## 1.2. Literature Review

In this part of my dissertation, I will analyze the literature on the subject of Egypt's civil-military relations. While reviewing the published literature, my aim is to analyze critically different segments of knowledge, which include theories, typologies and data by means of classification and summary.

The question of military in Egyptian politics as a dominant political actor requires a comprehensive literature analysis in the two fields of political science. The first field is the civil-military relations literature in general and of the MENA region. The second is the Egyptian civil-military relations in the context of MENA politics.

Theories and conceptual frameworks of civil-military relations will be interpreted in the Egyptian case. The field of civil-military relations as a branch of political science provides the necessary theoretical framework, conceptual analysis, and historical perspective. As the second part of the literature, the case of the Egyptian military in terms of MENA studies will be inquired.

This chapter presents my own categorization of the available literature within the framework of this dissertation. Even though this research focuses on the extent of the reasons for the military dominance over politics in Egypt, the outcome and prediction of this study are more likely concerned about the whole MENA region. The literature review of this dissertation has been classified under two categories, which are "Civil-Military Relations", "Praetorianism", and "Nasserism".

### 1.2.1. Civil Military Relations

The contribution of this thesis to the academic literature will be the attention it will draw towards the civil-military relations in the MENA region, especially in the case of Egypt. Although the literature based on civil-military relations emphasizes the dominant role of the military, the MENA studies have missed the Arab Insurgence and failed to predict what will happen in the future. There are also a limited amount of resources to understand and theorize civil-military relations in the MENA. A limited number of studies have been conducted as consistent theoretical frameworks in this subject.

In this thesis, I will examine the roots of military regime in Egypt, which may be accepted as the founding father of military regimes in the Arab World and the MENA region, by using eligible theories and approaches. The literature on civil-military relations in general and on the MENA region will shed light to understand clearly the contemporary issues and predict future issues. Further research on this vital subject may divert and normalize civil-military relations in Egypt and the MENA region.

Few prominent scholars have conducted the literature on civil-military relations. It may be clearly stated that the theoretical framework and analysis of the literature depend extensively on the cases or areas on which the scholars are working. Therefore, it can be asserted that civil military relations field was built on area studies. As a part of the political science discipline, this field aims to research the subordination of the military to civilian authority. More precisely, the principal problem of in this matter is the civilian control over the military. In addition to political sciences, the area benefits from a series of other social sciences including sociology, cultural studies, anthropology, economics, history, militarism, and authoritarianism, which provide important concepts and ideas for the explanation of civil-military relations.

Starting from the early times of Sun Tzu with his Art of War and Plato with his State, philosophers of ancient times emphasize and explain the state of the army in politics. In the medieval period, the foremost work on this subject is Machiavelli's magnum opus The Prince, which advises the idea of controlling the army not only at the time of war, but also in time of peace. In addition to political philosophers, political figures such as Napoléon in France and Cromwell in England have affected and shaped the concept of political science and civil-military relations deeply, especially in the Western world. Additionally, Prussia pointed out military professionalism, which

provides the modernization of the state and the society. By means of the Western powers' efficiency and global dominance, this trend becomes effective throughout the world with different terms and concepts. In the nineteenth century, Carl von Clausewitz might be accepted as the pioneer in this matter, not only with his concept of "war and politics", but also with his logical approach and recommendations to subordinating the army under political leadership. As he states in *On War*, "Subordinating the political point of view to the military would be absurd, for its policy that has created war. Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa." (Clausewitz et al., 1997: 607).

By the twentieth century, concept of the field required a change in the nature of the state, governance, army, and war. These initial works and their followers mainly focused on two terms that is convenient to the context of the practice. "Controlling" is the first term that aims to show the subordination of the military to civilians, namely political leaders. The subordination of the military to civilian leaders is vital especially for Western democracies, and it is one of the absolute rules for liberal democracies. The "efficiency" of the military as an institution of security is the second term in the field. Especially, at the time of the Cold War, the priority of the Western world was to protect the democratic system with an efficient, powerful and professional army. The difficult and necessary task of the government was the ability to control the military without hampering military efficiency.

In this point, we should note a major distinction in theoretical works on this subject. The emergence of civil-military relations is very connected with discussions especially after the World War II, when people exhausted and protested against conscription, reducing the size of army was a hot topic issue in the USA and other Western countries. While the life of soldiers and country was a great concern, the security extend of civil-military relations was acknowledged crucial.

Studies on civil-military relations are interdisciplinary, and involve scholars and researchers from a variety of fields and specialties. However, the civil-military relations field is the subject of mainly interest of political science and sociology. Political science deals with the issue of the subordination of the army under civilian authority, whereas sociology examines the nature of the military identity and the patterns of social interaction within the armed forces (Feaver, 1999.). This is also reason for a binary opposition between Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, as their perspectives were on politics and sociology respectively. Huntington advocated

military professionalism and favored military autonomy; on the other hand Janowitz asserted that perfect professionalism is impossible (Burk, 2002).

Two contrary arguments appeared in civil-military relations between Huntington and Janowitz. These scholars dealt with the problem of the military relations in different ways. While Huntington's theoretical framework inquires elite civil-military relations. Janowitz's works focuses on societal civil-military relations. Thus, the literature of civil-military relations based upon two main trends, which examined the role of military in political and social system. Concerning details of these approaches and their successors will be mentioned in this part. However, there will be a third way which is called as "praetorianism". This type of civil-military relations will be explained in "civil-military relations in the MENA region", since it would be more convenient to inquire praetorianism in terms of MENA dynamics.

Samuel Huntington's works on this field made remarkable the studies of civil-military relations literature and dominated it, with a comprehensive theoretical framework on this matter in 1957. *The Soldier and The State* alleges to regulate the relations between military and politics during the Cold War era. His work centers on the "professionalism of military" and defines it by using the historical process of Western militarism. He states the ideal type of relations between the civilians and the military, by distinguishing two clashing imperatives, which are functional and societal imperatives. By functional imperatives he means to material and technical requirements of an army, so that the military would have the opportunity to attack in case a war or any security threat. Especially at the times of the Cold War, he conceives the functional imperative "survival", since the imminent peril of Soviets. The term is coming from functionalist sociology which stands for any society's essential needs in order to survive and satisfy the need in care of the state. For societal imperatives, he divides into two parts: ideology and structure. They present features of a society that affects political affairs, so it does civil-military relations (Huntington 1957).

In the works of Huntington, professionalism always considered the main goal of civil-military relations. It is an advised and admired level of civil-military relations. Professionalism principle requires autonomy to the military. Over control of the military, such as meddle in military promotions by the government, diminishes military professionalism according to Huntington. In order to determine the limit of controlling the military, Huntington comes up with two terms, which are "subjective control" and "objective control". While subjective control involves "civilianizing the



military, making them the mirror of the state” (Huntington, 1957) objective control allows the military a certain amount of autonomy so that the efficiency of the military would be provided. In other words, subjective control extends the power of civilians through government institutions, social class, or constitutional form, but objective control accepts military professionalism and allocates power between military corps and civilian groups (Huntington, 1957).

Few years after Huntington’s work, sociologist Morris Janowitz contributed to the field with *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*” and “*Military Institutions and Coercion in The Developing Nations*. In this book he established another theoretical framework and created a school of thought from a sociological perspective. He focused on the military identity rather than the power balance between political elites and officer corps, unlike Huntington. From this perspective, it must be accepted that these two schools “wrote on different analytical levels and essentially explored different topics” (Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2013: 12).

In addition to Huntington and Janowitz, other scholars contributed to civil-military relations and pointed out different perspectives. Likewise, Eliot Cohen analyzed civil-military relations during wartime situations. Finer countered Huntington’s argument of professionalism and asserted that being a member of a profession does not necessarily mean loyalty to the civilian government, but it might pave the way for a military coup as well (Finer 1988). Peter Feaver’s *agency theory* is a useful tool to measure the obedience and disobedience of a military to civilian authority, but not very eligible for authoritarian regimes. Like Feaver, Michael Desch also emphasizes civilian control and points to the patterns of threat in civil-military relations, but his perspective is not a conclusive theory (Desch, 1999). However, he skillfully analyzed correlation between security and civil-military relations.

During the 1970s, the debates of previous research expand to other independent third world states. Samuel E. Finer (Finer 1962), Amos Pearlmutter (1977) and Eric A. Nordlinger remark the institutionalization of military intervention through the praetorianism theory. These studies deal with the military corporatism in the conditions of modern states. Praetorianism term and theories emerged in the civil-military relations in order to explain military abusive political influence in a country.

Apart from in the western world, civil-military relations have been used to describe and analyze the role of the military in politics. From Latin America to Africa, civil-military relation theories and approaches have become significant tools in

understanding politics. The theory of praetorianism grounded a proper explanation in the point of understanding the dynamics of civil-military relations. Therefore, this thesis focuses more on praetorianism, rather than other civil-military relations approaches. However, it also benefits from the other perspectives' helpful analysis and information.

### 1.2.2. Civil-Military Relations in the MENA region

The civil-military relations in the MENA region are part of subaltern studies and regional works. The literature on this field has been developed parallel with the political incidents of the region and world politics. Crucial points in the history of Egypt and world politics tremendously affected the nature of civil-military relations that reflected to the literature. In the decolonization period, establishment of military regimes occurred in a series of countries. Because, these new states were lack of modern bureaucratic institutions and apparatus and the military occurred not only the founding father, but also central bureaucratic power of these states. The Cold War between superpowers forced these new states to join one side or create its own camp. Liberalization efforts changed the position of military in politics starting from 1970s and strengthened especially after 1980s. Last chain of these developments was the Arab Spring which raised the inquiry towards the robust authoritarian regimes in terms of civil-military relations in the MENA region.

A series of military coups happened throughout the MENA region during the 1950s and 1960s. These military coups brought along curiosity towards civil-military relations and the role of the military in politics for the MENA region. Scholars and researchers of this subject tried to understand when the military wanted to intervene into politics and or return to the barracks. Majid Khadduri (Khadduri, 1953) wrote an initial article to this matter and he was followed by Edward Shils (Shils, 1962) and Manfred Halpern (Halpern 1962) who also wrote on the role of the military in politics regarding the essential dynamics of the MENA societies.

Thus, initial works on this matter address the governmental changes in Egypt and Syria, and point out the intense political struggle in Lebanon and Iraq. Majid Khadduri's article "The Role of Military in Middle East Politics" describes the difference of the Middle East from Western regimes along with the historical modernization process. He emphasizes the refutation of democracy for both right wing

and leftist groups, and explains this by stating the reason was the bad connotation of democracy for the people of the region (Khadduri, 1953).

Along with regional works, few works such as *The Role of Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, which was written by different scholars, allege to explain civil-military relations in different parts of the world together. From Latin America to Indonesia, this work examines third world countries; it attracts attention to the common points and differences in each region. Edward Shils analyzes structurally the political development of the new states, which emerged during the decolonization period. He indicates there is a significant role of the armed forces in attaining independence, since the end of the Second World War, such as that of Israel, Sudan, and Pakistan. The prominence of the military in new states is also because of the weaknesses of such countries, which were not compensated by political institutions inherited or established at the moment of independence (Shils, 1962). So, he advises to focus on the politics and elites of these states, and try to understand their political skills, inherited culture, and social structure.

In the 1980s and 1990s the subject of civil-military relations for the MENA studies was widely neglected. Because of the liberalization efforts of authoritarian regimes was accepted a positive step towards democracy, but it was only in the economy, not in terms of politics at that level. Robert Springborg (1989) is an exceptional scholar who writes substantial works on this issue along with other major problems in the Middle East since this period. Scholars and researches tried to explain the lack of democratization, and the robustness of authoritarian regimes. However, some of researches demonstrated the importance of military for the rule of the MENA countries, especially after 1980s. Mehran Kamrava (2000) and Eva Bellin's (2004) articles suggests the influx of military power in politics by making comprehensive analysis and producing typologies for the MENA region. Steven Cook's book *Ruling But Not Governing* (Cook, 2007) is very informative on this matter and inspirational for this thesis as well. After the year 2011, the incidents in the MENA region that started with the Arab Spring triggered the research on civil-military relations and the security sector in the MENA region once again. Omar Ashour (2013) and Philip Droz-Vincent (2013), who are among the prominent experts on this issue, bring forward this topic to the agenda of academy while contributing to the literature. The literature on this field has been developed parallel with the political incidents of the region and

world politics. A detailed analysis on theoretical framework will be made in the second chapter.

### 1.2.3. Nasserism

The literature on Nasserism is the third area in terms of the subject of this thesis. After inquiring a theoretical framework in civil-military relations in general and civil-military relations in the MENA region, Egyptian politics was researched over Nasserism for being the substantial ideology which grounded military domination over Egyptian politics. Nasserist ideology is not only about Gamal Abdel Nasser's rule and its principals, but also it includes transformation of Nasserism during Sadat and Mubarak's rule and it also suggests the continuous effect in recent politics.

Gamal Abdel Nasser, who is founder of modern Egypt, became the first president of the country by means of a military coup. The political structure of the country was formed in his rule and Nasserism constituted a substantial ground for the military influence in politics. Nasser's book titled as *Philosophy of Revolution* which explained 1952 revolutionary coup and acclaimed to legitimize the rule of Free Officers. There are plenty of books, articles, and reports interpreted modern Egypt through the glass of Nasserism. They inquired Nasserism as a political ideology, addressing hybrid nature of the ideology with consistencies and inconsistencies (Şahin, 2014).

There are plenty of political history and biography books about Nasser, but some of them include ideological background of Nasser and present analytical perspective on Nasserism. Nissim Rejwan's *Nasserist Ideology: Its exponents and critics* (1974) is one of the books which examine Nasserist ideology. It points hybrid nature of Nasserism, consistency, and methodical problems of the ideology. The relationship between Nasserism and decolonialism, Pan-Arabism, Islam, and Arab socialism was put it well in the historical context. The hybrid nature of Nasserism is also emphasized by P.J. Vatikiotis, Sadat and Mubarak's rule was also interpreted in the frame of Nasserist state. He suggested reading Nasserism in three different ideological phases: Egyptian nationalism from 1952 to 1954, pan-Arabism from 1954 to 1961, and Arab socialism from 1961 to 1967 (Vatikiotis 1991).

On the other hand, John Waterbury draws attention to Nasserism for its eclectic nature. 1952 as a revolution and Nasserism as an ideology were criticized by Waterbury for being a spontaneous rather than a planned organization and ideology.

He claims the Egyptian experiment involves enormous amount of “ad hocism”. 1952 revolution and Nasserist ideology were formed excessively in line with the circumstances according to him. Simon Shamir argues to Waterbury and says Nasserism embraces politically reactionary ideas “imperialism, feudalism, and exploitative capitalism”. Peter Mansfield’s article titled as “Nasser and Nasserism” (1973) inquires Nasserist ideology from nationalism perspective.

In the light of conceptual analysis from above, Nasserism will be inquired as the official and current ideology of the state of Egypt. The relationship between Nasserism and praetorianism will be analyzed to reveal the dynamics behind the political dominance of the military. The literature on Nasserism also includes political developments, transformations, speeches of leaders, and international politics during Nasser and his successors’ rule. This thesis also tries to defect the role of Nasserism in the recent praetorian Egyptian regime.

### 1.3. Research Methodology

In this part of my dissertation, I will explain describe methodology that used to collect research data. It will also include rationale of the research approach and details of subjects and sources of data. The inquiry of research techniques provides identifying type of research, so this will be very useful both to apprehend the details of thesis, further researches and the causation behind the structure. Then, an analysis of research finding will be made along with the limitation and obstacles will be admitted.

While the social science researches have increased throughout the years day by day, the techniques in this field are developing as well. The classification of knowledge, research methods and data collection methods have crystallized with their distinctive view of social reality. The main feature of these research techniques provides conceptualization, accumulation of knowledge and observing literature and trends in social research (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994).

Determining the type of research should be in line with the research question and eligible theories and research methods. Since my primary research question is “Why and how did the military as an institution come to be the dominant political actor in modern Egypt?” So, the theoretical literature that I am using is civil-military relations. This thesis investigates a few sub-question, which are also related to the field of civil-military relations. For this reason, this work classifies as an explanatory and descriptive research, because it both provides an identifying key issues and key

variables in order to better understanding the issue and also an accurate description of observations of a phenomena by attempting to explore and explain while providing additional information about the topic.

One of the main techniques in social research is the distinction of quantitative and qualitative data, which refers to numerical and nonnumeric data respectively. The use of qualitative data is preferable, when the subject concerns commonly assume a complex social reality. Beside to being the major field of academic study, it is also basis for every quantitative research inquiry. It is a flexible area of study with new theories and hypothesis, providing deep understanding of the issues and richness of meaning. On the other hand quantitative method is about make use of numeric data and mathematical symbols in order to explain social reality. By making a quantitative analysis, aspects of social reality could be translated into a numerical language that a scale of measurement would be possible (Bryman & Cramer, 1990). Although the latter tradition is broadly criticized by the first one for leading to a respectable loss in the meaning of concepts, it should be aware of advantages and disadvantages of the both methods and using eligible method to analyze well.

Due to the fact that the civil-military relations is heavily depended on qualitative data and clarification of the research subject of this thesis is better to be understood, qualitative data method is the main source of this dissertation. In this method, each case could be deeply understood and analyzed with eligible theories. Additionally, some numerical data and surveys also provide to explain the subject in line with the thesis.

Idiographic and nomothetic explanations consists another important point of this thesis. These explanations are two distinct form of causal reasoning and the use of these methods differs according to the subject. The idiographic explanation points to casual reasoning of unique, separate and peculiar case or data, but nomothetic explanation tries to find out a series of situations or events rather than a single one. In this context, this thesis is built upon both explanations, and it narrows gradually to understand and analyze the case. Obviously, there is an interaction between the case and theory, since there is no proper theory without data. Theories should suit the facts rather than the facts to theory Earl.

In this regard, comparative and historical research is one of three types of unobtrusive research and the most compatible method with the subject of the thesis. Moreover, the political science owes to comparison its occurrence and flourishes.

Historical perspective provides deep analysis of today's phenomenon. This method is widely used by political scientists, sociologists and other social scientists (Babbie, 2013).

Dependent and independent variables of civil-military relations will be explained and analyzed in the next chapter. The military coups, military influence, or the role of the military is the dominant dependent variables of the civil-military relations literature. On the other hand external factors, internal factors, and the form of the civil society are the independent variables (Carlsen, 2008). This explanatory research deals with understanding more about the correlation between these variables. Therefore, the thesis is based upon available literature. By means of criticizing and interpreting the literature, it provides an analytic perspective to the subject that lays the initial groundwork for future research.

The limitation of my research is mostly related to the field information on the subject. Taking into account the prominent scholars and researchers about this issue, I could not reach only one or two distinguished work. Another shortcoming of this research is lack of examining the literature in Arabic language, since my Arabic skills is not enough to make a research Arabic literature yet. However, I did my best to inquire the subject in Turkish, English, and French.

CHAPTER II  
ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS THEORIES IN TERMS OF  
THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY CONTEXT

And the first king was a lucky soldier.  
S. M. Stirling

2.1. Theorizing Civil-Military Relations

In this chapter, I will investigate the nature of civil-military relations. More specifically, I will focus on the civil-military relations in the MENA region. The term, civil-military relations, refers to the interaction between the role of the military and society in politics. The military as an institution is one of the main components of the state, and it is widely accepted as the main source of physical force that is used legitimately in a sovereign state, from a Weberian approach.

Firstly, most of the literature on the field of study essentially deals with the social and political role of armed forces. There is no relationship without participation of civilians and military, so the trajectory of this relationship has two sides. Each of them has their own part to play and they have responsibilities in this regard. As Colin Gray states, “The conduct of a war is the business of the statesman; its fighting is that of soldier.” (Gray, 2007, p. 7). There are various theoretical models and approaches on this subject, but all of them share one common purpose: a democratic understanding and conceptualization between the relations civilians and soldiers (Bruneau and Matei, 201, pp. 26-35).

Before discussing these theories, I would like to first point out an important distinction between what is called in the related literature “societal civil-military relations” and “elite civil-military relations” (Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2013, p.7). This is significant for avoiding misunderstandings while analyzing different levels of political groups and armed forces. It also suggests the different point of views between political science and sociology disciplines. Theories on societal civil-military relations examine the societal power of the military, and the functional role of the military. However, theories on elite civil-military relations studies the relationship between the



senior soldiers of the officer corps, who are the most senior members of the officer corps and civilians who are in charge of the governance.

The slight but crucial difference between the perspectives of sociology and political science is about the level of analysis. While military sociologists deal with military identity, the social legitimacy of the military, and the relations between the image of the military and the society at large, political scientists study power struggle in elite civil-military relations, i.e. power relations within the state, between civil leaders and officer corps. In reality, however, societal civil-military relations and elite civil-military relations are intermingled and cannot be separated from each other. Therefore political scientists need to comprehend the societal part of the civil-military relations in order to explain the power relations between civilian leaders and military officer corps. And in this study, I am going to attempt to combine both these perspective simultaneously and consider societal aspect of the discipline as well as power relations among civil and military elites.

Secondly, although civil-military relations is an exclusive area of study, it must be kept in mind the literature on this field directly has a link to the other disciplines, especially with militarism and authoritarianism, for the scope of this thesis. Authoritarianism is a political system that might be possible for any type of government, means politically limited, not responsible to someone, lack of elaborate and guiding ideology, but a distinctive mentality that does not require political mobilization (Linz, 2000), authoritarianism studies put forward an explanation to the occurrence of authoritarian regimes which are mainly after struggle for independence or as a consequence of crisis in liberal democracy. Even though democracy is seen fundamentally opposite to authoritarianism, democratic regimes can exhibit authoritarian characteristic, so the system “authoritarianize” in terms of concentrating power in the hands of a leader or a small elite (Schlumberger, 2007) . In this regard, civil-military relations area provides civilian subordination over the military in case of authoritarian inclination, especially military dictatorship.

Militarism is also relevant with the civil-military relations in the sense of defending maximization of military power and using it aggressively in order to promote national interests. It excessively accepted incompatible with the liberal democracies and endangers liberal values, since appealing stratocracy (rule of military chiefs) or military junta. On the other hand, effective, skillful and powerful army provides security, which is survival issue for the country. The study of social science

tries to defect militarist inclination in a certain society, regime or the state. From the political history to daily life of a nation might supply data for militarism studies. Similarly, the effectiveness of a military is a crucial question for civil-military relations. In parallel with militarism, civil-military relations seek the answers of the questions “how an army can be effective without intervening the sphere of politicians and civilians?” and “what are the boundaries of controlling the army for its effectiveness” etc. Thus, the both field of study make research on the same units the military, politics and governance, but slightly different perspectives.

For the both authoritarian and militarist regimes, civil military relations suggest healthy and good governance of armed forces, while analyzing reasons of the current situation of specific cases. The terms of authoritarianism and militarism along with the relevant resources of these fields will be subsidiary to this thesis. Nevertheless, theoretical ground of this study will be derived from civil-military relations, since it defines the role of both military and civilians, promotes democratic values, looks forward to way of controlling the military and subordination to civilians by making no concessions to efficiency.

It should be noted that the theories of civil-military relations range from democratic regimes to authoritarian ones, and they mostly depart from the examination of a particular state or region. Theories and conceptual analyses have emerged regarding these units in order to coordinate the field studies. Therefore, theories and conceptual analysis are results of these studies. A prominent example for this is Huntington’s *Soldier and The State*, which also has a great place in the literature, since it is the first attempt to put forward a general theory in this field. The specific goal of Huntington’s work was to ensure professionalism in the civil-military relations. The professional armies are focused on its effectiveness and strength. They abstain from entering political area in order to provide its professional duty.

On the other hand, the praetorian armies involve in political process and decision making in different levels. According to Eric Nordlinger, the praetorianism is “a situation in which military officers are major or dominant political actors by virtue of their actual or threatened use of force” (Nordlinger, 1977: 2-3). Likewise, a considerable amount of works on the field focus excessively on specific cases and regions. I will elaborate on some of these theories and approaches with special reference to the civil-military relations in the Middle East and North Africa. The relationship between civil leaders and military professionals is affected by political,

cultural, historical, and economic reasons. While examining the reasons for military intervention in politics, theories of civil-military relations will pave the way of this research.

