

**A CONCEPTUAL HISTORY OF *ULUS* IN THE CONTEXT OF NATION-BUILDING AND
LANGUAGE POLICIES IN TURKEY**

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ABSTRACT

A CONCEPTUAL HISTORY OF *ULUS* IN THE CONTEXT OF NATION-BUILDING AND LANGUAGE POLICIES IN TURKEY

Turgut, Üveys Mücahit

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In this thesis, I examine the historical adventure of the concept of *ulus*, which came to be used as the counterpart of "nation" in the language reform process in Turkey in the 1930s, based on the theoretical approach to conceptual history pioneered by Reinhart Koselleck. The study examines Turkish political life and identity construction through conceptual history and language nationalism. In this thesis, I explain different types of language politics and their role in the process of nationalization in France, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire. I discuss the changing sense of identity during the *Milli Mücadele* period and the Republican period of Turkey, and the new Turkish identity that started to be produced at the end of the 1920s. I narrate the language reform process in parallel with the Turkish history thesis and discuss the new secular Turkish identity in the process of nationalization. I begin by offering a short conceptual history of the term *millet*, after which I explain the etymology of the term *ulus*, the use of the term until the 13th century, and the changing meaning of the term in the Ottoman world over time. In doing so, I draw from etymological dictionaries, epics, inscriptions, ancient Turkish works, works of the TDK (Turkish Language Association), and newspapers. I discuss the struggle between the use of the terms *ulus*, *millet*, and *budun* and the process whereby the former term came to dominate. I describe the use of the concept of *ulus* in different circles. I explain in detail and with examples that the difference between *ulus* and *millet* was the result of an ideological divide. I also show how the concepts have become ideological symbols, particularly in terms of the differences between *milliyetçilik* and *ulusalcılık*.

Keywords: Ulus, millet, conceptual history, Turkish identity, nation-building, language policies.



ÖZ

TÜRKİYE’DE ULUS İNŞASI VE DİL POLİTİKALARI BAĞLAMINDA ULUS KELİMESİNİN
KAVRAM TARİHİ

Turgut, Üveys Mücahit

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Bu tezde 1930larda Türkiye’deki dil reform sürecinde dilimize “nation” kelimesinin karşılığı olarak millet yerine getirilen ulus kavramının tarihsel macerasını inceledim. Bunu yaparken Reinhart Kosselleck’in öncülüğünü yaptığı kavram tarihi çalışmalarının teorik formatını temel aldım. Çalışma, kavram tarihi ve dil milliyetçiliği üzerinden Türk siyasal hayatını ve kimlik inşasını ele alıyor. Sadece bir kavram çalışması olmayan bu tezde öncelikle dil politikalarının çeşitlerini ve bunların uluslaşma sürecinde ne gibi katkılarının olduğunu teorik olarak açıkladım. Akabinde, bu sürecin Fransa, Almanya ve Osmanlı’da nasıl olduğunu tartıştım. Milli Mücadele döneminde ve Cumhuriyet dönemi Türkiye’sinde değişen kimlik algısını ve 1920li yılların sonunda üreilmeye başlanan yeni Türk kimliğini bu bağlamda tartıştım. Dil reformu sürecini Türk Tarih Tezi ile paralel bir biçimde anlattım ve uluslaşma sürecinde yeni Türk kimliğini tartıştım. Bu doğrultuda millet kelimesinin kısa bir kavram tarihini yazdıktan sonra ulus kavramının tarihini anlattım. Burada kavramın etimolojisini, 13. Yüzyıla kadarki kullanımını ve Osmanlı dünyasında süreç içerisinde değişen anlamını anlattım. Bunu yaparken etimolojik sözlüklerden, destanlardan, yazıtlardan, eski Türkçe eserlerden, Türk Dil Kurumu çalışmalarından ve gazetelerden yararlandım. Kavramın dile yerleşme sürecinde budun ve millet kelimeleri ile girdiği çekişmeden bahsettim. Ulus kavramının farklı mecralardaki kullanımından bahsettim. Ulus ve millet kavramları arasında oluşan farkın ideolojik ayrışmalar kaynaklı olduğunu detaylıca ve örneklerle anlattım. Burada özellikle milliyetçilik ve ulusalcılık arasındaki farkları göstererek kavramların nasıl ideolojik semboller haline geldiğini gösterdim.

Anahtar kelimeler: ulus, millet, kavram tarihi, Türk kimliđi, ulus inşası, dil politikaları





“Die Sprache ist das Haus des Seins”

Martin Heidegger

“Kamus namustur”

Cemil Meriç

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thank you, in advance, to my readers, who I pray will forgive me if there is a slip of the tongue.



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A: Arabic

ADD: Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği (Atatürkist Thought Association)

AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)

CHP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican Peoples Party)

CKMP: Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi (Republican Villagers Nation Party)

ÇYDD: Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği (Association for the Support of Contemporary Living)

GG: Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (basic historical concepts)

L: Latin

MDD: Milli Demokratik Devrim (National Democratic Revolution)

MHP: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party)

MTTB: Milli Türk Talebe Birliği (National Turkish Student Union)

SHP: Sosyal Demokratik Halkçı Parti (Social Democratic Populist Party)

TBMM: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Grand National Assembly of Turkey)

TDK: Türk Dil Kurumu (Turkish Language Association)

TDTC: Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti (Investigation Society for Turkish Language)

TİP: Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Workers Party of Turkey)

TTK: Türk Tarih Kurumu (Turkish History Association)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: ON CONCEPTUAL HISTORY AND ITS IMPORTANCE

Words, their abstract envisagement in our minds, and meanings, that is to say the field related to language is exciting. The natural development of languages accompanies, naturally, creation of new words and semantic enlargement or constriction of words over time. So what if somebody would tell us to call “sea” as “tree”? This would not only be a name change of an entity. This would influence social intelligence as well as cognition, meaning, and identification. When social and political effects are added, this imagination could create an inextricable situation. Dogtooth (Lanthimos, 2009) is an eye-opening Greek movie related to these kind of matters. Its story makes it possible for us to think about some issues related with language and politics. The father keeps his three children and wife isolated outside of their home, which is surrounded by a tall fence and is positioned far from the city. No one but the father can go out of the house with his car. Thereby, family members do not have any connections outside of their territory. The father and mother create their own laws and language in their fenced territory. A lot of words are used with different meanings and teaching new words is under parents’ control. For instance, the movie starts with a voice record, which teaches definitions of some words. The recording gives the definition first and then exemplifies them. Sea, for example, means chair in this territory. Riffle means a beautiful bird. Zombie means a yellow flower. It is not easy and normal for them to learn new words out of parents’ authority. On the other hand, there is only one way to go out of this established system for children, the fall of the canine tooth, which is literally impossible.

Audience does not actually know why the father performs such a program for his family, but security concerns and domination are presumable reasons. The father, as an absolute leader, creates and manages language in the territory. It is possible to read the movie through concepts such as state, nation, and language politics. For example, the language politics of the Turkish Republic, which was performed due to some concerns as the father has in the movie, has some intersection points with the

Dogtooth. The Turkish Republic changed the alphabet first and then practiced new policies on existing language in the territory such as creation of new words, or cancelation of some existing words. The reason behind these policies and the consequences can be discussed. But it is intriguing how words and languages have existed, what affects usage of the words, how words cumulate their semantic stratum. Beside all these, is it possible to trace history of these semantic strata?

There are many theories on origin of languages. Each one forms a systematic integrity, so discussions on how words were created differ from each other. We do not use words only to express our basic daily needs and feelings. Some fields such as literature, philosophy, or politics require new words or adding new layers to meanings of living words. This provides developing scopes of words, so from here on out, some words become concepts and concepts may contain in itself stories and meanings of many words. If we can catch the periods of adding and changing meanings of words, we can trace and contact with the social history of that period. This kind of work will contribute to history, philosophy, and politics alongside its contribution to linguistics.

As mentioned above by combining with the story of Dogtooth, the possibility of playing with the semantic field of vocabulary, its effects on the human mind can be a discussion topic. It is possible to encounter this kind of experience in some countries such as Turkey. During the early republican era the Turkish language was exposed to some reforms starting with alphabet change in 1928. With an idea of not belonging originally Turkish a lot of Persian and Arabic oriented vocabularies were dropped out of use starting with early 30's. Enquiries and scanning have been made from old Turkish books and new words have been brought into existence as equivalent for existing words. Thus, with reproduction of unused or newly coined words, the Turkish language underwent a rapid change. As will be described in detail further in this chapter, I will focus in this thesis on conceptual history of the Turkish term *ulus*, which is a living witness of the language reform process. In connection with this matter, I will explain as background nation building and language political experiences from European history and the Ottoman language reform opinions, and language politics

of the republican era. I will focus on the term *ulus* afterwards and the thesis will cover the line from its pre-Islamic use to contemporary use.

Starting out with a similar concern of an academic circle in Germany, a branch called *Begriffsgeschichte* (conceptual history) has emanated. Interest in history of concepts in Germany can go back to Hegel (Monk, Tilmans, & Vree, 1998). After books we can count as evidence works such as Carl Schmitt's *The Concept of the Political* (*Der Begriff des Politischen*, 1927), and Otto Brunner's *Land and Lordship* (*Land und Herrschaft*, 1939), Reinhart Koselleck, Otto Brunner, and Werner Conze have pursued works and publications on history of social and political concepts in the post-war era. Their project *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* (The GG, basic historical concepts) finished with *Historisches Lexikon zur Politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland* (Historical Lexicon for Political-Social Language in Germany).

Before explaining the GG, I want to mention other conceptual history projects as well. *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* was an academic journal, which was founded by philosopher Erich Rothacker in 1955, published papers on concepts of history of philosophy and science in 49 volumes. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (the HWP, Historical Dictionary of Philosophy) is a dictionary focused primarily on philosophy and related topics. Joachim Ritter and his workmates started publishing bands in 1971. Differing from other types of conceptual history works, "the HWP does not attempt to specify the contexts for past uses of philosophical concepts. In the HWP, *Begriffsgeschichte* is applied only to those concepts that have either changed little over time, or enough so that they benefit from being viewed against contrasting horizons in the history of philosophy" (Richter, 2003, p. 93). And the other project was *Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich, 1680-1820* (Handbook Political-Social Basic Concepts in France) was focused on political and social terms in France between 1680 and 1820. Rolf Reichardt and Eberhart Schmitt were its publishers and because of its time scape, history of words did not go further into the past than the French *ancien régime*. Each of these conceptual history studies in Germany have distinctive system and time period. However, the most talked about

itself is the GG project, which is related so much with social history as much as linguistic, politics, and philosophy.

The GG project, unlike others, set its sights on the period approximately between 1750 and 1850, which was called the *Sattelzeit* (saddle time) by Reinhart Koselleck. According to Koselleck, semantic fields of some political and social vocabularies used in German-speaking Europe underwent changes during this period due to structural changes in government, economics, and society. This semantic transition was also deeply related with modern political and social thought (Richter, 1995). The GG focused and defined words long in use, neologisms, and words, which gained different meanings from earlier uses. The GG differed from other conceptual history projects as mentioned above. The GG's editors did not explain any historical or political characters with their ideas. Concepts and their usages over time were important for them. Therefore, the GG was not a chronology, but a correlated analysis on words and social environment of the time. This interest includes also historical shifts and innovations of words. The *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexicon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland* has been issued from 1972 to 1997 as 8 volumes. It consists of 120 concepts, covered in 7,000 pages. Average length of an article is about 50 pages. According to Melvin Richter's explanation, it is possible to categorize concepts into eight parts such as (1995, p 40):

- 1) Political concepts such as the state, sovereignty, monarchy, and politics
- 2) Social concepts such as civil society, class, system, family, and vocation
- 3) “-isms” or ideologies such as anarchism, liberalism, fascism, and Marxism
- 4) Philosophical concepts such as natural law, liberty, rights, and nihilism
- 5) Historical concepts such as history, progress, crisis, and revolution
- 6) Economic concepts such as worker, need, interest, capital, and property
- 7) Legal concepts such as basic law, constitution, statute, and contract
- 8) Concepts used in international politics such as war, peace, and neutrality

As it is understood, many concepts concerning social and politics were in GG's field of interest. And editors evaluated these terms from the points of temporalization,

democratization, ideologization, and politicization. All articles have a general format in the Lexicon. It can be separated into three sections. In the first section there is the historical process of the concept from classical to early modern period. In the second section explains the semantic change and development in the *Sattelzeit*. And the last section gives a summary and information about present day use (Richter, 1995).

These projects for German-speaking countries set similar discussions in other European academies. In England, for example, academicians John Pocock and Quentin Skinner criticized Koselleck's method and understanding on concepts and this created a different perspective on conceptual history. Some Dutch historians and political thinkers wrote articles on how to do a similar conceptual history work for Dutch concepts.

Why is conceptual history important? Conceptual history, which probed on the question how key concepts came into existence and transformed related to social, political, and economic structure, will definitely help us to understand and interpret more accurately the time we are interested in. This pursuit will help us to find sources of the contemporary political and social discussions as well as past events related with social and political life. When considered in German context, the *Begriffsgeschichte* helped tracing the transformation process from medieval to modern thinking and structure. This process concentratedly occurred in the *Sattelzeit* called by Koselleck. The accruing of this kind of studies in Turkish academic community will contribute understanding of Turkish modernization process related to social and political history.

1750-1850 is the focus of the semantic change in German history, it can be said that, the century approximately between 1839 and 1938 was the *Sattelzeit* of the Turkish history. This period between the *Tanzimat* Edict and the Mustafa Kemal's death testified to many changes attached to language alongside social, economic, and political alterations. Such new events like rearrangement of military system, identity policies, nationalism affect, constitutional monarchy, and western type schooling deflected classical social, religious, and political concepts into a west affected or

associated with a new social field. Furthermore, foundation of the Turkish Republic, the alphabet reform, other systematic reforms, and purification of language also influenced semantic field of many concepts. This story presents distinctness for every branch, and even for every word. Even if they are not methodologically similar with German conceptual history, there are some articles and books on history and development of concepts in Turkish language. When taken into account the numbers of the political events mentioned above, investigation on this wilderness is still made up of small academic work. Some examples I can give are following.

Professor İsmail Kara has some parts in his PhD thesis about the concepts of constitution, party, *millet*, *meşveret*, and *meclis*. This PhD thesis was published as a book by name *İslamcıların Siyasi Görüşleri* (Kara, 1994).

Behlül Özkan has a book by name *From the Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan; The Making of a National Homeland in Turkey* (Özkan, 2012). In his book, Özkan writes conceptual history of the term *vatan*. He traces back history of the concept from the time of the *Tanzimat* reforms in the late Ottoman Empire to the Turkish nation state period. He explains the transformation of the semantic field of the term from its Islamic meaning to a nationalism-related one. In the classical era, *vatan* meant in Arabic the place of one's birth. This can be translated as homeland. But unlike the English homeland and French *patrie*, Turkish term *vatan* does not refer only to the territory of an imagined nation state, whereas in connection with the old sense, *vatan* has a politico-religious meaning as well as there are many political and legal terms derived from *vatan*. Özkan exemplifies these derivations such as citizen (*vatandaş*), heimatlos (*vatansız*), and high treason (*vatana ihanet*) (Özkan, 2012). Starting with these discussions, Özkan traces the creation of national spatial consciousness in turkey through the term *vatan*. Behlül Özkan's book helps to see apparently the mental change of the Turkish people related to this term.

Yıldıray Oğur has a master thesis on the history of the concepts of *serbestiyet*, *hürriyet*, *özgürlük* from the Ottoman to the Republican era and this thesis was also published as a book by name *Ey Özgürlük* (Oğur, 2012). Yıldıray Oğur's thesis with the

title *Osmanlı-Cumhuriyet Modernleşmesinde İki Özgürlük Kavramı* focuses on liberty-freedom concepts in Turkish language during modernization process. He examines the mental changes of society brought about by the modernization on a conceptual dimension. According to Oğur, the term *Hürriyet* is about political liberty, whereas the term *özgürlük* refers to a non-political one, but has more philosophical and inner dimensions. Oğur starts with *serbestiyet*, which can be seen as an antecedent concept of *hürriyet* and *özgürlük*, dated back to post-French revolution period. The Ottoman Empire accelerated structural reforms during the *Tanzimat* era. However, this created an idea of *istibdat* among some intellectual circles and these circles discovered the *hürriyet* against the *istibdat*. Oğur reads the modernization through the concept. As the other main body of the book, he brings the theme to the Turkish Republic and he explains the transformation of the term *hürriyet* to *özgürlük* with language politics in 1930's. And Oğur explains his thesis related to *özgürlük* by mentioning radical *özgürleşme* and authoritarian politics of early republics.

Aydın Taneri has a book on the development of the concept of Turk by name *Türk Kavramının Gelişmesi; Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene* (Taneri, 1983). As title, Taneri's book seems very charming, because we hope to read in this book how the term *Türk* became existence and how it is used. Unfortunately, the book does not satisfy these expectations. Taneri's book does not have a similar discourse as above mentioned works. However, the reason why I mention his book in this thesis is its way of explanation the history as a contribution to the sense of the term *Türk*. In the book, which was written from a nationalist perspective, whole Turkish history from Mete Han (Modu Chanyu) to Mustafa Kemal serves and fills bottom of the term *Türk*. This book is not important in terms of conceptual history but in context of how historical events retroactively affect formation of meaning layers of a concept.

Based on abovementioned considerations, I will attempt to write a history of a concept in this master's thesis. I sincerely hope, this study will be a contribution to conceptual history research in Turkey. To find a common matter regarding the late Ottoman and the early republican period, such as nationalism and nation state, is important for the Turkish *Sattelzeit* in respect to both comprehensiveness and

relation with other social issues. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries nationalist rhetoric began to rise among Turks. New discussions appeared among intellectual environments and these discussions naturally were related to social, political and religious scopes. As the Islamic concept *meşveret* acquired new meanings during constitutional monarchy era, the term *millet* was influenced by nationalism and added new meanings to its semantic field. Then the term *ulus* was created and used in the republican period instead of *millet*.

The term *millet* is a deep-rooted word and it has many layers of meanings. The term *Millet* is a Quranic word and available in the book several times. The Holy Quran refers to noun phrase *millet-i İbrahim* in some verses. This phrase means the religion of the prophet Abraham or the way of life of the prophet Abraham. The *millet* here contains all groups of people belonging to the same system of beliefs. From this respect the *millet* refers to a more extensive group of people than the Muslim *ümmet*. In social structure of the Ottoman Empire the *millet* showed a religious category. Religious groups were arranged hierarchically and every group had some rights according to their own religious laws. There were mainly four *millet*s in Ottoman political and social life and they are hierarchically Muslim *millet*, Rûm *millet*, Ermeni *millet*, and Yahudi *millet*. This system was related to religion directly. For example, Greeks, Serbians, and Bulgarians are different ethnic groups but in Ottoman context they were combined in Rum *millet*, this shows the non-ethnic meaning of the term *millet*. However, with the influences of the French Revolution, *millet* acquired the meaning of nation. Although Prof. İslam Kara has some fragmentary works on the history of this term, a full-scale book containing all ingredients has not been written yet.

To find a well-examined article or book written about the term *ulus* is more difficult than *millet*. Almost whole books or articles including the term *ulus* are about nation building, nation state, and nationalism in Turkey. I could not find any source, which investigate the concept historically and semantically. They use the term as if it is a longtime used word rather than reproduced in the early republic. To find such a discussion in the nationalism literature is a compelling archeology. I will clarify in the

next subtitle the sources I will use in my thesis. Here I want to mention why this issue is worth studying. The Turkish Republic attached importance to language. Many parts of the language issue such as simplification and alphabet change were discussed in the Late Ottoman Empire, however, even if the mentality was different, the Republic was able to achieve these goals years after. Why would a state change the alphabet used by the society? By not satisfying with just changing the alphabet, the Republic intervened to vocabulary and their anaphors. Therefore, the semantic world that the language belongs, aesthetics, references of the language suffer a change and reproduce themselves. Most apparent reason of the language reforms of the Early Republic seems the involvement to a different *Weltanschauung*, perspective, or way of life. Let's take *kader*, *kismet*, *nasip*, *tevâfuk*, *yazgı* and *şans* as examples. While *kader*, *kismet*, *nasip*, and *tevâfuk* have a common metaphysical semantic world, *şans* and *yazgı*, which are produced after language reforms, do not have any metaphysical connotations even if they are used instead of previous words. That is to say, the Early Republic tried to cut off connections with traditions while building a nation state. The issue I mentioned applies to the relation between *millet* and *ulus*. Starting with these ideas, I will focus on the production of the term *ulus*. This will cover broad strokes process of production, usage, spread, space, and success. With a hope to have taken a step in this wilderness, I will attempt to write the conceptual history of the term *ulus*.

1.1. Literature and Research Sources

Since I explained the conceptual history school and their publications, I will not mention them here again. The way Reinhart Koselleck and his colleagues wrote conceptual history will be my guide in this thesis. That means I will investigate the history of the term through three main pillars: first, pre-Islamic usage of the term, its etymology, and the later usage if available; the second, whole process of recreation and release to the social; and third, from 1933 to contemporary usage.

Since I am critical about nationalism, in related parts I will utilize from sources in this manner. As I will mention below under the chapter outline, I will rely on Eric Hobsbawm, Anthony Smith, Ernest Gellner, and Benedict Anderson, who are

authorities on the issue of nationalism. Moreover, the way Liah Greenfeld explains nationalism in *Nationalism Five Roads to Modernity* (1993) also affected my approach. I will also use certain book sections and articles about language and creating a national language. I will combine these sources to explain nationalism and language in context.

Before addressing the conceptual history of the term *ulus*, I will explain the connection between language and nation building using the examples of French and German. Furthermore, I will discuss the Ottoman experience in the context of language policies. In this regard, books written by Robert Cooper, Robert McColl Millar, Sue Wright, Harold Schiffman, and Tomasz Kamusella were important to understand the relation between language and nation building, the types of language policies implemented in different countries, how language policies affected societies, and where the Turkish language policies can be placed in this literature. While writing about the language planning in France and Germany, I was influenced by Anne Judge's article in *Language and Nationalism in Europe* (2001), edited by Stephen Barbour and Cathie Carmichael, and Tomasz Kamusella's *The Politics of Language and Nationalism in Modern Central Europe* (2009). Hans Pohlsander's book on German nationalism and Eli Nathan's book on German citizenship were also helpful in covering the problem. While writing the Ottoman part, I mostly tried to use the most recent historical literature on the issue. C.A. Bayly's *The Birth of The Modern World 1780-1914* (2004), Frederick Anscombe's *State, Faith, and Nation in Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Lands* (2014), and Stephan Berger, Alexei Miller, and Hovard Eissenstat's articles in the book *Nationalizing Empires* (2014) were eye-opening and helpful in understanding the last century of the Ottoman Empire and nationalism in Ottoman lands. Moreover, David Kushner's book on Turkish nationalism and İlber Ortaylı's texts helped me to cover the process in the Ottoman Empire.

Before discussing language policies in the Turkish Republic, I attempted to scrutinize the development process of Turkish identity from the end of World War I. While explaining the developments, I conscientiously avoided the official historiography. Soner Çağaptay's *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey Who is Turk?*

(2006), Ahmet Yıldız's *"Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene" Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları* (2001), Erik Zürcher's article "The Vocabulary of Muslim Nationalism" (1999), Binnaz Toprak's article "Türkiye'de Dinin Denetim İşlevi" (2009) were particularly helpful to understanding and covering the general mindset of the period. Regarding language policies, the Turkish history thesis, and creating a new identity, I utilized from Etienne Copeaux's *Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk İslam Sentezine* (2006), *Büşra Ersanlı's İktidar ve Tarih Türkiye'de Resmi Tarih Tezinin Oluşumu* (2003), Ayşe Kadioğlu's article "The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity" (1996) and Uriel Heyd, Geoffrey Lewis's works.

There are some master and PhD theses about Turkish language reform. One of the most comprehensive such works is Hüseyin Sadoğlu's PhD thesis in political science entitled "Uluslaşma Sürecinde Türk Dil Politikaları 1839-1950" (2002). This thesis was published under the name of *Türkiye'de Ulusçuluk ve Dil Politikaları* (2010). I utilized this book to trace the language reform process through my thesis. However, my thesis has differences in terms of literature and bibliography. I discussed topics mainly related to religion and culture. Beside this, there are some other masters theses about language policies in Turkey such as Andre Zakari's "A Modernist Approach towards Turkish Nationalism: The Case of Language Policies in Early Republican Turkey 1928-1938" (2012), and Eda Topuz's "Atatürk'ün Dil Politikası" (2013). After I explained and discussed the link between language policies and nation building in Turkey, I examined the conceptual history of the term *ulus* in this thesis.

While investigating the Turkish history thesis and language reform, I took care to use primary sources such as Mustafa Kemal's own speeches, parliamentary minutes, and relevant books that were published such as *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları* (1930), Afet İnan's *Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal'in El Yazıları* (2000), and *Atatürk Hakkında Hatıralar ve Belgeler* (1959). On the other hand, there are books that were published by Turkish Language and History Associations such as Vecihe Hatiboğlu's *Ölümsüz Atatürk ve Dil Devrimi* (1973), Agah Sırrı Levend's *Türk Dilinde Gelişme ve Sadeleşme Safhaları* (1949), Zeynep Korkmaz's *Türk Dilinin Tarihi Akışı içinde Atatürk ve Dil Devrimi* (1963).

How did I make an archeology of the term *ulus*? For the etymology of the term, Sir Gerard Clauson's book *An Etymological Dictionary of the Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish* (1972) was my guiding source. Beside this, Ferdinand Lessing's *Mongolian-English Dictionary* (1960), and the etymological dictionaries of Hasan Eren, İsmet Zeki Eyübođlu, Radloff, and Bedros Kerestedjian also helped me to make an etymological archeology. At the beginning of my research, I scanned the parliamentary minutes to find the first use of the term. I found the term was used for the first time in late 1934 during parliamentary speeches. Then I have read the 1931 and the 1935 party programs of *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası*. The term *ulus* was not used in the 1931 program; *millet* was used instead. However, in the 1935 program the opposite was the case: there was not any use of *millet* and all words derived from "nation", such as national or international, were variants of *ulus*. So, I could be sure that this term was created between 1931 and 1934. Furthermore, I focused on the process of the establishment of *Türk Dil Kurumu* (Turkish Language Association – TDK). I went to Ankara to scan sources in library of the TDK and read the minutes of the Turkish Language Congress. What I sought was to find discussions on the creation of this term. I could not find such a discussion on this significant term. However, I found Hasan Âli Yücel's quests in the *Türk Dili* periodical, which was published by the TDK. Some parts of this periodical were devoted to giving new equivalents for existing words. For instance, Hasan Âli Yücel scans some old books then finds words and offers new meanings for them instead of the existing words. In an effort to create a purer Turkish language. As I will explain later on in detail, the term *ulus* also was available in the first couple issues of this periodical. Besides, for the words, whose meanings were changed, some small lists were sent to newspapers. So, newspapers published these new vocabulary lists and declared that they would use the new words instead of the old ones. Newspapers also constitute a primary sources for me in this study. I scanned and quoted the newspaper *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* and *Ulus* through this significant period.

In the chapter where I discuss the contemporary usages of the term *ulus*, columns written in *Hürriyet* by Mümtaz Sosyal and news texts from *HaberTürk* and *Ulus* were helpful for me to discuss the issues. Dođan Gürpınar's *Ulusalılık İdeolojik Önderlik ve*

Takipçileri (2011), Onur Atalay's *Kızıl Elma Koalisyonu* (2006), and Ali Bayramoğlu's article (2011) about *ulusalcılık* were advisory sources for my discussion about *ulusalcılık*. Articles in the nationalism volume of the book series *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce* (2008) were important to cover the discussions on different types of nationalisms in Turkey.

