

**A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE 1954 AND 2013 CRACKDOWNS ON
THE MUSLIM BROTHERS IN EGYPT**

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This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and International Relations.

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
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A handwritten signature in blue ink, consisting of a large, stylized 'O' followed by a horizontal line that extends to the right.

ABSTRACT

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE 1954 AND 2013 CRACKDOWNS ON THE MUSLIM BROTHERS

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Muslim Brothers have been one of the most important organizations in Egypt with its history spanning more than eighty-years. Founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Al-Banna, it swiftly rose as an important political actor both within and outside Egypt. Its being an important actor in the political arena has been costly for the organization. This thesis attempts to examine two crackdowns against the organization, one in 1954 and the other in 2013, to understand their similar and different dynamics. To do so the thesis first examines the general historical contexts of the clashes between the Egyptian state and the Muslim Brothers, the international dimension of the crackdowns, their political economy, and lastly their aftermath. The examination shows that the similarities are deep in that both like al-Nasser, al-Sisi has been enthusiastic about eradicating the Muslim Brothers completely. It also shows while the Brothers were able to revive thanks to the opportunity spaces opened in the early 1970s through the efforts of figures like Umar al-Tilmisani, they are not in propitious conditions now to gain their old status.

Keywords: Egypt, the Muslim Brothers, political Islam, crackdown

ÖZ

MÜSLÜMANLAR KARDEŞLER'İN MARUZ KALDIĞI İKİ BASKI DÖNEMİNİN İNCELENMESİ: 1954 VE 2013 BASKI DÖNEMLERİ

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Müslüman Kardeşler hareketi kurulduğu 1928 yılından beri hem Mısır'ın hem de Ortadoğu'nun en önemli aktörlerinden biri olagelmıştır. Siyasi arenada önemli ve etkin bir actor olagelen bu hareket bu etkinliği ve etkililiğinin bedelini birçok defa devletin hışmına maruz kalarak ödemiştir. Bu çalışma, bu bağlamda hareketin maruz kaldığı iki baskı dönemine odaklanıp bu dönemleri karşılaştırmıştır. İlk olat-rak Cemal AbdulNasır'a suikast girişimi sonrası hareketin maruz kaldığı ve nerdeyse yirmi yıl süren baskı dönemini incelemiştir. Sonrasında da 2013 yılında darbeyi müteakip maruz kalınan ortadan kaldırma çabalarını incelemiştir. Bu çalışma, bu dönemleri, şiddet, ekonomi-politik ve uluslararası boyutları bağlamında karşılaştırmaya girişmiştir. Bu karşılaştırma, hareketin 1954'teki benzeri bir yok edilme çabasıyla karşı karşıya olduğuna işaret etmiştir. Bu sancılı dönemden nasıl çıkılacağı belirsizliğini korurken, hareketin 1970'lerin başında tekrardan filizlenmesinin uygun şartlar oluştuğunda tekrarlanabileceğini düşünmek yersiz olmayacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Mısır, Müslüman Kardeşler, Siyasal İslam, baskılama

DEDICATION

To my beloved wife Sümeyye...



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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

“In July and August 2013, many of Egypt’s public squares and streets were *awash in blood*” (emphasis added, Human Rights Watch, August 2014, p.3) is the first sentence of Human Rights Watch’s report regarding the dispersal happening in the Rabaa square in the summer of 2013. It was a tragedy in and of blood befalling to the Brothers under eyes of people all around the world. It was a tragedy containing snipers on the roofs shooting people to death, thugs of the regime chasing people with all kinds of annihilating tools, police forces burning mosques with deceased and alive in them, soldiers preventing people from escaping from the square and making them prey for bullets of the regime. The July 3 of 2013, to be more precise and shorter, was an incarnation of brutality of a regime in the full sense of the word. The Human Rights Watch’s statement regarding this mass killing being “one of the world’s largest killings of demonstrators in a single day in recent history” by comparing it to other crackdowns is meaningful:

The indiscriminate and deliberate use of lethal force resulted in one of the world’s largest killings of demonstrators in a single day in recent history. By way of contrast, credible estimates indicate that Chinese government forces killed between 400-800 protesters largely over a 24-hour span during the Tiananmen Massacre on June 3-4, 1989 and that Uzbek forces killed roughly similar numbers in one day during the 2005 Andijan Massacre (Human Rights Watch, p.6).

The lethality of the crackdown is beyond words. What comes to mind or what should come to mind, at this point, is whether this crackdown was something new for the organization or not. This question is important in that it will give us some clues regarding how the organization will be able to weather such destructive circumstances. To say that this is new will not be a true answer because the Brothers in their relatively long history spanning almost the whole 20th century encountered such kinds of hard times even it may be argued in relatively mild levels. It might even be asserted that the history of the Brothers is a history of a cycle of crackdowns. Upon us now is to examine such periods.

The post-war of Egypt in the second half of the 1940s was full of chaos, disorder, destruction, violence, bloodshed. Termination of the Second World War with a

“Pyrrhus victory” of the United Kingdom along with the Allies plunged Egypt into uncharted waters mainly because this fragile victory crippling the Kingdom’s power triggered the domestic forces wishing to get rid of the yoke of the Empire. The stage was for these domestic forces that did not hesitate to launch a low-intensity uprising against the British forces and their domestic allies inside the palace. “From 1946 onwards”, says Mitchell (1993) by pointing this uprising mood, “in the large cities until after evacuation, and then in the Canal Zone whither the troops were withdrawn, bomb assaults on the British in their passing cars, establishments, or enclaves were common” (p.60). Among these domestic forces was of course the Muslim Brothers organization. It is even possible to assert that they were the leading faction targeting both the British forces and the government’s men. The year 1948 was a turning point for what would be coming. Ahmad al-Khazindar Bey, a respected judge, was assassinated by two Brothers, presumably members of the Brothers’ armed wing Secret Apparatus, because of the judge’s verdict regarding a Brother attacking the British forces. The situation in Egypt exacerbated throughout the year 1948; chaos reached to unprecedented levels. In December the Prime Minister Nuqrashi Pasha was assassinated by the Brothers as a reaction to the decree by the Nuqrashi government that ordered dissolving of the Brothers organization. The government got its revenge by assassinating Hasan al-Al-Banna in February 1949. Following the assassination, the government launched a comprehensive arrest campaign against the Brothers. Approximately 4000 Brothers had been incarcerated in the camp-prisons of Tur, Huckstep, and Uyun Musa by the mid-1949 (Mitchell, 1993, p.72). This crackdown on the Brothers both through incarcerations and trials continued until the Free Officers coup of 1954.

Founded in 1928, the Muslim Brothers organization had transformed into an important actor in the Egyptian political arena. They attempted to participate in the elections of 1942 and 1945 but to no avail due to the palace’s obstructions. This visibility on the political arena was the reason why they befall to the calamity by the palace and its men in the last years of 1940s. The assassination of the founder of the organization Hasan al-Al-Banna, seen by his followers “as an example of the

combination of religious conviction with moral courage and public engagement..... as charismatic and appealing to the masses of believers.....as exemplifying Islamic ideals” (Zoellner, 2007, 9), dealt a lethal blow to the organization. Added to that was the internal imbroglio about who would be the next leader and what kind of a path the organization would take. Amidst this mostly internal chaos came the Free Officers coup, nom de guerre the coup of “the blessed movement”. Jubilation with paeans on the side of the Brothers echoed in the words of Hasan al-Al-Banna’s father Abd al-Rahman al-Al-Banna:

O ye Brothers, this day your message has come forth. . . . This is a new dawn for you ... and a new day for the nation. Anticipate the dawn, O ye Brothers . . . embrace Neguib and help him with your hearts, your blood, and your wealth. Be his troops . . . for this is the message of "Hasan" for which God has willed success. . . . (quoted in Mitchell, 1993, 105).

This mood of jubilation did not last long because the Brothers woke to ambitions of the Free Officers regarding not giving up the power. What followed from the very beginning of the coup until the end of 1954 was an arm wrestling that ended up with one of the harshest crackdown the Brothers have ever experienced. On 26 October 1954 one of allegedly the members of the Secret Apparatus, the armed wing of the then Brothers, attempted to assassinate Gamal abd al-Nasser while he was addressing a huge throng. Unharmed by the bullets, Nasser embarked on eradicating all the opposition in general and the Muslim Brothers in particular from the soils of Egypt. What befell to the Brothers after the assassination attempt was beyond words. 5 important leading figures were executed and thousands were incarcerated and tortured. The organization was torn apart unprecedentedly. This *mihna*/inquisition lasted until the charismatic leader al-Nasser died in 1971. When the Brothers began to return to the Egyptian arena, there were a handful of them. When they embarked on re-establishing the organization from its ashes, they had the debilitating burden of Nasser’s years with an almost non-existent structure. It was a burden that brought 16-years of persecution with itself.

The 16-year of persecution ended with the death of Gamal Abd-al Nasser in 1970. The successor of Nasser Anwar Sadat, trying to get rid of the shadow of the charismatic Nasser, opened the path Islamic organizations like the Muslim Brothers.

Reorganizing itself from the scratch, the Brothers began to increase its influence within the Egyptian society especially among the university students. In the mid-1980s, the Brothers had already forgotten its years of persecution under Nasser. They transformed into a huge organization with a considerable political and social clout. The Brothers' plunge into politics both through direct participation in elections like 1984 and 1987 elections and indirect participation through professional syndicates was remarkable. It was remarkable on the one hand but quite dangerous on the other hand because the bells were ringing for the regime. With the early 1990s, when the Brothers were ubiquitous in Egypt, the regime launched crackdowns against the Brothers. Although it is possible to say the regime intended to eradicate the organization from the soils of Egypt, it is possible to say it aimed to eradicate, or at least cripple to a great extent, its political presence in Egypt. It was the 1995 elections the regime launched its crackdown on the Brothers after a long period of time. Out of 170 candidates, only one won a seat, which revoked later. The regime forces did their best to intimidate and terrorise rank and files of the organization. The high-ranking figures was arrested and pressured, the rank and file intimidated. These policies reminded the members of the old hard days, which did not end in the forthcoming years.

The 21st century started with elections in Egypt. Having gained the fruits of crackdown on the Brothers, the regimes adopted a similar policy in the 2000 elections. The regime did its best to prevent the Brothers winning seats in the parliament. The regime meddled in the voting process initially by arresting 1400 individuals, 1000 being the members of the Brothers and then by preventing people reaching polling stations for voting. The regime got what it wanted: The Brothers won only 17 seats. What started in the mid-1990s transformed into being an inseparable part of the members of the Muslim Brothers. That is to say, the Brothers get used to live under the tight surveillance of the regime after a relatively peaceful two decades. The 2010 elections were not different from those of the 2000. The crackdowns which had been the only game in the town for quite a while continued. The Brothers fielded 135 candidates but to no avail. The regime brooked no more participation of the civilians especially the archenemy the Brothers. On the

eve of the so-called “Tahrir revolution”, the Brothers were almost invisible in the Egyptian political arena due to permanent onslaughts.

Founded in 1928, the Muslim Brothers could not escape their unfortunate destiny of experiencing crackdowns. As shown above, there is almost no period the organization have not experienced a kind of crackdown – be it harsh or soft. However, among all these crackdowns two stand out in terms of their depth, extensity and lethality. These are the 2013 and 1954 crackdowns, respectively. Before the 2013 crackdown, it was argued that the harshest crackdown the Brothers experienced was that of Nasser following the assassination attempt against him. Upon seeing what happened in the Rabaa in the July of 2013, many have rethought this. This dissertation, in this connection, aims to plunge into these two periods and to see whether they are similar or different. If similar, what kinds of similarities there are or if different what kinds of differences there are. That is, my dissertation tries to do an (in-depth) study of the two crackdowns of 1954 and 2013 against the Muslim Brothers to investigate differences or similarities between these two periods. Added to that question is whether the experiences of 1954 constitute a historical precedent to weather these chaotic and severe circumstances and thus to get rid of total collapse. That is, a comparison between these two periods will give us insights about the question whether the Brothers will be back or not.

1.1. Methodology

This thesis compares the crackdowns of 1954 and 2013. Much ink has been spilt over the recent bloody state repression of the Muslim Brothers, but what insights does a comparison with the 1954 repression yield to better make sense of today’s Egyptian politics? By using the comparative method/approach and partially process tracing this study humbly embarks on giving the contours of these two crackdowns. The added question that whether it is possible to talk about a historical precedent regarding the path the Brothers will take amidst these toilsome circumstances will be examined mainly through the comparative method and partially through process tracing. Ours is the attempt to compare two crackdowns one by one in two

different chapters by giving the general background of the crackdowns and aftermath of the crackdowns in terms of political economy, international/regional dimension and radicalisation. The comparison of the two crackdowns will be made through two separate chapters on the 1954 crackdown and the 2013 crackdown respectively. And the next chapter will delve into questioning the dimensions of the differences and similarities. The study will do that with the help of comparative approach so that the dimensions of similarity and difference become crystal clear. These dimensions may possibly give insights into the possible paths the Muslim Brothers will take under these circumstances. The path the Muslim Brothers will take, upon insights gained through the examinations of the two periods, may be explained through the process tracing because an in-depth examination of the crackdowns may illuminate certain paths and the reasons behind taking of these possible paths.

The study mainly uses the secondary sources including books written on the Muslim Brothers organization, on Gamal Abd al-Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak's reigns and on the crackdowns. The books used are of great importance because reaching to the 1954 crackdown has been through these books. Without them it would be a big deal to narrate what was happening in the 1950s. Apart from the books, journal articles written on the Muslim Brothers has been used as well. Especially as far as the recent 2013 crackdown is concerned, the study mostly has benefited from the print media. To be a relatively new phenomenon makes the 2013 crackdown bereft of substantial examinations through books. That is why, out of necessity the study largely has relied on the print media. It should be admitted that if the primary sources were used, the study would be stronger than it is now. Although the study has tried to compensate this weakness by using Arabic media to some extent, it may not be possible to argue that using Arabic has been sufficient enough to compensate this weakness. A study upon primary sources may bring out stronger implications.

Structure of the Study

This study consists of five chapters. The first chapter is the introduction chapter giving a general outline of the study. The second chapter concentrates on the 1954 crackdown on the Muslim Brothers following the assassination attempt against Gamal Abd al-Nasser. In order to contextualize the power struggle and the subsequent crackdown a general background has been introduced blending the history of Egypt with that of the Muslim Brothers. The path to the Free Officers coup and especially accompanying tense atmosphere of then Egypt are of great importance for understanding upcoming clashes between the Free Officers and all other actors in general and the Officers and the Brothers in particular. After this brief background, stages of the Free Officers coup and the subsequent power struggle between the Officers and the Brothers has been introduced. These stages have been examined under four periods by making use of periodization of Anne Alexander. Each stage has seen an escalation of tension, which at the end of the day culminated in the form of head-on confrontation. The chapter continues with elaboration of the calamity befalling the Brothers after the assassination attempt against al-Nasser. Lastly, three dimensions of the crackdown, that is, political economy, international context and resort to violence dimensions has been handled.

Chapter 3 is concentrating on the 2013 crackdown following ouster of Mohamed Morsi through the bloody coup. By giving a basic background information that encompasses rise of the Brothers from its ashes in 1970s and burgeoning in 1980s and 1990s until 2010s, the chapter embarks on contextualizing the path to the Tahrir “revolution” and the aftermath. Then, focus is concentrated on the transition period from ouster of Hosni Mubarak to the parliamentary elections held in 2012. From this point on, that is, the parliamentary elections things went awry for the revolutionaries in general and the Muslim Brothers in particular. The study has also examined in detail this tense period culminating in the coup in the July of 2013: how the Brothers struggled to protect their achievements, how the ancient regime tried to undermine the legitimacy of the Brothers, how tension in general escalated. The study, then, has examined in detail three dimensions of the coup, that is, the political economy of the crackdown including the data on confiscation of the

Brothers' properties, regional and international context and violence dimensions. Lastly, regarding the question whether the Brothers will resort to arms, the study has projected the possible path the Brothers may take amidst these harsh circumstances.

Chapter 4 is an analytic comparison between the two crackdowns under three titles, that is, leadership, regional and international conjecture, internal dynamics and political economy. Under each title, the two crackdowns have been examined in accordance with the titles concerned. The study has tried to cast light upon the question regarding the question whether the leadership of the two leaders of the crackdowns al-Nasser and Sisi respectively matters under the leadership title. The regional and international conjecture has been discussed and current developments both in region and international arena that might and may have impact on the future of the crackdowns. Whether the Brothers will resort to arms has been examined in the light of the experiences of the 1954 crackdown under the title of the internal dynamics. Lastly, the study has elaborated on the political economies of the two crackdowns by shedding light upon the contours of economic aspect.

The conclusion chapter briefly has touched upon what the study has tried to do so far. Besides this, some brief commentaries will be made regarding the path the Muslim Brothers will take by taking the historical precedent into consideration. The conclusion will briefly dwell on whether the chaotic circumstances in Egypt and the increasing authoritarian streak of the regime will lead to an armed confrontation. This evaluation will be made through the use of social movement theory literature. By benefiting from what this field provides us we will be able to make certain generalizations regarding what kind of a path or paths the Brothers will take.

CHAPTER 2: THE 1954 CRACKDOWN

2.1. EGYPT IN TURMOIL: 1952-54

2.1.1. The Fiasco of the Liberal Age and the Muslim Brothers

The path to the Free Officers coup d'état of 1952 and 2 years later harsh crackdown on the Muslim Brothers was laid down by the failure of the period called "liberal age" of Egypt. The comment "twenty-eight uneasy years of parliamentary rule, years that had undermined faith in liberalism and left a large segment of the Egyptian intelligentsia amenable to the notion of military intervention in the political process" (Gordon, 1992, 14) was powerful to grasp the mood regarding this liberal age and therefore necessitates a brief look before passing to the early 50s of Egypt. The end of World War I brought hopes of total independence from Britain on the part of Egyptians. These hopes regarding independence in the post-war settlement did not find any repercussions among the British. The result was the 1919 uprising which caused total chaos in Egypt. The uprising forced the British to give Egypt partial independence in 1922. It was partial independence because Britain reserved the right to interfere in internal affairs in four areas: "the rights of foreign interests and minorities; the defence of Egypt against foreign aggression or interference; the Suez Canal; and the Sudan" (Gordon, 16). The approval of the constitution and elections followed in 1923 and 1924 respectively. The founder of the new Wafd Party Sa'd Zaghlul formed Egypt's first parliamentary government in liberal era. The liberal era from the 1920s was riddled with competing interests that crippled the parliamentary period. While there were destructive competing interests on the political agenda on the one hand, there was also the rallying cry for total independence from Britain on the other hand in the 1920s.

Amidst the rising discontent against the tutelage of the British, the Muslim Brothers arose. In Dhu al-Qai'da in Ismailiyya in March 1928, Hasan al-Al-Banna with six workers founded the Society of the Muslim Brothers. "We are brothers in service of Islam", said al-Al-Banna and gave the name by saying "hence, we are the Muslim Brothers" (Mitchell, 1993, 8). The path to the foundation of the Muslim Brothers was shaped to a great extent when al-Al-Banna, immediately after his appointment

to Ismailiyya, observed the British political and economic occupation in Ismailiyya. The nakedness of the British occupation was visible for him when al-Al-Banna saw “the conspicuously luxurious homes of the foreigners overlooking the 'miserable' homes of their workers” (Mitchell, 7). What started as a small movement in the Canal Zone of Egypt would have an indelible impact on the whole country in the coming years. Within four years after its foundation, besides having minor connections with the capital Cairo, the Brothers had branches along the eastern edge of the Delta Ismailiyya, Port Said, Suez and Abu Suwayr and on the western edge as far as Shubra Khit (Mitchell, 9). Moving from periphery to the centre, that is by transferring the headquarter from Ismailiyya to Cairo and opening its first branch in Cairo, the Brothers under the leadership of al-Al-Banna was gradually transforming into a nationwide movement.

1930s came with two important developments, first being the development regarding the revisions in the Anglo-Egyptian treaty and the second the coronation of the new king Farouk (Gordon, 17). King's plunge into “his insatiable personal appetites”, the increasing number of sycophants in the palace, the decadence and corruption of the politicians marked the 1930s and spread cynicism among the population. The corruption of the status quo politics and the consequent cynicism among the Egyptian enabled the voice of the Brothers to be heard. It was against this background the leap of the Brothers from the periphery to the centre of the country, Cairo, became meaningful. The move from Ismailiyya to Cairo accompanied deliberations on the future of the organization. The transfer to Cairo brought the questions with itself and consequently led to a series of conferences concentrating on these kinds of questions. The conferences made the Muslim Brothers a full-fledged organization. The first conference held in 1933 was concerned with the Christian missionary activities and how to tackle with these activities. The second conference was also held in 1933. It was concerned first with the proselytizing of the movement and second with construction a press for the Brothers. The third conference held in 1935 was an important one and mainly concerned with, as a result of the increase in membership, questions like membership criteria and responsibilities, the hierarchy and the structure of the movement (Mitchell, 13). The

fifth conference of 1939 was a turning point in the history of the movement. With this conference, al-Al-Banna decided the movement should play a much more active role in the political arena. As Al-Banna called it with this conference, the Brothers passed into “the stage of execution” and the movement was a political organization. Besides these, Al-Banna defined the movement as “a Salafiyya message, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political organization, an athletic group, a cultural-educational union, an economic company, and a social idea” (quoted in Mitchell, 14). As Mitchell (1993) aptly emphasizes:

The fifth conference of 1939 suggested that the Society had assumed its fundamental shape and was sufficiently strong, in its own mind, to flex its muscles publicly albeit cautiously. Its external activity, limited only by the exigencies of an organization in growth, developed more boldly, more self-assuredly, and more inclusively as its ideas, and the instruments of those ideas, evolved more clearly and precisely (15).

The fifth conference and outbreak of the clashes in Palestine marked the visible appearance of the Brothers in the political arena. The Brothers’ efforts to help their Muslim brethren in Palestine both boosted its popularity among the people and its role as a political actor in Egyptian political scene. Sixth conference held in January 1941 brought the political intention of the movement and of al-Al-Banna to the fore. The movement decided to run candidates in national elections to test its strength on the ground. The government summoned Al-Banna and persuaded not to run candidates in exchange for freedom for the movement’s activities. When al-Al-Banna decided to run in elections of 1945, this time the regime did whatever it could to obstruct the election of Al-Banna. The increasing popularity and consequently visibility on the political arena soured the relations between the Brothers and the regime in the coming years.