For this reason, this chapter consists of three parts. The first part will be about the professional army theory along with the different approaches and arguments in this subject to contribute the thesis background. In the second part will the praetorianism approach will be elaborated and interpreted in line with the Egyptian case. The third part will be on the examination of the theories, analysis, and approaches which are peculiar to the MENA region. Understanding the ideas in order to explain civil-military relations will provide comparing cases efficiently, and recognizing patterns and dynamics managing the core of the field. Since this thesis aims to reveal the dynamics behind the political dominance of the Egyptian military, without disregarding societal effects, I will focus on elite civil-military relations.

#### 2.1.1. Professional Army

The role of the military in politics has been a subject of political sciences for centuries. Since, the main subject of research in political sciences is the state, and one of the most important components of the state is the military, the relationship between politicians and the military constitutes field of research that cannot be ignored, and is analyzed under political sciences. The army is an inseparable part of the state and military forces are primary tools of war, so every political system needs an armed bureaucratic force to protect itself and its citizens. The responsibilities of modern armies vary, e.g. making war, keeping borders of territories, applying medical treatment, conscripting citizens, struggling against terrorism, and guarding the regime.

Civil-military relations is not a new field, there has been produced several theoretical works, but there is a lack of clear concepts and causal maps to understand the pattern of civil military relations (Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2013). The works on military issues have slipped towards security studies and other areas, which were thought as more practical. The two most related fields are authoritarianism and militarism, which will be used as a resource in this research; however, their level of analysis is quite different than that of civil-military relation theories.

By the twentieth century, concept of the field required a change in the nature of the state, governance, army, and war. These initial works and their followers mainly focused on two terms that is convenient to the context of the practice. “Controlling” is

the first term that aims to show the subordination of the military to civilians, namely political leaders. The subordination of the military to civilian leaders is vital especially for Western democracies, and it is one of the absolute rules for liberal democracies. The “efficiency” of the military as an institution of security is the second term in the field. Especially, at the time of the Cold War, the priority of the Western world was to protect the democratic system with an efficient, powerful and professional army. The difficult and necessary task of the government was the ability to control the military without hampering military efficiency.

In this point, we should note a major distinction in theoretical works on this subject. The emergence of civil-military relations is very connected with discussions especially after the World War II, when people exhausted and protested against conscription, reducing the size of army was a hot topic issue in the USA and other Western countries. While the life of soldiers and country was a great concern, the security extend of civil-military relations was acknowledged crucial.

In the works of Huntington, professionalism always considered the main goal of civil-military relations. It is an advised and admired level of civil-military relations. Professionalism principle requires autonomy to the military. Over control of the military, such as meddle in military promotions by the government, diminishes military professionalism according to Huntington. In order to determine the limit of controlling the military, Huntington comes up with two terms, which are “subjective control” and “objective control”. While subjective control involves civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state objective control allows the military a certain amount of autonomy so that the efficiency of the military would be provided. In other words, subjective control extends the power of civilians through government institutions, social class, or constitutional form, but objective control accepts military professionalism and allocates power between military corps and civilian groups (Huntington, 1957).

The theoretical framework and conceptual analysis of the work, along with Huntington’s understanding and explanations make the work significant in the field. As the author states, the theoretical framework has been developed for Western democratic systems. The historical process of Western armies has been explained and elaborated on in terms of civil-military relations, emphasizing the case of the United States of America. He recommends an “objective control” of the military and professionalization, which means political leaders can allow military autonomy in

specific issues that require “professionalism”. As he implies, the work is a guide to control for the West, rather than a global theory. However, his theoretical framework has been followed by further research and theories, and it still dominates the field with certain definitions and theoretical frameworks.

For the importance of Huntington’s theoretical framework, lots of different scholars have a consensus on enormous weight of the theory. Eliot Cohen is writer of the book of *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesman, and Leadership in Wartime*, accepts that Huntington’s book is the “normal” theory of civil-military relations, “the accepted standard by which the current reality is to be judged” (Cohen, 2002: 226). On the other hand, it is also criticized by some for the possibility of creating relationship between the professionalism and political neutrality (Bruneau and Matei 2013). It is argued that Huntington’s professional soldier is “a covert definitional truth”, since the conceived “professional” soldiers never intervene in politics, in case of intervention they are not accepted professional any more (Abrahamsson, 1972: 159).

Moreover, Thomas C. Bruneau criticizes the theory of Huntington with defecting three main problems. He remarks that his argument is tautological which has agreed by many scholars, changed culture of the profession and the third is preoccupation with control to the army (Bruneau and Matei 2013: 15-16). These points must be considered while inquiring the dominant theory of the field.

Few years after Huntington’s work, sociologist Morris Janowitz contributed to the field with *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* and *Military Institutions and Coercion in The Developing Nations*. In this book he established another theoretical framework and created a school of thought from a sociological perspective. He focused on the military identity rather than the power balance between political elites and officer corps, unlike Huntington. From this perspective, it must be accepted that these two schools “wrote on different analytical levels and essentially explored different topics” (Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2013: 12).

In *The Professional Soldier*, he encounters Huntington’s ideal type of two distinct spheres, by asserting that the politicization of the military is inevitable. For this reason, he advises civilians to intervene in the military sphere and influence the military culture. Although he basically agrees with Huntington in that the concept of professionalism is essential to understand the contemporary military identity, the traditional roles of the military is changing substantially, so civil-military relations is

becoming blurred with this transformation, which would lead to ambiguities and conflicts according to Janowitz (1960).

Another study was conducted by Eliot Cohen, who examined the civil-military theory during the period of war. In his influential work *Supreme Command*, Cohen indicated there should be a line between civilians and the military in order to maximize their competence. Cohen interpreted Huntington's argument and called it a "normal theory". He stated the war-leaders mostly intervene in the tactical and strategical details of the operations (Cohen, 2002). Thus, he depicted a messy argument between soldiers and civilians rather than a division of labor. Acclaiming that the responsibility of war and security is on the shoulders of politicians, the responsibility of learning the military business of war.

Furthermore a considerable contribution to the professionalism theory has been written by Peter Feaver, who is also one of Huntington's former students. The book of *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* is based on analyses of extensive polling data. In his work, he asserts that Huntington's theory is fundamentally impractical, since ideally theories should be able to predict actual events. The dominant theory of civil-military relations is a terrible blow and has little predictive power according to Feaver (Jensen, 2008). He depicts the relations between civilian leaders and officer corps as interplay between institutions, and observes the orders of civilians (principal) and the responses of the military (agency). He criticizes the theories of Huntington and Janowitz, asserting they are not enough to find answers to the problem of civilian control and include variables of values and costs into analysis. He aims to measure the obedience (working) and disobedience of the military (shirking) to civilian leaders. As an outcome of this analysis, the subordination of the military to civilians would be seen clearly (Feaver, 2003). Even though, this type of analysis is beneficial to the theoretical frame in measuring the control of the civilians over the military, there is a lack of concrete maps to provide sustainable and healthy relations between civilian leaders and officer corps, since it has only been developed for (the Western) democracies and democratic regimes.

These all works aimed to sustain professionalism in the military, so that subordination of the military to civilians would be possible. The main question of professionalism theory in civil-military relations was "How can we provide military subordination without effecting its strength?" That was a serious and hard question to answer, since over control of the military might affect negatively the military

efficiency or lack of control might cause problems military subordination to political leaders. Professionalism theory settled on to sustain democratic system in civil-military relation, but it did not try to establish or transform democratic civil-military relations. For this reason, we will benefit from professionalism theory in order to see the ultimate goal of civil-military relations. However, it is needed to inquire “praetorianism theory” to defect the situation in the case of Egypt.

## 2.2. Praetorian Army

Praetorianism occurs in the countries where the bureaucratic structure of a state is not settled properly. In the modern praetorian states, the military challenges civilian legitimacy and creates a new type of political authority. The word of “praetorian guard” originally comes from Roman Empire, where praetorian guardians of regime became the owner of regime. In modern praetorianism, it was defined as “a situation in which military officers are major political actors by virtue of their actual or threatened use of force” (Nordlinger, 1977). Along with the dysfunction of political institutions, societal structure is also very polarized and shattered in the countries of praetorian regimes. The military comes up with an overarching system for the people with its playmaker role in praetorian regimes. Prominent theories on praetorianism will be inquired for the role of the military and its disengagement from politics.

A theory in the frame of praetorianism was asserted by Samuel E. Finer in the book of “The Man on Horseback”, where he classified military regimes. He considered the conditions of military intervention to politics, rather than professionalize and control the army. Finer also expanded the view of research by considering and the coups and military interventions around the world. Elaborating the idea of military intervention to politics, he entails military intervention into politics to two set of forces that are the capacity and volition of the military to intervene, the latter is the condition of the society (Feaver, 1962). This reminds a very famous quote of Kenan Evren who is maker of the 1980 coup in Turkey: “We waited for one year for the situation to mature [to be able to conduct a coup].” (Cnn Türk, 2016). Undoubtedly, this is a prerequisite for a successful military intervention.

The classification of Finer is based on two variables/criteria: what extent the military control the major policies of the society and the degree of overtness of this control. The level of control and overtness determinates the type of military regime. There are five types for a military regime that are direct rule, quasi civilianized, dual-

rule, indirect rule or intermittent military regime according to Finer (Finer, 1962). Besides, he takes into consideration of constitutional role of the military, political tendency of the regime and guardian or praetorian role of the army. Moreover, Finer supplements Huntington's analysis in terms of intervention of army in the long run. He generates four paradigm cases whether the military will continue or leave to rule and its political power will raise or decrease (Finer, 1962). These are the points that we will emphasize and use while analyzing the case.

Another significant contribution of Finer is his conceptualization for the disengagement of military from politics. He considers four conditions which must be obtained in order to arrive disengagement of military from politics. The first is leader who was widely accepted by the military should want the army to quit politics. Secondly, that leader should have the capacity to establish a regime without military support. The third condition is a viable, but favorable regime for the interests of military. Finally, the armed forces should have enough confidence and respect to the leader, return to the barracks when it is ordered (Finer, 1962). Finer exemplifies implementation of these conditions for Napoléon, Atatürk, the post-Cardenas presidents of Mexico and de Gaulle. However, the intervention to politics occurred in Turkey's example, even it was transitional. Samuel Finer also considers the continuous military regimes of the Arab world which are Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Sudan. Even though two Latin American military regimes and the African military regimes finished or came into existence, these countries military regime seemed continuous and robust.

Perlmutter also considers the military as a repressive force and in the pursuit of its own interests, in *The Military and Politics in Modern Times* (Perlmutter, 1977). He essentially offers a theory of military corporate professionalism and praetorianism in modern times. By defining the military profession and the military organization, he builds a theory on military corporatism, which has emerged in line with the modern nation-states. In addition to Huntington's "professional soldier" concept, he attaches the praetorian soldier to the revolutionary one.

For the term praetorian soldier, Perlmutter states, "Praetorians certainly emerge in largely agrarian or transitional or ideologically divided societies." (Perlmutter 1977: 10). Military praetorianism indicates the failure of a subjective political control system. For this reason, under stable regimes, few officers are willing to prefer politics to their profession. Praetorian conditions affect military professionalism negatively, decrease the standards of professionalism, and cause fratricide bloodshed. And the



praetorian soldier is the chief of the military corporate. In the case of Egypt, Perlmutter asserts, “There was no state or society that could defend its independence or challenge its existence, became its own client.” (Perlmutter 1977: 77).

Given that the revolutionary soldier is a tool for revolution, and his motivation arises before and during the “revolutionary war”. This type is different from other types in its attitudes towards military corporatism. They favor comradely nonhierarchical relations, and are dedicated to the revolution, supporting the party movement. Since they are not the product of military expertise, their military cadres are politically indoctrinated, and their expectations are beyond of the professional military establishment. Perlmutter’s typology enables one to understand civil-military relations and the ideal types of soldiers (professional, praetorian, revolutionary), which are affiliated to the army of certain states or regimes (Prussia-Germany, France, Japan, Egypt, Ghana). His crucial contribution on this matter is his detailed inquiry of praetorianism in terms of the Middle East.

By making a clear distinction between historical and modern praetorianism, Perlmutter examines the concept in different branches. However, these ideal types do not fit properly into the cases, and they rather suggest ways of evolution for the Arab and African civil-military relations. His inconclusive analysis of and positive attitude towards the military rule render his theory impractical for this research. Although I will refer to few of his analyses and use his data, Perlmutter’s theory will not be the main theory on which this thesis is based.

Different forms of military involvement into politics are presented in *Military role and rule: Perspectives on civil-military relations* by Claude Welch and Arthur K. Smith. In this book, an important point remarked is, “No political group is more influential and less studied than the armed forces.” (Welch & Smith, 1974: 77). While the number of governments under military leadership increases over years, the authors state many forms of military involvement have happened in politics and they aim to discuss the civilian control of the armed forces. The authors assert that military influence has been transferred into military intervention. According to the authors, the most important variables that affect civil-military relations are political participation, civil institutions, military strength, and the institutional boundaries between the armed forces and other groups (Gellar et al., 1981).

Welch and Smith add twenty points to civil-military relations of the MENA literature; these factors show the likelihood of military intervention in politics. These

factors are stimulants and deterrents of military intervention and might be accepted as advice to politicians and researchers. Although they make no distinction of regimes while implanting the theory, in the section “praetorian polities and military rule” they explain the typologies of military-based regimes, which are: predatory, reformist, radical, and guardian. They classify Egypt as a radical form of the praetorian regime. For radical praetorian regimes, they make the definition, “the linkage of interest between military officers and the masses who previously had been unintegrated into national political life” (Welch & Smith, 1974: 77). However, the ultimate idea in their argument is that for such types of regimes, as explained in the part on Egypt in the book, a party structure and civilian control might be true, but this would not be a beneficial approach to the subject and scope of this thesis. So, I will use part of the analysis, data, and definitions, but not the theory itself.

Eric A. Nordlinger’s *Soldiers in Politics* is seen as the bible of praetorianism (Nordlinger, 1977). In this book, Nordlinger mainly asks two sets of questions. First, he asks about the attainment of political power, which explains the reasons for military intervention in politics at various levels. Second, He poses a question as to the government power dealing with the problem of measuring military intervention in politics. He presents a tripartite typology of praetorianism, which consists of “Moderators”, “Guardians”, and “Rulers” in MENA region (Jansen, 2008). Nordlinger uses the term praetorianism and depicts it as a system rather than a period after coup or military government. In this system, military officers are major or predominant political actors by virtue of their actual or threatened use of force.

Table 2.1: The Levels of Military Intervention (Source: Nordlinger, 1977: 27)

The Levels of Military Intervention			
	Moderators	Guardians	Rulers
Extent of Power	Veto Power	Governmental Control	Regime Dominance
Political and Economic Objectives	Preserve status quo	Preserve status quo and/or correct malpractices and deficiencies	Effect political change and sometimes socioeconomic change

As it can be seen in the table 2.1, Nordlinger depicts the typology of praetorianism on two variables and three typologies. While determining the characteristics and distinctive features of praetorianism, he indicates that praetorians are essentially different with regards to the level of intervention and ambitiousness of their objectives.

Nordlinger's works enables one to understand the substantial dynamics of civil-military relations of the MENA region from the aspect of praetorianism. The level of military intervention is explained with the terms of moderators, guardians, and rulers. However, his theory does not specify the MENA region and mainly deals with the societal part of civil-military relations. On the other hand, Egypt is one of the cases he touches upon, along with class and power struggle. Because of this, I suggest two other theories in order to explain the subject.

### 2.3. Civil-Military Relations in the MENA Region

In this part of the chapter, I will discuss the theories of civil-military relations for the MENA region, and I will present the peculiarity of the Middle East. Then a critique of the field theories will be made in terms of their applicability to the MENA countries, especially in the case of Egypt. The civil-military relations in the MENA region are part regional studies. The literature on this field has been developed parallel with the political incidents of the region and world politics. Crucial points in the history of Egypt and world politics tremendously affected the nature of civil-military relations which reflected to this field.

In the decolonization period, establishment of military regimes occurred in a series of countries. Because, these new states were lack of modern bureaucratic institutions and apparatus and the military occurred not only the founding father, but also central bureaucratic power of these states. The Cold War between superpowers forced these new states to join one side or create its own camp. Liberalization efforts changed the position of military in politics starting from 1970s and strengthened especially after 1980s. Last chain of these developments was the Arab Spring which raised the inquiry towards the robust authoritarian regimes in terms of civil-military relations in the MENA region.

The MENA region has been an area in which there have been external invasions and power struggles since the beginning of history. By the twentieth century, the foundation of modern states that took place in the post- colonization era changed

the substructure of the politics in the MENA region. The foundation of these new states in the region was based on robust military power, rather than the participation of the citizens and the will of the people. For this reason, the states of the MENA have been experiencing a severe crisis of state bureaucracy and citizen identity.

This crisis can be clearly seen in civil-military relations in the MENA region. According to the theoretical approaches and cases, the field includes several aspects: national security, the rule of the country, class struggle modernization, and political development. At this point, one needs to refer to one of the substantial problems of the Middle East, which stems from in terms of the military and political elites. The unclear and interbedded civil-military relations have been the common problem of the Middle Eastern regimes in the years that followed their independency. The key political role of the military in the MENA states is a subject that particularly appeals to researchers focusing on the post period of the Arab Uprisings.

On the other hand, the recent history of the MENA region in terms of wars and conflicts is another crucial factor of civil-military relations in the MENA region. Colonialism and corrupt regimes were revolted by the military coups and juntas. The military consisted of various ethnicities, classes, regional groups, that were largely excluded from the political and economic elites. Moreover, they were also a reaction to the 1948 defeat and subservience to Western imperialism, but the ineffectiveness of the MENA armies was seen especially during the 1967 War.

Earlier studies on the field addressed the problem of direct seizure of political power, since the military coups started with the case of Egypt in 1952, and a series of military coups changed the political map of the MENA, throughout the 1960s and 1970s. This is rather related to the explanation of military regimes and the dominant political role of the military in the region rather than general civil-military relations, which are based on the subordination of the military to civilian rule. The understanding of the subject was developed in line with the authoritarian military regimes of the post-colonial era. Thus, initial works on this matter address the governmental changes in Egypt and Syria, and point out the intense political struggle in Lebanon and Iraq. Majid Khadduri's article "The Role of Military in Middle East Politics" describes the difference of the Middle East from Western regimes along with the historical modernization process. He emphasizes the refutation of democracy for both right wing and leftist groups, and explains this by stating the reason was the bad connotation of democracy for the people of the region (Khadduri, 1953).

The conflict between democracy and conservative groups has been explained with the effect of Western powers, and the rejection of religious and conservative groups are pointed to as the reason of military authority. However, the lack of a democratic culture, the ideological reasons, the economic elites, and the lack of democratic institutions along with the effect of decolonization are underestimated by him.

Mehran Kamrava conceptualizes a comprehensive perspective to the entire region in line with changing circumstances. Kamrava points out how political leaders have implemented military professionalization, while seeking to guard themselves against military coups in his article “Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East” (Kamrava, 2000). Moreover, he elaborates on the term military professionalization by making a distinction. In Samuel Huntington’s concept, the term means the subordination of the military command to civilian officials, but in the Middle East the term must be understood as providing modern equipment and technology, improving training facilities and procedures, according to Kamrava. Such changes strengthen the military’s corporate identity, not only in a military sense, but also politically.

Kamrava generates a typology with three types of regimes for the MENA region and proposed a classification for each country based on these ideal types. The classification is military democracies, which means the legitimacy of the military’s political influence is seldomly questioned. These countries also can be distinguished from developed internal cohesion and professional discipline. Israel and Turkey are the best example of this type with the military’s balanced role with democracy, but effective role in politics (Kamrava, 2000).

Autocratic officer-politicians are part of the second type of classification, which is more prevalent than the others. The military is as the founding father for these countries historically and ideologically. The politics are dominated by the armed forces and their personnel. Such countries do not only owe their genesis, industrialization and development to the military, but also their decay, corruption and poverty. So, it is nearly impossible to figure out the nature of these regimes without appreciating the historic and global contexts within which they emerged (Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2014). Egypt, Algeria, Libya, and Syria are the most remarkable examples. For this reason, I will go into further detail regarding this type of military regimes in the following chapter.

The third and last type for the MENA regime is the “King, Tribes and Mercenaries” which essentially refers to monarchies. Unlike other regimes in the MENA, civil-military relations manifest completely different dynamics. Kamrava divides this category into two parts. The first is civic monarchies (Jordan and Morocco), and the other is oil the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. Population is a crucial challenge for these types of regimes, and their armies enjoy a certain level of corporate autonomy in exchange for their loyalty to the regime. Despite sophisticated weaponry, foreign aid, financially abundant resources, working for the military is not viewed as socially prestigious (Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2014). At this point, it can be asserted that armies are ultimately dependent on the regime and not socially effective with a limited number of staff members.

The last approach I will make use of is from Eva Bellin’s *Exceptionalism in Cooperative Perspective*. Her initial question asks why the MENA countries are singularly resistant to democratization. In this regard, her research is much alike the inquiry and subject of this thesis. By means of this analysis, she asserts to explain the understanding of the reason of absent prerequisites of democracy.

Bellin sums up four explanations for the lack of democracy and the robustness of authoritarianism in the MENA region. She refers to weaknesses of civil society such as state-controlled economy, a high level of deprivation, geographical problems, and cultural specificity. She does not accept these factors as satisfying, since none of them are peculiar to the MENA. Thus, she argues the robustness of autocratic regimes is the reason for the lack of democracy, rather than only the weaknesses of presumed preconditions for democratization (Bellin, 2004).

The term of “exceptionalism of the region” hints not only the cumulative failure of the MENA, but also refers to the peculiarity behind the failure to initiate democratic transition. Democratic transition is not likely to occur in statist regimes where the civil society is repressed or corporatized. As Theda Skocpol exhibited that successful revolution is a relatively rare event (Skocpol, 1979), since the state maintains its monopoly over the means of coercion. It is not plausible to expect a democratic transition as long as the state’s coercive apparatus has the capacity and desire to maintain the regime.

Therefore the exceptionalism of the MENA, and the strength of authoritarian regimes stems from a robust coercive apparatus, rather than absent prerequisites of democratization. The coercive apparatus prevents the state from establishing

democratic regimes and suppresses any type of opposition. Mirabeau's famous quote is valid for most of the MENA regimes, "Every state has an army, but in Prussia the army has a state. (Bellin, 2004 139-157)". Along with the coercive apparatus, the prevalence of patrimonialism makes the change more dramatic for the MENA region.

In this regard, Eva Bellin defines the five dynamics that shape a regime's coercive apparatus, namely the military, by distinguishing them as four factors. These are the fiscal health of the security apparatus, the level of foreign support, the level of institutionalization versus the extension of patrimonialism as the organizational basis for the military/security apparatus, the level of popular mobilization, the existence of a credible threat (Bellin, 2004).

These four factors concern the democratic transition of the regimes and the balanced civil-military relations that are based on professionalism. The exceptionalism of the MENA can be explained by Bellin's point of view. This will be the third approach that I acknowledge in my thesis. It will be worthy to analyze the case of Egypt, since Egypt has become a stage for massive protests, revolutions, coups, and a counter-revolution in the recent years.

#### 2.4. Conclusion

Consequently, the case of Egypt is an interesting part of Middle East politics and civil-military relations studies as well. Understanding civil-military relations in Egyptian case would provide substantial point of view to Egyptian and the MENA politics. In order to comprehend the crux of civil-military relations of Egypt, theoretical framework of this thesis was built upon "professionalism", "praetorianism" and "civil-military relations in the MENA region". A consistent and healthy analysis was inquired into various theories, approaches and typologies.

As I have explained the prominent theories and approaches thus far, I will continue by using parts of the data and analyses from the aforementioned works. The inquiry of Egyptian case will provide a clear understanding of politics, defection of praetorian regime and Nasserist ideology. An essential analysis of Egyptian politics in terms of civil-military relations might provide considerable solutions to the current troubles of the country.





