

**THE ROLE OF MUSLIM ACTORS IN PEACEBUILDING IN THE
PHILIPPINES: TURKEY, MALAYSIA AND THE ORGANIZATION OF
ISLAMIC COOPERATION**

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
İSTANBUL ŞEHİR UNIVERSITY

BY




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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

AUGUST 2019

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and International Relations

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A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Muhammed Yasir Okumuş', written over a horizontal line.

ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF MUSLIM ACTORS IN PEACEBUILDING IN THE PHILIPPINES: TURKEY, MALAYSIA AND THE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION

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MA in Political Science and International Relations

Thesis Advisor: Assist. Prof. Hüseyin Alptekin

August 2019, 82 Pages

The decades long armed conflict in the Mindanao Island of the Philippines between the Moros and the Philippines state have ended with the Bangsamoro Peace process. The government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front reached a peace agreement and the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao was established in 2019. One of the features of the peace process is the involvement of Muslim actors as third parties. Turkey, Malaysia and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation have been active in the process performing mediation, monitoring and decommissioning tasks. This thesis investigates their activities and attempts to locate these within the larger conflict transformation field. The involvement of Muslim actors in the peace process contributed to its success due to these actors' efforts to build trust between the conflicting parties through their identities, internationalize the peace process, and monitor the implementation of the peace agreements. Their mediation is not limited to elite level leadership, embraces different segments of the society.

Keywords: Conflict transformation, Moro, Bangsamoro, the Philippines, Turkey, Malaysia, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation

ÖZ

MÜSLÜMAN AKTÖRLERİN FİLİPİNLER’DEKİ BARIŞ İNŞASINDAKİ ROLLERİ: TÜRKİYE, MALEZYA VE İSLAM İŞBİRLİĞİ TEŞKİLATI

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
Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans Programı

Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Hüseyin Alptekin

Ağustos 2019, 82 sayfa

Filipinler’in Mindanao Adası’nda Morolar ve Filipinolar arasında on yıllardır süren silahlı çatışma Bangsamoro barış süreci ile sona erdi. Filipinler Hükümeti ve Moro İslami Kurtuluş Cephesi bir barış anlaşması imzaladı ve 2019 yılında Müslüman Mindanao Bangsamoro Özerk Bölgesi kuruldu. Barış sürecinin özelliklerinden birisi Müslüman aktörlerin üçüncü taraflar olarak sürece katılmalarıdır. Türkiye, Malezya ve İslam İşbirliği Teşkilatı süreçte arabuluculuk, gözlem ve silahsızlandırma görevlerini ifa etmektedir. Bu çalışma, Müslüman aktörlerin faaliyetlerini incelemekte ve bunları çatışma dönüşümü alanı içerisinde konumlandırmaya çalışmaktadır. Müslüman aktörlerin barış sürecine dâhil olup kimlikleri vesilesiyle çatışmacı taraflar arasında güven inşa etmesi, süreci uluslararasılaştırması ve barış anlaşmalarının uygulanmasını gözlemlemesi sürecin başarıya ulaşmasına katkıda bulunmuştur. Müslüman aktörlerin arabuluculuğu yalnızca siyasal elitler düzeyinde gerçekleşmemekte, toplumun farklı kesimlerini kapsamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Çatışma dönüşümü, Moro, Bangsamoro, Filipinler, Türkiye, Malezya, İslam İşbirliği Teşkilatı



“Indeed we belong to Allah, and indeed to Him we will return.”

(Surah Al-Baqarah, 156)

To the martyrs of Moro...

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Things have happened since I began my master's education six years ago, most importantly, as far as this study is concerned, the people of the Philippines were able to establish peace in their country. With the sincere prayers for the durability of Bangsamoro peace, I salute the militants of peace. I have a long list of dear people, to whom I am thankful, for without their care and toleration this thesis would not have been completed.

I would like to thank my family for their unconditional support during the process. My beloved wife Beyza and my son Ahmed Vefa, both became a part of this journey later on, deserve the best of compliments. They have taken the pain with me the whole time. My dad Ejder has been a kind mentor. My mom Nurcan supported me with her sincere prayers to Allah. My siblings Meryem Tuba (and her husband Hayri Taha), Fatma Sena and Salih Emre were always there. I will always be indebted to my family, including the ones I could not mention.

This thesis would not have been successful without the guidance of my thesis advisor Hüseyin Alptekin. He has always been responsive. I am thankful to Kadir Temiz and Edip Asaf Bekaroğlu, the members of the thesis defense committee, for their valuable scientific contributions. I should also mention my gratitude to Talha Köse, my previous advisor.

My fellow classmate Yunus Emre Orhan deserves special thanks. He has been a dear brother. Our academic discussions have been very insightful. Other classmates Ömer Şipal, Özgür Dikmen and Çağrı Koşak have been good fellows. My old friends Arif Tapan, Esat Samet Altun, Fatih Tufan and Orhan Gökçe have contributed to the process one way or another. Arif was the one to iron my shirt before the defense, special thanks for that. Esat was the one to drive me to the campus when needed. I should also thank my dear

friend Muhammed Nurullah Şensöz, as he was a good companion during the writing process.

I appreciate my professors at Social Sciences University of Ankara (ASBÜ), Muhittin Ataman, Gürol Baba, Vanessa Tinker and İbrahim Can Sezgin for their valuable contributions on the way. My colleagues Metin Yücekaya, Ömer Naim Küçük, Recep Kemal Kuzu, Furkan Maraşlı, Serra Kutan and Sümeyye Sakarya have also motivated me when I needed.

It has been a long journey, and I finally put an end to this part of my life. Let us see what tomorrow will bring.

Ankara
29.08.2019

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AHJAG	Ad Hoc Joint Action Group
ARMM	Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
BARMM	Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
BCF	Bangsamoro Coordination Forum
CAB	Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro
CCCH	Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities
FAB	Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro
FPA	Final Peace Agreement
GPH	Government of the Republic of the Philippines (Abbreviation after 2010)
GRP	Government of the Republic of the Philippines (Abbreviation prior to 2010)
ICG	International Contact Group
IDB	Independent Decommissioning Body
IMT	International Monitoring Team
MinHRAC	The Mindanao Human Rights Action Center
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MOA-AD	Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OIC-PCSP	Organization of Islamic Cooperation Peace Committee on Southern Philippines
OPAPP	Office of Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
TPMT	Third Party Monitoring Team

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Conflict in the Philippines

Our century is perhaps the century of ethnic conflicts; we can feel their mounting intensity in our lives. Ethnic conflicts are becoming worldwide; there are examples of them in almost all regions of the world. The instances can be multiplied: Palestine, Iraq, Thailand, Turkey, Sudan, Syria, the Philippines, Nigeria, and China. Nationalism and nation-states make up one of the building blocks of the modern world system and these concepts force the societies towards homogeneity. Ethnic conflicts are ubiquitous, that is, they can be seen in many geographies at the same time. Not all of them are promising for peaceful solutions; these ethnic conflicts evolve into various forms (Horowitz, 1985: 3). The ethnic conflict between Muslim Moro population and the Catholic Christian majority Filipino population in the Philippines is continuing for a long time.

The Philippines, consisting of numerous islands in the west Pacific Ocean, has been witnessing this conflict for centuries, and the conflict's intensity has been increasing since the withdrawal of US forces from the country in 1946. As a generalizable outcome of violent conflicts, the conflict in this case also damaged the region in countless aspects and caused the death of around 120,000 people (Schiavo-Campo & Judd, 2005: 5). Pleasingly, the conflicting parties are on the edge of concluding a peace process that is expected to solve the disputes. The current government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) seem to be dedicated to ensuring a long-lasting peace. Despite initiatives for peace in the previous decades (1976 Tripoli Agreement signed between the government of the Philippines [GPH] and the Moro National Liberation Front [MNLF], 1996 Final Peace Agreement [FPA] signed between GPH and MNLF), these were not successful for several reasons. The peace process continuing today is more successful until now when compared to the previous

attempts. The referendum that was held in January 2019 ratified the establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), which is an autonomous Islamic state with a parliament and a legal system based on sharia.

The conflict in Mindanao has a complex nature due to the complex relations between different Muslim insurgent groups, and the conflicting parties. The intergroup rivalry in addition to the struggle of these groups against the state makes it difficult to find an easy solution. Despite all the challenges and previously failed attempts to establish peace, the current peace process is continuing and the conflicting parties seem to put their efforts to institute a long-lasting peace. The other-regarding in the context of the Philippines society plays a central role in the complexity of the peacebuilding. The need for a multi-faceted process that would include all segments of the society is obvious and all parties need to work for such embracing culture of peace.

Inclusion of the Muslim population in the state affairs, elimination of economic inequalities between the Muslim-populated and other territories, improvement of cultural policies for minority ethnic groups have been the general solution suggestions for the conflict and the state seems to understand that the lack of these play a vital role in the duration of the conflict. The Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) signed in 27 March 2014 proposed the necessary constitutional changes for the establishment of an autonomous state for the Muslims in a part of Mindanao Island. Establishment of such entity is increased expectations to solve many of the problems in the Muslim-populated region.

The international community's involvement at different levels is a contributory factor for the peace. Various international actors such as the US, Japan, Malaysia, Turkey, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the European Union (EU), and a number of international non-governmental organizations are following the developments in the region and participating in the peace process. The Bangsamoro Peace is significant for

the inhabitants of Mindanao and the Philippines in general for the lack of peace is an obstacle for freedom and development in the region. It is important for the countries of the region for peace will create regional stability. The active involvement of Muslim actors such as the OIC, Turkey, Malaysia, IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation¹, and Muhammadiyah Association² in the peace process also makes the process an important model for conflict resolution. This research aims to understand the anatomy of the peacebuilding process and the contributions made by international Muslim actors.

1.2. Research Question

The peace process in Mindanao has reached a phase where the BARMM is established and the efforts to establish long-lasting durable peace continues. Bangsamoro peace is a complex process that includes a variety of actors from different units of analysis (states, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations). There are states, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. These actors have different backgrounds in terms of their religious, national, ethnic identity and their interests in involving in the process varies. The possible reasons for these actors' involvement in the process can be political, economic, security interests; protecting the regional status quo, or challenging it as the conflict might provide new opportunities for this; expansion of sphere of influence through different means of power; shared identity with conflicting parties. Shared identity is the focal point of this study. It focuses on Turkey, Malaysia and the OIC, as these actors share a religious identity with the resurgent groups, MILF and MNLF.³ The research questions of this study are:

1. What can be the effects of involvement of Muslim actors in the Bangsamoro peace process?

¹ IHH is a Turkey based humanitarian relief organization founded in 1992.

² Muhammadiyah Association is a society based in Singapore. Founded officially in 1989, it is performing educational and welfare activities.

³ The study does not argue that shared identity is the only reason behind the involvement of these actors to the process as third parties. They might have other interests, but these are beyond the limit of this thesis.

2. What were the activities of Muslim actors?
3. What is the bearing of these activities upon theoretical approaches of peace and conflict theory?

1.3. Hypotheses

Based on the research questions, the hypotheses of the study are:

1. The involvement of Muslim actors as third parties contributed to the success of the process.
2. The activities of Muslim actors cannot be framed under only track one or two diplomacy, their activities are hybrid in this sense.

1.4. Significance of the Study

Religious motivations play an increasing role in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The number of religious actors, at individual and institutional level, has been increasing and religion's role in the process is becoming more institutionalized (Sampson, 2007: 273; Hayward, 2012: 1). In fact, the efforts of religious actors have not been recognized due to lack of institutionalization of these actors in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, yet the influence of such actors has been increasing. Along with states and religious intergovernmental organizations, churches from different denominations, non-governmental organizations from various religious backgrounds, religious ad hoc committees, interfaith dialogue institutions, etc. have been active in the field. There have been religious actors working in peacebuilding in the Philippines as well. The Catholic Church's attempts to establish conciliation between the society and the corrupt leadership of Ferdinand Marcos is an example of the involvement of religious actors in such processes (Sampson, 2007: 282).

In spite of Islam's appreciation of and approach to peace in the Qur'an, hadith, and early sources, the Muslim actors, institutionally and relatively, are newcomers in the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. There are emerging initiatives by various Muslim actors to resolve the problems of the Muslim world. The politicization of Islam through radical interpretations sketches a portrait, where the Muslims are the subjects of conflicts around the world. Increasing depictions of Islam as a religion of violence and Islamophobia is a reality of today's world. Perhaps, the efforts to build peace in conflicting environments is going to play a contributory role in Islam's positive image. The case of the Philippines and the initiatives of Muslim actors becomes more important when viewed from this frame. The Bangsamoro peace constitutes a significant model, for it comprehends various Muslim actors in the field.

This research is an original contribution to the literature on the conflict between Muslim minority in Mindanao and the Philippines state; it addresses the role of Muslim actors in peacebuilding process. In this sense it is the first study that focuses on Turkey, Malaysia, and the OIC. It is a humble contribution to the wider literature on religion and peacebuilding.

1.5. Conceptualization

1.5.1. Moro

The Moro refers to the Muslim population living in the Mindanao Island of the Philippines. The Spaniards after beginning to colonize the Philippines, began to call the Muslims as Moros.

1.5.2. Bangsamoro

Bangsamoro literally means the "nation of Moro." While the Moro identity has been in consciously admitted since the Spanish colonization, Bangsamoro is a recently invented term (Tan, 1993: 3). The political entity established in the Muslim populated region of

Mindanao is named as the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. In this thesis the peace process is referred to as the Bangsamoro peace.

