

**FOOTBALL FOR THE NATION AND AGAINST SEPARATISM
THE CASES OF DIYARBAKIRSPOR AND AMEDSPOR**

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BY




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This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality; as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Modern Turkish Studies

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ABSTRACT

FOOTBALL FOR THE NATION AND AGAINST SEPARATISM THE CASES OF DIYARBAKIRSPOR AND AMEDSPOR

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The main assumption of this research is focused on the assessment of enforced Turkification of Kurdish society by means of social inclusion using the game of football. This approach was undertaken during the five years of armistice period between the Turkish State and PKK (i.e. from 01.09.1999 to 01.06.2004). Within this scope, the research's assertion will be modeled on the conceptual framework of the nation-state, national identity, and nationalism. An overview of multiple approaches reflecting the political power vis a vis football will be discussed by presenting prominent and relevant instances and rare football occurrences, thus bringing clarity to the key topic of this study. While analyzing this, the fundamental power of football as a nation-state builder and the role of empowering national identity and Kurdish identity will be taken into consideration. The Turkification through the social inclusion debate will be addressed by connecting the Turkish State and Kurdish political identity in Diyarbakır. In addition to this, the role of Gaffar Okkan, the Police Commissioner of Diyarbakır will be discussed thoroughly which will take into account his varying strategies towards the Kurdish issue. The research will also examine the political use of football in the Turkification of Kurdish identity through social inclusion in the cases of Diyarbakırspor and Amedspor. Lastly, this thesis will shed a bit of light upon the resistance and tactics of the Kurdish identity against the Turkish Government in consideration of Amedspor. It will be dealt as a reaction to Diyarbakırspor that was politicized with an artificial Kurdishness, as a reaction to a social inclusion project and Turkification policy.

Keywords: Nationalism, Football, Assimilation, Turkification, Kurds, Social Inclusion.

ÖZ

AYRILIKÇILIĞA KARŞI VE ULUS İÇİN FUTBOL
DİYARBAKIRSPOR VE AMEDSPOR ÖRNEKLERİ

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Bu çalışmanın esas varsayımı, Kürt toplumunun zorunlu Türkleştirilme politikalarının futbol üzerinden sosyal içerme yoluyla değerlendirilmesi üzerine odaklanmıştır. Bu yaklaşım, özellikle Türkiye Devleti ile PKK arasında geçen beş yıllık ateşkes dönemi boyunca (01.09.1999 – 01.06.2004) boyunca yapıldı. Bu kapsamda, araştırmanın iddiası ulus-devlet, ulusal kimlik ve milliyetçiliğin kavramsal çerçevesi üzerine modellenecektir. Genel olarak siyasi iktidar ile futbol ilişkisine ilişkin genel yaklaşımlar incelenecek, öne çıkan küresel örnekler ile ender görülen futbol olaylarından örnekler sunularak çalışmanın esas konusuna açıklık getirilecektir. Bunu analiz ederken, bir ulus-devlet üreticisi olarak futbolun temel gücünün ulusal kimlik ve Kürt kimliğini güçlendirmesindeki rolü ele alınacaktır. Sosyal içerme yoluyla Türkleştirme tartışması, devlet ile Kürt sivil toplumu arasında bir çekişme sahnesi olan futbol üzerinden Diyarbakır'da birbirine bağlanarak ele alınacaktır. Buna ek olarak, Diyarbakır Emniyet Müdürü Gaffar Okkan'ın Kürt sorununda değişen stratejileri dikkate alan rolü iyice tartışılacak. Aynı zamanda bu araştırma, Kürt kimliğinin Türkleştirilmesinde futbolun politik kullanımını, sosyal kimlik üzerinden Diyarbakırspor ve Amedspor vakaları özelinde inceleyecektir. Son olarak, Amedspor özelinde Kürt kimliğinin Türk Hükümetine karşı gösterdiği direniş ve taktiklere ışık tutacaktır. Yapay bir Kürtlük ile siyasallaştırılan Diyarbakırspor'a, sosyal içerme projesine ve Türkleşme politikasına bir tepki olarak ele alınacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Milliyetçilik, Futbol, Asimilasyon, Türkleştirme, Kürtler, Sosyal İçerme

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ABBREVIATION

AKP:	Justice and Development Party
ANAP:	Motherland Party
AP:	Justice Party
BTGM:	General Directorate for Physical Education
CHP:	Republican People's Party
CUP:	Committee of Union and Progress
DDKO:	Kurdish Revolutionary Eastern Culture Centers
DEP:	Democracy Party
DİSKİ:	Diyarbakır Water and Sewerage Administration
DP:	Democratic Party
DTP:	Democratic Society Party
EU:	European Union
HADEP:	People's Democracy Party
HEP:	People's Labor Party
ÖZDEP:	Freedom and Democracy Party
PKK:	Kurdistan Workers' Party
SHP:	Freedom and Democracy Party
TAF:	Turkish Armed Forces
TBMM:	Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA)
TFF:	Turkish Football Federation
UKO:	National Liberation Army
YTP:	New Turkey Party

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INTRODUCTION

The French Revolution that began in France in the 18th century, influenced a large part of the old and the new world and changed social, political and cultural structures significantly. Its socio-political repercussions also influenced the ideology and movement of many people, coining a word called 'nationalism' Nationalism brought the French concept of '*liberté, égalité, fraternité*' by altering the mindsets of individuals and transforming and shaping the social structures as well. Especially this concept, while altering the mindsets of individuals, transformed and shaped social structures as well.

Vital changes which emerged as a result of French and Industrial revolutions began to change the concept of authority which was the predominant ideology of the empires. In this context, it is worthwhile to consider that new, centralized, nation-based and identity-oriented states began to be organized in the era of decline of the great empires. The unit of nation is also formed with the contribution of West, especially ideas of French Revolution. This organization is called a nation-state in providing for the formation and development of social and political life.

The homogenization in these states has transformed the population that exists in the reminiscences of the empires. This transformation became one of the reasons to create nation-states out of the ruins of the empires. In the repudiation of the era of the empire, the world of nation-states began to replace the era of empires. The communities that could find a state in which to settle came through the era of the collapse of the empires smoothly. However, the mentioned "heterogeneous communities" have been suffering as a result of the fall of the empires for approximately 100 years; one prominent case in point being the Kurds. It is this very ethnic group, with all the related toils and troubles, upon which the discussion of this thesis shall be based.

As per some prior research remarks, when a power shift enables nationalists to defeat or adopt the existing system, a nation-state is more probable to arise.¹ Initially, the importance of national identity and the definition of citizenship may not be seemed as a fundamental topic of states before the emergence of the early forms of the nation-state. However, the legitimacy of states seems to have been driven by an obsession with mass commitment and assimilation. In this context, it is worthwhile to consider that, in numerous activities to ensure this legitimacy over their territories that were engaged by modern states should not be underestimated. In this framework, efforts to contribute to a new nation are labeled as 'nation-building' in the history of modern state. While sharing this common focus, identity-building processes occupy a significant role in nation-states and the building a nation seems a period of recognizing the primary identity, which covers all identities, within any given state's territory.

As a matter of fact, identity-building policies are implemented by nation-states even though the levels of homogeneity are different from each other. In the national identity building and assimilation policies, using forces such as military force is not a sole method, but also the provision of education, the introduction reforms of legislation, the promotion of ideologies, popular culture and sports activities are different assimilation adopted by the nations states. Generally, national independence seems the first cornerstone of nation-state building. Then, other cornerstones continue with the establishment of a legitimized and centralized administration, a national education system, as well as cultural standardization. The protection processes of its national solidarity against the internal and external separatist movements seem to be the main duties of an established nation-state. The underlying concept of this process is to entrench the allegiance of people for nation-state authority instead of for other factions, groups, administrations, tribes, or any other feudal structure.

¹ Andreas Wimmera and Yuval Feinsteina, "The Rise of the Nation-State across the World, 1816 to 2001" in *American Sociological Review*, 2010, p. 764.

In the first chapter under the title of “The Nation-State Building and Football” in the way of the Nation State, National Identity and Nationalism will be addressed in a theoretical framework. The role of football has been quite significant during the process of nation and identity building throughout history. That the parties which have actively been involved in building a nation and molding its identity consider this process in both formal and informal manners is discussed. Determining an ideology for a nation, structuring a state model and administrative approach can be regarded as the formal manner of the nation-state building process. Conversely, it has been seen that nation-states have used many methods to actively erode minority identities, and with state-controlled instruments, dissolve them in the nation-state in the aftermath of the homogenization process.

Sport and football, in particular, have been shown as a prior instrument with its unifying nature and accessibility to everyone, to be intended to legitimize state nationalism during the promotion of nationalism and the building process of the nation-state. It is widely acknowledged in many circles that “football is never just football” as stated by Simon Kuper in his famous book “*Football Against the Enemy*” (1994).² Football is one of the most well-liked sport activities in the world. According to records of Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), upward of 1 billion people watched the FIFA World Cup 2018 Final Match at home or in a public space.³ The central issue addressed here that football as a sports activity can reach the broad masses, and this accessibility coupled with the popularity of football is set at a very high level within societies around the world.

Football, as a worldwide leisure time activity, is the most followed sport in the world and it is one of the largest sectors in the world, which is why it is the source of a lot of data on many topics. Nevertheless, there are different other sports activities which are more popular than football, in some parts of the world such as Australia, the

² <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/serkan-demirtas/football-is-never-only-football--8590> (Accessed Date: 02.04.2019)

³ “The 2018 FIFA World Cup in Numbers” in FIFA, 2018.
<https://img.fifa.com/image/upload/veij99mubas9idvf47rl.pdf>
(Accessed Date: 15.11.2018)

United States of America, Pakistan, and India. Because of this, more of the data related to this research topic will be used and examined from regions where football is more popular such as in Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and with special focus on Turkey. Some examples will be quoted from Europe, Latin America, and well-known country clubs/national teams prior to the main discussion part of this thesis. This research clarifies that football itself is not the sole instrument in the power of football in dissolving the risk of separation in nation-state building.

Generally, many types of research that have been published are mainly focused on economic and sociological points via either football clubs or national teams. In recent years, there is several studies about football as a nation-building instrument, have emerged especially in the cases of South Africa, Latin America, Spain (Catalonia), Central Europe and even the Korea. The main question of this research focuses on the role of football in dissolving the risk of separation during the nation-state building. In addition to this, providing loyalty to the state for the people who live under its sovereignty supported by the administration can be seen as the informal manner through the exploitation of popular culture and sport activities policies.

Football is one of the most popular informal models in a nation state-building process. In this context, the historical background of football, nation, politics, and football relations will be supported by cases from around the world. This chapter is based on the conceptual manner and the informal part of this process are common culture, beliefs, and cultural codes.

The second chapter engages in the case of Turkey under the title of “Homogenizing Turkish Nationalism and Sport” along with a discussion of football as a national identity and a nation state-builder in Turkey as an introduction. The construction period of the modern Turkish nation emerged in the 1930s. The administration perceived sports as a way of building a nation-state and anchor westernization projects in this process. During this transition, sports activities were used to contribute to a new generation based on the ideology of the modern Turkish Republic. While the new regime was trying to diffuse the ideology to capillaries of

Turkish society, the masses started to gather under the roof of the ruling party of the time (CHP) in the 1930s. In this vein, a new law regarding the education of people in compulsory physical training in their leisure times was published in the Official Gazette on 18th July, 1938. The second section will address the brief history of Kurdish identity in Turkey, the correlation between the Kurdish question and football as a state instrument. This chapter is designed to embody the homogenizing of Turkish national identity, the use of tools in this process and addressing the Kurdish question from the point of discussion in the major altercation.

The final chapter “Football as a Tool of Alternative Nationalism: From the state’s Diyarbakırspor to Amedspor of Kurdish Identity” attempts to review Kurdish identity with local football team Diyarbakırspor and its successor Amedspor. Diyarbakırspor rose to the Turkish First League in 1977 for the first time, and even after the second season in the league, it managed to finish in fifth place in the league. However, in the next season, the team was relegated to the lower league. According to journalist Faruk Arhan, the author of the book “Crowded at the Wedding, Alone at the Funeral” (Diyarbakırspor: Düğünde Kalabalık, Taziyyede Yalnız) Diyarbakırspor was supported for political reasons, and everything was done for Diyarbakır to try and keep the team in the First League. He said when the Kurdish solution process began, Diyarbakırspor was literally forgotten. Diyarbakırspor, after falling from the first league in 2010, went down and found itself in the regional amateur league, falling four times in four seasons.⁴

Then, the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality bought Diyarbakırspor. In 2015, Diyarbakırspor changed its name to Amed SK (*Amed Sportif Faaliyetler Kulübü*), referencing the Kurdish name of the city, Amed. This action was highly symbolic for Kurdish identity in the region. Amedspor fans dressed in the Kurdish colors of red, yellow and green. These moves by the club, municipality and fans have been perceived as Amedspor representing the Kurdish minority. For instance, as Amedspor

⁴ “Artık Resmen Amedspor” in *Cumhuriyet*, 2019.
http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/sokak/350835/Artik_resmen_Amedspor.html
(Accessed Date: 05.04.2019)

spokesman and lawyer Soran Haldi Mızrak stated: *“When Amedspor beat First League team Bursaspor in its home city last year, Kurds from Batman to Hakkari celebrated, as though it were their own local team. Amedspor has become a platform for Kurdish identity.”*⁵ In this regard, the last chapter aims to analyze the transformation process of Diyarbakırspor and the identity building process of Amedspor.

The relationship between Turkification projects and nation-building has been studied at length. Nevertheless, most recent studies, concentrated on the building of national identity and inventing national tradition as a head-to-bottom practice in the appearance and through nation-states' effective involvement. Much less work has been done on football, as a political tool, for the assimilation projects of national identity among the nation-state researches. The research purpose is to analyze the role of football in the identity and nation state-building process. At this juncture, the power of football affecting the social building of a nation-state has been explored. The main goal of this project has been to address the role of football in Turkification (can be seen as a way of assimilation) by social inclusion in the case of Diyarbakırspor and Amedspor.

The main questions to guide this research are;

- How has football contributed a nation’s sense of belonging?
- What roles did Diyarbakır’s football teams, as a contest area, play in the conflict between Turkish State - Kurdish nationalist movement in the 1990s and 2000s?

In social and natural sciences, research is an effort to systematically and rationally answer and interpret a problem or a series of questions. In this context, the definition of the issue that is considered and the activity of reaching some results are also a part of this process. The researcher collects information to form the answers to the existing question or questions, interprets this information and reaches the result with

⁵ Sonja Galler, “Disciplinary measures are unfortunately part of our team identity” in qantara.de, 2017. <https://en.qantara.de/content/the-kurdish-football-club-amedspor-disciplinary-measures-are-unfortunately-part-of-our-team>
(Accessed Date: 05.04.2019)

analysis and synthesis. Systematization of the research is very crucial in terms of the fact that each other can be seen as a single picture in the process of acquiring information, analysis and reaching the result. Research methods can be classified as quantitative and qualitative research models. The qualitative research method, which is frequently used by social sciences, can be used as a framework concept and incorporates many different disciplines that can be evaluated within this scope. *“Ethnography, anthropology, situational research, interpretive research, action research, natural research, descriptive research, theory development, content analysis are just a few of these concepts.”*⁶

*“Content analysis, which is defined as classifying, summarizing verbal or written data in terms of a specific problem or purpose, measuring certain variables or concepts and scanning them in order to make a specific meaning from them, constitutes the basis of this study.”*⁷ This thesis includes content analysis in the context of a descriptive and explanatory literature review that includes theoretical information in forms of the basis of the research topic. Therefore, systematic collection and analysis of data in scientific research is of great importance. In this study, qualitative data analysis method will be used along with content analysis. Data collection processes and secondary sources are used in this concept.

The main significance of Diyarbakır particularly in the context of this research comes from one of the historical centers of Kurdish ethnic groups. To give answers of questions of this research, I will examine several examples regarding the relationship between football and politics from all around the world. Then, will be focused on Diyarbakır and Diyarbakırspor to discuss the relationship between Turkish state and football over the Kurdishness.

Various books, journals, scientific articles, online database of Turkish Football Federation (TFF) and two popular Turkish newspapers (Cumhuriyet and Milliyet) are studied related to Diyarbakırspor and Amedspor in this process. These methods are

⁶ Ali Yıldırım, “Nitel Araştırma Yöntemlerinin Temel Özellikleri ve Eğitim Araştırmalarındaki Yeri ve Önemi Qualitative Research Methods”, *Eğitim ve Bilim*, Vol. 23, No. 112, 1999, pp. 8-9.

⁷ Ezel Aslan ve Esra Tavşancıl, *İçerik Analiz ve Uygulama Örnekleri*, İstanbul, 2001, p. 20.

used in the literature search process on the Kurdish question, nationalism in Turkey and the correlation between the two issues. A lot of articles on the web, textbooks, magazines, journals and articles in English and Turkish are examined to gather relevant data and significant information. To answer all the objectives that are set at the start of this work, the data were systematically collated to make the most sense to the reader.



CHAPTER I

THE NATION STATE BUILDING AND FOOTBALL

1.1. The Nationalism and the Nation State

In the modern era, the modern state arose as the fundamental unit of state after the fall of empires. As such, the absolute rules laid down by the state became the foundation of its 'sovereignty'. There are many various ideas about the "source of sovereignty" such as "the people/nation," "the king", "the church and God", "clan/family" or sometimes". Before the French Revolution which acted as a catalyst to bring forth the changes in the concept of sovereignty, the perception of sovereignty was based on politico-religious elements such as religious places, city-states, and the empires. However, the perception of power underwent radical changes. There were several factors at play, especially the French Revolution (the rise of nationalism), the Industrial Revolution and the influence of these movements (the rise of capitalism, modernism and nationalism) led to transformations in sociopolitical, cultural and economic structures in the world. The effects of the French Revolution had been seen in the social and political structures in the world, especially in the 19th century. The term 'national identity' was unheard of during the reign of empires. People became aware of the ideas of liberty, equality, fraternity, and justice. This paved the way for an ordinary citizen to demand equality and not treated any more like a vassal.

In 1648, the peace treaty of Westphalia which is credited for providing the basic structure of the modern state system was signed. As a consequence, the nation-state and international system adopted a European character.⁸ Today, however, the developments which are considered to be contrary to the nature of the nation-state, and which are referred to as European integration can be viewed in this context. The nation-state and its system of states, dealing with the construction of a social

⁸ S. Latouche, *Dünya'nın Batılılaşması*, İstanbul, 1993, p. 89.

infrastructure⁹, which has been serving as a model from the nation-state to date, has engaged in economic activity.

The word “nation” comes from the Latin verb “nasci”, meaning “to be born”; that is a group of people born in the same place. Then it was used as a reference to students coming from the same zone or nation in medieval universities. Gradually, the term “nation” morphed into a new meaning that defined the social participate class representing any political or moral authority in the medieval order. Moreover, the present meaning of ‘nation’ came to have more clarity in its current form in the wake of the democratization process in England in the 16th century. “For Liah Greenfeld, the location of sovereignty within the people and the recognition of the fundamental equality among its various strata, which constitute the essence of the modern national idea, are at the same time the basic tenets of democracy. Democracy was born with a sense of nationality.”¹⁰ The sense of nationality with democracy actually emerged along with the state. Sovereignty was incarnated in a state which had gained a centralized apparatus and, for the most part, an authoritarian one prior to the democratization process.

Besides this, the concept of nationalism has five phases. The first phase is the exit line, where there are no apparent ethnic differences. Ethnicity begins to indicate itself in the nationalist uprising, being the second phase. The third phase comprises of the collapse of religion-based ethnic empires, dynasties, and legitimacy. At this point, a new state has been created. Since these states contain ethnic minorities, however, they once again face issues of the past. Proper measures will be eliminated in the fourth phase. In addition, to create ethnic homogeneity, nationalism acts brutally. After this comes industrialization, the last stage. Here, the requirements of nationalism are applied mainly.¹¹

At this stage, the intensity of nationalism itself, decreases, although it does not disappear. For instance, the Kurdish question can be dealt with within Turkey's

⁹ C. Tilly, *Zor, Sermaye ve Avrupa Devletlerinin Oluşumu*, Ankara, 2001, p. 66.

¹⁰ A. Dieckhoff and C. Jaffrelot *Revisiting Nationalism: Theories and Processes*, 2005, p.2

¹¹ Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*, Penguin Books, 1991, pp. 14-19.

existing borders. Under the umbrella of caliph and sultan in the Ottoman State, Turks and Kurds lived together for many years. In this regard, the sultan is a religiously based source of legitimacy. The after-effects of the sultanate and caliphate were canceled out with the fall of the Ottoman Empire; and the most vital factor of the Kurds connecting themselves to the Republic of Turkey was destroyed. Several outbreaks of civil unrest and overwhelming savage episodes occurred; the Sheik Sait Uprising is a case in point. In addition, different Turkification strategies of the Republic of Turkey have been linked such as banning the use of Kurdish language for communication and using Turkish instead in all walks of life from schools to. The Kurdish uprising coupled with the Turkish State's policies of Turkification led to the ever-increasing gap between the Kurds and the Turkish Nation-State. There was then a ban on Kurdish newspapers and magazines. No Kurdish radio or TV existed. In other words, as a language of power, Turkishness was planned to be imposed on the Kurdish people. With the foundation of the Republic, the Turkish state has embarked upon the Turkification process of Kurds, as the major non-Turkish-speaking group, especially the eastern side of Anatolia. It can be asserted that a generation of Kurdish people has faced with losing their ethnic and cultural consciousness as a result of these policies. It can be regarded that the Turkish Republic does not conduct, intensive and oppressive policies against the Kurdish people in recent times. The current situation is particularly considered as a new era in applying oppressive and social pressure, but the new state policy seems to undulate. For instance, while Newroz celebrations are allowed, the parliament representatives of Kurds are being arrested and non-governmental civil organizations are being closed.

The idea of the nation, first in 1689, the citizenship rights in England by the adoption of the constitutional monarchy, based on national sovereignty, constitutes the basis for the emergence of the nation-state.¹² Later, with the French and American Revolutions, the idea of the nation became a universal position in political and social organization.¹³ From the 19th Century onwards, the nation, the state and society

¹² Y. Santamaria, "Ulus-Devlet" in *Uluslar ve Milliyetçilikler*, İstanbul, 1998, p. 22.

¹³ D. Schnapper, *Yurttaşlar Cemaati*, İstanbul, 1995, p. 17.

became an essential tool in the reconstruction of the modernization process, and the 20th Century became an era of nations.

Politically, the nation has absolute authority meaning that the nation itself has the last word on the validity of other forms of authority and, if necessary, the right to violate them. With the monopoly of violence controlled by the state, social power has been weakened and the nation – and thus the nation-state – has always been prepared for development.¹⁴ The nation has the principles of centralization of administration and equal participation of all adult citizens in political activities. The division of individuals into two: as rulers and the ruled, in the nation-state, has caused the rise of political power and society.¹⁵

In this case, the French Revolution of 1789 was a new step that enhanced and changed the approach in this issue. As it is emphasized, the revolutionary doctrine made the people and the state one of the same terms by determining the people as the font of all political power, 'the State is me' (*L'Etat c'est moi*) convert to 'the state is the people' (*L'Etat c'est le peuple*). "*While the people's sovereignty was embodied in the state, simultaneously the state bureaucracy attempted to homogenize the population comprised within its borders and to foster the people's national allegiance.*"¹⁶

As a result of this, the nation eventually revealed the connection between the state and its subjects such as the "nation-state". Diversely, the nation-state, as a sign of the transformation of the feudal society and the transformation of capitalism, had been occurred as a new form of social change in the political, economic, cultural and intellectual sphere. The nation-state fiction created a new kind of community, the name of which is a modern nation providing a political unity among the members of the community which reflects a different way of life. Consequently, the nation-state has become central to the worldwide political relationship since its emergence. Despite the changes however, the nation-state has gained experience since its

¹⁴ A. Çiğdem, *Bir İmkan Olarak Modernite; Weber ve Habermas*, İstanbul, 1997, p. 163

¹⁵ Leca J. "Neden Söz Ediyoruz?" in *Uluslar ve Milliyetçilikler*, İstanbul, 1998, p. 13.

¹⁶ Jaffrelot Dieckhoff, (2005), *Ibid*, p. 3.

provenance; that is to say it has not let go of its monopoly to the legitimate use of force, nor power to taxation and in doing so partaking in economic life to direct cultural life. The development of capitalism, which constitutes the basic economic idea of the modern nation-state, has changed the actual functioning of the state. The modern state is the nation-state.¹⁷

The modern state is an altered “building” than the one we encountered in the past until the 19th century. The modern state, as a simple definition, is a hierarchical and effective building that can impose discipline and uniformity on the people within its authority. Homogeneous nations and centralized states have become the norm of modernity and humanity. This development was contributed to generate tremendous social confusion and difficulty in the lands of empires such as central Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle-East in the last quarter of the 19th century. The Turkish state can be shown as a case study at this crucial juncture. Arguably the Kurdish ethnic group is one of the case studies (with Armenians and Greeks who paid the highest price) in the sovereignty of Turkish modern state.

1.2. Nationalism, National Identity and the Sport

As human beings, people have multiple identities based on their gender, family, citizenship, territory, race, or religion. Although all these identities can be changed to a certain extent, the category of gender is the most fundamental and universally accepted identity among others. This is despite the fact that people started to change their gender in the light of scientific developments in the 21st century. Besides gender, Anthony Smith, a prominent scholar of this issue, speaks of several collective identities such as local, regional, socio-economic, religious, and ethnic identities. There is no comprehensive definition of this phenomenon. Having said this, a number of aspects can be taken into consideration: it is not stable; they are interconnected with other identities and as such, cannot be isolated.

Moreover, according to Bob Jessop, a wider range of social relations includes the state and the political system. Everyday language sometimes portrays the state as a

¹⁷ G. Marshall, *Sosyoloji Sözlüğü*, Bilim ve Sanat, Ankara, 1999.

topic which is used to its initiatives or interests. These are economic class, social stratum, political party or the formal caste. On the other hand, the core of the state is that political power needs to be territorialized. The fact is that an institutional expression of state power that has historical contingent rather than inevitable and irreversible effect of social development is relatively new, a system that has territorial exclusiveness, a reciprocal legalization, which is formally sovereign and which exercises sovereign control of large and exclusive territorial areas. Another cause of the growing artificial split in internal and international affairs is the existence of such an inter-state scheme.¹⁸ The rules are in the connection among others as interstate and stabilization cases. As Jessop's theory claims, in a similar manner, identities are like states. The continuity, progression, reciprocity, and synergy have a place in the context of identities. Identity embodies both a multicultural and multi-ethnic context and has a variable aspect. If there is no Turkish nationalism in Anatolia, could there possibly be any Kurdish nationalism? Or if there is no Sunni Muslims in Iraq, will there also be no Shiites in the same region?

Smith pursues an inductive method to reach a definition through the elements of national identity. With the purpose of explaining national identity and to distinguish the cultural community from a political one, Smith refers to the concepts of "Kulturnation" and "Staatnation" developed by Friedrich Meinecke in 1908. "Kulturnation" (the cultural nation) is defined as the broadly passive cultural community and "Staatnation" (State-nation) is defined as the active and autonomous political nation.¹⁹

Smith suggests that since in ancient Greece there were collective city-states which had autonomous sovereignty and interests, we cannot speak of a unique Greek nation of that time. However, during that time, there was a cultural and ethnic Greek community. In this regard, even if it is not strong enough in terms of its meaning, the national identity includes some sense of political community. Within a political

¹⁸ S. Clegg and M. Haugaard, (eds, Bob Jessop), *The State and State Power The SAGE Handbook of Power*, London: SAGE, pp. 367-382.

¹⁹ Anthony D. Smith (1995), *Ibid*, p. 8

community, there should be some public structures and a unique code of rights as well as tasks for the members of the community. Consequently, it implies a well-defined territory to which the members of a community feel they belong. All these assumptions take us to the concept of the nation concerning the Western model.

Smith distinguishes between the Western model of national identity and the ethnic-national identity. Nations are recognized in the Western model of national identity as cultural communities which have heterogenic features, and their members are united around common historical memories, symbols, myths, and traditions. On the other hand, the main feature of the non-Western concept of the nation includes a community of birth and local culture. As per this definition, a nation can be described as a community based on a shared ancestry. According to the parameters, there are some essential characteristics of national identity such as a historic region, or motherland, common fables and historical remembrances, a common, mass public culture, common legal rights and tasks for all members, a common economy with regional mobility for its members. In this regard, we can define a nation as *“a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.”*²⁰

Ethnic nationalism is used by Anthony Smith as the synonym of non-Western nationalism. This concept is based on ethnicity and includes common ancestry and hereditary. In this concept it should be discussed that there is a debate on nationalism. Ethnocentric approach of Smith and concentric discourse of Benedict Anderson clashes in this case. Smith argues modern nations have an ethnic origin as mentioned above collective name, shared history and etc. On the other hand, another scholar on nationalism, Anderson claims that the nation as imagined in his book *“The Imagined Communities.”* That *“... the nation in anthropological spirit; it is an imagined political community, and imagined as both inherently limited and*

²⁰ Anthony D. Smith (1995), *Ibid*, p. 14

*sovereign.*²¹ Moreover, Anderson emphasizes cultural artifacts by underlining this case, “*nation-ness, as well as of nationalism, are cultural artifacts of a particular kind.*”²² In his discourse “*nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with self- consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that precede it, out of which -as well as against which- it came into being.*”²³

Contrary to Smith, Anderson asserts that in a specific manner, the country is imagined. Everyone is imagining the community whose magnitude is beyond one's own touch. The country is thought to be small because the amount of individuals in a country is restricted and the country is thought to be sovereign because it was created in the era when the absolute realm of the revolution was destroyed. The country is thought of as a society since people are always seen as a profound, horizontal companion. This fraternity allows so many millions to sacrifice their lives for their country voluntarily.²⁴

On the other hand, Donald L. Horowitz states that there are a number of differences in the case of ethnic conflict. However, there can be two views on ethnic conflicts; soft view and a hard view. As Horowitz states that the theoretical scholars who accept hard stances claim that ethnic organizations are ascriptive and strongly bound entities that are based on a powerful common sense, generate significant fidelity, continue over time, give group members great affective benefits, tend towards ethnocentrism, are hostile to external peoples and willingness to dominate. In contrast to those who are on the hard side of ethnic conflicts, the owners of soft position discuss those ethnic organizations are entities whose borders are difficult and malleable whose solidarity is based not on the diffuse affection.²⁵ Horowitz discusses that ethnicity is a primitive allegiance that bonds people in an emotional

²¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London, 1983, p. 6.

