

**ISLAM AND SECULARISM IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
(1919-1938)**

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
İSTANBUL ŞEHİR UNIVERSITY

BY




HARUN KÜÇÜKALADAĞLI

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
IN
MODERN TURKISH STUDIES

AUGUST 2019

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Modern Turkish Studies

Examining Committee Members:

	DECISION	SIGNATURE
Prof. Nurullah Ardiç (Thesis Advisor)	<u>Accepted</u>	
Prof. Gökhan Çetinsaya	<u>Accepted</u>	
Assist. Prof. Mehmet Ali Doğan	<u>Accepted</u>	

This is to confirm that this thesis complies with all the standards set by the Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences of İstanbul Şehir University.

Date
08.08.2019

Seal/Signature


STATEMENT OF ACADEMIC HONESTY

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and standards of ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and standards, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.



Harun Küçükcaladađlı

ABSTRACT

ISLAM AND SECULARISM IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY (1919-1938)

Küçükkaladağlı, Harun

MA in Modern Turkish Studies

Thesis Advisor: Prof. Nurullah Ardiç

August 2019, 119 pages

This study examines the impact of Islam and secularism on Mustafa Kemal's foreign policy and relations with the Muslim world, focusing specifically on Middle Eastern countries during 1919-1938. By using Hurd's constructivist approach to international relations, I argue that secular ideology in internal politics was a significant parameter in Turkish foreign policy making during this twenty-year period. Also, I examine Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP) with Ardiç's concepts of accommodation and control/domination at the discursive and policy levels, by dividing the Mustafa Kemal era into three periods: Islamization (1919-1924), with particular emphasis on the Caliphate's role in TFP; secularization (1924-29), in parallel with the rising secularism in domestic politics; and securitization (1929-38), with the changing dynamics of TFP based on security concerns. I demonstrate that secularism did not entirely determine Mustafa Kemal's foreign policy continuously from 1919 to 1938, and that secular politics usually accommodated Islam in its application and rhetoric rather than always excluding and conflicting with religion. While Mustafa Kemal pursued a foreign policy in which Islam was used effectively as a discourse between 1919 and 1924 in order to ensure domestic and international political legitimacy, secular changes in TFP during the period of 1924-29 were the product of secular ideological transformations in domestic politics. Finally, due to the security priorities in the regional and global politics, Turkey could not continue to transmit its strict internal ideological transformation in its foreign policy between 1929-1938 – hence securitization. While investigating transformations of TFP through the religious and secular discourses of Mustafa Kemal as the primary decision maker of the new state, I point out the contradictions in both discourses and practices from the 1920s to 1930s.

Keywords: Accommodation Paradigm, Constructivism, Islam, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,
Secularism, Turkish Foreign Policy



ÖZ

TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASINDA İSLAM VE SEKÜLERİZM (1919-1938)

Küçükcaladağlı, Harun

Modern Türkiye Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Nurullah Ardıç

Ağustos 2019, 119 sayfa

Bu çalışma, İslam ve sekülerizmin 1919-1938 yılları arasında Mustafa Kemal'in dış politikasına ve İslam dünyasıyla ilişkilerine etkisini özellikle Ortadoğu ülkelerine odaklanarak incelemektedir. Hurd'un uluslararası ilişkilerdeki inşacı yaklaşımını kullanarak, iç politikadaki seküler ideolojinin bu yirmi yıllık dönemde dış politika yapımında en önemli parametre olduğunu savunuyorum. Ayrıca, Türk dış politikasını (TDP) söylem ve politika düzeyinde Ardıç'ın intibak ve denetim/tahakküm kavramlarıyla açıklıyorum. Mustafa Kemal dönemini, özellikle halifeliğin TDP'deki rolüne vurgu yaparak, İslamlaşma (1919-1924); iç politikada artan sekülerizme paralel olarak, sekülerleşme (1924-29); ve dış politikanın güvenlik kaygılarına dayanan değişen dinamikleri nedeniyle, güvenikleştirme (1929-38) şeklinde üç döneme ayırıyorum. Sekülerizmin 1919-1938 dönemini kapsayan Mustafa Kemal dış politikasını sürekli olarak belirlemediğini ve seküler siyasetin dönüşümünde ve söyleminde genellikle dini sürekli dışlamak ve çatışmaktan ziyade İslam ile intibak içinde olduğunu gösteriyorum. Mustafa Kemal, 1919-1924 yılları arasında içeride ve uluslararası alanda siyasi meşruiyetini sağlamak için İslam'ı söylem olarak etkili bir şekilde kullandığı bir dış politika izlerken, TDP'de 1924-29 döneminde görülen seküler değişiklikler ise tamamen iç politikadaki seküler ideolojik dönüşümlerin ürünüydü. Son olarak, Türkiye bölgesel ve küresel siyasetteki güvenlik öncelikleri nedeniyle, güvenikleştirme olarak adlandırdığım 1929-1938 yılları arasında iç politikadaki katı iç ideolojik dönüşümünü dış politikasına yansıtmaya devam edemedi. TDP'nin geçirdiği dönüşümlerini, yeni kurulan devletin esas karar verici figürü olan Mustafa Kemal'in dini ve seküler söylemleri vasıtasıyla incelerken, 1920'lerden

1930'lara kadar hem söylemlerindeki hem de uygulamalarındaki çelişkilere dikkat çekiyorum.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İnşacılık, İntibak Paradigması, İslam, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Türk Dış Politikası, Sekülerizm



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Prof. Nurullah Ardiç for his continuous support during the process of writing my thesis. Without his help and guidance, I would have never been able to complete this thesis. I would also like to convey my special thanks to Prof. İsmail Kara since his lectures and our discussions during the short trips we had in Istanbul's heavy traffic were very helpful. Special thanks are also reserved for my jury members Prof. Gökhan Çetinsaya and Dr. Mehmet Ali Doğan for sharing their ideas and insightful criticisms with me on the content and framework of the thesis.

Also, I gratefully acknowledge Atatürk Research Center (ATAM) for providing me with an MA scholarship, and the Centre for Islamic Studies (İSAM), Foundation for Sciences and Arts (BİSAV), and İstanbul Şehir University for allowing me to access their rich libraries and providing a useful research environment.

I have discussed the questions and topics of this thesis with several people over the years, and I would like to thank my friends, particularly Bilal Yıldırım, Kadir Temiz, Talha Üstündağ, Mustafa Öztürk and Nurettin Erdoğan for their contributions.

I owe special thanks to my wife, Gülnur, for her support and forbearance during the writing process of this study.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract.....	iv
Öz	vi
Acknowledgements.....	viii
Table of Contents	ix
CHAPTERS	
1. Introduction: Religion, Politics and Foreign Policy in Turkey.....	1
1.1. Research Questions.....	3
1.2. Literature Review	5
1.2.1. Religion and International Relations	5
1.2.2. Turkish Foreign Policy	10
1.2.2.1. The Chronological Approach.....	10
1.2.2.2. The Ideological Approach	13
1.2.2.3. The Analytical Approach	15
1.3. Theoretical Framework	20
1.4. Method.....	23
1.5. Organization of the Thesis.....	27
2. Islam and Foreign Policy in the Ottoman-Turkish Modernization.....	29
2.1. From Tanzimat to Republic	29
2.2. The Republican Era	38
3. The Caliphate and Islamization of Turkish Foreign Policy (1919-24).....	42
3.1. Religious Character of the National Struggle	42
3.2. Justification and Consolidation of the National Struggle with Reference to the Caliphate.....	47
3.3. Relations with the Muslim World.....	49
3.4. Abolition of the Sultanate and the Caliphate Question	54
4. Secularization of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Caliphate Era (1924-1929)...	59
4.1. Abolition of Caliphate and Reactions from the Muslim World	60
4.1.1. Reactions from Muslim World.....	63
4.1.1.1. Indian Muslims.....	63
4.1.1.1. North Africa.....	64

4.2. The Caliphate Conferences and Turkish Foreign Policy	65
4.2.1. The 1924 Mecca Congress	66
4.2.2. The 1926 Cairo Congress	66
4.2.3. The 1926 Mecca Congress	67
4.2.4. The 1931 Jerusalem Congress	68
4.3. Post-Caliphate Relations with the Muslim World	70
4.3.1. Relations with Muslim Countries.....	73
4.3.1.1. Iran	73
4.3.1.2. Saudi Arabia	75
4.3.1.3. Afghanistan	76
4.3.2. Relations with Muslim Communities.....	77
5. Securitization of Turkish Foreign Policy and Kemalist Establishment (1929-38)...	81
5.1. Turkey's Collective Security and Multilateral Relations.....	82
5.1.1. The Briand-Kellogg Pact.....	83
5.1.2. The Balkan Pact.....	84
5.1.3. The League of Nations	85
5.1.4. The Sadabad Pact.....	86
5.2. Bilateral Relations: End of Secular Foreign Policy?	88
5.2.1. The Balkans	89
5.2.2. Iran	90
5.2.3. Afghanistan	91
5.2.4. Saudi Arabia	91
5.2.5. Iraq.....	93
5.2.6. Transjordan.....	94
5.3. Secularism and Relations with Muslim Communities under Colonial Power	94
6. Conclusion	99
Bibliography	104

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: RELIGION, POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN TURKEY

After the annexation of Crimea by Russia, tensions with Ukraine has continued not only in the political and military spheres but also in the religious dimension. The Kyiv government claimed that Moscow has a dominant influence on churches within the country. Thereupon, the Kyiv Patriarchate in Ukraine, whose majority of the population was Orthodox, forwarded its demand for independence to the Fener Greek Patriarchate in Istanbul, and the Patriarchate in Istanbul decided to handle the process formally. Following its meeting on October 2018, the Patriarchate allowed the Ukrainian Orthodox to leave Russia and establish its own independent church. Russia reacted strongly to this decision. "Expressing immeasurable regret over Ukraine's attempt to leave the Russian Orthodox Church, Russia will continue to protect the rights of the Russian-speaking community in Ukraine after this illegal step. However, in doing so, it will apply to political and diplomatic means," the Kremlin stated. Foreign Ministry spokesman Peskov also said the steps that create division between the churches of the two countries are distressing. Russia indicates that Ukrainian President Poroshenko is behind the Ukrainian Church's desire for independence (Euronews 10.12.2018). The Russian Foreign Minister said that the Istanbul Patriarchate has a direct US influence in the decision and blamed Washington. It is not new that the United States is interested in the issue of the religious hierarchy in the Orthodox world. Washington is the strongest supporter of the Istanbul Patriarchate's claim to ecumenism. Washington accepts the Istanbul Patriarch at the highest level and welcomes him in the White House (Çelikkol 2018). In 2018, in Istanbul, with the support of the US government, a decision concerning Ukraine was taken, which attracted the highest level of reaction from the Russian administration. Consequently, the two major global actors and regional states are directly and indirectly involved in this issue.

This example shows that the decision of the Patriarchate is not a pure and independent religious decision and how international politics are interrelated with religion. Therefore, while the concepts of modern global system and sovereignty have been based on pushing religion away from foreign policy ultimately, religion has continued to show its presence and influence in foreign policymaking from time to time by increasing and decreasing. Although the importance of religion in politics has been undermined in the modern nation-state, it has not been completely removed from internal and international politics.

This is also the case in Turkish foreign policy (TFP). Islam has existed with its growing and diminishing influence in TFP making. For instance, Turkey participated for six years with low representation in the meetings of the Organization of Islamic Conference-later Cooperation- (OIC) after it was founded in 1969. Secularism debates in domestic and foreign policy were the main reason for Turkey's limited interest in the organization. Secular elites assumed that participation in OIC meetings would contradict the principle of secularism and that relations with the West could be damaged. But, Deputy Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan of the National Front government established in 1975, opposed the intensive relationship with the West and advocated to turn towards the Muslim world by creating a close cooperation with Muslim countries. Therefore, Erbakan strongly advocated equal participation in OIC meetings and full membership in the organization and encouraged the coalition partners to held OIC meeting in Turkey. The other partners in the government wanted to be cautious move, citing Turkey's political structure and secularism (Cumhuriyet 07.05.1976). Finally, after all the discussions, the government decided for full membership. In May 1976, Istanbul hosted the OIC Foreign Ministers meeting. While the debate on secularism in foreign policy continued strongly, Topkapı Palace was chosen for the meeting venue and the famous *hafız* Abdurrahman Gürses reciting the Qur'an at the opening was one of the most critical contrasts to 'secular' TFP (Cumhuriyet 08.05.1976; Cumhuriyet 09.05. 1976).

In fact, the relationship between Islam and foreign policy has not been only a matter of recent debates. It had been a controversial issue during the late-Ottoman and the

Republican periods. Thus, I examine in my thesis the religious characters of first years of TFP, including the late-Ottoman Era. This study hopes to contribute to explaining the role of Islam in TFP in the 1920s and 1930s. This period in the history of Turkey has long been considered as having been dominated by secular politics, and there has been a trend for the study of Islam and politics in this period. This is also true for TFP during this period. Since the purpose here is not to give a detailed and comprehensive analysis of TFP but to explain the role of Islam and secularism in the foreign-policy-making process, I have chosen not to focus on providing a detailed analysis of TFP.

Secularism and religion are rarely discussed in the mainstream literature on TFP, except for common discussion on domestic politics. I think that studying secularism and religion in TFP might change how we understand Turkish founding elites' political outlook. Although most scholars have examined secularization as a domestic issue only, it also had an important influence on international politics and the making of foreign policy. There is a large number of studies on Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk]'s foreign policy. Instead of repeating the events and cases chronologically, with this study, I aim to make a distinctive study in TFP literature, which is growing every day. My work differs from other studies in the literature with its arguments and cases, because it is not an international relations thesis, and the cases are not examined based on a chronological historical collocation, as revealed by my main and specific research questions.

1.1. Research Questions

In this study, I problematize the argument that the modern Turkish nation-state is a secular state that has completely excluded religion from politics. I hypothesize that there is a strong correlation between the new Turkish nation-state and religion. The formation of national identity, the relationship between nationalism and religion, and the contribution of religion to the creation of national identities might be seen as indications of this connection. Thus, as I will discuss in the following chapter, rather than excluding religion from politics, Mustafa Kemal and his circle seem to have established a secular state system that tried to control religion through a set of principles, institutions, and actors.

Thus, I formulate my research questions as follows: What was the impact of Islam and secularism in the foreign policy of the modern Turkish nation-state in its first decades? Can secularism fully explain Mustafa Kemal's discourses and actions in foreign policy? How and why did Islam be involved in developing Mustafa Kemal's foreign policy? When and in which circumstances did religious legitimacy, secularism, and pragmatic concerns influence foreign policy making? This study provides answers to these questions by using Nurullah Ardiç's model on Turkish modernization and Elizabeth S. Hurd's theoretical framework of social constructivism to analyze Islam and secularism in Mustafa Kemal's foreign policy (Ardiç 2012; Hurd 2008). Thus, we need to look at not only the national level but also the regional and global levels to understand why Turkey chose to follow religious, secular, and pragmatic policies. Also, we need a new perspective that includes religion as a significant explanatory factor for international relations to understand the complex structure of TFP.

In the third and fourth chapters, I will try to find answers to the following questions. Can we say Islam and secularism were the main motives of Mustafa Kemal's foreign policy discourse in different contexts? In contrast to the National Struggle period, why did Mustafa Kemal pay little attention to the Muslim world after the founding of the new state? I argue that Mustafa Kemal had established good relations with the Muslim world during the National Struggle in order to get financial and political support from Muslim countries for his new government. National Struggle was to observe as the popular fundamental model by oppressed Muslims around the world concerning their struggle for independence against imperial states. However, Turkey did not show any interest in other Muslim's liberation activities or the oppression of Muslim minorities even if they had fully supported Turkey during its "National Struggle". I claim that establishing a domestic secular structure predisposed TFP to be largely unassertive and primarily disregard relations with the Muslim world between 1924 and 1930.

The fifth chapter discusses the transformation of TFP centering on the following questions: Did the emergence of German and Italian aggressions in the Balkan and Mediterranean region alter the secular behavior of TFP? Can we say Mustafa Kemal

was a pragmatist and realist when taking foreign policy decisions, and if so, for which policies? Turkey demonstrated pragmatism in TFP based on security concerns and national interests. For instance, Turkey established good relations with Iran and Afghanistan simply because Kemalists had strategic and ideological relations with both countries based on regional security and also making modern nation-state. Turkey also showed interest in some other Arab countries, but this was in accordance with strategic concerns rather than religious ones. Here I argue that implementing new policies in foreign policy demonstrated the capacity of Mustafa Kemal's initiatives that might be even contradicting the secular domestic politics. Also, there were some political factors especially the German and Italian expansionism in international political environment that forced Turkey to take initiatives for sustainable foreign policy as in the 1930s.

1.2. Literature Review

1.2.1. Religion and International Relations

Since religion was considered diminishing in politics, scholars of international relations virtually disregarded the role of religion until the end of the Cold War. Since then, studies on religion and international relations in the literature have increased significantly. One of the reasons for this is that a series of important events has been taking place in international politics for the last forty years. The most significant of them was the 1973 oil crisis that arose as a result of the embargo imposed by the oil exporting Arab countries on the support of Western countries to Israel. The other was the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the new foreign policy of the new regime. Another was the "Afghan Jihad" against the Soviet occupation between 1978 and 1988 and the support of the Muslim world and the West to the Afghans against the Soviet Union, and, most importantly, the 9/11 attacks in the US and the new foreign and security policies developed by the US after the attacks.

Therefore, in the literature, many analyses and studies begin with the post-Cold War world order and take 9/11 as a turning point. In almost all of these studies, it is agreed that the Westphalia is the beginning of the secularization of international relations. According to this, religion, which lost its social and political importance as a result of

modernization, was separated from the international political arena. But finally, the events, as mentioned above, brought about the global resurgence of religion in international politics.

However, many of these studies have addressed the issue of international politics and religion in a way that is Middle East-centered and that reduces the issue to the relationship between Islam, terror, and conflict. I argue that although religion was less visible in international politics as a result of modernization and secularization, it has always existed as a foreign policy instrument of many nation-states. As an example, the impact of Jewish belief on Israel's foreign policy is often ignored in the literature. However, Israeli politics, which developed within the framework of Jewish and Zionist beliefs, the Western support, especially by the US, and the reaction of the Islamic world to this not only in the military field but also in politics and diplomacy have affected the regional and global politics in the last seventy years (Badham, Wells, and McForan 1988). Also, the problem of Northern Ireland was based on religious conflict. According to this, the Catholics wanted to reunite Ireland and leave the UK and Protestants wanted to stay in the UK. This conflict, which influenced Europe in many ways throughout the whole of the twentieth century, had a religious and cultural basis (Baumgart 2006; Mearsheimer and Walt 2009; Seliktar 2015). However, scholars of international politics have often ignored this situation. I believe that policies, alliances, conflicts, and events that have been in place for decades in world politics show that religion continued to influence international politics in the twentieth century.

Despite this, religion is almost completely isolated from the mainstream theories of international relations. The two main theoretical traditions of international relations, realism and liberalism, are influenced by secular world-view in connection with the rise of modernity. According to realism, states define their politics in material terms by focusing on economic political and military power. The role of religion is diminished to its existence as aspects of political authority. Realism emphasizes that religion is a private domain apart from the sphere of international politics. Its emphasis on state sovereignty is based on the Westphalian system, in which religion is henceforth

assumed to play a role in foreign policy (Morgenthau 1973; Waltz 1979). Idealism, in contrast, explains the global system based on human nature and moral values. However, it does not refer to religion but adopts a secular approach to understanding international relations. Liberalism, which emerged from idealism in the second half of the twentieth century, accepts that states are one of the most main actors in the international politics, and also that international bureaucratic coalitions and non-governmental organizations are the most important factors in the decision-making process, but religion and religious institutions are not included among them (Fukuyama 1992; Keohane 2005).

On the other hand, Social constructivism argues that defining issues such as identity and culture in international relations with only material elements is insufficient. It emphasizes that norms and culture affect the identity of states and play a critical role in determining the interests and behavior of states, and that the identities of states can alter pursuant the political, social, cultural and historical environments. A state acts in international politics in line with the identity it defines. Although social constructivists do not make direct references to religion, they consider ethnic, religious, and cultural elements as essential components of identity (Wendt 1999; Katzenstein and Byrnes 2006)

In the literature, the generally accepted argument is that the exclusion of religion from international relations is based on the socio-historical developments in Europe since the Enlightenment. During this era, many believed that the importance of religion will diminish and that it will no longer play a meaningful role in politics and society. With the Treaty of Westphalia, they hold, religion, which was disabled in the global system, was "sent into exile" as the main reason for the wars and chaos in the previous periods. Petito and Hatzopoulos edited a comprehensive volume in the field of the resurgence of religion in international relations, one contributed to by distinguished and prominent scholars. Thomas, Kubalkova, Hasenclever and Rittberger, Falk, Dallmayr, Esposito, and Voll refer to resurgence of religion in their chapters (Hatzopoulos and Petito 2003).

In his article examining the system of Westphalia and international relations, Philpott states that following the emergence of the sovereign state system after the Westphalia, the rules of war and peace, diplomacy, and economy were established not in accordance with religious rules, but rather according to the secular rules of the modern nation-state system (Philpott 2000). In this context, with "the Secularization of International Relations," studies in international relations have been shaped by concepts such as power, security, economy, interest, etc, but not religion (Philpott 2002).

The significance of religion in politics has weakened in the nation-state system based on secular principals. Religion has been removed from politics and international politics and reduced to private life. It was also taken as an internal matter of states and drawn into territorial boundaries. The secular decisions and implementations of actors and states in domestic and foreign policy eliminated religion from politics and have determined the character of the international relations discipline until the post-Cold War period. The concept of secular politics, which emerged with the Enlightenment, not only profoundly influenced the social sciences but was also engraved in the "genetic code of the discipline of international relations." The theories of international relations have adopted a state-centered, secular, and positivist perspective, undermining the influence of religion (Hatzopoulos and Petito 2003).

The role of religion in world politics is challenging the secular and materialist assumptions of the Westphalian establishment of international relations. Religion plays a decisive role in the behavioral character of states and actors. In foreign policy, it acts as an important factor affecting decision-making processes as well as practices as a legitimating tool (Fox and Sandler 2004).

In contrast to what is generally seen in the literature, Thomas does not link the issue of international relations and religion only to the events of the 9/11. In his extensive study, from a sociological perspective, he considers the global resurgence of religion with the increasing visibility of individual beliefs and religiosity in society, religious

discourses and worship, and the expanding role of religious people in politics and society. In this respect, it makes an important contribution to the literature (Thomas 2005).

According to Benno Teschke, the international relations discipline, as a result of the great transformation after the Cold War, crossed the boundaries of the parochial framework of the Myth of Westphalia, and multidimensional and comprehensive discussions have begun to emerge. In this respect, he also criticizes how the Westphalian system is regarded as a turning point in modern international relations. The theories of international relations were founded on the Myth of Westphalia, which was not a system of sovereign states in the modern sense that emerged in 1648, it is a stage in the formation of the absolutist state. However, he admits that the Westphalian system secularized international politics by excluding religion (Teschke 2009). The reason for this is that "*cujus regio, ejus religio* (whose region, his religion)," which is one of the most important principles of the Westphalia, gives the ruler religious control over his realm (Carlson and Owens 2003).

Although similar studies in the literature have recently increased, it is the English School that has attempted, since the second half of the twentieth century, to establish the first comprehensive model and theory in this field. Theorists of this School, like Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield, consider Christianity and religion as an important part of international relations and claim that without common culture, interests, goals, power, and law alone cannot form international society (Butterfield 1962; Thomas 2001; Wight 1960). However, since this school evaluates the subject only through Christian theology, its effect has been limited in the literature.

As can be seen from the above studies in the literature, religion is generally considered to have been isolated from international relations in the post-Westphalia order, but its role has started to increase again especially after the Cold War and 9/11. This approach is so dominant in the literature that almost all studies explain and conclude the subjects of international relations through the same narrative.

However, what differentiates Hurd from others is that she analyzes the cases of international relations by using new concepts and classifications as well as the framework of social constructivism. Accordingly, Hurd argues that the secular distinction between religion and politics is not fixed, but is historically and socially constructed. She emphasizes that the effect of religion on world politics can only be recognized from this perspective and that many problems in international relations can be better understood in this way. Thus, the author extends her thesis beyond the general assertion that "religion has withdrawn from the international arena after Westphalia, and has recently begun to return again". This approach distinguishes her from the others in the literature of religion and international relations, which is growing every day (Hurd 2004, 2008, 2012).

1.2.2. Turkish Foreign Policy

The 90 years of TFP literature are too large to address in this short review. I have to prioritize those studies that focus on the TFP of the early Republican era. TFP literature has been shaped by fundamental characteristics of the realist and ideological mindset. Most of them are written from secularist, nationalist ideological perspectives and use non-scientific methods (Akşin 1991; Aras 2003; Bayur 1973; Gönlübol and Sar 1990; Tuncer 2008). There are few studies in TFP indirectly examining the impact of Islam and secularism on foreign policy during the Mustafa Kemal era (Çalış and Bağcı 2003; Koçer 2003). Many of the studies on TFP are written using an ideological approach or only in chronological order (Bıyıklı 2008; Çakmak 2008). Thus, these studies can only explain limited aspects of the foreign-policy-making process and are unable to explain domestic effects on foreign policy. Here I examine TFP literature in three categories: chronological, ideological, and analytical.

1.2.2.1. The Chronological Approach

The main characteristic of these studies that I classify as chronological is that they describe events only in chronology and do not study documents and events with an analytical approach. In these studies, foreign policy elements such as bilateral relations, treaties, collaborations, alliances, international political events, developments, and visits are examined. They do not address the subjects within a

methodological and theoretical framework and are generally in the form of textbooks.

In the two-volume books, edited by Mustafa Bıyıklı, Turkey's relations with other states and neighbors are examined in chronological order. The foreign policy of the Mustafa Kemal period is covered under different articles within the framework of various issues and problems. This multi-authored edited book has led to the evaluation of the subject from different perspectives and has made a broad contribution to the literature (Bıyıklı 2008).

Armaoğlu inquires into developments in TFP from the National Struggle until 1939 in his comprehensive book regarding the political history of the 20th century. This period is divided into three categories: National Struggle 1919-22, Temporary Peace Period 1923-30, and Depression Period 1931-39. Although this period has not been studied in a very detailed way, he evaluates TFP within the framework of global policy developments until the post-Cold War period (Armaoğlu 1987). Another study highlighted in this category is Gürün's series on TFP in the 1923-39 period. He examines TFP in the framework of security issues in the international environment and its impacts on the new foreign policy's formulation (Gürün 1985, 1997).

Although Sönmezoğlu's book, which is one of the most well-known works of this area, extensively deals with the period between the world wars, it describes the period's foreign policy only within the framework of relations with the Western states. Instead of offering new approaches with a different point of view, it reviews the documents of the period from a general perspective (Sönmezoğlu 2011). Similarly, in Çakmak's edited book, which is a very popular textbook in universities, the foreign policy of the first years of Turkey is examined only through a reductionist approach to relations with Western states. In such studies, relationships with Muslim states are evaluated with a superficial and short narrative under the title of "Relations with the East", generally limited to three countries. Relations with Iran are examined within the framework of the border and security issues. Mosul and Kirkuk questions are also only items on relations with Iraq, and Afghanistan that are evaluated in a security

matter (Çakmak 2008). Likewise, the edited book *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası* (Turkish Foreign Policy with Events) is another study that is not able to go beyond the existing narrative model in the literature, following only the subjects and chronology and is written without using the questioning method (Gönlübol and Sar 1969). Although the edited book, *Türk Dış Politikası 1830-1989* (Turkish Foreign Policy 1830-1989) makes a different contribution to the literature with a narrative that starts TFP with Tanzimat, the foreign policy of the Republican Era does not go beyond the general narrative (Kekevi, Tekinsoy, and Türkmen 2017).

Furthermore, Balcı prepared his study as an introductory textbook for university students and intentionally does not include theoretical discussions in international relations. For this reason, Balcı pursues a chronological narration and tries to explain TFP in thirteen periods from 1774 to today based on those period's specific principles and actors. Although it can be included in the analytical category in this respect, this study is classified as chronological because of its undetailed and descriptive features as a textbook (Balcı 2013).

