

TURKEY'S SOFT POWER STRATEGY:
THE CASE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA



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THE CASE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

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This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Modern Turkish Studies.

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I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Ubeydullah Sakin

A handwritten signature in blue ink, consisting of stylized letters that appear to be 'U', 'S', and 'S'.

ABSTRACT

TURKEY'S SOFT POWER STRATEGY: THE CASE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

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As one of the most comprehensive academic subjects, power studies involve various disciplines from philosophy to industrial management, political sciences, and international relations. In this work, as my main power concept, I adopt soft power, which is a matter of debate among international relations scholars. I focus on Turkey's activism to generate soft power in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Evaluating the substantial transformation in Turkey's foreign policy during the last decade, I argue that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a focus for Turkey's foreign policy. Finally, I consider the obstacles to Turkish foreign policy goals in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Keywords: Soft Power, Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, neo-Ottomanism

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE'NİN YUMUŞAK GÜÇ STRATEJİSİ: BOSNA HERSEK ÖRNEĞİ

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En geniş akademik konulardan biri olan güç çalışmaları, felsefeden endüstriyel işletmeye, siyasal bilimlere ve uluslararası ilişkilere kadar farklı alanları kapsamaktadır. Bu çalışmada, uluslararası ilişkiler dalında sosyal bilimciler arasında sıklıkla tartışma konusu olan yumuşak güç teorisi, temel güç teorisi olarak kabul edilmiştir. Bu çalışma, Türkiye'nin Bosna Hersek'te yumuşak güç elde etme çabalarına odaklanmaktadır. Türkiye'nin dış politikasının geçtiğimiz on yıl içerisinde geçirdiği değişim değerlendirilerek, bu bağlamda Bosna-Hersek'in Türkiye için ayrıcalıklı bir ortak olduğu ileri sürülmektedir. Bununla beraber çalışma içerisinde, Yeni Osmanlılık kavramının farklı tanımları karşılaştırılmakta ve bu kavramın dış politikaya yansımaları ele alınmaktadır. Son olarak, Türkiye'nin Bosna-Hersek'e dönük dış politika geliştirme ve uygulama çabalarına engel olan ve olabilecek hususlar tartışılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yumuşak güç, Türkiye, Bosna Hersek, Yeni Osmanlılık

I dedicate this thesis to my beautiful wife whose presence alone is the biggest source of strength for me.



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA: Anadolu Agency

AFAD: Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Authority

AKP: Justice and Development Party [of Turkey]

BBC: The British Broadcasting Corporation

BHAS: Bosnia and Herzegovina Agency for Statistics

BİGMEV: Foundation for Development of Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina

BİH: Bosnia and Herzegovina

CCTV: China Central Television

DAESH: al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham

DGPI: Directorate General of Press and Information

DIB: Prime Ministry Presidency of Religious Affairs

EU: European Union

EUFOR: European Union Force

EUPM: European Union Police Mission

GOC: Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management

HDZ: Croatian Democratic Union

IFOR: Implementation Force

İHH: Humanitarian Relief Foundation

IUS: International University of Sarajevo

Kızılay: Turkish Red Crescent Society

NAM: National Association of Manufacturers

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Alliance

OHR: Office of Higher Representative

OPD: Prime Ministry Office of Public Diplomacy

PtP: Public to public

RT: Russia Today

SEDEF: Foundation for the Development of Education in Sarajevo

SFOR: Stabilization Force

StP: State to public

THY: Turkish Airlines

TIKA: Prime Ministry Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency

TRT: Turkish Radio and Television Corporation

UN: United Nations

UNDOC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

UNPROFOR: United Nations Protection Force

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

YEE: Yunus Emre Institute

YTB: Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The word "power" derives from the Latin word of *posse*, meaning "be able" (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). In the common dictionary definition with which I commence my exploration, "power is the ability to control people or things." (Merriam-Webster, n.d.; Thesaurus, n.d.) Because "power" is the essential component of this study, I would like to continue with some arguments on what power refers to in politics.

Traditionally, power has been perceived as the means to act with such sovereignty that is free from any restriction while being able to administer another's actions regardless of that person's choices. And being subjected to such administration is called powerlessness. This view is partially rooted in Robert A. Dahl's studies. As one of the initiators of power studies, Dahl (1957) says power is A's ability to get B to do something B would not do otherwise. Basically, having power is the possession of the ability to force individuals to act against their own will. Later academics have also agreed with this definition but introduced alternative perspectives as well.

Nye (2011), on whose theory I build my thesis, focuses on a particular form of power that he calls *soft power*. This is, in a nutshell, getting another actor to comply without directly using force.

Since its foundation in 1923 the Republic of Turkey based its reforms on Western social and political culture. When Mustafa Kemal consolidated his position as the founding leader of the country, the efforts intensified and an official process of self-Europeanization began. On the political sphere, the new republic adopted strong nationalism and defensive real-politik paradigms. And on social sphere, laws regulating alphabet, dress code, music, sanctuaries changed Turkish society. On the foreign policy sphere, extensive reforms

intentionally detracted Turkey from its predecessor Ottoman Empire's regions of interest. Turkey in its initial decades seemed to be relatively uninterested with regard to the Middle-East and the Balkans.

By the late 2000s, Turkish government launched a systematic programme, which I will call "Soft Power Strategy," to regain influence on these regions. Its programme simply included "a new interpretation of history" as the main paradigm of state institutions to disseminate and support the new interpretation. The programme also enabled civic missions of various causes to spontaneously join the efforts to increase Turkish presence in the Middle-East and the Balkans. Consequently, Turkey's Soft Power drew attention and scholars like Vracic (2014), Arin (2015) viewed Turkey to be neo-Ottomanist, while other scholars like Taspinar (2008), Somun (2011) defended that Turkish policy was merely pragmatic.

One of Turkey's primary targets for its new foreign policy has been Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Bosnia, since it became independent by the early 1992, has been a permanent focus of interest for Turkish state. Turkey was a determined supporter of Bosniaks during the Yugoslavian wars and has been involved in every stage of the post-war development process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, after Turkey began implementing its soft power strategy, the relations condensed into a multi-dimensional form. Thus, Turkish-Bosnian relations are likely to manifest trajectory of Turkish foreign policies from West-oriented defensive stance to the Middle-East and the Balkans-oriented offensive stance. This thesis will follow Turkey's foreign policy practices and focus on its increased activism in the last decade by studying its foreign policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

1.1. Problem Formulation

I wish to answer the following question within the problem area based on the introduction above:

How does Turkey use its soft power in its relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina and what challenges it confronts?

Sub-question:

- How has Turkey's foreign policy fluctuated from indifferent to assertive politics?
- How has Turkey's soft power strategy been perceived and challenged by different scholars and regional actors?
- How has Turkey applied its soft power strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

In this thesis, I will study Turkey's foreign policy within the framework of Soft Power. I will add various other perspectives that are the main paradigm of power studies. I will be evaluating Turkey's soft power strategy and the agents that enable the application of this strategy. Later, I will take Bosnia and Herzegovina as my case study. I will seek to understand how Turkey focuses on Bosnia with soft power politics.

This thesis, along with focusing on Turkish activism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also studies main theories in power studies and political reactions to Turkey's soft power strategy. While *balance of power* and *relational power* theories constitute the basis for the theoretical narratives, *neo-Ottomanism* constitutes the issue that critics mainly voice. I will convey my analysis of neo-Ottomanism that draws attention to Turkey's activism in the Middle-East and the Balkans. I will compare two prominent arguments that Turkey is planning to revive the Ottoman Empire on one side and Turkey is simply pursuing pragmatic foreign policy on the other. Later, I will discuss about obstacles that Turkey faces while trying to carry its strategy to success. The issue of non-Muslim, Ottoman image amongst Bosnians, structural problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the issue of Republika Srpska will be among the main issues to be discussed.

By studying these issues and answering the questions above, I will try to discover an extensive range of information about Turkey's soft power strategy with its main actors, gains and challenges. Hence, I argue that Turkey bases its new foreign policy primarily on soft power and the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the states that Turkey focuses for its new foreign policy.

1.2. Methodology

In this thesis, I employ qualitative analysis. I measure Turkey's soft power initiative on Bosnia and Herzegovina using a number of qualitative sources such as political party publications, speeches of politicians, official annual reports of institutions and foundations, intergovernmental agreements and other related information mainly retrieved from the official websites of the related institutions. My secondary resources are news articles and reviews. These resources contain interviews with significant political actors and provide alternative perspectives.

I employ latent content analysis to study reports, agreements, and party publications. And I employ process tracing to explain news and speeches. I have studied the activities of Turkish missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina to understand Turkish soft power strategy in this country. For each mission I collected data with the following method. First, I studied the basic strategy and introduction of the mission. I benefited from the missions' official websites to obtain this information. Second, I studied the annual activity, project and financial reports of the missions. Again, I obtained the reports from the missions' websites. And third, I studied the news articles about the missions published by Turkish and Bosnian media. The main limitation of this method was that some missions did not provide detailed reports and most of the news articles were published by Turkish journalist. Thus, I was not able to provide certain statistical analysis for some of the missions' activities.

I take Bosnia and Herzegovina as my case study due to its history, culture and Turkey's current activism in this country. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a former

Ottoman territory and a predominantly Muslim populated country. It hosts numerous Turkish schools as well as tens of Turkish businesses, some of which make the biggest enterprises in the region. Turkish tourists rank as the 4th largest group of arrivals to Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Turkish Embassy in Sarajevo, 2015) And there is a very large Bosnian diaspora in Turkey. Moreover, Turkey was in close cooperation with Bosnia during the Yugoslavian war.

Bosnia's history with the Ottoman Empire and its shared culture with Turkey are unique assets for Turkey. These assets construct common values that are, as I will explain in the related chapter, at the center of the soft power concept. Additionally, Turkey has established a strong network of relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hence, these reasons make Bosnia a favorable example to study Turkey's soft power politics.

1.3. Literature Review

Due to his role as the founding scholar of soft power studies, in this thesis I have frequently referred to Joseph. S. Nye's works. In 1990, Nye coined the term "soft power" in his book *Bound to Lead: Changing Nature of American Power*. He discusses that power is not only to have the right to make decisions, but also the ability to influence decision maker's rationale. He describes three dimension; daily communication, strategic communication and building lasting relations, and three resources; a culture that is contextually attractive, political values that are sincere and consistent, and a foreign policy that is moral and legitimate (Nye, 2008). I will be employing the dimensions and resources of soft power to analyze Turkey's strategy.

Understanding Turkey's soft power strategy required studying various dispersed resources. I benefited from former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu (2011) that discusses that Turkey's Ottoman experience should be utilized as the center piece of its foreign policy because the experience is shared by various nations. I also benefited from Ibrahim Kalin (2011, 2012) whose

publications provided a more specific approach to Turkey's foreign policy rationale. He discusses that the Turkish government is telling "a new Turkish story" that roots from Turkey's cultural and historical experience and it focusses on the Balkans and the Middle East to inner parts of Central Asia.

1.4. Organization of Thesis

In the first chapter I present the problem area and problem formulation of this thesis. I provide information related to the method and literature of the thesis. I end this chapter with "limitations and justification" section where I express the logic of the thesis and certain issues that hampered my ability to obtain knowledge.

The second chapter that presents the theoretical framework of this thesis consists of related theories and concepts in power studies, including soft power. In this chapter, I explain the types of powers and the transformation in the definition of power as has been exposed by various scholars like Robert A. Dahl, Steven Lukes, Peter Bacrach, Morton S. Bratz. I end this chapter with a broad explanation of soft power.

In the third chapter I present Turkey's soft power strategy. I begin with exploring Turkey's traditional foreign policy paradigm with its reflections in international politics. I explore the paradigm shift in the beginning of the 21st century, mainly caused by the election of AK Party government. Later, I point to certain changes in global politics and how the changes effected Turkey. I highlight declarations of Turkish politicians and explain the new paradigm. I end this chapter by explaining Turkey's newest foreign policy tools that together contribute to Turkey's soft power strategy.

The forth chapter explains Turkey's application of its soft power strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this chapter, I begin with studying history of relations between Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina. I follow with focusing on the activism of Turkish public and civic missions in this country. I present

data relating to the economic and cultural investment brought by these missions. I end this chapter by explaining the variety of outcomes caused by public and civic missions.

In the fifth chapter, I explain the obstacles and criticisms of Turkish soft power strategy. I begin this chapter by presenting some structural and fundamental challenges which Turkey faces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I focus on the sophisticated political system and fragmented society of this country. Later, I move to the issue of neo-Ottomanism as the global criticism directed to Turkey for its pro-active foreign policy in the last decade. I end this chapter by presenting counter-arguments.

In the sixth and the last chapter I conclude my thesis with final remarks, limitations and future research suggestions.

CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE CONCEPT:
POWER AND ITS SOFT FORM

Studying history, one finds himself surrounded by unending struggles, relentless wars, crafty plots, domination strategies, responding domination strategies, theses that spark ideologies, and antitheses that produce confronting ideologies. The list continues tirelessly. Pieces of events materialize over and over again, with different names and in the hands of different actors. Looking into the Ottoman expansionism in the 15th and 16th centuries and British expansionism in the 19th century, we observe different masters, methods, geographies, and intentions; but the fact that both states aspired to enlarge their dominion remains undebated. The French Revolution, for instance, shattered absolute monarchies not only in France but throughout Europe. The revolution became a catalyst for universal human rights and transformed people into nations. But it did not end Napoleon's ambition to seek command of his neighbors and beyond.

The United States and the Soviets were allies against Hitler's Germany. They fought on the same side in the largest war in history and shared victory. However, following the end of war, their successful cooperation did not prevent the half-a-century-long global hegemonic struggle between them. In this chapter I will present some of the prominent studies on power. I will compare the most appreciated theories within the framework of politics and international relations. I will also convey my analysis on how these studies are reflected in the theory of Soft Power.

Taking a step back from the examples above, I observe that states have always been struggling to align other states' choices with their own. The context of these actions varies from the use of resources to the command of military assets and adoption of belief systems. Regardless of the practical reasons, the

ultimate target of states has been the security of power resources in any conflict that a state has been a part of (Mearsheimer, 2013). In other words, if we were to merge the outcomes of any struggle into one measurement unit and evaluate the pre-and post-struggle statuses of states by that measurement unit, the unit would have to be power. States may use, or claim to use, power for different purposes, but it is always power that states seek.

2.1. Definition of Power

The trouble with “power” as a unit of measurement is that the definition of power varies depending on the context it is used in. This constrains its employment as a standard and causes a variety of arguments on how and in what volumes power is applied. For this reason, I find it useful to explore how different scholars and actors have perceived the materialization of power.

At the state level, military strength has been the ultimate measurement of power throughout history (Spykman, 2008). States have competed over the size and capabilities of their military. The strength a state projected had been measured in terms of its national power, the number of its troops, the mobilization skills of its armies, and the number of cities it conquered, namely, the fear its army instilled in other states. This idea directed thinkers to restrict the elements of national power to “population, territory, wealth, armies and navies” (Baldwin, 2013, p.274). As I observe, these elements were chosen due to their significance in manifesting military power. The study of military competition between states and military alliances formed by states to dominate each other spawned the balance of power theory. Morgenthau (1985) explains the theory as;

The aspiration for power on the part of several nations, each, trying either to maintain or overthrow the status quo, leads to necessity to a configuration that is called the balance of power and to policies that aim at preserving it. (p.237)

Adopting the realist paradigm, the theory normatively approaches power as a single-dimension engagement between nations. The view in this thinking is

zero-sum. States continuously seek balance by either defending the status quo or attacking it. Any additional use or development of the elements of national power by A is considered to change the power balance to the detriment of B.

By the late twentieth century, this theory was confronted by "relational power theory." In contrast to the "national power approach," which sees power as the domination of one state over another in a narrow single dimension perspective, relational power theory sees power as a relation between states. Power is perceived as state A's capability, which relies on the elements of national power, to directly affect state B's behavior in favor of state A. Behavior includes "attitudes, preferences, opinions, expectation, emotions, and/or predispositions to act" (Baldwin, 2013, p.274). Accepting power as a relational attribute adds additional practices to power, or incorporates power into additional areas of practice. The relation is not a uniplanar concept, it is a two-way communication in various fields of interest. Considering this fact, relational power theory has introduced "dimensions of power".

2.2. Dimensions of Power

As Baldwin (2013) explains, there are five dimensions to power. Because the shift from defining power in terms of elements to defining it in terms of dimensions is a milestone for the emergence of the soft power, I will briefly explain these five dimensions.

- *Scope* is area of influence. It refers to "the sector" in which an actor is capable of changing others' behavior. For example, the Chinese proposition regarding international law and human rights may not gain recognition, but its financial decisions can severely affect the global economy.
- *Domain* is the significance or number of the states an actor can influence. Turkey may have managed to export its culture to Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the EU exports its culture through a wide network of institutions to the whole Balkans.

- *Weight* is the chance of a state in achieving its desired level of influence over another state. It is basically the potential to successfully influence others. An American peace proposal for Syria may have a higher chance of acceptance by local Kurdish groups than a Saudi peace proposal.
- *Cost*, as apparent, is the expenditure required to influence another state. Cost includes both states' expenses. Russian sanctions on Turkey following the shooting down of the Russian jet fighter in November 2015 surely harmed the Turkish economy, but the incident involved costs to both states.
- *Means*, which is divided into *symbolic, economic, military, and diplomatic*, is the way, the method, or the strategy by which a state influences others. Israel relies on economic and diplomatic means to influence the United States, but uses military means to influence Palestine.

In the traditional theory of power, basically, a state with a powerful army is considered to have supremacy over any state that has a less powerful army. The relational theory of power, in contrast, while it acknowledges the essential role military plays in obtaining power, also points at the other dimensions of power. It is significant when one observes that the military is not always, and increasingly not at all, the most efficient way of dealing with issues. Military operations are very expensive and they no longer seem to be effective.

In 2002, Donald Rumsfeld, then the U.S. Secretary of Defense, said "Five days or five weeks or five months, but it certainly isn't going to last any longer than that, it won't be a World War III" (Esterbrook, 2002, para.5), while answering questions regarding the invasion of Iraq. After initiating the invasion in March 2003, US troops continued fighting for more than eight years until they were

finally withdrawn in December 2011 by President Obama. The war in Iraq cost more than \$815 billion (Belasco, 2014). Almost 8,000 US personnel were killed and more than 80,000 were injured. (Lutz, 2013) Today, some US troops are still in Iraq, training Iraqi forces. The US may re-initiate its ground operations in the region to fight al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham (DAESH), a terrorist organization that partially emerged as a result of US military use in Iraq. (Baker, Cooper; Gordon, 2015) The war that was supposed to end in five months lasted a decade, and may continue for long years, costing more dollars and lives. Former US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates (2009, p.15), who seems to have acknowledged this scenario, admitted that "one of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win [a war]."

2.3. The Faces of Power

Exploring the reasons behind why military alone is not sufficient to control other states, scholars have introduced three main paradigms. Enabled by relational power theory, the paradigms, also called "the three faces" of power, elaborate alternative ways in which states may use power. I think it is very important to have knowledge of these paradigms for a complete understanding of soft power. So, I would like to briefly summarize the faces of power.

In the first face of power, studying the town of New Haven, Dahl (1970) asserts that it was only a small group of elite that ruled the town. Thanks to their wealth they controlled the decision-making process. Thus, those who were directly involved in the decision making process practiced power over others. In other words, power is the ability to convince others to behave in a way they would not otherwise, which makes the first face of power. For instance, during both opium wars, the Chinese struggled for approximately seven years to keep the British out of its ports. In 1860, heavily bombarded by the British navy, the Chinese legalized the opium trade and granted civil rights to Christians. The British obtained unlimited access to Chinese ports. In this case, the British used their capability to change China's behavior. In

December, 1994, the UN Security Council voted on a draft resolution (S/1994/1358) to stop the Serbian government from shipping oil to Bosnian Serbs that used oil to finance the war against the Muslim city of Bihac. The members had spent days negotiating the resolution. Out of 15 members, 13 voted in favor and China abstained. However, Russia, having the right to veto, voted no, and paralyzed the resolution.

In the second face of power, Bachrach and Baratz in their *Critiques of Dahl* (1962) define power not only as the ability to convince others to behave against their own wishes, but also to keep certain issues out of the decision-making process. Thus, vetoing the opposition party's resolution about a softened terror law in parliament is surely power, but so is blocking the resolution from ever entering the parliament. Deprecating approval of Turkey's the 17th chapter for the EU membership is a manifestation of power by the EU, but so is not opening the 20th chapter. Examples may vary. Germany may not have the preparations to host millions of refugees, but it has the capacity to prevent them ever entering Germany by dealing with Turkey. In other words, keeping issues off the agenda counts as power to the same extent as using power to change the outcome of the issues on agenda.

In the third face of power, Lukes (2005) adds another concept to the previous two. He includes targeting a transformation of others' preferences in the definition of power. Individuals make decision based on their preferences (interests). Any time there is an action to be taken, the decision-maker reviews options with regard to his/her interests. The same process applies to states as well. Thus, if a state is able to change others' preferences, all decisions taken by other states will automatically be in countenance of that state. Without the need to directly encounter opponents, this concept focuses on an essential change in the opponent's values and interests that are involved in the decision-making process. Forcing states to adopt an open-market economy by invading them requires a lot of effort. Instead, exporting Western liberal values and internationalism costs less and creates much less reaction. These values

eventually lead to the open-market economy. Both changing and transforming the local economy are practices of power.

2.4. Definition of Soft Power

Having mentioned the fundamental studies on power, I would like to continue with the particular form of power that is the focus of this work, "Soft Power." The term was coined by Joseph Nye. In Nye's words, his main definition for power is that "Power is the ability to affect the behavior of others to get the outcome you want" (Nye, 2008, p.94). Influenced by the scholars before him (Dahl, 1961; Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Lukes, 1974), Nye (2011) describes three ways to affect others. These ways could be considered as concepts or categories of power.

Table 2.1. Nye's Types of Power

	Behaviours	Primary Currencies	Government Policies
Military Power	Coercion Deterrence Protection	Threats Force	Coercive Diplomacy War Alliance
Economic Power	Inducement Coercion	Payments Sanctions	Aid Bribes Sanctions
Soft Power	Attraction Agenda Setting	Values Culture Policies Institutions	Public Diplomacy Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy

The first of these is coercion. Coercion is to threaten others to get the desired outcome. It is the traditional way of controlling others. For instance, in 630, when the Prophet Muhammad surrounded the City of Mecca with his ten-thousand man army, he terrified the Meccans. Hours before the army approached Mecca, the city defenses fell, and Prophet Mohammed's army did not encounter any resistance (Presidency of Religious Affairs, n.d.). The Meccans handed the city to the Muslims on a plate, saving lives and expenses

for both sides. This is one of the finest examples of coercion. The capacity of the Muslim army was much greater than the City of Mecca, and the Meccans had only one alternative.

To avoid a possible misunderstanding, I should state that even if there had been a battle between the Meccans and the Muslims, and Muslims captured the city after winning the battle, this would still have been an example of coercion. In this case, Muslims would have used not the threat of force but actual force to coerce the Meccans. Although these two cases differ in terms of their means, they are the same in terms of their ends, namely to force Meccans to behave in a way they would not have otherwise.

The second is inducement. Rather than threatening, inducement suggests paying others to behave in the desired manner. Compared to coercion, inducement avoids physical battles and leaves less chance for reactionary movements. For instance, after the Second World War, the US initiated the well-known Marshall Plan (European Recovery Program, ERP) to aid war-torn states. The plan aimed to avoid Communist expansion, which could accelerate due to post-war poverty. The communists began losing popularity in the states that received funds from the Marshall Plan after it was signed in 1948 (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). Initially, the program was for the Western European states; however, the US offered to aid Czechoslovakia and Poland as well. The idea was to induce these states to become US allies. Both states found the US offer tempting. Although they were later coerced by Moscow to reject the aid, the US utilized the inducement strategy well, presented itself as an alternative to Moscow, and created strong states that successfully confronted the Soviets in the coming years. The US could have threatened to invade the Western States if they allied with the Soviets, but instead it chose to use funds to create its satellites.

The third is attracting or co-opting. This is also what actually Nye points at as the soft power. In this category, others are not directly asked to behave, but

inspired to behave. In other words, others behave in the desired way voluntarily. They are not under fear, nor do they seek easy bounty, but they are self-motivated to conform. Following the AKP's electoral success in the March, 2014 local elections, thousands gathered in the Gaza strip, cheering "Turkey's democratic success." The Gaza government spokesperson said the election results would encourage Turkey to extend further support to persecuted people (Haboosh, 2014). The 2014 election was a local election; it did not even elect the central government that designated state policies. Its outcome, surely, did not liberate Palestine, nor did it improve the Palestinians' living conditions. However, Palestinians, not only the Palestinian government, voluntarily exhibited support for the AKP's success. Turkey, particularly the AKP government, has attracted Palestinian support with its "guardian" image, without needing to threaten or induce Palestine. As Nye (2008) summarizes similar incidents, "If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what you do *not* want." (p.95) I will explore the reasons and methods for such attraction throughout this thesis.

