

**BETWEEN RHETORIC AND ACTION: STUDY OF ERDOGAN'S
FOREIGN POLICY APPROACH TOWARDS RUSSIA IN 2014-2018
PERIOD**

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I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

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ABSTRACT

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This work explores Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's unique style of leadership and foreign policy approach. Through the case study of Turkey's relations with Russia since 2014, the divergence between Erdogan's rhetoric and Turkey's actual stance towards Russia is analyzed while the existing differences are explained by the way of literature on populism, securitization, and discourse analysis.

Keywords: Turkey, Erdogan, Russia, jet crisis, populism, securitization

ÖZ

RETORİK VE EYLEM ARASINDA: ERDOĞAN'IN 2014-2018 YILLARI ARASINDA
RUSYA'YA DIŞ POLİTİKA YAKLAŞIMI

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Bu çalışmada Türkiye cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın özgün liderlik tarzı ve dışişleri politikasındaki yaklaşımı incelenmektedir. Türkiye'nin Rusya ile 2014'ten itibaren sürdürdüğü ilişkiler özelinde Erdoğan'ın kullandığı politik retorik ile Türkiye'nin Rusya'ya karşı gerçek tutumu incelenirken var olan farklılıklar popülizm, güvenleştirme ve söylem analizi yazınları üzerinden açıklanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Erdoğan, Rusya, jet krizi, popülizm/ halkçılık, güvenleştirme

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In August 2014 Recep Tayyip Erdogan was elected as the president of Republic of Turkey. Although victorious, Erdogan's newly acquired position was far from being without its problems and challenges. In the international arena he was facing isolation from his long-term Western allies due to his heavy handed policies in Syria against the Kurds. Domestically, his reign was being challenged by various societal elements while global criticisms against his increasingly authoritarian style of leadership were a constant reality.

Far from taking these criticisms seriously, Erdogan was calling them 'dirty plots' orchestrated by both foreign and domestic enemies of Turkey (Dombey, 2014). Such proclamations are nothing new in Erdogan's rhetorical repertoire. From the early 2000s and Erdogan's Justice and Development Party's (JDP) electoral victories, his political program was based on discrediting both internal and foreign political elements. His first target was Turkey's Kemalist military and secular establishment whom he challenged on liberal and human rights grounds (Park, 2014). Subsequently, in the post-Arab Spring context, this rhetoric changed to the one of nationalism and conservatism, which coincided with his tightening grip on the Turkish state. It can be said that in his political career Erdogan employed thin ideology that was able to assume many forms depending on the context and both domestic and international circumstances.

In this work Erdogan's leadership style seen through his rhetoric will precisely be the object of research. I will particularly focus on the international aspects of Erdogan's political strategy via the case study of his rhetoric towards Russia since his time in the office of the President, assumed in 2014. Object is to see whether discrepancy exists between Erdogan's rhetoric and actual Turkish foreign policy pertaining to Russia. Therefore, my research question will deal with uncovering reasoning behind these differences, which in and of themselves would be a good

indicator of the existence of aims other than transmission of foreign policy plans to the general public. Perceived incongruences will be analyzed by the way of theories of populism, securitization theory, discourse analysis and other relevant academic traditions.

I have noticed that throughout the entire JDP's period in power Erdogan's rhetoric was divisive, polarizing and exclusionary all the while being pointed against different political and social actors. I argue that this comes as a consequence of Erdogan's populism-a political style that bases its program on exclusionary rhetoric and proximity to people as an embodiment of 'national will' (Taguieff, 1995; Moffit, 2016).

More precisely, my thesis will be the case study of Erdogan's rhetoric towards Russia in the 2014-2018 period, which coincides with his time in Presidential office. Prompted by Erdogan's strong rhetoric over the years I chose to conduct this case study in relations to Russia due to the fact that aforementioned period brings variety of different dynamics in Turkish-Russian bilateral relations. Burgeoning economic and energy cooperation, downturns in relations, potential for military conflict and deepening political and strategic cooperation are some of the events that marked this period. As such, this case study provides a plethora of samples replete with different contexts, venues and audience types, which are all elements conducive for detailed analysis of populist style of leadership.

The study of Turkish-Russian relations is not a new thing by any means. For centuries Turkey and Russia had complicated relationship that has been well explored and documented (Hale, 2013; Ahmad, 2015; Karpat, 1975). However, what is new and original about this research is the analysis of Turkish President's rhetoric imparted towards the old neighboring country.

Thus, this thesis' research question is twofold. First, I ask whether there is divergence between Erdogan's rhetoric and actual Turkish foreign policy. My hypothesis is that at times, rhetoric and foreign policy are starkly opposed to one

another. If this proves to be true according to the empirical data gathered then the question is what is the reason behind this discrepancy. I argue that Erdogan's populism coupled with his peculiar rhetorical strain is conducted in favor of advancing Erdogan's own personal political interests and overall consolidation of power. I will offer my explanation in terms of populism aided by the theories from relevant intellectual traditions building upon it. Some of these will be framing, discourse analysis, agenda setting and securitizing acts as found in the Copenhagen School of securitization theory. My findings will contribute to the general literature on Turkish foreign policy as well as to the more particular branch of Erdogan's style of leadership. Furthermore, I hope that literature on populism as a political strategy following in the tradition of Weyland will find my research to be a contributing factor.

In my section on literature review I will try to show that populism, and in particular Erdogan's strain of exclusionary populism, is well-known for utilizing particular type of framing that relies on presenting political issues as securitizing acts, which is designed to create mass fear and thus aid 'us versus them' populist political agenda. This in turn contributes to the image of the populist leader as a best expression of public will where all the opposition is either seen as traitorous, elitist or downright ineffective.

Furthermore, in explaining Erdogan's rationale behind the utilization of populist strategy I borrow Weiland's (2001) definition, which argues that populism is one among many viable strategies for bringing political benefit and electoral results to its proponents. In other words, utilization of divisive political strategy in a highly polarized Turkish society was a pragmatic thing to do for Erdogan.

In order to test my hypothesis I will employ empirical method known as the content analysis based on large-N sample size of 446 speeches found on the official website of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey. I will code all of the 446 speeches for the tone, audience and venue types. These factors will be a good indicator of Erdogan's rhetoric and its intended purposes. I will pay particular attention to the

instances of Erdogan's rhetoric that I coded as inflammatory, which, in relations to Russia, I expect to find mostly in the 2015-2016 period that corresponds to the jet crisis and downturn in bilateral relations. I will also pay attention to the examples of exceedingly positive rhetoric, which I expect to find in post-2016 rapprochement with Russia. Negative and/or inflammatory rhetoric should be then contrasted to the actual foreign policy of the Turkish state and examined for either correspondence or divergence. The existence of divergence indicates the rhetorical use for purposes other than transmission of state's policies to the public. Some of these purposes are explained by populism and other relevant theories and they all indicate an increase and the preservation of personal political power. Positive rhetoric can also be a strong indicator of populism depending on the rhetorical style, intended audience and the frame (Hameleers, Bos & de Vreese, 2017).

One of the most important elements I will pay attention to when analyzing data will be the audience and venue type. Since populists like to emphasize their proximity to people as sole representatives of the public/national will to the exclusion of other political actors, I expect to find majority of positive or negative references towards Russia in speeches intended precisely for Turkish audience in domestic venue types such as opening ceremonies, civil society gatherings, meetings with low-level public officials (muhtarlar, kaymakamlar), etc.

My thesis will be organized in five chapters. After the introduction I will conduct a literature review in order to further elaborate on populism, and understand the contemporary position of academia in relations to it. In that section I will also talk about framing, securitization theory and discourse analysis in order to provide ground for more detailed discussion of Erdogan's exclusionary type of populism. In the second chapter I will try to give a historical explanation behind Turkish-Russian relationship and I will situate them in a broader context in terms of their respective positions vis-a-vis other countries such as the US, Syria, EU, etc. Moreover, I will examine Turkish foreign policy towards Russia and look for the indicators of change especially during the times of crisis. Turkish-imposed trade embargoes, undertaken political/military actions, cancelations of economic/business projects, unilateral

withdrawals from diplomatic agreements will all serve to demonstrate changes in the foreign policy on the behalf of Turkish side. Third chapter will be concerned with a short exposition on methodology I will be utilizing in my research. There, I will also analyze Erdogan's speeches according to the methodology stipulated as well as talk about my findings and how they relate to Erdogan and his political agenda. These findings will then be cross-referenced to the foreign policy discussed in the preceding chapter, which will show possible deviations between the rhetoric and foreign policy. In the last chapter I will open a discussion on Erdogan's populism and conclude with the strengths and deficiencies of my thesis all the while giving proposals for the future research on the topic.



CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This chapter will be concerned with providing the scholarly background behind the theories and schools of thought that I plan on utilizing in order to better understand Erdogan's rhetoric and its incoherence with the actual Turkish foreign policy on the ground. Two primary intellectual directions explored in this chapter will be academic contributions made in the field of populism and closely related Copenhagen School of securitization theory. Moreover, I argue that populism and securitizing acts are connected through the acts of framing and language manipulation which merits its separate discussion along the lines of critical discourse analysis (CDA). After the literature review and the analysis of the aforementioned traditions are provided, following chapter will deal with findings, conclusions and how it all ties to Erdogan and his rhetoric.

2.1. Populism

Populism is by no means a recent phenomenon. Since its origins in 19th century, it changed many of its attributes and definitions. While recently it acquired tenuous, loaded meaning, it used to denote political option that stands with people and direct democracy (Canovan, 1981, p. 5-6). Despite its long existence on political scene, populism is yet to have an agreed upon definition. Over the years many forms of populism appeared: military populism (Cotler, 1970), leftist populism (Laclau, 2007), Western/Eastern populism (Brubaker, 2017) and protest populism (Kriesi, 2014), to name a few. However many present day scholars agree, in one way or another, upon several key features that all conceptions and understandings of populism share: anti-elitism, plebiscitarianism, and mass mobilization (Barr, 2009; Selçuk, 2016; Weyland, 2001; Carrion, 2009).

In my work I will be utilizing definitions of populism that emphasize its exclusionary and pragmatist nature. Taguieff (1995) attempted to show multifaceted and multidimensional nature of populism. Brubaker (2017) follows Taguieff in his

conceptualization of populism as an exclusionary “us versus them” political strategy that operates on both domestic (vertical) and international (horizontal) dimensions. According to him, this creates a space where public/people is opposed to the outsiders on either inside or outside. In this particular conceptualization parallel can be drawn between two dimensional nature of populism and Putnam’s ‘two-level game theory’ that envisions diplomatic dealings between states on two levels: intranational (domestic) and international (Putnam, 1988). According to Putnam, domestic level compels political leaders to whip up support from plethora of societal actors, which in turn justifies his foreign policy. Seen as such, populism is a good way for a leader to rally support behind his cause by utilizing tactics and activities expounded on below. Others, like Weiland (2001), consider populism to be a simple political strategy that aims to bring its proponents political benefit and position through the strategy of exclusion. He imparts this vision as a critique against traditional understandings of populism that saw it as an amalgamation of various attributes from social to economic. Instead, Weiland’s conception of populism sees it as a single-issue concept completely reducible to politics (Weiland, 2001). Weiland’s contribution is an interesting continuation of Canovan’s (1999) interpretation of democracy as interplay between pragmatism and redemptivism that requires populism as a necessity. Subsequent research in this vein focused on populism as a thin ideology that, although not providing much analytical power, helps us understand populists’ pragmatic political programs (Stanley, 2008).

Aforementioned takes on populism are not the only ones permeating intellectual debates. Other scholars have been more or less receptive to populism as a political idea. Most notably, Ernesto Laclau in his *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (1985) argues for an impermanent nature of politics and society in general. According to him, “social” is always in the state of becoming, with ever present boundaries of exclusion that define what is social and what is not. In such conception, populism is not a pathological occurrence but rather normalcy that structure operating through discourse demands (ibid). In a fashion similar to Laclau, Mudde (2010) adopts a structural explanation as well and argues against the prevalent intellectual approaches to populism that see it as a pathology and/or societal abnormality.

Instead, Mudde claims, that populism is a result of, as he dubbed it, “pathological normalcy”. This means that not only should populism be included in the perception of mainstream politics, but also more emphasis should be put on the demand side within Western societies whose values are not so much at odds with rightist/nationalist populism as previously thought.

Since my thesis is dealing with discrepancy between Erdogan’s rhetoric and actual foreign policy I believe that the definition of populism which focuses on its exclusionary and political nature provides more explanatory power. Furthermore, in the later parts of this chapter, I will try to integrate the Copenhagen School of securitization theory into Erdogan’s populist style of leadership which would provide additional explanations for his exclusionary rhetoric and securitizing acts on both vertical and horizontal axes.

It needs to be noted that, the discussion found here with regards to Erdogan’s leadership style will be of general nature and will be utilized in favor of situating findings of previously mentioned studies on exclusionary populism and Copenhagen School of securitization theory connected by the way of literature on framing and agenda setting.

Another interesting differentiation of populisms can be done through the economic prism as shown by Aytac and Onis (2014). On the other hand, Brubaker (2017) looks at types of populisms influenced by the respective countries’ cultural values. He takes a deeper look at the populist phenomenon in Western Europe and deduces its common features. According to him, Western European populists amalgamate seemingly contradictory values of Christianity, liberalism and secularism in different proportions, depending on a populist current, to get original Western European blend. In a similar vein, on the case study of Turkey, Park (2014) and Ozpek and Yasar (2017) explain the versions of populism as political strategies, which are permeated by certain historically influenced national values such as religion or ideology. Mudde and Kaltwasser’s (2012) article continues in Brubaker’s tradition and analyzes regional variations in types of populism. They conclude that European,

and I would add Turkey's version of populism, rely heavily on exclusionary political sentiments unlike Latin American strain that is inclusionary in nature.

Populists can have very diverse political agendas. By presenting themselves as the will of the people, populists aim to grab voters over a wide spectrum. Not only do they increase the importance of the issues on the right that has traditionally been their domain, but also attempt to pull in the electorate from the left (Bale et al., 2009). Some, like Minkenberg (2001), claim that the real danger of radicalization does not come from the populists themselves but rather from their interaction with the established political actors. If both legislation and executive branches of the government cannot be dominated, then a mere recognition by the old guard in political arena can be enough to make a 'right turn' (ibid). In a similar vein, Kalis (2013) warned of dangers of normalizing populist discourse as a "common sense" with the help of the opportunism emanating from the political mainstream. Bale (2003) argues that populist right can adopt some of the common themes of the far right and therefore achieve larger legislative majorities in alliance with its former rivals.

This brings me to the next point. For populists, the audience is an extremely important factor. Populists derive legitimacy from the 'people' and aim, not only to represent them but also to create them (Moffitt, 2016). Earlier I emphasized the exclusivist nature of populism that is either of horizontal or vertical nature. In both of these dimensions 'the people' are the main point of references from which the exclusionary 'us versus them' dialectic appears. For Erdogan himself, the people play an important part in either his opposition to the previously dominant secular establishment or foreign powers internationally.

2.2 Speech act, framing and an agenda setting

Another thing that all these versions of populism have in common is the utilization of the "speech act". The concept of speech act is very important for understanding populist exclusionary strategies. Defined by Austin (1975), speech act represents any utterance that aims not only to transmit information but also to change reality.

Speech act as a performative utterance can be analyzed on three levels: locutionary act, illocutionary act and perlocutionary act. While locutionary act stands for the actual utterance and illocutionary act represents its implied meaning, perlocutionary act is of special importance here because it stands for the effect of an utterance on an audience that inspires emotions such as fear, threat, joy, sadness, etc. In populist reasoning, speech act is often used to frame (non)issues in a dichotomous “us versus them” style that carries with itself consequences of securitization; I will touch upon this later.

Populist usage of speech acts has been long noted in the academia. Ruth Wodak (2015) explains how right wing populists, by utilizing fears and threats as effects of their utterances, change voting patterns and thus gain more electoral popularity and political mainstay. This is precisely what makes an exclusionary ‘us versus them’ rhetoric such a potent weapon in populists’ arsenal. In one of her earlier works, Wodak (2003) also explains how populists utilize multiple linguistic strategies irrespective of ideology, which aim to include much of the electorate but also exclude “the others”. Hameleers et al. (2017) analyzed how populists’ attribution of blame can help them in increasing their own electoral fortunes on the expense of established political/bureaucratic structures at home. It should be recognized that although anti-elitist exclusionism is an important defining attribute of populists it is not an essential one. Muller (2016, p. 101) claims that in addition to being anti-elitist, populists are also anti-pluralists which means that they are against any sort of opposition and claim monopoly over the people’s will, its expression and representation. Van Dijk (1993) recognized exclusionary populist discourse to operate on the principles of production and reproduction of signification on the level of social cognition. In other words, exclusionary discourse not only maintains “us versus them” distinction but it also actively participates in construction of the radical other in popular perception and thus maintains antagonistic relations within the society itself. In similar vein, close relation between populism and nationalism has been analyzed. De Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017) see this contextual co-existence as an articulation on the side of populists, which try to present ‘people’ as both

underdog and nation at the same time. This articulation, they argue, happens on both in/out (horizontal) and down/up (vertical) dimensions.

I have already stated what possible perlocutionary effects can be made by the way of speech act. However, in the case of populism it is important to note that the usual focus is on the transmission of fear as the political strategy (Wodak, 2015). In political science, communication studies, anthropology and other related fields aforementioned strategies are subsumed under the title of 'framing'. Most of the definitions regarding frames and framing revolves around preferences, their creation and manipulation. Sniderman and Theriault (2004) define framing in a following manner: 'Framing effects, in the strict sense, refer to semantically distinct conceptions of exactly the same course of action that induce preference reversals'. Druckman (2010) considers frames as mental images of objects divided according to dimensions/attributes based on which the evaluation of the object in question is being conducted.

A concept that is associated with framing is agenda setting. McCombs and Reynolds (2002) define agenda setting as the ability to influence the importance of issues belonging to the public sphere. Since both concepts of framing and agenda setting imply unequal power relations, it is important to recall Block and Negrine's (2017) take on political communication which explains how power relations decide on the importance of public agenda and thereby framing process. The attention should be pointed towards the question of why populists decide to emphasize certain dimensions of an issue rather than others and in return change the popular perception, usually in favor of securitizing acts and fear-mongering stemming from it. Previously I have mentioned this has to do with unequal power relations and the desire for the preservation of personal power. However, securitizing acts do not always have to be the intended ends of a populist framing. Since it is characterized by exclusion, populist rhetoric is very successful at portraying the other side of the coin as well. Thus, populists can often color the people with positive attributes such as good, innocent and victimized (Hameleers, Bos & de Vreese, 2017). From this we can see that depending on a situation, an event can be represented in plethora of

different ways. One caveat needs to be added here. In their seminal paper, McCombs and Shaw (1972) pointed out that agenda setting and therefore creation of political reality always proceeds by the way of medium, which is usually media in the form of journals, magazines, TV programs, etc. This work will not draw upon such source material, however it can be a good addition to further research conducted on the topic.

2.3 Securitization theory

With this being said, it should be clarified that framing and full-scale securitization, although closely related are not one and the same. Influenced by Carl Schmitt (1985; 1996), securitization theory found in the seminal works of the Copenhagen School, deals with the conceptualization of 'existential' threats and response to them by those in power. One of its essential focuses is on the question of sovereignty and extra-legal power and authority. Even though securitized policies might imply populist agenda its existence is not a necessity. Actual security action is. Framing on the other hand, is a broader concept that can assume various dimensions studied throughout social sciences which does not provide it with one-fits-all methodology. It generally seeks to answer the question of how the preferences are shaped. However, these two approaches do have some similarities. According to Watson (2012) securitization and framing have many theoretical overlaps due to, as he claims, securitization being a 'subfield of framing analysis'. In her work on the impact of security frames on global agenda setting, Duygulu Elcim (2015) argues that security framing operates like any other framing and as such requires 'enabling strategic environment', which is crucial for the success chances of advocates using it as a tool. Both of these approaches have audience as a main referent and framing/securitization is being conducted in the sphere of unequal power relations. However, due to framing theories having much broader spectrum, Watson proposes that securitization should be subsumed under its research auspices. Since securitization is concerned with how the existential threats are constructed and dealt with, it admits that securitized issues do not have to be of an essential security nature. Rather, often times they are constructed and presented as such through the securitizing acts. This in turn requires several factors: securitizing

agent, audience, and an object of securitization that ultimately gets transformed into an existential threat (Buzan, Weaver & de Wilde, 1998). In other words, political agent and public need to be connected by a security threat that jeopardizes prize value. This is precisely why populists utilize securitizing acts so often while at the same time shying away from any concrete action; by framing certain issues as security threats, populists are able to exclude certain societal segments from everyday politics and thereby bolster their own popularity as defenders of prized values such as nation, freedom, religion, etc.

This brings me to another point that is closely related to this – securitization theory. Securitization can thus be considered as a form of framing with a very specific purpose and consequences. As stated above, securitization approaches have common root in the thinking of 20th century German jurist Carl Schmitt (Williams, 2003). Securitization approaches rely on speech acts in order to analyze how the leaders define security, and potentially, existential threats. This is precisely where the Schmittian tradition lies. What Schmitt brought was the entirely new conceptualization of “political”. According to him, political is about the ability to make a friend/enemy distinction (Schmitt, 1996). This in turn requires sovereign who needs to be able to decide on the life or death decisions. As Schmitt tells us: “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception” (Schmitt, 1985). This means that sovereign cannot be bound by everyday politics and laws since he is the sole responsible for declaring the state of emergency and hence an existential threat.

Theories of securitization, most notably the Copenhagen School, embraced and further developed this Schmittian designation. For them, the Schmittian “enemy” is precisely the existential threat designated, framed and created as such by the person(s) in power. Similar thinking echoes through the constructivist theory, which do not takes issues on a substantive, matter of fact basis but analyze their socially constructed nature (Wendt, 1992). This is where the importance of rhetoric and speech acts for securitization theories and their approaches to populist phenomenon is located.

Copenhagen School takes the concept of speech act very seriously in building its theories of securitization and threats. According to some of its key proponents, sovereign uses speech acts and their prelocutory power in order to move the state agenda beyond the political into the realm of “securitized” where he/she can decide on extraordinary means against the socially constructed threats (Buzan, Weaver & de Wilde, 1998). This gives sovereign wide discretion in regards to spheres of potential securitization since every sector of social and political life can be subjected to an existential threat (Weaver, 1995). From all this we can see that typically populist representation of social reality as “us versus them” is always one step away from complete securitization where populist can go to the realm of “extraordinary” to the detriment of normal, everyday politics.

Due to its exclusivist nature, populism often utilizes the language of securitization. Securitizing acts, if used as a political tool, are a potent weapon in populists’ arsenal. It allows for presenting various issues and objects in an extremely politicized light thus framing them as security issues and existential threats that need to be dealt with ‘by all means’(Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998). Since populism is a political program mostly based on exclusion and ‘us versus them’ rhetoric it becomes obvious how securitizing acts can be utilized to further bolster populist agendas. This can be further divided into the logic of salvation (de Silva & Vieira, 2018) and the necessity of action (Taggart, 2004). These strongly reminisce of concepts found in the Copenhagen School of securitization such as existential threat and ‘breaking point’ (Buzan, Weaver & de Wilde, 1998). Magcamit (2018) further analyzed the three-way linkage between securitization, realism and populism. On the case study of Donald Trump he deduced that if one sector or issue is securitized that can lead to an increase in country’s nativist sentiment that provides a populist with more popularity, which he can further use as a capital in favor of hard, realist policies in the international sphere. By securitizing a particular issue, populist leaders can direct public attention towards its direction and thus set/frame political agenda around it. I have previously stated that populists depend on mass mobilization and legitimacy achieved through plebiscitarian means. By presenting an issue as an existential threat through securitizing acts and by claiming

to represent the will of the people, populists can achieve extra-legal authority that serves their aims of preservation and consolidation of power (Weyland, 2001).

Indeed, we are able to notice similar strategy not only in Erdogan's example but also in the case of Venezuelan populist leader Maduro (Cawthorne & Ellsworth, 2013) and Hungarian Prime Minister Orban (Traynor, 2013). Lazaridis and Skleparis (2015) claim that right wing populist groups utilized perceptions of security professionals in order to perpetuate their practices and rhetoric filled with hate-mongering sentiments.

It needs to be recognized here also that foreign policy can be a powerful tool working for populists in favor of consolidation of their domestic position and electorate. Dodson and Dorraj (2008) analyzed how populists along with using divisive rhetoric against domestic elites can also formulate aggressive foreign policies directed against international powers.

2.4 Populism and Erdogan

Everything said above served as a literature review elucidating intellectual traditions and theories I will be using in explaining Erdogan's oscillating rhetoric and its divergence from the actual Turkish foreign policy. I particularly wanted to expound on the approaches pertaining to populism and securitization theory, the related works in their respective areas and their antecedents in order to better understand the context and grounds upon which my critique of Erdogan's discourse is going to rest. Brubaker's and Taguieff's understanding of populism supplanted by Weiland's 'single domain' populism will be pertinent for my research since they aim to expound on multidimensional strategies Erdogan utilized in his rhetoric towards Russia during the downturns in relations in order to increase and maintain personal power through institutional manipulation.

Furthermore, Aytac and Elci (2018) in combination with Aytac and Onis (2014) give an important insight into Erdogan's recent, post-Arab Spring style of populism that is permeated by acts of securitization and exclusionism. Like Ozpek and Yasar they also analyze Erdogan's use of Islam and religious sentiments as compliment to his

increasingly authoritarian style of leadership. Similarly to Ozpek and Yasar (2017), Park (2014) argues that Turkey's version of populism, especially in the post-Arab Spring context, became permeated by the historically present values of nationalism and Islam. Ozpek and Yasar in particular challenge this amalgamation by pitting Islamic values of universalism and globalism against populist exclusionism. They conclude similarly to Brubaker, that populism, at least in Turkey's case, is a thin ideology that brings together seemingly competing values in order to increase legitimacy and popular appeal of a populist leader, or in the case of Turkey, Erdogan.

General public is very important for populists who claim to be an expression of their will (Moffitt, 2016). For Erdogan himself, the people play an important part in either his opposition to the previously dominant secular establishment or foreign powers, internationally. Aforementioned authors make the point that Erdogan's utilization of integrationist values early in his career was a calculated move to weaken the power of Turkey's bureaucratic establishment, policy orientation that was later replaced by Islamic/nationalist mixture. On the other hand, Aytac and Onis (2014) view populism through economic perspective and perceive Turkey's Erdogan and Argentine's Kirchner as representatives of populism on either side of ideological spectrum. According to them, country's economic culture influences Erdogan's rightist/nationalist and Kirchner's leftist versions of populism.

