PROBLEMS WITH POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF IMMIGRANTS: THE CASE OF BELGIAN TURKS

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OF
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ZEHRA ÇELİK

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This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and International Relations.

Examining Committee Members:

	DECISION	SIGNATURE
Assist. Prof. Şirin Duygulu Elcim (Thesis Advisor)	ACCEPTED	
Assist. Prof. Muzaffer Şenel	Accepted	
Assist. Prof. Nihan Akıncılar Köseoğlu	ACCEPTED	

This is to confirm that this thesis complies with all the standards set by the Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences of İstanbul Şehir University.

Date

18.07.2019

Seal/Signature

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and standards of ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and standards, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to that work.

First Name, Last Name: ZEHRA GELIK

Signature

ABSTRACT

PROBLEMS WITH POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF IMMIGRANTS: THE CASE OF
BELGIAN TURKS

Çelik, Zehra

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There is a political representation problem of Turkish-origin immigrants in Belgium because, according to interviews conducted for this research, the interests of Turkish people are not represented by elected Turkish politicians. This thesis aims to understand the reasons lying behind the representation problem of Turkish immigrants. First, the ratio of Turkish politicians to all politicians in the assemblies was examined from municipal councils to federal government. When this ratio was compared with the ratio of Turkish population to the general population, it was revealed that there was descriptive representation. Thus, the representation problem was not about the lack of descriptive representation, but it was about the lack of substantive representation of their interests. In other words, Turkish people are represented in assemblies proportional to their population size, however, their interests are not substantially represented. The interviews conducted with Turkish politicians and the elites of Turkish people in Belgium revealed that there can be four different reasons for the representation problem of Belgian Turks. First, Turkish people do not have demands regarding their community issues, rather they have demands about their daily problems and personal interests. Second, Turkish politicians have interests, priorities and self-perceptions different from Turkish community in Belgium. Third, party politics and institutional structure in Belgium are limiting factors for Turkish politicians. Fourth, home state effect shapes the political participation patterns of Turkish people and it determines the political activities of Turkish politicians. In this respect, this thesis contributes to the literature on political representation of migrants in Belgium which is an almost under-researched area.

ÖZ

GÖÇMENLERİN SİYASİ TEMSİL PROBLEMLERİ: BELÇİKALI TÜRKLER ÖRNEĞİ

Çelik, Zehra

Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans Programı

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Bu çalışma için yapılan görüşmeler ortaya koyuyor ki Belçika'daki Türk kökenli göçmenlerin politik temsil sorunu var çünkü Türk halkının çıkarları seçilmiş Türk siyasetçiler tarafından temsil edilmiyor. Bu tez, Türk göçmenlerin temsil probleminin ardında yatan nedenleri anlamayı amaçlamaktadır. İlk olarak, belediye meclislerinden federal hükümete kadar meclislerdeki Türk siyasetçilerin tüm siyasetçilere oranı incelenmiştir. Bu oran, Türk nüfusunun genel nüfusa oranı ile karşılaştırıldığında, betimleyici olarak nüfusla orantılı bir temsil olduğu ortaya çıkmıştır. Dolayısıyla, Türkler' in temsil sorunu, betimleyici temsilin eksikliği ile ilgili değil, ancak çıkarlarının esas olarak temsil edilmemesi ile ilgilidir. Diğer bir ifadeyle, Türk halkı, nüfus büyüklüğü ile orantılı olarak meclislerde temsil edilmekle birlikte, çıkarları büyük ölçüde temsil edilmemektedir. Türk siyasetçilerle ve Belçika'daki Türk halkının önde gelenleriyle yapılan görüşmeler, Belçika Türklerinin temsil sorunu için dört farklı neden olabileceğini ortaya koymuştur. Birincisi, Türk halkının, genel toplumsal sorunlarıyla ilgili değil, günlük sorunları ve kişisel çıkarları hakkında talepleri olmasıdır. İkincisi, Türk siyasetçilerin Belçika'daki Türk toplumundan farklı çıkarları, öncelikleri ve kendi algıları olmasıdır. Üçüncüsü, parti politikaları ve Belçika'daki kurumsal yapı, Türk politikacılar için sınırlayıcı faktörlerdir. Dördüncü olarak, "ana devlet" etkisi, Türk halkının siyasal katılım kalıplarını şekillendirmekte ve Türk siyasetçilerin siyasal faaliyetlerini belirlemektedir. Bu bağlamda, bu tez, neredeyse araştırılmamış bir alan olan Belçika'daki göçmenlerin siyasi temsili ile ilgili literatüre katkıda bulunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk göçmenler, göçmenlerin siyasi temsili, betimleyici temsil, asli temsil, Belçika

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF MAPS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

More than fifty years have passed since the first Turkish immigrants went to European countries, such that we are talking about the third generation of those immigrants. Up to the present, political incorporation of the immigrant groups has been understudied by scholars. Rather than the political dimension of the integration, economic and social integration of them have been studied by the academics (Bloemraad & Schönwalder, 2013; Bird, 2003; Garbaye, 2005).

Political integration of the immigrants was not an important issue either for the receiving states or the immigrants themselves. European countries accepted immigrant workers to meet their labor force needs for a temporary period. Likewise, immigrant workers also left their country with the dream of the day that they would earn enough money and return back. Both the receiving countries and the immigrant workers thought that it was a temporary migration. However, this was not the case. migrants have not returned, they continued to live in the host country. Moreover, they are not temporary workers anymore. Although European countries have different legal processes for the acquisition of the citizenship status, migrants of the 1960's and 1970's are now citizens of the countries that they migrated to. The status of citizenship brings about the rights and responsibilities to the individuals, thus, it makes immigrants' political participation possible at all levels. However, in Belgium, foreigners from third countries, outside the EU, have the right to vote in local level elections where municipal and provincial assemblies are elected (Jacobs, Martiniello & Rea, 2002, p.202). As a result, immigrant background people without Belgian nationality can participate in local level politics. In this respect, this thesis aims to contribute to the literature on political participation and representation of Turkish immigrants in Belgium. In the first step, it was examined whether there is a representation problem of Turkish people in Belgium. In the second step, the underlying reasons for the representation problem of Turkish immigrants were discussed.

In the literature, the number of researches about the political participation and representation of immigrants are very limited. Besides, these researches are constrained to the immigrants' political participation in the American context, especially of the Hispanic and African origin people (Quintelier, 2009, p. 919). Accordingly, there is a gap in the literature regarding the political integration of the immigrant-origin minorities in Western European countries. Bloemraad et al. (2013) argue that political participation and representation of immigrants in Europe has attracted neither academicians nor politicians, actually, "political integration has received less attention than other integration dynamics, such as incorporation into labor markets or educational systems" (p. 567).

According to Martiniello (2005), there are four dimensions of political integration of immigrants (p.2). The first dimension is that the receiving country has to grant some rights to the immigrants. If immigrants have more political rights, they will become more integrated politically. The second dimension of the integration is the way that immigrants identify themselves. If migrants identify themselves with the receiving society, the level of political incorporation will increase. The third dimension is the level of democratic experience of the migrants. If migrants have embraced the culture of democracy, if their home countries are also democracies, their political integration will be positively affected. The fourth and the final dimension of the political integration is the political participation and representation of immigrants in the host countries. This thesis will mainly discuss the final dimension of the political integration.

Political dimension is an important part of the migrants' integration and it deserves attention although migrants had "a kind of devoir de reserve (duty not to interfere)" and they were expected to not to intervene in politics in the host country (Martiniello, 2005, p.1). The only duty of the immigrant workers was working and producing surpluses for the host country's economy. Migrants were welcomed economically, but the other dimensions were neglected. However, even if the political incorporation of the migrants was not considered to be important, there are politically active people having immigrant origins. Furthermore, in the municipal

councils, city councils and even in parliaments, there are politicians who have ethnic backgrounds.

1.1. The Aim of the Study

This thesis is intended to contribute to the discussion of the political integration of immigrant people, mainly to the representation of immigrant people in the host country. In this respect, this thesis will be about the problems with political representation of immigrants in the case of Belgian Turks. Preliminary observations and interviews conducted in Belgium show that there is a representation problem of Turkish immigrants in Belgium. This claim has a place in the literature because studies on immigrant political representation argue that "countries that experienced major immigration in the 1950s and 1960s are still far away from equal representation" although those immigrant flows to European countries are not recent phenomena and those migrants have acquired citizenship to a large extent (Bloemraad et al., 2013, p.564). However, there is still a "representation gap" for immigrant communities' interests in European countries (Aktürk, 2010, p.72). In the literature, there is a similar argument for the Belgian Turks; "the Turkish community is in relative terms still underrepresented in the political sphere in Belgium" (Jacobs, Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2006, p.145). Is there a political representation problem of Belgian Turks in Belgium as it is argued in the literature? If Turkish people have problems with regard to political representation, why? What are the underlying reasons for the representation problem of Belgian Turks? This thesis aims to understand the causes of representation problem of Turkish immigrants in Belgium by conducting interviews with the opinion leaders of Turkish community and Turkish politicians who are active in Belgian politics. In this respect, this study contributes to studies on migrants' political representation because it examines the perspective of both the Turkish people and Turkish politicians regarding the representation problem.

While searching for answers to the above questions, two types of political representation should be examined. According to literature, it can be argued that the representation problem of migrants in Europe can originate from the lack of descriptive representation or the lack of substantive representation. Descriptive

representation becomes possible if a group is represented in assemblies proportional to its size in the whole population, on the contrary, substantive representation requires for the material benefits given to that particular group by virtue of the representation of the interests of that group in the assemblies (Donovan, 2012). Whilst descriptive representation is related to the numerical presence of ethnic representatives in the legislative organs, substantive representation is about the content and the quality of that representation. Thus, dynamics of these two types of representation are different. Descriptive representation does not automatically lead to substantive representation. However, many studies argue that the former paves the way for the latter (Donovan, 2012, p.25). It can be claimed that descriptive representation is necessary but not sufficient condition for substantive representation.

In order to understand the degree of descriptive representation, studies on political representation of migrants compare the proportion of immigrant politicians in the assemblies and the ratio of immigrant population to the general population (Aktürk, 2010; Bloemraad et al., 2013). First, if the population sizes of immigrants are not mirrored in assemblies by their representatives, it can be argued that representation problem stems from the lack of descriptive representation. Second, if the requirements of descriptive representation are met, if there is descriptive representation of migrants in assemblies proportional to their population sizes, it can be claimed that the representation problem arises from the lack of substantive representation.

Moreover, the literature focuses on variables such as age, gender, and ethnicity as determinants of the intersectional identities of migrants (Donovan, 2012); the level of education and the occupation as determinants of the socio-economic status of migrants (Bird 2003) and; party politics and institutional structures as determinants of the broader social and institutional contexts (Koopmans, Statham, Giugni & Passy, 2005; Michon & Vermeulen, 2013; Rae 1969) while analyzing the factors shaping the patterns of immigrant political participation and representation in Europe. Apart from those factors, "politicians have goals, interests and values of their own"

(Przeworski, Stokes, & Manin, 1999, p.30), this aspect must be taken into account as analyzing the political representation.

1.2. Methods and Data

In this thesis, I intended to search for the underlying reasons for the representation problem of the Turkish immigrant community in Belgium. I preferred to use the terms of "Belgian Turks" and "Turkish immigrants living in Belgium" to refer to any Turk in Belgium, in other words, Turkish people who immigrated to Belgium after 1960s and their descendants who are living in Belgium. The terms of "Belgian Turks" and "Turkish immigrants" involve in, first, Turkish people who have residence permit without Belgian citizenship; second, Turkish people who have dual citizenship of Belgium and Turkey, and third, Turkish people who have only Belgian citizenship. Those Turkish people do not constitute an ethnically homogenous community, rather, they involve in Turkish-origins and Kurdish-origins. They are also not homogenous ideologically, there are secular, conservative, nationalist and conservative nationalist Turkish people. Thus, in this thesis, the term of Turkish people does not refer to those who are ethnically Turkish origin, rather, the term refers to those who are Turkish nationals of Turkish Republic and their descendants.

As it is argued in the beginning, this research was started with the assumption that there is a representation problem of Turkish-origin immigrants in Belgium. This assumption was reached at as a result of preliminary interviews and observations made in the cities of Gent and Brussels in Belgium between September 2017 and February 2018. Since this assumption of representation problem is confirmed by the studies on literature, the research was started. First, whether Turkish people have reached at descriptive representation in proportion to their population sizes is investigated. As a result, it can be argued that Turkish people have achieved a good level of descriptive representation in municipalities where Turkish people are highly concentrated, and the representation problem does not stem from the lack of descriptive representation. Second, the underlying reasons for representation problem of Turkish immigrants in Belgium were searched for. In order to understand the conflict axes between Turkish immigrant community and Turkish politicians,

qualitative research methods were employed. It is believed that a qualitative study would better establish the cause and effect relationship in this study, which seeks reasons for the discrepancy between the activities of Turkish politicians and the problems of Turkish people that require priority.

In the first step of the research, the aim was to look at whether Turkish people have reached at descriptive representation in legislative organs of Belgium. To examine descriptive representation of a group in assemblies, two sets of data are needed; the ratio of the population of Turkish-origins to the general population and the ratio of Turkish-origin politicians in assemblies to the total number of politicians. In order to decide which level of administrations would be searched for Turkish descriptive representation, administrative structure of Belgium from local governments to the federal government was studied. As a result, descriptive representation of Turkish immigrants was decided to be examined in three levels; municipal level, provincial level and regional level. However, the focus remained on the municipal level. The reason for the emphasis on municipal administrations is that Turkish population accounts for only 2% of the total Belgian population, however, there are some municipalities in which Turkish population densities exceed 10% of the total population.[1] It was decided that it would be more meaningful to look at the representation of Turkish people at the local level where Turks are highly concentrated.

First, with regard to demographics of Turkish immigrants in Belgium, there is not any official data regarding the population sizes of Turkish-origin people. The Belgian authorities do not make a distinction between ethnic minorities or immigrant background people while giving official statistics about the population sizes of the components of the Belgian society. If there is a categorization regarding minorities, it is usually based on the distinction between EU nationals and non-EU nationals. Non-EU nationals are usually restricted with the Turkish and Moroccan immigrant

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[1] Migratieachtergrond per nationaliteit in % per gemeente-01/01/2017 - Diverse subtotalen (http://npdata.be/Data/Vreemdelingen/NIS/Vreemdelingen-gemeenten/2017/Migratieachtergrond-2017.xls) (accessed in 19 April 2019).

background people, together with the Congolese, who are the most crowded immigrant communities outside EU in Belgium. Thus, it could not be reached any official data regarding the population size of immigrant groups separately in constituencies. However, sociologist Jan Hertogen, from the Catholic University in Louvain (the UCL) in Belgium provides a set of data with regard to the population sizes of Turkish migration background people per municipalities, provinces and regions in 2017.[2] He does the same thing all other ethnic minorities and immigrant communities.[3] The population sizes of Turkish-origin people, provided by Jan Hertogen, include all Turkish-origins who are Belgian citizens and non-citizens. This was not a problem for this thesis' aims because the focus was on political representation of Turks at local level and migrants with residence permit can vote in local level without citizenship status.

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[2] Migratieachtergrond per nationaliteit in % per gemeente-01/01/2017 - Diverse subtotalen (http://npdata.be/Data/Vreemdelingen/NIS/Vreemdelingen-gemeenten/2017/Migratieachtergrond-2017.xls) (accessed in 19 April 2019).

[3] This research is done by Jan Hertogen for the Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) which legitimates his approach, his method and his data, and the data is updated by him for the UCL every year.
To determine the number of inhabitants with migration background in Belgium for each nationality, Jan Hertogen followed this method; First, he counted the number of foreigners with regular stay in Belgium by nationality. Second, he counted the number of foreigners by nationality who had become Belgian citizens for each year after 1945. So, he determined the number of inhabitants by nationality that have become Belgian for each year. Then, he determined the rate of population growth by taking account the procreation, the deceases and the re-emigrants. Thus, he calculated the "multiplier factor" which was different for each nationality and evolving each year while there were foreigners that become Belgian each year. For example, he estimated that the population of European nations doubles in 48 years on average while the population of non-Europeans doubles in 24 years in Belgium. In other words, he estimated that the population of a European nation would increase by 1/48 of its total population each year and that the population of a non-European nation would increase by 1/24 each year. In sum, the sum of this three sets of data (the foreigners with regular stay by nationality, the foreigners that acquired Belgian citizenship by nationality and their multiplier factor (which evolves each year for every nation) gave the number of inhabitants with migration background by nationality in Belgium. This data is based on the official records regarding the numbers of people who have regular stay and have acquired citizenship in Belgium, and it is based on the calculation of their natural and migration balance after they had become Belgians. He could check this calculation with the real numbers in the official data for one nationality (Moroccan) in 2006, and the real numbers confirmed his calculations.
The official records regarding the number of immigrant people in Belgium do not differentiate this data by nationality and they do not count the grandchildren of migrants who had acquired Belgian nationality in the past. For this reason, their result was lower than the calculation of Jan Hertogen. Thus, he argues that his method is the best alternative which is approved by the UCL.

Based on the dataset provided by Jan Hertogen, 28 municipalities where Turkish people are highly concentrated and their Turkish population sizes were identified. Those municipalities were; Aiseau-Presles, Antwerp, Beringen, Brussels, Charleroi, Chatelet, Diest, Dison, Farciennes, Genk, Gent, Hamme, Herstal, Houthalen-Helchteren, Housden-Zolder, Leopoldsburg, Liege, Maasmechelen, Machelen, Saint Nicolas, Schaerbeek, Sint-Joost, Temse, Verviers, Vilvoorde, Vise, Willebroek, and Zele. Turkish population sizes in those municipalities are more than 4% of their total populations. In addition to municipalities, Turkish population sizes were identified for 10 provinces and 3 regions of Belgium.

Second, in addition to the ratios of Turkish-origin populations in municipalities, provinces and regions; the ratios of Turkish-origin politicians in councils to the total number of councilors had to be known in order to make a comparison between those ratios. As it is in the case of Turkish population sizes, there was not any data regarding the origin country of politicians since neither municipalities nor political parties have categorized their members ethnically. Thus, I looked at the websites of the 28 municipalities, 10 provinces and 3 regions; and identified the numbers of Turkish background politicians for each council. This was done by employing "the method of name recognition," as it is done by Celis, Eelbode & Wauters (2013) for their study on political representation of Turks and Moroccans in Antwerp and Ghent. While using "the method of name recognition", an Excel table was prepared, the names of Turkish politicians and their contact information were listed. Since this research was carried out in April 2018, those politicians were the elected officials who were at office between 2012 and 2018.

After identification of the population sizes and the numbers of politicians, the ratio of Turkish population to the general population and the ratio of Turkish politicians to the total number of politicians were compared. This comparison was made for each municipality, province and region. The result was that Turkish people have reached at descriptive representation in municipalities where they are highly concentrated. Likewise, in provincial and regional councils, a good level of representation could be

reached. The detailed information about the results of this research are given in the third chapter.

As it is argued above, the level of descriptive representation was investigated as a part of the research on the underlying reasons for representation problem of Turks in Belgium. As a result of this investigation, it was revealed that there is descriptive representation of Turks and representation problem of Turks does not stem from the lack of descriptive representation.

As the second step of the research, substantive representation of Turkish people was examined in order to identify the reasons behind representation problem. This was done with the help of interviews which were conducted with Turkish politicians who were active in Belgian politics and the opinion leaders of Belgian Turks.[4] First, an e-mail was sent to almost 80 Turkish politicians whose names and contact information were listed. This e-mail was roughly about the subject of the thesis and asking permission to interview with the politician. 12 politicians returned to the e-mail and agreed to interview. One of these politicians is interviewed face-to-face in Ghent and two of them were interviewed in Istanbul. The rest of them were interviewed over the phone. Second, the interviews with the opinion leaders were conducted as follows; the first interview was held in Ghent with the chairman of an umbrella organization that unites Turkish non-governmental organizations in Belgium. Then, other people to be interviewed were reached by snowballing method; each interviewee was asked to pioneer the next interview. In this way, the interview made with 8 people who were representatives of NGOs and professional organizations. The interviews were semi-structured, there were 8 questions. The interview questions will be given in the appendices.

In general, 20 interviews were conducted in total, each interview took approximately 40 minutes. During the interviews, audio recordings were made with the permission of the interviewee. Then, approximately 800 minutes of audio-recordings of these

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[4] The Ethics Committee of Istanbul Şehir University approved the content of the interviews. The Approval of the Ethics Committee can be reached at Appendix C.

interviews were transcribed and made ready for content analysis. The content of the interviews was categorized and employed in the analysis chapter. The names of the interviewees are not given in the analysis. Rather, they were referred to as Interviewee 1, Interviewee 2, and so on. The interviewees from Interviewee 1 to Interviewee 12 represent Turkish politicians while the interviewees from Interviewee 13 to Interviewee 20 represent the Turkish elites.

This thesis provides an important contribution to the literature because it examines the perspective of both the Turkish politicians and the opinion leaders of Turkish immigrant community living in Belgium. For this reason, those interviews can be called as elite interviews. It is acknowledged that in some respects, the analysis of the interviews may not reflect the views of Turkish immigrant community regarding their needs and their demands because those aspects are tried to figure out from the elite interviews.

