

**MEHMED MEMDUH PASHA: AN IMPERIAL BIOGRAPHY
FROM TANZIMAT TO REPUBLIC**

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
İSTANBUL ŞEHİR UNIVERSITY

BY

FİKRIYE KARAMAN

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
HISTORY

JANUARY 2020

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of PhD in History.

Examining Committee Members:

	DECISION	SIGNATURE
Prof. Abdulhamit Kırmızı (Thesis Advisor)	_____	_____
Prof. Engin Deniz Akarlı	_____	_____
Prof. Gökhan Çetinsaya	_____	_____
Assoc. Prof. Ebubekir Ceylan	_____	_____
Assoc. Prof. Fatma Sel Turhan	_____	_____

This is to confirm that this thesis complies with all the standards set by the Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences of İstanbul Şehir University.

Date


Seal/Signature

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and standards of ethical conduct. I also declare that as required by these rules and standards, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

First Name, Last Name

Fiskriye KARAMAN

Signature



Adopting the conception of imperial biography as a methodological framework, this biographical research focuses on the bureaucratic career of Ottoman statesman Mehmed Memduh Pasha (1839-1925). Modernizing imperial and professional structures of the nineteenth century determined careers, experiences, and visions of imperial elites. In the meantime, performing within the imperial framework, elites as agents initiated change in the empires according to their concerns, perceptions, and expectations.

This research takes both the Ottoman Empire and Memduh Pasha as units of analysis, reconstructs the imperial context and weaves his professional life into this context portraying him as an active agent operating within the fluid imperial structure.

Memduh Pasha's biography is significant for two main reasons. His bureaucratic career developed against the backdrop of the contest between the palace and the sublime Porte, which marked most of the late nineteenth century Ottoman politics. Since he sought to strengthen the power of the palace and rise in the bureaucracy coincided with the ascendancy of Sultan Abdülhamid II who consolidated imperial power at the Yildiz Palace. Thus, Memduh Pasha's career trajectory offers a profound insight into the political structure and the power relations of the late Ottoman Empire.

ABSTRACT

MEHMED MEMDUH PASHA: AN IMPERIAL BIOGRAPHY FROM TANZIMAT TO REPUBLIC

Karaman, Fikriye.

PhD in History

Thesis Advisor: Prof. Abdulhamit Kırmızı

January 2020, 476 pages

Adopting the conception of imperial biography as a methodological framework, this biographical research focuses on the bureaucratic career of Ottoman statesman Mehmed Memduh Pasha (1839-1925). Modernizing imperial and professional structures of the nineteenth century determined careers, experiences, and visions of imperial elites. In the meantime, performing within the imperial framework, elites as agents initiated change in the empires according to their concerns, perceptions, and expectations.

This research takes both the Ottoman Empire and Memduh Pasha as units of analysis, reconstructs the imperial context and weaves his professional life into this context portraying him as an active agent operating within the fluid imperial structure.

Memduh Pasha's biography is significant for two main reasons. His bureaucratic career developed against the backdrop of the contest between the palace and the Sublime Porte, which marked most of the late nineteenth century Ottoman politics. Since he sought to strengthen the power of the palace, his rise in the bureaucracy coincided with the ascendancy of Sultan Abdülhamid II who consolidated imperial power at the Yıldız Palace. Thus, Memduh's Pasha's career trajectory offers a profound insight into the political structure and the power relations of the late Ottoman Empire.

The second reason stems from the assumption that the broad range of actors partook in the creation and preservation of Abdülhamid's palace-centered regime. Memduh Pasha was one of the multiple agents who were motivated and shaped in certain ways by the Hamidian political structure. Concurrently, he invested in and with his actions and aspirations got involved in producing, implementing, and maintaining the same structure. Thus, Memduh Pasha's biography contributes to the understanding of the Hamidian political system and the delineation of a complex and analytical picture of the period.

This study explores all aspects of Memduh Pasha's career, tracing his postings and experiences with a concern for disclosing the imperial configuration. It also concentrates on the moments when contingency and chance interrupted not only his life course but also that of the empire, propelling them both in unexpected directions.

Keywords: Imperial biography, Memduh Pasha, Ministry of Interior, Abdülhamid II

ÖZ

MEHMED MEMDUH PAŞA: TANZİMAT'TAN CUMHURİYET'E BİR İMPARATORLUK BİYOGRAFİSİ

Karaman, Fikriye.

Tarih Doktora Programı

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Abdulhamit Kırmızı

Ocak 2020, 476 sayfa

İmparatorluk biyografisi yaklaşımını kullanan bu biyografik araştırma, Osmanlı devlet adamı Mehmed Memduh Paşa'nın (1839-1925) bürokratik kariyerini konu alır. Ondokuzuncu yüzyılın modernleşen imparatorluk ve meslek yapıları, imparatorluk elitlerinin kariyer, tecrübe ve vizyonlarını belirlemiştir. Aynı zamanda, elitler ilgi, algı ve beklentileri doğrultusunda imparatorlukları dönüştürmüşlerdir. Osmanlı devletini ve Memduh Paşa'yı analiz birimi olarak alan bu çalışma, dönemin imparatorluk şartlarını yeniden kurgular ve Memduh Paşa'nın mesleki hayatını bu şartların içine örer. Bunu yaparken, Paşa'yı, değişken imparatorluk yapısı içinde hareket eden aktif bir özne olarak resmeder.

Memduh Paşa'nın biyografisi en az iki temel sebepten dolayı önemlidir. Paşa'nın bürokratik kariyeri, ondokuzuncu yüzyıl Osmanlı politikasına damgasını vuran Saray ve Babıali arasındaki çekişme bağlamında evrilmiştir. Sarayın gücünün pekiştirilmesini savunan Memduh Paşa'nın bürokrasideki yükselişi, gücün Yıldız Sarayı'nda yoğunlaştığı II. Abdülhamid döneminde gerçekleşmiştir. Dolayısıyla, Memduh Paşa'nın kariyer çizgisini analiz etmek, geç dönem Osmanlı merkez teşkilatındaki güç ilişkilerine nüfuz etmeyi mümkün kılar.

İkinci sebep, Abdülhamid'in saray merkezli rejiminin oluşturulması ve korunmasında çok sayıda aktörün rol aldığı varsayımına dayanır. Memduh Paşa, Abdülhamid devri siyasi yapısının şekil ve yön verdiği kişilerden biridir. Aynı zamanda, bu yapıya yatırım yapan, hedefleri ve fiilleriyle onu ortaya çıkaran, uygulayan ve devam

ettirenlerdendir de. Bundan dolayı, Memduh Paşa'nın biyografisi, Abdülhamid devri siyasi yapısını anlamaya ve dönemin daha analitik ve kompleks bir biçimde incelenmesine katkıda bulunur.

Bu çalışma, Memduh Paşa'nın kariyerini, imparatorluk dokusunu da ortaya çıkaracak şekilde inceler. Atama ve mesleki tecrübelerinin izini sürmekle kalmaz, talihin ve olasılıkların hem Paşa'nın hem de imparatorluğun yaşam seyrini nasıl umulmadık istikametlere sevk ettiğini de gösterir.

Anahtar kavramlar: İmparatorluk biyografisi, Memduh Paşa, Dahiliye Nezareti, II. Abdülhamid

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe debt of gratitude to various people whose contribution to this study has been substantial. First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my advisor Prof. Abdulhamit Kırmızı, for his dedication. Without his inspiring guidance, generosity, and persisting help this thesis would not have been possible.

I am extremely grateful to Prof. Engin Deniz Akarlı and Prof. Gökhan Çetinsaya for their unique approaches, inspiration, and motivation. I am also very thankful to other members of my thesis committee, Assoc. Prof. Fatma Sel Turhan and Assoc. Prof. Ebubekir Ceylan, whose insightful comments and feedbacks led me to reconsider some arguments and information in different parts of my thesis.

Moreover, it is my pleasant duty to thank to Istanbul Şehir University's Graduate School of Social Sciences and History Department for the training, intellectual atmosphere and scholarship they provided for me during my PhD study. Last but not least, I am sincerely thankful to my family members and friends for their encouragement, support, and patience.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	iv
Öz	vi
Acknowledgements	viii
Table of Contents	ix
List of Tables	xiii
List of Figures	xiv
List of Maps	xv
List of Photos	xvi
Abbreviations	xvi
CHAPTERS	
1. Introduction	1
1.1. Rise & Fall	1
1.2. Method and Theory	8
1.2.1. The Return of Agency and Biography	8
1.2.2. Imperial Biography	12
1.2.3. Personal Theoretical Perspective	18
1.3. Literature Review	20
1.4. Sources of the Thesis	31
1.5. Organization of the Chapters	35
2. Mehmed Memduh: Career In The Ottoman Power Structure	39
2.1. Introduction	39
2.2. Contest between the palace and the Porte in the Age of Reform	39
2.3. Becoming an Ottoman Bureaucrat	60
2.3.1. Coexistence of Formal and Informal Practices	60
2.3.2. “Mülazemet” at the Foreign Ministry	64
2.3.3. Entry into the Palace Service	68
2.3.4. Chance, Competence, Strategy, and Loyalty	71
2.3.5. A Memorandum on Egypt: An Attempt at Showing his Capacity.....	76
2.4. Elite Formation at the Intersection of Bureaucracy, Poetry, and Sufism.....	78
2.4.1. Ten Years at the Office of the Receiver Office (<i>Âmedi Odası</i>)	78

2.4.2. Bureaucracy and Poetry	81
2.4.3. Literary Circles in the 1860s	83
2.4.4. The Young Ottomans and Memduh	87
2.4.5. Sufism: Spiritual Element of Elite Formation	90
2.5. Wealth and Entrepreneurship	94
2.5.1. Memduh’s Properties	94
2.5.2. Memduh’s Entrepreneurial Activities	99
2.6. Service in the Council of State	100
2.7. Conclusion	102
3. Reconstructing the Hamidian Imperial Context	105
3.1. Introduction	105
3.2. 1871-1876: The Transition from Tanzimat to the Reign of Abdülhamid	105
3.3. “Survival of Fittest”	111
3.4. Echoes of Mahmud Nedim in the Hamidian Era	113
3.5. Periodization of the Hamidian Domestic Policy	121
3.6. The 1894-1896 Crisis	125
3.7. The Calm before the Storm	128
3.8. “Hamidian Bureaucracy”	130
3.9. “The Bureaucratization of Patrimonial Authority”	132
3.10. “Patrimonial Leader, Ruling with Rational Bureaucracy”	135
3.11. Palace versus Porte	141
3.12. The Limits of “Hamidian Absolutism”	145
3.13. In Lieu of Conclusion: The Sultan and Stakeholders	149
4. Mehmed Memduh Bey: Governor Of Konya, Sivas, And Ankara.....	151
4.1. Introduction	151
4.2. New Career in the Central Anatolia	153
4.2.1. Governor: Mediator between Center and Periphery	153
4.2.2. Konya in 1887.....	156
4.2.3. The Measures Taken to Cope with the 1887 Famine	161
4.2.4. Public Works	166
4.2.5. “ <i>Mapusane</i> ”	169
4.2.6. Memduh’s Relationship with “Others”	173

4.2.7. Leaving Konya	178
4.3. A New Page in the Governing Career	181
4.3.1. Sivas in 1889	181
4.3.2. Sivas İdadisi & Schooling in Sivas under the rule of Memduh	182
4.3.3. Healthcare, Public Works and Economic Projects	186
4.3.4. Wealth & Corruption Allegations	190
4.3.5. Settlement of Caucasian Migrants	193
4.3.6. Crime, Punishment and Inter-Ethnic Relations.....	195
4.3.7. Never-Ending Complaints and Inspection Committees	201
4.3.8. The Dildilians and Memduh: A Story behind a Photograph	210
4.4. Path to Ministry of Interior: Ankara	215
4.4.1. After Sivas - Before Ankara	215
4.4.2. The Yozgat Incident	223
4.4.3 Crisis and Opportunity	239
4.4.4. Alewites & Armenians.....	242
4.4.5. Clash with Halil Bey	247
4.4.6. Revisiting Hamidian “New Orthodoxy”	249
4.4.7. Another Threat: Protestant Missionaries	259
4.4.8. Immigrants and Settlement Problems	260
4.4.9. Industry and Production in Ankara	264
4.4.10. Public Works and Construction	268
4.4.11. Literary Activities & Private Life	269
4.5. Conclusion	271
5. Mehmed Memduh Pasha: Minister of Interior	278
5.1. Introduction	278
5.2. Memduh is Back in Istanbul	279
5.2.1. The Ministry of Interior	283
5.2.2. Fight for Dominance at the Ministry	292
5.2.3. “Honest and Principled Statesman”	294
5.3. Early Years at the Ministerial Office and the Armenian Question	296
5.4. Yemen: A Place of No Return	319
5.4.1. <i>Yemen Kitası Hakkında Mütalaat</i> : Proposing Local Autonomy	324

5.4.2. “Politics of Difference”	328
5.4.3. Trial and Error: Seeking the Most Appropriate Way of Governance	331
5.4.4. Memduh’s Commissions	333
5.5. An Institution under the Ministry of Interior: <i>Darülaceze</i>	345
5.6. The Macedonia Question	350
5.7. A Tangled Web of Relationships	363
5.7.1. Minister of Interior versus Grand Vizier	363
5.7.2. Governor of Sivas: Reşid Akif	374
5.7.3. Palace, Porte, and Provinces: The Triangle of the Imperial Administration.....	375
5.7.4. Memduh and the British: Friend or Foe?	388
5.7.5. Memduh and Young Turks	394
5.8. Economy & Rewards	395
5.8.1. Memduh’s Proposal for the Ottoman Economy	395
5.8.2. Economic Benefits of Being a Hamidian Bureaucrat	397
5.8.3. Orders, Medals, and Rewards	402
5.9. The Fall of Abdülhamid II and Memduh	406
5.9.1. Memduh Efendi: Unemployed and Exiled	406
5.9.2. Becoming an Ottoman Historian	409
5.9.3. Leaning towards Constitutionalism	411
5.10. Conclusion	415
6. Conclusion	422
Bibliography	448
VITA	475

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1. Mehmed Memduh's Bureaucratic Career	37
Table 4.1. The newly founded sites in the sanjak of Konya	168
Table 4.2. The newly founded sites in the sanjak of Teke (Antalya)	168
Table 4.3. Numbers of Immigrants that were settled in districts of Sivas	194



LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 4.1. The years Armenians joined the civil service..... 256
Figure 4.2. The years Greeks joined the civil service..... 257



LIST OF MAPS

Map 1.1. Important places in Memduh's biography 38



LIST OF PHOTOS

Photo 2.1. Memduh in 1876	74
Photo 2.2. Abdülhamid II in 1870	75
Photo 5.1. The cover page of Servet-i Fünun	291
Photo 5.1. Memduh with the decorations he was granted	405
Photo 7.1. Memduh's grave at the yard of İsmet Efendi Sufi Lodge in Istanbul.....	444
Photo 7.2 Memduh in the 1880s	445
Photo 7.3. Konya Government Office	446
Photo 7.4. <i>Sivas İdadisi</i> (High School)	446
Photo 7.5. Exterior of Memduh Pasha Mansion	447

ABBREVIATIONS

BOA	: Cumhurbaşkanlığı Osmanlı Arşivi
Ed.	: Editor
FO	: Foreign Office, Public Record Office
TDVİA	: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi

Note: Abbreviations for the primary sources are provided in the Bibliography



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

*Bütün anlamlar insanda birikmiştir (In man, all meanings accumulate).*¹

1.1. Rise & Fall

*Evvel olurdu ehli reca bir vezire bend
Şimdi vezirler ne acep kim cezire bend
Hürriyetin esiri muazzez tutulmuyor
Âdet imiş urulması payı esire bend*

...

*Memduh için esarete hiç yoktur ihtimal
Hürriyet oldu zahmi derune cebire bend*²

After occupying the post of Ministry of Interior for thirteen years (1895-1908) Mehmed Memduh, a senior Ottoman statesman with a long and impressive career in the Ottoman bureaucracy, was exiled with a group of a “wreckage of despotism” (*enkaz-ı istibdat*)³ soon after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. Deeply frustrated, Memduh wrote the verses above to describe his disappointment with the radical developments that took place in the early years of the Second Constitutional period (1908-1918). Filled with a desperate longing for the Hamidian era, the verses express the misery the author was suffering when he was in Chios Island as an exile.

Adopting the conception of imperial biography as a methodological framework, this biographical research focuses on the imperial career of Ottoman statesman Mehmed Memduh. Over the course of his long life and more than half-century

¹ Nuri Pakdil, *Bağlanma* (Ankara: Edebiyat Dergisi Yayınları, 2017), 29.

² Mahmut Kemal İnal, *Son Şairler*, Vol 3 (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi 1969), 931.

³ This is one of the expressions Hamidian statesmen were described during the Second Constitutional Period. See Mizancı Mehmed Murad, *Enkaz-ı İstibdat İçinde Züğürdün Tesellisi* (İstanbul: Matbaa-ı Amedi, 1335/1917); Süleyman Kani İrtem, *31 Mart İsyanı ve Hareket Ordusu, Abdülhamid'in Selanik Sürgünü* (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2003).

bureaucratic career, Memduh served in wide range of positions across the imperial territory and experienced the nineteenth century of the Ottoman Empire. In terms of transfer of experience, relative mobility, and imperial loyalty, his career is well suited to the framework of imperial biography.

Born in the same year with the Tanzimat Decree, Memduh personally witnessed the critical moments of the empire, including the declaration of the Reform Decree of 1856, the Crimean War, the dethronement of Sultan Abdülmecid and then Murad V, the enthronement of Sultan Abdülhamid II, the 1877-78 Ottoman-Russian War, 1894-1896 Armenian Crisis, the 1908 Revolution, the Balkan Wars, World War I, the occupation of Istanbul, and finally the formation of the Republic of Turkey. Therefore, Memduh's life holds a mirror to the late Ottoman history.

Memduh stepped into the Ottoman bureaucracy when he was fifteen. In the first stage of career, he served for six years as an apprentice at the office of Ministry of Foreign Affairs without pay. During his stirring imperial career he served as a secretary and a chief secretary at the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance, and the Grand Vizierate; as governor⁴ of Konya (1887-1889), Sivas (1889-1892), and Ankara (1893-1895); and finally as Ministry of Interior (1895-1908). Given that, thirty-three people came to the post of the Ministry of Interior during the thirteen years after him, Memduh's uninterrupted thirteen years of service in the post becomes more meaningful, denoting the relative stability of the period between 1895 and 1908 in terms of cadre stability.⁵ Furthermore, most of the high officials who were active during the Second Constitutional and early Republican periods were recruited during Memduh's service in the Ministry of Interior. Throughout his career, Memduh was awarded Ottoman, German, Russian, Bulgarian, and Iranian orders and medals, and undertook important assignments on many commissions.

⁴ I will hereafter use the term "governor" for "*vali*," governor-general of a province, and *mutasarrıf* or subgovernor for governor of sancak (district).

⁵ Abdulhamit Kırmızı, *Abdülhamid'in Valileri* (Istanbul: Klasik, 2008), 11.

Moreover, he was always one of the close companions of Sultan Abdülhamid II.⁶ Memduh's career ended soon after the reinstatement of the constitution in July 1908. As he realized the difficulty of working under the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*), he voluntarily resigned from the Ministry of Interior. Immediately after his resignation from the post he was arrested and detained, with some other Hamidian bureaucrats, at the police department for a month, and subsequently exiled to the Island of Prinkipo (*Büyükada*) and then to the Island of Chios (*Sakız*). As Italians occupied the islands during the Tripoli War he was transferred to Izmir in 1911. In İzmir he published some books many of which were about the late Ottoman history. Following the amnesty, he returned to Istanbul in 1912 and until his death in 1925 he remained in seclusion at his residence in Kireçburnu. Unlike some others who were also part and parcel of the Hamidian political system, Memduh did not take part in the state administration in the Second Constitutional Period. This is not because he overtly opposed the reinstatement of the constitution and the parliamentary system, but because he was not accepted by the Young Turk leadership. He is also known for being one of the honorary founders of the Association of the Friends of England in Turkey (*İngiliz Muhibleri Cemiyeti*) in May 1919.⁷

Memduh, like his father Fehmi Mazlum Pasha, was not only a bureaucrat but also a poet and a Sufi affiliate. He compiled his poems in his *Divan-ı Eşar*.⁸ Moreover, he was attached to the Sufi order of İsmet Efendi, a Naqshibendi sheikh,⁹ which was held in high esteem by the bureaucrats of the time. The fact of a zealous civil official like Memduh's attachment to a Sufi order that was

⁶ Cemal Kafadar, Hasan Karateke, Cornell Fleischer, "Mehmed Memduh" *Historians Of The Ottoman Empire*, 2006.

https://ottomanhistorians.uchicago.edu/sites/ottomanhistorians.uchicago.edu/files/memduh_en.pdf accessed on 21 December 2019 at 13:46.

⁷ Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler II: 1918-1922 Mütareke Dönemi* (Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1986), 472.

⁸ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Divan-ı Eş'ar* (Istanbul, 1332, 1917/1918).

⁹ Memduh is buried at the yard (*hazire*) of İsmet Efendi Lodge in Fatih district of Istanbul.

highly appreciated by the reigning sultan, Abdülmecid, is indicative of the importance of informal practices for the Ottoman officialdom in the late Ottoman era. Indeed, as will be analyzed in Chapter 2, the large part of the Ottoman elite of the time emerged at the intersection of bureaucracy, poetry and Sufism.

As the summary of his professional background attests, Memduh's life story provides us with a synopsis of the late Ottoman history. Therefore, investigating his life would allow us to examine the social and political fabric of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. In addition to providing a general picture of the empire, Memduh's biography is worth studying for two primary reasons. The first is his professional life, which is the focus of this thesis, offers a lens through which can analyze the power structure of the late Ottoman Empire. Memduh's bureaucratic career had developed against the background of the power struggle between the palace and the Sublime Porte.¹⁰ Thus, tracing his professional journey would enable us to construe the power relations at the imperial capital. His rise and fall coincided with the rise and fall of the palace and the sultan. Thus, his biography illustrates the struggle between the palace and the Porte in the late Ottoman political realm.

As part of his policy of fierce centralization, Sultan Mahmud II eliminated the key actors that had been checking the absolutist tendencies of the palace. Consequently, power began to "lay with the Palace and the Porte."¹¹ The upset of the old equilibrium led to far-reaching structural impacts on the Ottoman polity. One of them was the contest between the Porte and the palace for dominance. The pendulum had swung between the Sublime Porte and the

¹⁰ Sublime Porte refers to the Ottoman government led by the civil officialdom. It is French translation of Turkish *Bâbıâli*, the High Gate, "which was the official name of the gate giving access to the block of buildings in Istanbul, that housed the principal state departments."

<https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sublime-Porte> accessed on 2 January 2020 at 18:03. Sublime Porte, Porte, and Babiali will be used interchangeably in this study.

¹¹ Roderic Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 32.

palace throughout the nineteenth century. Sultan Mahmud II gradually concentrated power in his own person during his reign (1808-1839), undermining all power groups at the center and periphery.

After Mahmud II's death, the pendulum had swung in favor of the Porte. The bureaucratic elite dominated the state affairs in the Tanzimat era (1839-1871). However, upon the demise of the pioneers of the Tanzimat in 1871, Mahmud Nedim Pasha, a prominent member of the pro-palace group, became the grand vizier. He attempted to restore the sultan's power but due to the inconvenience of the circumstances he could not realize his ambition. Abdülhamid II came to the throne after a period of political crisis (1871-1876) during which neither the palace nor the Porte had a full authority over the state affairs. Following a brief constitutionalist experience (1876-1878), Abdülhamid had gradually consolidated his power and the Yıldız Palace had become the administrative center until the Young Turk Revolution of 1908.

Memduh, like his father Mazlum Pasha and his father-in-law Giritli Mustafa Pasha, was from the pro-palace group who sought to strengthen the power of the palace and the sultan as a remedy for the problems of the Empire.¹² Memduh had close ties with Mahmud Nedim Pasha and İbrahim Edhem Pertev Pasha, the pioneers of the pro-palace group, who were kept out of the critical posts by the Tanzimat statesmen, Âli and Fuad Pashas. Mahmud Nedim was a favorite of Sultan Abdulaziz.¹³ The death of Âli Pasha in September 1871 paved the way for Mahmud Nedim's rise to the grand vizierate. Mahmud Nedim was twice appointed grand vizier and during his second term in 1875 he appointed Memduh as his secretary. However, neither Memduh nor his patron Mahmud

¹² As will be detailed in the subsequent chapter, Butrus Abu-Manneh refers to this division and power struggle in many of his studies that were compiled in a book: Butrus Abu-Manneh, *Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century* (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2001).

¹³ M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *A Brief History of Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), 109.

Nedim could stay at office for a long time. Soon after Mahmud Nedim's removal from the grand vizierate, Sultan Abdulaziz was dethroned in 1876.

It was his successor, Abdülhamid II, who had realized Mahmud Nedim's vision of "all-powerful ruler who attended in person to the daily affairs of the state."¹⁴ During his reign, Abdülhamid appreciated the pro-palace bureaucrats, including Memduh and Mahmud Nedim, for their loyalty to the palace and the sultan. Since he died in 1883, Mahmud Nedim could not enjoy the palace-centered Hamidian regime. However, as a junior member of the pro-palace camp, Memduh had become an important actor of Abdülhamid's political system. Though he was disturbed by some practices and attempted to resign a few times for some personal reasons, Memduh had stayed in the system until the 1908 Revolution. It seems that seeking an alternative path did not occur to him during three decades of the Hamidian regime. He, along with many other statesmen, managed to survive the challenges of the system and in the meantime made use of its opportunities.

The second reason that makes the biography of Memduh worth studying is related to the first one. Served as a member of the Council of State, then a governor, and finally as a Minister of Interior, Memduh substantially contributed to the crystallization of the Hamidian statecraft. He heavily invested in and, with his actions and ambitions, he took part in the production and reproduction of the Yıldız-centered political structure. He, like many others of the time, had personal interest in the success and consolidation of the Hamidian regime. That is to say, Abdülhamid, though he was at the apex of the elaborate imperial organization, was not alone in creating, implementing, and maintaining the political, economic, and cultural system that is summarized as the Hamidian regime. Abdülhamid established mutual interest based relationships with actors and groups from broad range of backgrounds. As observed by the first hand

¹⁴ Abu-Manneh, "The Sultan and the Bureaucracy: The Anti-Tanzimat Concepts of Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Pasa," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 22, no. 3 (Aug., 1990), 257.

accounts, he was willingly assisted, influenced,¹⁵ and even encouraged to act in “despotic” ways by the careerist and ambitious high ranking officials at the palace,¹⁶ the Porte, and even the provinces. Thus, examining the lives of actors such as Memduh who participated in the politics and administration both at the center and periphery would provide insight into the parameters of the Hamidian political system. Though carefully orchestrated by the sultan, these actors who were involved in the state apparatus made the whole mechanism possible. Therefore, their lives correspond to meanings, mechanisms and situations beyond themselves, a characteristic that makes their biographies imperial.

Based on Memduh’s biography, I suggest that rather than considering the Hamidian era as a period under the autocratic rule of an absolute sultan, we need to disclose the actions of different actors who vested interests in the existing political order. This would provide a more realistic and complex depiction of the period. In other words, instead of distinguishing Abdülhamid as an independent and absolute actor from bureaucrats and society one needs to evaluate all on the same ground because the Hamidian regime resulted from the complex interplay between all of them.

However, I do not mean to imply that the agents were independent from the structure. As will be elaborated in the theoretical discussion of the thesis, imperial structure and agents were interdependent and they had a symbiotic relationship.¹⁷ Moreover, it is not possible to study the ‘ruling class’ or the ‘elite’, as argued by Pierre Bourdieu, “without elucidating the conditions under which they reproduce themselves insofar as the very structure of the space of power they occupy is inseparable from its dynamic, from the mechanisms which

¹⁵ *Hatırât-ı Sadr-ı Esbak Kamil Paşa*, Cild-i Evvel (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Ebuzyiya, 1329), 190-197.

Mahmut Kemal Inal, *Son Sadrazamlar*, Vol. 3 (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1982), 25.

¹⁶ Tahsin Paşa, *Abdülhamit: Yıldız Hâtirâtı* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1990), 106.

“.....hünkârın istibdad yolunda muttasıl teşvik edildiği de o kadar doğrudur”

¹⁷ I am inspired by Antony Giddens’ conceptualization of “structuration.” Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society* (Oxford: Cambridge Polity Press, 1984).

produce and perpetuate it (even while transforming it).”¹⁸ Therefore, I take both the empire and Memduh as units of analysis, reconstruct the imperial context and weave Memduh’s professional career into this context portraying him as an active agent, operating within the fluid imperial structure.

1.2. Method and Theory

1.2.1. The Return of Agency and Biography

Biography came to be eclipsed in nineteenth-century historiography as being against the requirements of “scientific history.”¹⁹ The latter part of the twentieth century, however, witnessed theoretical turning points in the social sciences and historiography. This led to a paradigm shift away from positivism (and structuralism) and towards post-structuralism, which introduced a more subjective and culturally oriented approach.²⁰

This move away from structural history led to the exploration of new fields and to the growth of a body of literature concentrating on individuals and their lives. Heralding the narrative turn in history, Lawrence Stone stated that historians had begun writing literary (as opposed to scientific) descriptions (rather than statistics-based analysis) of individuals (in place of structure, political, or socio-economic circumstances) and that in doing so they drew upon the methods of anthropology and psychology (instead of sociology, economics, and demography).²¹ The agent as subject was back on center stage.

¹⁸ Lorc J. D. Wacquant, “From Ruling Class to Field of Power: An Interview with Pierre Bourdieu on La noblesse d’Etat,” *Theory, Culture & Society* (SAGE, London, Newbury Park and New Delhi), Vol. 10 (1993), 19.

¹⁹ Sabina Loriga, “The Role of the Individual in History, Biographical and Historical Writing in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century” in *Theoretical Discussions of Biography: Approaches from History, Microhistory, and Life Writing*, eds. Hans Renders and Binne de Haan (Leviston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2013), 124.

²⁰ Georg G. Iggers, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge* (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 2005).

²¹ Lawrence Stone, “The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History,” *Past & Present*, No: 85 (Nov., 1979).

In the 1990s, a number of new debates and experiments renewed interest in the genre of scholarly biography. Aiming to grasp a larger meaning from an individual life story, the “new biography”²² that resulted crossed disciplinary and national boundaries, “compiling many stories about a subject, cross-cutting between many voices, implying that any construction of a self was a matter of perspective and situation.”²³ In addition to its multidisciplinary approach, new biography assumed “unitary personhood” to be illusionary²⁴ and rejected the idea of the individual as internally coherent and consistent.²⁵ Thus, from the 1990s on, biographers have increasingly focused on revealing the conflicting aspects of an individual’s life.

Today, biographers are aware of the usefulness of theory and look for new approaches to conceptualize and deal with sources, structure, and style.²⁶ They utilize psychology²⁷ to comprehend the inner world of individual. At the same time, because individuals are not entirely products of their own creation, biographers are also interested in context as a determinant life courses. James Clifford, for instance, argues for a less subject-centered biography that focuses

²² Mary Rhiel and David Suchoff, *The Seductions of Biography* (Oxon: Routledge, 1996), 2.

²³ James Walter, “The Solace of Doubt? Biographical Methodology after the Short Twentieth Century” in *Theoretical Discussions of Biography: Approaches from History, Microhistory, and Life Writing* eds. Hans Renders and Binne de Haan (Leviston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2013), 73.

²⁴ Katherine P. Ewing, “The Illusion of Wholeness Culture, Self, and the Experience of Inconsistency,” *Ethos*, 18/3 (1990).

²⁵ Giovanni Levi, “Uses of Biography,” in *Theoretical Discussions of Biography: Approaches from History, Microhistory, and Life Writing*, eds. Hans Renders and Binne de Haan (Leviston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2013), 97; Abdulhamit Kırmızı, “Oto/Biyografik Vebal: Tutarlılık ve Kronoloji Sorunları” in *Otur Baştan Yaz Beni*, ed. Abdulhamit Kırmızı (Istanbul: Küre, 2013).

²⁶ Simone Lassig, “Introduction: Biography in Modern History-Modern Historiography in Biography” in *Biography Between Structure and Agency: Central European*, eds. Volker R. Berghahn and Simone Lassig (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 9.

²⁷ Alan C. Elms, *Uncovering Lives: The Uneasy Alliance of Biography and Psychology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); William Todd Schultz, “Introducing Psychobiography,” in *Handbook of Psychobiography*, ed. William Todd Schultz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

on the background of an individual.²⁸ Clifford argues that by questioning the myth of “personal coherence,” biographers can now produce “narrative transindividual occasions, weaving the collective through the individual.”²⁹

Likewise, according to Michael Shortland and Richard Yeo, individuals are the “meeting points for influences, no longer static but mobile, effusive, decentered, a process not a thing.”³⁰ In order to capture the big picture, they try to put the individual in a broader context, “an atmosphere which could account for the singular qualities of the path of life.”³¹ In the words of Simone Lässig, the new biography gives great importance to context, relating the individual to “the fields in which the person was active, to the networks that he or she helped to construct, and to the social background conditions that influenced, shaped, or even prompted individual decision and actions.”³² Reconstructing the social and historical context enables readers to make sense of what might otherwise appear to be incomprehensible and confusing in an individual’s life.

For biographers, the reconstructing of context in the analysis of historical lives involves considering their political, economic, cultural, and religious aspects. These contextual details, in turn, help shed light on attitudes, rituals, beliefs, and relationships. It has thus been said that “no method can grasp social networks with as much precision or profound insight as to their effects as the

²⁸ James Clifford, “Hanging Up Looking Glasses at Old Corners: Ethnographical Prospects” in *Studies in Biography*, ed. Danial Aaron (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 52.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 52.

³⁰ Michael Shortland and Richard Yeo, “Introduction” in *Telling Lives in Science, Essays on Scientific Biography*, eds. Michael Shortland and Richard Yeo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 14.

³¹ Giovanni Levi, “Uses of Biography” in *Theoretical Discussions of Biography: Approaches from History, Microhistory, and Life Writing*, eds. Hans Renders and Binne de Haan (Leviston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2013), 100.

³² Simone Lässig, “Introduction: Biography in Modern History-Modern Historiography in Biography” in *Biography Between Structure and Agency: Central European*, eds. Volker R. Berghahn and Simone Lässig (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 10-11.

biographical method can.”³³ Considering that “biography is not an end in itself, but a prism through which more general problems can sometimes be analyzed,”³⁴ Ian Kershaw attempts to “introduce structural elements into a biographical study and to use the biographical insights gained in the process in turn to cast a clearer light onto structures.”³⁵ This intertwined relationship between structure and the individual is succinctly captured in Cristoph Gradmann’s phrase “individualized social structure.”³⁶

However, as Giovanni Levi rightly points out, context should not be characterized as a coherent and rigid thing that functions “as a static background against which the biography can be explained. The individual paths of life have roots in a context, in this way, but have no influence on it, nor do they alter it.”³⁷ At this point, British sociologist Antony Giddens’s concept of “structuration” may help to provide a middle-ground for synthesizing structure and agency. Sabina Loriga also offers an approach of “accepting the circular character of knowledge.”³⁸ For her, “‘a universal-historical survey of the whole presupposes the understanding the parts united in it,’ however, ‘understanding of the particular depends on knowledge of the general.’”³⁹ To put it more explicitly, the whole and the parts are interdependent. Adopting such a multidimensional approach to biography encourages, even entails, cooperation between biographers and different disciplines and methodologies. To conclude, as a “prism of history,”⁴⁰ or a “shifting kaleidoscope,”⁴¹ or at least a “privileged

³³ Ibid., 11.

³⁴ Ibid., 14.

³⁵ Ibid., 14.

³⁶ Ibid., 11.

³⁷ Giovanni Levi, “Uses of Biography” in *Theoretical Discussions of Biography: Approaches from History, Microhistory, and Life Writing* eds. Hans Renders and Binne de Haan (Leviston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2013), 102.

³⁸ Sabina Loriga, “The Role of the Individual in History, Biographical and Historical Writing in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century” in *Theoretical Discussions of Biography: Approaches from History, Microhistory, and Life Writing*, eds. Hans Renders and Binne de Haan (Leviston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2013), 140.

³⁹ Ibid., 140.

⁴⁰ Barbara W. Tuchman, *Biography as Prism of History*, in *Telling Lives: The Biographer’s Art*, ed. Marc Pachter (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981), 134.

vantage point,”⁴² biography provides “mosaic pieces for the construction of the images that contemporaries have created as the guidelines for their particular social field.”⁴³

1.2.2. Imperial Biography

Against the backdrop of these theoretical developments in historical biography, historiographers of multiethnic and colonial empires have recently introduced the concept of “imperial biography.” This concept assumes that the lives, careers, and perceptions of elites were entangled with the multiethnic empires in which they lived. Modernizing imperial and professional structures of the nineteenth century determined the careers, experiences, visions, and everyday lives of imperial elites. In the meantime, performing within the imperial framework, elites as agents initiated change in the empires according to their concerns, thoughts, expectations, and perceptions.

Taking both empires and elites as units of analysis, imperial biographies as a methodological framework “contribute to the understanding of the behavior of both the empires as such and their elites, in particular as regards the possibilities and challenges of modernity.”⁴⁴ Imperial biography is explained further by Malte Rolf as follows:

During their life courses and professional careers many imperial subjects lived or worked at various locations within an empire. Their biographies were imperial, for they were connected to the framework of the empire in a number of ways: Their professional careers were as much shaped by the basic structures of the empire in which they flourished as the empire marked the main point of reference for their mental horizon, their loyalties and notions of identity or self-perception. An analysis of

⁴¹ Kali A. K. Israel, “Writing Inside the Kaleidoscope: Re-representing Victorian Women Public Figures” *Gender and History* 2 (1990).

⁴² Jacques Le Goff, *Saint Louis* (Paris: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996).

⁴³ Simone Lässig, “Introduction: Biography in Modern History-Modern Historiography in Biography” in *Biography Between Structure and Agency: Central European in the International Historiography*, eds. Volker R. Berghahn and Simone Lässig (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 19.

⁴⁴ Tim Buchen and Malte Rolf, Elites and Their Imperial Biographies, in *Elites im Vielvölkerreich, Elites and Empire*, eds. Tim Buchen und Malte Rolf (De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015), 32.

imperial biographies allows a new perspective on the interaction of the structural context of empires, the personal experience of the heterogeneity of imperial space and the individual's attempts to make sense of one's own place in the complex world of multi-ethnic and colonial empires.⁴⁵

Overall, imperial biographies help us to “understand how empires function,”⁴⁶ by reconstructing their relations, institutions, and political, socio-economic, and cultural structure, namely the imperial context and its networked nature. Moreover, concentrating on an individual and his career by exploring various professional contexts and parts of the empire casts light on the nature and transformation of empires in the context of modernization. “Providing insights into changing ways of elite recruitment, maintenance of their privileged position and their self-perception as a milieu during the long nineteenth century,”⁴⁷ imperial biographies demonstrate the patterns of elite formation in various professions.

Furthermore, examination of the career of elites can disclose “how the empires gained new arenas of influence and power and which developments resulted in a loss of control.”⁴⁸ Besides, imperial biographies not only reveal strategies of self-positioning of the imperial elites, but they also yield remarkable insights on the consistent and conflicting relations between the agendas and visions of empire and elites.

In the recent literature there are studies, though not many, adopting the concept of imperial biography as their methodological framework. In an article, Fredrik Lindström examines the Austrian state elite in the late Habsburg Empire.

⁴⁵ Malte Rolf, “Einführung: Imperiale Biographien. Lebenswege imperialer Akteure in Groß- und Kolonialreichen (1850 -1918),” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, Vol. 40, Issue 1 (2014), 5.

⁴⁶ Abdulhamit Kirmızı, “Experiencing the Ottoman Empire as a Life Course,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, Vol. 40, Issue 1 (2014), 42.

⁴⁷ Tim Buchen, Malte Rolf, *Elites and their Imperial Biographies*, Introduction in *Elites im Vielvölkerreich, Elites and Empire*, eds. Tim Buchen und Malte Rolf (De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015), 32.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 32.

He considers biographical works and prosopography on the groups of people who were attached to the state institutions to be significant, as they enrich our understanding of state institutions and the impact of their evolution on the elites tied to them. He takes the concept of “imperial biography” as the basis of his inquiry in so far as “it focuses squarely on the mutual shaping over time both of state structures and of the life and career patterns of the members of the elite, as well as the way members of the elite interpreted the imperial state and made it an object of (individual and collective) identification.”⁴⁹ Lindström’s study includes biographies of two Austrian state elite namely, Robert Musil and Hans Kelsen who can be deemed as late exponents of the Austrian state elite that preserved the characteristics of the Josephist reform bureaucracy.

With imperial biography as his method, Bradley D. Woodworth investigates the life of Carl Gustaf Mannerheim (1867-1951), concentrating on his military career.⁵⁰ Swedish-speaking Finn Baron Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim’s career in the Russian tsarist army underlines the significance of non-Russian elites in the tsarist state’s operation. Despite the existence of some officers who did not like serving with non-Russians, the Russian officer corps remained multiethnic. Baltic German, Finnish, or Transcaucasian officers were not discriminated against, in the state and military. Mannerheim had a supra-national approach to his personal and professional life. He was against both complete Russification and the idea of rejecting everything that was Russian. Rather, he believed that he could be loyal to Finland while he was serving the Russian state. Like other army officers from different nationalities, Mannerheim a nobleman from the Grand Duchy of Finland, remained committed to the tsarist state until the state collapsed. As Woodworth puts it until 1914 for Mannerheim the Russian Empire

⁴⁹ Fredrik Lindström, “Imperial Heimat, Biographies of the “Austrian State Elite” in the Late Habsburg Empire” in *Elites im Vielvölkerreich, Elites and Empire* eds. Tim Buchen und Malte Rolf (De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015), 372.

⁵⁰ Bradley D. Woodworth, “The Imperial Career of Gustaf Mannerheim: Mobility and Identity of a Non-Russian within the Russian Empire” in *Elites im Vielvölkerreich, Elites and Empire*, eds. Tim Buchen und Malte Rolf (De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015).

remained “the uncontested framework for all future political development.”⁵¹ He thought that the empire had to be reformed if it was to maintain its territorial integrity. Despite all its failures the empire gave individuals such as Mannerheim a sense of imperial belonging. Having two homelands, “one nesting inside the other,”⁵² Mannerheim was “an exemplar of an era and a mindset for which there was no place in the twentieth century after the Great War.”⁵³

In addition to throwing light on the workings of imperial institutions, imperial biography contributes to what recent British imperial historians have termed New Imperial History, which is heavily influenced by postcolonial theory.⁵⁴ “Network” (or web) is the key concept of New Imperial History, which was “founded on an awareness of much more extensive connections between multiple metropolitan, imperial, as well as extra-imperial, sites.”⁵⁵

⁵¹ Ibid., 152.

⁵² Ibid., 154.

⁵³ Ibid., 154.

⁵⁴ Alan Lester, *Imperial Networks: Creating Identities in Nineteenth-Century South Africa and Britain* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001); Alan Lester, “British Settler Discourse and the Circuits of Empire,” *History Workshop Journal*, 54/1 (2002, Autumn); Alan Lester, “Imperial Circuits and Networks: Geographies of the British Empire,” *History Compass* 4/1 (2006); Barry Crosbie, *Irish Imperial Networks Migration Social Communication and Exchange in Nineteenth-Century India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

Catherine Hall, *Civilizing Subjects* (University of Chicago Press, 2002); Catherine Hall, *Macaulay and Son: Architects of Imperial Britain* (Yale University Press, 2012); David Lambert and Alan Lester, *Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial Careering in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge University Press, 2006); Durba Ghosh, “Another Set of Imperial Turns?,” *The American Historical Review*, 117/3 (2012); Elizabeth A. Harvey, “‘Layered Networks’: Imperial Philanthropy in Birmingham and Sydney, 1860–1914,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 41/1 (2013); Joshua Piker, “Lying Together: The Imperial Implications of Cross-Cultural Untruths,” *The American Historical Review*, 116/4 (2011); Tony Ballantyne, *Orientalism and Race, Aryanism in the British Empire* (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); Tony Ballantyne, “The Changing Shape Of The Modern British Empire and its Historiography,” *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 53, Issue 2 (June 2010).

⁵⁵ David Lambert, “Reflections on the Concept of Imperial Biographies,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* (2014), Vol. 40, Issue 1.

In his article “Reflections on the Concept of Imperial Biographies: the British Case,” David Lambert relates a “networked conception of imperial interconnectedness”⁵⁶ to imperial biographies, and hence to imperial careers. He suggests “network as a model” and “biography as a method” to study empires.

Focusing on the interwoven notions of career and biography, Lambert argues that because they are located at the juncture of personal and professional, imperial biographies can be used to study imperial careers. A rich and suggestive concept, imperial career “conveys notions of agency, intent and efforts to forge a professional course through life, as imperial subjects sought to make their way in the world by expanding their expertise and patronage.”⁵⁷ Thus, exploring imperial careers is pivotal for tracing not only individual lives shaped by fortune, encounter, and chance, but also for the study of imperial societies more broadly.

Likewise, John MacKenzie sees parallels between the trajectory of imperial historiography and the careers pursued in empires. He argues that case studies on migrations, military, and gubernatorial careers in the imperial context contribute to the replacement of “the old imperial historiographical certainties and simplicities”⁵⁸ with “a complexity and multi-faceted approaches.”⁵⁹

This intertwined relationship between empire and imperial career is perfectly exemplified in the case of Avlonyalı Ferid Pasha, an Ottoman statesman in the nineteenth century. Ferid Pasha’s life coincided with the Tanzimat reforms in the state organization and Abdülhamid II’s centralizing policies. As his biographer Abdulhamit Kirmızı states, his life and the reorganization of the

⁵⁶ Alan Lester, “Imperial Circuits and Networks: Geographies of the British Empire,” *History Compass* 4/1 (2006), 133.

⁵⁷ David Lambert, “Reflections on the Concept of Imperial Biographies,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*: 2014, Vol. 40, Issue 1, 31.

⁵⁸ A. Mackillop and Steve Murdoch (eds.), *Military Governors and Imperial Frontiers C 1600-1800* (Leidan: Brill, 2003), xxi.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, xxi.

empire overlapped and influenced one another. Thus, it can be said that with his nearly fifty-year administrative and political career, Ferid Pasha “experienced the late Ottoman Empire as a life course.”⁶⁰

Providing similar examples in the context of the British Empire, Lambert argues that imperial biographies “permit a way of thinking about the British Empire in terms of its multiple and interconnected sites through focusing on a set of agents who played an important role in the making, remaking and unmaking of this network.”⁶¹ In the British Empire, imperial careerists functioned as mediators between the center and colonial peripheries. In this capacity, they turned the objectives of the imperial center into local policies and reported back from the periphery to the center. Endorsing the ideas of Lambert, Kirmızı demonstrates through Ferid Pasha’s imperial career in different corners of the Ottoman Empire how “late Ottoman governors spun the webs of imperial power within the province.”⁶² Like their British counterparts, imperial careerists in the Ottoman Empire “played the role of intermediaries in bringing vast territories of the Empire under the firm control of the state by translating the provinces’ landscapes to the language of the imperial center.”⁶³ Ferid Pasha transferred not only information between the imperial center and provinces, but also experiences among the different imperial positions and offices he occupied during his career.⁶⁴

Furthermore, this new approach of narrating lives through empires and empires through lives provides an effective strategy to “challenge the dominant epistemological framework,”⁶⁵ and thereby offers new insights into the stories of individuals and empires. This way of writing imperial and individual history deconstructs the grand narratives of nationalist historiographies, which in the

⁶⁰ Kirmızı, “Experiencing the Ottoman Empire as a Life Course.”

⁶¹ David Lambert, “Reflections on the Concept of Imperial Biographies,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* (2014), Vol. 40, Issue 1, 32.

⁶² Kirmızı, “Experiencing the Ottoman Empire as a Life Course,” 55.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 55.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 55.

⁶⁵ Kirmızı, “Experiencing the Ottoman Empire as a Life Course.”

twentieth century have virtually imprisoned multidimensional imperial subjects in the “imagined communities” of the modern nation state and its constructed boundaries. Biographical lives are convenient case studies for “addressing some of the historiographical fractures and neglect of imperial diversity.”⁶⁶ Relating life stories to the circumstances of empires, imperial biographies also allow us to understand attitudes and behaviors of imperial subjects that in the first instance often seem to be conflicting and confusing. This is because plurality of identity, culture, and religion is frequently alien to the nationalized societies of the twentieth century.

Not all imperial biographies focus on an individual’s life to construe an empire. Drawing on the case of the Mansurov family, a Russia noble family, Alexa von Winning exemplifies the family-based involvement in the imperial affairs in the context of nineteenth century Russia. He not only examines the issues such as patronage relations, loyalty, intra-imperial mobility, male and female cooperation but also women’s contribution to the empire.⁶⁷

Moreover, recently *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* published a special issue titled “Biographies Between Sphere of Empire.” This issue includes five case studies concentrate on “the lives of various less visible yet significant actors who were based in different African parts of the British and German colonial empires, or on their borders.”⁶⁸

1.2.3. Personal Theoretical Perspective

Before proceeding to the literature on Memduh and, later, the sources of the research, I would like to offer a few words on the theoretical and methodological approach I employ in this study. I do not think that individuals

⁶⁶ A. Mackillop and Steve Murdoch (eds.), *Military Governors and Imperial Frontiers C 1600-1800* (Leidan: Brill, 2003), xxviii.

⁶⁷ Alexa von Winning, “The Empire as Family Affair. The Mansurovs and Noble Participation in Imperial Russia, 1850-1917,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 40 (2014).

⁶⁸ Achim von Oppen and Silke Strickrodt, “Introduction: Biographies Between Sphere of Empire,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 44:5 (2016), 724.

are coherent, or that they should or even can be coherent. As they are supposed to act skillfully in different spheres in their daily lives, individuals need to be capable of coping with social expectations and constraints vis-à-vis their personal ambitions, motivations, and predicaments. Thus, the attitudes of an individual may seem contradictory or even illogical to an outsider. As I see it, the task of a biographer is not to construct an orderly world in which an individual always acts “properly” and coherently. My objective is rather to paint a portrait of Memduh as realistically as possible, with all its incoherent and conflicting aspects.

Because life is “complex, situational, fragmented, nonunitary, nonlinear, non-coherent, and constantly in flux,”⁶⁹ a biographer should be humble in his/her account of a person’s life. As pointed out above, the context in which individuals make their lives is not fixed and stable. In the case of Memduh, it should be borne in mind that he acted in an era of constant change. Therefore, his attitudes need to be analyzed in relation to the changing/transforming imperial context. Compared to the complex and fluid nature of life in general and of imperial space in particular, historical biographers have quite limited sources on the basis of which to construct an individual (imperial) biography. They variously depend on: various personal materials; writings including memoirs, diaries, photographs, poems, and prose; state archives; or the testimonies of others, including their subject’s contemporaries and those who are still alive. In brief, historical biographers are bound by the sources that are available to them.

In addition to all these contingencies that historical biography is subject to, “nearly all works of biography also reveal autobiographical components, even if

⁶⁹ J. Amos Hatch and Richard Wisniewski, *Life History and Narrative: Questions, Issues, and Exemplary Works*, in *Life History and Narrative*, eds. J. Amos Hatch and Richard Wisniewski, 113-135 (London, Washington D. C.: The Falmer Press, 1995), 122.

these are unlikely to be either intentionally or conscious in most cases.”⁷⁰ To put it more explicitly, a biography is in a sense a double portrait: that of the one who is writing and that of the one who is being written about. Whether due to dependence on different sources or to a difference of perspective and approach towards the same sources, each and every biography of the same person will differ. That is to say, the imperial biography of Memduh that I write is only one of the numerous possible ways of narrating his life story.

As I have indicated above, considering agency as independent from structure is not realistic at all. On the other hand, giving all the credit to structure as a determinant is not realistic either. I assume neither agency nor structure to be stable and fixed entities. Like Giddens, I see them as each actively involved in constituting the other. As they constantly penetrate each other, it may not even be possible to distinguish them in a life story. This is most likely what Gradmann meant by his phrase “individualized social structure.”⁷¹ Against this theoretical background, I offer an account of Memduh that weaves his bureaucratic career into the imperial context to portray him as an active agent operating within a fluid imperial structure.

1.3. Literature Review

There is an abundance of primary works about Memduh, due to his bureaucratic position and literary capacity, including memoirs and diaries of the late Ottoman statesmen, and the secondary literature focusing on the nineteenth-century Ottoman political and cultural history. Majority of the secondary studies depend on three major sources: Memduh’s Ottoman personnel record,⁷² Ibnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal’s prosopography on the

⁷⁰ Simone Lassig, “Introduction: Biography in Modern History-Modern Historiography in Biography” in *Biography Between Structure and Agency: Central European*, eds. Volker R. Berghahn and Simone Lassig (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 4.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁷² BOA, DH.SAİD. 1/84, 29 Zilhicce 1255/4 March 1840.

Ottoman poets of the nineteenth century, “Son Asır Türk Şairleri,”⁷³ and Memduh’s published works. The secondary literature on Memduh can be divided into three categories: those focusing on his bureaucratic career, those on his literary style and poetic productions, and the ones assessing his historical writings.

Based on the details given in Memduh’s personnel record, Zekeriya Kurşun, in the entry of *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, provides basic information about Memduh’s family background, education, bureaucratic career, and published works.⁷⁴ Selim Aslantaş goes one step further and describes Memduh’s views on the Ottoman political, administrative, and legal systems; caliphate, economics, foreign politics, the issues of centralization and decentralization; as well as his views on education, the press, and the public.⁷⁵

Adopting a similar framework to that of Aslantaş, Cemal Kafadar, Hakan Karateke, and Cornell Fleischer also briefly narrate Memduh’s life story with an emphasis on his career and the books he produced. They evaluate Memduh in terms of his contribution to Ottoman historiography, treating him as an Ottoman historian, since he published a number of books on the political figures and events of the late Ottoman history.⁷⁶ Orhan Bayrak, too, provides a brief biography of Memduh and the list of his works in his prosopography of Ottoman historians.⁷⁷ Furthermore, many works on the late Ottoman Empire use Memduh’s history books as a reference. *Mir’at-ı Şuunat*⁷⁸, *Esvat-ı Sudur*⁷⁹, *Haller ve İclaslar*⁸⁰ are three major works of Memduh that are mostly referenced.⁸¹

⁷³ Mahmut Kemal İnal, *Son Asır Türk Şairleri*, Vol 3 (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi 1969), 918-931.

⁷⁴ Zekeriya Kurşun, “Mehmed Memduh Paşa”, *TDVİA*, 2003, vol. 28. 495-497.

⁷⁵ Selim Aslantaş, “Bir Osmanlı Bürokrati: Mehmet Memduh Paşa,” *KÖK Araştırmalar: Kök Sosyal ve Stratejik Araştırmalar Dergisi*, III/1 (Bahar 2001).

⁷⁶ Cemal Kafadar, Hasan Karateke, Cornell Fleischer, “Mehmed Memduh” *Historians Of The Ottoman Empire*, 2006.

⁷⁷ Orhan Bayrak, *Osmanlı Tarihi Yazarları* (İstanbul: Milenyum Yayınları, 2002).

⁷⁸ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Mir’at-ı Şuunat* (İzmir: Ahenk Matbaası, 1328).

⁷⁹ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Esvat-ı Sudur* (İzmir: Vilayet Matbaası, 1328).

⁸⁰ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Hal’ler ve İclaslar* (İstanbul: Matbaa-ı Hayriye, 1329).

Since Memduh was one of the most renowned poets of his time, İbnülemin allocates a long section for him in his work on the poets of the late Ottoman Empire. İbnülemin provides not only a profile of Memduh, a list of his books, and some of his poems, but he also recounts his personal memories about Memduh. İbnülemin was a young official at the Secretary of the Grand Vizier when Memduh was Minister of Interior. Beside this administrative relation, İbnülemin and his brother used to visit Pasha's residence in Kuruçeşme on different occasions. İbnülemin characterizes him as a proud person who was known for his servility toward his superiors and his arrogance toward his subordinates. The personal dispute between Memduh and İbnülemin's father Mehmed Emin Pasha⁸² might influence İbnülemin's judgment about Memduh. When it comes to literature, İbnülemin finds Memduh's poems more appealing than his prose. Due to his ample use of puns, rhymes, wordplays, and metaphors, İbnülemin asserts that Memduh attached greater importance to words than he did to meaning.⁸³

Besides the works or chapter in which Memduh is specifically evaluated, there are other studies making references to him in different contexts. In "Abdülhamid'in Valileri", Kırmızı frequently refers to Memduh as he occupied the Ministry of Interior between 1895-1908, the period the book covers. Memduh is mentioned in contexts such as the Hamidian governors' terms of office and their career paths and literary abilities.⁸⁴ Furthermore, Kırmızı provides valuable anecdotes in Avlonyalı Ferid Pasha's biography about the unceasing conflict between grand vizier Ferid Pasha and Minister of Interior

⁸¹ İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal and Mehmed Zeki Pakalın who wrote on the prominent political and intellectual figures of the late Ottoman Empire referred Memduh's accounts in many contexts.

See İnal, *Son Sadrazamlar*; Mehmed Zeki Pakalın, *Son Sadrazamlar ve Başvekiller* (Istanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası, 1940).

⁸² As testified in the same work, İbnülemin's father Mehmed Emin Pasha and Memduh had a very long friendship. However, the close bond between them was permanently damaged when Memduh was governor general of Sivas and Mehmed Emin Pasha was governor (*mutasarrıf*) of Amasya. As minister of interior Memduh dismissed Mehmed Emin Pasha from the governorship of Denizli.

⁸³ İnal, *Son Asır Türk Şairleri*, Vol 3, 918-931.

⁸⁴ Abdulhamit Kırmızı, *Abdülhamid'in Valileri* (Istanbul: Klasik, 2008).