²² Benedict Anderson (1983), *Ibid*, p. 4.

²³ Benedict Anderson (1983), *Ibid*, p. 12.

²⁴ Craig Calhoun, *The Importance of Imagined Communities-and Benedict Anderson*, Annual Review, 1, 2016.

²⁵ Donald L. Horowitz, “Structure and Strategy in Ethnic Conflict”, the Paper prepared for the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C., 1998, pp. 1-2.

way to each other. He also states that old hatreds among organizations lead to conflicts and this generates group awareness. Groups worried about potential threats from other groups. Moreover, culture clashes are a result of ethnic conflict. Modernization causes ethnic conflict and makes individuals want the same resources. This will reveal new conflicts. Another approach of Horowitz is to assess the issue from the perspective of the economy. Ethnic conflict is a consequence of economic competition between ethnically different working-class sections or between ethnical and customer traders.²⁶

There is no clear-cut definition of national identity and finding the origins of this phenomenon is difficult, in its nature. To reach a comprehensive answer to the question: "What are the origins of the nation?"²⁷ Smith divides this question into several issues, such as: "Who is the nation? Why and how is the nation? When and where is the nation?" To understand the origins and improvement of national identity, the concept of ethnicity should be analyzed. In this regard, Pierre L. van den Berghe suggests that ethnicities are created by individual groups that are interacted with each other²⁸. Nevertheless, Smith differentiates between ethnic categories and ethnic communities. Ethnic categories are seen as a group of the human population which has separate and distinct cultural and historical features. Conversely, the six main characteristics of an ethnic community are as following;²⁹

1. A collective proper name
2. A myth of common ancestry
3. Shared historical memories
4. One or more differentiating elements of common culture
5. An association with a specific "homeland"
6. A sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population.

²⁶ Donald L. Horowitz, (1998), *Ibid*, pp. 5-7.

²⁷ Donald L. Horowitz, (1998), *Ibid*, p. 19.

²⁸ A. Ichijo and G. Uzelac, *When is the Nation?*, Routledge, 2005, p. 114.

²⁹ A. Ichijo and G. Uzelac (2005), *Ibid*, p. 21

In this context, the question of “When do ethnic communities transform into nations?” gains significance. Ethnic communities become nations at the time of state formation. However, every state is not formed by only one nation. According to van den Berghe, nationhood is a politicized ethnicity. In this regard, Smith differentiates between lateral and vertical ethnic communities. He does not delimit the ethnic communities to a territory but rather suggests that ethnic communities are associated with other communities within its borders. Lateral ethnic communities are minority groups which go beyond the borders. On the other hand, vertical ethnic communities are defined as the successful integration of all classes within a particular territory. High and low classes are dependent on the same culture as with the example of France.

Nationalism is one of the important concepts to understand national identity. Depending on the modernist approach, nationalism originates national identity. Nationalism acts as an important part in the formation of new nations. Although, nationalism emerged as a political ideology in the late eighteenth century, it includes ancient and historical motives. According to Smith, nationalism is considered as a political ideology, social movement and as a type of culture. In this regard, he gives us several definitions of nationalism as follows;³⁰

1. The whole process of forming and maintaining nations or nation-states;
2. An awareness of belonging to the nation, together with sentiments and ambitions for its security and welfare;
3. A language and symbolism of the “nation” and its role;
4. An ideology, including a cultural doctrine of nations and the national will and prescriptions for the realization of national aspirations and the national will;
5. A social and political movement to achieve the goals of the nation and realize its national will;

³⁰ A. Ichijo and G. Uzelac (2005), *Ibid*, p. 72.

According to Smith, territory, history, and community are the three main references that are mostly used to serve the nationalist ideology, language, and symbols. Besides, Smith divides nationalism into two parts, suchlike territorial and ethnic nationalism. In civic nationalism, the individuals of a community have a common desire to live together; and therefore, their identity is not based on ethnicity. Ernest Renan called this common desire “a daily plebiscite”³¹ Territorial nationalism claims that all inhabitants of a certain territory constitute a nation.³²

A prominent scholar Michael Hechter addresses nationalism from the perspective of its side of generating violence. Nationalism is a collective type of action supplying products collectively manufactured. Nationalism must depend on these products for the emergence of individuals and the country must be adequately structured to track contributions to and use of them effectively. Nationalistic advantages were minimal as countries already supplied and monitored the products they manufactured collectively by a central authority subcontract. Autocrats aimed at maximizing authority, and thus they created direct rule and attempted cultural homogenization within the peoples of their domains to promote and legitimize their seizure of authority. The rational approach of rulers to legitimate direct rule was state-building nationalism. For instance, the scholar discusses Yugoslavia from 1948 to 1991 in terms of containing nationalism. The nation was united by a constitutional order that was intended to decrease disputes between the constituent nations, and was implemented by central (federal) government funds. This Constitution seeks to ensure equality between republics and domestic minority safety in each republic. The aim was to avoid the gain of political dominance over the state in every single domestic community. In the 1980s the central government's capacity to preserve this constitutional order was however weakened by a lethal mixture of external financial and political shocks. This led to a decline in living standards. Inflation and unemployment had risen. The debt-repayment system transformed ordinary central/regional conflicts into constitutional conflicts, requiring constitutional

³¹ K. Nash and A. Scott (eds), *The Blackwell companion to political Sociology*, Wiley-Blackwell Pub., 2004, p. 391.

³² A. S. Leoussi, *Encyclopaedia of nationalism*, Transaction Pub, 2001, p. 62

revision. The Central Government was so weakened that it could efficiently destroy its capacity to contain nationalism through this mixture of external financial and political shocks.³³

On the other hand, there is a debate on national identity and nation building. Scholars such as Rogers Brubaker, Andreas Wimmer, David Laitin, contributed stimulating approaches to the issue. Brubaker claims that "identity" means a basic and consequential resemblance between group or category members. It is expected that this similarity will be expressed in solidarity. Brubaker states in his article written with Frederick Cooper that "identity" refers to a fundamental and consequential similarity between members of a group or category. This sameness/similarity is anticipated to be expressed in solidarity, in mutual arrangements or in collective action. He emphasized that ethnic groups are not essential but historical products. A heavily institutionalized ethno-national classification scheme provides for the depiction of social reality, the framing of political demands and the organization.³⁴ Wimmer claims that the expansion of political partnerships from the point of view of political inclusion across the whole nation; and independently of who governs the political element at the moment, the emergence of a sense of allegiance to and attachment to state entities. To encourage both political links between the people and the state must be promoted across ethnic divisions. Such alliance links domestic governments directly or indirectly with individual people by political organizations. The construction of nations has its repercussions; both positive and negative. Cross-sectional alliances depoliticize ethnic divisions. Politics is not viewed as a match of zero sums, where ethnic groups are fighting for state control. Instead, major political problems can come to the forefront as regards to what the State actually needs to do.³⁵ Furthermore, Laitin expresses that the empirical information demonstrate no important connection between ethnic and language diversity and violence in civil

³³ Michael Hechter, "Nationalism and Rationality" in *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Spring 2000, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 3-19.

³⁴ Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, *Beyond "Identity"* Theory and Society, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2000, pp. 1-47.

³⁵ Andreas Wimmer, "Nation building: Why Some Countries Come Together While Others Fall Apart", in *The International Institute for Strategic Studies Quarterly*, 2018, p. 60.

conflict; rather, violence is stimulated by weak government institutions, geographic factors that weaken government ability, and possibly elevated government capture rents. Although cultural diversity reduces social solidarity, there is no cause to expect that culturally heterogeneous countries will break up a priori. The traditionally homogeneous national model is no longer in balance. Sufficient interpretation of political identity calls for the integration of rational decision-making techniques, which can explain fast change in identity, focusing on cultural foundations. Given the unacceptable expenses of initiatives of homogenization, culturally heterogeneous countries should embrace a liberal multicultural housing democratic policy.³⁶

Assimilation theory is often seen to predict the removal of ethnic distinctions by adjusting an immigrant group in a one-way towards the mainstream of the receiving society. The mainstream includes those social contexts where there are no problems with or taken for granted the existence of members of the majority of the suitable population of the era, gender, social class.³⁷ Throughout history minorities or some communities were exposed towards different sorts of assimilation. The assimilation can be divided into two terms as “hard assimilation”, “soft assimilation.” Hard assimilation can be defined as the process by which outsiders, immigrants or subordinate groups in the dominant host culture become indistinguishable, ultimately in conformity with the current social cultural standards.³⁸ Besides, soft assimilation can be exemplified as the lack of language plurality in the media. The only available media is the language of the majority and does not reflect a content which is sensitive to minority needs, preferences and issues.³⁹ On the other hand, it is crucial to discuss assimilation literature as a subgroup of nationalism studies. It can

³⁶ Arash Abizadeh, “Nations, States, and Violence by David D. Laitin.” in *Nations and Nationalism*, 2008, pp. 616-617.

³⁷ Marco Martiniello, Jan Rath, *An Introduction to Immigrant Incorporation Studies*, Amsterdam University Press, 2014 p. 54.

³⁸ Peter Sanders, Assimilation vs integration.

<https://sites.cardiff.ac.uk/islamukcentre/rera/online-teaching-resources/muslims-in-britain-online-course/module-4-contemporary-debates/assimilation-vs-integration>
(Accessed Date: 22.07.2019)

³⁹ Graham Fox, “Minority Languages in the broadcast media” speech in the UN Commission on Human Rights Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights UN Working Group on Minorities Sessions, 2005.

Link: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Minorities/WG/11/MRG_3c.doc
(Accessed Date: 22.07.2019)

be observed in Turkey for the Kurds a wide range scale beginning from assimilation/hard assimilation to soft assimilation in this case. From the view of the Turkish state, such shifts, in particular, may contribute to the understandings of Kurdish identity problem between the Turkish state and Kurdish society.

The assimilationist approach does not address accepting, recognizing and supporting differences. In addition, this approach constituted the policies of states towards ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural differences.⁴⁰ With the intensification of the nation-building process, the project of the Turkish state: Turkification (can be seen as assimilation) Kurds by the tools of forces has always been experienced. The articulation of “Kurdishness” was interpreted as a threat to territorial integrity. In other words, the “national” claims of Kurds had constantly been seen as a threat to the ‘indivisible integrity’ of Turkish lands.⁴¹

The Republic of Turkey was built, as a dream of ethnically homogeneous state, in 1923. The foundation stones, such as constitution, language, culture, traditions, and education were played an extremely important role in the shaping of the Turkish State's national identity. The idea of homogeneous state tried to cover all different ethnicities, such as Kurds and Circassians, under the roof of Turkishness. The Turkification process has started to be marked that the Kurds were deprived of maintain their cultural identity. However, traditionally homogeneous nation-state models, as David Laitin mentioned, are no longer in balance.⁴²

In the steps of nation-building, the theories and concepts of nationalism contribute fundamental thoughts to understand the nationalism's function in influencing social political and cultural structures of societies. Therefore, some modernist nationalism theories have been notified in this thesis. According to some nationalism scholars such as Anthony D. Smith, there is a connection between territory and nations. Smith

⁴⁰ Sezen Ceceli Köse, “Çokkültürcülük Teorilerinden Entegrasyon Teorilerine Geçiş: Hollanda'daki Türkiye Kökenli Göçmenler Üzerine Bir İnceleme- Transition from Multiculturalist Policies to Integration Policies: A Study on Immigrants from Turkey in the Netherlands”, 2012, pp. 14-15.

⁴¹ Ceng Sagnic, "Mountain Turks: State ideology and the Kurds in Turkey" in *Information, Society and Justice*, Volume 3 No. 2, 2010: p. 128.

⁴² Arash Abizadeh (2008), *Ibid*, p. 617.

claims that territory is socially built and humans add value and importance to the territory. "Territoriality" is 'the attempt by an individual or group to influence, affect or control objects, people and relationships by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area"⁴³ As Zeynep N. Kaya says that, this definition can be used in various cases of nationalism, as well as in Kurdish nationalism.⁴⁴ As a whole, "territoriality" is an extremely important tool to examine the nation-building and nationalism in the world.

In this regard, Diyarbakır, as one of the most populous Kurdish city, was socially constructed for the struggle of the Kurdish identity. In this socially construction, some important facts, such as Diyarbakır Prison in 1980s and 90s, contributed symbolic value and importance to this territory. The Prison is not only a symbolic factor but also the history of Diyarbakır and being center of Newroz celebrations are also other factors. In this sense, Diyarbakır has been chosen periodically as one of the first symbolic places by the Turkish State. This particular symbolic place of Diyarbakır and the choice of Diyarbakırspor football club as a tool of national integration by the state provides also the rationale of this research. It is in this sense that I will examine the role of football as a forcible Turkification and social inclusion project, via Diyarbakırspor in Diyarbakır between 1999 and 2004.

Diyarbakır's symbolic place both in the conscience of an important segment of Kurdish population as well as in the state logic comes from the city's social, economic and political centrality in the Kurdish populated region of South-east Turkey. The project to create a homogeneous Turkish nation faced a challenge when dealing with this largest culturally and linguistically distinct population among the non-Turkish people: the Kurds. The Kurds have been presented, as the greatest internal obstacle to the development of a homogeneous Turkish nation-state as the largest ethnic minority group in Turkey. It can be asserted that, the important cohort of the Kurds,

⁴³ Johnston, et.al., 14; James Anderson, 'Nationalist Ideology and Territory' in *Nationalism, Self-Determination and Political Geography*, Johnston, Knight and Kofman (eds.), London, 1988, p. 5.

⁴⁴ Zeynep N. Kaya, *Maps into Nations: Kurdistan, Kurdish Nationalism and International Society*, The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), 2012, p. 35.

as a distinct ethnic group within the state borders of Turkey, has refused the forcible Turkification policies and has been resorting to armed conflicts. Policies pursued since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, have not brought a clear solution in resolving the Kurdish question yet. Generally, the Turkish state policies were based on hard assimilation. However, the hard assimilation has begun to be transformed into soft assimilation with internal and external developments in 1999.

In the context of democratization, Murat Somer addresses that the decreasing threat to state security from Kurdish separatism and the pull of the European Union (EU) further shifted the domestic environment of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey.⁴⁵ The membership process of Turkey to the European Union in Helsinki Summit of 1999, as an external development, is an extremely important turning point for Kurdish question. In the same year, the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the militant Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), became the main internal turning point.

There are many methods, as tools, to implement assimilation policies in the hands of nation-states. Some of these methods, such as using the force (military), punishment and interdiction, might be collected under the roof of the "hard assimilation policy methods". There are also different methods, such as education, cinema, press, cultural and sports activities, might be gathered under the roof of the "soft assimilation policy methods". The sport, as a leisure time activity, is one of the most preferred soft assimilation methods. Although a lot of methods have been adopted by the state's assimilation and social inclusion projects, there was no important solution for the Kurdish question until 1999 from the view of the state. Football here started to be seen as an alternative political instrument to touch and control the Kurdish society rather than military intervention, by the Turkish state. Diyarbakırspor has become one of key factors (such as "re-invention" of Newroz as a Turkish tradition (Nevruz), rewriting of lyrics of Kurdish traditional music in Turkish)⁴⁶ in the

⁴⁵ Murat Somer, "Turkey's Kurdish Conflict: Changing Context, and Domestic and Regional Implications," in *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.58, No.2, 2004, pp. 245–253.

⁴⁶ Rasim Özgür Dönmez, "Constructing Kurdish Nationalist Identity Through Lyrical Narratives In Popular Music" in *Alternative Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2012, p. 318-341.

building of national identity and imposing the "soft assimilation project" in Diyarbakır, in 1999.

The term of "sport" is defined under many different meanings. The United Nations Inter-Agency Taskforce on Sport for Development and Peace defines the term in a report as: *"Incorporated into the definition of sport are all forms of physical activity that contribute to physical fitness, mental well-being and social interaction. These include play; recreation; organized, casual or competitive sport; and indigenous sports or games"*.⁴⁷ Sport provides an opportunity to gain discipline, self-discipline, leadership, and confidence and teaches ethics of competition; teamwork, tolerance, empathy, respect and even the behaviors of both the victor and the defeated to their counterparts. Furthermore, many writers assert that sport has societal functions such as purification and purgation of emotions (Catharsis), authentication of identity, social control, socialization, collective conscience, and success.⁴⁸

Throughout history, competition has attracted people all over the world. The people of Ancient Greece watched sports in the Olympic Games such as jumping, pentathlon, wrestling, running, jumping, discus throw, and boxing.⁴⁹ These activities, in drawing the attention of the public, are all effective parameters to be used in building a nation or nation-state. The soul of competition, taking part in a team to acquire an identity and socialize, collective identity all leads builders of a nation to use the terms effectively to achieve their goals. Notably, in Europe, the nation-states tried to gain benefits from the widespread collectivism of football. For instance, the case of Muhammad Ali is remarkable in this context. After Muhammad Ali declared that he converted to Islam, Muslims around the world identified themselves with his victories.

Football, as a leisure time activity, is one of the most popular and followed sports activities all around the world. Therefore, this popularity reveals its power over

⁴⁷ UNIATSDP Report, 2005.

https://www.un.org/sport2005/resources/task_force.pdf

(Accessed Date: 30.03.2019)

⁴⁸ M. L. Krotee and C. A. Bucher, *Spor Yönetimi*, Beyaz Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007, p. 146.

⁴⁹ M. Göral, "Spor Basını Ahlakı" in *Dumlupınar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 2003, p. 8.

societies and contributes, as a new area, to open the sense of belonging of people. As a political tool, the importance of football began to be grasped in Europe, especially in the 19th century. Recently, the relationship between football and the state, as a means of shaping nation-state, has been a major theme in academic discussions.

Nationalism takes a more comprehensive approach to that of patriotism. Therefore, the political and collective aspect of football nationalism can be considered notable in fluctuating the relationship of competition and collaboration among communities. It can be said that as a result, football provides an opportunity for the nation builders to maintain the notion of homogenization in constructing an ethnic nation besides many other instruments such as literature, cinema, and other cultural tools. Football can be seen as an essential tool in shaping social identities and mobilizing the collective emotions of society. Football and its nationalism can also be formed by football-oriented events, heroes and icons which are perceived as being strong, remarkable instruments. Therefore, this sport activity should be considered as an extremely important issue and historical breaking point in which changes happened in the world.

Throughout history, there was no Kurdish state to constitute the Kurdish national identity. Therefore, the Kurdish national identity cannot be evaluated in the same way as other national identities which emerged on industrialized and developed contexts within the scope of the theoretical discussions. However, the Kurdish people has common history, culture, language and traditions. As Horowitz discussed, national identity building is based on common history, culture, language, traditions, and historic memories⁵⁰. In line with this point of view, the Kurdish ethnicity has also common historic memories, culture, tradition, and language, as fundamentals of a potential building of their national identity, to be built their national identity.

⁵⁰ Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, pp. 63-65.

As shown by Smith, the Kurdish nationalism also contains ethnic roots, myths, collective memories, common traditions as well as values. As per his point of view, the "ethnic core" was already found in the pre-modern tribal structure of the Kurds. Therefore, there is no doubt that the Kurdish cultural identity existed before the modern era. Accordingly, the Kurdish nationalism has been heavily influenced by the pre-modern tribal social structure.⁵¹ Football, as an element of identity, which creates a strong commitment, has been started to be associated with ethnic identity and become involved in the foundation of new ethnic, nationalist and territorial culture.

1.3. The Historical Background of Football

During the Industrial Revolution period, the prohibitions on football were lifted, and workers had more free time than they had had before. Football, as a modern freelance activity, emerged and started to be popular among the middle class, especially workers in Britain in the 18th century. After the "Nine Hours Movement"⁵², compulsory working hours were lowered and as a result, workers did not have to work more than 54 hours per week. As a consequence of this move, workers began to have more leisure time, and one of the most popular activities to fill the time was by playing football.

Football mainly started to become a popular sport in the 19th century. Therefore, the subject will be discussed within the existence of the game from the end of the 19th century, as that of modern football. At that time, football drew attention for becoming an essential and effective communication bridge between the power elites and society. For certain, we could say that in having a broad and general understanding of football history, there are many reasons for the increase in the worldwide popularity of football. First and foremost, it is an easy game to play; the rules are not complicated in comparison to other sports activities. The game also

⁵¹ M. Hakan Yavuz, "Five stages of the construction of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey" in *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* Routledge, Vol: 7, No: 3, 2001, pp. 1-24.

⁵² For more information about the nine hours movement, please see the below book: Patricia Hollis, "The Short Time Movement: the question of hours" in *Class and Conflict in Nineteenth-Century England: 1815-1850*, Routledge, 2016, pp. 192-193.

allows for quite acrobatic-like maneuvers and innovative tactics. Moreover, football has a long tradition and provides cultural icons, memorable moments and incredible superstar success stories.⁵³ In addition, football is a platform where both patriotism and nationalism overlap. It should be highlighted that patriotism can be defined as “*attachment of group members toward their group and the country in which they reside.*”⁵⁴ Hence, patriotism contains emotional belonging to a place. Nationalism has a different form “*which embraces a comparison with other countries, and the desire to best those other nations*”.⁵⁵

The world first faced the push of technological developments and globalization. The increase in the popularity of football began with technological developments which sped up the Industrial Revolution in Britain. When steam locomotives started to connect the towns of Britain by rail, and leisure hours increased by the use of electric lighting in factories, the changes allowed for the possibility of football to be played with ease; it became the game that the middle class favored and was played outside the local villages; and this quickly spread to a national level. Another insight into increased popularity is with the increase in steam power that had come into use in the shipping industry. European ports were becoming crowded, and sailors had started to have more time to spare while having to wait for ship freight loading at the ports. These waiting periods created more free time for the British sailors to attract other workers at the ports, and football was both an essential and enjoyable pastime activity among sailors and dock workers.⁵⁶

The ruling classes also recognized that the industrial economy must have a much more skilled workforce. The business owners in the economy at that time began to send apprentices and employees to schools to equip them with more skills so that they would consequently possess the tools, knowhow and skills to better the

⁵³ C. Rowley, “Football Goes Global” in *The Shared Origins of Football, Rugby, and Football*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, September 2015, p. 173.

⁵⁴ D. Bar-Tal, *The Monopolization of Patriotism*, Nelson-Hall Publishers, Chicago, 1997, p. 246.

⁵⁵ S. Worchel, and D. Coutant, “The tangled web of loyalty: Nationalism, patriotism, and ethnocentrism” in *Patriotism: In the lives of individuals and nations*, (Eds. D. Bar-Tal & E. Staub) Nelson Hall, Chicago, 1997, p. 193.

⁵⁶ B. Murray and W. J. Murray, “A Very British Beginning” in *The World’s Game: A History of Football*, University of Illinois Press, 1998, pp. 2-3.

operations of the mills, factories and companies for which they worked. In school, individuals could be more engaged in football, hence there being no reason for football not to spread in popularity through the working classes. The effects of this trend became apparent in just a short period of time. In the early part of 1882, the Old Etonians team was established by the graduates of the Eton School in the north of England, and more or less at the same time, Blackburn Rovers FC was also formed comprising of working class players; Old Etonians won the match 1-0.⁵⁷ However, the nine hours movement was not enough to organize football activities. Therefore, the institutionalization processes such as time limits, boundary lines, game rules, and prize, started for football in the late 19th century. While football standards were in line with the rules and starting to become standard practice, it was being commercialized in public space. According to the records of the Britain Federation Cup (1875-1914), the number of spectators was substantially increased in England and Scotland.⁵⁸ In the beginning, workers were playing each other in factory gardens and at some stadiums in Britain. There is one famous painting (“The Football Match”, which was painted by Laurence Stephen Lowry) depicting the adventure of football in factory gardens.




Image 1.1. Laurence Stephen Lowry, was an English artist, painted “The Football Match” in 1949.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ David Goldblatt, *The Ball Is Round - A Global History Of Football*, London, Penguin Books, 2006, pp. 37-54.

⁵⁸ Dağhan Irak, “Futbolun Kısa Tarihi: Futbolun İngiltere’de Doğuşu ve Yayılması” in *Hükmen Yenik*, Evrensel, 2013.

⁵⁹ Please see the image 1.1. by using the below Link:

<http://www.thedaisycutter.co.uk/2013/11/ls-lowry-footballs-painter-laureate/>

Football was an accurate barometer of Britain's relationship with the rest of the world. The British Empire, upon which the Sun never set, helped to spread the game on a global scale despite the early reservations in adopting the game.⁶⁰ For instance, British sailors or workers introduced football to Genoa and Naples in Italy in the 1890s.⁶¹ In the Netherlands, the port workers learned this game from British sailors while miners and steel workers did so in the port in Rotterdam.⁶² In Spain, football became more common, especially in the Basque country with British maritime workers, especially shipyard workers from Sunderland and Southampton, and was played in the iron mines of Bilbao in the 1890s.⁶³ In Argentina, the team Boca Juniors was founded in 1905 in Buenos Aires. Those who established the game in the region were from Genoa, who found work on the docks or in the shipping industry. Also, the team's colors, which are blue and yellow, are reference to the colors of the flag of the first ship entering the city port, which was from Sweden.⁶⁴

In today's globalized world with the rapid development of technology, the importance of football organizations has increased because of the fact that the events of these organizations have been watched the world over simultaneously. Today there are many regular sports organizations such as World Championship Tournaments, European Champions League, UEFA European League and not only local, but also international leagues like The Premier League, La Liga, Serie A. For the football organization, which is the most popular branch of sports today, billions of dollars are spent and sports channels are in competition with each other in order to broadcast live matches.

(Accessed Date: 30.08.2016)

⁶⁰ J. M. Deyo, *Sports and International Relations: The Role of Football in International Conflicts and Resolutions*, University of Tennessee Honors Thesis Projects, 2013.

⁶¹ John Nauright and Charles Parrish, "Ball Games" in *Sports around the World: History, Culture, and Practice*, ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2012, p. 223.

⁶² D.G. McComb, "The globalization of sport" in *Sports in World History*, Routledge, 2004, p. 69.

⁶³ Rowley, C. (2015), *Ibid*, p. 181.

⁶⁴ John Nauright and Charles Parrish, "Argentina" in *Football around the World: A Cultural Guide to the World's Favourite Sport*, ABC-CLIO, 2014, pp. 9-10.

1.4. Nation, Politics and Football Mirroring Conflicts

Football was born in England and became popular in the 1800s, permeating further in the second half of the 20th Century. In almost 150 years, it has spread all over the world, and in most of the regions that it has reached, the game has become the most loved and followed sport by the general public. A natural consequence of this popularity of football is that football players use football as a tool to guide the masses in some way. After attracting hundreds of millions of football team fans around the world, football has not only drawn attention as being solely a sport, but also carries other characteristics. Particularly those who watch football and are deeply involved in the football culture, start to identify themselves with football teams, and this sometimes leads to the kind of fanaticism that can affect the most extreme dimensions of football. This situation takes football to a place which has a direct effect on the masses.

Football fans are so faithful to their teams that they are ecstatic whether their team wins or loses. It is, in part, for this reason that football is central to the way they lead their lives. The pervasive attributes of this devotion are also very clear for as long as people are engaged in football. As a result, football, with the discovery of this dominant factor, has been used by those in power as an effective weapon to guide the masses. Politicians began to use football as a device to encourage relations between society and the ruling party because it is a crucial instrument used to bond the daily life of society. It has also helped promote the relationships between the ruling party and society. Many leaders have used football as an effective tool to reconstitute these relations. To date, politicians have also mentioned the significance of football in the political arena. For Betül Yarar, this is “instrumentalism”. In exploiting this, politicians have, on many occasions, been to stadiums and disclosed their favorite football teams.⁶⁵

Besides, from the viewpoint of football fans in Turkey, their relation with football fluctuates along the thin line between hooliganism and fanaticism. Despite trying to

⁶⁵ Yarar, B. “Hegemonic struggle, the state and popular culture; The case of football in Turkey” in *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, Vol: 8 (2), SAGE Publications, London, 2005, pp. 204-205.

establish fair play in Turkish football, there are many “*unwritten rules of football.*” For the sake of winning; the term: “*winning at all costs*” (*kazanmak için her şey mübah*) is normal for Turkish football fans. Nuhurat conceptualizes this case as “*Permissibility (Mübah) v. Malice (Çirkef)*” in her thesis.⁶⁶ The fans can legitimize some foul acts in football as permissibility to win or denounce others as malice to emphasize its deep immorality for their sake. Indeed, these concepts adopted by football fans indicate that fanaticism and football nationalism surround Turkish football. One cannot ignore, however, that this fanaticism is quite convenient to “*national loyalty as a part of footballing convention in Turkey.*” Nuhurat analyzes that football helps reproduce some of the characteristics of Turkish nationalism.