1.2. Outline of Chapters

This thesis questions first the relation between language and politics. I investigated for this purpose how nation building influenced language politics. The Ottoman case was examined afterwards. Through the Republic of Turkey and its language politics such as alphabet change and Sun-Language theory, creation of the term *ulus* were examined thoroughly. Here is how I structured this thesis' chapters.

In the introductory chapter I mentioned how conceptual history was established as an academic branch in Germany. I also mentioned its varieties and their differences from each other. This chapter also includes answers as to why we should study conceptual history and its existence in Turkey.

The first chapter focused on nationalism, the nation state, and language politics. German and French nation building story led this part. A brief history of the concept "nation" was required to understand European story. In this chapter, Eric Hobsbawm, Ernest Gellner, and Antony Smith's books will guide me on nationalism and creating national identity, furthermore W. Roger Brubaker's comparative analyses on German and French nation building, Pierre Birnbaum's comparison between two nations, Norman Berdichevsky's book, and George Orwell's Politics and English Language article will lead me on relation between language and politics. After this first part of the chapter I explained language policies in the Ottoman Empire and Ottoman intellectual's ideas on language. So, I explained these issues until the end of the World War I and the Turkish War of Independence.

In the second chapter I brought the subject to the Republic of Turkey and discuss its language policies. This will cover alphabet change, the foundation of Turkish

Language Association (*Türk Dil Kurumu –TDK*), and perspectives on it. I benefited in this part especially from Geoffrey Lewis, İlker Aytürk, Falih Rifkî Atay, Hüseyin Sadođlu, Afet İnan, Ruşen Eşref Ünaydın, Nail Tan, and Ahmet Yıldız. I discussed in this way the reason of these reforms and the idea behind them. All these discussions are also crucial to understand volition behind the transformation from *millet* to *ulus*.

In the second part of the second chapter, subject will transfer to the term *ulus*. Here, I will attempt to trace and explain etymology and usage of the concept before Islamic period. Etymologic dictionary authors such as Gerard Clauson, Gerhard Doerfer, Ferdinand Lessing, and İsmet Zeki Eyübođlu will help me not to deviate from the road. After the investigation whether the term was used post-Islamic era in Turkish language, I will focus on the reproduction and usage process of the term. Hasan Ali Yücel’s vocabulary quests in 1933, the start of the use of the word, and the field of use such as parliamentary minutes, political speeches, book, and newspapers will be examined in this part.

In the last chapter, I attempted to analyze and interpret the usage of the term I gave in the third chapter and different usages. I mentioned, for example, on change from *hâkimiyet bilâ kayd-u şart milletindir* to *egemenlik ulusundur*, differences between *milliyetçilik* and *ulusalcılık*. I mainly combined in the third chapter topics I explained in the first and second chapters in order to analyze and understand the contemporary use of the term.

CHAPTER 2

THE FICTION OF A ZEITGEIST: NATIONALISM AND LANGUAGE POLITICS

As I discussed in the previous chapter, the history of vocabularies and the history of societies go hand in hand. Therefore, tracing the history of concepts can help to understand historical events. In this context, I will describe and explain the phenomenon of nationalism through the history of the term “nation” in this chapter. In order to lay out the historical background of my thesis, I will begin by showing how this term obtained the meaning we understand today. Moving on from here, I will discuss the relation between the nation-building process and creating a national language, with a focus on the German and French examples. I will then explain the relation between politics and language in the Ottoman case.

The idea of nationalism, which transformed issues related to society in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, created a new and different *Gemeinschaft*, or modern society, from the old ones. Nationalism appeared as a new type of idea for social cohesion in the early nineteenth century after the French Revolution. Nationalism offered a new way of understanding historical context, so it projected a new definition of society and created a new political system, whose units of analysis and decisions were nations. According to this system of thought, nations would govern themselves. As Elie Kedourie argues, one of the successes of nationalism was to give a new meaning to the concept of nation, which until the end of the eighteenth century had been unknown (1961, p. 14). Nationalism consecrated an involuntary identity and constituted a system through this identity. As Benedict Anderson states in his book *Imagined Communities*, “It is the magic of nationalism to turn chance into destiny” (2006, p. 12). That is to say, nationalists assumed the antiquity of the nation even though it was clearly a modern entity, and believed the shiny day of nationalism would continue forever.

Nationalism as a concept has spread all over the world, but it has not taken the shape of a universalist ideology such as Marxism or liberalism. It does not have a common

ethics or politics aside from everyone's preferring his or her own nation. Therefore, this priority and *Gemeinschaft* of modernism has created a new world system. As a consequence, the creation of societies, which have been homogenized in terms of language, culture, race, and history, has resulted in new artificial political units. There are basically two types of nationalism in the literature. One is civic and the other is ethnic nationalism. The dominant type of nationalism in a place depends on the society, history, and role of the state. From this point of view American and Turkish nationalism are different from one another. Whether the state founds the nation or vice versa has a big impact on defining the type of nationalism in a society. A great deal has been written on these issues, but my immediate focus is on how the nation has historically been constituted and how this term has acquired the meaning we understand today.

2.1. From *Natio* to Nation: on the Genealogy of a Concept

Most European languages use same form of the term "nation": *die Nation, la nation, nasjon, and natsiya*. Languages such as Czech, Finnish, and Latvian use different words for it such as *narod, nemzet*. At this level, the term nation concerns us. "The origin of the term nation as it is currently used in most European languages can be traced back to Latin word *natio*, derived from the verb *nascor*, I am born" (Hroch & Maleckova, 2001, p. 203). *Nascor* or *nasci* is the base verb, which means "to be born" in Latin and such derivations as son (*natus*) or daughter (*nata*) comes from this verb (Vaan, 2008). The *natio*, which is related to "to be born," means breed, stock, and kinds according to Charlton Lewis' etymological dictionary (1958) and Lewis adds, "in a more restricted sense, a race of people used commonly in more limited sense than *gens* usually applied by Cicero to distant and barbarous people" (p. 1203).

As seen from these descriptions, *natio* is related to the verb "to be born" and refers to a small group of people related by birth or place of origin. However, this Latin term was used not for Roman people, but rather for distant and barbarous groups. Therefore, it had a derogatory connotation. Romans did not describe themselves as a *Natio Romanorum* but as a *Populus Romanus*. The term *populus* meant citizens and referred to the people as the source of sovereignty. That is to say, *populus* had a more

positive connotation than *natio* in ancient Rome. While *natio* originally meant a group of people larger than a family but smaller than a clan or tribe, it gradually lost its negative connotation in later centuries. The striking point here is that the nation, which began as a derogatory depiction, gradually evolved into a positive identity that served to separate the self from others.

Natio acquired a different meaning in medieval times. Medieval universities such as Paris, Oxford, and Bologna were divided into *nationes*. This term represented student fraternities in a university and they varied according to students' birth places and languages. Therefore, their togetherness formed a mutual protection and society in universities. For example, as Carleton Munro states, Paris University was divided into four *nationes* in medieval times. These were the honorable nation of the Gauls, the venerable nation of the Normans, the very faithful nation of the Picards, and the very constant nation of the English (1921, p. 369). These sections designated neither a nation as we understand today nor modern geographical borders. And belonging to a nation was restricted to one's studentship period. After graduation, this identity dissolved and the student returned home (Greenfeld, 1993). That is to say, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries "nation" meant a group or a community of opinion in universities. The term thus extended its meaning but had not yet come to mean a political organization and identity. Over time, the meaning and connotation of the term continued to change. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, nation was used to distinguish between different groups within councils of the Catholic Church. Each member of a nation had a high status, namely he was an elite. The term nation thus matured by accumulating new layers of meaning in this fashion.

In the early sixteenth century in England "the word 'nation' in its conciliar meaning of 'an elite' was applied to the population of the country and made synonymous with the word 'people'" (Greenfeld, 1993, p. 6). With the early modern period the concept of nation emerged as a political community. This period enlarged the meaning of nation from a community of opinion or elites to a political meaning. As the size of the group referred to by the term nation increased, so too did it come to include each layer of society. During first usage of the term in Latin, the term had a derogatory

meaning. Later, in universities and the Church, it had a special and mostly elite connotation. However, after it acquired the meaning of a political community—the nation we understand today—the term came to encompass all people in society without distinction. In other words, the semantic field of *natio* has risen and expanded to the semantic field of *populus*.

As I cited above from Liah Greenfeld, in the sixteenth century nation was first used in England as a population of a country synonymously with the word people, *Volk* in German. This was the first use of the word in the sense in which we understand today. As Greenfeld explains, the word “people” was used for population of a region before its nationalization, but it specifically applied to the lower classes. The equation of two concepts (nation and people) created a new “elite,” which involved the whole population (1993, p. 6). In reality, this crowded “elite” group was an imaginary identity. Nevertheless, this identity attained a great motive force among people and states. Empirical research can be conducted on whether there was a relation between the foundation of and independent Anglican Church and the first usage of the term nation in England, in the sense we understand today. Because the Reformation in Europe created a position counter to the Catholic Church, a new identity was formed through Protestantism. This directed states to take a secular rather than their previous religion-oriented shape. With the dissolving of old religious identities, a new secular identity was produced for a new type of association. We see its most concrete shape in Enlightenment thinkers and social contract theorists, who ascribed new meaning to the individual, state, nature, and society. This secular state formation was interlaced with national ideas, and it became the identity of the modern individual and state. In short, nationalism took on the mission of becoming the non-religious identity of the modern state.

In the same period elsewhere in Europe a different political use of the term *natio* emerged. *Natio* appeared as a political nation, in the sense of political elites. After the war between the Habsburg dynasty and the Hungarians, the word nation was used in the text of the peace treaty. Nation here identified the Hungarian nation: not the whole Magyar nation, but the privileged estates, in contrast to their subjects, the

plebs (Hroch & Maleckova, 2001). *Natio Hungarica* “did not mean the generality of the people inhabiting the territory of Hungary, but the ‘barons, prelates, and nobles of Hungary,’ an exceedingly small part of the population” (Kedourie, 1961, p. 14). According to this case, language and race were not sufficient for inclusion in the Hungarian nation. It was belonging to the Hungarian nobility that made one part of the nation.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, nation lost its pejorative meaning completely and came to include such ideas as being the bearer of sovereignty, the supreme object of loyalty, and the basis of political solidarity. The French Revolution acted as a catalyst of national ideas in the region. The ideas of self-determination and creating unique nations with regards to language, history, and race forced ongoing political and identity system to change in waves.

[Thus], the word “nation” meaning “sovereign people” was now applied to other populations and countries which, like the first nation, naturally had some political, territorial, and/or ethnic qualities to distinguish them, and became associated with such geo-political and ethnic baggage. As a result of this association, “nation” changed its meaning once again, coming to signify “a unique sovereign people” (Greenfeld, 1993, p. 8).

As a person who argues that England was the first nation in the world, Greenfeld’s making such a distinction between English and later national identity can be understood. In the circumstances, it required some pillars, which designated the edges of the new definition of nation.

The term nation has acquired such a meaning that an actuator of modern period instead of a passive and others related meaning. Going closer to *populus* in its Latin meaning, nation has become the holy identity of the modern individual as well as the sovereign and decision-maker of a state. As mentioned before, although national identity is a product of modernism, it is viewed as a deep-rooted identity that will last forever. This illusion was created by some elements such as common history, language, and culture. I will focus these further, but now I want to scrutinize the relation between the French Revolution and the nation state.

2.2. The Politicization of the Concept

There were many social, historical, political, and economic reasons for the emergence of the French Revolution. However, the impact of ideas in paving the way for it cannot be stressed enough. Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Enlightenment philosophers established the infrastructure of the revolution. As a result of their efforts, the *Ancien Régime* was demolished, and the republican regime was established with the *Assemblée Nationale* instead of the monarchy, and the Catholic Church was obliged to make reforms. As had happened in England before, the realm of the Church was restricted, and so the system and individual were redefined.

In the meantime, the abovementioned philosophers' ideas constituted the characteristics of new political system. For instance, Montesquieu had written on the importance of separation of powers and usage of the legislative power through representatives elected by the people. Rousseau explained state-individual relations through the social contract and the general will, in which individuals accordingly consign their rights to state. This renunciation of rights forms the base of society and state according to Rousseau. On the other hand, the Kantian autonomous individual and ethic also had an influence on the modern individual and state in terms of rational thinking, rights, and freedom.

When these antecedents and the consequences of the Revolution are thought of together, the *Geist* of the modern state and nationalism becomes clear. People realized with the French revolution that kingdoms, which were believed to get their legitimacy from God, can be destroyed. Thus, legitimacy and sovereignty were taken from the metaphysical source of legitimacy and given to the nation. In the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, which was approved by the National Assembly of France in 1789, we can see the reflection of this new understanding. The third article of the declaration says, "The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. No body nor individual may exercise any authority which does not proceed directly from the nation" (The Avalon Project; Documents in Law, History, and Diplomacy, 2016). As seen from this article, the sovereignty and the right of decision-making were attached to the nation in the post-revolution era. That is to say, the

nation became the only source of legitimacy in the modern state, nobody was allowed to use sovereignty instead of the nation or for the nation. On one hand multinational empires started to be divided into small units, and on the other dispersed nations in different states started to unite. This process is called the era of nation states.

What are the social elements that determine the boundaries of a nation? As with other social phenomena, this case does not have a single answer that everyone agrees on. Some prioritize racial factors to explain a national identity, while others prioritize common culture, citizenry, or belief in belonging to the same nation. This variation of priorities brings us to the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalisms. It is usually presumed that civic nationalism forms a community regardless of its subjects' ethnicity, religion, or language, based on a common citizenship. Moreover, according to civic nationalism the state is the agent that defines the nation. The USA is a great example of this type of nationalism. On the other hand, language, race, culture, and maybe religion are the pillars of ethnic nationalism. However, due its lack of strict boundaries, the importance of language for example cannot be denied for civic nationalism either. Since there is an interrelation between the nation and state, the founder effect of nation on state or vice versa cannot be divided from one another and both should be evaluated together. Since it is directly relevant to my thesis, I will focus here on the comparative effect of language on national identity and the state's instrumentalization of language in nation-building.

2.3. Language as a Pillar of the Nation State

To show more clearly the foundational role of language, the Reformation process can be a good example. The Catholic Church dominated the social and political life of the pre-modern era in Europe and religious practices were performed in Latin not only in the Vatican but in every church in Europe. Moreover, the Holy Book was in Latin and clergy construed it into local languages. This context created a domination of Latin in throughout Europe. However, with the Reformation movements, pioneers like Martin Luther and Jean Calvin argued for the Bible's translation into local languages.

Martin Luther, for instance, translated the Latin Bible into German. The German Bible had an impact on religion as well as the creation of German nation. On one hand, Germans began converting to Protestantism, and on the other hand Luther's writings formed the basis of German national identity together with those of philosopher Immanuel Kant.

Much later, republican elites in Turkey, who noticed the constitutive role of language, tried to make religious practices and the Quran Turkish. Mehmet Akif Ersoy, who was charged with writing a Turkish translation of the Quran, discovered the republican elites' intention of Turkish worship. The Turkish *adhan*, the call for prayer, can be given as a different example in this matter. The *adhan* was recited in Turkish from 1932 to 1950 and this was advocated in the contexts of nationalization, national language, and secularism. I give these examples to show the role of language in the creation of an identity. However, these can be interpreted for religion as well.

Kedourie expresses the connection between language and identity as follows: "Language is the means through which a man becomes conscious of his personality. Language is not only a vehicle for rational propositions, it is the outer expression of an inner experience, the outcome of a particular history, the legacy of a distinctive tradition" (1961, p. 62). Kedourie explains why states perceived language to be important and so intervened and directed it in accordance with their policies. Bureaucracy and the spread of a written language can be given as an example related to this issue. With the centralization of the state, bureaucratic procedures increased, and so a public language was required for these procedures. That is to say, the language of one group came to dominate over other languages in a society with impact of states. On the other hand, as Benedict Anderson investigates in his book, after the invention of printing press, publishing became a profit-oriented activity and publishers were obliged to select a similar language to what society used. These circumstances caused either the spread of certain dialects and the marginalization of others, or a demand to purify language of foreign words. Thus, as with the history of the concept nation, written language in Europe ceased to be the privilege of nobles

and clergy and as the nation's self-consecration, public language lifted effectiveness and base. Thus, new political units appeared in conjunction with nations.

The official language, which took form and spread during the monarchical period, made it easy to imagine the nation as a new political entity (Sadoğlu, 2003). However, this is not the only reason for the emergence of nationalism. There is undoubtedly an interrelation between nationalism and language, but nationalist models define the characteristics of this relation. For that reason, an investigation of the German and French nationalization processes will enable us to understand the role of language in the nation state. There are different factors for every nation in this matter but to comprehend the main points, these two examples constitute the core of the issue.

I have already mentioned that the values of modern states and the features of being a nation nourish each other in general terms or to be more precise, it is very difficult to distinguish one from the other due to lack of strict boundaries. The state possesses a power that distributes an identity related to birth. On the other hand, as long as the state was centralized, the bureaucracy correspondingly grew and this required more bureaucrats literate in the official language of the state. To provide literacy for the whole population in a state, all children went to elementary school by the end of the eighteenth century (Kamusella, 2009). Thus, other than the local languages or dialects, the state language was disseminated throughout the whole country. This also allows us to perceive the homogenizing effect of the modern nation state on language.

Here, the distinction Ernest Gellner makes about type of the polity and language is important. According to Gellner, the homogenization of language is related to a distinction between agrarian and industrial societies. Agrarian societies live in a world of their own. People sustained their economic and social needs in their own localities. The state did not concern itself about matters other than collecting taxes and ensuring peace. The state moreover did not have any interest in connecting with its subjects and it had no plan to homogenize all sections of society. Different languages and different usages did not constitute a categorical problem for the polity. In

agrarian societies the dichotomy of linguistic majority and minority did not exist. This distinction is valid for the monolingual character of modern states. In agrarian societies and states, “there were no pressures for linguistic homogenization or convergence, [so] rulers of territory of any size always governed multidialectal if not multilingual populations” (Wright, 2004, p. 24). In contrast, industrial societies are mobile and ready to shift from one activity to another. People have to communicate with others they do not know and who are probably from a different cultural environment. “They must also be able to communicate by means of written, impersonal, context-free, to-whom-it-may-concern type messages. Hence these communications must be in the same shared and standardized linguistic medium and script” (Gellner, 1983, p. 35). Precisely for this reason, members of a nation must be educated in the same way. Hence, they will be able to use the same language and idioms to communicate with each other. And in society, where the organic solidarity exists, the human need required for the state will be provided.

The increase of dictionary writing can be given as another example in this regard. The history of dictionary writing can be traced back to the 2,300s B.C. to the Akkadian Empire. However, the number of dictionaries increased especially in nineteenth century. This increase in the number of dictionaries giving both the equivalents of words in a different language and explains the meaning of words can be correlated to the politics of language. Just like the effect created by the printing press, dictionaries also have contributed the standardization of the language within the borders of the state and thus the delimitation of language within specific geographical areas. This standardization and homogenization in language has marginalized traditional languages. Tomasz Kamusella describes this marginalization as follows:

The official/national language of a state replaced other written languages traditionally used within the polity, whereas popular education and mass media contributed to leveling differences in speech, which meant the liquidation of these forms of oral language construed as dialects of the official/national language (2009, p. 9).

As Benedict Anderson (2006) says, with the spread of printing in Europe, works were published in vernacular languages to reach the masses and sell more books. This

pragmatic purpose nourished social changes related to language. Martin Luther wrote his translation of the Bible in the bureaucratic language used in Saxony in order to be understood by more people. This process made a great contribution to the rise of modern High German. Naturally, as long as magazines, books, newspapers, and novels were written in a certain vernacular, other dialects lost impact and the written language expanded its usage area. A similar example was seen in Italy as well. With the unification of Italy, the Tuscan dialect was chosen as the standard Italian language. The most important determinant in selecting Tuscan instead of the Piedmont dialect, which was the political center, was the influence of literature (Sadoğlu, 2003). Boccaccio, Dante, and Machiavelli wrote their books in the Tuscan dialect and this situation paved the way for the Tuscan dialect to become standard Italian in the future. The standardization of languages for national purposes left other vernaculars the fate of being cultural element or linguistic mosaic.

As the prominence of vernacular languages increased, efforts were made in many countries to create truly national vernaculars. In Norway, as Eric Hobsbawm notes, some nationalist intellectuals demanded a purer Norwegian as distinct from the extremely Danicized written language (1992). In England, George Orwell upheld in his 1946 article "Politics and English Language" never to use foreign phrases instead of Saxon words (Orwell, 2016). In Turkey, the Republican cadre actualized sharply a similar policy in the early 1930s. Firstly in 1928, "to heighten Turkish-Turkey's national consciousness at the expense of any wider Islamic identification, Atatürk imposed compulsory Romanization" (Anderson, 2006, p. 45). Then in the early 30s, the Republican cadre promulgated the simplification and purification of language in concert with intellectuals and linguists. This policy centered on the exclusion of foreign vocabularies from Turkish and their replacement by neologisms inspired by pre-Islamic Turkish.

2.4. Types of Language Policy and Examples

In this section, I will explain the varieties of language planning and give examples by correlating them with nation-building. "Language planning is a government-authorized, long-term, sustained, and conscious effort to alter a language's function

in a society for the purpose of solving communication problems” (Kennedy, 1982). The aim of language planning is the tackling of communication problems among people in respect to this definition. And governments are asserted as the actor of language planning. As a different definition, Joshua Fishman states the following: “The term language planning refers to the organized pursuit of solutions to language problems, typically at the national level” (Cooper, 1989, p. 30). This example implies a relation between nation-building and the language planning. As I mentioned above, the rise of bureaucracy created a need for a standard communication tool for people coming from places where vernacular languages were spoken. Various types of language planning, including standardization and purification, were implemented as a consequence of this need. Apart from this, the role of language in creating self-awareness and identity in the process of being a nation is also a different face of this issue. I will explain it in relation to Germany. Robert Cooper (1989) distinguishes the actors of planning as different from the abovementioned definitions. He thinks that language planning is created sometimes by individuals working outside of official foundations, sometimes the product of official institutions such as churches, professional associations, schools, etc., sometimes created by governments, and sometimes by all of these together. Actors are formal elites, influential people, and authorities.

What can be the aims of language planning? Taking into consideration that there are hundreds of vernacular and official languages in different parts of the world, the variety of probable reasons and aims of language planning is not surprising. While it emerges as language purification in some polities, in others it aims at the revival of a dead language. Modernization, the standardization of language, script change, reform in language (such as grammar and spelling change), the spread of language’s usage field, and stylistic simplification can be other reasons for language planning (Nahir, 2003). Some polities may implement several of these together.

There are three main types of language planning. These are corpus planning, status planning, and acquisition planning. Corpus planning is related to coining new words, changing spellings, adopting a new script, and the creation of new forms (Cooper,

1989). In corpus planning, language planners decide what is correct, what is pure and what is the best usage for language, linguistically as well as ideologically. If a new concept emerges corpus planners produce a means to express this concept (Millar, 2005). The establishment of Turkish Language Association (TDK) or the *Académie française* can be given as examples for corpus planning. I will investigate corpus planning in detail below. The other two types of planning are status and acquisition planning. “Status planners attempt to achieve greater status for their language variety within a given polity in relation to other language varieties. Acquisition planning is an activity designed to encourage the greater knowledge, and (eventually) native use, of a language variety” (Millar, 2005, p. 100). Status planning is related to the spread and prestige of a language or a dialect in a given territory. For example, “when speakers of a minority language are denied the use of that language in educating their children, their language has no status. Alternatively, when a government declares that henceforth two languages ... be officially recognized..., the newly recognized one has gained status” (Wardhuagh, 2006, p. 357). Martin Luther can be given as a different example of this type of planning. Luther selected the Saxony dialect in order to write the Bible translation. In this way, the Saxony dialect, which had been spoken widely in German territories, became *lingua franca* and constituted the basis of the standard German as a result of Martin Luther. As mentioned above, the same is true for the role of Dante and other writers in the Piedmont dialect’s becoming standard Italian.

Corpus planning has more strict and fundamental contents than the other two. The language planning in the Early Turkish Republic period can be positioned and evaluated under corpus planning. Corpus planning is structural and directly related to the written language itself. It includes discussions of the writing system (e.g., the alphabet suggestion of Enver Paşa, the so called *hurûf-u munfasıla/hatt-ı cedîd* or transition to Latin from the Arabic alphabet in the Turkish Republic) and an imperative spelling system (e.g., the spelling difference between American and British accent such as colour and color, orthographic change of words in Turkish as to spell the name أحمد /'a:məd/ as Ahmet). “Corpus planning corresponds to two widespread convictions: that language usage helps bring about social change, on one

hand and that language usage helps reinforce or stabilize social change, on the other hand” (Fishman, 2006, p. 4). Thinking specific to Turkish, there was the idea that alphabet and word change would bring about social change and the modernization of society. As Fishman (2006) says, the ideology pursued by corpus planning is more generally related to imperative ideological direction. For this reason, actors intervene in the language in a very strict and ideology-driven way regardless of the semantic world of words specifically in the context of the Turkish case. As a matter of fact, the aim of language planners was to cut off the connection of the semantic tradition in language.

Linguistic purity can be seen in the center of corpus planning. Planning actors discuss purism due to different reasons. Norwegians tried to construct a more “Norwegian” Norwegian than their existing Danicized language, whereas for the Turkish language there were different agendas as well such as modernization and the de-Islamization of language. Planning for modernization has as a basic goal the cleansing of a language of its “foreign” factors. And these interventions in language have very close relations with ethnic nationalism. To create an ethnically homogeneous society in a given territory, polities especially intervene in language to produce a unique language.

I have discussed thus far how national identity occurred and how various types of language politics are available. I will discuss the relation between the two and give examples of them in the French and German cases. At the end of this chapter, I will also discuss the Ottoman case. The Republican period and its strict implementations will be covered in the next chapter. The history of nation building brings into the open how linguistic unity is a part of the development of a nation state and national consciousness. A national language has some important roles in the nation-building process. First of all, a language provides utility. It becomes a common means of communication among citizens and this provides an economic and political efficiency, which I discussed above concerning bureaucracy and compulsory education. Secondly, a common and unified language contributes to social cohesion and creates a common culture. The common culture already has been an element of being a

nation but here we see an interrelation. Thus, in some cases refusing to learn the national language can be seen unpatriotic and schismatic. And thirdly, if the language of a group is distinctive from a neighbors' language, this can be asserted as an element of being a nation. For that reason, the language matters much more compared to the past, and leaders became more interested in language (Wright, 2004, p. 42).

Language politics emerge as status planning in some countries and this can be divided into two forms. Status planning is mostly related to the level of the language and its being an official language in a given territory. Mostly the language shape of the capitol city or of the dominant group is chosen as the official language. The language takes root and spreads because all formal institutions, education, and official correspondence use the national language. Thus, other languages cannot take any status in the public field. In countries where ethnic nationalism exists, this plan emerges as a powerful tool for independence and sovereignty (Wright, 2004, p. 45). That is to say, the spatial scope of language determines the borders of the nation. The German example is here particularly important. Wright's quotation from German nationalist Fichte explains how language determines the border of a nation: "whenever a separate language was to be found there was also a separate nation, which had right to manage its all affairs and rule itself" (2004, p. 45). Moreover, Kedourie quotes a different passage from the same book of Fichte *Reden an die Deutsche Nation* (Adresses to the German Nation). According to this, Fichte describes the nation directly with language: "we give the name of people [nation] to men whose organs of speech are influenced by the same external conditions, who live together and who develop their language in continuous communication with each other" (1961, p. 64).

