

POPULISM AS POLITICS OF (MIS)RECOGNITION

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

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ABSTRACT

POPULISM AS POLITICS OF (MIS)RECOGNITION

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Contemporary political landscape is dominated by movements structured around race, gender, sexuality, language, ethnicity and religion that are driven by a common claim for recognition. Since the mid 1960s, several different groups have struggled for recognition to draw attention to the neglected importance of their identities. In a political environment where struggles for recognition are on the stage, the world has also witnessed the global rise of populism. Today, politics of recognition and populism share the political stage in a wide range of countries. The rapid rise of populism seems to be related to its ability to addressing the question of recognition. There are several concerns that these two forms of politics share in common such as representation and democratization. Nevertheless, there are also significant inconsistencies between their understanding of politics. The complex relationship between politics of recognition and populism brings an important question in its wake: Does populism represent a valid answer to the question of recognition? On the one hand populism can be seen as a form of recognition for many reasons: It integrates previously excluded groups into society, defends redistribution policies to improve social status of disadvantaged groups, and promises a sense of solidarity. On the other hand, it excludes the others, obstructs the possibility of mediated institutions, and ossifies misrecognition. This thesis aims to analyze populism with regard to politics of recognition while also discussing the validity of its response to the demands of recognition.

Keywords: Politics of recognition, Populism, Identity, Misrecognition

ÖZ

TANINMA(MA) SİYASETİ OLARAK POPÜLİZM

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Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans Programı

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İrk, toplumsal cinsiyet, cinsellik, dil, etnisite ve din gibi kimliklerin etrafında tanınma talepleriyle şekillenen sosyal hareketler, çağdaş siyasetteki hakim unsurlardan biri olmuştur. 1960'lı yıllardan bugüne, birçok farklı grup, kimliklerinin gözardı edilmiş önemine dikkat çekmek için tanınma uğruna mücadele vermektedir. Bu mücadelelerin siyasetin gündemini oluşturduğu bir ortamda, dünya aynı zamanda popülizmin yükselişine tanıklık etmektedir. Günümüzde birçok ülkede tanınma siyaseti ve popülizm siyaset sahnesini paylaşır durumdadır. Popülizmin hızlı yükselişi tanınma ihtiyacına hitap etme hüneriyle ilişkili görünmektedir. Bu iki siyaset biçimi temsil ve demokratikleşme gibi birçok ortak endişe taşımaktadır. Fakat aynı zamanda siyaset anlayışlarında önemli zıtlıklar göze çarpmaktadır. Tanınma siyaseti ve popülizmin bu karmaşık ilişkisi beraberinde önemli bir soruyu getirir: Popülizm tanınma ihtiyacı için geçerli bir cevap mıdır? Popülizm, bir taraftan dışlanmış grupları topluma entegre ederek, dezavantajlı grupların sosyal statülerini yükseltmek için yeniden dağıtım politikalarını savunarak ve bir tür dayanışma duygusu oluşturarak tanınma taleplerine cevap vermektedir. Fakat, diğer taraftan, öteki olanın dışlanmasına, aracı kurumların işlevsizleşmesine ve sayılmamanın yerleşik hale gelmesine sebep olmaktadır. Bu tezin amacı popülizmi tanınma siyasetine referansla analiz etmek ve popülizmin tanınma taleplerine verdiği cevabın geçerliliğini tartışmaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Tanınma siyaseti, Popülizm, Kimlik, Sayılmama

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INTRODUCTION

Figuring out to answer to “Who am I?” is a struggle as old as the history of humankind. This question has always occupied an important place among life’s other big questions. It establishes a link between the self and the other since people realize themselves through their interaction with others. In Joseph John Powell’s words; “it is an absolute human certainty that no one can know his own beauty or perceive a sense of his own worth until it has been reflected back to him in the mirror of another loving, caring human being”. The relationship between the self and the other has a unique value for self realization.

In pre-modern societies, social hierarchies provided a response to the question to a certain degree by the promise of a given identity to the people by their birth. In the contemporary societies, however, it has been more and more difficult to find an answer to the question. Due to the collapse of the social hierarchies in the modern era, identity requires to be discovered within one’s self. Individuals, now, have several identities to be discovered including gender, ethnic, sexual, and religious ones. They are also surrounded by the others of these identities in the globalized world. Since identity is always shaped in dialog with others, recognition has come to the fore as a democratic need. People need to be recognized to find a satisfactory answer to the question who they are. If society around individuals mirrors back to them a negative image of themselves, these individuals may suffer from a real damage. It ends up with loss of one’s social worth. This experience of misrecognition paves the way for struggle for recognition.

Contemporary political landscape is dominated by these struggles around race, gender, sexuality, language, ethnicity and religion that are driven by a common claim for recognition. Since the mid 1960s, several different groups have struggled for recognition to draw attention to the neglected importance of their identities. In a political environment where struggles for recognition are on the stage, the world has also witnessed the global rise of populism. Today, politics of recognition and populism

share the political stage in a wide range of countries. According to Oxford English Dictionary, populism refers to “political approach that strives to appeal to ordinary people who feel that their concerns are disregarded by established elite groups”. However, there is a struggle over the nature of populism in the existing literature. Scholars has not reached a consensus to acknowledge populism as a political style, as identity politics, or as an ideology. Still, there is a consensus on several characteristics of populism such as its people-elite distinction, its emphasis of general will, and its claim to exclusive representation. Due to the different interpretations of these characteristics, the relationship between populism and democracy has also become a controversial issue in the literature. On the one hand, there are approaches that claim populism as a negative force for democracy or as a disease of it. On the other hand, populism is acknowledged as a positive force and as a necessary component of democracy. What is indisputable, however, is the global rise of populism.

The rapid rise of populism seems to be related to its ability to addressing the question of recognition. There are several concerns that the two forms of politics share in common such as representation and democratization. Nevertheless, there are also significant inconsistencies between their understanding of politics. The complex relationship between politics of recognition and populism brings an important question in its wake: Does populism represent a valid answer to the question of recognition? Since recognition is directly related to self-realization, it is crucial to understand if populism promises a satisfactory solution to the struggle for recognition. On the one hand, populism seems to promise recognition by addressing problems of disadvantaged and marginalized groups. On the other hand, it has some characteristics which lead to misrecognition. This thesis aims to answer this important question and analyze complex relationship between populism and politics of recognition. There are several questions that will be addressed: What are the commonalities and inconsistencies between the two forms of politics? How does populism answer the demands of unrecognized groups? Does the answer provide a real solution for these groups? Does it cause another form of misrecognition?

The first chapter offers a detailed review of the populism. In the first part, four main approaches are examined. Populism is addressed as a thin-centered ideology, as a political style, as a discursive and stylistic repertoire, and as a form of identity politics. Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser argue that populism is a thin-centered ideology because of the fact that it attaches to other ideological elements such as liberalism, nationalism, or socialism. The people, the elite, and general will represent three core concepts of populism while elitism and pluralism refer to two direct opposites of the phenomenon in this approach. Benjamin Moffit, on the other hand, suggests that populism is a political style that features an appeal to the people versus the elite, and uses bad manners, crisis and breakdowns to make the appeal successful. In this approach, populism is not understood in a black and white fashion. The approach supports the idea that all political movements or parties may be more or less populists in certain times. Populism is also seen as a discursive and stylistic repertoire. Rogers Brubaker, as one of the representatives of the approach, argues that populism is a matter of degrees and does not have a strictly logical criteria. It has one core element that is to speak and act in the name of the people and five additional elements that are antagonistic re-polarization, majoritarianism, selective anti-institutionalism, protectionism, and bad manners. The approach also explains the other of populism in vertical and horizontal dimensions instead of focusing exclusively on the elite. Lastly, populism is also argued to be a form of identity politics. This approach is mostly based on the Jan-Werner Müller's works. According to him, populism is a moralized form of anti-pluralism and anti-elitism that promises direct representation of citizens. Populists believe that only one part of society is the real people and it is their job to act in the name of this people. This approach also explains three governing techniques of populists that are to colonize and occupy the state, mass clientalism, and being harsh with non-governmental organizations. In the second part of the chapter, the relationship between populism and democracy is analyzed through democratic paradox theory. The theory suggests that liberal democracy is a combination of two pillars: constitutional pillar and democratic pillar that have their own incompatible logics. These pillars are supposed to keep each other in check for a stable democracy. Populism arises when liberal democracy is believed to be out of balance in favour of the constitutional pillar. By examining different approaches to

populism and its relationship with democracy, first chapter aims to reveal characteristics of populism to analyze its answer to the question of recognition.

The second chapter explores theories of recognition in detail. It is composed of two main parts. Due to the fact that theories of recognition are affected by Hegel's famous works *Phenomenology of Spirit*, *Philosophy of Rights*, and *System of Ethical Life*, in the first part, the Hegelian roots of the recognition issue is examined. According to Hegel, freedom constitutes the most fundamental goal for all human beings. Freedom requires people to achieve self realization and to be recognized by others is the only way to accomplish this aim. The second part, on the other hand, focuses on contemporary theories of recognition. These theories are categorized into two main classes: recognition as a matter of identity and recognition as a matter of social status. The identity model is discussed with regard to works of Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth while the status model is explained through Nancy Fraser's analysis. Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth draw attention to the fact that the significance of recognition has been intensified in modern era as a democratic need. Taylor focuses on the collapse of social hierarchies and emergence of an individualized identity that makes mutual recognition a vital need for human beings. Honneth, on the other hand, develops a more comprehensive theory of recognition by synthesizing the early writings of Hegel and the social psychology of Mead. His main purpose is to show how self-relation gradually becomes positive when the three levels of recognition are achieved. Nancy Fraser criticizes Taylor's and Honneth's accounts of recognition. According to her, the identity model is guilty for displacement of claims for egalitarian redistribution. Acknowledgement of recognition as an identity model causes to ignore economic inequalities in the society. She suggests to examine relations of recognition as a question of social status.

Third chapter attempts to explain populism as a form of recognition. In the first part, representation, critique of the establishment, and democratization are defended as three common concern of populism and politics of recognition. Representation comes to the fore in the case of recognition on two levels: legal recognition and social

esteem. It constitutes a significant part of second and third levels of mutual recognition. Populism, on the other hand, emphasizes representation to give voices back to the people who does not represented enough by the elite. Critique of the establishment is crucial for politics of recognition to change society's hierarchy of values which causes misrecognition. It also constitutes the very essence of populism through the people-the elite distinction. Populism and politics of recognition share also a democratization concern by their promises of an egalitarian and sovereign society. After explaining the points of juncture between the two forms of politics, second part of the chapter aims to reveal how populism promises recognition to disadvantaged and marginalized identity groups. Inclusion of excluded groups, promise of redistribution, and promise of solidarity are represented as three ways of populism to answer recognition question. Populist conceptualization of the people refers to an empty signifier that makes possible to include misrecognized groups. Its promise of redistribution, on the other hand, helps to improve the social status of these groups that paves the way for accomplishment of social esteem as the third stage of recognition. Lastly, populism constructs a sense of solidarity among misrecognized individuals who are deprived of this feeling because of their experience of misrecognition. Thus, third chapter tries to explore the populist ways to address question of recognition.

The fourth chapter represents an anti-thesis for the third chapter by indicating populism as a form of misrecognition. Firstly, anti-pluralism and polarization are illustrated as populism's inconsistencies with politics of recognition. Politics of recognition requires a pluralist society to establish mutual respect between different identity groups while populism is essentially anti-pluralist due to its understanding of the elite and the people as homogenous entities. Populism also causes a polarized society because of its construction of the other as an enemy and it prevents the possibility of mutuality in relations of recognition. After the examining inconsistencies, in the second part of the chapter, populism is argued to cause misrecognition because of its exclusion of other, its understanding of direct representation, and ossifying misrecognition. The other of the populism refers to an enemy, an existential threat who corresponds with real identity groups in populist

discourse. Acknowledgement of direct representation by populists, on the other hand, damages mediating institutions that make possible deliberation and participation. Furthermore, populism constructs identities on the basis of negative emotions which are results of misrecognition. Thus, populism causes misrecognition on many levels. The fourth chapter aims to explain why populism is a form of misrecognition despite its relative contribution to the struggle for recognition.

Recognition is acknowledged as a matter of identity in the thesis for two reasons: Firstly, identity model includes the claims of redistribution. Secondly, contemporary movements, that are driven by the demands for recognition, are structured around the identities. The thesis' approach to populism, on the other hand, does not follow a specific interpretation. Instead, populism is analyzed through its canonical characteristics which all approaches have a consensus on.

Since the mid 1960s, politics of recognition has intensified its significance due to the rise of identity movements. Similarly, it was in the year 1969 that Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner have drawn attention to the specter of populism. Politics of recognition and populism have become a subject of attention at approximately same time in the contemporary academic world. From that days onwards, several researches have come forward to explain these two forms of politics. Nevertheless, the number of studies, which discuss populism and politics of recognition together, is very few. This thesis aims to bring these two types of politics together. By doing so, it intends to contribute to the understanding of rise of populism as well as to provide a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between politics of recognition and populism.

CHAPTER 1

POLITICS OF POPULISM: A DEMOCRATIC PUZZLE

Populism increasingly become one of the most popular concepts around the globe. It is used to refer to governments, policies, and to styles of politics taking place in several regions of the world. It has been fifty years since Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner wrote that “a specter is haunting the world: populism” (Müller 1). Nevertheless, it is almost popular as much popular as populism itself to emphasize the vagueness of the term in every attempt to analyze and explain the phenomenon. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, populism means “a political approach that strives to appeal to ordinary people who feel that their concerns are disregarded by established elite groups.” Still, there is no consensus in the existing literature regarding the meaning of populism. In the 1960s, populism appeared in discussions of decolonization, peasantism, and communism (Müller 1). During the 1980s and 1990s, it had been used to refer to a type of irresponsible economic policy that involves too much redistribution of wealth and government spending (Mudde 4). After the significant rise of populism in late 2000s, however, more comprehensive analysis have come forward. In this more recent body of works, two tendencies are visible: On the one hand, scholars try to identify the characteristics of populism. Some others, on the other hand, focus on the nature of relationship between populism and democracy. There are four main approaches to populism: populism as a thin-centered ideology; as a political style; as a discursive and stylistic repertoire; or as a form of identity politics.

General characteristics of populism must be understood to analyze its relationship with politics of recognition. This chapter offers a comprehensive examination of the existing literature to identify significant features of populism. In the first part, four main approaches to populism will be explored. Then, in the second part, populism will be discussed through its relationship with democracy.

1.1. Perspectives on Populism

1.1.1. Populism as a Thin-Centered Ideology

The view of populism as a thin-centered ideology is represented by Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser. According to these authors, every approach to populism illuminates significant aspects of the issue and they are not necessarily incompatible with their ideational approach. The purpose of their work is to provide one clear and consistent explanation of the populism. In their famous book *Populism: A Very Short Introduction* (2017), populism refers to the view “society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonte generale*(general will) of the people” (6). If ideology is a body of normative ideas about how the world is and should be, then populism can be analyzed as a thin-centered ideology. A thin-centered ideology differs from full ideologies such as liberalism and socialism by its lack of complex or comprehensive answers to political questions. It seems to be attached to other ideological elements. Seen in this light, populism combines its core concepts with other concepts which are borrowed from other ideological elements. Thus, Mudde’s and Kaltwasser’s approach helps to understand several shapes of populism in different societies. Populism has three core concepts that are common in every shape: *the people*, *the elite*, and *general will*. The authors also offer two direct opposites of populism: elitism and pluralism.