Meanwhile, Hale takes the history of TFP from 1774, like Balcı, and this is an early date compared to other studies. The second chapter (Resistance, Reconstruction, and Diplomacy 1918-39) examines the foreign policy of Mustafa Kemal era and emphasizes the fact that the new Turkish state is used extensively for diplomacy to survive. In this chapter, where he refers to many secondary sources, he discusses the foreign policy of the period only with Western countries within the framework of security and place-based policies but does not address relations with the Muslim world, like many other studies in the Turkish literature (Hale 2000). Similarly, Karpat's *Türk Dış Politikası Tarihi* (History of Turkish Foreign Policy) is trying to present a broader perspective with historical context by including the last period of the Ottoman Empire. However, since it is not a completely planned study, and it is a collection of his speeches and studies at different places and dates, there is a problem of subject integrity in the book. But, while examining the Ottoman period, he develops comprehensive approaches that make the book valuable in the literature.

Rather than providing a chronological narrative, he tries to investigate the causes and consequences of events and policies (Karpas 2012; see also Karpas 1996).

1.2.2.2. The Ideological Approach

As I mentioned above, the basic assumption of my study is that there is no continuity of Mustafa Kemal's foreign policy based on secular ideology from 1919 till 1938. Domestic politics and the international environment dictated to Turkey's decision makers variable foreign policy options. However, there are ideological publications of Kemalist writing in the literature in order to reflect the internal ideological transformations to the foreign policy and expand the scope of legitimacy in domestic politics. For instance, in the years of National Struggle, the foreign policy efforts to establish intense relations with the Muslim world are ignored. Instead, there was a discourse that would legitimize the construction process of the Kemalist elite's secular domestic politics in foreign policy. This policy has been the need for legitimacy in the academic sphere rather than a need for popular legitimacy. The reflection of this legitimacy effort, which has a place in the foreign policy writing as well as internal politics, is still present today.

This approach has reduced Westernization in foreign policy to just relations with the West and has claimed that Turkey wholly followed a new foreign policy during the first years of the Republic. Pointing out a rupture between the Ottoman and the Republican era, this approach dismissed continuity between two periods at the level of actors and bureaucracy. It has even been claimed that the Ottomans pursued a religious, unreal, aggressive foreign policy and that the new Turkey adopted a foreign policy in line with the realities of the modern world order.

The actors of domestic and foreign politics wrote many publications based on this approach. Tevfik Rüştü Aras, who was the foreign minister between 1925 and 1938, wrote one of the most significant books in this category. He defines the foreign policy of Mustafa Kemal as an active foreign policy which is principled, rational, respectful of national interests, peaceful, conciliatory, cooperative, and in accordance with mutual interests (Aras 2003). Furthermore, retired ambassador Bilal Şimşir, the most

productive name in the foreign bureaucracy with his dozens of works, carried out a number of studies based on primary sources from the state archives, particularly on the Armenian issue. Although they contain hundreds of original and valuable documents, he aims at legitimizing the policies of the state from an ideological point of view. In these studies, Şimşir discusses the foreign policy of the Mustafa Kemal period only within the framework of the Misak-ı Milli, Lausanne, Mosul, Kirkuk, Montreux, and Hatay issues (Şimşir 1999; Şimşir 2017). Akşin who worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs one generation before Şimşir, can also be evaluated within this framework (Akşin 1991).

Furthermore, in many articles and books, the authors adopt the state's discourses and arguments with ideological expressions. For example, Bayur wrote his book in 1938 to explain the developments in TFP between 1918 and 1936 by using official documents and with the approval of Mustafa Kemal (Bayur 1973). Besides, Esmer's study examined TFP in the period of 1920-1955. Because of its ideological approach, this study could be evaluated directly within this framework (Esmer 1944). Also, Yalçın's study can be considered as a reflection of the legitimacy attempt of the secular ideology in domestic and foreign politics due to its language and ideological approach. (Yalçın 2000). In addition to their chronological features, some studies also evaluate the Mustafa Kemal's foreign policy from an ideological perspective within the framework of the relations and agreements with Western and non-Muslim neighboring countries (Gönlübol and Sar 1990). As a new nation-state, Turkey had adopted a nationalist discourse in domestic politics. However, it is not possible to say that this discourse was directly implemented in foreign policy. Karakoç, on the contrary, tries to demonstrate that Mustafa Kemal gave importance to relations with other Turkic communities. While he explains the Hatay, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Cyprus issues in most of the book, he touches upon Turkic communities in Central Asia superficially, with ideological and emotional discourse (Karakoç 2002). Meanwhile, in many of these studies relations with the Muslim world are limited to Iran and Afghanistan, and relationships with Muslim communities are not addressed at all or only unilaterally. Thus, they are evaluated with a focus on the admiration of Muslim

communities and leaders for Mustafa Kemal, but Turkey's reciprocation and attitude towards them are rarely mentioned (e.g. Şimşir 1999).

Contrary to the wealth of evaluations on religion and politics in Turkey, Islam and TFP are understudied in the literature. Koçer examines the influence and capacity of Islam in Turkey's foreign policy and claims that the nation-state and secular identity are the main factors in the formation of foreign policy. He underlined that the Army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are the institutions that carry out the secular foreign policy of the nation-state. Islam does not have a decisive role in the foreign policy making process in Turkey. He argues that Turkey pursued a realistic and pragmatic foreign policy. In his study, Koçer focuses on Turkey's last fifty years of foreign policy. However, he emphasizes the period of Mustafa Kemal less, which was the most intensive secularization period in the history of Turkey. In addition, he does not support his claim with a theoretical and methodological framework (Koçer 2003). A better treatment of TFP in the literature is perceived in what might be called analytical studies.

1.2.2.3. The Analytical Approach

In addition to the two categories discussed above in TFP literature, which includes the period of Mustafa Kemal, there is another approach which I call analytical. This narrative tries to explain TFP with a theoretical framework and analytical and methodological approach by avoiding an ideological and chronological narrative. Over the past two decades, there has been a modest literature in both theoretical and empirical fields in TFP. The first examples of these analytical analysis on TFP, can be seen in the 2000s. Essentially, they are the product of academics who gained a methodological point of view and completed their graduate education in the US. In these studies, TFP is not described as a chain of events, but as a scientific case without superficial approaches. In this context, among the studies of TFP that address the period of Mustafa Kemal, I will discuss following studies under the analytical approach.

In his *Turkish Foreign Policy, Islam Nationalism and Globalization*, Kösebalaban tries to investigate the elements of continuity as well as changes in TFP since the late-Ottoman era. He attempts to assess the effects of discourses on Turkish identity and domestic political changes on foreign policy. He emphasizes the impact of identity on the evolution of TFP over the last one-hundred years, which is a rare attempt to look into the Ottoman origins of modern TFP in the literature. Kösebalaban makes a number of original analyses and remarks such as using İdris Küçükömer's classic right-left description and the classification of political identities in Turkish politics. For him, the four ideological perspectives; secularist nationalism (Kemalism), Islamic nationalism, secularist liberalism, and Islamic liberalism, have been main approaches in TFP. He argues that during the late-Ottoman period, they designed three primary methods for solution: "Ottomanist liberalism," Islamism, and Turkish nationalism, these also conducted their impact on the Republican period. Establishing a theoretical framework for his analysis, he brings the conceptual instruments of the constructivist approach to internal politics to examine the foreign policy aspects of social identity groups. Thus, an understanding of TFP requires accurate measurement of Turkey's internal politics in addition to the altering international politics (Kösebalaban 2011).

Secondly, although he has focused on Turkey's foreign policy during and after the Cold War, Bozdağlıoğlu makes a historical overview of how Turkey's identity was created as a Western-oriented state in both the late-Ottoman and the Republican eras. In his comprehensive and analytical thesis, he tries to show the effects of identity on the formulation of Turkey's foreign policy preferences. He supports his study by a historical analysis of how that identity was constructed and how it defined Turkey's preferences and interests. He makes the theoretical discussion between realist and constructivists by giving a critique of Waltz's anarchical approach and Wendt's constructivist approach. While analyzing the impact of the West during the late-Ottoman period and the construction of new Turkey's secular identity following the year 1920, he says that Mustafa Kemal dominated Turkish politics through his definition of Western identity and ideas on Western and Eastern civilizations. He explains the elements and institutionalization of Turkey's Western identity that

determined TFP choices and its alliance with the West during the Cold War (Bozdağlıoğlu 2003).

Although Weisband's Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-45 does not cover the period and the subject I studied, it is one of the rare studies in the international literature that examine the early Republican period. No study examining the period of Mustafa Kemal with a specific question is how yet appeared in the international literature. In the first chapter, which is not included in the Turkish version of the book, he explains the analytical framework of his study and emphasizes the modernization and secularization policies of the Republic and its Ottoman background. So, studying this period with this approach makes his work unique and valuable in the literature (Weisband 1973).

I will also mention two more studies under this category. The first is one of the most cited books in the TFP literature, edited by Baskin Oran. Although this study does not have a sufficient analytical point of view, I have evaluated it in the analytical because of its methodological framework as well as its useful methods in narrative and most importantly its content, which does not include unnecessary information although it is voluminous. While explaining the purpose of the book, Oran asserts that as a practical textbook, it aims not only to convey the facts and information, but also to present an analytical framework with a holistic approach. According to Oran, in spite of the sharp rupture and transformations experienced in many areas during the transition period from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic, some issues in TFP have been institutionalized and have continued to remain a strong tradition until today. In the introductory section, where he tries to present a methodological framework, he examines TFP with its political, economic, and military dimensions as well as historical cultural and geographical factors. According to Oran, TFP is affected clearly from Turkey's Asian, Middle Eastern, Islamic, and Western identities and multifaceted cultural dimensions from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic.

At the same time, the book emphasizes that TFP maintains many characteristic elements from the Ottoman era within the framework of its historical dimension.

Referring to the factor of Internal Structural Dimension, which is neglected in many studies, Oran argues that social structure affects foreign policy making to a certain extent, and he also examines actors and institutions in this context. On the other hand, Oran examines the international factors within the Strategic Dimension and analyzes the effects of the geographical factor, regional security circles, and world power axes on foreign policymaking. In addition to relations with the West, it also touches on relationships with Indian Muslims primarily through the caliphate, which is not seen in other TFP studies. This is one of the features that distinguishes the book from other studies. However, as in other studies, the relations with the Muslim countries are explained based on security, border issues, Mosul and Hatay problems, and it does go beyond the general narrative. The book, like other studies, has a chronological and thematic approach. It tries to present the documents and their interpretations in a holistic framework and to move away from the official history. However, because it is a multi-contributor book, the ideological approach can be seen in some articles. Although the editor requested that the contributors examine all chapters within the framework of the methodological approach mentioned in the introduction, this is challenging in such a work with so many authors, and some sections in the book contain ideological and superficial narratives. Both Oran and some other writers have traces of ideological, generalist, and reductionist narratives. Nevertheless, the book tries to make an essential contribution to the literature of the TFP with its methodological framework and its way of analyzing its subjects (Oran 2010).

Finally, Ahmet Davutoglu's *Stratejik Derinlik* (Strategic Depth), the other study under this category, has been the most influential work on the recent TFP literature and is also widely discussed in today's academic community and practical politics. This study is a milestone in the TFP literature with its content, approach, and impact. While presenting the conceptual framework of the book, Davutoglu reinterprets geostrategy theories in the context of Turkey and provides a theoretical framework for the active and multi-dimensional foreign policy that emerged in the post-cold war era. He argues that if Turkey implements "strategic depth" in its foreign policy, not

only can it become a regional power, it can also contribute to achieve peace and can play an essential role in the solution of problems in the region.

Focusing especially on the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods, Davutoğlu strengthens his analysis with emphasis on the historical background of the late-Ottoman period and the early years of the Republican era. Although Davutoglu does not focus much on the foreign policy of the period of Mustafa Kemal, he emphasizes the continuities and ruptures between Ottoman and Republican foreign policy. Accordingly, in the nineteenth century in the Ottoman-Turkish foreign policy tradition based on the balance of power policy against external threats was transferred from Abdülhamid II to the Committee of Union and Progress and from there to the Republic. Neglecting the Ottoman tradition, Kemalist elites had cut relations with both the neighboring region and the Muslim world and pursued a parallel strategy with secular domestic policy.

He argues that ignoring Turkey's historical and cultural ties with the Muslim world has paved the way for a passive position in both regional and global politics. Therefore, Turkey should abandon the current foreign policy that consists of only tactical moves and short-term tactics and is geographically and culturally limited. By utilizing the advantages offered by Turkey's geographical location and rich historical background, TFP should eliminate the lack of its strategic vision. Making this new foreign policy will also lead to a critical transformation of Turkey's international politics. He discusses in detail Turkey's relations with the West as well as the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Caucasus within his conceptual framework. He also underlines the importance of international organizations and offers dynamic positions for Turkey in them. The relationship between Islam and foreign policy is continuously seen between the lines throughout the book. Re-evaluating relationship between Islam and politics within the framework of Turkey's geopolitical and civilizational realm, he claims to present a new TFP paradigm and theory which has room for Islam. While emphasizing bidirectional historical continuity between the Ottoman and Islamic civilization, he considers that the denial of the connection with this experience and background is one of the Turkish elites' critical mistake. By improving

good relations with Muslim countries, which Turkey has ignored from the early years of the Republic, Turkey will be able to position itself at the heart of the Muslim world. He argues that Turkey would gain critical advantages in the international arena by using its history, culture, and economy, softening its security aspect, and implementing a proactive foreign policy (Davutoğlu 2001).

1.3. Theoretical Framework

Mainstream international relations theories try to explain the making of foreign policy from a secular and reductionist perspective. It largely ignores the effect of religion on the foreign policy-making process. In my opinion, the decisions taken by foreign policymakers in a realist or idealistic framework might be influenced by religion as well. Explaining foreign policy in a realist or idealist framework does not mean that religion is not considered in the making process of that policy. Therefore, social constructivism might more helpful in understanding the role of religion in international politics. Thus, I adopt Hurd's approach in social constructivism to analyze the role of religion in the making of TFP. For more precise analysis and conceptions into the role of religion in TFP, my study needs to be based on a sociological perspective. Thus, social constructivism with its sociological perspective are well suited to examine the relations between religion and politics in TFP.

In addition, although it is essential that the social constructivism attempts to explicate the foreign policy making process from a comprehensive perspective that includes the influence of religion too, it may be inadequate in explaining many cases and examples because it largely ignores the effect of domestic politics on foreign policy. Thus, I build my examination on Ardıç's theoretical model of (a different path of) secularization in the Turkish-Islamic context. In this study, I try to explain how the politics of secularism, religion, and actors' internal policy-making affect foreign policy with periodization and examples. In my opinion, this complicated and multidimensional period, which includes the establishment of the nation-state, is better understood through this approach.

In the international relations theory, Alexander Wendt gives us a different vision than either realism and liberalism to understand the relationship between state identity and foreign policy. Although he shows how state identity affects the process of decision-making and implementing foreign policy, he does not explore how the scope of religion and secularism in the state's internal structure influence foreign policy (Wendt 1999). Hurd claims that the secular structure of international relations is socially constructed. She emphasizes that the impact of religion on international politics can only be realized and many problems in international relations can be understood better with this point of view. She tries to explain the cases of the US-Iran and Turkey-EU, which have been studied in much empirical and theoretical work in international relations, by using her own theoretical framework and conceptualizations. While examining the secular structure of international relations, Hurd excludes non-state structures such as NGOs and multinational corporations and evaluates the state and actors as analysis units. Although Hurd adopts Wendt's social constructivism as a theoretical approach, she suggests her own "social constructivism" by evaluating domestic politics and actors to be more coherent in her studies. Hence, she argues that in order to understand the politics of secularism in international relations, domestic politics should be taken into consideration along with foreign policy decision-makers, unlike Wendt's social constructionism. According to her, the behaviors, discourses, and the way of making domestic politics are among the essential factors that shape foreign policy and construct secular politics in international relations. Thus, she takes her thesis beyond the general claim that religion has been removed from world politics after Westphalia and has recently begun to return (Hurd 2004, 2008, 2012).

A common assumption found in many studies is that religion is isolated from international relations in the post-Westphalia order. However, I, like Hurd, disagree with the generalist arguments that the post-Westphalia foreign policy is totally secular. Just as religion and politics are not divided from one another with precise lines in the modern period, we cannot talk about a specific, static, and definite secular division in international relations. Since I claim not only Turkey's domestic secular political identity but also Islam had a powerful influence on making foreign policy

during Mustafa Kemal era, I use Wendt's constructivist approach with Hurd's insight that he does not touch upon. Her constructivist approach to religion and international relations is suitable to analyze Turkey's Islamic, secular, pragmatist, and non-expansionist (passive) foreign policy behavior by different periods. Also, I do not ignore strategic, economic, and political factors in foreign policymaking and implementing process. However, studying these factors in TFP can be the subject of another study. My focus is only to discover the influence of domestic Islamic and secular political identity on TFP. I further assume that ideology does not always provide a framework of political action in foreign policy. In this perspective, sometimes, ongoing circumstances might force decision makers to abandon their ideological position. I argue that Hurd's social constructivism enables us to understand how actors' ideologies do not always identify the state's foreign policy.

By doing so, I also apply Ardiç's models of Turkish modernization (Ardiç 2008, 2012) to explain the relationship between Islam, secularism, and TFP by what he calls the "accommodation paradigm" and control/domination paradigm. According to Ardiç, the "conflict paradigm" considers religion and modernity to be two separate and opposite worlds that will never match. The process of modernization from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic is explained by many through the assumption of conflict between religion and (secular) politics. They also reduce this process to tensions and struggles between modernists and reactionaries (see Berkes 1964; Lewis 1961; Tunaya 1962, 1995). Ardiç argues that a direct confrontation between Islam and modernity has never been the dominant character of the secularization process in Turkey, particularly before 1924. On the other hand, he offers a new approach, which he calls the "accommodation paradigm", which sees the Ottoman-Turkish modernization as a complex and dialectical process, trying to explain it by avoiding reductive narratives based on binary contrasts and simplifications. It shows how the relationship between Islam and modernity was mostly characterized by accommodation in the discourses and actions of political actors and intellectuals during much of the late-Ottoman period as well as the early years of the Republic (See Ardiç 2008 for a methodological critique). In addition to these two approaches, Ardiç also proposes a third approach, which he calls the control/domination

paradigm, in order to better understand the complex process during the Republican period. Accordingly, the new state tried to implement a religious control policy with the aim of building a secular nation-state. It tried to cleanse the public sphere from religion by banning the *sufi* sects, prohibiting the Qur'anic alphabet and education etc., and to control its institutional aspects through the Department of Religious Affairs founded in 1924.

I also explain the foreign policy of the Mustafa Kemal era with Ardiç's two approaches – the accommodation and control/domination paradigms. Accordingly, I explain the first period (1919-24) with the concept of accommodation. Here an intense Islamic discourse plays a central role as a source of legitimacy, as seen in the case of the Caliphate. Because the new political elites needed the legitimacy of the National Struggle at national and international level, they tried to get the necessary financial and political support mainly through religious justification. While the second period (1924-29) was dominated by more secular discourses and practices, I do not use the conflict paradigm for this period. I think it would be more appropriate to explain this period with the concepts of control/domination, which was also the case with the third period (1929-38) that had more pragmatist discourse and action formed around the state's security concerns. Hence, Islam was not completely separated from the foreign policy as well as domestic politics from 1924 to 1938. During this period, Islam was largely confined to the private sphere while also being kept institutionally as part of the government structure. For secular elites aimed to use Islam which was under the control of new regime in order to produce a docile and homogenous population (Ardiç 2012). Consequently, secular politics usually accommodated Islam in its actions and rhetoric rather than always excluding and conflicting with religion between 1919 and 1938. Therefore, I define TFP with the concepts of accommodation and control/domination at the discursive and policy levels during this twenty-year period.

1.4. Method

In this study, I analyze the relationship between Islam, secularism, and foreign policy through some critical events and the politics and discourses of the actors rather than explaining the chain of events in a chronological way. Based on the necessity of

examining foreign policy in the context of interaction with domestic policy, I emphasize the relationship between Mustafa Kemal's external and internal politics and evaluate TFP within the framework of developments in international politics and foreign policy events without ignoring domestic politics. In addition, I examine TFP in the context of Islam and secularism, which changes according to the developments in domestic and foreign politics, by using the crucial events in international relations, diplomatic contacts. In this study, I examine the discourse of political actors, especially Mustafa Kemal, in the primary sources like parliamentary records and newspapers. Besides the speeches in the press such as *Cumhuriyet* and *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, I also use his statements in his famous book *Speech (Nutuk)*, declarations and foreign policy assessments in the inauguration speeches for the Grand National Assembly (GNA) in 1921, 1922, 1926, 1928, 1931, 1937, 1938. In addition, I used the speeches Mustafa Kemal gave in various scenes which I quote directly from the secondary sources.

The main goal of this study is to point out how religious and secular discourses were produced and reproduced in the 1920s and 1930s. This attempt entails Mustafa Kemal's foreign policy in two aspects. Firstly, I aim to discover the religious and secular discourses of Mustafa Kemal as the primary decision maker of the new state in both domestic and foreign policy. Secondly, while investigating transformations of TFP, I point out the contradictions of its discourses and practices from the 1920s to 1930s.

My analysis examines the impact of religion and secularism on Mustafa Kemal's foreign policy and relations with the Muslim world, focusing specifically on the historical ties with the countries of the Middle East, which are reflections of Turkey's organic relationship to the Muslim World. I argue that secularism did not determine Mustafa Kemal's foreign policy continuously from 1919 to 1938. I also analyze when and in which circumstances Islam and the politics of secularism influenced foreign policymaking. I discuss the transformation of TFP between 1919 and 1938 in three different periods with three conceptualizations. I call the period of 1919-24 Islamization because Islam was used as an effective instrument in foreign policy at

the level of discourse. I take the abolition of the Caliphate as a turning point in the period from 1924 to 1929, which I define as secularization in connection with domestic politics. Under the pressure of the 1929 world economic crisis and increasing foreign threats from Germany and Italy, Turkey changed the dynamics of its foreign policy in the 1930s. Because the primary goal of TFP was ensuring national and regional security, I describe the 1930s as Securitization. I divide these periods further into sub-sections based on important events as critical junctures to facilitate the assessment and understanding.

In order to evaluate the relationship between Islam, secularism, and foreign policy in the first years of the republican era, I trace the historical development of the relationship between religion and politics from the Tanzimat period. Between late-Ottoman and republican periods, there was more continuity than rupture in political, economic, and social fields (Ardıç 2012; Kara 2003; Karpaz 2001; Mardin 2000; Zürcher 1997). For this reason, to understand the transformation of the foreign policy between 1919 and 1938, it is essential to consider the continuity in foreign policy from the late-Ottoman period to the Republic (Çetinsaya 2007; see also Davutoğlu 2002 for a detailed study on the historical, structural, institutional and behavioral continuity of TFP between the Ottoman and the Republic).

In this context, when analyzing the social and political developments in the historical process, actors should be considered. Indeed, TFP changed as a result of actors' behaviors and policies as well as the changing internal and international political situation. With the Tanzimat, there were different foreign policy positions according to the actors' behaviors and understandings in the relationship between Islam and foreign policy. Powerful actors such as Abdülhamid II and the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) carried out a pragmatic foreign policy with secular and Islamic elements that could adapt quickly to the international context. TFP's secular character was mainly observed during the first years of Turkey that would be considered the beginning of a significant transformation in the foreign policy and becoming part of the modern international system as a new nation-state. In addition, I will treat the Caliphate as an essential institution in the formation of TFP because

the Caliphate became one of the crucial elements of TFP during Hamidian and CUP periods as well as during the National Struggle. Also, its abolition was the main instrument of the secularized foreign policy between 1924 and 1930.

Mustafa Kemal Paşa was the most prominent actor in domestic politics and foreign policy formation both during the National Struggle and after the proclamation of the republic. He was the ultimate decision-maker in determining the overall orientation of TFP. Mustafa Kemal Paşa had the authority to determine the foreign policy first as the head of the Representative Committee (*Heyet-i Temsiliye*) during the congresses, then as the speaker of the GNA and the head of government after it was established on 23 April 1920. After the declaration of the republic, as a head of state, he continued to be the most crucial decision-maker foreign policy. During this period, Mustafa Kemal Paşa took control of the foreign policy by centralizing the decision-making process. He was not only a policymaker, but he was also personally involved in the conduct of foreign policy, as the case in the negotiations of the 1921 Agreement with France. Another actor in the field of foreign policy during this period was İsmet [İnönü] Bey. When he was selected to attend the Lausanne Conference, he was appointed a foreign minister. However, İsmet Bey, on the other hand, had no position in the conduct of foreign policy, independent of Mustafa Kemal's decisions. Furthermore, Tevfik Rüşdü [Aras] Bey was the longest foreign minister in the history of the republic from 1925 to 1938, although he was not a decision-maker but a practitioner. Consequently, the primary decision-maker in foreign policy was always Mustafa Kemal, and Tevfik Rüşdü Bey was the policy executive. Mustafa Kemal used him to implement his strategies (Balcı 2013:48–50; Oran 2010:36–37). For this reason, in my study, I will focus on the discourse of Mustafa Kemal, especially the parliamentary speeches, interviews, and public speeches as the unit of analysis rather than the global political structures and actors. Foreign policy does not occur only as a result of one country's international relations activities. It is produced and implemented in the complex environment of internal as well as actor's behaviors and discourses. In other words, rather than offering a macro-level systemic and structural view, I examine TFP through concrete foreign policy strategies and actions, such as Turkey's bilateral relations and alliances and its reaction to events using specific

examples. Inspired by Hurd, I argue that it is necessary to consider domestic politics in order to understand “the politics of secularism” in TFP and that internal political structures should be evaluated together with foreign policy decisions. Accordingly, the discourses and behaviors of the decision-makers, and their ways of making domestic politics are among the critical factors that shaped foreign policy and helped build secular politics in international relations.

1.5. Organization of the Thesis

I have so far discussed the theoretical background, research questions, and method of the thesis and offered a general review and criticism of the literature. The second chapter examines the role of religion in politics and foreign policy from the Tanzimat to the Republican era, including the Abdülhamid and CUP eras. It presents a history of the late-Ottoman domestic and international policy process in line with its modernization and analyzes the role of religion, specifically the Caliphate's role in making foreign policy. It also examines radical changes in line with the secularization process during the first years of the Republican era.

In the third chapter, I argue that Islam was a useful instrument in mobilizing domestic and external support for the National Struggle between 1919 and 1924. I try to show that during this era, Islam and the Caliphate played a critical role and were the most significant issue in terms of understanding TFP. Both played a significant role in the attempts of the ruling elite to consolidate the society domestically and to get support from the Muslim world internationally against the occupation of Western powers.

The fourth chapter discusses TFP between 1924 and 1929. Here I claim that in contrast to the previous era, Turkey followed a foreign policy isolated from the Muslim world, especially the colonial communities, as one of the consequences of the secularization policy. For the Republican elites held the "politics of secularism" as an agent for modernization came to play a determinant role in the making foreign policy-making process.

The main hypothesis of the fifth chapter is that security played a larger role than secularism in TFP during the 1930s. This hypothesis will be tested by Turkey's initiative in the region in establishing pacts and improving bilateral relations. Although from 1924 through 1929 Turkey was not worried about developments in the Middle East, it pursued close ties with neighboring countries in the 1930s. Some high-level cooperation and strategic partnership agreements were signed with its neighbors not only in the Middle East but also in the Balkans. However, I argue that these new policies toward neighboring countries were not a sign of the new era, so these policies did not mean a complete change of the secular and Western-oriented foreign policy.



CHAPTER 2

ISLAM AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE OTTOMAN-TURKISH MODERNIZATION

This chapter examines the role of religion in politics and foreign policy from Tanzimat to the Republican era. In order to better understand the role of Islam and secularism in the foreign policy of the Republican era, I argue that the relationship between religion and politics should be examined in detail in the late-Ottoman period. Because with its actors, institutions, and approaches, there is a continuity in many fields as well as in foreign policy between the two periods (see Çetinsaya 2007). Thus, this chapter is organized into two sections. The first section focuses on the relationship between religion and politics and religion's role in foreign policy from Tanzimat to Republic, including the Abdülhamid and CUP periods. It presents a history of late-Ottoman domestic and external policy process in line with its modernization and analyzes the role of religion, specifically the Caliphate's role in making foreign policy. The second section examines only radical changes in line with the secularization process during the first years of the Republican Era.