2.5. Dimensions of Soft Power

Apart from the ways or channels of influence, Nye (2008) describes three dimensions to soft power: daily communication, strategic communication, and building lasting relations. Daily communication is to continuously inform the public about the decisions taken by the government. This, in a sense, is the explanation and justification of the everyday political agenda. It covers both domestic and foreign politics. States that understand the significance of this dimension establish international channels. Turkey's TRT World, Britannia's BBC, Russia's RT, France's France 24, China's CCTV provide daily communication. Social media is another instrument that serves this purpose. World leaders and government accounts find the chance to instantly comment on related events. Through healthy daily communication, states and leaders are bound to an information struggle to gain legitimacy.

Strategic communication is to foresee resistance to specific decisions, as well as significant projects and operations, and start informative campaigns to, again, explain and justify them. These campaigns focus on individual cases, launched before facing the case. Thus, public will digest favorable information, and not be misinformed. Strategic communication is a collective effort. Based on the context of the case, various institutions may participate. However, states have established special institutions focusing on strategic communication. Turkey's Office of Public Diplomacy, the United States' Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, and China's Office of Foreign Propaganda are some examples.

Building lasting relations, the last dimension of soft power, is about raising allied individuals that hold powerful positions in their home countries. This dimension particularly serves to influence the preferences of the public. Long-term projects, such as youth-exchanges, fellowships of all kinds, and commercial match-making efforts are some important examples. Exporting traditional and local popular culture, language, and history serves to build strong relations. Foreign individuals that are involved in these projects are expected to become natural sympathizers to the host country. On this dimension, Turkey's Yunus Emre Institutes, Britain's British Council, Germany's Goethe Institute, France's French Institute, Turkey's Mevlana, the European Union's Erasmus, and the United States' Fulbright programs fall under this dimension.

Before proceeding further, I would like to underline the issue of context that is very significant to have a complete understanding of Soft Power. "Because power is a relationship, by definition it implies some context" (Nye, 1990). Here, Nye is influenced by Sprout & Sprout's (1965) statement that:

Without some set of given undertakings (strategies, policies), actual or postulated, with reference to some frame of operational contingencies, actual or postulated, there can be no estimation of political [power] capabilities. (p.280)

In contrast to the capability of the first and second faces of power, which partly depend on context, soft power entirely depends on the context of power practice. More precisely, what A's soft power is capable of depends on what A is going to use its power for. For instance, consider a U.S. army tank company that consists of 13 tanks. This tank company has the same anticipated destructive power in any battle. A tank's firing range, operational range and maneuvering skills show little variation under different circumstances. On the other hand, President Obama's use of liberalist discourse, as a soft power practice, to influence other states' policies may give entirely different results depending on the context. Proposing same-sex marriage as a federal right would gain the US soft power in Europe. However, it would deteriorate existing U.S. soft power in Iran.

In another case, Swiss banning the construction of minarets may generate soft power in Israel, but it diminishes Swiss soft power in Saudi Arabia. Thus, when studying a state's soft power "one must ask the question [soft] power for what" (Nye, 2008).

As Nye (2011) states, soft power operates on intangible sources such as culture, values, communication, legitimate policies, a positive domestic model, and a successful economy, as well as a competent military. It also operates on sources in the fields of national intelligence services, information agencies, diplomacy, public diplomacy, exchange programs, training programs, and assistance programs. In short, a country's soft power depends on three major resources: a culture that is contextually attractive, political values that are sincere and consistent, and a foreign policy that is moral and legitimate (Nye, 2008).

The idea is to shape other states' beliefs and preferences to gain more control over them without relying merely on active control. This works in the same way as parents working to transfer traditional sets of values and beliefs to their children so that once they mature they will independently refuse foreign

influence. Thus, in application, political leaders gain soft power by producing attractive ideas, setting the political agenda, and determining the framework of debate (Nye, 1990).

For instance, during World War II, the allied states adopted freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from fear, and freedom from want as the four fundamental rights. These rights were announced to the world by Franklin D. Roosevelt, the President of the United States, in a speech to the members of 77th Congress (Roosevelt, 1941). Politicians, intellectuals, and common people found the idea of fundamental rights very attractive. Advocacy groups such as the National Association of Manufacturers voluntarily initiated campaigns to support the idea with posters and mottos such as "Defend America's Freedom: It's everybody's job!" (NAM, 1942).

Following the end of the war, efforts to define human rights and describe basic liberties began. Although its history is much older, the Commission on Human Rights was formed in 1946. Its members consisted of 18 different countries and Eleanor Roosevelt, first lady of the US and wife of President Roosevelt, chaired its work. The Human Rights Commission presented the final draft of the freedoms, named as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in 1948. Later, after significant efforts on the part of the United States, the United Nations accepted human rights "as a common standard of achievements for all peoples and all nations" by two covenants, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966. These two covenants would form an important part of customary international law.

The United States was the first to declare a possible set of internationally accepted rights, and again, it was the first to orchestrate the structure of these rights. And finally, the United States pushed human rights to the international agenda as a priority topic and assisted it to become a part of international law. By doing so, the American government generated a great amount of soft

power in the context of human rights. Now valued globally, these efforts enable self-initiated resistance to autocratic governments from citizens of various countries. And the United States is able to legitimize itself as “the protector” of human rights.

Before going further, I would like to differentiate two interrelated terms, public diplomacy and soft power. Public diplomacy exports a state’s culture and values. It uses various materials and cultural institutions based in other states. Its outcome may produce soft power. But what if a state’s culture and values are not attractive. Trying to disseminate culture and values, in this case, may result in a loss of soft power, rather than further accumulation (Nye, 2008) Organizing huge commemoration ceremonies for the conquest of Istanbul may gain soft power in Baku, but it definitely does not attract Athens.

Although soft power is relatively new as a concept, producing policies to gain public support is a very old practice. For instance, the Ottoman Empire would send its merchants ahead of its army to the lands it planned to invade. The merchants would tell the stories of how pleasant and secure it was to live under Ottoman protection (Yılmaz, 2011). Such information campaigns decreased the public resistance to the new Ottoman government. In another case, following the French revolution, The Council of State published materials such as pamphlets and newspapers in various European languages to affect the public and “export the revolution” (Yılmaz, 2011). The extensive volume of text produced and disseminated during this era laid the basis for French hegemony in this area, attracting other states, including the Modern Turkey to conform to the new French-led political order (Köçer & Egüz, 2013).

2.6. Basis of Soft Power

It is possible to trace the roots of the concept of soft power in traditional Marxist thought. For instance, the theory of false consciousness which Engels mentioned in a letter to Franz Mehring in 1893 (Engels, 1968) refers to ideology dominating the consciousness of exploited groups and classes which

at the same time justifies and perpetuates their exploitation. False consciousness is the working class' thinking that sees the success of capitalist goals as its own success. Engel says that the bourgeoisie use ideology, whether it is religion or nationalism, to convince the working class that all classes equitably benefit from the society's resources. This sort of consciousness is named "false" due to the Marxist thinking that capitalist ideology is duplicitous, and that in fact it is only the bourgeoisie who really benefit from the resources. However, the dedication to ideology keeps the working class voluntarily consenting to capitalist exploitation.

In a similar theory, the famous Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci (2000) introduced the notion of "cultural hegemony." Gramsci explains that the elite of the society imposes its culture on the lower strata of the society. Using various methods and information channels, the elite sets its values as norms. Eventually, subsequent generations become unaware of their original values. They voluntarily conform, and furthermore, defend the elite's values. Thus, the elite, without having to struggle, consolidates its position of hegemony.

While governments comfortably use tools such as education, regulations and popular culture to transform domestic public values, targeting another state's values is a complex and fluxional process. Tools and methods for this purpose vary in accordance with the nature of the relations between the governments and publics of the states. Moreover, while domestic soft power practices are mainly in control of the government, international practices cannot be subjected to such tight control and they are exposed to intervention of the target state.

In short, there are three faces of power that respectively consider power as the right to make decisions, the ability to intervene in the decision making process and the ability to influence decision makers' rationale. The concept of soft power, heavily influence by the third face of power focuses on influencing the decision makers. It describes that an actor should operate on three

dimensions to influence its targets that are daily communication, strategic communication and building lasting relations. Moreover, an actor should have three resources to generate soft power that are a culture that is contextually attractive, political values that are sincere and consistent, and a foreign policy that is moral and legitimate. Based on these arguments, how an actor will apply its strategy on the field may vary according to the context of its relation with the target. In the following chapter, I will try to convey possible tools, methods and challenges in soft power policies in the example of Turkey's efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina.



CHAPTER 3

TURKEY'S SOFT POWER PROJECT

In this chapter, that is also the core of my thesis, I will explain Turkey's Soft Power strategy with its troubles and resources. I will analyze the historical background of Turkey's foreign policy and its relation with the Balkans as well as the West, prior to the implementation of Soft Power policies.

As Nye (2008) describes, in addition to foreign policy that is moral and legitimate, a country's soft power depends on two other resources that are "culture" which is contextually attractive and political values that are sincere and consistent. An attractive culture and consistent "political values" are, naturally, affected by the country's previous deeds, namely, on that country's history. A state with a history that contradicts its political rhetoric would find it very hard to receive recognition to its agenda. Turkey, as a part of "Eastern culture block," faces a major challenge. I find it necessary to briefly summarize how these challenges developed throughout its history.

3.1. Historical Summary

As a new and strong empire, which was able to protect people under its rule, the Ottomans gained a reputation for tolerating religious and other differences. Thus, when the Ottomans conquered Serbia in 1389, they seemed more as liberators than intruders. Under Ottoman rule, until the 1600s popular insurgencies were very rare (İnalçık, 2005). And these insurgencies did not spread until the early 1800s when nationalist movements reached these lands. However today, the majority of people living in the former Ottoman Europe perceive the entire Turkish history as a time of torture and enslavement (Vracic, 2014).

Occasionally, the European view of the Ottoman Empire fluctuated as the relations with the Ottoman Empire changed status. In 1590, when the

Ottoman Empire was at the peak of its extraordinarily successful expansion in Europe, the Venetian Ambassador to Constantinople, Lorenzo Bernardo, noted:

The Turks are low and vile people who neither know honor nor how to respect the word. Thus it is not surprising that they are unjust, because in the end violence, tyranny, and subordination are their natural condition. Their conduct towards us is malicious and it will always be utmost dangerous to believe in their goodwill. (Fassl, 2011, p.12)

However, following the treaty of Passarowitz (1718) that passed the administration of Serbia from the Ottoman Empire to the Habsburg Empire, another Venetian writer, Francesco Gritti, tenuously praised an Ottoman Pasha with the following words:

He is Ibrahim Pasha, from Caesarea, sixty-five years old, of delicate nature, and somewhat deteriorated for his licentious life. His figure is not very beautiful, but his appearance all the more sweet and courteous... Signing the treaty of Passarowitz, he honored his government and, in the first moments of glory and grace, became the liberator of the empire. (Fassl, 2011, p.14)

3.2. Traditional Turkish Political Rationale

Europe's analysis of the Ottomans influenced later Turkish generations as well. Humiliated by the empire's downfall and devastated by the First World War, modern Turkey began transforming itself into a Western state. Becoming a true European state with all its modern values was thought to be the solution to all the problems Anatolia had been suffering from. Constructing a nation-based identity, establishing a centralized government within precisely marked borders, as the Europeans did, and building a strong military were the challenges the Modern Turkey had to overcome.

Only a decade after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the new regime began mass-importing European culture to Turkish cities. The regime copied politics, law, fashion, and even music from the West and forced them into society. In 1926, Turkey adopted the Swiss Civil Code and Italian Criminal Code. In 1929, the German Law of Criminal Procedure was adopted and administrative law was modified in accordance with the French law ("Cumhuriyet," 2016).

European codes inspired the founding leaders of modern Turkey in making many other laws and regulations. Some even intervened in citizens' dressing habits.

In 1925, the head of state, Mustafa Kemal, stated in a speech in the city of Kastamonu:

Dear friends, there is no need to study and promote Turkic dress. Our precious nation deserves civilized and international attire. That is what we shall establish. On our feet, shoes or ankle boots; on our legs, trousers, then waistcoats, shirts, ties and jackets; and in order to complete the outfit, a sheltering headgear. And this I want to express most clearly: the name of this headgear is hat. (Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, n.d. p.32)

Within three months a new law was passed in the parliament and wearing hats became compulsory in public.

The government used radio to promote European music. In 1934, Turkish traditional music was banned on the radio. "It was observed that the streams included not only symphonic music but also examples of brass band music, solo singing performances and jazz songs as well. Turkish folk music was not broadcasted at all in Istanbul and Ankara radio shows until 1936" (Mutlu, 2014). Along with these, the government introduced various new practices, including the radical alphabet reform and adoption of secularism, inspired by Western culture.

During this period, transforming into a true "European" became the main and only objective of the Modern Turkish state. In the following decades, whenever the government tended to loosen its strict dedication to the unconditional objective of Westernization, the military intervened. In justifying the interventions, each time the military stated the importance of the reforms and goals defined by the founding leaders (Sakallioğlu, 1997).