Memduh who had an eye on the grand vizierate.⁸⁵ Illustrating the intrigue and contention that marked the interpersonal relations at the Porte, Kırmızı refers to several reports that were submitted by Memduh to Abdülhamid II about Ferid Paşa.⁸⁶ The reports prove that Memduh was deeply frustrated for not having been chosen for the grand vizierate. Thus, he used every opportunity to complain about Ferid Pasha, who served as the grand vizier from 1903 to 1908. The rivalry between them was not only because of the passion for the most precious post in the Ottoman realm, but also due to the tough administrative equilibrium that Abdülhamid set up for playing “the pashas off against one another, thereby keeping their conflicting interests and views in check.”⁸⁷

Carter Findley, too, concentrates on Memduh’s ministerial career. In *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, Findley cites Memduh to explain the subordinate position of the Ministry of Interior, like all other ministries at the time, in the palace-dominated Hamidian system.⁸⁸ Aiming at elucidating the structural evolution of the local and central administration in the Hamidian era, Findley also offers a brief description of the circumstances in which Memduh flourished.⁸⁹

There are some works that concentrate on a specific period or issue of Memduh’s administrative life. As will be detailed in the chapter on his ministerial years, Memduh chaired three commissions on Yemen and produced comprehensive reports. These reports not only thoroughly explained the problems of this distant province of the Empire but also offered some solutions to them. After 1908 Revolution, Memduh compiled some of his correspondence

⁸⁵ Kırmızı, *Avlonyalı Ferid Paşa*, 221, 222, 295.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 349-355.

In Chapter 5 of this thesis there is a section on the relations between Memduh and Ferid. In this section these reports are discussed.

⁸⁷ Engin Deniz Akarlı, “The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdülhamid II (1876-1909): Origins and Solutions” (PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, 1976), 142.

⁸⁸ Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), 251.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 251.

he had with the governors of Yemen and the reports of the commissions he chaired in a book titled “*Yemen Kit’ası Hakkında Bazı Mutaalat.*”⁹⁰

Some studies about the late nineteenth century Yemen refer to Memduh’s book for it offers a first-hand account on the views and policies of the Ottoman central administration on Yemen. One such study belongs to Jon Mandaville who evaluates the Ottoman government’s general approach toward Yemen. Mandaville discusses the commission reports on Yemen that Memduh and other commission members prepared. He pays special attention to the 1904 report because, for him, this report accurately represents the official view of Yemen in the early 1900s.⁹¹

Thomas Kuehn too refers to Memduh’s “*Yemen Kit’ası Hakkında Bazı Mutaalat.*”⁹² Kuehn interprets Memduh’s proposal on the autonomous status of Yemen as politics of difference. Besides Memduh, Kuehn refers to the reports and memoranda drafted by Tahsin Pasha,⁹³ Mustafa Şevket, and Namık Efendi to prove his argument. For Kuehn, the politics of colonial difference and the Ottoman politics in Yemen had some similarities: “they were based on the assumption that the ‘backward’ could not be governed like the “civilized” and they “institutionalized the difference and perceived inferiority of the local population by leaving them outside the purview of political practices and administrative regulations that were theoretically universalist or empire-wide in

⁹⁰ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Yemen Kit’ası Hakkında Bazı Mütalaat* (Dersaadet: Numune-i Tıbaat Matbaası, 1324/1908-1909).

⁹¹ Jon Mandaville, “Memduh and Aziz Bey: Ottoman Experience in Yemen,” in *Contemporary Yemen: Politics and Historical Background*, ed. B.R. Pridham (Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984).

⁹² Thomas Kuehn, *Empire, Islam, and Politics of Difference: Ottoman Rule in Yemen, 1849-1919* (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2011).

⁹³ Kuehn quotes from the memoirs of Tahsin Pasha, the first secretary of Abdülhamid II; that were written down after the disintegration of the Empire.

“There was a special policy that Sultan Hamid pursued toward distant regions (of the empire), such as Iraq and Yemen, and that one could term a colonial policy....” *Tahsin Paşa’nın Yıldız Hatıraları, Sultan Abdülhamid* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1990), 205.

nature.”⁹⁴ For Kuehn, in comparison to the European colonialism, the Ottoman policy on Yemen was hybrid and ambiguous. Thus, he describes the Ottoman governance of Yemen as Ottoman colonialism.

The discourse analysis of the reports of some of the Ottoman bureaucrats and military officers provide some discursive evidences to support the claim of Kuehn. Yet, instead of taking some officials’ selected discourse and label the Ottoman State’s policy on Yemen as “colonial”, one is supposed to examine much more reliable parameters of the center-periphery relations and most particularly the economic parameters which would provide hard data for assessing and comparing the Ottoman enterprise to European colonial governance.⁹⁵

Besides the issue of Yemen, Memduh was also known for his Armenian policy. Memduh’s way of dealing with the Armenian population was one of the most important aspects of his governorship in the province of Sivas. In his article, “*Şikayat Tezayüd Etmekte: Memduh Bey’in Sivas Valiliğinde Ermeni Politikası (1889-1992)*,” Kırmızı concentrates on Memduh’s attitudes and policies towards the Armenians in Sivas.⁹⁶ As it is stated in his personnel record, Memduh was dismissed from the post in Sivas because of the complaints about his intolerance towards the Armenians in the province.⁹⁷ However, the way his dismissal was explained indicates that Memduh was half-heartedly dismissed from the post mainly because of the foreign pressure with regard to the

⁹⁴ Kuehn, *Empire, Islam, and Politics of Difference*, 11. Kuehn goes as far as to say “the predominance of politics of difference also characterized Ottoman imperial rule over a number of other provinces during this period, notably Shkodër in present-day northern Albania, as well as Tripolitania and the Hijaz, which today are part of Libya and Saudi Arabia, respectively.” Kuehn, *Empire, Islam, and Politics of Difference*, 8.

⁹⁵ For the critique of Kuehn’s argument see the section on Yemen in the Chapter 5 of the thesis.

⁹⁶ Abdulhamit Kırmızı, “*Şikayat Tezayüd Etmekte: Memduh Bey’in Sivas Valiliğinde Ermeni Politikası (1889-1992)*,” in *Osmanlılar Döneminde Sivas Sempozyumu Bildirileri*, 2007.

⁹⁷ BOA, DH.SAİD. 1/84, 29 Zilhicce 1255/4 March 1840.

Armenians of the *vilayat-ı sitte*,⁹⁸ one of which was Sivas. In the personnel record, Memduh was appreciated for his efforts to establish peace and order in the province.⁹⁹ As Kırmızı notes in his article, some Armenian inhabitants of Sivas were also thankful to Memduh for his commitment to maintain order and security and establish peace and harmony between Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants of Sivas.¹⁰⁰

Armen Marsoobian's book on the memories of the Dildilian family, one of the most prominent artisan Armenian families of Sivas, also offers a positive image of Memduh with regard to his relations with the Armenian community of Sivas.¹⁰¹ As will be detailed in Chapter 4, Memduh had an intimate relationship with the Dildilians. Although he was dismissed from Sivas on the grounds of his strict treatment of Armenians; the telegraph that was sent by a group of Armenians and the case of the Dildilian family attest that Memduh's relationship with Armenians in Sivas is more complex than it seems.

Not all works that deal with Memduh's service in Sivas focus on his Armenian policy. In her MA thesis, Özlem Sarıtepe examines Memduh's contributions to the industrial, educational, economic, and urban development of Sivas. She also examines the corruption allegations towards him.¹⁰² Since he governed Sivas for over three years Memduh's contribution to the development of the province is

⁹⁸ *Vilayat-ı Sitte* refers to six provinces located in the Eastern Anatolia namely Sivas, Elazığ, Van, Diyarbakır, Erzurum, Bitlis.

⁹⁹ BOA, DH.SAİD. 1/84, 29 Zilhicce 1255/4 March 1840.

¹⁰⁰ Fifty-four prominent Armenian inhabitants of Sivas sent telegraph to the imperial capital to appreciate Memduh's efforts. A portion of the original version of this telegraph is given below. "*Vilayetimizde İslam ahali ile yekdiğerimizin hoşnudî üzere imtizacda bulunulması hususunda vali-yi âlî atufetlu Memduh Beyefendi hazretlerinin gece ve gündüz ittihaz etmekte olduğu tedâbir, sâ'ibe-i fi'iliyyât ve âsâr ile sabitdir. Müşarünileyh, Ermeni meselesi nâmını alet-i menfaat olmağa kimseye meydan vermedi. Vilayet dahilinde ber-karar olan emn u istirahat-ı umumiyeyi bir kat daha takviye eylemek için kendüsi geçende diğêr mahallere azimet eyledi. Kemal-i asayişle yaşamaktayız...*" BOA, Y.PRK.AZJ. 21/91, 4 Şevval 1308/13 May 1891.

¹⁰¹ Armen T. Marsoobian, *Fragments of a Lost Homeland: Remembering Armenia* (London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 2015), 23.

¹⁰² Özlem Sarıtepe, "Sivas Valisi Memduh Paşa" (MA Thesis, Sivas Cumhuriyet University, 2011).

dealt in some other studies as well. Kemalettin Kuzucu, for instance, traces back the history of Sivas Atatürk Congress House, which was constructed as a high school (*idadi*) under the governance of Memduh. This prestigious construction project was part of an empire-wide campaign for education during the Hamidian era.¹⁰³ Memduh carried out many other building projects including schools, bridges, streets, telegraph lines, sidewalks, and fountains both in countryside and center of Sivas.¹⁰⁴

In addition to his service in Sivas, there are also studies that make references to Memduh's activities in Ankara. Özkan Keskin's article is one of them. Keskin refers to Memduh's contribution to the agricultural development projects in Ankara. As part of this empire-wide campaign to improve the cultivating techniques and agricultural productivity, the Model Farm and the Shepherd School in Ankara were founded in 1898 at the request of Memduh when he was the governor. Despite the technical and financial support of the central administration, due to various reasons the school and the model farm in Ankara were ultimately unable to realize the state's goals for them.¹⁰⁵

Memduh was a multifaceted person. Aside from his long bureaucratic career, he, like his father, was a poet and an author under the penname of Memduh and Fâ'ik. Having produced around fifteen books, some of which were literary works, Memduh, like his father, was part of the elite circles of Istanbul. Thus, in addition to the works dealing with Memduh's professional life and historical writings, there are studies on his literary activities. Some of these studies shed light on Memduh's involvement in the cultural life of the provinces he

¹⁰³ Kemalettin Kuzucu, "Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyete Şehircilik, Mimari ve Eğitim Anlayışındaki Değişmeler Bağlamında Sivas Kongresi Binasının Tarihçesi," *Atatürk Yolu* (Atatürk Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Dergisi) 37-38 (Mayıs-Kasım 2006).

¹⁰⁴ Kemalettin Kuzucu, "Osmanlı Modernleşme Sürecinde İki Sivas Valisinin Raporlarının Karşılaştırılması ve Vilayetin Kentsel Dönüşümüne Etkileri" in *Osmanlılar Döneminde Sivas Sempozyum Bildirileri*, (Sivas: 2007).

¹⁰⁵ Özkan Keskin, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Modern Ziraat Eğitiminin Yaygınlaşması: Ankara Numune Tarlası ve Çoban Mektebi," *Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi*, 28 (2015).

governed. For instance, examining the literary legacy in Ankara, Necati Tonga refers to Memduh's friendly approach to poets and minstrels when he was the governor of Ankara. Memduh used to invite poets and minstrels to his mansion for dinner and conversation.¹⁰⁶

In some cases Memduh's literary activities and professional life overlapped. His relationship with Veled Çelebi (Bahaddin Veled İzbudak), the eighteenth great-grandson of Rumi, is an example of this. Acknowledging Veled Çelebi's literary skills, Memduh, who was then governor of Konya, supported Çelebi's appointment to the secretariat of Konya. The studies on Veled Çelebi İzbudak not only underscore Memduh's contribution to the literary career of Veled Çelebi but also include some details about Memduh's years in Konya.¹⁰⁷ Memduh's involvement in the literary activities of the provinces he governed goes beyond these anecdotes. Memduh published some of his poems in a journal titled "*Hazine-i Fünun*" that was owned by Kirkor Faik Efendi of Kayseri, between 1893 and 1896.¹⁰⁸

Given that Memduh was one of the central figures of the elite gatherings in the late Ottoman period, Şemsettin Şeker gives a wide coverage of him in his book about the intellectual, cultural, and artistic life of the nineteenth century Istanbul. Besides several anecdotes about him, Şeker underlines the centrality of Memduh's mansion at Kuruçeşme for the intellectual and literary gatherings.¹⁰⁹

In addition to the works dealing with Memduh's participation in the cultural and literary activities of the capital and the provinces, there are some studies that

¹⁰⁶ Necati Tonga, "Cumhuriyet Ankarası'nın Devraldığı Edebi Miras: Cumhuriyet Dönemi'ne Kadar Ankara'daki Edebi Hayatı ve Edebiyat Mahfilleri," *Journal of Ankara Studies*, 2, (December 2014).

¹⁰⁷ Metin Akar, *Veled Çelebi İzbudak* (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1999), 65.

Necib Asım, "Veled Çelebi Hazretleri," *Türk Yurdu*, vol. VII, no.15. 2471-2476.

¹⁰⁸ Şemsettin Şeker, *Ders ile Sohbet Arasında, On Dokuzuncu Asır İstanbul'unda İlim, Kültür ve Sanat Meclisleri* (İstanbul: Zeytinburnu Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, 2013), 124.

¹⁰⁹ Şeker, *Ders ile Sohbet Arasında*, 369-373.

examine the literary works of Memduh. Looking into his three literary works - namely *Eser-i Memduh*,¹¹⁰ *Berg-i Sebz*,¹¹¹ and *Divan-ı Eş'ar*¹¹² - Müjgan Çakır describes Memduh's literary style and views on poetry and poets.¹¹³ According to Çakır, as a typical *Encümen-i Şuara* poet, Memduh preferred the Divan Literature (the Classical Ottoman Literature) to the new literary works that had started to become popular during the period, particularly poems written in Western style.¹¹⁴ Yet, based on the statements in the preface of Memduh's Divan (*Divan-ı Eş'ar*) and some of his poems, Çakır argues that Memduh was open to novelties in terms of form and content.¹¹⁵ Mehmet Korkut Çeçen too, focuses on *Encümen-i Şuara* and the impact of this literary society on the Tanzimat poets and authors. Memduh Faik was attached to the society of *Encümen-i Şuara*. This society used to gather at Hersekli Ârif Hikmet Bey's house on a weekly basis to read poems. In addition to Memduh, famous poets like Ziya Pasha and Namık Kemal regularly attended these gatherings in the 1860s.¹¹⁶

In addition to the secondary sources, thanks to his long and multifaceted life, Memduh is cited in various memoirs that were written in the late Ottoman and

¹¹⁰ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Eser-i Memduh* (Istanbul, 1289, 1872/1873).

¹¹¹ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Berg-i Sebz* (Istanbul, 1289, 1872/1873).

¹¹² Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Divan-ı Eş'ar* (Istanbul, 1332, 1917/1918).

¹¹³ Müjgan Çakır, "Mazlum-zade Mehmed Paşa'nın Poetikasına Dair," *Atatürk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Dergisi* (2009), Issue 39.

Two of these literary works of Memduh, *Divan-ı Eş'ar* and *Berg-i Sebz*, are also transliterated and examined by three MA thesis in Turkish Language and Literature.

Nilay Şahin, "Mehmed Memdûh Paşa'nın Hayatı, Sanatı, Eserleri ve Divân-ı Eş'âr'ı Üzerine Bir İnceleme" (MA Thesis, Ondokuz Mayıs University, 2012).

Fatih Odunkıran, "Mehmed Memdûh Paşa ve Divân-ı Eş'âr" (MA Thesis, Trakya University, 2011).

Mustafa Yavuz, "Mehmed Memdûh Faik Bey (Hayatı, Sanatı, Eserleri)" (MA Thesis, Erzincan University, 2016).

¹¹⁴ Metin Kayahan Özgül, *XIX. Asrın Özel Bir Edebiyat Mahfili Olarak Encümen-i Şuarâ* (Ankara: Kurgan Edebiyat, 2012).

¹¹⁵ Müjgan Çakır, "Gelenekten Moderne: Encümen-i Şuara'da Şekil Değişiklikleri ve Mehmed Memduh Paşa," in *Eski Türk Edebiyatı Çalışmaları 2, Eski Türk Edebiyatına Modern Yaklaşımlar 1*, 24 Nisan 2006 Bildiriler (Istanbul: Turkuaz Yayınları 2007).

¹¹⁶ Mehmet Korkut Çeçen, "Encümen-i Şuara'nın Tanzimat Birinci Dönem Sanatçılarına Etkisi," *Çukurova Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* (2006), vol. 15, no. 2.

early Republican period.¹¹⁷ In the political memoirs attributed to Sultan Abdülhamid II, there is a passage on Memduh. In an entry dated 1901, Abdülhamid says,

Everyone makes accusation about minister of interior Memduh. Claiming that Memduh is the most incompetent and corrupt Ottoman minister that ever came to power, [even] foreign newspapers open fire on him. Many of them say that I should have fired him by now. They wish to present me with a fait accompli. But I do not have such an intention. Because I know very well who are the ones attacking him. According to the report I received, Memduh attempted to set up special commissions to prevent making benefits available to their proponents from the official appointments. This attempt made his enemies angry. The best response to these intriguers is to reward Memduh. I intend to award him with the greatest order in the Ottoman.¹¹⁸

As will be exemplified in the upcoming sections of the thesis, Memduh was known for his close ties with Abdülhamid. The quotation above supports this assumption.

As denoted in the above quoted passage from the memoir attributed to Abdülhamid, Memduh's relations with some of his colleagues were quite strained. Ali Fuad Türkgeldi, who worked with Memduh at the Ministry of Interior for thirteen years, provides some examples about the conflict between Memduh and some officials such as Grand Vizier Ferid Pasha and undersecretaries of the Minister of Interior. In these conflicts Türkgeldi sides with Memduh. Furthermore, he illustrates a positive image of Memduh, describing him as an honest and principled person. According to Türkgeldi,

¹¹⁷ Sa'îd Paşa, *Sa'îd Paşa'nın Hâtîrâtı*, Vol. I-II. Istanbul: Sabah Matbaası, 1328/1912; Mehmed Nazım Paşa, *Selanik Vali-i Sabıkı Nazım Paşa'nın Hatıraları* (Istanbul: Arba, 1992); Mehmet Tevfik Biren, *Bürokrat Tevfik Biren'in Sultan II. Abdülhamid, Meşrutiyet ve Mütareke Hatıraları*, V. 1, ed. Fatma Rezan Hürmen. Istanbul: Pınar Yayınları, 2006); Lütfi Fikri, *Dersim Mebusu Lütfi Fikri Bey'in Günlüğü: Daima Muhalefet*, Ed. by Yücel Demirel (Istanbul: Arba, 1991); Hilmi Uran, *Hatıralarım* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1959); Tahsin Paşa, *Abdülhamid ve Yıldız Hatıraları* (Istanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitaphanesi, 1931); Mizancı Mehmed Murad, *Tatlı Emeller, Acı Hakikatler* (Istanbul: Marifet Yayınları, 1997); Mizancı Mehmed Murad, *Hürriyet Vadisinde Bir Peñçe-i İstibdad* (Istanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1997); *Arap İzzet Holo Paşa'nın Günlükleri- Abdülhamid'in Kara Kutusu* (Istanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2019); Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, *Görüp İşittiklerim* (Istanbul: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2010).

¹¹⁸ Sultan II. Abdülhamid, *Siyasi Hatıratım* (Istanbul: Dergah 1984), 108.

Memduh was intelligent and both his memory and poems were very strong. He was quick in understanding what he heard and read. His poems and official writings were pompous, generally having an internal rhyme. However, Türkgeldi states that Memduh's official writing capacity could not reach the level of Kamil (Kıbrıslı), Mehmed Said, and Mahmud Celaleddin Pashas.¹¹⁹ In another work, Türkgeldi narrates how in the early days of the 1908 Young Turk Revolution newspapers attacked prominent Hamidian bureaucrats particularly Said Pasha and Memduh.¹²⁰

Like Türkgeldi, in his memoirs Semih Mümtaz describes Memduh by positive terms, saying that Memduh was a smart, witty, gentle literary man who advanced in the bureaucracy during the reign of Abdülaziz.¹²¹ Mümtaz also refers to the Çerkes Hasan Incident (1876), which took place at the grand vizier Midhat Pasha's house in Beyazıt. As he was then the secretary of the grand vizier Memduh witnessed the moment Hüseyin Avni Pasha, the commander-in-chief and ex-grand vizier, was shot. This was one of the many critical events Memduh witnessed or was involved in during his life-course.¹²²

1.4. Sources of the Thesis

The main primary sources for this research on Memduh's imperial biography are documents from the Ottoman Archives of the Prime Ministry State Archives (*Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Osmanlı Arşivi*) in Istanbul. The *Dahiliye Nezareti Defterleri* (DH.d) and the *Yıldız Evrakı* are two major sections from which data for the significant part of Memduh's career is collected. The *Yıldız Evrakı* contains documents belonging to the Hamidian period. In this section the *Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Umum Vilayetler Tahriratı* (Y.PRK.UM), the *Yıldız Mütenevvi Maruzat* (Y.MTV), and the *Yıldız Esas Evrakı* (Y.EE) provide a substantial amount of data that not only aid in reconstructing the imperial context and institutional

¹¹⁹ Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, *Maruf Similar* (Istanbul: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2013), 387-411.

¹²⁰ Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, *Görüp İşittiklerim* (Istanbul: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2010).

¹²¹ Ahmet Semih Mümtaz, *Tarihimizde Hayal Olmuş Hakikatler* (Istanbul: Hilmi Kitabevi, 1948), 221.

¹²² Mümtaz, *Tarihimizde Hayal Olmuş Hakikatler*, 221.

network but also shed light on the thirty years of Memduh's professional life. Among other things, the *Yıldız Evrakı* collection and particularly the *Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Umum Vilayetler Tahriratı* (Y.PRK.UM) includes correspondences between the central administration and provinces, offering perspectives and depictions of Ottoman imperial space.

The section *Dahiliye Nezareti Mektubi Kalemî* (DH.MKT) includes much of the correspondence that the Ministry of Interior had and the reports it produced. Given that the bulk of Memduh's career centered on internal affairs, there is valuable information about his time as a governor as well as Ministry of Interior. The *Dahiliye Nezareti Sicill-i Ahvâl Komisyonu Defterleri* (DH.SAİD) provides chronological career records for Memduh and his family members. Moreover, the *İrade-i Dahiliye* (İ.DH) section contains documents describing each of his appointments as well as the honors he obtained. There are also documents related to Memduh's life course in many other Ottoman state archival sections some of which are the *Sadaret Mektub-i Mühîme Kalemî Evrakı* (A.MKT.MHM), the *Maarif Nezareti Defterleri*, the *Şura-yı Devlet Evrakı* (ŞD), the *Meclis-i Vala Evrakı* (MVL), the *Bab-ı Âli Evrak Odası Evrakı* (BEO), the *Hariciye Nezareti Siyasi* (HR.SYS), *Dahiliye Nezareti Tesr-i Muamelat ve Islahat Komisyonu* (DH.TMIK.S).

Besides these archival sections, I use some primary source collections that have been prepared and published by the Ottoman Archives of the Prime Ministry State Archives including *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni-İngiliz İlişkileri*, Vol. I (1845-1890);¹²³ *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni-İngiliz İlişkileri*, Vol. III (1894-1895);¹²⁴ *Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre Ermeni-Fransız İlişkileri*, Vol. I (1879-1918);¹²⁵ *Ermeni Olayları Tarihi I*;¹²⁶ and *Kaynakçalı Ermeni Meselesi Kronolojisi (1879-*

¹²³ *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni-İngiliz İlişkileri I (1845-1890)* (Ankara: Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 2004).

¹²⁴ *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni-İngiliz İlişkileri III (1894-1895)* (Ankara, Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 2005).

¹²⁵ *Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre Ermeni-Fransız İlişkileri I (1879-1918)* (Ankara, Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 2002).

¹²⁶ Hüseyin Nazım Paşa, *Ermeni Olayları Tarihi I* (Ankara: Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı 1998).

1923).¹²⁷ The yearbooks (*salnames*) of the state and provinces¹²⁸ and some of the journals¹²⁹ are primary source that supply valuable data for this study.

In addition to the Ottoman state archives I resorted to the correspondence between the British consuls to the Anatolian province of the Ottoman Empire and the British embassy in Istanbul, between the embassy and the authorities in London as well as the annual reports about the Ottoman state. I tapped into two major files of the British Foreign Office: FO 421 (Confidential Print, Southeastern Europe, 1903) and FO 424 (Confidential Print, Asiatic Turkey, 1890-1908).

Memoirs and diaries are also used to complement the official primary sources. However, these sources should be read carefully, not only because they are subjective and constructed but also because they were produced either under the Young Turk regime or that of the Republic.¹³⁰ In such subjective testimonies, authors usually either praise or vilify their contemporaries with a concern for justifying or vindicating themselves. Moreover, individuals overtly or subtly practice self-representation through personal narratives including memoir, auto/biography, travel notes, diaries, or even books. To put it more explicitly, personal narratives, like all texts, are constructed, and therefore reveal conscious or subconscious tendencies and biases. The biographer should thus be aware of the possible mechanisms a narrator might have employed, such as selective writing, omission, rationalization, and highlighting.¹³¹ Keeping this in

¹²⁷ Recep Karacakaya, *Kaynakçalı Ermeni Meselesi Kronolojisi (1878-1923)* (Istanbul, Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 2001).

¹²⁸ The Yearbook of 1326/1908 (*Devlet Salnamesi*); The 1305/1887 Yearbook of Konya; The 1308/1890 Yearbook of Sivas; The 1310/1893 Yearbook of Ankara.

¹²⁹ *Servet-i Funun*, no. 325; *Takvîm-i Vakâyi*, 10 Şevval 1265, no. 410; *Takvîm-i Vakâyi*, 29 Şaban 1266, no: 427; *Tanin*, 24 July 1324 (6 August 1908), no: 6, p. 3.

¹³⁰ For “political and ideological meanings attributed to memoirs” in Turkey see Doğan Gürpınar, “The Politics of Memoirs and Memoir- Publishing in Twentieth Century Turkey,” *Turkish Studies*, 13:3, (2012): 537-557.

¹³¹ For the use of the discourses provided by the memoirs see Thomas Couser G., *Memoir: An Introduction* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); James Olney, *Metaphors of Self* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); Carolyn Steedman, *Past Tenses* (London: Rivers Oram Press, 1992); Tuija Parvikko, “Memory,

mind, the pieces of Memduh's last years are collected with the help of various memoirs and history books.¹³²

Another primary source that this thesis consulted is the published works of Memduh such as *Yemen Kit'ası Hakkında Bazı Mütalaat*,¹³³ *Mir'at-ı Şuunat*,¹³⁴ *Feveran-ı Ezman*,¹³⁵ *Esvat-ı Şudur*,¹³⁶ *Tasvir-i Ahval Tenvir-i İstikbal*,¹³⁷ *Hal'ler İclaslar*,¹³⁸ and *Kuvvet-i İkbal Alamet-i Zeval*.¹³⁹ In the absence of a personal archive such as memoirs, diary and letters, his books take on a particular importance, but they also present special problems. Because they were written with a concern to survive under the difficult circumstances of the Young Turk regime, these books probably have some parts in which Memduh tried to justify his Hamidian background. Due to his active bureaucratic career as well as his family relations, Memduh had an opportunity to witness, understand, and explain the political, financial, and social events of the nineteenth century. However, "he refrains from describing and explaining the period where he was the decision-maker, and he likewise omits information which might cause him

History and the Holocaust: Notes on the Problem of Representation of the Past," *Redescriptions: Yearbook of Political Thought and Conceptual History*, (8/2004): 189–209; Richard Freadman, *Threads of Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).

¹³² Mehmed Nazım Paşa, *Selanik Vali-i Sabıkı Nazım Paşa'nın Hatıraları* (İstanbul: Arba, 1992); Mehmet Tefik Biren, *Bürokrat Tefik Biren'in Sultan II. Abdülhamid, Meşrutiyet ve Mütareke Hatıraları*, V. I, ed. Fatma Rezan Hürmen (İstanbul: Pınar Yayınları, 2006); Lütfi Fikri, *Dersim Mebusu Lütfi Fikri Bey'in Günlüğü: Daima Muhalefet* (İstanbul: Arba, 1991); Tahsin Paşa, *Abdülhamid ve Yıldız Hatıraları* (İstanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitaphanesi, 1931); *Arap İzzet Holo Paşa'nın Günlükleri-Abdülhamid'in Kara Kutusu* (İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2019); Hasan Ferit Ertuğ, "Musahib-i Sani-i Hazret-i Şehriyârî Nadir Ağa'nın Hatıratı I," *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 49 (January 1998), 39-40.

¹³³ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Yemen Kit'ası Hakkında Bazı Mütalaat* (Dersaadet: Numune-i Tıbaat Matbaası, 1324/1909-1910).

¹³⁴ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Mir'at-ı Şuunat* (İzmir: Ahenk Matbaası, 1328/1912-1913).

¹³⁵ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Feveran-ı Ezman* (İzmir: Vilayet Matbaası, 1324/1909-1910).

¹³⁶ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Esvat-ı Sudur* (İzmir: Vilayet Matbaası, 1328/1912-1913).

¹³⁷ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Tasvir-i Ahval Tenvir-i İstikbal* (İzmir: Vilayet Matbaası, 1328/1912-1913).

¹³⁸ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Hal'ler ve İclaslar* (İstanbul: Matbaa-ı Hayriye, 1329/1913-1914).

¹³⁹ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Kuvvet-i İkbal Alamet-i Zeval* (İstanbul: Matbaa-ı Hayriye, 1329/1913-1914).

difficulties. When it is impossible for him to withhold the facts, he tends to defend himself vehemently.”¹⁴⁰

1.5. Organization of the Chapters

This study is organized chronologically. Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive account of the power struggle between the Porte and the palace at the Ottoman central administration in the age of reform. Memduh had performed in different bureaucratic capacities against the backdrop of these power relations, which had persisted throughout the nineteenth century. In the latter part of the chapter, I explore Memduh’s family background, early career, literary activities and Sufi attachment by connecting all these personal experiences to structural themes such as elite cultivation in the late Ottoman Empire. Based on Memduh’s case I attempt to identify the major qualities that would enable one to become an Ottoman bureaucrat in this period. The chapter ends with a detailed account of the properties that Memduh acquired in his early career as well as entrepreneurial activities he engaged during his unemployment period from 1878 to 1881.

In an effort to reconstruct the Hamidian imperial context in which the large part of Memduh’s life story unfolded, in Chapter 3, I explain the circumstances that resulted in the ascendancy of Abdülhamid and examine the similarities between the policies of Mahmud Nedim and Abdülhamid. Based on Çetinsaya’s periodization of Abdülhamid’s domestic policy,¹⁴¹ I delineate the major political developments of the time and discuss the key aspects of the Hamidian bureaucracy such as patrimonialism, centralization, and the conflict between the palace and Porte. In the last section of the chapter, inspired by the new

¹⁴⁰ Cemal Kafadar, Hasan Karateke, Cornell Fleischer, “Mehmed Memduh,” *Historians Of The Ottoman Empire*, 2006, 2.

¹⁴¹ Gökhan Çetinsaya, “II. Abdülhamid’in İç Politikası: Bir Dönemlendirme Denemesi,” *The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, 47 (2016). The revised English version of this article is recently published as a book chapter: “Sultan Abdülhamid II’s Domestic Policy: An Attempt at Periodization,” in *Abdülhamid II and His Legacy, Studies in Honour of F. A. K. Yasamee*, eds. Ş. Tufan Buzpınar and Gökhan Çetinsaya (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2019), 39-63.

perceptions of the state and society relations, I analyze the limits of the “Hamidian absolutism”.


Chapter 4 zooms in the governing experience of Memduh from 1887 to 1895 in three neighboring provinces of Anatolia: Konya, Sivas and Ankara. This phase of Memduh’s biography offers a deep insight about the missions of governors, who functioned as the intermediaries between the center and provinces in the Hamidian era. Tracing his activities illuminates a broad range of political, social, and economic issues that prevailed in the provincial setting. Furthermore, the chapter includes various anecdotes that revealed Memduh’s governing capacity, careerist ambitions, and relations with his colleagues, and the local people.

Chapter 5 examines Memduh’s ministerial career under five major themes: the 1894-1896 Armenian crisis, the conflicts in Yemen, the Macedonia question, the power relations at the palace, the Porte, and the provinces, and Memduh’s economic activities. This chapter also surveys the development of the Ministry of Interior and the institution of *Darülaceze*, a social welfare institution under the Ministry of Interior. The section that concentrates on the economic aspect of Memduh’s life discloses the properties, investments, and the contracts that he was granted by Abdülhamid. This part of the thesis gives an idea about how the resources, such as administrative power or intimacy with the sultan, that were accumulated by an upper official could be used to derive some personal benefits in the Hamidian regime.

Table 1.1. Mehmed Memduh's Bureaucratic Career¹⁴²

Department & Position	Period	Salary
The Foreign Ministry, Apprentice (<i>Mülazım</i>)	1854-1861	no payment
Palace Secretariat Office, Scribe (<i>Mabeyn-i Hümayun Kâtibi</i>)	1861-1862	1500 kuruş
Office of the Receiver Office, Clerk (<i>Âmedi Odası Hülefası</i>)	1862-1872	5000 kuruş
Reporting Officer (<i>Encümen-i Mahsus Zabıt Memuru</i>)	1872-1873	6000 kuruş
Ministry of Education, Clerk (<i>Maarif Nezareti Mektupcusu</i>)	1873-1875	5000 kuruş
Grand Vizier's Secretary (<i>Sadaret Mektupcusu</i>)	1875-1876	10,000 kuruş
Ministry of Finance, Clerk (<i>Maliye Nezareti Mektupcusu</i>)	1876-1877	7000 kuruş
Unemployment (<i>Mazuliyet</i>)	1878-1881	2000 kuruş
Member of Council of Financial Affairs (<i>Şura-yı Umur-u Maliye Azası</i>)	1881-1882	5000 kuruş
Member of Council of State (<i>Şura-yı Devlet Azası</i>)	1882-1887	5000 kuruş
Governor (<i>Vali</i>) of Konya	1887-1889	17,000 kuruş
Governor (<i>Vali</i>) of Sivas	1889-1892	17,000 kuruş
Unemployment (<i>Mazuliyet</i>)	1892-1893	6000 kuruş
Governor (<i>Vali</i>) of Ankara	1893-1895	17,000 kuruş
Minister of Interior (<i>Dahiliye Nazırı</i>)	1895-1908	40,000 kuruş

¹⁴² BOA, DH.SAİD. 1/84, 29 Zilhicce 1255/4 March 1840.



Map 1.1. The important places in Memduh's biography

CHAPTER 2

MEHMED MEMDUH: CAREER IN THE OTTOMAN POWER STRUCTURE

2.1. Introduction

Chapter 2 is comprised of four parts. In the first part I situate Memduh in the power structure of the Ottoman central administration in the nineteenth century. This part of the thesis is critical because I constructed Memduh's biography upon the idea that he belonged to the pro-palace group led by Mahmud Nedim Pasha and his life story developed in parallel with the power shifts between the sultan's palace and the civil officialdom's Sublime Porte.

In the following two parts I focus on his early life and career, beginning from his family background to his appointment as governor of Konya in 1887. I do this by relating his story to the larger issues of the empire. Based on his experience I attempt to reach some conclusions about the major qualifications that were necessary for being a successful bureaucrat in the late Ottoman Empire.

Moreover, by examining the literary activities and Sufi connections of Memduh, I demonstrate how the three fields; bureaucracy, poetry, and Sufism, intersected and contributed to the elite production of the period. In the last part of the chapter I zoom into economic aspect of Memduh's biography. I provide a thorough account of the properties he acquired until he was appointed to governor of Konya. I also dwell on his entrepreneurial activities during his unemployment period from 1878 to 1881.

2.2. Contest between the Palace and the Porte in the Age of Reform

Mehmed Memduh was born in 1839 in Istanbul to a bureaucratic family. His father Mustafa Fehmi Mazlum Pasha was Undersecretary of Naval Affairs. His maternal grandfather Ömer Lütfi Efendi was an experienced bureaucrat, who

served in various high-ranking positions.¹⁴³ Having a humble background Mazlum Pasha probably depended upon his father-in-law to enter into the Ottoman bureaucracy; in which he and his two sons, Ahmed Tevfik and Mehmed Memduh, and later his grandsons had successful careers.

The year 1839 was a turning point not only for Mazlum Pasha's family, for they welcomed their second son, but also for the Ottoman Empire as Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839) passed away and his son Abdülmecid ascended to the throne. Following his father, Abdülmecid continued to introduce substantial reforms in the imperial administration. On 3 November 1839 the Gülhane (Rose Chamber) Decree was proclaimed under the auspices of Abdülmecid. With that "the initiative of reform was transferred from the palace to the Sublime Porte (bureaucracy)"¹⁴⁴ and the Tanzimat Era began.

The 1839 Imperial Decree introduced a series of new legislations assuring the right to life and property, forbidding bribery, and regulating taxation and conscription. All these new laws would apply to all Ottoman subjects, Muslim and non-Muslim, rich and poor alike. In the subsequent years the Tanzimat statesmen had launched administrative, legal, and economic reforms to realize the promises given in the Gülhane Decree. Memduh's long career evolved against the backdrop of this comprehensive transformation in the Ottoman central and provincial administration throughout the second half of the nineteenth century.

Memduh, like Abdülhamid II, was born into a hopeful world in which "liberal ideas and confidence in modern scientific and technological achievements inspired a sense of common destiny for humankind and the possibility of

¹⁴³ Filiz Kılıç, "Giritli Divan Şairleri," *Hacı Bektaş Veli Araştırma Dergisi*, No. 32 (Winter, 2004).

¹⁴⁴ Ahmet A. Ersoy, *Architecture and the Late Ottoman Historical Imaginary: Reconfiguring the Architectural Past in a Modernizing Empire* (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), 12.

building heaven on earth.”¹⁴⁵ Furthermore, Britain - the leader of the post-Napoleonic Wars’ Europe - had a friendly approach to the Ottoman Empire and others in the European system were acting in harmony with her. Despite such optimistic perception of the time, the Tanzimat was far from a smooth period for the Ottomans. It was rather imbued with uncertainties. The reforming process was unstructured and eclectic. The power relations were highly intricate. Ahmet Ersoy’s account captures the complexity of the Tanzimat.

Not a thoroughly orchestrated program of reform, the Tanzimat instead comprised a complex set of pragmatic measures and negotiations crafted in response to myriad local exigencies as well as to international policies and pressure. In its complex dramaturgy of change, therefore, the period of intense social and political transformation embodied deep fractures as well as marked continuities, hovering as it did between evocations of the past and veneration of the new.¹⁴⁶

In fact, the reformation movement had begun long before the declaration of the 1839 Decree. Starting from the eighteenth century the idea of change had been in the agenda of the Ottoman leadership and the intellectuals. Sultan Mahmud II probably introduced the most radical changes to the Ottoman political system. He exterminated the Janissary corps in 1826 and curbed the provincial power magnets.¹⁴⁷ By doing so not only did he consolidate and centralize political authority but also eliminated two major checks on the practices of the central government. The historic equilibrium in the Ottoman polity was disrupted.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁵ Engin Deniz Akarlı, “The Tangled Ends of an Empire: Ottoman Encounters with the West and Problems of Westernization-an Overview,” *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East*, vol. 26, no. 3 (2006), 354.

¹⁴⁶ Ersoy, *Architecture and the Late Ottoman Historical Imaginary*, 13.

¹⁴⁷ For the Ottoman local power magnates see Engin Deniz Akarlı, “Provincial Power Magnates in Ottoman Bilad el-Sham and Egypt, 1740-1840” in *La vie sociale dans les provinces arabes à l’époque ottomane*, vol. 3, A. Temimi ed. (Zanghouan, Tunisia, 1988); Albert Hourani, “Ottoman Reform and Politics of Notables.” In *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East; The Nineteenth Century*, eds. William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, 41-68, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).

¹⁴⁸ Roderic Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876* (Princeton University Press, 1963), 32.

The annihilation of the most critical actors of the Ottoman implicit contract that had been restraining the absolutist tendencies of the palace¹⁴⁹ left the society vulnerable. As observed by Davison, “power now lay with the Palace and the Porte, and the possibilities of direct oppression of the people by the central government were thereby increased.”¹⁵⁰ The disruption of the old equilibrium led to far-reaching structural consequences for the Ottoman polity. One of them was the competition between the Porte and the palace for dominance. Indeed, they were not alone in the political power game of the late Ottoman Empire. In the following decades the configuration had become more complex. By the early 1860’s, the constitutionalists, the new military organization, and the intellectuals had also been involved; thereby the old power struggle between the palace, janissaries, and ulema was replaced by the highly dynamic and unstable balance of power between the palace, intellectuals, bureaucracy, and military.

The pendulum swung between two powerhouses, the Porte and the palace, throughout the nineteenth century. During the long reign (1808-1839) of Mahmud II political power devolved into the hands of the sultan at the expense of upsetting the balance at the center and the periphery. Beginning with an official promise to respect the basic individual rights, which were drastically violated during the reign of Mahmud II;¹⁵¹ the Tanzimat era (1839-1871) witnessed the dominance of civil bureaucracy against the palace. Mustafa Reşid, Âli, and Fuad Pashas were the most prominent reformist statesmen of this

¹⁴⁹ Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991), 116.

¹⁵⁰ Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 32.

¹⁵¹ According to Abu-Manneh, the Gülhane Edict was essential to appease the Muslims of the empire who were alienated and infuriated by Sultan Mahmud’s despotic governance. Mahmud not only destructed the provincial notables as part of his aggressive centralization policy but also violated some of the Islamic principles. The Edict was translated and sent to all the provinces to make known publicly. Butrus Abu-Manneh, “Mehmed Ali Paşa and Sultan Mahmud II: the Genesis of a Conflict,” *Turkish Historical Review*, 1 (2010), 22. As recounted by Ahmed Cevdet, the response was quite positive and the public opinion turned in favor of the Ottoman central government and the sultan everywhere including the places such as Damascus and Aleppo occupied by the forces of Mehmed Ali of Cairo with whom Mahmud had a long-term conflict. Ahmed Cevdet, *Tezâkir* Vol. II (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1953), 7-8.

period. Upon the death of Âli Pasha in 1871 Mahmud Nedim Pasha, a pro-palace bureaucrat was promoted to the grand vizierate and attempted to reassert the sultan's power,¹⁵² but neither Sultan Abdulaziz nor the circumstances were convenient for establishing a political order resembling the one under Mahmud II. Political instability and economic crisis overwhelmed the years between 1871-1876. After a brief constitutionalist period Sultan Abdülhamid reasserted the power of the palace and fixed the pendulum at the Yıldız Palace until the 1908 Young Turk Revolution.

&

Born in the same year of the declaration of the Gülhane Decree; Memduh grew up, socialized, and entered into the civil service during the Tanzimat era. The first two decades of his career overlapped with this period. His father Mazlum Pasha, his brother Ahmed Tevfik, his maternal uncle Mehmed Azmi Bey, and his father-in-law Mustafa Naili Pasha served in the Tanzimat cadres.

Notwithstanding its appearance as a harmonious epoch under the reformist bureaucrats and a weak and reconciling sultan, the Tanzimat era had different visions for the empire. In the early 1860s there were three groups having different proposals about the political regime. The first and the dominant group was made of the Tanzimat bureaucrats who were defending an authoritarian state of law. They opted for Austrian and Prussian autocracy instead of British and French constitutionalism. A few able statesmen, such as Mustafa Reşid and his two disciples, Âli and Fuad Pashas, would rule the state. After their benefactor passed away Âli and Fuad Pashas stayed in power until 1871 despite

¹⁵² By the early 1870s more and more people were critical of the Tanzimat men and their pro-British and French policies. The hopeful days were behind, the state was in debt and in crisis, and France and Britain were not keeping their promises to the Empire. Thus, Mahmud Nedim seemed to be a reasonable option for he was defending the opposite of what Âli and Fuad advocated. He was not only promoting the restoration of central power to the palace but also balancing the French and British influence with the Russian one. According to Roderic Davison, the streams of discontent that appeared from in the early 1870s were not well defined but if there were any common ground, it was the familiar broad desire to strengthen the empire against European pressures and domestic separatism. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 270.

“the displeasures of Sultan Abdulaziz (1861-1876), their unpopular acts of reform, and growing opposition which they encountered.”¹⁵³ Their objective was to keep the government strong and stable and this could, for them, only be possible by concentrating the power at the Porte and preventing the intervention of the sultan and the palace in state affairs. Two groups challenged the Porte’s absolute authority: the pro-palace group led by Mahmud Nedim Pasha and the constitutionalists made up of various intellectual and bureaucratic figures such as Midhat Pasha, Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, and Namık Kemal.¹⁵⁴ The pro-palace group, the statesmen loyal to Abdülaziz such as Mahmud Nedim who were, according to Şükrü Hanioglu, “labeled ‘Old Turkey’ by foreign diplomats”¹⁵⁵ were not against Tanzimat reforms but they were critical of the excessive influence of the French and British on the Ottoman political affairs.

Coming from an established family Mahmud Nedim, the most prominent of the pro-palace group, served in various government offices before he became Mustafa Reşid Pasha’s secretary when the latter was assigned grand vizier in 1846. After three years, Mahmud Nedim was promoted to Receiver-General (*Âmedi*) and he remained at this post even after his patron, Mustafa Reşid Pasha, was removed from the office in 1852.¹⁵⁶ During the grand vizierate of

¹⁵³ Butrus Abu-Manneh, “The Ascendancy of Âli and Fu’ad Paşas at the Porte (1855-1871)” in *Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century*, ed. Butrus Abu-Manneh (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2001), 120.

¹⁵⁴ Gökhan Çetinsaya, Kalemîye’den Mülkiye’ye Tanzimat Zihniyeti in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasal Düşünce Vol 1, Cumhuriyet’e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet Birikimi*, eds. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 68.

At this juncture it would be useful to quote from Ahmet Ersoy in order to appreciate the common ground shared by the groups that appeared to be in conflict. “Instead of being severely divided by cultural rifts, most participants in the new debate over the nature of the Tanzimat reforms, from the illuminati of the upper bureaucracy to the runaway littérateurs of the Young Ottoman underground, shared a background in official training and were imbued with the same ethos of serving the dynastic state.” Ersoy, *Architecture and the Late Ottoman Historical Imaginary*, 13.

¹⁵⁵ Hanioglu, *A Brief History of Late Ottoman Empire*, 109.

¹⁵⁶ Interestingly, despite his close connection with Mustafa Reşid Pasha, Mahmud Nedim was not influenced by his ideas. Abu-Manneh, “The Sultan and the Bureaucracy:

Mustafa Naili Pasha, who later became Memduh's father-in-law, Mahmud Nedim was promoted first as the councilor of the grand vizier (*beylikçi*) and then as the undersecretary of the grand vizier. Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha succeeded Naili Pasha and in the meantime Reşid Pasha became the foreign minister. With that Mahmud Nedim's eight years of service at the grand vizierate came to an end. He followed his benefactor and was assigned as the councilor of the foreign minister. Before long, he requested to be assigned as governor of the province of Saida. After almost a year of service in Syria he came to Izmir and worked there for one and a half year.¹⁵⁷

Soon after Reşid Pasha's death in the beginning of 1858 he returned to Istanbul. During Mahmud Nedim's absence Reşid Pasha managed to surpass his opponents, Damads (imperial son-in-laws) Mehmed Ali and Ahmed Fethi known as the pro-palace group. However, as Memduh stated in his *Esvat-ı Sudûr*, a prosopography of the Ottoman grand viziers served during the nineteenth century, the two parties not only disgraced each other but also mismanaged the crisis, which resulted in the Crimean War.¹⁵⁸ Consequently, they were both regarded incompetent for undertaking the state affairs, thus Âli and Fuad Pashas emerged as the new leading figures. This was the victory of the Porte over the palace.

Deprived of the support of his patron, Mahmud Nedim was at the mercy of Âli and Fuad who did not seem to trust him.¹⁵⁹ He was appointed as the minister of commerce. However, he and his brother lost their jobs during the purge undertaken in the wake of the Kuleli Affair (1859).¹⁶⁰ One of the underlying

The Anti-Tanzimat Concepts of Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Pasa," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 22, no. 3 (Aug., 1990), 261.

¹⁵⁷ İnal, *Son Sadrazamlar*, I; Ali Akyıldız, "Mahmud Nedim Paşa", *TDVİA*, Vol. 27, 2003, 374-376.

¹⁵⁸ Mehmed Memduh, *Esvat-ı Sudûr* (İzmir, 1328), 13.

¹⁵⁹ İnal, *Son Sadrazamlar* Vol. I, 267-268.

¹⁶⁰ In September 1859 a group of army officers and ulema unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Sultan Abdülmecid in order to enthrone Sultan Abdülaziz. This is called Kuleli Affair in historical sources. For Kuleli Affair see Uluğ İğdemir, *Kuleli Vak'ası Hakkında Bir Araştırma* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1937); Burak Onaran,

reasons behind their exclusion from power space was probably their connection with the Naqshbandi-Khalidi order,¹⁶¹ which played a key role in the organization of the Kuleli Affair. Mahmud Nedim's father Gürcü Necib was a follower of the Naqshi-Khalidi order.¹⁶² According to Abu Manneh, "as a Naqshbandi-Khalidi, Nedim's father would have brought up his son to believe in the principles of Orthodox Islam and that Shari'a rules should be supreme in society and state."¹⁶³ Abu Manneh considers this background important to explain the Young Ottomans' plan to have Mahmud Nedim as the grand vizier to replace their archenemy Âli Pasha during the late 1860s. Furthermore, Mahmud Nedim had intimate ties with Damad Mehmed Said, a pro-palace, who was famously attached to Sufi thought.

The Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi order and its branch, the Khalid suborder,¹⁶⁴ enjoyed prominence in Istanbul in the early phase of the nineteenth century.¹⁶⁵ The government functionaries, and the literary elites in the Ottoman capital, who made up the upper sections of the Ulema, were adherents of this sufi order. Şeyhülislam Mekkizade Mustafa Asım Efendi (served 1833-1846) was affiliated with the Khalidi suborder, his father Mekki Efendi and his father-in-law

Padişahı Devirmek: Osmanlı Islahat Çağında Düzen ve Muhalefet: Kuleli (1859), Meslek (1867) (Istanbul: İletişim, 2017).

¹⁶¹ Butrus Abu-Manneh argues that "Mahmud Nedim never followed suite, he seems to have enjoyed company of Sufis.

Abu-Manneh, "The Sultan and Bureaucracy," 260.

¹⁶² Butrus Abu-Manneh, "The Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya in the Ottoman Lands in the Early 19th Century," *Die Welt des Islams*, 22 (1982-84), 24.

The Naqshbandiyya order and its branches including the Mujaddidiyya and the Khalidiyya, played a critical role in preservation and consolidation of Sufism against the assaults of the movements of Salafiyah and Wahhabiyya throughout the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Butrus Abu-Manneh, "Transformations of Naqshbandiyya, 17th and 18th Century," *Die Welt des Islams*, 43, 3 (2003), 308.

¹⁶³ Abu-Manneh, "The Sultan and the Bureaucracy," 260.

¹⁶⁴ For history of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi order see Hamid Algar, "The Naqshbandi Order: A Preliminary Survey of Its History and Significance," *Studica Islamica*, no. 44 (1976).

Butrus Abu-Manneh, *Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century (1826-1876)* (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2001).

¹⁶⁵ *Vak'a-nüvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi I*, (Ankara: TTK, 1988), 286.

Butrus Abu-Manneh, "The Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi in Istanbul in the Early Tanzimat Period, in *Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century (1826-1876)*, ed. Butrus Abu-Manneh (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2001), 11.

Şeyhülislam Sammanizade Ömer Hulusi Efendi were followers of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi order. Mekkizade Mustafa Asım Efendi's successor Şeyhülislam Arif Hikmet Bey (served between 1846-1854) was the son of İbrahim İsmet Bey who was a devoted Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi order. Although Arif Hikmet was not affiliated with a Sufi order but his activities attest that he was inclined to it. Successors of Arif Hikmet in the 1860s and the early 1870s were too followers of Naqshbandi order. Furthermore, numerous distinguished preachers of Istanbul were adherents of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidiyya during this period.¹⁶⁶

The high-ranking statesmen were also among the followers of this Sufi order. The most prominent ones were Hüsrev Pasha, the commander-in-chief of the new army (*Asakir-i Mansurey-i Muhammediyye*) between 1827 and 1836; Pertev Pasha, a high official under the reign of Mahmud II and one of the deputies of Naqshi Sheikh Ali Behçet, Gürcü Necib Pasha, the governor of Damascus and later on Baghdad and the father of Mahmud Nedim Pasha, the grandfather of Mehmed Bey¹⁶⁷, and Musa Safveti Pasha, the Minister of Finance. There were also upper functionaries who were indirectly affected by the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidiyya order, most prominent of whom were Mustafa Reşid (1800-58) and Sadık Rifat (1807-1865) for they were the protégés of Pertev Pasha.¹⁶⁸ According to Abu-Manneh, after mid 1850's the influence of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidiyya had decreased and the dominance of Âli and Fuad Pashas coincided with this period.¹⁶⁹

Mahmud Nedim and his family were considered as a threat to the Porte-centered Tanzimat regime because of their close connection to the palace and the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidiyya. Seeing no future for himself in Istanbul, Mahmud Nedim voluntarily went to Tripoli as a governor and remained there

¹⁶⁶ Abu-Manneh, "The Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi in Istanbul in the Early Tanzimat Period."

¹⁶⁷ Mehmed Bey was from Young Ottoman movement.

¹⁶⁸ For Sadık Rifat's traditional Islamic tendency see Bernard Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 133.

¹⁶⁹ Abu-Manneh, "The Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi in Istanbul in the Early Tanzimat Period."

for seven years. There he had a chance to reflect upon the state policies and practices. In 1861, Abdülaziz ascended to the throne. Diagnosing the causes of the setback of the Ottoman state and proposing solutions for them, Mahmud Nedim came up with *Ayine-yi Devlet* (The Mirror of State), a treatise that was addressing to the new sultan. Comprised of sixty-one pages, *Ayine-yi Devlet* was like a “political credo,”¹⁷⁰ including some proposals to reinstate the old Ottoman order.¹⁷¹

Reminding Abdülaziz of the former governing principles of the empire, Mahmud Nedim provided an alternative path to the Tanzimat, which put an end to the supremacy of the sultan.¹⁷² He gave opinions to correct the wrongs that had been made during the nineteenth century before the enthronement of Abdülaziz. According to Mahmud Nedim, the sultan was the keystone in the Ottoman political system and if the empire was to regain its strength the sultanic power had to be refurbished. Sultans of the good old times of the empire were absolute (*mustakil*) and determined. They were personally involved in all government affairs and the state was governed in accordance with their will. Yet still, like other statesmen, they were bounded by law and the laws were based on the Islamic and communal fervor. All this united the community and the sultanate, and empowered the empire. Thus, for Mahmud Nedim “the decline of the sultan's power and the rise of the bureaucracy and the ulema lay at the root of the state's and the Muslim millet's weakness”.¹⁷³ As shall be discussed in the coming passages of the thesis, Memduh’s biography includes a great deal of elements that shares these assumptions of Mahmud Nedim.

&

¹⁷⁰ Abu-Manneh, “The Sultan and the Bureaucracy,” 261.

¹⁷¹ Mahmud Nedim Paşa, *Âyine ve Hasbihâl* (Istanbul: Karabet Matbaası, 1327/1909).

¹⁷² Gökhan Kaya, “Bürokratik Nüfûza Karşı Monarşik Egemenliği Yeniden Kurgulamak Üzerine Bir Girişim: Mahmud Nedim Paşa’nın Görüşlerinde Ahlâk ve Devlet İdaresi,” *Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi*, 38 (Fall 2015).

¹⁷³ Abu-Manneh, “The Sultan and the Bureaucracy,” 262.

Memduh and his father were close to the pro-palace group, led by Mahmud Nedim, and the earlier mentioned damad pashas (imperial son-in-laws) whose ambition was to shift the locus of power from the Porte to the sultan like it had been in the past centuries.¹⁷⁴ Memduh and his father were followers of Nakshibendi Sufi order.¹⁷⁵ Even though he did not overtly criticize the Tanzimat policies and statesmen in his writings, Memduh's professional journey included a great deal of elements attesting his advocacy to the idea of all-powerful sultan. Memduh had intimate ties with Mahmud Nedim. He composed a short poem appreciating Mahmud Nedim.¹⁷⁶

The most critical evidence of their intimacy is Memduh's appointment as the Secretary of the Grand Vizier on 20 October 1875¹⁷⁷ with the personal request of Mahmud Nedim during his second term at the grand vizierate. His appointment took place at the expense of another young and ambitious official, who along with Memduh and some other upper level bureaucrats would constitute the Hamidian Bureaucracy in the 1890s.¹⁷⁸ Said Bey, later known as Küçük Said Pasha,¹⁷⁹ was the secretary of the grand vizier and Memduh was secretary at the Ministry of Education. Mahmud Nedim Pasha, who was recently appointed as the grand vizier, decided to exchange Memduh and Said

¹⁷⁴ Ahmed Cevded Pasha and Tunuslu Hayrettin Pasha too were of the similar opinion but they were not as overt as Mahmud Nedim Pasha.

¹⁷⁵ As will be explained in the last part of this chapter Memduh was one of the most prominent followers of Mustafa İsmet Efendi, a deputy of Mevlana Halid-i Bagdadi coming from Naqshibendi order.

Muharrem Varol, *Islahat, Siyaset, Tarikat: Bektaşiliğin İlgası Sonrasında Osmanlı Devleti'nin Tarikat Politikaları (1826-1866)* (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2013).

¹⁷⁶ The poem is below:

*Bu tasvir-i hümayunu görenler sadrı devlette
Sanurlar bir güneşdir asümana ziybüfer vermiş
Değil pırlanta etrafında bu tasviri garranın
Cenab-ı Yusuf'a tacı pür güher vermiş*

Bedri Aydoğan, "Edebiyatçıların Arkası Şiirli Armağan Fotoğrafları," *Çukurova Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, vol. 15, no. 1 (2006).

¹⁷⁷ BOA, İ.DH. 709/49647, 20 Ramazan 1292/20 October 1875.

¹⁷⁸ Kırmızı, *Abdülhamid'in Valileri*. There is a thorough explanation about the conceptualization of Hamidian Bureaucracy in the fourth chapter.

¹⁷⁹ Said Pasha became the head clerk of the *Mabeyn* in the early years of Abdülhamid's reign. He also held the post of grand vizierate for a long period of time in the Hamidian era and sometime later in the Second Constitutional Period.