As discussed in the previous chapter, in Westphalian system, religion is never supposed to play a role in international relations. However, I argue in this chapter, during the late 19th-century religion played a role to some extent in the Ottoman foreign policy-making process. The Ottoman state elites used religion in foreign policy to sustain the territorial integrity of the state and to balance its lack of political and military in the international arena against Russia, Britain, France and other European powers.

2.1. From Tanzimat to Republic

Ottoman Empire faced three main challenges from the mid-eighteenth to the twentieth centuries: the military threat from Russia, nationalist movements after the French Revolution throughout the Empire, and finally, financial requirements to implement modernization projects. The Empire initiated transformation in military, political, social and cultural fields reacting to these challenges and so paved the way

for introducing a series of changes aimed at centralization and Westernization through military, bureaucratic, administrative, and legal modernization (Çetinsaya 2001). These reforms were started by Selim III (r. 1789-1807), continued by Mahmud II (r. 1808–1839), Abdülmecid (r. 1839–1861) and Abdülaziz (r. 1861–1876), and were continued under Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909) and CUP era (1908-1918) (See Berkes 1964; Findley 2010; Hanioglu 2008; Karpas 1972; Kasaba 2008; Lewis 1961; Shaw and Shaw 1977; Zürcher 1997).

The ruling elites intended to set up a fundamental change in the Empire from traditional to a modern state in the nineteenth century in order to save the Empire from collapse. They established new institutions that would regulate the political and social life. During this period the European political modernity adopted within Ottoman institutions and bureaucracy, namely significant reforms in the areas of education, culture, judiciary, and society had been realized in accordance with the model of Europe. Mahmud II initiated some critical changes in the fields of taxation, civil and military bureaucracy, judiciary, and provincial government system (Çetinsaya 2001; Deringil 1998). These administrative and political developments were accompanied by social and cultural adjustments in the Ottoman society. The changes began in the spheres of politics, judiciary, and military and then extended with socio-cultural transformation (Berkes 1964; Cleveland and Bunton 2009; Hanioglu 2008).

In the face of the growing nationalism and separatism as well as internal political, economic and social crises, the ruling elites initiated crucial reform documents in 1839, 1856 and 1876 in order to remove pretexts for foreign intervention and forestall the decline of the Empire. *The Tanzimat Decree* of 1839 was the turning point of the Ottoman Empire's modernization, and there had been various amendments that its effects have been felt today, especially in the areas of education and administration. This text designated to develop new rules and arrangements for all subjects of the Empire to guarantee for the security of lives, properties, faiths, and honors regardless of their religion or race. (Findley 2008; Zürcher 1997).

The *Islahat* Decree of 1856 expanded and reiterated the reforms made by the Tanzimat Decree. It confirmed the rights granted to all Ottoman subjects and aimed to take the necessary measures to implement them. While the Tanzimat Decree set general principles concerning all Ottoman subjects, the *Islahat* Decree contained provisions concerning non-Muslim Ottoman subjects. Therefore, it was more detailed than the Tanzimat Decree. The *Islahat* Decree mainly altered the status of non-Muslims in Ottoman society such as religious freedom, legal equality, participation in governance, tax and military matter, and rearranged them. State institutions and education system continuously developed, and *Mecelle*, a new legal code, was adopted and systematized Islamic law in Western-style between 1868 and 1876.

The ruling elites had used religion since *Nizam-ı Cedid* (1789) to justify their reforms that were set of perceived political and social changes for the preservation of the state. The *Tanzimat* statesmen who wrote the decree and its protocols could have known one of the basic tenets of Islamic law, and it is safe to conclude that they wanted to draw on the unquestionable authority of the *sharia* itself to justify their actions and the reforms proposed by the royal decree (Ardıç 2012:48). As mentioned above, especially with the Tanzimat reforms, state elites attempted to rebuild the Ottoman state along with modern principles in the social, political, and cultural practices. The main aims of these reforms were to prevent the decline of the Empire economically and politically and to keep the non-Muslim population be part of the Empire.

Most of these influential reformists such as Ali Paşa, Fuad Paşa, Ahmed Vefik Paşa, Münif Paşa, Mehmed Raşid Paşa, Safvet Paşa, and Namık Kemal who initiated and implemented the changes were from the Translation Office, (*Bab-ı Ali Tercüme Odası*), established by Mahmud II in 1833. This institution laid the groundwork for training reformist influential bureaucrats in domestic and foreign politics. Most of them also are prominent character in ideological developments during the nineteenth century. In this office, they found the chance to learn and improve their French which helped to perceive and conduct developments in Europe. As well as

they conducted Ottoman foreign policy in line with their secular and westernized ideas due to their direct involvement the European diplomatic affairs and developments (Mardin 1996:233–36; see also Davison 1963:55; Taglia 2015:29). For instance, according to them, the *Islahat* Decree was necessary in order to prevent the decline of the Empire and win the friendship of England and France against Russia contrary to the traditionalist who of the view that the edict as a European device designed to undermine the Islamic essence of the Ottoman state and the foreign ministry and its translation bureau had violated the fundamental principles of the Empire. These newly emerging state elites used diplomacy as a modern method of carrying foreign relations to defense not only the interest of the Empire but the territories also. It was used to ensure the balance of power among European states and also to attract support from European power, especially against the Russian threat. For instance, alliance with Europe during the Crimean War rapidly moved the Ottoman state into the European political, cultural, and economic orbit (Karpas 2001:74–78).

During the Tanzimat, there was “less emphasis on Islam as the basis of Ottoman foreign relations. During the Crimean War, for instance, Mehmed Cemil Paşa, who was an Ottoman ambassador in Paris, asked the French foreign minister not to address Sultan Abdülmecid any more as "*Empereur des Musulmans*." He should be addressed as "*Empereur des Ottomans*", or "*Empereur de Turquie*", or "*Sa Majeste Imperiale*" (Davison 2000:864–65). On the other hand, according to Karpas,

Ottoman relations with Europe and Russia cannot be viewed only from a strategic perspective, for religious differences were often magnified into conflicts of civilization and culture and used to justify military-political actions. Such differences often exerted a powerful influence on Ottoman-European relations at the same time that developments in Ottoman society were pointing toward cultural understanding, rather than cultural confrontation, with the West.

(Karpas 2001:15)

He also argued that the Ottoman alliance with Europe in the Crimean War led many Muslims and leading Ottoman statesmen to view the European powers not as the enemies of Islam but as saviors and as trustworthy friends and allies. The reformist

bureaucracy in response cited the new-found friendship with Europe as proving that religious affiliation had ceased to be an active factor in foreign relations (Ibid 2001:75).

Although the Ottoman Empire was to act in foreign policy as a secular dynastic state, like the European countries, Islam continued to play a significant role in Ottoman external relations. In particular, Islam became the instrument of the Ottoman negotiators. For instance, during the negotiations of the Berlin Congress, Ottoman diplomats considered Muslim public opinion on the discussion of the territories that had a large Muslim population (Davison 2000:864–65). Also, during his reign, Abdülaziz wanted to elevate the Caliphate in order to establish a balance among European powers and also to oppose Russian expansion. Britain saw the Caliph as the main actor to prevent Russian occupation in Central Asia. Russia also had its own fear regarding the Caliphate's influence to mobilize Muslims in Caucasia and Central Asia. But due to the lack of military and political power, the Ottoman policymakers could not use the influence of the Caliphate in Caucasia and Central Asia in order to ensure Ottoman foreign policy interests (Karpas 2001:77–78). On the other hand, Britain also used its alliance with Caliphate to reconcile some Islamic doctrinal problems related to the Muslims' status in India. According to a “classical Islamic doctrine, Muslims could not live under the authority of a non-Muslim ruler”, *Dar-ul-Harb* (house of war). In spite of this doctrine, Britain supported and propagated some *ulama's* argument that “India was part of the *Dar-ul-Islam* (house of Islam), despite British rule, because the Caliph had become England's ally” (Ibid:83–88).

During the reign of Abdülhamid II, most of the Tanzimat reforms were preserved in social, economic and administrative fields. Some of them were developed in infrastructure areas such as railways, telegraph line and educational, administrative, military, and judicial services improved significantly. Secularization was also one of the major trends in education during the late nineteenth century. Education was therefore given the highest priority to meet the needs of efficient, trained workforce for the army and civilian bureaucracy. The education reforms that were started through the Tanzimat were also maintained during his reign; several new schools in

primary and secondary degree and even a network of civil and military schools (*Mülkiye, Tıbbiye, Harbiye*) were established throughout the Empire. As well the first university, *Darülfünun*, was founded in 1900. Besides the traditional Islamic schools; *medreses*, secular state schools; *mektebs* had been created during the *Tanzimat* era, they became widespread during the reign of Abdülhamid II (1876–1909). These schools brought the reforming cadres that were not only to lead the Empire but also the Turkish Republic. A significant outcome of all these social, cultural, and political reforms was the creation of a new, secular educated bureaucratic class. (Mardin 2006:100–120; Zürcher 1997:62).

The Ottoman system became increasingly centralized during his period to transform the Empire into a well-governed and modern state. So, he improved *Tanzimat's* centralized state system with new executive, legislative, and judiciary institutions. Trade, agriculture, mining, and industrialization were also urged to increase revenues. He founded an agricultural bank to finance agriculture as well as to fund modernization programs. He also encouraged European investment to the country for developing new railroads, telegraph lines and building textile, and tobacco factories (Akarlı 1976; Çetinsaya 1999b; Deringil 1991; Fortna 2002; Kodaman 1987).

When Abdülhamid II came to power in 1876, the Empire was losing Christian majority lands in the Balkans, and also receiving enormous Muslim immigrants from Balkans and Caucasia. Thus, the main change occurred in the religious distribution of Ottoman population that became Muslim in the majority. Also, many Muslim communities from Asia and Africa were getting under European imperial control. For instance, besides the lost-Ottoman lands; Serbia, Rumania, Montenegro, Bosnia, Cyprus, Egypt, and Tunisia, Muslim communities from Caucasia, Central Asia, South Asia, South East Asia, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa had been dominated by Russian, British and French powers (Hülagü 2006).

With these developments, Abdülhamid II emphasized the traditional and Islamic character of his reign by using the title and symbols of the Caliphate and attempted to bring Islam as the dominant uniting factor not only among Ottoman citizens but

also among the Muslim communities outside the Empire. He used the title of the Caliphate as instruments of his centralization policies to connect the Ottoman territories to the capital. Although the emergence of the idea of Pan-Islam or İttihad-ı İslam emerged in the 1860s, he took different approaches by exploiting Caliphate's power and exercising the policy of Pan-Islam in foreign policy. (Mardin 1992). He “promoted Islamic unity, facilitated the *Hajj*, made investments in the Muslim Holy Land, enhanced communication and transportation between the caliphal center and the *Hijaz*, developed friendly relations with other Muslim leaders, and portrayed himself as the leader of all Muslims, the great caliph” (Ardıç 2012:189). Like Kara and Ardıç, I believe that the term Pan-Islamism has been used in an orientalist and ideological meanings not only Western political discourses and in academic literature and also in the Muslim world (Kara 2005). As Karpát points out, even the term “pan-Islamism was non-Islamic, and it had had no parallel in Islamic history. It was a European-type movement of liberation and change, clad in Islamic garments” (Karpát 2001:18). Furthermore, I use here the term *İttihad-ı İslam* against Pan-Islamism's domination of the literature with its orientalist and ideological meanings. *İttihad-ı İslam* was particularly strong in Muslim regions such as in Russia, India, and China, where Muslim populations had recently come under the control of non-Muslim powers. Although the movement may not have aimed to achieve an actual political reunification of all Muslims, it was intended to secure the interest of Ottoman foreign policy. The idea of using the Caliphate's power was essential to Abdülhamid II's foreign policy to counteract *balance of power diplomacy* among European powers and to use it as a political card to play against them. He also attempted to ensure leadership over the ever-diminishing territories of the Empire (Çetinsaya 1999b; Deringil 1991; Karpát 2001).

He began using the title "Caliph" and also the titles "Leader of the Faithful" (*Emir el-Müminin*) and "Protector of the two Holy Places: Mecca and Medina (*Hadim-ül Haremeyni Şerifeyn*)" (Deringil 1993). Abdülhamid II sent delegations composed of political and diplomatic figures and Islamic scholars to Muslims living countries such as China, Russia, British India and also Africa for asking them to acknowledge the caliph as their protector against European colonial empires (Deringil 1991). He also

used these titles to restore the problem that took place within the Muslim world, especially *Sunni-Shi'i* division. Under the influence of one of the foremost proponents of pan-Islam, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Abdülhamid II undertook a rapprochement toward Iran. He considered this policy as a possible long-term solution for the Shi'i problem in Iraq (Çetinsaya 2006:99–127; Kern 2013:76–77). He used the strategy of *ittihad-ı İslam* and the title of caliph in order to support his foreign policy vis-à-vis European powers and Muslim leaders. He also aimed to restore loyalty to Sunni Islam and to the Ottoman dynasty from Muslims, both those who lives in the empire but alienated as the result of the Tanzimat reforms, and those who resided in former Ottoman territories (Buzpınar 1996; Çetinsaya 1999b). Abdülhamid II relatively accomplished on his policy of handling balances among European powers and expanding Islamic integration through the Caliphate. Thus, he retained his empire out of widespread military conflicts with European states. He also successfully determined Ottoman and Muslim benefits together to mobilize Muslims like in India for the Caliphate's ideal (Ardıç 2012:190)

The CUP Era

With the reinstatement of Ottoman Constitutions in July 1908, the Young Turks or The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) came to power, and the Second Constitutional Era started. This period was marked critical social and political transformation, especially the relation between religion and politics had been changed. During this time, the CUP further marginalized the *ulema*, and through conducting secular domestic policy, they tried to reduce the Caliph's power in internal politics (Hanioğlu 2008:185–86). Hence, regulatory changes in the provincial administration led to a higher degree of centralization. The government encouraged further reform in addition to restructuring and updating the taxation system, including the introduction of an income tax. In addition, the CUP implemented the secularization of the legal system to challenge the power of the traditionally influential Islamic clerics by placing Islam more under its own control. The religious courts and schools were secularized, and *Kadis* (Muslim judges) were appointed, transferred, dismissed and overseen by the secular Ministry of Justice. The *Şeyhulislam's* office changed from a ministry to a department and he was removed

from the Cabinet. The government also brought about major reforms for women such as their legal rights concerning marriage and inheritance, providing educational opportunities (Shaw and Shaw 1977; Somel 2003).

Among the other fields, the changes could also be observed in foreign policy. The CUP's primary aim in foreign policy was a rapprochement with the European power; Britain, France, and Russia. Especially during the Balkan wars sought the support from them. However, they disappointed the CUP for their policy then became an alliance with Germany before the Great War. Concerning relations with the Muslim world, according to Hanioglu, the CUP adopted plans that did not differ fundamentally from the politics pursued by Abdülhamid II, in connection with the Muslim communities under the rule of the Western states, and the Turkish tribes in the Caucasus and Central Asia. For instance, in 1906, the CUP leaders organized a Paris-based institution under the name *Uhuvvet-i Islamiyye Cemiyeti*, established relations with the Azeri and Tatar intellectuals and political societies, and tried to develop relationships with the world Muslims, Caucasus, and Central Asian Turks (Hanioglu 2011b:368). Although there were many active Islamists in the CUP, related to secular domestic policy, the government did not consider Islam and Caliphate as a power in its foreign policy until the outbreak of Great War. As Ardıç states, the CUP was aware of Caliph's significance among Muslims, and they attempted to put specific items about the Caliph's spiritual authority in the treaties and agreements that were signed after the Balkans and Libya war defeats (Ardıç 2012:44). In spite of their awareness and attempts, Islam and the Caliphate were not at the forefront of their foreign policy and they did not have any program and policy for Muslim communities. The CUP's major attempt to use Caliph's ideological and political power was, upon entering the Great War, the declaration of the Great Jihad that called all Muslims to fight against the Allies. As an Ottoman alliance, "Germany hoped to benefit from the Caliph's prestige in the Muslim world in order to prevent the Allies from consolidating the Western front with colonial troops by instigating revolts in Muslim colonies", but these attempts were not very effective (Ibid:192).

2.2. The Republican Era

Mustafa Kemal and the secular elites launched a series of radical secular changes not only in politics but also in the social, cultural and economic spheres which intended to transform Turkey into a secular state that represented a secular reconstruction; a shift from the multinational Empire to the nation-state and the realization of purported modern Turkish national identity. The "reforms" began with the secularization of the state institutions including the abolition of Sultanate, the establishment of the RPP (Republican People's Party), the proclamation of Republic, the abolition of the Caliphate and enacting the new Constitution of 1924. This was the first part of changes that were carried out between 1922 and 1924 in order to assure secularization through political reforms with fundamental institutional changes. The most radical changes that had claimed over the modernization of the society and the new state had dissolved the two main offices; the Ottoman Dynasty on 1 November 1922, and the Caliphate on 3 March 1924. "While the Caliphate was preserved, first the abolition of the Sultanate took place in November 1922, in the aftermath of the decisive victory of the Turkish forces led by Mustafa Kemal against the Greek occupation powers" (Zürcher, 2004, p. 103 see also Findley, 2010; Lewis, 1961).

The proclamation of the Republic in October 1923 was one of the outcomes of these struggles. The establishment of the Republic did not mean the end of reform; secular elites continually had been pressed their secularization agenda that were both conceptually radical and systematically significant. Therefore, the Caliphate, which is the temporal and spiritual authority of the Muslim Ummah, was abolished several months later, in March 1924 and all the members of the Ottoman dynasty were sent into exile. Besides these changes, Mustafa Kemal founded the People's Party in 1923. The primary aim of the establishment of the Party was to serve as a vanguard body to secure and support the Kemalist reform program. Meanwhile, the secular principles in education were implemented through the new law on the unification of education (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat*), while the Ministry of Sharia was displaced with the Directorate for Religious Affairs (DRA) (Cleveland and Bunton 2009:179–85; Findley 2010:248–56).

Later the new Turkish Constitution replaced the Constitution of 1921 on 20 April 1924. Therefore, the new state had its new legal frame that served as the basis for reforms that claimed to transform Turkey into a secular Republic. Besides these reforms, one more decision holds an outstanding place; establishing Ankara as the Capital City of the Turkish Republic on 13 October 1923. In comparison to Istanbul, which was the Caliphate's capital, Ankara symbolized the new secular Republic. At the same time, this new capital served to “inscribe the new secular nation upon space and establish the new state as the agent of this inscription” (Çınar 2014).

The Law of *Takrir-i Sûkun* in 1925 suppressed the *ulema*, the Islamist intellectuals, and the opposition press in several. Thus, by eliminating alternative thought and politics, the people who would establish possible contacts and relations with the Muslim world were restricted either directly or indirectly. In other words, objections to the secularization of not only domestic policy but also foreign policy were prevented. Furthermore, the independent religious lodges (*tekke and zaviye*) and *sufi* orders (*tarikât*) were outlawed by the enactment of law in 1925. Western headgear as well as western calendar and time system were officially adopted in the same year because old ones for the founding elites were the symbols of the reactionary Ottoman regime. A new civil code, inspired by the Swiss Code was enacted in February 1926 that was transformed the legal basis of marriage, family, and property. One of the controversial acts of reform was making it obligatory to issue the *Ezan* and prayers in Turkish instead of Arabic. As part of the secularization program, secular elites recreate Turkish language and rewrite Turkish history in a nationalist form. The Latin alphabet replaced the previously used Arabic script in 1928 as a part of the language reform. Islam had been declared as the official religion of the Turkish Republic in 1924 Constitution, but it was eliminated from the constitution in the amendment of 1928. Although secularism existed ‘de facto’ since the foundation of the Republic, it became a constitutional principle with the amendment of 1937. These reforms were to be assured by the removal of the persistence of traditional cultural values and also aimed to establish clear boundaries between the Ottoman religious past and the secular present (Zürcher, 1997, pp. 172–182; see also Findley 2010; Lewis 1961; Shaw and Shaw 1977).

The new Turkey experienced a radical transformation; a revolutionary change from the old order to the new through the Secularist-Kemalist reforms in political, social as well as cultural life indeed. Kemalist elites aimed to destroy existing social-structural arrangements and tried to wipe out the value systems of Ottoman *ancien régime*. They tried to establish and then to consolidate a secular state through the abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate, a move that ended any connection between the state and the religion. The elites' strategic purpose was to break the influence of these institutions over the new state by removing them from the political arena. These institutions were in existence, with its heritage of religious and dynastic authority, during the National Struggle. Especially through the abolition of the Caliphate, the highest religious-political position was removed from the government level (Mardin 1971:202–9).

Kemalist secularism sought to take religion under control by the state rather than abolishing and separating it from politics. “The Kemalist identity was secularist when it came to eradicating Islam’s dominant sociopolitical position but not secular at a much deeper level, in its imagination of the self and the external other; it aimed to control and reinterpret religion in its dealing with the domestic Islamic social elements, but it did not free itself from religion and acted with a religious instinct” (Kösebalaban 2011:48). While the former justifies repression of religious, political activism, the latter secures the superiority of the state over religious institutions. Thus it asserted state hegemony over the definition and signification of what were legitimate practices in the public sphere (Dressler 2011:188–89). Therefore, their original and primary aim was to control religion, more than separating it from politics, and to limit its role in politics and public spheres through state institutions such as the DRA that was represented theological authority combined with secular-political legitimacy and also state schools for religious education additionally placing all religious foundations under the Prime Minister Office and prohibition of convents and dervish lodges (Ardıç 2012:25; Yükleven 2008:381–82). As for Islam, it is the task of the DRA to define, represent, organize, and regulate the religion in the secular public forms, and thus the DRA embodied the normalizing, executive side of Turkish secularism (Dressler 2010:125; see also Gözaydın 2006, 2008; Kara 2010). Any

religious activities outside the oversight of the state were defined as reactionary, divisive and anti-modern, and were observed as a threat by the secular state. Furthermore, Islam's public visibility and presence were controlled by the state through the 1925 Hat Law that banned and penalized the unauthorized wearing of religious dress. In other words, what "the secular state was against was the visibility of Islam that was beyond its control" (Çınar 2005:59–60; see also Cizre Sakallıoğlu 1996; Tunçay 1999).

Furthermore, the demographic structure of Anatolia changed dramatically due to wars and population changes. These demographic changes bumped up an overwhelmingly Muslim population in Anatolia. It confronted with the difficulty of controlling a population in Turkey's new borders, which was religiously homogeneous but ethnically different. "The official discourse of Turkish nationalism, Ziya Gökalp's idea of the nation, was based on a common culture, including all the Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire, including Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Albanians, and Bosnians" (Kösebalaban 2011:49). Paradoxically, the new regime secularized and Islamized the country at the same time. Mustafa Kemal guaranteed that the new regime recognizes the non-Turkish as equal founders and participants of Turkey: "The people who are present here and constitute the Great Parliament are not only Turks, Circassian, Kurdish or Laz. They are an honest community comprised of the elements of Islam (anasır-ı İslam). ... The unity that we are determined to construct is not for Turks or Circassians only but for the entire elements of Islam" (Mustafa Kemal 1920, quoted in Kosebalaban 2011:49). Consequently, according to Kara modernization, which is essentially a secular project, is also a source of Islamization, religious revival and feeds religious-mystical movements. He states that modern-secular ideas, institutions, and practices can only be defended with religious content since there are no other legitimizing and mobilizing elements in the Muslim societies that are more powerful than religion. He also argues that the experience of modernization in Turkey should be evaluated in this frame. Almost all the issues in Turkey are remotely or closely related to religion. Therefore, the assessment on Turkey's modernization or secularization needs to be considered religion and Islam-centered (Kara 2003:29, 2005:43–46).

CHAPTER 3

THE CALIPHATE AND ISLAMIZATION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY (1919-24)

This chapter aims to discuss the relation between Islam and politics with the implications of the Caliphate for foreign policy in the first years of Mustafa Kemal's power. In the first section, I examine the religious character of the “National Struggle” and underline that during this era (1919-1924), Mustafa Kemal did not make any statements against Islam, Caliph and the office of Caliphate. For instance, the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses unquestionably underlined the protection of the Caliphate and the Sultanate and this discourse continued during the era of the First Parliament until the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 (Ardıç 2012:248–49; Hülügü 2008:45–61).

The second section examines the relations between Turkey and the Muslim world especially during the National Struggle. Mustafa Kemal established good relations with the Muslim world, and he succeeded to get considerable financial and political support from most Muslims around the world. I argue that especially during the National Struggle, he constantly used religion to defend the Sultanate and the Caliphate in order to receive support not only from people and organizations in Turkey but also from the Muslim world for his new government. The last section analyzes the process of the abolition of the Sultanate. I argue that Mustafa Kemal started to consolidate his power and secular establishment with the abolition of Sultanate. I adopted that the abolition of the Caliphate was the critical point of the relation with the Muslim world.

3.1. Religious Character of the National Struggle

Mustafa Kemal was sent to Anatolia by the Sultan as a military inspector with wider authorization four days later the Greek's occupation of İzmir. Upon his arrival at Samsun in May 1919, he directly communicated with the influential commanders and began endeavors to bring together the separate local groups into one. Together with Rauf [Orbay], Ali Fuat [Cebesoy] and Refet [Bele] Paşa's and telegraphic consultation

with Kâzım [Karabekir] Paşa who was in Erzurum, Mustafa Kemal Paşa drafted the Amasya Memorandum which was sent to all civil and military authorities in Anatolia. It invited Turkish people to struggle for sovereignty and independence and to decide their destiny because the Istanbul government was incapable of defending the country and the Sultan-Caliphate that just the determination of the nation could save them. Then, Mustafa Kemal Paşa and his colleagues organized the Congresses in Erzurum and Sivas to start and coordinate a movement and recruit an army for the resistance against foreign intervention. In July 1919, the Erzurum Congress convened and endorsed a declaration calling for an independent Turkish state. After long and often intense debates, the Erzurum Congress decided to do everything in its power to protect and liberate Muslim territories from the foreigners and save the Sultan-Caliphate. Then in September, the National Congress reconvened in Sivas to complete the works discussed in Erzurum. It set up a committee for the defense of the rights of Anatolia and Thrace charged with organizing popular resistance and established a Representative Committee (*Heyet-i Temsiliye*) with Mustafa Kemal's leadership. The Congress also adopted the National Pact (*Misâk-ı Milli*) that was formulated at the Erzurum Congress. Later in Istanbul, it was also adopted by the Ottoman Parliament in January 1920, and became the charter of the National Struggle (Ardıç 2012:248; Hale 2000:32–33; Zürcher 1997:148–52, 2010:104–6). This document had a remarkably religious character based on a religious assessment for determination of the territory to fight occupation. The Pact rejected the secession of any territory where the majority were Muslims. The first of the six articles of the document underlined that the Muslim majority of the Ottoman State constitute an indivisible entity by united in religion, in race, and in aim. The fourth article also emphasized the security of Istanbul as the “seat of the Caliphate”, and finally, the fifth article underlined the rights of Muslim minorities in the neighboring countries (Ardıç 2012:249–50; Shaw 2000:803–4; Zürcher 1997:138–39). Moreover, on 1 May 1920, Mustafa Kemal, as leader of the resistance movement, pledged to fight the integrity of the nation that was “intended not only Turks, Circassians, Kurds, and Lazes but the Islamic ethnic elements of all of these, a sincere community. The nation, the preservation and defense of which we have undertaken are not only composed of one ethnic element, and it is composed of various Islamic elements” (Rustow

1973:106). According to Zürcher, the proclamations of the national resistance movement against the Greek and Armenian armies that threatened Anatolia with the support of the Allied occupation forces after 1918 “made it abundantly clear that the movement fought for the continued independence and unity of Ottoman Muslims” (Zürcher 2010:148).

Mustafa Kemal called to Muslim solidarity to mobilize support in the National Struggle. He declared Anatolia as the last stronghold of Islam and demanded all Muslims' support by using discourses of Islamic institutions and concepts in his declaration on 9 May 1920, at the GNA addressed to the Muslim world:

Our Muslim brothers and sisters,
Our honorable prophet, who buried in a corner of the southern deserts and listens to the sounds of the world, had united your souls with our souls. I, as your religious fellow, call out to you from a surrounded fortress. After the silence of Damascus, Kurtuba, Cairo, and Baghdad, the last land of the Caliphate of Islam (Darü'l Hilâfe), İstanbul, fell under the shadow of enemy attacks too. Hejaz as the Qibla of Islam and Home of Prophet (Ravza-i Nebevi), Yemen, Palestine, and Iraq have now become the vast and endless carriageway of the British reign while they were crying to their sister homeland, which has been persecuted in Africa, India, and Central Asia. Those who fled from the Crimea, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Caucasus in front of hostile raids have found a homeland in our lands. This is the country to give the right to freedom and the right to life to many unhappy children of Islam that they want to break down, to disaggregate. In order to condemn the people's resistance, which grows more every day and increases its influence every moment, British politics decided to resort to every way out. We learned that those who crushed the head of Islam with the hand of Islam, as in Egypt and India, want to introduce us as a rebel and sinful group to the Caliph.

