# THE FAILURES OF THE AFGHAN RECONCILIATION PROCESS BETWEEN 2001 AND 2014

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
İSTANBUL ŞEHİR UNIVERSITY

BY

ZABIHULLAH KOKCHA

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

AUGUST 2019

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and International Relations

Examining Committee Members:

|  | DECISION | SIGNATURE |
|---|---|---|
| Assist. Prof. Hüseyin Alptekin (Thesis Advisor) | accepted | |
| Assist. Prof. Kadir Temiz | accepted | |
| Assoc. Prof. Talha Köse | accepted | |

This is to confirm that this thesis complies with all the standards set by the Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences of İstanbul Şehir University.

Date

12.07.2019

Seal/Signature

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and standards of ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and standards, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

First Name, Last Name: Zabihullah Kokcha

Signature

ABSTRACT

THE FAILURES OF THE AFGHAN RECONCILIATION PROCESS BETWEEN 2001 AND
2014

Kokcha, Zabihullah

MA in Political Science and International Relations

Thesis Advisor: Assist. Prof. Hüseyin Alptekin

August 2019, 117 pages

This thesis studies the failure of Afghanistan's reconciliation process between 2001 and 2014. It argues that throughout this period, the reconciliation process in Afghanistan failed because of the spoiling behavior of neighboring Pakistan and the mistaken policies of the US in Afghanistan. This thesis presents its argument through the use of spoiler theory and qualitative research in the form of in-depth interviews.

I conducted interviews with thirteen people, including public figures, scholars, senior government officials, heads of political parties, senior members of the High Peace Council, senior members of the Upper House of Afghanistan, and former high officials of the Taliban. According to the findings, Pakistan was the main spoiler of Afghanistan's reconciliation process between 2001 and 2014. According to the interviews, various factors motived Pakistan to spoil Afghanistan's reconciliation process, the most significant of which were border and water disputes between Afghanistan and Pakistan and threats to the economic interests and national security of Pakistan in Afghanistan and the region. Moreover, some interviewees –less than half- also believed that the US was also one of the spoilers of the reconciliation process. Accordingly, the motivating factor for the US was ideology and its security interests in Afghanistan and the region. More than half of the interviewees believed that the US was not a spoiler, but pursued mistaken policies, such as not inviting the Afghan Taliban to the first Bonn Conference, not co-opting their former members into the new political system, and not having a concrete policy against Pakistan, led the Afghan reconciliation to fail.

# ÖZ

## AFGANİSTAN'DA 2001 VE 2014 YILLARI ARASINDA YÜRÜTÜLEN BARIŞ SÜRECİNİN BAŞARISIZ OLMASININ NEDENLERİ

Kokcha, Zabihullah

Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans Programı

Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Hüseyin Alptekin

Ağustos 2019, 117 sayfa

Bu tez çalışması Afganistan'da 2001 ve 2014 yılları arasında yürütülen barış sürecinin başarısız olmasının nedenlerini araştırır. Çalışma, bu barış sürecinin başarısız olma nedeninin Pakistan'ın bozgunculuk (*spoil*) yapması ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin Afganistan'da Taliban'a karşı yanlış politikalar yürütmesi olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Bu çalışma, nitel araştırma yöntemi ve bozgunculuk (*spoiler)* teorisini kullanarak argümanlarını sunmaktadır.

Bu tezde birincil kaynak olarak; barış sürecini yürüten, sürece dâhil olan ve yakından takip eden 13 kişi ile yapılan orijinal mülakatlar kullanılmıştır. Bunların arasında; Yüksek Barış Konseyi (High Peace Council) başkan yardımcısı, Afganistan Ayan Meclisi (Upper House) başkan yardımcısı, eski Taliban üyeleri (Taliban'ın eski Birleşmiş Milletler Temsilcisi, eski Pakistan Büyükelçisi, ve eski Kabil Rektörü), siyasi parti başkanları, senatörler, akademisyenler, televizyon yorumcuları ve barış sürecini yürüten devlet görevlileri yer almaktadır. Bu on üç kişiden on ikisi barış sürecinin asıl barışsız olmasının nedeninin Pakistan'ın spoil etmesi olduğuna ve beşi de Amerika'nın spoil etmesi olduğuna inanmaktadırlar. Bu şahıslar, Pakistan'ın Afganistan'daki barış sürecini spoil etmesindeki ana nedenler olarak; Afganistan ve Pakistan arasındaki sınır sıkıntısı, su sıkıntısı, Pakistan'ın Afganistan'daki ve bölgedeki ekonomik çıkarları ve Pakistan'ın Afganistan ve bölgeye karşı olan güvensizlik hissi olduğuna inanıyorlardı. Pakistan spoil etmek için, barış sürecine katılmak isteyen Taliban mensuplarını ya öldürmüş ya hapishaneye attırmıştır. Ki çoğu Taliban liderleri Pakistan'ın Peşawer, Islamabad ve Karaçi gibi büyük şehirlerinde yaşamaktalar. Mülakat yapılan on üç

kişiden beşine göre, Amerika'nın bu barış sürecini spoil etmesinin ana nedenlerini ise ideolojik faktörler ve Afganistan'daki ve bölgedeki çıkarlar oluşturmaktadır. Fakat bu mülakat yapılan on üç kişiden sekizi iddia edilenin tersine Afganistan'ın Amerika'nın stratejik güvenlik ortağı olduğuna, Afganistan'ın barış sürecini spoil etmediğine fakat Amerika'nın yanlış siyasetlerinin bu süreci başarısız kıldığına inanıyorlardı. Bu sekiz şahsa göre, Amerikan'ın yanlış siyasetlerinin örnekleri olarak; 2001 yılındaki Bonn Konferansı'na Taliban'ı davet etmemesi, eski Taliban mensuplarını ülkenin yeni sistemine asimle edememesi ve Pakistan'a karşı belli bir duruşu olmaması olarak görülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler:  Dirençli çatışma (*intractable conflict*), Uzlaşma, Afganistan, Taliban, Bozguncu (*spoiler*), Afganistan Uzlaşma ve Reintegrasyon Programı

I dedicate this to my mother and father.

For their endless love, support and encouragement

# ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To begin with, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my professor and advisor Hüseyin Alptekin, without whose support, guidance, and encouragement this study would not have been possible.

I would also like to thank Istanbul Sehir University for offering me the scholarship that allowed me to study at their respected institution. I wish to express my genuine appreciation for the support several professors showed me throughout my study: Associate Professor Talha Köse, who supported me in various ways and always made time for me despite his busy schedule; and Assistant Professor Kadir Temiz, who enriched my thesis with his discussion, ideas, and feedback.

Aside from my academic contacts, I would also like to thank my friends: Abdinasir Ahmed Jimale, Hugh Jefferson Turner, Nasratullah Osmani, and Nematullah Noori. Your constant encouragement and support was essential in helping me complete this thesis.

Finally, I would like to express my greatest appreciation to members of my family as a whole and particularly to my parents and my brother Aminullah Khan. They have been extremely supportive and encouraging throughout this process and have made countless sacrifices to allow me to continue my study.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

# LIST OF TABLES

# LIST OF FIGURES

# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIHRC        : Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission

ANBP         : Afghanistan New Beginning Program

ANSC         : The Afghanistan National Security Council

ANSF         : Afghan National Security force

APRP         : Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program

AREU         : Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

CIA            : Central Intelligence Agency

DDR          : Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

FATA         : Federally Administrated Tribal Area

HPC          : High Peace Council

IMF           : International Monetary Fund

MAF          : Million Acre-Feet

MP            : Member of Parliament

NATO         : The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCPJ         : National Consultative Peace Jirga

NGO         : Non-Governmental Organization

NRP          : National Reconciliation Policies

NWFP        : North West Frontier of Pakistan

PCRWR      : Pakistani Council of Research in Water Resources

PDPA         : People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan

PRIO          : Peace Research Institute Oslo

PTS           : Prose-i Tahkim-e-Solh - Strengthening Peace Program

RSCA         : Regional Studies Center of Afghanistan

SIGAR        : Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SSG          : The Pakistan Army Special Service Group

TAPI          : Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline

TTP          : Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

U.S.           : United States

UAE          : United Arab Emirates

UN            : United Nations

UNITA      : National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

USA        : United States of America

USAID      : United States Agency for International Development

USGS       : the US Geological Survey

USIP       : United States Institute of Peace

USSR       : Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or Soviet Union

**CHAPTER 1**

**INTRODUCTION**

Conflict is a natural part of everyday human interaction. Conflict occurs at various levels, such as the individual or group level, whenever people feel that their goals, values, and interests are opposed to those of other groups or individuals (Stewart, 1998; Bart-al, 2011). But in a country which has experienced protracted forms of conflict[1] and civil war[2] there is a great likelihood of generating a conflict trap (Collier, Sambanis, 2002). Conflict trap means, once a country had a civil war it increases the likelihood of war breaking out again (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004: 8). This is because, these forms of conflict have the propensity to polarize societies and to weaken their ability to cope with conflict without violence, thereby increasing the risk of future conflict in the country (Strand et al. 2011). Most of the time the parties in conflict develop some strategies to deal with incompatible goals and interests. Reconciliation is one of these tools to prevent further conflict and a cycle of war (Brounéus, 2008).

For the last 40 years Afghanistan has been in an uninterrupted conflict. Afghan domestic stakeholders, regional countries, and international powers have all been involved in this conflict. For decades, the Soviet Union, Western counties, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran have all attempted to bring security and peace to Afghanistan. However, their attempts have had the opposite effect, creating new conflict, new antagonism, and new kinds of warfare.

The main goal of this thesis is to study the reasons for the failure of Afghanistan's reconciliation process between 2001 and 2014. The primary question of this thesis is why the reconciliation process introduced by the Karzai regime to make the Taliban put down their weapons and integrate them into the Afghan society failed between

---

[1] This form of conflict is characterized by longevity, intractability, violence and zero-sum nature.

[2] A civil war is a politically organized, large scale, sustained, and physically violent conflict that occurs within a country mainly among large groups of its residents or citizens over the monopoly of physical force within a country (Gersovitz, and Kriger, 2013: 160-161).

2001 and 2014. To analyze the reasons for this failure, this thesis going to study the role of Pakistan, the US, and Afghan domestic stakeholders in the failure of Afghan reconciliation during the stated period with the support of spoiler theory and qualitative research in the form of in-depth interviews. The main argument of this thesis that between 2001 and 2014, the reconciliation process in Afghanistan failed because of the mistaken policies of the United States towards the Taliban and the active spoiling of the Afghan reconciliation process by neighboring country Pakistan.

## 1.1. Historical Background

Afghanistan has been at war for more than forty years, beginning with the Soviet Union's invasion (1979-1989) and continuing with the civil war (1990-2001) and the US occupation (2001-present). In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in order to protect the communist regime of Kabul from falling into the hands of mujahedeen groups supported by the United States (US), the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and Pakistan. In the 1990s, a civil war emerged as a result of the power vacuum when the Soviet Union left the country and cut its financial and military support from the Kabul's communist regime. In 1992, the mujahedeen groups took control of Kabul and installed an Islamic regime, the Islamic State of Afghanistan. But with the intervention of the regional countries (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and India), the conflict intensified and more bloodshed occurred. In 1994, the Taliban emerged from the Afghan city Kandahar with a narrative of ending the ongoing conflict in the country and bring security to the Afghan people. In 1996, they took control of Kabul and installed their regime, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) recognized the Taliban regime in Kabul. The Taliban managed to bring security to the country but failed to bring peace. They banned girls from studying in public universities and from going out alone or without a veil, banned people from watching TV and using technology, and punished men who cut their beards. The Taliban regime in Kabul allied with Al-Qaeda, provided them safe haven, and isolated itself from the world.

In late 2001, in Afghanistan, the Taliban regime ended with the intervention of the US and allied forces in the name of "war on terror".[3] This marked the beginning of a new historical period in the country. On the one hand, the Afghan people became freer from the repressive regime of the Taliban and enjoyed a short period of relative peace and development in their country. For instance, between early 2002 and 2005, many different forms of economic, social, and political development took place in the country. Afghan girls began to go to schools, and foreign companies came to the country to invest. Afghan immigrants began to return to their homeland, and, most important, the country gained international respect and recognition. On the other hand, after 2002 the Taliban reemerged for the second time, but this time with different rhetoric and fighting tactics. While the Taliban's pre-2001 rhetoric was as that of a fight between two Afghan groups (the Taliban themselves and the Northern Alliances[4]) to install security and bring peace in the country, their post-2001 rhetoric was that of a war against "the foreign invaders" (the US and international community) and their local partners on the ground (Afghanistan government) (Semple, 2014: 7). The Taliban's new fighting tactics were totally unknown and unprecedented for the Afghan people. These were carrying out suicide bomb attacks in public places (mosques, shopping centers, city centers), pouring acid on school girls' faces in order to prevent them from going to school (Human Development Resource Center, 2012: 14), and cutting voters fingers in order to prevent them from participating in elections (Giustozzi, 2014: 9).

Hamid Karzai, the president of Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime, introduced various programs from the early period of his presidency in pursuit of making reconciliation and integrating the Taliban back to Afghan society. These included under-the-radar diplomacy, [5] High Profile diplomacy, [6] Disarmament,

---

[3] This is a term that is used to describe the US-led international counterterrorism campaign which was conducted in response to the 9/11 terrorist attack.

[4]  This was a coalition of different of Afghan ethnic and religious groups against the Taliban.

[5] The main point of under-the-radar diplomacy was to convince the significant insurgent figures to participate in open reconciliation. The Afghanistan Security Council (NSC) had the task of following this task due to its close relationship with the president, Hamid Karzai

[6] High Profile diplomacy is the most well-known face of the reconciliation carried out by Hamid Karzai. In this regard, the president's most notable initiatives could be included his

Demobilization, and Reintegration program (DDR),[7]*Prose-i Tahkim-e-Solh* (PTS) (the Strengthening Peace Program), [8] Declaratory Reconciliation by the Afghan Parliament, Regional Peace Jirga, and lastly, APRP (Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program). The last and most recent of these was developed based on the suggestion of about 1600 Afghan delegates in the Consultative Peace Jirga (CPJ) of June 2010. Between 2001 and 2014, however, the Taliban consistently rejected Karzai's call to make peace. The Taliban's leadership believed that Afghanistan had been invaded by the US and that Hamid Karzai was a "puppet leader" of "a puppet government" in Kabul (Rubin, 2012). The Taliban's main demand was a complete withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan or a set date for its withdrawal. Thus, the Taliban suggested talking with the US rather than the Karzai government. They viewed the peace talks with the Karzai regime as a waste of time and considered his regime as illegal.

## 1.2. Literature Review

In terms of literature, there is plenty of literature that discuss the issue of the Taliban in Afghanistan from a historical, organizational, and ideological point of view. For instance, Kamal, in his book titled *The Taliban Phenomenon in Afghanistan 1994-1995*, talks about the Taliban from a historical point of view. He defines them as a "messiah" which emerged in order to rescue the Afghan people from an anarchic situation that occurred as a result of the power struggle between Rabbani and Hekmatyar groups. Differently, some other scholars like Shahid A. Afsar focus on the organization structure of the Taliban. Afshar defines them as a group who fixed themselves on the system of tribalism, religion, and ethnicity. However, others emphasize the ideological dimension of conflict: these include Armajani in his book

---

January 2006 requests from Hikmetyar and Mullah Omar to return back to his country and to abandon insurgency.

[7] DDR, was implemented from 2003 to 2006 under the Afghanistan New Beginning Program (ANP) in order to make the lower level Taliban put down their arms, and the act of insurgency, and to enable the Karzai government to establish a monopoly over the use of force.

[8] PTS was headed by Sebghatullah Mujadidi, the first president of Afghanistan after the communist era. The National Commission for Peace was the main vehicle for formally endorsed reconciliation. The main aim of this commission was to guarantee that reconciled insurgents were living peacefully and accepting the constitution of the country.

titled, *Modern Islamist movements: History, religion, and politics,* published in 2011; Ahmed Rashid, the Pakistani journalist in his book, named as *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia,* published in 2000; and Nojumi, in his book, published in 2001, *the Rise of Taliban in Afghanistan.*

Beside these works, a significant number of reports about the reconciliation process of Afghanistan have been published by some research centers, such as the Regional Studies Center of Afghanistan (RSCA), Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), United States Institute of Peace (USIP), and Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). Regardless of the rich literature about the conflict in Afghanistan, there have been little efforts to conduct a comprehensive study of the reconciliation process in Afghanistan and its failure, especially during Karzai's period. The available studied focused on analyzing a particular peace program (e.g., Derksen, D. [2011]; Sajjad, T. [2010]), or the diversity of insurgent networks and how they grouped under the term of Taliban (e.g., Michael Semple). Some have attempted to design a comprehensive peace process for Afghanistan (ex, Schirch, L [2011]). In 2008, Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, the current spy chief of Afghanistan, falsely presented the conflict between the insurgent and the Karzai administration as being ripe for making reconciliation in his article titled, "Thwarting Afghanistan's Insurgency: A Pragmatic Approach Toward Peace and Reconciliation".

Graduate dissertations on the peace process in Afghanistan have also neglected the failure of reconciliation in Afghanistan between the years of 2001 and 2014. Most of the theses which were written about this topic discuss the intervention of the US and allied forces in Afghanistan and evaluate the intervention from the international law perspective. Therefore, it is crucial to make a comprehensive study about the failure of the process, to learn its main causes, and to contribute to the literature.

This thesis attempts to study the reasons for the failure of the reconciliation process in Afghanistan between the Taliban and the Karzai regime from a macro (regional and global) level perspective. The existing literature studies the root causes of the conflict and only a few elements the failures of the reconciliation process in the country (local

stakeholders, warlords, tribal leaders, etc.). In contrast, this thesis offers a holistic view of the root causes of the failures of the Afghanistan reconciliation process, using an in-depth interview qualitative research method with a list of more than dozen experts, public figures, and actors involved in this reconciliation process.

## 1.3.    Sources of the Research

Throughout this research, this thesis will make use of both primary and secondary sources. Interviews I conducted with approximately 13 significant people from different backgrounds will be the thesis's primary sources. The secondary sources will be reviews through library research, academic journals, and books regarding the questions of the failure of the reconciliations process during the Karzai period. The secondary sources also include reports from organizations like RSCA, USIP, AREU, PRIO, the website of the High Peace Council (HPC), and the content analysis of newspapers like 8 am (local newspaper), Tolonews (local news channel), the Guardian, the New York Times, etc.

## 1.4.    Methodology

The approach that this study will utilize is a qualitative research method. It is an authentic way of obtaining, organizing, and interpreting opinion, behavior, and publications. It is inductive in nature and works with non-numerical data in order to search meanings and insights in a given situation (Mohajan, 2018: 1-2). The focus of this research method is not only to describe and to define, but also to analyze; in other words, it does not only attempt to look at the what of the event, but it also looks at the why of the event. Moreover, in order to better understand the reconciliation process and the impact of external powers over this process, this research uses semi-structured interview method.

This thesis employs qualitative research method in the forms of semi-structured interviews with the support of snowball sampling methods. A semi-structured in-depth interview is qualitative research method in which a researcher can ask a series of closed and open ended question: often accompanied by follow-up *why* or *what* questions (Newcomer, et al., 2015: 493). Firstly, it provides opportunities for both

interviewee and interviewer to discuss the topic a researcher wants cover in more detail (Mathers, et al,. 1998: 2). Secondly, it helps to ensure the coverage of the researcher's agenda at the same time providing opportunities for interviewees to talk about what is important for them, in their own words (Hartas, 2015: 231). Finally, in semi-structured interview a researcher can prepare his/her questions a head of time, but also allowing for some flexibility in answering those questions or additional follow-up questions (Huss, 2008:29).

Because the reconciliation process in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014 involved both the Karzai administration and the Taliban, the list of interviewees had to include a balance of relevant players from different groups and parties. Therefore, I prepared a list of 13 people, including public figures, experts, government officials, members of the High Peace Council (HPC), the heads of political parties, members of parliament (MPs), members of the upper house, members of NGOs, academics, and former decision makers and high officials of the Taliban.

While selecting my interviewees, I used snowball sampling techniques. It is a non-probability qualitative sampling technique that is used for identifying and sampling the cases in a network. This sampling technique "begins with one or a few people or cases and spreads out on the basis of links to the initial cases" (Neuman & Robson, 2007: 149). The analogy is of a snowball growing in size as it rolled in the snow (Blaikie and Priest, 2019: 179). This sampling technique applicable when target characters are not easily accessible (Naderifar, 2017: 1).

## 1.5. Outline of the Thesis

This thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter, the introduction, has introduced the research question, a brief literature review, methodology, and the sources of the research. The second chapter will be the theoretical conceptualization part. This chapter makes an intensive literature review regarding the thesis topic. Subsequently, it draws a conceptual framework for the failures of Afghan reconciliation between 2001 and 2014 based on the existing debates. Chapter three of this thesis attempts to study the conflict and reconciliation efforts initiated by

previous regimes. These main reconciliation efforts are: the National Reconciliation Policies (NRP), which was started in 1986 by Dr. Najibullah's government and ended in 1992; Mahiper, Peshawar, and Islamabad accords, which were initiated by the Mujahideen regime; during the Taliban there were not any well-known peace efforts except some agreements between some small communities and the Taliban regime. Chapter four attempts to answer the main question and sub-question of this thesis based on my interviews with senior politicians who were involved in the conflict and peace efforts; academics and TV commentators related to this topic; MPs and NGO members; and religious, tribal, and community leaders. Chapter five, the final chapter, presents the conclusion of this thesis and links the significant segments of this thesis.

# CHAPTER 2

# THEORETICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION

## 2.1. Introduction

The present chapter of this thesis studies the concept of reconciliation and the underlying reasons for the failure of this process. This chapter consists of four main parts. The first part studies intractable conflict and explains why it requires a reconciliation process in order to solve it comprehensively. The second part conceptualizes the term reconciliation. In this section, first of all, it defines reconciliation as both a process and outcomes. Then, it attempts to differentiate it from other conflict resolution mechanisms. The third part of this chapter studies the main obstacles to successful reconciliation: societal beliefs of a positive self-image, societal beliefs of one's own victimization, and societal beliefs of delegitimizing one's rivals. The last part this chapter presents spoiler theory as the main theory of this thesis. It offers different definitions of spoiler from different scholars and studies the main motives of a spoiler for any reconciliation efforts.

## 2.2. Intractable Conflict and Reconciliation

Conflict is natural in all intergroup relations (Bar-Tal, 2010: 183). It takes place between two or more parties that have mutually irreconcilable and conflicting goals and lack a coordinating or mediating mechanism (Woodhouse, et al, 2015: 47). When society members determine and associate a certain situation as a conflict, they engage in cognitive activities for the aim of expanding their epistemic understanding of the conflict condition (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352). The society members try to explain the conflict condition and find responses to the questions as what caused the conflict to erupt, which party might be responsible for its eruption, what could be the intentions of rival party's members, and so on. This cognitive activity convinces the basic human motivation to see the world in a meaningful way, in that events, things, individuals or symbols come to be understood in an organized and systematic structure (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352). In 2010, Robin R. Vallacher argued that there were over 30 wars and violent conflicts waged around the world; about 40 percent of intrastate armed

conflict has lasted for ten years or more, and 25 percent of wars have lasted for more than 25 years, such as the case of Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Cyprus, and Israel-Palestine (Vallacher, et al., 2011: 263). Prolonged conflict, at least 25 years that is characterized by being total, irresolvable, violent, zero-sum, central, protracted, and materially and psychologically costly is classified as intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013: 230). Societies that experience this kind of conflict are required to develop a psychological infrastructure (Bar-Tal, et al, 2012: 41). This is formed of such elements "as devotion to the society and country, high motivation to contribute, persistence, readiness for personal sacrifice, unity, solidarity, determination, courage, and maintenance of society's objectives" (Bar-Tal, 2000: 353).

The establishment of such a psychological state requires an establishment of functional societal beliefs. This is defined as lasting beliefs shared by society members that address topics and issues with which members are especially concerned and which also contribute to their sense of uniqueness (Christie, 2011: 188). These beliefs build society member's view which contributes to the continuation of conflict (Bar-Tal, 1998:2). Societal beliefs are incorporated into the ethos and are reflected in the society members' language, myths, stereotypes, and collective memories (Bar-Tal, 1998: 9). An ethos is defined as the configuration of dominant societal beliefs that give dominant characterization to society and provides a particular meaning to societal life (Sharvit and Halperin, 2016: 115). Danial Bar-Tal suggests eight societal beliefs as a part of the conflictive ethos[9] of a society. These are social beliefs about the justness of one's own goal, societal beliefs about security stress, societal beliefs of positive self-image, societal beliefs of one's own victimization, societal beliefs of patriotism, societal beliefs of delegitimizing the opponents, societal beliefs of unity, and societal beliefs of peace (Bar-Tal, 2000: 354). These eight societal beliefs assist to shape the reality of societies that experience intractable conflict, and mass media, and leaders, and educational and political mechanisms plays significant role in explaining a conflict's causes, nature, and solution to society members (Bar-Tal, 2000: 354).

---

[9] A conflictive ethos enables society members effectively to adapt to the conflict condition, survive stressful periods, and deal successfully with rivals (Bar-Tal, 2000: 351).

Many intergroup conflicts in which society members are not involved, however, are tractable (Bar-Tal, 2000: 354). Societies find a way to eliminate the incompatibility, resolve the contradiction between their goals and those of their rivals, and ultimately establish a new state of perceived compatibility through the method of conflict resolution (Bar-Tal, 2000: 354). Conflict resolution refers to a process of peacemaking that "involves the development of a new relation, with an associated set of new attitudes alongside – or perhaps on top – of the old attitudes" (Kelman, 2010: 3). This means that even if a new relationship is built between conflicting parties, the old attitudes, including basic distrusts between the parties and negating each other, remain intact as new attitudes (Kelman, 2010: 2). In addition, conflict resolution mostly ends with an agreement that is negotiated between the representatives of two rivals groups. Hence, in the case of intractable conflict, it is only a necessary phase of peacemaking process. In intractable conflict the significant process is reconciliation via that the rival parties in conflict establish a new relationship of peaceful coexistence based on mutual trust, cooperation, acceptance and consideration of others (Bar-Tal, 2000: 355).

Yet, there is a great debate among the scholars about whether a reconciliation process should take place at the leadership and elite level or at the population or grassroots level. The scholars who highlight the role of leadership within a nation to bring an effective reconciliation argue that there is a link between a leadership's or government's willingness to accept their mistakes in the past, on the one hand, and other parties' willingness to do the same (Nordquist, 2007: 25). The reason for this is that armed conflicts are considered to a large extent the elites' projects, which are continued over time with the material and logistic backings of elites (Nordquist, 2007: 25). On the other hand, some scholars such as Nordquist argue the process of reconciliation to be a process which should take place at the population or grassroots level and claim that these groups are the ones who suffered most from ongoing conflict in a country. Thus, they argue, "it would be easier to integrate larger layers of population into a process where most, at least, feel involved or at least have access to the extent wanted" (Nordquist, 2007: 26). However, the aim of this research is not to indicate the success of one process over others. That is beyond the scope of this

research paper. Yet, in order to achieve an effective reconciliation process and coexistence in a society, the process should combine both top-down and bottom-up approach (Rosoux, 2015: 6). The reason for this is that reconciliation requires both the leadership's support, and the normal population's momentum, because without the leadership's support, the efforts made by some groups or individuals will not be enough to send a clear signal to the other party; on the other hand, without the population's support, official discourses and public ceremonies are sterile and vain (Rosoux, 2015: 13).