1.3. The Argument of the Thesis

As a result of the research with regard to underlying reasons for the representation problem of Turkish migrants in Belgium, it is the argument of this thesis that representation problem does not originate from the lack of descriptive representation because descriptive representation is achieved for Turkish migrants, they are represented in the assemblies by a number of Turkish politicians in proportion to their population size. The interviews conducted with Turkish politicians and elites of the Turkish immigrant community reveals that there are four different reasons for representation problem; first, Turkish people do not make demands about their community issues, rather they have demands regarding their daily problems; second, Turkish politicians have personal interests and priorities and they identify themselves in Belgian society different from Turkish community; third, party politics and institutional context in Belgium are limiting factors for Turkish politicians; and the fourth, the home state effect determines the patterns of political participation of Turkish people and shapes the political activities conducted by Turkish politicians.

1.4. An Overview of the Chapters

The introduction chapter gave the research topic and the research question of the study. In addition, it presented the method and the research design of the study. The second chapter gives the theoretical framework of the study, it searches for the definition of political participation and political representation, and the factors affecting them in terms of migrants in Europe. It presents an overview of the studies on political participation and representation of migrants in Europe and of Turkish migrants in Belgium.

The third chapter gives the institutional structure and demographics of Belgium. In addition, it makes an analysis about the level of descriptive representation of Turkish people at three levels; municipal, provincial and regional level by comparing the ratios of Turkish populations in the constituencies and the ratios of Turkish politicians in the councils.

The fourth chapter presents the answers for the research question by making content analysis of the interviews conducted with Turkish politicians and elites of the Turkish society. The reasons for the representation problem of Turkish people are explained under four subsections. First, the demands of Turkish people from Turkish politicians will be discussed. Second, the priorities, self-interests and self-perceptions of the politicians as an influencing factor for their political activities will be examined. Third, party politics and institutional structure in Belgium will be addressed as a limitation for Turkish politicians. Fourth the home state effect will be analyzed in terms of its determining role for Turkish people and politicians in Belgian politics. As a conclusion, important findings of this research and in which ways this study can be developed are explained in Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In the beginning of this study, it is assumed that there is a representation problem of Belgian Turks. This assumption is confirmed by literature to some extent because it argues that migrants' political participation remains at lower levels in European countries (Pettinicchio & Vries, 2017, p. 526) and those countries are "still far away from equal representation" in terms of migrants' interests (Bloemraad & Schönwalder, 2013, p. 564). In this respect, constraining factors in terms of migrants' political participation and representation gain importance. In order to discuss the restrictive factors, political participation and representation must be defined and their forms must be identified.

In the first part of this chapter, political participation will be mainly discussed. The descriptions of political participation that scholars have a consensus on will be explained. The forms of political participation and the factors affecting political participation will be examined. In addition, a short discussion on political representation and its varying forms will be presented. In the second part, political participation of immigrant communities will be analyzed. Finally, the studies on immigrant political participation in Europe and in Belgium will be reviewed under two sections.

2.1. Defining Political Participation

In social sciences, it is very unusual to have a definition of a concept or a phenomenon that is agreed by all parties. There is not a consensus on the definition of political participation, either. The debate about the phenomenon of political participation is about the extent and the comprehensiveness of it. In the narrow sense, political participation is expressed as behaviors aimed at influencing decision making mechanisms while in the broad sense it includes in political orientations and attitudes of people in addition to political behaviors (Sakman, 2015, p.24). Moreover, political involvement will be defined in relation with the concept of democracy because they

are closely related terms used in the literature. Further, the motivations of people while getting involved in politics and the forms of political participation will be discussed because they are determining for the definition of political involvement.

In the narrow sense, Milbrath (1965) defines political participation as "those actions by private citizens which seek to influence or to support government and politics" (p.2). Likewise, Ersin Kalaycıoğlu (1983) argues that political participation is the activities and actions of individuals to have an effect on people who will have hold or have already held political decision-making mechanisms (p.10). At this point, the legality of those actions gains importance. Some scholars argue that if those actions and activities are legal, they can be accepted as political participation. For example, Nie, Verba & Converse (1989) seek for the condition of legality to accept any behavior as a type of political participation while Kalaycıoğlu (1983) accepts all types of activities such as participation into assassinations, coup d'états, riots and revolutions as forms of political participation, as long as the individual has his/her consent to that activity even if it is a result of the influence of others (p. 10-11).

In the broader sense, some scholars claim that political participation also includes the political attitudes and orientations of people in addition to acts and activities to impact politics. They criticize the definition of political participation in the narrow sense as incomplete and faulty. Kapani (2007) argues that political participation is not limited to voting in elections, participation includes a wide range of attitudes and activities ranging from simple curiosity to intense action (p.130-131). Besides, Turan (1996) claims that there are two fundamental deficiencies of narrow definitions of political participation, first; disregarding the degree of people's interests in politics and the people's feeling about their political capability and second; the negligence of forms of symbolic political participation having no specific purpose (p.69).

Apart from those definitions, political participation can be defined in relation with the concept of democracy because the concept of the democracy and of the political participation goes hand in hand in the literature. Besides, the term of "the government by people" can be employed for both terms. However, neither political

involvement nor democracy can be reduced to voting. Even though going to the polls to change governments and to affect the rulers is an important aspect of the political participation and democratic systems, voting is not a comprehensive definition for both of them.

Political participation of people is a necessary condition ensuring the legitimacy of democratic governments. If the political participation of the whole population and their access to the decision-making mechanisms cannot be ensured, democracies cannot fulfill their functions, they become faulty (Almond and Verba, 1963). Thus, some countries make it compulsory to vote in the elections in order to have a higher turnout. However, the obligation to vote in elections contradicts with one of the basic principles of political participation, volunteering, which refers to that people should participate in politics voluntarily without any enforcement (Eroğul 1999, p.45). For example, citizens are obligated to take part in elections constitutionally in Belgium, Austria and Turkey. This type of political participation might be called as a type of political mobilization because if there is a political participation under the influence of others, for example, if the citizen has a loyalty to the ruler, or if there is a coercion, it will become political mobilization (Özbudun, 1975, p.3).

There is one more dimension of the relationship between political participation and democracy, "the capability of citizens." Almond and Verba (1963) argue that the capability of citizens to take part in politics and the participation of them are at "the heart of the democracy" (p.230). In other words, there are two things important. First, citizens should have some political rights, i.e.: the right to vote, the right to freedom of speech, etc. Second, citizens should be aware of their rights and believe that they can affect the decision-making mechanisms by being involved in politics. Almond and Verba (1963) call this second aspect "subjective competence" and argue that political behavior of the people who are "subjectively competent" differ from the people who believe that they cannot affect politics (p. 231). The sense of political competency varies according to some factors such as gender, education level and socio-economic class (Almond and Verba, 1963, p.234). Moreover, ethnic background is another influencing factor for political competency of people. Political

competency of ethnic minorities or immigrant origin people may have also been affected by their ethnic backgrounds (Donovan, 2012, p.24).

In addition to various types of definitions, the motivations of people to get involved in politics are important determinants for the definition and the forms of political participation. This discussion goes back to Aristoteles who argues that human is "zoon politikon" which means that human is a political and social animal, thus, people are born and live in politics (Ağaoğulları, 2006, p.340). While people form their opinions regarding politics and their decisions about getting involved in politics or not, they care about their interests. Eroğul (1999) argues that people may have three goals to be ensured by participating; first, to form the state according to their needs and priorities; second, to change the ruler, the government; and third, to have an impact on the rules and practices (p.170). In this respect, McAtee & Wolak (2011) argues that citizens separate between the levels of the government, they attach different responsibilities to each level and accordingly, have different expectations from them (p.46).

There can be different motivations for people to get involved in politics. McAtee et al. (2011) argue that there are four motivations, first and foremost; people take part in politics because they expect material benefits from politicians that they support such as gaining a job in public service offices, improving their career goals, or receiving aid, second; people have good relationships with politicians and have a sphere of influence on politicians thanks to the affinity between them in the political processes, third; people will think that they do their citizenship duties to improve their societies, the fourth and the final reason; people have an aspiration to affect the rulers and the governments (p.49). First two explanations are important especially in political participation at local level when compared to national level because there is a closer acquaintance between people and the politicians at local level, thus, people may have benefit more from familiar politicians and are recognized by them in an easier way. To sum, the answers to the question of why people get involved in politics can be such that; because of the respective commitment to a leader or a party, solidarity, individual and collective interests,

social environment, the sense of citizenship and the obligation of being a citizen (Sakman, 2015, p.31).

Until now, it has been discussed reasons for which people might participate in politics, and it has been argued that there is no consensus on those issues and consequently, on the definition of political participation. The reason for the disagreement between scholars is that there are many different forms of political participation. Although scholars from different disciplines describe the forms of political participation differently, there are basically two forms mentioned by them; conventional forms of political participation and unconventional forms of political participation.

The first form is called as conventional, normative, institutional or electoral forms of participation while the second one is called as unconventional, confrontational, non-normative, non-institutional, extra-institutional or non-electoral forms of political participation (Barrero, Gabrielli, Montijano & Jaulin, 2013; Jost, Petrits & Abrams, 2011; Garbaye, 2001; Caren, Ghoshal & Ribas, 2011). The first one, conventional form includes voting in elections and referenda, signing petitions, contacting politicians, running for elections, et cetera (Barrero et al., 2013, p.1). Citizens can employ the provisions of being a citizen. They can contact the representatives of the government via institutions. They can take part in politics by voting in the elections to change governments or to demand something having importance or priority for them. They are neither costly nor marginalizing actions for the participants in the society because they do not break the daily routines of other people. Because of these reasons, conventional politics is described as "the main channel for political incorporation" (Garbaye, 2001). On the other hand, the second one, unconventional form includes in protests, demonstrations, strikes, boycotts and riots which are costly, destructive and "attention grabbing events defying the social order and everyday routines" (Jost et al., 2011, p.199). For instance, scholars from the social movement tradition look at how people challenge the laws, governments and institutions. They employ the terms such as "confrontational versus non-confrontational" and "institutional versus extra-institutional" forms of political participation (Caren et al., 2011). When people apply

to conventional forms, if people cannot contact politicians, if their voice is not heard by the rulers, they will resort to non-conventional forms. Furthermore, if people do not have access to conventional forms of political participation, if they cannot use institutions as it should be, if they are not citizens, if they have not the right to vote, they will resort to extra-institutional forms.

2.2. Defining Political Representation

In this section, the relationship between the political participation and political representation will be discussed with reference to the concept of representative democracy. Then, two types of political representation, namely, descriptive representation and substantive representation, and their differences will be examined.

Representation cannot be discussed independently from participation because representation is a part and a natural result of political participation. Representation is an advanced stage of political involvement for people while it is the ultimate goal for democracies with a system allowing people to get involved in politics. In this respect, political representation will refer to representative democracies which mean that political processes are executed according to the needs, priorities and preferences of people by governments. By combining representation and democracy, representative democracy refers to that "under democracy, governments are representative because they are elected" (Przeworski et al., 1999, p.29). It means that if citizens have political rights and liberties, if there are elections that are freely held, if there is widespread participation to elections, governments will act according to citizens' interests. There are two accepted arguments regarding the representation of people and the elections. The first one, "mandate view" argues that in the election times, political parties and their candidates make campaigns by expressing people their political engagements and giving promises to do when they are elected. Voting behavior of people is shaped by these policy proposals of politicians. They vote for the candidates whose proposals and promises are attractive. In this way, the parliament mirrors the needs and priorities of people, it becomes the "mandate" that governments should follow and act accordingly while

the second one, "accountability view" argues that governments act on behalf of the interests of people because people regard them as responsible in the elections for their actions in the past (Przeworski et al., 1999, p.29). If they do not take into account the will of people, they would not be elected in the next elections.

In the literature, there is a differentiation between descriptive representation and substantive representation because the former means the numerical presence of the group representatives in the assemblies while the latter means the representation of the interests of that particular group by their group representatives. Descriptive representation becomes possible under the condition that the proportion of that group's population to the whole population is equal to the proportion of the group representatives to all parliamentarians in the assemblies. In other words, "a particular group's size relative to the general population should be reflected in or mirrored by representative assemblies" (Donovan, 2012, p.25), to have descriptive representation.

In contrast to descriptive representation, substantive representation focuses on more concrete outputs in terms of the improvement of interests of the group that is represented. It is the material benefits given to that particular group thanks to the representation in the parliaments. For example, the politicians with immigrant background are expected to focus on the issues related with migration, naturalization and integration of migrants, discrimination against immigrant descent people, and so on. Thus, substantive representation can advance the political and social incorporation of immigrant communities (Donovan, 2012, p.25).

As it is seen, descriptive representation and substantive representation have different dynamics; however, many scholars argue that descriptive representation brings about substantive representation. When the issue is representation of women or immigrant groups, whether descriptive representation leads to substantive representation gains importance. For example, if the half of the population is women, then, half of the seats in the parliaments should belong to women politicians. However, proportional existence in assemblies is not enough. Women should be able

to discuss matters related with women and solve their problems. If women are not allowed to enter into decision making mechanisms in the parties or governments, if they are used by parties to have women's votes, descriptive representation become insignificant for women's interests. But there are questions as such; Can women's interests be best represented by only women? Can male politicians not work for women? Do female politicians have to work on issues only related with women and family? Do they have to represent women's interests only? Those questions bring up the classical debate in the literature, discussions related to that "members of parliaments should represent whom and how should they represent" (Schmitt & Thomassen, 2007, p.14). The discussion made above about the representation of women's interests by women politicians is also valid for the ethnic minorities and immigrant communities.

2.3. Immigrant Political Participation

Political participation of migrants is an understudied topic and there are conflicting and incomplete points in the literature. However, migrants' political participation can be examined in four different ways. It can be examined in the context of the country of residence or of the country of origin. Further, it can be examined at conventional levels or unconventional levels. This thesis will address the immigrant's political participation in their country of residence and in terms of their participation in conventional politics. The reason for this focus is that studies on migrants' political participation generally refer to the context of the host countries in terms of conventional politics. As a result of these studies, it is argued that "immigrant's political participation remains at lower levels" (Pettinicchio et al. 2017) and they are "still underrepresented in European countries" (Bloemraad et al. 2013). In this respect, this thesis aimed to understand whether Turkish migrants achieved political representation in Belgium.

When political participation of migrants is discussed, Martiniello (2005) suggests that it can be discussed at two levels; "the geographic level of political action" and "the level of conventionality" (p.7). For the first level, to which country's politics they participate in gains importance. Especially, if dual citizenship is allowed by both of

the countries, political participation of the migrants can be studied in the context of the home country and the host country. While immigrants take part in politics of the country of residence, they might continue to get involved in politics of their home countries due to the highly developed diaspora consciousness in migrants. Migrants' political participation has crucial importance for both of the countries because there is a considerable amount of immigrant population that can be called as diaspora in European countries and they can affect the politics of both of them when they collectively act. For example, 20 % of the general population in Germany is of immigrant origin (Bloemraad et al. 2013, p.565) and 2,000,000 of them are of Turkish origin.[5] In Belgium, 10,4% of the general population is of immigrant origin, and 240,000 of them are of Turkish origin.[6] Turkish people constitute 2% of the total Belgian population. However, in some municipalities, Turkish population exceeds 10% of the total population of municipalities. Those immigrant population rates are so large that both the host country and home country of migrants cannot ignore them (Martiniello, 2005).

The second dimension, "the level of conventionality" assumes that there are basically two levels, political participation in "state politics" and "non-state politics". The literature regarding the immigrant political participation has almost focused on the conventional forms, i.e. voting behavior of migrants because it is accepted that migrants do not take part in confrontational politics due to their fragile positions. However, they can prefer non-institutional forms as much as institutional forms. The citizenship status is the most important factor determining the preferences of migrants to prefer institutional forms or extra-institutional forms of political participation. It is also the distinctive factor between native people and immigrants in terms of political participation. Pettinicchio et al. (2017) argues that when compared to the political participation of native people and immigrants, their patterns of political involvement are not so different (p.523), if immigrants are

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[5] Hangi ülkede kaç Türk vatandaşı yaşıyor? (https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-47134873) (accessed in 12 July 2019).

[6] Ibid.

citizens of the country. In other words, the ways of political involvement of citizen migrants may resemble to those of native people. Instead, there can be differences among migrants according to their citizenship status because absence of the citizenship status directs migrants to "non-institutional, unconventional, confrontational forms" of political participation (Pettinicchio et al., 2017, p.523).

2.4.   The Factors Affecting Political Participation and Representation of Immigrant Groups

In this section, first, the effect of being immigrant with a different ethnicity on the political participation and representation will be discussed. Second, the impact of "structural resources" and socio-economic status will be examined. Finally, the role played by "political opportunity structures" in the broader institutional context will be addressed.

The literature focuses on variables such as gender, age and ethnicity as determinants of the identity; educational level and occupational level of people as determinants of the socio-economic status; cultural characteristics, party politics and institutional structures as determinants of the broader social and institutional contexts while examining the factors affecting political participation and representation of migrants.

Gender and ethnicity are the components of the identities of people and influence their preferences simultaneously. "The intersection of gender and race" have a determining effect on people's identities and behaviors according to "theories of intersectionality (Donovan, 2012, p.36). First, when the issue is gender, politics is considered to be the work of men. İmmigrant women suffer from being a woman and at the same time, being a immigrant. Thus, it is expected for the gap between immigrant men and women to be larger regarding the level of political participation. Second, if there are ethnic minorities or immigrant groups, the ethnic differences play an important role in determining the patterns of political participation and representation of those ethnically different people.

According to the theories of ethnic representation, most of the members of the ethnic minority groups believe that their group's interests can be best represented by their group's members (Ruedin, 2009, p.335) and as a result, patterns of political participation of immigrant communities are shaped by this assumption. It can be discussed whether it is true or not, but ethnic minorities think that an outsider cannot represent the interests of a group which he/she is not belong to and they vote for the candidates coming from their own ethnic groups.

Ethnic voting or ethnic representation brings about two implications, first; political parties can use the ethnic representatives to win immigrant societies' votes and the second; immigrant politicians may use this situation to their advantage and can be elected for not because of their capabilities and competencies in political arena but because of their ethnic origins only. Electorates with ethnic origins can vote to another member of their ethnic groups without any hesitation with the expectation that they can be best represented by another group member. Particular differences between group members lose its importance while loyalty and solidarity among immigrant groups and the belief in common fate gain importance (Dawson 1994). Even though an elected deputy with an ethnic origin might represent that ethnic group in a descriptive manner statistically, following questions are important regarding the ability of that deputy to represent his/her ethnicity. How he/she perceives or identifies herself/himself? As a representative of her/his community or as a representative of the whole population? What are her/his personal career goals? What are the priorities of this deputy? Does he/she prioritize her/his interests or her/his community's interests? These are questions that can have different answers according to individuals, time and space, contexts of the country of origin and of residence, and so on.

In addition to gender and ethnicity, socio-economic status of people has a determining role with regard to the patterns of political participation and representation of immigrant communities. Pippa Norris (2007) makes a categorization as "structural resources and cultural attitudes" for the discussion of immigrant political participation (p.629). First, "structural resources" include in level

22

of education, level of income, and also occupational status of individuals, in other words, they are the factors determining the socio-economic status of individuals. Since these resources are scarcely distributed to immigrant groups in foreign countries where they are newcomers, migrants are generally, at the lowest level of society in terms of education, socio-economic and occupational status (Bloemraad et al., 2013, p.568). Thus, they are behind native people in terms of political participation. Second, "cultural attitudes" involve in both of the receiving and the immigrant societies' attitudes. In terms of migrants, it is important to have an experience of a democratic system in the home country to get involved in politics in the country of residence. The level of associational organizations of immigrant groups also affects political participation level because it is accepted that if there is a strong civil society, the level of political involvement will rise (Almond & Verba, 1963; Putnam, 1993; Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995). Further, the receiving society's attitudes towards newcomers is also important. They must accept the migrants and recognize their right of political participation and representation.

Furthermore, there is one more factor influencing the political participation of immigrant societies, broader institutional contexts which include party politics, electoral systems, and citizenship and immigration regimes of the host countries. Koopmans et al. (2005) express those factors as "the political opportunity structures" shaping the patterns of immigrant political participation and representation. The following questions reveal the borders of the political opportunity structures. Do countries give citizenship to those people who have migration background? Do they allow dual citizenship in favor of the ones who do not prefer to leave their citizenship of the home country? In addition, do countries allow foreigners who have been living there for years with residence permit to vote in the elections? What is the form of electoral system? Is it majoritarian or proportional? Is there preferential voting that gives opportunity of voting to migrants for their ethnic representatives even if they are in non-eligible places in the lists? Besides, political parties' attitudes towards migrants are also important because political parties can play the role of "gatekeepers or facilitators of immigrants' political participation" (Bloemraad et al. 2013, p.574). Do they have ethnic candidates in their electoral lists? Do they work for

the improvement of immigrant interests in politics? Do they include their immigrant politicians into their decision-making mechanisms? These are very important questions regarding the immigrant political participation and representation in the institutional context. This study will tackle these questions in order to understand the effect of the institutional structure in Belgium on migrants' political participation and representation.