1.5.3. Muslim Actors

The main focus of the study is on the Muslim actors that are part of the Bangsamoro peace. Muslim actors is formulated as a sub-category of religious actors, a term which is accepted in the literature of conflict and peace. Religious actors indicate a large group of actors from different levels of analysis that are associated with a religion, or attributed religious features. These actors operate with religious affiliations and benefit from religious sources (Sampson, 2007: 274). Muslim actors, as far as this study is concerned, refer to states, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations that are associated with a religious identity. The source of such association might vary across actors. Specifically, Turkey, Malaysia, and the OIC are Muslim actors.

Turkey is a country with a dominating Muslim population. Despite the fact that it is a secular state constitutionally, the expectations derived from its historical heritage and the discourse and behavior of its current government plays a key role in classifying as a Muslim actor. It is ruled by Justice and Development Party, which has an Islamist background and now defines itself as conservative democrat, for nearly two decades.⁴ It has embraced a foreign policy perspective that stresses development of good relations with the Muslim World. Malaysia is a federal constitutional monarchy, in the constitution of which the official religion is defined as Islam. The OIC is the intergovernmental organization that was established by Muslim states, and currently has 57 member states, all of which are defined as Muslim. It safeguards and protects the interests of the Muslim world.

⁴ See Köni, H. (2019). *Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey: Causes and Effects*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.; Cizre, Ü. (Ed.). (2008). *Secular and Islamic politics in Turkey: The making of the Justice and Development Party*. Routledge.

1.6. Methodology

1.6.1. Nature and Scope of the Research

Armed conflict between Muslim resurgent groups and the state of the Philippines has been going on for decades, let alone the centuries old historic issues. The Moro conflict is one of the bloodiest ethno-religious conflicts of all times. Although the number of casualties varies, at least 120,000 including civilians were killed throughout the more than four decade long conflict (Heydarian, 2015: 4). Hundreds of thousands of Muslims took refuge in Malaysia. A major portion of the Philippines army being concentrated in the Mindanao Island since the early 1970s is another indicator of severity of the Moro conflict (Muslim, 1990: 3).

Current picture of the peace process seems to be promising for establishment of a long-lasting durable peace in Mindanao Island. Despite the unforeseen delays in agreed schedule, the sides were able to come to terms on the establishment of an autonomous state in Mindanao Island, including the once Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. The efforts of international actors in mediating the conflicting parties and monitoring the healthy progress of the process is also a significant contribution to the process. The fact that there are Muslim actors among these international actors provides confidence to the Muslim side in dealing with the issue.

Religion is a key element in conflict transformation and peacebuilding. Use of the religious sources and their interpretation for instance, contributes to mobilization of both conflicting religious parties and third party religious actors in search of building peace. Keeping the fact that it is a challenging task to survey the relationship between religion and peace process on state level, the involvement of the actors that are focused in this study are approached cautiously in terms of framing. The study does not try to assess the activities of these actors within the traditional religion and peacebuilding framework. The main reason for such choice is because this framework deals with track two diplomacy, which is the diplomacy undertaken by non-state actors. It is a difficult

task to make an analysis of the activities of states and intergovernmental organizations based on religion. It should be noted, therefore, that the logic behind selection of the “Muslim actors” is not built on an identity based approach. In other words, this study does not focus on the relationship between identity and peacebuilding. The preference of the concept of Muslim actors is of practical concerns. Turkey, Malaysia and the OIC has a shared Muslim identity. The commonality is highlighted with the use of Muslim actors.

In conjunction with this, it should also be noted that the literature’s approach to states as secular actors is deficient in cases where religion is a driving motivation for a state to involve in a peace process. The Moro conflict presents a case where religious identity is a key dynamic of conflict due to the religious identity of the secessionist groups and their presentation of own causes, as well as it is a key dynamic of peacebuilding because religious actors including states work in favor of peacebuilding.

The time frame of the study is between 1997 and 2019. The Bangsamoro peace process has two stages. In the first stage between 1997 and 2000 was mainly around security issues. The Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH), Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG), and the International Monitoring Team (IMT) were established at this stage. Third parties were not involved in the mediation process at this stage. The second stage is a further inclusive negotiation stage in which international actors are involved. Discussions of political settlements, autonomy and self-governance are held at this stage. The geographical scope of the study is limited to Mindanao Island of the Philippines.

1.6.2. Case Selection

The Moro conflict is an ethno-religious conflict by nature. The conflicting parties have separate religious identities and the discourse and rationale behind the conflict is largely shaped by their religious understanding of the world. This religious rhetoric leading to

conflict has the potential to end the conflict and spark peacebuilding activities. Religion or the religious has the power to change the interpretation of conditions. While religious rhetoric leads to conflict due to certain grievances, it gives the objective to reach peace at some point as well. Moro conflict is a case where religious discourse has the influence on both conflict and peacebuilding.

The logic behind selection of the Moro case is that it is a case where there is a political settlement. The conflict between the GPH and the MILF has ended with the signing of the Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro (FAB) and the CAB, and the initial steps towards the formation of the BARMM was taken with the referendum held in 2019. The Moro case is an important case in the sense that the peace process has given its initial results in ending the five decades long armed conflict. Methodologically, the case presents a sample of involvement of third party actors from varying religious identities. The achievement of political settlement and the involvement of Muslim actors in the peace process make the case an appropriate case for this thesis.

Religious identification or religious motivation of third party actors is an important determinant for the course of a conflict and peace process, as well as religiosity/religious identification of the conflicting parties. The assumption behind this argument is that the inclusion of third party actors with shared identities has positive influence on transition from conflict to peaceful settlements. In the Moro case, the involvement of Turkey, a member of the OIC, was seen necessary to appease the MILF (Quintos Deles, 2018: 79-80). Conflicting parties find third parties with shared identities more trustable and this eases their potential suspicions towards a settlement. The existence of third party of shared identities will fertilize the belief that the conflicting parties are not alone in the table and they are safer because these third parties will advocate for their interests. Turkey, Malaysia, and the OIC are the three actors involved in Bangsamoro peace process that share Muslim identity with the resurgent groups MILF and MNLF.

States with religious identities engaging in peacebuilding in a conflict region where religion is a defining element of the conflict presents an original case for academic inquiry. The logic behind selecting the Moro conflict and the aforementioned actors is that the conflict is ethno-religious and the actors share a common religious identity.

1.6.3. Research Design

This study is a case study. The key strength of qualitative research is that it gives a deeper and fuller understanding of the social phenomena under survey (Babbie, 2010: 315; Mack et al., 2005: 1). Qualitative research enables the researcher to engage in a case which provides fertile ground for exploration and eventually produce an explanation of the case. Since the research is based on analyzing the activities of different actors in the process and this is an introductory study, we need in-depth analysis about the topic. The qualitative method investigates the why and how of decision-making, and it focuses on each actor. The research tries to exhaust the idiosyncratic causes of the nature of relations between the actors, so idiographic explanation will be used.

A case study is holistic in nature, meaning that it is the comprehensive examination of a social phenomenon (Gerring 2007: 17). This study is modeled as a single-case study, it focuses on the Bangsamoro peace process. The Bangsamoro peace process needs detailed examination and explanation, for it possesses a case where the selected actors play a vital role in peacebuilding.

Exploratory questions derived from the conflict resolution literature and the Moro conflict literature in specific guide the research. Since one of the targets in writing this thesis is to contribute to the literature on peace and conflict studies, Moro in specific, the observed deficits of the literature guide the research. Therefore, the first step for gathering information is the literature itself.

As for the data, which is used to support the arguments of the thesis, a variety of sources are used. The data is derived from secondary sources, as the literature, along with official institutions related to the case. To give an example, the texts of agreements, timetables, archives and publications released by OPAPP are beneficial as they are open to public and objective. Furthermore, the data provided by institutions working on the ground, such as the press releases of OIC and publications of IHH, is valuable as well. The NGOs might have their interpretations and their political agenda, and these are kept in mind to avoid biases.

The nature of Moro conflict is addressed around systems mapping of conflict, and the contribution of international Muslim actors to peacebuilding is discussed within the theoretical framework of conflict transformation and peacebuilding. The concepts used in this study are defined in the introduction chapter so the audience could easily benefit from the research. The objective is to explain the activities of Turkey, Malaysia, and the OIC and their approaches and contributions.

1.7. Outline of the Thesis

There are three main chapters of this study, excluding the introduction and conclusion. In the first chapter, theoretical framework is drawn. This chapter addresses the differences between theoretical approaches to conflict. Brief definitions of conflict settlement, conflict management, and conflict resolution are presented and then a more comprehensive investigation on conflict transformation is made. This study is framed around the theoretical aspects of conflict transformation. These actors operated in the peace process as third parties. Mediation is their main activity. Because of this, mediation and tracks of diplomacy are investigated within the framework of conflict transformation.

The second chapter of the study is an attempt to look at the historical roots of the conflict, main issues and the actors involved through presenting a mapping of the

conflict. It is crucial to understand the historical process of the conflict to make sense of the developments in the peace process. The rhetoric of Muslim resurgent groups in engaging in conflict, the response of the state and the phases of conflict will be included in this chapter. The motivations and desires behind the reactions of Mindanao Muslims and the state need to be clarified and conceptualized. Muslim insurgent groups aimed to establish a political entity, where the Muslims will be able to practice their religion free of intervention. Exploring the mindset and behavioral capabilities of the MILF and the MNLF, which are the two main insurgent groups with largest support from the Muslim population, is among the central focuses of this study. In this framework, their ideological positioning, military capabilities, purposes, definition of the conflict, willingness to take further positive/negative action in the conflict, willingness to participate in the peace process, and relations with each other will be addressed.

The third chapter of the study will be focusing on the activities of the selected Muslim actors: the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Malaysia and Turkey. This part of the study presents the relationship of these actors with MILF, their activities in the peace process and then as the second part of the research question wonders, analyze their activities within the theoretical framework of conflict and peace. The inclusion of these actors in the process and their possible contributions will be investigated.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Building long-lasting peace in conflict torn societies has been the central question of experts working on conflicts. There are different theoretical and practical experiences, which may make it difficult to find a common ground in terms of how to address the issues and find solutions. These differences make up the richness of the field. Dealing with conflict is a multilevel and multidimensional task, where different actors play various roles in specific sections of the whole process. Various actors put their efforts to end violence, make settlements and eventually address the root causes of conflict. As the practice of resolving conflicts become widespread, the theoretical approaches would try to address the problems in the field and will be enriched. The experiences in the field show that the complexness of conflicts require the theoreticians to produce more and more comprehensive approaches.

2.1. Theoretical Approaches to Conflict

There is a widening academic literature on conflicts. Peace and conflict studies is a dynamic field in terms of its domestic debates. Looking at the literature, four main theoretical approaches for studying conflict can be spoken of: conflict management, conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation. Each of these schools have their peculiar approaches to conflict. Before beginning to develop the theoretical framework of the thesis, defining these approaches briefly would help the reader to make a sense of the general patterns within the field. The main differences between these four theoretical approaches are briefly presented in *Table 2.1*.

Table 2.1. Differences between Conflict Settlement, Management, Resolution, and Transformation

	Conflict			
	Settlement	Management	Resolution	Transformation
Key inquiry	How to settle the political dispute	How to control a conflict	How to end the undesired	How to end the destructive and construct the desired
Focus	Objective dispute	Escalation and de-escalation	Content	Context: process, relationships, social constructs
Intention	To achieve a mutually satisfactory agreement	To control the conflict in order to make it less destructive	To achieve an agreement and solve the underlying problem	To promote constructive change processes, including immediate solutions
Process	It is concerned with the immediate political dispute.	The aim is to deal with limiting violence because addressing root causes is unrealistic.	It is developed around the reasons behind the immediate problem.	It is concerned with responding to symptoms and engaging the systems within which relationships are embedded.
Interval	Short-term	Short- to mid-term	Short- to mid-term	Mid- to long-term
Understanding of conflict	It does not approach the conflict thoroughly, deals with on-the-surface disputes.	Since addressing root causes of conflict is unrealistic, controlling the conflict environment is the best option.	It envisions the need to de-escalate conflict processes.	It sees conflict as a dynamic process that does not necessarily have a negative connotation.

2.1.1. Conflict Settlement

Conflict settlement, or dispute settlement, addresses the reaching of an agreement between conflicting parties to settle the political dimension of a conflict to forestall or end the armed side of it (Ramsbotham et al., 2011: 31). Although it helps ending violence, it should be noted that conflict settlement does not focus on the underlying causes of a conflict (Burton & Dukes, 1990: 83-87). It does not deal with the established social norms and institutions. The process is short termed, targeting the development of a mutually satisfactory agreement between the conflicting parties. Because of this feature, the effectiveness of conflict settlement is not long-lasting. In fact, the cases dealt with settlement are re-opened (Ramsbotham et al., 2011: 31).

2.1.2. Conflict Management

Conflict management is the collection of efforts to settle, contain, and control violence in a conflict (Ramsbotham et al., 2011: 31), therefore not the resolution of the conflict. Conflict management is preferred when a total resolution of a conflict does not seem possible. In protracted conflicts for instance, this approach can be used to limit the destructive facets of conflict to a lesser degree. The use of peacekeeping forces is an example; though they will not resolve the conflict, they have a high chance of decreasing the violence.

It generally refers to the intervention of a third party into the already existing or potential conflict to decrease or fully end violence (Akyeşilmen, 2014: 33). However, the involvement of a third party is not a must for conflict management. Conflicting parties might be able to build a consensus without the need for third party intervention. Conflict management does not deal with the underlying causes of a conflict. It tries to contain the conflict, within the least possible amount of time and casualties (Licklider, 2008: 377). Conflict management, in a way, is a preliminary stage for advanced processes.