After understanding populist style particular to Erdogan I will try to understand the fundamental reasoning behind it and its broader reaching consequences. I argue that Erdogan's main goal, which especially became visible following the 2015 crisis with Russia and 2016 failed coup attempt, was transition into full presidential system with president's extended powers and authorities. In the preceding lines I have mentioned research done by Ruth Wodak on framing issues through the utilization of fears and threats as well as overarching exclusionary rhetoric irrespective of any ideological considerations, which, according to her, directly influences outcomes of electoral events. In line with this, Cizre (2017) argues that the atmosphere of fear contributed to Erdogan's electoral successes and ultimately

in constitutional amendments in favor of presidentialism. Moreover, Erdogan's shift from globalist/integrationist discourse towards the one dominated by nationalism can be seen as a clear example of populism as a 'thin ideology' (Stanley, 2008). Furthermore, the research conducted by Hameleers et. al. (2017) indicates how attribution of blame directed towards established state elites at home and abstract entities abroad can help populists in ramping up the popular support in their favor. In regards to this, Erdogan was often noted blaming his country's problems on foreign powers and entities that might carry abstract connotations such as the illusive 'mastermind' (üst akıl) (Aytac & Elci, 2018). Furthermore, earlier Erdogan's rhetoric of putting blame on the Kemalist military and secular political actors was also well documented (Kuru & Stepan, 2012).

However, such behavior was by no means a precedent. Historically speaking, Erdogan had a long experience with populist style of leadership that in its early days found expression in curbing the influence of military and bureaucratic elites. Dincshahin (2013) found this especially to be true in his analysis of Erdogan's political strategy between 2007 elections and 2010 constitutional referendum where, as he argues, Erdogan was using divisive rhetoric separating 'us' the people and 'them' the elites. Later, his political style transitioned into that of rightist/nationalist populism, which was a great departure from his global Islamic and integrationist grassroots. While somehow managing to combine Islamic and exclusivist, nationalist values in an unstable mixture (Ozpek & Yasar, 2017), in this period Erdogan changed his conception of the domestic 'other' from corrupt elites to intellectuals, journalists and academics (Aytac & Elci, 2018). This in particular did not wane with the transition to presidentialism, which I see as a tool in ensuring the preservation and maintenance of power.

Some like Esen and Gumuscu (2017) argue that even in the post 2016 coup attempt period Erdogan started ruling in a defacto presidential system through his heavy-handedness and plethora of executive decrees. Preservation of that power became a top priority for Erdogan even today after the full transition to the presidential system. Weyland (2001) will be able to shed some light on general goals of

populists, into whose explanation Erdogan's case is subsumed. To ensure this transition, Erdogan utilized his populist style together with securitizing acts that ultimately brought about this. Here, securitizing acts should be seen as a type of framing making them an effective political tool utilized by Erdogan to bolster his exclusionary agenda in favor of personal popularity and political mainstay. In order to better explain that, I will utilize securitization theory, more specifically the branch of Copenhagen School, that rests upon prelocutory power of speech acts and Schmittian legacy of sovereignty and the political. All of my claims will be further supplanted by Erdogan's quotes found not only on the official website of the Presidency but also in press releases and his other statements.

Dodson and Dorraj (2008) also analyzed how such populist behavior domestically can infuse populist leaders with an authority to devise aggressive foreign policies that further contribute to the atmosphere of fear and divisiveness. In Turkish case this strongly reflects Erdogan's rhetoric towards both the US and Russia. By utilizing such foreign policy, Erdogan hoped to not only reinvigorate population through domestic means but also by presenting Turkey as a capable international actor. Similarly, Criss (2010) argues how attempts at foreign policy can be a mere rhetoric without any substance destined to fail at the outset. She claims that Turkey's foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East and towards Europe, was colored by Erdogan and ruling JDP's populism. However, according to the data I collected, I argue that in the case of Turkey's relations with Russia full scale securitization has never been enacted. By this I understand the lack of military mobilization or any actions stemming from Turkey's security apparatus directed against Russia. Rather, what Erdogan did through his rhetoric is creation of securitizing acts as a step away from full securitization. In other words, Turkey's animosity towards Russia even at the lowest points in their bilateral relations stayed at the level of Erdogan's rhetoric without any material actions/policies. How securitizing acts are tied into populist agenda will be further discussed in the later parts of this chapter. Furthermore, lack of any tangible actions in relations to Russia that would correspond to Erdogan's rhetoric will be explored in the third chapter on policy shifts.

CHAPTER III

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: STATUS QUO OR CHANGE?

In this chapter I will outline Turkey's policy shifts (if any) towards Russia corresponding to the 2014-2018 period. Analyzing policy shifts is important due to the fact that when they are put against and contrasted to Erdogan's speeches they will give an important insight into the possible agenda setting. In other words if there is discrepancy between Erdogan's rhetoric and official government policy towards Russia that would be a strong indicator of foreign policy being instrumentalized for domestic purposes favoring those in power.

In order to better understand Turkey-Russia relations, especially in the post-2016 context, and ultimately domestic agenda setting that followed from it, it is important to understand broader structural context in which both of these countries were located. To that end, I will observe relations of these countries to other major players such as the European Union and the United States. It will also be of importance to talk about major events that impacted the region such as the Arab Spring in general and Syrian conflict in particular as well as to mention actors that had a stake in these regional developments such as Iran and various Kurdish entities and political formations. Due to the fast dynamic of these events old alliances were rewritten and new ones created. Moreover, it is important to note that Turkish-Russian cooperation in the strategic and political spheres, especially in the period after 2016, did not happen in the vacuum but was built upon strong economic and energy ties that will also be discussed here.

3.1 Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Russia: Historical Background

Turkey and Russia had dynamic relations that can be traced back several hundred years to the times of Ottoman and Russian Empires. During the era of empires, relations between these two states have been less than amicable. Russian Empire and later Soviet Union had pretensions towards Turkish territory, which propelled

the latter in joining European family of nations and later the NATO pact in favor of security against its northern neighbor (Hale, 2013; Kosebalaban, 2011).

Thus, one of the most important security considerations present in the Ottoman and later Turkish thinking was undoubtedly threat posed by Russia (Cetinsaya, 2017). Since the 18th century, Ottoman Empire suffered a string of military defeats imparted on it by its Russian rival, which was closely followed by the shrinkage of territory and influence, most notably in the western provinces of the Ottoman Empire – Balkans. Propelled by these humiliations, Ottoman Empire attempted to modernize its entire state, bureaucratic and military apparatus. This could have been done only through the aid that European powers like Britain and France provided, who wished to retain the Empire as a ‘sick man of Europe’ predominantly in order to balance the encroaching Russian imperial ambitions (Kedourie, 1968).

Turkey was wary of Russian intentions even after the dissolution of Empires following the World War I. Soviet Union, under Stalin, maintained clear pretensions directed towards Turkey’s Istanbul straits, which would enable it unfettered access to the Mediterranean (Ahmad, 2004, p. 9). Moreover, threat of Soviet Union demanding two Turkey’s eastern cities of Kars and Ardahan was constantly looming. These and similar dynamics only helped in further anchoring Turkey in the Western camp. From 1948, Turkey was a recipient of the US-funded program of financial aid known as Marshall Plan that served to further remove it from the Russian influence. Turkey’s allegiance became institutionalized in 1952 when Turkey officially joined the NATO. As an eastern member of the pact and a primary bulwark against a possible Soviet invasion, Turkey enjoyed immense strategic importance in the eyes of the US and European decision makers. Establishment of US air base in Incirlik in 1951 as well as deployment of Jupiter missiles infused with nuclear warheads is a testament to this (Kosebalaban, 2011, p. 75).

Turkish-Russian relations, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, returned to the friendlier footing, which was mostly revolving around economic and energy agendas (Arafat & Alnuaimy, 2011). This being said, during this time, Turkey

remained firmly planted within the Western/NATO camp and thus no changes were visible in its geostrategic and foreign policy orientation. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 'Treaty on Principles of Friendship and Cooperation between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation' was signed that would guide their mutual relations well into 2000s. In the mid and late 1990s series of bilateral visits was conducted, which were mainly centered on acknowledgments of their good wills and admissions of their respective sovereignties in the light of Chechen and Kurdish upheavals. In 1999, 'Joint Declaration on Anti-Terrorism' was promulgated and grounds for new projects were prepared, such as now defunct Blue Stream. Both countries' foreign ministers, Ciller and Primakov, argued that despite their differences Turkey and Russia should find a common ground for cooperation that was mostly echoing their mutual economic interests (Markushin, 1997).

3.2 Turkish-Russian Relations in the JDP Era

This trend continued through 2000s under the newly elected JDP. Landmark of the Russian-Turkish relations during the early 2000s was the construction of Blue Stream gas line in 2005 and, at that time planned construction of Turkish Stream project that was to replace defunct South Stream, which started in 2017 (Haddad, 2018). Year 2004 saw President of Russian Federation Putin visiting Turkey in the first of its kind instances in order to agree and deepen cooperation on several key sectors such as oil, nuclear power and gas (Oncel & Liapina, 2018). Following years saw more high-level visits along with agreements and declaration similar to the aforementioned ones including but not limited to visa liberalization, agriculture, customs, etc (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, 2009; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2011). During that period, economic considerations were given priority over political ones due to the long-lasting geopolitical disagreements between Russia and Turkey on several key areas such as Caucasus, Central Asia and Balkans.

However, this does not mean that in the early 2000s Turkish-Russian relations were without a problem. Two watershed political events marked Turkish-Russian relations in this period. The first was Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. Russia

attacked Georgia in August 2008 in favor of South Ossetian and Abkhazian rebels. This event marked a beginning of Russian unilateralism and watershed in international affairs on a global scale (Blank, 2008). The second event, which coincided with the year in which Erdogan assumed presidency, was Russian invasion and subsequent annexation of Crimean peninsula. The whole process lasted from February to March 2014. Russia used the instability in Ukraine caused by the preceding Euromaidan protests organized in favor of closer ties with the EU rather than Russian-led Euroasian Economic Union. This latter case is very pertinent for Turkey. Turkey strived to develop good relations with Crimean Tatars, native population of Crimea, since the times of the Ottoman Empire (Celik & Dirik, 2018). Faced with Russian annexation of Crimea, Turkey was torn between its allegiance to NATO and Crimean Tatars on one side and deepening economic/energy ties with Russia on the other side (Aydin, 2014). These two interventions demonstrate Russian desire to play more active and assertive international role (Karagiannis, 2014).

This being said, Turkey still imported massive amounts of Russian gas during Russian invasion of Georgia as well as maintained close cooperation over the Turkish Stream project during Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Winrow, 2017). Erdogan criticized Russian actions in both Georgia and Crimea on multiple occasions (Aliriza, 2008). Despite this, Turkey's official stance towards Russia remained unchanged. For example, in 2008 during invasion of Georgia, Erdogan was pushing forward with Caucasus Cooperation and Stability Pact that encompassed two beleaguered countries plus Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey. This is one example of zero-problems with neighbors policy but the fact that relations with Russia went on unhindered is very telling. It is also important to note that Turkey was the only NATO country which did not impose sanctions on Russia following the annexation of Crimea. When it came to Turkish Stream it is important to note that there were certain disagreements in its inception. Turkey briefly suspended the whole project during its cradle stage. However, the reason behind this was disagreement over prices rather than anything of political nature. Earlier this year, Turkey managed to secure 10.25% discount on Russian gas (Yinanc, 2018). From this we can conclude

that despite political disagreements Turkey's strategy and official government stance towards Russia is very much dominated by economic and energy concerns as well as by maintaining generally good relations as shown by an established foreign policy doctrine initiated by Davutoglu.

Russia, due to an assertive nature of its foreign policy as seen in the case of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, has managed to alienate the European Union. Moreover, it has been shown in the case of Syria that the EU has neither the wish nor capabilities to influence regional designs. The lack of resolve in dealing with security/terrorism issues compounded with indecisive refugee policy further alienated Turkey, as well as propelled Ankara to develop its own sort of assertiveness in international affairs, which ultimately brought it closer to Russia (Piet & Simao, 2016). Moreover, it was claimed that Russia due to its idiosyncratic political culture could never accommodate itself to American-led unipolar world but would rather contest it whilst insisting on multipolarity (Ambrosio, 2017). This translates into an assertive foreign policy in Russia's own region. Russia has insisted on multipolar world since at least mid-1990s and has expressed this in several ways, from the idea of Slavic Union to alliance with China, which also seeks to resist American unilateralism (Ambrosio, 2007; Turner, 2009). Furthermore, Iran's proximity to Russia is natural considering Iran's strenuous relations with the West. One example of Iran's proximity to Russia is its successful incorporation into the framework of Russia and China dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Suresh & Ramesh, 2015). Moreover, after 2012 especially, Russia and Iran attempted to bring their policies closer together and initiate era of closer bilateral relations (Kozhanov, 2016). While USA sees Iran as one of the main culprits for Middle Eastern instabilities from Syria to Yemen guided by religious zeal, Iran's foreign policy is very much based on national pragmatism in line with the likes of Putin's and Xij Jinping's thinking (Nasr, 2018). From all this it can be seen that alliance between Russia, China and Iran is built upon necessity in order to counter Western influences in the pursuit of their respective foreign policies. Turkey seems to fit this mold provided that the United States and West in general cannot satisfy its security and foreign policy prerogatives. Russia's position towards Turkey could also be better understood in

the light of Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation adopted in 2000. This foreign policy stance further reinforced during Putin's presidency advocates the concept of Eurasianism by improving relations with countries like Turkey, China, and Iran (Hajiyeva, 2018).

During the early period of Erdogan's presidency assumed in August 2014 relations with Russia were not seriously obstructed in any way. It seemed as both countries decided to postpone prevalent (geo)political issues to a later date and focus instead on economic and energy cooperation. Turkey, Russia and Iran were mainly focusing on economic/energy ties and keeping other sectors on a tactical rather than strategic level (Flanagan, 2012). Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers dependency on energy imports as one of its main energy concerns since Turkey can supply only 26% of its total energy demand (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, 2018). Moreover, it has been officially admitted that economy, trade, and energy constitute main driving factors between Russian-Turkish relations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, 2018). Even during the downturn in relations from 2015 to mid-2016 natural gas, Russian staple export, continued to flow unhindered (Bechev, 2018). From this point, Turkish consumption of Russian natural gas only increased hitting a record level in 2017 numbering 53.5 billion cubic meters (Tiryakioglu, 2018). Total trade volume between the two countries has been \$23.9 billion in 2015 (Simsek, Simsek & Zhanaltay, 2017). In 2017, Turkish Exporters' Assembly marked a 52.5% increase of exports within the span of eight months (Mulhem, 2018).

Shortly after Erdogan became president in 2014, Putin visited his Turkish counterpart in December of the same year. Putin used the opportunity of the official state visit to declare the beginning of the new gas pipeline known as "Turkish Stream". In the same year, Russia scrapped the South Stream project, which was supposed to go through the countries of the EU. Russia found itself targeted and heavily sanctioned by the European Union and the United States earlier that year when it invaded and ultimately annexed Crimea. It is important to note that despite the harsh rhetoric Turkey never joined the West and NATO

countries in imposing sanctions on Russia following the 2014 Crimean crisis. By using the Turkish Stream, Russia sent a clear message to the West (Bechev, 2015). Perhaps, the project ultimately precipitated closer political as well as strategic ties between Turkey and Russia in the post-2016 context due to their precarious positions relative to the West. At the very least, both countries wanted to show the existence of alternatives.

Besides Turkish Stream, another important energy project was the construction of Akkuyu nuclear power plant. According to Turkish foreign ministry nuclear power is another one of the main objectives of Turkish state when it comes to energy. Akkuyu is being constructed by the Russian subsidiary company and its official inauguration happened in April 2015 (Daily Sabah, 2015). In the November of the same year Russia started its bombing excursions into Syria and one of its targets was Turkey-backed rebels, primarily of Turkmen ethnic group. However, neither the Turkish Stream nor Akkuyu power plant suffered any disruptions in the construction. Shortly after Turkey shot down Russian jet over its own territory Russia halted Akkuyu construction but, nevertheless, ROSATOM did not terminate the contract (Coskun, 2015). Turkey looked to diversify contractors but did not get any offers and thus remained reliant on Russia. In 2015 Turkey attracted \$11,77 billion in FDI, 6.34% from Russia only, majority of funds being imparted precisely to Akkuyu project (Simsek, Simsek & Zhanaltay, 2017). Lack of firm stance by Russia in the case of Akkuyu shows that both countries are dependent on their existing energy relations and investment portfolios.

The first major event that marked Erdogan's presidency and put Turkey under the international spotlight was the siege of predominantly Kurdish city of Kobane in Northern Syria by the Islamic State in the September of 2014. The Kobane case was the important test for the US-Turkish relations since it clearly established their different designs over Syria. Turkey's refusal to aid Kurdish militias in the besieged border town cemented their priorities; fighting the ISIS was secondary to stopping the Kurdish gains in Syria, Kurdish defense organizations being viewed as terrorist by Turkish authorities (Goren, 2018). Arguably, this could have been considered as a

sign for Turkey to look for different political alliances more sympathetic to its aims. This event moved Turkey away from the Western political alignment that saw Kurds as an important ally in fighting Syrian regime and the Islamic State. Thus, if we take into consideration opposing strategic interests in the Middle East between the USA and the EU on one side and Turkey on the other we can understand this realignment towards Russia better.

Despite their economic and energy cooperation and an existing potential for strategic cooperation as mentioned above, Turkey and Russia still had many diverging political objectives. Syria was no exception to this. In the case of Arab Spring and Syrian conflict in particular Turkey was still very much committed to the Western political agenda and the removal of Assad from power. However, it went about doing this in a very different way from the West. It supported various Sunni jihadist groups and factions (Ozkan, 2015). West found its partner on the ground in Kurds and their self-defense organizations that Turkey deemed as terrorist. Russia on the other hand exposed skepticism and dismay towards Western interventionism directed towards changing regimes in the third world countries at first diplomatically and ultimately militarily, too (Charap, 2013). Moreover, Russia and Syria had cordial relations that goes back to the period of the Soviet Union and Cold War. Besides the strong geopolitical interest in Syria, it can be argued that Russia was concerned about the potential spillover of radical Islamist elements and hence radicalization of its predominantly Muslim Caucasus region (Allison, 2013). In addition, contrary to Turkey, Russia never declared PKK as a terrorist organization and it continued to perceive Kurds as an important ally in Syrian conflict against ISIS unlike jihadist groups that Turkey supported. Russia in turn considered these as terrorist factions rather than PYD/YPG. The fact that Russia allowed YPG to open diplomatic office in Moscow in 2016 is very telling (RT, 2016).

From this, we can see that with growing assertiveness in Russia foreign policy, Turkey found itself in a precarious position. Despite this, Turkey's official position towards Russia continued in a constant fashion. This can be due to major economic ties they have, which neither of the two countries wanted to jeopardize. Another

possible explanation that can supplement preceding economic one is Turkey's "zero problem with neighbors" policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey). Coined by at the time Foreign Minister Davutoglu, zero problems with neighbors envisions balance between Turkey's strategic alliances and its neighbors (Davutoglu, 2010). In other words, this policy proposes harmony in dealing with different regional actors instead of conflict-based approach to the regional problem solving. Due to this, Turkey tried to engage holistically all parties to conflict and lead a policy of reconciliation between them rather than taking sides.

3.3 Changes in Foreign Policies? From Economic to Political Spheres

Jet incident from November 2015 signifies shift of focus in the Turkey-Russian relations from the economic to political sphere (see Figure 3.1.). Crisis over the downed Russian jet came as a culmination of pre-existing disagreements over the Syrian issue between these two countries. In September of the same year Russia decided to militarily engage and support Assad's regime which further alienated it from Turkey. It could be that before this incident Turkey and Russia were focusing exclusively on economic issues rather than finding a structural solution to their political impasses (Ozertem, 2017). Immediately after, crisis in the relations happened. Russia imposed economic sanctions and discontinued, but not terminate, energy projects like Akkuyu power plant. One day after the incident Russia continued with its bombing campaigns against the Turkmen rebels in favor of Kurdish forces as well as deploying S-400 rocket system in its air base near Latakia, Syria (Bertrand, 2015). In February 2016 Democratic Union Party, a known affiliate of Kurdish terrorist group PKK, was allowed by Russian authorities to open a diplomatic mission in Moscow (Daily Sabah, 2016). From this we can see that Russia completely changed its strategic policies towards Turkey while putting economic ties in jeopardy. Economic relations were discontinued while some facets completely went under. Trade volume contracted from \$23.9 billion in 2015 to 16.8 billion in 2016 (Bechev, 2018). In political arena, Russia actively supported Turkish enemies and prevented Turkey from using Syrian airspace. Turkey became unable to change realities on the ground and could only react to moves made by ISIS and YPG/PKK from its own territory (ground or air). In this climate, ISIS began firing

missiles into Turkey and jeopardizing its border while YPG/PYD gained considerable grounds in Northern Syria which Turkey saw as an additional security threat (ibid; Kasapoglu & Ulgen, 2016). Furthermore, economic sanctions against Turkey hit hard as well considering Russia's position as one of Turkey's biggest trade and energy partners. (Mankoff, 2016).

Russia shifted its anti-Turkish policy only after Erdogan issued an official apology in June 2016 (see Figure 3.1.). Relations further improved after Erdogan visited Putin in August, and Putin came in a return visit to Turkey in October. Turkey needed Russia due to key economic, political, and security concerns. Russia removed sanctions on most of agricultural products, fruits and vegetables (excluding tomatoes) as well as allowed unfettered movement of people, goods and services (Bechev, 2018). In the strategic sphere, Turkey's security concerns required it to counter ISIS and PYD/PKK threats over the Syrian borders. This could have only been done with Russia's help. Security concerns can be seen as another reason beside the economic one behind Turkey's decision not to change its official policy towards Russia in the wake of the jet crisis (Taylor, 2017). Furthermore, American military cooperation with Kurds, that intensified after the 2014 siege of Kobane, propelled Turkey to look for the security guarantees elsewhere (Cunningham, 2015; Stephens & Stein, 2015). In this vein, it has been stated that both Turkey and Russia suffered from global isolation primarily emanating from the West and due to that fact they needed to return their relations to previous levels of cooperation (Ataman, 2016). This would certainly explain Turkish passivity and lack of firm response after the crisis as well as welcoming Russian acceptance of the apology and Turkey's extended hand.

Shortly after Erdogan's apology in June, Turkey-led operation Euphrates Shield began in Syria (see Figure 3.1). Turkey invaded Northern Syria and initiated the removal of ISIS, Kurdish and Syrian government-backed forces. This action was planned for the earlier period in that year however its execution was deemed impossible due to the lack of Russian aid and access to the airspace (Razzak, 2016). Turkish sources admitted this; aide to president Erdogan Ilnur Cevik stated that the

operations Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch (which will take place later) would be impossible without Russian help and their opening of the Syrian airspace (Sputnik International, 2018). Furthermore, Turkey consulted with Russians prior to launching the operation, which meant that Russian approval was necessary (Akturk, 2017). Parallel to this, official Astana talks began in January 2017 sponsored by Turkey, Iran and Russia in order to bring about an end to Syrian conflict by providing warring Syrian factions with an international platform.

Russian acquiescence remained important even after the operation Euphrates Shield was concluded in 2017. Turkey needed guarantees that Syrian government forces would not overtake the Idlib region. That guarantee is something only Russia could provide due to their influence over Assad and his decision-making capabilities (Issaev, 2018). Moreover, airspace over that region was still dominated by Russia. Throughout 2017 many high-level meetings were held between Russia and Turkey. Particularly important were the ones held between Russia's defense minister Shoigu and Turkey's security establishment (TRT World, 2017; Guldogan, 2017). In retrospect, we can conclude that these meetings served to pave the way for another Turkish operation that began in January 2018 entitled "Olive Branch".

Unlike Euphrates Shield, operation Olive Branch was solely concerned with the removal of Kurdish PYD/PKK units from Northern Syrian canton of Afrin. Turkey viewed Afrin as an important strategic point that could, if left in Kurdish possession, potentially connect Kurdish territories in Northern Syria to Mediterranean. Erdogan proclaimed successful completion of the operation on 18th of March during the 103rd Gallipoli victory commemoration (Hurriyet, 2018). Kurds perceived Russian allowance of Afrin occupation as betrayal as obvious from the statement of senior YPG commander Sipan Hemo: "We had certain arrangements with Russia. But Russia suddenly disregarded these agreements and betrayed us. They have clearly sold us out" (MacDonald, 2018). It appears that for Russia Kurds were temporary and disposable ally. Shortly after Turkey declared success in Afrin, Russian foreign minister Lavrov stated in April that he expects Turkey eventually to return Afrin to Syrian government forces arguing that deal Russia had with Turkey did not imply

occupation (Hurriyet Daily News, 2018). This of course provoked strong reactions from the Turkish side. Day after Lavrov's statement on April 10th Erdogan criticized Russia's position and said that Turkey will hand over Afrin to people of Afrin when the time comes (Hurriyet Daily News, 2018). However, it needs to be said that Turkey's bargaining power in this particular circumstance is very limited. Due to previous disagreements with the United States Turkey acted unilaterally in Afrin which means it cannot count on NATO's support. The United States forbade Turkey from advancing into neighboring town of Manbij while simultaneously increasing the number of troops there in order to protect Kurdish forces stationed there (Hussein & Omar, 2018). In June Turkey and US agreed on the road map that would allow YPG forces to withdraw from Manbij (U.S. Department of State, 2018; Gall, 2018). However, American position on Turkey's actions in Syria against Kurds is very clear. In such a context, Turkey is faced with a regionally predominant Russia that has no reservations about wanting to see Afrin returned to government hands. What will Turkey do and what will be the ultimate faith of Afrin remains to be seen. Furthermore, going back to 2016 Turko-Russian rapprochement, there is high possibility that Turkey's domestic events had a part to play in this thaw in relations. In 2016 Turkey suffered an unsuccessful coup attempt that aimed to topple Erdogan and JDP's democratically elected government. After the coup attempt, Russia immediately expressed support for Turkey's legitimate government (Hurriyet Daily News, 2016). Moreover, there is another development that potentially explains why Turkey did not change its official policy towards Russia after the jet event. It has been claimed by Turkish side, primarily by Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Simsek, that FETO elements within Turkey's military were responsible for downing of the jet; FETO being the terrorist organization responsible for the failed coup attempt (Paksoy, 2016). It is also argued by some that this was the move of Turkish state in the attempt to save face domestically after the issued apology and general lack of changes in foreign policy after Russian reactionary activities. Another fact that backs Turkey's desire to maintain good relations with Russia and already existing course of official foreign policy is statement given by Turkish military immediately after the incident, which claims that air force did not know that plane in question was Russian (The Times of Israel, 2015). Such rationalization by Turkish authorities

found place again later in the year when Russian ambassador to Turkey, Andrei Karlov, was gunned down in Ankara during an art exhibition. Public prosecutor in Ankara opened a case against FETO, echoing sentiments of Turkish government (Budak & Acil, 2018). What is interesting about this unfortunate event is that it did not affect Turkish-Russian rapprochement or general relations in any way. Even Putin stated that the attack was a provocation directed at undermining Turkish-Russian relations (Walker, Shaheen, Chulov & Wintour, 2016).

It is also important to note that constitutional referendum was set for early 2017. In it, Erdogan was supposed to change the constitution in order to increase powers of the president-position he was bound to retain in 2018 presidential elections. In terms of foreign policy, Erdogan had nothing to show except for increased cross-border missile strikes and terrorist attacks. All these factors together pushed Turkey to swallow a bitter pill and apologize to Russia.