Over the course of the 1940s especially the second half of 1940s, Egypt was suffering from the tribulations of the World War II on the one hand and from the calls for social justice on the other hand. What Britain did on February 4, 1942, when the British forces surrounded the Abidin Palace and threatened the king to appoint a Wafd government, left an indelible wound in the national memory of the Egyptians. As Egypt was barrelling along the end of the 1940s, the chaos deepened

and aggravated. The end of the war brought the demands of total independence and therefore a national struggle against the Great Britain to the fore. The insistence of the Great Britain to maintain its control over Egypt in the aftermath of the war and inability of the government to oppose the intentions of the Great Britain brought non-governmental organizations such as the Muslim Brothers to the fore. The emergence of the Brothers as an important political actor was not smooth and unproblematic. Added to that chaotic atmosphere of Egypt was the internal problems simmering and surfacing in 1947 within the organization. Another significant development that shook the Brothers in the post-war period was the resolution regarding the partition of Palestine in November 1947. Amidst both internal and external developments shaking the movement, the movement found itself against the regime. The Brothers' insistence on helping Palestinians disturbed the government headed by the Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi Pasha. The assassination of Ahmad al-Khaznidar Bey –a respected judge- due to his verdict against a member of the Muslim Brother who attacked a British soldier, by the two members of secret apparatus of the Brothers (Mitchell, 62) unfolded the crisis that would end up the abolishment of the movement in December 1948. On 6 December 1948, the Muslim Brothers organization was dissolved by the decree of the government based on the charges “to embark on widespread terroristic activity of pressing danger to the security and existence of the state” (quoted in Mitchell, 66). On December 1948, the prime minister Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi Pasha was assassinated by a member of the Muslim Brothers Abd al-Majid Ahmad Hasan. Many Brothers were arrested but Hasan al-Al-Banna was not arrested. On 12 February 1949, Hasan al-Al-Banna was assassinated possibly by the state in revenge for the assassination of the Prime Minister Nuqrashi Pasha.

In 1950 two years before the coup d'état of the Free Officers after the bloody late 1940s hopes were somewhat high when the Egyptian went to the polls in January. Mustafa al-Nahhas, the Wafdist leader, won the elections and promised to make Egyptians' lives better. Both the hopes regarding the elections and the promises of al-Nahhas soon faded amidst the growing conflictual atmosphere within the political elites. While “the promise of the 1950 went unfulfilled” as a result of “corruption, internecine feuding, heavy-handed treatment of parliamentary

opponents, and the policy of conciliation toward the palace" (Gordon, 25), the path to the coup was being laid by the ineffectual political elites. In October 1951 while negotiations were underway between the British and Egyptian sides, al-Nahhas abrogated the 1936 treaty. The already simmering chaos outburst. January 1952 saw the bloody clashes between the British and Egyptian forces which led to what is called Black Saturday the burning of Cairo. The chaos lasted until the Free Officers seized power on July 23, 1952 and temporarily halted the burst of anger.

2.1.2. The Coup and the Aftermath

The aforementioned background, as it were a kind of political blizzard, seems to give some clues regarding what might happen thereafter. "The conditions associated with rebellion, if not revolutions were propitious", says Vatikiotis (1978). By pointing to this political blizzard pregnant with a political blast, he also adds the conditions of "rapid change, a demographic explosion and the movement of masses of people from country to the towns, all of them suffering the hardships of economic privation" (p.115). While it is possible to say "the conditions are propitious" for the coup, it is necessary to draw attention to two sparks that ignited the intention of coup among the Officers. The first is the Officer Club Elections of January 1952 that "marked the public confrontation between the King and the Free Officers" (Vatikiotis, 106). The king's attempts to block the victory of the Officers' slate after the Officers' decision to run a slate in the elections was a warning to be considered by the Officers regarding the time to do something. The dissolution of the Officers' Club on July 16 following the landslide victory of the Officers persuaded the Officers the time was ripe. The second event that accelerated the deliberations on staging a coup was the Black Saturday of January 1952. The burning of Cairo during the Black Saturday also made the Officer certain about the necessity of action. When the conditions were propitious and the sparks were ignited, what is next was the "saviour" salvaging the people and "a king for long" (Vatikiotis, 124).

The idea that the Officers would return to their barracks after restoring order and initiating the parliamentary life (Gordon, 38) proved to be false. That Nasser's aim

from the beginning was “the exclusive control of the revolution by the Free Officers” and that Nasser was in the pursuit of his own control over the Officer and by extension control over Egypt (Vatikiotis, 126) turned out to be true. What happened in the immediate aftermath of the coup was the Officers’ gradual penetration of the system and the consolidation of their control. The period beginning with the coup of 1952 and continuing until the assassination attempt against Nasser in 1954 saw fierce confrontations for the sake of getting the lion’s share. At the end of the day the Free Officers under the leadership of Gamal Abd-Nasser consolidated their power. It is possible to look at how this consolidation took place at two levels (Vatikiotis, 1978). The first one was the total control of the army and the second was the neutralisation and then destruction of all kinds of centres of power – be it the monarchy, political parties, financial, industrial and commercial members of the old ruling class. “A necessary corollary of this twin objective”, as Vatikiotis (1978) aptly points out, “was the control of education, the media, professional syndicates, trade unions, the rural structures in the countryside, the religious institutions and orders, the administration and bureaucracy, eventually, the whole society” (p.127).

The penetration of the Officers into the whole system was not a sudden occurrence. In the early phases of the coup they preferred an indirect role – behind the scenes. Slowly, under the leadership of Nasser the Officers adopted a more aggressive stance towards political rivals (Gordon, 1992). The above-mentioned consolidation of the power followed this path –from behind the scenes management of the country to the direct involvement and confrontation with the rivals. When the Officer staged the coup on July 23, 1952, they easily controlled the armed forces. They were more or less able to control the armed forces while weathering the storms of the post-coup confrontations. The day after the coup, the Officers invited “the least tainted of Egypt's old-guard independent politicians”, Ali Mahir, to form a government. Put forward as the new face of a new era, Mahir was used by the Officers as an instrument to spread the impression the constitutional order would be installed. Mahir assumed the office with the hope of reforming the corrupt system but naively without paying attention to the real intentions of the Officers.

He supported the continuation of martial law and the delay of elections for at least six months. Added to his brave stance was his attempt to install his autonomy from the junta. His attempts to be independent from impacts of the Officers and to follow policies to the detriment of the Officers made the confrontation inevitable. Mahir's opposition to land reform as a wealthy landowner was the last straw that broke the camel's back. Upon his opposition to land reform and his "stubborn independent streak" (Gordon, 65), the junta first initiated a minor shuffle in the cabinet on September 5 and the following day fired him. On September 7 Muhammed Naguib took the oath as the new prime minister. The Agrarian Reform law was ratified by Naguib on September 9. By enacting this land reform "the soldiers had struck a heavy blow against the land-owning elite and the economic base of its power" (Vatikiotis, 132).

The next target of the Officers were the political parties. The purification campaign against the rival political entities step by step was implemented. For six months after July 1952, the junta preferred not to plunge into the political struggles mainly because they did not want to give the impression the junta would hijack the constitutional order. Upon encountering a resistance from civilians beginning with Ali Mahir, the Officers did not leave their fortunes to chance. The confrontation between the Officers and the civilians gained momentum with the Parties Reorganisation Law of September 9. This law enabled the soldiers to subject all the political parties to army control under the Ministry of Interior, headed by Gamal Abd al-Nasser. The reactions of Mustafa al-Nahhas to this law is quintessentially emblematic of the reactions of the political parties: "The Army is a steamroller. Nothing will stop it short of a public fiercely attached to democratic principles and the constitution" (quoted by Vatikiotis, 132). In December 1952 the constitution was abolished and the elections were postponed until an evacuation agreement was signed with Britain. Although a committee composed of fifty members under Maher's supervision to draft a new constitution was constituted in January 1953, the intended outcome did not arise. And the committee turned into being a non-functional project. In the same month few days after the constitution of the committee the junta's confiscation of the political parties' properties already

heralded the committee would be ineffectual and the Officers has no intention to return to the barracks. Another important move was the formation of the Liberation Rally on January 23 by the Officers. By outlawing all political parties on January 16 and clearing the field for shaping the circumstances, the Officers now with the formation of the Rally, “free of taint of the old political parties” (Vatikiotis, 134), embarked on controlling all the political arena. The junta were barrelling along hegemony by destructing the old order when they enacted the eleven-article Provisional Constitution reminiscent of the Six Principles of Revolution on February 10, 1953. Abolition of the monarchy and declaration of a republic in June was the last nail in the coffin of the old order.

The declaration of the republic on June 18, 1953 “marks the turning-point in the intention of the soldiers to assume permanent power, and the transformation of the Revolutionary Committee Council (thereafter RCC) from a revolutionary directorate to a government” (Vatikiotis, 138). It was also the beginning of the power struggle between Nasser camp composed of the army, the Officers and Naguib camp composed of the civilians such as the Brothers. With the declaration of the Republic the head-on collision unfolded and escalated step by step. Naguib took over the posts of presidency, premiership and chairmanship of the RCC while Nasser became the Interior Minister and Vice-Premier. Two moves of the Nasser camp caught attention. The first was the promotion of Abdel Hakim Amer from major to major-general and then his appointment to commander of the armed forces. An acolyte of Nasser, Amer assumed the mission of purification of the dissenters within the armed forces and then of control of the armed forces. The second move was the existence of the RCC members in the new Cabinet. These members, being acolytes of Nasser, were “clearly stacked against Naguib” (Vatikiotis, 138 emphases added). These two moves, from the very start of the struggle, gave the upper hand to Nasser.

By February 1954, internal divisions had begun to surface between the pro-Naguib and pro-Nasser camps. The Amer-Badran army policy of purification of dissenters or removal of them to civilian posts alienated the corps not close to the Officers. Being

cognizant of this policy, which attempted to make him powerless as the president and premier, Naguib expressed his displeasure and then resigned on February 23. Upon Naguib's resignation Nasser took over the premiership and accused Naguib of pursuing dictatorial powers. Naguib was put under house arrest and the post of presidency was left vacant. Complaints and disturbances broke out within the armed forces upon Naguib's house arrest. Besides grumbles of the soldiers, street demonstrations chanting slogans like "To prison with Salah, to prison with Gamal. No revolution with Naguib" broke out (Vatikiotis, 140). Having recognized the increasing popularity of Naguib among the people, the RCC brought Naguib back to premiership on February 28. On March 5 in order to avoid a head-on collision with Naguib for the fear of public backlash the RCC announced a packet of resolutions. According to this packet, a constituent assembly would be elected by a referendum in July and this assembly would make a new constitution. Press censorship and martial law were revoked. Political parties were to be allowed to exist. And political prisoners were to be released (Vatikiotis, 142).

These concessions exasperated the pro-Nasser camp, especially the pro-Nasser soldiers within the armed forces. They did not abandon the field to be moulded by pro-Naguib camp. Beginning with March 27 mass demonstrations, possibly coordinated by the Officers and shouting slogans like "no parties and no parliament; do not abdicate, Gamal; no partisanship and no elections" (quoted by Vatikiotis, 143), broke out. What followed thereafter was a controlled chaos leading to eventual victory of Nasser. After three tumultuous days, the army was in the streets. By exploiting the turmoil, the junta postponed March 5 resolutions. Naguib was dismissed from the premiership and the chairmanship of the RCC but left as the president so as not to exasperate the public. A harsh campaign against the groups critical of the junta started. The press was muzzled, professional syndicates and associations were dissolved and razed. On April 17 Nasser became the Prime Minister and brought eight members of the RCC into his new cabinet. This move also enabled Nasser to get rid of dissenters in the armed forces. The officers close to the Muslim Brothers or Communists were purged (Vatikiotis, 144). The initialling of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement and the Brothers' opposition to the agreement

was used by Nasser as a pretext to arrest Muslim Brother officers within the army. The crisis of the power struggle culminated when Mahmud Abdel Latif, a member of the Brothers, attempted to assassinate Nasser but failed. The following was the path to total control of Nasser over the whole country. Naguib was sacked, beginning especially with Brothers all rival groups were razed.

2.2. THE MUSLIM BROTHERS BETWEEN 1949 AND 1952

2.2.1. The Death of Al-Al-Banna And Reorganization

The successor of the first General Guide martyr Hasan al-Al-Banna, seen as “an example of the combination of religious conviction with moral courage and public engagement” and had a charismatic leadership, Hasan al-Hudaybi unlike his predecessor “was accused of weakness, of failing to unify the organisation in its opposition to the political system and of letting down the Brothers in its efforts to contain Nasser’s despotic exertions” (Zoellner, 2009, 9). The shadow of the charisma of the first guide al-Al-Banna did not stop following the leadership of Hudaybi not even a second until he achieved more or less to control the organization in the early 1950s. The period following the assassination of al-Al-Banna until mid-1951, the main concern of the organization was more to be able to achieve survival than to choose a new guide. During these two years the movement survived in a clandestine underground network while permanently seeking legalisation of the organization. The possible candidate figures competing for the vacant top seat of the organization thought the search for legality might get harmed if a public contest for leadership would lead to a theatre of power-seeking struggle inside the group. As ideological positions of the most likely candidates, Salih al-Ashmawi, Abd al-Hakim Abidin, Abd al-Rahman al-Al-Banna’, Shaykh Hasan al-Baquri and Mustafa Mu’min, varied significantly, any open contestation for the vacant seat would have divulged the fragmented structure of the organization to the detriment of the organization while legalization and public acquittal were pursued (Zoellner, 17). The trial of the assassination of Nuqrashi Pasha and The Jeep case trial were the main obstacles preventing the attainment of the legality and that is the main reason for the postponement of the General Guide elections. The first trial terminated on 25 April 1950 with a verdict that did not find the whole

organisation guilty of the assassination. The first obstacle disappeared as the movement wished. The second trial that of Jeep case concluded on 17 March 1951 with the sentence “a criminal conspiracy to overthrow the form of government, on the basis of the evidence and investigation, to be without foundation” (quoted in Zoellner, 18). The success of the Brothers in these two trials, mainly because of its temporary collusion with the Wafd Party, opened the path to fill the top vacant seat.

No matter how “clean” it might seem after the acquittals, the Brothers needed to restore its reputation by introducing a new and respectable face. Because the figures of the leading circle “were encumbered by the stigma of violence and internal crisis”, an ideal nominee as part of the reputation-restoration strategy had to be an outsider and “be publicly recognized and well connected to the network of political power” (Zoellner, 19). The leading figures controlling the organization during the two-years- period that there was no general guide did not have the intention to leave the top seat of the organization to be filled by an outsider, the ideal choice for the organization was to find a well-respected “outsider”, who had no internal influence within the Brothers. The selection of Hubaydi both made the restoration of the public reputation of the Brothers possible and prevented a possible clash among the leading figures of the organization. In October 1951 Hasan al-Hudaybi became the second General Guide (Murshid) of the Brothers. Within a short period of time, it became apparent that Hudaybi would not be content with a symbolic leadership. Firstly, he stipulated that certain key positions would be left to him so that he could choose who could fill these positions. Secondly, Hudaybi insisted on the abolition of the Secret Unit (Nizam-ı Hass). His insistence on the abolishment of the Secret Unit and his flirtation with the upper echelons of the Egyptian political system while trying to be independent of them shook Hudaybi’s credibility both within and outside. This in turn left the organization and Hudaybi vulnerable to harsh criticisms and attacks both from within and outside.

The July 1952 coup of the Free Officers was heralded as the coming of the spring for all the sectors of the Egyptian people fed up with the corrupt monarchical system. The Muslim Brothers was no exception to this exhilaration. A few days after the

coup of 23 July, the Brothers declared its support for the new revolutionary government. No matter how cautious Hedaybi approached the junta, he and other Brothers, believing they had a substantial role in instigation and achievement of the coup, hoped to participate and found a respectable position within the newly-emerging/inchoate constellation. The coup did not end the enmities dating back to the selection times of Hedaybi to the post of General Guide. Internal rivalries especially among the leading figures deepened and exacerbated to the detriment of the organization. What is more important regarding these rivalries was the Brothers' openness to external interference such as that of Nasser. Having been one of the most important political actors of Egypt, the Brothers posed a challenge to the Free Officers. The Officers under the leadership of Nasser embarked on exploiting the internal divisions of the organization and they brought it to its heels. This story will be narrated in detail below.

A brief note should be given regarding the status of the Muslim Brothers in the early 1950s. As mentioned above, "Egypt's constitutional monarchy was torn apart by competition between the political forces, namely the king, the British, the parliamentary political parties and the growing power of non-governmental opposition movements, among them the Muslim Brothers" (Zoellner, 10). This "torn apartness" leading to the fiasco of the liberal political system contributed to a great extent to increasing popularity of the Brothers among Egyptian population. The Brothers' increasing popularity as a result of the status quo political actors' failure to meet demands of the people and consequently increasing membership especially from the middle class and students, and its success in constructing an effective network enabled the movement to play increasingly more active role in the political arena. This increasing role became visible through mass street demonstrations, which also led to the emergence of the Brothers as "political pressure movement" (Zoellner, 12). The Brothers as "a political pressure movement" made its pressure felt on the other political actors until Gamal Abd-Nasser suppressed it in October 1954. The pressure of the movement leant on the number of the member and branch it had. While it is not possible to know exactly how many members and

branches the Brothers had in the early 1950s, the numbers and branches Mitchell (1993) provides casts light on the issue. According to Mitchell (1993), there were,

4 branches in 1929; 5 in 1930; 10 in 1931; 15 in 1932; 300 in 1938; 500 in 1940; 2000 in 1949. In terms of membership numbers these branches have been estimated to represent some 300,000-600,000 in the peak period 1946-8, figures which nearly correspond to the claim by a member that 2,000 branches in 1949 represented 500,000 'active members'. Add 500,000 'sympathizers', and the Society's claim, in 1948, to be speaking in the name of a million Egyptians was not exaggerated. After 1949 membership dropped sharply. In 1953 it was estimated that there were 1,500 branches in the whole of Egypt, a figure estimated to represent a membership of 200,000-300,000 (p.328)

The assassination of the charismatic General Guide Hasan al-Al-Banna and then coming of Hasan al-Hudaybi with grumbles arising among some members of the movement seemed to affect the number of membership. Crushed under the shadow of al-Al-Banna, the second guide could not muster allegiances of all the members. The internal rifts between Hasan al-Hudaybi and certain leading figures also contributed to the break-off of the existing members in the early 1950s. Hudaybi's "un-Al-Banna-like" posture, his unwilling and unenthusiastic attitudes to live up to the image of Al-Banna", his laxity towards the concerns of the organization, his tendency to adopt a top-down control by constructing "a party of aristocrats" rather than Al-Banna's bottom-up "popular movement" dramatically influenced the decrease in the number of the membership (Mitchell, 116). "In sum, Hudaybi had offended the sensibilities of the members, violated the Society's constitution and precedents, and also relegated its aims to obscurity and deprived the mission of its spirit and purpose" (Mitchell, 117). The sharp drop in the early 1950s can be attributed to these factors.

2.3. THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN GAMAL ABD-NASSER AND THE MUSLIM BROTHERS DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD 1952-54

The exhilaration on almost all sides of the Egyptian public regarding the salvation from the yokes of both palace and the Great Britain faded when the Free Officers gradually divulged their intentions of maintaining their grasp on the country. The Muslim Brothers were no exception to paeans of victory but to be disappointed

soon. The honeymoon period between the Free Officers and the Brothers turned out to be short-lived. The abovementioned cautious stance of Hedaybi vis-à-vis the Officers and concomitantly the Officers' crescendo unwillingness to share power with the civilians especially with the Brothers soured relations between them, harmed the communication and lastly poisoned the remaining trust.

According to Anne Alexander the relations between the sides had four stages. The first stage –July 1952 to early 1953 – is the early times of the coup in which the Officers urgently needed a civilian ally to fend off any internal threat and the Brothers were seen as a “radical civilian ally in the domestic area” (Alexander, 2011, 535). The ties between the Brothers and the Officers dating back to the fight against the British and the Zionist in Palestine provided a modicum of trust on the two sides to collude for a while against the Communists and the Wafd Party. It is “a modicum of trust” because back then Nasser wanted an independence from “an extensive, highly organised hierarchical movement like the Brethren to compete for the loyalty of the masses” (Vatikiotis, 1978, 95). Figures like Muhammad Labib and Abd al-Mun'im Abd al-Ra'uf, both Free Officers and respected members of the Brothers, within the armed forces laid a bridge between the Officers and the Brothers during a chaotic period that necessitated collusion against other forces. No matter how cautious Hasan al-Hedaybi was in the very early days of the coup, he declared his support for the Officers. His meeting with Nasser at the end of July and the consequent “friendly cooperation” between the sides marked a happy start.

Searching for wide public support during the early phases of the coup, the Officers glossed over the different views regarding how the state should be managed. Likewise, the Brothers, in order to exploit the new constellation of power for playing a much more active role in Egypt, approached the Officers despite disagreements over how to manage the state. The public support of the Brothers was of crucial importance during August 1952 when textile workers at the Misr Fine Spinning and Weaving mill rioted and launched a strike demanding for the removal of “the abusive supervisors” (Alexander, 537). Clashes erupted between the security forces and the strikers, leading to several casualties. The riot was suppressed

brutally by the Officers, several workers were arrested, and two of them were hanged. During all these events, the Brothers sided with the Officers by participating in joint campaign of anti-communist repression. What Sayyid Qutb said related to these events gives clues about the Brothers' support:

I cannot believe that the workers who dealt the first blow against imperialism in the Suez Canal Zone would allow themselves to become a tool in the hands of imperialism to be used to stab in the back the homeland and its movement of regeneration. Fellow-workers! I who now address you am well known to you as one of the fighters for freedom, who attacked tyranny in your defence, in the defence of those who toil for hire. I who now speak to you and who fought for you am ashamed of the action some of you have taken . . . Dawn has broken, the yoke has been lifted. You, the workers, will benefit. You, the workers, who were in the forefront of the struggle for freedom, how could you turn overnight against liberty and her supporters? (Quoted in Alexander, 538).

Beginning with autumn 1952, the relations between the Officers and the Brothers deteriorated. On the surface, the Officers' offer to the Brothers to participate in the formation of a new government seemed to a harbinger of good relations but in reality made the relations worse. That Hasan al-Baquri, a member of the Brothers, was given the Ministry of Religious Endowment without the consent of Hedaybi deepened the simmering disagreements. The organization gave Baquri to choose the Brothers or the post, he preferred the second and consequently was dismissed from the organization. Bona fides on the surface led to deepening of the disagreements in reality.