Conflict management theory approaches to violent conflict as an entrenched result of differences within a society or between societies. The established institutions and historical relationships within a society along with the distribution of power is the main reason behind appearance of conflict. Due to the inevitable deep-rootedness of these structural factors, conflict management favors a rather realistic view and tries to manage the conflict (Bloomfield & Reilly, 1998: 18). Conflict management targets to direct violence into designed political settlements. The ultimate aim then is to push the conflicting parties to make compromises so that violence can be put behind and a political settlement can be achieved (Miall, 2004: 69).

2.1.3. Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution, as opposed to conflict settlement and management, is a more comprehensive approach to conflict. The main insight separating conflict resolution from the former is that the fundamental needs of people cannot be compromised (Miall, 2004: 70). Thus, it is not possible to establish durable peace unless the root causes are addressed. It is due to this understanding conflict resolution tries to address the causes of conflict and develop solutions accordingly. Disputes over non-negotiable needs are among fundamental causes of conflicts. Human needs, moral differences and distribution of various resources are non-negotiable issues. In order to resolve a conflict the process should address the clashing interests over these issues.

One of the factors contributing to the continuation of conflict is the lack of communication and entrenched positions caused by this. Conflict resolution theory sees the surpassing of conflict is possible through helping conflicting parties for them to “explore, analyze, question, and reframe their positions and interests (Miall, 2004: 70).” The source of the mentioned help can be carried out by powerless third-parties, who unofficially conduct a diplomacy between conflicting parties. These third parties can focus on the root causes and propose solution to persuade the parties to move away from their entrenched positions. In sum, conflict resolution is about turning zero sum

games into positive sum games for the parties (Miall, 2004: 70). Finding long-lasting and/or permanent solutions to conflict (Woodhouse & Duffey, 2000: 34) through ending violent behavior and hostile attitude and changing the structure causing conflict (Ramsbotham et al., 2011: 31), or initiate process that are effective in performance and acceptable to parties (Azar & Burton, 1986: 1) is the goal of conflict resolution theory.

2.1.4. Conflict Transformation

Conflict transformation is a framework for addressing the root causes of a conflict and changing the human relations and structure in the widest sense to overcome the potential of conflict's reoccurrence. In this sense, it is beyond the limits of conflict resolution. Conflict transformation deals with the deep institutions and discourses which are behind conflict to preclude the existence of violence (Ramsbotham et al., 2011: 31-32). The fact that the scope of conflict transformation is wider than the other approaches makes it possible for experts to focus on processes that pave the way to conflicts rather than focusing only on the causes of specific conflicts. The target here is not only to prevent the grievances to turn into actual conflicts, it is changing the structures that produce grievances.

Whether conflict transformation refers to the field as conflict settlement, management and resolution or it is simply a theory within the broader field needs clarification. Instead of taking conflict transformation as the name of a broad field of inquiry, here I refer to it as a theory. Conflict transformation is not a completely new theory with its original concepts, on the contrary, it is a theory that builds on the same concepts used by conflict settlement, management and resolution, as well as the same tradition of theorizing practices (Miall, 2004: 69).

The field of peacemaking has been extending from only the peak of a conflict cycle to post conflict peacebuilding. Theories must follow the trends in practice and respond to them. It is inevitable for theories of conflict to ignore the influence of globalization and

complexness of current conflicts. A solid theory therefore needs to address the factors exacerbating and restraining conflicts in different phases. Furthermore, it should refer to the interconnected causes and preventers of conflict that are present in different levels of the international system (Miall, 2004: 74). There exists five levels at which conflicts occur: global, regional, societal, conflict party, and individual/elite (Ramsbotham et al., 2011: 111).

Conflict theories tend to contemplate on the conflict party level, excluding the wider context of the conflict (Miall, 2004: 75). The context of a conflict is multi-level, it has global, regional, domestic and inter/intra-group dimensions. Conflict can be made sense of through this web of relations; concentrating solely on the party level would result in deficient interpretations. Previous relations between people, the history, deter the behavior of conflict parties to a large extent. Memories are embedded in the socially constructed identities of conflicting parties. They provide a narrative, a source of legitimacy. Global and regional ties such as economic and political also contribute to the construction of the context. Hence, there exists a need for a theory of conflict-in-context. The need for a new quest on theorizing conflict arises from reconceptualization of conflict stemming from the changes in the nature of conflict. The first reason behind such a need for reconceptualization is that contemporary violent conflicts, by a majority, are asymmetric in terms of power and status relations. Second, most of the contemporary conflicts are protracted or intractable, meaning that they are repeatedly falling into cycles of violence (Miall, 2004: 69). The conflict process is cyclical rather than linear. The potential inefficacy of peace process in addressing the roots causes or the hidden structures of conflict reveals the possibility of reoccurrence of violence. Third, the societal and economic problems caused by conflict create multifaceted crises, which is difficult for the theories of conflict that are simplistic in nature to address (Miall, 2004: 69).

As it is previously mentioned, conflict transformation is a wide approach that does not only aim to end violent conflict and find a settlement between the conflicting parties, but tries to transform the structural and cultural constructs. In contrast to other theories mentioned previously, conflict transformation argues that “contemporary conflicts require more than the reframing of positions and the identification of win-win outcomes (Miall, 2004: 70).” Transformative approach wants to transform the nature of relations including interests, discourses, etc. within a society. It is due to this understanding that transformative approach is involved in societal processes along with elite level processes. While state level actors try to put an end to conflicts, actors working as observers, educators, advocates, and intermediaries try to transform the nature of conflict via reaching to societies and trying to alter the behavior of people.

Conflict transformation, often associated with John Paul Lederach, does not take conflict as a static phenomenon, but approaches it as a rather dynamic set of relationships. The term “conflict resolution” attributes negative connotation to conflict and deals with conflict as if it is a short-term resolvable event, which would not have further future implications. Differing from conflict resolution, while acknowledging the long-term nature of conflict, “conflict management” takes conflict as if it and therefore the people involved in it are manageable. This approach takes the actors involved in the conflict as objects instead of subjects of the conflict. Such attitude underrates the possibilities originating from humans, therefore could not make clear assumptions regarding the conflict. As contrary to conflict resolution and conflict management, conflict transformation proposes a more dynamic conceptualization of conflict, which is aware of the human factor and the possible ways the conflict can evolve into. Conflict transformation differs from previous concepts because it encircles a larger area, both elite level and societal level processes. This characteristic enables conflict transformation to avoid a top-down approach and adopt an integrative method, which includes the societal dynamics as well (Lederach, 2003).

Establishment of peace is a long term process that entails the transformation of a conflict system into a peace system (Lederach: 1997). This process of transformation should bear values as justice, truth and mercy in all levels of conflict –individual, group, state, regional and global. Peace building is not a process that can be taken on its own, it will lead to success if it is seen as a continuation of the conflict (Bilener & Büyükakıncı, 2018: 516). Transforming the dynamics of conflict is not the sole product of elite level processes: As conflict arises at different levels, the journey towards peace should include efforts at all levels.

2.1.4.1. Lenses of Conflict Transformation

Conflict transformation, according to Lederach (2014: 17), has three lenses that allow it to be a comprehensive approach. These include a lens to see the immediate situation, a lens to go beyond the immediate situation to look into the deeply established relation schemes, and a lens to assess the situation and the environment to address the content, context and relationship structure for finding creative responses to the conflict. These new lenses are required to look at the conflict setting and the people in it as the answer to the problem (Lederach, 1995: 122). People engaged in conflict need support rather than the outsider mediators (Miall, 2004: 70).

There are three issues regarding these lenses. First of all, each lens has a specific function and focal distance. Each lens can be used to focus on a specific level, therefore it is not meaningful to use a lens to focus on something that is beyond the sight of it. Secondly, and related to the first point, none of the lenses have the capacity to bring everything into focus at once by themselves. Each lens can be used to monitor the corresponding focal point. Lastly, the three lenses must be brought into the same frame to make a healthy understanding of the picture. Understanding the overall process is the aim of the transformative approach as mentioned. In order to achieve so, the three lenses must be used together, all of them in relationship with each other (Lederach, 2014: 17-18). This

will enable the student of conflict transformation to make a comprehensive sense of the studied case.

2.1.4.2. Components of Conflict Transformation

Lederach (2014: 23) defines conflict transformation as, “to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real life problems in human relationships.” There are seven components of conflict transformation according to this definition.

- 1) To envision and respond: Transformation is proactive. It requires positive orientation towards the conflict and willingness to engage in the conflict (Lederach, 2014: 24). The key to transformation is to envision for a constructive change.
- 2) Ebb and flow: Conflict is a natural part of human life. Transformation view takes conflict as a natural phenomenon and tries to make sense of it within the broader human relationships. The overall conflict process includes escalations and de-escalations. Conflict transformation does not only deal with the escalation of conflict as an isolated part, it takes the process as a whole and tries to understand parts as embedded in the greater pattern (Lederach, 2014: 26)
- 3) Life giving opportunities: According to Lederach (2014: 28), life giving opportunities is twofold. On the one hand, it refers to the fact that life gives us conflict. Conflict is a normal part of human life. On the other hand, conflict provides new opportunities for life. Conflict is not necessarily a threat to human life. It can be life-affirming and life-destroying (Galtung, 1996: 90). It is a motor driving change as the needs of people change. It provides a dynamism for human life.

- 4) Human relationships: While the content and context must be addressed to transform conflict, it is of great importance to focus on human relations. Relations present a web of connections that can escalate or de-escalate particular issues quickly. The human ecosystem, which can be defined as the larger context that originated from this web of relations, is at the center of particular issues (Lederach, 2014: 27). In simpler words, conflict arises from the human relations.
- 5) Constructive change processes: Transformation is not about finding quick solutions to surface level issues. It is about directing the energy coming out of conflict from negative to a more positive and constructive way. Conflict should not be approached with its negative connotation. It can be seen as a catalyst for change (Miall, 2004: 70). It is not a sin, it is an inevitable phenomenon vested in human nature (Lederach, 1999: 110)
- 6) Reduce violence and increase justice: To reduce violence, transformation must address the obvious and content reasons. To increase justice we must help the people to be involved in an inclusive political system (Lederach, 2014: 31-32), so they can voice their grievances. In these terms, transformation is a process structure. It is not an end game, the process is dynamic and continues forever.
- 7) Direct interaction and social structures: Transforming conflict requires dialogue. Mechanisms of dialogue should be constructed and kept open in order to prevent re-escalation of conflict. Reducing violence, as the successful cases show, is vested in communicative capacities. In order to increase the communicative capacities, relationships at all levels should be transformed (Lederach, 2014: 32.) Building peace is a task of rehabilitating the fragmented relations (Lederach, 1999: 4).

2.1.4.3. Levels of Leadership

A major contribution of conflict transformation approach to the study of peace and conflict is that while it take peace as a structure and peacebuilding as a process, it focuses on the actors from different levels and try to identify their roles and capacities in the process of establishing the peace structure. The pyramid model developed by Lederach includes three levels of actors: top leadership, middle-range leadership and grassroots leadership. *Figure 2.1.* presents a detailed demonstration of Lederach’s pyramid. The chance of succeeding at peacebuilding depends on the ability to incorporate all three levels of actors into the process in coordination (Bilener & Büyükakıncı, 2018: 520). All of these leaders are somehow involved in the conflict environment along with the society, therefore they are natural partners of the peace process.




Figure 2.1. Lederach Pyramid of Actors in Peacebuilding (see Lederach, 1997: 39)

The first level of leadership is located at the pinnacle of Lederach's pyramid. The highest representatives of states and conflicting parties are within this level. Military, political, religious leaders are included as well. Leaders of conflicting parties are the actors that generate conflict and they are the ones to resolve it (Lederach, 1997: 38). These leaders are highly visible through the use of media. Their statements and behavior have a large impact on their party and the society in general (international society as well). Related to their high visibility, they are required to strengthen their position vis-à-vis their adversaries. The media visibility of them limits their decision and movement capacity for there exists a possibility of inconsistency between the previous statements and actions exist. Another feature of these leaders is that they are portrayed as they have power and influence. The word "portrayed" is used on conscious because their perceived image is often more than their capacities. Their perspectives on the conflict and the resolution of conflict becomes important in this sense. The members of this level are the ones that conduct the official steps including the armistice, negotiations, peacekeeping operations, mediation, peace support, etc. They rely on bargaining power stemming from their capacity of threatening.

The approaches to peacebuilding in the top leadership level mostly requires the involvement of intermediary actors, mediators, who are eminent figures on their own and have a visible public profile. These mediators are supported by governments of international organizations, which are outside the conflict context. Their target is to establish negotiated settlements between the top level leaderships of the conflicting parties. Intermediary actors need to build trust for themselves and between the representatives of the conflicting parties to find the necessary flexibility in achieving negotiated settlements. Achievements towards peacebuilding at first sight are ceasefire or cessation of hostilities and the signing of an agreement. The process at this level is hierarchical and monolithic as it bears assumptions of identifying the top leaders of conflicting parties, receiving their perspectives, and their ability to collect support from their groups (Lederach, 1997: 44-45).

The second level of actors, or the middle-range leadership, consists of leadership positions that are not necessarily connected to the political authorities and the official leaderships of the conflicting parties. The members of the middle-range leadership includes four general types of individuals: (1) highly respected individuals who hold leadership positions at sectors such as education, business, etc.; (2) individuals holding top positions in networks and institutions as academic institutions, religious groups, humanitarian organizations, etc.; (3) individuals belonging to a specific ethnic minority or from a specific geographic location, who are respected by the local people and known outside the group or region; (4) individuals from the conflict setting, whose prestige is recognized by a large portion of the conflicting society (Lederach, 1997: 41).

