

BECOMING A REGIONAL POWER: A COMPARISON OF TURKISH
AND JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICIES (2002-2015)

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
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A handwritten signature in blue ink, consisting of a large, stylized 'O' followed by a series of loops and a final flourish.

ABSTRACT

BECOMING A REGIONAL POWER: A COMPARISON OF TURKISH AND JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICIES (2002-2015)

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This thesis presents a comparative study of Turkish and Japanese foreign policy activities since 2002. By comparing their foreign policies over their activities to become a regional power, this thesis aims to look upon the efficiency of those policies in achieving respective country's aims. Due to the similarities between Turkey and Japan in terms of aiming to become a regional power, Japan's foreign policy is taken as a reference for comparison. The interest and study of Turkish foreign policy has risen in the past few years due to Turkey's increasing activism in political field, enhanced influence in its region, most prominently its increasing soft power. This thesis aims to make a more inclusive study by looking into use of both hard and soft power and events that are surrounding the country.

We focus on Turkish and Japanese foreign policies through their democracy promotion, the use of the financial aid in their foreign policy and their security problems. Also the effects of the hard and soft power on those policies and those policies' effects on countries' hard and soft power is taken into account. Rather than evaluating the success of those policies, this thesis aimed at elaborating whether those policies yielded the desired results. Using this approach this thesis pointed out some of the reasons of the inefficiency in some policies, and to better evaluated the efficiency of their policies towards in their regional power bid.

Keywords: Turkey, Japan, Turkish Foreign Policy, Japanese Foreign Policy, Regional Power.

ÖZ

BÖLGESEL GÜÇ OLMA: 2002-2015 ARASINDAKİ TÜRK VE JAPON DIŞ POLİTİKALARINA DAİR BİR KARŞILAŞTIRMA

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Bu tez Türk ve Japon Dış Politikaları'nın 2002 yılından bu yana bölgesel güç olma adına gerçekleştirdikleri aktiviteler üzerine bir araştırmadır. Türk ve Japon dış politikalarının bölgesel güç olma yolunda yaptıkları uygulamalar üzerinden karşılaştırarak dış politikalarının bu amaçları doğrultusunda ne kadar efektif olduğunu incelemiştir. Bu çalışmada Japon Dış Politikası Türk Dış Politikasına olan benzerliği sebebiyle karşılaştırılma yapılabilecek nokta olarak seçilmiştir. Bu çalışmada iki ülkeyi çevreleyen olayların geneline bakılıp yumuşak ve sert gücü bir arada ele alarak bütüncül bir karşılaştırılma ortaya koymak amaçlanmıştır.

Hem Türkiye hem de Japonya bölgesel güç olmayı amaçlamakta ve benzer siyasal ve jeopolitik durumları sebebiyle birbirine benzer politikalar izlemektedirler. Bu iki ülkenin dış politikaları demokrasi teşvikinin kullanımı, ekonomik yardımının dış politikalarındaki rolü ve güvenlik sorunları üzerinden ele alınmıştır. Ayrıca bu politikaların ülkelerin hem yumuşak hem de sert güçlerini nasıl şekillendirdikleri ve onlar tarafından nasıl şekillendirildikleri de irdelenmiştir. Bu tezde bu politikaların başarılı olup olmadıklarından ziyade, istenilen sonuçları verip vermediği incelenmiştir. Bu yaklaşım sayesinde dış politikalarında izledikleri yöntemlerin bir kısmının neden etkisiz kaldığının sebepleri irdelenmiş, ve bölgesel güç olma yolundaki durumları daha iyi değerlendirilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Japonya, Türk Dış Politikası, Japon Dış Politikası,
Bölgesel Güç.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
IHH	Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
JDP	Justice and Development Party
JICA	Japanese International Corporation Agency
KYM	Kimse Yok Mu
LDP	Liberal Party of Japan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Overseas Economic Corporation Fund
PKK	Partiya Kakeran Kurdistan
RPP	Republican People's Party
SDF	Self-Defense Forces
TAI	Turkish Aerospace Industries
TFX	Turkish Fighter Experimental
TIKA	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
UAV	Unmanned aerial Vehicles
USFJ	US Forces in Japan

INTRODUCTION

Turkey and its potential for becoming a middle power or potentially a regional power has been discussed and analyzed in Turkey over the last few decades. Especially since the 2000s and with the Justice and Development Party (JDP) governments, Turkish foreign policy may seem to be focused on becoming a regional power. However, there has been little research to evaluate the effectiveness of this policy with respect to the expected goals or in comparison with the similar policies of the regional rivals. One could fill this gap by comparing Turkish Foreign Policy to the foreign policy of a country with a similar agenda to seek informative and valuable insight into its effectiveness. Thus, I aim to compare Turkish and Japanese foreign policies between 2002 and 2015 with regards to becoming a regional power and evaluate their effectiveness. Also by examining how different applications of similar activities by Turkey and Japan created different results I aim to bring a better understanding to the use of those activities in fostering foreign policy.

The regional power is a complex term to define. The definition of the regional power changes depending on how one perceives “region” and “power”. While more realist definitions may emphasize more on the military prowess of the country, others may attribute more to importance on the soft power influence. Thus, the manifold definitions have impact on the necessary conditions of becoming a regional power. In my thesis, I will use two sets of conditions I find most appropriate and generally applicable to every regional power, which are Stefan Schrim’s¹ and Maxi Soheeman’s² conditions. These conditions are power capacity, desire, activity, and acceptance by the regional countries. These attributes will serve as the basis of my analysis of Turkish and Japanese foreign policies.

Since Turkey is a country that is trying to become a regional power, it needs to have a multi-layered foreign policy to satisfy all its objects. Turkish foreign policy cannot be explained by simply looking through one perspective of the political science,

¹ Stefan Schirm, “Führungsindikatoren und Erklärungsvariablen für die neue internationale Politik Brasiliens”. *Lateinamerika Analysen* 11 (2005): 107-30.

² Maxi Schoeman, “South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power: 1994-2003” in *State of the Nation: South Africa 2003-2004*, eds. by John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall, (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2003.), p. 349-67.

and neither can it be compared with countries that are not in the same situation. Certain aspects of Turkish foreign policy cannot be fully understood if we look only through the prism of soft power. For example if we do not take Turkey's resource dependency into account, we cannot explain Turkey's cooperative attitude towards Iran and Russia. Thus, Turkish foreign policy will appear to be contradictive if only analyzed through soft power. Therefore, I aim to analyze Turkish foreign policy by taking into account the use of both hard power and soft power tools and the desired aims. This way, a more comprehensive perspective can be established. Secondly, I will look at Turkish foreign policy in process of become a regional power, because the JDP government seems to pursue this agenda since 2002. This policy is an amalgam of hard and soft powers aiming at particular goals in the region. Its effectiveness or progress must be understood in comparison to another state that also pursues the goal of becoming a regional power, with a relatively similar situation. If such a comparison is drawn between Turkey and the USA, the UK or any other country of a stronger stature, the outcome may not be able to predict the efficiency of this policy. Thus, because of similarities in its agenda and situation, Japan is chosen for the comparison.

This comparison and subsequent analysis will be based on a study of Turkish and Japanese foreign policies since 2002, in terms of their desire to become regional powers. It can be argued that a comparison with a regional rival for the regional power bid would be more appropriate, but when we look at Turkey's rivals in the region – Iran and Saudi Arabia, it can be seen that Turkey has a completely different political system and socio-cultural conditions. Turkey does not possess the resource capital of Saudi Arabia or the religious influence of Iran, but Turkey shares many similarities with Japan including in its political system and security problems – something that I will further explain in later chapters. The reason that I take 2002 as the starting point is because it is a milestone in both Turkish and Japanese politics. The year 2002 witnessed the JDP's and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's ascension to power in Turkey, which marked the rise of a proactive foreign policy. In the same time period, there was the rise of Junichiro Koizumi in Japan, which marked a change in the Liberal Party of Japan (LDP) and Japanese foreign policy from reactive to proactive and has been continued with his successor Shinzo Abe. Lastly, the year 2002 was of utmost significance on the global level due to the escalation of the US War on Terror and the consolidation of Putin's power in Russia and multiple other incidents of similar nature.

While doing this comparison I will refer to some changes in the domestic politics in Japan and Turkey and their effects on the foreign policy, but I will not look to the domestic politics in so much detail. Due to the differences in the domestic politics and their handling by the respective governments, and the differences in the understanding and the relationship between the domestic politics and the foreign policy, I find it hard to compare the effects of the domestic politics on the foreign policy. Furthermore domestic politics and its effects on the foreign policy is not something that can be mentioned without giving an extended and informative background, which is on itself a chapter or another thesis topic. Also in some cases not only the analyzed country, but target country's domestic politics may also prove important in particular policies and this will further complicate the already complex foreign policies. Therefore, I intend to not to delve in to the domestic politics too much.

I will make my comparison around three activities that constitute an important part of both countries' foreign policy activities. First, I will look to the use of financial aid by both Tokyo and Ankara. While developmental and humanitarian aids are often regarded as soft power-building tools, I tried to look at their hard power aspects as well, such as economic potential and security concerns. Both Turkey and Japan are using the financial aid for both soft power and hard power aims. Second, I will take the use of democracy promotion and economic progress as both a soft power and hard power building tool. And finally, I will look at the security dilemmas of both countries against rivals that are far superior to them. As the military capability is one of the main vessels in the international politics, excluding it will make it harder to explain certain situations. I took these three activities, financial aid, democracy promotion and military capability, because aid and democracy promotion are helpful to both Turkey and Japan's soft and hard power and therefore it is important for them, and the importance of military capability is instrumental to understand any country's policies.

Because I intend to analyze and compare Turkish foreign policy to that of Japanese through the lenses of these three aspects, I have divided my thesis according to them. It will start by providing a description of what power is, why it is important in international relations, and the degrees of power as well as why and how the relations between these different degrees exist, so on and so forth. Then, it will describe hard and soft power, and why they are important in understanding the policies of the states.

The second chapter will look into the use of the developmental aid as a foreign policy tool. In the general approach the use of developmental aid is perceived as a tool to increase the donor's soft power on the donee and to increase further cooperation. I tried to take it as a tool to achieve such aims, plus a supplementary tool for other policies. In Turkey's case it is used as a tool to support its ambition to take on a leadership role by answering the needs of regional countries, such as Gaza and Somalia, and as a support to its claim as a role model to regional countries, such as Tunisia. In Japan's case it is a tool to answer the needs of regional countries, therefore containing and countering Chinese influence, on countries like Vietnam and Indonesia, and to increase cooperation with possible military allies, such as India.

In the third chapter, I took Ankara and Tokyo's use of democracy promotion and economic progress discourse as a foreign policy tool. Turkey has used democracy promotion to increase its soft power and to show itself as a role model, as in the Tunisian and Egyptian cases. Japan on the other hand, uses democracy promotion and economic progress as a way to acquire hard power aims. Japan's and a number of other regional countries' security are under threat from China, a highly authoritarian regime that is accused with human rights violation and lack of democracy. To pull other countries into a security cooperation Japan has used its democracy and economy as a way to unite regional countries against Chinese encroachment.

In the fourth chapter, I look at the security dilemmas and hard power realities of Turkey and Japan. While Japan and Turkey may try to pursue a proactive foreign policy, their policies are bound to the realities that are surrounding them. Turkey cannot act completely independent without first acquiring self-sufficiency in its military equipment modernization and acquisition, and secondly without taking other regional powers into account. Despite all its efforts, Turkey has been unable to convince the UN to make a move in Syria or to solve the problem on its own due to myriads of parties involved in the conflict. Japan's situation regarding security is more precarious. While Turkey needs to increase its military self-sufficiency, Japan has problems regarding its army. The restrictions on the Japanese army were a problem that has shadowed Japanese foreign policy for decades, which was only changed on September 2015. Secondly, while the security threats to Turkey are potential threats, the security threats that Japan is facing are very real. Japan had to endure continued threats from North Korea and claims on its lands from China. Lately, China has moved more boldly with its disregard towards international law and started to endanger

regional security and balance more directly, which Japan has yet to counterbalance if it wants to become a regional power.

In the concluding chapter, first I will give a general comparative overview of Turkish and Japanese foreign policies. I will look into whether their policies were able to give the intended effects or not. Then, I will evaluate the efficiency and results of the policies and whether they met the four conditions stated by Stefan Schrim and Maxi Schoeman. Although Turkey and Japan fulfilled and/or made progress in the first three conditions, they have been unable to acquire the last conditions, acceptance by the regional countries. I argue that because they could not get recognition as regional powers, they were unable to achieve their aim to become a regional power. Furthermore, their mistakes in their foreign policy activities was a big reason for that. Turkey's insistence on its stance against Sisi and Bashar Assad made Ankara just another external power, which then created resentment and was one of the main reasons for regional antipathy for Turkey's leadership claim. Different than Turkey, Japan was unable to commit itself fully in its activities and did not take a strict position like Turkey, which than made Tokyo look weak and it was not seen as an alternative to back against China.

CHAPTER I

POWER AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

1.1. Regional Powers and International Power Structure

From Plato and Aristotle to Machiavelli, from Hobbes to Morgenthau, power has been an important part of political thought and international relations theories. Its acquisition and sustainment have been the main aim of international relations from Sumerian city-states to modern states. But what is power? Power is often described as the ability to acquire the intended results from others with or without their consent. One of the simplest definition of power is Professor Joseph Nye's definition that describes power as "the ability to influence the behaviors of others to get the desired outcome"³.

Power has its own types such as, hard power, soft power and smart power. In this thesis two types of power are referred, hard power and soft power and their combination which makes up the smart power but since this thesis is not about them, I will not further indulge in the concept of smart power. Hard power is the first type of power explained and theorized in international relations and political science. It is the purest form of power conceptualized in an anarchic world order where states only accept the crude reality, where the only way to survive is to acquire more and more economic and military power.⁴ Hard power is the power that Machiavelli proposes; it is the power one uses to make sure he is feared in case he is not loved.⁵ Soft power on the other hand is something completely different. A state can exert influence on others by using brute force and violence, but to influence others without using force is something different. Soft power is the ability to influence others' actions without the need for force. Therefore, it is more complex to define and measure than hard power. While hard power can be measured by territory, resources, population and military force; measuring soft power is not that easy.

³ Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

⁴ Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations, Theories and Approaches*, 5th Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013)

⁵ Nicollo Machievalli, *Hükümdar: İl Principe*, (İstanbul: Say Yayınları, 1998)

From power comes the classification of states according to their powers. States may be categorized like a pyramid in the international order. From bottom to the top states can be classified into small powers, middle powers, great powers, and hegemonic power. Each state in this pyramid tries to reposition itself into a higher category. While small powers try to become middle powers, the middle powers try to become great powers and great powers try to become the hegemonic power. And like a real pyramid, the stability of each floor is essential for the world order. When there were too many great powers that tried to become the hegemonic power the world saw intercontinental wars that devastated entire nations in a short period, as can be seen in the examples of the First and the Second World Wars. The hegemonic power is one of the most difficult parts of the pyramid to define. In simple words, it is the power that is *hegemonic* throughout the world. Previously, Great Britain was the hegemonic power for a brief period of time in the 19th century, and currently the USA is accepted as the hegemonic power. The USA's place is currently challenged by Russia, China, and another bunch of middle powers. Also, more importantly, even though the USA is the hegemonic power, sometimes it still cannot acquire its desired outcomes from others, despite the sheer amount of its hard and soft power. Turkey's refusal to grant military access during the US's invasion of Iraq in 2003 is an example of this.

Regional powers are also a part of this pyramid, but their place is not clear. A state can be a regional power while it is merely a middle power, or it can be a regional power when it is above the middle power. Regional powers have always been a part of the international system. While the great powers define the system of the world, the regional powers define the system of their region. Regional powers may even defy the great powers in their region, such as the Pakistani involvement in Afghanistan, which proved a crucial point in the Soviet Union's defeat. Regional powers are important because they provide the link between the hegemonic powers and other countries and provide the necessary stabilizing factor to their region. If there is no regional power in a region, countries in that region will try to become the regional power and in the long run this will start an arms race, economic collapse and possible conflicts. One of the best examples for this was the Cold War period in the Middle East where Iraq, Iran,

Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia all simultaneously tried to increase their own influence, which created enmities and a war⁶ in the region.

What is a regional power? Martin Wight defines regional power as a power between the middle powers and great powers, with a more geographically restricted and concentrated role. “States with general interest relative to a limited region and the capacity to act alone in this region, which gives them the appearance of local great powers.”⁷ We might summarize the definition by saying that a regional power is a country that can exert a certain amount of hegemonic influence in its own region but may lack this influence on global scale. This power can vary from hard power to soft power, but the country must be able to exert its influence in the region and manipulate regional politics for its own gains. Stefan Schirm⁸ and Maxi Schoeman⁹ propose similar conditions to define regional power. Schoeman lists; power capacity, desire, and acceptance. Schirm adds activity to those three. There are other conditions listed by various academics and institutes, but some of the definitions are stuck between regional power and middle power, usually combining them. However, the distinction between the two is important: while a regional power is influential in its own region, a middle power can be a country, which is active in international politics, and may or may not be a leading country in its region.

Resources, claim, acceptance and appliance can be accepted as one of the simplest set of conditions for the definition of regional power. To be a regional power a country has to claim to be a regional power, for without the claim, the power is nothing. Secondly, the country has to have the resources to follow its claim. Any country can claim to be a regional power, as can be seen from the Balkans and the Middle East, but without resources there is little left to follow this claim. Thirdly, the country needs to direct its resources to apply its claim in its foreign policy. Lastly, it needs to be accepted by other countries in the region as a leader. Without this

⁶ The Iraqi-Iranian War may be read as the result of both countries aim of becoming a regional power. Iraq wanted to show its power to other Arab countries thus taking the mantle of leadership, and Iran wanted to promote and export its revolution to other Shia and pro-Shia minorities in the region to increase its influence.

⁷ Martin, Wight, and Bull, Hedley et al. (eds.). *Power Politics* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 202).

⁸ Stefan Schirm, “Führungsindikatoren und Erklärungsvariablen für die neue internationale Politik Brasiliens”. *Lateinamerika Analysen* 11 (2005): 107-30.

⁹ Maxi Schoeman, “South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power: 1994-2003” in *State of the Nation: South Africa 2003-2004*, eds. by John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall, (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2003.), p. 349-67.

acceptance its influence will be very limited. When we look at some of the current regional powers we can see that they have those conditions and also other similarities:

- Most regional powers are historically either ex-great powers or middle powers. Examples include the UK, Germany, China, and Russia. They have a history of being an influential power and either still possesses a part of it, as the UK, or the desire to return to that power, as Germany and Russia.

- They have economic potential. This potential can vary among countries. They can be developed economies like Germany, resource exporters like Russia, or developing economies like Brazil. Whatever the form they take, they have the economic potential to carry out their claims.

- Depending on their situation and location, regional powers may possess an extensive military. For example, Russia has a very powerful military and constantly improves it. China and India are raising their military capacities. But others such as Germany and Brazil do not have powerful armies because of their location.

- Demographically, many regional powers have growing populations. Brazil, India, and South Africa have growing populations and not only in quantity but also their quality is increasing. Some regional powers may have demographic problems, as Germany, but in their cases, this problem is solved by the immigrants attracted from other countries.

Some countries may fulfil most of the Schoeman and Schirm's conditions but still may not be a regional power. For example, Canada is among the most developed countries in the world with a powerful economy and a developing military, but it is not a regional power, because it has no claim to be a regional power, and is unable to exert any influence in its region. Thus, while Canada is a middle power, it is not a regional power because power by itself is not enough to become a regional power. To become a regional power, a country needs to exert influence on others, and be recognized as a regional power by others. Regional powers can vary from region to region and have different ways to exert influence. Russia with its military and economic power is the biggest power in the ex-Soviet bloc and is the head of the economic and security organizations in its area. China is able to exercise its influence via its massive

economic power, by funding of projects in Third World countries.¹⁰ India is trying to improve its status in the international politics and gain a permanent seat in the UN.

Throughout history, when great powers clashed, it happened through continental scale wars and peace agreements that defined and shaped the new structure. The Evangelical League and the Catholic League's conflict led to the Thirty Years' War and the subsequent Peace of Westphalia. Napoleonic France's challenge to Great Britain led to the Napoleonic Wars and the Vienna Congress. Nazi Germany and Japan's claim to power led to the Second World War and the subsequent Yalta Conference and the Treaty of San Francisco. These agreements set the rules of the new international order, either as the Vienna which brought a relative stability or as the Versailles which caused more strife and new wars.

However, the Cold War ended abruptly with no war, therefore there was no definition of the new international structure. When the Soviet Union was dissolved, it created a wave of excitement and speculation throughout the world. The dissolution of the Soviet Union gave the USA uncontested power, at least in the first decade. In 1989, Francis Fukuyama published an article in the *National Interest* under the title of "the End of History" (1989)¹¹, where he claimed capitalism displaced communism, and won the struggle between the two models. He further claimed democracy has won the battle and it had no alternative. The embodiment of both capitalism and democracy was the US and therefore it was read as the USA's ultimate victory and ascension to hegemonic power. However, this optimism about the USA's so-called 'hegemonic power' quickly collapsed. After an initial chaotic decade Russia came back to world politics as a regional power with ambitions to become a great power under Vladimir Putin's presidency. China, empowered by the Western investments in its country, started to employ its vast industrial capacity to dominate, or at least influence, the third world and more worrisome it started to expand its military capacity and as of 2015 it is the most problematic revisionist country in Asia. The lack of a new international order, and the USA's eagerness to declare itself as the ultimate winner left the international system in chaos. The USA's invasion of Iraq in 2003 was done without the consent of the UN or within any proper international law. The USA's 'reckless'

¹⁰ By definition a great power is also a hegemonic regional power. Here I looked to how China and Russia exert influence in their region, rather than reducing them to a regional power.

¹¹ Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History", *The National Interest*, No:16 Summer, (1989).

actions ruined the perception of the US hegemony. With the USA's economic decline there are many challengers to its so-called 'hegemonic' power. In 1999 Huntington wrote:

Global Politics have moved from the bipolar system of the Cold War to a unipolar moment. But the superpower's effort to maintain a unipolar system stimulates greater effort by the major powers to move toward a multipolar one. Now the international system is passing through one or two uni-multipolar decades before it enters a truly multipolar 21st century.¹²

Now, true to his words, the world is experiencing the uni-multi polar decades that Huntington mentioned and the rising Russia and China are marking the "truly multipolar 21st century" Huntington predicted. But more importantly this unipolar system is not only challenged by Russia and China, but also latecomer rising powers and ex-powers. Brazil, Turkey, India, Germany, and Japan are among such contenders. Although such second tier powers do not pose enough military or economic power to directly challenge or replace the current hegemon, they have a growing role in the current power structure and international politics. Especially since the September 11 attacks, the limits of the US power have been challenged continuously. The decline of US economic power, social problems and the burden of the military on the US budget show the next decades may not go smoothly for the USA. These rising powers keep challenging the current international structure in several fields including economics, military, and lately the UN. Brazil, Turkey, India, and Japan are among the countries that are criticizing the permanent spots on the UN Security Council and their veto powers and are calling for restructuring the UN system.¹³ Yet not all rising powers have the same agenda. Germany tries to be more influential in Europe, Turkey is trying to become more active in the Islamic world and the Middle East, Japan is trying to achieve a more representative role for its developed economy and solve its security problems regarding China. Brazil and India are trying to become more active in international politics. As can be seen while some of the rising powers have regional plans, others may have more global desires, and it is difficult to guess what any of

¹² Samuel Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower", *Foreign Affairs* 78 (1999): 35.

¹³ Jo Adetunji, "Turkey calls for UN security council reform over failure to pressure Syria", *the Guardian*, 13 October 2012, accessed on 10.01.2016 accessed from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/13/turkey-un-security-council-reform-syria>
Andreas Rinke, "Germany's Merkel says U.N. Security Council must be reformed", *Reuters*, 26 September 2015. Accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.Reuters.com/article/us-un-assembly-merkel-idUSKCN0RQ0NC20150926>

these countries will seek if they achieve their desires. For so long it was argued that because of economic interdependency China would never turn hostile towards other nations, however the latest Chinese military development and territorial disputes hint that this may prove to be wrong.¹⁴

However, whether they are challenger or not the regional powers are an important part of the international system. Not all regional powers are revisionist challengers, and even when they are challengers they are still balancing actors in the international system. Most of the regional powers are an assurance for stability of their regions, and even when they are not providing security, their own stability is crucial to world stability. Without the Russian security umbrella leadership ethnic conflicts, if not wars, may ignite throughout the ex-Soviet bloc. China is not a security provider, but the fact that China itself is stable, is a stabilizing factor for the whole world. If China was to fall into a civil war, as in the inter-bellum period, it would be disastrous for India, Korea, Russia, and Japan, and when the Syrian refugee crisis' effects on Europe is taken into account, China with its population would create a wave of migration that would cause a butterfly effect which will flung the world in to chaos. Yet, just as they have positive effects in their respective regions, the regional powers may also have negative effects on regional stability. While the hegemonic power's military build-up may not be perceived as a primary threat by regional powers, another regional power's military build-up may trigger an arms race between two competing regional powers, as can be seen in the Indian-Chinese and Japanese-Chinese tensions or the Cold War era Iraqi-Iranian arms race and war.

This thesis is based around the term of regional power and soft and hard powers, as aforementioned. Turkish and Japanese foreign policies cannot be understood without looking them as an effort to become a regional power. In the last ten years Turkey has been again and again voicing its desire under its then Prime Minister now President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Japan, although not voicing over such an argument, has been trying to contain Chinese power in its region and tried to be more involved in fields that previously it had never showed interest, like military. Comparisons between the policies of Turkey and Japan with those of the great powers will always show Turkish and Japanese foreign policies as failures, because they cannot compete

¹⁴ This will be explained broadly in the fourth chapter.

with great powers. For example, if Japanese foreign policy towards Central Asia is compared to that of Russia or China, it will surely look like a failure. But whether Japanese foreign policy towards Central Asia is failure or success should be judged by its initial aims and results. Therefore, comparing the foreign policies of two countries that have the same aim and similar problems makes more sense and provides better data to analyze whether such activities are yielding results and making progress or not.

Also, while some regional powers, like Russia, rely more and more on hard power, soft power still deserves to be mentioned in any meaningful research regarding foreign policy. When we look at history, secondary powers usually replaced hegemonic powers first economically then militarily, like the US and the UK or the Netherlands and the Spanish Empire. In cases where the secondary powers directly tried military means as their main tool, they usually failed, as the Napoleonic France against Great Britain or Nazi Germany in the Second World War. While economic power is often read as hard power, today most of the foreign policy activities are interlocked, as these activities support one another and increase both soft power and hard power. When a state puts economic development assistance as an important part of its foreign policy tools, this raises its soft power and hard power. Financial aid a country raises both the reputation, soft power, and creates a stable market for its goods. The USA showed its hard power during the Second World War, but one of the actions which helped the USA to establish its image as a great power were the US' aid plans, such as the Marshall Plan, and other independent acts, like Truman Doctrine. Such aids helped the USA to create dependable allies while showing its technological and economic capacity and improving its image. For these reasons this thesis focuses on Ankara and Tokyo's foreign policy activities around the developments in their developmental aid, democracy promotion and military capabilities.

1.2. Japan and Turkey

The reasons why I choose Japan and Turkey is their very similar yet very distinctive structures and aims. Both Ankara and Tokyo are in a bid to become regional powers, and their situation and problems are very similar. Therefore, comparing their contemporary foreign policy makes more sense than comparing them with other countries. Also, this similarity provides an experiment where small differences in the appliance of the foreign policy may cause greatly different results. Turkey and Japan have historical, regional, economic and socio-political similarities.