The people is a core concept that is used in every single approach of populism. Despite the vagueness of the term, there is a near consensus in the literature to acknowledge its imagined character. According to Mudde and Kaltwasser, the concept is used in a combination of three meanings: the people as sovereign, as the common people, and as the nation (9). *The people as sovereign* refers to democratic idea which celebrates the people as the ultimate source of political power and as its own ruler. A democratic regime, as in Abraham Lincoln’s famous words, should be the government of the people, by the people, and for the people. Nonetheless, the gap between the governed and the governors still exists. Inescapably opaque procedures of the democratic regime further broadens this gap. As a result, sovereign people tends to feel that they are not being well represented. This dissatisfaction may serve as a basis

for the populist struggles to give the government back to the people (Müller and Kaltwasser 10). “The notion of the people as sovereign is a common topic within different populist traditions, which functions as a reminder of the fact that the ultimate source of political power in a democracy derives from a collective body, which, if not taken into account, may lead to mobilize and revolt” (10). The second meaning that is emphasized by Mudde and Kaltwasser is *the common people*. This includes a critique of the dominant culture that devalues the views, tastes, and values of the ordinary citizens. The notion is used for the populist aim to dignify the groups that are excluded from power due to their sociocultural and socioeconomic status. Glorification of excluded groups’ culture can also be seen in populist leaders’ adoption of cultural elements that are considered as the markers of inferiority by the dominant culture (Müller and Kaltwasser 10). The authors also emphasize the fact that this meaning of the people is not only used to unite an angry and silent majority, but it is also used to mobilize the majority against a defined enemy (11). It always includes criticism towards institutions such as political parties and organizations. The third meaning of the people is the people as the nation. It means national community that may be defined in ethnic or civic terms. All native citizens are included in the definition and claimed to form a community with a common life (11). The authors draw attention to the difficulty of deciding the boundaries of the nation due to the fact that there are always several different ethnic groups exist on the same territory (11).

The elite is another core concept of populism for Mudde and Kaltwasser. It refers to one homogeneous corrupt group, including economic, cultural, and media elites, who work against the general will of the people (12). The concept serves as the Other of the people and represents a moral distinction between the *pure* people and the *corrupt* elite. The elite indicates the people who hold power positions. Nevertheless, populists and their supporters are not included in the definition even when they hold the leading positions. It is because of the fact that the *real power*, according to the populists, does not belong to the elected leaders. There are shadowy forces that have illegitimate powers to undermine the will of the people (Mudde and Kaltwasser 12). The elites are not blamed only for ignoring the interests of the people. They are also

guilty for working against the interests of the country. If the distinction between the people and the elite is ethnic as well as moral, populist discourse may turn into nationalism. In these cases, the elites are not agents of an alien power like other cases of populism. Here, the elites are aliens themselves. It shows the fact that populism uses several criteria to distinguish between the people and the elite. Populists combine diverse interpretations of the elite and the people to improve their potential of maneuver.

General will is the last core concept that Mudde and Kaltwasser offers. It is linked to Rousseau's famous distinction between the general will and the will of all. While the will of all means the sum of all the particular interests at a specific moment, general will refers to the potential of a people to form a community and enforce their common interests (16). Thus, populism requires politicians who have the capacity to understand what the general will is and politicians who have sufficient charisma to form individual citizens into a community. Populists follow Rousseau's critique of representative government by adopting the concept of general will. Representative government is blamed for treating citizens as passive entities who do nothing more than select their representatives. Self-government, however, should empower citizens to make the laws and execute them. That is why all the populists around the world prefer direct democratic mechanisms such as referenda and plebiscites (17). Populism emphasizes the general will and criticizes the establishment for its incapacity for taking the will of the people into consideration. Most students of populism acknowledge the relevance of this criticism. "By appealing to the general will of the people, populism enacts a specific logic of articulation, which enables the formation of a popular subject with a strong identity, which is able to challenge the status quo" (Mudde and Kaltwasser 18). Nonetheless, counter-critics fear that populism may also lead to authoritarianism because such an emphasis on general will requires to determine who belongs to the people and who does not. It may end up with legitimating the exclusion of some groups as a threat to the homogeneity of the people.

These three core concepts are helpful for a better understanding of populism but they are not fully sufficient to identify the phenomenon. Mudde and Kaltwasser also define the opposites of populism. They refer to two direct opposites of populism: elitism and pluralism (7). Elitism and populism converge on a monist understanding of society. In both accounts, society is divided into two camps: homogeneous good groups and homogeneous evil groups. However, in contrast to populism, elitism takes the people as dangerous, dishonest, and vulgar. The elite, on the other hand, are superior to the people in terms of intellectual capacity and cultural inheritance. It often ends up with support for a limited model of democracy. Pluralism, as another direct opposite of populism, does not share the idea of a dualist society. Society is composed of a broad variety of partly overlapping social groups with several ideas and interests (7). Social diversity does not form a weakness, rather it is a strength in pluralist perspective. Populism as a thin-centered ideology suggests that populism exists in where these three core concepts have an impact on the expense of pluralism and elitism.

1.1.2. Populism as a Political Style

In some early works on the subject, populism was seen as a political style. Tagueieff exemplifies this stance by his contention that populism may be seen as a political style rather than a political regime or an ideology because it is applicable to several ideological frameworks (9). Canovan, similarly, argues that populism is an appeal to the people against established structures of power and it dictates its characteristic legitimating framework, political style and mood (3). However, these works focus on identifying characteristics of populism rather than explaining why populism may be seen as a political style. In *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation*, Benjamin Moffit provides a comprehensive conceptualization of the issue. His work examines twenty-eight cases of leaders, who are accepted as populists, to identify populism in terms of political style (5). His approach does not only identify the characteristics of populism but also explores why it should be seen as a political style. It aims to improve our understanding of contemporary populism as a general phenomenon rather than offer a depth knowledge of the particular cases of populism.

Political style, according to Moffit, is “the repertoires of embodied, symbolically mediated performances made to audiences that are used to create and navigate the fields of power that compromise the political, stretching from the domain of government through to everyday life” (38). Contemporary populism, in this view, features *an appeal to the people versus the elite, bad manners, and the performance of crisis, breakdown or threat* (45). The division between the people and the elite is central in this approach as well as other approaches to populism. *The people* represents the central audience of the populists. It also signifies the true holders of sovereignty. *The elite*, on the other hand, serves as the Other of the people and refers to the corrupt establishment or system. Populism may also define different Others such as immigrants or minority groups but they are also linked to the elite in populist discourse. For an instance, liberal elites may be blamed for increased immigration(43). Thus, the elite becomes the source of crisis, breakdown, or corruption. Populists claim that only they know what the people wants and needs. It mostly ends up with the denial of expert knowledge and glorification of an undifferentiated public opinion. *Bad manners* refers to a function of the appeal to the people. Populists adopt a language that is usually seen as inappropriate for the political realm. It includes use of slangs, swearing, political incorrectness in contrast to use of the technocratic language (Moffit 44). Bad manners of populism differs from culture to culture due to society’s history, identity structure and accumulated resentments. It always aims to propagate that populists are a part of the common and real people in contrast to the elites. Crisis, breakdown, and threat is another instrument of populism according to Moffit. Crises of societies may be results of several different issues such as immigration, economic or social problems. However, populists always find a way to relate these social crisis and breakdown to the general distrust towards the elites or the establishment. By doing so, they display themselves as a hope against the current problems of politics and society. They prefer short-term action instead of a slow politics of negotiation. In this respect, populist politics is instrumentalized and turn utilitarian (Moffit 45).

Populism as a political style has four central advantages for understanding the matter. First of all, it makes easier to explain why populism appears in several

contexts. Populist politics can be observed in a wide ideological spectrum from the left to the right (Moffit 45). According to Moffit, this proves that populism is a political style that may be used by different ideologies. Second, this approach opposes the binary understandings of populism. Instead of a simple dichotomy between populism and non-populism, it acknowledges that politicians can be more or less populist at certain times (46). The political arena is not seen in a black and white fashion. It emphasizes the grey area between the extremes. In contrast to ideational approach, the opposite of populism is not elitism or pluralism. It is rather the technocratic political style. Technocrats are portrayed as the opposite of populists because of their faith in expertise and specialist training. They also prefer a “dry” scientific language, rationality instead of emotional performances, and stability instead of crisis discourse and breakdown. Thirdly, this approach explains why populism is regarded as devoid of substance. It is a result of populism’s primarily stylistic characteristics. These criticisms can be eliminated by examining what is on the surface of populist politics.(Moffit 49). Lastly, populism as a political style draws attention to the performances of populists. It is not content with the explanation of concepts alone, such as the people and the elite, to analyze populism. It aims to offer an answer to how these concepts are constituted through a performative analysis of populist politics (Moffit 49).

1.1.3. Populism as a Discursive and Stylistic Repertoire

Another approach to populism explains the phenomenon as a discursive and stylistic repertoire. Rogers Brubaker develops this approach on the basis of its three important implications. Firstly, the discursive approach is intended to analyze political and ideological ambivalence of populism and to show its democratic and anti-democratic tendencies. Secondly, it does not aim to look for a strictly logical criteria of populism. Instead, it looks for a complicated network of similarities between populists to define the phenomenon (Brubaker, 361). Thirdly, this approach is represented as an answer to the claim that populism is ubiquitous. It emphasizes that populism is a matter of degrees and shows qualitative differences in several context (361).

According to Brubaker, populist repertoire has one core and five additional elements. The core element is common with the other approaches. It refers to the populist claim to speak and act in the name of the people (362). The originality of the approach is its suggestion of vertical and horizontal opposites of the people. Brubaker is not content with current binary explanations of the people and the elite. He suggests to see the Other of the people in two dimensions. In the vertical dimension, the Other is the economic, cultural, and political elites. The people is claimed to be economically struggling, hard-working, family-oriented and endowed with common sense. The elite, in contrast, is rich, powerful, over educated, and institutionally empowered (Brubaker 363). The values, habits, and ways of life of the two camps represent serious differences in populist discourse. The people, however, is not defined only in terms of those on the top. There are also others at the bottom. "Those on the bottom may be represented as parasites or spongers, as addicts or deviants, as disorderly or dangerous, as undeserving of benefits and unworthy of respect, and thus as not belonging to the so-called decent, respectable, normal, hard-working people" (363). In the horizontal dimension, on the other hand, the main contrast is between the inside and the outside (363). The people represents a bounded collectivity as insiders. It is defined in different terms by the left-wing and the right-wing populisms. The left-wing populism addresses the bounded collectivity in terms of economy and politics. Outsiders are the threats for this collectivity that are identified with unfettered trade, unregulated globalization, or American imperialism. The right-wing populism, however, defines the collectivity in terms of culture and ethnicity with a shared way of life. Outside groups, which do not belong to the definition, are believed to be threat for the collectivity even if they are citizens of the state. The elites, Brubaker concludes, are represented as outside as well as on top (363).

In addition to the core element, Brubaker underlines five additional elements that characterize populism as a discursive and stylistic repertoire. First one is antagonistic re-polarization. It means "the claim to reassert democratic political control over domains of life that are seen, plausibly enough, as having been depoliticized and de-democratized, that is, removed from the realm of democratic decision-making" (Brubaker 364). This process of re-politicization always marks an anti-elite thrust.

Second element is majoritarianism. It includes defending interests, rights, and the will of the majority against those on the top, those on the bottom, and those at the margins (Brubaker,365). It is one of the characteristics of populism that its ambivalence comes to the surface. On the one hand, populists may pave the way for challenge of privileged few in the name of the many. On the other hand, “they may challenge efforts to promote the interests, protect the rights, or recognize the dignity of marginal groups, defined by religion, race or ethnicity, immigration status, sexuality, or gender” (365). The third element is selective anti-institutionalism. If populists are in power, they may establish their own institutions and dominate existing ones. Nevertheless, populism is mostly critical of the mediating institutions such as political parties, media, and the courts (365). Complexity and non-transparency of the institutional mediation is always subject to populist criticism. Thus, populists prefer direct rather than representative democracy. The fourth element, that Brubaker stresses, is protectionism. Populists claim to protect the people from threats from above and outside. There are three forms of protectionism: economic, securitarian, and cultural. Economic protectionism emphasizes the disadvantage of domestic procedures against cheap foreign goods, and domestic workers against cheap foreign labor. Securitarian protectionism refers terrorism and crime and cultural protectionism acknowledges different religions, languages, dresses as threats that the people must be protected from. The fifth and final element addresses how populist discourse uses communicational, rhetorical matters and body-behavioral style. Populists adopt a low style by disrupting the conventions of polite speech, wearing unconventional dresses and so on. It aims to challenge elitist complexity and increase familiarity of populists to the people.

1.1.4.Populism as a Form of Identity Politics

Populism is analyzed as a form of identity politics by Jan-Werner Müller. The approach Müller adopts in his book *What is Populism?* (2016), Müller offers to recognize and deal with populism. Müller’s approach may be argued to be more negative in comparison with others. Populism, according to him, is always anti-elitist and anti-pluralist. It includes a claim to exclusive representation. In other words, populists argue that only they are capable of representing the people. Müller draws

attention to the moral nature of this argument. If populists are the only ones who can represent the people against the immoral elite, then it will become easier to refuse any opposition as illegitimate. Populism also rejects to recognize whoever does not support populists as a proper part of the people. They claim to form 100 percent of the people. Remainders are dismissed as immoral and not proper part of the people. According to Müller, that is why populism is always a form of identity politics. “What follows from this understanding of populism as an exclusionary form of identity politics is that populism tends to pose a danger to democracy” (3). It is a danger because democracy requires pluralism and recognition but populism poses the idea of a single, homogenous, authentic people that is no more than a fantasy for the author.

Müller states that a social-psychological perspective focusing on the feelings of the voters, or a sociological analysis that takes certain classes into account are helpful to understand populism. Nonetheless, they are not sufficient to distinguish populism from other phenomena. Populism does not refer a codified doctrine. Rather, “it is a set of distinct claims and has what one might call an inner logic” (Müller, 10). Müller defines the phenomenon as a moralistic imagination of politics. Political world is composed of two groups in populist logic: a morally pure and fully unified people and an immoral, corrupt elite. Being critical of the elite is mentioned in every approach of populism as one of its characteristics. Nevertheless, Müller emphasizes that it is necessary but not a sufficient condition to decide what populism is. In addition to anti-elitism, populism includes an anti-pluralist element. Populists perceive themselves as the only representatives of the people. Every other political rival is accused to be immoral and illegitimate because of the fact that they work against the interests of the people. In other words, populism does not recognize any opposition as legitimate. According to Müller, they support holism: the people should have one true representative and they should no longer be divided. “The core claim of populism is thus a moralized form of anti-pluralism” (20). It requires a leader who speak on behalf of the people that marks leaderism as a characteristic of populism. Appeal to the people is another necessary condition of populism, but like anti-elitism, it is not sufficient to fully discriminate the phenomenon. For a political movement to

be populist, it must include the claim that only one part of the people is the people (Müller 22). Populists identify themselves with the “real people” and claim to represent them.

In contrast to general belief, populism is not against political representation. Populist conceptualization of political representation, however, significantly differs from other forms of representation. Populists address only some parts of society as the real people. Certain segments of society, on the other hand, does not belong the populist conceptualization of the people. Thus, populists claim to represent a hundred percent of the people. According to their claim, there is a singular common good. The only job of the leader or the party is to mirror it. That is why populists demand more referenda. Still, the purpose of referendum is not continuous participation of citizens. In Müller’s words, “the referendum serves to ratify what populist leader has already discerned to be the genuine popular interest as a matter of identity” (29). Populists assume that they make contracts with the people through elections and referendum. It is possible to understand what the people asks and needs because they speak with one voice. If the people expresses its demand with one voice, then there will be no need for debate or deliberation. Müller criticizes the idea of a single popular will that can be mirrored by the leader. What populists call popular will, for Müller, is just a fantasy that is based on interpretations of the populist politicians (31). It has also a weakening effect on democratic accountability. Due to the populist understanding of representation, populists always have a chance to turn back to the people and claim that they implement exactly what the people wanted. Idea of the direct representation is strengthened by populists by blaming mediated institutions. The institutions, in populist discourse, produce wrong outcomes. “Even if they look properly democratic, there must be something going on behind the scenes that allows corrupt elites to continue to betray the people” (Müller 32).

The leader is central in the populists’ claim of representation. The people is identified with the populist leader who becomes the symbol of the will of the people. Populism represents its leader as someone who is able to understand and know the real needs

and demands of the people. It is even possible for the leader to know what is good for the people before they know. Any kind of mediation or idea of the middleman is cut out. Thus, the leader is directly connected with the people. That is how populists get rid of complex party organizations or procedures as intermediaries between citizens and themselves (Müller 35).