The second stage begins January 1953 and is named by Alexander (2011) as the period of "public cooperation, private conflict" (p.538). With the dissolution of all political parties except the Brothers the Officer began to encroach on the Brothers' freedom to take action without the purview of the state. As touched upon above, the disagreements began to surface gradually in the autumn 1952 when the Officers invited the Brothers to participate the new Naguib government. On 16 January 1953, the Officers ordered the abolition of all political parties but the Brothers was exempted. While it is one thing to say disagreements were slowly surfacing, it is quite another to assert the Officers did not need the Brothers any more. Quite the contrary, as the exemption of the Brothers proved, the Officers could not afford

abolishing it but were in the pursuit of finding alternatives to Brothers' public support. The Brothers were still quite instrumental as a countermovement to both the Left and the Wafd. The formation of the Liberation Rally in January 1953 that can be considered as a balance power vis-a-vis the Brothers in particular and the other domestic forces in general was a move to restrict the activities of the civilian non-governmental groups, especially the Brothers. The abolishment of the political parties cleaned the ground to be taken over by the Rally. By establishing the Liberation Rally the Officers' showed their intention to terminate their temporary alliance with the Brothers. Pressures from the Officers regarding the participation of the Brothers into the command of the Rally intensified. In the face of the pressures from the Officers the movement was unwilling to withdraw its active paramilitary organisation from the ground. The Officers started to warn the Brothers about dissolving the clandestine cells within the armed forces and Police back in October 1952. The Officers' request regarding the dissolution of the clandestine Special Section in the Army and Police in May 1953 (Alexander, 539) from the Brothers found no reverberation within the organization. This unwillingness raised the prospect of the open public conflict.

With the third phase –from autumn 1953 to the end of March 1954- the tension between the Brothers and the Officers especially Nasser began to surface perceptibly. In his attempt to hegemonize the political realm Nasser began to intervene in the internal conflicts of the Brothers by encouraging the oppositional groups to rise against the debated General Guide Hasan al-Hudaiby. On September 1953 at dinner with the British Oriental Councillor Trevor Evans, Nasser expressed his intention to back the anti-Hudaybi faction, composed of figures like Abdul-Rahman al-Al-Banna, Salah Ashmawi, Shaykh al-Baquri, to get rid of Hudaybi. The reason why Nasser wanted to get rid of Hudaybi was obvious: "Being against direct participation, any coalition or union with the RCC on the one hand, al-Hudaybi's stance that the Brothers could not be ignored, because it represented the Egyptian people, was met with suspicion" (Zoellner, 2009, 31). The internal conflict within the organization culminated in November 1953 when the fight for the leadership led to violence. On November 27, a delegate of critics of Hudaybi met him at his

home to demand his resignation and then occupied the Society's headquarter. In order to help solve the problem Nasser intervened to mediate between the sides. By persuading the opponents of Hudaibi to meet on November 28, Nasser showed how embroiled he was in the internal affairs of the organization. The meeting on November 28 ended up with victory of the pro-Hudaibi camp. Hudaibi's "enthusiastic reception" by the Assembly isolated the dissidents and consequently four dissidents - Ahmad Zaki Hassan, 'Abd-al- Rahman al-Sanadi, Mahmoud Sayyid Khalil al-Sabbagh and Ahmad Adil Kamal- were expelled by unanimous vote of the Guidance Council on December 9 (Alexander, 540). Hudaibi was able to eliminate his rivals and dealt a blow to the intentions of Nasser but this was not without costs. It was a kind of Pyrrhus victory making a fragmented and weary organization vulnerable to the coming death blows.

Taking advantage of the vulnerability of the organization immediately after the internal crisis the junta dissolved the Brothers on 13 January 1954. Hudaibi was arrested and a media campaign was launched against him. According to the junta, pretexts were many:

Hudaibi's failure to come forward on 23 July and declare himself for the revolution; his resistance to the land-reform law; the government's gesture in reopening the Al-Banna murder case and releasing the political prisoners; the crisis over the ministerial appointments; the government's saving of the Society from the law on political parties of January 1953, and the subsequent demand by the Brothers for control over affairs of state; the resistance of the Society to the formation of the Liberation Rally; the meetings with the British; the subversion in the army due to the secret apparatus; and finally the incident at the university (Mitchell, 127).

Hudaiby wrote a letter to Naguib and accused Nasser of having autocratic inclinations. This letter hinted that Hudaibi aligned with Naguib against the Free Officers in general and Nasser in particular. If Naguib's displeasure related to the Nasser's policies in the armed forces was taken into consideration, Hudaibi's move would be much more understandable. Hudaibi chose to align with Naguib in the power struggle between Nasser and Naguib and use Naguib as a shield against Nasser. After resigning on February 23 1954, Naguib returned to the premiership on

February 28. The dissolution of the Brothers was lifted immediately after Naguib's return.

The last phase saw the increase of the Brothers opposition to the regime especially regarding with the agreement about the British evacuation from Suez Canal Zone and the assassination attempt in October 1954. Escalation of the power struggle between Naguib and Nasser from March 1954 on exacerbated the relations between Nasser and the Brothers. Aligning with Naguib so as to inhibit autocratic tendencies of Nasser, the Brothers under the leadership of Hedaybi began to bear the brunt of this alignment. Beginning towards the end of March 1954, the Officers launched their offensive against Naguib and his supporters. The mass demonstrations organized clandestinely by the Officers to make their existence felt paved the way for the coup de grace of the Officers. On April 17 Nasser became the prime minister and chairman of the RCC. For a while the tension between the sides calmed down. The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement looming on the horizon ignited the wick of the culmination of the conflict. The Brothers launched an active campaign against the agreement. The campaign disturbed the Officers and in turn they initiated a campaign of mass arrests against the Brothers. Besides mass arrests, the Brothers could not avoid raids on its headquarters and sequestering hidden arms. Clashes erupted between the Brothers supporters and the police in Cairo in autumn 1954. The final act that ended all these struggle between the sides came in October 1954. On October 19, 1954 the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement was signed to Brothers' chagrin. One week after the agreement on October 26 allegedly a member of Secret Apparatus of the Brothers Mahmud Abdel Latif attempted to assassinate Nasser while he was addressing an audience of 10,000 workers. While nine shots fired by Abdel Latif were ringing out, Nasser was thundering:

Oh ye people ... Oh ye free men ... I, Gamal Abd al-Nasir, am of your blood and my blood is for you. I will live for your sake and I will die serving you. I will live to struggle for the sake of your freedom and your dignity. Oh ye free men ... Oh Yemen ... Even if they kill me, I have placed in you self-respect. Let them kill me now, for I have planted in this nation freedom, self-respect, and dignity. For the sake of Egypt and for the sake of Egypt's freedom, I will live and in the service of Egypt I will die (Quoted in Mitchell, 151).

2.4. THE CRACKDOWN ON THE BROTHERS

2.4.1. The Path to the Crackdown and the Death Blow to the Brothers

Tensions simmering beneath the unfolding events since the end of 1952 culminated into head-on collision in 1954. Having had different projections, visions regarding the future of Egypt, how Egypt should be like, the two sides ended up finding themselves in an all-out war. If the assassination attempt against Nasser is considered as a precipitating cause that is, the wick, the different visions about the path Egypt should take and which actor should on the driver seat might be accepted as the deep cause of the head-on collision. The “Manshiya incident” that is the assassination attempt against Nasser, was the final nail in the coffin of trust between the Brothers and the Officers. Or perhaps more correctly, the nine shots that could not hit the target was the death warrant of all the rivals given to Nasser and the final nail in the coffin of the civilians. General Naguib, the Brothers, the dissidents in the armed forces, the critical civilian political actors one by one collapsed but the Brothers was the only actor that bore the brunt of the crackdown. Anglo-Egyptian Agreement whose negotiations began in the mid-1954 regarding the evacuation of the British did not satisfy the expectations of the Brothers. Since 1922 when Egypt gained partial independence, the country’s elites were trying to attain full independence. With the coup and collapse of the king, pressures began to increase on the British to evacuate Egypt. This agreement was a step to achieve that end. Hudaybi, four days after the heads of two governments announced an agreement was reached on July 27, expressed his opinions about the agreement. The main points were:

(1) the treaty of 1936 would have expired in less than two years, whereupon Britain would have been required to evacuate the base and would have been left without any legal foundation on which to return to it; the new treaty would give her that right by providing for reactivation of the base in case of attack on any of the Arab states or on Turkey; (2) the clause permitting reactivation in the event of attack on Turkey bound Egypt and the Arab states to her and therefore to the 'western camp'; (3) the provision permitting Britain to maintain air bases was a threat to Egypt and, in the air age, was a device for perpetuating control; (4) the 'civilians' expected to assist in operating the installations were, of course, military personnel in civil dress; (5) the agreement extended the treaty of 1936 for five years and permitted 'consultation' for revision at its termination, the same kind of provision which made the treaty of 1936 eternal in effect (Mitchell, 137).

On the basis of these points Hedaybi rejected the agreement and proposed the agreement be left to a parliament that would represent will of the Egyptian people. Hedaybi's opposition to the agreement disturbed the Officers and they embarked on a massive press campaign against him and meanwhile increased the pressure on activities of the movement. The officers wanted to dissolve the Brothers when Hedaybi caused nuisance for them but they were not enthusiastic for suppressing because the Officers feared any serious campaign against the Brothers might be short-lived and abortive and they were looking forward for the right time. The assassination attempt on October 26 provided the right time for the crackdown. That is why, the belief that Nasser concocted the assassination has permeated the organization since then.

The day after the assassination attempt Nasser made a triumphal march from Alexandria to Cairo in company with the slogans like "death to the traitors", "fire for the Brothers", "death to the Brothers of the Devil" (Mitchell, 151). The headquarters of the Brothers throughout the country were ransacked and set on fire by the people exasperated by the assassination attempt. Having got what he wanted from people, Nasser now could launch an eradication campaign against his archenemy. The first step of this campaign was the demonization of the movement through a vitriolic press campaign. For months, newspapers were, so to speak, decorated with stories and news about the abortive conspiracy of the Brothers against the government. The Brothers, according to these news, was determined at all cost to overthrow the legitimate government and seize the power. A bunch of such plots attributed to the Brothers will be illustrative:

well-conceived plan to destroy the two capitals of Alexandria and Cairo, dynamite all the bridges and factories in the country, cripple communications, and assassinate not only all the members of the army junta, but over 100 other army officers and civilians, and all the heads of the Arab governments (Mitchell, 1993, 152).

Another dimension of the demonization of the Brothers, according to the stories made up by the newspapers, was its being the fifth column or agent or lackey that served the interests of the enemies of the people i.e. monarchy, the old ruling classes, the British, the French, the Zionists, Western Imperialism, communism, and

capitalism. There were also the charges that the leading figures of the Brothers were “the merchant of religions” either using the trust of their followers for their personal interests or leading them to a “primitive, barbaric religious state” by colluding with the imperialists and capitalists (Mitchell, 1993, 153). According to the government, by the end of November 1000 members of the Brothers were arrested (Mitchell, 153).

On November 2 People’s Tribunal was formed to try the members of the organization. Within a few weeks after the assassination attempt the leading figures of the Brothers were arrested. Important figures like Hindawi Duwayr, Hasan al-Hudaybi, Muhammad Khamis Humayda, Ibrahim al-Tayyib, Yusuf Tarat, Hasan al-Ashmawi, Abd al-Munim Abd al-Ra'uf, and Abu al-Makarim Abd al-Hayy were arrested within a few weeks. Added to these were all the other members of the Guidance Council and leading acolytes of Hudaybi. On November 9 trials kicked off with the would-be assassin Mahmud Abd al-Latif. Muhammad Naguib was dismissed from presidency and confined to his house on the grounds of his mention very early in the proceedings. The trials reminded the Stalinist show trials of 1930s and the Czechoslovak trials of the early 1950s (Dekmejian, 1971, 33). What Mitchell (1993) says about the court and judges especially about the chief judge and his posture during trials shows how farcical the trials were:

The chief 'judge' -Gamal Salim-conducted himself rather as chief prosecutor: he freely interrupted the answers of the witnesses if the answer displeased him; he put words into their mouths and forced -sometimes by threats-the desired answers. His questions were phrased to preclude any answer but that sought by the court; any attempt to attach niceties was halted. Sometimes he engaged in an exchange of petty insults with the witnesses; in most cases the insults came from the court alone. The court freely set one witness against the other, fabricating the testimony of one to incite another. The audience was allowed, even encouraged, to participate in laughter and ridicule and to jeer at and insult the witnesses. Most of the questioning, in this regard, was irrelevant to the crime, and included, inter alia, grammatical and exegetical Qur’anic examinations intended to embarrass the witnesses (Mitchell, 1993, 155).

The torture in the prisons both broke the morale of the members and led to the quick collapse of the organizational fabric. It is not difficult to guess what the

corollary would be when the organizational fabric collapsed and the loyalties shook: confessions, accusations, pointing fingers to the guilty persons. The court deliberately brought the confessions to the fore both to break the morale of the members and to show the public how despicable the members of the Brothers were by exploiting the internecine clashes dating back to the power struggle during the early period of Hedaybi. The Brothers were accused of preparing for “bloody insurrection” that would lead to overthrow of the regime. However, the court could not prove there were preparations for insurrection and it seemed the assassination attempt was planned by the Secret Unit without the knowledge of Hedaybi. That is why, the attempt possibly was because of inaction rather than action of Hedaybi and his coterie. What is interesting regarding who planned the attempt was that during the trials the would-be assassin Abd al-Latif said he had been told the leadership decided to kill Nasser (Mitchell, 158).

On December 4, the verdicts were announced. Seven members of the Guidance, who were also advisers of Hedaybi were sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labour. These were Kamal Khalifa, Muhammad Khamis Humayda, Ahmad Abd al-Aziz Atiyya, Husayn Kamal al-Din, Munir al-Dilla, Hamid Abu al-Nasr, and Salih Abu Ruqayq. Two other members of the Guidance Council were sentenced to fifteen years in prison: Umar al-Talmasani and Ahmad Shurayt. Three members of the Council, who were close to the Officers were acquitted: Abd al-Rahman al-Al-Banna, Abd al-Muizz Abd al-Sattar, and al-Bahi al-Khuli. Seven members of the Society were sentenced to death by hanging: Hasan al-Hedaybi, Mahmud Abd al-Latif, Hindawi Duwayr, Ibrahim al-Tayyib, Yusuf Tarat, Shaykh Muhammad Farghali, and Abd al-Qadir Awda. The death sentence of Hedaybi commuted to the life imprisonment with hard labour due to his excuse that “perhaps he had fallen under the influence of those around him, a view supported by his bad health and age” (quoted in Mitchell, 160). On December 9 by turning a deaf ear to protest coming all over the Arab world, the regime executed the six Brothers. Their last moments were conveyed by Mitchell (1993):

Abd al-Latif and Duwayr repeated Qur'anic verses and showed, it was said, considerable fear; Tayyib angrily observed, 'The trial was a comedy; our

enemies were our judges'; Tal'at calmly pleaded for the forgiveness of Shaykh Farghali, for whose betrayal he felt responsible, and added 'May God forgive me, as well as those who have done harm to me'. Farghali, apparently at peace with himself, merely noted, 'I am ready to die; I welcome the meeting with God'; 'Awda ended his life with a flourish, saying 'Praise be to God that He has made me a martyr and may He make my blood a curse upon the men of the revolution' (p.161).

When the Tribune ended its mission in February approximately 1000 Brothers had been tried. Fifteen were sentenced to death, apart from six others' sentences were commuted to various punishments. More than half of these 1000 Brothers were absolved or given suspended sentences. Unlike the Guidance Council, most of the members of the Consultative Assembly were absolved or given suspended sentences.

2.4.2. International Dimension of the Crackdown

No matter how little the talk within the literature regarding the international dimension of the crackdown of 1954, it seems some glimpses of this dimension can be grasped and in turn some ink can be spilled over it. What is the most significant point that may be related to whether there was an international dimension of the crackdown is Nasser's intention to bring the transition period to an end by concluding negotiations with the British. Retrospectively speaking, it is possible to say Nasser was able to consolidate his power with the agreement with Britain in October 1954. March of the Officers to the power accelerating with the March 1954 amidst chaos vis-a-vis a motley enemy would have facilitated greatly if Britain had been eliminated as a rival. "A few days after the first anniversary of the coup" says Thornhill (2004), "Nasser acutely aware that only an agreement with Britain could secure the regime's position in the longer run" (p.910). The British authorities, on the other hand, were cautious vis-à-vis the Officers. They wanted to reach an agreement with the Officers who according to them were much more promising than any previous actors. During the very early days of the coup the king Farouk contacted the British to ward off the Officers but the British were not enthusiastic to prevent the Officers from taking over the power. Their unwillingness to help the king pointed out the policy of encouraging moderation on the side of the Officers.

The meeting between the British officer John Hamilton and Naguib gives clues regarding the stance of the British. "Hamilton informed Naguib", Thornhill (2004) conveys, "that London viewed the events as an internal matter for Egypt, and that British forces would only intervene if foreign lives and property were threatened" (p.897). This paradigm shift from interference to non-interference in the British policy may be attributed to the possible bad consequences of any attempt against the Officers. That is why, they turned a deaf ear to the king's calls for help, accepted take-over and adopted a cautious approach. This cautious approach towards the Officers was what the Officers wanted to get and what was necessary to reach an agreement to end the transition period.

There were the memories regarding the tragic downfall of the Colonel Ahmed 'Urabi in 1882 in the minds of the Officers. That is why, the Officers from the outset had the intention to construct positive relations with the West especially with the United States. "To forestall a similar eventuality", emphasizes Thornhill (2004) by paying attention to the seriousness of the memory of Urabi, "Nasser cultivated close relations with American officials in the hope that Washington's influence would be a 'trump card' over British 'veto', as well as help hasten a British military withdrawal" (p.892). The Officers made clear via the Americans any interference by the British would be confronted by the Egyptian army with force (Thornhill, 893). The Officers' commitment to fight against the Communists and to participate in a defence pact under the leadership of the United States against the Soviet Union were goodwill gestures currying favour with the US. On the whole, the memory of the Urabi revolt's doom, the damaged image of the British both among the Officers and the Egyptian public, the British resistance to an acceptable evacuation agreement tilted the Officers towards the US.

Overall, both the British and the American greeted the Officers' takeover positively. The British's "cautious optimism" and the American's "unveiled enthusiasm" towards the Officers' (Gordon, 1992, 165) takeover facilitated the transition period to be a relatively tranquil period at least as far as the external actors were considered. The American ambassador Jefferson Caffery's statement regarding

Nasser reflected the overall position of the West especially of the US: “Nasser is the only man in Egypt with strength enough and guts enough to put over an agreement with Britain” (quoted in Rubin, 1982, 80). The belief that Nasser was the only person with whom an agreement could be reached especially on the side of the Americans helped Nasser’s consolidation of the power. The Americans’ increasing involvement after the coup as an actor supporting the Officers and forcing the British to reach an evacuation agreement provided an upper hand against the rivals of the Officers. What Caffery cabled Washington gives a hint about the US’s stance towards the Officers:

Eight weeks after original military coup it is clearer that new regime in Egypt is going to be around for a while. It is faced with tremendous problems and strong opposition groups but it has determined program and guns on its side and will not be easily upset or diverted from its objectives. It is equally obvious that it is only a question of time—and not much time at that—before West will be faced with necessity choosing to support, ignore, or oppose regime. Arguments in favour of support multiply as objectives of regime become clearer (Gordon, 1992, 167).

The international dimension of the crackdown on the Muslim Brothers should be evaluated against this backdrop of the US’s stance towards the Officers. The Officers’ journey under the command of Nasser to the power by eliminating their opponents one by one was welcomed by the Americans. As for the British, it is possible to say that they were also content with the rise of the Officers to some extent because they hoped they would made an agreement with the Officers. Both the British and the Americans turned a deaf ear and a blind eye to the calls of the civilians for help. The West’s intense concentration on whether they were able to reach an agreement with the junta led to the negligence of the other actors of Egypt. If the guerrilla warfare of the Brothers in the Canal Zone was taken into consideration, it will be no exaggeration to think that the West were content with the eradication of the Brothers from the Egyptian ground. The Brothers’ increasing operations in the Zone especially in the early 1950s were of that kind that might disturb the British authorities. “An estimated 300 volunteers-some of whom were from the secret apparatus-actually found their way into the Canal Zone from December onwards,” says Mitchell (1993) by pointing out the increasing operations of the Brothers and adds, “and participated in the harassment of British personnel

and positions” (89). Getting rid of such an actor that caused a lot of nausea was possibly welcomed by the West especially the British.

What the American ambassador Caffery said after Nasser launched the crackdown on the Brothers gives clues about the Americans’ stance vis-à-vis the crackdown. While the Brothers were tried by the People’s Tribunal after the assassination attempt, it is reported Caffery said the Officers had done “done more for Egypt in two years than all their predecessors put together before them” (quoted in Gordon, 172). This statement shows even if the Americans and the British were not full-fledged complicit in the crackdown, they were somewhat complicit by remaining silent vis-a-vis what the Officers did to the civilians especially the Brothers and by upholding Nasser as the only alternative to be negotiated with.

2.4.3. The Political Economy of the Crackdown

The crackdown on the Muslim Brothers left the organization crippled. By grasping the pretext to get rid of the Brothers with the assassination attempt, Nasser dealt a lethal blow to the organization. The Brothers were in shambles upon experiencing this blow. The organizational structure was torn apart. While it is not possible to say there are any mention related to how the regime dealt with the properties of the organization, it will be no exaggeration to assert the regime confiscated all the properties whether it be social charity foundations, commercial companies. It should be admitted that not much data is found regarding the dimensions of the confiscation. The policy to cripple the organizational structure especially by confiscating all the property aimed to prevent any possible resurgence. That is why, the regime swooped down on the structure that enabled the Brothers to expand its popularity among the fellow Egyptians. That is to say, the junta was intent on undermining the grass-root supports of the Brothers. What the US ambassador said regarding this issue is quite revealing:

An eventual attack on the Brothers' welfare program was almost a certainty and the only surprising thing about the December 10 announcement was that it has been so long in coming. The welfare activities of the Brothers dated from the early 1940s and are the basis for the organization's strength in certain rural areas. A complete discontinuation of these activities would

have caused rural elements who have benefitted from them to view the regime's move against the Brothers adversely; therefore, the regime had little choice but to take over and continue the Brothers' projects if it desired to maintain its popularity in the rural areas where the Brothers have been active. (Gordon, 1992, 184).

When a discussion is made upon whether the regime confiscated the Brothers' properties, it immediately becomes obvious there are hardly any mention of this issue within the literature. That is why, ours cannot move beyond the predictions. More research should concentrate on the extents of the regime's confiscation and the impact of these confiscations on the future of the organization.