Football paves the way and helps the imagination of the essence of Turkish citizenship as an ethno-religious connection as opposed to conceptualizing citizenship based on territorial rights. Turkish football produces ethnic and nationalist stereotypes and uses militarist metaphors for other rivals. Football is seen as war waged between two rivals on a turf soccer pitch between the strategic and leading troops (football players). In another dissertation, Nuhurat cites that Turkish nationalism in Turkish stadiums spreads with anti-Kurdish propaganda in the form of singing the Turkish national anthem. For instance, the official practice in protest for armed political struggle in Southeastern Turkey performs the anthem with slogans of “*Martyrs do not die and the motherland cannot be divided*” (*Şehitler ölmez, vatan bölünmez*) immediately afterwards.⁶⁷ Therefore, it can be pointed out that there is a positive correlation between football fans in Turkey and nationalism. Politicians or nation/identity builders are aware of the rate of success while exploiting football as a prominent tool to shape the masses.

Exemplification of the link between football, inter-states relations, nationalism and identity building can be seen between rival clubs in some parts of the world. In

⁶⁶ Yağmur Nuhurat, “Fair Enough? Negotiating Ethics in Turkish Football”, Doctorate Thesis of Philosophy in the Department of Anthropology at Brown University, Rhode Island, 2013, pp. 85-96.

⁶⁷ Yağmur Nuhurat (2013), *Ibid*, pp. 95-99

Scotland, there is a football derby known as the Old Firm⁶⁸, between the Glasgow Rangers and Celtic football clubs. These two clubs are the most popular and successful football teams in Scotland based on their achievements in the national and international sporting arena. Glasgow Rangers FC was founded in 1872⁶⁹ and Celtic FC was founded in 1887.⁷⁰

The rivalry between these two clubs represents their political and religious identities. One is Glasgow Rangers, a Protestant club with its anti-Catholic and anti-Irish identity. The other team is Celtic, a Catholic club based on the Catholic Irish immigrants in Glasgow. When the Irish came to Scotland, they were poverty stricken. They were working in factories and living under adverse conditions, especially in Glasgow city. These conditions gathered Irish Catholic people under the roof of Celtic football club, against the Rangers.⁷¹ The popularity of Celtic is extremely strong among Irish society, people who live in Ireland come to Glasgow to watch the derby matches between Rangers and Celtic.⁷² Furthermore, John Reid, who was the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, suggested the Irish Catholic and Ulster Protestant Diasporas generated large fan bases for Celtic and Rangers in both North America and Australia.⁷³

The foundational links between politics and football mainly came after the First World War in Europe. The first political regime, as a founder of these links, was Fascism. The hypnotizing effect of football was consciously used in this sense by oppressive regimes to avoid any possible political reaction (revolt) from people in

⁶⁸ The rivalry between Glasgow Rangers and Celtic called the "Old Firm", because both football clubs are the two oldest teams in the country and are noted the football foundation in Scotland.

⁶⁹ The brief history for Glasgow Rangers football club, please see Link: <http://rangers.co.uk/club/history/rangers-history/founding-fathers/> (Accessed Date: 20.02.2019)

⁷⁰ The brief history for Celtic football club, please see Link: <http://www.celticfc.net/pages/history> (Accessed Date: 20.02.2019)

⁷¹ Anderson, S. "Sports and the Reconstruction of Postwar Western Europe and Japan" in *The Politics and Culture of Modern Sports*, Lexington Books, 2015, pp. 200-201.

⁷² Bora, T. "İskoç mahzunluğu" in *Radikal*, 28.12.2011.

Link: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/tanil-bora/iskoc-mahzunlugu-1073805/> (Accessed Date: 10.05.2019)

⁷³ S. Wagg, *British Football & Social Exclusion (Sport in the Global Society)*, Routledge, 2004, p. 158.

response to their failures in policy-making in the economy and other fields.⁷⁴ In the first quarter of the 20th century, the first apparent examples of the transformation of football into an important political, social and economic factor could be seen in the period when the oppressive administrations swiftly came to power in Italy and Germany. The Fascist Party led by Benito Mussolini in Italy and the National Socialist Workers Party (Nazi Party) led by Adolf Hitler in Germany were among the first executives to implement the idea of the power of football on the masses. The two fascists could turn football into an important ideological apparatus.

The exploitation of football was used first by Benito Mussolini, who was the leader of Italy (under the umbrella of the National Fascist Party) as Prime Minister from 1922 until 1943, for the benefits of the Italian fascist regime. Mussolini used football as a tool in promulgating his fascism to the world. For instance, Mussolini's attempt to impose responsibility on the shoulders of the Italian national team as a representative of the fascist regime in the 1934 World Cup was a message to his people for propaganda purposes. This message was also clearly received by people across the world, as well as citizens in Italy. The message being that the Italian race was superior to sports. In this case, Italian footballers played in black shirts⁷⁵ with a special directive during the match with France. The Italian National Team became the symbol of the fascist regime in the world and sent this message to the masses through football.

In other respects, one of the most popular football rivalries is that between two clubs of Rome: SS Lazio and AS Roma. Both teams were founded in Rome, playing matches on the same pitch known as "Stadio Olimpico" (Olympic Stadium). However, the differences are based on social structures and political conflicts. The fans of SS Lazio are extreme rightist, being working class and a large portion being factory laborers; whereas the fans of AS Roma tend not only to be many of the residents of Rome itself, but also in general, leftist immigrants. According to Sean Brown, the communal

⁷⁴ S. Kuper, *Futbol Asla Sadece Futbol Değildir*, Sabah, İstanbul, 1996, pp. 160-186.

⁷⁵ The fascists wore black shirts during the "Roman March" organized by Mussolini before the conquest of the power led the clothes to become an informal uniform of fascism.

stadium is the place where the similarities end for these clubs, because the AS Roma fans (Romanisti) prefer to stay in the south part of the city because it is closer to the center of Rome. SS Lazio fans (*Laziali*) stay in the north.⁷⁶ Moreover, SS Lazio is also known as the most favorite football team of Benito Mussolini, who was the fascist dictator of Italy.⁷⁷ Initially, the alterations made to Italian football games, were symbolic. For instance, Italian players would give the signature fascist salute, known as a Roman Salute in Italy.⁷⁸

“Benito Mussolini himself was regularly horse riding, swimming, cycling and playing tennis, and for once this was quite genuine, for he was an active man who needed plenty of exercise. In 1924 he and (allegedly) 15,000 followers jogged six miles uphill to visit the house of his intellectual precursor, Alfredo Oriani. Perhaps significantly, the Duce did not play any team games, not even the most popular sport in Italy, football.”⁷⁹

Nevertheless, Mussolini considered and emphasized the importance of football with easy accessibility to the masses because fascist propaganda could be easily and powerfully conveyed to the thousands of people in stadiums. Moreover, the masses were gathered by football, and Mussolini was fascinated by those full stadiums. In 1934, the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA), had organized the second World Cup organization and the host country was Italy. The Italian national football team became the second World Cup champion by beating Czechoslovakia 2-1 in the final in Rome. Within a year, there was an Italian general election held, and the National Fascist Party won all seats in the Italian parliament. Therefore, the second World Cup organization was under the influences of political victory of

⁷⁶ S. Brown, “The Roman Derby” in *Football Fans Around the World From Supporters to Fanatics*, Routledge, 1997.

⁷⁷ T. Bar-on, “Italian Postwar Neo-Facism: Three Paths, One Mission?” in *Analysing Fascist Discourse: European Fascism in Talk and Text* (ed: Ruth Wodak, John E. Richardson), Routledge, New York, 2013, p. 51.

⁷⁸ J. Foot, “Power and Politics” in *Winning at All Costs: A Scandalous History of Italian Football*, Nation Books, 2007, pp. 355-356.

⁷⁹ M. Clark, “The Regime And The Duce 1929-35” in *Mussolini*, Routledge, January 2005, p. 158.

Mussolini and the celebration of the World Cup championship was transformed into a celebration of fascism with propaganda.

Having a complicated past regarding football and fascism, it is not surprising that we have come across the strong bond between Italian football and fascism in the recent past. In the 1990s, Italy became an immigrant receiving country and many people started to migrate to Italy from old Yugoslavia and Eastern European countries.⁸⁰ These movements increased the level of intolerance towards Italian nationalist society by new immigrants. In addition to this, the growth of anti-immigrant and rightwing movements began to be observed. The racist and anti-immigrant tendencies were long concealed, but these reactions started to explode and became more visible via football. One case is the Lazio team which is seen as an important tool in showing a sense of belonging for some rightist people in Italy.

In January 2005, there was an important derby match between AS Roma and SS Lazio in Italy. Paolo Di Canio, who was a forward player for Lazio, gave a straight-arm fascist salute to Lazio team supporters during the match.⁸¹ After the fascist salute, Paolo Di Canio can be seen bearing the word "Dux" (the Latin equivalent: "Duce") tattooed on his arm and said, "*Basically, Benito Mussolini was a very principled, ethical individual and was deeply misunderstood*".⁸² Moreover, Lazio supporters opened Nazi flags, fascist symbols, and anti-Semitic banners in the stadium. After the games, there were reports of black foreigners being victims of physical violence and arsonists attacked hotels usually used by foreigners. All these events are related to the reaction of nationalist Italians for certain political decisions.⁸³

⁸⁰ G. Özerim, "Supranationalisation of The Migration Policies in Europe and Transformation into a Security Issue: A New Phase In History of European Migration?" in *Ege Strategic Research Journal*, Vol: 5, No: 1, 2014, pp. 11-48.

⁸¹ Bar-on, T. (2013), *Ibid.* p. 51.

⁸² Fenton, B. "I'm a fascist, not a racist, says Paolo di Canio" in *The Telegraph*, 24th December 2005. Link: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1506262/Im-a-fascist-not-a-racist-says-Paolo-di-Canio.html> (Accessed Date: 19.06.2015).

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1506262/Im-a-fascist-not-a-racist-says-Paolo-di-Canio.html>

⁸³ C. Kassimeris "Racism in European Football" in *Anti-Racism in European Football: Fair Play for All* (ed. Christos Kassimeris), Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.: Lexington Books, 2009, pp. 16-18.



Image 1.2. Pictured at Lazio, has been seen giving the straight-arm/Nazi salute at the stadium in public.⁸⁴

In this context, Germany is another address where fascism prevailed in Europe in the 1930s. After the German National Socialist Workers Party (Nazi Party), led by Adolf Hitler, won around one-third of the votes in the general elections held in 1932, Hitler became Germany's new chancellor at the beginning of 1933, and fascism and Nazism from that moment seized power. Anti-Semitism, which is one of the most well-known results of the Nazi Party's racist attitude, was not spared in football and as with every other country, this trend also became pervasive here. On June 2, 1933, the process was officially started when Bernhard Rust, Germany's new minister of national education, ordered the expulsion of Jews from social aid organizations, youth groups and sports clubs.⁸⁵

In 1936, the Olympics were held in Berlin, Germany. Adolf Hitler, who had no interest in football until that day, came to the Olympiad Stadium in Berlin to watch Germany's match with Norway in the quarter-final of the games. However, Germany was defeated 2-0 by Norway and Hitler and his staff were very disappointed. Hitler, who

⁸⁴ Please see the image 1.2 by using the below Link:
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2305295/Paolo-Di-Canio-tattoo-Just-days-renouncing-fascism-Mussolini-design-revealed.html>
(Accessed Date: 15.06.2019)

⁸⁵ David Goldblatt (2006), *Ibid.*, pp. 308-309.

had most probably watched a football match for the first time in his life, was so angry, not only because a game was lost on the pitch, but also because of his racist ideas on Arianism. For his mindset, the Germans were “*Übermensch*”, *superior race*, so it was his perception that the loss to the Norwegians in the match equated to a great disgrace to the German race. It can be seen from this example that football has meanings far beyond being a game. When the national football teams represented the nation, the Nazis considered the German national football team as an invincible armada for the creation of a German nation based on the Arian race. The defeat was therefore unacceptable for Hitler.⁸⁶

The relationship between football and politics was not only strong in the fascist regimes but also strong with communist regimes in Europe. After the Second World War, the communists came into power (with the support of the USSR) in Romania. Steaua Bucharest and Dinamo Bucharest are the most popular football clubs in Romania. However, the popularity of both these teams was not only the achievements, but also identity tags for society. Steaua Bucharest, as a team of the Romanian Army, was founded in 1947⁸⁷ and Dinamo Bucharest, as a team of the Romanian Police Force, was founded in 1948.⁸⁸ These football clubs were extremely important propaganda tools as well as a battlefield for these two crucial state institutions in Romania. Indeed, the increasing competition influenced social groups through the fans of two capital city clubs.

In Romania, the communist regime used football as an important propaganda tool. On 26 June 1988, there was a football cup match final between Dinamo Bucharest and Steaua Bucharest clubs at the Romanian National Stadium. The match was tied 1-1 in the 19th minute when the apparent winning goal, scored by the Steaua team, was disallowed by the referee because the ball was reported as being offside.

⁸⁶ David Goldblatt (2006), *Ibid.*, p. 310.

⁸⁷ For the history of Steaua Bucharest football club.
Link: <http://www.steauafc.com/en/istoric/>
(Accessed Date: 10.01.2019)

⁸⁸ For the history of Dinamo Bucharest football club.
Link: <http://www.fcdinamo.ro/legenda-dinamo>
(Accessed Date: 10.01.2019)

However, Valentin Ceausescu, who was the son of Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu, ordered the team off the field. The Minister of Sport directed the media not to report the match score.⁸⁹ Two days later, Romanian Football Federation announced, the goal of Steaua Bucharest was not offside. Thus, Steaua Bucharest team was proclaimed the *de facto* winner of the game and the cup against Dinamo.⁹⁰

In Argentina, the British had a large share in the construction of railroads. As a result of the British construction of railways, most of the engineers and workers working in Argentina came from England. This case led these workers to play football in their spare time. Various football clubs started to come out of the railways. The first official league in South America, the Argentine Association Football League was established in 1893. At the forefront of construction, the founders of some of these clubs were railways workers themselves. The Quilmes Athletic Club and the Rosario Central (former Buenos Aires-Rosario Railway), founded in 1889, are still active today.⁹¹ At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, Argentinean football continued its development under the leadership of foreigners.

In addition to the clubs, the Newell's Old Boys Club in Rosario was founded by the British in 1903. In the same period, the important clubs of the capital Buenos Aires began to emerge as one of the groups of the immigrant population of the city. The River Plate club was first founded by the British in 1901, and then by 1903, the French minority in the town formed a football club with the same name, inspired by the club named Racing Club in Paris; and in 1905, though its founder was an Irishman. Additionally, there was the Boca Juniors Club, which started its activities as an organization of Italian immigrants.⁹²

⁸⁹ D. Rissolo, "Misbehavior" in *Football Stories: Anecdotes, Oddities, Lore, and Amazing Feats*, Bison Books, 2010, pp. 115-116.

⁹⁰ F. Poenaru, "Chapter 10: Power at Play Football Stadiums and Popular Culture in 1980s Romania" in *Socialist Escapes: Breaking Away from Ideology and Everyday Routine in Eastern Europe, 1945-1989* (By Cathleen M Giustino), Berghahn Books, 2013, p. 232.

⁹¹ V. Duke and L. Crolley, "Fútbol, Politicians and the People: Populism and Politics in Argentina", in *Sport In Latin American Society – Past and Present*, (Ed. J.A. Mangan.; Lamartine P. DaCosta) London, Frank Cass, 2002, pp. 94-95.

⁹² G. Oliver, *The Guinness Book Of World Soccer*, (2nd ed., Middlesex), Guinness Publishing, 1995, pp. 2.

There is a derby match held in Argentina which clearly highlights the class divisions through football. The Boca Juniors and River Plate are the most famous and successful football clubs in Argentinian history. This derby match is not only a game, but also an extremely important demonstration of class division between workers and the upper class. River Plate, which was founded by an Englishman in 1901⁹³, represents the upper-class community in Buenos Aires. The team's nickname is "*los Millionarios*" (the Millionaires). Moreover, the club's stadium (Monumental Stadium), is located in one of the richer zones (Belgrano) in Buenos Aires.⁹⁴ Boca Juniors, founded by Genoese immigrants mentioned above, represents the working-class community in Buenos Aires. The team bears the name of La Boca, which is a dominant working class in Buenos Aires. The team's nickname is "*Xeneizes*", which is reference to the Genoese people who migrated from Italy to Argentina in search of better employment opportunities.⁹⁵

In Argentina, when football became more professionalized, its political function became more intense and more overt. The relationships between the presidents of Argentina Football Association (AFA) and the state were especially strong. This is evident because if you wanted to be the president of AFA, you had to possess three main characteristics: a strong connection with those in politics (especially members of the ruling government), a business career, and a traineeship in football – which often involved the running of a club.⁹⁶ The culminating point of the state intervention was the Peronist Period of 1946 to 1955 under the regime of Juan Peron. In this period, the control mechanism of the state imposed on society was through the exploitation of football. Argentinian football brought spectators together under the same roof. In this regard, Argentinean politicians exploited football, seeing it as a golden opportunity to control the masses by structuring and defining social identities and reinforcing unified national sentiments.⁹⁷

⁹³ D. Aeberhard, Andrew Benson and Lucy Philips, "Basics" in *The Rough Guide to Argentina*, Rough Guides, 2000, p. 57.

⁹⁴ John Nauright and Charles Parrish (2014), *Ibid*, pp. 6-7.

⁹⁵ John Nauright and Charles Parrish (2014), *Ibid*, p. 9.

⁹⁶ V. Duke and L. Crolley (2002), *Ibid*. p. 102.

⁹⁷ V. Duke and L. Crolley (2002), *Ibid*, pp. 103-105.

The FIFA World Cup of 1978 was a great opportunity for Argentina's military dictatorship. There were many members of international press at the event in Argentina to follow the progress of team members and conduct interviews, and to report on the World Cup matches and associated events. Jorge Rafael Videla, who was the dictator of Argentina at the time, used the organization and surrounding hype of the World Cup to divert attention away from atrocities like the kidnappings and torture that had been taking place up to the year of 1978.

The sense of identity belonging can be seen in society under the headings of religion, ethnicity, political party, national/international unity, as well as sports teams. Within this framework, if a group of people comes together under some of the common values such as traditions, history and language, we can talk about identity. Football came to be understood in places like Brazil and Argentina as a vehicle for building national identity and a device used by different nationalities. The styles and experiences surrounding football came to inform people of how lawmakers and rulers envisioned their communities. For example, in Argentina, "beating the British at their own game", although with a particular style belonging to "us" (la nuestra), became a crucial image for promoting and experiencing the sense of nationalism, as well as particular masculinities.⁹⁸

With the emergence of nation-states on the stage of history, a new national identity topic came to be the main question, although adverse to the previous state structures. The new question that we call national identity, is apparently simple, yet is difficult in practice. There is no nation-state that has a single ethnicity in the world. For instance, Japan is a nation state that is more racially and ethnically homogeneous than almost any other modern nation, contrary to the popular wisdom of the world. However, despite the overwhelming majority of the population being Japanese (98.1%), there are some other ethnic identities such as Chinese (0.5%), Korean (0.4%) and other (1%: Filipino, Vietnamese and Brazilian).⁹⁹ Therefore, national identity has

⁹⁸ Yağmur Nuhurat (2013), *Ibid.*, pp. 92-93.

⁹⁹ For more information, please check the below Link:

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html>

found itself becoming embroiled in a struggle for sovereignty within the society. Manuel Castells has categorized this struggle as “legitimizing identity”, “identity of resistance” and “project identity”. Castells cites that legitimizing identity is put into effect by the “dominant institutions of society” to enhance and legitimize their authority reciprocally with social actors. Resistance identity is created by the actors that are devalued by the logic of domination. Therefore, building trenches of resistance and survival based on principles differ from those promoting the institutions of society. Based on what cultural material social actors fit, project identity, in the case of incompatibility, dictates the creation of a new identity which redefines social actors’ positions.¹⁰⁰

When an international event is held in a country and the host country’s team participates in that event, this constructs an identity or a national symbol that your country can fully stand behind. Sometimes, the whole country works towards one goal against the opponent team (country). Well-known international tournaments such as FIFA World Cup or continental champions (Cups of Asia, Europe, Africa, America) are especially effective at arousing a feeling of belonging among supporters, and build an identity in each individual, providing a sense that they belong aided by the fact that they have been brought together under the same roof as a nation, as seen with the World Cup 2002 held in South Korea and Japan. While the World Cup tournament continued, South Korea became a “*state of football frenzy in the face of the surprising success of the national team.*” The national team was called “Asian Tigers” or “Taeguk Warriors”, and more commonly, the team was known as “Red Devils”. The “Red Devils” encircled the stadiums and the streets during the 2002 World Cup with their colorful faces and red T-shirts and became a popular image in both local and international media.¹⁰¹

(Accessed Date: 02.12.2018)

¹⁰⁰ Nancyrubin, “Manuel Castells: The Power Of Identity”, 2014.

Link: <https://nancy-rubin.com/2014/03/10/manuel-castells-the-power-of-identity/>

(Accessed Date: 08.04.2019)

¹⁰¹ G. Podoler, *Nation, State and Football: The Korean Case, The International Journal of the History of Sport*, 25:1, 2008, pp. 7-8.

Another case on a broader spectrum is that of the 1994 Rugby World Cup, which was hosted by South Africa. At this event, it was considered extremely important to unite the nation under the same roof. On the downfall the apartheid regime, sports activities (especially football, cricket, and rugby) were used as an important instrument against the system of racial discrimination system in South Africa. In line with this purpose, Nelson Mandela, who was the first elected President of South Africa decided to use the power of sports activities to find a solution to the deep-rooted discrimination. Therefore, after the end of apartheid in 1994, South Africa hosted the Rugby World Cup in 1995. However, Rugby, cricket, and football are very popular and national sports activities of South Africa, but traditionally these seem like the “white man’s games”. Dr. Ali Bacher, who was the top South African cricket administrator, summarizes the importance of this tournament as follows:

“To give an indication of his (Mandela’s) wisdom and insight, in 1995 - halfway through the Rugby World Cup - he came out publicly to support players wearing the Springbok emblem which, to many, represented a sporting code that only whites could play for in the apartheid era. A television crew came to me to ask about the response from South African cricket and I said that we wanted a neutral emblem that will satisfy both white and black. Soon after, Mandela invited me to lunch, and he took me out onto the patio with two of my board members. He started to explain that he understood that amongst Afrikaans people, rugby and the [Springbok] emblem were very important. He told me he wore the rugby jersey and the emblem and went out onto the field (on the day of the Rugby World Cup final) because he wanted to thank them for their support for him as South Africa’s first ever-black president. In 1996 we represented a nation and saw what we are seeing now (in 2010). White people came to [the then] FNB stadium to support football and the nation. It was brilliant. Before, these people would know the rugby team

but after 1996 - with Mandela supporting the team - they knew who we were".¹⁰²

The audiences of each football team illustrate how people within society and this membership also gives happiness and identity, because football teams (national or international) do not only represent players, but they also represent social classes, cultures, religions, or nationality. According to Eker, the sense of belonging to a family, a football team, a political party, a nation or a culture, is an extremely important criterion for the determination of personal social role and status in society.¹⁰³

At this juncture, football is one of the most important facts to show a sense of belonging for the masses, because winning a football match is perceived as an achievement, not only of the team, but also the supporters' political and cultural views. In this context, this sports arena has been represented as an arena of ethnic, national, religious, and political identity.¹⁰⁴ Societies are handing their historical and cultural heritages down from generation to generation via education, political propaganda, and sports activities. Bias and hostility are important pieces of heritage, which are transmitted. Thus, the sense of "them and us" originates from this historical heritage and has important meaning.

Football, as the most popular worldwide sport activity, provides processes for incorporating disparate communities within a community by enabling national identities to be formed.¹⁰⁵ Football competitions encounter between the divided identities. Sometimes, the divided identities can be involved in cities, countries,

¹⁰² "Uniting a nation", FIFA, 2010.

Link: <https://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/uniting-nation-1270711>
(Accessed Date: 17.11.2018)

¹⁰³ G. Öğüt Eker, "Futbolun Dayanılmaz Çekiciliği, Büyülenen Taraftar Portresi, Fanatizm ve Beşiktaş (Irresistible Charming of the Football, Portrait of Fascinated Supporter, Fanaticism and Besiktas)" in *Milli Folklor*, Year 22, Number 85, 2010, pp. 173-174.

¹⁰⁴ K Lee & SJ Jackson, "The Relationship between Spectatorship of Korea-Japan Football Games and Sports Nationalism" in *International Sports Studies*, Volume 26, No: 2, 2004, pp. 44-45.

¹⁰⁵ Tim Delaney and Tim Madigan, *The Sociology of Sports*, McFarland & Company, 2015, p. 344.

ethnic groups, eternal rivalry clubs. Most of the times, these football competitions are usually played like a military struggle. With the singing of the national anthems, the feelings of nationalism and belonging are being energized, among football players and spectators.¹⁰⁶ In this context, there are a lot of international football matches, such as Iran vs the USA (Fifa World Cup in 1998), Serbia vs Albania (the European Championship in 2014), Barcelona vs Real Madrid, (Spain), AS Roma vs SS Lazio (January 2005), were played all around the world.

The sense of belonging and the disintegration, which is in the “them and us”, rose noticeably out of football and it is possible to see evidence of this within national and international football activities. On the other hand, the USA and Iran national football teams were in the same group after a draw result during the 1998 FIFA World Cup in France. Since the 1979 Iran Hostage Crisis, the relationship between the USA and Iran has been hostile. And 19 years later, these two countries, as national football teams and their citizens, as supporters, were coming together for a football match at the 1998 FIFA World Cup.

As Eric Wynalda said, “It is a wonderful opportunity for the sport of football to bring two countries together. It shows the beauty of the World Cup. Obviously, there have been political differences, but we can show there are more important things, like human relations”.¹⁰⁷ The Iran national team won 2-1 against the USA national team, and it was the first victory for Iran in World Cup history. Moreover, this match was defined as a political and national achievement for Iranians. This sports struggle did more to repair relations between two nations than decades of diplomacy, Neil Billingham said.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ Joanne Miyang Cho, *Transnational Encounters between Germany and East Asia since 1900*, Routledge, 2018.

¹⁰⁷ J. Longman, “World Cup '98; Diplomacy And Urgency As the U.S. Faces Iran” in *The New York Times*, June 21st 1998.

¹⁰⁸ Neil Billingham, “98: The most politically charged game in World Cup history”, in *FourFourTwo.Com*, June 6th 2014.

<http://www.fourfourtwo.com/features/98-most-politically-charged-game-world-cup-history> (Accessed Date: 19.06.2015)



Image 1.3. Iran & USA players form a joint team group before the football match, Lyon, France, 21.06.1998.¹⁰⁹

In October 2014, there was the UEFA Euro 2016 qualifying match between the national football teams of Serbia and Albania in Belgrade.¹¹⁰ The relationships between Serbia and Albania were tense since the declaration of independence of Kosovo in February 2008. Kosovo has around two million people of whom 90% are ethnic Albanians.¹¹¹ Therefore, Albanian supporters were forbidden to watch the match in the stadium because of security issues. During the first half of the match, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) appeared over the football pitch with an Albanian flag and a map of “greater Albania” attached, which illustrated their nationalist claims to a neighboring state, including Serbia.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ Please see the image 1.3. by using the below Link:

<http://www.gettyimages.com>

(Accessed Date: 15.05.2019)

¹¹⁰ O. Gibson, “Serbia’s charge sheet is absurdly long and UEFA needs to get tough” in *The Guardian*, 24th October 2014.

Link: <http://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2014/oct/24/serbia-charge-sheet-uefa-albania>
(Accessed Date: 19.06.2015)

¹¹¹ “Kosovo: The world’s newest state”, in *The Economist*, February 21st 2008.

Look below for detailed information for the independence process of Kosovo;

Link: <http://www.economist.com/node/10727947>

(Accessed Date: 19.06.2015)

¹¹² Neil Billingham (2014), *Ibid.*



Image 1.4. UAV appeared over the football field by carrying an Albanian flag over the stadium. ¹¹³



Image 1.5. Stefan Mitrovic, player of Serbian national football team, pulled down the flag. ¹¹⁴

¹¹³ Please see the image 1.4. by using the below Link:
[dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2793298/](https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2793298/)
(Accessed Date: 19.06.2018)

¹¹⁴ Please see the image 1.5. by using the below Link:
[dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2793298](https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2793298/)
(Accessed Date: 19.06.2018).

Then, Stefan Mitrovic who is a defender player of Serbian national football team pulled down the flag and several players of the Albanian national football team attempted to take it back. Subsequently, Serbian supporters occupied the pitch and the match was abandoned. Ten days later, UEFA awarded Serbia a walkover against Albania 3-0, but deducted 3 points. Also, both national teams were fined 100,000 Euros and both national football federations accepted the decisions.¹¹⁵

In this chapter, the key terms were covered within a conceptual framework. The role of football and the game being of great importance on a global level during the process of nation and identity building has been emphasized. The cases given as illustrations from the world – particularly from Europe - makes it is evident that the core of these ideas stem from the French and Industrial Revolutions in the old continent. Sport, and particularly football, have been used during the nationalism and nation-state building process as an old instrument with its unifying nature and accessibility to everyone.

This chapter has been overlapping in understanding the theories of nationalism, ethnicity, identity and using football as a tool in building a nation or identity. Regarding national identity as cultural communities, Smith states that the members of a national identity members are united around common historical memories, symbols, myths, and traditions. He asserts that a nation can be described as a community based on a shared ancestry. For Smith, the essential characteristics of national identity are a historic region, or motherland, common fables and historical remembrances, a common, mass public culture, common legal rights and tasks for all members, a common economy with regional mobility for its members. In contrary, Anderson claims that the countries are imagined. Ethnicity tries to reach a number of analyzes on topics such as identity, borders, maps, national values, and explains in detail how these elements are imaginatively created and how they are transformed into segregation mechanisms. It relates the emergence and development of nations

¹¹⁵ N. Ames, "Albanian FA president angry at UEFA's sanctions for Serbia abandonment" in *The Guardian*, 24th October 2014.
<http://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/oct/24/albanian-fa-uefa-serbia-armand-duka>
(Accessed Date: 19.06.2015)

to religious communities, to the collapse of dynasties, to the development of capitalism and broadcasting, to the formation of official state languages, and to the change of our understanding of time. Taking nationalism as an imagined community, replacing old-fashioned communities, such as blood and religion, Anderson argues that after nationalism first emerged in America, first popular movements in Europe, then imperialist powers, and finally the Third World.