3.3. Reactions to Traditional Turkish Political Rationale

Although undoubtedly sincere, these efforts failed to gain visible soft power in Europe. Taunting Turks as "the Other" did not change; rather it became ordinary in Western political culture. Turkey became one of the first states to be targeted in the political rhetoric of Europe. In 2002, when asked about Turkey's EU candidacy, the former French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing replied that Turkey was "a different culture, a different approach, a different way of life" (Black, 2002). In 2004, prior to PM Erdoğan's visit to Brussels for EU integration talks, Dutch Commissioner Frits Bolkestein stated that if Turkey was to enter Europe, "The relief of Vienna in 1683 will have been in vain" (Traynor, 2004, para.11). In 2007, French President Sarkozy said in an interview that "I do not think that Turkey has a place in Europe. Because Turkey is a part of Asia Minor" ("Sarkozy reiterates," 2007, para.2). Surely, limiting the definition of Europe to geographical borders is not accurate while granting EU membership to states in distant locations such as Estonia and Finland. Indeed there is no law outlining the potential borders of the EU.

The Brexit Referendum in late June 2016 was another example for Turkey's failure to generate soft power. The entire pro-exit campaign, named Vote Leave and led by far right politicians, focused on the destruction that Turkey would cause if it ever became a member of the EU. The issue of Turkey was Vote Leave's first argument on its website where the British citizens were called to exit the EU ("What would," 2016). The leaders of the movement wrote a letter to the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary of England, questioning the government's policy towards Turkish accession to the EU. The letter demanded a guarantee that the government would be strict against Turkey's accession to the EU (Stuart, Johnson, Gove, 2016).

Moreover, the campaigners' arguments emphasized the "violent" nature of Turks. In an official statement, Vote Leave said:

This [the high birth rate in Turkey] will not only increase the strain on Britain's public services, but it will also create a number of threats to UK security. Crime is far higher in Turkey than the UK. Gun ownership

is also more widespread. Because of the EU's free movement laws, the government will not be able to exclude Turkish criminals from entering the UK. (Boffrey, Helm, 2016, para.5)

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime database, in 2012, the number of assault cases in the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland, England, Wales, and Scotland) was 688,4 per 100.000 people. This was almost two-times higher than Turkey, which had 350.5 cases. In the same year, there had been 208,913 cases of theft in Turkey, whereas only in England and Wales 1,474,291 cases of theft occurred (UNODC, 2016). The data showed apparent proof of the crime rates, and that the campaigners abused stereotypes about Turkey. And, as the exit decision indicates, they correctly read the public opinion.

The systematic Westernization policy not only failed to gain European appreciation but also sacrificed potential ties with the historically allied and religiously related nations. Modern Turkey neglected establishing strong alliances with the emerging states in former Ottoman borders. It, in contrast to the late imperial policy, had little interest in integrating with these states. For the founding leader Mustafa Kemal, it was "foolish" ideologies such as pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism that caused the empire's humiliation (Carley, 1995). Atatürk had little interest in building strong relations with the Islamic world. Thus, from the 1920s onwards "one of the constitutive denials of the official Turkish republican ideology has been the proximities between Turkey and the Middle East" (Yörük, 2013, p.13).

Europe's unwillingness to embrace Turkey and Turkey's nonchalance in seeking alternative allies left Turkey isolated. This situation was reflected in Turkey's foreign affairs. Turkey from the beginning of its establishment began to perform "defensive and cautious realpolitik diplomacy" (Mitrovic, 2014). This posture was successful in holding Turkey off from conflicts, including the Second World War. However, it did not ameliorate Turkey's solitude in the

Islamic world. In 2002, when the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came to power, the situation slowly started to change.

3.4. Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy Rationale

The new government created an offensive soft power policy to resurrect relations with Islamic states. The AK Party builds its strategy on the very elements its predecessors had denied for decades, namely culture and history. Culture and history gained significance as the new raw materials of Turkey's soft power strategy. The current spokesperson for Turkish Presidency, Ibrahim Kalin, wrote in an article that "Turkey's soft power potential, which extends from the Balkans and the Middle East to inner parts of Central Asia, emerges from the cultural and historical experience it has inherited." (Kalin, 2011, p.10)

The AK Party government considered Turkey's international image poor and outdated, a distortion from the European Enlightenment years. So a new image was to be built on the past experience with the Islamic states. "A new Turkish story" was being told (Kalin, 2011). While telling the new story, the government did not deny its modern history. Instead, it simultaneously carried out a democratization process which was welcomed in the rest of the world, including the West. It indeed added its secular and democratic experience to culture and history to set an example as the ideal Muslim state (Öner, 2013).

The new foreign policy did not aim to destroy Turkey's current place in the West, nor did it clash with it. Turkey simply began a process of reconciliation with its own past. Thus, Turkey's new image was declared to be a great civilization that is peace loving, seeks cooperation, shares culture with a vast geography and has a very deep understanding of the states in that geography. In a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, President Erdoğan (2014) summarized Turkey's new story as the follows:

And today too, we view the -- all the states and peoples that used to make up the rest of the Ottoman -- what was then the Ottoman Empire, with peace, friendship, and solidarity. And we respect their territorial integrity. The reason why I make this point is to be able to say that

Turkey is a country which best knows, understands, and analyzes the geography that it's in, because we share a common history with every country and peoples in the region, including those areas of crises. (para.15)

In his article "Turkish Foreign Policy: Framework, values and mechanisms" (2011) the current Chief Policy Advisor to President Erdoğan Ibrahim Kalin explains that three reasons are behind Turkey's changing foreign policy: changing geostrategic environment, new-mindset, and new policy instruments.

Turkey's geostrategic environment has gained significant value after 9/11 terror attacks to the United States. Turkey as a bridge between the Middle-East and the West provided actors around its borders and beyond either by supporting military operations or undertaking mediating missions. Thus, its relations naturally changed in every direction.

Globalization and Turkey's internal politics strongly influenced Turkey's foreign policy. State regulations became more liberal while the discourse of the state became more Islamized. Its sui generis features enlarged Turkey's foreign policy horizon.

Another transformation globalization cause, not only to Turkey, but to international politics in type of instruments used in foreign affairs. Direct confrontations between states turned to proxy struggles, and soft power gained importance. Instruments that proliferate a state's values gained significance as strategic tools.

Turkey, ignited by these reasons, added traditional Turkish-Islamic values to its worldview without giving up on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. (Kalin, 2011)

3.5. Tools of Turkey's Soft Power Strategy

Surely, changing the decades-old perception of Turkey requires more than tailoring an image at home. A state has to be able to explain itself through the right channels. It has to do more than promising and instead bring real proof to support its arguments. It should be able and available to assist its target states if demanded. And if its targets do not demand help, it should help regardless. However, A's soft power works only when B finds its involvement legitimate.

All this and more, which I will explain in the following attempts, requires an extensive amount of funds, as well as strong institutions and dedicated human resources. For this reason, Turkey began founding a series of institutions. The institutions work as operators in the field. They focus on different locations and target various populations. However, ultimately, their work generates soft power for the state.

It is important to note that not all of these institutions are funded or operated by the state. Some institutions may be NGOs or private companies. Some may even be disfavored by the government. But they all contribute to Turkey's soft power machinery. The institutions may be categorized as State to Public (StP) and Public to Public (PtP). StPs are official government institutions that may be dependent or semi-autonomous which primarily target another country's society by a certain methodology within a framework of specific issues. PtPs are non-governmental and private sector organizations that target another country's society by a varying methodology within a framework of commercial, cooperative, charitable and cultural issues.

Turkey's state to public institutions may be listed as the Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information (DGPI), Prime Ministry Office of Public Diplomacy (OPD), Prime Ministry Turkish Coordination and Cooperation Agency (TIKA), Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), Prime Ministry Presidency of Religious Affairs (DIB),

Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD), Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management (GOC), Turkish Red Crescent Society (Kızılay), Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), Turkish Airlines (THY), Yunus Emre Institute (YEE), and municipalities.

Due to their multitude and scattered positioning, it is not possible to list all public to public missions. Some of the major institutions that target the sample of this paper, Bosnia and Herzegovina, are the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (İHH), Foundation for Development of Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIGMEV), International University of Sarajevo (IUS), Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, and Islamic communities. In the following chapters, I will introduce these institutions and analyze their work based on their operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3.6. Leadership and Turkey's Soft Power Strategy

A leader should have *policy vision, communications and emotional IQ* in order to generate soft power. Policy vision is the ability to attract followers, communications is the ability to speak persuasive words to near and distant followers, and emotional IQ is the ability to manage relationships with charisma. (Nye, 2006) Importance of these skills may vary in accordance with the changes in available resources, target population, opponents' conditions. In some situations, leaders may have to use some portion of hard power as a supplement to soft power. To understand how to carefully mix the two sorts of power, without harming generation of soft power, a leader should have Contextual Intelligence. (XXX) In other words, the leader should be able to act in accordance with the context of the situation he/she is in.

Nye (2006) says "leadership and power are inextricably intertwined." To materialize all sorts of potential into any category of power, there has to be a leadership. And the ability of the leadership is an essential determinant to volume of the power produced from available resources. Leadership and soft

power would make a title for a separate research. However, before moving to the Turkish soft power offensive in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I would like to briefly analyze Turkey's leader President Erdoğan's role in Turkey's soft power strategy.

In my opinion, Davos meeting in 2009 where Erdoğan confronted former Israeli President Simon Peres on Palestine was a turning point for Erdogan to internationally manifest his skills. Palestine was a sensitive issue for Muslims around the world and, together with Erdogan's communication skills, it drew abounding attention. After his speech in Davos, hundreds gathered in Gaza and around the world to manifest solidarity with Erdogan. (Anadolu Agency [AA], 2009) In the following years, the AK Party, under his leadership, continued to support politically suppressed Muslims around the world. These efforts returned more international recognition to Erdoğan, particularly in Muslim states.

In 2011, while asking for financial aid, the President of Kyrgyzstan, Almazbek Tambavey, openly called Erdoğan "ağabey", a title in Turkic culture that literally means "elder brother" (Milliyet, 2011). In 2014, while being interviewed by a reporter, a Patanian Muslim community leader began praying for the well-being of Erdogan in tears, expressing his sorrow for the excessive criticism directed to Erdogan following the Gezi events (Asilsoy, 2015). Also following the Gezi events, in Gostivar, Macedonia, thousands of Erdogan supporters gathered to support him against the critics. The crowd cheered in the Turkish, Bosnian, Macedonian, Albanian and English languages that "You are not only the Prime Minister of Turkey but of the 1.5 billion [Muslims]" (AA, 2013). Similarly, in a press conference before the Turkish presidential elections of 2014, President of Bosnia and Herzegovina Bakir Izzetbegovic said "Erdoğan is a very special person. He is not only the leader of Turkey, but of all Muslims, everyone looks up to him and wishes his success." (AA, 2014, para.4)

As the examples indicate, for nearly a decade, Erdogan has become a celebrity in Muslim-dominated economically underdeveloped states. Governments and societies have both responded to his policies with respect and sympathy. Surely, Turkey's significant efforts in producing soft power cannot be reduced to a single figure. However, Erdogan's exceptional fame definitely contributed to the positive image of Turkey.

More examples may be found in various incidents. However, undoubtedly, the hardest challenge to Erdoğan's soft power was the attempted military coup on the night of July 15, 2016. The Turkish public was terrified by sonic booms and whirling helicopters. News told that tanks were ramming through civilians, and soldiers were firing at public buildings. Citizens watched media channels being assaulted live on television. In the middle of this chaos, Erdoğan made a brief video call to a news program. He declared the coup unlawful and said "I invite my citizens to the squares." ("Cumhurbaşkanı," 2016, para.1) Millions marched into the streets only minutes afterwards, and after long hours of clashes the coup was suppressed. Although Erdoğan's call was only to the Turkish public, thousands attended the call abroad.

People gathered in the biggest cities of Palestine, Somalia, Switzerland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, France, Macedonia, Hungary, Canada, Qatar, and Brussels to support Turkey after the president's call ("Dünya ayakta," 2016). After the initial defeat of the uprising, the president thanked the public and asked them to stay in the streets until a second command. People held the squares for weeks. They worked during the day and protested during the night. Moreover, 5 million people attended the Democracy and Martyrs' Meeting that was organized under Erdogan's leadership to protest the failed coup, making it the largest public gathering in Turkish history.