From what has been said so far it is clear that Turkey at no point since 2014 desired to change its official government policy towards Russia that was based on economic cooperation and good diplomatic relations. It is also visible that Turkey did everything to restore relations to their previously amicable levels after the severe diplomatic rift in November 2015. Rather, where we can perceive shifts in Turkey's post-2016 foreign policy towards Russia is in the case of Syria. One month before Erdogan issued an apology, his long term political ally and at the time incumbent Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu resigned from his position. Up until that point his Neo-Ottoman foreign policy was the guiding principle of Turkey in its adjacent regions; however with changes described above, that outlook has hit the brick wall and those principles became untenable (Yesilada, 2016). Furthermore, Davutoglu stated that no Turkish President or Prime Minister will apologize (BBC, 2015). Davutoglu's resignation could be explained by larger rift in the Turkish state over key issues such as greater need for security-oriented policies that the US and NATO allies could not provide as well as by Erdogan's desire to turn Turkey's parliamentary system into presidential one. After the apology, Turkey's Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu stated that there may be some shifts in Turkey's foreign

policy towards Syria and expressed wishes for closer cooperation with Russia (Radio Free Europe, 2016). This has been interpreted as a change in Turkey's priorities in Syria. Removal of Assad officially became of secondary importance in favor of countering Kurdish claims in Northern Syria. In line with this, certain shifts in Russian Syrian foreign policy are also perceivable. Russia started cooperating more closely with Turkey in strategic/military aspects allowing it use of airspace over Northern Syria which enabled both "Euphrates Shield" and "Olive Branch" operations conducted by Turkish Armed Forces. This meant sacrificing its on and off ally, Kurds, in favor of bigger strategic aims provided by Turkey (Eurasia Review, 2018). At this point Russia and Turkey officially became security partners attempting to converge their respective designs.

3.4 Turkey and Russia: Deepening Cooperation

Another possible change of Turkish foreign policy towards Russia could be in greater military cooperation. After their June 2016 rapprochement, there were rumors that Turkey is planning to buy Russian state of the art surface-to-air missile system S-400. In September 2017, Erdogan stated that Turkey has already made a deposit to Russia for the missile system and in November Turkish Minister of Defense has issued a firm timeline regarding the arrival of the system to Turkey (Gall & Higgins, 2017; Haaretz, 2017). In the light of this, Russian ambassador Yerkhov has stated that Russia is ready to further military-technical cooperation with Turkey (Tass, 2018). This type of military cooperation shows Turkey steering away from NATO and its already established security precepts. This policy shift can be explained as Turkey's disillusionment with the West and its NATO allies due to their meek responses to terrorist and border issues that has been plaguing Turkey. Furthermore, Turkish officials have stated on numerous occasions that NATO members are not interested in sharing sensitive military technologies or investing into Turkish defense industries (Aghayev & Aktas, 2017). This resonates well with the already mentioned claim that Turkey along with Russia is feeling isolated by the West. Regardless, Turkey encountered on a barrage of criticism by the US and its NATO allies following the decision to procure Russian weapons system. NATO criticisms were mostly of technical nature, expressing fears that foreign missile

system will jeopardize coherence of alliance-wide integrated air-defense mechanism (Mehta, 2017; Erkus, 2018). However, American side has stated that Turkey's purchase of Russian defense system will seriously damage bilateral relations with the US and hence, Turkey will be liable to sanctions as defined in Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) (Tass, 2018). Russia is supposed to deliver two S-400s in 2019; whether Turkey will actually go through with the transaction despite Erdogan's claims that deposit has already been paid, remains to be seen.

Another general shift in Turkey's foreign policy can be witnessed in the case of Astana Peace Talks (see Figure 3.1.). Astana Talks are latest among many attempts to bring peace into war-shattered Syria. However, what differentiates this process from others is that it is not conducted under the UN auspice but rather project is sponsored by Russia, Turkey and Iran. While previous talks have been conducted in Geneva under the US predominance, Astana talks are being held in Kazakhstan without the US participation. Turkey and Russia along with Iran continue to cooperate on presenting Syrian factions with platform for peace talks as well as lobbying to allow unfettered aid to war-stricken areas of Damascus and Idlib. So far, there have been nine rounds of talk in Astana, ninth being held on May 14th 2018 as well as Sochi conferences held within the framework of Astana talks. The ninth round called for Syria summit that was held in Ankara on April 4th. This was a trilateral summit between Erdogan, Putin and Rouhani in order to reach a lasting solution for Syrian war. According to column written by Presidential spokesperson Ibrahim Kalin main priority for Turkey remains removal of terrorist organizations, namely PYD, while for Russia and Iran the main goal is preservation of Syrian integrity and sovereignty (Kalin, 2018). Astana talks institutionalize Turkish-Russian alignment in the case of Syria. This is another clear indication of Turkey aligning its foreign policy to accommodate its new-found ally, Russia.

From these examples, it is obvious that Turkey, rather than changing its already existing foreign policy towards Russia and going in an opposite direction, supplemented it by deeper cooperation in political and strategic spheres. Despite

some turbulence in the relations during the second year of Erdogan's presidency, Turkey held a steady foreign policy course towards Russia, which ultimately led to improvement in relations in June 2016. From this point, Turkish-Russian bilateralism diversified to include political, strategic and military cooperation, thus supplementing already existing economic and energy ties. This diversification was a natural progression rather than a change of already chartered foreign policy. It is true that this policy could have been influenced and/or reinforced by internal/external events such as failed coup attempt, Turkey's disagreements with the United States over Syria, feeling of insecurity, and general alienation of Turkey by its Western allies. Thus, it can be argued that all these events pushed Turkey into closer cooperation with Russia that was the only regional country whose strategic and security goals could correspond to Turkish ones. Where we perceive actual shift in Turkish foreign policy is in its stance towards the US and West in general. The cracks in relations with the US have been visible since 2014 and siege of Kobane, only to get worse in the following years. Turkey's allegation that US helped Gulen in conducting the coup attempt, arrest of American pastor Brunson in Turkey, and US-imposed economic sanctions are some of the key events that rocked Turkish-American bilateral relations. Moreover, neither the US nor NATO has taken kindly to closer strategic and military cooperation between Turkey and Russia. This has been seen in Western reactions to Astana talks, Turkey's purchase of S-400s and creation of demilitarization zones that would save Sunni/jihadi rebels backed by Turkey from the Syrian forces.

It is still too early to say whether this reorientation in foreign policy will last and whether it will mean complete change in Turkey's century old Grand Strategy. Difficulty is increased when we consider that recent months have seen warm-up of Turkish-American relations. Turkey released the American pastor and in turn America lifted some of its sanctions against Turkey. Moreover, Turkey's cooperation with the US over the murder of Saudi journalist Khashoggi can indicate further improvement in relations. Regardless, Turkey's foreign policy towards Russia has followed consistently during Erdogan's presidency without any perceptible changes. Whether Turkey's relations with the US are strong enough to overcome this shift

and whether Turkey's foreign policy towards Russia will continue to be amicable remains to be seen. Following chapter will analyze Erdogan's speeches pertaining to Russia, which will then be contrasted to the actual Turkish foreign policy in order to show divergences (if any) between the two.




Figure 3.1. Timeline of key events in Turkish-Russian relations (2014-2018)

CHAPTER IV
INCONGRUENCE BETWEEN RHETORIC AND POLICY? ERDOGAN'S SPEECHES
ANALYZED

As stated previously, method through which I will explore my hypothesis will be content analysis. The claim that President Erdogan's rhetoric did not match Turkey's actual foreign policy on the ground can be best analyzed by examining his speeches/statements and comparing them to the foreign policy actions, or their lack thereof. I have talked about Turkey's foreign policy towards Russia (2014-2018 period) in two preceding chapters. In this chapter, I will explain the way I went about gathering and coding the data. Then as I go along, I will analyze Erdogan's speeches and explain the context behind positive or negative instances in reference to Russia.

In total, I analyzed 446 speeches for this study. All of them were collected from the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey website and were made in the period since Erdogan assumed presidency in the August of 2014 until the moment of writing. Out of these speeches, 110 had a direct reference to Russia. Once these speeches were pinpointed the next step was the coding of relevant data points. First, the time period in which the speech was made was considered and the relevant information divided in year, month and day columns. Second, I observed the general tone of references pertaining to Russia. I divided it into positive, neutral and negative columns. And finally, in coding the data, I also took into consideration the type of venue or audience in front of which speeches were being uttered. The audience type can give a good insight into the possible agenda setting and strategic use of rhetoric. In line with this, I believe that venues with a domestic audience will have more instances of Russia mentions. Hence, audience was organized in domestic and international columns respectively. It is important to note here that international column refers to either fully international audience (such as the G20 meetings) or to venues where domestic and international audiences were mixed (meeting of ambassadors to Turkey in Ankara/Istanbul). I have decided to put them under the

“international” column due to the relative difficulty in distinguishing these types of venues with complete certainty. From this, it follows that the special importance should be given to the context. Some of the utterances about Russia were made in a venue/situation that had a vastly different subject matter. One example of this is Erdogan referencing Russia during Doctor’s Day. Invoking Russia in an irrelevant context is a good indicator of a strategic utilization of rhetoric. Moreover, not only is the context of the venue important but the context of the speech itself. Therefore, before coding the reference the entire speech needed to be read and understood so that particular mention of Russia could find its place in a greater literary unit.

In searching for these speeches, I utilized certain key words that would indicate a direct reference to Russia. These consisted out of the following: *Rusya, Rus, Putin, Lavrov, Moskova, and Kremlin*. If a speech contained one or more of these keywords, I considered it an example of Erdogan’s rhetoric towards Russia. As I already stated, the tone of these references was an important indicator of the type of rhetoric utilized. Even though tone of the reference itself is an important determinant, it is not the only one and focusing on it exclusively can give reductionist results. Therefore, before classifying the reference, the entire speech was surveyed in which the reference was found. This was done in favor of grasping the broader context that would help in better defining and classifying the relevant comment. Therefore, I considered a comment as “positive” if there was a direct praise of Russia, its statesmen/government, or people, by utilizing a variety of epithets such as “dost” (friend/friendly) and “güvenli” (trusted). Furthermore, if there are instances where Russian foreign policy or particular Russian action is strongly regarded/appreciated without the use of any attributes I have considered it positive as well. In such cases, context of the whole speech was taken into consideration. One example of this is Erdogan’s 2016 speech in front of NATO assembly where he praised at the time rapprochement with Russia:

“After the events of November 24th initiated normalization of our relations with Russia has taken speed.” (Rusya’yla ilişkilerimizde 24 Kasım hadisesi sonrasında başlatılan normalleşme sürecinde önemli bir ivme yakaladık).

What adds to the positive tone of this statement is the broader context in which it was said, namely the praise of the Turkish-Russian cooperation in Syria as well as in the fight against terrorism. More direct example of a positive tone could be Erdogan's reference in his 2018 speech directed to his party's general assembly:

We see both Russia and Ukraine as our close friends and with both of them, by carrying the deep unity we have built into the future, we want to see as soon as possible Black Sea region brought into the state of piece. (Hem Rusya'yı, hem de Ukrayna'yı yakın dostu olarak gören, her ikisiyle de kurduğu derin işbirliğini geleceğe taşıma gayretinde bir ülke olarak Karadeniz'in bir an önce barış denizi haline gelmesini istiyoruz).

"Neutral" tone was determined to be reference where no attributes were used, but was simply a neutral statement of facts, be it of historical, economic or political character. In neutral type, Turkish-Russian cooperation can be emphasized however it should be devoid of the use of any praiseworthy words pertaining directly to Russia. Similarly, context should be neutral as well without in-depth praises or reproaches directed towards Russia through the length of the entire speech. Example is Erdogan's reference to Russia in his 2015 speech made for Turkey-Slovakia business forum:

In this environment, we see important pipeline projects that transport energy supplies to either Turkey or to Europe via our country from the rich sources like Caspian Basin, Middle East and Russia... (Bu çerçevede, Hazar Havzası, Ortadoğu, Rusya gibi zengin kaynaklardan hem Türkiye'ye, hem de ülkemiz üzerinden Avrupa'ya enerji tedarikine yönelik boru hattı projeleri üzerine önemli duruyoruz).

On the other hand, reference that condoned Russia, its government and foreign policy, or that painted Turkish-Russian relations in a negative light was considered as "negative". Example of this is the 2015 speech made in the Justice Academy:

If you look at it now there are 350 thousand people being killed in Syria and 7 million who left their homes. This business is what ties two countries. Which ones? China and Russia. (Şu anda bakınız Suriye'de 350 bin insan öldürülmüş vaziyette. 7 milyon insan evinden barkından, her şeyinden uzak vaziyette. Fakat iki ülke bağlıyor işi. Neresi? Çin ve Rusya).

4.1 Summary Findings

In 2014, 39 speeches were made in total, three of which mention Russia. Considering the relatively small number of speeches and the fact Russia partakes only 7.69% in total number can be explained by the fact that Erdogan assumed presidency in August, which is considerably late in the year. All three of the 2014 speeches referred to Russia in a neutral manner. Years 2015 and 2016 saw an increase in both number of total speeches and those that directly mention Russia. This can be attributed to the diplomatic crisis that followed 2015 downing of Russian jet by Turkish Armed Forces and the subsequent mending of this rift in 2016. In 2015, there were a total of 153 speeches, 29 of which mentioned Russia. Out of these, 16 were neutral and 13 were negative. Similarly, in 2016, out of 108 speeches, Russia was mentioned in 29 of them. Fifteen were neutral, 12 negative and 2 positive. Although making less number of speeches in 2016, Erdogan emphasized Russia more than 2015, thus making an almost 8% increase in mentions.

In 2017, total number of speeches plummeted to 43 but frequency in Russia mentions was similar to the previous year, taking 25.58% of total number of speeches while in 2016 it was 26.85%. All 11 speeches that mentioned Russia in 2017 were neutral. In 2018, there were 103 speeches published on the website and out of these, 38 mentioned Russia. This year is notable because it has the highest number of speeches referring to Russia relative to the total number since Erdogan assumed presidency in 2014. In 2018, Russia references partake 36.89% of the total number of speeches for that year. 27 of the 38 references were neutral while 11 were of positive character.

Table 4.1. Erdogan’s speeches mentioning Russia

	Total number of speeches	Speeches mentioning Russia	Percentage of speeches mentioning Russia
2014	39	3	7.69%
2015	153	29	18.95%
2016	108	29	26.85%
2017	43	11	25.58%
2018	103	38	36.89%

Table 4.2. Tone of Erdogan’s speeches pertaining to Russia

	Speeches on Russia	Positive % of speeches mentioning Russia	Neutral % of speeches mentioning Russia	Negative % of speeches mentioning Russia
2014	3	0%	100%	0%
2015	29	0%	55.17%	44.83%
2016	29	6.9%	51.72%	41.38%
2017	11	0%	100%	0%
2018	38	28.95%	71.05%	0%

I have shown in the previous chapters that during the period of Erdogan’s presidency (2014-present) Turkey’s foreign policy towards Russia remained relatively unchanged. However, according to the data collected, the same cannot be said about Erdogan’s rhetoric directed towards Russia. Rhetoric itself is very volatile and it ranges from defamations to praises, depending on the time period as well as on the context of both speech itself and particular reference.

In Erdogan’s mentions of Russia, it is important to perceive whether Russia was an object of the particular reference, or whether it was used as a neutral term, by the way of which Erdogan could talk about other matters. The example of the latter would be Erdogan’s rhetorical use of Russia, the US, Mexico and other countries

that have presidential systems as an examples that would support his political claim on the presidential system in Turkey proper: “Now in America, I don’t know, Latin America, Russia, Europe, etcetera, their types of systems are not an absolute must.” (Şu anda Amerika’daki, ne bileyim Latin Amerika’daki, Rusya, Avrupa vesaire buralardaki sistemler olmazsa olmaz değil).

However, in majority of his speeches Russia was a direct object of reference. This means that the weight and the focus of the statement rested exclusively upon Russia and not on other countries, international entities, organizations, matters or points that he tried to make. In such cases, Russia was not used as a tool that would help in illustrating a point, such as the example above about the presidential system shows.

As discussed above, Erdogan used Russia in a neutral manner to discuss other things, usually of domestic political importance in a neutral or positive way. However, this rhetorical use of Russia should be differentiated from his utilization of Russia as a vehicle through which he approached negatively and criticized different matters. In eight speeches Erdogan used Russia in various ways to reproach other countries. In 2014 there was one, in 2016 three and in 2018 there were four instances of this. In 2014 there was much discussion about planned energy cooperation through newly envisioned Turkish Stream project. In regards to this, Erdogan called out those who are allegedly against his country’s national will. The case of 2016 is particular since it follows in the wake of November 2015 jet crisis in which Turkey shot down the Russian fighter plane. This event worsened relations substantially and Erdogan was noted criticizing Russia and its various foreign policy activities. However, in his speeches, Erdogan also criticized Western countries and international community for the lack of steps undertaken to prevent Russia and Russian-backed Syrian government from committing atrocities in Syria. Finally, in his 2018 speeches Erdogan reflected on those countries that did not support Turkish-Russian energy and defense cooperation; Turkish purchase of S-400 rocket system being the main problem of the day.

4.2. 2014 Data

All of Erdogan's 2014 statements regarding Russia were uttered in the light of the announced Turkish Stream project. Energy/economic cooperation and common interest between the two countries was emphasized. The references themselves were of neutral character tilting towards the positive side. Interesting thing to note about the speeches that the Presidency wanted to communicate on its official site for year 2014 is the fact that there were no mentions of Crimea and its invasion by Russian forces earlier that year. Regarding the cooperation with Russia Erdogan stated the following: "Like with other countries, with Russia too we strive to continue our cooperation in this area on the principle of win-win and mutual benefit." (Diğer ülkelerle olduğu gibi, Rusya ile de bu alandaki işbirliğimizi karşılıklı fayda temelinde, kazan-kazan esasına dayalı olmak suretiyle devam ettirmek arzusundayız).

This reference was made in front of an international audience. However, in another example directed towards the domestic audience from December of the same year, Erdogan used an example of cooperation with Russia to reproach European states for their apparent interference in Turkey's domestic politics:

They became very uncomfortable with esteemed Putin's visit to our country, the deals we made and with the putting of our signatures. I apologize, but our will is not under anybody's mortgage. This will is national will. (Sayın Putin'in ülkemizi ziyaret etmesinden, burada anlaşmalar yapmamızdan da, imzaları atmamızdan da çok rahatsız oldular. Kusura bakmayın da bizim irademiz birilerinin ipoteği altında değil. Bu irade, milli iradedir).

What is important here is Erdogan's utilization of Russia to talk about third parties in a domestic venue which illustrates strategic utilization of Turkey's relations with Russia in communicating other concerns.

Since all of the statements mentioned in 2014 were of neutral character they do not have a particular relevance for my research. However, the fact that Erdogan chose not to talk about certain issues Turkey as a state had with Russia, such as the

invasion of Crimea, is very telling of the importance Russia as a country and an economic partner held for Turkey.




Figure 4.1. Positive/Neutral/Negative mentions about Russia in Erdogan’s speeches

4.3. 2015 Data

The year 2015 was specific in few regards. For the first time since Erdogan assumed presidency in August of 2014 we see a reversal in his position regarding Russia. Negative statements regarding Russia started in February of 2015. Although they referred to the political rather than the economic sphere, the latter could have influenced the speeches, nevertheless. In the beginning of the 2015, Turkey and Russia came to an impasse regarding the gas prices that were tied to the construction of the Turkish Stream (Holodny, 2015). This was the first real snag in Turkish-Russian relations following Erdogan’s presidency. Moreover, as discussed in the previous chapter, increasingly diverging views regarding the Syrian war also put Erdogan and Putin at odds in the beginning of the year, which can explain negative

nature of the references. For instance, February statement criticized Russia's position in Syrian war and its support for Assad. In his speech in the Justice Academy, Erdogan stated the following:

If you look at it now, there are 350 thousand people killed in Syria. Seven million people left their homes, being far away from everything. This is due to two countries. China and Russia. Despite our numerous talks, there is no solution. Where is the justice? (Şu anda bakınız Suriye'de 350 bin insan öldürülmüş vaziyette. 7 milyon insan evinden barkından, her şeyinden uzak vaziyette. Fakat iki ülke bağlıyor işi. Neresi? Çin ve Rusya. Defaatle konuşmamıza rağmen iş çözilemiyor. Nerede adalet?).

Other February statement criticized Russia's and other countries' silence over the death penalties against Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood members: "In the same manner, Russia step up and say something. How is that 183 innocent people who stood up against the coup are being executed." (Aynı şekilde Rusya, çıkın bir şeyler söyleyin. Nasıl oluyor da hiçbir suçu olmayan bu insanlar darbeye karşı çıktıkları için 183 kişi idam ediliyor).

In his April speech in MÜSİAD general assembly, trying to discredit Russia for supporting the Armenian claims of genocide, Erdogan said:

Due to actions that Russia did on its own soil from 1917, 10 million people lost their lives. Recently, this tradition is very clearly happening in Caucasus and Ukraine, in Donetsk, Luhanks and in Crimea as well. (Rusya'nın 1917'den beri kendi toprakları içinde gerçekleştirdiği uygulamalar sebebiyle hayatını kaybeden 10 milyonu aşkın insan var. Son olarak Kafkasya'da ve Ukrayna'da yaşanan hadiseler tüm çıplaklığıyla ve tazeliğiyle ortada, Donetsk'te olanlar ortada, Luhansk'ta olanlar ortada, hatta hatta Kırım'da olanlar ortada).

In these examples, it is again important to note the character of the audience the speeches were directed to. Audience was completely domestic, ranging from the education sector to business/civil society groups. Similarly, in the August speech directed to the heads of local authorities Erdogan praised Turkey's acceptance of peoples prosecuted by the Russian Empire: "From 1850s Caucasus people and our Crimean brothers who were escaping the cruelty of the Russian Empire found a

solution by coming to Anatolia.” (1850’li yıllardan itibaren Rus Çarlığı’nın zulmünden kaçan Kafkas halkları Kırımlı kardeşlerimiz çareyi Anadolu’ya gelmekte bulmuşlardır).

What is important here besides the venue is the use of the word ‘cruelty’ that refers to the Russian state. Despite talking about the historical fact, Erdogan’s use of the loaded language should be noted here.

As I said previously, this negative portrayal of Russia in Erdogan’s speeches could have been influenced by rising tensions over Syria coupled with disagreements over gas prices related to Turkish Stream project. However, despite Erdogan’s overly negative rhetoric, as discussed earlier, we do not see any official changes in Turkey’s government policy towards Russia. For example, neither the Turkish Stream nor the newly inaugurated Akkuyu nuclear power plant projects were discontinued or abandoned in any way. On a whole, Turkey attracted almost \$12 billion in FDI, 6.34% of which came from Russia (Simsek, Simsek & Zhanaltay, 2017). Neither do we see any sort of sanctions or visa-restrictions on Turkey’s side. Some see the following jet incident as an outcome of blind focus on economic cooperation rather than mutually tackling regional geopolitical and security questions (Ozertem, 2017). Therefore, to say that Erdogan’s rhetoric in this period reflected the real state of affairs of Turkish foreign policy would be an overstatement.

After August, the frequency in Erdogan’s mentioning of Russia decreased. There was one neutral reference in September whereas October was completely devoid of speeches that mention Russia in any way. However, this changed in November when Turkey shot down the Russian fighter jet due to its alleged infringement of Turkish airspace and its subsequent unwillingness to vacate it after numerous warnings. Number of speeches referring to Russia in a negative sense increased to, at the time, unprecedented levels. November had three and December four speeches that criticized Russia. Number of times Russia was mentioned negatively in the last two months of the 2015 is more than the combined number of negative

references in the preceding 10 months, which amounts to six. Most of these speeches criticized Russia's violation of Turkey's airspace and Russian involvement in the Syrian war, particularly against the Turkey-backed Turkmen rebels. All of the speeches referring to Russia in both November and December were conducted in a domestic setting intended for a domestic audience.

The day after the plane shooting, in his speech to one Turkish civil society group, Erdogan clearly criticized the violation of Turkey's airspace: "Yesterday again we witnessed how careless steps that do not account for regional stability, peace and future can produce regrettable results." (Dün bir kez daha bölgenin istikrarını, huzurunu ve geleceğini dikkate almayan özensizce atılan adımların ne tür müessif sonuçlar verebileceğine hep birlikte şahit olduk).

In some of his later speeches, Erdogan wanted to soften the crisis, but he nevertheless continued to present Russia as a guilty party over its violation. Furthermore, he continued to criticize Russian involvement in Syria particularly over its targeting of Turkey-backed Turkmen rebels. In his speech in Anatolian town of Bayburt, he criticized Russian position:

Right now, there is an illegitimate government in Syria. Do you have to accept every invitation? Here, there is Assad who has killed 380 thousand people; do you have to respond to his invitation? (Şu anda gayrimeşru bir devlet var Suriye'de. Siz her davete icabet etmeye mecbur musunuz? Burada 380 bin insanı öldüren bir katil Esad var, bunun davetine icabet etmeye mecbur musunuz?).

Parallel to this, in his speech to Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions, Erdogan claimed that Russia has nothing to do in Syria; rather this geography should be left to Turkey:

Syria, besides sharing 911 kilometer long border with Turkey, is a geography where our peoples' common background could be found for thousands of years. For Turkey, since there cannot be an issue of being isolated from Balkans, Caucasus, Mediterranean basin and Iraq, neither can it be of us ignoring Syrian people. That is why I say: what is Russia

looking for in Syria? (Suriye, Türkiye'nin 911 kilometre sınırıya sahip komşusu olmanın yanında, halklarımızın binlerce yılı bulan ortak geçmişe sahip olduğu bir coğrafyadır. Türkiye olarak nasıl Balkanlar'a, Kafkaslar'a, Akdeniz Havzasına, Irak'a bigâne kalmamız söz konusu olamaz ise, Suriye'de yaşananları da kesinlikle yok sayamayız. İşte onun için diyorum; Rusya Suriye'de ne arıyor?).

Erdogan also used an incident with Russia to blame the third parties for their alleged hostility against Turkey:

You see it too, you follow it, we shoot down in Hatay a foreign plane who violates our borders; some immediately step up and direct the entirety of their grudges, hostility and animosity towards our country. (İşte sizler de görüyorsunuz, takip ediyorsunuz, Hatay'da sınırlarımızı ihlal eden yabancı bir savaş uçağını düşürüyoruz; birileri hemen çıkıyor tüm kinini, düşmanlığını, husumetini ülkemize, şahsımıza yöneltiyor).

He also used another meeting with heads of local governments not only to besmirch Russia, but also to blame domestic political/social or various ideological colorings as siding with Russia:

Do you know what the agents of the stance, following the Balkan War hundred years ago, "instead of Enver entering in Edirne may it be Bulgars" are saying now? They are spilling their logic of "instead of Erdogan being right may it be Putin" attitude. (100 yıl önce Balkan Harbi sırasında 'Edirne'ye Enver gireceğine Bulgar girsin' diyen zihniyetin bugünkü temsilcileri ne diyor biliyor musunuz? 'Erdoğan haklı çıkacağına Putin haklı çıksın' mantığıyla ortaya döküldüler).