Horowitz discusses that ethnicity is an elementary loyalty that emotionally binds individuals to one another. He also says that ancient hate among organizations, and this creates group consciousness, leads to disputes. Groups were concerned by other groups' prospective threats. Cultural conflicts are also the consequence of ethnic conflicts. Modernization is responsible for ethnic conflicts and makes people want the same resources. Taking into consideration nationalism from the perspective of its side of generating violence, Hechter cites that the collective form of action providing jointly produced products is nationalism. Nationalism needs to rely on such products for the creation of people and the nation needs to be properly structured in order to monitor and efficiently use donations to them. As nations already provided and supervised products they jointly produced under a central authority subcontract, national benefits were minimal.

Major approaches to the question of nationhood and nation-states introduced in this thesis can be grouped under two headlines: Culturalist and historical institutionalist. Culturalists, such as Anderson, Brubaker, and Smith, view nationalism primarily as an amalgamation of shared values and common historical myths and rituals, which are often produced or perpetuated by the state. On the other hand, historical institutionalists, such as Tilly and Horowitz, understand nationalism as a byproduct of the development of states' institutional capacities. In this perspective, what makes the relationship between the state and citizens "modern" is foremost the increase in state institutions' ability to mobilize (such as war-making) and control (such as taxation) the state's subjects.

However, there is also a growing line of social scientific studies that attempts to combine these two distinct schools. One of the best exemplified by Joel Migdal's book *State and Society*, this approach strives for a comprehensive analysis of the state by involving itself with both its institutional structures and cultural practices. Migdal defines the state as, "a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts"¹¹⁶ This definition of the state aims to conceive the state not only as a unified omnipotent structure above society, as Weber's definition of it as "monopoly over the legitimate use of violence" might imply, but as a field of competition over its practices and meanings, which is sometimes vulnerable to the actions of those who are ruled.

Second, as the title of his book implies, the state cannot be reduced to the sum of its institutional parts. Instead, it should be studied accounting for its alliances in civil society, and for the cases where the demarcations between the state and society are not clear. Moreover, the boundaries lay between the state and society are themselves contested in the day-to-day life of members of a society. However, Migdal and his followers do not simply reduce the state to its cultural practices to build legitimacy. Instead, the state should be studied in "dual terms" including as well the states' "image of a clearly bounded and unified" organization.¹¹⁷ In the same vein of thought, in a recent collection of essays, Morgan and Orlof propose a new conception of states "as encompassing multiple institutions, various interpenetrations with civil society, multiple scales of analysis, and multiple and potentially contradictory logics"¹¹⁸ They argue, following Bourdieu, that the state should be viewed "as the monopoly of symbolic violence" in addition to Weber's classic definition.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ Joel S. Migdal, *State in Society: Studying how states and societies transform and constitute one another*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 15-16.

¹¹⁷ Joel S. Migdal, (2001), *Ibid*, p. 22.

¹¹⁸ Kimberly J. Morgan, and Ann Shola Orlof, *The Many Hands of the State: Theorizing Political Authority and Social Control*, Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 3.

¹¹⁹ Kimberly J. Morgan, and Ann Shola Orlof, (2017), *Ibid*, p. 4.

This thesis's main argument aligns well with the perspective seeking to combine institutionalist and culturalist approaches to the state and nationalism together. Football in Diyarbakir can be viewed as a scene of contestation between the state and the Kurdish civil society. This contestation certainly involves the state's cultural practices to bring Diyarbakirspor, and along with with it the broader Kurdish society, in line with the mainstream nationalistic norms of the state. As I will show in the coming sections in the case of Gaffar Okkan, such cultural practices include building legitimacy in the region through the sympathetic practices of local governors and officials as well as many other methods.

In response, Kurdish football fans with their struggle to decorate Amedspor with the symbols of Kurdish nationalism constitutes the other side of this cultural conflict between two nationalisms. On the other hand, it is a contestation to define the boundaries between the state and civil society. Kurdish people's practices to make the team of their city associated with Kurdish identity, are also struggling to define how much the state can exist in civil society, and how much the state can penetrate into their daily lives.

However, the symbolic conflict between the state and society over the meaning of football teams does not cover the whole story. The state relies on building legitimacy as much as it relies on ensuring the compliance of the population through force.¹²⁰ This is where the institutional structures of the state, with their power to sanction and mobilize resources, should be accounted for. In fact, in order to trace the state's ability to govern one has to look at both its symbolic as well as its institutional actions. In other words, the state's presence in the football scene should be analyzed not only in terms of its attempts at constructing a nationalist cultural integration of the population but also in terms of how such cultural domination is supported or undermined by institutional practices. As I will show later, the state institutions' discriminative and punitive practices towards "Kurdish teams" (The fines, given to

¹²⁰ Joel S. Migdal, (2001), *Ibid*, p. 52.

Amedspor by TFF) are clear examples of the institutional aspects of this contestation between the state and society.



CHAPTER II

THE CHALLENGE OF HOMOGENISING TURKISH NATIONALISM

2.1. Creation of National Identity in Turkey

The state is an organized political community that has appropriate boundaries, population, history, and values. In the modern world, the description of the state is a nation-state. The nation is an ethnic community, which is the dominant group over the others in a country. For instance, the dominant ethnic group of the Turkish Republic, which was founded in Anatolia, is that of the Turks, and they have rights and duties over the other ethnic communities such as Kurds over their lands. According to Anthony Smith, in the state concept, everybody has to have some common and particular values such as language, culture, myths, economy, traditions, institutions, rights and duties.¹²¹ These kinds of common and particular values gave national identity and citizenship to individuals. For instance, all people, who live in Turkey, are Turks; and Turks are the name of the citizenry and national identity of the Turkish Republic.

National identity is based on the two main paradigms of politics and cultural aspects and involves a number of important aspects such as time (historical memories), space, and values. During the foundation period of the nation, history has a significant value because it is necessary to legitimize the state over the particular space. According to Anthony Smith, some states have an extremely detailed and rich history – such as China; and as such can legitimize their states over the land. On the other hand, some states do not have particularly rich histories, such as that of Turkey over its land, because Anatolia upon which the Turkish Republic was founded became a host to many civilizations and ethnic communities. The dominant ethnic group of the Turkish Republic migrated from Asia to these areas of land; and this can be regarded as being a Turk; but migrants to the region had also come from diverse roots or identities. Besides this, some of the states tried to find their own national identity

¹²¹ Anthony D. Smith, “National and Other Identities” in *National Identity*, Penguin Books, 1991, p. 14.

under the authority of an empire or a state. For instance, Bulgaria and Romania were parts of the Ottoman Empire and tried to find their own national identities. In this point, Kurdish identity is an extremely important example because Kurdish people, like Romanians or Bulgarians, try to find their identity under the authority of the Turkish Republic. There is evidence that competition arises between countries which have a rich history; and for those countries lacking such a rich history, competition exists in the political arena.

States, which do not have rich histories, try to persuade their legitimacies over the ethnic groups to continue competition. For instance, the Turks are one of the many ethnicities in the Turkish Republic, but the Turkish political community is based on citizenship tie and comes under the heading of the Turks. Therefore, the Turks become the prominent ethnicity and try to persuade the legitimacy as a governmental entity over non-Turk such as the Kurds and non-Muslims, such as the Jewish, Greek, and Armenian societies. In this case, there are many examples in Turkish history regarding bio-politics at the end of the Ottoman Empire, which was discussed above in the reign of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). This attitude was inherited from the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and practiced in the Turkish Republic.

During the modernization process, football entered Turkey in the last years of the Ottoman Empire.¹²² According to archives, on the 27th November, 1880 the first football match was played by Istanbul's Constantinople Football Club, one of the earliest football clubs in the Ottoman Empire with the Istanbul Olympic Football Club. Football in the Ottoman Empire was first played and developed among the non-Muslim groups, particularly in Izmir and Salonika.¹²³ During this period, since the declaration of the Second Constitutional Regime in 1908, the governing Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) was convinced that “football could be used as a means

¹²² Cüneyd Okay, 'The Introduction, Early Development and Historiography of Soccer in Turkey: 1890–1914', in *Soccer and Society* 3, 2002, pp. 1-10.

¹²³ Mehmet Yüce, “Osmanlı Melekleri: Futbol Tarihimizin Kadim Devreleri” in *Türkiye Futbol Tarihi*, Vol. 1, İletişim Publishing, İstanbul, 2014.

of creating a Turkish national identity"¹²⁴. Fenerbahçe was among the first close relations with the Committee staff in football.

Herein, it is indubitable that the establishment of Altınordu was an extremely important event as an indicator for political hegemony in football. The club was formed by a group of people separating from Galatasaray. Their action was for the sake of "Progress." The group separating from the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1910 captured the team in 1913 and changed the name of the team as Altınordu (an old Turkish state in the Central Asia). Moreover, "the Minister of Interior was appointed as the honorary president of the club."¹²⁵ The colors of the club were changed to red and blue. This choice symbolized to reflect blood and steel, which refers to the Turkish presence in Central Asia. In this case, it can be regarded that the civil part of the Committee was intensified in Fenerbahçe and the military part was staffed in Altınordu. This political difference led to an aggressive competition between Altınordu and Fenerbahçe until the end of 1918 when the Committee was overthrown.¹²⁶

The Committee was focused more on İzmir teams. For instance, Karşıyaka football club was established under the influence of the Committee in 1912. The green and red represented Islam and red symbolizing Turkish nationality. The colors of Karşıyaka and Altınordu represented the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. This was also remarkable to understand the mindset of the Committee. In addition to Karşıyaka and Altınordu, Altay was established in 1914. The name of the team came from Central Asia Turkishness. This is referenced in the myths of Central Asian Turks where the motherland of Turks is located in the mountains of Ural-Altai. The allocation of a building to Altay by the İzmir Branch of the Committee proved that the Committee

¹²⁴ Cüneyd Okay, 'The Introduction, Early Development and Historiography of Soccer in Turkey'; İlker Aktükün, 'Futbolun Siyasi Tarihine Kenar Notları', in *Cogito: Dünya Gözüyle Futbol* 63, 2010.

¹²⁵ Mehmet Ali Gökaçtı, "*Bizim İçin Oyna*": *Türkiye'de Futbol ve Siyaset*, İstanbul: İletisim Publishing, 2008.

¹²⁶ Mehmet Ali Gökaçtı, 2008, *Ibid.*

began to use football consciously as a tool in being the first nation/identity state-builder in the history of Turkey.¹²⁷

These examples indicate that football was regarded as an important instrument to create a national identity and paramilitary force at the end of the Ottoman Empire. A number of ministers also notably became involved in the establishment of some football clubs mentioned above. In the aftermath of the birth of the Turkish Republic, this approach continued. On the other hand, football, as an ideological tool, was for the sake of sport and more so a part of general organized sports, which should be examined from the point of biopolitics to frame the nature of the Turkish state's policies from the late 1800s to early 1900s. During the period of rapid transformation, there were no social movements or interwoven societal structure in football because the state regarded football as a tool to redesign Turkish society and thus this tool was not as strong as other sports activities such as traditional oil wrestling. Oil wrestling was chosen on purpose because it symbolizes Turkish power, and it was the image that a wrestler represents the idea of great traditional sport activity.

The period following the birth of the Turkish Republic witnessed the construction and growth of Turkey into a modern Turkish nation during the 1930s. The early Republican regime perceived sports as a way of mobilization of various human-social capitals and sources to improve and discipline the social body in every sense. Sports were under the control of the State, and its interventions were based on westernization projects. For instance, Atatürk, who was the founder of Turkish Republic, stated that "life with sport is very significant on Earth. A life with sport which is really significant is more important for us, because it is a matter of race, regulating the race, developing the race, and it is even a matter of civilization".¹²⁸ Under this perception, sports activities were being used to raise the new generation which was based on the ideology of a new Turkish Republic enforced by the Kemalist

¹²⁷ Cüneyd Okay, 'The Introduction, Early Development and Historiography of Soccer in Turkey'; İlker Aktükün, 'Futbolun Siyasi Tarihine Kenar Notları', in *Cogito: Dünya Gözüyle Futbol* 63, 2010, pp. 8-26.

¹²⁸ Kazım Öztürk, *Türk Parlamento Tarihi (1923-1927)*, Vol: 2, Part: 3, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Vakfı, Ankara, 1993, p. 77.

regime. The masses were collected under the roof of the ruling party (CHP) in the 1930s. Both the penetrative and constitutive-legal effects were taken into consideration together in this period. In the 1930s and the 1940s the football clubs were regarded and used as the “training dorms” in parallel with the rise of nationalism all over Europe.¹²⁹

During this period, the world was rolling into the darkness of despotism and fascism. The dictatorial regimes were trying to suppress the organized opposition and create youth-based national movements and impose their political ideologies upon societies. Although the Kemalist cadres distanced themselves from the political ideologies the regimes in Italy, Germany and the Soviet Union could not free themselves from the temptation to use states’ regulated methods of upbringing their youth. In this regard, methods of education provided to the youth were the most important. In the third Congress of the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP) in 1931, all young people approaching political voting age were automatically considered to be the natural members of CHP. The other side of the Congress was that the Party accepted its duty to maintain and protect the sports organizations. The regime's Community Centers (Halkevleri) encouraged all citizens, particularly teenagers, to engage in sports and physical cultural movements.

With this duty the sports branches would organize gymnastics once or twice a year, and every three or four years they would organize gymnastic holidays all around the country. This was provided under the instruction of the Community Centers. Recep Peker, known as the spokesperson of the authoritarian-statist wing in the CHP, was influenced by the organizational structures of fascist and Nazi Parties during his travels to Italy and Germany. Mass sports in this period began to dominate the Turkish sports system. Sports were no longer a scattered occupation of enthusiasm and ingenuity, but a social task.

¹²⁹ Umut Koç, Janset Özen-Aytemur and Erkan Erdemir, “Powerful Actor and Hesitant Institutionalization: The State in the History of Turkish Football”, in *The International Journal of the History of Sport 1904-1920*, 33:16, 2016.

In terms of both technical and sanitary needs, the institution that would organize sports from a single center within a plan was the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). Henceforth, each club had to act within the program of the TAF. In addition, the TAF would appoint one day of the year as an anniversary ; on that day, there would be sports activities around the country. Beşiktaş Gymnastics Club's offer to the congress for the festive anniversary was May 19. Fenerbahçe and Galatasaray Clubs, taking part in the Atatürk Sports Day competitions on 24 May 1935 under the name of the Sports Day on May 19th, offered the date May 19th. When this proposal was accepted by the members of the congress, it was taken to the CHP; the party's central organ. Then May 19th was accepted and became the official festive anniversary. The authority had given importance to the role and usage of May 19th in creating a nation and identity and used these instruments effectively in that period.

One of the prominent figures in this context was Selim Sırrı. Selim Sırrı, Physical Education Inspector, who worked for the Ministry of Education, was the head of organization in search of a youth organization model. Having experience in youth organizations, Selim Sırrı was the assistant of General Inspector Colonel Von Hoff during World War I. The youth organizations were inspired by Germany at that time.¹³⁰

In this context, Selim Sırrı had taken the first steps. He brought to the Ottomans and thus the Unionists (members of the Committee of Union and Progress) the preliminary ideas for a "Festive Day" which was actually an imitation and extension of the "Mass Gymnastic", the production of Czech Nationalism in the 1860s.¹³¹ After the birth of the new republic Selim Sırrı Tarcan remained as one of the most significant figures of modern physical education teachers in the Turkish education system. Selim Sırrı played an important role in the organization of physical education and sports, both in the Olympic Games and schools. He was one of the pioneers in

¹³⁰ Umut Koç, Janset Özen-Aytemur & Erkan Erdemir (2016), *Ibid*, p. 87.

¹³¹ Bahadır Kurbanoğlu, "19 Mayıs Bayramı'nın Hikâyesi ve Bitmeyen Faşizm", *Haksöz*, No: 266, 2013. <https://www.haksozhaber.net/19-mayis-bayraminin-hikayesi-ve-bitmeyen-fasizm-76869h.htm> (Accessed Date: 08.09.2019)

developing physical education and sports both in formal and informal education in Turkey. Tarcan in his book (*Beden Terbiyesi: Oyun-Cimnastik-Spor*) stated:

“One should bear in mind that neither a morbid intellectual nor an illiterate wrestler may be of value and one should make effort for raising well thinking, good and hardworking, skilled, well-disciplined and sound people” (1932)

He also emphasized that “...sport is the literature of physical education, physical education is a branch of public health, and gymnastics is the language of the physical education.”¹³² Although national festivals have the aim of reinforcing power during the periods of the despot leaders, the ceremonies of adherence to the “one man” after their deaths have been used to keep the regime alive and to assure the subconscious of the masses. And this approach has been put into practice throughout the country with the new regime since 1930s. These preparations were also used by the 12th September regime. The 1980 coup regime started three months in advance and students were fully conditioned to May 19th exercises. This could be the most defining illustration of “mass gymnastics” in those periods.¹³³

The Turkish Grand National Assembly declared the establishment of the General Directorate for Physical Education (BTGM) on 29 June 1938. Then, this new law passed through parliament was published in the Official Gazette on 18 July 1938. According to this new law, people were to be educated by the Turkish Republic, regardless of their ages It was also stipulated that all youth must join one of the sport clubs and engage in physical training in their leisure times.¹³⁴ By the line with this obligatory rule (article number 4), it was compulsory activity for both male and female citizens. Male citizens, aged between 12 and 45 years old and female citizens

¹³² G. Demirhan, and F. Konukman, “Selim Sırrı Tarcan: a Pioneer in the Development of Physical Education and Sports in Turkey”, in *Physical Culture and Sport, Studies and Research*, 2012, pp. 41-44.

¹³³ Bahadır Kurbanoğlu, (2013) *Ibid*.

¹³⁴ Please find the “Physical Training Law (Beden Terbiyesi Kanunu) - 29.06.1938” on below Link: https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc018/kanuntbmmc018/kanuntbmmc01803530.pdf (Accessed Date: 20.05.2018)

of between the ages of 12 to 30, had to engage in sports activities for at least 4 hours each week.¹³⁵

Under 1938 conditions, the Turkish Republic used the power of sport as a military education because of a fear of war. Therefore, Cemil Tahir Taner, who was a major general in the Turkish Army, was appointed as General Manager of the Turkish Physical Training department in October, 1938 and he held this role until November 1945.¹³⁶ After the Physical Training Law was published, and General Cemil Tahir Taner took over as General Manager, he wrote letters below to İsmet İnönü, who was the President of the Republic of Turkey and also of the Republican People's Party (CHP).

"The Turkish Youth, who gathered around the National Chief as an everlasting halo looking towards their bright futures, has taken great pleasure in the first step in the implementation of their compulsory practice of physical training. While our young generations are gathered at the inauguration ceremonies of youth clubs and groups in provinces, districts, towns and even villages in order to celebrate the anniversary of our victory, I am honored to convey their sincere homage and allegiance to You, my respectable National Chief".¹³⁷

By Cemil Tahir Taner.

"I am pleased to inform that inauguration ceremonies were organized today in provinces, districts, towns and even some villages for the youth clubs and groups formed with the inspiration from the cardinal principles outlined in the constitution of the Republic of Turkey, and that the movement enabled the Turkish youth, who are united around our Party and its Chief as a massive population, to express their joyous

¹³⁵ N. Tuna, N. Ergeneli, *Beden Terbiyesi Mevzuatı*, Alaeddin Kiral Matbaası: Ankara, 1941.

¹³⁶ More info about Cemil Tahir Taner:

<http://sgm.gsb.gov.tr/Sayfalar/220/110/cemil-tahir-taner.aspx>

(Accessed Date: 20.05.2018)

¹³⁷ Anonymous. *Büyüklerimizin Gençliğe İltifatı. Physical Education and Sport Magazine*, No: 21, Alaeddin Kiral Basımevi, Ankara, 1940, pp. 1-2.

excitement".¹³⁸

By Cemil Tahir Taner.

The letters above openly illustrated the relationship between sports and politics; it is also an illustration of the attempt, particularly by the officers, to incorporate games within politics in Turkey in the 1930s. Besides, football was expected to serve the aim of identity building, and the Gençlerbirliği club was the main actor of the Kemalist regime in Early Republican period. Gençlerbirliği was founded in 1923 at the same time with the foundation of the Turkish Republic. This football team became a tool of modern Turkish culture, which the state had had ambitions of establishing in Ankara. Gençlerbirliği became very popular among the bureaucratic elites because its cadre composed mostly of high school students and teachers. The club had a symbol of the new modern Turkish culture and became the voice of the new Turkish state in the area of sports.

During the period of multi-party democracy, Turkey began to integrate its social, political and economic system with the world. This affected Turkey from A to Z. Football was a front-runner sector with the acceptance of professionalization as a legal status in 1951.¹³⁹ During the 1950s and 60s, the Democratic Party (DP) and the Justice Party (AP) ruled out a football bureaucracy. In this period, football became popular and professionalized and commercialized, also attracting the intervention of politics in the game. The football clubs, notably the three pioneers, were intertwined with power. Beşiktaş was chaired by Talat Asal, parliament member of the Justice Party and a minister. The Presidents of Galatasaray Sadik Güz and Suphi Batur were also Members of the Parliament. Moreover, the AP and DP deputies, and ministers Osman Kavrakoğlu, Zeki Rıza Sporel, Bedii Yazıcı, Agah Erozan and Medeni Berk also served as chairs of Fenerbahçe.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ Anonymous (1940), *Ibid*, pp. 1-2.

¹³⁹ Mehmet Ali Gökaçtı (2008), *Ibid*.

¹⁴⁰ Ecevit Kılıç, "Meşrutiyetten Bugüne Siyasetin Futbol Markajı", [bianet.org](http://bianet.org/biamag/spor/78368-mesrutiyetten-bugune-siyasetin-futbol-markaji)
<http://bianet.org/biamag/spor/78368-mesrutiyetten-bugune-siyasetin-futbol-markaji>
(Accessed Date: 01.05.2019).

Although the 1960 military coup was a turning point for this part of football in Turkey, the routines of the past, football, and political relations emerged again with the hegemony of the military regime. Vefa and Altınordu were immediately included in the National League following a direct order from the Prime Minister (İsmet İnönü) in 1962.¹⁴¹

However, the role of football in Turkey regarding the nation/identity builder as exemplified above concluded after only a brief period and the developing period of football began. In the second half of the 1960s, labor movements and unionist movements emerged in Turkish society. When five men over the age of 60 and interested in football were asked: “How can you define the Turkish football in the 1960s?” Their common response was: “*We began to learn how to watch football in stadiums and to listen match on radio.*”¹⁴² Because people began to be organized in every part of society in the 1960s, this situation also emerged in some areas of sport such as matches held on football fields. One further case is observing these processes from the perspectives of players. A good example of this was evident in 1965 and the first “Football Players’ Union” was founded on the 31st of May, 1965.¹⁴³ However, many sports columnists, such as Turgay Şener, Metin Kurt and Ziya Şengül, argue that this union was unable to go beyond a “sign union”. In the 1960s, the union remained on paper because football was only popular in some metropolitan cities of Turkey such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir and the players of these cities did not need a union.

In the late 1970s, the Football Players’ Union (syndicate) transformed from a union to the Amateur Players Association. The main duty of this association was to protect the rights of amateur players who were playing in unpopular football teams, which were made up of especially Anatolian teams, such as Kocaelispor, Kayserispor and Bursaspor. For instance, the yearly income of a player of Galatasaray was more than a million, whereas the yearly income of a player of Kayserispor was one fourth of a

¹⁴¹ Melih Şabanoğlu, “Zeki, Çevik ve Ahlaklı Siyasetçiler!”, in *NTV Tarih* 25, 2011, pp. 8-55.

¹⁴² My personal observations and conversations with my family and relatives about their perception of football in the 1960s.

¹⁴³ *Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi*, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996, pp. 230-231.

player at Galatasaray. The Amateur Players Association, as a syndicate, had begun to find solutions for some serious problems of football players. The Association conducted labor negotiations for transfer cost discussions and set out to protect some important rights such as official time off to rest, compensation and retirement rights.

In the aftermath of 1980's coup, the military regime evoked its presence in football with Ankaragücü. Ankaragücü, as a major team of the capital city, was promoted to the first league from the second division league by direct instruction of Kenan Evren, the President of the military government.¹⁴⁴ The 1980s in Turkey are regarded as the beginning of neo-liberalism. The Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) and its leader Turgut Özal were in power between 1983 and 1991 and performed considerable liberalization policies in some areas of economic activity such as in the financial sector, international trade, and capital movements. In this term, Özal revealed his interest in football. Becoming an honorary member of Fenerbahçe, Özal was the first politician to watch both important matches in stadiums such as both the national team and cup finals and ordinary matches, particularly those of Fenerbahçe. Özal paved the way for politicians to feel at ease at showing their favorite football teams and many began to attend popular team matches.¹⁴⁵

2.2. The Challenge to the Homogeneity: The Brief History of Kurdish Identity in Turkey

During the 19th century, when the Ottoman Empire underwent a process of centralization, the first expression of Kurdish nationalism took place. The Kurdish Emirates had enjoyed virtual autonomy until that time. The Kurds were already under the rule of Ottomans in the 16th century, but they had a remarkable degree of autonomy, though they were subordinated to Istanbul, due to a special arrangement.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ Mehmet Ali Gökaçtı, (2008), *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ Betül Yazar, "Hegemonic Struggle, the State and Popular Culture: The Case of Football in Turkey", in *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, No: 8, 2005, pp. 197–216.

¹⁴⁶ Mesut Yegen, "The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity," in *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2, 1996, pp. 213-224.

The Ottomans attempted to tighten their grip on the Kurdish Emirates, which was infringing on the interests of the majority of the population, and in particular the participation of an administratively and politically powerful local emirates, which provoked Kurdish uprisings between 1808-1839. However, the uprisings resulted that Kurdish leaders were drawn to inner power struggles. As a result of these uprisings, it can be expected that the Kurdish emirates created an independent Kurdish state. Indeed, in the imperial era, this could be so assertive. On the other hand, the Kurds lived in tribes for years in the Middle East. This tribal culture requires some cultural differences such as dialects, -Kurmanji (Northern Kurdish), Sorani (Central Kurdish) and Southern Kurdish (Palewani or Xwarig/Xwarîn)- sects, Alawite, Shiite or Sunni. Considering these differences in the context of Smith's theory, having a common culture, symbols and myths, building a national identity have been tough at that time. Although having some common ancestral figures such as Amed, King of Assyria Adad Nirari, that can be regarded that the essential differences of the Kurds restrain building a national identity. If needed to discuss Anderson's theory in case of the Kurdish tribes, the Kurds are actually "politically invented" although they are considered as an ancient group by nationalists. Especially in the aftermath of the French Revolution and the era of dissolution of the empires, the Kurdish identity, as a result of certain political developments and socio-economic determinations, emerged in the 19th and 20th centuries.

As a result of increasing nationalism and nationalization movements, the Ottoman Empire suffered the loss of land and entered in a phase of identity crisis in the second half of the 19th Century and the first of the 20th Century in the Balkans and the Middle East in the Arab region. Particularly during the Tanzimat Reforms (1839-1876), there was a strong desire and intention for different ethnic and religious groups of the empire to be kept together under the roof of Ottoman supremacy with the approach of "Ottomanism" which tried to prepare the institutional and legal infrastructure and became the official ideology of the state.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁷ Serhun Al, "Barış Ve Çatışma Arasında: Türkiye Ve Ortadoğu'da Kürt Dünyasını Anlamlandırmak", in *Diyarbakır-Şanlıurfa-Mardin-Erbil Saha Araştırması Raporu*, İzmir: İzmir Ekonomi Üniversitesi, 2016, pp. 6.

The first outcome of Ottoman modernization by the end of the 19th century was the erosion in the Ottoman policy of decentralized aspects. Therefore, this brought the abolition of the Emirates, which had constituted a communal and organizational connection between the Kurdish tribes. The result was tribal confrontations which were not regulated by central authorities. In Kurdish politics, the situation led to the appearance of new players, the sheiks. These leaders had played an important role in the Kurdish rebellion; that is to say, with the first National Uprising of the Kurds, Sheik Ubeidullab of the 1870s became involved in events with the objective of establishing an independent Kurdish entity.¹⁴⁸

The Kurdish elites were affected by the nationalistic response in the second half of the 19th century, like other nationalities in the Ottoman Empire. Kurdish intellectual groups, either pursuing a form of the Kurdish decentralized administration or total independence from the Ottoman Empire, started forming secret societies.¹⁴⁹ However, such activities failed in a basically tribal and rural society without the support of powerful tribes and strong leaders who could organize enough transformation to bring about political changes. In 1908, the Young Turk uprising promised that all ethnic groups within the Empire would have equal rights. Contrary to this commitment, the Young Turk and the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) implied that all non-Turkish cultural and political expressions should be forbidden.¹⁵⁰ The commitment of the Ottoman Empire to World War I affected the Kurds. The war was officially fought against external enemies, but also against “their local compradors” in practical non-Turkish people of the Ottoman Empire. In describing the war as holy war, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) used the religious dynamics of the Kurds. They urged them to contribute and to defend the empire

¹⁴⁸ William E. Hazen, "Minorities in Revolt: The Kurds of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey", in *The Political Role of Minority Groups in the Middle East*, (R.D. McLaurin (ed.), New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979, pp. 49-75.