Regionally, Turkey and Japan are in similar atmospheres. Turkey is in the Middle East, one of the most problematic regions of the world. With its diverse ethnic and religious differences, vast natural resources, and strategic location; conflict is an everyday part of the Middle East. In the past decades Iran, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Israel faced internal and external problems and after the Arab Spring the ‘supposedly’ stable authoritarian countries like Yemen, Libya and Egypt are also in turmoil. Especially Iranian-Saudi and Iranian-Israeli rivalries, and their open hostility with one another create a tense situation. In the west, the Balkans have been somewhat stable in the last decade, but the current ethnic clashes in the Macedonia and the rising far-right with its revisionist rhetoric in Hungary marks possible future problems in the region. In the north a revisionist Russia with increasing hostilities towards neighbors with the recent annexation of Crimea and the Ukraine Crisis marks other problems. The problem Turkey is facing is not having hostile neighbors but having hostilities with them. Turkey has a maritime border crisis with Greece, has problems with Iraq regarding terrorist camps in Northern Iraq, the border gates are closed with Armenia due to the Armenian occupation of Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh province, and Turkey was on the brink of war with Syria in the 1990s and as of the end of 2015 there is no functioning state in Syria. This makes security a high priority for Turkish foreign policy. Similarly, Japan is located in a problematic part of current international politics. East Asia is not as strategically important as the Middle East, but nonetheless the countries are still problematic. Japan like Turkey has a history of hostility with its neighbors, which is caused by Japanese activities in the Second World War. But the problems are not only historic; Japan currently has territorial problems with its neighbors. Japan and Russia still have not solved the Northern Islands dispute since the end of the Second World War. There are problems with South Korea due to the Liancourt Rocks, with China and Taiwan due to the Senkaku Islands, and there are also North Korea’s nuclear weapons project and ballistic missile tests. And in addition to a revisionist Russia, Japan also borders an increasingly revisionist China.

Historically both countries are ex-empires. Turkey was founded on the Ottoman Empire’s heritage and Japan was founded on the Japanese Empire’s heritage. Both heritages create historical enmities with their neighbors. During the Ottoman period, Turkey fought with most of its neighbors and countries in its near vicinity. Japan similarly fought with all of its neighbors. Both Japan and Turkey’s current regional rivalries are also based on historical rivalries, for Turkey these are Russia and Iran, for

Japan these are Russia and China. However, while Turkey's Ottoman past is both a hindrance and a boost for Turkish foreign policy, Japan cannot use its imperial legacy. More importantly, as most of the ex-regional powers, Turkey and Japan's bid to become a regional power again can be based on this historical influence. History creates an illusion, a nostalgia, which states take influence. Countries with a history of being great powers often try to become great powers again. Furthermore, history affects the route Tokyo and Ankara take. While Turkey's Ottoman past influences its foreign policy towards Middle East and Balkans due to common past, Japan's imperial past pushes it towards a more anti-militarist and pacifist approach. Also, this history limits their foreign policies. When Japan and Turkey try to become more active in their region, this activity is branded as "resurgence", as can be seen from the reaction of regional leaders to Japan and Turkey.

Economically, Japan and Turkey are not in the same category when their GDP and economic development are taken into account, however the effect of resource dependency is the same for both countries. Japan is located in the East Asia without any significant natural resources. Among its neighbors only Russia has enough resources to export to Japan but the current infrastructure in the Eastern Russia is an obstacle in front of this option. Japan with its developed economy needs resources and obtaining such resources is one of the top priorities of Japanese foreign policy. Turkey is in a resource rich area but has limited natural resources of its own, and the consistent instability of the region is an obstacle in front of Turkey's access to natural resources. Purchases from Azerbaijan have to take a longer route via Georgia due to the Armenian occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh, Iran came under international economic sanctions several times and Turkey was pressured to not to buy natural gas from Iran. The Iraqi and Syrian borders with Turkey are dangerous areas and as of autumn 2015 beyond the Turkish border in the south there is only chaos. This pressure on resource access limits Turkish foreign policies towards certain countries. This reliance puts Turkey in to a dangerous dependence until it can diversify its resource providers in the future.

Politically, both Japan and Turkey are parliamentary democracies. Their democratization and liberalization process started around the same time in the late 19th century when both countries were trying to modernize themselves in order to survive

against Western colonialism.¹⁵ However, both countries turned into authoritarian regimes shortly afterwards and it was not until the end of the Second World War that there were multi-party systems. However, while Japan quickly turned into a dominant party system Turkey remained multi-party system with several parties represented in its parliament. While in Turkey there was no party that truly dominated the political scene following the Second World War, except the Justice and Development Party's (JDP) success in the last decade, in Japan the Liberal Democrat Party (LDP) has dominated the Japanese politics since the Cold War and only lost twice in the elections. In the current political spectrum Japan and Turkey share another similarity in the political arena. Japan's ambition to become a regional power is embodied in Shinzo Abe and the LDP, while the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is proposing a more inward approach and promise to make Japan's internal problems a top priority. Similarly, Turkey's regional power ambition is embodied in Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the JDP, and the greatest opposition party the Republican People's Party (RPP) proposes to prioritize Turkey's internal problems.

¹⁵ Ottoman Empire became a constitutional monarchy in 1876 and Japan in 1890.

CHAPTER II

AID, A USEFUL TOOL IN FOREIGN POLICY

2.1. Aid and its Role in Foreign Policy

Aid is a tool that has been used in the policymaking process in international relations for a long time. It is a tool that can be beneficial for the donee country, as it will cover its needs; from funding economic growth to fulfilling military needs. But it is also useful for the donor, as it can be used for military, diplomatic or economic reasons by the donor. From influencing alignments to strengthening allies, foreign aid can help to stabilize, reconstruct and improve a country, and this will help the donor country to improve its reputation and soft power on the donee and will have direct political, economic and military effects.

First, the donor country can use its influence on the donee at the political and diplomatic stage; both in regional or international organizations, such as the UN voting. The UN's egalitarian "one country, one vote" system makes every country in the world equally important, a resolution may be refused even before any veto from the permanent members of the UN Security Council. So a donor country can try to influence the votes of its donee countries to pass a resolution or elections for the UN Security Council.

Second, as the donor country invests in the stability and reconstruction of the donee, it creates a new market where, thanks to its influence and image as the donor, it will have a leading role. Especially, since some of the donee countries do not have functioning economies because of their instability, a latecomer country can compete with big powers. This factor can be used to explain the tendency of the rising economies, such as India¹⁶, Turkey and China¹⁷, great interest in aiding the African nations. A latecomer country can still compete with the big economies in the newly stabilized countries because no one will have experience in the market, ties with the

¹⁶ Harry G. Broadman, *Africa's Silk Road: China and India's New Economic Frontier*, (Washington DC: World Bank Publications, 2007).

¹⁷ Helmut Asche and Margot Schüller, *China's Engagement in Africa – Opportunities and Risks for Development*, (Echborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 2008).

local government or institutionalization in the region, because it is a newly opened market.

Third, the donor can use its power to keep the donee in its military alliance, obtain military bases, or even support some military operation. For example, Georgia politically or militarily had nothing to do with the 2003 invasion of Iraq but it sent a total number of 2.000 soldiers to Iraq, and became one of the biggest contributors to acquire the US military support.¹⁸ As can be seen, a country that has no relationship to a war can send its soldiers to acquire the support it needs from the donor on other fields.

Aid has been used as a tool in foreign policy on several occasions, as military and economic aid from France to the Thirteen Colonies in the American War of Independence against the British Empire. France starting from the early days of the war supported Thirteen Colonies with arms and other materials and later entered the war. However, before the Second World War the use of aid as a foreign policy tool was limited and bound to situation, rather than being an organized action. One of the most extensive use of foreign aid as a means for foreign policy happened during the Second World War. The United States' Lend-Lease Act, which was enacted on 11 March 1941, was perhaps the first extensive use of material aid as a foreign policy tool in that scale. Under the Lend-Lease program the US started supplying Allied countries first Free France forces and the United Kingdom, and later the Soviet Union, Nationalist China, and other Allied and non-participant countries with food, arms and other materials needed for the continuation of the war.¹⁹ With Lend-Lease aids the USA intended to keep the Allies intact and encourage neutral countries to join Allies, or at least discourage them from joining Axis powers. The Lend-Lease shipments, which eventually started with major Allied countries, increased to a number over 30 countries around the world including nearly all Allied nations, all Latin American countries, and Turkey. Not all of these countries were allies of the USA and some of

¹⁸ "Parliament Endorses Increase in Troop Levels in Iraq", 8 June 2007, accessed on 10.01.2016 accessed from <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=15242>

Andrew E. Kramer, "Georgia becomes an unlikely U.S. ally in Iraq", *New York Times*, 8 October 2007, accessed on 10.01.2016 accessed from <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/08/news/08iht-ally.4.7803155.html?pagewanted=all&r=0>

¹⁹ The US supplied materials and arms to non-participating countries like Turkey, Ecuador or Chile hoping to influence them to enter the Second World War on the Allied side

them still kept being neutral until the very end of the war but the USA aided them to make sure that they do not approach the Axis block. The Lend-Lease Act helped the USA shape the foreign policy of many nations and gave it a leading role in the Cold War international structure.

During the Cold War, with the polarization of the world between the USA and the Soviet Union and the de-colonization process, the aid towards the Third World countries increased. Both superpowers tried to ensure the loyalty of their allies and encourage neutral or the opposite block's countries to join their block, especially the Third World countries, which by that time constituted a large part of the world after the de-colonization. After the war, the United States launched the Marshall Plan, which unlike the Lend-Lease Act, was not military but rather aimed to improve the industrial capacity of the benefiting nations after the destruction havocted by the Second World War. The Marshall Plan aimed to create strong and prosperous European allies²⁰ for the United States that would become militarily and industrially capable of supporting the Western Block. The main beneficiaries of the Marshall Plan were allies of the United States during the Second World War, and to a lesser degree the Axis and neutral countries. Although the Marshall Plan was designed to fulfil the needs of the post-war Europe's for economic development, there are few criticisms towards the actual effects of the Marshall Plan, especially by German economist Werner Abelshauser. Abelshauser states the economic reconstruction was already on a successful path in West Germany even before the first significant Marshall aid came.²¹ However, in most cases the Marshall Plan acted as the necessary catalyzer to start the development and reconstruction process. Other single acts were also implemented for Asian and Middle Eastern Countries, as the Truman Doctrine to support Greece and Turkey in their struggle against communism inside their countries. Greece experienced a civil war between 1946 and 1949, which left the country in bitter social division, and Turkey experienced pressure from the Soviet Union for military bases and border changes while it also had to deal with leftists inside.

²⁰ Most of the aid that was done to Japan was given under Government and Relief in Occupied Areas. For further information SEE Nina Serfino, Curt Tarnoff, and Dick N. Kanto, *U.S. Occupation Assistance: Iraq, Germany and Japan Compared*, Congressional Research Service, 23 March 2006. Retrieved 25 April 2015, from <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33331.pdf>

²¹ Werner Abelshauser, *Wirtschaft in Westdeutschalnd 1945-1948; Die Rekonstruktion und Wachstumsbedingungen in der amerikanischen und britischen Zone*, (Stuttgart: Verlag-Anstalt, 1975).

While the United States sent help to its allies via abovementioned acts, the Soviet Union founded its own aid and economic integration organization named Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) in 1949. It consisted of the Soviet Union, Eastern European communist countries and later Vietnam, Mongolia and Cuba. The major positive effect of the COMECON on its member states was the low oil and raw material prices resulting from the Soviet Union's production. The COMECON initiated the economic rehabilitation of its members via its industrial and material help. There were also cases of direct aid towards specific countries by both the Soviet Union and the United States, as in Arab-Israeli or Indian-Pakistani conflicts, but those were mainly military aid and were not as organized as the COMECON or the Marshall Plan and were rather ad-hoc strategies to pull these countries in to their blocks.

As can be seen the effects of foreign aid can range between small economic relief actions to military aids that can keep countries intact in the most devastating war. Although the effects of foreign aid is debatable, since as much as it may help a country to overcome its problems, it can create states that are chronically bound to foreign aid. However, one thing is undebatable and it is the role that aid can and is playing on the foreign policy of the done and the donor.

2.2. Turkish Aid History and Contemporary Turkish Aid Activities

During the Ottoman Empire, there were separate examples of Turkish aid towards a third country. One of the first examples happened between the Ottoman Empire and Sultanate of Aceh²² in Indonesia.²³ The Sultanate of Aceh had clashes with the Portuguese during the 15th century as a part of the Portuguese expansion in the Indian Ocean. To resist Portuguese expansion the Sultanate of Aceh requested help from the Ottoman Empire, which was also trying to stop Portuguese expansion in the area. Ottoman Empire sent many missions to Aceh during the reign of Sultan Suleiman I and Selim II, and later continued sending aid to Aceh. However, these aids were officers to train troops, equipment and know-how to build weapons. Rather than creating long-term alliances, the help aimed to slow down or stall the expansion of a

²² The Sultanate of Aceh was a Muslim Indonesian Sultanate in the medieval Indonesia. People of Aceh has embraced Islam starting from 12th century via trade and other means rather than an Islamic conquest. Muslims in Indonesia founded several sultanates and the Sultanate of Aceh was one of the major ones.

²³ Andrew Peacoc and Annabel Teh Gallop (eds.), *From Anatolia to Aceh: Ottomans, Turks and Southeast Asia*, (Oxford University Press, 2015).

rival country. However, since the Ottoman Empire was in decline by the time the maritime developments like steam power made large-scale aids possible, the foreign aid could not be used as a political tool.

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the newly founded Turkish Republic found itself economically and demographically devastated after a decade of continuous battle. The Turkish Republic, in its fragile economic state was a recipient of financial aid nearly half of its history, and still needs financial aid in some large projects today like the Marmaray.²⁴ Although Turkey initially did not accept any foreign aid²⁵ in its early years due to its reluctance caused by the Ottoman Empire's loans and bankruptcy, with the start of the Cold War Turkey began receiving aid from the Western block on a large scale. During the start of the Cold War Turkey received economic and military aid from the US under the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and the Marshall Plan in 1948. Until the 1990s because of Turkey's economic weakness, Ankara could not pursue an aid policy that would be organized and continuous. Aid towards other countries was ad-hoc strategies that were separate and based on occasions rather than a systematic program with long term aims.

One of the first developments in the Turkish Republic after the Cold War regarding becoming a donor was the founding of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA). TIKA was founded in 1992 by the Decree Law No. 480 under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the aim; "to respond to the restructuring, adaptation and developmental needs of the Turkic (Turkish-speaking) Republics after the disintegration of the Soviet Union."²⁶ Later TIKA's designated operational area was enlarged and as of 2015 TIKA conducts aid programs in 120²⁷ countries throughout the world. There are also other state organizations like Kızılay, the Turkish Red Crescent, which conducted aid organizations inside Turkey but lately also conducts regular and permanent aid programs in other countries.

²⁴ "The first rail welding Ceremony of Marmaray Project was held on January 14, 2012 in Istanbul in the Ayrılıkçeşme-Kazlıçeşme Part of the Project in İstanbul.", JICA, 14 January 2012, accessed on 10.01.2016 accessed from <http://www.jica.go.jp/turkey/english/office/topics/news120114.html>

²⁵ Except the Soviet and Indian Khilafat Movement's aid during the Turkish War of Independence.

²⁶ "History of TIKA", TIKA, 24 December 2014, accessed on 14.03.2016 accessed from http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/page/history_of_tika-8526

²⁷ "Overview of 2013 Activities", *TIKA 2013 Annual Report*, p. 16, TIKA, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/publication/TIKA%20ANNUAL%20REPORT%202013.pdf>

The state organizations are not the only organizations in Turkey that send humanitarian aid to other nations. Turkey has great non-state aid organizations as the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH) or Kimse Yok Mu (KYM).²⁸ As of 2013 IHH serves in 136 countries²⁹ and KYM serves in 113 countries³⁰. This means Turkey helps more than half of the world via its state, sub-state, or civil society organizations.³¹ In 2013 the official development assistance (ODA) given by Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee member countries rose by 6.1% and totaled \$134.8 billion. In 2013 Turkey increased its ODA by 30% and reached a total of \$3.3 billion.³² This is a high ratio as Turkey is a country, which had \$823 billion GDP in 2013.³³ If we also add the donations made by the NGO's, Turkey might be one of the biggest donors compared to donation/GDP ratio.

2.2.1. Contemporary Turkish Aid Activities: Bosnia

Since the 1990s the first massive aid Turkey made was to Bosnia during the collapse of Yugoslavia. Initially, Turkey, which was having a considerable separatist problem within and usually in favor of the status quo on international politics, supported the integrity of the Yugoslavia. However, after the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by the major European countries, Turkey recognized Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia on 6 February 1992. After initial confusion, the disintegration of Yugoslavia turned in to a bloody civil war with usually more than two sides fighting against each other. The Yugoslav Wars (1992-1995) and the ethnic cleansing devastated Bosnia economically, politically and demographically, rendering it unable to achieve a permanent conciliation between three ethnicities.

²⁸ Further information regarding Turkish NGOs that sends aid to third countries can be found in *TIKA 2011 Annual Report*, p. 68-78, TIKa, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/oldpublication/kyr_ing.pdf

²⁹ *IHH 2013 Annual Report*, p. 11, IHH, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://www.ihh.org.tr/fotograf/yayinlar/dokumanlar/204-2013%20Yetim%20Dayan%C4%B1%C5%9Fma%20G%C3%BCnleri%20Faaliyet%20Raporu-yetim_faaliyet_raporu_ing_web.pdf

³⁰ "About Kimse Yok Mu", Kimse Yok Mu, accessed on 10.01.2016 accessed from http://www.kimseyokmu.org.tr/index.php?p=content&gl=temel_icerik&cl=kurumsal&l=hakkimizda

³¹ There are currently 206 sovereign and de-facto states in the World.

³² *TIKA 2013 Annual Report*, p.17;

³³ World Bank data on economic situation of Turkey, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://data.worldbank.org/country/turkey>

Initially the Yugoslav Wars did not pose a threat to Turkey, as Turkey was geographically distant from the region so the wars could not spread to Turkey or affect the Turkish economy in a considerable way. However, historical, cultural, and religious ties with Bosnia and the Bosnian immigrant population in Turkey prompted a greater response from Ankara. Especially the scale of the ethnic cleansing, the inability of the UN to stop the war or protect the civilians³⁴ and the hardships Bosnians were going through were the main reasons of Turkish aid campaigns. In other words, the widespread view that Turkey projected its soft power on Bosnia is true, but to a certain degree both countries used their soft power upon each other.

During the Yugoslav Wars, or the Bosnian War, the UN resolutions prohibited the sale of arms to all ex-Yugoslav countries.³⁵ Turkey as a member of the UN abided by those resolutions and most of its aid was done in accord to the resolutions. The greatest importance of the Yugoslav Wars for Turkey was the Turkish civil society and NGOs active participation in the aid. There were mass campaigns to raise money for Bosnians in Turkey and in European countries where a Turkish migrant population lived. Throughout Turkey there were fund-raising and charity organizations to provide money and material aid to Bosnia. Both local and big NGOs' participated in these events. These aids were delivered to Bosnia by various means and as a consequence some of them went undocumented. However, the aid campaigns also showed a problem, the lack of experience and the organization. There were charges of swindle and misuse of the donations, and problems in the deliverance of the aid to the area. So in a sense the hardship faced in Bosnia aid campaigns also helped the success of later campaigns. After decades of idleness Yugoslav Wars provided the necessary catalyzer for institutionalization of Turkish aid. IHH, one of the biggest NGOs in Turkey, puts its foundation on the hardships they faced in the mobilization and organization during the Yugoslav Wars.³⁶

³⁴ The UN designated several safe zones in the region, however the UN peacekeeping forces had difficulties to protect the civilians, and in Srebrenica the Netherland Peace Keeping Forces abandoned their position rather than fighting with paramilitaries. Between 11 July and 13 July 1995 within a few days over 8,000 Bosnians were massacred by the Serbian paramilitary groups.

³⁵ Those resolutions was one of the reasons of the hardships Bosnians went through. Serbians had access to major Yugoslavian army stockpiles in the region, Croats had an extensive shore with plenty bays where they could smuggle weapons. Bosnians were stuck between two hostile populations and had to mainly rely on scavenged or captured weapons.

³⁶“Brief History”, IHH, accessed on 10.01.2016 accessed from <http://www.ihh.org.tr/en/main/pages/tarihce/338>

Turkey's aid to Bosnia did not end after the Yugoslav Wars. TIKA continues to support dozens of projects in Bosnia, supporting cultural, educational or economic organizations and helping the infrastructure of the country as well as preserving the Turkish heritage in Bosnia. On calamities, as in the 2014 South Eastern European Flood, there were special aids sent to Bosnia to use on the disasters. In a disaster where hundreds of houses were put out-of-use and nearly 40,000 people were displaced, while the UN Development Program paid for the reconstruction of the 30 houses TIKA paid for 640, and IHH paid for 300.³⁷

2.2.2. Contemporary Turkish Aid Activities: Somalia

Africa is one of the regions that gets a great amount of official development assistance (ODA) in the world. Most of the continent is agonizing under poverty, civil wars, insurgencies, ecological problems and many other issues. Apart from a few countries like Botswana, nearly all countries faced and continue to face ethnic conflicts or civil wars after their independence and more than half of the continent is considered fragile states.³⁸ One of the most severe cases of civil wars in Africa happened in Somalia. After its independence Somalia experienced a military coup, and was ruled by a military regime for over twenty years. Since 2005 Somalia has been trying to rebuild its infrastructure, governance and economy while still fighting a low-intensity war with pocket resistances inside country. Turkey is one of the countries that have been trying to help Somali society on their efforts to rebuild. Turkey demonstrated special interest in Somalia and its re-construction, both in terms of state-building and economic restoration. In 2010 and 2012 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held Istanbul Somalia Conferences organized within the UN framework under the theme of "Preparing Somalia's Future: Goals for 2015".³⁹

³⁷"Bosnia: Turkish aid agency restores flood-damaged homes.", *Anadolu Agency*, 05 December 2014, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/bosnia-turkish-aid-agency-restores-flood-damaged-homes/95222>

"Turkey extends helping hand to Bosnia and Herzegovina flood victims", *Today's Zaman*, 18 May 2014, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_turkey-extends-helping-hand-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina-flood-victims_348096.html

³⁸ Fragile State Index is an index published by the Fund for Peace organization. It publishes the Failed States Index, an annual ranking of 177 countries by 12 indicators like demographic pressures, group grievances, economic decline and etc. For 2014 report; <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2014> Accessed, 02.05.2015

³⁹ "The Second İstanbul Conference on Somalia, Final Declaration, 1 June 2012, İstanbul", Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-second-istanbul-conference-on-somalia-final-declaration-1-june-2012-istanbul.en.mfa>

Turkey's aids to Somalia for its reconstruction are done through several organizations like, TIKA, Kızılay, IHH and KYM. From 2008 to 2013 the annual share of spending Somalia received from the TIKA's annual budgets increased from 0.16% in 2008 to 9.57% in 2013.⁴⁰ As of the end of the 2013, Somalia was the third largest recipient of TIKA aid, coming only after Palestine and Tunisia. Considering that TIKA is operating in more than 120 countries, this demonstrates how much Turkey is putting on the reconstruction of Somalia. Among the TIKA aid given to Somalia, nearly 22% was spent on health-care and 70% is spent on economic infrastructure and services. This infrastructure investment went to projects that aim to restore the economic and social recovery of the country, like opening wells, a hospital, material help to orphanages and roads.⁴¹

Another Turkish state organization, which aids Somalia, is Kızılay. Since 2011 Kızılay has been sending help to Somalia. In August 2011 Kızılay started building a tent-camp, which consisted of 3,000 tents to accommodate 15,000 people. Also, they opened wells, fountains, school, a masjid and social activity buildings, so their tent-camp turned into a small town to not only preserve their lives, but also restore the social life. Between August 2011 and October 2014 the Turkish Red Crescent sent 44.356 tons of provisions to Somalia, which was very important for the region, where agricultural capacity was devastated from the war and drought. Also, with the help of the Istanbul Municipality, Kızılay opened, repaired or improved roads, buildings, the sewage system and other infrastructure in several Somali towns upon the request of their local governments.⁴²

IHH also sends aid to Somalia. IHH's involvement in Somalia began earlier than others, as early as 2006. IHH both helps Somalia in terms of provisions and infrastructure. IHH built the biggest orphanage in Somalia, which was opened by Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud. This orphanage includes a school, and is

⁴⁰ %0.16 in 2008, %0.19 in 2009, %0.26 in 2010, %0.94 in 2011, %2.28 in 2012 and %9.57 in 2013. *TIKA 2013 Annual Report*, p. 163.

⁴¹ For detailed information on TIKA's aid to Somalia see; *TIKA 2012 Annual Report*, p. 57-58, TIKA, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/oldpublication/TurkishDevelopmentAssistance2012.pdf> and *TIKA 2013 Annual Report*, p. 163-165.

⁴² For further information on Kızılay's aid to Somalia see; "Mart 2015 Somali İnsani Yardım Operasyonu", Kızılay, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://www.kizilay.org.tr/upload/Dokuman/Dosya/62306176_somali-insani-yardim-operasyonu-mart-2015.pdf

planned to accommodate 400 children and the school will have capacity for 1500 students' education.⁴³ In Somalia, IHH looks after 600 orphans via its Sponsor Family System. As of 2011, 340 wells were opened and 46 more are still in progress and there are plans to open additional wells in suitable locations. IHH also with the aid of TIKA co-founded an Agriculture Faculty to train qualified people to make sure drought and food-shortages will not happen, or not affect as much as they do now, in the future.⁴⁴ IHH also provides provisions and medical supplies as emergency aid when needed.⁴⁵

KYM does not get involved in infrastructure projects like other organizations, but mainly serves via the refugee camps it opened. KYM opened 7 different refugee camps and sent tons of medical and other aid supplies. Alone their aid is worth 58.242.808 TRY of the total aid to Somalia,⁴⁶ which as of the date of the news was worth nearly 26.470.000 USD. For their services in Somalia, KYM received the outstanding service award from Somali President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed.

2.2.3. Contemporary Turkish Aid Activities: Gaza

While Turkish aid towards Bosnia is the most known example among the generation of which the members are around 40 years old, Gaza is the most known for the new generation. Gaza and the West Bank are the two regions that form Palestine. After HAMAS's political victory in the 2006 elections, Israel started an extensive economic blockade against the Gaza Strip, to pressure HAMAS to step down from the government and to prevent rocket attacks from Gaza to Israeli territory.⁴⁷ Although

⁴³"IHH opened largest orphanage in Somalia", IHH, 22 May2013, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://afrika.ihh.org.tr/en/main/news/2/ihh-opened-largest-orphanage-in-somalia/1723>

⁴⁴ "First Faculty of Agriculture in Somalia", IHH, 17 December 2014, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.ihh.org.tr/en/main/region/somali/16/ihhnin-destegiyle-somaliye-ilk-ziraat-fakulte/2656>

"Good news from Agricultural School in Somalia", IHH; 26 April 2014, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.ihh.org.tr/en/main/region/somali/16/somalideki-tarim-okulumuzdan-guzel-haberler-v/1685>

⁴⁵ "IHH Somalia Relief Activities", IHH, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.ihh.org.tr/en/main/pages/ihh-somalia-relief-activities/271>

For additional information regarding IHH's activities in Somalia can be found in; IHH's Somalia activities news page, IHH, accessed on 25.04.2015, accessed from <http://www.ihh.org.tr/en/main/region/somali/16> Accessed 25.04.2015

⁴⁶ "Kimse Yok Mu Somali'de Neler Yaptı?", *Zaman*, 14 September 2014, accessed on 07.04.2015 accessed from http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_kimse-yok-mu-somalide-neler-yapti_2244203.html

⁴⁷ HAMAS is a political organization in Palestine which has its own paramilitary group, Izz ad-Din Qassam Brigades. Because of the rocket attacks on the Israeli territory HAMAS is considered as a terrorist group in some countries. In Australia, New Zealand and the UK, military wing is listed as terrorist organization. But in Canada, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Egypt and the United States, Hamas as a

Israeli officials explained this blockade as a pre-emptive measure to cripple rocket attacks, most of the listed items had nothing to do with rockets, and were not even dual-use items, which could be used in the production of weapons or ammunitions in any way.⁴⁸ This blockade left the region dependent on aids from the UN and other countries' NGOs on healthcare and other fields. As a result of the economic sanctions and the Israeli military operations, the Gaza Strip is economically crippled and the infrastructure devastated by Israeli military operations cannot be repaired. When the population and density⁴⁹ of the place is added, Gaza is in a state of emergency that rivals some African countries.