## 2.3. Conceptualizing the Term Reconciliation

Reconciliation evolved out of an acknowledgement that there is a necessity to go beyond the conventional focus of conflict resolution, to expand the study of peacemaking and peacebuilding to a macro-societal perspective that deals with the transformation of relations between societies that were engaged in intractable conflict into totally different peaceful and cooperative relations (Bar-Tal, 2013: 377). In recent years, it became apparent that even reaching a formal peace agreement falls far short of establishing a genuinely peaceful relationship between old rivals (Bar-Tal, and Bennink, 2004: 2). This is because the formal conflict resolution sometimes involves merely the leaders that negotiated the agreement or a small part of the society, and the larger part of the country may not indicate an interest to accept the negotiated terms; furthermore, even if they do, they may still keep the ideology that has caused the emergence of conflict (Bar-Tal, 2009: 365). Therefore, there is a likelihood the formal method of conflict resolution may collapse like the case of Anglo, or may turn into cold peace as in the context of Israel-Egyptian relations (Bar-tal & Bennik, 2004: 2-3). In contrast, a reconciliation process builds stable and lasting peace (Halperin and Sharvit, 2015: 111). The reason is, contrary to conflict resolution in which only leaders participate, a reconciliation process includes at least a major segment of society (Berliner and Kupermintz, 2014). Furthermore, it attempts to change the motivation, beliefs, goals, attitudes, and emotions of the larger part of the society members regarding the conflict, the nature of the relationship between the parties, and the parties themselves (Bar-tal & Bennik, 2004: 3). Eventually, these changes advocate and solidify a new pattern of intergroup

relations and serve as a secure and safe foundation for cooperative and friendly acts that symbolize these relations (Salomon and Cairns, 2011: 23). However, this does not mean that reconciliation comes into play only after an agreement has been made. It is, after all, a process as well as an outcome; ideally, it should be set into play from the beginning of a peace process as an integral part of it (Kelman, 2010:3).

### 2.3.1. Differentiating Reconciliation from other Conflict Resolution Tools

In *The book the Contemporary Conflict Resolution Reader*, Ethiopian Professor of Conflict Studies Hizkias Assefa defines the concept of reconciliation "as just one of a range of approaches to conflict", but says that compared to other types of conflict handling mechanisms like mediation and negotiation, reconciliation requires the highest participation of parties and the most proactive engagement (Woodhouse, et al., 2015: 236). However, compared to other conflict handling mechanisms, reconciliation is the least well understood. The meaning of it, its processes, and its applications have not yet been clearly explained or developed (Woodhouse, et al., 2015: 236). The figure below indicates the types of conflict handling mechanisms and the levels of mutual participation by parties in conflict in search of a solution to their problems.



Figure 2. 1. The Spectrum of Conflict Handling Mechanisms (Woodhouse, et al., 2015: 237).

The figure indicates that at the left of the spectrum, the level of mutual participation is minimal: only one party in the conflict attempts to find a solution to their problems by using force. But, further to the right of the spectrum, the adjudication mechanism is placed. In that, a third party, instead of a rival imposes a solution. In adjudication process, the parties in conflict will at least find a chance to present their case to be heard and to submit their arguments for why their selected solution should be the basis upon which the decision should be made. However, in this process, the decision which is taken by a third party, will be backed by a force in order to ensure that the losing party complies. To the right of adjudication in the figure is arbitration. In this process, both parties in the conflict can choose who is going to decide the issue under conflict. They can identify under which condition their case will be decided and whether the outcome will be binding or not. Therefore, the participation of parties in the decision-making process is higher than in adjudication. But, in this process, the decision is still taken by outsiders.

Based on the figure, to the right of the arbitration mechanism is the negotiation approach. In the negotiation process, the participation of all parties involved in the conflict is higher compared to arbitration to find a solution for their conflictive issues. In this process, the parties in conflict themselves formulate the issues and will search for satisfactory solutions to all of them. However, in the negotiation process, and particularly in bargaining types of negotiations, the final choice of the solution may depend on the relative power position of rivals rather than what might be the most satisfactory solution to all parties involved in the conflict. To the right side of the negotiation mechanism is mediation. It is a special kind of negotiation in which the parties in conflict search for a mutually satisfactory solution with the assist of a third party. In this process, the third party's role is to minimize obstacles to the negotiation process, including the one that emerges from the power imbalance between parties. At the far right of the spectrum is reconciliation. Here, the level of mutual participation of parties in conflict to search for a solution to their problem is high. They not only search for a solution but also work to change their relationships from resentment and hostility to friendship and harmony (Woodhouse, et al., 2015: 237).

In every intergroup conflict, however, reconciliation is not a necessary process, it is only applicable to those intergroup conflicts that are intractable and last for a long period of time (at least two decades), involve extensive violence conflicts,[10] and in which there is enormous hatred, animosity, and prejudice between the conflicting parties (Bar-Tal, 2000: 355). There could be different types of reconciliation. Some reconciliation process may take place within a society that is divided on an ideological issue, for instance, the case of Chile, Spain, or El Salvador; some may take place within a country on the bases of interreligious, interracial, or interethnic schisms, for example, in South Africa, Northern Ireland, or Turkey; and some may take place only between states, for instance, France and Germany, India, and Pakistan or Israel and Egypt (Bar-Tal, 2000: 355). Depending on the types of conflict, different social scientist have emphasized different aspects of reconciliation. For instance, in the case of conflict-ridden societies like Chile, Argentina, Honduras, and South Africa, the studies of reconciliation have emphasized the political process of democratization, and have proposed justice as a condition for reconciliation (Bar-Tal, 2000: 356). In a reconciliation process, particular attention is paid to the process of reconstructing the past (with its act of violation of human rights like discrimination, torture, killing, and injustice) for the aim of promoting social healing (Bar-Tal, 2000: 356). Studies of reconciliation on intersocietal conflict have proposed the elements of truth, mercy, justice, and peace; in contrast, the social scientists that study the reconciliation process between two states (Germany – Poland or Germany – France) have referred to their task as establishing peace by creating new economic, political, social and, cultural relationships between former rivals (Bar-Tal, 2000: 356). Overall, these studies of reconciliation recognize that reconciliation requires a psychological change; in other words, a transition to beliefs and attitudes that substantiate peaceful relations between the old rivals (Bar-Tal, 2000: 356).

---

[10] In extensive violence conflicts, people on each side (mostly civilians) get killed and wounded and became refugees, and properties are destroyed or damaged (Bar-Tal, 2000: 355).

### 2.3.2. Reconciliation in a Psychological Context

From a psychological perspective, reconciliation refers to a societal – cultural process that includes the majority of members of society, who form a new opinion about a former rival, about their own society, and about the relationship between the societies (Bar-Tal, 2000: 356). Reconciliation, from a psychological perspective has a special importance in the case of intractable intergroup conflict due to the need to alter the well-entrenched ethos of conflict – which provides systemic rationalization and psychological ground for the continuation of conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000: 357). Over this process, the perpetrators of the crime need a sincere and honest acknowledgement of the past, and readiness for apologizing for their wrongdoings and inflicted injuries (Sentama, 2009: 31; Ouellette, 2011: 317). The victims also should forgive them for their past injuries. Yet this forgiveness should not be in a diplomatic and conciliatory context; it should be in the context of healing and commitment, because only committed forgiveness liberates the psyche and the soul of victims from the need for personal revenge (Langholtz, 1998: 208). Thus, from a psychological perspective, reconciliation heals the traumas of both victims and perpetrators after civil violence and provides closure to bad relations (Galtun, 2003:1). Because, a psychological change is crucial for a reconciliation process and without this, a long-lasting relationship between the former adversaries will not be established (Matthews, 2011: 2013).

### 2.3.3. Reconciliation as Delivering Justice

Some scholars view the concept of reconciliation by being too soft; therefore, inappropriate on criminal conduct of offenders (Miall, 2015: 241). They emphasize on requirement to accompanying a reconciliation with the justice process since it is essential for making offenders accountable and re-establish a relation of equity and respect (Bloomfield et al, 2003: 14). For some, an "unjust peace" is "detrimental to postwar stability and reconciliation" (Lambourne, 2000: 5); and as Miall puts that, "there cannot be reconciliation without justice" (Miall, 2015: 241). Yet, there is an ongoing debate about its implementation stages, particularly in a society which have experienced horrendous and shocking conflict; such as, Rwanda, Chile, Cambodia, and Yugoslavia etc.  However, the core is not whether the justice is applied or not.

What is significant is the methodology that was followed during the reconciliation process and whether it will bring a livable, and psychologically healthy environment among the old antagonists. For this reason, the path that is used to arrive at justice in the reconciliation process is significantly different from which that is used to arrive at justice in juridical approach (Miall, 2015: 242). The main goal of the latter one is to identify a crime of a person thus to punish him/her; however, the former is known as "restorative justice" in which the aim is to bring the situation in a point where justice can be done, meanwhile the possibility of reconciliation increases (Miall, 2015: 242). In such context, reconciliation does not mean the offenders are pardoned, but he/she acknowledged the responsibility of its offenses, and thus motivated to alter the condition in a positive manner  Thereby, a reconciliation in the justice sense could change the relationship between former enemies from a destructive (hate) relationship to constructive (cooperative) relations (Miall, 2015: 242).

## 2.4. The Main Obstacles to Reconciliation

A society that has experienced an intractable conflict constructs at least eight societal beliefs that constitute the conflictive ethos (mentioned above). A reconciliation process needs to change these beliefs. Three of the elements of this ethos of conflicts are the main obstacles to reach a successful reconciliation: the belief in the justness of one's own goal, delegitimizing the rival, and positive self-image (Bar-Tal, 2000: 357).

The belief about the justness of one's own goal is one of the factors that society in an intractable conflict forms. It challenges a set of similar beliefs that an adversary has, and it works as one of the main obstacles to reaching a successful reconciliation between the parties in a conflict. Societies in intractable conflict form varies justifications and beliefs and construct myths, symbols, and rituals for the aim of serving their epistemic purpose (Bar-Tal, 2000: 357). Therefore, a reconciliation process, firstly, requires changes of societal beliefs about the past through learning about the adversary's collective memory and accepting one's own misdeeds and responsibility for the emergence and the continuation of a conflict (Halperin and Sharvit, 2015: 112). Secondly, it necessitates that the parties in conflict accept that

there are at least two (legitimate) narratives of the conflict (Bar-Tal and Salmon, 2006: 24). These changes in each group's belief about their goals removes the foundation of a conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000, 357) and helps them to take significant steps towards reaching a reconciliation (Bar-Tal, Cehajic-Clancy, 2014: 131). Thirdly, a reconciliation process needs new goals concerning the future (Bar-Tal, 2000: 357). But a society's new goals should not contradict those of former rivals; instead, they should encourage living in peaceful coexistence with the rival and establishing cooperative relations (Bar-Tal, 2000: 357). The reconciliation process between Germany and France after the Second World War, which evolved from violent conflict and competition to new goals that emphasized common interests and cooperation, are example of this.

The second element of the ethos of conflict that operates as an obstacle to a successful reconciliation process is delegitimizing the adversary group. Delegitimizing means the classification of a group or groups into very negative social categories that exclude it or them from the scope of a human category that acts within the limits of acceptable norms or values (Bar-Tal and Teichman, 2005: 67). A war-torn society that has experienced a long history of conflict requires changes of stereotypes about the adversary, as well as personalizing and legitimizing them. Legitimization allows members of the party in conflict to see the opponent group as belonging to the category of acceptable group and acting within the frame international norms; in turn, personalization allows members of the ingroup to view the adversary as human beings, individuals, and as human as members of the perceiving groups (Bar-Tal, 2000: 358). In terms of stereotypes, the change of opinion and beliefs regarding the rival group should lead to balanced stereotypes of it; the delegitimizing stereotypes should disappear, and the rival should be viewed as comprising several subgroup and not as a homogeneous and unitary group (Bar-Tal, 2000: 358).

The third element of the conflictive ethos that works as an obstacle to a successful reconciliation process is having a positive self-image about one's own group. A positive self-image refers to the ethnocentric tendency to relate positive characteristics, values, and behavior to one's own group (Bar-Tal, et al, 2017: 63). In

the context of intractable conflict, parties in conflict relate characteristics like heroism, courage and endurance about one's own group, while the rival is presented in sharp contrast, by providing clear differentiation between the two parties (Bar-Tal, 2010: 187). A reconciliation process requires the changes of this belief about one's own group, and instead, it should build a new societal belief that is characterized by being more objective about the ingroup and particularly about the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000: 358). The new belief requires both parties to recognize their misdeeds during the conflict and their role in the outbreak and the extension of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000: 358). For example, the Mutual Relations and their Future Development declaration that was signed between Czechoslovakia and Germany in 1997 had an implication for the self-image of each group because it explicitly recognized their past acts of injustice (Handl, 1997: 150-167).

Overall, however, the ethos of conflict represents a very complex, painful, and threatening process, one that presents many obstacles to reconciliation for various reasons.

Firstly, the ethos of conflict during intractable conflict becomes an ideological base for societies in conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000: 360). This provides one of the epistemic bases that offer membership in the society and maintain the ongoing conflict. For example, in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict (one of the salient examples of intractable conflict), for more than 70 years Palestinians and Israel have clashed over the right for self-determination and statehood. The Israelis, inspired by the Zionist ideology, believed in the return of Jews to Israel after 2000 years to establish a Jewish state (Bar-Tal, 1998: 17). This ideology offered the Jews with both the justification and the goals to occupy the Palestinian lands and claim statehood. Therefore, the groups in conflict consider the societal beliefs of the ethos of conflict as their credo, and thus any minor modification of beliefs threaten their raison d'etre (Bar-Tal, 2000: 360).

Secondly, during intractable conflict, the groups develop a sense of maximum differentiation between one's own group, which is perceived positively, and one's rival, which is delegitimized and labelled as rivals, murderers, terrorists, fascists, or

colonialists (Naveh, 2005: 6). Therefore, they perceive themselves as a victim and consider their own violence as a reaction to the harm caused by the rival (Bar-Tal, et al, 2009: 229). They develop about themselves and the ingroup the self-image of peace-loving group that has worked hard to end the bloody conflict against an evil, bloodthirsty, and vicious rival that, according to the first group, is unwilling to end violence and resolve the ongoing conflict peacefully (Naveh, 2005: 7). For example, in the case of the Israeli and Palestinian conflict, the delegitimization and differentiation of Arabs by the Israeli Jewish society serves as one of the main obstacles to launching and conducting a reconciliation. In 2008, a conducted study found that 77 percent of Jewish respondent considered Arabs and Palestinians as having little respect for human life and that 79 percent of Jewish respondent agreed with the statement that dishonesty always characterizes Arabs (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2010: 36). In such kinds of conflict, organized cultural, educational, social, and political institutions like literature books, movies, theatre, leaders, television programs, newspapers, and sometimes even academic research disseminate the conflictive ethos, help to maintain it without presenting alternatives (Bar-Tal, 2000: 360).

Thirdly, the ethos of conflict serves as an obstacle to reconciliation because intractable conflicts last at least one generation, which is about 25 years.  The new generation is socialized based on the conflict, getting the ethos of conflict with its beliefs, symbols, and myths; therefore, the changing of the mentality of these younger generations is difficult (Bar-Tal, 2000: 360). In transition of societal beliefs of the conflictive ethos, school curricula and textbooks play a significant role. For example, in Israel, the school books are based on the curriculum developed by the Ministry of Education and Culture, which outlines its didactic, academic, and societal objectives (Bar-Tal, 1998: 22). There, history textbook attempted to justify the Jewish people's claim on the land the Zionist ideology in the intractable conflict, at the same time by discrediting any Palestinians or Arabs claims, for the same reasons. The justification in the history textbook is based on the historical origins of Israelis in "the land of Israel" where they originated and lived for centuries and then were forcibly exiled; from thus, they consider it their right to regain and make this land their homeland (Bar-Tal, 1998: 23).

## 2.5. Changing the Ethos of Conflict into the Ethos of Peace

Where the conflictive ethos blocks, rejects and censors alternative beliefs, the reconciliation process demands the change of these beliefs. For such change to begin, proceed, and develop into an ethos of peace, there must be a societal climate of openness and motivation to search out and accept new information that gives alternative beliefs on the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000: 361). This process is not a formal process that can be fully taken under control, but according to Bar-Tal, it depends on the following seven factors. Firstly, a reconciliation process depends on a successful conflict resolution that has terminated the ongoing conflict formally and is presented in the agreement signed by both parties in the conflict. Bar-Tal identifies this as a determinative factor because without it, reconciliation cannot advance (Bar-Tal, 2000:361). Secondly, the rival parties in conflict should indicate an interest in changing the conflict relations into peaceful relations. This factor could be reflected through goodwill, symbolic acts of peace, reciprocal acts of concession, statements by leaders to indicate interests for peace, the appearance of an organization that contributes to the reconciliation process, or the initiation of cooperation in various areas like economic, cultural, political, and educational fields (Bar-Tal, 2000:361). The third factor that changes the ethos of conflict between two conflicting parties into the ethos of peace is external supportive situations like a peaceful international environment, pressure from international allies, or the rise of a new external common goal. Fourthly, reconciliation needs the building of extensive and intensive contributions from members of society with the aim of weakening groups opposing this process. Fifthly, reconciliation is based on the support of leaders in society. Because they serve as a model to many of their followers, their open support of reconciliation and promotion of it in deeds and words contribute to maintaining and mobilizing the support of ingroup members (Bar-Tal, 2000: 361). The sixth factor that contributes to advancing a reconciliation process is the mobilization of educational, societal, and cultural institutions in support of the reconciliation process. These institutions transfer the ethos of conflict into the ethos of peace and establish for the members of societies a new ethos of peace. The seventh factor that contributes to the success of a reconciliation process is the activities of various organizations. These

organizations should promote reconciliation among the members of the parties that are in conflict and should initiate joint acts with the members of former rivals.

## 2.6. Rethinking Reconciliation in the Context of Afghanistan

The globally applied defination of reconciliation that to pursue it only after fighting has stopped may also be relavent to Afghanistan's in-conflict reconciliation efforts, between 2001 and 2004 (Semple, 2001: 6). In 2001 Bonn Conference through which the new Afghan political system was established, for the aim of solving this intractable conflict in Afghanistan and create the foundation upon which a lasting peace would rest made reference to the idea of reconciliation (Semple, 2009: 1). The first paragraph of this conference reaffirmed the participants' determination to "end the tragic conflict in Afghanistan and promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights in the country" (Bonn Agreement, 2001, December). But, in 2003 Afghanistan faced a new round of conflict accompanied with the insurgency like suicide bombing and attacking public places. This escalated more sharply in 2005. For this reason, in the post-2005 period, the Karzai administration in Kabul under the name of reconciliation process introduced a series of peace building efforts like Strengthening Peace Process (2005) and Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (2010). The main aim of these peace building efforts were to make the Taliban stop fighting, to create a permanent peaceful relationship with them and to stabilize the deteriorating situations in Afghanistan (Semple, 2001: 2). Therefore, these peace building efforts of the Karzai administration became associated with the reconciliation process rather than a peace process.

## 2.7. Spoiler Theory

For Stedman, a senior research scholar at the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University, the greatest sources of threat to a peace process come from the spoiler of the process (Stedman, 1997: 5). For instance, in the 1990s, most of the negotiated peaces became deadlocked, prolonged, and failed due to these spoilers (Lee and Özerdem, 2015: 61), like in the case of Rwanda in 1994 and Anglo in 1992. There are several factors that a researcher may encounter when discussing the spoiler theory. The first problem is regarding the definition of the

theory: what is a spoiler exactly, and in which meanings it used by different scholars? The second factor is regarding the motivation of a spoiler of a peace process: what exactly motivates them to spoil the process, and which kind of strategies do they use in order to undermine a reconciliation or a negotiated peace process? The third is regarding the classification or categorization of spoilers; in other words, how many kinds of spoilers are there? All of these questions are going to be discussed in the following section.

**2.7.1 Definition of Spoiler and Strategies they Use to Spoil**

There is a vast amount of literature about the spoiler theory, and the definition of the term significantly differs from scholar to scholar. Spoiler theory is an approach originally coined by Stephen Stedman. He defined spoilers as leaders or parties that consider the peace that emerges from a negotiation a threat to their values, interests, and worldviews, and they use violence in order to undermine attempts to achieve it (Stedman, 1997: 5). But various scholars have criticized Stedman's definition of spoiler as too narrow (Greenhill and Major, 2007). For this reason, Stedman later changed his definition by arguing that a spoiler a party that has a willingness to use violence in order to spoil (not necessarily one that uses it) (Stedman, 2003). Therefore, Stedman argues that a spoiler can use both violent and non-violent strategies in order to undermine a negotiated reconciliation or peace process (Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs, 2011: 611).

Other scholars that have come up with their own definition of spoilers, like Edward Newman, offer a broader definition of the term. For Newman, spoilers are groups that actively attempt to hinder, delay, or undermine a process for various reasons through a variety of methods (Newman, and Richmond, 2006). Another scholar, Anthony Wanis-St. John, emphasizes the role of civil societies in order to indicate the role of citizens' participation in political decision makings while defining spoiler. For this reason, he defines civil society groups as a potential spoiler that may have a significant role in undermining a negotiation process (Paffenholz and John, 2006: 69). In general, the core idea behind all these different definitions is that the actions of spoilers work against the agreement of a peaceful settlement (Ostendorf and

Frerks, 2013: 4). Equally, it is also significant not to forget that in order to a spoiler to exist and to spoil a process, there should be an ongoing peace process (Stedman, 1997: 7) or at least one party that indicates a willingness to enter a negotiation process (Ostendorf and Frerks, 2013: 4).

## 2.7.2. Motivations of Spoiler of a Reconciliation

There are various factors that motivate spoilers to undermine and threaten a reconciliation process. Stedman states that fear is the main motive for the spoiler of any reconciliation process (Stedman, 1997: 9). Fear is defined as a primary emotion which includes aversive feelings, arises in the condition of threat and danger to the people and to their environment, and enables them to respond to threat and danger adaptively (Christie, 2012: 441). The perception of fear causes the continuation of conflict by hindering attempts to normatively process new ideas and proposals that could potentially contribute to the resolution of the conflict (Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011: 638). In addition, fear causes great mistrust and delegitimization of rivals and establishes unity, solidarity, and mobilization among the group members facing a threat (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2007: 175-176), as it is discussed in the previous sections. For this reason, a fearful society is inclined to choose to fight in response to threatening situations (Bar-Tal, 2001: 604) without trying new avenues of behavior that can break the cycle of violence ( Naveh, 2005: 5). These could be the fear of insecurity thus to seek for survival, ideological or religious beliefs or adversary, or economic interests of a spoiler, to mention a few of them that are related to this thesis.

The fear of losing economic interests is one of the reasons that motivate the spoilers of reconciliation to undermine the process. Stedman argued that there is a greater likelihood for a peace process to fail due to spoilers when there exist "valuable and easily marketable commodities such as gems or timbers" (Stedman, 2001: 2). The reason for this is that the parties in conflict consider the potential peace that is emerging out of a negotiation a threat to their economic interests (Lee and Özerdem, 2015: 61). These economic interests could be natural resources sequestrations (Ostendorf and Frerks, 2013:1), illegal income from conflict like selling weapons, income from taxing people, or support from to abroad the warring parties. For

instance, the Revolutionary United Front group in Sierra Leon (1991-2002) and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Angelo were reluctant to enter a negotiation process because of economic insecurity.

Ideological reasons are another factor that motivates spoilers to undermine a reconciliation process (Nehm, 2011). Ideology is defined as a structure of opinions, values, and behaviors – a way of thinking about individuals and society (Gerring, 1997: 958). Wilson states that although economic and political factors are the main motives for spoilers, emotional and religious factors are the resonance to these goals (Wilson, 2017). For instance, according to him, in most of cases where the intensity of the conflict is high, the weaker enemy can have the chance to flee or join a more powerful group. Many chose to do so, while many others chose to fight. Thus, one can argue that the motivation of spoiler is not only economic interests, they also have a broader goal like ideological motives (Wilson, 2017). The basic reasons for this, particularly for radical groups, are the concern that "they may lose the normative of their beliefs if they compromise with their adversary" (Lee and Özerdem, 2015: 61).

The third and most significant factor that motivates the spoiler of a reconciliation process is the perception of insecurity. The basic reason for parties to fight in a civil war are insecurity and the search for survival (National Research Council, 2000: 181), because they fear if they make peace and disarm themselves, the adversary will take the advantage and eliminate them (Stedman, 1997:9). Danial Bar-Tal states that about 85 percent of civil wars end in the victory of one faction over another, while the remaining 15 percent do not accept military force as a method for solving their problem and thus seek a solution via talking and discussing at the negotiation table (Elman and Goren, 2012: 8-9).

Stedman argues that neighboring states play a great role in the success or failure of a peace process (Stedman, 2001). He adds that civil war rarely takes place in stable regions, and he cites Peter Wallenstein and Margareta Sollenberg, arguing that nowadays "many civil wars intersect with regional conflicts and interstate competitions (Stedman, 2001: 11). There could be two main reasons for this. Firstly,

the spoilers to negotiated peace settlement are more confident and stronger when they can count on neighboring states to provide sanctuaries, guns, capital, and fuel (Stedman, 2001). Secondly, a peace process is most likely to be spoiled when neighboring states see their interest in the continuation of conflict in a particular country (Stedman, 2001: 11). This is because states are rational actors, and any decision they make is based on deep calculations (Mearsheimer, 2007: 74). For example, Mearsheimer argues that "states care deeply about the balance of power and compete among themselves either to gain power at the expense of others or at least to make sure they do not lose power" (Mearsheimer, 2007: 71). Here, power is defined as "material capabilities that a state controls", these could be both tangible like military assets, and latent, like a state's wealth and the size of its overall population (Mearsheimer, 2007: 72).

Spoilers of a reconciliation or peace process could be both "inside" and "outside" of the process and can be characterized as "limited", "greedy", or "total" spoilers according to their goals and determination to achieve these goals (Kastrati, 2014: 316). An inside spoiler of a peace process signs a peace agreement and indicates a willingness to implement the agreement (Stedman, 1997:8). Examples can be seen in Cambodia, where the Khmer Rouge attended the Paris Peace Accord, signed it, but refused to demobilize its fighters, instead choosing to boycott the election (Branigin, 1993); and in 1991 in Angola, where the Union for the Total Independence of Anglo (UNITA) signed the Bicesse but in 1992 returned to war when it lost on the election. On the other hand, outside spoilers are ones who are excluded from a peace process or who exclude themselves, and who use violence in order to undermine the process – the committing of genocide by the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution in Rwanda in order to prevent the implementation of the Arusha Accord (Stedman, 1997:8). Furthermore, inside and outside spoiler strategies differ the way they undermine a negotiated peace process. For instance, while inside spoilers are more inclined to use strategies of stealth, outside spoilers often employ strategies of violence (Stedman, 1997:8). The reason for this that the inside spoiler has signed the peace agreement for tactical reasons; it wants the process to continue as long it serves its interests, and thus it wants to keep its threat hidden; in contrast, outside

spoilers aims to undermine the process and thus use overt violence like assassination of moderates or "massacres that coincide with any progress in reaching a negotiated settlement" (Stedman, 1997:8-9).

As mentioned above, for Stedman since the great sources of risk to any peace process come from spoilers, it is important to understand their goals, commitments, and dimensions in order to successfully manage them (Stedman, 1997). Typologically, spoilers could be categorized as limited, greedy, and total. The "limited spoiler" has limited goals like "recognition and redress of a grievance, a share of power or the exercise of power constrained by a constitution and opposition, and basic security of follower", while on the other side of spectrum Stedman places the total spoiler, which he say see the world from an "all or nothing" perspective, refuses to change its goals, and seeks total power and exclusive recognition of its power and authority (Stedman, 1997: 10). Between these two is the "greedy spoiler," whose goals are context dependent and based on the calculation of risk and costs (Mac Ginty, 2016: 113). According to Stedman, there can be more than one spoiler in any peace or reconciliation process (Stedman, 1997).