The members of middle-range leadership are noteworthy for they have connections with the top-level leadership and they are connected to the society in the broader sense and are aware of the conflict context through their relations with local representatives. Their connection to the top-level leadership does not restrain them in their behavior as they are not part of the decision making mechanisms in that level. Furthermore, their influence is not derived from political or military power. This is an important issue because it enables the middle-range leadership to be more free and flexible in their decision making and actions. Individuals in this level are not necessarily identified within a specific identity. Their network of relations enable them to position themselves in a rather impartial position. The members of this group have ties to the members of the first level, and they prepare the society for peace process. Goodwill initiatives, reconciliation, problem solving, peace commissions, etc. are among the activities of this level leadership.

The middle-range leadership has the potential to help creating the infrastructure for sustainable peace as these figures are respected actors within the conflict context. Three main peacebuilding activities fit into the middle range leadership approaches: problem-solving workshops, conflict resolution trainings and development of peace commissions.

As these individuals have a knowledge of the conflict context and they have connections to the top leaders of conflicting parties, they have the position to influence the opinions of the top leadership and the grassroots leadership (Mitchell, 1992: 275). The target of middle-range leadership approaches is not to replace the top-level approaches, on the contrary, it is to promote and support the top level gains (Lederach, 1997: 47).

The grassroots level leadership represents the base of the society. This level is involved in the conflict and their image is characterized by the conflict settings. These individuals are aware of the conflict conditions under which people try to live and they have a knowledge of local politics. They have relations with the local representatives of the governments and conflicting parties (Lederach, 1997: 43). This level includes local leaders, community developers, local health officials, refugee camp leaders, etc. Their activities include establishment of social reconciliation, local peace commissions, grassroots trainings, psychosocial support, reduction of prejudice, etc. They play a crucial role in preventing conflicts in the field and connecting the society to the upper level actors.

The grassroots level leadership approaches to peace are more problematic than top level and middle-range level leadership approaches. There are two main reasons for such problem. First, this group consists of a large population as opposed to the other two levels. It is difficult to target such crowded group. Second, the people at this level are in a survival mode. They cope with the devastating conditions created by conflict. It is often luxurious for them to involve in activities of peacebuilding. However, the roots of conflict is embedded at this level, and practical efforts for the sake of peace can be developed as well. The efforts of grassroots leadership are from bottom to up, and they can take place before or after the elite level talks. The masses put pressure on the elites for change (see Garcia, 1993). An example to grassroots activities is local peace conferences, where discussions take place between adversary group members and agreements are reached.

The masses then, through grassroots leaders, can pressure the higher level leaderships to follow similar processes to achieve peace (Lederach, 1997: 53).

The root causes and the generating conditions of a conflict is clearly seen at the grassroots level. As this level is the lowermost level of the pyramid and represents the masses, it is easier to observe the daily problems that generate conflict at this level. Lederach (1997: 43) notes two inverse relationships in the conflict setting based on the pyramid. In the higher levels of the pyramid, individuals will have the opportunity to have grasp of the bigger picture of the conflict setting, yet would not feel the impact of the decisions made in this level. In the lower levels, on the other hand, the access to greater picture would be limited, yet the effects of the decisions made in the upper levels is felt directly.

It should be noted that the lines of group identity is formed in a vertical fashion that includes all three levels. Today's conflict are not class based conflicts that would typically be generated through the rivalry between the three levels. Instead, group divisions in conflicts are generated by ethnic, religious or geographical identities. People belonging to these identities exist in all levels of the pyramid and they are connected to the people of common identity from upper or lower levels (Lederach, 1997: 43).

2.1.4.4. Mediation

Mediation is a process of resolving conflict that is carried out by a mediator (third party), accepted by the conflicting parties, where the mediator does not have an authority to make decisions that are binding for the conflicting parties, but assists them to come to terms (Fisher, 2011: 161) on a deal to end the disputes through improving their relations, enhancing communication channels and using effective problem solving mechanisms (Moore, 2014: 8). The role of mediators in the process is to help the conflicting parties, who at this phase are negotiating parties, to address "contentious and difficult

relationship, procedural, substantive, or structural issues (Wodrow & Moore, 2010: 409).”

Mediation and conflict transformation are two interrelated concepts. Conflict transformation approach comprises mediation and attributes it a more comprehensive meaning than other conflict theories. While traditionally mediation is a short term process carried by third parties to help the elites of the conflicting parties to come to terms in negotiation, conflict transformation approach extends the content of it by targeting beyond negative peace. The ultimate aim is to establish positive peace that is “presence of social justice through equal opportunity, a fair distribution of power and resources, equal protection and impartial enforcement of law (Hellmüller & Ahere, 2014: 6)

Table 2.2. Main Differences between Mediation and Conflict Transformation (Hellmüller & Ahere, 2014: 7)

	Mediation	Conflict Transformation
Means	Assisted negotiations	Transforming relationships and structures
Timeframe	Short-term	Long-term
Parties	Decision-making conflict parties	Society at large
Third Parties	Mediators and mediation support actors	Mediators, peacebuilders, development workers, etc.

The main differences between mediation and conflict transformation are shown in *Table 2.3*. The parties involved in both approaches is worth looking at. Mediation requires the attendance of actors who are decision makers, namely the political and military actors. Although mediation processes might include other actors (Hellmüller & Ahere, 2014: 8), they are secondary in importance. Conflict transformation favors including a wider set of actors in mediation process. A peace constituency, which is comprised of individuals

from all levels of the pyramid is a model for mediation in conflict transformation (Lederach, 1995: 211).

Conflict is an outcome of self-awareness. Individuals or groups engage in conflict –if necessary- for pursuing justice. Injustice in terms of various needs leads groups to confront their adversaries, and this might result in conflict if their requests are not met. Once conflict escalates, its transformation is a process that is possible through awareness of the conflict context. Intermediary actors become key in increasing the awareness of conflicting parties at this point. Lederach, based on Adam Curle’s (see 1971) ideas, developed his chart on the progression of conflict where he argues that mediation is a prerequisite for establishing and sustaining peace (see Figure 2.2.).




Figure 2.2. The Progression of Conflict (Lederach, 1995: 13)

In this framework of progression of conflict, education is expected to increase awareness of needs and interests. Through the help of advocates the awareness will increase even further and reveals confrontation by bringing balance of power into the scene. Without the existence of advocacy mechanisms in favor of the people, who were once unaware of the imbalances, the power holders would keep the status quo. Confrontation is

expected to bring awareness of interdependence and balance of power, which in turn makes negotiations possible. If negotiations are executed successfully, justice and peaceful relations will be increased (Lederach, 1995: 13-14).

While education and advocacy share the goal of reconstructing/transforming the relations between groups, confrontation does not directly evolve into peace. Mediation is a crucial step in the process towards peace. Unlike education and advocacy, mediation is not one-sided in the sense that it does not favor a side. It is a rather impartial position “for justice’s sake (Lederach, 1995: 14).” Building on the awareness education and advocacy unveiled, mediation is an attempt to increase the mutual understanding of conflicting parties and decrease enmity.

Table 2.3. Mediation according to Lederach

MEDIATION	
Stance	Connected to all sides
Method	Increase mutual understanding
	Reduce adversaries
Emphasis	Hear truth
Process	Awareness to dialogue to mutual solutions
Goal	Social change and increased justice through peaceful means

Table 2.5 shows in detail how Lederach perceives mediation. Mediator is connected to all sides within the conflict setting, tries to increase the mutual understanding and reduce the adversaries between parties through opening channels of effective communication and dialogue for the parties to tell the truth for the ultimate aim of peacefully changing the social setting, developing human relations in a positive fashion and increasing justice.

There are three factors necessary for a third party to be accepted as a mediator by the conflicting parties:

1. Independence refers to the third party's non-involvement in the conflict. In other words, a conflicting party cannot be a mediator as it is not a third party by definition or a party that supports one of the conflicting parties.
2. Impartiality is about the unbiased character of the third party. Bias towards any component of the conflict context is unacceptable as this carries the potential to influence the mediation process and its likely outcomes. In most instances mediators are the only actors that can assist the conflicting parties to begin trusting each other. With the lack of certain amount of impartiality, developing trust would be endangered (Fisher, 2011: 165).
3. Neutrality means the lack of connections between the third party and any of the conflicting parties. Personal connection between these parties might result in shared interests and influence the mediation process.

Despite the fact that independence, impartiality and neutrality are desired features of a mediator, there may be circumstances where third party's link to conflicting parties is desirable (Moore, 2014: 21). One or more of the conflicting parties might specifically require other parties to include third parties that they have connections to or the other parties have connections to. This might be causing from the expectation to proceed in a healthier fashion.

The reason for third parties to involve in peace processes varies, making it difficult to produce generalizable patterns of mediation (Mitchell, 1988: 30). Although it is desired for them to have an independent, impartial, and neutral stance, it would not be realistic to expect mediators to be disinterested (Fisher, 2011: 163). Interests of mediating third parties vary on a large scale, from extending sphere of influence, or increasing soft power to having direct interests in regional politics. Furthermore, certain proposed models of

mediation are built on manipulation, a concept which raises question marks (see Touval & Zartman, 1985).

2.1.4.4.1. Tracks of Diplomacy

Mediation is an activity that is associated with top level leadership approaches to peacebuilding. This feature of mediation, however, should not mislead to the conclusion that the mediators themselves are necessarily from top level leadership. More precisely, mediation is not exclusively conducted by official representative of states or international organizations (Delna, 2018: 20); non-governmental actors can and do practice mediation. “Tracks of Diplomacy” concept is developed to categorize the mediation activities in accordance with the mediators’ affiliation. Tracks of diplomacy is the collective efforts of third parties, be it state or non-state, to transform the conflict through enabling communication between parties, recommending solutions, and finding a negotiated solution (Böhmelt, 2010: 167). Conventionally, there are two kinds of tracks of diplomacy: track one and track two.

Track one diplomacy refers to official diplomatic initiatives that are performed by state or international organization officials. This type of diplomacy is an instrument of foreign policy used to establish and develop contacts between conflicting parties (Magalhaes, 1988: 17). Since track one diplomacy is carried out by these actors, the process is official and formal. The individuals or institutions representing states and intergovernmental organizations perform to influence the conflicting parties to negotiate peace.

The strength of track one diplomacy is the ability to influence the conflicting parties with their state power. Potential use of power is a reliance for track one diplomats. Their access to financial and material resources increase their leverages in the table, thus expands the field of maneuver. The sources of intelligence provided by the states or international organizations at the disposal of diplomats increases their knowledge on the

conflict context, thereby increase their effectiveness in the process (Mapendere, 1999: 67).

The weaknesses of track one diplomacy stems from the very fact that it is an official process performed by states and intergovernmental organizations. Having a powerful entity's support at the table, mediators of this sort might undermine the positions of weaker parties and this might pose an obstacle to durability of peace. Another issue arises from the appointment of mediators. Officials of state are subject to appointment to different posts in different countries. Change of diplomats performing the mediation might result in lack of information and extend the duration of the mediation process. Another problem with this track of diplomacy is that it is highly dependent on changes in governments, assuming elections are performed in the mediating country (Mapendere, 1999: 68).

Track two diplomacy is the type of diplomacy performed by non-state actors through non-official and non-coercive methods (Reimann, 2004: 45). This sort of diplomacy is unofficial and informal, designed to support the leadership of conflicting parties to investigate possible solutions to the conflict (Montville, 1982: 162). It should be kept in mind that track one and track two diplomacies are not alternative methods, they are rather complementary to each other. Track two diplomacy generally support track one initiatives either by diffusing the track one gains into lower segments of conflicting parties or by providing insight for track one mediators.

Track two diplomacy has certain advantages. The very first advantage stems from the non-state nature of the process. This provides a freer environment both for mediators and the conflicting parties in expressing their opinions. This type of diplomacy is more inclusive in terms of the inclusion of various segments of the society into the process. This is an important facet of track two diplomacy for it includes middle-range leadership and grassroots leadership into the mediation process, it is not limited to top level

leadership. The fact that these levels of leadership are more effected from the outcomes of conflict plays a vital role in proposing constructive solutions.

The disadvantages of track two diplomacy largely originate from the lack of support from a state or an international organization. The very reason that strengthen track one diplomacy weaken track two. Lack of power and influence decreases the effectiveness of track two. Another related outcome of this situation is the time consumption in reaching the objectives (Mapendere, 1999: 68-69). Track one has the financial and material tools to influence the conflicting parties in a shorter amount of time, whereas track two is more time consuming for the lack of such tool and the fact that it is more inclusive in the sense that a wider group of participants are targeted.

Table 2.4. Differences between Track I, Track II and Hybrid Diplomacies

	Track I	Track II	Hybrid
Actors	Top-level leadership: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Representatives of conflicting parties • Representatives of states or intergovernmental organizations as third parties 	Top-level leadership and middle-range leadership: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Representatives of conflicting parties • Representatives of non-state actors 	Track I and Track II actors at the same time
Strategies	Outcome-oriented <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Official non-coercive and coercive measures 	Process-oriented <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-official non-coercive measures 	Cooperation of official and non-official measures

Hybrid diplomacy, which is a rather new type of diplomacy, refers to the joined efforts of track one and track two level actors in the mediation process. There are several strengths hybrid diplomacy. As the areas of expertise diversify, and the resources increase, the potential success of mediation increases (Greig & Diehl, 2012: 189). The non-governmental actors open new channels of dialogue for track one level actors to engage with the conflicting parties through their non-official strategies, while their

leverage increases with the support of these track one actors. As an outcome of these advantages, Mullhearn (2018: 66) argues that hybrid diplomacy offers an increased chance of success in mediating a comprehensive peace settlement.