## CHAPTER III

### ESTABLISHING A ROBUST MILITARY REGIME

“In the Middle East, as elsewhere, nationalisms have been modern, contingent, confused and instrumental ideologies, and the movements corresponding to them have reflected this.”

Fred Halliday (2000: 67)

#### 3.1. Egypt: Establishing a Robust Military Regime

Egypt as a MENA country and post-colonial state was established in a particular context which shapes civil-military relations in Egypt. In addition to the key geographical, historical and cultural key role of military in politics, Nasserism deeply affects the politics of Egypt in internal and external level especially in the (armed) bureaucracy. Another key component of civil-military relations in Egypt and many Arab countries is the compatibility of regimes with Islamism, and the compatibility of Islamists with the regime. The regional and international context of Egyptian politics is another significant factor for military rule. For some this last factor is the most important one, since Egypt is a key country for the region. Therefore, I will try to explain these factors according to civil-military relation theories, and understand the dynamics of Egyptian politics in terms of civil-military relations.

In this chapter, I will discuss the dynamics which are playing an effective role in civil-military relations in Egyptian politics. Egypt has been the area of authoritarian regimes since ancient times. The roots of authoritarian culture may be followed back to the ancient times of the pharaohs. Undoubtedly, this is not the reason behind authoritarian regime in the country, but it is a significant historical reference and tool of legitimacy. Egypt's geographical and historical peculiarity, certainly have a major role on politics at the first place. Egypt's political culture and external factors have a great influence on politics as well.

After explaining the country of Egypt in terms of geography and history, it will be followed by political history of early modernization from the perspective of civil-military relations. Understanding of early modernization will show us prominent

political actors appeared with the aim of creating a modern state, saving the country from colonialism or facing with the modern world. The roots of the military regime will be clearer within this context. The foundational ideological spirit of the current Egyptian regime, Nasserism, will be inquired with its main tenets. These main tenets are still effective even they acknowledged in the period of Nasser. Last but not least part of this chapter will be on the transformation of Nasserism by the rule of Sadat and Mubarak. Thus, the praetorian Egyptian regime's ideological, political and historical background would be definite

### 3.1.1. Geopolitical and Historical Context of Egypt

In this part of dissertation, I will evaluate the role of geopolitical, historical and cultural factors in for the military domination of Egypt. These variables are often given as the reason for a strong central or authoritarian regime, which also means military intervention in politics. So, I will try to explain these factors in the context of civil-military relations in Egypt.

While telling the history of Egypt, I would like to point out the power of the military in politics over the centuries. The role of the military has a different context in Egyptian history, since it is more than a security apparatus. The military means various things for Egyptian people: a social class, pioneer of modernization, assurance against colonial powers, father of the nation, and secret ruler of the country. There is a geographical and historical peculiarity of Egypt for these various functions of the military. I will try to assess the potential data on the Egyptian case by means of specific theories of civil-military relations on the MENA region. The role of the military in civil-military relations and the concept of the military in modern countries will be useful norms to distinguish the role of military in Egypt.

### 3.1.2. The Country of Egypt

Egypt is located in the northeast corner of Africa, nearly in middle of the MENA region and the southeastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea. It lies at the heart of the Arab world. However, 99 % of the territory of the country comprised of mostly uninhabitable desert. Egypt's population of 80 million people lives along the banks of Nile River which is vital for Egypt. The whole country would be desert without the river, so "Egypt is the gift of the Nile" according to Herodotus (Goldschmidt, 2008). Its neighbors are Libya, Gaza, Israel, and Sudan, and these affects considerably both

the internal and external politics of Egypt. The Suez Canal ensures the country a vital geostrategic importance like the straits of Turkey. The canal is a passage mostly for merchant ships from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean by way of the Red Sea. The unique position of Egypt makes it the most strategically important country in the MENA region.

The region from the Aswan High Dam to the Mediterranean shore is Egypt's core (Stratfor, 2015). The Nile is also the longest river in the world, but it is not commercially navigable forms the basic irrigation dependent agricultural sector. The total surface of the modern Egyptian state is more than 363.000 km<sup>2</sup>, but the habitable and historical part of Egypt is only 15.000 square miles (CIA Factbook, 2016). The long narrow stretch of populated area requires extra infrastructure development, especially related to transportation. The desert topography demands a great deal of investment on a national scale, necessitating a strong central state. It is asserted that the geography of Egypt is linked with Egypt's history of authoritarian regimes beginning with the pharaohs (Stratfor 2015).

While historical ties with Sudan and Libya bring about intimate and complex relations, Egypt's relations with Israel has a vital importance for regional and international politics, and it has enabled Egypt to translate its strong central government and border with Israel into developing relationship with the Western world, particularly the USA. This is one of the main reason why the US to support with the authoritarian regime with billions of dollars for military. The neighboring Gaza Strip is called the Rafah border, makes the country an inseparable part of the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Historically, Egypt is one of the most ancient places in human history. It dates back to the 10th millennium BC and has 5.000 years of recorded history (Shaw, 2000). Because of the central government – we talked about the geopolitical reasons of it – Egypt's army has always played a crucial political role in ruling the country. The army is not only the inseparable part of pressure and has a monopoly on violence, but also it is the only power that saves Egypt from imminent and constant external threats. The country has seen various dynasties and empires from Pharaohs to Greeks and Romans, and its vast sources of wealth and strategic location have attracted many empires and dynasties from ancient to modern times.

Egypt became a part of the Islamic World and a crucial part of the Islamic Civilization, during the era of Umar ibn Al-Khattāb who was the second of the

Rashidun caliphs. The control of Egypt was taken under the command of Amr ibn al-As in 640 C.E. (Sayyid-Marsot, 1985). This incident profoundly affected Egypt. Along with the Islamic conquest, the political and cultural dynamic of Egypt changed substantially. Egypt subsequently served as the center of a number of Islamic dynasties including the Umayyads, Tulunids (a branch of Abbasid) dynasty, Fatimids, and Ayyubids (Abu-Lughod, 1991).

After 1250, the Mamluks, which is a Turco-Circassian military caste, ruled Egypt more than 500 years and it also affected substantially political culture of the country (Ayalon, 1967). By the early 16th century, the Ottoman State conquered Egypt, but it was too far to control for the Ottomans and strange. After a large scale revolt in 1523, the Ottoman State agreed Mamluks to control and rule Egypt in the name of the state, and the Egyptian military caste continued to govern, collected taxes and maintained public order in return till the Napoleonic invasion of France (Goldsmith, 2008). The colonial invasions of Egypt started with the Napoleonic expedition in 1798 and Egypt became one of the first Middle Eastern countries to come under direct European influence (Vatikiotis, 1969).

The country of Egypt has witnessed various dynasties, occupations and military invasions. The vast resources, crucial strategic location, huge population, cultural richness, and versatility of the country make the country a special, but a characteristic country on the Middle East and North African region. Moreover, it is said that this peculiarity facilitated Egypt's central authoritarian rule. Historically, Mamluk dynasty was an interesting experience with its military hierarchical system. These potential variables should be regarded for their essential role in terms of civil-military relations, even though they are not enough to explain the military domination in Egyptian politics.

### 3.1.3. Early Years of Modern Egypt

The early years of modernization starts from the turn of 19<sup>th</sup> century with French invasion until the foundation of "Egyptian Republic" with the revolutionary coup for Egypt. The substantial effect of colonialism and capitalist manufacture production occurred as the challenges of modernization to Egypt. In return for these challenges, Egypt witnessed a few major reactions in order to solve this crisis. These are substantial answers to the modernization problem and they also consisted the roots

of today's political actors, so it is highly significant understanding Egyptian politics from this perspective.

A few years after the French invasion, an Ottoman Albanian commander, Mehmet Ali Pasha seized power in 1805. He is widely accepted as the founder of modern Egypt, since he carried out agricultural reforms, early industrialization, and increased military power during his reign. More than other rulers of the period, Mehmet Ali Pasha tried to find a way through defensive modernization to develop his country's armies and administration by claiming sovereignty within the borders of Egypt (Bill and Springborg, 1994). Despite Mehmet Ali Pasha's efforts, Egypt could not become an industrialized, wealthy, and mighty state, but it did become the most prominent country in the region and his dynasty ruled Egypt for more than a century. According to Vatikiotis, Muhammad Ali used Egypt as a springboard for the power ambition, which extended at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. Muhammad Ali was a modernizing autocrat and methods of government and administration were absolute and strictly centralized (Vatikiotis, 1969). Actually, Muhammad Ali Pasha's efforts should be considered as a reaction to the Ottoman Empire. An Ottoman Pasha reacted against the colonial powers and the phenomenon of modernization not only with traditional methods of war, but also economic development, manufacturing, and substructure of the country tried to be flourished.

The early successors of Muhammad Ali were Ibrahim, Abbas I and Said. They were not capable of modernizing Egypt. The substructure modernization infrastructure of Egypt was widely neglected by them except for the Suez Canal during the reign of Said in 1869. Then Khedive Ismael came to power in 1863, he was willing to transform the country in a European way. Despite the socio economic and even geographic realities of Egypt, his slogan was: "My country is no longer in Africa, it is in Europe." (Vatikiotis, 1969: 73).

Khediv Ismail's blue-sky obsession, thinking lack of grounded or in touch with the realities of the present, caused a great deficit in Egypt's budget and made the country more dependent on colonial powers, particularly Britain. On the other hand, the era of Khediv Ismail brought many developments and changes: introducing new technical skills, modernizing major cities and municipalities, increasing production of cotton abundantly, expanding the irrigated areas of the country, educating the bureaucrats in a European way and employing them, creating an Assembly of Delegates, and making efforts in the direction of constitutional policy. The result of a

colossal budget deficit and new tax laws led to a catastrophic financial crisis by 1875, and members of Assembly and the Egyptian Army officers opposed the policies of Khediv (Vatikiotis, 1991).

Thereafter, the Urabi revolt blew up against the British and French powers financial control, it is known as Dual Control (Rose, Newton, Benians, & Dodwell, 1929), and raised its voice with a nationalistic and class consciousness during the era of Khedive Tawfiq Pasha. This would be accepted as also a military revolt, for the leader of the insurgence Ahmet Urabi was a military officer in the Egyptian army. Nevertheless, the Urabi revolt became the pretext of British bombardment and occupation, and led British to invasion and colonization (Brown, 1994). According to the Istanbul agreement, the Khedivate of Egypt continued under the condition that he be chosen by the Ottoman and Britain. Thus, the existence of British rule was officially accepted by the Ottoman Empire.

Urabi revolt was unsuccessful, but it was a great and remarkable event against the British colonialism. The leader of this movement was a prominent officer of the Egyptian army. His revolt and resistance reflected Egyptian people's discomfort with British invaders. His slogan which is *Mısır li'l-Mısriyin* (Egypt belongs to Egyptians) flamed the Egyptian nationalism and influenced Egyptian people (Blunt, 1922). Dunn skillfully ties skillfully effect of this historical movement with Egyptian nationalism:

In the end, to shorten the tale, it was the army that mattered. The Egyptian officers, the most senior of whom were colonels like Urabi, first sought to neutralize the Turco-Circassian senior officers; they won some concessions from Tawfiq. The British advisers grew alarmed, fearing a nationalist army might repudiate Egypt's debt. Tawfiq sought to play the nationalists, the British, and the Sultan in Constantinople against each other, but lacked the skills. In 1881, with Urabi and the colonels increasing their power, Tawfiq sought to transfer him out of Cairo. He refused, declared himself Prime Minister, and called for a Parliament.

Yet he does not seem to have been all that radical. One slogan, 'Egypt for the Egyptians' may have targeted not only the outside British and French but the internal Turco-Circassian elite, but the demand was essentially for a constitutional monarchy. But the British authorities not only managed to portray 'Urabi as a radical threat, but also to hint to the Ottoman Sultan that 'Urabi might raise the Arab provinces of the Empire in revolt, or even proclaim a rival caliphate, though 'Urabi's ambitions do not seem to have run in those directions: he was an Egyptian nationalist. (Dunn, 2013)

The successor and son of Tawfiq Pasha, Abbas II of Egypt became the Khedive of Egypt, who is also known as the nationalist Khedive. His cordial relations with the Turks always disturbed Britain, but the United Kingdom's influence over Egypt increased gradually. The last straw was the First World War, because the Ottoman Empire went to war alongside the central powers against British Empire. Abbas II of Egypt also supported the Central Powers, he deposed from the Khedivate throne. Although his uncle Huseyin Kamal took the title of Sultan, the throne was completely dominated by Britain (Maḥfūz, 1990).

Apart from the Ottoman heritage and nationalist Egyptian military, another important component of modern Egypt comes from Islamist reformism. In the period of early modernization of Egypt, prominent Islamic intellectuals like Sheikh Mohammed Abduh and his follower Rashid Rida, who were influenced by Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, questioned the basic problematic of Islamism on Egypt and Islamic World. Why was the Muslim civilization so backward? What is the relationship between Islam and modernity? How the Islamic World could adopt the modernity? Their essential argument was about the condition of Muslims when they were in the state of collective ignorance, for public morals, and disunity (Walsh, 2003). Later on these ideas caused the establishing of one of the most widespread and effective Islamist organization in Egypt and across the Middle East. The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 and became an important political and societal actor with its Islamist view. The Muslim Brotherhood was a bottom-up movement, but they always had a political agenda, such as supporting 1952 coup, and the Arab Spring. Hence, the Brotherhood was lack of capability to create a state under the flag of a political movement or revolt.

Last but not least, Wafd Party experience is remarkable in order to understand early democratic attempts and liberalism in Egypt. The case of Wafd Party and Saad Zaghlul was also influential political actors at that time. Although he graduated from al Azhar and he was al Afganis's disciple, Zaghlul's worldview was largely secular (Salem, 1996). As an ambitious politician, he managed to be among the prominent officials in Egypt. Following the end of World War I, Zaghlul and other members of the defunct Legislative Assembly requested to send a delegation (wafd) to present Egypt's demands. The demand was very simple: the end of martial law, the abolition of Britain's protectorate, and representation at the Conference of Peace in the Paris. Even these demanded were disregarded by London, the political effect of the Wafd

Party led to huge protests and strikes that called as 1919 Revolution (Cook, 2012). Ultimately, British Empire declared an unilateral independence of Egypt, the Wafd Party became the first party to rule Egypt and Saad Zaghlul the first prime minister. Nevertheless, the governance of the new quasi-independent state was stuck between British influence, the king, and the Wafd Party, and the power struggle between them brought poverty, unemployment and economic instability until the revolutionary coup in 1952.

However, the contest of Wafd party pushed more the regime towards United Kingdom. Apart from all these, the corruption of the regime accounted for the prolonged economic problems which affected the daily life of all people. The defeat of Egypt by Israel was depicted as the Catastrophe /Al Nakba, was the final straw that broke the camel's back. In the words of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the sense of dignity, independence and stability of Egypt was in need of a revolution. (Nasser, 1959). Hostility against the colonization and its cooperators in the country brought an excessive doubt to politicians. For this reason democracy attempts always regarded as a Trojan horse of Western powers. On this point Khadduri makes a significant analysis about the birth of military regimes:

Democracy from its very inception failed to command general respect, and when adequate reforms were not achieved democracy had to bear the blame. Opposition to democracy came from the right (religious) as well as from the left (socialist and communist) parties and groupings; and when neither side could muster sufficient support to achieve power, the army intervened to carry out a moderate program of reform by force" (Khadduri, 1953: 511-512).

This perspective clarifies highly remarkable points for understanding failure of democracy and founding of military regime in Egypt and some other MENA countries as well. The reactions to challenges of modernization and colonialism are vital for the emergence of essential actors in Egyptian politics. While traditional Ottoman authority was struggling with Britain, the military caste revolted and mobilized Egyptian nationalism. Islamists and liberals were also stepped up into the societal and political scene, but they were lack of state experience and popular support to defeat British invaders at that time. Thus, the followers of Urabi came to power after seventy years and ended imperial existence of Britain (Taygar, 1999).



#### 3.1.4. The Revolutionary Coup

The roots of military influence in politics are much related to the modernization process in Egypt. Like the Memluk enclave in Egyptian history, the military officers have a prominent role in politics and the societal structure of Egypt.

Egypt was also one of the colonial regimes, but it gained ostensible independency before the Second World War. Fuad I of Egypt became the first king of this newborn state. The nationalization period of Egypt witnessed a long period of struggle against colonialism and monarchy. By 1914, the end of Ottoman province of Egypt made more prominent the British rule. Parallel to other parts of the empire, Egyptian people revolted against the protectorate. The revolution of 1919 brought recognition of Egyptian independence with declaration of “Unilateral Recognition of Egyptian Independence” by Britain (Wucher King, 1989).

It is highly remarkable that the creation of modern Egypt owes its independence from British protectorate to a military coup. This incident is also the beginning of Gamal Abdel Nasser period in the political scene of Egypt and the Arab world. Despite the passing of decades, defeat by Israel, liberal and Islamist political opponents, the Cold War and the Arab Spring, Nasserism is still in demand for the resilient Egyptian military regime. This feature of Egyptian politics is the main focus of this dissertation.

The significance of the Egyptian revolution in 1952 stems from the previous stance of the country. The long period of colonization and malfunction of the state became a problem, because of the power struggle inside the regime. Especially the loss of 1948, this was accepted as an obvious indication of corrupt government by the army officers. The junior grade officers Salah Salim, Zakariyya Mohieddin, and Kamal al din Hussein along with Nasser acted to redeem Egypt’s greatness (Nasser, 1959). This incident would be called the “revolutionary coup”, because of the military intervention in politics and its great effect on shaping Egyptian and Arabic political life.

The free Officer’s Movement was a group of military officer within the army who aimed a military coup in the name of full independence of Egypt. Gamal Abdel Nasser along with some fellows Abd-el Hakim Amr and Anwar al-Sadat organized this group with a nationalist, anti-imperialist and anti-corruption agenda. As a reaction against this corruption, indignity and instability, the Free Officer Movement stepped into action on 23 of July in 1952. Gamal Abdel Nasser explains the conceptual background of 1952 revolutionary coup:

Egypt has passed through a critical period in her recent history characterized by bribery, mischief, and the absence of governmental stability. All of these were factors that had a large influence on the army. Those who accepted bribes and were thus influenced caused our defeat in the Palestine War [1948]. As for the period following the war, the mischief-making elements have been assisting one another, and traitors have been commanding the army. They appointed a commander who is either ignorant or corrupt. Egypt has reached the point, therefore, of having no army to defend it. Accordingly, we have undertaken to clean ourselves up and have appointed to command us men from within the army whom we trust in their ability, their character, and their patriotism. It is certain that all Egypt will meet this news with enthusiasm and will welcome it.

As for those whose arrest we saw fit from among men formerly associated with the army, we will not deal harshly with them, but will release them at the appropriate time. I assure the Egyptian people that the entire army today has become capable of operating in the national interest and under the rule of the constitution apart from any interests of its own. I take this opportunity to request that the people never permit any traitors to take refuge in deeds of destruction or violence because these are not in the interest of Egypt. Should anyone behave in such ways, he will be dealt with forcefully in a manner such as has not been seen before and his deeds will meet immediately the reward for treason. The army will take charge with the assistance of the police.

I assure our foreign brothers that their interests, their personal safety, and their property are safe, and that the army considers itself responsible for them. May God grant us success? (“July Revolution Plan”, 2016).

That was the declaration of Nasser’s successor Sadat to the toppling down of Kingdom of Egypt. Nasserism after this revolutionary coup was felt deeply in Egypt’s political life and resonated in other parts of the Arab world. It was transformed, interpreted and practiced in line with the changing circumstances of Egypt, but what is clear is that the military obtained a robust place in the political, social and economic life of Egypt.

Nasser links Egypt’s geography to its historical role as protectorate, providing sanctuary within its boundaries for Islamic civilization and heritage during times of invasion (Silbermann, 1972). This history provides a third source of identification, the familial. Nasser enveloped Egypt’s story in the character of a people rooted by a shared language and history, whose destiny has been thwarted by successive waves of imperialist powers. Arab nationalism in the colonialist period could not help, but define itself against the invading forces (Reid, Gershoni and Jankowski, 1997). Following the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916, the Balfour Declaration in 1917, and the 1920 fall of Damascus to the French, Arab nationalists redirected their struggle against European colonialism. (Ayubi, 2009). As the Ottomans withdrew, British and

French military control dashed hopes for an independent Arab kingdom. Egypt had attached itself to the Ottoman Empire in name only, and its nationalist energy was singularly directed against the British. From the turn of the century to the Second World War, Egyptians perceived the nationalist struggle as exclusively their own. This phenomenon was called as “self-differentiation” by scholars (Connor, 1998). It suggested a differentiated perception of identity from other Arab nations.

Until this part of the chapter, Egypt’s struggle with modernization and colonialism was told. In line with this challenge, the military initiated to create a regime, eluded from other politically influential actors, which are traditional Ottoman authority, Islamists, and liberals. The real success of the military became the 1952 coup, it occurred against British colonization and its puppet ruler in the country. The Free Army Officers succeeded the revolutionary coup, Gamal Abdel Nasser lead the military officers and shaped the regime in line with his ideas. The revolutionary coup provided the military entitling the right of establishing political and economic system, and social structure which also consisted the indoctrination of the military regime in Egypt.

### 3.2. The Ideology of Nasserism

Following the French and Industrial Revolutions, the idea of nationalism and the socio-economic system of capitalism draw different parts of the world into the concept of nation-state. Ideologies are emerged as a way out of the crisis of modernization. The situation in Egypt give birth to an ideology is as important as the ideology itself. The class, society or group who benefit from the ideology must be taken in to account while interpreting of an ideology.

In this part of the thesis, I would like to remark on the importance of the Nasserist ideology in order to understand the domination of military in Egyptian politics and in the broader context of its effect across the MENA region. Nasserist ideology ensured necessary background for the military rule in the praetorian state of Egypt. The following section will begin by addressing two questions: How did the ideology of Nasserism emerge and what are the main tenets of Nasserism? After answering these questions, the section will conclude within an analysis of two more: How was this ideology put into practice and how was it interpreted in the name of legitimization of military dominance in politics?

The republic of Egypt was founded in 1952 by revolutionary coup of Free Officers. This revolution had substantial effect on Egyptian and MENA politics theoretically and practically. After that, Nasserist ideology, which evolved gradually in line with the conditions of the country, directed the politics of Egypt. So, legitimation of the military's presence in politics was provided with the interpretation of Nasserist ideology. In this section, I will explain the main tenets of Nasserism in terms of civil-military relations in Egypt and the MENA region.

While analyzing the doctrine of Nasserism, it has to be taken into account that the political ideas of the revolution emerged and evolved after the revolution. In this sense, the application of ideology precedes theory. For this reason, Nasserist ideology involves great deal of populism and pragmatism. The most prominent reason for this process is the necessity and quest of a theory after the successful revolutionary coup.

If we interpret to the relevance to Nasserism from a Gramscian perspective, he asserts "hegemony construction" and "ideological domination." By these terms, Gramsci implies the domination of one ideology suppresses—often brutally—another. In order to explain reality, ideological explanations were created by academics or political activists or philosophers (Gramsci, Buttigieg and Callari, 2011). Moreover, the hegemony of an ideology would be possible with ideological state apparatus. This is how hegemony is created and maintained. According to Gramsci, ideology serves the corporate the interests of a certain class.

In order to understand the Nasserist ideological approach, a critical point must be considered. Using Nasserism as a tool of ideological domination, the regime acted in the name of the Egyptian people but without their consent. Moreover, it was clearly stated that there would be no free and multiple party election for the purpose of keeping the nation together.

For the civil-military relations theories, Perlmutter (Perlmutter, 1981) and Nordlinger emphasized praetorianism, in which the military acts like the guardian of the regime. It uses coercive power in the name of the state itself. Especially Nordlinger's view is beneficial for interpreting the Egyptian case. Since it focuses on the attainment of political power and inquire into military intervention in politics of different levels. According to this approach, military officers are the major dominant political actor in a regime (Nordlinger, 1977).