Although Turkey's agenda has been occupied by the crisis with Russia, Europe, and the US for the last couple of years, Bosnia and Herzegovina has always held a particular place for Erdoğan, due to Erdoğan's pledge to the founder of

the current Bosnian state, Aliya Izzetbegovic, regarding the assistance to the country. On October 18, 2003, Erdogan visited Izzetbegovic in his home, a day before his death. Izzetbegovic told Erdogan, as reported, "Look after my Bosnia, protect her" (AA, 2010, para.4). Erdoğan has conveyed Izzetbegovic's request various times in his speeches. In 2010, during the Srebrenica Memorial, Erdogan told a reporter that Izzetbegovic said to look after Bosnia and I told him that "we will never leave Bosnia alone." (Akpanti Avrupa, 2010)

Whether influenced by Erdoğan's dialogue with Izzetbegovic or not, Bosnian people have been determined supporters of Erdogan. Joined by the Turkish citizens living in Bosnia, the majority of the Bosnian public has keenly followed political developments in Turkey. Turkey and Erdoğan were regularly given space in the mainstream Bosnian media, as well as the social media. Analyzing Turkey's history and activities in the country, this is not very surprising.

During the Bosnian war, Bosnian Muslims –later named Bosniaks-, the majority of Bosnia, realized that Turkey was the only country they could ask for help (Coşkun, 2011). It seems that Turkey's defender image remains unchanged. Although Europe and the United States also fund development programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosniaks consider Turkey as the real trustworthy friend that will not wait until things become tragic to lend its hand. (Vracic, 2014) And Erdogan, as the representative of the stronger and more generous Turkey, is an important factor in gaining Bosnia's allegiance.

CHAPTER 4

TURKEY'S SOFT POWER OFFENSIVE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

4.1. State Missions

In the case of the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus reverse-Westernization worked as a soft-power generator. The more Turkey focused on its long-abandoned history, culture, and old allies, the more soft power it accumulated. And this process continues in an observably accelerating fashion in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Historically, Bosnia was Ottoman Empire's most beloved *eyalet* in the central Balkans. Converting to Islam, raising statesmen and soldiers for the empire, Bosnia was definitely inalienable for Ottomans. However, four centuries after its conquest, the empire had to leave Bosnia to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. From the time of its withdrawal from Bosnia to the fall of Yugoslavia, the two nations could not find any concrete basis to establish strong ties (Vracic, 2014). Nevertheless, Turkey has been a keen supporter of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina since its foundation.

The Turkish government recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina on February 6, 1992 as an independent state even before Bosnia held its independence referendum on February 29, 1992. Turkey was the first to realize the potential war between Serbs and Bosniaks in the country. Within a few weeks, Turkey held a meeting with the Organization of Islamic Conference (now, Organization of Islamic Cooperation) members on 17-18 June, 1992 in Istanbul that urged the UN to intervene in Bosnia (OIC. Res. 1/5-Ex, 1992).

In August 1992, realizing the Western disinterest for intervening in Bosnia, Turkey proposed an action plan to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that consisted of political and military scenarios ("Türkiye'nin,"1992). At the

time, Turkey was under heavy terrorist attacks by the Kurdish separatist PKK that occupied its domestic and foreign agenda. Nevertheless, Turkey continued its efforts to draw attention to the conflicts in Bosnia. In November, 1992, the Foreign Ministry organized a Balkan Conference that was attended by Bulgaria, Slovenia Macedonia, Croatia, Austria, Italy, Romania, and Hungary. The main concern of the conference was the possibility of war spreading to other parts of the Balkans. The message the Balkan Conference sent to the UNSC was simple; "send troops into the region" ("Bölgeye asker," 1992).

Frustrated by the Western apathy in Bosnia, the Organization of Islamic Conference focused on lifting the arms embargo on Yugoslavia to legally arm the Bosniaks. Turkey supported the OIC resolution that demanded the UNSC to lift the embargo (OIC. Res. 7/21-P, 1993). Meanwhile, Turks took initiative in the following years and began secretly sending weapons to Bosnia, some of which were captured by European intelligence agencies (Coşkun, 2011; Hedges, 1996). On the other hand, the Turkish state attempted to broker peace in Yugoslavia between various parts a number of times. Turkey participated in almost all of the mediation attempts during the entire war either by organizing the meetings or advising the organizers (Coşkun, 2011).

When the international community finally intervened in Bosnia, Turkey ambitiously participated. It was a part of the peacekeeping forces and operations since the beginning of the conflict in Bosnia. Turkish troops participated in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) that was formed in 1992 and ended in December 1995 (UN, 1996). From July to December 1995, Turkish pilots flew 78 sorties over Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the UN-led NATO mission, Operation Deliberate Force that pushed the Serbs to negotiate the Dayton peace agreement (global security, n.d.).

Following Dayton, from December 1995 to December 1996, Turkey participated in Operation Joint Endeavour, also known as Implementation Force (IFOR) that was responsible for overseeing the implementation of the

peace agreement (NATO, 1996). In the same year, the United States announced an aid program to rebuild war-torn Bosnia and Herzegovina and asked for donations. A report by the US General Accounting Office (1997) regarding the progress of the Dayton agreement stated that:

In March 1996, the U.S. government announced the program and began soliciting international cash and in-kind donations for the program at a conference held in Turkey. Although 32 nations and 5 international organizations attended, only Turkey and the United States made a specific pledge at that time, while 5 other nations pledged to provide unspecified material and technical assistance in Bosnia. (p.82)

According to the report, Turkey donated 46.5 million dollars, a third of the amount donated by all Muslim states and NGOs.

In the late 1996, IFOR transferred its mission to SFOR (Stabilization Force), again with Turkish participation until NATO ended this mission and the EU took over in 2005. From 2005 onwards, Turkey has continued to be a part of EUFOR (European Union Force) under Operation ALTHEA (EUFOR, 2015). As of 2011, Turkish troops are the second largest force in the mission (MFA, n.d.).

From 2003 until it ended in 2012, Turkish police participated in EUPM (EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina) Moreover, Turkey has been contributing to the security of Bosnia and Herzegovina by training local police for nearly two decades ("Turkish police," 2016). Today, Turkey is the strongest supporter of Bosnia's membership to NATO. Croat member of the Bosnian Presidency, Dragan Čović, said in a press conference with President Erdoğan that "Without friends like you and your representation in NATO union we could not proceed in this [NATO membership process] matter" (Presidency, 2015, para.5).

Simultaneously, Turkish officials produced strategies to reintegrate Bosnia into the region. From 2009 to 2012, Turkey tailored peace talks between Serbia and Bosnia with a series of meeting attended by the presidents, prime ministers, and ministers of foreign affairs of all three states. Particularly, the

Balkan Summit of 2010 was a “historic” example of mediation (Turbedar, 2011). These meetings resulted in Bosnia opening an embassy in Belgrade, and Serbia condemning the Srebrenica Genocide, a major breakthrough in the post-war reconciliation period.

Looking at the economic relations, although the Turkish President announced Turkish investment not to be at the desired volume, Turkish businesses are among the top traders in Bosnia. As of May 2016, Turkey is the 6th largest trade partner of Bosnia (BHAS, 2016). Moreover, the Turkish state has invested 85 Million Euros in Bosnian agriculture and plans to invest another 15 Million Euros in this sector (Presidency, 2015).

Today, Turkey’s soft power in Bosnia heavily relies on its state-to public-missions. I find it very important to separately explain the institutions that carry out these missions. Meanwhile, I will be defining dimensions and resource-incentive efforts of the missions, based on the three soft power dimensions, that are; daily communication, strategic communication, and building lasting relations, and three soft power resources that are; a foreign policy which is moral and legitimate, a contextually attractive culture, and consistent political values as set by Nye (2008). I have explained these dimensions and resources in previous chapters.

The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency is one of the strongest representatives of its missions. Founded in 1992 to assist Turkic states in Asia in reviving their own culture after the fall of the Soviet Union, TIKA expanded its domain to global level by 2002 (TIKA, n.d.). Relatively, TIKA’s activity areas (means) have expanded over the years. Its activities include education, health, water and sanitation, administrative and civil infrastructure, production sectors, economic infrastructure and services, and other social infrastructure and services.

According to its latest available annual report in 2013, TIKA has spent 4.10% of its overall budget in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). It established study centers, health centers, laboratories, water networks, and restored various buildings. It completed a major agricultural development project in the east of BiH. TIKA supported the re-development of prominent national products such as honey and handmade rugs. It also invested in the revival of national culture by restoring historical bridges and mosques. (TIKA, 2013)

Some of these restoration projects are very strategic in regard to reviving the Turkic portion of Bosnian culture. The restoration of monumental buildings that were constructed by the Ottoman Empire such as the famous Mostar Bridge in the city of Mostar (1566), Drina, or Mehmed Pasa Sokolovic bridge in the city of Visegrad (1577), Emperor's Mosque in the city of Sarajevo (1457), Kursumlija Mosque in the city of Maglaj (1560), Bascarsija old town in the city of Sarajevo (1462), Mevlevi Tekke in the city of Sarajevo (1462), Ferhadija Mosque (1579) in the city of Banja Luka, Karadoz Beg Madrasa in the city of Mostar (1554) and many more are visible representation of the "glorious" Ottoman past of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

TIKA contributes to build lasting relations. Its work produces items that last years and bear influential historic significance for a broad domain. Mosques, madrasas, bridges, schools and health centers are visited by thousands of people each day, reminding people who built them. Some of its work has also increased the attractiveness of Turkish culture. A beautiful mosaic in a restored Ottoman Mosque, or a consolidation technique used in an Ottoman bridge may awaken interest among the locals, and perhaps, direct them to reevaluate the Turkish presence in the region.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is also a fixed target for one of world's oldest and Turkey's oldest humanitarian organization, Turkish Red Crescent. Originally founded in 1868, the organization aimed to aid wounded Ottoman soldiers during the empire's military operations. With the declaration of the republic,

the organization took its modern format and today its operations are global. Since 2007, the organization has sent large volumes of beef to Bosnia as part of its eid al-adha project that covers 18 countries. Last year the aid was 100 cattle in Bosnia. (Türk Kızılayı, 2015) The organization also sends green housing materials to distant villages. Within its primary operation purpose, providing post-disaster humanitarian relief, after the devastating floods that intensified around the city of Maglaj, Turkish Red Crescent sent 31 trucks and one military plane of aid materials that contained goods from blankets to furnitures. (Türk Kızılayı, 2014)

Its biggest partner in this operation was another Turkish institution, the Turkish Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD). Since its foundation in 2009, AFAD has continued operations in Bosnia. It sent humanitarian aid along with three firefighting helicopters during the forest fires between 2010 and 2013. The organization also prepares Bosnian schools for potential disasters (AFAD, 2015). Along with organizing various study and focus groups, AFAD also trains Bosnian personnel and helps develop local rescue system in Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFAD, 2014).

Both Kızılay and AFAD operate on the dimension of building lasting relations. Their work aims to establish friendships that are bound by strong feeling such as compassion and gratitude. These friendships, when consistently supported, may result in mutual trust and powerful allegiance. Moreover, their work contributes to increase consistent political values as a resource. Turkey's claim to have good intentions and unconditional support for Bosnia finds representation in the generous aid of these missions.

Perhaps the most important institution among the institutions that implement Turkey's soft power offensive is the relatively young Yunus Emre Institute. Founded in 2007 and operational since 2009, the institute's main aim is to tell a "new story." Seref Ateş, the president of Yunus Emre Institute, declares the institution's mission as:

Turkey's cultural institution Yunus Emre Enstitüsü that protects major Anatolian civilizations and makes efforts to bring the cultural heritage of this region to various corners of the world, plays a significant role in making the ancient sound of Turkish language heard in the world as well as introducing our historical and cultural heritage (Yunus Emre Institute, n.d. para.2).

The institution continuously organizes cultural events, funds projects that promote Turkish culture and teaches Turkish language to locals in each location. Through another language program, the institution certifies non-Turkish citizens as eligible Turkish language teachers, and offers employment opportunities. Organizing symposiums, seminars and mini-courses on Turkish language are some of its other activities. Bosnians are fond visitors of the institute. As of the end of 2014, 3,118 Bosnian citizens had successfully completed a Turkish language course in the two institute branches in the cities of Sarajevo and Fojnica (Yunus Emre Institute, 2015).

The Yunus Emre Institute also operates on building lasting relations. Its efforts directly target culture exportation and result in individuals that understand Turkey from the Turkish perspective. Its students study science, arts, and politics in the Turkish language, which presents alternatives to foreign perspectives. These people are also able to realize certain cultural details that may be lost in translation. In the long-term, they may voluntarily confront intentional or unintentional misrepresentation of Turkish culture and history.