2.4.1. France

Language policies can be traced back to long before the French Revolution. In the past, traditionally, an estimated seven regional language were spoken in French territories: Basque, Catalan, Alsatian, Breton, Corsican, Flemish, and Occitan (Judge, 2002). However, with such causal agents as the centralization of monarchies and

vitation of Latin, the French language became dominant in the territory. François I declared an edict in 1539 in Villers-Cotterêts, whose article 111 commanded the use of the French Language for the establishment of the civil state and the compilation of notarized law (Schiffman, 1996). The article of the edict stated that the reason for the new ordinance was due to a poor understanding of Latin words. However, the reason was actually breaking the influence of Latin. Although the regional aristocracy and church opposed it, the edict went in effect (Sadoğlu, 2003). This edict can be seen as an example of status planning, because it did not reform the written language as corpus planning would have, but instead it made a decision about the status of the language. But with the *Académie française* corpus planning stepped in. Cardinal Richelieu founded the *Académie française* in 1635, and it is now the most famous language academy in the world. In the beginning, the institute aimed to simplify, enrich, and refine the French language. However, the institute later became a center where the language politics of the state were determined and implemented (Sadoğlu, 2003). Richelieu's political purposes were realized and the unofficial club became an official language academy. Richelieu wanted the academy to regulate the French language not only in regard to purification but also in terms of improving the abilities of the language for all domains, including science and scholarship. That is to say, Richelieu wanted French to replace Latin (Cooper, 1989, p. 10).

After the revolution, the monarchy was destroyed and the formation of the state changed. At first, language issues were not essential for the state-building process, since the Constituent Assembly accepted the principle of bilingualism and translation. However, the Jacobins wanted to establish a centralized and uniform state against feudal and provincial polities during discussions in the *Convention Nationale*. The importance of language emerged at this point. Revolutionaries realized all citizens should speak the same language. The standard French, the language of the élite, was their obvious choice. Having a standard language appealed to actors. Moreover, a common language was useful to enable communication in a society at both a vertical and a horizontal level. Other languages were banned, and thus "one state, one nation, one language" became a slogan in France. (Judge, 2002, p. 73). To teach every citizen the national language, primary school education became a necessity. The

conflict, which started in the sixteenth century against Latin, had already made French with its *académie* and protectionism a powerful language even in the international area.

2.4.2. Germany

German unification occurred in the late nineteenth century (1871). Compared with France and England this date corresponds to a later period. Before unification, there were large and small German states in German-speaking territories. Communication between a person from today's Switzerland and one from northern Germany was quite difficult in this period. German was the first language to open a battlefield against the dominance of Latin. Luther produced a new perspective on religion with translation of the Bible. It is possible from here to make a connection between religion and language as well. The birth of Protestantism shook the existing system in Western Europe and long-term wars happened between Protestants and Catholics. During the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), language communities were founded in German territories, similar to the *Académie française*, in 1635. The *Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft* (Fruition Society) was founded in 1617 in Weimar. Moreover, different language societies (*Sprachgesellschaften*) sprang up in 1633, 1642, and 1644. Language societies increased numerically and effectively in the eighteenth century. The state and bureaucracy after German unification intervened in language planning and implemented many standardization and purification policies.

This purism process was encouraged by a variety of language associations and pressure groups, most notably the *Allgemeiner Deutscher Sprachverein*; it would have got nowhere without the active participation of members of the federal and state governments and bureaucracies in the process, however (Millar, 2005, p. 118)

Besides wars in the name of religion, these dates show us that there was a war to protect language as well. These language societies were founded especially in the Saxony region and, as we already know, Luther had written in the Saxony dialect. In addition to that, a book for German grammar was written in the eighteenth century, which was again in *Ostmitteldeutsch*. There was not any other competitor against these standardization movements of this dialect. And at the end of the process, a vernacular language became the German national language (Kamusella, 2009; Millar,

2005). And speakers of Low German dialects learned standard German as if a foreign language in schools. The actual standard German was agreed after German unification. Imperial actors implemented Duden's orthography as the standard spelling norm (Kamusella, 2009).

Although political unification occurred late, German national ideas were active in culture. Because of that, German identity has a unique significance in the context of language and nation. Unlike France, the German nation was constituted upon language and culture. As I previously quoted from Fichte, some German intellectuals, poets, and philosophers have written on the connectedness of these two concepts. Poets and philosophers filled the bottom of the German identity. They thus created a kind of *Kulturpatriotismus* and *Kulturnation* before they were a nation state. And the elements of this *kulturnation* were common language and common culture. In a poem poet Ernst Moritz Arndt described the boundaries of the German state as wherever German was spoken. (Pohlsander, 2008). These statements show the character of German national identity. Fichte wrote his *Addresses to the German Nation* "shortly after Napoleon's defeat of Prussia and the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, emphasized language as the basis of German national unity. The German nation, he wrote, stretched 'as far as the German tongue was spoken'" (Nathans, 2004, p. 29). And lastly nationalist Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, who lived until the middle of the nineteenth century, wanted the German state to be religiously Protestant and linguistically pure from foreign words. And he also said that only subjects of German history belong to the German state (Pohlsander, 2008). As seen, German nationalism was founded on language, culture, and historical unity. These factors reveal the ethnic rather than civic foundations of German nationalism.

Considering both the linguistic and spatial character of German nationalism and the standardization process of language, the importance of language on nation building appears more clearly. First, a dialect from among a lot of vernaculars distinguished itself under the influence of printing and Luther. Then the dialect spread and took root in all German-speaking polities. Thus the language entered into a process of standardization. At the same time, national ideas spread among German

intelligentsia and the characteristics of German nationalism started to be shaped. German national ideas had more linguistic, cultural, and ethnic tendencies than the American and French ones. Therefore, such phenomenon as identity became meaningful not by means of the state, but a nation.

2.5. Language Planning and the Ottoman Experience

Language politics in the Ottoman State had a different route from those in France and Germany. Language policies were not related to building a nation state or a national identity in the Ottoman context. Most of them had to do with centralization, bureaucratic structure, and settling journales. While multi-ethnic monarchies were going out of existence in Europe due to the process of nationalization, the Ottoman state endeavored to attune itself to the new circumstances by maintaining its multi-ethnic structure. The *Gülhâne Hatt-ı Hümayûnu* (the *Tanzimat* Edict) was published with this goal in 1839 during Abdulmecid I's reign. This edict opened a new social and political era in Ottoman history. The *Tanzimat* Edict aimed, on the one hand, at military and administrative innovations, and on the other hand at production of a modern identity out of the *Millet* system. Greeks and Serbians had already rebelled in the Balkans with religious and nationalist impetuses in the early nineteenth century. These types of movements shook the *Millet* system, which defined traditional social layers of the polity. Therefore, the Ottoman State formed an Ottomanist identity with support of intellectuals after the *Tanzimat* Edict. "A counterpoint to the nationalism... Ottomanism was a state policy designed to unite the diverse cultural and ethnic components of the existing empire under the umbrella of a shared political identity" (Bulut, 2009, p. 448). That is to say that, the Ottoman identity was spatial rather than ethnic and cultural. The *Islahat* Edict (1856) added a new perspective on the *Tanzimat* Edict. New steps were taken to reinforce the Ottoman identity. All Ottoman subjects became equal before the law regardless of their religion. Furthermore, the right to work in the civil service was officially given to all subjects on a non-discriminatory basis (Gümüç, 2008). As is seen, the new social constructing began to transform the *Millet* system into a citizenship-based modern identity. On the one hand, the reforms strengthened ethnic identities while corroding religious community identities (Sadođlu, 2003). On the other hand, Russia "began to

partition the European parts of the Ottoman Empire into small, aggressive Christian principalities following the Balkan War of 1878" (Bayly, 2004, p. 206). This process directed the Ottoman administration and elites to adopt the circumstances and develop different perspectives on being an Ottoman subject.

The *Tanzimat* Era was a period of reformation and modernization, which started in 1839 and ended with the First Constitutional Era in 1876. Another feature of the *Tanzimat* Era was reformation in education. In the classical era, education was under the protection of the *ilmiye* and was being done in accordance with Islam. However, with the reformation process, Western-type schools were established. During Sultan Mahmud II's reign, the idea of reforming the *sıbyan* schools appeared and *iptidai* schools were established (Cihan, 2007). The *rüştiye* schools, which were like secondary schools, were established in the *Tanzimat* Era and the *idadi* and the *sultani* schools followed them as modern schools. As I mentioned before, school had an important role as a tool for establishing a common means of communication among subjects in a modern state. Therefore, to provide for the bureaucracy's need and create a common identity, compulsory education was implemented as a state policy. The Ottoman State also performed this policy in the context of Ottomanism. With the April 1847 Regulations to teachers of the *sıbyan* schools, six years of compulsory education (*sıbyan* and *rüştiye*) was decided (Gündüz, 3-10). Here, the principle of compulsory *sıbyan* education, which Sultan Mahmud II had previously commanded in 1824 for the first time, was repeated (Akyüz, 1994). However, a lot of non-Muslim schools were established during the *Tanzimat* Era but they were only subject to licensing control. They were free to implement their own curricula. This situation was an obstacle to standardization, which was to impart a citizenship identity to subjects (Sadoğlu, 2003). Ottomanist politics wished to have a collectivity among the education system of all societies in the Ottoman state. The Empire aimed to teach a common culture and language to all its subjects in these schools. However, the number of newly opened public schools was not enough in non-Turkic cities (Kushner, 1998).

All subjects were to be able to work as civil servant as mentioned in the *Islahat* Edict. However, to be able to attain this right, they had to know Turkish. The 1876 *Kânûn-ı Esâsî*, the first constitution, declared this necessity:

Madde 18 - Tebaa-i Osmâniyenin hidemâtı devlette istihdâm olunmak için devletin lisân-ı resmîsi olan türkçeyi bilmeleri şarttır (Gözübüyük & Kili, 1982, p. 29)

Art. 18 - Admission to public office has a condition - the knowledge of Turkish which is the official language of the State (The Ottoman Constitution, Promulgated the 7th Zilbridje, 1293 (11/23 December, 1876) , 1908, p. 369)

As I discussed for the French and German examples, centralization and the rise of bureaucracy increased the need both for a phonetically, grammatically, and orthographically standardized language, and for a written language that was close to the public language. Since the number of personnel in the bureaucratic organization was low in traditional states, polities employed people with limited educated for bureaucratic service. Because of that, the rate of literacy was low and polities did not require to scale up (Ortaylı, 2007). This process started intensively during the *Tanzimat* era. Thus, discussions related to language were prominent in this period.

Efforts to simplify and standardize the language also intensified in the *Tanzimat* era. The *Encümen-i Daniş* (advisory committee) had a significant importance on this point. The *Encümen-i Daniş* was founded in 1851 primarily for the purpose of providing and translating course books in Turkish for students of the *Dârulfünûn*. To write books in a plain language that the public could understand was on aim of the committee as well (Uçman, 1995). Care was taken to write books in a simple Turkish. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha's grammar book *Kavâ'id-i Osmaniye* was presented to the Sultan on the opening day of the *Encümen-i Daniş* and published under this name (Uçman, 1995). In addition to this, the committee aimed at publishing more grammar books and dictionaries to standardize and simplify the language (Karaçavuş, 2009). In the sense of organizational form, selection of members, and aim the *Encümen-i Daniş* is similar to the *Académie française*, but the most significant similarity was that they both attached importance to the simplification of language (Bilim, 1985). However, the *Encümen-i Daniş* was dissolved a few years after its foundation without achieving its goals.

Language planning in the Ottoman State involved an academy similar to the French example. At the same time, the discussions in literature and in the press also contributed to language standardization. The first newspaper in Turkish, *Vakayi-i Mısriye*, was published by Mehmed Ali Pasha in Cairo in 1826 (Sadođlu, 2003). The first official newspaper in Ottoman history was *Takvîm-i Vekâyi* in 1831. The *Takvim-i Vekayi* formed a basis for later Turkish periodicals. The first private newspaper, *Tercümân-ı Ahval* was published by Agah Efendi and İbrahim Şinasi in 1860, followed a simple language policy. Şinasi wrote a *mukaddime* (introduction) in the first issue of the newspaper and explained why such a newspaper was important, and what its publishing policy was. In the *mukaddime* Şinasi says the following about the language of the newspaper:

Bu itibar-i hakikate mebnî, giderek, umum halkın kolaylıkla anlayabileceđi mertebede işbu gazeteyi kaleme almak mültezem olduđu dahi makam münasebeti ile şimdiden ihtar olunur (Tercüman-ı Ahval, issue 1, 1860) (Şinasi, 1960)

Although most men of letters in the *Tanzimat* Era supported articulate and easily understandable written language, Şinasi argued both for plain language and, for the first time, for society's right to know what happens in politics in the *mukaddime* of the *Tercüman-ı Ahval* (Sadođlu, 2003). Ali Suavi articulated the same idea in the introduction of his newspaper *Muhbir*. He wrote "tasrihi caiz olan her şeyi, asitanede kullanılan adi lisan ile ya'ni herkesin anlayabileceđi ifade ile yazacaktır (1861)" (Koç, 2007, p. 14)

On the one hand, writers and intellectuals defended a simpler Turkish: on the other, the priority of the Turkish strengthened in the field of education during the Sultan Abdülhamid II's reign. Non-Muslim schools had not been audited in terms of their curricula before. However, the opening of foreign and non-Muslim schools was attached to the permission of the Sultan by law in 1893 (Sadođlu, 2003). Moreover, an ordinance was declared in 1894 on the necessity of Turkish education in foreign and non-Muslim schools. According to the law, all schools in the empire had to give compulsory Turkish lessons (Kushner, 1998, p. 124).

Discussions on the naming of language in the last decade of nineteenth century are important to trace nationalist particles in the Ottoman state. The name of the language spoken in the Ottoman state was normally called *lisân-i Osmanî* (Ottoman language). However, with the rise of Turkism, some writers defended that the name of the spoken and written language was *lisân-i Türkî* (Turkish language). According to Sadođlu, Süleyman Pasha, who had an important role in the declaration of the First Constitution, did research on Turkish language and the history of the language. Süleyman Pasha was strictly against the characterization of Turkish as *lisân-i Osmanî* and the name of his grammar book was *İlm-i Sarf-ı Türkî* (Sadođlu, 2003).

Şemseddin Sami, who wrote *Kâmus-i Türkî*, a competent dictionary of Ottoman Turkish, held with Süleyman Pasha. As seen from the name of his dictionary, Şemseddin Sami was of the opinion that the language should be called Turkish. According to Şemseddin Sami, the Ottoman language was formed after the encounter between Chagatai, Arabic, and Farsi, as well as old French formed mixture of Welsh and Latin. Thus, Sami accepted Chagatai as the real original Turkish. He characterized the language as the Ottoman language here, but he renounced this idea afterwards. Later, he said that Ottoman could be name of the state, but not of nation or language (Şen, 20014). Thus, he supported to reach national base of literature and language. Şemseddin Sami dwelled on origin of the Turkish language, simplification of language, and incorrectness of the phrase *lisan-i Osmanî* in his 1898 article "*Lisan ve Edebiyatımız*" (our language and literature). Sami upheld simplification, but he was opposed to refining Turkified words. Arabic and Farsi noun phrases should be left according to him (Dođramaciođlu, 2010). The most important issue in this article is his construction of a relation between Turkish identity and the Turkish language.

Her bir kavim ve ümmet, büyük olsun küçük olsun kuvvetli olsun zayıf olsun manevi varlığını sağlamlaştırıp kuvvetlendirmeye, çalışmalıdır. Kavmiyet ve ırkın birinci işareti esası bütün fertlerin eşit olarak ortak malı söylediđi lisanıdır. Bir lisanı konuşan halk, bir kavim ve bir ırk teşkil eder. Bundan dolayı ırkı varlığını temin etmek isteyen her kavim ve ümmet en önce lisanı düzeltmeyi, kurallarını koymaya ve o dili geliştirmeye ilim ve fen ve diđer sanatlara ait kitaplara ve klasik sayılmaya deđer seçkin edebi eserlerle zenginleştirmeye borçludurlar (Sabah, Nu. 3232, 8 August 1898; Kushner, 1998, p. 85).

As seen from this quotation, Şemseddin Sami declares clearly that language is an indicator of the nation. Moreover, similarly to Fichte, he implies that language determines the boundary of the nation. To strengthen the existence of the nation, language should be standardized. Şemseddin Sami was the first person among Ottoman intellectuals to argue for a direct relation between language and national identity (Sadođlu, 2003).

The *Yeni Lisan Hareketi* (New Language Movement) and *Genç Kalemler* periodical (Young Pens) will be my last examples for language politics in Ottoman history. They were connected with each other and represented a different perspective from the language planning that started after the *Tanzimat* Edict. Former proposals for language standardization and simplification were related mostly to modernization and the centralization of the state. However, the language planning of *Yeni Lisan* was directly related to Turkish identity and its starting point was Turkism (Demir, 2012).

Genç Kalemler was a periodical that was first published in 1911 in Salonika. The first issue of the second volume of the periodical opened with an editorial titled *Yeni Lisan* (Akalin, 2011). Thus, *Genç Kalemler* became the journal in which *Yeni Lisan's* ideas were written. The editorial argued against the use of Arabic and Farsi phrases, with the exception of some ingrained ones and certain Arabic and Farsi plurals. Arabic and Farsi words should be written as pronounced in spoken language. Words belonging to other Turkish dialects will also not be used. The written language should be created based upon the Istanbul dialect (Sazyek, 2013). *Yeni Lisan* was neither *eski lisan* (old language), which was written redundantly and complicatedly, nor purification (Sadođlu, 2003).

The leading author of the periodical was Ali Canip Yöntem. Ömer Seyfettin joined the periodical afterwards and wrote the editorial that triggered a new language movement. With participation of Ziya Gökalp, who accepted the inseparable relation between language and nation, the core cadre of the periodical was completed. *Yeni Lisan's* simplification policy was not only linguistic, they aimed to create a language that had national characteristic (Demir, 2012). Thus, written language and spoken

language would converge and *Milli Edebiyat* (National Literature) would be established. *Milli Edebiyat* was a period of literature that started with *Yeni Lisan* and ended in the early years of the republic. A pan-Turkish feeling appeared and spread among some Ottoman elites after the Young Turk revolution in 1908. However, this feeling was not widespread, though some literati began to write feverishly about Turkish language and culture (Bayly, 2004, p. 213).

It is common to read the history of the late Ottoman Empire through the three categorical divisions of Ottomanism, pan-Islamism, and Turkism. However, new historiography reads that period differently from a broader perspective. The process of nation-state building occurred after different events such as revolutionary autonomization (Greece, Serbia, Belgium), hegemonic unification (Germany, Italy), evolutionary autonomization (Norway), and lastly centers of empires became a nation (Spain, Portugal) (Berger & Miller, 2014, pp. 3-4). The process in the Ottoman Empire was also an example of an imperial nation. This term refers to a nation building project which was implemented in an imperial core. The project never aimed to create a nation that included all subjects and all imperial territory (Berger & Miller, 2014). As the Ottoman Empire lost territory in Europe, it developed new policies according to its new population. Abdulhamid II “reinterpreted the Ottomanism to fit new demographic realities with the loss of most of the Balkan territories... As the empire became more Muslim, the symbols of legitimacy became more Islamic” (Eissenstat, 2014, p. 451). On the other hand, Abdulhamid’s language had an emphasis on Turkishness as well. This was not in the scope of nationalism, but was a useful quality of the state (Eissenstat, 2014, p. 451) After the independence of Albania in late 1912, the Muslim variety decreased in the empire. Thus, political discourse adopted to fit the new demography, as had happened before. The emphasis on Turkishness increased in this period among Ottoman elites. However, because the literacy rate was very low in the Ottoman state, the perspective of Ottoman elites reached the public only belatedly. As a result, “nationalism had still not emerged as a coherent set of ideas and political practices even in 1914” in the central Ottoman lands (Bayly, 2004, p. 219). Thus language policies in the Ottoman Empire were not similar to those in the German and French examples mentioned above.

In this chapter, I discussed how interrelated national identity and language are by investigating the history of the term “nation”. I showed how the term nation came to gain the meaning we understand today and which elements this term covered. Factors such as race, culture, and homeland were all united under the term “nation”. However, in this chapter I mostly discussed the significance of language on being nation and creating a nation state. To clarify this argument, I firstly explained the types of language planning, then I discussed them in the context of the French and the German cases. Finally, I discussed the rising importance of language for the centralizing Ottoman State. However, language policies there were not similar to those of France and Germany. Ottoman language policies were mostly about the centralization of the state and simplification of the language. This was not mainly about creating a nation state. In the *Tanzimat* era, simplifications, standardizations, and other language programs were not directly related to nation building, but rather to Ottomanism and the state. However, with the rise of Turkist tendencies among some intellectuals in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, a connection between nationalist ideas and language was made. *Yeni Lisan* and *Milli Edebiyat* were the examples I gave for these perspectives.

CHAPTER 3

BUILDING A NATION: FROM *MILLET* TO *ULUS*

3.1. The *Milli Mücadele* and religious borders of the Turkish identity

In the previous chapter I mainly discussed how the term nation became the soul and the mortar of the social cohesion in Western Europe in the modern era. In that part I firstly explained the history of the concept of the “nation,” which had a derogatory meaning in Roman times and which subsequently gained new layers of meaning and an enlarged semantic field. This process continued until the term gained a meaning that defined the character and the identity of modern states. As the scope of the term changed, it lost its derogatory meaning and became something worth fighting for. Politicization of the term spread in waves from Western Europe to other parts of the world. The factors which determined the boundaries of a nation varied from region to region. This distinctness brings us to civic and ethnic nationalisms. On one side civic nationalism was determined by space and citizenship, on the other side ethnic nationalism was determined by culture, ethnicity, language, and history. This classical classification was criticized by some scholars on account of the fact that there is not a strict distinction between the two and interpenetration is possible

I secondly discussed the correlation between nation and language. I focused on the impact of the language in determining the boundaries of a nation. German nationalism and German idealism serve as especially significant examples on this issue. Starting from this point of view, I thirdly discussed the type of language planning adopted in different countries and how these policies supported and strengthened national identity. I used the examples of France and Germany to highlight the different experiences about the influence of language on nation-building.

At the end of the chapter, I tackled the Ottoman experience and discussed how the language was used during the modernization process of the state after the *Tanzimat*, and how the importance of language continued to increase during that period until

World War I. The conditions of the Ottoman Empire were different from those of Germany and France. Nation-building was beside the point for the Ottoman Empire. However, language and its form came into prominence towards the end of the Ottoman Empire. Language gradually gained crucial importance for the Turkish Republic, which was founded in what remained of Ottoman Anatolia.

In this chapter I will scrutinize the role of language in nation building in Turkey. I will explain the process starting from the *Milli Mücadele* period and discuss the character of Turkish identity during this period. Then I will investigate the transition of the identity with the establishment of the Turkish Republic. 1930 was the turning point for the identity and nation building in Turkey. Nation building gained a secular and sometimes an ethnic character after 1930. Turkish history thesis and language reforms processed in parallel with this idea of nation building. I will explain and discuss changes and interactions in detail. Then, I will focus on the reproduction of the term *ulus* during this process and compare it with the term *millet*.

3.1.1. Turkishness until the Establishment of the Republic

In the late nineteenth century national ideas emerged gradually among the Ottoman Turks. However, Turkish nationalist thought was commonly blended with religious identity. It was difficult to make distinction between the two and they fed and strengthened one another. A secular ethnic connotative nationalism has been barely endeavored to be placed by force of the state mechanisms in 1930s. As C.A. Bayly states in his book *The Birth of the Modern World 1780-1914*, in such areas as “the central Ottoman lands and parts of Austria-Hungry, Russia... nationalism had still not emerged as a coherent set of ideas and political practices even in 1914” (2004, p. 219).

The identity perception of Ottoman Muslims was affected by Greek, Serbian, Romanian, and Bulgarian revolts and wars. These territorial declines resulted in the emergence of nation states in the Balkans: As nation states, these Balkan states also aimed to establish homogenous entities within their boundaries. However, the skeleton of these homogeneities was made up mostly of religious identity and

concerns. For instance, “the first Greek constitution, adopted in 1822, defines the citizens of the new Greek state as the ‘autochthonous inhabitants of the realm of Greece who believe in Christ’” (Çağaptay, 2006, p. 5). This case shows us how national identity and religious affiliation determined the homogenous entity within a state.

All these processes in the Balkans were the beginning of a very difficult period for Muslims living in the region. Muslims were subjected to religious exclusion and slaughters. Huge migration flows followed and became a part of these religio-national processes. Much of the Muslim population in the Balkans was forced to migrate to Anatolia. Thus, the Christian population decreased and the Muslim population increased in the Ottoman Empire. The Hamidian regime reinterpreted Ottoman identity to fit its new demography. And the discourse of Islamic legitimacy began to be expressed. The more the Muslim population increased in the Empire, the more Islamic the symbols that the state used (Eissenstat, 2014, p. 451). “In a world in which Christian anti-Turkish rhetoric had become a successful rallying cry, it was not surprising that the later sultans began to see themselves increasingly as Muslims” (Bayly, 2004, p. 221).

The content of the entity issue began to be filled in different ways during the Young Turks era. The emphasis on Turkishness and Ottoman Turkish relatively increased alongside Muslimness. That is to say, the gap between being a Turk and being a Muslim narrowed. Thus, nationalist discourse and Islamic discourse came to more closely resemble each other. The Ottomanist identity referred to a more Muslim and Turkish character with the help of the demographic situation in the last years of the Empire. All these experiences “helped to create a sense of ‘Muslimness’ as an ethnic category” (Eissenstat, 2014, p. 459). The Young Turks aimed to make the Ottoman realm a Turkish one. However, their definition of Turkishness covered Muslims in Anatolia and Thrace. The Arab rebellions against the Empire also increased the importance of Anatolia in the eyes of Muslims in Anatolia. “Now, the Turkish-Muslim community of Anatolia (and Thrace) was convinced that Turkey was its only homeland” (Çağaptay, 2006, p. 8).

The Turkish-Muslim Anatolian community, which fought for its independence against the Allied Powers' invasion after World War I, was such an overarching collection of thoughts. The document which declared the end of Ottoman involvement in World War I was the Armistice of Mudros on 30 October 1918. According to the armistice, the region of Anatolia was legally opened to occupation by the Allied forces. Despite the fact that inhabitants of Anatolia had been perpetually at war since 1911, some armed forces, the so called *Kuvâ-yi Milliye* (National Forces), were organized against the occupation of Allied forces due to the absence of effective government and military security from the state (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, p. 340). In parallel with that, from the armistice of Mudros until the end of October 1920 almost 30 local and national congresses convened around Anatolia (T.B.M.M., 1993, pp. 7-12). This interval is called the congress and protocols period in Turkish historiography.

Here, it will be helpful to give some conceptual details from the historical chronology to digress by comparing this period with era after the 1930s. This will make it clear how certain terms were involved with new meaning. Investigating the protocols and speeches in these congresses will help to understand the mindset of that period. This will help to comprehend and compare the changes over the next decades of the Turkish Republic.

The first article of the Amasya Protocol, 21 June 1919, declared that “the integrity of Fatherland [*vatanın tamamıyeti*] and national independence [*milletin istiklâli*] are in danger” (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, p. 344). The protocol described the remainder of Ottoman territory as *vatan* and urged national (*milli*) independence. The answer to the question of who the nation (*millet*) here is, as I explained above, is the Turkish-Muslim Anatolian community. Similar emphases can also be seen in the first article of the Erzurum Congress resolutions: “Trabzon ve Canik Sancağıyla Vilayat-ı Şarkıye... hiçbir sebep ve bahane ile yek diğerinden camia-i Osmaniye'den ayrılmak imkanı tasavvur edilemeyen bir küldür... Bu sahada yaşayan bilcümle anasır-ı İslamiye yekdiğesine... öz kardeşlerdir” (Ezherli, 1992, p. 8). Here again it was stated that the Muslim communities of the provinces were inseparable from each other. After the Erzurum and Sivas Congress, the Ottoman government called elections. The last

Ottoman Chamber of Deputies met in Istanbul on 12 January 1920. Deputies in the chamber improved Societies for Defence of National Rights decisions taken in the Sivas Congress and these decisions were unanimously accepted on 28 January as *Misak-ı Millî* (National Oath) in the Ottoman Chamber and announced on 17 February 1920.