¹⁴⁹ Peter Sluglett, and Marion Farouk-Sluglett, *The Times: Guide to the Middle East*, Times Books, London, 1991, p. 55.

¹⁵⁰ Pervine Jamil, "A Publication of the Kurdish Institute in Brussels and the Solidarity Socialist-Foundation of Cooperation and Development with the Support of the Commission of European Communities" in *Kurdistan*, 1993.

against non-believers which led to the massacre of Armenians by Kurdish tribes between 1915 and 1916.¹⁵¹

After World War I there was no independent Kurdish state as a result of the Sevres Treaty (1920) or the Lausanne Conference (1923). The Kurds have remained in Turkey ever since the establishment of the New Republic in 1923. The new republic initiated ontological transformations. In this case, the Caliphate and religious orders had been abolished. Turkish history had been written in line with the new state, the Arab alphabet had been discarded in favor of the Latin alphabet and a new dress code had been adopted. The Turkish Government launched a radical nationalist agenda after the dissolution of the multiethnic Ottoman Empire with a view to redefining Turkishness, the new citizen of the nation. Unlike the Ottoman Empire, which was based on a broader Islamic theme, the new nationalist ideology was extremely secular. According to an expert, it was "defensive in nature where the nation was supposed to express homogeneity deriving from ethnic unity, and this unity would be expressed in a single voice".¹⁵²

Any public expression of Kurdish culture was restricted under the laws of sedition which could be punished with the death penalty because this was a threat to national integration and unity. The Kurds had to accept the historical assumption that Turks and Kurds came down from the same race and roots. According to the narratives, Kurds, due to the isolation of the Anatolian mountains, had forgotten their mother tongue. The lack of communication upon changing the alphabet had dire impacts on the Kurdish language.¹⁵³ Teachers and students were only allowed to speak Turkish in schools. Kurdish classes were discarded, Kurdish dresses and folklore had been

¹⁵¹ Bernhard Michalowski, *Hot Point, The Kurds- a People Fighting for Survival: Background, History, Analysis*. Munchen: Wilhelm Heyne Verlag, 1991.

¹⁵² Çağlar Keyder, "Wither the Project of Modernity?", in *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Modern Turkey* (S. Bozdoğan and R. Kasaba (eds.)), Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997, pp. 31-54.

¹⁵³ Robert D. Kaplan, "Sons of Devils: in a turbulent region the stateless Kurds play the role of spoiler," *The Atlantic*, Vol. 260, No. 5, 1987, pp. 32-49.

banned, and over 90% of the names of Kurdish villages had been changed to Turkish.¹⁵⁴

Turkey's experience of modernization following the First World War led to and consisted of considerable implications which require a certain level of background information in order to understand the nature of Turkish nationalism and its reflections on Kurds. Although the mindset and aspirations of Turkish nationalism date back to the early 19th century, there exists a clear divergence between the nationalism adopted until the end of Independence War and the subsequent nationalism which was formed by militarist modernization. There was a considerably higher degree of cooperation between the Kurdish and Turkish political elites both during the War of Independence and the subsequent foundation of the Turkish Republic.

The Turkish Government nominated Mustafa Kemal Pasha as the leader of the Turkish Republic with the modernization project of Turkey. He was nominated because he was greatly influenced by French positivism and nationalism projects which he experienced in Western Europe. His efforts led to the incorporation of Kurds in the emerging Turkish national state.

On the other hand, for Kurds, the repressive practices of the Turkish state were not perceived as an assault on Kurdish identity despite the contrary arguments and aspirations among the Kurdish political elite and intellectuals. In any case, neither Turkish nor Kurdish modernization entailed mass mobilizations along national lines during the first decade of the Republic. Therefore, the major confrontation of the Turkish state with Kurds in 1925, The Sheikh Said Rebellion, was not merely for Kurdish causes and a reaction against the alien rule, but essentially because of the abolition of the Caliphate by the Kemalist regime. Thus, instead of modern nationalistic identity, religion was the key bonding factor for Kurds. However, in the history of modern Turkey, religion was not the only sphere for the restructuring.

¹⁵⁴ Nader Entessar, *Kurdish Ethnonationalism*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.

Fairly soon after the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the dominant Turkish character had emerged and the politics of giving autonomy to the Anatolian Kurds was discontinued.¹⁵⁵ Turkish state officials viewed the Kurds as strangers with their unique cultural and administrative traditions. The Kurds were begun to see as an important barrier to the premature Republican Westernization phase by especially Kemalists.¹⁵⁶ In this context, the 1924 Constitution is one of the first and main indicators at the foundation of Turkish nation-state. The words "Citizenship" and "Citizen" were associated with Turkishness in the Constitution of 1924. Hereunder, this constitution indicated that to become a representative of parliament and the like, he had to be a Turkish representative. According to article 88¹⁵⁷, Kurds may be defined as "Turks" but only at the cost of rejecting their cultural and ethnic identities. Clearly, the Kemalist regime's rulers regard unintended, uncontrolled Kurds as both a primitive aspect and a future menace to the dignity of the contemporary state they plan to construct. At the beginning of 20th century, the major "non-Muslim" minorities of Anatolia, Armenians (with the deportation of 1915) and Greek-Orthodox (with the population exchange of 1923) groups had left their lands between 1914 and before the foundation of Turkish Republic. After these ethnic population cleansing projects in the concept of Turkification efforts, the Kurds were the only non-assimilated/non-discriminated large minority that stayed within the borders of the Turkish Republic in the foundation of Turkish nation-state.¹⁵⁸

Within ten years, the Kemalist cadre not only transformed the party system to party-state system, but also developed a form of nationalism that aimed to change society with its civilizing and revolutionary ideals. From education to dress codes, a series of reformations were conducted usually by applying force and through repressive

¹⁵⁵ Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, "The New Republic and the One-Part Era" in *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, NewYork, 1998, pp. 9-13.

¹⁵⁶ Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller (1998), *Ibid*, pp. 9-10.

¹⁵⁷ The 1924 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey:
<https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa24.htm>
(Accessed Date: 25.05.2019)

¹⁵⁸ Mesut Yeğen, "Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler", in *bianet.org*
<https://m.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/75849-cumhuriyet-ve-kurtler>
(Accessed Date: 15.05.2019)

measures. Moreover, during the same period, there had been major Kurdish rebellions other than the one that broke out in 1925. The rebellions in the Ağrı province (1927-1930) and in Dersim (1937-1930) led the state to develop a serious perception of threat against Kurdish separatism.¹⁵⁹ In these rebellions, Kurds, including the aghas, the local elite, intellectuals, sheiks and the communities collectivized almost all the reactionary reflexes against the state repression and mobilized against the repressive measures. With the heavy hand of the Turkish state, those rebellions, which were located at the east and the southeast of Turkey were crushed during the first two decades of inception of the Republic of Turkey. Therefore, the problem had seemed to be stayed, as dormant, until the 1960s.

In the 1940s, there were many indicators which could be considered an forcible Turkification (as a way of assimilation) to the Kurds in Turkey. The lack of handicrafts, culture, business, the absence of any aspect of the Kurdish civilization and the lack of Kurdish schools all characterizes this period.¹⁶⁰ In the 1950s, the Kurds benefited politically from the new era of multi-party democracy in Turkish political environment. Under the rule of the Democratic Party (DP) the Kurds became a Members of Parliament and even ministers. As schools, hospitals, and roads were built in the Kurd-dominant regions of Turkey, the Kurds benefited economically. There was tiny progress made in using the Kurdish language only in private conversations. The liberalization policy of the Democratic Party also had its limits.¹⁶¹ Turkey was not ready at that time – nor will it be for some time to come – in being able to provide basic human rights to the Kurds.

The legacy of the Kemalist regime continued into the era of the multi-party system which was dominated by highly politicized groups in conflict with each other. As a reaction against two decades of repressive policies conducted by the Republican Party, Kurds favored for Democratic Party (DP) which, in return, provided relatively

¹⁵⁹ Şener Aktürk, "Türkiye Siyasetinde Ethnik Hareketler: 1923-2007" in *Doğu Batı*, No: 44 İstanbul: Doğu Batı Yayınları, 2008, p. 28.

¹⁶⁰ David McDowall, *The Kurds: A Nation Denied, Worcester (Great Britain): Billing and Sons*, 1992.

¹⁶¹ Michael Gunter, *The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma*, Colorado: West View Press, 1990, p. 59.

democratic space for the Kurdish elite to represent themselves. The long-living state paranoia against the Kurdish politicization and the end of cooperation of liberals with the center-right politicians within DP caused the failure of the state to consolidate its democratic character. This was basically represented by the arrests of 50 Kurdish intellectuals, with one of them dying while in custody; and therefore the case is known as the '49ers Case', covering those who overtly supported Musa Anter's Kurdish poem. They were sentenced to imprisonment accordingly.

The 1960 military coup was an important turning point for the Kurdish question. Under the emancipatory approach of the 1961 Constitution, the Kurdish movement had awakened (after the 1960s) and came under the influence of the leftist movement. During the 1960s, the leftist groups became a roof, to contribute to Kurdish national identity. While the DP was in the process of fragmentation, the coup staged on May 27, 1960, overthrew the ruling government. Following the coup, another party, the New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi-YTP), was formed by those, who had previously been members and supporters of the DP. YTP included several Kurdish representatives within its body and brought the Kurdish question to the parliamentary debates. It was awarded electoral success in the Kurdish regions.

YTP represented the struggle of traditional feudal leaders who were trying to integrate themselves into the national political system within the framework of political negotiation. It prompted the integration of those Kurdish elites with Turkey's domestic politics with the central right wing; despite this collaboration, the cooperative attitudes were short-lived. The Kurdish politicians resigned from the party following a debate within the party over the pro-Kurdish policies of YTP, heated with the accusations of CHP Parliamentarians.¹⁶² The resignation of Kurdish politicians who defined their political positions to be in the center-right wing led to the evolvement of Kurdish demands to be defined in the urban politics along the leftist and nationalist lines. Notably, the rise of urban classes which included university students, early politicians and the Kurdish intellectuals – enriched with

¹⁶² Şener Aktürk, (2008), *Ibid*, pp. 67-68.

nationalist aspirations – found fertile ground for the germination of radical Kurdish politicization and subsequent nationalism.

The 1960 military coup in Turkey changed the trend to a neo-Kemalist ideology. Under the constitution that granted Kurds more civil liberties but prohibited the foundation of any ethnic group, impeding the unity of Turkey." The situation of the Kurdish minority further improved with a democratic and pluralist atmosphere of the 1961 Constitution. Despite these positive developments, Kurdish parties had still not been legalized thus allowing them to participate in political activities. Only the Kurds claiming to be Turkish were entitled through Turkish organizations. The rest of the issues and rights to equal representation and participation were still being ignored. To sum up, in this relatively democratic and pluralist political life, the Kurdish politicians benefited from a multi-party system in Turkey by negotiating their support for the party which committed to considering its problems in East Anatolia.¹⁶³

Once again, the military took power having given a memorandum to the politicians in 1971. The memorandum, which was given to the government on the grounds that public order had deteriorated and there had been an increase in the terrorist activities which had not been sufficiently handled by the government; to that end, the military thereafter demanded that the problems in the country be solved with a party approach. Turkey, between 1961 and 1971, needed a restoration of the constitutional structure which was "large" for Turkey. In this context, from 1971 to 1973, fundamental regulations were adopted in the 1961 Constitution which would not coincide with the spirit of the constitution in the observation of the military. In 1970s, the PKK, as a Marxist/Leninist organization, was showed up to the stage of political history under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan in 1978.

The administration was strengthened and the autonomy of the universities narrowed, with the changes which did not concur with the underlying logic and approaches of the 1961 Constitution and which became the grounds for the

¹⁶³ Aziz Namo, *Kurdistan: People, History, Culture*, Nürnberg: DA GmbH, 1992.

preliminary preparation of the 1982 Constitution. This period actually witnessed 15 radical Kurdish political, cultural, and social movements forming in the 1970s, either through the means of peace or by armed force. The roots of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), an underground Marxist-Leninist organization, dated back to these anti-democratic approaches in the aftermath of the 1971 memorandum. The organization recruited socio-economically marginalized individuals and sought an independent socialist structure – a Kurdish state.¹⁶⁴ This movement played a key role in driving Turkey's own politics as well as international politics towards the Kurdish question. Some scholars argue that, the ideology of the PKK are mix of Stalinism and nationalism. For instance, Paul J. White claims that there are many connections to Stalinism.

“In theory, the PKK remains formally wedded to a Stalinistic two-stage theory of revolutionary strategy, in which the first stage is the achievement of a united democratic and independent Kurdistan (including the current Kurdish regions of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria), via a ‘national democratic revolution.’”¹⁶⁵

The spiral of violence in Turkey led the Turkish Armed Forces to initiate military coup on 12 September 1980. The military again intervened in Turkish political life in claiming to support the government that was subjected to severe attacks simultaneously by Leftists, Islamists and the Kurds. The constitution of 1982, which was adopted during the military reign, constituted cultural repression against the Kurds. This was actually a new form of “the state’s continuity is essential.”

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), as an insurgent type of terrorist and political organization, was considered that the organization was established in Turkey and

¹⁶⁴ Aziz Namo (1992), *ibid*, p. 44.

¹⁶⁵ Two Kurdish towns, where are in southeastern Turkey, Eruh (a town in Siirt) and Semdinli (a town in Hakkari), were attacked by the PKK. These bloody assaults were the first bullet of PKK against the Turkish state and marked the beginning of the terrorist reign of the PKK for both the Turkish and the Kurdish societies.

Iraq in 1984 by the launch of its first attack in Siirt, Eruh on August 15, 1984.¹⁶⁶ The first attack was launched on the Turkish gendarmerie guardhouse and then gravitate towards to Eruh and Şemdinli city centers. Duran Kalkan, who is one of the founder of PKK, stated that Eruh and Şemdinli were selected because these towns were small to succeed and would represent the PKK's war zone.¹⁶⁷

This first attack of PKK was a bloody violence response on the lands, which are the majority is Kurds, against the Turkish state. From this date forward, the Turkish Republic has endured the PKK's ethno-nationalist terrorism. Nevertheless, its roots date back to the middle of 1970s. Abdullah Öcalan was one of the founders of the Democratic Higher Education Association founded in Ankara in 1974. The association would later establish the Kurdistan Workers' Party, the PKK. In the meanwhile, PKK distanced itself from the Turkish left (Turkey's one of the strongest political force) and through Turkification started to weaken and to eliminate other Kurdish organizations.¹⁶⁸ Abdullah Öcalan, during his student years, advocated the idea that the national problem could be solved by armed struggle and transferred his field of activity to Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. In 1978 armed actions began. The group was first known as "Apocular" or "UKO" (*Ulusal Kurtuluş Ordusu* - National Liberation Army). Öcalan and his friends held a meeting with the PKK and came up with the name of their organization in his village of Lice district of Diyarbakir on November 27, 1978.¹⁶⁹

The blatant conflict between the PKK and the Turkish State that began in 1984 resulted in the loss of millions of civilians, the removal of millions of Kurds as well as Yezidis, Assyrians, Armenians, and a severe effect on the sociological structure for

¹⁶⁶ Paul J. White, "PKK Strategy and Tactics" in *Primitive Rebels Or Revolutionary Modernizers?: The Kurdish National*, Zed Books, London, p. 142.

¹⁶⁷ S. Ekici, A. Ekici, D.A. McEntire, R.H. Ward, and S.S. Arlikatti, "Turkey's Counter Terrorism Policies Against the PKK" in *Building Terrorism Resistant Communities: Together Against Terrorism*, IOS Press, 2009, p. 270.

¹⁶⁸ Mehmet Kurt, *Historical Overview of Hizbullah*, Pluto Press, 2017, pp. 15.

¹⁶⁹ Anonymous, "PKK Nasıl Kuruldu ve Güçlendi", [aljazeera.com.tr](http://www.aljazeera.com.tr), 2013.

<http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/dosya/pkk-nasil-kuruldu-ve-guclendi>
(Accessed Date: 20.07.2019)

thousands of civilians in this region.¹⁷⁰ Since the foundation of the PKK, acts of violence emerged and for the most part, this involved an increase in violence aimed towards the Turkish armed forces and citizens in the East and South East of Anatolia. In time, the popularity of the PKK increased because of Turkey's rejection policies (especially in the Kurdish history, culture and language), in Kurdish territories. Turkey was looking at the Kurdish problem through the perspective of terror instead of identity. After the state apprehended Abdullah Öcalan, the method of handling the Kurdish separatism problem had shifted from PKK members to the Kurdish society. The Turkish state started to use several methods and tools such as military force, education, media, popular culture, as well as prohibitions against the movement of Kurdish society.¹⁷¹

A series of new legislation claimed to prevent efforts of dividing the nation and prohibited Kurds from expressing their views and thoughts in their mother tongue. The new regime considered that Kurdish ideas were an attack on the unity of the state and its territorial integrity. The 1982 Constitution also disallowed and sanctioned publications, printed materials, documents, videotapes or any other product in Kurdish. Materials on Kurdish history, culture, and ethnic identity were banned. Listening to Kurdish programs and foreign broadcasts was also forbidden.¹⁷²

During this period, Diyarbakır Prison had a notorious place in the Kurdish collective memory. As one victim and witness expressed: *"physical violence, beatings, covering people in excrement, forcing ten burning cigarettes into a person's mouth, we had no right to defend ourselves. Even speaking became a reason for torture. They threw mice on to us and [we were victims to forceful] sodomized rape with truncheons. Practices were inconceivable to people such as [the administration of] electric shocks to the genitals were normal in prison"*.¹⁷³ In such a repressive atmosphere, no

¹⁷⁰ Mehmet Kurt (2017), *Ibid*, p. 15.

¹⁷¹ Baskın Oran (Ed.) "1990-2001: Kürselleşme Ekseninde Türkiye; İslamcılık, Kürt Ayrılıkçılığı, "Derin Devlet" / Ortam Değişikliği" in *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, Vol: 2, İletişim, 2002, pp. 224-225.

¹⁷² Michael Gunter (1990), *Ibid*, p. 44.

¹⁷³ Bawer Çakır, "Turn Diyarbakır Prison into a Museum!" in *bianet.org*, 2009.

<https://m.bianet.org/bianet/other/116637-turn-diyarbakir-prison-into-a-museum>

institution, especially universities, political parties, or mass media, would dare to discuss the Kurdish question. The Kurds were seen as having privileged rights as far as they admitted to being Turks.¹⁷⁴

The former president of the People's Labor Party (Halkın Emek Partisi-HEP) Feridun Yazar claimed:

“With the military coup of March 12, 1971, both the Turkish left and the Kurdish movement turned to illegality. The exit of the PKK originates here. Before March 12 as the first democratic organization they founded in Turkey in general cultural meanings of the Kurdish Revolutionary Eastern Culture Centers (DDKO) draws attention. I was one of the founders. On March 12th, this was closed, we all received penalties from the Diyarbakır Martial Law Court. After we got out of jail, we saw that he was heading for illegality. There was not much to do because the fighters in the democratic field had been blocked. Meanwhile, Abdullah Öcalan started the PKK movement in 1978 under the name ‘Patriots of Kurdistan Bu’. The armed struggle of the PKK movement began to receive approval and attention by the masses by blocking the democratic paths of the state. People who pushed the military coup on September 12, 1980 were instrumental in bringing people to the mountains with Apo. With martial law, very intense oppression was established in the region, and people experienced torture and inconvenience. We all know what is going on in Diyarbakır Prison. Whether it was right, wrong, right or wrong - it would take a long time to discuss, but there is one certain fact; and that the PKK movement has created an awakening in people, an awakening of self-identity in the Kurds. Thanks to the state, the procedures it carried, the village evacuations and the printing policies”.¹⁷⁵

(Accessed Date: 02.05.2019)

¹⁷⁴ David McDowall (1992), *Ibid*, p. 44.

¹⁷⁵ Ruşen Çakır, *Türkiye'nin Kürt Sorunu*, Metis Yayınları: İstanbul, 2004, pp. 154-155.

From the early 1980s, the rapid increase of regional Kurdish national movements (especially in the East of Turkey) with the armed conflicts between the PKK and the Turkish State, the "Kurdish question" was centered on the Turkish politics. In such an oppressive state over the last 30 years, there have been severe moral and material costs of conflicts between an occasional ceasefire and high and low-intensity conflict process characterized the PKK and Turkey state. According to the report of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) Resolution Commission, published in November, 2013; in these conflicts, 7,918 security guards, 5,575 civilians, and 22,101 PKK militants lost their lives; but these figures are even worse when unsolved murders and executions are included. The period of conflict between 1986 to 2012 cost Turkey a huge sum of approximately \$1 trillion.¹⁷⁶ In addition to this, nearly 1 million people became victims of forced migration as a result of the conflict.

In order to be free of such a heavy cost, the first step was the "Democratic Initiative" or "National Unity and Brotherhood Project" which was launched in 2009. Then, in 2013-July 2015, the process of conflict was initiated during the time period called the "Solution or Peace Process" which was initiated with active dialogue between Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, imprisoned on the Isle of İmralı, and state officials. To reach a deal, reinstating a certain state of normalization was attempted.¹⁷⁷ In a political atmosphere combining the political concerns of the ruling party, the traditional assimilationist core of the Turkish state and the political and military interests of PKK ruling cadres provoked the break of this peace process and the process was dissolved. In a political atmosphere combining the political concerns of the ruling party, the traditional assimilationist core of the Turkish state and the political and military interests of PKK ruling cadres provoked the break of this peace process. Moreover, the different cliques of nationalist (milliyetçiler), neo-nationalist (ulusalcılar) and Eurasianists, westerners

¹⁷⁶ "TBMM İnsan Haklarını İnceleme Komisyonu Terör ve Şiddet Olayları Kapsamında Yaşam Hakkı İhlallerinin İncelenmesine Yönelik Kurulan Alt Komisyon Raporu", in *TBMM (TGNA)*, 2013. <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/insanhaklari/docs/2013/raporlar/31012013.pdf> (Accessed Date: 10.06.2019)

¹⁷⁷ Al, *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

(baticılar) in the Turkish state structure make seems to use of these political concerns to conduct their own perspective in terms of efforts of directing the state. The practices of the Turkish state from the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) have been required that there should not exist any other identity but Turkishness.

2.3. The Rise and the Politicization of A “National / Ethnic” Identity

One of the main problems of the Kurds in Turkey has been the issue of representation since the beginning. Although there has always been at least one Member of Parliament of Kurdish origin, this has never meant that Kurdish identity was represented politically. In other words, the Kurds are not Kurdish; but they have the chance to be represented as Turkish. In the meantime, since the system accepted Kurdish-origin lawmakers to an extent, they were in harmony with the regime or identified with their origins. They often did not dare to bring the problems of Kurds and Kurdishness into the public sphere. This situation continued, and parties based on Kurdish identity were permitted to establish as of the 1990s. This time, however, the system then introduced regulations that would make it possible to exclude such parties from public life.

During the 1990s, Turkey witnessed the rising consciousness and politicization of the Kurdish identity. The move to close political parties is mainly applied to Kurdish parties. The first party of this sort to face such a barrier was when the Kurdish movement established as the People's Labor Party (Halkın Emek Partisi-HEP) in 1990. Therefore, this year was an important turning point which helped in the development of Kurdish nationalist movement. The People's Labor Party (Halkın Emek Partisi, HEP), as the first legally recognized Kurdish political party, was founded in Turkey on 7th of June, 1990. During its short span, The People's Labor Party (HEP) identified itself to contribute to clearly advancing Kurdish freedoms until the party was banned by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey in July 1993.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁸ Muna Güvenç, "Constructing Narratives of Kurdish Nationalism in the Urban Space of Diyarbakır, Turkey" in *TDSR*, Vol: 13, 2011, p. 27

In the 1991 general election, when a closure case against HEP was opened, the party had already agreed an alliance for the election with the Social-democrat People's Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti-SHP). Then, the political movement set up the Freedom and Democracy Party (Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi-ÖZDEP). Both HEP and ÖZDEP were sentenced by the Constitutional Court to closure in 1993 but the HEP line had already completed its organization with the Democracy Party (Demokrasi Partisi-DEP). But DEP did not face the same fate in 1994. The People's Democracy Party (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi-HADEP) had already been established, which would replace it. When the fate of HADEP remained the same, the party was called the Democratic People's Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi-DEHAP). When DEHAP confronted the closure case, the party closed automatically; and this time, the team held meetings with the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi-DTP).¹⁷⁹

These meetings had a two point agenda; the implementation of the electoral threshold and the party closure measure. The 10% electoral threshold in the general elections prevented some social degrees from entering the parliament as well as the parties representing Kurdish identity. Therefore, the electoral threshold in question created a problem of representation throughout the country. However, the problem was much worse in the regions where the Kurds lived. For instance, the Democratic People's Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi-DEHAP) in the 2002 elections gained 50% in 1 province (Diyarbakır 56.2%), 45% in 3 provinces (Batman 47.1%, Şırnak 45.9%, Hakkari 45.1%), 40% in 2 provinces (Van 40.9%, Muş 40.7%), 35% in 2 provinces (Mardin 39.6%, Ağrı 35.1%) and 30% in 3 provinces (İğdır 32.7, Tunceli 32.6% , Siirt 32.2%) received more votes. Throughout the country, DEHAP received 2 million votes and won 6.2% of the votes. However, the party was not able to be represented in parliament because of the 10% electoral threshold, not even a single DEHAP member was able to represent in parliament from any of the 11 cities.¹⁸⁰ The above election data has marked that the Kurdish nationalist parties were tried to be excluded from

¹⁷⁹ Mustafa Erdoğan and Vahap Coşkun, (2008), *Ibid*.

¹⁸⁰ Mustafa Erdoğan and Vahap Coşkun, "Türkiye'nin Kürt Meselesi" in *Liberal Düşünce İlkbahar*, 2008, pp. 14-16.

the TGNA. These steps have also created a surge of unrest in the Kurdish regions and PKK found another chance to increase its popularity and recruitment propaganda among the Kurdish society.

The Kurds have known their "Kurdishness" as a major ethnic group in Turkey for many years although the country has consistently ignored, denied, or suppressed its ethnic and cultural aspirations. The Kurds have been forced to evolve within Turkey's political culture, system, and structure. As long as they claim to be of "Kurdish roots", their social rights continued to be denied, and they have never enjoyed the same cultural rights as Turks. The Turkish authorities used a two-fold policy to guarantee their compliance. The first one is the policy of geographically separating the Kurds from the capitals and political centers; and second, the policy of Turkification.¹⁸¹

The emergence of Kurdish nationalism and the subsequent nature of the conflict between Kurds and the Turkish Republic has been an unanswerable question for the parties struggling to bring an end to the conflict. This is mainly because Kurdish nationalism did not come out of the social, economic transformations and labor migration from rural to urban cities, which are counted as the main factors for nationalism.¹⁸² These factors fostered the massification and mobilization processes of the Kurdish cause. On the contrary, what leads "nationalist historians" to fail in their attempt to explain nationalism in Kurdish context is their obsessive accounts of industrialization and national achievements of independence within boundaries.¹⁸³ The Kurdish mobilization and nationalism can be assessed in two dimensions.

While the modernization process of the Turkish state brought considerable mobilization among the Kurdish intelligentsia, it did not achieve the same mobilization within Kurdish society because of the persistent nature of state

¹⁸¹ Robert Olson, "Kurds and Turks: Two Documents Concerning Kurdish Autonomy in 1922 and 1923" in *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 15, No: 2, 1991, p. 13.

¹⁸² Martin van Bruinessen, *Kürtlük, Türklük, Alevilik: Etnik ve Dinsel Kimlik Mücadeleleri*, İletişim, 1999, p. 28.

¹⁸³ Fred Halliday, "Can We Write a Modernist History of Kurdish Nationalism? Politics" in *The Kurds Nationalism and Politics*, (Eds. Faleh A. Jabar & Hosham Dawod), SAQI, Beirut, 2006, pp. 11-21.

repression, assimilationist policies as well as the violence adopted by the PKK. This argument answers why Kurdish intelligentsia sought violence as the inescapable solution rather than demanding political rights through democratic channels. The reason as to why Kurdish intelligentsia chose such a strategy is basically due to the impasse that this highly politicized group experienced between themselves and the state; which in turn did not provide the institutional assets for political participation, and the immobilized society which would subsequently suffer for a long time through a lack of access to decent basic modern services such as education, economic and technological assets that could have mobilized and modernized social structures and thus empower Kurdish civil society. The modernization, and all of its dimensions discussed, was not perceived by Kurds contrary to the expectations of the state. There is no doubt that such services would bring about mobilization for democratic participation. However, it would again turn into a vicious circle since both democratic participation with demands and Kurdish ethnic identity would be limited.

CHAPTER III

FOOTBALL AS A TOOL OF ALTERNATIVE NATIONALISM

In this chapter, first, the history of Diyarbakır in Turkey will be presented. This section will summarize the developments starting from ancient times until the early 2000s. Then, empirical pieces of evidence such as the influence of policemen on the board decisions of Diyarbakırspor, the graphs of newspaper archive researches, and backgrounds of Diyarbakırspor football players, will be presented to how the Diyarbakırspor was used as a political instrument, by the Turkish state. Actually, use of Diyarbakırspor as a political tool, did not start in 2000s. The football club was also used by the Turkish state time to time. For instance, Nuretting Dilek, the mayor of Diyarbakır (from the Motherland Party, ANAP) believed that, “Diyarbakır has symbolic values as a mayor and a popular Kurdish city in 1980s. And if the authorities can control Diyarbakırspor, it helps them to control Diyarbakır and the Kurdish population in the region”¹⁸⁴ Gaffar Okkan also believed that, “linking the success of Diyarbakırspor with the Turkish state could be a way to counter the rise of Kurdish nationalist parties.”¹⁸⁵ From my own observation, I believe that the Turkish state was trying to keep the Kurdish people under the umbrella of a sportif institution resembled by a football club (Diyarbakırspor), as a leisure time activity, instead of letting the PKK's propaganda to recruit the majority of Kurdish people under the umbrella of their own political agenda.