To sum up, there are a various definitions of spoiler theory. Some offer narrower definitions like Stephen Stedman, and others a broader definition like Edward Newman. But the main idea behind these definitions is that a spoiler works against any agreement that does not serve its interests. These spoilers could have various motives like economic, ideological, and security concerns, to mention a few of them that are related to this thesis. They use different strategies like "strategies of stealth" or "strategies of violence" in order to achieve their goals. In order to manage spoilers, one must understand their position (inside spoiler or outside spoiler) and their types (limited spoiler, greedy spoiler, or total spoiler).

## 2.8. Conclusion

Taking everything into consideration, reconciliation is considered to be a significant process for a society that has experienced an intractable conflict. In intractable conflict, societies develop an ethos of conflict that provides systemic rationalization

and psychological bases for the continuation of the conflict. However, a reconciliation process transforms the societies' ethos of conflict into the ethos of peace. It changes their motivation and beliefs regarding conflict and establishes a new relationship based on mutual respect, trust, and cooperation.

In this thesis, eight societal beliefs, namely social beliefs about the justness of one's own goal, societal beliefs about security stress, societal beliefs of positive self-image, societal beliefs of one's own victimization, societal beliefs of patriotism, societal beliefs of delegitimizing the opponents, societal beliefs of unity and societal beliefs of peace were defined as a part of the conflictive ethos of a society. However, three of them, namely, societal beliefs of a positive self-image, societal beliefs of one's own victimization, and societal beliefs of delegitimizing the opponents, were considered as the main obstacle for reaching a successful reconciliation process. These beliefs block, reject, and censor alternative beliefs, and a reconciliation demands changes in these beliefs. Successful reconciliation require an open society in which alternative beliefs are not blocked.

The success of a reconciliation process depends on seven factors. The first determinative factor is a successful conflict resolution process in which the conflict is formally ended through an agreement between two conflicting parties. However, this does not mean that reconciliation is a post-conflict process; after all, it is a process as well as an outcome. Thus, a reconciliation process could be set into motion from the beginning of a conflict resolution process. Secondly, reconciliation depends on the willingness of parties in conflict to change their conflictive relations into peaceful relations. Thirdly, it depends on external supportive conditions like a peaceful international climate. Fourthly, it depends on the peaceful support of members of societies that are in conflict. Fifthly, it depends on the acts of leaders in conflicting societies, since they act as role models for their society. Sixthly, it depends on the mobilization of educational, societal, and cultural institutions in support of the reconciliation process. Finally, it depends on the promotive acts of various organizations that operate among the ingroup members.

This thesis used Stephen John Stedman's spoiler theory because of the multi-dimensional characteristics of Afghanistan's conflict and the domestic, regional and global dimensions of it. He defines the spoilers in a peace process as leaders and parties that consider the negotiated agreement a threat to their values, interests, and worldview and use both violent and non-violent strategies to reach their goals. The theory was discussed from different perspectives and three main motives were presented as the main reason for the spoiler of a reconciliation process: ideological differences between the competing parties, economic interest, and feeling a threat to their national security.

In the upcoming chapter, this thesis is going to study the history of conflict and the past examples of reconciliation efforts in Afghanistan. Firstly, it will analyze the role of global and regional powers in the conflict of Afghanistan since its formation as a modern state. Then it will study the reconciliation efforts that took place in the country between 1978 and 2001.

# CHAPTER 3

# HISTORY OF CONFLICT AND THE PAST EXAMPLES OF RECONCILIATION IN THE MODERN HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN

## 3.1. Introduction

This chapter of the thesis is firstly going to present brief information about the pre-modern history of Afghanistan. Secondly, it is going to discuss the history of the conflict in the country, the reason behind this phenomenon, and the actors that played a role in it. Thirdly this chapter will discuss the reconciliation efforts introduced in the country between 1978 and 2001. The main such efforts under the communist regime were the Geneva Accord and National Reconciliation Program (NRP), and those during the civil war (1990-2001) were the Peshawar accord, Islamabad Accord, Mahipar Accord, and Six Plus Two Contact groups.

## 3.2. Pre-Modern History of Afghanistan

Historically, Afghanistan was known as the land of empires, sciences, and arts. The signs of urban civilization in this territory go back to 545 BC (Ghobar, 2001). Zoroastrianism served as the main religion of people who lived in the region of today's Afghanistan around 1000 BC. (Emadi, 2005); Buddhism flourished under the Kushanis Empire between AD 40 and 230 (Ghobar, 2001; Hartmann, 2004). From the 8th to the 9th century, most of inhabitants of present-day Afghanistan and Pakistan were converted to Sunni Islam (Gladstone, 2001: 93). During the Ghaznavid (AD 998-1030) and Timurid empires, the cities of Ghazni, Herat, and Kabul became centers of knowledge and the arts. The famous poet, theologian, and Sufi mystic Mawlana Jalaluddin Mohammad Balkhi was born in Balkh and later travelled to Anatolia; the famous poet and politician Ali Şiir Navai was born, lived, and died in the city of Herat.

## 3.3. The Modern History of Afghanistan

Nowadays, Afghanistan is considered a traumatized nation (Torfeh, 2007) and has been in conflict and struggles for survival for over two centuries. This part of the thesis aims to analyze the main reasons and actors in the conflict of the modern

history of Afghanistan, which I divide into four periods: 1813 to 1947, 1947 to 1979, 1979 to 1989, and 1989 to 2001.

### 3.3.1. The First Period (1813 to 1947): The Great Game Rivalry and its Impact on Afghanistan

As a modern state of Afghanistan was established by Ahmad Khan Abdali (known as Ahmad Shah Baba) in 1747, after the death of Nadir Shah Afshar.[11] This date also marks the transfer of power from the Afsharid dynasty (Persians) to the Abdali or Durrani Dynasty (Pashtuns). After the death of Nadir Shah, the Pashtun tribes gathered in Kandahar and after nine days of discussion they choose Ahmad Khan as their leader (Miakhel, 2012: 8). According to tradition, a well-known dervish, or holy man, spoke in Ahmad Khan's favor and placed two sheaves of wheat[12] in his turban an act of crowning (Wahab, Youngerman, 2007: 69).



Figure 3.1. In 1747, Pir Sabir Shah, a sufi sheikh, crowned Ahmad Khan, of the Abdali tribe Badshah, king (Adamec, 2011: 9).

In the modern history of Afghanistan, the roots of the current conflict go back to the 19th century (Crainic, 2013: 22), when Great Britain and the Russian Empire fought

---

[11] Nadir Shah Afshar was the founder of Afshary dynasty and the Persian ruler from 1736 to 1747.
[12] The symbol of wheat can be seen on Afghanistan's flag.

for control, expansion, and influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia. This period is also known as the "Great Game" period. Over this period, Afghanistan became a "buffer zone" and a point of rivalry between the two superpowers of the time, Tsarist Russia and the Victorian British Empire (Olson, et al, 1994: 19). In this rivalry, while the main motivating factor for the British was to protect the British India from Russian aggression, Russia's motivation was to reach the warm waters to the South through Afghanistan (Eflein, 1992: 5-6).

In 1878, Sir John Tenniel (a well-known British political cartoonist) depicted the difficult position of the Afghan ruler, Emir Sheer Ali Khan between the British Empire and Tsarist Russia by drawing the below cartoon.

The photo indicates the difficult position of Emir Sheer Ali Khan between the British and the Russian Empire as each eyes the other with suspicion.



"SAVE ME FROM MY FRIENDS!"

Figure 3.2. Emir Sheer Ali Khan (in the middle) with "friends" the British Lion and the Russian Bear. (Sharif, A. [2017, December 07]).

Great Britain three times attempted to invade Afghanistan (between 1839 and 1842, between 1878 and 1880 and in 1919). The first invasion started in 1838. In this war, the British defeated the Afghan emir Dost Mohammad Khan and installed Shah Shuja as the new ruler of Kabul. But Shah Shuja's reign was short and disastrous for the British. The second war started in 1878. This time, Amir Abdul Rahman, who was able to maintain the balance the two superpower of time (the British and Russian Empire)

was installed as the ruler of Afghanistan in 1880. His reign survived for twenty-one years. Over this period, however both the British and the Russian Empire realized that neither of them were able to put troops in Afghanistan, thus they to draw the bordered around Afghanistan (Loyn, 2008: 125). In 1893, the British Empire instructed Sir Motimer Durand (a British diplomat) to meet Abdul Rahman Khan and to make an agreement. In this meeting, the main mission of Sir Motimer Durand was to delineate the border between British India and the Afghanistan Emirate (Micallef, 2015) in order to secure the control of strategic Khyber Pass. The resulting agreement firstly divided the Afghan territory into two part, leaving the west part under Abdul Rahman Khan's control and the east part under British control. Secondly, the border (Durand Line), as indicated in the map below, cut Afghanistan's historic access to the Arabian Sea by attaching Baluchistan province to British India. Thirdly, the British diplomat ensured that there would be a thin strip of Afghanistan running to the Chinese border in order to separate British India from the Russian Empire (Kulkarni, 2018: 17). Although the Great Game ended in 1907, the motivation of Great Britain to invade Afghanistan continued until the first part of the 20th century. Finally, in 1919, as result of the third Anglo-Afghan War, the Great Britain recognized the independence of Afghanistan.



Figure 3.2. The map of the disputed Durand line between Afghanistan and Pakistan (National Geographic Society).

The seeds of the current conflict in Afghanistan were planted in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when the country became a "buffer zone" between the two empires of the time, the British and Russia. When both empires realized that they could not put soldiers in Afghanistan, the British Empire drew the current border of Afghanistan with modern state Pakistan. Ever since, this border (Durand Line) issue has remained the central issue of Afghanistan's foreign policy and at the heart of Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan.

### 3.3.2. The Second Period (1947 to 1979): From the Formation of Pakistan to the Soviet Union's of Invasion of Afghanistan

In 1947, Pakistan got its independence from India. Ever since, the Durand Line (the controversial border) has remained a cause of great tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 1947, Afghanistan's delegate to the UN (United Nations), Hussein Aziz, was the only one to vote against Pakistan's admission to the organization. Indeed, the Afghan delegate was not against Pakistan's membership in the UN, but he vetoed its membership due to the North West Frontier of Pakistan (NWFP) (Setas, 2013: 3). Hussein Aziz argued that Afghanistan cannot recognize the NWFP as the territory of that country unless the people living there be given an opportunity to decide for themselves whether they want to be part of Afghanistan or Pakistan (Ranjan, 2013: 80). For Afghan rulers, the Pashtuns that live both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan are same and should be united under the government of Afghanistan (Setas, 2013: 4).

The birth of Pakistan as a nation-state changed the structure of the region. Immediately after its establishment, Pakistan attracted greater Western sympathy than other regional countries. In 1954, the US signed a mutual defense assistance agreement with Pakistan, and under this agreement Pakistan became able to benefit from US military and economic aid (Pandey, 2018:2). In contrast to this, the Soviet Union sided with Afghanistan and supported it in its dispute with Pakistan regarding the issue of the disputed border (De Reincour, 1982: 417-418). During the Cold War, although Afghanistan was a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries, regional and international rivalries resulted in the emergence of different groups in

the country. These groups consisted mostly of university students. While some of these students were supported by Western countries and Pakistan, others were supported by the Eastern Bloc (the Soviet Union).

In the late 1960s, Afghanistan witnessed increasing dissent as young Afghan people came to Kabul from other parts of the country to benefit from the city's expanding education opportunities, particularly at Kabul University. They found a system that was still highly elite. As a result of these, a radical movement found fertile ground among Kabul's student populations. The students who supported a faster process of reform received support from the Soviet Union and formed the first People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). They tried to penetrate the government system and army with the help of Soviet Union. On the other hand, the university students who were fiercely against faster changes and fought for the return of Islamic values became militant and received military training in Pakistani camps with economic and military support of the US and Pakistan.

On 17 July 1973, when the king of Afghanistan Muhammad Zahir Shah and his family were in Italy, the army commander General Mohammad Daoud Khan seized the power in Kabul through a coup d'état. He overthrew the monarchic regime and established the Republic of Afghanistan. Mohammad Daoud Khan became the first president of the country. But he had a pan-Pashtunist character. During his presidency, he strongly supported and sheltered the Pakistani Pashtun ethnicities, particularly the ones that lived in the Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA). In response, Pakistan sought a similar opportunity in order to balance Daoud Khan's act. Pakistan found the chance when Afghan university students (Ahmad Shah Massoud, Jalaluddin Haqqani, Yunus Khalis, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf, and Burhanuddin Rabbani) escaped Daoud Khan's regime in Kabul and fled to Pakistan. The Pakistan Army Special Service Group (SSG), a special operations force in the Pakistani Army, assisted the conservative Islamic Afghan students, taught them how to use simple infantry weapons and gave them specialized training in how to conduct guerrilla warfare (Khalil, 2017).

Domestically, Dauod Khan was known as a reformist, progressive, and modernist leader. He encouraged Afghan women to attend universities and to take part in building a modern and progressive Afghanistan. He favored a better relationship with pro-American regimes (e.g., the Shah of Iran). For this reason, the Soviet Union felt threatened by Daoud Khan's liberalizing policy toward women and pro-western approach (Synovitz, 2003). In April 1977, during his state visit to Moscow, Leonid Brezhnev[13] warned Daoud Khan about the increasing number of experts in the northern part of Afghanistan, who according to Brezhnev were NATO backed experts and US spies (Pazira, 2005: 70). For Daoud Khan, Brezhnev's statement was an absolute intervention in the domestic affairs of Afghanistan. Thus, Daoud Khan told Brezhnev, "We will never allow you to dictate to us how to run our country and whom to employ in Afghanistan. How and where we employ the foreign experts will remain the exclusive prerogative of the Afghan state. Afghanistan shall remain poor, if necessary, but free in its acts and decisions" (Maley, 2009: 23). This was the last time that Daoud Khan met the Russian leader. On 28 April 1978, Daoud Khan was killed with his entire family (his children, wife, brother and sister) by a communist revolutionary group (Saur Revolution), and the PDPA came to power.

### 3.3.3. The Third Period (1979 to 1989): The Cold War Rivalry and its Impact on Afghanistan

On 27 December 1979, Afghanistan experienced its second phase of devastating conflict when the Soviet Union invaded with approximately 120,000 soldiers equipped with modern weaponry (Sais, 2011: 22). In this conflict, on the one hand, the communist regime of Afghanistan, the Indian government, and Iran's revolutionary regime were supporting the invasion; on the other hand, the US, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia were supporting the mujahedin group against the invasion (Mirza, 2010: 287).

---

[13] He was the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1964 to 1982.

On 14 September 1979, Hafizullah Amin, a seemingly pro-Western leader of the PDPA, came to power by overthrowing Noor Muhammad Taraki.[14] Amin ruled the country only for three months. Unlike his predecessor he sought to develop friendly relations with the US and Pakistan. For this reason, and amid the claims that he was a CIA (Central Intelligence Agency of America) agent (Male, 1982: 188) who had committed "crimes against the state" (Phillips, 2007: 363), he was killed by the Soviet Union. On 1 January 1980, a pro- Moscow government led by the exiled former deputy prime minister Babrak Karmal was installed in Kabul. Karmal was eager to appear as a good Muslim. He attended mosques regularly and tried to convince some mullahs to declare that Communism and Islam were compatible (Schofield, 2010: 283). But his presidency ended in 1986 and the more moderate Dr. Najibullah Ahmadzai replaced him. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan because of three main reasons. Firstly, its decision makers wanted to protect the communist regime in Kabul which was on the edge of collapse in the face of Islamic resistance; secondly, they wanted a Soviet satellite Afghanistan that would be under virtual Soviet imperial rule with only the façade of independence; thirdly, they wanted to use Afghanistan as a base to project authority further south (Riedel, 2009).

By advocating Afghan resistance and embracing Afghan refugees, Pakistan was able to present itself as the defender of Islam against Soviet-sponsored communism in the world, block the revival of Afghan nationalism in the FATA region, receive US assistance for Pakistan's military and economic budget, and receive massive international aid in the name of Afghan refugees (Weinbaum, 1991: 77). During Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union, the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Durand Line, was no longer a point of dispute and a boundary between the two countries: it became the last line of defense against the Soviet communism (Schofield, 2010: 281). The ISI trained approximately 80,000 Afghan Mujahedeen in different training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan (RATH Saroj, 2016: 323). Furthermore, it gathered all the Islamic radical groups from all over the world in

---

[14] Noor Muhammad Taraki were the first communist president of Afghanistan. He came to power after the overthrowing Mohammad Daoud Khan's government by a coup. He ruled the country from 1978 to 1979.

Pakistan, trained the them in camps with the financial, military, and political support of the US and Saudi Arabia and then sent them to Afghanistan. The Islamic groups that called themselves "Mujahedeen " were considered "bandits" in the eyes the Soviet Union, but "freedom fighters" to everyone else (Schofield, 2010: 282).

To summarize, during the Cold War Afghanistan became a point of rivalry between the superpowers of time (the US and the Soviet Union) and their regional allies (Pakistan vs. India and Iran vs. Saudi Arabia). These rivalries of the superpowers of the time, the USSR invasion, and the intervention of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and India in the internal affairs of Afghanistan resulted in mass killings, mass immigration, and deep division within Afghan society.

### 3.3.4. The fourth period  (1989 – 2001): The Civil War Period

On 15 February 1989, although the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Afghanistan, it did not install security or bring peace to Afghanistan. On the contrary, due to the power vacuum, the country entered into a point of civil war. The inexperienced Afghan local leaders who fought against the Soviet Union this time began to fight over power among themselves (Williams, 2011: 176). There were three groups who were sharing the country over this period: the ethnically Pashtun Engineer Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the etnically Tajik Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, and the ethnically Uzbek general Abdul Rashid Dostum.

Islamist groups like Jamiat-i-Islami[15] (which later formed the Northern Alliance with other Islamic groups) began to receive weapons from their former enemies (Russia, Iran, and India) (Christia, 2012: 74). On the other side, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,[16] and later the Taliban, were getting military and economic support from Pakistan, Saudi

---

[15]  Hizbi Jamiat-i- Islami is an official political party in Afghanistan. It was founded by Burhanuddin Rabbani (the former president and the head of the High Peace Council) in 1967. It was one of the main resistance groups against the Soviet invasion. After 2001, it became the major ally of the US in its fight with the Taliban in the country.

[16] Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is a former warlord, former prime minister, and the head of the Hezb-e Islami party. He left Kabul in 1996, when Taliban took the control, and returned in 2017. He is famous mostly for his role in the country's bloody civil war after the Soviet Union's withdrawal.

Arabia, and the US. In the power struggle between Hekmatyar and Rabbani, approximately 50,000 Afghans were killed (Fatah, 2017: 21). The Afghan people lost their faith in Hekmatyar and Rabbani and corruption reached its highest point. Meanwhile, General Rashid Dostum was ruling six provinces as if he was the head of an autonomous region, unlike Rabbani and Hekmatyar. He had his own airline (Balkh Airlines), had his own currency, and often visited foreign lands and made agreements with them. Within his region, women moved about freely with or without veils as they pleased, cinemas were showing Indian movies, and Russian vodka and German beers were openly available (Matinuddin, 1999, 96-97). Dostum's own city, Sheberghan, was known as the "little Moscow" in Afghanistan, due to its secular and liberal life style. The people who escaped from the conflict between Rabbani and Hekmatyar sought shelter in Dostum's region. However, the problem with Dostum was his old identity, being a former communist. He started his political life as a communist and worked for the Soviet Union's intelligence service, the Soviet Union's committee for state security (KGB) (Riedel, 2016).

### 3.3.4.1 The Emergence of the Taliban

There are two main arguments about the emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. One analyses the Taliban's emergence from a domestic point of view, while the other does so from a regional and external point of view. According to the first view, the anarchic and chaotic environment in the country after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union encouraged the Taliban, a group of madrassa students, to stand up to establish the rule of law under Sharia in the country (Rath Saroj, 2016: 332). The immediate cause of the Taliban's rise was when the Herarti family, while on its way to Kandahar from Herat, was stopped at a checkpoint by local Mujahedeen group, whereupon the men and women were separated and the girls were raped (Matinuddin, 1999, 25-26). It was the Taliban's leader Mullah Muhammad Omar with thirty madrasa students (with only sixteen rifles) who freed the girls and hanged the governor from the barrel of a tank (Brahimi, 2010:3). Mullah Omar encouraged his students to take up arms and stand up against corruption, telling them that: it was not possible to pursue their education in such a chaotic and corrupt environment and that if they truly wanted to work for the religion of Allah, they had to fight (Van Linschoten, et al., 2018: 50). The

Taliban members claim this marked the beginning of their campaign in Afghanistan (Rath Saroj, 2016: 333).

The external and regional reason behind the rise of Taliban was Hekmatyar's to defend the national interest of Pakistan against Ahmad Shah Masood (the field commander of Rabbani) in Afghanistan. Although initially both Masood and Hekmatyar were supported by Pakistan, Masood was not happy with Pakistan and he was always criticizing Pakistan for providing more support to his rival (Hekmatyar) than to him. For this reason, Masood begun to flirt with India (Matinuddin, 1999, 125-126). This and the failure of Hekmatyar motivated Pakistan to withdraw much of its support of Hekmatyar redirecting it to the Taliban (Livermore, 2014: 7). In 1996, the Taliban, with the military, economic, and political support of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab countries, took control of Kabul. In 1998, the Taliban, defeated Rashid Dostum and subsequently Dostum went into exile in Turkey. Until 2001, the Taliban ruled most of Afghanistan. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia accepted the Taliban's regime as the official regime of Kabul (Matinuddin, 1999, 140).

The Taliban based their ideology on a radical way of understanding Islam. Between 1996 and 2001, the Taliban based their state formation on interpretation of the Islamic principle of Khalifat. They created the Ministry for Vice and Virtue ( امر بالمعروف و نهى عن المنكر – Amr-bil- maruf ve nahi anil munkar). For them, Mullah Mohammed Omar was amir-ul-muminin (commander of the believers), and hence the leader not only of Muslims in Afghanistan but also of all Muslims in the world (Nojumi, 2002, 153). During the Taliban's rule in Afghanistan, imams mentioned his name in Juma prayers. Most members of the Taliban were illiterate people from urban areas. They banned Afghan women from studying in public universities and men from shaving their beards, watching TVs, etc. They perused an anti- imperialist policy which helped them to cooperate and work with other terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and with other radical groups.

In short, after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, the war in Afghanistan was no longer a war in the name of Islam, unlike it had been between 1979 and 1989: it was

a fight for power and self-interest, a war of warlords and mullahs, and a projection of the rivalries between regional and international powers. Figure 3.3. below indicates the domestic Afghan players and their regional and international allies between 1992 and 2001.

Table 3.1. Afghan local actors and their regional and international partners between 1992 and 2001 (Najibullah, 2017: 55-56).

| Regional and Global actors | Afghan Local Actors |
|---|---|
| Pakistan | Hizbe-i-Islami (Led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar) - Sunni Mujahedeen group from the Pashtun ethnicity. |
| Pakistan & Saudi Arabia | Hizbe-i- Islami Khalis (led by Mawlawi Khalis) - a Sunni Mujahedeen group from the Pashtun ethnicity. |
| Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia | Jamiat-i-Islami (led by Burhanuddin Rabbani) – a more moderate Sunni Mujahedeen faction from the Tajik ethnic background (it was supported by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia until 1994). |
| Iran, Russia, India | 7 Mujahedeen factions based out of Peshawar. |
| Pakistan | Taliban - Sunni fundamentalist and from Pashtun ethnic background. |
| Saudi Arabia | Ittehad-e Islami bara-ye Azadi-ye Afghanistan - a mujahedeen faction that was led by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (Sunni and from the Pashtun background) |
| Pakistan and European countries[17]supported this group because of its affiliation with the king who lived in Rome. | Jabhayi Nijate Milli - a moderate Sunni faction from a Sufi sect called the Naqshbandi, formerly led by Sebghatullah Mojadeddi. |
| Pakistan and European countries[18] supported this group because of its affiliation with the king who lived in Rome. | Mahaze Islami – a pro-royalist mujahedeen group (Pashtun and Sufi), led by Pir Said Ahmad Gilani. |
| Turkey, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran | The Junbesh Party - led by Abdul Rashid Dostum (from the Uzbek ethnic background) |
| India, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan | Jabha-ye Muttahed-e Islami bara-ye Nejat-e Afghanistan - known as the Northern Alliance (NA), established in 1997 to fight against the Taliban. |
| Iran | Harakate Islami - a moderate Shiite mujahedeen group from the Tajik ethnic background. |
| Iran | Shura-ye I'tilaf-e Islami-ye Afghanistan - it was formed in 1989 from eight Shiite groups united under the council out of which Hizbe-Wahdate Islami was born (led by Abdulali Mazari from the Hazara ethnicity). |

---

[17] Members of NATO countries.
[18] Members of NATO countries.

### 3.4. Past Examples of Reconciliation in Afghanistan

Over the last four decades, there have been many efforts by different regimes to stop violence, bring stability, and make peace between adversaries. The most well-known of them, which will be discussed below, are the Geneva Accord, and the NRP National Reconciliation Program (NRP) during the communist regime; the Peshawar Accord and Islamabad Accord during the mujahedeen period; and the strengthening the peace (Prose-i Tahkim-i Solh) and Afghanistan Peace and Reconciliation Program (APRP)[19] during the Karzai regime.

### 3.4.1. Reconciliation Efforts between 1978 and 1992

Between 1978 and 1992, there were various small and large scale reconciliation initiatives in Afghanistan, such as Babrak Karmal's[20] ten-point reconciliation efforts, the Panjshir Valley Protocol between Ahmad Shah Massoud and the government, and the UN's Five-Point-Peace-Plan (5PPP) for Afghanistan. [21] However, the most significant and notable of them were former president Dr. Najibullah's [22] Nationational Reconciliation Program (which focused on the national level) and the Geneva Accord (which concentrated on the regional and global level).

### 3.4.1.1. National Reconciliation Program (NRP)

Dr. Najibullah (the last communist president of Afghanistan) replaced Babrak Karmal in 1986 on the order of Mikhail Gorbachev (the last leader of the Soviet Union). Gorbachev realized that the war in Afghanistan could not be won and hence planned a political "exit strategy" (Maass, 2006, 17). Another reason for pursuing this "exit strategy" was that the war in Afghanistan was not only between the Afghan resistance (Mujahideen) and the Moscow-backed communist regime of Kabul; rather,

---

[19] The APRP will be discussed in the findings chapter.

[20] Babrak Karmal was installed as the president of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979. He was forced to resign from the presidency in 1986 by the Soviet Union.

[21] Babrak Karmal introduced this program in order to liberalize the communist regime of Afghanistan rather than focusing on reconciling with the resistance (Najibullah, 2001: 9)

[22] Dr. Najibullah, who is from the Ahmadzai tribes of Afghanistan, was the president of the country from 1986 until 1992, when the Mujahiddin group took over Kabul.

it was a proxy war between the Soviet Union and the United States of America within the context of the Cold War (Maass, 2006, 17).

Gorbachev, in order to operationalize his plan, needed an active man like Dr. Najibullah would be able "to earn the support of the peasant masses for the state; to compromise with the opposition forces and to open discussion with the King" (Giustozzi, 1997: 154). Therefore, when Najibullah became the president of Afghanistan in 1986, he introduced the National Reconciliation Program in Loya Jirga (grand assembly) of 1987 (Najibullah, 2017: 94). The main aims of the program was as follows: to form an inclusive government by including a power-sharing agreement among the political parties, amnesty for some political prisoners, and a cease-fire between the mujahedeen group and the government (The Afghanistan Justice Project, 2005: 48); and to make constitutional changes, hold an elections, and advocate freedom of speech (Stewart, G. 2017). To operationalize this, Najibullah's government created 3370 reconciliation commissions over the country that were composed of 31 provincial commissions, 45 city commissions, 142 district commissions, and 3,151 commissions in rural areas and villages and stuffed by 30,000 volunteers, including members of the opposition who joined the government (Wafayezada, et al, 2017: 26).