There are also scholars discussing the issue by combining group level of variables and systemic level of variables. For example, Michon and Vermeulen (2013) incorporating "social capital approach" and "political opportunity structure approach" show that associational structures of immigrant communities and political parties' attitudes towards integration of migrants shape the quantity and the quality of political representation of migrants.

In sum, political representation of immigrant communities is affected by ethnic differences, socio-economic status and social capital of that immigrant group, institutional context including the citizenship regime and electoral system of the host country and party politics. When it comes to the relationship between these variables and the political involvement of migrants, it is clear that if there is "multicultural citizenship regimes" (Koopmans, 2004) and "proportional electoral system" (Rae, 1969), and if the immigrant community has higher levels of social capital and live highly concentrated in some constituencies (Bird, 2003), representation of them will be at higher levels (Eelbode, Wauters, Celis, & Devos, 2013, p.2). This study contributes to those kinds of studies by highlighting the differences between the descriptive representation and substantive representation because above factors that studies refer to as determining factors for the political representation of migrants are important for descriptive representation of migrants to a large extent, however, they are not sufficient conditions for substantive representation of migrants.

2.5.   The Factors Affecting Political Behaviors of Immigrant Politicians

This section is an important source for the following case chapters because this thesis problematizes political representation of Turkish migrants in Belgian political arena and searches for the possible explanations for the lack of proper representation. In this respect, the factors having an influence on the behaviors of immigrant politicians in European politics gain importance. Those factors can be categorized under two headings; the factors directly related to the politicians and the external factors in the broader context. The factors related to the politicians are age, gender, social capital and their personal interests, goals and priorities. The external factors are party politics and the institutional structures. Those factors are important in European countries that accepted immigrant workers in 1950s and 1960s. In different countries as well as different contexts, there can be other variables.

The first category is the factors related with the politicians directly. Gender, ethnicity and legal status of migrants are different sources of their identities in the receiving country and these dimensions have distinct impacts on immigrant politicians' behavior in politics. Many of the studies have addressed substantive representation unilaterally by assuming that there is only one dimension of identity and political behavior of elected representatives is affected by this identity. However, identities have multiple dimensions, thus, each and every dimension has an impact on political behavior of politicians. These dimensions such as gender, ethnicity, and legal status coexist and create a common impact (Donovan, 2012, p.25). In addition to those intersecting identities, social capital of the politician is very important. Because his/her level of language acquisition and the level of education shape his/her capability and competency regarding political activities.

Moreover, generation and visibility of migrants are other components determining migrants' identities (Donovan, 2012, p.34). First, being a first generation immigrant or a second matters. A first-generation immigrant might have experienced exclusion more, and as a result, would focus on the issues related to social and political incorporation of migrants. Second, being a visible minority with a different hair and skin color or being a non-visible minority from another EU country also matters.

Visible minorities might be discriminated more, so that, they would advocate human rights and fight against discrimination more strongly.

The identity of the politician is important, nevertheless, self-interests and self-identification of the politicians might be more important in some cases. Political behaviors, priorities, and activities of elected parliamentarians are not affected only by their gender or ethnic backgrounds. There can be other variables, for example, representatives could have private interests and goals different from the group that they belong to. In this respect, Przeworski et al. (1999) argue that the issue of representation is problematic in every aspect "because politicians have goals, interests and values of their own." (p.30). Since politicians would have different motivations, agendas, and career goals, once they are elected and get to the office, they would work for the improvement of their own interests rather than the interests of the people. If personal interests of the politicians are not overlapping with the interests of their communities, they can prioritize their self-interests and career goals, as a result, sacrifice their group interests because "promoting migration issues is not a successful strategy in pursuing a parliamentary career" (Wüst, 2011, p.259).

In addition to self-interests, self-perception and self-identification of the politicians are also important. How do those politicians define themselves? As a member of their ethnic community or as a member of the country of residence? How they perceive themselves? Do they perceive themselves as a representative of their immigrant community or the whole population in the host country? Do they perceive the improvement of the interests of their immigrant communities as their primary duty? The answers of these questions are determining political behaviors of immigrant elected officials. In this respect, this thesis is intended to answer those questions.

The second category is external factors including party politics and institutional structure in the broader context. Party politics is important because they may have different attitudes towards migrants and their inner party mechanisms might have a restrictive effect on the politicians. Whether parties have an inclusionary or exclusionary attitude towards immigrant politicians and whether they allow the

issues related to migration and integration are put forward by immigrant politicians to be discussed in the assemblies matter. The party ideology also matters. Identification to a leftist party provides advantages to ethnic candidates because left parties promote ethnic candidates and "give greater voice to issues related to migration than parties of the center right and right" (Donovan, 2012, p.40). However, there are studies proving that political parties use ethnic candidates to have their ethnic votes in the elections and then do not allow them to rise in the inner-party structures (Jannsen, Dandoy & Erzeel, 2017, p.22; and Eelbode, Wauters, Celis & Devos, 2013, p.12).

Institutional structure may have also restraining effects on immigrant politicians. If the countries have flexible naturalization processes and more welcoming citizenship regimes, immigrant politicians can easily enter into political arena. Some institutional factors might be beneficial for the immigrant representatives. For example, proportional electoral systems promote ethnic candidates, especially when they are concentrated in certain constituencies, they can have descriptive representation in the local councils. On the contrary, how they can carry out their political activities without limitations remains as a question mark. For example, immigrant politicians have a higher chance at the local level elections because migrants live highly concentrated in some specific neighborhoods, and this rises the chance of being elected of the immigrant politicians in these constituencies. However, at local level politics, it could be expected that immigrant politicians do not have a power to find solutions to the problems of their immigrant communities.

The literature which is already limited in terms of migrants' political participation, does not refer to home state effect as a determining factor for migrants' political participation and representation. However, this thesis will address home state effect as a determining factor. There are some reasons for the dominant home state effect on Turkish migrants in Belgium. First, there are some failures of integration in social, economic and political aspects (Alba & Foner, 2014), thus, Turkish people do not have the sense of belonging to Belgium. Second, Turkish people think that they would return to their home country one day, thus, they continue to teach their children "the

language and the culture of origin" (Timmerman, Vanderwaeren, & Crul 2003, p. 1072). In fact, Turkish people are very persistent in speaking their mother tongue (Alba, 2005, p.37). Those factors make home country effect on Turkish immigrants inevitable. Thus, home state effect can be a determining factor for the patterns of political participation and representation of immigrants.

2.6. Studies on Immigrant Political Participation in Europe

In this section, studies on immigrant political participation in Europe will be reviewed. However, this is a very limited and under-researched area. It is argued that "the scholarship on minority representation in Europe is in its infancy" (Bloemraad and Schönwalder, 2013, p.572). The literature is limited to the factors affecting immigrant political participation and representation. It mainly has focused on social capital of the immigrant communities, party politics and institutional structure as the determinant factors. Moreover, some studies have sought to understand the relation between descriptive and substantive representation over immigrants.

This literature review is limited only to the European studies even though the literature is focused generally on the context of the US and Canada that is because those two groups of countries are very different in terms of immigrant politics. First, European countries are not traditional immigrant countries like the former group. Second, migrants who targeted the European countries were originally third country nationals having different cultural and religious backgrounds and who have been invited to European countries as guest workers. European countries are exposed to dense migration movements in the second half of the twentieth century. They have invited immigrant workers who were supposed to go back to their countries of origin few years later. However, immigrant workers have not gone back, they have stayed. Thus, these countries have had to dealt with economic, social and political problems that they could neither experienced nor predicted before. Especially, political incorporation of immigrant groups is not considered to be an important issue by either of the politicians or academicians (Bloemraad et al. 2013, p.517).

Studies on immigrant political participation in Europe have focused on the factors affecting the scope of the immigrant participation and representation. Those studies address the individual level of variables such as the social capital of migrants, group level of variables such as the organizational structure and cultural attitudes of the immigrant communities, and in a broader extent, systemic level of variables such as the institutional context and the party politics in the host country.

First, as individual level of variables, studies focus on the "social capital" or the "structural resources" of individuals (Norris, 2007, p. 629; Bloemraad et al. 2013, p.567). Those terms can be used interchangeably and refer to the level of education, the level of income and the group of occupation of individuals. Since those resources are distributed to immigrant groups and minorities scarcely, under-participation and under-representation of migrants in politics is a natural outcome of unjust treatments of migrants in social and economic platforms.

Immigrants can be excluded from politics due to lack of social capital or due to their identities. Social capital can be an obstacle leaving would-be politicians with immigrant origins behind native politicians. Because "the acquisition of the new language and the political knowledge" is a necessary condition for getting involved in politics in the receiving country, also to have "contacts and networks" to be able to run for elections is significant for immigrant politicians (Bloemraad et al., 2013, p. 567), thus, to meet those requirements for immigrant politicians can be challenging. The other cause of migrants' exclusion from the host countries' politics can be any component of their identities; gender, ethnicity, race. For example, Klandermans, Stekelenburg and Toorn (2008) argue that immigrant people in European countries, especially Muslim migrants, are discriminated against and excluded from political mechanisms in the receiving countries, thus, most of the participants of the protests in European countries in the future will be immigrant origin (p.1009). In other words, migrants' exclusion from institutional politics might be the reason for them to resort to confrontational forms of political participation.

In addition to the individual level of variables, there are also group level of variables, i.e. "cultural attitudes" and "the organizational structure" of the immigrant groups are effective in terms of immigrant political participation and representation (Bloemraad, 2006; Norris, 2007; Maxwell, 2012; Bloemraad et al., 2013). "Cultural attitudes" refer to the receiving society's attitude toward the new immigrants and the immigrants' attitudes towards politics. If the receiving society accepts newcomers and recognize their right of participation in politics, and, if the newcomers have an experience regarding political participation in their home countries, the rate of political participation and representation of the immigrant community rises (Bloemraad et al., 2013, p. 567). For example, it is argued that immigrant people are discriminated by both the politicians and the people in Britain, thus migrants in Britain are negatively affected by the attitudes of the host society (Norris, 2004, p.212). Moreover, if migrants are excluded from politics and institutional mechanisms, they avoid getting involved in politics or they change the form of political participation that they will take part.

In addition to "cultural attitudes" of the host societies towards immigrants, organizational structures of those immigrant societies also matter. If there are ethnic associations helping the group members to have a conscious of shared destiny, to have a group solidarity, to have a communal awareness and to have a political and social knowledge to get involved in the host country's affairs. Maxwell (2012) argues that there is a positive correlation between strong group associations and high representation in politics for example, some immigrant groups achieved higher levels of political representation in France and the United Kingdom due to their "strong group structures." Because opinion leaders of those communities can mobilize and lead to their communities for political outcomes; they can form a relation between their own interests and major political agents' interests; and they can play the role of mediation between the immigrant individuals and institutions and processes of politics in the receiving country (Bloemraad et al., 2013, p. 569). Thus, strong organizations and strong civil societies lead to higher levels of political participation and substantive representation of ethnic or immigrant groups.

Beyond individual and social level of variables, there are systemic level of variables such as institutional contexts and party politics which have an effect on the immigrant political representation. In the literature, mainly these two variables have been studied.

In terms of institutional structure, citizenship regimes of countries are determining factors. There are three scenarios in literature regarding the effect of the citizenship on political participation of migrants (Pettinicchio et al., 2017, p.526). The first scenario claims that politicians do not care about the migrants' grievances and not respond to their concerns because they are minorities and especially non-citizen migrants do not have the right to vote (Munro, 2008, p.6). Since migrants are minorities, their preferences and priorities are not taken into account, they are ignored by politicians. The second scenario argues that citizenship status is determining because migrants get rid of their fragile situations in legal and social grounds with it. Citizenship appeases the costs of the confrontational politics for migrants (Just & Anderson, 2012). Thus, citizen-migrants can participate in unconventional, non-institutional forms of political participation without any hesitation thanks to the rights granted by citizenship status. Contrarily, non-citizen immigrants are not expected to be active participants in risky and costly events because of their fragility. The first and the second scenarios do not exclude or refute each other, both of the scenarios are possible and can occur at the same time. On the contrary, the third scenario claims that immigrants are inclined to be active in non-institutional forms of political participation because they are excluded from political and social institutions. Moreover, conventional ways of participation are not effective ways in terms of migrants because their interests are not considered to be important by politicians. Theories of political participation claim that if politicians are unresponsive to needs and priorities of people, individuals resort to more costly political actions such as strikes or demonstrations because they can take place without institutions, therefore, political systems, more specifically, "political opportunity structures" determine the ways that migrants participate in politics (Pettinicchio et al., 2017, p.527).

By taking those three scenarios into account, it can be argued that political participation rate of the immigrants will remain at a very low level. Whether they are citizen or non-citizen immigrants, their level of political involvement will be lower. On the one hand, when citizen immigrants try to employ conventional ways, they cannot influence the governments and political processes because they are minorities that are not taken into consideration. On the other hand, non-citizen immigrants who are able to participate in politics with only confrontational and disruptive forms will be reluctant or disinclined to resort to these risky and costly forms because of their fragile positions in legal terms. Overall, literature regarding political participation of immigrants shows that immigrants' political participation remains at lower levels. Likewise, it is argued that being a citizen immigrant or non-citizen immigrant does not matter because there are not many differences in terms of rights regarding the access to the jobs and benefits in European countries (Bloemraad, 2006, p.671).

The other dimension of the institutional context is the electoral system. There is a tradition among academicians, starting with Arend Lijphart, which accepts electoral system as the key determining factor for the representation of ethnic and minority groups in ethnically diverse societies (Bloemraad et al., 2013, p.570). For example, proportional systems of representation are a favor for women and immigrant communities to have higher levels of representation in local councils. Proportional systems of representation provide an advantage to ethnic minorities because they are concentrated in particular districts and their candidates can have a seat by winning the votes proportional to their group size. Yet, it brings about a handicap, political parties can restrict representation of these people only to their settlements where they have intensively dwelled (Sobolewska, 2013).

Electoral constituency is another aspect of the electoral system. The ratio between the district magnitude and the number of seats of this district effects the representation of immigrant background people. If the ratio of the number of the seats to the number of the voter population is high, women and ethnic minorities can be represented high in numbers thanks to the lower levels of competition. For

instance, higher level of representation of immigrant groups in regional assemblies and councils in Germany is expressed as the result of the higher rate of seats when compared to the number of the voters (Schönwalder, 2013).

In addition to citizenship regimes and electoral systems, there is one more dimension of the institutional structure, it is the dissemination of the political powers and duties to the politicians who are working at local levels and state levels. Although immigrant achieve a good level of representation at local level, it is important to look at the duties and powers of those local politicians. For example, in France, institutional structure neither restrict nor improve the representation of immigrants' interests because mayors and local politicians have strengthened by the system, thus, they can use this power for the benefit of immigrants as well as to their detriment (Garbaye, 2005, p.34-36).

The other decisive factor in terms of immigrant political participation and representation is party politics. Party ideologies, political parties' attitudes towards immigrant background people, inner party mechanisms, party strategies are important because those factors can have restrictive effects on the migrants' participation and representation.

Party ideologies are important for the representation of immigrant communities. For example, social democratic, green and socialist parties have been more welcoming parties for the immigrant communities and consequently, are supported more by them (Bird, Saalfeld & Wüst, 2011, p. 66). In the countries where these parties have strong positions, representation of immigrant communities will be higher. For socialist or social democratic parties to have strong positions in the elections, there have to be a multi-party system rather than two-party system (Schönwalder, 2012). Moreover, traditional mainstream parties are also important in terms of the representation of immigrant groups because these parties control the processes and mechanisms providing elected offices to the politicians.

There is one more important point about the political parties, inner party mechanisms, especially about the processes that nominees are selected for the elections. Do parties select their candidates from ethnic or immigrant groups according to their own criteria? If this is the case, what kind of filters determine the candidate of immigrant groups? Parties can discriminate among immigrant background politicians with some filters that lead to parliaments which are filled up with elder and richer males who are "ethnically more homogeneous than the general population" (Bloemraad et al., 2013, p.572).

Political parties' strategies regarding having ethnic candidates in electoral lists and their attitudes towards these ethnic politicians after elections are very important. Parties may have ethnic candidates in their electoral lists to gain ethnic votes. But after the elections, parties' attitudes towards those ethnic politicians may change. They may discriminate politicians according to their ethnic origins. If this is the case, ethnic politicians become politicians who have physical existence in the assemblies but without a voice. In this respect, there are studies claiming that political parties see the ethnic candidates as a means to have ethnic votes. For example, Geisser and Kelfaoui (1998) claim that political parties in France resort to hypocrite strategies to have ethnic votes; on the one hand, they present candidates who have ethnic background to attract these ethnic communities' appreciation and votes; on the other hand, these candidates are deliberately selected from the assimilated members of these groups who have not good relations with their ethnic community and who would not represent their communities' interests accordingly (in Bloemraad et al., 2013, p.570). Besides, Michon et al. (2013) argue that immigrant background politicians are not advanced and promoted in their political careers by their parties because they are perceived as representatives of only their own communities' interests in the Netherlands (Bloemraad et al., 2013, p. 570).

Existence of immigrant politicians in the assemblies is important but migrants need more qualitative representation, physical existence is not enough. In this respect, political parties' attitudes are determining. It can be argued that political parties' attitudes about immigrant groups determine "political presence" of immigrant

politicians in the assemblies and "political weight" of them in the system. In a case study examining "ethnic group consciousness and group organization" of the immigrant background people who have Turkish and Moroccan origin in Amsterdam, Michon et al. (2013) claim that political integration of immigrant communities become possible with the "political presence" and "political weight" of them. "Political presence" refers to descriptive representation which means mirroring the general population to parliaments while "political weight" refers to substantive representation which means more concrete representation of immigrant communities' interests. Those concepts refer to different situations but whether there is a relation between "political presence" and "political weight," in other words, descriptive representation and substantive representation is important.

With regard to descriptive representation, there are some studies comparing the numbers of elected officials of foreign origins in assemblies in European countries. For example, Aktürk (2010) argues that although almost 10% of the total French population is of Muslim origin, there is not one Muslim representative in "the French House of Representatives" (p.77). In Britain, while the immigrant population is 8% of the total population, immigrant origin politicians in the Member of Parliament is of 4% of the total members (Bloemraad et al., 2013, p.564). Besides, in Germany, although 20% of the total population is of immigrant origin, only 3% of the Bundestag members are immigrant origin (Bloemraad et al., 2013, p.564). In this respect, France, the United Kingdom and Germany are not good examples in terms of migrants' descriptive representation. However, Germany can be a good example in terms of Turkish migrants' representation because Turkish immigrant population size with German citizenship is of 1% of the total German population and the rate of Turkish politicians in Bundestag is 0.8% (Aktürk, 2010, p.78). These rates are very close and there is a relatively good descriptive representation of Turkish people when compared to other immigrant groups in Germany. In this respect, Donovan (2012) argues that the ethnicity of immigrant people matters in terms of political representation because Turks achieve a relatively better representation level than of other immigrant groups in Germany (p.41).

With regard to relation between descriptive representation and substantive representation, Barbara Donovan (2012) addresses the case of Turkish migrants in Germany where there is a rise of representation of Turkish immigrant people in local councils and the federal legislatures in recent elections. She finds that there is a positive relation between two types of representation and the extent of substantive representation is affected by "gender, ethnicity, political party and the level of representation," such that, being a representative at local level, identification to a leftist party and having Turkish origins are strong reasons for a representative to engage in "issues related to migration and integration" (p.24). There is another research that finds a positive correlation between descriptive and substantive representation. Pantoja and Segura (2003) argue that descriptive representation of immigrant communities in the parliaments can bring about "substantive changes in policies" in favor of migrants whereas "a lack of descriptive representation" might result in the exclusion of immigrant from politics (in Bloemraad et al. 2013, p.565). As a result, it can be argued that even though migrants' interests do not have to be best represented by immigrants, the absence of immigrant background politicians in the assemblies pave the way to the alienation and exclusion of the immigrant groups. Because a legitimate democratic system requires for the representation of the whole population in the parliaments.

There is a relation between descriptive representation and substantive representation such that descriptive representation of immigrant background people is a necessary condition while it is not sufficient for substantive representation. Existence of immigrant politicians in assemblies, parliaments is an important step to their political integration because descriptive representation brings about higher level of political participation of migrants (Tate, 2003); it strengthens the migrants' trust in state institutions, governments (Pantoja et al., 2003); it fosters the sense of belonging to that country (Zimmerman, 1994) and it is a necessary resource for substantive representation of migrants' interests and priorities (Phillips, 1995). However, immigrant background people are still underrepresented in European parliaments (Bloemraad et al., 2013, 564).

In sum, the studies have generally focused on the factors influencing the political participation and representation of migrants. Besides, those studies conclude that underrepresentation of migrants has originated from "a group's social capital, its size, geographical concentration, political experiences in the homeland, citizenship regimes, electoral systems and party structures" (Celis, Eelbode & Wauters, 2013, p.1-2).