3.1 The History of Diyarbakır:

The use of Diyarbakırspor as a tool of power in football depends on the perception of the Kurds about Diyarbakır of being more than just a city but a center of Kurdishness. In order to grasp this case, this section concentrates on the historical background of Diyarbakır as well as the feelings of the Kurdish people about this city. The Turkish state has begun to address the absolute authority of Kurdish provinces since the foundation of Turkish Republic.

¹⁸⁴ Patrick Keddie, *The Passion: Football and the History of Modern Turkey*, I. B. Tauris, April 2018.

¹⁸⁵ Patrick Keddie, (2018), *Ibid.*

As a strategic location, Diyarbakır is a vast area between the mountainous terrain in the North, the plains between these mountains, and the deserted plains to the South. Located on the Eastern edge of the broad basalt plateau extending from Karacadağ to Tigris, Diyarbakır city, located 100 meters above the Tigris Valley, was adapted to the natural setting of the land by the shape of its walls. The inner part of the citadel, which is located in the northeast part of the fortress, dates back to the 4th century B.C. It is believed that it was built in B.C. 3000 in the time of the Hurrians. As the great cultures emerged in the regions of the world-famous ramparts of the Tigris River with its high waters and fertile soils – one of the two rivers embracing Mesopotamia – there is now an abundance of the cultural heritage of Diyarbakır.¹⁸⁶

This area is also located on the main roads connecting the remote areas of the region. One of these roads runs from Anatolia and Syria to Iraq, which connects the Mediterranean coasts to the Persian Gulf. In this way, the connection between Mesopotamia and the Black Sea coast was established through Diyarbakır. Another road leaving Diyarbakır was connected to Azerbaijan and Iran via the Bitlis-Van Lake Basin. The presence of Diyarbakır on a strategic position upon the main roads have been an important factor in the development of Diyarbakır throughout the ages. Due to these characteristics, Diyarbakır has been a substantial settlement since ancient times. It is estimated that primitive tribes lived in the region in B.C. 3000.¹⁸⁷

The city has been named since B.C. 14 as Amidi, Amid, Amida, Augusta, Karaamid, Karakale, Karacakale, Hamid, Karahamid, Diyarbekir and Diyarbakır. This region, today, is located on the center of Erbil, Erzen, Cizre, Hani, Silvan, Harran, Hasankeyf, Habur, Ceylanpınar, Raqqa, Urfa, Siirt, Sinjar, Imadiye, Mardin, Muş and Nusaybin. However, today the name of Diyarbakır represents only the city center. The city of Diyarbakır was not the original name for the territory. For many thousands of years,

¹⁸⁶ Aysel Yılmaz, Mine Baran, "Tarihi Sokakları Ve Evleriyle Mekansal Örüntünün Yarattığı Düşlerin Taşlara Yazıldığı Kent: Diyarbakır", *Tarih-Kültür-İnanç Kenti Diyarbakır*, Uzman Matbaacılık: İstanbul, 2013.

¹⁸⁷ The History of Diyarbakır (Diyarbekir)

Link: <http://www.diyarbakir.com/diyarbakir/Tarihce/tarih.asp>
(Accessed Date: 03.06.2019)

it was referred to by the name of its Assyrian founders: Amida or Amed. The Turks referred to the city as “Diyar Bekir”, the land of the Bakr borrowed from Arab tribes that had settled in the region in the 17th century. On a visit in November 1937, Atatürk changed the name of city from “Diyar Bekir” to “Diyarbakır”.¹⁸⁸

This has always been the case for Diyarbakır's name. Those who wanted to leave the name and the history of the city unchanged wanted to refer to the city with their own names. This was the period of the king who established the first Dikran Kingdom in the B.C. 40s and named the city "*Dikranagerd-Tigranagerd*" in the name of "*Diyyarbekr*" in the name of *Bekir Bin Vail*. In the 1920s, the Turkish Republic found "*Diyarbakır*" to be suitable for the purpose of consolidating the context and importance in terms of Turkishness and descendants of the copper-skinned people. Moreover, the Kurds found the name "*Amed*" worthy of the Meds ancestors. The name has changed since the name of Amid, the name of which was changed from Adad Nirari, the king of Assyria to Amid. But the blood dripping from the hilt of the sword has not been cut. The claim over the land irrigated by blood has always been on the agenda.¹⁸⁹

According to the information given by sources from B.C. 3000 to the present day, Diyarbakır has hosted many civilizations such as the Hurrians, Meds, Assyrians, Urartians, Scythians, Persians, Romans, Sasanians, Byzantines, Arabs in the three Caliphate Era, Umayyads, Abbasids, Seljuks, and Ottomans. This pattern reveals that Diyarbakır can be considered the cradle of civilizations. Diyarbakır, under a long history of many Asian origins since the early ages; with the Macedonians and Romans, including the Azov Sea region in the Caucasus, Azerbaijan through Anatolia, Syria and the Palestinian region, all had come under the domination of many different civilizations and dynasties. Later, when the Romans dominated the area, Diyarbakır was seen as a field of struggle between the Romans and other dominations, especially

¹⁸⁸ John McManus, “15: Diyarbakır” in *Welcome to Hell: In Search of the Real Turkish Football*, 2018.

¹⁸⁹ Şeyhmus Diken, “Diyarbakır Amed Midir?”, *Bianet*, 2012.

<https://m.bianet.org/biamag/toplum/139828-diyarbakir-amed-midir>
(Accessed Date: 04.06.2019)

those of Iranian origin. Meanwhile, during Roman rule, the walls of Diyarbakır were built and reinforced to a great extent. Moreover, Diyarbakır witnessed the struggle between the Muslim Arabs and the Byzantines. In 699, Diyarbakır was conquered by the Muslims. Diyarbakır, which had had the Arab administrations such as the Umayyads and Abbasids, made significant development during the period of the Umayyads and had become one of the principal cities of the Islamic world in the region.¹⁹⁰

Diyarbakır was one of the most important and extensive states during the Ottoman period. The city which became two consecutive sentences begin from Diyarbakır which does not sound so good. Diyarbakır, which became an important center of supply for the armies moving to the East, also became the province with the highest number of soldiers, especially in the 16th century. As major transformation activities were carried out in Diyarbakır, it grew into/developed into an important center of trade and art during the century. Diyarbakır, which did not lose much in its importance in the following centuries, maintained this position until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁹¹ Diyarbakır and its hinterland, which have, over the ages has been exposed to oppressive injustices such as martial law, single parties, and extraordinary situations, have has been in the arena of confrontation for the greatest part of the 80 years for an entire Republic. For this reason, all the rulers of the Turkish Republic have always been able to express their influential words through Diyarbakır.

Throughout history and even today, the Kurds have been settled in different parts of Mesopotamia. Until the end of the First World War, which led to the final collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds lived in tribal-based feudal communities under the Ottoman and the Iranian Empires. Martin Van Bruinessen's anthropological and sociological study asserts that the Kurdish and other tribes of the region have been

¹⁹⁰ Şeyhmus Diken (2012), *Ibid.*

¹⁹¹ The History of Diyarbakır (Diyarbakır)

Link: <http://www.diyarbakir.com/diyarbakir/Tarihce/tarih.asp>

(Accessed Date: 03.06.2019)

living in the periphery of central and powerful states for centuries. Therefore, they both influence and are influenced by these states.¹⁹²

Kurdish geography has often been a buffer zone between two or more central states. This provided relative autonomy and political maneuverability for Kurdish tribes. Due to the strengthening and weakening of one of these states' central authority in the region, the central control over the Kurdish tribes, and military and financial obligations as a result of this, have either increased or decreased. The geography did not have a free environment that would enable the Kurdish tribes to evolve a sufficient level of power within the Emirates or the emirates into an independent centralized state. The region was determined by different tribes, the non-tribal population, and a centralized power struggle. For example, the Ottoman Empire, which initially considered the sovereignty of Kurdish rulers over their emirates, later replaced these local leaders with bureaucrats/governors appointed from the capital. The last Kurdish emirates was destroyed by military force following the reforms in order to strengthen central authority of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁹³

In the 16th century, the main conflict area between the Ottomans and the Iranians was the Kurdish geography, and the Kurdish tribes played key roles in this conflict. The Kurdish politics of Shah Ismail, the leader of the Safavids, who were also supporters of the Turkish tribes in Anatolia, were based on a form of government which was carried out by governors sent from the center instead of the local Kurdish leaders. Shah Ismail suppressed the rebellion of the Kurdish tribes through bloody tactics trying to remain independent and resisting the policy as well as the fact that the Kurdish leaders took the side of the Sunni Ottomans in the Battle of Çaldıran. The massacre came as a natural result. The struggle for power and influence between the two central forces resulted in the final victory of the Ottomans as a result of the strategic alliance of the Ottoman Empire with the military successes and the mires.

¹⁹² Martin Van Bruinessen, *Ağa, Şeyh, Devlet*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1992, p. 202

¹⁹³ Martin Van Bruinessen (1992), *Ibid*, pp. 200-204.

During the reign of Sultan Selim I, a large part of the Kurdish geography (the whole of Diyarbakir province, present-day northern Iraq and every place to the west of them) came under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. During the reign of Sultan Suleyman, the Ottoman political sphere and its influence, even though it was further enlarged, some Kurdish tribes and emirates remained under Iran's control. The administrative deal – except for minor changes – would continue for four centuries, and the Ottoman-Iranian border, which was determined by the Treaty of Kasr-i Shirin, signed between the two states in 1639, would hold valid to this day.¹⁹⁴

3.2. The Importance of Diyarbakır:

Between those sorts of struggles, Diyarbakır has been one of the most prominent and symbolic cities of the Kurds in the Middle East. It is a city of "Alternative Opposition Metropol". It is a city that does not follow in the footsteps of others but creates own track. The city is today a significant symbol for the Kurdish political movement. Therefore, the name of Amed is the name of a new language and style of existence, despite the marginalization of its existence.¹⁹⁵ This case was concretized by Bitlis Governor Orhan Öztürk in 2015. The governor stated that introducing a province requires different things. "For example, what do we know of Diyarbakır? We know Diyarbakır for its watermelon and *kadayif*. But what is the perception of Diyarbakır? What's her style, as we call it, in style? Diyarbakır Municipality is known as BDP and it is known as the capital of Kurdistan."¹⁹⁶

In other respects, Diyarbakır is not only a Kurdish city but also a Turkish and Armenian city – or a city of pigeons. However, as Mehmet Atlı, academic of Mardin Artuklu University expresses that in the hearts of the Kurds, Diyarbakır has become a symbol of all their history, political existence, struggles, pains, hopes, despair, and future horizons against the oppressors. The tortures in the Diyarbakır Military Prison in the 1980s, organised arson attacks on villages, IDPs (internally displaced person) and

¹⁹⁴ Martin Van Bruinessen (1992), *Ibid*, pp. 211-217.

¹⁹⁵ Diken (2012), "Diyarbakır Amed Midir?", *Ibid*, 2012.

¹⁹⁶ "Diyarbakır Kürdistan'ın başkenti diye tanınır", *Milliyet*, 2015.

<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/diyarbakir-kurdistan-in-baskenti--gundem-2054656/>
(Accessed Date: 03.03.2019)

many other unidentified murders make Diyarbakır for the Kurds and the Kurdish political movements indispensable.¹⁹⁷ Moreover, the period of 1915-2015 has created deep wounds on the Kurds as well as on other minorities like the Armenians in the region. In addition to this, human rights violations have increased instead of showing signs of diminishment in the period, which is between 2015 and 2019, (in the aftermath of the trench wars). The “trench wars”¹⁹⁸, the change of politics towards the Kurds and domination of the hawks from both parties in the decision making processes and the murder of Tahir Elçi¹⁹⁹, former Chair of the Diyarbakır Bar Association and human rights defender, and unlawful practices during the state of emergency in the aftermath of the 15 July 2016 coup attempt were remarkable instances of this process.

All these practices, particularly in the Diyarbakır Military Prison in the 1980s, paved the way for the deepening of collective trauma and victimhood in the mindsets of the Kurds in Diyarbakır.²⁰⁰ In addition to this, no efforts have been made to enhance socioeconomic life in the region. At the beginning of the democratization process in early 2000s, the former deputy of Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP), Kutbettin Arzu as a ruling party, emphasized the fate of Diyarbakır in 2004 on the perspective of socioeconomic development.

“Unfortunately, Diyarbakır is losing blood every day. There is no recovery in the economy; there are huge increases in the number of the unemployed. This unemployment and poverty is accompanied by social problems; drug addiction, street children, prostitution and unemployment all going parallel to one another. For this reason, besides

¹⁹⁷ Emre Can Dağlıoğlu, "Diyarbakır Kürt şehri demek doğru ama eksik", Agos, 01.11.2014
Link: <http://www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazi/8352/diyarbakir-kurt-sehri-demek-dogru-ama-eksik>
(Accessed Date: 25.05.2019)

¹⁹⁸ "Hendek savaşlarında sona gelindi" DW.COM, 2016
Link: <https://www.dw.com/tr/hendek-sava%C5%9Flar%C4%B1nda-sona-gelindi/a-19291491>
(Accessed Date: 19.03.2019)

¹⁹⁹ "Possible Perpetrators' of Tahir Elçi Murder Identified", English Bianet, 2018
Link: <https://bianet.org/english/law/203572-possible-perpetrators-of-tahir-elci-murder-identified>
(Accessed Date: 12.05.2019)

²⁰⁰ Hasan Cemal, *Kürt Sorununa Yeni Bakış Barışa Emanet Olun*, Everest Yayıncılık: İstanbul, 2011 p. 139.

the solution of the democracy and human rights issues of this region, it is necessary to develop an investment environment and in doing so employment opportunities should be created. Another important aspect of the issue is that Diyarbakır has a very young and rapidly growing population. We have great problems in education. We are still carrying out the dual structure of education; and there are 60 to 70 students in each class. In a four-hour block, how much can a teacher cover a student in a classroom of 70? These children are our future. If the country has to develop or for the development of this country, the problems related to education must be resolved earnestly. In the sector of health, people are suffering from various diseases such as typhoid fever, dysentery, and tuberculosis which are now unheard of in the western countries. As a result, the mortality rate is high and there has been an increase in the number of suffering and dying from these diseases over the last five to ten years. The mortality rate from diseases that have disappeared in the West like typhoid fever, dysentery and tuberculosis is still very high here and there has been an increase in these numbers over the last five to ten years.”²⁰¹

This approach can only be seen as a one-sided economic perspective besides building and living Kurdish identity. Nevertheless, when the issue is considered while taking into consideration different dimensions such as identity values, social, economic and cultural stances, the socioeconomic development or poverty becomes determinant in daily life. On the other side of the fence, from the perspective of the Turkish state, the question can be assessed in the light of security. Graham Fuller, former Vice-Chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA, acclaimed that “weak and miserable Diyarbakır could create a huge amount of danger for Turkey and could easily be open to outside influence and exploitation. Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran, Russia, Armenia and Greece as competitors can easily abuse this situation. A happy and stable Diyarbakır will make Turkey strong; Iran or Iraq, could be an ideal model for

²⁰¹ Ruşen Çakır, *Türkiye'nin Kürt Sorunu*, Metis Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004, pp. 18-19.

the Kurdish population of countries such as Syria.”²⁰² Besides all technical perspectives from different disciplines, Diyarbakır is a city of poems and songs throughout history. In this case, while discussing Diyarbakır and its perception on the Kurds, the Diyarbakır Song written by Yusuf Hayaloğlu and composed by Ahmet Kaya, a prominent Kurdish singer, cannot be ignored. This could be regarded as one of the most sentimental songs in Turkish and arouse the true feelings of the people of Diyarbakır.

“I've been struck in the middle of Diyarbakır
I know from where this bullet sounds.
In these mountains, my youth is burning
The Moon hits my tears where I stay overnight

Don't worry, don't worry, tilt your head forward
The day unfolds, don't worry Diyarbakır
Don't cry, don't cry, don't tie bloody clothes
This fire will go out someday, don't cry Diyarbakır

I dissipate in the road of Diyarbakır
I'm shaken by these grueling earthquakes, I bleed
Friends faced with heavy fade
The day rises on highlands; I'm embarrassed by my grief

O stormy slope, O oppressed Diyarbakır
Red fire in the mountains, red copper on the forehead
The crocuses are like solar beams, as mothers light up
I'm on my knees, don't cry Diyarbakır”²⁰³

²⁰² Ruşen Çakır, (2004), *Ibid*, pp. 136-137.

²⁰³ Diyarbakır Song (Diyarbakır Türküsü), written by Yusuf Hayaloğlu and composed by Ahmet Kaya.
Link: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l--VbZVy36c> (Accessed Date: 19.05.2019)

Diyarbakır ortasında vurulmuş uzanırım
Ben bu kurşun sesini nerde olsa tanırım
Bu dağlarda gençliğim cayır cayır yanarken
Ay vurur gözyaşına ben gecede kalırım

Üzülme sen, üzülme başını öne eğme
Gün olur kavuşuruz, dert etme Diyarbakır
Ağlama sen ağlama, kanlı bezler bağlama
Bu yangın söner birgün, ağlama Diyarbakır

Diyarbakır yolunda toz olmuş dağılırım
Bu hırçın depremlerle sarsılırım kanarım
Arkadaşların yüzü ağır ağır solarken

3.3. Diyarbakırspor and Its Effects on Kurdish Identity:

The Turkish Sports Training Community for the establishment of the nation-building process showed the impact of sports clubs in Diyarbakır and began to establish new clubs. The first amateur sports club in Diyarbakır was founded in the 1920s under the Youth Association, led by the famous thinker, writer, and sociologist Ziya Gökalp. The association aimed, generally, at cultural activities and folk dances for young people as well as the formation of a sports club under the name of Youth Training Dormitory. It was the first official sports club in the contemporary sense created in the city. When ZiyaGökalp was elected as a deputy in 1923 and left the city and died a year later, the Youth Association was closed. Some athletes who left the Dicle İdman Yurduspor Club in 1930 formed the Ayspor and Yıldızspor teams.

Between 1927 and 1930, there were Dicle İdman Yurdu, Ayspor Youth Club and Yıldız Youth Clubs as the main sports clubs in Diyarbakır. In addition to these famous sports clubs, Karacadağ Gençlikspor was established in 1949, and Dicle Gençlikspor Club was established in 1950. Diyarbakırspor was founded on 24th June, 1968. The first president of the club was Nejat Cemiloğlu, who was the mayor of Diyarbakır in the same year. The professional football club was established by merging two amateur football clubs; Dicle Gençlikspor and Yıldız Gençlikspor. The club had a blotchy record of success since its foundation date. During the 1986-1987 Turkish Football Season, Diyarbakırspor dropped from the Turkish First League.²⁰⁴ In those years, the PKK had engaged in very intense, bloody armed activities such as the Ortabağ Village Attack (January 1987), the Açıkyol Village Attack (March 1987) and the Pınarcık Massacre

Gün doğar yaylalara, kahrımdan utanırım

Ey fırtınalı bayır, ey mazlum Diyarbakır
Dağlarında kızıl ateş, alnında kızıl bakır
Çiğdemler solar gibi, anneler yanar gibi
Dizlerine döküldüm, ağlama Diyarbakır

²⁰⁴ The History of Diyarbakırspor Football Club:

<http://www.diyarbakirspor.org/sayfa/kulubumuz/tarihce/>
(Accessed Date: 25.11.2018)

(June 1987).²⁰⁵ When Diyarbakırspor dropped from the First League, it did not show the same achievement again until the 2000-2001 Turkish Football League Season.²⁰⁶

Besides Diyarbakırspor, football, as professional way, started in Anatolian cities in 1960s. For example, many Anatolian football clubs such as Eskişehirspor, Samsunspor, Boluspor, Adanaspor, Balıkesirspor, Zongulakspor, Çanakkalespor, Denizlispor, Antalyaspor, Kayserispor, Malatyaspor, Trabzonspor, Orduspor, Kocaelispor, Aydınspor, Muğlaspor, Nazillispor, Elazığspor, were founded in 1960s. The most important purpose of football club foundation was to have the right to comment (to make hear their voice) on Turkish state's agenda via football. In this context, the positive attitude towards football was illustrated by the Turkish state over the Kurds.


At the peak of the PKK's attacks, the Turkish government developed a new way to undercut separatist sentiment between the Kurds and football, following decades of attempted forced Turkification. Ankara's policymakers tried to succeed in helping to win promotion into the First League of rather a second-division squad from the biggest province of Kurdish population region, Diyarbakır. In celebration of this remarkable and doubtful victory, the red and green banners of the club, Diyarbakırspor still flood the provincial capital. It is alleged that Gaffar Okkan, Police Commissioner of Diyarbakır had mastered the system. He practiced with the team daily and attended all its games. Even in this period, despite the government's full support, the fans of the home team were roaring "Ocalan's bastards" or "PKK go back", if Diyarbakırspor performed outside the Kurdish provinces. Despite the attempt of the state by conducting "Peace and Democracy Process", the home team fans were accepting Diyarbakırspor as an enemy of Turkish national identity. The interesting thing was that during these swearing slogans, just two football players of

²⁰⁵ Fatih Beren, "The Action Profile of PKK/KCK Terrorist Organization" in *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika*, Vol:8, No: 29, 2012 pp. 87-107.

²⁰⁶ Dağhan Irak, "Kurdish Identity and Sports in Turkey: The Case of Amedspor" in *Society Register*, 2018, p. 66.

Diyarbakirspor were Kurds, the rest of the team were Turks or of other nationalities.²⁰⁷ However, the perceptions had played an important role for the masses. Although Diyarbakirspor was accepted as "Ocalan's bastards" on the side of the rival's perception, Diyarbakirspor, as a team in this sense, has never been in a position that identifies with the political identity of Diyarbakir. For instance, some football teams of other regions and cities are known for their political opposition. Teams such as Atletico Bilbao, Barcelona and Real Madrid of Spain; Bayern Munich of Germany; Partizan of Serbia; Manchester United and Liverpool of England; Red Star of France; Juventus and Milan of Italy; all have identical and political attributes. However, Diyarbakirspor has been regarded as only being based on the fans. The extreme-nationalist fans of Bursaspor and Altay who often want to express their hatred of the city and the public, have placed Diyarbakirspor in the political category that they identify with their slogans.²⁰⁸

Despite these racist slogans, by means of the below graph (Graph No: 3.1), it is worth to notice the distribution of the birthplaces of the Diyarbakirspor players.



Graph 3.1. Birthplace of Diyarbakirspor Football Players (1968-2018)²⁰⁹

²⁰⁷ Faruk Arhan (2012), *Ibid.*

²⁰⁸ Şeymus Diken, *Büyüklerin Korkulu Rüyası Diyarbakir(spor)*, *bianet*.

<https://m.bianet.org/biamag/spor/112249-buyuklerin-korkulu-ruyasi-diyarbakir-spor>
(Accessed Date: 07.06.2019)

²⁰⁹ Resource:

<http://www.tff.org/Default.aspx?pageID=130>
(Accessed Date: 10.04.2019 – 18.05.2019)

This data (the above graph) provided by the Turkish Football Federation, clearly illustrate the birthplaces of Diyarbakırspor football players between 1968 and 2018. According to the information gathered, there are more than 50 Diyarbakırspor football players born in Diyarbakır between 1968 and 2018 football seasons. Besides, the number of Diyarbakırspor football players, born in different Kurdish cities, were more than the period of Diyarbakırspor between 1999 and 2004.

3.4. The Usages of Football in Kurdish Question between 1999 and 2004:

At the beginning, the basic proposed solution from the view of the Turkish state was to use military force against Kurdish separatist movements. However, the Turkish state has been in a struggle with the Kurdish problem and has continually found itself resorting to military force, even though there was no real solution through such military action. Turkey's Kurdish question has been on the table for many years; and there have been countless attempts made to resolve the issues in the interests of all concerned parties regarding nationalism, terrorism, identity, assimilation, society, linguistic and culture at various points in Turkish history. Throughout history the approaches of the State has transformed in a wide range from military solution to peace process. In this transformation process Turkey's foreign relations and its memberships or affiliations to the international organizations has played a significant role as well as ruling party's commitments.

After the Öcalan's arrest in 1999, the Turkish state put into effect important the European Union (EU) harmonization reforms regarding the Kurdish question. According to the Helsinki process, the Turkish state had to put in force the Copenhagen criteria of the EU. The Copenhagen criteria gave an important chance to formulate reforms and start the accession negotiations for the government. A significant impetus for politicians to formulate policies that could further democratize Turkey in a number of issues, including the Kurdish issue had been developed and provided an important new window by the EU accession talks.²¹⁰

²¹⁰ Ozlem Kayhan Pusane, "Turkey's Kurdish Opening: Long Awaited Achievements and Failed Expectations" in *Turkish Studies*, Vol: 15, No: 1, 2014.

As Özlem Kayhan Pusane quoted that, the EU Copenhagen criteria and reforms included gradually ending the emergency rule in the Southeast, allowing television and radio broadcasts in Kurdish, making Kurdish language education possible, and removing the death penalty from the Turkish Criminal Code.²¹¹ In a sense, the Kurds policy of the Turkish state had started to change from a hard way to a soft way struggle. However, the political transitional stage was not easy and that's why, the Turkish state started to use some instruments, as tools, to touch the Kurdish society. Football, as the most popular sport activity in Turkey, was discovered as a political instrument for Kurdish question in case of Diyarbakır, by the Turkish state at the end of 20th century.

Sports activities, notably football matches, are one of the most important popular cultural activities where people gather under the same roof, regardless of any ethnic or religious differences. In this point, there are also other apparent observable differences in stadiums such as social and economic class, education, language, sexuality; however, these differences are outside the scope of this research. In this context, having a new concept in the aftermath of the capture of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, the Turkish State tried to enact a project to stabilize the Kurdish question by using football. This approach was to focus particularly on Diyarbakırspor, the prominent football club in the region. Moreover, Diyarbakır has an exclusive perception in the mindset of the Kurds in the Middle East.

In the Turkish First (Super) League, some of the most famous football clubs such as Galatasaray, Fenerbahçe, Beşiktaş and Trabzonspor, have millions of supporters all around Turkey. From the points of view of the Gramscian approaches, the Turkish government used football as a tool against the PKK within Kurdish society, especially in Diyarbakır. For instance, the Turkish Football Federation (TFF) designated the Turkish Cup Final to be played in Diyarbakır in 2000. It was an important step to construct a bridge between the State and Kurdish society, as these relations were

²¹¹ Ozlem Kayhan Pusane (2014), *Ibid.*

weakened because of the PKK. Here, the Turkish state used football as a peace field for the Kurdish problem.²¹² In the 1990s, Turkey found itself in a serious armed and bloody struggle with the PKK in the Southeast of Turkey. During this struggle, the Turkish government tried to maintain national security and to provide national unity by using the power of football against the PKK problem. Galatasaray was by far being a successful football club in 2000; yet it was also – and still remains – a favorite football team among Kurdish society, because Abdullah Öcalan, who is the PKK leader, is known to be a fan of Galatasaray Football Club.²¹³

Until that time, the state could not achieve any success in solving the Kurdish question except through armed struggle. From the standpoint of the state itself, the importance of professional football in Diyarbakir was a crucial trial. When this project first began, instead of joining the rebels in the mountainous areas, the state thought that the Kurdish youth should have played and watched football in stadiums. The simple idea of the state was to keep the Kurdish youth busy with football rather than politics and identity struggles. Indeed, this is a universal practice to use football as opium like Franco in Spain.

As seen in many other parts of the world in areas where there is either oppression or a lack of basic social services among other social issues, the youth in the area have no other real interests to aspire to, than football. The knock-on effect is that instead of discussing the Kurdish question and movement, the people of Diyarbakir would become involved in football. From then on, the only goal remaining was to bring Diyarbakirspor to the first league. One of the most important aims of the state for Diyarbakirspor was to transfer it into the Turkish Football First League. It was the 2000-2001 season and Diyarbakirspor was moving up in the second league. At the end of the football season, Diyarbakirspor was promoted to the upper league with the state's support. In this case, there were some rumors circulating; the state played

²¹² Please see the below link for the Turkish Cup Final (Antalyaspor vs Galatasaray) in Diyarbakir in 2000. (Accessed Date: 20.08.2016)
<http://www.tff.org.tr/Default.aspx?pagelid=29&maclid=31834>.