However, our nation, which runs from war to war between centuries, from the hot deserts of the south to the icy climates of the north and from east to west, continues to adhere to the purpose of the blessed trust of the martyrs sacrificed on the way of religion. As Yavuz Sultan Selim, who is the most prominent representative of the idea of Islamic Union said: Do not miss your spiritual support for our nation dedicated itself for the unity of Islam, and its struggle for independence. Let the sun of Islam not be darkened entirely; let it shine again on your realm.

(Mustafa Kemal 1964:323–26)

In the case of foreign relations, the Mustafa Kemal focused on to develop close ties with the Muslim world to urge Muslims to observe themselves as a part of Muslim

Ummah under the auspices of the Caliph. After the Sivas Congress, again in Sivas, Mustafa Kemal organized an Islam Congress. In his book *İslam Birliđi ve Mustafa Kemal* (The Islamic Union and Mustafa Kemal), Hülagu published the British archive documents to explain the participants and decisions of the Congress, which was held in November-December 1919 in three sessions. Mustafa Kemal was elected to the executive committee of the Islamic Congress attended by delegates from the Muslim world (Hülagü 2008); out of the thirty-seven participants twenty-five were *ulama*: sixteen from Anatolia, two from Transcaucasia, two from Egypt, two from Syria, one from Yemen, one from the Najd, and one from the Crimea. Since the prospect congress was projected more comprehensive participation, in his opening speech, Bekir Sami Bey, one of the close friends of Mustafa Kemal, said that the second congress would include participants from Morocco, Algeria, Muscat, Afghanistan, India, and Bukhara, which have been unable to send delegates to this meeting (Kramer 1986:73–74). Before this congress, eight unnamed "Muslim notables" gathered at an unnamed place because of absolute secrecy, and drafted a constitution named the Society of Unitarians (*Muvahhidin*) (see for the full document Ibid:178–80).

Furthermore, at the beginning of the struggle, a *fatwa* war transpired between the clergy in İstanbul and Anatolia. *Şeyhulislam* issued the fatwa that was called for the death of Mustafa Kemal and other resistance movement proponents participating in the National Struggle. Then the *Mufti* of Ankara released an opposing fatwa in April 1920 to urge the public to support the national resistance. In this *fatwa*, it was clearly stated that untrue and unsubstantiated fatwas were not considered legal per Sharia law. Also, it declared that all good Muslims should join in the struggle to free the caliph from foreign captivity. Then the *fatwa* of Ankara was supported by 153 *muftis* and other clergies across Anatolia and was published by a number of newspapers (Ardıç 2012:251; Kedourie 1963; Mango 2008:160).

Furthermore, in the resistance movement, Islam was presented not only as political and cultural symbols but also constituted the legitimate discourse. In his speeches, Mustafa Kemal clearly expressed that the resistance movement against foreign

invaders was a jihad and also it would remain loyal to the Sultan-Caliph (Ardıç 2012:250–51). In other elites' discourse, for instance, Rauf Bey's, the resistance's identification was formed with Islam a sacred duty for Muslims and those who fought for the resistance became *mücahid*, and the fight was *jihad* (Gingeras 2009:75). Also, İsmet Bey, in his interview with *Muslim Standard* in Paris, in 1922, emphasizes the requirement of the support to Turkey as the center of the Caliphate from the Muslim world through using religious legitimacy:

The Turkish nation will never fall short of being a servant of the Caliphate. The Turkish nation prides on being the sword of Islam... the Turkish nation declares itself to be the hub and aide of the Caliphate and expects the great Muslim forces to assist Turkey in this new era... The fear of losing the authority of the Caliphate is completely untrue and unfounded... We hope that our Muslim brothers and sisters around the world will thoroughly take into consideration these words and understand that it is reasonable to expect their help.

(Bıyıklı 2006:215–16)

Moreover, the religious character of the movement was not only in Mustafa Kemal's statement and official documents; It was often observed in almost all major events. For instance, the GNA was opened with the parliamentarians attending Friday prayers in which Mustafa Kemal participated as well, thus, his praying before the opening session was a well-known photograph for the sake of religious leader propaganda. A full recitation of the Quran also took place among other religious ceremonies that together outdid any comparable ceremony in Ottoman history (Ardıç 2012:250; Gawrych 2013:104; Hanioglu 2011a:102). Additionally, the Grand National Assembly bestowed the title 'Ghazi' on Mustafa Kemal after the army won the Battle of Sakarya. The title of "*ghazi*" signifies a warrior for Islam, and it was adopted as an official title by Mustafa Kemal like some of the Ottoman Sultans. It signified religious meanings for Muslim Turks and also for all Muslims (Mardin 1989:4–5). In 1935, Mustafa Kemal claimed Atatürk as family name and dropped the title of Ghazi that has religious connotation (Ahmad 1993:63). Ironically, all these religious practices during the National Struggle were taken under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal.

3.2. Justification and Consolidation of the National Struggle with Reference to the Caliphate

The Caliphate, as not only symbolic and political but also religious aspect, was at the heart of the National Struggle. In fact, one of the favored slogans for National Struggle was "Save the Caliph" and this call was expressed through Erzurum and Sivas Congresses and also new Assembly (Hanioğlu 2011a:113–16). Indeed, Mustafa Kemal knew that Islam had a crucial role over the Anatolian people and as a pragmatic leader he used the social influence of religion in society and mobilized different groups and religious people of Anatolia in the name of saving the Sultanate and Caliphate. Hence, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal both Congresses announced that national army would serve as the protector of the Caliphate and the Sultanate (Ibid:98). Also, Mustafa Kemal thought that religion was useful in consolidating and extending his power among the supporters so he used the position of the Caliphate in the beginning of National Struggle to strengthen his political position.

During National Struggle, the Ankara Government and especially Mustafa Kemal did not expressly challenge the Sultan-Caliph's authority in the documents and his statements. For example, in the fatwa issued by the Mufti of Ankara, there was a very careful and clear distinction that they opposed the İstanbul government but they remained loyal the Sultan-Caliph (Butler 2011:223). The leadership of the movement accepted the Caliphate as a high and respectable position and considered the Caliphate as the legitimate authority, not the İstanbul government. Thus, they demanded direct correspondence with the Caliph (Hanioğlu 2011a:99). From the beginning, the main goals that were identified by the Sivas and Erzurum Congresses were to achieve the integrity of the Ottoman land, to assure of the nation's independence and to protect the Sultanate and Caliphate (Gawrych 2013:81–85). The leadership of the movement benefited the legitimacy of the Caliph against the external and internal threats as well as he gained supports not only from Anatolian Turks also from many Muslim nations by recognized the 'Caliph' as a legitimate ruler and his place in the governance of the new state (Ibid 2013:105).

When it comes to foreign relations, the Kemalists focused on to develop friendly relationships with the Muslim world to encourage Muslims to perceive themselves as a part of Muslim Ummah under the auspices of the Caliph. The ideological aim of this policy was not to settle Muslim unity against the threat posed by European imperialism. Political leaders, as well as bureaucrats, intellectuals, and elite circles in Muslim countries, are also affected by the developments in Turkey. Mustafa Kemal was one of the primary political leaders in the Muslim world between 1922 and 1923. Therefore, Kemalism was seen by the Eastern societies as an exemplary struggle for their independence from Western colonialism (Georgeon 1990:30–40). As mentioned above, Turkey organized an Islam Congress in November-December 1919 in Sivas attended by delegates around the Muslim world and Sheikh Ahmad Sanusi presided the Congress (Lewis 1964:108). The article in the *Islamic News* in 27 January 1920 mentioned that “Mustafa Kemal had invited entire Asia and Africa to Anatolia to show them what he had accomplished, and by the mere fact of their presence to intimidate the West” (Zarewand 1971:124). The delegation of the Sivas Congress also discussed the idea of establishing an Islamic Federation like the United States of America consist of Muslim autonomous states in the Balkan and Arab region (Sonyel 1987:152; Yalçın 2002:211).

Mustafa Kemal demonstrated the continuing conflict as a fight among the imperial powers and Muslim-Ottomans to save the Sultan-Caliph and motherland. He explicitly used this argument on many occasions in order to consolidate multi-ethnic Ottoman Muslim population (Romano 2006:30). Although the Treaty of Sevres recognized the possibility of creating a Kurdish state, the Kurds in Anatolia supported the Anatolian resistance movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, rather than fighting for the Kurdish independence and eventually a Kurdish state. For they believed that the movement aimed to save the Ottoman state and preserve the Caliphate by which Mustafa Kemal justified the National Struggle. Also, Mustafa Kemal emphasized the importance of Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood as being Muslims in a series of declarations and diplomatic communications (Gawrych 2013:74; Saraçoğlu 2011:44–47; Shaw 2000 II:741–48).

Moreover, many members of the *ulema* and intellectuals, such as the Kurdish Muslim scholar Said Nursi, believed that the nationalists were really trying to save the sultan-caliph. At Mustafa Kemal's invitation, Nursi visited the GNA, delivered a speech and prayed for their further success. Also, he supported the fatwa of Ankara Mufti. Then he declared that he would continue to support them if they would adhere to Islam and the Caliph. Thus, his statements and activities gave the impression for supporting the National Struggle over the people, especially Kurdish (Atabaki 2007:128). According to Stirling, the majority of the Turkish villagers think of the National Struggle as a victory of Islam over the infidels, rather than as a national victory of a secular Republic, even during the late 1940s and early 1950s (Stirling 1965:400).

3.3. Relations with the Muslim World

Mustafa Kemal was smart enough to understand and remember that during the National Struggle, the defense of Islam was fundamental in mobilizing not only the people of Anatolia but also Muslim communities around the world. During the years of National Struggle, the Caliphate's prestige was very important for Mustafa Kemal because he used the Caliphate as an instrument to provide support to the National Struggle from the Muslim world and benefited from its prestige among Muslims. As soon as the GNA was established in April 1920, he released a declaration to the Muslim world and requested financial and moral support to the National Struggle and even stated that this owed loyalty to the Caliphate for Muslims. The Caliphate's influence could help secure financial and political support from Muslims outside the Empire. He addressed the entire Muslim world in the GNA, on 9 May 1920:

...the last center of the Muslim caliphate has fallen under the shadow of enemy weapons... Anatolia, the union, and independence of which we are trying to defend is a land of refuge for many Muslim communities driven out of their homelands... Hundreds of muftis and scholars have issued fatwas to show the right direction to our nation and the Islamic world ... Please hear this voice of sharia.

(Hanioglu 2011a:100)

He also aimed to gain the assistance of the Khilafat movement in India, which had a very effective political and economic power at that time. He also emphasized the independence of Muslim communities and the leadership of the National Struggle in

the struggle of other societies. Mustafa Kemal gave messages in this direction in two different speeches that he made on 7 July 1922 due to the arrival of the Iranian envoy Mümtazüddev İsmail Han to Ankara: “We are confident that in our struggle, the East nations, the Muslim world of Islam and the world are with us. There is no doubt that this countenance to Turkey will lead to absolute victory. I hope our friends will be pleased to see this final sequel soon” (Güven 2012:223). The other made on the occasion of the envoy’s reception on 14 July 1922:

Turkey's current struggle does not only belong to Turkey. This was said by all our colleagues, but I feel the need to verify once more. If Turkey's current struggle alone on its behalf, it might be shorter, less bloody and could be done more quickly. Turkey makes a great and significant effort. Turkey defends all downtrodden nations and all the eastern nations' rights. We are confident that eastern nations walk with us to reach this aim.

(Mustafa Kemal 2011:53–56)

Moreover, the religious and secular elites together sought the support from Muslim communities during the National Struggle. The Islamic character of the resistance movement was stressed for seeking support against increasing imperialist encroachments on Ottoman Muslim lands. Hence, Mustafa Kemal's addressed at the reception ceremony in the GNA for Recep Bey and Nazari Bey, the Delegates of Bukhara:

Gentlemen of the Extraordinary Political Authority of Bukhara,
I welcome on behalf of Turkish people, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and its government to your esteemed delegation coming from on behalf of People of Bukhara and the Committee of Ministers of the Bukhara People's Councils Republic. Despite the traditional and religious devotion of the Bukharians to our nation, the existence of the occupying and brutal forces had prevented to implement this devotion properly thus far. The Great Eastern revolution, which has a significant share of boasting of Turkey's hero armies, connects the oppressed easterners with ties that become more frequent and solidified day by day.

....

The Holy Koran which was sent as gifts to the Turkish and Muslim brothers and sisters in Turkey and the sword which is sent as a medal of admiration and celebration to the Turkish army by people of Bukhara are two extraordinary enormous and valuable memorabilia that are representing the right of religion and serve for the God. My heart was filled with excitement as I took these relics. Our people and our army will undoubtedly be very emotional and happy from these encouraging and

celebrating gifts from our distant brothers. I will deliver this holy book to the nation and give the precious sword to the conqueror of Izmir by fulfilling the wishes of the coreligionist and brother people of Bukhara.

(Hâkimiyet-i Milliye 08.01.1922)

According to the British sources, Mustafa Kemal founded a “scientific committee” and revitalized the former Islamic Society that was supposed to organize religious affairs in Turkey and maintain its connections with other Muslim countries and communities. This committee had played a key role in getting funds and public support from Muslims in India, Afghanistan, Iran, and North Africa for the Turkish resistance. Its new aim was to strengthen links between Turkey and other Muslim societies, especially in the Arab world. Britain interpreted these activities as an attempt by Mustafa Kemal to revitalize Pan-Islamism (FO’s Report, 371/9290, quoted in Ardiç 2012:282). The resistance elites emphasized Islamic solidarity among Muslims and also their own role as the protector of Caliph of all Muslims. They needed to establish relations with them because of lack of enough economic and military power, but seculars did this somewhat reluctantly.

Mustafa Kemal’s discourse was addressed to ‘Muslim compatriots’, and aimed to wrest ‘Islamic lands’ and ‘Islamic peoples’ from foreign domination. Mustafa Kemal’s supporters envisaged the reconstitution and liberation of the caliphate. In his speech at Ankara in January 1920, Mustafa Kemal laid out the projected reforms necessary “so that Turkey may take her place among the civilized nations, extending her hand to all Muslim brothers so as to ensure the success of the Muslim world, of whose revival there can be no doubt” (Moreau 2003:60). In the *Speech* he also presented his sympathy to Muslim communities’ struggle for their independence, and declared during the National Struggle the right of all oppressed Muslim nations to liberate themselves from the imperial powers:

We have been citizenship since the centuries with our fellow brothers and sisters, who are outside the border I have drawn from the point of view of our community. These brothers and sisters everywhere in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, in the East to maintain their existence and struggle to ensure independence. How great would it be for the Muslim world to have the independence of all these Islamic parts? I feel great bliss by already envisaging how robust the position of the Muslim world will be in

realizing this. I see the success of the Muslim world, which has no doubt that it is possible to awaken.

(Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası 1994:39)

With this, he hoped to benefit from Caliphate's prestige in the Muslim world because he knew that the Caliph was a nominal and spiritual authority over these territories' Muslim populations. And the call for saving the Caliph could hardly be ignored by Muslim societies, especially under imperial domination territories (Moreau 2003:61). For instance, the Muslim community of India, in general, made various interventions as an essential source of support for the Kemalist movement. Notably, the Khilafat Movement, which occupied a vital place in British Indian politics as a pan-Islamic movement, met on 17 February 1920 and published a manifesto favorable to Turkey and initiated a remarkable financial aid in order to protect the Ottoman Caliphate from Western occupation (Minault 1982:140–45; Qureshi 1999:137–38). This movement also sought to “use its influence in India to apply pressure on the British government to moderate its policies in relation to Turkey”. They also demanded that Turkey might be allowed to retain her pre-war frontiers, and especially should not lose control of the Hijaz (Ahmad 1977:100).

Certain sympathy for the center of the Caliphate also existed in North Africa. Thus, during the National Struggle Mustafa Kemal's reference to Islam and the Caliphate paved the way to get support from North African Muslims. Also, Mustafa Kemal was becoming an iconic figure in the Arab world because of his leadership against occupiers (Georgeon 1990:33). Even though fundraising and political gathering were forbidden by French authorities, in Algeria and Tunisia the issue of the Caliphate and the Turkish struggle were discussed among the intellectuals, politicians, and religious scholars. Some Algerians and Tunisians sought solidarity through the collection of funds (Bıyıklı 2006:207–10; Moreau 2003:63–66). More efforts in aid were also undertaken in Egypt and Trablus. The news regarding developments on the movement in Turkey as well as postcards bearing Mustafa Kemal's portrait were introduced to Egypt from Tunisia and Algeria and circulated in cafes and through newsagents. Mustafa Kemal became recognized as *Ghazi* and '*Hero of Islam*' in North Africa and also as the '*sword of Islam*' in India. This can be seen clearly in the popular

imagery of which he was the subject in the Arab world through the images that were produced particularly in Egypt (Moreau 2003:60). In response, Mustafa Kemal, in his addresses to the GNA in 1921 emphasized the importance of developing relations with the Muslim world:

We are always looking for good relations and friendship ties with Eastern and Western states. We have established sincere relationships in the East with the governments of Azerbaijan, North Caucasus, and Afghanistan, as well as with the Muslim communities in Iraq and Syria. We also have relations with the Iranian government. We maintain these important ties.
(TBMMZC 1921:4)

In another sitting in the parliament the next year, he emphasized the importance of his meeting with the delegation of the newly established Republic of Bukhara and bilateral relations with this country.

An embassy committee is about to go to Bukhara these days. We have established and continued the best relations with the Russian Shura Republic and its allies, as well as we accepted the aim of strengthening our existing good relations with the Eastern Muslim countries in the same situation like us as our partner.

(TBMMZC 1922:10)

On the other hand, when the Ankara Government and France signed an agreement on 20 October 1921, ending the Franco-Turkish War, it was Morocco who had encouraged France to reach an agreement with the Turks. Also, the Moroccan press reported on an exchange of telegrams between the Sultan of Morocco and President of France. It was reported that this agreement had produced a favorable “impression on the population, who saw the reassertion of those ties that bind France and Islam. The French press also sought to present the agreement with Ankara as a reconciliation of the French Republic with the whole Muslim world, via the normalization of her relations with the people of Turkey” (Moreau 2003:61–62).

In South-East Asia, the Ottoman Caliph was also considered a religious authority. Although Southeast Asia and Turkey lie on opposite sides of the vast Muslim world, Muslims of this region's interest in the Ottoman Empire was long established, and they were affected by any event in Turkey (Formichi 2013:96). For instance, they expected the Ottoman assistance for the Acehese issue of North Sumatra in the late

nineteenth century when they were struggling against Dutch imperialism. The press even reported that the Ottoman government considered to send eight warships to Sumatra to prevent any hostile attack on Aceh (Reid 1967:276). Moreover, several times Malay Muslims sought assistance from the Ottoman Sultan against the British. Javanese pilgrims saw Ottoman Consul as a representative of the Caliphate (Ibid:276). Consequently, the call for "saving the Caliph" during the National Struggle got attention from Southeast Asian Muslims. Many articles and news published in the newspapers relating to the Caliphate's situation and the war against British imperial occupy. There were a number of anti-colonial and pan-Islamic movements focused on achieving independence from their colonial masters. Turkey's victories against the Greeks and Mustafa Kemal's attitude toward the Caliph positively impressed Indonesian intellectuals and politicians, and they considered Turkish movements' achievements could be an example for their struggle and independence. Notably, the founding leader of Indonesia, Soekarno was impressed by Mustafa Kemal's leadership and confidence as he challenged the occupiers. Newspapers across the region were hailing him as their hero, not only as a pan-Islamist, also secular hailed him as *Ghazi* and *Tiger of Islam* (Formichi 2013:98–101). Mustafa Kemal's portraits were acquired in hundreds by young Malays from the shops kept by Indian Muslims. They were moderately stirred by the idea of an Asiatic Power, making a stand against the overwhelming strength of the victorious colonial powers (Milner 1986:118). However, with the end of the National Struggle and the proclamation of the republic, structural and institutional secular changes began to emerge in domestic politics. These developments, one of them the abolition of the Sultanate, would also affect foreign policy.

3.4. Abolition of the Sultanate and the Caliphate Question

The First National Assembly was an alliance represented by many dispositions and groups. Kara emphasizes that this Assembly accomplished the National Struggle with Islamist and the Caliphate discourses and that established the State based on religion by preparing a constitution that included the article "the religion of the state is Islam." However, during the Lausanne talks and the proclamation of the Republic, the first Assembly was replaced with an exiguous and relatively homogeneous cadre in line

with the idea and politics of the single party regime. The Republican administration and ideology, as well as strict secularism and practices, are essentially the work of this narrow cadre (Kara 2005:14, 2010:10–15). This does not mean that the first National Assembly fully supported the Sultanate system. It was quite a heterogeneous and unruly body. Apart from Unionists, the Second Group, there was another opposition group, the Association for the Preservation of Sacred Institutions that emphasized the significance of religion and of the Sultanate and the Caliphate. The ongoing struggle against Greece kept these oppositions in a temporary silence. Against these oppositions, Mustafa Kemal organized his followers around the Defense of Rights Group in the GNA which had the majority in the Assembly. The achievements in the National Struggle tremendously empowered Mustafa Kemal's position. He utilized this situation to strengthen his position in the postwar period. However, he could not make his plans explicit due to pro-monarchy, unionist opposition in the GNA. He decided to eliminate the monarchy and declared the GNA as the sole sovereign body in new Turkey. Even the Constitution that he had drafted in 1921 explicitly stated that their primary aim was to protect the Caliphate and serve the Sultan. Although during the struggle he and other leaders declared many times their loyalty to the Sultan, they did not have any plans to keep the political institutions of the Ottoman Empire (Zürcher 1997:159–60). In the meantime, there was an important event that would prepare the ground for the abolition of the Sultanate.

In addition to the Ankara government, the Istanbul government was also invited to the Lausanne Conference in the late 1922, which meant that the Entente States were still recognizing the Sultanate and the Istanbul government. Mustafa Kemal used this situation as an opportunity to abolish the Sultanate. He made a long and historical speech regarding the necessity of abolishing Sultanate and separating the Caliphate from it. During his speech, he legitimized his arguments by using Islamic history and discourse and underlined the “unIslamic” nature of Sultan by giving examples of the Prophet's life story and the first four caliphs of Islam who were elected. Then he explained how the Caliphate turned from this authentic system into a monarchy during the Umayyad and the Abbasid periods. He emphasized that “a two-tiered system consisting of the GNA government and the Caliphate (with no political power)

was perfectly compatible with Islam” by giving the example of the Seljukid period when the Caliphate and monarchy were separate (Ardıç 2012: 258–264; see also Shaw 2000: 1882–1900). After the long discussions, the draft law was accepted on 1 November 1922. Thus, the Caliphate separated from the Sultanate and the Sultanate was abolished. The next day GNA elected the Sultan’s nephew Abdülmecid Efendi as the Caliph. After the abolition of the Sultanate, the Ankara government sought to justify this critical political decision over the Muslim world. Hence, İsmet Bey, in his interview with *Muslim Standard* in Paris, on 22 November 1922, emphasized the requirement of the support to Turkey as the center of the Caliphate from the Muslim world through using religious legitimacy. He also legitimized the abolition of the Sultanate by emphasizing that it was a non-Islamic institution and underlined to protect the interests of Islam and the Caliphate as the Ankara government by following the Islamic traditions (Şimşir 1981:136–39).

The new elections held in July and almost all members of Second Group were not re-elected. With this election, Mustafa Kemal gained absolute power in the Assembly. Later he converted the Defense of Rights Group into a political party, to be called the People's Party. The Treaty of Lausanne was signed on 24 July 1923 by Prime Minister İsmet Bey with the approval of Mustafa Kemal. Accordingly, with the signing and ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne, Mustafa Kemal substantially achieved the process of consolidation, of accumulating the Assembly's and Party's power under his complete control (Zürcher 1997:156–63).

After the elections, Mustafa Kemal began to implement his secular program. Firstly, the GNA declared Ankara the capital of the new state. This was an essential and symbolic change, because Istanbul was the capital of two glorious empires, the center of the Caliphate. Then, Mustafa Kemal proposed a law proclaiming the republic on 29 October 1923. The same day, the GNA adopted the proposal and elected Mustafa Kemal as the first president of the new state. Although he added a new article in the constitution that declared Islam as the religion of the state on the day of the proclamation of the republic, Mustafa Kemal continued to make secular changes. Even though he had passionately defended the Caliphate when it separated from the

Sultanate, he saw the Caliphate as the main impediment to the secular transformation that he wanted to initiate. (Hanioglu 2011a:147; Zürcher 1997:166–70).

Actually, Mustafa Kemal profoundly opposed the Caliph's (political or symbolic) authority believing that the new state had to adopt the secular political and social institutions for its future. According to him, there was no place for Caliph in the new state but he did not share these ideas publicly during the era of the First Parliament. However, after the elections, Mustafa Kemal began to express his criticisms clearly:

The happiest period of our history is when our rulers were not caliphs. One of the Turkish sultans used his influence, credibility, and wealth to claim the caliphate. The Prophet ordered his followers to spread Islam to the nations of the world; he did not order to rule these nations. Such an idea never passed through the mind of the Prophet. Caliphate means governance and government. A caliph who really wants to do his duty, to rule all the Muslim nations, how can he achieve this? I confess that if they make me caliph in these circumstances, I immediately resign. But let's come to history, let's examine the facts. Arabs established a caliphate in Baghdad, but they created another in Kurtuba. Neither the Iranians nor the Afghans, nor the African Muslims, ever recognized the caliph in Istanbul. The idea of the sole caliph who served the supreme spirituality on all Islamic nations is not an idea, but a concept derived from books... The criticisms caused by our last reform are implicit in a non-genuine idea; the idea of Islamic unity.

(Mustafa Kemal 1959:69–70)

Mustafa Kemal knew that the Caliphate was a significant symbol for Muslims, and its abolition was more difficult and complicated than the abolition of the Sultanate. Abdülhamid II had increased its importance by reinvigorating the institution. Many Sunni Muslims throughout the Muslim world considered it to be the highest Muslim institution commissioned defending their rights against the Western occupation. (Hanioglu 2011a:147).

Soon after the abolition of the Sultanate, many politicians, scholars, and intellectuals sent letters to Mustafa Kemal and other Turkish leaders and warned that as Muslim's leader, the Caliph's position and dignity should be kept and maintained in the new state. Mustafa Kemal and leaders of the ruling party did not give any response to

those letters or even sometimes accused these kinds of efforts intervening internal affairs of Turkey (Zürcher 1997:167–68). Furthermore, Mustafa Kemal assessed the debates on the Caliphate's leadership to the Muslim ummah as follows:

"Gentlemen, the foreigners were not attacking the caliphate; but this was not saving the Turkish nation from being attacked. The ones who were attacking the caliphate were not the Muslim nations who were jealous of the Turks. However, it was the Muslim nations who were fighting against the Turks in Çanakkale, Syria, and Iraq under the English and French banners.

(quoted in Dural 2007:117)

After the opening of the new year of the GNA on 1 March 1924, the abolition of the Caliphate started to be discussed and the proposals were presented to the parliament on 3 March. Although some deputies had strongly opposed the abolition of the Caliphate, considering Mustafa Kemal's dominant position in the parliament, the proposed acts were passed on 3 March 1924. (Akgün 2006:190; Lewis 1961:257–59). The abolition of Sultanate did not itself constitute a secular change in foreign policy and did not directly affect foreign policymaking. However, since the Sultanate was an integrated institutional system with the Caliphate, it became meaningful in foreign policy with the abolition of the Caliphate was the beginning of the secularization period in TFP.