The *Misak-ı Millî* was seen as the manifestation of the Turkish Independence War (Kayalı, 2008, p. 127). “This dictated that those areas of the Empire that were within the Mudros Armistice line of October 30, 1918 and ‘inhabited by the Ottoman-Muslim majority’ were an ‘indivisible whole’” (Çağaptay, 2006, p. 11). As can be seen from these examples, the basic aim of struggle in the remainder of Ottoman land was the protection of the fatherland and the fundamental owners of the land were conceived of as the Anatolian Muslim community. The newspaper *Hâkimiyet-i Milliye* (national sovereignty) was established as a propaganda organ of the Societies for Defence Rights on 10 January 1920.

The vocabulary of the period what is called *Millî Mücadele* (National Defence) was mostly about the Ottoman-Muslim majority, unity of the Fatherland, *millî irade* (national will), and protection of the sultanate and caliphate. In the conceptual context of the period, terms like *millî* and *millet* especially had Islamic connotations rather than secular national ones. “The national independence struggle had a strong Islamic flavor and until the end it was waged in the name of caliphate and Sultanate” (Zürcher, 1999, p. 83). Similarly, Gotthard Jäschke also says that the aim and the mission of the national movement (*milli hareket*) was to protect the sultanate and the caliphate. When the Grand National Assembly was established, this aim was changed to rescuing the sultanate and the caliphate. In this condition, it left theoretically untouched the sultan’s rights (2009, p. 86). However, according to Ahmet Yıldız, the term *millî*, which had both an Islamic and a nationalist connotation, gave ground at least conceptually to transition to nationalist discourse (2001, p. 91). Within the process, the Turkish State swayed to a secular level and implemented harsh decisions in defiance of customs.

On Friday 23 April 1920, the Grand National Assembly was founded in Ankara with Islamic rituals. Deputies swore allegiance to the sultan and caliph and reaffirmed their desire to save him from the hands of the enemy (Lewis, 1991, p. 251). A declaration was prepared by the assembly and issued in *Hâkimiyet-i Milliye* on 28 April. According to the declaration, the National Assembly was working to save the sultan and caliph from enemy attack, to save Anatolia from fragmentation, and to connect the capital city to the homeland again (Ezherli, 1992, p. 42). While the new political movement in Anatolia on the one hand was displaying loyalty to the sultan, on the other hand, it emphasized the fatherland, national will, and Muslim Anatolian community. Using imperial heritage and nationalist items at the same time can be seen as a manifestation of being an imperial nation. The term imperial nation is used for a state that “includes former centers of empires abandoned by their imperial possessions” (Berger & Miller, 2014, p. 4). That is to say, imperial nation refers to a nation-building project that was implemented in the imperial center (Berger & Miller, 2014). Thus, the nation in the process of self-construction exhibits behavior like its imperial past. As I mentioned above, this can be seen in the acceptance of the remainder of Ottoman territory as the fatherland and Anatolian-Muslims as the nation.

In a speech on 1 May 1920, Mustafa Kemal explained the Muslim elements that constituted the Turkish nation (*millet*) in the following words:

Burada maksut olan ve Meclisi âlinizi teşkil eden zevat yalnız Türk değildir, yalnız Çerkes değildir, yalnız Kürt değildir, yalnız Lâz değildir. Fakat hepsinden mürekkep anasır-ı islâmiyedir... Anasır-ı İslâmiyeden mürekkep bir kütleye aittir... Binaenaleyh muhafaza ve müdafaasıyle iştigal ettiğiniz millet bittabi bir unsurdan ibaret değildir. Muhtelif anasır-ı İslâmiyeden mürekkeptir. Bu mecmuayı teşkil eden her bir unsur-u İslâm, bizim kardeşimiz ve menafii tamamiyle müşterek olan vatandaşımızdır. (Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2006, p. 74)

In this speech, Mustafa Kemal articulated the groups that made up the nation. He stated that this nation was made up of the Muslim elements within Anatolia. Moreover, Mustafa Kemal stated that these were the groups who were to be protected and defended. This situation shows us the character and content of the identity of that time.

A similar example can be given from the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which showed that Muslim groups were the fundamental and determinant part of identity in Turkey. The treaty is seen as the certificate of formation of the Turkish nation state. Turkey did not react as a standard nation state in the matter of minorities. The standard definition of minority was according to race, language, and religion in that period. However, Turkey wanted minorities to be only according to religion as had been the case in the Ottoman Empire. And at the end, international minority rights were given only to religious groups, as Turkey had demanded (Oran, 2001, p. 222). The population exchange with Greece was also relevant to this issue. Turkey was engaged in nation building and it also wanted to create a homogenous society. This homogeneity consisted of Muslims in Turkey. A population exchange with Greece was on the agenda during the Lausanne negotiations. According to this, Turkey was to send all Orthodox Christians to Greece and Greece was to send all Muslims regardless of their race to Turkey. Karamanlis were Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians and they were also sent due their religion. Turkey took care to establish the nation state on a religious basis, predicated in one sense on the Ottoman *millet* system (Oran, 2001, pp. 331-333).

Nationalism in today's sense was weak among Anatolian inhabitants during the period of the *Milli Mücadele*, the establishment of the Grand National Assembly, and in the following years. Religion was the main social bond during this period. Thus, the nationalist wing could not bear the consequences of opposing religion while fighting on many fronts at the same time. Over the years, however, republican elites gradually overpowered first the religious authority (caliphate) and then began to interfere in the religious practices of the society (Oran, 1988, pp. 74-75). A fast secularization movement in bureaucracy and daily life started after the establishment of the republic. And after the abolishment of the state religion from the constitution in 1928, secular identity and ethnic nationalism rose with the support of the political authority. This process aimed to build an identity and revealed itself in many areas, including the simplification of language and a new historiography.

As I mentioned before, layers of the term *millet* centered on religion in that time. However *millet* began to be used increasingly as the equivalent of the term nation from the late nineteenth century onward in some written works such as dictionaries and newspapers. This situation created a certain ambiguity in the concept. This vagueness was successfully used as a manipulation tool by Mustafa Kemal, the chief of the Grand National Assembly (*Büyük Millet Meclisi*). And although the majority of the Assembly was dominantly on the side of coterie of religious representatives, the first article of the *Teşkilât-ı Esâsiye*—the first constitution of Turkey—was able to pass the assembly in 1921 without objection. The article was as follows: “Hâkimiyet bilâ kaydü şart milletindir,” which means that sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the nation.

The vagueness of the term *millet* made it possible for religious representatives in the assembly think that what was desired from this article was the rights of the Muslim community. However, this was a preparation for Mustafa Kemal to make the nation dominant over the sultan-caliph (Mardin, 1991, p. 66). Moreover, according to a community that was connected to the dynasty religiously and traditionally, only those deprived of religious and fatherland feelings would have thought of a country without the sultan-caliph (Yıldız, 2001, p. 96). However, the *hakimiyet-i milliye* slogan was both a mission and a tool for Mustafa Kemal. The people seemed to be the subject of the struggle against the enemy and the readjustment of the state, but were actually used as the object. In the process of substituting national legitimacy for religious legitimacy, Mustafa Kemal Paşa was very prudent (Yıldız, 2001, pp. 96-97). This policy culminated in the abolishment of the sultanate and the establishment of the republic. And in later years, identity and legitimacy were openly moved into a secular space.

3.2. The Establishment and Secularization of the Republic

Allied forces invited both the Ankara and Istanbul governments to Lausanne for the peace negotiations. However, Mustafa Kemal did not want to present an image of divided authority and so worked for the Ankara government to join the negotiations as the sole authority. Mustafa Kemal decided suddenly and precisely to end the political authority of the sultanate. On 1 November 1922, the Grand National

Assembly decided to disband of the institution of the sultanate. However, it accepted that the caliphate belonged to the Ottoman dynasty. According to the decision, the assembly would elect the caliph from this dynasty (Lewis, 1970, pp. 257-259). In this circumstance, the sultanate and the caliphate were separated from one another. Moreover, the caliph was elected by the Grand National Assembly from the Ottoman dynasty. This was a practice that was unprecedented in the history of the caliphate. The assembly elected Abdülmecid Efendi as the new caliph on 18 November and the Lausanne negotiations started officially on 20 November 1922 (Alpkaya, 1998, p. 23). Choosing a caliph who did not have the right to be the sultan was a temporary solution to prepare society for further changes (Jäschke, 2009, p. 89).

The abolishment of the sultanate was an important milestone on the road to a new state. This seemed to strengthen the slogan “sovereignty belongs to the nation,” because this would signify the political principle that no authority was accepted above national sovereignty and the national will. The Grand National Assembly had a pluralist structure. There were representatives in it from Istanbul Chamber of Deputies, Societies for Defence of Rights, sheikhs, and Kurdish leaders. Thus, the Assembly witnessed heated debates. The assembly was not suitable for Mustafa Kemal to take sharp decisions for the future. In July 1923 an election was held and most of the opposition groups were excluded from the new parliamentary structure (Lewis G. , 1974, p. 89). The first important political action of the new parliament was to ratify the Treaty of Lausanne that brought international recognition to Turkey on 23 August 1923 (Lewis B. , 1970, p. 260).

Hâkimiyet bilâ-kayd ü şart milletindir. İcra kudreti, teşriî salâhiyeti milletin yegâne hakikî mümessili olan mecliste tecelli ve temerküz etmiştir. Bu iki kelimeyi bir kelimedede hulâsa etmek kaabildir: —Cumhuriyet. Yeni Türkiye'nin emr-i teceddüdü daha nihayet bulmamıştır. Harbten sonra Türk teşkilât-ı esasiyesinin inkişafı henüz kat'î bir şekil almış addedilemez. Tadilât ve tashihat yapmak ve daha mükemmel bir hale getirmek elzemdir. İkmaline başlanan bu iş henüz bitmemiştir. Kısa bir zaman zarfında Türkiye'nin bugün fiilen almış bulunduğu şekil kanunen de tesbit edilecektir. (Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, 2006, p. 83)

This quotation is from Mustafa Kemal Paşa's statement to a *Neue Freie Presse* reporter on 27 September 1923. In it, Mustafa Kemal articulates that Turkey became

a de facto republic and that legal regulations would also be determined in a short time. The vagueness of the term *millet* allowed some groups to understand the slogan “hakimiyet bila kaydu şart milletindir” as meaning that sovereignty belongs to *millet-i hakime*, that is to say, to the Muslims in this territory. However, Mustafa Kemal interpreted this slogan as directly related to a republican regime. This ambiguity of the term gave Mustafa Kemal Paşa the opportunity to direct the assembly to the purpose he wanted. A month after this speech, the republic was proclaimed with an amendment to the Teşkilatı Esasiye on 29 October 1923. With the change of the constitution in 1924, Turkey was defined a republic whose religion was Islam and whose language was Turkish (Karpas, 2007, p. 35).

The legitimating role of Islam was reflected in some speeches in the assembly. The deputy of Şarkhisar, Mehmet Emin Bey, took the floor and said that the prophet constituted Allah’s government and that was a republic. Then he said a prayer to the new government and shouted, “long live the republic.” Following his speech, the deputy of Urfa, Şeyh Saffet Efendi, took the floor and said that proclaiming a republic meant a reversion to the time of *hulefâyı Raşidin* (Alpkaya, 1998, p. 95). He meant by this that the republic was the political system of the first caliphs and that republicanism was the true Islamic way of governing. When the republic was proclaimed, some deputies tried to legitimize this new system with Islamic narratives. This shows how religious legitimacy still made itself felt also during the proclamation of the republic.

The president Mustafa Kemal delivered an opening speech in the parliament on 1 March 1923. He articulated how religion should be separated from politics and argued that this separation would help appearing profound knowledge of Islam as following:

İntisap ile mutmain ve mesut bulunduğumuz diyanet-i islâmiyeyi, asırlardan beri müteamil olduğu veçhile bir vasıta-i siyaset mevkiinden tenzih ve îlâ etmek elzem olduğu hakikatini müşahede ediyoruz. Mukaddes ve lâyuhti olan itikadat ve vicdaniyatımızı muğlâk ve mütelevvin olan ve her türlü menfaat ve ihtirasata sahne-i tecelliyat olan siyasiyattan ve siyasetin bütün uzviyatından bir an evvel ve katiyyen tahlis etmek milletin dünyevî ve uhrevî saadetinin

emrettiği bir zarurettir. Ancak bu suretle diyanet-i İslâmiyenin maaliyatı tecellî eder. (Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri I-III, 2006, p. 344)

The newspaper *Vakit* reported this speech the following day with the headline: “Reisicumhur Hazretleri nutuklarında diyanetin vasıta-ı siyaset olmaktan kurtarılması lüzumunu söylediler” (Tunçay, 1999, p. 91). According to Mustafa Kemal, religion was being used and instrumentalized in politics. The newspaper presented the speech with this implication. Mustafa Kemal’s argument for separating Islam from politics was based on the idea that it was for the benefit of Islam. He articulated that Islam should be dissociated from the turbulent and self-seeking field of politics. Another issue Mustafa Kemal mentioned in this speech was that of establishing a unified national education system. This meant that education would also be separated from religion and be placed under the control of the government. The caliphate was abolished on 3 March 1924. Moreover, the law on the unification of education (*tevhid-i tedrisat*) was passed. Turkey thus entered a new era in respect to daily life and the relation between religion and politics, culture, and political legitimacy.

Turkish national identity was built on a religious base until 1924. However, that year symbolized a sharp change to a secular definition of identity. New conditions meant a transition from a religiously based model of sovereignty to modern nation-based one. The process of the *Milli Mücadele* temporarily reversed the secularization trend that had been ongoing since the *Tanzimat* era. In that time, for the first time non-Muslims were not represented in the Assembly. A coalition that consisted of all the ethnic groups in Anatolia fought against the invading Christian armies. Socio-political legitimacy was grounded on Islam (Yıldız, 2001, p. 128). After 1924, however, secularization became the character of the Turkish Republic and bureaucracy, social life, appearance, and identity were determined accordingly. This aimed a destruction of the social memory of Anatolian society. Turkishness began gaining a political definition in 1924. These who were citizens of the republic and accepted Turkish language, culture, and the republican national doctrine were seen as Turks. However, in the late 1920s this definition changed again and a more ethnically based definition was added to the definition of what it meant to be a Turk (Yıldız, 2001, p. 126). Thus,

the regime played with the cultural and religious codes of the society for these fluctuant definitions.

The new state took drastic measures by trying to wipe out the traces of Ottoman/Islamic history in the society to open a new page for the sake of modernization. However, the bureaucratic elites of the republic perceived modernization and progress as a cultural transition movement but not an economic and political one. These elites viewed the European model as the highest level of civilization and were eager to adopt the symbols of Europe. Thus, like European orientalist, they saw Islam as an obstacle to development and especially European civilization. Laicism in the republic developed as a positivist ideology to save Turkish minds from Islamic sources and to encourage people to adopt the modern doctrine of civilization. As laicism was weakening loyalty to old traditions, nationalism was seen as something that could serve as a new basis for the political identity of the Turkish people (Karpas, 2007, p. 43). In the new period after 1924, the government tried to end Islam's status as a source of legitimacy and accelerated secularization.

Most changes in the early republican years had the aim of changing the ethos of Turkish society instead of effecting structural reforms. The aims of the republican changes were to create a modern state. However, this modern state was based on an ideology of Westernization. Even nationalism was described from a Western position rather than a national one. That is to say, the Turkish nation consisted of a people that would share a common future with Western civilized nations but not of a people that shared a common past (Toprak, 2009, p. 448). Secularization and laicism set the limits and the main character of this process. With the abolishment of the caliphate, religion, which had penetrated even the smallest points of everyday life, was excised from these fields. Despite the large-scale secularization in the nineteenth century, the *ulema* (religious scholars) were still needed for birth, education, marriage, death, and inheritance services. However, these fields were also secularized in the new era (Mardin, *Modern Türkiye'de Din*, 1991, p. 97). This secularization program was implemented under three phases. These phases were

symbolic secularization, institutional secularization, and functional secularization (Küçükcan, 2003, p. 486).

Firstly, symbolic secularization mainly concerned those areas of culture and societal life that were based on Islamic traditions and symbols. The most important change under this section was alphabet reform from the Arabic to Latin script in 1928. “Because the new regime regarded language as a connection with history, culture, and sacred scripture, changing the alphabet was an ‘effective step towards breaking old religious traditions’ and weakening the link with the past” (Küçükcan, 2003, p. 487). Making the hat in public places obligatory (25 November 1925), replacing the Hijri calendar with the Gregorian calendar (1 January 1926), changing the weekly holiday from Friday to Sunday, and banning religious clothing were examples of symbolic secularization.

Secondly, institutional secularization was about decreasing the institutional bases and political influence of Islam. The most significant implementation of this type was the abolishment of the caliphate in 1924. In the same year, the *Şeriye ve Evkaf Vekaleti* (the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations) was abolished. A Directorate of Religious Affairs and a General Directorate for Foundations were established as two different institutions instead of that ministry. “Thereafter, the state tried to transform the *Ümmet* (or Umma, the Community of Believers) into a secular national entity in order to eradicate religion as a common bond of solidarity” (Küçükcan, 2003, p. 487). With the abolishment of *tekkes* and *zaviyes*, Sufi movements and their activities were declared unlawful (30 November 1925). Thus, Islam was deprived of legitimacy and solidarity.

Thirdly, the secularization of the courts and the educational system can be evaluated under functional secularization. Sharia law was abolished and an Italian-based criminal code was accepted (1 June 1926). Moreover, the Swiss civil code was accepted as the new civil code in Turkey (4 October 1926). On the other hand, education programs and systems were also changed under secularization. As mentioned above, with the *tevhid-i tedrisat*, education became strictly controlled by

the state and all educational institutions were unified under the Ministry of National Education. As Binnaz Toprak argues, most Kemalist revolutions were not related to the modernization indexes of the social sciences. However, such changes were apt to give impetus to the main purpose of Kemalism. And this aim was to shift Turkish society from an Islamic attitude to a Western one (2009, p. 449).

These three areas were matters directly related to identity. Republican elites tried to vitiate Islam from societal life, institutional structure, education, and law. These implementations were done in order to modernize. However, this modernization process was strictly implemented to adopt the Western world. These concepts were used to cut off the influence of Islam in all layers of the country. From the start of these secularizing reforms until 1928, republican elites put a different building process into place. The Turkish Republic, which attempted to rid itself of its Ottoman and Islamic past in early 1930s, introduced and worked for a new description of Turkish identity. This new description of identity inclined to a more ethnic base. Forgetting and opposing recent history, the nation-building process in Turkey glorified pre-Islamic history and embraced new language policies. Recent changes before the transition to this process were the alphabet change from the Arabic to the Latin script and the removal of Islam as the state religion from the constitution.

On 9 April 1928, the second article of the constitution, which stated that Islam was the state religion, was withdrawn from the constitution. The national oath also included references to Allah, so it was replaced by a new oath made in the name of honor. Additionally, the National Assembly renounced enforcing the *Şeriat*. These were replaced by articles separating religion and state (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, p. 378). The Turkish Republic announced that secularization had covered a long distance with these constitutional changes. The presence of Islam in the constitution meant that the common bond of solidarity in Turkey was based on Islam. The removal of this article, on the other hand, meant the direct opposite. At least, republican elites tried to promote and enforce this understanding. The removal of Islam as an identity determinant created a definitional gap. Therefore, the Kemalist regime tried to fill this gap with an ethno-secular national identity. History and language investigation

societies were established in the following years in order to ground and rationalize the new identity. This was a transition to a new stage in terms of the construction of identity and nation building in the Turkish Republic.

Few among the republican changes could symbolize Western and nationalist character of “Kemalism” like alphabet change. Western, because adopting the Latin alphabet would open the door to the Western world. Nationalist, because it separated and distinguished Turkish society from Islamic sources and Arab coreligionists to the same extent (Sadoğlu, 2003, p. 215). On the one hand, the alphabet change was an indicator to show the republic’s demand for Westernization; on the other hand it meant the deletion of written memory, forgetting of recent history, and rejection of Islamic history. These phenomena were at the same time requirements for the creation of a nation-state. Sabri Akural also states that this alphabet change should be treated under the heading of nationalism rather than secularism. This is because this change was actually an aspect of a broader linguistic reform program which demanded the creation of a national language purged from foreign languages (1984, p. 134). According to republican elites, the Arabo-Farsi alphabet was deficient for expressing the Turkish language and it was not suitable as a national alphabet. Because reading and writing this alphabet was difficult, the rate of literacy was very low in Turkey. Atatürk believed that the literacy rate would increase after switching to a Latin-based alphabet.

A large campaign was started to create a Latin-based script in 1928. A lot of meetings were organized in Dolmabahçe Palace in August to discuss the alphabet issue. İsmet İnönü wrote some points on the blackboard in these meetings and they were accepted. He said there was no other solution than to accept a Turkish alphabet based on the Latin script in place of an Arabic script that did not fit the Turkish language (Levend, 1949, p. 373). This attitude and statement are very revealing in terms of how İnönü rejected the alphabet in which almost all Turkish works had been written for centuries and appropriated the Latin script instead of the Turkish alphabet. This statement can be seen as one of the most obvious examples of oblivion culture and creating a culture from scratch. On 1 November 1928, the Grand National

Assembly tendered the new alphabet on a golden plaque to Mustafa Kemal on the first day of the new legislative session. And on 3 November the code, forbidding usage of old alphabet, effective as of the start of 1929, was promulgated in the official gazette. In the following days some exams were performed to check the ability of civil servants in the new alphabet (Lewis B., 1970, p. 277).

As I mentioned above, the argument for an “alphabet revolution” was that the Arabo-Farsi alphabet was not suitable for the Turkish language, because vowels in this alphabet were not significant to express the wealth of vowels in Turkish. The new alphabet brought a significant limitation to the pronunciation of Arabic- and Farsi-origin words. Thus, the gap between Turkish-origin and foreign-origin (namely, Arabic and Farsi) words grew increasingly wider (Sadoğlu, 2003). According to Uriel Heyd, the new alphabet, which was created according to Turkish vocal harmony, transformed turkized Arabic and Farsi words to different foreign elements (Heyd, 1954, p. 23). Therefore, the alphabet change gave Mustafa Kemal psychological grounds for purging vocabularies in the following years. Thus, by the end of 1928, the laic republic was established completely and consolidated its power. The only remaining issues that did not completely fit Kemalism only related to Turkish identity, citizenship, and history. The Turkish state became a republic because the sultanate was abolished and became in part laic because the caliphate was abolished. Thus, these two characteristics of the state showed its opposition to the past.

3.3. Transition to ethno-secular nationalism; from *Millet* to *Ulus*

3.3.1. The instrumentalization of history for the new identity

History gives people a consciousness by means of the past. It is not directly a collection of past events, but a source of meaning derived from them. Thus, historical consciousness influences our identity; at the same time identity shapes the way we investigate past events and creates a consciousness. Thus, this reciprocal situation is the factor affecting our perception of the future. That is to say, to determine the future of a group or a nation, one must first defining the past so-called history of this group or nation (Fazlıoğlu, 2014). History is an object lesson, a power, and a perception of the future. Because of that, history is a field where nationalists make

sense of themselves. They build the past according to their ideas. Thus, they can answer easily from a nationalist perspective the question of whether a nation is a produced or a continual identity. As Benedict Anderson explains, nationalist historians do not accept the modernity of nations but rather see nations as archaic phenomena (1993, p. 19). That is to say, nations existed in all historical periods but actually nationalism is not a process of self-consciousness of nations. Nationalists produce nation even if they do not exist (Anderson, 1993, p. 20). This shows how history is important for nationalists to prove the strength of the nation. Writing a history of a nation constitutes an important pillar of building a nation and identity. It is possible to see this effort in Turkey as well, from the late 1920s onward. Nationalist ideology needed to construct a ground for the nation in Turkey while implementing the principle of laicism to rescue the nation from having to sit on the grounds of religion. And this was realized by launching a movement to nationalize language and history (Oran, Atatürk Milliyetçiliği Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir İnceleme, 1988, p. 200).

It is possible to see this kind of historical perspective in Mustafa Kemal's *Nutuk*. In 1927, in the second anniversary of the establishment of his political party, the Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası¹ (Republican People's Party) Mustafa Kemal gave a long speech about events after 1919. Mustafa Kemal started his speech with the day he arrived in Samsun on 19 May 1919. *Nutuk* is one of the most significant official history books in Turkey. Mustafa Kemal laid the foundation in this speech for how the new Turkish historiography would be. Mustafa Kemal's statements show us what he thought about the Turkish nation and its history as follows:

En bariz ve en maddî ve en kat'î delâli tarihiyeye istinaden beyan edebiliriz ki, Türkler on beş asır evel Asyanın göbeğinde muazzam devletler teşkil etmiş ve insanlığın her türlü kabiliyatına tecelligâh olmuş bir unsurdur. Sefirlerini Çine gönderen ve Bizansın sefirlerini kabul eden bu Türk Devleti ecdadımız olan Türk milletinin teşkil eylediği bir devlettir. (Atatürk, 1969, p. 1240)

¹ Mustafa Kemal established the *Halk Fırkası* on September 9, 1923. After the establishment of the republic, the party's name became *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası* and lastly in the fourth party caucus in 1935 the name of the party was changed to *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*. *Fırka* (side, division, party) was an Arabic word. However, during Turkification of the vocabulary, the word *fırka* was abolished and *parti* was adopted instead. The problem here is that the term *parti* was not Turkish but French. A French origin word was set as Turkish instead of an Arabic word. Even this example can show us the character of the language reform in the 1930s.

This short paragraph contains the core of the *Türk tarih tezi* (Turkish history thesis) that would be declared in the following years. Firstly, Mustafa Kemal said that Turks established great states in the center of Asia fifteen centuries ago. Secondly, he added that this information constituted conclusive evidence. Thirdly, people of these countries developed all the abilities humanity would later possess, and these spread from there to other parts of the world. And lastly, the Turkish ancestors of the Turkish nation established this country. This paragraph shows us that Mustafa Kemal believed in the continuity of a nation and he brought evidence from fifteen centuries ago with the belief that there was a conclusive evidence of this. Actually, no such evidence existed. Moreover, he implied that the abilities of humanity appeared in this Turkish state and spread to other parts of the world from there. This idea was one of the claims of the Turkish history thesis. In the following year, a new historiography was built on these ideas and argued for the continuity, strength, and intelligence of the Turkish nation. Thus, an ethnic-based definition of identity was added to Turkish identity.

Ayşe Kadioğlu explains the situation and the reason why a new Turkish identity was needed as follows:

By 1930, it was generally agreed by the Republican elites that the reforms that were undertaken in the course of the 1920s had not taken root. This problem was to be remedied with further reforms from above that were geared towards creating a new Turk. The emerging new Turkish identity, then, was distinguished by its manufactured character. Turks were a “made” nation by virtue of emphasizing their difference from the Ottomans along the similar Jacobin lines that the French revolutionaries followed in creating the Frenchman. (Kadioğlu, 1996, p. 188)

“Kemalist” laicism was in an unconsummated situation to create a surrounding identity. This was a factor driving Kemalist nationalism to acquire an ethnic color. Kemalist laicism was weak among society and it was necessary to find a new ideal that would compete with ideal of Sharia and supplant it (Yıldız, 2001, p. 159). Islam had been the source of a common bond between Turkish people for centuries. However, the parallelism between people’s understanding and institutional system was broken after abolishment of the *ulema*, *tekkes*, and the caliphate. And lastly, after the removal of religion from the constitution, the institutional system of the so-

called state had to find a new common bond instead of religion. Society could not be expected to adopt the new identity spontaneously. The excitement and romantic content of the republic was extremely poor on a mass scale. Therefore, it failed to replace Islam as a unifying and mobilizing ideal. When the republic broke connections with the legitimizing soul of the *Milli Mücadele*, which was Islam, it had to find a new identity and soul to replace Islam. And these were self-referencing ideals (Yıldız, 2001, p. 160). Thus, an education system had to be adopted quickly to spread the new ideals. A quest for a new identity not associated with religion was one face of the program. The other side of it was about increasing the self-confidence of society and showing the abilities of the Turkish nation to the West.