Despite the severity of Erdogan's rhetoric shown here, it is important to remind that Turkish government did not undertake any concrete action against Russia that would match his statements. Russia, on the other hand, imposed various sanctions on the Republic of Turkey following the incident. It abolished the visa-free regime it had with Turkey, imposed limitations on private and corporate personalities dealing in Russia, as well as put sanctions on Turkish imports, mostly of agricultural nature (BBC, 2015). It also threatened to recall its ambassador to Turkey (Trend News Agency, 2015). Russia unilaterally suspended the High Level Cooperation Council (HLCC) - an institutional mechanism existing between Turkey and Russia regulating

the economic affairs between them. Furthermore, tourist agencies were encouraged to stop their travel arrangements to Turkey while there were parliamentary initiatives to criminalize the denial of the Armenian Genocide-an extremely sensitive issue for Turkey (Kiselyova, 2015).

Regarding the political consequences of the deterioration in the relations between the two countries, they were mostly felt in the case of Syria. By deploying its anti-aircraft S-400 rocket system in Syria, Russia effectively isolated any cross-border Turkish responses that would benefit its precarious security situation (Özertem, 2017).

The change in the attitude and action of the Russian government following the jet incident was a one-sided affair. Turkey did not retaliate despite enormous losses to its economy (Girit, 2016). Rationale behind this inaction on the behalf of Turkish side could have had much to do with its reliance on Russia for its energy needs; Turkey imported 55% of its natural gas from Russia (ibid). Further antagonizing Russia could have been detrimental to Turkey's energy sector. Moreover, despite certain snags in the continuation of projects such as Turkish Stream and Akkuyu nuclear power plant, neither side discontinued them permanently.

From the examples above, one can see how Erdogan used the diplomatic crisis with Russia for various purposes. Not only did he try to discredit Russia in plethora of domestic venues, but he also used the incident as a catalyst serving his claims of illegitimacy as well as immorality of Russia's aims in Syria. In the process of doing this, he also asserted logic of Turkey's regional and Syrian designs to the detriment of Russian one. Erdogan not only invoked the present context, but also veered into the history, criticizing Russian Soviet and imperial past. Moreover, he used the incident as an opportunity to discredit his domestic opponents pointing them out as socialist and as liberals. The incident also served to delegitimize international third parties that did not agree with Turkey's undertaken action. It is visible from his rhetoric that Erdogan, through the process of exclusion, attempted to assert himself and his stance both internationally and domestically.

The year of 2015 and especially its later half is relevant for my research since it shows that no government actions on the side of Turkey followed from Erdogan’s harsh rhetoric. Only actions we can perceive are those coming from the Russian side, such as the deployment of S-400 rocket system in Syria and the unilateral suspension of the HLCC.




Figure 4.2. Positive/Neutral/Negative mentions about Russia in Erdogan’s speeches

4.4. 2016 Data

Passing to the year 2016, trend of referring to Russia in a negative way continued. In the first half of the year, 12 speeches that mention Russia negatively were observed, while neutral tone of reference was used in only four cases. Most of those of neutral nature mentioned Russia among other countries, usually in a historical context referring to the World War I, not necessarily in a negative light but

as a way of pointing out Turkey's and Ottoman successes. Other neutral references simply stated factual state of affairs, whether in reference to the jet crisis or trade relations, not adding or detracting anything from Russia proper.

In a similar manner to that of 2016, all of the negative references were uttered in front of the domestic audience with the exception of one speech conducted in the conference for ambassadors to Turkey. Also similarly to 2016, most of the speeches in the first half of the year criticized Russia for its involvement in Syria and its targeting of rebels, primarily of Turkmen ethnicity:

Due to the bombings of Regime and Russia that supports it, often times those who are losing their lives are kids, women, elderly, innocent people that is. Russia bombs DAES 10% of the times while 90% of the times it bombs Turkmen villages in the north of Lazkiye; it is not fooling anyone. (Rejimin ve onu destekleyen Rusya'nın bombaladığı yerleşim alanlarında sürekli çocuklar, kadınlar, yaşlılar, yani masum insanlar hayatlarını kaybediyor. Rusya, yüzde 10 itibariyle DAES'i bombalarken, yüzde 90 itibariyle Lazkiye'nin kuzeyindeki Türkmen köylerini vuruyor; kimse kimseyi aldatmasın).

Again, in his speech made in Meeting of the Working Women, Erdogan stated the following criticizing both the international community and Russia: "Why are Bayribucak Turkmens, Arabs, and our brothers there who are bombed by Russia being ignored?" (Rusya'nın uçaklarıyla bombardıman ettiği Bayırbucak Türkmenlerini, oradaki Arapları, oradaki kardeşlerimizi niçin görmezden geliyorlar?).

There were instances of Erdogan talking about wider aspects of Russia foreign policy:

With steps undertaken towards Syria and Ukraine, Russia caused serious problems between us. I have to ask, because Syria invited them they entered Syria; 'Alright, did Georgia invite you that you enter it, or did Ukraine invite you so you entered Ukraine too'. (Rusya'nın hem Suriye'de, hem Ukrayna'da attığı adımlar bu ülkeyle aramızda ciddi sorunlar ortaya çıkmasına yol açtı. Sormak lazım, Suriye kendilerini davet ettiği için Suriye'ye girmişler; 'Peki Gürcistan sizi davet etti de mi

Gürcistan'a girdiniz veyahut da Ukrayna sizi davet etti de mi siz Ukrayna'ya girdiniz?').

However, unlike in 2015, there are instances in 2016 of Erdogan blaming Russia and Western countries for supporting YPG/PYD and its PKK affiliates:

When we look at the weapons taken from PKK, PYD and YPG what do we see? We see either Russia weapons or Western weapons, among these there are American weapons too, as well as other countries'. (PKK'nın, PYD'nin, YPG'nin ellerinden çıkan silahlara baktığımız zaman, yakaladığımız silahlara baktığımız zaman neyi görüyoruz? Ya Rus silahlarını görüyoruz, ya Batının silahlarını görüyoruz, bunun içinde Amerika'nın silahları da var, diğer ülkelerin silahları da var).

Related to this is Erdogan's criticism of Russian domestic politics stated in front of Bozok University audience: "Now Russia thinks, I opened them office in Moscow and give them plenty of weapons; it will return to hit you like a boomerang, know that well." (Şimdi Rusya zannediyor ki, Moskova'da ben bunlara ofis açtırttım, bol bol da silah veriyorum, bumerang gibi döner bir gün seni de vurur; bunu da bilin). Erdogan was referring here to the decision of Russian government to allow YPG's diplomatic mission to open its office in Moscow.

Second half of the 2016 is in stark opposition to the first half. We can witness complete abandonment of negative rhetoric towards Russia in favor of more neutral and positive language. From July until December 2016, Erdogan mentioned Russia in a neutral manner in 11 speeches. Moreover, in two instances (November and December) Erdogan referred to Russia by using friendly language. Not only was positive language absent in the first half of 2016, its presence was not marked in previous two years either since Erdogan assumed presidency. Moreover, compared to only four neutral instances of the first half of 2016, 11 instances in the second half are also significant as an indicator for the improvement in relations. Out of 13 speeches that contain references to Russia, two were done in front of audience that contained international elements, while the remaining 11 were intended for the domestic audience.

This reversal in rhetoric can only be understood when wider political context is analyzed. At the end of June, Erdogan issued an apology to Russian President Vladimir Putin over the 2015 downing of Russian fighter jet. This apology was brought in part by Turkey's increasing international isolation on top of deteriorating security situation. Both PKK and ISIS targeted Turkey from Syria in the cross-border missile attacks. Turkey was not able to respond effectively to these threats since Russia controlled the airspace over Syria making effective Turkish mobilization impossible. All this changed in the second half of the 2016. In August of 2016, operation Euphrates Shield was launched by Turkey, directed against ISIS and Kurdish controlled territories in Northern Syria. As I stated in previous chapters, Russian support for this undertaking was recognized by Turkish government sources as being of crucial importance, especially due to its allowance of Syrian airspace.

Regarding Erdogan's neutral references concerning Russia, they were mostly revolving around statement of facts in economic/energy and political/strategic spheres. Normalization of relations in June was quickly followed by cooperation in the aforementioned spheres. In the 27th meeting with heads of local authorities, Erdogan stated the following regarding economic relations:

One whole month did not pass and 60 thousand tourists from Russia entered Turkey. We are even more hopeful for the following season. With schools opening and summer holiday ending, along with crisis scenarios slumping down I believe that we will lift the lull in the market as well. (Bir ayı bulmadı, Rusya'dan 60 bin turist Türkiye'ye girdi. Önümüzdeki sezon için çok daha ümitliyiz. Okulların açılması, yaz tatilinin sona ermesi, kriz senaryolarının çökmesiyle birlikte piyasada yaşanan durgunluğun da ortadan kalkacağına inanıyorum).

Similarly, in his speech to Turkish Parliament, Erdogan commented optimistically Turkey's future relations with Russia:

With our efforts to come to terms on the issues through which we suffered differences in opinions by focusing on common interests, we are aiming to restore our relations with this country to their previous levels. (Görüş farklılıklarımızın olduğu konulardaki uzlaşma çabalarımızı sürdürmekle birlikte, ortak çıkarlarımıza odaklanarak, bu ülkeyle olan ilişkilerimizi eski seviyesinden de üzerine taşımayı hedefliyoruz).

Regarding the energy cooperation and Turkish Stream project in particular Erdogan stated:

Presently Russian gas taken by the way of Balkan will be dispatched directly through Black Sea through the envisioned Turkish Stream project and we are continuing our workings and looking toward to it favorably. (Rusya'nın hâlihazırda Balkanlar üzerinden aldığımız gazı doğrudan Karadeniz üzerinden ülkemize sevk etmeyi öngören Türk Akımı Projesine de şu anda çalışmalarımız devam ediyor, buna olumlu bakıyoruz).

When it comes to Syria, Erdogan was stating cooperation with Russia in the following manner: "Yesterday night I met with esteemed Putin and we discussed Halep. They stated that from 10pm they will stop their bombings there." (Dün akşam Sayın Putin'le bir görüşmem oldu ve bu görüşmede Halep'i konuştuk. Saat 22 itibarıyla da orada hava bombardımanlarını durdurduklarını, durduracaklarını ifade ettiler).

In his December speech during the opening ceremony of Eurasian Tunnel, Erdogan stated his grief regarding the assassination of Russian ambassador to Turkey in a fashion that sees Russia in a very positive light:

Personally, in the name of my nation I strongly curse and condemn. In the presence of Head of the State esteemed Putin, I forward my sincerest condolences to the entirety of the friendly Russian people and to the deceased Karlov's family. (Şahsım, milletim adına şiddetle telin ediyorum, lanetliyorum. Devlet Başkanı Sayın Putin'in şahsında tüm dost Rus halkına ve müteveffa Karlov'un ailesine başsağlığı dileklerimi iletiyorum).

Similarly, in regards to Syria, Erdogan described rapprochement with Russia in a positive manner:

Normalization of our relations with Russia that started after the events of 24th November took on a great acceleration. I think that this process will reflect positively on the pursuit of solution concerning regional issues as well as on efforts in the fight against terrorism. (Rusya'yla ilişkilerimizde 24 Kasım hadisesi sonrasında başlatılan normalleşme sürecinde önemli bir ivme yakaladık. Bu sürecin bölgesel meselelere

çözüm arayışları ve terörizmle mücadele çabalarına da olumlu yansımaları olacaktır diye düşünüyorum).

From all this we can see that, in the first half of 2016 Erdogan continued with his inflammatory rhetoric without any substance in the foreign policy side. However, in the second half of the year following Erdogan's apology, we see that his rhetoric towards Russia vastly improved. Having strategic and political cooperation back on track along with the lifting of certain economic sanctions on the Russian side marked a definite softening in Erdogan's approach. This shows reactive nature of Erdogan's rhetoric, which was usually a response to foreign policy events dictated by Russia.




Figure 4.3. Positive/Neutral/Negative mentions about Russia in Erdogan's speeches

4.5. 2017 Data

After the 2016 normalization of relations, similar trend of neutral references about Russia continued. The year of 2017 marked 11 speeches that mentioned Russia in

neutral way. No instances of negative or positive mentions were recorded. Out of these, eight was conducted in front of the domestic audience while rest of them had some sort or full international component. Most of these references were focused on the attempts to resolve Syrian conflict through the cooperation with Russia and Iran in the initiated Astana Process. One example that confirms this: “There are hope-inducing developments in regards to the process of establishing a lasting ceasefire in Syria we conducted with Russia as well as to opening a path through meetings to a political solution.” (Rusya ve İnan’la Moskova’da düzenlediğimiz toplantı ve diğler görüşmelerle Astana sürecinin zeminini hazırladık).

In the 33rd meeting with heads of local governments since his assumption of presidency, Erdogan was found stating:

There are hope-inducing developments for the search of a political solution regarding the maintenance of ceasefire we ensured together with Russia and the subsequent talks on disputes. (Rusya’yla birlikte yürüttüğümüz Suriye’de kalıcı bir ateşkesin sağlanması ve ardından anlaşmazlıklara görüşmeler yoluyla siyasi çözüm aranması çalışmalarında umut verici gelişmeler var).

In regards to the economic sphere, Erdogan was optimistic about further cooperation as observed in his speech to JDP assembly: “Now the sanctions that Russia imposed are about to be lifted with the signing of the esteemed Putin. If God willing, our exports to Russia will increase as well.” (Şu anda Rusya da yaptırımlarını Sayın Putin’in attığı imza ile kaldırmış durumda. İnşallah Rusya’ya yönelik ihracatımız da hareketlenecektir).

With the reduction in sanctions came tourist mobility: “With the number of Russian tourists approaching 3.5 million it would appear we solved issues there as well.” (Rus turistlerin sayısı da 3,5 milyona yaklaştığına göre, oradaki sorunlar da çözüldü demektir).

Similar to 2014, all of Erdogan’s speeches in 2017 regarding Russia were of neutral tone and as such do not hold a particular significance for research. Despite their

tone being neutral however, speeches did contain a dose of optimism and good-will pertaining to further relations with Russia, which is again one of the manifestations of foreign policy events such as cooperation on the Syrian issue through the Astana Talks and increasing economic proximity between the two countries.




Figure 4.4. Positive/Neutral/Negative mentions about Russia in Erdogan’s speeches

4.6. 2018 Data

Finally, in 2018 Erdogan’s rhetoric was the most positive out of all years thus far observed. It was also the year that had most references to Russia relative to the total number of speeches. In total, there were 38 instances of Russia in Erdogan’s presidential speeches. Out of these 27 were neutral and 11 were positive. Positive mentions are observed in March, April, May, August, October and November. November recorded most of the positive references in 2018-four. Great majority of the total number of speeches, 28, was done in front of the domestic audience. Ten

of the speeches had an international component to them. Out of 11 positive references, eight were done in front of the domestic audience while only three had an international component to them. I believe that context needs to be discussed that would explain frequency of the positive tone in relation to Russia.

The year of 2018 saw the so far closest Turkish-Russian cooperation in economic and political sectors. In the economic sphere, construction of Turkey's Akkuyu nuclear power plant by Russia's state subsidiary started in April, while the construction of the Turkish Stream project ended in the November, which would explain the high frequency of positive references for that month. Moreover, in the political/strategic sphere, there was a close Turkish-Russian cooperation in the issue of Syrian conflict. The three-way Astana process that brought Turkey, Russia and Iran in search for the lasting ceasefire and ultimately a stable solution to the conflict facilitated this cooperation. Furthermore, Turkish-Russian cooperation on the question of Idlib prevented the massacre of Turkey-backed rebels by the Syrian government forces that retook the city.

All of these instances of cooperation are nicely summarized in Erdogan's April speech in the ceremony for the opening of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant:

We are accomplishing many strategic project with Russian Federation. Some of these are S-400 air defense system, natural gas pipeline Turk Stream, and Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, a project that we are currently starting. Besides this, our countries are in the close cooperation regarding terror threat in Syria and bringing to an end conflict there. (Ayrıca Rusya Federasyonu ile birlikte birçok stratejik projeyi de hayata geçiriyoruz. S-400 hava savunma sistemleri, Türk Akım Doğalgaz Boru Hattı, işte şu an temelini atacağımız Akkuyu Nükleer Güç Santrali bunlardan sadece birkaçıdır. Bunun yanında ülkelerimiz bilhassa Suriye'deki terör tehdidinin ve çatışmaların bir an önce sona erdirilmesi noktasında da yakın işbirliği içindedir).

Another speech that summarizes this cooperation is Erdogan's October speech to Turkish Parliament:

We are in tight and fast relationship with Russia in every sphere. From Syrian politics, tourism, defense structures to energy, in every sphere we are accomplishing projects with Russia for our common benefits. (Rusya ile her alanda çok sıkı ve hızla gelişen ilişkiler içindeyiz. Suriye politikasından turizme, savunma sanayinden enerjiye kadar her alanda Rusya'yla, ülkelerimizin ortak çıkarına olan projeleri hayata geçiriyoruz).

First 2018 positive mention of Russia came in Erdogan's speech intended for the ceremony entitled "Natural gas to 101 district":

Another important project that we accomplished together with Russia was the Turk Stream. Very soon, I plan to establish foundations of the plant with my dear friend President of Russian Federation esteemed Putin. With Russia, we are moving towards Turk Stream and Akkuyu nuclear power plant, we are accomplishing it together, we will accomplish it together. (Bir başka önemli projemiz, Rusya Federasyonu'yla yürüttüğümüz Türk Akımıdır. Santralin temelini çok yakında değerli dostum Rusya Federasyonu Devlet Başkanı Sayın Putin ile beraber atmaya planlıyoruz. Rusya'yla Türk Akım'da, Akkuyu Nükleer Santralinde birlikte hareket ediyor, birlikte kazanıyoruz, birlikte kazanacağız).

Regarding the cooperation about Syrian war proper, Erdogan stated:

Recently, we have proven again that we are together with Syrian people in the true sense of the word by averting the humanitarian crisis in Idlib. This whole process was possible in great measure due to our cooperation with Russia. (Son olarak İdlib'de büyük bir insani kriz yaşanmasının önüne geçerek Suriye halkının gerçek manada yanında olduğumuzu bir kez daha ispatladık. Bütün bu süreçleri büyük ölçüde Rusya ile birlikte yürüttük).

Finally, I would like to conclude this section with Erdogan's November speech stated in the opening ceremony of the Turkish Stream:

For us, Russian Federation is a trusted friend with whom we can make long-term business cooperation and like with this project an important supplier of the natural gas. Our business cooperation with Russian Federation is progressing in a great range. With Russia, we never acted according to other countries' demands nor impositions regarding our mutual relation's areas. We always strived to build a long-term business cooperation with Russia. (Bizim için Rusya Federasyonu, uzun vadeli iş

birliđi yapabileceđimiz güvenilir bir dost ve bu projedeki gibi önemli bir dođalgaz tedarikçisidir.Rusya Federasyonu ile iş birliđimiz çok geniş bir yelpazede ilerliyor.Biz, Rusya ile ikili münasebetlerimizin çerçevesini hiçbir zaman diđer ülkelerin taleplerin veya dayatmalarına göre belirlemedik. Daima Rusya ile uzun vadeli iş birlikleri kurmanın çabası içinde olduk).




Figure 4.5. Positive/Neutral/Negative mentions about Russia in Erdogan’s speeches

4.7. (Un)Importance of Venue, Audience and Context

What I consider of crucial importance for this research is the venue type and the context in which statements concerning Russia were made. Erdogan made speeches in plethora of different venues of both domestic and international character. In order to test my hypothesis further context of these venues needs to be taken into consideration, which would shed additional light on Erdogan’s instrumental use of rhetoric for agenda setting purposes. Indeed, majority of speeches mentioning Russia were conducted in front of the domestic audiences. This illustrates Erdogan’s

motivation, which is based on strategic agenda setting in favor of personal, political benefit. The following table shows idealized version of venue types in which Erdogan’s speeches can be observed within the time periods in consideration:

Table 4.3. Frequency of venue types

Events	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Charity events		1			
Civil society addresses		1	1		
Commemoration ceremonies		2	1		1
Economic/Business cooperation meetings	3	6	4	1	2
International meetings		3	3	3	5
JDP meetings				3	12
Meetings with local authorities and village heads		5	13	3	3
Meetings with NGO boards		1			
Opening ceremonies		5	5		5
Receptions/Symposiums		2			8
Parliament addresses			1	1	1
University/graduation ceremonies		3	1		1

This table clearly shows the predominance of domestic-type venues when it comes to the speeches containing references about Russia. Venue type that is most frequently represented are meetings with local authorities and village heads. There were 24 occurrences of it throughout the 2014-2018 time period. This makes it 21.82% of 110 speeches mentioning Russia. Following this are economic/business cooperation venues with 14.55% representation out of the total number. This makes sense since as already mentioned, Russia and Turkey have a close economic cooperation especially in the energy sector . Next venue type that has most Russia mentions are opening ceremonies with 13.64%. Meetings with JDP have the same amount of mentions and take up 13.64%. International meetings compose 12.73% while receptions/symposiums represent 9.09%. Speeches that mention Russia in universities/graduation ceremony are 4.55% frequent while commemoration

ceremonies follow closely with 3.64%. Parliamentary addresses are 2.73%, civil society addresses 1.82%, while charity addresses and meetings with NGO boards take up 0.91% representation respectively.

I believe that these results are peculiar and merit a closer attention. Especially interesting is a relatively high place that Erdogan's meetings with local authorities and village heads take. Indeed, in some of these meetings most vehemently positive and negative utterances were made regarding Russia (see above). Low administrative status of these officials does not merit attention they got, especially regarding sensitive foreign policy issues. However, precisely due to their low status, these officials act as a sort of transmission belt connecting Erdogan and his rhetoric directly with the public. Hence, Erdogan recognized them as a helpful tool for accessing public opinion and agenda setting. Moreover, relatively high number of business/economic cooperation meetings in the years 2015 and 2016, which reference Russia in a neutral light, may be explained by the fact that through these events Erdogan was preparing ground for eventual rapprochement that indeed occurred in the second half of 2016.

Regarding receptions and symposiums one example requires attention. In his speech during 2018 Doctor's Day reception, Erdogan stated: "Syrian regime is moving together with Russia right now. If that is so, then who are coalition powers acting with? I will tell you: with YPG and PYD." (Suriye rejimi zaten Őu anda Rusya'yla beraber hareket ediyor. Őyleyse koalisyon g¼çleri kimle hareket ediyor? Syleyeyim; YPG ve burada beraber hareket ettiĐi PYD).

It can be argued that this venue was neither the time nor the place for such statements. Another interesting example of an ill-fitting context is Erdogan's 2016 Bozok University speech where he criticized Russia for allowing Syrian Kurds to open their diplomatic mission in Moscow: "Now Russia thinks, I will allow them to open the office in Moscow, give them plenty of weapons; one day it will return to you and hit you like a boomerang, know this well." (Őimdi Rusya zannediyor ki,

Moskova'da ben bunlara ofis açtırttım, bol bol da silah veriyorum, bumerang gibi döner bir gün seni de vurur; bunu da bilin).

Similar statements could be observed in venues regarding economic/business cooperation that Erdogan frequented. One such example is 2015 23. general meeting of MÜSİAD:

While we fought to bring peace to the world, some countries among them like Russia, France, Germany, Austria supported statements built on Armenian lies and stepped on the side of grudge, hate, animosity and hostility. (Biz dünyaya barış mesajı vermek için mücadele ederken, aralarında Rusya, Fransa, Almanya, Avusturya gibi devletlerin de bulunduğu kimi ülkeler, Ermenilerin yalanları üzerine inşa edilmiş bir iddiaya destek vererek, kinin, nefretin, husumetin, düşmanlığın tarafında saf tuttular).

The following chapter will take all of the findings from the preceding analyses into consideration in an attempt to discover reasons behind Erdogan's changing rhetoric and the lack of convergence between it, especially in the 2015-2016 period, and Turkish foreign policy.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH

In the second chapter, I suggested that the core motivation behind divergence in Erdogan's rhetoric and actual foreign policy of Turkey is the particular type of framing coupled with domestic agenda setting. In this chapter, I will expand more on this claim. As mentioned in the second chapter, I define agenda setting in the tradition of McCombs and Reynolds (2002) as the ability to influence the importance of different issues belonging to the sphere of public agenda. Similarly, framing should be seen as a political strategy utilized in order to create and shape preferences. In my research, concepts of framing and agenda setting were used interchangeably due to their similar nature.

If accepted, then these premises raise additional questions. Primarily, one needs to ask what issues did Erdogan want to emphasize and why. Therefore, in analyzing Erdogan's agenda setting we need to observe what he wanted to communicate and how. To this end, I will use Block and Negrine's (2017) definition of political communication as "the way power relationships are performed and negotiated over the control of the agenda". In my case study of his rhetoric towards Russia within the 2014-2018 period, I have discovered that Erdogan was prone to having an extremely negative, securitized rhetoric during the downturns in bilateral relations, and a very positive one during the periods of cooperation. This created a sort of an artificial dichotomy where political issues are framed at either of the two extremes. According to the Taguieff (1995), such conceptualization of politics is precisely the trait of populists. In line with Barr (2009), I argue that this type of rhetoric is a good tool to create plebiscitarian linkages while distorting reality in the process. Manichean worldview (we, the good versus them, the evil) together with anti-establishment rhetoric and plebiscitarianism (Selçuk, 2016) are the elements I use to define Erdogan as a populist.

My research has indicated that Erdogan used loaded rhetoric and terminology towards Russia, particularly in the aftermath of the 2015 jet crisis. Even before that,

Erdogan was well known for using exclusionary rhetoric directed, at first, towards Turkey's secular military and bureaucratic establishment and later against academics, journalists and intellectuals (Özpek & and Yaşar, 2017). Moreover, Erdogan's populist rhetoric, particularly in the wake of the jet crisis and subsequent 2016 coup attempt intensified and precipitated constitutional amendments that ushered in a presidential system with president's powers being greatly increased. More recently, his populism took a right turn which I attribute to his coalition with rightist Nationalist Movement Party (NMP). Hence, in such an environment I do not consider Erdogan's populism to be of structural nature or a standard requirement of Turkey's democratic politics. Instead, I consider Erdogan's exclusionary strain of populism, on both vertical and horizontal dimensions, to be directly influenced by his desire to increase and uphold personal power.

Taguieff defines populism in both vertical and horizontal dimension as an opposition between "us" and "them". Horizontal dimension of populism is a fairly straightforward and was mostly represented in the speeches analyzed thus far. It deals with the "outsiders" who want to threaten the domestic way of life. This line of rhetoric was mostly present in 2015-2016 period during the jet crisis and is best summarized in Erdogan's statement intended for 2015 16th annual meeting of local authorities and village heads:

You see it and follow it too, we shoot down foreign airplane that tries to violate our borders in Hatay and some are immediately coming and direct all of their grudges, hostility and animosity towards us and our country. (İşte sizler de görüyorsunuz, takip ediyorsunuz, Hatay'da sınırlarımızı ihlal eden yabancı bir savaş uçağını düşürüyoruz; birileri hemen çıkıyor tüm kinini, düşmanlığını, husumetini ülkemize, şahsımıza yöneltiyor).