Likewise after the revolutionary coup in 1952, the military in Egypt grew stronger politically, but not professionally. The ideology of Nasserism with its various

aspects consolidated and legitimized military authoritarianism for the sake of the Egyptian people. After seizing the power, the Free Officers Movement transformed into the Revolutionary Command Council and placed the military at the center of the regime. 1,500 former officers were appointed to top nonmilitary positions between 1952 and 1964 (Abdel-Malek, 1968).

Although Nasserism has a populist and pragmatist nature firmly related to the historical and geographical context of Egypt and is also certainly a post-colonial Cold War product, it has also distinctive tenets. According to Şahin there are five main tenets of Nasserism and they will be counted here with interpreting a civil-military perspective (Şahin, 2014). Militarism can be regarded as the first principle of Nasserism for acting with a military coup, with a group of officers, and ruling the country with a military junta (Revolutionary Command Council). This pillar employs the military of the heart of the regime as the guardian or ruler of the state. Anti-imperialist, Territorial Arab Nationalism defines the extent of rule for the Nasserist regime. Although Nasserism concerns pan-Arabism, it was aware of that this is a duty beyond the Egyptian political clout. Arab socialism was an alternative socio-economic system in order to have a cure for the poor economy of the Egyptian state and Egyptian people as well. Corporatist society of Nasserism consisted the power base of the regime, especially officer corps enjoyed from corporatism and provided regime stability. The last tenet of Nasserism is secularism which is particular to the Egyptian context, but similar with other modern ideologies. Thus, Nasserism will be explained under these titles in order to grasp the ideology of the praetorian Nasserist state.

### 3.2.1. Militarism: The Stronghold and Backbone of Nasserist Egypt

The military of Egypt is a very fundamental component of modern Egypt and Egyptian nationalism. The militarist tenet of Nasserism is also related with the principles of Arab socialism and secularism, which will be explained later. Looking to the history and contemporary politics of Egypt, the stronghold and backbone position of the military for the regime will be more obvious.

Firstly, the Free Officer's Army constitutes the main body of the military revolution. The class structure and motivation of the officer corps as a middle class of Egyptian society is crucial to grasp the tenets of Nasserist ideology and its interaction with the other classes. Even Gamal Abdel Nasser explains the preference for

militarism, while explaining the revolutionary coup in his book *Philosophy of Revolution*:

One question is persistently occurred to me: Was it our duty, as an army, to do what we did in July 23, 1952. I have just explained how the revolution on July 23rd was the realization of a hope that dangled before the eyes of the people of Egypt, since they began, in modern times, to think of governing themselves and having the final word on their destiny.

If this is be so, and if what took place on July 23rd was only a military mutiny and not a popular revolt, why was the army then, apart from the other forces, destined to carry out this revolution?

Throughout my life I have had faith in militarism. The soldier's sole duty is to die on frontiers of his country. Why then was our army compelled to act in the capital and not on the frontier? (Nasser, 1959: 17-18)

In this point we should think about the choice of military regime for Egypt in the frame of civil-military relations. Theoretically, it would be useful to look into studies of different scholars the reason behind the militarism in Nasserism might be found. Huntington's societal imperatives consist of ideology and structure, but he acknowledges this in order to render military effectives for civilian leaders (Huntington, 1957). However, Huntington conceives that the army would be away from ideological inclinations and he attaches the term of "professionalism" to this idea. So, it will be clear that his "normal theory" would be very inconsistent to the Egyptian case.

In this point, the civil-military relations of MENA are useful in explaining the militarism phenomenon in Nasserism. Samuel E. Finer tries to explain the reasons behind the military intervention in politics. He considers two conditions for military intervention, namely the capacity of the military and the volition of the society (Finer, 1988). In the Egyptian case, it seems the situation for the military intervention was ready, particularly after disappointing failure against Israel in 1948, *el-Nakba* (Day of the Catastrophe).

The governing style of the officer corps and its features are skillfully clarified by Nordlinger, explained the term of praetorianism. According to Nordlinger: "Praetorianism refers to a situation in which military officers are major or predominant political actors by virtue of their actual or threatened use of force." (Nordlinger, 1977: p.2). He also depicts the Egyptian government as praetorian and analyzes over this

concept. Accepting that the officer corps predominantly comes from middle-class backgrounds, Nordlinger asserts that they tend to be progressive-modernizing soldiers.

The military governance style is expressed as authoritarian in which “there is little or no political competition and participation, and no more than minimal levels of control and penetration from above.” (Nordlinger, 1977: 112). Because of the authoritarian nature of the Egyptian praetorian regime, competition and participation in politics was unable, it caused minimal control and penetration. Nasser admits, what he believed was a united, widespread support of the people, but what he found was a completely different condition (Cook, 2012). Despite the efforts to create a mass party, the Arab Socialist Union, so that the nation and the country would not be divided, the praetorian rules could not build a mass party to mobilize the population. The military was only able to penetrate and control the regime in Egypt, as in other examples of praetorian regimes.

### 3.2.2. Anti-Imperialist, Territorial Arab Nationalism

The nationalist identity of Egypt was founded against the occupiers, the colonial invasion of France and Britain. Egypt’s modernization brought the idea of independency, especially after the World War I. The efforts of the Wafd Party were remarkable, but it was seen that political struggle is vain unless it is supported by an armed forces. Above all, the psychological shock of the 1948 War and loss of Palestine solidified Arab identity, and paved the way for a revolutionary coup. The appeal of the masses in the name of Egyptian Arabic identity consolidated the regime, but it also constructed indisputable authoritarian military governance, because according to Nasserist ideology, the independence and dignity of the country was at stake, and only the military could save Egypt.

Egyptian nationalism was a response to the domination of Egypt by the West, in particular British domination. Smith suggests that nationalism can mean the process of: the formation of nations, a national conscious/sentiment, a sociopolitical movement, a language and symbolism of the nation and an ideology of the nation. Smith defines nationalism as an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential “nation” (Smith, 2001). While looking from this perspective, the formation of modern Egypt and its territorial, anti-imperialist nature would be very compatible with the creation of the new country. The

people of Egypt required an independent state to be away from colonialist rule and its poverty; Egyptian nation appeared as a nation with its army made a coup and gained independence as the Egyptian nation.

In Nasserism, the effect of anti-imperialism on Egyptian nationalism is remarkable considering the sparking of the revolution. For an independent Egypt, the Free Officer's Movement was in cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood and communist cells. It was remarked that "Nasser, for instance, had worked with activists from various political backgrounds including the Muslim Brotherhood and the Communists in the Democratic Movement for National Liberation" (Şahin, 2014: 52).

This distinctiveness of Egyptian nationalism from other Arab countries induced "Egyptian territorial nationalism" which became the main principle of Nasserism as well. As a reaction against the British colonialism and its monarchy, "self-determination" in the full sense of the world created the Egyptian territorial nationalism. Likewise, Milton Easman defines Egyptian nationalism as an idea that demands rights of self-determination (Easman, 1994). This feature can be found generally in the speeches and policies of Gamal Abdel Nasser. The term of the "*watan*" (country) suggests a territorial nationalistic feature and separates it from the pan-Arabism of the Ba'ath ideology.

A skillful elaboration of the territorial Egyptian nationalist idea was made by Nazih Ayyubi. For being the largest, most populated, strategically crucial, and culturally deep country of the Arab world, Egypt is different from other countries. In addition to this, the historical experience of Egyptian nationalism is significant with autonomy from Ottoman Empire by establishing the state of Muhammad Ali Pasha, Saad Zaghloul's struggle and Wafd's Party, and introducing with secularist citizenship after 1919 revolution (Ayubi, 2009). In the light of these historical experience and specific conditions, he concludes that Egyptian nationalism has its own nationalism in which the "*umma*" (nation) refers to the Egyptian people, rather than Arab peoples.

By emphasizing distinctiveness of the Egyptian nation, Nasserism creates and constructs an anti-imperialist territorial Egyptian nationalism. From this sense, Nasserist ideology tries to constitute a special role for Egyptians. The slogan of "Lift your head up brother, the age of subjugation is over" transforms to "Lift your head up brother, you're an Egyptian!" and indicates how Egypt's drive for regional leadership based on pan-Arabism constituted a unique feature of Nasser's populism (Podeh and Winckler, 2004).



The transformation of the concept of nationalism points to the ideological transformation in Nasserism. Before the establishing the United Arab Republic, shifts the rhetoric of “Arab Egypt” and acclaims that Egypt is “member of the greater Arab entity”. In the same way, he reviews concept of “the country” concerning the greater Arab geography, says: “by our country I mean the whole Arab world.” (Jankowski, 2001).

For the foreign policy of Nasserism, there is a remarkable consistency and interaction with “anti-imperialist Egyptian nationalism”. In the atmosphere of the Cold War, Nasser steered Egypt in a neutral, but effective way that was one of the most prominent feature of Nasserism. It was clearly seen in the Suez Canal incidence, Egypt made an operation against Israel, Britain, and France, acclaimed the right on Canal and nationalized the Suez Canal Company (Metz, 1991). Another significant case of Nasserist foreign policy was the financial issue of building of High Aswan Dam, because the financial assistance of USA was abruptly withdrawn their offer to build dam to protest arm deal with USSR (Dekmejian, 1972). His support of Algerian independence, campaign against Baghdad Pact, and most importantly his effort in the creation of The Non-Alignment Movement is the most prominent instances that prove reflection of “anti-imperialist Egyptian nationalism” to foreign policy of Egypt.

He also developed the three circles theory to explain the historical role of Egypt. The circles stand for the missions of Egypt to Arab countries, the African continent and the Islamic world. In a book was published in 1954, Nasser described Egypt’s strategical geopolitical position in terms of its racial and historical affiliation. An important role in line with Egypt’s strategical circumstances was conceived by Nasser (Mansfield, 1973). Actually, the foreign policy of Nasserism may be accepted as the backbone of the ideology, since it represents independence and Arabic identity. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Islam Nasserism called for “the liberation of Arabs and all Afro-Asian states colonized or dominated by Western powers, with Egypt playing a key leadership role” (“Nasserism”, 2016).

The nationalization of the Suez Canal was a milestone for the foreign policy of Nasserism. After the nationalization of Suez Canal, Nasser appeared as the leader of modern Arab nationalist movement and he gained the capability to voice the aspirations for revival and restored dignity of the Arab masses, according to Mansfield (Mansfield, 1973). Moreover, he elaborated this idea and developed a doctrine of neutralism, asserting the non-alignment of the countries of Arab world. Through the

close affiliations with both Premier Nehru of India and President Tito of Yugoslavia, the non-alignment pact was signed in Indonesia in 1955, which attempted to mobilize Third World countries against any major power bloc (Haykal, 1973).

### 3.2.3. Arab Socialism

The second pillar of Nasserism is constituted by Arab socialism which is an amalgam of Pan Arabism and socialism. This tenet of Nasserism provides a structural base for étatist (statist) policies and so determines the economic and social politics of the state. Although Nasserism did not invent the ideology of Arab socialism, it is interpreted and implemented by Nasserism in the Egyptian context.

By using the ideological principles of Arab socialism, the authoritarian rulers of Egypt was able to manage economic resources of the country. The socio-economic system of Arab socialism is ideally suited to this mission. The economic presence of the state is legitimized politically with Arab socialism which also ensured the effective control of natural sources and labor power. Arab socialism is accepted as propulsive force of Egyptian economy, so the industrialization and modernization of the country would be possible through the state (Beinin, 2001).

According to the typology of Kamrava, the second type of regimes in terms of civil-military relations is rule of “autocratic officer politicians.” For these kinds of countries, they were founded by their military. Because, the Arab World was mired in a deep crisis, the social classes and educated groups considered military to take control of the state acceptable. It was thought to “start the process of political development, give speed and direction to industrialization, and pull the country out of ‘backwardness’ and underdevelopment” in this way (Kamrava, 2000). Following the revolution, most of these ideological armies chose a Revolutionary Command Council in order to effect change.

To provide a corporate identity among the officer corps, they needed to a single, unifying ideology like Ba’athism. These ideologies pursued projects that were in fact nationalist and statist and were defined in terms of economic nationalism, industrial development, state capitalism, and the development of a bourgeois class. He acknowledged this type is suitable for Iraq, Syria, Libya, Egypt and Algeria. This approach explains how these Middle Eastern militarist ideologies occurred across the Arab World and why they were accepted by the people in these countries. It would be a good starting point to grasp the idea that how the military deeply affected politics

not only by governing, but also in its ideological role that enabled to convince and mobilize the masses. For this reason, Arab socialism meant more than a pretext of military governance; it envisaged a modern, developed, independent and united country for the Middle Eastern Arab people (Kamrava, 2000).

The roots of Arab socialism were founded by Michael Eflaq, who was the founding father of Ba'athism. He combined Arab nationalism with socialism in a different perspective. While Eflaq put forward the Ba'ath ideology for the Arab world, he was also a prominent political figure, and the founder of the Ba'ath Party in Syria. The ideology was to unite the separated and underdeveloped Arab world. As a reaction to Western political hegemony in the Middle East, the Ba'ath ideology was centered upon anti-imperialism. Therefore, the term Arab socialism was coined as a nationalist interpretation of socialism in Arab societies (Devlin, 1976). In his view, nationalism has equated with socialism, since both of them sought the same action against the capitalist Western world for the Arab societies.

Arab socialism was defined as a hybrid concept which founded on two components by Shahrough Akhavi. These are "Arab unity" and "egalitarianism" indicating both the nationalistic and socialist character of Arab socialism. The hybridization makes sense with this Socio-economic reality of the Middle East, because the invasion of colonial powers for years which aroused nationalistic reactions among the Arab people and the income disparity between the rich and poor strata of society (Akhavi, 1975). Joel Beinin also remarks on this point by relating the history of peasants and workers, and its connection with the idea of an independent state: "The grievances and collective actions of workers, peasants, and their allies among the intelligentsia popularized the notion that truly independent national governments would serve the needs of workers and peasants." (Beinin, 2001: 131).

For this reason, the effect of the Ba'ath Party was considerable across the Arab world. Especially in Syria and Iraq, the Ba'ath Party ruled these countries for a long time with authoritarian rulers. Even though the Ba'ath regime in Iraq was toppled by the invasion of the USA, it is still in use in Syria under Assad's rule. The party's branches spread to the other Arab countries. In Libya, Jordan and Lebanon, the Ba'ath party was popular in the post-colonialist era. However, the branches of the Ba'ath party and Arab socialism were challenged by other ideological movements.

In Egypt, the effect of Ba'ath ideology was limited for the political sphere of the country was being dominated by Nasserist ideology. Nevertheless, Nasserism was

affected much by Ba'athism, specifically from the point of Arab socialism. The interaction between these two political movements was at peak in the years of the United Arab Republic. However, Ba'athism was centered upon an interpretation of socialism, but Nasserist ideology was centered upon nationalism. Arab socialism was a tool to provide economic development and prosperity by the hands of the state in Nasserist ideology. Ba'athism was more robust ideology that aimed to turn Arab states into socialist political entities. On the other hand, Arab socialism was acknowledged and developed the Egyptian case in Nasserism. Apart from the Ba'athist approach, Nasserism implemented Arab socialism as a tool of nationalization, rather than Pan Arabism. Moreover, it was conducted more skillfully and flexibly than other precedents.

Two main features of Arab socialism in Nasserist ideology distinguish from other interpretation across the Arab world. These features account for embracing Arab socialism, since it provides popular support from the masses and strengthens the state apparatus economically and politically. One of them is the populist and the other is the étatist characters, of Arab socialism in the Nasserist interpretation (Şahin, 2014).

Egypt became a successful example of Arab socialism, particularly in the period of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasserist ideology and Egyptian politics adapted itself to changes, in line with world political-economic trend. One of the main reasons for the resilience of the regime and the infrastructure of the military dominance was the populist and étatist character of Nasserism which are still current in the state of Egypt and among Egyptian society.

#### 3.2.4. Corporatist Society of Nasserism

The corporatist aspect of Nasserism is a consequence of Arab socialism. This feature of Nasserism incorporates several social strata into the regime and aims to redesign socioeconomic life in order to provide "social justice" in society. The most evident example of the corporatist tenet of Nasserism can be found in National Charter (Abu-Laban, 1967).

A widely accepted definition of corporatism is a "system of social organization that has at its base the grouping of men according to the community of their natural interests and social functions, and as true and proper organs of the state they direct and coordinate labor and capital in matters of common interests" (Wiarda, 1996: 33). The corporatist state is one of the types of Gramscian theory. In his view, corporatist state

is between the gendarme-state and the integral-state, which are to secure consent of classes use dominance and hegemony, respectively (Gramsci, 2010). Thus, the state seeks to manage economic activities to strengthen itself. It exhibits anti-liberal characteristics, rather than anti-capitalist, since it attempts to use the state's development for peasants and workers.

At this point, I would make use of Nordlinger's analysis for the explanation of corporatist politics and their implementation on social classes. The early years of Nasserism are a key for making-sense of the substructure of modern Egypt, which is still in power ideologically and practically. He chiefly mentions about how the praetorian regime of Egypt was able of become a successful example to reconciling the divisions of society and bring a relatively fair and prosperous economy for the all social classes by considering the other precedents of military regimes.

Numerous problems and crisis in non-Western societies, which are divided along communal; religious, racial, linguistic, tribal, and regional lines, and are afflicted with serious economic scarcities and inequities. He makes an assessment of military governments in preventing communal violence and bringing economic change, since many non-Western societies are deeply divided along communal lines and suffer from widespread violence. For most cases, he concludes that "military governments that have come to power in societies that are deeply divided along communal lines have usually been unwilling or unable to contain the severity of these conflicts." (Nordlinger, 1977: 171). And he exemplifies this analysis with Iraq, Sudan, Nigeria, Indonesia, Burma and Pakistan.

Nevertheless, the cases of Peru, Burma, and Egypt are accepted as successful military regimes in terms of preventing communal conflicts and bringing progressive economic change. The military regimes of these countries motivated, determined and exceptional according to Nordlinger. He prefers explain and elaborate the cases rather than try to save the hypothesis or ignore.

For Egyptian case, it was described as "the most radical of military regimes" under the influence of Nasser's revolutionary rhetoric and the virulent Arab socialism (Archcar, 2011). The policies of the Nasserist praetorian regime in terms of class analysis is made to gauge the extent of success in terms of progress and modernization. The agrarian reform of praetorians limiting the arable land to two hundred acres was an instrument to attack the political and economic predominance of the semi-feudal oligarchy. However in practice it has the rural middle class who was the major

beneficiary rather than poor peasants. This can be seen from the fact that only one hundred thousand acres were distributed to poor peasant owning less than five acres during the execution of the reform. While a substantial amount of land was given to farmers who already owned more than five acres, the rest of it was sold and was obtained by solvent farmers who could afford to buy (Vatikiotis, 1969).

Moreover, Nordlinger makes a revision of governmental policies of Nasser in terms of class analysis. He states that the first decade of Nasserism was not detrimental to the interests of bourgeoisie including wealthy financiers, industrialists, and commercial entrepreneurs. In contrast, their interests are promoted, aristocracy is eliminated, the political left silenced, and the unions destroyed. As for the second decade of Nasserism, the economic power of wealthy urban class is seized by means of 1961 nationalization laws, but the praetorians charter considerable opportunities and private capital maintain certain and quick profits: building construction, real estate, hotels, medium-size industry (Nordlinger, 1977). His analysis on modern Egyptian state depicts how the praetorian Nasserist Egypt was affected the social classes in the country.

The policies of military regime enrich the middle class, particularly from public sector involving salaried administrators, engineers, technicians, economists, and clerical workers. According to Nordlinger, the praetorians filled and promoted educated to the nationalized private companies in this way the praetorians create a relatively large, well-trained managerial class in order to promote economic growth and modernization. The officer corps get its share from the economic growth and prosperity as a member of the middle class.

The lower classes amelioration seems considerable in comparison to the other cases and the previous situation of Egypt. The praetorian Nasserist regime supplied better medical care, more education, and greater social security services, in addition to public assistance at times of crop failure and fairer treatment at the hands of landowners and bureaucrats. Workers were guaranteed a minimum wage, protected against unjust dismissals, and had their working conditions improved, so Egypt's praetorians gained considerable legitimacy from the lower-class.

After the Free Officer's grasp seizure of the state power, a set of policies provided the state as principal organizer of capital accumulation which generated an opportunity of the Nasserist regime to counter the political opposition with its social incorporation policies (Bread, Freedom and Social Justice). Ayyubi also considers the

authoritarian-bureaucratic state of Egypt to consisted of three layers: charismatic leader (via the boss), partly ideological political (via the party) and an organizational (via the bureaucracy and sometimes the army). Thus, the praetorians “mobilized the loyalties of the common people by implementing corporatist organizational principles without allowing an accompanying increase in their political power.” (Ayubi, 2009: 203).

Consequently, the state power of Egypt concentrated on a boss (the praetorian rule), and led to a restructuring not only of the politics of Egypt, but also a substantial change and incorporation of varied social strata to the main body of the state. However, the progress of the country required a great deal of motivation and control against the corruption of the military regime. The deterioration of Egypt should be interpreted in line with the liberal policies, loss of motivation and withdrawal from corporatist policies particularly in favor of lower classes after Nasser.

#### 3.2.5. Secularism

The modernization process of nations brought a sense extensively of criticism or opposition towards religious/traditional values. Even the creation of these states owed much to religious values like in the Algerian case, because the independence of Algeria became with the help of religious groups, symbols, and leaders. (Cook, 2007). The new regimes of the Third World extensively choose to stay away from religious identity and effect. Actually, the struggle between secularism and religion is still a big question mark for all political systems, but especially for Middle Eastern countries. The problematic of the states with religion is still a hot topic, especially for the Middle Eastern Islamic countries.

The praetorian regime of Egypt is established upon a nationalist narrative and high modernist concept, but its relations with religion, particularly Islam was always reflected the Middle Eastern and Islamic identity of the country. For Nasser’s stance on this issue, it has never said his anti-religion speeches or politics, rather his neutral position in terms of Islam. However, Nasser’s hostile relations with the Muslim Brotherhood flamed up from this debated issue. Because of the fact that these two societal power in Egypt once cooperated in the revolutionary coup, but they could not agree after the establishment of the military regime. The disagreement between the military and the Brotherhood also reflects two prominent view among the Egyptian society. Thus, the issue of secularism is still a crucial point of political struggle.

These two essential different point of views were summed up well by Perlmutter:

Both groups believed that the nation should be engaged in a constant struggle against al-Isti'mar, but the Brotherhood saw the struggle as a moral and religious conflict, while Nasserites saw the struggle as a psycho-political encounter, a clash of ideologies. The Muslim Brotherhood viewed modern state as a guilty, or potentially guilty, of shi'k (conspiracy against the Divine); the Nasserites viewed as a means of improving the position of both Egyptian state and Islam, in the world as well as in the Middle East. To the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic religion was the core of nationalism, while the Nasserites saw Islam as a cohesion and identity to be exploited by the secular state (Perlmutter, 1974: 72).

In respect to the Nasserist ideology, it is essentially a secular pan-Arabist movement. However, it never denounced religions, or overtly declared Egypt as a secular republic or separated religion and state. The secularist tenet of Nasserism reveals itself in the practice of policies and being an ideology for the masses, so it rather prefers to choose a neutral position in terms of religion. A space for religion is always favorable in the Nasserist regime, but Islamist political movements are never tolerated, especially in the case Muslim Brotherhood which is seen as the archenemy of the regime.

As we mentioned above, Nasserism was established mainly upon Egyptian nationalism as the main form identity recognition and tool of mobilization in the territory of Egypt. Neither Gamal Abdel Nasser nor his successors Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak conducted anti-religious campaigns, but their use of religious expressions and practice were limited. However, the regime has always refrained from political Islam as praetorian Nasserist regime.

Along with the Nasser's positive attitude towards Islam in his speeches, Sadat and Mubarak rule witnessed more engagement with Islam. The National Charter, which issued during the rule of Sadat, emphasized the role of Islam in politics, accepted shari'a principal rule of legislation (Cook, 2007:68). Mubarak rule was also opened a space for religion as long as they do not constitute political power. For instance in 1991, the rising Islamism concerned Mubarak and a number of members of the Muslim Brotherhood were arrested and its organization accepted as a terrorist threat (Şahin, 2014: 83).