Bey. The explanation Mahmud Nedim made for this exchange was that the secretary of grand vizier had to be trustworthy. The new grand vizier was of the opinion that Said Bey was in the party of Hüseyin Avni Pasha with whom Mahmud Nedim was on bad terms. Refusing to work as a secretary at the Ministry of Education Said Bey resigned.¹⁸⁰

By the early 1870s the pioneers of the Tanzimat faded from the stage. In an effort to undermine the dominance of the Sublime Porte, Abdülaziz supported various marginalized statesmen.¹⁸¹ After long years of struggle and patience Mahmud Nedim became grand vizier in 1871 and got a chance to repeal the Tanzimat policies and realize his vision that idealized the early Ottoman mode of governing. Since he considered Memduh trustworthier than Said Bey, first thing he did was to appoint Memduh as his secretary. This anecdote is very critical in locating Memduh in the competing visions of the late Ottoman political structure.

Another important evidence supporting Memduh's affiliation to the pro-palace group is dedication of his poetry book, *Eser-i Memduh*, to İbrahim Edhem Pertev Pasha in 1872. Pertev Pasha was one of the prominent figures of the pro-palace group and he was carefully kept out of the key positions by Âli and Fuad Pashas because of his palace promoting ideas.¹⁸² When Mahmud Nedim became grand vizier after the demise of Âli Pasha in 1871, he appointed Pertev and Ahmed Vefik Pashas to critical posts. However, Mahmud Nedim's removal from the grand vizierate in 1872 changed their fate. They, like Mahmud Nedim, were sent

¹⁸⁰ "Hizmet-i sadaret mektubculuğunun emniyete mensubiyeti mutalâasmca Maarif mektubcusu Memduh Bey'in sadaret ve Said Bey hazretlerinin Maarif mektubculuğuna becayişleri..." As expectedly, Said Pasha denies this claim saying that he was appreciated by both Hüseyin Avni and Es'ad Pashas because of my good work not anything else.

Sadrazam Sa'îd Paşa, Sa'îd Paşa'nın Hâtirâtı, vol. I (Istanbul: Sabah Matbaası, 1328/1912), 8.

Zeki Pakalın, *Son Sadrazamlar ve Başvekiller*, vol. 5, 22.

Zekeriya Kurşun, "Küçük Said Paşa" (PhD Dissertation, Marmara University, 1991).

¹⁸¹ Hanioglu, *A Brief History of Late Ottoman Empire*, 110.

¹⁸² Abu-Manneh, "The Sultan and the Bureaucracy," 265.

from Istanbul. Pertev Pasha became the governor of Kastamonu. Under these circumstances Memduh penned a poetry book, *Eser-i Memduh*,¹⁸³ and dedicated it to Pertev Pasha, who was also a famous poet. In this book he asserts the superiority of pen over sword.

More interestingly, according to the explanation he made in the introduction of his *Divan-ı Eş'ar*, a compilation of all his poems, which was published after the Young Turk Revolution, Memduh wrote a poem in the form of ode (*gazel*) that rhymed with the word “*millet*” (nation) and he wanted to add it to *Eser-i Memduh* to be published in 1872. However, he thought that the book would be banned, thus (since it would be considered detrimental to the political order) he decided to wait for the right time to publish it, and he published *Eser-i Memduh* without this particular poem. As will be discussed in the context of the post 1908 era, highlighting his Constitutionalist stance in the 1870s was one of the strategies that Memduh, who became a *persona non grata* after the reinstatement of the Constitution in 1908, adopted to be accepted by the Young Turks. What is important in this context is this poem, if it was composed in the early 1870s as Memduh asserted, it may be seen as an indication of Memduh’s inclination¹⁸⁴ towards the ideas of the Young Ottomans. The pro-palace group and the Young Ottomans had a common foe: the Sublime Porte’s absolutism. They also agreed on the necessity of establishing Islam as the basis of governance. Thus, Memduh’s slight tendency towards the Young Ottomans was not necessarily in conflict with his palace affiliation.

Even though he was twice appointed by Abdülaziz to the grand vizierate, Mahmud Nedim’s dream of “all-powerful ruler who attended in person to the

¹⁸³ Mehmed Memduh, *Eser-i Memduh* (Istanbul, 1289/1872-1873).

Memduh was working at the Ministry of Education when he published this poetry book.

¹⁸⁴ As will be discussed in the last part of this chapter, Memduh was not committed to the ideals of the Young Ottomans but had a possible tendency towards the Young Ottomans.

daily affairs of the state”¹⁸⁵ could not be achieved under the reign of Abdülaziz. It was his successor, Abdülhamid II, who prudently concentrated the power in his hands, making the palace locus of political authority. Mahmud Nedim passed away in 1883. He could not witness the sultan-centered rule of the Hamidian era, but Memduh, a young member of the camp advocating the strengthening of the palace for gaining back the empire’s strength, was lucky enough to contribute to Abdülhamid’s political system by serving in different capacities for three decades. After nine years of governing service in three major Anatolian provinces between 1887 and 1895, Memduh became the Minister of Interior. During his ministerial years he became one of the critical figures in forming the constellation of the “Hamidian bureaucracy.” As the details of his biography attest, Memduh remained loyal to the sultan under all circumstances during the Hamidian era.

All in all, Memduh’s rise overlapped with the rise of the pro-palace group and the palace-based Hamidian regime. Thus, his biography is a representative example illustrating the power struggle between the civil bureaucracy and the Palace. The struggle resulted in favor of the former in Memduh’s early career and the latter during the Hamidian era when he served in high-ranking positions. Thus, his professional journey demonstrates power shifts between the palace and the Porte in the late Ottoman administration.

Memduh’s attachment with the pro-palace group went beyond his personal story. Senior members of his family were also pro-palace. His father Mazlum Pasha’s career track indicates that he also belonged to the group advocating the empowerment of the Palace against the Porte. During the mid-1850s the Ottoman capital witnessed a fierce conflict between the civil bureaucracy led by Mustafa Reşid Pasha and the pro-palace group who derived their power from their close connection with the palace and “their control of the armed

¹⁸⁵ Abu-Manneh, “The Sultan and the Bureaucracy,” 257.

forces.”¹⁸⁶ Though this long conflict exhausted both parties and damaged the state affairs, Reşid Pasha triumphed over the palace group who were holding military based bureaucratic posts and rose in the palace culture. As observed by Abu Manneh after the destruction of the janissary corps the Serasker (Commander-in-Chief and Minister of War) was appointed from those who had close connections with the palace. They were strong advocates of preservation of the sultan’s power. Hüsrev Pasha, the creator of the new army, Damad Mehmed Sa’id, and Damad Halil Rif’at belonged to this group. This very tradition was maintained during the reign of Abdülmecid (1839-1861).

The three most senior military posts in the state, namely that of *Serasker*, *Tophane Müşiri* (i.e. The Grand Master of the artillery) and *Kapudân-ı Derya* (i.e. the Commander of the Fleet), throughout the first half of the Tanzimat period were controlled almost exclusively by a group of men whom we may call the “palace group”.¹⁸⁷

Mazlum Pasha became the Grand Master of the artillery in 1838. After this prestigious position he was appointed to another military post in 1839 and became Undersecretary of Naval Affairs. He continued serving at various other critical posts in the following years. He became a member of the Council of Judicial Ordinance (*Meclis-i Ahkam-ı Adliye*)¹⁸⁸ in 1840. In the same year the sultan commissioned him to bring back the Ottoman Navy from Egypt.¹⁸⁹ Such a critical task would only be given to someone that the sultan and Hüsrev Pasha, a strong advocator of Sultan’s power, trusted. For he successfully fulfilled this

¹⁸⁶ Butrus Abu-Manneh, “The Roots of the Ascendancy of Âli and Fu’ad Paşas at the Porte (1855-1871),” in *Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century*, edited by Butrus Abu-Manneh, 115-124 (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2001), 116.

Mahmud Nedim Pasha was not alone in promoting the idea of strong sultan for the recovery of the empire. Bureaucrats having direct connection to the palace and those serving at military related posts were also against the absolutism of the Porte.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 116.

¹⁸⁸ This was a prestigious executive and judicial institution, which was founded in 1838 by Mahmud II to make the reforms and inspect their execution.

Ali Akyıldız, “Meclis-i Vâlâ-yı Ahkâm-ı Adliyye”, *TDVİA*, Vol. 28, 2003, 250-251.

¹⁸⁹ Once Abdülmecid ascended to the throne in 1839 Hüsrev Pasha became the grand vizier. After having heard that his bitter foe gained the full authority in Istanbul the chief admiral Ahmed Fevzi Pasha, who was then around the Aegean Sea, decided to go to Egypt with the Ottoman Navy. This anecdote is crucial to comprehend the significance of personal disputes and factionalism in the Ottoman administration in the early decades of the nineteenth century.

duty, Mazlum Pasha was assigned to the Department of Superintendent of Military Expenditure (*Masarifat Nezareti*). The following year he was appointed as a member of the Supreme Council (*Meclis-i Vala*) where he stayed until the end of his life (1862). Furthermore, he became the steward of Egypt (*Mısır Kapı Kethudası*) in 1842, mediating the administrative affairs between the Ottoman center and Egypt. Later on, he was appointed as the Chief of Justice (*Deavi Nazırı*) and he remained at this post until 1852.

Mazlum Pasha was the Undersecretary of Navy when Sultan Abdülaziz came to power in 1861. He was appointed as the steward to sultan's mother, Pertevniyal. In the meantime on 11 July 1861 he became the Minister of Private Treasury of the sultan. However, he was dismissed from these two posts not long after due to Âli Pasha's personal request. Based on Küçük Said Pasha's account, Mahmud Kemal İnal provides an explanation on the dismissal of Mazlum Pasha. According to İbnülemin, soon after the enthronement of Sultan Abdulaziz, Mazlum Pasha had an official trip to İzmit and at the Ministerial Council he demanded from the Minister of Finance, Taşçızade Tefik Pasha, to pay for his travel expenses. As Tefik Pasha remained silent and Mazlum Pasha repeated his demand by raising his voice. Disturbed by this behavior Grand Vizier Âli Pasha wrote a letter to the palace requesting the dismissal of Mazlum Pasha as the Minister of Private Treasury and Steward of Sultan's mother. Not long after his dismissal Mazlum Pasha passed away.¹⁹⁰ İbnülemin's explanation provides accurate information, however an issue such as this requires a more comprehensive analysis of the power relations between the bureaucrats.

In order to understand the real cause of Mazlum Pasha's dismissal from two critical posts it is necessary to consider the Kuleli Affair. Mazlum Pasha sided with some of the suspects while Grand Vizier Âli Pasha opposed the idea of amnesty. Sulemani Sheikh Ahmed Efendi was the most effective actor of the secret organization behind the Kuleli Affair. He was not only a Naqshi-Khalidi

¹⁹⁰ İnal, *Son Şairler*, 384.

sheikh but was also once a member of the Ottoman army who fought in the Crimean War (1853-56). Ahmed Efendi arranged the plots against Abdülmecid with a group of outstanding army officers such as general Hüseyin Daim Pasha and Cafer Dem Pasha. When he ascended to the throne, Abdülaziz pardoned them. Other than Sheikh Ahmed, who was sentenced to a lifelong confinement in a fortress, the sultan forgave all the suspects.¹⁹¹ Excusing such a crime was almost impossible. Hence, not surprisingly, Grand Vizier Âli Pasha opposed the idea of an amnesty. However, according to Abdurrahman Adil,¹⁹² by virtue of the traditional and patronage relations Mazlum Pasha, who was then the steward of sultan's mother, played a crucial role in the sultan's decision of amnesty. Mazlum Pasha and his family were known with their association to the Naqshibendi order.¹⁹³ It is asserted that one of the third-level suspects of the Kuleli Affair was Mazlum Pasha's sheikh Fazlullah of Hazergrad.¹⁹⁴ It is also asserted that Azmi Bey, Mazlum Pasha's brother in-law (Memduh's maternal uncle), who was then Minister of Silk supported this unsuccessful plot but he was not charged.¹⁹⁵

Based on this anecdote, it can be assumed that both the Naqshbandi order and the Young Ottoman movement unified against the absolutist rule of the Porte during 1860s. As highlighted earlier, though they proposed different solutions for the integrity of the empire the pro-palace group and the constitutionalists

¹⁹¹ *Vak'a-nüvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi X*, 26-27.

¹⁹² Abdurrahman Adil, "Tanzimatta İlk Cürm-i Siyâsî-Kuleli Vak'ası ve Ahmed Rasim Bey," *Hâdisât-ı Hukukiyye*, XV (Istanbul: İkdam Matbaası, 1340), 210.

This source is referred in Muharrem Varol, "Kahramanlıktan Kalebendliğe: Kuleli Vak'asının Baş Aktörü Süleymaniyeli Şeyh Ahmed'e Dair Bilinmeyenler," *Tasavvuf: İlmî ve Akademik Araştırma Dergisi*, 35 (2015/1), 111.

¹⁹³ Mazlum Pasha is buried at the yard (*hazire*) of Taşlıburun Lodge of a Sa'diyye branch of Naqshibendi order. Filiz Kılıç, "Giritli Divan Şairleri."

¹⁹⁴ Muharrem Varol, *Islahat Siyaset Tarikat Bektaşiliğinin İlgası Sonrasında Osmanlı Devleti'nin Tarikat Politikaları (1826-1866)* (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2013), 232.

¹⁹⁵ Adil, "Tanzimatta İlk Cürm-i Siyâsî-Kuleli Vak'ası ve Ahmed Rasim Bey," 210.

In the ensuing years Azmi Bey became the steward of Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, an Egyptian prince living and serving in Istanbul. Mustafa Fazıl Pasha is known for his sponsoring the Young Ottoman activities in Europe. Due to his being the steward of Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, Azmi Bey was in charge of finance and administration of the Young Ottoman community.

İnal, *Son Şairler*, 142-143.

known as the Young Ottomans¹⁹⁶ challenged the authoritarian rule of the Tanzimat bureaucrats who were of the opinion that the empire had to be governed only by the heavy hand of the Sublime Porte.

As suggested by Abu Manneh, besides imprisoning the offenders, Âli and Fuad Pashas, the Kuleli Affair (1859) was seen as an opportunity to remove bureaucrats who were considered untrustworthy such as Mahmud Nedim Pasha. "Comparing the list of government members in 1859, 1860, and 1861 one notices the changes that took place among the leading personalities at the ministerial level."¹⁹⁷ As explained above Mazlum Pasha, too, lost both of his posts one of which was Ministry of Private Treasury, probably in relation to the stance he took in the Kuleli Affair. The officials such as Ziya Bey and Ibrahim Şinasi who happened to be disciples of Mustafa Reşid Pasha were also dismissed. Ziya Bey was serving at the Mabeyn¹⁹⁸ and he was removed by Âli Pasha on the suspicion of plotting against him with recently enthroned Abdülaziz in 1861.

To sum up, both positions, the steward of sultan's mother and the Minister of Private Treasury that Mazlum Pasha was holding would indicate a close contact with the sultan and his family. Mazlum Pasha was a member of pro-palace

¹⁹⁶ The Young Ottomans were the most active opposing figures to the Tanzimat policies. The group was comprised of some bureaucrats and intellectuals who were critical of the reforms introduced by the civil bureaucrats who gave no credit to the ideas such as freedom and parliamentary system. The Young Ottomans thought that the Tanzimat was nothing but a submission to the European orders. They tried to find a middle ground between the Islamic tradition and European political thought. They were particularly opposed to the political and economic terms of the Islahat Edict (1856), which was an important aspect of the Tanzimat, upsetting the Ottoman socio-economic order. In 1865 they founded a secret society. As openly criticized the state policies their newspapers were closed and prominent figures were exiled to distant parts of the empire. Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*; Nazan Çiçek, *The Young Ottomans: Turkish Critics of the Eastern Question in the Late Nineteenth Century* (London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 2010).

¹⁹⁷ Abu-Manneh, "The Roots of the Ascendancy of Âli and Fu'ad Paşas at the Porte," 121.

¹⁹⁸ *Mabeyn* literary refers to "what is between". This office was located at the palace and it managed the communication between the palace and the Sublime Porte, imperial periphery and the outside world.

group and attached to the Khalidi-Naqshibandi order. Thus, Âli Pasha must have considered him not suitable for the Porte centered political system of the Tanzimat.

In the same period Memduh was also working at the Mabeyn. During the enthronement ceremony of Sultan Abdülaziz he presented a short historical writing consisting of five verses that he composed. As an appreciation of this gesture and his literary skill Sultan Abdülaziz ordered the appointment of Memduh to the Mabeyn with the salary of fifteen thousand kuruş. This anecdote may also be considered as an indication of Memduh's belonging to the pro-palace group. Memduh stayed at this post less than a year. Not long after his father's dismissal he was removed from the Mabeyn, the office that could enable him to have a close relationship with the sultan. It is not specified how and on what basis he was relocated to the Office of the Receiver (*Âmedi Odası*), where he worked for a decade. Yet, it was likely that his being a pro-palace might have had an effect on his removal from the palace service. Âli Pasha, who believed that palace should refrain from joining the political scene, might feel threatened by a possible alliance between the new sultan and the officials who were looking for an opportunity to move the governance once again to the palace and the Sultan.

Giritli Mustafa Naili Pasha,¹⁹⁹ who later became Memduh's father-in-law, was also at odds with the Tanzimat statesmen. After serving long years at Crete

¹⁹⁹ Memduh had four wives: The first was Hatice Hanım, daughter of Abdüllatif Bey whose father was Minister of Finance Abdurrahman Nafiz Pasha. The second was Nazlı Hanım, granddaughter of Giritli Mustafa Naili Pasha (1798-1871). The third was Circassian Nazenen Hanım and the fourth was Circassian Şehbal Hanım. This family information is from the notes taken by Sabiha Rüştü Bozcalı (1904-1998), granddaughter of Memduh, who is one of the first women painters of Turkey.

<https://archives.saltresearch.org/handle/123456789/5548>

Mustafa Naili Pasha, an Albanian origin statesman, was born in the Ottoman province of Salonika. During his youth he stayed in Egypt along with his father and maternal uncles Tahir and Hasan Pashas and served in the administration of Albanian origin Mehmed Ali Pasha, governor of Egypt. In July 1821 Christian Greeks revolted in Crete and the Sultan Mahmud II authorized Mehmed Ali Pasha to suppress the revolt. Assigned by Mehmed Ali Pasha, Mustafa Naili went to Candia, the largest city of Crete,

Mustafa Naili Pasha became grand vizier in May 1853. At that time Mustafa Reşid Pasha, the Foreign Minister, had de facto authority. Mustafa Naili Pasha did not consent to this situation and the conflict between him and the Foreign Minister caused both of their dismissal on 8 July 1853. Two days later, both of them came back to their posts but the dispute between them continued and even affected the Council of Ministers. During the early days of the Crimean War (1853-1856) the Council discussed the issue of borrowing from an international source. Probably disturbed by the dominance of Reşid Pasha in the discussion, Naili Pasha, in the capacity of grand vizierate, rebuked the Foreign Minister by saying that “you do not allow me to do my job.” In response Reşid Pasha left the meeting and only came back after the requests of the mediating deputies. On the next day (30 May 1854) Naili Pasha was removed from the grand vizierate position. He was replaced by Kıbrıslı Mehmed Pasha. Later Reşid Pasha occupied the office until May 1855 and Âli Pasha until December 1856. The former became the grand vizier again after his protégé but as the Ottoman’s relationship with France and Russia got tense he left the post to Naili Pasha on 2 August 1855. During that time, they made peace. As the tension between the Ottoman state and France eased Reşid Pasha was reappointed on 22 October 1855.²⁰⁰

As underlined earlier, Mahmud Nedim was promoted to the post of councilor of the grand vizier (*beylikçi*) under the grand vizierate of Mustafa Naili Pasha. Mahmud Nedim was removed from the post when Kıbrıslı Mehmed Pasha came to office. These details are important for grasping power relations at the Porte. To conclude, it is clear that both Mazlum Pasha and Mustafa Naili Pasha belonged to the pro-palace and the anecdotes above reveal that the prominent Tanzimat statesmen tried to exclude them from key positions.

along with Hasan Pasha and Hüseyin Bey of Kavala to put down the revolt and rule the region. Soon Crete came under the Egyptian authority as part of Mehmed Ali’s expansionist policy. Mustafa Naili was appointed as the governor of Crete and he remained there for the next three decades as the governor of the island. Therefore, he was called “Giritli” (Mustafa Naili Pasha of Crete).

Davut Hut, “Mustafa Naili Paşa”, *TDVİA*, EK-2, 2016, 328-329.

²⁰⁰ Şeker, *Ders ile Sohbet Arasında*, 228-229. İnal, *Son Sadrazamlar*.

As earlier highlighted, Memduh was transferred from the Mabeyn in 1862 to the Office of the Receiver (*Âmedi Odası*) where for a decade. In 1872 he was appointed as the chief secretary of the Ministry of Education. In 1875, during the second term of Mahmud Nedim, he was promoted to the secretariat of the grand vizier. He was transferred to the secretariat of the Ministry of Finance in 1876 upon the dismissal of his patron Mahmud Nedim from the post. Memduh had served at the Ministry of Finance for fourteen months. In 1878 he lost his job due to downsizing of the government offices. During his unemployment from 1878 to 1881, he engaged in several entrepreneurial activities.²⁰¹ He returned to the government service in 1881. He served in the Council of State from 1881 to his appointment to Konya in 1887. In the ensuing two decades he became one of Abdülhamid's favorites.

Overall, Memduh's career developed in parallel with the power struggle embedded in the late Ottoman political structure. As exemplified above his pro-palace approach aided Memduh's rise in bureaucracy. He was promoted when the palace had an upper hand. He was promoted to the Mabeyn in 1861 and to the secretariat of grand vizier in 1875 when the palace surpassed the Porte. However, he was removed from these posts once the palace lost ground to the Porte. He advanced his career in the palace-centered Hamidian era. As a junior member of the pro-palace group of the Tanzimat period, Memduh had become one of the key figures of Abdülhamid's political system, which was an actualization of Mahmud Nedim's vision of the imperial governance. Memduh made substantial contribution to the construction of an omnipotent cult of personality around the Sultan-Caliph. It is possible to observe his servility in all his writings to the sultan. Furthermore, as will be detailed in the upcoming sections of the thesis, in addition to having a prestigious career he made use of all the opportunities the Hamidian system provided to achieve various personal benefits.

²⁰¹ BOA, DH.SAİD. 1/84, 29 Zilhicce 1255/4 March 1840. For wealth and entrepreneurial activities of Memduh see the last section of this chapter.

2.3. Becoming an Ottoman Bureaucrat

2.3.1 Coexistence of Formal and Informal Practices

Evolved against the backdrop of the contest between the palace and the Porte, Memduh's life course provides valuable insights about the features that would enable one to become an Ottoman bureaucrat during the age of reform. Based on his experience we can derive some ideas about the process of bureaucratic career in Istanbul in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

Notwithstanding the formalization efforts in the nineteenth century informal procedures such as patronage remained intact for official appointments. Memduh's father Mustafa Mazlum Pasha's integration into the Ottoman bureaucracy through his father in law, Ömer Lütfi Efendi, is an example demonstrating how the patronage ties worked for incorporating those who might not otherwise have the chance to take part in government service.²⁰² Relevance of such informal procedures must have slowed down the rationalization of the Ottoman statecraft but at the same time it proves that the Ottoman state had never been closed off.

Having a patron as a stepping-stone was a typical practice among the young and somewhat talented individuals pursuing a career in the Ottoman administration before the nineteenth century. This method maintained its relevance during the age of reform even after the establishment of modern educational institutions such as rüşdiye schools. Focusing on the Tanzimat era, Roderic Davison argues that the absence of clear and specific criteria for appointments and holding posts in the imperial service contributed to the notion that informal procedures were of considerable importance in official appointments. According to Davison, the ruling class of the Tanzimat era was "an aristocracy of office rather than

²⁰² Mustafa Mazlum (1812-1862) was from Candia, the biggest city of Crete. When he came to the imperial capital with his mother in 1821 he was eight years old. Mazlum and his mother resided at Fatih district, an old and renowned neighborhood in the capital. One of their neighbors was Ömer Lütfi Efendi who was from Crete too. After his basic education Mazlum married Hatice, daughter of Ömer Lütfi Efendi, at a young age. Nermin Vahid, *Boğaz'daki Kırmızı Köşk* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2008).

blood. The tendency grew for sons of officials to follow their fathers' calling, but birth was in itself no guarantee of official position, and the ruling group was replenished by additions from below."²⁰³ Illustrating the fact that the Ottoman "state had never been closed off"²⁰⁴ Mazlum Pasha's case is a representative example of how "the ruling group was replenished by additions from below" through informal procedures.

Patronage networks could also be formed through *intisab*, which requires an attachment to a grandee's household²⁰⁵ and the possession of certain talents and qualifications. In the eighteenth century, for instance, if one was to be part of the bureaucratic elite, "ideally, he was required to behave as an Ottoman in manners and etiquette and possess certain skills, the most noted of which was the mastery of the *elsine-i selase*, the three languages, namely Arabic, Persian and Turkish."²⁰⁶ However as rightly suggested by Aksan "these characteristics, which contributed to the portrait of an Ottoman did not remain static, but changed with transformations in state organization, social framework and the changing nature of tradition, manners and language."²⁰⁷ Memduh's experience in the changing administrative system of the nineteenth century is a vivid example, demonstrating the transforming parameters of the Ottoman bureaucratic tradition, manners and language.

²⁰³ Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 32.

²⁰⁴ Marc Aymes, Benjamin Gourisse, Elise Massicard, *Order and Compromise: Government Practices in Turkey from Late Ottoman Empire to the Early 21st Century* (Leiden – Boston: Brill, 2015), 5.

²⁰⁵ As suggested by Carter Findley "in the case of individuals whose entry depended on the formation of *intisab* connections, and who, to produce the displays of talent necessary for that purpose, must have been somewhat older and more experienced, the protector would have been the head of the patrimonial household to which the young man had become attached." Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 94. In principle, as the system of brevets of appointment implies, appointment was a matter of centralized official procedures. In practice, appointment making depended to an important degree on the influence of a patron and meant appointment to a position in whatever part of the bureaucracy fell under the patron's control or influence.

²⁰⁶ Fatih Yeşil, "How to be(come) an Ottoman at the End of the Eighteenth Century," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları/The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, XLIV (2014), 124.

²⁰⁷ Virginia Aksan, *Savaşta ve Barışta Bir Osmanlı Devlet Adamı Ahmed Resmi Efendi (1700-1783)*, translated by Özden Arıkan (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1997), 10-30.

Patrons would have been candidate's father,²⁰⁸ father-in-law²⁰⁹ or any other senior relative, already in government service. Thus, coming from a family who had connections within the state was also an important facilitator to become a civil servant in the Ottoman realm. For instance, two experienced bureaucrats, his father and grandfather, had an influence on Memduh's and his brother Ahmed Tefvik's integration into the government service. This guild-like procedure continued in the later part of the nineteenth century in the career of Memduh's two sons, Mustafa Raik and Mazlum Hamit.

Furthermore, socializing in a bureaucratic environment might have contributed to identity formation as an Ottoman statesman. Memduh spent his childhood at Kuzguncuk²¹⁰ and Kanlıca²¹¹ and his early teenage youth at Arnavutköy.²¹² In parallel with his father's advancements in government service, they moved to an affluent neighborhood and Memduh became acquainted with the bureaucratic elite circle of Istanbul.

In the mid-1840s Memduh began to attend some official ceremonies due to his family's official position. Mehmed Ali Pasha, governor of Egypt, and the Ottoman central administration had decades of perpetual conflict over the

²⁰⁸ Most of the thirty-nine chief scribes of the period 1768-1836 were officials' sons. Scribal officials who did not grow up in scribal households were especially dependent for the success of their careers on establishing a patron-client "connection" *intisab* with well-placed officials. Carter Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 48.

²⁰⁹ Many young men entered into the scribal service by patron-client links that often later included a marriage to a woman from a patron's household. Findley argues that "the senior parties to the relationships used them to augment the household-centered networks through which they sought to defend themselves in the intense factionalism of the upper official echelons." Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, 51.

²¹⁰ According to Üsküdar Municipality records Mazlum Pasha family lived at one part of Armenian Beylikçiyan's kiosk at Kuzguncuk Baba Nakkaş Street. This kiosk was three floor and within a garden. <https://www.uskudar.bel.tr/tr/main/erehber/saraylar-kasirlar-koskler/47/baba-nakkas-sokagi-yokusu-koskleri/816> accessed 2 January 2019 at 13:24.

²¹¹ As referred in an instance in Mehmed Memduh's book *Mir'at-ı Şuunat* (p. 29 in Turkish version) in 1853 Mazlum Pasha family was living at a mansion and neighbor to Sadık Rifat Pasha, the Foreign Minister.

²¹² Fulya Eruz, "Yalı", *TDVİA*, Vol. 43, 2013, 301-305.

authority of Egypt, Crete, and Arabian Peninsula. The Egyptian crisis, as it is called in the Ottoman history literature, was resolved with the mediation of the European powers, soon after Abdülmecid's accession to the throne. As an indication of his goodwill towards Sultan Abdülmecid, Mehmed Ali Pasha decided to build a palace known as Hidiv Kasrı, at the Asian side of Bosphorus. In July 1846 the groundbreaking ceremony was held with the presence of Sultan Abdülmecid. Seven years old Memduh attended this historic ceremony with his father who was then the Minister of Justice (*Deavi Nazırı*).²¹³

Having said that, the comparison of the careers of Memduh and his brother suggests that although informal procedures might facilitate an entry to the in government service, they were certainly not sufficient for advancement. One had to have some personal and educational qualifications to reach upper levels of the Ottoman bureaucracy. Though not indispensable, graduation from rüşdiye school could provide a better chance of an official service appointment in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Unlike his brother, Memduh enrolled rüşdiye school after primary school education in his neighborhood. He was one of the first rüşdiye graduates who were employed at a government office. He joined the Beyazid Rüşdiye School and *Valide Mektebi (Darulmaarif)* where he took several courses including Qur'an, Catechism (*ilmihal*), Arabic, Persian, Geography, Arithmetic, Calligraphy,²¹⁴ Geometry, Physics, Astronomy, Orthography (*imla*), *inşa*.²¹⁵ Basic religious/ethical, scientific, and linguistic training he received during his four years of rüşdiye education prepared Memduh for official service. At the rüşdiye he gained not only skills but also acquired friends who constituted the most prominent intellectual elites of the late nineteenth century. Renowned poet

²¹³ Mehmed Memduh, *Mir'at-ı Şuunat* (İzmir: Ahenk Matbaası, 1911). P.?

²¹⁴ According to *Meclis-i Maarif-i Umumiye Rüşdiye* school curriculum in 1846: Qur'an, İlmihal, Arabic, Persian, Geography, Arithmetic, Hüsn-ü Hatt. Takvîm-i Vakâyi, 10 Şevval 1265, no. 410; Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, VII (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1967), 194.

²¹⁵ The Darulmaarif curriculum in 1850: Arabic, Persian, Calculation, Geography, Hendese, Physics, Astronomy, İmla, İnşa (Takvîm-i Vakâyî, 29 Şaban 1266, no: 427).

and author Namık Kemal (1840-1888),²¹⁶ Süleyman Hüsnü (1838-1892)²¹⁷ who became the Minister of Military Schools, and Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha were Memduh's classmates at Bayezid Rüşdiye School and *Valide Mektebi*. These childhood relations were reinforced in the following years with official and literary ties.

2.3.2. "Mülazemet" at the Foreign Ministry

Completing rüşdiye education in 1854 Memduh embarked on his bureaucratic career as an apprentice at the office of chief secretary of the Foreign Ministry where he worked for six years without payment.²¹⁸ This tradition was called *mülazemet* in the Ottoman bureaucracy. The *mülazıms* were aspirants both in professional terms, as student clerks, and in economic terms, as an unpaid position.²¹⁹

In the Ottoman bureaucratic tradition being an official was a lifetime experience that began at a very young age and lasted more than half a century, as it also was in the case of Mehmed Memduh. In the eighteenth century a scribal official would generally begin apprenticing before the age of ten after completing elementary mosque school. This practice continued in the nineteenth century and as observed by Findley, "there were many who began by the early teens and some who thus accumulated service records running into six and seven decades."²²⁰ Findley relates the practice of having a long training period as an apprentice to the guild tradition, which had profound influence on the administrative career patterns. As he puts, "guild-like patterns of organization and procedure were strongly entrenched within the scribal service, especially in

²¹⁶ For a thorough account of Namık Kemal as well as compilation of all his articles see İsmail Kara and Nergiz Yılmaz Aydoğdu, *Osmanlı Modernleşmesinin Meseleleri: Bütün Makaleleri 1* (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2019).

²¹⁷ Mehmed Memduh, *Mir'at-ı Şuunat*, 82.

²¹⁸ BOA, DH.SAİD. 1/84, 29 Zilhicce 1255/4 March 1840.

In the same year (1854) Mazlum Pasha was appointed as the undersecretary of Minister of Defense (*Serasker Müsteşarı*).

²¹⁹ Mehmet İpşirli, "Mülazemet", *TDVİA*, Vol. 31, 2006, 537-539.

²²⁰ Carter Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1980), 94.

its lower echelons, and continued to exert their influence well into the era of reform, if indeed they ever ceased to.”²²¹

Given the increasing prominence of the Foreign Ministry in the Ottoman state affairs, the office of Foreign Ministry was a promising beginning for a young official like Memduh. In the classical Ottoman administration there was no independent foreign office. *Reisülküttab* was dealing with the foreign affairs until the creation of an independent ministry in the mid nineteenth century. Under the authority of *Nişancı*, *Reisülküttabs* were hired from scribal service (*kalemiye*). *Reisülküttab* was not a member of the *Divan-ı Hümayun*. As the Sublime Porte and grand vizier gained more power in the eighteenth century *Nişancı* lost ground to *Reisülküttab*. This is mainly because the former was not directly attached to the grand vizier who was the head of the new focal point of power and also because the empire’s foreign relations began to intensify from the eighteenth century onward.²²²

The reign of Mahmud II (1808-1839) was marked by great deal of troubles threatening the very existence of the Empire. The Ottoman central state had to prudently deal with the war against Russia (1806-1812), Iran (1820), the 1821 Greek Revolt, French occupation of Algeria, the Egyptian Crisis, and the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi with Russia (1833). Intensification of the diplomatic relations or rather bargaining with European powers entailed sending ambassadors to Paris, Vienna, and London in 1834. Handling the expanded foreign relations and coordinating communications with the newly-established embassies became ever-harder within the classical institutional framework of the Sublime Porte. Therefore, the central state had to formulate effective solutions and if necessary form new institutions conducing to changes in the state structure. Against the backdrop of these developments Mahmud II made a number of changes in the administrative order. He transformed the office of

²²¹ Ibid., 30.

²²² Ali Akyıldız, *Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilatında Reform* (İstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 1993), 71.

Reisülküttaplık into the Foreign Ministry, the *Sadaret Kethüdalığı* into the *Umuru Mülkiye* (the Office of Administrative Affairs), which became the Ministry of Interior in 1836.²²³ Yozgatlı Akif Pasha, the *Reisülküttab* of the time, was appointed to be the first Foreign Minister. The first office of the Foreign Ministry was the mansion of Rif'at Pasha, the ambassador to Vienne. Not long after Ahmed Hulusi Pasha and then Mustafa Reşid Pasha became the Foreign Minister. In addition to the ever-increasing diplomatic affairs with the outside world the Foreign Ministry was dealing with wide range of issues including the industrial development, quarantine, legal matters of the non-Muslim communities of the empire.

In the Ottoman state archive there are more than fifteen thousand official documents produced between March 1854 and 1861, during the period Memduh was working as an apprentice at the Chief Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, which was probably the busiest among all the departments of the Sublime Porte. During the six years he worked as a secretary, Memduh not only learned the basics of the scribal service, administrative procedures and conventions but he also acquainted himself with great deal of issues related to diplomatic affairs, non-Muslim Ottomans, foreigners, conversions, quarantine, foreign ambassadors, and telegram lines between Istanbul and the provinces.²²⁴ Dealing with huge volumes of data about the imperial affairs at the Foreign Ministry in such an early age must have contributed to Memduh's development as an Ottoman statesman.

In the first three years (1854-1857) Memduh worked with his brother Ahmed Tevfik who had already been working as an apprentice at the same office for ten

²²³ Ibid., 78.

²²⁴ During his six years of service at the office of the Foreign Ministry Memduh worked under eight different ministers including Mustafa Reşid Pasha (1853-54), Emin Âli Pasha (1854), M. Esad Safvet Paşa (1854-55) (acting Foreign Minister), Fuad Pasha (1855-56), Emin Âli Pasha (1856), Ibrahim Edhem Pasha (1856-57), Ali Galib Pasha (1857), Emin Âli Pasha (1857), Fuad Pasha (1857-58), Mahmud Nedim Pasha (1858-60) (acting), M. Esad Safvet Effendi (1860) (acting), Emin Âli Pasha (1860-61), Fuad Pasha (1861), Emin Âli Pasha (1861-67).

years.²²⁵ During this period Memduh also became familiar with the political affairs and faces due to his family's connections and the affluent neighborhood they were living in. As he highlights in his book *Mir'at-ı Şuunat* from his father he acquired valuable information about the fragile relations between the Ottoman central administration and Egyptian administration, issues of Yemen²²⁶ and personal tensions and factionalism among the high officials.²²⁷

Being a young and ambitious apprentice growing up in the bureaucratic environment, Memduh socialized with members of the ruling elite at mansions. Mansions and kiosks played a pivotal role in the political, literary, social and artistic lives of the Ottoman elites in the nineteenth century. Scholars, poets, and ministers used to convene at the mansions of distinguished personages such as Mustafa Reşid, Hersekli Arif, Hüseyin Avni, and Midhat Pasha.²²⁸

Memduh used to attend gatherings at Mustafa Reşid Pasha's mansion where he probably had some conversations with the distinguished political figures including Âli, Fuad, Mahmud Nedim, Rüşdü, and Cevdet Pashas and men of letters such as Müşfik, Şair Ali, Namık Kemal, Ziya and Kazım Pashas.²²⁹ During these years, (mid 1850s) Memduh was also attending gatherings at Mehmed Âli Pasha's mansion where he witnessed dialogs about the political events of the time such as the Crimean War.²³⁰ Memduh was in the last year of rüşdiye at the *Valide Mektebi* when the Crimean War broke out. The war was long under way, when Memduh began his apprenticeship at the Foreign Office. In collaboration with the great powers of Europe, the Ottomans defeated the Russians and the war ended with the Paris Treaty. Another critical event that took place when Memduh was at the Foreign Office was promulgation of the Islahat Decree in 1856. Reşid Pasha convinced the British and the French to support the

²²⁵ BOA, DH.SAİD. 4/156, 29 Zilhicce 1249/9 May 1834.

²²⁶ Mazlum Pasha wrote a memorial about Yemen in 1848.

²²⁷ Mehmed Memduh, *Mir'at-ı Şuunat*.

²²⁸ Şeker, *Ders ile Sohbet Arasında*, 157.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, 219.

²³⁰ Mehmed Memduh, *Mir'at-ı Şuunat*. Şeker, *Ders ile Sohbet Arasında*, 268.

Ottomans against Russia during the war. One of the conditions of this support was introducing sweeping reforms that would equalize Muslims and non-Muslims of the Ottoman society in all realms.

Moreover, based on Memduh's experience it is safe to say that in addition to have a bureaucratic family background and mingling with the elites of Istanbul, literary skills particularly that of poetry was significant for advancement as well as for stabilizing professional relations with the seniors. Literary circles such as the ones Memduh took part in, provided civil officials a space for socializing and possibly fostering class-consciousness.

2.3.3. Entry into the Palace Service

In the summer of 1861 Sultan Abdülmecid fell sick and died within the same year. His brother Abdülaziz ascended to the throne on 25 June 1861. During the enthronement ceremony Memduh presented his own composition of short historical writing consisting of five verses about the enthronement of the new sultan. As an appreciation of this gesture and literary skill new sultan ordered the appointment of Memduh to the Mabeyn with a salary of fifteen thousand kuruş.²³¹ Based on Memduh's account Mahmud Kemal İnal provides an anecdote about Memduh's encounter with Abdülaziz.²³²

Memduh was presented to the sultan after being appointed to the Mabeyn. The Sultan was sitting without his fez and robe in his office. When Memduh and Hakkı Pasha, the chief clerk of the Mabeyn, entered the room he wore his fez and put his robe on his shoulders. After honoring the sultan, Memduh took a step back with respect. Addressing Hakkı Pasha the sultan said that Memduh's father²³³ requested him, the sultan, to appoint Memduh's brother Ahmed Tevfik to the Mabeyn and Memduh to the Office of the Receiver in Ahmed Tevfik's

²³¹ *Mabeyn* literary refers to "what is between". As an office it managed the communication between the palace and the Sublime Porte, imperial periphery and the outside world.

²³² İnal, *Son Şairler*, 918.

²³³ Mazlum Pasha, who was then the steward of the sultan's mother

place.²³⁴ The sultan, however, thought that rewarding his brother would be injustice for it was Memduh who composed the piece not his brother. Therefore, appreciating his literary skill Sultan Abdulaziz appointed Memduh to the Mabeyn.

The Mabeyn was one of the most critical branches of the palace administration as it ensured an effective correspondence among the sultan, the agents in the Sublime Porte, all the provinces and also the foreign countries.²³⁵ At this office there were three to six clerks (scribes) until the reign of Abdülhamid II. It was after his death that the workload and influence of the office considerably expanded.²³⁶ Memduh was one of the four (Ali, Ziya,²³⁷ Hilmi, and Memduh Beys) scribes at the Mabeyn headed by Hakki Bey.²³⁸

This was a remarkable development in Memduh's career not only because he successfully completed his apprenticeship and became a full time official in a better position but also because the sultan personally granted him the position. Memduh's promotion to the Mabeyn is an evidence of the significance of the literary skills²³⁹ particularly that of poetry for the administrative appointments

²³⁴ Ahmed Tevfik was then serving the Office of the Receiver.

²³⁵ Ali Akyıldız, "Mabeyn-i Hümayun", *TDVİA*, Vol. 27, 2003, 283-286.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Famous poet and author who was one of the prominent Young Ottomans Mehmed Âtîf Efendi, *Hatıra-ı Atîf*, eds. Nurettin Gemici and Hikmet Toker, TBMM Milli Saraylar Daire Başkanlığı, 2016), 70.

Mustafa Reşid Pasha and Şayk al-Islam Arif Hikmet Bey's had an effect on Ziya Bey's entry in the palace as an official (Şeker, *Ders ile Sohbet Arasında*, 226).

²³⁸ Mehmed Âtîf Efendi, *Hatıra-ı Atîf*, eds. Nurettin Gemici and Hikmet Toker (Istanbul: TBMM Milli Saraylar Daire Başkanlığı, 2016), 68.

²³⁹ *Edeb* was a crucial part of the training in the Sublime Porte. As a synonym of *sunna* or custom, *edeb* means civility and comity. Following the age-old tradition, the young apprentices were introduced to the eastern political literature by studying key sources such as *Humâyûnnâme*, the Turkish translation of *Kalila and Dimna*, Ibn Khaldun's *Muqaddimah*, *Ethics of Nasîreddin Tusî* and *Ahlak-ı Alai* of Kinalızade Ali. F. Gabriel, F. "Adab," *Eİ2*, vol.I, 1954, 175-176. Goldziher, I. "Edeb," vol. IV, 1997, 105-106; Aksan, *Savaşta ve Barışta Bir Osmanlı Devlet Adamı Ahmed Resmî Efendi*, 13.

Fatih Yeşil compares "*edeb*" with Norbert Elias's *Höflichkeit* (courtesy), "which was employed in training the reliable and loyal bureaucrats in enlightening Europe". *Edib*, according to Yeşil, referred to a person who was equipped with knowledge of behaving

in the Ottoman realm.²⁴⁰ Memduh, in the ensuing years, continued to compose verses in different occasions. For instance he wrote a long *kaside* for Sultan Abdülaziz's travel to Europe.²⁴¹ He wrote *kasides* to the grand vizier Âli Pasha, Grand Vizier Yusuf Kamil Pasha, and Gazi Osman Pasha. These examples prove that Memduh successfully utilized his literary skills to stabilize his professional relations with his seniors in bureaucracy.²⁴² Furthermore, he composed a poem to celebrate the sultan's birthday.²⁴³ Yusuf Kamil Pasha also requested him to compose a poem rhymed with "*Haber yok nazlı canandan haber yok.*" This poem was turned into a song to be sung in the presence of Grand Vizier Âli Pasha who was then in Crete to deal with rebellions in the island.²⁴⁴ Memduh also composed a short poem to Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Pasha.²⁴⁵ In parallel with the advancement in his career Memduh was also very active in the literary circles during this period.

Besides literary activities many of the civil officials like Memduh and his father had attachment to Naqshbandi Sufi order. The nineteenth century witnessed

and speaking properly in certain conditions. Yeşil, "How to Be/come an Ottoman at the End of the Eighteenth Century."

²⁴⁰ Ziya Pasha's poems also contributed to his appointment to the *Mabeyn* Office. İnal, *Son Şairler*, 1985.

²⁴¹ Sultan Abdülaziz traveled to Europe talong with his entourage, his two nephews, Şehzade Abdülhamid and Şehzade Murad, and Foreign Minister Fuad Pasha in 1867.

²⁴² In addition to *kasides* attributed to these statesmen there is one *kaside* attributed to Sultan Abdülmecid and, as stated above, two *kasides* to Sultan Abdülaziz in Memduh's Divan. Interestingly enough there is no poem specifically attributed to Sultan Abdülhamid II despite the very fact that Memduh was known for his loyalty to the sultan during his service for three decades. This was most probably because Abdülhamid II was declared *persona non grata* in the post 1908 era and Memduh compiled his Divan in this period and published in 1913.

²⁴³ BOA, A.} MKT.MHM. 249/50, 16 Cemaziyelahir 1279/9 December 1862.

²⁴⁴ İnal, *Son Şairler*, 1321.

²⁴⁵ Memduh was then working at the Office of the Receiver. The poem is below:

*Bu tasvir-i hümayunu görenler sadrı devlette
Sanurlar bir güneşdir asümana ziybüfer vermiş
Değil pırlanta etrafında bu tasviri garranın
Cenab-ı Yusufu tacı pür güher vermiş*

The poem is quoted from Bedri Aydoğan, "Edebiyatçıların Arkası Şiirli Armağan Fotoğrafları," *Ç. Ü. Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Vol 15, No 1 (2006).

intimate relations between bureaucracy and Sufi orders.²⁴⁶ These two fields of power reinforced each other.²⁴⁷ As will be explained in the following part of this chapter, there was a nexus between bureaucracy, Sufi orders, and poetry in the nineteenth century Ottoman political and cultural space and the Ottoman elites of this period emerged out of this nexus.

2.3.4. Chance, Competence, Strategy, and Loyalty

Memduh's career has some aspects that can be taken as an example of interplay of chance, skills, and strategy. He was promoted to the Mabeyn in 1861 by Sultan Abdülaziz as an appreciation of his literary skill. In 1876 by chance he was informed of a critical intelligence about Abdülhamid II before he came to the throne.

The circumstances, under which Memduh and Abdülhamid II met, were quite decisive in determining both of their lives. Said Bey, who later became Grand Vizier Küçük Said Pasha, was appointed as the head scribe of the Mabeyn of the palace soon after Abdülhamid II ascended to the throne. As recounted by Mahmud Kemal İnal,²⁴⁸ a few days after his appointment he came into the presence of the new sultan and there, he was puzzled when he saw Mahmud Celeleddin Pasha at one side of the door and Memduh on the other. At that moment he could not figure out how and when they established such a strong connection (*intisab*) to the sultan. Mahmud Celeleddin helped Abdülhamid create a circle comprised of "reliable" functionaries such as Mahmud Nedim, Said,²⁴⁹ and Memduh.

²⁴⁶ For instance, Grand Vizier Fuad Pasha was involved with the Galata Mevlevi Lodge and his sheikh was Kudretullah Efendi and Minister of Finance Abdurrahman Nafiz Pasha attached to the Yenikapı Mevlevi Lodge. Although it is not clear if he was affiliated to him is unclear) or not Grand Vizier Âli Pasha and Qadiri sheikh Osman Şems Efendi.

²⁴⁷ Muharrem Varol, *Islahat, Siyaset, Tarikat: Bektaşiliğin İlgası Sonrasında Osmanlı Devleti'nin Tarikat Politikaları (1826-1866)* (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları: 2013).

²⁴⁸ İnal, *Son Şairler*, 919.

²⁴⁹ François Georgeon, *Sultan Abdülhamid* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2012), 50.

According to the anecdote Memduh recounts in his book “*Serair-i Siyasiye ve Tahavvülat-ı Esasiye*,”²⁵⁰ one night, sometime after the enthronement of Murad V, Memduh’s neighbor on the Bosphorus Şeyhülislam Hayrullah Efendi invited Memduh and told him that “in the morning I saw the queen mother and she said to me that the sultan (Murad V) was in good health but some rumors are circulating. In order to rebut the claims about the health of the sultan there will be a feast for the senior şehzades at the Nispetiye Kasrı.” Hayrullah Efendi added that Veliâhd Abdülhamid’s attendance to this event along with his brothers was not safe for him. With no delay he wanted to inform Memduh about the possible danger awaiting Abdülhamid there, so that şehzade could be informed about the situation. Memduh knocked the door of Mahmud Celaledin Pasha, Memduh’s friend from *Rüşdiye* school years and Abdülhamid’s brother in law as well as the head of Armory (Tophane) at Kabataş and told what he was informed by Hayrullah Efendi. Celaledin Pasha expressed his gratitude to be reported such a critical information and said that he was waiting for Osman Efendi, a steward of Abdülhamid, who later became the head of the Mabeyn, to send the message with him to Abdülhamid.

Next day, Celaledin Pasha met with Memduh and told him that Abdülhamid was very pleased with him (Memduh). As reported by Celaledin Pasha, Abdülhamid said that “I will not meet with my brother until he accepts the foreign consuls and personally has a conversation with them and I will not attend the feast. Reporting such a critical information attests the loyalty of the secretary (referring to Memduh).” Three months after this conversation Abdülhamid became the new sultan of the Ottoman Empire. Soon after his enthronement he invited Memduh to the Bağdad Kasrı to show his appreciation.²⁵¹

²⁵⁰ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Serair-i Siyasiyye ve Tahavvülat-ı Esasiyye* (Istanbul: 1328). Mahmud Kemal İnal quoted the anecdote in his prosopographic work *Son Şairler* on pages 919-920.

²⁵¹ İnal, *Son Şairler*, 919-920.

Memduh proved his loyalty to Abdülhamid II in a time no one could foresee that he would rule the empire in the following three decades. Apparently, and reasonably, the sultan did not forget this until he fell from power. With regard to the link between this intimate beginning that happened by chance and his bureaucratic career Memduh later on remarked that “previously I had no connection with the sultan and although I did not display any competency I did not fall out of work possibly because of the information I reported in a critical time.”²⁵² This candid and sincere remark of Memduh explains some of the controversial decisions, which will be detailed in the following chapters, taken by the sultan in favor of Memduh later in his career.

As recounted earlier, Memduh was granted a position by Sultan Abdulaziz due to the poem he presented in honor of the Sultan. Based on these two incidents one can argue that Memduh’s early career had some elements of chance which conducted important developments in his professional life, but as will be elucidated in the subsequent chapters, Memduh was not only competent in administration but also had the capacity to act in a calculated and strategic manner to stay in the posts he held and advance his career. Although it backfired in the post 1908 period, loyalty to the sultan played a pivotal role in underpinning what Memduh obtained by chance, hard work, and strategy throughout his career over half a century.

²⁵² “Daire-i hümayunlarına evelden hiçbir irtibat ve ihtisasım olmadığı halde mahza kazadan taharrüz ve tahaffuz elzemiyetini bilâ ifatei vakt ihbar etmeliğim tuli müddet açıktta kalmadığıma belki vesile olmuştur.” İnal, *Son Şairler*, 920.



Photo 2.1. Memduh in 1876

Source: Engin Özdenses, *Abdullah Freres Osmanlı Sarayının Fotoğrafçıları* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2016), 63.



Photo 2.2. Abdülhamid in 1870

Source: Özdenses, *Abdullah Freres Osmanlı Sarayının Fotoğrafçıları*, 63.

2.3.4. A Memorandum on Egypt: An Attempt at Showing his Capacity

Memduh was proactive as he used every opportunity to show his capacity and competence. Acting strategically, he managed to remind the sultan of his grasp of the critical affairs of the empire. While doing this he skillfully transferred his personal knowledge and experience from previous offices he held as well as from his senior family members. An undated memorandum prepared by Memduh who was then a member of the State Council, provides an overview of Egyptian history, since the time of Sultan Mahmud II, including his perspectives and suggestions on Egyptian matters.²⁵³ The memorandum outlines not only administrative transformation of Egypt but also political and economic developments such as the opening of the Suez Canal and the European powers' policies and agendas on Egypt during this period. Essentially, Memduh discusses the disadvantages of making Egypt a neutral state for the Ottoman Empire, the necessary withdrawal of the British troops from Egyptian territories and the best and most advantageous position that the Ottoman government can take on these matters.

In order to demonstrate the significance of Egypt for the Ottoman State Memduh provides a little comparison between Bulgaria and Egypt and concludes that, while Bulgaria was made up of people from variety of ethno-religious background Egypt was a Muslim majority province and therefore a Bulgarian would serve the state but an Egyptians would serve Muslims, which in turn would strengthen the caliphate. Egypt was critical for the Ottoman State, because centuries ago the Ottoman leadership took over the prestigious title of caliphate from Egypt. Taking into account all of these, it was not appropriate for the Ottoman government to accept the neutrality of Egypt. This would lead not only to intangible losses, such as the one referred above, but also tangible losses. British would make all sorts of arrangements to protect Egypt, since it was on the route to India. Furthermore, according to the treaty signed in Paris, which was ratified in the aftermath of the Crimean War, the European powers

²⁵³ Drawing on his father's experience and knowledge in 1893 Memduh will once more write a long memorandum on Egypt. BOA,Y.EE. 88/3, 4 Receb 1310/22 January 1893.

stood guarantors of the integrity of the Ottoman territories. Given that Egypt is a part of the Ottoman territory, the Ottoman government's forsake of Egypt seems against the terms of this treaty. Britain took wide range of measures to keep Egypt in peace so that no other country would have an excuse to intervene in the affairs of Egypt. If Britain took Egypt officially under her authority, there would be no reason for her to fear. If the Ottoman government took a firm stand the British would financially support it. If Egypt broke with the caliphate the relations between Ottoman state and Britain would only be based on trade and this was an unfavorable situation for the former. According to the agreement that was signed after the British invasion of Cyprus, if Russia were to go beyond the limit in Anatolia the British would fight against Russia on Ottoman side.

Thus briefly, Britain was obliged to assist the Ottoman state in two ways: the first is Suez Canal and the second is the Euphrates River Valley. When Egypt becomes neutral, Ottomans will lose one of its bargaining chips. Memduh also states that Britain should be kindly reminded her promise to withdraw her troops from Egypt. If she does not, France will be upset and thus wage war against Britain. He completed his memorandum by underlining that, as the British media and parliament suggested, if the Ottoman government persists its legitimate rights over Egypt, Britain will carry out her responsibility to protect Egypt against the attacks of other states.²⁵⁴ Apparently, Memduh believed that if the Ottoman State wants a financial assistant, protection against French harassment, and the Russian invasion of Anatolia, it has to work with Britain. He presented this cooperation as an option that will serve to benefit both sides: the Ottoman government and Britain. Interestingly enough, after more than three decades, in 1919, Memduh once more will think that the salvation of the Empire can only be possible with the British support or rather mandate.²⁵⁵ Another idea that persisted during the course of his life was his conviction of

²⁵⁴ BOA, Y.EE. 88/40, 6 Rebiülahir 1327/27 April 1909.

²⁵⁵ Memduh is known as one of the honorary founders of the İngiliz Muhipleri Cemiyeti. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler II: 1918-1922 Mütareke Dönemi*, 472.

the significance of the caliphate for the Empire. He believed that the Ottoman leadership should use this position as a soft power in international relations to appeal to the Muslims of Asia and Africa as well as to deal with the European powers who were ruling the Muslim societies. In *Feveran-ı Ezman*, one of the books he published when he was in exile after the 1908 Revolution, he made the same suggestion to the new government under the Young Turks.²⁵⁶

2.4. Elite Formation at the Intersection of Bureaucracy, Poetry, and Sufism

2.4.1. Ten Years at the Office of the Receiver (*Âmedi Odası*)

After receiving his education at *rüşdiye* school and then training at the secretariat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Mabeyn, Memduh proved not only his literary and administrative skills but also his reliability for the Office of the Receiver (*Âmedi Odası*) which was a very promising post for a young and ambitious official such as Memduh.

As discussed in the previous part of this chapter, Memduh's father Mazlum Pasha was appointed to two critical posts once Abdulaziz came to power in 1861. However, he was dismissed from both posts upon the request of Grand Vizier Âli Pasha. The positions that Mazlum Pasha was holding would allow him to have a close contact with the sultan and his family. Mazlum Pasha was a pro-palace official and he had a strong attachment to the Khalidi-Naqshibandi order. Thus, as highlighted earlier, Âli Pasha might have considered him not suitable to the Porte-centered order of the Tanzimat.

Not long after his father's dismissal Memduh was transferred from the Mabeyn, the office that could enable him to have a close relationship with the sultan to the Office of the Receiver. It is not clear how and on what basis he was moved to the Office of the Receiver but it was likely that his pro-palace outlook affected his removal from the palace. As a Tanzimat statesman Âli Pasha was careful about keeping the palace out of the governance to maintain the

²⁵⁶ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Feveran-ı Ezman* (Istanbul: 1324/1909). P.?

predominance of the Porte over the palace. Thus, he might have feared the formation of an alliance between the new sultan, who had the capacity and will of challenging the existing order, and the civil officials who wanted the old structure back with the palace and the Sultan as the locus of power.

On 30 October 1861 Memduh was appointed to the Office of the Receiver²⁵⁷ where he served for ten years. Memduh was twenty-two when he began to work at this office and he was a mature and an experienced official when he left it. Initially his wage was 4000 kuruş but afterward it rose to 5000 kuruş.²⁵⁸ When he joined the Office of the Receiver his brother Ahmed Tevfik was already there. Ahmed Tevfik had worked at this office for almost three decades. This is a clear proof that patronage might have been necessary but was certainly not sufficient for upward mobility in the Ottoman bureaucracy. Given that they come from the same family background Memduh and Ahmed Tevfik had similar patronage networks. Yet, while Memduh reached upper echelons, his brother had a relatively stable and humble official career track. Memduh's personal capabilities, maneuvers, and qualities most likely contributed to his advancement.