CHAPTER 4
SECULARIZATION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-CALIPHATE ERA
(1924-1929)

In this chapter, I discuss TFP between 1924 and 1929 in three sections. The first section examines the abolition of the Caliphate as the most critical step of the secularization of TFP, including the reactions from the Muslim world to the abolition of the Caliphate. As mentioned in the previous chapter, most Muslim communities around the world supported the resistance movement during 1919-22 not only politically but also financially. Indeed, the abolition of the Caliphate came as a surprise for most of the intellectuals, political and religious leaders who had supported the resistance with the Islamic ideals. In the second section, I examine four Caliphate Congresses Mecca 1924, Cairo 1926, Mecca 1926, and Jerusalem 1931 respectively and Turkey's attitude to these Congress. I argue that after the abolition of the Caliphate, TFP became turn increasingly "western" and "secular. Under Mustafa Kemal's rule, Turkey avoided involving not only the issue of Caliphate in the international arena but also the issues of in the Middle East and other Muslim regions. Thus, any religious tendencies, particularly the Caliphate, were not allowed to influence foreign policy. Also, in his famous *Speech* (Nutuk) delivered by Mustafa Kemal between 15 and 20 October 1927, he intentionally gave few references to his previous Islamic foreign policy. The only specific mention his concerns regarding Pan-Islam. Because of rapid secularization in domestic politics through Western-orientated reforms, his foreign policy was not to develop close cooperation with the Muslim world (Landau 2004:131). Davutoğlu emphasizes the transforming identity of the Republic in domestic and foreign politics compared the past. Accordingly, the Islamic identity and policies in foreign policy that were thought to lead to the dissolution of the state by increasing the contradictions between the Ottoman Empire and the Western colonial powers were abandoned. In domestic politics, minority status in the new state was given to non-Muslims only, and the religion-based Islamic identity defined the constituent elements of the country. Furthermore, he underlines the contractions of domestic and foreign political structure. Indeed,

the Ottoman Empire had multi-religious and multinational composition despite hosting the Caliphate. However, the Republic was relieved of responsibility for international religious symbols and institutions with the abolition of the Caliphate in contrast to its overwhelmingly mono-religious society structure based on Islam as a result of population exchanges (Davutoğlu 2001:70). Mustafa Kemal thought that in order to implement a secular nation-building project, he should focus on domestic politics, isolated from foreign policy issues. He stated that “it is quite natural and therefore simple to explain the fact that a country which is in the midst of fundamental reforms and development should sincerely desire peace and tranquility both at home and in the world” (Benli Altunışık and Tür 2005:94). The secular elite used this explanation to justify nonassertive foreign policy traditions. They acquired, as a secular nation-state, Turkey's degraded position in international politics to strengthen its authority internally and execute the secular changes (Kösebalaban 2011:53–54). While the Kemalist paradigm determined the functioning of the new secular nation-state as the founding element in domestic politics, it also established its practices as the founding discourse of foreign policy. Thus, the new political elite through the Kemalist reforms constructed a new secular identity which defined TFP as well (Bozdağlıoğlu 2003:51–56).

Furthermore, in this chapter, the last section analyzes the relations with the Muslim world after the abolitions of the Caliphate with the cases of Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Muslim communities in India, North Africa, and Southeast Asia. I claim that Turkey had followed isolated foreign policy from the Muslim world, especially the colonial communities as one of the results of the secularization policy. Turkey did not give a symbolic response to the Indian Muslim community that gave generous financial support to the Turkish resistance movement. This illustrates that the new secular elites determined to follow secular politics in the new foreign policy that began with the abolition of the Caliphate.

4.1. Abolition of Caliphate and Reactions from the Muslim World

After the abolition of the Sultanate and the proclamation of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal had sought to bring an end to the Caliphate as part of his aim to alter Turkey

into a secular state. In his mind, there was no place for the Caliphate as an authority in the new secular state. Then, Mustafa Kemal decided to complete the most radical stage of secularization process of the new state through the abolition of the Caliphate and elimination of the Ottoman reign's authority from politics and Turkey. On the other hand, some politicians in Turkey strongly opposed the abolition of the Caliphate. Some of them like Rauf Bey stated his loyalty to the Caliphate as an authority of all Muslims, and also some like Yusuf Akçura suggested to use this institution which had the capability to be useful in relations with Muslims, for the sake of new state's and entire Muslim world's benefits. However, it was obvious that Mustafa Kemal had decided to abolish the Caliphate that was the most important reminder of the past and there was no place such an institution in the new state's foreign and domestic policy (Eraslan 2001a:80–85).

In addition to this not only in Turkey but also throughout the Muslim world politicians, intellectuals had expressed their objection concerning the abolition of the Caliphate. One notable event was that Ameer Ali and Agha Khan who were prominent figures in the Indian Muslim community and founding members of the Khilafat Movement, sent a letter to Prime Minister İsmet Bey. It was published in influential Istanbul newspapers on 24 November 1923 before reaching him. They argued that "any diminution in the prestige of the Caliph or the elimination of the Caliphate as a religious factor from the Turkish body politic would mean the disintegration of Islam and its practical disappearance as a moral force in the world" (for the full letter see Boivin 2013: 402–403). This letter significantly raised the levels of political tension already taking place within Turkey. In particular, it made a critical reference to the Caliph's diminished position after the abolition of the Sultanate and the proclamation of the Republic.

Furthermore, Kemalists were very anxious for the Caliphate position because of an increased interest in Caliph Abdülmecid Efendi by local and international prominent figures (Berkes 1964:457–60). His situation was a direct contradiction to Mustafa Kemal's secularist, nationalist foreign policies that were based on limited involvement with the other Muslim countries and communities. Also, according to

Kemalists, as long as the Caliphate remained, Western countries with Muslim colonies –notably British Empire– and also Muslim countries would intervene Turkey's domestic and foreign policy. For instance, Aga Khan and Ameer Ali were viewed with great suspicion, and branded as agents of Britain, seeking the overthrow of the Republic and the restoration of the Ottoman dynasty. It is perhaps the ultimate contradiction that the Indian Muslims were regarded as agents of Britain in their championship of the Caliph, but that is the way Mustafa Kemal presented it, who was seeking an excuse to abolish the Caliphate altogether to consolidate his own power (Minault 1982:203).

Eventually, the proposition about "Abolishment of the office of the Caliphate and exile of the Ottoman dynasty from Turkey" were brought to the GNA on 3 March 1924. After long discussions taking place in the GNA regarding this proposal Prime Minister İsmet Bey terminate the discussion by stating that "Love of Turkey in the Muslim World did not result from the fact that Turkey is the country where the Caliphate is located, but from the services that Turkey provided for the Muslim World. Turkey may be a single entity in domestic and foreign policies, such singularity is also valid for the other Muslims" (Eraslan 2001b:354). Then the GNA abolished the Caliphate and adopted that the members of the Ottoman Dynasty to be deported from Turkey. The abolition of the Caliphate paved the way of generating secular control and oversight mechanism over Islam and politics. Thus, with this, a critical step was taken in the transition of foreign policy from the religious base to secular isolated and Western-oriented foreign policy. According to Davutoğlu, the Republican Government, which rejected the political ideals and institutions of the Ottoman Empire, turned to a new political culture in line with this international position. The political elites embarked on a wide range of reforms, believing that the preservation of internal political integrity and borders was possible through the elimination of political identities and institutions that disturbed the West. Therefore, Turkey refused to be a weak center of the civilizational basin, which it belonged by taking a critical and radical decision as an international position. Though, it chose to become a regional power under the security umbrella of the Western civilizational basin (Davutoğlu 2001:70).

4.1.1. Reactions from Muslim World

The abolition of the Caliphate generated different responses throughout the Muslim world. For many, this decision of the Turkish government was a disappointment because according to it signaled the end of the unity of Islam. Others, mainly some secularists and nationalists, supported it. For instance, Within the Arab world, leaders and elites were satisfied to eliminate Turkish authority ultimately and were pleased to terminate this issue and to initiate secular alternatives for the creation of their new nation-states. But it did not mean that there were monotonous reactions (Moosa 2015:107).

This decision disappointed particularly Muslim communities who endeavored to live under Western imperial governments. In fact, they viewed the National Struggle as against European Imperialism, and to some extent, it was a defending the courage of the Caliphate. From this perspective, many prominent leaders in the Muslim world including Abdulhamid Bin Badis, Algeria's religious leader, Muhammad Iqbal, the prominent Islamic thinker and poet from India, Sheikh Ahmed Senussi, the great leader of Senussis community in North Africa and supporter of National Struggle, Abdurresid Ibrahim, renowned Muslim scholar who acquainted Islam in Japan, Musa Yarulla Bigiev, a scholar from Kazan, and Ahmed Shawqi, the Arab poet who likened Mustafa Kemal to the great commander Khalid ibn Walid on the side of Prophet Muhammad, were remarkably disappointed by the abolition of the Caliphate (Pay 2015:114).

4.1.1.1. Indian Muslims

Covering the Indian Muslim reaction to the abolition of the Caliphate is important because not only Turkey occupied an eminent and significant place for their intellectuals and leaders during the last century, the "greatest regrets and resentment appeared in India" (Toynbee 1927:62). Not only for the seat of the Caliphate, but also according to them, it was the only Muslim country that had managed to preserve its independence against European colonialism. The Khilafat Committee was bewildered because of their icon, the Caliph, had been abolished, and their idol, Mustafa Kemal, had been the iconoclast. The Committee sent a wire

to Mustafa Kemal and expressed their disappointment (Akbulut 1988:79–80). In India, the Committee and ulama issued a joint statement to their followers that there was no reason for discouragement. Even if the Turks were on the wrong course, there were other ways to work for Islamic solidarity. They could promote a congress of representatives from all Muslim countries to elect a new caliph on a democratic basis (Sayyid 2003:60–61).

At a meeting of the Khilafat Working Committee in June of 1924, the Committee refused to accept the deposition of Abdülmecid and vented their wrath on Mustafa Kemal. The meeting also suspended the title "The Sword of Islam" conferred earlier on Mustafa Kemal. In addition, the statements released by Mohammad Ali and his brother Maulana Shaukat Ali, prominent figures of the Committee. They revealed harsh criticism to Mustafa Kemal who was a traitor to Islam and acted for selfish reasons and should be obliged to take Abdülmecid back. "The Indian Muslims had given their money and ornaments and had suffered imprisonment, but Mustafa Kemal, that ungrateful atheist, despised all those sacrifices and ignored their entreaties" (Minault 1982:203–5).

Amir Ali was of the view that Ankara's decision was a "disaster for the Islamic civilization" and the abolition of the Caliphate would have a ponderous impact on Muslim unity and was the gravest tragedy within the last seven centuries. In contrast, some such as Mohammad Barakatullah stated that although Mustafa Kemal abolished the Caliphate, history might forgive him because of his other services to Islam. Also, other Indian Muslims repeatedly petitioned Mustafa Kemal to assume the Caliphate himself, some stressing that this would promote Islamic unity (Evered and Evered 2010:14).

4.1.1.1. North Africa

Many African Muslims considered the Ottoman Caliph as the nominal leader for the solidarity of Muslims. For instance, the abolition of the Caliphate caused an outburst of emotion in Tunisia. Some prominent figures of society, religious leaders, as well as students gathered in the city of Tunis to show their support to the Caliph. In fact,

North African Muslims supported Ottoman Caliph against the King of Hijaz, Sharif Huseyin, for his claim of the Caliph. Many Muslims in North Africa, especially in Tunisia, had sympathy for the Ottoman Caliph because, the Caliphate was the last symbol to connect to Islamic sovereignty, so they tried to maintain their symbolic affinity of interdependence with the Caliphate. Thus, they had some reservations for the secular reforms in Turkey. In fact, in Tunisia a group of young, modernist bourgeois found a Committee for the Caliphate. Although they had secular and nationalist ideas and sympathy for Mustafa Kemal, they attempted some initiatives not only with Turkey but also with Caliph Abdülmecid, some Muslim countries like Egypt and even France. Tawfiq al-Madani, president of the Committee, communicated with Abdülmecid, and the Committee transmitted a telegram to the embassy of Turkey in Paris, to express its complaint about Caliph's dethronement. Also, the Committee tried to use French influence to settle a new role for the Caliphate and negotiated with the French government to apply an adjustment of the Treaty of Lausanne, to reconsider the Caliph's position over Muslim countries (Moreau 2003:64–65).

In Egypt, on the other hand, there was no unified response to this critical development. Mostly intellectual debates occurred among the scholars and ulama. For instance, Ali Abdur-Raziq, the prominent Al-Azhar scholar, defended the abolition of the Caliphate and argued that Islam does not advocate a specific form of government and Quran nowhere any mention of the Caliphate as a political institution. On the other side, the leading ulama in Al-Azhar condemned him for his secularist view and declared that Muslims were not bound the Caliphate. From the political side, some also supported the abolition, and they had their own plan to appoint a new Caliph; King Fuad (Ardıç 2012:316; Kedourie 1963:238–39).

4.2. The Caliphate Conferences and Turkish Foreign Policy

The abolition of the Caliphate was considered as a political gap in the Muslims world. Prominent leaders and intellectuals desired to avoid this hiatus by assembling Islamic Congresses. In every case, they attempted to identify their objectives or ambitions by receiving approval from the Muslim world. Although some of the participants aimed

to seek more extensive Muslim assistance against non-Muslim rivals, others, especially the hosts, sought support for their claim of the title of the Caliph. During the Congresses, the main debate was the validity of Turkey's decision regarding the Caliphate and appointment of the new Caliph (Kramer 1986, 1995). Four Caliphate Congresses were held in Mecca (1924), Cairo (1926), Makka (1926) and Jerusalem (1931).

4.2.1. The 1924 Mecca Congress

Four months after the abolition of the Caliphate, in July 1924, the first Congress was held in Mecca. Sharif Huseyin, who claimed himself as a legitimate Caliph on 7 March 1924 organized the Congress (Aydin 2007:139). Participants from Arab communities, especially Palestinians, dominated the Congress, and not only Turkey but also most Muslims countries and communities throughout the world did not attend the Congress. Also, the British had withdrawn their support before the Congress so, the meeting could not agree on any resolution or decision, and Sharif Huseyin could not get the approval for his claim for the Caliphate (Armaoğlu 1998:357; Gökalp and Georgeon 1990:111–16; Kramer 1986:80–85; Özcan 2010). As mentioned in the previous chapter, Mustafa Kemal gathered an Islamic congress in Anatolia in 1919 to mobilize foreign Muslim's support for the National Struggle. However, after the establishment of the new state he took no further initiatives and refused to attend the Mecca Congress because the GNA recently abolished the Caliphate.

4.2.2. The 1926 Cairo Congress

After that, one more meeting was held in Cairo in May 1926. The ulama of Al-Azhar in Cairo summoned a "Caliphate Congress" to discuss the issue. The Congress enjoyed the support of Egypt's King Fuad in order to legitimize his claim of the Caliphate (Kedourie 1963:218–24; Toynbee 1927:66). Compared to Mecca; this Congress was widely attended from the Arab world, Indonesia, South Africa as well as Europe, namely Bosnia and Poland (İhsanoğlu 2010:15–16; Karčić 2007:116). However, many major Muslim countries like Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and also the Muslim communities of Russia, China, and India did not send delegates to the Congress. Even the Indian Khilafat movement refused to send delegates, fearing that

the Congress was designed to promote King Fuad's claim of the Caliphate (Qureshi 1999:543). Although the meeting released a resolution that declared the necessity of the Caliphate for Muslim unity, it could not take further actions to implement this resolution (Hill 2011:67; Hourani 1983:184).

Turkey stayed away from the Congress and declined the invitation to attend with the cold reply that the country had no Caliphate problem (Lammens 1968:204). Toynbee mentioned in his 1927 book that the most noticeable response of Turkey to this Congress was reported by the Turkish ambassador to the newspaper *Al-Siyasah*: "the question of the Caliphate did not exist for his country" (Toynbee 1927:84–85). One of the reasons for Turkey's disinterest in this Congress might be that prominent opponents of the new regime were living in Egypt. Thus, Cairo might have been perceived by Ankara as the center of anti-regime activities.

4.2.3. The 1926 Mecca Congress

Following the defeat of Sharif Huseyin and the occupation of Mecca, the victor Abd Al-Aziz Ibn Saud organized an alternative Congress to the Cairo Congress of May 1926. He named it "World Muslim Congress" and convened it in Mecca in July 1926 on the occasion of the Pilgrimage (*Hajj*). The date of this Congress obviously demonstrated that it was organized as an alternative to the Cairo Caliphate Congress, though, as Wahhabis the Saudis thought that the Caliphate was not rightly constituted and it functioned as an instrument for disunity in the *Ummah*, not the symbol of Muslim unity. Thus, there was another purpose of this Congress: to seek recognition of Saudi rule over the Hejaz as a Custodian of *Haramain* (Mecca and Madina) on behalf of the entire world of Islam. Unlike the Cairo Congress, the Mecca Congress achieved a high quality of representation from all the Muslim communities and all the independent Muslim states except Iran, Chinese Muslims, Libya and the rest of the Maghrib Communities (Hosein 1997:54–67; Kramer 1986:106–22; Landau 1990:238–41; Qureshi 1999:400–401). More importantly, Mustafa Kemal sent Deputy of Istanbul, Edip Servet Bey as a Turkish delegation and gave instruction to behave as a "modern and secular country's representative" even to keep wearing a hat during the Congress. Therefore, he did not participate Hajj ceremony and arrived the Congress

after Hajj time. Thus, Turkey ultimately attended the Congress but remained silent and passive despite its Caliphate past. Turkish delegation told the British vice consul that "he had been sent by the Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha with a watching brief only" (Kabaklı 1989:177–78; Kramer 1986:111). Turkey might have attended this Congress to get support from the Muslim world for the Mosul question. According to Shaykh Muhammad al-Ahmadi al-Zawahiri, chief of the Egyptian delegation to the Congress and later rector of Al-Azhar, the Turkish delegation remained aloof:

I learned from another quarter that the Turks had decided to participate in the Congress before the settlement of the Mosul question, to execute a political maneuver. When they came to an agreement [with the British] over Mosul, they refused to turn back in disorder, and so sent a token delegation. This was clear from the work of the delegation. It avoided all political or financial commitment.

(Kramer 1986:111)

4.2.4. The 1931 Jerusalem Congress

From 1926 to 1931, there were no other significant collective attempts to respond to the abolition of the Caliphate and to other important issues and problems that occurred in the Muslim World. In December 1931 Amin al-Husaini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, convened a "General Muslim Congress" in Jerusalem to secure Muslims support for the Palestinian struggle against the British mandate and Zionism. He claimed that the advances of Zionism in Muslim Palestine presented a threat to Islam, especially Muslim unity in the world. Also, leaders of the Khilafat Movement played an important role in organizing this meeting to pursue support for their support for the Ottoman Caliphate. Hence their main aim was the reestablishment of the Caliphate for forging Muslim solidarity (Qureshi 1973:299–300). It is worth to mention here that the Congress was to take place in the territory that was under direct British mandate to seek to restore Muslim unity. The British Government had some concerns regarding this development. High Commissioner of Britain warned Amin al-Husaini that the Government would not allow convening of the Congress that might be raised questions among the other neighbor and colonial countries. Despite the number of participants from the Muslim world, including Iran, compared with the Mecca Congress, there was less participation of official governmental delegations at the Jerusalem Congress. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Afghanistan decided not to send

any official delegation. The last Caliph, Abdülmecid also assumed to attend the Congress but he could not participate due to financial reasons. Unlike the Mecca Congress, Turkey did not send a delegate to Jerusalem, because Turkey had concerns about the Khilafat movement's attempt to reinstate Abdülmecid as Caliph in Jerusalem. Like the previous Congresses, the Jerusalem Congress also adopted several decisions, but it failed to implement them. Especially the Congress failed to take any concrete decision concerning the Zionism issue in Jerusalem that was the main reason gathering of this Congress (Hosein 1997:68–77; Kramer 1986:123–41; Nielsen 1932; Tür 2007:239–44).

Turkey's lack of interest in the Caliphate Congresses held earlier in Cairo, Mecca, and Jerusalem came as a part of the implementation of Turkey's new secular foreign policy whose the principles and objectives emerged with the abolition of the Caliphate. Placing the Caliphate and Muslim unity in the center for these Congress was also problematic concerning the secular establishment of Turkey. Thus, Turkey could not accept even the attempt of the reestablishment of the Caliphate that might be considered as an attack to its basic existence. Foreign Minister Tefvik Rüştü bey expressed Turkey's sensitivities and concerns regarding the Congress in his speech at the GNA on 3 December 1931:

It has been learned from the British Government that disputed political issues, any matters that might disturb the Republic of Turkey and especially the subject of the Caliphate will not be discussed at the Congress... In fact, we have received invitations from those who attempted to convene the Congress; but the Republic of Turkey does not have to do with such attempts that are seeking to hinder the nations on the path of progress, as well as having deplorable consequences that are no longer subjects of the debate. Notably, we are opposed to the acceptance of religion in the internal and external politics... We have a very deep sensitivity on profound revolutions that we have made in a very short time... We cannot allow any interventions from outside to our revolution, which the Turks willingly accomplished.

(TBMMZC 1931b:3)

Consequently, the lack of political interest of the new secular government to the Caliphate Congresses was one of the indications of limited relations with the Muslim world. As a result, because of the conflict between the objectives in the Congresses

and the secular TFP, Turkey did not attend the Congresses (Brown 2000:155–120; Kramer 1995:308–11; Minault 1982:206–7). Therefore, Mustafa Kemal had his own justification regarding the lack of interest in the Muslim world to establish the relationship and refusing the attempts of the revitalization of the Caliphate. He understood that the Caliphate henceforth met the requirements of the foreign policy of the new state:

For centuries our nation was guided under the influence of these erroneous ideas. But what has been the result of it? Everywhere they have lost millions of men. “Do you know,” I asked, “how many sons of Anatolia have perished in the scorching deserts of the Yemen? Do you know the losses we have suffered in holding Syria and Egypt and in maintaining our position in Africa? And do you see what has come out of it? Do you know?

“Those who favor the idea of placing the means at the disposal of the Caliph to brave the whole world and the power to administer the affairs of the whole of Islam must not appeal to the population of Anatolia alone but to the great Muslim agglomerations which are eight or ten times as rich in men. “New Turkey, the people of New Turkey, have no reason to think of anything else but their own existence and their own welfare. She has nothing more to give away to others.

(Mustafa Kemal 1929:592–93)

4.3. Post-Caliphate Relations with the Muslim World

Mustafa Kemal transformed the TFP through domestic institutions and politics. Completely aware of the influence of domestic politics over foreign policy behavior, he stated in 1927, "What particularly interests foreign policy and upon which it is founded is the internal organization of the State. Thus it is necessary that the foreign policy should agree with the internal organization" (Kedourie 2000:171). Therefore, the transformation of foreign policy took place as part of the restructuring process of the values and institutions of the society. The priority of peace, sovereignty, and neutralism over the revisionism and expansionism was tied to the process of secularization. The political consequences of secularization in TFP included removing the Empire's experience to engage the Muslim world's matters and issues (Weisband 1973:9–11). During 1924-1929, it is said that TFP was formed within the framework of isolationism. I argue that Turkey did not completely isolate itself from the Muslim world, but unlike the previous period, did not engage too much with the Muslim world, either, due to domestic secularization. Hence, one of the main reasons of

limited relations (secularization) with the Muslim world during the post-Caliphate era was due to the abolition of the Caliphate that is not only local but also a global actor connecting Muslim world to Turkey.

Furthermore, Mustafa Kemal and other elites recognized that the new Turkey had limited political, economic, and military power. Thus, losing most of its territory, the new state reduced from massive Empire to the medium size nation-state with losing half of the population. Also, Turkey was surrounded by the imperial powers; Britain in Iraq, France in Syria, holding the Dodecanese by Italy and border with Soviet Union at the East and the Black Sea made Turkey neighborhood of these four European powers. These powers were very sensitive regarding their Muslim population. Because of this, Turkey maintained its relations at the lowest level with new states in the region in an effort to avoid conflict with Britain and France, which were the supreme powers, as the winners of the Great War, in the Middle East and North Africa (Bein 2017:29–34). Moreover, Turkey was careful, especially for the relations with Britain because Turkey anxious about British support to Kurds to gain autonomy and independence. Besides, unsolved problem of Mosul, for one of the crucial issues determined in the National Pact, was critical relations between Britain and Turkey (Evans 1982:40–55).

We may say that Turkey followed a realist foreign policy by considering the balance of power and geopolitical calculations on relations with the Muslim world as well as colonial powers. Thus, because of the reasons mentioned above, Turkey had reservations about the Caliphate issue and maintain modest relations with Muslim countries and communities, neither those directly governed by European powers nor those under indirect European control. Mustafa Kemal underlined this foreign policy approach in his statement at the GNA on 1 November 1926:

As you know, our relations with Afghanistan continue sincerely. Drawing the borders with Syria and Iraq are about to begin. The treaty was concluded to ensure the security and good neighborly relations of the parties. I hope that the realization of these aims and the mutual goodwill, which is the basis of the treaty will show itself in practice. It will be expected that this situation will affect our relations with France and Britain positively. We see that the behavior we follow and desire in our

relationships with our eastern neighbors, proceeds in an open and sincere direction, developing in confidence, peace, and friendship towards each other, free of all hidden agendas.

(TBMMZC 1926:4)

Hence, as it well known Mustafa Kemal's realist perspective also facilitated to pursue secular foreign policy. He justified his position in his *Speech* to using the discourse of sovereignty, independence, self-administration:

Let us accept for a moment that Turkey would take this mission upon herself and would devote herself to the aim of uniting and leading the whole Islamic world and that she would succeed in achieving this aim. Very good, but suppose these nations whom we want to subject and administer would say to us: You have rendered great services and assistance to us for which we are thankful to you, but we want to remain independent. We do not suffer anybody else to interfere in our independence and sovereignty. We are capable of leading and administering ourselves. In such a case will the efforts and sacrifices made by the people of Turkey result in anything more than earning thanks and a benediction?

(Mustafa Kemal 1929:593)

Moreover, criticizing the Ottoman universalism for being too ambitious, unrealistic, and "not being national," he said:

... to found a mighty State is a brilliant and attractive political ideal; but it is a misleading one. It is an unrealisable aim to attempt to unite in one tribe the various races existing on the earth, thereby abolishing all boundaries. Herein lies a truth which the centuries that have gone by and the men who have lived during these centuries have clearly shown in dark and sanguinary events. There is nothing in history to show how the policy of Panislamism could have succeeded or how it could have found a basis for its realisation on this earth.

(Mustafa Kemal 1929:378)

This realist approach creates secular foreign policymaking like secular ideology. However, since I concentrate here on the reflection of secularization in domestic politics to TFP, I will not focus on this aspect of foreign policy. Hence, in line with the general view that Turkey followed a moderate, realist, and non-aggressive foreign policy, I add that during this period, Turkey also followed secularized foreign policy. The basic priority of the new TFP was the maintenance of peace and stability through Turkey's orientation towards the West and following Western basis-secular foreign

policy. Thus, after the abolition of Caliphate Mustafa Kemal sought a dramatic change in the character of foreign policy. He believed that religion as a basis of Turkey's foreign policy was no longer adequate, and it needed to be replaced by secular foreign policy. Further, I analyze TFP in this period through using some cases that are independent Muslim countries and Muslim communities under colonial powers.

4.3.1. Relations with Muslim Countries

Mustafa Kemal transformed TFP from religious and cultural base to the secular and western-aligned foreign policy. Hence, when creating its relations with the Middle Eastern states in this period, Turkey has perceived that the region located across secularism and Westernization and represented the value system of the "other". This perception was also the reason why relations did not develop in this period. The abolition of the Caliphate through the changes made also severed ties with the region in institutional terms (Tür 2007:239). Therefore, I argue that the change in the character of foreign policy from "Islamic" to secular marked a significant landmark in the development of TFP. Here I examine some Muslim countries such as Iran and Afghanistan that shared or even admired Mustafa Kemal's secular vision.