2.7.   Studies on Immigrant Political Participation in Belgium

In this part, the literature on political participation and representation of immigrant origin people in Belgium will be reviewed. Studies on political participation and especially on political representation of Turkish immigrant people are very limited while they are not differentiated from the studies in Europe. Those studies examine the factors that provide advantages for political participation of immigrant communities or restrict it (Eelbode, Wauters, Celis, & Devos, 2013). In literature, there are some studies looking at the voting behaviors and party preferences of immigrant communities (Jacobs, Phalet, & Swyngedouw, 2006; Teney, Jacobs, Rea, & Delwit, 2010). Besides, some studies examine the relationship between the descriptive representation and substantive representation by comparing the parties' electoral lists and lists of elected politicians and they argue that ethnic politicians in the electoral lists and assemblies are rising (Celis, Eelbode, & Wauters, 2013). As a result of this increase, there are also some studies analyzing the reasons for the success of ethnic candidates in Belgian elections (Jacobs, Martiniello, & Rea, 2002; Janssen, Dandoy, & Erzeel, 2017).

First, studies examine the restrictive factors for the political participation and representation of immigrant communities in Belgium. For example, Jacobs et al. (2006) have argued that political involvement of Turkish people is at very low levels and they are underrepresented in Belgium politics. In the study, they analyzed why trust in political institutions and political involvement remain very low among Turkish immigrant community in Brussels although they have a very strong culture of associations. The paper claims that there is no strong correlation between the level

of political involvement and associational engagement among Turkish immigrant community in Brussels (p.159).

Although social capital has an important place for the political involvement patterns of people, there is a study illustrating that migrants' party preferences are not affected by their social capital, rather shaped by their ethnic origins. Teney et al. (2010) examine whether immigrant background people have voted for particular parties in a way that cannot be associated with their "social capital" such as level of education and income. They figure out that there is a strong relation between ethnic backgrounds of people and their party preferences in the elections, such that; Turkish and Moroccan background people vote for the parties from the left wing while EU citizens do not vote for leftist parties generally (p.293).

When it comes to representation of immigrant communities, there are some studies examining party politics by comparing the number of immigrant politicians in the electoral lists of those parties and the number of elected officials of immigrant origin in the assemblies. In a case study in the city of Ghent and Antwerp where Turkish and Moroccan migrants have concentrated, Eelbode et al. (2013) have examined the effect of party politics and party ideologies on representation of ethnic minorities and immigrant people. They found that parties, regardless of their ideology, have the same number of immigrant background candidates on their electoral lists because they only consider their success in the elections. Eelbode et al. (2013) claim that political parties try to take "ethnic votes" from these immigrant groups by preparing a list including immigrant candidates, though they are not interested in their representation (p.12). The ultimate goal of political parties is to empower their positions in municipal councils, in parliaments by taking "ethnic votes" in the districts where these ethnic people are highly concentrated, and this is not related with the parties' ideologies. Some ethnic politicians that they made an interview even argue that they want to leave their party and found a new ethnic party because their parties do not take them seriously and they are employed as "people on display (vitrinefiguren)" to have "ethnic votes" (Eelbode et al. 2013, p.12).

Besides, there are some studies examining different dynamics of descriptive representation and substantive representation by comparing the parties' attitudes towards immigrant politicians before and after elections. For example, Celis et al. (2013) contribute to the argument of the previous study by claiming that involvement of ethnic politicians in political parties is restricted to only electoral lists, after elections immigrant politicians are not allowed to enter into party's inner structures and important positions (p.2). In their case study, Celis et al. (2013) study political representation of Turks and Moroccans who are visible minorities in terms of their physical appearance and names. By employing "the method of name recognition" (p.3), they looked at the party lists and discover that descriptive representation is rising in Belgium. They had to use that method because parties have not categorized their members according to their ethnic background like they have done for age and gender. Although there is a limited data, they have found that all parties in Belgium have an effort to involve in ethnic and immigrant background people in their party lists, nonetheless, leftist parties are more successful although they are far from substantive representation (Celis et al. 2013, p.7). Moreover, while the proportion of Turks and Moroccans in general population matches their proportion on parties' lists in the elections, it does not overlap with their proportion in councils (Celis et al. 2013, p.5). Their explanation regarding this discrepancy of the parties' attitudes towards ethnic representatives before and after elections is that "political parties only promote the representation of ethnic minorities out of concern for their own electoral competitiveness, and not based on an unconditional commitment to the full political integration of ethnic minorities" (Celis et al. 2013, p.1). Moreover, individual representatives of immigrant communities have often hesitated and avoided from becoming a representative of their ethnic community (Saalfeld & Kyriakopoulou, 2011). Thus, having immigrant representatives in assemblies do not automatically ensure the representation of immigrant groups' interests. Rather, these immigrant politicians must be included in decision making mechanisms in parties, only in this way, quantitative representation in parliaments contribute to the qualitative representation of migrants' interests (Celis et al. 2013, p.2).

As a result of the rise of ethnic politicians in the assemblies, some studies in the literature examine the success of those politicians in Belgian elections in recent years. They employ the term of ethnic politicians, but they mean third country nationals who are visible in terms of appearance, having different cultures and religious beliefs, especially Turks and Moroccans. For example, in a case study, Janssen et al. (2017) tried to figure out the underlying reasons for ethnic minority candidates' electoral success. According to that study, there can be two reasons for that success; party politics or ethnic vote. It is argued that in the first step, it was the success of ethnic votes because even though ethnic candidates go to the poll from non-eligible positions in the electoral lists, they are elected by preferential votes of their ethnic communities, however, this situation which is in favor of ethnic candidates is reversed by parties because all parties started to present lots of ethnic candidates, thus, ethnic votes are broke up among those candidates (Jannsen et al., 2017, p.22). However, whether the success of ethnic candidates in the recent elections is originated from party's strategies or ethnic votes requires some new studies. Moreover, Jacobs et al. (2002) address the remarkable success of Turkish and mainly Moroccan candidates in 2000 elections in the Brussels. The 2000 elections differ from others because non-EU origin people were able to vote and run for elections for the first time. There was a striking increase of Moroccan and Turkish origin politicians in the assemblies and councils. For example, almost 25% of municipal councils such as Schaerbeek and Sin Joost Ten Node were consisted of Moroccan and Turkish origin people although they made up 9% of the population. They argue that the electoral success of immigrant descent people is originated from the preferential votes used by both "old Belgians (autochthonous Belgians) and new Belgians (Belgians of immigrant) origin" (p.220).

By taking into account these studies in the literature on political participation and representation of immigrant background people in Belgium, the following arguments can be put forward. Enfranchisement of immigrant background people in Belgium is a recent phenomenon. Those people were able to vote and run for elections only after 2000s, however, they had a remarkable electoral success. Scholars tended to study underlying reasons for that success. They examine the voter behaviors,

strategies of political parties, institutional context such as electoral system. Nevertheless, studies on political representation of migrants, the factors affecting the immigrant politicians' activities, the extent of substantive representation of migrants by politicians from the same background are unresearched areas. In this respect, this thesis will contribute to that gap in the literature.

CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF TURKISH PEOPLE IN BELGIUM IN TERMS OF DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION

In the literature, it is argued that European countries that received immigrants-workers in 19650s and 1960s are "still far away from equal representation" (Bloemraad et al., 2013, p.564). Besides, it is argued that Turkish immigrant people are underrepresented in Belgian politics (Jacobs et al., 2006, p.145). In addition to these arguments, the preliminary observations and interviews that I have conducted in Belgium have led me to assume that there is a representation problem in the case of Belgian Turks. In order to understand the underlying reasons for that representation problem, it must be revealed whether there is descriptive representation of Turkish people or not. For this purpose, first, the federal structure of Belgium from municipalities to the federal government and its demographics will be examined. Second, institutional structure of Belgium in terms of migrants' political participation will be discussed. To understand what they are entitled to and what those rights mean for political participation, it is necessary to look at the political structure and demographics of Belgium.

Finally, to see if there is descriptive representation of Belgian Turks, the ratio of Turkish population to the total population in municipalities, in provinces and in regions will be compared to the proportion of Turkish-origin politicians in the municipal councils, provincial councils and regional councils. For this reason, in the next subsections, information about the population sizes of Turkish people will be given. Those numbers include all Turkish-origin people regardless of their Belgian citizenship status. The first reason for using those numbers is that there is not any official data regarding the Turkish-origin people with Belgian citizenship, however, Jan Hertogen, a sociologist from Belgium, provides data regarding the population of

Turkish-immigrant origin people.[7] This data does not make a differentiation between Turkish immigrants according to their citizenship status. The second reason is that since the focal point of this thesis is on the Turkish immigrants' representation at local level, whether Turkish people have citizenship or not has not so much importance for their participation at local level elections because immigrants with residence permit can participate in local level elections without citizenship.

In this chapter, I will try to understand whether Turkish-origin immigrants living in Belgium can find a place in the assemblies in proportion to their population sizes. As a result of the comparison between the ratio of Turkish population to the general population and the proportion of Turkish elected officials in assemblies, it is seen that Turks have reached descriptive representation especially at the municipal level. Thus, it becomes clear that representation problem of Turks does not stem from the lack of numerical representation of them, thus, there must be different reasons for it. This conclusion changed the direction of the research and led me to conduct a more in-depth research to understand the causes of the representation problem of Turkish migrants in Belgium.

3.1. Belgium Federation; Its Components and Demographics

Belgium is a very complex and stratified federal state with its administrative structure and demography. It is a federation based on three communities; "the Flemish community, the French Community and German speaking Community" and three regions; "the Flemish Region, the Walloon Region and the Brussels Region" (Belgian Constitution, 2009, Article 1,2,3). There are ten provinces and their provincial councils; "Antwerp, Flemish Brabant, West Flanders, East Flanders, Limburg, Walloon Brabant, Hainaut, Liege, Luxembourg and Namur" (Belgian Constitution, 2009, Article 5). Besides, there are 589 municipalities with their municipal councils (Toptop, 1995, p.51).

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[7] Migratieachterground 2015 per gewest (http://www.npdata.be/Data/Vreemdelingen/NIS/Vreemdelingen-gemeenten/2015/Tabellen/Migratieachtergrond-2015-per-gewest.xls) (accessed in 15 June 2019).

Map 3.1. Belgium Administrative Regions[8]

Map 3.2. Language Communities in Belgium [9]

[8] Belgium Administrative Regions (https://www.polgeonow.com/2016/12/what-is-wallonia-in-belgium.html) (accessed in 26 April 2019).

[9]Ibid.

Map 3.1 shows those three regions. From these two administrative structures, four linguistic regions; "the Dutch-speaking region, the French speaking region, the bilingual region of Brussels-Capital and the German-speaking region" and their parliaments were established (Belgian Constitution, 2009, Article 4).

In Belgium, those three linguistic communities do not scatter around homogenously. As it can be seen in Map 3.2, Flemish speaking community lives in the north of Belgium near the Netherlands-Belgian border, which is called as Flanders. French speaking community lives in the southern side of Belgium which is called as Wallonia near the French-Belgian border. Apart from Flanders and Wallonia, there is also the capital city, Brussels where Flemish speaking community and French speaking community live together. Furthermore, German speaking community lives in the eastern side of Belgium nearby the German-Belgian border.

	German language region	French language region	Bilingual region (Brussels-Capital)	Dutch language region
Federal Level		Federal Authority		
Community Level	German-speaking Community	French-speaking Community / Federation Wallonia-Brussels	Community Commissions	Flemish Community
Regional Level	Walloon Region		Brussels-Capital Region	Flemish Region
Provincial Level	5 provinces		Brussels-Capital Region CommunityCommissions	5 provinces
Municipal Level	262 municipalities		19 municipalities	308 municipalities

Figure 3.1. Institutional Structure of Belgium[10]

Institutional structure of Belgium can be seen in the Figure 3.1. Administratively, from the bottom level, first; there are municipal councils, second; provincial councils.

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[10] Its Structure; Belgium a federal state not like the others (http://www.pfwb.be/en/its_structure) (accessed in 27 April 2019).

Third; there are regional governments and parliaments, Flemish, Walloon and, Brussels governments and parliaments. Fourth; there are language communities' governments and parliaments; the French-speaking community's and the German-speaking community's governments and parliaments. However, there is an exception, there is not a different government or parliament of Flemish-speaking community because "the powers of the Flemish Region are exercised by the Community, therefore, there is only one Flemish Parliament and only one Flemish Government and a single budget for the two types of powers." And finally, at the top, there is a federal government consisted of two legislative parliaments; "the House of Representatives" and "the Senate".

As it is mentioned above, Belgium with three language communities living in separate regions and having separate parliaments is a structurally complex federation. In addition to those three ethnic cleavages, immigrant background people also make it a complex country in terms of its demography. Belgium has 11,239,000 population according to 2015 census.[11] Flemish community has the largest share in total Belgian population. There are more than 6 million Flemish people consisting of the 57.6% of the total population while French speaking Walloons are the second largest ethnic group with 3.5 million residents consisting of 31.2% of the population, apart from these two largest ethnic groups, there is also German community with approximately 1 million population.[12]

In addition to those three ethnic enclaves, there is a huge immigrant background population from different countries including EU and non-EU countries, there are 1,357,556 people having a foreign origin and immigrant background.[13] It means the proportion of immigrant people is 12% of Belgium's total population. Those numbers

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[11] Belgium Population 2019. (http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/belgium-population/) (accessed in 17 April 2019).

[12] Ibid.

[13] Foreign Population of Belgium in 2018, by origin (https://www.statista.com/statistics/517235/foreign-population-of-belgium-by-origin/) (accessed in 23 April 2019).

are the official records and those people have not Belgian citizenship. However, Jan Hertogen argues that there are 3,072,455 people who have immigrant background (this number also includes immigrant origin people who are Belgian citizens). Top ten countries sending immigrants to Belgium are the following; Morocco, Italy, France, Turkey, the Netherlands, Spain, Poland and Congo. There are 468,687 Moroccan origins, 458,452 Italian origins, 292,234 French origins, 242,133 Turkish origins and 231,448 Netherlands origins.[14] As can be seen from the above numbers, Belgium is a multi-national and multi-ethnic state. Moroccan and Turkish background people are the most crowded immigrant communities from non-EU origin countries.

Table 1 shows the magnitude of the Turkish population in regions in numbers and percentages. There are 242,133 Turkish immigrants living in Belgium while 122,078 of them live in the Flanders, 61 569 of them in the Wallonia and 58 486 of them in the Brussels capital region.[15] Those numbers include in all Turkish people living in Belgium regardless of their citizenship status in Belgium. As a result, Turkish community is a large community from non-EU origin.

Table 3.1. Population and the Percentage of the Belgian Turks per region in Belgium, in 2015			
	Population of the Belgian Turks	**Total population**	**Percentages of the Belgian Turks in their region**
Flemish Region	122 078	6 516 011	1.87%
Walloon Region	61 569	3 614 473	1.70%
Brussels-Capital Region	58 486	1 191 604	4.90%
Total	242 133	11 322 088	2.14%

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[14] Migratieachterground 2015 per gewest (http://www.npdata.be/Data/Vreemdelingen/NIS/Vreemdelingen-gemeenten/2015/Tabellen/Migratieachtergrond-2015-per-gewest.xls) (accessed in 15 June 2019).

[15] Jan Hertogen, Migratieachtergrond per nationaliteit en gewest in Belgie 2015 (http://community.dewereldmorgen.be/blog/janhertogen/2015/09/04/migratieachtergrond-per-nationaliteit-en-gewest-in-belgie-2015) (accessed in 9 May 2018).

3.2. Belgium's Structure of Political Participation for İmmigrant People

The institutional structure of Belgium is important in terms of political participation and representation of Turkish people. In Belgium, immigrants with residence permit can vote in local level elections while immigrants with citizenship status can vote in local and general elections like Belgian natives. In addition, there are also Turkish immigrants who have citizenship both of Belgium and Turkey. This is also important for this thesis's aim because there is a home state effect on those dual citizens while participating in politics of the host country.

In this section, the system of citizenship acquisition and the electoral system in Belgium will be examined since they provide advantages to migrants in terms of political participation.

In Belgium, foreigners who are the citizens of other EU countries have the right to vote in the local level elections as a result of the execution of Maastricht Treaty (1992) while in 2000 foreigners from third countries outside EU have the right to vote in local level elections where municipal and provincial assemblies are elected (Jacobs et al., 2002, p.202). The citizenship status is a requirement for voting at the national level elections for both of the EU and non-EU citizens. However, in 1999, "purple-green government Verhofstadt, a coalition of socialists, right-liberals, and ecologists" introduced a new process which is not only about the enfranchisement of third country nationals, but it was also about the citizenship acquisition of them (Jacobs et al., 2002, p.204). In Belgium, the principle of jus sanguinis has been executed for citizenship acquisition like in many other European countries. This principle of jus sanguinis means that a child becomes the national and the citizen of the country of his/her parents, it is "the right of blood". In contrast, the principle of jus soli refers to that a child becomes the national and the citizen of the country where he/she was born, it is "the right of the soil." From 1984 to 2000, the principle of jus soli has been introduced progressively in Belgium; "the second generation immigrants who are born in Belgium and whose parents have been living there for at least 10 years" can acquire citizenship if their parents apply for citizenship on behalf of their child before the child is 12 years old while "the third generation immigrants" who are born in

Belgium and whose parents are also born in Belgium acquire citizenship automatically (Jacobs et al., 2002, p.205).

In sum, immigrant background people from third countries have not needed a special arrangement with regard to enfranchisement, rather, they obtained citizenship. Thus, there is no difference between people of immigrant origin and native people in legal grounds. Citizenship status brings about the right to vote and the right to run for office both at the local level and national level elections.

In addition to citizenship status attained in Belgium, the status of dual citizenship is also important. This is a determining factor in terms of the patterns of political participation of Turkish people in Belgium because there is a home state effect on Turkish migrants while determining their attitudes towards Belgian politics. The Belgian Citizenship Law permits dual citizenship. Belgian nationals, those over 18 years of age, who have voluntarily acquired another country's citizenship have lost their Belgian citizenship until 9 June 2007, however, Belgian citizenship continues even if another country's citizenship is taken after 28 April 2008 (Gelekçi, 2011, p.129). People who are Belgian nationals and who automatically obtain another citizenship without any action (for example, because parents have a nationality of a country which has adopted the principle of jus sanguinis) do not lose Belgian citizenship. In that way, migrants can be citizens both of the country of origin and of Belgium if the sending country allows for dual citizenship. According to the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Brussels, 78% of Turks living in Belgium has dual citizenship, further, this rate continues to increase every year (Gelekçi, 2011, p.142).

As a dimension of the institutional structure, the electoral system of Belgium is also one of the factors encouraging the political participation of migrants in addition to citizenship regime of Belgium. The system of proportional representation, which is executed for the first time in Belgium thanks to the contributions of Viktor Dhondt who was an academician in the University of Ghent (Bouhon, 2017, p.2), provides an advantage to immigrant origin people. If there was a pluralist electoral system, the party and the candidates that are supported by the most crowded group would win

the elections. However, proportional electoral system supports minorities because they can have a representation proportional to their population size in the constituencies where they are significantly concentrated. Another benefit of Belgian system to migrants is "open-list system" which refers to that electorate can vote for any candidate he/she wishes without depending on the list offered by the party. Even if the parties place immigrant origin candidates in non-eligible positions in the electoral lists, people can vote for them by preferential voting system. In this respect, Turkish-origin politicians can be elected thanks to the preferential votes of people although they are in the non-eligible positions of electoral lists. Besides, Turkish-origin people can have descriptive representation in assemblies thanks to proportional election systems.

3.3. Measuring Political Participation of Turkish Migrants in Belgium

As it is discussed in the literature review, political participation of immigrant groups in the host countries remains at lower levels. Moreover, studies on political involvement of Turkish immigrant communities in Europe and also in Belgium have drawn the same conclusion; "the Turkish community is in relative terms still underrepresented in the political sphere in Belgium" (Jacobs et al., 2006, p.145).

There can be two reasons lying behind this argument dominant in the literature. First, Turkish-origin politicians might not find a place for themselves in Belgian assemblies because of some obstacles. Second, there can be descriptive representation of Turkish people, but Turkish elected representatives might not represent the interests of their communities.

The political participation of Turkish people, especially their participation in elections cannot be examined due to an obstacle; the percentage of Turkish people going to the polls is not known because Belgian authorities do not give any official statistics regarding ethnic background of people, rather statistics is based on the nationality (Jacobs et al. 2006, p.147). It means that once immigrant background people have citizenship status, they become Belgian nationals, their ethnicity does not matter for Belgian authorities. If there are statistics with reference to people who have

nationality other than Belgian nationality, it means that mentioned people are not Belgian citizens, they are people living in Belgium with residence permit. Thus, it cannot be reached any official data regarding the rate of participation to the elections among Turkish immigrant people who have Belgian citizenship.

The next step can be to look at the numerical representation of Turkish people in assemblies to understand political participation and representation of Turkish people. This is an important issue because political participation and political representation are two sides of the medallion. As representatives of Turkish community, Turkish immigrant politicians' existence in the local councils and parliaments is an important indicator with regard to their political participation and representation.

As it is discussed in the literature review, political representation has two dimensions; descriptive representation and substantive representation. In the following subsection, it will be analyzed whether Belgian Turks have achieved descriptive representation and found their seats in the assemblies proportional to their size in the general population.