In the hierarchical order of the Ottoman bureaucracy the Office of the Receiver came into prominence after the second half of the eighteenth-century.²⁵⁹ The term *âmedi*, which originates from the Persian verb 'to come', "reportedly derives from the fact that the receiver wrote the term *âmed* ("arrived") in the appropriate registers opposite the names of newly invested holders of benefices in land to indicate receipt of the fees they owed the chief scribe."²⁶⁰

²⁵⁷ BOA, İ.DH. 480/32276, 27 Rebiülahir 1278/1 November 1861.

²⁵⁸ His salary rose to 6000 kuruş in 1871 as he was commissioned to record the decisions of the Ministerial Cabinet (Encümen-i Mahsus-ı Vükela). BOA, DH.SAİD. 1/84, 29 Zilhicce 1255/4 March 1840.

²⁵⁹ Akyıldız, *Merkez Teşkilatında Reform*, 84.

²⁶⁰ Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, 78.

According to Halil İnalçık, the Office of the Receiver dates back to 1777. The receiver was personal secretary of the chief scribe and his office, according to some accounts, was at the fourth section of the Office of the Imperial Divan. The main task of receiver was assisting the chief scribe in his writings, preparing grand vizier's documents to be submitted to the palace and arranging the grand vizier's diplomatic correspondence.²⁶¹ In the eighteenth century administrative division of labor, the Office of the Receiver was preparing documents for submission from the Porte to the palace. In the nineteenth century, the office continued to carry out this main task, taking new responsibilities such as keeping the Council of Ministers' records and registering the imperial decrees produced in response to the papers submitted by the Porte. Therefore, while many of the traditional offices were losing their importance, the Office of the Receiver not only maintained its position but also came into prominence during the nineteenth century.²⁶²

Since it dealt with confidential documents and correspondences not everyone was eligible to be recruited to this office. Only the most qualified people in other offices who were successful in an entrance exam were to be appointed to the Office of Receiver.²⁶³ This department was significant not only because of the critical affairs it managed but also because many of the most outstanding officials of this era were trained there before proceeding to strategic positions. It was particularly famous for producing high profile officials for foreign ministry. Ministers including Akif Pasha, Mustafa Reşid Pasha, Mehmed Sadık Rıf'at Pasha, Şekib Pasha, Sârim Pasha and Fuad Pasha previous served at this office.²⁶⁴ This is probably due to the close connection the clerks of the office

²⁶¹ Ibid., 78.

²⁶² Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, 53.
Akyıldız, *Merkez Teşkilatında Reform*, 84.

²⁶³ Akyıldız, *Merkez Teşkilatında Reform*, 84.

²⁶⁴ Ibid., 85.

In 1834 Mahmud began to establish permanent embassies, starting with the assignment of the then Receiver, Mustafa Bey, after January 1838, to Paris. With him and the other ambassadors who shortly began to follow him went suites of officials drawn for the most part from the Offices of the Imperial Divan, the Palace Secretary, and the Receiver. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 136.

had with the diplomats and foreign embassies.²⁶⁵ The Office of the Receiver, as Akyıldız observed, together with the Translation Office²⁶⁶ played a critical role in forming a new type of bureaucratic elite during the Tanzimat Era.²⁶⁷ The relation between the bureaucracy and the elite formation in the late Ottoman Empire needs to be discussed from a wider perspective.

2.4.2. Bureaucracy and Poetry

Memduh's professional life, even in its early phase, perfectly reflects the fact that bureaucracy served as a space for elite formation in the modernizing Ottoman Empire. The process of centralization entailed a phenomenal growth of the civil bureaucracy. Tasks and activities such as education, policing, municipal services, forms of tax collection, medical service, and welfare facilities that used to be traditionally within the scope of non-state actors, e.g. waqfs, began to be undertaken by the state. In implementing these reforms, the central administration desperately needed a sizable bureaucracy. The old institutions of the empire including the janissary corps, guilds, tribes, provincial rulers, religious groups, and unruly subjects had gradually lost ground to the central state apparatus.²⁶⁸ The result, as stated by Barkey, "was a new power wielded by the Ottoman bureaucracy." Memduh was part of this new field of power therefore his biography contributes to better understanding the new power, which had a transformative role in the empire.

In addition to the foreign ministers many other high officials including Pertev Pasha and Sadullah Pasha served at this Office. İnal, *Son Şairler*.

²⁶⁵ Akyıldız, *Merkez Teşkilatında Reform*, 85.

²⁶⁶ According to İlber Ortaylı, Translation Office was a very good school that produced efficient statesmen of the Tanzimat era. İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı* (Istanbul: Hil Yayınları, 1983), 111-112.

²⁶⁷ Akyıldız, *Merkez Teşkilatında Reform*, 90.

²⁶⁸ Metin Heper, *Bürokratik Yönetim Geleneği: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Gelişimi ve Niteliği* [The Tradition of Bureaucratic Administration: Its Development in the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic] (Ankara: ODTÜ, 1974); Halil İnalçık, "Application of the Tanzimat and its social effects," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6 (1980), 283–337; Resat Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire: Nomads, Migrants and Refugees* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009).

Bureaucracy was not alone in cultivating the elite of the nineteenth century. Poetry and Sufism accompanied it and the large part of the Ottoman elite emerged at the intersection of these three fields.²⁶⁹ The Sufi lodges (*tekkes*) functioned as intellectual and cultural centers.²⁷⁰ As suggested by Findley, “the mystical orders remained a major forum for intellectual as well as spiritual expansion”²⁷¹ in the later part of the nineteenth century. Pertev Pasha, Şeyhülislam Arif Hikmet Bey, and Keçecizade İzzet Molla, and Leskofçalı Galib were the most famous poets and functionaries who adhered to the Khalidiyya Sufi sub-order.²⁷²

Memduh can be seen as an example of this group who worked at government offices, wrote poems and affiliated to Sufi orders. In parallel with advancement in his career Memduh became active in the literary circles. Like many other Ottoman officials in the nineteenth century including his father Mazlum Pasha, Memduh was interested in poetry. The close connection between civil officials and litterateurs makes Kemal İnal’s prosopography of the late Ottoman poets (*Son Şairler*) a primary biographical source on the civil officialdom. Memduh is one of the many bureaucrats who was also a poet, thus in his voluminous book, İnal designates long pages to Memduh’s biography and poetry. According to Findley, the civil officialdom in the Ottoman society resembled the bourgeoisie in Western Europe. He argues that “what unites the three categories – intellectuals, officials, poets - is that the nineteenth century Ottoman gentleman normally held a government post and, like his Elizabethan English

²⁶⁹ This is one way of producing the Ottoman elite at the age of reform. Drawing attention to the prominence of the scientific mentality and the engineering schools (*mühendishane*) in the Ottoman modernization process, Berrak Burçak suggests that in the nineteenth century a new Ottoman intelligentsia was formed, “a scientific-technical elite, who, having completed their training, assisted the Ottoman sultan in his military reform project”. Berrak Burçak, *Modernization, Science and Engineering in the Early Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire*, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 44:1 (2008), 70.

²⁷⁰ Butrus Abu-Manneh, “The Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi in Istanbul in the Early Tanzimat Period,” in *Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century (1826-1876)*, (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2001), 110.

²⁷¹ Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, 176.

²⁷² Manneh, “The Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi in Istanbul in the Early Tanzimat Period,” 110.

counterparts, wrote verses.”²⁷³ Memduh’s father Mazlum Pasha, too, was a bureaucrat, poet, and a follower of Khalidiyya sub-order.

2.4.3. Literary Circles in the 1860s

Having published around fifteen books, some of which were poetry, Memduh, like his father, was part of the literary circle of the imperial capital. Using the pen name Fâik, Memduh was a member of the society of *Encümen-i Şuara*.²⁷⁴ Based on the close reading of his three literary works, namely *Eser-i Memduh*, *Berg-i Sebz*, and *Divan-ı Eş’ar*, Müjgan Çakır argues that like other *Encümen-i Şuara* poets Memduh favored the Divan Literature, thinking that the new literary works specifically the poems, which had become popular in the nineteenth century, was nothing but imitation of the Western style.²⁷⁵ Yet, as observed by Çakır, he was open to poetic novelties in terms of content and form.²⁷⁶

Memduh used to attend the gatherings regularly at the Hersekli Arif Hikmet Bey’s house at Laleli Çukurçeşme neighborhood of Istanbul in 1861. This once a week poetry meetings are considered to have formed the literary society *Encümen-i Şuara* (The Council of Poets). In terms of style *Encümen-i Şuara* poets were inspired by the classical Ottoman Literature. Memduh already had a close connection with some of these poets. He was friend with Namık Kemal from his school years and Ziya Bey from the office of Mabeyn (in 1861). Namık Kemal’s appreciation of Memduh’s poetic skills was also noted in some sources.²⁷⁷ Furthermore, in his books written after 1908 Revolution,²⁷⁸ Memduh provides

²⁷³ Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, 13.

²⁷⁴ Mehmet Korkut Çeçen, “Encümen-i Şuara’nın Tanzimat Birinci Dönem Sanatçılarına Etkisi,” *Çukurova Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, vol.15, no. 2 (2006).

²⁷⁵ Müjgan Çakır, “Mazlum-zade Mehmed Paşa’nın Poetikasına Dair,” *A.Ü. Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Dergisi* (2009), Issue 39.

²⁷⁶ Müjgan Çakır, “Gelenekten Moderne: Encümen-i Şuara’da Şekil Değişiklikleri ve Mehmed Memduh Paşa,” in *Eski Türk Edebiyatı Çalışmaları 2, Eski Türk Edebiyatına Modern Yaklaşımlar 1, 24 Nisan 2006 Bildiriler* (Istanbul: Turkuaz Yayınları 2007).

²⁷⁷ Ömer Faruk Akün, “Namık Kemal”, *TDVİA*, Vol. 32, 2006, 361-378.

²⁷⁸ E.g. *Mir’at-ı Şuunat*

various anecdotes about Ziya Bey and his intrigues particularly against Grand Vizier Âli Pasha.

Memduh was working at the Mabeyn while he was regularly attending the meetings at Hersekli Arif Hikmet Bey's house, between May 1861 and January 1862. Leskofçalı Galip Bey (1829-1867),²⁷⁹ Hersekli Arif Hikmet (1839-1903), Mehmet Lebib Efendi (1785-1867), Mustafa İzzet Efendi (1801-1876), Sheikh of Naqshibandi Osman Nurettin Şems Efendi (1813-1893), the fifth scribe at the office of Mabeyn Abdülhamid Ziya Bey (1829-1880), a budget officer of a regiment (*alay emini*) Koniçeli Musa Kazım Bey (1821-1889), the Minister of Takvim-i Vekayi (the first Ottoman official newspaper) and the Matbaa-i Amire (the Ottoman official printing house) Ruznamecizade Mehmed Lebin Efendi (1785-1967), the deputy of chief clerk at the Commodity Custom Mehmed Kemal (Namık) Bey (1840-1888), Manastırlı Hoca Salih Naili (1823-1876), a scribe at the office of the chief secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Recaizade Mehmed Celal Bey (1838-1882), Niğdeli Deli Hikmet Bey (died after 1888), Osman Nevres Efendi (1823-1874), Miratçı Mustafa Refik Bey (1843?-1865), the Minister of Bosphorus Ibrahim Hakkı Bey (1822-1895), an officer at the Commodity Custom of Istanbul Manastırlı Salih Faik (1825-1900) were among those who were regularly attending these gatherings.²⁸⁰

Most of these attendees including Memduh were in the early phases of their literary journey as well as bureaucratic career. Most of them had connections to Rumelia, the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire, either they had genealogical ties or they served there. Moreover, majority of these poets were affiliated with Sufi orders.²⁸¹ During these gathering they not only shared their

²⁷⁹ Leskofçalı Galip Bey was a follower of the Khalidiyya sub-order.

Abu-Manneh, "The Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi in Istanbul in the Early Tanzimat Period," 110.

²⁸⁰ Metin Kayahan Özgül, *Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi, C. 3* (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2006), 77-78.

Şeker, *Ders ile Sohbet Arasında*, 465.

²⁸¹ Çeçen, "Encümen-i Şuara'nın Tanzimat Birinci Dönem Sanatçılarına Etkisi."

poems with each other but also composed poems together. For instance, Memduh, Namık Kemal, Hikmet Bey, and Galib composed a collective poem.²⁸²

In March 1863, Mustafa Refik, a civil official from the Translation Office, and Namık Kemal founded *Mir'at Mecmuası*, the first known pictorial journal of the Ottoman media.²⁸³ *Mir'at* published only three issues. This journal included poems besides scientific information. Memduh was referred to as one of the co-founders of this short-lived publishing initiative by some sources.²⁸⁴ Yet other sources only mention the names of Mustafa Refik, Namık Kemal, Ali Pasha, Pertev Pasha, Mehmed Said Efendi, and Halet Bey from the Foreign Ministry

²⁸² Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Dîvân-ı Eş'âr* (Istanbul, Matbaa-i Hayriye ve Şürekası, 1913).

"Nâmık" "Hikmet" "Gâlib" Beylerle Müştereken Söylediğimiz Gazeldir

Fâ'ilâtün Fâ'ilâtün Fâ'ilâtün Fâ'ilün

*Gâlib Aşk kim âfet-resân-ı zühd ü tâ'atdır bize
Ebruvân-ı yâr mihrâb-ı ibâdetdir bize Memdûh*

*Memdûh Zillet-âbâd-ı talebde geşt eder dîvâneviz
Dâğ-ı hicran meş'al-i şeh-râh-ı vuslatdır bize Hikmet*

*Hikmet Dâver-i uzlet-nişîn-i âlem-i mahviyyetiz
Genc-i istiğnâ serîr-i şân-ı devletdir bize Nâmık*

*Nâmık Derd ile âl-i Resûlullâh'a kıldık iktida
Fez-i Haydar pertev-i necm-i hidâyetdir bize Gâlib*

*Gâlib Biz harâb-ı bezm-i nûş-â-nûş-ı derd ü hasretiz
Çeşm-i pür-hun sâgar-ı gül-gûn-ı işretdir bize Memdûh*

*Her ne rütbe şî'rde Memdûh ise Nâmık yine
Gâlib ammâ kuvve-i tab'ıyla Hikmetdir bize*

²⁸³ On the back cover of the journal there was an explanation about the content and publishing policy of the journal: this booklet/journal does not deal with any political or sectarian –probably meant religious- issue rather it includes scientific and industrial matters together with maps and illustrations. *"İşbu risale umûr-ı mezhebiye ve politikadan bahs etmeyerek ve fûnûn u sanâyî'e müteallik mevadd ile harita ve resimleri hâvi olarak her şehri Arâbi ibtidasında çıkarılır"*. Nergis Aydoğdu, "Türk Basın Tarihinde İlk Resimli Dergi Mirat," in *Türk Basın Tarihi Uluslararası Sempozyumu* (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 2018), 919.

²⁸⁴ Ömer Faruk Akün, "Namık Kemal", *TDVİA*, Vol. 32, 2006, 361-378.

secretariat in regards to this journal.²⁸⁵ Even if he was not one of the contributors of *Mir'at* Journal, it is still significant to notice that someone from Memduh's literary circle was involved in such initiatives.

Memduh's literary skills went beyond poetry. He translated a number of French books during the early years of his career. He translated Adolphe Ganot's *Neuro Physique* into Ottoman Turkish before 1879. This translation was lost. Probably around that time Memduh also translated another work of Adolphe Ganot titled *Traite Elementarie de Psyhique*. The whereabouts of this unpublished translation is not known either.²⁸⁶ While he was working at the Office of the Receiver he translated Alphonse de Lamartine's *Genevieve* and *Histoire d'une Servante* (Paris, 1850), the translation was published in 1868-69 (1285) under the title of *Tercüme-i Hikaye-i Jönevie*.²⁸⁷ Memduh also translated a poem by Lamartine.²⁸⁸

²⁸⁵ Nergis Aydoğdu, "Türk Basın Tarihinde İlk Resimli Dergi Mirat," 920.

²⁸⁶ BOA, DH.SAİD. 1/84, 29 Zilhicce 1255/4 March 1840.

²⁸⁷ This novel of Lamartine was translated into Ottoman Turkish twice. The first was done by Mehmed Memduh in 1869 and published by Dividciyan Matbaası in Istanbul. The original copy of the novel was published in 1830 and was comprised of 192 pages. On the other hand, Memduh's translation was only 79 pages. The second translation of Lamartine's novel was done by Halide Edib Adivar in 1886 and it was 235 pages together with long introduction of the translator.

Esra Birkan Baydan, "Tanzimat Dönemi Çeviri Romanlarında 'Yeniden Çeviri' Örnekleri," *International Journal of Social Science*, No: 39 (Autumn III 2015), 178.

²⁸⁸ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Dîvân-ı Eş'âr* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Hayriye ve Şürekası, 1332).

Lamartin'in Şiirinden Mütercemdir
Fe'ilâtün Fe'ilâtün Fe'ilâtün Fe'ilün

Güneşin battığı dem hüznle cây etmiştim
Görünen dağ başının gölgeli bir devhasını
Düştü pâ-yı nıgehim bir ucu yok hâmuz
Başka elvân ile gördüm çemenin levhasını

Ovanın dalgalı nehri köpürüp aktıkça
Mâr-âsâ süzülür gâ'ib olur bir sûda
Lâciverdî feleğin mâhı kül üzre doğmuş
Uykudan mı bu sükûnet bilemem ben suda

Tâclanmış başı ormanlar ile küh-sârın
Var karanlık biraz ammâ yine pertev mevcud
Taht-ı gerdûnda zulmet ne güzel bir meleğe

2.4.4. The Young Ottomans and Memduh

Memduh's literary activities and bureaucratic career paved the way for him to interact with a group of constitutionalist intellectuals who were known as Young Ottomans.²⁸⁹ Majority of the members of this movement was, like Memduh, civil officials and poets and they constituted an important part of the late Ottoman elite. As underlined earlier, Young Ottomans were, like pro-palace group, were against the Porte's absolute domination and undue influence of France and Britain on Ottoman state affairs. Unlike the pro-palace group, they promoted the constitutional regime, believing that Islam and the principles of Constitutionalism are compatible. The literature on the Young Ottomans²⁹⁰ emphasizes the connection between Memduh and the prominent Young Ottoman figures such as Namık Kemal and Ziya Bey in the early 1860s. Zekeriya Kurşun argues that Memduh even attended the first meeting of the Young Ottomans in 1865 while he was working at the Office of the Receiver.²⁹¹ Another account goes as far to say that Mehmed Azmi Bey, maternal uncle of Memduh, was also at this secret meeting at Veliefendi as the steward of Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, brother of Khedive of Egypt, Ismail Pasha, who managed to secure the viceroyalty at the expense of his brother by lobbying the politics in

Ufk etrâfını devr etmede gerdûne-i dud

*Zirveden zirve[ye] beyhûde edip atf-ı nazar
Şarkdan garba şimâl ile cenûba gittim
Seyr edip hâsılı her nokta-i âfâkı tamam
Yok saâdet eseri bahtım içün hükm ettim*

*Tatlı bir manzaradır gördüğüm âsâr amma
Bana bu dâ'ireden zevk ü telezzüz heyhat
Gam ile mürde olan rûh-ı safâyı ne bilir
Tâb-ı hurşîd-i dırahşâna ısınmaz emvat*

²⁸⁹ For a detailed account of Young Ottomans see Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000); Nazan Çiçek, *The Young Ottomans: Turkish Critics of the Eastern Question in the Late Nineteenth Century* (London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 2010).

²⁹⁰ *Bab-ı Alinin İç Yüzü*, an Ottoman book published with no name of author.

Cemal Kuntay, *Devrinin İnsanları Arasında Namık Kemal* (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim, 1949).

²⁹¹ Zekeriya Kurşun, "Mehmed Memduh Paşa", *TDVİA*, Vol. 28, 2003, 495-497.

Istanbul.²⁹² However, based on EbuZZiya Tefvik's account,²⁹³ Œerif Mardin²⁹⁴ refers only to six individuals, namely Mehmed, Nuri, ReŒad, Namık Kemal, Ayetullah and Refik Beys, who attended this secret picnic organized in the summer of 1865.

As he states explicitly in *Mir'at-ı Œuunat*,²⁹⁵ Memduh believed that Sultan Abdulaziz committed suicide. According to Memduh, it is not possible to solve such a complicated problem with just an assumption. He continues to say that Abdülaziz was a fearless sultan. Memduh believed that sadness, frustration and contempt drove Abdülaziz to suicide.²⁹⁶ According to KurŒun²⁹⁷ this belief is a convincing proof of Memduh's affiliation with the Young Ottoman community who had similar views regarding the sultan's cause of death. However, in his own narrative Memduh carefully locates himself in a safe position with this critical issue. He prefers not to take any sides. He rather focuses on the conditions in which the tragic event occurred.

Considering Abdülaziz as a martyr,²⁹⁸ Memduh wrote a historical poem²⁹⁹ about him after his death. According to his own account in *Mir'at-ı Œuunat*, Memduh

²⁹² Œaban Ortak, "Türkiye'de Millet İradesi Prensibinin İlk Savunucularından İnkılapçı Mehmed Bey," *Atatürk Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Dergisi*, 2000.

²⁹³ EbuZZiya Tefvik, *Yeni Osmanlılar Tarihi* (Istanbul: Hürriyet, 1973).

²⁹⁴ Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, 10.

²⁹⁵ This historiographical work of Memduh was penned in 1876 when Memduh left the secretarial office of the grand vizierate and was published in 1912, like most of Memduh's other books. Made up of three chapters, namely *Levha*, *Nevha*, and *Karha*, and an introduction this work includes valuable data some of which are firsthand accounts of major events, court politics, and the attitudes of the ministers during the reigns of Mahmud II, Abdülmecid, Abdülaziz, and Murad V.

²⁹⁶ Mehmed Memduh, *Mir'at-ı Œuunat*, 91.

²⁹⁷ Zekeriya KurŒun, "Mehmed Memduh PaŒa", *TDVİA*.

²⁹⁸ Memduh seems to avoid to take side on the series of unsettling events that led to the tragic end of Sultan Abdülaziz. It is obvious that Memduh was upset about the death of the sultan thus he regarded him as martyr.

²⁹⁹ *Mef'ûlü Fâ'ilâtün Mef'ûlü Fâ'ilâtün
Abdülazîz Hâna luţfede Rabb-i ma'bud
Bir pâdiŒâh idi bu Œân u Œükûhu meŒhud
Kıldı nice hükümdar dergâhını ziyâret
Pek çok ekâbir oldu ikrâmı ile hoşnud*

visited the police station to see the corpse. The dead body in plain white linen lying on the wooden floor in a small and empty room. Both of his arteries were cut. His eyes were open and staring at the heavens. Seeing a sultan in such a pathetic condition Memduh cried and wailed for Abdülaziz.³⁰⁰

Highlighting Memduh's connection with the Young Ottomans is important to observe the ideological transformation of Memduh as an official who, unlike many of those who remained in opposition, served half a century in the Ottoman bureaucracy. Though Memduh did not make an explicit criticism of any political figure, particularly the sultan, or an issue his relations with the Young Ottoman community might be considered an indication of his ideological tendencies in his early career. He might have felt the need of revising his views as he climbed the bureaucratic ladder in the ensuing decades.³⁰¹

As mentioned earlier, clarification he made in the introduction of his poetic work, *Divan-ı Eş'ar*, reveals Memduh's ideological strategy. In *Eser-i Memduh*, which was first published in 1872 (1289) during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, he decided not to include his poem, which rhymed with the word "millet" (nation).

*Hal' ettiler o şâhı takdîre var mı çâre
Bir iş yapıldı ammâ andan garazdı maksud
.....*

³⁰⁰ *Sultân Abdülazîz Hân Aleyhirrahme ve'l-gufrân Hakkında Mersiyedir*

Mefâ'îlün Mefâ'îlün Mefâ'îlün Mefâ'îlün

*Değildir lâle yer yer hâk-i pâk-i bûsitân üzre
Alevlerdir ki ser çekmiş zeminden âsumân üzre*

*Zemîn âteş kesilmiştir yanardağ oldu her bir kûh
Eder neşr-i şerer fark-ı cihan berk-ı çehân üzre*

*Tutuştı hirmen-i âlem hevâya savrulup gitti
Uçar cev hem-çü pervâne şümû-ı afterân üzre
.....*

³⁰¹ This change is pretty similar to other official such as Avlonyalı Mehmed Ferid Pasha, who reformulated his political identity as he rose to the high politics at the Ottoman center. For the evolution of Ferid Pasha's identity see Kırmızı, *Avlonyalı Ferid Paşa Bir Ömür Devlet*.

This is because, he thought that *Eser-i Memduh* would be banned due to this poem. He published it in *Divan-ı Eş'ar* during the Second Constitutional Period. In this context it is suffice to say that, feeling the need to reconstruct his political identity Memduh accentuated his pro-constitutionalist background in the introduction of *Divan-ı Eş'ar* after the demise of the Hamidian regime.

Getting back to the issue of Memduh's relationship with the political opposition led by the Young Ottomans during his youth, in addition to the literary connections Memduh might have a link with the opposition via his maternal uncle Azmi Bey. Like other senior male members of his immediate family Memduh's maternal uncle was also a high profile officer. After serving first as a secretary of grand vizier, a clerk at the Office of the Receiver, he became the second deputy of the Minister of Justice in 1858, and finally the steward (*kapı kethüdası*) in 1866.³⁰² Besides his maternal uncle's close relations with the Young Ottomans, Memduh, as explained earlier, might have connected with the opposition group(s) via affiliation to Naqhsibendi-Khalidi suborder.³⁰³

Besides literary activities, many of the civil officials like Memduh and his father had attachment to various Sufi orders. These two fields of power had reinforced each other in this period. Overall, the civil officialdom, having intellectual and administrative capacity, served as an engine for producing Ottoman elites. In the meantime, it functioned as a new powerhouse in the absence of strong traditional institutions of the empire such as janissary corps and artisan guilds.

2.4.5. Sufism: Spiritual Element of Elite Formation

Memduh's career at Office of the Receiver coincided with his spiritual soul searching. He, like many of his counterparts, was affiliated with Nakshibendi Sufi order and he became one of the most prominent followers of Mustafa Ismet Efendi. As it was highlighted earlier, this order was held in high esteem by

³⁰² Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmanî* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1327/1909).

³⁰³ As stated earlier, Memduh's father Mazlum Pasha's sheikh was Fazlullah of Hazergrad was one of the third-level suspects of the Kuleli Affair (1859).

the bureaucrats of the time. Therefore, Memduh's attachment to this order is critical for comprehending not only his poetic life³⁰⁴ but also his extensive political and social network.

İsmet Efendi was born in 1808 in Janina. He worked as a scribe at the Shari'a Court of Janina. He had a journey to Mecca where the deputy Abdullah-i Mekki initiated him into the Mevlana Halid-i Baghdadî order, a branch of Naqshbandî Sufi order. İsmet Efendi completed his spiritual training (*seyr-i süluk*) in seven years and then founded a lodge in Edirne. In 1853 he came to Istanbul and took over the Sheik Murad Lodge at Eyüp in 1867. Five years later, he established the lodge that was located at Fatih district.³⁰⁵ As his personal correspondences revealed, İsmet Efendi had good relations with the officials particularly those who held high positions.³⁰⁶ He was very close to the Mabeyn and he often wrote to İsmail Hakkı Efendi, the head of office and who was also his disciple.³⁰⁷

³⁰⁴ Memduh's *Divan-ı Eş'ar* includes not only great deal of Sufi notions and elements but also two long poems specifically attributed to his sheikh İsmet Efendi. One of them is below.

Der-Senâ-yı Şeyh Muhammed Mustafa İsmet El-Nakşibendî El-Hâlidî Kuddise Sırruhu

Mefâ'îlün Mefâ'îlün Mefâ'îlün Mefâ'îlün

*Şafakla subh-dem bir la'î idi bu lâle-gûn hâmun
İnan-tâb oldu şeb-rîz-i kamerle râ'iz-i gerdun*

*Mu'anber çetr-i Leylâ zeyn-i sahn-ı pehn-i çarh oldu
Kan ağlarsa şafak şâyan misâl-i dîde-i Mecnun*

*Kamer hem-ğâl-i Rûhullâh'dır ihyâ-yı leyl eyler
Tibâk-ı âsuman destinde kat kat suhuf Engelyun*

*Havâriyyûn-veş tarh eylemiştir encümen encüm
Dıraşan tâli-i meh hem-çü şem-i dâniş-i Şem'un*

.....

³⁰⁵ Muharrem Varol, *Islahat, Siyaset, Tarikat: Bektaşiliğin İlgası Sonrasında Osmanlı Devleti'nin Tarikat Politikaları (1826-1866)* (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları: 2013).

³⁰⁶ Muharrem Varol, "Bektaşiliğin İlgası Sonrasında Osmanlı Devleti'nin Tarikat Politikaları (1826-1866)" (PhD Dissertation, Istanbul University, 2011), 431-433.

³⁰⁷ One of İsmet Efendi's letters to İsmail Hakkı Efendi begins with the following praise. "Mabeyn-i Hümayûn şevket-makrûn Başkâtibi defîne-i fehâmet ve hazine-i merhamet ve bahr-i sehâvet hassü'l-hass'ül-havass evlâd-ı maneviyem şem'i fu'âdim Hakkı Bey

Apparently, İsmet Efendi communicated with Sultan Abdülmecid through Hakkı Efendi. Moreover, he attributed his poetry book *Risale-i Kudsiyye* to the Sultan, and the palace also sponsored this book. The Sultan granted him a regular monthly salary however he could never get the payment. Memduh's burial site, the İsmet Efendi Lodge, is a clear indication of his devotion to his sheikh and also his valuable contribution to the family of İsmet Efendi³⁰⁸ and the Lodge. Memduh, who was then working at the Office of the Receiver, even attended a trial on behalf of the İsmet Efendi's wife after İsmet Efendi passed away. Moreover, probably aiming to free his sheikh from debt burden, he purchased İsmet Efendi's house in the Karacavehhab neighborhood of downtown Edirne.³⁰⁹

Since he was holding an official post, Memduh's affiliation with a Sufi order needs to be analyzed from a wider perspective through which we can see the

efendim hazretlerine duanâme-i zelilânemizdir." Varol, "Bektaşiliğin İlgası Sonrasında," 432.

³⁰⁸ İsmet Efendi's sons Mehmed Zahid Efendi (DH.SAİD, 175, 29 Zilhicce 1265/15 November 1849) and Mehmed Sıddık Efendi (DH.SAİD, 134, 29 Zilhicce 1284/22 April 189) and his brother-in-law Ahmed Nimetullah Efendi (DH.SAİD, 2, 926, 29 Zilhicce 1265/15 November 1849) worked in various capacities at the government office. As a loyal follower of İsmet Efendi Memduh would most likely have an influence on their assignment to the official posts.

³⁰⁹ BOA, DH.MUİ. 141/14, 19 Muharrem 1329/20 January 1911.

Memduh's possession of İsmet Efendi's house in the Karacavehhab neighborhood of downtown Edirne turned out to be dubious in the post-1908 era. This house originally belonged to İsmet Efendi of Janina. İsmet Efendi sold his house, land, and mill in Edirne and then moved to Istanbul in 1853. Mehmed Sıddık, one of the two sons of İsmet Efendi, wrote to the Ministry of Interior on 20 January 1911 stating that he had no idea when and under what circumstances, or at what price Memduh Pasha bought the house of his father, İsmet Efendi, from his mother, İsmet Efendi's wife Advıye Hanım, after İsmet Efendi passed away. Saying that he was very young to take care of the house when his father died, Mehmed Sıddık would like to clarify the details about the transaction between Memduh and Advıye Hanım. It is interesting that decades later, İsmet Efendi's son decided to investigate Memduh's purchase despite the fact that Memduh was one of the closest disciples of İsmet Efendi and had played a significant role in the appointment of İsmet Efendi's two sons, Mehmed Zahid and Mehmed Sıddık, as well as his brother in-law to official posts. As the shoe was on the other foot in the post-1908 era, Mehmed Sıddık expressed his suspicions about Memduh, the ex-Minister of Interior, probably hoping to reclaim the house in Edirne. This is just one of the many cases exemplifying the degradation of high profile Hamidian officials in the post-1908 period.

close connections between politics and Sufi orders in the late Ottoman era. As was discussed above in the context of the expansion of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi order among the upper ulema, the government functionaries, and the poets, the Sufi orders in general had close relationship with bureaucracy in the nineteenth century Ottoman realm. Abu-Manneh focuses on the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidiya's impact on the Ottoman central politics.

On the other hand, as the brief explanation below attests, Muharrem Varol looks at the government's policies on Sufi orders. This relationship took a new form after the disbandment of Janissary Corps and the prohibition of Bektashism in 1826 by Mahmud II. With this radical development the official control of Sufi orders had fastened. At the same period the Ministry of Foundations (*Evkaf Nezareti*) was founded and Sufi orders had gradually lost their relative economic independence. That is to say, in the post 1826 era Sufi orders fully depended on the state for financial support, which dramatically damaged their administrative independence. In addition to these radical developments, the nineteenth century, particularly the later part of it, witnessed intimate relations between bureaucracy and Sufi orders.³¹⁰ These two fields of power reinforced each other. As it was highlighted earlier, many civil officials were involved in literary activities. Based on the examples provided by Memduh's biographical data, it is safe to say that bureaucracy, poetry and Sufism intersected in the Ottoman capital and led to the production of the elite during that period.

³¹⁰ For instance, Grand Vizier Fuad Pasha attached to the Galata Mevlevi Lodge and his sheikh was Kudretullah Efendi. Orhan Köprülü, "Fuad Paşa", *TDVİA*, Vol. 13, 1996, 202-205.

Minister of Finance Abdurrahman Nafiz Pasha attached to the Yenikapı Mevlevi Lodge. Although it is not clear if he affiliated to him or not Grand Vizier Âli Pasha and Qadiri sheikh Osman Şems Efendi. Muharrem Varol, "Bektaşiliğin İlgası Sonrasında Osmanlı Devleti'nin Tarikat Politikaları (1826-1866)" (PhD Dissertation, Istanbul University, 2011), 202-203. This list, provided by Muharrem Varol, seems to affirm the view of Abu-Manneh who argues that the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidiya's influence decreased after the mid-1850s among the political elites. Yet, as Varol suggests, the Sufism remained an important element of the Ottoman politics.

2.5. Wealth and Entrepreneurship

2.5.1 Memduh's Properties

Memduh was a multifaceted person. He was a statesman, a poet, a historian, and an entrepreneur. Archival documents show that Memduh had various economic activities besides his official service. Memduh came from a well-to-do family. Senior members of his family held prestigious positions and a great deal of wealth. His father Mazlum Pasha was a relatively high profile bureaucrat. Although he came from a humble background he managed to secure a position at the Sublime Porte. Memduh's maternal grandfather Ömer Lütfü Efendi (d. 1252) was an experienced bureaucrat who served in different capacities. Ömer Lütfü Efendi had various assets in İzmir that he converted to a waqf (charitable foundation). After his death, the eldest of his sons and then his grandsons led the board of trustees. Being the eldest male member of the family, Memduh demanded a position on the board of trustees of his grandfather's waqf in summer 1901 when his brother Ahmed Tevfik passed away.³¹¹

In addition to a number of real estate properties Memduh, his brother Ahmed Tevfik, and his sister Ayşe Makbule inherited more than 50,000 kuruş from their father when he passed away in 1862. They opened a deposit account for this amount. On 28 May 1865, Memduh and Ahmed Tevfik demanded the amount to be returned totally and swiftly as they were financially in dire straits.³¹² During that time, both Memduh and his brother were working at the Office of the Receiver. Memduh's salary was 4000 kuruş while Ahmed Tevfik's was around 3000 kuruş. So, the 50,000 kuruş was a moderate amount for them.

Memduh's wife Nazlı Hanım's grandfather Giritli Mustafa Naili Paşa (1798-1871) was a very wealthy man who left a great deal of property in different parts of the Empire to his heirs,³¹³ one of whom was Memduh's wife. Though no clear information was obtained about the amount she received from her

³¹¹ BOA, Y.EE. 88/10, 7 Rebiülahir 1319/24 July 1901.

³¹² BOA, MVL. 473/4, 2 Muharrem 1282/28 May 1865.

³¹³ Kevser Değirmenci, "Mustafa Naili Paşa'nın Hayatı ve Girit Valiliği" (PhD Dissertation, Istanbul University, 2013).

grandfather's estate, she possibly inherited a manufacturing plant in Balat. Mustafa Naili Pasha's brief biography mentions his factories at Balat and Ayazma alongside properties in different places.³¹⁴

After the 1908 revolution an investigation on Memduh was carried out and some of his properties were confiscated, while he could keep some others. An official document prepared in June 1913 reveals that Memduh had a spinning mill made up of 108 shares on the street of the ferry landing in the Balat Karabaş neighborhood on the Golden Horn in Istanbul.³¹⁵ This spinning mill might be one of the properties that Memduh's wife inherited from her grandfather. It is not clear if Memduh run the spinning mill or somehow made a profit out of it but he did so this can be taken as an evidence of Memduh's entrepreneurial capacity and his capabilities of private investment.

Moreover, Memduh and his brother Ahmed Tevfik owned a land on which there was a dairy farm and mansion in the Çobançeşme Taşköprü region on the European side of Istanbul. Memduh was then thirty-five years old and working at the secretariat of the Ministry of Education. This land and the farm were next to imperial lands where military troops were training and conducting cannon experiments. An official document prepared on 14 February 1874 refers to the necessity of purchasing the land and the farm of Memduh and Ahmed Tevfik by the military department in order to be used for the training.³¹⁶ The documents that I could reach are silent on whether the purchase was made; however, they probably sold their land, as there is no correspondence about it after 1874. Apparently, Memduh and his brother were earning an extra income from rent if they were not actively operating the above-mentioned dairy farm.

³¹⁴ Davut Hut, "Mustafa Naili Paşa" DİA, EK-2, 2016, 328-329.

³¹⁵ BOA, BEO. 4185/313836, 15 Receb 1331/20 June 1913.

³¹⁶ BOA, A.)MKT.MHM.474.17, 26 Zilhicce 1290/14 February 1874.

Besides the land at Çobançeşme, Memduh and his siblings collectively owned three fishponds in Antakya³¹⁷ and a large plot of land in the district of Karamurt close to the fishponds.³¹⁸ The lake of Amik in the Antakya region of the province of Aleppo hosted fifteen fishponds, three of which belonged to Memduh's father Mazlum Pasha.³¹⁹ There is no accurate information about how Mazlum Pasha obtained these fishponds. There is no record of the fishponds in the land registers other than the transaction of them from Memduh to his wife Zehra Narin Hanım on 28 November 1891.³²⁰ Notwithstanding their absence in the land registers, these three fishponds and a watermill remained in the hands of Mazlum Pasha's family until the demise of the Ottoman Empire. The fishponds were actively used for snakefish farming, which was a valuable export product in Mediterranean trade.

Mazlum Pasha and his heirs, after he passed away, rented the fishponds. According to a comprehensive petition submitted by Memduh and his siblings to the central administration in 1866 the yearly income of fish farming at these fishponds was 115,000 kuruş.³²¹ In the same period, Memduh and Ahmed Tevfik were working at the Office of the Receiver and each earning monthly incomes of 5,000 kuruş. This means, the fishponds could yield as much as the total amount that both Memduh and Ahmed Tevfik earned in a year. So, running fishponds was relatively profitable even if not lucrative.

There are plethora of documents on Mazlum Pasha's fishponds, most of which were produced after Mazlum Pasha passed away. The correspondence on the fishponds revolved around the complaints about them due to the swamp they caused and the issue of destroying or expropriating them as a solution. Memduh and his brother sometimes wrote long petitions to the central administration to keep the fishponds from being demolished. Consequently,

³¹⁷ BOA, MVL. 502/20, 4 Rebiülahir 1283/16 August 1866.

³¹⁸ BOA, BEO, AYN.d., (*Halep Ayniyat Defterleri*), 867, p. 64.

³¹⁹ BOA, DH.MKT. 1901/11, 12 Cemaziyelevvel 1309/14 December 1891.

³²⁰ BOA, DH.MUİ. 69/37, 10 Rebiülevvel 1328/22 March 1910.

³²¹ BOA, MVL. 502/20, 4 Rebiülahir 1283/16 August 1866.

despite all complains and warnings for five decades the Mazlum Pasha's fishponds were not destroyed. This is a good example of how difficult it was to take a radical action in the Ottoman bureaucratic realm. More importantly, it is evident that petitions, particularly those of officials, were quite influential in the bureaucratic process.

If we take the story from the beginning, on 3 June 1862, Mazlum Pasha passed away and the fishponds passed to Memduh and his siblings. In the years of 1862-1863, Attarizade Mehmed Efendi rented one of the fishponds and the watermill with the condition of paying the rent in three installments. However, Mazlum Pasha's heirs brought up the idea of cancelling the contract as there had been a bitter disagreement between Attarizade and them because the former did not fulfill the payment conditions of the contract.³²²

The major problem associated with the fishponds in that region was swamp and floods. The fishponds particularly the ones of Mazlum Pasha had dams (*su bendi*) at the mouth of the Karasu River, a branch of the Asi River, which prevented the extra water of Lake Amik from draining into the river. The swamp³²³ on the shores of the lake caused by poor drainage increased the risk of mosquito-borne epidemics. Furthermore, during heavy rains the lake used to overflow, as the extra water could not drain into the river because of the weirs, submerging the lands and houses of the tribe of Reyhanlı in the region. The year 1864 witnessed one of these floods. As the complaints reached to the Ministry of Foundations, the possibility of destroying Mazlum Pasha's fishponds began to be discussed in the capital for the wellbeing of the people of Antakya. Memduh and Ahmed Tevfik wrote comprehensive petitions³²⁴ to prevent the destruction of their fishponds. They said that other fishponds in Antakya had the same destructive effects in the region but that only the ones of Mazlum Pasha were to be destroyed merely because the owners of the others were from the local

³²² BOA, A.MKT.MHM. 261/31, 2 Zilkade 1279/21 April 1863.

³²³ Sea-snake farming requires swamps or marshy places.

³²⁴ BOA, MVL. 502/20, 4 Rebiülahir 1283/16 August 1866.
BOA, MVL. 510/112, 27 Cemaziyelevvel 1283/7 October 1866.

council and lobbying to protect their assets. Moreover, Memduh and Ahmed Tevfik defended their case by saying that the rain of the previous year had been extraordinary, causing floods not only in Antakya but everywhere, even in Eastern European cities. They also said that their father recently invested a lot into the fishponds to do sea-snake farming, and therefore that destroying them would be a waste of capital, effort, and a valuable resource of the empire.

In the ensuing decades, complaints about the dams of the fishponds continued, as did the defense of Memduh and Ahmed Tevfik.³²⁵ Mursaloğlu Mustafa Şevki Pasha's writings on the issue were of particular importance, as he was an outstanding personage from the tribe of Reyhanlı. Mustafa Şevki Pasha had close relations with the central administration because he served as regional administrative and chief district officer. In 1893, he sent a telegram to the Ministry of Interior to complain about Mazlum Pasha's fishponds.³²⁶ In that telegram, he also cites a petition he submitted to the Ministry of Public Works when he was in Istanbul in 1880. In that petition to the Ministry of Public Works, he argued that if the state destroyed all the fishponds in Antakya, thousands of decares of land would be created for farming, which would ultimately contribute to the prosperity of the plain of Amik.³²⁷

³²⁵ BOA, BEO. AYN. d., 868, p. 78.

BOA, BEO. AYN. d., 868, p. 116.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1911/19, 13 Cemaziyelahir 1309/14 January 1892.

BOA, BEO. 187/13960, 7 Şevval 1310/24 April 1893.

BOA, BEO. 198/14798, 26 Şevval 1310/13 May 1893.

BOA, BEO. 200/14995, 28 Şevval 1310/15 May 1893.

BOA, BEO. 222/16650, 4 Zilhicce 1310/19 June 1893.

³²⁶ BOA, DH.MKT. 20/13, 15 Zilhicce 1310/30 June 1893.

³²⁷ This dream of Mustafa Şevki Pasha was realized in the Republic of Turkey. In 1968, the water of Lake of Amik (seventy-five thousand decares) was completely drained into the River Asi to drain the swamp and open farm land to distribute to the people. In 2007, an airport was established on this drained lake. Flooding is however still the major problem of the region, as it was in the Ottoman period.

The idea of the state expropriating or purchasing the fishponds of Mazlum Pasha and Vecihi Pasha,³²⁸ another proprietor in the same region, was added to the agenda of the constitutional government after 1908. However, despite a series of correspondence,³²⁹ these fishponds could not be expropriated until the demise of the Ottoman Empire, as the judicial procedure between Memduh and the imperial treasury had not come to a conclusion.

2.5.2. Memduh's Entrepreneurial Activities

As will be detailed in Chapter 4 and 5 Memduh's wealth increased in parallel with his career. As he rose, his chances of acquiring property and access to business contract opportunities increased. Indeed, Memduh began entrepreneurial activities as early as 1877. He was appointed to the secretary of the Ministry of Finance after less than a year of service as the secretary of grand vizier. The worsening crisis in Herzegovina and Bulgaria along with the grave economic problems unseated Mahmud Nedim from the grand vizierate in May 1876, eight months after his appointment. Upon the removal of his patron from the grand vizierate, Memduh was transferred to the secretary of the Ministry of Finance. However, he could stay at this post only fourteen months. He lost his job because downsizing of the government offices.³³⁰ Since his early youth it was the first time that he was unemployed. He was put on a 2000 kuruş unemployment salary.

Memduh remained out of official work for over three years. During that period, he did not idly wait to be appointed to another office but searched for alternative means of livelihood in the private realm. On 12 April 1877, he got an official permission for tree cutting and lumber export in Shkodra, an Eastern European province of the Ottoman Empire, which had large forests. He rented a

³²⁸ In the summer of 1913, the Ministry of Finance decided to buy Mazlum Pasha' fishponds for the price of 7,000 kuruş. BOA, BEO. 4185/313850, 17 Receb 1331/22 June 1913.

³²⁹ BOA, DH.İD, 177/5, 29 Rebiülevvel 1332/25 February 1914.

³³⁰ This type of dismissal was called *mazuliyet* in the Ottoman bureaucracy. *Mazuliyet* comes from the verb "azl" which means to dismiss.

forest there and started the business of lumbering. In June 1880, Memduh visited Shkodra. On the same day, a brief official paper was sent from the capital to the governor of Shkodra commanding him to facilitate Memduh's activities in Shkodra without giving any details about the activities he was going to be involved in.³³¹

After eight years, another official paper³³² was sent from the capital to the governor of Shkodra stating that due to certain considerations, an official ban had been issued on lumbering in the demesne forests of the Shkodra province; however, the forest rented by Memduh Bey, the governor of Konya, was exempted from this ban, as he had received an official permission for cutting trees and lumber export on 12 April 1877.³³³ These two documents tell us that Memduh did lumber business when he was officially unemployed and he continued this lucrative business after he was appointed back to a government office. There is no documentation if he received any technical if not financial help from the senior members of his family to start out such a business requiring capital, knowhow, and domestic and foreign connections. This attests to the entrepreneurial capacity of Memduh at a relatively young age, notwithstanding having little or no experience in production, trade, and industry.

2.6. Service in the Council of State

After a period of unemployment, Memduh was appointed to the Council of the Financial Affairs (*Şura-yı Umur-u Maliye azalığı*) in November 1881 with a salary of 5000 kuruş. In April 1882 he became a member of the Council of the State. He worked as a member of a commission founded under the Council of State to

³³¹ BOA, DH.MKT. 1331/89, 4 Receb 1297/12 June 1880.

³³² BOA, DH.MKT. 1436/28, 12 Zilkade 1304/2 August 1887.

³³³ In this case, the Ottoman administration's faithfulness to its word is certainly remarkable.

examine Military Penal Code from April 1882 to October 1886.³³⁴ In the meantime, he served in the Supreme Court of Appeal of the Council of State from August 1883 to July 1887. He also worked in the Commission for the Selection of the Civil Servants (*İntihab-ı Me'murin Komisyonu*) between February 1885 and June 1885. Before he was appointed as governor of Konya he also served in the commission established to prepare the budget of the municipality of Istanbul from April 1886 to July 1887.³³⁵

Although it gradually lost power during the Hamidian epoch, the Council of State was still a prestigious and well-established institution dealing with the affairs of legislation while Memduh was a member of it.³³⁶ It was this position that provided him an opportunity to advance to high-ranking positions and take part in the core of the Hamidian administrative system. When he became a member of the Council of State he was forty-three years old and in the middle of his life and his official career. Five-year service at such a critical institution, dealing with major administrative and legislative issues of the central government and provinces equipped Memduh with vital information and experience that he successfully transferred and utilized in the latter phase of his career. He served at the Council until his appointment as governor of Konya in 1887 upon the outbreak of a severe famine.

³³⁴ According to Memduh's personnel record, his first task at the Council of State was "*Askeri Ceza Kanunnamesinin tedkiki.*" BOA, DH.SAİD. 1/84, 29 Zilhicce 1255/4 March 1840.

³³⁵ BOA, DH.SAİD. 1/84, 29 Zilhicce 1255/4 March 1840.

³³⁶ In 1868 the Council of Judicial Ordinances, founded upon the Supreme Council (*Meclis-i Vala*), was divided into two: the Council of the State and the Council of Judicial Ordinances. The Council of the State (*Şura-yı Devlet*) was comprised of fifty members. These members were serving in five specialized divisions and undertaking broad range of tasks such as preparing drafts of laws and regulations, examining the administrative affairs, functioning as court of appeal for the disputes between the judicial and administrative officials, trying the suits between the government and individuals, interpreting the law texts, examining the civil servants and it was necessary to try them, and after careful assessment make decisions about the records of the annual meeting of the provincial councils. Ali Akyıldız, "*Şura-yı Devlet*", *TDVİA*, Vol. 39, 2010, 236-239.

2.7. Conclusion

The late Ottoman political structure was characterized by a contest between the palace and the Sublime Porte. Memduh's career pattern exhibits the shifts in the balance of power at the Ottoman central politics. Though his post-1908 writings about the late Ottoman history seem impartial, Memduh, like his senior family members, was a member of the pro-palace group who was critical of the Tanzimat civil officialdom who labored to construct a Porte-centered imperial administration. The pro-palace group sought to restore the power of the sultan and the palace as a remedy for the existential problems of the Empire.

Memduh was appreciated by Mahmud Nedim, the leader of the pro-palace group, and then by Abdülhamid, the sultan who was fitting to the idealized sultanic figure in Mahmud Nedim's treatise, *Ayine-yi Devlet*. As a member the pro-palace group Memduh had become an essential part of the Hamidian political puzzle in the latter phase of his career during which he held high administrative positions. Overall, Memduh career evolved against the backdrop of the power struggle between the pro-palace group and the civil bureaucrats in the second half of the nineteenth century in Istanbul.

In addition to providing insight into the power structure of the late Ottoman Empire Memduh's biography gives us an idea about the parameters of being an Ottoman civil official in the long century of the empire. Memduh grew up in the imperial capital in an elite family, attended the gatherings of bureaucrats, studied in a newly founded rüşdiye school, and apprenticed more than half a decade at the Foreign Ministry. Thus, Memduh at a young age perceived himself as an "Ottoman" and learned what the empire was all about. Empire, as put by Malte Rolf for all imperial subjects, "marked the main point of reference for his mental horizon and his loyalty."³³⁷ Memduh's identity formation developed in parallel with his bureaucratic career. In parallel with his advancement in the

³³⁷ Malte Rolf, "Einführung: Imperiale Biographien. Lebenswege imperialer Akteure in Groß- und Kolonialreichen (1850 -1918)," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, vol. 40, Issue 1 (2014).

government service, Memduh's views had become more and more state-centered.

Memduh's life story shows how the civil officialdom functioned as a new field of power in the absence of strong traditional institutions and served as an engine for generating Ottoman elites. Literary activities and attachment to Sufi orders were quite common among the civil officials in the 1860s. Based on Memduh's experience and other cases that are examined in the secondary sources, it can be said that the large part of the Ottoman elites of the late nineteenth century emerged at the intersection of bureaucracy, Sufism, and poetry.

Memduh's biography also includes some elements showcasing the transforming parameters of the Ottoman bureaucratic tradition, manners and language. Thus, his career pattern exemplifies how old and new recruitment, training and promotion methods were integrated. From the early years until the very end of his career Memduh operated on a spectrum ranging from a very traditional to modern. He was one of the few officials who went through modern education at *rüşdiye* school in the early 1850s. In the meantime, he underwent traditional apprenticeship that had been in practice for centuries both in scribal service and artisanship.

The existence of variety of recruitment and training processes in the Ottoman political and administrative spheres in the nineteenth century can be taken as an indication of the gradual and prudent nature of change in the Ottoman Empire. This may seem problematic and confusing, indeed in some cases it was. Yet still adaptation of traditional administrative practices to modern needs and institutions should not necessarily be seen as a defect. Combination of traditional practices, which were developed throughout centuries in accordance to the needs of the Ottoman state and society, and the modern ones created a unique amalgam providing chances for agents like Memduh and his father who had different capitals to enter the bureaucracy.

Furthermore, Memduh's career until his appointment as a governor demonstrates that civil officials did not necessarily have a linear advancement in their professional life. They could even face unemployment in the middle of their career. However, as in the case of Memduh there was always a possibility for an official to be reappointed or promoted after a period of official unemployment. Memduh's career pattern exemplifies the interplay between patronage, hard work, strategy, skills, loyalty, and chance.

The entrepreneurial activities that Memduh engaged when he was unemployed (1878-1881) and the properties of Memduh offer an insight into an Ottoman official's economic activities in this period. Furthermore, the correspondence over the fishponds, which Memduh and his siblings inherited from their father, between Memduh and the central government started in 1862 and continued until the demise of the empire. The issue of destroying, expropriating or purchasing them had come to the fore frequently but the judicial procedure between Memduh and the imperial treasury had not come to any conclusion. This can be taken as an example of slow decision-making process of the Ottoman central government.

Having served more than three decades at the offices of the central administration Memduh reaped the fruits of his service and loyalty and in 1887 he was appointed as governor of Konya. Participated in the judicial and legislative activities at the Council of State for six years he gained the skills and capacity that would enable him to represent the central government in a province.

CHAPTER 3

RECONSTRUCTING THE HAMIDIAN IMPERIAL CONTEXT

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter I reconstruct the Hamidian political landscape in which large part of Memduh's career developed. After describing the circumstances that led to the enthronement of Abdülhamid, I show the similarities between the policies of Mahmud Nedim and Abdülhamid. In the ensuing sections of the chapter I outline the major political developments of the period within the framework provided by Çetinsaya.³³⁸ In an effort to comprehend the administrative configuration in which Memduh worked for three decades I delve into the aspects of the Hamidian bureaucracy such as patrimonialism, centralization, and the conflict between the palace and Porte. In the light of the new perceptions of the state and society relations, I also examine the limits of the "Hamidian absolutism" by referring to the first hand accounts. In the last part of the chapter, I demonstrate how the Hamidian bureaucrats such as Memduh acted like stakeholders having interest in the status quo, substantially contributing to the production and preservation of the Hamidian regime.

3.2. 1871-1876: The Transition from Tanzimat to the Reign of Abdülhamid

The death of the Grand Vizier Âli Pasha, the last prominent Tanzimat statesman who consolidated the power of the Porte, in September 1871, changed the configurations of the Ottoman central politics. In a bid to undermine the hegemony of the civil bureaucracy, Abdulaziz gave the seal of grand vizierate to his favorite statesman Mahmud Nedim, the pioneer of the pro-palace group.

Mahmud Nedim's appointment to the grand vizierate led to radical changes in the bureaucratic positions. The functionaries who were associated with Fuad

³³⁸ Gökhan Çetinsaya, "Sultan Abdülhamid II's Domestic Policy: An Attempt at Periodization," in *Abdülhamid II and His Legacy, Studies in Honour of F. A. K. Yasamee*, eds. Ş. Tufan Buzpınar and Gökhan Çetinsaya (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2019), 39-63.

and Âli Pashas were removed from their positions in Istanbul as well as in the provinces. Ali Fuad and Raşid, Âli's son and disciple respectively, lost their jobs. Despite their competence they were kept unemployed until the end of Mahmud Nedim's term. Some high-ranking officials such as Hüseyin Avni Pasha, the Minister of War, Âli's protégé, Şirvanizade Mehmed Rüşdi, Fuad's associate, Hüsnü Pasha, Chief of Gendarmerie, and Emin Bey, the head-clerk of the Mabeyn, were among those who were exiled. Furthermore, as a fiscal measure a great number of officials were laid off. Many governors were rotated for no reason.³³⁹

While such radical acts alienated many from the new grand vizier, Memduh who was then working at the Office of the Receiver, composed a poem manifesting his reverence to Mahmud Nedim.³⁴⁰ Given the fact that Memduh was promoted by Abdülaziz due to the poem he composed in honor of the sultan's enthronement, presenting a poem to the new grand vizier can also be interpreted as an investment for his career.³⁴¹ Memduh's affiliation to the pro-palace group and affinity to Mahmud Nedim did not yield any promotion in 1871, but, as stated earlier, he became the secretary of Mahmud Nedim during his second term at the grand vizierate in 1875.

Mahmud Nedim brought the marginalized statesmen who were known for their conservative outlook back to the political arena. Namık Pasha, an official coming from military background, became the president of the Council of State. He was affiliated with the Ibrahimiyye branch of Halvetiyye Sufi order. Ahmed Muhtar Molla, a pro-palace and Mahmud Nedim's friend, was appointed to the office of

³³⁹ Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 280-286.

³⁴⁰ The poem composed by Memduh for Mahmud Nedim is below.

*"Bu tasvir-i hümayunu görenler sadrı devlette
Sanurlar bir güneşdir asümana ziybüfer vermiş
Değil pırlanta etrafında bu tasviri garranın
Cenab-ı Yusuf'a tacı pür güher vermiş"*

Bedri Aydoğan, "Edebiyatçıların Arkası Şiirli Armağan Fotoğrafları," *Çukurova Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, vol. 15, no. 1 (2006), 49.