4.3.1.1. Iran

Before 1924, Turkey and Iran pursued a cordial relationship; both regimes had a similar internal and external problem. Turkey gave full support to Iran in order to maintain its independence and territorial integrity. Thus, Turkey encouraged Iran to establish a republican regime through the diplomatic way as well as newspapers in January-April 1924 (Çetinsaya 2000:784–87). At this point, the abolition of the Caliphate was the turning point for the relations between the two countries. In Iran, the *ulema* supported establish the republican regime; however, after the abolition of the Caliphate withdrew their support for founding the republic because they concerned that Iran could become a secular state like Turkey. After the losing support of ulama and other internal factors, Reza Khan announced that he would not proclaim republic in Iran (Çetinsaya 2002:124–25). The new regime in Iran would not follow a secular system because of the influence of ulama over the regime and politics. Also, in 1924, outgoing Iranian ambassador Ishaq Khan criticized the Turkish government

for the abolition of the Caliphate and other secular reforms. In addition to that, Mustafa Kemal had some concerns as to the new Iranian ambassador, Seyed Tabatabae, who was the member a most prominent ulama family. Hence, he intimated his concerns in his speech during the letter of credence ceremony of the new ambassador. Then at the end of 1925, Reza Khan established his own dynasty and became a Shah. After this development, Turkey remained silent and did not send congratulatory letter to Shah for almost one month (Çetinsaya 2000:788–93). However, Reza Shah started a number of secular reforms in politics and public life. Later, Mustafa Kemal realized that Reza Shah attempted to establish secular structures in his regime. Therefore, both leaders initiated a close relationship on the mutual goal of secular modernization (Atabaki 2004). Then two countries signed a Pact of Friendship and Non-aggression in 1926 in order to build political, economic as well as social cooperation. Mustafa Kemal underlined the importance of this Pact in his inauguration speech of the GNA in 1926:

Our close relations with Iran have been enlightened and determined by the treaty submitted to your acceptance (GNA). As a result of this agreement, we welcome the results of the development and progress in this neighboring country and the efforts of the Iranian patriots to establish the Iranian unity of administration on strong and solid grounds.
(TBMMZC 1926:4)

However, though Reza Shah and Mustafa Kemal had sometimes been viewed as similar and many of their secular reforms were directed toward the same goals, after 1927, a tension emerged between two countries because of the different approaches to the Kurdish question in the region as well as the border dispute. Despite these significant problems, Turkey kept the relations on a cordial level, and established a trilateral relationship with Iran and Soviet Union. In addition to this, both countries agreed to sign an additional protocol for the 1926 Pact in order to increase security and economic cooperation (Çetinsaya 1999a, 2003:122–25; Cronin 2004; Mango 2008:510; Narlı 1993:267–68). I argue that one reason for maintaining the relations with Iran despite disagreements on the sensitive issues was that Iran as the secularist and modernist regime was the only ally in the region in terms of following common goals in the domestic politics in term of secular modernization of state and society.

4.3.1.2. Saudi Arabia

When the Saudi family ruler ended Sharif Huseyin's rule in Hijaz, at the end of 1924, Abd Al-Aziz proclaimed his new state, the Kingdom of Hijaz, in 1926 and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. In addition to Turkey and Iran, non-Arab countries, one more independent state had emerged in the region. However, though Turkey did not have strong solidarity with the Saudis, Turkey recognized the new state immediately, opened its diplomatic mission in Jeddah and appointed its ambassador to the Hijaz. Turkey also acknowledged titles of Abd Al-Aziz as the King of Hijaz and the Custodian of *Haramain*. Turkey, thus, tried to create active support in the region, especially for the Mosul question. Then the newly appointed ambassador, Süleyman Şevket By, presented his letter of credence to King Abd Al-Aziz as soon as his arrival to Jeddah. In presenting his Letters of Credence, he presented compliments and solidarity from President Mustafa Kemal and underlined the importance of cordial and progressive relations between Turkey and Hijaz. He said that relations between the two countries are characterized by a common history and culture in the region. He also ensured cooperation on regional issues for the mutual benefit of the two countries. However afterward Turkey maintained its relations with Saudi at the minimum level and did not take any further step in order to improve economic and political relations until 1929 (Keyman 2008; Nouredin 2000). At this juncture, Turkey's participation to Mecca Congress in 1926, was the critical point for not only the relations between the two countries but also Turkey's secular foreign policy. This may be seen as a contradiction, but it was not, because the agenda of the meeting did not violate the principles of the Turkish state. Since its agenda concentrated the situation of Holy Cities Turkey thought that the meeting might not cause problems for its secular regime (Çalış and Bağcı 2003:203). However, there were also hesitation and discussion to attend the Congress. The other agenda, solidarity with the Muslim world, might be understood by the secular ruling elites of Turkey, to restore the Caliphate. Here I argue that Turkey participated the Congress because Mustafa Kemal might have wanted to know the current reactions and approaches of the Muslims to the Caliphate and control the situation and the process about it. Also, as mentioned above, he definitely wanted to show new Turkey's secular establishment to other

Muslims by behaving as “modern and secular” even wearing a hat during the 1926 Mecca Congress.

Like Saudi Arabia, Turkey also established diplomatic relation with Egypt in 1925. Despite this development, the relations were far from the expected level because of the Egyptians’ attitude to the secular reforms in Turkey. Especially Egyptian ulama and press harshly criticized the reforms in Turkey. In response to them, Turkey kept the relations a minimum level, and Turkish press published severe criticism against Egypt. Indeed secularism again was one of the determinant factors to conduct foreign policy with Egypt (Çolak 2010; Değerli Sarıkoyuncu 2015).

4.3.1.3. Afghanistan

Amanullah Khan, who came to the throne of Afghanistan in 1919, committed to profound reforms and transformation as a modernist, nationalist leader like Mustafa Kemal. Accordingly, his aim was to transform Afghanistan into a secular state modeled on Mustafa Kemal's Turkey (Olesen 1995:142–44; Rasanayagam 2003:20–22). King Amanullah paid an official visit to Turkey in May 1928. Mustafa Kemal welcomed him and the Queen with an official ceremony. He gave a speech underlining the historical relationship between Afghanistan and Turkey for centuries, and emphasizing the increasingly deepening relations between two countries since 1919. He said that Turkey's only wish is to contribute to peace and stability as well as to encourage modernization efforts in Afghanistan. Then after attending a dinner in their honor held by Mustafa Kemal, the Turkey-Afghanistan Friendship and Cooperation pact was signed (Atatürk’ün Milli Dış Politikası 1992:156–65). During the dinner given to the honor of Afghanistan's King Amanullah and Queen Süreyya in Ankara Palas, Mustafa Kemal declared that he praised the changes in Afghanistan and was ready to give all kinds of support:

Excellency King,
Turkish people and Government of the Republic and I, your Honor and venerable Queen, happy and pleased to see in Turkey.

....

As soon as your honorable ruler became the leader of the noble Afghan nation, you did not merely bring full independence to your nation and your country. In your beautiful and fertile country, you have begun

resurrecting and boosting the constructions destroyed by time in accordance with today's ascension. You corrected the organization of your state. You have rearranged and consolidated your fearless and heroic army. You've taken essential steps in science. In social life, you have made extraordinary strides. All these conscious and spirited practices and studies guarantee that your country and nation's time to rise to the highest position in the field of public works and civilization will not be delayed.

Excellency King!

I sincerely wish that your movement and work on the path of reform will be successful.

....

The tough and harsh nature of Afghanistan's Hindu Kush and the positive intelligence, courage, and heroism of the Afghan nation, and especially the high personality of the elite ruler of the Afghan state, rise with certainty and power in the face of all difficulties. As the president of the Turkish nation who really loves your nation and your country, let me sincerely declare that it is our special wish to see that your attempts to rise and exalt Afghanistan's material and spiritual life have been born in less time. We are confident that your success is right. In this regard, the Turkish state tries to fulfill the duties and responsibilities that are naturally directed to a sister nation to the extent that its power is sufficient.

(Hâkimiyet-i Milliye 21.05.1928)

I argue that while evaluating Turkey's developing relations with Afghanistan and Iran in this period as a reflection of secular foreign policy, its limited and controlled relationship with Muslim communities (most of them being under colonial rule) should also be read as a requirement of secular foreign policy.

4.3.2. Relations with Muslim Communities

In parallel with domestic secular policy, Turkey pursued a secular foreign policy which led it to turn away from its prior engagements and politics and especially by controlling relations with the Muslim communities that helped Turkey during the National Struggle. Despite limiting its ties with the Muslim world, the national movement of Turkey inspired the other national movements throughout the Muslim world (Vere-Hodge 1950:87–89). Also, Mustafa Kemal declared during the National Struggle that the right of all oppressed nation to free themselves from the imperialist and many Muslim communities showed their sympathies this struggle (Şimşir

1975:88–90). However, despite the declaration of its support to Muslim communities for their independence before 1924, ironically Turkey avoided building a relationship with them after 1924. Abolition of the Caliphate gave signals for the isolation of Turkey from the Muslim world. Hence the foreign policy of Turkey towards the Muslim communities was conditioned partly by its ideological and domestic policy though not as much as by its political and economic relations to colonial powers. Here I am focusing on only ideological and religious influence on the foreign policy-making process towards Muslim communities.

Turkey had attracted comprehensive support during the National Struggle from Indian Muslims. They established organizations to fund the Turkish movement and to protect the temporal and spiritual power of the Caliphate. Their strategies and relations with Turkey were based on their perception of Turkey as the protector of Islam's interests, and Mustafa Kemal was hailed as the Savior of Islam and Savior of Caliphate by Indian Muslims. Two prominent figures, Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Mohammad Iqbal, considered Mustafa Kemal an excellent model to follow though he abolished the Caliphate. However, Mustafa Kemal did not respond to their interest and support adequately (Minault 1982:206–7; Qureshi 1996).

Furthermore, Turkey's attitude toward North Africa had changed despite North African communities' moral, economic, and political support to Turkey during the National Struggle. For instance, Libya's most prominent figure Sheikh Ahmad Sanusi, who had been with Mustafa Kemal, may be taken as an example to show this change on the part of the new Turkey. As mentioned in the previous chapter, he engaged, along with his spiritual authority, to bring together the Arab and Kurdish tribes of the east and southeast of Anatolia. However, he would have no place at all in the new Turkey and left the country to end his days in exile in the Hijaz (Moreau 2003:66). Hourani emphasizes that Turkey's process of secularization in domestic politics was the main factor to cause an ambivalent nature of the relations between Turkey and the Arab countries despite their collective history:

Built around the framework of the Ottoman administration and army, and dominated until his death by a remarkable leader, Mustafa Kemal, Turkey

embarked on a path which led it away from its past, and from the Arab countries with which its past had been so closely connected: that of recreating society on the basis of national solidarity, a rigid separation of state and religion, and a deliberate attempt to turn away from the Middle Eastern world and become part of Europe. The ancient tie between Turks and Arabs was dissolved, in circumstances which left some bitterness on both sides, exacerbated for a time by disputes about frontiers with Iraq and Syria.

(Hourani 1991:320)

On the other hand, in colonial Indonesia, Sukarno praised modern Turkey as an example to be followed by Indonesia. He admired the regime of Kemal Ataturk in Turkey and quoted with the approval of the Turkish secular nationalism. He wanted to unite the whole nation under the banner of this idea. He sought the ideological support of Turkey in order to advance his modernization agenda in the country. Despite Turkey's relatively successful secularization model, Indonesia could not get any support from Turkey and also Mustafa Kemal's interest in Sukarno's emerging secularist nationalist regime. Even Mustafa Kemal ignored the attempts of Indonesia's survival and independence from its Dutch colonial power. Turkey's attitude to British Malaya was also same as to Indonesia (Formichi 2013:90–110; Laffan 2003:210–14; see also Milner 1986; Noer 1973).

The religious dimension of TFP during 1919 and 1924 and its early openness towards the Muslim world was largely eradicated. I argue that an important reason for this policy was the Caliphate's position in the eyes of Muslim communities. Despite their secular and nationalist leaders, historically they considered the Caliphate as the spiritual and sometimes political leadership of the Muslim world. Due to its realist and secular foreign policy orientation, Turkey did not establish strong connection with Muslim world though many Muslims supported and admired Mustafa Kemal. The Western-oriented foreign policy has moved away Turkey from the Middle East toward Europe. Kemalists have kept the interaction with the Middle East at a minimum level because of the requirements of the modernization and westernization process. Mustafa Kemal did not have any intention of keeping the relations with the Muslim world in the name of Islam (Bozdağlıoğlu 2003:53; Gökalp and Georgeon 1990:35–37). Also, I argue that he was aware that through avoidance

of establishing relations with Muslim countries even some of the leaders were secular, he would be able to consolidate secular domestic establishment. According to him, foreign policy was a branch of internal goals, and he viewed foreign policy as a mechanism to maintain Turkey's secular transformations. Therefore, TFP remained largely secular between 1924 and 1929. Turkey's political, historical, and cultural relations with the Muslim world, especially with the Middle East had been dormant throughout this era. In the following period, a foreign policy emerged in which relations became more complicated and security oriented, and the ideology of secularism was less effective in determining the foreign policymaking.



CHAPTER 5

SECURITIZATION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND KEMALIST ESTABLISHMENT (1929-38)

As discussed in the previous chapter, TFP in the period of 1924-1929 was more secular due to the consolidation of domestic secular politics. Initially, Turkey aimed to consolidate secular establishment and therefore, launch good relations with Western countries. Then, Turkey began to pursue foreign policy initiatives in the region the period of 1929-38. Because the secular elite understood that TFP could not be sustainable only in relations with Western countries instead of giving importance to Turkey's relations with some Muslim countries but not underlining solidarity with Islamic causes. It did not mean that the TFP was turning to the Muslim Middle East. Turkey's improving ties with neighboring countries as a security concern; however, Turkey did not develop relations throughout the Muslim world, from Africa to Central Asia and South Asia and concentrating on Middle Eastern and Balkan countries was a reflection of the critical role played by these countries in Turkey's security policy. Although the Briand-Kellogg Pact was the initiative of the Western power in 1928, Turkey's accession to the Pact in 1929 was a crucial moment in TFP since it was the first multilateral treaty to be involved to ensure the security of Turkey. Therefore, I think it would be appropriate to begin the period of Securitization in January 1929, when the GNA approved the membership of this Treaty. Furthermore, Turkey played an active and important role in the process of establishment of the Balkan Pact in 1934 and the Sadabad Pact in 1937 and signed bilateral agreements to ensure its security. In this chapter, I focus on mainly Turkey's multilateral and bilateral relations with non-western countries.

I argue that these developments to TFP reflected a pragmatic change based on security concerns. Therefore, Turkey did not aspire to improve relations with countries in its region, not through religion-based politics but extended the utilization of diplomatic and political dialogue and engagements were based on security concerns. I claim that as far as secular foreign policy was concerned, during this

period, there was no major foreign policy transformation; instead, there was continuity in TFP, only security factors become more critical. In this chapter, I examine Turkey's developing relations during the 1930s, in bilateral and multilateral forums, over the Middle Eastern countries despite its secular foreign policy establishment.

5.1. Turkey's Collective Security and Multilateral Relations

Security considerations were paramount in TFP in the 1930s due to its being under the pressure of the world economic crisis and foreign threats from Germany and Italy, and unsolved problems of Lausanne; status of Straits and Alexandretta (Hatay). Turkey faced the revisionist claims of the Soviet Union over the Straits, the hegemonic aspirations of Italy toward the Balkans and the Mediterranean, and Turkish minority living in Bulgaria. However, there was no extant multilateral arrangement, which might guarantee Turkey's security. According to Turkey, collective security through the patronage of the League of Nations had proven an imperfect mechanism, especially after the failure of the resolution of the Mosul question (Güçlü 2003:204). Turkey had to consider its extensive defense requirements because of having sea and land border with the Soviet Union, long border with Iraq and Syria and naval arms need for protecting very long sea costs from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea. Accordingly, Turkey tried to restrain Italian military expansion by building coalitions hostile to fascism through advocating collective security with bilateral agreements and multilateral cooperation (Kösebalaban 2011:54). In 1938, Mustafa Kemal emphasized the importance of regional cooperation to maintain state's security:

...It is a duty for each nation to promote the diligence of the peace in reality by using each of these (bilateral or multilateral collective agreements) according to geographical and political requirements and situations. The Republican Government has seen and applied this truth and knows how to arrange relations with its closest neighbors as well as with the farthest states, and friendships and alliances. In this way, our foreign policy is based on sound principles.

(TBMMZC 1938:6)

In the 1930s, Turkey concluded military cooperation with Soviet Union and British, joining League of Nations as well as took the lead establishing two important regional collective security pacts. Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Bey argued that Kemalist foreign policy preferred to protect regional and global security through collective security:

In the absence of peace in the world, we cannot keep our external peace on our own. For this reason, it is natural to have harmonious cooperation on equal terms in terms of freedom and rights in order to protect our internal peace as well as to maintain and establish peace; we must cooperate with those who want peace and cooperation, as much as we can.

(Aras 2003:9)

During his tenure, for this purpose, Turkey initiated bilateral and multilateral alliances that were collective security agreements as well as became a member of the League of Nations (Uzer 2011:66–69).

5.1.1. The Briand-Kellogg Pact

The Briand-Kellogg Pact, signed on 27 August 1928, which Turkey joined the next year, was one of the most important initiatives in global politics to ensure global security and peacekeeping under the leadership of the United States, Britain, and France between the two world wars. Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Bey expressed Turkey's desire to join in Pact to the US Ambassador. In his telegram dated 11 April 1928, the US Ambassador sent to Washington to summarize this as follows:

In interview last night with Minister for Foreign Affairs.... he inquired on his own initiative and without my broaching the subject whether the United States did not intend to extend its "outlawry of war" treaties to nations other than the great powers.... He implied quite openly that Turkey would welcome such a proposal and asked me to consider the matter. He added that if I thought it desirable, he, himself, after discussing the question with the Ghazi, would propose such a treaty with the United States. He said that in his opinion such international pacts should include a neutrality clause in order to obviate any possibility of combinations of powers and that if arbitration treaties were included the circle would be complete. He said that in addition to the neutrality nonaggression pacts which Turkey had already concluded, he had begun similar negotiations with a number of other powers...

(FRUS 1928)

Therefore, Turkey was invited to the Pact in September 1928, and the accession negotiations started. In his opening speech of GNA on 1 November 1928, Mustafa Kemal emphasized the importance of the Pact to ensure Turkey's external security alongside reforms in domestic policy:

The principles of honesty and giving importance to the protection of our country's security and development are guiding our behaviors in our foreign policy. There can be no more easily explained issue than the fact that a country undergoing significant reforms and developments genuinely desires peace both in and around itself... The Republican government is making special efforts to sign international security agreements. We have the same sincere opinion to join the proposed Kellogg Agreement.

(TBMMZC 1928:2)

The GNA approved the membership of this Pact on 19 January 1929, making it the first multilateral treaty to be involved to ensure the security of Turkey. Though, the Pact was not sufficient to ensure the sustainability of global peace despite the participation of around 50 countries, Turkey's accession to the Pact was a critical turning point in TFP because it was the first multilateral treaty to be involved to ensure the security of Turkey. The next important alliance was the Balkan Pact, which was Turkey's first multilateral alliance initiative in the region.

5.1.2. The Balkan Pact

In the 1930s, Turkey attempted to have an active position to preserve the status quo in the Balkans, and took a leading role to convene the Balkan conferences. The first Balkan Conference was held with the participation of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia on 3 October 1930 in Athens. Then, the second was held in Istanbul on 20-26 October 1931. One year later the third one was gathered on 23-26 October 1932 in Bucharest. Finally, the last one was again in Athens 4-10 November 1933. These regional initiatives culminated in the Balkan Pact signed by Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Romania in Athens on 9 February 1934 to defend the region's territories against the aspirations of revisionist regional states, in particular, against Italian and also Bulgarian territorial expansionisms. The parties declared the stability of their boundaries and promised to negotiate with each other in the developments of any threat in their region (Değerli Sarıkoyuncu 2009; Kissoudi

2009:128–36). Turkey played an important role in the realization of the Balkan Pact because it believed that the Pact would contribute to ensure peace and to exclude the influence and rivalry of the Great Powers. Notably, Mustafa Kemal tried to establish a cooperation among the Balkan nations and the maintenance and assurance of harmony in the region (Hale 2000:44–78). Through these initiatives, Turkey attempted to act as a mediator for the dispute settlements in the Balkan region. Thus, Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Bey became chair of the Balkan Entente Council in 1936. He explained the aims of the Pact in his interview to *Cumhuriyet* newspaper as: “peace and friendship between the Balkan states; peace and order in Europe; finally, world peace. Fidelity to the system of collective security and textual execution of engagements were undertaken towards the League of Nations” (Güçlü 2000:957). In his speech at the opening of the Fourth Grand Congress of the Republican People's Party in 1935, Mustafa Kemal emphasized the importance of the Balkan Pact as follows:

Another important event in the last four years is the Balkan Pact. Four states; they are interconnected for their own trust and to make the Balkans no longer a matter of intervention and confusion. We are pursuing a policy of solidarity and harmony with our allies in the Balkans. We strictly observe the requirements of our obligations. What is remarkable is that the Balkan Pact become a major factor for international peace within a year. The Balkan Pact become increasingly one of the cornerstones of European peace.

(Mustafa Kemal 1945:367)

Following to this regional Pact, Turkey tried to integrate the international system through the representative of global alliance; the League of Nations.

5.1.3. The League of Nations

The League of Nations had been set up to safeguard the post-war settlement and aimed to establish collective security against revisionist countries. Thus, it was under the influence of victorious states of the Great War, especially Britain. Therefore, Turkey had shown no desire to be a member of the alliance. International security cooperation became imperative in after 1930, Turkey's interest in the League of Nations also increased. Since Turkey's main concern was to protect the country's territorial integrity and security such as the Hatay and Straits questions, Foreign

Minister Tevfik Rüştü conveyed Turkey's proposal to join the League of Nations at the Geneva Disarmament Conference on 20 April 1932. Subsequently, Turkey became a member of the League of Nations in July 1932 and granted its engagement to the doctrine of collective security against aggression in world politics (Aras 2003:105–8; Barlas 2017:99–100; Güçlü 2003:197–98). After the membership of the League of Nations, Turkey continued its global cooperation initiatives due to rising security concerns in international environment.

5.1.4. The Saavedra Lamas Treaty

Reflecting the efforts to provide security globally, a third multilateral pact, signed in Rio de Janeiro on 10 October 1933, was established by Latin American states (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay and including Turkey) aiming at preventing war and reconciliation. The pact was called “Saavedra Lamas Treaty” because Since Saavedra Lamas, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, played an important role in the making of the treaty to which Turkey became a member by the letter sent by Tevfik Rüştü Bey to Lamas on 21 June 1935. The accession of Turkey, which was officialized after the GNA ratified it on 20 November 1935, indicated that Turkey sought to provide security at not only regional but also at the global level through joining security alliances even in remote regions such as South America (Soysal 2000:367–68). For security reasons, Turkey initiated the Balkan Pact in the region and became the member of the League of Nations and joined the Saavedra Lamas Treaty at the global level. Then, Turkey launched an important collaboration in the East; the Sadabat Pact.

5.1.5. The Sadabad Pact

Turkey also wanted to secure its eastern territories and took another initiative like Balkan Pact. Turkey brought the Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan around the table and the parties signed the Sadabad Pact in Tehran on 8 July 1937. Mustafa Kemal underlined the importance of this Pact in his speech in the GNA on 1 November 1937:

Our Balkan policy continues to create very peaceful cooperation and proceeds with more productive results on the path of peace day-to-day. The friendship and closeness policy of the Republican government in the east has taken a new and powerful step. In Sadabad, the quadruple agreement that we signed with our friends Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran is one of the efforts of peace with great pleasure. We are confident that the states gathered around this agreement and the cooperation between these governments that pursue the same goal and wish to develop

peacefully will yield good results in the future. There are a harmonious order and development in the relations of the Republican government with its neighbors and other big and small states. When an appeal to the path of peace, Turkey always welcomed and did not withhold its support.

(TBMMZC 1937:8)

This was a non-aggression pact among its contracting parties to establish a regional security arrangement that covered non-intervention to the domestic affairs of the parties. Thus, Turkey's position was strengthened through the Pact in the Middle East and it guaranteed Turkey's security, and peace on its eastern borders. Also, it provided Turkey close and friendly relations with its Muslim neighbor states (Watt 1988:333–52). The New York Times wrote:

It is considered of the greatest significance that these four independent Moslem countries have for the first time united on their own initiative and agreed to patch up minor differences which have embittered past relation and to seek friendly cooperation in the future. Credit for the rapprochement is given to Turkey, and particularly to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, president of the Turkish republic. For ten years Turkish diplomacy has been busy removing long standing causes of friction and estrangement.

(quoted in Kösebalaban 2011:57)

Thus Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü declared that the Pact represented a removal of a constant source of anxiety on Turkey's eastern frontiers, a narrowing down by the area of the four contracting parties of the field for speculation in terms of military or power politics helping to close a large region of the south-west of Asia to adventurous policies by ambitious states (Çetinsaya 1999a:170–73; Güçlü 2000:958). Turkey's aim was to show its solidarity with its eastern neighbors against a possible Italian expansionism in the region. Also, Turkey wanted to increase collaboration with its neighbor countries as a reaction to France, which was in control of Syria, an eastern neighbor of Turkey (Barlas 1998:182). The real beneficiary of the Saadabad Pact, according to French Ambassador René Massigli, was Turkey that had managed to re-establish its moral suzerainty and assured its intellectual, economic and political influence over the major Muslim countries of Western Asia (Güçlü 2000:958).

5.2. Bilateral Relations: End of Secular Foreign Policy?

In the 1930s, the Kemalist elite built its political domination and implemented policies to strengthen its ideological priorities in domestic politics. However, the rising Italian and German threat pushed the government to act moderately in foreign policy, and searching pragmatic multilateral relations was the characterizing feature of this period. Besides, non-Western initiatives were made in foreign policy, especially in the field of security, through bilateral relations. Although avoiding any interference into the regional affairs was the main principle for Turkey's policies toward the Middle East during the second half of the 1920s, bilateral relations with regional states were established during the 1930s and Turkey gradually improved relations with Middle Eastern and other Muslim countries. This period was a good example of how the international environment limited the ability of powerful political figures in domestic politics to transform their ideological approaches to foreign policy. Turkey was unable to continue to transmit the strict internal secular transformation to foreign policy due to its security priorities in international politics. Although Turkey tried to consolidate its regional relations and attempted to improve security relations with its neighbors, TFP remained basically pro-Western and secular. Mustafa Kemal emphasized the significance of stronger diplomatic, economic, and security ties with neighbor states in his inauguration speech of the GNA in 1931:

The peaceful and correct nature of our foreign policy has once again been seen in the last year. Sincerity has increased in our relations with our close neighbors. Internationally, we have positive results by having good relationships with every state. Following a path of peace will be our unchanging principle by aiming at Turkey's security and without taking against any country.

(TBMMZC 1931a:3)

He intended to strengthen Turkey's position in the region and simultaneously diminish Italy's and Germany's growing appeal. However, developing relations with its neighbors Iran and Afghanistan can be seen as an attempt to create a partially independent alternative hinterland that extends to the East. Although this policy carries traces of the conflict that has continued for centuries with Western countries as Davutoğlu (2001:70) argues, it does not contain any assertive and risky discourse. During the 1930s, German and Italian threats strained Turkey's determinations to

diversify foreign relations to regional cooperation. Hence, Turkey strengthened its policy with the region based on security, and security matters were at the vanguard of improving Turkey's relations with Middle Eastern neighbors. Thus, Middle Eastern countries gained importance in Kemalist elites' eyes. Aiming to ensure its territorial integrity and unity, Turkey strived to establish regional cooperation and bilateral relations. The goal of maintaining national security was designated to establish collaboration in the region that took an essential bilateral foreign policy mechanism.

Therefore, Turkey started relative changes in relations with Middle Eastern and other Muslim countries. The challenges of TFP were the effect of secular domestic policy to foreign policy and the necessity of developing relationships with its Muslim neighbor states. Although Turkey tried to strengthen its regional relations and endeavored to develop security relations with its neighbors, TFP remained pro-Western and secular. Although the Balkans are not considered as Muslim countries in the literature, I evaluate the relations with the Balkan states under this category. Since it was a part of the Ottoman Empire only two decades ago, and the Republican elites, particularly Mustafa Kemal, originated from this geography, Turkey's relations with this region can be explained through issues of culture, language, and religion.

5.2.1. The Balkans

First of all, Turkey established close ties with the Balkan countries by signing bilateral agreements with Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia. In this context, Turkey initially solved the problems with Greece remained from Lausanne and then signed the treaty of friendship with Greece in September 1933 in Ankara. Turkey, giving much importance to the collaboration in Balkans, also concluded agreements of cooperation with Romania in October 1933 and with Yugoslavia in November 1933 within the fields of bilateral friendships (Hale 2000:44–48; Millman 1995). During in his speech at the GNA in 1931 and in his meeting with journalists from Balkan countries in 1937, Mustafa Kemal underlined common history and cultural heritage that links people on both Turkey and Balkan states and highlighted the importance of deepening economic relations, while utilizing historical and cultural heritage (Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası 1992:75–76).