Because of this, Turkey sends help to Palestine, especially to Gaza. TIKA and IHH are among the biggest contributors of Turkish aid to Palestine. Prior to 2010 Turkish aid towards Palestine could not reach Gaza because of the blockade and the ongoing Israeli military operations, and as a result, most of the Turkish aid could only reach the West Bank. However, after the end of the military operations and the lightening of the sanctions, Turkish aid started to reach Gaza. Palestine's share from TIKA's annual budget increased from 2.20% in 2008 to 18.02% in 2013.⁵⁰ The greatest obstacle for the aid was the military operations. Military operations ruined the already suffering region. During the military operations Turkey airlifted injured people to Turkey for advanced medical care that could not be provided in Gaza. The medical emergency the Strip is experiencing can be understood from TIKA's spending in the region, 89.64% of the budget went to health-care spending in 2013.⁵¹

IHH also sent aid to Gaza. Unlike some organizations IHH did not obey the blockade order by Israel and tried to break it, however this resulted in the Mavi

whole is listed as terrorist organization. The EU listed Hamas as a terrorist organization in the past, but renounced its status later.

⁴⁸“Partial List of Items Prohibited/Permitted into the Gaza Strip”, Gisha Legal Center for Freedom of Movement, May 2010, However it should be noted that this is the list after some of the sanctions were lightened, Accessed on 25.04.2015, Accessed from <http://gisha.org/UserFiles/File/HiddenMessages/ItemsGazaStrip060510.pdf>

⁴⁹ Gaza has a population of nearly 1.8 million people living in just 360 sq.km. Which means its population density is nearly 5,000 person per sq.km. “Gaza Strip”, Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gz.html>

⁵⁰ %2.20 in 2008, %2.31 in 2009, %3.31 in 2010, %9.00 in 2011, %15.59 in 2012, and %18.02 in 2013. *TIKA 2013 Annual Report*, p. 135. In page 20 the figure is %20.20 but I took the figures from the Palestine part of the report.

⁵¹ *TIKA 2013 Annual Report*, p. 135

Marmara incident.⁵² During the Mavi Marmara incident, where one IHH ship was a part of an international aid flotilla, but the IHH ship the Mavi Marmara was stormed by the Israeli commandos and this incident led to the death of 10 aid activists.⁵³ IHH did not stop sending aid to Gaza after the Mavi Marmara incident. IHH sends provisions to the families that are affected by the Israeli military strikes, who could not look after their families. During the winter of 2014, IHH delivered food and cash as aid to 3,500 people who lost their homes and jobs during the Israeli military operations during the summer.⁵⁴

Since 2008 Kızılay sent more than 2,285 tons of provisions to Gaza.⁵⁵ Kızılay also brought fabric worth \$762,000 to help stimulate production and trade in Gaza, which was donated by the Turkish Chamber of Commerce. The water treatment and pipeline system, which were partially damaged in the 2008 military operations, were also repaired by Kızılay. Since 2008 Kızılay provided aid, worth more than \$6.6 million, and the majority of the donations were medical aid. Ironically, after all arguments and accusations, most of the Turkish aid to Gaza is delivered via the gate on the Israel border, the Kerem Shalom gate, in coordination with the Israeli army, since the Rafah gate on the Egyptian border is closed to the passage of goods.⁵⁶

2.3. Japanese Aid History and Contemporary Japanese Aid

Japan has a different donorship history compared to Turkey. First of all, Japan's major donation activities are carried out by the state; therefore Japan has an official rhetoric and categorization regarding its aid programs. Second, Japan's aid history started very early compared to Turkey, while Turkey became a donor in the early

⁵² The IHH ship Mavi Marmara, which was the flagship of a larger flotilla of international aid to Gaza, did not obey the Israeli instructions to stop for inspection and direction to an Israeli port. Israeli boarding resulted with death of 10 activists and the detainment of the ship and the activists.

⁵³ Ian Black. "Israeli attack on Gaza flotilla sparks international outrage", *The Guardian*, 31 May 2010, accessed on 24.06.2016, accessed from

<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/31/israeli-attacks-gaza-flotilla-activists>

⁵⁴ "IHH's in-kind and financial aid to Gaza", IHH, 16 December 2014, Accessed from <http://filistin-gazze.ihh.org.tr/en/main/news/0/ihhs-in-kind-and-financial-aid-to-gaza/2653> accessed on 25.04.2015

⁵⁵ "Gazze İnsani Yardım Operasyonu Mart 2015", Kızılay, accessed from

https://www.kizilay.org.tr/Upload/Dokuman/Dosya/03975851_gazze-insani-yardim-operasyonu-mart-2015.pdf accessed on 05.05.2015

⁵⁶ Sevil Erkuş, "Turkey increases aid to Gaza through Israeli crossing", *Hurriyet Daily News*, 14 July 2014, access on 05.05.2015, accessed from <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-increases-aid-to-gaza-through-israeli-crossing.aspx?pageID=238&nID=69074&NewsCatID=510>

1990s, Japan became a donor as early as early the 1950s.⁵⁷ Japan's relationship with aids, like Turkey, started as an aid recipient during the Cold War. After the Second World War Japanese economy was in great disarray. The zaibatus⁵⁸ were targeted for dissolution under the US occupation to give way to more competitive free market economy and to prevent the big industrial groups to effect Japanese politics again. However, this created havoc in the highly organized Japanese economy. Also, the heavy bombardments during the Second World War left most of the industries in ruins, and Japan itself was in need of foreign aid. Ironically, this aid came from the US, who was responsible for the destruction, and the newly founded World Bank.⁵⁹ Japan used the grants and loans to invest in infrastructure and heavy industry such as highways, railroads, dams, and the coal, steel and shipbuilding industries, which would give immediate effect on the Japanese economic-recovery.

For Japanese foreign policy, ODA loans and grants are an important tool. Japan is far from strategic regions, like the Balkans or the Middle East, and is surrounded by powerful neighbors, like China and Russia. To pursue an active foreign policy Japan has to look in over-seas regions. When we consider Japan does not have an army, the most powerful tool in Japanese toolbox is economy. Therefore, the loans and grants constitute an important part of Japanese foreign policy, as it is stated on the website of Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

Indeed, official development assistance is the most important instrument of foreign policy of Japan that is determined to promote peace and its important vehicle for international contribution. Japan itself has had the experience of reconstructing its war-torn economy with the help of other countries before it become one of the leading donor countries of the world. Today, it has financial and technological resources to help other countries develop their economies. Economic aid to developing countries is the very area to which Japan can actively contribute by bringing its experience and resources. In step with the

⁵⁷ But this is debatable, in early 1950s the "aids" that were given by the Japan were mainly war reparations. If we don't count the war reparations as aid, the date will be 1960s. I took the 1990s as the start of Turkey's donorship date because prior to that Turkey's humanitarian aids were occasional rather than a systematic and continuous activity.

⁵⁸ Zaibatsu's were a type of business groups that were unique to Japan which resembled the post-Cold War oligarchs of the Eastern Bloc countries. They were very big business groups, who were usually ruled by one family and had their own parties and their affiliations with military. They were one of the main pursuers and supporters of the Japanese expansion.

⁵⁹ The aid that Japan received a total amount of roughly \$15.2 billion dollars, in 2005 values. %77 was grants and %23 was loans. Most of those grants were given through Government Aid and Relief in Occupied Areas grants. Nina Serfino, Curt Tarnoff, and Dick N. Kanto, *U.S. Occupation Assistance: Iraq, Germany and Japan Compared*, Congressional Research Service, 23 March 2006.

changes occurring in the environment surrounding official development assistance, needs for ODA have increased and diversified – so much so that the importance of ODA will grow, not decline, and the role Japan can play in this area will take on growing importance in coming years.⁶⁰

The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs categorizes Japanese aid history in five periods⁶¹:

Period I Japan as a foreign aid recipient.

Period II: Post-war war reparations.

Period III: Quantitative expansion of aid.

Period IV: Systematic donorship.

Period V: Japan as top donor.

But when it is read carefully, the official categorization is a bit problematic. Adding war reparations to Japan's aid history might be an error. War reparations were paid to compensate the damage caused by the Japanese armies in the Second World War, and are more of an obligation than voluntary acts. Thus it should be excluded from the aid history of Japan, even if it is not excluded it should not be noted as 'aid-giving'.

Compared to Turkey, an overwhelming portion of Japanese aid is done by the state, via grants and ODA loans. Such grants and loans are done via three state institutions, the Japanese Exim Bank, the Overseas Economic Corporation Fund (OECF) and the Japanese International Corporation Agency (JICA). Exim Bank started as Export Bank, later turned into Exim Bank with its changing role and after initial procedures it was permitted to give loans to foreign governments and corporations. The OECF is responsible for the ODA loans. The JICA is responsible for giving grants, loans and technical assistance, and is the Japanese equivalent of the Turkish TIKA.

Although it is a bit controversial to add the war reparations to the history of Japanese donorship, since it is a part of the official categorization it should be mentioned. Japan officially paid war reparations only to four countries for its actions

⁶⁰ "Japan's ODA Annual Report (Summary) 1994: The Significance of ODA to Japan", Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/summary/1994/2.html>

⁶¹ Furuoka, Fumitaka, *A History of Japan's Foreign Aid Policy: From Physical Capital to Human Capital*, MPRA Paper 5654, University Library of Munich, (2007). Accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/articles/2010/FuruokaOishiKato.html>

in the Second World War; Myanmar, Indonesia, South Vietnam and the Philippines.⁶² Major participants of the Second World War waived all reparations claims from the war. However, Japan later paid reparations, or quasi-reparations as they are generally called, to other countries in the region, and outside of the region, for the damage caused in the Second World War.⁶³ Such reparations and quasi-reparations were mostly done between the 1950s and 1960s, although some stretched to the 1980s. These early payments helped the countries in the region stabilize their newly founded countries after centuries of colonization. Thus, while creating a stable and secure environment for Japan and helping its security, the aids also helped create stable markets for Japanese products in this newly founded countries.

Starting from the 1950s Japan began limited scale donations to the UN and other international development programs. In 1952 Japan started contributing to the United Nations' Expanded Program for Technical Assistance, which was a predecessor of current the United Nations Development Program with an initial donation of \$80,000. In 1961 Japan joined the International Development Association, a World Bank affiliation. Japan contributed \$33.5 million to the total starting capital of \$1 billion.⁶⁴ Japan was among the founding members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and is still one of the biggest funders of the organization. Japan made an initial contribution of \$200 million to ASEAN's founding fund, which was equal to the US's contribution. Also, although Japan cannot send combatants due to its constitution, Japan also helps monetarily the UN on Peacekeeping Missions or sends technical assistance teams to such missions.

Tokyo's first official loan to a country on a government-to-government level was given to India to support India's Second Five-Year Plan in 1958. Later same year Japan also joined a World Bank consortium on India. In 1958 Japan joined another World

⁶² "History Issues Q&A, Q3", Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/q_a/faq16.html

⁶³ Those countries are; Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Micronesia and Mongolia. Burma also received money in both official reparations and quasi-reparations. Also there were some payments to Sweden, Switzerland, Netherlands and the United Kingdom for damages occurred during the Second World War. Shinji Takagi, "From Recipient to Donor: Japan's Official Aid Flows 1945 to 1990 and Beyond", *Essays in International Finance* No: 196 (March 1995), p.10-11, accessed on 10.01.2016 accessed from http://www.princeton.edu/~ies/IES_Essays/E196.pdf

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 15.

Bank consortium on Pakistan. Between 1958 and 1965 Japan gave ten countries loans that were worth over \$900 million.⁶⁵

One of the most interesting cases of Japanese ODA loans was China. China after a long civil war formed a socialist state and joined the Eastern Block. However, after the death of its founding leader, Mao Zedong, China started a very ambitious modernization plan and requested aid from Japan, which up to that date Beijing had refused despite Tokyo's offer. Japan agreed to lend to China in 1980, which made Japan the first non-socialist country in the world to help China. After that, Japan continued to be one of the major investors in China. Japanese total ODA loans surpassed Germany in 1983, France in 1986 and the USA in 1989 and thus Japan became the world's biggest donor, with an amount that nearly reached \$9 billion.⁶⁶ In 2013, Japan contributed more than \$8.81 billion in form of grants and loans, and contributed another \$2.97 billion to international organizations. 2013 Japanese ODA contributions were increased nearly 11% from the previous year on a dollar basis.⁶⁷ Since Tokyo started giving ODA loans, they were received by at least 185 countries⁶⁸, and in 2013 it was received by 169 countries.⁶⁹

The Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was founded in 1974, although its predecessors were established in the 1950s and 1960s. Since its foundation the JICA participated in many projects, eventually starting with the South and South East Asia but later covering many parts of the world. Since founding, the JICA sent more than 136,500 experts and 46,000 volunteers throughout the world. Unlike the TICA, the JICA directly aims to create a market for Japanese companies in the countries it invests. In the goals section of JICA's 2014 Annual Report, among its aims are stated, "assistance for emerging and developing countries to grow together with Japan, promotion of Human Security and Peacebuilding, and promotion of private

⁶⁵ Ibid., 14.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 18.

⁶⁷ Japanese ODA's year-on-year increase was 35.9 percent on Yen basis. But due to the Yen's loss of value against USD, increase was lower in dollar basis. *JICA 2014 Annual Report* p. 14, JICA, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from

http://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/reports/annual/2014/c8h0vm000090s8nn-att/2014_all.pdf

⁶⁸ "Japan's Official Development Assistance White Paper 2004, Part 1", Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on 25.04.2016, accessed from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2004/part1-1.pdf>

⁶⁹ "Japan's Official Development Assistance White Paper 2013", Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on 25.04.2016, accessed from http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/page_000043.html

sector collaborations and domestic collaboration.”⁷⁰ As can be seen, while the TIKA is mainly focusing on providing infrastructure and provisions that are needed in emergency situations and does not actively pursue a policy of Turkish companies’ involvement; the JICA tries to encourage economic partnership between the donees and Japanese firms, thus while investing in those countries also creates contracts for Japanese firms.

Japan’s extensive use of finance in its foreign policy was quite successful for maintaining the access to resources. However, in some cases it backfired. One of the cases was the Gulf War. Because of the constitutional restrictions Japan could not dispatch troops to the Gulf War, but made extensive financial contribution to the campaign and nearly paid \$13 billion with today’s value, which was more than any of the contributors including the USA. Although Japan funded nearly half of the operations, its checkbook diplomacy went unnoticed. When the government of Kuwait thanked the UN coalition, Japan was not among the dozens of countries which was listed there. This failure strengthened the desire for the constitutional change that tied Japan militarily.⁷¹ This shame, of being unable to do anything, was the tipping point against the pacifism and gave way to increased desire to change the constitutional burden on the armed forces.

2.3.1. Contemporary Japanese Aid Activities: Myanmar

Japanese ODA plans are usually based on regions, rather than countries. For example, when Japan started its “New Silk Road” policy it focused on all countries in the region rather than skipping some of them. But there are a few exceptions for that, and the latest exception is Myanmar.⁷² The importance of the Myanmar for Japanese foreign policy is that, Myanmar constitutes the link between Indochina and India, thus it is an important part of the Japanese containment policy towards China. To this end

⁷⁰ *JICA 2014 Annual Report*, p. 18.

⁷¹ Yamaguchi Jiro, “The Gulf War and the Transformation of Japanese Constitutional Politics”, *The Journal of Japanese Studies* Vol. 18:1 (Winter 1992), p. 155-172.

Courtney Purrington, “Tokyo’s Policy Responses During the Gulf War and the Impact of the ‘Iraqi Shock’ on Japan”, *Pacific Affairs* Vol. 65:2 (Summer 1992), p. 161-181.

⁷² Historically the country was known by other names including Burma. However, its official name is Myanmar therefore I will refer it as Myanmar.

Japan has been on competition with China to establish good relations with Myanmar since the Myanmar junta's democratization, or opening process.⁷³

Myanmar has a special place in the Japanese aid history, because it was the first country Japan started to pay war reparations, after former's independence from the British colonial rule. Myanmar is a country with divided social structure. It is home to several ethnic and religious groups, which causes strife in the society. In 1962 this instability brought a coup, and Myanmar was turned into a socialist republic. During the military junta's regime Myanmar turned into one of the poorest countries in the world. Since 2011, Myanmar is on its way to democratization, although there are critiques to the credibility of this democratization process.

With this new era in the country's history, Japan restarted its investments in Myanmar. Starting with an initial \$60 million grant in 2011, the amount quickly increased to \$2.3 billion loans and \$322 million grant in 2012, and \$485 million loan and \$186 million grant in 2013 and as a further aid Tokyo cleared nearly \$2.8 billion loan debt.⁷⁴ Japan also helped Myanmar to re-enter to ASEAN, which Myanmar itself quit during military regime. By adding Myanmar back to ASEAN and to its aid plans, Japan is investing and aiding all countries in South and South East Asia.

Japanese aid in Myanmar focuses on psychical investments rather than bringing provisions to the country. The JICA does the investments with the cooperation of Japanese private firms. The JICA focuses on funding infrastructure throughout Myanmar to open way for further Japanese investments from private sector, transportation network, dams, government buildings, banks and stock market. This way the JICA is creating a functioning economy, which will be ready for further investment from private sector in the upcoming years, thus ending the need for official aid.⁷⁵

⁷³ Zhao Hong, "Japan and China: Competing for Good Relations with Myanmar", *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* Vol. 28:2 (Fall/Winter 2014), p. 1-23.

⁷⁴ All numbers are calculated according to USD to YEN exchange rates of the end of the respective years. For further information; "Japan's Assistance to Myanmar", Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000077442.pdf>

⁷⁵ "Myanmar: Has the 'Frontier' Economy's Time Finally Arrived?", Wharton University, 22 July 2014, accessed on 25.04.2016, accessed from <http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/rushing-myanmar-will-foreign-investments-pay/>

Alexander Martin and Shibani Mahtani, "Japan Companies to Help Set Up Myanmar's First Stock Exchange", *The Wall Street Journal*, 23 December 2014, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from

2.4. Evaluation

As in the case of most of the aid campaigns in the world, Turkish or Japanese aid campaigns are not solely humanitarian. It can be said that both countries are using aids to create 'benign power' image as well as supplementing other policies, like their security policy.

For Turkey's bid to become a regional power, the countries in the region are more important than countries that are distant from Turkey. This is primarily because of economic and diplomatic reasons, if not military. Turkey has historical, religious and cultural ties with the countries in its region, which make it easier for Turkey to interact with the region. But the extent of Turkey's *region* is not very clear. Balkans, Middle East and Central Asia can all be named as Turkey's region, as well as North Africa and East Europe. This ambiguity overstretches Turkey, and Turkey's own ambition to help worldwide overstretches already stretched organizations. Since the end of the Cold War, eventually starting with countries in its region and ex-Soviet Turkic republics, Turkey became the fourth- largest donor in 2012 in the world.⁷⁶ For Turkey donations have two main aims; first diplomatic and second economic.

Turkey is a latecomer rising economy; therefore Turkey needs both markets to sell its products and the resources for those products. As a rising economy it is easier for Turkey to establish its presence on newly created markets than already established ones. Because of such reasons, Turkey considers Asia and Africa as markets where it can compete. And this is actively supported by business groups in Turkey, which can be seen from activities of Turkish businessman organizations, such as TUSKON.⁷⁷ TUSKON organized 5 international summits regarding economic relations with different regions, three summits on Africa, one summit on Eurasia, and one summit on Asia-Pacific region.⁷⁸

Regarding Turkey's relations with Africa the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' website page focuses on two aspects of the continent; historical and cultural

<http://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-companies-agree-to-help-establish-myanmars-first-stock-exchange-1419331355>

⁷⁶ "Turkey-Africa Relations", Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>

⁷⁷ TUSKON is an organization mainly formed by late-comer Anatolian bourgeoisie who did not have extensive business connections with the European market.

⁷⁸ Mehmet Özkan and Birol Akgün, "Turkey's opening to Africa", *Journal of Modern African Studies* Volume 48:4 (2010), p. 525-546.

ties and Africa's economic potential via its resources and population.⁷⁹ This shows the state is looking at the region as an economic zone that can be coordinated for the Turkish economic aims, and if Turkey is to raise its power it needs to improve its economic power.⁸⁰ Cooperation between state and non-state actors in Turkey for a stronger economy is one of the pillars for the bid to become a regional power. As Ahmet Davutoğlu states in *Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy* the coherence between states macro-level strategies and business sectors micro-level strategies is a key, which will make Turkey successful at a global scale.⁸¹

During the Cold War, Turkey showed very little interest in Africa. Due to Turkey's limited economic capacity, internal problems, and Turkey's passive foreign policy Turkey's initiative towards the continent was very limited. It was solely based on diplomatic level and there were limited relations in terms of economic activities or military cooperation. Turkey recognized most of the African countries after their independence in the de-colonization period. It was not until two decades after the end of the Cold War, Turkey started forming its own African policy. In 1998 Turkey announced its African Action Plan, its first initiative towards the continent. However, due to the economic and political instability there was no big change. After 2002, Turkish focus on Africa increased as a part of the JDP's foreign policy. The new Turkish Foreign Policy towards Africa can be understood from the words of former Minister of Foreign Affairs and current Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu who in his book stated that to make Turkey a global power it is not enough to only engage with the European Union and the Organization of Islamic Conference but also with Africa and Central Asia.⁸² In 2009 there were only 12 Turkish Embassies in the African countries, by the end of 2014 there were Turkish Embassies in 39 countries.⁸³ 2005 was announced as "the year of Africa" in Turkey. In 2008 Turkey held the First

⁷⁹ "Turkey-Africa Relations", Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁸⁰ Umut Korkut and Ilke Civelekoğlu, "Becoming a regional power while pursuing material gains: The case of Turkish interest in Africa", *International Journal* Volume 68:1, (Winter 2012-2013), p. 187-203.

⁸¹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy* (Washington DC: SETA Foundation, 2009), p. 83.

⁸² Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy* (Washington DC: SETA Foundation, 2009), 77.

⁸³ "Turkey-Africa Relations", Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit with participation of 49 countries⁸⁴ and 11 regional and international organizations, and Ankara was announced as strategic partner by the African Union. In 2014 the Second Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit was held in Equatorial Guinea under the theme of “A New Model of Partnership for the Strengthening of Sustainable Development and Integration” where Turkey was represented by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.⁸⁵ A third summit is planned to be held in 2019. As a result of these summits there is also an increase on African countries’ attraction to Turkey. The number of African countries that have embassies in Ankara increased from 10 to 31 over the last 5 years.⁸⁶

While Ankara’s aid towards Africa helps to increase its hard power capacity by yielding benefits in the economic field, its involvement in Palestine increases its soft power. Turkey has little to gain from Palestine in economic terms; in the current situation it is unlikely that Palestine will ever have a functioning economy. However, Turkey’s support to Palestine helps its soft power building via supporting its reputation in the Arab and Muslim world. Erdoğan’s criticism of Israeli attritions towards Palestine⁸⁷, Turkey’s insistence on the lifting of Israeli embargo towards Gaza and the Mavi Marmara incident made Turkey the vanguard against Israeli atrocities in Palestine. During his visits to Tunisia and Egypt large crowds cheered for him as if he was doing a local meeting in Turkey.⁸⁸ Even though Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu apologized for the Mavi Marmara incident 3 years later in 2013, the Turkish-Israeli relations are still strained and the previous military cooperation did not restart. Turkey is one of the few countries in the world to strongly and openly condemn Israel⁸⁹, even at the cost of diplomatic and military loss. While Turkey increases its

⁸⁴ 49 countries out of 54 Countries in the continent, 55 if Sahrawi Republic in the Western Sahara is accepted as a sovereign state. This is a sign how important that summit was for the regional cooperation.

⁸⁵ Erdoğan’s speech in Turkish: “Zirve Deklarasyonu”, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 November 2014, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://afrika.mfa.gov.tr/21-kasim-2014-zirve-deklarasyonu.tr.mfa>

⁸⁶ “Turkey-Africa Relations”, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁸⁷ Emre Peker, “Turkey Labels Israel a ‘Terrorist State’”, *The Wall Street Journal*, 19 November 2012, accessed on 12.05.2015, accessed from <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323353204578128880612421650>

⁸⁸ Atul Aneja, “From Arab Spring to post-Islamist summer”, *The Hindu*, 12 October 2011, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article2529040.ece>

⁸⁹ “Turkish PM: Netanyahu Massacred Gaza Like the Terrorists Massacred Paris”, *Haaretz*, 15 January 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.Haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.637216>

outlook in the Muslim world by supporting Palestine, it also faces to lose ground in the West. As Turkey is criticizing Israel for its “genocidal actions” towards Palestinians in Israel, Israeli officials also criticize Turkey for being anti-Semitic and a bully. Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman commented on 14 January 2015, “Civilized, politically correct Europe’s silence over an anti-Semitic neighborhood bully like Erdoğan and his gang takes us back to the 1930s.”⁹⁰ As can be seen, Liberman is using the soft spot of Europe, the guilt for pre-Second World War silence over the Nazi atrocities towards the Jews. While Ankara is gaining support in one part of the world, it is losing on the other part. Also, Turkey stopped its military partnership with Israel, both purchases and cooperation.⁹¹ This move severely hampered Turkey’s military purchases and upgrade plans, yet also proved to be a catalyzer for the domestic production, which will further help Turkey’s regional power bid. However how much of this strain will affect Turkey is still not visible. For Turkey’s regional power policy it is more important to improve relations with its Arab neighbors and to achieve this a little deterioration of relations with the West can be regarded as an acceptable loss.

While Ankara explains its interest in the aid operations as humanitarian interest, Tokyo gives an honest and straight explanation to its aid operations. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs states two main reasons for Japanese ODA; first, “Japan can only ensure its security and prosperity only in a peaceful and stable world. One of the most appropriate means for Japan to contribute to peace and stability of the world is assistance to developing countries.” And second, “Japan is closely interdependent with developing countries since it is able to secure natural resources only through trade with those countries. Therefore, it is essential to maintain friendly relations with developing countries for Japan’s economic growth.”⁹² As can be seen, for Tokyo the aid is a tool for both maintaining friendly relations to have access to resources and markets and to some extent create a stable political sphere, which will benefit the security of Japan.

⁹⁰ Semih Idiz, “Turkish-Israeli ties worse than ever”, *Al Monitor*, 16 January 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/01/turkey-israel-worse.html>

⁹¹ Özlem Tür, “Turkey and Israel in the 2000s-From Cooperation to Conflict”, *Israel Studies* Volume 17:3 (Fall 2012), p. 45-66.