2.2. Chapter Conclusion

This chapter outlines the theoretical framework for studying the activities of Turkey, Malaysia and OIC in the Bangsamoro peace process. Conflict transformation approach is selected to explain the case, as mentioned in the introduction chapter. The logic behind this choice stems from the comprehensiveness of conflict transformation approach in comparison to other approaches to conflict as settlement, management and resolution. As the nature of current conflicts evolve into a cyclical process, it becomes vital to target beyond facilitating surface level political agreements.

Building durable and sustainable peace can be achieved through understanding the root causes of conflict and the underlying human relations and structures, and transforming them. This task requires a comprehensive effort that includes larger portions of the society in conflict into the peacebuilding process. Individuals from top level leadership, middle-range leadership and grassroots leadership should be included in peacebuilding activities to construct peaceful relations and eventual reconciliation.

Conflict is not necessarily a negative phenomenon. It creates opportunities for constructive change, if assisted properly. The actors involved in peace processes have the opportunity to undertake such task. The conditions of achieving durable peace in general is inclusivity and establishment of social justice. Third parties play a vital role in increasing the awareness of conflicting parties, which in turn would move these parties from conflict to peace.

Turkey, Malaysia and OIC contributed to the Bangsamoro peace process at different levels as third parties. Their main activities fall into mediation. Here, I tried to specify a comprehensive mediation perspective by benefiting from the conflict transformation

approach. As the activities of the focused actors fall under track one and track two diplomacies, I briefly defined the main aspects of these concepts.



CHAPTER 3

MAPPING THE MORO CONFLICT

3.1. Conflict Mapping

Conflicts, regardless of their level, consist of many elements. Conflicts that involve multiple conflicting parties that represent large numbers of people and states are complicated to trace the nature of relations. In order to understand the whole conflict sphere, a useful approach is to develop a map of conflict. Conflict mapping enables conflict parties, actors following the conflict for whatever reason and the experts working on the case to make a clear understanding of the case and present a road map to resolve the matters or to study them (Wehr, 1979: 9). The elements of a conflict map in the widest sense includes context, parties, causes and consequences, contrasting beliefs and values, goals and interests, dynamics, functions and regulation potential (Wehr, 2006).

The first step to create a map is to write the history of the conflict. This is a vital element to understand the context within which the conflict occurs. The second step is to identify the conflicting parties. Conflicts take place between more than one adversary parties, and sometimes there are allies/supporters/sympathizers of these parties that do not directly confront other parties. Furthermore, there might be outsider third parties that involve in the conflict to facilitate resolution of the conflict.

A conflict map should try to address the causes of conflict by distinguishing them from the consequences. Although this is not an easy task, for issues become complex throughout the course of conflict, it will be beneficial for a healthy understanding. After all, addressing the root causes of conflict is a must to end the violence cycle and build peace.

3.2. History of the Moro Conflict

Republic of Philippines is one of the countries where numerous minority groups are in conflict with the central government. The major armed conflict is between the Muslim inhabitants of the Mindanao Island and the GPH. The history of this conflict dates back to centuries-old warfare between the Muslim sultanates of the Philippines peninsula and the Spanish colonizers. What began as a struggle against the Spanish forces turned into an independence movement after the republic was declared.

Framing the Moro conflict is not an easy task. The Philippines society consists of many ethnolinguistic groups. Religion seems to be the only overarching identity for these groups. Religious identity, at least for the Moros, is the key element in construction of the cultural homogeneity among the different ethnolinguistic groups (McKenna, 1998: 85). There may be many factors behind the current conflict, but the ethno-religious identity combined different groups in a cause: separatism. The Spanish colonization constructed the Moro identity and the following American colonization politicized the Moro identity. As a result, the modern republican era has been era of armed conflict.

3.2.1. Islamization of the Philippines

Although there is no certainty on when the Philippines encountered with Islam, the traces can be followed back to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The increasing numbers of Muslim merchants visiting the islands in the thirteenth century is accepted to be the beginning of Islam's entrance into the region (Majul, 1999: 41). Arab and Persian traders spread this new religion to the region through Sumatra and Java (Nadeau, 2008: 6). Islam's expansion in the region was accelerated with the local rulers becoming Muslims. Parameswara, the ruler of Malacca Island, accepted Islam through marriage bonds and this increased the speed of Islamization in the region.

The political influence of Islam increased further when the sultanates in the Sulu Islands converted into Islam. A critical turning point in this process was the marriage of Sumatran

Sultan Sayyid Abu Bakhr with a local princess from Sulu archipelago (Nadeau, 2008: 7). This marriage bond increased the speed of Islamization. Local rulers rapidly converted to Islam after the incident. It should be noted that a major reason of Islamization was its economic benefits. Muslim merchants preferred to harbor in Muslim sultanates. Inclusion in the Muslim trade networks provided wealth for the region. Wealth of the region was crucial for the rulers to strengthen their political and military authorities.

3.2.2. Spanish Colonization (1521-1896)

Spanish colonization is a significant historical development that changed the course of events in the Philippines. By the end of the fifteenth century, Muslim sultanates in Sulu archipelago, Maguindanao region of southern Mindanao and Manila had consolidated their political spheres. The islands, which is now known as the Philippines, were in a strategic location on the trade routes connecting Europe to Far East (Malan & Solomon, 2012: 60). Spain's maritime policy in the sixteenth century was largely established around exploring new trade routes and decreasing the costs of trade.

What began as an exploration expedition under Ferdinand Magellan in 1521, paved the way for Spain's colonizing the region. The sultanates of Sulu (1450) and Maguindanao (1515) at the time were consolidated political entities with certain foreign relations with regional actors (Bacani, 2005: 3). The Spanish Kingdom under Philippe II, increased its presence in the islands by sending further expeditions under Miguel Lopez de Legazpi. From this time on the islands became known as the Islands of Philippe, *Las Islas Filipinas*. Kingdom of Manila in Luzon Island became a Spanish land in 1570, changing the Spanish direction to northern part of the Islands.

Spanish colonizers adopted a policy of working with the *datus*. *Datu* is the leader of a *barangay*, which is a small political entity. The office *datu* in Muslim sultanates was inherited by blood line and passed through the male members of the *datu* family. *Datus* sought the loyalty of their people and protected them from external threats. The Spanish

policy was to consolidate its power through *datus*. In this manner, they collaborated with *datus*, provided them certain amount of wealth, made sure that the *datus* and their followers converted to Christianity. Certain *datus* in this process collaborated with the Spanish colonizers, while some others resisted against the Spanish forces.

The Christian-Muslim clashes are a major root cause of the current Moro conflict. Use of the name *Moro*, as mentioned in the introduction chapter, was the first step of otherization by the Spanish colonizers. This name was used to classify the Muslim inhabitants of the region, and eventually the Muslims embraced the name (Tanriverdi, 2018: 49). The religious rhetoric behind the current conflict stems from the implementations of the Spanish colonization. The “Muslim problem” of Catholic Christian Filipinos is at the center of the conflict, and obviously, such a formulation led to the birth of a reaction by the Mindanao Muslims (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005: 294).

The Spanish colonizers initiated new reforms on settlements, economy, government, etc. As it was difficult to control the population, which was fragmented in a broad geography, *barangays* were coaxed into conjoined with each other in new towns that were built around churches. This process is known as *reducción*. In the traditional cities, where an inside and outside wall encircled the city, the inner part was used by Spaniards and Christians and the outer part was left for non-Christians (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005: 53). *Datus* were included in the process of *reducción* with rewards by the colonizers.

The *reducción* process ruptured the traditional economic system by the end of the sixteenth century (Alonso, 2003: 68). As the *barangays* were emptied with the population forcefully moved into the towns and cities, and the populations of these settlements increased further with the incoming foreign mercenaries, missionaries, officials, and merchants a new agricultural policy was needed. The land was redistributed to the people, sparking new disputes between the rural inhabitants and their colonizers

(Abinales & Amoroso, 2005: 61-62). Taxation became another burden on the people as well.

In terms of governance, the colonizers continuously tried to centralize the government. The local rulers and intermediaries were pushed out of the government, and Spanish governors were appointed to rule cities in the nineteenth century (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005: 85). This was seen as a necessity for efficient taxation and securing the cities against the Muslim raids. These initiatives were not undertaken simply because of the issues in the Philippines. Mainland Spain was having difficult times as well, as it was invaded by Napoleon. Decreasing the economic costs was a must for the Philippines as their income from the mainland was insecure.

The Spaniards had three main goals in colonizing the Philippines: increasing the share of the Spanish Kingdom in spice trade from the Far East, establishing a safe harbor for its maritime trade activities between Mexico and China and Christianizing the Philippines (Nadeau, 2008: 33). Their activities to achieve these goals created grievances among the inhabitants of the islands. There was apparent segregation between the Spaniards and the rest. Despite the fact that the Spaniards were successful to certain extent in Christianizing the local people, these people were not treated equal. Furthermore, the Spaniards did not have the chance to fully colonize the Muslim sultanates. Sulu Sultanate was still a central power and the Maguindanao Sultanate shrank towards the inner parts of Mindanao Island, where the Spaniards did not have the capacity to enter due to geographical obstacles. The very end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century was an era of uprisings against the Spaniards, mainly by the Christianized Filipinos. In such an environment, the Spanish rule in the Philippines ended with its defeat to the US in 1898.

3.2.3. American Colonization (1898-1946)

The US took over the control of the Philippines with the signing of Paris Peace Treaty in 1898, at a time of intensive unrest in the society against colonization. Despite the fact that the people wanted independence, the US colonized the region. It used the similar strategy of working with the local elites to diffuse its power into the society. The American colonial rule targeted more than securing sea trade, it wanted to use the natural resource of the region. The American rules tried to combine the whole country under their dominion, including the Muslim populated areas, which were never fully controlled by the Spanish.

The American colonial era was a period of increasing discrimination between the Christian and Muslim inhabitants of the islands (Pertierra & Ugarte, 2002: 196). The discrimination was politicized during this era (Tanriverdi, 2018: 49). The fact that Christian Filipinos were included in the political system and Muslim Moros were not, as they were perceived as rural people who needed to be civilized, played a crucial role in the politicization of Moro cause (Makol-Abdul, 1997: 316). This was perceived as offensive by Muslims.

The American rule in relation to the Moros can be divided into three periods: Military Government (1899-1903), the Moro Province (1903-1913), and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu (1914-1920) (Makol-Abdul, 1997: 316). The first period began with the signing of Bates Agreement between the American Brigadier General John Bates and the Sultan of Sulu Muhammad Jamalul Kiram on August 1899. The Sultan had the right to rule his sultanate with this agreement. Similar acknowledgements were given to Muslims in Basilan and Mindanao as well (Makol-Abdul, 1997: 316). The agreement lived shortly, being abolished in 1902 by the Americans.

The Moro Province was established in 1903 to integrate the Moros further into the Filipino society. Another aim of this step was to be able to use the natural resources of

the Moro region (Makol-Abdul, 1997: 316). In this period, the American Governor settled in Zamboanga became the highest ruler of the Moro Province. Implementation of Western institutions and values were objected by the Moros as these were seen incompatible with the Muslim culture. The new systems introduced on judiciary and education was non-Islamic, creating alienation of Moros from their religions. Furthermore, these policy implementations were not only about developing the region, they were used as tools to secure the American interests (Makol-Abdul, 1997: 317). Another benefit of directly ruling the Moro region for the US was the ability to extract and use the natural resources such as gold, copper, and coal. Many mine plantations were established in this period (Gomez, 1977: 149).

The Muslim resistance was defeated in 1914 and from that point on American policy implementations accelerated. In the same year, the Moro province was replaced with Department of Mindanao and Sulu, a civilian run political entity. This period is important for the colonizers implemented migration policies, moving Christian Filipinos from northern island of Luzon and other crowded areas to Mindanao and Sulu. The objective was to decrease the Moro density in the population and integrate them into the society.

With the efforts of Filipinos towards independence, the Philippine commonwealth was established in 1934, which foresaw independence in ten years. The Philippines was granted independence by the US in 1945 after the end of World War II. This was partly due to the foreseen schedule and largely due to the problems the US faced after the end of World War II. Despite the efforts of Moro leaders, the Muslim lands were annexed into the new republic.

3.2.4. The Republic of the Philippines

The Republic of the Philippines was recognized as an independent country after World War II, in 1946. The establishment of this new state was problematic for the Muslim inhabitants of the Philippines (McKenna, 1998: 80). According to Ivan Molloy,

For over 400 years, the Moros perceived their struggle as a fight to protect their religion, cultural identity and homeland against foreign invaders. They have fought many wars for political independence against the Spanish, the Americans and lastly, the Christian Filipino governments in Manila. With their strong sense of Islamic nationalism, the majority of the Muslims regard themselves simply as Moros and not Filipinos at all. Over the centuries Islam has been important to the Muslim people in the Philippines not only in forging the basis of their self-identity, but also in acting as the cement between deep ethnic divisions that exist among the many cultural-linguistic groups that make up the Moro people (1988: 61).

The state formation process in the Philippines, as in elsewhere, was problematic for the minority groups. In a country consisting of tens of ethnic and ethnolinguistic groups, the grievances increased. Christian Filipinos and Muslim Moros were alone in the country after their colonizers left. The Moros were not in favor of establishment of a single state, yet their request was turned down by the US. Syed Serajul Islam cites a passage from a letter written by Moro elites to the US congress:

We do not want to be included in the Philippines Independence. For once independence is launched, there will be trouble between us and the Christian Filipinos because from the time immemorial these two peoples have not lived harmoniously. It is not proper peoples live together under one flag (Islam, 1998: 445-446).