This statement can further be supplemented by some other Erdogan's statements presenting Russia as a threat not only for Turkey and Turkish sovereignty proper but also for the entirety of the region:

Yesterday we witnessed once again how steps taken that do not take into consideration regional stability, peace and future can bring about regrettable consequences. (Dün bir kez daha bölgenin istikrarını,

huzurunu ve geleceğini dikkate almayan özensizce atılan adımların ne tür müessif sonuçlar verebileceğine hep birlikte şahit olduk).

Another dimension of populism according to Taguieff is vertical one. That dimension was not within the scope of this research but I feel it is important to mention it since it provides an additional context that could be helpful in understanding Erdogan's populism. Vertical dimension makes a clear distinction between "us" the people and "them" the corrupt elites. Erdogan always attempted to portray himself as a man of the people and therefore increase his popular appeal:

My story is the story of this people. Either the people will win and come to power, or the pretentious and oppressive minority - estranged from the reality of Anatolia and looking over it with disdain - will remain in power. The authority to decide on this belongs to the people. Enough is enough, sovereignty belongs to the people! (Yagci, 2007, p. 116).

Some scholars argue that Erdogan's and the ruling JDP elites' employment of more exclusionary populist policies in foreign affairs coincided with their successful limiting of the Kemalist military and bureaucrats' domestic influence through similar means in the context preceding the Arab Spring (Park, 2014). However, the main difference between the pre and post-Arab Spring populisms lies in the strategic utilization of Islam. Ozpek and Yasar (2017) argue that in JDP's case populism as a thin ideology could be subsumed under different ideologies and political perspectives. In the pre-Arab Spring period populism was combined with democracy and liberal values, which would help in reigning in the influence of Turkey's secular and authoritarian Kemalist establishment. However, in the post-Arab Spring context JDP's populism has been supplemented by Islam and nationalism; a mix that would help in maintaining authoritarian style of leadership as well as the course of foreign policy in the immediate Middle East neighborhood. Hence, it is not a surprise that the main targets of Erdogan's attack in a post-Arab Spring context were intellectuals, academics, journalists, etc (Aytac & Elci, 2018).

Ozpek and Yasar (2017) go further in defining three main traits of JDP's populism. According to them JDP relies on anti-elitism, "us" vs. "them" exclusionary strategy

and mass mobilization. In my case study of Erdogan's rhetoric towards Russia latter two strategies take a very important place. Through "us vs. "them" rhetoric, Erdogan manages to present issues in absolute terms while the mass mobilization is one of the strategies through which Erdogan whips support for his claims and hence legitimacy.

According to Canovan (2004), populists rely on masses for legitimacy, often claiming to support and represent their interests, thus setting themselves apart from other political actors. Also, according to Mudde (2007), the main defining traits of populists are perception of politics as a struggle of good against evil (people vs. the elites) and preference for direct linkage with people through referendums and other plebiscitarian tools as a central representation of people's will. This would explain high number of Russia mentions (positive or negative) in Erdogan's speeches directed to low-level public officials, public opening ceremonies, civil society organizations, commemoration ceremonies and university/graduation events. By accentuating Turkey's relations with Russia and bringing it to public attention, Erdogan accomplishes the agenda setting through shaping public opinion and mass mobilization that imbues him with much needed legitimacy and approval. Moreover, Erdogan emphasized the importance of national will (milli irade) on many occasions. Commenting on the results of 2015 general elections Erdogan stated: "National will manifested itself yesterday from November 1st together with stability and developments within that short time mean there is no other way but stability." (Milli irade dün 1 Kasım itibarıyla istikrardan yana tecelli etti ve o kısa süreli gelişmeler milli iradeye İstikrardan başka çıkış yok). (Hürriyet, 2015).

Regarding the 2018 elections, Erdogan had something similar to say:

The victor of these elections is democracy, national will, in fact, the victors are our people themselves. The victor of these elections are our 81 million citizens, each one individually (Sabah, 2018). (Bu seçimin galibi demokrasidir, milli iradedir, milletimizin bizatihi kendisidir. Bu seçimin galibi 81 milyon vatandaşımızın her bir ferdidir).

In my case study of his rhetoric towards Russia I discovered that the venue type was a very important variable pertaining to his speeches. Unsurprisingly, in the time period analyzed (2014-2018) the most predominant venue type catering to Erdogan's speeches was precisely the domestic one. Around 87% of Erdogan's speeches out of all the speeches mentioning Russia in that period were of domestic nature. Out of this 87%, venue type that was mostly represented was 'meetings with local authorities and village heads', which is very peculiar considering their low administrative status and relative unimportance when it comes to high politics and international relations/diplomacy. However, their relative proximity to the people enables Erdogan to have more influence on the ground in shaping public opinion. Other domestic venues that Erdogan frequented were JDP meetings, commemoration ceremonies, opening ceremonies, civil society meetings, etc. By seeing this it becomes clear how Erdogan was utilizing the exclusionary rhetoric in the foreign policy arena in favor of influencing and thereby consolidating his domestic electorate.

Another school of thought that could provide an additional explanation into discrepancy between Erdogan's rhetoric and actual foreign policy is the securitization theory. It should be noted, as discussed in previous chapters, that explanations relying on securitization theory are not mutually exclusive with populist ones; rather, they reinforce one another. That is because both of these put premium on "us" versus "them" distinction as an explanatory variable. Furthermore, securitizing acts that Erdogan employed in his rhetoric are a particular type of framing subsumed under typical populist agenda.

In securitization theory, the question of security is always seen as constructed through social processes and dynamics (Williams, 2003). It is never taken for granted or seen as an objective fact. In relation to a security issue questions such as "whose security", "from what", "to whose benefit" necessarily need to appear (ibid). This construction of security question happens through a "speech act", which itself is a performative utterance designed to influence and shape reality through intersubjective understanding (Austin, 1975). Many intellectual lines of

securitization theory, most notable of which is Copenhagen School, borrowed this concept of reality creation through linguistic means.

In such understanding, wide variety of things can be securitized. However, although any actor can attempt securitization, more successful examples will be found in the positions of power (Buzan et al., 1998). This is precisely one of the intersections where security theory meets populist explanations. Populists, who present themselves as a “voice of the people” and occupy high offices, frame issues in such a way that allows their agenda setting. Erdogan’s rhetoric towards Russia in the aftermath of 2015 jet crisis is one example of this.

Agenda setting through the acts of securitization is a peculiar example. It is a very potent tool that allows populists to go outside the scope of rules, laws and everyday politics (ibid, 26). German jurist Carl Schmitt has first theorized such conceptualization of the “political” through his idea of sovereign who decides on a friend/enemy distinction, or in other words, the one who deems something (or someone) as an existential security threat. Once such threat is established, there is nothing that a sovereign is forbidden from doing in order to alleviate that threat. By framing an issue in terms of an existential threat and/or threats directed against values Turkey deems important and thus creating securitizing acts it in the process, Erdogan was aiming to gain position of a sovereign that would allow him to make friend/enemy distinction and hence open a path to extraordinary means in dealing with the created enemy. In my previous work (2018), I have explained how Erdogan utilized securitization rhetoric in the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt to ensure a transition from a parliamentary system into a presidential one. His proposed presidential system would enable extended presidential powers and authorities, in turn transforming his office into a Schmittian sovereign. What is important to note is that securitization rhetoric in Erdogan’s case did not originate with the attempted coup but, as we have seen, it was very much present in the case of 2015-2016 rhetoric directed towards Russia. Erdogan was using worsening situation in Syria coupled with plethora of other problems such as Turkey’s international isolation and Western pressure regarding the question of Armenian genocide, to goad the

people into supporting his presidential system initiative. One example of this is his speech at 23rd meeting of MÜSİAD where he criticized certain Western countries for accepting the resolution on Armenian genocide:

While we fought to bring peace to the world, some countries among them like Russia, France, Germany, Austria supported statements built on Armenian lies and stepped on the side of grudge, hate, animosity and hostility. (Biz dünyaya barış mesajı vermek için mücadele ederken, aralarında Rusya, Fransa, Almanya, Avusturya gibi devletlerin de bulunduğu kimi ülkeler, Ermenilerin yalanları üzerine inşa edilmiş bir iddiaya destek vererek, kinin, nefretin, husumetin, düşmanlığın tarafında saf tuttular).

In his seventh meeting with the ambassadors, Erdogan was defending his government from the Western accusations regarding the lack of media liberties:

How do they pervert this? Freedom of press. It is not freedom of press. I speak with conviction; Neither in Europe nor in other countries, in West in general, is press free as in Turkey, neither written nor visual. (Hemen olay nereye saptırılıyor? Basın özgürlüğü. Basın özgür değilmiş. İddia ile konuşuyorum; Ne Avrupa'sında ne diğer ülkelerinde, Batı'nın genelinde Türkiye'deki basın kadar özgür bir medya yoktur, ne yazılı, ne görsel).

Similarly, in a 2015 symposium dedicated to the decline of Ottoman Empire, Erdogan reiterated his, by now, famous statement: "Turkey is now making a statement. What is our statement? We say, world is bigger than 5." (Türkiye bir şeyi şu anda iddia ediyor. Nedir bizim iddiamız? Diyoruz ki, dünya 5'ten büyüktür).

A caveat should be added here. Although there are plenty of statements directed against the Western world, China, Russia and global order in general, I have listed some of the statements from Erdogan's so far analyzed speeches that use Turkey's unenviable international position as a motive to bring about potential transition to a presidential system through populist means. However, since my research is focused on speeches that contain Russia this sample is not very large and hence this claim should be taken with a grain of salt. Nevertheless, it could potentially open ways for an additional research on this topic. With this being said, there are still scholars who

would agree with the aforementioned statement. Aytaç and Elçi (2018) made an extensive analysis of Erdogan's conception of *üst akıl* (higher intellect/mastermind) whom Erdogan blames for variety of Turkey's problems like Gezi Park protests, German recognition of the Armenian genocide, the US support for Syrian Kurds, 2016 coup attempt and subsequent 2018 economic crisis. According to some of Erdogan's statements, this unnamed mastermind seeks the following:

Like I said it is the supreme intelligence/mastermind. He plays game with Turkey. He seeks to divide, part and if he has enough strength swallow Turkey as well (Tepeli, 2016). (Üst akıl dediğim olay da bu zaten. Üst akıl, Türkiye üzerinde oyun oynuyor. Türkiye'yi bölmek, parçalamak, güçleri yeterse yutabilmek).

Regarding the statements for presidential system proper, in 2015 just around the time Russia was intervening in Syria on the side of government forces against Turkey-backed rebels, Erdogan was noted lobbying through various domestic venues. In 2015 Bursa civil society opening ceremony Erdogan stated the following:

Let us look at the world's developed countries, in November there was G-20 meeting in Turkey and all of the participant countries are governed by presidential system. There is no need to discover the world all over again. Look, 18 countries, out of these 10 are governed by the presidential system, America is one of these, Argentina, Russia, Mexico, Brasil, all of these are governed by the presidential system. (Dünyada şu gelişmiş ülkelere bakalım, Kasım ayında Türkiye'de G-20 toplantısı var ve bu G-20 toplantısının ağırlıkta olan ülkeleri, hepsi başkanlık sistemiyle yönetiliyor. Dünyayı yeniden keşfetmeye gerek yok. Bakınız, 18 ülke, bunların 10 tanesi başkanlık sistemiyle yönetiliyor, işte Amerika bunlardan bir tanesi, Arjantin, Rusya, Meksika, Brezilya, bunların hepsi başkanlık sistemiyle yönetiliyor).

In the same month, February, at the dinner with village heads, Erdogan was arguing for the same point: "Now in America, I don't know, Latin America, Russia, Europe, etcetera, their types of systems are not an absolute must." (Şu anda Amerika'daki, ne bileyim Latin Amerika'daki, Rusya, Avrupa vesaire buralardaki sistemler olmazsa olmaz değil).

These statements coupled with his securitizing acts mentioned above are a clear proof of Erdogan's agenda setting that had the transition to presidential system as its ultimate goal. Indeed, changes in the Turkey's domestic politics and institutions would testify to this. As we have seen above, Erdogan's presidency has been filled with populist statements and securitized rhetoric. With such policies and rhetoric, in 2017 Erdogan passed constitutional amendments, which would see increased president's power to the detriment of judiciary and legislative branches, in a polarized referendum after they have been shot down in Turkish parliament.

Another such change that directly or indirectly enabled a transition into presidential system merits discussion. Its precursor was the state of emergency declared six days after the July 15th coup attempt. Peculiar thing about this is that it has been extended seven times since its imposition on July 21 2016. The very nature of the state of emergency is very restrictive for populace and civil sector while giving executive apparatus wide range of additional powers. Hence, it is very interesting that the state of emergency lasted as long as it did, until its revocation on July 19 2018, almost two years after its imposition. During the duration of the state of emergency, Erdogan consolidated his power and made the already mentioned constitutional changes regarding the president's office that he assumed after his victory in June 2018 early presidential elections.

To summarize, I believe that I have sufficiently shown that not only was there a discrepancy between Erdogan's rhetoric and Turkish foreign policy in the case of Turkey's dealings with Russia but also that Erdogan used a populist style of leadership permeated by 'us versus them' exclusionary rhetoric in order to further his personal political interests, which were mainly concentrated around the transition to presidential system with increased powers and authorities.

5.1. Concluding Remarks and Recommendations for Further Research

In this research I attempted to show the divergence between Erdogan's rhetoric and the official Turkish foreign policy towards Russia. Due to the discrepancy observed I noted that Erdogan's rhetoric did not follow the policies on the ground,

especially during the tumultuous periods in Turkish-Russian bilateral relations, which was a strong indicator of foreign policy rhetoric being utilized for purposes other than making foreign policy transparent to the Turkish public. Through the use of strategies such as framing and domestic agenda setting Erdogan shaped public opinion by bringing to the fore sensitive issues like Turkey's relations with Russia when it benefited his political program. These mentions could have been permeated by the negative (such as in 2015 and 2016) or positive tone (example is year 2018). For example, in 2015, out of all his speeches with a mention of Russia, 44.83% had negative tone (rest had neutral tone). In 2016, negative speeches amounted to 41.38% of the total mentions of Russia (rest was neutral with one instance of positive tone in the second half of the year). After the improvement in relations with Russia we can observe positive tone, most notably in 2018, which stands at 28.95%, the rest being neutral.

I have explained Erdogan's such behavior as being shaped by the populist tendencies in his leadership style. Due to Erdogan's high penchant for the rhetorical acts of securitization and presenting political issues in exclusionary 'us versus them' rhetoric on both horizontal and vertical dimensions, which was fairly obvious during the downturn in Turkish relations with Russia following the 2015 jet incident, I have concluded that this can be explained by populist strategy. Russia was also used indirectly as a way through which Erdogan approached third party states and entities. This was noted in eight of the speeches. Moreover, it is important to note here that 87% of Erdogan's speeches pertaining to Russia were directed towards the domestic audience, which is a clear indicator of rhetoric being used for ends other than foreign policy. Venue type that has the biggest share of Erdogan's domestic mentions of Russia are meetings with representatives of local authorities and villageheads. This begs the question regarding Erdogan's intentions behind discussions of foreign policy matters with officials who are relatively low on a domestic administrative scale, but nevertheless enjoy proximity to the public. These meetings are one of the mediums (see Chapter 4) through which Erdogan employed agenda setting, which in turn increased his popularity and political mainstay. In this vein, negative mentions of Russia in international venues were mostly absent, which

is another confirmation of the claim that his speeches had populist/political character underlined by the intentions of agenda setting and framing. I also noticed that these populist tendencies increased especially with his and JDP's consolidation of power over Turkish state in the aftermath of his election to the position of President in 2014. Populism and all that it entailed as a political strategy helped Erdogan further consolidate and increase his power which resulted we eventually see in the 2016-2017 constitutional amendments and transformation of Turkish parliamentary system into the presidential one with president's (Erdogan's) powers and authorities being vastly increased. Crisis with Russia, Turkey's global isolation, worsening economic situation, costly policies towards Syria and 2015 unsuccessful coup attempt bolstered Erdogan's populism, which in my opinion is best observed through his rhetoric. As I stated earlier, findings in this work led me to believe that Erdogan's rhetoric was reactive, rather than proactive, and as such did not have motivation to transmit foreign policy as much as it did to shape domestic realities and political fortunes.

Strength of this research lies in its overall contribution to the academic literature on recent directions of Turkish politics and foreign policy. In the case study of Erdogan's rhetoric towards Russia, I illustrated how domestic politics and personal strategic considerations shape and influence a leader's rhetoric, however without tangible effects on the foreign policy. Moreover, my thesis adds to the populist literature through its exploration of Erdogan's rhetoric that proves to be one of the most important indicators of populism's strategic dynamics. The exploration of the utility of the securitization acts as a particular type of framing can be seen as an additional contribution that touches upon one of the most significant elements of populists' political strategies that serves to capitalize on fears stemming from the accentuated 'us versus them' dichotomy.

However, my case study on Erdogan's his rhetoric relating to Russia in 2014-2018 period should be considered as only one part in the greater whole. In order to better understand Erdogan's populism in particular and his broader political strategies in general, I believe that research on his rhetoric during any of the aforementioned crises would help expand general knowledge on the topic.

Furthermore, in my research I have focused only on the official texts published officially on the government's website. Further research of Erdogan's speeches and rhetoric transmitted by newspapers, magazines and television could provide better understanding of his political style on the count of different sort of text filtering. Moreover, academic community could benefit from additional research based around the comparative analysis between Erdogan and other populist leaders similar to the one conducted by Aytaç and Öniş (2014). Comparing and contrasting rhetoric of Erdogan and others could help us in understanding his own original style and idiosyncrasies shaped by the uniqueness of Turkey, its domestic political scene and international environment in which it is located.



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APPENDICES

A.

year	month	day	Title of the statement	Russia mentioned?	positive	neutral	negative	audience domestic	audience international	audience mixed	statement
2014	12	20	Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu'nda (DEİK) Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	İşte bir diğer tarafta kısa bir süre önce Sayın Putin'in yine Türkiye ziyareti ve bu ziyarette Güney Akım'ı tamamen terk ettiklerini, kendi ifadeleriyle bir Türk Akımı kurmayı hedeflediklerini söylediler. Nedir o? Yunanistan sınırında



											burada bir dağıtım merkezi kurmayı ifade ettiler. Şimdi bu ifade ile bizde buradan Türkiye olarak ihtiyacımız olan gazı alabileceğiz. Ama, Avrupa, Batı'da onlarda istedikleri kadar oradan gazı alabilecekler. Bütün bunlar önümüzdeki 3 yıl içerisinde atılabilecek önemli adımlar.
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2014	12	17	Hazreti Mevlana'nın 741. Vuslat Yıldönümü Uluslararası Anma Törenlerinde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2014	12	17	Konya-İstanbul YHT Seferlerinin Başlatılması Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2014	12	15	TÜRKSAT 6A Yerli Haberleşme Uydusu Proje İmza Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2014	12	15	TÜPRAŞ Fuel Oil Dönüşüm Tesisi Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2014	12	13	Şeb-i Arus İstanbul 2014 Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2014	12	12	Hattat Hasan Çelebi'ye Saygı Gecesi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2014	12	10	Uluslararası Petrol ve Doğalgaz Stratejileri Sempozyumu Galası'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	Enerji sektörü, ülkemiz dış politikasında da önemli yere sahip. Türkiye artık sadece kendi topraklarında değil, Azerbaycan'dan tutun Irak'a, Afganistan'dan Kazakistan'a, Rusya'dan Kırgızistan'a, Libya'ya, KKTC'ye, Kolombiya'ya varıncaya kadar dünyanın her yerinde petrol arıyor. Şimdi önemli bir konuya geliyorum. Geçtiğimiz günlerde Sayın Putin ile yaptığımız görüşmelerde enerjideki işbirliği
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Güney Akım bitiyor, ki Sayın Putin "Bunun adını Türk Akımı koyabiliriz, Türk doğalgaz akımı koyabiliriz" gibi bir ifade de kullandılar. Karadeniz'den geçecek, Türkiye sınırında, Yunanistan sınırında, Türk topraklarında orada bir hub kurulacak. "Bunun adını atabiliriz" dendi. Mutabık kalmamız halinde bir de bu hattı kuracağız ki, yıllık bunun da 63 milyar metreküp kapasitesi olacak. Biz de

											oradan alabildiğimizi alacağız, Avrupa da talep etmesi halinde oradan istediği kadar doğalgazı alma şansına sahip olacak.
2014	12	6	9. ASKON Olağan Genel Kurulu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Biz her ülkeyle otururuz, konuşuruz, anlaşmamızı yaparız. Bize yasak koymak isteyenler, kendileri dolaylı yollardan Rusya Federasyonu'yla iş

											bağlıyorlar. Çok enteresan. Avrupa Birliği de buna dahil. Sayın Putin'in ülkemizi ziyaret etmesinden, burada anlaşmalar yapmamızdan da, imzaları atmamızdan da çok rahatsız oldular. Kusura bakmayın da bizim irademiz birilerinin ipoteği altında değil. Bu irade, milli iradedir.
2014	11	26	15. MÜSİAD Uluslararası Fuarı'nın Açılış Töreni ve 18. Uluslararası İş Forumu (IBF) Kongresi Kapanış Oturumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2014	11	24	Uluslararası Kadın Ve Adalet Zirvesinde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0

2014	11	21	2. Türkiye-Afrika Ortaklık Zirvesi Açılış Oturumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2014	11	11	Turkcell'in 20. Yıl Resepsiyonunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2014	11	10	Gazi Mustafa Kemal'i Anma Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2014	11	7	Türkmenistan-Türkiye İş Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2014	11	2	Esenler Belediyesi'nin Toplu Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2014	10	29	Cumhuriyet Bayramı Vesilesiyle Ankara Hipodromu'nda Düzenlenen Törende Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2014	10	18	Afganistan Doğan Kışlası'nda Askeri Personele Hitaben Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2014	10	13	Marmara Üniversitesi Akademik Yıl Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2014	10	11	Rize’de Toplu Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2014	10	11	Güneysu Kaptan Ahmet Erdoğan İmam Hatip Lisesi Açılış Töreni’nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2014	10	11	Rize'de Akşam Yemeğinde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2014	10	11	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Üniversitesi Akademik Yılı Açılış Töreni’nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2014	10	10	Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi 2014-2015 Akademik Yıl Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2014	10	10	Trabzon Toplu Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2014	10	10	Trabzon'da Akşam Yemeğinde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2014	10	10	Rize'nin Kendirli Beldesi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2014	10	7	Islahiye'de Bulunan Çadırkent'te Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2014	10	1	Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin 24'üncü Dönem 5'inci Yasama Yılı Açılışında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2014	9	29	Uluslararası Uyuşturucu Politikaları ve Halk Sağlığı Sempozyumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2014	9	28	Türkiye İhracatçılar Meclisi Türkiye Markası Tanıtım Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2014	9	28	Dünya Ekonomik Forumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2014	9	24	BM Güvenlik Konseyi "Yabancı Savaşçılar" Özel Oturumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2014	9	24	Birleşmiş Milletler 69'uncu Genel Kurulu Genel Görüşmelerinde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0

2014	9	23	BM İklim Zirvesi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2014	9	19	TÜSİAD Yüksek İstişare Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2014	9	17	TESK 19. Olağan Genel Kurulu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2014	9	1	Ercan Havaalanı'nda Halka Hitaben Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2014	8	28	Devir Teslim Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2015	12	26	"Asım'ın Nesli'nden Bir Usta: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan" Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2015	12	23	17. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Biliyorsunuz geçen haftadan beri Rusya, sınırimızı ihlal ettiği için düşürülen uçağının kara kutusu üzerinden bir propaganda yürütüyor. Kara kutudaki bilgilerin kendi iddialarını ispat edeceğini öne süren Rus yetkililer, bu işi bir şova dönüştürmüşlerdi. Sonra kara kutu açıldı ve tahribattan dolayı içindeki bilgilerin okunamadığı ifade edildi. Tabii bizim kendi elimizdeki bilgiler açık ve sağlam olduğu için konuyla ilgili en küçük bir tereddüdümüz
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2015	12	22	Dostluk Derneği'nin Kabulünde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	12	14	2015 Yılı Türkiye Bilimler Akademisi Ödül Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	12	9	2015 Yılı Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kültür ve Sanat Büyük Ödülleri Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	12	8	16. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	İşte sizler de görüyorsunuz, takip ediyorsunuz, Hataş'da sınırlarımızı ihlal eden yabancı bir savaş uçağını düşürüyoruz; birileri hemen çıkıyor tüm kinini, düşmanlığını, husumetini ülkemize, şahsımıza yöneltiyor. Ruslar bir yandan,

2015	12	3	Dünya Engelliler Günü Resepsiyonunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	İnsanı ruhundan ve fitratından kopararak adeta bir metaa dönüştüren, sadece güçlünün hayat hakkını kutsayan bu yaklaşım bugün de maalesef varlığını devam ettiriyor. Hitler Almanya'sının, Stalin'in Rusya'sının işlediği soykırımlar, 1990'larda Bosna Hersek'te vuku bulan katliamlar, Filistinlilerin yıllardır maruz kaldığı baskılar, komşumuz Suriye'deki zulümler farklı ülke ve zamanlarda bunun en canlı örneğini teşkil
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												ediyor.
2015	12	3	2015 Yılı TÜBİTAK Bilim, Özel ve Teşvik Ödülleri Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	

2015	12	3	TÜRK-İŞ 22. Olağan Genel Kurulu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Suriye, Türkiye'nin 911 kilometre sınıra sahip komşusu olmanın yanında, halklarımızın binlerce yılı bulan ortak geçmişe sahip olduğu bir coğrafyadır. Türkiye olarak nasıl Balkanlar'a, Kafkaslar'a, Akdeniz Havzasına, Irak'a bigâne kalmamız söz konusu olamaz ise, Suriye'de yaşananları da kesinlikle yok sayamayız. İşte onun için diyorum; Rusya Suriye'de ne arıyor? Efendim, neymiş? Birleşmiş Milletler'in kendilerine verdiği
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										<p>böyle bir yetki varmış. Neymiş o yetki? Eğer o ülkenin yönetimi davet ederse, gidilirmiş. Oraya gitmek mecburiyetinde değilsiniz. 380 bin insanı öldüren katil Esed'in davetine icabet etmeye mecbur değilsiniz. O gayrimeşru bir yönetimdir, meşru değildir; bunu görmek durumundasınız. Bunu ben Sayın Putin'in kendisiyle çok konuştum, onun için de burada açık ve net söylüyorum...Şunu bilmenizi istiyorum:</p>
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										<p>iftiradır. Eğer ispat ederse ben Cumhurbaşkanlığı makamında durmam. Ama ispat edemezse kendisi de makamını bırakır mı, koltuğunu bırakır mı, bu önemli...Türkiye'nin petrol aldığı yerler, doğalgaz aldığı yerler bellidir. Birinci sırada Rusya'dır, ikinci sırada İran, üçüncü sırada Azerbaycan, dördüncü sırada Kuzey Irak, beşinci sırada Katar, ardından Cezayir... Zaman zaman da Nijerya'dan biz bu</p>
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2015	11	27	Bayburt'ta Toplu Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Daha sonra bunun Rusya'ya ait olduğu anlaşıldı. Tabi ki bu üzüntü verici hadisenin yaşandığı bölge, rejim güçleriyle Bayırbucak Türkmenlerinin yoğun çatışmalarına sahne olan bir yerdir. Suriye sınırlarımız daha önce de rejimin ve terör örgütlerinin uçak, helikopter, insansız hava aracı, havan mermisi, top mermisi gibi tacizlerine maruz kalmıştır.G-20'de kendisiyle bunları yine konuştuk. Ve orada da şunu söylediler: 'Bunu
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bir misafirlik olarak kabul edeceksiniz.’ Ben de dedim ki, ‘Davetsiz misafirlik olmaz.’ Hassas bir bölgenin içerisindeyiz. Şu anda Rusya orada, biz defalarca söyledik; ‘Sizin orada ne işiniz var?’ Neymiş? Suriye rejimi davet etmiş. Şu anda gayrimeşru bir devlet var Suriye’de. Siz her davete icabet etmeye mecbur musunuz? Burada 380 bin insanı öldüren bir katil Esad var, bunun davetine icabet etmeye mecbur musunuz? Her