⁹² *Japan’s ODA Annual Report Summary 1994*

While Turkey mainly gives aids in forms of grants and technical assistance, Japan gives both loans and grants. Loans can be considered as both aid and not. However, what makes it possible to count Japanese loans as aid is Japan's ability to differentiate between its donees. The distribution of the Japanese grants and loans shows the mentality and ability to differentiate; while more than 90% of the ODA that is given to economically develop Asian and European countries are loans, half of the ODA that was given to Africa is made up by grants.⁹³ Tokyo is not using the aid process to take advantage of the donees, but since Tokyo also invests in developed countries it needs to differentiate between countries. The categorization of which country will receive aids in terms of grants or loans is done according to their GNP.⁹⁴

Similar to Turkey's aid policy which helps Turkey's hard power via economic gains, Japan's aid policy helps Japan's hard power via helping its security issues. Apart from economic reasons that are stated officially, Japan's aid policy helps its security via establishing a stable environment for Japan and supplementing its security policy against Chinese encroachment. Japan's foreign aid is a tool to contain and retain China in its near vicinity. Even though Japan does not have hostile relations with China, the Japanese bid to become a regional power again is a question of competition against China. Every move China makes in the South and South East Asia is against the interests of Japan. For this containment policy Japan has to out-move China in the region. Weak countries in the region are prone to Chinese capital and investment, which would result in closer ties with China and ultimately hurt Japanese interest, like Chinese-Burmese relations during the military rule in Myanmar when Japan did not have any foothold in Myanmar. When we look at the JICA grants and loans we will see that the two regions have the highest priority; South and South East Asia, and after them two regions have medium importance; Africa and Middle East. When we look to the importance of those regions we will see that South and South East Asia contain possible future allies against China, if Japan plays its card carefully. Africa and Middle East contain the necessary resources that are needed for the Japanese economy.

Countries in the South East Asia have material and human resources but need capital investment for their development. If Japan does not offer this investment,

⁹³ *The JICA 2014 Annual Report*, p. 16.

⁹⁴ Takagi, p. 25.

countries may turn for Chinese assistance, which will in turn increase the Chinese influence in the region. Chinese interest in the region can be seen from recently founded Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which was founded as a rival for Japanese dominated Asian Development Bank. So therefore Japan needs to offer necessary loans and grants to stop China gaining power in the region. To this end Japan invested nearly \$3.6 billion in South East Asia in 2014, most of which went to Vietnam and Indonesia. Vietnam received \$1.6 billion and Indonesia \$721 million from Japanese ODA in 2014.⁹⁵

Vietnam and Indonesia are important for the Japanese foreign policy towards the region because of several reasons. Vietnam is the second biggest economy after Thailand in Indochina and has a big population, which can be a production base for Japanese firms. More importantly, Vietnam used to be a Chinese ally during the Vietnam War and after its initial independence, but since then their relations deteriorated. Especially after the Chinese claims on Spratly Islands in South China Sea which are also claimed by Vietnam, Vietnam can prove to be an ally to Japan against China. So if Japan can fill the gap opened by Chinese departure, it can gain a valuable partner, which can transform into a future ally with a stable market and industrial base for Japan with its 90 million population.⁹⁶ Indonesia, has great capacity for exporting the natural resources that Japan industry badly needs and has a very big population, over 250 million. Also both Indonesia and Vietnam showed high GDP growth rates in recent years. Since 2000, Vietnam increased its GDP from \$33.6 billion to \$186.2 billion in 2014, and Indonesia increased its GDP from \$165 billion in 2000 to \$888.5 billion in 2014.⁹⁷

India with its large population, natural resources, stable market economy, strategic location and democratic structure is a valuable ally for Japan.⁹⁸ Japan invested \$2.5 billion in South Asia in 2014, which nearly \$1.4 billion of it went to India.⁹⁹ India is one of the few countries, which can compete with Chinese industry and military

⁹⁵ *JICA Annual 2014 Report*, p. 21.

⁹⁶ CAROLYN L. GATES, "Vietnam and Japan: Japan Investment and Aid Strategies in Vietnam: Implications for Development Directions", *ASEAN Economic Bulletin* 12.3 (March: 1996), p. 427-30.

⁹⁷ World Bank data on GDP's of world countries in 2014, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf>

⁹⁸ India's importance for the Japanese foreign policy will be examined deeply in the next chapters.

⁹⁹ *JICA 2014 Annual Report*, p. 37

buildup in the region, and previously had two huge border clashes with China in the post-war period, which may have been counted as wars.

After South and South East Asia, Middle East and Africa gets the medium interest in the Japanese investments. Africa received \$1.1 billion from the JICA in 2014, most of which went to East Africa and Horn of Africa regions.¹⁰⁰ Africa has been lately targeted by Chinese investments and to counter this Japan intensified its investments in the region. The priority of East Africa comes from the stability and the strategic importance of the east coast. During the same period countries in the Middle East and North Africa received \$1 billion investment, and nearly 55% of that went to Iraq for the reconstruction of infrastructure. Middle East and North Africa are very important and vital for both China and Japan for their oil and natural gas purchases. Therefore, it is very important for Japan to have friendly relations with the region for the continuation of resource access.

For both Turkey and Japan, aid is an important tool. To both countries aid is crucial to supplement their non-aggressive image. While for Ankara aid is a tool to both improve its economy and further enhance its soft power, for Tokyo it helps solve its security problems without military means. In the current political atmosphere economy and diplomacy are among the key elements in the process of becoming a regional power. Both Japan and Turkey need economic and diplomatic power. Japan may be among the world's biggest and most advanced economies, yet it is stagnated at the best and declining in the worst view. So new markets are important for Japan for two reasons; first, to improve its stagnated economy, and second, to close those markets to possible rivals. Also, Japan needs countries with strong developed economies as possible future allies. Turkey's situation is very much same yet very different at the same time. Turkey does not have the necessary capital investment capacity to use its benign image as of today. Yet it is an investment for the future of Turkish economy, which needs markets to expand. It is possible, and highly likely, for Turkish capital to be invested in other countries in a greater amount in near future.

¹⁰⁰ *JICA 2014 Annual Report*, p. 51

CHAPTER III

FREEDOM AND PROGRES: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AS FOREING POLICY TOOL

3.1. Democracy Promotion as a Foreign Policy Tool

As stated in the introduction, in the bid for becoming a regional power the claimant country's resources are important. However, how it is perceived by others is as much important as its economic and military capacity. If the claimant cannot produce a preferable alternative to the current regional power or its rivals, its influence in the region will be limited. Because of this, both Turkey and Japan are trying to present themselves as preferable alternatives to the countries in their region than their rival claimants and the current regional power. While doing this they need to take several things into consideration; their current structure, regional countries' needs, historical elements and etc. To this end, both Turkey and Japan are focusing on two things in this policy; freedom and prosperity.

In a region surrounded by authoritarian regimes, countries may struggle to continue their democratic structure. In the past, several countries were swayed to more authoritative policies by external and internal problems, and some others needed external help to protect their democratic structure. In the inter-bellum period Spain suffered a civil war that started in 1936, as an internal conflict, but soon external powers such as Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union were actively involved to export their ideologies, supporting opposing sides of the conflict. During the Cold War in Czechoslovakia and Hungary authoritarian regimes were put in power under heavy pressure, and direct military involvement of the Soviet Union. Also, in the same period, Turkey and Greece were under internal and external pressure in which Greece experienced a bloody civil war. Both countries resisted pressure with the aid they got from the USA under the Truman Doctrine.

In such contested environments, countries that are trying to become a regional power need to promote themselves as preferable choices to more authoritative alternatives. Turkey is promoting itself as a successful democratic country in the Muslim world, which also has a developing economy. In the politically authoritative and economically backward environment of the Middle East, Turkey is an alternative

to Europe for the disillusioned young people, and is easier to reach. Japan likewise is surrounded by authoritative regimes like China and Russia. Promoting itself as a politically democratic and economically developed country is an instrumental part of Japanese foreign policy. Japan has to promote a preferable alternative to China's economic might. It can be claimed that Chinese economic and political model can be tempting for the regional countries that are suffering both from social and economic problems, therefore Japan needs to show it has an alternative model to Chinese one, which manifested itself in Japanese 'Arc of Freedom and Prosperity' policy.

Another reason for Turkey and Japan's democratic and economic role modelling is their historical heritage. Both countries have "imperial heritage". Having histories as empires is both a blessing and a curse. Countries that have "imperial legacy" may benefit from historical power-base in their ex-subjects and enjoy "privileged role" in those areas or they may have strained relations with their ex-subjects due to past actions. For example, Russia enjoys a "privileged role" in Central Asia and the Caucasus¹⁰¹ due to its cultural and economic power, yet it has strained relations with the Baltic States¹⁰², Hungary¹⁰³ and Czech Republic¹⁰⁴ due to its actions during the Tsarist and Soviet regimes. The United Kingdom on the other hand, kept its influence in most of its ex-subjects via its Commonwealth of Nations.¹⁰⁵

Like most of the Asian countries both Turkey and Japan have imperial history, yet unlike most of the other Asian countries, both countries' imperial history continued

¹⁰¹Alexander Cooley, *Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

¹⁰² In January 1991 Soviet government had a crackdown on the organizations which wanted total independence for the Baltic States. This issue still creates tension between the Baltic States and Russia. "Estonia Blasts Moscow For Not Accepting Soviet Responsibility", *The Moscow Times*, 16 January 2001, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/free/2001/1/article/estonia-blasts-moscow-for-not-accepting-soviet-responsibility/256098.html> "Lithuania presses charges over deaths in 1991 Soviet crackdown", *Reuters*, 31 August 2015, accessed on 14.03.2016, accessed from <http://www.Reuters.com/article/us-lithuania-soviet-crimes-idUSKCN0R01RP20150831>

¹⁰³ In 1958 Soviet troops entered Hungary to crackdown on Hungarian nationalist government which wanted to cut relations with the Eastern Block and quit Warsaw Pact. Soviet responded by a military intervention where thousands were killed or deported. This was the second time when Hungarian nationalist movement was crushed by Russians, the first being the 1848 Hungarian Revolution, which left a permanent effect on Hungarian nationalist discourse.

¹⁰⁴ In 1968 Soviet troops entered Prague to crackdown on reformist Czech government. Later the events were named as Prague Spring.

¹⁰⁵ The UK maintains close relations with most of its old colonial subjects, including sports, education, and economy.

until the 20th century. Turkey was founded on the last remnants of the Ottoman Empire after the catastrophic First World War. The last years of the Ottoman Empire were marked with internal turmoil, constant wars and land loses which resulted in migrations and massacres. In the Balkans under nationalist history building, the Ottoman Empire is portrayed as an oppressive regime that suppressed the national identities of the region. In its Arab ex-subjects, it is blamed for the regions backwardness. For this reasons, Turkey's imperial history can create prejudices against Turkey's policies in the region. However, this is not the whole picture. In some parts of the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire has a positive image, like in Kosovo, Bosnia and to some extent in Macedonia. Therefore, Turkey may benefit from the Ottoman Empire's positive image as much as it suffers from its negative image.

Japan on the other hand, has a different imperial history. For much of its history Japan was a feudal agricultural country, which changed in a short time in the late 19th century. Over a few decades Japan turned into a Westernized country with a highly centralized government and strong industry that badly needed natural resources. To obtain these resources Japan had several wars with China and Russia, and then joined the Second World War with a surprise attack on the Allies in December 1941. The Japanese quickly seized modern day Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Indochina and Myanmar. However, Japanese rule was too harsh, in some cases harsher than the European colonial rule and was followed by executions, rape and extortions of local people. These policies created a horrific image of Japan, which until this day continues via issues like "comfort women", and creates an obstacle in front of Japanese openings in the region.

To counter the negative effects of their imperial legacy and to promote a good alternative to the authoritarian regimes, both Turkey and Japan are following a more democracy promoting and economic progress oriented promotion campaign. Both Ankara and Tokyo are situated in regions where countries may look over the human rights issues in order to achieve economic growth. Vietnam, one of the biggest growing economies in South East Asia is a one-party regime, Thailand is riddled with corruption and coups, all of the Gulf countries are monarchies etc. Japan may promote itself as an example for the blending of freedom and progress, where the state does not get a draconian stance against its own people to obtain that progress. Japan is a good example of personal and political liberties going together with a developed free market

economy. In an environment like East and South East Asia, Japan can promote a highly appealing alternative to more authoritarian systems.

Turkey is one of the few countries in the Islamic world that has a continuing democratic history, albeit it was interrupted by some coups for short times but nevertheless continued. In the Middle East, Turkey is one of the few countries that have a working democracy. Most of the Arab states directly started with monarchies after their independence, which were gradually replaced with authoritarian monarch-like dictators who came to power via coups. An article by *the Economist* on 5 July 2014 only counts Tunisia as a democracy, Lebanon as semi-democracy and the rest of the Arab states in the Middle East ranges between “democratic-facade” and “absolute monarchy”.¹⁰⁶ In economic terms, Turkey successfully adopted the free market economy and improved economic relations worldwide. Especially, Turkey’s rising economic profile, since 2002, helped Turkey promote an alternative to the west, for the Muslim world. In an environment where most of the nearby nations suffer from undemocratic and economically incapable countries, Turkey can try to become a role model for Arab states with its working democracy, Euro-Atlantic organizations based stance and developing economy it has the potential to become a new “American Dream” for the disillusioned Arab people which is easier to reach than Europe or the US.

3.2. Turkey: Democracy in Middle East

Since the establishment of the republic, Turkish foreign policy has been based on two things, status quo and security. This resulted with Turkish foreign policy being based on realism rather than idealism. Until the end of the Cold War, Turkey was reluctant to condemn human rights issues and stayed out of other countries problems, as Ankara perceived them as internal issues. However, in the last two decades Turkish foreign policy turned in to a value-oriented diplomacy, at least regarding some countries, as was seen in the cases of Syria, Egypt and Libya.

Turkish foreign policy was significantly changed since the JDP came to power in 2002. Unlike its predecessors, weak coalitional governments of the 1990s, the JDP

¹⁰⁶ “Tethered by History: The failures of the Arab spring were a long time in the making”, *The Economist*, 5 July 2014, accessed on 10.01.2015, accessed from <http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21606286-failures-arab-spring-were-long-time-making-tethered-history>

government tried to be active in Turkey's vicinity and beyond. Since 2002, Ankara showed significant importance to its region, which can be seen from the rapprochement with the neighbors under the "zero-problem policy". Turkey's focus on the region can be read as a desire to solve the problems closer to home so that Turkey could focus beyond. For a country with a bid to become a regional power, having hostile relations with half of its neighbors was not a good starting position as the region, which it tries to be active starts from its neighbors. The best example for this zero problem policy was the rapprochement between Turkey and Syria. Turkey achieved considerable progress during 2006-2010, but the Arab Spring foiled this progress. The Arab Spring and the subsequent disturbances in Libya and Syria changed the hopes for a smooth transition and reformation in the region. In 2010 Turkey was in a Free Trade Agreement with Syria with a high level of cooperation between states and was close to enlarge it to Lebanon and Jordan.¹⁰⁷ Yet, with the start of Syrian Civil War, all that progress was reversed and in 2011 the relations with the Syrian government became non-existent, and Turkey is one of the main supporters of the Syrian opposition.¹⁰⁸

Turkey has been one of the main supporters of the post-Arab Spring governments in the Middle East.¹⁰⁹ Ankara supports Tunisia¹¹⁰ and Morocco¹¹¹ with their reformation process, supported Morsi government in Egypt, and in general increased its help towards post-Arab Spring governments for economic restructuring. Turkey continued its support to Morsi even after he was ousted by coup, and all the

¹⁰⁷ "Joint Political Declaration on the Establishment of the High Level Cooperation Council among Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon", Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-political-declaration-on-the-establishment-of-the-high-level-cooperation-council-among-turkey-syria-jordan-and-lebanon.en.mfa>

¹⁰⁸ "Relations between Turkey-Syria", Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey%E2%80%93syria.en.mfa>

¹⁰⁹ "Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika Ülkeleri ile ilişkiler", Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_nin-ortadogu-ile-iliskileri.tr.mfa

¹¹⁰ Ariel Ben Solomon, "Turkey establishes cooperation council with Tunisia", *The Jerusalem Post*, 26 December 2012, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Turkey-establishes-cooperation-council-with-Tunisia>

¹¹¹ "Turkey hails Morocco's peaceful transition, eyes improved ties", *Today's Zaman*, 19 March 2012, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_turkey-hails-moroccos-peaceful-transition-eyes-improved-ties_274801.html

other countries recognized Sisi government that came with the coup.¹¹² Ankara sees the protests and post-Arab Spring governments as “the legitimate response of the people” and supports the people’s demand.¹¹³ Nonetheless, it should be noted that claiming Turkey’s foreign policy is totally value-oriented would be a bit exaggeration. Turkey may speak against Israel on behalf of Palestine or to Sisi government on the behalf of Morsi, but Turkey herself keeps dealing with regimes that are not totally democratic. Turkey did not make any objections against suppression of the Shia majority in Bahrain¹¹⁴, or the opposition against the Saudi regime¹¹⁵, and both countries show no desire to reform. Also, Turkey’s increasing relations with Iran¹¹⁶, which is accused for oppressing its opposition, or Turkey’s amicable relations with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir¹¹⁷, who is accused with war crimes, can be seen contradictory to value-oriented diplomacy. Furthermore Turkey has never made any objections towards some of the Central Asian countries, despite their lack of democracy.

Turkey has a fairly democratic structure, which is run by electorally chosen civilian politicians, a developing economy, respects personal freedoms, and has not suffered any foreign intervention or war since its independence. Turkey is among a few countries in the Middle East, which has democratic regime, where governments *come* and *go* with elections, with the latter being a stronger sign of democracy than the first. In some of the Middle East countries, which are rich on natural resources,

¹¹² “Morsi Death Sentence draws reaction from Turkey and world”, *Today’s Zaman*, 17 May 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_morsi-death-sentence-draws-reactions-from-turkey-and-world_380962.html

¹¹³ “Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika Ülkeleri ile ilişkiler”, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

¹¹⁴ “Bahrain: Opposition Leader’s Trial Grossly Unfair”, Human Rights Watch, 25 August, 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/25/bahrain-opposition-leaders-trial-grossly-unfair>

¹¹⁵ Asma Alsharif, “Saudi authorities crack down on rights campaigners activists”, *Reuters*, 8 August 2012, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.Reuters.com/article/us-saudi-activists-idUSBRE8770TN20120808>

¹¹⁶ Saban Kardas, “‘Revolutions’ in Egypt and Tunisia Highlight Dilemmas of Turkey’s Democracy Promotion Agenda”, *European Dialogue*, 09 February 2011, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://eurodialogue.eu/Revolutions-in-Egypt-and-Tunisia-Highlight-Dilemmas-of-Turkey-Democracy-Promotion-Agenda>

Robert Tait, “‘Iran is our friend’, says Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan”, *The Guardian*, 26 October 2009, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/26/turkey-iran1>

¹¹⁷ “Sudan’s Bashir in visit to Turkey”, *BBC*, 19 August 2008, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://news.BBC.co.uk/2/hi/7569901.stm>

governments or monarchies subsidize people's political reformation desire with economic gains, however in other countries people who are crushed under economic problems are often looking for economic and political reformation. If Turkey can promote itself as a model, both to states and people, it can increase its popularity and power in the region. To promote itself as a preferable model Turkey has to put emphasis to its stronger points, democracy and economy, which are badly needed by governments that wants to reform and sooth any possible uprisings, or post-Arab Spring governments that needs to find a way to solve the problems that they rose against in the first place.

Previously, Turkey as a model, was discussed openly in Tunisia by Mohammad Ghannouchi and his Ennahda Party¹¹⁸ and to some extent in Egypt by Mohammad Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood.¹¹⁹ When Erdoğan visited Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia thousands had gathered to cheer for him, as if he were a politician from their own country.¹²⁰ However, the ongoing civil war in Syria where Ankara openly sides with the opposition, and again Ankara's open criticism towards the coup against Morsi and interference to Egyptian internal affairs raises questions among regional countries on whether Turkey will become a role model and ally, or just another power interfering with local politics.

3.2.1. Syria and Egypt: Collapse of reformation

Turkey's first achievement in its "zero problem" policy was with Syria.¹²¹ Syria has been a long-term regional enemy of Turkey, with two countries hostile relations often going close to declaration of war. Since the Ba'athist coup of 1963, Syria has been close to the Eastern Bloc in the Cold War. This brought the country at odds with Turkey, who was in the Western Bloc. For years Turkey and Syria had quarrels over several reasons, such as Syria's support for the Partiya Kakeran Kurdistan (PKK)¹²², the Turkish dams on the Euphrates River and the flow of water, Turkey's recognition

¹¹⁸ Atul Aneja, "From Arab Spring to post-Islamist summer", *The Hindu*, 12 October 2011

¹¹⁹ Gözde Nur Donat, "We need Turkey in post-revolution Arab world, Morsi says at AK Party congress", *Today's Zaman*, 30 September 2012, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_we-need-turkey-in-post-revolution-arab-world-morsi-says-at-ak-party-congress_293897.html

¹²⁰ Atul Aneja, "From Arab Spring to post-Islamist summer", *The Hindu*, 12 October 2011

¹²¹ Efforts to solve problems with Armenia was stalled due to lack of interest in the Armenian side and efforts on Cyprus was fruitless due to Greek Cypriot refusal to the Annan Plan on referendum.

¹²² A Kurdish separatist terrorist organization that is active in Turkey but had bases in Turkey's neighbors.

of Israel and Hatay problem. Because of this problems Turkey and Syria remained confrontational towards each other.

In 2000, there was a leadership change in Syria. When Hafiz Assad died, he left his place to his youngest son, Bashar Assad. Bashar Assad was not involved in the Syrian politics until 1994 when his elder brother died and Bashar assumed the role of heir. His previous non-involvement in the Baath Party's rule created hope for reformation. Bashar's early years proposed a hope for reformation in the Syria's authoritarian regime. Bashar released political prisoners, who were mainly Muslim Brotherhood members who have been imprisoned by his father, and started a crackdown on corruption. However, when the opposition requested a quicker reformation and transition he started a crackdown, and arrested some of the opposition members.

With Bashar's ascension to power, there was a detente between Turkey and Syria. Bashar Assad responded positively to a rapprochement. Bashar visited Turkey in 2004, the first of its kind in 57 years.¹²³ Syria under Bashar fought with PKK, renounced its irredentist claims on Hatay and promised to further improve relations.¹²⁴ Ankara responded to this with a range of high profile visits, by Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül in 2003, by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer in 2005, and by Prime Minister Erdoğan in 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010.¹²⁵ Syria was one of the neighbors with which Turkey had serious problems, so moves were made to ease the problems between two countries. Between 2002 and 2010 Turkish-Syrian border was cleared of mines, visa exemption was implemented, a free trade agreement was concluded, and two states started a high level cooperation. With the Free Trade agreement that came to force on 1 January 2007, the trade level between both countries increased. From 2007 to 2010, the trade volume tripled over three years.¹²⁶ During Bashar's visit to Turkey it was decided to start High Level Strategic Cooperation Council in September 2009. In October 2009 two meetings of this council were held in Gaziantep, Turkey

¹²³ Banu Eligür, "Are Former Enemies Becoming Allies? Turkey's Chancing Relations with Syria, Iran, and Israel Since the 2003 Iraqi War", *Middle East Brief August 2006*, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB9.pdf>

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ "Relations between Turkey-Syria", Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey%E2%80%93syria.en.mfa>

and in Aleppo, Syria, with the participation of over ten ministers. The ministerial-level meetings were followed by a meeting between prime ministers in December 2009.¹²⁷ The High Level Strategic Cooperation Council was established in the same year.¹²⁸ Furthermore, Quadripartite High Level Strategic Cooperation Council was established among Syria, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan with the aim of creating a free-trade zone between Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan.¹²⁹

Starting from 2006, Syria experienced rising discontent, which was fuelled by economic problems caused by drought. In 2011 Syrian government reacted to the discontent brutally, by firing upon protesters, and what started as small economic protests soon turned in to an all-out civil war. At first the civil war was a two sided conflict between the government troops and the Free Syrian Army, which was backed by Sunni regional countries and some Western powers. After both sides failed to achieve a quick decisive victory, it turned into a fractured civil war, with dozens of competing groups. This virtually ended the Syrian state as an actor and gave way to dozens of new non-state actors who controlled some areas and acted as de facto countries, in a sense, which resembled the Chinese Warlord Period during the 1920s and 1930s.

Turkey openly backed the Free Syrian Army against the Syrian government, basing it as the people's struggle against tyranny. Since the start of the war Ankara opened its borders to refugees, but also trained and equipped the Syrian opposition against Damascus.¹³⁰ Turkey gave support at the expense of its relations with the immediate area. Turkey's support not only cut its relations with Syria but also strained

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ "Joint Statement of the First Meeting of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council Between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Republic of Turkey, Damascus, December 22-23, 2009", Turkish Ministry of Affairs, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye---suriye-ydsik-1-toplantisi-ortak-bildirisi_-22-23-aralik_-sam.en.mfa

¹²⁹ "Joint Political Declaration on the Establishment of the High Level Cooperation Council among Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon", Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-political-declaration-on-the-establishment-of-the-high-level-cooperation-council-among-turkey_-syria_-jordan-and-lebanon.en.mfa

¹³⁰ Amena Bakr, "Exclusive: Secret Turkish nerve center leads aid to Syria rebels", *Reuters*, 27 July 2012, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.Reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-centre-idUSBRE86Q0JM20120727#VC6xizODrE0VOYDV.97>

its relations with Russia¹³¹ and Iran¹³², the main powers that are still supporting the Syrian government.

Egypt has similar but very different political history than Syria. In 1952, in a bloodless coup, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Muhammad Naguib became the leaders of Egypt. After Nasser became the sole leader of the Egypt, Cairo tried to become the leader of the Arab world, and for some time Egypt became the leader of the Arab struggle against Israel. Egypt was drawn to the Soviet bloc due to the Western support to Israel, but it was not a complete a member of the bloc and started the Non-Aligned movement with India, Indonesia and Yugoslavia. After the 1956 Coup, Turkey's relations with Egypt were sour, due to Turkey's problems with Syria. Egypt formed a short-term union with Syria between 1958 and 1961. Even though their union was futile, the Pan-Arabic sentiment in both countries prevailed. Furthermore, the fact that Turkey heavily entrenched itself in the Western bloc was another factor that stalled any improvement in relations. While Egypt was pitting the West and the Soviets to maximize its advantage while staying unaligned, Turkey joined to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) upon its own request. Both during the Nasser and after, Egypt was ruled under an authoritarian regime by the military. After the death of Nasser, Anwar Sadat replaced him as the president. Sadat's rule was marked by the growing tension between the Islamists in Egypt and the military government. As a result of this conflict Sadat was assassinated in 1981 and his successor Hosni Mubarak had a heavy crackdown Islamic movements. Until 2011 Egypt was ruled by Mubarak, with the backing of the army.

In 2011 Mubarak was ousted from power as a result of the mass protests in Egypt.¹³³ The army saw that a clash was inevitable if it sided with Mubarak, avoided confronting the protesters directly, and followed a more cautious approach that

¹³¹ Richard Weitz, "Russia-Turkey Strains Deepen Over Syria", *The Turkey Analyst* Vol. 5 No. 20, accessed 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/327-russia-turkey-strains-deepen-over-syria.html>

¹³² Bulent Aliriza, Jon B. Alterman and Andrew C. Kuchins, *The Turkey, Russia, Iran Nexus: Driving Forces and Strategies* (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013), accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://csis.org/files/publication/130318_Flanagan_TurkeyRussiaIran_web.pdf

¹³³ Yasser Imam, "Mubarak Reigns as Egypt's President; Armed Forces to Take Control", *The Huffington Post*, 02 November 2011, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/11/mubarak-red-sea-egypt_n_821812.html

resulted with Mubarak's step down.¹³⁴ After some time, Egypt went to elections and new blocks emerged in Egyptian politics. Muslim Brotherhood, liberals, westerners and small Islamic parties entered the parliament.¹³⁵ However, no side gained majority in the elections and soon the democratic process was stalled by the disagreements. These disagreements reached peak during the presidential elections, when the Muslim Brotherhood's candidate Mohammad Morsi and opposition's candidate Ahmet Shafiq were left as the last candidates.¹³⁶ Mohammad Morsi was elected as president with very small margin. Morsi's presidency was marked with growing tension between the Muslim Brotherhood and the opposition.¹³⁷ While the Muslim Brotherhood's support base wanted more Islamic policies, the opposition feared the country would eventually become an Islamic republic. After a very short period, Morsi enacted laws that enlarged the powers of the President, which he claimed was necessary to remove pre-Arab Spring structures from the state organization, however opposition perceived this move as enhancing his powers to pave way to an Islamic republic.¹³⁸ Opposition started mass protests against Morsi government, where clashes occurred between anti-Muslim Brotherhood protesters and pro-Muslim Brotherhood protesters. On 1 June 2013, the Egyptian Army issued a 48 hours ultimatum to Morsi asking to either respond to the demands of the protesters or they would intervene, and when their ultimatum was not accepted, the Army launched a new coup and removed Morsi and his cabinet from power.¹³⁹ Here it should be explored how Turkey reacted to these events and how they shaped its relations in the region.