There was a prevalent prejudice in Europe that saw the Turkish race a second-class race at that time. Republican elites created the Turkish history thesis and sun-language theory as a defense reflex to prove that Turks had served as midwives to all civilizations (Yıldız, 2001, p. 160). This face of the history thesis was a reflection of defense psychology. According to the republican elites, Turkishness and the Turkish race was seen as non-civilized, low-level characters. The history and language theses were incarnational forms of efforts to change the rude, barbarian, and backwards idea of Turkishness that most Westerners even some Turkish intellectuals held (Yıldız, 2001, p. 163). There was also a new state that tried to reach the level of modern civilization and embrace Western principles. Islam was seen as an obstacle for progress like Western orientalists. A modernization program was implemented with a laic path. Thus, according to the republican elites, Turkish society gained self-confidence. Therefore, Western ideas of Turks were prejudiced because Turks made a successful progress. Kemalist nationalism did not content itself with that much. It took a few steps forward and said that Turks, who were ancestors to all humanity, established great states in the pre-historical era. These Turks were the sources and inventors of all civilizations. Thus, all archaic civilizations such as the Sumerians, the ancient Egypt were of Turkish origin. Kemalist elites supported Turkish nationalism with pre-Islamic successes. Central Asia was chosen as the sources of the oldest successes of the Turkish nation. Pagan names such as Cengiz, Oktay, and Mete were spread among the children of Kemalist elites. Central Asian origin played important

role among the upper classes of the republican regime (Mardin, 2000'lere Doğru Kültür ve Din, 1991, p. 232).

The historical research that began under Mustafa Kemal's control, gave some results in 1928-29, and some were published in notes. The first institutive efforts in history research came from *Türk Ocakları* (Turkish Hearths) and *Tarih Tetkik Heyeti* (Investigation Committee for History), which was established in 1930. However, when the *Türk Ocakları* were abolished and joined the *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası* in 1931, this committee was transformed to the *Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti* (Investigation Society for Turkish History - TTTC), which was established with founders of the old institution (Ersanlı, 2003, p. 111). A new institution, which was controlled directly by the regime, was established after the abolition of the *Türk Ocakları*. This was an important step for the Kemalist regime in controlling the intellectual life. Thus, Kemalism was the only producer of historical discourse (Copeaux, 2006, p. 61).

Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları, which can be considered as the declaration of Turkish history thesis, was published in late 1930. The book focused almost entirely on prehistory and antiquity. The book explained how Turks civilized other parts of the world as they spread out from the motherland in Central Asia (Copeaux, 2006, p. 60). The book consisted of 607 pages and only 50 pages was about Ottoman history and 12 pages about Seljuk (*Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları*, 1930). This was also a sign of the glorification of the pre-Islamic sources of the new identity. There is a part in the introduction of the book that explained why this book was written. I quote a section from this article below:

Bu kitap muayyen bir maksat gözetilerek yazılmıştır. Şimdiye kadar memleketimizde neşrolunan tarih kitaplarının çoğunda ve onlara mehz olan fransızca tarih kitaplarında Türklerin dünya tarihindeki rolleri şuurlu veya şursuz olarak küçültülmüştür. Türklerin, kendi ecdatları hakkında böyle yanlış malumat alması, Türklüğün kendini tanımasında, benliğini inkişaf ettirmesinde zararlı olmuştur.... Bununla milletimizin yaratıcı kabiliyetinin derinliklerine giden yolu açmak, Türk deha ve seciyesinin esrarını meydana çıkarmak, Türkün hususiyet ve kuvvetini kendine göstermek ve milli inkişafımızın derin ırkî köklere bağlı olduğunu anlatmak istiyoruz. (*Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları*, 1930, p. 1)

As is seen, the book aimed to destroy some prejudices about Turkish history. These prejudices were obstacles for the development of a national identity, and revealing a Turks' intelligence and moral quality was the aim of the book. Moreover, according to the book, there was a bond between national development and racial origins. This shows us how the new identity bound together nation ethnicity. Thus, Kemalist historians instrumentalized racial themes and said that the brachycephalic Turkish race created the oldest civilization in the world. This race established the Egyptian, Anatolian, and Aegean civilizations. In other words, it was a European race (Yıldız, 2001, p. 182). This attitude was a reflection of both self-confidence and inferiority complex. A new national identity was established through the claim of being European and was increased national confidence. As mentioned before, with Binnaz Toprak's statement, the national identity of Kemalism imitated the West. Thus, the relationship established with European civilization proved the quality of the Turkish race according to Kemalists (p. 185).

Ayşe Afetinan, Mustafa Kemal's adopted daughter, wrote *Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler* (Civil Information for Citizen) in 1930. This book was taught in secondary and high schools. It both explains Mustafa Kemal's thought and how a Turkish citizen should be. In the chapter related to *millet*, it said that there was not any nation bigger, older, or purer than the Turkish nation, and that it was unprecedented in human history (Afetinan, 2000, p. 28).

To teach and spread the history thesis to society, thousands of pages of history books were written for secondary and high schools. As mentioned above, these books also explained myths from distant history and tried to create a common bond. The distant past was chosen because as the more distant the past the less discussion it would provoke. With school teachers' attendance the First Turkish History Congress was made in 1932 to introduce the history thesis (Ersanlı, 2003, p. 139). In parallel with the history thesis, further language reforms in line with the Sun-language theory were implemented.

Büşra Ersanlı scrutinizes how the understanding of the terms *millet* and *milliyetçilik* (nation and nationalism) underwent change by looking at the 1923, 1927, and 1931 guidelines of Mustafa Kemal's *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası*. Indigenizing Turkish culture was an inevitable necessity in the party guidelines of 1923. That is to say, the cultural definition of Turkishness was more important than citizenship at that time. National definition could not go further than a cultural togetherness. However, in 1927, new concepts were added to the guidelines such as *milli dayanışma* (national sovereignty), unity of language, and unity of ideals. The most important aim of the party was shown as improving Turkish language and culture. The *millet* was described in the guidelines of 1931 as a political and social whole that comprised linguistic, cultural, and ideal unity (Ersanlı, 2003, pp. 104-105). Adding that kind of a definition of *millet* to the party guideline and program shows us the increasing importance of language for being a nation.

3.3.2. Language Movements in the Light of the History Thesis

Millî his ile dil arasındaki bağ çok kuvvetlidir. Dilin millî ve zengin olması millî hissin inkişâfında başlıca müessirdir. Türk dili, dillerin en zenginlerindedir, yeter ki bu dil şuurla işlensin. Ülkesinin yüksek istiklâlini korumasını bilen Türk millet, dilini de yabancı diller boyunduruğundan kurtarmalıdır. (quoted in Korkmaz, 1963)

Mustafa Kemal wrote this on 2 September 1930 and Sadri Maksudi Arsal cited this on the first page of his book *Türk Dili İçin*. Mustafa Kemal mentions four issues in this paragraph. Two of them were the detection and the other two were signs for further language reforms. Firstly, he says the link between language and the national sentiment is very strong. Secondly, according to him language should be national for the development of national sentiment. Thus, as is seen, he saw a direct relation between nation and language. This understanding directed him and Kemalist elites to intervene in the Turkish language in order to create a national Turkish language. Thirdly, he gives signs and argues for the need to intervene in language. Therefore, he says language will encourage national sentiment, if language is processed consciously. And fourth, he gives a decision and says that the Turkish nation will clean its language from "foreign" elements. This discourse resembles the German nationalist philosopher Fichte's discourse. As I explained in the previous chapter,

German nationalism, and Fichte particularly, see a direct relation between nation and language. “Whenever a separate language was to be found there was also a separate nation, which had right to manage its all affairs and rule itself” (Wright S., 2004, p. 45). Fichte explains here how language determines the borders of a nation. Moreover, Kedourie quotes a different passage from Fichte’s book *Reden an die Deutsche Nation* (Addresses to the German Nation). According to this, Fichte describes the nation directly with language. “We give the name of people [nation] to men whose organs of speech have been influenced by the same external conditions, who live together and who develop their language in continuous communication with each other” (1961, p. 64). This shows how Turkish national identity was inclined to an ethnic, cultural, and linguistic basis rather than one based on citizenship or territory.

Mustafa Kemal used more striking statements in a speech in Adana in 1931. According to this, Turkish means language. If a person says he is Turkish, he or she should speak the Turkish language. A person who cannot speak Turkish cannot belong to the Turkish culture and community. Those who cannot speak Turkish can betray Turkish society. Therefore, they should be become true Turks who speak the Turkish language. Although they are Turkish citizens, they are not accepted as “real Turks” due to the fact that they do not speak Turkish. These statements show the borders of the Turkish nation. The ethnic borders of the identity dominated in the new process. To imply that not speaking Turkish could be a reason for betrayal was very risky and shows how far this relation between nation and language could go. Mustafa Kemal’s statements are as follows:

Türk demek dil demektir. Milliyetin çok bariz vasıflarından birisi dildir. Türk milletindenim diyen insanlar, her şeyden önce ve behemehâl Türkçe konuşmalıdır. Türkçe konuşmayan bir insan Türk harsına, camiasına mensubiyetini iddia ederse buna inanmak doğru olmaz. Halbuki Adana’da Türkçe konuşmayan 20.000’den fazla vatandaş vardır... Efendiler ! Herhangi bir felaketli gününüzde bu insanlar, başka dille konuşan insanlarla el ele vererek aleyhimize hareket edebilirler. Türk Ocaklarımızın başlıca vazifesi bu gibi unsurları, bizim dilimizi konuşan hakiki Türk yapmaya çalışmaktır. Bunlar Türk vatandaşlarıdır. (quoted in Akalın, 2005, p. 30)

According to the new discourse, language was the leading element that made the nation a nation. Become a nation, a group should first have a distinct language.

Language is the mirror of a nation's history and changes gradually like the society. Words from different languages can be added to languages in consequence of cultural transaction. However, nations that reached the level of national consciousness knew how to save their language against foreign languages (Korkmaz, 1963, p. 1). These arguments aimed to explain the following: Languages changes according to the cultural situation of society. Turkish society made a great change in the first ten years of the republic, so language should also change accordingly. It is natural to have some foreign words from other languages as a consequence of interaction. However, if a nation has a strong national consciousness, it will save its language from the intervention of foreign languages Therefore, The Turkish Republic and its rulers tried to strengthen the Turkish national consciousness and identity. Thus, the Turkish language will be cleaned off of intervention of foreign languages. Vecihe Hatipoğlu, who has some works defending Persian and Sumerian language as Turkish, also explains the dialectical connection between language and nation. According to her, strong nations have strong languages. Strong languages are the biggest factor in creating strong nations. The Turkish language was also strong, but only as long as it was processed consciously. Language constitutes and strengthens the national structure (1973, p. 12).

In parallel with the history thesis, language research was carried out. Language was also a part of the process, like history, of creating a new national identity. As is seen from the quotation above, Mustafa Kemal had already given signs of this creation in 1930. History and language were two coherent locomotives of the secular Turkish identity-building process. History meant investigating the past and dominating the future. Investigating, developing, and processing language meant developing and processing the future. Thus, these two issues and facts were questions of life and death (Hatiboğlu, 1973, p. 12). Furthermore, Afetinan articulates in *Medeni Bilgiler* that the Turkish language is a holy treasure for the Turkish nation and its heart and mind. The Turkish language, according to her, is the key point that saves elements of Turkish nation such as ethics, tradition, and interest (Afetinan, 2000, p.29).

A national language is supposed to provide a variety of functions. A national language should provide vertical and lateral communications in a country. That is to say, regardless of geographic origin and societal status, all members of the nation should understand and speak this language. A national language should reflect the nation and should embody in itself the nation, and national language should bear the trace of the nation (Thiesse, 2010, p. 160). However, the process in Turkey did not fit this description. Language reforms in Turkey did not aim at overlapping history, tradition, and language. Instead, they drove a wedge between them and brought and created a new common bond from the distant past. Baskın Oran both supports and rejects Thiesse's arguments as follows: Language reform aimed at two things. Firstly, decreasing language origin discriminations of village-city and lower-upper strata and creating a nation and national unity through this implementation. Secondly, ensuring strictly detachment of young generations from Ottoman political and cultural tradition by putting Turkish origin words instead of Arabo-Farsi words (Oran, Atatürk Milliyetçiliği Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir İnceleme, 1988, p. 202). Kemalist elites wanted to provide a national language that could be understood by everyone, and that broke all ties to recent history.

How was the process implemented? Mustafa Kemal assembled a meeting with the participation of A. Afetinan, Samih Rifat, Akçuraoğlu Yusuf, Sadri Maksudi, and Ruşen Eşref on the last day of the first history congress on 11 July 1932 in Çankaya. And Kemal opened the establishment of an association for discussion. At the end of the meeting, it was decided to establish an association named *Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti* (Investigation Society for Turkish Language, TDTC hereafter) (Sadoğlu, 2003, p. 235). There were mainly two aims in establishing a language society. Firstly, the simplification of the Turkish language, creating a harmony between the spoken and written languages, and determining the rules of the Turkish language. Secondly, investigating dead languages that have value for historical documents and making philological comparisons (İnan, 1959, p. 294). However, Soner Çağaptay explains the establishment of this society through different arguments. According to him, the *Türk Tarih Tetkik Cemiyeti* wanted to prove that Turkish was the mother language of great civilizations. Thus, the *Tarih Cemiyeti* established the TDTC for this mission.

Moreover, Atatürk believed that Turkish and Indo-European languages were relatives and that Turkish was the origin of these languages. TDTC would do research how Turkish was the mother tongue of Sumerian, Egyptian, and Etruscan civilizations. Thus, this would prove that Turkish was the most effective factor in the evolution and the advancement of all the world languages (Çağaptay, 2006, p. 50). During the entire process, this association, so called society, was directed by political elites. This was different from Western associations with similar aims such as the *Académie française*. It directed language with prestige rather than a political influence and functioned conservatively (Sadoğlu, 2003, p. 237). However, the TDTC and *Türk Dil Kurumu* (Turkish Language Association) later had revolutionary characters.

The first Turkish language congress was held between 26 September and 6 October 1932. The TDTC had been founded just two months earlier. However, the language congress was held fast and declarations were presented. The declarations and discussions were mainly suitable to the abovementioned principles and the Turkish history thesis (Korkmaz, 1963, p. 54). However, some antithetical opinions were also presented such as those of Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın). What Hüseyin Cahit told on the first day of the congress had a great impact on participants. Mustafa Kemal, who watched developments from the loge, brought Samih Rifat, despite the fact that he was ill, to corroborate the republican elites' thesis. Hüseyin Cahit actually was not against the change of language, but he was against the intervention of the state. According to him, language would simplify on its own in time. There was no need for state intervention (Sadoğlu, 2003, p. 238).

The chief of the TDTC was Samih Rifat. He defended for years that there was a kinship between Turkish and Indo-European languages. This assertion was a product of a coping mechanism of Kemalist elites, because it helped the idea that the Turkish language was not undeveloped and that was it even the ancestor of European languages. Either it must be admitted that the Turkish language was the ancestor of Indo-European languages, so that the injustices to Turkish would be resolved easily, or Turkish should be accepted as a natural member of this family (Aytürk, 2013, p. 104). When Samih Rifat attended the congress in spite of his illness to advocate the

Kemalist thesis against Hüseyin Cahit's declaration, he repeated these arguments. Samih Rifat's arguments contained the whole infrastructure of the Sun-Language theory that became famous in 1935-1936. According to İlker Aytürk, the Sun-Language theory was wrongfully attributed to Feodor Kvergić. In point of fact, Samih Rifat's thesis in the congress was predecessor of the Sun-Language theory, but because he died shortly after the congress, establishing a connection between him and the Sun-Language theory did not occur until much later (Aytürk, 2013, p. 105). I will come back to this subject below.

After the end of the first language congress, the board of directors of the TDTC prepared a work program. This program laid out the subsequent projects of the TDTC. According to the program, the Turkish language would be turned into a complete instrument of national culture. Foreign words would be purged from the written language, and a national language whose basic elements were *öz Türkçe* (pure Turkish) would be created. To achieve these goal, a Turkish dictionary would be prepared and scientific terminology would be determined so as not to fall behind the West (Türk Dili, 1933, s. 1-2).

After the TDTC established its center in Ankara, the committee prioritized investigation of word compilations (*derleme*) from folk speech. Governors in cities, *kaymakams* in districts, and directors of schools and teachers in schools embarked upon this word compilation as a duty in accordance with a guide prepared by the committee. All words would be written as vouchers and sent to district centers, then to cities and then to Ankara. All vouchers would be checked by the TDTC and would be brought into force. Word compilation was started in early 1933 and approximately 130.000 vouchers were accumulated in 19 months in Ankara (Levend, 1949, p. 368). These words were accumulated to use as the equivalents of Arabic and Farsi words. Furthermore, word scanning (*tarama*) was started from books of local and foreign Turcologists and classical Turkish books to find equivalents for Arabic and Farsi words. At the end of this investigation 125,000 vouchers were collected, and it was published as *Osmanlıcadan Türkçeye Söz Karşılıkları: Tarama Dergisi* in 1934 (Sadoğlu, 2003, p. 244). On the other hand, lots of neologisms were artificially produced as if a game

with words and derivational affixes of Turkic languages such as Uigur, Chagatai, Kazakh, and Turkomen to reach *öz Türkçe*. The aim was to use these artificial words as substitutes for Arabic and Farsi words that had been used for hundreds of years and that were firmly entrenched in social memory.

The second Turkish language congress was conducted in 1934. As a result of compilation and scanning efforts, *öz Türkçe* words started to be replaced instead of “foreign words.” The committee itself also took part in this implementation. The word *tetkik* (A) and *cemiyet* (A) were changed to *araştırma* and *kurum* respectively. Thus, the name of the committee became *Türk Dili Araştırma Kurumu*. And the name of the TDTC was changed to *Türk Dil Kurumu* in 1936 (Turkish Language Society, TDK hereafter) (Lewis G. , Turkish Language Reform A Catastrophic Success, 1999, p. 45).

The republican elites argued for the oldness of the Turkish race and tried to prove it with the Turkish history thesis in the early 30s. Along the same line, Kemalists claimed the same thesis for the Turkish language in parallel with the history thesis. According to them, the Turkish language was the ancestor of all languages in the world. They attributed this thesis to a philological base and the Sun-language theory arose from this point of view. Efforts to find Turkish equivalents to “foreign words” perpetually continued. However, the situation had come to such a point that everybody wrote articles with words they excursively found. Thus, sometimes articles would only be understood by their own writers. Some found equivalents even for Turkish words. There was an opinion on the necessity of a linguistic philosophy to get rid of this situation. The Sun-language theory was a product of this pursuit (Levend, 1949, p. 393).

Hermann Feodor Kvergić, a Viennese philologist, wrote *La psychologie de quelques Éléments des Langues Turques* by utilizing Freud’s psychoanalysis to investigate the Turkish language and sent this book to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk² in 1935. According to

² In accordance with law no. 2525 that was accepted on 21 June 1934, all Turkish citizens had to adopt a surname. Five months after this law, in accordance with law no. 2587, Atatürk was given as a surname to Mustafa Kemal. The law did not mention Mustafa but only Kemal as

this, cultural words spread from the Turkish language in the Stone and Metal Ages to other languages in the world. Thus, they concluded that there was no need to purge words from the language, because they could be originally Turkish. In this direction, a lot of words were explained through a Turkish base. For example, etymology of the word *botanik* (botany, Greek origin) was explained with *bitki* (herb). *Bitki* and *botanik* were phonetically similar, so this was a proof for them. Etymology of the term *termal* (thermal, Latin origin) was explained with the word *ter* (sweat) (Levend, 1949, p. 394). Thus, there was no need to expend energy to find a Turkish equivalent for these kind of words. The number of these so-called philological works—seemingly a game—climbed into the thousands. As with the history thesis, the Sun-language theory was also an effort both to supersede and to join the West. That is to say, Kemalists on the one hand argued that Turkish was the ancestor and source of Western languages, while on the other hand they showed the kinship of Turkish society and language with the West and Western languages.

The source of the Sun-language theory was mostly seen as Kvergić. However, İlker Aytürk articulates the following by utilizing the archives of the TDK. In a letter to Tahsin Mayatepek, İbrahim Necmi Dilmen wrote that the Sun-language theory “was a brilliant discovery, roused in the grand genius of Our Exalted Leader by the Institute’s years-long preparations on linguistic data” (Aytürk, H.F. Kvergić and the Sun-Language Theory, 2009, p. 30). According to Aytürk, this linguistic theory might have been created by Atatürk. Thus, the language theory, which seemed as a scientific work, was perhaps a political decision and that strained credulity. The probability that Mustafa Kemal created this theory personally strengthens the thesis that Kemalists went to all lengths to create a nation on behalf of their wishes. In

his first name. According to the law, no one after Kemal Atatürk could take Atatürk as a first name or surname. However, with the effect of the Sun-language theory, Yusuf Ziya Özer and Naim Hazım Onat persuaded Atatürk that the name Kemal passed to Arabic from Turkish and its original form was Kamâl. Kamâl meant castle in Turkish. Atatürk used his name in this form in a telegram that he sent for a language feast on 3 February 1935. Moreover, in the CHP Congress in 1935 Kamalizm was used instead of Kemalizm (Sadoğlu, 2003, p. 252). Mustafa Kemal’s national ID card can be seen in Anıtkabir in this form.

Tomasz Kamusella's words, this theory was an extreme kind of linguistic nationalism and it subsided after Mustafa Kemal's death in 1938 (2009, p. 267).

The Turkish language experienced a corpus planning at the hands of the state and republican elites. I explained the types of language planning in the previous chapter. Corpus planning was implemented in Israel and Germany as well. Turkish language nationalism was similar to both these examples. Israel resurrected an alphabet that was not used by society. However, this can be more understandable than the Turkish case, because Hebraic alphabet was the alphabet of Jews. Considering the Turkish language, the Latin script seems rather imported. On the other hand, the center of lingual nationalism was Germany. This inclined German nationalism toward ethnic nationalism. Determining the border of nation mainly with language constituted an important period of Turkish nationalism whose character underwent change in a short period.

I explained how the Turkish language was instrumentalized by the Kemalist regime to create a national identity outside of religion. Since religion was a fact that determined a position for individuals and the society, there was a need to change the social bond to complete the bureaucratic and systematic changes that were implemented after 1924. Some examples from this period would show how these changes served the purpose of building a nation and an identity.

In Ramadan 1932 (January), it was decided by the regime to recite the call to prayer in Turkish. This practice was without precedent in the history of Islam. The call to prayer had been recited in Arabic for centuries. However, the Kemalist regime intended to change the language of worship to Turkish in order to restrain the religion and its unmanipulable strictness. However, the Turkish call to prayer was not easy to settle among believers and religious officials. On 3 February 1932, the Turkish call to prayer was recited from the Ayasofya Mosque and nationwide recitation was planned after the first Turkish language congress (Ayhan & Uzun, 1995, p. 39). The other pillars of this project were a Turkish Quran and Turkish prayers. The project of Turkish worship contained a number of matters in itself. It served the nation building project

through language policy and bringing religion under control. Thus, the Kemalist regime wanted to enjoy the best of both worlds. Reciting the call to prayer in Turkish continued until the time of the Democrat Party. Reciting the call to prayer in Arabic was resumed before Ramadan in 1950 (Ayhan & Uzun, 1995, p. 41).

Making *öz Türkçe* out of Arabic and Farsi words that had been used for centuries, and which were expressed as foreign words during this period, caused a transition in the semantic world of the language. Connotations of words and layers of meaning changed and disappeared in this manner. The maturation of the language was not left to its natural course. Instead, it was obtrusively made by language planners such as Kemalist elites and the state. Words that were being used lost their histories and neologisms and words that lacked social validity were inserted instead. For example, the word *ahlak* (Arabic origin) has a religious connotation and means “innate peculiarity, natural disposition, and character of a person” (Cowan, 1976, p. 258). In addition to this religious base, the word means morality and ethics. The equivalent that TDK gave to *ahlak* is *aktöre* and *sağtöre* (Büyük Türkçe Sözlük, 2016). The word *töre* belongs to the social life of pre-Islamic Turks and its layers of meaning come mainly from social order, tradition, and customs. That is to say, it has a social rather than a religious base. This shows that these two terms belong to different semantic worlds. However, Kemalist elites gave *aktöre* and *sağtöre*—which were produced from *töre*—as equivalents to the term *ahlak*, which basically referred to a character and morality from disposition—. Thus, *ahlak* underwent a semantic restriction and assumed a tradition-originated ethics, and became a secular word by being stripped of its metaphysical base. The word *kader* (A) also has an Islamic connotation and basically means “divine foreordainment, predestination, and fate” (Cowan, 1976, p. 746). However, the TDK gave *yazgı* as the equivalent. In Turkish *Yaz-mak* means to write and the word *yazgı* was produced from this origin. It is possible that it was considered appropriate because of the term *alın yazısı* (forehead script), that means destiny as well.

The examples I gave above can be augmented. However, when all these efforts to build a new identity, a common bond, and a new state are considered, the soul of

these implementations can be understood through the change of the name of the identity. It is about how the new identity determines itself. I have attempted to describe the character of Turkish identity until the abolition of the caliphate, after which republican elites filled the identity with secular elements. Finally, I explained the transformation and tendency of identity from a religious base to a more ethnic base after 1929. The history thesis and language reform were implemented for this aim in the following year. The main purpose here was to build a nation independent from religion and recent history. Because these had an impact on society, republican elites had to get rid of powers such as religion, language, and history in order to steer society in the direction of their requests. Being able to achieve this goal meant a victory over the recent past and religion. Thus, everything connoted by these two phenomena was blurred or taken off the agenda. Kemalist elites wanted to build a nation but the Turkish equivalent of the term nation had both religious and historical connotations. The term *millet* was the equivalent of this term and during the language reform it changed to *ulus*. In the next phase of the study I will scrutinize and compare the conceptual history these two terms.

3.4. Politization of a Religious Term; History of *Millet*

Hebrew word מלל (*melel*) means to speak (Clines, 2011, p. 328). And מילה (*mila*) means word and statement. The word millet ملة forms from Arabic letters of م ل ل (m-l-l) and is from word stem of املى (*imlâ*), to dictate. From this base, the word *millet* was used as equivalent of religion in respect to dictating something heard and read. Moreover, the word means “path” as well (Şentürk, 2005, p. 64).

The term *millet* was used fifteen times in the Quran and mostly as composition of *millet-i İbrahim* (Şentürk, 2005, p. 64) and it is translated as the creed of Abraham (4:125) in English (Badawi & Abdul Haleem, 2008, p. 895). Moreover, the term was used as the precise religion (2:128) or while stating religion of Jews and Christians (2:120) (Yusuf-Ali, 1937, pp. 50-54).