Müller also explains three populist techniques for governing. Firstly, populists, when they are in power, tend to colonize or occupy the state (44). It is accomplished by reshaping the entire system. Amendment of procedures of the institutions like courts, appointment of new judges, who are supporters of the populist regime, may be seen as examples of this. In fact, it is not a strategy exclusively populists use. There may be other political actors who follow the same path. What is unique in the case of populism, however, is their unconcern to mask what they are doing. Populists “can undertake such colonization openly and with the support of their claim to moral representation of the people” (Müller 45). If the populists are true representatives of the people, then the colonization may be seen as the people’s possession of their state through their rightful representatives. Second technique, that populists use, is mass clientelism. It refers to “the exchange of material and immaterial favors by elites for mass political support” (Müller 46). Due to the populist belief in that the only a part of the society is the real people, there is no problem with mass clientelism. In fact, it is just giving opportunities and power back to the people who are the real owners. It is the main reason why populists do not seem to be damaged by revelations of corruption. They make the mass clientelism morally defensible. The last technique of the populists for governing is to be harsh with nongovernmental organizations. Opposition of civil society undermines the populist claim of exclusive moral representation (Müller 48). Thus, civil society is blamed for not being civil society at all. They are mostly identified with the elite who work just for their interests and aim to damage interests of the real people. It shows the populist purpose of creating the people in whose name they speak all along. In other words, populists try to construct the homogenous people that they claim to represent. As a result, populists cause variety of exclusions that they criticize in the beginning. “What the old establishment or corrupt, immoral elites supposedly have always done, the

populists will also end up doing ... without guilt and with a supposedly democratic justification” (Müller 49).

1.2. Populism and Democracy

Apart from the approaches above, populism is also analyzed through its relationship with democracy in the literature. Questioning if populism is good or bad for democracy is the heart of all debates that turn around the complex relationship between democracy and populism. It is also argued that populism is a natural consequence of democracy. In this section, the relevant literature on the relationship between populism and democracy will be explored.

1.2.1. The Democratic Paradox

The definitive feature of modern democracy, which differentiates it from the ancient one, is the disappearance of a power which was embodied in the person of the prince. (Lefort). In modern democracies, power is an empty place which can be only fulfilled by the will of the people. In addition to the empty place of power, Chantal Mouffe examines the distinction between two aspects of the modern democracy to grasp its uniqueness. On the one hand, democracy is a form of rule which refers to the principle of the sovereignty of the people. On the other hand, there is a symbolic framework within which democratic rule is exercised (Mouffe 2). According to Mouffe, the principle that “power should be exercised by the people” is central for modern democracies. However, there is also another definitive feature what makes the modern democracy unique: the liberal discourse with “its strong emphasis on the value of individual liberty and on human rights” (2). Therefore, modern democracy is a combination of two different traditions: liberal tradition and democratic tradition. Liberal tradition emphasizes the rule of law to defend human rights and the respect for individual liberty. Democratic tradition, on the other hand, focuses on principles of equality and popular sovereignty. (Mouffe 3) Despite the fact that the link between liberalism and democracy is taken for granted in the contemporary world, as Mouffe states, there is no necessary relation between those two distinct traditions and their union was the result of bitter struggles (3). Modern democracy is a result of the articulation of these two logics which are argued to be incompatible in the last

instance. “There is a constitutive tension between their corresponding grammars, a tension that can never be overcome but only negotiated in different ways” (Mouffe 5).

The democratic paradox suggests to understand constitutional democracy as paradoxical by its nature. Accordingly, populism is a result of this paradoxical nature of constitutional democracy for many authors. (Canovan -1999- , Meny and Surel - 2002, and Papadopoulos 2002). Even though different authors stress different aspects of the paradox, Abst and Rummens suggests to see all of them as minor variations of the same two-strand model (409). According to this model, democracy is a combination of a constitutional pillar and a democratic pillar. In their words, “both pillars, or strands, are characterized by their own, incompatible logics, which have been elaborated and defended within two opposing traditions of political theory” (410). The constitutional pillar is a representative of the liberal tradition which emphasizes the rule of law to protect the rights of individuals against arbitrary exercise of power of the state or against other people. Democratic pillar, on the other hand, is based on democratic tradition in political theory. According to this tradition, despite its reputation, anonymous rule of law is not innocent. Proponents of this tradition usually argue that “the law usually institutes and conceals the dominance of particular groups in society” (Abst and Rummens, 410). Therefore, a supreme authority is required for political legitimacy rather than the law and this supreme authority is the people. The democratic pillar emphasizes the public autonomy instead of the private autonomy of citizens. “Constitutional democracies thus seem to embody a delicately balanced compromise between the apparently incompatible logics of the liberal and the democratic pillar, which supposedly keep each other in check” (Mouffe, 44-5).

Nevertheless, it is always possible that constitutional democracy is out of balance in favor of one of the pillars. Populist arguments emerge when constitutional democracy is believed to be out of balance in favor of the constitutional pillar (Abst and Rummens 410). Popular sovereignty is thought to be undermined because of too much emphasis on the constitutional pillar. “Populism then gives voice to the desire

to restore power to the people by referring to the democratic pillar of constitutional democracy” (Abt and Rummen 410). Populism tries to persuade the people that unbalanced democracy signifies an illegitimately taken power from the pure people by corrupted elite because of the representative system. Giving power back to the people is the main argument of populism.

1.2.2. Populism as a Negative or Positive Force of Democracy

It is possible to examine populism’s relationship with democracy within the contemporary literature of populism under three main approaches: “those who see it as a negative force, those who see it as positive, and those who remain on the fence” (Moffit, 134).

The idea that populism is a negative force for democracy is the most dominant view in the literature. This approach accepts populism as a pathology or disease of democracy. In Pierre Rosonvallon’s words, “populism is a word that serves as both a screen and a crutch. One way to make the term less ambiguous is to think of populism as a democratic pathology ... Populism is not just an ideology. It is a perverse inversion of the ideals and procedures of democracy” (Counter Democracy, 2008). It is argued that this view is especially popular in Europe because of the fact that populism is tied to the radical right in recent years. Nevertheless, apart from Europe, it is remarkable that it is also possible to see the pathological view in the studies of Latin American populism despite the successes of Chavez, Morales and Correa. (Corrales and Penfold 2011, Krauze 2011). The existence of the pathological view in those studies is strongly linked to abuses of the procedures and rules of the democracy (Moffit, 136)

There are many anti-democratic tendencies that populism is believed to foster. First of all, proponents of this approach draw attention to populism’s emphasis on the people. For populism, the people does not mean all of the people in the political community. It refers to a part of community that is believed to be representative of all people. In populist discourse, the people is accepted as a united, homogenous unity. To define who the real people is, populism requires to define an Other. Thus, populism revolves around a central antagonistic relationship between the people and

the other. "In doing so, populism excludes certain identities from the people, deeming them as illegitimate and not part of the community" (Moffit, 145). It shows denial of complexity and diversity of society and reflects a challenge to pluralism. In addition, defining and targeting of the Other for all the problems in society and politics covers the real problems. According to Zizek, populism ignores the true enemy like speed of modern capitalism, globalisation, sexism, racism, poverty and so on by creating an other who is represented as the only reason behind all problems (Moffit 146). Lastly, extreme personalisation is another anti-democratic tendency that populism causes. Most populist governments or movements seem to rely on a singular leader who embody the hopes, the desires and the voice of the people. Such a leader is believed to be tied together with the people symbolically. Populist leader is not just a representative of the people. He is the one who knows desires and needs of the people and who actually embody their sovereign will. Such personalisation mostly ends up with the strict dichotomisation of political space and monopolisation of power.

The second approach accepts populism as a positive force for democracy. In this view, populism is far from being a negative force. On the contrary, it is a core element of democracy because of its great emphasis on the sovereignty of the people. Supporters of this view mostly tend to criticize liberalism and liberal democracy. It is argued that the rule of law or individual rights are used to empower certain groups in society and it causes imbalances between political or economic powers of different groups within society. Furthermore, officials who are not elected and supranational bodies like UN are criticized for constraining or ignoring the sovereign people that are the true source of democratic legitimacy (Moffit 138). The well known representative of this approach is E. Laclau. According to him, it is necessary to adopt a normative model of democracy or in his words radical democracy. For Laclau, radical democracy is always populist because of the fact that if there is no populism, then there will be no people and without people it is not possible to talk about democracy. (259). Populism opens up the democratic horizon to expanding the number of identities instead of particular struggles like class, race or gender (Moffit, 137).

There are several democratic tendencies in populism according to this benign account of populism as a positive force for democracy. First of all, populism makes politics more comprehensive and understandable for every citizen. Populism makes easier to understand political issues for everyday citizens by its simplification and its language that is far from being convoluted. Secondly, populism can integrate excluded identities within the people and make them legitimate political actors. Moffit draws attention to cases of Evo Morales, Hugo Chavez and Thaksin Shinawatra as examples of inclusion of previously excluded identities. Morales succeeded to put forward an inclusive conception of people by recognizing indigenous population of Bolivia. Likewise, in Venezuela, Chavez was successful to include groups who live at the margins of civil society in his conception of the people. In Thailand, similarly, Thaksin called rural poor, the urban middle class, and northern small-business and land owners as the people (Moffit 143). Thirdly, populism reveals the dysfunctions of democratic systems. “The most obvious way it does this is by revealing corruption or elite collusion, and by calling for the increased sovereignty of the people in the name of democracy” (Moffit 144).

Third and last approach is the equivocal approach. According to this view, it is not possible to make a general argument about whether populism is positive or negative for democracy. Supporters of this approach compares regional examples of populism by specific case studies. Populism is seen ambivalent in its relationship with democracy. It has both negative and positive effects on democracy. Populist politics may cause different results in different kinds of democracies. In Mudde’s and Rovira Kaltwasser’s words, who advocate this approach, “populism can play a positive role in the promotion of an electoral or minimal democracy, but it tends to play a negative role when it comes to fostering the development of a full-fledged liberal democracy” (507).

Examination of existing literature on populism helps to identify general features of the phenomenon. There are several different characteristics that come forward. First of all, the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite is a necessary component of all populist movements. The people is the true source of power while

the elite represents a corrupt group who has stolen this power from the real people. So, the critique of the current establishment is always inherent in populism. Secondly, populism promises to give this power back to the people. It connects populism with economically or socially struggling groups who feel weakened because of the established practices and institutions. Thirdly, populism includes a claim of representation. It suggests to bring up interests and demands of the people to the political agenda. By doing so, it attempts to give voices of the people back to them who become voiceless because of the elite and the corrupt institutions. These features seem to cause different outcomes that pave the way for different approaches to populism. On the one hand, populism is claimed as a corrective to democracy. On the other hand, it is seen as a disease of democracy. What is undoubted, however, is the global rise of populism. It is certain that populism answers some personal and social demands. However, it is necessary to examine existing literature on politics of recognition to understand whether populism answers demands of recognition or not.

CHAPTER 2

POLITICS OF RECOGNITION: A DEMOCRATIC NEED

Contemporary political landscape is dominated by movements structured around race, gender, sexuality, language, ethnicity and religion which are driven by a common claim for recognition. Oxford English Dictionary defines recognition as acknowledgement of existence, validity, or legality of something. In the literature, however, there is a struggle over the meaning of the recognition despite its acknowledgement as a vital human need. What does it mean to be recognized and to recognize? What do people need when they ask to be recognized and how can be need of recognition fulfilled? Different answers to these questions pave the way for emergence of two models of recognition: the identity model and the social status model. In this chapter, these models will be examined to analyze commonalities and contradictions between populism and politics of recognition. After the brief summary of Hegelian roots of the recognition question, two models of recognition will be discussed with regard to theories of Charles Taylor, Axel Honneth, and Nancy Fraser.

2.1.The Hegelian Background

Hegel is the most prominent philosophical figure in the literature of recognition. His works, *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), *Philosophy of Rights* (1820), and *System of Ethical Life* (1802) have been the main texts that recognition discussions revolve around. In *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel claims that all human agents must be recognized by others to achieve self-consciousness. This is because of the fact that individuals encounter themselves in the response of other human beings. The desire for recognition represents such significance for human beings that they are willing to risk death in order to gain recognition from others. Furthermore, human agents do not desire recognition limited to certain people, they seek to be recognized by everyone. Hence,,only universal recognition can meet this desire in a satisfactory way. In fact, in Hegel's thought, all human history can be seen as the struggle for recognition. The desire for universal recognition can be achieved only through

membership in the modern state which promises equal freedom and dignity for all of its members (*A Hegel Dictionary*, 195-6).

Freedom constitutes the fundamental goal for human beings in Hegel's social and political theory. Despite the fact that he agrees with social contractarians to take freedom as the main human goal, Hegel significantly differs from social contract tradition with his unique way of conceptualizing of the freedom. His interpretation of the concept paves the way for construction of theory of recognition. According to the social contract theory, human beings are assumed to be atomic beings in a society where every single individual struggles to stay alive and competes with others due to insufficient resources. The idea of atomic individuals ends up with glorification of individual will and consent. According to Hegel's interpretation of the social contract theory, by insisting on respecting individual choice and consent, social contractarians treat membership, authority, and obligation as though they were optional (Patten, 111). In contrast to this view, Hegel embraces the Aristotelian concept of *zoon politikon* that implies human beings are essentially social rather than being atomic. In *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel confirms Aristotle's dictum that "a man who could live alone would be either an animal or a god" (*PR*, 210) and states that it is the rational destiny of human beings to live within a state (*PR*, 75). For Hegel, the social contract tradition is mistaken to assume that human agents are absolutely free in the state of nature. In fact, it is quite the contrary: Individuals are like children in the state of nature. They have potential for freedom and reason but they have not realized that potential yet (Patten, 117). The capacity for freedom and rationality is directly linked to the right sort of self- understanding. If a person is unfree, it is not because of his chains but rather his false self- conception. Hegel claims that human beings must live in a society to acquire the right kind of self- understanding that finally ends up with freedom. Here, the theory of recognition serves as a bridge between the concern for the development of individual freedom and the focus on the social institutions and practices that make up a community of free individuals (Patten, 123).

How agents can develop the right sort of self-understanding and achieve freedom is explained in Hegel's account of recognition. In order to establish a free identity, every

person needs to be able to see that he can actively affect other things or people to establish a free identity. Such a crucial interaction emerges in three steps. The first way of interaction to acquire self-certainty is asserting independence vis-a-vis non-human material objects by negating them (Patten, 125). Agents' sense of independence is weakened by their apparent dependence on the surrounding environment. On this stage, individual tries to demonstrate his independence by altering or destroying the material objects. Despite the fact that he alters or destroys the material environment surrounding him, the agent maintains his existence. Thus, he asserts his independence through objects. However, for Hegel, it shows only that the agent is not dependent on the object in its present form. He is not independent of its matter. The only way to establish independence on this model is to negate all material environment by destroying it (Patten, 126). This way of interaction is self-defeating because complete negation of the material environment can cause the agent's own death. Even if such an outcome is eliminated, agent could not achieve the right sort of self-understanding. After the complete negation of the objects, agents would be left with memory of their acts of independence and would need more objects for negation to reconfirm their independence. It makes claim of freedom just an assertion and as Hegel states "the assertion that one is free does not suffice to make one so" (Patten, 125).

The failure of the first stage brings a second way of interaction to the agenda. Since, human beings cannot establish their independence through their interaction with objects, an agent needs another agent to achieve the desired sense of independence. "Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness" (Patten, 127). Thus, the second way of interaction takes place between agents. On this stage, individual struggles to achieve his self-certainty by forcing another agent to recognize him as free and independent. According to Hegel, the first experience will take place as a life-and-death struggle. In the first experience, the "I" is an egoistic self-identity that asserts itself by excluding all otherness. Each agent will seek to establish an independent self-identity that is recognized by the other and each will strive to prove his self-certainty against the others by negating them. Thus, the relation between the agents becomes a violent conflict that both of them stake their

own lives in seeking the death of the other ¹(Sinnerbrink, 279). However, if agent accomplishes to destroy the other, he will fail to gain recognition which was the point of the struggle.

Life-and-death struggle ends up with an unequal recognition relation. In the first experience, self-consciousness learns that life is as essential to it as independence. It brings Hegel's famous master-slave dialectic to the agenda. As a result of the life-and-death struggle, slaves become only recognizing self-consciousness to survive. Masters, on the other hand, try to achieve self-certainty by forcing slaves to recognize them as free and independent. "The master is an intentional subject who disregards the other's intentionality, while the slave is a subject who sets aside his own point of view, subordinating himself to the independent self-certainty of the master" (Sinnerbrink, 279).