2.5. THE BROTHERS AFTERMATH OF THE CRACKDOWN

The Muslim Brothers were in tatters after the crackdown following the assassination attempt. Many members were executed on the gallows, incarcerated for a long time, tortured heavily in the prisons, exposed to hard labour penalties under brutal conditions. The organizational structure of the movement was destructed and any kind of activities were banned. The general mood of the organization was despair. While the organization was in shatters, the members without having any connection with each other were dispersed to different prisons. The mood of despair spread among the Brothers when they were tortured and abused heavily in the prisons, when they saw their fellow Brothers collapsed and died under inhuman circumstances, when they felt a bright future did not loom on the horizon. "The regime did not destroy the Brothers", says Gordon (1992) but adds, "some managed to elude the dragnet; pockets of resistance remained, and Brothers cells reportedly operated covertly under the averted gaze of sympathetic prison officials. But the Brothers had been dealt a staggering blow" (p.184).

The persecution period of the movement beginning in 1954 and continuing until 1971 except some respite periods, what the Brothers dubbed as *mihna* in Arabic, shaped the trajectory of the organization to a great extent. As mentioned above the mood of desperation resulting from unspeakable sufferings left an indelible imprint on the memories of the Brothers now and then. The mood of desperation without any hopes on the horizon made the harsh circumstances much more unbearable.

The inclination towards radicalization, as what happens most of the time in such cases, seemed as an undesirable but inevitable phenomenon. Beginning in late 1950s and culminating in the mid-1960s under the ideologue Sayyid Qutb the incarcerated Brothers engaged with what went wrong both within the organization and Egypt. A vibrant internal debate tackling with questions such as what went wrong and why and what to do to rectify the wrong led to the emergence of fragmentations within the Brothers. Disagreements on what went wrong and what could be done culminated in the late 1960s. These words from the book “Duat la Qudat”, written purportedly Hasan al-Hudaybi, give a vivid picture of the situation of the organization in the 1960s:

It was when the Brothers had to suffer in their prison cells and detention camps that some chose to pronounce unbelief on Muslims or to doubt the truth of their belief in Islam. Despite the harsh conditions of their imprisonment and incarceration, [other] Brothers then rushed to correct this understanding... Their general guide at the time, Master Hasan Isma'il al-Hudaybi ... gave in response to the thesis [of takfir] a comprehensive answer, which shaped the path of the Muslim Brothers, determined their method, and laid down their mission. “We are preachers, but we are not judges...” (Quoted in Zoellner, 2007, 411).

Central to these disagreements was the figure of Sayyid Qutb. Qutb’s writings provided an influential and persuasive explanation to the Brothers waiting an explanation about what was really happening. His ideas that the Nasser’s regime was a modern jahili regime opposing the laws of God reverberated among the incarcerated desperate Brothers. These reverberations would lead some Brothers to deflect away from the moderate stance of the Brothers to more radical stance. It was against this background the Brothers especially in 1960s engaged with elimination of the radical views spreading among the incarcerated Brothers. And it is because of these radical views there has been an ambivalence attitude towards the figure of Sayyid Qutb. On the one hand, he was respected as a martyr for the sake of Allah but on the other hand he was continuously refuted because of his radical views demanding and calling for much more stringent and radical methods.

Qutb’s views regarding jihad, jahiliyya and hakimiyyah reverberated among the disenchanting Islamists in the late 1960s and 1970s. Groaning under torture in

Nasser's prisons, both Qutb and his comrades adopted a pessimist view vis-à-vis the Nasserist regime. The consequence was the radicalization of the discourse of those people under the leadership of Qutb. According to Qutb's reading, God is the sole and ultimate sovereign and consequently the supreme legislator. The laws of the Quran, Qutb argues, are obligatory and everyone has to obey these laws. As Qutb says "no sovereignty (hakimiyya) but God's, no law (sharia) but God's law and no power of a person over another person, because all power belongs to God" (quoted in Zoellner, 2009, 57). The systems or societies that do not obey the laws of the God are jahili systems or societies and it is the duty of the Muslims to fight against the Jahili system so as to establish the hakimiyyah of the God. This duty to fight against the jahili systems, what he calls Jihad, to establish the hakimiyyah of the God paved the path of radicalization. The disenchanting Muslims especially the ones that were exposed to torture in the prisons embraced this method. It was against this background that some deflected the Brothers to take up arms against the "jahili" Egyptian regime.

The ascendancy and pervasion of the radical views among the incarcerated Brothers led the leading figures of the organization especially the general guide Hudaybi to stop the radical current. The aftermath circumstances of the crackdown resurfaced the problems inflicting the organization when the organization selected Hasan al-Hudaybi as the new general guide. There were strong reactions to Hudaybi's selection and Hudaybi's policies after he was elected as the general guide. From those times on there were disagreements simmering beneath the discourse that the Brothers should be united no matter how different opinions the members had. The resistance of certain leading figures especially the figures controlling the Secret Unit to Hudaybi crippled the authority of Hudaybi to a great extent. Besides certain leading figures, there was also discontent among the grass-roots of the organization while Hudaybi was shaking amidst the chaos of the post-coup period. This legacy of discontent vis-vis the governing of Hudaybi was bequeathed to the years the Brothers were groaning under the torture of Nasser's fiends in the prisons. The breakdown of the organization and the dispersal of the leading figures to different prisons, as it were, left the Brothers especially the younger leaderless. While these

Brothers were vacillating between how to cope with the harsh circumstances and trying to come up with a persuasive explanation, there was no leading figures around them to guide and make explanation to them. Added to that was “the lack of concrete guidelines from al-Hudaybi” (Zoellner, 2007, 415). The rise of the ideas of Qutb coincided with this backdrop of the despair accompanying the imprisonment and of the ideological vacuum within the Brothers. These two shaped the trajectory of the Brothers greatly.

Having seen the spread of the radical views among the Brothers, the leading figures especially Hudaybi, concerned with the route the organization might take if many Brothers adopted these views, embarked on fighting against these views. Duat la Qudat was a consequent of that apprehension regarding the future of the organization. Duat la Qudat was completed in 1969, three years after Sayyid Qutb was hanged by Nasser. The urgency to keep the organization together after the catastrophe of 1966 when Sayyid Qutb, Abd al-Fattah Ismail and Muhammad Yusuf Awash were hanged stirred the leading figures. “At stake at this point was”, as Zoellner aptly states, “whether members of the Brothers defined the vision of the organisation as radical or moderate Islamist opposition” (Zoellner, 2009, 45). Zoellner (2009) continues:

As for the radical option, it took the view that jihad as an offensive method and the establishment of an Islamic state was an immediate duty; this position sees it as a necessity to use revolutionary and militant means to bring about the establishment of an Islamic state. The moderate counterpart, however, argued that an Islamic state needs to be brought about through a gradual change of society. This is to be done through education (talim) and missionary engagement (dawa) (p.45-46).

The efforts of the leading figures bore fruit. Generally speaking, the efforts were able to curtail the radical current within the organization. However, it is possible to say that this radical current continued to live with radical figure like Shukri Mustafa, who left the Brothers and adopted the views of Qutb while in prison. After he was released from prison in the early 1970s, he put his radical view into practice by establishing the militant group named al-Takfir wa al-Hijra (the Predicament of Unbelief and the Refuge). “The aspiration for a Muslim society, the qualification of

Egyptian society as jahiliyya, and the belief that this society had to be destroyed and a Muslim society erected on its ruins” (Kepel, 1984, 72) corroborated the impacts of Qutb’s radical understanding on the next generation. Kepel (1984) adds “Shukri Mustafa had stretched the concepts presented by Sayyid Qutb in Signposts to the limit (emphasis added, p.103). Another important figure that was influenced by Qutb’s understanding of jihad and founded al-Jihad organization was Abd al-Salam Faraj. His Al-Farida al-gha’iba (The Hidden Imperative) reminds of the views of Qutb regarding jahiliyya, jihad and hakimiyya:

'Now, there is no doubt whatever that the false gods (tawaghit) of this earth will disappear only at sword-point. That is why the prophet said: I was sent sword in hand that they might worship only God — He has no associate. . . . The Prophet proclaimed the construction of the Islamic state and the re-establishment of the caliphate. This was God's order, and it is the duty of every Muslim to spare no effort to execute that order. . . . Nevertheless, certain Muslims claim to know nothing of this, although God’s Book offers striking proof of it: Govern them according to what God has revealed. . . . Those who do not govern according to what God has revealed are wrongdoers (quoted in Kepel, 1984, 195).

These two figures show how deep the radical temptations of Qutb penetrated the next generations understanding regarding what to do under a despotic “jahili” regime.

CHAPTER 3: THE 2013 CRACKDOWN

3.1. FROM PRISONS TO POLITICAL ARENA

3.1.1. From Nasser's Dungeons to Egypt's Parliament

The death of Gamal Abd-al Nasser in 1970 and subsequently the coming of Anwar Sadat as president heralded a relatively open political system. As Brown (2012) points out, Egypt beginning with the early 1970s “shifted from fully authoritarian to a semi-authoritarian system” (p.86). It was against background of this turn from authoritarian to a semi-authoritarian that the Brothers returned to the normalcy of pre-1954 period. In order to rectify the legitimacy deficit that pursued Nasser and by extension the regime after rout of the 1967 War and to erase the shadow of “charismatic” Nasser on the minds of the Egyptians (Zahid, 2010, 81-82), Sadat capitalized on Islam by promoting himself as the “believer president”. As the “believer president”, Sadat “made a public show of his personal piety; promoted Islamic programming in the media, schools, and universities; expanded the government’s support of official Islamic institutions; and used religious themes to justify the regime’s policies, including the decision to go to war with Israel in 1973” (Wickham, 2002, 95-96). The Brothers were the first that benefited from this opening: release of members from prison, return of exiled member from abroad, sanction to revive activities etc. It was the third Murshid Umar al-Tilmisani that was the pioneer of this resurgence after Sadat’s opening. Tilmisani rose the organization from its ashes through his activities within the universities. The Brothers under the command of Tilmisani “looked to the Islamist student associations with the hope that they could help replenish its base, which had atrophied considerably during the organization’s dark years under Nasser” (Wickham, 2013, 40). The efforts of Tilmisani to reach the students on university campuses would bear fruit in the forthcoming decades in the form of new qualified cadres.

With the coronation of Mubarak after the assassination of Sadat in 1981, a new era began with the institution of multiparty system. The first elections were held in 1983-84. Because of not being able to get rid of illegality, the Brothers could not found their own party both during Sadat’s and Mubarak’s reign. Cognizant of

possible consequences of legality –that is to say, fearing any possible unwanted but expected rise on the political arena- both Sadat and Mubarak preferred to balance the rise of the Brothers with the illegality card. Under the surveillance of the regime, the Brothers surprisingly approached the secular Wafd Party to build a tactical alliance in the 1984 elections. The simple logic was that “the Wafd provided a legal channel while the Ikhwan [Brothers] offered a popular base,” and this would enable for “both to reclaim their place on the national stage after long years of state-enforced absence” (Ghobashy, 2005, 378). The Brothers won eight seats from that alliance. Three years after the first elections, Egypt saw the second elections. 1987 elections showed the increasing visibility of the Brothers on the Egyptian political arena. This time the Brothers approached the Al Amal and the Labour Parties to form a tactical alliance under the name of “Islamic Alliance”. The Brothers, when compared to the alliance of the 1984 elections, were forefront actor within the alliance. They won thirty-six seats out of fifty-six seats from this alliance.

Another aspect of the political dynamism of the 1980s was the rise of the professional syndicates. The Brothers, besides having been the most dynamic actor in the elections, were enthusiastic about being active in the syndicates. “The real political significance of the syndicates in Egypt”, Zahid points out, “lies in their role as vehicles for mobilising the support of the professional class” (p.106). Having been aware of this political significance especially because of being under the surveillance of a regime that left few paths to political mobilization, the Brothers gravitated towards the syndicates. Beginning with the Doctors’ Syndicates in 1984, the Brothers gradually penetrated and gained dominance upon the Engineers, Dentists’, Scientists’, Agronomists’, Pharmacists’, Journalists’, Commercial Employees’, and Lawyers’. The success of the Brothers in the management of the syndicates led to its being a significant political actor in Egypt.

The increasing visibility of the Brothers both in the parliamentary and syndicates elections and consequently its increasing popularity disturbed the regime when the 1990s were on the horizon. Several events coinciding the early 1990s accelerated the regime for finding ways to hinder the increasing influence of the Brothers.

Unlike the Mubarak regime that supported the war the Brothers opposed to the 1991 Gulf War. By using its dominance in syndicates and its existence in the parliament, the movement launched events that challenged the regime's policy of supporting the US for the war with Iraq. These efforts aiming at embarrassing the regime frustrated it to a great extent. Another event that awaked the regime to the "nightmare" was the Brothers victories in the Lawyers' syndicate in the early 1990s. The Lawyers' syndicate was assumed as the bastion of the seculars before the Brothers made an unexpected foray into it in 1990. The earthquake that hit Egypt in October 1992 was the last straw that broke the camel's back. What Wickham (2013) says about the Brothers' efforts contra to that of the regime is revealing:

The Brothers' quick response to the earthquake and its efficient mobilization of relief funds and supplies in the days that followed through such groups as the doctors' syndicate-affiliated Humanitarian Relief Committee was in stark contrast to the governments slow-footed response, exacerbated by the fact that President Mubarak was in China at the time and the earthquake occurred on a Thursday after most state offices had closed for the weekend (p.77)

Beginning with the elections of 1995, the regime gradually showed its cold face. Out of 170 candidates the Brothers won only one seat in the parliament, which was revoked later based on the pretext of the Brothers' being an illegal organization. In order to prevent the movement from winning many seats in the elections, the regime tried to hinder voters from reaching polling stations. This practice of hindering voters from reaching the polling stations became an inseparable pillar of the forthcoming elections in next years. The route of the Brothers from 1970s until the beginning of 2000s began with hopes when Sadat leave them relatively free but ended with the suppression of Mubarak as a penalty for being influential in the Egyptian political arena

3.1.2. 2000s and the Road to Perdition

The last decade before the uprising hitting Egypt saw in the early phases the cold face of the authoritarian regime, a hopeful opening heralded a bright future in the mid-phases and learned helplessness on the very eve of the uprising. The trajectory

of the Brothers during this decade was similar to this picture as Wickham (2013) points out:

the Brothers' trajectory in the decade before the uprising arguably encompassed three distinct phases: (1) an initial period of guardedness in which the group attempted to recover from the repressive measures taken against it in the mid-to late 1990s (2000–2003); (2) a period of bolder self-assertion against the backdrop of a short-lived political opening (2004–5); and (3) a reversion to self-restraint following the onset of a new wave of repression (2005–10) (p.96).

The 2000s began with new elections. The Brothers, archenemy of the Mubarak regime, prepared for the elections by bearing lessons of the 1995 elections in mind. That onslaught of the regime against the Brothers gained momentum with the 1995 elections reminded the movement of being modest henceforth in the elections. By almost reducing the number of candidates from 170 to 75, preferring not well-known low-profile from local districts instead of high-profile candidates and focusing on specific issues instead of issues that might disturb the regime, the Brothers aimed at eliminating the draconian policies of the regime during the elections but to no avail. The regime meddled in the voting process initially by arresting 1400 individuals, 1000 being the members of the Brothers and then by preventing people reaching polling stations for voting. The regime got what it wanted: the Brothers won only 17 seats.

The events on the global level had huge impacts on Egypt. September 11 attacks against the US shaped to a great extent the trajectory of the Brothers. The "guardedness" that the Brothers showed in the early phases of 2000s as Wickham (2013) points out above could also be attributed to the attacks of September 11, 2001. The leading figures of the organization were aware that if they had not distance the organization away from al-Qaida and other militant Islamic groups, the regime would have exploited this for suppressing the movement. With the deaf and dumb West, the regime would do fear mongering by concocting prima facie links between the Brothers and the other militant groups. "The sharp rise in global and domestic scrutiny of Islamist groups as purveyors of terrorism and extremism", Wickham (2013) states by pointing out this situation," placed the Brothers on the

defensive and increased its reluctance to launch any move that could trigger another round of conflict with the state (p.101).

Closely related to “the global and domestic scrutiny” was the absence of the Brothers in the streets against the aggression of Israel in Palestine and the US invasion of Iraq. Under the close surveillance of both the Mubarak regime and Bush administration, the Brothers could not afford to participate in demonstrations that would exasperate these actors. While the activists on the left were organizing demonstrations, sit-ins as a protest against both the Palestine questions and the invasion of Iraq in 2002 and 2003 respectively, the movement preferred at best to show low-profile stance. It was this deadlock Abd al-Munim Abu al-Futouh was pointing out when asked why the Brothers were absent in the streets: “We are not prepared to bear the consequences! You ask me: “Can you mobilize a 10,000-strong demonstration?” I’ll tell you: We can mobilize 50,000. But if it’s only us, then the government would try us in the military courts and not the leftists. We don’t want blood, and we don’t want a civil war in the streets!” (Quoted in Wickham, 2013, p.101).

The early 2000s also saw leadership succession struggles within the organization. The unexpected deaths of fifth and sixth Murshids Mustafa Mashour and Mamoun Hudeiby in 2002 and 2004 respectively left the movement in a difficult situation. The above-mentioned state of scrutiny put huge obstacles in front of choosing a new Murshid. Besides this climate of repression there were also objections from the relatively reformist group within the movement about the way the next Murshid would be selected. The so-called reformist group were uncomfortable with the hegemony of the old guard conservative group. This process ended with the selection of relatively a centre figure Mahdi Akef, close both to reformist and conservative groups.

September 11 attacks increased the tension on the Islamic movement all around the Islamic world on the one hand, it led to discussion on the roots of the militant groups on the other hand. The deliberations, especially of the US over the root

causes of the rise of the Islamic militancy, on the reasons of these kinds of occurrences focused on the “democracy deficit” in the Islamic world in general and in the Arab world in particular. The Bush administration talked intensely on the necessity of opening enough path to Islamic actors in the Islamic world. In his speech at the National Endowment for Democracy on November 6, 2003, President Bush emphasized the lack of democracy and its dire consequences:

Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safer—because in the long run, stability cannot be preserved at the expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment and violence ready for export. . . . Therefore the United States has adopted a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East (Emphases added, Quoted in Wickham 2013, p.103)

US’s new approach, which led to what is called “Cairo Spring”, had direct consequences for Egypt and by extension the Brothers. US’ pressure on Mubarak for more political opening so that Islamic actors would find places for themselves within Egyptian political constellation. The thrust of democracy led to emergence of movements, such as Kefaya movement, composed of figures from all walks of life. By endorsing the demands of the Kefaya movement such as “the peaceful alternation of power, the direct election of the president, strengthening the independence of the judiciary and the media, the abolition of the country’s Emergency Laws, and the imposition of strict limits on presidential power” (Wickham, 2013, 108), the Brothers tried to benefit from the opening without being labelled as non-democratic and illiberal.

The era what is called “Cairo Spring” bore its first fruits in the 2005 parliamentary elections as far as the Brothers were concerned. Being well aware of the political opening instigated by the external pressure, the Brothers ran 161 candidates in the elections. Yet the movement also foresaw the dangers of flexing its muscles too much. That is why, they announced beforehand they would not contest more one one-third of the seats in order not to threat the status quo. Despite regime’s chronic practice of tainting the elections by hindering people reaching the polling stations or arresting the candidates, the Brothers were able to win 88 seats out of

161 candidates. It was a historic achievement that would shock the regime and rekindle the authoritarian temptations of the regime.

The honeymoon starting with the “Cairo Spring” came to an end when the regime awoke to the nightmare of a possible strong movement and more importantly when the US abandoned its democracy promotion project. Ottoway&Crothers’s (2004) comments on what urged the US to abandon democracy promotion catches the crux of the issue:

It seems clear that the administration is unwilling to push the envelope and adopt a much more assertive policy toward non-democratic and largely non-reforming but friendly Middle Eastern states. Despite all the talk about a new paradigm for U.S. policy in the region, U.S. policy makers are still effectively paralyzed by an old problem: the clash between their stated desire for a deep-reaching transformation of the region and their underlying interest in maintaining the useful relations they have with the present governments of many nondemocratic states there.

This would have dire consequences for the civil actors in Egypt at most for the Brothers. From the 2005 elections onward the regime accelerated its onslaught on the movement. Ironically, the Brothers, as Wickham (2013) aptly titles, became “a victim of its own success” (p.120).

The old days of repression returned. Comeback of the old days of repression accompanied as usual the declaration by the Brothers of adoption of non-violence path. The pattern was vicious cycle plus an internal leadership struggle on the very eve of the 2011 uprising. Climate of repression surrounding the movement had indelible impacts on its trajectory that would shape it in the post-Mubarak era. In August 2009, Supreme Guide Mahdi Akef unconventionally announced he would leave the post when his term expired in 2010. Living under the close surveillance of the regime enabled the conservative faction to attain the upper hand in the selection of the next guide. When the internal elections ended with the selection of Muhammad Badie in January, relatively reformist figures like Abu al-Futouh and Muhammed Habib were outside of the key decision-making mechanisms. These results on the very eve of the uprisings left the movement vulnerable to partial

fragmentations after the uprising. This vulnerability bore its fruits when certain important reformist figures like Abu al-Futouh left the organization.

The last elections immediately before the uprising persuaded all civilian actors the futility of sham elections, democratic system. What was peculiar to these elections was the rise of former chief of International Atomic Agency Muhammad Baradei as a leading defender of reform. Baradei founded the network dubbed the National Association for Change (NAC) and summoned all the opposition to unite behind this network. Upon government's refusal to fulfil the demands of the NAC, Baradei called for boycott of the 2010 elections. Small opposition groups supported the boycott but relatively big groups or parties like the Wafd Party and the Brothers were not enthusiastic about boycotting the elections. The Brothers fielded 135 candidates but to no avail. The regime brooked no more participation of the civilian into the sham democratic system. So as not to encounter any problem in the coming presidential elections in 2011, the regime intervened intensely. The Brothers after the first round despairingly joined the boycott bloc. The uprising that would unfold a few months later rested on this background in no small measure as Wickham (2013) avers:

The 2010 elections all but eviscerated the opposition in parliament and left the Brothers with no representation at all. Intended to consolidate the regime's grip on power ahead of the presidential race in the spring, *the fraudulent elections ended up eroding the legitimacy of the political system as a whole*. In addition, the elections encouraged the opposition, long divided by partisan and personal rivalries, to unite (emphasis added, p. 150).