Furthermore, Najibullah's regime was successful in establishing secret and semi-secret links with the Mujahideen groups via provincial intelligence directors (Tripathi, 2011:89). The regime's intelligence used local diplomacy effectively and signed protocols on behalf of the central government (Semple, 2009: 19). The protocol was regarded as a non-aggression pacts, according to which the mujahedeen commanders were allowed to retain their arms superficially, but in reality, they were abstaining from attacking government positions (Semple, 2009: 19). Through this reconciliation program, Najibullah's regime survived until 1992, although the Soviet Union withdrew from the country in 1989.

### 3.4.1.2. The Geneva Accord

The accord was signed between the representatives of the government of Afghanistan and Pakistan and with the guarantorship of the US and the Soviet Union on April 14, 1988 in order to end the violence and war in Afghanistan (Azam, 1993). This accord consisted of three bilateral agreements and an additional "Declaration on the international Guarantees" (Klass, 1988: 922). The accord came into force on May 15 that year with its provision specifying the beginning of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

In terms of global and regional significances, this accord was the first of the regional agreements between the government of Pakistan and Afghanistan based on the "Principle of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-Interference and Non-Interventions"; it bound the two states, Pakistan and Afghanistan, to abstain from a variety of specified activities that constituted interference in each other's affairs (Klass, 1988: 923). Globally, the significance of the accord was that it helped "to solve the external aspect of the conflict namely, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan" (Najibullah, 2017, 93).

However, the terms of the Geneva Accord remained highly controversial and unclear among the parties. For instance, it was not clear how quickly the Soviet Union should withdraw its troops from Afghanistan (Heymann, 2008: 32). Nor did it specify any procedures for enforcing, verifying, and even the monitoring the withdrawal of the Soviet troops (Klass, 1988: 924). Therefore, when in April 1988 Dr. Najibullah argued that "Soviet military advisers can stay in his country under the terms of a settlement signed in Geneva this month," the US responded that the Soviet Union "had committed itself under the Geneva accords to withdrawing from Afghanistan not only its estimated 115,000 troops but also its military advisers".[23]

---

[23] On April 30, 1988, the US's State Department spokesperson, Charles E. Redman objected to the presences of Soviet Adviser in Afghanistan. Source: The New York Times, (APRIL 30, 1988), website, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/30/world/us-disputes-afghan-on-soviet-adviser-issue.html

To sum up, the reconciliation efforts between 1978 and 1992 failed for two main reasons. Firstly, the Mujahedeen factions had little motivation to join the reconciliation, because they believed that Dr. Najibullah's regime would collapse after the Soviet Union's withdrawal and that the final victory would be waiting for them (Majidyar, 2014). For this reason, they were not satisfied with power-sharing with the government (Bew, et al. 2013: 16). Hence, the Mujahedeen group "did not consider it necessary to accept the peace settlements and form a joint, interim or coalition government with Dr. Najibullah" (Wafayezada, et al. 2017: 36).

The second reason was the lack of consensus among the various factions of Mujahedeen parties that were fighting against Najibullah's regime. There are thought to have been eight Tehran-based and seven Peshawar-based resistance Afghan groups between 1978 and 1992 (Guidère, 2017: 442). Each of these groups had a different agenda and was supported by different countries. For instance, while the seven Peshawar-based groups were supported by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the USA (Akbar, [Year of publication is not given]: 83-85), and the eight Tehran-based Shiite groups were supported by Iran.

### 3.4.2. Reconciliation Efforts between 1992 and 2001

Between 1992 and 2001, also called the civil war period, various peace agreements were signed among the warring parties and their regional partners in order to stop the civil war. The most important of them were the Peshawar Accord (April 1992), Islamabad Accord (March 1993), and Mahipar Accord (1995). However, these also resulted in failure, thereby creating the conditions for the Taliban to rise (Nojumi, 2016: 121).

### 3.4.2.1. Peshawar Accord

This power-sharing agreement was signed in Peshawar among the former Mujahedeen groups on 24 April 1992. This accord laid the basis of the Islamic state of Afghanistan (Clement, 2003: 203). The accord provided for a leadership council of 51 persons that was headed by Sebghatullah Mujadidi for a period of two months; later, it would be transferred to Burhanuddin Rabbani for four months (Adamec,

2010: 256). Based on this accord, the post of prime was created. This was reserved for Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and the post of defense ministry was offered to Ahmad Shah Massoud in return for recognition of Massoud's control of Kabul (Schofield, 2010: 332).

However, because of two main reasons, the Peshawar Accord also resulted in failure. Firstly, the designated time period for holding power for the president was strict and which would not be extended by even one day. For a country like Afghanistan, which had only just emerged from a war, the period of two months was very short. After Mujadidi, Rabbani took presidential office in June 1992 with an understanding that he would leave the office in December 1994. But once his term of presidency ended, he refused to step down from his post. Kabul subsequently was ruined by the shelling of other mujahedeen factions, especially Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

Secondly, mujahedeen groups' lack of experience in governing the country and the disagreement over power-sharing among them were the main obstacles to the success of the Peshawar Accord. Mujadidi, on his arrival in Kabul, was carrying a rocket in his plane which signaled the continuation of conflict and dissatisfaction among the different jihadi groups (Wafayezada, et al., 2017: 36). Furthermore, Hekmatyar, in a period of less than a week, refused the terms of the accord (Moslih, 2014); meanwhile, the Sunni Ittihad Party led by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and the Shiite Wahdat factions led by Abdul Ali Mazari began to fight with each other in west Kabul (Li, 1994: 22). All of these factors led to the Peshawar Accord's failure.

Keeping the above points in mind,  in order to stop fighting, enforce a cease-fire, and resolve the dispute among the different jihadi factions in Afghanistan, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan and King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia invited the warring Afghans to Islamabad. Later this process led to the Islamabad Accord.

### 3.4.2.2. Islamabad Accord
This accord was signed on 7 March 1993 in Islamabad among the different segments of the former jihadi parties with the pressure of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan in

order to find a political solution to the ongoing conflicts in the country (Gladstone, 2001: 200). According to this accord, Rabbani's presidency was extended for another eighteen months and the office of the premiership was returned to Hikmetyar. Under this accord, the troops of different jihadist parties were planned to merge into a national army (Dixon, et al. 2015: 577). The terms of the accord were also approved and signed by Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.

Unfortunately, the Islamabad Accord met the same fate as the Peshawar Accord due to the signatories' lack of cooperation and rejection of the terms of the accord. For instance, Hekmatyar, who was assigned as the prime minister, refused to cooperate with Rabbani (Taylor, et al, 2004: 422). He dismissed Ahmad Shah Massoud as the defense minister, but this change was rejected by Rabbani; hence, this disagreement resulted in attacks by Hekmatyar on Kabul, and Afghanistan once again slipped into a destructive civil war (Javaid and Fatima, 2013: 82). Apart from Hekmatyar, two days after the signing of the accord the Wahdat Party began to fire rockets at government areas due to disputes over the selection of the cabinet members (Peter, and Blood, 2001: 103). The ongoing insecurity constant failures of peace accords in the country contributed to the rise of Taliban (Semple, 2009: 21).

### 3.4.2.3. Mahipar Accord

This agreement was signed between the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's party during the rise of Taliban, in May 1996. The Taliban, which emerged after 1992, reached the gates of Kabul in February 1995. In September of that year they captured Herat province from Ismail Khan (the governor of Rabbani). The Mahiper agreement was signed in order to bring the two different parties (Rabbani and Hekmatyar) together against their common enemy, the Taliban movement (Marsden, 2016).

However, this agreement did not bring any advantages to Rabbani, because many of Hekmatyar's local commanders joined the Taliban "both out of ideological sympathy and for reasons of tribal solidarity" (Roy and Sfeir, 2007: 133). Furthermore, the camps that were used by Hekmatyar's party in order to train non-Afghan fighters

were taken over by the Taliban and handed over to Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) groups like the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (Rashid, 2010). Finally, in September 1996, the Taliban took control of Kabul; this led to the withdrawal of Rabbani's force north of Kabul to the Panjsher Valley, (Katzman, 2010: 5), and Hekmatyar's escape to Iran (Shephard, 2008).

### 3.4.2.4. The Six plus Two Contact Group Talks in Tashkent during the Taliban Regime

During the Taliban regime, there were no major reconciliation efforts. There were some successful attempts to bring security to the country, but these failed to make peace with other warring parties. Between 1996 and 2001, the most important initiatives were the Six plus Two Contact Group Talks in Tashkent. The "six" countries were the countries bordering Afghanistan; namely, Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and China; and then the "plus two" were Russia and the USA. In late July, the group held a peace talk in Tashkent in order to indicate their commitment to resolve the ongoing Afghan conflict through "peaceful political negotiations" and declared "not to provide military support to any Afghan party to prevent the use of our territories for such purpose" (Allison, et al. 2004: 225). However, this declaration did not bring any positive result. Almost immediately after the declaration, the Taliban and Rabbani's United Front resumed fighting. As the Taliban pushed Rabbani's party to the north, the Taliban "forced the civilians to flee from their home and set fire to houses and crops, and they destroyed the irrigation canals and wells" in order to prevent the residents from returning home (Mukarji, 2003: 7).

### 3.5. Conclusion

Taking everything into conclusion, since the coup of 27 April 1978 Afghanistan has experienced a vicious cycle of repeating war, bloodshed, mass killings, mass migrations, and enormous infrastructural and financial damages. This section of the thesis studied the history of conflict (the Great Game period, the Cold War period, and Civil War period) in Afghanistan, the reasons it emerged, and the actors that played a role in it. Furthermore, this part of the thesis also studied the reconciliation processes that were introduced between 1978 and 2001. These efforts were

categorized into two main phases. The first phase is between 1978 and 1992. The second phase is between 1992 and 2001. Overall, the first phase of the reconciliation process was more inclusive compared to the second phase. The PDPA-era reconciliation program of (the first phase) had the characteristics of solving both regional-level problem (the Geneva Accord), and the national level problem (the NRPA), while the period between 1992 and 2001 (the civil war period) had the characteristics of sequences of top-level unsuccessful initiatives.

**CHAPTER 4**

**FAILURE OF AFGHANISTAN'S RECONCILIATION PROCESS WITH THE TALIBAN,**

**BETWEEN 2001 AND 2014**

## 4.1. Introduction

Since 1978, Afghanistan has been in constant conflict and this has caused extensive bloodshed and suffering. This conflict has had all the characteristics of being intractability. This was protracted (lasting at least one generation), violent (causing hundreds of casualties), total (fight over basic goals like ideology and identity), in order to deal with - and win the conflict, there has been enormous psychological and material investments by the parties in the conflict. Both in human and material terms, the conflict in Afghanistan has inflicted on Afghan society threat, pain, stress and enormous exhaustion. Therefore, they had psychologically adapted themselves to live with these harsh and violent conditions. In such conflict, reconciliation is considered to be a significant process because through that the rival parties in conflict establish a new relationship of peaceful coexistence based on mutual trust, cooperation, acceptance and consideration of others (Bar-Tal, 2000: 355). In the context of Afghanistan under the name of reconciliation the issues of making peace with the Afghan Taliban became the top priority in the domestic policies of the Karzai administration between 2001 and 2014. Various serious efforts were made and two main initiatives were taken by the Karzai administration in order to integrate the Afghan Taliban back to the Afghan society and make them abandon their weapons. The most significant and well-known of these efforts are the Strengthening Peace Process (2005-2009) and the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (2010-present).

The present chapter of this thesis attempts to explain the causes of the failure of the reconciliation process in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014. This chapter of the thesis argues that the reconciliation process in Afghanistan failed due to the active spoiling of neighboring Pakistan and the mistaken policy of the US (not inviting the Afghan Taliban to the first Bonn Process, not being able to co-opt the former Taliban

members into the new political system, and not having a concrete policy against Pakistan) in the country between 2001 and 2014. This study attempts to present its argument through the use of qualitative research in the form of in-depth interviews. In order to obtain useful and valid results to its research question (why the reconciliation process failed in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014), I have conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with thirteen people. They consist of experts or people that were involved with the peace talks, including the deputy chairperson of the High Peace Council, the Taliban regime's former representative to the United Nations (UN), its ambassador to Saudi Arabia, the current deputy minister of Justice in Ashraf Ghani's administration, the second deputy of the Upper House (Moshrano Jirga), the leaders of political parties, scholars, members of parliament and senior government officials.

In Afghanistan, between 2001 and 2014, there was no shortage of spoilers (either internal or external) for any of the reconciliation efforts initiated in the country. Over this period, the level of spoiler's behavior have changed from "limited" (with limited goals like the recognition of grievances or sharing of power) to "greedy" (with goals based on the calculation of risk and cost) and "total spoilers" (with uncompromising goals in the form of "all or nothing") (Stedman, 1997: 11). The limited outside spoilers were those that considered their national interests as mostly in convergence with Afghanistan's national objectives, but with some differences. These differences could become problematic concerning finding common ground and at the bilateral level. The greedy spoilers were those which considered their national interests merely having from moderate to weak in convergence with Afghanistan's national goal's and which most of the time they opposed Afghanistan's national goals. The total spoilers were the ones whose national interests were totally against Kabul's national goals; in other words, their goals were not compromised or accommodated. Between 2001 and 2014, the twelve interviewees out of thirteen that is almost the entire set argued that Pakistan played the role of spoiler in the Afghanistan's reconciliation process in various levels. For example, while it was considered to be a limited spoiler (e.g. offered sanctuaries for defeated Taliban in Pakistan) between 2001 and 2005 in the reconciliation process of Afghanistan; thereafter, between 2005 and 2014, it became

a greedy or even total spoiler (e.g. Pakistan assassinated or imprisoned the Taliban members that indicated an openness to the reconciliation process) for any reconciliation process initiated in Afghanistan. The goal of Pakistan was to secure its national interests in the region. These interests included preventing Indian Influence in Afghanistan, securing a safe passage to Central Asia, and solving the border and water issue with Afghanistan. The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and its military leaders thought that they could accomplish these goals only by having a weak client regime in Kabul, as it had between 1996 and 2001 (the Taliban regime). With regards to the US, the majority of the interviewees stated that although it was the main supporter of the Kabul regime against terrorism, its mistaken policies (mentioned above) towards the Taliban gave birth to the conspiracy theory among the Afghans that it wanted to prolong the conflict in the country in order to benefit from Afghanistan's natural resources and to use its strategic location against its rivals, such as China, Russia, and Iran. Regarding the domestic stakeholders, most of the interviewees believed that there was a consensus among Afghan stakeholders on the need to make peace with the Afghan Taliban and bring security in the country.

This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section offers brief information about the concept of reconciliation related to Afghanistan and the Karzai administration's reconciliation efforts. The second and third section discuss the possible internal reasons for and the role of the US in the failure of Afghanistan's reconciliation process and explain why these were not the main reason for its failure. The fourth and last section discusses the role of Pakistan in the failure of Afghanistan's reconciliation process.

## 4.2. Conflict and Reconciliation Efforts in Afghanistan (2001 - 2014)

The main historical developments between 2001 and 2014 could be categorized into two periods. The first period is between 2001 and 2004, where the US and other international forces defeated the Taliban but considered no need to initiate any kind of official reconciliation process with this group in order to win them back to the Afghan society. Over this period, Pakistan played the role of "limited" and "greedy" spoiler in Hamid Karzai's reconciliation efforts. For instance, Pakistan allowed the

defeated rank-and-file Taliban fighters to freely live in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region, while allowing most senior Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders, like Mullah Muhammad Omar Osama Bin Laden, to live in the big cities of Pakistan like Peshawar and Quetta, where the US could not bomb or capture them. Then, in 2003, once the US invaded Iraq, Pakistan encouraged the Taliban to return back to Afghanistan by providing financial, military, and political support.



Figure 4.1. Map of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Khan, et al., 2016).

The second period is between 2005 and 2014, where Karzai administration took some significant and serious initiatives. For instance, in 2005 his administration introduced Strengthening Peace, known as the Prose-i Tahki-i Solh (PTS); in 2008 his delegates met Taliban representatives in Mecca during Ramadan; in 2010 he introduced the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program, known as APRP (پروسه صلح); and in 2011 he supported the opening of the Taliban's Office in Qatar. In addition, President Barack Obama, who came to power in 2009, unlike his predecessor, George W. Bush, welcomed the reconciliation efforts of the Karzai administration during his presidential term. But Pakistan was the one which acted as a "greedy" and even sometimes "total spoiler" for any of the reconciliation efforts the Kabul regime initiated to end the conflict in Afghanistan and bring peace to their community.

In December 2001, the United Nations envoy to Afghanistan, Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, and the US ambassador and envoy to the Afghan Opposition, James Dobbins, gathered a diverse group of international diplomats and Afghan leaders at the Hotel Petersburg in Bonn, Germany (Fields & Ahmed, 2011: 5). This process led to the Bonn Agreement, which made the first reference to the concept of reconciliation regarding Afghanistan. The Bonn Agreement's first paragraph underlines the determination of participants "to end the tragic conflict in Afghanistan and promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights in the country". In this context, the reconciliation process of Afghanistan aimed to establish the foundation on which a lasting peace would rest (Semple, 2009:1). Thus, in this conference, reference to the idea of reconciliation was made in the post-conflict (conventional) sense. It had a connotation that the fighting has stopped (because the Taliban was defeated) and therefore that the Afghan people would achieve concrete peace and prevent possible conflicts in the future.

On the other hand, Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov argues that despite the fact the success of reconciliation is never assured, it depends on the peaceful resolution of conflict (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 35). He argues that the resolution of the conflict should be satisfactory for both parties, and they should consider that the resolution has fulfilled their fundamental needs and addressed their basic aspirations (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 35). In the context of Afghanistan's reconciliation process, the Taliban was not invited to the 2001 Bonn Conference, although they had ruled the country for five years. This is considered one of the biggest mistakes made by the organizer of the program and the US, both domestically and internationally (Brahimi, 2008).

In 2003, the defeated Taliban, which was mostly living in the FATA region (figure 4.1.**)** and in the big cities of Pakistan like Peshawar and Quetta, began to return to Afghanistan. First, they emerged in the rural southern regions of Afghanistan on the border with Pakistan. Then, they began to attack US bases, government buildings, and public places. This led to an increase in civilian casualties and territorial losses. In 2004, they made suicide bombing an integral part of their fighting strategy (Fair, 2007: 10), targeting mostly civilians. While between 2001 and 2004 there was an

average of one suicide attack in Afghanistan per year, in 2005 it increased to 25 attacks, and more than a hundred per year thereafter (Semple, 2014: 12). The figure below indicates the number of civilian injuries in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014.



Figure 4.2. Number of civilian death and injuries in Afghanistan between 2009 and 2014.[24]

In the post-2004 period, an escalation in the conflict accompanied the insurgency, and the increase in civilian casualties and the revived interest among Afghans in reconciliation warranted the rethinking of the concept of reconciliation and how to operationalize it in the country (Semple, 2009:2). Unlike during the Bonn conference, in the post-2004 years, the concept of reconciliation was used both to stop the fighting in the ongoing conflict and also to create a permanent peaceful relationship that could stabilize the deteriorating situation in the country (Semple, 2009:2). In other words, the concept of reconciliation was used just as one of a range of conflict-handling mechanisms. However, unlike other conflict handling-mechanisms like adjudication, arbitration, negotiation, and mediation, etc., reconciliation is based on

---

[24] This data was extracted from UNAMA's website: Afghanistan: 10,000 civilian casualties in 2017 - UN report suicide attacks and IEDS caused high number of deaths and injuries. (2018, February 15). Available at: https://unama.unmissions.org/afghanistan-10000-civilian-casualties-2017-un-report-suicide-attacks-and-ieds-caused-high-number.

the internal and voluntary initiatives of the parties in conflict to acknowledge their responsibility and guilt (Woodhouse, et al., 2015: 240).

In early 2005, Hamid Karzai established the PTS in order to prevent further conflict, to stop civilian casualties, and to make peace with the Taliban. He selected Hazrat Sibghatullah Mojaddedi as the chairman of this commission. Mr. Mojaddedi, in the May of 2005, stated that amnesty would be offered to all members of the Taliban regime—including its spiritual leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar (Border Immigration Agency, 2007: 70). However, the U.S. military rejected this proposal by arguing that "those guilty of terrorism or other serious crimes would not be allowed to join the amnesty" (Brumberg and Shehata, 2009: 459). For this reason, this program was established only to attract file and rank insurgents, and by October 2006, 2,600 supposed fighters had been given certification letters under this program, but most had not been active since 2001 and were predominantly refugees trying to return to Afghanistan (Waldman, 2014: 6).

On December 12, 2005, based on the findings of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), Hamid Karzai adopted an Action Plan on Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation in order to address past human rights violation. It concentrated on five broad categories: remembering the suffering of the victims, institutional reform and vetting, truth-seeking, reconciliation, and criminal accountability. However, his action plan was criticized for being focused mostly on the past rather than on how to end the ongoing violence in the country (Brumberg and Shehata, 2009: 459). Furthermore, almost three years later, none of his five points had been implemented. Then, in the early months of 2007, the Lower House of the Afghanistan National Assembly approved a controversial draft amnesty bill which would offer amnesty to war criminals of the past three decades (from 1979 to 2001) (Synovitz, 2007). At the same time, by 2007, the Taliban already felt "strong enough to talk" with the US; thus they established a commission led by Agha Jan Mutasim and sent him to Saudi Arabia in order to seek dialogue with Washington, but the talk resulted in failure when the Taliban did not accept the preconditions (Rubin, 2018).

In a nutshell, from 2006 to 2008, in the country, "the security situation deteriorated – a number of districts were lost to Taliban control, violence escalated and the insurgency spread across Afghanistan" (Waldman, 2014: 7). In 2008, "almost 50 percent of Afghanistan was effectively a 'no-go area' for the international aid community and the UN, and in the early period of 2009, various reports indicated that over 60 percent of the country was no longer safely accessible" (Masadykov et al., 2010: 2). Having said this, in order to answer some of the criticisms of the previously introduced programs (PTS, Action Plan on Peace, Justice and Reconciliation in Afghanistan, etc.), and to provide some incentives for the Taliban in order to attract them to Afghan society, in 2010 Karzai introduced the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP).

## 4.3. Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program

In Afghanistan's context, since 2010, the reconciliation process is closely associated with the APRP. It is the main and the last effort in this chain Karzai's administration introduced and was backed both nationally and internationally. First, Karzai announced this plan on 28 January in London at a conference, where he received the economic and political support of his main international allies, the US, Germany, Japan, etc. But, in order to have the backing of national leaders, he presented it in June 2010, in Kabul, after the gathering of the National Consultative Peace Jirga (NCPJ). The NCPJ that was held in the capital of Afghanistan, Kabul, in June 2010 was attended by 1600 delegates from all over the country. These were scholars, member of civil societies, tribal leaders, members of parliaments, religious leaders, businessman, and members of the judiciary etc. At the end of the NCPJ, a resolution of 16 articles was adopted. This Jirga's resolution gave the president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, a mandate to pursue peace; on 29 June 2010, Karzai issued a decree that detailed the APRP's structure and the directions of its implementation.

Karzai's administration had three main motivations for initiating the reconciliation process of 2010. Firstly, it was based on the assumptions that the insurgents namely, the Afghan Taliban would renounce violence and terroristic acts due to the opportunities provided for them like protection, security, freedom of movement, and

the negotiation of forgiveness (*afwa*) between all parties. Secondly, it was introduced in order to establish a peaceful relationship between the government and the insurgent groups through building trust and confidence. Thirdly, the APRP aimed to answer some of the criticism of the previously introduced and not highly successful projects such as Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration program (DDR ), which were implemented from 2003 to 2006 under the Afghanistan New Beginning Program (ANBP), and from 2005 under the Prosei Tahkim e-solh (PTS, or "Strengthening Peace" in Dari).

With regard to the structure of the APRP, the president of the country, Hamid Karzai, was the highest decision-maker and the executive power. In order to implement the reconciliation process successfully and get clear and comprehensive results, the president was pursuing this process through two channels: the independent directorate of local governance, and the High Peace Council (HPC). The independent directorate of local governance was established in order to fulfill four main tasks: to enhance government and attain stability at a substantial level, to work closely with provincial and district governments, to ensure the compliance with the APRP guidelines at the provincial level, and to participate in the Joint Secretariat-led monitoring and evaluation mission. Under this directorate, the provincial governors were working with two more institutions: the district governors and the the provincial peace committee. With regards to Afghanistan's reconciliation process, the provincial governors are tasked to fulfill three main jobs: to appoint provincial peace committee members, to work as an interlocutor with national level actors who are assigned to implement the APRP, and to supervise the provincial peace and the reintegration activities. The provincial peace committee is an intersecting committee between the independent directorate of local governance and the HPC.

The HPC was the main institution that advise the president of the country about his policy with regards to pursuing the reconciliation process. However, its main task is not to make peace but to be a mediator between the insurgents and the government. The HPC has four main branches: an executive branch, a joint secretariat, a general assembly, and a working committee. The members of HPC are appointed by the

president of the country. They consist of former insurgents, tribal leaders, religious leaders (ulema), parliamentarians, scholars, civil society, and the former heads of armed groups.

At its first establishment, the general assembly consisted of 70 members, the working committee was 6 people, and the executive branch was 14 people. However, later some substantial changes occurred about the structure of this organization in order to get the best result out of this process. For example, the members in the general assembly reduced to 64 from 70, members of the working committee were reduced to 5 from 6, and the number of people in the executive branch was increased by 10 members to 24. The main task of the joint secretariat of the HPC's is to execute all the elements of APRP, works closely with the Provincial Joint Secretariat Team, and the line ministries. The former one is responsible for the administration of the program at the provincial level, while the latter supports APRP activities at the local and provincial levels.

The introduction of the APRP and the opening of the Taliban's office in Doha (Qatar) were considered the most significant step towards reaching a reconciliation between the Karzai administration and the Taliban insurgents. Between 2001 and 2014, there were some formal and informal meetings between the Karzai administration and the Taliban, like the meetings in Paris, Maldives, or in Saudi Arabia (in 2008), but the opening of the Qatar office is significant because it provided the Afghan Taliban a specific address to talk and to discuss their issues. The US and other members of the international community supported the opening of this office. Qazi Habibullah Fauzi[25] stated that the Taliban's delegates also went to Qatar with the permission of Mullah Mohammad Omar, who lived in Pakistan under the protection of ISI. However, when the Taliban insurgents started to fly their white flags outside their office in Qatar and acted as the representative of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Karzai suspended the talks. According to Maulawi Pir Mohammad Ruhani,[26] Karzai thought the announcement and flags would give the Taliban an unwanted legitimacy.

---

[25] Qazi Habibullah Fauzi (personal communication, January 04, 2018), in Kabul.
[26] Maulawi Pir Mohammad Ruhani (personal communication, January 04, 2018), in Kabul.

**4.4. Questioning the Failure of Afghan Reconciliation Process (2001-2014)**

Geographically Afghanistan is situated in the heart of Asia. It is located at the crossroad of Central, South and West Asia. Afghanistan's immediate neighbors (Pakistan, Iran and China) and its extended neighbors (Saudi Arabia, India and Russia) have involved in the conflict of this county for centuries. The interests of all these countries intersects in Afghanistan. Therefore, each of them want a regime in Afghanistan that does not threatens its national interests in the region.