Master-slave relationship is an institutional resolution for struggle for recognition and represents the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of political union for Hegel (Patten, 127). Nevertheless, second way of interaction is self-defeating as much as the first one according to Hegel. Despite the fact that master-slave relationship marks institutionalization of struggle for recognition, it is far from ensuring self-certainty. In this relationship, master only consumes the goods prepared for him by slave who is driven by his fear. Slave recognizes master only because the master coerces him into doing so. Recognition on this stage cannot go beyond a mere assertion by the master that he is free. Therefore, master-slave relationship represents a failure of struggle for recognition and does not provide desired sense of self-certainty to reach true freedom.

The failure of the second way of interaction brings the third and final solution to recognition question. An agent can achieve self-certainty only by receiving free recognition of other agents. In Hegel's words, "it is only when the slave becomes free that the master, too, becomes completely free" (Patten, 128). In the final stage, an

¹Struggle between agents is motivated by the need of recognition in Hegel's thought. It does not stem from insufficient resources as social contractualists claim.

agent can affirm his own sense of agency and freedom only by being part of a community that is composed by mutually recognizing free agents. The acquisition of self understanding “requires that individuals participate in stable patterns of mutual recognition” (Patten,128). To do so, certain institutions and practices are needed that everybody joins to stabilize recognition relation. That is why Hegel claims state as the rational destiny of human beings. State is an institutional form of recognitive relations that makes possible to acquire the right sort of self-understanding and reach freedom. Thus, for Hegel, an agent needs another agent to recognize him freely in order to establish a free identity and it becomes only possible by joining a state.

2.2. Contemporary Theories of Recognition

Hegel’s works have inspired several scholars to develop their own recognition theories. In the contemporary literature, there is a struggle over the meaning of recognition. What it means to recognize and to be recognized is conceptualized in different ways by different scholars. It is possible to argue that there is one main question that comes into prominence: Is recognition a matter of identity or social status? Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth are two popular scholars whose answer to the question is identity. Nancy Fraser, on the other hand, is representative of the literature of recognition as a matter of social status. In the next sections, I will discuss these two answers to the recognition question through theories of Taylor, Honneth, and Fraser.

2.2.1. Recognition as a Matter of Identity

2.2.1.1. Charles Taylor

Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition is one of the major texts that discusses recognition as a matter of identity. In “The Politics of Recognition”, Charles Taylor examines how the significance of recognition is modified and intensified due to new understanding of individual identity in the modern era. The main argument of the section is that identity is shaped by recognition or misrecognition and individuals can suffer real damage if the society around them mirror back to them a contemptible picture of themselves (25). Misrecognition does not refer to a trivial lack of respect.

In Taylor's words "it can inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred" (26). Recognition, here, is claimed to be a vital human need.

Taylor distinguishes two changes that "together have made the modern preoccupation with identity and recognition inevitable" (26). The first major change is the collapse of social hierarchies. Social hierarchies, in the ancien regimes, provided a given identity to the people by their birth. Individuals did not have to think and discover who they are and what their purpose in life is. It was also the basis of honor before the modern era. Honor, in this sense, is not a notion that every single individual shares in it. Due to the fact that people were characterized by their social milieu, honor was something that only certain people shared in it in the society. However, modern societies have experienced the collapse of social hierarchies which undermined the concept of honor. The notion of honor was replaced by the notion of dignity that is used in a universalist and egalitarian sense. In contrast to honor, the crucial promise of dignity is that everyone shares in it. The shift in concepts indicates a democratic society because of the fact that dignity, in this sense, is only compatible with democracy. It also shows that the forms of equal recognition have been essential to democratic culture. "Democracy has ushered in a politics of equal recognition, which has taken various forms over the years, and has now returned in the form of demands for the equal status of culture and of genders" (Taylor 27).

The second change, that Taylor mentions, is the emergence of a new understanding of individual identity that emerges at the end of the eighteenth century. It is an *individualized* identity that is particular to one's self and can be only discovered in one's self. It underlines the ideal of authenticity that is being true to one's self and one's own particular way of being. At the end of the eighteenth century, Taylor states, people have been believed to be endowed with a moral sense, an intuitive feeling for what is right and what is wrong. This doctrine came into the agenda against a rival view that deciding right and wrong was a matter of calculating consequences. In contrast to this idea, knowing right and wrong is not a matter of dry calculation, but is anchored in people's feelings. It is a matter of one's self relation. "Morality has, in a sense, a voice within" (Taylor 28). According to Taylor, Jean-Jacques Rousseau is

worth mentioning as one of the most significant writers who helped to bring about this change: “Rousseau frequently presents the issue of morality as that of our following a voice of nature within us. This voice is often drowned out by the passions that are induced by our dependence on others, the main one being *amour propre*, or pride. Our moral salvation comes from recovering authentic moral contact with ourselves” (Taylor, 29). The ideal of authenticity increased its significance after Rousseau with Herder. According to him, every individual has an original way of being human. In other words, there is a certain way of being human which is one’s own way. As Taylor writes, it is an idea that has burrowed very deep into the modern consciousness. Now, being true to one’s self has a crucial consequence that if a person is not true to himself, he misses the point of his life, he misses what being human is for him (30). Differences of individuals have significant moral consequences which had never been related before the eighteenth century. Individuals have to discover and articulate their originality for being true to themselves. It also means defining themselves and realizing their potentiality. In contrast to premodern societies, identity is not fixed by one’s social position or by their birth. Therefore, the way of being cannot be socially derived anymore. It must be inwardly generated (Taylor 32).

What makes recognition a vital human need in modern societies becomes clear when dialogical character of human beings is added into the equation. According to Taylor, individuals become full human agents, understand themselves, and define their identity through their acquisition of rich human languages of expression and it is only possible through exchange with others. Thus, identity is defined always in dialogue with others or in struggle against them. Taylor criticizes the monological ideal for underestimating the dialogical character of human life. Discovering the identity, Taylor claims, does not mean that individuals work it out in isolation, but that they negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly internal, with others (Taylor 33). Thus, the ideal of inwardly generated identity makes recognition crucial because of the fact that identity of individuals depend on their dialogical relations with others. In premodern societies, recognition of socially derived identities was based on social

categories that everyone took for granted. However, original identity, in modern societies, does not enjoy this recognition a priori.

Recognition, as a central identity issue in modern societies, comes into agenda on two levels. First one is the intimate sphere where people forms their identities in a continuing dialogue and struggle with significant others. The second one, on the other hand, is the public sphere that politics of equal recognition play a crucial role. Taylor indicates that politics of equal recognition refers to two different meanings. On the one hand, replacement of honor by dignity have brought to the agenda politics of universalism that emphasizes equal dignity of all citizens. It demands equalization of rights and entitlements (Taylor 37). On the other hand, the second major change, which is development of modern identity, has paved the way for emergence of politics of difference. Here, everyone is recognized for her unique identity. The basic promise of the politics of equal dignity is that every single individual is equally worthy of respect because they share a universal human potential. The politics of difference, however, requires equal value of what people have made of their potential. Despite the fact that both modes of politics are based on the notion of equal respect, they come into conflict.

For politics of equal dignity, people must be treated in a difference-blind fashion. For the other, particularity of people must be recognized and even be fostered. Taylor, claims that each has its own weaknesses and strengths and both can be seen in liberal societies. "More and more societies today are turning out to be multicultural, in the sense of including more than one cultural community that wants to survive" (Taylor 61). According to him, strict forms of each modes of politics are not sufficient by their own. There should be a new form politics which balances the two.

2.2.1.2. Axel Honneth

Axel Honneth is one of the prominent figures in literature of recognition who analyzes the issue as a matter of identity. In his famous work, *Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, Honneth constructs a social theory by synthesizing the early writings of Hegel and the social psychology of Mead. According

to Honneth, Mead's works provide the theoretical resources for a materialist reformulation of Hegel's theory of struggle for recognition (92). Hegel and Mead shares the idea that the reproduction of social life is significantly dependent on mutual recognition. An individual can develop a practical self-relation only when individual has learned to view himself from the normative perspective of his partners in interaction (Honneth, 92). Social struggle, for both thinkers, is a structuring force for society's moral development. Furthermore, both Hegel and Mead make a three-part division among forms of recognition. According to Honneth's interpretation of Hegel, the struggle for recognition happens in three levels: family, civil society, and state. Mead, on the other hand, argues that the self-relation develops in three levels. These three levels of recognition corresponds with three levels of self-relation: self-confidence, self-respect, and self worth. One's relation to herself gradually becomes positive when the three forms of recognition are achieved (Honneth, 94). Patterns of intersubjective recognition are analyzed by Honneth in three categories: love, rights, and solidarity.

a) Love

Love refers to primary relationships that are constituted by strong emotional attachments among a small number of people such as parent-child relationships, friendships, and erotic relationships. It is the first stage of reciprocal recognition for Hegel because of the fact that subjects confirm and recognize each other as needy creatures. "In the experience of loving care, both subjects know themselves to be united in their neediness, in their dependence on each other" (Honneth, 95). Honneth supports Hegel's argument with object-relations theory of psychoanalysis. Object-relations theory makes possible to analyze love as a particular form of recognition. It owes to the specific way in which it makes the success of affectional bonds dependent on the capacity, acquired in early childhood, to strike a balance between symbiosis and self-assertion (Honneth, 98). According to the theory, children, in the first months of their life, are so dependent on the care they receive that "the care with which the mother keeps the newborn baby alive is not added to child's behaviour as something secondary but is rather merged with the child in such a way that one can plausibly assume that every human life begins with a phase of

undifferentiated intersubjectivity, that is, of symbiosis” (Honneth, 98). As infants grow up, mother and child learn to detach themselves from a state of undifferentiated oneness and they love each other by recognizing as independent persons. In addition, all love relationships of a person are driven by the unconscious recollection of this experience. However, if the detachment process is not accomplished, disorders of love relationship that are clinically termed masochism and sadism may emerge. The one-sidedness in the recognition causes these pathological cases because one of the subjects is no longer able to detach himself from the other subject. “From a therapeutic angle, the possibility of reinterpreting the clinical material on relational pathologies in terms of a structural one-sidedness in the balance of recognition supports the idea that, ideally speaking, the love relationship represents a symbiosis refracted by recognition” (Honneth, 106). Love, as the first stage of recognition, is prior to other forms of recognition because it provides essential emotional confidence. It provides a kind of self-relation that individuals acquire self-confidence by experience and expressions of needs and feelings.

b) Rights

Honneth claims legal relations as the second stage of recognition. Legal recognition, unlike the case of love, emerged in the historical process. It refers to respect which individuals show one another as legal subjects for the reason that they are aware of the social norms by which rights and duties are distributed in their community (Honneth, 109). The conventional legal recognition exclude the possibility of reciprocity because individuals’ rights and duties were determined by their social status in a hierarchical social order. However, it is the transition to modernity that brings to the agenda reciprocal legal recognition. With modernity, legal system becomes the expression of the universalizable interests of the all individuals that eliminates the possibility of legally privileged classes or groups. The collapse of social hierarchies has made legal recognition something that every subject shares equally in modern societies. As a result, two separate forms of respect came to the fore that differentiate legal recognition from social esteem. Legal recognition is based on the idea that every person must be considered to be an end in itself whereas social esteem takes the worth of a subject into consideration that can be measured with

reference to the criteria of social relevance (Honneth, 111). The first case refers to universal respect for the freedom of the will of the person. The second case, on the other hand, emphasizes recognition of individuals through their achievements that separate them from others and show their uniqueness.

If legal recognition means to respect a person for his universal capacity, then the question will arise: what is the universal feature of human beings to be respected? According to Honneth, it is the assumption of the moral accountability of all subjects because of the fact that to consider legal order as valid, legal subjects must have the capacity to make reasonable, autonomous decisions regarding moral questions. "In the absence of such an ascription, it would be utterly inconceivable how subjects could ever have come to agree on a legal order" (Honneth, 114). Thus, in modern societies, cumulative expansion of individual rights had gone hand in hand with the expanding scope of the general features of a morally responsible person. In other words, new perspectives on the definition of morally responsible subjects paved the way for the emergence of new categories of rights. Individual rights, now, are divided into three main categories in legal studies which are civil rights that guarantees liberty, political rights that guarantees participation, and the social rights that assures basic welfare (Honneth, 115). What Honneth implies here is that modern law has been gradually expanded in terms of recognition. For justification of the thesis, he reminds the historical formulation of T.H. Marshall which basically claims that civil rights developed in the eighteenth century, political rights came into agenda in the nineteenth century, and social rights were established in the twentieth century. The process started with the collapse of social hierarchies and emergence of general principle of equality that requires every legal order to allow no privileges. The principle of equality marks "full-fledged" membership in a political community: every subject in society should have rights for equal representation for his political interests. However, in the process, it became clear that if these political rights were not guaranteed by certain social standard of living and some degree of economic security, they would not be more than a merely formal concession. Therefore, the twentieth century witnessed the demands for a welfare state and emergence of social welfare rights. What comes to light with Marshall's analysis is that "historically,

the establishment of each new class of basic rights is consistently compelled by arguments that referred implicitly to the demand for full- fledged membership in political community” (Honneth,116). It differentiates modern understanding of being legally recognized from former legal recognition. The individual is now recognized with regard to his concrete human feature instead of his abstract capacity to orient himself vis-a-vis moral norms. On the one hand, modern law generates a sensitivity for differences of individuals’ opportunities to realize socially guaranteed freedoms. On the other hand, it universalizes legal relations by granting the same rights to previously excluded groups with all other members of society. Thus, disrespect in legal relations represents conflicts over expansion of both the substantive content and social scope of the status of a legal person (Honneth, 118).

What legal recognition provides for one’s self relation is the ability to relate to oneself as a morally responsible person. Subjects see their actions as universally respected expression of their own autonomy in the experience of legal recognition. Whereas love ensures self-confidence, rights provides self-respect by showing that the subject deserves the respect of everyone else.

c) Solidarity

Honneth offers a further form of mutual recognition besides love and legal relations with regard to Hegel and Mead. Individuals need a form of social esteem that facilitates to develop positive relation with their concrete traits and abilities. Unlike legal recognition, social esteem refers to a form of respect towards particular qualities of subjects that characterize them in their personal difference. “Whereas modern law represents a medium of recognition that expresses the universal features of human subjects, this form of recognition demands a social medium that must be able to express the characteristic differences among human subjects in a universal and, more specifically, intersubjective obligatory way” (Honneth, 122). What legal relations and social esteem share in common is that both forms of recognition emerged as a result of historical development.

Changing nature of social esteem in modern societies can be analyzed through transition from concepts of honour to categories of social prestige. In premodern societies, which were hierarchically organized, the status of people were measured in terms of social honour. Characteristic differences that are decisive in measuring the social esteem, had been defined collectivistically with regard to individuals' social status in these societies. However, dissolution of traditional hierarchy of values in modern societies have undermined such possibility. In other words, social esteem is no longer determined by collective traits. It is now a matter of capacities that one develops personally in the course of her life. Thus, a form of value pluralism constitutes the cultural framework which individuals' social worth are defined in modern societies. "It is in this context that the concept of social honour gradually becomes watered down into a concept of social prestige" (Honneth, 125). Prestige refers to the degree of social recognition that is earned by contributing to society's abstractly defined goals. Social esteem, therefore, becomes a subject to cultural conflict due to the fact that abstract guiding ideas requires cultural interpretations to be applied in the sphere of recognition. As Honneth states relations of social esteem are now subject to a permanent struggle that social groups try to draw attention to the neglected significance of the traits and abilities they collectively represent to raise their social worth (127). In addition, relations of social esteem are affected by patterns of income distribution. So, it should not be ignored that economic confrontations are also a significant part of this form of struggle for recognition.