5.2.2. Iran

On the other hand, Turkey's relations witnessed the most dramatic change with Muslim neighbors. After a decade of stability, relations with the region began to improve bolstered in part by the principle of collective security. Thus, Turkey maintained friendly relations with the monarchies of Iran, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq. For instance, after 1930, both parties had new options for economic, political and strategic cooperation between each other and with other partners. Then Shah Reza Pahlavi made his famous visit to Turkey in June 1934 in order to improve relations and to observe the accomplishments of Turkish modernization and seek opportunities to mirror these advances in Iran (Çetinsaya 2003). The visit of Shah Reza to Turkey took almost one full month. He visited several cities in Turkey along with Ankara and Istanbul. Mustafa Kemal welcomed him in Ankara with a large delegation composed of ministers, deputies, senior bureaucrats as well as foreign diplomats. He also accompanied Shah during his Istanbul visit. The press widely covered the Shah's visit to Turkey both in Iranian and Turkish media. The 1934 visit of Shah Reza to Turkey was significant precisely concerning regional security circumstance and had important means of transmitting the political message to the regional and international actors. Both Reza Shah and Mustafa Kemal intended to show the world that the two states would act together in term of security issues in the region (Marashi 2003). Mustafa Kemal made a speech at the gala dinner reception in honor of Reza Shah and underlined consolidating of brotherhood relations and cooperation and good-neighborliness existing between the peoples two countries based on common historical ties. Most importantly he emphasized to strengthen the relations in all areas especially in peace and security issues on the basis of common interest:

With the greatest pleasure we welcome the leader of our brother nation, Alahazrat Humayun [Reza Shah], upon his arrival in Turkey. The entire Turkish nation is honored by His Majesty's presence. Whenever in history these two nations have been at odds they have experienced the most difficult periods of their existence. However, whenever they have worked together they have made progress. The Turkish republic considers good relations with Iran to be central to its politics... Turkey and Iran have had elevated civilizations for thousands of years and today with great steps they are moving forward...and the friendship which day by day between these two brother nations advances, with the presence of his majesty

here ...and without doubt this will be welcomed by world civilization...and our nations will go down the road of peace and be part of the global peace which is our hope.

(Cumhuriyet, 17 June 1934, quoted in Marashi 2003:109)

In reply to Mustafa Kemal's statement, the Shah characterized Turkish–Iranian friendship as the main principle of his foreign policy:

Great friend and dear brother, the honorable president of the great Turkish Republic. The kindness with which I have been received by the Turkish nation has left a lasting impression on me. From the first day of my reign I have felt the need for friendship with Turkey and for this reason I am happy to see that the closest relations now exist between Turkey and Iran. These two neighbors and brother nations can move forward toward progress and civilization. In honor of this friendship I raise my glass.

(Cumhuriyet, 17 June 1934, quoted in Marashi 2003:110)

5.2.3. Afghanistan

Afghanistan, following the Soviet Union, was the second country to recognize the Ankara Government, and instituted diplomatic contacts during the National Struggle. Mustafa Kemal had a heavy influence over rulers of Afghanistan, especially Amanullah Khan (Shorish 1984). The good relations between the two countries also continued during the 1930s. In addition to signing the Sadabad Pact, bilateral relations had been further developed and led to intensive cooperation. Turkey opened diplomatic missions and assigned ambassador, and signed some agreements to train the military and administrative personnel of Afghanistan (Rasanayagam 2003:20–21). Although Saudi Arabi was more religious-oriented compared to Afghanistan and Iran, Turkey also visibly improved relations with it during this period.

5.2.4. Saudi Arabia

On January 1926, Turkey was one of the first Muslim countries to recognize Saudi Arabia, formerly known as the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd until 22 September 1932, and as discussed above, Süleyman Şevket Bey was appointed as a representative to Jeddah in September 1926. Turkey-Saudi relations were formalized with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1929, followed by the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries (Soysal 1986:250, 2001:274–75).

According to this agreement, both sides agreed on to establish diplomatic ties as well as maintain mutual relationships based on brotherhood ties. This agreement did not stress any spiritual relationships based on common cultural stemming from the Islamic faith¹. Hence, the most serious rapprochement between the two countries took place with Amir Faisal's, Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia visit Turkey in June 1932. After staying a few days in Istanbul, he proceeded towards Ankara, and when he arrived there, he was welcomed by Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Bey and other high dignitaries who represented President Mustafa Kemal and Prime Minister İsmet Bey. Then, he was received by Mustafa Kemal, and the two interlocutors held a meeting in a cordial environment. Also, Mustafa Kemal gave an official dinner in Faisal's honor. Interestingly, he visited him in his hotel as reciprocation, but in a diplomatic manner, it meant to break the protocol rules. Also, Faisal gave exclusive interviews to the Turkish press, and he underlined the friendly and close relationship between the two countries. Besides, the ratification process of the 1929 Agreement was accelerated after this visit, and finally, the agreement went into force on December 1933 (Soysal 2001:275; Tevetoğlu 1986).

In Turkey's developing relations with its neighbors, Iraq and Transjordan had an exceptional place since the rulers of both countries were prominent figures from the Ottoman politics and bureaucracy, particularly King Faisal and King Abdullah, the sons of Sharif Hussein. Most of these people were educated in Ottoman institutions and made politics in the Ottoman system. The elites, who formed the Ottoman ruling class in Arab lands before the Great War, pioneered the establishment of their new states after the war. As Kemalist in Turkey, their experiences of reform and modernization during the Ottoman period shaped their political vision and new countries (Picard 1990). In this respect, relations with both countries can be considered as an important point of transformation in TFP in this period.

¹ This Agreement was published in Resmi Gazete on May 31, 1930.

5.2.5. Iraq

Mosul Question had caused a considerable dispute between Iraq and Turkey during the 1920s (Soysal 1989:304–7). Then, the solution of Mosul Question made amicable relations, and finally, King Faisal's visit to Turkey in 1931 confirmed better relations between two countries. Both leaders had realized the necessity of a close and cooperative relationship and underlined the importance of regional stability and security (see for King's speech: Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası 1992:197–98). Mustafa Kemal addressed at the dinner given in honor of the King Faisal in Ankara Palas:

Excellency King!

Your Majesty personally here, but I'm happy saluted the capital of the Republic of Turkey.

We are deeply committed to our friend and neighbor, the respected Iraqis, and their beloved ruler. How much these feelings are so strong in Turkey, you will see by yourself. Your Majesty's visit will undoubtedly strengthen the existing feelings of friendship and ties.

The Republican government, which dedicates all its efforts to develop in peace, adopts the principles of mutual sincerity and equality with its neighbors and all the nations of the world, observes Iraq's increasing happiness and peace and wishes them to continue.

Apart from geographical and economic reasons, which are very important in the development of ties and interests between nations and have always been influential in history, current mutual benefits, internal and external peace, and calmness policy and relations are closer together with Turkey and Iraq and to make more friendships. I kindly ask you to let me express my belief that we share have these views and understandings. As I finish my words in these sincere thoughts and emotions, I wish the personal happiness of our esteemed guest, the Majesty King who gave us joy for being here, and the comfort and success of our fellow Iraqis.

(Hâkimiyet-i Milliye 08.07.1931)

He also mentioned the importance of this visit in his inauguration speech of the GNA: "The visits of His Majesty the King of Iraq and his precious ministers left many good memories in our country. Our sincere desire to develop good relationships with Iraq that is the signs of dignity and good neighborliness" (TBMMZC 1931a:3–4). This visit had provided the first step of collective security arrangement, Sadabad Pact, against German, Soviet and Italian expansionism in the region. Also, there were mutual visits between Iraqi and Turkish dignitaries several times during the 1930s. Especially expansionist policies of Italy and concerns for regional peace and stability had paved the way to improve the relationship between Iraq and Turkey. Along with developing

bilateral relations, two countries became the parties of the Sadabad Pact alongside Iran and Afghanistan in 1937 (Şimşir 2001:265–66; Soysal 2001:268–70).

5.2.6. Transjordan

After the Iraqi King and the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, the third Arab statesman to visit Turkey was Amir Abdullah of Transjordan, which was still under the British mandate. Amir Abdullah was the son of Sharif Hussein, the leader of the Arab rebellion against the Ottoman rule in 1916, and he was also deputy of Mecca in the Ottoman parliament during the *II. Meşrutiyet*. Mustafa Kemal was extremely cordial towards the Amir Abdullah during this visit, which happened between 31 May and 8 June 1937, and received him both in Ankara and Istanbul (Bilgin 2008:96). According to Soysal, there are no documents about the Mustafa Kemal-Abdullah talks in the Turkish archives because the visit took place at a time when the Alexandretta crisis between Turkey and French mandate Syria was at its peak. In his symposium paper, Birbulak did not include Mustafa Kemal's speeches during this visit, although he examined many newspapers and other primary sources and provided comprehensive information about the visit (Birbudak 2013). In the memoirs of the Amir Abdullah, he mentions only that the visit passed in an amiable atmosphere (2001:275). Even Mustafa Kemal did not mention this visit in his annual speech in the GNA on 1 November 1937 (Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası 1992:64–67).

5.3. Secularism and Relations with Muslim Communities under Colonial Power

The impact of the abolition of the Caliphate among the Muslims in colonial regions had already disappeared by 1930s. Pan-Islamism was to end after the failure of the Congresses that aimed to reestablish the Caliphate. Elites and leaders had focused on achieving independence from their colonial master rather than recreate the Caliphate as a religious and political institution. Thus, Pan-Islamism transformed secular, nationalist anti-colonial movement in parallel with gradual secular changes in Turkey. Nevertheless, Turkey stayed reluctant to establish relations with the Muslim communities. Despite all the financial and political support and attempts to create ties by Indian Muslims, Turkey did not respond to these efforts. Then especially after the abolition of the Caliphate, the political situation was also

dramatically changed in India. Muslim leaders understood that Turkey would not change its foreign policy under the establishment of the secular state. However, Mustafa Kemal left a positive image some of them and inspired them in their politics. For instance, Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League, changed his religious-political thought to secular constitutional approach. Jinnah gave references to Kemalist Turkey as an example for the Muslims of India to follow in his statements in the 1930s. According to him, Turkey's progress as a modern state should be an example for Indian Muslims for their independence (Hamdani 2012:110–15).

Furthermore, Muhammad Iqbal He acknowledged the changes and events in Turkey as progressive and admissible under Islam. He legitimized them as being an action of the right of *Ijtihad*. Therefore, he articulated the concept of Pakistan on the basis of Indian Muslim nationalism in his famous address at the annual session of the All-India Muslim League in December 1930. Iqbal transformed his pan-Islamism to the concept of Muslim nationalism in response to the change in Turkey from Caliphate to the secular republic (Ahmad and Butt 2012:17–19; see also Iqbal 2013). However, Turkey did not change its position toward Indian Muslims. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Turkey's reservation during the 1920s was based on secular concerns. Despite the new engagements in TFP and ideological change of Indian Muslim leaders, Turkey did not intend to establish relations with Indian Muslims. Therefore in the Turkish press and among the secular elites, there was no support or positive opinion regarding Indian Muslims' nationalist and secular approach and the struggle for independence (Duman 2014; Qureshi 1996).

Likewise, Turkey followed a similar foreign policy toward Southeast Asia. As discussed in the previous chapter Mustafa Kemal and Turkey had become a symbol and example for Indonesia according to secular elites and also press. Mustafa Kemal was seen as a hero in Indonesian periodicals and Turkey was seen as a mirror for Indonesia in a case of the process of independence and modernization. Hence, during the 1930s also some nationalist leaders were impressed by the secular changes in Turkey. Soekarno, the founder of modern Indonesia as a secular and nationalist leader, showed his appreciation to Mustafa Kemal and defended his secular shifts in Turkey.

Despite all, like India, there was no political and cultural contact between Turkey and Indonesia during the 1930s (Formichi 2013:90–110).

Why did Turkey not establish relations with Muslim communities despite their transformation into secular and nationalist position? I claim that the main reason for this policy is again Turkey's security concerns in the 1930s. Turkey did not want to endanger its already fragile relations with colonial powers, especially with Britain. If Turkey supported the independence movements and improved ties with Muslim communities, the colonial powers might not have supported Turkey against German and Italian military expansions. Hence, Turkey increasingly focused on the politics of balance among European powers. Changes of bilateral and multilateral relations in TFP reflected a pragmatic shift in discourse and a desire to withstand security concerns through increased use cooperation political and security engagements and use of diplomacy. This new discourse of Turkey's elites did not rely on cultural and religious proximity. We cannot see Turkey's activity in the region as a restoration of Ottoman legacy and go back its past religious roots in foreign policy.

Despite securitization, secularism was still a factor in the making of TFP. For instance, the Uygur Turks declared the Turkish-Islamic Republic of East Turkestan (TIRET) with its capital in Kashgar on November 1933, however, it existed for less than one year (Dillon 2014:30–43; Karrar 2009:29–34). Although they would look to Turkey and other Muslim countries to get assistance for their independence, this event did not become a topic of even a small discussion in Turkey. The significance of the TIRET for TFP, despite its short existence, was that it showed the secular policy effects still on TFP. It cannot be expected policy from the government for only three months existed state. However, apparently, this issue did not find any place even in the press and nationalist elites' agenda.

Another notable example is the fez crisis between Egypt and Turkey that happened on the occasion of the 9th anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey on 29 October 1932. Abdel-Malek Hamza Bey, Egypt's ambassador to Ankara, attended the Republic Day reception wearing his fez. Mustafa Kemal, who considered

abolishing fez as one most important step for secularization in Turkish society, wanted to take off his fez; however, Hamza Bey refused the demand and left the reception. This event caused a serious diplomatic crisis between the two countries. It was widely covered by not only Turkish and Egyptian press but also European press. Mustafa Kemal showed his determination to international society to maintain the secularization process of the state in domestic and even in foreign policy (Akşin 1991:209–10; Şimşir 1999:251–319). This example shows that although the predominant character of TFP in this period was securitization, secularization still had an influence on foreign policy as secularism continued its decisive impact and strength in domestic politics.

Consequently, Turkey's Middle Eastern policy was not separate from its security concerns. In this context, Mustafa Kemal pursued a broader policy through the involvement of the Middle East and Balkan region to tackle the security challenges. So, Turkey entered into military and political cooperation with Muslim neighboring countries for the purpose of preserving threats from Germany and Italy. In that regard, Turkey first sought to guarantee its security in the region through engaging some alliances such as the Balkan Pact and the Sadabad Pact. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, Turkey had ideological limits to relations with Muslim countries and rejected Ottoman-era claims to the Middle East and Balkan region that was one of the significant secular based foreign policy decisions made by Mustafa Kemal. I claim that Turkey continued to keep its secular principles in foreign policy but because of the security situation in the international arena, Turkey followed pragmatic policy, especially with its region. Hence, Mustafa Kemal had a justification that these policies did not have any contradiction on the political ideology and founding principles of modern Turkey. In this sense, Turkey took a significant position in the founding of Balkan Pact and Sadabad Pact in order to balance Italy and Germany's expansion policies and to sustain stability and peace in the region. Also, Turkey's foreign policy coincided with its neighbors' interests, and Turkey paved the way to sign historic accords with them, putting alliances for the regional threats. Hence, these new more active policies derived from strategic interests to establish the stability and security in the region. One of the critical questions, to analyze the

relation between Islam and foreign policy in Turkey, is whether the main principles of TFP are changing towards a more religious direction. In this chapter, I argue that there was a perceived change in TFP towards becoming a founder of pacts with Muslim countries, which can be said to be a result, not of Islamization, but securitization. Even though this transition was not as per the secular foreign policy vision during the 1920s, it did not mean Islam controlling the foreign policy; instead, it is a reasonable reaction to the German, Soviet and Italian threats. In other words, Turkey's position in the region, considering its pragmatic relations among Muslim nations based on securitization.



CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

By examining the role of Islam and secularism in foreign policy during the Mustafa Kemal era, I have tried to contribute to the TFP literature and also to studies of religion and politics. In this study, I have not made a comprehensive analysis of TFP, as my specific focus is to explain the role of Islam and secularism in the process of foreign policy formation. I have analyzed Islam and secularism in TFP, in particular in the Mustafa Kemal era, when a series of significant secular based socio-economic and political changes were implemented. Mustafa Kemal did not exclude religion from politics, rather he founded a secular state system that regulated the role of religion in politics and society. He did not follow a gradual modernization like the Ottoman experience from the Tanzimat to the CUP era. Mustafa Kemal and his circle had a systematic approach after 1924; implementing several changes to establish a secular nation-state and Western-oriented country. This policy was implemented by describing Islam and any issue related to religion as a threat to the newly established secular state structure. Hence, in foreign policy, they distanced themselves from any association with the Muslim world. I have explained the relationship between Islam and secularism in the making of TFP by dividing the Mustafa Kemal era into three periods: Islamization (1919-1924), with particular emphasis on the Caliphate; secularization (1924-29), in parallel with rising secularism in internal politics; and securitization (1929-38), with the changing dynamics of TFP based on security concerns.

My theoretical framework is based on Ardiç's model of Ottoman-Turkish modernization and secularization, through which I explain the relationship between Islam, secularism, and TFP by what he calls the "accommodation paradigm" and control/domination paradigm. Accordingly, I describe the first period (1919-24) with the concept of accommodation. Here an intense Islamic discourse played a central role as a source of legitimacy in foreign policy, as seen in the case of the Caliphate. While the second period (1924-29) was dominated by more secular discourses and

practices, I do not refer to the conflict paradigm for this period. I think it would be more appropriate to explain this period with the concepts of control/domination. The same holds for the third period (1929-38), which contained more pragmatist discourse and action formed around the state's security concerns.

I have also applied Hurd's social constructivist approach in international relations to explain the roles of Islam and secularism in TFP behavior during these different periods. She underlines the scope of religion and secularism in the state's internal structure and their influence on foreign policy. I examine only the impact of Islam and the process of secularization in domestic politics on foreign policymaking. Thus, this study analyzes the interaction of foreign policy with internal politics in decision-making and implementation as well as the global and regional environment in which foreign policy was shaped. Hence, this study focusses on the problematic relations between Islam and secularism in TFP.

Secular policies in foreign policy were seen not only in the republican era but also in the late-Ottoman period. Likewise, the effect of Islam on foreign policy was also observed occasionally from the Tanzimat to the Republic. Therefore, Islam and secularism influenced the period of foreign policymaking, including the late-Ottoman era. Consequently, I argue that the notion that religion withdrew from international relations after the Westphalia is not valid in TFP, where I trace continuous elements from the late-Ottoman to the Republican era.

Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, religion became a critical instrument of TFP during the National Struggle. From the Middle East to India; and from Central Asia to North Africa, efforts were made to introduce the National Struggle to Muslim communities and to secure support by using the Caliphate as a unique Islamic leadership institution. Between 1919 and 1924 which I call the period of Islamization in foreign policy, much of the pattern of state behaviors internally and externally, such as legitimization of the National Struggle, used religious discourse rooted in the CUP period.

The period of 1924-30 was the crucial time in terms of creation a modern society in domestic politics as well as the new pattern of international and regional politics had emerged. Mustafa Kemal's target was to create a secular nation-state as he attempted a total withdrawal from the Muslim world. This isolation was not only due to following a secular domestic and foreign policy. Turkey turned away from the Muslim world and focused on its own program of secular reforms, which aimed to create a new nation-state determinedly broke from its Ottoman history. Mustafa Kemal, having full authority in TFP, believed that in order to sustain stability and to implement reforms, Turkey needed to adopt secular foreign policy, to maintain positive relations with Western countries, and to avoid of establishing ties with Muslim countries.

In the 1930s, the rising Italian and German threats pushed the government to act moderately in foreign policy, and the search for a pragmatic alliance was a sharply defining feature of this period. Turkey departed from its passive and Western-oriented foreign policy and TFP, with its political and security aspects, moved into the areas outside Europe. Therefore, a period of relative improvement in relations with the Middle Eastern and other Muslim countries began. This period is an excellent example of how the international environment could limit the ability of powerful actors in domestic politics to transfer their ideological approaches to foreign policy. Turkey, due to the security priorities in global politics, could not continue to reflect its strict internal ideological transformation in its foreign policy. Although Turkey tried to consolidate its regional relations and attempted to improve security relations with its neighbors, TFP remained basically pro-Western and secular.

Secular elites implemented secular politics internally and externally after 1924, and the secular state system was established by using coercive and authoritarian methods. The emergence of security concerns in the region during the 1930s caused some political changes in TFP and led to critical alterations of secular foreign policy behaviors. While the conflict paradigm could define the period of 1924-38 due to the predominance of secular policies, Islam was not wholly separated from domestic politics. Thus, even though I divide the period of 1924-38 into secularization and

securitization, I explain the whole period within the framework of the control/domination paradigm. I argue that secularization in foreign policy was carried out in a controlled manner just like in domestic politics in the years of 1924-29, due to events such as the establishment of diplomatic missions in Iran, Afghanistan, Egypt and Iraq, the recognition of Saudi Arabia, and the Afghan King's visit.

On the other hand, my study lacks a discussion on certain topics, particularly global economic and political issues. It is important to look not only at the national level but also regional and global levels to understand why Turkey chose to follow religious, secular, and pragmatic policies. But all these did not mean that Turkey changed its main pro-Western and secular foreign policy. Not everything related to TFP is discussed in this study, and I am not suggesting that Islam and secularism were the only factors in the making of foreign policy. I do not wish to ignore strategic, economic, and political factors in foreign policy making and implementing process. Hence, there are many reasons for changes in TFP. For example, the political, social, and economic burden of more than ten years of wars during 1911-22 was inherited by the newly established Turkey, which may have prevented it from developing close relations with the Muslim world and particularly with its periphery. Additionally, due to the British and French domination in the Muslim world, especially in the Middle East, the new regime did not seek any confrontation with these two superpowers. This strategy in turn limited the potential attempts of the new elites and created difficulties for policymakers on the international level. I agree that these factors affected the implementation of TFP in important ways; however, examining these factors in TFP should be the subject of another study. Here my focus has been only to explore the impact of domestic Islamic and secular political identity on TFP. I have tried to examine Islam and secularism in the foreign policy during the Mustafa Kemal era that is understudied in the literature.

However, since I primarily used secondary sources and a number of limited primary sources, I could not analyze the secularization process and secular politics in this period in a multidimensional way. Further studies could be located in both local and international politics. These studies should not ignore the locale by addressing only

systemic data, nor ignore its systemic effects. Besides, enriching the studies with more primary sources and using more empirical analyses and units will yield more original studies.

This study does not aim to make a foreign policy assessment but rather to contribute to the discussion on religion and politics in TFP. Therefore, my analysis is based more on a sociological perspective than international relations theories. Although Mustafa Kemal's period has been studied many times in the TFP literature, I think that using two original theoretical frameworks and a new periodization and conceptualization that I offer differentiates my thesis from others. I try to make a modest contribution by distinguishing the Mustafa Kemal era into three different conceptualizations.

Furthermore, I have not adopted the idea that the Turkish nation-state is secular, completely excluding religion from politics, but argued that there is an integral link between modern nation-state and religion. Therefore, the formation of national identity, the relationship between nationalism and religion, and the contribution of religion to the formation of national identities can be seen as indications of this bond. From this perspective, since I hold the view that the relationship between TFP and secular and religious national identities, and the discourse and politics that these identities have been built upon have not been studied sufficiently, I present my work as a modest step and contribution towards closing this gap.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ahmad, Aziz. 1977. "India and Pakistan." Pp. 97–126 in *The Cambridge History of Islam V 2A*, edited by P. M. Holt, A. K. S. Lambton, and B. Lewis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ahmad, Feroz. 1993. *The Making of Modern Turkey*. London/New York: Routledge.
- Ahmad, Ishtiaq and Mahmud-Ul-Hassan Butt. 2012. "From Pan-Islamism to Muslim Nationalism: Khilafat Movement and the Struggle for Pakistan." *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture* XXXIII(2).
- Akarlı, Engin Deniz. 1976. "The Problems Of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics Under Abdulhamid II (1876-1909): Origins and Solutions." Princeton University.
- Akbulut, Dursun Ali. 1988. "Hilafetin Kaldırılması Üzerine Erzurum'dan Reiscumhur Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa Hazretlerine Çekilen Telgraflar." *Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Dergisi* 1(2):65–89.
- Akgün, Seçil. 2006. *Halifeliğin Kaldırılması ve Lâiklik, 1924-1928*. 2nd ed. İstanbul: Temel Yayınları.
- Akşin, Aptülahat. 1991. *Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi.
- Anon. 1994. *Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası Cilt:1 (Milli Mücadele Dönemine Ait 100 Belge) 1919-1923*. 3rd ed. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları.
- Aras, Tevfik Rüştü. 2003. *Atatürk'ün Dış Politikası*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları.
- Ardıç, Nurullah. 2008. "Türk Sekülerleşmesi İncelemelerinde Paradigma Değişimine Doğru." *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi* 6(11):557–624.
- Ardıç, Nurullah. 2012. *Islam and the Politics of Secularism: The Caliphate and Middle Eastern Modernization in the Early 20th Century*. London / New York: Routledge.
- Armaoğlu, Fahir. 1987. *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi: 1914-1980*. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.
- Armaoğlu, Fahir. 1998. "Hilafetin Dış Cephesi." *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi* XIV(41):347–58.

- Atabaki, Touraj. 2004. "The Caliphate, the Clerics and Republicanism in Turkey and Iran Some Comparative Remarks." Pp. 44–64 in *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah*, edited by T. Atabaki and E. J. Zürcher. London / New York: I.B.Tauris.
- Atabaki, Touraj. 2007. *The State and the Subaltern: Modernization, Society and the State in Turkey and Iran*. London / New York: I. B. Tauris.
- Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası. 1992. . Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları.
- Aydın, Cemil. 2007. *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Badham, Paul, Ronald A. Wells, and Desmond W. J. McForan. 1988. "The Contribution of Religion to the Conflict in Northern Ireland." *International Journal on World Peace* 5(1):45–67.
- Balcı, Ali. 2013. *Türkiye Dış Politikası*. İstanbul: Etkileşim Yayınları.
- Barlas, Dilek. 1998. *Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey: Economic and Foreign Policy Strategies in an Uncertain World, 1929-1939*. Leiden/New York: Brill.
- Barlas, Dilek. 2017. "Milletler Cemiyeti'nde Türkiye: İyimserlik ve Kuşku Arasında." *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 14(55):93–111.
- Baumgart, Claudia. 2006. *Religious Zionism and Israeli Foreign Policy*. Cornell University Peace Studies Program Occasional Paper 30-1. New York.
- Bayur, Yusuf Hikmet. 1973. *Türkiye Devletinin Dış Siyaseti*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi.
- Bein, Amit. 2017. *Kemalist Turkey and the Middle East: International Relations in the Interwar Period*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Benli Altunışık, Meliha and Özlem Tür. 2005. *Turkey : Challenges of Continuity and Change*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Berkes, Niyazi. 1964. *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. Montreal: McGill University Press.
- Bilgin, Mustafa. 2008. *Britain and Turkey in the Middle East: Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era*. London: Tauris Academic Studies.
- Birbudak, Togay Seçkin. 2013. "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti - Ürdün İlişkileri Kapsamında Emir Abdullah'ın 1937 Türkiye Ziyareti." in *Uluslararası Türk – Arap Müşterek Değerler ve Kültürel Etkileşim Sempozyumu*. Amman, Jordan: Unpublished conference paper.
- Bıyıklı, Mustafa. 2006. *Batı İşgalleri Karşısında Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu Politikaları: Atatürk Dönemi*. İstanbul: Gökkuşbuğu.