The failure of Afghan reconciliation process and the actors that played role for it could be analyzed from three levels: domestic, regional and global. The domestic level analyses of actors in the reconciliation processes of Afghanistan covers the roles of Afghan government, political parties ( Jamiati Islami, Junbush Islami, Wadat Islami), and the insurgent (the Afghan Taliban). The analyzing of regional actors covers the role of regional countries like Pakistan, and India; Saudi Arabia and Iran. The analyzing of global actors in the reconciliation process covers the role of the US, China and Russia.

**4.4.1. The Domestic Reasons for the Failure of Afghanistan's Reconciliation Process (2001-2014)**

In the post 2001 era Afghanistan we can categorize the domestic actors within two groups: the pro-government and the pro-Taliban. The pro-government actors the political parties that played significant role in the continuations of Karzai regime and supported the Afghan National Army and Police against insurgents (Taliban). They considered the presences of the US and the western communities in Afghanistan as an opportunity to train Afghan soldiers and police force and as a strong ally against the regional power. On the other hand, the pro-Taliban actors are the one which worked in hand to hand with Taliban and supported any actions that further weakened Karzai regime and strengthened the Taliban; these are like Al-Qaeda, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, TTP (Pakistani Taliban) etc. They supported the Taliban insurgencies as militarily, morally and economically in return for a safe haven within the territory of Afghanistan.

Between 2001 and 2014, in the context of Afghanistan, there were several domestic parties that could have served as a potential spoiler for any reconciliation efforts. Those included Jamiat-i-Islami Party (led by Salahuddin Rabbani), Junbish-i Islami Party(led by Abdul Rashid Dostum), Wahdat-e Islami Party (Karim Khalili) and the Taliban group. As indicated in figure 4.3. below, each of these political parties had close relations with regional and global powers. For example, while Abdul Rashid Dostum (Uzbek) had close relations with Turkey and Uzbekistan, Burhanuddin Rabbani and later his son Salahuddin Rabbani (Tajik) had close relations with India, France, and Iran, Karim Khalili and Muhaqiq (Hazara) is well-known for having a close relationship with Iran due to their Shia faith, and the Afghan Taliban had close relations with neighboring Pakistan.



Figure 4.3. Main Afghan stakeholders and their regional and international partners between 2001 and 2014.[27]

The thesis, however, found that the domestic Afghan leaders and political parties rarely attempted to spoil the reconciliation process throughout 2001-2014.

---

[27] I drew this figure in order to depict the close relations between domestic Afghan stakeholders and other countries. In this figure K.S.A means Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and J.S mean Jamiat- i- Islami party.

Mohammad Qasim Halimi,[28] the deputy minister of justice, argued that from the meetings that he had with several significant Afghan leaders and with the influential decision makers within the Karzai administration, there was a general consensus about making peace with the Taliban. He said that "the Afghans are thirsty for peace, it does not matter from which ethnicity or political party, they are all of them are ready to make peace with the Taliban. But, the problem is with our neighbor, Pakistan. They killed, imprisoned, and pressured any Taliban member that wanted to join the reconciliation process". This research found that the political parties or Afghan leaders that could have been considered as the potential spoiler for any reconciliations initiated during the Karzai administration were part of his government or worked in the reconciliation process. For example, Hazrat Sibghatullah Mujaddidi (the first president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan after the Soviet Union's withdrawal) served as the head of PTS and supported Karzai in most of his initiatives that could bring peace and security to the country. Karim Khalili served as Karzai's first vice president, and now he is the chairman of the HPC. Abdul Rashid Dostum, who was known as a fierce critic of the Taliban and their mass killings, apologized in 2013 for his involvement in the civil war, in 2013. Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was the main rival of the Taliban during their role, served as the head of HPC. He believed in peace and the possibility of solving the protracted conflict of Afghanistan via negotiations. In 2011, Rabbani was killed by a Taliban representative who introduced himself a peace agent and claimed that he came to negotiate peace.

Regarding the leadership of the Taliban the majority of the interviewees described them as the dependent actors on ISI. The headquarters of the Taliban is situated within the territory of Pakistan, in Quetta and Peshawar. Toryali Ghiyasi,[29] now a member of the negotiation team with the Taliban in the cabinet of President Ashraf Ghani, believed that the Taliban insurgents are economically, politically, and militarily supported by the ISI and hence cannot make peace without their permission. The

---

[28] The former top Taliban official, now serves as the deputy minister of justice, member of the Ulema Shura, and member of the HPC. At the same time, he is considered to be the best and appropriate person to negotiate with the Taliban. Personal communication, interviewed in november, 2018, in Istanbul.

[29] Toryali Ghiyasi (personal communication, January 01, 2018), in Kabul.

former official of the Taliban and the rector of Kabul University during the Taliban regime, Moulavi Pir Mohammad Ruhani,[30] argued that his close friends and some of the leaders of the Taliban were assassinated or imprisoned by the ISI when they showed interests in joining Afghanistan's reconciliation process. When the question was asked how the ISI knew which the Taliban members were joining Karzai's reconciliation process, Mohammad Qasimi Halimi[31] replied that:

> Karzai was an emotional person, and he was not able to keep the peace talks secret. Whenever he received some good news, he was calling his close circles and sharing it with them. Also, there were some people within the Karzai administration that had contact with ISI and were leaking the information about the peace talks to the Pakistani officials in return for their personal interests like economic gain.

Talha Kose defines reconciliation as a comprehensive process that encompasses the legal, economic, and social dimensions of a problem (Köse, 2017: 140). In the context of Afghanistan's reconciliation process, despite the fact that majority of the interviewees believed that domestic leaders were not the main spoilers of the reconciliation process, there were some interviewees that they believed the economic gains of the lower level Taliban from the conflict were one of the motives for them to continue the conflict. Furthermore, if a society that is in conflict has easily marketable commodities, such as timber and gems (Stedman, 2001: 2), or if the parties in conflict consider that emerging peace threatens their economic interests (Özerdem, 2015: 61) like incomes from selling weapons, taxing people, and foreign support for conflicting parties, there is a greater possibility for a peace process to fail. In the context of Afghanistan, it is a country that is rich in natural resources. In this country, natural resources were always a source of income for different armed groups. For instance, the struggle and competition over the lapis lazuli mine in the Badakhshan province of Afghanistan fueled the conflict in this region over the decades. It is the income the Taliban receives from just one small area of this province "rivals the government's declared income from the entire Afghan natural resources sector" (Witness, 2016: 5). Furthermore, some of the interviewees believed the extortion money from selling weapons, trading opium, from the taxation of people

---

[30] Maulawi Pir Mohammad Ruhani (personal communication, January 04, 2018), in Kabul.
[31] Mohammad Qasim Halimi (personal communication, November, 2018), in Istanbul.

under their control areas in the form of ushr[32] and zekat[33], and also from taking money from contractors and non-governmental organizations were the other sources and motivating factors for the Taliban to continue the conflict and their insurgent activities.

On the other hand, Mohammad Qasim Halimi[34] (the Taliban's former chief of protocol) stated that the economic factors and illegal sources of income only motivated the normal Afghans to voluntarily join the Taliban network and to pursue fighting. He said that the file and rank Taliban fighter had nothing to do with the spoiling of the reconciliation process, because the Taliban's network is based on a hierarchical order, in which their main decision makers are their leaders and those have control over their fighters. But, he added, the problem is in the leadership of Taliban that were and still are in Pakistan, and even the Taliban members that are in Qatar, who take orders from Karachi. Matt Waldman (a specialist in conflict and an Afghanistan analyst) argues that the Taliban's most significant meetings are organized by the ISI, and he quotes a deputy minister of the former Taliban regime who argues that "the ISI has responsibility for organizing the meetings and that it exerts pressure on individual participants beforehand, especially if major decisions are to be taken." (Waldman, 2010: 6).

Moreover, Mohammad Siddiq Asifi[35] who believed that although the decision makers and senior officials within the HPC were not the spoilers of the reconciliation process, they were the obstacles for reaching a successful reconciliation during the Karzai period. The HPC of Afghanistan is the main organization to advise the president of the country regarding his policies about peace and pursuing the reconciliation process with the insurgents. The main task of the HPC is not to make peace with the insurgents but to be a mediator and to prepare the ground between the conflicting parties in order to make reconciliation. However, the fact that the senior members

---

[32] According to Islamic law, a ten percent of taxes on harvest.
[33] In Islamic culture, 2.5 percent of taxes on wealth.
[34] Mohammad Qasim Halimi (personal communication, November, 2018), in Istanbul.
[35] Mohammad Asif Siddiqi (personal communication, January 06, 2018), in Kabul.

of the HPC are drawn from the former rivals of the Taliban increased the latter's doubt regarding the sincerity of this organization. Furthermore, these people, such as Burhanuddin Rabbani (the former president of Afghanistan) and Sebghatullah Mujadidi (the first president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan after the Soviet Union's withdrawal) had more experience in conflict and war than peace-making. For this reason, the deputy of the Upper House of Afghanistan, Mohammad Asif Siddiqi,[36] believed that the structure of HPC was problematic from the beginning. He added that "the selection of Burhanuddin Rabbani as the head of this organization was a wrong decision because he was the one with whom Taliban were in a fight since their emergence in 1994; hence this was one of the significant reasons that Taliban were not joining the reconciliation process."

On the other hand, the well-known Afghan scholar and politician Asadullah Walwaliji[37] interpreted the selection of Sebghatullah Mujadidi (as the head of the PTS) and Burhanuddin Rabbani (as the head of the HPC) as a political decision by Hamid Karzai himself. He argued that Karzai appointed Rabbani as the head of the HPC in order to get the support of the Jamiat-i- Islami Party (one of the largest political parties in Afghanistan) and warlords for the reconciliation process. He stated that "because Rabbani was a respected and experienced politician and he fought against the Soviet Union and served as the president of the county, for these reasons different factions of Afghans were respecting him. Therefore Karzai thought that by appointing Rabbani in this post, he would be able to get the support of a large portion of the society, especially the former Northern Alliances group that is considered to be the domestic spoiler of the peace process in the country by most of the people". Gul Ahmad Azimi, a senator in the Upper House of Afghanistan,[38] claimed that Afghanistan can achieve a long-lasting peace only when Pakistan and the US both support the process. He argued that the Taliban are too dependent on Pakistan at such level that it cannot make peace with the Kabul government without the permission of Pakistan.

---

[36] Mohammad Asif Siddiqi (personal communication, January 06, 2018), in Kabul.
[37] Asadullah Walwaliji (personal communication, January 05, 2018), in Kabul.
[38] Gul Ahmad Azimi (personal communication, January 06, 2018), in Kabul.

The main question is, however, what were the preconditions and the main demands of Taliban insurgents and the Karzai administration from the reconciliation process between 2001 and 2014?

Karzai's administration, particularly after 2010, was ready for a power-sharing agreement with the Taliban. Karzai announced several times that his administration was ready to assign a Taliban leader as governor, minister, or judge. For example, he left the set of the judiciary empty for a long time in order to assign a Taliban leader in this post.[39] He introduced the APRP in order to win both lower-level and high-level Taliban back to the Afghan society. This program as a bottom-up process was aimed at tackling the problems of rank and file insurgencies; while as a top-down process, it was understood as the political talks with more senior members of the Taliban, because a successful reconciliation process can only be achieved via a combination of both bottom-up and top-down processes (Rosoux, 2015: 6).

Mawlawi Aminuddin Muzaffari[40] argued that Karzai had four main demands from the Taliban in order to make reconciliation with them. He said these mainly were "cutting ties with Al-Qaeda, accepting and operating within the boundaries of Afghanistan's constitution, respecting women's rights, and preserving the present regime". He added that Karzai insisted on these conditions because for him these were counted as the big achievement of his regime over more than one decade. On the other hand, the Taliban insurgents after their re-emergence established a "shadow government" in the territory that they control. They have their own governors, judges, and municipalities. They interact with the local government officials and sign agreements with NGOs (non-governmental organizations).[41] They have officials that collect taxes

---

[39] The language of the website is Persian (Dari): https://8am.af/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/8am-2990.pdf

[40] Maulawi Mohammad Amin Muzaffari, (personal communication, January 07, 2018), in Kabul. He is a scholar and has been the secretary of the HPC, since its establishment. He followed the peace process very closely and is known as the info icon among his colleagues.

[41] Based on the Washington post news by 2011, the Taliban insurgents had signed agreements with 28 aid organizations that included giving permission to conduct polio vaccinations.                                                                                                    Website:

and have judges that hear civil and criminal cases. The Taliban organization preferred to talk with American rather than Afghans. They described Karzai's administration as a "puppet regime"; thus, according to them, talking with Afghans was considered as a "waste of time".

Sayed Ishaq Gailani,[42] the head of the Afghanistan National Solidarity Movement who joined most of the peace talks with the Taliban, like in Qatar and Dubai, argued that the Taliban had three main demands from the Karzai administration in order to join the reconciliation process. These were the withdrawal of the international force and particularly the US from Afghanistan, changes in the constitution, and establishing an interim government. He stated:

> The Taliban demanded from the Karzai administration that foreign forces should withdraw from Afghanistan, an interim government should be established; because, over this period the Taliban argued that they leave their weapons, and work over the constitution of the country in order to change the part that is against Islamic.

Mawlawi Aminuddin Muzaffari[43] argued that the Taliban wanted the changes in the constitution of the country because according to them it was created under US influence, and the people who attended the Loya Jirga (grand assembly) to amend this constitution were influenced by the US.

### 4.4.2. The Role of the US in the Failure of Afghanistan's Reconciliation Process

If a society has experienced a long-lasting and intractable conflict, it needs the restoration of a peaceful relationship once a formal resolution has been achieved (Bar-Tal, et al., 2009: 23). In Afghanistan, there is still an ongoing conflict between

---

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/06/21/the-taliban-has-successfully-built-a-parallel-state-in-many-parts-of-afghanistan-report-says/?utm_term=.97c295778ef1

[42] Interview with him in his home, in Kabul, 18.01.2018. Sayed Ishaq Gailani: He is the leader of Hezb-e-Nuhzat Hambastagi Milli (National Solidarity Movement of Afghanistan) and is a Sufi religious leader (or "pir"). He participated in the Bonn conference in 2001 as well as the Cyprus meetings, and was one of the candidates for the Afghan general election which was held in June 2004.

[43] Maulawi Mohammad Amin Muzaffari, (personal communication, January 07, 2018), in Kabul.

the Kabul regime and the radical Afghan Taliban network. The Taliban argues that they do not want to make peace with the Kabul regime unless the US withdraws its forces from Afghanistan. The Taliban's former ambassador in Saudi Arabia, Qazi Habibullah Fauzi,[44] argued that the Taliban believed that their country is "invaded" by "infidels" (the US), who ended their regime; thus they demanded the withdrawal of the US from the country as their first condition to make peace talks with the Kabul regime.

According to Hamid Karzai, the root cause of the conflict in Afghanistan is the US and Pakistan. On 21 September 2017, the former president, in his interview in *Foreign Policy Magazine* regarding the source of the conflict in Afghanistan argued that "the biggest threat to Afghanistan is the U.S. and Pakistan combined." He added that "I don't see them separately. I've dealt with both of them. They've been cooperating all along…" (Kumar, 2017: *Foreign Policy Magazine*). Karzai, at the end of 2014, when he was leaving the presidency, rejected signing the bilateral security agreement with the US by arguing that "America did not want peace for Afghanistan, because it had its own agendas and goals here" (Partlow, 2017: page is not given). On the contrary to his arguments, this thesis argues that the US wanted peace and security in Afghanistan, but its mistakes in the country led to the continuation of the conflict. Research indicates that it is crucial for a peace process to diagnose its spoilers correctly (Kastrati, 2014: 5). The following section of this thesis is going to assess the role of the US in the failure of Afghanistan's reconciliation process between 2001 and 2014.

This research argues that US policymakers made three main mistakes (not inviting the Taliban to the Bonn Conference, not being able to co-opt the former Taliban members into the new political system, and not having a concrete policy against Pakistan) in their path to bringing peace and security to Afghanistan. These mistakes of the US gave the birth to the conspiracy theories among the Afghan people (either educated or not) that the US did not want to end the conflict in Afghanistan, and even

---

[44] Qazi Habibullah Fauzi (personal communication, January 04, 2018), in Kabul.

some believed that the US spoiled any reconciliation process initiated in the country between 2001 and 2014.

**4.4.2.1 The main mistakes of the US in its path to bringing peace to Afghanistan (2001-2014)**

On the morning of September 11, 2001, the US's famous Twin Towers (the World Trade Center in New York) and Pentagon (the headquarters of the US Department of Defense) witnessed an attack by the globally recognized terrorist group Al-Qaeda. Around 3,000 American people lost their lives (Bush, 2001:1). The leader of the terrorist group who took the responsibility for the attack, Osama Bin Laden, was living in Afghanistan at the time under the protection of Mullah Mohammad Omar's emirate, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Taliban regime in Kabul acknowledged that Bin Laden lived there (Afghanistan), but refused to hand over him to the US by arguing that it would be an "insult to Islam" (Bergen, 2015: CNN). On October 7, 2001, less than a month after the 9/11 events, the US forces started their operation in Afghanistan under the name of "Operation Enduring Freedom".[45] In a matter of weeks, the US forces, with the support of former Northern Alliances forces, pushed the Taliban out of power, first from Kabul, then from the southern parts of Afghanistan like Kandahar, and finally from all over Afghanistan.

Firstly, in November 2001, the United Nations organized a conference in Bonn, Germany, on the future of Afghanistan and how to design a transnational post-Taliban government. But, according to some of the interviewees, this conference was more in the form of winners (the US and the anti-Taliban group) gathering against the loser (the Taliban). They believed that aside from the Taliban other Afghan stakeholders from different factions of Afghanistan's society were invited to this conference, although the Taliban formed an important faction of Afghan society and political life and in addition to this, they ruled the country since 1996. The conference's architects, Lakhdar Brahimi and Francesc Vendrell, made a statement that was in a form that advocated the claim of the interviewees. Brahimi and Francesc

---

[45] It was a response to the 9/11 events and aimed to stop the Taliban regime from providing a safe haven for Al-Qaeda.

confirmed that leaving the Taliban out of Bonn was a mistake (Waldman, 2014:4). He argued that they did not invite the Taliban because the US did not want them because of the 9/11 events (Brahimi, 2008).

Secondly, according to Seth G. Jones, who was cited by Alicia A. Q. Wittmeyer, after the Bonn Conference, the United States failed to co-opt the former Taliban officials, instead sending them to prison at Guantanamo Bay or Bagram Airfield (Wittmeyer, 2013: Foreign Policy). For example, soon after the 9/11 events, on December 6, 2001, some of the Taliban's top officials, like Mullah Berader (Mullah Omar's top military commander), Mullah Obaidullah (the defense minister of the Taliban), Mullah Abdul Razzaq (the interior minister), and many others, secretly gathered in Kandahar (the birthplace of the Taliban), and delivered a letter of surrender to Karzai (Bergen, et al. 2012: 10-11). In the letter, they mentioned that they accepted the selection of Karzai as the head of the interim government and also mentioned that they had the permission of Mullah Omar to surrender (Gopal, 2010:1). In return, the main request of the Taliban was to be given immunity from arrest in exchange for agreeing to abstain from political life (Maley, Schmeidl, 2014: 14). But, the overtures were ignored by the government of Karzai mostly due to pressure from the US. The US. Defense Secretary of the State Donald Rumsfeld replied to the Taliban's surrender by saying that there is going to be neither a negotiated settlement nor an amnesty for the Taliban (Rubin, 2018: The New Yorker). This was the one of the main reason and due to that until 2003 no major reconciliation occurred between the Taliban and the Karzai government. The signatories of the letter of surrender fled to Pakistan, joined Mullah Omar, and became leading figures in his circle (Gopal, 2010). For instance, Mullah Obaidullah became the key deputy of Mullah Omar, One insurgent key strategist, Tayeb Agha, became a leading member of the finance committee of the Taliban and also served in Quetta Shura and as the envoy of Mullah Omar. Mullah Baradar became the day to day leader of the entire movement. And Mullah Abdul Razaq become the cash and weapons facilitator for the Kandahari insurgency ((Bergen, et al. 2012: 12).

Thirdly, the United States failed to develop an effective policy towards Afghanistan's neighbors particularly Pakistan, after the Bonn Conference. In this conference, Pakistan and other neighbors of Afghanistan, including Iran, Russia, and China, mutually agreed to advocate for the Karzai-led government in Afghanistan, but Pakistan in the background provided sanctuary to the Taliban by offering military and political support. The Taliban who escaped from the operation of the US in Afghanistan found sanctuary in the FATA region. They received military training under the Pakistani ISI and the US could not continue its operation in Pakistan's territory. Even if the US had done so, the Taliban's leadership (ex. Quetta Shura and Peshawar Shura of Taliban) resided in the big cities of Pakistan like Quetta (ex. Quetta Shura) or Peshawar (ex. Peshawar shura) where the US could not carry out an operation. In addition to this, according to Amrullah Saleh (the former head of the National Directorate of Security of Afghanistan), who was cited by the *Journal of Foreign Policy*, the US is "simply too afraid of Pakistan to sever ties with it" because of Pakistan's strong ties with the radical groups (Wittmeyer, 2013: Foreign Policy). For this reason, the US tried always to make sure that it had good relations with Pakistan, or at least that nothing was wrong with its relation with it. For example, in 2009, after Barack Obama became the president of the US, Joe Biden (vice president of the US) paid a visit to Kabul. According to Abdul Hakim Mujahid, [46] a deputy chair of Afghanistan's HPC, Hamid Karzai asked the US vice president to exert more pressure on Pakistan in order to force the Taliban to come to the negotiation table. However, according to Mr. Mujahid, in response to Karzai, Joe Biden gave him an unexpected answer by stating that "Pakistan is fifty times more important than Afghanistan for the US". He said after a tense discussion between Karzai and Biden, Biden left the presidential office in Kabul. Furthermore, most of the interviewees believed that although the US supported the Karzai government, and the Afghan National Security force (ANSF), it never forced or put pressure on Pakistan in order to force the Taliban to stop fighting and join the Afghan reconciliation process until 2014.

---

[46] Abdul Hakim Mujahid (personal communication, January 03, 2018), in Kabul.

There were, however, some interviewees, researchers, political analysts, and Afghan leaders that believed and argued that US spoiled any reconciliation process initiated in Afghanistan due to its ideological differences with the Taliban and the geostrategic location of Afghanistan.

**4.4.2.2. Did the US spoil the Afghan reconciliation process (2001-2014)?**

Firstly, at the end of 2001, when the US planned to invade Afghanistan, the mission was clear: retaliation against the Taliban regime in Kabul for providing safe havens to Al-Qaeda which bombed and killed hundreds of American citizens. Therefore, one of the reason for the US to invade Afghanistan was based on ideological ground. On 20 September 2001, George W. Bush, the former US president, announced the doctrine of "war on terror". In his speech, the US president likened Al-Qaeda's ideology to fascism, Nazism, and totalitarianism. He stressed that the US had decided to use all kinds of diplomatic, military, and intelligence tools to defeat and destroy this ideology from the globe; furthermore, he asked all the nations in the world to decide either to be with them or "with the terrorists". Hence, according to him, any country that continued to harbor and advocate terrorism would be regarded by the US as a hostile regime (McLarney, 2011:1). Similarly, for the Taliban, the war against the US equally was laid on ideological ground. After the invasion of the US, the Taliban changed their rhetoric. While their pre-2001 era rhetoric was defined as a fight and struggle in order to rescue the Afghan people from the anarchic situation which occurred the after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and the corruption which was widespread in the country at the time (Kemal: 1999, 24), in the post-2001 era, the new rhetoric and propaganda of the insurgents were defined as "an armed resistance to the foreign invaders (US and allied forces) and their local partners (the Karzai regime) on the grounds that they were committing aggression against a Muslim country and challenging an Islamic system" (Semple: 2014, 7).

Although the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001 due to an ideological reason, there is no clear evidence that supports the claim that the US spoiled the reconciliation process due to ideological differences. Furthermore, at the end of 2014, after almost a dozen years it was no longer clear the purpose of their (US) presence in Afghanistan.

Timothy Mitchell argues that the US did not have any kind of problem with the Taliban regime in Kabul between 1996 and 2001. Mitchell draws the reader's attention to a conversation between a Taliban delegate and a senior United States State Department official. The main theme of this conversation is the case of building a pipeline from Central Asia through Afghanistan under the Taliban regime. In this conversation, the senior US state official expresses that they do not have a problem with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, because the Taliban will probably develop a governing system like that of the Saudis and "there will be Aramco, pipelines, an emir, no parliament and lots of Sharia law. We can live with that" (Mitchell, 2011: 200). Additionally, Asadullah Walwaliji, [47] one of the participants of the 2001 Bonn Conference and a well-known TV commentators believed that the United States' problem began with the Taliban regime after the 9/11 event, when the Taliban refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden and cut ties with it. In order clarify this, he stressed that this problem was not important enough to motivate the US to spoil the reconciliation process in Afghanistan.

Secondly, five of my thirteen interviewees believed that the US spoiled the reconciliation process of Afghanistan because of its long-term plan to stay in Afghanistan due to its geo-strategic location. Mawlawi Pir Mohammad Ruhani, [48] a member of the HPC, argued that the geostrategic location of Afghanistan has been one of the critical factors for global power. The Russian Empire and the Great Britain fought over it in the 19th century (the Great Game), the Soviet Union and the US did so in the second half of the 20th century (Cold War), and the US did so again in the 21th century in the pretext of "war on terror". He added that the US has had the aim of controlling Afghanistan since the 1970s, but it accomplished its goal only at the beginning of the 21st century. The interviewees argued that the geostrategic location of Afghanistan is significant for the US because of two main reasons. Firstly, according to Aminuddin Muzaffari, [49] the US as the hegemon power of the 21st century seeks to

---

[47] Asadullah Walwaliji (personal communication, January 05, 2018), in Kabul.

[48] Maulawi Pir Mohammad Ruhani (personal communication, January 04, 2018), in Kabul.

[49] Maulawi Mohammad Amin Muzaffari, (personal communication, January 07, 2018), in Kabul. He is a scholar and has been the secretary of the HPC, since its establishment. He followed the peace process very closely and is known as the info icon among his colleagues.

use Afghanistan as a bridge to cross to Central Asian countries and to impose its influence in those countries. Secondly, according to Mawlawi Pir Mohammd Ruhani,[50] the former Taliban commander and the former rector of Kabul University, the US wants to prevent the influence of China, Russia, and Iran in Afghanistan. Director of the Center for Strategic Studies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Faramarz Tamanna[51] argued that the US only can accomplish its goal if it has a toehold in the specific part of Afghanistan like as we have today, in the border of China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Pakistan.

The majority of the interviewees concluded that although the US had the long term plan of staying in Afghanistan via its several military bases, it did not spoil any reconciliation process in the country between 2001 and 2014. Furthermore, this thesis interprets the presences of the US in the country as in the interests of both Afghanistan and the US due to economic and security reasons. Regarding the geostrategic location of Afghanistan, the country is surrounded by hostile neighbors that have always interfered in the internal affairs of Afghanistan via using Afghan domestic actors. Between 2001 and 2014, although it is true that the US wanted to have bases in the country in order to stay closer to its rivals like Iran, Russia, and China, most of the interviewees considered the US an important ally of Afghanistan for its war against the Taliban. Interviewees deputy of the Upper house, Mohammad Asif Siddiqi[52] believed that if the US had left Afghanistan by the end of 2014, the occurrence of a second civil war would have been inevitable due to a power vacuum (as it happened in the 1990s after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union), because according to them the Taliban and Pakistan were encouraged to wait the Americans out. As explained in more detail in chapter three of this thesis, in the 1990s after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, the Soviet-backed Kabul regime collapsed. Afghanistan's close and extended neighbors, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, India, and Central Asian countries supported different Afghan factions in order to fight against the proxy of other states in Afghanistan. Over that period while Pakistan and Saudi

---

[50] Maulawi Pir Mohammad Ruhani (personal communication, January 04, 2018), in Kabul.
[51] Faramarz Tamanna (personal communication, January 18, 2018), in Kabul.
[52] Mohammad Asif Siddiqi (personal communication, January 06, 2018), in Kabul.