Social esteem that provides this form of recognition is organized in terms of group identity such as gender or ethnicity. Group identity of individuals determines their social worth. It is this form recognition that allows individuals to attain group-pride or collective honour. "Here, individual knows himself or herself to be a member of a social group that can collectively accomplish things whose worth for society is recognized by all the other members of society" (Honneth, 128). According to Honneth, internal relations of such groups mostly takes shape of the solidarity. Solidarity refers a kind of "interactive relationship in which subjects mutually sympathize with their various different ways of life because, among themselves, they esteem each other symmetrically" (128). It may also be seen in the use of the concept

in the experience of collective resistance. It emerges as a result of shared experience of great strain and sacrifice that provide esteem for abilities which previously did not refer to a societal significance. In this form of recognition, individual's achievements and abilities are recognized as valuable by others members of society. What it means for the individual's self relation is self-worth that is acquired by the third form of recognition.

d) Misrecognition

Axel Honneth also presents three forms of disrespect corresponding to three forms of recognition. Disrespect refers to a kind of specific vulnerability of human beings that is caused by absence of recognition. Following both Hegel and Mead, Honneth claims that the self image of a person depends on the possibility of being continually backed up by others (131). Due to the fact that positive understanding towards one's self can only be acquired intersubjectively, disrespect cause a risk to collapse of the disrespected identity. There are several acts which can be referred to as disrespect despite the difference in their levels of damage to one's identity. According to Honneth, if experience of disrespect means withdrawal of recognition, then it is possible to distinguish three forms of disrespect with regard to three forms of recognition. First form of disrespect includes every acts of maltreatment in which one is forcibly deprived of any opportunity freely to dispose over one's body like rape and torture. Every attempt to gain control of one's body against one's self represents the most destructive form of disrespect. It is not because of purely physical pain but rather "the combination of this pain with the feeling defencelessly at the mercy of another subject, to the point of feeling that one has been deprived of reality" (Honneth, 132). This form results in loss of basic confidence that is learned through love. The form of recognition which this kind of disrespect deprives subjects of is the respect for the control of one's own body. It causes a lasting damage on one's trust in oneself which represents the fundamental form of self-relation.

Second form of disrespect emerges when subjects are structurally excluded from the possession of certain rights in society. Rights, here, refers to "individual claims that a person can legitimately expect to have socially met because he or she participates,

with equal rights, in the institutional order as a full-fledged member of a community” (Honneth, 133). If subjects are systematically deprived of such rights, it would imply that they do not have the same degree of moral responsibility as other members of society. It includes the forcible restriction of personal autonomy but more significantly second form of disrespect prevents subjects from being equal partners in interaction with other subjects. Thus, second type of disrespect destroys the possibility that one relates to herself as a legally equal interaction partner. The recognition that this form of disrespect deprives of is the cognitive regard for the status of moral responsibility. Individuals who experience it fail to keep possessions of self respect that can be acquired in the interactive processes of socialization.

Third and final type of disrespect refers to degradation and denigration of individuals or groups. As discussed above, the dignity or status of subjects are determined within a society’s inherited cultural horizon. “If this hierarchy of values is so constituted as to downgrade individual forms of life and manners of belief as inferior or deficient, then it robs the subjects in question of every opportunity to attribute social value to their own abilities” (Honneth, 134). It causes loss of personal self-esteem due to the absence of social approval which can be acquired through group solidarity. Honneth claims that negative emotional reactions arising as a result of forms of disrespect, can serve as the motivational impetus behind the struggle for recognition. Individuals are dependent on intersubjective recognition of their abilities to develop a successful self-relation. Every experience of absence of the recognition or disrespect at some stage of one’s development causes psychological damage within one’s personality. It paves the way for the emergence of negative emotions such as shame or rage. Subjects reveal that certain forms of recognition are being withheld from them through these negative emotions. Honneth emphasizes the feeling of shame because of the fact that both psychoanalytical and phenomenological approaches are in agreement on its impact. Shame causes to lower one’s own feeling of self-worth (137). The source of shame can be a result of one’s own actions or others. In the first case, individual feel inferior to others because of the fact that he has violated a moral norm. In the second cases, on the other hand, self-esteem is lowered because of interaction partners’ violation of moral norms. Honneth claims that “it is only by

regaining the possibility of active conduct that individuals can dispel the state of emotional tension into which they are forced as a result of humiliation” (138). Therefore, the experience of disrespect can become the motivational impetus for a struggle for recognition.

2.2.2. Recognition as a Question of Social Status

Identity model has been the dominant one in the literature of recognition for many years. It is mostly because of the fact that contemporary struggles for recognition are based on the identity claims such as gender, race, or sexuality. Nevertheless, identity model of recognition has its own weaknesses and it is not free from criticism in the literature. Nancy Fraser is the most popular scholar who gives expression to some significant critiques of the identity model. She also proposes to rethink recognition as a matter of social status. In this section, her criticisms towards the identity model will be explored and recognition will be discussed as a question of status with regards to Fraser’s theory.

2.2.2.1. Criticism of The Identity Model of Recognition

Nancy Fraser throws two problems of the identity model out for consideration in her article “Rethinking Recognition” (*New Left Review*). First criticism towards the identity model is termed *the problem of displacement* by Fraser. She draws attention to the fact that many movements make their claims in the idiom of recognition especially after the demise of the Soviet-style communism and the acceleration of globalization (107). Significant increase in the recognition claims also represents the relative decline in claims for egalitarian redistribution. According to Fraser, it is worth mentioning that move from redistribution to recognition occurs at a time when expanding capitalism creates massive economic inequality. In this context, questions of recognition causes to marginalize and displace the redistributive struggles in several ways. Identity model of recognition is accused of being silent on the economic inequality. As Fraser puts in, it treats misrecognition as a free-standing cultural harm. In other words, identity model ignores distributive injustice by focusing exclusively on efforts to change culture (110). The problem, as identity model acknowledges it, is located in the demeaning representations of identities. However, it misses the fact

that these problems are socially grounded and caused by institutionalized significations and norms. For an instance, it is difficult for identity model to reveal the links between gender norms which devalue activities coded as feminine and the low wages of female workers (Fraser, 110).

Nevertheless, there is another version of the identity model that does not ignore maldistribution. It acknowledges the economic inequality and injustices and links them with the cultural ones. Still, for Fraser, it reflects a similar problem by misunderstanding the character of the links. This type of identity model is also mistaken to take maldistribution as a secondary effect of misrecognition. Supporters of this version of identity model assume that cultural hierarchies pave the way for economic inequalities. For example, cultural devaluation of proletarian identity gives rise to class oppression in their view. (Fraser, 111). It ends up arguing that maldistribution can be overcome indirectly by a politics of recognition without any necessity for politics of redistribution. Fraser rejects these arguments by pointing to increased marketization. Contemporary societies are far from being purely cultural ones with no economic relations. There is a unique logic of markets that is neither wholly constrained by culture nor subordinated to it. Thus, economic inequalities emerge as not mere expressions of identity hierarchies (Fraser, 112). That is why identity model mistakenly displaces struggles for economic justice.

Second problem of the identity model, according to Fraser, is the *reification of identity* (112). Supporters of the identity model emphasize the significance of authentic, self-affirming and self generated collective identities. Nevertheless, it paves the way for some kind of moral pressure on individuals. Members of the groups are situated in a position that they have to conform to a given culture. People dissenting to the given culture mostly face the accusation of disloyalty. It is discouraged to explore intragroup divisions like gender, class, or sexuality. For an instance, criticism of patriarchal norms within a subordinated culture may be seen as inauthentic and it may end up with prevention of revealing gender inequality in the group. As a result, identity model tends to impose a single, drastically simplified group identity that misses the complexity of people's lives. Fraser claims that by shielding

struggles within the group for the authority, identity model brings about misrecognition. Theories of the model are mostly silent about the power of dominant fractions of the groups and about intragroup domination. "The identity model thus lends itself all too easily to repressive forms of communitarianism, promoting conformism, intolerance and patriarchalism" (Fraser, 112). Furthermore, it seems to deny its own Hegelian premisses. At the beginning, it emphasizes the dialogical character of identity that is shaped through interaction with another subject, then it supposes that misrecognized people can construct their identity on their own (Fraser, 112). From this point of view, Nancy Fraser concludes her criticism by stating that the identity model encourages separatism and group enclaves.

2.2.2.2. Recognition as a Matter of Social Status

After her critiques of the identity model, Fraser proceeds to treat recognition as a question of social status. It emphasizes the status of individual group members as full partners in social interaction rather than group specific identity. In this approach, misrecognition does not mean deformation of group identity. It takes misrecognition as social subordination which indicates being prevented from participating as a peer in social life (Fraser 113). The main aim of the status model is to overcome subordination by establishing the misrecognized party as a full member of society capable of participating on a par with the rest.

Recognition as a matter of status refers to "examining institutionalized patterns of cultural value for their effects on the relative standing of social actors" (Fraser, 113). Reciprocal recognition exists only if actors are capable of participating in social life as peers. Misrecognition, on the other hand, does not mean a psychic deformation or a free-standing cultural harm. It emerges when institutionalized patterns of cultural value constitutes some actors as unworthy of respect or esteem. Fraser suggests to focus on institutionalized cultural norms instead of free-floating discourses to reveal misrecognition. It can come to the surface within several forms. In some situations, it is juridified by a formal law like marriage laws that exclude same-sex partnership. In other cases, it may emerge via government policies or it may be institutionalized informally- in associational patterns, long standing customs or sedimented social

practices of civil society (Fraser 114). What all cases shares in common is a form of institutionalized subordination and violation of justice. From this point of view, struggle for recognition aims to “de-institutionalize patterns of cultural value that impede parity of participation and to replace them with patterns that foster it” (Fraser, 115). In the status model, accomplishment of the struggle depends on changing social institutions. How struggle for recognition should take place vary due to several forms of misrecognition. For an instance, if misrecognition is caused by a formal law, the struggle should aim legal change or if it is in policy- entrenched forms, the struggle will require policy change. In general, status model does not prioritise any type of remedy for misrecognition. “It allows for a range of possibilities, depending on what precisely the subordinated parties need in order to be able to participate as peers in social life” (Fraser, 115).

Status model of recognition differs from identity model by also addressing maldistribution. According to Fraser, institutionalized patterns of cultural value are not sufficient to accomplish reciprocal recognition. Equal participation also requires actors to reach necessary resources. In other cases, lack of necessary resources forms an obstacle to parity of participation of social life and it constitutes a form of social subordination and injustice (Fraser, 116). Social justice, for status model, has two dimensions: “a dimension of recognition, which concerns the effects of institutionalized meanings and norms on the relative standing of social actors, and a dimension of distribution, which involves the allocation of disposable resources to social actors” (Fraser, 116). By doing so, Fraser tries to addresses both the status order and economic structure of society. Moreover, each dimension is associated with distinct forms of injustice in status model. Injustice in recognition dimension refers to misrecognition while it states maldistribution in distributive dimension. They also corresponds with the status subordination and economic subordination.

In conclusion, Nancy Fraser develops a status model of recognition as a rival to identity model to situate the problem of recognition within a larger social frame. Society, in her view, is a complex field which has both cultural and economic forms. Due to the capitalist characteristic of contemporary societies, none of two forms is

reducible to the other. They also do not represent two completely separate fields of society which interact with other. Thus, in contrast to identity model, status model of recognition requires struggle for recognition to take place in both cultural and economic field.

Fraser's contribution to the existing literature is significant. Her approach helps to grasp grey areas of need for recognition. It shows the fact that identity model has its own weaknesses and problems as well as strengths and promises. Nevertheless, it is also a fact that contemporary demands for recognition are based on identities. That is why it is more helpful to understand populism's relationship with politics of recognition. The identity model provides several important features of the need of recognition. Firstly, it emphasizes the significance of mutuality in recognition relations. Mutuality is vital for recognition to be valid. Secondly, it shows that interaction with the others has serious impacts on one's own identity and the self-realization. A valid recognition provides self-confidence, self respect, and self-worth. This explains why recognition is a vital human need. Thirdly, the identity model suggests that request for recognition includes both personal and social dimensions. Feelings such as marginalization, shame, powerlessness play a crucial role for people to struggle for recognition. Furthermore, it draws attention to identity groups who attempt to challenge society's cultural horizon to acquire recognition. These features represents some commonalities with populism as well as differences. Populism seems to address especially social dimension of recognition. It is helpful for overcoming misrecognition especially on the second and the third level. In the next chapter, populism's contribution to the struggle for recognition will be discussed.

CHAPTER 3

POPULISM AND RECOGNITION I: A COMPATIBILIST ACCOUNT

Identity politics has dominated the political arena since 1960s all around the world. Several movements are established around the question of identity that are driven by a common demand for recognition. In recent years, world has also witnessed the global rise of populism. In a political environment where claims of recognition are on the stage, such a striking rise of populism brings several questions in its wake: What is the relationship between populism and politics of recognition? Is the rapid rise of the populism connected to the recognition issue? What are their commonalities? Does populism represent an answer to the recognition question? In this chapter, populism will be discussed as an answer to the struggle for recognition. In the first part, common concerns of the two will be addressed. Then, in the second part, populism's promise of recognition will be analyzed.

3.1. Common Concerns of Populism and Politics of Recognition

3.1.1. Representation

The contemporary crisis of representation constitutes the common problem context for both populist politics and politics of recognition. Representation plays a crucial role for politics of recognition on two levels: legal recognition of individuals and recognition of social status of the groups. Legal system is regarded as the expression of universalizable interests of all individuals in contemporary societies (Honneth 111). Legal recognition refers to the principle of respect for persons for their universal capacity. It is achieved and institutionalized by the accumulation of certain rights. These rights can be divided into three categories: civil rights that guarantees liberty, political rights that guarantees participation, and the social rights that assures basic welfare. According to Honneth, every category has been developed thanks to expanding scope of demands for full-fledged membership in a political community (116). While civil rights assure freedom of individuals, political rights provide equal representation of the political interests of every individual and group. Social rights, on the other hand, have been developed due to the fact that people need a certain

social standard of living and degree of economic security to take advantage of political rights. Therefore, equal representation must be protected by law through both political rights and social welfare rights to accomplish legal recognition.

Social esteem or recognition of social status, on the other hand, marks a form of respect towards particular qualities and characteristic differences of individuals. These qualities and differences are not free from the social groups to which people belong. In this form of recognition individuals experience themselves as valuable people for society and as members of social group who can accomplish things (Honneth 128). According to Honneth, it is the form of recognition that allows people to attain group-pride or collective honour. In some cases, society's hierarchy of values causes to downgrade individual forms of life. It ends up with a denial of individuals' social worth because of prevailing patterns of domination in groups to which they belong. These misrecognized groups may attempt to change social norms, extend the existing social identities or demand the creation of new ones to be recognized. The main problem here is the lack of representation or misrepresentation of the group identity. They need a new image in society to acquire the desired sense of self worth. Thus, representation becomes crucial to accomplish social esteem.

Representation is also crucial for populism. Every scholar, who analyzes populism, emphasizes its claim to representation. Populism reveals the tension between the democratic ideology and the functioning of democracy. As M. Canovan states, ideology of democracy stresses sovereignty of people against accommodation, majority against minorities, and transparency against intricate procedures (43). However, populists argue that the existing practices of democracy are full of opaque and intricate procedures and forms of accommodation of minorities (Abst and Rummens, 411). These problems cause distrust towards politicians and the government. Citizens become passive entities who are just able to select representatives (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 17). Furthermore, the elite, who hold power positions, represent only their own interests and ignore the interests of the real people. By emphasizing the sovereignty of the people, populism offers to give power back to the people who become voiceless in the process. Populists claim to act in the

name of the people by adopting some supposedly more direct forms of democracy. They promise to represent the people whose representation rights are illegitimately stolen by the elite. As Müller states, the claim for exclusive representation is central for populist discourse. Representation of 100 percent of the people is one of its vital arguments. (Müller, 31).