The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities is another significant government mission for Turkey's soft power offensive. Founded in 2010, the presidency seeks to establish professional relations and revive cultural ties with Turkish citizens living abroad as well as related minorities around the world. However, its most popular service is the scholarships it grants to the students from kinship and related communities from 153 countries. In 2015, more than 15 thousand students were granted scholarships to study in Turkey (YTB, 2016). Within its Balkan Scholarship Programme, Bosnian students are also brought to Turkey to receive education

in the most prestigious universities. In 2015, the presidency organized an art workshop in Turkey that was attended by 150 student from Bosnia and 8 other Balkan states. The students' fees, transportation and accommodation were paid by the presidency. (YTB, 2015)

As apparent from its name, the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, operates on the dimension of building lasting relations. Through various cultural and scientific efforts, it aims to revive relations between Turkey and other nations. Its scholarship program raises generations that may have very good knowledge and experiences of Turkey. Moreover, its work enhances the attractiveness of Turkish culture and provides consistency for Turkey's political rhetoric about Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Table 4.1. List of Turkey's State Missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Name	Establishment	Working Area	Soft Power Dimension
Presidency of Religious Affairs	1935	Education; Religion	Build lasting relations; Strategic communication
Turkish Red Crescent Society	1947	Humanitarian Relief	Building lasting relations
Turkish Radio and Television Corporation	1964	Media	Daily communication
Turkish Coordination and Cooperation Agency	1992	Humanitarian Assistance	Building lasting relations
Disaster and Emergency Management Authority	2009	Humanitarian Relief	Building lasting relations
Turkish Airlines	1933	Transportation	Building lasting relations; Daily communication
Yunus Emre Institute	2007	Education; Culture	Building lasting relations
Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related	2010	Education; Humanitarian Assistance	Building lasting relations

Turkey's official religious regulation and fatwa authority, the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs is another institution that has developed strong ties with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its primary counterpart in Bosnia is the Islamic Community (Islamska Zajednica) which is the largest Islamic

organization in the country. The Islamic Community is independent from the state and elects its own board of managers. Its president is given the title of Grand Mufti. The presidency has permanent Religious Affairs Consultants that carry out diplomatic missions in Bosnia and work with the local community. In 2015, a cooperation protocol between the presidency and the community was signed. In his speech in the signing ceremony, President of Religious Affairs Mehmet Görmez stated that "Between Turkey and Bosnia, we do not only have signed protocols on documents but between hearts" (TRT, 2015, para.2).

In accordance with the cooperation protocol, the presidency sent 23 hafizes to various cities in Bosnia during the last Ramadan. Each year there are numerous consultation meetings between the two parties. The presidency is a regular donor for Ramadan feasts and distributes Qurans to hundreds of Bosnian Muslims. It restored Travnik Madrasa which is one of the biggest Islamic schools in Bosnia. Moreover, 9 masjids and one library were restored in the Defense Ministry of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Presidency (Diyamet Foundation, 2015).

The presidency of Religious Affairs has the broadest common cultural platform due to its Islamic identity and endeavors to build lasting relations and establish strategic communication. Its religious officers convey the Turkish interpretation of Islam while establishing strong professional ties with their Bosnian counterparts. Its president informs the Islamic Community in Bosnia about developments in Turkey. This prepares the local community for upcoming situations in Turkey. For instance, following the July 15 coup attempt, President Mehmet Görmez told the Reis-ul Ulema of Bosnia and Kosovo about the junta and their movement's ill-intentions ("Diyamet İşleri," 2016). The presidency consolidates the resource of political values. Turkey's Islamic identity proves its maturity through the presidency's assistance in Bosnia.

Partially state owned, one of Turkey's front-running corporations, Turkish Airlines, is a major contributor to the Bosnian air-transportation and tourism sector. With at least 14 flights each week, Turkish Airlines is one of the most frequent guests of the Sarajevo Airport. Its role in generating soft power is its costly sponsorships activities. Turkish Airlines is the official sponsor of Sarajevo FK, one of the biggest two football clubs of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It funds the nation's most prestigious international music and film festivals, such as the Sarajevo Film Festival and Sarajevo Jazz Festival.

Turkish Airlines operates on building up the dimension of lasting relations and establishing daily communication. Its transportation services enable establishing and maintaining relations between the two nations, while its sponsorship programs increase Turkey's daily visibility, in major football competitions and the most popular cultural events, attendees see Turkey's contribution. The company sets another example for Turkey's pledged assistance to Bosnia; thus increasing the resource of consistent political values. Its success also attracts attention to Turkey's business culture.

Turkey's biggest media company in terms of the number of television and radio channels owned, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), is also present and very active in Bosnia. TRT has an agency in Sarajevo that watches daily news in the country. Thus, it provides daily communication. TRT cooperates with another state owned media company, Anadolu Agency, as well as local companies. In one of its channels, TRT Avaz, TRT broadcasts in Bosnian language to the Turkish public. It also has a website in the Bosnian language that conveys news from Turkey.

TRT operates on the daily communication dimension. Its daily broadcast of the developments in Turkey raises awareness about Turkey's domestic and international policies in Bosnia. After minor or major events, TRT enables the Turkish government to convey its own analysis to Bosnians, bringing its own perspective against possible opposing or misinforming news agencies. It

enhances the legitimate and moral foreign policy resource by creating the change to continuously explain the reason behind government policies.

The Turkish Embassy in Sarajevo, Turkey's official diplomatic mission, along with implementing direct political decisions, as expected, also contributes to the soft power offensive. It coordinates state missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and organizes its own efforts to introduce Turkish culture. Its Culture and Promotion Consultancy organizes an annual Turkish Film Festival. Having completed the fifth event, the embassy brings Turkish celebrities to Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ministry of Culture, n.d.).

Surely, the Turkish Embassy as the diplomatic representative of Turkish government, operates on all dimensions and enhances all resources. However, its primary dimension needs to be strategic communication. It explains Turkey's position and possible upcoming decision to specifically targeted Bosnian institutions. This communication results in clarifying Turkey's position and understanding the position of the Bosnian government in particular events.

4.2. Civic Missions

Although state-to-public missions have larger funds and are better organized, society-to-society missions are able to reach distant communities in Bosnia. One of those missions, established by Foundation for the Development of Education in Sarajevo (SEDEF) in 2003, the International University of Sarajevo, where I obtained my bachelor's degree, is the biggest private university in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It employs 200 local and international academic and administrative professionals. Currently, it has around two thousand students, most of whom are from Bosnia and Herzegovina (IUS, n.d.). The university's board of trustees has ten members, and seven of these members are Turkish, along with the current and all previous rectors. IUS has 21 study programs under five faculties. Although its official language of education is English, students that enroll in any of the programs are offered

courses on Turkish history, literature and language. Its most significant contribution to the soft power strategy is the university's function as the meeting ground for Turkish and Bosnian citizens. Turkish students in the university study alongside with their Bosnian peers. Academics from both countries carry out joint courses and seminars on Turkish and Bosnian history and politics. Every development in Turkey is conveyed instantly to the Bosnian members of the university personally, whether by organized meetings or by casual coffee talks. Namely, the university acts as the melting pot for Turks and Bosnians.

Moreover, during the years I studied in IUS, I observed that many Turkish and Bosnian citizens joined their lives. Most of these couples have settled in Bosnia. Mixed marriages naturally result in "experts of culture" that are able to find detailed similarities between the two cultures and convey them to rest of the public. I follow this through my personal contacts. Some of my friends that only had superficial knowledge of Bosnia and Bosnian culture now tell me the most special stories of Bosnian elders after a few years following their marriage with Bosnians. I think this is a significant example for understanding the difference between PtS and StS missions. With its more personalized structure, society-to-society missions enable establishing very strong ties in the long term.

Founded by a prominent Turkish businessman of Bosnian origin in 2010, the Center for Developing Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina (BİGMEV) is a prominent civil mission. Operating particularly at the level of economic relations, BİGMEV mediates between ministries, business chambers and companies of the two countries. BİGMEV has a sizable match-making center that is accredited by the Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology. Enabled by this accreditation, the center grants up to 60% state assistance to Turkish businesses investing in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, BİGMEV continuously organizes business trips to different locations in Bosnia, taking interested Turkish businessmen on-site to introduce investment opportunities.

The foundation has signed cooperation agreements in Bosnia with 20 state institutions, 28 municipalities, 20 NGOs, and 5 business chambers (BİGMEV, n.d.).

In addition to its business activities, BİGMEV works to integrate the Bosnian diaspora. It claims that the number of Bosnians in diaspora is bigger than the number of Bosnians living in Bosnia and Herzegovina; therefore, if well organized, the diaspora would be a significant assistance in solving Bosnia's ongoing problems by internationalizing their home country. BİGMEV has built a Bosnian diaspora database and educates Bosnians on diaspora strategies (BİGMEV, n.d.).

The Istanbul Chamber of Commerce is another mission that works to enhance trade between Bosnia and Turkey. It annually organizes a Turkish Products Exhibition in Sarajevo. In 2015, 45 Turkish companies participated and more than 8 thousand local businessmen visited the exhibition (Ministry of Economy, 2015).

The Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) is another noteworthy organization in Bosnia and Herzegovina. IHH works on various fields ranging from seek and rescue missions to consciousness-raising and education. However, its main aid area in Bosnia is the orphans. In 2012, 77 orphans were in the sponsorship program (IHH, 2012). In only a couple of years, IHH increased this number more than 16 times. As of 2015, IHH sponsors 1253 orphans with their health, food, clothing, education and social needs on regular basis. Moreover, the foundation organizes outdoor activities as picnics and trips to help orphans socialize with their peers (IHH, 2015). These orphans along with the homeless and poor also benefit from Eid-al Adha donations.

In addition to its humanitarian relief activities, IHH also supports cultural communication efforts. In Sarajevo's Bascarsija district, it has financed the opening of the Istanbul Education and Culture Center that offers courses on

Turkish and Bosnian languages and traditional arts as well as vocational courses. The center also helps the coordination of IHH operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (IHH, n.d.).

All public-to-public missions operate on building lasting relations. Occasionally, they may expand to other dimensions as well. These institutions are not pre-planned by a central authority and their efforts are not coordinated. Thus, their place in Turkey's soft power offensive is partially ambiguous.

4.3. State Missions versus Civic Missions

Professionals that work within the framework of a certain state institution are limited in their method and techniques of communication, as well as by the context of the work they participate in. Moreover, these professionals may be located in some other states by the central management and their ties are either lost or weakened in the target country. Volunteers, on the other hand, may maintain their contact without restrictions on multiple directions. Their ties may extend to family relations and business partnerships, making it much more special than official communications.

Moreover, civic missions directly focus on citizens without intermediary institutions, whereas state missions often work with home state that may influence the distribution of aids or aims of projects due to political reasons. In the former, activities are dependent on the political conformity between the two states. However, in the latter civic mission operate without political concerns and do expect to benefit from their activities.

4.4. Turkey versus Europe in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Turkey's overall soft power offensive in Bosnia and Herzegovina diverges from the Western offensive in one respect; that is, Turkey's actual history in the country. When observed, Turkey's tools and method are similar to Europe's and America's. The EU with its Pre-accession Assistance and the states with its USAID are bringing state funds to assist Bosnia. Their NGOs such as British

Youth Council of England; Association Culturelle Joseph Jacquemotte, AEGEE Europe, Bruegel of Belgium; Bridging Europe of Greece, Banlieues d'Europe, Fondation Sciences Citoyennes of France; Citizens of Europe, A Soul for Europe of Germany, Balkan Trust for Democracy, Youth Initiative for Democracy of the States and many more engage Bosnian public.

Most of these organizations manifest their goal as assisting Bosnia and Herzegovina's "development" in different areas. Reference in the subjected development is the Western liberal norms, not only in culture but in trade, law, art and all remaining sectors. These values are relatively global but it would be very hard to say that they have strong roots in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is due to the Ottoman and Yugoslavian experiences of this country. Culture in both Ottoman and Yugoslavian eras was distant from the Western liberal worldview. I should highlight, one more time, it is not only the individual lifestyle we should study here, but culture of the nation in every field.

On the other hand, Turkey bases its arguments on actual history with its achievements and failures. Its discourse is not based on what may be achieved through cooperation but what has happened. Despite the contradicting narratives, Bosnia and Herzegovina was the heart of the region for many centuries during the Ottoman era. Surely, this can only be an inspiration in beginning of a partnership that is fundamentally different in its form and instruments between Turkey and Bosnia.

4.5. Responses to Turkey's activism in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Turkish missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina returns positive response from different segments of Bosnian government and people. I would like to present some of the numerous examples on mainstream and social media. In an interview with successful students of Yunus Emre Institute's Turkish Language Program in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hamida Catic, one of 80 students that were rewarded a week-long trip to Istanbul due to her accomplishments said that "We are brothers and sisters with Turkish people, we love them very

much" (Radiosarajevo, 2016). Yunus Emre Institute periodically sends successful Bosnian students for short-term visits to different cities in Turkey to provide them with a chance to practice their Turkish with native speakers as well as to enhance the students' bond with Turkey.

There are also Bosnians that receive Turkey's support to live and study in Turkey. Alexandra Immamovic one of nearly 300 Bosnian students that study in Turkey with YTB scholarships said in an interview to Bosnians that seek chance to study in Turkey that "Terms of study are quite satisfactory [here]. The scholarship covers all costs of the home in which we live to the monthly allowance. I recommend that you come [to study in Turkey] through the state agency YTB" (Klix, 2015). Students that come to Turkey with YTB scholarships are not only registered to universities in Turkey's major cities like Istanbul and Ankara but to various universities in Anatolia. Aleksandra, for example, has been studying in Ataturk University, in the city of Erzurum.