3.2. TAHRIR AND THE AFTERMATH

3.2.1 The Tahrir Process

The 2010 elections were watershed in the history of Egypt. These elections showed the oppositional groups the regime was not enthusiastic about blossoming of the democracy in the Egyptian soil. Demonstrations starting with January 25 were a reaction to the erosion of "the legitimacy of the political system as a whole". Added to that was the spark ignited by Tunisians when they were galvanized upon Muhamed Bouazizi's self-immolation as a reaction to the confiscation of his licence. The death of Bouazizi triggered a tremendous outpouring of accumulated anger

against the thirty-year authoritarian regime. The massive demonstrations against the Tunisian regime bore fruits on January 14 when the president Zine el-Abdine Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia. The reverberations of collapse of Ben Ali reached Egypt in a time of apocalyptic despairs following the 2010 elections. These two factors, that is the regime's unabashed interference in the 2010 elections and the inspiration of the Tunisian "Jasmine Revolution", laid the foundation of the demonstrations starting on January 25. The date of January 25 was a symbolically important day because it was the time that the Egyptian police clashed with the British forces in 1952.

The seeds of change were sown among the revolutionary youth from all walks of life. The emergence of activist movements like April 6 movement besides Baradei's National Association for Change, with social media tools like Twitter, Facebook at their disposal, gave momentum to the demonstrations for democratic reform. It was to these kinds of formation the youth of the Brothers were integrated in the period preceding the uprisings. When the wave of protests reached Egypt, the Brothers' youth had already forged "ties of friendship and trust with their counterparts in secular human rights networks" (Wickham, 2013, 155). The Brothers youth, contra to their top leaders, were aware of futility of acting alone. This awareness gravitated these youth towards forming wider coalitions with the youth from different ideologies. What Muhammed Qassas, a Brother student leader, said about these mixed coalitions gave clues about how these youths perceived these wider coalitions: "The formation of these committees, which included student leaders from different groups, was unprecedented, at least for our generation. They gave us the new experience of working together and enabled us to get to know each other on a personal level, establishing a pattern of cooperation that continued over the next fifteen years" (Quoted in Wickham, 2013, 156).

When the demonstrations started on January 25, these youth from different ideological backgrounds were at the forefront. Mubarak did not brook adventures of these youth and started crushing the demonstrations. Having been cognizant of possible consequences in cases of insurgency against the regime, the leadership of

the Brothers were hesitant about full-fledged participation in demonstrations. Unlike enthusiasm of its youth, the old figures of the movement kept their ingrained caution alive in the very beginning of the demonstrations. The protest gained momentum within a few days. The leadership of the organization was at a junction as Nabil Abd al-Fattah points out: "The Brothers is afraid of aggravating security forces against them and are at the same time afraid of missing the opportunity to participate in this widely anticipated protest against the regime" (cited in Wickham, 161). On January 28, the Brothers as an organization decided to participate in the demonstrations. The movement's participation en masse determined the destiny of the "revolution" to a great extent. By using its organizational discipline and expertise besides avoiding articulating Islamic discourses or slogans, the movement contributed to a great extent to success of the uprising. Another important factor that led to the success of the uprising, which would have significant ramifications in post-Mubarak era, was the stance of the army vis-à-vis the protestors. The army declared from the very early its neutrality, which exhilarated the protestors and gave momentum to the uprising. The uprising, at last, achieved its aims on February 11 when Vice President Omer Suleiman announced the resignation of Mubarak.

The transition period began on February 13 with the communique of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces declaring the disbandment of the parliament and suspension of the constitution. Responsibility for ruling the country for six months or until parliamentary and presidential elections were held and the formation of a committee that would make a new constitution were included in the communique. Before the demise of Mubarak, the Brothers made some pledges regarding not dominating the parliamentary elections and not running a candidate for the presidency (Wickham, 2013, 170), which became sticking points in the coming months amidst political cacophony. Litmus test for the Brothers came with Constitutional Amendment of March 19. In spite of objections from other oppositional groups, mainly because of the fear of "document in which the protection of civil and political freedoms would be diluted in the name of preserving the country's Islamic values" (Wickham, 171). Besides this, the opponents objected to the decision about the timing of new elections which would be held within six

months on the basis of fear regarding insufficient time for newly-founded parties. That is why, the opponents voted “no” to these Amendments. The Brothers, on the contrary, voted “yes” because they believed the civilians should take the authority and stabilize the country as soon as possible. The Amendments were accepted with the 77% in favour of them and with 23% against. This referendum process tainted the relations between the Brothers and other revolutionary groups, which would exacerbate the future relations in the coming months.

On April 30, the Freedom and Justice Party was founded on the chairmanship of Muhammad Morsi. Esam al-Aryan was vice president while Muhammad Saad al-Katatni was the secretary general of the brand-new party. The party gained legal status on June 6. The formation of the party without the integration of the reformist figures like Abu al-Futouh led to fragmentations and then defections from the movement. Seen as a top-down fait accompli by the reformists, the formation process was tainted by the tyranny of the conservative bigwigs. This perception on the side of the reformist figures including especially the activist young figures led to the defections and consequently resulted in the formation parties like Nahda, Adl, al-Tayyar al-Misri.

3.2.2. From Parliamentary Elections to the Coup

The conflicts that have hit Egypt after the Tahrir Revolution have disappointed those who were hopeful about smooth transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Having been beaten by the authoritarian regime for nearly a century, the Egyptian people, at last, got rid of the authoritarian mentality but the people are now grapple with the conflicts among themselves. It is necessary to state that the main conflict is between the ancien regime and the Brothers but what has unfolded gradually over time has enmeshed people from the liberals, seculars, Christian. The power struggle over the control of the state between the ancien regime and the Brothers transformed into a full-fledged conflict as a result mutual moves of the two sides.

The period following the decline of Mubarak saw the rule of the military that could not meet justice expectations of the masses – justice for the crimes committed during 18 days revolution process. “Every new official since the uprising in Egypt has sought legitimacy by relying on the narrative of the “revolution” and paying tribute to the “martyrs”, Amnesty International (2013) points out aptly, “yet, all have failed to deliver justice to the families of those killed, or to provide full explanations on the circumstances of their death” (p.5). Besides not meeting the justice expectations, the military continued showing its ugly and cold face towards civilians. When the military transferred to the elected civilian –Justice and Freedom Party-, those participating the Tahrir revolution waited a new democratic Egypt as Elgindy (December 2011) points out:

Once universally viewed as a pillar of stability for a country in transition, the SCAF's foot-dragging on basic reforms and its increasingly repressive tactics against all forms of dissent, including the trial of some 12,000 civilians before military tribunals and the use of deadly violence against young protesters in Tahrir Square in the lead-up to the elections, have convinced most Egyptians of the need to end military rule as quickly as possible.

However, in reality a new phase of the struggle and conflict between the ancien regime and the Brothers began and meshed with the other sectors of the Egyptian society. The story of the power transfer in Egypt has been a story of escalation.

It is possible to argue that the latent conflicts in Egypt became manifest with the transfer of power from the military to the civilian authorities with the elections held in January 2012. The landslide victory of the Islamist parties – the Brothers and the Salafis got 70 % of the total votes- triggered the concerns, or more correctly the “real fears”, of the ancien regime about the end of their golden age. The fact that military ceded the power to the Brothers does not, and has not, mean the disappearance of the military from the political arena. The military, behind the scenes, have been in rush “to preserve its myriad social, economic and political benefits” and as a consequence of this rush it “has aggressively manipulated the political scene throughout the transition process” (Elgindy, December 2011) and it appears it will continue to manipulate as the coup shows. The landslide victory of the Islamist parties and the Brothers’ takeover of the power raised questions about

whether the Brothers would be willing to share the fruits of the revolution with the other groups of the revolution and the remnants of the ancien regime. The future of the country would depend on the degree the Brothers would share the power with the opposition – whether the differences between the Brothers and the ancien regime on the one hand, and the differences between the Islamists and the opposition –leftists, liberals, seculars, Christians- on the other hand will turn into contradiction and polarization or not.

After the victory of the Brothers in the parliamentary elections, the Brothers declared that it would not run candidate on the presidential elections that would be held in July 2012. This decision that any candidate would not be run in the presidential elections alleviated the fears about hegemonic “coming” of the Islamist parties both on the side of the remnants of the ancien regime and other oppositional groups. But with the presidential elections approaching, the Brothers changed their decisions and decided to run a candidate on the presidential elections. The fear that the old regimes would gain ground vis-à-vis the Brothers led to renege on their promise. Morsi pointed out this fear when he said:

We have witnessed obstacles standing in the way of parliament to take decisions to achieve the demands of the revolution. We have therefore chosen the path of the presidency not because we are greedy for power but because we have a majority in parliament which is unable to fulfill its duties (cited by Hamid, June 2012).

The environment gradually got up with the decision of the Brothers, the mutual moves by the remnants of the ancien regime – especially courts- and the Brothers being the result of this hot environment. As Ottaway (2012) points out, “the standoff [between the Brothers and the ancien regime] is the unavoidable consequence of a struggle for power between two political forces that have no incentive to compete in the same political arena on the basis of accepted rules of the game; one side fights through the vote and the other through the courts (emphasis added). Added to this hot environment were the demands from the opposition about trial of those who committed crimes during the Tahrir revolution and left untouched (Amnesty International, 2013). The struggle over the power gradually turned into conflict and conflict gradually escalated. The struggle

escalated and became conflict, and the consequent was the transformation from light conflict to heavy conflict. It is possible to talk about the increase in the number of people involving in the conflict – other elements of the revolution: liberals, leftists, Christians and other small groups. The Brothers, the strongest actor in the Egyptian political arena, with the decision to run candidate in presidential elections violated one of the most important pillars of the post-revolutionary ideals: power sharing. The Brothers made a bad beginning to the politics by its will to dominate both legislation and execution. Being the most important actor of the politics in Egypt, the Brothers should have provided inducement in the form of power sharing so that the post-revolutionary Egypt could be inclusive. Being aware of the dangers of the repercussions of its decision, the Brothers, via the president candidate Morsi, tried to allay the fears of the Egyptians by promising “broad coalition government and that the country's new constitution will be written by a panel that truly represents the nation” (CBS, 2012).

The real conflict started after the presidential elections that ended up with the victory of the Brothers’ candidate Morsi. In fact, the escalation of the conflict in a real sense came after the period following the presidential elections. The ancien regime through its clout in bureaucracy especially in courts – especially Supreme Constitutional Court- began its counter-moves against the Brothers by dissolving the parliamentary elections held in January (Ottaway, November 2012). Morsi, as a reaction to that decision to dissolve the January elections, responded by issuing a constitutional declaration that gave all his decisions immunity from court rulings (CBS, 2012). This move by Morsi was the last straw that broke the camel’s back, whose consequence was the spiral conflict. The intensity of the conflict between the ancien regime and the Brothers increased dramatically. Added to that was the rising opposition of the other elements of the revolutions – liberals, leftists, Christians. The country divided into the two camps: the Brothers and “liberals, leftists, revolutionary movements, and politicians who served in Mubarak’s regime, join hands” (Messieh, November 2012). El-Baradai, the leader of the liberal bloc, stated in his twitter account “Morsi today usurped all state powers and appointed himself Egypt's new pharaoh, a major blow to the revolution that could have dire

consequences” (CBS, 2102). The consequent of this declaration of Morsi was the protests and clashes in the streets of Egypt.

The constitution-making process was also full of mistakes of the Brothers. Immediately after Morsi’s constitutional declaration that gave him far-reaching powers liberals, leftists and Christians withdrew their representatives from the Constituent Assembly – the committee that prepared the new constitution. In the meantime, the Brothers and the Salafis ratified the draft constitution and called for referendum in December. This action of the Islamists escalated more the already escalated conflict. “The political climate in Egypt appears volatile, heated, and tense”, as Saad (2012) points out, “with no signs of the social or political consensus necessary for the drafting of a new constitution. The low rate of turnout of referendum in December 2012 – 32% out of 52 million constituents- was a serious blow to the legitimacy of the constitution. The concerns of the opposition about the rights of women and minority groups, the freedom of expression, the role of Islam, especially al-Azhar, in the constitution (CBS, 2012) was substantial. Concerns that “an unelected body gets to have a say over legislation” and that “this consultation will embroil al-Azhar in no end of dangerous political machinations” (Mabrouk, 2013: 5) are voiced by the opposition about the role of al-Azhar as the consultation body in issues related to Islamic law. One commentator argues the draft constitution “a blow to the goals of the revolution – to achieve a real democratic transformation, to establish the rule of law, a separation of powers, and an independent judiciary” and he adds that “in effect, the president declared himself Pharaoh, putting himself above any challenge or opposition (Saad, December 2012).

The position adopted by the Brothers during constitution-making process –ratifying the draft constitution in the chaotic environment without the consensus of all sectors of the Egyptian society- was the main dynamic behind the escalation of the conflict. The position of the Brothers that it did not seek the consensus of the other groups entrenched the already-adopted view that the Brothers carved out its state not the state of everyone in Egypt. The monopolization of the power was guaranteed with the constitution and unfortunately a hole was opened in the future

of the country. Instead of pursuing the consensus, the Brothers allied with the Salafis and ratified the draft constitution that would be approved in December but added more fire on the escalation. The statement made by the opposition “one of the aspirations of the revolution was to ensure that power would not be overly concentrated in the hands of any one person or institution” (CBS, 2012) summarized the dynamics of the opposition: no power sharing. Inducement in the form of power sharing would integrate the other elements of the revolution into state they fought for –a state with democracy, rule of law, and “bread, dignity and social justice” during the Tahrir revolution but unfortunately they had been alienated and kept away from the formation of a democratic state.

3.3. THE IMPLACABLE COUP

3.3.1 The Path to Coup

Retrospectively speaking, the developments under way at the turn of 2012 were pregnant with a presumptive catastrophe. What was missing perhaps from the very beginning was the lack of an inclusive reconciliation process. Two narratives, or more correctly “duelling legitimacies”, were predominant when Egypt was at a critical crossroad: “The first was based on popular outcry against Morsi and the Muslim Brothers, viewed as incompetent, arrogant, domineering and increasingly out of touch. The second was rooted in the ballot box” (International Crisis Group, 2013, p.1). Let us rewind the film and trace the developments bearing a bitter fruit, that is, a bloody coup.

The wrangling between the ancient regime and the Brothers reached a moment of direct confrontation when the president Morsi granted himself comprehensive executive powers as a countermove aiming to “safeguarding the upper house of parliament and the constituent assembly against potential dissolution by the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC), which in June 2012 had dissolved the lower house” (International Crisis Group, p.3). Being aware of the fact that “A highly politicised judiciary has been doing all in its power to hinder the new leadership’s efforts and obstruct the expression of popular will, while the non-Islamist opposition has not shown itself the least bit constructive or conciliatory”

(International Crisis group, November 2012), the president saw no way but slam his fist on the table. From this point on the developments proceeded as if they were doomed to military takeover. Towards the end of November the Islamist-dominated constitutional assembly ratified the draft constitution without the participation of liberal, secular and Christian members. The way the draft constitution with an Islamist bent was ratified led to the consternation on the side of opposition. The reactions from the opposition were about the collapse of legitimacy of the assembly. On December 15, the first round of the referendum was held amidst the mutual accusations regarding the voting violations. The Islamist camp won the day by outvoting the opposition slightly. The second round was held on December 22. 63.8 % of the total turnout voted for the new constitution (BBC News, June 2012). While the perception that the Islamists hijacked the revolution by not sharing power was spreading, the second anniversary of the Egypt's revolution was approaching.

The second anniversary of the revolution saw violent demonstrations in several important cities. Before the events got more exacerbated, Morsi tried to intervene and called for national dialogue with the opposition. The opposition coalition National Salvation Front (NSF), headed by figures like Mohamed ElBaradei, Hamdeen Sabahi, rejected the call. This rejection deepened the crack opened at the turn of 2012. In the coming months this crack would deepen more and more. On March 2 US secretary of state John Kerry visited Egypt to discuss about conditions for economic aid and urged the opposition not to boycott the coming parliamentary elections in April. The opposition coalition NSF accused the US of supporting not curbing the Brothers and did not retreat from their decision to boycott elections. Step by step the political tug-of-war transformed into a knotty impasse. Both the Brothers and the opposition dragged on the process to the detriment of the revolutionaries. The transformation of the political bickering into direct bloody confrontation, as hinted above, occurred towards the end of March. The last week of March saw clashes between the pro-Brothers and the anti-Brothers. Cycle of violence began to widen and involved the groups from different ideological, religious and sectarian backgrounds such as Christian Copts, Shias etc. April came

with a new grassroots movement Tamarod (Arabic “rebellion”) founded to force the president Morsi to go to early elections. Tamarod aimed to collect 15 million signatures by 30 June 2013, the one-year anniversary of Morsi's inauguration. The movement announced it collected more than 22 million signatures (22,134,460) as of 29 June 2013 (BBC News, July 2013). It was the Tamarod movement that organized nation-wide demonstrations against the president. Its announcement that it collected 22 million signatures no matter how realistic this announcement was triggered the exasperation against Morsi and so to speak made people pour into streets. As of June 30 an estimated three million demonstrators poured into streets all around Egypt to protest Morsi on the one-year anniversary of his inauguration. There were also the supporters of the president Morsi on the streets. While all this was happening, the military was lurking behind the scenes and waiting for its role to come.

3.3.2. The Coup Unfolded

The honeymoon for the civil government ended in a short, as it were, out of the blue. After taking over the control of the country following the ouster of Mubarak until early 2012, the military left the control of the country to civilians. But this transfer of the power was not in real terms. The struggle between the civilians, especially the Brothers after the parliamentary elections, and the military resumed in different forms. From the moment of resignation of Mubarak on, the soldiers waited until the conditions were propitious.

Husnu Mubarak unlike his predecessors Nasser and Sadat was determined to change precedent of the transfer of the power to another soldier when the general-turned-into-president left the post. Mubarak was intent on handing over the presidency to his son Gamal Mubarak but he was aware of possible resistance from the brass. In order not to encounter the resistance from the military Mubarak weakened it in two ways (Frisch, 2013, 182). Firstly, he augmented the power of the police department at the expense of the military. Frisch (2013) provides a vivid picture regarding the rising power of the police:

Thus, police budgets soared almost seven-fold from 3.5 billion Egyptian pounds (\$583 million) in the decade before 2002 to 20 billion pounds (\$3.3 billion) in 2008 compared to the Army's budget which merely doubled.⁴ It was not only a matter of money but of access to the President. Habib al-'Adli, the veteran Minister of Interior who was sentenced to life imprisonment, and 'Umar Sulayman, the veteran director of the Egyptian Intelligence Services, enjoyed greater rapport with the President than any army figure, including veteran Minister of Defense and Military Production, Marshal Tantawi, who had held that post since 1991 (p.183).

Secondly, he "further distanced the military by making sure that former top military officers did not hold the position of Prime Minister, which General Kamal Hassan 'Ali, the former Chief of Staff, held during Sadat's presidency" (p.183). "Egypt under Mubarak", says Frisch (2013), "became if anything a police rather than a garrison state" (p.183), which summarizes succinctly what Mubarak tried to do. The so-called Tahrir Revolution enabled the military to undermine the Mubarak's plan regarding the transfer of the power to his son Gamal. The Tahrir process opened the path of the head of the intelligence Abdel Fatah al-Sisi to the power. Sisi was "seen by contemporaries as a potential successor to then defence minister, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi" (Kingsley, May 2014) and by extension the possible president if the civilian rule is bypassed. It was against this background that Sisi rose to the power. General Sisi was weaving his net of power behind the scenes insidiously when the civilians were squabbling over the destiny of the country and thus clearing the ground for the general Sisi.

This background gives clues about what the general Sisi wanted to do when he issued an ultimatum, on July 1, to the president Morsi threatening military intervention within 48 hours if a settlement was not reached that would prevent people from pouring into the Egyptian streets. Possibly having been known to what extent polarization was deep-seated within the Egyptian society and by extension the futility of calls for a settlement, Sisi tried to exude a modicum of legitimacy to both the domestic and international arena. On July 2 Morsi gave a speech to his supporters gathering in the streets as a reaction to the opponents of the president. In his speech Morsi rejected the ultimatum and declared himself as the legitimate leader of the country. On July 3 when the given time was over, the chief of the

armed forces, General Abdel-Fatah al-Sisi, announced that the military removed president Morsi from power because of his inability to meet the demands of Egyptians. With the support of Shaykh Ahmad al-Tayyib of al-Azhar Mosque, Pope Tawadros II of the Coptic Church, opposition leader Mohamed ElBaradei, and the Salafi Nour Party, the army also suspended the constitution; called for new elections and a coalition government; passed presidential power to 'Adli Mansur, chief of the Supreme Constitutional Court; and denied any intention of controlling the new government. The army placed travel bans on Morsi and other top FJP officials and held them at the Presidential Republican Guards Club as a preventative measure. While there were paeans of euphoria on the side of Morsi's opponents at the Tahrir, there was a deep sorrow among the supporters of Morsi. The euphoria on the side of opponents of Morsi was depicted by Guardian's reporter:

Sisi's televised statement was met by rapturous applause and a spectacular firework display at the centre of the anti-Morsi revolt in Cairo's Tahrir Square. The streets of downtown Cairo became a raucous carnival that lasted into the small hours, with many waving flags, blasting horns, and dancing. One or two could be seen drinking in the same streets that four days ago were jammed with frustrated drivers queuing for hours for petrol (Kingsley, July 2013).

What followed the coup was not unfamiliar to the Brothers that had a history replete with harsh crackdowns. Initial days of the coup was not without turmoil. The military was trying to suppress the resistance of the Brothers and thus to get the whole country under control. This getting the country under control accompanied a high price in the form of hundreds of dead. On July 8 Army and police forces killed 51 civilians and injured more than 400 outside the Republican Guard headquarters in Cairo during dawn prayers. The civilians staged a sit-in to protest the removal of former president Morsi. They asserted that they did not provoke security personnel to attack, which the army denied. The interim government issued a statement saying that the protesters attempted to storm the building, prompting the violent response, and it established a judicial committee to investigate the incident. Unsurprisingly, the government's statement regarding the investigation of the incident disappeared without being remembered amidst the chaotic atmosphere. On the same day that 51 civilians were killed Freedom and Justice Party's

headquarters in Cairo were shut down by a court decree. What would happen on August 14 would overshadow what transpired on July 8. The supporters of ousted president Morsi, immediately after the coup of July 3, took to the streets to defend him. Rabaa al-Adawiya Square became the heart of the protests against the coup. The military, after waiting six weeks, decided to end sits-in. Security forces used bulldozers, tear gas, and live ammunition to break up sit-ins, arrest hundreds of protesters. Human Rights Watch described the massacre as "one of the world's largest killings of demonstrators in a single day in recent history" (Human Rights Watch, August 2014). Even though there are controversy about the death toll, no one can deny the depth of the massacre. According to Human Rights Watch, a minimum of 817 people and more likely at least 1,000 were killed in Rabaa Square on August 14 (Human Rights Watch, August 2014). According to the Egyptian Health Ministry, 638 people were killed on 14 August (of which 595 were civilians and 43 police officers) and at least 3,994 were injured (Daily News Egypt, August 2013). The Muslim Brothers and the National Coalition for Supporting Legitimacy (NCSL) claimed the number of deaths from the Rabaa al-Adawiya Mosque sit-in alone was about 2,600 (Al Jazeera, August 2013). From this massacre on the regime was able to achieve its full control over the country. At least it eliminated a powerful enemy on the streets although this enemy may cause some nausea in the coming days and years.