As it is evident in the passage, the Moros evaluated the foundation of the new Republic as unlawful annexation of their homeland. Perhaps, the Moros saw the new republic as a continuation of the American colonization (Timberman, 1991: 9). The fact that the new republic was a continuation of the Commonwealth administration strengthens such perception.

Violent conflict arose during the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos, who was elected in 1965. The Marcos regime is a brutal dictatorial regime under which many armed groups engaged in conflict with the state. His second term (1969) began with protests, which were suppressed through violence. He tried to change the constitution to allow a president to serve more than two terms. There were bombing incidents during his

regime. Eventually, in 1972 he declared martial law. The Philippines, which was once seen as the most democratic country in Asia, was torn with economic problems and violent conflict. Marcos left office after the elections in 1986.

The Marcos era is known as increasing state suppression over the Moros. It was during his term the MNLF was founded. The killings of Moros in incidents pushed the Moros to organize under armed groups (Nadeau, 2008: 88). After the declaration of the martial law, the MNLF increased its capacities and went onto a full scale revolutionary war against the Marcos regime. Not only Moros, but communists engaged in armed conflict as well. There are many massacres by the Philippines armed forces against Moros such as the Manili Massacre of June 1971, where 61 Moros were killed in a mosque, and Malisbong Massacre of September 1974, where around 1000 Moros were killed in a mosque as well (Garrido, 2003).

Despite the fact that the MNLF and Marcos regime signed the Tripoli agreement in 1976, under supervision of Libya, the requirements of this agreement was not implemented. MNLF's behavior in engaging in an agreement with the GPH resulted in the separations from the group and the establishment of MILF in 1978. From then on, the course of conflict became even more complex, for now he GPH had to deal with more than one actors.

The Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was established in 1989 with a referendum that was held in the provinces of Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur; and in the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Koronadal, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa, and Zamboanga. Despite the fact that the ARMM was established to end the conflict, it was inefficient in the sense that the process was not undertaken efficiently. The

government of the ARMM under Nur Misuari, the founder of MNLF, was not able to meet the expectations.

The following years under presidents Corazon Aquino, Fidel Ramos, Joseph Estrada, and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo had similar features. The country struggled with economic problems and ethno-religious separatism was not solved. Despite the fact that there were initiatives to make peace with the MNLF (the signing of FPA in 1996) and MILF (peace negotiations since 1997), these were not efficient processes. The efforts during the presidency of Benigno Aquino III accelerated the peace process between the GPH, and the MILF and FAB (2012) and CAB (2014) were signed. Finally during the term of President Rodrigo Duterte, the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) was accepted in the Congress and the BARMM was established with the referendum in 2019.

3.3. Issues

3.3.1. Ancestral Domain

The main area of problem in the Moro conflict is the distribution of land. As it can be traced in the previous sections of this chapter, the Moro cause is born mainly from the struggle over land. The Muslim sultanates in Mindanao and Sulu fought for keeping their independence against the Spanish colonizers. It was during this period that the borders of these sultanates shrank because the Moro people withdrew into mountainous inner parts of their lands for the purposes of defense. The American colonial administration tried to change the demographic structure of the Mindanao and its surroundings by enforcing migration of Christian Filipinos into this geography. The continuation of Spanish model of central administration decreased the value of local barangay lands and the Moros were generally left in the rural areas. Furthermore, the lands of Moros were redistributed to the new coming migrants.

The Moros did not have the opportunity to receive their ancestral domain as the new republic included the Mindanao archipelago. The increasing population of Filipinos is the

main obstacle in claims over the ancestral domain. The population of Mindanao grew from 0.7 million people in 1948 to 2.3 million in 1970. Cotobato, for instance, one of the main cities in Mindanao, received 523,037 persons between 1939 and 1960 (McKenna, 1998: 116). While Moros made up 54.5% of the population in Cotobato in 1939, this was reduced to 34.6% in 1960 due to the flow of Filipino migrants (O'Shaughnessy, 1975: 377). *Table 3.1.* shows the demographic change in major cities of Mindanao between 1918 and 1970.

Ancestral domain refers to the lands owned by the Moros before the Spanish colonization and on. The issue of ancestral domain is twofold: it refers to the right to turning back to the ancestral land, and the use of natural resources in this area (Tanriverdi, 2018: 53). As it was mentioned in the section titled "American Colonization," the Mindanao region is rich in natural resources and the American colonizers wanted to make use of this richness. A major problem for the resolution of the Moro conflict is about the use of natural resources and this makes up a part of the ancestral domain issue.

The GPH passed the Republic Act No. 8371, or "The Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997" (IPRA), to address the ancestral domain issue. As this is a material cause of the armed conflict and it legitimizes the cause of the Muslim resurgent groups, the GPH implemented the IPRA to stop the historical injustices. The IPRA targeted to address the recognition of indigenous peoples' right to ancestral domains, their rights to cultural integrity, recognition of their political structures and governance, delivery of basic services, human rights, elimination of discrimination, foundation of an office to fulfill the need of indigenous peoples (Congress of the Philippines, 1997).

Table 3.1. Population of Muslims and Non-Muslims in Moro Ancestral Domain
(O'Shaughnesy, 1975: 377)

	1918	1939	1948	1960	1970
Muslims in the Total Population	4.29%	4.23%	4.11%	4.86%	4.31%
Philippines					
Non-Muslims	9,871,273	15,322,400	18,442,591	25,770,210	35,100,092
Muslims	443,037	677,903	791,817	1,317,475	1,584,394
Cotobato					
Non-Muslims	61,052	135,939	284,507	672,659	711,430
Muslims	110,926	162,996	155,162	356,460	424,577
Lanao					
Non-Muslims	8,140	80,805	106,703		
Muslims	83,319	162,632	237,215		
Lanao del Norte					
Non-Muslims				214,070	269,089
Muslims				56,533	80,853
Lanao del Sur					
Non-Muslims				22,600	39,239
Muslims				355,727	416,269
Palawan					
Non-Muslims	63,529	87,278	97,655	149,893	219,566
Muslims	5,524	6,395	8,614	12,776	17,069
Sulu					
Non-Muslims	4,147	16,584	13,943	15,972	23,633
Muslims	168,629	230,533	226,883	310,926	401,984
Zamboanga					
Non-Muslims	102,544	263,956	388,593		
Muslims	44,789	92,028	133,348		
Zamboanga del Norte					
Non-Muslims				265,218	388,680
Muslims				16,211	20,699
Zamboanga del Sur					
Non-Muslims				564,171	863,190
Muslims				178,233	170,828

3.4. Actors

The Moro conflict is complex due to the number of resurgent groups involved. The MNLF, MILF, and Abu Sayyaf are the three Muslim groups who have engaged in armed resistance against the GPH. In this section these groups are briefly introduced.

3.4.1. Moro National Liberation Front

The MNLF was founded by Nur Misuari in 1969 in secret and in 1972 it began implementing its activities openly after the Marcos Regime declared martial law. The group embraced an armed resistance method for the establishment of a state in Moro land. The economic underdevelopment of Moros in comparison to Filipinos was among the main reasons for the MNLF's engagement in armed conflict. Furthermore, as mentioned, massacres performed by the GPH played a triggering role in the armed organization of the Moro people. The group declared a manifesto in 1974, in which the cause of the movement is explained as freeing the Moro people from Filipino colonialism and defining the national destiny of Moro people with their free will (Kamlan, 2011: 6).

Under leadership of Misuari, the MNLF organized itself as a political organization in addition to being an armed one. Misuari embraced a policy of finding support from the Muslim World through delegations sent to third parties. As a result of these efforts, countries as Libya, Malaysia, Iran and Saudi Arabia provided assistance to the group in terms of money and weapons (Jubair, 1984: 174; Delna, 2018: 65). The OIC gave the MNLF an observer status, which is still in act. Thanks to the efforts of the OIC, the MNLF signed the Tripoli Agreement with the GPH in 1976.

The Tripoli Agreement granted the establishment of an autonomous region in Mindanao. This agreement never came in effect though. One of the outcomes of the process leading to the signing of the Tripoli Agreement was that the MNLF changed its target from establishing an independent state to an autonomous political entity.

The MNLF and the GPH was finally able to reach an agreement (FPA) in 1996, according to which an autonomous entity was to be formed. The ARMM was formed after this agreement, and the MNLF under Misuari governed it in a transitional period. The establishment of ARMM did not meet the expectations of the Moro people. The Misuari led ARMM was not able to change the traditional political structures in the region, such as *datus*. Economic development was not achieved. As a result of failure of the expectations, the MNLF began losing its power and influence and new organizations emerged as offshoots of the MNLF.

3.4.2. Moro Islamic Liberation Front

The failure of the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement cause criticisms against the Misuari administration of the MNLF. Salamat Hashim, the foreign affairs chief of the MNLF, along with high ranking MNLF officials went onto forming a new administration within the MNLF. They were expelled by Misuari and in 1984, Hashim declared the foundation of the MILF. The main difference between the two groups is that while the MNLF is secular nationalist, the MILF claims to be Islamic-oriented (Jubair, 1984: 154). The main argument behind MILF split from MNLF is the fact that the leadership of MNLF was drifting apart from Islamic principles (Jubair, 1984: 154). Furthermore, the MILF argued that MNLF should not have settled in for any solution less than independence (Mastura, 2012: 13).

As the MNLF was weakening, as mentioned in the previous section, the MILF's capacity increased and it became the most powerful Moro insurgent group. The success of the MILF in becoming the main Moro resurgent group lies in its effective communication with the society. The group acted as a governing body in Muslim populated areas of Mindanao, where the capacity of the GPH was not enough to control, and worked to solve the problems of the local people. Provision of services increased the popularity of the group. Furthermore, the fact that the administration of the group was more

consultative and inclusive than that of the MNLF, attracted the people (Stanford University, 2015).

The MILF, although not included in the 1996 peace deal, did not prevent the peace negotiations between the GPH and MNLF. This attitude was to show that the MILF was in favor of peace. Also, as an outcome, the members and supporters of MNLF, who were not satisfied with the FPA, switched their loyalty to the MILF. The number of MILF militants reached to 15,000 at this time (Stanford University, 2015), making the group the largest.

The MILF and the GPH began negotiating peace in 1997. The process was interrupted several times. Eventually, with the referendum held in 2019, the MILF was succeeded its goal of establishment of an autonomous state with the rule of sharia.

3.5. Peace Process between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front

The peace process between the GPH and the MILF has two stages (OPAPP, 2016). The first stage of the negotiations took place between 1997 and 2000. This stage began with the signing of “Agreement for General Cessation of Hostilities between the GPH and the MILF” in 1997. These negotiations were majorly on security issues. In addressing these issues, the CCCH, the AHJAG, and the IMT were established. Furthermore, ceasefire agreements were signed by the parties. Third parties were not involved in the first stage of the process. This stage ended with the all-out-war declared by the GPH.

The second stage of the peace process began in 2001 after Gloria Macapagal Arroyo became the president. With the facilitation of Malaysia, the talks began once more. In June 2001, the “Agreement on Peace between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front” was signed. This stage marks the involvement of international actors into the process. Detailed discussions and

negotiations on political settlement including autonomy and self-governance were on the table.

The conflict was partly rooted in the ancestral domain. The “Agreement on Peace between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front” addressed the issue of ancestral domain, and in July 2008 a draft “Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain” (MOA-AD) was finalized. The MOA-AD was restrained by the Supreme Court of the Philippines. The failure to sign the MOA-AD caused the re-escalation of armed conflict (OPAPP, 2016).

In 2009, the International Contact Group (ICG) was established in order to restore the trust between parties. The aim of this body is to assist the parties to prevent potential failures within the process. This body consists of states and NGOs. Its members are Turkey, Japan, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, The Asia Foundation, Conciliation Resources, Muhammadiyah Association, and Community of Sant’Egidio.

The Declaration of Continuity for the Peace Negotiations between the GPH and the MILF was signed between the parties in June 2010. Along with the establishment of the ICG, signing of this declaration marked the beginning of a healthier peace process, in the end of which the BARMM was established. The FAB was signed in 2012, and the Third Party Monitoring Team (TPMT) was established in extension in 2013. The TPMT is a non-governmental body oversees the process and evaluates the compliances of the parties as well as the local population (Söylemez & Kavak, 2014: 24). Its members are the Asia Foundation, Gaston Z. Ortigas, IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, the Mindanao Human Rights Action Center (MinHRAC). The Chairman of the TPMT is the former EU ambassador to the Philippines, Alistair MacDonald.

In March 2014, the CAB was signed and the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB) was formed. The duty of IDB is to plan and undertake the decommissioning of the MILF troops. The IDB is run by Fatih Ulusoy, Turkey's ambassador to the Philippines, and its board consists of the president, vice president, an international expert, a local expert and MILF and GPH experts.

3.6. Chapter Conclusion

This chapter was on the mapping of the Moro conflict. Conflict mapping includes the historical developments, areas of problems and the actors involved in the conflict. Within this framework, I tried briefly outlined the conflict by addressing the history of conflict, issues, actors, and the peace process in four separate sections.

Historically the conflict can be divided into three phases: the Spanish colonization, the American Colonization, and the Republic of the Philippines. The Spanish colonial phase formed the Moro identity, and the American Colonial phase politicized it. The Republic phase is a phase of armed conflict. The common issue in these three phases is the distribution of the ancestral domain. Both the MNLF and the MILF has claims on the ancestral domain.

The next chapter is a discussion on the activities of Turkey, Malaysia, and the OIC in the Bangsamoro peace process.