Responses from top management of Bosnia's Islamic community that closely follows Turkey's daily politics are some other examples. The community does not hesitate to publicly express its relation with Turkey. For instance, The Grand Mufti Husein ef. Kavazović was one of the first to express support for Turkey after the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016. A day after the attempt, in an interview, he stated that: "Last night was a night of great challenges and horrors. [I Pray] with anxiety at heart and sincere prayers addressed to the Supreme Lord to help our brothers" ("Na podmukao," 2016).

On another instance Dženita Jusufbegović General Director of Bosnia's state television BHRT publicly expressed BHRT's appreciation to Turkey for TRT's donation of technical equipment and partnership (TRT, 2013). TRT and BHRT often work in joint projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As I have stated earlier, Turkey's IHH provides Eid-al Adha donations. During the distribution of beef as a part of these activities in Bosnia, a resident of

Bosnian City of Tuzla said in an interview with the local news agency that “These [activities] are very important things, they show us that these people are not forgotten and abandoned, especially at this time of the holiday season” (Tuzlanski, 2016).

Following another humanitarian aid activity, activities of Turkish Red Crescent and AFAD for the victims of floods in the city of Maglaj, Bosnian Minister of Foreign Affairs Zlatko Lagumdžija thanked Turkish government and nation for their support in a meeting with Turkey’s ambassador to BiH (MVP, 2014). Turkish missions were a few of the humanitarian relief organizations that arrived to Maglaj.



CHAPTER 5

OBSTACLES TO TURKEY'S SOFT POWER

As said before, Turkey is pursuing a wide and systematic soft power strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, there are a few but very complex problems to solve before Turkey can ensure victory for its strategy. In this chapter, I will try to explain these problems that require a great deal of attention from Turkish policy-makers.

5.1. Historical Hostilities

Ottoman rule in Bosnia resulted in a Slavic Muslim nation that had superiority over non-Muslim Bosnians for more than four centuries. Now only remembered in the very old stories of older generations, these years were the era of peace and prosperity for the Bosniaks whose grandsons today support Turkish involvement in their domestic politics. However, the same era is considered as "a time of enslavement and tragedy" for the remaining ethnic groups (Vracic, 2014). Such Ottoman policies as the child-levy, cizye tax and the oppressive rule of unregulated provincial elites like janissary commanders and ayans are remembered as Ottoman oppression by the non-Muslims. It seems that the scope and iteration of such tragedies were exaggerated through "a distorted interpretation of history" by the Balkan romantic nationalists (Turbedar, 2011). Thus, upcoming generations in Bosnia were taught an Ottoman history that is built only on the mistakes of the Ottomans, disregarding Istanbul's efforts to punish the oppressors by outlawing ayans and janissaries. In fact, even recent history textbooks in Bosnia and Herzegovina give students the overall impression that Ottomans were the "common historical enemy" (Muhasilovic, 2014).

Deeply rooted in the non-Muslim communities' collective memory, this "trauma" evokes suspicion and anxiety for some Bosnians when they witness a Turkish company opening a new store or a Turkish state institution donating

thousands of blankets. This perception is being transferred to upcoming generations. In a recent research on Bosnian Serb Students, subjects were asked the first thing that comes to their mind after hearing "Ottoman Empire". 49% of the students answered "Occupier" and 40% of the students answered "Enemy" that indicates almost half of future Bosnian Serb community keeps historical hatred against Turkey's preceding state (Muhasilovic, 2014).

Turkey may never fully obtain Bosnia's appreciation for its efforts, considering the fact that some of the Bosnians still see Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic as a hero (Wilkinson & Sterling, 2012) who stated to TV camera before ordering the slaughter of 8.000 Bosnian Muslims that "On this day I give Srebrenica to the Serb people, the time has finally come for revenge against Turks [Bosnian Muslims] who live in this area" (Hodzic, 2012).

5.2. Structural Complications

Another obstacle that also partially fortifies Bosnian Serb resistance to appreciation of Turkey in the country is the fragmented nature of the Bosnian state structure. Perception of Turkey is substantially negative in Republika Srpska (Turbedar, 2011). Differently from having individual oppositions to Turkish presence, Republika Srpska has its own central government that may through organized institutions block Turkey's influence.

As I said before, Turkish activism in the region is strongly affiliated with Turkish President Erdogan's personal sympathy for the country. Unless structured as a systematic strategy, not just as a romantic involvement, Turkish efforts may be hampered if Turkey's president retires. Soft power mainly bears fruits over the long term; so the future of the strategy must be well planned.

Turkey's discourse in Bosnia, as announced officially, comprises a history and culture that may be very influential on some Bosnians. But as Nye (2008) explains, in order for culture to be effective in soft power politics, it should be contextually attractive. Turkish culture and history, as I mentioned earlier, are

not attractive to all Bosnians. Turkey must enlarge its soft power discourse by introducing additional arguments. Turkey's secular democratic experience may be uttered more often, increasing its portion in the soft power discourse, due to the simple fact that Muslims are slightly a majority in Bosnia.

5.3. Hard Power Limitations

Lastly, Turkey should realize that "there is no soft power without hard power" (Cooper, 2004). A state may design very sophisticated strategies to influence other states. However, without manifesting hard power, it will be very difficult to influence others. Regardless of geography and context, manifesting hard power, in other words, manifesting military or economic strength inoculates others with confidence and fear, both enhancing generated rate of soft power.

It would not be correct to say Turkish politicians are completely ignoring this argument. Erdoğan's invitation of foreign leaders to opening ceremonies of giant projects such as Marmaray sub-sea tunnel, Yavuz Selim Bridge, Osman Gazi Bridge and many more is a contributing policy. He shows them what the Turkish economy is able to afford. Bakir Izzetbegovic is a frequent guest in these ceremonies. He publicly shares his positive observations in Bosnia, arousing curiosity towards Turkey among Bosnians.

Demonstrating military strength, is perhaps more important than demonstrating financial strength. Turkey's recent operation in Syria is a favorable move in this respect. Although this operation is not in Bosnia and Herzegovina's region, it shows what Turkey is eventually capable of performing. As Turkey's hard power becomes more obliging, its soft power will become more persuasive.

However, I would like to convey another argument that diverts Turkey's use of soft power from other great powers in its target regions. Turkey, unlike US, Russia and the EU, has limited hard power. By hard power, I refer to coercing and inducing. The United States, for instance, leans heavily on its military and

economic resources to adjust other states' decision in accordance with its interest. In the last two decades, US army invaded Afghanistan and Iraq. It intervened in Yugoslavia, Somalia, Liberia, Sudan and Haiti. The US government imposed sanctions on Iran, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, Myanmar and individuals from numerous different states. Meanwhile, US has continued its soft power politics, only as a supplementary strategy.

Russia recently intervened in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria. Despite all objections from the EU and the US, it annexed Crimea. It imposed sanctions on the European Union and temporarily on Turkey. Moreover, Russia continuously intimidates North European and Scandinavian states by violating their airspace. Although Russia's aggressive policies damage its overall soft power, it attracts certain ethnic groups amongst its Slavic neighbors. Pro-Russian insurgency of 2014 in Ukraine is a good example of Russia's soft power.

The European Union does not have its united army but intervened in Yugoslavia, Congo, Chad, Central African Republic, Somalia and Mali for peace keeping purposes. Its hardest power is its economic wealth, and the EU does not hesitate to use it. Currently, it imposes sanctions on various African states, Iran and Russia.

Turkey, on the other hand, does participate in peace keeping operations and confirms with UN-led mandatory sanctions on other states. However, it is not as comfortable as its potential opponents in using hard power due to its relatively fragile economy and limited military capability. Traditionally, Turkish army is a strong defensive power; however its strength as an offensive military is disputable.

Although it caused a great deal of security gap, Turkey's reluctance to intervene in its neighbor Syria for five years is a good example of Turkey's distrust of its military's offensive power. The most significant reason for that, is lack of Turkish mechanized and aerial defense industry.

Surely, exploring Turkey's hard power would require a separate, deeper analysis. But I observe that Turkey is compelled to use soft power as a substitute to hard power, not as supplementary to it.

5.4. Neo-Ottomanist Indictment

Turkey's overall activism in the Balkans and the Middle East has raised the question whether Turkey aims to "revitalize" the Ottoman Empire. Drawing intensive attention with the attractive term, neo-Ottomanism, and the debate has occupied scholars for quite some time. In this section I will try to elaborate neo-Ottomanism and its varied perceptions. Moreover, I will appraise this chapter as a chance to convey my analysis on what Turkey plans to use its soft power for.

Turkey has been an active actor in the Balkans since the end of the cold war. Contrary to what is popularly voiced, Turkey's close relations with the Balkan states began by the late 80s, almost two decades before the AKP government. It reached its peak during the crisis in Yugoslavia. Former President Turgut Özal (89-93) literally dedicated Minister of Foreign Affairs Hikmet Çetin to the defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Yugoslav crisis.

Although Turkey failed to stop the tragedy in Yugoslavia, it partially succeeded in drawing the attention of the international community to the tragedy in Bosnia, as discussed in the previous chapter. Turkey's interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as overall in the Balkans, did not diminish when Suleyman Demirel succeeded Turgut Özal as president. During President Demirel's term in office (1993-2000), Turkey granted great amount of funds, 46.5 million dollars, to the reconstruction of Bosnia (US General Accounting Office, 1997). Even when Turkey faced one of the biggest economic crisis in its history in 2001, it continued its presence in the region through intergovernmental organizations. After AKP's election into office, the relation between the two countries took a multidimensional structure. I tried to explain details of Turkish

activity in Bosnia. I would like to continue with the debate about the aims of Turkey's active foreign policy.

5.4.1. Criticism of Turkey's Foreign Policy Shift

By the mid-2000 Turkey visibly changed its approach to the Caucasus and Eurasia, the Middle-East and South East Europe (Somun, 2011). Scholars have different opinions on why Turkey shifted its foreign policy. Two main arguments gained recognition. First, Turkey with an awfully romantic approach, aims to revive the Ottoman Empire, or sort of an Ottoman Federation, on the former Ottoman lands by using an Islamic discourse and its former Islamic leadership experience (Vracic, 2014). The core of the argument here is Turkey's desire to recapture global, or, at least, regional, leadership of Muslims by expanding its cultural influence. Second, Turkey with a realistic approach, aims to enlarge its influence for pragmatic reasons on the former Ottoman lands by using a liberal discourse (Taspinar, 2008). The main argument here is that Turkish foreign policy was influenced by the liberal international politics and economy, and it focuses on the former Ottoman states to make allies.

One of the reasons for arguing about Turkish romance towards the former Ottoman states is surely the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's passionate speeches about Turkey's neighboring regions. For instance, in 2009, while telling how Turkey successfully mediated the conflict between Israel and Hamas in a party meeting, Davutoğlu said:

This is the reason why the European Union does not wish to see us [in the Union]. Because we solve the problems in this region. We have inherited the Ottoman legacy. They call us neo-Ottomans. Yes, we are the neo-Ottomans. We have to deal with the troubles of our region (Directorate General of Press and Information, n.d. para.3).

At first glance, drawing on the Ottoman Empire that for centuries dealt with the troubles of the regions it ruled, is confounding. But it provides legitimacy and motivation for Turkey's active stance in the area. Davutoglu's self-

assigned tasks regarding the former Ottoman states are also visible in his book "Strategic Depth". For instance, regarding the Balkans, he says:

Particularly, efforts of the two main Ottoman remainders in the Balkans, Bosniaks and Albanians, to survive as independent entities require the promotion of shared historical and cultural ties between these natural allies and Turkey (Davutoglu, 2001, p.89).

These statements, if dissociated from their context, may direct us to think that Turkey is romantic with the Balkans and it moves with a sort of religious idealism to revive pax-Ottomanica (Arin, 2015). However, from another angle, these and other statements could also be perceived as attempts to find a connection point with the target states on which a realist/pragmatic relationship can be built. This sort of legitimization approach is not new; it is actually applied numerous times by Western states. For instance, former US President George Bush said in a speech prior to the invasion of Iraq in American Enterprise Institute:

A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform that vital region, by bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions. America's interests in security, and America's belief in liberty, both lead in the same direction: to a free and peaceful Iraq ("Full text", 2003, para.8).

Or in another example, Russian President Putin answered a question regarding the situation in Crimea:

... if I do decide to use the Armed Forces, this will be a legitimate decision in full compliance with both general norms of international law, since we have the appeal of the legitimate President, and with our commitments, which in this case coincide with our interests to protect the people with whom we have close historical, cultural and economic ties (Presidential Executive Office, 2014, para.39).