¹³⁴ Omar Ashour, "Egypt's Revolution: Two Lessons from History", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 7 February 2011, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=42533>

¹³⁵ "Egypt's Islamist parties win elections to parliament", *BBC*, 21 January 2012, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.BBC.com/news/world-middle-east-16665748>

¹³⁶ "Presidential Election in Egypt: Final Report May-June 2012", The Carter Center, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/egypt-final-presidential-elections-2012.pdf

¹³⁷ Patrick Kingsley, "How Mohammed Morsi, Egypt's first elected president, ended up on death row", *The Guardian*, 1 June 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/01/mohamed-morsi-execution-death-sentence-egypt>

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Matt Bradley and Reem Abdellatif, "Egypt Army Issues Ultimatum", *The Wall Street Journal*, 2 July 2013, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323297504578578991289439784>

During the Morsi government, Turkey supported Egypt in various fields. Economic support was offered to compensate Egypt's economic loss that occurred during and after the protests.¹⁴⁰ Ankara also made remarks regarding the constitution writing process, and offered help during the constitution writing process giving Turkey's own process as an example. Turkey offered a more moderate constitution to alleviate both sides, during his North Africa tour Erdoğan said "Don't be afraid of secularism, prepare your constitution on the basis of secularism".¹⁴¹ Turkey looked to Egypt as a potential example, from which other Arab countries may take influence. This should not be read as a one-sided interest, as Morsi's government was interested in Turkey as a role model as well. During his visit to Turkey in September 2012, Morsi attended the JDP congress and claimed Turkey's democratic tradition was a "source of inspiration for the Middle East" showing Turkey's importance as the first democratic country in the Middle East and the Islamic world. At the same congress he said Turkey's involvement was needed for "economic and social rehabilitation following the Arab Spring revolutions" again showing the need for Turkish economic assistance and help for social policies.¹⁴²

When the coup happened, Turkey's reaction to the coup was negative, unlike some regional countries.¹⁴³ The Muslim Brotherhood is influential in a number of regional countries, like Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries, and their ascension to power had been foreseen by these countries as a threat to their political structure. Therefore, most of the Arab countries, like Jordan and Saudi Arabia, were in favor of the coup to prevent the rise of Muslim Brotherhood in their own domestic political structure. In my opinion, the reaction of the JDP against the coup was influenced by its adherence to the concept of 'national will'. As a political party claiming to represent

¹⁴⁰ Muhammad Ayad, "Egyptian government asks Turkey for help to revive economy", *Daily News Egypt*, 11 May 2013, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/05/11/egyptian-government-asks-turkey-for-help-to-revive-economy/>

¹⁴¹ "Will secularism work in the Middle East?", *Today's Zaman*, 23 September 2011, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://www.todayszaman.com/turkish-press-review_will-secularism-work-in-the-middle-east_257755.html

¹⁴² "We need Turkey in post-revolution Arab world, Morsi says at AK Party congresses", *Today's Zaman*, 30 September 2012, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_we-need-turkey-in-post-revolution-arab-world-morsi-says-at-ak-party-congress_293897.html

¹⁴³ "Mısır'ın Siyasi Görünümü", Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on 16.03.2016, accessed from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/misir-siyasi-gorunumu.tr.mfa>

‘the long suppressed will of the silent Turkish majority’ against the elitist secular establishment in Turkey, the JDP naturally sympathized with the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt. Fearing that the coup may trigger additional coups in the post- Arab Spring countries the JDP firmly opposed the Sisi government. Turkey did not recognize the Sisi’s government and considered it illegitimate.¹⁴⁴ Turkey expressed this in international platforms, openly called other countries to not recognize the coup and put pressure on the army, and criticized the Western double standards for recognizing and legitimizing a coup.¹⁴⁵ Turkey’s continuing support to the Muslim Brotherhood severed the relations between Cairo and Ankara. As a response to Ankara’s moves and calls against it, Cairo in turn did not support Ankara’s candidacy to obtain a seat in the UN Security Council. As of June 2015 Turkish-Egyptian relations have been sour and Turkey is one of the last stronghold countries where the Muslim Brotherhood can openly continue its activities, since it was banned and designated as terrorist organization in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, where the movement was active previously.¹⁴⁶ However, major regional countries, like Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, supported the post-coup military supported regime and Turkey was left alone in its refusal to acknowledge the post-coup government.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, the use of this situation in Turkey’s domestic politics created doubt regarding Turkey’s sincerity on the topic. With the recognition of the new Egyptian government by other countries, Turkey is left with the image of a country, which is interfering in another country’s domestic problems.

Syria and Egypt are two deadlocks of Turkey’s foreign policy in the region. In Syria what could have been a successful reformation process was turned into a civil war, which contains ethnic and religious cleansing, created non-state actors as players,

¹⁴⁴ Soner Cagaptay and Marc J. Sievers, “Turkey and Egypt’s Great Game in the Middle East”, The Washington Institute, 8 March 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkey-and-egypts-great-game-in-the-middle-east>

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Alaa Shahine and Glen Carey, “U.A.E. Supports Saudi Arabia Against Qatar-Backed Brotherhood”, *Bloomberg Business*, 9 March 2014, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-09/u-a-e-supports-saudi-arabia-against-qatar-backed-brotherhood?cmpid=yhoo>

¹⁴⁷ Andrew Critchlow, “Saudi and UAE ready \$20bn boost for Egypt’s El-Sisi”, *The Telegraph*, 1 June 2014, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/10868522/Saudi-and-UAE-ready-20bn-boost-for-Egypt-s-El-Sisi.html>

and started a wave of immigration, which caused instability and socio-economic problems in neighboring countries as well as in the EU. Turkey's unquestioned support to the opposition can be related to the previous actions of the Syrian military elite. The brutal crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1980s by the government raised concerns in Turkey regarding another crackdown on the opposition. When the Syrian government did not stop its heavy-handed approach, Turkey cut its relations with the Syrian government and started giving assistance to the Syrian opposition. While Turkey still legitimizes its position in Syria as support against a tyrant, the waging war crosses the lines regarding who is a tyrant and who is not. The Free Syrian Army and other opposition groups that are fighting against the Syrian government also started to commit war crimes according to the Human Rights Watch.¹⁴⁸

In Egypt, Ankara may justify its opposition by claiming the coup is anti-democratic. However Ankara's solitary opposition leaves it as the only country that is still interfering with Egyptian internal politics. Especially after the elections, which were boycotted by the Muslim Brotherhood, where Sisi garnered popular support for the new constitution his government prepared¹⁴⁹, the post-coup government represents the legitimate government, despite the way it first came into power.

Both of these policies damaged Turkey's reputation in the region. Turkey was seen as a mediating power among the regional countries, the one that can be trusted for inter-state problems, as seen in Syrian-Israeli talks. Since Turkey's interference in the Syrian Civil War and Egyptian politics, Turkey stands as "just another external power" that is interfering with the region's domestic problems.

3.2.2. Tunisia: Success of the Arab Spring

The only successful and lasting change that was achieved during the Arab Spring so far has been in Tunisia. After its independence from France, Tunisia had been ruled by two authoritarian leaders, first by Habib Bourguiba between 1956 and 1987 and later by Zine El Abidine Ben Ali between 1987 and 2011. Both leaders' reign were marked by widespread corruption, lack of personal freedoms, censorship, arbitrary

¹⁴⁸ "Syria", Human Rights Watch, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-africa/syria>

¹⁴⁹ Tom Perry and Maggie Fick, "Egyptians back constitution, opening way to Sisi presidential run", *Reuters*, 16 January 2014, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://uk.Reuters.com/article/uk-egypt-referendum-idUKBREA0E1EE20140116>

jurisdiction, and oppression of opposition.¹⁵⁰ Under Ben Ali's presidency strictly "secular" policies were implemented, which often resulted in the oppression of Islamic symbols from the social life, such as the headscarf ban, which was implemented on educational and government institutions in 2006, like the one that happened in Turkey.¹⁵¹ Yet, again like Syria the protests started against the economic problems rather than socio-politic oppression. On 17 December 2010 a street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, immolated himself after police confiscated his goods and insulted him, and later municipality officials refused to grant him an audience. His self-immolation started a wave of protests, which were crushed heavily by the security forces. However, when Bouazizi died in the hospital on 4 January 2011, and the protests started again¹⁵², this time they became wider as the security forces used force to disperse them. Several people committed suicide during the protests, while there were casualties resulting from police violence. Within weeks Ben Ali fled the country and a new government was announced, however this did not stop the protests as the new government also included members of Ben Ali's party. Facing protests, the new government also collapsed and an interim government came into power.¹⁵³ Following the elections of 23 October 2011 Ennahda, an Islamist-conservative party, became the greatest party. Ennahda did not pursue to implement its policies alone, and rather formed a coalition with other two runner-up parties Congress for the Republic and Ettakatol.¹⁵⁴ Ennahda agreed to a coalition government with its rivals in 2015.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁰ "Profile: Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali", *BBC*, 20 June 2011, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.BBC.com/news/world-africa-12196679>

¹⁵¹ Heba Saleh, "Tunisia moves against headscarves", *BBC*, 15 October 2006, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://news.BBC.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6053380.stm>

¹⁵² Yasmine Ryan, "The tragic lie of a street vendor", *Aljazeera*, 20 January 2011, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.Aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/201111684242518839.html>

¹⁵³ Elaine Ganley and Bouazza ben Bouazza, "Tunisians drive leader from power in mass uprising", *The Huffington Post*, 14 January 2011, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20110114/af-tunisia-riots/>

¹⁵⁴ "Tunisia coalition agrees top government posts", *BBC*, 21 November 2011, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.BBC.com/news/world-africa-15830583>
"Tunisia's Ennahda to join coalition government", *Aljazeera*, 01 February 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.Aljazeera.com/news/2015/02/tunisiaennahda-join-coalition-government-150201172336735.html>

Ennahda's compromising nature was a big contributor for post-Arab Spring governments' success in Tunisia.¹⁵⁶

After Ennahda came into power, there were critics of Ennahda that feared Ennahda's Islamist roots, and a potential move to make Tunisia an Islamic republic. However, Ennahda's leaders gave speeches assuring the public that they did not have any 'Islamic' agenda like Salafi or Wahhabi Arab states, but they wanted a 'moderate' view like in Turkey. Rached Ghannouchi, co-founder of Ennahda, said "Why are we put in the same place as a model that is far from our thought, like the Taliban and the Saudi model, while there are other successful Islamic models that are close to us, like the Turkish, the Malaysian and the Indonesian models; models that combine Islam and modernity?"¹⁵⁷ As can be seen Turkey created the intended effect on the Tunisia; promoted itself as an acceptable alternative over more authoritarian rivals, like Saudi Arabia, with its blending of Islam, modernity and liberty rather than subsidizing the discontent.

3.3. Japan: Peace, Security and Prosperity

Until the end of the 1990s Japan was technologically the most advanced and biggest economy in Asia, and even today it is the top country in some fields. This is a result of the Japanese economic restructuring following its destruction after the Second World War. Knowing that its meagre resources could not compete with other countries, Japan turned from quantity to quality, resulting in mastery on electronics and top-end technology. This is an economic model, which many countries have been trying to adopt fully or to some extent. Because of this, a number of countries have been trying to re-model their economies after the Japanese model and to do so they have been increasing their trade relations and cooperation with Japan and inviting Japanese firms to learn know-how. Until the change in the Japanese Foreign Policy in 2000s, this model was the main thing Japan was promoting, however now Japan is also focusing on 'values' along with 'prosperity' in its promotion of itself as a model country, like Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.

Unlike some countries where the foreign policy is marked by powerful political figures and remembered after them, Japanese foreign policy is marked by speeches.

¹⁵⁶ Mustafa Akyol, "Turkey's Model Nation", *The New York Times*, 16 February 2014, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/17/opinion/turkeys-model-nation.html>

¹⁵⁷ Atul Aneja, "From Arab Spring to post-Islamist summer", *The Hindu*, 12 October 2011.

While those speeches are usually given by important individuals, policies are called after the speeches because even after individuals lose their position, those policies are followed. On 24 July 1997, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro gave a speech to the Japan Association of Corporate Executives, where he marked the importance of the old Silk Road countries and Russia for Japan, which subsequently created Japan's "New Silk Road" project and paved way to the intense Japanese involvement in Central Asia.¹⁵⁸ Another example is Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso's speech on 30 November 2006, which was named "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan's Expanding Diplomatic Horizons".¹⁵⁹ His speech added "freedom" as a new fragment to Japanese foreign policy, and changed its essentials. But it should be noted that this trend of the Japanese foreign policy was not solely based on one member of the government, but what Aso proposed in his speech was further continued by other members in the cabinet, such as Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Abe gave a speech at the North Atlantic Council meeting at Brussels on 12 January 2007, where he was the first Japanese prime minister to address the NATO. In his speech Abe pointed out the common values between Japan and the NATO members, and suggested Japan could cooperate with the NATO to promote these ideals.

Japan and NATO are partners. We have in common such fundamental values as freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It is only natural that we cooperate in protecting and promoting those values. My government is committed to reinforcing the stability and prosperity of the world based on the fundamental values I have just mentioned¹⁶⁰

Abe continued the rhetoric, which Aso used a month before and focused, two things: values and prosperity. Two weeks later in his speech to the Japanese Diet on 26 January 2007, Abe promoted a 'proactive diplomacy' for Japan, which was new

¹⁵⁸ "Address by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto to the Japan Association of Corporate Executives", Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 July 1997, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://japan.kantei.go.jp/0731douyukai.html>

¹⁵⁹ "Speech by Mr. Taro Aso, Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Occasion of the Japan Institute of International Affairs Seminar 'Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan's Expanding Diplomatic Horizons'", Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 November 2006, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html>

¹⁶⁰ "Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the North Atlantic Council 'Japan and NATO: Toward Further Collaboration'", Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 January 2007, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/pmv0701/nato.html>

thing for Japan, which has a highly bureaucratic structure and usually has been 'reactive' rather than 'proactive'.¹⁶¹ In his speech Abe stated three pillars;

- a. Strengthening relations with countries that share common values.
- b. Creating an Asia that is prosperous.
- c. Contributing to global peace and stability.¹⁶²

Abe later promoted same ideas during his new prime ministership in 2012. The emphasis on the common values became an important part of the Japanese foreign policy under Shinzo Abe's administration. In the *Diplomatic Bluebook 2014*, the keys of the Abe's foreign policy are stated as;

Since the inauguration of the current administration led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan has pursued a strategic foreign policy that "Takes a Panoramic Perspective of the World Map." Upholding universal values such as freedom, democracy, respect of fundamental human rights, and the rule of law.¹⁶³

3.3.1. The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity

In 2006 Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso heralded new dimensions to Japanese foreign policy in the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity speech. First, Japanese foreign policy up to this date had not been centered in a value-oriented form, such as democracy, freedom or human rights etc. This pragmatism and the lack of value-orientation was one of the reasons where Japan was criticized in some cases, like its lack of condemnation to Uzbekistani government after the Andijan events.¹⁶⁴ The Arc of Freedom integrated value-oriented foreign policy to Japanese foreign policy. Second, it brought new areas and countries to the attention of Japanese foreign policy.

First of all there is "value oriented diplomacy," which involves placing emphasis on the "universal values" such as democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of law, and the market economy as we advance our diplomatic endeavors.

And second, there are the successfully budding democracies that line the outer rim of the Eurasian continent, forming an arc. Here Japan wants to design an

¹⁶¹ Shinzo Abe, "Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 166th Session of Diet", Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 26 January 2007, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://japan.kantei.go.jp/abespeech/2007/01/26speech_e.html

¹⁶² Shinzo Abe, "Policy Speech by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo to the 166th Session of the Diet", January 26, 2007

¹⁶³ "Diplomatic Bluebook 2013 Summary; Chapter 1: Overview", Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2014/html/chapter1/japansdiplomacy.html>

¹⁶⁴ In Uzbekistan Andijan, Uzbek government made a brutal crackdown on peaceful demonstrators where several hundred people died and others went missing.

"arc of freedom and prosperity". Indeed, I believe that we must create just such an arc.¹⁶⁵

Previously Japan was mainly engaged in its close neighbors, like China and South Korea, and the US, which has been its main ally. However, the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity could not make a significant change due to unexpected failure of the Liberal Democrat Part (LDP) in councilor elections in 2007. The LDP government was unexpectedly defeated in the elections, which lead to changes in government. Aso lost its position to Machimura Nobutaka, who did not follow Aso's Arc of Freedom and Prosperity initiative. Then Abe resigned from his post, and his successor Yasuo Fukuda had difficulty in running the government because of the political deadlock between the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors and resigned from his position in favor of Aso, who managed to run the government for another year before finally going to early elections in 2009. 2009 Elections proved disastrous for the LDP, which became opposition for the second time in the post-war era. The new government run by the Democrat Party of Japan (DPJ) focused on domestic politics and did not followed the policy that was proposed by Abe and Aso's foreign policy. Yet it should be noted that while the DPJ's focused on domestic politics, it still continued the initiatives started by the LDP even if not expanded them.

The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity's value-oriented approach is noteworthy, because it brought a new discourse to Japanese foreign policy. Previously Japanese foreign policy was based on several pillars, such as access to resources, good relations with neighbors, and continuation of alliance with the US for Japan's security. But this policy sometimes created an atmosphere where Japan came to odds with its Western allies due to its reluctance at condemning authoritarian regimes. But what was more important was that Japan did not propose an only 'value-oriented' policy, which would create resentment from authoritarian regimes. Japan's choice to add "prosperity" to its new approach makes it easier to promote itself to the regional countries. One of the main reasons of the regional countries' authoritarian policies may be seen as their inability to solve their people's socio-economic demands and therefore the fear against rising discontent. When we look at the regions that are surrounding Japan we will see

¹⁶⁵ "Speech by Mr. Taro Aso, Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Occasion of the Japan Institute of International Affairs Seminar 'Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan's Expanding Diplomatic Horizons'", Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 November 2006.

a five-decade long military dictatorship in Myanmar, frequent coups in Thailand, authoritarian China, and North Korea and Central Asian countries. Only stable democracies in the region are Taiwan, Philippines and South Korea and even they suffered military coups and internal problems. In such an environment trying to promote values that are ‘alien’ to the region may be a hindrance for Japanese foreign policy. Values such as democracy, freedom, and free market economy may seem as ‘normal’ values for the Western countries and societies, they may even think those values as ‘universal’. However, to the strictly ordered community based social climate of the Asian people, these Western universal values may be perceived as a threat to their stability, especially by their government who will see those values as a means to provoke their otherwise docile population. Therefore adding ‘prosperity’ to the ‘freedom’ makes it more acceptable to Asian nations.

Aso’s speech was also an initiative came from the foreign minister rather than the ministry. In Japan, ministers usually have served less than one year and acted as figure-heads as they did not intervene in to the ministry too much. Instead of ministers, bureaucrats ruled ministries. However, Aso was the main driving force behind the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity. Even before his position as foreign minister, he was backing Japan’s interaction in the regions beyond its previous relations. Back in 1997 when Prime Minister Ryutaro launched Japan’s “New Silk Road” policy, Aso was a member of the Hashimoto’s administration as Director General of the Economic Planning Agency and immediately visited Central Asia, embracing this new region as a necessary geopolitical and economic zone for Japan’s economy and foreign policy.¹⁶⁶ The speech was also important to mark the Abe’s future government and his taking the grip in the government and policies.

3.3.2 Australia and India

For Japan’s value-oriented diplomatic discourse Australia and India keep a special place. While most of the regional countries need to first internalize the values, and secondly need to develop themselves to become ‘useful’ allies, India and Australia are both ready as allies. Both India and Australia are important for Japan’s security and promoting the cooperation beyond security dimension.

¹⁶⁶ Christopher Len, Uyama Tomohiko and Hirose Tetsuya (Ed.), *Japanese Silk Road Diplomacy Paving the Road Ahead*, (Washington: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2008), 50.

Australia is an ex-colonial subject of the United Kingdom, and a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. Australia has the 4th strongest economy in the Commonwealth, with a GDP of \$1.454 trillion, despite its small population.¹⁶⁷ Australia is the best example of having a continuing democracy in the region that surrounds Japan. Since it was given status of dominion, Australia maintained a perfect record of democratic tradition and did not suffer any coups or inter-party civil disturbances. Apart from South African Apartheid like laws against its indigenous people that were relinquished in the last few decades, Australia has a near perfect history of Western values, such as freedom of press, human rights, rule of law, universal suffrage etc. It already shares most of the values that are proposed by the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.

Australian military history started with the First World War, where a great number of Australian troops fought in the British armies in many fronts. However, it was the Second World War that made Australia realize it needs to have its own military capability. Australia was spared from the war during the First World War because of its location. The same thing seemed to happen in the Second World War, but the Japanese surprise attack on the Allies caught them off-guard. In a few months all the British and Dutch colonies fell to the Japanese and Japanese advanced as far as Papua New Guinea, which is just across Australia. Australians had to defend themselves from the Japanese by themselves before the US accommodated forces to the Pacific theatre. This military cooperation later continued to the Cold War era and created a military alliance in 1951 as Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) which is still active between the USA and Australia.¹⁶⁸ Australian troops participated in the Korean War according to the UN resolution. Also, as a part of the ANZUS treaty Australia sent troops to Vietnam War, the US Invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the US Invasion of Iraq in 2003. Australia was the largest non-NATO personal contributor to Afghanistan with more than twenty six thousand soldiers.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁷ World Bank data on economic situation of Australia, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://data.worldbank.org/country/australia>

¹⁶⁸ "Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand and, the United States of America", 1 September 1952, Australian Legal Information Institute, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1952/2.html>

¹⁶⁹ "Australian Army in Afghanistan", 13 April 2016, Australian Army, accessed on 12.06.2016, accessed from <http://www.army.gov.au/our-history/history-in-focus/australian-army-in-afghanistan>

Unlike many other nations in the region, Japan's imperialistic ambitions prior and during the Second World War did not leave permanent infamy on the Australian public opinion. This was due to Japanese forces could not reach mainland Australia; therefore their hostilities were mainly on the front. Because of this, Japan does not have the negative impressions it has on other countries, like China or South Korea. Therefore a partnership between Japan and Australia is easier to achieve than with some other countries. The partnership between Australia and Japan came to formality on 1 May 2002 during Prime Minister Koizumi government called *Australian-Japanese Creative Partnership*.¹⁷⁰ One of the main points of this agreement that needs to be highlighted is the stress to regional cooperation:

Drawing on their strong record of cooperation in APEC, the East Asian financial crisis, the ASEAN Regional Forum, peacekeeping in Cambodia and now in East Timor, both leaders affirmed their renewed commitment to work together to meet regional challenges.¹⁷¹

Both countries look to one another as a partner to answer 'regional challenges' which are the instability, human trafficking, money laundering and countries that are threatening regional countries. But another important dimension of this agreement is that it is not solely on regional level, but further includes areas like the UN. Australia agreed to support Japan for its bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. To further stabilize a bilateral partnership Australia and Japan signed *Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation* on 13 March 2007.¹⁷² This declaration was signed on Shinzo Abe's first term as prime minister, who comes from the same faction of the LDP with Koizumi and lead that faction after him. The Security Cooperation Agreement further promised to increase a defensive cooperation between two countries regarding many fields, and most importantly, maritime and aviation security where regional countries are increasingly pressured by China. The most important aspect of these agreements was that Australia is the second nation Japan has concluded any bilateral military cooperation agreement since the end of the Second

¹⁷⁰ "Joint Press Statement by Prime Minister John Howard and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi: Australia-Japan Creative Partnership", May 2002, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0204/joint.html>

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² "Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation", 13 March 2007, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0703.html>

World War, after Japan's traditional ally and security provider the US. After decades of relying on one main ally, Japan is trying to diversify its security partners. As for Australia, like Japan, the US is its main military ally. So when Japan and Australia started increasing their security cooperation with each other, it easily turned into a trilateral cooperation. On 18 May 2006, a Trilateral Strategic Dialogue was launched among the US, Australia, and Japan. Although the US and Australia do not want this agreement to be “anti-Chinese”, the rising suspicion and fear towards Chinese military build-up and territorial claims against most of its neighbors will certainly bring the agreement towards that point eventually.¹⁷³ The agreement includes “a wide range of current security challenges, both regional and global, of shared interest to our three Governments. Supporting the emergence and consolidation of democracies and strengthening cooperative frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region”¹⁷⁴ and currently the biggest revisionist country in the Asia-Pacific region is China.

India has the biggest democracy in the world, and has problems with income inequality and poverty, but has great economic potential with its resources and population. Japan approached India as a strategic partner for its proactive diplomacy as India would fit into both parts of the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.¹⁷⁵ In early 2007 a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue was launched among Japan, India, the US and Australia but later did not develop much further than an initial declaration. In 2007, during his visit to Japan, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made a joint statement with Abe and said:

The two leaders affirm that Japan and India are natural partners as the largest and most developed democracies of Asia, with a mutual stake in each other's progress and prosperity. Indeed, a strong, prosperous and dynamic India is in the interest of Japan, and likewise, a strong, prosperous and dynamic Japan is in the interest of India.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷³ Mina Pollmann, “US-Japan-Australia Security Cooperation: Beyond Containment”, 21 April 2015, *The Diplomat*, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/us-japan-australia-security-cooperation-beyond-containment/>

¹⁷⁴ “Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, Joint Statement Australia-Japan-United States”, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 March 2006, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0603-2.html>

¹⁷⁵ David Envall, "JAPAN'S INDIA ENGAGEMENT: From Different Worlds to Strategic Partners." In *The Engagement of India: Strategies and Responses*, edited by HALL IAN, (Georgetown University Press, 2014), 39-60.

¹⁷⁶ “Joint Statement Towards Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership”, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 December 2006, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/pdfs/joint0612.pdf>

After Singh's visit to Japan, Abe paid a visit to India in return between August 21 and 23 in 2007, where he concluded several agreements. Also, Japan for the first time joined the Malabar naval military exercises, which are held by India and the US. In 2007, Malabar 07-01 exercises were conducted off the coast of Okinawa islands in Japan, by a joint fleet from the US, India and Japan.¹⁷⁷ Again in 2007 Malabar 07-02 was exercised with a larger participation in Bay of Bengal by a joint fleet from Australia, Singapore, the US, India, and Japan.¹⁷⁸ China was greatly disgruntled by the two military exercises held in the waters around it but it did not openly criticize them.

However neither the Indian-Japanese nor the Australian-Japanese strategic partnerships yielded the intended results. In 2007 Abe had to resign, which led to power struggle inside the LDP and eventually resulted with the LDP's electoral defeat. At the same time in Australia John Howard of the Liberal Party, who favored the security cooperation between Japan and Australia, lost elections to Kevin Rudd of the Labor Party, who wanted to draw Australia back to domestic issues. A similar change happened in Japan where the new DPJ government focused on domestic issues, but was reluctant to expand those partnerships beyond the already established extend. However, not all of the Japanese efforts on Aso's Arc of Freedom and Prosperity or Abe's proactive diplomacy were in vain. Even in the DPJ's domestic oriented government, Japan maintained close relations with both India and Australia at the ministerial level, if not the desired military level. Annual foreign minister level meetings were held between both India and Japan, and Australia and Japan where regional, economic, and global problems were discussed.