3.1.2. Critique of the Establishment

Another commonality between politics of recognition and populism is their critical attitude towards established institutions, norms, and values. This aspect of the matter comes to the fore especially on the third stage of recognition in the case of politics of recognition. The third stage or social esteem refers to the condition of being recognized through one's concrete traits, abilities, and differences that are acquired thanks to the social groups to which individuals belong. In modern societies, value pluralism constitutes the cultural framework in which subjects' social worth are determined (Honneth, 125). Nevertheless, in some cases, society's hierarchy of values may cause denial of the worth of some forms of life. Individuals who experience this kind of misrecognition struggle to be respected as equal interaction partners in society. According to Honneth, these struggles mark an effort to draw attention to the neglected significance of traits and abilities individuals collectively represent to raise their social worth (127). In "Logic of Identity", Bhikhu Parekh states that misrecognized identities seek recognition either by stretching the existing social identities or demanding the creation of new ones (273). In any case, to draw attention to the neglected significance of certain identities includes a demand to change society's established values. Misrecognized groups need to challenge the cultural framework whereby their worth is determined. They challenge the established social norms that devalue or neglect their identities. Moreover, the third stage of recognition also has a distributive dimension. Economic confrontations are constitutive for this kind of struggle for recognition because of the fact that relations of social esteem are coupled with patterns of income distribution (Honneth, 127). Thus, recognition on this stage also requires to challenge distributive injustices. Misrecognized groups do not only reject the established values in society but also demand changes in established economic hierarchy to accomplish recognition.

Populism, on the other hand, is characterized by its anti-establishment discourse. The famous populist distinction between the people and the elite is acknowledged and emphasized by all scholars of populism. The elite refers to the representatives of the established economic, cultural, and political hierarchies in society. As Moffit states, the elite is a synonym for the corrupt establishment or system (43). Populism draws attention to the inequality between the elite and the people. Despite the fact that the elite is rich, powerful, and institutionally empowered (Brubaker, 363), the people is deprived of all facilities by the establishment. According to the Democratic Paradox theory, populism arises when popular sovereignty is thought to be undermined because of the establishment's clientelism (Abst and Rummen, 410). Populists aim to challenge status quo to give power back to the people. M. Canovan states that populists involve a kind of revolt against the established structure in the name of the people. They challenge both established power holders and elite values. "Populist animus is directed not just at the political and economic establishments but also at opinion-formers in academy and media" (Canovan, 3). Furthermore, populism includes critiques of economic inequality and distributive injustice. According to Jean L. Cohen's analysis, the link between the feeling of political exclusion and loss of influence and the sense of economic insecurity is used for populist promises to give power back to the people (4). Therefore, populism includes serious criticisms towards the establishment through both cultural, political, and economic structures.

3.1.3. Democratization

Politics of recognition and populism can exist only in a democratic culture. Despite the fact that democracy is believed to be the best regime, the practice of democracy has its own problems and flaws. One of the common concerns that politics of recognition and populism seem to share is their promise of deeper democratization.

The democratic promise of recognition has its roots in Hegel. Hegel foresees a democratic state for agents to stabilize recognition relations. People have to be equal and free to accomplish mutual recognition. Charles Taylor, on the other hand, draws attention to the fact that recognition becomes a vital human need in contemporary societies. Collapse of social hierarchies and emergence of a new understanding of

individual identity have made mutual recognition essential to democratic culture (Taylor 27). Following Honneth's theory, it is possible to argue that politics of recognition may provide democratization on two levels. Firstly, legal recognition eliminates the possibility of legally privileged classes or groups. It guarantees equality among individuals by accumulation of the rights in process (Honneth, 116). Any form of privilege is restricted by the law. Thus, legal recognition aims to accomplish equality among individuals in a difference blind fashion. If legal recognition is acquired in a desired sense, discrimination among individuals and groups will be removed by the guarantee of law.

Social esteem, as the third stage of recognition, provide a sense of social worth through collective identity of individuals. Despite the fact that legal recognition guarantees equality and nondiscrimination before the law, individuals may be deprived of social worth because of society's hierarchy of values. So, even if every citizen is equal before the law, one can still be subject to exclusion due to his group identity. Social esteem, as the third level of recognition, aim to fix this problem and eliminate the possibility of exclusion or discrimination because of collective identity.

Populism also contains a promise of genuine democratization. Democracy is argued to be undermined by the elite who dominates significant leading positions. The people's interests are ignored by them and the people becomes voiceless in the process. Populism defends to give power back to the people by emphasizing general will or the sovereignty of the people. Transparency of the will of the people is promised through more direct forms of democracy (Abst and Rummens, 409). Populism's promise of democratization can be classified into three categories. Firstly, it makes politics more comprehensible and understandable for common people. "Rather than speaking in the convoluted language of technocrats or relying on abstraction, populists' blunt style can enable citizens to regain their grip on a complex political reality by restoring mundane political experience to the centre of democratic practice" (Moffit, 142). Secondly, populists claim r to include previously excluded identities in their definition of the people. Thus, they transform these identities into legitimate political actors. Thirdly, populism reveals the dysfunctions of the current

system by exposing corruption and elite collusion (Moffit, 144). As a result, it aims to make people feel properly represented as the legitimate source of power.

These common concerns are points of juncture between populism and politics of recognition. In the following part, promises of populism for recognition will be discussed.

3.2. How Does Populism Answer the Recognition Question?

3.2.1. Inclusion of the Excluded Groups

The people is one of the core concepts of populism. Populists claim to act and speak in the name of the people against the established structure. According to Laclau, the people is an empty signifier with a vague, unspecifiable signified. In other words, it does not refer to any concrete feature of the social reality. It provides to conceive of different political demands as a totality. “Unlike political struggles based around particular categories like class, gender or race, Laclau saw populism’s appeal to the people as opening up the democratic horizon to an ever-expanding number of identities” (Moffit, 137). Thus, populism fosters the mobilization of excluded parts of society to achieve radical democracy. In fact, for Laclau, radical democracy is always populist (Moffit, 259). Seen in this light, there is a strong connection between the third stage of recognition and the populist promise. It is the stage that people are recognized through their group identity. It provides individuals to know themselves as a member of social group that can collectively accomplish things (Honneth, 128). Failure of this form of recognition refers to degradation and denigration of individuals because of their group identity. If society’s hierarchy of values that determines the social worth of individuals causes to downgrade some forms of life, it will end up with struggle for recognition. In such cases of misrecognition, groups aim to draw attention to the neglected importance of the traits and abilities they collectively represent (Honneth, 127). If the struggle reaches its goal, the worth of the group will be recognized and individuals, who belong to the group, will join society as equal partners of interaction. In modern societies, value pluralism is central for the cultural framework that subjects’ worth are determined. So, struggle for recognition always includes challenges towards established norms that cause devaluation of the group

identity. Struggling groups try to widen cultural framework by establishing new values and norms. By doing so, they show their worth through their contribution to society's goals. Here, populism offers recognition for these groups by including them in the definition of the people. Canovan states that "populism in modern democratic societies is best seen as an appeal to the people against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society" (3). Likewise, according to Mudde and Kaltwasser, the meaning of the people includes a critique of the dominant culture, which views the judgements, tastes, and values of ordinary citizens with suspicion (10). Populist challenge of the establishment corresponds to the need of misrecognized groups to show neglected worth of their traits and abilities. The people, as an empty signifier, is able to include different misrecognized groups. Populism "vindicates the dignity and knowledge of groups who objectively or subjectively are being excluded from power due to their sociocultural and socioeconomic status" (Mudde and Kaltwasser 10). Evo Morales, the populist leader of Bolivia, has successfully included the urban mestizos and ignored indigenous population of Bolivia in the concept of the people (Moffit, 143). Hugo Chavez, likewise, was able to include the groups who live at the margins of civil society (Moffit,143). The former populist leader of Taiwan, Thaksin Shinawatra, also accomplished to add the rural poor, the urban middle classes, and the northern small businesses and land owners in the conception of the people (Phongpaichit and Baker). Juan Peron, the former president of Argentina, changed the perception towards marginalized groups such as descamisados (shirtless ones) and cabecitas negras (blackheads) (Mudde and Kaltwasseer, 11). These populist leaders spoke for the previously excluded groups and helped them to join society as equal interaction partners. They also adopted the clothing, speech and dress of these groups as symbolic gestures. "These symbolically inclusive gestures sought to legitimise previously excluded identities within political and cultural sphere" (Moffit, 143). Thus, populism provides recognition by challenging and widening the values and norms that determine social worth of the groups and by legitimizing excluded groups in the definition of the people.

3.2.2. Promise of Redistribution

One of the characteristics that populists around the world share in common is a promise of economic recovery. Populism promises to adopt new redistribution policies, reduce unemployment rate and inflation, and provide social welfare to the people who is weakened economically by the elite. Several examples of populist government that will be discussed below have been successful to make serious changes in the economic status of society. It represents an answer to the struggle for social esteem on a crucial level. According to Honneth, due to the fact that relations of social esteem are coupled with patterns of income distribution, economic confrontations are central for these types of struggles (127). There are two sources of demands for material redistribution which arise out the democratic ethics. On the one hand, in a democratic regime, every citizen is promised to be treated equally by law. It requires to assure social rights for citizens to have equal opportunity of participation to democratic process. On the other hand, democratic society needs to give a chance to its citizens to be socially esteemed for their personal achievements (Honneth, "Recognition or Redistribution?", 53). Honneth claims that it corresponds to the just distribution because "the rules organizing the distribution of material goods derive from the degree of social esteem enjoyed by social groups, in accordance with institutionalized hierarchies of value" ("Recognition or Redistribution?" 54). In the capitalist economic order, the amount of economic reward is determined by the social groups' positions in the process of production. For instance, the difference between the status of a wage labourer and manager end up with different economic rewards. Honneth states that rules of production can be seen as the results of the sociocultural dispositive that determines the value of activities, attributes and contributions ("Recognition or Redistribution?" 54). Seen in this light, redistribution demands are the struggles over established cultural definitions of what activities are socially necessary and valuable. It reveals the fact that these struggles are locked into a struggle for recognition that aim to challenge established measures of social esteem (Honneth, "Recognition or Redistribution?" 54).

Some contemporary researches prove that there is a strong connection between economic demands and populism. M. Roodujin draws attention to a strong

connection between economic crises and rise of populism (2014). Similarly, Ford and Goodwin have found that the votes for UKIP is higher in the areas with high unemployment rates (2014). Empirical analyses of Hauwert, Schimpf and Dandoy also testify that a deteriorating economic environment rises the region's populist potential. They have also found that if the regional identities are stronger, the populist potential is more likely to be high (318). It shows that the redistribution struggle is tied with the status of groups' identity and populism is seen to be a solution. If demands of redistribution are a part of struggle for recognition, populism's challenge of established economic situation of society and promise of just distribution will be a solution to recognition question on the third stage. Populists do not only offer economic growth, but also the transformation of established definitions of what activities are valuable. The Venezuelan populist government under the leadership of Hugo Chavez represents an example for the situation. Gabriel Hetland shares important details of the Venezuelan economic situation under the Chavez government ("The Promise and Perils of Radical Left Populism"). Venezuelan economy had a growth rate of 4.1 percent between 2005 to 2013. More importantly, "the Chavez administration progressively redistributed enhanced state revenues by doubling the percentage of GDP devoted to social spending, from 11.3 % to 22.8 % between 1998 and 2011" (Hetland, 281). It paved the way for several social improvements: poverty regressed from 62 percent to 32 percent, extreme poverty fall to 71 percent, and university graduates doubled (Hetland, 281). Furthermore, the government funded several organizations such as health, water, urban land committees, and communal councils to develop a participatory democracy. "A 2002 law mandated nationwide local participatory budgeting" (Hetland 284). It has facilitated representation of disadvantaged groups' interests and demands. It is remarkable that the redistribution policies go hand in hand with participation policies. The populist government in Venezuela made significant changes in economy that was resulted with the improvement of disadvantaged groups' social status. Thus, their social worth has been recognized progressively. Similarly, Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), that is a South-African far-left political party, represents another example of populism as an answer to redistribution struggles. According to the party's manifesto, they promise expropriation of land for equal redistribution, free

education, healthcare, housing, and industrial development to provide millions of jobs, and closing wage gap by introduction of minimum wages (Mbetete, 40).

The impact of economic issues in Trump's victory is also related with the populist response to the question of redistribution as a part of struggle for recognition. William A. Galston draws attention to how economic problems affected Trump's victory as a populist figure in 2016 US elections. Increasing economic problems before Trump's coming to power have been experienced unevenly in American society. There is a contradiction between metropolitan areas and small towns and rural areas. Employment in metropolitan areas is more than five percent above its peak prior to the Great Recession. In contrast, employment rate remains lower than it was at the end of 2007 in small towns and rural areas. Manufacturing employment declined sharply while postindustrial coastal economies almost have not been damaged. It has affected society's expectations towards the future. Despite the fact that people have thought that the next generations will do better than they have in the past, current researches show that optimistic expectations towards the future of society significantly declined. In 2015, 60 percent of the American society were reported to think that it would be worse off than the current generation (Galston, 25). Many citizens blame American elites for their economic problems. Galston states that there is some basis for their anger towards the elite. Transition to a knowledge-based economy have provided better economic situation for highly educated individuals in society. Their access to goods, services, and opportunities are also higher in comparison with others in society. "Meritocratic norms and practices have propelled this group to the highest reaches of the economy, media, and politics" (Galston, 28). Furthermore, many leaders did not address these problems. It lead people to feel voiceless in the process. The American experience has shown the relationship between the economic problems and the status of the people. Distributive injustices seem to be a result of people's status in society. The worth of the activities has been determined on a knowledge-based economic basis that causes to sharpen inequalities between metropolitan and rural areas. In these circumstances, Trump's criticisms towards the elite and promise of economic recovery have been found worth listening in certain quarters of the American society. It is stated that Trump's

victory is based on the feeling that one's group is disadvantaged relative to others. Economically struggling groups have felt deprived because of other groups uneven access to resources (Pettigrew, 111). Thus, status of the groups is directly linked to the economic struggles in USA. Trump, as a populist figure, is acknowledged as someone who heard and represent interests of disadvantaged groups.

Therefore, the populist promise of redistribution establishes important changes in disadvantaged groups' status and social worth.

3.2.3. Promise of Solidarity

Social esteem, as the third stage of recognition, is organized in terms of status groups as discussed above. Collective group identity of subjects is respected as valuable for society. Mutual recognition between different status groups provides group-pride or collective honour. Relationship between the group members, on the other hand, takes the shape of solidarity. Axel Honneth draws attention to the place of solidarity in experiences of collective resistance. In different forms of collective resistance or struggle for recognition, individuals acquire esteem for the abilities that were previously not socially significant. Solidarity emerges as a result of shared experiences of sacrifice and strain in the process (Honneth, 128). Therefore, what misrecognition of social esteem deprive of is experience of solidarity.

Populism promises to establish a sense of solidarity among individuals. Disadvantaged groups are deprived of a sense of solidarity because of misrecognition of their social worth. Populists challenge the established cultural horizon that devalue the social worth of the groups by its anti-establishment discourse. It reveals the dysfunctions and the corruption of the current establishment (Moffit, 144). Thus, problems of disadvantaged groups are expressed and represented in politics. Then, populism suggests to include disadvantaged groups in the category of the people. As Laclau argues, the concept of the people becomes an empty signifier that makes possible to conceive different political demands of the groups as a totality. In a sense, the people serves as a supra-identity including several disadvantaged groups who oppose the establishment. Despite the fact that each of these groups has unique

stories and demands, their experience of sacrifice and strain is common. According to Mudde and Kaltwasser, social movements may be a form of populist mobilization. "Social movements are informal networks that bring together people with a shared identity and a common opponent who engage in noninstitutionalized collective action to pursue a goal" (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 47). These movements are required to identify what most significant social grievances affect society. Only by doing so, they can be able to determine the common opponent. Populism has a capacity to mobilize a widespread feeling of anger towards the establishment (Mudde and Kaltwasser 47). Seen in this light, populism may be able to unite different groups' struggles for recognition against the elite or the establishment. Populism unites them under the single roof of the people. Thus, it provides solidarity among expanding number of identities. That is why Laclau acknowledges populism as useful for democracy.