CHAPTER 4

THE ROLE OF MUSLIM ACTORS IN THE BANGSAMORO PEACE PROCESS

4.1. Turkey

Turkey has been increasingly taking part in peace processes around the world especially for the last 20 years. The peace process between the GPH and the MILF is one of these. Despite the fact that the bilateral relations between the two states have not been of significance, with Turkey's involvement in the peace process, the relations developed significantly. Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's visit to the Philippines in November 2014 was the first time a Turkish Prime Minister visited the country. The bilateral relations intensified after this visit. Turkey's trade with the Philippines increased, especially in terms of its exports (see World Integrated Trade Solution by World Bank).

Turkey was a member of the OIC Peace Committee for Southern Philippines (OIC-PCSP) along with Egypt, Libya, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, etc., and monitored the peace process between the GPH and the MNLF. The OIC constituted the OIC-PCSP for the purposes of monitoring the implementation of the FPA signed between the GPH and the MNLF (Fitrah, 2012: 19). It was through the efforts of this committee, the Bangsamoro Coordination Forum was established in 2014. As for the GPH-MILF peace process, Turkey has been a member of the ICG and the chair of the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB) since its establishment. Turkey has been active in the country through the activities of IHH. IHH is a member of the TPMT, and monitors the implementation of the peace process at the local level.

4.1.1. International Contact Group

The ICG was established in 2009 for the purpose of supporting the mediation efforts of Malaysia. Malaysia's effort in pushing for the formation of the ICG was to persuade the MILF in engaging in the peace process after the failure of the MOA-AD and further

internationalize the GPH-MILF peace process (Fitrah, 2012: 2). The ICG consists of four states and four international NGOs. These are the United Kingdom, Turkey, Japan, Saudi Arabia Conciliation Resources, Muhammadiyah Association, The Asia Foundation and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. This hybrid committee is the first of its kind, where track one and track two diplomacies are merged (DPI, 2014: 7).

The target of the ICG is to mobilize international support for the peace process and to create leverage against the negotiating sides, while sustaining their interests (Framework Agreement on the Formation of the International Contact Group for the GRP-MILF Peace Process, 2009). The members of the ICG was selected according to their support potential, expertise in peace processes and active performances in Mindanao. The GPH wanted to eliminate big powers from the table and the MILF did not want states that supported the GPH in terms of military aid (Herbolzheimer & Leslie, 2013: 2). The ICG consisted of members who were experienced in peace processes and who did not have interests over the Philippines. This unbiased nature of the ICG was important for establishment of trust between the conflicting parties (Mullhearn, 2018: 72).

The ICG has four functions according to the “Framework Agreement on the Formation of the International Contact Group for the GRP-MILF Peace Process (2009):”

To attend and observe the face-to-face negotiations upon invitation by the Parties with the concurrence of the Facilitator;

To conduct visits, exchange views, and give advice on discreet basis in coordination with the Parties and the Facilitator;

To seek out the assistance of recognized experts, resource persons or groups on specific issues in order to support the Parties;

To meet upon request by any of the Parties at various levels to help resolve substantive issues based on agreed agenda.

The ICG played a central role in the signing of the FAB in 2012.

4.1.2. Independent Decommissioning Body

One of the stages of the Bangsamoro peace process is the decommissioning of the combatants of the MILF. In fact, the FAB has an annex on normalization, which foresees the normalization of life in Mindanao through the disarmament of the MILF combatants. The IDB was formed as an extension of the Annex on Normalization of the FAB in March 2014 with the signing of the Terms of Reference of the IDB. According to this, the IDB consists of seven members, a chairperson, two foreign experts and four local experts. The chairperson and foreign experts are chosen from states.

Turkey became the chair of the IDB with the signing of a protocol in January 2015. Ambassador Haydar Berk and Ambassador Mustafa Pulat served as the chairmen of the IDB. Fatih Ulusoy, Turkey's ambassador to the Philippines, is the current chairman. The other international experts are from Norway and Kingdom of Brunei. The local experts are decided by the GPH and the MILF.

The IDB is in charge of registering the combatants and weapons of the MILF as well as planning the decommissioning schedule, collecting the weapons and storing them. The IDB has decommissioned 145 MILF combatants and 75 weapons in June 2015. This took place in an environment where the peace process has gone into an impasse due to the Mamasapano Clash that happened in January 2015, in which 44 police commandos were killed. The MILF showed its dedication to peace with the decommissioning of 145 combatants.

The IDB has constructed a Secured Arms Storage Area in Camp Abubakar of the MILF in Maguindanao to keep the decommissioned weapons. It has completed site surveys in 29 areas across Mindanao Island to plan the decommissioning process. It has held capacity development trainings for the combatants of the MILF and conducted eight simulations for the decommissioning. The IDB plans to decommission all MILF combatants before the

signing of the exit agreements. As part of this plan, in March 2019, the MILF has handed the IDB the list of its combatants and weaponry (IDB 2019).

4.1.3. Third Party Monitoring Team (IHH)

The TPMT is an independent monitoring committee that was established as an extension of the FAB, with the signing of its Terms of Reference in January 2013. The Team consists of five non-state members: a chairperson two international NGOs and two local NGOs. Current members of the TPMT are Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute, United Youth for Peace and Development, IHH, the Asia Foundation and the former EU Ambassador to the Philippines Alistair MacDonald. The aim of the TPMT is to monitor and review the implementation of all agreements signed between the parties.

The TPMT meets in every two months in its headquarters. It submits reports to the GPH and the MILF as well as the Malaysian facilitator quarterly. So far, it has convened in 34 monitoring sessions. It has published five annual public reports, in which it briefs the public about the implementation of the peace process, TPMT activities, and recommendations.

The IHH, which is an international NGO based in Turkey, is the member of the TPMT. IHH's continuous presence in the Philippines since 1996 and its global recognition were the main reasons behind its nomination to the TPMT (Demircioğlu, 2016: 37). Despite the fact that IHH is a non-state actor, its role in the TPMT is included in the section on Turkey for it is a Turkish NGO and it has been working in coordination with the state regarding the peace process in the Philippines.

4.1.4. Turkey's Activities Assessed

Turkey plays different roles in the Bangsamoro peace process. Its mediation is not limited to top level leadership. It is more comprehensive in that it both executes different tasks at the same time and embraces middle range and grassroots levels along with the top

level leadership. While the ICG has been a useful body for building trust between the conflicting parties during the negotiation phase, the IDB is key for the normalization of life in the region, and the TPMT makes sure there exists coordination between the conflicting parties and awareness of the reality in the field.

Turkey has been taking active part in these fields because it is aware of the necessity to supervise the parties in the process. The signing of agreements does not necessarily mean the establishment of durable peace (MFA, 2017: 3). Third party assistance enhanced the process and balanced the different interests of the parties (MFA, 2013: 3). By helping to provide the coordination between the GPH and the MILF through the IDB and the TPMT, Turkey tried to prevent the failure of the peace process as in the one between the GPH and the MNLF (MFA, 2018: 5).

4.2. Malaysia

Malaysia, being one of the neighboring countries to the Philippines, has been influenced from the Moro conflict. The large scale armed conflict in the early 1970s caused a flow of migration into the Sabah region of Malaysia.

4.2.1. Malaysia's Relations with the Philippines and Its Involvement in the Peace Process

The first phase of the peace process between the GPH and the MILF ended with President Estrada's declaration of all-out-war against the MILF. As he was impeached from office in 2000, his successor President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo instantly changed the all-out-war policy to an all-out-peace policy. The issue in front of the government at this time was to build trust with the MILF. The building of this trust was made possible with the involvement of Malaysia into the peace process as a facilitator.

The MILF's request for the inclusion of a state third party to the process resulted in the GPH's search for a mediator (Pobre, 2009: 61). In her trip to Kuala Lumpur in February

2001, President Arroyo requested the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed to act as a third party facilitator between the GPH and the MILF. This was accepted by the Malaysian side on the condition that the MILF was persuaded to continue the talks. As the MILF under Salamat Hashim accepted Malaysia's facilitation, the parties met at Kuala Lumpur in March 2001 to agree on continuing the peace negotiations. In June 2001, the parties signed the Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement) in Libya.

Looking at the nature of relations between the Philippines and Malaysia, it might seem controversial for the GPH to ask Malaysia to become a third party facilitator, and Malaysia to accept this request. As there is dispute over the Sabah region of Malaysia between the two sides and Malaysia is accused of supporting the secessionist movements in Mindanao, the inclusion of Malaysia in the process was approached with suspicion by the Philippines public. The most important reason of such decision is the request of the MILF. As the previous talks, which did not include international third parties, failed, the MILF wanted to make sure the process was overseen by a state third party. The GPH's decision to accept the MILF's request to bring Malaysia into the scene is related to its policy to build trust with the MILF.

The Malaysian side of the story is related to five main issues. First, instability in Mindanao, a geographically close part of the Philippines to Malaysia, is problematic for the security of the Malaysian state. Spillover effect in terms of instability, underdevelopment and insecurity is undesired for Malaysia. Second, migration from Moro lands to Malaysia creates instability. According to the Malaysian government more than 59,000 citizens of the Philippines remain in East Malaysia (UNHCR, 2019). Third, non-state armed groups threatens the security of Malaysian borders. The attacks of Royal Sulu Army in February 2018, led to death of 65 Philippine citizens and 10 members of the Malaysian security forces (Franco, 2013: 218). Fourth, the Moro conflict decreases the chances of economic cooperation between the two countries. Mindanao Island has a central location in the free trade area between Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and the

Philippines. Bilateral economic relations has the potential to develop without the conflict. Fifth, via its contribution to the Bangsamoro peace, Malaysia wants to enhance its regional influence. Establishment of peace in the Philippines would be a positive contribution to the image of this member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the OIC (Franco, 2013: 218).

4.2.2. International Monitoring Team

The most important contribution of Malaysia to the Bangsamoro peace process is the establishment of International Monitoring Team (IMT), and its activities in preventing violent incidents. Ceasefire mechanisms such as the CCCH, and local initiatives to monitor the cessation were established when the GPH-MILF negotiations began in 2001. The need for international monitoring of the cessation gave birth to the foundation of the IMT (Franco, 2013: 220). The IMT was established in 2004 for the purpose of monitoring the process of implementation of the requirements of the Agreement on Peace (2001) signed by the GPH and the MILF. The Terms of Reference of the International Monitoring Team defines IMT's responsibilities under two aspects: security and humanitarian, rehabilitation and development. Security aspect refers to the monitoring of the implementation of cessation of hostilities; and humanitarian, rehabilitation and development aspect is concerned with the monitoring of human rights violations. Malaysia is the most influential actor along with Indonesia, which became a member in 2012. Other members are Libya, Brunei, Japan, Norway and the EU. The non-state members, or officially the Civilian Protection Component, consists of Nonviolent Peaceforce, Mindanao Peoples Caucus, Mindanao Human Rights Action Center, and Moslem Organization of Government Officials and Professionals.

The IMT has proved to be a vital organ of the peace process as its activities decreased the number of violent incidents. *Table 4.1.* shows the number of clashes between the Philippines army and the MILF between 2002 and 2012. The number of clashes decreased between 2002 and 2008, and 2008 to 2012. As the MOA-AD was failed to be

implemented, the number of armed clashes increased in 2008, yet the IMT was able to decrease the number of incidents in the following years.

Table 4.1. Number of Annual Clashes between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the MILF (Franco, 2013: 221)

Annual AFP-MILF Clashes	
Year End	Clashes Reported
2002	698
2003	596
2004	16
2005	10
2006	13
2007	8
2008	218
2009	115
2010	14
2011	8
2012	0

4.2.3. Features of Malaysian Mediation

Malaysia's mediation was based on facilitating both formal and informal talks between the conflicting parties. The shuttle diplomacy enabled Malaysian officials to resolve deadlocks during the process (Santos Jr., 2003). The talks between the GPH and the MILF began after the Malaysian delegation persuaded the MILF. The beginning of the talks after the failure of the signing of the MOA-AD was also facilitated by the Malaysian side. It was with the initiatives of the Malaysian mediators the two sides put the process back on track.

Malaysian mediation used a grassroots level mediation at the same time with the top level leadership mediation. As mentioned in the second chapter, the grassroots level is the level where the conflict drivers are highly visible. The security of people at this level is a factor that has the potential to fuel the conflict (Franco, 2013: 219). The military operations of the state influences the living conditions of the local people. Therefore,

the rehabilitation of these people is of high importance. Malaysia succeeded to decrease the negative effects of the conflict at this level through the foundation of the IMT.

4.3. Organization of Islamic Cooperation

4.3.1. OIC's Conflict Resolution Activities

The OIC is the second largest intergovernmental organization on after the UN with its 57 member states. Two of the purposes of the OIC is the protection of the rights of Muslim minority groups and conflict prevention. The action plan titled "To Meet the Challenges Facing the Muslim Ummah in the 21st Century" has two objectives regarding OIC's approach towards conflict. The first one is to strengthen the role of OIC in conflict prevention, resolution, and peacekeeping, peacebuilding, rehabilitation, etc. in conflict environments. The second is to enhance the level of cooperation between the member states and between the OIC itself and other intergovernmental organizations to protect the rights of the member states and Muslim minorities in peace processes (Özerdem, 2012: 395). The OIC has had concerns over inter and intra state conflicts as the Iran-Iraq War, Afghanistan, Moro, Kosovo, Bosnia, Kashmir, Somalia, etc.