²¹³ Doğu Perinçek: "Kürtlerin dirilişinde bir bahar yaşanıyor" in *Ortadoğu'nun çehresini değiştireceğiz ABDULLAH ÖCALAN Seçme Röportajlar Cilt 1*, Weşanê Serxwebûn, December 1994, p. 363.

a significant role in promoting Diyarbakırspor. After their victory over Konya, Diyarbakırspor reached the final stage. İzmir's long-established club Altay was to play in Diyarbakır. It was announced before the match that the game would not be broadcasted. In the stadium, cameras were disallowed, and rumors were spreading at a fast pace. According to this, the exhaust pipe of a vacuum truck was running into the window of the locker room of Altay. Altay players were forced to inhale carbon monoxide while wearing uniforms. It was a strong sign for Altay of what would happen to the players if Altay was not defeated.²¹⁴

On the other hand, at the beginning of the 2000s there was a paradigm change in the Turkish state to the Kurds during the EU candidate process. Within this scope, a breakthrough in Turkey-EU relations occurred at the European Council in Helsinki, on 10-11 December 1999. In Helsinki, Turkey was recognized as a candidate country on the same case as the other applicant countries without any preconditions. Turkey will gain the advantages of stimulating its reform and supporting its pre-accession policy. This includes the Accession Partnership, which will be established in conjunction with the National Acquis Programme. Turkey will be involved in Community programs which will be accessible to other applicant nations and organizations.²¹⁵

Turkey has altered its position on the EU by recognizing itself as the candidate country in Helsinki and has opened a fresh era in Turkey-EU relations. It sets out the capacities of Turkey and the actions that the Turkish administration needs to take. In doing so, Turkey demonstrated its willingness to join the EU, accelerating and already initiating, albeit slowly, the process of reform. Turkey was obliged to respect democracy, the rule of law, individual rights and liberties, and the legal and administrative measures needed to take those reforms, i.e. amendments and laws. In addition to them, the national programme covered all the chapters of the *acquis*,

²¹⁴ Bener Demirtop, "Derin Futbol ve Diyarbakır", [bianet.org](https://m.bianet.org/bianet/spor/75520-derin-futbol-ve-diyarbakir), 2006
Link: <https://m.bianet.org/bianet/spor/75520-derin-futbol-ve-diyarbakir>
(Accessed Date: 04.04.2019)

²¹⁵ The History of Turkey - EU Relations
Link: https://www.ab.gov.tr/brief-history_111_en.html
(Accessed Date: 19.07.2019)

allowing Turkey to fulfill the requirements of Copenhagen. Turkey began to take major measures towards the negotiations for accession to the National Programme. The significant review of Turkey's Constitution in October 3, 2001 is one of the oldest and most significant reforms. This amendment was so large that almost a fifth of the 177 constitutional articles were altered. The Constitutional amendment package covered a broad variety of subjects including improvements in human rights, the strengthening of the rule of law and the reorganization of democratic institutions. This amendment was also complemented with the legal and administrative measures needed to guarantee that they were implemented.²¹⁶

In this regard in February 2002, the first set of laws was enacted and different laws were changed in the Penal Code, anti-terrorism Law, frequent criticism of which was the legal base for many intellectuals' arrest and imprisonment for expressed opinions. In August 2002, the package became effective and was a prominent success in Turkey's history. The package consisted of the abolition of the death penalty, the abolition of lifting legal constraints on individual cultural rights, the re-trial of the European Court of Human Rights judgments and the easing of the right of association restriction.²¹⁷

In Turkey, 60% of the public had taken in favor of political power from the EU and has supported their efforts in this direction. There were two important reasons for this. The first element was the idea that EU membership will accelerate economic development, contribute to welfare and decrease unemployment. The other element was the point of view of intellectuals who thought that the freedom of expression and respect for beliefs would establish Turkey into a modern state with democratic values. The Kurds, on the other hand, support the EU membership because they believe that they will contribute to the recognition of the real human rights and minority rights, the end of oppression and violence, freedom and democratic

²¹⁶Ali Aybey, "Turkey and The European Union Relations: A Historical Assessment", in *Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi*, Vol: 4, No: 1., 1990, pp. 32-33.

²¹⁷ Ali Aybey (1990), *Ibid*, p. 34.

development along with the idea that it will bring a solution to unemployment through economic development, free movement, etc.²¹⁸

When viewed from this aspect, football was used as a tool to achieve the goals of the Turkish State over Kurdish society. The Turkish central government attempts to render control over society by using the power of football and Diyarbakir is the center to maintain this control within Kurdish society. In this period the Turkish state began to use soft materials to reach the community that had problematic relations. To reach this goal, the state tried to transform itself. Therefore, the Turkish state started to support Diyarbakirspor from that point onwards, which created an important symbolic expression channel for Kurdish identity especially from the 1990s onwards because this football club had become a means for representation of the Kurdish people or, if manipulated, a projection for their political expressions outside Kurdish society.

On the other hand, there was an important turning point for the Kurdish problem in Turkey in 1999. Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK leader, was apprehended in Kenya and taken back to Turkey where he went through a trial and sentenced to death for treason and sedition.²¹⁹ Then, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire on the call of Abdullah Öcalan from September 1st, 1999 to June 1st, 2004. The “Democratic Republic Project” was proclaimed by Abdullah Öcalan after he had been captured in Kenya. The main aim was to start an inertial movement in Turkey. Therefore, the conflict strategies of the Turkish state and the PKK were brought to an agreement of disarmament and a transfer to a non-violent struggle. The Turkish government wanted to use this to create its projects over Kurdish people through Diyarbakirspor as one of its main instruments. Faruk Arhan, who is a journalist, clarifies the importance of Diyarbakirspor for Kurdish society in the following sentences:

²¹⁸ Tarık Ziya Ekinci, *Avrupa Birliği ve Kürtler*, *bianet.org*, 2004.
<https://m.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/51626-avrupa-birligi-ve-kurtler>
(Accessed Date: 19.07.2019)

²¹⁹ Ercan Çağlayan, “Endoktrinasyon ve Eğitim: Diyarbakır Türk Ocağı ve Halkevi” in *Diyarbakır’da Kimlik İnşası (1923 – 1950)*, İletişim, 2014, pp. 13-15.

“The main reason for sympathy for Diyarbakır is related to identity. It means this to be a Kurd. It is a natural response that Diyarbakırspor's Super League promotion is celebrated in Diyarbakır. However, the underlying cause for the sharing of this joy in other provinces, where the Kurds are a majority, is that 'Diyarbakırspor phenomenon' is a Kurdish representation. Heretofore, Vanspor, Erzurumspor and Siirtspor were promoted to the Super League. Furthermore, Gaziantepspor has been struggling for many years in the Super League. However, Kurdish people did not support any of these football clubs as much as Diyarbakırspor in the general sense.”²²⁰

Within this case, the Turkish state tried to use Diyarbakırspor as a safety valve against the ethnic hostility in the South East of Anatolia where the Kurdish majorities live. The main aim was to decrease the politicization of Kurdish identity and increase social integration between Turkish and Kurdish societies. Following this state purpose, Diyarbakırspor had become the symbol of an alternative way that created a level of struggle with regards to the PKK and Kurdish ethnic problem. Diyarbakırspor became the main symbol of state struggle against the Kurdish question in Turkey in the 1990s. In those years, Turkey had started to encounter PKK terrorism as a result of the Kurdish ethnic problem in Eastern Anatolia. The Turkish government began to use all tools against the PKK, especially in Diyarbakır, which is one of the epicenters of Kurdish society. In addition to military engagements, football was one of the “precautions” against the Kurdish ethnic problem and an important tool to emphasize Turkish national unity against the communal subversion in Turkey.

3.5. The Approach of the Turkish State to Diyarbakırspor via Gaffar Okkan

In this period of football in Diyarbakır, as a Kurdish region, it was considered to be an antidote against the separatist movements, which were labeled mainly “terror” (as with many other ethnic political or identity movements other than Turks), by the Turkish state. Some of the different Kurdish cities' football clubs such as Vanspor,

²²⁰ Faruk Arhan, *Diyarbakırspor: Düğünde Kalabalık, Taziyyede Yalnız*, İletişim, İstanbul, 2012, p. 193.

Siirtspor, Batmanspor, were promoted to the Turkish Football First League with the support of the Turkish state from time to time, although their fans had nearly no chance to present their identity either by football supporter chants or oral/written statements in the stadiums.

The embodiment of the soft practices of Gaffar Okkan overlapped with the process of the official recognition of Turkey's candidate status for full-membership to the European Union at the Helsinki Summit of December 1999. Ali Gaffar Okkan was appointed as the Police Commissioner of Diyarbakır in 1997. Okkan was an unusual type of police officer of which the people of Diyarbakır had never seen before. Before taking office, the policewomen in Diyarbakır would hardly ever be permitted to go on patrol outside the security building compound. Okkan made police women go out on patrol. He ordered the police officers to communicate with the general public.²²¹

Gaffar Okkan firstly tried to discipline the Diyarbakır police and then he conducted operations in the Police Department of Diyarbakır. Criminal organizations were formed within the police department. Even while the Hezbollah operation was in progress, the “minimized gangs” in the police department continued to operate. For instance, Okkan had said that *"A traffic police officer , three officers for counter terrorism, one responsible for drags issues go to a citizens' house, they find a single shotgun. They threat the citizen and say they will detain him guilt by association if he does not offer them 300 million Liras. I took my car, we went all over town and we found the traffic officer. The citizen identified the police officer. The police didn't object. Then we uncovered the others. Well, they don't like me either."*²²² Okkan objected to the opinion that every Kurdish person is a potential PKK member, which the public officials who have worked in the region for many years have quietly accepted. He showed this with his practices. Therefore, he gained the trust of the people. Thus, Gaffar Okkan was a transparent person of the Turkish Republic,

²²¹ Özgen Aydos, "Gaffar Okkan'ın hikayesi: Diyarbakır'ın Gaffar babası" in cnnturk.com, 2018. <https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/gaffar-okkanin-hikayesi-diyarbakirin-gaffar-babasi?page=29> (Accessed Date: 10.05.2019)

²²² Nazım Alpman, Polislerin Dışında Herkes, *bianet.org* <https://m.bianet.org/bianet/toplum/493-polislerin-disinda-herkes> (Accessed Date: 21.07.2019)

whereas also a fan of Diyarbakirspor. He went to stadiums to watch matches wearing his official uniform, tried to find financial support and was fighting against corruption within the football club.

On the other hand, Okkan's social factor according to Faruk Arhan, was to reorganize the political and social environment. Gaffar Okkan aimed to downgrade the Kurdish population party, HADEP (People's Democracy Party / Halkın Demokrasi Partisi - HADEP) within the Kurdish society. To reach this goal, Arhan claimed that Okkan assisted to promote Diyarbakirspor to the Super League.²²³ Thus, he first wanted to control the club management by registering 700 policemen to Diyarbakirspor. This meant that he had gained an extremely important voting power into the administration of Diyarbakirspor.²²⁴

In this case, there are claims about the role of Okkan to be based on political and social factors. Firstly, the state with the atmosphere of democratization process of EU lead Turkey to include all ignored parts of the society particularly the Kurds on a framework of social inclusion. The term social exclusion was derived from the social policy of the socialist governments of France in the 1980s, where marginalized people were referred to as "*les exclus*", the excluded, notably those without access to social insurance.²²⁵ "*Social exclusion is what can happen when people or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime, poor health and family breakdown.*"²²⁶ Social inclusion should have aimed at the inclusion of the Kurds in Turkey.

Since 2001 and during the EU accession process, both the coalition government as well as,– the AKP government under the military tutelage, issued institutional

²²³ Faruk Arhan, Diyarbakirspor: *Düğünde Kalabalık, Taziyede Yalnız*, İletişim, İstanbul, 2012, p. 193.

²²⁴ Faruk Arhan (2012), *Ibid*, p. 93.

²²⁵ Richard Tacon, "Football and social inclusion: Evaluating social policy", in *Managing Leisure*, 12:1, 2007, pp. 1-23.

²²⁶ The Social Exclusion Unit Leaflet , Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, pp. 2.

Link:https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/social_exclusion_task_force/assets/publications_1997_to_2006/seu_leaflet.pdf

(Accessed Date: 20.08.2019)

foundations in order to abolish old laws and to change the constitution following a quiet acceptance by the top management of the armed forces. In this process it can be said that the reconciliation of civil-military leaders on the aim of EU membership was achieved in a general social reconciliation environment on the EU membership in the last year of the Chief of General Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu and then during the Hilmi Özkök and Yaşar Büyükanıt periods.²²⁷ In such a coordination and cooperation atmosphere at the top of the government, football was claimed to have an important social inclusion potential. The tenure of Okkan came up to this Period of consensus in the Turkish state.

In addition this consensus period, the mighty general of former chief of Turkish Armed Forces Yaşar Büyükanıt should not be ignored. General Büyükanıt had served in Diyarbakır at the end of 1990s. It is claimed that his interest on Diyarbakırspor developed in this period. He considered the place of Diyarbakırspor in the first league as a political gain. Moreover, he was the initiator of the establishment of the Diyarbakırspor Fans' Union in 1996 and was elected to the Honorary President. Büyükanıt's photo was hung in the association. He cared not to miss the matches. After Büyükanıt left Diyarbakır due to his duty, his interest in the club did not decrease. Especially after the murder of the provincial police chief Gaffar Okkan, Diyarbakırspor had his personal interest.²²⁸

Gaffar Okkan was killed (as well as five other police officers) in Diyarbakır, on January 24th, 2001. Only Hezbollah assumed full responsibility for the assassination, but the assassins were never found. The assassination of Gaffar Okkan not only led to subsequent influences in Diyarbakır, but also throughout Turkey. After the first league match (against Sivasspor), Diyarbakırspor players had come out onto the pitch with the t-shirt of Gaffar Okkan. After Gaffar Okkan's murder, the struggle of

²²⁷ Özlem Kaygusuz, "Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemde Türkiye'de Sivil-Asker İlişkilerinin Dönüşümüne Bir Bakış: Küresel Eğilimler, AB Süreci ve Kürt Sorunu'nun Etkileri" in *mülkiye*, Vol: 34, No: 268, 2010, p. 190.

²²⁸ Faruk Arhan, Büyükanıt'ın Diyarbakırspor Aşkı, *bianet.org*
<https://m.bianet.org/biamag/spor/104124-buyukanit-in-diyarbakirspor-aski>
(Accessed Date: 21.07.2019).

Diyarbakırspor to the First Turkish Football League was perceived not only as a promise to a martyr Police Commissioner, but also the politicians of Turkey.


Although having such kind of a consensus at the top of the Turkish state, it can be regarded that the state apparatus should not be considered as one structure. The murder of Gaffar Okkan represents these fragmented state institutions as evidence. According to the claims the perpetrators of the assassination of Okkan and his five police guards were *Hizbullah*. Before the military coup on 12 September 1980, *Hizbullah* was set up in Batman at the time when *Ikhwan*'s influence was growing, the conservatist line of *Milli Görüş* became more active. When the Iranian Revolution had taken place, a left-to-right conflict was on the rise in Turkey, and the PKK was emerging as an active force.²²⁹ *Hizbullah* was commonly heard by the general public in late 1991, when it clashed with the PKK. According to the PKK *Hizbullah* was one of the last trumps of the state in the region and had to be destroyed. *Hizbullah* called the PKK as "*Partiye Kâfirin Kürdistan*" (Kurdistan Infidels Party). As stated in an official report, the PKK's losses against *Hizbullah* were beyond expectations: "*Nearly 700 sympathizers and militants were killed during this period. It is estimated that up to 500 of these actions were carried out by illegal Hizbullah / İlim (science) organization and 200 by PKK terrorist organizations.*"²³⁰ It is claimed that *Hizbullah* has always been seen as a "subcontractor" because of speculations about its relationship with Iran and/or the Turkish state. Indeed, as with many illegal organizations, some intelligence services may have infiltrated *Hizbullah* or may be in contact with some of its executives.²³¹ Therefore, regarding these kind of dissertations the Kurdish policy of the Turkish state can be taken into consideration as very conflicting and contentious.

²²⁹ Mehmet Kurt (2017), *Ibid*, p. 15.

²³⁰ Serhat Alaattinoğlu, "Ne sen sormuş ol, ne de ben duymuş olayım", ntv.com.tr
Link:<https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/ne-sen-sormus-ol-ne-de-ben-duymus-olayim,iVffg29IEyQ4BeP0NqQtw>
(Accessed Date: 10.05.2019)

²³¹ Ruşen Çakır, "Geçmiş, bugün ve gelecek kışkacında Türkiye Hizbullahı", rusencakir.com
<http://rusencakir.com/Gecmis-bugun-ve-gelecek-kiskacinda-Turkiye-Hizbullahi/739>
(Accessed Date: 22.07.2019)

To sum up the perception and usage football as an instrument, Diyarbakırspor was shown as a tool in Diyarbakır by the civil and military bureaucracy as a way of depoliticizing the Kurdish society and diverting them from the Kurdish political movements, especially from the PKK during the period (1999-2004). Therefore, Diyarbakırspor was perceived as an antidote against PKK by the most of state executives. In order to elucidate the transformation of the Diyarbakırspor, we can give an example of the transformation of the demographic data of football players, who played in Diyarbakırspor specifically between 1999 and 2004. This typical period can be seen in the below graph.




Graph 3.2. The Birthplace of Diyarbakırspor Football Players (1999 – 2004)²³²

The above graph (3.2.) illustrate that Diyarbakırspor football players came from mostly outside of Diyarbakır between 1999 and 2004 years. According to the database searching of Turkish Football Federation (TFF), there was only one Diyarbakırspor football player (Erhan Ölker, Licence Number: 273402), was born in Diyarbakır and most of Diyarbakırspor football players were born in İstanbul, Ankara, Balıkesir, Adana, Mersin, Trabzon and Rize provinces except international football players that mostly from Africa and the Balkans. It should also be noted that, there was no football player who was born in Diyarbakır, played in Diyarbakırspor between 1999 and 2002.

²³² See more: <http://www.tff.org/Default.aspx?pageID=130>

There was no clear data records for Diyarbakırspor until the 1991-1992 football season in the database of Turkish Football Federation (TFF). As per the TFF records, the appearance of international football players, who played in Diyarbakırspor, started with the 2001-2002 football season, as mentioned on below graph (No: 3.3).



Graph 3.3. International Football Players of Diyarbakırspor (1991 - 2018)²³³


The Turkish state's long-lasting efforts to assimilate the Kurds via use of mass media as a process of 'Turkification' are needed to be indicate with empirical evidence. In this research, the two national newspapers (*Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet*), which have online access archive, were examined about the news of Diyarbakırspor and Gaffar Okkan between 1993 and 2018. The news searching started from 1993, because there was no news about Gaffar Okkan before his the first important official title as the police chief of Kars province, in 1993. The newspapers online access archive is research in this case to specify and show the peak and intense news on Diyarbakırspor and Gaffar Okkan.

The press is one of the tools used to serve state politics in many aspects. Media organs such as TV channels, newspapers and radio programs, may have a contribution in molding public opinion in some specific subjects.²³⁴ Especially from the 1990s, Diyarbakırspor football club has created a symbolic path for representing

²³³ See more: <http://www.tff.org/Default.aspx?pageID=130>

²³⁴ Erez Amichai, "The Role Of The Media In Counter-Terrorism", Mustafa Ozguler; Ali Ozdogan; A. Sait Yayla; Ekrem Mus and Halim İltas (Ed.), in *Terrorism A Global Perspective*, Washington: The Turkish Institute for Security and Democracy, 2009, p. 241.


the Kurdish identity.²³⁵ Two national newspapers (*Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet*), which have online archive accesses, were selected, as samples of this study. The data is obtained from the newspapers' online archive year by year separately, and then Diyarbakır and Gaffar Okkan news were gathered and were numerically transferred to the below graphs (3.4. & 3.5.).



Graph 3.4. Diyarbakırspor and Gaffar Okkan News on *Cumhuriyet* Newspaper (1993-2018)²³⁶

²³⁵ Mert Kerem Zelyurt, "Dünyanın Çeşitli Ülkelerinde Etnik Gerilimler Bağlamında Futbol", in *İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Araştırma Dergisi*, Vol: 2, No: 2, 2013, p. 179.

²³⁶ *Cumhuriyet* Newspaper Online Archive
Link: <https://www.cumhuriyetarsivi.com/>
(Accessed Date: 10.04.2019 – 20.05.2019)




Graph 3.5. Diyarbakırspor and Gaffar Okkan News on *Milliyet* Newspaper (1993-2018)²³⁷

Both the graphs (No 3.4. and 3.5.) represent the news comparisons which includes “Diyarbakırspor” and “Gaffar Okkan” on *Cumhuriyet* (Graph 3.4.) and *Milliyet* (Graph 3.5.) newspapers between 1993 and 2018, a period of 25 years. These two graphs can also be used to compare two different results over time and the number of news on both sides similarly with a similar. It is worth emphasizing that, there is a significant parallel increase regarding the news about Diyarbakırspor and Gaffar Okkan in both news of the newspapers mentioned between *Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet* between 1999 and 2004. Another important increased in news occurred when Diyarbakırspor was playing in the first division football league in 2008 and 2009 years. It seems clear that, there are parallels between the support of state and the support of mainstream media for Diyarbakırspor during the period between 1999 and 2004.


The dataset of *Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet* newspapers for 50 years (between 1968 and 2018), which contains Diyarbakırspor news, reveals the popularity of Diyarbakırspor suddenly increased at the period between 1999 and 2004. In some specific periods of 50 years, this dataset illustrates saliently that there are positive relationships

²³⁷ *Milliyet* Newspaper Online Archive
 Link: <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/>
 (Accessed Date: 10.04.2019 – 20.05.2019)

between the mainstream media and Diyarbakirspor. Unlike the preceding periods, Diyarbakirspor news were found to have a higher number than average in this period.



Graph 3.6. Diyarbakirspor News on *Cumhuriyet* Newspaper (1968-2018)



Graph 3.7. Diyarbakirspor News on *Milliyet* Newspaper (1968-2018)

These two graphs (Grap No: 6 & 7) show the mentioned news of Diyarbakirspor on *Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet*, which are two of the most popular newspapers in Turkey, from 1968 to 2018. The two graphs clearly shows the number of news about Diyarbakirspor goes up in short periods such as 1977-1980, 1985-1988, 1999-2005 and 2008-2011, during the half century. Those increased periods illustrate the time of periods that Diyarbakirspor was promoted to the upper league (especially to the first Turkish football league. Within these periods, most of the news about Diyarbakirspor were published between 1999 and 2004 years during the 50 years. In this period, the popularity of Diyarbakirspor was rapidly increased again after 12 years periods. During the 1990s, Diyarbakirspor did not show any sportive reaction because of the political and economic condition in the Kurdish provinces. It can be inferred from this perspective that Diyarbakirspor has found a chance or shown

success in limiting sphere of the Turkish state. As there is no possibility to do something against the state's will, Diyarbakırspor has also prevented by the state with its many means. Some obstacles or sanctions by Turkish Football Federation (TFF), legislative arrangement by the Youth and Sports Ministry thanks to its stadiums and other socioeconomic challenges can be exemplified in this case.

Diyarbakırspor Football Club had a very successful season in the Second Turkish Football League and reached the final match against Çaykur Rizespor Football Club in Antalya on May 31st, 2000. Çaykur Rizespor was founded in Rize in 1953 and was sponsored by the Çaykur Company.²³⁸ Moreover, Rize is also the hometown of Mesut Yılmaz who was a Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic. According to Adnan Öktüren, who was the president of Diyarbakırspor in 2000, Diyarbakırspor lost the final match because of incorrect in-match rulings by the match referee, Bülent Uzun, who was a non-commissioned officer in the Turkish Army, and Öktüren claimed that, *“the Turkish state had rigged a game by using a referee who had a military background during the final match against Diyarbakırspor.”*²³⁹

Gaffar Okkan was a very popular and important figure for the non-violent struggle between Kurdish movement and the Turkish State via Diyarbakırspor in Diyarbakır. For Dağhan Irak, *“The only time their Kurdishness was remembered was when opponent fans treated them as if they were PKK members, like Bursaspor's ultra-nationalist fans called Diyarbakırspor fans as such in 2009. This situation changed when the state officials considered sponsoring football teams against Kurdish separatist movements to be a failure and withdrew from club boards in the late*

²³⁸ Çaykur was established as a State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) limited with its capital, autonomous in its activities having a legal entity under the name of General Directorate of Tea Enterprises (Çay-Kur) under Statutory Decree 112 dated 10.10.1983 based on code 2929 enacted in year 1983. More info: <http://www.caykur.gov.tr/Pages/Lang/Menu/Detay.aspx?ItemId=42> (Accessed Date: 20.11.2018)

²³⁹ Interview of Adnan Öktüren “Diyarbakırspor - Altay Documentary (13.05.2001)” in *KeşkeOlmasaydı*, TV 24 Channel. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pkd9qHBuJ3I> (Minutes: 8.40 – 09.03 seconds) (Accessed Date: 20.11.2018)

2000s.”²⁴⁰ Gaffar Okkan had tried to promote Diyarbakırspor, as a football club of Kurdish society, to the First Turkish Football League with the power of Turkish state, without Kurdish identity. And it can be said that Gaffar Okkan was successful in this goal.



Image 3.1. Gaffar Okkan was writing that “Champion is Diyarbakırspor”.²⁴¹



G. Doğu'da Diyarbakır bayramı

14 yıllık aradan sonra yeniden Türkiye Birinci Ligi'ne çıkan Diyarbakırspor'un coşkusu devam ediyor. Yeşil-Kırmızı ekibin başarısı, özellikle Güney-doğu illerinde büyük sevinçle karşılandı. Birinci ligi İstanbul'da yakalayan Diyarbakırsporlu futbolcu ve yöneticiler önceki gün sanatçı Mahsun Kırmızıgül'ün organize ettiği gecede eğlenirken dün de teröre kurban giden onursal başkanları şehit Emniyet Müdürü Gaffar Okkan'ın Hendek'teki mezarını ziyaret ettiler. 50 araçlık konvoyla İstanbul'dan Adapazarı'na giden Diyarbakırspor kafesi adına konuşan takım kaptanı Kemalettin Şentürk, "Eminim Gaffar Müdürümüz bu sevincimizi görüyor. Ona verdiğimiz sözü tuttuk" dedi. ■ 7. Sayfada

Image 3.2. Diyarbakırspor fans were celebrating the championship with posters of Gaffar Okkan.²⁴²

²⁴⁰ Dağhan Irak, “Kurdish Identity And Sport In Turkey: The Case Of Amedspor” in *Society Register*, 2018, 2 (1), p. 69.

²⁴¹ Please see the image (3.1.) by Link:

http://wowturkey.com/tr735/satkan21_B8G34usIAAEiYVvk.jpg

(Accessed Date: 20.05.2019)

²⁴² *Cumhuriyet* Newspaper, 22.05.2001, p.1

Diyarbakır'da 'teröre hayır' şenliği



Ünlüler Gaffar Okkan için oynadı

● Şehit edilen Diyarbakır Emniyet Müdürü Gaffar Okkan ve 5 arkadaşı anısına spor, sanat ve basın dünyasının ünlüleri futbol maçında bir araya geldiler. İbrahim Yıldız, Saffet Sancaklı, Cem Yılmaz, Ali Kırca, Tayfun Talipoğlu, Mahsun Kırılmaz, Tanju Çolak, Deniz Erdoğan, Diyarbakır Valisi Cemil Serhadli, Murat Soylu, Mehmet Ekşi'den kurulu olan kırmızı takım, Yavuz Bingöl, Yılmaz

Erdoğan, Ferhat Tunç, Fatih Altaylı, Erhan Onal, Tufan Oktüren, Abdurrahman Yakut, Mustafa Güneş, Faruk Balıkcı, Mehmet Türk, Hayri Ülgen'len oluşan beyaz takıma 5-3 yenildi. Maçın ardından heyette yer alan ünlülerin otobüslerinin etrafında sevgi çemberi oluşturan çocuklu gençlerin üzerine polis otoları ve motosikletlerinin sürülmesi tepkiyle karşılandı. ■ 6. Sayfa



Cem Yılmaz da Diyarbakır'a giden ünlüler arasındaydı.

Image 3.3. There is a group of Turkish celebrities such as singers, directors, journalists, artists and showmen, come to Diyarbakır to play a football match in commemoration of Gaffar Okkan.²⁴³

SAYFA
6

CUMHURİYET
HABERLER

26 ŞUBAT 2001 PAZARTESİ

Diyarbakır'daki barış, sevgi, hoşgörü, dostluk ve kardeşlik maçının sonucu 5-3

GOLLER OKKAN İÇİN ATILDI

DIYARBAKIR (Cumhuriyet Bürosu) - Aralarında gazetemiz Genel Yayın Yönetmeni İbrahim Yıldız'ın da bulunduğu çok sayıda ünlü gazeteci ve sanatçı dün Diyarbakır'da oynadıkları dostluk maçıyla 'barış, sevgi ve hoşgörü' mesajları verdiler. Ancak beyette yer alan ünlülerin otobüslerinin etrafında sevgi çemberi oluşturan ve 'barış' sloganları atan gençlerin üzerine polis otoları ve motosikletlerinin sürülmesi katliamlarda tepkiyle karşılandı. Sanatçı Mahsun Kırılmaz'ın organizasyonu ile aralarında gazetemiz Genel Yayın Yönetmeni İbrahim Yıldız, Tayfun Talipoğlu, Mehmet Ali Birand, Ali Kırca, Reha Muhtar, Leyla Uzun ve Fatih Altaylı, sanatçılar Yılmaz Erdoğan, Yavuz Bingöl, Ferhat Tunç, Cem Yılmaz ile eski sporcuların Tanju Çolak ve Saffet Akbaş'ın bulunduğu yaklaşık 100 kişilik 'barış, dostluk ve hoşgörü' beyeli din mekânı Diyarbakır'a geldi. Misafirleri Atatürk Havalimanı'nda Diyarbakır Vali Yardımcısı Hüseyin Nalbant, Emniyet Müdürü Atilla Çınar, Diyarbakırspor Kulübü Başkanı Adnan Oktüren, Güneydoğu Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Başkanı Naci Sapan karşıladı. Çelik, Birand ve Muhtar



Okkan anısına yapılan maçta Reha Muhtar'ın takımı M. Ali Birand'ın takımı 5-3 yenildi. Maçın sonuna yaklaştıkça bir araya gelen ünlülere yürecek murra kahvesi ikram edildi.