Kevin Rudd's government made a further move and left the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. However, this did not mark the end of the security agreements between four countries. Rudd later visited India in November 2009 and signed a bilateral agreement with India, so all four countries had bilateral agreements with one another but the quadrilateral agreement did not fall into action.¹⁷⁹ But, since all countries shared same suspicion towards China's revisionist aims in the region, which

¹⁷⁷ "Malabar 07-01", Bharat Rakshak, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/Galleries/Bridges/2007/Malabar0701/>

¹⁷⁸ "Malabar 07-02", Bharat Rakshak, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/Galleries/Bridges/2007/Malabar0702/>

¹⁷⁹ "India-Australia Relations", Indian Ministry of External Affairs, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Australia_2015_07_02.pdf

was suspicion back in 2007, but became a fact in the recent years, there is still a high possibility of further cooperation among the four countries.

3.3.3. Abe's New Term: Since 2012

When Abe was re-elected as prime minister on 26 December 2012, it marked a return to pro-active foreign policy he tried to follow in 2007. On 27 December 2012, just the day after Abe's election, his new foreign policy was published under the name of "Asia's Democratic Security Diamond".¹⁸⁰ There, Abe stated his fears, plans and hopes for the region and showed what the Japanese foreign policy would be in his new term. The main points of Democratic Security Diamond were; expanding and redefining the US-Japan security alliance, continuing and expanding the Quadrilateral agreement of 2007, re-integrating the United Kingdom and France to the regional security, and the containment of Chinese ambitions in the region.

In his article Abe based Japan's choices regarding allies on democracy. Thus, since 2012 Japan has spent efforts to strengthen her ties with India, Australia and the US. Tokyo tried to expand and reinstate bilateral agreements between Japan-India, Japan-Australia, and Japan-US, as well as trilateral and quadrilateral agreements that were put in motion in 2007.

Japan is a mature maritime democracy, and its choice of close partners should reflect that fact. I envisage a strategy whereby Australia, India, Japan and the US state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific. I am prepared to invest, to the greatest possible extent, Japan's capabilities in this security diamond.¹⁸¹

Since 2012 Japan has been focusing on its relations with Australia.¹⁸² Australia concluded joint naval drills with Japan and the US in 2015.¹⁸³ Japan was chosen as producer for new submarines for the Australian navy.¹⁸⁴ However, although Canberra

¹⁸⁰ Shinzo Abe, "Asia's Democratic Security Diamond", *Project Syndicate*, 27 December 2012, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe>

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Mark Thomas, "Australia and Japan: The Unknown Unknowns", *The Diplomat*, 21 November 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/australia-and-japan-the-unknown-unknowns/>

¹⁸³ "Exercises Talisman Sabre", Australian Ministry of Defense, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.defence.gov.au/exercises/ts13/>

¹⁸⁴ Franz-Stefan Gady, "Japan to Offer Australia Its Top-Secret Submarine Technology", *The Diplomat*, 07 October 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/japan-to-offer-australia-its-top-secret-submarine-technology/>

may feel endangered by Chinese intentions¹⁸⁵, it still enjoys trade relations with Beijing. This was seen when the initial Australian participation in quadrilateral agreement was cancelled by the Labor Party government in 2008.¹⁸⁶ Although Australia started participating in bilateral, trilateral and quadrilateral agreements again, any direct or indirect conflict with China may be disastrous for Australian economy.¹⁸⁷ Therefore, it is not clear whether Japan will find the ally it seeks in Australia and if Japan hopes to attract Australia to an actual military agreement, it has to offer the prosperity mentioned previously.¹⁸⁸

India, on the other hand, became clearer regarding its stance against China, and the possibility of alliances with Australia, Japan and the US in Abe's second term.¹⁸⁹ The rising tension between China and its neighbors or regional countries increased Delhi's fears regarding Beijing's ambitions. As a country, which suffered from Chinese revisionism, India is ready for a security agreement more than Australia. The Indian-Japanese relations still continue to expand, from security to economy.¹⁹⁰ In 2014¹⁹¹ and 2015¹⁹² Japan rejoined Malabar naval exercises that were held by the US and India, which Japan previously joined in Abe's first term. Especially, the theme of the 2015 exercises, hunting submarines, shows these exercises are not about disaster

¹⁸⁵ Elliot Brennan, "Australia Speaks Plainly on the South China Sea", *The Diplomat*, 29 May 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/australia-speaks-plainly-on-the-south-china-sea/>

¹⁸⁶ Prashanth Parameswaran, "Australia Wants to Join India, US and Japan in Naval Exercises: Defense Minister", *The Diplomat*, 05 September 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/australia-wants-to-join-india-us-and-japan-in-naval-exercises-defense-minister/>

¹⁸⁷ Mina Pollmann, "US-Japan-Australia Security Cooperation: Beyond Containment", *The Diplomat*, 21 April 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/us-japan-australia-security-cooperation-beyond-containment/>

¹⁸⁸ Joshua Kurlantzick, "What to Expect From a Turnbull Government in Australia", *The Diplomat*, 19 September 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/what-to-expect-from-a-turnbull-government-in-australia/>

¹⁸⁹ Harsh V. Pant, "Asia's New Geopolitics Takes Shape Around India, Japan and Australia", *The Diplomat*, 28 July 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/asias-new-geopolitics-takes-shape-around-india-japan-and-australia/>

¹⁹⁰ J. Berkshire Miller, "The Indian Piece of Abe's Security Diamond", *The Diplomat*, 29 May 2013, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/the-indian-piece-of-abes-security-diamond>

¹⁹¹ Akhilesh Pillalamarri, "India, Japan, and the US Hold Joint Naval Exercises", *The Diplomat*, 25 July 2014, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/india-japan-and-the-us-hold-joint-naval-exercises/>

¹⁹² Abhijit Singh, "Malabar 2015: Strategic Power Play in the Indian Ocean", *The Diplomat*, 28 October 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/malabar-2015-strategic-power-play-in-the-indian-ocean/>

relief but a preparation to a future conflict.¹⁹³ Given the rise of the number of submarines in the Chinese fleet, and the plans to further raise that numbers, it is more of a reality than speculation that these exercises aim to prepare the region against the Chinese naval expansion. Japan is planning to permanently join those exercises to solidify its defense cooperation with India.¹⁹⁴

3.4. Evaluation

While Turkey and Japan both try to promote themselves as democratic and progressive role models,” they both received mixed results. While democracy, personal freedoms and free market may be seen as “universal ideals” by the Western societies, they may not prove tempting in other regions. In some societies democracy may be seen as a destabilizing factor, which brings political uncertainty, personal freedoms may be seen as being against the moral codes of the society and the free market may be seen as a way to exploit the lower segments of the society. Therefore, promoting Western ideals can be a difficult aim to achieve.

The Japanese democracy promotion discourse focuses on two sets of countries. First, the already established democracies of the region, like India and Australia, second, the developing democracies of the region, like Indonesia and Vietnam. Japan’s preferences, unlike Turkey, are based on more practical reasons. Although using the democracy against more authoritarian rivals, Japanese foreign policy is still based on *real-politik* and changes according to the realities of the world. In the decade after the end of the Cold War, Japanese focus on Central Asia was based on the hopes of a slow but steady transformation of the socio-politic structure of Central Asia and to gain necessary resources like natural gas that Japan was in dire need. Because of this, Japan did not criticize any of these countries in their slow transformation or lack of enthusiasm, and rather focused on economic gains while promoting democracy.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹³ Gordon Fairclough, “Military Drills in Indian Ocean Signal Deepening Ties”, *The Wall Street Journal*, 18 October 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.wsj.com/articles/military-drills-in-indian-ocean-signal-deepening-ties-1445191451>

¹⁹⁴ Franz-Stefan Gady, “Confirmed: Japan Will Permanently Join US-India Naval Exercises”, *The Diplomat*, 13 October 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/confirmed-japan-will-permanently-join-us-india-naval-exercises/>

¹⁹⁵ Christopher Len ed., *Japan’s Silk Road Diplomacy: Paving the Road Ahead*, (Washington: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, 2008).

However, when it became clear that a quick transformation in Central Asia was not an option, Japan stopped giving priority to the region.

Since 2001, first under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and later under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan turned its attention to the areas that are closer, focusing on the developed and developing countries in the South Eastern Asia. In South Eastern Asia, the presence of Chinese domination and threat is more visible and it is easier and more likely for Japan to find allies. Therefore Japan's focus on the region under the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity and Democratic Security Diamond can be seen as using the democracy promotion and prosperity as a pretext to create containment towards the Chinese threat in the region. This containment can be easier to achieve by using democracy promotion as a rhetoric in its foreign policy against the Chinese authoritarianism and providing an acceptable alternative.

When Shinzo Abe became Prime Minister for the second time in 2012, he renewed his plans to pursue an active foreign policy. This time taking the advantage of his growing popularity in the public, and with the increase of the LDP's electoral success, Abe started to pursue his foreign policy, which was cut short in his previous government. Abe started to implement what he called the 'democratic security diamond' that included the regional democratic countries against the undemocratic countries. In his second term Abe's foreign policy became more successful on using the democracy promotion because of changes in the regional politics. China's revisionist and expansionist policies became clearer. In Abe's first term they were merely speculations, which were waived as realist paranoia, however in Abe's second term China's revisionist policies became visible with Chinese massive military build-up and continuous territorial claims. China became a visible threat to the democracies of the region. Japan was successful in democracy promotion discourse became successful because the defining core of the policy was not the export of the values or the system. Rather than spending effort to export the values, Abe's tried to improve and expand Japan's foreign policy to the countries that already shared or was ready to share those values. As a result of both these reasons, the Chinese actions and Japan's slow pace, Japan was able to create stronger ties with regional countries like India.

While Tokyo was successful in bringing Australia and India to its side, whether the democratic security diamond will be successful is a big question mark. Japan has been unable to bring the UK or France in to arena. Furthermore, Japan has to overcome its pride and face with its past to bring South Korea into this alliance, if Tokyo really

wants to promote an *Asian NATO*¹⁹⁶. South Korea, like Japan, is endangered by both North Korea and China and has the closest democracy to Japan. In the current context, *democracy* is only used as a *flavor* to name the security organization against China.

Turkey's democracy promotion on the other hand, was more about exporting democracy and the so-called 'Turkish model' to the region. During the early years of the JDP government Ankara was occupied with the improvement of the Turkish economy after the 2001 economic crisis. Because of this, Ankara could not divert its attention to value oriented policies and rather focused more on realist policies such as improving trade relations. However, as the Turkish economy recovered and the regional political structure became ready for this export of values under the Arab Spring, the JDP government started to turn its attention to a more value oriented foreign policy. Turkey tried to promote democracy, the free market and regional cooperation, which would help to start a successful reformation process in the Middle East countries. To achieve this Turkey intensified its rapprochement with Syria, promised economic aid to Tunisia and Egypt, and implemented several agreements to improve regional cooperation.

When the Arab Spring first started it sent a wave of shock across the Middle East. To some countries the news was worrisome, consolidated dictatorships that have lasted more than a several decades were ousted in a few weeks. For Turkey, it signaled an era of opportunity, where Turkey could improve its relations with the region. As much as signaling a chance to improve trade relations, it also enabled Turkey to export its model. When the protests achieved their aims in Tunisia and Egypt, a question arose about the new government form and which model they could follow. Apart from Turkey, the whole Middle East had three 'functioning' democracies, Iran, Lebanon and Israel. Iran with its limited democracy and highly, if not totally, theocratic structure would not be an appealing model to regimes that came after revolutions against authoritarian governments. Israel could not be named by any Muslim country as role model due to the great amount of resentment from the people. The other half of the Middle East countries are either monarchies or dictatorships. Turkey's peaceful relations with the EU, growing economy, and relatively good slate on human rights

¹⁹⁶ Zachary Keck, "Is an Asian NATO Possible?", *The Diplomat*, 17 April 2014, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/is-an-asian-nato-possible/>

issues made it an acceptable alternative, which was more preferable than monarchies and dictatorships, which troubled the region for too long, and which was the main reason behind the Arab Spring.

When Turkey was openly discussed and pointed to as a model by some politicians from Tunisia and Egypt, it created great optimism in Turkey. Turkey did not only produce a model in terms of government model but also the JDP was a role model on its own. Tunisia and Egypt's biggest Islamist parties, Ennahda and Muslim Brotherhood respectively, took lessons from the JDP's ascension to power and more importantly its consolidation of power. Although the JDP's ascension to power can be based on reasons that are not solely about the party, its power consolidation and the continuation of electoral success are mainly a result of party policies. When the JDP first came to power in 2002 it did not pursue openly Islamist rhetoric. Rather than choosing openly confrontational policies, the JDP respected the red lines of the secular state structure, and emphasized the democratization process. By doing so, the JDP managed to avoid an open clash with the power structure until it consolidated its power. While Ennahda followed a similar approach the Muslim Brotherhood followed a more confrontational approach, like the JDP's predecessor the Welfare Party. Similarly while Ennahda managed to stay in power, the Muslim Brotherhood had been ousted from the power by a coup, again like the Welfare Party.

While Japan was able to restructure its discourse and the target countries, Turkey stuck to the same countries, which turned them from foreign policy topics to domestic policy topics. When faced with difficulties, Japan did not pursue an insisting approach and was able to change its attention towards other countries, thus its policies did not enter a deadlock and was able to bring more efficient results. However, while Turkey was able to get over its differences with Russia, Iran, and pre-Arab Spring Syria, after the Arab Spring, it got caught up in Syrian and Egyptian problems. This also affected Turkey's relations with the neighboring countries. Ankara's insistence in Syria can be based on the fact that Turkey and Syria are neighbors, and the amount of violence and ethnic cleansing resulting in refuge makes it a domestic issue. Yet, in its response to the coup in Egypt, Turkey became a side in Egypt's domestic politics, and continued to be so even after it became clear that there was no change on the horizon. Sisi came at power via the coup, and later became elected president via elections. Turkey was left as the only country to oppose the coup, which strained Turkey's relations with Egypt and the regional countries. Furthermore, Turkey's reluctance to condemn some

countries, which were also having problems regarding democracy and freedom, like Iran or Sudan, strained the credibility of its discourse.

For both Turkey and Japan, the democracy promotion is an essential part of their foreign policy. Turkey's rivals in the bid to becoming a regional power are countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia. Apart from Ankara nearly all the regional countries that are in bid for regional power are authoritarian, and the current regional power Russia is authoritarian too. Similarly, Japan's main rival in the region is China has a highly authoritarian one-party system. Because of this, both Turkey and Japan need to show themselves as preferable alternatives to authoritarian regimes, organize cooperation among the democratic countries of their region, and further democratizing more countries via peaceful solutions, which will help their competition against authoritarian countries in their region. But, while Japan is using this discourse pragmatically and reorganized its foreign policy according to the regional changes, Turkey got stuck in Egypt and Syria, which tarnished its reputation and discourse. Turkey although opposing to the brutal methods of the regime in the Syria, supported opposition groups, which fought against the regime with similar methods. In Egypt, Turkish stance was seen as a pro-democratic stance against coups from a country that also suffered several coups. But as the time passed, Turkey's pro-Muslim Brotherhood stance became a domestic issue in Turkey and interference in to the domestic problems of another country. While Japan was successful on using this discourse in its foreign policy due to adaptability, Turkey was unable to co-op with the ever-changing political environment of the Middle East.

CHAPTER IV

MILITARY CAPABILITY AND REGIONAL POWERS

4.1. Hard Power and Regional Powers

While the emphasis has shifted from hard power to soft power in the recent decade, the role hard power plays in the international power structure is unarguable. Realist theorists, such as Hans J. Morgenthau and John J. Mearsheimer, often place hard power, military power to be more precise, at the heart of international politics. Mearsheimer defined power mainly as the military because of the realist theory's great emphasis on hard power and stated, "I define power largely in military terms because offensive realism emphasizes that force is the ultima ratio of international politics"¹⁹⁷

Although underestimated in recent years, it seems the role of military power will not diminish in the international order. While the role of economic power and soft power has risen, the military power is still one of the deciding factors in the international power structure. Even when the economy of a great power collapses, as can be seen in Russia, or starts to decline, as can be seen in the US¹⁹⁸, the sheer might of its military can still keep it as a great power. Also, the last decade showed that without military power to act as persuasion tool, even a small country could threaten a larger country. The threat created by North Korea against South Korea and Japan can be seen as an example. Although no match to either of these countries in economy or human resources, North Korea still is a military threat to the both of them because of their weak militaries.

If the current great powers and regional powers are examined, it can clearly be seen that there is still an increase in the overall military spending in most countries. India, China, Australia, and Russia increased their military spending, while the US still tries to maintain its military leadership even with its declining economy and budget deficit. In such an environment for a country trying to become a regional power, the

¹⁹⁷ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), p.56.

¹⁹⁸ Immanuel M. Wallerstein, *The Decline of American Power: the U.S. in a Chaotic World*, (New York: New Press, 2003).

military capacity is as important as its economic and soft power capacity. Without the necessary military power to act as protection or deterrence, there is no way a country can protect itself. Even though most of the new theories criticize the realist theory's over-emphasis on military power, their emphases on other things such as economic interdependency, soft power and etc. do not provide a better focus either.¹⁹⁹ The economic interdependency was seen and proposed as a tool to prevent future conflicts and wars, but the current international situation shows this may not work in reality, as it works in theory. Since the 1990s the Japanese and Chinese economies are heavily interdependent but the last decade saw extensive Chinese military build-up and continuous incursions in Japanese aerial and maritime boundaries. Since 2010, China increased its defense budget over 10% each year, and at the end of 2014 had a military budget that was five times of Japan's and four times of India's.²⁰⁰ The same situation is happening between Russia and the European Union. While the European Union is relatively dependent on Russia for natural resources, and Russia needs the European Union as a big and stable market for its natural resource exports, this does not stop Russia from interfering in Ukraine and Georgia despite heavy protests from the European Union or from European countries allowing the US to station missile defense systems in their lands despite protests from Russia.

In Japan and Turkey's bid for regional power, military power constitutes an important part. Both countries are in hostile environments. Japan is surrounded by countries that are actively hostile towards it. North Korea, despite its small size and weak economy, poses a threat to the security of Japan with its missile tests, nuclear program, and frequent threats towards Japan and past issues such as the abduction of Japanese civilians.²⁰¹ China is one of the few countries that keep increasing military spending consecutively, and its dominating attitude towards its neighbors and territorial claims increase the tension in the region. China has claims on the Senkaku Islands, which have been under Japanese rule since 1895, and territorial disputes

¹⁹⁹ Scott Burchill et al., *Theories of International Relations*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

²⁰⁰ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_data-1988-2014

²⁰¹ "Japan and North Korea meet over abductions", *Guardian*, 28 October 2014, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/28/japan-and-north-korea-meet-over-abductions>

continue with South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam and Philippines. China also creates artificial islands to act as military bases on the South China Sea, which further complicates the already messed up situation.²⁰² Although Russia is not actively hostile towards Japan, the two countries have not resolved their problems regarding the Russian occupation of Kuril and the Sakhalin islands at the end of the Second World War. Furthermore, the recent Russian interventions in Ukraine and Georgia create suspicions towards a future Russian revisionism. The *friendliest* country towards Japan in its near vicinity is South Korea, which has bittersweet relations with Japan. Both countries face the same problems, a hostile North Korea and revisionist China but this does not change the historical issues created by the Japanese occupation of Korea between 1910 and 1945.

Similarly, Turkey is surrounded by a hostile environment. Turkey had bittersweet relations with both Greece and Iran, ranging between hostile and friendly. On the south, Turkey is neighbor to Syria and Iraq, which both had problems with Turkey throughout history. Syria supported the PKK and had territorial claims over the Hatay province of Turkey. But what is more worrisome is, as of 2015 there has been no functioning central authority in Syria. Syria is divided between groups that are fighting against one another and since nearly each group has international support from some countries, the situation does not promise a quick end. Iraq had its ups and downs in relation to Turkey, and the presence of the PKK camps in Northern Iraq further strained the relations. The weakness of the Iraqi and Syrian states also paved way to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)²⁰³, which made several terrorist attacks on Turkey and further aggravates the situation in Iraq and Syria. Turkey's relations with Armenia are also problematic due to the 1915 Events and Armenian invasion and occupation of Azerbaijan's Nagorny Karabakh province. In the past there were problems with Bulgaria regarding discrimination towards the Turkish population living in Bulgaria. But out of all these neighbors, the only neighbor that poses an actual

²⁰² Matthew Liddy and Ben Spraggon, "Before and after: China builds artificial islands in South China Sea", *ABC News*, 22 September 2015, accessed on 19.10.2015, accessed from <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-09-22/south-china-sea-islands-before-and-after/6794076>

²⁰³ Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Islamic State (IS), Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and ad-Dawlah al-Islameyah fi Iraq wal- Sham (DAES) are commonly used to refer the Salafi Jihadist militant group that is based in Raqqa in Syria and claimed caliphate. I'll use ISIL here, as I use the English shortened versions when naming political parties and other organizations.

military threat to Turkey is Russia. Russia with its military capacity is the only country in the region, which can make an actual difference in regional politics, and the Russian interference in Georgia and Ukraine has created tension in the region. But more importantly, Turkey faces a threat that Japan does not, a separatist terrorist organization. Since the late 1980s Turkey has been facing continuous terrorist attacks from the PKK on both its military and civilian targets. The conflict was slowed down with the JDP government's initiatives, but as of end of 2015, the conflict intensified to a new scale.

In facing such threats both Turkey and Japan have two tools: their security forces, and their memberships in the international security organizations and bilateral alliances. Both Turkey and Japan were in the Western block during the Cold War and they still are. Turkey joined the NATO in 1952, and is still a member of it. Turkey joined the NATO to have a security umbrella against any possible Soviet offensive. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey has needed the help of NATO against possible attacks at its southern border. Also, Ankara is a close ally of Washington and provided it with military bases during the Cold War, the Gulf War, the US War on Terror, and the latest operations against the ISIL. The US is the closest ally and arms provider of Turkey.

Unlike Turkey, Japan was not a member of any great security organization during the Cold War, and was only admitted as strategic partner by the NATO in 2002. Japan's security was mainly based on its alliance with the US. The US has maintained over a few dozen military bases and stationed troops in Japan since the Second World War. Other than the US, Japan signed bilateral agreements with India and Australia in the recent years, as aforementioned, which bore fruit with joint military exercises.

The greatest difference between Ankara and Tokyo is Tokyo has no 'army' since the end of the Second World War.²⁰⁴ Japan's security is provided by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the US Forces in Japan²⁰⁵ (USFJ). The SDF is a security force between the police forces and the regular army, stronger than the first but weaker than

²⁰⁴ The Japanese nuance on the names of army is a bit complicated. Japanese SDF are called "Jieitai" which means "the force that cannot attack" while a normal army is named "Guntai" which is regular army. While the latest constitutional amendments changed its role, the SDF technically is not an army in commonly used sense.

²⁰⁵ "About USFJ", U.S. Forces Japan, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.usfj.mil/AboutUSFJ.aspx>

the latter, and even then it was constitutionally unpermitted from acting overseas. As I explained before, until the same of the Gulf War, Japan was not fully aware of its precarious situation. While there was a desire to change the constitutional restrains, this desire was not shared by general public. Japanese public was in favor of “trading power” which brought comfort Japanese people without taking any policemen role in world. Starting from 1990s Japan changed its military restrains and abilities. In 1993 Japan send SDF forces to peacekeeping mission to Cambodia under UN resolution, and later to other missions. The Japanese Ministry of Defense was officially founded in 2007, which was seen as a move to make Japan a *normal power*. Until 2015, there were strong arguments regarding a change in the law that forbids the foundation of a regular army and use of force outside of Japan²⁰⁶, and it was only changed at the end of 2015.²⁰⁷

4.2. Turkey: Military Threats and Security

The Republic of Turkey was founded on the heritage of the Ottoman Empire, but this transition was not a peaceful one. After the end of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire was stripped to a small territory in Central Anatolia, which sparked the Turkish Independence War. During the Turkish Independence War, Turkey fought against France, Armenia, the UK, and Greece, and before the conclusion of the war the sultanate was abolished, thus ending the six-century rule of the Ottoman Empire. After the war Turkey moved to a more neutral position in favor of status quo, which Ankara kept during the inter-bellum period and for most of the Second World War. However, after the Second World War, Turkey came under demands from the Soviet Union about making territorial changes in the Turkish eastern border, and giving military bases to the Soviet Union on the Bosphorus. To counter the Soviet demands and gather support, Turkey started to deepen its relations with the Western Block and send troops to the Korean War with the hopes of entering the then newly founded NATO.

²⁰⁶ Alexander Martin and Toko Sekiguchi, “Japan Policy Shift to Ease Restrictions on Military”, *The Wall Street Journal*, 1 July 2014, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-policy-shift-to-ease-restrictions-on-military-1404211813>

²⁰⁷ Reiji Yoshida and Mizuho Aoki, “Diet enacts security laws, marking Japan’s departure from pacifism”, *The Japan Times*, 19 September 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/19/national/politics-diplomacy/diet-enacts-security-laws-marking-japans-departure-from-pacifism-2/#.VIRQuXbhDIV>

The Soviet Union as a threat only ceased to exist when the Soviet Union dissolved. However, even though the Soviet Union dissolved, the Russian threat to Turkey persisted. Despite the good relations since the 1990s and 2000s, Russia is the only country in region that poses a threat to Turkish security. The rise of revisionism in Russia under Putin, and especially the Russian military intervention in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing separatist war in Ukraine reminded Turkey that Russia could be a threat. As of the September 2015, there is also the Russian intervention in the Syrian Civil War, where Russia has deployed troops to conduct operations against anti-Assad forces and launched missiles from its ships in the Caspian Sea, which may be read as a show as to its military capabilities to regional countries.²⁰⁸ This Russian threat became more visible when Turkey shot down a Russian plane that entered her air space on 24 November 2015.²⁰⁹ Since then the ongoing tension between Turkey and Russia did not spill in to an open conflict but had its effects on other fields.

The second military threat perceived by Turkey was Greece. Although Greece was in no position to compete demographically, militarily or economically, starting from the 1960s, Greece had been perceived as a threat. There were several reasons for this perception. First, Turkey fought the main bulk of its Independence War against Greece, which created a lasting enmity towards Greece, second, the Turkish minority in Greece and the Greek minority in Turkey and the hardship and discrimination both sides faced, third, aerial and maritime border problems in the Aegean Sea and lastly the Cyprus problem. Despite the fact that Greek military power did not pose a real threat to the Turkish military power, both countries continued their arms race. From the 1960s until the 2000s Turkey maintained a bittersweet relationship with Greece, with occasional *détentes* and escalations. Even though both nations were members of the NATO, there were occasions when they were on the brink of war. Especially during the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 and during the maritime border crisis in 1996, conflicts almost turned into a war. The Greek threat affected the Turkish

²⁰⁸ Kashmira Gander and Olivia Blair, "Russia launches missile at 'Isis targets' in Syria from Caspian Sea – as Turkey is claiming Moscow is targeting rebels", 7 October 2015, *Independent*, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.Independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/russia-in-syria-russia-launches-missiles-against-isis-from-caspian-sea-a6684631.html>

²⁰⁹ "Turkey downs Russian jet", Aljazeera, 24 November 2015, accessed on 10.01.2015, accessed from http://live.Aljazeera.com/Event/Turkey_downs_Russian_jet/207502662

military strategy so much that the only non-NATO assigned army in the Turkish land forces was the Aegean army formed to directly face a possible Greek offense. As of 2015 Greece is no longer perceived as a military threat by Turkey, due to the Greek economic collapse and because it has fallen behind its military means. Still, most of the problems, such as those in Cyprus and Aegean maritime zones, between Turkey and Greece have not been resolved, and furthermore, Turkey's ascension process with the EU where Greece has veto power over Turkey could create another obstacle.²¹⁰

The third military threat Turkey faces is the Kurdish separatist terrorist group, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). After the rebellions in the early years of Turkey's foundation, Turkey was suspicious towards its Kurdish population, which formed the largest minority group in the country. These suspicions led to discrimination and assimilation policies, which then increased the resolve of the opposition against those policies. The PKK was founded in 1974 and carried out its first great attack in 1984. After its first attack, the conflict escalated and there were continuous fighting until the end of the 1990s. Since the early 2000s the conflict cooled down, and under the JDP government there has been a peace process and negotiations between the government and the PKK. However, the renewed clashes in 2015 indicate a peaceful solution or an end to the conflict cannot be expected soon.²¹¹

The burden that the PKK puts on Turkey's economy and military is different than the first two threats. Soviet and Greek threats were military threats that came from other countries, therefore such conflicts could be counter-measured. However, the PKK is not a state, apart from few training camps in the region it has no permanent base. It is an insurgency spread among the civilian population, therefore any measure that will be enacted is likely to affect non-participant civilians. But more importantly, it is nearly impossible to totally differentiate non-participants from members, which creates a security gap. Furthermore, a terrorist organization can become a tool for any rival country, and it is a liability that cannot be afforded by a country, which tries to become a regional power.