In fact, Nasserism recognizes Islam as a native ingredient of Arabness, admitting that Islam contributed to the struggle against Western colonialism, like



Ba'athist ideology. Moreover, Nasser and his successors did not care much for the Islamic World compared to Arabic World, even though he gave place to Islamic World in his three circles of Egypt's historical role.

One of the main reason behind the acknowledgment might be seen in the speeches and writings of the praetorians. Nasser calls attention to this point: "After eighteen months in power, I still don't see how it would be possible to govern according to the Koran...The Koran is a very general text, capable of interpretation, and that is why I don't think it is suitable as a source of policy or political doctrine" (Jankowski, 2001: 35). This explanation should be considered seriously, because post-colonial regimes, especially military regimes were unable to interpret religion for daily political issues. So, they have favored nationalism so that they could interpret the notion of "nation" easily in line with the political context of the nation state.

On this point, we should pay attention to Ernest Gellner who is one of the most influential academics in the field of the nationalism. According to Gellner: "It is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round." (Gellner, 1983: 55). Moreover, he succeeds in creating a boundary between legitimacy and nationalism. This is what Nasserism tried to do while establishing modern Egypt. Even Nasser's Minister of Awqaf Sheikh al-Baquri states to Abdallah Imam that: "Egyptian had any say in Egypt until Gamal Abdel Nasser came along with his righteous brothers." (Podeh & Winckler, 2004: 63) So, the praetorian state of Egypt is not against the religion, especially among the society, but rather it neglected and abstained from Islamist political view and agenda in order to create a "nation" and a "nation-state".

A neutral and non-political state of Egypt is also praised by Copts, who are almost ten percent of Egyptian population. According to prominent Copt writers, secularism is regarded rather a positive component of Nasserist regime, Yunan Labib Rizq praised the revolution's egalitarian stance for religious minorities and Milad Hanna favored Nasserism for considering Egyptian citizens equal and treated them with justice (Ḥannā, 1994: 52). They felt more belonging to the regime by means of secularism and a member of Egyptian nation.

On the other hand, Islamism was a very strange ideology or political culture for the military regime. Modern politicians, especially the military rulers are really unsure how to interpret sacred text in daily politics. The thoughts of the Muslim Brotherhood especially are considered "dangerous" and as constituting a threat to "national security." The praetorians widely feared that Islamist politics would destroy

or harm the country's main principles, and topple the political position of the military, which was the stronghold and backbone of the Nasserist Egyptian regime.

### 3.3. Transformation of the Nasserist Regime

In this part of my dissertation, I would like to address the transformation of the Nasserist regime along the political history of Egypt. The main tenets of Nasserism have continued to be followed after the reign of Gamal Abdel Nasser, but the regime adapted itself to the changing conjuncture of world policies, regional politics and domestic politics. This change allowed the authoritarian regime to stay in power and strengthened political and economic power of the military in Egyptian politics.

It should be noted that three rulers of Egypt (Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak) have an obvious feature in common: former high-ranking military officers ruled Egypt since the revolutionary coup and has regarded democracy as a corrupted Western system. This inclined the political system to authoritarianism, but it also led to militarism. The balance of civil-military relations constituted a problem, because of the authoritarian nature of high ranking ex-military officers. The influence of the military on politics and social life was remarkably distinct from democratic civil political countries. Even though politics in Egypt have shuttled away from Nasserism, the substructure of Egyptian politics was determined during Nasser's period. Actually, the successors of Nasser merely made modifications and reforms of Nasserism in line with the changing dynamics of Egypt and the international system.

For this reason, this part of the chapter will be less detailed, since it will not include explanation of the ideological principals of Nasserism. The main tenets of Nasserism, which are militarism, Arab nationalism, Arab socialism, corporatism, and secularism, were discussed in the previous section. Here the transformation of Nasserism will be analyzed in reference to civil-military relation theories.

The era of the two successor of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Husni Mubarak, deeply affected the principles of Nasserism and Egyptian politics as well. The two major events the 1967 War and the end of the Cold War that left their work on Middle Eastern politics effected in Nasserism and civil-military relations in Egypt as well. Although the first of these two incidents occurred during the reign of Nasser, its consequences are also apparent in Sadat's era. In addition to this, the assassination of Sadat had an inevitable impact on Mubarak's Egypt, and under Mubarak the

characteristics of the Egyptian regime's Nasserism, and civil-military relations passed to another phase as a result of the end of the Cold War.

### 3.3.1. Correcting the Revolution: Anwar Sadat Era

Anwar Sadat was the second and last of the cabal of Free Officers, so his rule both resembles and differentiates from that of his predecessor Gamal Abdel Nasser. As a ruler who had been in the circle of rule from the beginning of regime, Sadat's political era was deeply affected by the rule of Nasser in terms of both his achievements and mistakes. The domestic and foreign policy of Egypt witnessed tactical political changes/corrections during the Anwar Sadat era. In fact the main feature of Nasserism was seen in this period with the continuity in Sadat and Mubarak period. The highly personalized system of governance in Nasser's era, which made him a native sultan from *primus inter pares*, developed a system of leadership and decision making in Egypt according to (Vatikiotis, 1991) and (Owen, 2012). The absolute power of the Egyptian leader under the flag of Nasserism provided the stability for the regime despite the changing economic, social, and foreign policy of the ruler. The hero image he constructed people's loyalty and allegiance to him.

The highly personalized system of autocracy also distracted from some important figures that should not be disregarded. Regarding the specific conditions of Egypt and Middle Eastern countries, the role of the military is key to Egyptian colonial and social history, which are important features of the country. As mentioned before, the military constitutes the main pillar of the Nasserist regime. This position of Egyptian military was mentioned to a large extent, despite some crucial changes to the in political system like the "open-door policy" in Sadat's period.

Nasser's legacy to Sadat was a highly militarized and centralized post-colonial Middle Eastern country. As Vatikiotis stated: "The centralization of power was also assisted by the peculiar geography of Egypt and the military elitist provenance of the régime. Political competition was eliminated; the bureaucracy was further militarized; the society mobilized and regimented." (Vatikiotis, 1991: 424). Let us now understand how and to what extent the Nasserist regime transformed and what remains from Nasserism.

According to the Şahin, Anwar Sadat's period in Egyptian politics is memorable in the two respects which are "Open Door policy" and "de-Nasserisation campaign" in this issue (Şahin, 2014). In my view, however Sadat period is not more

than series of small changes to the system which did not bring a revolutionary change to Egyptian politics. However, they are crucially important contributions to Nasserism that maintained the survival of Egyptian political system. Sadat's policies are also articulated the Nasserist legacy and transformed them in line with the internal and external political atmosphere. From this perspective, I will summarize the main characteristics of Sadat's politics and its relations with the tenets of Nasserism, especially to militarism.

The presidency of Sadat after Nasser is not well regarded, especially for U.S. diplomats who regarded him as "too weak to transform his provisional leadership into a bid for lasting power" (Cook, 2012: 113). He succeeded to power over several other strong nominees: Minister of the War General Mohammad Fawzi, Minister of Interior Sharawi Guma, head of the Arab Socialist Union Ali Sabri, and Soviet's man in Egypt and original member of the Free Officer Zakariyya Mohieddin. The institute of the presidency became crucial after Nasser's supreme leadership. Also, the vast majority of Egypt's poor population lacked political organization. Even though Sadat was a pragmatic, non-doctrinel political type with Nasser's serious ideological commitment, their personalities and characters were so different that it reflected on their governing styles. Nasser was an urban man the 1930s, but Sadat was a villager type who maintained his close links with his village and the popular-religious inclinations of the villagers (Vatikiotis, 1991).

#### 3.3.1.1. De-Nasserization Campaign

When Sadat came to the presidency in 1970, Egypt was much better off than in the colonialism period, but it was nevertheless in the middle of serious troubles. Firstly, the most severe problem faced by the country with imminent war with Israel. Even though the Six Day War in 1967 was resulted in the clear triumph of Israel, the confrontation between the troops of Israel and Egypt on the border continued with sporadic mutual attacks. Moreover, the setback of 1967 and economic slowdown that began in 1966 caused the first major popular unrest since 1954 (Glover, 2016). Second of all, the economic performance of Egypt was suffering because of the essential population-resources problem in the economic structure, the country's large population and the inflated national budget. These problems were causes of effects' of the crisis with the trade deficit, external debt, and employment problems (Waterbury, 1983).

Under these circumstances, Sadat sought new policies to escape from the prolonged troubles of the country. According to Steven Cook, Sadat is an experienced statesman in politics and a member of Free Officer, set to work in order to correct the revolution, especially in terms of foreign and economic policies. What was accomplished by this transformation as put by Vatikiotis that after establishing his undisputed control over the Egyptian state, Sadat expelled Soviet advisers, and at the same time moved closer to an alliance with the rich, conservative Arab states, chief among them Saudi Arabia. He also deviated from the present economic system and adopted a different economic policy to attract massive foreign capital to Egypt (Vatikiotis, 1991).

In the light of these incidents and requirements of Egypt, Sadat initiated a set of new policies different from Nasser, which called as de-Nasserisation campaign, reflected to the social life. The number of books, articles, and movies in this period following to the lifting the ban on publications revealed the brutal suppression under Nasser (Şahin, 2014). As a matter of the fact that the original members of Revolutionary Command Council, who were demoted for being liberal or Islamist, so they were called as “Silent Ones” (Podeh and Winckler, 2004).

The book of *Sami Gawhar* entitled *The Silent Ones Speak Out* is a typical example of de-Nasserization. It depicts Nasser as a liar, dictator and murderer, his conflict with General Naguib was told accusingly to Nasser (Podeh & Winckler, 2004). His relationship with other members of the Free Officers, especially with Rishwan Fahmy and Kamal al-Din, portrayed in a way that was harshly critical of Nasser. Moreover, Nasser was also accused of betraying the *Ikhwan* (The Muslim Brotherhood) after the revolutionary coup, thereby positioning committed himself as the sole leader of the country. It was alleged in the book that even the assassination attempt against Nasser was a put-up job exploited to use against General Naguib, build a popular image, and destroy the Muslim Brotherhood (Şahin, 2014). Publishing of this book signifies how the Egyptian regime’s sensitivity concerning Nasser changed after his death, regardless of whether the accusations in the book are true or not. Sadat deliberately permitted de-Nasserist publications in order to destroy Nasser’s image and take over his position.

### 3.3.1.2. Open Door Policy (infitah)

The Open Door policy of Sadat was initiated with the declaration of “the October Working Paper” in 1974. In fact, this document was the continuation of the earlier Plan for National Action, in June 1971, and a constitutional referendum dating back to September 1971 (Lippman, 2016). Sadat’s legacy in to Egyptian politics and Nasserism was infitah, but it was essentially a series of political initiations rather than constituting political institutions. These initiations were the result of serious economic requirements as well as foreign policy and even civil-military relations aspect.

The policy of economic liberalization in the Arab socialist country of Egypt was seen as an assertive step towards change. The Open Door policy term refers to the United States policy of opening the China market to international trade in 19<sup>th</sup> century (Britannica, 2015). Likewise, the Open Door policy in Egypt was an effort towards economic liberalization in hopes attract foreign Arab capital investment and international trade in order to recovery Egypt’s terrible economic and social ills (Vatikiotis, 1991). Sadat’s initiation did not create an economic structure, but it served “to establish and expand a parallel market for foreign exchange, reduce exchange restrictions, reform banking laws, and to some extent decentralize the making of economic decisions” (Costa, 1999). Nevertheless, the biggest infrastructural economic challenge of the country, namely feeding the 40 million Egyptians, remained the same despite of the fact that the Open Door policy encouraged the participation of the private sector in the economy and increased agricultural development. The political economy of the country remained troubled by crucial challenges, including unemployment, poor education, the immigration of qualified labor power, and lack of cultivated land and among other problems.

The Open Door policy resulted in a crucial shift in the trajectory of Egyptian politics. Sadat aimed to conduct plan of corrective revolution in his presidency. The plan also involved introducing a new system of government predicated with on electoral and parliamentary competition, the regime’s popular party Arab Socialist Union and later the National Democratic Party on the one side, smaller refined opposition parties on the other. By means of strong client networks and more importantly, a foreign policy shift towards the West, Sadat fortified his reign, which was described as a “presidential monarchy” by Americans (Cook, 2012). Ousting Egypt’s Soviet military advisers and victory against Israel on the eastern side of the Suez in October 1973 increased his popularity and legitimacy in the eyes of the

Egyptian people, so his authority in the bureaucracy increased. Thus, Sadat dared to touch the most sensitive issue in Egyptian and Arab politics, the Arab-Israeli conflict and signed the treaty agreement of Camp David with Menachem Begin in 1978 (Cleveland, 2004). This last step resolved the most imminent security problem of Egypt, but ultimately caused a great deal of anger and hatred inside of the country and led to the assassination of Sadat two years later in 1981.

### 3.3.1.3. Civil-Military Relations in the Sadat Era

The civil-military relations aspect of Sadat's rule is crucial in terms of Egyptian politics. In order to extend his authority, Sadat did not only oust his political rivals and Soviet advisers, but also professionalized the military and limited its political role in line with the Open Door Policy. However, the growth of the military as an economic power center flourished by means of various investments as was also the case in a number of other Arab countries in the 1980s. Thus, the political influence of the military diminished in the name of economic income. Despite the de-Nasserization campaign and the liberalization program, the military was unable to intervene in the politically shrewd and experienced rule of Sadat (Cook, 2012). To protect against the threat of a coup d'état, Sadat also carried out a periodic purging of the officer corps. An extensive change in the organization and training of the army officers occurred between 1964 and 1973, so according to Vatikiotis the professionalization of the military greatly affected the role of the army in politics (Vatikiotis, 1991).

Additionally, the enrichment of political leaders, opponent networks, even the better pay and conditions of the police aroused suspicion and discomfort in the military. The reason for this dissatisfaction was not only the economic aspect of the *infitah*, but also the political results of the policy, especially the Camp David Accord with Israel which substantially changed the role of the military in state affairs. After the settlement of boundary problems and hostilities, the role of the military and the extent of military bureaucracy was called into question. If the country was no longer at war, it would no longer need its huge military establishment (Şahin, 2014). Moreover, Egypt began to be supplied with arms by the United States not the USSR, which became a remarkable reason for the military not to be satisfied. Because, this ran against the idea of Nasserist non-alignment foreign policy. It was even said that some Egyptians believed that there was a connection between military dissatisfaction and Sadat's assassination in 1981 (Brooks, 1998).

Civil-military relations in Sadat's era were not at their best. Given the number of fired officers under Sadat's rule, there seems to have been a constant problem between Sadat and high ranking military officers. They were jailed, exiled, or died in accidents. Muhammad Fawzi, who was Minister of War when Sadat became president, was jailed in 1971. Then he was replaced by Chief of Staff Saad al-Din Shazli, who was later also arrested. Shazli was exiled to Britain, then Algeria in 1975. Ahmad Isma'il was chosen as Minister of War because of his loyalty to Sadat. However, his death left the seat to Abd al-Ghani Gamasi, and his Chief of Staff Muhammad 'Ali Fahmi served until Camp David. The peace accord required more obedient and agreeable commanders, so the position was given to Kamal Hasan Ali and later Ahmed Badawi. Ahmad Badawi was also popular among Egyptians for his achievements in the Yom Kippur War. A few months after becoming Minister of War he has died in a helicopter crash along with 12 senior officers, leaving his seat to Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala at last (Hashim, 2011).

Comparing to his successor Nasser, Sadat's record of rule diminished all the fiefdoms of power including the barons in the army, the state security services and the Arab Socialist Union. His correction to the revolution manifested not only in the economy, but also the political arena. The military enclave was isolated from important decisions. According to Vatikiotis:

He shifted the political centre of gravity from the military establishment to a more varied civilian technocracy. As the armed forces were transformed from the political vanguard of the revolution into a professional force, as they grew in size and professional effectiveness, their political authority diminished (Vatikiotis, 1991: 438).

Its growth by means of wider conscription made the military less elitist, but the army largely preserved its privileged social status, unlike its political power. The relations between Sadat and the Egyptian military indicate the Nasserist reactions to the de-Nasserism and Open Door Policy in Sadat's period. Along with the other tenets of Nasserism, the militarism diminished, but it was not abandoned completely in line with the establishment of the regime. The rule of Sadat aroused suspicion and dissatisfaction among the officer corps, which is apparent from the fact that the office of Minister of War and Chief of Staff witnessed constant shifts. Limiting the role of the military in politics, liberal politics, approaching the United States, and



disengagement from Soviet, and especially the peace accord with Israel could be accepted as the main disagreements between Sadat and the military (Hashim, 2011). Nevertheless, Sadat's era aimed to make a liberal change in the country by a set of policies to restore Nasserism. These tactical maneuvers were inherited as policies by his follower Mubarak and caused a significant change in the trajectory of Egyptian politics.

### 3.3.2. Undemocratic State and Crony Capitalism: Mubarak Era

The assassination of Anwar Sadat brought an unexpected and tragic end to his era. In spite of this situation, the vice president of Egypt easily reached the top position of Egyptian politics, namely the presidency. Muhammad Hosni El Sayed Mubarak, who was the first president who did not belong to the generation of Free Army Officers, was a former military commander of the Egyptian Air Force. He served as the president of Egypt from 14 October 1981 until the Egyptian revolution on 11 February 2011. He was the head of the Air Force and the Egyptian Deputy Minister of Defense during the June 1973 war. The Egyptian Air Force's sudden attack and 90 % accuracy against Israel made him a national hero (CNN Library, 2016). His fame and cordial relations with Sadat led to his appointment as Egypt's vice president in 1975, and his luck in the event of Sadat's assassination brought him to the presidency.

The assassination of Sadat was as interesting as the presidency of Mubarak. As Hero of the Crossing, Anwar Sadat attended to the commemoration ceremony of the Crossing of the Suez Canal along with dignitaries on 6th of October 1981. During the military parade, a group of soldiers suddenly got out of a military truck and started to attack Sadat and his comrades, throwing stun grenades and opening fire. Lieutenant Khaled Islambouli led the assassins, including Junior Sergeant Abdelhameed Abdul Salaam, Corporal Ata Tayel Hameeda Raheel, and Corporal Hussein Abbas, who turned the ceremony into a bloodshed in the name of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Zayyāt and Abu-Rabi', 2002). They were all soldiers, but infiltrated the army by means of a military intelligence colonel, Abdud al-Zumar, who was exposed after the assassination as the founder and first Emir of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Orr, 2003). This organization would merge into al-Qaeda after the succession of Ayman al-Zawahiri (Council on Foreign Relations, 2016). This staggering incident reveals that Egyptian military was abused in order to assassinate an Egyptian president (Anwar Sadat) and later evaluated to a global terrorist organization (al-Qaeda). That the murder of the last

president of the Free Army Officers came from a clique in the military is very meaningful in terms of the civil-military relations. Because, all members of the assassination team was a military clique and the military was seen as the founder and backbone of the regime.

Mubarak's ascension to the rule of Egypt had to be quick and easy under the supervision of the military and internal security forces, since the sudden death of Sadat could have thrown the country into chaos or produce prolonged instability (Cook, 2012). Constitutionally, Egypt needed to choose a president within sixty days after the vacancy. The ruling National Democratic Party, nominated Hosni Mubarak who was also secretary general of the party. Thanks to the shock after Sadat's death, Mubarak's reputation both in the bureaucracy and among the Egyptian people, Mubarak's presidency was not contested like Sadat. However, his main challenge came after his presidency and troubled him for seven long years with Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Abu Ghazala (Cook, 2012). This will be explained in detail in the section of the civil-military relations. Another remarkable figure from Sadat's era was Osman Ahmed Osman. He was a successful businessman, from humble origins and a leading figure of the Open Door policies of Sadat. He made a quick fortune and business affairs by using *infitah* policies environment (El Tarouty, 2015). He will also be mentioned later on in the part of crony capitalism.

Mubarak promised to and did adhere to Sadat's policies, but he was also a follower of Nasserist ideology in terms of undemocratic militarist authoritarianism. Like Sadat, Mubarak was aware that Egyptian regime was based on Nasserist principles in terms of liberation, Egyptian nationalism, corporatism, and secularism. On the other hand, he believed that: "the strength of a revolution depends on its adjustment ability to new circumstances" (Şahin, 2014: 74). So, the maintenance of the regime and the reassessment of the revolution became the main features of Mubarak's rule.

Mubarak was a follower of the regime, but his idea was transforming Nasserism through reflecting his views to the Nasserism debate. Especially for economic centralization and nationalization, he conceived of these as a burden on the public sector and stimulated private initiative. Moreover, Mubarak was also critical towards the policy of Arab unity, asserting the complex nature of Arab reality and of course Egypt's special conditions (Şahin 2014). He interpreted the non-violent nature of July revolution and disassociated Nasser from the July revolution, pointing at that

revolution “symbolized the protection of liberty, justice and national honor” (Podeh & Winckler, 2004: 114). However, the official account promised a more democratic country in accordance with the demand of the masses and Egypt’s new superpower partner the USA.

For Mubarak’s rule, I will mainly discuss two notable aspects under the titles of “Non-Democratic State” and “Crony Capitalism”. These will be followed by an inquiry into civil-military relations in Mubarak’s era. The reason of this classification is highlighting significant features of Mubarak’s rule and eliciting how Nasserist ideology transformed and reached the present day, after Sadat. The rule of the third president of the military officers witnessed a great protest and a revolution along with the Arab Spring, as I mentioned before in the introduction. However, the coup in 2013 against elected politicians toppled the civilian government and fortified the counter-revolution of the military regime again.

#### 3.3.2.1. Non-Democratic Rule of Mubarak

Gamal Abdel Nasser never promised democratic governance to his people, but his rule had significant popular support. As I explained in the main tenets of Nasserism, democracy and free elections has always been considered a threat against the independence of Egypt, according to Nasser. The colonial invasion of democratic Western powers and the failure of the Wafd Party made democracy more vulnerable than other regimes for Nasserism. Not to put too fine a point on it, Nasser thought the exact opposite of Winston Churchill. Churchill said: “Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time” (from a House of Commons speech on Nov. 11, 1947). According to Nasser, military government is not good, but it is better than all the others, including democracy.

As for Sadat, who came to the forefront with the intention of “Correcting Revolution”. He clearly embraced more democratic state for Egypt (Cook, 2012). He tried to steer the country towards democracy in Sadat’s rule, also in the military bureaucracy. Although it was far from institutional reforms or to sharing political power, Sadat’s rule brought a great deal of political and social liberalism comparing to Nasser’s rule along with the economic liberal policies, namely *infitah*.

Under these circumstances, Mubarak had to follow both Nasser and Sadat, which is difficult to describe in terms of politics. The Nasserist authoritarianism and militarist legacy constituted the infrastructure of the Egyptian regime (Podeh & Winckler, 2004). On the other hand, Sadat’s liberal policies and the new ally of Egypt,

the United States, remarkably affected Mubarak's rule. So, it had to be seen democratic in the conjuncture of the new era of liberalism, which was easing the opposition and compatible with the consent of the United States. On the other hand, the authoritarian and militarist nature of the regime always was the real center of power. For this reason Mubarak's era might be called as "Non-Democratic Rule," because it resembles various types of governments, especially militarist autocracy, but it is certainly not a democracy. Even though it was said to be democratic, its elections were questionable (Blaydes, 2011).

In terms of Egypt's democratization in Mubarak's rule, there is a great difference between discourse and reality. Mubarak's rule was seen as the third phase of revolution and Nasserism was criticized for its democracy deficit was aired by Mubarak supporters to show how democratic Mubarak's regime was (Şahin, 2014: 75). In fact that was a result of disengagement from Arab socialism, which was accepted as a threat to the crony capitalist system which will be mentioned later.