3.4. Is There a Descriptive Representation of Turkish Community in Belgium?

In this subsection, descriptive representation of Turkish community in Belgium, in other words, quantitative existence of Turkish representatives in the assemblies will be examined. This will be done at three levels; municipal level, provincial level, and regional level. At the municipal level, there is a descriptive representation of Turkish community in the councils of the municipalities where there is a concentrated Turkish population. At the provincial level, there is only one provincial council (Antwerp) that can approach the descriptive representation. The other provinces have not adequate number of Turkish representatives that is proportional to Turkish population size in the general population. At the regional level, there is a descriptive representation in three regional parliaments.

Since descriptive representation is related with the rate of the group size and the number of representatives of that particular group in a certain electorate, the group size of Turkish people in every electorate and the number of representatives from Turkish descent in local councils, regional councils and national parliaments must be compared. By taking into account theories of ethnic vote and ethnic representation (Ruedin 2009, p. 335), it can be assumed that Turkish immigrant people would vote for the Turkish candidates. Thus, if there is a concentrated Turkish population, these Turkish candidates can be elected. As a result of this assumption, firstly, the constituencies where Turkish people are residentially concentrated are identified.

Map 3.3. Map of Belgium Showing the Density of Belgian Turks per Municipality in 2015.

In this respect, Map 3.3 shows a map demonstrating the municipalities where Turkish population is densely concentrated. On the map, the places where the Turkish population is very dense are shown with red color and the places where it is less dense are shown with green color.[16] At first glance at the map, the red places, i.e. Ghent, Antwerp, Mechelen, Charleroi, Hasselt, Liege, Leuven, Mons and municipalities in the capital region of Brussels, are the municipalities where Turkish population are highly concentrated. For example, the rate of Turkish people in the municipality of Ghent is 0.1127571. It means that Turks constitute more than %10 of the general population of Ghent.[17]

There are 589 municipalities in Belgium. Since there are too many municipalities and not all of them have a Turkish population, we need to identify municipalities which has a Turkish population density. As a result, the municipalities which has a concentrated Turkish population are identified. In this respect, Turkish population refers to all Turkish-origin people regardless of their citizenship status in Belgium. 28 municipalities having a sizeable Turkish population, where more than 4% of the general population is Turks, are identified. Then, the number of Turkish representatives in these municipalities' councils are determined.

In Table 3.2, the first column shows the municipalities that have a sizeable Turkish population, exactly the municipalities having a Turkish population more than 4% of its total population. The information regarding the population sizes of Turkish people is provided by Jan Hertogen as it is argued in the Chapter 1.[18] The second column gives the numbers of Turkish councilors in their municipal councils while the third column gives the total number of municipal councilors in every municipality. The information regarding the total number of councilors and the number of Turkish

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[16] The maps in the Map 3 and Map 4 can be accessed from the following link;
http://www.gemeentekaart.be/#804c65a6-bd09-4769-b04c-7acc1979d54d (accessed in 16 April 2019).

[17] Migratieachtergrond per nationaliteit in % per gemeente-01/01/2017 - Diverse subtotalen (http://npdata.be/Data/Vreemdelingen/NIS/Vreemdelingen-gemeenten/2017/Migratieachtergrond-2017.xls) (accessed in 19 April 2019).

[18] Ibid.

	Municipality	The number of Turkish councilors in the municipal councils	Total number of the municipal councilors	The rate of Turkish councilors over the total number of the councilors	The rate of Turkish people per municipality
	Table 3.2. The Representation in Municipal Councils in Belgium				
1	**Aiseau-Presles**	2	21	**0.095**	**0.1042227**
2	**Antwerp**	3	47	**0.064**	**0.04790849**
3	Beringen	2	27	0.074	0.2683386
4	**Brussels**	2	49	**0.041**	**0.05296607**
5	Charleroi	2	51	0.039	0.07400146
6	Chatelet	1	31	0.032	0.06943793
7	**Diest**	1	27	**0.037**	**0.04542038**
8	Dison	1	26	0.038	0.06727648
9	Farciennes	1	7	0.143	0.2849379
10	**Genk**	5	41	**0.122**	**0.1532475**
11	**Gent**	6	51	**0.117**	**0.1127571**
12	**Hamme**	1	19	**0.053**	**0.06133091**
13	Herstal	1	33	0.030	0.07766756
14	**Houthalen-Helchteren**	5	31	**0.161**	**0.1219599**
15	Housden-Zolder	3	32	0.093	0.2558352
16	Leopoldsburg	1	26	0.038	0.1080223
17	Liege	1	50	0.020	0.04250048
18	**Maasmechelen**	4	24	**0.166**	**0.1501135**
19	Machelen	0	23	0.000	0.06610159
20	**Saint Nicolas**	2	28	0.071	**0.07559877**
21	**Schaerbeek**	11	47	0.234	**0.181991**
22	**Sint-Joost**	8	29	0.276	**0.2418029**
23	Temse	0	30	0.000	0.04832042
24	Verviers	1	38	0.026	0.05582646
25	Vilvoorde	0	35	0.000	0.04501737
26	**Vise**	1	18	**0.055**	**0.05887222**
27	**Willebroek**	2	29	**0.068**	**0.05551844**
28	Zele	2	28	0.071	0.1536045

councilors in municipal councils is obtained from the websites of municipalities. As this research regarding the number of councilors was carried out in April 2018, these

numbers of councilors include politicians who were at their office between 2012 and 2018. The fourth column shows the rate of Turkish councilors over the total number of the councilors. The fifth column gives the rate of Turkish people per municipality. The most important contribution of that table is that it gives you an opportunity to compare the rate of Turkish councilors in municipal councils and the rate of Turkish people in general population. The comparison of the ratios in the fourth and fifth columns shows that those rates are very close to each other.

In Table 3.2, the municipalities where there is a match between the rate of Turkish councilors over the total number of the councilors and the rate of Turkish-origin people per municipality are illustrated with bold font. While there is an exact match between the rates in half of the municipalities, the rates are very close for the rest of them. There are 7 municipalities where Belgian Turks are over-represented in municipal councils, 5 municipalities where they are equal-represented, 13 municipalities where they are under-represented and 3 municipalities where there are no Turkish politicians.

For example, the population of the municipality of Ghent was 253,300 in 2015.[19] Proportional to its population size, its municipal council has 51 members. According to Jan Hertogen, the rate of Turkish people in Ghent is 0.1127571 percent. Total number of councilors is 51 and the number of Turkish councilors is 6.[20] It means that the rate of Turkish councilors in municipality council is 0.117 percent. Therefore, the rate of Turkish people in the general population (0.1127571) and the rate of Turkish councilors in the municipal council (0.117) overlap.

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[19] Ghent- Population (http://population.city/belgium/gent/) (accessed in 15 April 2019).

[20] City Council (https://stad.gent/ghent-international/city-structure/city-council) (accessed in 15 April 2019).

Another example is the municipality of Sint-Joost-Ten-Node. Its population is 27,032.[21] Its municipality council has 29 members proportional to its population size.[22] According to Jan Hertogen, the rate of Turkish immigrant people in Sint-Jost-Ten-Node is 0.2418029. Total number of councilors is 29 and the number of Turkish councilors is 8. It means that the rate of Turkish councilors in municipality council is 0.276. Therefore, the rate of Belgian Turks in the general population (0.2418029) and the rate of Turkish councilors in the municipal council (0.276) overlap. Besides, the rate of the councilors in the city council is exceeding the rate of Turkish people in the city.

According to Table 3.2, descriptive representation is realized at local level politics in Belgium because the proportion of Turkish councilors in the councils overlaps with the rate of Turkish population in the general population. This is a surprising finding because these overlapping numbers of the rate of the Turkish city councilors and the rate of Turkish population, in other words, a good level of descriptive representation of Belgian Turks was an unexpected case. This finding goes against the literature on political participation and representation of immigrant communities which argues that migrants' political participation remains at lower levels and they are under-represented in legislative organs (Pettinicchio 2017, p.527). Moreover, there is an interesting finding claiming that the proportion of Turks and Moroccans in general population matches with their proportion on parties' lists in the elections, however, it does not overlap with their proportion in councils (Celis et al. 2013, p.5). This study finds that at local level politics, there is a descriptive representation proportional to population size of Turkish immigrant population.

When it comes to representation at provincial level, a fair representation rate could not be reached as it is at municipal level. There are 10 provinces in Belgium. Table 3.3

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[21] SAINT-JOSSE-TEN-NOODE (Région de Bruxelles / Brussels Gewest).
(https://www.citypopulation.de/php/belgium-bruxelles.php?cityid=21014) (accessed in 15 April 2019).

[22] Gemeenteraad Uw Verkozen (http://sjtn.brussels/nl/de-gemeente/politiek-leven/gemeenteraad) (accessed in 15 April 2019).

shows the numerical representation of Turkish people at provincial councils. The first column gives the names of provinces. The second column gives the numbers of Turkish councilors in their provincial councils while the third column gives the total number of provincial councilors in every province. The information regarding the number of Turkish councilors and the total number of councilors are obtained from the websites of the provinces. The fourth column shows the rate of Turkish councilors over the total number of the councilors. The fifth column gives the rate of Turkish people per province.[23]

Table 3.3. Representation in Provincial Councils					
	Province	The number of the Turkish councilors in the provincial council	Total number of the provincial councilors	The rate of Turkish councilors over the total number of councilors	The rate of Turkish people per province
1	Antwerp	2	72	0.027	0.0193
2	Hainaut	0	58	0.000	0.0250
3	Limburg	2	63	0.031	0.0583
4	Luxembourg	0	39	0.000	0.0035
5	Namur	0	39	0.000	0.0034
6	East-Flanders	1	72	0.014	0.0327
7	Flemish-Brabant	0	72	0.000	0.0118
8	Walloon-Brabant	0	20	0.000	0.0023
9	West-Flanders	0	72	0.000	0.0021
10	Liege	0	34	0.000	0.0245

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[23] Migratieachtergrond per nationaliteit in % per gemeente- 01/01/2017- Diverse subtotalen (http://npdata.be/Data/Vreemdelingen/NIS/Vreemdelingen-gemeenten/2017/Migratieachtergrond-2017.xls) (accessed in 19 April 2019).

According to Table 3.3, there is a descriptive representation of Turkish people only in the province of Antwerp. Apart from that, there are Turkish representatives in the councils of Limburg and East-Flanders. Except Antwerp, there is not a proportional representation of Turkish people in provincial councils.

There is one more representational level, national parliaments. Table 3.4 shows the national parliaments including 3 regional parliaments (Brussels, Walloon and Flemish Parliaments), parliaments of linguistic regions (Parliament of the French community and the Parliament of the German speaking community), Chamber of Representatives, and the Belgian Senate.

The first column gives the names of parliaments. The second column gives the numbers of Turkish politicians in the parliaments while the third column gives the total number of politicians in every parliament. The information regarding the number of Turkish politicians and the total number of politicians are obtained from the websites of the parliaments. The fourth column shows the rate of Turkish deputies over the total number of the deputies. The fifth column gives the rate of Turkish people per province.[24]

The two parliaments with the highest number of Turkish deputies are the Brussels Parliament and the Chamber of Representatives. In these parliaments, there is descriptive representation of Turkish community. For the other parliaments, it cannot be suggested whether there is descriptive representation or not, because there is no data regarding Turkish population size in the French speaking community or German speaking community. There is data only about Turkish population size in 3 regions, Brussels, Flemish and Walloon regions.

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[24] Migratieachtergrond per nationaliteit in % per gemeente- 01/01/2017- Diverse subtotalen (http://npdata.be/Data/Vreemdelingen/NIS/Vreemdelingen-gemeenten/2017/Migratieachtergrond-2017.xls) (accessed in 19 April 2019).

	Parliament	The number of the Turkish deputies in the parliament	Total number of the deputies	The rate of Turkish deputies over the total number of deputies	The rate of Turkish people per region
	Table 3.4. Representation in Regional and National Parliaments in Belgium				
1	Brussels Parliament[25]	4	89	0.0450	0.0490
2	Flemish Parliament[26]	1	124	0.0080	0.0187
3	Walloon Parliament[27]	1	75	0.0130	0.0170
4	Parliament of the French-Speaking Community[28]	1	94	0.0110	
5	Parliament of the German-Speaking Community[29]	0	25	0.0000	
6	The House of Representatives[30]	5	150	0.0330	
7	The Belgian Senate[31]	1	60	0.0160	

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[25] Parlement Bruxellois- Les deputes (http://www.parlement.brussels/deputes/) (accessed in 23 April 2019).

[26] Vlaams Parlement- Flemish Representatives (https://www.flemishparliament.eu/flemish-representatives) (accessed in 23 April 2019).

[27] Parlement De Wallonie- Travaux Palementaires (https://www.parlement-wallonie.be/pwpages?p=composition_mandataires) (accessed in 23 April 2019).

[28] Fedration Wallonie-Bruxelles/Le Parlement- Les Deputes (http://www.pfwb.be/les-deputes) (accessed in 23 April 2019).

[29] Parlement der Deutschsprachigen Gemeinschaft Belgiens – Menchen- Abgeordnete (http://www.pdg.be/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-4065) (accessed in 23 April 2019).
[30] De Kamerleden – Huidige Leden- 150 Leden (http://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/depute&language=nl&cfm=/site/wwwcfm/depute/cvlist54.cfm) (accessed in 23 April 2019).

[31] Belgische Senate- Huidige Senatoren (http://www.senaat.be/www/?MIval=/index_senate&MENUID=11200&LANG=nl) (accessed in 23 April 2019).

As the political structure of Belgium is highly intricate and regional governments have been more effective in line with their establishment objectives, Turkish politicians and their political activities in regional and municipal administrations will be prioritized.

All in all, in this chapter, it is revealed at the numerical presence of Turkish councilors and MP's in the local councils and parliaments. Thus, it has been discovered that there is good level of descriptive representation especially at the local level. Turkish population size in the municipalities have been mirrored in the councils by proportional numbers of Turkish representatives. The next chapter will examine whether descriptive representation brings about substantive representation or not.

CHAPTER 4

POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF TURKISH PEOPLE IN TERMS OF SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION

What Does the Turkish Electorate Want, What Does the Turkish Politician Do?

There is a representation problem of Turkish immigrant community in Belgium. Aktürk (2010) argues that there is a "representation gap" for Turkish immigrants because "the conservative social, cultural, and religious views of the Turkish minority are not expressed by their political representatives" (p.72). This thesis claims that representation problem of Turkish immigrants in Belgium does not stem from the lack of descriptive representation of Turkish migrants. Rather, representation problem is the result of the deficiencies related to substantive representation of Turkish migrants' interests.

In the previous chapter, it is illustrated that there is descriptive representation of Turkish people in Belgium's legislative organs at least at the local level. In this chapter, it will be analyzed whether the descriptive representation can reflect the needs and demands of the Turkish electorate to the political decisions as well as the reasons for any discrepancy. Based on the interviews conducted with politicians and the elites of the Turkish community, the conflict axes and the non-overlapping points between those two groups will be examined.

The analysis of the interviews shows that there is a perceived discrepancy between the expectations of the Turkish people from Turkish politicians and the political activities of Turkish politicians. In other words, Turkish representatives do not respond to their communities' expectations. This thesis aims to understand the underlying reasons for this mismatch between the people's demands and the politicians' activities.

The "representation gap" for Turkish immigrant community in Belgium can originate from four different reasons; first, the demands of the Turkish community; second,

self-interests and self-perceptions of Turkish politicians; third, party politics and the institutional context in Belgium in terms of immigrant's representation; and fourth, the home state effect. Thus, the analysis in this chapter is divided into four subsections. In the first section, the demands and expectations of Turkish electorate from Turkish politicians will be discussed. In this respect, what the electorate says, what the politician hears will be analyzed. In the second section, the priorities and self-interests as well as the self-perceptions of the Turkish politicians will be discussed. In this regard, the second section will focus on the target audience of Turkish politicians when they carry out their political activities in contrast to the expectations of the Turkish community. As whose representatives do Turkish politicians consider themselves? Whom they serve for? In the third section, the party politics and the institutional structure in Belgium will be examined as restrictive factors for Turkish politicians. Finally, the fourth section will analyze the home state effect on Turkish electorate and Turkish representatives in Belgian context. Those four sections do not represent subjects that are completely different from each other. On the contrary, each topic discussed under those sections are actually intertwined with the other. However, in order to have a categorization of interview analysis, those four main themes are identified.

4.1. What Does the Turkish Electorate Say? What Does Turkish Politician Hear?

The Demands and the Expectations of Turkish Immigrant Community from Turkish Representatives

In this subsection, in the first part, the opinions of the Turkish elites with regard to priorities and demands of Turkish people from their politicians will be analyzed. In the second part, the perceptions of the Turkish politicians regarding the demands of Turkish people will be examined.

In the first step, the problems that Belgian Turks face will be examined with the help of the interviews conducted for this study. It is acknowledged that the interviews may not fully reflect the problems of Belgian Turks because they were elite interviews which are conducted with the opinion leaders of the Belgian Turks and Turkish politicians. However, those interviews and the preliminary observations give

important clues regarding the problems that Belgian Turks have. Their main problems that require an immediate solution are related to language, education, unemployment, religion and discrimination against Turks in schools, business, and social life. First, in general, Turkish people do not know any of the Belgian languages or even if they know, they prefer to speak Turkish language in their homes, friendly groups, school and work. In the interviews regarding linguistic difficulties that Belgian Turks have, it is argued that "first generation of the Turkish immigrants tried to buy eggs by imitating chicken in the grocery store because they have not known Flemish." Belgian Turks have solved this linguistic problem over the years. Instead of learning Flemish or French, Turkish people established their own markets, groceries in their neighborhoods. They can easily lead a life without speaking Belgian languages because they live together with other Belgian Turks in Turkish neighborhoods. There are Turkish doctors, Turkish lawyers, Turkish businessmen and Turkish politicians who were integrated to economics, politics and social life in Belgium. Turkish people tried to solve their problems in those areas with the help of those Belgian Turks who have integrated to Belgium more than the other Turks.

Linguistic inadequacies of Belgian Turks can be considered as the most important problem of them because this is the main source of other problems and discrimination of the Turks in education, business, social life and many other issues. The other problem is the difficulties that Belgian Turks face in their education life. Those difficulties are largely related with the linguistic problems. Turkish children start their education life one step behind the other children because Turkish language is spoken in their homes, and Turkish children go to schools without knowing Belgian languages. Moreover, these children are directed to vocational high schools while they are in secondary school and their university education is prevented from their very early ages. The interviews reveal that Turkish youth prefers to get a job and earn money after their high school education rather than going to universities. This causes problems in the employment areas. Turkish people work in low-paid jobs in insecure conditions. The other problem is related to religion. Turkish mosques must be recognized by the state in order to receive financial support from the Belgian state, which is a long-term procedure that depends on harsh conditions. Thus, most of the

Turkish mosques cannot take a grant from Belgian state although an allowance is allocated to the churches from the municipal budgets, which the Turks also contribute by paying taxes.

According to Turkish elites, the most important problems that require an immediate solution are about discrimination against Turkish people in every field from education and employment facilities to municipal services, Turkish people are silent about those community issues. They do not have such large-scale social demands. As it is argued in the literature review, people may take part in politics because they expect some material benefits from those politicians such as gaining a job in the public offices, improving their career goals or receiving aid (McAtee et al., 2011). The interviews conducted with the elites of Turkish people confirms that argument in the literature, because it can be claimed that Turkish people participate in politics to improve their personal interests. Further, Turkish people are not satisfied with their political representation because Turkish people want to take precedence over every action of the Turkish-origin politicians, however, their demands that exceed the authorities of local level politicians could not be met by most of the politicians. In addition, Turkish people do not employ the methods that are provided by the institutional structure in expressing their demands. All in all, it can be argued that there is a mismatch between what Turkish people perceive as their problems and what their community issues are. There is also a mismatch between what politicians can do about those problems and how it is perceived by Turkish people. Moreover, there is a mismatch between how Turkish people should communicate their problems to Turkish politicians and how they do it. All those discrepancies contribute to the perceived lack of substantive representation by the Turkish community.

Turkish elites interviewed for this study argue that there are two reasons for the problems that Turkish people encounter in Belgium. First, Turkish community is a closed society who does not know the Belgian languages and does not join with the other components of Belgian society. Second, there is discrimination against foreigners in Europe, it is not racism but discrimination in every area of life, i.e. in

municipal services, education and employment facilities. As a result, Belgian Turks is an isolated society. Interviewee 15 argues that

> Turkish people live in a closed system. The most important problem that they have is that Turks cannot express themselves sufficiently in municipalities and state institutions, this linguistic inadequacy causes trouble every time. For these reasons, Turkish people do not know their rights. Secondly, there is a rising trend about racism and Islamophobia. Although it cannot be said there is racism and Islamophobia against Muslim Turks in Belgium, Turks are discriminated. Turks are labeled as foreigners, they have neither political power nor sanction power, they cannot create a big reaction when their demands are not met. In Belgium, things are carried out as the following; nobody's request is rejected. Requests of all the segments of the society are listened and collected. They say, we can do it, we will deal with your problem. But it has not been done.