There are several researches that point out the connection between populism and solidarity. According to Fabio Wolkenstein, populism offers a sense of belonging by the concept of the people and thus, it can be classed as based on a form of solidarity (118). Likewise, Kiess and Trenz states that populist parties establish a kind of communitarian solidarity and the distribution of welfare within the community (460). It is remarkable to note that if feeling of solidarity is in decline, populism's appeal to the people will mostly likely be successful. Researches show that the likelihood of support for populist parties increases if individuals aim to rehabilitate their status loss and displacement in society. In the US case, for instance, support for Trump as a populist leader is mostly associated with feelings of alienation and displacement. Supporters of Trump are reported to believe that the norms and values, which provide them status and solidarity, disappeared (Hills, 38). It has caused status anxieties for some groups whose sense of social prestige and solidarity were based on those values. Their social identity is believed to be deprived of social respect and social solidarity by the rest of society (Cohen, 16-7). The relationship between immigration and populism is also related to similar anxieties. Immigration is seen as a crucial problem by most of the populists, because of the belief that it causes to

weaken social cohesion in addition to other problems (Halikiopoulou, 36). In both cases, populism appears to be a solution to restore solidarity.

Therefore, populism provides recognition by including previously excluded groups, changing their social status by its redistribution policies, and establishing a sense of solidarity among disadvantaged groups. In this chapter, it explored that populism represents an answer to the demands of recognition on some levels. As Rogers Brubaker states, “populism is keenly attuned to the distribution not only of resources and opportunities but of honor, respect, and recognition, which may be seen as unjustly withheld from ordinary people” (363). Nevertheless, there are also contradictions between populism and politics of recognition. For a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between these two kinds of politics, it is also necessary to investigate how populism may lead to misrecognition. In the following chapter, inconsistencies of politics of recognition and populism and will be discussed.

CHAPTER 4

POPULISM and RECOGNITION II: AN INCOMPATIBILIST ACCOUNT

Populism and politics of recognition are topical issues on the political stage in contemporary societies. Despite the fact that populism seems to provide an answer to the question of recognition, it is arguable if its answer is viable and valid. There seem to be several contradictions between the two forms of politics. Populism is accused of being anti-pluralist, exclusionary, and authoritarian while politics of recognition aims at a pluralist, open society. In this chapter, inconsistencies between these two forms of politics will be illustrated and populism will be discussed as a form of misrecognition.

4.1. Inconsistencies Between Populism and Politics of Recognition

4.1.1. Anti-Pluralism

Politics of recognition requires a pluralist society. Due to the collapse of social hierarchies, one's identity is not fixed in his social position anymore. Every single individual must discover his unique way of life to achieve self-realization (Taylor). However, dialogical character of human subjectivity necessitates the presence of and communication with others for self-discovery and identity formation. In other words, individuals discover and define their identities only through exchange with others. That is why it is a vital human need to be recognized by other subjects. Recognition is acquired in three steps. In the first place, individuals are recognized through emotional attachments such as parent-child relationships, friendships, or erotic relationships. It is constitutive for identity formation but as the basic form of recognition, it is not subject to social conflict (Honneth, 162). In the second step, individuals are legally recognized through their universal capacity as morally responsible people. Then, finally, they are respected through their unique characteristics and differences as valuable for society. In contrast to first form of recognition, the other two are subjected to social conflicts because of the fact that they are based on socially generalized criteria to function (Honneth, 162). Social esteem requires a social medium that ethical values and goals are formulated

because social worth of the individuals is measured by reference to their contribution to the societal goals. “The cultural self understanding of a society provides the criteria that orient the social esteem of persons, because their abilities and achievements are judged intersubjectively according to the degree to which they can help to realize culturally defined values” (Honneth, 122). Due to the dissolution of traditional hierarchy of values, in contemporary societies, a form of value pluralism constitutes the cultural framework which social worth is determined. Thus, struggle for recognition emerges when the cultural framework cause to neglect the value of particular identity groups. “The very notion of struggle for recognition can be interpreted as a competition of multiple claims regarding valuable human qualities and ways to achieve self-realization” (Maia and Vimieiro, 163). Seen in this light, politics of recognition provide to establish new values in society’s cultural framework. By doing so, it constructs a form of value pluralism that make possible to recognize individuals through their characteristic differences.

Populism, on the other hand, tends to display an essentially anti-pluralist orientation (Müller, 20). The antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite has several consequences pertaining to this anti-pluralist bent. Firstly, the people is defined as a homogenous unity that presume a closed, collective identity (Abst and Rummens, 416). The interests and demands of different groups are assumed to be the same. Such a homogenizing conception of the people causes denial of complexity and diversity in society. Secondly, populism adopts an illiberal form of holism. Populists claim that the transparency of the will of the people is possible because of the people’s common identity. Correspondingly, it is also possible for the people to have one true representative embodying this common transparent character. The people or the demos cannot be seen as an internally differentiated whole. That is why populists dare claim to represent 100 percent of the people. Thirdly, only one part of the citizenry represents the real people in the populist logic. The others are defined either as threats or enemies of the real people, eliminating the possibility of legitimate opposition. Therefore, populists do not just want to represent the people but they create the impression that only they can be the true representatives. That is why Müller argues that populism is a “moralized form of anti-pluralism” (20).

4.1.2. Polarization

Politics of recognition is based on the dialogical character of human beings. According to Hegel, subjects encounter themselves in the response of others. Individuals' capacity for freedom and rationality requires the right sort of self-understanding. Every human being needs to see his influence on other things or people to establish a free identity. Thus, recognition enters the stage as a necessity to acquire self-realization. Relations of recognition happens in three steps. Firstly, subjects assert their independence by negation and destruction of material objects. However, it is not more than an assertion because of the fact that it is impossible to destroy all environment. On the second step, individuals try to acquire independence by their interaction with other subjects. In fact, self-consciousness can achieve its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness for Hegel (Patten, 127). In the second stage, people assert themselves by excluding all otherness. Independent self-identity is aimed to be established by negating other subjects. It causes a violent conflict, a life and death struggle, that each agent tries to destroy the other. Hence, second step ends up with an unequal recognition: master-slave relationship. The slave recognizes the master to maintain his own existence. The master, on the other hand, forces the slave to recognize him as free. Even if this relationship arises as an institutional solution for the struggle for recognition, Hegel argues that it is ultimately a failure. In the relationship between the master and the slave, the master is recognized only because of fear of the slave. So, the master's claim of independence is nothing more than an assertion. The failure of this relationship brings the third step to the fore. Here, the people come to understand that self-certainty can only be achieved if individuals recognize other agents freely. In other words, recognition is valid only if it is mutual. "It is only when slave becomes free that the master, too, becomes completely free" (Patten, 128). Therefore, politics of recognition has its roots in the assumption of free individuals who acquire self-realization through other subjects. It requires deliberation and negotiation. However, polarization paves the way for regarding others as a threat and jeopardizes the mutuality of recognition relations.

Populism, nevertheless, constructs the other as a common enemy. The distinction between the people and the elite includes a moral claim. The elite refers to one

homogeneous corrupt group while the people is homogeneously pure (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 12). It makes possible to delegitimize the elite and exclude as a threat for society. Political conflict, in populist discourse, is always zero-sum. “One side or the other will win and winner takes all, with no possibility of mutually beneficial transactions or compromises” (Zurn, 3). The people and all political demands are consolidated around an us vs. them dynamic. In populist discourse and politics, recognitive process is either entirely pre-empted or it is arrested in the dialectic of self and other; further dialogical leaps, that is sublation of this dialectic in a deeper level of recognition is not allowed. The process and experience of recognition is not self free to unfold, it is on the contrary arrested in an over-dichotomized relation of us and them. Hence, societal polarization becomes a common issue in countries with populist governments. In the U.S. example, Americans increasingly identify themselves on one political team with an increasing hostility towards the others (Zurn, 5). It makes partisan identity an organizer of one’s other social identities. Thus, politics become more about victory of one’s team instead of policy differences. Trump’s frequently repeated line represents a good example of the situation: “we will have so much winning if I get elected, that you may get bored with winning” (Zurn, 6). Populism, then, excludes the possibility of mutuality by polarization of society. It constitutes a contradiction with politics of recognition because of the fact that recognition must be mutual to be valid.

4.2. How Does Populism Lead to Misrecognition?

4.2.1. Exclusion of the Other

All forms of struggle for recognition aim of inclusion of previously excluded groups. These groups struggle to be recognized through their differences, their unique traits and abilities. If the struggle accomplishes its aim, excluded groups will be able to join society as equal interaction partners. Nevertheless, populist approach to the Other causes exclusion of certain groups from society.

The antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite around which populism revolves corresponds to Carl Schmitt’s notorious friend-enemy distinction. According to Schmitt, the essence of the political is hidden in this binary distinction.

Enemy is the other who represents an existential threat to our substantial identity. Existence of the enemy is necessary to describe “us” because as Schmitt states, “the inclusion of what is identical or homogeneous necessarily also requires the exclusion or even destruction of what is non-identical” (Abst and Rummens, 418). Any truly political “we” requires a “they”. Political collectivities rest on this existential division. Due to the fact that populism understands the other as an existential threat for the people, the other is always a common enemy for the people. It defines the enemy on two levels. The first group of enemy refers to the corrupt elite who works against the interests of the pure and authentic people. They represent the top echelons of society, who have stolen the power from the people and who ignore their demands. Second group, on the other hand, indicates bottom of society. “Those on the bottom may be represented as parasites or spongers, as addicts or deviants, as disorderly or dangerous, as undeserving of benefits and unworthy of respect, and thus as not belonging to the so-called decent, respectable, normal, hard-working people” (Brubaker, 363). Furthermore, populists claim that there is a symbiotic relationship between their enemies: the elite, who represents the top of society, and marginal groups, who are assumed to be the bottom of society. For instance, Trump’s opposition to Obama during his campaign was based on two issues. On the one hand, “bicoastal elite” was criticized through the Obama’s policies and government. On the other hand, the controversy over Obama’s birth certificate emphasized his African American identity as the other of US society. Thus, the relationship between the elite and marginalized groups becomes obvious through Obama’s personality according to populists (Müller, 23). Greater tolerance on the part of the so-called elite towards the marginalized was a sign of complicity between the two segments of society from a populist standpoint.

It may be claimed that every identity requires an other to define its constitutive limits. So, conceived populist distinction between the people and the elite may not be an extraordinary issue. In fact, Laclau claims that it is a necessary distinction to conceive different political demands as a totality. As discussed in the third chapter, the people is argued to be an empty signifier that does not refer to any concrete features of the social reality. Nevertheless, the other of the people is mostly defined through

concrete groups in populist politics. “The threat of the other must be stirred up constantly because to do otherwise would be to endanger identification with empty signifier, i.e. the people” (Hirvonen, 11). It reveals the supply-side of populism. Despite the fact that most of the analyses of populism focus on the demand-side, several scholars draw attention to the fact that populists shape popular demand and interest instead of simply responding to it (Halikiopoulou, Hirvonen). Emphasizing the threat of the other to increase identification may be seen especially in times of crisis (Hirvonen, 11).

The 2019 local elections in Turkey may be illustrated as an example. The Justice and Development Party and the Nationalist Movement Party formed the People’s Alliance while main opposition parties, the Republican People’s Party and İYİ Party, formed Nation Alliance. The campaigning strategy of the People’s Alliance focused on the meaning of elections. They argued that it was more than a simple local election and the survival of the country depended on it. The Nation Alliance was labelled as an “alliance of despicableness”. Erdoğan, as the leader of the ruling party, shared an image on his Twitter account, supposedly illustrating the differences between the People’s Alliance and “Alliance of Despicableness”.² It is stated in the image that the People’s Alliance always supports the truth, only aims to serve the people, and it is always against the tyrants. The Nation Alliance, on the other hand, is accused of being a product of secret and dirty negotiations and interests, being rough to the oppressed, and using lies, slanders, and insults as instruments. The image also associated them with the terrorist groups PKK and FETÖ. The example shows the construction of the Other as an enemy who threaten the existence of the people. In addition, here the other is not simply an abstraction as is usual in an empty signifier. It corresponds to some real political parties and concrete political groups whose opposition is seen as illegitimate. Every single group, who does not support the People’s Alliance, is excluded from the definition of the people. Similarly, the others overlap with real identity groups in Trump’s discourse. Immigrants, refugees, minority groups such as Muslims are marked as be threats for the people. Darrius

² <https://twitter.com/RT Erdogan/status/1100651748602056705?s=20> (27.02.19).

Hills draws attention to the fact that supporters of Trump see him as a savior who can save America from the encroachment of unwanted others (39). Likewise, the government suspended the opposition-controlled National Assembly in Venezuela in 2017. In addition, opposition figures have been banned from elections (Hetland, 287). Thus, populism legitimizes the exclusion of some identity groups by conceiving them as common enemies.

With regards to politics of recognition, there are several outcomes of conceiving the other as enemy. First of all, populism rests on an assumption of homogeneous identity groups defined according to friend-enemy distinction. It is based on the “imaginary fiction of a closed, collective identity, which suppresses individual differences” (Abst and Rummens, 416). Denial of differences ends up with misrecognition of different interests and demands. An obvious contradiction emerges here with recognition’s objective of an open and diverse society. Zizek states that populism ignores the complexity of the contemporary societies by conceptualizing of the other as enemy whose annihilation would restore balance and justice. It fails to grasp the real enemies of the people such as sexism, racism, poverty, capitalism and so on (555). Secondly, predetermination of identity categories obstructs the possibility of mutual recognition. Since the other is acknowledged as enemy who threaten the existence of the people, populism limits the number of potential recognizers (Hirvonen, 13). Collective self-definition of groups are ignored, which is a clear condition of misrecognition. Furthermore, their status as a valid recognizers is taken from them which also prevents potential recognition of the populist camp. “This involves a strange, almost tragic, dynamic where recognition is struggled for and yet the status of a valid recognizer is denied from the others” (Hirvonen, 13). Then, populism becomes a self-fulfilling hypothesis, or a vicious circle, or it is condemned to a kind of Tantalus punishment. Thus, thirdly, populism also causes to narrow the self-understanding of the people. According to recognition theories, every identity group needs to recognize other identities to be able to have the conditions of its own self-identity. Nevertheless, since the other is an existential enemy, “in Hegelian terms, the populists are stuck in a struggle for life and death

where they aim to eliminate the other while the road to self-realization would be found in recognizing the other” (Hirvonen, 13).

Therefore, populism ends up with misrecognition because of active exclusion of the other. It understands the other as enemy which corresponds with real identity groups in populist politics. By treating the other as enemy, it eliminates the possibility of an open and diverse society and mutual recognition.

4.2.2. Direct Representation

Populist exclusion feeds on the assumption that only a part of society is the real people who shares the same interests and demands. Since that the people is conceived as a homogenous entity, transparency of the will of the people seems possible to grasp. This paves the way for the populist claim to exclusive representation. If the will of the people is transparent, it is accessible to those who are willing to listen. Then, there is no need for discussion, party politics, or negotiation. What is needed is just a leader or a party who is able to understand the people and act and speak directly on behalf of them (Abst and Rummens, 408). Intermediary institutional arrangements only retard the will of the people to be manifest. Mediating institutions are also seen as obstacles for democratic transparency that is used by the elite. Even if they seem to be democratic, behind the scenes, there is always something in these institutions that allows the elite to betray the people (Müller, 32). Thus, populism favors more direct forms of representation such as referenda. It is also the reason why populist governments mostly have strong leader figures and even cults of personality. Populism seems to rely on a singular leader who embodies the hopes, desires, and the voice of the people. The leader is more than a simple representative. S/he is the one who is symbolically tied together with the people and who is able to embody the sovereign will (Moffit, 146).

Politics of recognition, on the contrary, presupposes mediating institutions as a necessity for recognition relations. According to Hegel’s theory of recognition, an agent can affirm his own sense of agency and freedom only by being part of a community that is composed by mutually recognizing free agents. Social institutions

are required to mediate and stabilize relations of mutual recognition. “Hegel’s claim is that two or more individuals can recognize each other as free and rational agents only through specific institutions and practices in which they are participating. To this extent, a community of mutual recognition can be realized only if it has a certain objective institutional structure” (Patten, 130). In fact, that is why Hegel claims the state as a rational destiny of human beings. Populist understanding of direct representation, however, damages intermediary institutions. In populist logic, it is the people who directly legitimizes the populist government without any need of mediation (Urbinati, 160). Thus, a directly chosen leader has the capacity to represent the people. It prevents the ability of institutions to freely organize themselves. Institutions become ossified, static, or dead because of populist animus against mediation. Due to the fact that recognition relations require mediating institutions, populism obstructs the realization of recognition potential that is built into social institutions (Hirvonen, 12).