										<p>türlü desteęi veriyorsunuz, devlet terörü estiren böyle bir insana bu desteęin verilmesi meşru mudur? Türkiye olarak pek çok kanalla bu konudaki hassasiyetlerimizi Rusya'ya ilettik. Buna rağmen kasıtlı mı olduğunu, yoksa özensizlikten mi kaynaklandığını bilmediğimiz bir şekilde sınırlarımızın ihlaline bigâne kalmamız mümkün değildir.</p> <p>Olayın olduğu andan</p>
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										itibaren meselenin bu çerçevede değerlendirilmesi için elimizden gelen gayreti gösterdik. Büyükelçi Dışişleri'ne çağrıldı, Askeri Ataşe aynı şekilde çağrıldı, kendilerine teknik her türlü bilgi verildi. Yaşanan hadiseden duyduğumuz üzüntüyü ifade ettik. Rusya'nın bu olay üzerine gösterdiği tepkiyi yine anlayışla karşılamaya çalışıyoruz. Ancak meseleyi asıl mecrasından çıkartıp farklı alanlara taşımaya
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										<p>Rusya yönetimine ben şunu söylüyorum: Bakınız, Türkiye'nin yüzde 99'u Müslümandır. Türkiye'nin böyle bir İslamlaştırma hareketine ihtiyacı yoktur, yüzde 99'u Müslümandır. Böyle bir yakıştırmayı ben Rusya yönetimine doğrusu hiç yakıştıramadım.</p> <p>Acaba ben kalkıp da 30 milyonun yaşadığı Rusya için 'Rusya yönetimi bir Hristiyanlaştırma hareketi yapıyor'</p>
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										<p>desem doğru mudur? O ne kadar yanlışsa, Türkiye'nin yönetimi için bu yakıştırmayı yapmak da o kadar yanlıştır, kusura bakmasınlar.</p> <p>'DAEŞ Türkiye'ye petrol satıyormuş'; yazıklar olsun. Türkiye'ye bu iftirayı atanlar bunu ispat etmekle mükelleftir. Türkiye DAEŞ'ten petrol almıyor. Tam aksine Amerikan Hazine Bakanlığı açıkladı; Rus şirketleri ile DAEŞ'in ortaklaşa Suriye</p>
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										<p>hükümetinin, kendi devletinin yanında değil, orada yer alıyorlar. Daha önce de zaten bunlar Suriye'deki devlet terörü estiren rejimin yanında yer almadılar mı? Şimdi de yine aynı şeyi yapıyorlar, ama biz milletimizi yanımızda görüyoruz ya; bu bize yeter.Sayın Putin Türkiye'ye giden ve petrol taşıyan birtakım kamyonlardan bahsediyor. Uluslararası ilişkiler dedikoduyla, iftirayla yürümez. Hele hele</p>
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										<p>Sayın Putin'e hiç yakışmaz. Şayet Rusya'nın böyle bir iddiası varsa tüm belgeleriyle bunu ortaya koymak, bunu ispat etmek mecburiyetindedir.</p> <p>Yakında Paris'te bir zirve var. Ben kendilerinden olayın olduğu gün randevu talebinde bulundum, telefonla görüşelim istedim. O günden bugüne dönmediler.</p> <p>Şimdi Paris'te İklim Değişikliği Zirvesi var. Zannediyorum kendileri</p>
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										<p>Bizim gönlümüz hiçbir ülkenin böyle bir duruma düşmesine razı gelmez.</p> <p>Tabii Rusya'nın uçak meselesini bahane ederek Suriye'deki askeri varlığını güçlendirmesinin gerisindeki kurnazlığı da görmüyor değiliz. Bu mesele sadece bizim değil tüm bölgenin, tüm dünyanın meselesidir. Sayın Putin, 'Kim terörizme çifte standart uyguluyorsa ateşle oynuyordur' diyor. Bu</p>
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										<p>söze ben sonuna kadar katılıyorum, doğru.</p> <p>Suriye’de 380 bin cana mal olan devlet terörü uygulayan Esad rejimine destek olmak, evet o da ateşle oynamaktır. DAES’le mücadele bahanesi ile uluslararası meşruiyeti olan muhalifleri vurmak, evet ateşle oynamaktır. Türkiye’nin haklılığının tüm dünya tarafından kabul edildiği bir hadiseyi bahane ederek bize olmadık ithamlarda bulunmak, meseleyi</p>
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											<p>Sayın Putin, Türkiye'nin kendilerini sırtından bıçakladığını söylüyor. Hayır, bu millet bugüne kadar hiç kimseyi sırtından bıçaklamamıştır. Bu millet göğüs göğse savaşmasını bilen bir millettir. Biz mücadelelerimizi her zaman göğüs göğse verdik ve öyle veririz, neticesi ne olursa olsun öyle veririz.</p> <p>Biz bu ilişkilerin zarar görmesini hiçbir şekilde istemiyoruz, özellikle ilişkilerimize zarar</p>
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2015	11	26	15. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Şimdi diyorlar ki, 'DAEŞ'ten Türkiye petrol alıyor.' Yetkili makamlarda olanlar söylüyor bunu. Çok ayıp, yazıklar olsun. Türkiye şu anda petrolünü de, doğalgazını da aldığı yerler bellidir. Biz bu noktadaki en büyük ithalatı Rusya'dan yapıyoruz, ikinci derecede İran'dan yapıyoruz. Azerbaycan'dan doğalgaz alıyoruz, Kuzey Irak'tan aynı şekilde alıyoruz. Bunun yanında Cezayir ve
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										<p>sonra anlaşılmıştır. İnanın bana, Suriye'deki tüm hadiseler gibi bu olay da bizi ziyadesiyle üzmüştür. Çünkü biz en başından beri, bölgede kimse ölmesin, kimsenin burnu kanamasın diye uğraşyoruz, çaba gösteriyoruz.</p> <p>Konuyla ilgili teknik izahat Genelkurmay Başkanlığımız ve Dışişleri Bakanlığımız tarafından Rusya başta olmak üzere ilgili tüm ülkelere ve kurumlara yapılmıştır. Buna</p>
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rağmen Rusya tarafından yapılan açıklamaları ve konuyla ilgili olmayan alanlarda ortaya konan tepkileri üzüntüyle takip ediyoruz. Bizim Rusya'yla stratejik ortaklığımız var, ÜDİK denilen Üst Düzey İstişari Konseyimiz var. Ama bizim bu birlikteliğimiz dayanışmayı gerektirir. Bu birlikteliğimiz bizim birbirimizi bu anlamda tehdit etmemizi gerektirmez; bu bizi üzmüştür.

										<p>iliřkilerimizin olduđu Rusya'yı herhangi bir sınır ihlali olmadan hedef almamız için sebep yoktur.</p> <p>Rusya'yla Suriye politikasında anlaşamıyor olmamız başka bir şeydir, angajman kurallarımızın işletilmesi başka bir şeydir. DAEŞ'le mücadele gerekçesiyle başlatılan, ama sadece muhalifleri hedef alan saldırılara karşı itirazlarımız elbette devam ediyor. Müttefik ülkelerle birlikte</p>
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										<p>Cerablus'tan batıya doğru Suriye sınırlarımız boyunca insani güvenlik bölgesi oluşturma kararımız da aynı şekilde sürüyor. Dikkat edilirse, bizim çabalarımız Suriye sınırlarımızı DAESH'ten ve diğer terör örgütlerinden arındırma amacına yöneliktir.</p> <p>Esad rejimine karşı mücadele eden muhalif unsurların desteklenmesi, uluslararası meşruiyete haiz bir çabadır. Esad</p>
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										<p>ülkemin istikrar ve güven ortamını tehdit eden manzara 1 Kasım'da tamamen deęiřti.</p> <p>Bakın, řöyle bir açıklama yapılabilir mi? 'Bu ülkede idarenin, idarecilerin 'Türkiye'yi İslamlařtırma gayreti var' diye bir açıklama yapılabilir mi? Demek ki ben, hükümet, bizler Türkiye'yi İslamlařtırma gayreti içindeyiz. Türkiye'nin yüzde 99'u Müslüman; bunu nasıl söylersiniz? Böyle bir ifade nasıl kullanılır?</p>
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2015	11	25	31. İSEDAK Açılış Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Dün bir kez daha bölgenin istikrarını, huzurunu ve geleceğini dikkate almayan özensizce atılan adımların ne tür müessif sonuçlar verebileceğine hep birlikte şahit olduk. Sabah saatlerinde dün hava sahamızı ihlal eden milliyeti belirsiz iki uçak, Hatay Yayladağı bölgesinde sınır ihlali yapmamaları konusunda 5 dakika içinde 10 kez ikaz edilmiştir. Askeri makamlarımızın yaptıkları ikazlar
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											uçanın, Rusya Federasyonu'na ait olduğu bu ülke makamlarının açıklamalarından sonra anlaşılmıştır. Olayın hemen arkasından gerek Türkiye olarak Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi üyeleri ve NATO bünyesinde gerekli bilgilendirmeleri sürekli yaptık.
2015	11	24	Öğretmenler Günü Resepsiyonunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	11	19	İslam İşbirliği Teşkilatı 5. Sağlık Bakanları Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0

2015	11	19	7. Atlantik Konseyi Enerji ve Ekonomi Zirvesi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2015	11	16	G-20 Antalya Liderler Zirvesi Sonunda Basın Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2015	11	4	14. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	10	26	13. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	10	20	BM Çölleşme İle Mücadele 12. Taraflar Konferansı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2015	10	19	12. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	10	19	İstanbul Yeni Havalimanı Proje Finansmanı İmza Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	10	17	Türkiye'den KKTC'ye Su Temini Projesi Alaköprü Barajı Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0

2015	10	17	Türkiye'den KKTC'ye Su Temini Projesi Geçitköy Barajı Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2015	10	5	Belçika Egmont Uluslararası İlişkiler Kraliyet Enstitüsü'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2015	10	3	Amfibi Gemi Bayraktar'ın Denize İndirilme Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	10	2	G-20 Enerji Bakanları Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2015	10	1	Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi 25. Dönem 2. Yasama Yılı Açış Konuşması	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	10	1	Sağlıklı Yaşam Kültürünü Teşvik Projesi Tanıtım Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	9	29	11. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2015	9	16	Türkiye Gençlik Kulübü Federasyonu Kongresi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	9	16	3. Uluslararası Ombudsmanlık Sempozyumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	Türkiye'nin Suriye ile ilgili söylediği her şey en başından beri doğru çıkmasına rağmen, sorunun çözümüne yönelik ciddi adımlar maalesef hala atılmadı. Çünkü buradaki 2 milyon insan İran'a gitmiyor, 2 milyon insan Rusya'ya gitmiyor, 2 milyon insan benim ülkeme geliyor ve bunun bedelini biz ödüyoruz.
2015	8	26	10. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2015	8	19	9. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	8	12	8. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1850'li yıllardan itibaren Rus Çarlığı'nın zulmünden kaçan Kafkas halkları Kırımli kardeşlerimiz çareyi Anadolu'ya gelmekte bulmuşlardır. 93 Harbi sonrasında Balkanları boşaltan yüz binlerce kardeşlerimize yine Anadolu kucak açmıştır. 1917 Bolşevik ihtilalinden kaçan yüz bini aşkın Beyaz Rus'un geldiği yer de yine bu topraklar olmuştur.
2015	7	3	Millet Camii Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2015	6	30	Eski Milletvekilleri ile İftar Programı	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	6	28	Ensar Vakfı İftar Programı	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	6	27	Birlik Vakfı İftar Programı	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	6	26	Türk Kızılayı'nın Madalya Töreni ve İftar Programı	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	6	25	ASKON İftar Programı	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	6	24	Muhtarlarla İftar Programı'nda (Yedinci Muhtarlar Toplantısı) Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	6	21	Türkiye İhracatçılar Meclisi 22. Olağan Genel Kurulu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	6	20	Midyat Geçici Barınma Merkezi'nde İftar Yemeğinde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	6	18	Şehit Yakınları ve Gaziler İftar Program'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	6	11	4. Uluslararası Öğrenciler Mezuniyet Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2015	6	4	Sivas'ta Halka Hitapları	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2015	5	30	İstanbul'un Fethi'nin 562. Yıl Dönümü Kutlamalarında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	5	25	Dünya Enerji Düzenleme Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2015	5	21	TUSAŞ Uzay Sistemleri Entegrasyon ve Test Merkezi Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	5	19	19 Mayıs Atatürk'ü Anma Gençlik Ve Spor Bayramı Münasebetiyle Gençleri Kabulünde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1876 yılında bir Rus Generali Michail Grigor Cernayev, demek ki yalnız Türkleri değil, onların tarihini de yenmek lazım diyor. Bunu derken kast ettiği şey, işte tam da budur, yani sadece kendilerini, şu anda muhatabımız olanları değil, onların tarihini de yemek lazım,

											ki onları o zaman ne yapalım? Kökünü kazımış olalım. Ülkemizde yıllarca işte bu yapılmaya çalışıldı, koskoca bir millet kendi geçmişinden, kendi değerlerinden, kadim tarihi mirasından kopartılmak, bunlara yabancılaştırılmak istendi.
2015	5	16	8. Uluslararası Öğrenci Buluşması'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2015	5	14	Van'da Toplu Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	5	11	Rize Toplu Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	5	10	Almanya "Karlsruhe Buluşması"nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0

2015	5	9	İzmir'de Toplu Açılış Töreninde Halka Hitaben Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	5	8	B-20 Türkiye İş Dünyası Liderleri Forumu Çalıştayı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	5	8	Türkiye Ziraat Odaları Birliği 26. Olağan Genel Kurulunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	5	5	Tekirdağ Toplu Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	5	5	12. IDEF Uluslararası Savunma Sanayi Fuarı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2015	5	2	Diyarbakır Toplu Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	5	2	Batman Toplu Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	4	29	Türkiye Tarım ve Kırsal Kalkınma Hamlesi Proje Uygulamaları Tanıtım Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2015	4	25	MÜSiAD 23. Genel Kurulu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Biz dünyaya barış mesajı vermek için mücadele ederken, aralarında Rusya, Fransa, Almanya, Avusturya gibi devletlerin de bulunduğu kimi ülkeler, Ermenilerin yalanları üzerine inşa edilmiş bir iddiaya destek vererek, kinin, nefretin, husumetin, düşmanlığın tarafında saf tuttular. Her zaman söylüyorum, burada bir kez daha ifade ediyorum, maalesef buna Amerika da değişik bir ifade şekliyle
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											ve Ukrayna'da yaşanan hadiseler tüm çıplaklığıyla ve tazeliğiyle ortada, Donetsk'te olanlar ortada, Luhansk'ta olanlar ortada, hatta hatta Kırım'da olanlar ortada.
2015	4	23	Çanakkale 100. Yıl Barış Zirvesi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Çanakkale, Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nın kilidiydi, bu cephede yaşananlar Rusya'daki 1917 Ekim Devrimi başta olmak üzere pek çok önemli gelişmenin kapısını araladı.
2015	4	23	23 Nisan Ulusal Egemenlik ve Çocuk Bayramı Dolayısıyla Çocukları Kabulünde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2015	4	22	Irak Cumhurbaşkanı Fuad Masum ile Birlikte Ortak Basın Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	4	21	Uluslararası 23 Nisan Çocuk Şenliği'ne Katılan Çocukları Kabulünde Yaptığı Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2015	4	21	Türk Telekom'un 175. Kuruluş Yılı Dönümü Dolayısıyla Düzenlenen Törende Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	4	19	Levent-Rumeli Hisarüstü Metro Hattı Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	4	18	Siyer-i Nebi Yarışması Ödül Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	4	18	Kocaeli'nde Toplu Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Geçtiğimiz yüzyılın başında Rusların, Fransızların, İngilizlerin ve bölgede hesabı olan diğer devletlerin tahrikine kapılan Ermeniler, yüzbinlerce

											Müslüman'ın kanına girerek tehcirin kapılarını bizzat kendileri araladılar.ma önce Karabağ sorunu hallolacak. Burada Amerika üzerine düşen görevi hala yapmadı, Rusya üzerine düşen görevi hala yapmadı, Fransa üzerine düşen görevi hala yapmadı.
2015	4	18	51.Cumhurbaşkanlığı Türkiye Bisiklet Turu Tanıtım Etkinliğinde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	4	17	Hoca Ahmet Yesevi Uluslararası Türk-Kazak Üniversitesi Tarafından Fahri Profesörlük Tevdii Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0

2015	4	16	Kazakistan Cumhurbaşkanı Nazarbayev ile Ortak Basın Toplantısında Yaptığı Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2015	4	16	Türkiye-Kazakistan İş Forumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	Ve Avrasya Ekonomik İşbirliği'ni önemsiyoruz. Bu konuda Değerli Dostum Nursultan Nazarbayev ile de bunu görüştük. O da şu: Şu anda gerek Rusya Federasyonu, gerek Kazakistan, gerek Belarus istiyoruz ki, Türkiye'yle de bütünleşmek suretiyle burada farklı bir oluşumu, ekonomik, güçlü bir oluşumu da başaralım.

2015	4	14	Türkiye İhracatçılar Meclisi Üyelerini Kabulde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	4	12	Hz. Peygamber ve Birlikte Yaşama Ahlakı' Temalı Kutlu Doğum Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	4	11	Sakarya Toplu Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	4	10	Polis Haftası Münasebetiyle 81 İlde Görev Yapan 400 Polis Memurunu Kabulde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	4	9	4. Türk Patent Ödülleri Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	4	8	Altıncı Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Şu anda G-20 ülkelerinin en ileri 10 tanesi başkanlık sistemiyle yönetiliyor. Bunlar o zaman akıllarını mı yitirdiler de başkanlık sistemini

											kullanıyorlar? Bunların içerisinde dünyanın işte en ileri ülkeleri, başta Amerika olmak üzere, bakıyorsun Meksika, Arjantin, Brezilya, öbür tarafta Rusya, Fransa, bütün bunlar başkanlık sistemiyle; sadece bunların içinde Fransa yarı başkanlık sistemiyle yönetiliyor.
2015	4	7	İran Cumhurbaşkanı Ruhani ile Ortak Basın Toplantısında Yaptığı Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2015	4	1	Romanya-Türkiye İş Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2015	4	1	Romanya Cumhurbaşkanı Iohannis ile Düzenledikleri Ortak Basın Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0

2015	3	31	Türkiye-Slovakya İş Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	Bu çerçevede, Hazar Havzası, Ortadoğu, Rusya gibi zengin kaynaklardan hem Türkiye'ye, hem de ülkemiz üzerinden Avrupa'ya enerji tedarikine yönelik boru hattı projeleri üzerine önemli duruyoruz, tabi bir taraftan da bunları çeşitlendiriyoruz, buna mecburuz. Şu anda bizim Rusya, Azerbaycan ve bildiğimiz gibi İran tedarikçi ülkelerimiz, oralardan doğalgazı almak suretiyle ihtiyacımızı karşılıyoruz.
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2015	3	31	Slovakya Cumhurbaşkanı Kiska ile Ortak Basın Toplantısında Yaptığı Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2015	3	30	Slovenya Cumhurbaşkanı Pahor ile Ortak Basın Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2015	3	30	Slovenya-Türkiye İş Forumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2015	3	29	Tokatlılar Buluşmasında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	3	27	Karabük'te Toplu Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	3	25	"Pazarcı Esnaf Buluşması"nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	3	23	Türk Kızılay'ı Olağanüstü Genel Kurulu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Biliyorsunuz, Kızılay'ın hali hazırdaki sembolü olan kırmızı hilal amblemi, 93 Rus Harbi sırasında ilk defa resmen kullanılmaya

											başlandı.
2015	3	23	Beşinci Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	3	21	Denizli'de STK'larla Toplantıda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Aynı şekilde Rusya'da, Ukrayna'da, Gürcistan'da çok önemli gelişmeler yaşandı, yaşanıyor. İşte dün Ukrayna'daydım ve Ukrayna'yı yerinde gerek Devlet Başkanı ile ikili görüşmemizde, gerekse yüksek düzeyli stratejik konsey toplantısında bakanlar olarak yaptığımız o geniş çaplı toplantıda iyi analiz ettik. Ve bizim Büyükelçimiz aynı

											Sayın Poroşenko'yla görüştüğümde o da 'Sayın Putin Minsk sürecine uysun', yani herkes topu şu anda birbirine atıyor, bununla meşgul.
2015	3	21	Denizli Toplu Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	3	20	Ukrayna Devlet Başkanı Petro Poroşenko ile Ortak Basın Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2015	3	19	"Çanakkale Ruhu ve Gençlik" Konulu Kompozisyon Yarışması Ödül Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2015	3	19	Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı'nı Ziyaretleri Vesilesiyle Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	<p>Bu yıl, 100'üncü yıldönümüne ulaştığımız Çanakkale Savaşlarını, 1877-1878 yıllarında yaşanan 93 Rus Harbi ve 1912 Balkan Harbi ile birlikte değerlendirmemiz gerektiğine inanıyorum.</p> <p>Gerçekten de, 93 Rus Harbi ve 1912 Balkan Harbi, milletimizin hafızasında çok derin izler bırakmış, gönlünde çok derin yaralar açmıştır.93 Rus Harbinden başlayıp 1912 Balkan bozgununa ve Kurtuluş Savaşımıza</p>
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											kadar devam eden süreçte, bu coğrafya, tarihin gördüğü en büyük soykırımlarından birine şahit olmuştur. Doğumuzda Ermenistan ve Gürcistan, kuzeyimizde Rusya ve Ukrayna'ya bu sıkıntılı çemberi sürdürüyor.
2015	3	19	"100. Yılında Dünya Savaşının Belgeleri" Sergisi ve Dünya Arşiv Yöneticileri Kongresi Açılışında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	3	18	Güven Çayyolu Sağlık Kampüsü ve "Göğüs Göğüse Kalp Kalbe Çanakkale Sergisi" Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	3	17	Trans Anadolu Doğal Gaz Boru Hattı (TANAP) Temel Atma Töreni'nde	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0

			Yaptıkları Konuşma								
2015	3	17	Haydar Aliyev Mesleki ve Teknik Anadolu Lisesi ile Toplu Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2015	3	16	Devlet Övünç Madalyası Tevcih Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	3	16	Aselsan Gölbaşı Yerleşkesi Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	3	15	Balıkesir Toplu Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	3	15	Balıkesir Ekonomi Ödülleri 2015 Töreni ve STK Temsilcileri ile Kahvaltıda Yaptığı Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	3	14	Çanakkale Toplu Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Bugün sadece Galiçya Cephesinde savaşırken kaybettiğimiz askerlerimizin Çek Cumhuriyeti'nden

											Macaristan'a, Polonya'dan Romanya'ya, Slovakya'dan Rusya'ya, Ukrayna'ya kadar pek çok ülkede şehitlikleri bulunuyor.
2015	3	14	14 Mart Romanlar Günü Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	3	14	14 Mart Tıp Bayramı Dolayısıyla Çanakkale'de Düzenlenen Toplantıda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	3	13	"100. Yılında Çanakkale Ruhu ve Gençlik" Adlı Özel Programda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	3	12	Macaristan Cumhurbaşkanı Ader ile Ortak Basın Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	Şu anda bir tarafta TANAP olayı var, bir diğer tarafta işte şimdi Sayın Putin'in de ifadesiyle 'Türk Akımı'

												diye adlandırdığı süreç var ve burada da yine biz özellikle Avrupa'ya açılan bir kapı olarak yine dostlarla gerek doğalgaz konusunda, gerekse nükleer enerji konusunda; ki, Macaristan'ın bu konuda bir deneyimi var, bu deneyimlerinden sağ olsunlar, "biz her türlü tecrübemizi sizlere aktarmaya hazırız", dediler.
2015	3	11	Yükseköğretim Kurulu'nu Ziyaretinde Rektörlere Hitaben Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	
2015	3	10	Dördüncü Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	

2015	3	8	Dünya Kadınlar Günü Buluşması'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	3	7	Gaziantep Toplu Açılış ve Temel Atma Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	3	7	Gaziantep Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi'nin Açılışında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	3	7	Gaziantep STK Temsilcilerinin Katıldığı Yemekte Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	3	6	Türk Metal Sendikası Kadın İşçiler 20. Büyük Kurultayı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	3	4	Zümrüdüanka "Yeşilay Enleri" 2015 Ödül Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	3	4	"Kelam'dan Kalem'e Büyük Buluşma" Sergisi'nin Açılışında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2015	3	3	Türkmenistan Devlet Başkanı Gurbangulu Berdimuhamedov ile Ortak Basın Toplantısı'nda Yaptığı Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2015	2	28	28 Şubat'lar Bin Yıl Sürmez' Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	2	27	Valiler Toplantısı Münasebetiyle Verilen Yemekte Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Amerika'da farklı bir başkanlık sistemi var, hemen güneyine iniyorsun Meksika'da farklı bir başkanlık sistemi var, geliyorsun Küba'ya farklı, Arjantin farklı, Brezilya farklı, hepsi farklı, Rusya'ya gel farklı, Fransa'ya geliyorsun yarı başkanlık sistemi, farklı farklı sistemler var.Şu anda Amerika'daki, ne

											bileyim Latin Amerika'daki, Rusya, Avrupa vesaire buralardaki sistemler olmazsa olmaz deęil.
2015	2	25	TESKOMB Heyetini Kabulünde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	2	25	TÜRGEV Yurtları Toplu Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	2	24	Üçüncü Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	2	23	Geçici Köy Korucularından Oluşan Heyeti Kabul	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	2	21	Malatya'da Toplu Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	2	21	Malatya'da STK Temsilcileri ile Kahvaltıda yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	2	20	Elazığ, Toplu Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2015	2	18	AFAD, 22 Lojistik Merkez Toplu Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	2	17	İkinci Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	2	16	Yurtdışı Müteahhitlik Hizmetleri Ödül Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	2	13	Meksika Matus Romero Enstitüsünde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2015	2	11	Türk-Kolombiya İş Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2015	2	10	"1915; Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun En Uzun Yılı" Sempozyumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Türkiye bir şeyi şu anda iddia ediyor. Nedir bizim iddiamız? Diyoruz ki, dünya 5'ten büyüktür. Dünya 5'e mahkum mu olacak? Ne var bu 5'te? Amerika var, Rusya var, Çin var, Fransa var,