²¹⁰ For further information regarding Turkish-Greek disputes see; Mustafa Aydin and Kostais Ifantis (ed.), *Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean* (London: Routledge, 2004)

²¹¹ For further information regarding Turkey-PKK conflict see; Graham Fuller and Henri Barkley, *Turkey's Kurdish Question* (New York: Rowman&Littlefield, 1998).

4.2.1. Turkey's Military Alliances and Security Agreements

Since its establishment, the Republic of Turkey tried to resolve its security issues via regional security organizations, which would provide coordination against any country outside of the region while solving the problems of the region with mutual understanding. The Treaty of Saadabad in 1937 and the Balkan Pact in 1934 can be read in this practice. Both agreements were made before the upcoming Second World War, and aimed to resolve regional issues. The Treaty of Saadabad helped resolve the territorial disputes between Iraq and Iran, and promised cooperation against an outside invasion, however failed to address the participation of Iran by the UK and the Soviet Union during the Second World War.²¹² The Balkan Pact aimed to organize regional countries against any possible aggression from Bulgaria or an invasion by Italy. Although it helped resolve the problems between Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria, it failed to address the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece.²¹³

After the Second World War, Turkey found itself alone, facing the Soviet Union. Due to the reluctance of Turkey to enter the Second World War, allies were reluctant to help Turkey. However, as stated previously, because of the Greek Civil War, the Soviet demands for bases on the Bosphorus, and refusal to agree to have control over nuclear weapons pushed the US to help Turkey under the Truman Doctrine in 1947.²¹⁴ Three years after its foundation Turkey joined the NATO in 1952.

After the Turkish entrance in the NATO, Ankara organized its military structure according to NATO standards. The Turkish military was re-organized according to the NATO doctrine. Turkey with its large army was seen as the eastern vanguard of the NATO against a possible Soviet offense. Turkey hosted several NATO airbases, radars and other kinds of military installations.²¹⁵ Turkey mainly hosted airbases, where US planes with atomic bombs were placed, due to Turkey's geographical position where aircrafts deployed in Turkey could easily hit targets in the Soviet Union over the Black Sea. Over the years, Turkey became an important strategic and military partner in the

²¹² Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi 1914-1995*, (Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2014), 312.

²¹³ Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi 1914-1995*, (Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2014), 302.

²¹⁴ "The Truman Doctrine, 1947", U.S Department of State, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-doctrine>

²¹⁵ "NATO's Eastern Anchor. 24 NATO bases in Turkey", Global Research, 14 February 2011, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.globalresearch.ca/nato-s-eastern-anchor-24-nato-bases-in-turkey/23205>

organization and had the second largest army after the US and a large air fleet with experienced pilots. But Turkey's relations with the NATO were not always good. During the Cyprus Crisis in 1964, American President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a letter to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, where he declared the US and the NATO would not come to the aid of Turkey in case of a Soviet military intervention in a Turkish-Greek crisis.

Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.²¹⁶

This letter created a wave of shock in Turkey against the NATO and the US, which Turkey saw as an unquestionable ally against the Soviet Union.²¹⁷ Effects of this move were seen in the Turkish military intervention to Cyprus in 1974, where Turkey did the operation anyway, despite the criticism of the Western Block. To the further surprise of Ankara, Washington reacted to the intervention with an arms embargo. After the Johnson Letter and the 1974 US Arms Embargo, Ankara realized that it could not entirely rely on the NATO for security, and thus founded its first and only non-NATO commissioned army, the Aegean army, in 1974 as a direct defensive measure against a possible Greek offense after Greece armed the Aegean islands that were close to Turkey.²¹⁸

Despite all this, Turkey has been an important member of the NATO. Since 1999, Turkey sent forces to the NATO missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya and helped patrol the Mediterranean Sea against terrorists, pirates and human traffickers. Turkey's importance for the NATO was thought to be lowered after the end of the Cold War. However, the Gulf War, the Yugoslav Wars, the US War on

²¹⁶ "Letter to Prime Minister Inonu from President Johnson dated June 5, 1964", accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.cyprus-conflict.org/materials/johnsonletter.html>

²¹⁷ "Turkish Reaction to President Johnson's letter to Prime Minister Inonu", Central Intelligence Agency, 6 June 1964, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from

http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000615268.pdf

²¹⁸ Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi 1914-1995*, (Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2014), p. 312.

Terror, and the Syrian Civil War reminded that Europe and the US are far from being threatened. Thus Turkey's geostrategic position became important once again.²¹⁹

The importance of the NATO for Turkey in the past was a security umbrella against the Soviet Union. Since Turkey alone could offer little resistance to an aggression from the Soviet Union, it needed a security organization for protection. But after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ankara's expectations of NATO's role increased. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs site states, "Turkey attaches the utmost importance to NATO's role in maintaining security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and in providing a forum for political-military consultations on topics of interest to its member."²²⁰ From this statement it can be read that Turkey sees the NATO military intervention in Kosovo and Bosnia as legitimate actions to preserve regional peace, even though the NATO is a defensive alliance and neither of these countries were member states.

The importance of the NATO for Turkey continued, even after the end of the Cold War. Since the start of the Syrian Civil War, Turkey's southern border has been affected by the clashes over time. When some stray rockets and projectiles hit the Turkish side of the border, Turkey asked the NATO for patriot defense systems to provide security to its southern cities against any possible missile or rocket attacks from the Syrian side in 2012.²²¹ Since the Syrian government had chemical and biological weapons, Turkey was afraid that it could use those weapons as a desperate last attack, which would be devastating for Turkey's border region.²²² With the start of direct Russian military intervention in Syria in September 2015, the civil war entered a new phase where aircrafts belonging to the NATO and Russia fly over the same zones with military aims. Russian planes made incursions into Turkish air space,

²¹⁹ Sofia Haffdel, "Turkey-NATO Relations at the 60th Anniversary", Global Political Trends Center, March 2012, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://www.gpotcenter.org/dosyalar/PU2_NATO_Hafdel_MAR2012.pdf

²²⁰ "Turkey's Relations with NATO", Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/nato.en.mfa>

²²¹ Robert Burns, "Pentagon to send Patriot missiles, 400 troops to Turkey to help NATO defense against Syria", *The Star*, 14 December 2012, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2012/12/14/pentagon_to_send_patriot_missiles_400_troops_to_turkey_to_help_nato_defence_against_syria.html

²²² Eric Schmitt and Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. to Send 2 Missile Units to Turkey to Deter Syrians", *The New York Times*, 13 December 2012, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/14/world/middleeast/us-to-send-patriot-missiles-to-turkey-to-deter-syria.html?_r=0

which the NATO condemned in strong words.²²³ NATO offered to station more missile defense systems, against further incursions from Russia.²²⁴

The US is one of the few great powers, which Turkey did not directly fight in the past²²⁵, therefore enjoyed better relations than other great powers. While Turkey was skeptical of France and the UK due to their mandates in the Middle East and was afraid of a possible move against its territories from the Soviet Union, the US had no direct territorial or hegemonic appearance in the region. Therefore, Turkey had no reason to fear the US. In the inter-bellum period there were few interactions between both countries. However, Turkey became a country of interest during the Second World War due to its strategic location, and after the war it kept its geo-strategic importance.

Turkey formed an important part in the US containment policy against the Soviet Union. Turkey blocked the direct route between the Soviet Union and the Middle East. Because of this, the US supported Turkey under the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall program. These aid programs made the US one of the most important allies of Turkey in a short period.

Since the 1950s Turkey has been one of the foremost allies of the US, hosted several American military bases, and let the US military deploy nuclear warheads and missiles on Turkish soil. This made Turkey one of the targets of the Soviet Union, due to the close proximity of the missiles to important parts of the Soviet Union. One of the major reasons for the Soviet Union's missile deployment in Cuba may be read as a response to the US Jupiter missiles, which were stationed in Turkey and could hit Moscow.²²⁶ Apart from the actions against the Soviet Union, the US bases in Turkey played instrumental role in the US intervention in Lebanon, the Gulf War and the US

²²³ "NATO rejects Russian explanation for Turkey incursion", *Aljazeera*, 07 October 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.Aljazeera.com/news/2015/10/nato-rejects-russian-explanation-turkey-incursion-151006130012896.html>

"NATO warns Russia after jet strays into Turkey", *Aljazeera*, 06 October 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, access from <http://www.Aljazeera.com/news/2015/10/nato-warns-russia-jet-strays-turkey-151005155403930.html>

²²⁴ Kareem Shaheen, "NATO ready to 'defend' Turkey as Russia strikes Syria", *the Guardian*, 8 October 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/08/nato-ready-to-deploy-forces-to-defend-turkey-against-any-threats>

²²⁵ The US entered the First World War very late, and did not send troops to Middle East.

²²⁶ The proximity of the missiles stationed in Turkey to the important cities and sites in the Soviet Union may be seen as one of the reasons behind the Soviet move to station missiles in Cuba.

War on terror. Because of these bases, Turkey is “a key partner for U.S policy in the surrounding region”²²⁷, especially after the fall of the Pahlavi regime in Iran.

While Turkey proved to be an important strategic partner for the US for its overseas military operations in the Middle East, Near East and the Eastern Europe, the US proved to be the main military benefactor of Turkey. The US military aid and grants were crucial for the Turkish military in its acquisitions and modernizations. Much of the armament and modern equipment of the Turkish armed forces were acquired from the US, and this was the reason why the arms embargo was disastrous for Turkish-American relations. The US Patton tanks have been the main tanks of Turkish armored divisions, even as of 2015, most of the tanks in the Turkish armored regiments are either German or American.²²⁸ The US was also the main provider of aircraft to the Turkish air forces; Turkey has 240 F-16s and more of other American-origin aircraft.²²⁹

More importantly, apart from being a supplier the US was the main protector of Turkey, both in the NATO and outside. Without US support, Turkey would have had to bow to Soviet demands after the Second World War. After the Truman Doctrine, Turkey found itself supported against the Communist threat from both inside and outside. Because of this, Turkey has been in favor of the US, which affected both the military and the diplomatic stance. Turkey supported the US goals, even when it contradicted its own gains; During the Cold War basing the US planes and missiles made Turkey a primary target for Soviet retaliation or pre-emptive strikes, and during the Gulf War Turkey let the US to use its facilities and could have become a target for Iraqi Scud missiles for harboring American planes.

4.2.2. Turkish Military Self-Sufficiency

Ankara’s military self-sufficiency is in contrast to its regional power bid or military capacity. Despite fielding an impressive arsenal and a massive army, Turkey had little self-sufficiency in terms of production. In its early years, Turkey did not

²²⁷ “U.S. Relations with Turkey”, U.S. Department of State, 24 February 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm>

²²⁸ “Armored Units”, Turkish Land Forces, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.kkk.tsk.tr/en/Siniflar/ZirhliBirlikler.aspx>

²²⁹ For further information see; “Turkish Air Force Current Inventory”, Hava Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <https://www.hvkk.tsk.tr/TR/EnvanterdekiUcaklar.aspx?ID=7>

make significant investments in arms production due to other more immediate needs. After the Second World War, with acceptance to the Western Block and access to American products, Turkey continued its previous trend and bought the necessary equipment from other countries rather than producing its own. However, after the 1974 US Arms Embargo, as an effort to increase its self-sufficiency Turkish armed forces formed its own companies in the 1970s and 1980s. Aselsan, Roketsan and Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) were founded to provide advanced weapons and vehicle needs of the Turkish Armed Forces.

Among such companies, TAI was instrumental for the modernization of the Turkish Air Force and also provided service to regional countries. Most of the F16s in Turkish Air Force were modernized by the TAI.²³⁰ It also provided its services to regional and allied countries like Egypt²³¹, Jordan²³² and Pakistan²³³. Such production and modernization programs helped the TAI gather enough experience to start the production of its own designs. The TAI started its own productions by training aircraft; drones and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), like Şimşek and Turna target drones²³⁴, the Hürkuş training aircraft²³⁵, and Anka reconnaissance UAV²³⁶. But more importantly with the experience gathered from both domestic and foreign designs, the TAI plans to produce its first fighter aircraft by the 2020s.²³⁷ The TAI plans to produce a fifth-generation fighter aircraft that is currently called the Turkish

²³⁰ “F-16 Modernization Serial Program”, Turkish Aerospace Industries, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <https://www.tai.com.tr/en/project/f-16-modernization-serial-program>

²³¹ “Egypt F-16 Program”, Turkish Aerospace Industries, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <https://www.tai.com.tr/en/project/egypt-f-16-program>

²³² “RJAF F-16 Program”, Turkish Aerospace Industries, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <https://www.tai.com.tr/en/project/rjaf-f-16-program>

²³³ “The Last Four TAI-Modernized F-16s Were Delivered To Pakistan Air Force”, Turkish Aerospace Industries, 2 September 2014, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <https://www.tai.com.tr/en/basin-bultenleri/the-last-four-tai-modernized-f-16s-were-delivered-to-pakistan-air-force>

²³⁴ “Şimşek”, Turkish Aerospace Industries, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <https://www.tai.com.tr/exn/project/simsek>

“Turna”, Turkish Aerospace Industries, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <https://www.tai.com.tr/en/project/turna>

²³⁵ “Hürkuş Training Aircraft”, Turkish Aerospace Industries, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <https://www.tai.com.tr/en/project/hurkus>

²³⁶ “Anka”, Turkish Aerospace Industries, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <https://www.tai.com.tr/en/project/anka-medium-altitude-long-endurance-uav-system>

²³⁷ “Jet Trainer and Fighter Aircraft Conceptual Design Project”, Turkish Aerospace Industries, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <https://www.tai.com.tr/en/project/jet-trainer-and-fighter-aircraft-conceptual-design-project>

Fighter Experimental (TFX) by the 2020s to give Turkish Air Force an edge in the race. Ankara wants TFX to be domestically produced to stop further decrease of reliance on outside sources. As of the December 2015, the TFX is in the design phase. The TAI also produced Turkey's first domestically produced attack helicopter T129 ATAK.²³⁸ T129 ATAK was produced to fulfill the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces as well as the international market.²³⁹ The TAI produced Turkish Armed Forces' order and delivered it in 2014, thus Turkish Armed Forces began to use its first domestic attack helicopter after decades of foreign productions.²⁴⁰

Another milestone in Ankara's national military vehicles program is Turkey's tank project. Since its foundation, Turkish Armed Forces armored regiments had to rely on imported tanks, mainly American and German origin. This put Turkey in a precarious situation, where the US prohibited Turkey to use the equipment imported from the US in Cyprus. Turkey intends to produce a tank that is completely or nearly completely produced domestically to be used in the Turkish Armed Forces.²⁴¹ However, due to the technical and production issues the production plans were delayed. Although Ankara wanted the new tank to be fully domestic, Turkish industrial know-how was not sufficient, and the plans and bargains with out-sources were problematic. The last part of the problems was solved by finding a domestic producer after the initial plans to acquire Japanese and Korean engines failed.²⁴² After the initial testing of the first prototypes, Altay tanks are supposed to be ready to be dispatched to Turkish Armed forces in 2018.

²³⁸ "T129 ATAK Helikopteri", Turkish Aerospace Industries, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <https://www.tai.com.tr/tr/proje/atak>

²³⁹ Bartoz Glowacki, "TAI details Polish potential for T129 ATAK", *Flightglobal*, 03 September 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/tai-details-polish-potential-for-t129-atak-416338/>

²⁴⁰ Beth Stevenson, "TAI completes deliveries of first T129 batch to Turkish army", *Flightglobal*, 17 August 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/tai-completes-deliveries-of-first-t129-batch-to-turk-415786/>

²⁴¹ "Milli tank Altay 2018'de TSK envanterine girecek", *Anadolu Agency*, 14 May 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/milli-tank-altay-2018de-tsk-envanterine-girecek/47531>

²⁴² "Milli tankın motoru da yerli olacak", 17 March 2015, *Anadolu Agency*, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/milli-tankin-motoru-da-yerli-olacak/66193>

4.3. Japan: Military Threats and Security

As Turkey, Japan has an imperial history and carries the burdens of this history. Apart from two Mongol invasion attempts to Japan in the 13th century, and two Japanese invasion attempts to Korea in the 16th century, Japan has isolated itself from the rest of the world in military terms. Continental countries, such as Korea and China, were not interested in expanding their realms to Japan, thus Japan was left free of invasions. Likewise, the internal divisions between the daimyos and the constant conflicts also influenced Japan to not have expansionist ideas. However, this changed when Japan started to modernize in the late 19th century under the Emperor Meiji. When the US ships under the command of Commodore Matthew C. Perry opened Japan to foreign trade and influence under the Convention of Kanagawa in 1854, under gun-boat diplomacy, Japanese elites saw they could no longer continue their isolationist policy to keep their country safe and had to modernize in order to survive. This incident was the first external incident Japan faced since the failed Mongol invasion attempts. This process turned Japan into a modern industrial state, which needed resources to sustain its growing industry.²⁴³ To obtain these resources, Japan waged war against both of its neighbors, China and Russia, annexed Korea, and later during the Second World War attacked the Netherlands, France, the UK, Australia and the US.

During the Second World War Japanese troops committed atrocities in the occupied countries, which still stains Tokyo's relations with many countries in its region. During the war, the Japanese Imperial Army carried out numerous massacres, war crimes, and started controversial policies, such as the comfort women issue. Even seventy years after the Second World War, Japan still has historical problems that aggravate its relations with its neighbors.²⁴⁴ These unresolved historical issues sustain the portrait of Japan as an aggressor country that is able to attack other countries, despite Japan's more than six decades of peaceful pacifist history.

²⁴³ William G. Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

²⁴⁴ "S Korea and Japan leaders meet for first time in years", *Aljazeera*, 02 November 2016, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.Aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/korea-japan-leaders-meet-time-years-151102014419349.html>

"Japan, S Korea agree to work to resolve WWII sex slave issue", *Daily Mail*, 2 November 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3298773/Leaders-S-Korea-Japan-China-meet-rare-summit.html>

Tokyo's security problems are caused by its immediate neighbors, China, North Korea and Russia. Japan still did not conclude a peace treaty with Russia after the Second World War. Although it is unlikely that Russia may become a security problem for Japan due to lack of strategic interest, it still has to be taken into plans due to Russia's interventionist policies in the recent years. And more importantly while Japanese military expenditure has been at similar levels over the last decades, which are fixed to 1% of the Japanese GDP, Russian military spending has been rising each year since 1998, and has surpassed Japanese military spending in 2008.²⁴⁵ Russian military spending was around \$37 billion in 2002, but rose to \$61 billion in 2008 and \$91 billion in 2014, compared to Japan's \$60 billion in 2002, \$59 billion in 2008 and \$59 billion in 2014. North Korea poses little threat to Japan in terms of conventional arms, as its military is outdated and North Korea does not have an economy that can improve its military forces. However, North Korea has a ballistic missile program and a nuclear weapon program, and as was seen in the previous missile tests, it has advanced in its programs, despite international pressure. North Korea launched its first ballistic missile tests of Taepo-dong-1 in 1998, and from 1998 to 2006 it increased the accuracy and the range of its missiles, and carried out an unsuccessful nuclear test in 2006.²⁴⁶ This makes North Korea a threat for Japan, because even if one missile with a nuclear warhead passes through Japanese ballistic missile defense systems it will be disastrous for a highly urbanized country like Japan.

It can be said that the biggest threat to Japan's security comes from China. Although China has claimed to be a *peaceful* country with *harmonic* aims rather than *hegemonic*, currently it is one of the two revisionist countries in the region, with the other being North Korea. To understand China's revisionism, understanding its history might be helpful. Apart from a brief loss of power in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, China has been the most influential country in the East and South East Asia.²⁴⁷ Today, China is trying to assert its old position in the region once more. To this end, China is trying to revert its losses in the previous centuries and impose its hegemonic position over countries that were once a vassal of China. To revert its

²⁴⁵ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database.

²⁴⁶ Linus Hagström and Christian Turesson, "Among threats and a 'perfect excuse': Understanding change in Japanese foreign security policy", *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 21:3 (2009): 301.

²⁴⁷ Denny Roy, *Return of the Dragon: Rising China and Regional Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).

territorial losses China has claims on nearly all of its neighbors. To this end, China had border clashes with the Soviet Union, wars with both India and Vietnam, made border revisions with Central Asian countries, which changed the border in favor of China, and has territorial claims on Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, India, and Vietnam. And to further escalate the already tense region, China started a program to create artificial islands on the South China Sea, to serve as possible military outposts.²⁴⁸ These artificial islands were built on coral reefs that were half submerged, and few of the islands are as big as four million square meters, have landing strips big enough to land military aircraft and can serve as supply and docking points to small and medium military ships. Furthermore, these islands are hundreds of kilometers away from China, while they are closer to all other claimants; few of these islands are only a few kilometers from other nations, which has the potential to further escalate the military tension in the region.²⁴⁹ While Beijing's claims on many places can be backed by historic claims, Beijing's claims on the islands and the fact that it is building military bases on the artificial islands shows it has long term military intentions in the region.

But, what makes Beijing the biggest threat to the region, and to the security of Japan, is not Beijing's desire to return to its status of old times, but the fact that it actually has the resources to do so. Chinese military spending has increased more than 10% over the last ten consecutive years. This increase can be seen as acceptable, due to the increase in Beijing's overall GDP, but as of the end of 2014 Beijing's annual military expenditure was five times of Japan, despite having a GDP of two times of Japan.²⁵⁰ And this is only the known spending, as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute indicates, some part of the Chinese military spending is done secretly and there is no way to learn the exact amount spent. Moreover the effects of this increase in the military budget can be seen from the recent increase in the quality of the Chinese military arsenal. Between 2000 and 2013, Chinese destroyer fleet

²⁴⁸ Matthew Liddy and Ben Spraggon, "Before and after: China builds artificial islands in South China Sea", *ABC News*, 22 September 2015, accessed on 19.10.2015, accessed from <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-09-22/south-china-sea-islands-before-and-after/6794076>

²⁴⁹ Jeremy Page and Julian E. Barnes, "China Expand Island Construction in Disputed South China Sea", *The Wall Street Journal*, 18 February 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-expands-island-construction-in-disputed-south-china-sea-1424290852>

²⁵⁰ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database.

increased from 20 ships to 29, which makes roughly a 45% increase.²⁵¹ In the same period, the submarine fleet increased from 50 to 63, which makes a 26% percent increase, with 6 of the new submarines having capacity of launching ballistic missiles.²⁵² More importantly, China bought an aircraft carrier and plans to produce two more before 2020. While many battle ships can be explained as defensive precautions, an aircraft carrier is not a defensive vessel and shows the desire for a blue water fleet, which can act far from its mainland to pursue the military aims of the country. Similarly, the Chinese Air Force went under a rapid upgrading and enlargement process. Since 2000 the air forces saw a rapid decrease in the number of aircraft, but on the contrary, there has been great improvement in the quality of the aircraft. While the number of the second-generation fighter aircrafts decreased, third-generation and fourth-generation aircrafts replaced them in the inventory²⁵³, and furthermore China is developing fifth-generation stealth fighter jets which can match those of the US. The most worrisome development for Japan's national security is the number of Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and short-range missiles. From 1999 to 2007, the number of ICBM's tripled and the number of short-range missiles nearly quintupled.²⁵⁴ Japan is one of the most likely targets for these missiles, and adding the Chinese nuclear arsenal to this makes it one of the gravest threats to Japan.

Beijing claims to be harmonic, rather than hegemonic. During an interview with the Japanese press in 2007 Chinese Premier stated:

China is committed to peaceful development. This is determined by China's national conditions, its cultural tradition and the nature of its system. China's development will not affect or threaten any country. China is still a developing country. It does not seek hegemony. China has a long way to go before it can become a developed country. It will never seek hegemony even when it is developed. For a big country with a population of 1.3 billion, China's defense expenditure, in terms of either size or proportion, is not high. It is lower than that of many developed countries and even many developing countries. Let me make

²⁵¹ Number of active warships in People's Liberation Army Navy, Global Security, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/navy.htm>

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Number of active aircraft in People's Liberation Army Air Force, Global Security, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plaaf-equip.htm>

²⁵⁴ Linus Hagström and Christian Turesson, 301.

it perfectly clear: China's limited military capabilities are solely for upholding its security and national unity.²⁵⁵

But at the same time China accused Japan's ballistic missile defense system as "far exceed the defensive needs of Japan" and risks a regional arms race.²⁵⁶ How the ICBMs, nuclear warheads, aircraft carriers and an expanding air force are defensive actions but a ballistic defense system is offensive and may trigger an arms race is incomprehensible. In such an environment, Japan has the lowest military expenditure compared to its GDP in its neighborhood. In 2014 Chinese expenditure was 2%, Russian expenditure was 4.5% and South Korean expenditure 2.6% while Japanese expenditure was 1%.²⁵⁷

4.3.1. Japan's Bilateral Security Agreements and the US

Japan, unlike Turkey, does not maintain its security via an international security organization, but via bilateral security agreements. While the NATO is active in North America and Europe, there is no such organization in the East and South East Asia. Alternatively, Japan has bilateral and trilateral security agreements on a nation-to-nation level, similar to pre-First World War European alliances. Japan has bilateral agreements with India²⁵⁸, Australia²⁵⁹ and the US²⁶⁰, and a trilateral agreement with Australia and the US, as pointed out earlier.²⁶¹ Although it did not come into effect, there were talks about quadrilateral security agreement among Japan, the US, Australia and India, today four countries still continue the Malabar military exercises. Most of

²⁵⁵ "Joint Interview Given by Premier Wen Jiabao to Japanese Press", Consulate-General of the People's Republic of China in San Francisco, 04 April 2007, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.chinaconsulatesf.org/eng/xw/t309115.htm>

²⁵⁶ Linus Hagström and Christian Turesson, 302.

²⁵⁷ World Bank Military data regarding military expenditures of countries as percent of GDP, North Korea's military expenditure's percentage to its GDP is unknown, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS>

²⁵⁸ "Joint Statement Towards Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership", Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 December 2006, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/pdfs/joint0612.pdf>

²⁵⁹ "Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation", Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 March 2007, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0703.html>

²⁶⁰ Latest version of the US-Japan security agreement; "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration On Security", Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 April 1996, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html>

²⁶¹ Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, Joint Statement Australia-Japan-United States", Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 March 2006, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0603-2.html>

the agreements are defensive in nature, where the military support is often bound to a defensive clause.

The first and foremost bilateral military agreement was signed with the US. During the US occupation period, occupation administration disbanded all Japanese armed forces. After that, it was the US' responsibility to provide order and security in Japan and this was formalized with the *Security Treaty Between Japan and the United States* in 1951.²⁶² However, the Korean War showed the regional countries were in danger of Communist takeover. Because of this the US occupation administration allowed the establishment of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in 1954. The 1951 Security Treaty was turned in to *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America* in 1960, where Japan also promised to help the US in Japan's defense.²⁶³ The articles IV and V promised if Japan's security came under threat, the US would come to aid of its ally. Under the Yoshida Doctrine²⁶⁴, this American guarantee to its security gave Japan the ability to develop its economic reconstruction, but when the US President Richard Nixon made a surprise visit to China in 1971, Japan was caught unready. Until then, Japan trusted the US against any possible Chinese threat, but when the US showed it was ready to conciliate with China, Japanese security based on the US came under question. However, even after a few changes in the treaties, withdrawal of some of the troops and closure of bases, the US is still the most important security partner of Japan.