Arabia supported Hekmatyar and Taliban, India, Iran, and Central Asian countries supported the Northern Alliances factions that were drawn from Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara ethnicities.

Furthermore, the presence of the US in Afghanistan provided economic benefits for both the US and Afghans. Afghanistan is a country that is rich in untapped natural resources. For example, based on a report from the *New York Times* in 2010, quoting a joint report by the Pentagon, the US Geological Survey (USGS), and THE United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Afghanistan owns "previously unknown" and untapped mineral deposits worth around $1 trillion. The "previously unknown" and untapped minerals are defined by senior US officials as huge resources of Iron, copper, cobalt, gold, and crucial industrial materials like lithium (Alikuzai, 2013: 710). With regards to the resources of lithium in Afghanistan, the *New York Times* report quoted an internal Pentagon memo stating that Afghanistan could become the "Saudi Arabia of lithium". The Lithium is a critical raw material that is used in the manufacturing of batteries in laptop and cell phones (Karlekar, 2012: 7). These raw materials and natural resources in the country could become the backbone of the country's economy if properly used (Gardner, 2013: 116). However, the country cannot benefit from these natural resources due to the insecurity and the lack of mining culture. Firstly, since 2003, with the increasing attack of insurgents, most of the country has been under the Taliban control, particularly the regions that are rich in natural resources like Helmand (famous for its copper deposits), Ghazni (lithium deposits), and Badakhshan (azure and rubies). These were the natural resources that were supposed to make the country rich and prosperous; instead they became one of the significant sources of income for the insurgents (ex. Taliban). Secondly, according to Jack Medlin, a geologist in the United States Geological Survey's international affairs program who was cited by Matthew Bugeja, Afghanistan is a country that has no mining culture (Bugeja, 2014: 134). For these reasons, Afghanistan became highly dependent on foreign aid, according to the World Bank. For example, the US and other international donors provide more than 60% of the Afghan national budget and find many of the reconstruction programs

and projects in the country (SIGAR, 2014).[53] The US alone spent approximately $110 billion to rebuild Afghanistan between 2002 and 2015 (Kapur, 2019: 145). This is the number the US spent on 16 European countries after World War II under the Marshall Plan according to SIGAR's report. But still, according to Mohammad Ashraf Ghani (the current president of Afghanistan) the Kabul regime "cannot survive without US military and financial assistance" for more than six months.[54]

In a nutshell, since 2001 the US has been one of the main actors in the reconciliation process in Afghanistan. Between 2001 and 2014, it supported the Kabul regime militarily, economically, and politically. Although five of my thirteen interviewees argued that the US spoiled the Afghan reconciliation process, eight of my interviewees believed that the wrong policies that the US perused towards Afghanistan led to the reemergence of Taliban, continuation of conflict, and furthermore gave birth to the conspiracy theory that the US was one of the spoilers of Afghanistan's reconciliation process. These wrong policies were not inviting the Taliban to the 2001 Bonn Conference, not accepting the Taliban members who wanted to surrender to international forces after the 9/11 events, and not pressuring Pakistan to cut its support for Taliban members.

### 4.4.3. The role of China, Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia in the Failure of Afghan Reconciliation Process (2001-2014)

Between 2001 and 2014, Russian and Chinese governments played more passive in the reconciliation process of Afghan government. China had several interests in Afghanistan. But, the domestic security and stability in the Xinjian region of China overwhelm all other. Between 2001 and 2014, China maintained friendly and good relations with the Karzai regime in Kabul. Its main aim was to benefit from the rich

---

[53] John F. Sopko (the US special inspector general for Afghanistan's reconstruction) remark's in Georgetown University Washington, D.C. Friday, September 12, 2014, website: https://www.sigar.mil/newsroom/ReadFile.aspx?SSR=7&SubSSR=29&File=speeches/14/Georgetown_University_Speech.html

[54] Ashraf Ghani, the president of Afghanistan in a television show CBS 60 minutes said that his country can't survive without continued US's support for more than six month, if international forces leaves Afghanistan. Source: https://www.globalvillagespace.com/kabul-cant-survive-without-us-assistance-ghani/

natural resources of Afghanistan (e.g. extracting of vast quantities of copper and coal from Mes Aynak and oil from Amu Darya) and to include Afghanistan in China's Silk Road Economic Belt strategy. The reason is Afghanistan situated at the geographical hub of these regions and any conflict or unrest in this country would likely to result in instability into neighboring region and making Chinese strategy hard to succeed (Huasheng, 2015: Carnegie Middle East Center). Regarding China's stands towards the Taliban until 2014 it disliked the Taliban group in Afghanistan because of their close relations with Uyghurs in China. At the same time, China dealt with them cautiously, trying to avoid any direct conflict with them (Huasheng, 2012: 1).

On the other hand, Russia did not have coherent and stable strategy towards Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014. Over this period, Russia's policy towards Afghanistan went from offensive in 2001-2002 to stagnation in 2003 – 2006, and in 2007 when it realized that it cannot compete effectively with the US influence in Afghanistan, since then it developed active policy towards Afghanistan (Menkiszak, 2012: 7). In 2009, when Karzai won presidential election in Afghanistan unlike western countries Russia gave him *de facto* unconditionally support; at the same time, it begun to openly communicate with the representative of "moderate Taliban" (Menkiszak, 2012: 23-24). Over this period. Russia formulated four conditions for Afghan reconciliation process: "the renunciation by the 'moderate Taliban' of the armed struggle; breaking their ties with al-Qaeda; the recognition of the constitution and other laws of Afghanistan; and not holding any talks with the extremist Taliban leaders, as defined by UN sanction"( Menkiszak, 2012: 23).

Between 2001 and 2014, in Afghanistan, there were different views toward both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Among the high level Afghan officials after Pakistan Saudi Arabia was perceived as one of the most significant country which could persuade the Afghan Taliban to sit in negotiation table with the Afghan government. That is why when Hamid Karzai was in power he developed close relations with Saudi Arabia and asked Saudi's to pursue Taliban for peace talks (e.g. 2008 Peace Talks between Karzai and Taliban delegates in Saudi Arabia). On the contrary, the motives of Afghanistan towards Iran are more economical and political. Geographically,

Afghanistan shares a 900 kilometer-long border with Iran, which is key for trade and access to trans-boundary water sources. Secondly, around 20% of the Afghan population are Shiite through them to some extent Iran could spread its influence in the country. Thirdly, between 2001 and 2014 the most important tool for Iran to influence and interfere into Afghanistan's internal issues were by using Afghan migrants who lived in Iran, or even Iran could destabilize the country by expelling this 3 million migrants from Iran.

At the same time, as the history of Afghanistan indicates, Afghanistan was a point of rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, particularly between 1979 and 2001. The rivalries of these two countries were based on their role of leadership and influence in the Muslim worlds. Iran in order to reduce the influences of its rival Saudi Arabia, and to create a political and religious sphere in Afghanistan assisted the non-Pashtun speaking ethnicities and Hazara group (Shiites). On the other hand, Saudi Arabia in order to reach to its objectives in Afghanistan such as, spreading Wahhabis in Afghanistan and through it to Central Asia and balancing Iran indicated sympathy to the activities of Taliban.

After 2001, however both Saudi Arabia and Iran developed a friendly relations with Karzai regime in Kabul. Both of them welcomed the coming of the US and International community to Afghanistan and helped to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. For instance, In January 2002 Conference, Iran pledged 560 million dollars towards Afghanistan, and in 2006 London Conference, it committed an additional 100 million dollars, making it one of the leading contributor to Afghanistan's reconstruction (Milani, 2006: 251). Similarly, after 2001, the Saudi government politically and economically supported Karzai government, convinced the Pakistani leadership to cooperate with the US against its fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan (Woermer and Steinberg, 2013: 10).

So who was the main spoiler of Afghanistan's reconciliation process between 2001 and 2014? What sorts of evidence exist that can indicate the intention and behavior of it being a spoiler? And what were the main motives and demands of the spoiler?

Stephen John Stedman argues that regional countries play crucial roles in the success or failure of a peace process (Stedman, 2001). He adds that a peace process is most likely to be spoiled by a neighboring state when it considers the continuation of conflict in a particular country to be in its interest (Stedman, 2001:11). Stedman states that there are several means that a spoiler of a peace process can use depending on its position; for example, while an inside spoiler uses covert violence, and an outside spoiler is more inclined to use overt violence like assassinations of individuals that are willing to join the peace process (Stedman, 1997: 8). In the context of Afghanistan, five interviewees out of thirteen defined the US as one of the main spoilers of Afghanistan's reconciliation process, while twelve interviewees out of thirteen; which is almost the entire set, stated Pakistan as the main spoiler of the process between 2001 and 2014. The interviewees believed that the reconciliation process in Afghanistan was not successful because it did not have the support of external countries, particularly Pakistan. Based on the interviews, indeed there were several factors that motivated Pakistan to spoil Afghanistan's reconciliation process, but the most significant of them were border and water disputes between Afghanistan and Pakistan and threats to the economic interests and national security of Pakistan in Afghanistan and in the region. Pakistan, used varies of methods to spoil the reconciliation process, but the most well-known of them are assassination or imprisoning of Taliban members that indicated interest in joining the reconciliation process.

### 4.4.4. The Role of Pakistan in the Failure of the Afghanistan Reconciliation Process (2001-2014)

Mr. Attau Rahman Salim[55] (the deputy head of the HPC) and Toryali Ghiyasi[56] (former ambassador of Afghanistan in Jakarta and Chairman of the 4th Department of National Security between 1992 and 1993) defined the Taliban as a product of Pakistan. According to them, the Taliban was established by Pakistan in order to secure its national interests in Afghanistan and in the region. Attau Rahman Salim,[57]

---

[55] Maulawi Attaurahman Salim (personal communication, January 07, 2018), in Kabul.
[56] Toryali Ghiyasi (personal communication, January 01, 2018), in Kabul.
[57] Maulawi Attaurahman Salim (personal communication, January 07, 2018), in Kabul.

who was part of the negotiation team on the behalf of Burhanuddin Rabbani's government between 1994 and 2001, stated that he met with Taliban leaders more than three times over this period, mainly in Islamabad (Pakistan), Chahar Asyab (Kabul), and Ashgabat (Turkmenistan). He said that he realized that the Taliban were not an independent actor and were not able to make a decision by themselves; rather, they were saying and doing what Pakistan allowed them to. In 2012, a NATO report that was based on more than 27,000 interrogations of 4,000 Taliban captives, Al-Qaeda members and other fighters in Afghanistan concluded that Pakistan's help was critical for the survival and revival of the Taliban after 2001, just as it had been for the conquest of Afghanistan by the Taliban in the mid-1990s (Riedel, 2013: 145). The classified report that was leaked to the BBC indicates that the ISI was "thoroughly aware of Taliban activities and the whereabouts of all senior Taliban personnel"; in addition, according to the report, the Taliban's senior official, Nasiruddin Haqqani, lived "in the immediate vicinity of ISI headquarters in Islamabad," while  Haqqani's family lived "immediately west of the ISI office at the airfield in Miram Shah" (Paul, 2014: 62).

Abdul Hakim Mujahid, Mawlawi Pir Mohammad Ruhani, and Qasim Halimi expressed that any Taliban members that indicated a willingness to stop violence and join the reconciliation process of the Kabul regime without Pakistan's permission were either assassinated or imprisoned by the ISI. For example, Mawlawi Pir Mohammad Ruhani[58], the former Taliban commander and rector of Kabul University during the Taliban regime, argued that "we know that Pakistan has control over the Taliban, and Pakistan does not want peace in Afghanistan, and that is why they kill any Taliban members that want to join the reconciliation process of Afghanistan government". He said that when he contacted the Karzai administration in order to join the reconciliation process, he kept these talks secret and joined the reconciliation process before the Pakistani ISI got to know about this. He added that Pakistan protects the Taliban members that obey its orders and kills the one that act independently. The other interviewee, Abdul Hakim Mujahid,[59] was the international

---

[58] Maulawi Pir Mohammad Ruhani (personal communication, January 04, 2018), in Kabul.
[59] Abdul Hakim Mujahid (personal communication, January 03, 2018), in Kabul.

face of the Taliban regime, their former representative in the UN, and their former ambassador in Pakistan. He had reconciled with the government of Hamid Karzai years ago, argued that most of other high-level Taliban officials who wanted to join the reconciliation process of the Karzai regime were not as lucky as himself, because, when they wanted to join the process, they were assassinated, killed, or jailed by the ISI. Mr. Mujahid gave a long list of some of his former Taliban colleagues that were killed or jailed by the ISI when they indicated an interest in the peace talks or contacted Hamid Karzai's regime. The most well-known of them are Mullah Ubaidullah Akhund[60] (the defense minister of the Taliban Regime), Maulavi Abdul Raqib Takhari[61] (the minister of repatriation of the Taliban regime), and Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar[62] (deputy and minister of defense of the Taliban regime).

The ISI has a separate bureau for Afghan affairs that operates under its "S wing" (Saroj, 2016: 316). The Afghan Taliban operates under the command of this wing. This wing enjoys great autonomy, and it serves as "a buffer that allows top military officials deniability" (Saroj, 2016: 319). It is the second largest funded bureau after the Indian desk. The officers that work in the Afghanistan and India desks are carefully selected from the Pakistan Army's best branches (Saroj, 2016:316). They work directly under the control of the army chief of Pakistan. Little is publicly known about these wings of the ISI (Saroj, 2016: 319), and Pakistani political leadership is nearly

---

[60] He was one of the deputies of Mullah Mohammad Omar and a member of the Taliban's supreme council. He was responsible for the military operation of the Taliban. According to Abdul Hakim Mujahid, he was arrested in Pakistan in 2007 by the ISI, when his delegates met with the Karzai administration several times in order to settle the conflict of Afghanistan through negotiation. He died in 2010, while in custody in Pakistan.

[61] He was one of the Taliban's supreme council members. Unlike most of the Taliban's high official (who are Pashtuns), Takhari was from the Tajik ethnicity. He was responsible for Takhar and Badakhshan provinces. According to Mohammd Qasim Halimi (the former chief of protocol in the Taliban regime) Abdul Raqib Takhari was one of the strong believers in resolving Afghanistan's conflict through negotiation. For this reason he was killed by the ISI in Hayatabad (Peshawar), Pakistan.

[62] Bradar is said to be the second person in the command in the Taliban's network, after Mullah Mohammad Omar. He was one of the four people who founded the movement, and he belongs to the Popalzai tribes of Pashtun to which Hamid Karzai also belongs. According to Mohammad Qasim Halimi, he was arrested in Pakistan in 2010, when he showed an interest in solving Afghan conflict via negotiation. He was released recently at the request of Zalmay Khalilzad (the US diplomat) as sign of positive development in the Afghan reconciliation process.

banned from taking a decision regarding this bureau (Saroj, 2016: 316). "When militant groups needed to replenish their ranks, it would be operatives from this wing who often slipped into radical madrasas across Pakistan to drum up recruits" (Saroj, 2016: 319). The Pakistani ISI, in order to have direct control and influence on their work, housed the Taliban elements and their leadership committees (Shuras) in its different cities like Peshawar, Quetta, Karachi, and Miramshah. The Quetta Shura of the Taliban is responsible for the Taliban's operation in the southern part of Afghanistan, while the Peshawar and Miramshah shuras of the Taliban are responsible for operational command in the eastern and southeast parts of Afghanistan (Saroj, 2016: 327). Based on the interviews that were conducted with seven Taliban field commanders and one senior intermediary by Harvard analyst Matt Waldman in 2010, one of the interviewees argued that "If anyone rejects that the ISI backs or controls the Taliban, he has a mental problem … all our plans and strategy are made in Pakistan and step by step it is brought to us, for military operations or other activities. Pakistan [the ISI] does not have only one representative on the Quetta Shura, they have representatives everywhere. As for Mullah Baradar's arrest, do you think they didn't know where he and others were before that? … the ISI have more than two, three or four [representatives] on the [Quetta] Shura. … Some [other members of the Quetta Shura] know they work for the ISI, but it's not discussed. … The reality is that the ISI controls the leadership. Mulla Omar has a strong support of Pakistan; he has to listen to them and do what they say" (Waldman, 2010: 10).

One can argue that in 2001 Pakistan supported the US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan. Further, since Pakistan itself is suffering from terrorist attacks, why would it support and provide sanctuaries for the Afghan Taliban?

Pakistan played a significant role in the US-led war in Afghanistan just after the 9/11 events. It allowed the US to supply its forces in Afghanistan via Pakistan's territory. However, it was also one of the three countries (the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia) that had recognized the Taliban regime in Kabul officially between 1996 and 2001. The US's former secretary of state Colin Powell, only two days after the 9/11

events made a phone call to Pakistan's president at the time, General Pervez Musharraf, and stated: "You are either with us or against us" (Khan, 2018:3). Musharraf confirmed that the Bush administration called and threatened to bomb Pakistan "back to the stone age" if Pakistan did not cooperate with America's war on Afghanistan (Ahmed, 2016: 214). Musharraf apparently accepted to side with the US and its operation in Afghanistan, but in the background, it continued to support and provide sanctuaries for the Taliban in Pakistan's territory. He authorized the rescue of Key Taliban officials from Afghanistan and allowing them to live freely in Pakistan.

There were three main reasons for Pakistan that motivated it to join the "war on terror" coalition. Firstly, Pakistan worried that if it did not join the coalition, a potential US-India coalition would further cement the conventional Northern Alliance-India coalition against Pakistan. Secondly, it was afraid that India might put Pakistan under great pressure with the support of the international community in regard to the presence of its militancy in Kashmir (Sial, 2013: 4). Thirdly, Pakistani decision-makers anticipated that the US would not remain in Afghanistan for a long time. Thus, they felt that they could use the Taliban and even Al-Qaeda later as their proxy in Afghanistan and in the region.

It is also true that Pakistan suffered immensely from terrorist attacks just as Afghanistan did, between 2001 and 2014. For instance, in 2014, a terrorist attack on innocent school children in Peshawar left over one hundred dead (17 December 2014, BBC), and in 2010, a coordinated attack in two mosques in Lahore killed around 80 members of the Muslim minority, Ahmadis (Perlez, 29 May 2010: *The New York Times*). However, this thesis found that Pakistani officials do not consider the Afghan Taliban as a threat to their country. For instance, in November 2014, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's national security advisor on foreign relations Sartaj Aziz, stated that there is no need for his country to target militants that do not threaten his country's security. He argued "why should enemies of the US unnecessarily become our foes," referring to the Haqqani branch of the Afghan Taliban that reside in Pakistan, and he went on to say, "why must we make enemies out of them all?" (Ghumman, 20 November 2014: *DAWN*). The problem with the Pakistani authorities

is they make a distinction between different terrorist groups. They argue that there are two kinds of Taliban, "good Taliban" and "bad Taliban". For them, the Taliban that carry out an attack in Afghanistan's territory against Afghan people and their government, like Afghan Taliban, are "good Taliban"; on the other hand, those that carry out an attack in Pakistan's territory and against its interest, ike Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) also known as the Pakistani Taliban, are "bad Taliban". Furthermore, Pakistani officials mostly do not reject the threat of the Taliban, but when they claim that they are fighting against the Taliban, they fail to clarify which Taliban they are talking about. Moreover, in Pakistan, the civilian government has little to say about its foreign policy; rather, it is controlled by the top military leadership. The Pakistani military and ISI consider themselves the only guardian of the Pakistani people's welfare (Sinai: 2017: 324). Any act of normalization between Pakistan's civilian government, Afghanistan and India is considered as suspicious by the ISI and military. The Pakistani Military and the ISI have always used insurgent and terrorist groups as a means to achieve its goal.

### 4.4.4.1. The reasons Pakistan spoiled reconciliation process in Afghanistan (2001-2014)

Between 2001 and 2014, although there were several factors that motivated the Pakistani ISI and its military leaders to spoil reconciliation efforts initiated in Afghanistan and to support the Afghan Taliban to continue their fight in Afghanistan, the most significant were the border issue and the dispute over sharing water resources between the two countries, the economic concerns of Pakistan, and its perception of threat from Afghan and Indian sides.

Firstly, the border disputes between Afghanistan and Pakistan was a motivating factor for Pakistan in spoiling the reconciliation process of Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014. The root of this tension between these two countries dates back to the 19th century when Pakistan was still part of British India. In 1893, the British Empire imposed a borderline with approximately 2,600 km (figure 3.3.) on the Amir of Afghanistan in order to strengthen its control over the northern parts of India and

especially to secure control of the strategic Khyber Pass.[63] This agreement was signed between the Indian Foreign Secretary at the time, Sir Motimer Durand, and Amir Abdul Rahman Khan (ruler of Afghanistan) in Kabul. Yet, over the mutual history of Afghanistan and Pakistan (since 1947), this border has remained as one of the sources of tension between the two countries. Afghans widely believe that the original agreement with former Great Britain was a hundred-year term (1893-1993),[64] and that after this the land in question would revert back to Afghanistan.[65] For this reason, on September 30, 1947, Afghanistan's delegate in the United Nations assembly, Hussein Aziz opposed Pakistan's application for admission in the organization.

However, for Pakistan the issue of the Durand Line is an existential one; the territory in question amounts to some 60 percent of its sovereign territory (Pasoon, 2017: 27). The former senior Taliban diplomat Qazi Habibullah Fauzi[66] argued that the border issue between Pakistan and Afghanistan has always been one of the significant factors that motivated Pakistan to support the continuation of conflict in Afghanistan. He argued that "whenever a regime change occurs in Afghanistan, or a reconciliation attempt takes place, Pakistan's main request has been to solve the border issue". Mohammad Qais Wakili,[67] a senator from Bamiyan province in the Upper House of Afghanistan, argued that Pakistan fears a centralized and independent Afghanistan.

---

[63] It has been one of the significant line of communication between Central and South Asia since time immemorial. Traders, invaders, and seasonal nomads have used this route (Qadir, Minhas, 2013: 41). For example, in 326 BC, Alexander the Great marched his army through the Pass in an unsuccessful attempt to capture India; after almost 2000 years, Babur Shah succeed to conquer India via this pass, and during the Kushan Empire it became the main trade and migration route between India and China, "The Silk Road" (Wood, 2011, February 17).

[64] When Afghans cite the term of this agreement, they refer to the Dari and Pashto copies of the agreement, which specify a hundred-year term (1893-1993), but there are no clear references regarding this term in an English version of this agreement (Micallef, 2015).

[65] Micallef, J. V. (2015). Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Poisoned Legacy of the Durand Line. Huffington Post, 21. Website: https://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-v-micallef/afghanistan-and-pakistan_b_8590918.html

[66] Qazi Habibullah Fauzi (personal communication, January 04, 2018), in Kabul.

[67] Mohammad Qais Wakili (personal communication, January 07, 2018), in Kabul. Mr. Mohammad Qais Wakili (Senator of Bamyan Province), member of the commission of hearing complaints, worked as a manager of the transportation department of the National Defense Ministry for seven years.

He said the reason for this is that Pakistan thinks the Pashtun people who live on both sides of the Durand Line will unite and get their land back from the Pakistani government if there is a peaceful and independent Afghanistan. This would strip nearly half of Pakistan's land area as well as its vital Indian Ocean ports of Jiwani, Gwadar, and Pasni. These ports give Pakistan access to the mouth of the Arabian/Persian Gulf and provide further strategic strength. For Pakistan, the loss of Pashtun lands is unacceptable, which is why the Pakistanis have consistently sought to undermine Afghan unity and maintain a weakened Afghanistan in order to secure their northwest border (Livermore, 2014: 3).

Secondly, the tension over sharing water resources between Afghanistan and Pakistan was another motivating factors for Pakistan to spoil the reconciliation of Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014. Although Afghanistan is located in a half-deserted atmosphere, it is still a water-rich country, primarily due to its high mountains, such as Wakhan, Hindukush, and Kohi Baba, covered by snow (Saffi, Kohistani, 2013: 8). Afghanistan, per year, produces 80 billion cubic meters of water; 60 billion cubic meters of it goes to neighboring countries — especially Pakistan (Majidyar, 2018). The primary surface water resources of Afghanistan are the Amu Darya, the Helmand River, the Kabul River, and the Harirud and Murghab rivers (King and Sturtewagen, 2010:3). The Kabul River is shared by two countries, Pakistan and Afghanistan. This river contributes 25 million acre-feet (MAF) to the economy of Pakistan (Awan, 2019: *The News International*). But there is no official agreement between the two countries regarding how to share this river. Furthermore, Pakistan is facing serious water shortages. Its population, both urban and rural, suffers from lack of access to safe drinking waters and from water-borne diseases. There are some reports, like one from the Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources (PCRWR) that warns Pakistani authorities that by 2025 their country may "run dry" (Tunio, 2016: 27).

Before 2001, Pakistan did not have the concern of water sharing with Afghanistan. Because of civil war, lack of development, and conflict, Afghanistan was not able to benefit from its water basins. But, with the fall of the Taliban regime, the country

opened a new chapter. The globally isolated country became the focal point for the international community. It experienced increased development in various fields like human rights, education, and institution building, but it still lacks a modern water infrastructure for its agricultural and urbanization requirements. Most of the time, big cities like Kabul still do not have 24-hour supply of electricity. The country buys its electricity from its neighbors like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Furthermore, there is no doubt that freshwater is crucial for irrigation for agricultural development. The agriculture sector contributes about half of Afghanistan's GDP or gross domestic product (King and Sturtewagen, 2010: 2). For these reasons, it is crucial for Afghanistan to use its available and abundant water resources. During the Karzai administration, the Afghan government, with the assistance of the Indian government and World Bank, planned to build 12 dams over the Kabul River, but the Pakistani government indicated its concern regarding this plan, arguing that these dams will stop crucial water supply from flowing to the Indus River and that "this will increase India's spheres of influence over water issues in the region" (Chaturvedi, 2013: 142). Qazi Habibullah Fauzi[68] (the Taliban's former ambassador in Saudi Arabia) argued that Pakistan wants a consistent conflict in Afghanistan in order to make Afghanistan dependent on Pakistan for water and other things. He added that it was because of this that Pakistan assassinated the Afghan Taliban leaders who indicated interest in solving the conflict in the country via peace and negotiations.

Thirdly, between 2001 and 2014, another significant factor that motivated the Pakistani ISI and its military leaders to spoil Afghanistan's reconciliation was economic. It has been argued that if a society has valuable and marketable resource, such as gems and timbers, it is highly likely that its initiated peace process will fail (Stedman, 2001:2). The parties in conflict may perceive the peace that is emerging out of the peace process as threatening their economic interests (Lee and Özerdem, 2015: 61). For this reason, they spoil the initiated peace process. Mawlawi Pir Mohammad Ruhani[69], Taliban's former senior official, argued that:

---

[68] Qazi Habibullah Fauzi  (personal communication, January 04, 2018), in Kabul.
[69] Maulawi Pir Mohammad Ruhani (personal communication, January 04, 2018), in Kabul.

Pakistan always had problems with Afghanistan. It had problems regarding water, mineral resources, timbers, and its geostrategic situation. It has always perceived Afghanistan, not as an independent state, but as one of its states like Punjab, Balochistan or Sindh. Afghanistan industrially is a weak country. It does not have big companies that can produce the basic needs of its populations. Thus its needs Pakistani markets. Even, it imports Sulphur matches from Pakistan. For this reason, Pakistan spoiled the reconciliation process of Karzai via killing or assassinating influential Taliban decision makers in order to keep yoke on the Kabul regime.