Ottoman society was constituted mainly on the basis of religion, and the status of individuals was determined according to their religions. Society was divided into

*millet*s according to branches of religions and this type of usage of the term was available in Ottoman literature from the classical era onward. Millets were arrayed hierarchically and rights varied from millet to millet. Muslims were considered as one millet and they were dominant (*millet-i hakime*) over other millets. In addition to this, the hierarchy continued with the Rum, Armenian, and Jewish millets respectively. These names that indicate nations today were used for religious groups in that time. Bulgarians and Greeks were under the Rum millet. The concept of *millet* never designated an ethnic or linguistic groups. It was a cultural and administrative concept that designated a religious group (Eryılmaz, 1992, p. 11). However, a critical literature has developed in the last twenty years around this classical understanding of the *millet* system. Some historians allege that the *millet* system was not visible contrary to common opinion. According to this argument, the word *millet* was used in the nineteenth century as an autonomous structure and *taife* was the term used for non-Muslim groups. Macit Kenanoğlu investigates these discussions in his book *Osmanlı Millet Sistemi: Mit ve Gerçek*. According to his explanation, *taife* and *millet* were sometimes used instead of one another, and he adds the usage of *millet* in the classical era (Kenanoğlu, 2007, p. 44-56). There were differences in the groups for which the term *millet* was used. These usages highlights the religious nature of the *millet* system. For example, even all Armenians were not considered just one millet in the Ottoman Empire. The Gregorians were considered as Armenians, while Catholics were considered as Catholics. These two groups were organized as different millets (Ortaylı, 2005, p. 66). There is not any direct equivalent in English of the term millet in this sense.

This situation can be traced in Ottoman dictionaries as well, even though millet started to be used as equivalent of nation in the Ottoman literature. Şemseddin Sami's *Kamus-i Türkî* gives religion and denomination as equivalents of millet (1901, p. 1400). Then he adds that religion and millet are the same. Furthermore, Muallim Naci's dictionary *Lugat-ı Naci* explains millet in the same way as Sami (1901, p. 831).

A non-religious meaning was acquired by *millet* in the second half of the nineteenth century. However, the secularized meaning of the word at first existed only in

dictionaries (Yıldız, 2001, p. 50). There were different words in Ottoman Turkish for the term nation, such as *cins*, *kavim*, *ümmet*, *millet*, and *ahali*. This was a source of debate among intellectuals. Ahmet Cevdet Paşa and Kaninpaşazade Rifat Bey used the term *kavim* for nation. On the other hand, Ali Suavi translated it as *ümmet*. Ali Suavi wanted to call Ottoman society as a nation. This translation was adopted and the term *ümmet* was used in Ottoman Turkish at first (Türköne, 1991, p. 258). However, for intellectuals who preferred *millet* for nation, religion was a common bond to homogenize and to bind under a feeling of common interest (Yıldız, 2001, p. 51). Therefore, *millet* was more suitable to homogenize the society due to its connotation. This constituted a vagueness between *millet* and *ümmet* after a while.

Şemseddin Sami discussed this topic in his dictionary *Kamus-i Türkî*. Under the *millet* entry he explains his views. According to him, *millet* states a religious group and it covers more people than *ümmet*. The phrase *ümmet-i İslamiye* is wrong for him. The correct phrase should be *millet-i İslamiye*. Saying *Türk milleti* is also not correct, so *Türk ümmeti* should be said, because *millet-i İslamiye* constitutes different Muslim elements and ethnic groups (Sami, *Kamus-i Türkî*, 1901, p. 1400). The dictionary of *Lugat-i Naci* also makes the same explanation under the *millet* entry. According to this dictionary as well, *ümmet* should be used for the term nation (Naci, 1901, p. 831). However, in a different dictionary that Şemseddin Sami prepared from French to Ottoman Turkish, *Kamus-i Fransevi*, he translates nation as *ümmet*, *kavim*, and *taife*. He adds *millet* parenthetically to the entry. Moreover, he translates the term “national” as *millî* with derivation from *millet* (Sami, *Kamus-i Fransevi*, 1886, p. 429-430). Although he prefer *ümmet* for the first equivalent, he translates national as *millî*. These discussion of the period affected the perception of our understanding today as well. The vagueness of *millet* and *ümmet* is available in today’s usage. There is a misperception that *ümmet* covers more people than *millet*. The opposite of Şemseddin Sami’s explanation is very common among people today.

At the end of all discussions, *millet* was accepted and used as equivalent of “nation” in Ottoman literature. Redhouse’s dictionary, 1884, gives *millet* as the first equivalent for nation and does not use *millet* for religion or religious groups (1884, p. 529).

According to Türköne, the main tendency of Ottoman intellectuals was to use *millet*. Ottoman intellectuals believed that religious ties were sources of common history and interest. *Millet* had religious connotations and because of that, it was in demand in dictionaries as well. And *ümmet* stayed on the sidelines. The word *millet* alone stated *millet-i İslam* and this changed to *Türk milleti*. However, this change was about content of the concept. *Millet* still retained its connotation (Türköne, 1991, p. 261). This perception was blurred systematically after the abolishment of the caliphate.

I explained how the borders of the Turkish identity and the term *millet* was apropos of Islam until 1924 in the beginning of this chapter. This situation makes more sense when considered in the light of the abovementioned conceptual history of *millet*. However, the history of the Turkish Republic affected the history of words as well. The alterations in the political system and daily life influenced and change the gradation of words' layers of meanings. Some words lost some meanings and gained different meanings. This is natural development in the process of a language. However, the implementations took place differently in Turkey due to language reforms. The term *millet* also received its share from these policies and *ulus* started to be used instead. I will scrutinize the history of the concept *ulus* in the next phase of this chapter. I will cover its etymology, usage in pre-Islamic period, Ottoman usage, and reproduction.

3.5. Resuscitation of a Term: Variable History of *Ulus*

While all Arabic and Farsi words were being purged from Turkish, efforts to find a new equivalent for the term *millet* also continued. For *millet*, *Tarama Dergisi* offered eight possibilities. However, the Mongolian pronunciation of the Turkish *uluş* was chosen. According to Geoffrey Lewis, this was a wrong horse. Mongolians used this term to define a confederation of peoples. By the 14th century the Turks had taken this term back with its Mongolian form *ulus* and it was used until the seneteenth century (1999, p. 56).

3.4.1. Etymology of the Term

Before explaining how the term was adopted in the mid-1930s by the TDTC, I will present its etymology and usage in the pre-Islamic period. Sir Gerard Clauson's *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth Century Turkish* has the most detailed explanation. Clauson gives the term as *uluş*, not as *ulus*. "Originally it meant country in a geographical sense, but it began to be associated with the names of cities, and by eleventh century in some languages it meant "city" rather than "country"" (Clauson, 1972, p. 152). However, the word passed to Mongolian and due to Mongolian phonetics the word became *ulus* and it acquired a political meaning rather than a geographic one. It was used for people under the rule of Mongolian Çingis' sons as well. For example, the *ulus* of Çağatay. That is to say, it meant a "confederation of peoples." Ferdinand Lessing defines *ulus* (улс) in his Mongolian English dictionary as "people, nation, country, state, empire, and dynasty" (Lessing, 1960, p. 873). These equivalents are in contemporary usage. However, it still has a geographic sense and, as is seen, *ulus* is used as nation in Mongolian as well. Radloff gives *narod* (Russian), *das Volk* (German) (peoples) as the first equivalent for *ulus* (улс) in his etymological dictionary (Radloff, 1893, p. 1696). Peoples were divided into tribes (*aymağ*), tribes into clans (*boy*), and clans into families (*uruğ*) (Clauson, 1972). The term passes in the old inscriptions for example as *buxarak uluş* (the country of Bokhariots), *burxanlar uluşı* (the country of the Buddhas), *Cinadés uluş* (the country of China). Being a topic I will discuss further, *budun* and *ulus* are confluent terms. Clauson gives an example if both used side by side: *uluş bodun* (the people of the country). As is seen, *uluş* has a geographical meaning and *bodun* indicates people. Terms changed their meanings in time. The term passes in a different example as follows: *uluğ Monkol uluş beg* (beg of the great Mongol empire). The term had territorial meaning in this example as well. The term meant village in some languages such as Çigil. Mahmud Kashgari also gives the term as village in his dictionary *Dîvânü Lütagtî't-Türk*. According to his dictionary, *uluş*, not *ulus*, meant village in the Çigil dialect. And he adds that *uluş* meant city in the dialect of Balāsāgun and its neighbor the country of Argu (Mahmûd, 2005, p. 621). According to Clauson, the term meant country of people in the sense of a political unit under a ruler in the

Ottoman Empire between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries and sometimes as tribe in the seventeenth century (Clauson, 1972, p. 153).

Etymological dictionaries written in Turkish have different explanations. Hasan Eren gives *ulus* as *aşiret* (clan) and *halk* (people) (1999, p. 422). *Ulus* means *halk* (people) in the Tuva language. Eren adds how the last letter of the term became –s from –ş in Mongolian. And he says that the *ulut* (үлүт) form of the term came from Mongolian form. Starting with Mongolian invasions, the term spread across Turkish lands as *ulus* again. And the term passed to Farsi as *ulūs* (Eren, 1999, p. 422). However, İsmet Zeki Eyüpoğlu explains *ulus* in his etymological dictionary differently from common expression. He claims that *ulus* comes from old Turkish word *ülüş* (Eyüboğlu, 1998). *Ülüş* means portion and share. No other etymological dictionary explain the term in this way. Clauson, for example, does not mention a similarity between these two words. Bedros Kerestedjian took *ülüş* to his etymological dictionary as اولوش, but he did not mention *ulus* (Kerestedjian, 1912, p. 64). The word *ulus* and *ülüş* were written similarly in Ottoman Turkish. *Ulus* is اولوس and *ülüş* is اولوش. This similarities can be the cause of the explanation. Şemseddin Sami's *Kamus-i Türkî* has *ulus* as an entry. He explains *ulus* as *tribe*, *ümme*, and a bigger group of people than *aşiret* (clan). As I already explained, Sami used the term *ümme* for nation. It is a considerable translation, if he used *ümme* with the same meaning for *ulus*. Because if it is so, Sami would be the first man to translate *ulus* as nation. Then he adds *ulus* divided into *il*, *il* into *oymak* (phratry), *oymak* into *uruk* (family) (Sami, *Kamus-i Türkî*, 1901, p. 223).

How is the term *ulus* used in classical Turkic books and sagas? The term *ulus* is passed nineteen times in *Maaday-Kara*, an Altaic saga from South Siberia (Gürsoy-Naskali, 1995). The saga was written in Altai Turkish and the term was used to mean “peoples” and “everyone” in the saga. For example, *bastıra ulus kaykaşkadıy* (everyone is an admirer) (Gürsoy-Naskali, 1995, p. 38) or *bastıra ulus bu süündi* (all peoples rejoiced) (p. 174). *Ulus* is used in the form of *ulus* twenty eight times in the *Kutadgu Bilig*, Karahanid Turkish Yusuf Has Hacib of Balasagun, in the sense of village or city (Arat, 1979, p. 494). The term is used in the Orkhon inscriptions, which are among the most important old Turkish written works. The inscriptions were written in the early eighth

century and are located within the borders of Mongolia. The term *ulus* is written in the inscriptions as *uluş*. *Ulus* is used in the north side of the Kül Tigin monument as “kuriya kün batsıkdaki Sogd Berçik er Bukarak uluş budunda Enik sengün Oğul Tarkan kelti (*Batıda gün batısındaki Soğd, İranlı, buhara ülkesi halkından Enik general, Oğul Tarkan geldi*) (Ergin, 1970, p. 59) which means general Enik and Oğul Tarkan who are from people of Sughd, Iranian, and Bokhariots countries came from the west at sunset. This example was given by Clauson, and in it *ulus* means country in a geographical sense.

What is of interest here is the confusion between *budun* and *uluş*. In the pre-Islamic period, these two terms had different meanings and were not interchangeable. According to Clauson, *budun* (originally *bodun*) was used “for an organized tribal community, a people, in the sense of a community ruled by a particular ruler” (1972, p. 306). *Budun* is maybe the most frequently used term in the inscriptions. It is possible to see multiple instances of the word as *Türk budun* in the inscriptions. *Türk budun* means Turk people: Clauson gives this phrase as *Türkü budun*, or *Türkü* people. While *budun* had a meaning about human groups, *ulus* had a geographical sense. Considering the time that the inscriptions were written, there was not a misunderstanding between these terms. However, when there was an effort to find an *öz Türkçe* equivalent for *millet*, there was a debate about whether to use *budun* or *ulus*. Muharrem Ergin, who translated the Orkhon inscriptions to modern Turkish, translates *budun* as *millet* (Ergin, 1970).

3.4.2. Ottoman Usage of the Term

I have already mentioned that the term *uluş* entered Turkish usage after the Mongolian invasions in the form of *ulus*. Etymological dictionaries say that the term was used, albeit rarely, in Ottoman Turkish between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the scanning investigations that were carried out by the TDK on books written after the thirteenth century, the term *ulus* was found in books between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries. The investigations were published as *Tarama Sözlüğü* by the TDK. *Tarama sözlüğü* made the archeology of the term in Ottoman

Turkish as follows (XIII. Yüzyıldan Beri Türkiye Türkçesiyle Yazılmış Kitaplardan Toplanan Tanıklarıyla Tarama Sözlüğü, 1972, p. 3955-3956):

Yine dönmedim ya'ni namustan

Yol azdim irak düştüm ulustan. (XIV, p. 239)

These verses belong to *Süheyl ü Nevbahar* as translated by Hoca Mesut in the fourteenth century. Dehri Dilçin scanned the book. *Ulus* means country and homeland.

Kanı ulus, kanı şehir ile diyar

Kanı mülk ü kanı il, kanı hisar. (XIV-XV, p. 515)

Ulus was given with the words "city" and "region" in the *İskendername* written by Şair Ahmedî in 1389. Turkish-language teacher Hicri Göncel scanned this book. *Ulus* had a geographical sense here in this book as well.

1) İlde, ulusda her ki boyun hana sunmadı

Sultan yaşağı oldur anı han esir eder (XV, p. 140)

2) İl, ulus ve memleket tutmak ulu iştir. (XV, p. 18)

3) Bezendi il ü gün anda tamamı

İle ulusa düştü şadmanî (XVI, p. 144)

Ahmed-i Dâ'i was a Germiyanid poet in the fifteenth century. The first example belongs to his *Divan*. Turkish-language teacher Nurettin Koç scanned this book for the TDK. The second quotation belongs to *Tarih-i Âl-i Selçuk*, which was translated by Yazıcıoğlu Ali in the fifteenth century. This book was scanned by Kilisli Rifat Bilge. And the third example is from Diyarbakırlı Şerifî's translation of Firdewsi's *Şehname* in the sixteenth century. This book was also scanned by Kilisli Rifat Bilge. *Ulus* was used in all examples here with the term *il* (country). It is understood from this that the term was used in a geographical and political sense in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. *Ulus*, furthermore, passes in *Hikmetname* by Antepli İbrahim bin Bâli' (fifteenth century), and in a translation of *Gülşen-i Raz* by Şeyh Elvan Şirazi (fifteenth century) as well.

1) Uluslar: hem kabildir, sebepler: hem vesildir (XVII, p. 43)

2) Ulus: halk ü aşirettir, çeri sınımak: hezimettir (XVII, p. 71)

3) Halkı ekser ulus kavmi konar göçer evli taifedir (XVII, p. 252)

The first and the second examples were taken from the Arabic-Turkish dictionary *Cevâhir-ül Kelimât*, which was written by a man named Şemsi in the seventeenth century. This book was scanned by Turkish-language teacher Atif Tüzüner for the TDK. These examples are different from the previous ones, because *ulus* indicates here a group of people directly. The examples express *ulus* as “clan” and “tribe.” The third example is from Katip Çelebi’s *Cihannüma*, 1654, and was scanned by Kilisli Rifat Bilge.

El-heltat: yurttan yurda konup göçer olan taife-i insaniye denir ki göçer evli ta’bir olunur. Türkmenler ulus ta’bir ederler (XVIII-XIX, 1, p. 335)

Antepli Mütercim Ahmet Asım translated Mecdüddin Firuzâbâdi’s fifteenth-century dictionary *el Kâmus’ül-Muhît* in the very early nineteenth century. This book says that Turkmens called migrant settler groups as *ulus*. This book was scanned by Velet İzbudak. It is seen that with the seventeenth century, *ulus* acquired a meaning about human groups, and lost its territorial meaning.

On the other hand, the TDK also prepared a dictionary to show how words were used in folk speech around Turkey. An *ulus* entry was also available in this dictionary, which was published as *Türkiye’de Halk Ağzından Derleme Sözlüğü*. According to this, firstly, *ulus* was found in Lapseki, Çanakkale with the meaning of *göçebe* (nomad). This meaning shows similarity with the entry in the abovementioned 19th-century dictionary. Secondly, *ulus* was found in Maraş with the meaning of *oba* (nomad group or camping side). And lastly, it was encountered in Bergama, İzmir with the meaning of *aşiret*, or *kavim* (clan, tribe) (*Türkiye’de Halk Ağzından Derleme Sözlüğü*, 1993, p. 4035). As is seen in the examples, *ulus* mostly referred to tribe at that time. This understanding started with the seventeenth century, because it had a territorial meaning before that. And moreover, as I mentioned above, Şemseddin Sami translated *ulus* as “tribe” and as a group of people bigger than an *aşiret* (clan). That is to say that, when the Turkish Republic was founded and while the language policies were being implemented, the term *ulus* had these layers of meaning.

3.4.3. A Concept in Operating Room: The Revitalization of *Ulus*

The TDTC started publishing the journal *Türk Dili* (Turkish Language) in April 1933. This journal was the media organ of the TDTC and explained and presented the program and plans for the future investigations of the organization. It had a section devoted to French translation as well. Furthermore, *Türk Dili* had some parts that offered new translations for Arabic and Farsi words. These parts were created by investigating old classical Turkish books. The etymology commission of the TDTC undertook this investigation. Hasan Âli (Yücel) was the head of this commission. According to the explanation of the society in the journal, the first job was to investigate concepts associated with military and administrative terminology. There was a list of words found in *Kitab-ül İdrak Li Lisan-il Etrak* in the first issue of the journal. Hasan Âli listed words that might be alternative for old terminologies. He offered and recommended *öz Türkçe* words instead of Arabic and Farsi terms by investigating this book. The second issue of the journal was published in June 1933 and Hasan Âli offered military and administrative terms from Gokturk inscriptions that were published by V. Thomsen and W. Radlov in this issue. Here Hasan Âli gives *budun* as an equivalent to *millet*. He makes this investigation from Radlov's Tonyukuk inscription. Curiously enough, he investigates *ulus* as well as *ulus* from Thomsen's Orkhon inscriptions. However, the term *ulus* was given here as "tribe" (*kavim, kabile*) (Türk Dili, 1933, pp. 37-40). It can be understood from this that Hasan Âli offered *budun* instead of *millet*. According to his investigations *ulus* indicated a smaller group than *budun*. In the third issue of the journal, word scanning was made by Mehmet Şükrü (Akkaya). He investigated the first comprehensive dictionary of Turkic language, Mahmud Kashgari's *Dîvâvü Lügati't-Türk*. *Budun* was given instead of *millet* according to Mehmet Şükrü's list as well (Türk Dili, 1933, pp. 45-51).

The TDTC published the fifth issue of *Türk Dili* in April 1934. The term *budun* was used in this issue while mentioning the Turkish nation (Türk *budunu*) (Türk Dili, 1934, pp. 20-23). It can be seen that *ulus* was still not used as nation and that *budun* was used instead. This blurriness is reminiscent of the discussion between *ümmet* and *millet* in the Ottoman case. *Türk Dili* journal has importance owing to its status as the bulletin

of the TDTC. Because of that, it is obvious that *ulus* had still not been chosen as the equivalent of “nation” in April 1934.

By the time the sixth issue was published, the shape of the situation and translation had changed slightly. *Dil anketi* (language survey) was also an investigation to find equivalents for terms. This issue published some accepted words as well as words that were accepted only by the survey commission. Equivalents for the term *millet* were accepted in the society yet, but accepted only by survey commission. According to that, the commission accepted *budun* as the first equivalent and *ulus* as the second equivalent for the term *millet* and it offered *budunluk* for the term *millî* (national) (Türk Dili, 1934, p. 59). These investigations were made from the Radloff dictionary. *Ulus* was used for the first time that much transparently with *millet* in the sixth issue of the journal in May 1934.

The eighth and ninth issues were published together in September 1934. Although equivalents had been found and used for *millet* in previous issues, *millet* and *milli* were frequently used in this issue. It can be seen that *ulus* was used with the word *uruk* (phratry) as “Türk ulus ve uruğları” (Türk Dili, 1934, p. 11). This means that *ulus* had not been accepted as nation yet, but it was used to identify a smaller group like tribe or phratry in September 1934 when this issue was published.

The adventure of the term in the parliament is also curious. *Ulus* passes in parliamentary documents on 12 June 1933 for the first time. This is quite an interesting date, because the first record of the term was in April 1933, as I mentioned above in the discussion of *Türk Dili*. And the term was used in a parliamentary document only two months after this investigation, although it was not accepted by the TDK. This record was in a legislative proposal about Mustafa Kemal’s properties. “Gazi Mustafa Kemal Hazretlerinin bütün yurt ve ulus işlerindeki görüş ve yapıları...” (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1933). *Ulus* was used alongside the term *yurt* which was used instead of *vatan*. It is seen that *ulus* was used as “nation” here. The term *ulus* did not pass in parliamentary documents for one year after this record. The next time *ulus* was used in parliament was on 7 June 1934. *Ulus* here was used

in a record about settlement law with *aşiret* (clan) and *oba* (nomad group) (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1934). This record shows that *ulus* was not used in the sense of nation.

The tenth issue of *Türk Dili* was published in October 1934. This issue was critical for the term *ulus*. In this issue, *ulus* was used as nation. There was a word list showing Saffet Arıkan's suggested *öz Türkçe* words. In this list, *budun* was directly translated as *millet* and *ulus* was translated as *millet* and *halk* (peoples) (Türk Dili, 1934, p. 9). As is seen dichotomy between *budun* and *ulus* was distinguished. However, the spread of *ulus* in the literature started after October 1934. Moreover, *Türk Dili* gives a telegram sent by Atatürk for the Language Festival on 26 September 1934. Atatürk uses *ulus* very clearly as nation in the telegram. "Dil bayramımızdan ötürü Türk Dili Araştırma Kurumu Genelözeğinden, Ulusal kurumlarından, türlü orunlarından birçok kutunbitikler aldım. Gösterilen güzel duygulardan kıvanç duydum. Ben de kamuyu kutlarım" (Türk Dili, 1934, p. 1).

As is seen, the language of the telegram contains fully *öz Türkçe* words. Some of them are not used today and it is difficult to understand some words. This telegram has importance for the term *ulus*. Because, as far as I found, this is the first time Mustafa Kemal used this word in a document. After this time, Atatürk increased gradually the usage of the term in his speeches and documents. It is clear from this case that, being an authority, Atatürk accepted the word *ulus* as "nation." However, this acceptance did not reflect directly to journalese. The newspaper *Hakimiyeti Milliye* under the influence of Kemalist regime spoke of the League of Nations (*Milletler Cemiyeti*) as *budunlar cemiyeti* (Hakimiyeti Milliye, 1934, p. 2). Atatürk used *ulus* as nation but the overlap with *budun* could not been solved completely.

Swedish crown prince Gustaf Adolf VI visited Ankara on 2 October 1934. Atatürk made a speech at the banquet held in honor of the prince. This speech is important both for the vocabulary of the *öz Türkçe* movement and the term *ulus*. A part of the speech is as follows:

Altes Ruayâl;

Bu gece, ulu konuklarımıza, Türkiye'ye uğur getirdiklerini söylerken, duyduğum, tükel özgü bir kıvançtır... İsveç - Türk uluslarının kazanmış oldukları utkuların silinmez damgalarını tarih taşımaktadır. Süerdemliği, önü, bu iki ulus, ünlü sanlı sözlerinin derinliğinde sonsuz tutmaktadır... Avrupa'nın iki bitim ucunda yerlerini berkiten uluslarımız, ataç özlüklerinin tüm ıssıları olarak baysak, önürme, uygunluk kıldacıları olmuş bulunuyorlar; onlar bugün en güzel utkuyu kazanmışa anıklanıyorlar: baysal utkusu. (Hakimiyeti Milliye, 1934, p. 1)

This text cannot be understood by any Turkish citizen without a dictionary today. It contains a lot of fabricated words which are not used today. This is important to see to the point the *öz Türkçe* movement had reached at that time. On the other hand, Atatürk used *ulus* in this speech several times as "nation." This can be understood as an effort to encourage the use of the term in daily language. The newspaper *Hakimiyeti Milliye* reported this speech in its leading article and gave equivalents for the *öz Türkçe* words in this speech on the second page. Although equivalents for all *öz Türkçe* words were given in the list, no equivalent was given for *ulus* (Hakimiyeti Milliye, 1934, p. 2).

The first usage of *ulus* in parliamentary proceedings was on 1 November 1934. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk made a speech in the parliament for the fourth gathering year of the fourth legislative period. Kemal Atatürk used the term *ulus* and its derivations 21 times in this speech. *Millet* did not pass even once in this speech. The term *millet* was excised entirely from Atatürk's lexicon (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1934). The newspaper *Hakimiyeti Milliye* reprinted in opening speech on its front page and presented the equivalents for *öz Türkçe* words on the second page. *Ulus* was given as *millet* and *ulusal* as *milli* (Hakimiyeti Milliye, 1934, p. 2). This meant that *ulus* was the winner of the struggle with *budun*. Atatürk had already noted in his hand writings between 1934 and 1936 in this manner. He translates *budun*, but he wrote *pudun* as peoples and *ulus* as "nation." Moreover, Atatürk suggested *ulus* as an equivalent for "state" (Atatürk'ün Dil Yazıları, 2011, p. 275). However, in origin both words are the same, they only had phonetical changes. Moreover, Atatürk suggested Türkiye Büyük Ulus Otağı or Türkiye Büyük Ulusal Toplantısı instead of Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi

(Atatürk'ün Dil Yazıları, 2011, p. 235, 314). However, it did not change and millet was used in the name of the parliament.

Ulus was frequently used in parliament after 1 November. However, *budun* was also used in the parliament as nation two times until 1935. Once by İsmet İnönü on 5 December 1934 (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1934), and once by the parliamentary deputy speaker on 23 December 1934 (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1934). There is not any other record outside of these in parliamentary minutes and *budun* was not found in parliament after 1935. *Osmanlıcan Türkçeye Cep Kılavuzu*, which was published by the TDK (TDAK at that time) in 1935, gave *ulus* as the only equivalent for *millet* (p. 205). Thus, *budun* disappeared from mainstream literature without establishing its presence.

October 1934 had great importance for the fate of the term *ulus*. On the one hand, it was used frequently in order to engraft the term in daily language. On the other hand, some associations, places, and newspapers were renamed with *ulus*. The newspaper *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, which was founded as the media organ of the state during the Turkish War of Independence in 1920, published its last issue under this name on 27 November 1934. On 28 November 1934, the newspaper was published under the name *Ulus*. The headline of the newspaper was as follows:

Hakimiyeti Milliye'yi kuran Atatürk'tür, gazetemize ULUS adını da O verdi. Adımız, andımızdır: Atatürk'ün ulusçuluk yolunda yürüyeceğiz. (Ulus Gazetesi, 1934)

Atatürk founded *Hakimiyeti Milliye*. He gave our newspaper the name *Ulus* also. Our name is our oath: We will walk the path of Atatürk's nationalism.

The name of the newspaper was changed. Thus the soul and motto also was changed. Besides that, its publishing house was also named *Ulus Basımevi* instead of *Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası*. This staggering and clear headline actually declared the relation between the term *ulus* and Atatürkist nationalism. The newspaper was published every day with the motto of *adımız andımızdır*. This implied that the newspaper indigenized the laic Kemalist type of nationalism. This type of nationalism was built on a produced nation. The community already living in Turkey was manipulated with some strict policies and *millet* was converted to *ulus*. As I have already mentioned,

Atatürkist nationalism both fought the Turkish community and imitated the West to make itself accepted among Western states. Thus, a Western character pervaded the Kemalist interpretation of Turkish nationalism. I will discuss this topic in the next chapter in detail.