- Bıyıklı, Mustafa, ed. 2008. *Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi I*. İstanbul: Gökkuşbe Yayınları.
- Boivin, Michel. 2013. *La Renovation Du Shi'isme Ismaelien En Inde Et Au Pakistan*. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis.
- Bozdağlıođlu, Yücel. 2003. *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity. A Constructivist Approach*. New York: Routledge.
- Brown, L. Carl. 2000. *Religion and State the Muslim Approach to Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Butler, Daniel Allen. 2011. *Shadow of the Sultan's Realm: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books.
- Butterfield, Herbert. 1962. *Christianity, Diplomacy and War*. London: Wyvern Books.
- Buzpınar, Tufan. 1996. "Opposition to the Ottoman Caliphate in the Early Years of Abdul-Hamid II: 1877-1882." *Die Welt Des Islams* 36(1):59-89.
- Çakmak, Haydar, ed. 2008. *Türk Dış Politikası 1919-2008*. Ankara: Platin Yayınları.
- Çalış, Şaban and Hüseyin Bağcı. 2003. "Atatürk's Foreign Policy Understanding and Application." *Selçuk Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Sosyal ve Ekonomik Araştırmalar Dergisi* 1(6):195.
- Carlson, John David. and Erik C. Owens. 2003. *The Sacred and the Sovereign: Religion and International Politics*. Washington: Georgetown University Press.
- Çelikkol, Oğuz. 2018. "Ortodoks Dünyasında Bölünme." Retrieved January 10, 2019 (<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/oguz-celikkol/ortodoks-dunyasinda-bolunme-40987957>).
- Çetinsaya, Gökhan. 1999a. "Atatürk Dönemi Türkiye-İran İlişkileri 1926-1938." *Avrasya Dosyası* 5(3):148-75.
- Çetinsaya, Gökhan. 1999b. "İsmi Olup Da Cismi Olmayan Kuvvet': II. Abdülhamid'in Panİslamizm Politikası Üzerine Bir Deneme." *Yeni Türkiye* 2:380-88.
- Çetinsaya, Gökhan. 2000. "Millî Mücadeleden Cumhuriyet'e Türk-İran İlişkileri 1919-1925." *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi* XVI(48):769-96.
- Çetinsaya, Gökhan. 2001. "Kalemiye'den Mülkiye'ye Tanzimat Zihniyeti." in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce I: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyetin Birikimi*, edited by M. Ö. Alkan. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Çetinsaya, Gökhan. 2002. "From the Tanzimat to the Islamic Revolution: Continuity and Change in Turkish-Iranian Relations." *Turkish Review of Middle East Studies* (13):113-34.

- Çetinsaya, Gökhan. 2003. "Essential Friends and Natural Enemies: The Historical Roots of Turkish-Iranian Relations." *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 7(3).
- Çetinsaya, Gökhan. 2006. *Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890–1908*. New York: Routledge.
- Çetinsaya, Gökhan. 2007. "A Tale of Two Centuries: Continuity in Turkish Foreign and Security Policy." Pp. 5–18 in *Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey*, edited by N. Ateşoğlu Güney. Aldershot, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing.
- Cizre Sakalioğlu, Ümit. 1996. "Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Republican Turkey." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28(2):231–51.
- Çınar, Alev. 2005. *Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places, and Time*. Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press.
- Çınar, Alev. 2014. "State Building as an Urban Experience: The Making of Ankara." Pp. 227–60 in *Power and Architecture: The Construction of Capitals and the Politics of Space*, edited by M. Minkenberg. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Cleveland, William L. and Martin P. Bunton. 2009. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Çolak, Melek. 2010. "Türk Mısır İlişkileri Çerçevesinde Mısır'ın Atatürk ve Türk Devrimine Bakışı." *Karadeniz Uluslararası Bilimsel Dergi* (6).
- Cronin, Stephanie. 2004. "The Army, Civil Society and the State in Iran: 1921–26." Pp. 130–208 in *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah*, edited by E. J. Zürcher and T. Atabaki. London / New York: I. B. Tauris.
- Cumhuriyet. 1976a. "AP İle MSP'nin İslam Konferansına İlişkin Çelişen Görüşleri MC'yi Zor Duruma Soktu." *Cumhuriyet*. Retrieved May 23, 2019 (<https://www.cumhuriyetarsivi.com/katalog/192/sayfa/1976/5/9/9.xhtml>).
- Cumhuriyet. 1976b. "İslâm Zirvesi Yüzünden Demirel İle Erbakan, Bakanlar Kurulunda Sert Biçimde Tartıştılar." *Cumhuriyet*. Retrieved May 23, 2019 (<https://www.cumhuriyetarsivi.com/katalog/192/sayfa/1976/5/7/9.xhtml>).
- Cumhuriyet. 1976c. "MC'nin İslam Konferansı İle İlgili Tutumu Bugün Belirlenecek." *Cumhuriyet*. Retrieved May 23, 2019 (<https://www.cumhuriyetarsivi.com/katalog/192/sayfa/1976/5/8/9.xhtml>).
- Davison, Roderic H. 1963. *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*. Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press.

- Davison, Roderic H. 2000. "The Modernization of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Tanzimat Period." *Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi* (11):862–74.
- Davutoğlu, Ahmet. 2001. *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*. İstanbul: Küre Yayınları.
- Davutoğlu, Ahmet. 2002. "Uluslararası Dönüşümler ve Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türk Diplomasinin Süreklilik Unsurları." Pp. 162–76 in *Türkler*, edited by H. C. Güzel, K. Çiçek, and S. Koca. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları.
- Değerli Sarıkoyuncu, Esra. 2009. "Balkan Pact and Turkey." *The Journal of International Social Research* 2(6):136–47.
- Değerli Sarıkoyuncu, Esra. 2015. "Political and Cultural Relations between Turkey and Egypt (1923-1938)." *Eurasian Studies Journal* (1):1–19.
- Deringil, Selim. 1991. "Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdülhamid II (1876–1909)." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 23(03):345–59.
- Deringil, Selim. 1993. "The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1808 to 1908." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35(1):3–29.
- Deringil, Selim. 1998. *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909*. London / New York: I.B. Tauris.
- Dillon, Michael. 2014. *Xinjiang and the Expansion of Chinese Communist Power : Kashgar in the Early Twentieth Century*. New York: Routledge.
- Dressler, Markus. 2010. "Public-Private Distinctions, the Alevi Question, and the Headscarf: Turkish Secularism Revisited." Pp. 121–41 in *Comparative Secularisms in a Global Age*, edited by L. E. Cady and E. S. Hurd. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dressler, Markus. 2011. "Making Religion through Secularist Legal Discourse: The Case of Turkish Alevism." Pp. 187–208 in *Secularism and Religion-Making*, edited by Markus Dressler; Arvind-pal Singh Mandair. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Duman, Selçuk. 2014. "Atatürk Dönemi Türkiye-Hindistan İlişkileri." *International Periodical For The Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic* 9(4):389–99.
- Dural, A. Baran. 2007. *His Story: Mustafa Kemal and Turkish Revolution*. New York: iUniverse.
- Eraslan, Cezmi. 2001a. "Abolishment of Caliphate and Turkey's Transformation to Modern State." *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi* XVII:67–87.

- Eraslan, Cezmi. 2001b. "Abolishment of The Caliphate And Turkey's Transformation to Modern State." *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi* 12(50):345–58.
- Esmer, A. Şükrü. 1944. *Siyasi Tarih*. İstanbul: Siyasal Bilgiler Okulu.
- Euronews. 2018. "Rus Ortodoks Kilisesi: İstanbul Kırmızı Çizgiyi Aştı." Retrieved January 10, 2019 (<https://tr.euronews.com/2018/10/12/ukraynanin-bagimsiz-kilise-talebine-onay>).
- Evans, Stephen F. 1982. *The Slow Rapprochement: Britain and Turkey in the Age of Kemal Atatürk, 1919-38*. Beverly N. Humber: Eothen Press.
- Evered, Emine Ö. and Kyle T. Evered. 2010. "Decolonization through Secularization: A Geopolitical Reframing of Turkey's 1924 Abolition of the Caliphate." *The Arab World Geographer/Le Géographe Du Monde Arabe* 13(1).
- Findley, Carter V. 2008. "The Tanzimat." in *The Cambridge History of Turkey Volume 4, Turkey in the Modern World*, edited by R. Kasaba. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Findley, Carter V. 2010. *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789-2007*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
- Formichi, Chiara. 2013. "Mustafa Kemal's Abrogation of the Ottoman Caliphate and Its Impact on the Indonesian Nationalist Movement." P. 307 in *Demystifying the Caliphate: Historical Memory and Contemporary Contexts*, edited by M. Al-Rasheed, C. Kersten, and M. Shterin. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Fortna, Benjamin C. 2002. *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.
- Fox, Jonathan and Shmuel. Sandler. 2004. *Bringing Religion into International Relations*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- FRUS. 1928. "Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928, Volume III." *Office of the Historian*. Retrieved June 16, 2019 (<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1928v03/d772>).
- Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press.
- Gawrych, George. 2013. *The Young Atatürk: From Ottoman Soldier to Statesman of Turkey*. London & New York: I.B.Tauris.
- Georgeon, François. 1990. "Kemalizm ve İslam Dünyası (1919-1938): Bazı İşaret Taşları." Pp. 11–53 in *Kemalizm ve İslam Dünyası*, edited by F. Georgeon and İ. Gökalp. İstanbul: Arba Yayınları.
- Gingeras, Ryan. 2009. *Sorrowful Shores: Violence, Ethnicity, and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1912-1923*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.

- Gökalp, İskender and François Georgeon. 1990. *Kemalizm ve İslam Dünyası*. İstanbul: Arba.
- Gönlübol, Mehmet and Cem Sar, eds. 1969. *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları.
- Gönlübol, Mehmet and Cem Sar. 1990. *Atatürk ve Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası (1919-1938)*. Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu.
- Gözaydın, İhtar B. 2006. "A Religious Administration to Secure Secularism: The Presidency of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey." *Marburg Journal of Religion* 11(1).
- Gözaydın, İhtar B. 2008. "Diyanet and Politics." *The Muslim World* 98(2-3):216-27.
- Güçlü, Yücel. 2000. "The Basic Principles and Practices of the Turkish Foreign Policy Under Atatürk." *Bellekten* LXIV(241).
- Güçlü, Yücel. 2003. "Turkey's Entrance into the League of Nations." *Middle Eastern Studies* 39(1):186-206.
- Gürün, Kamuran. 1985. *Savaşın Dünyası ve Türkiye I (1919-1925)*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi.
- Gürün, Kamuran. 1997. *Savaşın Dünyası ve Türkiye II (1926-1939)*. İstanbul: İnkılâp Kitabevi.
- Güven, Cemal. 2012. *Millî Mücadele'de Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın Yabancılarla Temas ve Görüşmeleri: (Asker, Siyasî Temsilci ve Gazeteciler)*. Konya: Eğitim Yayınevi.
- Hâkimiyet-i Milliye. 1922. "Buhara Şûra Cumhuriyeti Delegationlarına." *Hâkimiyet-i Milliye*. Retrieved February 1, 2019 (<http://www.atam.gov.tr/ataturkun-soylev-ve-demecleri/buhara-sura-cumhuriyeti-delegelerine>).
- Hâkimiyet-i Milliye. 1928. "Afganistan Kralı ve Milleti Hakkında Konuşma." *Hâkimiyet-i Milliye*. Retrieved February 21, 2019 (<http://www.atam.gov.tr/ataturkun-soylev-ve-demecleri/afganistan-krali-ve-milleti-hakkinda-konusma>).
- Hâkimiyet-i Milliye. 1931. "Irak Kralı ve Türkiye –Irak İlişkileri Hakkında Konuşma." *Hâkimiyet-i Milliye*. Retrieved April 27, 2019 (<http://www.atam.gov.tr/ataturkun-soylev-ve-demecleri/irak-krali-ve-turkiye-irak-iliskileri-hakkinda-konusma>).
- Hale, William M. 2000. *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*. London: Frank Cass .
- Hamdani, Yasser Latif. 2012. *Jinnah: Myth and Reality*. Lahore: Vanguard Books.
- Hanioglu, M. Şükrü. 2008. *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Haniođlu, M. Őukrő. 2011a. *Atatőr: An Intellectual Biography*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Haniođlu, M. Őukrő. 2011b. "TeŐkılāt-ı Mahsūsa." *TDV İslām Ansiklopedisi* 568–69.
- Hatzopoulos, Pavlos and Fabio Petito. 2003. *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hill, Charles. 2011. *Trial of a Thousand Years World Order and Islamism*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University.
- Hosein, Imran Nazar. 1997. *The Caliphate, The Hejaz and The Saudi-Wahhabi Nation-State*. Kuala Lumpur: Ummavision.
- Hourani, Albert. 1983. *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hourani, Albert. 1991. *A History of the Arab Peoples*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Hőlagő, Metin. 2006. *Pan-İslamizm: Osmanlının Son Umudu*. İstanbul: Yitik Hazine Yayınları.
- Hőlagő, Metin. 2008. *İslam Birliđi ve Mustafa Kemal*. İstanbul: TimaŐ Yayınları.
- Hurd, Elizabeth Shakman. 2004. "The International Politics of Secularism: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Islamic Republic of Iran." *Alternatives* 29(2):115–38.
- Hurd, Elizabeth Shakman. 2008. *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hurd, Elizabeth Shakman. 2012. "International Politics after Secularism." *Review of International Studies* 38(05):943–61.
- İhsanođlu, Ekmeleddin. 2010. *The Islamic World in the New Century: The Organisation of the Islamic Conference*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Iqbal, Muhammad. 2013. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Kabaklı, Ahmet. 1989. *Temellerin DuruŐması*. İstanbul: Tőr Edebiyatı Vakfı Yayınları.
- Kara, İsmail. 2003. *Din İle Modernleşme Arasında ÇađdaŐ Tőr Dőşőncesinin Meseleleri*. İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları.
- Kara, İsmail. 2005. "İslamcı Sőylemin Kaynakları ve Gerçeklik Deđeri." Pp. 34–47 in *Modern Tőrkiye'de Siyasi Dőşőnce: İslamcılık*, edited by Y. Aktay. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Kara, İsmail. 2010. *Cumhuriyet Tőrkiyesi'nde Bir Mesele Olarak İslam*. İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları.

- Karakoç, Ercan. 2002. *Atatürk'ün Dış Türkler Politikası*. İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık.
- Karčić, Fikret. 2007. "The Bosnian Muslims and Islamic International Networks: 'The Age of Conventions.'" *Bosnian Studies: Journal for Research of Bosnian Thought and Culture* (1):114–21.
- Karpat, Kemal H. 1972. "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 3(3):243–81.
- Karpat, Kemal H. 1996. *Turkish Foreign Policy: Recent Developments*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Karpat, Kemal H. 2001. *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.
- Karpat, Kemal H. 2012. *Türk Dış Politikası Tarihi*. İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları.
- Karrar, Hasan H. (Hasan Haider). 2009. *The New Silk Road Diplomacy: China's Central Asian Foreign Policy since the Cold War*. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Kasaba, Reşat, ed. 2008. *The Cambridge History of Turkey Volume 4, Turkey in the Modern World*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Katzenstein, Peter J. and Timothy A. Byrnes. 2006. "Transnational Religion in an Expanding Europe." *Perspectives on Politics* 4(4):679–94.
- Kedourie, Elie. 1963. "Egypt and the Caliphate 1915-1946." *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* (3/4):208–48.
- Kedourie, Sylvia. 2000. *Seventy-Five Years of the Turkish Republic*. London; Portland OR: Frank Cass.
- Kekevi, Serkan, Yunus Emre Tekinsoy, and İsmet Türkmen, eds. 2017. *Türk Dış Politikası (1830-1989)*. Ankara: Berikan Yayınevi.
- Keohane, Robert O. 2005. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Kern, Karen M. 2013. *Imperial Citizen Marriage and Citizenship in the Ottoman Frontier Provinces of Iraq*. New York: Syracuse University Press.
- Keyman, Fuat E. 2008. "Atatürk ve Dış Politika Vizyonu." in *Türk Dış Politikası 1919-2008*, edited by H. Çakmak. Ankara: Platin Yayınları.
- Kissoudi, Penelope. 2009. *The Balkan Games and Balkan Politics in the Interwar Years 1929-1939: Politicians in Pursuit of Peace*. Abingdon: Routledge.

- Koçer, Gökhan. 2003. *Türk Dış Politikasında İslam: Araf'ta Olmak Ya Da Bir Pragmatizm Örneği*. İstanbul: Öğreti Yayınları.
- Kodaman, Bayram. 1987. *Sultan II. Abdulhamid Devri Doğu Anadolu Politikası*. Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü.
- Kösebalaban, Hasan. 2011. *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism and Globalization*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kramer, Martin S. 1986. *Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Kramer, Martin S. 1995. "Congresses." in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Laffan, Michael. 2003. *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia*. London ; New York: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Lammens, Henri. 1968. *Islam: Beliefs and Institutions*. London: Cass.
- Landau, Jacob M. 1990. *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*. New York: Clarendon Press-Oxford.
- Landau, Jacob M. 2004. *Exploring Ottoman and Turkish History*. London: Hurst & Co.
- Lewis, Bernard. 1961. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. London New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lewis, Bernard. 1964. *The Middle East and the West*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Mango, Andrew. 2008. "Atatürk." Pp. 147–72 in *The Cambridge History of Turkey Volume 4*, edited by R. Kasaba. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Marashi, Afshin. 2003. "Performing the Nation: The Shah's Official Statevisit to Kemalist Turkey, June to July 1934." Pp. 103–24 in *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Riza Shah 1921-1941*, edited by S. Cronin. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Mardin, Şerif. 1971. "Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 2(3):197–211.
- Mardin, Şerif. 1989. *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bedüzzaman Said Nursi*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Mardin, Şerif. 1992. *Türk Modernleşmesi*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Mardin, Şerif. 1996. *Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

- Mardin, Şerif. 2000. *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*. New York: Syracuse University Press.
- Mardin, Şerif. 2006. *Religion, Society, and Modernity in Turkey*. New York: Syracuse University Press.
- Mearsheimer, John J. and Stephen M. Walt. 2009. *İsrail Lobisi ve Amerikan Dış Politikası*. İstanbul: Küre Yayınları.
- Millman, Brock. 1995. "Turkish Foreign and Strategic Policy 1934-42." *Middle Eastern Studies* 31(3):483-508.
- Milner, A. C. 1986. "The Impact of the Turkish Revolution on Malaya." *Archipel* 31(1):117-30.
- Minault, Gail. 1982. *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Moosa, Ebrahim. 2015. "Political Theology in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring: Returning to the Ethical." Pp. 101-20 in *The African Renaissance and the Afro-Arab Spring: A Season of Rebirth?*, edited by C. Villa-Vicencio, E. Doxtader, and E. Moosa. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
- Moreau, Odile. 2003. "Echoes of National Liberation: Turkey Viewed from the Maghrib in the 1920s." P. V in *Nation, Society and Culture in North Africa*, edited by J. McDougall. London & Portland: Frank Cass.
- Morgenthau, Hans. 1973. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Knopf.
- Mustafa Kemal. 1929. *A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal*. Leipzig: K. F. Koehler.
- Mustafa Kemal. 1945. *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri I: T.B.M. Meclisinde ve C.H.P. Kurultaylarında 1919-1938*. edited by N. Arsan and N. Unan. Ankara: Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları.
- Mustafa Kemal. 1959. *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri I*. edited by N. Arsan. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi.
- Mustafa Kemal. 1964. *Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri IV (1917-1938)*. edited by N. Arsan. Ankara: Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları.
- Mustafa Kemal. 2011. *Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün Dış Politika Konuşmaları*. edited by M. Bıyıklı. İstanbul: Hiperlink.
- Narlı, Nilüfer. 1993. "Cooperation or Competition in the Islamic World: Turkish-Iranian Relations from the Islamic Revolution to the Gulf War and Beyond." *CEMOTI* 15(1):265-93.

- Nielsen, Alfred. 1932. "The Islamic Conference at Jerusalem." *The Muslim World* 22(4):340–54.
- Noer, Deliar. 1973. *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942*. Singapore & New York: Oxford University Press.
- Noureddin, Muhammed. 2000. "Arab-Turkish Relations during the Atatürk Era." in *Atatürk 4. Uluslararası Kongresi Cilt I*, edited by A. Süslü. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi.
- Olesen, Asta. 1995. *Islam and Politics in Afghanistan*. Richmond: Curzon.
- Oran, Baskın, ed. 2010. *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
- Özcan, Azmi. 2010. "Şerif Hüseyin." in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi Cilt 38*. Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı.
- Pay, Salih. 2015. "The Journey of Caliphate from 632 to 1924." *International Journal of Business and Social Science* 6(4).
- Philpott, Daniel. 2000. "The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations." *World Politics* 52(January):206–45.
- Philpott, Daniel. 2002. "The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations." *World Politics* 55(October):66–95.
- Picard, Elizabeth. 1990. "Suriyeli ve Iraklı Arap Milliyetçiler ve Kemalizm: Yöneşmeler, Perdelemeler ve Etkiler." Pp. 55–77 in *Kemalizm ve İslam Dünyası*, edited by F. Georgeon and İ. Gökalp. İstanbul: Arba Yayınları.
- Qureshi, M. Naeem. 1996. "Muslims of British India and the Kemalist Reform in Turkey, Iqbal, Jinnah and Atatürk, 1924-1938." *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi* XII(35):379–87.
- Qureshi, M. Naeem. 1999. *Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement, 1918-1924*. Leiden & Boston: Brill.
- Qureshi, Mohammad Naeem. 1973. "The Khilafat Movement in India, 1919-1924." University of London.
- Rasanayagam, Angelo. 2003. *Afghanistan: A Modern History*. London/New York: I.B. Tauris.
- Reid, Anthony. 1967. "Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 26(2):267–83.
- Romano, David. 2006. *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Rustow, Dankwart A. 1973. "The Modernization of Turkey in the Historical and Comparative Perspective." in *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis*, edited by K. H. Karpat. Leiden: Brill.
- Saraçoğlu, Cenk. 2011. *Kurds of Modern Turkey: Migration, Neoliberalism and Exclusion in Turkish Society*. London & New York: I.B. Tauris.
- Sayyid, Bobby S. 2003. *Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism*. London/New York: Zed Books.
- Seliktar, Ofira. 2015. *New Zionism and the Foreign Policy System of Israel (RLE Israel and Palestine)*. Routledge.
- Shaw, Stanford J. 2000. *From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation, 1918-1923*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları.
- Shaw, Stanford J. and Ezel Kural Shaw. 1977. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume 2*. Vol. v. 2. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Shorish, M. Mobin. 1984. "The Impact of the Kemalist 'Revolution' on Afghanistan." *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* VII(3):34-45.
- Şimşir, Bilal N. 1975. *İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk (1919-1938) Cilt: 2*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları.
- Şimşir, Bilal N., ed. 1981. *Dış Basında Atatürk ve Türk Devrimi: 1922-1924 Bir Laik Cumhuriyet Doğuyor*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları.
- Şimşir, Bilal N. 1999. *Doğunun Kahramanı Atatürk*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi.
- Şimşir, Bilal N. 2001. *Atatürk ve Yabancı Devlet Başkanları*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları.
- Şimşir, Bilal N. 2017. *İlk Dönem Türk Diplomasisi Üzerine İncelemeler*. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi.
- Somel, Selçuk Akşin. 2003. *Historical Dictionary of the Ottoman Empire*. Lanham Md.: Scarecrow Press.
- Sönmezoğlu, Faruk. 2011. *İki Savaş Sırası ve Arasında Türk Dış Politikası*. İstanbul: Der Yayınları.
- Sonyel, Salahi R. 1987. *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Dış Politika I*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları.
- Soysal, İsmail. 1986. "Turkish-Arab Diplomatic Relations After the Second World War (1945-1986)." *Studies on Turkish on Turkish-Arab Relations I*.

- Soysal, İsmail. 1989. *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları Cilt I*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları.
- Soysal, İsmail. 2000. *Tarihçeleri ve Açıklamalarıyla Birlikte Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları, I. Cilt (1920–1945)*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları.
- Soysal, İsmail. 2001. *Between East and West Studies on Turkish Foreign Relations*. İstanbul: The ISIS Press.
- Stirling, Arthur Paul. 1965. *Turkish Village*. New York: Wiley.
- Taglia, Stefano. 2015. *Intellectuals and Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Young Turks on the Challenges of Modernity*. London & New York: Routledge.
- TBMMZC. 1921. "TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi Cilt: 9 Birinci İçtima, 1 Mart 1921." Retrieved March 12, 2019 (<https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d01/c009/tbmm01009001.pdf>).
- TBMMZC. 1922. "TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi Cilt: 18 Birinci İçtima, 1 Mart 1922." Retrieved March 12, 2019 (<https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d01/c018/tbmm01018001.pdf>).
- TBMMZC. 1926. "TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi Devre 2, Cilt 27, Birinci İçtima, 1 Teşrinisani 1926." Retrieved January 7, 2019 (<https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d02/c027/tbmm0207001.pdf>).
- TBMMZC. 1928. "TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi Devre: III, İçtima Senesi: II, Cilt V, Birinci İnikat." Retrieved May 14, 2019 (https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tarihce/ataturk_konusma/01_11_1928.pdf).
- TBMMZC. 1931a. "TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Cilt 4, Birinci İnikat, 1 Kasım 1931." Retrieved February 4, 2019 (<https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d04/c004/tbmm04004001.pdf>).
- TBMMZC. 1931b. "TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre 4, Cilt 5, Dokuzuncu İnikat, 3 Aralık 1931." Retrieved February 10, 2019 (<https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d04/c005/tbmm04005009.pdf>).
- TBMMZC. 1937. "TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Cilt 20, Birinci İnikat, 1 Kasım 1937." Retrieved January 2, 2019 (<https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d05/c020/tbmm05020001.pdf>).

- TBMMZC. 1938. "TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Cilt 27, Birinci İnikad, 1 Kasım 1938."
Retrieved April 28, 2019
(<https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d05/c027/tbmm05027001.pdf>).
- Teschke, Benno. 2009. *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations*. London: Verso.
- Tevetođlu, Cihad Fethi. 1986. "Bugünkü Türk-Suudi Dostluđuna İlk Adım: Gazi Mustafa Kemal-Faysal Bin Abdülaziz Görüşmesi." *Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations* 1:291–309.
- Thomas, Scott M. 2001. "Faith, History and Martin Wight: The Role of Religion in the Historical Sociology of the English School of International Relations." *International Affairs* 77(4):905–29.
- Thomas, Scott M. 2005. *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Toynbee, Arnold. 1927. *Survey of International Affairs, 1925, Vol. 1: The Islamic World since the Peace Settlement*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Tunaya, Tarık Zafer. 1962. *İslamcılık Cereyanı*. İstanbul: Baha Matbaası.
- Tunaya, Tarık Zafer. 1995. *Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler*. İstanbul: Arba Yayınları.
- Tunçay, Mete. 1999. *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi’nin Kurulması, 1923-1931*. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.
- Tuncer, Hüner. 2008. *Atatürkçü Dış Politika*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları.
- Tür, Özlem. 2007. "Türkiye ve Filistin - 1908-1948: Milliyetçilik, Ulusal Çıkar ve Batılılaşma." *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 62(1):223–51.
- Uzer, Umut. 2011. *Identity and Turkish Foreign Policy the Kemalist Influence in Cyprus and the Caucasus*. London & New York: I. B. Tauris.
- Vere-Hodge, Edward Reginald. 1950. *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1918-1948*. Ambilly-Annemasse: Impr. Franco-Suisse.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Watt, D. C. 1988. "The Saadabad Pact of 8 July 1937." P. 434 in *The Great powers in the Middle East, 1919-1939*, edited by U. Dann. New York: Holmes & Meier.
- Weisband, Edward. 1973. *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

- Wight, Martin. 1960. "Why Is There No International Theory?" *International Relations* 2(1):35–48.
- Yalçın, E. Semih. 2000. *Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Siyaseti*. Ankara: Berikan.
- Yalçın, Hüseyin Cahit. 2002. *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları: Bir Devri Aydınlatan Tarihi Mektuplar*. İstanbul: Temel Yayınları.
- Yükleyen, Ahmet. 2008. "Sufism and Islamic Groups in Contemporary Turkey." Pp. 381–87 in *The Cambridge History of Turkey Volume 4*, edited by R. Kasaba. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Zarewand. 1971. *United and Independent Turania: Aims and Designs of the Turks*. Leiden: Brill.
- Zürcher, Erik Jan. 1997. *Turkey: A Modern History*. London & New York: I. B. Tauris.
- Zürcher, Erik Jan. 2004. "Institution Building in the Kemalist Republic: The Role of the People's Party." Pp. 98–112 in *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah*, edited by Touraj Atabaki; Erik Jan Zürcher. London / New York: I.B. Tauris.
- Zürcher, Erik Jan. 2010. *Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey*. London & New York: I.B. Tauris.