Moreover, discrimination against foreigners is manifested differently in local governments. It has been understood from the interviews that municipal governments behave loosely about providing services to places where Turks live intensively. Since the Belgian state allows foreigners to establish their neighborhoods, there are Turkish neighborhoods where Turks live intensely. For this reason, Turks and Belgian natives live in separate neighborhoods. Thus, municipal services are not delivered to every neighborhood in the same way. Regarding that, Interviewee 15 argues that

> Turkish people want Turkish politicians to ignore their parties. Rather they should work for to enhance the standard of living of Turkish people. Turkish politicians should pay regard for the rights and liberties of the Turks that are granted to them by law. For example, in Schaerbeek, there are two types of neighborhoods, the neighborhoods that native people live in and the neighborhoods that immigrant communities and foreigners live in. In the first type of neighborhood, the works of construction and road, repair works are carried out faster. When they call police, they come in ten minutes. But in the suburbs where foreigners live, construction works are not done. If they call the police ten times, the police do not come. Thus, we want our politicians to work for us because we are in an unequal situation. But we are aware of the fact that if these politicians try to work only for us, the society where they

come from, they will be disqualified from the political scene. Their parties are obstacles in front of the politicians. These political parties want them to make a choice between their society and their careers in politics.

There is also discrimination against Turkish children in schools because they may have more difficulties in lectures when compared to other children because Turkish children go to school without knowing the Flemish language. This situation, which is caused by linguistic inadequacies, leaves Turkish children behind and this may lead to discrimination against them. Thus, there is another important demand from politicians in the field of education; following the academic success of Turkish children in schools and preventing discrimination against them in the field of education. Interviewee 18 argues that

> Students of Turkish origin, especially intelligent, successful students are prevented from going to better schools by saying them "You cannot succeed". They are sent to vocational schools, i.e. art schools. They are directed to electrical, carpentry or industrial works. Our children are prevented from being a lawyer, doctor or manager. Families are going to the ombudsman, offering their children to be tested again. Families are crying by saying that "My child is not idiot." Children who are successful are disqualified consciously by teachers and schools. During the election processes, Turkish politicians have promised that they will do what they need to do about the discrimination against Turkish children in schools, but they do nothing. They are guided by the party they involved in. They cannot respond to the demands of Turkish society. This is our biggest problem.

As a result, Belgian Turks have some social problems because of discrimination against them. However, when it comes to delivering of those problems to politicians, there is a deadlock between people and politicians because Turkish people are silent about their social issues, they are not demanding from Turkish politicians. This deadlock does not stem from a communication problem between people and politicians. Rather, it is the result of the lack of confidence of Turkish people have in their politicians.

First, it is obvious that Turkish people can easily communicate with Turkish politicians. Turkish elites living in Belgium claim that Turkish politicians are listening people sincerely, but they do not produce solutions to their problems. It has been complained about politicians' unresponsive attitudes towards the demands of Turkish people. Regarding that, Interviewee 18 claims that

> Turkish politicians are open to communication with people. People have their phone numbers even. We are expressing our demands. It is not a problem to reach the politician and voice your demand. The problem is that our politicians are not working, they do not response to our demands.

In addition, Interviewee 16 argues that

> Turkish politicians are talking about the problems of Turkish society, but they cannot find any solution. Politicians are listening to our problems, they seem sincere, but they can't offer any solution. They don't express these problems somewhere and don't try to solve them.

Second, Turkish people alienated Turkish politicians. They do not see those politicians as a part of their community. Rather, they think that those politicians are the part of the system because they are subordinated by their parties. There is a lack of confidence, Turkish people do not trust in Turkish politicians. Thus, Turkish people are silent about their community issues because of the attitudes of Turkish politicians towards not to work about Turkish people's demands. The reason is that Turkish people think that the ones who can enter into Belgian political parties become one of them, they are no longer like Turkish people. They need to embrace the party ideology and act according to the its requirements to be accepted by their parties. Regarding that, Interviewee 17 argues that

> They have no expectations from the politicians they vote for because those politicians who are nominated by the Belgian political parties are generally assimilated people. They are moving in certain patterns which are close to Belgian people. Unfortunately, they have no expectations from them. Because they

are people who have been absorbed by their parties. And they also have adopted the ideology of their parties.

Third, Turkish people are unsatisfied with the activities of Turkish politicians because they want to be prioritized in every action of Turkish politicians. Moreover, Turks want that Turkish politicians work for only themselves. However, they are aware that Turkish politicians are not free to behave in this manner. Regarding that, Interviewee 15 argues that

> Turkish people want Turkish politicians to ignore their parties. Rather they should work for to enhance the standard of living of Turkish people. Turkish politicians should pay regard for the rights and liberties of the Turks that are granted to them by law. For example, in Schaerbeek, there are two types of neighborhoods, the neighborhoods that native people live in and the neighborhoods that immigrant communities and foreigners live in. In the first type of neighborhood, the works of construction and road, repair works are carried out faster. When they call police, they come in ten minutes. But in the suburbs where foreigners live, construction works are not done. If they call the police ten times, the police do not come. Thus, we want our politicians to work for us because we are in an unequal situation. But we are aware of the fact that if these politicians try to work only for us, the society where they come from, they will be disqualified from the political scene. Their parties are obstacles in front of the politicians. These political parties want them to make a choice between their society and their careers in politics.

In the first part, the problems of Belgian Turks from the perspective of Turkish elites are discussed. In the second part, the demands of Turkish people from the perspective of Turkish politicians will be analyzed. There are three headlines standing out in this regard. First, Turkish politicians argue that Turkish people have demands only about their daily problems, there are no large-scale social demands. Second, Turkish politicians complain that Turkish people act as if all their problems have to be solved by Turkish politicians. Third, they complain that Turkish people do not employ the institutional ways of demanding.

According to the politicians the demands of Turkish people have a substantial variety. The content and the scope of the demands are very extensive. Those demands are generally about the personal interests or problems on their daily lives. The examples of those demands can be seen from the following quotations;

Interviewee 11 argues that

> People have different expectations from us. For example, there was a man whose daughter would take a test. He wanted me to intervene in the test results and make sure that his daughter would pass the exam. Or they want me to put themselves on the front line of social housing lists. But people are queuing up for social housing and there are groups of people to be given priority for these lists. People expect me to put him in front of these priority groups on the charts. But this is rightful due. The experts decide the priority groups, then send it to the municipality, finally, the councilors approve it. I cannot do something. Another interesting demand was to delete a fine which is given by the police in traffic. I cannot interfere with those things. For this time, I may cancel the traffic fine, but what happens the next time? I am losing votes for these reasons. But it does not matter. Our people must overcome this. For example, they got angry with me when I do not go to the coffeehouse and sit with them. But they are smoking there which is a crime in the closed areas. I must report when I see people smoking cigarettes in the coffeehouses. And they are doing illegal jobs in the coffeehouses. If there is a police raid while I was there, they would fire me.

Interviewee 5 argues that

> When Turkish people have a problem, they will contact us immediately. Sometimes, they have very strange demands. For example, warthogs have ridden a neighborhood, Turkish people asked for help from me. Another example, there is someone who wants to make a building with two floors on his own land, but the municipality did not allow them to do, so, this man asks for help. He asks, "Will you come and take care of the file? Can you ask why they did not allow us to do? Please, can you guide us?" Another example, someone else's daughter had difficulty in French lessons at school. He is calling me to find someone who will teach French to her daughter. Yet there is one more interesting instance; someone called me few days ago and asked for my help to cut down the tree

in front of his house. We are a very sensitive country about trees, we never cut trees. If the tree is sick or very large, they can make an exception. Thus, they demand everything from us without thinking that we can or cannot. Even if we can't help, we try to cheer up them because we are very sad when we cannot do anything.

Interviewee 6 argues that

Turkish people have lots of demands. Since they are unfamiliar with the Belgian politics, unfortunately, they see a municipal councilor as he/she is a minister. They think that we are going to solve everything. All kinds of applications come to me. I am a municipal councilor, talk to me from our municipality. But the man is coming, he has a problem with the prosecutor, or with the State Department or with the Ministry of Justice, or with the Chamber of Commerce. They want lawyer. We have always such complex files. For example, visa issue. A man married with a woman from Turkey. But he cannot bring her wife to Belgium. They need visa. Visa issuance is under the responsibility of the Foreigners' Office which is affiliated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Interior. Institutions of the ministries are very different and separate from us. However, since we are politicians, the citizen comes to us to seek for help. We try to solve these problems as much as we can do by using our relations within the party or with senior officials within those boards. The ability to solve the problems is also related with the capacity of the politician. I mean, every kind of request comes to us. Turkish people see us at the center of Belgian politics, and they think we can do everything.

Interviewee 7 adds that

People demand jobs. Sometimes, their children have problems in their schools, and they ask us to take care of the issue. Similar to that, they ask for help with the personal problems they face in their daily life. In general, community issues are not discussed unfortunately.

In sum, those arguments show that the demands of Turkish people from a Turkish politician can vary so much that some people may ask to be favored in the exams and recruitment processes. They may have expectations forcing politicians to commit corruption. In such cases, the politician may prefer to be indifferent to such demands

70

by taking the risk of losing votes or prefer to act upon such requests. Politicians find those demands are unrealistic and exceeding the limits of their abilities and area of responsibility.

The second outstanding aspect of the demands of Turkish people from the politicians is that Turkish people think that all their problems have to be solved by Turkish politicians because those politicians are elected thanks to their support. Turkish people may ask for help on many issues that are not included in the duties and jurisdictions of the municipal councilors or mayors. In this respect, Interviewee 9 argues that

> They come to us when they face a problem, including issues that are not in my jurisdiction. The view of Turkish society is that; you are deputy mayor; you are in charge of everything. I'll come to you when there is something related to school, hospital or police. I'll come to you for family issues, for poverty, for unemployment. You have to look at everything because we have elected you. There is such an expectation of Turkish people.

The third prominent issue about the demands of Turkish people is that they do not employ the proper and institutional ways of demanding. There are some institutional ways they can use to express their demands officially, but they do not use. In this respect, politicians argue that Turkish community has not yet reached at the level of voicing their complaints to the responsible authorities by comparing their dialogues with the native people of Belgium and Turks. They find problematic the way that Turks communicate with politicians. In this regard, Interviewee 8 claims that

> When Belgian people have a problem, they try to fix it with the help of the responsible institutions or officials. For example, there are many Belgians who are calling me, they say, "I entered the municipality's website. I see that this field is your responsibility, I have a problem like this." Then, we are trying to do what is necessary. However, Turkish people are not behaving like that. When we see them in Friday praying, when we meet on the street, when we meet in the association, they start to explain their problems immediately. I say, "Send an e-mail explaining your problem, if it is necessary, attach a photograph. But they do not

71

accept, they say, you'll come and see the problem, then solve it."
Nevertheless, they have the problem and they should inform me
about the content of it. They expect me to go and detect the
problem, then send an email to myself, then fix the problem. This is
not the case. Our society has not yet reached at the level of voicing
their complaint. That makes me sad.

In addition to that, politicians argue that Turkish people do not benefit the
possibilities that are granted to them when they demand something. Interviewee 8
claims that

There is a law in Belgium; if a petition is signed by the 10% of the
population in a municipality, that issue can be presented in the
municipal councils. Our Diyanet Mosque has 450 members in our
municipality. Generally, I say to the mosque administration; "Come
to us with a proposal petition, let your members to sign that
petition. It is enough to have 450-500 signatures. You only have to
say that you have a project that can be practiced in your
municipality by presenting it to the municipal council." People
should come to council and follow the discussions regarding that
project. They should analyze which party defends the project, who
support their project, on the contrary, who hinders the project. I
have been saying this for five years, but people don't do something.
This is an important opportunity for people, but they are not aware
of that. If the signatures of 10% of the population are collected, the
councilors are obliged to discuss the issue in the council. Then,
municipal councilors have to do their research and prove their
arguments. At the end, the council has to give an answer to that
petition by resolving the problem. If the solution is not possible,
they have to give a feedback by explaining the reasons and proving
why it is not possible. Thus, this is a great opportunity for people,
however, Turkish people are not using this.

To conclude this section, it can be argued that although Turkish people have some
community issues that are waiting for solutions in Belgium, they only demand about
their daily personal problems. Accordingly, from the politicians' perspective, there
are only personal demands of Turkish people. Thus, the perspective of Turkish
politicians regarding the problems, priorities and expectations of Turkish people do
not reflect the real problems of Belgian Turks. All in all, there is a mismatch between
what the Turkish population perceives as its problems, how they communicate those
problems with politicians and what politicians can do about those problems. This

mismatch contributes to perceived lack of substantive representation by the Turkish community.

Important lessons to be learned from this subsection can be listed as the following. It can be argued that Turkish people cannot develop a sense of belonging for Belgium, they do not see the problems that they face in Belgium as crucial problems. Their aim is to earn money and lead a prosperous life. When there is a problem that will adversely affect their wallets, they complain. Thus, it can be argued that the immigration movement of Turks starting from 1960s have a positive effect on Turks in economic terms, however, there are lots of problems regarding their integration in social, cultural and political life in Belgium. Economic advantages in Belgium make other problems foldable. Further, it can be argued that Belgian Turks plan to leave Belgium and resettle in Turkey when they face serious problems that will influence adversely their life in Belgium.

The second lesson is that Turkish people do not employ their rights that are granted to them by Belgian authorities. According to Martiniello (2005), one dimension of the political integration of immigrants is the rights that are given to migrants in the host country. The political opportunity structures in Belgium grant some legal rights for political participation to immigrant-origin people, however, Turkish people exercise those rights in a very limited way. Belgian Turks have citizenship to a large extent thanks to the immigration and citizenship regime in Belgium, they have no difference from the native Belgians in legal grounds. Further, Belgian Turks who are not Belgian citizens have the right to vote in local level elections. Moreover, if they collect signatures from people as much as 10 percent of the population of the district where they live, the issue that they want to highlight have to be discussed in the councils by the politicians. Also, people can participate in those assembly meetings and can observe which issues are discussed and solved by the politicians. Institutional structure provides such rights to Turkish people, but they do not use those rights. In the verbs of Almond and Verba (1963), those people are capable to take part in Belgian politics. However, there is a question mark regarding whether they are aware of their rights. In this respect, Almond et al. (1963) produced the term of "subjective

competence" to refer to the situation that people are aware of their rights and believe that they can affect the decision-making mechanisms. This study does not give the answer to the question of whether Turkish people see themselves as subjectively competent in Belgian politics. However, it can be argued that either they are not aware of those rights because of linguistic inadequacies and lower levels of education or although they are aware, they do not use those granted rights because they have a non-demanding attitude with regard to Belgium. This will be discussed in more details in the fourth subsection of this chapter.

The third lesson is that Belgian Turks expect solutions to all their problems from Turkish politicians. On the contrary, Turkish politicians claim that they are not the representative of Belgian Turks only and they do not work only for them. The details regarding this will be examined in the next subsection, however, this is an important aspect of this section, too. Turkish people cannot express themselves in municipalities and state institutions owing to linguistic inabilities and demand help from those Turkish politicians. Besides, Turkish people expect that their problems that they face in Belgium will be understood and expressed best by Turkish politicians because they share the same language, religion and the culture. Belgian Turks may be justified to some extent about those expectations. It can be argued that Turkish politicians can understand Turkish people the best because there must be people who have the same problems in their close vicinity and relatives. In a period, which right-wing parties and nationalism are on the rise and discriminatory behaviors against foreigners have increased, it is natural that Belgian Turks expect to be represented by Turkish politicians. Different attitudes of Turkish politicians and Belgian Turks related to political representation may be the result of their different integration levels to Belgium which will be discussed in the next subsection.

4.2. Who Elects the Turkish Politician? For Whom Does the Politician Serve?

The Priorities, Interests and Self-Perceptions of Turkish Politicians in Belgian Political Arena

The expectations of Turkish community and the activities of Turkish politicians do not coincide with each other. In this subsection, the priorities, interests and self-

perceptions of Turkish politicians as an underlying reason for this mismatch will be analyzed. As it is mentioned before, there is a classical debate in the literature about "members of the parliaments should represent whom and how should they represent" (Schmitt et al., 2007, p.14). Moreover, it is argued that the issue of representation is conflictual in every aspect, "because politicians have goals, interests and values of their own." (Przeworski et al. 1999, p.30). The issue of political representation of migrant-origin people in the receiving country is more complex and problematic. This argument is confirmed by the interviews conducted with Turkish politicians. According to those interviews, politicians have priorities, interests and self-perceptions different from their own communities. In this respect, it is found that Turkish politicians do not perceive themselves as the representative of the Turkish immigrant community in Belgium. They define themselves as a Belgian national and perceive themselves as the representative of the whole society. Thus, they claim that they are not only working for Turkish society but also working for each and everyone in the society. This is an important reason for the mismatch between expectations of people and the attitudes of politicians. In this respect, it can be argued that there is also a mismatch between the levels of integration of Turkish immigrant community and Turkish-origin politicians because while Turkish-origin politicians identify themselves as a part of the Belgian nation, Turkish immigrant people do not approve such kind of identification.

As it is argued in the literature review, members of minority communities think that their communities' interests are best represented by another member of that minority group (Ruedin, 2009, p.335). This argument is confirmed by the interviews with the elites of Belgian Turks. The interviews show that when Turkish people vote, the first priority of them is to vote for a candidate who is Turkish, and Muslim while the second priority is that the candidate has not broken his/her ties with Turkish society. In other words, Turkish people vote for Turkish candidates with an expectation that Turkish politicians would represent Turkish society and their interests.

Theories of ethnic representation argue that people believe that an outsider cannot represent the interests of the group as any group member. This belief has two implications; first, political parties can use migrant-origin politicians to have migrant communities' votes, which will be discussed in the next subsection in more details; second, migrant-origin politicians can use this belief to their advantage, they can be elected by ethnic votes not because of their capabilities but because of their migrant-origins. Particular differences among the group members lose its importance and migrant-origin electorate vote with the expectation that their interests will be best represented by another group member, as it is argued in the second chapter. Political parties present Turkish candidates to have Turkish votes and they obtain Turkish votes without any further effort. Political parties do not make any promise to the Turks regarding the improvement of their interests. They get the Turkish votes without promising a solution to the problems of Belgian Turks and increase the number of seats in the parliaments. After the elections, Turkish politicians are strictly controlled and monitored by their parties and they are not allowed to enter inner party structures. This will be discussed in more details in the next subsection.

The second beneficiary of the ethnic voting is the Turkish politicians who are elected by the Turkish votes. They are elected because of their ethnic origins; Turkish people do not place an emphasis on the level of education of those Turkish politicians or their capabilities in politics. In this way, they can be elected without any further effort. However, those politicians reject to be the representative of the Turkish society. This can have two reasons; first, they can reject being a representative of Turks because of their career goals in politics, they can prioritize their self-interests over the interests of their communities, or, second, they might be fully integrated to Belgian society in such a way that there is no difference between a native Belgian and a Turk for them. This study cannot give the answer of the question of which scenario is closer to reality. In the interviews, Turkish politicians argue that they are the representative of the all Belgians because they are part of the Belgian nation. Thus, according to interviews, the level of integration of Turkish politicians and Turkish society differs, and the perceived representation gap is the result of their different levels of integration.

The interviews conducted with the Turkish politicians reveal that contrary to the belief that Turks will be best represented by a Turk, Turkish politicians proclaim that they are not the representative of the Turkish people but the representative of the whole society and not working for only Turkish people but also for the whole society. It is claimed that Turkish people is a part of the society, thus, they can help Turkish people when they work for the whole society. To do politics for the interests of the whole society is an important corner stone for the career goals of the politicians because every politician asserts that to get involved in politics only to represent the interests of Turkish people and to work only for their interests bring about success in the short run, then, these politicians would be lost in the political arena in the long run. The reason is, according to interviews, that Turkish people have not realistic and feasible demands from politicians. If the politician tries to meet those kinds of demands in order not to lose the support of Turkish people, he/she would lose the support of both of the Turkish community and of the other components of the society. Because they can satisfy neither the Turkish people's demands nor the others in this way.

How Turkish politicians define themselves is an important cornerstone for their political activities and their representative actions. This identification determines whose representatives are those politicians and whom they work for. In every political decision and activity, there are three paths in front of the Turkish politicians, first, they may choose to be the representative of the Turkish community only; second, they may choose to cut their relations with Turkish community and become a Flemish or Walloon by forgetting the society and culture where they come from; third, there is a midway where the politician become a Belgian national and serve for the whole Belgian society but without forgetting his/her own immigrant community and culture.

In this respect, Interviewee 11 argues that

> The most proper way is the midway which I embrace. I am trying to
> be a citizen of Belgium without forgetting my own society, values,

and culture. I am trying to adapt to this country as myself without changing my values and beliefs. This is very challenging for us. Because, on the one hand, in the eyes of Flemish people, I am Turkish, I am Muslim, I am different from them, I am the other. On the other hand, in the eyes of Turkish people, I am much more like a Flemish rather than a Turk. Because I speak like a Flemish, my daily routines are like Flemish people.