											İngiltere var. Peki biz bu 5 tane ülkeye mahkum muyuz?
2015	2	6	Bursa STK Temsilcilerinin Katıldığı Yemekte Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	2	6	Büyük Roman Ödülü' Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	2	6	Bursa, Toplu Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Dünyada şu gelişmiş ülkelere bakalım, Kasım ayında Türkiye'de G-20 toplantısı var ve bu G-20 toplantısının ağırlıkta olan ülkeleri, hepsi başkanlık sistemiyle yönetiliyor. Dünyayı yeniden keşfetmeye gerek yok. Bakınız, 18 ülke, bunların 10 tanesi

											başkanlık sistemiyle yönetiliyor, işte Amerika bunlardan bir tanesi, Arjantin, Rusya, Meksika, Brezilya, bunların hepsi başkanlık sistemiyle yönetiliyor.
2015	2	4	TESK Heyetini Kabulde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	İşte buyurun, Mısır'da bakın şimdi 183 kişiye idam cezası verildi. Peki, bu idam cezasını veren yargı ve onun arkasında duran darbeci yönetimi acaba Batıcı ülkeler şu anda telin ediyor mu? Avrupa'da idam yasak, yok. Peki, çıkın konuşun ya, bunlara bir şeyler

											söyleyin. Aynı şekilde Amerika, çıkın bir şeyler söyleyin. Aynı şekilde Rusya, çıkın bir şeyler söyleyin. Nasıl oluyor da hiçbir suçu olmayan bu insanlar darbeye karşı çıktıkları için 183 kişi idam ediliyor.
2015	2	2	Adalet Akademisi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Yakaladıkları saltanatın elden gitmesini istemiyorlar. Şu anda bakınız Suriye'de 350 bin insan öldürülmüş vaziyette. 7 milyon insan evinden barkından, her şeyinden uzak vaziyette. Fakat iki ülke bağlıyor işi. Neresi? Çin

											ve Rusya. Defaatle konuşmamıza rağmen iş çözülemiyor. Nerede adalet?
2015	1	31	Girişimci İşadamları Vakfı, Girişimcilik Ödül Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	1	31	TÜMSİAD 6. Genel Kurulu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	1	30	Kırşehir, Mucur Geycek Rüzgar Enerji Santrali'nin Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	1	30	Kırşehir Toplu Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	1	27	Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	1	22	Addis Ababa Üniversitesi'nde Fahri Doktora Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2015	1	22	Türkiye-Etiyopya İş Forumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0

2015	1	21	İslam İşbirliği Teşkilatı Parlamento Birliği (İSİPAB) 10. Konferansı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2015	1	20	Enerji Piyasaları Zirvesi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	1	19	Türkiye Genç İş Adamları Konfederasyonu (TÜGİK) Genel Başkanı Erkan Güral ve Konfederasyon Üyelerini Kabulünde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Bunu 9 seçimde de bizzat ben uluslararası camiada yaşadım. Gittiğim birçok ülkede; yani ABD, Avrupa ülkeleri Rusya hepsi bu sorularla kendileriyle yaptığımız görüşmelerde, hep bu sorularla karşılaştık.Sayın Putin buradan çıkarken bir şey söyledi: Bu eser dedi 'büyük devlet olmanın alametidir'

											dedi. Bakın çok ilginç, vak'a budur. Şimdi Kremlin'e gittiğiniz zaman oraya giden turistleri görürsünüz, binlerce on binlerce turistin gelip orayı gezdiğini görürsünüz. İstanbul'da da Dolmabahçe Sarayı, Topkapı Sarayı'nı geziyorlar.
2015	1	12	Topkapı Müzesi'nin Restorasyonu Tamamlanan Bölümlerinin Açılışında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2015	1	8	Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi/nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Burada bakanlığımızın yurt dışına öğrenci gönderme olayı, YÖK'ün yurt dışına öğrenci gönderme olayı

											aynı şekilde devlet olarak bizler görevlileri yurt dışına gönderme noktasında her türlü adımları attık, atıyoruz ve atacağız. Niye ? Dedik ya, “Müslümanın yitiğidir nerede bulursa alır.” Japonya’ya gönderilecekse orası. Rusya, Amerika, İngiltere, Malta her yere göndereceğiz.
2015	1	6	Yedinci Büyükelçiler Konferansı’nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	Bakıyorsunuz işte bir tahşiye olayı çıkıyor ve bu olaydan dolayı bir operasyon. Hemen olay nereye saptırılıyor? Basın özgürlüğü. Basın özgür değilmiş. İddia ile

2016	12	29	TÜBİTAK 2016 Yılı Ödüllerinin Tevdi Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	12	28	Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kültür ve Sanat Büyük Ödülleri Tevdi Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	12	22	Orman ve Su İşleri Bakanlığı Toplu Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Rusya'yla, Amerika'yla, öbür tarafta İran'la, Irak'la, bütün buralarla, Körfez ülkeleriyle, Katar, Suud, hepsiyle görüşmelerimizi yapıyoruz ve bütün bunlardan sonra da bu harekât başladı. Son dönemde, PKK terör örgütünün, DEAŞ terör örgütünün, Rus Büyükelçisine yapılan suikastta olduğu gibi FETÖ terör örgütünün

											alçakça, hunharca eylemleri kaçırılan fırsatların telafisi gayretidir.
2016	12	20	Avrasya Tüneli Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	Sözlerimin hemen başında dün Ankara'da alçakça bir saldırıda hayatını kaybeden Rusya Federasyonu Ankara Büyükelçisi Andrey Karlov'un ölümünden duyduğum üzüntüyü bir kez daha tekrarlamak istiyorum. Gerçekten bir diplomat olarak takdir ettiğim bir arkadaşı. 1 hafta kadar önce Tataristan Cumhurbaşkanı yanına getirmişti,

											adedir, işte bunu yaptılar.Dikkat ederseniz, eksiden dağda eylem yapan teröristler, şimdi şehirlere indi, hatta Rusya Federasyonu Büyükelçisinde olduğu gibi, misafirlerimizi de hedef almaya başladılar.
2016	12	14	32. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Bugün Sayın Putin'le akşama doğru tekrar bir görüşmem olacak, Dışişleri Bakanımız

											takip ediyor, Milli İstihbarat Müsteşarımız aynı şekilde takip ediyor, hala takip ediyoruz bir netice alırmıyız diye.
2016	12	10	Necip Fazıl Kısakürek Ödülleri Takdimi Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	12	7	31. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Dış ticaretimizde çok önemli yeri olan ülkelerle birer birer yerel paralarla ticaret dönemi başlıyor. Söylemişim ya, Rusya'yla görüşmeler yaptık demişim ve Rusya'dan bir şey mi alacağız, onların parasıyla, Rusya bizden mi alacak, bizim

											paramızla... Çin'le konuştum, biz Çin'den bir şey mi alacağız, Çin parasıyla, onlar bizden bir şey mi alacak, Türk Lirasıyla... İran'la da konuştuk, nitekim şimdi onlar da açıklamalarını yaptılar, İran Dinarıyla, onlar da bizim Türk Lirasıyla...
2016	12	5	Göktürk-1 Uydusu Faaliyete Alma Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Bilindiği gibi Rasat uydumuzu 2011 yılında Rusya'dan, Göktürk-2 uydumuzu ise Çin'den fırlatmıştık. Şimdi Göktürk-1 uydumuzu uzaya göndererek uzay çalışmalarında yeni bir adım daha atmış

											oluyoruz.
2016	12	4	Abdullah Gül Müze ve Kütüphanesi Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	12	1	30. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Bunun için biz Rusya'yla, İran'la, tüm Orta Asya Türk Cumhuriyetleriyle, Güney Asya ülkeleriyle, Çin'le, Japonya'yla siyasi ve ekonomik ilişkilerimizi en ileri seviyede tutmak istiyoruz. Batıyla olan ilişkilerimizi Doğuya, Doğuyla olan ilişkilerimizi Batıya alternatif görmüyoruz. Tam tersine, bu

												konumumuzu kendimiz ve dostlarımız açısından birbirini tamamlayan, birbirini bütünleyen ilişkilerin teminatı olarak kabul ediyoruz.
2016	11	29	Parlamentolararası Kudüs Platformu 'Kudüs ve Sürecin Problemleri' Sempozyumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	
2016	11	29	'Küresel Gelecek: İnsan Odaklı Akıllı Ekonomi' Temalı 7. Boğaziçi Zirvesinde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	
2016	11	25	KADEM Adalet Ve Kadın Kongresinde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	Şu anda bakın çok ilginç, 5 tane daimi üye; Fransa, İngiltere, Rusya, Avrupa değil mi? Bunun yanında Çin, Asya. Amerika, Amerika'nın bir kısmı, buraları temsil ediyorlar, ama

											diğer kıtalardan temsilci yok.
2016	11	23	Borsa İstanbul ile İslam Kalkınma Bankası Arasında İmzalanan Stratejik İşbirliği İçin Mutabakat Zaptı Gong Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2016	11	23	İSEDAK 32. Toplantısı Açılış Oturumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2016	11	22	"Türkiye'nin Yeni Güvenlik Konsepti" Konferansında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	11	21	NATO Parlamenter Asamblesi Sonbahar Genel Kurul Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	Rusya'yla ilişkilerimizde 24 Kasım hadisesi sonrasında başlatılan normalleşme sürecinde önemli bir ivme yakaladık. Bu sürecin bölgesel meselelere çözüm arayışları ve

											terörizmle mücadele çabalarına da olumlu yansımaları olacaktır diye düşünüyorum.
2016	11	15	TRT World Tanıtım Gecesinde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2016	11	14	Milli Tarım Projesi Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	11	13	Enerji Gemilerini Görev Yerlerine Uğurlama Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	11	10	10 Kasım Gazi Mustafa Kemal'i Anma Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	11	9	MÜSiAD 16. EXPO Fuarı ve 20. Uluslararası İş Forumu Kongresi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2016	11	7	Elektrik Santralleri Toplu Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	11	4	Sermaye Piyasaları Kongresi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2016	11	3	Yaşayan İnsan Hazinesi 'Geleceğe Aktarılan Mirasın Temsilcileri' Ödül Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	10	26	29. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Geçmişte Bulgaristan'daki, Yunanistan'daki, Makedonya'daki soydaşlarımız, Bosna'daki, Arnavutluk'taki, Kosova'daki kardeşlerimiz sıkıntıya düştüğünde, oralara 'kendi iç işleridir' deyip sırtımızı döndük mü, dönebilir miyiz? Ukrayna'da hadiseler başladığında Kırım'daki kardeşlerimizin sıkıntılarını 'Ukrayna'yla

											Rusya'nın meseledir' deyip görmezden geldik mi, gelebilir miyiz?Bizim Halep'le ilgili şu anda bir sorunumuz yok. Ama Halep'le ilgili itirazlarımız var, bunu da muhataplarımıza söylüyoruz. Bunu Sayın Putin'le de görüştüm.
2016	10	22	İnegöl Hacı Sevim Yıldız Mesleki Eğitim Kampüsü'nün Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	10	22	Bursa Toplu Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	10	19	28. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Dün akşam Sayın Putin'le bir görüşmem oldu ve bu görüşmede Halep'i konuştuk. Saat

											22 itibarıyla da orada hava bombardımanlarını durdurduklarını, durduracaklarını ifade ettiler.
2016	10	17	Uluslararası İstanbul Hukuk Kongresinde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2016	10	11	9. Avrasya İslam Şûrası Açılışında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2016	10	10	23. Dünya Enerji Kongresi Açılış Oturumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	Rusya'nın hâlihazırda Balkanlar üzerinden aldığımız gazı doğrudan Karadeniz üzerinden ülkemize sevk etmeyi öngören Türk Akımı Projesine de şu anda çalışmalarımız devam ediyor, buna olumlu bakıyoruz. Bu

2016	10	1	Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi 26. Dönem 2. Yasama Yılı Açılışında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Rusya, Almanya, İran gibi devletler ve Avrupa Birliği gibi kurumlarla ilişkilerimiz ile çeşitli uluslararası platformlardaki temsilimiz noktasında, çok önemli gelişmeler yaşadığımız bir dönemden geçiyoruz. Rusya ile geçtiğimiz yılın Kasım ayında maruz kaldığımız talihsiz krizin ardından, Haziran ayından itibaren, ilişkilerimizin normalleştirme yönünde önemli
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											adımlar atıyoruz. Görüş farklılıklarımızın olduğu konulardaki uzlaşma çabalarımızı sürdürmekle birlikte, ortak çıkarlarımıza odaklanarak, bu ülkeyle olan ilişkilerimizi eski seviyesinden de üzerine taşımayı hedefliyoruz. Nitekim enerji, turizm, tarım ihracatı başta olmak üzere, pek çok alanda ilişkilerimiz süratle eski seviyesine doğru yaklaşıyor.
2016	9	29	27. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Bir ayı bulmadı, Rusya'dan 60 bin turist Türkiye'ye girdi. Önümüzdeki sezon için

											çok daha ümitliyiz. Okulların açılması, yaz tatilinin sona ermesi, kriz senaryolarının çökmesiyle birlikte piyasada yaşanan durgunluğun da ortadan kalkacağına inanıyorum.
2016	9	22	ABD'deki Türk STK'larla Bir Araya Geldiği Toplantıda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2016	9	20	Birleşmiş Milletler Mülteciler Zirvesi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2016	9	20	Birleşmiş Milletler 71. Genel Kurulu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2016	9	8	81 İlin Valisini Kabulünde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	9	1	2016-2017 Adli Yıl Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2016	8	26	Yavuz Sultan Selim Köprüsü ile Otoyol Ve Bağlantı Yolları Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	8	18	İslam Dünyası Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları Birliği Heyetini Kabulünde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2016	8	16	Türkiye Barolar Birliği Heyetini Kabulünde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	8	10	'Demokrasi Nöbeti' Tutan Vatandaşlara Hitaben Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	8	7	'Demokrasi Ve Şehitler Mitingi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	7	29	Beştepe Millet Kongre ve Kültür Merkezi Açılışı ile Şehitleri Anma Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	7	23	15 Temmuz Darbe Girişimi ile İlgili Meydanlara Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2016	7	20	Bakanlar Kurulu Toplantısı Sonrasında Yaptıkları Basın Açıklaması	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	7	19	Millete Hitap	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	6	23	Kanaat Önderleri İle İftar Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	6	22	Fatih Sultan Mehmet Vakıf Üniversitesi 2015-2016 Akademik Yılı Mezuniyet Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	6	21	STK Temsilcileri İle İftar Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	6	19	Sanatçı ve Sporcularla İftar Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	6	18	Burgazada Korveti'nin Denize İndirilmesi ve Kınalıada Korveti'nin İlk Kaynak Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	6	18	'Büyük İstanbul Tarihi' Adlı Eserin Tanıtım Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2016	6	17	STK Temsilcileri ile İftar Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	6	16	İstanbul Yöneticileri ve İl Protokolü İftar Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	6	16	Emniyet Mensupları İle İftar Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	6	15	Büyükelçiler ve DEİK İş Konseyi Başkanları ile İftar Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2016	6	13	Milletvekilleri ile İftar Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	6	12	MÜSİAD Tarafından Düzenlenen İftar Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Gezi olayları, 17-25 Aralık darbe girişimi, bölücü terör örgütünün eylemleri, ardı ardına yaşadığımız 2 genel seçim, Suriye'deki gelişmeler, Rusya'yla yaşadığımız uçak krizi

												gibi sorunlar gerçekten yorucu ydu. İnşallah artık bu dönemi yavaş yavaş geride bırakacak, yeni bir heyecanla, yeni bir güçle 2023 hedeflerimize doğru süratle ilerleyeceğiz.
2016	6	11	36. Geleneksel Birlik Vakfı İftar Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	
2016	6	9	Louisville Ahıska Türkleri Kültür Merkezi'nin İftar Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	
2016	6	8	26. Muhtarlar Toplantısı ve İftar Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	
2016	6	7	Şehit Yakınları ve Gazilerle İftar Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	
2016	6	5	KADEM Yeni Hizmet Binası Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	

2016	6	5	Sebahattin Zaim Üniversitesi 2015-2016 Akademik Yılı Mezuniyet Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	6	4	Medipol Üniversitesi 2015-2016 Akademik Yılı Mezuniyet Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	6	2	Türkiye-Kenya İş Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	Müteahhitlerimiz, Kuzey Afrika, Rusya, Ortadoğu, Kafkaslar ve Orta Asya başta olmak üzere birçok coğrafyada pek çok projeler, ama büyük projeler yürütüyorlar.
2016	6	1	Türkiye-Uganda İş Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2016	6	1	Uganda Makerere Üniversitesi Tarafından Fahri Doktora Tevdi Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0

2016	5	24	Dünya İnsani Zirvesi Kapanış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2016	5	6	Eyüp Belediyesi Yeni Hizmet Binası ve Toplu Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	5	4	25. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	4	30	Çok Maksatlı Amfibi Hücüm Gemisi Anadolu'nun Sac Kesim Töreni'nde Yaptığı Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	4	30	İlim Yayma Cemiyeti'nin 65. Kuruluş Yılı Dönümü Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	4	29	Kut'ül Ammare Zaferinin 100. Yılı Dönümü Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Bu sayede Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda 1 milyonu dahi bulmayan bir güçle 1,5 milyon İngiliz, 1 milyon Rus, çeyrek milyon Fransız ve bir o kadar da

											Ermenilerin başı çektiği çeşitli azınlık çeteleriyle mücadele edebilmeyi başarabilmiştir
2016	4	26	BM Medeniyetler İttifakı 7. Küresel Forumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2016	4	19	24. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Osmanlı'nın son döneminde yetişip Cumhuriyet devrinde ülkenin yönetiminde söz sahibi olan kadronun çok önemli bir hissiyatı vardı. Bu, Yunanistan'ın, Bulgaristan'ın, ardından tüm Balkanlar'ın elimizden nasıl kayıp gittiğine şahitlik etmiş bir kadroydu. Dönemin Osmanlı yapısı içinde

											dini azınlık konumunda olanların çeşitli Avrupa ülkelerinden Rusya'ya kadar yabancı devletlerin tahriki ve koruması altında devleti nasıl parçaladıklarını bu insanlar bizzat yaşamışlardı.
2016	4	14	İslam İşbirliği Teşkilatı 13'üncü İslam Zirvesi'nin Açılışında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0

2016	4	6	23. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	<p>İşte şu anda Suriye'yle ilgili olaylarda bakıyorsunuz tek başına Rusya 'hayır' diyor iş bitiyor veya Çin'le beraber 'hayır' diyor iş bitiyor. Güvenlik Zirvesi'nden döndük, Rusya 'Türkiye taraf tutuyor' diyor. Eğer Azerbaycan-Ermenistan arasında taraf aranacaksa, burada en önemli taraf Rusya'dır, Rusya. Rusya, taraf olmayı sever. Rusya Ukrayna'da da taraf olmuştur, Gürcistan'da da taraf olmuştur,</p>
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											niçin bunları böyle yaptın?Türkmen dağlarını hangi uçaklar vuruyor? Rus uçakları vuruyor, rejim uçakları vuruyor. Çünkü maksat kimyasal silah değil, bu silahları kullananlarla mücadele hiç değil.
2016	3	26	Global Eğitim Zirvesi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2016	3	26	Dünya Türk Girişimciler Kurultayı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2016	3	25	Bozok Üniversitesi Tarafından Fahri Doktora Tevdi Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Aynı ikazı PYD terör örgütü değildir inadı içinde olan diğer ülkelere de yapıyorum. Belçika'da eylem yapan canlı bombaların DAİŞ

2016	3	25	Sorgun Toplu Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	3	21	'5 Bin Köye 5 Bin Orman Eylem Planı' ve 'Türkiye Çınar Yılı 2016' Projeleri ile Dünya Ormancılık, Su ve Meteoroloji Günleri'ni Kutlama Merasiminde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	3	18	18 Mart Şehitleri Anma Günü ve Çanakkale Deniz Zaferi'nin 101. Yılı Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	3	16	22. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	PKK'nın, PYD'nin, YPG'nin ellerinden çıkan silahlara baktığımız zaman, yakaladığımız silahlara baktığımız zaman neyi görüyoruz? Ya Rus silahlarını görüyoruz, ya Batının silahlarını görüyoruz, bunun

												çinde Amerika'nın silahları da var, diğerk ülkelerin silahları da var.
2016	3	13	Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Uluslararası İyilik Ödülleri Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	
2016	3	11	Burdur Toplu Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Biliyorsunuz Burdurlu bir Koca Mustafa vardır, kendisi Sarıkamış'ta Ruslara karşı savaşmıştır. Dedem de orada savaştı. Dedem de orada şehit oldu.Kardeşlerim, ben sizden bir şey istiyorum; aman ha birliğimizi kaybetmeyelim. Eğer	

											PYD'ye, YPG'ye Moskova'da ofis açtıranlar var bu ülkede.
2016	3	8	8 Mart Dünya Kadınlar Günü Resepsiyonu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	3	7	HAK-İŞ 5. Uluslararası Kadın Emeği Buluşması'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	Rusya'nın uçaklarıyla bombardıman ettiği Bayırbucak Türkmenlerini, oradaki Arapları, oradaki kardeşlerimizi niçin görmezden geliyorlar?
2016	3	4	Yeşilay 3. Zümrüdüanka Ödül Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	2	27	Ensar Vakfı 37. Genel Kurulu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2016	2	24	21. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Rusya'nın maruz kaldığı benzer saldırılar sonrasındaki tepkileri de halen hafızalarımızdadır. İkincisi de, Rusya ve İran gibi devletlerin Esad rejimine güçlü destek sağlayarak Suriye halkının özgürlük mücadelesini sabote etmişlerdir. Tüm Batı, tüm dünya; Amerika'sıyla, Rusya'sıyla, İran'ıyla, Avrupa Birliği'yle, Birleşmiş Milletler Teşkilatı'yla maalesef dünya Suriye'de insan onurunun yanında dik
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2016	2	23	Somali 6. Yüksek Düzeyli Ortaklık Forumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2016	2	20	'UNESCO Gastronomi Kenti: Gaziantep' Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	2	17	İkinci Mülki Amirler Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Kıymetli arkadaşlarım, son günlerde Suriye kaynaklı krizin daha da derinleştiğini, Rusya'nın müdahalesiyle iyice çıkmaza girdiğini görüyoruz. Rusya şu anda 500 bine yakın insanın ölümüne neden olan katil, zalim Esad'ın yanında yer almak suretiyle o da kendi kimliğini ortaya koymuştur. Ve şu andaki süreçte

										yağdırdığı bombalarla o da, işte çok açık, net ortada, çok ciddi bir insanlık suçuna ve bir savaş suçu işlemekle karşı karşıyadır. Ne diyor Birleşmiş Milletler? 'Eğer tespit edilirse, belirlenirse bu bir savaş suçudur' diyor. Daha ne arıyorsunuz? İşte buyurun hastaneler bombalanıyor ve o kuvözlerin içerisindeki fotoğrafları, resimleri görmediniz mi? Gönderin elemanlarınızı, oralarda yerinde incelemeleri
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2016	2	11	TÜGİK Genel Kurulu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Pazar yerleri, camiler, hastaneler, insanların canlarını kurtarmak için sığındığı binalar, hatta insani yardım gönüllüleri Rusya ve rejimin ağır bombardımanına maruz kalıyorŞayet Rusya'nın ve rejimin Halep'e yönelik hava bombardımanı, kara harekatı saldırıları devam ederse, bu sayının 600 binlere yükselme ihtimali var.Bu göç akınının en büyük sebebi Rusya'nın ve Esad rejiminin başlattığı sivil halkı
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											<p>hedef alan saldırıdır.Hem buna imkan sağlamayacak, hem rejimin ve Rusya'nın saldırılarını durdurmayacak, hem de Türkiye'den daha fazlasını yapmasını bekleyeceksiniz.</p>
2016	2	10	20. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	<p>Terör için İstanbul ve Ankara'nın Moskova'dan, Washington'dan, Berlin'den, Paris'ten, Roma'dan, Tahran'dan farklı olmadığını biz acı tecrübelerimizle çok iyi biliyoruz. Kimsenin canı değerinden daha kıymetli değildir.</p>

											Suriye’de ölenlerin canını, Avrupa’da, Rusya’da, Amerika’da yaşayanlardan daha az değerli görmek, insanlıktan nasibini almamaktır.
2016	2	10	Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı 30 Bin Öğretmen Atama Töreni’nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	2	9	Sigarayı Bırakma Günü Münasebetiyle Düzenlenen Resepsiyonda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	1	28	“Yeni Anayasa İçin Hep Birlikte” Temalı Programda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	1	26	Kaymakamlar Toplantısı’nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	1	24	Kayseri Ticaret Odası’nın ‘120. Onur Yılı Programı’nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2016	1	20	19. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2016	1	14	99 Baraj Ve Hidroelektrik Santralinin Toplu Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	İşte son Rusya krizinde hep birlikte gördük. Bu ülkenin anlamsız ve bizden ziyade kendisine zarar veren tutumu karşısında ilgili kurumlarımızın desteğiyle ihracatçılarımız hemen farklı pazarlara, diğer pazarlara yöneldiler, sağ olsunlar.