Although the documentation of the level of trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan is unreliable, and much of it informal, one source estimates it to be as much as USD 10 billion annually (Harpviken and Tadjbakhsh, 2016: 52). The flow of this trade is largely one way. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) cited the Pakistani side's export to Afghanistan at USD 2 billion, while from the Afghan side was USD 177 million, in 2012 (Harpviken and Tadjbakhsh, 2016: 52). The main exports of Afghanistan consist of gold, grapes, vegetable saps, insect resins, and tropical fruits.[70]

Moreover, an Afghanistan under the Taliban regime could serve as a transit hub for Pakistan in order to reach to energy-rich countries of Central Asia and could prevent the trade activities of its rival, India, in the region. Over the history of Afghanistan, foreign traders and colonizers come to Afghanistan not to capture the county but to use it as a safe passage to other countries like China and Central Asian countries. Pakistan has always been inspired by the idea of establishing trade links with the landlocked Central Asian countries via using the geostrategic position of Afghanistan for two main reasons. First, in order to give them access to the Arabian Sea port of Gwadar, and secondly, to benefit from the rich resources of those countries (Hasnat, 2009: 144). In addition, Pakistani stakeholders think that if there is a weak client regime in Kabul, they will be able to prevent India's economic activities in Afghanistan. The absence major of economic relations between India and Pakistan caused a ripple affected in the region, particularly in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is one of the few and significant countries on which Pakistan and India can find common ground. For instance, in the field of transportation, particularly between the Central

---

[70]This data is extracted from the website, *the Observatory of Economic Complexity*, website: https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/afg/

Asian countries and India, in 2010, Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA). According to this agreement, Pakistan was supposed to facilitate Afghan exports to India via Pakistan (Wagah).[71] However, once the Indian consortium won the mining rights in Afghanistan (Hajigak), Pakistan banned the transit of iron ore, which led to the opening of an alternative route via Chabahar in Iran (Harpviken and Tadjbakhsh, 2016: 52). The Transit Afghan Pipeline, also is known as the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline (TAPI) was initiated in 1995 but has been stalled many years, in part due to Pakistan's reluctance to get involved with India (Harpviken and Tadjbakhsh, 2016: 53). This planned project was to be 1,814 kilometers with a total estimated cost of USD 9.9 billion (Rahim, 2018: *The Diplomat Magazine*). This pipeline would have the capability to export of "33 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) from Turkmenistan, of which India and Pakistan would each receive 14 bcm/y while Afghanistan gets 5 bcm/y" (Cutler, 2011: *The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute*). But, once the pipeline project started, Pakistan demanded high transit fees yet was reluctant to guarantee security for the pipeline (Harpviken and Tadjbakhsh, 2016: 53).

Fourthly, and most importantly, between 2001 and 2014, the Pakistani military and ISI tried to spoil the reconciliation process of Afghanistan due to security reasons. It has been argued that parties in conflict are only motivated by insecurity and only seek survival (Stedman, 1997: 9). There has always been a mindset among the Pakistani military and ISI that perceive the Indian government and Kabul regime as a threat to Pakistan's security. Hence they wanted to have a client regime in Kabul in order to prevent Indian hegemony in the region and be secure from Kabul. For this reason, between 2001 and 2014, any of the Taliban's leadership that indicated an interest in joining the reconciliation process of Hamid Karzai's government either were either assassinated or imprisoned by Pakistan. The reason for this insecurity firstly lies in Pakistan's military and the ISI's defensive strategy which is to perceive a threat from India and Afghanistan. For example, General Pervez Musharraf argues that out of

---

[71] Agreement between the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA), published in 2010, p. 27. website: http://www.nttfc.org/reports/APTTA-Final-Signed%2028102010.pdf

thirty-three of India's infantry division, twenty-five of them are against Pakistan and the rest against China, Bangladesh, and Myanmar (Sinai, 2017: 325). General Musharraf further claims that "India has got three mechanized divisions, all of them against Pakistan. The Indian air force, the forward air bases, which are supposed to be air bases which are activated in case of offensive, all against Pakistan. All of these necessitate the Pakistani army to have a mindset that is oriented towards India" (Sinai, 2017: 325). Pakistani generals and the ISI fear not only being squeezed by Indian forces in the south but also a pro-Indian regime to the north in Kabul. The Pakistani government finds the role of India in Afghanistan a threat to its national security. For example, although it is not confirmed officially either by the Afghan government or by India, the Pakistani military and ISI blame the Indian government in Afghanistan for funding and arming insurgents in Balochistan and Waziristan via its consulates in Afghanistan (Harpviken and Tadjbakhsh, 2016: 49). However, Hamid Karzai replied that most of such blame from the Pakistani side was "hurtful" and "unfortunate" DAWN, November 19, 2014). Current Deputy Minister of Justice Muhammad Qasim Halimi[72] argued that "Afghanistan is an independent country, we have the right to have relations with any country, as we have with Pakistan. Having India in Afghanistan and having a friendly relation with it does not mean that our land can be used by India against another country, particularly Pakistan."

The Pakistani military and ISI perceive that they can counterbalance the Indian hegemony in the region and can be secure from Kabul regime, when Pakistan had a client regime in Kabul. This perception of Pakistan is based on its "strategic depth" doctrine, which was developed in the 1980s by two key actors in the Pakistani security establishment, General Hamid Gul and Mirza Aslam Beg (Harpviken and Tadjbakhsh, 2016:46-47). This doctrine emerged after Pakistan's disastrous defeat in the third Indo-Pakistani War in 1971. The Indian army in less than two weeks crushingly defeated the Pakistani army. As a result of East Pakistan's rising up against West Pakistan, East Pakistan became the independent state of Bangladesh. Based on the Pakistani narratives, the division of Bangladesh from Pakistan, which they blame

---

[72] Mohammad Qasim Halimi (personal communication, November, 2018), in Istanbul.

on India, made it all the more important to have a pro-Pakistani regime in Afghanistan because of two significant reasons that are related to this discussion. Firstly, in the case of a possible war between Pakistan and India, Pakistan wants to have a secure refuge in Afghanistan's territory; secondly, in the case of an invasion of Pakistan by India, Pakistan wants to use the "porous border" between Afghanistan and Pakistan as "a route by which Pakistani leaders, troops and other assets, including its nuclear weapons, could retreat" (Dalrymple, 2013). However, in order for this doctrine to work, there should be a pro-Pakistani and anti-Indian regime in Kabul that is willing to cooperate for its fight against India. The best candidate for this was the Afghan Taliban. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, the Afghan Taliban are from the young Afghan generation that migrated to Pakistan during the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. They studied in Pakistani Deobandi madrasas[73] and were brainwashed there. These religious teaching centers are known for having a close relationship with the Pakistani military and the ISI (Sinai: 2017: 335). Secondly, the Afghan Taliban ideologically has a hostile standing against non-Muslim countries, particularly India. The ISI believes that such leverage cannot be found in other groups in Afghanistan; thus it prefers to support this group rather than others. For example, in 1996, when the Taliban come to power, they worked perfectly in the harmony with this doctrine. The victory of the Taliban gave to the ISI and its military the long-sought goal of granting it strategic depth against India (Ganguly, Howenstein, 2009). The Taliban closed the Indian Embassy in Kabul and its consulates in the cities of Jalalabad and Kandahar with the encouragement of Pakistan. After the 9/11 events, the Afghan Taliban several times targeted India's diplomatic mission and citizens in Afghanistan. Among the most significant and serious instances were the bombings of the Indian embassy in 2008 and 2009, the terroristic attack on two Kabul guest houses popular among Indians there in 2010, suicide bombing on the Indian consulate in Jalalabad in 2013, and the 2014 attack on the consulate of India in Herat (Harpviken and Tadjbakhsh, 2016: 48-49).

---

[73] It emerged in British India as a reform movement aiming to rejuvenate the Islamic community in a colonial state (Rath, 2016: 330). This madrasa first was founded in the town of Deoband in Northern India in 1867. It emphasizes "purification of Islam from cultural accretions, and a return to the teachings of the Quran and the practices of the Prophet" (Haqqani, 2006: 76).

In addition, Pakistani stakeholders associate the peace process of Afghanistan with the Kashmir issue between Pakistan and India. Senator Mushahid Hussain Syed, the Pakistan Prime Minister's special envoy on Kashmir, argued that "peace in Afghanistan links to the resolution of the Kashmir issues. Unless the Kashmir issue is resolved, peace cannot be maintained in Afghanistan" (*The Centre for Strategic and Regional Studies (CSRS)*, October 15, 2016). One may question what the Kashmir issue has to do with Afghanistan and with the Taliban's peace process. While the root cause of Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India goes back to 1948, to the time when the Indian subcontinent became independent from British rule, the disputes between the Karzai government and the Afghan Taliban date back to 2001, when the US invaded the country. Mohammad Taqi, a columnist for Pakistan's *Daily Times* argues that "the Kashmir imbroglio is an unfortunate phenomenon whose obvious shadow has loomed over not just Indo-Pakistan relations but upon Afghanistan as well" (MASHAL, 2011: AL JAZEERA). Shahrbanu Tadjbaksh and Kristian Berg Harpviken, in their book titled, *A rock between hard places: Afghanistan as an arena of regional insecurity,* define the main cause of conflict in the security dynamics of the South Asian Complex as mainly a reflection of India and Pakistan's bilateral relations via which they check the influence of others by supporting their proxy in Afghanistan (Harpviken and Tadjbakhsh, 2016: 45-46). Over the history of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India have always supported the opposite sides in Afghanistan's case. For example, between 1979 and 1989, while India supported the Kabul regime, Pakistan supported the resistance groups; between 1994 and 2001, while India supported the Northern Alliances, Pakistan supported the Taliban regime; after the 9/11 events, while India supported the Kabul regime, Pakistan secretly offered the Afghan Taliban sanctuaries and assisted them militarily and economically.

## 4.5. Conclusion

Taking everything into consideration, this chapter of the thesis discussed the causes of the failure of the reconciliation process in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014, with the support of spoiler theory and interview qualitative research method. Despite the fact that some of the interviewees claimed that domestic Afghan leaders, the rank and file Afghan Taliban, and the US were the spoiler of Karzai's reconciliation

process, this research founded that the Pakistani ISI and its military officials were the ones who spoiled the reconciliation processes initiated in the country through the stated dates. Some of the interviewees believed that the domestic Afghan leaders spoiled the reconciliation process due to their former rivalries, that the rank and file Afghan Taliban spoiled them due to their economic gains from the continuation of conflict, and that the US spoiled them due to Afghanistan's geostrategic location (to stay close to its global rivals like China and Russia) and its rich untapped minerals. However, based on my interviews, this research found that the Taliban's organization is structured on hierarchical order; hence, their lower level members do not have the power to spoil any reconciliation process. Regarding the role of Afghan domestic leaders in the failure of the reconciliation process, this thesis found that there was a general consensus among them to make peace with the Afghan Taliban in order to end the ongoing conflict and bring security to peace in the country. Regarding the role of the US in the failure of the reconciliation process of Afghanistan, this research found that the wrong policies of the US, such as not inviting the Afghan Taliban to the First Bonn Process, not being able to co-opt the former high level Afghan Taliban officials into the new political system, and not being able to develop a concrete policy against Pakistan, led to the re-emergence of the Afghan Taliban. These mistakes by the US give the birth to the conspiracy theory in Afghanistan that the US was not motivated to end the conflict in the country, and even some believed that the US spoiled the reconciliation efforts in the country between 2001 and 2014. Moreover, this research found that the US was the main ally of Afghanistan in its fight against terrorism. It supported the Karzai government politically, economically, and militarily. Regarding the failure of Afghanistan's reconciliation process, this thesis found the ISI and its high-level military officials as the main spoiler of Afghanistan's reconciliation process between 2001 and 2014. Based on my interviews, Pakistan's ISI and its military officials believed that they could secure themselves from the Indian threat in the region and in Afghanistan, solve the water and border disputes with the Kabul government, and secure Pakistan's economic interests in the region and in Afghanistan, only if Pakistan had a weak or a client regime in Afghanistan. Hence, they spoiled all attempts at reconciliation process by Hamid Karzai's government via the assassination or imprisoning of the Taliban leaders that wanted to join.

# CHAPTER 5

# CONCLUSION

## 5.1. Concluding Remarks

Afghanistan has been at war for more than four decades. This is a period longer than the two World Wars combined. During the course of this history, the Afghan people and the international communities have tried tirelessly several times to end the conflict and bring peace to the country. However, in each instance, it ended with failure. The most well-known examples of the reconciliation efforts are: during the communist regime, the National Reconciliation Program (1986) and the Geneva Accord (1988); during the mujahideen regime, the Peshawar Accord (1992), the Islamabad Accord (1993), and the Mahiper Accord (1996); during the Taliban regime, the Six Plus Two contact groups Talks in Tashkent (1999); and during the Karzai regime, the Prosei Tahkim-e Solh (Strengthening Peace) (2005) and the Afghanistan's Peace and Reintegration Program (2010).

As indicated in chapters three and four of this thesis, since the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the history of the country has shown no shortage of spoilers, both internal and external, for its reconciliation processes. Yet, this thesis found that the external spoilers played a greater role in the continuation of the conflict and the constant failure of the reconciliation processes in the country than the internal spoilers, particularly between 2001 and 2014.

This thesis argued that between 2001 and 2014, the reconciliation process in Afghanistan failed because of two main reasons: the mistaken policies of the US towards the Afghan Taliban and the active spoiling of the neighboring country Pakistan. To obtain valid and unbiased results, this thesis employed the research question of why the reconciliation process failed in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014. A qualitative research method and spoiler theory were utilized while carrying out this study (Stedman, 1997). For this thesis, I conducted intensive interviews with a dozen of experienced experts, including heads of political parties, high officials in

the former Taliban regime, senior members of the Afghan parliament, senior members of the Afghan Upper House (Moshrano Jirga), members of the High Peace Council, TV commentators, scholars, and former warlords.

This thesis found that after the 9/11 events, when the US invaded Afghanistan, its wrong policies towards the defeated Afghan Taliban, such as not inviting them to the first Bonn Conference, not co-opting the former Afghan Taliban members into the new political system, and not having a concrete policy against Pakistan, led to the reemergence of the Afghan Taliban and the continuation of the conflict in Afghanistan. These mistakes of the US even gave birth to the conspiracy theory among Afghans (both educated and not) that the US was one of the spoilers of the reconciliation process in the country. In this study, the majority of interviewees defined the US as an ally of the Kabul regime against terrorism rather than as a spoiler of the Afghan reconciliation process. They argued that although the US made several mistakes in its attempt to bring peace to Afghanistan (as mentioned), it helped the Karzai regime in its APRP (Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program) and PTS (Strengthening Peace) in order to bring the Taliban to the negotiation table and make them abandon their weapons.

Regarding Pakistan, twelve interviewees out of thirteen, which is almost the entire set, believed that the Pakistani ISI and its military leaders were the main reason for and the spoiler behind the failure of Afghanistan's reconciliation process between 2001 and 2014. This thesis found that throughout the stated dates, Pakistan spoiled the Afghan reconciliation process at various levels. While between 2001 and 2004 it was a limited spoiler, between 2005 and 2014 it became a greedy spoiler or even sometimes a total spoiler for the reconciliation process initiated in the country. Pakistan used various tactics like assassinating, imprisoning, and warning the Taliban members who indicated an interest in joining the reconciliation process of the Karzai regime. The main aim of Pakistan in doing so was to secure its national interests in Afghanistan and the region by preventing Indian Influence in Afghanistan, securing a safe passage to the Central Asian countries to benefit from their markets and rich natural resources; and solving its border and water issues with the Kabul regime. The

Pakistan ISI and its military leaders believed that they could  these goals only by having a weak pro-Pakistani and client regime in Kabul, as it had between 1996 and 2001 (the Taliban regime).

## 5.2. Challenges and Limitations of This Thesis

In conducting the interviews for this thesis, I encountered a number of challenges. These include difficulty contacting interviewees and transcribing, translating, analyzing, and compiling the interviews. First, since this research is based on the interviews of experts, high government officials, heads of political parties, members of parliament and Senate, and experienced individuals concerning the topic, it was not easy to contact and to make appointments with them due to their busy schedules and security concerns. Some of the interviewees several times delayed the appointment time, and others, despite their arrangement to do an interview, canceled the meeting. In addition, it was impossible to conduct an interview or even to contact active the Afghan Taliban members. For this reason, I chose to interview high officials among former Taliban members in order to reflect their opinion and add to the cohesiveness of the thesis.

The second challenge concerned transcribing, translating, analyzing, and combining different opinions of interviewees. It was a very time consuming and effortful process. To make the research more comprehensive and to make the interviewees feel more comfortable, I conducted interviews in three different domestic languages (Dari, Uzbek, and partly in Pashto). Then, I translated original transcripts in the above-mentioned languages into English, analyzed the results, and combined them into one comprehensive narrative.

## 5.3. Literature Contribution and Research Recommendation

In terms of literature, since no previous study has examined the causes of the failure of Afghanistan's reconciliation process, especially between 2001 and 2014, by using an in-depth interview qualitative research framework and spoiler theory, this study is going to be an original contribution to the literature. Secondly, theoretically, most of the existing studies have attempted to explain the causes of the failure of

Afghanistan's reconciliation process through the ripeness and power-sharing theory of conflict analysis. They focused mostly on the role of Afghan domestic leaders and the main parties (the Taliban and Afghan government) in the conflict. However, this thesis, via spoiler theory argues that the real reason for the failure of Afghanistan's reconciliation process was not the main parties (the Afghan government and the Afghan Taliban) and domestic leaders but an outside spoiler (Pakistan).

On the other hand, it is significant to note that in Afghanistan, domestic Afghan leaders, political parties, warlords and ulema have complex direct and indirect relations with regional and global powers, as was indicated in the Figure 4. 3. of finding chapter. But, because of theoretical limitation, this thesis could not explain their relations and the impact of those relations on the failure of Afghanistan's reconciliation process. Thus, future research on the relations of Afghan domestic actors with regional and global powers and the impact of these relations on the continuation of conflict in the country by system thinking theory would be a distinct contribution to the literature.

### 5.4. Policy Recommendation

As mentioned in the findings chapter, one of the main conditions of the Afghan Taliban to negotiate with the Karzai regime and join the reconciliation process was the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan. This study found that the Taliban considered Afghanistan to have been invaded by the US and viewed the Kabul regime (under administration of both Karzai, and Ashraf Ghani) as the puppet of the US. Hence, they always emphasized direct negotiation with the US rather than the Kabul regime. Similarly, this study showed that the withdrawal of foreign forces cannot bring peace in Afghanistan for three main reasons. First, the conflict in Afghanistan is not only between the US and the Taliban but has domestic, regional, and global dimensions. In Afghanistan, almost all the local stakeholders and political parties have a regional and global ally, as detailed in chapters three and four of this thesis. The domestic stakeholders are directly or indirectly politically and economically supported by those countries. For these reasons, any possible negotiation should include all these parties. Second, even if the Taliban and the US sign an agreement

and the US withdraws from Afghanistan, a long-lasting peace will not come to Afghanistan. One of the reason for this is that a power vacuum might occur in the country. Thus, the regional countries (Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia) and global powers (China, Russia, etc.) will try to fill that vacuum by advocating for their Afghan allies. Therefore, it is highly likely that the scenario of 1990(the emergence of civil war in the country after the departure of the Soviet Union) would be repeated.[74] Third, the Afghan Taliban has no economic and political agenda for the conflict of Afghanistan other than securing a US withdrawal. Between 1996 and 2001, when Afghanistan was ruled by the Taliban, the country was isolated from the world (instead it allied with terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda), girls' education and technology was banned, and the country was ruled by Sharia Law and Pashtun nationalism. Yet, now Afghanistan's condition is very different from what it was eighteen years ago. Yes, it is true that there is no security and peace in the country, but there has been tremendous development in terms of democracy, freedom, free media, human rights and particularly women's rights, and in education. Therefore, the Afghan people are not ready for a Taliban dominated regime in Kabul.

On the other hand, now, the US (the main ally of the Kabul regime) believes that there is no better military solution in Afghanistan, the Afghan Taliban militarily controls a significant part of the country, and the Kabul regime believes that it cannot sustain for a long time if the US leaves Afghanistan. Furthermore, the Afghan people, are tired of constant war and the conflict; thus, they seek for long-lasting peace in their country. For this reason, the main parties in the conflict (the Taliban and the Kabul regime) should accept each other and should sit together in order to solve their issues via negotiation rather fighting and killing. The Afghan Taliban should accept the free and fair election, should allow Afghan girls to get their education in universities, and also should allow the Afghan women to decide about their future. One way to achieve this and long-lasting peace in the country could be possible by conducting another conference that resembles the 2001 Bonn Conference, under the supervision of the

---

[74] In 1989, when the Soviet Union left Afghanistan a power vacuum of occurred. The regional and global actors attempted to fill it by supporting domestic political parties and different ethnicities. For this reason, a civil war took place which led to the emergence of the Taliban.

UN. Unlike the Bonn Conference, this one should be inclusive of all the domestic (including women and civil societies), regional and global stakeholders. The Afghan delegates should choose among them a head of the interim government for two years. Over this period, the necessary constitutional amendment should occur, the Afghan Taliban fighters should leave their weapons (some of them may join to the Afghan National Army), and the interim government should prepare the country for a new election. Similar to the 2001 Bonn Conference international community should continue their economic, and political support for the Afghan government without interfering to their domestic issue. Furthermore, the UN should make sure that regional countries like Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are not spoiling the process. Then after two years, the new head of the state should be selected through a free and fair election under the observation of the UN.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**

A. Livermore, D. (2014). Pakistani Unconventional Warfare against Afghanistan: A Case Study of the Taliban as an Unconventional Warfare Proxy Force. Small Wars Journal. Retrieved February 4, 2014, from http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/pakistani-unconventional-warfare-against-afghanistan?page=2

Adamec, L. W. (2010). The A to Z of Afghan Wars, Revolutions and Insurgencies (Vol. 30). Scarecrow Press.

Adamec, L. W. (2011). Historical dictionary of Afghanistan. Scarecrow Press.

Afsar, S., Samples, C., & Wood, T. (2008). The Taliban: an organizational analysis.

Ahmed, N. (2016). Re-defining US-Pakistan relations. *The Dialogue, 7 (3)*, 212-233.

Akbar, M. Islamisation in Afghanistan and Afghan Jihad: A critical appraisal.

Alikuzai, H. W. (2013). *A Concise History of Afghanistan in 25 Volumes* (Vol. 14). Trafford Publishing.

Allison, R., & Jonson, L. (Eds.). (2004). Central Asian security: the new international context. Brookings Institution Press.

Armajani, J. (2011). Modern Islamist movements: History, religion, and politics. John Wiley & Sons.

Awan, H. A. (2018, July 09). A Pak-Afghan water treaty? Retrieved from https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/339335-a-pak-afghan-water-treaty

Azam, F. (1993). The Geneva Accords on Afghanistan

Bar-Siman-Tov, Y. (2010). Barriers to peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Makhon Yerushalayim le-heker Yisra'el.

Bar-Siman-Tov, Y. (Ed.). (2004). From conflict resolution to reconciliation. Oxford University Press.

Bar-Siman-Tov, Y. (Ed.). (2007). The Israeli-Palestinian conflict: from conflict resolution to conflict management. Springer.

Bar-Tal, D. (1998). Societal beliefs in times of intractable conflict: The Israeli case. International Journal of Conflict Management, 9(1), 22-50.

Bar-Tal, D. (2000). From intractable conflict through conflict resolution to reconciliation: Psychological analysis. Political Psychology, 21(2), 351-365.

Bar-Tal, D. (2001). Why does fear override hope in societies engulfed by intractable conflict, as it does in the Israeli society?. Political Psychology, 22(3), 601-627.

Bar-Tal, D. (2009). Reconciliation as a foundation of culture of peace. In Handbook on building cultures of peace (pp. 363-377). Springer, New York, NY.

Bar-Tal, D. (2010). Culture of conflict: Evolvement, institutionalization, and consequences. In Personality, Human Development, and Culture (pp. 199-214). Psychology Press.

Bar-Tal, D. (2011). Introduction: Conflicts and social psychology. In Bar-Tal, D. (Ed.), Intergroup conflicts and their resolution: Social psychological perspective (pp.217-240). New York: Psychology Press

Bar-Tal, D. (2013). Intractable conflicts: Socio-psychological foundations and dynamics. Cambridge University Press.

Bar-Tal, D., & Bennink, G. H. (2004). The nature of reconciliation as an outcome and as a process. From conflict resolution to reconciliation, 6.

Bar-Tal, D., & Cehajic-Clancy, S. (2014). From collective victimhood to social reconciliation: Outlining a conceptual framework. In War, community, and social change (pp. 125-136). Springer, New York, NY.

Bar-Tal, D., & Salomon, G. (2006). Narratives of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Evolvement, Contents, Functions and Consequences. 2006). Israeli and Palestinian narratives of conflict: history's double helix, 19-46.

Bar-Tal, D., & Teichman, Y. (2005). Stereotypes and prejudice in conflict: Representations of Arabs in Israeli Jewish society. Cambridge University Press.

Bar-Tal, D., Chernyak-Hai, L., Schori, N., & Gundar, A. (2009). A sense of self-perceived collective victimhood in intractable conflicts. International Review of the Red Cross, 91(874), 229-258.

Bar-Tal, D., Nets-Zehngut, R., & Sharvit, K. (2017). Self-Censorship In Contexts Of Conflict. Reprint, Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Bar-Tal, D., Sharvit, K., Halperin, E., & Zafran, A. (2012). Ethos of conflict: The concept and its measurement. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 18(1), 40.

BBC (17 December 2014), Peshawar school massacre: What we know website: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30488503

Bergen, P. (2015, August 21). The enigmatic Mullah Omar and his legacy. Retrieved from https://edition.cnn.com/2015/07/29/opinions/bergen-mullah-omar/index.html

Bergen, P., & Tiedemann, K. (Eds.). (2012). Talibanistan: negotiating the borders between terror, politics, and religion. Oxford University Press.

Berliner, D. C., & Kupermintz, H. (Eds.). (2014). Fostering change in institutions, environments, and people: a festschrift in honor of Gavriel Salomon. Routledge.

Bew, J., Evans, R., Frampton, M., Neumann, P., & Porges, M. (2013). Talking to the Taliban: Hope Over History?. ICSR.

Blaikie, N., & Priest, J. (2019). Designing social research: The logic of anticipation. John Wiley & Sons.

Bonn Agreement, (2001, December). Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions. In The First International Bonn Conference on Afghanistan. Website: https://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm

Border Immigration Agency (2007). Country of Origin Information Report Afghanistan, p. 70

Brahimi, A. (2010). The Taliban's evolving ideology.

Brahimi, L. (2008). Afghan Bonn Architect Says People's Needs Have Been Forgotten. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Reports.

Branigin, W. (1993). Khmer Rouge Move Toward War. [online] Washington Post. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/05/10/khmer-rouge-move-toward-war/8b1e36b6-03ac-4e08-bcfe-6845a3643b34/?utm_term=.19dc6f1abb13

Brounéus, K. (2008). Rethinking reconciliation: Concepts, methods, and an empirical study of truth telling and psychological health in Rwanda (Doctoral dissertation, Institutionen för freds-och konfliktforskning).

Brumberg, D., & Shehata, D. (Eds.). (2009). *Conflict, Identity, and Reform in the Muslim World: Challenges for US Engagement*. US Institute of Peace Press.

Bugeja, M. (2014). Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan: Nation-building and Combating Al-Qaeda's Ideology. Anchor Academic Publishing (aap_verlag).

Bush, G. W. (2001). Address to a joint session of Congress following 9/11 attacks. American Rhetoric, 20.

Cary Gladstone. (2001). Afghanistan revisited. Nova Publishers.

Chaturvedi, A. K. (2013). *Water: A Source for Future Conflicts*. Vij Books India Pvt Ltd.