Turkish politicians identify themselves not only as Turks but also as Belgian nationals or Belgian Turks. They claim that they are the representative of the whole Belgian society and they work for all segments of the society. Those claims of Turkish politicians can be seen in the next quotations;

Interviewee 9 argues that

I am uncomfortable when you say constantly Turkish politicians and Turkish people. We are the members of Belgian society. We are people who serve society as a whole. Politics cannot be done for only Turks and if it is done, it becomes a fault. So, we are serving all people here. If you want to do your duty faithfully, if you want to win the hearts of people, you have to serve every person in society. Since we work like this, we can get votes from everyone, not just from Turks. Only Turks themselves cannot carry out politics. If you do politics only for Turks, you will be successful in the short term. After that, you will be lost immediately.

Interviewee 8 argues that

We see ourselves as Belgian. Yes, I am Turkish and Muslim. This is our pride, because our culture, our religion is more comprehensive and wealthier. That makes us stronger against the Belgians. But we are very uncomfortable to be called only Turkish origin and only to be seen with this eye. We serve everyone in our municipality; we do not distinguish religion, language, race. We are the elected deputy of everyone. We're trying to give people their rightful due because they voted for us. Otherwise, we'll treat unjustly. I feel myself under the weight of a great responsibility. I'm trying to serve every people and I try not being ashamed of people who trust me.

Although they try to represent each and every person in the society, they are complaining about the perception about themselves as "the Turkish representative of the Turkish people" in the eyes of both of Turkish people and native Belgians. This

perception has two implications. On the one hand, to be called as a Turkish politician by Flemish people and the political parties is a signal of the discrimination in the eyes of Turkish politicians. Because it implicates that Turkish politicians are there for only Turkish people. Thus, this perception creates difficulties for Turkish politicians. On the other hand, Turkish people insist on that Turkish politicians are elected by their votes and they have to serve only Turkish people. This is also not a desirable perception for Turkish politicians. Two different views of these two different societies put Turkish politicians in a difficult situation. They have to prove themselves to both of the Flemish people and the Turkish people. One of the politicians describe this as "a war with two sides." The examples of those arguments can be found in the next quotations.

Interviewee 8 claims that

> I see myself as a representative of the whole society living there, not the representative of those who are of the Turkish origins. I am trying to reflect myself exactly like this. But in practice there is a different situation; the Turkish society thinks that we have been chosen by only Turkish votes, we are only sitting in that seat thanks to Turkish people and we are only obliged to serve the Turks. On the other hand, there is a perception dominant among the Belgians; such that the Turks are working only for the Turks. The Belgian media is also working hard to create and maintain this perception. So, we're in a war with two sides. The accusations of the two sides are too unfair for us. Our job is very difficult. On the one hand, Turkish citizens are forcing us just like we have to serve them. On the other hand, the Belgian media are slapping us.

Interviewee 4 argues that

> We are trying to be the representative of everyone, every person. But they see us as the representative of Turkish society. When we make a mistake, it's not like someone else's fault. That's why I'm trying to set an example with all my actions. I am cautious with my posture, my actions, my speaking. Because when I make a mistake, they bill this fault to all Turks. We are monitored by Turkish community and at the same time, by the Flemish community.

Interviewee 8 holds responsible the media for the development and the spread of negative views on Turkish politicians. He complains about that when they participate in an event about Turks or Muslims, it is announced by the media, however, when they go to a church for a ceremony, the media ignores it. In this way, native people believe that Turkish politicians get involved in politics to improve only the interests of Turkish people.

In this regard, Interviewee 8 argues that

> We do not work for only Turks. I have worked hard for years, I tried to serve everyone. When we take part in the activities of Turkish society, Belgians, especially xenophobic parties, use this against us by taking photographs of us and giving statements to the newspapers. They argue that we are working only for Turkish society. They claim that, we were right-wing, Turkish nationalists, pro-Erdoğan and we were trying to spread their views here. Journalists report this news without asking us. I finally got an interview with my own party. I said, "Look! I have been involved in the activities of every society for 5 years. When we participate in the MHP's event, you make news, but you do not report on when we go to the church. I participate in the activities of the Jewish society, Orthodox Christians and Greek society. I'm trying to be with everyone, to help everyone. For example, November 11 is celebrated here as a holiday, they celebrate the end of World War II. Celebrations are held in the church. I have been attending this ceremony for 5 years. I told the journalists that I was waiting for a question like that "Your name is Mohammed and you are of Turkish origin. What are you doing in church? You didn't ask this question once. You are ignoring that." We are trying to fulfill our duty for both of the Turkish society and the whole Belgian society. Unfortunately, the media is not behaving impartially while making news. When we go to the mosque iftar, this becomes news, it is used against us, but this is not the case when we go to church.

Politicians' self-interests and career goals are other determinants for the self-identification and political priorities for the politicians. They have to work more than the other politicians because they are supposed to prove themselves to their own immigrant community and then, to the other components of the society. They need the support of their own community to be elected and enter into the political arena.

Moreover, they need the support of the other components of the society in order to succeed at the political arena. In this respect, Interviewee 1 argues that

> I did my election propaganda for the general population of Gent. I ran a campaign for all the society. But the essence of the issue is that, as a Turkish candidate, you have to lean on the Turkish community and their votes in the first place. Like all other Turkish candidates, I lean on the support of the Turkish people. In the second phase of the propaganda, we tried to appeal to all Gent people. So, we worked in two different ways. While we were talking to the press in front of everyone, we addressed all the people. Turks are aware of the fact that we are trying to get the votes of the Flemish people by doing that. But when we are alone with Turks, they say "There is no Flemish here, let's talk sincerely now." Of course, we are not aiming to represent only Turks, we want to represent the whole society. But this is the political cunning. To be elected, first, you need to get support from your own community. Then, you can seek for the other's support.

As it is seen in the last quotations, Turkish politicians in Belgium need the support of two different communities at the same time. For this reason, they need to work hard. In this regard, Interviewee 6 argues that it is very difficult to be a politician of foreign origin in the Belgian political arena.

The other important dimension is that whether they perceive the improvement of the interests of Turkish community as their primary duty or not. Politicians may try to improve their self-interests, which may take precedence over the interests of the community that is represented. In this point, it is important that whose interests are on the front row for the politicians. Their self-interests or the interests of their immigrant community? In some cases, politicians may have some particular interests to reach at their career goals and those interests may conflict with the interests of the Turkish people. If this is the case, what will the politician do? Interviewee 20 blames most of the politicians to follow their own interests. He claims that

> Many of our friends participate in politics not because they think what they can change in their neighborhood and in what ways they can help to their community. But they think to which status they will come and how much salary they will receive.

In sum, there is a mismatch between the expectations of Turkish people and the activities of Turkish politicians. One reason for this mismatch is the self-identification and self-interests of Turkish politicians, which make them act differently from what Turkish people expect. Further, there is also mismatch between the level of integration of the Turkish-origin politicians and of the Turkish immigrant community because politicians identify themselves as a part of the Belgian nation while Turkish people blame this kind of identification. It can be argued that Turkish politicians in Belgium limit themselves in their political activities. The self-limitation of politicians may be the most important reason for the representation problem of Turkish people. This study is started with the assumption that the underlying reasons for the representation problem are about party politics and the institutional context of Belgium, Turkish politicians need to be cautious about their discourses and political activities because their parties strictly monitor and control them, their activities that can be against the party line are prevented by their parties. However, their self-limitations regarding not being the representative of Turkish people may have more restrictive effects on them than the limitations of political parties.

While concluding this subsection, there are questions that needed to be ask. Can a politician represent all the elements of his society? Can a politician of immigrant origin, having a different religious belief from a different ethnicity and culture, represent everyone in the host state? Even if the immigrant-origin politicians claim to represent everyone, does the society they represent accept this representation? In addition, parliaments should represent the whole society with all their parliamentary members, this is the sine qua non principle of the representative democracies, however, this is technically impossible for a politician to represent the whole society.

4.3. The Effect of Party Politics and the Institutional Context

Restraining Effects of Party Politics and Institutional Structure on Turkish Politicians in the Belgian Context

The mismatch between the demands of Turkish people and the activities of Turkish politicians, in other words, the "representation gap" of Belgian Turks cannot be

explained only with the personal priorities and interests of politicians. There are also other factors determining the representation capability of Turkish politicians in broader extent such as party politics and institutional context in Belgium. It can be argued that party politics and the institutional context are facilitating factors for the descriptive representation of migrant background people, however, they are restraining factors for their interests' representation. First, political parties present Turkish candidates to have Turkish votes in the elections, however, they limit politicians' ability to voice their demands, Turkish politicians are not allowed to enter inner party mechanisms. Second, political opportunity structures including citizenship and immigration regimes, electoral systems and party politics provide advantages for descriptive representation of migrant background people, thus, migrants achieved a good level of descriptive representation at local level. Nonetheless, immigrant politicians at local levels cannot improve the interests of their immigrant communities because of their limited jurisdictions.

4.3.1. Party Politics

Political parties can play the role of "gatekeepers and the facilitators of immigrant political participation" (Bloemraad et al., 2013). Likewise, they can play a constraining role in terms of migrants' representation. It is understood from the interviews that party politics is a restraining factor for Turkish politicians and political representation of the interests of the Turkish immigrant community in Belgium. As it is argued in the literature review, the first reason is that political parties do not care about the migrants' grievances and do not respond to their concerns because they are minorities (Munro, 2008). The second reason is that involvement of Turkish politicians to political parties are limited to electoral lists to gain votes of Turkish society, however, they are not allowed to enter inner party mechanisms after the elections (Celis et al., 2013). This argument is confirmed by the interviews conducted with the politicians. It is understood from the interviews that those Turkish politicians are elected thanks to the preferential votes although their parties present them from non-eligible places. After they become elected officials, their parties are monitoring and controlling their discourses and activities because they are of foreign origin. Turkish politicians do not deny the constraining role of the political parties, but they

do not perceive it as an obstacle for themselves. Rather, they normalize the restraining effect of the parties. They argue that there is a party system, party ideology and they have to comply with their party lines. In this respect, there is not a confrontation between the politicians and the parties.

It can be argued that Turkish politicians have become the part of the system, they have also been institutionalized by the system. Therefore, there is a conflict between the Turkish politicians and the Turkish electorate. This is an important reason for the "representation gap" of Turkish people. With regard to restrictive effects of political parties, the following quotations are remarkable;

Interviewee 6 argues that

> Traditional parties use Turkish politicians to have the votes of Turkish people especially in local elections in municipalities like Gent, Antwerp and Brussels where Turkish people are highly concentrated. But after the elections, nobody listens what Turkish politicians say or what Turkish people want.

Interviewee 7 argues that

> We're limited by our parties. You may encounter some limitations, not only because you are of Turkish origin, but because you are of foreign origin and are especially of Muslim origin. There is a lot of pressure on the foreign-origin elected officials. Because they see them as Trojan horses. It is believed that they are advancing the interests of their countries of origin. For this reason, when you participate in politics as a foreign politician, you face great challenges. You have difficulties to find yourself in the lists. You have difficulty in expressing yourself. Your social media posts are strictly controlled. You are warned when it is necessary. So, there's a lot of control. The controls made on you are not made for the other politicians. In addition, there is a discrimination within the party and important missions for the party are not given to you. Those types of missions are given to different lobbies. I mean, there's a pressure on foreigners. Especially in recent times, there is a more intense pressure on Turkish backgrounds. For example, we are originally from Turkey, when there is a contact between the states of Turkey and Belgium, media and people in parties restrict

us too much from making interviews, they exclude us. These are very wrong things. After all, we are doing politics as a Belgian citizen, of course we have personal sensibilities. Being both Turkish and Belgian are not a shame but a wealth.

As it is argued in the second chapter, political parties, regardless of their ideology, have the same number of migrant background candidates on their electoral lists, because political parties use ethnic candidates as "people on display (vitrinefiguren) to have "ethnic votes" (Eelbode et al., 2013, p.12). This attitude of the political parties is a very important contribution to political presence of migrant politicians, by this means, Turkish politicians can find their seat in the parliaments. However, political parties limit migrant-origin politicians by preventing their rise in the inner party structures (Jannsen et al., 2017). The political parties' restriction on Turkish politicians is applied regardless of the party's ideology. For example, left wing parties are known for their respect for differences when compared to right wing parties. Since Turks are workers and the left-wing parties support the working class, Turkish politicians prefer to involve in politics from the Socialist or Green Parties. However, even those Turkish politicians who are part of the left-wing parties complained about their parties' restrictions. In this respect, Interviewee 8 argues that

Socialist Parties respect pious people and foreigners. In contrast with this, right-wing parties do not accept foreigners, they do not approve dual citizenship, they say, if you're Turkish, you're Turkish, if you're Belgian, you're Belgian. This is their party statute. For this reason, we chose the Socialist Party, but sometimes we have big problems within the party. Our society voted for us, gave us authority and a position. We have to fulfill the expectations of our society. We want to act as we are, and we want to act in a way that people demand from us. When we behave like that, we can get reaction from our Belgian friends who are at the top of the party. When we are engaged in activities where national or religious feelings are highlighted, there is a reaction against us. In response to this reaction, we argue that we participate in the activities of Belgian people and Christian groups as well as we participate in the events of Turkish people and Muslims, thus, we are trying to keep the pointer in the middle, please try to hold it in the middle you too! I am proud of saying that I have a double culture and I am not assimilated. When I ask where your democracy is, they are stuck. They cannot say anything. Because they have not the right to

intervene in where we are going and what we are saying. In other words, when we defend ourselves, it works.

In opposition to this argument of parties' restrictive roles, there are many other politicians arguing that political parties do not intervene in or have restraining influence on the politicians. They claim that there is an advanced culture of democracy and politicians cannot be limited by their political parties. Those arguments can be seen from the following quotations;

Interviewee 10 argues that

> Democratic culture in Europe is very much ahead of Turkey, I can say this clearly because I know the situation in Turkey. I do not believe in the possibility of a Turkish representative who is under pressure. It is not a matter of discussion whether Turkish politicians can ask questions, or they can get involved in political activities without any force. I believe in that no power can subjugate a politician.

Interviewee 11 argues that

> I have never been exposed to a limitation by my party so far. Our ethical obligation is to meet the demands of people, to solve the problems of the society. The party cannot prevent the politician in this respect because the party's purpose is the same, this is what the party demands from its politicians.

Even the politicians who claim that the parties do not have a restrictive effect on them declare that parties have a set of rules and regulations and a political line, and politicians have to act accordingly. Politicians do not accept that as a restraining factor. Yet they normalize this restrictive effect of the parties on them. In this respect, Interviewee 5 argues that

> We are forming a group as party. There is a limitation of being a member of a party with a certain program. But we express our ideas freely. I have not any trouble so far because of my ideas or activities. But sometimes, the party makes a decision and we have to accept this decision even we do not approve it. This can be annoying sometimes.

Interviewee 10 claims that

> Party work means group work. The party has a line, you have to work by consulting to your party. This is the case for every politician and every party. It is not true that parties do not let Turkish politicians freely act. If you want to make something about transportation or pedestrians, who will close your path? This is the case.

Although Turkish politicians normalize the restraining effect of their parties on them, Turkish people are aware of that party limitations. As it is discussed in the previous subsection, Turkish electorate is not satisfied with the representation of Turkish politicians. Turkish people claim that those politicians do not represent themselves. They perceive the reason behind this representation problem as the limitations of the political party to which the politician is involved in. In this regard, Interviewee 19 claims that

> Our elected politicians cannot represent us enough. If there are decisions made in the councils, that do not please us, we begin to criticize the people we send to parliament. Because we are not satisfied with the work of our politicians so far. Our politicians do not represent us or cannot. Maybe they're trying to make our voices heard behind the scenes, but we can't know this. When something is spoken against us or a decision is made against us in parliament, can these Turkish representatives come out and say something? No. None of them can come out. Maybe 1 or 2 are doing it, but that's the exception. Because the parties sometimes compel them to do some explanations. Fortunately, we have newspapers that are published in Turkish, we have internet newspapers or there are sites we follow online. When we follow these platforms, we see that these people cannot represent us, they cannot be our voice.

In sum, political parties provide opportunities to migrant origin politicians in terms of their political presence in the assemblies. However, physical existence of those politicians does not result in the representation of migrants' interests. In some cases, Turkish politicians limit themselves not to be the representative of the Turkish community as it is discussed in the previous subsection. In some cases, political parties can limit Turkish politicians. The interviews show that all Turkish politicians

talk about some kinds of limitations of their parties, but they call them differently. Most of them normalize and accept those limitations as natural regulations of the parties. In this respect, it can be argued that the politicians are institutionalized, they also have become the part of the system. There is not a conflict between the parties and the Turkish politicians. Rather, the conflict is between the Turkish electorate and the Turkish politicians. The "representation gap" stems from this conflict.

4.3.2. Institutional Limitations

In the context of Belgium, institutional structure is an advantage for descriptive representation of immigrants, but it is a limitation for substantive representation of immigrant communities' interests. "Political opportunity structures" including the citizenship and immigration regimes, electoral systems and party politics in Belgium provide advantages for immigrant's descriptive representation (Koopmans et al., 2005). The institutional context in Belgium, for example, multicultural citizenship regime in Belgium (Koopmans, 2004) and the proportional electoral system (Rae, 1969) provide advantages for migrant communities' descriptive representation. However, institutional context becomes a limiting factor in terms of substantive representation of immigrants. The reason is that immigrants are numerically best represented at local levels, but immigrant politicians at the local level do not have the responsibility and authority to improve the interests of immigrants.

It is understood that there is a well-established system functioning in the best way and leaving no space for the political parties or politicians to work. Some politicians even argue that there is no need for politics. Thus, most of the Turkish politicians interviewed with complained about the restrictive effects of the institutional system on them.

The most important constraining factor for immigrant politicians is that the politicians working at the local level have very limited jurisdictions. Since descriptive representation of Turkish people is satisfied at the local level, this study search for the limitations on Turkish politicians at the municipal level. It can be argued that the responsibility and authority of the municipal councilors are very limited. This limited

authority is not sufficient for the improvement of migrants' interests. In this respect, Interviewee 10 argues that

> The municipal councilor has two duties; first, he has the right to visit, that is to visit the institutions of the municipality and the second, the right to ask a parliamentary question in written or oral form in the council.

Interviewee 12 argues that

> We vote for the decisions of the municipality. For example, we vote in the council when the municipality buy or sell land. Tomorrow, we will vote to choose a director of the municipality. Every decision that the municipality has to make must go through our voting; for example, trading, renting, demolition, building. Everybody offers what the municipality wants them to do, and we vote, we accept or reject it.

Municipal councils meet monthly. In these meetings, the issues concerning the municipality are discussed and decided. How to use the budget of the municipality, staff policies, building a new gym, opening a library can be discussed by the members of the municipality. Most importantly, these meetings are held publicly and there is also room for proposals from citizens in the municipal council.[32] There are many deputy mayors who are responsible for economy, welfare, culture, education, urban development, spatial planning, environment, climate, transportation, trade, sport, et cetera.[33]

When compared to councilors, mayor and deputy mayors have a large scope of authority. Interviewee 9 who is a deputy mayor responsible from social services argues that

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[32]Wat doen de gemeente- en OCMW-raad? (https://stad.gent/over-gent-en-het-stadsbestuur/stadsbestuur/het-bestuur/gemeente-en-ocmw-raad/wat-doen-de-gemeente-en-ocmw-raad) (accessed in 12 May 2019).

[33]Gemeenteraad (https://stad.gent/over-gent-en-het-stadsbestuur/stadsbestuur/wie-zit-het-bestuur/gemeenteraad/wie-zetelt-de-gemeenteraad/gemeenteraad) (accessed in 12 May 2019).

The municipal councilors come only once a month to the municipality and attends the general assembly. They do not receive salary, rather, they receive a certain amount of money for each meeting they participate. They are not active in other matters. They can join workgroups if they want. But the deputy mayors have responsibilities and a span of authority, they receive salaries in return for their service. There is also a specific budget for their areas of activity. For example, I am responsible for social services, I had the authority to make decisions about people with disabilities, seniors, women and foreigners. For the current activities, the deputy mayors and the mayor come together once a week and take decisions.

Turkish politicians argued about the limitations for politicians at local level, however, it is also argued that there is a well-functioning system that does not allow politicians to behave freely. Even if the politicians have a large span of authority, they cannot create effects on a large scale. Turkish politicians make this argument by comparing the institutional structure of Belgium and Turkey. In this respect, Interviewee 11 argues that

We have to bear in mind that there is a system in Belgium, and we cannot do anything other than this system. All we can do, if there are problems in this system, gaps, inaccuracies, injustice, we can express them.

There are also politicians claiming that politics is only an image in Belgium because of the institutional context. Interviewee 6 argues that

Belgium has a robust structure of itself. Belgium broke a record five years ago; we have lived without a government for two years. Neither the economy has been damaged, nor has anything been interrupted. What does it mean? The politics in Belgium is only an image. In Turkey, when the prime minister has a cold, the economy is affected; when the president throws a book, the stock market is shocked. The economy is very sensitive, and politics affects it. However, in Belgium the system is very robust and settled.