3.3.3. International Dimension of the Coup

The sudden eruption of the Arab uprisings starting in Tunisia and spreading Egypt, Libya, Syria left many international actors at an awkward position. What these international actors did in the early phases of the uprisings tells a lot about what they have done in countries whose destinies are closely related to these actors. That the Sisi coup in Egypt revealed much about what, for example, the Gulf countries' or the Israel's real intention were vindicates above claim. That is, these countries were concerned about the so-called revolutionary wave and they, as far as signs are concerned, did their best to forestall success of this wave.

The Gulf countries, as it were, were appalled when the uprisings began to collapse despotic Tunisian and Egyptian regimes. The protestors' political demands such as "constitutions that limit executive power, guarantee civil and human rights, and lead to a fairer sharing out of the nation's resources" (Tetreault, 2011, 629) horrified these countries because the rulers of these countries were aware that these kinds of demands would cripple their authorities and then collapse these kingdoms. In order to preclude the path of success in front of the demonstrations the rulers adopted a brutal stance. They were not sympathetic with both demonstrators within and outside their countries. Despite using incentives such as doing new payments to citizens to appease them, they were not hesitant about using violent methods. As stated aptly by Tetreault (2011):

Overall, however, the Gulf regimes chose to meet pro-democracy movements by pretending they did not exist, or, where the pretense could not be sustained, by applying threats and force. Media restrictions, included blocking websites as well as the more draconian penalties imposed by the new media laws noted above, were accompanied by accusations charging demonstrators with disloyalty and, when this did not work, by sending police and military forces to disperse and punish them (p.632).

The most vivid picture of the Gulf countries' antipathy towards the demonstrations may be seen in how they reacted to the "successes" the Muslim Brothers in Egypt. "It became obvious that the Gulf states (with the exception of Qatar)", points out Steinberg (2014), "regard the MB as a strategic threat because they fear that it might export the successful revolutions in North Africa to the monarchies of the Gulf countries, where the Brothers have a presence in all states". That the Brothers movement was "a strategic threat" in the eyes of the Gulf countries was confirmed when, a few days after the coup on July 9 and 10, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait pledged 3, 5 and 5 billion dollars of economic aid respectively. These pledges only a few days after the coup showed nakedly the main international actors behind the coup and also made clear how significant the defeat of the MB had been to them. What Steinberg (2014) says seems to be correct when these facts are taken into consideration: "Looking at the sequence of events, it is very likely that Saudi Arabia and the UAE had been consulted in advance of the coup in order to secure their support after the crackdown".

As for the USA, it is possible to say that there has an ambivalence in position-taking of it. At the beginning of the protests against Mubarak, as expressed succinctly by Brooke (2013), “the Obama Administration hedged its bets and lent diplomatic and rhetorical support to the Egyptian regime” (p.27). But upon seeing that things were not going well for Mubarak, the administration began to express an “orderly transition”. Ups and downs of the Obama administration resumed after the resignation of Mubarak. At the early days of the ouster of Mubarak, the administration did not make mention of the rising actor of the uprising, namely the Muslim Brothers. The Freedom and Justice Party visited the United States in April 2012 to express themselves to both the state and American public. The elections before this visit and this visit changed the policy of little mention. The White House seemed to accept the Brothers reality but they were aware of the consequence of that reality, which would influence to a great extent the position the US took towards the coup. What Brooke (2013) says about Palestine Question may give clue about the possible consequences for the US and by extension Israel: “it is likely that the United States and Israel will experience far less cooperation than they have come to expect on day-to-day issues regarding the Palestinians. For example, the policy of blockading and isolating Gaza will likely find little support in Egypt” (p.31). The US administration, therefore, was aware of the prices they might have to pay no matter how democratic the presidency of Morsi was, as hinted at the above-mentioned Palestine Question. Instead of working with an Islamist party that would be sensitive to the demands of people –despite this party’s insistence on adhering to the international agreements- Americans used to prefer and preferred authoritarian rulers. This line of policy was justified both when the Obama administration avoided using the “magic word” coup so as not to prevent aid flows to Egypt and when US secretary of State said the following: “The military was asked to intervene by millions and millions of people, all of whom were afraid of a descendance into chaos, into violence. And the military did not take over, to the best of our judgement - so far. To run the country, there's a civilian government. In effect, they were restoring democracy” (BBC, August 2013).

Hamid&Mandaville (2013) emphasised that the Obama administration's willingness to flow economic aid despite presence of a military coup "suggested not a lack of leverage, but the absence of the political will to use it" (p.1). They added "Questions of US influence are as relevant as ever as Egypt finds itself in danger of entering a period of sustained civil conflict and political violence" (p.1) by criticizing the comments that highlighted the futility of the US's efforts to avoid junta's iron fist. Despite the Obama administration's short-term suspension of military assistance to Egypt on October 10 –which they renewed the aid in March 2015, alleging a need to fight Islamic state (Guardian, March 2015) - they minimised their pressure on April 23 when they announced they would deliver ten Apache helicopters to Egypt. All these show even if a strong support like that of the Gulf countries cannot be observed, a tacit recognition at early phases and a tacit support at later stages have been provided.

As nemesis of the Arab people due to sufferings inflicted upon Palestinians, Israel watched with worried eyes the authoritarian regimes in Tunisia and Egypt collapsing in favour of the Arab peoples. Status quo of the Middle East especially with an Egypt adhering to the Camp David Accords and coercing its archenemy's friend Hamas through the pressure upon borders enabled Israel to live in a relatively safe environment. Rise of the Arab peoples or more correctly possibility of an increasing impact of the peoples on foreign policies of region's states was at the heart of fear Israel had when the uprisings hit the region. Added to that was possibility of the rise of Islamist parties across the region. "It is assumed", says Berti (2013) by pointing out the above-mentioned points," that the current shift in the region's political arena and the rise of political Islam will benefit the "Resistance Camp" in general, and groups like Hamas and Hezbollah specifically, while negatively affecting Israel" (p. 130). It was this understanding that led Israeli authorities to express their concerns both over possible collapse of Mubarak regime and the implications of this collapse over the stability of the region (Berti, p.132). As the process progressed in favour of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt with success in elections, the Israeli authorities' fear regarding the fate of the Camp David increased. Although the organization declared that they would adhere to the general framework of the

treaty but only with caveat that they might revise some terms of the treaty, the Israeli authorities did not stop worrying about the treaty's future because they were afraid of predominant anti-Zionism within rank and file of the Brothers (Berti, p.142). This fear was closely related to another one, that is, rise of Hamas politically. An Egyptian regime that would be controlled by the Brothers meant, to the Israelis, a stronger Hamas in Palestine. Security of Sina was also of paramount importance for Israel because in the eyes of Israel Sina was a hotbed of jihadists, which would be tolerated in case of an Islamist government. It is against this background that doubts regarding possible meddling of Israel into the coup have spread. These kinds of doubts were not without foundation. A few days after August 14 massacre, one New York Times (Rudoren, August 2013) piece says: "Israel plans this week to intensify its diplomatic campaign urging Europe and the United States to support the military-backed government in Egypt despite its deadly crackdown on Islamist protesters, according to a senior Israeli official involved in the effort". Another piece from Foreign Policy (Hudson, August 2013) again at approximately same day as the one before points out support of Israel lobby in the US for Sisi: "As pressure mounts on Washington to cut off U.S. military aid to Egypt, Cairo has found an awkward ally in the form of AIPAC, the influential pro-Israel lobby firm that is actively pushing for continued U.S. aid to Egypt". It seems that the Israeli authorities, if not diehard active supporters of the coup, have not so far missed the opportunity to strengthen the place of Sisi. The two states cooperation against jihadists in Sinai and Hamas after the bloody coup alludes to how close the states have been since the coup. Reopening of Israeli embassy in Cairo on September 9 2015 after four years of closure shows the things have been put on the right track after the removal of the "common archenemy".

3.3.4. Political Economy of the Coup

The Sisi regime's strategy to eradicate the Brothers movement from the soils of Egypt cannot do without uprooting the organization's flaunted network of nationwide social services. Having been one of the most important factors behind popularity of the movement among Egyptian ordinary people, as known well by the regime, the Brothers' social services have needed to be taken over or shut down by

the regime. The concerns that led Sisi to undermine the network of nationwide social services are summarized well by Brooke (2015):

On the other hand, allowing this network to continue in its current form poses apparently unacceptable risks to the regime. For decades, the Brothers' network of social services have deeply embedded themselves in Egypt's cities and villages and earned the movement a reservoir of gratitude, if not outright support. So long as this network continues to exist it will serve as a potential site of opposition against Egypt's new rulers, a place where activists from the Brothers can build support by leveraging their resources to help Egyptians cope with their everyday problems (p.3).

The regime's crackdown on the organization did not remain limited to just the network of social services. Besides these, the regime attacked NGOs affiliated by the organization, companies owned by the organization or leaders of the organization or people affiliated with the organization. Last but not least was the regime's decision to freeze assets of the leaders of the movement. When these blows are added to other blows, sum effect will be disheartening for the Brothers:

Beyond civil society, the group's economic enterprises have been targeted, political participation foreclosed, and even fields of religious education and study are being strictly policed to remove alleged Brothers influences. All this is occurring against a rhetorical campaign to exclude the Brothers from Egyptian body politic, to tar it as a foreign body to be excised (Brooke, p.3).

A September 2013 court case banned all the activities of the organization and opened the way of confiscation of both the organization's and the members' funds, assets etc. With the declaration of the Muslim Brothers as a terrorist organization by the regime in December 2013, legal ground was prepared for freezing and confiscating the assets of the organization. Upon the declaration, a committee headed by the deputy Justice Minister İzzet Khamis was established to oversee confiscation process. The process began to bear its first fruits with February. The state froze personal assets of 572 members of the Muslim brothers, including ousted Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi, leader Mohamed Badie, deputy leader Khairat Al-Shater and former leader Mohamed Akef (Middle East Monitor, February 2014). In the same month the state also confiscated 93 companies owned by Muslim Brothers leaders and members. Among figures whose companies were frozen were Mohamed Ibrahim owning 20 companies, Helmi Al-Jazzar having shares

in Group 21 for Investment and Commerce, Deputy Leader Khairat Al-Shater owning 3 companies and Second Deputy Rashad Bayoumi owning one large company (Middle East Monitor, February 2014). One of the deadliest blow to the organization was decision to confiscate funds and assets of 28 branches of the largest medical charity association Islamic Medical Association (IMA). IMA was founded in 1978 to provide low cost and high quality medical care by Ahmed Al-Malt, a former member of the Muslim Brothers' Guidance Bureau (Middle East Monitor, January 2015). As of January 22, 2015, damage to the organization's economic structure became visible. Izzet Khamis, the head of the committee established to oversee the confiscation process, announced results of the committee's work. According to these results, the state froze the assets of 901 Muslim Brothers members and 1,096 Brothers-affiliated charities (Middle East Monitor, January 2015). 522 offices of the dissolved Justice and Freedom Party and 54 Brothers-owned premises were seized. 360 vehicles and 328 feddans [138 acres] of land owned by the organization members were confiscated. 532 Brothers-affiliated companies and 28 hospitals and medical centres were grabbed. 1,096 Brothers-affiliated NGOs and 82 schools were seized. As 2015 progressed the number of NGOs appropriated by the regime rose to 1300 (Middle East Monitor, July 2015). Putting minor inconsistencies between the numbers aside, it is possible to say that the numbers have been increasing since January 2014. When we come to August 2015 we see an increase when compared to the numbers given before by authorities. According to Egyptian authorities the state froze the assets of 1,345 members of the organization over the past 18 months; seized 1,117 NGOs and 50 hospitals affiliated with the organization; took over 103 Brothers-linked schools (Middle East Monitor, August 2015). In December 2015, 12 money exchange companies thought to be affiliated with the organization with worth of 20 million Egyptian pound (approximately, \$2.5 million) were confiscated (Middle East Monitor, December 2015). As of May 2016, the crackdown on the economic infrastructure of the Muslim Brothers was in progress. As of January 2016, according to the Egyptian authorities, the state confiscated approximately \$695 million from the organization since January 2014, as well as money belonging to 1,370 people affiliated with the movement (Middle East Monitor, May 2016).

3.4. WHITHER THE MUSLIM BROTHERS?

Itinerary the Muslim Brothers will take in coming years has not crystallized and has yet to be seen. Although it is not possible to say what the itinerary of the organization will be, it is quite possible to say that the current situation of the organization does not bode well for a luminous future at least in the short run. Living under inexorable circumstances after the ouster of Morsi in July 2013, perhaps comparable with Nasser's crackdown of 1954, the movement, so to speak, has been in a complete shamble. As touched above, the economic, social and political infrastructures of the organization have been at the centre of the regime's crackdown. What has (been) left from the organization is its name, a name without body. The path the organization will take, as far as these harsh circumstances are concerned, arouse interest. According to Ashraf El-Sherif (October 2014), there are four likely future scenarios, which will be addressed below to cast a light on what the future of the organization will be.

3.4.1. "Total Eradication"

The coup of July 3 brought the gargantuan military back to the heart of the Egyptian politics. The military comeback after Morsi's ouster has left the Muslim Brothers in a highly ambivalent position. The new "pharaoh" of Egypt hinted from the beginning he had no intention brook an intransigent Muslim Brothers: either acquiesce new status quo or suffer what befalls to the organization. That is why, Sisi at the very beginning summoned the Brothers to participate in transition but of course not without costs as Sherif (2014) points out:

Those rules were clear: the Brothers would recognize the legitimacy of the new system, cease protests and demonstrations, stop demanding that Morsi be returned to the presidency, and accept legal punishment for leaders involved in social strife. The Brothers would also accept military-imposed redlines on issues related to national security and identity, limit its sectarian activities, and refrain from additional bids for electoral and political domination (p.9).

Acceptance of these conditions, the Brothers thought, would make the movement a pawn at the hands of Sisi and undermine the solidarity within the organization to its detriment. And they rejected the call and decided to resist. "In the face of the

Brothers' intransigence", as Sherif (2014) aptly says, "the regime seeks the group's decapitation and its total destruction if possible" (p.9). The "decapitation" of the organization has been being put into practice since the coup. Rabaa massacre was a part of this process of the decapitation. The use of death as an efficient tool at the hands of the regime was not limited to the Rabaa massacre. The regime uses this tool whenever it thinks necessary. That 3,143 Egyptians are estimated to have been killed between July 3, 2013, and January 31, 2014 (Dunne, March 2014) gives clues about the intent of the regime regarding the decapitation policy. Besides this there is also the mass arrest phenomenon. As of March 2015, estimates were that as many as 40,000 people were being incarcerated for political reasons, most of them for real or suspected links to the Muslim Brothers (Freedom House, 2016). There have been also mass trials and mass death sentences. On March 24 a court sentenced 529 Muslim Brothers members to death, which was the largest death sentence in Egypt's modern history (Aljazeera, March 2014). On April 28, a court sentenced 683 people to death, including the Muslim Brothers Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie (Aljazeera, April 2014). These sentences are the harshest ones. There have been so many death sentences, life imprisonment and other penalties that it is not possible to know for certain the number of verdicts. It appears the regime is enthusiastic about using verdicts especially death sentences as a trump card at its disposal against both domestic and international actors. Last but not least was the regime's effort to undermine the network of social services. As examined in detail above, the regime confiscated nearly all the network of social services of the organization.

The important question that needs to be answered is whether the regime will be able to eradicate the movement totally from the soils of Egypt. The answer to that questions seems to be no. Some in Egypt, by comparing Sisi to Nasser, thinks Sisi will be able to eradicate the Muslim Brothers:

Some anti-Islamist elites in Egypt still view the regime's strongman President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, elected in June 2014, as the country's Atatürk, the father of modern-day Turkey, who would be capable of purging Egypt of Islamism. These elites often point to former president Gamal Abdel Nasser's efforts to eliminate the Brothers in the 1950s and 1960s (Sherif, 2014, p.10).

The movement was able to rise from its ashes after nearly two decades of suffering when Anwar Sadat replaced Gamal Abdal Nasser. The regime, perhaps being aware of this fact, has forced the movement to take up arms by suppressing it in unprecedented ways and thus made it an illegitimate organization in the eyes of the Egyptian people. The organization has so far resisted taking up arms despite all temptations caused by the regime even if it is possible to talk about some minor tendencies to violence. As Sherif (2014) asserts in this context, “given the socio political and economic situation in Egypt today, a similar Islamist comeback is not unlikely, though it is a distant possibility given current polarization” (p.10). What Hamid (May 2014) says in his newspaper article “The Brothers will be back” is enlightening especially when the question whether the Brothers will survive is thought:

The lesson of the Arab Spring isn't that Islamist parties are inimical to democracy, but that democracy, or even a semblance of it, is impossible without them. When there are democratic openings — whether that's in 5, 10 or 15 years — Islamists might look different and talk differently, but they will still be there, waiting and ready to return to political prominence, and perhaps even power.

3.4.2. “Triumphant Comeback”

It is one thing to assert that the democratic openings will certainly make the comeback of the Brothers possible because base of the movement will not disappear as a result of the brutal crackdown. It is quite another to say the comeback will be heroically triumphant. Underlying this idea is that the economic and political failures of the regime will canalise the Egyptian people towards the Brothers (Sherif, 2014, 11). This is misleading. What this argumentation misses is that the path to the coup partially was paved by mistakes of the Brothers at least opponents of the organization had that perception. People poured into streets towards the end of June when the first anniversary of the election of Morsi as president approached. This was absolutely not coincidental. Those who poured into the streets were angry about the path the revolution took under the command of the political wing of the Brothers, Freedom and Justice Party. Those people, when they were on the streets before the coup, thought the Brothers stole their

revolution. Ironically, Sisi stole the revolution of all Egyptian with no hope of return thanks to those people's demonstrations. It appears that the anger of these people will not wane in a foreseeable future as Sherif (2014) points out:

It will take a long time to undo the negative perceptions of the Brothers prevalent in the mainstream—fed by bloody confrontations, sectarian clashes, terrorism, religious hate, civil strife, and a media witch hunt. Moreover, despite the Brothers having hoped otherwise, public discontent with the regime's economic policies has not translated to popular support for the organization (p.12).

Those who assert that the Brothers will come back triumphantly make comparisons with times of Nasser. The comparison goes like this: Nasser brutal crackdown lasted for nearly two decades. With the death of Nasser and coming of Sadat tragic destiny of the organization ended. Upon seeing the collapse of Nasser's project with the debacle of 1967 War with Israel, people began to adopt narrative of Islamic movements like that of the Muslim Brothers. The same will happen in the case of Sisi. People will see how unsuccessful Sisi's project will be and will turn to the Brothers. What is missing in this narrative unlike the case of Nasser in which there was not any government experiment is the scale and scope of anti-Brothers feelings as a result of unsuccessful government experiment. As far as foreseeable future is concerned, it appears that odds of the Brothers' survival is high while odds of a triumphant comeback is low.

3.4.3. "Reconciliation with the Regime"

The reconciliation with the regime means more or less "a return to the political formula of the Mubarak days, when the limited, de facto political inclusion of the Brothers was permitted within certain regime redlines" (Sherif, p.14). "Participation not domination (al-musharika la al-mughaliba)" strategy that was emphasized by the Brothers nearly over the course of Mubarak' reign (Brown, 2012) may be brought to the fore in the coming years in order to get rid of the regime's crackdown. To live under unbearable circumstances for a long time may tire the organization and lead them to seek out an acceptable modus vivendi. By prioritizing social services instead of focusing on political activities, the organization may find a propitious place within the Egyptian system. Besides the Brothers, such a

settlement will relieve the state of load of continuous surveillance of the movement. “This scenario could be a win-win situation for both the old state and the Brothers”, says Sherif (2014) by pointing out possible advantages to both sides and adds, “The old state would be relieved of the burden of maintaining its harsh tactics against the Brothers and could achieve desperately needed political and economic stability” (p. 14).

Any possible reconciliation between the sides will decrease possibility of spread of radicalization among the rank-and-files of the Brothers. The Muslim Brothers as a movement will certainly try to stay away from violence as the period after the coup attests. But what is more important than whether the Brothers will take up arms is that the regime’s bloody crackdown on the movement may canalise people especially youth towards jihadist groups such as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis that is active in Sinai Peninsula. Fayed (2016) dwells on possible negative ramification of the crackdown for this issue:

The armed Islamist group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) strengthened its influence in the Sinai after the military coup. In its calculus, the collapse of Islamists’ gamble on democracy proved the impossibility of change through standard political mechanisms. In short, it was a victory for those advocating force as the only effective route to change. This small group in the Sinai exploited events to press the need for directly confronting the state, and was able to attract members from outside the Sinai. The rise of ISIS and the subsequent military campaign in the Sinai against ABM led to additional popular support for the group, which would go on to formally affiliate itself with the Islamic State, rebranding itself as ISIS’s “Sinai Province..... In this context — and after the greatest instance of mass killings in Egypt’s modern history — it is not a surprise that armed groups sought to capitalize on these events and use them as a pretext for violent action. Pointing to the Brothers’ aborted reign as primary evidence, armed groups argued that democracy would never permit an Islamist victory, even if fairly earned. It then became simple to paint the picture of a supposed “war on Islam” that could appeal to disillusioned individuals. (p.9).

In order to circumvent this exploitation of disillusion with peaceful methods, the Brothers and more importantly the regime may need to come together for a settlement even if there is not such a prospect on the horizon for the time being.

A reconciliation will relieve both sides but to reach such a reconciliation will not be easy in foreseeable future for several reasons. First obstacle in front of any possible reconciliation is that both sides demonizes each other heavily (Sherif, 2014). Underlying this demonization on the side of the Brothers is the number of people killed by the regime. This will possibly make reconciliation nearly impossible because such a reconciliation means avoiding seeking retribution. The second is about whether the regime will allow the movement to play more or less a role in political arena. As the brutality of the crackdown shows, the regime cannot brook the existence of the Brothers in Egypt let alone political arena. The regional context is also important to reach a reconciliation. As touched above, the Gulf countries have been the main backers of the coup. The context of 2013 is quite different from that of now. The focus on “threat” of the Muslim Brothers has been replaced Shia-Sunni confrontation in places like Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Whether this shift in focus will result in a détente between the regime and the Brothers is not crystal clear and there have not reliable signs in this direction so far.