Christia, F. (2012). Alliance formation in civil wars. Cambridge University Press.

Christie, D. J. (2012). The encyclopedia of peace psychology. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Christie, D. J. (Ed.). (2011). The encyclopedia of peace psychology (Vol. 1). John Wiley & Sons.

Clements, F. (2003). Conflict in Afghanistan: a historical encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO.

Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). The challenge of reducing the global incidence of civil war. Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University, 26.

Collier, P., & Sambanis, N. (2002). Understanding civil war: a new agenda. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(1), 3-12.

Crainic, A. (2013). An Analysis of the Conflict in Afghanistan. 22.

Cutler, R. M. (2011). Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline Gets Official Four-Way Go-Ahead. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 19. Website: https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/12207-analytical-articles-caci-analyst-2011-1-19-art-12207.html

Dalrymple, W. (2013). A deadly triangle: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Brookings Institution Press. Website: http://csweb.brookings.edu/content/research/essays/2013/deadly-triangle-afghanistan-pakistan-india-c.html

Dawn, (November 19, 2014) Afghanistan won't allow proxy India-Pakistan war: Karzai. Website: https://www.dawn.com/news/1145541

De Reincourt,, A. (1982). India and Pakistan in the Shadow of Afghanistan, 61(2). Retrieved Winter, 1982.

Derksen, D. (2011). Peace from the Bottom-up?: The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program. Peace Research Institute Oslo.

Dixon, J. S., & Sarkees, M. R. (2015). A Guide to Intra-state Wars: An Examination of Civil, Regional, and Intercommunal Wars, 1816-2014. CQ Press.

Eflein, D. J. (1992). A Case Study: Afghanistan-A Soviet Failure. Army War Coll Carlisle Barracks PA.

Emadi, H. (2005). Culture and customs of Afghanistan. Greenwood Publishing Group.

Etikan, I., Musa, S. A., & Alkassim, R. S. (2016). Comparison of convenience sampling and purposive sampling. American Journal of Theoretical and Applied Statistics, 5(1), 1-4.

Fair, C. (2007). Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (2001-2007). *Kabul, Afghanistan: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Google Scholar*.

Fatah, M. (2017). The Taliban Conundrum. IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 22(01), 21-26. doi:10.9790/0837-2201022126

Fields, M., & Ahmed, R. (2011). *A review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and application to the road ahead in Afghanistan*(No. 8). National Defense University Press.

Galtung, J. (2001). After violence, reconstruction, reconciliation, and resolution. Reconciliation, justice and coexistence: Theory and practice, 3-23.

Ganguly, S., & Howenstein, N. (2009). India-Pakistan Rivalry in Afghanistan. Journal of International Affairs, 63(1), 127-140. Website: https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/india-pakistan-rivalry-afghanistan

Gardner, L. (2013). Killing machine: the American presidency in the age of drone warfare. New Press, The.

Gerring, J. (1997). Ideology: A definitional analysis. Political Research Quarterly, 50(4), 957-994.

Gersovitz, M., & Kriger, N. (2013). What is a civil war? A critical review of its definition and (econometric) consequences. The World Bank.

Ghobar, M. G. M. (2001). Afghanistan in the Course of History. Hashmat K. Gobar.

Ghumman, K. (2014, November 20). Aziz criticized for 'good, bad Taliban' distinction. Website: https://www.dawn.com/news/1145708

Giustozzi, A. (1997). War, politics and society in Afghanistan 1978-1992 (Doctoral dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London)). Chicago

Giustozzi, A. (2014). The Taliban and the 2014 elections in Afghanistan. United States Institute of Peace.

Gopal, (2010, November 10). Missed opportunities in Kandahar. http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/11/10/missed-opportunities-in-kandahar/

Greenhill, K. M., & Major, S. (2007). The perils of profiling: Civil war spoilers and the collapse of intrastate peace accords. International Security, 31(3), 7-40.

Guidère, M. (2017). Historical dictionary of Islamic fundamentalism. Rowman & Littlefield.

Halperin, E., & Bar-Tal, D. (2011). Socio-psychological barriers to peace making: An empirical examination within the Israeli Jewish society. Journal of Peace Research, 48(5), 637-651.

Halperin, E., & Sharvit, K. (Eds.). (2015). The Social Psychology of Intractable Conflicts: Celebrating the Legacy of Daniel Bar-tal (Vol. 1). Springer.

Handl, V. (1997). Czech-German declaration on reconciliation, German Politics 6.

Harpviken, K. B., & Tadjbakhsh, S. (2016). *A rock between hard places: Afghanistan as an arena of regional insecurity*. Oxford University Press.

Hartas, D. (Ed.). (2015). Educational research and inquiry: Qualitative and quantitative approaches. Bloomsbury Publishing.

Hartmann, J. U. (2004). Buddha's Forgotten Country. Fikrun wa Fann= Art & Thought, (78), 34-37.

Hasnat, S. F. (2009). Pakistan's strategic interests, Afghanistan and the fluctuating US strategy. Journal of International Affairs, 63(1), 141-155.

Hegre, H., Strand, H., Gates, S., & Nygard, H. M. (2011). The conflict trap.

Heymann, P. B. (2008). Living the policy process. Oxford University Press.

Huasheng, Z. (2012). China and Afghanistan: China's Interests, stances, and perspectives. Center for Strategic & International Studies.

Huasheng, Z. (2015). What Is Behind China's Growing Attention to Afghanistan?. Carnegie Middle East Center, 8.

Human Development Resource Center, 05 November 2012. Helpdesk Report: Violence and sexual abuse in schools in Afghanistan and Pakistan. https://www.heart-resources.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Violence-and-Abuse-in-Schools-November-20121.pdf

Husain, S. A. (1979). Politics of Alliance and Aid: A Case Study of Pakistan (1954-1966). Pakistan Horizon, 32(1/2), 11-46.

Huss, M. T. (2008). Forensic psychology. John Wiley & Sons.

Javaid, U., & Fatima, Q. (2013). An Analytical Study of Pakistan's Policy Toward Afghanistan Before the Taliban's Rise. Journal of Political Studies, 20(2), 59.

Kapur, R. (2019). Rising powers and peacebuilding: Breaking the mold?

Karlekar, H. (2012). *Endgame in Afghanistan: for whom the dice rolls*. SAGE Publications India.

Kastrati, M. B. (2014). Methods Used to Deal with Peace Process Spoilers. ILIRIA International Review, 4(1), 343-355.

Kastrati, M. B. (2014). Methods Used to Deal with Peace Process Spoilers. ILIRIA International Review, 4(1), 343-355.

Katzman, K. (2010, September). Afghanistan: Post-Taliban governance, security, and US policy. Library of Congress Washington DC Congressional Research Service.

Kelman, H. C. (2010). Conflict resolution and reconciliation: A social-psychological perspective on ending violent conflict between identity groups. Landscapes of Violence, 1(1), 5.

Khalil, A. B. (2017, March 04). Pakistan, Islamism, and the Fear of Afghan Nationalism. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/pakistan-islamism-and-the-fear-of-afghan-nationalism/

Khan, M. A., Xiaoying, J., & Kanwal, N. (2016). Armed Conflict in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan and the Role of NGOs in Restoring Health Services. Social work in public health, 31(4), 215-230.

Khan, S. (2018), Double Game: Why Pakistan Supports Militants and Resists US Pressure to Stop.

King, M., & Sturtewagen, B. (2010). Making the Most of Afghanistan's River Basins. *East-West Institute, New York*.

King, R. R., & Tan, S. L. (Eds.). (2014). (un) Common Sounds: Songs of Peace and Reconciliation Among Muslims and Christians. Cascade Books.

Klass, R. (1988). Afghanistan: The Accords. Foreign Affairs, 66(5), 922-945.

Köse, T. (2017). Rise and fall of the AK party's Kurdish peace initiatives. *Insight Turkey*, *19*(2), 139-166.

Kulkarni, S. ( 2018, June 06). Balochistan: A Free-For-All Tussle between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Kumar, R. (2017, September 21). Hamid Karzai Has Nothing Good To Say About America. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/21/hamid-karzai-has-nothing-good-to-say-about-america/

Langholtz, H. J. (Ed.). (1998). The psychology of peacekeeping. Greenwood Publishing Group.

Lederach, J. P. (2005). The moral imagination: The art and soul of building peace. Oxford University Press.

Li, R. (1994). Blood-stained Hands: Macbeth in Kunju Form(No. 25). Human Rights Watch. P. 22

Loyn, D. (2008). Butcher and bolt: two hundred years of foreign engagement in Afghanistan. London: Hutchinson.

M. Milani, M. (2006). Iran's Policy Towards Afghanistan. Government and International Affairs Faculty Publications. Paper 106.

Maaß, C. D. (2006, May). National Reconciliation in Afghanistan. Conflict History and the Search for an Afghan Approach. In Internationales Asien Forum. International Quarterly for Asian Studies (Vol. 37, No. 1/2, p. 5). Arnold Bergsträsser Institut.

Mac Ginty, R. (2016). No war, no peace: the rejuvenation of stalled peace processes and peace accords. Springer.

Majidyar, A. (2014). Negotiating with the Taliban: Lessons from history. American Enterprise Institute, 1.

Majidyar, W. (2018, December 15). Afghanistan and Pakistan's Looming Water Conflict. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/afghanistan-and-pakistans-looming-water-conflict/

Male, B. (1982). Revolutionary Afghanistan: a reappraisal. Taylor & Francis.

Maley, W. (2009). The Afghanistan Wars. Macmillan International Higher Education.

Maley, W., & Schmeidl, S. (Eds.). (2014). *Reconstructing Afghanistan: Civil-military experiences in comparative perspective*. Routledge.

Marsden, L. (Ed.). (2016). The Ashgate Research Companion to Religion and Conflict Resolution. Routledge.

Masadykov, T., Giustozzi, A., & Page, J. M. (2010). Negotiating with the Taliban: toward a solution for the Afghan conflict.

Mashal, M. (2011). The Kashmir Afghanistan Puzzle. website: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/08/201188175314121853.html

Mathers, N., Fox, N., & Hunn, A. (1998). Trent focus for research and development in primary health care: Using interviews in a research project. Trent Focus.

Matinuddin, Kemal (1999). The Taliban Phenomenon

Matthews, E. (Ed.). (2011). The Israel-Palestine conflict: parallel discourses. Taylor & Francis.

McLarney, E. (2011). American Freedom and Islamic Fascism: Ideology in the Hall of Mirrors. Theory & Event, 14(3).

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2007). Structural realism. International relations theories: Discipline and diversity, 83.

Menkiszak, M. (2012). Russia's Afghan Problem. The Russian Federation and the Afghanistan problem since 2001.

Miakhel, S. (2012). The Importance of Tribal Structures and Pakhtunwali in Afghanistan; Their Role in Security and Governance, 2006, 4.

Micallef, J. V. (2015). Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Poisoed Legacy of the Durand Line. Huffington Post, 21.

Mirza, R. M. (2010). American Invasions: Canada to Afghanistan, 1775 to 2010. Trafford Publishing.

Mitchell, T. (2011). *Carbon democracy: Political power in the age of oil*. Verso Books.

Mohajan, H. K. (2018). Qualitative research methodology in social sciences and related subjects. Journal of Economic Development, Environment and People, 7(1), 23-48.

Moslih, H. (2014, September 09). Afghanistan in the shadow of Ahmad Shah Massoud. Retrieved December 17, 2017, from http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/09/afghanistan-shadow-ahmad-shah-mas-2014997826874331.html

Mukarji, A. (2003). Afghanistan, from Terror to Freedom. Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd.

Naderifar, M., Goli, H., & Ghaljaie, F. (2017). Snowball sampling: A purposeful method of sampling in qualitative research. sdmej, 14(3).

Najibullah, H. (2017), Reconciliation and Social Healing in Afghanistan.

National Geographic Society. (2012, October 15). The Durand Line, website: https://www.nationalgeographic.org/news/durand-line/

National Research Council. (2000). International conflict resolution after the Cold War. National Academies Press.

Naveh, C. (2005). The Role of the Media in Establishing International Security Regimes. Conflict & Communication, 4(1).

Nehm, B. (2011). A Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The "Politics" of a Peacekeeping Mission in Cambodia (1992–1993).

Neuman, W. L., & Robson, K. (2007). Basics of social research: Qualitative and quantitative approaches. Power,

Newcomer, K. E., Hatry, H. P., & Wholey, J. S. (2015). Conducting semi-structured interviews. Handbook of practical program evaluation, 492.

Newman, E., & Richmond, O. (2006). The impact of spoilers on peace processes and peacebuilding. United Nations University Press.

Nilsson, D., & Söderberg Kovacs, M. (2011). Revisiting an elusive concept: A review of the debate on spoilers in peace processes. International Studies Review, 13(4), 606-626.

Nojumi, N. (2002). The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region. Middle East Institute.

Nojumi, N. (2016). The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass mobilization, civil war, and the future of the region. Springer.

Nordquist, K. Å. (2007). Reconciliation as a Political Concept: Some Observations and Remarks. Perspectives on Peace and Conflict Research, 197.

Olson, J. S., Pappas, L. B., & Pappas, N. C. (Eds.). (1994). An Ethnohistorical dictionary of the Russian and Soviet empires. Greenwood Publishing Group.

Ostendorf, L., & Frerks, G. (2013). Third parties dealing with spoilers in peace processes. Sl: sn.

Ostendorf, S. Y., & Özerdem, A. (2015). International peacebuilding: An introduction. Routledge.

Ouellette, A. (2011). Bioethics and disability: Toward a disability-conscious bioethics. Cambridge University Press.

Paffenholz, T., Kew, D., & John, A. W. S. (2006). Civil society and peace negotiations: Why, whether and how they could be involved. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Pandey, S. (2018). US Sanctions on Pakistan and their Failure as Strategic Deterrent.

Partlow, J. (2017). A Kingdom of Their Own: The Family Karzai and the Afghan Disaster. Vintage.

Pasoon, A. (2017, May 18). Mission Impossible: Afghan Peace Talks.

Paul, T. V. (2014). *The warrior state: Pakistan in the contemporary world*. Oxford University Press.

Pazira, N. (2005). A bed of red flowers: in search of my Afghanistan. Simon and Schuster.

Perlez, J. (2010, May 29). Pakistani Taliban Carried Out Attack on Lahore Mosques, Police                                    Say.                                    Website: https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/world/asia/30pstan.html

Peter, R., & Blood, E. D. (2001). Afghanistan: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress.

Phillips, D. J. (2007). On this day. Place of publication not identified: IUniverse Com.

Rahim, S. A. (2018, April 20). Why Pakistan Is TAPI's Biggest Hurdle. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/why-pakistan-is-tapis-biggest-hurdle/

Ranjan, A. (2013). Afghanistan Quagmire and India-Pakistan "Strategic" Rivalry: Is Cooperation Possible? Journal of Asian Politics & History

Rashid, A. (2000). Taliban: Militant Islam. Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia,(New Haven: Yale, 2000).

Rashid, A. (2010). Taliban: The power of militant Islam in Afghanistan and beyond. IB Tauris.

Rath Saroj K. (2016), South Asia's Violent Landscape: Counter Terrorism in India, Pakistan, And Afghanistan, in Masaeli, M., & Sneller, R. (2016). The root cause of terrorism: A religious studies of the perspective. Cambridge Scholars.

Riedel, B. (2009). Comparing the US and Soviet experiences in Afghanistan. Policy, 2. Website: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2010/06/Vol2Iss5-Art1.pdf

Riedel, B. (2013). *Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the brink and back*. Brookings Institution Press.

Riedel, B. (2016, July 28). The Warlord Who Defines Afghanistan: An Excerpt From Bruce Riedel's 'What We Won'. Website: https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-warlord-who-defines-afghanistan-an-excerpt-from-bruce-riedels-what-we-won/

Rosoux, V. (2015). Post Conflict Reconciliation: In Search for a Typology. Revue internationale de politique comparée, 22(4), 557-577.

Roy, O., & Sfeir, A. (2007). The Columbia world dictionary of Islamism. Columbia University Press.

Rubin, A. J. (2012, February 16). Karzai Says Afghanistan Has Joined Talks With Taliban. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/16/world/asia/karzai-taliban-afghanistan-united-states-talks.html

Rubin, B. (2018, February 27). An Open Letter to the Taliban. Retrieved from https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/an-open-letter-to-the-taliban

Rubin, B. (2018, February 27). An Open Letter to the Taliban. Retrieved March 04, 2018, from https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/an-open-letter-to-the-taliban

Saffi, M., & Kohistani, A. (2013). Scientific Investigation Report in Afghanistan: Water Resources Potential, Quality Problems, Challenges and Solutions in Afghanistan. Water Resources Potential, Quality Problems, Challenges and Solutions in Afghanistan.

Sais, S. Z. (2011). Who is Winning the War in Afghanistan?. Xlibris Corporation.

Sajjad, T. (2010). Peace at all costs: reintegration and reconciliation in Afghanistan.

Salomon, G., & Cairns, E. (Eds.). (2011). Handbook on peace education. Taylor & Francis.

Schirch, L. (2012). Designing A Comprehensive Peace Process for Afghanistan, 7.

Schofield, V. (2010). Afghan Frontier: At the Crossroads of Conflict. Tauris Parke Paperbacks.

Semple, M. (2009). Reconciliation in Afghanistan. US Institute of Peace Press.

Semple, M. (2014). Rhetoric, Ideology, and Organizational Structure of the Taliban Movement. United States Institute of Peace.

Sentama, E. (2009). Peacebuilding in post-genocide Rwanda: The role of cooperatives in the restoration of interpersonal relationships. School of Global Studies, Peace and Development Research; Institutionen för globala studier, freds-och utvecklingsforskning.

Setas, C. (2013). Las relaciones entre Afganistán y Pakistán y las negociaciones de paz con los Talibanes Afganos. Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, (2).

Sharvit, K., & Halperin, E. (Eds.). (2016). A Social Psychology Perspective on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Celebrating the Legacy of Daniel Bar-Tal (Vol. 2). Springer.

Shephard, M. (2008). Guantanamo's child: the untold story of Omar Khadr. John Wiley & Sons.

Sial, B. (2013). Pakistan's role and strategic priorities in Afghanistan since 1980. *Report by Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center*, 2.

Sinai, J. (2017). The Root Causes of Terrorism: A Religious Studies Perspective.

Stanekzai, M. M. (2008). Thwarting Afghanistan's insurgency: A pragmatic approach toward peace and reconciliation.

Stedman, M. F., & Goren, N. (Eds.). (2012). Spoilers of Peace and the Dilemmas of Conflict Resolution. Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

Stedman, S. J. (1997). Spoiler problems in peace processes. International security, 22(2), 5-53.

Stedman, S. J. (2001). Implementing peace agreements in civil wars: lessons and recommendations for policymakers. New York: International Peace Academy.

Stedman, S. J. (2003). Peace processes and the challenges of violence. In Contemporary Peacemaking (pp. 103-113). Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Steinberg, G., & Woermer, N. (2013). Sources of Tension in Afghanistan and Pakistan: A Regional Perspective. Exploring Iran & Saudi Arabia's Interests in Afghanistan & Pakistan: Stakeholders or Spoilers - A Zero Sum Game?

Stewart, G. (2017, October 8). Dr.Najib: A Sketch of A Man And A Country. Retrieved from http://www.countercurrents.org/2017/10/08/dr-najib-a-sketch-of-a-man-and-a-country/

Stewart, S. (1998). Conflict Resolution: a foundation guide (Vol. 1). Waterside Press.

Synovitz, (2007, March 16). Afghanistan Report: March 16, 2007. Retrieved from https://www.rferl.org/a/1347518.html

Synovitz, R. (2003, July 19). Afghanistan: History Of 1973 Coup Sheds Light On Relations With Pakistan. Retrieved from https://www.rferl.org/a/1103837.html

Taylor, et al, (2004). The Europa year book: a world survey. London: Europa Publications.

The Afghanistan Justice Projects(2005). Casting Shadows: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 1978-2001 Documentation and analysis of major patterns of abuse in the war in Afghanistan.

*The Centre for Strategic and Regional Studies (CSRS)*, (2016, October 16), ''The road to Peace in Afghanistan is via Kashmir''. Retrieved from http://csrskabul.com/en/blog/the-road-to-peace-in-afghanistan-is-via-kashmir/

Torfeh, M. (2017, August 19). ISIL in Afghanistan: A growing threat. Retrieved March 18, 2018, from https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/08/isil-afghanistan-growing-threat-170813133122968.html

Tripathi, D. (2011). Breeding ground: Afghanistan and the origins of Islamist terrorism. Potomac Books, Inc..

Tunio, H. (2016). The Big Book of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene. Pakistan May Run Dry by 2025: Study I, 27. Retrieved from https://www.wateraid.org/pk/sites/g/files/jkxoof326/files/The big book of WASH 2.pdf.

Vallacher, R. R., Coleman, P. T., Nowak, A., & Bui-Wrzosinska, L. (2011). Rethinking intractable conflict: The perspective of dynamical systems. In Conflict, Interdependence, and Justice(pp. 65-94). Springer, New York, NY.

Van Linschoten, A. S., & Kuehn, F. (Eds.). (2018). The Taliban Reader: War, Islam and Politics in Their Own Words. Oxford University Press.

Wafayezada, M., Ebrahimi, G., Karimi, H., & Taha, S. (2017). Four Decades of Efforts for Peace and Reconciliation in Afghanistan .

Wahab, S., & Youngerman, B. (2007). A brief history of Afghanistan. Infobase Publishing.

Waldman, M. (2010). The sun in the sky: the relationship between Pakistan's ISI and Afghan insurgents.

Waldman, T. (2014). Reconciliation and research in Afghanistan: an analytical narrative. International Affairs, 90(5), 1049-1068.

Weinbaum, M. G. (1991). War and peace in Afghanistan: the Pakistani role. Middle East Journal, 45(1), 71-85.

Williams, B. G. (2011). Afghanistan declassified: a guide to America's longest war. University of Pennsylvania Press.

Wilson, C. (2017). Ideological Motives in Spoiler Violence: Postconflict Assam, Northeast India. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 23(3), 280-296.

Witness, G. (2016). War in the Treasury of the People: Afghanistan, Lapis Lazuli and the battle for mineral wealth. London: Global Witness, June.

Wittmeyer, A. P. (2013). What Went Wrong in Afghanistan?. *Foreign Policy*.

Woodhouse, T., Miall, H., Ramsbotham, O., & Mitchell, C. (2015). The Contemporary Conflict Resolution Reader. Polity Press.

1)     **Mawlawi Atta ur-Rahman Salim** was one of the closest person to Ahmad Shah Masood and Burhaniddin Rabbani. Between 1994 and 2001, during the presidency of Rabbani he was authorized to make peace with the Taliban (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan). Several times he met Taliban delegates in Geneva, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. During the Karzai administration he served as the deputy and the caretaker of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and currently works as the deputy head of High Peace Council.

2)     **Abdul Hakim Mujahid,** during the Taliban regime he served as the representative of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to the UN. After the fall of Taliban regime he went to Pakistan and in 2005 joined the Afghan peace process. Now, he serves as the deputy chair of Afghanistan's High Peace Council.

3)     **Dr. Faramarz Tamana** is a presidential bid for the July 2019 Presidential elections of Afghanistan. He hold tow PhD, respectively a PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University of India in the field of international studies and a PhD Tehran University of Iran in the field of in international relations. He is the author of two books ("*America's Foreign Policy in Afghanistan"* [2008] and *"Afghanistan's Foreign Policy in the Sphere of Regional Cooperation"* [2014]) and several articles in national and international journals. Mr. Tamana previously worked as director general of the Center for Strategic Studies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Afghanistan, and chancellor of the University of Afghanistan in Kabul. He, also, served as in Afghan diplomatic mission abroad and taught in several universities.

4)     **Sayed Ishaq Gailani** is the founder and the leader of Hezb-e-Nuhzat Hambastagi Milli (National Solidarity Movement of Afghanistan). He is also a Sufi religious leader (*pir*). He was one of the mujahedeen leader and fought against the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan between 1980 and 1990. In 1993, in the government of Islamic State of Afghanistan, he worked as deputy in the Security Ministry. Between 1996 and 2001, he was one of the member of Cyprus Peace Group

who worked to establish a constitutional governance system in Afghanistan. In 2001, he was one of the participant of Bonn Conference through which the post-2001 political system was established. Between 2005 and 2014, he represented Paktia province in the parliament of Afghanistan. In 2014, he was one of the presidential candidate. Between 2001 and 2019, he several times met the Taliban delegates in order to pursue them to make peace with the government.

**5)** **Doctor Mohammad Asif Sediqi** is the second Deputy Speaker of Upper House of Afghanistan (Meshrano Jirga) and a member of Commission of Women Affairs and Civil Society.

**6)** **Asadullah Walawalji** is originally from Takhar province of Afghanistan. He is fluent in several languages like Uzbek, Dari (Persian), and Pashtu. He is a scholar: the author of Silk Road (In Dari), Here is not the Northern Iran (In Dari)… He has been active in civil society activities. He is one of the founder of the Afghani Civil Society Forum. He served as the chairperson of the magazine "Andisha" in Balkh city and "Chawosh" in Peshawar (Pakistan). Also, he served as the head of Alishir Navabi Cultural Association, and the head of the Afghanistan Pen Association. Mr. Walwaliji participated in 2001 Bonn Conference. Later, he became a member of emergency Loya Jirga. In 2004, he took responsibility of holding election in the Northern part of Afghanistan. During the Karzai administration he served as an advisor in the Security Council of Afghanistan and several times met the Taliban delegates for the aim of making peace talks.

**7)** **Mohammad Qasim Halimi** (Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Justice), under the Taliban regime, he served as the Afghanistan's chief of protocol. Then, he spent a year in US custody. Now he is the speak person of the Afghanistan National Ulema Council. With his background, he is considered a potential negotiator with any emerging Taliban moderates. At the same time he serves as a Political Adviser to High Peace Council.

**8)** **Engineer Touryalai Ghiyasi** is one of the eleven member government's negotiation team that responsible for holding direct talks with the Taliban delegates. He, also, works as the head of Cultural Affairs in the Foreign Ministry of Afghanistan. He previously served as the Chairman of the 4th Department of National Security between 1992 and 1993, Consul General of Afghanistan in Mashhad- Iran between

2001 and 2004, Minister Counselor and acting Ambassador in Jakarta, 2010-2011. He is the author of two books *Marde Ostowar,* and *US and Civil Society*

**9)**     **Qazi Habibullah Fawzi** is oginally from Ghazni province of Afghanistan and fought in the 1980s jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. During the Taliban regime he served as an Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, the Head of United Nations Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Currently, he is a member of HPC.

**10)**    **Gul Ahmad Azimi** is a senator and serves a deputy chairperson of the Complaints and Petitions Commission in the Upper House of Afghanistan.

**11)**    **Maulvi Pir Mohammad Rohani (former Taliban official):** during the Taliban regime he served as the rector of Kabul University, and head of negotiation team between Rabbani government and the Taliban regime. In 2005, he joined to Karzai government. He was appointed as the Head of the Supreme Court's administrative affairs department (2005). Currently, he is a member of High Peace Council and also a member of National Ulema Council.

**12)**    **Mawlawi Aminuddin Muzaffari** is an influential Islamic scholar in Afghanistan. Previously, he served the head of the department of Islamic Studies in Paktia University. Between 2005 and 2010, he served as the Senate secretary. And since 2010, he works as the head of the secretary of High Peace Council. He followed the peace process very closely and is known as the info icon among his colleagues.

**13)**    **Mr. Mohammad Qais Wakili** is a senator from Bamyan Province of Afghanistan. He serves as a member of Commission of Hearing Complaint in the Upper House of Afghanistan. Previously for seven years, he worked as manager of transportation department for the National Defense Ministry.