³⁴¹ Mahmud Kemal İnal says that Ziya Bey entered into the palace secretary by virtue of the poems he composed. İnal, *Son Şairler*, 1985.

shaykh al-islam. He was too a follower of a Sufi order. Yusuf Kamil Pasha, ex-grand vizier and minister of justice, was also promoted. Mahmud Nedim also protected the prominent members of the Young Ottomans Ziya, Şinasi, and Namık Kemal, the intelligentsia opposing to the iron rule of the Porte. With the declaration of amnesty, they also came back to the imperial capital.³⁴²

Ahmed Vefik Pasha, who was vastly experienced, had been unemployed since 1864 due to a rivalry between him and the Tanzimat statesmen. Though not unemployed, Ibrahim Edhem Pasha was kept out of the key positions because he was from the pro-palace group.³⁴³ Both figures were promoted to higher posts as soon as Mahmud Nedim was appointed as grand vizier. However, after their patron's dismissal, they lost their advances. Like many other functionaries who were kept out of the field of power during the Tanzimat era due to their pro-Palace outlook, Ahmed Vefik and Ibrahim Edhem Pashas were reappointed to critical posts such grand vizierate under the reign of Abdülhamid. This recruitment pattern attested to the continuity between Mahmud Nedim's grand vizierate and the Hamidian period. Abdülhamid took over the mission Mahmud Nedim tried to accomplish, shifting the locus of power back to the palace, ending the Porte's initiative of reforming the empire. Mahmud Nedim urged Abdülaziz to have absolute authority over the state affairs "at the expense of his own power as grand vizier."³⁴⁴ With this initiative the grand vizierate lost ground to the palace and could not consolidate power until the end of the Hamidian era.

Âli and Fuad were not the only rivals of Mahmud Nedim. His other adversary was Midhat Pasha, the governor of Baghdad. According to Davison, "the contrast between Midhat Paşa and his rival and opponent whom he replaced,

³⁴² Abu-Manneh, "The Sultan and the Bureaucracy," 265.

³⁴³ As mentioned in the previous chapter Mahmud Nedim was dismissed from the grand vizierate in 1872 and he and his friends such as İbrahim Edhem Pertev were sent (removed) from Istanbul. Pertev Pasha became the governor of Kastamonu and at that time Memduh published his poetry book *Eser-i Memduh* in dedication to Pertev Pasha who was one of the prominent palace affiliates.

³⁴⁴ Abu-Manneh, "The Sultan and the Bureaucracy," 265.

Mahmud Nedim Paşa, could not have been greater.”³⁴⁵ Midhat Pasha was famous for his reformist outlook and successful governing career in the provinces of Nish and Danube. He was appointed to Baghdad because he had a personal conflict with grand vizier Âli Pasha. Midhat Pasha came to Istanbul in 1872 and the civil officials who were not in tune with the new grand vizier began to gather around him. Midhat was constitutionalist and an advocate of preserving the power of the Porte. While Mahmud Nedim was regarded as pro-Russian,³⁴⁶ Midhat was a believer of maintaining the pro-British position of the Empire in international relations.³⁴⁷

In less than a year, Mahmud Nedim’s governance proved to be unsustainable. The economic position of the empire worsened, salaries of civil officials could not be paid for months and new loans were taken for paying off these debts. The license of an independent Bulgarian exarch, which was postponed in the time of Âli Pasha, was granted. Moreover, Mahmud Nedim cancelled the already reached agreement on Rumelia railroad and rearranged a new one that was in Baron Hirsch’s favor.³⁴⁸

Backing Mahmud Nedim became impossible for Sultan Abdülaziz and thus he removed Mahmud Nedim from the grand vizierate³⁴⁹ and appointed his rival Midhat Pasha to the office in July 1872. After two and a half months, Midhat Pasha was, too, dismissed.³⁵⁰ Political and economic instability persisted in the empire. In less than a year, the Porte saw three more grand viziers: Mütercim

³⁴⁵ Roderic H. Davison, “Midhat Paşa and Ottoman Foreign Relations,” *The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, V, 1986, 163.

³⁴⁶ Ibid., 163-164. Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of Late Ottoman History*, 84.

³⁴⁷ Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of Late Ottoman History*, 110.

³⁴⁸ For the Rumelia Railroads and Mahmud Nedim’s relations with Jewish businessman Baron Hirsch see Vahdettin Engin, *Rumeli Demiryolları* (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1993).

³⁴⁹ Mahmud Nedim was put on 20,000 kuruş unemployment salary. After a brief exile to Trabzon he was appointed as governor of Adana. In March 1875 he came back Istanbul and became the head of the Council of State.

İnal, *Son Sadrazamlar*; Akyıldız, “Mahmud Nedim Paşa”, *TDVİA*, Vol. 27, 2003, 374-376.

³⁵⁰ Tufan Ş. Buzpınar and Gökhan Çetinsaya, “Midhat Paşa (1822-1884)”, *TDVİA*, 2005, Vol. 30, 7-11; Davison, “Midhat Paşa and Ottoman Foreign Relations.”

Rüşdü Pasha, Müşir Esad Pasha,³⁵¹ Şirvanizade Rüşdü Pasha respectively. The next grand vizier was Minister of War Hüseyin Avni Pasha who was exiled to Isparta during Mahmud Nedim's first term at the grand vizierate.³⁵² Once he returned to Istanbul, he managed to create a disfavor against the current grand vizier Şirvanizade Rüşdü Pasha and came to power on 15 February 1874.³⁵³ He was both the Minister of War and the grand vizier until 25 April 1875. Denounced by his rivals Hüseyin Avni, he lost his power and Müşir Esad Pasha was given the seal for the second time. On 13 April 1875 an uprising broke out in Herzegovina. Despite the efforts, peace and order could not be established in the region in the ensuing years.³⁵⁴

Already suffering instability, the central administration implemented a job rotation program and on 26 August 1875 Mahmud Nedim once more became grand vizier. Midhat Pasha was appointed to the head of Council of State and Hüseyin Avni to the Ministry of War. Failure of Mahmud Nedim's economic policies had caused sharp decline in government bonds, majority of which were owned by British and French. Consequently, the British public opinion turned negative against the Ottoman Empire.³⁵⁵

At this juncture, Memduh was appointed to the Secretary of the Grand Vizier.³⁵⁶ Herzegovina issue was still very critical for the empire. Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim asked Memduh to provide his opinion about this issue and Memduh wrote two pages of memorandum for the solution of the Herzegovina question,

³⁵¹ Esad Pasha's brother was the scribe of Memduh's father Mazlum Pasha. Therefore, Esad Pasha used to visit Mazlum Pasha's kiosk.

Mehmed Memduh, *Mir'at-ı Şuunat*, 60.

³⁵² However, as Mehmed Memduh stated in *Mir'at-ı Şuunat* (p. 58), Avni Pasha had the opinion that it was indeed Sultan Abdulaziz who ordered his exile.

³⁵³ When he became grand vizier Hüseyin Avni Pasha exiled Şirvanizade Rüşdü Pasha to the province of Aleppo and then to Hijaz where Şirvanizade died from a heart attack.

³⁵⁴ Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 311-357.

³⁵⁵ For details of these developments see Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 311-357.

Mehmed Zeki Pakalın, *Son Sadrazamlar ve Başvekiller*, Vol. 3 (Istanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası, 1940).

³⁵⁶ BOA, DH.SAİD. 1/84, 29 Zilhicce 1255/4 March 1840.

which was proved to be highly difficult contrary to Mahmud Nedim's assumption.³⁵⁷ Great powers, particularly Austria and Russia had vested interests in Herzegovina. Therefore, as in the case of many other internal issues of the empire, Herzegovina question had been internationalized.³⁵⁸

The April uprising of Bulgarians broke out before the Herzegovina crisis was resolved. Spring of 1876 witnessed not only successive insurgencies in the Balkans but also escalation of dissatisfaction among the Ottoman public, particularly among the *madrassa* students in the imperial capital. At the end of tumultuous months of spring, "*erkân-ı hal*," led by Grand Vizier Mütercim Rüşdü, Minister of War Hüseyin Avni, and Midhat Pashas as well as Şeyhülislam Hayrullah Efendi, plotted against Sultan Abdülaziz and deposed him on 30 May 1876. They enthroned his nephew Murad V who promised not to prevent the declaration of a constitutional regime.³⁵⁹

Contrary to the expectations, the coup d'état further complicated the political situation. Initially, a disagreement rose among the coup plotters about the necessity of the constitutional regime. On 4 June 1876 Sultan Abdulaziz had suspiciously died. And in a short span of time Sultan Murad's inability to rule the empire became evident. Ensuing days witnessed another tragic event. The ministerial cabinet met at Midhat Pasha's kiosk on 15 June 1876. Memduh, in the case secretary of grand vizier, was at the meeting, too. Aiming at revenging the death of Sultan Abdulaziz, a military officer named Çerkes Hasan, a brother-in-law of the former, entered the gathering and assassinated Minister of War Hüseyin Avni and Foreign Minister Raşit Pasha while wounding some others.³⁶⁰

³⁵⁷ Mehmed Memduh, *Mir'at-ı Şuunat*.

³⁵⁸ For the involvement of the great powers into Herzegovina question see Mihailo Stojanović, *The Great Powers and the Balkans 1875-1878* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939); David MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism 1875-1878* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967); Richard Millman, *Britain and the Eastern Question 1875-1878* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).

³⁵⁹ As the secretary of grand vizier, Memduh either witnessed or was informed about the chain of events of this critical period and he narrates in detail in *Mir'at-ı Şuunat*.

³⁶⁰ Mehmed Memduh, *Mir'at-ı Şuunat*.

As an eyewitness, Memduh narrates the event thoroughly in his book *Mir'at-ı Şuunat*. Despite the unfavorable conditions, Grand Vizier Midhat Pasha continued to prepare the Constitution (*Kanun-i Esasi*). On the other hand, due to mental health problems Sultan Murad V was not able to rule the empire. As observed by Memduh, there was a sultanate but there was no sultan.³⁶¹ Abdülhamid, promising to ratify the constitution, II came to power under these circumstances on 31 August 1876. He kept his promise, but the events that unfolded afterwards convinced the young sultan that constitutional regime was not a viable option for the empire in that period. Engin Deniz Akarlı perfectly summarizes this process as well as Abdülhamid's leadership in this new political configuration.

This first experience with a parliament clearly contradicted Ottoman traditions of statecraft, which considered government the prerogative of a properly trained elite. Abdülhamid, who shared this perspective, appeared to the Ottoman statesmen in general to be a sensible sovereign who could provide the leadership necessary to deal with the grave problems facing the government. In this he did not disappoint his colleagues....Eventually, however, confidence in Abdülhamid's leadership began to erode, partly because he was unable to fulfill some of his plans and partly because those that he did fulfill created new dynamics and problems that undermined his style of government.³⁶²

3.3. "Survival of Fittest"

Sultan Abdülhamid II had ruled the Ottoman Empire in an era when the struggle among the industrial states for more power in the form of land, trade volume, and sphere of influence within the world order greatly intensified.³⁶³ As each of

³⁶¹ Ibid.

Many history books on this period refer to Memduh's account of the Çerkes Hasan Incident for he personally witnessed it.

³⁶² Engin Deniz Akarlı, "The Tangled Ends of an Empire: Ottoman Encounters with the West and Problems of Westernization—an Overview," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, vol. 26, no. 3, (2006), 396-397.

³⁶³ Akarlı identifies "world order" in late nineteenth century context as the domination of the world by a few hegemonic industrial powers. This order formed and grew in western Europe with the advent of the 'modern technical age', and spread from there throughout the nineteenth century to encompass the entire world. It was a dynamic process in the sense that the centers of hegemony and their relative strength changed

them struggled to consolidate and broaden their domination “at the expense of another, rivalries mounted, suspicions grew deeper, the arms race accelerated, and the ‘survival of fittest’ became the slogan of the times.”³⁶⁴ Under these relentless conditions Abdülhamid II’s neutral diplomacy proved to be costly and not very durable. Ever since he came to power the sultan had tried hard to enhance the Ottoman State’s negotiating power in order to put her in a more advantageous position in the new world order.³⁶⁵ This very purpose determined the foreign and domestic policies of Abdülhamid II reign.

Abdülhamid II, though fiercely opposed to constitutionalism, was, as suggested by Bernard Lewis, not blind, uncompromising, and reactionary. He was rather “a willing and active modernizer.”³⁶⁶ It was in the early years of the Hamidian era, “the whole movement of the *Tanzimat*—of legal, administrative, and educational reform—reached its fruition and its climax. And so, too, did the tendencies, already discernible under the *Tanzimat* regimes, towards a new, centralized, and unrestrained despotism.”³⁶⁷ That is to say, although the Hamidian regime had some unique aspects, it continued many of the practices and initiations of the *Tanzimat* era.

As Hanioglu put, Abdülhamid was “a shrewd tactician” pursuing “an administrative solution to the problems at home, while maximizing the Ottoman Empire’s weak potential abroad by staving off external threats to the empire through diplomacy.”³⁶⁸ His zealous program of bureaucratic modernization, however, was contingent upon his capacity to ward off the external threats to the empire. In the long run, the predicaments of the

over time, while peripheral states passive and dependent at one point could move towards position of power partly with the more active and dominant states.

Akarlı, “The Problems of External Pressures,” 208.

³⁶⁴ Akarlı, “The Problems of External Pressures,” 215.

³⁶⁵ An important aspect of his foreign policy was undermining the British dominance on the Ottoman Empire. Akarlı, “The Problems of External Pressures,” 213.

³⁶⁶ Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 178.

³⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 179.

³⁶⁸ Hanioglu, *A Brief History of Late Ottoman Empire*, 129.

Ottoman state's foreign and internal policies, the vicious cycle of economic dependence, and more importantly the multiplication of its enemies and their growing military power had posed formidable obstacles to Abdülhamid's ambitious reform agenda.

Memduh served more than half a century in the Ottoman bureaucracy and thirty years of this period coincided with the Hamidian era. He became the secretary of the Ministry of Finance, a member of Council of Financial Affairs and of the Council of State, the governor of Konya, Sivas, and Ankara, and finally the Minister of Interior. This career track is enough to draw a conclusion that Memduh was rising through the ranks in the Hamidian era. As elaborated earlier, like Mahmud Nedim, Memduh belonged to the pro-palace group advocating a political regime having strong sultan and palace. Abdülhamid possessed the characteristics of the ideal leader described by Mahmud Nedim in his treatise, *Ayine-i Devlet*. Abdülhamid managed to pull the strings of the state affairs. Memduh supported the sultan's initiative and as an agent, like his counterparts, actively got involved in forming and re-forming Hamidian political structure. Since he was greatly influenced and molded by it, he was prompted to act in a certain way due to this structure.³⁶⁹ Therefore, it is critical to understand the parameters and major issues of this period. Reconstructing the Hamidian political setting would account for the particular qualities of Memduh's professional life.

3.4. Echoes of Mahmud Nedim in the Hamidian Era

To examine Memduh's relations with the Hamidian regime it would be better first to look into Mahmud Nedim's relations with it. This is because, as highlighted earlier, there is a parallel between the political system that Mahmud Nedim idealized and attempted to realize when he was grand vizier in cooperation with Abdülaziz and the one Abdülhamid established. Capturing the similarities between the policies and approaches of Mahmud Nedim and

³⁶⁹ This is what Antony Giddens conceptualized as "structuration". Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society* (Oxford: Cambridge Polity Press, 1984).

Abdülhamid would lay the foundation for an analysis of Memduh's integration into the Hamidian administrative system.

While Istanbul was engulfed by the political crisis, Mahmud Nedim voluntarily went first to Çeşme and then to Chios. With the enthronement of Abdülhamid, he was promoted to governor of Mosul. Soon afterwards, he was called to Istanbul and in October 1879 was appointed as the Ministry of Interior to the cabinet that was under the grand vizierate of Küçük Said Pasha. The cabinet was comprised of some other conservative statesmen such as Gazi Osman Pasha and Munif Efendi. The day before the appointment, Mahmud Nedim presented a memorandum about the organization and governance of provinces to the palace.³⁷⁰ What he proposed in it was in harmony with his ideas in the treatise he penned years ago. On 28 February 1883 he was removed from his post due to health issues and in May 1883 he passed away.³⁷¹

Abdülhamid appreciated Mahmud Nedim's loyalty to the palace and showed his appreciation by restoring his prestige and appointing him to an important position despite the fact that both of his terms at the grand vizierate were not successful. On the other hand, Mahmud Nedim's rival, constitutionalist and reformist Midhat Pasha was dismissed from the grand vizierate not long after Abdülhamid's ascendancy. Midhat Pasha was trialed in 1881 at a private court at the Yıldız Palace for his involvement in the coup d'état against Sultan Abdülaziz. He found guilty and condemned to death but his sentence was reduced to a life sentence. He lived in Taif, a city of Hejaz, for three years as an exile. According to his son Ali Haydar Midhat's account, in the last years of his life Midhat Pasha devoted himself to prayer and Sufism. On 8 May 1884, he was

³⁷⁰ BOA, Y.EE. 95/22, 2 Zilkade 296/18 October 1879.

³⁷¹ Abdülhamid cancelled the meeting he had with the British ambassador, Lord Dufferin, on the day that Mahmud Nedim passed away due to the death of Mahmud Nedim.

BOA. Y.PRK.TKM.6/17, 8 Receb 1300/15 May 1883.

strangled.³⁷² Furthermore, Ziya Pasha died in Adana four years before Midhat Pasha and Namık Kemal died in Chios in 1888. Since its prominent leaders died, the constitutionalist movement had to wait for a decade to resurface.

Mahmud Nedim's pro-palace group came out victorious. The palace, after three decades of the Porte's domination, seized power once again. Abdülhamid, in the following three decades, had done his utmost to preserve the power at the Yıldız Palace. Memduh as a junior member of the pro-palace group was appointed to key positions in this period. After a half decade of service at the Council of State, he was first promoted to governorship and then to the Ministry of Interior.

Memduh was a believer of the political system Abdülhamid established. As stated earlier, Mahmud Nedim trusted Memduh because of his pro-palace outlook and family background. Memduh became one of the trustees of Abdülhamid too. Despite some corruption allegations, he remained so until the demise of the Hamidian regime. The statement from the memoirs attributed to Abdülhamid that was quoted in the literature review of the thesis can be regarded as a testament to his opinion of Memduh. Though he could not reach the topmost position, the grand vizierate, Memduh's career was always on rise during this period. The sultan was generous to him and he felt free to demand anything he needed. Memduh became one of the stakeholders of the Hamidian statecraft. He invested in and contributed to the Yıldız-centered political structure. He, like many others, had a personal interest in the success and consolidation of the Hamidian regime.

³⁷² Tufan Ş. Buzpınar and Gökhan Çetinsaya, "Midhat Paşa (1822-1884)", *TDVİA*, 2005, Vol. 30, 7-11. For Midhat Pasha's biography, trial, and administrative activities see Ali Haydar Midhat, *The Life of Midhat Pasha* (London: J. Murray, 1903); İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Midhat Paşa ve Yıldız Mahkemesi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000); Najib Saliba, "The Achievements of Midhat Pasha as Governor of the Province of Syria, 1878-1880," *International Journal of Middle East*, IX (1978); Maria Todorova, "Midhat Paşa's Governorship of the Danube Province," in *Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Cesar E. Farah (Kirksville, MO: Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993).

Though he was disturbed by some practices and attempted to resign a few times for some personal reasons, Memduh stayed in the system until the 1908 Revolution. It seems that seeking an alternative path did not occur to him during the three decades of the regime. He managed to survive the challenges of the system and in the meantime capitalized upon the opportunities it offered. That is to say, Memduh's life intersected with the Hamidian regime. Therefore, revealing the details of his biography would help us piece together the puzzle of the regime.

&

As explained above, there is continuity between the recruitment pattern between Mahmud Nedim and the reign of Abdülhamid. The course of Memduh's career is the manifestation of this pattern. Like Mahmud Nedim, Abdülhamid rewarded the functionaries who had proven their loyalty to the palace in previous decades, and punished those with exile or exclusion from key positions, who supported the Porte-centered system of the Tanzimat.

Abdülhamid adopted the same policy in the provinces in dealing with the local, social, economic, and religious groups. In addition to establishing a direct link between the local notables and the palace, the Hamidian state supported some groups in the provinces. For instance, as suggested by Abu Manneh, "the split in Istanbul between two factions appears to have manifested itself in Aleppo." The Muslim notables in Aleppo were divided into two, "each supporting one or the other in Istanbul and subsequently protected by it."

The Kethuda, Kawakibi, and the Jabiri families endorsed the policies of the Tanzimat, particularly Âli and Fuad, whereas the Rifa'i, Mudarris, and the Qudsi families supported the sultan and the palace affiliates. The second group pledged loyalty to the sultan under all conditions. Despite the hegemony of the Porte, the enthronement of Abdülaziz strengthened the hand of this group in Aleppo and Rifa'i Shaikh Abulhuda ascended. The overthrow of Abdülaziz tipped the balance in favor of the Jabiris again. Nafi, a member of the Jabiri family, became one of the deputies of Aleppo in the first Ottoman parliament (1877-

1878). He was highly critical of Abdülhamid, therefore he was commanded by the sultan to leave the imperial capital after the suspension of the parliament. In the meantime, Nafi's father was removed from the office of Mufti. Similarly, Kawakibis were put under pressure during the Hamidian era.³⁷³ It is noteworthy to observe that in the late 1890s, Abdurrahman al-Kawakibi emerged as a leading Arab nationalist questioning the legitimacy of Abdülhamid's caliphate and authority.³⁷⁴ He was one of the champions of the political-ideological project of the "Arab Caliphate,"³⁷⁵ a project of emerging Arab nationalism and the ongoing British colonialism in the Ottoman periphery."³⁷⁶ It is neither possible nor appropriate to attribute one cause to the emergence of a socio-political phenomenon. Yet still, it is striking to notice a link between the changes in the balance of power at the Ottoman central administration with the marginalization of some groups at the provincial level, and the development of a movement such as the Arab caliphate which had international connections. All in all, the alliance of the palace with a specific group or notable family at the expense of the others in a province might have polarized the provincial society

³⁷³ Butrus Abu-Manneh, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and Shaikh Abulhuda Al-Sayyadi," *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 15, no. 2 (May, 1979), 135.

There are other examples of the alliance of the palace with one specific stake-holder by probably disrupting the balance of power in the province. Çürüksulu Ali Pasha, the leader of the Muslim Georgians of Batum-Çürüksu region who migrated to Trabzon after the 1877-78 Ottoman-Russo War, had intimate connection with the Yıldız Palace and thus he was assigned as the settlement officer (*iskan memuru*). This strengthened the Georgian immigrants. The relations, already tense due to the brigandage of the Georgian gangs, between the immigrants and the local Muslim and non-Muslim community further deteriorated and turned into hatred. Oktay Özel, "Migration and Power Politics: The Settlement of Georgian Immigrants in Turkey (1878–1908)," *Middle Eastern Studies* 46, no. 4 (2010), 481. Despite the public dissatisfaction the Sharif of Mecca remained at the office and made use of the system of personal connection with the sultan through courtiers for persisting in his abusive rule." Butrus Abu-Manneh, "Sultan Abdülhamid II and the Sharifs of Mecca (1880-1900)," *Asian and African Studies*, 9 (1979). The connection between the palace factionalism, favoritism, and bribery that prevailed the provincial policy of the regime in the last years of the Hamidian era will be discussed in the context of Memduh's ministerial years.

³⁷⁴ For the opposition to the caliphate of Abdülhamid see Tufan Buzpinar, "Opposition to the Ottoman Caliphate in the Early Years of Abdülhamid II, 1877–1882," *Die Welt des Islams*, 36 (1996).

³⁷⁵ Nurullah Ardiç, *Islam and the Politics of Secularism: The Caliphate and Middle Eastern Modernization in the early 20th Century* (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 316.

³⁷⁶ Ardiç, *Islam and the Politics of Secularism*, 205.

and eventually caused unintended and irremediable consequences, damaging the state society relations.

Abdülhamid also supported some religious groups at the expense of the others. Abdulqadir al-Qudsi and his close friend Rifa'i Shaikh Abulhuda al-Sayyadi from Aleppo, and Shaikh Muhammad Zafir, the head of Shadhili-Madani suborder from the North Africa, who were already backed by the pro-palace group during the reign of Abdülaziz, pledged loyalty to Abdülhamid and provided their service to him. As mentioned earlier, Mahmud Nedim had friendly relations with the followers of the Sufi order. He established strong links with the Sufi leaders such Muhammad Zafir during his governing years in Tripoli and later on in Adana.³⁷⁷ Mahmud Nedim could not realize it during his brief period at grand vizierate but he seems to have been assigned with the project of getting the assistance of the Sufi sheikhs to stimulate Islamic communal fervor and bolster the ties between the sultan and the Muslims of the empire. As put by Abu Manneh, this policy, too, was left to Sultan Abdulhamid to be put into practice.³⁷⁸

Abdulqadir al-Qudsi, Abulhuda, and Shaikh Muhammad Zafir were the permanent guests of the Yıldız Palace functioning as mediators between the central administration and the provincial community they came from.³⁷⁹ They

³⁷⁷ Tufan Buzpinar, *Hilafet ve Saltanat: II. Abdülhamid Döneminde Halifelik ve Araplar* (Istanbul: Alfa, 2016), 174.

According to Georgeon, it was Mahmud Nedim who introduced Shaikh Muhammad Zafiri to Abdülhamid. Mahmud Nedim enjoyed the company of Shaikh Zafir in Tripoli during his governing years. The sultan attached (grew found of) to Shaikh Zafir later on. Georgeon, *Sultan Abdülhamid*, 50.

This information is important to appreciate the critical role Mahmud Nedim played not only in the formation of the Hamidian regime but also in Abdülhamid personal religious life.

³⁷⁸ For Abdülhamid II's efforts to integrate Arabs into the Ottoman system see Engin D. Akarlı, "Abdülhamid II's Attempt to Integrate Arabs into the Ottoman System," in *Palestine in the Ottoman Period*, ed. David Kushner, (Leiden: Brill, 1986).

³⁷⁹ In his recent study on the caliphate and the Arabs in the Hamidian era, Tufan Buzpinar provides a thorough explanation about the role Abulhuda and Shaikh Muhammad Zafir played in improving the relationship between the Ottoman center and the provinces they were from. Buzpinar, *Hilafet ve Saltanat*, 171-191.

were acting as representatives of the regions, which were considered critical by the sultan, at the palace. Through their assistance Abdülhamid managed to secure the political and religious allegiance of people of the province who were associated with these Sufi leaders. In exchange of their propaganda for the Ottoman caliph-sultan, they were fully supported by him³⁸⁰ while some others who were acquainted and somewhat friendly with the Tanzimat statesmen were excluded from the space of power and some of them were even exiled. These three Sufi leaders expanded their religious activities and zawiya with the financial and political backing of the sultan.³⁸¹ This relationship based on mutual gains and interest continued until the 1908 Revolution after which the power was once again transferred to the Porte.

As the discussion above attests, Abdülhamid allied with the agents from different segments of the Ottoman society to consolidate his palace-based political system. Furthermore, the power struggle at the imperial center, in which Memduh was also involved, had far reaching impact. There was a correlation between the power struggle at the imperial center and that of provinces and this struggle had wide-ranging implications.

The Hamidian provincial policy improved the relations between the central government led by the Yıldız Palace and the provincial powers in the early phase of the regime. Yet, as put by Fatma Arıkan “it depended on the constant political fine tuning of the Hamidian regime, because ‘provincial social forces’ represented a plethora of interests, political camps and socio-economic strata, whose demands and aspirations cannot always be smoothly reconciled”.³⁸² Thus, in the later period when the sultan’s capacity of harmonizing the interests of different groups had decreased, the policy of expediency in dealing with the

As noted by Buzpınar, Abdülhamid’s relations with Abuhuda was not smooth and stable. Abdülhamid tried to balance the influence of Abulhuda with that of other religious groups across the empire. Buzpınar, *Hilafet ve Saltanat*, 214-215.

³⁸⁰ Buzpınar, *Hilafet ve Saltanat*, 171-191.

³⁸¹ Abu-Manneh, “Sultan Abdulhamid II and Shaikh Abulhuda Al-Sayyadi.”

³⁸² Fatma Melek Arıkan, “‘Periphery’ in the Heartlands: Yenişehir and İznik, 1863-1909” (PhD Dissertation, 2018, Sabancı University).

provinces produced undesirable consequences. It not only upset the balance of power in the provincial society but also damaged the legitimacy of the regime in the long run.

As will be detailed below, Abdülhamid, like Mahmud Nedim,³⁸³ regarded loyalty as a crucial element of the state administration. The civil officials under the reign of Abdülhamid were expected to owe their allegiance to the sultan. Another resonance of Mahmud Nedim in the Hamidian era is the policy of Islamic unity. There are different explanations about the roots and logic of this policy of Abdülhamid. Yet, in this context, what is important is to underline the continuity between the policy of Mahmud Nedim and the policies of Abdülaziz as well as those of Abdülhamid. The doctrine of Islamic unity, which emphasized the role of the caliph of the Ottoman sultan for the unity of Muslim community, was advanced for the first time under the reign of Abdülaziz.³⁸⁴ Abu Manneh argues that, Grand Vizier Âli Pasha would probably have reservations about this doctrine. Thus, “it was most probably advanced during the first grand vizierate of Nedim.”³⁸⁵ Like many other views and policies of Mahmud Nedim, this was left to Abdülhamid to be implemented.

Furthermore, according to the memoir of Nadir Ağa, the second gentleman-in-waiting (*musahib*) of Abdülhamid, spying (*jurnalcilik*) became prevalent at the Yıldız Palace after the demise of the Mabeyn officials including Süreyya Pasha, the head clerk, Osman Bey, and Marshall Gazi Osman Pasha. This is because, after them the associates of Mahmud Nedim were recruited to the Mabeyn. The head of the spies was Lütfi Ağa, a servant working at the tobacco room. Ahmet Refik Pasha, the undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior during the term of Memduh,³⁸⁶ who was the father-in-law of Tahsin Pasha; the head clerk

³⁸³ Mahmud Nedim Paşa, *Âyine ve Hasbihâl*.

³⁸⁴ Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 124.

³⁸⁵ Abu-Manneh, *The Sultan and Bureaucracy*, 267.

³⁸⁶ As will be explained in the chapter on Memduh’s ministerial years, Memduh was not comfortable with the undersecretaries of the ministry one of whom was Ahmed

of the Mabeyn, Haşim Pasha who later on became the Minister of Education, Mehmed Âli Bey; the Minister of Customs, Tahsin Pasha; the head clerk, attendant İzzet Ağa, butler İzzet, butler Tefik Ağa, Custom official Cemal Bey, and Fuad Bey; undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior under the reign of Memduh,³⁸⁷ were the associates of Mahmud Nedim and according to Nadir Ağa they were the ones who established and expanded spying at the Yıldız Palace.³⁸⁸ Tahsin Pasha became the head clerk of the Mabeyn on 16 November 1894 and as suggested by Ali Akyıldız, based on the accounts of Ali Cevad Bey³⁸⁹ and Nadir Ağa,³⁹⁰ after the appointment of Tahsin Pasha, the Mabeyn turned into a center for all affairs of the state.³⁹¹ As will be discussed in the following sections of this chapter, period from 1895 to 1908 was significant for multiple reasons. The ascendancy of the Mabeyn and the expansion of spying activities and surveillance were features characterizing this period. In parallel with these developments, the professional and personal relations of the civil officials at the center and provinces had become highly intricate. Memduh was one of the key figures serving in the capacity of minister of the Hamidian administrative system.

3.5. Periodization of the Hamidian Domestic Policy

In an effort to contextualize Memduh's professional life, it is necessary to outline the major political developments of the Hamidian era. The scheme provided by Gökhan Çetinsaya would help us survey the key events of the period. Çetinsaya examines the Hamidian domestic policy and political regime in six sub-periods: 1876-1878, 1878-1882, 1882-1891, 1891-1897, 1897-1902, and

Refik Pasha. Though they did not have an open conflict Memduh's relations with him was tense.

Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, *Maruf Similar* (İstanbul: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2013).

³⁸⁷ As recounted by Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, Memduh and Ali Fuad Bey had often times open disputes. Türkgeldi, *Maruf Similar*.

³⁸⁸ Hasan Ferit Ertuğ, "Musahib-i Sani-i Hazret-i Şehriyârî Nadir Ağa'nın Hatıratı I," *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 49 (January 1998), 39-40.

³⁸⁹ Ali Cevad Bey, *İkinci Meşrutiyet'in İlanı ve Otubir Mart Hadisesi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 1985), 4.

³⁹⁰ Ertuğ, "Musahib-i Sani-i Hazret-i Şehriyârî Nadir Ağa'nın Hatıratı I," 15.

³⁹¹ Ali Akyıldız, *Osmanlı Bürokrasisi ve Modernleşme* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004), 168.

1902-1908. Each of these phases included various determining political developments, turning points as well as challenges including the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-78 and the implementation of the provisions of the Berlin Treaty of 1878; the Armenian crisis of 1894-1897; and the Macedonian crisis of 1903-1908. While the Hamidian regime weathered the first two challenges, the last of them sounded the death bell of the regime.³⁹²

Having served in various offices, Memduh pursued his career in the Hamidian administration and in parallel with the abovementioned six sub-periods. He was working at the secretary of the Minister of Finance when Abdülhamid came to the throne. The third sub-period corresponded to his years at the Council of the State in Konya and Sivas. In the fourth sub-period, after serving in Ankara he came back to the imperial capital in 1895, and had remained at the post of Ministry of Interior until the beginning of the Second Constitutional Period. His ministerial career coincided with 1891-1897, 1897-1902, 1902-1908 sub-periods of the Hamidian regime.

&

The series of dramatic events that instigated constitutional regime in the Ottoman realm, ending the rule of Sultan Abdülaziz and heralding the beginning of the Hamidian era were discussed in the first part of this chapter. In the early phase of his reign (1876-1878), Abdülhamid II maintained, to a certain extent, the Tanzimat legacy such as some of the bureaucrats, the constitutionalist ideals, and British oriented foreign policy. Tragic 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War left its mark on this sub-period and a chain of unpleasant events followed this heavy defeat: the Edirne Armistice (31 January 1878), the suspension of the parliament (13 February 1878), the Treaty of San Stefano (3 March 1878), the Çırağan Incident (20 May 1878), leaving Cyprus to the British (4 June 1878), the Berlin Conference and the Treaty of Berlin (13 June -13 July 1878). Under the extraordinary circumstances of 1878, the young sultan suspended the parliament. He appeared to be planning to convene it by 1881 but he did not do

³⁹² Gökhan Çetinsaya, "II. Abdülhamid'in İç Politikası: Bir Dönemlendirme Denemesi," *The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, 47 (2016).

it. Furthermore, after the Çırağan Incident, a failed initiation by Ali Suavi to bring Abdülhamid's brother Murad V back to the throne, Abdülhamid II began to suspect people around him and removed most of them from Istanbul.³⁹³

Between 1878 and 1882, the sultan seemed to be questioning the Tanzimat policies such as limitless foreign borrowing, being tolerant of European penetration into the Empire, inability to prevent separatist nationalist activities among the Christian subjects and protecting the Muslims. This period can be considered a transition in terms of Abdülhamid II's use of his authority. While the sultan was prudently changing the domestic policy of the Empire towards a different direction, the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin began to have an impact on the Balkans and Eastern Anatolia.³⁹⁴ Ultimately, an intensive reform movement had been embarked in Anatolian and Arab provinces.³⁹⁵

In the meantime, Abdülhamid initiated a purge in bureaucracy. They were vetted according to their performance, loyalty, and the role they played in the deposition of Sultan Abdülaziz, some of the high-profile statesmen maintained their positions, some others did not. In the subsequent years, Abdülhamid II continued to try and change the men in the cabinet he was working with. After a hectic period,³⁹⁶ the imperial administration reached a relative stability. As the transition process came to an end, six principles of the Hamidian domestic policy including conservatism, autocracy, centralism, internal Pan-Islamism,

³⁹³ Çetinsaya, "II. Abdülhamid'in İç Politikası"; Georgeon, *Sultan Abdülhamid*.

For Abdülhamid's foreign policy see Feroze A. K. Yasamee, *Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdülhamid II and the Great Powers, 1878-1888* (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1996); Vahdettin Engin, *II. Abdülhamid ve Dış Politika* (Istanbul: Yeditepe, 2005).

³⁹⁴ Implications of the Treaty of Berlin in the Eastern Anatolia were discussed in Chapter 3 in the context of Armenian question and formation of the Hamidian Light Cavalry in the Six Eastern Anatolian Provinces one of which was Sivas, the province Memduh was governing.

³⁹⁵ Ahmed Cevdet, Küçük Said, Kamil, Tunuslu Hayreddin, and Safvet Pashas prepared reform memorandums in this process. Some of these statesmen came up with memorandum on their own initiative while some others were requested by the sultan.

³⁹⁶ This period witnessed not only treaties, reform movements, and purge, but also French invasion of Tunisia and the establishment of the Public Debt Administration in 1881.

reformism and the policy of status quo crystalized and began to be carried out.³⁹⁷ Memduh's career in the ministry overlapped with the period when the Hamidian system was fully formed with the realization of these six principles.

On the other hand, the financial crisis and political instability in Egypt resulted in irremediable consequences, the British invasion of Egypt. The third sub-period of the Abdülhamid II's reign, from 1882 to 1891, bore witness to some other political developments signaling the difficulty of maintaining the empire intact. According to the terms of the Treaty of Berlin an independent Bulgaria and an autonomous Eastern Rumelia were created in the Balkans. In 1885, Bulgarian nationalists united these two. The Ottoman state, the great powers, Greece, and Serbia were against the unification. But because they could not find a common ground, Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia remained united. In general, fearing from the emergence of an internal crisis, Abdülhamid II abstained from military intervention to the events in the Balkans and the North Africa. This case perfectly exemplifies the nature of the Hamidian domestic policy, which was greatly in favor of the status quo. As Çetinsaya suggests, bearing in mind the fragility and weakness of the empire, Abdülhamid preferred to maintain the status quo, play safe, and negotiate rather than conflict.³⁹⁸

In the succeeding years, the empire witnessed substantial reforms and developments in all fields including administration, education, military, law, economy, public works, agriculture, and mining. Besides the external and internal affairs, the relationship between the palace and Sublime Porte enjoyed a relative stability in the third sub-period of the Hamidian regime (1882-1891). The duration between 1890 and 1895 is deemed to be the turning point in

³⁹⁷ Çetinsaya, "II. Abdülhamid'in İç Politikası: Bir Dönemlendirme Denemesi," 373-383. Gökhan Çetinsaya, "Din, Reform ve Statüko: II. Abdülhamid Dönemine Bir Bakış, 1876-1909," *Osmanlı Medeniyeti: Siyaset, İktisat, Sanat* (İstanbul: Klasik, 2005).

³⁹⁸ Gökhan Çetinsaya, "Abdülhamid'in Kilit Taşı: Merkezîyetçilik," in *Siyaset, İktisat, Dış Politika, Kültür, Eğitim: Sultan II. Abdülhamid Dönemi*, eds. M. Bulut, M. E. Kala, N. Salık, M. Nar (İstanbul: İZÜ Yayınları, 2019), 17.

Tahsin Paşa, *Tahsin Paşa'nın Yıldız Hatıraları, Sultan Abdülhamid*, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1990), 207.

Abdülhamid's reign³⁹⁹ as after this period the sultan consolidated his grip on power and the Hamidian political system had been crystalized.

3.6. The 1894-1896 Crisis

Holding key positions both in the province and later in the Sublime Porte, Memduh had operated against the backdrop of this crisis. Hence, examining the parameters of 1894-1896 Crisis would be helpful in placing him in the context of the Ottoman Empire during this period. Reconstructing that particular historical context would demonstrate how Memduh's perception and career were entangled with the empire-wide political phenomena.

As noted by Gökhan Çetinsaya,⁴⁰⁰ the 1894-1896 Crisis, like the 1875-1878 Crisis, during which the Sultan Abdülhamid II ascended the throne, had a multidimensional nature. This crisis was, too, at the intersection of three major factors, which threatened the stability of the Ottoman state: revolts, foreign intervention, opposition to the regime and the coup attempt. This internal turmoil of the Empire, as Hanioglu put, particularly "marked a broader turning point in Ottoman-British relations, as a result of the drastic reduction of the importance of the Ottoman Empire in the eyes of British policy makers."⁴⁰¹ The British were planning a maritime demonstration in June of 1895. The French had a similar project in October. Furthermore, there was an intervention in the agenda of Austria Hungary's foreign minister.

Debilitating the Ottoman state internally and externally, this crisis affected not only the *vilayat-ı sitte*⁴⁰² but also other regions of the Empire. The violent

³⁹⁹ Ali Akyıldız, "II. Abdülhamid'in Çalışma Sistemi, Yönetim Anlayışı ve Babıali'yle (Hükümet) İlişkileri," Osmanlı, Vol. 3 (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 1999); Çetinsaya, "Din, Reform ve Statüko: II. Abdülhamid Dönemine Bir Bakış, 1876-1909"; Abdulhamit Kırmızı, *Abdülhamid'in Valileri: Osmanlı Vilayet İdaresi, 1895-1908* (İstanbul: Klasik, 2007).

⁴⁰⁰ Çetinsaya, "II. Abdülhamid'in İç Politikası: Bir Dönemlendirme Denemesi."

⁴⁰¹ Hanioglu, *A Brief History of Late Ottoman Empire*, 131.

⁴⁰² As explained in the previous chapter of the thesis, *Vilayat-ı Sitte* referred to the six Eastern Anatolian provinces that the 61st article of the Berlin Congress obliged the Ottoman state to introduce far-reaching reforms in the conditions of Armenians.

conflicts frequently occurred in different parts of Anatolia including Trabzon in 1890, Yozgat, Kayseri, Merzifon, and Çorum in 1892-1893 as well as in the capital. Conflicts in Sason (Bitlis) occurred on August 1894,⁴⁰³ the Armenian demonstration at the Sublime Porte on 30 September 1895 together with the events of Istanbul started with Kumkapı demonstration. The Storming of the Ottoman Bank on 26 August 1896 were the three peak points of the 1894-1896 Crisis.⁴⁰⁴ All these developments enabled the European powers particularly the British to intervene in the Ottoman realm and from May 1895 onwards the demands for substantial reform was once again a forefront issue. The intervention, threat, and the external pressure on the empire greatly intensified between December 1896 and January 1897. The French and British critics of the time who were hostile to Abdülhamid II called him the “Monster of Yıldız” and the “Red Sultan,” asserting that he was bloodthirsty specifically in relation to the Armenian question that accelerated in 1890s. Repercussions of this discursive propaganda is still felt today in the public opinion and scholarly world.

Faced with serious challenges within the state and abroad, the sultan took various measures during this crisis. Çetinsaya analyzes these measures in five categories. The European powers pressured the Ottoman state to adopt their solution for the Armenian uprisings and made use of the Empire’s weakness to partition the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁰⁵ In response, Abdülhamid played the great powers off against each other. With the help of this mode of foreign policy the sultan managed to prolong the empire’s life and that of his regime.⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰³ The second Sasun revolt broke out in 1903. After two years an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Abdülhamid II was undertaken and in 1909 the Adana revolt occurred.

⁴⁰⁴ For the Storming of the Ottoman Bank see Edhem Eldem, “26 Ağustos 1896 ‘Banka Vak’ası’ ve 1896 Ermeni Olayları” [The Ottoman Bank Incident of 26 August and the 1896 Armenian Incidents], *Tarih ve Toplum*, 5 (2007).

⁴⁰⁵ The Europeans’ scramble for the Ottoman Empire need to be evaluated against the backdrop of the Age of Neo-Imperialism (1881-1914) during which the north European countries partitioned most of the globe among themselves.

⁴⁰⁶ The Armenian issue resurfaced time to time in different contexts in the following years. The second Sasun revolt broke out in 1903. After two years an unsuccessful

As it also happened during the previous crisis, the central administration, during this crisis was also rendered unstable because the grand viziers were only serving for short periods. In five months, between June 1895 and November 1895, four grand viziers came to the office. Torn between his principle of unconditional loyalty and the foreign pressure, the sultan had difficulty in choosing the most appropriate functionary for the grand vizierate. In June 1895 Said Pasha (for the fifth time after ten years of unemployment) replaced Ahmed Cevad Pasha. Four months later Said Pasha was dismissed due to British pressure and Kamil Pasha, a functionary who was on good terms with the British, came to the post as the sultan succumbed to internal crisis and external pressure. But it was not easy for Abdülhamid II to work with a grand vizier who wished to bring back the pre-1891 relationship pattern between Sublime Porte and Yıldız Palace. Hence after a year, Halil Rifat Pasha who would serve in the office for six years replaced Kamil Pasha who attempted to restore the power of the Power.⁴⁰⁷

Responding to the external pressure that had intensified, May 1895 witnessed not only the frequently change of the grand vizier but also comprehensive reforms that were introduced in Anatolia. In fact, the appointment of Müşir Ahmed Şakir Pasha as the General Inspector of Anatolian Provinces in June 1895 was part of this reform process. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, the Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments from the Muslim groups of Anatolia was founded to counterbalance the Armenian agitators and revolutionary activists. The unceasing events most of which were violent against the Ottoman state and the growing foreign coercion intensified all sorts of political opposition movements in different parts of the empire. Two waves of arrests and exiles

assassination attempt on Abdülhamid II was undertaken and in 1909 the Adana revolt occurred.

⁴⁰⁷ On 18 November 1901 Küçük Said Pasha was appointed sixth times to the grand vizierate. In the mid of January 1903 he was replaced by Mehmed Ferid Pasha who served until the restoration of the Ottoman Constitution in July 1908.

came in response to the mounting opposition activities and coup attempts against the regime.⁴⁰⁸

The measures taken by the Ottoman leadership to protect the empire against the internal and external threats led to the crystallization of the authoritarian features of the Hamidian system. Increasing use of control mechanisms such as growing centralization of the state power at the Yıldız Palace, suppression, censorship, denouncement, and exile, elicited an internal opposition against the regime.⁴⁰⁹ The mid-1890s bore witness not only to the start of this vicious cycle, which ended in the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, but also to the beginning of a short but relatively stable period during which the Hamidian system reached its peak⁴¹⁰ before going into decline. This stable phase of the regime corresponds to the fifth sub-period, from 1897 to 1902, in Çetinsaya's periodization of Hamidian domestic policy. In a similar vein, Fortna considers the period from 1896 to around 1905 as "the high-water mark"⁴¹¹ of the Hamidian regime.

3.7. The Calm before the Storm

The regime survived the 1894-1896 Crisis. However, taking advantage of the challenges caused by the Armenian question, the Christian Greeks in Crete revolted on 6 February 1897. As they recognized that they could not realize their political dreams without fighting, they attacked the Ottoman State by crossing the border in Thessaly on 17 April 1897. The war ended with the victory of the Ottoman State over the Greeks on 19 May 1897. This victory was significant for multiple reasons. It strengthened the sultan's hand in domestic and foreign politics, restored the Hamidian regime's prestige both internally and externally, exhibited the durability of the empire, and consequently halted the

⁴⁰⁸ In 1896 one and in 1897 a few coup attempts in Istanbul and Syria were aborted. Syria witnessed an effective organization of the Young Turk opposition between 1895 and 1897. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 71.

⁴⁰⁹ Çetinsaya, "II. Abdülhamid'in İç Politikası: Bir Dönemlendirme Denemesi," 391.

⁴¹⁰ Georgeon, *Sultan Abdülhamid*.

⁴¹¹ Benjamin Fortna, "The Reign of Abdülhamid II" in *Cambridge History of Turkey*, Vol 4, ed. Reşat Kasaba (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 57.

foreign pressure on the state and the activities of the Armenian organizations and the Young Turk opposition for a while. Contributing to the restoration of the prestige of Hamidian regime, German Kaiser Wilhelm II visited Istanbul and Jerusalem in 1898. Foundation of two great projects, the Hijaz Railroad and the *Darulfünun*, was also laid during this period.⁴¹²

Besides the victory gained against the Greeks and the ability of coping with the Armenian Crisis, the relative stability of the post-1896 had to do with the international configurations. As Akarlı notes, “after 1896, the powers’ attention had switched to the Far East and remained there well into 1901, leaving the Ottomans more or less alone”.⁴¹³ Forthcoming relative internal stability and even, as Akarlı argues, the long grand vizierate of Halil Rifat Pasha, had to do with this international development.⁴¹⁴ This situation also came as a relief to the ever-increasing tension between the Sublime Porte and the palace. After Halil Rifat Pasha’s term (1895-1901), the relations between the sultan and the Porte were never as smooth.⁴¹⁵ Akarlı’s above-quoted notice is critical to

⁴¹² Çetinsaya, “II. Abdülhamid’in İç Politikası: Bir Dönemlendirme Denemesi.”

⁴¹³ Akarlı, “The Problems of External Pressures,” 136.

⁴¹⁴ Halil Rifat Pasha remained in grand vizierate from July 1895 to until his death in September 1901. The point Akarlı raised regarding the correlation between Halil Rifat Pasha’s long term office holding and the Empire’s relief from the great powers’ attention is certainly correct. At this juncture, it would, however, be meaningful to remember the long grand vizierate of Albanian origin Mehmed Ferid Pasha, who served from January 1903 to July 1908, during very difficult years when the Empire was engulfed by the Macedonian crisis. Ferid Pasha’s long office-holding might have to do with his capability to cope with the intricate relations between the foreign embassies and the imperial administration but more importantly his Albanian background, owing to the fact that his noble Albanian roots were deemed by the Sultan “as an advantage to pacify the Albanians’ exasperations against egalitarian reforms in a peaceful way” (Kırmızı, “Experiencing the Ottoman Empire as a Life Course,” 59). With regard to Mehmed Ferid Pasha’s appointment to the post Akarlı underlines his pro-German stance against pro-British Grand Vizier Said Pasha with whom the sultan was at odds with in regards to handling the mounting crisis in Rumelia. Said Pasha stuck to the idea of accepting the demands of the British on the issue. Engin Deniz Akarlı, “Friction and Discord within the Ottoman Government under Abdülhamid II (1876-1909),” *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi*, Vol 7 (1979), 19. However, despite the stability at the grand vizierate office, affirming Akarlı’s view, the relations between the Porte and palace in the post 1902 period never became as smooth as it was during the term of Halil Rifat Pasha.

⁴¹⁵ Akarlı, “The Problems of External Pressures,” 136.

observe, once more, the vulnerability of the domestic affairs of the Empire to the great powers' neo-imperialist policies in the late nineteenth century.

3.8. "Hamidian Bureaucracy"

Abdulhamit Kırmızı looks at the stability of this period from a different angle by drawing attention to the extraordinarily long durations of office holdings and emergence of "Hamidian bureaucracy."⁴¹⁶ Tahsin Pasha (Head Clerk of the Mabeyn, 1894-1908), Ahmet Tevfik Pasha (Foreign Minister, 1895-1908), Mehmed Memduh Pasha (Ministry of Interior, 1895-1908), Selim Melhame Pasha (Minister of Forest and Mines, 1893-1908), Abdurrahman Nureddin Pasha (Minister of Justice, 1895-1908), Hacı Ali Pasha (Serkurena, 1891-1908), Mehmed Cemaleddin Efendi (Şeyhülislam, 1891-1909), Rıdvan Pasha (Mayor of Istanbul, 1890-1906), Ahmed Şefik Pasha (Minister of Public Security, 1896-1908), Mehmed Said Pasha (Head of the Council of State, 1895-1908), Mehmed Tevfik Pasha (Undersecretary of the Grand Vizierate, 1890-1906), and Hüseyin Hasib Efendi (Minister of Post and Telegraph, 1895-1908) are among the high profile government officials who remained in the office from the early 1890s to the end of the Hamidian era. They were all considered "the record-holders of their posts."⁴¹⁷

In terms of term of office, upper ranks of the military, too, enjoyed long term stability. For instance, Rıza Pasha served as Minister of War from 1890 until the 1908 Revolution, Edhem Pasha was Chief of the General Staff from 1880 until his demise in 1905, Zeki Pasha held the position of Chief of the Tophane and Director of the Military Schools between 1891 and 1908. Similarly, the military commissions and the provincial commands had a great stability starting from the mid-1890s to 1908.⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁶ Kırmızı, *Abdülhamid'in Valileri*, 11-12.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 12.

In line with the stability at the central administration, the provinces also enjoyed long-term office-holding governors such as Kamil Pasha (Aydın, 1895-1907), Ahmed Ratib Pasha (Hijaz, 1893-1908), and Arif Pasha (Edirne, 1895-1907), Bahri Pasha (Adana, 1898-1908), Abidin Pasha (Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid, the Mediterranean Islands, 1893-1906), Nazım Pasha (Syria, 1897-1906), Enis Pasha (Kastamonu, 1897-1906), Kadri Bey (Trabzon, 1892-1907), Rauf Bey (Mamüretülaziz, 1895-1903), Osman Feyzi Pasha (Yannina, 1897-1906), and Tahir Pasha (Van, 1898-1906). Since the provincial administration was attached to the Ministry of Interior, Memduh worked with a relatively stable ruling unit. All in all, to appreciate the stability of this period, Kırmızı points out the fact that “thirty-three people were raised to the post of Interior Minister during the thirteen years after Memduh Pasha”⁴¹⁹ who held the post for the last thirteen years of the Hamidian era.

Having cadre stability in higher civil and military echelons at the central and provincial administrations, the period between the mid-1890s and 1908 is regarded, by Kırmızı as the real “Hamidian bureaucracy.” “Hamidian” in this context refers to “by means of working within certain parameters of loyalty created by educational and bureaucratic internalization in a period of strong centrifugal forces.”⁴²⁰ As earlier underlined, the functionaries who served in the Tanzimat administration either died or retired in the first two decades of Abdülhamid II’s rule. That being said, by “Hamidian bureaucrats” Kırmızı means “officials whose first influential posts were granted to them by Abdülhamid II”⁴²¹ and Memduh was one of these officials who formed the constellation of the “Hamidian bureaucracy.” Thus, it is necessary to comprehend the parameters of Hamidian bureaucracy so that Memduh’s ministerial career would be woven into the imperial context in general and Hamidian bureaucracy in particular. On the other hand, assuming that the parts and the whole are interdependent, the mosaic pieces of Memduh’s imperial biography would

⁴¹⁹ Ibid., 12.

⁴²⁰ Ibid., 11.

⁴²¹ Ibid., 11.

serve as reliable guidelines about the Hamidian bureaucracy. The discussion below on different aspects of Abdülhamid's regime would be helpful in delineating some of the structural features of the bureaucratic system in which Memduh served.

3.9. "The Bureaucratization of Patrimonial Authority"⁴²²

The Ottoman bureaucratic system in general and the Hamidian bureaucracy in particular has been associated with patrimonialism, which concentrated on the household, based on the personal loyalty and depended on personal association to the ruler. In the Weberian theory, patrimonialism and bureaucracy are mutually exclusive models. Bureaucracy as an ideal type is "characterized by hierarchical organization, clearly demarcated lines of authority, rational and objective written rules and regulations, trained and impartial bureaucratic officials, and meritocratic career advancement".⁴²³ However, the recent historical researches have demonstrated that these two models of administrative organization coexisted.⁴²⁴ Some scholars even argue that patrimonial elements are necessary for the resolution of strains between authority and power within bureaucracies – a problem, which Weber's idealized bureaucracy does not consider.⁴²⁵

Patrimonialism is an extensive concept that is be fitting of variety of cases including the Ottoman, the Mughal and the Safavid Empires of Eurasianic

⁴²² Karen Barkey, "The Ottoman Empire (1299-1923): The Bureaucratization of Patrimonial Authority" in *Empires and Bureaucracy in World History: From Late Antiquity to the Twentieth Century*, eds. Peter Crooks and Timothy H. Parsons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 106.

⁴²³ Ibid., 106.

⁴²⁴ On Weber and ideal types, see Peter Crooks and Timothy H. Parsons, *Empires, Bureaucracy and the Paradox of Power*, in *Empires and Bureaucracy in World History: From Late Antiquity to the Twentieth Century*, eds. Peter Crooks and Timothy H. Parsons, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 16-17; Sam Whimster, *Empires and Bureaucracy: Means of Appropriation and Media of Communication in World History: From Late Antiquity to the Twentieth Century*, eds. Peter Crooks and Timothy H. Parsons, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 437-441.

⁴²⁵ Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, "Authority and Power in Bureaucratic and Patrimonial Administration: A Revisionist Interpretation of Weber on Bureaucracy," *World Politics*, 31:2 (1979).

landmass.⁴²⁶ These empires, as Barkey suggests, “certainly developed bureaucracies, since they were able to control government officials in faraway provinces, organize military campaigns, collect taxes from their populations, and organize the peoples they ruled into different categories, statuses and classes.”⁴²⁷ That is to say, the premodern imperial organizations had some, though not all, of the aspects of Weberian rational-bureaucratic system.

Providing a broader perspective on the nature of the Ottoman political system and questioning the assumption of the absolute power of the Ottoman sultans, Akarlı argues:

I do not believe that the Ottoman Sultan could act arbitrarily in either administrative or fiscal and juridical matters. “Precedent” (*teamül*), the legal tradition was always important in the ottoman authority structure. Perhaps the only (an partial) exceptions to this situation were the times of Selim I (1512-20) and Mahmud (1808-1839).⁴²⁸

The Ottoman bureaucracy certainly originated from the patrimonial house of the sultan and this was apparent in its general form. However, as the empire dramatically expanded in the ensuing centuries, the administration gradually became impersonal, predictable and rational. The transition from patrimonialism to bureaucracy mostly took place during the reign of Süleyman (1520-1566), mainly because preserving order, providing services, collecting tax revenues and maintaining the dynasty entailed an “extensive routinization and coordination, as well as a system of checks and balances”.⁴²⁹ Indeed, Barkey highlights, the prevention of arbitrary power was the major achievement of Süleyman’s authority. According to Cornell Fleischer “the palace class of servitors to which the Kanunname gave order was in fact the patrimonial

⁴²⁶ Stephen F. Dale, *The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

⁴²⁷ Barkey, “The Ottoman Empire (1299-1923): The Bureaucratization of Patrimonial Authority,” 106.

⁴²⁸ Akarlı, “The Problems of External Pressures,” Chapter II footnote 110.

⁴²⁹ *Ibid.*, 107.

household made government, enlarged, rationalized, bureaucratized, and refined.”⁴³⁰

The Ottoman decline discourse can be disproven since the Ottoman bureaucracy had undergone a great deal of changes over the course of centuries. The government experimented with different ways and modes in the bureaucratic system particularly during the times of crises.⁴³¹ Barkey argues, that although corruption endured among the government officials and patrimonial house maintained its centrality “the routinization of function, salary and rank, merit-based promotions and frequent rotation of office all contributed to an imperial administrative complex that tended towards some rationality and efficiency of administration over the core of the empire.”⁴³²

The strain between the bureaucratic and the patrimonial was somewhat settled by two major processes: rising bureaucratization and, though not rapid, “systematization of state–society relations.”⁴³³ Nineteenth century witnessed the peak of both. Furthermore, the striking development of civil bureaucracy occurred due to the centralization efforts of the Ottoman government. Replacing many of the traditional and religious institutions, the state bureaucracy in the nineteenth century began to undertake wide range of tasks such as tax collection, education, medical services, social welfare, and policing. Each of these activities not only increased the bureaucracy but also empowered it tremendously. Having said that, some of the patrimonial characteristics of the administrative system remained intact. Thus, what the Ottomans experienced in

⁴³⁰ Cornell Fleisher, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: the Historian Mustafa Ali, 1546–1600* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 196.