To conclude this section, it can be argued that political parties and the institutional structure in Belgium can play the role of facilitator for Turkish politicians in terms of their descriptive representation, but they become limiting factors when those

politicians try to improve their communities' interests and fulfill the requirements of substantive representation. Nonetheless, it is necessary to appreciate the attitudes of political parties and the institutional context that allow immigrant-background politicians to be visible in Belgian politics and enter parliaments. The most striking example of those immigrant-origin politicians is Mahinur Özdemir who entered the Brussels parliament with her headscarf in 2009. At that time, neither in European countries nor in Turkey there was a woman deputy with headscarf.[34] She is still the first and the only parliamentary member with headscarf in Europe. Moreover, it is obvious that political parties and institutional structure has a restrictive effect on those Turkish migrant-origin politicians according to interviews. This was predicted by the studies in the literature and was an expected result for this study. In this respect, it can be argued that the discriminatory attitudes of these political parties towards the Turkish politicians and the fact that they do not allow them to act for the interests of their own immigrant communities indicate that they have failed in the internal democracy of the party. When it comes to the limitations of the institutional context, it can be argued that those limitations are about the limited jurisdiction of the local level politicians. At this point, it is necessary to take into account the consequences of giving broader authorities to local level politicians, which is the opposite of the current situation. Local politicians with broad powers can use this situation in favor of migrant origin people and can also use their power to the detriment of those people. Thus, it is not certain that giving broad powers to local level politicians will have positive consequences for people of immigrant-background.

4.4. The Home State Effect

The Effect of the State of Turkey on Turkish Electorate and the Turkish Politicians in Belgium

The home state effect is an important factor affecting the patterns of political participation of Turkish people and this affects the political representation by Turkish

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[34] Belçika türban krizini aştı (http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/belcika-turban-krizini-asti-11928973) (accessed in 20 July 2019).

politicians in Belgium. It is argued that Turkish community living in Belgium is a parallel society to that of Turkey, they are not concentrated on Belgium context and they have not any demand in Belgium. This is the home state effect.

Dual citizenship is an important factor crystallizing the home state effect on Belgian Turks. As it is mentioned in the previous chapter, 78% of Turks living in Belgium has dual citizenship and this rate continues to increase every year (Gelekçi 2011, p.142). It is argued that Turkish people do not have the sense of belonging to Belgium, they are neither interested in Belgian politics nor have a demand in Belgium. Because they think that if there is a problem that is displeasing Turkish people in Belgium, they will leave there and go back to Turkey.

Moreover, Belgian Turks are divided according to the fault lines of Turkish politics. They have very few words to say about Belgian politics and they have very few things to demand from it. This situation affects the patterns of political participation of Turkish migrants and political priorities of Turkish representatives. Turkish immigrant community cannot create an effect on Turkish politicians because their general attitudes towards Turkish politicians are shaped by the politicians' hometown or political viewpoints about Turkish politics rather than the politicians' capabilities or priorities in Belgian politics.

With regard to indifference of Turkish people to Belgian politics and non-demanding attitudes in Belgium, the following quotations are important. Interviewee 20 argues that

> Turkish society in Belgium has become a parallel society. The Belgian government considered the parallel society as a democratic right and allowed to establish Turkish neighborhoods. For example; this is not the case in France, the French authorities do not allow immigrants to establish their own neighborhoods, rather they want immigrants to get involved into French society. In France, you have to adopt and comply with solid republican values. However, Belgium emancipates the immigrant communities. Immigrants establish their own neighborhoods. In this way, an immigrant can live for a lifetime without knowing one of the Belgian languages and this does not cause any problems to the immigrants. If it is

necessary, immigrant can have a translator besides him. Belgium provided immigrants with this opportunity. But this situation has built a wall for immigrants, they live in this wall and feel safe. This seems to be a favor for immigrant communities, but this does not allow immigrants to be partners for the country. That's a country which Turkish people have built for 50 years with other Belgian people. Their future generations will lead their life in this country. Thus, Turkish people need to have a share and a color in the administration and the politics of Belgium.

Interviewee 10 argues that

Turkish people are not living in Belgium although they are physically in Belgium. Now, the feet of this parallel society are on the ground in Belgium. However, the head of this society is in Turkey. Turkish people buy home from Turkey, they follow Turkish politics, they live with Turkish media, especially with Turkish football. Therefore, they are not concentrated on Belgium, their eyes are close to Belgium. They do not mention any issue regarding the politics of Belgium. They have not any demand about the square meter of the road in their neighborhood, the collection of garbage or the renovation of the school. They only say "Our Turkish representatives! We elected you, you need to take care of these issues!" Turkish people should say that "We have our rights in this municipal council, and we have empty seats. So, we need to send our representatives there. These politicians should have our religious and ideological viewpoints and should represent us. At the same time, they should be practical enough to know our deficiencies and provide opportunities to us as organizing our neighborhood.

Firstly, the home state effect reflects itself to the voting behaviors of Turkish people. When Turkish people go to the polls, they vote for the politicians who are from the same neighborhood, their own townsman. For example, people from the Emirdağ district of the Afyon city in Turkey is the majority of Turkish population in the city of Gent and consequently, the majority of the Turkish politicians in the municipal council of Gent is also from Emirdağ. Interviewee 8 argues that

Our people love their townsman and vote for their townsman in the elections. For example, in our municipality there are Turks mostly from Trabzon, Zonguldak and Kayseri. As a Turkish politician, if you are from these cities, you are advantageous when compared to others.

Turkish people look for the point of view of the politician after the hometown. However, the politicians' point of view about Turkish politics matters. Their perspective about the Belgium politics or their parties that they involved in are not attached importance by the Turkish electorate. Because the political fragmentation of Turkish community in Belgium reflects the political fragmentation of people in Turkey. In this respect, Interviewee 19 argues that

> The first and the most important factor determining the voting preferences of Turkish people is the hometown of the politician. Then, ideas and ideologies come. The individual supporting the AK Party votes for the candidate who also supports the AK Party. Likewise, the individual supporting the CHP votes for the candidate who also supports the CHP. If there are several candidates with the same opinion, the people want to support them all, this time the votes are divided. Therefore, the nature of politics is very different in Belgium in the case of Turkish people. There's something important that people need to understand here. We are not in Turkey; we live in Belgium. We cannot reflect political divisions here as it is in Turkey. It is not important for us that the candidate is supporting the AKP or CHP. It should be important for us whether this person has the ability to represent us or not. We cannot reflect Turkish politics here.

In the literature review, it was argued that minority group members do not place emphasis on their particular differences, rather they act with solidarity because they believe in their common fate (Dawson 1994). However, this case study reveals that Turkish people cannot direct their politicians as a block because they cannot unite and demand from Belgian politicians about their community issues. In this issue, Interviewee 20 comments as the following;

> The democratic experience of the Turkish electorate remains weak and their information with regard to the agenda of their city and their municipality is very limited. Because the Turkish politics is in their center of focus especially after Turkish state give the right to vote to the Turkish people living in abroad. They make their political fragmentation by looking at the Turkish politics. It means they are divided. Now think of a diaspora community, which is divided by the political scheme of his homeland. What is this? This is a very serious

weakness, the process of losing the ability to become power, the loss.

Further, Turkish elites are displeased by the attitudes of Turkish politicians regarding their indifference to community issues of Turkish people in Belgium. It is argued that even if Turkish people do not voice their social problems, politicians should foresee them, and act accordingly. In this respect, Interviewee 20 argues that

> The basic issue is that the absence of any social demand by the Turkish people does not imply that they have no rights. Therefore, democratic administrations, municipalities, federations, governments should respond to the needs of immigrant communities by following the society, anticipating their needs, by asking the experts if it is necessary and respond to these needs again. Therefore, even if there is no such demanding community behind the politician, he needs to know that the society has some deficiencies and he should work on how to overcome them. It's his responsibility.

Moreover, it is argued that individual efforts to represent the interests of Turkish people are not adequate because they are temporary efforts, there is no guarantee of the continuity of those efforts. The substantive representation of the Turkish people in the councils and the material benefits to the Turkish people as a result of this representation can be possible only with lobbying. Interviewee 19 claims that

> In order to have a representation of an immigrant community in a foreign country, there should be lobbying. It means this immigrant community must identify itself as a diaspora, this diaspora must produce a lobby movement, this lobby must bargain with the political parties and ensure that parties will accept the lobby's candidates. If it is not be assured, Turkish people have to be a non-demanding community who is heated in election times and then slept again.

To conclude this section, it can be argued that the home state has a dominant effect on the political participation patterns of Belgian Turks. This home state effect also determines the political acts of Turkish elected officials from their propagandas in the

election times to their activities when they are in the office. In this respect, the home state effect becomes a reason for the "representation gap" of Belgian Turks.

Turkish-origin politicians can be elected without much effort since Belgian Turks vote by considering the candidates' hometown. It can be argued that Turkish-politicians in Belgium win or lose the elections not because of their political capabilities, their level of education or their promises to people but because of their country of origin and hometown. In this way, Turkish politicians that are the candidates of the constituencies where their fellow townsmen are highly concentrated are not worried about not being elected. This situation affects the political activities of those politicians in the negative way because Turkish people do not have demands about their community issues in Belgium and do not hold responsible those politicians when their demands are not met. This situation also contributes to the perceived lack of substantive representation of Turkish immigrant community.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Migration is not a recent phenomenon, but a phenomenon that has existed throughout human history because of reasons such as wars, climate changes, economic reasons, and so on. In this respect, this study aimed to draw attention to Belgian Turks who migrated for economic reasons in the 1950s and 1960s and still suffered from representation problem. This thesis aimed to understand the underlying reasons for the representation problem of Turkish people in Belgian politics.

5.1. Findings

This research topic is started to be studied with the assumption that there is a representation problem of Turkish immigrant community in Belgium. This assumption was the result of preliminary interviews and observations made in Belgium and it is confirmed by the studies on political representation of migrants in European countries. Turkish people are still underrepresented in Belgian politics (Jacobs et al. 2006) because there is a mismatch between the activities of Turkish politicians and Turkish people's problems that require priority.

The findings of the research on the causes of the representation problem of Turkish people in Belgium can be listed as the following; first, the representation problem does not stem from the lack of descriptive representation of Turkish people, rather, Turkish people have reached at a good level of descriptive representation. In other words, Turkish people are represented in the assemblies by a number of Turkish politicians in proportion to their population sizes especially at the local level.

Second, this case study on representation problems of Belgian Turks illustrates that descriptive representation of a group does not automatically lead to substantive representation of that particular groups' interests because there is an obvious

97

discrepancy between the expectations of Turkish people from their representatives and political activities of Turkish politicians.

Based on the interviews conducted with Turkish politicians and the elites of Turkish society, the underlying reasons for the representation problem of Turks can be categorized under four headings. First, Turkish people have demands only about their self-interests and daily problems from their politicians, they do not have demands regarding their community issues. Second, Turkish politicians have self-interests and career goals which are obstacles for them to represent their communities' interests. Further, they do not identify themselves as the representatives of Turkish people. Contrary to the expectations of Turkish community, they define themselves as Belgian nationals and claim to be the representatives of the entire Belgian society. Third, party politics and institutional contexts in Belgium are restrictive factors in terms of migrants' interests. It can be argued that political parties present Turkish candidates in the elections to have Turkish votes, however, they do not allow them to voice their demands. Moreover, institutional structure can be a limiting factor in terms of substantive representation of Turkish people although it facilitates descriptive representation of them. Fourth, there is a home state effect on the patterns of political participation of Turkish people because they are divided according to the fault lines of Turkish politics. Thus, Turkish people have few things to demand from Belgian politics and this situation shapes political activities of Turkish politicians.

Some of those findings overlap with the arguments presented in the literature while some of them brings in a new approach to the studies on migrants' political participation and representation. First, it is argued that Turkish people have demands only about their personal interest. This argument overlaps with the argument of that people get involved in politics because they expect some material benefits from politicians (McAtee et al. 2011). Second, it is argued that Turkish politicians have self-interests and career goals that can be obstacles for the representation of Turkish people's interests. This was argued by Przeworski et al. (1999) as the following; "politicians have goals, interests and values of their own" and this makes politics

problematic every time (p.30). However, this thesis also argues that there is a mismatch between the levels of integration of Turkish-origin politicians and Turkish people in Belgium, because Turkish politicians identify themselves as a part of the Belgian nation while Turkish people do not approve such an identification. Further, it is argued that Turkish politicians perceive themselves as the representatives of the entire Belgian society and work for everyone in the society. Thus, self-identification and self-perception of Turkish politicians are factors playing important roles in the political activities of Turkish politicians. These arguments add a new element to the factors that influence the political representation of immigrants mentioned in the literature; self-identification of the immigrant politician.

Third, this thesis discussed the effect of the party politics and the institutional structure on the immigrants' political representation. This discussion had a place in the literature, in fact, studies on the literature mostly have focused on the limiting effects of party politics and the institutional structure on immigrants' political participation. However, this thesis presents the perspective of immigrant politicians and the elites of Turkish immigrant community in terms of the restrictive roles of those two factors. Finally, this thesis argues that home state effect is a determining factor in terms of immigrants' political participation and representation. Discussion of the home state effect as an influencing factor for the immigrants' political participation might be a new approach because home state effect has been discussed in the literature only with reference to economic integration of migrants as it is argued in the literature review. In this respect, to examine the home state effect on Turkish migrants in Belgium is a new approach.

5.2. Recommendations for Future Studies

Studies on political participation and political representation of migrants are relatively recent and very limited studies. As it is argued in the literature review, especially "the scholarship on migrants' political representation is in its infancy" (Bloemraad et al. 2013). In this respect, this study opens a new area for the new studies that will deal with political representation of immigrants in Europe because it refers to the perspective of the elites of the immigrant society but also to the

perspective of the politicians with immigrant background with regard to the representation problem of immigrants. Nonetheless, there are restraining aspects of those interviews because they do not necessarily provide the perspective of all Turkish people. Those interviews conducted with the elites of Turkish people and Turkish politicians may not reflect the viewpoint of all Turkish people regarding their needs, their problems that require immediate solutions, and their demands from politicians. Rather the opinions of Turkish people on those issues have been evaluated from the eyes of Turkish politicians and Turkish elites. In another study, the problems and needs of Belgian Turks directly from their perspective can be examined.

Moreover, in this study it is argued that one reason for the representation problem of Turkish people is the way that Turkish politicians identify themselves as the representative of the whole Belgian nation rather than the representative of the Belgian Turks. This study does not give the answer of the question why Turkish politicians identify themselves as the representative of the whole Belgian nation. Turkish politicians may be fully integrated to the Belgian culture, society and politics and for this reason they may identify themselves in this way. The other possibility is that Turkish politicians may employ this discourse as a strategy to be accepted by their political parties and the Belgian electorates. This study cannot give a definitive answer; thus, which possibility is closer to the reality can be examined in another study.

This research had to be limited to Turkish immigrants living in Belgium due to time and financial constraints. In another study, the levels of substantive representation of Turkish migrants and Moroccan migrants in Belgium can be compared because Moroccans and Turks are the most crowded immigrant communities from non-EU origin in Belgium. There are 468,687 Moroccan origins and they are 4 % of the total Belgian population, they are more crowded than the Turkish migrants.[35] There are 10

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[35] Migratieachtergrond per nationaliteit in % per Gemeente- 01/01/2017 - Diverse subtotalen (http://npdata.be/Data/Vreemdelingen/NIS/Vreemdelingen-gemeenten/2017/Migratieachtergrond-2017.xls) (accessed in 17 June 2019).

municipalities where Moroccan migrants constitute more than 10 % of the total population and 8 municipalities where Moroccan migrants constitute more than 20% of the total population.[36] Most strikingly, they are 26,61% of the total population of Brussels which is the capital city of Belgium and 13,71% of the population of Antwerp which is one of the biggest municipalities of Belgium, further, there is the example of Anderlecht, a municipality where 41,47% of the total population is constituted by Moroccans.[37] In this respect, it can be investigated whether Moroccans achieved descriptive representation in assemblies of those municipalities where they are highly concentrated by the numbers of Moroccan origin politicians proportional to their population sizes. If they achieved descriptive representation, it can be investigated whether there is a representation gap in terms of the interests of the Moroccan-origin people. The restrictive factors for the political representation of Moroccans in Belgian context can be discussed. Is there a home state effect on Moroccans as they get involved in politics? Do Moroccan-origin politicians identify themselves as the representatives of the entire Belgian society or only Moroccans? Does party politics have a restrictive role on political activities of Moroccan-origin politicians? These questions are the subject of curiosity in terms of Moroccans because they refer to some factors having restrictive effects on Turkish politicians.

Likewise, Germany is another European country which is hosting the largest number of Turkish-origin immigrants. In this respect, political representation of Turkish immigrants in Belgium can be compared with their representation in German politics. The factors that provide advantages and restrict the representation of Turkish immigrants in Germany can be researched.

Moreover, there is a discussion in the literature with regard to whether immigrant communities in the host countries are diasporas or not. Regarding that discussion,

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[36] Migratieachtergrond per nationaliteit in % per Gemeente- 01/01/2017 - Diverse subtotalen (http://npdata.be/Data/Vreemdelingen/NIS/Vreemdelingen-gemeenten/2017/Migratieachtergrond-2017.xls) (accessed in 17 June 2019).

[37] Ibid.

there are some outstanding arguments accepting migrants as diasporas. Walker Connor (1972), an essentialist scholar, defines diaspora as "a segment of a people living outside homeland" (p.16). In addition, Robin Cohen (1997) argues that there are modern diasporas that are the byproducts of labor migration in contrast to conventional diasporas as byproducts of forced migration. In this respect, modern diasporas refer to people who adopted the country that they migrated as their new country and surpassed "the myth of the return" (Kaya 2011, p.26). Further, Safran (1991) claims that Turkish immigrant workers and their descendants in European countries have these characteristics and they are diasporas although they have migrated to these countries voluntarily unlike the Jewish diaspora (p.85). By taking account these arguments, Turkish migrants in European countries can be accepted as diasporas. As a result, political participation and political representation of Turkish migrants can be examined in terms of diaspora politics.

To conclude, it can be argued that this thesis contributes to literature because it opens a new space for those kind of studies by offering a two-sided perspective from the eyes of both Turkish politicians and the elites of Turkish people in terms of political representation of Turkish migrants.

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APPENDICES

A.   Interview Questions for the Elites of Turkish Community in Belgium

1. What kind of criteria do you have when you vote for the local and general elections? Is it important for you that the candidate you vote for is Turk?

2. What kind of problems and what kind of needs do you have in your neighborhood and generally in Belgium?

3. What kind of expectations and demands from Turkish politicians when you consider the problems and needs that you have? Can you specify your demands from local councilors and federal deputies?

4. Do you get in contact with Turkish politicians and express your demands? If you do, what do you demand from them?

5. Do you think that your requests/demands are fulfilled by Turkish politicians? Do Turkish politicians work in line with your demands?

6. If your demands are not met by Turkish politicians, what kind of reasons lie behind this?

7. Is there anything that you want to add?

8. Who should I contact with after you? Is there anyone that you can recommend me?

B. Interview Questions for Turkish Politicians in Belgium

1.   What has been your political activity since you were elected? What were your priorities? What have you done so far?

2.   How many of the votes you get in the elections come from Turkish people? Do you have such data in your hand?

3.   What are the primary needs of Turkish immigrants?

4.   Do people in your region get in contact with you and express their demands? If they do, what do they demand?

5.   What do you do or how do you work about these demands?

6.   Are you restricted or encouraged by your party when you try to create a policy for Turks? What are the obstacles or possibilities in front of you? Do you think that it gets better or worse over time?

7.   Do political agenda/events in Turkey affect you, your electorate and your political activities?

8.   Is there anything that you want to add?

9.   Who should I contact after you? Is there anyone that you can recommend?

C. The Approval of the Ethics Committee

ARAŞTIRMA ETİK KURUL KARARLARI

Toplantı Tarihi : 01.3.2019
Toplantı Sayısı : 14/2019
Toplantı Saati : 14:00
Toplantıya Katılanlar : Doç. Dr. Eda YÜCESOY (Başkan)
Prof. Dr. Nihat BULUT
Prof. Dr. Cem BEHAR
Doç. Dr. Elif ÇELEBİ
Doç. Dr. Hızır Murat KÖSE
Doç. Dr. Sinem ELKATİP HATİPOĞLU
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Betül NİZAM
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Eyyüp Said KAYA

Karar No : 1- İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Araştırma Etik Kurulu, proje yürütücüsü Zehra Çelik tarafından sunulan, "Belçikalı Türkler'in Belçika Siyasetine Katılımı ve Belçika Siyasetinde Temsili" isimli proje taslağını değerlendirilerek, projenin uygunluğuna karar verilmiştir.

Aşağıda isimleri ve imzaları bulunan İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Araştırma Etik Kurulu üyeleri, araştırmacı tarafından kurula sunulan yukarıdaki bilgiler ışığında, ekte belirtilen araştırmanın yürütülmesinde etik açıdan bir sakınca görmemektedir.

Doç. Dr. Eda YÜCESOY
Başkan

Prof. Dr. Nihat BULUT
Üye

Prof. Dr. Cem BEHAR
Üye

Doç. Dr. Elif ÇELEBİ
Üye

Doç. Dr. Hızır Murat KÖSE
Üye

Dr. Betül NİZAM
Üye

Doç. Dr. Sinem ELKATİP HATİPOĞLU
Üye

Dr. Eyyüp Said KAYA
Üye