The regime was depicted as the populist authoritarianism in 1980s and early 1990s (Kurun, 2015). Nationalist discourse was used to gain legitimacy from the public by Mubarak. In the political arena there was only one party, the NDP, reached through social and economic life. The intelligence service (*Mukhabarat*) was an instrument of repression over the public any type of opposition was suppressed brutally by the security forces (Saikal, 2011). Developments in information technologies, complexity of social life, and population explosions affected the tactics of regime. This transform was called "post-populist, competitive authoritarianism" (Landolt and Kubicek, 2013: 2) or "liberalized autocracy". On the other hand, press, civil society and non-governmental organizations were more tolerated in this period in line with economic liberalization (*infitah*) (Kurun, 2015).

After 1990, al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group) declared war against the regime and organized violent, bloody attacks in various cities, which led many civilian deaths including tourists. The regime harshly suppressed all Islamist movements in return (Hashim, 2011). The Muslim Brotherhood was one of the most oppressed due to its prominent role in society. Between the period of 1990 and 1994, almost 20,000 Egyptians were arrested as a part of witch-hunts against Islamists. (Brownlee, 2010). The Mubarak era also witnessed multi-party election between 1990 and 2000. Five legal political parties entered the elections, but none of them except National Democratic Party had a popular support and they were not representative of

a remarkable portion of the society. For this reason, the regime accepted them to the elections in order to be seen as “democratic” (Cook, 2012).

The surrender of Jamaa paved the way in politics for Islamist movements, especially the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the regime kept its non-democratic position to remain in power. The political efforts of the Muslim Brotherhood were curbed by undemocratic elements of the Egyptian political system (Çağlayan, 2011). 17 seats were taken by the party of the Brotherhood in 2000 and the number became 88 in 2006. However, this did not bring political influence to the Brotherhood, but harsh deterrence from the regime (Wickham, 2011).

Although constitutional amendments in favor of democracy were made in 2000s, the executive power remained robust. It is bear into the mind that the authoritarian government have never really intended democracy. The elections were a farce. Minimal liberation in the realm of politics was not enough to revive democratic governance. On the eve of the revolution, the Egyptian political system under Mubarak regime was well depicted by Shahin:

Mubarak’s regime became increasingly exclusionary and blocked the institutional avenues for real political change. Its vulgar forgery of the 2010 Parliamentary elections marked the beginning of the end, as it blocked the channels of participation and forced main political forces outside the process. (Shahin, 2016: 27)

At the end of the thirty years of Mubarak’s rule and almost sixty years of militarist regime, there was no sign real democracy in the field. The Egyptian people were aware that political participation in governance was in vain. Moreover, the so-called democratic system was based on liberal economy, which brought suffering and badly affecting to the daily life of Egyptians. This degenerated liberal economic system was widely called as Crony Capitalism.

#### 3.3.2.2. Crony Capitalism

The economy has been for centuries, from the colonial period onward, a major problem for Egypt. Sadat’s economic legacy and the most constant challenge of Mubarak’s rule was economic depression. “Feeding the millions of people” was still a problem for the regime. Moreover, the population of Egypt became almost 44 million by the start of Mubarak’s rule. When it is taken into consideration that the economy was afflicted by annual rate of inflation ranging between 16 and 20 percent, rapid

growth of population, high state subsidies for certain necessary food and fuel commodities, the economy of Egypt was not flourishing (Vatikiotis, 1991).

In Mubarak's period, according as liberalization trend (*infitah*) did not brought proper political freedom to the country, economic liberalization was built on selective choice of free-market principles in Egypt (El-Mahdi & Marfleet, 2009). Actually, it was hard to imagine a full-fledged liberalism looking at history of the political economy of the country. The system was composed of circle of interest groups which had to be intertwined with political system in order to survive. Thus, Mubarak's economic policies shifted completely from Nasserism, disregarding social welfare or democratic reform in the interests of the Egyptian lower classes (Şahin, 2014).

For this reason, the Egyptian economic system under Mubarak's rule is widely called "crony capitalism" by various scholars (Sadowski, 1991: 92), ('Arafāt, 2011: 43) and (Şahin, 2014: 77). This term points not only to the scale of corruption, but also the exclusive people who can infiltrate the economy and get profit from it. In crony capitalism, systematic corruption and favoritism in the distribution of legal permits, government subsidies, or other forms of clientalism occurs in the domestic economy (Wei, 2001). Shang-Jin Wei studies on the crony capitalist economy explains how it operates on a domestic and international level.

Crony capitalism is an economic system in which the adjudication of commercial disputes as well as the allocation of resources are generally made to favour those who have a close relationship with political leaders or government officials (by blood or by bribes). It is a system in which connection trumps competence, and money supersedes merit. (Wei, 2001: 23)

Liberal policies were started in the Sadat era, but social policies existed and clientalist relations were not so intense in that period. According to Springborg, the "well-balanced" strategy turned into a "missionary zeal" (Springborg, 1989: 67). The incident of prominent *infitahiyun* Osman Ahmed Osman is remarkable to observe crony capitalism in Egypt. He was a successful engineer, contractor and entrepreneur, and founded the Arab Contractors, which was the largest firm across the Arab countries during the 1960s until 1980s (Moore, 1986). During the years of Nasser, his company led the building of the High Aswan Dam project. After Nasserist nationalization in 1961, Osman continued to work in Saudi Arabia. His wealth and power flourished with the rule of Sadat. He also became Minister of Housing and Reconstruction by virtue of his clientalist relationship. His marriage with one of

Sadat's daughters strengthened his place in the regime. Cook states for his case that: "If this was the case for someone of towering stature like Osman, it was certainly true for titans of business and industry." (Cook, 2012: 139). In Mubarak years, Osman remains powerful, and probably the most famous Egyptian entrepreneur, even many Egyptians predicted Mr. Osman's fall from grace. (Miller, 1985)

NDP's businessman in other words *infītahiyun*, was called as Othmanists by Alaa Al-Din Arafat in his book *Hosni Mubarak and the Future of Democracy in Egypt*. He uses this term to depict and classify the crony capitalism in the rule of Sadat and Mubarak calling the first generation and second generation "Othmanists" (Arafāt, 2011). The famous names of second-generation Othmanists are Ahmed 'Azz, Mahmoud Abu Al-'Anien, and Gamal Mubarak. Ali Lutfi, who is widely known as a famous crony capitalist in Egypt, was forced to practice politics, even though he had no political background. They had different tendencies, like authoritarianists Sorour, Al-Shazli, Al-Sharif, and General Habib Al-'Adli, liberal-conservativists best represented by Gamal Mubarak, and many apolitical businessman such as Kamal Al-Shazli and Fathi Sorour (Arafāt, 2011). Most of them gained their positions and wealth through the ministries, military or police ranks which uncovers the system of crony capitalism.

While the country benefited from liberal investments and economic development, Egypt's economic liberalization program deepened relative deprivation in the country. There became a clear contrast between hulking, dusty brown building of Omar Effendi department store and the eight million square feet of commercial, entertainment, and hospitality space of City Stars (Cook, 2012). In this struggle for benefits, the stronghold of the regime the military got the lion's share.

### 3.3.2.3. Civil-Military Relations in Mubarak's Era

The era of Mubarak witnessed fluctuations in terms of civil-military relations. Between the 1980s and early 1990s, Mubarak provided legitimacy by playing the nationalist card to the Egyptian people (Kurun, 2015). Especially the military and the bureaucracy were the proper tools of state power and they had a foundational place in the regime their elites also had an exclusive position in the society and politics.

The contentious relationship between Mubarak and Abu Ghazala is suggestive of the nature of civil-military relations in Egypt. Abu Ghazala was in the second most powerful position in Egyptian politics, as defense minister in Sadat's era. His personal

features and skills also strengthened his position against Mubarak. According to Steven Cook, Field Marshall Abu Ghazala was: “Charismatic, extremely good to his man, and on excellent terms with the United States, the Field Marshall was a natural contender for the job.” (Cook, 2012: 158). This situation was clearly disruptive for any authoritarian leader, so Mubarak had to wait patiently till to find an occasion to sack him for seven long years.

In 1989, Mubarak ousted Abu Ghazala from the Defense Ministry with the excuse of the USA technology transfer to Iraq, whereas it was a defense industry project among three countries Iraq, Argentina and Egypt. Moreover, a series of magazines and newspapers blamed him “for negotiating a secret missile deal with North Korea, and was trying to develop chemical weapons behind America’s back” and his religious image was tarnished by corruptions and sex scandals (Kandil, 2012: 180). On the other hand, the American newspaper New York Times depicted him as a pro-American defense minister. His removal was seen as the most dramatic change in the Egyptian political line-up in order to strengthen the presidency. Abu Ghazala’s was a popular figure with the military and civilians, his transformational role in the army was portrayed as follows: “Under him, the armed forces have become almost a society within a society, running their own industries and other ventures. The army is a very independent part of society” (Cowell, 1985).

Likewise, Owen argues that the army grew as both a military and an economic center of power under its influential chief, Defense Minister Field Marshal Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala. He also remarks a trend of similar developments in a number of Arab countries during the 1980s for the purpose of self-financing some of the military’s own expenses (Owen, 2012). However, Mubarak could not stand for autonomy and losing control of the military, it resulted in the removal of Abu Ghazala from the office of Defense Ministry and Chief of Staff.

Instead of Abu Ghazala, Youssef Sabri Abu Taleb was appointed as Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Youssef Sabri was Mayor of Cairo before being promoted to Chief of Staff. He was a close ally of Mubarak's who for the past six years and chosen deliberately for being a name outside the armed forces for nearly a decade (Stavrianakis & Selby, 2012). In Hazem Kandil’s words, the replacement of Abu Ghazala with Youssef Sabri was a shrewd decision in for a couple of reasons. Firstly, the promotion of Youssef Sabri was over his dead to the top military post and unusual incident, in place of a very experienced Field Marshall. This new



minister was also serving in a civilian position as Cairo's governor, away from the officer corps, so even the contacts of Abu Ghazala were eliminated from the game of politics (Kandil, 2012).

During the Gulf War in 1991, Youssef Sabri was replaced with Muhammad Hussein Tantawi. It seemed that Mubarak's choice secured loyalty to him and depoliticized the army by "choosing a military officer without political ambitions which might be cause of concern for the President" (Stavrianakis & Selby, 2012:156-160). However, Robert Springborg's analysis of Tantawi's Egyptian military reveals how the role of army transformed in the last decades:

Foreign military professionals who have interacted with the Egyptian military liken its head, Field Marshal Muhammad Hussein Tantawi, to the CEO of the largest corporate conglomerate in Egypt, in that his primary concern is the economic well-being of the military, not the performance of its nominal tasks and duties. (Stavrianakis & Selby, 2012: 98).

Moreover, his name emerged in the Wikileaks scandal, Tantawi described as "Mubarak's poodle" by unnamed Egyptian officers quoted in a 2008 U.S. embassy cable (Pankhurst, 2011: 337).

In the atmosphere of the crony capitalist economic system and authoritarian rule of the non-democratic regime, the military transformed into a company like a center of interests. The economic empire of the Egyptian military will be further analyzed in the fourth chapter, but it should be noted that it is very consistent with the political transformation of regime in line with the regional and international conjuncture.

The security role of the Egyptian army was also diminished after the 1990s, since the authoritarianism of the system caused a perennial poor economy and the rise of extremism. It was an inherited problem, but Mubarak's rule witnessed an extreme attempt to overthrow the political system, particularly in the poorer southern region of the country. As a consequence of this, for the sake of the regime the security and intelligence apparatus responded harshly against terrorism using extra-judicial methods in the defense of the system. In order to gather intelligence, The General Directorate for State Security Investigations (GDSSI) recklessly applied brutal methods and efficient network and wire-tapping. The military did not want to be in a position of intelligence operations, lest the public become aware of its capability (Hashim, 2011). Tantawi's statement on this issue is remarkable: "The armed forces are the last line of defense [and] cannot remain idle in the face of threats that may harm

[the country]." (FBIS-NES, 1993). He hoped the army would not have to intervene. This strategy seemed beneficial against extremism, but building up intelligence services and paramilitary forces stirred up systematic violence and violation of human rights throughout the country.

However, all of these developments were not in favor of ordinary people of Egypt whose reaction would pave the way for the Arab Spring in the country. Considering crony capitalism, military privileges, non-democratic elections and human right violations, there was nothing guaranteed for the ordinary Egyptian people, except for one thing there was no end in sight.



## CHAPTER IV

### KEY ISSUES OF MILITARY DOMINATION

In this chapter of my thesis, I will try to explain strategies and challenges of military domination in Egyptian politics. These strategies provide maintenance of the robust military regime and reproduce the political hegemony of military regime. While examining the case of Egypt, prominent theoretical approaches should be taken into consideration in the context of civil-military relations in MENA region.

Up to here, after making a comprehensive interpretation on civil-military relations in general and specifically in the MENA region in the second chapter, I explained the roots of military power in Egyptian political history in the third chapter. It obviously proved that starting from the 1952 revolutionary coup to fall of Mubarak, the military has been the stronghold of the regime. In spite of the authoritarian leaders, who are former officers, Egyptian military ruled but not governed the country till the revolution (Cook, 2007). The military rule became more obvious after the Arab Spring and following 2013 Egyptian coup d'état. In this point, a reassessment of civil-military relations must be made in terms of Egyptian case on some key issues.

These key issues, which are the strategies of military rule in politics on the one hand, and challenges to the military domination on the other, will be the subject of this chapter. The first part of the chapter aims to inquire what lies behind the military domination in politics, in terms of what kind of strategies and tactics are being used in order to maintain the political heaviness of the military. Understanding the relationship between authoritarianism and militarism of robust regimes in the MENA countries, especially in Egypt, is vital. It is not only about making future predictions, but it also draws the lines of current politics. The strategies and tactics of military regime reveal the very basis of military power on politics.

Second part is about challenges to the military domination in politics. In spite of the obvious and great influence of Egyptian military in politics, other factors are challenging the military regime. These factors could change the trajectory of Egyptian politics in favor of civilians. A clear review of challenging factors to the military regime will make it possible to understand the political atmosphere inside the country. However, there is still a robust military regime in the country and it has various tools,

including the international support which is also mentioned as a third component of this chapter.

#### 4.1. Strategy of Military to Dominate Egyptian Politics

Political strength of Egyptian military stands on several dynamics. These dynamics are also substantially important for the country of Egypt – regarding the fact that even the revolution did not overthrow the rule of the military. By means of this analysis, I would like to point out the key components of military stronghold in Egypt and the main obstacles in the matter of democratization problem. While Nasserist military ideology and historical legacy of military in Egyptian politics constitute the foundations of the regime, a type of figurehead leadership ruled the country with an authoritarian leader. Economic interests of the military have risen sharply and emerged as a remarkable power in economy especially after 1980s. Moreover, the military regime has never hesitated to use pressure and fear against the opposition. Another tactic against to weaken opposition is to divide and rule with an authoritarian leader.

The Egyptian regime has been based on the military political power since 1952 revolutionary coup. The military is not only meant as a defense force against external powers, but it also carried the responsibility of being a modern, institutionalized, native, professional institution; and most importantly, it constituted the reliable middle class of the regime. By the time of modern Egyptian political history, it also transformed in line with the required circumstances. Other examples of military regime were common phenomenon across the Middle East. However, what is clear today is that Egyptian military regime successfully achieved, transformed and supported itself with various strategies and tactics.

According to the praetorian theory, Egypt is one of the greatest examples of the term, especially looking to the recent situation of the country in civil-military relations. It became clear that the military is the dominant actor on political arena along with a substantial autonomy. Likewise, the praetorian theory emphasizes the dominant role of the military for all key political institutions. Even for the political leadership, it requires a leader from the military or from groups close to the military (Lutterbeck, 2012: 30). Although praetorianism is interpreted differently by various scholars and researchers, they all agree on political heaviness of the military as an institution (Nordlinger, 1977); (Perlmutter, 1974); (Finer, 1962).

The other approaches that we acknowledged and used in this thesis was from Kamrava and Bellin. They were also compatible with the case of Egypt in order to comprehend different military typologies and their role in politics for the MENA region. Mehran Kamrava remarks the relationship between the professionalization and de-politicization in the region. This is a false outcome in reference to Huntington's professionalism. It would only make sense with the historical and infrastructural dynamics of the MENA region. However, to keep the army out of politics while professionalizing is still a stark paradox. In this point, Kamrava reports a misunderstanding of professionalism along with the increasing corporatist military identity. Besides, Bellin assumes five distinguishing factors, which are crucial obstacles for the institutionalization of the militaries in the MENA region. The aforementioned factors are shortly fiscal health, foreign support, patrimonial logic, popular mobilization and the existence of a credible threat. As it was seen in the previous chapter, Egypt's praetorian Nasserist characteristic was diminished under Sadat's rule and it has deepened under the rule of Mubarak.

In this part of my thesis, I will handle the issue of Egyptian military strategy with these comprehensive approaches. At the first phase, the political institution of military institution will be examined by regarding it as an autonomous political actor beyond the state. The economic empire of the military is also a crucial mainstay which the military stands on, especially in the Egyptian case. Then, the military regime's control over the media will be explained, which provides popular support to the institution and generates "credible threats" so that the military institution would be needed and trustworthy in the eyes of the nation. The last part of the military regime dynamics is the international context. The international partners and cooperators' contribution to the coup and the military dominance will be considered.

#### 4.1.1. The Political Institution of the Military

The Egyptian politics has kept its own nature over the decades since 1952. The regime adopted itself to the changing circumstances somehow, in spite of the protests, crisis, wars, changing international system, revolution and counter-revolution. All these developments proved an obvious reality for the country that the military is much more than a professional institution of coercive power of the state.

Perlmutter previously stated this substantial reality on Egyptian politics, which is revealed today, in his book titled as *Egypt: The Praetorian State*. The first sentences

of the book starts with “the military has the potential of dominating the political system.” (Perlmutter, 1974). The definition of praetorian state is based upon the military’s significant role in key political structures and institutions. Egypt’s army is the core group as a political ruling class which the political leadership recruits from; due to the fact that the military’s heaviness on political system comes from particular conditions which it is shown by frequent military coups, countercoups, critical political decisions, and interventions.

Nevertheless, Perlmutter entails praetorian system with a lack of professionalism which is not true for Egyptian military. Kamrava puts forward a different opinion on professionalization of the Middle East armies. According to him, professionalization increases the potential of military intervention to politics contrary to the military’s de-politicization and subordination to civilian control (Kamrava, 2000). As it was mentioned above, the latter diagnosis seems more accurate regarding the facts of the military institution in the MENA region, particularly in Egypt. On the other hand, Bellin contributes to the issue with institutionalism and patrimonialism. Patrimonialism is a contrary term against institutionalization; it was depicted with favoritism and cronyism for the armies. She deliberately uses the term of institutionalization instead of professionalism, since the term of institutionalization does not refer to de-politicization of the military and subordination to civilian control unlike professionalism. An institutional military is considered as rule-governed, predictable and meritocratic. However, patrimonial armies are preferable for authoritarian regimes, because they are loyal to the ruler, despite selective favoritism and cronyism. Most importantly, the patrimonial coercive power is one of the main reasons that make authoritarian regimes resistant to democratic transformation (Bellin, 2004).

In this context, making an intimate understanding is a crucial crossroad for the Egyptian military which has a considerable influence on the country’s political situation. As a founder of Egyptian state and caretaker of Nasserist regime, the military has a substantial capacity on politics, but the question is what kind of political actor the military is. Several approaches of scholars will be taken into consideration to understand Egyptian military’s political stance. Then the other parts of this chapter will provide a map of Egyptian military’s political strategy and means of dominating politics.

The Egyptian military is commonly presented as the most institutionalized structure of the state. Egyptian military force is one of the largest forces in Africa and the Middle East with its four branches which include Egyptian Army, Egyptian Air Force, Egyptian Navy, and Egyptian Air Defense Forces. The armies are equipped with modern material and they have a remarkable fighting strength, the actual manpower drives the army through conscription of men between the ages 18 to 30 and for 18 to 26 months duration (Egypt Defence & Security Report Q1, 2015). It might also be seen a shortcoming of the military power since the conscription system is a heavy burden on the budget of these armies and most of the conscripts are not capable in terms of experience and training (Cordesman, 2004). Nevertheless, Egyptian military service is accepted as a considerable socialization agent in Egyptian society regarding the egalitarian environment, system of promotion that is based on merit, and a relatively satisfactory standard of living. Moreover, the conscription system reproduces the political identity of national citizenship, civic duty and loyalty to the state for the various strata of the society no matter what tribe, village, kinship or citizenry identity they come from (Gotowicki, 1999).

Egyptian military does not only have a huge manpower, but it also has a notable capacity of weaponry force with 4,624 tanks, 13,949 armored vehicles, 1,133 aircrafts, 1,481 multiple-launch rocket systems in land and air forces. But the naval strength of Egyptian military does not seem mighty with 174 coastal defense craft and zero destroyer. The crucial weak point of the military is revealed in the fields of lack of oil resources and financial deficit. Meanwhile, oil consumption is estimated as 740,000 barrels-per-day, while oil production remains 478,400 barrels-per-day. The difference between consumption and production is a great trouble, especially considering oil's importance as lifeblood of any fighting force and supporting economy. Financial deficit of Egyptian military is colossal with total \$41,320,000,000 external debt and \$4,400,000,000 defense budget is not likely to payoff (The World Factbook "Egypt", 2016). This scenario reveals the reason why Egyptian military would need foreign aid to resolve the acute problem of finance.

While the country's tremendous strategic location and wide geographical territory ensure an advantage for the army, they also generate constant security concerns and threats in terms of the national security. In spite of the Camp David peace treaty in 1978 which normalized relations between two countries, Egyptian army still keeps in mind the repulses in 1948, 1967 and 1973. The ongoing Israel-Palestine

conflict is accepted as a potential security risk as well (Egypt Defense & Security Report Q1, 2015). Radical extremism in Sinai Peninsula is not a new phenomenon for Egypt, but it gained a momentum after the coup in 2013 and with rise of ISIS in the region. Egypt stands on a critical instable position which is not quite clear in terms of regional problems. In spite of the cordial relationship with Saudi Arabia, Egypt favors Assad regime in Syria. The seemingly neutral position of Egypt towards the Palestine-Israel conflict does not recognize Palestinian political actors. One thing is clear that Egypt does not wish to act in a manner that displeases Washington because of the heavily dependence on US aid of the military.

The political power of Egyptian military organization comes from its institutionalized coercive power, along with its historical and ideological background. Foundation of modern Egypt was based on aforementioned Nasserist principles that provided robust praetorian state. In this point, the political role of the military as an actor in Egypt has to be explained. Although the literature on civil-military relations in developing countries considers the growing role of the military in the frame of “political development” and “modernization” as a new middle class, it is questionable whether this enclave is pursuit of its own interests or the whole country. Like Perlmutter stated the theory of new middle class does not explain social change and it is unproductive comparing to its role in Western counterparts (Perlmutter, 1981).

Whereas starting from the first decades after the toppling of the monarchy, the military officers has a direct control over most areas of policy making, by means of occupying bureaucratic, ministerial and presidential positions. After the defeat in the 1967 war, Anwar Sadat and his successor Hosni Mubarak’s efforts to limit the political influence of the army did not ensure aimed results (Lutterbeck, 2012). Even though these policies caused withdrawal from day-to-day politics, the armed forces have remained a key pillar within the Egyptian political system. The political power of Egyptian military has been transformed within the years. Direct influence on policy making is diminished, but it appeared as a remarkable economic actor. It is interpreted as a trade-off for accepting a political lesser role (Achimandos, 2011).

During the years of authoritarian former military officer’s presidencies who are General Muhammad Naguib, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar al-Sadat and Husni Mubarak, the political power of military in the system transformed and changed, but never vanished. Moreover, the political institution of the military expanded in various ways by growing up particularly with Mubarak’s crony system, until the officer’s



republic came to light from its shadow to assume full power in early 2011 by means of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). Nevertheless, it was supposed that the military officers were incorporated into Mubarak's regime, deviated from its ideological Nasserist loyalty, drawn into the privileged access and patronage under the presidential system and completely depoliticized. Besides, the political institution of the military occurred as a very apparent political actor, it became so pervasive in the civilian sphere by virtue of its ubiquity (Sayigh, 2012).