⁴³¹ Rhoads Murphey, “Continuity and Discontinuity in Ottoman Administrative Practice during the Late Seventeenth Century,” *Poetics Today* 14:2 (1993).

Barkey, “The Ottoman Empire (1299-1923): The Bureaucratization of Patrimonial Authority,” 115.

⁴³² *Ibid.*, 116.

⁴³³ *Ibid.*, 116.

the nineteenth century, particularly, according to Barkey, in the Tanzimat era, was “the bureaucratization of patrimonial authority.”⁴³⁴

3.10. “Patrimonial Leader, Ruling with Rational Bureaucracy”⁴³⁵

Sustaining the reformist spirit of the Tanzimat era, Abdülhamid II, in just the same way as the Tanzimat leadership, believed that for efficient administration the imperial bureaucracy had to be modernized,⁴³⁶ which contributed to the process of “the bureaucratization of patrimonial authority”. The government under the Hamidian rule was particularly preoccupied with “producing civil servants who were capable and loyal.”⁴³⁷ As emphasized previously in some other contexts, comprehensive bureaucratic reforms had been undertaken during this period. Yet, the Hamidian regime restored an old Ottoman political practice: personal loyalty. While the Tanzimat statesmen “sought to establish the identity of the subject upon a territorial basis, and to transfer his loyalty from his own community to the state (the principle of Ottomanism),”⁴³⁸ the Hamidian regime and traditionalist statesmen such as Mahmud Nedim “wished to keep the subject's identity based upon confessional grounds and to preserve loyalty to the person of the sultan.”⁴³⁹

That is to say, during the reign of Abdülhamid II, merit did not lose its importance; the recruitment pattern and bureaucratic organization were highly systematized. But at the same time loyalty became critical for employment in the bureaucracy. This feature differentiates the Hamidian epoch not only from the Tanzimat but also from the post-1908 era. Underlining the continuities and ruptures between the reign of Abdülhamid II and the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918), Hasan Kayalı distinguishes the state patriotism of the latter

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*, 116.

⁴³⁵ Hanoğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, 24.

⁴³⁶ Hanoğlu, *A Brief History of Late Ottoman Empire*, 125.

⁴³⁷ Fortna, “The Reign of Abdülhamid II,” 50.

⁴³⁸ Butrus Abu-Manneh, “Sultan Abdulhamid II and Shaikh Abulhuda Al-Sayyadi,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 15, no. 2 (May, 1979), 134.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*, 134.

from the notion of loyalty to the sultan that prevailed in the Hamidian bureaucracy.

As Memduh's biography and many other examples illustrate, Abdülhamid was quite generous in granting ranks, decorations and gifts to the upper-level officials who remained absolutely loyal to him. Quoting from Abdülhamid's personal account, Akarlı suggests that Abdülhamid did not uproot the "semi-aristocratic pretensions that pashas had gained through the Tanzimat"⁴⁴⁰ for he feared "disturbing this nest of wasps who had well-demonstrated their capability of seating and unseating sultans"⁴⁴¹ and believed that he could produce "the best harvest on the field of sovereignty" through "the royal fountain of favor."⁴⁴² Thus, by granting and holding back his favor in variety of forms and pre-eminent administrative positions, "he played the pashas off against one another, thereby keeping their conflicting interests and views in check."⁴⁴³ The lower ranking officials, however, were not only strictly bounded by the administrative hierarchy but also poorly paid.

The disparity between the salaries of higher and lower officials was enormous and this was causing "friction within the bureaucracy."⁴⁴⁴ Carter Findley examines the salaries and rewards of the civil officials to show the patrimonial aspect of the Hamidian political system. Those who were not close enough to the sultan to secure their economic interest were, as Findley put, in search of "connections" who could help them gain benefits from being in the grace of the sultan. The significance of personal and familial links to the sultan for recruitment, payment, and granting was, according to Findley, an indication of patrimonial nature of the Hamidian bureaucratic and economic structure.⁴⁴⁵ Looking at the issue from a different angle, Akarlı argues that Abdülhamid's

⁴⁴⁰ Akarlı, "Friction and Discord within the Ottoman Government under Abdülhamid II," 20.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid., 21.

⁴⁴² Ibid., 21.

⁴⁴³ Ibid., 21.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid., 19.

⁴⁴⁵ Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 237.

favoritism in his approach to high-ranking bureaucrats “contrasted sharply with the objectified norms of administrative rationality emphasized for rank-and-file bureaucrats.”⁴⁴⁶

With respects to the concept of loyalty to the sultan, Hanioglu relates “the creation of an all-encompassing personality cult around the Caliph-Sultan” was “a broader trend that peaked during the Hamidian regime: the re-invention of tradition”.⁴⁴⁷ Inspired from variety of sources ranging from Europe to the old Ottoman traditions, the Hamidian regime initiated various new traditions to substitute those abandoned during the previous decades. Similarly, Carter Findley suggests that “as the mounting volume of innovative legislation and the studied neglect of the official religious establishment indicate, his was a new use of the imperial tradition”.⁴⁴⁸ Findley interprets the combination of traditional and modern elements in an elaborate manner as “the clearest indication of the extent to which the patrimonial tradition could survive into the era of modernization and assume new forms.”⁴⁴⁹ However, Hanioglu specifically warns not to interpret the practices as a historical patrimonial form of authority.

A candid assessment of the regime of Abdülhamid II would not conclude that it constituted a simple reversion to the patrimonial, pre-Tanzimat style of government. To be sure, the sultan wielded paramount authority; he often made arbitrary decisions; he emphasized personal loyalty to the sovereign; and he reduced the Sublime Porte to subservience. But at the same time he clearly sought to be more than the uppermost link in an inefficient chain of patronage.... The regime’s patrimonial façade was to a certain extent misleading. While the sultan himself would issue innumerable imperial decrees on issues ranging from decisions of life and death to the utterly trivial—he was, in other words, above the law—and the actions of all other bureaucrats, including those of the grand vizier, were legally constrained. The sultan’s ultimate source of authority was the “imperial will,” but his civil servants were bound by the law.⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁶ Akarlı, “The Tangled Ends of an Empire,” 363.

⁴⁴⁷ Hanioglu, *A Brief History of Late Ottoman Empire*, 126.

⁴⁴⁸ Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 233.

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 234.

⁴⁵⁰ Hanioglu, *A Brief History of Late Ottoman Empire*, 128.

In another context, Hanioglu states that the desire to replace the Hamidian neopatrimonial administrative system with a modern bureaucracy was one of the most effective features of the Young Turk program. However, Hanioglu suggests, it would be inaccurate to designate Abdülhamid's reorganization as the reestablishment of patrimonialism that was gradually abolished during the Tanzimat Era. This is because the sultan desired by no means to reinstate the patrimonial system; rather, he wished to be "the single patrimonial leader, ruling with the help of a rational bureaucracy."⁴⁵¹

Yet, as highlighted above, in the Hamidian administration merit had, to some extent, been eclipsed by loyalty, and bureaucrats both at the central and provincial administration showed their allegiance to the sultan in variety of forms. Providing critical information about the state affairs or other high-ranking officials, was one of the ways to pledge loyalty to the sultan. As recounted in the second chapter of the thesis, even right before Abdülhamid ascended to the throne, Memduh provided him with secret intelligence, which was of vital importance for the prospective sultan-caliph. In the ensuing years Memduh continued delivering reports about various issues and individuals, specifically about Grand Vizier Ferid Pasha to Abdülhamid II.

In this regard, Memduh was not an exception.⁴⁵² Using every opportunity to write to the palace, provincial governors were either directly communicating with the sultan or they were informing him about all the correspondence they had with the Sublime Porte. In an effort to gain Abdülhamid's favor, they were giving his name to every monument or institution they completed in the provinces.⁴⁵³ Sending gifts, some of which were quite extravagant, from

⁴⁵¹ Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, 24.

⁴⁵² For examples see Kırmızı, *Abdülhamid'in Valileri*.

⁴⁵³ For instance BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 66/75, 8 Cemaziyelahir 1321/1 September 1903.

According to Fatmagül Demirel, buildings such as schools, hospitals, train stations, Government Office, fountain, and clock tower were not only demonstrating the state's power but also making the sultan more and more visible in the public space. Fatmagül Demirel, "Sultan Abdülhamid'in Kamusal Alanda Görünürlüğü," in *Siyaset, İktisat, Dış*

provinces to the palace was also a common practice of governors to establish a good relationship with the palace.⁴⁵⁴ Furthermore, the use of special expressions of allegiance⁴⁵⁵ and exaggerated compliments to the sultan dramatically increased in the official correspondence during the Hamidian era. In order to illustrate this, Hanioglu quotes passages from two memorandums Memduh submitted to the sultan. He addresses the sultan in the following way:

Despite neither having the ability nor worthiness to be your slave, due to your kindness am I a slave who has grown happy through service as the Minister of the Interior. . . . I dare, impelled by devotion and loyalty, to present my humble thoughts before your exalted throne.⁴⁵⁶

In another memorandum Memduh says that

I confess it is beyond my power to say [anything in response to] your loyal slave's being so honored by [His Imperial Majesty] saying "he became my faithful servant": [It is] an example of the kindness of His Majesty, the protector of the Caliphate, which gives your slave endless, incalculable joy. Since every slave of the state is nourished by blessings, his commitment to the creation of good works for the administrative branches of the state accords with patriotism and loyalty.⁴⁵⁷

Despite this verbal servility, the officials and the sultan in fact had very personal relations with them. Bureaucrats demanded wide spectrum of favors and privileges from the sultan ranging from extremely lucrative business contracts and luxury residences to employment of their relatives or royal decorations for the members of their family.⁴⁵⁸ As is discussed in Chapter 5 of this study, Memduh too demanded various favors from the sultan particularly when he became a minister.⁴⁵⁹ Overall, like most of the functionaries served during this

Politika, Kültür, Eğitim: Sultan II. Abdülhamid Dönemi, eds. M. Bulut, M. E. Kala, N. Salık, M. Nar (Istanbul: İZÜ Yayınları, 2019).

⁴⁵⁴ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 70/105, 15 Cemaziyelevvel 1322/27 August 1904.

BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 75/38, 24 Safer 1323/30 April 1905.

BOA, P.PRK.UM. 61/97, 15 Şevval 1320/15 January 1903.

⁴⁵⁵ For example the term *bende*, "your subject" was widely used. Officials of the Hamidian regime generally used to describe themselves in the presence of the sultan.

⁴⁵⁶ BOA, YEE, 31/1221-IV/104/88. The memorandum is dated 31 January 1903.

Hanioglu, *The Young Turk in Opposition*, 24.

⁴⁵⁷ BOA, YEE, 31/1221-IV/104/88. The memorandum is dated 2 December 1907.

Hanioglu, *The Young Turk in Opposition*, 1995, 24.

⁴⁵⁸ *Ibid.*; Kırmızı, *Abdülhamid'in Valileri*.

⁴⁵⁹ BOA, Y.PRK.DH. 11/31, 23 Zilhicce 1317/24 April 1900.

period, Memduh, both in the capacity of governor and minister, was involved in the crystallization of the Hamidian bureaucratic system. That is to say, solidifying its parameters, he skillfully acted within the Hamidian system benefitting from all the administrative and economic opportunities it provided to the bureaucrats specifically to the ones of higher echelon. Furthermore, as stated by Findley, the highest-ranking officials, particularly the ministers, played a role in legislative activities under the reign of Abdülhamid, despite the fact that they did not enjoy considerable independence and power.⁴⁶⁰ Thus, they were parts of the Hamidian administrative system. Nevertheless, as will be discussed in the section that focuses on the post-1908 period of Memduh's biography, once the Hamidian regime was overthrown by the Young Turks, the sultan was solely held responsible from all the "sins" of the past three decades as if he was the only person ruling the state machinery.⁴⁶¹ Even before the reinstatement of the 1908 Revolution, the ministers such as Memduh and Tevfik Pasha, the foreign minister, asserted that they had no influence on the sultan and their opinions were not taken in to consideration.⁴⁶²

In addition to his "unconditional" obedience and loyalty to the sultan, like the majority of the Hamidian bureaucrats, if not all, and eager involvement in administration and legislative activities of the period, Memduh both contributed to the crystallization of the Hamidian political system and benefitted from the resources of the state in the form of contract, investment, housing, and favor for family members. Though not directly granted by the sultan, he acquired some properties in Sivas when he was the governor in the city by using his administrative authority in the region. Overall, many aspects of

BOA, Y.EE. 88/37, 6 Rebiülahir 1327/27 April 1909.

BOA, Y.MTV. 137/142, 23 Ramazan 1313/8 March 1896

BOA, MF.MKT. 87/64, 4 Zilkade 1302/15 August 1885.

BOA, ML.EEM. 310/14, 12 Muharrem 1317/23 May 1899.

BOA, YEE. 14/213, 20 Muharrem 1314/1 July 1896.

⁴⁶⁰ Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 247.

⁴⁶¹ Kırmızı, *Avlonyalı Ferid Paşa: Bir Ömür Devlet*, 389.

⁴⁶² FO 424 (208), 1905, No. 99, N. C'Onor to the Marquess of Lansdowne, Therapia, October 10, 1905.

Memduh's career attest that "the state is in fact a set of positions to be conquered where these positions offer the possibility of accumulating resources that can be converted in other arenas."⁴⁶³

Notwithstanding the fact that they were able to derive various personal benefits, the Hamidian bureaucrats were still bounded by law⁴⁶⁴ which means the Hamidian bureaucracy was ran by rational legal regulations. Hanioglu discusses the Hamidian state's devotion to the law in relation to authoritarianism. Abdülhamid's authoritarianism can be evaluated together with the centralization policy, which became the main feature of the Hamidian political system.

3.11. Palace versus Porte

Abdülhamid was a strong believer of administrative centralization. Except for few cases, he stuck to this idea by opposing any decentralizing practice that could strengthen the hand of the provincial rulers against the central government.⁴⁶⁵ The telegraph and railroad lines were critical in connecting the center and periphery and transmitting the intelligence and orders between them. Furthermore, gradually disempowering the Porte, the sultan managed to take over the reins of political power. Even though the Porte kept functioning, Yıldız Palace ultimately became the real powerhouse of the Ottoman polity during the Hamidian era particularly after 1895 when Memduh was the minister of interior.

Removal of Kamil Pasha from the grand vizierate who was yearning for the reinstatement of the Sublime Porte's powers⁴⁶⁶ marked the beginning of an era

⁴⁶³ Marc Aymes, Benjamin Gourisse, Elise Massicard "Order and Compromise: Government Practices" in *Turkey from the Late Ottoman Empire to the Early 21st Century*, (Eds) Marc Aymes, Benjamin Gourisse, and Elise Massicard (Leiden – Boston: Brill, 2015), 12.

⁴⁶⁴ Hanioglu, *A Brief History of Late Ottoman History*, 128.

⁴⁶⁵ Çetinsaya, "II. Abdülhamid'in İç Politikası: Bir Dönemlendirme Denemesi."

⁴⁶⁶ He fell from the grand vizierate because he requested to appoint the ministers by himself saying that "*Makam-ı vekaletde bulunacak olan kimseye mesuliyeti nisbetinde*

in which the locus of power was the sultan's palace. The last Tanzimat men such as Ahmed Cevdet Pasha faded away from the political stage in the mid-1890s and since then a new military and administrative elite comprised of officials such as Mahmud Şevket, Hüseyin Hilmi, and İbrahim Hakki Pashas began to work with the sultan. Moreover, as stated in different contexts, the Mabeyn became the center during the Hamidian era. The main task of this office was to form the correspondence between the palace and the Porte. However, after Tahsin Pasha's assignment as a head clerk in November 1894, the office became the key actor in all state affairs. In parallel with the Mabeyn's significance, its workload and the number of staff had increased from 10 in 1878 to 29 in 1896. According to an ex-clerk of the Mabeyn, centralization of such a vast empire became possible only because of the constant work they were doing in the Yıldız Mabeyn Office.⁴⁶⁷ Furthermore, demonstrating the central role of the palace organization in governance, the list of important members of the palace service ran nearly forty pages in 1908 government yearbook.⁴⁶⁸ Bypassing the Porte, the palace eventually established its sole authority, corresponding with all institutions and individuals on all issues.

Tahsin Pasha, head-clerk of the Mabeyn between 1895 and 1908, placed the blame on Küçük Said Pasha⁴⁶⁹ for the concentration of power at the palace.⁴⁷⁰ However, expressing his regret about the disempowerment of the Porte and its transformation into an executive body in the Hamidian system, Said Pasha denied this accusation in his memoirs that he wrote in the Second Constitutional Period.⁴⁷¹

mezuniyet i'tasıyla ve bunun tarafından dahi birlikte işleyecek zevâtin intihabıyla bir heyet-i vükela şekil olunub," Kamil Paşa, Hatırat-ı Sadr-ı Esbak Kamil Paşa, Cild-i Evvel (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Ebuziyya, 1329), 190-194.

⁴⁶⁷ İsmail Müştak Mayakon, *Yıldız'da Neler Gördüm?* (İstanbul: Sertel Matbaası, 1940), 142.

⁴⁶⁸ Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 230.

⁴⁶⁹ He served as the head-clerk of the *Mabeyn* and many times as a grand vizier.

⁴⁷⁰ Tahsin Paşa, *Tahsin Paşa'nın Yıldız Hatıraları, Sultan Abdülhamid*, 25-33.

⁴⁷¹ Saîd Paşa, *Saîd Paşa'nın Hâtîrâtı, I-III* (Dersaâdet: Sabah Matbaası, 1328), 14-17; İnal, *Son Sadrazamlar*, Vol. II, 1046; Akyıldız, *Osmanlı Bürokrasisi ve Modernleşme*, 165.

Disregarding the bureaucratic hierarchy, the palace was directly corresponding with the provincial rulers and interfering in the appointments of officials. Furthermore, establishing a kind of alternative communication channel between the center and periphery, the palace had strong connections with the provincial notables. On top of that, some of the consultants at the palace were representing various provincial notables. That is to say, during the Hamidian epoch an informal channel between the palace and provinces was established besides the formal bureaucratic channel working respectively through governor, Minister of Interior, Grand Vizier, and the Sultan.

Furthermore, Abdülhamid was personally involved in all policies from conception to implementation. Besides, the Mabeyn, the palace had consultants from all walks of life who were experts on variety of issues. Coming from broad range of ethnic, religious, economic, ideological, and occupational background, the consultants were, so to speak, working like an informal parliament in the palace. The commissions, comprised of these consultants, some of which were temporary while others permanent, were functioning like an alternative government for they were evaluating every proposal by the Porte, or rather grand vizier, and producing reports for the sultan who had the final word. Generally, Abdülhamid approved the views of the consultants and commissions of the palace.⁴⁷²

Many high ranking officials, including grand vizier and ministers, were disturbed by this situation. In his memorandum⁴⁷³ he prepared on 5 December 1894 at the request of Sultan Abdülhamid II, Grand Vizier Cevad Pasha kindly stated that “what is needed is the utilization of the normal channels for the screening and

⁴⁷² Çetinsaya, “Abdülhamid’in İç Politikası”.

⁴⁷³ A Yıldız document in *Osmanlı Arşivi Yıldız Tasnifi: Ermeni Meselesi*, Vol. 2 (Istanbul 1989), 137.

investigation of the cases presented by the governors or other officials”.⁴⁷⁴ He even openly expressed his critique of the state of the provincial communication:

Yet, since nobody has any idea of what the other parts does, and nobody knows its own higher body concerned, there exists an administrative confusion. As a matter of fact, since the governors know that they will not be reprimanded due to whatever faults they may have, they tend to ignore their authorities and the Grand Vizierate.⁴⁷⁵

As the account of Cevad Pasha indicates, the sultan’s wish to acquaint himself with all information had stirred up trouble within the Sublime Porte. The sultan, however, viewed the Porte’s demand for power as desire for dictatorship.⁴⁷⁶

Although, the conflict between the palace and the Porte increased particularly at times of strong external pressure, according to Akarlı, the problem was deep-rooted. In the Ottoman political system, political and administrative domains of authority were not clearly separated, tasks and powers of the palace and the Porte were not precisely specified, and power struggles of the political elites were personalized and uninstitutionalized. For instance, Abdülhamid was able to manage the problem by balancing the conflicting interests and views of the bureaucratic elites and by controlling the machinery of government through inconvenient practices such as re-examination of the decisions taken by the Porte. By doing so, he obtained a full picture of the administrative activities and relations of the pashas “as well as the certainty of being in a position to counteract or, at least, to delay the demands which he deemed contrary to the interests of the state.”⁴⁷⁷ However, these practices contradicted the elaborate administrative system that was developed under the reign of Abdülhamid.⁴⁷⁸

⁴⁷⁴ English translations of these quotations are taken from Abdulhamit Kırmızı, “*Ruler of the Provincial Empire: Ottoman Governors and Administration of Provinces, 1895-1908*” (PhD Dissertation, Boğaziçi University, 2005), 42.

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 42.

⁴⁷⁶ In response to Cevad Pasha’s remarks Abdülhamid II issued a memorandum in February 1895 and severely criticized the demands of the Porte.

“...*Bu kadarlık asırlık bir devletin umur-u mühimmesi mes’uliyetini yalnız uhdelere almakdan nasıl ihtiraz edilmiyor, bunlar dikatörlük değil de nedir?*”

İnal, *Son Sadrazamlar*, Vol. III, 1494-95. For details see pages 1495-1501.

⁴⁷⁷ Akarlı, “The Problems of External Pressures,” 142.

⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 219.

In another context, Akarlı evaluates the problem or rather “deformation of the Ottoman structure of authority” in a larger continuum. In the absence of political norms according to which interests are reconciled and established institutions within which the conflicting parties operate⁴⁷⁹ the intra-elite power struggle turned into an acute problem in the Ottoman administration during the nineteenth century.

The Ottoman political elite (or simply the Ottomans) found themselves driven ever deeper into a political crisis resulting from the erosion of traditional norms and political institutions, and from the failure to create a new organizational basis for conflict resolution. As the existing principles of legitimacy faded, the rules of power distribution and struggle became increasingly disordered. The separation of the making of political decisions from the administration of those decisions turned into an issue of constant dispute. In short, the Ottoman “structure of authority” lost its coherence, just as the state crumbled, failing to keep in step with the new world order that was being built under Western domination.⁴⁸⁰

Active involvement of Abdülhamid as “a legitimate arbitrator” in the administrative affairs saved the Ottoman government from a political chaos that prevailed in the 1870’s. However, this situation ultimately caused not only confusion but also created conflict between the palace and the Porte. Furthermore, although slowed down the administrative decision-making process at a time when the circumstances of the empire required prompt and unequivocal responses.⁴⁸¹

3.12. The Limits of “Hamidian Absolutism”

In addition to these structural problems the Hamidian administration suffered another complication. Abdülhamid was at the apex of the expanded palace organization, which became the powerhouse of the Hamidian system. But, in fact the “palace ring”⁴⁸² was at the center of this organization having considerable power to set the tone for much of the state affairs. To put it

⁴⁷⁹ Akarlı, “Friction and Discord within the Ottoman Government under Abdülhamid II (1876-1909),” 3.

⁴⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁴⁸¹ Akarlı, “The Problems of External Pressures,” 142.

⁴⁸² The most effective civil officials working at the palace service

differently, supposedly at the palace, the only safe zone of the sultan, there emerged “number of mechanisms that served to buttress the sultan's position and extend his control over Ottoman society in general, and over the bureaucracy in particular”.⁴⁸³ The sultan’s dependence on the palace ring to run the empire eventually increased and so did the factionalism within the palace ring, which deeply affected not only the palace politics but also the provincial one.⁴⁸⁴ Thus, propensity and agenda of those constituting this ring at the palace had become highly critical, particularly during the later years of the regime. However, as some examples indicate, the inner circle of the palace played a role in the degeneration and the discredit of the Hamidian system.⁴⁸⁵

In his seminal work, İbnülemin argues that the sultan’s responsibility for the troubles he caused for himself and for people due to his suspicions is undeniable. But informants who drove him out of his mind and determined and ambitious ministers, high ranking bureaucrats, scholars, and rulers who abstained from telling him the truth and led him to the right path are far more responsible.⁴⁸⁶

Likewise, drawing attention to the limits of Abdülhamid ‘s absolute power and the problems of the post-1908 historiography in representing the Hamidian regime, Abdulhamit Kırmızı⁴⁸⁷ focuses on the power of the Mabeyn in decision-making processes regarding the provinces. Given the fact that it was the Mabeyn, not the sultan himself, which managed all the correspondence of the palace, those who held posts in this office had, expectedly, an advantageous

⁴⁸³ Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 233.

⁴⁸⁴ There is a section in the later part of the chapter focusing on the phase of Memduh’s years at the Ministry of Interior exemplifying the intricate relationship between the factions at the palace and the ones in the provinces.

⁴⁸⁵ Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 231.

⁴⁸⁶ İnal, *Son Sadrazamlar*, Vol. 3, 25.

İbnülemin does not identify what he meant by “right path” but he probably alluded to act appropriately and justly.

⁴⁸⁷ Abdulhamit Kırmızı, “Hem Efendi Hem Tutsak: Sultan Abdülhamid Mutlakiyetinin Sınırları.” Paper presented at the Conference *Vefatının 90. Yıldönümünde II. Abdülhamid ve Dönemi, Bilim ve Sanat Vakfı*, İstanbul, 18-19 October 2008.

position in the imperial administration. This office was functioning as a mediator between the sultan and the provinces. Therefore, it was indeed the civil officials working at the Mabeyn who decided which information, news, demand, or complaint coming from the provinces to be presented to the sultan and which orders and decisions to be sent from the palace to the provinces. That is to say, the sultan depended upon the palace officials about the information coming from the provinces and vice versa.

Moreover, the palace officials decided on which journals (reports) coming from informants, were to be submitted to the sultan. This enabled the officials to use their mediating position to influence the sultan, who rarely left the palace, about many of the affairs of the empire. The officials affected the state policies by proposing their suggestions to the sultan and were generally convincing. According to Tahsin Pasha, a head scribe of the Mabeyn, only ten percent of the grant, promotion, and orders bestowed from the palace were given by the sultan personally while the rest of them were given as a result of the request and demand of the high functionaries.⁴⁸⁸ Furthermore, some of the officials serving at the Mabeyn were more influential on the sultan and decision-making processes than others and this led to an emergence of cliques⁴⁸⁹ and conflicts at the palace, which ultimately overshadowed the relationships between the palace and all the institutions, departments, and individuals.

The brief discussion above about the nature and working of the palace organization is critical for deconstructing the widely accepted narrative about Abdülhamid II's neo-absolutism and despotism. In the post-1908 era both the Young Turks and most of the Hamidian bureaucrats treated Abdülhamid as a scapegoat for all the wrongs of the Hamidian era. In later periods, the historians directly adopted this highly exaggerated historical discourse with no revision or reconsideration. However, as the above discussion on the Hamidian

⁴⁸⁸ Tahsin Paşa, *Abdülhamit: Yıldız Hâtrâtı* (Istanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitaphanesi, 1931), 103.

⁴⁸⁹ *Mehmet Tevfik Bey'in II. Abdülhamid, Meşrutiyet ve Mütareke Devri Hatıraları*, Vol 2, Prepared by. F. Rezan Hürmen (Istanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1993), 153-154.

bureaucracy illustrates the sultan was not alone in running the empire, making and conducting the policies and decisions. He was rather voluntarily helped, affected,⁴⁹⁰ and even urged to act “despotically” by the high officials working at the palace,⁴⁹¹ the Porte, and even the provinces.

To put it more precisely, Abdülhamid shared not only his “absolute” power, but also responsibilities of his policies with the bureaucrats around him, one of whom was Memduh. Functionaries were not only actors who had vested interests in the Hamidian regime. As detailed above, the activities of Syrian Shaikh Abulhuda from Rifa’i Sufi order and Shaikh Muhammad Zafir, the head of Shadhili-Madani suborder from the North Africa, exemplify the mutual interest of Abdülhamid and the religious actors.⁴⁹² These Sufi leaders, who were backed by the pro-palace group already under the reign of Abdülaziz, were fully supported by Abdülhamid. Abulhuda and Muhammad Zafir expanded their activities and zawiya. In exchange they pledged complete loyalty to the sultan-caliph and propagating for him, to link the Arab Muslims and the imperial center. This mutual interest-based relationship had lasted until the end of the regime.

Thus, putting all the blame upon the sultan for the “despotic” and “oppressive” policies of his reign seems not only inappropriate but, more importantly, misleading. Therefore, the Late Ottoman historiography direly needs a revised and nuanced view of the Hamidian regime. Rather than treating it as a dark age under the despotic rule of an absolute sultan, uncovering different forms of actions, conflicting realities, and agents who had vested interests in the status-quo is crucial for delineating a much more analytical and complex picture of the Hamidian period.

⁴⁹⁰ *Hatîrât-ı Sadr-ı Esbak Kamil Paşa*, Cild-i Evvel (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Ebuzyiya, 1329), 190-197.

⁴⁹¹ “.....hünkarın istibdad yolunda muttasıl teşvik edildiği de o kadar doğrudur” Tahsin Paşa, *Abdülhamit: Yıldız Hâtîrâtı*, 106.

⁴⁹² Abu-Manneh, “Sultan Abdulhamid II and Shaikh Abulhuda Al-Sayyadi.”

3.13. In Lieu of Conclusion: The Sultan and Stakeholders

Though in this context the issue in question is the illusory omnipotence of the sultan, the problem is indeed far greater, rooted in the way state is defined. In order to appreciate the broad range of actors having different interests participate in the Ottoman political sphere by setting up complex networks, it is necessary to broaden the definition of “political” by abandoning the state-centered “assumption that the state as a distinct entity, opposed to and set apart from larger entity called society”.⁴⁹³ As observed by Phillio, “oftentimes, who and what constituted ‘the state’ is taken for granted as a unit of analysis in scholarship on the Ottoman Empire and is assumed to coincide with formal categories of status and power in the Ottoman period”. However, particularly in the nineteenth century the state was far from being an independent actor. It was rather constituted by various institutions and competing parties that were motivated and formed by factors and thoughts many of which were informal.

In an effort to go beyond the top down approach and the state and society dichotomy state needs to be seen as a field not as a body, as an arena not as an arbiter, and “as one of the issues at stake in social interplay” not as a dominant actor.⁴⁹⁴ This would in turn open new vistas for studying the Ottoman history in general and Hamidian epoch in particular. As with state, Abdülhamid II is generally conceived as an “autonomous actor”⁴⁹⁵ and as “an independent cause.”⁴⁹⁶ Foucault’s suggestion about the state may be helpful in revising this perception of Abdülhamid who might indeed be “no more than a mythicized abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think”.⁴⁹⁷

Against the backdrop of these reconsiderations there is a need to examine the Hamidian era “in a new political landscape” such as the one adopted by

⁴⁹³ Timothy Mitchell, “Society, Economy, and the State Effect,” in *State/Culture: State Formation after the Cultural Turn*, ed. George Steinmetz (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 82.

⁴⁹⁴ Aymes, Gourisse, and Massicard, *Order and Compromise*, 3.

⁴⁹⁵ Mitchell, “Society, Economy, and the State Effect,” 81.

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 82.

⁴⁹⁷ Michel Foucault, “Governmentality” in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, eds. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 103.

Christian Philliou to write a biography of Stephanos Vogorides (1780-1859). In Vogorides' life story, Philliou explores the ways through which Phanariots got involved in the Ottoman politics during the first half of the nineteenth century. Inspired by Michel Foucault's "governmentality" according to which power is disseminated in multitude of ways, not solely concentrated in the state machinery, Philliou adopts the concept of governance, "the project of keeping a political order in place, including the formal state apparatus but also the many relationships in the society involving institutions, networks, individuals, customs, and beliefs that contribute to upholding that order."⁴⁹⁸

Although Abdülhamid seemed to be acting as an arbitrator at the core of the Hamidian political system, there were multiple agents at the center and at the provinces operating in different capacities with different aspirations. These agents were motivated and shaped in certain ways by the Hamidian political structure and in the meantime they heavily invested in and with their actions and aspirations they got involved in making, executing, and preserving the same political structure. Memduh's biography demonstrates that, modernizing Ottoman imperial structure determined his self-perception, vision, career, and whole life. Yet, he was not a passive component of the structure. As an agent, he rather acted in different capacities over the course of his long life. Not only did he initiate some changes in accordance to his thoughts, concerns, and expectations but also made great contribution to the preservation of the structure. Based on the example of Memduh, I argue that instead of differentiating the sultan as an autonomous and "absolute" actor from bureaucrats and society, one needs to evaluate all on the same ground since the Hamidian statecraft resulted from the complex interplay between all of them.

⁴⁹⁸ Christine M. Philliou, *Biography of an Empire: Governing Ottomans in an Age of Revolution* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2011), xxiii.

CHAPTER 4

MEHMED MEMDUH BEY: GOVERNOR of KONYA, SIVAS, and ANKARA

4.1. Introduction

In an effort to understand how the Ottoman Empire functioned at the provincial level and how it responded to the challenges of the late nineteenth century, this chapter takes both the empire and Memduh as units of analysis, reconstructs the provincial context, and weaves Memduh's professional career into this context, portraying him as an active agent operating within the fluid imperial structure.

In doing so, this chapter seeks to answer several questions: What challenges and opportunities might an Ottoman governor face in the provinces? What were the major issues Memduh had to deal with in the provinces? What were the major factors influencing power relations among provincial functionaries? How did successive waves of Muslim immigration affect Ottoman provincial administration and society? To what extent could the reforms formulated at the imperial center be applied in the provinces? And how did the 1894-1896 Crisis affect the inter-communal relations in the Anatolian provinces, and vice versa?

This chapter includes remarkable details about Memduh's career and, more interestingly, his careerist ambitions and initiatives. His relations with some of the staff he was working with, colleagues in other provinces, inspectors, and some provincial notables reveal the nature of power relations in the provinces. Moreover, corruption allegations against Memduh demonstrate the extent of a governor's power and the opportunities he could use for personal interests. Yet, as in the case of Memduh filing charges against governors was quite likely in the provinces. Furthermore, after the Berlin Congress (1878), the *vilayat-ı sitte* (six provinces of Eastern Anatolia), one of which was Sivas, began to be watched by British observers and consuls who reported daily to the British embassy in Istanbul about the Armenians in the region. The emergence of the Hamidiye

Light Cavalry in the early 1890s coincided with Memduh's tenure in Sivas. Karapapak community of Sivas got involved into the Hamidiye Cavalry. Thus, the security concerns of Sivas and Memduh's attempts to maintain peace and order in the province were part of larger processes of crime, punishment, and inter-communal relations in Anatolia during the 1890s.

Memduh did not only translate "the provinces' landscapes to the language of the imperial center,"⁴⁹⁹ but he implemented the center's modernizing reforms and projects in the provinces. Alongside educational, industrial, and infrastructural projects, he, in his capacity as governor, had to deal with prisons, which were "microcosms of imperial transformation."⁵⁰⁰ Besides its description of Memduh's efforts to solve the problems of jails and prisons in the provinces, this chapter includes a thick description of *mapusane* as an aspect of Ottoman modernization. And its account of Memduh's efforts to settle Caucasian immigrants and solve provincial land disputes are valuable contributions to the social history of the Ottoman Empire.

The Armenian question was the top issue in Ankara during Memduh's two years of governorship, which culminated in his appointment to the ministerial office in the midst of the 1894-1896 Crisis. Therefore, the Ankara chapter of his career provides a first-hand account of the crisis, as he was appointed to this province to suppress the Armenian insurgency in the district of Yozgat. Because he was a smart and experienced statesman who mastered the procedures of the empire's politics and bureaucracy, both in the capital and the provinces, and was attentive to the sensitivities of the sultan, Memduh was able to turn the crisis into an opportunity.

Memduh's pro-Muslim—or, rather, pro-Sunni—approach towards the Armenian and Alewite communities in Sivas and Ankara confirms the accounts

⁴⁹⁹ Kirmizi, "Experiencing the Ottoman Empire as a Life Course," 55.

⁵⁰⁰ Kent F. Schull, *The Prisons in the Late Ottoman Empire: Microcosms of Modernity* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014).

of conventional Ottoman historiography, which describe the Hamidian policies as a “new orthodoxy.” However, based on the findings and perspectives of recent research, I contend that the Hamidian government likely pursued different policies simultaneously in different contexts with different rationales, and that Memduh’s pro-Islamic policy was one of the many strategies in the spectrum. Furthermore, the intimacy between Memduh and the Armenian Dildilian family as well as the appreciation of more than fifty Armenian artisans of Sivas reveal the complexity of Memduh’s relations with the Armenian community in the context of Sivas.

4.2. New Career in Central Anatolia

4.2.1. Governor: Mediator between Center and Periphery

Having served for more than thirty years at a variety of departments in the central administration, Memduh was a forty-eight-year-old statesman who was not only well versed in the procedures of the Porte but also well informed on the political and economic issues of the empire. Furthermore, having taken part in the legislative and judicial activities at the Council of State for more than five years, he was equipped with logic and skills that would help him to make judgments on behalf of the central government in a distant province.

Governors were extremely prominent in the Hamidian era. They were the key actors for implementing modernization projects that were considered indispensable for the integrity of the empire. They maintained efficient communication between the provinces and the imperial center, dispatching periodic, and sometimes instant, reports and memorandums about the developments taking place in the provinces. Operating in the periphery on behalf of the central administration, governors were effective agents for regulating the multiethnic Ottoman society dispersed over vast territories.

They not only executed imperial legislation at the provincial level but also contributed to the legislation process. Based on the governing experience of Mehmed Ferid Pasha, Kırmızı concisely explains the critical roles and functions

of governors in the Hamidian Era:

Late Ottoman governors spun the webs of imperial power from within the province. They played the role of intermediaries in bringing vast territories of the Empire under the firm control of the state by translating the provinces' landscapes to the language of the imperial center. Knowledge of the provinces was gathered and passed to Istanbul through governors' mobility. The center of the state distilled, arranged, and systematized this information, using it for the sake of order and control.⁵⁰¹

Occupying one of the highest positions in the empire, governors had many responsibilities. As stated in the 1871 Provincial Regulation, the duties of governors were divided into five categories: administrative affairs, financial affairs, educational affairs and welfare, municipal affairs, and legal and penal affairs.

According to the 1876 Instruction for the Administration of the Provinces (*İdare-i Umumiye-i Vilayât Hakkında Talimat*), published in *Düstur*,⁵⁰² the tasks of governors were divided into three: *vazife-i asliye*, *vazife-i islahiyye*, and *vazife-i daime*. Implying the equality of all Ottoman citizens, *vazife-i asliye* refers to the assurance and protection of the rights of each and every individual regardless of class and community and also the protection of everyone from oppression and hostility.⁵⁰³ As part of the second group of tasks, *vazife-i islahiyye*, the governor was responsible for implementing the temporary restoration and reformation processes laid out in the Edict of Justice (*Adalet Fermanı*). *Vazaif-i daime*, the third group of tasks presented by the 1876 Instruction for the Administration of the Provinces, were delegated essentially to perpetuate the abovementioned *vazaif-i islahiyye*.⁵⁰⁴

⁵⁰¹ Kırmızı, "Experiencing the Ottoman Empire as a Life Course," 55.

⁵⁰² *Düstur*, I. Tertib, vol 3, p. 24-33. For the transcription of the Instruction, see "Vilayet ve Mahalli İdareler Mevzuatı (1864-1996)," 67-74. *Düstur* is the official publication of the series of legal volumes.

⁵⁰³ "Valilerin en mühim vazifeleri ale'l-umum ve ale'l-infirad sunûf-ı teba'anın hukukunu temin ve himaye ve herkesi zulm u ta'adîden vikaye etmektir."

⁵⁰⁴ For details on these tasks, see *Düstur*, I. Tertib, vol 3, p. 24-33. For the transcription of the Instruction, see "Vilayet ve Mahalli İdareler Mevzuatı (1864-1996)," 67-74.

Though governors were responsible for all provincial matters, their authority was by no means absolute. The 1876 Instruction fixed the boundaries of governors' authority. Accordingly, governors had to consult with the Porte to determine the extent of measures to be imposed against the great security challenges in province. Furthermore, they were not allowed to use the police forces for personal matters. They were firmly forbidden from intervening in elections and courts in the provinces.

Besides these prohibitions, the Instruction also imposed restrictions on the financial aspects of governors' operations in the provinces. It first stated that governors had broad authority over the collection, protection, dispatch, and spending of taxes. But then it drew attention to the mutual responsibility of governors and provincial treasurers (*defterdar*) in the taxation process, providing precise instructions on that matter to be carefully followed. Governor of a province was obliged to check that the provincial treasurer adhered to these precise instructions,⁵⁰⁵ but in the final analysis, it was the provincial treasurer who was in charge of the financial matters of the province. However, as stated in the Instruction, the provincial treasurer was compelled to deliver daily reports to the governor, detailing receipts and expenditures.⁵⁰⁶ In addition to the abovementioned tasks, the governor had certain responsibilities in some councils and commissions.

Overall, the basic components of a governor's job description were tax collection, maintaining public order and security, strengthening morality, edifying public servants, executing justice without interfering with the legal process, and maintaining communication between the province and the imperial center. Moreover, he was commissioned to deal with a wide range of

Nizam Önen, Cenk Reyhan, *Mülkten Ülkeye: Türkiye'de Taşra İdaresinin Dönüşümü* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2011).

⁵⁰⁵ "Ve defterdarların talimatında muharrer ahkama tevfik-i hareket edip etmediklerini dahi daima tahkik ve taharriye memurdurlar," *Düstur*, vol. 3, 30.

⁵⁰⁶ "Memurîn-i maliye yevmi vukubulan makbuzât ve medfu'âtı mübeyyin mülkiye memurlarına yevmiye pusulası i'tasına olunmak lazım geleceği" BOA, MV.100/44, 7 Rebiülevvel 1318/5 July 1900.

social services, including the management of public elementary education, public health, and care for orphans, the poor, and the elderly. Infrastructural investments, such as construction and maintenance of roads, bridges, and canals, and urban development projects were also under the governor's charge.

4.2.2. Konya in 1887

After more than six years, Said Pasha, the governor of Konya, was informed by the Ministry of Interior on 26 June 1887, that he was appointed to Mamuretü'l-Aziz. Konya was going through one of the severest droughts of the nineteenth century; and this period of drought, known as the "1303 Kahtı,"⁵⁰⁷ went beyond Konya and its vicinity, affecting neighboring provinces including Ankara, Kastamonu, Bursa, and Adana,⁵⁰⁸ as well as Cyprus.⁵⁰⁹ Taking the appointment to a small province like Mamuretü'l-Aziz as an insult- after years of service in Konya, Said Pasha refused to exchange posts with the governor of Mamuretü'l-Aziz, citing health problems an excuse. Thereupon, he was called to Istanbul, but before going there, he was requested to stand in for Mehmed Memduh, the newly appointed governor of Konya, until Memduh could take over the position.⁵¹⁰

A month later, Said Pasha left Konya with his family and some officials, marking the end of Said Pasha's professional adventure in Anatolia and the beginning of Memduh's. Having gained the confidence of the sultan during long years of

⁵⁰⁷ The "Famine of 1303" occurred in the summer of 1887 (1303 in the Rumi calendar).

⁵⁰⁸ Mehmet Yılmaz, *Konya Havalisinde 1303 (1887) Kıtılığı ve Alınan Tedbirler*, *Yeni İpekyolu Dergisi Özel Sayısı* (Konya 1988), 137.

⁵⁰⁹ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 11/56, 24 Cemaziyelahir 1305/8 March 1888. Memduh was informed by Ragıb Efendi, a financial official who happened to visit the sanjak of Teke, about the misery of the inhabitants of Cyprus in the winter of 1888 due to famine and a locust swarm. Due to its proximity, Memduh came to know about the circumstances about Cyprus, an island neighbor of Teke. In a note written on 18 March 1888, to the imperial capital, Memduh said that despite its great wealth, the state of England did not give aid to the starving Christians of Cyprus under the English authority. Rather, it was the Ottoman state that came to the rescue. However, the document does not provide any detail about the way the needy people of Cyprus were rescued by the Ottoman central administration.

⁵¹⁰ *İngiliz Said Paşa ve Günlüğü (Jurnal)*, ed. Burhan Çağlar (Istanbul: Arı Sanat Yayınevi, 2010), 79.

official service in Istanbul, Memduh was ready to have full authority in a province. Though not experienced in province administration, he had more than three decades of professional experience acquired in various ministries, offices, and commissions. According to his own account, he went to the palace head clerk's office after he was informed about his appointment to Konya. During this visit, Besim Bey, the head scribe at the office, told him that it was the sultan himself, not the Porte, who had decided to appoint Memduh. Besim Bey disclosed an imperial decree to him saying that Konya urgently needed good governance, as inhabitants of the province were suffering dearly from the famine. The head scribe also added that Memduh's efforts would certainly be rewarded.⁵¹¹ This anecdote can be regarded as an indication of the affinity between the sultan and Memduh. As will be seen in this and the following chapters, notwithstanding the existence of an elaborate bureaucratic hierarchy in the imperial administration, Abdülhamid was the sole authority in the eye of Memduh. Thus, at all times, he preferred to contact him directly.

Memduh's appointment as governor of Konya was in some respects a turning point in his career. It was the first time he was posted outside Istanbul, and it was the first time he was going to govern a province. With this appointment, his responsibilities multiplied, and so did his salary. In terms of wages, Konya was a second-degree province.⁵¹² The governor-general of this province received a monthly salary of 17,000 kuruş. It was a large province made up of four big

⁵¹¹ "Konya valiliğine memuriyetiniz Bab-ı Aliden değildir. Şevketmeab efendimizi intihab ve tayin buyurdular. Ahali-i vilayet kaht içinde muzdarip bulunmalarıyla hüsn-ü hizmet lazımdır. Neticede mükafat ile mesrur olacaksınız. Hakkınızda tasavvur-i mülükane başkadır' mealinde irade-i seniye-i tacidarını tebliğ eylemişti." BOA, Y.EE. 14/19, 28 Zilkade 1310/13 June 1893.

⁵¹² Kırmızı, *Abdülhamid'in Valileri*, 209. Of the twenty-nine provinces of the empire, fourteen—including most of the Anatolian provinces and Yanya, Edirne, Salonica, Cezayiribahrisfid, Kosova, and Monastir—belonged to this category. Governors of the first-degree provinces were paid 20,000 kuruş monthly, while those who were governing third-degree provinces were paid 15,000 kuruş.

sanjaks namely, Niğde,⁵¹³ Hamid,⁵¹⁴ Teke (Antalya),⁵¹⁵ and Burdur,⁵¹⁶ in addition to Konya center.⁵¹⁷

Located on a large plain devoid of water, forest, and stone, Konya was virtually a desert. However, it was known for its fine weather. Because of the scarcity of stone, the majority of the houses in Konya were wooden. Most of the stone structures were public buildings with official and religious functions. Konya had forty-four mosques, five to ten madrasas, two *rüşdiyes* (one for men and one for women), seven primary schools, forty *sıbyan mektebis*, two schools for the Rum and Armenian communities, a prison, a factory annually producing 173,070,000 kg of potassium nitrate, and water fountains among, other things.⁵¹⁸

Above the traditional landscape, a fifteen-meter clock tower stood atop Alaaddin Tepesi, a hilly region at the very center of the province. Epitomizing the changing socio-political character of the region, the same building had once been Amphilokios Church⁵¹⁹ before it was first transformed to Eflatun

⁵¹³ The administrative arrangement of the province is as follows: The whole province (*vilayet*) was under the authority of a governor-general (*vali*). The province was divided into sanjaks (sub-provinces), and the central sanjak, Konya, was under the direct rule of the governor, while each of the other four sanjaks, Teke, Niğde, Burdur, and Hamid, was governed by different *mutasarrıf* (governor). *Mutasarrıfs* were appointed by the sultan. Sanjaks were divided into *kazas* (districts), and districts were ruled by *kaymakams* (lieutenants). *Kaymakams* were appointed by the Ministry of Interior. Below the district, the next unit was the *nahiye* (bigger than a village), and a *müdür* (headman) was in charge of the *nahiye*. The smallest administrative unit was village, and it was ruled by an elected *muhtar* (headman). The districts of the sanjak of Niğde: Niğde, Nevşehir, Bor, Aksaray, Hamidiye, and Ürgüb.

⁵¹⁴ The districts of the sanjak of Hamid: Hamidabat, Yalvaç Eğridir, Karaağaç, and Uluborlu.

⁵¹⁵ The districts of the sanjak of Teke: Antalya, Alaiya, Akseki, and Elmalı.

⁵¹⁶ The districts of the sanjak of Burdur: Kemer, Ağlasun, and Gölhisar.

⁵¹⁷ The districts of the sanjak of Konya: the center, Akşehir, Karapınar, Karaman, Iğın, Ereğli, Bozkır, Beyşehir, Koçhisar, and Hadim.

⁵¹⁸ The 1305 Yearbook of Konya.

⁵¹⁹ The earliest available sources refer to the Amphilokios Church belong to the early thirteenth century. Semavi Eyice, "Eflatun Mescidi ", *TDVİA*, Vol. 10, 1994, 477-478. On the exterior surface of the mihrab wall, there was the tughra (sultan's signature) of Sultan Abdulaziz, below which was a historical epitaph comprising five verses. The last

Observatory and Mosque and then to a wooden a clock tower in 1872 and named the Eflatun Mescidi Saathane.

With more than sixty rooms, three floors and a basement, four gates, and eight pillars at the entrance, the Government Office (*Hükümet Konağı*), was the most magnificent public building in the province. It was constructed between 1885 and 1886 during the reign of Said Pasha, the ex-governor of Konya, who had to leave the post before he could enjoy the new building. The Konya Government Office typified the Hamidian Era government offices, which were characterized by fringes and pediments at the entrance and whose inner furnishings were established upon wooden abutments.⁵²⁰

The Ottoman central administration intensified the construction of government offices, barracks, railroad stations, and schools in the provinces during the second half of the nineteenth century. Acting as agents of the central administration in the provinces, these architectural structures played critical roles in both connecting the state and society and demonstrating the state's political power and authority.⁵²¹ This is different from the pre-Tanzimat period in which the Ottoman administration preferred mosques, madrasas, and imarets to exhibit power and authority. Before, the Ottoman governors and other administrators appointed from the center to the provinces used to work in rented mansions. In correlation with the centralization policies of the nineteenth century, administrative complexes comprising a government office, prison, post office, barracks, school, hospital, courthouse, gendarmerie, and

line of the verses was “*Bu bünyâdgehın tecdîdine Hâlet dedim târîh Rasadgâh-ı Felâtun’ken yapıldı kulle-i sâat 1289 (1872).*”

⁵²⁰ The characteristics of the Ottoman government offices that were constructed during the Hamidian era were specified in a large number of official documents. Raşan Toptaş, “Bergama Hükümet Konağı Örneğinde II. Abdülhamit Dönemi Hükümet Konakları,” *The Journal of International Research*, Vol: 9, Issue: 47, (December 2016), 416.

⁵²¹ Deeming “space” a resource for power, Paul Hirst argues that buildings are instruments of power in cities, which are autonomous political entities. Paul Hirst, *Space and Power: Politics, War, and Architecture* (Cambridge - Malden: Polity Press, 2005), 3-5.

railroad buildings began to be established at the centers of the provinces.⁵²² These complexes, which functioned as spaces of power, pioneered the reorganization of the planning of Ottoman cities.⁵²³

An inauguration would have been held for Memduh in front of this marvelous government office. In such ceremonies, the *valilik fermanı*, an imperial order delegating power and authority to the governor to rule the province, was read before all the civil and military officials who had to be present at the ceremony. The imperial decree had three parts: praise for the newly appointed governor, reference to the significance of that particular province, and the wishes of the sultan for the wellbeing of the people of the province. Once the edict was read, the governor came to the front to give his speech, in which he praised the sultan and his instructions referred to in the edict. After that, high religious authorities (the mufti or *kadi* of the region) performed a public prayer for blessings and gratitude to the sultan and the state.⁵²⁴

In order to carry out list of tasks delineated in the early part of this chapter, Memduh presided over sizable official hierarchies that oversaw the administrative, legal, financial, military, religious, educational, and infrastructural affairs of the province. He had to work in cooperation with a large administrative staff.⁵²⁵ Fulfilling the above-listed laborious tasks was not always possible due to a lack of sufficient funding and personnel. For instance, Memduh could not do much about the issue of public education in Konya due to a lack of financial resources. It was Mehmed Ferid Pasha, a diligent governor that served in Konya from 1898 to 1902, who launched an education campaign

⁵²² Rahşan Topbaş, "Bergama Hükümet Konağı Örneğinde II. Abdülhamit Dönemi Hükümet Konakları," *Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi/The Journal of International Social Research*, Vol 9, Issue: 47 (December 2016), 412.

⁵²³ Yasemin Avcı, *Bir Osmanlı Anadolu Kentinde Tanzimat Reformları ve Kentsel Dönüşüm: Denizli (1839-1908)* (Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınları, 2010), 200-201.

⁵²⁴ As noted by Kırmızı (2008), this is the procedure that was followed after the arrival of the newly appointed governor to the place of duty. But I could not document the procedure for Memduh.

⁵²⁵ The 1305 Yearbook of Konya.

in this province.⁵²⁶ That is to say, after Memduh's reign, the children of Konya had to wait for a decade more to receive proper elementary and high school education in their province.

4.2.3. The Measures Taken to Cope with the 1887 Famine

Memduh bore the responsibility of abovementioned broad spectrum of tasks in Konya, but the most important duty waiting for him in this Anatolian province was dealing with the famine. Coping with drought and famine was the most challenging task faced by all the governors appointed to Konya before and after Memduh. Falling short of expectations during the famine was the major theme of complaints and allegations about the authorities in the province, which sometimes ended in the dismissal or reassignment of an official. Memduh explains the dismissal of Said Pasha as due to his failure to take necessary measures during the famine.⁵²⁷ He probably made such an argument because after Said Pasha's removal, an investigation was carried out into corruption allegations about the purchase of wheat flour during the famine.⁵²⁸ However, it needs to be underscored that Said Pasha was by no means an exception. The "1303 Kahtı" unseated the governors of Ankara and Adana, where the famine also prevailed. The imperial capital might have reshuffled the governors in the region to refresh the administrative mechanisms in provinces that were going through severe crises rather than to punish the wrongdoers. However, there were always those who sought to take advantage of the opportunities times of crisis afforded. During and after the famine in Konya, some office holders and members of the provincial administrative council were tried and removed from their positions due to corruption and embezzlement.⁵²⁹

⁵²⁶ For details of Ferid Pasha's far-reaching education program in Konya see the pages 114-128 in his biography. Kırmızı, *Avlonyalı Ferid Paşa: Bir Ömür Devlet*.

⁵²⁷ BOA, Y.EE. 14/19, 28 Zilkade 1310/13 June 1893.

⁵²⁸ BOA, DH.MKT. 1962/49, 20 Zilkade 1309/16 June 1892.

Another document (BOA, DH.MKT. 1445/29, 24 Ramazan 1304) penned on 8 September 1887 indicates that ex-governor, Said Pasha, forced the inhabitants of Niğde, one of the sanjaks of Konya, to pay the cost of grain purchase to be distributed to the needy in the sanjak.

⁵²⁹ BOA, Y.PRK.KOM. 5/118, 27 Safer 1305/14 November 1887.

BOA, DH.ŞFR. 137/7, 14 Muharrem 1306/20 September 1888.

In addition to rearranging offices, the central administration ordered the formation of commissions in provinces that were suffering from famine.⁵³⁰ The provincial general assembly met on 3 July 1887,⁵³¹ and took four major decisions. The first was to collect two *mecidiye* from each household in the sanjak of Konya⁵³² to stockpile cash for the famine. According to the decision, households that were not able to put up money could borrow from well-to-do families of the region. The second decision was to add the funds the *Menafi Sandığı*⁵³³ and the *Maarif Sandığı*⁵³⁴ had in the Konya and Teke branches of the Ottoman Bank to the famine fund. The third was to purchase cereal and flour with the accumulated fund. Finally, the general assembly decided to inform the

BOA, DH.MKT. 1643/94, 1 Zilhicce 1306/29 July 1889.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1449/81, 3 Muharrem 1305/21 September 1887.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1653/12, 6 Muharrem 1307/2 September 1889.

BOA, MV. 46/61, 8 Zilhicce 1306/5 August 1889.

BOA, Y.PRK.MYD. 8/76, 25 Zilhicce 1306/22 August 1889.

⁵³⁰ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 10/20, 11 Zilkade 1304/1 August 1887.

BOA, Y.PRK.KOM. 5/103, 11 Zilhicce 1305/19 August 1888.

⁵³¹ This meeting was held before the appointment of Memduh to Konya. However, the decisions taken in the meeting should have been carried out, if at all, during the time of Memduh's tenure.

⁵³² Konya center was one of the four sanjaks of the province of Konya and this decision was relevant only for the sanjak of Konya.

⁵³³ Homeland Funds (*Memleket Sandıkları*) were established in 1863 with the initiative of Mithat Pasha (the governor of Niş), under the auspices of the Ottoman government in 1863 for providing loan to farmers who had no option other than loan sharks to contract debt. Homeland Funds (*Memleket Sandıkları*) transformed into *Menafi Sandıkları* (Public Welfare Funds) in 1883 and became the basis of the Ziraat Bank of Republican Turkey.

Ömer Yazan, "Ziraat Bankası'nın İlk Yirmi Yılına Ait Bazı Kayıtların İncelenmesi," *Abant İzzet Baysal Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* (2017), vol. 17, no. 4.