The question as to whether Japan can utterly trust the US with its defense paved way to the growing desire to change Japan's post-war military structure. Especially during the prime ministership of Junichiro Koizumi, between 2001 and 2006, and Shinzo Abe's first term, in 2007, Japan tried to diversify its defense strategy. Japan tried to diversify its security agreements rather than solely depending on the US. In 2007 Shinzo Abe visited Australia and India, promoting bilateral security agreements

²⁶² "Security Treaty Between Japan and the United States of America", Database of Institute of Oriental Culture University of Tokyo, 8 September 1951, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19510908.T2E.html>

²⁶³ "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America", Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 January 1960, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html>

²⁶⁴ The Yoshida Doctrine is the name given Japanese foreign policy started by Japan's first post-war Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida. The main idea of the doctrine was to rely on the US for the Japan's security while Japan would rebuilt its devastated economy. The Yoshida Doctrine started the extensive Japanese-American security cooperation and Japanese anti-militarism.

and further agreements that included the US. Since Abe's second term, started in 2012; these efforts again became a primary cornerstone of the Japanese foreign policy. This new Japanese security policy was perceived as an "Asian NATO" to keep China contained through the coalition of the endangered regional countries.²⁶⁵ This was called the Asian NATO due to Abe's continuous reference to the shared western values of possible members against an authoritarian regime, in the Asian case, China.

The 1960 Security Treaty was changed a few times, but in all revisions the US restated it was the guarantor statue for the security of Japan. However, due to the economic interdependency between China and the US, it is still doubtful whether Washington would back Tokyo against Beijing in a possible confrontation in the East China Sea, especially in an environment where Beijing's actions become more and more challenging. However, the most important point of the later revisions is that Japan promised to help the US militarily outside of Japan, which was criticized as Japan's return to its military past.

After the China-India War in 1962²⁶⁶ and the continuous Chinese claims on the Indian Territory, Japan found a strategic partner in India against China. While India and Japan had what the other needed economically, with one side having capital and the other side having human and material resources, what made them possible military partners was Beijing's attitude. After its initial independence, Delhi maintained positive relations with Beijing, since both countries needed to consolidate their administration. However, after the 1960s, China turned its attention to its losses in the 19th century, and had considerable tension with India. With both countries' successful integration into world economy, India and China have massive economic capacity at their hands to pursue their foreign policy. Especially, the Chinese military build-up over the recent years created great concern in India, who is one of the main possible targets.

When Shinzo Abe became prime minister in 2006 for the first time, he approached India as a potential strategic partner in the region. His visit to India in 2007

²⁶⁵ Zachary Keck, "Should China Welcome an Asian NATO?", *The Diplomat*, 30 April 2014, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/should-china-welcome-an-asian-nato/>

Zachary Keck, "Is an Asian NATO Possible?", *The Diplomat*, 17 April 2014, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/is-an-asian-nato-possible/>

²⁶⁶ Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi 1914-1995*, (Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2014), p. 605.

led to the *Joint Statement Towards Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership*.²⁶⁷ There, Japan and India agreed to expand their cooperation in many fields, and in the same year Japan started to participate in Malabar military exercises. Despite not participating in some of the exercises, Japan participated in Malabar exercises in 2009, 2011, 2014, and latest in 2015.²⁶⁸ Although this initiative was cut short by Abe's electoral loss, when Abe became prime minister again in 2012 he immediately restarted the initiative. Abe visited India in 2014 again, and this time the *Japan-India Joint Statement: Intensifying the Strategic and Global Partnership* expressed stronger defensive cooperation, continuation of the joint military exercises, and a desire for trilateral defense cooperation, which would include the US.²⁶⁹ As Asia's second and third military spenders, an Indian-Japanese cooperation may prove to be a great improvement for Japan's security diagram.

Australia has drawn big interest from the Japanese policy makers starting from Koizumi and continued during Abe's first prime ministership. After Koizumi's visit to Australia in 2002, a joint press statement was given by Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi and Australian Prime Minister John Howard, where they promoted "an expanding dialogue and cooperation between the two nations on security and defense

²⁶⁷ "Joint Statement Towards Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership", Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 December 2006, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/pdfs/joint0612.pdf>

²⁶⁸ "Malabar 2009", Bharat Rakshak, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/Galleries/Bridges/2009/Malabar/>

Sandeep Dikshit, "Japan to take part in India-U.S. naval exercises again", *The Hindu*, 16 February 2011, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/article1459675.ece>

Akhilesh Pillalamarri, "India, Japan, and the US Hold Joint Naval Exercises", *The Diplomat*, 25 July 2014, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/india-japan-and-the-us-hold-joint-naval-exercises/>

Abhijit Singh, "Malabar 2015: Strategic Power Play in the Indian Ocean", *The Diplomat*, 28 October 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/malabar-2015-strategic-power-play-in-the-indian-ocean/>

²⁶⁹ "Japan-India Joint Statement: Intensifying the Strategic and Global Partnership", Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 January 2014, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000025064.pdf>

"Defense cooperation ties with India bolstered", 26 January 2014, *The Japan Times*, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/01/26/national/politics-diplomacy/defense-cooperation-ties-with-india-bolstered/#.Vk7KE3bhDIV>

Franz-Stefan Gady, "India and Japan Continues to Deepen Their Defense Ties", *The Diplomat*, 01 April 2015, accessed 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/india-and-japan-continue-to-deepen-their-defense-ties/>

issues, underpinned by their close strategic interests”.²⁷⁰ When Abe took the position of the prime ministership, Japan engaged in a new series of initiatives towards Australia. His visit in 2007 resulted in *Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation*.²⁷¹ This declaration promised annual meetings between the Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers of both countries. Australia participated in Malabar joint naval exercises in 2007, alongside Japan. However, the instabilities on the political stages of both countries again stopped further development of the cooperation and the cooperation was left at a meeting level, and was not implemented further at a practical level. But with Abe’s second term in Japan in 2012 and the Liberal Party’s return under Tony Abbot in Australia in 2013, possibility for future and further cooperation was on the rise. The defense cooperation was continued as planned in 2007, with the 6th Defense and Foreign Ministers meeting was held in November 2015.²⁷² Japan is among the competitors for the improvement of the Australian submarine fleet.²⁷³ But Australia is still reluctant to signing an agreement with Japan. Furthermore, the new Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull is considered pro-Chinese, and how this will turnout for Japanese-Australian partnership is yet to be seen.²⁷⁴

4.3.2. Japan’s Military Self-Sufficiency

When the Second World War ended, the US tried to make Japan a demilitarized country, as Germany. To this end, they disbanded all branches of the military, abolished the Ministry of Defense and put a clause in the new constitution where Japan forfeit its right to use arms, except in the case of an offense against its homeland. But the emergence of the Korean War showed the US that they needed a strong ally in the

²⁷⁰ “Joint Press Statement by Prime Minister John Howard and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi”, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 2002, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pm0204/joint.html>

²⁷¹ “Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation”, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 March 2007, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0703.html>

²⁷² “Sixth Japan-Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations”, Australian Ministry of Defense, 22 November 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2015/11/22/minister-for-defence-joint-communique-sixth-japan-australia-22-foreign-and-defence-ministerial-consultations/>

²⁷³ Mark Thomas, “Australia and Japan: The Unknown Unknowns”, *The Diplomat*, 21 November 2015,

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

East Asia, which could play a vanguard role in case of a Communist offense until the US forces could be moved there. Because of this, and with the fresh memories of the Second World War, the American occupation authorities let Japan to found Self-Defense Forces in 1954, which was an improvement for the Japanese police force but was still weaker than a conventional military force.

However, the ongoing Cold War made the US government re-consider their stance on Japanese military, and with the later amendments on the Japan-US security agreement, the Japanese SDF turned from ‘riot police’ with light weapons to a military force with land, naval and air branches, and obtained aircrafts and ships. But still, the SDF is a questionable military at its best. Its only source of manpower as of 2015 is volunteers, as there is no conscription in the Japanese constitution. Furthermore the SDF has no combat experience of any kind. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution renounces Japan’s right to wage war or use arms, other than self-defense. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution states:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.²⁷⁵

Article 9 forbade Japan to send its forces to any combat area, which included the UN Peacekeeping Missions. In cases where Japan participated in the UN Peacekeeping Missions, like Cambodia, South Sudan and Timor-Leste, Japanese troops were given non-combat roles as engineering, supplies, logistics and training missions. This deprived Japanese forces from any combat experience outside, and since Japan had no interior terrorist organizations, Japanese forces’ experience is limited to training and their military exercises.

Japan needed to amend Article 9 and become a *normal* power before it could become a regional power. Japan with its constitutional restrains had a difficult time in showing its military importance to other countries and gathering support for an Asian NATO. Article 9 was amended in the Japanese Lower House of the Parliament in May

²⁷⁵ “The Constitution of Japan”, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet information page, 3 November 1946, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html

2015, and in the Upper House in September 2015, marking an end to the seventy-year pacifism.²⁷⁶ Also, the SDF and all its branches are, and will likely continue to be, behind in military inventory in the face of their Chinese counterparts. Therefore, the military capability of the SDF forces is not important in the inventory or numbers, but the ability to help its allies. The new law allows Japan to send SDF forces in cases where its allies are under threat of force, which can greatly help Japan in its military agreements. Previously, Japan could not commit such a promise because it was against its constitution.

4.4. Evaluation

Unlike some contender countries, such as Brazil or Mexico, Japan and Turkey are in tumultuous regions where their military capabilities constitute an important part of their bid for regional power. Without the ability to pursue their policies on the hard realities of today's world, neither country can be successful in their bid. A middle power can have interests in a region, but when its interests are hurt, it can simply change its attention to another region in the world. But a regional power is entrenched to its region, therefore it needs the military capacity to react to regional developments and provide security for itself and for its region.

Currently, Turkey is considered a military power in its region, due to the immense size of its armed forces and its military inventory. Furthermore, Turkey pays great attention to increase the effectiveness of its military while trying to expand its arsenal. In the recent years Turkish armed forces saw a decrease in numbers, while the number of contracted military personal increased. This may give Turkey an edge in military terms, where professional soldiers can spend long years in their service area and become experts in their region rather than conscripts rotating every few months. The investment on the Turkish military arsenal, both in terms of numbers and modernization, is also a move that was badly needed. While Turkey has an impressive inventory in overall numbers compared to other countries in its region, some of its equipment is old and in need of modernization. This modernization was normally done

²⁷⁶ Reiji Yoshida and Mizuho Aoki, "Diet enacts security laws, marking Japan's departure from pacifism", *The Japan Times*, 19 September 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/19/national/politics-diplomacy/diet-enacts-security-laws-marking-japans-departure-from-pacifism-2/#.VIRQuXbhDIV>
"Japan to allow military role overseas in historic move", *BBC*, 18 September 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.BBC.com/news/world-asia-34287362>

via contractors from other countries, mainly Western, which then made Turkey a regular customer. But as seen from the 1974 American Arms Embargo or the recent Turkish-Israeli problems, this continuous dependency on other countries may hinder Turkish military forces. For a country with a regional power claim, this is a great problem that requires immediate attention.

However, the effectiveness of the Turkish military at a regional level is yet to be proven. The ongoing Syrian Civil War showed the lack of aerial and ballistic missile defense systems in Turkey. The ballistic missile defense system contract that was given to a Chinese company also showed that Ankara's military commitments might prove a hindrance on Ankara's future plans to develop its military capacity, as NATO protested over it. Turkey was unable to prove the systematic control of its Syrian border, and was accused of being lenient on the border crossing which was abused by terrorist organizations to smuggle weapons and fighters. With the recent entrance of Russia in the Syrian conflict, Turkey was unable to prevent the continuous violations of the Russian planes in its airspace. To what extent Ankara's military alliances will help it in a possible offence against its national security is another question. With the bitter memories of the Johnson Letter and the 1974 US Arms Embargo, to what extent can Turkey trust its alliances with the NATO and the US is doubtful. With an increasingly interventionist Russia, Turkey can find itself in a hostile environment very easily. In the recent years the US showed that it could not afford an active conflict with Russia, first in Georgia then in Ukraine.

In contrast to Turkey, the security problems that Japan is facing shows that Japan needs to become a *normal* power before it can become a *regional* power. Japan with its current military restraints will have a hard time providing security for its own region. Surely Japan's military capacity is greater than many countries, but due to the situation in its region, Japan cannot be considered a regional military power. Japan can produce complex military vehicles, and is increasing the SDF's power capacity, but still Japanese armed forces are no match to those of Russia or China. While the military power of China increases, the gap between Japan and China will keep increasing, where Japan cannot compete. Recent changes and improvements in Japan's armed forces can only prove influential if Japan can organize a NATO-like organization against China.

For Japan's security, Japan is bound to find partners, and due to China's military investments and revisionism Japan can find partners in the region. The relations with

India regarding a coordinated defense policy are promising. India's political stability and economic capacity mark such a relationship as likely to improve. But on the other hand, Australia is stuck between its concern over the rising Chinese military power and interventionism and Australia's trade relations with China. This makes Australia highly vulnerable to Chinese economic retaliation, in case of Japanese-Australian security cooperation. Thus an Asian NATO seems unlikely unless Japan puts considerable resources to counter China's economic relations with the regional countries. Further, South Korea can be the partner Japan needs in the region, as both countries are threatened by China and North Korea, both are allies of the US and both are democratic countries with similar values. However, Japan's imperial history and its rule in Korea create historical obstacles. To further restrain the relations, Japan insists on not making the necessary apologies and acknowledgments regarding the historical issues demanded by South Korea. In a recent meeting, where Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Korean Prime Minister Park Geun-hye met for the first time, Abe stated both countries needed to resolve the historical issues and "build a new future of forward-looking Japan-Korea relations".²⁷⁷ This new opening can be the catalyzer that was needed to amend the historical issues between both nations and form a stronger front against both North Korea and China.

Furthermore, Japan is a democracy and its military effectiveness is bound to its political stability. Since 2001 Japan had seven prime ministers, and thirteen defense ministers in just eight years since its foundation. Nearly all the Japanese prime ministers lacked the political support or had little time to make a change in politics. This political uncertainty causes administrative problems. No prime minister had the support to make changes in Article 9, except Abe, and the flow of appointments causes interruptions which than sabotage a consistent and continues policy.

²⁷⁷ Kiyoshi Takenaka and Ju-Min Park, "South Korea, Japan leaders to seek early resolution of 'comfort women' dispute, *Reuters*, ", 02 November, 2015, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://uk.Reuters.com/article/2015/11/02/uk-southkorea-japan-idUKKCNOSR02520151102>
Carol E. Lee, Kwanwoo Jun and Yuka Hayashi, "Current Leaders of South Korea, Japan Meet for First Time", *The Wall Street Journal*, 25 March 2014, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303949704579461571598440060>
"S Korea and Japan leaders meet for first time in years", *Aljazeera*, 02 November 2016, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from <http://www.Aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/korea-japan-leaders-meet-time-years-151102014419349.html>

Compared to Tokyo, Ankara certainly proceeded a greater distance since 2002. The two liabilities Ankara had to cover in the security area were to solve its dependency on foreign equipment and technology in the military field problem and the PKK terror. Via its domestic production projects, Turkey is planning to greatly reduce its dependency on more advanced military equipment such as tanks, rockets and planes, and this certainly increases its power projection. However, on the PKK problems it still holds, as of December 2015, it intensified to a new scale. The PKK tries to openly defy Turkey in civilian areas, which it could do before. The new projects like tank and aircraft cannot be applied to the conflict with the PKK. Therefore while Ankara solved one of its problems, the other more immediate and more demanding security problem still needs to be solved.

Tokyo on the other hand still has the same security dilemma it had in 2002, what to do against Beijing. While the act that enabled Japan to send its troops overseas certainly strengthened Tokyo's hand and is an important step in Japan's transformation from *civilian power* to *normal power*, it is not enough to solve Japan's security problems. No matter what Japan does it will not be able to stand against China on its own, similar to Turkey's situation against the Soviet Union in the 1960s. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that Japan create a security organization to bring stability in the East and South East Asia and gain the ability to stand against Chinese encroachment.

CONCLUSION

Prior to 2002, Turkish and Japanese foreign policies can be read as reactive to the changes occurring in their region than taking the lead in these events. Their long standing attitude to favor status quo, and their reluctance to adapting to the changes in their region and worldwide were results of their reactivity. However, the reasons of this attitude should be understood before any insightful comment can be made on the topic. After the aggressions Japan committed before and during the Second World War, the Allied Powers stripped Japan much of its military power. Together with the material and human cost, those wars left Tokyo with no choice but to focus on the rebuilding itself. To this end, Tokyo left much of its security to Washington's hands, and completely focused on its economy. Similarly Turkey came out of Turkish Independence War with catastrophic human and material losses which limited its foreign policy capacity in the 1920s and 1930s. Prior to 2002, the only two occasions where Ankara took the initiative were the annexation of Hatay in 1939 and the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974. Japan on the other hand, was docile and repeatedly apologized for its wartime activities. Except a few history issues, which Japan insists on refusing, Japan kept a low profile.

Since 2002, both countries have actively been trying to push a more proactive foreign policy. This was a surprising move that unsettled regional dynamics due to the unexpectancy. Turkey under the Justice and Development Party (JDP) and Japan under Koizumi and Abe's Liberal Democrat Party (LDP) wanted to become determining actors in their regions, to prove themselves as regional powers. World politics since 2002 have been in favor of such a change with some old and new actors that were trying to create a new place for themselves or reorient themselves. Russia under Vladimir Putin has been making a comeback after a decade of uncertainty, the EU was trying to push for a constitution union, which could pave way for further integration of the EU, new actors such as Brazil were trying to be more active in international politics and etc. In such a strong wind of change Turkey and Japan also tried to change their positions; both Ankara and Tokyo used nearly the same tools in their bid to regional power, which was the use of developmental aid, democracy promotion and improvement of their military capacity.

Turkey and Japan both used developmental aid as a foreign policy tool with some success. Turkey mainly used the developmental aid to increase its soft power in Arab and African countries while also creating a new market for its goods. While the increase of the trade volumes between Turkey and those countries may seem as a success for the second part, the extent of Turkish soft power and the effects of developmental aid on its soft power is not certain. Turkish developmental aid was a potential supplementing tool for its democracy promotion, as seen in the economic process with Syria before the civil war. But as of the end of 2015 the results of the Turkey's democracy promotion are not very positive. Therefore, this also restricts the effects of the Turkish developmental aid. For Japan on the other hand, the developmental aid was a tool to increase economic relations and a supplement to both its democracy promotion and security needs. In this field Japan was more successful in achieving its aims than Turkey. Japan provided regional countries, like Indonesia and Vietnam; with the capital investment they needed and used it to strengthen its security relations with India and Australia.

The use of the democracy promotion, on the other hand, brought upon mixed results for both parties. Until the Syrian Civil War and the fall of Morsi in Egypt, the Turkish democracy promotion seemed to be successful, especially with respect to the Arab Spring at its height. Turkey was considered as a role model by the Tunisian and Egyptian post-Arab Spring leaders, and the process with Syria was expected to enter a new political and social reformation phase. However, in 2011 the Arab Spring started to crack, the protests in Syria was crushed by the government forces, which started a multi-sided bloody civil war. Before the Syrian Civil War could be brought to a decisive end, the post-Arab Spring Morsi government in Egypt was ousted by a military coup. At the same time Libya also entered a multi-sided civil war. The Syrian Civil War has been going on non-stop and only intensified with the passing years, the coup government of the Egypt legitimized itself with local elections and international recognition, and moreover now the opposition of Saudi Arabia and other countries which previously did not continue their protests against their governments will be more insisting on their demands with the regimes' latest atrocities against them. In such an environment of raising discontent and crackdown, Turkey is more likely to face difficulties using democracy promotion as a part of its foreign policy.

For Japan democracy promotion combined with prosperity aimed to show regional countries that it could provide a better model to them than China and convince

them to join its side. Japan's "Asian Democratic Security Diamond" was intended to reflect this idea, that the union of the democratic countries of the region against an authoritarian bully. The union of prosperity and democracy seemed as an appealing idea, at least in the planning phase. However in practice, thus far the only two democracies that Japan could start a military cooperation with were Australia and India. The main targets of this security diamond, developing democracies of the Southeast Asia, are still hesitant to commit themselves.

Considering their security policies, both Japan and Turkey could be considered successful to some extent. Ankara started policies that would help it to develop its domestic arms industry further. Through this initiatives Ankara was able to solve one of its most crucial security gaps, its dependency on external sources for the modernization and acquisition of its military arsenal. Since the lessons of the 1974 US Arms Embargo, Turkey was well aware of this situation and with its new found industrial capacity and economic resources Ankara was determined to solve it. On the other hand, the security threats in the region against Turkey have increased. Ankara felt the full weight of the Russian threat for the first time since the Soviet threat in 1950s. On 24 November 2015, Turkey shot down one of the Russian military aircraft that strayed in to its airspace, the Russian reaction was a full-fledged economic war as well as threats to do further as much as it can. NATO supported Turkey against Russia, which was a relief for Turkey's fear of a second Johnson Letter. Turkey's third security threat, the domestic terror, is still a question to be solved, but as of December 2015 the direction, which the situation will take is highly unpredictable. The JDP government who previously tried to solve the problem through negotiations in a peaceful manner has to make a choice, whether to continue those negotiations despite attacks from PKK or give in to the more hawkish side and fight fire with fire. Furthermore, the ISIL became a new security threat, both internally and externally.

Japan likewise was unable to solve its primary security threat, China. Although the last decade was a time of change for the Japanese security it still faces the same threat. In 2015, Japan under Shinzo Abe was finally able to make the big leap from being a civic power without an army to a normal power with a standing army. This was a move that significantly strengthened Japan's hand for future military agreements and to strengthen its army. However, Japan was unable to create a block against China. Apart from its main ally the US, Japan was able to find two allies in the region India and Australia. India is in favor of such a military alliance because it feels threatened

by Chinese claims on its lands and China's growing confrontational attitude in the region. Australia on the other hand has no clear stance about the issue because of its internal politics and different opinions of Australian parties towards China. Countries like Malaysia, Vietnam and Philippines, which should be more threatened by the Chinese artificial islands, are reluctant towards an *Asian NATO*.

However, the aim of this thesis was not to investigate whether Ankara and Tokyo were able to or unable to get all the intended results. The analysis was made according to the Schoeman and Schrim's conditions as to whether Turkey and Japan were able to fulfill those conditions or not. According to the conditions set by these scholars Turkish and Japanese foreign policies have been analyzed.

Since 2002, Turkey had significantly increased its power capacity. After the economic crisis in 2001, Turkish economy was recovered in the last decade. Its GDP rose from \$232 billion in 2002 to \$798 billion in 2014. At the same time Turkey took huge steps to improve its military power. But more importantly, Turkey who previously secluded itself from its region and tried to identify itself solely with the European identity turned its face to its region. Since 2002, Turkey has improved its ties with African and Middle Eastern countries which strengthened Turkey wider in the region. However, although Ankara's power increased in general and specifically in the region, it still may not be enough to become a regional power. Beyond Syria and Iraq, Ankara's influence is hardly visible in regional crisis, and even there Ankara could not accomplish what it intended. Ankara was unable to get a UN resolution on Syria or convince Iraq to expel the PKK and its camps. So even if Turkey's power is increasing it is still not enough to match its aims. Turkey lacks the religious influence of Iran or the military power of Russia, and this causes problems when competing with those countries. Japan, on the other hand, had not been successful on the economic field, compared to other countries in the region, although Japanese economy rose from \$3,980 billion in 2002 to \$5,954 billion in 2012. Interestingly it started to shrink again under Abe's second term in 2012, despite his plans to recover Japanese economy under 'Abenomics' and declined to \$4,601 billion in 2014. Japan's military capacity also stayed stagnant. Although the amendment of the Article 9, which banned the use of arms on foreign soil by Japanese armed forces, strengthened Tokyo's hand in military terms, Japanese military still is weak. Japan's power and whether that power is enough to obtain the status of regional power is a dilemma. If Japan was in another part of the

world it could have been a regional power, but Japan is neighbor to China and Japan's current power cannot compete with China.

Since 2002, Turkey and Japan show the desire to become a regional power. Their policies under the JDP and the LDP are a result of this desire. While Turkey tries to become a regional power for being determinant power in the region, Japan wants to balance China and improve its status in the East Asia. Turkey's refusal to give military access to the USA in the invasion of Iraq, or its eagerness to show itself as a role model and to start relations with the post-Arab Spring governments can be seen in this direction. Japan's awakening from its long slumber is also a result of this desire to become a regional power. After decades of reactivity, Japan started to implement a proactive foreign policy and launched initiatives like the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity in 2007 and the Asian Democratic Security Diamond in 2012. Those initiatives were made because of this desire to become a regional power.

In terms of activity, Japan and Turkey have been in a proactive foreign policy period. Both countries used developmental aid and democracy promotion to increase both their soft and hard powers. Also they were actively engaged in activities that would help them to solve their security gaps. All activities that were given in detail in the previous chapters were done to achieve their final aim, the bid to become a regional power.

The acceptance might be seen as the most problematic part about Turkey and Japan's regional bid. If the regional attitude towards Turkey and Turkey's role in the region is looked upon, it may be seen that Turkey's place as a regional power is still debatable. Although proponents may claim there can be no changes in the region without taking Ankara into account, this is a weak claim. It is true that Ankara wields some influence in the Balkans and the Middle East, for example without taking Ankara into the plans there can be no solution to Iraq or Syria's problems. However, this may be very well the result of being a neighbor, and not a result of being a regional power. Turkey is not a side of the crisis in Yemen, and Turkey's involvement in Libya and Egypt was not decisive. Turkey was looked upon as a mediator between Israel and Syria between 2008 and 2010, which was a big boost for Turkey's regional role. But after Turkey's involvement in the Syrian Civil War or the Egyptian 2013 Coup, the number of sides that may look to Turkey as a mediator is dwindling. Furthermore, the Syrian Civil War created the real test ground for the Turkey's power in the region. Turkey was unable to unite the opposition to topple Bashar Assad. Turkey's inability

to create a change when opposed by other regional powers, Russia and Iran, demonstrates the limited capacity of Ankara's current power in the region.

Japan, although has long been accepted as a regional power, is gradually losing its ground to China. Since 1890s, Japan had been more powerful than China due to Japan's successful modernization and reformation process. However, this changed after China managed to reform its economy and integrated itself to international economic system in the 1980s. After three decades of rapid economic growth, China now has the economic capacity to pursue a more active foreign policy. Beijing's increasing confrontational actions in the East and South East Asia forces Japan to show reaction, but so far Japan has been unable to confront China. After China declared a large area between Japan and Taiwan as air identification defense zone or declared its maritime borders around the artificial islands in the South China Sea, Japanese reaction was minimal. Furthermore, the increasing aggressions in to Japanese aerial and maritime borders by the Chinese aircrafts or navy vessels are also gone with faint protests. If the current situation will be taken into account, Japan does not pose as a regional power, although powerful and to some extent influential in its region, Japan is not the actor that decides on the regional dynamics any more. Its inability to match China and convince other countries to act shows the limits of its current power in the region.

When Turkey and Japan's current situations are looked upon around the conditions given by Schrim and Schoeman, both countries were unable to achieve their ultimate aims. While both Ankara and Tokyo managed to move towards their bid, currently they cannot be seen as regional powers. Turkey and Japan are certainly influential regional actors but they have been unable to become effective regional powers.

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