Not only others, but also its own members of military enclave, regarded the presence of the military in the political scene as bizarre. There are a number of explanations in this point. According to Droz-Vincent, the military positioned itself as symbol of the state, denoted the image of service of the country with its disengagement from the political sphere to the people (Droz-Vincent, 2013). In this point, the explanation of Janowitz should be taken into consideration. The military institution has developed the national identity, presented itself as a guardian of country's ideals, and emitted national myths and symbols in order to gain popular acceptance by means of the shared identity and values between the military and Egyptian society (Janowitz, 1964). Thus, the military institution has always regarded as a trustable institution, a kind of residual patriotism and common respect. These factors gave autonomous legitimacy to the military apart from the authoritarian regime. Comparing to other institutions like the Interior Ministry, the military is less delegitimized because of these factors (Droz-Vincent, 2013).

Besides, Omar Ashour contributes to the issue of supremacy of armed institution of the state by classifying the MENA civil-military relations into four models: a guardian model, an armed institutional racketeering (AIM) model, a sectarian tribal model, and a less politicized model. AIM model is accepted as suitable for Egyptian and Algerian armies. These military institutions believe superiority compared to the other state institutions. The military enclave has exclusive privileges in society and a package of economic benefits, along with the military institution's participation to crucial political issues and veto in high politics. The Egyptian revolution in 2011, which was a product of several socio-political forces, generated the SCAF as a concrete political branch of military establishment. The military establishment's interests were at the stake, since the Arab Spring's effect in Egypt was astonishing with millions of protests in Tahrir Square. Mubarak's policies and his son Jamal's probable ascension to the presidency were also undermining factors for the

military supremacy. Nevertheless, the role of military in revolution caused clashes and tensions inner circle of SCAF throughout its rule (Ashour, 2013).

On the other side, Philippe Droz-Vincent interpreted the role of the military for Arab authoritarian regimes differently. By recognizing the military as an essential and specific part of the regimes, he regarded the militaries as modernizers with a nationalist vision in the 1950s and 1960s. For the Arab Spring, the military propelled into political sphere, but it sided with protestors rather than the regime. The autonomous structure of Egyptian military was favored by Droz-Vincent. According to him, the military paved the way for political transformation in Tunisia and Egypt. These armies did not use coercive power against protestors. That is crucial for Arab regimes, whether the military under stress can retain its coherence and autonomy from the regime. On the other hand, if the military had a part in repression, its image, prestige, moral, discipline and even legitimacy would be harmed like in Syria and Yemen. In the last instance, the military's attitude is attached to several dynamics including the characteristics of the regime and the element of surprise (Gerges, 2014). This approach may be criticized for its optimism and affirmation of military intervention to politics. In the early times of Egyptian revolution, Egyptian military's role was supposed democratic transformational, but the 2013 coup against the first elected president and the military reproduced authoritarian regime with the figure of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.

The superiority role of the military in Egyptian politics above other parties is even clearer than after 2013 coup. The current politics is shaped under the military establishment's control. There was a single aim before the military intervention according to Shahin: "the exclusion of Islamists and revolutionary youth and the eradication of opponents" (Shahin, 2016). The other alternatives were like, reviving National Democratic Party's rule or building a new political party disregarded, by reason of the military superiority, the necessity to keep the state under military control, distrust civilians of concerns of the military and the deep-state institutions. For this reason, the current regime is standing on individual rule and the political institution of military. There will be two main consequences of this situation, which are the facts that army will withdraw from political life soon and political engagement of military will prevent the creation of healthy and political life (Shahin, 2016). His analysis might be seen as overemphasizing the political power of the military, but there is variety of reasons to think similarly regarding the political atmosphere in Egypt. On the other side, there are plenty of actors and dynamics which shape Egyptian politics; therefore,

a complete surrender to the political institution of military would be pessimist determinism.

While making analysis on this issue, the foremost reality is to reveal the role of the political institution of the military by amplifying reasons of the political power of the military establishment, making an interpretation in the frame of civil-military relations, and predicting policies in order to inform without disappointing, but inspiring. This exploration is also aiming at a democratic transition for Egypt, but the reality of politics is much more important than idealistic attitudes. Otherwise, swallow analytics and indiscretion would deepen the prolonged problems.

It is worth noting that unavailability of data is a significant shortcoming of civil-military relations, particularly at the top level. The relationship among the military officers and their dialogue with politicians are unknown or subject to misinformation. Some of these are revealed after the incident, but it still has importance. Egyptian military's strong role in politics was hidden from view in Egypt before the revolution. The military officers have always been tight-lipped about their part in key state decisions. While Mubarak was preparing succession of his son Gamal, the top military brass was not pleased with this upcoming development, thus reacted with mistrust and opposition according to Mubarak's national security advisor Osama al-Baz (Norton, 2013).

Furthermore, some analysts make a different interpretation on 2011 revolution in terms of civil-military relations. Hansen and Jensen interpreted the incidents in 2011 and 2013 as two military coups. The first coup d'état provided toppling down of the rule of Mubarak regime and the authoritarian rule of Mubarak was taken by SCAF. Political role of the military was defined as "democratic manager". It is because the military's participation enabled abolishment of the rule of old authoritarian regime, planning of the transition process, making the series of elections (parliamentary, shura and presidential) and preparing of a new constitution in which Egyptian military takes on the role of democratic manager. Bradley also makes this interpretation. He made a deep analysis of the 2011 Arab Spring effect on Egypt upon removal of Mubarak as follows:

In Egypt, however, it was the military that forced Mubarak out, and then a small number of generals appointed themselves as interim rulers. In other words, there occurred a military coup. Egypt moved from being a military dictatorship with a military man acting as president, to being a sole military dictatorship. Initially, both

the masses who had poured out onto the streets and the small number of pro-democracy political activists whose initial acts of brave defiance had inspired them were content with this outcome. The revolution's only goal was the removal of Mubarak. But accustomed to power, wealth, and influence, the country's military elite saw no reason why that should change. (Bradley, 2012)

Besides, the second coup provided a military control over Egyptian politics. The Muslim Brotherhood movement was crushed with means that extended use of military violence such as imprisonment and dissolution, especially affiliates of the Freedom and Justice Party. The second coup also occurred with the consent of various parts of Egyptian political components including Salafi Nour Party, liberals, Egyptian Coptic Church and Al-Azhar (Hansen and Jensen, 2015). That was an interesting moment which indicates the playmaker role of Egyptian military. The political institution of military succeeded to have consent of all opposition groups in order to sustain order in the country. For this feature of the second coup, the military coup in 2013 was also defined as "civil-society coup" by anti-Morsi political opposition. Military chief Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's popularity was claimed unprecedented, but the emerging political situation was embedded in post-1952 traditions of authoritarianism (Dorman, 2016).

It is surely beyond doubt that, the military intervention on 3rd of July 2013 has all the characteristics of a coup. The reason for this is that the military forcefully removed the elected president of Egypt and suspended the Egyptian constitution, the president Muhammad Morsi and leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood were prisoned, the head of SCAF appointed as interim president and the protests against the coup in favor of Morsi were violently suppressed with a massacre. Especially, the extent of the massacre against protestors in the square of Rabia Al-Adawiya was devastating, the death toll was 2,600 according to the Muslim Brotherhood, but it was only two hundred and seventy-eight with official resources (Sevinç, 2016). That was the clearest threat of the army against any opposition who assume power over the state. The number of dead and wounded people was less than some other internal wars in the MENA region: Algerian civil war with 150,000 people, Syrian civil war 250,000 people and Lebanese civil war with 150,000 (Schulhofer-Wohl, 2007) (Amnesty 2016) (Gaub, 2015). These wars and conflicts continued for years or decades, however, the massacres in Egyptian case occurred in hours. It might be inferred that Egyptian military warned the people to show its decisiveness and cruelty, so Egypt was turned on the verge of a civil war.

For the 2013 incidents some other descriptions were also made to understand the reality behind the military intervention into politics. One of these views suggests that political resilience of the military regime and its ruler role in politics called the military intervention as “repositioning” or “redeployment”. Army, backed to its legacy, brought together all parties and presented itself as being above all sides of political struggle. Thus, it repositioned itself from day-to-day politics and created a new space for the political institution of the military. Kamal states that: “The army's scuttled bid to bring together disputing political forces was not a mere invitation for lunch. The army insists to act as an umbrella for all Egyptians.” (Kamal, 2016). That is a remarkable point to be taken into consideration about the role of the political institution of the military in Egypt. Anne Alexander makes another analysis. From the Marxist school of thought, she interpreted the 2013 military intervention as “counterrevolution” owing to its contrary mission against 2011 revolution. The balance of forces on political scene between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces changed by means of political struggle (Alexander & Aouragh: 2014). Especially in reference to political economic dynamics and the reactions of Egyptian media, this term provides a different meaning to the political developments. Egyptian military and its collaborative forces were called as “counterrevolutionary forces” with this approach.

The political institution of Egyptian military is not a new phenomenon, but it was embedded into Nasserist authoritarian regime before. The heavy influence of the president was on the stage as the ruler of the country, but the military has a long history of involvement in politics more than 60 years since 1952. It emerged in the political arena in 2011, jumped out of its back seat role and became the most political force. Although Morsi ousted Tantawi and replaced al-Sisi, the military intervention was inevitable considering that the Muslim Brotherhood governance would threaten the military interests and national security sense of the officer corps. Along with that, it is unlikely diminishing the political power of the military in the short term according to scholars. Besides, these developments strengthened the stronghold of the military according to Michael Wahid Hanna: “It further reinforces the military's role as the ultimate arbiter of civilian politics in an emerging order that lacks institutions to arbitrate between irreconcilable, feuding parties.”

The political institution of the military also adopted itself to the last circumstances by doing so. Along with the umbrella role for political parties,

democracy manager role in the political system, and the guarantor of regime stability, the stance towards religion changed remarkably after the coup against the mainstream Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. The presence of Al-Azhar Sheikh Ahmet al-Tayeb and The Pope of the Coptic Orthodox Church of Alexandria Tawadros II was very interesting during the declaration of the military coup with Sisi's speech. The former mufti of Egypt Ali Gomaa was also a significant figure who backed the military coup, praised the army and issued a fatwa for the massacre in Rabia. Gomaa said: "Egypt is a country that God Almighty mentioned in the Quran unlike any other" and "We are an army that the Messenger of the God has blessed, and made its soldiers the best on the planet, and gave it its blessing" (Wenig, 2014). These words can be interpreted as a respect towards the national army and supporting the political peace, but he went forward and announced "Brotherhood's blood is permissible". That was a frightening for a religious leader. In another speech during a conference with officer corps, he made a bloody-thirsty expression against the Muslim Brotherhood calling them as Kharijites:

Hit them as hard as you can. Do not let your soldiers die at the hands of these Kharijites. Have no fear, religion is with you, Allah is with you, His messenger is with you, the believers and the people are with you. Paradise is for those who kill them. They do not deserve Egypt and we are ashamed to call them Egyptians. We need to clean our country of this shame. It emits a bad smell both inwards and outwards. Our prophet warned us of people like this. (Khalifa, 2016)

On the other side, the new political figure of the military regime, Sisi is known with his religious personality. Citing verses from Kuran also religiously charges Sisi's rhetoric. Moreover, he removed the ban on prayers during military exercises (Wenig, 2014). He also became the first president, who paid visit to Coptic Church, wished "Merry Christmas" to Coptic Egyptians and expressed unifying messages (Kirkpatrick & Thomas, 2015). It appears that religious gestures would play a more belligerent role in speeches and decisions in order to gain popular support.

In a nutshell, the political institution of the military has always been the stronghold of the regime, but after the Arab Spring it emerged as an autonomous political player at the scene. The praetorian state of Egypt is more obvious than ever, even the pattern of the president's supremacy over the military seems reversed (Ashour, 2015). It is much difficult to mention about Sisi's superiority over the

military. The reason why the military's political power expanded lies behind its other reinforcements. In the authoritarian political system, the regime continued cordial relations with the military, but it was removed from active political decision making. Thus, the military positioned itself as symbol of the state and transformed into a strong corporatist group seeking its own economic interests according to Droz-Vincent (Gerges, 2014). Backed up to its economic empire, the military power stands on a remarkable media power and international support. Thus, the praetorian Nasserist Egypt's political power was attached to economic, international, and societal conditions and the military activities in these areas.

#### 4.1.2. The Economic Empire of the Military

The economic power of Egyptian military is remarkably supporting its political role. Although economic activities of the Egyptian military have a long story till Muhammad Ali Pasha, the military economy appeared in 1970s with a trend of liberalization program, which might be seen in other Arab countries. This trend was called as *infatih* by Sadat and changed the nature of civil-military relations, as it was mentioned before. The rule of Mubarak brought Crony Capitalism and it infiltrated military officers to various positions in the economy. The Egyptian military gained its autonomy and strengthened its political power, which stands upon the diversity of its economic activities. The extent of Egyptian military economic power will be discussed in this part, along with its consequences to Egyptian politics. An essential analysis of the economic empire of the Egyptian military is vital for observing the military interest and understanding its dominance over the regime.

The prolonged and structural economic problems constitute the essential reason of economic activities of Egyptian military. While the country has a brilliant potential in terms of economy with its strategic location, natural gas reserves, young and dynamic population, and remittances; limited resources of irritable land, lack of industry, over-population, relative poverty, and inflation have been the most prominent grievances of Egyptian economy (Kinninmont, 2012). In this situation, the Egyptian military became a production unit with its organized man power, politically privileged role, and its control on economic resources. Egyptian military's economic activities started with arms production during the reign of Muhammad Ali Pasha. This production included comprehensive and high quality warships, artillery, rifles, bombs and ammunition. However, the production facilities were disbanded under European

pressure in the 1840s (Stork, 2016). The developmental and productive role of the military continued with arm production after the World War II. After the revolutionary coup, Egyptian military increased and professionalized defense industry production. The arm productions are varied with ballistic missile of Al Zahir and Al Kahir, even aircraft production was made with Al Gomhoriya and supersonic jet Helwan HA-300 with help of West German technicians (Matthews, 1992).

Arm production of the militaries is not an unprecedented phenomenon for the rest of the world. Most countries' military are making, financing, and developing weaponry production. This is quite normal regarding the security reason behind the army production. This type of production should be under a serious control, otherwise its produce and sale can occur security problems. In addition to this, some of them were engaged various economic activities. For instance, in Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador pension funds were directed to the military's own commercial business and bank. The Chinese, Vietnamese, and Pakistani armies expanded the economic role into construction, development, commerce, and even tourism in the name of self-sufficiency or funding military modernization (Feagin, 2013).

The 1973 October War and the increase in the oil prices are milestones for Egyptian economic empire. After this date Egypt acknowledged a more liberal political stance and while the political role of military was limited, the economic activities of Egyptian military flourished increasingly. More particularly after the 1979 Camp David Agreement, the most imminent security threat of the country was silenced and the political role of military limited in line with the *infatah* program. It was depicted as "The military's new political supremacy has been translated into unprecedented economic expansion." (Adly, 2014). The reason for this is that the economic activities of Egyptian military became diversified in different sectors including arms, durable goods, foods, and mineral water following to the Camp David. In order to sustain its self-sufficiency, military modernization, and contributing to national economy, the share of Egyptian military in Gross Domestic Product reached to 40% according to different resources (Marshall, 2015),

In this point, the Egyptian military's economic presence should be thought in reference to civil-military theories. The praetorianism approach takes the military as a political unit and assumes the officer corps as an interest group, which seek to preserve and maximize their own interest. In modern states, the praetorian army serves as a center for political turmoil, political ambition and threats to legitimate authority.



Moreover, the patrimonial military reproduces a new type of authority and its relations with authority are based on a legal-rational orientation. The military officer is essentially a professional praetorian soldier (Perlmutter, 1981). Kamrava also emphasized the increasing political role of the military in professionalization. He classified Egypt among the “autocratic officer-politician” countries and talked about the expanding economic role of Egyptian military since 1970. On the other side, the robustness of coercive apparatus and maintenance of fiscal health are directly linked by Eva Bellin. She exemplifies disengagement of sub-Saharan African militaries after a prolonged fiscal crisis and democratic transition. The security establishment is quite likely give up when the financial foundation is at the stake (Bellin, 2000). The military professionalism and economic interests are intertwined in the praetorian armies. This is because of the fact that the military recognizes itself a center position in the regime and the military interests are attached to the state interests as well.

These perspectives would be so valuable in order to understand Egyptian military’s political stance in 2011 and 2013. The threat against financial instability arose with the large scaled protests in 2011. Thus, the economic empire of the military also became vulnerable under the threat of the revolution in 2011. However, the SCAF assumed the executive and legislative powers following Mubarak’s resignation. The state of emergency maintained, but the parliament dissolved and the 1971 constitution was suspended by the military (Rus, 2015). If the military is so engaged with authoritarian regime, why did it abandon Mubarak? According to Neol, the answer lies in the core interests of Egyptian military establishment. In fact, the military was in the pursuit of preserving its autonomy from civilian control. Three things were used to ensure this autonomy: formal recognition of the military role through legal mechanisms, informal rules followed by civilian political leaders and economic independence (Noël, 2013). The military’s economic interest is attached to its autonomy, which was the main concern of Egyptian military.

Furthermore, Youssef Saber Hanna mentions three major military interventions to politics in Egypt. These major military interventions took place in 1952, 2011 and 2013. The 1952 intervention toppled down the monarchy and established the republic. After this date, the military created its own foundations to the regime and its compounds militarized the state. For the other two interventions, they are the results of indispensable reactions in order to preserve corporatist interests (Hanna, 2014). In

this sense, the inquiry of military interest will provide us an understanding and even foreseeing of military stance in politics.

The Egyptian Armed Forces is inferior to The Ministry of Defense and Military Production. The mission of the ministry is not only to defend the country from internal and external security threats, but its duty is also producing military and industrial tools ("State Information Services", 2016), (Battera, 2014). The military economy income comes from of four main components: the defense industry in the form of the Ministry of Military Production; the state-owned Arab Organization for Industrialization; the Ministry of Defense's National Service Project Organization; and the EAF's own income generating enterprises (Sayigh, 2012). Foreign aid is also an important contribution to military/regime budget, but this will be analyzed in international context part.

Military companies make production in quite a range of sectors including water, olive oil, cement, construction, hotel, gasoline, drugs, home appliances, food and agriculture; though its profits and scope have never been revealed with the pretext of national security. The estimated income is 2bn Egyptian pounds (\$286m) from the economic activities of the military per year. Robert Springborg stated in an interview on Egyptian military economy that: "very little is known about how big is [the army's] economy, as very little is released about it," and he continued "The question isn't what sectors do they invest in, but rather: is there a sector that they don't invest in? (Kholiaif, 2013)". "One hand builds and another carries an arm" was the slogan of 1970s which was realized with the military's diversified economic activities.

Given its organizational skills, comparative economic advantages, and employing a large number of soldiers in meaningful activities, the military could provide an effective engine for economic growth and development. On the other side, the major role of Egyptian military in economy was initiated with the neutralization of the primary external security threat after the Camp David agreement. The military had to find a new mission (Feagin, 2013). However, Samuel Huntington and Charles Tilly remarked that the external security threat increases specialization and professionalization, and lack of external security threat might expand the military's political role (Huntington, 1957) (Tilly, 1990). Michael Desch also argued that "civilian control of the military will be the highest in states with low internal security threats and high external security threats" (Desch, 1999). These ideas should be taken into consideration in the Egyptian case. The changing role of Egyptian military in

politics is crucial especially in the last three decades. The economic interests provided a remarkable autonomy since 1980s.

The last stance of Egyptian military's economic power and its reflection to its political power and autonomy is astonishing. The military has an economic empire with several enterprises, thousands of workers, and high profits. The economic transformation of Egyptian military is not limited in the economic sphere, but it ensured an organizational autonomy with corporate interest of the military rule. Following to the infitah policies of Sadat and growing fat with the crony capitalism under Mubarak, the military power is at its most pervasive (Sayigh, 2012). The retired senior officers become managers of military owned-companies. Civilian companies also prefer the retired senior officers to be free from state restrictions. The officers' salaries are benefited from bounties of the military industry. Local government, police and intelligence brass are also filled with the military officers, who are apparently the owners of the state. If we consider the extent of the military power in state bureaucracy and economy, its harmful effect to a healthy governance and financial situation will be revealed again. The military's central role in politics and developmental role in economy are flattered and manipulated with the military's control over the media, so that the justification and legitimacy to the military authority is provided.

#### 4.1.3. Controlling Media

The means of mass communication has been sharply increasing the social power that provides popular support, informs people, and makes propaganda. The media facilities are increasing day by day and it is likely to increase in the future. In parallel with the developing media technology, an inevitable effect of media over politics, cultural life, everyday social life, and economics is emphasized (McQuail, 2005). The case of Egypt and the MENA region is also a significant subject related to the media effect since the 1952 military coup. The media effect was deeply felt in the last two military involvements in 2011 and 2013. A comprehensive analysis of the media in terms of its relation with the military regime will be brought forward in this part.

A crucial part of every authoritarian and praetorian regime is popular support. The early military regimes of the Middle East enjoyed remarkable popular legitimacy (Kamrava, 2000). Along with the military's historical legacy and central role in the state, the leaders' charisma also played a substantial role for the popular support,

particularly in the case of Egypt with Nasser. The radio was the only tool of mass communication between the people and Nasser. Even at that time, one of the first targets of the military coups was the state radio. The incidence of the military coup in Turkey has also been announced firstly by means of radio in 1960 and 1980. Thailand's silent coup in 1951, which is also known as the Radio coup, was declared over the radio through several steps: the dissolution of parliament, reinstatement of the 1932 constitution, and formation of a provisional government (Chaloemtiarana, 2007). Likewise, Egypt witnessed a radio announcement of the military coup in 1952. A manifestation of the military coup is given to the public through explaining its aim, reason, and the process by the official radio, so that obedience of the people to this new military authority is guaranteed.

The last coup in 2013 demonstrated a similar reality in Egypt to the others. Defense Minister and Chief Commander of the Armed Forces Abdel Fattah el-Sisi made a televised announcement with general commanders of the Egyptian Armed Forces meet, the anti-Morsi Tamarod (Rebel) campaign, the ultra-conservative Salafist Nour Party, the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar and Coptic Orthodox Pope Tawadros II, as well as Mohamed ElBaradei who was delegated by the 30 June Front and the opposition National Salvation Front (NSF). Sisi stated a roadmap for the political future of Egypt (El Sharnoubi, 2013).

This incident is the most obvious example which depicts the relationship between the military and the media. The military coup against the first elected president of the country was made in front of the cameras and in the presence of various representatives of Egyptian society. Legitimacy and popular support to this undemocratic political act was pretended to be gained by using this picture. It seems that the military is well aware of the media power over the crowd and prestige.

However, the effect of military is not limited with this scene. The military regime has used and controlled the media outlets for years. Media ownership by the state was an element of Nasser's rule and this principle is still effective with various media outlets of the state. Three mainstream printed newspapers, which are al-Ahram, al-Akhbar and al-Gomhureya are state controlled. Egypt's main wire service the Middle East News Agency also belongs to the state together with major publishing houses (Attalah & Rizk, 2011). These institutions do not have the autonomy privilege like the BBC in the UK, in the contrary; they have been exposed to heavy state control and censorship of state, government, and the military in recent years.

There are various different control mechanisms of the government towards the media outlets: the Ministry of Information, the public broadcaster Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU), and the Shura Council. These institutions are under the control of the regime along with military officers. According to ERTU Code of Ethics 8th article: “It is prohibited to broadcast any program that criticizes officers of the courts, military officers, or security officers as well as religious leaders.” (“ERTU Code of Ethics”, 1989).

The private ownership of media realm is also under the state control. A small number of media outlets in this expensive business and the crony media reveal the crony capitalist system in the country. In order to support the regime, the patronage of strong businessmen provides support for them with no financial gain. There might be different examples on this issue. For instance, Salah Diab is the founder of al-Masry al-Youm and an established businessman in the oil sector. Likewise, Naguib Sawiris is a telecom and construction entrepreneur and behind OnTV, which is a private satellite television channel. Another example is Ahmad Bahgat, who is a real estate development businessman and keeps Dream TV (Attalah & Rizk, 2011). It would be understood that the media sector is not a very profitable field, but its owner can have a word on public opinion and a strong position in the state in line with their political and economic interests.