Not only were the names of newspapers and printing houses changed. The names of some places also had their share of this change. The clearest example of this was *Ulus Meydanı* (Ulus square). The changing story of the name of this square in the *Ulus* district of Ankara has similarities with the conceptual history I have explained here. The square was in use in the Ottoman period. *Taşhan* was built in the square as a large commercial building in 1888. There was also a teacher school for males built in 1880. The name of the square was *Taşhan Meydanı* in this period (Bayraktar, 2013, p. 22). The first building of Grand National Assembly was also built in the square in 1920. Thus, the symbol of the square was changed. *Taşhan* was used as hospital during the *Milli Mücadele*. *Taşhan* square was arranged as a republican square with the name of *Hakimiyet-i Milliye Meydanı* (National Sovereignty Square) after 1923, and celebrations and ceremonies were conducted there (Bayraktar, 2013, p. 23). With the construction of *Zafer Anıtı* (Victory Monument) in 1927 in the square, the name of the square became *Millet Meydanı*. With the language reform, the name of the square was converted to *Ulus*. Nuray Bayraktar alleges that the square became officially *ulus* in 1930 by quoting from Anıl Çeçen. However, considering the reproduction of the term in 1933-34, the claim that the change was made in 1930 does not seem true.

The term *ulus* was used instead of *millet* as an equivalent for “nation” after late 1934. Kemalist circles used the term intensively in their writings and columns. However, the term did not become popular among some circles. For example, the newspaper *Vakit*, of which Ahmet Şükrü Esmer was a charter member, did not use the term *ulus*. Hikmet Feridun Es’s newspaper *Akşam* also refrained from using the term *ulus*.

How did literary people view the replacement of *millet* with *ulus* in the meaning of nation? There were different views. Peyami Safa, for example, stated that it was not

sure whether people would adopt the term *ulus* instead of *millet*, which was a widely used term. Nurullah Ataç argued that *millet* was a foreign word. Because of that, it should be purged from Turkish and the Turkish word *ulus* should be adopted instead. Ömer Asım Aksoy defended that *ulus* was a Turkish term and it will be enough only to check Şemseddin Sami's *Kamus-i Türkî* in order to understand it. Tekin, in contrast, stated that *millet* had settled in folk speech and was society's own property, and thus that purging this word because of its foreign origin was not appropriate. According to Faruk Timurtaş, *ulus* did not mean *millet*. It meant "city" and "peoples" and *ulus* was hardly ever found in old Anatolian Turkish. According to Timurtaş, reviving *ulus* instead of *millet* was wrong (Bayar, 2006, p. 290-291). Moreover, Timurtaş evaluated *ulus* as a wrongly produced but broadly accepted word in his dictionary *Uydurma Olan ve Olmayan Yeni Kelimeler Sözlüğü*. According to this dictionary, other words that were derived from the term *ulus* such as *ulusal*, *ulusçu*, *ulusallaşmak*, and *ulusçuluk*, were also in appropriate and fabricated (1979, p. 140). The debate over *ulus* continued over the following decades. Hayat publishing house published *Büyük Türk Sözlüğü* in 1969. The first definition for *millet* is "religion" in this dictionary. "Nation" was given as the third meaning. On the other hand, after explaining how the term *ulus* was used among old Turks, the dictionary says using *ulus* instead of *millet* was incorrect and fabricated (1969, p. 1199).

Because the souls of concepts are influenced by the change of concepts, different ideological discourses select and use terms expressing their views. This situation can be seen very apparently in discussion of Turkish language in TV shows, coffeehouses, and even in parliament. Some ideological groups abstain from using certain words in order to show their political positions. For instance, the term *yurt* was given as the equivalent for *vatan* (homeland) during the period of language policies discussed. Conservatives and nationalist people are bound up with this concept as well as Kemalists. However, conservatives and nationalists prefer using the term *vatan*, whereas Kemalists and leftists use the term *yurt* in order to explain the concept. It is difficult to encounter a conservative person who uses *yurt* to correspond the concept of homeland in Turkey. This represents a political stance. As in this example, *ulus* and *millet* share the same fate. Some particular groups use *ulus* or *millet* as an expression

of their political attitudes. In the next chapter, I will explain and discuss how these two terms settled in the Turkish political vocabulary.

In this chapter, I have explained and traced back the mental change due to historical and political experiences, and the reflection of these developments in language. In order to do this, I firstly described the idea of Anatolia and the future apprehension of the Anatolian community after World War I. Anatolian Muslims carried out a war in order to rescue their territories from Western invasions in the post-war period. A new parliament was established in Ankara in 1920 and this parliament declared to loyalty to the sultanate and the caliphate. However, by 1924 the sultanate and caliphate had been abolished, a republican regime had been proclaimed, and the Treaty of Lausanne had been signed. This indicated a bureaucratic disengagement from an Islamic definition of Turkishness. The republican regime desired to establish a Western-type secular state and nation. A lot of strict implementations were promulgated against Turkish traditions and religion in order to achieve this desire. Kemalist elites did not want to content themselves with institutional and bureaucratic secularization. They also want the society to westernize, because modernization meant Westernization for these elites. The state religion was abolished and the Arabo-Farsi alphabet was replaced with a Latin-based alphabet in 1928. These two developments represented a strict turn away from the legitimizing role of religion. The Kemalist regime was obliged to create a common bond, a strong identity in order to fight with religious legitimation and to replace religious identity, because a newly constructed identity would help the regime to direct the society into an easy adoption of new policies.

By 1929, the Kemalist regime conducted investigations on Turkish history. Lots of books were published and conferences were conducted. The aim was to prove the greatness of the Turkish race in history. However, the real aim was to erase recent history and the period after the Turks converted Islam. Thus, they would be able to create a new ethnically based Turkish identity. All these efforts and products were called the Turkish history thesis. Mustafa Kemal started investigations for language in parallel with the history thesis. Heidegger says that language is the house of being.

And the being is directly related with thought. That is to say, language reflects thought. Thus, language was a strong impediment to the realization of Kemalist ideas, because the Turkish language was heavy with Islamic terminology. To destroy this, neologisms were produced from pre-Islamic Turkish language as equivalents for conventionally used terms. The TDK managed these implementations relating to language.

Language policies and history were instrumentalized for the aim of nation building. All efforts aimed at creating a nation. However, the term nation also took its share from these implementations. The translation of the term nation was *millet* in Turkish. This term had a long history and an Islamic connotation. The Kemalist regime created the term *ulus* as a replacement for *millet*. The history of the term *ulus* was quite curious. It had variously had a geographical, political, and communal meaning. I scrutinized the history of *ulus* from its etymology to its reproduction in the 1930s. I also explained process of its adoption into the Turkish language. It was in a competition with the term *budun* for a length of time.

There were different views on the term *ulus* and *millet* at that time and now as well. This is a discussion about contents of Turkish identity. The social response, and how intellectuals, literary people, politicians, and ideologists used this term will be the topic of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

ULUS IN CONTEMPORARY USAGE

The previous chapter explained and analyzed the transition of Turkish identity from the end of the World War I to the first third of the twentieth century. I read this historical process through the relation between language policies and nation building. Language nationalism played a dominant role in nation building in Turkey, especially with the history thesis beginning from the late 1920s. One of the main catalysts of nation building is oblivion culture. In such a culture, recent history and items reminiscent of that recent history and culture are forgotten or society is made to forget, as a result of the implementations of various policies. This is the most effective way to construct a new identity and existence independent from the fetters of the past. The distant past is chosen as the source of creating the new identity with the thought that many factions of society can more easily agree on it in comparison with the current time. Language policies in Turkey under the guidance of the Turkish history thesis were clear examples of this process.

The name of the new identity was naturally influenced by these implementations, and this gives us information about the character of the newly created social bond. It was a race between the terms *millet* and *ulus*. However, it was not just about renaming an outmoded term but rather fulfilling an aim. I explained and discussed the building process of this conceptual differentiation and historical adventure of concepts in the context of political and religious life in the previous chapter. After the concept was introduced into the Turkish language, it became an ideological indicator in Turkish politics. Using *ulus* instead of *millet* as the equivalent for the term “nation” did not mean that *millet* sank into oblivion. Both concepts maintained their existence in language and political terminology. And the concept has become a sort of ideological symbol. Although both terms mean “nation” and its derivations, their range and the form of nationalism they indicate are different. This creates a conceptual confusion for Turkish political terminology. This confusion is actually a mirror of identity chaos in Turkey. In this chapter, I will focus on comparing and

discussing how derivations of these terms are used in Turkish politics and how a conceptual chaos appears. Firstly, I will discuss the motto *hakimiyet bila kaydu şart milletindir* and its transition to *egemenlik ulusundur* (sovereignty belongs to the nation). Then I will investigate the struggle between *ulus*, *millet*, and *budun*. Thirdly, I will focus on *milliyetçilik* and *Milli Görüş*. And lastly, I will discuss *ulusalcılık* ideology. These examples will contribute to the conceptual study.

The way that the *Ulus* newspaper reported the news of Atatürk's death is quite interesting for the theme of this thesis. Atatürk died on 10 November 1938 and on the next day one of the propaganda organs of the regime and the CHP reported this news from headline as follows: "Kurtarıcını ve en büyük evladını kaybettin Türk milletini sen sağ ol," which means, "You have lost your savior and greatest child, oh Turkish nation, be strong" (Ulus Gazetesi, 1938). As I explained before, *Ulus* was a media organ of the Kemalist regime. When new words were created instead of Arabic and Farsi words as part of the language reform under the TDK, *Ulus* used them immediately in its news texts. Therefore, the newspaper was a means of spreading the usage of new words and providing their socialization. This was an important role and *Ulus* was attentive to it. However, the news report on Atatürk's death shows a concession from this mission. A newspaper whose name had been changed a few years previously from *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* to *Ulus* used *millet* as "nation". This is conceptually important for this thesis, as it serves as an indicator that language policies were not strictly implemented anymore.

It is actually possible to see the first instances of this transition period as early as 1935. The CHP conducted its fourth party congress in May 1935. The vocabulary of the party regulations and program was definitely different from first three programs. Atatürk's party prepared the text of party regulations and program with *öz Türkçe* words as if to show the success of the language reform. I compared the 1931 and 1935 CHP party programs to trace the conceptual differences. The texts of these two programs are structurally similar. They explain similar issues. However, their vocabulary is different. The 1935 program contains coined phrases, allegedly *öz Türkçe*, which are not used in current Turkish. The term *ulus* was dominantly and

frequently used in the 1935 text. It is not possible to see the term *millet* in any sentence of the text (CHP Programı, 1935). This shows the resolution of the regime on the new term. That is to say that, there was not any hesitation or reluctance on using the term *ulus*. However, the situation started changing in late 1935. Atatürk delivered the opening speech of the parliament on 1 November 1935 by using both the terms *millet* and *ulus* to refer to the nation (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1935). Other derivations and examples of these words in this speech were as follows: Atatürk used *arsıulusal*—currently *uluslararası*—for the word “international”, and *saylav* for deputy. *Milletvekili* was the previous term for deputy and it is still used, but not *saylav*. It is seen from this speech that the consensus on using the term *ulus* had fractured late 1935.

4.1. Being of Two Minds; Ulus, Millet, Budun

Some of the Turkicized words within the scope of language reforms successfully found a place for themselves in the language and are still being used today. However, some words that had a long history in the language and culture retained their existence in spite of interventions. The concept of *millet* was one example of this group. Because *ulus* was given as the direct equivalent for *millet*, the regime tried to change every instance of *millet* to *ulus*. Considering the wide semantic field of *millet* and the semantic extension of *ulus*, some problems and anachronisms appear. Perhaps one of the most obvious example of this was the motto of the National Assembly which was *hakimiyet bila kaydu şart millettindir* (sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the nation)

When the National Assembly was established in Ankara during the Milli Mücadele on 23 April 1923, the parliament had a very pluralist structure. As I explained in the previous chapter, the aim of the parliament was not serving national ideas. The assembly did not consist any of pro-nationalist members. There were ethnical Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Lazs, and Circassians as well as sheikhs, clan leaders, and artisans. As a reflection of the *Milli Mücadele*, the National Assembly aimed to end the invasion of enemies in Anatolia and save the sultan-caliph and Istanbul. Turkish identity had religious borders in this period, and therefore had very different elements from those

in the process of nation building in the 1930s. The concept of *millet* was used in parliamentary speeches and Mustafa Kemal's statements. However, the question of whether or not it had the same meaning as the present use of the word should be examined.

The parliament that was established in this political and ideological conjuncture enacted the *Teşkilat-ı Esasiye* in 1921. The principle of *hakimiyet bila kaydu şart milletindir* passed in the first article of the law (*Teşkilatı Esasiye Kanunu*, 1921). It is necessary to discuss what the meaning and scope of the word *millet* was in this sentence. It is understood that when the term *ulus* was used, it meant directly "nation" in English. However, during the period in question the term *millet* still had a dominant historical meaning related to religion. Thus, considering the structure and aim of the parliament, and the layers of meaning of the term, a political vagueness appears.

A Quranic verse (42:38) was hung on the wall of the first parliament building. The statement in the verse was "... their affairs by mutual Consultation..." (Ali, 1937, p. 1317). This was located for deputies as a religious advice in the parliament. After the republic was proclaimed and a new parliament building constructed, the principle of *hakimiyet milletindir* (sovereignty belongs to millet)—by calligrapher Mehmet Hulusi Yazgan—was hung on the wall of the parliament (Serin, 2013). The same statement was written in the Latin script after the alphabet reform in 1928. With the language reform the principle was written as *egemenlik ulusundur* on the wall; this form is available among Atatürk's pictures. On 10 January 1945, the text of the constitution was simplified. This was not a change of the constitution but a simplification of its language (Gözler, 2000, p. 73). The principle I discuss passed as *egemenlik kayıtsız şartsız Milletindir* in this version of the constitution. On the wall of the current parliament building, the principle was written in this form.

The form that the principle took on the wall of parliament and in the constitution offer insight into the political situation in Turkey during the period. Kemal Gözler says it is accepted that there was only one constitution in Turkey from 1924 to 1960.

However, the change of words can mean the change of the constitution (2000, p. 73). I also advocate the same, namely that the principle *hakimiyet bila kaydu şart milletindir* also had different meanings over the course of its history. That is to say, the form of the principle in the 1921 constitution and from that was written on the wall of the parliament after the language reform were not similar and did not have similar connotations. *Hakimiyet bila kaydu şart milletindir* and *egemenlik ulusundur* do not have the same meaning. Meanings change when words change. These two sentences were discussed by Harun Şahin in *Orkun Journal* exactly in this way (Şahin, 2003). According to him, using proverbs and principles like this by changing their words is a type of infidelity. He also thinks that this implementation was made against Atatürk. Thinking the principle I discuss irrespective of *millet-i hakime* understanding may be lacking in 1921. However, considering the term *ulus* in 1934, it signified a constructed Western-type identity. Although *ulus* was used as the equivalent for *millet* in this process, *ulus* was used very strictly in the first session of this rename after 1934. The layers of meanings and historical adventures of these two simultaneously used words were disparate. The Kemalist one-party regime preferred using *ulus* frequently in media organs in order to establish the term in public language. However, *millet* was used again instead of *ulus* in the effort of simplification of the constitution in 1945. This was a signal that the term *ulus* could not be established in the language in spite of all efforts by the regime.

It is possible to give other examples to show that the change of the term could not be established in the language. Mustafa Kemal found *öz Türkçe* equivalents for many words. There were political and military terms as well as geometrical ones. Turkish General Staff Press published Mustafa Kemal's handwritings about language works. He offered *öz Türkçe* equivalents for old Arabic and Farsi terms. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Grand National Assembly of Turkey) was one of them. It is seen that Mustafa Kemal tried to find a different name for the Assembly. Mustafa Kemal offered Türkiye Büyük Ulus Otağı (Atatürk'ün Dil Yazıları I, 2011, p. 235) and Türkiye Büyük Ulusal Toplantısı (Atatürk'ün Dil Yazıları I, 2011, p. 314) for the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. He suggested *kayın/kayım ulus* (Atatürk'ün Dil Yazıları I, 2011, p. 273) and *ulusal toplantı* (Atatürk'ün Dil Yazıları I, 2011, p. 314) for the term national assembly.

However, these recommendations were not implemented. Although *millet* was individually changed to *ulus*, *millet* in the name of basic institutions of Turkey were not changed to *ulus*. Names of Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı (Ministry of National Education) and Milli Savunma Bakanlığı (Ministry of National Defence) also were not affected by these conceptual changes.

Leaving the term *millet* as such a possibility and the conceptual weakness of *ulus* vis-à-vis *millet* in the social memory were maybe reasons for conceptual discussions in the following decades. Some writers both from nationalist and leftist wings discussed this conceptual differentiation at various times. I have already mentioned above that the vocabulary is a sign of ideology. Different ideological factions reflect political standings by their choice of concepts. This is valid for the term used as the equivalent for “nation” in the Turkish language. I will attempt to show this differentiation by discussing the opinions of some nationalists and leftists. I discussed in the previous chapter how *budun* was an alternative to *ulus* in the effort of finding an equivalent to *millet* during the language reform. *Budun* was a term identifying the whole group of Turkic clans in the Orhun inscriptions. However, *ulus* had a geographical sense. Those who adhered to a more racial dimension of nationalism preferred using *budun* instead of *ulus* or *millet*. When they say *Türk budunu*, they imply a Turkish identity based on consanguinity. For instance, Turgay Tüfekçioğlu explained this issue in an essay in the *Orkun*, which was known for its nationalist stance. After explaining the meaning of *ulus* and *budun* in Orhun inscriptions, Tüfekçioğlu says using *budun* as nation is more suitable than using *ulus* that had a different meaning. Furthermore, he states that choosing *ulus* as the *öz Türkçe* equivalent for the “nation” was a mistake (Tüfekçioğlu, 2003). The same argument was advocated in a different essay in *Orkun* (Şahin, 2003).

4.2. Two Types of Nationalisms: *Ulusçuluk* and *Milliyetçilik*

Famous Turkish sociologist Niyazi Berkes had different classification for this conceptual discussion. In his book *Baticılık, Ulusçuluk ve Toplumsal Devrimler* by Yön Yayınları in 1965, he separates the *ulusçuluk* (nationalism) of Atatürk from *milliyetçilik* (nationalism). He claims that right-wing nationalism is *dilenci milliyetçiliği*

(nationalism of beggars). The term *milliyetçilik* has right wing and negative connotations. To stay out of this situation, leftist-Kemalists frequently used *ulus* and *ulusçuluk* in order to show their way of nationalism (Gürpınar, 2011, p. 37). To comprehend the reason Niyazi Berkes made such a distinction between *milliyetçilik* and *ulusçuluk*, it is necessary to look at his view of Turkish modernization. The concept of modernization has the same meaning as secularization for Berkes. Thus, Ottoman-Turkish modernization meant a secularization process for him. The ultimate aim was to establish a nation state and this aim was directly related to the modernization process. Furthermore, because modernization brought secularization, the term *millet* gained a secular meaning after the republic. Thus, secular Turkish nationalism (*ulusçuluk*) was established instead of the Islamic ummah (Ak, 2016, p. 79). As is seen, according to Berkes, the concept of *ulus* represents a constructed secular and progressive identity as a sign of the ultimate aim of modernization/secularization. Therefore, Berkes prioritizes the term *ulus*, whereas *millet* and *milliyetçilik* have negative, reactionist, and religious connotations for him. This attitude of Niyazi Berkes is still valid for some Kemalists, and I will discuss them further in the following pages.

Assuming the term *milliyetçilik* (nationalism) with a right-wing nationalism may be related due to institutional usage of the term and the main character of the Turkish nationalism also affected the idea that *milliyetçilik* and *ulusçuluk* are different type of nationalisms. To trace this conceptual difference, the character of the Turkish right and the main vein of Turkish nationalism after 1960 should be taken in consideration. The Turkish right comprised various mixes of nationalism, Islamism, and conservatism. The concise statement of these components was *milliyetçi-maneviyatçı/mukaddesatçı* (nationalist-spiritualist/ritualist) (Can, 2008, p. 664). Associations like Milli Türk Talebe Birliği (National Turkish Student Union, MTTB) became the center, in which nationalist and religious movements were blended in this period (MTTB Tarihçe, 2016). Furthermore, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek was one of the most important leader who combined *milliyetçi* and religious ideas. His ideas in the periodical *Büyük Doğu* were examples of the alliance of these ideologies (Koçak, 2008, p. 611). When leftist movements arose in the late 60s all over the world, Turkish

nationalism strengthened its alliance with Islamism compared to the past. Turkish nationalists established a main-stream political party. Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi (Republican Villagers Nation Party, CKMP) was converted to Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party, MHP hereafter) in 1969 by Alparslan Türkeş. One of the strongest motivation of MHP was anti-communism. To strengthen this motivation religion was a powerful mortar for their *milliyetçilik*. When talked about Turkish nationalism with the term *milliyetçilik*, it had more or less a relation with religion. Thus, some secular or leftist nationalists abstained from being mentioned in the same category with these *milliyetçi* groups instead, they preferred *ulus*, to which they assigned a secular and sometimes leftist meaning. This situation caused an increase of sub-categories of Turkish nationalism. That is to say, there are many Turkish nationalisms.

Another movement established in the same period is quite related to the conceptual discussion here. This movement is the *Milli Görüş* inspired by Necmettin Erbakan and founded in 1969. *Milli Görüş* means “national outlook” in English. However, it is possible to misunderstand the political standing of *Milli Görüş* when translated to English. The name national outlook has absolutely different connotation than *Milli Görüş*. *Milli Görüş* is a religio-political movement that settled in different countries and has a political party culture. Necmettin Erbakan was a politician who did politics towards religious teachings. The name of his social and political movement was *Milli Görüş*. As I mentioned above, the term *milli* in its name had religious connotation. The word *milli* can be used instead of *ulusal* in current Turkish language. However, an *ulusal görüş* would imply different from *Milli Görüş*. The online portal of *Milli Görüş* in the Netherlands also explains the *milli* in relation to *millet-i Ibrahim* (Ibrahim’s religion, path), as I explained in the previous chapter (*Milli Görüş nedir?*, 2016). And it says that the *milli* in *Milli Görüş* does not have a lexical relation with *millet* as *ulus* (nation). As is seen, the movement use the term *millet* in the traditional Islamic sense. The MHP and other *milliyetçi* groups used the term *millet* with the meaning that it gained in the late nineteenth century in the sense of nation. However, *Milli Görüş* used the derivation of *millet* in its Arabic meaning, which still available and frequently used until the twentieth century. The term *ulus* does not extend to these contexts.

The concepts of *millet* and *milli* were not used only by the right wing in Turkey. A socialist movement the name of Milli Demokratik Devrim (National Democratic Revolution, MDD) appeared in the 1960s in Turkey. This was a nationalist-inclined socialist movement. This movement planned to construct a *milli cephe* (national front) among the Turkish left with an anti-imperialist and national attitude. The second congress of the Workers Party of Turkey (TİP) had such recommendations in 1966. Beside the name of the movement, it can be seen that they frequently used *milli* in their speeches and writings (Atalay, 2006).

4.3. Ulusalçılık

While the layers of meanings of *millet* and *milliyetçilik* followed this path in the twentieth century, the term *ulus* and its derivations had a different path. Some authors close to Bülent Ecevit such as Ali Gevgilli after 1973 frequently used *ulusalçı* in the sense of *milliyetçi*. However, *ulusalçı* gained new ideological meanings and became a name of a political stance after the 1990s. The nationalist left gradually lost its socialist tendency in the post-Cold War period. And they have begun to form a deep partnership with Kemalism. A new ideology named *ulusalçılık* and a new type of nationalism appeared from this partnership. In the foundation manifesto of the Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği (Atatürkist Thought Association, ADD), which is known as a Kemalist society, Atatürk was defined as follows: Atatürk“ creates a positive, constructive, and modern Turkish nationalism (*ulusalçılık*) and makes it one of the main principles of the state by objecting to racism along the National Pact (*Misak-ı Milli*)” (Grounds of Foundation, 2016). Using *ulusalçılık* the “nationalism” instead of *milliyetçilik* or *ulusçuluk* can be seen as a mumpsimus. A reference was given to Atatürk’s nationalism that is one of the six arrows of the CHP (Gürpınar, 2011). According to Doğan Gürpınar, using that kind of derivation was a product of *öz Türkçe* in Atatürkist texts and words became meaningless due to this concern (2011, p. 38).

A concern to establish a national left front (*ulusalçı sol*) emerged after 1995. The SHP (Social Democratic Populist Party) of Murat Karayağcın and CHP of Deniz Baykal merged in 1995 and columns written in this time used the concept of *ulusalçı* to define the new type of ideology (Gürpınar, 2011, p. 39). The leftist Mümtaz Soysal

also supported and developed the concept of *ulusalci* with his writings in this period. Especially his writings in the *Hürriyet* newspaper set light to the concept. As Niyazi Berkes had done in his writings, Soysal used the term *milliyetçilik* for the right wing and criticized it in many ways. He tried to rescue nationalist thought from the Turkish right and created an alternative form for the left as follows in his column in 1997:

Türkiye'nin sağ, eskiden beri ulus sevgisine sahip çıkmaktan, hatta onu tekelinde tutup fiyakasını satmaktan pek hoşlanır. Hem de ne sağ? Irkçılıkla milliyetçiği karıştıran. Ümmetçiliğini ulusallık gerisinde saklayan. Bir yandan sınırlar ötesi sermayeyle işbirliği yapıp kendi halkını sömürürken, bir yandan da ulus sevgisini kimseye kaptırmaz görünen bir sağ... Ulusal davalara ve sorunlara, evrensel değerlerle çatışmadan, ama kendi halkının çıkarlarına ve kendi ülkesinin yaşamsal haklarına da ters düşmeden insanca çözümler bulmanın akıllıca yolları vardır. Bunları her şeyden önce akıl demek olan sol bulmayacak da kim bulacak? (Soysal, 1997)

Mümtaz Soysal consciously used the term *milliyetçilik* to insult right-wing nationalism for being too religious and close to foreign capital. And he says that the left can be the alternative to this negative situation because it is more rational. Soysal extolls the rationalist character of the left. This is important to understand how *ulusalci* groups differentiate themselves from *milliyetçi* people. According to *ulusalci* people, a *milliyetçi* conceives of the nation in an emotional and mythical way. *Ulusalcılık*, in contrast, pays regard to national interests with its rational character (Gürpınar, 2011, p. 40). Mümtaz Soysal wrote in 1999 that if neo-liberal economic policies were accepted by right-and left-wing nationalist parties, it would mean that they lost their nationalism (*ulusalcılık*) (Ulusalcılık ve Ekonomi, 1999). Soysal showed that he adopted a connection between *ulusalcılık* and economic policies in his writings during the economic crises in 2001 (Ulusal, 2001: Ulusal Plan, 2001: Ulusal'ı Beklerken, 2001).

Doğan Gürpınar's analyses on *ulusalcılık* and *milliyetçilik* in the 2000s are very important to understand the current situation. According to him, *ulus* and *ulusal* are normally two different words. For instance, a TV channel that makes an *ulusal* telecast does not make an *ulusçu* telecast. However, the differences between *ulus* and *ulusal* were gradually lost. Thus, a secular image of *ulus* remained its existence. On the other hand, *ulusalcılık* lost its leftist tendency with AKP (Justice and

Development Party) governments after 2002 and became a different word for nationalism. This is because, according to Gürpınar, *ulusalcı* groups gradually gained a purely nationalist character and lost their leftist discourse (2011, pp. 40-42).