Terör onarı yıldırmadı

Gençlerin tek isteği iş ve barış

İBRAHİM YILDIZ
DIYARBAKIR - Diyarbakır'da özel bir güne tanık olduk. Kentte gerçekleştirilen etkinlikler gösterdi ki bu bölgenin dostluğa, barışa ve en önemlisi sevgiye gereksinimi var. Bu anlamda ilk adım, bundan 2,5 yıl önce Emniyet Müdürü Ali Gaffar Okkan tarafından atılmış. Ve Güneydoğu insanı kendisi için bir şeyler yaparken teröre kurban giden 'Gaffar Mithilirini', 'Gaffar Babasının' unutmaması. Günler, haftalar geçse de bölge halkı, kendinden biri olarak gördüğü bu devlet adamının anısını yaşıyor. Stadin etrafına büyük bir özenle asılan Okkan posterleri ve 'Ali Gaffar Okkan'ı unutmamaya çağırın' yazılı pankartlar da Diyarbakır'ın eski emniyet müdürlerini ne denli sevdiğinin en belirgin göstergesiydi sanıyoruz. Bir grup sanatçının girişimiyle medyadan ve spor dünyasından ünlü isimlerin Okkan anısına keremte bir araya gelmesi Diyarbakır'ın, 'Okkan' konusunda yalnız olmadıklarını hissettirdi. Gençler yaşlasa, gençlere büyük bir saygı gösterildi, kucak açtı. Katliyi nereye ne omuzlarda taşıyor gözyaşları döken yüzlerce insan "Biz yalnız değiliz" diye seslendi.

Image 3.4. There is a group of Turkish celebrities such as singers, directors, journalists, artists and showmen, come to Diyarbakır to play a football match in commemoration of Gaffar Okkan.²⁴⁴

²⁴³ Cumhuriyet Newspaper, 26.02.2001, p.1

²⁴⁴ Cumhuriyet Newspaper, 26.02.2001, p.6



Image 3.5. Diyarbakırspor players were showing T-shirts of Gaffar Okkan during the match.²⁴⁵

Gaffar Okkan was an icon in the Kurdish question. A police officer of a Kurdish city was working and supporting Diyarbakırspor to win the title of the football league. The "police" as a word, was a symbol of the brutality, violence, fear, tears, and torture within Kurdish society in the cities where the majority of the population belongs to Kurds, in Turkey. In the aftermath of the assassination of Okkan, Diyarbakırspor started to play its games under the curtains of the state. At that time the Turkish state decided to promote Diyarbakırspor to the upper league utilizing some tricks.

The power of football crystallizes Kurdish political conflicts and shows how we can really understand Kurdish identity through football as well as understand the nationalist reactions against Kurdish society in Turkey. Football is an important opportunity for people to show their reactions against political conflicts in a different way and participate in creating new debates about their political disputes. Football

²⁴⁵ Cumhuriyet Newspaper, 05.02.2001, p.1

and politics created a strong interpenetrating network in Turkish society. Politics evinces itself via football; and football has been used as a political tool for propaganda because both nationalism and identities become related to football teams. Turkey also has a few football clubs that have linked achievements between football and a sense of belongings in the society.

3.6. Football as a Tool of Resistance: Amedspor

In contrast to Diyarbakırspor, Amedspor football club became a new symbol in the sense of ethnic belonging for the Kurdish identity in the sports of Diyarbakır. Amedspor became an important symbol of the Kurds to exhibit Kurdish identity in Turkish public opinion. This section, using the case of Amedspor, will examine how the power of football in Turkey can serve as an instrument of resistance against the dominant power. When Diyarbakırspor was dissolved in 2013 because of unpaid debts, Amedspor became the new symbol of the city in sports.²⁴⁶

Diyarbakır is an extremely important city displaying a sense of ethnic belonging and a symbol of Kurdish identity within Turkish society. There were two important football clubs in Diyarbakır – the first being the aforementioned – and the other one being Amedspor. In 2015, the history of Amed Sportive Activities Club, which took its current name, began as Melikahmet Turanspor. Established in 1972, with the sponsorship of Turan Gazozları, the club has fought in amateur leagues for many years. With the withdrawal of Turan Gazozları from sponsorship in 1985, the club's name was remained to Melikahmetspor. The name of the club which was bought by Diyarbakır Municipality in 1990 was changed to Diyarbakır Belediyespor. Its colors were also changed into green and white. The name of the club was altered to Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality Football Club (Diyarbakır Büyükşehir Belediyespor) for the third time when Diyarbakır gained metropolitan status in 1993. In 1996, the team's colors changed from green and white to yellow and red. In 1999, the club was renamed Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality Football Club Diskispor

²⁴⁶ Özlem Galip, "The Kurdish Novelistic Discourse in Diaspora: Constructing 'Home-land' and 'Identity' " in *Imagining Kurdistan: Identity, Culture and Society*, I.B.Tauris, 2015, pp. 139-146.

in order to provide income from DiSKİ (Diyarbakır Water and Sewerage Administration). On 15th April 2007, the team became the champion two weeks before the end of the Third League.

For many years, Diyarbakır's second largest team after Diyarbakırspor was Diskispor; at the end of the 2009-2010 term, they were once again relegated to the Third League. As a result of the congress held at the beginning of the 2010-2011 term, the club's name was changed to Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality Football Club. At the end of the 2012-2013 term, Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality Football Club, the leader of the Third League Group 1, was promoted to the TFF Second League. The colors of Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality Football Club which were yellow and red were once again changed to green and red on 19th May, 2013. The club changed its last name to Amed Sportive Activities Club following the congress held on 7th July, 2015. With this previous name change, the club emphasized the historical and cultural structure of Diyarbakır and changed its existing logo to the double-headed eagle symbol in the inner castle of Diyarbakır.²⁴⁷



Image 3.6. The logo of Amedspor²⁴⁸

Revolt for identity through sports is a common phenomenon and Amedspor is one example of this. As it was mentioned above, there are popular football teams around

²⁴⁷ NEDEN AMED?, amedspor.com.tr

Link: <https://www.amedspor.com.tr/neden-amed/>
(Accessed Date: 13.04.2019)

²⁴⁸ Please see the image 3.6. on below Link:

https://www.bbc.com/turkce/spor/2016/02/160208_amedspor
(Accessed Date: 07.06.2019)

the world such as Athletic Bilbao representing Basque nationalism and Barcelona—the Catalans in Spain; or lesser known teams like the Armenian clubs in Iran, such as FC Ararat Tehran. Sports implies challenges between rivals, and teams can exhibit their cultural, domestic or ethnic symbols and slogans. Amedspor's victory against Bursaspor in the Turkish Cup can be seen in this regard. The Amed fans who chanted “kids should not die” or “Resist Diyarbakır, Resist Amed” referring to Turkish armed forces' activity in Diyarbakır, coupled with the nationalist Bursaspor fans' slogans which has led to the Turkish military operation, were both considerable cases. Even with the use of the name Amed in the name of the club, formal state policies are directly challenged because the Turkish State and the nationalists constantly prefer not to use Amed as it is Diyarbakır's name in Kurdish.²⁴⁹

In 2013-2015, during the “Kurdish opening” by the Turkish government, Diyarbakırspor changed its name, which was formally modified later to Amedspor because the Turkish Football Federations (TFF) did not approve the name of the deceased amateur club. As a parallel to HDP's victory in the elections of June 2015, the pressure on Amedspor began to increase. Amedspor, as a new football club, began to receive frequent administrative penalties and suspensions from the Turkish Football Federations (TFF) after the government's position on the Kurdish question was transformed into a nationalistic approach in 2015. Amedspor was punished 63 times by the TFF for multiple and innovative reasons in the 2015-2016, 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 seasons.²⁵⁰


Both the graphs below (No 8 & 9) represent the comparative news of Diyarbakırspor and Amedspor between 1990 and 2018. Although the I would like to show the difference of Diyarbakırspor and Amedspor news especially in 1990s and the first two decade of 21st century. Therefore, both the graphs started from 1990, although the foundation of Amedspor was in 2014. (The foundation of Amedspor was in 1990, but Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality Football Club decided to change the name as

²⁴⁹ Dağhan Irak, “Kurdish Identity and Sports in Turkey: The Case of Amedspor”, in *Society Register*, 2018, pp. 65-66.


²⁵⁰ Dağhan Irak (2018), *Ibid*, pp. 68-69.

Amedspor in October 28th, 2014).²⁵¹ The data was taken from the online archive websites of *Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet* newspapers by using key words: “Diyarbakırspor”, “Amedspor”, and “Amed Sportif AŞ” year by year separately.

According to the two graphs (No 3.8. & 3.9.), the popularity of Amedspor started to be increased between 2015 and 2016 years. As per both the graphs, the popularity of Diyarbakırspor was sharply decreased especially after 2012. It was clearly shown that, the Turkish state does not need Diyarbakırspor, as a political tool, in the Kurdish question anymore.



Graph 3.8. The News of Diyarbakırspor and Amedspor on *Cumhuriyet* newspaper (1990-2018) ²⁵²



Graph 3.9. The News of Diyarbakırspor and Amedspor on *Milliyet* newspaper (1990 – 2018) ²⁵³

²⁵¹“Yeni adı Amedspor” trtspor.com.tr, 2014

Link: <https://www.trtspor.com.tr/haber/futbol/tff-2-lig/yeni-adi-amedspor-82948.html>
(Accessed Date: 20.05.2019)

²⁵² *Cumhuriyet* Newspaper Online Archive

Link: <https://www.cumhuriyetarsivi.com/>
(Accessed Date: 10.04.2019 – 20.05.2019)

²⁵³ *Milliyet* Newspaper Online Archive

For Diyarbakırspor and its turning point started with the match between Bursaspor and Diyarbakırspor in Bursa's Atatürk Stadium in September 2009. In this match, many Diyarbakırspor fans, football players, officials were subjected to verbal and physical attacks by Bursaspor fans. For instance, Bursaspor fans always chanting "PKK out" during 90 minutes. After this match, the revenge was played in Diyarbakır Atatürk Stadium in March, 2010. In this match, most of Diyarbakırspor fans pelted Bursaspor football players and the referee with rocks.

Then, the match was canceled in 17th minutes. Diyarbakırspor has also encountered (since the season is in progress we have to use has also encountered) some similar events from to time during the 2019-2020 football season. After this season, the club was suffering from fines, deeply indebted problems. Diyarbakırspor could not even afford to travel to some distant matches and players' salaries. As a result, the club dropped to lower leagues rapidly within 3 years.²⁵⁴

When the Turkish state policy toward the Kurdish problem has been shifted from relatively democratizing approach to a more homogenizing mentality in 2015, the nationalistic tones started to be dominated. After this shifting, Amedspor started to receive frequent fines from the Turkish Football Federation. As per the data records of Turkish Football Federation, Amedspor was fined a lot of times in 2015-2016, 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 football seasons.


When we analyze the fines, which were given to other football clubs at the same league group, the major reasons are "swearing", "unsporting behaviors" and events at football pitch". However, when we examine at the fines, which were given to Amedspor, the major reasons are listed as "ideological propaganda", "discrimination", "events at the football pitch" and "others".

Link: <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/>
(Accessed Date: 10.04.2019 – 20.05.2019)

²⁵⁴ Patrick Keddie, *The Passion: Football and the History of Modern Turkey*, I. B. Tauris, 2018.

Fines that were given to Amedspor are severer than other football clubs at the same league group. For instance, the average of fines, which were given to TFF 2nd League Division Red Group's football clubs in 2015-2016 football season, seems close to each other. However, when we look at the fines average of 2016-2017 football season, there is an enormous difference between the fines of Amedspor and the fines of other football clubs.

The below 4 graphs (No: 3.10., 3.11., 3.12. & 3.13.) illustrates the fines, which were given to Amedspor and other football clubs, which were at the same league group between 2015 and 2018.




Graph 3.10. The Types of Fines (Penalties) Given To Amedspor By TFF (Between 2015 and 2018)²⁵⁵




Graph 3.11. Fines (Penalties) Given To Amedspor By TFF (2015-2016 Football Season)²⁵⁶

²⁵⁵ www.tff.org , *ibid.*
(Accessed Date: 25.06.2019)

²⁵⁶ www.tff.org , *ibid.*
(Accessed Date: 23.06.2019)



Graph 3.12. Fines (Penalties) Given To Amedspor By TFF (2016-2017 Football Season)²⁵⁷



Graph 3.13. Fines (Penalties) Given To Amedspor By TFF (2017-2018 Football Season)²⁵⁸

The above 4 graphs (No: 3.10., 3.11., 3.12. and 3.13.) deals with the fines (penalties) of 2nd League Division groups, which Amedspor played, between 2015 and 2018. All graphs' data were taken from the official website of Turkish Football Federation (TFF). As it can be inferred from the above graphs (3.10. and 3.13.) , Amedspor was punished regularly in parallel to the state's viewpoint of the Kurdish Question in the aftermath of the dismissal of the solution/peace/democracy process.

²⁵⁷ www.tff.org , *ibid.*

(Accessed Date: 21.06.2019)

²⁵⁸ See more: <http://www.tff.org/default.aspx?pageID=633>

(Accessed Date: 20.06.2019)

As per the graph (3.13.) shows that, most of the fines (penalties) were given to Amedspor in the fields of ideological propaganda, events at football pitch, discrimination others such as report notes of observers, unfurl a banner. The number of fines (penalties) given to Amedspor was enormously increased, especially in the 2016-2017 Football Season. The graph (3.11.) shows that, Amedspor football club was penalized with a record of more than 251.100 Turkish Liras during the 2016-2017 Football Season in the 2nd League Division in White Group. Amedspor was playing with other 17 teams in the same league group and the total fines (penalties) of 17 teams was 157.500 Turkish Lira during the same season at the same league group. The 2015-2016 Football Season was played at the same time of the Trench (Urban) Warfare between Turkey and PKK in the southeast Turkey.²⁵⁹

This newly designated penalty was applied solely against the Kurdish clubs. In this context, the most remarkable slogan was *"The barricade is here to stay; everywhere is Sur, resistance is everywhere; everywhere is Cizre, resistance is everywhere; do not let children die, let them come to the stadiums"* chanted by Amedspor fans during the trench wars of 2015-2016 in the region.²⁶⁰ The football clubs under the Kurdish political movement's administration such as Dersimspor, Van Büyükşehir Belediyespor, Diyarbakır Büyükşehir Belediyespor, Cizrespor and Diyarbakirspor as well as Amedspor all received the penalty. Notwithstanding, this "ideological propaganda" punishment has never reasoned in the rest of the stadiums in Turkey, even for ultra-nationalist slogans chanted against the Kurdish teams.

There was a Turkish Cup match between Medipol Başakşehir and Amedspor on January 28, 2016. During the match, Amedspor fans were cheering for their team and saying that "we will win as we resist", "the barricade is here". They were also saying that, "everywhere is Sur, everywhere is resistance" (referring to a district of Diyarbakır under heavy bombardment during those days).²⁶¹ When Semih Şentürk,

²⁵⁹ More details about the Trench (Urban) Warfare between Turkey and PKK: Murat Yeşiltaş and Necdet Özçelik, *When Strategy Collapses The Pkk's Urban Terrorist Campaign*, SETA Publications, 2018, p. 18

²⁶⁰ Murat Yeşiltaş and Necdet Özçelik (2018), *Ibid*, pp. 69-72.

²⁶¹ Patrick Keddie, (2018), *The Passion: Football and the History of Modern Turkey*, *Ibid*.

who was a forward player of Medipol Başakşehir, scored a goal against Amedspor, he faced Amedspor fans, stood to attention and gave a military salute in a clear gesture of Turkish nationalism. As Nurhat cites that, Turkish nationalism in Turkish stadiums spreads with anti-Kurdish propaganda in the form of singing the Turkish national anthem.²⁶² The behavior of Semih Şentürk at the Medipol Başakşehir and Amedspor match, was showing similarities with Paolo Di Canio, who was a forward player for Lazio, at the match between AS Roma and SS Lazio in January 2005.

On the other hand, the “solution/peace/democracy process”, played the biggest role to transform Amedspor into today’s Amedspor. In the aftermath of the process, the battlefield took place in cities rather than up in the mountains. Since cities and towns such as Cizre, Şırnak, and Silopi, as well as some of Diyarbakır were the battlefields, Amedspor was conducting its training and matches with the sounds of bombs, cannons and machine guns echoing from another corner of the city. Sur, the historical district of the city, surrounded by city walls, had the scene of a bloody and destructive city war between the PKK behind the barricades and government forces for months.

While the people of Sur were forced to leave their houses, there was widespread destruction of some neighborhoods of the district as a result of the use of tanks and armored combat vehicles to repress the armed resistance. At that time, the view became a reminder of the atrocities occurring in Syria. Surely Amedspor supporters must have accumulated anger when living in Diyarbakır while people were collectively punished regardless of guilt or innocence. The violations of human rights by the government forces contributed to further anger and grudges. In this atmosphere of conflict, Amedspor did the last thing that it could do in Turkey to further polarize the conditions by winning a surprise sporting success. Amedspor took points from Başakşehir. At that time, this move was interpreted as the footballer perceiving his goal as an “act of war”. After that, police raided the club's premises and searched the building and confiscated the club’s computers. As Club President

²⁶² Yağmur Nuhrat (2013), *Ibid*, pp. 85-96

Ali Karakaş reported, 40 police participated in the raid in order to search computers for a few tweets.²⁶³

Aside from this, the use of the “undesirable” Kurdish name of Diyarbakır by challenging the official discourse, Amedspor’s popular player Deniz Naki stated on a social media channel: “We did not bend our neck as Amedspor and ... (...) This victory lasted more than 50 days on our land to the victims and the lives of the victims and the wounded” adding in Kurdish “Her biji azadi” (Long live freedom). He was referring to the ditch clashes and was suspended for 12 games for writing publicly, content contrary to sporting statements as well as ideological propaganda following the match against Bursaspor.²⁶⁴

Amedspor was contained by the official authorities of the Turkish Republic as well as its supporters. The fans have been restricted from chanting acceptable slogans for the state. As Amedspor Resistance Supporters Association President Ramazan Tugay cited that “*We want to shout peace at the stadiums, but it is a crime, ‘Kids should not die, and come to the match’, ‘mothers should not shed tears and come to follow the children.’ These slogans are all a crime. So, what do we say?*” Amedspor supporters and the administration have always faced bureaucratic bans in the cities they go to, and witness “racist, discriminatory and nationalist” reactions. The opening of Turkish flags by the players before the match, the salute of soldiers, the signs of the gray wolfs, the large screens in the stadium showing the images of military operations, “PKK, terrorist” in the form of confrontation between the “discriminatory treatment” are common occurrences.²⁶⁵ In the struggle of the Turkish state against the Kurds through football, Amedspor is an embodied example in this struggle via two approaches; the one is culturalist (such as slogans, swearing, banners) and the other

²⁶³ Yağmur Nuhra (2013), *Ibid*, pp. 71-74.

²⁶⁴ Kadri Gürsel, “Türk Futbolunun Kürt Sorunu”, *al-monitor.com*, 2016.
Link: <http://kadrigursel.com/Turk-futbolunun-Kurt-sorunu/4111>
(Accessed Date: 05.06.2019)

²⁶⁵ Çağıl Kasapoğlu, “Amedspor: Diyarbakır’ın siyasetle değil futboluyla anılmak isteyen takımı”, *BBC News*, 2019.
Link: <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-47908854>
(Accessed Date: 07.04.2019)

is institutionalist (such as TFF's financial fines, spectator prohibitions). To conclude, Amedspor has been paying a heavy price for revealing a community's social identity. Hence, the state apparatus has been using all possibilities to punish Amedspor for challenging its hegemony and discourse.

Social identity is an important concept in expressing a sense of belonging for individuals. This concept neither addresses group membership in an institutive way nor as a one. Individuals identify and evaluate social groups based on their own social group and thus categorize themselves. This categorization comprises their social identities. The social identity concept examines a psychological aspect which includes the sense of belonging regarding group membership. In this context, people express their identity by using their unique social and/or cultural attributes.²⁶⁶ However, people do not have to have a social identity for each group member. The identities of individuals based on religious, nationality, education, sexuality, or nation, can refer to a different social group. For instance, a Turkish nationalist who lives in Izmir can be a member and a supporter of Amedspor in Diyarbakir. Therefore, individuals must feel that they belong in the group.

While the Turkish state used ideological instruments (such as media and power of TFF) as Gramsci²⁶⁷ mentioned, against the Kurdish national ideology via Diyarbakirspor and Amedspor, the Kurdish nationalist movement, if we refer to Michel de Certeau²⁶⁸, were "subverting" and "resisting" the state politics by their own tactics such as the re-usages of the red-yellow-green colors on the uniforms of the football players.

However, these uniforms do not belong to Diyarbakirspor. For instance, it can be asserted that most of the Kurdish people are also supporters of Galatasaray Football

²⁶⁶ Sabine Trepte and Laura S. Loy, *The International Encyclopedia of Media Effects*, Patrick Rössler (Editor-in-Chief), Cynthia A. Hoffner, and Liesbet van Zoonen (Associate Editors), John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2017, pp. 2-4.

²⁶⁷ Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, "I. Problems of History and Culture" in *Selections From The Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, London, 1999, p. 145.

²⁶⁸ Michel De Certeau, "Popular Cultures: Ordinary Language" and "Makind Do: Uses and Tactics" in *The Practice of Everyday Life*, University of California Press: Berkeley, 1984, pp. 15-40.

Club not only because of the favorite football club of Abdullah Öcalan, but also the color combinations of Galatasaray's uniforms. Its players wear red and yellow uniforms; and when this uniform is set against the green of the football pitch, it can be regarded as the colors of the Kurdish flag.²⁶⁹ After this connection was made, the uniform colors began to be a tool to show a reaction to the ruling class for Kurdish people. As a result, Diyarbakırspor Corporate Board decided to change the name of the football club from Diyarbakırspor to Amedspor.²⁷⁰

To sum up, it is obvious that Amedspor is a resistance organization with a Kurdish domestic title held close to the community's subconscious state. Amedspor is publicly opposed to Turkish sports laws and has formal sanctions forced upon it by the governing bodies. In negotiating its name and colors, Amedspor rejected embracing the legitimizing identity and proceeded to challenge the standards imposed by the dominant force of the Turkish State. While suspensions and punishments have severely reduced its achievement, it has continued to struggle against existential threats. Although after the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality was replaced by an Administrator designated by the Turkish state in November 2016, Amedspor was demanded to edit its name and taken state-appointed municipality civil servants to the club board to continue receiving financial support from the municipality. The club refused both demands in early 2017.

²⁶⁹ "Turkey's Kurds: "With a little help from the ref" in *The Economist*, 2001, p.73

Link: <https://epdf.tips/the-economist-04-august-2001.html> (Accessed Date: 17.05.2019)

²⁷⁰ "Amedspor 'resmi' isim, logo ve renklerine kavuştu", [diken.com.tr](http://www.diken.com.tr)

<http://www.diken.com.tr/amedspor-yeni-isim-logo-ve-renklerine-resmen-kavustu/>
(Accessed Date: 20.12.2018)

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

It is necessary to consider the position of the nation-state in the phase of building national identity through sport. As Anthony D. Smith has asserted, states have an involvement in encouraging a national identity that is unique. Therefore, the state authorities are addressing political conflicts within their boundaries resulting from the racial variety. If a state that cannot provide some kind of national identity for its citizens, one of the main tasks (the establishment of a consent-based on loyalty) is considered to have failed.²⁷¹ Sports have been shown to be the most efficient in building and retaining national identities. In this research, the power of football as a popular sport activity was illustrated as an instrument of national identity building for the Turkish state. There are some important events such as occupation, freedom, war, repression, and revolution in the history of nearly all the societies. All these experiences that could have a "common shared events" impact. All such shared memories, these shared memories are crucial in influencing the feeling of the national identity of the individual.

Popular sports activities have the Power to influence the mass audiences, particularly when helped by the press. Football is one of these popular sports activities and that's why it performs a role in the method of creating national identity.²⁷² In building the individual's sense of national identity, shared experiences are also essential. Smith remarked that "the shared historical memories" is one of six main characteristics of an ethnic community.²⁷³ Football provides so many "great shared events" such as victory, disappointment, happiness or sadness. These movements and occasions are experienced communally and remembered collectively.

The history of Kurds, as one of the largest and ancient people of the Mesopotamian

²⁷¹ Robert Edelman and Wayne Wilson, "Sport and National Identity" in *The Oxford Handbook of Sports History*, Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 479.

²⁷² Robert Edelman and Wayne Wilson (2017), *Ibid*, p. 478.

²⁷³ A. Ichijo and G. Uzelac, *When is the Nation?*, Routledge, 2005, p. 21.

plains, is generally an existence struggle. These aside, the assimilation by social inclusion, which has been forced by the dominant state over the Kurdish society has long been commonplace in the Middle East. In this context, the states have implied different strategies to create social inclusion policies such as the instruments of national identity, identity building, and even soft powers like football. The Turkish State also used the power of football over the Kurdish population in her territory in terms of supporting homogenization policies.

As a matter of fact, nation states put into practice the policies of identity building to provide necessary homogeneity. Nation states have continually applied national identity, social inclusion and assimilation policies with the instruments of military responses, legislation activities, ideologies, education policies, and popular culture and sport activities. Some aspects of identity building can be considered to have interaction with other identities. In this case, the continuity, progression, and reciprocity of identities are quite significant. The tools of identity building in the process have many different dimensions which allow for ease of implementation. Throughout history, competition has always attracted people on a worldwide scale, regardless of their backgrounds and heritage ever since ancient people began watching a wide variety of games that drew the attention of the public. These are effective instruments to be used in building a nation or nation-state.

The competitive soul which exists in a team that aims to develop a sense of identity and socialization both lead collective identity builders of a country to use these tools efficiently to attain their objectives. In Europe, the nation states, in particular, attempted to benefit from the famous football collectivism. The Turkish State, having great experience to use state apparatus in Turkification and social inclusion, has also applied to football during history since the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). After the Committee, the new republic maintained the same approach with the cadres of the Committee which took part in the new state's bureaucracy operatively. Some specific anniversaries and festivals, with an emphasis on the new regime's prominent and praised figures and facts, were designated to constitute a homogenized society.

The Kurdish sense of distinct ethnic and cultural identities has remained powerful despite all authoritarian methods. There is a strong tradition of literature and oral culture in the Kurdish tradition, concerning the Kurdish language, which is mainly spoken in Kurdish villages. As Mesut Yegen mentioned that, even though the official view of the state is that Kurds can be assimilated into Turkishness, Kurds are no longer prospective-Turks.²⁷⁴ Their desire for autonomy and independence is promoted by cultural organizations and freedom organizations. The Kurds have partly been refused access to the writing of folklore songs, while other traditions are preserved and expressed verbally because of a habit of oral culture in the Middle East. Diyarbakır is indispensable for both Kurds and Kurdish political movements due to the reported cases of torture in the military prison of Diyarbakır in 1980, arson attacks on villages, internally displaced people and many others unreported killings. All of these violences especially in the military jail of Diyarbakır in the 1980s, have paved the way for collective trauma and victimhood deepening Kurdish attitudes. These traumatic practices have made the Kurds increase their sense of identity and belonging in close reference to Diyarbakır.

In this context, the fundamental solution suggested by the Turkish State was to use military force to fight Kurdish separatist movements. The Turkish State, however, was struggling with the implementation of military force in dealing with the Kurdish problem. During the PKK attacks, after decades of attempted forced Turkification, the Turkish Government created a new approach to undercut separatist sentiments between Kurds and football. The scheme was controlled by Gaffar Okkan, Diyarbakır's police chief. He worked every day with the squad and took part in all their matches. The allegations were that Okkan had two goals in Diyarbakır, one of them was to decrease the number of votes for HADEP and to promote Diyarbakırspor to the Turkish First League. By these means, the Kurdish youth would change its focus from politics and identity issues to an area free of problems. That was football.

²⁷⁴ Mesut Yeğen, "Prospective-Turks" or "Pseudo-Citizens:" Kurds in Turkey" in *Middle East Journal* 63, 2009, p. 14.

Unlike Diyarbakırspor, backed by the state, the Amedspor Football Club has been converted into a fresh sign in terms of ethnicity in Diyarbakır's sporting region. In the Turkish public view, Amedspor became an important symbol of the Kurds to show Kurdish identity with its Kurdish name and with its strong reference to the Kurd's ancestors. At first, during the peace/solution/democracy process, Amedspor attracted sympathy from public opinion; however, this did not last long. In the aftermath of the government dissolving the peace/solution/democracy process, the state's iron fist has remained for Amedspor. The Football Federation, which is under the guidance of the government, brought both administrative and sportive sanctions against Amedspor. The football players, the administrators of the club, the manager and even the fans were subjected to blanket punishments during this process.

Amedspor is a Kurdish national resistance organization in the subconscious state of the Kurds. Amedspor refused to adopt the legitimizing identity in negotiations of its name and colors and proceeded to question the standards enforced upon it by the authoritative force of the Turkish Republic. Moreover, without dismissing its Kurdishness, Amedspor could be cited as being the only instance of its kind that exists in Turkey's popular culture. As the consequence of the peace/solution/ democracy process, Amedspor's evolving times were witnessed; but in more challenging times, the club survived through the process. After the peace process failed, Amedspor has become a resistance organization and the Kurds have continued their presence in football. Finally the politics of creation of a national identity accompanied with an attempt to assimilate the alternative politicized ethnic identity by means of football is never independent from this alternative identity's realization by means of football. In other words, we can argue that the attempts of controlling Kurdish political identity via Diyarbakırspor, paradoxically, created the identity of Amedspor, the football figure of an uncontrollable ethnic identity. It is evident that throughout history, oppression on identities has never been achieved successfully with the objective of suppressing and then dissolving a community's identity.

This thesis endorses the view that the state should be understood as a dynamic, as

opposed to the static, entity. In other words, the state's strategies to govern, contain, integrate or repress a population change in response to the feedback, resistance, and varieties of counter-actions from civil society. The dialectic between the Turkish state and Kurdish football teams and fans is affected by the meaning-making practices of both camps. The state's strategies to contain the emergence of Kurdish nationalism in new fields are limited and transformed by the practices and resistance of Kurdish civil society. Most particularly, in the case of the Kurds, it should be emphasized that these kinds of practices do not seem to contain a success potential.



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