Independent and objective journalism is a quite hard job in Egypt. Despite Sisi’s statement on 3rd of July which promised “laying down a media code of ethics to guarantee the media's professionalism” (El Sharnoubi, 2013), the media have been controlled even more after the coup. A coordinated clampdown was made against Muslim Brotherhood’s Misr25 television channel and two other Islamist supportive channels El Hafez and El Nas. They were simultaneously shut down at the night of the coup. Al Jazeera’s Egyptian branch Al Jazeera *Mubasher Misr* was raided and the other channels’ activities of Al Jazeera were ceased by the military government (Amin, 2013). Moreover, three journalists of Al Jazeera, who were broadcasting about the coup were detained with the accusation of spying and were not released till 2015 (Amnesty, 2015). The BBC’s Jeremy Bowen was injured and Sky News cameraman Mick Deane was shot and killed during the attacks of the military in a pro-Morsi protest (Freedom House, 2013).

According to the reports of Freedom House in different years, Egyptian press is not free. The only exception of this classification is that it was partly free in 2013

with the effect of civilian rule and various media outlets (Freedom House, 2013). The struggle between Islamist Freedom and Justice Party's rule and military regime left a narrow space for the press in that year. In 2014, Egypt's press freedom rate ended up being not free like before, because of the violent crackdown against Islamists and the military rule (Freedom House, 2014). The last report remarked a downward trend in terms of political and civil rights, state surveillance, mass trials and unfair justice system (Freedom House, 2015).

While the military regime is producing a leader image to Sisi, a systematic crackdown towards the media is going on like it did before. The new development is that the control over the media is more systemized. Any criticism is allowed neither against Sisi, nor against the military. The control is even tightened with a law which bans reporting on the military without permission, otherwise the consequence will be imprisonment up to five years and an excessive fine up to 50,000 Egyptian pounds (7,000 \$) (Noueihed & Mourad, 2014). Thus, the Egyptian people will only hear the voice of Sisi and regime compliments; the cases including the Muslim Brotherhood's Rabaa Massacre, the Maspero massacre in which 27 Coptic protestors' were killed, and socialist Shaimaa al-Sabbagh's murder will go unnoticed by the society.

#### 4.1.4. International Context

The international context of the military power constitutes a crucial part of the regime politics. Beginning with the rule of Nasser, the foreign policy has been a non-ignorable part of the praetorian state of Egypt. While Nasserist approach stamped the early years of the regime with his nonalignment to neutral foreign policy, Sadat and Mubarak shifted the country's axis to the West, particularly the USA. The fall of Mubarak and Morsi's presidency were promising new initiations, the growing unrest which was mixed with suspicion and perception of threat among both regional and super powers paved the way for military intervention in 2013. The international support is still one of the pillars of military domination in Egyptian politics with its international acceptance, economic aid, and cooperation in a number of issues - but especially in security.

The effect of international support is a quite addressed issue in terms of the military regimes. In particular, military coups link to the external powers through the environments exposed to the suppression. As we have seen in the 1960 and 1980 coups in Turkey, the USA role emphasized for the military interventions (Yetkin, 1995). The

USA ambassador's achievement cable "Our boys did it!" on the 1980 coup is remarkable (Durham, 2014: 349). The most obvious example on this issue is the case of Mohammad Mosaddegh in Iran, after years of his toppling down, CIA involvement in the coup against Mosaddegh is confirmed.

International support network is one of the four variables of Eva Bellin's explanation on "The Robustness of Coercive Apparatus". She reckons that security establishments requires to have crucial international support in order to maintain their order, otherwise the coercive apparatus can lose its will and capacity (Bellin 2004). Thus, the lack of military aid and the financial support of Western donors resulted in democratic regimes in sub-Saharan Africa after the Cold War, and the Soviet Union's withdrawal of support for the Brezhnev doctrine fractured the coercive backbone of Eastern European regimes.

The praetorian state of Egypt was founded upon the independent foreign policy after the colonial experience. Although Nasser acknowledged a neutral foreign policy in the country, the problematic relations between Egypt and the USA started with Aswan High Dam and continued with arm deal with Czechs, which pushed Egypt towards the Soviets (Heykel, 1974). His successor Sadat's ousting Soviet advisors before 1973 War was critic, but he turned to the West again with *infitah* policies and Camp David agreement with Israel in 1979. Mubarak followed the way of Sadat to a large extent in terms of good relationship with the West. Above all, he was seen as the guarantor of Camp David agreement for the side of Egypt and a valuable and loyal ally for the USA, even with his support in the Gulf War.

The insurgence of Egyptian in 2011 changed the equitation. Two different opinions appeared inside the USA. While the first one favored Mubarak for his loyalty and suspicion towards the Muslim Brotherhood, the second view preferred transformation to military in order to save the regime. Obama's decision became the support of protestors in this point which was based on the fact that it is beneficial for the USA's interests to have a more inclusive and stronger regime in Cairo (Stein, 2012). However, the protests brought the presidency of Morsi in 2012. Morsi's foreign policy triggered a comprehensive reaction against him among the officer corps, regional powers and super powers. His politics was blamed to put Egypt's national security in danger and jeopardize national security. Along with the security of Suez Canal, Camp David agreement was felt threatened by the USA, in reference to his criticism in Israel's attack to Gaza. President Morsi's two novelties, which are opening

towards Iran and an improvement in relations with Hamas, were negatively reacted. Normalizing diplomatic relations with Iran angered Salafi groups in the country and Hamas relations part disturbed the USA and Israel (Meringolo, 2015).

In addition to this, the prospects of a Muslim Brotherhood rule terrified the regional actors, particularly Saudi Arabia. Saudis worked on to reverse Egyptian revolution on the ground of the threat of an expansion coming with the revolution, which meant millions of Egyptian workers and the Muslim Brotherhood in their country. Military and Salafi groups were supported with billions of dollars against the Muslim Brotherhood (Meringolo, 2015). Not only Saudi Arabia but also other Gulf countries were felt threatened from Morsi's rule in Egypt. The only exception in the region remained Qatar and Turkey who relatively stood on the side of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood.

On the other side, the military prepared necessary conditions for the coup as the oldest and strongest political institution in Egypt. The foreign support to the military intervention was crucial in both ways: legitimizing the new government and providing resources to the country during the crisis. The military coup and current military regime lies back to the Gulf States in the region and to the USA as a superpower.

The Gulf countries were significant economic and political players long before 2011. The infitah policies constituted the initial Gulf influence in Egypt with investments, but the increase of oil prices in 1999 and the attacks of September 11 gave rise to Gulf engagement in the MENA region economically and politically. For these reasons, the Gulf States acted to lift the main burden of responsibility for region's stability (Sons & Wiese, 2015). The military coup appears to have been really welcomed by the Gulf States. Right after the military intervention Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and UAE promised to send financial aid to Egypt. Saudi regime has become the most generous supporter of the Egyptian regime in international and regional arena. King Abdullah aided to the new military regime with 5 billion dollars which accounts for 1 billion dollars in cash, 2 billion dollars in oil, and 2 billion dollars in bank deposits (Gresh, 2013). Total Gulf aid with Kuwait and United Arab Emirates became 12 billion dollars just after the coup against the first elected president of Morsi ("Egypt returns \$2 billion to Qatar in sign of growing tensions", 2016). The Gulf countries aimed to maintain their economic and political influence over the most populated Arab country Egypt, and abstained from the democratically elected Brotherhood rule which



would be a serious threat with their Islamist agenda and set a bad example with its democratic rule. After almost the first year of military intervention, the Gulf aid to Egypt reached to 20 billion dollars (Ahram Online, 2014).

Qatar was not among the supporters of the military regime in the Gulf. By means of Al Jazeera and financial support, Qatar looked for the way of change in Egypt. Morsi government was supported in Al Jazeera broadcasts in Egypt, across the Middle East and international scene. The coup in 2013 was loudly protested on Al Jazeera coverages. Moreover, the relationship between Qatar and Morsi government was impressing. However, Qatar's 7.5 billion dollar loan to Egypt ("Egypt Returns \$2 Billion to Qatar in Sign of Growing Tensions", 2013) could not be enough for preventing the military rule and Doha withdrew 2 billion of the 3 billion dollars which it had deposited with the Bank of Egypt since 2011 (Meringolo 2015). Egypt-Qatar relations slightly changed through the reconciliation efforts with the mediation of the Gulf countries, but president Morsi and other members of the Freedom and Justice Party is still under trial for the alleged Qatar espionage.

The Gulf countries' involvement in Egyptian politics is quite interesting. The Gulf investment resulted in a search for political stability or regime change especially after the Arab Spring. These aids are very critical in terms of the development of Egyptian economy. Expertized economists remark that Egypt's economic problems are structural and it does not need to be 'stimulated' with more spending. On the contrary, it needs a predictable institutional environment, stable public finances, and more market flexibility (Rohac, 2013). Nevertheless, the financial aid was used to buy popular support for the regime instead of structural reforms. For the intention of Gulf engagement in Egypt Haider A. Khan said that: "I think the main reason that Arab countries give aid to Egypt is that they do not want to see instability in Egypt." ("The Impact of Gulf Aid on Egypt's Economy", 2013). In reference to their political ambitions, the Gulf disagreement on Egypt was described as a proxy war (Szala, 2014).

Turkey have conducted principal oriented policy towards the Arab Spring. Not only in Egypt, but Tunisia, Libya and Syria, Turkey's foreign policy stood upon democracy, Arab people's rights and dignity (Davutoğlu, 2014). For this reason, Turkey-Egypt relations starkly changed after the military coup. By 2012, the volume of trade between Egypt and Turkey was equal to 5.2 billion dollars and Turkey's investment in Cairo were reckoned at 1.9 billion dollars, and the aim was to reach 5 billion dollars. However, the regime change, Rabaa massacre, and oppression against

the Muslim Brotherhood terribly affected the relations which also led the repatriation of the Egyptian ambassador to Ankara. Turkey embraced the Muslim Brotherhood members, Turkey became the first to lend its own antennae to the Egyptian Brotherhood and the channel Rabaa on 19 December 2013. Turkey-Egypt relations is still not positive and it seems hard to reach back to the pre-coup days (Meringolo, 2015).

Despite the European Union's attitude against the 2013 coup and suspense of the sale of arms and materials that could be used for repression, the economic activities in other areas are continuing ("EU suspends arms deliveries to Egypt", 2016). Moreover, political relations between the EU countries and Egypt appeared to be détente for the vis-à-vis visits and acceptance of al-Sisi as the leader of Egypt (Halawa, 2015), ("Federica Mogherini on official visit to Egypt", 2016). Even some democratic countries in the West including Canada welcomed the military rule and did not make a noise for the humanitarian affairs (Christoff, 2015). Whereas Canadian citizen and Canada's Committee for World Press Freedom award winner Mohammed Fahmy was under arrest till late 2015. These types of relationships between the West and Egyptian military rule are quite pragmatic, rather than being a principal attitude.

The United States have conducted a strategic alliance with Egypt since 1979 Camp David agreement. Actually, that was a trilateral good relationship among the three countries which are USA, Egypt, and Israel. The rule of Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak were complicit of these ties (Cook, 2012). The close relationship with the USA and Israel is also one of the fundamental reasons of protests during the Arab Spring along with the other serious problems including economic crisis, corruption, and injustice (Bekaroğlu & Kurt, 2015). The short rule of Morsi witnessed a series of accusation against him such as being an American citizen, puppet, and even a spy (Nazemroaya, 2016). However, Morsi did not take any major steps which would directly affect the relations between the United States and Israel (El-Adawy, 2016). The presidency of Morsi alarmed the USA and Israel because of the fame of the Muslim Brotherhood which is the cradle of Hamas and other Islamist parties across the Middle East.

On the other hand, the Egyptian military have enjoyed the USA military aid and training for decades. According to the Camp David agreement, the USA sent 1,3 billion dollars every year to the Egyptian military in order to modernize Egyptian military. Furthermore, Egyptian military was armed with American weapons like

M1A1 Abrams tanks, AH-64 Apache gunships, the F-16 fighter jets and so forth. Egyptian military officers have also been trained in the USA military schools like the leader of 2013 coup Abdel Fattah al-Sisi who was enrolled to the United States Army War College in 2006 ("Abdel Fattah el-Sisi Fast Facts", 2016). The United States did not define the military intervention as a coup, but Democrats' approach to Egyptian junta is not so cordial. Because of the USA's Israel priority, it appears that Sisi government is a lesser evil, especially for Democrats. Besides, the USA's interests on Egypt is not limited on this issue. Egypt opens its airspace for the USA jets, so it enables room for maneuver in the MENA region. Most of the USA military aid was spent as weapon and equipment order and the dollars return to America providing employment and import (Atalay, 2013). In brief, Egypt looks like a profitable investment and also a friendly neighbor of Israel in the MENA region for the United States. The recent security threat in Sinai Peninsula and the ISIS threat ended the security cooperation between the USA and Egypt ("Security Assistance and Cooperation for a New Egypt", 2016).

In a nutshell, Egyptian military has been an active international player, particularly with the coup against the Muslim Brotherhood. The strongest ally seems like the Gulf countries which are Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait with their billion dollars of aid in order to preserve their investments and keep the Brotherhood and democracy away from the region. The exception of the Gulf is Qatar who still has a positive attitude towards the Muslim Brotherhood and democratic regimes in the MENA region. Likewise, Turkey holds the people's will and rights above the regimes and it believes sustainable peace and stability would be created in the region. The military regime switched its financial patronage from the USA to the Gulf and built stronger ties with Russia and China. After the pullback from democracy, the relations with the West were also influenced (Diamantopoulos, 2015). Egypt's neighbor and the USA's closest friend Israel appears to be more content with the military regime rather than with an Islamist party rule. By using the prejudice and hatred against the Muslim Brotherhood, the military regime provided legitimacy, foreign aid, and security alliances in the regional and international level.

#### 4.2. Opposition Groups and Challenges to the Military Regime

The Egyptian military regime lacks democratic support of the people, even though it has popular support from a remarkable part of the people. The praetorian

regime uses different tactics like divide-rule, oppression, manipulation, and demonize. In the last stance, the Muslim Brotherhood stood against military rule as the most organized political and societal power in Egypt. On the other hand, liberal groups, socialists, and Salafi groups are other political actors in Egyptian politics, despite their support or silence towards the coup. Moreover, the prolonged structural problems of the military regime and its weak points appear to cause trouble in the long term. These issues have not been changed from the 2011 revolution and almost nothing changed in the daily life of ordinary citizens including human right abuses, injustice, representation problem, crony capitalist system and unfree press.

The Muslim Brotherhood as a religious societal organization was founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna and it was genuinely a bottom-up movement. It is a mass grassroots, pan-Islamic, religious movement and especially after the 2011 revolution it came to represent a powerful religious and political opposition force in Egypt (Brown, 2012) (Partager, 2011). The Brotherhood has a comprehensive ideology, and according to them, Islamic values are the core pillars of society, so that the organization gained an exceptional level of regional and international resonance (Johnson, 2012). Muslim Brotherhood members sometimes positioned themselves as a radical group as in during the Secret Apparatus' (al-jihaz al-Khas) and with the effects of Qutbism after the crackdown began in the Nasserite period, but it should also be noted that the mainstream organization distanced itself from its more radical elements in time (Ardovini, 2015). While the infitah policies of Sadat opened a space to promulgate their idea and belief to the people such as the famous magazine Dawa, under Mubarak's rule the Brotherhood turned to a versatile civil-society organization with its network of supporters, profession chambers, and charity organizations (Wickham, 2002).

The revolution in 2011 and presidential elections in 2012 became a turning point for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian politics. It acquired an overwhelming success both in the general elections with Justice and Development Party which won 235 of the 498 seats in the 2011 general elections and presidential elections with Mohammad Morsi 51.73% of the votes (Sharp, 2012). The military coup in 2013 toppled the first elected president of Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood exposed to a serious crackdown, massacre, and torture of security forces along with the ban of the organization with terrorist labeling (Laub, 2016). However, the Muslim Brotherhood has not answered with violence against the regime yet. This may be because of what

they saw happen during the Algerian civil war in 1992 and the ongoing Syrian civil war since 2011.

Other opposition groups in Egypt are also been subject to military crackdown and political oppression. Liberal groups like the Kefaya movement acted skillfully against Mubarak rule, but the Tamarod campaign under the leadership of Mohammad el-Baradei facilitated the coup against Morsi and awkwardly welcomed the military regime. Furthermore, The National Salvation Front appeared as the alliances of opposition groups against Morsi from liberals to socialists, but they were unable to unite against the military rule since 2013 (Black, 2012). Moreover, Egyptian liberals appear to divide into two camps: on the one hand military supporters who thought that Morsi governance was illiberal democracy like Mohammad El-Baradei, opposing the military crackdown over the Muslim Brotherhood such as Bassem Youssef and columnist Belal Fadl on the other (Kouddous, 2013).

The prolonged essential political and human rights problems, economic troubles, and corruption still constitute the main challenges to military rule. While the regime is oppressing its people for the sake of the establishment of the military rule, the human rights abuses are deepening such as the murder of Khalid Said and Shaimaa al-Sabbagh. Political opponents and protestors were tortured, arrested, and killed not only by security forces, but also thugs of the regime who were known as *baltagiya* and state serving civilians (al-Shishani & El-sheikh, 2012). There seems a vicious circle and interaction between the protests and oppression. Whatever happens in Egypt, there will be no sustainable solution disregarding the essential human rights, justice, structural economic problems, and freedom, but it should be regard to the robust military establishment in Egypt. Otherwise, the military's dominance over the politics will continue to obstruct solutions.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

Egypt is a crucial country in the MENA region. It has witnessed remarkable incidents during the last years. The revolution in 2011 was followed by the coup in 2013 and Egyptian military emerged as the sole dominant actor in the political arena. The case of Egypt is interesting in terms of the broader civil-military relations issue in the MENA region. In this work, the case of Egypt was examined from this perspective by means of eligible theories, typologies, and approaches of civil-military relations. The main aim of this research was to understand the dynamics behind the dominance of military power in Egyptian politics. Thus, it would be useful to comprehend the very foundations of the regime with analyzing the robust power of military in Egypt and other precedents in the region. In order to resolve the problem of change for prolonged structural issues, especially for democratic transition, the military effect in politics was researched and findings were analyzed for this purpose.

Civil-military relations from democratic to authoritarian countries consist of different level of dynamics. While military professionalism is a key issue in democratic regimes, the military power might have a fundamental role in an authoritarian system. Praetorian armies appear as the guardians of the regime, but it controls it through various strategies and apparatus. However, these militaries have a certain reason to intervene into politics. In these states, the lack of overarching structure over the people, essential mechanisms of state apparatus in judiciary and legislation, political culture played much important role, but the most importantly founding values of these states enabled the military institution to influence on politics. The case of Egypt is a remarkable example of this, because the rooted Nasserist legacy in the regime merged with Sadat and Mubarak's policies and the military has always been a power base of the authoritarian regime. The Arab Spring protesters toppled President Mubarak. Nevertheless, the resilience of regime adopted itself into the changing circumstances and the military institution occurred as the real possessor and guardian of the regime with the coup in 2013. After this coup, the military regime reproduced itself again and established its dominance over politics.

Regarding the various roles of the military in different fields and the military officers in the regime, the military would be accepted as the ruler of the country. The Nasserist legacy and ideology provided a legitimate ground for military influence. Accordingly, the military became a political institution with autonomous decision making prerogatives. This autonomy stood upon the economic empire of the military, which also facilitated the legitimization of its popular support. Media control is another very critical issue necessary to acquire popular support and eliminate other parties. The international context indicates the external role to the military coup and military government in Egypt. The opposition groups are divided into two camps one hand is the Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand other opposition groups. The Muslim Brotherhood blamed for having an Islamist agenda and its rule was perceived as a threat by the old regime, the military in particular. Other opposition groups from leftists to liberals and even Salafists preferred a military regime rather than the rule of Brotherhood. Uniting various strata of society under its flag has been the main feature of the military regime which reproduced military rule along with its coercive power in the field.

As a result of the recent incidents in Egypt, military rule in the country became more obvious and dominant in politics more than ever. This study has dealt with the presumption of Egyptian army's dominant role in reference to civil-military relations theories and analysis. The characteristics of the Egyptian regime were examined with reference to the Nasserist ideology and its transformation in line with the circumstances of the time. What it found is the increasing role of the military not only in politics, but also in the economy, the media and the international arena. These variables set up a substructure, but the incidents from the 2011 revolution to 2013 coup were used to reestablish military rule in the country under the leadership of Chief of Staff Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. However, severe and constant challenges still constitute problems in the country including injustice, human rights, economic corruption and welfare along with the suppression by the regime of protests. The results of this thesis may be summed up shortly as the following:

The role of military in 2011 revolution and its invasion to the politics with the coup in 2013 proved the military's dominance over politics in Egypt. The military is ruling the country, so it is an entire political system, rather than rule of a tyrant. Regarding to Nasserist legacy for the Egyptian military dominance, Egyptian political system might be called as "praetorian Nasserist regime".

Egypt is a remarkable and ancient country in the region with MENA characteristics. From the start of the modern period to the present, Egypt has been under the influence of the military. The Nasserist ideology and its transformation provided the infrastructure for the military regime in the country by means of authoritarian rules of former officers. Praetorian Nasserist regime reproduced itself after the 2013 coup and the military rule extended its authority with eliminating other political opposition groups and oppressing political rights.

Changing the robust system of military regime in Egypt is not likely in short period of time. It would be also hardly difficult to make a proper revolution regarding to societal dynamics of the military rule. Moreover, the military is inseparable and unbreakable part of a state. For this reason, negotiation and reasonable opposition is crucial in order to change Egyptian military regime.

Struggle with such authoritarian regimes would cause more oppression, civilian casualties, extremist/separatist terror, and economic crisis as we saw in Algerian and Syrian civil wars. Any opposition group must ensure that its political agenda is not an existential threat against the ruling group, but its political message conveys very beneficial messages to fix serious troubles of the country.

Economic activities ensured a substantial autonomy for the political power of the military in Egypt. The military establishment searched for its economic interests not only for its officers' financial gain, but also supplying economic gain to the military establishment to conduct autonomous politics 'for the sake of the nation' – something which was in line with Nasserist ideology. The military regime must be considered with its economic gains and interests. It should be noted that an essential change is not possible without an essential change in terms of economic activities of the military.

The military of Egypt maintains its dominance over the politics through a system. The military as a political institution conducts political affairs at the national and regional level. Subordination of military to any civilian authority is problematic because of the main codes of the regime. However, a substantial change may occur by means of education and media. These might be two tools in the hands of civilian politics.

Media control is an indispensable part of the military regime in Egypt. The state media outlets are heavily under the control of various apparatus. Private media outlets, which are being owned by crony capitalists, back the military regime with its



news and programs. Opposition media faces serious crackdown from the military regime. However, the area of Internet including social media and blog pages might be an alternative place to share information and mobilization for Egyptians.

The international context is a crucial part of this system. The military regime negotiates with regional and international partners to acquire legitimacy, financial aid, and security for the military regime in the country. This is an undeniable issue while facing with the military regime in Egypt. Its unprecedented geostrategic position exposes to various foreign players for Egypt. Therefore, considering allies of Egyptian military regime is an undeniable truth.

Opposition groups are exposed to brutal crackdown, the Muslim Brotherhood in particular. They are also divided into various hostile camps, which makes impossible to create a unified political opposition. On the other hand, the constant problems (political representation, legitimacy, economy, corruption, and human rights) are still constitutes serious challenges to the military regime. It appears that these essential problems are the strongest challengers to the military regime, not a political group.

Future research could use this study as a compilation of civil-military theories and their implementation over a praetorian case in the MENA region. Conducting regime analysis in this respect would be quite useful for other countries in the region, so that the role of coercive power in politics and their effect in the moment of change become clearer. More particularly, this thesis could provide a beneficial perspective for one to grasp of Egyptian politics, even though it has certain deficiencies and analysis which are open to disagreement.

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