2016	1	12	8. Büyükelçiler Konferansı Vesilesiyle Düzenlenen Yemekte Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	Rusya'nın hem Suriye'de, hem Ukrayna'da attığı adımlar bu ülkeyle aramızda ciddi sorunlar ortaya çıkmasına yol açtı. Sormak lazım, Suriye kendilerini davet ettiği için Suriye'ye girmişler; 'Peki Gürcistan sizi davet etti de mi Gürcistan'a girdiniz veyahut da Ukrayna sizi davet etti de mi siz Ukrayna'ya girdiniz?'Suriye'de terörle mücadele bahanesiyle bölgeye gelen, asıl amacının Esad rejimini ayakta
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2016	1	6	18. Muhtarlar Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Siz gidip Amerika'da, İngiltere'de, Almanya'da, Fransa'da, Rusya'da veya başka herhangi bir ülkede o ülkenin bütünlüğüne yönelik adımlar atmaya kalkın bakalım da görün başınıza neler gelir.ejimin ve onu destekleyen Rusya'nın bombaladığı yerleşim alanlarında sürekli çocuklar, kadınlar, yaşlılar, yani masum insanlar hayatlarını kaybediyor. Rusya, yüzde 10 itibariyle DAES'i bombalarken, yüzde 90 itibariyle
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											Suudi Arabistan'da bu müessese var, İran'da da bu müessese var, Amerika'da var, Rusya'da var, Çin'de var, buralarda hala idam çalışıyor.
2017	12	20	42. Muhtarlar Toplantısı	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2017	11	10	Atatürk'ü Anma Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2017	11	9	41. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2017	11	8	Şehircilik Şûrasında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2017	11	6	Yeni AKM Projesi Tanıtım Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2017	11	2	'Türkiye'nin Otomobili' Ortak Girişim Grubunun Tanıtım Toplantısında	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

			Yaptıkları Konuşma								
2017	11	1	3. Turizm Şûrasında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Rus turistlerin sayısı da 3,5 milyona yaklaştığına göre, oradaki sorunlar da çözüldü demektir.
2017	10	29	29 Ekim Cumhuriyet Bayramı Resepsiyonunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2017	10	23	Aliya İzzetbegoviç'i Anma ve Aliya Dizisinin Tanıtımı Toplantısı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2017	10	20	D-8 Zirvesinde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2017	10	18	40. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2017	10	5	Kanaat Önderleri ve STK Temsilcileri İle Buluşma Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2017	10	1	Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi 26. Dönem 3. Yasama Yılı Açış Konuşması	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	G20 zirvesindeyiz, şahsımın resmi, Sayın Putin'in resmi ve Suudi Arabistan Kralı'nın resmi, üçlü resim.
2017	9	26	2017-2018 Akademik Yılı Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2017	9	25	Uluslararası Ombudsmanlık Konferansında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2017	9	21	TÜRKEN Vakfı Geleneksel Gala Yemeğinde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2017	9	21	Türk-Amerikan ve Amerikalı Müslüman Toplumuyla Buluşma Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2017	9	19	Birleşmiş Milletler 72. Genel Kurulunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	Ülkede kalıcı bir ateşkesin sağlanması ve barışın tesisi için Rusya ve İran'la birlikte tüm kesimlerin katılımıyla

												Astana toplantılarını başlattık.
2017	9	18	ABD’de Türkevi Binasının Temel Atma Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		0
2017	9	10	İslam İşbirliği Teşkilatı, Bilim Ve Teknoloji Zirvesinde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0		0
2017	8	22	39. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0		0
2017	6	1	38. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Şu anda Rusya da yaptırımlarını Sayın Putin’in attığı imza ile kaldırmış durumda. İnşallah Rusya’ya yönelik ihracatımız da hareketlenecektir.	
2017	5	30	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0		0

2017	5	29	Bakanlar Kurulu, AK Parti MKYK Üyeleri ve Grup Başkan Vekilleri ile İftar Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Hindistan, Rusya ve Amerika seyahatlerimiz ikili görüşme, Kuveyt ziyaretimiz ikili görüşme ve temel atma, Çin ve Belçika seyahatlerimiz de zirve toplantılarına iştirak amaçlıydı.
2017	5	21	AK Parti 3. Olağanüstü Büyük Kongresinde Yaptıkları Teşekkür Konuşması	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2017	5	21	AK Parti 3. Olağanüstü Büyük Kongresinde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	İşte Hindistan'a gittik, oradan Rusya'ya, Kuveyt'e gittik, 4,5 milyar dolarlık bir yatırımın orada temelini attık. Kuveyt'ten Çin'e, oradan Amerika'ya

											geçtik.	
2017	5	6	'Mukaddes Emanetler Işığında' Sergi ve Konferansında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0		0
2017	5	2	AK Parti'ye Katılım Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Yarın günübirlik bir Rusya seyahatimiz var, Sayın Putin'le bunları enine-boyuna görüşeceğiz, konuşacağız. Temenni ederim ki, oradan hayırlı bir neticeyle döneriz.	
2017	5	1	Hindistan Jamia Millia İslamia Üniversitesi'nin Fahri Doktora Takdim Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0		0
2017	5	1	Hindistan-Türkiye İş Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		0
2017	4	5	37. Muhtarlarla Buluşmada Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0		0

2017	3	3	3. Milli Kültür Şûrasında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2017	3	2	4. Uluslararası Ombudsmanlık Sempozyumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2017	3	1	13. EİT Liderler Zirvesinde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2017	2	13	Bahreyn’de “Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu’da Barışa Yönelik Girişimci Vizyonu” Konulu Konferansında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	Bu sürecin içerisinde bildiğiniz gibi Türkiye, Rusya, İran, tabii bunu üst düzeyde yürütmedik, en üst düzey burada dışişleri bakanlarıyla oldu ve Cenevre süreciyle bunu biraz daha yükseltmek istiyoruz.
2017	2	11	‘Cumhurbaşkanlığı Sistemi Sempozyumu’nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2017	2	8	36. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2017	2	2	Turizm Sektör Temsilcileri ile Buluşmasında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2017	2	1	TÜBA Ödülleri Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2017	1	19	35. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2017	1	12	34. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Bu örgütün Türkiye’de yaşanan darbe girişimindeki rolüne tereddütle yaklaşanlar, Rusya Federasyonu Büyükelçisine yapılan suikastın ardından herhalde ikna olmuşlardır diye düşünüyorum.

2017	1	9	9. Büyükelçiler Konferansı Vesilesiyle Düzenlenen Yemekte Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	Rusya ve İran'la Moskova'da düzenlediğimiz toplantı ve diğer görüşmelerle Astana sürecinin zeminini hazırladık.
2017	1	4	33. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma ??	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Rusya'yla birlikte yürüttüğümüz Suriye'de kalıcı bir ateşkesin sağlanması ve ardından anlaşmazlıklara görüşmeler yoluyla siyasi çözüm aranması çalışmalarında umut verici gelişmeler var. Sektörde önce Rusya, sonra terör olaylarıyla Avrupa tarafında ortaya çıkan kayıpların yakında

											sona ereceğini, bu sezondan itibaren yeniden yükselişin başlayacağını düşünüyorum.
2018	12	14	İslam İşbirliği Teşkilatı Birinci Yargı Konferansında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	Bunun için daha önce Cerablus'ta, Afrin'de, Rusya'yla vardığımız anlaşmayla İdlib'de yaptığımız gibi Fırat'ın doğusundaki bölgeleri de huzura ve güvene kavuşturmakta kararlıyız
2018	11	28	34. İSEDAK Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	Berlin'den Paris'e, Brüksel'den Moskova'ya kadar nerede olursa olsun teröristin kimliğine bakmadan, masumların

											öldürülmelerine önce biz karşı çıkacağız.
2018	11	27	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	Hem Rusya'yı, hem de Ukrayna'yı yakın dostu olarak gören, her ikisiyle de kurduğu derin işbirliğini geleceğe taşıma gayretinde bir ülke olarak Karadeniz'in bir an önce barış denizi haline gelmesini istiyoruz.Dünyanın siyasi, ekonomik ve askeri olarak ciddi tehditlerin pençesinde kıvrandığı bir dönemde Rusya ve Ukrayna'yı karşı karşıya değil yan yana görmekten

											memnuniyet duyarız.
2018	11	21	48. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	Pazartesi günü Rusya Devlet Bakanı dostum Putin'le birlikte yılda 31,5 milyar metreküp doğalgaz taşıma kapasitesine sahip olan Türkakım Projesinin boru hattının ülkemiz topraklarına çıkış törenine katıldık, izlediniz değil mi?
2018	11	20	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	Rusya Devlet Başkanı dostum Sayın Putin'le bu aşamaya gelmesini temin ettiğimiz Türkakım, ülkemiz için

											önemli ve stratejik bir enerji projesidir.
2018	11	19	Türkakım Projesi Deniz Bölümünün Tamamlanması Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	Bizim için Rusya Federasyonu, uzun vadeli iş birliği yapabileceğimiz güvenilir bir dost ve bu projedeki gibi önemli bir doğalgaz tedarikçisidir.Rusya Federasyonu ile iş birliğimiz çok geniş bir yelpazede ilerliyor.Biz, Rusya ile ikili münasebetlerimizin çerçevesini hiçbir zaman diğer ülkelerin taleplerin veya dayatmalarına göre belirlemedik. Daima

											Rusya ile uzun vadeli iş birlikleri kurmanın çabası içinde olduk.
2018	11	17	2018 Yılı Mevlid-i Nebi Haftası Açılışında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	11	17	Millet Bahçeleri Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	11	10	Atatürk'ü Anma Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	11	7	Sağlık Bilimleri Üniversitesi Akademik Yıl Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	11	6	"Fidanlar Fidanlarla Büyüyor" Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	11	6	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2018	11	4	Burgazada Korvetinin Deniz Kuvvetlerine Teslimi ve Denizaltı Aydınreis'in İlk Kaynak Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	11	3	Türkiye Gençlik Zirvesinde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	10	31	Milli Teknoloji Geliştirme Altyapıları Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	HABRAS'ın işletmeye alınmasıyla savunma sanayimiz, Amerika, İngiltere, Fransa, Almanya, Rusya ve Çin gibi sınırlı sayıda ülkenin sahip olduğu önemli bir yeteneğe ve altyapıya kavuşmuş oluyor.
2018	10	30	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	Son olarak İdlib'de büyük bir insani kriz yaşanmasının önüne geçerek Suriye halkının

											gerçek manada yanında olduğumuzu bir kez daha ispatladık. Bütün bu süreçleri büyük ölçüde Rusya ile birlikte yürüttük.
2018	10	29	İstanbul Havalimanı'nın Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	10	24	'Şûra-yı Devlet'ten Danıştay'a Uluslararası Sempozyumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2018	10	23	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Bu hafta sonu itibariyle Cumartesi günü İstanbul'da bir zirve gerçekleşecek, bu zirvede Rusya Devlet Başkanı Sayın Putin, Fransa Devlet Başkanı Sayın Macron ve Almanya Şansölyesi

											Merkel ile birlikte olacağız, drtl olarak İstanbul'da bir zirveyi gerçekleřtirip zellikle İdlib bařta olmak zere birok konuyu ele alma fırsatını yakalayacađız.
2018	10	23	Milli Eđitim Bakanlıđı 2023 Eđitim Vizyon Belgesi Tanıtım Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuřma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	10	20	Diyarbakır Genlik Festivali'nin Kapanıř Treninde Yaptıkları Konuřma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	10	19	SOCAR Star Rafinerisi'nin Aılıř Treninde Yaptıkları Konuřma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2018	10	18	Moldova - Gkođuz Yeri Ziyaretinde Komrat Halkına Hitaben Yaptıkları Konuřma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2018	10	16	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuřma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2018	10	16	Hâkim Ve Cumhuriyet Savcısı Kura Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	10	15	35. İl Müftüleri İstişare Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	10	12	2018 8'inci Dönem Uzman Erbaş Komando Kursiyerlerinin Bröve Takma Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	10	10	Türkiye-Afrika Ekonomi ve İş Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	Rusya, Çin, İran gibi ülkelerle bir süredir yürüttüğümüz müzakerelerde belli oranda mesafe kaydettik.
2018	10	3	Yükseköğretim Akademik Yılı Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2018	10	2	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Cenevre süreci derde derman olmadı, onun için Astana sürecini başlattık ve Astana sürecinde Rusya, Türkiye, İran, bunun yanında Birleşmiş Milletler müşterek bir çalışmaya girdik ve bu çalışmayla birlikte bir süreç oluştu. Önce Soçi, ardından Ankara, ardından Tahran süreci zirve olarak devam etti ve akabinde de bizler Rusya'yla bir Soçi Zirvesini yaptık. Ve bildiğiniz gibi İdlib çevresinde 12 gözlem noktası bize ait, 10
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											masada yemek yediğimiz Sayın Lavrov'la etraflıca görüşme fırsatım oldu. Zira Sayın Putin Amerika'ya gelmemiști, Dış İşleri Bakanıyla bunu orada etraflıca görüşme imkanım oldu.
2018	10	1	TBMM 27. Dönem 2. Yasama Yılı Açış Konuşması	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	Rusya ile her alanda çok sıkı ve hızla gelişen ilişkiler içindeyiz. Suriye politikasından turizme, savunma sanayinden enerjiye kadar her alanda Rusya'yla,

											<p>lkelerimizin ortak ıkarına olan projeleri hayata geiriyoruz. Biliyorsunuz, bir dnem, Rusya ile aramızı bozmak iin de pek ok provokasyon yapıldı. Karşılıklı olarak saėduyuyu ve soėukkanlılıėı elden bırakmayarak, bu sıkıntıların stesinden geldik. İnşallah, nmzdeki dnemde Rusya ile aramızdaki bu olumlu işbirliėi iklimini daha da gçlendireceėiz.</p>
2018	9	25	73. Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Kurulunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	Son olarak Rusya'yla birlikte imzaladığımız

											Soçi mutabakatıyla rejimin 3,5 milyon sivilin yaşadığı İdlib çatışmasızlık bölgesine yönelik kanlı saldırılarının önüne geçtik.
2018	9	24	TURKEN Vakfı Gala Yemeğinde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Başından beri işte Rusya ve İran ile Astana'da başlattığımız süreç, Suriyeli kardeşlerimizin sıkıntılarının bir nebze olsun hafiflemesine vesile oldu.Orada bildiğiniz gibi önce Soçi Zirvesi, ardından Ankara Zirvesi, ardından Tahran Zirvesi ve daha sonra işte Soçi'de bizim

												Sayın Putin'le biraraya gelişimiz, ilgili bakan arkadaşlarımla beraber yaptığımız görüşmeyle hamdolsun 10 maddeden oluşan belgeyi savunma bakanlarımızın da imza altına almasıyla huzurumuzda böylece yeni bir süreci başlattık ve İdlib'de ürkülen, korkulan büyük bir katliamın önüne geçilmiş oldu.
2018	9	24	ABD'de Türk Ve Müslüman Toplumuyla Buluşma Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	
2018	9	22	TEKNOFEST İstanbul'da Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	

2018	9	19	Gaziler Günü Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Az önce Savunma Bakanım ifade etti, işte Sayın Putin ile Soçi'deki yaptığımız görüşmelerde idlib'le alakalı o barış sürecini nasıl başlattığımızı ifade ettiler ve her iki tarafın savunma bakanları artık o belgeye imzayı attılar.
2018	9	18	2018-2019 Eğitim Öğretim Dönemi Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	9	15	Bakü'nün Kurtuluşunun 100. Yıl Dönümü Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2018	9	2	Kırgızistan-Türkiye Manas Üniversitesi Fahri Doktora Unvanı Tevcih Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	Yani buradan yetişecek Kırgız gençlerin özellikle ülkemizde birer misyon temsilcisi olması ne kadar önemliyse, aynı

											şekilde yetişecek Türk gençlerinin de Kırgızistan'da birer misyon temsilcisi olması, hatta farklı ülkelerde Rusya'da, Çin'de bu tür görevleri ifa etmeleri çok büyük önem ifa ediyor diye düşünüyorum.
2018	9	2	Türkiye-Kırgızistan İş Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	Ha biz Rusya'yla S-400 anlaşması yaptık, birileri bundan rahatsız oluyor. Kusura bakmayın, biz hem kendimizi korumada-savunmada, hem de bu noktada atacağımız adımlarda herhalde birilerinden izin alacak

											ülkelerle yerel para birimleri üzerinden ticaret yapmanın şu anda çalışmalarını hızla sürdürüyoruz
2018	8	31	Kara Astsubay Meslek Yüksekokulu Mezuniyet Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	8	30	Milli Savunma Üniversitesi Harp Okulları Mezuniyet Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	8	30	30 Ağustos Zafer Bayramı Resepsiyonunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	İdlib'de yeni bir Halep faciası yaşanmaması için Ruslar ve İranlılarla ortak çalışmalar yürütüyoruz.

2018	8	29	Radyo Televizyon Gazetecileri Derneği 2017 Yılı Medya Oscarları Ödül Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	8	26	Anadolu'nun Fethi Malazgirt 1071 Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	8	13	10. Büyükelçiler Konferansı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	1	0	0	0		1	Rusya ile memleketimizin çıkarlarının gerektirdiği biçimde ilişkilerimizde ilerlemeler kaydettik.
2018	7	15	15 Temmuz Şehitler Köprüsü Buluşmasında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	7	15	15 Temmuz Şehit Yakınları ve Gazileri ile Yemek Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Rusya, Çin, Afrika, Güney Amerika, Asya gibi tüm coğrafyalarda dünyanın yükselen güçleriyle mümkün olan en geniş işbirliği zeminini kurmaya çalışıyoruz.

2018	7	13	TBMM Başkanı Binali Yıldırım'a Devlet Şeref Madalyası Tevcih Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	7	13	Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kabinesi Birinci Toplantısı Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	7	9	Cumhurbaşkanlığı Göreve Başlama Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	6	24	AK Parti Genel Merkezinde Yaptıkları Balkon Konuşması	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	5	20	Uluslararası Saraybosna Üniversitesi Fahri Doktora Tevcih Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2018	5	20	6. UETD Genel Kurulunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2018	5	18	Kudüs'e Destek Mitinginde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	5	18	İslam İşbirliği Teşkilatı Olağanüstü Zirvesinde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0

2018	5	16	Şehit Aileleriyle İftar Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Olaylar başladığından bu yana Filistin Devlet Başkanı Mahmud Abbas, Ürdün Kralı II. Abdullah, Malezya Başbakanı Mahathir Muhammed, Kuveyt Emiri El Sabah, Suudi Arabistan Kralı Selman bin Abdülaziz, İran Cumhurbaşkanı Muhammed Ruhani, Katar Emiri Şeyh Temim el Sani, Sudan Cumhurbaşkanı Ömer el Beşir, Endonezya Devlet Başkanı Joko Widodo, Rusya Federasyonu Devlet Başkanı Vladimir Putin,
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											Almanya Şansölyesi Sayın Merkel ve Katolik aleminin ruhani lideri Sayın Papa Francis ile telefon görüşmeleri yaptım.
2018	5	14	Londra'da, Chatham House'da Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	İdlib bölgesinin güvenliği için, Rusya ve İran'la birlikte başlattığımız çalışmaları önemli bir noktaya getirdik.
2018	5	13	Türk-İngiliz Tatlıdil Forumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2018	5	12	Danıştay'ın 150. Kuruluş Yıldönümü Yemeğinde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	5	8	Restorasyonu Tamamlanan 250 Eserin Toplu Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Dostoyevski ve Tolstoy'un Rus, Shakespeare'in İngiliz, Victor Hugo'nun Fransız

											kültürü temalı eserlerinin her biri dünya klasiği değil midir?
2018	5	8	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Dış politikada Suriye, Irak, İran, Balkanlar, Avrupa Birliği, Amerika, Rusya, Orta Asya, Afrika başta olmak üzere her alanda yapacağımız çok iş var.
2018	5	4	Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın İstanbul Gençlik Festivali Gençler İle Buluşma Programı	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	4	30	Özbekistan Âli Meclisi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2018	4	28	İzmir Ticaret Odası Özel Meclis Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2018	4	25	Anayasa Mahkemesi'nin 56. Kuruluş Yıldönümü Yemeğinde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	4	24	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	4	17	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Suriye konusunda Türkiye, kimsenin mutlak yanında veya mutlak karşısında değildir. Biz Suriye'de hem kendi güvenlik önceliklerimizi, hem Suriyeli kardeşlerimizin haklarını, hukuklarını savunuyoruz, bunun için mücadele veriyoruz. Bu çerçevede, nerede, ne zaman kiminle birlikte hareket etmemiz

												gerekliyorsa ediyoruz. Çıkmış bir tanesi, 'Rusya'yla Türkiye'nin arasını açtık' diyor.
2018	4	16	Müslüman Azınlıklar Zirvesi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	
2018	4	16	Global Girişimcilik Kongresi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	
2018	4	12	Başkentray Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Ne Amerika'yla olan müttefikliğimizden, ne de Rusya'yla enerjiden güvenliğe kadar geniş bir alanda kurduğumuz stratejik ilişkilerimizden, ne de İran'la bölge sorunlarının çözümünde birlikte çalışmaktan vazgeçmek gibi bir niyetimiz	

												yoktur. Bizim Rusya, İran ve Çin gibi ülkelerle kurduğumuz ilişkiler, Batıyla olan ilişkilerimizin alternatifi değil, tam tersine tamamlayıcıdır.Rusya ve İran'la bölgemiz açısından çok önemli bir zirve gerçekleştirdik.
2018	4	11	'Romanlar Buluşma' Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	
2018	4	10	TİKA Koordinatörlerini Kabulünde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	

2018	4	10	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	O da, Mersin Akkuyu'da Türkiye'nin 60 yıllık rüyası olan ilk nükleer güç santralının temelini Rusya Devlet Başkanı Sayın Putin'le birlikte canlı bağlantıyla attık.Rusya'yla biliyorsunuz enerjiden savunma sanayine, turizmden tarıma kadar çok geniş bir alanda ve çok derinlikli ilişkilerimiz var.Ticaret hacmimiz şu anda Rusya ile 22 milyar doları buldu; ama bizim hedefimiz 100 milyar dolar... Rusya'yla önümüzde kullanılmayı
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											<p>bekleyen daha pek çok fırsat olduğunu biliyoruz.Çarşamba günü ise Rusya ve İran'la birlikte ilkinin Soçi'de yaptığımız zirvenin ikincisini Ankara'da gerçekleştirdik. Rusya ve İran'la Suriye krizinin çözümünde bir dönüm noktası olan bu zirveleri ve aramızdaki yakın işbirliğini devam ettirmekte kararlıyız.</p>
2018	4	9	Proje Bazlı Teşvik Sistemi Tanıtımı ve Teşvik Belgesi Dağıtım Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	<p>İşte Akkuyu Nükleer Güç Santralinin ülkemize kazandırdığı aynı zamanda da kalifikasyonu yüksek,</p>

											kariyeri yüksek gençler... Şimdi bu mühendislerimiz Rusya'da yetiştiriliyor.
2018	4	3	Akkuyu Nükleer Güç Santrali Temel Atma Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	Öncelikle kıymetli dostum Rusya Federasyonu Devlet Başkanı Sayın Putin'e ve heyet üyelerine ülkemize hoş geldiniz diyorum.Bugün gerek ülkemizin kalkınması adına, gerekse Rusya Federasyonu ile enerji işbirliğimiz adına gerçekten tarihi bir ana şahitlik ediyoruz. Akkuyu Nükleer Güç Santralini temelini bugün burada değerli

											noktasında da yakın işbirliği içindedir.Aynı şekilde Rusya ile bölgesel meseleler hususundaki işbirliğimizi de her geçen gün daha da artırarak sürdürmekte kararlıyız.
2018	4	2	İstanbul'da Yapımı Tamamlanan 80 Okul ve 59 Okul Spor Salonunun Toplu Açılış Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	4	1	Oğulpınar Hudut Karakolu'nu Ziyaretlerinde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	3	20	101 İlçeye Doğalgaz Arzı Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	Bir başka önemli projemiz, Rusya Federasyonu'yla yürüttüğümüz Türk Akımıdır. Santralin temelini çok yakında

											değerli dostum Rusya Federasyonu Devlet Başkanı Sayın Putin ile beraber atmayı planlıyoruz. Rusya'yla Türk Akım'da, Akkuyu Nükleer Santralinde birlikte hareket ediyor, birlikte kazanıyoruz, birlikte kazanacağız.
2018	3	20	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	3	19	Avukatlık Mesleğinden Hâkim ve Savcılığa Geçen 7. Dönem Adaylarının Kura Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	3	18	18 Mart Şehitleri Anma ve Çanakkale Zaferi'nin 103. Yıldönümünü Kutlama Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

2018	3	18	1915 Çanakkale Köprüsünün Kule Temel Betonunu Atma ve Kule Kazık Çakım Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	3	15	'Liseliler Destanı Yazıyor' Şiir ve Kompozisyon Yarışması Ödül Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	3	14	46. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	3	14	14 Mart Tıp Bayramı Münasebetiyle Hekimleri Kabulünde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Suriye rejimi zaten şu anda Rusya'yla beraber hareket ediyor. Öyleyse koalisyon güçleri kimle hareket ediyor? Söyleyeyim; YPG ve burada beraber hareket ettiği PYD. Peki, bu üsler burada niye var? Akla iki şey getirir; ya Türkiye, ya İran. Herhalde Rusya'ya karşı

											bu işi kullanacak değil. O zaten 3. Dünya Savaşının ifadesi anlamına gelir. Bunları hep konuşuyoruz, ama tıp bayramında da bunları konuşmamızda fayda var. Çünkü her şeye hazır olacağız.
2018	3	13	İyilik Ödülleri Takdim Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Mali'den Somali'ye, Kazakistan'dan Belarus'a, Moskova'dan Suriye'ye, Arakan'dan Amerika'ya kadar gittiğimiz her yerde Türkiye Diyanet Vakfının o topraklara vurduğu iyilik mühürlerine şahit oluyoruz.

2018	3	8	'Kadının Güçlenmesi Strateji Belgesi ve Eylem Planı'nın Tanıtım Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	3	7	HAK-İŞ Dünya Kadın Günü Programında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	3	6	Yargıtay'ın 150. Yılı Sempozyumu ve Yeni Yargıtay Binası Temel Atma Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	3	6	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Bizim bölgeyi asli sahibi olan Suriyeli kardeşlerimizin yaşayabileceği güvenli, huzurlu, altyapıdan konuta kadar her bakımdan insani şartlara sahip bir yer haline getirmek istediğimizi herkes biliyor, bunları onlarla hep konuştuk,

												Batılılarla da konuştuk. Amerika, Rusya, onlarla da konuştuk. Rusya ve İran'la anlaştığımız ve birlikte olduğumuz hususlar var, anlaşılmadığımız ve dolayısıyla karşı karşıya geldiğimiz konular da var. Türkiye S400'leri alacağı zaman, sizlerden istediğinde vermeyeceksin, ama Rusya'dan S400'leri alma yoluna gidince, anlaşınca, 'NATO ülkeleri için bu yanlıştır' diyeceksin.
2018	2	22	Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Kültür Sanat Özel Ödülleri Töreninde Yaptıkları	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	

			Konuşma								
2018	2	13	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	2	10	'Vefatının 100. Yılında Sultan Abdülhamid'i Anlamak' Konulu Konferansta Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	2	8	45. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Ve bunun yanında Irak'ın kuzeyinde sahnelenen oyunu Tahran ve Bağdat yönetimleriyle birlikte bozduk. Bunu takiben, Rusya ve İran'la birlikte İdlib'de güvenli bölge oluşturulmasına yönelik adımları attık.Bunların mantığına göre, PKK Suriye'de olabilir, DEAŞ Suriye'de olabilir,

											Amerika Suriye’de olabilir, Rusya Suriye’de olabilir, İran Suriye’de olabilir, Fransa, İngiltere ve daha nice ülke çeşitli görüntü ve bahaneler altında Suriye’de olabilir.
2018	2	6	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Burada kendilerine söylediğim için bu konuda rahatım, çok açık, net bir şey var; o zaman sizin Türkiye’ye yönelik hesabınız var, sizin İran’a yönelik hesabınız var veya olmaz ya Rusya’ya yönelik hesabınız var.
2018	1	30	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Bu arada Amerika Birleşik Devletleri

											Başkanı, Rusya Devlet Başkanı, Fransa Cumhurbaşkanı ve daha pek çok liderle bölgemizdeki gelişmeleri ve ikili ilişkilerimizi değerlendirdiğimiz telefon görüşmelerimiz oldu.
2018	1	24	44. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	1	16	Ak Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	1	11	43. Muhtarlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Neler çektik... Daha bakin, Sarıkamış'ın 103. yıldönümünü yeni kutladık. Benim dedem de orada şehit oldu. Ve onlar o bedeli ödediler,

											ama Ruslar orada daha farklı bir bedel ödedi.
2018	1	10	Kaymakamlar Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	1	10	Adalet Şûrasında Yaptıkları Konuşma	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
2018	1	9	AK Parti Grup Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Bugün Sarıkamış Harekatının sona erişinin 103. yıldönümü. Herkes Sarıkamış'ı askerlerimizin yaşadıkları facialara bakarak bir yenilgi, bir ricat sanır. Halbuki Sarıkamış bir zaferdir. Kahraman askerlerimiz tüm zorluklara ve eksikliklere rağmen Doğu Anadolu illerimizi işgal eden Rus