In both examples the leaders refer to certain values for the possible policies that we now clearly know are motivated by pragmatic reasons. Bush emphasizes liberty and Putin emphasizes shared history and values. However, the real reason behind the invasions that came shortly after these statements, was to enhance national security and economy of the US and Russia. The truth

is that, seeking legitimacy with idealist rhetoric does not mean producing policy based on idealist motives.

5.4.2. Turkey's Foreign Policy Justification

Turkey's new foreign policy is a mixture of real-politik and ideal-politik that is weaved around political and economic justice, principles of security and freedom, and trade and economic development (Kalin, 2011).

Principle of justice refers to the uneven distribution of resources and rights to the Balkans, the Middle-East, Africa, and other poor nations. Turkey defends development of nations in these regions. Restricted or limited representation of states in intergovernmental organization and exclusive rights granted to certain states as in the case of permanent members of UN Security Council are also voiced by Turkey to be detrimental to establishing global justice. As President Erdoğan said in his speech to the UN General Assembly, "... I should underline that world is bigger than the five" ("Erdoğan", 2014, para1). If we turn to our focus country, as stated earlier, Turkey is the strongest supporter of Bosnia's membership to NATO, hoping to increase international representation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Security and freedom refers to domestic and global security in a balance. The balance should be well designed because "...security without freedom leads to authoritarianism and freedom without security invites chaos and instability" (Kalin, 2012, p.15) This principle is highly observable in Turkey's domestic politics: while it grants equal rights to Kurdish minority, Turkish military simultaneously severely attacks insurgent Kurdish terrorist organization. In Bosnia, Turkey supports the integration of Muslim and non-Muslim communities. However, it sides with underprivileged Bosniaks. While Bosnian-Croats and Bosnian-Serbs have Croatia and Serbia as their mother states supporting them, Bosniaks mostly rely on Turkey.

Lastly, trade and investment principle refers to Turkey's stronger integration to international economy, enhancing its trade volume with its neighbors and beyond. Attempts to lift visas, create free-trade zones and government incentives are indicators of this principle. Erdoğan's displeasure with the current Turkish investment volume in Bosnia and Herzegovina is one example. Turkey projects that larger trade relations bring tighter political relations (Kalin 2011).

As it is observed from the principles, Turkey's new activism does not seek to revive the Ottoman golden age. On the contrary, it plans for practicable foreign policy goals.

5.4.3. Origins of Neo-Ottomanism

Moreover, actual Ottomanism in the late years of the Ottoman Empire was not implemented by idealist motives either. By the mid-19th century, the Ottoman Empire was severely threatened by nationalist movements. It clearly observed that two essential policies had to be replaced. First, non-Muslims could no longer have secondary status. Second, official Islamic discourse had to be softened. These precautions were taken in 1869, when all people living within Ottoman borders were declared equal subjects, members of the Ottoman Nation (Hashemi, 2014). Nevertheless, dissolution of the empire continued with popular revolts in the Balkans. This policy shift was a pragmatic turn. The Ottomans who proudly declared themselves as the protector of Muslims and the Caliphate, protector of all Muslims, abandoned the former image of the empire in the hope of gaining its non-Muslim citizens' support.

For pragmatic reasons, following the failed Ottoman Nation project, Sultan Abdulhamit returned to Islamic policies (Hashemi, 2014). Predicting what future may hold for the empire, the Sultan hoped to ignite an Islamic revival that would support Islam's pioneer front against the West. This attempt failed as well and left its place to Westernism, accelerating after the establishment of modern Turkey.

5.4.4. Counter Arguments

Having provided different perspectives on the debate, I believe, Turkey's traditional West-oriented foreign policy that avoided close relations with Muslim states, particularly in the Middle East, gave place to a more liberal doctrine after 2002. The new foreign policy under AKP government removed Turkey's self-imposed barriers. For the Turkish government, Islam and Islamic communication were the major vehicles for increasing the Turkish influence. This potential was idle in the traditional approach to foreign policy. Attempts to reutilize Islamic experience as a tool also enlarged Turkey's influence of domain. Muslim states, due to their centuries-long relationship with the Ottoman Empire, gained pragmatic importance in Turkey's security and economy agenda. The territories under Ottoman sovereignty, particularly the Balkans, were good starting points for its new strategy (McDonald, 2012).

Turkey that pursued a defensive realist strategy through manifestation of its coercive power during most of the pre-AKP governments changed its route to become a partner state through manifestation of its soft power (Rüma, 2011). Its emphasis on soft power aims to pave the way for the development of partnerships that will benefit Turkey's security and economy, and not to animate Ottomanism. In fact "Neo-Ottomanism does not call for Turkish imperialism in the Middle-East and the Balkans" (Taspinar, 2008, p.14).

On the other hand, attempts to revive relations with former Ottoman states do not come only from the government. As I said in the previous chapter, civic actors voluntarily play a very significance role in Turkey's overall soft power strategy. I would like to underline an important detail that is not orchestrated by the AKP government but simply enabled by its years-long presence in power. During the single party period, until 1945, every non-governmental organization had to operate within the narrow borders drawn by the central government; thus civil initiatives did not develop. NGOs and businesses that were led by religious and right wing political individuals lacked opportunities to establish international relations. Following the transition to multiparty

democracy, civil society as well as the private sector began growing (Özkiraz & Arslanel, 2015).

However this time, military coups of '60, '80 and '97 redesigned civil initiatives in accordance with the national radical secularist ideology by closing NGOs, political parties and seizing private companies, hampering the empowerment of religious-conservative segments of society. During the AKP government, extensive democratization and privatization in accordance with the EU criteria and resistance to military involvement in politics resulted with the flowering of these civil initiatives.

Turning to neo-Ottomanism debate, how Turkey's activism affects non-Muslim and anti-Turkish groups is another dimension that is very seldom argued. I believe, there is more to explore about their opposition to Turkish involvement than security concerns. Historically, taunting Turks as the other, non-European, was not only an outcome of the perceived cultural differences but a tool for newly emerging states' nation-building processes (McDonald, 2012). People in the Balkan States and the Middle-East also had their differences between themselves depending on their hometowns, religiosity, sect, accent, and overall culture.

Their history under Ottoman rule was one of the strongest values which different segments in these countries shared, and it is still reminded by leaders of ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina such as Milorad Dodik of Republika Srpska and Veso Vegar of HDZ 1990.

The significance of the common Ottoman heritage is better understood when considering that most of these ethnic groups did not have self-governance experience for more than five centuries. The collective "cause" against the Ottoman Empire filled this void, gathering people under newly emerging centralized states. Today, "the Turkish threat" is a useful tool for internal unity of different ethnic segments. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, as I have supported

with examples, this is apparent amongst Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat politicians.

5.4.5. Europe's Role in Turkey's New Foreign Policy Rationale

Finally, Europe's role in Turkey's decision to change its route should not be overlooked. For decades, Turkey not only self-westernized, but also appealed for official "recognition" by European states. After half a century-long struggle to become a member, the EU still keeps Turkey in the waiting room. Disappointed by its externalization, Turkey's enthusiastic efforts to make new friends or revive old relations should not be surprising. President Erdogan's statements to France 24 News in a recent interview clearly gives clues about this Turkey's disappointment. The President said that "The EU has been keeping us at its door for 53 years. Were the countries they have received as a member better than Turkey in terms of the EU acquis?" (Presidency, 2016, para.5).

Turkey's determined activism in Bosnia and Herzegovina is partially related to the European Union as well. Due to the Peace Agreement, there is an Office of High Representative (OHR) that is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the agreement and fulfill the requirements of the Implementation Council. The office enjoys extraordinary authority over the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fact OHR's responsibility is to ensure that the government institutions function properly (OHR, n.d.). In order to meet this vaguely defined responsibility, OHR's powers include "the imposition of substantial legislation, the amendment of Bosnian legislation, the dismissal of elected government officials, and the annulment of decisions of the Bosnian Constitutional Court" (Banning, 2014, p.261). Due to Dayton Peace Agreement, Annex 10, Article 1.2, The High Representative is appointed by the United Nations Security Council.

OHR is responsible only to the Peace Implementation Council. The council has a steering board that acts as its managerial branch. In the board, Canada,

France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States are individually represented, while Turkey represents the Organization of Islamic Conference.

In substance, Bosnia and Herzegovina is governed by the Western powers whose decisions cannot be directly influenced by Turkey. In order to maintain influence, Turkey has to be active in Bosnia through soft power tools, if it does not wish to be excluded from the entire design of this country. This behavior does not refer to neo-Ottomanism or sort of imperialist policy, but it simply is an effort to obtain power in Bosnia and Herzegovina.



CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

“Power” is one of the most debated issues in the social sciences. The ways an actor successfully changes another actor’s behavior have been studied by many scholars. Thus far, three main paradigms, in other words, the three faces of power, have been asserted in the political sciences domain. The first defends that power is to hold the right or capability to make decisions. The second argues that power is the right or capability to prevent issues from reaching the decision-making process. And the third also claims that power is the capability to change decision-makers’ values and interests.

Influenced by these studies before him, Joseph Nye introduced the concept of soft power. According to Nye, actors are able to practice power over others to make them comply with their choices in three ways: Coercion which refers to forcing others to comply; inducement which refers to paying others to comply; attraction which refers to co-opt others into complying. An actor’s capability into co-opt others to complying with its own interest is called soft power.

The capacity of an actor’s soft power depends on three resources: contextually attractive culture, sincere and consistent political values, and foreign policy that is moral and legitimate. These resources are used and reproduced through the three dimensions of daily communication, strategic communication and building lasting relations.

Turkey is a keen practitioner of soft power. Its synthesis of Ottoman history and culture with Turkish democratic experience is the foundation of its soft power strategy. It has been reinterpreting its history by shifting its efforts from westernization to reconciliation with tradition to find a common ground with the former Ottoman provinces.

Turkey's changing geostrategic position, domestic shift in its mind-set and globally changing foreign policy instrument caused a fundamental change in its foreign policy. As manifested, this foreign policy centers on the principles of political and economic justice, security and freedom and trade and economic development.

Bosnia, as one of these provinces, is a distinct example of Turkey's strategy of soft power. Supporting it before and during the Yugoslav war, following the peace agreement, the Turkish government launched numerous missions to Bosnia and Herzegovina that work in various fields, on different dimensions, using and enhancing soft power resources. The success of the Turkish soft power strategy is visible in Bosnia's favorable response to Turkish demands as well as Bosnian interest in Turkey's domestic issues.

Being also a sphere of influence for Europe, Bosnia and Herzegovina is also significant for observing the cultural struggle between Turkey and the West. Turkey asserts its history, culture and religion while Europe asserts Western liberal values, Schengen and stability. The latter is appealing not only to non-Muslim but also to secular Muslim Bosnians while the former steadily seeks to consolidate its position.

Turkey's activism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as other former Ottoman states, triggered the debate whether Turkey is turning to its Ottoman roots. Gained popularity with the term "neo-Ottomanism", many scholars attended the debate. My analysis is that Turkey changed its traditional defensive foreign policy due to the liberal transformation of its domestic politics and the international politics after the end of the Cold War. Turkey aims to extend its relations with the former Ottoman states, not to revive the Ottoman Empire, but because it has more leverage on these states than others. It is simply easier for Turkey to find a common ground to build relations with the Balkan States and the Middle-Eastern states than, say, South American states.

It should be noted that Turkey lacks extensive hard power to directly intervene in these states. Its military and economy are efficient for defense but not for intervention. Thus, Turkey is compelled to substitute its hard power inefficiency with soft power. In other words, Turkey chooses the time-consuming but safe strategy based on soft power instead of quick but risky strategy based on hard power.

In the future, Turkey should continue its efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina with a smoothed Islamic discourse. Its democratic experience is an important resource that should be highlighted more often. Islam is exclusively attractive to Muslims; but democracy is universal and targets a bigger domain. Moreover, emphasis on not only researching the Ottoman history in Bosnia, but also using a persuasive secular narrative may weaken non-Muslim resistance. In any case, Turkey is following a promising strategy. Yet there is still much to do to have substantial capability to influence Bosnia's agenda.

Turkey's increased activism in its foreign affairs caught attention of many scholar. Thus, there are a number of works on Turkey's soft power strategy. Although the Balkans consist a significant portion of the studies, most of the work on this issue take the Middle-Eastern states as their cases.

The volume of publications on Turkish activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina are very limited. It is possible to learn certain activities of state missions from their official reports. But there are not any descriptive works on the activities of Turkey's civic missions. Moreover, it is very hard to find scholarly publication on Bosnia's reactions to Turkish missions. Such information may be acquired from the media and political speeches.

This theses provides an overall view of Turkey's new foreign policy rationale. And a short examination of Turkish applications in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This work may be an introduction to detailed studies of Turkish-Bosnian relations, Turkish foreign policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and transformation

in Turkey's foreign policy and Turkish-European relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.



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