⁵³⁴ In order to overcome the problem of securing funding for public education at the provincial level, the "education contribution tax" (*maarif hisse-i ianesi*) was introduced in the beginning of 1884. This made the education in the provinces more self-sufficient and less dependent on the central budget. As put by Selçuk Akşin Somel (2001, 146), "Originally the education contribution tax was calculated on the basis of a unit of tithe to which 1.7 + (1.4 of 1.7) was to be added and from the resulting amount of addition 1.3 assigned to education (i.e. educational contribution tax, 5,3 % of the total tithe) and 2.3 to public works ('share for public works,' *menafi hissesi*, 10,6% of the total tithe)." The Educational Funds (*Maarif Sandığı*) were founded to collect the needed funds, most of which were from the locally collected education contribution tax, to cover the local educational expenses. The educational fund was located at the center of province, what Somel called as "*vilâyet-center*." Selçuk Akşin Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908: Islamization, Autocracy and Discipline* (Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, 2001).

mutasarrıfs of the other sanjaks of Konya of the decisions taken in the meeting so that they might be implemented throughout the province.⁵³⁵ Furthermore, in the beginning of September 1887, the sultan personally granted 461,520 kg wheat flour to the inhabitants of Adana, Konya, and Ankara.⁵³⁶

On 22 September 1887, three months after the abovementioned provincial general assembly meeting, a relief commission was set up in Konya. The commission was made up of two high-profile inspectors from Istanbul, Osman Seyfi Pasha and Mirliva Faik Pasha,⁵³⁷ and number of prominent administrative, judicial, and military officials, as well as the leading scholars and sheikhs of the province. As the first practical measure against the ongoing famine, the central imperial administration sent 51,200,000 kg (40 million *kıyye*)⁵³⁸ of cereals to the province to be distributed to the people.⁵³⁹ Despite the decisions taken at the provincial general assembly urging the use of local resources, the official documents attest that the Imperial Treasury was the main supplier of cereals for consumption and cultivation in Konya during the famine.⁵⁴⁰

In addition to the aid stocks dispatched from Istanbul, grain and flour as well as cash were collected from such diverse parts of the empire as Kosovo, Manastır, Janina, Diyarbakır, Syria, Bursa, and Sivastopol.⁵⁴¹ This required the effective

⁵³⁵ Yılmaz, "Konya Havalisinde 1303 (1887) Kıtılığı ve Alınan Tedbirler," 135-146.

⁵³⁶ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 10/22, 14 Zilhicce 1304/3 September 1887. Alongside big grants from the center, there were also humble donations at the local level. Ibrahim Bey, an official who was working at the Telegraph Office of Konya, donated a portion of his salary to the relief commission to be disbursed to the needy in September 1888. BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 12/124, 26 Zilhicce 1305/3 September 1888.

⁵³⁷ BOA, DH.MKT. 1450/28, 4 Muharrem 1305/22 September 1887.

⁵³⁸ One *kıyye* equals 1.282 kg.

⁵³⁹ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 13/18, 2 Muharrem 1306/8 September 1888.

⁵⁴⁰ BOA, DH.MKT. 1461/93, 22 Safer 1305/9 November 1887.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1462/81, 26 Safer 1305/13 November 1887.

BOA, Y.MTV. 28/34, 27 Muharrem 1305/15 October 1887.

⁵⁴¹ BOA, Y.PRK.KOM. 6/7, 7 Rebiülahir 1305/23 December 1887.

BOA, Y.PRK.KOM. 5/168, 21 Rebiülevvel 1305/7 December 1887.

BOA, Y.PRK.ML. 7/58, 2 Rebiülahir 1305/18 December 1887.

BOA, Y.PRK.ML. 7/64, 23 Rebiülahir 1305/8 January 1888.

BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 11/26, 26 Cemaziyelevvel 1305/9 February 1887.

BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 6/104, 22 Şaban 1305/4 May 1888.

organization of a long chain of operations including collection, purchasing, transportation, storing, and distributing. The collected or purchased aid supplies were transported by ships to the ports of Antalya, Mersin, Silifke, and İzmir,⁵⁴² and from there to different parts of Konya by camel.⁵⁴³ In April 1888, a commission was set up to distribute the collected tithes to the victims of the famine in Konya.⁵⁴⁴ Another measure that was adopted in response to the famine was a temporary customs-duty exemption for the grain and flour imports to Konya.⁵⁴⁵

Memduh was to ensure the efficient coordination of this process. During the ensuing eleven months he, in cooperation with the relief commission, coped with the famine by distributing 9 million kg of the great amount of cereals sent to Konya from the center.⁵⁴⁶ As stated by Memduh, the effective management of the aid stock coming from outside the province saved the lives of seven hundred thousand inhabitants of Konya. The rest of the cereals remained in the treasury of the province to be used in other urgent cases.

Despite these efforts, there were still those who could not access the aid or were not satisfied with the amount they received. Thus, although it was forbidden,⁵⁴⁷ some of the inhabitants of Konya and Ankara migrated to neighboring provinces such as Karesi and Aleppo to escape the famine. However, as the Ministry of Interior wanted to solve the problem of food scarcity in the locality, the immigrants were compelled to repatriate to their hometowns.⁵⁴⁸

⁵⁴² BOA, Y.PRK.KOM. 5/66, 24 Zilhicce 1304/13 September 1887.

⁵⁴³ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 11/13, 16 Cemaziyevvel 1305/30 January 1888.

BOA, Y.PRK.KOM. 6/12, 9 Rebiülahir 1305/25 December 1887.

⁵⁴⁴ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 12/1, 15 Şaban 1305/27 April 1888.

⁵⁴⁵ BOA, MV. 24/27, 26 Zilhicce 1304/15 September 1887.

BOA, Y.PRK.DH. 2/75, 9 Şaban 1305/21 April 1888.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1462/27, 23 Safer 1305/10 November 1887.

⁵⁴⁶ As stated above, the central imperial administration sent 51,200,000 kg (40 million *kıyye*) of cereals to Konya.

⁵⁴⁷ BOA, DH.MKT. 1449/8, 2 Muharrem 1305/20 September 1887.

⁵⁴⁸ BOA, Y.PRK.KOM. 6/15, 11 Rebiülahir 1305/27 December 1887.

In mid-June 1888, Memduh informed the imperial capital that Konya had left the drought behind after heavy precipitation the previous winter and spring.⁵⁴⁹ By the next year, which was the second and last year of Memduh's service in Konya, the famine had passed. The relief commission (*kaht komisyonu*) that had been founded to address the needs of people during the famine was dissolved, and its members from Istanbul, Osman Pasha and his adjutant Faik Pasha, were called back to the capital on 9 April 1888.⁵⁵⁰ According to Memduh's account, the tithes collected throughout Konya in 1888 totaled 250,000 liras, an unprecedented sum, as the annual amount of tithe never exceeded 120,000 liras in the province. This situation even drew the attention of foreigners, and a survey mission twice came to the province to investigate.⁵⁵¹

While Memduh drew such a bright picture about the province, an anonymous person from Konya wrote to the imperial capital (more than once) that whatever Memduh Pasha reported about Konya was not correct at all. The situation in the province was still very critical and great deal of people was still struggling to survive in all parts of Konya. The rain and snow that Memduh heralded could not solve the problem of grain scarcity, as the weather and season was not suitable for cultivation. Furthermore, contrary to what the governor illustrated in his telegraph to the imperial court, the aid sent by the sultan had not been fairly distributed to the needy and poor, who were entirely depending upon aid. Even worse, millions of kilograms of grain were still at the harbors waiting to be distributed to the poor, particularly the ones in the villages of Konya. The anonymous person who wrote this letter of complaint said that it was not known if there was any corruption in the distribution of aid or if there were measures that could be taken against possible corruption. According to him, the situation in Konya was desperate because the province

BOA, Y.PRK.KOM. 5/31, 23 Zilkade 1304/13 August 1887.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1449/8, 2 Muharrem 1305/20 September 1887.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1449/103, 4 Muharrem 1305/22 September 1887.

⁵⁴⁹ BOA, Y.PRK.KOM. 6/95, 13 Şaban 1305/25 April 1888.

⁵⁵⁰ BOA, Y.MTV. 31/82, 27 Receb 1305/9 April 1888.

⁵⁵¹ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 13/18, 21 Muharrem 1306/27 September 1888.

did not have a governor like Abidin Pasha, the governor of Ankara. He also argued that the report prepared by the inspection committee, which was made up of Osman Pasha and Faik Bey, was far from reflecting the reality, as during their inspection on the ground they could not collect authentic data about the conditions of the province.⁵⁵² Indeed, Memduh was not the only governor who was reported to the imperial capital during the famine. As noted above, Said Pasha, the former governor of Konya, was dismissed from the post due to similar allegations. It is not clear if the accusations of this anonymous letter were true, but it is clear that Memduh wanted to paint an optimistic picture for the palace. He might have wanted to get credit for the amelioration of the circumstances in the province.

4.2.4. Public Works

As Konya and its vicinity gradually weathered the crisis, the council of ministers in the capital ordered the establishment of a model farm in Konya on 7 October 1888.⁵⁵³ There is no document attesting to the setup of the model farm in Konya during Memduh's rule.⁵⁵⁴ However, Memduh successfully carried out such a project in Sivas in the ensuing years. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the famine, the central administration refreshed its search for substantial and if possible permanent solutions for the chronic drought problem of Konya. So the idea of irrigating the dry Konya plain with the Lake of Karaviran was added to the agenda.⁵⁵⁵ Memduh was appointed to Sivas two weeks after this decision.

⁵⁵² BOA, Y.PRK.KOM. 6/95, 13 Şaban 1305/25 April 1888.

⁵⁵³ BOA, MV. 36/31, 1 Safer 1306/7 October 1888. The same document also ordered the establishment of model farms in Sivas, Ankara, Syria, Aleppo, Manastır, and Janina.

⁵⁵⁴ As suggested by Bünyamin Duran, the Ottoman state, especially after the 1880s, initiated an agricultural-development program to increase productivity. As part of this program, model farms were established across the empire. Consequently, "these programs and world demand stimulating total agricultural output had risen significantly." Bünyamin Duran, "The Ottoman Agriculture (1880-1917)," in *Histoire Economique et Sociale de L'Empire Ottoman et de La Turquie (1326-1960)* (Collection Turcica, Vol.VIII) eds. Daniel Panzac and France Peeters (Louvain and Paris: Editions Peeters, 1995), 176.

⁵⁵⁵ BOA, DH.MKT. 1609/111, 24 Receb 1306/24 March 1889. Indeed, the irrigation of the Konya plain with two lakes in the region was on the agenda of the Ministry of Interior at onset of famine: "*Mevsim-i baharın kuraklıkla güzerânı cihetle ahâlinin ziraat*

Therefore, he made no substantial contribution to the solution of Konya's aridity issue. Mehmed Ferid Pasha, ten years after Memduh, strove to carry out the ambitious irrigation project during his governorship in Konya, but he could not. He was determined to realize the grand project and therefore continued working on it after he left Konya. His efforts yielded result in 1907 when he was the grand vizier, and the Konya-Çumra plain began to be irrigated with the water of the Lake of Beyşehir. This project was the largest and earliest irrigation project in Turkey.⁵⁵⁶

Another issue that was added to the agenda of Memduh in the post-famine period was the settlement of immigrants from the Balkans, Caucasia, and Crimea. In the period following the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878, many of the Anatolian provinces began to host immigrants who left their homelands due to Russian persecution. By 1890, six thousand immigrants had settled in the province of Konya. In the fall of 1888, a commission was created for the immigrants in the region.⁵⁵⁷ Konya hosted Tatars, Circassians, and Togays who migrated from Caucasia and Crimea.⁵⁵⁸ The places they were collectively settled became new neighborhoods and villages.⁵⁵⁹ The table below lists the names of these newly founded sites in the two large sanjaks of Konya.

ve telfat yüzünden dûçar oldukları zarar ve hasarın medâr-ı cebr ve telâfisi olmak üzere civardaki iki gölün Konya ovasına icrası için ittihazı mûceb-i muhâsenad olacak tedâbir hakkında bazı ifâdatı have Konya Vilayeti defterdarlığından alınan tahrirât sureti...."
BOA, DH.MKT. 1426/13, 23 Ramazan 1304/15 June 1887.

⁵⁵⁶ Kırmızı, *Avlonyalı Ferid Paşa: Bir Ömür Devlet*, 104-114. Ali Altundaş, "Konya-Çumra Ovası'nın Sulanmasının Tarihçesi ve Kuru Kafa Mehmed Efendi," in *Bildiriler, I. Uluslararası Çatalhöyük'ten Günümüze Çumra Kongresi, 15-16 Eylül 2000* (Konya: Çumra Belediyesi, 2001), 149-160. Ömer Faruk Yılmaz, "Osmanlı'nın Konya Ovası Sulama Projesi," *Yedikıta* 22 (June 2010).

⁵⁵⁷ BOA, YPRK.KOM. 6/164, 29 Zilhicce 1305/6 September 1888.

⁵⁵⁸ BOA, DH.MKT. 1545/4, 15 Muharrem 1306/21 September 1888.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1581/24, 29 Rebiülahir 1306/2 January 1889.

⁵⁵⁹ Nedim İpek, *Rumeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri (1877-1890)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1994), 204-205.

Table 4.1. The newly founded sites in the sanjak of Konya

Hamidiye Neighborhood	(53 households)
Hamidiye Village	(12 households)
Eser-i Hamidi	
Mamure Neighborhood	(12 households)
Osmaniye	
İhsaniye	

Table 4.2. The newly founded sites in the sanjak of Teke (Antalya)

Orhaniye Neighborhood	(40 households)
Hamidiye Village	(64 households)
Can-malu	(24 households)
Aydoğmuş	(18 households)
Tevkifiye	(20 households)
Gedikli	(29 households)
Şevketiye	(73 households)
Vardarlı	(60 households)
Selimiye	(30 households)
Karakır	(62 households)
Gölelü	(23 households)
Satırlu	(24 households)
Dereli	(60 households)
Kırımlı	(70 households)

As he exerted much of his effort to manage the famine crisis in the first year of his service, Memduh was able to deal with public works only in the second year of his rule in Konya. One of the most important public-works projects was the construction of a high school (*idadi*). Although the essential preliminaries such as location scouting and architectural planning were done during Memduh's time, the construction of the first high school of Konya was completed after Memduh.⁵⁶⁰

⁵⁶⁰ BOA, MV. 39/39, 21 Cemaziyelevvel 1306/25 December 1888.

Even though resources were very limited, the list of public-works projects was quite long. The sanjaks and districts (*kaza*) needed government offices, schools, hospitals, and prisons. The governor and the Ministry of Interior exchanged correspondence to plan the construction and finance of government offices in the sanjaks of Antalya and Niğde and the district of Maden.⁵⁶¹ Finding funds for these projects was a major problem for the governor and the central administration.⁵⁶²

In addition to large-scale public projects, various renovations and repairs were also done in different locations of Konya during the governorship of Memduh. One of these was the waterway of the Yusuf Ağa Library and Madrasa, a historical site that was constructed in 1795 at the center of Konya.⁵⁶³ Another historical building that was renovated was the Rumi Tomb and Semahane.⁵⁶⁴ The Private Treasury, probably due to its significance as a religious institution in that locality, met the expenses of this renovation.⁵⁶⁵

4.2.5. “Mapusane”⁵⁶⁶

Prisons in different parts of the province also required repairs or rebuilding. They were very old and crowded. Prisoners were subjected to difficult conditions. In this respect, Konya was by no means an exception. Prisons in other provinces⁵⁶⁷ and in the capital were in a similar condition. However, the

BOA, A.MKT.MHM. 499/8, 24 Cemaziyevvel 1306/28 December 1888.

BOA, İ.ŞD. 96/5731, 5 Zilkade 1306/3 July 1889.

⁵⁶¹ BOA, İ.DH. 1123/87821, 19 Cemaziyelahir 1306/20 February 1889.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1612/61, 2 Şaban 1306/3 April 1889.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1471/32, 7 Rebiülahir 1305/23 December 1887.

⁵⁶² BOA, DH.MKT. 1471/32, 7 Rebiülahir 1305/23 December 1887.

⁵⁶³ BOA, İ.ŞD. 92/5457, 8 Zilkade 1305/17 July 1888.

⁵⁶⁴ Semahane refers to a building where the Rumi sema, a sufi ritual, was performed.

⁵⁶⁵ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 10/59, 18 Safer 1305/5 November 1887.

BOA, Y.MTV. 28/113, 26 Rebiülahir 1305/11 January 1888.

⁵⁶⁶ Gültekin Yıldız, *Mapusane: Osmanlı Hapishanelerinin Kuruluş Serüveni (1839-1908)* (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2012).

⁵⁶⁷ In the same period the neighboring provinces suffered from the same problem.

state treasury lacked the funds to cover the costs of construction⁵⁶⁸ and reconstruction and the daily expenses of the prisons.⁵⁶⁹ The Konya prison at the center,⁵⁷⁰ the sanjak of Antalya prison,⁵⁷¹ the Burdur prison,⁵⁷² the Karaman prison,⁵⁷³ the Karapınar prison,⁵⁷⁴ the Hamidiye prison,⁵⁷⁵ and the Aksaray prison⁵⁷⁶ were in miserable conditions and in need of emergency action. But, other than the Antalya prison, which to be reconstructed,⁵⁷⁷ all the repairs were either postponed or temporarily solved. The convicts who were kept at unserviceable prisons were temporarily shifted to other places.⁵⁷⁸

How and why did prisons become such an important and chronic issue for the central and local administrations in the Ottoman realm? All layers of the state had profoundly changed in the empire during the nineteenth century, including punishment. The adoption of imprisonment as the primary mode of punishment was a part of a broader administrative transformation in the last century of the Ottoman Empire. The criminal justice system and penal reforms were formulated according to the nineteenth-century administrative principles of

The Osmaniye prison in a district of the province of Adana (BOA, DH.MKT. 1473/9, 13 Rebiülahir 1305/29 December 1887), the Karahisar-ı Şarki prison in a sanjak of the province of Sivas (BOA, DH.MKT. 1475/28, 21 Rebiülahir 1305/6 January 1888), the Ankara prison (BOA, DH.MKT. 1474/52, 19 Rebiülahir 1305/4 January 1888), and the Üsküdar prison (BOA, DH.MKT. 1468/93, 22 Rebiülevvel 1305/8 December 1887) were all in dire need of reconstruction.

⁵⁶⁸ Although there was an urgent need, prisons for women in most of the districts and provincial centers could not be constructed due to lack of funds.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1455/8, 27 Muharrem 1305/15 October 1887.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1578/92, 22 Rebiülahir 1306/26 December 1888.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1473/26, 14 Rebiülahir 1305/30 December 1887.

⁵⁶⁹ BOA, DH.MKT. 1581/94, 3 Cemaziyellevvel 1306/5 January 1889.

⁵⁷⁰ BOA, DH.MKT. 1579/6, 23 Rebiülahir 1306/27 December 1888.

⁵⁷¹ BOA, DH.MKT. 1475/36, 21 Rebiülahir 1305/6 January 1888.

⁵⁷² BOA, DH.MKT. 1473/26, 14 Rebiülahir 1305/30 December 1887.

⁵⁷³ BOA, DH.MKT. 1485/107, 2 Cemaziyelahir 1305/15 February 1888.

⁵⁷⁴ BOA, DH.MKT. 1559/66, 25 Safer 1306/31 October 1888.

⁵⁷⁵ BOA, DH.MKT. 1562/116, 6 Rebiülevvel 1306/10 November 1888

⁵⁷⁶ BOA, DH.MKT. 1579/107, 25 Rebiülahir 1306/29 December 1888.

⁵⁷⁷ BOA, DH.MKT. 1475/36, 21 Rebiülahir 1305/6 January 1888.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1485/67, 2 Cemaziyelahir 1305/15 February 1888

BOA, DH.MKT. 1488/94, 11 Cemaziyelahir 1305/24 February 1888.

⁵⁷⁸ BOA, DH.MKT. 1554/27, 9 Safer 1305/27 October 1887.

centralization, standardization, and rationalization. Seeing prisons as microcosms of imperial transformation, Kent Schull argues that

it was within the walls of prisons that many of the pressing questions of Ottoman modernity played out. Bureaucrats addressed issues related to administrative reform and centralisation, the rationalisation of Islamic criminal law and punishment, the role of labour in the rehabilitation of prisoners, economic development and industrialisation, gender and childhood, the implementation of modern concepts of time and space, issues of national identity based on ethnicity and religion, social engineering, and the increased role of the state in caring for its population.⁵⁷⁹

Although the Tanzimat period made incarceration the dominant method of punishment and rehabilitation of convicts in the Ottoman Empire, incarceration had been in the repertoire of the Ottoman judicial system in the pre-nineteenth-century period.⁵⁸⁰ The Penal Code was promulgated in 1840,⁵⁸¹ followed by the New Penal Code in 1851⁵⁸² and the Imperial Ottoman Penal Code in 1858. This last was not only a culmination of the previous two Penal Codes but also a product of the 1856 Islahat Decree. Entailing comprehensive criminal codes and reformation of forms of punishment, the Islahat Decree lent

⁵⁷⁹ Kent Schull, *The Prisons in the Late Ottoman Empire: Microcosms of Modernity* (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 2014), 43-44.

⁵⁸⁰ As stated by Gültekin Yıldız (2012) and Schull (2014), imprisonment in citadels, dungeons, government buildings, jails, and prisons and incarceration with hard labor existed in the Ottoman Empire from the very beginning. For instance, the Baba Cafer Zindanı located near the Yemiş İskelesi on the Istanbul Walls had been used for incarceration between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. Gültekin Yıldız, *Mapusane: Osmanlı Hapishanelerinin Kuruluş Serüveni (1839-1908)* (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2012), 15.

⁵⁸¹ Comprising thirteen articles in forty-two sections and an epilogue, the 1840 Penal Code tackled crimes such as treason, rebellion, embezzlement of state resources, evasion of tax, and confronting the state authority. According to Kent Schull, this code did not bring a profound change, as many of the traditional methods of punishment continued to be practiced. Kent Schull, "Criminal Codes, Crime, and the Transformation of Punishment" in *Law and Legality in the Ottoman Empire and Republic of Turkey*, eds. Kent F. Schull and M. Safa Saraçoğlu, and Robert F. Zens (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 159.

⁵⁸² As the 1840 code was not comprehensive and adequate enough to realize the promises of the Gülhane Edict, a new code was introduced in 1851. The main objective of the 1851 Code was to preserve public order, inhibit tyranny and corruption by civil officials, and protect individual rights. Rudolph Peters, *Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from Sixteenth to Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 127-133.

a considerable impetus to the modernization of the Ottoman criminal justice system.⁵⁸³ Some parts of the Imperial Ottoman Penal Code included adaptations from the 1810 French Criminal Code. The most salient difference between the Imperial Ottoman Penal Code and the previous codes was that it had a section devoted to the protection of individual rights.⁵⁸⁴

All these efforts culminated in the Hamidian era, which occupied an important place in the legislation and implementation of penal reforms. Abdülhamid II created the 1879 Code of Criminal Procedure, the Nizamiye court system,⁵⁸⁵ and the 1880 Regulation for Prisons and Houses of Detention. Furthermore, developments such as judicial proceedings in criminal issues, attendance at international prison conferences, erection of new prisons, and routine prison inspections occurred under the reign of Abdülhamid II.⁵⁸⁶ These substantial reforms coincided with Memduh's career in the provinces as well as in the ministry. As the long list of archival documents above attest, Memduh had to tackle matters related to the prisons and jails in different locations of Konya. His involvement in the issues of criminal justice and implementation of penal reforms continued while he was running the Ministry of Interior.⁵⁸⁷

Going back to Konya years of Memduh, jails and prisons in the province during his governorship were generally filled with robbers, bandits, and those who

⁵⁸³ Schull, "Criminal Codes, Crime, and the Transformation of Punishment," 160-161.

⁵⁸⁴ Gülnihal Bozkurt, "The Reception of Western European Law in Turkey (From the Tanzimat to the Turkish Republic, 1839-1939)," *Der Islam* 75 (1998).

⁵⁸⁵ Although the foundations of the Nizamiye court system can be found in the 1864 Provincial Regulations, this court system was official established in 1879.

Macit Kenanoğlu, "Nizamiye Mahkemeleri", *TDVİA*, Vol. 33, 2007, 185-188.

⁵⁸⁶ Schull, *The Prisons in the Late Ottoman Empire*, 46.

⁵⁸⁷ Aiming to centralize the state authority, Sultan Mahmud II established a new police force as part of the reorganized military under the Ministry of War after the disbandment of the Janissary corps. In time, the police forces were detached from the military and put under the Ministry of Interior. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the administration and reformation of prisons was managed by commissions and institutions founded within the Ministry of Interior. Schull, *The Prisons in the Late Ottoman Empire*.

were found guilty by association.⁵⁸⁸ Most of these convicts were imprisoned with hard labor. In addition to these convicts Memduh also dealt with drifters. One of the correspondences⁵⁸⁹ between the Ministry of Interior and Konya attests that unwanted drifts had been dispatched from İzmir to Konya⁵⁹⁰ as their settlement in İzmir was found inconvenient. Memduh demanded that the governorship of İzmir should stop sending drifts to Konya and the Ministry decided to keep the drifters in İzmir.

Forgery was another crime that Memduh had to tackle. Having no proper explanation a very brief document⁵⁹¹ from Konya to the Ministry of Interior refers to Pandalaki Efendi who was involved in forgery. Interestingly enough, a group of documents⁵⁹² prepared in the ensuing years by the Council of State refers to Memduh's being the surety for forger Pandalaki Efendi who used to work at the correspondence department of Foreign Ministry and was charged with embezzlement. Pandalaki's case was brought up again in the post-1908 era. Other than Memduh's being the surety for Pandalaki documents do not provide details about the link between them. But as a matter of fact, this was neither the first nor the last dubious relationship Memduh had with an official.

4.2.6. Memduh's Relationships with "Others"

Understanding Memduh's relationships with the officials he was working with whether superior or inferior requires an analytical approach. This is because; in

⁵⁸⁸ BOA, DH.MKT. 1581/62, 1 Cemaziyelevvel 1306/3 January 1889.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1585/15, 15 Cemaziyelevvel 1306/17 January 1889.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1566/60, 16 Rebiülevvel 1306/20 November 1888.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1581/57, 1 Cemaziyelevvel 1306/3 January 1889.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1581/58, 1 Cemaziyelevvel 1306/3 January 1889.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1579/51, 25 Rebiülahir 1306/29 December 1888.

⁵⁸⁹ BOA, DH.MKT. 1480/24, 11 Cemaziyelevvel 1305/25 January 1888.

⁵⁹⁰ The reason might have been the more secluded location of Konya compared to İzmir.

⁵⁹¹ BOA, DH.MKT. 1668/47, 25 Safer 1306/31 October 1888.

⁵⁹² BOA, HR.HMŞ.İŞO. 176/26, 29 Zilhicce 1308/5 August 1891.

BOA, ŞD. 2565/10, 21 Rebiülevvel 1332/17 February 1914.

BOA, ŞD. 445/26, 12 Receb 1328/20 July 1910.

his professional relationships he seems to be calculating, among other things, short and long term gains and losses, gratitude and revenge. His authority increased over time during his professional journey so did the complexity of his relationships with his colleagues. Official documents and first hand accounts such as memoirs delineate the intricate nature of some of his relationships in Konya, Sivas, and Ankara where he served as governor and back in Sublime Porte where he was equipped with ministerial authority for more than a decade. It is not appropriate to make sweeping statements based on an individual case about the period in which Memduh acted with different roles in different capacities. Yet it still needs to be highlighted that with regard to the complexity of professional connections Memduh was by no means an exception. Rather, he acted within a large administrative network with an intricate structure.

It is possible to observe the complexity of his relationships in the context of Konya, the first administrative setting outside the capital he had complete authority. Memduh's relations with the officials working under his authority in Konya sometimes became strained. One of the officials Memduh could not get along with was the chief secretary Mehmed Nazım Bey (1840-1926)⁵⁹³, who was known for his literary skills and attachment to Rumi order. Nazım Bey worked under the reign of Said Pasha, ex-governor of Konya- for a long time and often times he acted for the governor. Initially Memduh and Mehmed Nazım worked in coordination however this did not last long. There were rumors that the conflict between Memduh and Nazım Bey emerged due to the latter's prevention of the former's corruption. On the other hand, in his memoirs Mehmed Nazım referred to a disagreement that arose between him and Memduh about the measures that needed to be taken against the famine. Consequently, Nazım Bey, according to his own account, informed Memduh about his

⁵⁹³ Poet Nazım Hikmet's grand father.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1570/30, 28 Rebiülevvel 1306/2 December 1888.

This state document proves the disagreement between Memduh and Nazım Bey.

intention to resign from the post or to be exchanged with another official.⁵⁹⁴ Despite this dialog Memduh requested the dismissal of Nazım Bey. Nazım Bey overtly expressed his disappointment with the governor. In response Memduh defended himself by saying that he indeed requested the Sublime Porte not his dismissal but rather his being appointment to Antalya as mutasarrıf.⁵⁹⁵ This is how Nazım Bey explained the situation.

Another account⁵⁹⁶ on the issue referred to Nazım Bey's satirical poems. However, even before Memduh's appointment to Konya there had been some misconduct allegations such as embezzlement⁵⁹⁷ and maltreatment of public about Nazım Bey.⁵⁹⁸ In another document prepared by the Ministry of Interior on 7 May 1887, more than two months before Memduh's appointment to Konya, refers to the misconduct allegations against Nazım Bey and his proven innocence.⁵⁹⁹ Neither the abovementioned accusations nor Memduh's complaints could displace Nazım Bey from Konya. He was dismissed from the post and appointed to Bitlis province on 13 March 1888, as Hacı Âli Pasha, the head scribe of the Mabeyn, demanded Nazım Bey's dismissal because a conflict emerged between them.⁶⁰⁰

Once he got rid of Nazım Bey, Memduh appointed Abdullah Bey, a person after his own heart, to the post of chief secretary.⁶⁰¹ Abdullah Bey soon became -or already was- a favorite of the governor. Attempting to transfer human

⁵⁹⁴ *Nazım Hikmet'in Büyük Babası Nazım Paşa'nın Anıları* (Istanbul: Arba, 1992), 85-86.

⁵⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 85-86.

⁵⁹⁶ Fevziye Abdullah Tansel, "Bir Mevlevi Nâsir ve Şair: Mehmed Nâzım Paşa," *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, vol. 14, no.1 (1966), 69.

⁵⁹⁷ BOA, DH.MKT. 1338/44, 17 Safer 1299/8 January 1882.

⁵⁹⁸ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 122/99, 26 Şevval 1301/19 August 1884.

⁵⁹⁹ BOA, HK.MKT. 1418/25, 13 Şaban 1304/7 May 1887.

⁶⁰⁰ *Nazım Hikmet'in Büyük Babası Nazım Paşa'nın Anıları*, 86.

This event can be taken as an example proving the extent of the power of the *Mabeyn* in decision-making processes particularly the appointments in the Hamidian regime particularly after the 1890s. As will be discussed in detail in the next chapter the increasing power of the functionaries working at the *Mabeyn* entails questioning Sultan Abdülhamid II's neo-absolutism and despotism. Many anecdotes show that this office was very influential over much of the state affairs, domestic and international alike.

⁶⁰¹ BOA, HK.MKT. 1496/95, 12 Receb 1305/25 March 1888.

resources from one province to another, he even requested the appointment of Abdullah Bey as his chief secretary in Sivas once he was appointed as the governor of Sivas in April 1889. However, Memduh's demand was kindly rejected⁶⁰² by the imperial capital saying that assignment of a chief secretary according to the personal will was not seen appropriate and rejection of Memduh's demand was not an exception as the central administration denied the similar demands of some other governors.⁶⁰³ As it will be discussed in the forthcoming passages, Abdullah Bey was not the only official that Memduh wanted to take with him to Sivas.

Veled Çelebi (1869-1950) was another official known for literary skills working in a government office under the rule of Memduh. Veled Çelebi (Bahaddin Veled İzbudak) was the eighteenth great-grandson of Rumi. Veled Çelebi and Memduh were on good terms in and outside the office. Memduh used to encourage young poet Veled Çelebi as the latter shared some of his poems with the governor, who was known as *üstad-ı edeb*,⁶⁰⁴ to get feedback. However, the relationship between Memduh and Abdülvahid Çelebi (1858-1907), the head of the Rumi Lodge, A socially and politically influential Sufi order in Konya founded by the followers of Jalaluddin Rumi, at that time in Konya, were quite tense. Therefore, Abdülvahid Çelebi did not want his junior cousin to be intimate with Memduh. According to some accounts⁶⁰⁵ Abdülvahid Çelebi even forbade Veled Çelebi to keep company with the governor and whenever Veled Çelebi met with Memduh the sheikh scolded his cousin. Over time Memduh too began to keep Veled Çelebi at a distance due to his proximity with the Rumi sheikh. Eventually, Veled Çelebi resigned from the post and left Konya for Istanbul after kindly asking permission of Memduh. As earlier highlighted, notwithstanding the tension between the governor and the head of the Rumi Lodge, the private

⁶⁰² However, similar demands of other governors such as Mehmed Ferid Pasha were replied in the affirmative.

Kırmızı, "Experiencing the Ottoman Empire as a Life Course," 55.

⁶⁰³ BOA, Y.MTV. 38/86, 22 Şaban 1306/23 April 1889.

⁶⁰⁴ Necib Asım, "Veled Çelebi Hazretleri," *Türk Yurdu*, vol. VII, Issue 15, 2471.

⁶⁰⁵ Metin Akar, *Veled Çelebi İzbudak* (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1999), 65.

treasury of Abdülhamid defrayed renovation expenses of the lodge and probably Memduh was involved in this process.

Furthermore, Memduh and İhsan Bey, the Commander of Gendarmerie in Konya, could not get along with each other and the dispute arose between them ended up in a long-running lawsuit.⁶⁰⁶ Multitude of archival documents some of which were written by the official authorities about the trials while some others were composed by İhsan Bey attest to the inconclusive nature of the judicial process which lasted for years. As explained by İhsan Bey in one of his petitions prepared on 5 October 1889⁶⁰⁷ İhsan Bey wrote thirty-eight telegraphs to the sultan to inform him about the malpractices of Memduh in Konya. According to İhsan Bey, Memduh made use of his official authority for personal interests and gains. However, Commander of Gendarmerie İhsan Bey paid a heavy price for the serious charges he made about the governor of Konya. Having Ahmet Çavuş⁶⁰⁸ as a witness Memduh came up with a countercharge against Commander of Gendarmerie İhsan Bey after four months. Ultimately, İhsan Bey was dismissed on account of fabricating groundless charges about the governor.⁶⁰⁹ In response, adjudicating the

⁶⁰⁶ Conflict between the civil and military officials in the provinces was frequent. Military officers were sometimes used to balance the power of governors. See *Abdülhamid'in Valileri*, 191-193. Similarly, İlber Ortaylı indicated that the governor and commander were two competing authorities in province and their disputes over the responsibilities never resolved. İlber Ortaylı, *Tanzimat'dan Cumhuriyet'e Yerel Yönetim Geleneği* (Istanbul: Hil, 1985), 67. Hence, Memduh's dispute with İhsan Bey needs to be evaluated in the context of conflict-ridden atmosphere of the province.

⁶⁰⁷ BOA, ŞD. 2572/21, 29 Safer 1309/4 October 1891.

At that time Memduh was governor of Sivas.

⁶⁰⁸ According to İhsan Bey, Ahmed Çavuş was "an illiterate person who was impassioned and manipulated by Memduh".

⁶⁰⁹ ".....hak-ı acizanemde hiçbir şahs tarafından ikame-i dava olunmaksızın mücerred kullarını lekedar etmek maksad-ı garazkaranesiyle çakeranem okuyup yazması olmayan sadedilinden ahmed çavuşu vali-i müşarünileyh hazretleri icbar ve itmaa eyleyerek muhbir sıfatıyla meydan iddiata sevk edip birtakım hilaf-ı vaki tahkikat evveliyeye tanzim ettirmiş ve bunun mecruhiyet meydana çıkarmak üzere makam vala-yı seraskeriye takdim olunması üzerine işten el çektilerik taht-ı mehakemeye alınmaklığıma dair istihsal olunan irade-i seniye hazreti Padişahi makam u amedi-i seraskeriden vali-i müşarünileyh hazretlerine tebliğ edilmesini müteakiben taht -ı tevkife alınmaklığım hususu iki ... kumandanlarına tahrir emr olması o zaman müteaddid telgrafname-i

decision of dismissal from the military post İhsan Bey raged a legal struggle for his reinstatement. However, the official correspondences do not include any information about a decision giving him back to duty. Though, it is not clear which side was right but Memduh seems to be favored by the central administration.

4.2.7. Leaving Konya

Not long after İhsan Bey's dismissal Memduh too left Konya. After twenty months of service the Konya chapter of Memduh's career ended and the Sivas chapter began which lasted forty-four months. After his dismissal from Sivas he remained unemployed in Istanbul waiting for almost a year to be assigned to a new post. Probably feeling the need of clarifying his position so that he could win the trust of the sultan back, which was critical to change his ill-fate, he wrote a long petition to the court on 13 June 1893 to explain the reasons behind his dismissal from the posts in Konya and Sivas.

As he explained in this petition to the court⁶¹⁰ despite the fact that he achieved a phenomenal success in his first governing experience in Konya by coping with the famine and managing the efficient collection of taxes, a committee of inspection was sent from Istanbul to Konya and this was, for Memduh, because of the personal resentments of some officials against him. Memduh was appointed to Sivas six months after the arrival of the inspection committee in Konya. He implied that he was transferred from Konya to Sivas not because he fell short of the sultan's expectations but rather because of the grudges of someone on him.

According to Memduh, he was transferred to Sivas because of two reasons. One was related to Kıbrıslı Kamil Pasha, the grand vizier of the time, who was known "for his inclination to the British policies." Memduh received a cipher telegram

çakeranemle huzur dekaik-i nüsur samilerine arz edilmişti." BOA, ŞD. 2572/21, 29 Safer 1309/4 October 1891.

⁶¹⁰ BOA, Y.EE. 14/19, 28 Zilkade 1310/13 June 1893.

while he was in Konya from the Ministry of Interior pronouncing a decision taken at the Ottoman Council of Ministers. According to the telegram a group of British officials from Cyprus were going to come to Anatolia to explore the effects of the disease of phylloxera. Memduh not only informed the sultan about this development but he also expressed his worries over this suspicious visit as he thought that the vine stocks were not the real concern of the British officials who must have had a secret agenda to enter into the Anatolian lands. The visit of British officials from Cyprus was postponed probably because of the correspondence between Memduh and the court.⁶¹¹ This gave an excuse to someone –he did not spell any name but probably referring to Kamil Pasha- to lobby against him in Istanbul.

Kamil Pasha was removed from the grand vizierate in 1891. He was appointed back in 1895 upon the outbreak of the Armenian crisis to soothe the British. But as will be examined in chapter 6 he was dismissed after five months of service mainly because of his suggestions to cope with the internal and external problems of the empire. The bottom line of his memorandum was the necessity of the reinstatement of the power of the Porte and the grand vizierate.⁶¹² Backed by the British and the French diplomats Kamil Pasha dared to swing back the pendulum of power to the Porte but he was immediately dismissed and exiled to Aydın. He was appointed to the grand vizierate in 1908 after the Young Turk Revolution upon the resignation of Said Pasha. This is all to say that

⁶¹¹ On 9 November 1887 the Ministry of Interior wrote to Syria, Adana, Aleppo, Konya and Aydın to be careful about the behaviors of the British who came to these provinces to research phylloxera in vineyards. BOA, DH.MKT.1461/88, 22 Safer 1305/9 November 1887.

Another document prepared by the Ministry of Interior on 15 December 1887 revealed that the British researchers had not come yet to the abovementioned provinces and phylloxera had not appeared in the vineyards. BOA, DH.MKT. 1469/114, 29 Rebiülevvel 1305/15 December 1887.

⁶¹² The memorandum submitted by Kıbrıslı Kamil Pasha was transliterated by Mahmut Kemal İnal. İnal, *Son Sadrazamlar*, 1369-1372 and 1466-1468.

Memduh as a pro-palace official was, expectedly, at odds with Kamil Pasha who wished to restore the power of the Porte as late as 1895.⁶¹³

Getting back to Memduh's explanation about his removal from Konya;⁶¹⁴ the second reason lying behind his reassignment, according to Memduh, was related to his disagreement with Çelebi Efendi on an issue.⁶¹⁵ Memduh began explaining the occurrence of this disagreement by reminding the sultan about a worrisome detail which was Çelebi Efendi's being Bektashi.⁶¹⁶ At this point he also underlined his efforts to balance between Çelebi Efendi and Sunni ulema of Konya to prevent any conflict. It was neither the first nor the last time that Memduh exaggerated a situation that would pose a threat to the mainstream Sunni Islamic values. It is possible to observe same kind of exaggerations in his reports on the Alewi community in Sivas and Ankara. Memduh made use of the sultan's concerns about the protection of the Sunni traditions among the Muslims of the Empire in order to portray himself a responsible and sensitive governor who deserved to be rewarded by the sultan.⁶¹⁷

According to the anecdote Memduh narrated, Çelebi Efendi wanted his deed of sheikhhood mission be read in the presence of the Rumi Shrine with the attendance of the governor, officials, and police officers in uniform and with their medals and decorations (*nişan*). Memduh refused this demand on the ground that such a ceremony could only be conducted for official reasons. As

⁶¹³ The conflict between them cannot be reduced to their political stand. They might have other personal issues as well.

⁶¹⁴ The following explanation is also from his petition. BOA, Y.EE.14/19, 28 Zilkade 1310/13 June 1893.

⁶¹⁵ This is how he wrote in his petition. Çelebi Efendi must have been Abdülvahid Çelebi, the head of Rumi Lodge in Konya.

This anecdote is significant to understand the tension between Memduh and Abdülvahid Çelebi which affected the relationship between Veled Çelebi and Memduh.

⁶¹⁶ Though there were some similarities between Rumis and Bektashis in principle they were different creeds. Ali Çetin, "Mevlevilik ve Bektaşilikteki Bazı Benzeşmeler," *Türk Kültürü ve Hacı Bektaş Veli Araştırma Dergisi* (2016), 78.

⁶¹⁷ As exemplified in Kırmızı's *Abdülhamid'in Valileri* (2008) (on pages 105-109) the governors sometimes, for different motivations and reasons, misinformed Sultan Abdülhamid II about the issues and events of the provinces they were governing.

Çelebi Efendi persisted in his demand Memduh sent a telegraph to the head scribe at the sultan's court. Consequently, Çelebi Efendi not only got offended to the governor but he also made some complaints against Memduh that would contribute to his dismissal from Konya.

In the same petition Memduh also referred to causes of his removal from governing office in Sivas after almost four years of efforts to deal with disruptions caused by the Armenians throughout Sivas. According to Memduh he was transferred from Konya due to the hatred of grand vizier Cevad Pasha and Minister of Interior Rifat Pasha towards him.⁶¹⁸ Four months after this petition Memduh was appointed as governor of Ankara due to his experience of coping with challenges posed by Armenians as this province was also suffering from similar problems that Sivas had.

4.3. A NEW PAGE in GOVERNING CAREER: SIVAS

4.3.1. Sivas in 1889

On 7 June 1889 the grand vizier informed Memduh that he was appointed as governor of Sivas while Sururi Pasha, the governor of Sivas, was appointed to Konya. They were exchanged because the former needed to be transferred to another province⁶¹⁹ while the latter had difficulty of adapting to the natural conditions (to the water and the air) of Sivas.⁶²⁰ Whatever the reason behind his transfer from Konya this was indeed a piece of good news as Memduh served in Sivas for three and a half year and got a chance to demonstrate his administrative abilities to the sultan. Rendering broad range of services in the

⁶¹⁸ BOA, Y.EE. 14/19, 28 Zilkade 1310/13 June 1893.

⁶¹⁹ The appointment document does not clarify the reason behind the need of transferring Memduh to another province. However, another document prepared by the Ministry of Interior (BOA, DH.MKT. 1623/113, 7 Şevval 1306/6 June 1889) refers to an investigation about Sururi Pasha due to the complains against him during his service in Sivas.

⁶²⁰ BOA, İ.DH. 1130/88237, 8 Şaban 1306/9 April 1889.

“Sivas vilayeti valisi devletlü Sururi Paşa hazretleri oranın ab ve havasıyla adem-i imtizacdan bahisle istidaasında bulunan ve Konya valisi atüfetli Memduh beyefendi hazretlerinin dahi ahire bir vilayete nakil lüzumuna mebni...”

This is one of most referred excuses of governors to change the place of duty. For more examples check Abdulhamit Kırmızı's Abdülhamid'in Valileri.

fields of infrastructure, education, transportation, manufacture, trade, and agriculture he became one of the governors who put his seal on Sivas. Pleased with his appointment to Sivas Memduh immediately expressed his sincere thanks to the sultan via telegraph.⁶²¹ He arrived in Sivas almost a month after he received the notification of his assignment.⁶²²

Sivas was an Anatolian province comprised of four sanjaks namely Sivas,⁶²³ Amasya,⁶²⁴ Tokad,⁶²⁵ and Şark-i Karahisari.⁶²⁶ It had borders with seven neighboring provinces: Trabzon on the north, Erzurum on the east, Mamüratü'laziz on the southeast, Aleppo and Adana on the south, Ankara on the west, and Kastamonu on the northwest.⁶²⁷ Making up approximately eighty two percent of the overall population Muslims were the majority in the multi-religious society in the province while the non-Muslims comprised of Armenians, Rums, Jews, and Coptic occupied the around eighteen percent of the population.⁶²⁸ According to the 1890 Yearbook of Sivas the province had a population of almost 518.674.

4.3.2. Sivas İdadisi & Schooling in Sivas under the rule of Memduh

One of the first enterprises that Memduh undertook in Sivas was establishment of a high school (*idadi*). In February 1890 the project was approved by the central administration. In the fall of 1890, foundation of the school was laid down and after two years of construction period Memduh opened Sivas İdadisi (high school) on 5 October 1892.⁶²⁹ Designed in a neo-classical and a

⁶²¹ BOA, Y.MTV. 38/58, 9 Şaban 1306/8 June 1889.

⁶²² BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 14/77, 4 Ramazan 1306/4 May 1889.

⁶²³ Districts of the sanjak of Sivas: Hafik, Yıldızeli, Koçgiri, Divriği, Şarkışla (Tonus), Aziziye, Gürün, and Darende.

⁶²⁴ Districts of the sanjak of Amasya: Merzifon, Ladik, Mecidözü, Madensim (Gümüşhacı), Osmancık, Hazva, and Köprü.

⁶²⁵ Districts of the sanjak of Tokat: Erba, Zile, and Niksar.

⁶²⁶ Districts of the sanjak of Şark-i Karahisari: Alucra, Suşehri, Hamidiye, and Koyulhisar.

⁶²⁷ Şemsettin Sami, *Kamusu'l-Âlam IV* (Istanbul, 1894-1311), 2794.

⁶²⁸ The 1308/1890 Yearbook of Sivas.

⁶²⁹ The construction of the building costed 814,000 kuruş which was almost the twice that expected. Haluk Çağdaş, "Sivas İdadîsi," *Tarih ve Toplum*, 90 (June 1991), 30.

symmetrical form the stone triple-decker school with an inner court epitomized the Hamidian school architecture. In a wider historical perspective erecting one more magnificent school somewhere in Anatolia was indeed a realization of the ideals of the Public Education Regulation of 1869 during the Hamidian era.

Getting back to Sivas İdadisi, the building, which used to serve as a prestigious high school for decades during the Ottoman and Republican periods, is now known as the Congress Building because it hosted a very critical congress (Sivas Congress) held on 4 September 1919. More importantly, the Board of Deputies used the building as the Headquarter of Turkish National Struggle between 2 September and 19 December 1919. After the proclamation of Republic the building continued to be used as high school. In 1993 it was transformed into a museum and since then it has been serving as Atatürk Congress and Ethnography Museum.⁶³⁰

Memduh's contribution to education life of Sivas went beyond the establishment of a high school in the provincial center. A high school construction also began in the sanjak of Amasya.⁶³¹ Memduh, like many other counterparts,⁶³² believed that the source of all problems in the Empire was ignorance and ignorance could only be overcome through education. In a long memorandum he asserted that in order to fight against ignorance and religious deviations –referring to Alewi dogmas- there was a need to establish a school for basic education and a masjid for religious tutoring in every village of Sivas. In order to cut down on expenses he even suggested that primary school teachers could also serve as imams of the masjids of the villages. Although it included

On the marble inscription panel placed at the entrance of the building calligrapher Sivaslı Mahmud Edip inscribed the below lines about the foundation of the school. *“Şevketlü Gazi Abdülhamid Han-ı Sâni hazretlerinin zaman-ı saltanatlarında rütbe-i bâlâ ricalinden Mazlum Paşazâde Mehmed Memduh Beyefendi'nin Sivas vilayeti valiliğinde işbu mekteb-i idadî-i mülkî inşa olundu. 12 Rebûlevvel sene 1310”.*

⁶³⁰ Kemalettin Kuzucu, “Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyete Şehircilik, Mimari ve Eğitim Anlayışındaki Değişmeler Bağlamında Sivas Kongresi Binasının Tarihçesi,” *Atatürk Yolu* (Atatürk Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Dergisi) 37-38 (May-November 2006).

⁶³¹ BOA, İ.MMS. 106/4564, 25 Muharrem 1307/21 September 1889.

⁶³² BOA, Y.MTV. 53/108, 27 Muharrem 1309/23 September 1889.

Memduh's suggestions, ideas, and views on broad range of issues, this memorandum was indeed a report on the Alewite community of Tokat, a sanjak of Sivas. Speaking from the field Memduh wrote -probably upon request- to the central administration about the strategies that they could adopt to prevent the prevalence of Alewite creed and traditions in the region. Memduh seems to be convinced that "one school and one masjid in every village" could cure the problems.⁶³³

Considering the missionary schools and activities as one of the biggest threats against the integrity of the Ottoman society in the Anatolian provinces Memduh also made valuable suggestions about the education of non-Muslim communities. These thoughts of Memduh were in tune with the sultan's views about the ever-increasing presence of missionary schools,⁶³⁴ which were posing a danger for the future. As suggested by Selim Deringil, "none of the challenges to the legitimacy of the Ottoman state, and all that it stood for, was more dangerous in the long term than that posed by missionary activity."⁶³⁵ Indeed, the Ottomans were not exceptional. The missionary activities particularly schools was one of the most formidable challenges of the late nineteenth century across the world.⁶³⁶ The Hamidian educational policy, Benjamin Fortna noted, was indeed "similar to many contemporary education strategies around the world that sought to adapt to the rapid changes of the modern world by drawing on the religious and national sources of past success."⁶³⁷

In accord with the sultan's concern to protect the Ottoman society from the missionary propaganda Memduh submitted long notes to the palace about the issue. In one of his writings he argued that due to the lack of appropriate state funds for the basic education of the non-Muslim children in Anatolia the

⁶³³ BOA, Y.MTV. 53/108, 27 Muharrem 1309/23 September 1889.

⁶³⁴ Benjamin Fortna, *Imperial Classroom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

⁶³⁵ Selim Deringil, *The Well-protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 112.

⁶³⁶ *Ibid.*, 112.

⁶³⁷ Fortna, "The Reign of Abdülhamid II," 51.

missionaries, the French,⁶³⁸ and the priests opened schools for the Christian children and in these schools they were propagating against the Ottoman Empire saying that the Empire was not even able to take care of its citizens' basic needs such as education. Memduh was very much worried about the missionary schools as they were totally out of state control for years. However, with his efforts these schools recently began to be inspected by the state authorities. He was particularly concerned about the curriculum that Armenian children were following in the missionary schools. He thought that official education inspectors should be equipped with foreign language so that they could understand what the Ottoman Armenian students were learning in those schools. Primary schools for Muslim children were relatively better off as they were taking some share from the tithe collected from the Muslims of the province. According to Memduh, the state could increase property taxes for improvement of the schools of Muslims and non-Muslims. He also suggested that inhabitants of villages who lacked educational facilities should be transferred to the districts to be educated.⁶³⁹ What he proposed was a kind of campaign for education.

With regard to the issue of education he also highlighted the indispensability of opening new *rüşdiye* schools in the province to cope with inadequate administration particularly in the district courts. As part of his contribution to the schooling in the province thirteen schools were founded in different parts of Sivas in addition to the abovementioned Sivas High School during his tenure. Overall, Memduh's diagnoses and suggestions aimed at improving not only the literacy rate among the Muslims and non-Muslims alike but also the public services in the province.

⁶³⁸ Probably referring to French consuls and inspectors in the Anatolian provinces.

⁶³⁹ BOA, Y.MTV. 53/108, 27 Muharrem 1309/23 August 1891.

4.3.3. Healthcare, Public Works and Economic Projects

In the report he prepared on the shortcomings of Sivas Memduh also depicted the top health concerns including the epidemics such as dysentery, cholera, and syphilis and unfavorable conditions for healthcare.⁶⁴⁰ He particularly drew attention to the insufficiency of doctors in the province. Showing the severity of the situation he told some pathetic anecdotes about the difficulty of accessing to medical facilities in the villages and districts. In the report he not only diagnosed the problems of medical service but he also prescribed solutions. He thought that the challenge of insufficiency medical facilities would be addressed if a military medical school or an administrative school either in Sivas or in one of the nearby provinces was established. The cost of the construction and maintenance of the school would be covered by the annual fundraisings from sanjaks and districts. The graduates of the school would be employed in the region. By doing so a very critical and also costly problem of the province would be able to solved without depending on funding from the imperial center, which was suffering chronic budget deficit.

Interestingly, he asserted that because of the misconducts of administrators in the imperial capital establishment of a military medical school or an administrative one in Istanbul would be fifteen or more times costly than doing it in a province. Proposing a very idealistic formula he argued that opening medical schools in twenty-three spots of the province would address all the healthcare problems in Sivas. In addition to the schooling aspect of the healthcare he took measures against the threat of cholera⁶⁴¹ and smallpox⁶⁴² epidemics in Sivas.

Besides contemplating and reporting on the major issues of the province Memduh carried out a large number of public projects ranging from

⁶⁴⁰ BOA, Y.MTV. 53/108, 27 Muharrem 1309/23 August 1891.

⁶⁴¹ BOA, A.MKT.MHM. 501/21, 19 Safer 1308/4 October 1890.

⁶⁴² BOA, DH.MKT. 1678/61, 8 Rebiülahir 1307/2 December 1889.

construction and urban planning to commercial and agricultural enterprises.⁶⁴³ During his tenure government offices were built in the districts of Aziziye,⁶⁴⁴ Köprü,⁶⁴⁵ and Divriği⁶⁴⁶ with the support of the public in these localities. Another project that was financially supported by the local people was the construction of a hospital.⁶⁴⁷ However, there is no evidence of the completion of the construction of this hospital.

Memduh also put efforts to bring water from a source in a village to the center of Hafik, a district of Sivas.⁶⁴⁸ But, the project could not be completed due to lack of adequate funding. Another unfulfilled water project was at the village of Zara.⁶⁴⁹ However, he could undertake the repair of the water fountain known as *kepenek suyu* in front of the government building. In the first year of his service in Sivas a mosque, a kitchen, two storehouses, and two barns were added to the military barracks of the province.⁶⁵⁰ As the correspondences attest the construction cost of the barracks was defrayed by the public due to lack of sufficient state funding.⁶⁵¹ As the collected amount could not cover the expenses the Ministry of Interior began to seek new resources to complete the project.

⁶⁴³ In the Yearbook of Sivas a nice introduction, is given below, was made before giving details about the services of Memduh during his tenure in Sivas.

"Müşarünileyh hazretleri vilayetimizin valiliğine vukua memuriyet ve muvâsalât-ı âliyelerinden beri ber vefk-i matlub-u âli, imâr-ı mülk, terakki-imaarîf tevsî-i ziraat, teksir-i ticaret, teşkil-i nakliyat, umûr-u mutenâ bahasında ikdâmı tam göstermiş olduklarından gerek müceddiden ve gerek tamir suretiyle ve suret-i ihrâ ile himemât-ı celîle-i memdûhiyeleri ile vücuda getirilen âsâr-ı âliye ve nâfihanın beyanıyla tayin-i sahaif olur."

⁶⁴⁴ BOA, DH.MKT. 1690/75, 26 Cemaziyelevvel 1306/28 January 1889.

⁶⁴⁵ BOA, DH.MKT. 1773/2, 5 Rebiülevvel 1308/18 October 1890.

⁶⁴⁶ BOA, İ.MMS. 118/5075, 27 Receb 1308/8 March 1891.

⁶⁴⁷ The documents refer to the hospital as "*Gureba Hastanesi*" (hospital for the poor).

BOA, DH.MKT. 1884/72, 18 Zilkade 1308/25 June 1891.

BOA, ŞD. 2570/26, 2 Zilkade 1308/9 June 1891.

⁶⁴⁸ BOA, Y.MTV. 61/26, 10 Ramazan 1309/8 April 1892.

⁶⁴⁹ BOA, Y.MTV. 61/29, 12 Ramazan 1309/10 April 1892.

⁶⁵⁰ The 1890 Yearbook of Sivas.

⁶⁵¹ BOA, DH.MKT.1715/38, 17 Şaban 1307/8 April 1890.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1721/103, 12 Ramazan 1307/2 May 1890.

Furthermore, a mountain pass was constructed on top of the Çamlıbel Mountain for the military purposes. In that guard adequate number of military officers were located for the security of the region.⁶⁵² Government offices and schools were built in some districts. During his tenure some roads and highways, bridges, culverts, water-bars were constructed and broken ones were repaired in various parts of Sivas. In fall 1891 the Ministry of Interior expressed its satisfaction with and appreciation for the improvements in the public works and education in the province of Sivas during the tenure of Memduh.⁶⁵³ While the public projects were on, Memduh and people rejoiced at the news about the coming of railroad to Sivas in the near future.⁶⁵⁴

Manifesting his entrepreneurial capabilities in the provincial level Memduh also took remarkable steps for the vitalization of the production and trade activities in the places he was governing. This was particularly true in Sivas, where he served for three years and eight months, one of the longest periods among the governors of Sivas in the nineteenth century. Sivas was historically an important station in the land trade network in Asia Minor. Aiming to improve internal and interprovincial trade, Memduh carried out projects to increase transportation efficiency. He not only constructed and repaired roads⁶⁵⁵ but also put much effort into establishing an inland river transport system to supply local agricultural products to larger markets. The 1890 yearbook of Sivas⁶⁵⁶ provides details about Memduh's substantial contribution to the economic and commercial life of the province.

⁶⁵² Fikri Karaman, *Sâlnâme-i Vilâyet-i Sivas (1308/1890)* (İstanbul: Sivaslılar Vakfı, 2001), 54.

⁶⁵³ "Sivas'ın bazı mülhakatında yapılan teftişlerde imar ve maarifin gelişmesi için yapılan icraatın takdire değer ve sevindirici olduğunun Sivas vilayetine bildirildiği"
BOA, DH.MKT. 1870/65, 17 Safer 1309/22 September 1891.