The most prominent political actions of *ulusalcı* groups under the AKP government were the republic protests (*Cumhuriyet mitingleri*) in 2007. The president of Turkey was elected by the parliament before 2007, and the AKP had the majority in the parliament. Thus, the AKP candidate would be elected as the new president of Turkey. The CHP did not want parliament to elect a new president and instead wanted a new general election. However, the AKP declared Abdullah Gül as the candidate for presidency. The *Ulusalcı* faction perceived this situation as a threat to the secular structure of the state and to the republic and decided to conduct crowded rallies to protest the government and to protect the secular principles. The *ulusalcı* groups ADD and Association for the Support of Contemporary Living (ÇYDD) pioneered the rallies in big cities. Many politicians, authors, and journalists known for their Kemalist line attended the protests. *Ulusalcı* characters such as Tuncay Özkan, Birgül Ayman Güler, and Nur Serter remained in the forefront of rallies and made vehement speeches. While visiting Atatürk's mausoleum in Anıtkabir, crowded masses shouted such slogans as "Çankaya is laic and will remain laic" (HaberTürk, 2007). The presidential palace was in Çankaya. Therefore, this slogan was directly against the conservative government that would elect the president.

I have already said that *ulusalcılık* is different from *milliyetçilik*. *Ulusalcılık* is seen as "white nationalism" and an activist secularism constitutes its central position. A secularist attitude is an upper and overarching umbrella for *ulusalcı* people (Bayramoğlu, 2011, p. 47). This attitude is fed on various internal and external enemies. Islam—*irtica* (reactionism) in their jargon—is one of the biggest internal enemies for *ulusalcılık*, as is separatism. This perception of Islamism as an enemy lent a holiness to secularism/laicism (Kabakçı, 2011, p. 102). The history of the Turkish republic mostly means the only Turkish history for *ulusalcılık*. The identity created in the early republican era, which I discussed in the previous chapter, constitutes the main character and defense of *ulusalcılık*. *Ulusalcılık* perceives other threats to

Turkish politics as well. According to them, the republic is under constant threat from internal enemies and a countrywide purge should be carried out. Because of bad situation in Turkey, various associations, including the military, should intervene in politics. A second independence war is needed against internal and external enemies (Bayramođlu, 2011, p. 46). The secularist attitude and the idea that Islamism is an internal enemy distinguish *ulusalcılık* from the main character of *milliyetçilik* in Turkey.

These two concepts still maintain their ambiguity in common language. Because various ideological groups use these words differently, no terminology that everyone agree on how developed in public language. It is possible to show this problem with an example from TBMM discussions. While the right to speak in one's mother tongue in court was being discussed in the TBMM on 23 January 2013, the discussion among deputies shows how there is a big conceptual chaos in people's minds. I quote a part from the discussion:

BİRGÜL AYMAN GÜLER (İzmir) – AKP'nin, Türk ulusunu tarihten silmeye, Türk vatandaşlığını tarihten silmeye dönük olan girişimlerinde BDP'yle nasıl iş birliği yaptıklarını onun konuşmasında gördük [...]

BİRGÜL AYMAN GÜLER – “Ve biz bunu tarihten sileceğiz.” diyor. Burada büyük Türk milleti önünde yemin ettiniz, büyük Türk milleti önünde yemin ettiniz.

MEHMET METİNER (Adıyaman) – Biz ulusalcı değiliz, biz ırkçı değiliz.

BİRGÜL AYMAN GÜLER – O büyük ulusa parti olarak, tek tek şahıs olarak ihanet ediyorsunuz [...]

BİRGÜL AYMAN GÜLER – Kürt milliyetçiliğini bana “ilericilik” ve “bağımsızlık” diye yutturamazsınız. (CHP ve MHP sıralarından alkışlar) Türk ulusuyla Kürt milliyetini eşit, eş değerde gördüremezsiniz.

İDRİS BALUKEN (Bingöl) – Biz asla milliyetçi değiliz, siz ulusalcısınız, ulusalcısınız! (TBMM Tutanak, 2013, p. 461)

The complete conceptual confusion that prevails in this discussion need to be analyzed. Birgül Ayman Güler was professor of politics and a deputy of the CHP. She firstly equated the Turkish *ulus* and Turkish citizenship in this speech. This directs us to think that she adopted a French type nationalism. However, the discussion was about a linguistic issue. It is understandable from her column in *Aydınlık* in 2014 that she sees a direct relation between *ulus* and language (Güler, 2014). That is to say, *ulus* is a lingual entity according to Güler. She first used *ulus* and *millet* synonymously. The AKP deputy Mehmet Metiner equalized *ulusalcılık* and racism in his response to

her. Then, Güler said a statement which was discussed in further days: you cannot says the Kurdish *milliyet* (nationality) is equal and congruent to the Turkish *ulus* (nation). Güler made a difference between these two words and used *milliyet* in a derogatory meaning. According to her, *ulus* was a statement of development and a political unity. On the other hand, *milliyet* was a social and cultural structure. And she believed that there was a categorical differences between these two terms (Birgül Ayman Güler: Özür Bekliyorum, 2013). After Güler uttered this sentence in the parliament, Kurdish deputy İdris Baluken said, “we are not *milliyetçi* but you are *ulusalçı*.” This statement also support my discussion above that *milliyetçilik* and *ulusalcılık* are different nationalisms in Turkey.

As can be understood from this short discussion in the parliament, there is still not a common agreement on the meanings of these terms. Some people insult others with the idea that an *ulus* can be built with a political maturity. While doing this, the other side was seen as a *milliyet*, with some derogatory implications. This political language is a consequence of not having correct information on the histories of these concepts and wrong argumentations. It must be decided more clearly which concept will be used for which meaning.

The word *millici* is grammatically a synonym to the word *ulusalçı*. However, as I previously mentioned, *ulusalçı* has different ideological connotations. The word *millici* was used for those who supported the Ankara government during the Turkish War of Independence (Büyük Türkçe Sözlük, 2016). The word *millici* is not used in contemporary Turkish to identify any groups or ideology. As is seen, although derivations are same, they cannot be used instead of one another. There is a table below that shows the normative and derivations of terms *ulus* and *millet*.

Table 4.1. Meanings of Terms Derived from *Ulus* and *Millet*

Millet	Nation	The term meant religion and was used to define religious groups. In the late 19 th century it was used as an equivalent for nation.
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Table 4.1. (continued)

Ulus	Nation	The term meant tribe, clan. However, after 1934 it was used as equivalent for nation.
Milli	National	Can be used as “religious”
Ulusal	National	No other meaning than national
Ulusçu	Nationalist	The true derivation from ulus for the term nationalist.
Milliyetçi	Nationalist	
Ulusalcı	Nationalist	A mumpsimus used for nationalist. However, it became a name of an ideology
Millici	Nationalist? Nationist? (not in use today)	The term was derived in the same way as <i>ulusalcı</i> . It was used for people who supported the Ankara government during the War of Independence.

I collected interchangeable words in the above table to offer a clear summary of the previous discussions. These words are derived from the terms *millet* and *ulus*. The words, which can be used interchangeably, have different layers of meanings and symbolic connotations. Concepts may be signs of political ideologies or social movements. I attempted to show and correlate policy making and Turkish history with these concepts.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This history of concepts is related to politics and social life and reflects the political culture and traditional codes of a society. Investigating this correlation in the academic platform started in Germany. There were various projects that studied conceptual history in relation to the history of concepts, such as *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* (Archive for Conceptual History), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (the HWP, Historical Dictionary of Philosophy), and *politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich, 1680-1820* (Handbuch, Handbook of Basic Political-Social Concepts in France). These projects focused on concepts in different fields. In addition to these, the biggest and the most comprehensive project on conceptual history was *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* (The GG, Basic Historical Concepts). In the GG project, Reinhart Koselleck and his colleagues investigated 120 concepts from various fields such as politics, law, economics, history, and philosophy. As I detailed in the first chapter, the project had a particular method in writing the history of a concept. A concept was investigated in three parts as follows: The first section detailed the historical process of the concept from the classical to early modern period. The second section explained the semantic change and development in the *Sattelzeit*. And the last section gave a summary and information about present day use (Richter, 1995).

According to Reinhart Koselleck, the semantic fields of some political and social vocabularies used in German-speaking Europe underwent changes between 1750 and 1850 due to structural changes in government, economics, and society. This semantic transition was also deeply related with modern political and social thought (Richter, 1995). This period constituted the main part of the articles and showed the main milestones in the evolution of concepts. Starting from this point of view, I saw a similarity with Turkish political and social culture. There were great changes between the Tanzimat Edict in 1839 and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's death in 1938 in all

fields related to Turkish politics and tradition. The way of policy making, social life, and identities were strictly changed in this period in which modernization was implemented intensively. A nation state was established in Anatolia, in what remained of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. Nation state and nationalization were the main characteristics of the period in Europe and spread to other parts of the world from there. This situation influenced Turkey and the Turkish society to a certain extent. As Koselleck said for Germany, I think this period can be named as a Turkish *sattelzeit*. All political, social, and economic changes with modernization influenced the language as well. While starting this thesis, I decided to investigate and trace the history of the concept of nation, which I see as characteristic of the period.

In the thesis I have tried to examine this concept in coordination with political culture, tradition, and religion. Nationalization or nation building progressed in Turkey by creating a new identity based on an idea of the distant past. Thus, this occurred with the idea that a new common identity could be created with the most common consensus or minimal conflict. I attempted to scrutinize the concept of nation in parallel with both political developments and language policies. The issue of religion was included in many aspects of identity in Turkey. The historical adventure of the term *millet* also reflects this. The word *millet*, with its religious connotation, started being used as an equivalent for the term nation in the late Ottoman Empire. Transition from the term *millet* to *ulus* reflects the secularization in language as well as in politics and identity in Turkey. Tracing this process through concepts is possible.

As Benedict Anderson (2006) says, with the spread of printing in Europe, works were published in vernacular languages to reach the masses and sell more copies. This pragmatic purpose nourished social changes related to language. Martin Luther wrote his translation of the Bible in the bureaucratic language used in Saxony in order to be understood by more people. This process made a great contribution to the rise of modern High German. A similar example was seen in Italy as well. With the unification of Italy, the Tuscan dialect was chosen as the standard Italian language. The most important determinant in selecting Tuscan instead of the Piedmont dialect,

which was the political center, was the influence of literature (Sadoğlu, 2003). Boccaccio, Dante, and Machiavelli wrote their books in the Tuscan dialect, and this situation paved the way for the Tuscan dialect to become the Italian standard. The standardization of languages for national purposes left other vernaculars to the fate of being sub-elements of the culture or linguistic mosaic.

Language had an important role during the establishment of nation states and national identity. The French language had a big impact on centralization and the nation state as well as over vernaculars. I mentioned in the second chapter how the edict that François I declared made French superior in the territory. This was an example of status planning. The *Académie française* helped standardize the French language and became the center where language planning was determined and implemented in the state over time. The situation was different in Germany. German philosopher and poet Herder was the first person who established a bond between language and national identity. Fichte and some other philosophers also thought and wrote in a similar vein. According to them, language was the determinant of the boundaries of a nation. That is to say, all territories where the German language was spoken belonged to Germans. This was a different description of the nation state and nationalism than the French one. German nationalism had more cultural and ethnic tendencies than a nationalism and nation state identified with citizenship and territory. The Turkish nation state theoretically described Turkish identity in terms of citizenship and territory. However, implementations such as the Turkish history thesis and language reform resembled a German type nationalism. It is possible to see examples of ethnic and linguistic nationalism in this period.

Starting with the language-planning experiences in the Ottoman Empire, I discussed how national identity was described in the 1920s and how the ethno-secular boundaries of Turkish identity were established after 1929 in Turkey. The name of the identity was also changed in this period. This change was from *millet* to *ulus*. I traced back the layers of meanings of these concepts and discussed the process by which they came to be equivalents for the term “nation”. These adventures meant more than simply finding a correspondence. They had a deep relation with religion,

tradition, the way of policy making, modernization, and nation building in Turkey. I have attempted to reveal these relations in this thesis. This work which can be evaluated as an introduction to the field of conceptual history will be a guide for my further studies. I came to better understand the importance of conceptual history during my thesis-writing process.

While researching the topics I discussed in these chapters I saw how concepts impose their historical accumulations on current events. *Millet*, for example, still has a wider meaning than the Turkish nation in a classical sense. However, the word *ulus* seems to give the desired meaning more precisely. This can be seen from discussions I made regarding *hakimiyet bila kaydu şart milletindir*, *milli görüş*, and *milliyetçilik*. I put the term *ulusalcılık* in a different place, as I discussed above. The word does not directly mean nationalism in terms of its derivation. However, *ulusçuluk* seems the most suitable equivalent for nationalism. It is possible to see that authors choose the word *ulus* for nation and *ulusçuluk* for nationalism in their writings to be more precise. Ahmet Yıldız's and Hüseyin Sadoğlu's books, which I used frequently in this thesis, state that they preferred to use *ulus* as equivalent for nation in order to avoid ambiguity. İlber Ortaylı also says that using *ulus* to correspond to the term "nation" would be right. *Millet* has a religious connotation and does not correspond to the meaning nation. According to him, the most proper usage of the term *milli* is *Milli Görüş* (2007, p. 62), a movement formed by religious people and with a religious vision. Although the term *milli* means "national," *Milli Görüş* used it in a religiously connoted way.

I discussed the struggle between the terms *ulus*, *millet*, and *budun* in the second and third chapter above. *Ulus* and *budun* were revived from old Turkish sources. For instance, *budun* was used in the Orkun inscriptions next to the term "Turk" to identify all clans. However, *ulus* had a geographical sense in the inscriptions. *Ulus* was chosen as the term nation in 1934. If *budun* had been used instead of *ulus*, it would have had a tendency to identify the nation along more ethnic lines. This could have caused more discussions and conflicts on Turkish identity, citizenship, and the state in Turkey.

Political ideologies, discourses, cultures, and, that is to say, social life are fluid in time. Thus, vocabulary and the way of mobilizing society change according to new conjunctures. The language of daily life is also influenced by these conjuncture changes. This situation precludes the history of concepts from becoming static. The history of concepts is alive and changeable, and it has a continuously evolving structure, as do human beings and society. Thus, writing a history of a concept always requires further revision. I experienced this need first hand during my thesis-writing process. There was a military coup attempt on 15 July 2016 in Turkey. A group of soldiers in the armed forces attempted a coup against the elected government. The attempt failed, but this sequence of events did create a new political language in Turkey. If we accept the 15 July coup attempt as a milestone for Turkish political life and discourse, we should add a new page for the conceptual history of the term “nation” in Turkey. The way the word *millet* was used in the aftermath of the failed coup shows this clearly. In President Erdoğan’s political language, the word *millet* gained again its religious connotation. This can be seen in all his conferences, rallies, and interview speeches. The term *millet* started to imply a group of believers who respect religious and traditional values rather than the idea of a modern nation. The term *ulus* was never used to define people during this process. Thus, *ulus* lost its existence in political language. This term and its derivations were frequently used in Kemalist discourse in earlier periods. However, the post-15 July period revived the usage of the term *millet*. This constant usage of the term tacitly contained its religious connotation as well. On the other hand, as I mentioned above, academic literature over the past few decades started preferring the term *ulus* to unambiguously designate the idea of nation. As is seen, usage frequency, the ranking of words, and their connotations change according to conjuncture. This shows that the history of concepts may need to be updated from time to time.

Before writing this thesis, my aims were as follows:

- 1) Understanding the role of language in discussions of nationalism.
How effective is language in determining the boundaries of nation in a country? How does language affect the development of nationalism in a country?

- 2) Understanding the role of language in the search for identity in the late Ottoman Empire.

To what extent did the importance of language change in the Ottoman Empire in the Tanzimat reform era and afterwards? What was the relation between efforts to simplify the Turkish language and modernization? Is it possible to read this history as similar to the French and German experiences?

- 3) Understanding the path of identity change from the War of Independence to Atatürk's death.

Which elements constituted Turkish identity during the Turkish War of Independence and how did the change over time? To what extent did religion influence the identity?

- 4) Understanding the role of language in the post-1929 era and in the establishment of a new Turkish identity.

What kind of implementations were done to establish a nation state in Turkey? How were Turkish language and history instrumentalized to define the borders of the Turkish nation and nationalism? What were the reasons for the Turkish language reform and Turkish history thesis?

- 5) Understanding the revival of the term *ulus* instead of *millet* and its effects on political discourse.

What were the historical adventures of the terms *millet* and *ulus*? How were these terms received by society and institutions? To what extent and where exactly were they used? Why was the term *ulus* selected but not the term *budun*? Which term was used more frequently in political discourse and daily life? How political standings affect the selection of terms in political discourse? Which term is more suitable to use as the equivalent for the term "nation" today?

These concerns were mine main concerns before writing this thesis. On the other hand, I did not want just to write a history of a concept, but I wanted to correlate it with Turkish nationalisms, language policies, and identity studies. Therefore, the thesis has several pillars. Undoubtedly, a master's thesis cannot completely process

all these fields. The following are the achievements and shortcomings of this study that I intend to explore in my future research:

- 1) I attempted to read Ottoman history from recent books about the topic. Therefore, I did not categorize late Ottoman history using the sharp division of Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism. I did not directly correlate the increasing usage of Turkish language and Turkism, because otherwise it would have been difficult to define the article 18 of the Kanun-i Esasi (1876) regarding the Turkish language. In this respect, this thesis distinguishes itself from older works on the same topic. For example, Hüseyin Sadoğlu evaluates the late Ottoman history in three categories like Yusuf Akçura such as Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism. Therefore, he correlates the increasing importance of the Turkish language in the Ottoman Empire with Turkism. However, recent studies evaluate this categorization more fluidly than the classical literature. I attempted to set the relation between this fluidity and the Turkish language according to this vision in the first chapter.
- 2) I attempted to avoid writing my thesis according to Turkish official historiography, though without digressing from the academic field. I read and cited books and articles written from a critical perspective in order to discuss topics clearly. I analyzed the primary sources with the help of these books and articles. Thus, I attempted to provide a strong critical standing in this thesis. This concern helped me to realize that the religion factor had more importance on mobilizing society in the early Republican era than official history books explain. Thus, it helped to me to understand the strict change of identity from religious boundaries to a secular and ethnic frame.
- 3) I traced the conceptual history of the term *ulus* by means of classical Turkish books, inscriptions, sagas, dictionaries, and etymological dictionaries. I discussed the different explanations of the term's origins and I presented them objectively in the thesis. In future however, to write a stronger conceptual history of this term, books in various languages written in the Central Asia between the 13th and 17th centuries could be

scanned, which would strengthen the argumentation and sampling of the thesis. Dictionaries give certain meanings, but if it is possible to see the word in a book or saga, it is more likely to understand the semantic layers of the term. It is possible regarding the term *ulus* to say that if these books can be scanned, we will have a clearer idea about the reason of the selection of the term *ulus* instead of *budun* as the equivalent for the term “nation.”

- 4) Although I gave a brief account of the historical course of the term *millet* in the thesis, I only investigated the essentials and milestones about the term. This thesis provided a parallel reading for both terms *millet* and *ulus*. A study of the term *millet* would be more difficult than this one on the term *ulus*, but this thesis could prove helpful to conceptual studies on the term *millet* in several ways. I discussed the etymology and early usage of the term *millet* in the second chapter above. The term has several layers of meaning as it was used in Islamic law and in the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, a difficult research process and advanced language skills are needed. Regarding this study, I collected many sources about the conceptual history of the term and I offer extensive account of another term with the same meaning. Thus, I hope it will help future researchers on the topic.
- 5) I investigated the derivations of the term *ulus* as well in the thesis. *Ulusalcılık* and *ulusçuluk* were the main focuses in this respect. I tried to explain and discuss these terms in the light of some columns, books, and newspaper clippings. I investigated the essentials, but the contemporary usage and ideological framework of these terms can be strengthened and deepened with further investigations on primary sources. Various journals, periodicals, and newspapers can be scanned in depth and analyzed to better understand the creation and ideological argumentation of the term *ulusalcılık*. Speeches and texts of politicians and authors such as Niyazi Berkes and Doğu Perinçek can be investigated. These will help to more easily distinguish and build the political frames of the terms.

6) I focused on a topic that had not previously been comprehensively investigated in Turkey. The Turkish language presents a jungle for academic studies of conceptual history. The Turkish language had radical changes in the last century in the political system and daily life. Many concepts of several fields lost some of their layers of meanings and some other concepts gained new layers of meaning. Many words that were used in Ottoman political and daily life were integrated to the republican era. The situation provides rich sources for conceptual history studies. Unfortunately, studying the history of a concept is not common in Turkish academy. Yet, no conceptual history study is completely finished, and there a lot of discussion to do in this frame. Thus, I hope that this thesis will encourage other studies on the history of concepts that will contribute further to the development of the conceptual history of the term *ulus*.

In this thesis, I explained the story of the re-extraction of the term *ulus* from dusty books by correlating and discussing it in the context of the modernization process of Turkey. On this path, I touched on types of language policies, types of nationalism, the Milli Mücadele period, secularism, religion, the Turkish history thesis, and the Turkish language reform. I attempted to analyze all these points in the conceptual history of the term *ulus*. The result I ultimately got was that although the layers of the meaning of the term *ulus* and its historical background did not direct us to declare it an equivalent for the term “nation,” the new meaning of the concept has been accepted to some extent by society. When compared to the term *millet*, the term *ulus* gives today a more precise meaning for the idea of nation. Therefore, the recent academic literature uses the term *ulus* more frequently to avoid ambiguity.

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APPENDIX

Some pictures and newspaper clippings that show the transition of terms in time.



The motto "Hakimiyet Milletindir" on the wall of the first parliament



Another picture showing the wall of parliament



The wall of parliament after the language reform



The final state of the motto on the wall of current parliament

Tıvrelif = resmi
 Tıvrelı = mintayam
 Tıvretken = mücit
 Tıvrek = bahadır, zikâdet
 Tıvıs = haslet, renk, sima
 Tıvız = adal, dıvıst, Tıvızıvız = söz
 Tıvızlık = adalet
 Tıvızlık = vıvızam, karda, vıvız
 mıvım, tıvızimat
 vıvız = akıv, kenar
 +k =
 vıvızmak = eorvet
 vıvızlık = Harf Hece
 vıvızlık = Harf, Hece (vıvızlık)
 vıvızlık =

vıvız / vıvız
 millet / Devlet

vıvız = mintayın
 vıvız = vıvız
 vıvızmak = rica etmek / vıvızmak
 vıvız = arız
 vıvız = rica, vıvız
 vıvız = vıvız d.

Ulus as equivalent for millet at Atatürk's handwriting



ON BEŞİNCİ YIL, No: 493

EDİRNE

İlk gençliğinin iki unvanı azacığınca bir anam, öbürü Edirne'dir.

1912 Edirne yanında bütün yurda nasıl bir gönül kavratmış, çokluğunu kim unutmamıştır? Büyük ağacın dallarını kırın, gövdelerini bükün fırtına, Edirne'de, onu bu künden sarıtsın.

Ana yerine gelmez. Edirne bir daha nerede bulunur?

Edirne ile, Avrupa topraklarındaki son Türk savağı yere düştü. Düşen sancak gibi üstüne atıldı: Onu kurtarmakla, bilikülmüş boyumuz doğruldu, başımız yerden kalktı.

Büyük kurtuluş savaşını da Edirne ile bitirdik. O bir suar üstü değil, bir temel taşıdır: Yeterince oynuyunuz. O bir soy üretilidir: Türk kabeşektir. Alastık'un yurdu arasında mahl Edirne'den öte-

27

İhtisâcî teşrin
1934
SALI

HAKİMİYETİ MİLLİYE

Her gün sabahları, Ankara'da çıkar

Her yerde 5 kuruş

Geçmişten kalma "içtimâî üstünlük doğuran unvanlar," ağa, bey, efendi, paşa tüm kalktı

Meclis, kalkan unvanlar arasına, molla, hafız, hoca sınıflarını da ekledi



KANUN

Birinci madde: — Ağa, Hoca, Hafız, Hoca, Molla, Efendi, Bey, Beyşeyh, Paşa, Hanım, Hanımefendi ve Hazretleri gibi unvanlar kaldırılmıştır. Erkek ve kadın vatandaşlar, herhangi bir zamanda ve resmi belgelerde yalnız adlarıyla anılabilir.

İhtisâcî madde: — Sicil rütbe ve resmi nişanlar ve maddiyat kaldırılmıştır ve bu nişan, maddiyatların kullanılmasını yasaklar.

Büyük Atatürke

Katle ölmüş sana Atatürk akl,
Ey türklerin göklerine uçtu kanak.
Sen büyük soyunun titizliğini elinden,
O da öteden sana gönül bağlad.

Yayın yitirdiklere şüksek ümitsiz;
Ne muhta bilere görülmek boğulmuş.
Görüp yitirdiler de inanisizler,
Her yitirden ümitsizliğine ümitsizlik.

Bükünmüş boynunu umutsuz, yurdunu;
Sen önde yeryüzü bir sen buldun.
Sarıpın boyluğuna bir yarı ayık,
Bombay gömüllere inan delirdün.

Sıldın alımlarına sen, sınırsız yarı,
İçlere çöken o silimmez paşa,
Neyyasan büyükleri illerine, vatan,
Ey büyük ulusun İhtisâcî Atan.

36 kaskın teşir var, ne yitirdik (tanrıya)
Sana bir gününce öğretilmiş.
Güdermiş güdermiş yitirdiklerimiz.



ULUS

28

Son sayının
1934
CARŞAMBA

ON BEŞİNCİ YIL, No: 4794

Adımız andımızdır

Her yerde 5 kuruş

UÇ BOY

Türkün üç boyu vardır; İnan!
Biri: (Ulu) dur;
Biri: (Ulutürk) tür;
Biri: (Atatürk)...

İnanırım!
Ulu demek yeter, Türktür o;
İnan!

Ulu Türkün bağrından Ulular
Ulusu doğar; Kutluğ gibi.. O.
güz gibi.. Atıla gibi..

Onlara (Ulutürk) derler,
İnanırım!

Ulular Ulusu (Ulutürk) lerin
Emulusu da (Atatürk) tür.

Otağ; evrenler bağrında yük-
selen Çankaya'dadır, bir.. göçül-
ler içindedir, iki.. ölmezlik başın-
dadır, üç..

İnanırım!

Uç gez, yedi gez, kırk gez.. sa-
yılardan artık gez inandım!

**Hakimiyeti Milliye'yi kuran Atatürk'tür,
Gazetemize ULUS adını da O verdi.
Adımız, andımızdır: Atatürk'ün ulusçuluk
yolunda yürüyeceğiz.**

C. H. F. Grupunda

*Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Meclis Grubu İdare Heyeti Reisi-
ğinden:*

*Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Grubu Reis Vehidî Cemil'in başkan-
lığı altında toplandı. Evvelce hükümet tarafından tahsisli olarak
soğulan emlakların tahsislerinin ıvazlanması ve bedel miktarının azal-
tılması için Manisa Meclisleri tarafından yapılan teklif, Meclise
Vehtipin hazırlığıyla konuldu. İdare Heyetinin seçeceği bir en-
cubanın vasıtasıyla bu meselelerin teklif ettirilmesini kararlaştırıldı.*

Ökonomi Bakanlığı

Yeni müsteşarı

Türkoğlu Reisi Kurtuluş Faik
Ökonomi Bakanlığı Müsteşarlığı-
na tayin edilmiş ve tayini yüksek
tasdikten geçmiştir. Kurtuluş Fa-
ik'in yeni işini kutlarsak.

Sevgili

Başbakanımıza

Büyük Atatürk'ün yâseleşiş güvünü
Dedi, sana bugün: İmet İsmail
O çetin avazı ilk muhtolayan
Yadı yurubunza bu ünlü gün.

Ne umitli sen gibi bir türk ağlasa,
Büyük önder seni aldı koluna.
İnanın dışarını salmadan zâden,
Oğrile kendisi verdin yoluna.
İnanın vâkıfın, bir arzubaşın.

Halkevinde

Soyadı koyma günü



Ulus the day after Atatürk's death