3.4.4. Fragmentation of the Organization

The recent crackdown on the movement may deepen disagreements over what to be done within the organization. These disagreements within the movement regarding the path that will be taken especially about the issue of taking up arms may cause collapse of the organizational fabric. Generally speaking, it is possible to talk about emergence of two possible currents, one being moderates and other being hardliners.

Having born brunt of the brutal crackdown for three years, some Brothers may propose a return to original concern of the organization, that is, social services. Prioritization of political activism instead of social activism from the Tahrir to the coup, these moderates may think, has been to the detriment of the organization. They may initiate an overhaul of this prioritization of political activism. “The Brothers’ brief experience of being in power and its subsequent removal by military coup has served to strengthen the idea of separating the Brothers’ role as a social institution from its role as a political force”, says Fayed (2016) by pointing out

tension between political and social activism and adds, “In hindsight, it appears that the Brothers’ direct participation in competitive politics has done substantial damage to decades of social and religious institution building” (p.7). In a period of time that nearly all decades of social and religious infrastructure is in a complete shambles, the urgency to return to old social charity works may be pressing. This faction may need to take political realities in Egypt into consideration and try to focus on reviving social activism as Sherif points out “Recognizing political realities, this faction may abandon the goal of restoring Morsi to the presidency, pursuing reconciliation on the regime’s terms and focusing on good governance instead of identity-based politics” (p.18). But how possible emergence of such a faction? Odds are slim: “The practical possibility, then, that a moderate faction will emerge is limited. By 2010, the hardliner faction had already achieved organizational and ideological hegemony in the Brothers. The supposedly moderate faction represents only a few individuals lacking real organizational clout” (Sherif, 2014, p.18).

Disillusioned by the brutality of the regime, some Brothers especially youth may resort to violence. When availability of the jihadist organization within and without the country is taken into consideration, recourse to violence is not far-fetched. According to what Sherif (2014) conveys, “Brothers insiders point out that the movement’s youth are not particularly ideological and are currently motivated more by a spirit of vengeance. However, the anti-regime revolutionary spirit they embrace leads them toward detachment, narcissism, and holier-than-thou attitudes—all products of Qutbist ideology” (p.19). It appears that there is a tendency within the movement’s youth to take up arms. But as touched above, this tendency will not possibly be predominant because the reigning cultural model within movement contradicts this tendency. As can be seen in the case of “Duat la Qudat” in which the second guide Hasan al-Hudaybi reacted to Qutb’s radical method, the movement will not choose violence. This, however, does not mean puritanical method similar to that of Qutb will disappear. What is more probable is that that tendency will find a place for itself within the members but will be tamed. That is, the above-mentioned moderates will be outshone by hardliners, but

hardliners will be tamed so that their disillusionment with the regime do not urge them to use violence.



CHAPTER 4: AN ANALYTIC COMPARISON OF THE TWO CRACKDOWN

Ordeal that has befallen the Brothers in last years after the bloody coup of July, as implicated above, is comparable to that of the 1954 ordeal continuing more than one and a half decade. The abundance of comments like “with all of its top leaders either arrested or on the run, its activities banned, and its assets seized by an Egyptian court, the Brothers is at the brink of destruction” (Trager, Atlantic 2013) within pieces written on the current status of the Brothers movement reminds the talks of 1950s and 1960s regarding the demise of the movement as indicated by Zoellner (2009) by words “the organization seemed to have come to an end” (p.38). The parallels between these two periods, which are handled in detail above, especially in terms of sufferings the organization had will be examined in the form of a short recapturing under four titles, which are leadership, political economy of the coup, regional and international dimensions and the internal dimension of the Brothers.

4.1. LEADERSHIP

Leadership matters when the periods of 1954 and 2013 are considered especially in that contours of these two periods have been shaped to a great extent by the people incumbent. The all-out war that broke out between the Brothers and Nasser immediately after the overthrow of the king and culminated in the failed assassination attempt against Nasser ended up with the absolute victory of Nasser. The words of Nasser on the day of assassination reverberated among the Egyptian people and cleared the way of purge of the Muslim Brothers in particular and all other rivals in general:

Oh ye people ... Oh ye free men ... I, Gamal Abd al-Nasir, am of your blood and my blood is for you. I will live for your sake and I will die serving you. I will live to struggle for the sake of your freedom and your dignity. Oh ye free men ... Oh ye men ... Even if they kill me, I have placed in you self-respect. Let them kill me now, for I have planted in this nation freedom, self-respect, and dignity. For the sake of Egypt and for the sake of Egypt's freedom, I will live and in the service of Egypt I will die (taken from Mitchell, 1993, 151)

From this time onward the Brothers became the archenemy of Nasser and by extension the enemy of the state, that is, the Nasser’s state. The years of repression, torture, suffering, that is, years of mihna/ordeal for the organization

came with an old friend and ally. Days of friendship and alliance were long gone and endless and relentless of days of suffering befell under the command of Nasser. These days of suffering under the presidency of Nasser softened to some extent in the coming years notwithstanding, Nasser was always vigilant about any possible resurrection of the organization and kept them under continuous surveillance. The regime brooked no appearance of the Brothers on the Egyptian scene. They were incarcerated in prisons, as it were, with no hope of recovering from these historic lows of deplorability.

The relatively softening of policy of repression which was directly related to the decreasing threat perception of the organization opened opportunities for it to revive. When mid-1960s came, the organization, possibly thanks to efforts of Muslim Sisters under the command of Zaynab al-Ghazali (Zoellner, 2009, 41-42), began to rise from its ashes. It was this period that Sayyid Qutb emerged as a trailblazer for the desperate Brothers incarcerated and repressed by the regime. Upon seeing the recovery of the organization, Nasser thanks to its constant surveillance nipped the nascent recovery of the organization in the bud. Executing prominent figures of this period Sayyid Qutb, Abd al-Fattah Ismail and Muhammad Yusuf Awash in 1966 and trying to exterminate the flowering structure, Nasser manifested vividly his being the leader of the regime mattered when the Brothers were concerned.

Sisi has so far pursued a similar policy of repression, or perhaps more correctly a much severer policy. The coup of July 3 has left unspeakable sufferings among the members of the organization with thousands of deaths and arrests. The Rabaa Massacre on 14 August 2013, which was described by Human Rights Watch as "one of the world's largest killings of demonstrators in a single day in recent history" (Human Rights Watch, 2014), manifested brutality of the coup leader Sisi with deliberate killings of hundreds of people. Witch hunt following the coup especially after the bloody dispersal of people in Rabaa Square on 14 August has haunted the members of the Brothers but people from different political background too could

not spare themselves from this hunt. The brutality of repression has reached to absurdities as this case of sentencing of a toddler:

Qenawy is three years old. Last month, a Cairo court sentenced him to four years and three months in prison for theft and 'resisting the authorities'. His lawyer appealed the conviction, and the case continues. In a recent court appearance, Qenawy entered the courtroom asleep on his lawyer's shoulder (Trafford&Ramadhani, Independent, September 2016).

Besides thousands of incarcerated people both from the Brothers organization and from other political actors, there have been so many cases of disappearance mostly in the form of unidentified murders by the Sisi's regime. This disappearance of people who are critical of the Sisi's regime has attracted attention of Amnesty International: "Enforced disappearance has become a key instrument of state policy in Egypt. Anyone who dares to speak out is at risk, with counter-terrorism being used as an excuse to abduct, interrogate and torture people who challenge the authorities" (Amnesty International, July 2016). The scene from Egypt under aegis of Sisi, as far as the crackdown on the Brothers is concerned, is startlingly scary. The Brothers have borne the brunt of Sisi's mishandling after the bloody coup so far and it seems they will in the near future. What Sisi has done so far seems to have what Nasser did forgotten. Similar to Nasser, Sisi has embarked on an all-out war with no-return against the Muslim Brothers organization after inflicting such a big casualty.

One point that needs to be dwell on in this context is to look at what kinds of links there are between Nasser and Sisi. Needless to say, the similarities between the times of Nasser and those of Sisi, especially when the Brothers are considered, bring the question whether any link can be made between then and now. Perhaps more than this, the question whether Sisi has been trying to portray himself as a new Nasser in a guise needs to be addressed if the two periods are compared. Nasser was an outstanding figure standing against the colonizer West and a figure trying to bring the Arab together under the same of state. "Nasser's strengths", Serougi (March 2016) aptly points out, "were the idealisation of modern Arab societies predicated on what were secular anti-colonial values, alongside his three circles of Africanism, Arabism and Islam". His policy of nationalization of Suez Canal and his pioneering initiatives in foundation the non-aligned movement made him a hero in

the eyes of both the Egyptian and the Arab. Even if this charisma suffered to a certain extent after debacle of the Six Days of 1967, Nasser has always been regarded as a respected figure in the collective memory of considerable amount of the Egyptian people and especially in the collective memory of the military. By linking this memory and Sisi's appropriation of this memory, Serougi (March 2016) says: "The nostalgic appeal and political gravity of Nasserism, despite being heavily caricatured for domestic consumption, still lies close to the surface of the Egyptian psyche. Given the army's imprint runs through civic life, Sisi was a man in the right place at the right time". It was against this background that Nasser appeared on the Egyptian political arena in the hands of Sisi for legitimacy. Serougi continues and says in this context: "Numerous military men, seeking the mantle of successor, have intoned the political heritage of Nasser as a means of acquiring authority and legitimacy. Sisi was no different and when he took power; his popularity reflected a wish to reconnect with a leadership that was rooted in Nasser's legacy".

The days following the ouster of Morsi, even in the very early days of demonstration in the eve of the ouster of Morsi, Nasser appeared on the Egyptian political arena among the supporters of Sisi. Sisi was aware of the charisma of Nasser among the Egyptians who were against the Brothers and began to exploit this charisma. When daughter of Nasser, Hoda Abdel Nasser historian and professor in the Political Science Department at Cairo University, wrote a letter to Sisi, encouraging him to handle the state, it became apparent Nasser's spirit would be with Sisi in his handling the state. Hoda's words are quite interesting to understand the link that was made between Nasser and Sisi:

When the constitution was approved on 16 January 1956, Abdel Nasser dissolved the Revolutionary Leadership Council. He was no longer a military officer and he stood for presidential elections that same year. He became a civilian. His political wisdom shined at crucial moments in our history: the evacuation negotiations in 1954, eradicating the weapon monopoly in 1955, the victory against tripartite aggression, managing the political and media battle in an efficient way, securing our interests during the separation crisis in 1961, and restructuring the Egyptian army following the 1967 defeat in just three years, from 11 June 1967 to 28 September 1970 (Hoda Abdel Nasser, Egypt Independent).

Sisi was a general like Nasser and he was encouraged by Nasser's daughter to terminate his military career and stand for presidential elections. As touched above Sisi was also enthusiastic about following the footsteps of Nasser. His mega project of Suez Canal extension reminds Nasser's nationalization of Suez Canal in 1956. Sisi, following the footstep of Nasser that nationalized the Suez Canal, portrayed himself as heir of Nasser as the president that extended the Suez Canal for making the Egyptian economy better. As Mansour (Middle East Eye 2016) stated Sisi "showed off, portraying himself as Gamal Abdul Nasser, a godfather of mega state projects". Besides launching mega projects like the Suez Canal extension reminiscent of Nasser, Sisi also did symbolic things like Nasser's grave in Nasser's death anniversary. Sisi's words that "I wish I was like Nasser. Nasser was not for Egyptians just a portrait on walls but a photo and voice carved in their hearts" (Ahram Online, May 2014) were another important sign that shows how enthusiastic Sisi has been in exploiting Nasser and his legacy.

At the flip side is leadership of the Muslim Brothers. By the time the Brothers experienced the crackdown the second general guide Hasan al-Hudaybi had just weather the storm of restoring its authority against the ones concentrating on his being outsider. As Zoellner (2009) points out Hudaybi was an outsider summoned for pragmatic reasons:

The ideal was to find a well-respected public figure, but one who lacked influence within the Brothers, since the interim leaders of the organisation had no intention of giving up their power and control. The nomination of al-Hudaybi was therefore a pragmatic decision As a formerly high-ranking representative of the judiciary, his influence in state institutions as well as his contacts with relevant persons was useful (p.20).

At the beginning the situation was as described above, with time passing Hudaybi began to establish his authority. As touched above, Nasser was not happy about this strengthening of the authority and did his best to undermine Hudaybi's authority. It was against this background that Hudaybi was able to weather this severe storm and to gather the Brothers around himself. When the desperate incarcerated Brothers tended to radicalize, it was Hudaybi that embarked on publishing Duat La Kudat to minimize this radicalization trend among the brothers' youth.

As significant as Hedaybi's was the third guide Tilmisani's efforts. Tilmisani's efforts were of utmost importance because these efforts paved the way for revival of the organization beginning with 1970s. The death of Nasser and subsequent inauguration of Sadat heralded a new era for Islamic movements. Tilmisani was not intent on missing this opportunity. It was he that plunged into university campuses to recruit new members to the flowering organization. Islamist student associations were the main target of Tilmisani "with the hope that they could help replenish its base, which had atrophied considerably during the organization's dark years under Nasser" (Wickham, 2013, 40). What he said about entering electoral politics in early 1980s shows vividly how important he was in resurrection of the organization in Egypt:

When we were released from the 1981 detention, we were in a state of near-recession. We set to looking for a lawful means to carry out our activities without troubling security or challenging the laws. Allah saw fit to find us a lawful way in the views of officials. The parliamentary session had just ended and thinking began on the new parliamentary elections. It was the opportunity of a lifetime; had the Ikhwan [Brothers] let it slip from their hands they would surely have counted among the ranks of the neglectful (taken from Wickham, 2013, 48).

What comes to mind now is whether there are such kinds of leadership that will provide integrity of the organization. The organization has been in a shambles for three years. So far signs of a strong leadership have not emerged yet. The turmoil the organization has now, that is, divisions, fragmentations, infightings has left it crippled. Inside Egypt, the regime do not brook any kind of activity that will help restructure or revive of the organization. The question whether there will emerge a figure like Tilmisani cannot be answered now because the circumstances are not propitious for emergence of such a figure. The Sisi's regime, after its unprecedented atrocities, will not be happy to encounter a flowering Muslim Brothers movement. This will make these all atrocities futile, which may mean Sisi accepts his sins. It seems that in near future the circumstances will not be propitious for the Brothers no matter what leadership it has.

4.2. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONJECTURES

Regional and international conjuncture matters considerably if a state as big and important as Egypt is concerned, both now and then. As touched above, when links between the Free Officers and Britain or the United States are dug, the Free Officers, from the very beginning, were enthusiastic about constructing positive relations with Britain and especially the United States. While they implied they would show their teeth in case Britain might undermine their “revolution” on the one hand, they showed gestures of goodwill towards the United States on the other hand. This was important because while Britain was on the eve of leaving the Middle East, the United States was on the eve of plunging into the region strongly. That the United States believed they would be able to reach an agreement with the Officers might be of crucial importance for the Brothers. The belief on the side of the West that the intransigence of the Brothers would impede resolution of the evacuation of Suez Canal might lead the Western actors to turn a blind eye to iron fist of Nasser towards the Brothers after the assassination attempt. The stance of the international powers might possibly play an important role in how the Officers treated the organization.

The Suez Crisis and aftermath also had significant implications for the Brothers organization. The Free Officers under the command Nasser burnt their bridges with the Western powers and gravitated towards the Soviet Union. Nasser rose as triumphant when the crisis ended. This would have important consequences for the organization in the coming years especially in Egypt as Zoellner aptly points out:

After the Suez crisis, the British presence in Egypt came to an end. This was clearly a victory for Abd al-Nasir and strengthened him to expand his regime. It made him a national, even an Arab, hero and enabled him to push forward his ideology of pan-Arabism. As many Egyptians supported the Brothers because of its resistance to the presence of British troops, Abd al-Nasir's victory was an implicit defeat for the movement. Hence, Abd al-Nasir may no longer have considered the Brothers as a threat. This change of government policy had an immediate impact; the release of Brothers accelerated the revival of the organisation (p.39-40).

The termination of the crisis with the victory of Nasser started what Malcolm Kerr called Arab Cold War. There were pan-Arabist, nationalist, socialist states under the

leadership of Nasser on the one hand and traditional monarchies under the leadership of Faisal of Saudi. This little cold war within the big one brought some opportunities especially outside the borders of Egypt. Groaning under the harsh repression of Nasser, the Brothers that could escape Egypt found a safe haven in Saudi Arabia under the king Faisal, the archenemy of Nasser. While some members of the organization were being incarcerated in the prisons of Egypt under harsh circumstances, some others were active in Saudi Arabia in reviving their organization and gaining ground in Saudi, which would cause a headache for Saudis in the coming years. In a nutshell, the regional conjecture opened certain opportunities to Brothers who were in an impasse under Nasser.

The role of regional actors in coup of July 2013 is crystal clear. As discussed above in the section regarding the international dimension of July 2013 coup, the Gulf countries did not hesitate to praise the bloody military coup against the Muslim Brothers. They did not confine themselves just to praise the coup but without delay they promised to give billions of dollars to Sisi. Having been aware of the ramifications of any possible democratic wave in the region, the Gulf countries were quite happy about the doom of the Brothers. Besides being happy before and after the coup they helped actors inside Egypt that tried to undermine nascent democracy. In short, the role of the regional actors has mattered to a great extent then.

Time is fast and open to surprises in the Middle East. Whether the above description is valid now is dubious. There is an open conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran through proxies in different parts of the region. Activities of Iran in Iraq, Yemen and especially Syria through its proxies there disturbed newly crowned king Salman. The belief that Iran is invading Arab countries to the detriment of Saudi Arabia within high echelon of the Saudi state has led the rulers to concentrate on repelling Iranian threat. This war between the two states that is called new Middle East cold war by Gregory Gause (2014) reminds old Arab cold war of 1950s and 1960s. This new cold war, especially as far as the Gulf countries are concerned, will possibly reduce pressure upon the Muslim Brothers throughout the region. The

decrease of threat perception towards the Brothers especially in the Gulf can be seen for example in Yemen. Fighting against Iran-backed Houthis, the Saudis have approached the Brothers “To reconstitute an alliance against Iran and its allies” (Ali Al-Arian, Aljazeera, July 2015). This policy may spread to other parts of the region. Whether this will have an impact on how Sisi treat the organization in Egypt remains difficult to be answered in positive terms. It seems that at least in the short run this policy of the Gulf will not have positive implications for the organization in Egypt. But one thing that has become visible is that the support that the Gulf provided Sisi in the early days of the coup is not available to a large extent. Whether this will cripple the Sisi’s repression in Egypt is too early to be answered but a regime having bad times in terms of economy and devoid of economic aid it hoped may have to soften its draconian policies towards the Brothers.

The honeymoon between the Gulf countries and Egypt in the initial days of the coup, as touched above, has disappeared to a large extent. The main factor that has accelerated the termination of the honeymoon is expansion of Saudi Arabia’s arch-enemy Iran’s expansion in the region. The succession of the king Salman coincided a different conjecture from what the deceased king Abdullah had. What the king Salman saw when he ascended the throne was the accelerating expansion of influence of Iran in the region through its proxies like Hizballah and the Houthis. The king Salman perceived that nuclear deal between the West and Iran opened the path of more Iranian influence within the region to their detriment. Upon encountering this “existential” challenge, Salman prioritized containment of Iran over threat of political Islam. (El-Ahram Weekly, October 2016) conveys Egyptian officials’ concerns regarding policy change of the king Salman and says “Riyadh is far less sensitive to Cairo’s deep worries over political Islamic groups and is instead intent on building a Sunni camp, under the leadership of Mohamed bin Salman, to face up to the Saudi Arabia’s arch-enemy Iran”. While the Saudis perceived the Iranian threat seriously, they think Egypt exaggerates the threat of political Islam. Ezzat (el-Ahram Weekly, October 2016) touches upon this point and says that “The Saudi narrative is that Cairo’s worries about the possible resurrection of the Muslim Brothers has led it to become obsessed with the fate of political Islam”.

This disagreement rose to the surface in a number of developments. The developments that contributed to deterioration of bilateral relations can be listed: that a high-ranking Egyptian delegation participated in an anti-Wahhabi conference in Grozny, capital city of the Chechen Republic; that Egypt abrogated a contract according to which Egypt had transferred control of Sanafir and Tiran islands to Saudi Arabia; that Saudi Arabia failed to fulfil its commitments toward Egypt, including construction of a causeway over the Gulf of Aqaba; that Egypt opposed to overthrow of Syria's Assad; that Cairo was reluctant for sending troops to Yemen war and rumours about Egypt's indirect support for the Houthi fighters in Yemen; that relative closeness is happening between Iran and Egypt, especially a meeting between the two countries' foreign ministers in New York; and that quite recently, Cairo appointed a new charge d'affaires to Tehran" (Ghorabi, Eurasia Review). Of these the Syrian civil war is the most fundamental area of disagreement that turned sour the bilateral relations. It is possible to say there is no compromise because while Riyadh sees the Assad regime as a proxy of Iran, Cairo sees the Muslim brothers and other extremist groups as the only possible alternative to Assad. This deadlock regarding what should be done in Syria crystallized recently upon the Egyptian representative's vote in the Security Council for the Russian draft resolution concerning the Syrian situation. Abdullah al-Mouallami, Saudi Arabia's representative to the United Nations, stated his disappointment regarding Egypt's support and said:

It was painful that the stances taken by Senegal and Malaysia were much closer to the agreed-upon Arab decision than the stance of an Arab delegate — the Egyptian one. Though this is a dark day for the Syrian people, they do not know the meaning of darkness or despair and, God Almighty permitting, will prevail (Baladi News, November 2016).

This was the last straw that broke camel's back in the bilateral relations. The day following the Egyptian vote, Hamda Abd al-Aziz, the official spokesman for the Saudi Oil Ministry, said that the Saudi company Aramco had informed the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation orally that it would not be exporting to Egypt petrol products ranging from diesel to gasoline that had been set monthly at 700,000 tons as part of an agreement between Egypt and the kingdom for a period of five years.

This deterioration in the bilateral relations between the two countries may have implications for the Muslim Brothers in the coming days. Egypt nowadays is living one of its worst economic bottleneck. This stop in economic aid will exacerbate the Egyptian economy. Whether the Sisi's regime will be able to weather this crisis is open to question. What seems certain under these circumstances is that the brutal regime will resort to more draconian policies to silence any disturbing voices, which will in turn cripple its legitimacy. The loss of legitimacy, which is not possible to say it is high now, may accelerate Sisi's possible demise in the forthcoming days.