Representative institutions make possible deliberation and participation and it paves the way for temporary interpretation of common good in terms of variety of beliefs and wants of the citizens (Habermas). Due to changing circumstances, all these interpretations can be challenged on the basis of new arguments. This guarantees that the construction of common good is an open-ended process (Abst and Rummens, 417). In this respect, this is in tune with the aim of politics of recognition. Struggle for recognition involves the efforts to re-interpret the common good by challenging established beliefs and adding new ones into society’s cultural horizon. It requires active citizenship as well as functioning institutions to mediate these efforts. Nevertheless, populists do not need empowerment or active participatory citizenship because there is already a leader or party who can directly speak on the behalf of the people. As Müller states, populists mostly conclude contracts with the people through elections and referendum because they believe that “the people can speak with one voice and issue something like an imperative mandate that tells politicians exactly what they have to do in government (31). Therefore, referendum does not refer to an open-ended process of deliberation. Rather, it serves to ratify what the populist leader has already understood to be the real interest of the people. There

are several examples of populists who act like a caretaker of the people. The ideal citizen of Italy, under the leadership of Berlusconi, was considered to be one who sits at home, watches TV, and leaves matters of the state to the Cavaliere without any attempt of participation. Similarly, the Orban government in Hungary did not need to make an election for the new national constitution (Müller, 30).

Populism hampers the institutions that stabilize recognition relations. Its emphasis on direct representation ends up with nonfunctional institutions. If there is no institution functional for deliberation, it is impossible for the people to challenge the dominant interpretation of the common good. Thus, they cannot successfully draw attention to their neglected interests which is the objective of struggle for recognition.

4.2.3. Ossifying Misrecognition

Misrecognition deprives people of a positive understanding towards themselves. It causes a kind of vulnerability leading to negative emotional reactions such as shame, powerlessness, resentment, or rage. Populism constructs identity around these negative feelings. It seems to answer misrecognized identities by revealing these emotions and blaming the elite for it. Nevertheless, it furthermore anchors misrecognition by constructing identity on the basis of the negative feelings.

As previously indicated, love, as the first level of recognition, refers to primary relationships that are constituted by strong emotional attachments. Early childhood is crucial for this level of recognition. Infants, in the first months of their lives, are not aware of the fact that they are separate beings from their mothers. As they grow up, mother and child learn to detach themselves from a state of undifferentiated oneness, symbiosis, and then love each other by recognizing their independent personality. All love relationships of a person are based on unconscious recollection of this experience. Misrecognition, on this level, refers to a failed detachment process. Such failures engender disorders of love relationship that are clinically termed masochism and sadism (Honneth,106). Both masochism and sadism are the results of one-sidedness of a failed recognition relationship.

Erich Fromm's analysis is remarkable to show the relationship between the first level of misrecognition and populism. According to him, masochism appears due to feelings of inferiority, powerlessness, and individual insignificance (163). Sadistic drives, on the other hand, can be seen in the pleasure in domination over another person (179). Despite the fact that two pathologies seem to be opposite, in fact, they are two sides of the same coin. Both masochism and sadism are results of one basic need, "springing from the inability to bear the isolation and weakness of one's own self" (Fromm, 180). Although they arise in different behaviours, the common aim of the two is forgetting one's self. In the case of masochism, individual can find cultural patterns to satisfy his masochistic strivings. According to Fromm, these individuals may attempt to become a part of a bigger and powerful whole outside of oneself to overcome feeling of powerlessness. It may be in several forms such as an institution, a leader, or a nation. By doing so, "the masochistic person ... is saved from making decisions, saved from the final responsibility for the fate of his self" (Fromm, 177-8). In the case of sadism, on the other hand, individuals lust for power because of their weakness. They aim to dominate others because of their inability to stand alone and live (184). Thus, they admire authority and want to be an authority to have others to submit to them.

Populism seems to offer an answer to the need of these two pathologies. The people serves a bigger and powerful whole outside of oneself. Masochist individual may attempt to lessen his feeling of powerlessness by being a part of the people. Furthermore, as discussed above, populist understanding of direct representation does not require active citizenship and populists act like caretakers of the people. It helps masochist individuals to avoid final responsibility. Similarly, identification with the people provides to fulfill need of authority for sadistic personalities. The strong leader figures of populism may be admired by these individuals as an answer to their lust for power. Due to the fact that the leader is identified with the people in populist discourse, sadistic individuals may assume to have authority through the leader by being a part of the people. Moreover, populist exclusion and denial of the interests of the other may answer the sadists' need of domination. Therefore, it corresponds with Fromm's claim that sadistic and masochistic drives may be drawn on by strong

leader to overcome individual's feelings of isolation. If sadism and masochism are the results of misrecognition on the first level, then individuals with sadistic and masochistic personalities may struggle to heal the bruise of misrecognition through populism. The common aim of these personalities is stated as forgetting one's self. The supra-identity provided by populism may be overvalued by individuals to serve this aim. Nevertheless, it is not a real solution. "The individual succeeds in eliminating the conspicuous suffering but not in removing the underlying conflict and the silent unhappiness" (Fromm, 175). In fact, populism causes to ossify misrecognition by organizing these identities on the basis of their negative emotions.

Populism is also related to the third level of misrecognition that includes degradation and denigration of group identity. In this form of misrecognition, the dignity and status of the people are subjected to a kind of humiliation. It triggers strong negative emotional reactions that pave the way for people to understand certain forms of recognition are being withheld from them. These feelings constitute also the motivational impetus behind struggle for recognition (Honneth, 137). Feelings of alienation and marginalization are also associated with populism as well as struggle for recognition. Several researches show that feeling one's group is in some way disadvantaged relative to others increases the support for populists (Marchlewska et al, 4). It includes feelings of injustice and resentment towards other groups that are believed to threaten disadvantaged groups' interest.

The victory of Trump in 2016 elections is an interesting example to show the complex relationship between misrecognition on the third level and populism. The status order of US society has predominantly been defined in terms of patriarchy and white supremacy. It has caused misrecognition of several identities and paved the way for struggle for recognition. Starting in 1960's, several struggles have been successful to transform established norms, beliefs, and values of the older recognition order and overcome misrecognition of previously excluded identities (Zurn, 8). Legalization of same-sex marriage in 2015 is one of the current results of these struggles. It is argued that especially in Western societies, a silent revolution in values such as gender equality, toleration of minorities, multiculturalism has happened since mid 1960's.

Nevertheless, the groups, who benefited from the older recognition order, has felt a status loss. "These significant changes have ... also been accompanied by a counterrevolutionary retro backlash, especially among the older generations, white men, and less educated sectors, who sense decline" (Zurn, 9). Trump has been supported largely by conservative, White, male citizens to reclaim their values and reconcile their status in society (Hills, 39). There are striking statements of individuals in Arlie Hochschild's research on supporters of populism (2016). One of the participants expresses his feeling of displacement and injustice due to the changing status order:

You are patiently standing in a middle of a long line leading up a hill, as in a pilgrimage. Others beside you seem like you - white, older, Christian, predominantly male. ... Then, look! Suddenly you see people cutting in line ahead of you! As they cut in, you seem to be being moved back. ... Who are they? Many are black. ... Others are cutting ahead too - uppity women seeking formerly all-male jobs, immigrants, refugees. ... As you wait in this unmoving line, you're asked to feel sorry for them all. People complain: Racism, Discrimination, Sexism. ... You're a compassionate person. But now you've been asked to extend your sympathy to all the people who have cut in front of you. ... You believe in equal rights. But how about your own rights? ... It's unfair (16).

Feelings of these people may be conceptualized under the title of resentment. According to Eric Fassin, resentment is hidden in the idea that the other takes pleasure instead of one's self and that if one cannot take pleasure, it is because of others (73). Struggle for recognition changes the society's hierarchy of values that determines the social worth of individuals. However, individuals whose social worth is already recognized through these values have had an anxiety for losing their privileges and status. It makes these people resent to former disadvantaged groups who started to be recognized. As it is seen in the statement above, they blame these groups for their social and economic problems. Populism effectively mobilizes feelings of resentment and exclusion (Fassin, Cohen). In the US case, "to white, native-born, heterosexual men, Trump offered a solution to the dilemma they had long faced as the left-behinds of the 1960s and 1970s celebration of other identities. Trump was the identity politics candidate for white men" (Hochschild, 230).

As Honneth states, the struggle for recognition takes shape of solidarity and if it becomes successful, it provides self-worth. Populism, here, offers a sense of belonging and solidarity to resenting individuals and promises to reconcile their social-worth and status by re-establishing changed norms and values. Hence, it may be seen as an answer to the recognition question of these individuals. However, it represents misrecognition on third level for two reasons. Firstly, feeling of resentment, which characterizes populism, indicates politics as a zero-sum game. If one group wins, the others will completely lose and the loss is caused by the victory of others. Political conflicts always end up with one winner who takes all with no possibility of mutually beneficial transactions or compromises (Zurn, 3). It eliminates the possibility of mutuality that is the core aim of recognition. Secondly, populism constructs the identity of the people around feelings of resentment and marginalization. These feelings may serve as the basis for individuals to join the populist camp but populism requires to keep these feelings alive to make sure the continuation of its support. Thus, it does not remove the feelings of alienation and marginalization as politics of recognition requires. Instead, it contributes to them by defining the people and the elite through these feelings. So, the social feelings, that are the sources of struggle for recognition in the first place, are negatively fixed and anchored by populism.

Therefore, populism mobilizes the people through their negative feelings such as marginalization, alienation, resentment, or powerlessness. All these feelings may be seen as different reactions to misrecognition. They may be the motivational impetus behind the struggle for recognition. However, the true objective of the struggle is to overcome these feelings. In contrast, populist identity construction is based on these feelings. Thus, populism deepens misrecognition by galvanizing and perpetuating the negative emotional reactions that are the sources of the struggles in the first place.

To sum up, populism contradicts with politics of recognition because of its anti-pluralist nature and its polarization of society. It causes misrecognition for three reasons. First, it ends up with active exclusion of the other through construction of identities on the basis of friend-enemy distinction. Politics of recognition requires

relatively reasonable encounters with others, but by marking and stereotyping others as enemies populism precludes such encounters. In this way, social dynamics of recognition are seriously impaired and motivational resources of mutual recognition are exhausted. Second, populist understanding of direct representation renders the mediating institutions dysfunctional. It preempts the possibility of deliberation to stabilize recognition relations. Finally, populist politics mobilizes the people through their negative emotions by constructing their identities on the basis of these very emotions. Since these feelings are the sources of struggle for recognition, populism causes to ossify misrecognition by obstructing release from them. Populism, therefore, can be seen as a form of misrecognition.



CONCLUSION

Populism has shown a significant rise all around the globe. Students of populism focus on the reasons behind its rapid rise and the increasing support for it. As a result of their analysis, current literature on populism is divided into two camps: On the one hand, some approaches claim that populism is a disease of democracy which paves the way for polarization, authoritarianism, and anti-pluralism. On the other hand, some others adopt a more positive attitude towards the phenomenon. According to them, populism is an essential part of democracy that makes possible to conceive several political demands as a totality. In any case, populism is related to politics of recognition. In the contemporary political landscape that is characterized by struggles for recognition, it would not be possible for populism to rise without addressing the demands of recognition. What is disputable, however, is the validity of its answer to these claims.

Struggle for recognition comes to the fore when society's hierarchy of values causes to humiliation of some group identities. Misrecognized groups aim to change these established values to draw attention for their neglected worth. They require their interests and demands to be represented. Populism seems to share these concerns. Firstly, anti-establishment discourse characterizes populism. By opposing established elites and their values, populists represent themselves on the same side with misrecognized groups. In other words, they seem to oppose same values and practices that lead to misrecognition. Secondly, populists criticize the elite for being blind to the interests of the real people. They demand more transparent forms of democracy for a better representation of the interests. It corresponds with the needs of misrecognized groups. Populism's critique of the establishment are mostly based on real problems of misrecognized groups. Thus, the other of the misrecognized groups and populism seem to overlap.

After the construction of a common ground, populism includes previously excluded groups in its definition of the people. It makes possible to represent different

demands and interests as a totality. Populist leaders make many gestures such as adopting clothes or speeches of the disadvantaged groups. By doing so, populism legitimizes these identities. Furthermore, the populist challenge to the established norms helps to reveal significance of misrecognized identities. Thus, populism integrates misrecognized groups into society.

Populism also promises redistribution of resources. Several populist governments have adopted redistribution policies and social aid programs to improve economic situation of struggling groups. Due to the fact that relations of social esteem is coupled with patterns of income distributions, redistribution provides to recover social status. In this manner, populism answers an important part of the demands of recognition.

Furthermore, misrecognition causes a sense of lack of solidarity. On the third level of recognition, individuals acquire group-pride. Nevertheless, people who live in the margins of society are deprived of these feelings. Feeling of solidarity comes into being as a result of shared experience of sacrifice and strain. It is a fact that groups who come together under the roof of the people have their unique stories and demands. Still, their experiences of sacrifice and strain are common. Populism establishes a sense of solidarity by uniting different marginalized groups under the single roof of the people. Thus, it seems to fulfill an important need of misrecognized individuals.

Nevertheless, populism does not seem to cover all problems that are results of misrecognition. First of all, it is a fact that populist critique of the establishment is shared by misrecognized groups. The elite represents the other also for misrecognized groups in many cases. However, inclusion of the groups in the definition of the people does not provide a real recognition. Even though populism offers to acknowledge these groups as friends, it refers to the other as enemy who represents an existential threat. In addition, the others of populism do not refer to an abstract group. They corresponds with concrete individuals, groups, or political parties. By constructing the other as an enemy, populism obstructs the possibility of

mutual recognition. The others as the potential recognizers are neglected as the enemies of the people. It ends up with polarization of society. It also damages the possibility of the self-realization by limiting self-understanding. As a result, populism acknowledges politics as a form of life-death struggle where each party aims to eliminate the other.

Secondly, populists prefer more direct forms of representation. Due to the fact that the people refers to a homogenous unity for them, populists believe in the possibility of transparency of the will of the people. Mediating institutions, in this sense, are simply unnecessary. They just retard the manifestation of will of the people. What is needed is a singular leader or a political party who can embody the voices of the people. Furthermore, these institutions are blamed for allowing to betrayal of the elite behind the scenes. This interpretation of the mediation ends up with nonfunctional institutions. However, mediating institutions are vital to stabilize relations of recognition. They make possible deliberation and participation by making construction of common good as an open-ended process. Populist understanding of representation eliminates the ability of the institutions to freely organize themselves. Thus, individuals are deprived of institutions where they can join to stabilize relations of recognition by deliberation.

Lastly, populism ossifies misrecognition by freezing the negative emotions of individuals. Misrecognition on both levels ends up with different feelings such as marginalization, powerlessness, and resentment. On the first level of misrecognition, individuals may suffer from masochism or sadism. The feelings that are common in both pathologies are powerlessness and insignificance. These individuals may attempt to be a part of a bigger existence outside of themselves to overcome these feelings. Populist conceptualization of the people may serve as this bigger existence. By becoming a part of the people and embodiment in the populist leader, sadistic and masochistic individuals may try to heal their feelings of insignificance and powerlessness.

The third level of misrecognition, on the other hand, causes feelings of marginalization and resentment. These feelings provide individuals to understand that they are deprived of recognition. Thus, they have potential to turn into struggle for recognition. Nevertheless, populism mobilizes people around these negative feelings. It does not refer to a real solution to overcome neither sadism and masochism nor marginalization and resentment. In contrast, populism takes these feelings as the basis for its identity construction. In this way, individuals are stuck in these negative emotions despite the fact that the purpose of the struggle for recognition is to overcome them. Thus, populism causes ossifying misrecognition.

It is an undeniable fact that populism promises some solutions to the problems of society. Its appeal to the people finds an important amount of audience including misrecognized groups. Populist promises are believed to worth listening by these groups. Thus, movements of identity that are driven by the demands of recognition help populism to rise and widen its influence. In some respects, populism answers these demands. Nevertheless, at the end of the day, it causes other kinds of problems for politics of recognition. Consequently, populism does not represent a proper solution to the question of recognition.

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