4.3.2. OIC's Involvement in the Moro Conflict

The OIC is one of the first third parties to engage with the conflicting parties of the Moro conflict. The very first attempt came after President Marcos declared martial law in 1972. The MNLF under the leadership of Nur Misuari approached to the OIC for requesting support in their cause to establish an independent state. The OIC issued a resolution titled "The Conditions of Muslims in the Philippines" in 1972, and sent a Quadripartite Commission comprising of Libya, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Senegal to the Island of Mindanao in August 1973 to observe the situation in the field. The Resolution 18 of the OIC, issued in May 1974, called the parties to find a solution to the conflict while not violating the territorial integrity of the Philippines. As the OIC's willingness to support a resolution process for the conflict, the conflicting parties and third parties initiated intensive talks. Political settlements were reached between the GPH and the MNLF as a

result. The Tripoli Agreement was signed in December 1976. Libya was the mediator of the negotiations at the summit in Tripoli.

The Agreement foresaw the establishment of an Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao in thirteen provinces and cities. Though the agreement was not implemented by the Marcos regime, it was a significant development for peace in Mindanao. The MNLF was settled in for autonomy, and the agreement was providing the Muslims a more inclusive political system, sharia law, and economic development. The OIC is the key actor behind the signing of the agreement for the very fact that it persuaded the MNLF to give up its secessionist targets (Özerdem, 2012: 402). OIC's call for the parties to resolve the conflict within the framework of territorial integrity and national sovereignty was essential for both the GPH's acceptance of the OIC mediation and the MNLF's set back from secessionism (Sharqieh, 2012; 220). The OIC's stress on territorial integrity might be stemming from its members that are in close proximity to the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. These states compose of different ethnic groups as the Philippines, and they did not want the Philippines to be a model of ethnic breakaways (International Alert, 2003: 9).

The years after signing of the Tripoli Agreement were years of on and off conflict. The OIC continued its efforts for the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement, yet this was not possible. The OIC's efforts paid off in the year 1996, when the FPA was signed between the GPH and the MNLF for the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement. The OIC's contribution to the process was acknowledged in the agreement and two articles gave new roles to it. Article 12 states that the OIC was to monitor the implementation of the agreement during the transition process. Article 13 ensured the establishment of a monitoring body by the GPH and the MNLF under the supervision of the OIC (OPAPP, 1996).

4.3.3. OIC in the GPH-MILF Peace Process

The OIC has been the main intergovernmental organization actively seeking peace in the Philippines since the very beginning of the armed struggle of the Moro people. It has been active in the peace process between the GPH and the MNLF. The same cannot be argued for the peace process between the GPH and the MILF though. The OIC has a relatively passive performance in the GPH-MILF peace process. This is largely due to the active involvement of OIC member states, especially Malaysia, in the process as third parties. The OIC performed as a mediator between two insurgent groups, the MNLF and the MILF (Demircioğlu, 2016: 27).

The OIC's main contribution to the GPH-MILF peace process is its efforts to make sure the interests of Muslim groups were overlapping. The MILF became an independent body as the MNLF signed the Tripoli Agreement, in which the MNLF stepped back from its claims of independence. The OIC, by not granting any status to the MILF, as it gave the MNLF an observer status, actually weakened the MILF in terms of its secessionism (Buendia, 2004: 213). Since the very establishment of the MILF, the OIC urges both groups to unite (Arguillas, 2001: 111). The signing of any peace agreement regarding the Moro case is the concern of both the MILF and the MNLF. In order to avoid potential dissidences from the MNLF to the peace process, and to avoid the weakening of the political strength of the Moro cause, the OIC established the Bangsamoro Coordination Forum (BCF) in 2010.

Under the auspices of Libya and Malaysia, the MILF and the MNLF were brought together in the Bangsamoro Solidarity Conference, held in August 2001. It was in this conference the representatives of the OIC persuaded the MNLF and the MILF to coordinate their interests. Eventually in June 2014, both parties agreed to sign the Terms of Reference on the BCF in Makati City to inaugurate the BCF. According to the Terms of Reference, the BCF is a venue of discussion on the issues and concerns regarding the peace processes between the GPH and the MNLF and the MILF. It is established to find common ground

between the MNLF and the MILF to make sure the separate peace processes (1996 Tripoli Agreement and 1996 FPA for the MNLF, and 2004 CAB for the MILF) are on the same track. With the BCF, the efforts of both parties for the Bangsamoro people were united (Arguillas, 2015).

As a result of the activities of the BCF under the supervision of the OIC, Nur Misuari, the leader of the MNLF, after the fourth session of the BCF, declared that the MNLF was no longer in search of a new deal with the GPH to avoid potential complications (OIC, 2017). This was an important achievement for the BCF, for it contributed to the fast tracking of the Bangsamoro peace process.

4.3.4. Evaluation of OIC's Performance

The OIC has been involved in the Moro conflict since the 1970s. It has been used various conflict resolution mechanisms such as fact finding, peacekeeping, mediation, and monitoring. Despite the fact that it was actively involved in the resolution process between the GPH and the MNLF, the same amount of involvement is not valid for the process between the GPH and the MILF. The main reason of this situation is the involvement of individual states, such as Malaysia, as mediators rather than the OIC.

The OIC's main area of activity in the Bangsamoro peace process was its mediation between two liberation fronts of Moro. The foundation of the BCF is the most tangible contribution of the OIC. It was with the efforts of this forum, both parties were able to unite on the same track. The fragmentation of resurgent parties has been a problem for the Philippines, as these parties have confronting views on the conflict as well as the initiatives of peace. The BCF work is valuable in terms of bringing two liberation fronts together in the peace process, thus making it a less complex process.

OIC's mediation between the MNLF and the MILF is an important part of the Bangsamoro peace process. It is important because it is unconventional in the sense that it goes

beyond the conventional mediation between two conflicting parties. The MNLF and the MILF, though adversaries, have a common agenda for the future of the Moro people. The OIC's mediation between these two groups decreased the complexness of the peace process and made peace more elusive for the GPH.

The OIC's participation into the peace process has been useful because it contributed to the trust of Muslim groups. Through the shared religious identity with the Moro people, the OIC was able to influence the conflicting parties (*see* Salah, 2011). The cultural competency of the OIC with the Muslim resurgent groups is an important feature for three reasons. First, it helped the MNLF and the MILF to continue peace talks with the GPH, as they trusted that the OIC would defend their rights. Second, the OIC's inclusion curbed secessionist interests of these groups and forced them to seek their interests within the territorial integrity of the Philippines. Third, the OIC eliminated the different interests of the two groups.

The OIC lacks mechanisms to enforce the peace agreements signed between the GPH and the MNLF and the MILF. As the signing of peace deals is not sufficient for establishment of durable peace (Sharqieh, 2012: 222), monitoring and guiding mechanisms becomes more noteworthy. Despite OIC's close attention to the Philippines case, the Tripoli Agreement and the FPA was failed to be implemented. The implementation of the aforementioned mechanisms requires political will and economic sources, both of which are lacking in the case of the OIC (Lingga, 2005: 9).

4.4. Chapter Conclusion

This study was organized around three research questions and two hypotheses based on the questions. The main area of investigation was to map the activities of Muslim actors in the Bangsamoro peace process and to make sense of these within the theoretical framework of conflict transformation. Turkey, Malaysia, and the OIC had been executing

mediation, decommissioning and monitoring through certain mechanisms such as the ICG, IMT, TPMT, IDB, and OIC-PCSP.

The first hypothesis argues that the involvement of these actors in the process contributed to the success of the process. The logic behind this argument is the establishment of the aforementioned mechanisms. The failure of peace process between the GPH and the MILF was a valuable experience in the sense that it increased the quality of monitoring and guiding mechanisms established in the Bangsamoro peace process. The success of a peace deal cannot be degraded to signing of peace agreements. Implementation of these activities are vital for the establishment of durable peace. The Moro case is a good example of both types of peace processes.

As the second hypothesis of the study envisaged, the activities of Muslim actors cannot be framed under only track one or two diplomacy, their activities are hybrid in this sense. While a portion of their activities, such as the facilitation and mediation of Malaysia, is track one, other activities as of the ICG, IDB or the TPMT are hybrid and do not carry the typical features of tracks one and two separately. The ICG is first of its kind, and proves to be promising for the transformation of other intractable conflicts.⁵

⁵ For a detailed analysis of the ICG, see Charlotte Mullhearn (2018).

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The Bangsamoro peace process has been a successful peacebuilding process so far. There exists numerous agreements signed between the conflicting parties, mechanisms to monitor the implementation of the agreements, inclusion and support of international and national level third parties from states, intergovernmental organizations and NGOs, most importantly dedication to the process on the side of conflicting parties. All of these factors are key in the successful continuation of the process.

This study was designed to investigate the role of Muslim actors, namely Turkey, Malaysia, and the OIC during the Bangsamoro peace process. Their involvement in the process has been important for the conflicting parties. On the MILF's side of the story, the construction of trust towards the GPH and the process was dependent on the inclusion of trustable international third parties. While the inclusion of third parties internationalized the Moro case and put pressure on the GPH to implement the peace process, the fact that certain Muslim actors are involved in the process helped building trust of the MILF. In terms of the GPH, inclusion of Muslim actors was of importance to show its dedication to the MILF. Furthermore, these actors have been dealing with the issue within the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the Philippines state. They were helpful in curbing the secessionist interests of the MILF.

The research questions of the study were:

1. What can be the effects of involvement of Muslim actors in the Bangsamoro peace process?
2. What were the activities of Muslim actors?

3. What is the bearing of these activities upon theoretical approaches of peace and conflict theory?

In order to respond to the research questions, the theoretical chapter was built on the theoretical approach of conflict transformation. As conflict transformation is more comprehensive than other approaches in terms of the time span and the depth of its lenses, it presents an integrative narrative. Conflict transformation approach is not strict in terms of the categorization of peacebuilding activities. The rhetoric of conflict transformation allows the student of peace and conflict studies to explain the activities of actors in a given process without being bound to a hierarchical classification.

As the aim of peace builders, according to conflict transformation, is to transform the structure and the human relations that produce conflict (Hellmüller & Ahere, 2014: 7), the peace process should be interactive in the sense that it should not be limited to elite level activities and strictly defined operations. As previously stated in the second chapter, today's conflicts are generally not class based conflicts. On the contrary, contemporary conflicts are generated by identities. This means that groups, which are formed around shared identities, mobilize their members from all three levels of leadership (Lederach, 1997: 43). Therefore, the effort of transforming a conflict should be inclusive of the members of all levels.

Conflict transformation's evaluation of mediation is compatible with these arguments. Conflict transformation sees mediation as a comprehensive set of activities to assist the conflicting parties to target positive peace. Third party mediators therefore should target all levels of society in their activities and help leaderships to reach applicable agreements to transform the structure and the relations producing the conflict. Their activities in this respect, is not limited to top-level leadership.

A thorough investigation of the activities of the Muslim actors in the Bangsamoro peace process via the research questions and within the framework of conflict transformation helped the testing of the two hypothesis of this study. These hypotheses were:

1. The involvement of Muslim actors as third parties contributed to the success of the process.
2. The activities of Muslim actors cannot be framed under only track one or two diplomacy, their activities are hybrid in this sense.

The first hypothesis is valid for the fact that these actors were key in decision making processes as mediators and they were aware of the fact that the implementation of the peace deals are even more important than the signing of them. To this end, the conflicting parties were persuaded for the establishment of international bodies such as the ICG, IMT, TPMT, IDB, BCF and OIC-PCSP. These bodies show that the Muslim actors are closely monitoring the implementation of the peace agreements. Furthermore, the activities of these bodies embody different segments of the society, they are not limited to elites from both sides. Their activities encircle a wide area including, mediation, monitoring and decommissioning.

The inclusion of these actors along with other international actors is a key factor in the continuation of the peace process since the failure of the implementation of MOA-AD in 2008. As it can be traced from the developments since then, despite the fact that there exists ups and downs in the process, both sides did not give up on the process. The Mamasapano clash in 2015 for instance, was a low point for the process, as was subsequent non-ratification of the Bangsamoro Basic Law in the Philippines Congress. Despite such setbacks, the parties continued their initiatives for peace largely with the support of the international community. This was not the case for the peace process between the GPH and the MNLF.

The second hypothesis is meaningful for it complies with the premises of conflict transformation. The international bodies established during the process include state, intergovernmental and non-state actors as members. Their relationships with each other goes beyond the limits of track one and track two diplomacies. The ICG for example, is a hybrid mediation model, where states and NGOs work together. The aim is to merge the pros of both actors. While states have leverage at the elite level negotiations, the NGOs have unofficial capacities to diverse the efforts into the society.

The durability of peace in Mindanao is dependent on the inclusivity of political and economic systems established in the BARMM. As there are different insurgent groups, it should be the aim of the MILF and the GPH to persuade these groups to the idea that the BARMM belongs to all Moros and other indigenous peoples. The MILF and the MNLF now has an understanding through the BCF, yet the moderation of takfirist groups such as the Abu Sayyaf, an offshoot of the Al-Qaeda (now of Daesh), is still a must for achieving stability in the new autonomous region.

The governance capacity of the MILF is another issue that might pose a threat to the durability of peace. The transformation of the MILF from a community of combatants to a service provider is required for the success of the BARMM experience. The failure of the ARMM under the MNLF leadership was caused by the lack of qualified labor force to carry on governance. Therefore the MILF should be assisted by the GPH and the international community to increase its service capacity. The MILF seems to be aware of this fact as it has been trying to increase its capacity with the help of countries as Turkey. The MILF leaders have been visiting Turkey for education programs, and Turkey is trying to increase the service capacity by providing scholarships to Moros and opening facilities of different sectors in the Philippines.

The Bangsamoro peace process is a promising case of building peace and it would be a model for other intractable conflicts around the world. The lessons learned from the

previous GPH-MNLF peace process contributed to the success of the process. Muslim actors had the opportunity to contribute to the process as well as learning from it. Therefore the experience is worthy for the Muslim World.



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