4.3. INTRA-ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENTS

As big as or perhaps bigger than the assassination of the charismatic leader of the Muslim Brothers Hasan al-Al-Banna was the blow accompanying the assassination attempt against Nasser in October 1954. What followed this attempt was a crackdown bringing the organization to its heels as touched above. What concerns us here is what kind of mood the members had during this period and the consequences of this mood for the whole organization. A mood of desperation and silence haunted the Brothers within and outside of the prisons in the period following the assassination attempt. Underlying this pessimistic mood was the harsh circumstances they were exposed to following sudden and unexpected demise. Added to that was the regime's strategy to disperse the imprisoned Brothers all around the country and thus sever their ties with the leadership, which aimed to hinder a soul-searching that would initiate a possible revival. As Zoellner (2007) points out, "authorities adopted a divide et impera policy that brought internal communication between the leadership and the members to a complete halt" (413). When the consequences of this strategy were added to the pre-persecution tumultuous struggles within the organization especially regarding endorsing authority of Hedaybi, the mood gravitated towards alternative narratives about what to do. It was these alternatives narratives or views that the leadership of the organization tried to thwart becoming strong. These alternative views gravitating towards violent methods gradually spread among the prisoner, which alarmed the leadership. This, the editor in the foreword of the book written by

Hasan al-Hudaybi argues, led Hudaybi to come up with an idea that would prevent spread of extremism among the disenchanting prisoners:

It was when the Brothers had to suffer in their prison cells and detention camps that some chose to pronounce unbelief on Muslims or to doubt the truth of their belief in Islam. Despite the harsh conditions of their imprisonment and incarceration, [other] Brothers then rushed to correct this understanding... Their general guide at the time, Master Hasan Isma'il al-Hudaybi, ... gave in response to the thesis [of takfir] a comprehensive answer, which shaped the path of the Muslim Brothers, determined their method, and laid down their mission. "We are preachers, but we are not judges (quoted by Zoellner, 2007, 411).

Inclination among the prisoners towards a stringent ideology did not come out of blue. As touched above the circumstances were propitious for such an ideology. What is more important was the rise of Sayyid Qutb with a strong narrative, which Zoellner (2007) describes with the words "a clear, activist, Islamist message" (p.415). This powerful rise of Qutb as nonconformist preacher alarmed the figures like Hudaybi about total fragmentation of the Muslim Brothers' gradual, non-violent mission dating back to al-Al-Banna. The name of the book *Duat La Qudat* meaning Preachers, Not Judges implies that understanding of non-violent mission. Published in 1969, the book embarked on refuting Qutbian violent ideology. The death of Nasser after one year of the publication of the book was a happy coincidence that led the non-violent views adopted by the book to take root within the newly emerging organization in the coming years. But the Qutbian views did not disappear from ground. As touched above, extremist groups like Takfir wal-Hijra and Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya gained popularity to some extent among the youth in the 1970s. This violent ideology, however, did not take hold among the bulk of the youth. Under the leadership of Tilmisani, the views put forward in *Duat la Qudat* took hold within the newly emerging organization and thereby among the newly recruited university students. The organization, in short, was able to divert attention of the youth away from the extremist groups to a large extent and direct it to re-establishment of the crippled organization.

The 2013 crackdown and aftermath, similar to that of 1954, has been precarious for the organization especially about whether the organization will be able to weather

the crackdown and avoid its rank and file from falling prey to temptation of taking up arms. The Sisi's regime has been aware of fragility of the organization as far as violence is concerned and thus of the fruits that any kind of resort to violence will bring forth. That is why, the regime has so far pursued a policy of eradicating the central leadership. What is striking, as far as observed, is Sisi's ambition to stamp out the experienced middle generation politicians on the one hand and brain of the organization on the other hand. It is known that the Brothers gaining experience in politics of the student unions, the professional syndicates etc. in 80s and 90s have been the driving force in the rise of the movement as a political actor. Their careers starting with activism in universities and continuing in the parliament have been of crucial importance especially in that these people's experiences in politics have contributed to a great extent to how the organization has weathered political difficulties of the authoritarian regime. Besides these seasoned Brothers, the old guards having long history in the organization have been instrumental in managing the social side of the organization. Without these two types of leadership, the Muslim Brothers resemble to a ship without a captain heading towards nowhere. Such an organization, as Sisi knows well, may resort to violence, which will provide pretext for Sisi to legitimize his all-out war against it. Inexperienced young Brothers, without guidance of the experienced Brothers, may fall prey to Sisi's temptations.

In spite of all kinds of provocations by the regime in the form of killing, jailing etc. the organization has been able to avoid violence to a large extent. This has so far undermined the above-mentioned regime's strategy of pulling the Brothers especially younger ones into endless cycle of violence. Both international and domestic legitimacy of the organization is closely related to avoiding any kind of violence. This avoidance notwithstanding, possibility of few taking up arms is not far-fetched. As Fayed (2016) points out, although the likelihood of the organization taking up arms is not much, a few deflections may emerge:

The likelihood of the Muslim Brothers resorting to violence in Egypt is less than what many observers believe. Much of this has to do with the current structure of the organization, and the model of thought and culture that has governed it for decades. *This, however, is not inconsistent with the increased possibilities that a not-insignificant segment of members and supporters will*

resort to responding to the state's violence with violence, whether on an individual, decentralized level, or by joining more violent groups such as "Sinai Province" or "Al-Murabiteen," or even by joining the ongoing wars in Syria and Iraq (emphasis added, p.1-2).

The integrity of the Muslim Brothers is closely related to whether they will be able to avoid violence and revive the organization. The Sisi's regime, in order to legitimize what it has done so far and will do, need justifications for the crackdown and will be keen on finding such justifications. No matter how divided and crippled the organization now has been in recent years, the real issue has been, at least in the short run, to keep its rank and file away from violence.

4.4. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE TWO CRACKDOWNS

Organizations as huge as the Muslim Brothers with their roots reaching every sector of the society they are in, when hard times befall them, cannot escape most of the time from watching their economic infrastructure falling into pieces. Tale of the two crackdowns befalling the Brothers in 1954 and 2013 respectively is that of watching destruction of hard work of years without being able to stop it. The destruction following short honeymoons in both cases possibly makes the situation more unbearable for the organization. Hopes regarding a bright future after years long suffering disappeared within a short span of time, that is, within days or hours. Putting this visceral aspect of this destruction aside now, we will embark upon making some comments on the political aspects of these crackdowns.

The crackdown of 1954 on the Muslim Brothers crippled the organization. By obtaining the opportunity to get rid of the Brothers with the assassination attempt, Nasser dealt a lethal blow to the organization. The Brothers were in shambles upon experiencing this blow. The organizational structure was torn apart. While it is not possible to say there are any mention related to how the regime dealt with the properties of the organization, it will be no exaggeration to assert the regime confiscated all the properties whether it be social charity foundations or commercial companies. As stated above not much data was founded regarding the political economy dimension of the crackdown. The policy to destroy the

organizational structure especially by confiscating all the property might aim to prevent any possible resurgence. Even if there is not much documented source regarding how lethal the blow was, what the then US ambassador said about this issue is quite enlightening:

An eventual attack on the Brothers' welfare program was almost a certainty and the only surprising thing about the December 10 announcement was that it has been so long in coming. The welfare activities of the Brothers dated from the early 1940s and are the basis for the organization's strength in certain rural areas. A complete discontinuation of these activities would have caused rural elements who have benefitted from them to view the regime's move against the Brothers adversely; therefore the regime had little choice but to take over and continue the Brothers' projects if it desired to maintain its popularity in the rural areas where the Brothers have been active. (Gordon, 1992, 184)

Attack on welfare activities, which formed the backbone of the Brothers as a movement, cleared the way for Nasser's state's incursion into the realm of welfare activities. Replacing the Brothers, Nasser's state began to provide goods and services to the public in order to attain its political support especially against the Brothers. In order for a (nearly) totalitarian system to take root within the Egyptian society, any outstanding rivals providing goods and services outside the boundaries of the state must be eliminated. Nasser, the very day after taking over the power, knew the Brothers would have become an obstacle in front of his grip on both the state and the society. That is why, during the transition period from 1952 to 1954 he incessantly interfered in inner working of the organization to tame it. When the assassination attempt failed, he got the opportunity to eradicate the movement as a significant rival with all its activities especially the ones that attracted people to its mission. The Nasser's state was, as was all other ones, jealous of any rival. The crackdown laid the ground for undermining of a giant with significant economic assets that provided huge political capital to the organization.

The Free Officers under aegis of Nasser was a nascent political group when they eliminated their archenemy the Muslim Brothers in 1954. Internationally, they were not known much. Both the US and the Great Britain, as touched in the first chapter, at the beginning were optimistic about these new cadres. Whether this optimism

transformed into economic aid at the early days of the crackdown and the consolidation of the Nasser's regime is not known to a great extent, which should be investigated in a separate study. But what seems more probably is that the West did not provide enough economic aid to Nasser, which made him approach the Soviet Union in the coming years. In a nutshell, foreign economic aid was not at Nasser's disposal at those times.

Although we do not have enough information about the details of the Nasser's confiscation in 1954, we have detailed information about the depth of confiscation following the 2013 coup. No less than the confiscation of 1954, the confiscation following the 2013 coup until now has torn the organization apart. In the second chapter of this study a detailed map of confiscation have been given. What appears from that scene is that like his predecessor Nasser Sisi have been making his best to eradicate any vestiges of the Brothers from the soils of Egypt at least erasing their political visibility. No person, no school, no hospital, no charity activity, no nongovernmental institution has spared itself from clutches of the regime. Following the footsteps of his mentor – as above touched, Sisi tries to emulate Nasser by promoting himself as a new Nasser- by being aware of the importance of the Brothers' economic infrastructure for the survival of the organization especially gaining human capital, Sisi attacked the organization's all kinds of activities –be that hospital, school, charity networks. Under these circumstances, it is nearly impossible for the movement to resurrect, which is why Sisi followed such a brutal policy.

Another aspect of the political economy of the crackdown is the interference of the regional and global in the form of economic support to the Sisi's regime. It is a known fact that in the very early days of the coup and following crackdown, the most ardent supporters of Sisi were the Gulf countries. Because the Gulf's support has been handled above in detail, a few brief notes will be introduced here. The Gulf promised Sisi more than 10 billion dollars immediately after the coup, which crystal-clearly shows how fearful they were about the possible rise of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and domino effect of this rise. Much water has flowed beneath

the bridge so far and we are now face to face a new conjecture. As touched above, Egypt has begun to approach Iran-Russia line, which means moving away from the Gulf especially the Saudi Arabia. It is not possible to talk about blank cheques introduced to Sisi in the early days of crackdown as the incident that were dwelled on above regarding the Aramco's cutting of oil shipment to Egypt. Foreign aids were one of the mainstay of the Sisi's regime at the beginning but these aids have begun to evaporate recently. When this evaporation is taken into consideration with the exacerbating economic situation in Egypt, it is possible to say Sisi's regime is in a stucked situation. That is to say, Sisi has lost one of the main pillars of its crackdown on the Brothers. Whether he will be able to continue his brutal crackdown without significant amount of support will be seen in near future.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

This dissertation concentrated on the two periods of 1954 and 2013 in which the Muslim Brothers movement was and has been the enemy of the regime par excellence. The 1954 crackdown has been examined in detail with its background and aftermath including the power struggle between the Free Officers and the Brothers, the political economy of the crackdown, that is, whether there was any confiscation or not, the international dimension and the violence and radicalization dimension. In chapter 2, the 2013 crackdown, has followed a pattern similar to the first chapter on the 1954 crackdown. Chapter 3 has embarked on analysing the two crackdowns comparatively under four titles. These are leadership, political economy of the coup, regional and international dimensions and the internal dimension of the Brothers. This chapter has tried to make analytical comparison between the crackdowns. This needs to be done mainly because what has been narrated in two separate chapters necessitates to be connected analytically. This chapter, I hope, gives more or less a holistic picture of what was going on then and is going on now.

The question whether the Brothers will be back or not comes to the fore upon our examination of these two crackdowns. It is known that a relatively smooth period followed the tough years of Nasser upon the death of Nasser in 1970. The organization, as it were, rose from its ashes to become a full-fledged organization beginning with the 1970s. Whether such a rise will be possible or not may be evaluated, here in the conclusion chapter, through the tools social movement theory provides. Social movement theory, as al-Anani (2016) states, “investigates how Islamists allocate resources, recruit members, mobilize the public, build social networks, and frame their message to their followers. This trend treats Islamists as social agents seeking political and social change” (p.26). The points regarding how the Brothers “allocate resources, recruit members, mobilize public, build social networks and frame their messages to their followers” were of crucial importance when the organization recovered with the early 1970s.

The Nasserist years were harsh as Wickham (2015) depicts: “the Brothers remained a prime target of the Nasserist state. Thousands of Brothers members languished in desert prison camps, where many were deprived of basic necessities and repeatedly

subjected to brutal acts of torture, while those not caught up in the regime's security net fled into exile or were forced underground" (p.28). When Nasser died on September 28, 1970, a new page opened for the Brothers. If put in the language of social movement theory, new political opportunity spaces were at the Brothers' disposal. The coming of Sadat meant new opportunities for all Islamists in general and the Brothers in particular. It was because Sadat attempted to "break out of the shadow of his larger-than-life predecessor", to get rid of both "the radical social and economic policies Nasser had enacted in the name of 'Arab socialism' in the late 1960s" and diehard Nasserists and socialists and "to boost his authority by invoking religious themes and values, presenting himself as the 'Believer-President' and appearing on numerous television broadcasts entering and exiting public mosques on Fridays and Islamic holidays" (Wickham 2015, p.29). His attempts to outshine Nasser gave its fruits in the form of more spaces in which the Brothers could reemerge as an important actor. Political opportunities can be defined as the opportunities "created by governments that enable social movements to mobilize people, allocate resources, and organize collective action" (al-Anani, p.27). By benefiting from opportunity spaces opened, social movements press for more benefits. That is what happened in the early 1970s when Umar al-Tilmisani embarked on reviving the organization by seizing the opportunity spaces opened by Sadat. The case of Brothers through their rational attempts to maximize their benefits corroborates "the assumption that actors, once they perceive opportunities and threats, will respond rationally to maximize openings or limit adversity" (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p.14).

That opportunity spaces open does not necessarily mean these spaces automatically engender mobilization. These spaces are necessary but not sufficient for mobilization or rise to occur. Here is the point, as far as the Brothers are concerned, where the importance of al-Tilmisani crystallizes. It is possible to understand the role al-Tilmisani played in the revival of the organization from its ashes in the early 1970s under the concept "strategic thinker". Strategic thinkers can be defined as "thinkers embedded in a political context which influences choices and decisions" or as "thinkers who are affected by opportunities and

constraints” (Wiktorowicz, p.14-15). As a strategic thinker or activist trying to maximize the spaces opened, Tilmisani delved into university campuses to revive the organization. That is to say, acting strategically al-Tilmisani did make use of the *resources* available in the university campuses of Egypt. What Wickham (2015) points out this by emphasizing their efforts regarding how they framed their mission vis-à-vis other Islamic groups within the campuses.

The Brotherhood looked to the Islamist student associations with the hope that they could help replenish its base, which had atrophied considerably during the organization’s dark years under Nasser. As Baker observed, “from the Brotherhood perspective, the Islamic groups’ strong appeal to youth was potentially a great resource.” During the second half of the 1970s, the Brotherhood made a concerted effort to reach out to student leaders and persuade them to join its ranks. For example, ‘Umar al-Tilmisani and Mustafa Mashhour, both senior members of the Guidance Bureau, attended seminars and conferences sponsored by the *jama’at* and made presentations on the Brotherhood’s goals and methods, which they portrayed as based on a “proper” and “correct” understanding of Islam, as opposed to the “mistaken” views of the jihadist groups with whom they were competing for the students’ support. (p.40).

As indicated above, in order to reach students on the campuses al-Tilmisani and the other leadership of the Brothers had recourse to frames. “Frames”, says Wiktorowicz (2004), “represent interpretive schemata that offer a language and cognitive tools for making sense of experiences and events in the ‘world out there.’” And he adds “For social movements, these schemata are important in the *production and dissemination of movement interpretations* and are *designed to mobilize participants and support*. As signifying agents engaged in the social construction of meaning, movements must articulate and disseminate *frameworks of understanding that resonate with potential participants and broader publics to elicit collective action*” (emphases added, p.15). We will turn to al-Arian (2014) to learn what kind of frames the Brothers under the leadership al-Tilmisani that “resonated with participants and broader publics to elicit collective action”. He narrates how the frames resonated with the new participants and gave its fruits:

For its part, the Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership proved extremely adept at recruiting the next generation of Islamic activists to join its ranks. In promoting the concept of *tawrith al-da’wa*, or bequeathing the call,

Tilmisani and other senior figures relied on the Muslim Brotherhood's rich history on the front lines of the struggle for the promotion of Islam, as well as its ability to convey a complete program, respond to competing trends, and demonstrate flexibility in its views. Once the intellectual congruity was reached, during the course of countless meetings, lectures, camps, and conferences, the parties moved closer to organizational coordination, and ultimately, the organizational structure of the Muslim Brotherhood was rebuilt. The student leaders made up the base of the newly reestablished Muslim Brotherhood, which by the close of the decade, had proved to be a major thorn in the side of the Sadat regime (emphasis in the original p.16-17).

In sum, with the death of Nasser in 1970, the circumstances for a revival were propitious and the Brothers grabbed the opportunity to revive. With the new opportunity spaces opened by Sadat, the leadership under Tilmisani embarked on recruiting new members through their efforts within the Egyptian university campuses. This was not an easy job but by benefiting from their "rich history on the front lines of the struggle for the promotion of Islam", Tilmisani and his coterie were able to have their frames resonated with the new possible participants. Without such a leadership working with effective frames, opportunity spaces and mobilization through recruitment would not have been enough to revive the organization. All these factors – that is, opportunity spaces opened by Sadat, mobilization of the university students, frame resonance through "rich history on the front lines of the struggle for the promotion of Islam"- contributed to the emergence of the Brothers as, perhaps, the most important political actor in Egypt beginning with the mid-1970s and culminating in the 1980s. The revival of the Brothers, as it were, from scratch shows crystal-clearly how important not only opportunity spaces and mobilization of the resources but also framing are. And if these opportunity spaces are grabbed well with the other factors, as the Brothers show, becoming an important political actor will not be far-fetched.

As for the current crackdown, it is not possible to talk about any kind of opportunity spaces paving the way for a recovery. In contradistinction to the early 1970s, the current circumstances augur the crackdown will continue for a while. Although the Egypt of Sisi is not bright, which may cause a sudden collapse, it is necessary to know that Sisi will not allow such a scenario to happen. It appears that similar to

what Nasser did to the Brothers in 1950s and 1960s, Sisi is trying to eradicate the Brothers from the soil of Egypt. When the economic and political crises Egypt is now experiencing and Sisi's implacable efforts to kill the movement are taken into consideration, it is possible to say, as the early 1960s saw the re-burgeoning of the movement during the reign of Nasser, Sisi fears collapse of the regime and consequently rise of the Brothers again. This comment may seem an exaggeration when the current chaotic circumstances the Brothers are in are considered. But a sudden debacle due to frustration among the Egyptians, similar to the 1967 war Israel that undermined Nasser's charisma and broke his spell among the Arab both inside and outside Egypt, may change all the odds irreparably for Sisi. Being aware of this danger, Sisi is nowadays always concentrating on solutions that can heal and redress grievances of the ordinary Egyptians. Sisi's refrigerator is a good example of how he has tried to give the impression that he has been an ordinary man. In October 2016 during the National Youth Forum, Sisi said twice: "I swear, I swear, for 10 years, I had nothing in my refrigerator but water, and I never complained...nobody ever heard my voice, even though I come from a very rich family" (Daily News Egypt, October). Similarly, in May, Sisi said that if they took from each employee one Egyptian pound, it would monthly be seven million Egyptian pound. This, according to Sisi, would play a crucial role in fighting against poverty especially in rural areas (Al-Jazeera, May 2017). These are examples that show vividly Sisi has been concerned about the extent of poverty the Egyptians have been experiencing since the coup. Being aware of possible dangers this poverty may cause, Sisi has been articulating the need to reduce subsistence problems.

Besides articulating the grievances of the people to show his empathy and sympathy for the people, Sisi is not leave his fate to chance. Recently, in spite of not having an existential regional or international threat, the regime has accelerated military purchases. Absent a serious engagement both in a regional and international conflict, these purchases do not seem plausible on the condition that Sisi is scared about a possible upheaval among Egyptians. What Mandour (Carnegie Endowment, 2017) says regarding that point is revealing:

Yet the kind of weaponry purchased does not seem well suited for Egypt's internal or external security challenges, nor do they fit its foreign policy aims. The bulk of the purchases are of fighter jets, assault helicopters, and multi-purpose carriers, which are traditionally used to project power or carry out offensive operations. This raises questions about whether the state foresees a Syria-type internal conflict. Considering the lack of credible traditional threats, the unsuitability of the weaponry for current counter-insurgency operations, and the risk-averse nature of Egyptian foreign policy, these weapons are most likely aimed at repressing a mass, urban uprising—with little regard for the civilian casualties fighter jets and attack helicopters are liable to incur.

Being aware of possible consequences of the recent crippling legitimacy, the regime is trying to consolidate its power through these types of purchases.

As stated earlier, for a social movement to (re)burgeon at minimum a relatively open space is necessary. Now the Sisi's Egypt is not propitious for the Brothers to re-burgeon as seen crystal-clearly in Sisi's efforts to get rid of any obstacles that may unintentionally lead to rise of the Brothers. With no opportunity spaces at hand, talking about resource mobilization and framing is meaningless. What the organization can and should do under such harsh circumstances is to be able to weather the crackdown and thus survive. Beyond that is not the job of now.

This dissertation, in this context, gives the picture of a period in which the Muslim Brothers were suppressed and its aftermath that experienced a gigantic rise from ashes of a movement. What is important perhaps now is to concentrate on whether dynamics that may lead to a regime collapse will be ready or already underway or the exacerbating conditions in the Egyptian lives will make people vulnerable to radical and extremist ideologies. That is to say, further research should concentrate on the "bread" part of so-called Arab Spring, now's-turned-into-Arab-Winter, that has not been satisfied in the post-protests period because people are living under dire circumstances. And how this with the brutal state violence may affect transformation of moderates into radical. Whether a pattern similar to 1960s and 1970s during which while the core of the movement did its best to resort to violence, the ones not happy with the orthodoxy of the movement steered their way towards violence will be observed should be studied through interviews, meetings etc. with suppressed Egyptians. This dissertation has generally resorted to

secondary sources to give a picture of these two periods but did not embark on benefiting from primary sources like interviews. If this had been done, it might give a modicum of clues regarding these questions areas but unfortunately it cannot. That is why, we hope scholars will handle these research areas one by one in future.



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