⁶⁵⁴ BOA, Y.MTV. 46/126, 21 Rebiülahir 1308/4 December 1890.

⁶⁵⁵ Numerical details about Memduh's road construction will be given in the chapter focusing on his governorship of Sivas.

⁶⁵⁶ Karaman, *Sâlnâme-i Vilâyet-i Sivas (1308/1890)*.

In this regard, the most important initiative of Memduh was the establishment of the Ottoman Riverine Company (*Şirket-i Nehriyye-i Osmaniye*) to transport cereals over the Kızılırmak River. He undertook this project soon after he was appointed to Sivas. He had Selim Efendi, the head-engineer, check the feasibility of efficient transportation from the district of Zara, the source of the Kızılırmak River, to Bafra, the place where the river flowed into the Black Sea. The necessary correspondence was carried on between the Ministry of Trade and the Sivas governorate. Memduh brought an expert craftsman from Diyarbakır to construct the requisite boats. He founded a joint-stock company named the Ottoman Riverine Company to operate the boats. The expansion of Sivas' cross-border trade capacity led to the revitalization of the provincial economy mainly because the efficient river transportation enabled farmers to export their agricultural surplus to the Black Sea region. In the ensuing years, another company was founded to operate the boats on the Kelkit Stream in Sivas.⁶⁵⁷

Memduh was also among the most effective governors of Sivas to contribute to the development of agricultural production. Aiming both to promote agricultural modernization and to reclaim seeds for high-volume production, he successfully set up a model farm for the first time in the province and imported agricultural engines from Europe.⁶⁵⁸ Memduh's contribution to the economic life of Sivas was not limited to these. The volume of carpet, rug, and shawl weaving substantially increased in Sivas during his governorship.⁶⁵⁹

Apart from these there were other developments in the economy of Sivas. The Ministry of Interior demanded from the governor a report on the mines of

⁶⁵⁷ BOA, DH.MKT. 1660/32, 27 Muharrem 1307/23 September 1889.

BOA, ŞD. 1790/19, 9 Ramazan 1307/29 April 1890.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1722/103, 18 Ramazan 1307/8 May 1890.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1725/52, 6 Şevval 1307/26 May 1890.

⁶⁵⁸ Kemalettin Kuzucu, "Osmanlı Modernleşme Sürecinde İki Sivas Valisinin Raporlarının Karşılaştırılması ve Vilayetin Kentsel Dönüşümüne Etkileri" in *Osmanlılar Döneminde Sivas Sempozyum Bildirileri* (Sivas: 2007).

⁶⁵⁹ BOA, Y.MTV. 73/108, 14 Cemaziyelahir 1310/3 January 1893.

potassium nitrate that were planned to be opened.⁶⁶⁰ Furthermore, the contract for lead-silver mining interest at Lice, a locality of Sivas, was transferred from William Gor and Arthur Abraham Lui to admiral Sir John Omund and Edwin-Heinz, the directors of the Anadolu Maadin Company.⁶⁶¹ Though not directly related to Memduh's professional life in Sivas this information is important as it attests the involvement of foreigners in the provincial economy.

4.3.4. Wealth & Corruption Allegations

Memduh not only vitalized the production and trade activities in Sivas but he was also actively involved in entrepreneurial activities enriching himself. Memduh used his position and distance from the capital to invest in different fields when he was a governor. For instance, he possessed a hotel and a bathhouse in Havza⁶⁶², in a district of the Sivas province, which he acquired when he was governor of Sivas. The way he obtained them was very controversial, discontending many, if not all, of the inhabitants of the district. Despite all, constructing and managing such a high-income-generating asset, in addition to his heavy workload in Sivas, Ankara and finally in Istanbul, could be seen evidence of Memduh's enterprising capacity.

Immediately after the 1908 Constitutional Revolution, Memduh had to resign from the Ministry of Interior and the new power holders initiated a prosecution against him without delay. In that process, the hotel and the bathhouse in Havza were going to be seized, with the intention of using them to fund the affairs of the Ministry of Education in the region.⁶⁶³ But the new government could not seize the hotel and the bathhouse because these assets were registered to Fatma Melek Hanım, Memduh's daughter. Appropriating a private-registered property was not an easy task, so it required some time and

⁶⁶⁰ BOA, DH.MKT. 1891/110, 17 Rebiülahir 1309/20 November 1891.

⁶⁶¹ BOA, A.}DVN.MKL. 82/25, 3 Cemaziyelevvel 1309/5 December 1891.

⁶⁶² This hotel and bathhouse were the most important assets for the district's economy, as they attracted people from different places.

⁶⁶³ BOA, DH.H. 37/2, 9 Ramazan 1328/14 September 1910.

many more petitions being sent from Havza.⁶⁶⁴ Registering valuable properties to his family members⁶⁶⁵ in the Hamidian Era - an unequivocally safe period for Memduh - attests not only to Memduh's vigilance and cunning but also to his entrepreneurial skills, despite the fact that he belonged to the civil officialdom, a class generally not known for having entrepreneurial capacity.

As the new government could not seize the thermal hotel, it temporarily transferred the operating rights of the hotel to the municipality of Havza. The registrar Mustafa Efendi, the person in charge of the hotel employed by either Memduh himself or his daughter, was dismissed by the new government.⁶⁶⁶ Not long after, someone from Havza brought an accusation against Memduh of corruption and abuse of his position for personal interest. A telegram was sent from Havza to the grand vizierate on 22 November 1908 by lieutenant Ömer on behalf of the community of the soup kitchen.⁶⁶⁷ In the telegram Memduh was accused of seizing the water of two thermal springs to build a private hotel and a bathhouse in Havza when he was governor of Sivas. These thermal springs were founded by Sa'di Pasha 500 years earlier and as waqf properties they were devoted to public use. According to the accusation, Memduh illegally occupied the thermals, used the stones and land of Muslim graveyard, and embezzled more than 30,000 kuruş⁶⁶⁸ from the coffers of the municipality for the construction. Memduh exiled anyone who stood against his illegal privatization of waqf property. Once the hotel and bathhouse had been erected, he transferred them to his daughter, Fatma Melek Hanım, with a trick, and then he

⁶⁶⁴ BOA, DH.H. 37/2, 9 Ramazan 1328/14 September 1910.

⁶⁶⁵ The fishponds were registered to his wife Zehra Narin Hanım. A very large parcel of land in Kazabad was registered to his younger son Mazlum Pasha. The thermal hotel in Havza was registered to his daughter Fatma Melek Hanım.

⁶⁶⁶ BOA, DH.H. 37/2, 9 Ramazan 1328/14 September 1910.

Apparently Memduh used his official connections to operate the establishments he owned.

⁶⁶⁷ BOA, DH.MKT. 2614/10, 27 Şaban 1326/24 September 1908.

⁶⁶⁸ Memduh's monthly salary was 17,000 kuruş at that time.

Another document coded DH.H. 37/2 says that this 30,000 kuruş was earned from the waqf thermal hotel and held at the coffer of the municipality of Havza.

forcefully rented them out. The second correspondence ⁶⁶⁹ demanded Memduh's hotel and bathhouse be restored as public property for the benefit of the district. The case was brought to the Sharia court by a group of people from Havza.

In the same period, another telegram was sent to the Ministry of Interior from Havza signed by 138 prominent figures of the district. In addition to the above-mentioned appropriation story, the telegram included serious allegations about Memduh. One of the allegations was that Memduh, in his capacity as governor of Sivas, dismissed Halil İbrahim Efendi of Alaiye, the judge of the Sharia Court of Havza, at short notice, as he disapproved Memduh's purchase of the spring of the Sa'di Pasha waqf bathhouse. Ali Zihni Efendi stepped into Halil İbrahim Efendi's shoes and approved the governor's demand so as to avoid the same fate as his predecessor. In another document, it was stated that Memduh bought the waqf bathhouse at a price corresponding to five percent of its real value. The allegations continued with the issue of exiling opponents. Memduh exiled Mahmud Ağa, a notable from the district, because of his opposition to Memduh's illegal appropriation of public property. The governor then transferred this property to his daughter Fatma Melek Hanım in order to calm down the people of the district. As the telegram stated, notwithstanding this handover, the people in the region were still uncomfortable with Memduh's act and asked for justice. The 138 notables who signed the telegram also referred to an earlier attempt at reclaiming the thermal hotel. This attempt failed because of the influence of Memduh, who was the Minister of Interior, and that of his men on the administration of the Amasya Council. ⁶⁷⁰

On the other hand, Fatma Melek Hanım waged a legal battle to regain the right to run the hotel. İbrahim Sabit Efendi, the proxy of Fatma Melek Hanım, wrote extensive petitions to the district governorship of Havza defending Fatma Melek Hanım's indisputable legal right to keep the thermal hotel due to the title deed

⁶⁶⁹ BOA, DH.MKT, 2672/69, 8 Zilkade 1326/2 December 1908.

⁶⁷⁰ BOA, DH.H. 37/2, 9 Ramazan 1328/14 September 1910.

she held.⁶⁷¹ He said that it was legally inappropriate to interfere with a registered private property.⁶⁷² However, the thermal hotel ultimately was taken from Fatma Melek Hanım to be used to fund the Ministry of Education; therefore, the thermal today is known as *Maarif Hamamı* (Education Bathhouse). The hotel is also known as *Paşa Hamamı* (Pasha Bathhouse) because Mustafa Kemal Pasha stayed at that thermal hotel in 1919 when he stopped by the district. At the moment, it is hard to clarify if these allegations against Memduh were true or not, but what is clear in the context of this chapter is that on every occasion, Memduh skillfully benefitted from the enterprising opportunities to invest in profitable businesses.

4.3.5. Settlement of Caucasian Immigrants

In addition to the public work and economic projects Memduh dealt with the settlement, provision, and peace and order of the migrants from Caucasia who were dislocated due to the Russian persecution.⁶⁷³ The governor had to find the proper places to settle them as well as funding⁶⁷⁴ to provide the basic needs of the newcomers.

Muslim immigrants from Kars⁶⁷⁵ and different parts of Caucasia⁶⁷⁶ were settled in various locations of Sivas during the reign of Memduh. He was personally involved to the settlement of the 122 immigrant households from Kars⁶⁷⁷ at a new neighborhood founded around the Kabak Square.⁶⁷⁸ He also organized the settlement of groups of immigrants in the newly founded villages of Amasya

⁶⁷¹ BOA, DH.H. 37/2, 9 Ramazan 1328/14 September 1910.

⁶⁷² BOA, DH.H. 37/2, 9 Ramazan 1328/14 September 1910.

⁶⁷³ The 1308 Yearbook of Sivas. *Sâlnâme-i Vilâyet-i Sivas (1308/1890)*, İstanbul.

⁶⁷⁴ BOA, DH.MKT. 1734/19, 4 Zilkade 1307/22 June 1890.

⁶⁷⁵ BOA, DH.MKT. 1835/89, 15 Şevval 1308/24 May 1891.

⁶⁷⁶ BOA, Y.PRK.PT. 6/96, 23 Zilkade 1307/11 July 1890.

BOA, HR.İD. 16/12, 18 Muharrem 1309/24 August 1891.

⁶⁷⁷ *Vilayat-ı Selase*, namely Kars, Ardahan and Batum which were three provinces at the northeast of Anatolia, were lost to Russia with the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russo War.

⁶⁷⁸ BOA, BEO. 32/2343, 18 Zilhicce 1309/14 July 1892.

during one of his tours to this sanjak. Another immigrant group comprised of 215 households settled in the sanjak of Tokat during the reign of Memduh.⁶⁷⁹

Table 4.3. Numbers of immigrants that were settled in districts of Sivas

Settlement	Number of Immigrants
The sanjak of Sivas	
The district of Koçgiri	1378
The district of Aziziye	9200
The district of Gürün	157
The district of Hafik	1600
The sanjak of Tokat	
The district of Zile	6868
The district of Niksar	200
The sanjak of Amasya	
The district of Merzifon	504
The district of Madensim	180
The district of Osmancık	114
The district of Köprü	1011
The district of Mecidözü	1513
The district of Havza	511
The sanjak of Karahisar-i Şarki	
The district of Suşehri	400
The district of Alucra	40
Overall	24,915⁶⁸⁰

Besides the issue of settlement immigrants brought with them some other problems such as posing a threat to the peace and security of the provincial society. Keeping the immigrants in order was far from an easy task for the governor. For instance, some of the Karapapak immigrants who were settled at the district of Kangal became bandits and their leaders, Hasan and Ali Aghas, were exiled to Beirut with their families, as their presence in Sivas was

⁶⁷⁹ The 1308/1890 Yearbook of Sivas.

⁶⁸⁰ The 1308/1890 Yearbook of Sivas, 193-223.

considered inconvenient.⁶⁸¹ Moreover, some of the Circassian and Chechen in the districts of Maden and Boğazlıyan engaged in brigandage.⁶⁸²

There were also conflicts between the inhabitants of the province and the immigrants. There was a controversy between the Circassians and the Afshars in the district of Aziziye concerning the land issue.⁶⁸³ The inhabitants of the village of Gemriz bitterly complained that the Circassians extorted their lands. They submitted a petition to declare that they would be satisfied if they were provided with another land.⁶⁸⁴ Georgian immigrant bandits were arrested and dispatched to Samsun, a region in the province of Trabzon on the Black Sea coast.⁶⁸⁵ It was not only Sivas where some of the immigrants caused trouble for the order and security. For instance, Circassians in Isparta, Burdur and Antalya burned schools and shops, damaged people and disallowed the departure of ships.⁶⁸⁶ Georgian bandits persecuted the public around Fatsa, a district of the province of Sinop on the shore of the Black Sea.⁶⁸⁷

4.3.6. Crime, Punishment and Inter-Ethnic Relations

Immigrants were of course not the only group disturbing the peace in Sivas. There were many other inhabitants committed various crimes including homicide, forestallment, robbery,⁶⁸⁸ and theft of livestock.⁶⁸⁹ Using every means possible Memduh had combated against these offences. Attaching great importance to the security concern he worked in coordination with Commander Gendarmerie Hüsrev Bey from the outset of his service in Sivas.⁶⁹⁰ With regard

⁶⁸¹ BOA, DH.MKT. 1647/91, 16 Zilhicce 1306/13 August 1889.

⁶⁸² BOA, DH.MKT. 54/41, 14 Zilkade 1310/30 May 1893.

⁶⁸³ BOA, DH.MKT. 1947/22, 13 Şevval 1309/11 May 1892.

⁶⁸⁴ BOA, DH.MKT. 1943/44, 13 Zilkade 1308/20 June 1891.

⁶⁸⁵ BOA, Y.PRK.ASK. 72/103, 28 Şevval 1308/6 June 1891.

⁶⁸⁶ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 27/12, 24 Şevval 1310/11 May 1893.

⁶⁸⁷ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 21/90, 13 Şevval 1308/22 May 1891.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1848/31, 1 Zilhicce 1308/8 July 1891.

⁶⁸⁸ BOA, Y.PRK.ASK. 59/116, 11 Receb 1307/3 March 1890.

⁶⁸⁹ BOA, MV. 62/92, 13 Receb 1308/22 February 1891.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1817/79, 29 Receb 1308/10 March 1891.

⁶⁹⁰ Hüsrev Bey and Memduh stayed in touch with each other even after the latter was removed from Sivas and then assigned back to Ankara. As it will be discussed in detail,

to the security of the province their cooperation continued for long period of time. Seven months after Memduh took office Hüsrev Bey and his subordinates were rewarded due to their service in dealing with bandits.⁶⁹¹ Once he took office Memduh tried to reinforce the law enforcement in Sivas. The cavalry began to be used in addition to gendarme to maintain the public order.⁶⁹² Besides, spies were recruited⁶⁹³ and whenever the existing gendarmerie forces fell short of dealing with the security matters additional forces were deployed to the province.⁶⁹⁴ Moreover, a gendarmerie station was constructed at the market place of the province.⁶⁹⁵ The prominent religious and scholarly members of the society in Sivas appreciated Memduh's efforts to improve safety in the province.⁶⁹⁶

The security concerns of Sivas were indeed part of larger processes. Sivas was one of the *vilayat-ı sitte* (the six provinces in the Eastern Anatolia)⁶⁹⁷ where the

there were claims that the area of collaboration between Memduh and Hüsrev was far more than security of the province. According to the claim they got large shares from the illegally registered public property of Kazabad, a district of the sanjak of Tokat. BOA, Y.A.HUS. 259/50, 8 Şevval 1309/6 May 1892.

Hüsrev Bey was appointed as the commander of gendarmerie on 28 August 1891. BOA, İ.DH. 1239/97059, 22 Muharrem 1309/28 August 1891.

⁶⁹¹ BOA, DH.MKT. 1683/74, 26 Rebiülahir 1307/20 December 1889.

Occupying the highest office in the province Memduh's opinion might have been effective on Hüsrev Bey's being rewarded. This development and their hand in hand struggle against activities that they found inconvenient demonstrate that Hüsrev Bey was one of the positive figures in Memduh's professional network.

⁶⁹² BOA, MV. 44/53, 25 Şevval 1306/24 June 1884.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1859/88, 11 Muharrem 1308/27 August 1890.

⁶⁹³ BOA, İ.ŞD. 105/6302, 19 Şaban 1308/30 March 1891.

⁶⁹⁴ BOA, BEO. 45/3336, 11 Muharrem 1310/5 August 1892.

⁶⁹⁵ BOA, İ.DH. 1257/98710, 22 Cemaziyelevvel 1309/24 December 1891.

As suggested by Nadir Özbek, establishment of gendarmerie was an essential component of modern state formation process. The gendarmerie, official armed forces, were the main "infrastructural apparatus of the Ottoman state in its efforts to extend central governmental authority to distant provinces...These corps were engaged primarily with pacification of the countryside and with various tasks that had remained neglected or beyond the central government's reach, such as military conscription, arbitration of disputes, and registration of lands and revenues". Nadir Özbek, "Policing the Countryside: Gendarmes of the Late 19th Century Ottoman Empire (1876-1908)," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 40 (2008), 48-49.

⁶⁹⁶ BOA, Y.PRK.ASK. 59/116, 11 Receb 1307/3 March 1890.

⁶⁹⁷ Bitlis, Sivas, Ma'muret'ül Aziz, Van, Erzurum, and Diyarbakır.

Ottoman central administration was compelled by the Article 61 of the Berlin Congress (1878)⁶⁹⁸ to undertake, without delay, substantial reforms to ameliorate circumstances under which the Armenians were living. Furthermore, according to the Article 61 it was imperative for the Ottoman administration to protect Armenians in the six Eastern provinces against the Circassians and Kurds. This article “gave the powers carte blanche to interfere in eastern Anatolia whenever they wished. Because the article lacked all specifics, it was always easy to say that the Ottomans had not carried out their promises well enough.”⁶⁹⁹

A wedge between the Ottoman imperial authority and the Armenian community in the eastern Anatolian provinces began to be driven in the 1880s. As explained above Armenian question was added to the agenda of the European powers in the Berlin Congress (1878) and thereafter it became the top matter of negotiation, besides the Macedonian question, between the great powers of Europe and the Ottoman Empire. In the beginning of 1890 year the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) also known as Dashnaktsutyun was formed in Tbilisi and in the summer a series of events led by the Armenian community - probably agitated by the ARF - occurred the province of Erzurum leading to unrest in the region.

⁶⁹⁸ The 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russo War (*93 Harbi*) ended with the defeat of the Ottomans and the Treaty of San Stefano (3 March 1878). Upsetting the balance of power in the Balkans in favor of Russia the heavy terms of this treaty distressed the great powers of Europe, Serbia, and Greece. The German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck convened the Congress of Berlin to revise the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano. The Ottomans managed to restore some of what they lost (i.e. Macedonia) in the war and San Stefano. One of the articles of the Berlin Congress was Article 61: “The Sublime Porte engages to carry out without further delay ameliorations and reforms which are called by local needs in the provinces inhabited by Armenians and to guarantee their security against Circassians and Kurds. It will give information periodically of the measures taken for this purpose to the Powers, who watch over execution of them.”

⁶⁹⁹ Justin McCarthy, “Ignoring the People” in *War and Diplomacy, The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 and the Treaty of Berlin*, eds. Hakan Yavuz with Peter Sluglett (Utah: Utah University Press, 2011), 442.

The idea of establishing a light cavalry regiments from the Muslim communities of Anatolia including Circassians, Turkmens, Karapapaks, and most importantly Kurds came up in 1890 against the backdrop of these developments unfolded in the late 1870s and 80s. The idea was first proposed by Marshal Zeki Pasha⁷⁰⁰ to Sultan Abdülhamid. The sultan approved the idea believing that the formation of regiments comprised of Muslim bodies of the region would serve multiple purposes such as protecting the frontier against Russia and Persia, defending against the Armenian revolutionary activities, integrating the tribal entities into the state system by forging a distinctive link between the sultan and the Muslims in the eastern Anatolia particularly the Kurds, and thereby strengthening the Islamic unity in the Empire.⁷⁰¹ It is also argued that Abdülhamid saw the Hamidiye Regiments “as a means of preventing Britain from implementing its policy toward the Armenians and from provoking the Kurds against the empire.”⁷⁰²

To sum up, it was believed that the Hamidiye Light Cavalry⁷⁰³ would “bring the region into the Ottoman fold and to ensure, by almost any means necessary, that it remained there”⁷⁰⁴ because “it offered explicit advantages to its members to act in the interests of the Ottoman state, or at least not to act against them.”⁷⁰⁵ Sivas got involved into this process with its Karapapak community who formed the fourth regiment of the Hamidiye Cavalry.⁷⁰⁶ There

⁷⁰⁰ The commander of Fourth Army, based in Erzincan, which had authority over most of the Anatolian provinces including Trabzon, Erzurum, Sivas, Ma'muret'ül Aziz, Dersim, Hakkari, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, and Van.

⁷⁰¹ Bayram Kodaman, “Hamidiye Hafif Süvari Alayları (II. Abdülhamid ve Doğu-Anadolu Aşiretleri),” *Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi* 32 (1979).

⁷⁰² Bayram Kodaman, “The Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments: Abdülhamid II and the Eastern Anatolian Tribes,” in *War and Diplomacy, The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 and the Treaty of Berlin* eds. Hakan Yavuz with Peter Sluglett (Utah: Utah University Press, 2011), 394.

⁷⁰³ The terms of Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments were codified in a kanunname (imperial legal code) on August 5 1891 and thus the regiments were formed as an official institution. BOA, Y.EE. 112/10, 29 Zilhicce 1308/5 August 1891.

⁷⁰⁴ Klein, *The Margins of Empire*, 4.

⁷⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁷⁰⁶ BOA, Y.EE. 81/42, 14 Ramazan 1315/6 February 1898.

BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 25/51, 5 Rebiülevvel 1310/27 September 1892.

is no specific information to what extent and under which terms and conditions Memduh collaborated with the mentioned fourth regiment of the Hamidiye, but it is certain that he was firmly committed to eliminate the Armenian revolutionary activities in Sivas.

From the late 1880s onward Sivas, like other provinces populated by Armenian community, had witnessed nationalist activities of some of Armenian inhabitants as well as outside agents such as Hunchak Committee. Memduh, in his capacity as governor of Sivas, struggled against these activities by using all means possible. Taking his mission of maintaining peace and security serious, perhaps a little too much, in the context of Armenian issue Memduh urged to take wide-ranging measures against the Armenian revolutionary activities. Deeply concerned about the curriculum of the missionary schools and activities of monasteries Memduh, not long after he came to office, issued a demand for inspection of the schools and monasteries in which Armenians attended.⁷⁰⁷ Furthermore, in one of his writings to the imperial court he drew attention to various activities of Jesuit priests in promoting the Armenian cause in the region.⁷⁰⁸ The provincial administration also demanded spies in necessary number for the surveillance and seizure of the nationalists who were involved in Armenian revolutionary propaganda in Sivas.⁷⁰⁹ Another demand was made for the immediate increase of the guards of arsenal in Tokat, Amasya and Zile against Armenian threat.⁷¹⁰

Memduh, like his counterparts in other *vilayat-ı sitte*,⁷¹¹ regularly delivered brief reports to the capital on the matters of security, in oftentimes indicating that

⁷⁰⁷ BOA, Y.PRK.PT. 5/15, 13 Şevval 1306/12 June 1889.

In his memorandum (BOA, Y.MTV. 53/108, 27 Muharrem 1309/2 September 1891) he proudly referred to his initiative.

⁷⁰⁸ BOA, Y.PRK. UM.15/86, 10 Zilkade 1306/8 July 1889.

⁷⁰⁹ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 142/29, 20 Receb 1307/12 March 1890.

⁷¹⁰ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 17/8, 1 Zilhicce 1307/19 July 1890.

⁷¹¹ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 21/45, 14 Şaban 1308/25 March 1891.

BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 21/46, 14 Şaban 1308/25 March 1891.

BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 21/47, 14 Şaban 1308/25 March 1891.

BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 21/49, 15 Şaban 1308/26 March 1891.

everything was fine in the province.⁷¹² But, there were also cases that he remained on the alert due to the rumors of general Armenian uprising in the region.⁷¹³ These preventive measures were by no means useless rather, from the government's and the governor's perspective, they proved to be necessary for the reason that Armenians –certainly not all of them- in the region were increasingly involved in revolutionary propaganda⁷¹⁴ but most importantly arming themselves with smuggled weapons.⁷¹⁵ When the provincial security forces fell short of coping with the matters Sivas demanded support from the Fourth Army, based in Erzincan.⁷¹⁶ On the other hand, the central administration was advising on the governors not let the Armenians in the *vilayat-ı sitte* to complain about the state policies to the European powers

BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 21/51, 15 Şaban 1308/26 March 1891.

⁷¹² BOA, Y.PRK.HR. 13/38, 28 Zilkade 1307/16 July 1890.

BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 17/119, 22 Zilhicce 1307/9 August 1890.

BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 19/15, 1 Rebiülevvel 1308/15 October 1890.

BOA, DH.ŞFR. 147/3, 19 Rebiülahir 1308/2 December 1890.

BOA, DH.ŞFR. 147/30, 3 Cemaziyelevvel 1308/15 December 1890.

BOA, DH.ŞFR. 147/48, 10 Cemaziyelevvel 1308/22 December 1890.

BOA, DH.ŞFR. 147/52, 14 Cemaziyelevvel 1308/26 December 1890.

BOA, DH.ŞFR. 147/5, 17 Cemaziyelevvel 1308/29 December 1890

BOA, DH.ŞFR. 147/65, 24 Cemaziyelevvel 1308/5 January 1891.

BOA, DH.ŞFR. 147/73, 1 Cemaziyelahir 1308/12 January 1891.

BOA, DH.ŞFR. 147/84, 12 Cemaziyelahir 1308/23 January 1891.

BOA, DH.ŞFR. 148/13, 22 Cemaziyelahir 1308/2 February 1891.

BOA, DH.ŞFR. 148/30, 29 Cemaziyelahir 1308/9 February 1891

BOA, DH.ŞFR. 148/68, 21 Receb 1308/2 March 1891.

BOA, DH.ŞFR. 149/7, 5 Şaban 1308/16 March 1891.

BOA, DH.ŞFR. 149/14, 12 Şaban 1308/23 March 1891.

⁷¹³ BOA, Y.MTV. 44/54, 12 Zilhicce 1307/30 July 1890.

BOA, MV. 58/35, 20 Safer 1308/5 October 1890.

⁷¹⁴ BOA, Y.PRK.AZJ. 17/76, 4 Muharrem 1308/20 August 1890.

BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 24/38, 16 Ramazan 1309/14 April 1892.

BOA, Y.PRK.ŞFR. 154/32, 9 Ramazan 1309/7 April 1892.

⁷¹⁵ BOA, İ.DH. 1191/93218, 18 Muharrem 1308/3 September 1890.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1749/49, 23 Zilhicce 1307 10 August 1890.

BOA, DH.ŞFR. 147/19, 29 Rebiülahir 1308/12 December 1890.

BOA, DH.ŞFR. 149/76, 26 Ramazan 1308/5 May 1891.

BOA, DH.ŞFR. 153/27, 15 Cemaziyelahir 1309/16 January 1892.

BOA, Y.MTV. 46/142, 29 Rebiülahir 1308/12 December 1890.

There were sporadic armed conflicts between the Muslim immigrants and Armenians.

BOA, Y.PRK.ASK. 65/114, 1 Rebiülevvel 1308/15 October 1890.

⁷¹⁶ In one instance eighty cavalrymen were demanded from the Fourth Army.

BOA, DH.ŞFR. 153/3, 27 Cemaziyelevvel 1309/29 December 1891.

BOA, DH.MKT. 1907/31, 2 Cemaziyelahir 1309/5 December 1891.

particularly the British authorities, fearing from turning the British public opinion against the Ottoman State.⁷¹⁷

4.3.7. Never-Ending Complaints and Inspection Committees

For Memduh retaining his position was as hard as maintaining order in Sivas given that he was frequently charged with misconduct. In the beginning of the summer of 1890 the head scribe of the Yıldız Palace wrote that the ex-head of the finance office⁷¹⁸ of Aziziye, a district of Sivas, who made certain allegations against Memduh Bey, governor of Sivas, was a man who was suspected of a crime a while ago in Istanbul. The head scribe also highlighted the good conducts of Memduh.⁷¹⁹ An explanation of this kind from such a high office can be seen as a sign of Memduh's strong connections at the palace, which might have been a critical factor for his successful professional career. Almost a month hence from the abovementioned ministerial writing Memduh wrote to the Ministry of Interior stating that he was going to comply with the orders of the Ministry.⁷²⁰ Apparently, he was warned firmly by his seniors in Istanbul so that he felt the need of declaring that he was going to be obedient to the Ministry of Interior under which he was working. Either he was acting independently in the province without paying attention to the orders of the center or he was charged with serious faults annoying the authorities in Istanbul.

Going back to the dispute between the head of the finance office of Aziziye and Memduh, although this particular document, referred above,⁷²¹ did not provide the name of the ex-head of the finance office, other official documents did. He was Sivaslı Şeyh Rüstem Efendizade Hacı Ali Rıza. Originating point of the conflict between Memduh and Hacı Ali Rıza is not specified in the correspondence. The documents attest that it was Ali Rıza who attacked the

⁷¹⁷ BOA, Y.PRK.ZB. 10/62, 5 Rebiülevvel 1310/27 September 1892.

BOA, DH.ŞFR. 146/7, 24 Safer 1308/9 October 1890.

⁷¹⁸ *Mal müdürü.*

⁷¹⁹ BOA, DH. 1181/92366, 22 Şevval 1307/11 June 1890.

⁷²⁰ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 143/137, 14 Zilkade 1307/2 July 1890.

⁷²¹ BOA, DH. 1181/92366, 22 Şevval 1307/11 June 1890.

first by accusing the governor but it cost him dearly. Memduh counter attacked⁷²² not long after and the process ended up in Ali Rıza's arrest in Istanbul⁷²³ and his efforts to clear his name.⁷²⁴ Backed by the palace, Memduh, once more, proved to be a hard nut to crack.

Ali Rıza was not an exception. New misconduct allegations arose against the governor in the ensuing months led to a series of correspondence in Istanbul.⁷²⁵ Consequently, the Minister of War ordered Brigadier Ali Fuad Pasha to form a secret inspection committee comprised of him, Colonel Cemal Bey, the deputy commander of Sivas, and some others to investigate the allegations of misconducts. The memorandum⁷²⁶ prepared by the secret inspection committee revealed striking statements about the public perception of Memduh's misconducts. The committee bore testimony to Memduh's misuse of his authority to further his personal interests. One of the anecdotes told in the inspection report was about the governor's indifference to an issue regarding the public security, which was the upmost task a governor had to fulfill.

⁷²² What kind of allegation he made against Ali Rıza is not revealed in the documents.

⁷²³ Memduh's involvement in the process must have had an effect on Ali Rıza's arrest. Yet, it has to be remembered that the first document (BOA, DH. 1181/92366, 22 Şevval 1307/11 June 1890) referring to the report of Memduh's misconducts was prepared on 12 May 1890, which means long before Ali Rıza's arrest. The same document identified Ali Rıza as someone "suspected of a crime a while ago in Istanbul". That is to say, there might have been some other factors, besides Memduh's complaint, behind his arrest.

⁷²⁴ BOA, DH.MKT. 1946/13, 12 Şevval 1309/10 May 1890.

BOA, BEO. 3/203, 15 Şevval 1309/13 May 1890.

BOA, DH.MKT. 2000/111, 20 Safer 1310/13 September 1892.

⁷²⁵ In order to send an inspection committee to Sivas to investigate the conducts of Memduh the Ministry of Interior wrote the below note to the grand vizierate on 23 November 1891.

"Sivas Vilayeti Valisi atüfetlu Memduh Bey Efendi hazretlerinin hal ve idaresince bir müddetten beru muku bulmakta olan şikâyet tezâyüd etmekde ve muhâlifî rıza-ı âlî olan bir takım sû-i isti'mâlâta dair ihbârât dahi vuku bulmakda idüğüne mebni, bi'l-etrâf icra-yı tahkikat ile hakikat-ı hâle kesb-i vukuf-ı tâm olunmak için münasib bir tahkik-i memurının tayin ve i'zâmı." In response on 26 November 1891 the grand vizier wrote to the Seraskerat that *"suret-i mahsusada mahremane icra-yı tahkikat olunarak neticesinin ve ol-babdaki hissiyat ve mütala'âtının bi'l-etrâf iş'ârı zımında orada ve olmadığı halde civarda bulunan kumandanlardan birine tebliğât-ı lâzime icrasıyla alınacak malumatın izbârına himmet buyrulması."* BOA, A.)MKT.MHM. 502/52, 18 Cemaziyelahir 1309/19 January 1892.

⁷²⁶ BOA, Y.A.HUS. 259/50, 8 Şevval 1309/6 May 1892.

As an example of his irresponsibility the inspectors told the incident below. A few armed Armenians in ranger garments raided the farm of another Armenian named Taşçıyan Manuk from the district of İrek and abducted him. Manuk took legal action once he returned to the district but achieved no result. Emphasizing the significance and sensitivity of the involvement of some armed Armenians in brigandage acts the inspection committee asked the governor about the case. Memduh said that a governor couldn't cope with the judicial cases taking place somewhere in three hours distance from the provincial center and in such instances majors of districts were more potent than the governor. He added that he assigned the issue to the judicial office as he did in many other cases. According to the committee, falling short of handling the instances of this kind that were challenging the public security attested to the incompetency of Memduh as a governor.

The same report also revealed intricate relations among the staff working under the governor. Going back to his early days in Sivas, in order to set up his own administrative cadre Memduh begged the imperial capital persistently for transferring some of the officials who used to work with him in Konya. As earlier mentioned, Abdullah Bey, the chief secretary of Memduh in Konya, was one of them. Though he could not bring Abdullah Bey with him, as this demand was kindly rejected by Istanbul,⁷²⁷ he somehow managed to bring Fahri Efendi and Diyarbekirli Ulvi Efendi along with him. Oddly enough, there is no official correspondence between Memduh and Istanbul about the transfer of these two men from Konya to Sivas. Either they did not hold any official position in Konya or they resigned from the posts they held to be able to go to Sivas with their patron. Fahri Efendi became the head of the finance office of the district of Hafik. Having account deficit in the office Fahri Efendi was, according to the inspection committee report, deliberately sent to Istanbul and interestingly while he was in Istanbul the financial books and papers of his office were stolen.

⁷²⁷ BOA, DH.MKT. 1619/48, 23 Şaban 1306/24 April 1889.

Ex-cashiers (*sandık emini*) Antranik Vartanyan and Taşcıoğlu Dimyetoş too had similar kind of problems but their legal proceedings were not seriously undertaken according to the inspection report.⁷²⁸ What is worse, some of the financial books and papers of the province that were preserved in the government building were deliberately burned down with gas oil after Ibrahim Efendi, the head of financial department, was suspended from his duty upon complaints about him. The inspection report⁷²⁹ that was produced on 18 March 1893 provided the list of financial papers that were burned in the storage of the government building. Trabzonlu Ahmed Efendi was another official who was under the patronage of Memduh. Trabzonlu Ahmed Efendi left the province of Mamuratülaziz due to his inappropriate behaviors and came to Sivas and was appointed to the department of public treasury. People of Sivas filed charges against him due his bad treatment during the governor's inspection tours.

Drawing attention to his documented malpractices and incapacity of ensuring public security the inspection memorandum suggested that Memduh was to be replaced with Reşad Pasha, the ex-mutasarrıf of Jerusalem. The grand vizier delivered this memorandum to the court and an imperial decree responding to it was issued on 4 March 1892. According to the imperial decree, continuation of Memduh's service in Sivas was appropriate.⁷³⁰

Even though Memduh secured his post this time probably with the favor of the sultan, his replacement with the governor of Mosul came up after a few months as new problems arose regarding his administration. Tobacco was an important income-generating field in Sivas and the sanjak of Tokat was known for tobacco production. The Regie Company, a branch of the Public Debt Administration, was dominant over all stages of tobacco production in the Ottoman Empire from 1883 on. A fierce conflict between the inhabitants of Almus,⁷³¹ who were

⁷²⁸ BOA, YEE. 35/52, 6 Rebiülahir 1327/27 April 1909.

⁷²⁹ BOA, DH.MKT. 3/11, 29 Şaban 1310/18 March 1893.

⁷³⁰ "*orada beka-yı memuriyeti muvafık-ı hal ve maslahat*"

⁷³¹ A district of the sanjak of Tokat.

infamous with tobacco smuggling,⁷³² and the Regie Company was one of the major issues Memduh had to handle in 1891.

Memduh placed the blame on Rasih Bey, the mutasarrif of Tokad, for the ever-increasing tobacco smuggling in the sanjak. According to Memduh, due to his complicity in tobacco smuggling Rasih Bey had to be dismissed. More interestingly, Rasih Bey was appointed by Memduh short a while ago from this blame by precipitately replacing Latif Efendi, the ex- mutasarrif of Tokad, who abruptly resigned and went to Istanbul making his sickness as an excuse. Recently appointed mutasarrif Rasih Bey too blamed Memduh for involvement in tobacco smuggling. Their mutual accusation had continued and neither Memduh's demand for the dismissal of Rasih Bey was approved nor the inspector's suggestion of exchanging Memduh with the governor of Mosul.⁷³³ Memduh more than once sent telegraph to the capital asking for dismissal of the mutasarrif of Tokat and the kaimakam of the district of Merzifon because of their inappropriate attitudes.⁷³⁴

Erbaa was another district of Tokad where the relations between the Regie Company and the people were strained. The local women who were working in tobacco cultivation for the Regie attacked the administrative office of the Regie and threatened the director of the Company.⁷³⁵ With regard to this event Memduh founded the way mutasarrif Rasih Bey dealt with the situation inappropriate.⁷³⁶

As detailed in the inspection report, in his defense mutasarrif Rasih Bey made some other claims about Memduh besides his alleged involvement in the tobacco smuggling. According to Rasih Bey, much of the public property of the Kazabad district of Tokad, a sanjak of Sivas, was illegally registered with title

⁷³² BOA, Y.A.HUS. 259/50, 8 Şevval 1309/6 May 1892.

⁷³³ BOA, Y.A.HUS. 259/50, 8 Şevval 1309/6 May 1892.

⁷³⁴ BOA, İ.DH. 1269/99745, 25 Şaban 1309/25 March 1892.

⁷³⁵ BOA, DH.MKT. 1838.41, 23 Şevval 1308/1 June 1891.

⁷³⁶ BOA, Y.A.HUS. 259.50, 8 Şevval 1309/6 May 1892.

deed by the governor. Two and a half shares of the 25,000 decare (25,000,000 square meter) lands of Kazabad were registered under the name of Mazlum Pasha, Memduh's younger son. In order to maintain military support Memduh also gave a great amount of land of Kazabad to Hüsrev Pasha, the Commander Gendarmerie of the province. According to the claim, while he was in Tokad Memduh sent two thousand liras to the Ottoman Bank in Sivas. In his defense included in the inspection report Rasih Bey correlated this two thousand liras with the illegal selling of some lands around the Lake of Kazabad.⁷³⁷

In response to the allegations about Memduh's conducts in Sivas, the governor did not remain silent. Rather, he came up with long memorandum particularly against Brigadier Ziya Pasha, the head of the second inspection committee. Memduh and Ziya Pasha made their first acquaintance in their *rüşdiye* years. The conflict between them arose twenty-five years earlier out of a personal matter and, according to Memduh, since then Ziya Pasha had been nursing a grievance against him. By providing this background, Memduh implied that the inspection report was prepared out of Ziya Pasha's personal grievance against him, which undermined its objectivity. Interestingly enough, rather than justifying his conduct by making counterarguments to the allegations about him, Memduh opted to attack Ziya Pasha's character by uncovering his frauds and scams. He asserted that Ziya Pasha was speaking against Memduh and the government here and there and that this was affecting Memduh's honor. Moreover, Memduh claimed that the lodging expenses of Ziya Pasha and his thirty attendants were covered by the municipalities for almost a year in Sivas and, what is worse, that he was calling prostitute to his house at nights. According to Memduh's account, Ziya Pasha took a very young concubine from Gendarmerie Commander Hüsrev Pasha's harem during his visit to the commander's house. Though he promised to marry her, he broke his promise

⁷³⁷ BOA, Y.A.HUS. 259/50, 8 Şevval 1309/6 May 1892.

It is interesting that Memduh registered such a large piece of land to his younger son, who was probably less than twenty years old, rather than his elder son Mustafa Raik, who was around thirty years old at that time.

and made her a concubine. Furthermore, he caused the burning of the house where he was a guest and then moved to another house where he paid no rent at all for a month. Memduh continued criticizing Ziya Pasha with an ironic tone and said that as the means of transportation multiplied and ideas developed, Europeans were able to circumnavigate the globe in less than a year, but the inspection committee led by Ziya Pasha had been wandering in five or six provinces for thirty-eight months and getting a double salary. According to Memduh, inspector Ziya Pasha remained in Sivas even though he could not find any irregularity in the province during his three-and-a-half month inspection. This was merely because he wanted to continue to receive such a high salary and to spend a comfortable time in the province.⁷³⁸

It is thought-provoking that while a series of inspection reports full of misconduct allegations about him could not unseat Memduh from the post, his Armenian policy put an end to his governorship in Sivas on 14 November 1892. He had to wait for eleven months in the capital until he was assigned to a new office. During this period he received 6000 kuruş per month.⁷³⁹ Although he was removed from the office due to his ill treatment of the Armenians, the personnel records seem to appreciate his efforts against the harms caused by the Armenians. The statement in the personnel records about Memduh's removal from Sivas emphasized his loyalty, thoughtfulness, and authority and ended with his appointment as governor of Ankara.⁷⁴⁰ The way his dismissal was

⁷³⁸ BOA, Y.A.HUS. 259/50, 8 Şevval 1309/6 May 1892.

“Dünyada vesâit ta’addüd ve efkâr tevessü’ ve teceddüd ettiğinden, Avrupalılar vapur ile devr-i alem seyhatini bir seneden az bir zamanda icra ediyorlar; heyet-i teftişiyeye ise otuz sekiz aydan beru beş-altı vilayet içinde dolaşmakda olmağla iki kat maaş ve mekârî ücretleri alurlar.” The dispatch of inspection missions from the capital to the provinces was disquieting for most governors, and complaining about inspection committees was not confined to Memduh. Among those who complained of the inspection commissions that came to their provinces to investigate were the governor of Baghdad, Ebubekir Hazim (BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 80/99, 9 Zilkade 1325/14 December 1907); the governor of Adana, Bahri Pasha (BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 80/5, 4 Cemaziyelahir 1325/15 July 1907); and the governor of Erzurum, Rauf Pasha (BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 40/10, 7 Cemaziyellevvel 1315/4 October 1897).

⁷³⁹ BOA, DH.MKT. 37/14, 25 Muharrem 1311/8 August 1893.

⁷⁴⁰ BOA, DH.SAİD, 29 Zilhicce 1255/4 March 1840.

represented in the official records also implies that Memduh was half-heartedly removed from the Sivas governorship in the face of ever-increasing foreign pressure regarding the Armenians living in the *vilayat-ı sitte*, one of which was Sivas. An imperial decree that was sent from the court to the Minister of War clearly stated that Memduh was discharged due to the complaints brought by the Armenians and some of the foreign consuls in Sivas. The imperial decree also included a genuine acknowledgement of Memduh's dedication to his work and to preventing the harmful activities of Armenians in Sivas.⁷⁴¹

Indeed, the sultan was not only person who appreciated Memduh's Armenian policy. On 11 July 1892, fifty-four prominent figures from the Armenian community of Sivas sent a telegraph to the imperial capital expressing their gratefulness to the governor for his wholehearted effort to maintain order and security in the society and also to ensure peace and harmony between the Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants of the province.⁷⁴² The fifty-four Armenians were particularly thankful to Memduh for his determination in preventing the manipulation of the Armenian issue for personal interests. The same telegraph

“Mir-i müşarunileyh Sivas Vilayeti’nde bulunduğu sırada Ermeniler tarafından hakkında vuku bulan şikayat bunların hareket-ı muşedatkaranelerine meydan vermemesinden münbais olup kendisinin ashab-ı rüyet ve iktidar ve sadakatten bulunduğu nezd-i âlide dahi malum olmasına ve Ankara Vilayeti’nin ehemmiyet-i hazırası cihetiyle vilayet-i müşarunileyha Valiliğine icra-yı memuriyeti re’sen şeref-sudur buyrulan irade-i seniyye-i cenab-ı hilafet-penahi mantuk-ı münifinden olmasına mebni sene-i merkume Cemaziyelahiresinin dördünde on yedi bin kuruş maaşla vilayet-i müşarunileyha Valiliği’ne tayin buyrulmuştur.”

⁷⁴¹ The original version of the imperial decree is below.

“Esnâ- memuriyetinde ifa-yı hüsn-i hizmet eylediği nezd-i rekâyik-vefd-i mülükânede kaviyyen manzur olup, zaten kendüsünün Ermeni mefâsidinin mevki’-i fi’le konmamasına meydan vermemesinden dolayı Ermenilerle dâhil-i vilayetteki bazı ecnebi konsoloslarının vuku bulan şikayetleri üzerine Babialice azli cihetine gidilmiş.”

⁷⁴² BOA, Y.PRK.AZJ. 21/91, 15 Şevval 1309/13 May 1892.

The telegraph sent from Sivas by the fifty-four prominent Armenians to the capital originally said that *“Vilayetimizde İslam ahali ile yekdiğerimizin hoşnudî üzere imtizacda bulunulması hususunda vali-yi âlî atufetlu Memduh Beyefendi hazretlerinin gece ve gündüz ittihaz etmekte olduğu tedâbir, sâ’ibe-i fi’iliyyât ve âsâr ile sabitdir. Müşarünileyh, Ermeni meselesi nâmını alet-i menfaat olmağa kimseye meydan vermedi. Vilayet dahilinde ber-karar olan emn u istirahat-ı umumiyeyi bir kat daha takviye eylemek için kendüsi geçende diğher mahallere azimet eyledi. Kemal-i asayişle yaşamaktayız...”*

was also sent to the sultan.⁷⁴³ This was not the only group that expressed its appreciation for the governor. A month before the abovementioned telegraph, another group of individuals from different walks of life sent a telegraph to the court to express their complete satisfaction with Memduh's rule.⁷⁴⁴ However, these telegraphs could not prevent the dismissal of the governor.

Most probably informed by the foreign consuls and inspectors as well as some of the Armenians from Anatolia, print media in Europe had a negative image about Memduh's rule in Sivas. The councilor of the Ottoman embassy in Berlin, Mehmed Rifat Bey, sent an article written by an Armenian from Sivas and published in a newspaper in Germany to the imperial court in Istanbul. The article included claims about Memduh's ill treatment of Armenians of Sivas. Furthermore, there were some allegations published in the *Daily News* in London about the harsh treatment of Armenians in Sivas by police officers because they failed to pay taxes.⁷⁴⁵ Despite his unpopularity in the eyes of the foreign consuls in the empire and European political environments, Memduh was brought back to the scene a year after his removal from Sivas.

Memduh was dismissed from Sivas because of the foreign consuls' complaints against him with regard to his treatment of the Armenians of the province. Yet the anecdotes given in the memoirs of the Dildilian family, an Armenian family of Sivas, provide a much more complex account of Memduh's relations with the Armenian community of Sivas.

⁷⁴³ Abdulhamit Kırmızı, "Şikayat Tezayüd Etmekte: Memduh Bey'in Sivas Valiliğinde Ermeni Politikası (1889-1992)," in *Osmanlılar Döneminde Sivas Sempozyumu Bildirileri*, 2007, 363.

⁷⁴⁴ BOA, Y.PRK.AZJ. 21/59, 20 Ramazan 1309/18 April 1892.

These telegraphs might have been sent upon the request of Memduh.

⁷⁴⁵ *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni-İngiliz İlişkileri I (1845-1890)*, Ankara 2004, 221.
BOA, Y.A .HUS. 237/35, 9 Zilhicce 1307/27 July 1890.

4.3.8. The Dildilians and Memduh: A Story behind a Photograph

Armen Tsoilag Marsoobian (born in 1951, New York), philosophy professor at Southern Connecticut State University, received from the senior members of his family, the Dildilian family, hundreds of pages of memoirs and letters and over 800 photographs of the Ottoman period, all providing vivid detail on the life of the Dildilian family as well as the last decades of Ottoman Sivas. While Marsoobian was identifying and recording the photos in the Dildilian family collection he “came across a small portrait of a very distinguished-looking gentleman.”⁷⁴⁶ The photograph was among the oldest photographs in the family collection from the early 1890s, the first years of the Dildilians’ photography business in Sivas. The attire and medals of the man in the photo indicated that he was a high Ottoman official, and the memoirs in the collection helped Armen Marsoobian to find his identity.

The Dildilian family tree goes back to mid-eighteenth-century Sivas. Krikor (1838 Sivas-1894 Sivas) (grandson of Mouradentz Garabed, the first known member of the family) and Loucia Keledjiyan (1848 Yozgat-1894 Sivas) had eleven kids and one of them was Tsoilag (1872 Yozgat-1935 Athens). Tsoilag married Mariam Nakkashian (1880 Harput-1959 New York). They had six children. One of them, Alice (1911 Marsovan-2000 New York), married Michael Marsoobian (1909 Palu-1985 New York). They had two children, and one of them was Armen Tsoilag Marsoobian.

Krikor was an Armenian shoemaker in the Ottoman province of Sivas in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Krikor’s shop, named Tchitchekli Ghondouradji (*Çiçekli Kunduracı*) (The Flowered Shoemaker Shop), had a good reputation and was located in a choice spot in the marketplace, beside the famous Stone Bridge. According to the account of Tsoilag, Armen Marsoobian’s grandfather Krikor was the most skillful shoemaker in the region and ran the shop with his two brothers (Tsoilag’s uncles), Haroutioun (1854 Sivas-1915) and

⁷⁴⁶ Armen T. Marsoobian, *Fragments of a Lost Homeland: Remembering Armenia* (London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 2015), 24.

Mikael (1863 Sivas-1915), and fifteen workers.⁷⁴⁷ Maritsa, Tsolag's cousin, narrated a fascinating story about the Çiçekli Kunduracı and the "distinguished-looking gentleman" in the small portrait Armen T. Marsoobian came across in the Dildilian family collection.

One day a new vali is appointed. As it is the custom, the vali goes for a protocol visit, the so-called "welcome tour," around town. Krikor, seeing that the vali is wearing slippers, comes up to him and tactfully asks him why he does not wear shoes. "Shoes are too heavy," laments the vali. So Krikor manages to take measurements of the vali's foot and he makes a pair of shoes that he presents to the vali. The vali tries them on; he finds so light and so supple that he declares he will wear shoes from now on for he had never known such light shoes.⁷⁴⁸

The "vali" in this anecdote, whom Maritsa identifies as the gentleman in the unidentified portrait, was Memduh, the governor of Sivas. During his term in Sivas, Memduh had very close friendship with the Dildilians. As reported by Aram, a cousin of Tsolag, the Çiçekli Kunduracı "became the rendezvous of many government officials, especially the governor, the vali of Sivas, who often would come over after office hours, sit for a while to have water pipe, drink coffee or tea and then go home."⁷⁴⁹

The intimate relationship between Memduh and the Dildilians changed the family's faith in the ensuing years. In 1888, photography came into the life of the Dildilian family and played a pivotal role in the lives of family members until the 1960s. In that year, Tsolag, shoemaker Krikor's son and Armen Marsoobian's grandfather, was 17 years old and interested in photography. Initially he did not show success, but Memduh's appointment to Sivas marked a crucial turning point in Tsolag's photography career. Based on Tsolag's memoirs, Armen Marsoobian notes that

Tsolag's success is clearly connected to his personal relationship with the governor of Sivas, identified here as Mamdouh Pasha. This Mamdouh Pasha may have been the highly appreciative governor who patronized Krikor's shoe store. Tsolag appears to have been hired by the governor

⁷⁴⁷ Marsoobian, *Fragments of a Lost Homeland*, 45.

⁷⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁷⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 23.

to travel around the province and to cities much further afield, such as Kastemoni, to take photographs of the antique monuments. The governor had also assigned him a guard for all his travels.⁷⁵⁰

Puzzled by this information about the relationship between Memduh and the Dildilian family, Armen Marsoobian articulated his confusion about the governor by saying that

Here is a man accused by Armenians of oppression while governor of Sivas, who later becomes interior minister under Abdülhamid II. On November 12, 1895, six day after being elevated to that post by the sultan, a government-instigated mob destroyed all the Armenian businesses in Sivas, including Krikor's shoe store and factory.... Now more questions than answers arise about this portrait found in a box of family photographs. Can one draw connection between the events of the week of November 12, 1895 and Mamdouh's role as former governor of Sivas?⁷⁵¹

Given Memduh's political standpoint and the prevalent narrative about his approach to Armenians, Marsoobian's confusion about the attitudes of the governor is understandable. It is not clear if there was any connection between Memduh, who was recently appointed to the Ministry of Interior, and the alleged mob attack in Sivas on 12 November 1895. But it is clear that as citizens of the Ottoman Empire, both Memduh and the members of the Dildilian family were operating in an extremely flexible imperial structure in which political identities did not necessarily determine their interpersonal relations and all the positions they took in their lives.

The empire as a sphere of multiplicity allowed its citizens to act differently in parallel realities, and thus to have multifaceted lives without forcing them to confine themselves to a particular identity. Ottoman people "had different points of allegiance which constituted their identity,"⁷⁵² or, more precisely, they were located at the intersection of ethnic, religious, socio-economic, ideological, sectarian, and local identities and were also connected by

⁷⁵⁰ Ibid., 46.

⁷⁵¹ Ibid., 24.

⁷⁵² Nancy Reynolds, "Difference and Tolerance in the Ottoman Empire. Interview with Aron Rodrigue," *Stanford Electronics Humanities Review* 5:1 (1996).

professional and patronage ties. So, they “found themselves frequently in a syncretistic, hybrid sort of space,”⁷⁵³ not in a rigidly compartmentalized one. Accordingly, at one and the same time Memduh might have been a governor taking strict measures against the Armenian revolutionary activism by virtue of his loyalty to the official mission of maintaining the integrity of the empire at all costs and also a friendly and an appreciative governor in his relationships with the Armenians in the society under his rule. Given that more than fifty Armenian artisans of Sivas sent telegraphs (more than once) to the palace and the Porte to express their gratitude to Memduh, the case of the Dildilians seems not to be exceptional.

That being said, thanks to new actors⁷⁵⁴ and their multiple agendas, the centralization attempts of the government, and the politicization of ethno-religious identities under external pressure, during the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, Anatolia became a space of competing and conflicting interests and visions; all were vying for supremacy. As the risks, possibilities, and opportunities increased for all the agents in parallel with the changing socio-political dynamics in the region, so did the complexity of the activities of the agents.

Getting back to the Armen Marsoobian’s grandfather Tsoilag’s photography career during and after the governorship of Memduh, Tsoilag’s memoirs with regard to his photography career provide a fascinating account of Ottoman Sivas. Traveling around the province to take photos, young Tsoilag was closely acquainted with the cultural and social milieu of the province. He recounted the difficulties of being a photographer in an Anatolian province. At that time, photography was indeed a reputable and burgeoning profession in the cosmopolitan imperial capital. But Sivas, though it was a significant and historic

⁷⁵³ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁴ Such as Armenian Revolutionary committees, Christian missionaries, European consuls, and Caucasian Muslim immigrants. Though they were outside the borders, various stakeholders in Russia and Persia were also much involved in the affairs of the region.

province, was, according to Tsolag, “still under the sway of a patriarchal and gendered system of prejudices.”⁷⁵⁵ Tsolag continued his description of the milieu by saying that

Armenians were very jealous about their families. They would consider it immoral or immodest to have their women exposed to the photographer. Many would consider it belittlement to stand next to their women. My ears have heard many unkind remarks addressed to photographers.... Let me not forget to say that there is some justification for people’s criticism. Starting with my master, I have not seen a photographer who contradicted people’s opinion.⁷⁵⁶

In time, Tsolag was able to break down the prejudices of the Armenians of the province about photography. The details Tsolag gave with regard to his experience of being photographer in the heartland of Asia Minor during the 1890s are valuable for the history of photography in the Ottoman Empire and, more importantly, for the social history of the empire. Krikor rented a place for his son Tsalog nearby his shop, Çiçekli Kunderacı. Not long after, the Dildilians opened a studio close to the American College compound in Marsovan. It became a lucrative business, as the Americans college staff and the Greek students patronized the studio. Not only did photography bring profit to the Dildilian family, it also played a role in the family’s survival during World War I. Owing to Tsolag’s photographic skills, Tsolag and his immediate family members were saved from the deportation in the summer of 1915.

Indeed, the Dildilian family was not exceptional. Memduh cooperated with some other Armenians in Sivas and later on in Ankara. For instance, he established carpet-weaving workshops at the female division of the Medrese-i Hamidiye and invited two Armenian masters, Matok and Nişan, along with their families, from Sivas to Ankara to set up carpet-weaving workshops in the schools. These masters’ wives became instructors of the female trainees. Six of

⁷⁵⁵ Marsoobian, *Fragments of a Lost Homeland*, 47.

⁷⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 47.

the trainees⁷⁵⁷ became instructors after completing their education and were congratulated in the Ankara provincial newspaper on 8 April 1895.⁷⁵⁸

4.4. PATH TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR: ANKARA

4.4.1. After Sivas - Before Ankara

With regard to the relationship between Memduh's career and the Armenian issue, British Consul H. Z. Longworth asserted that Memduh "endeavored to maintain himself in office by creating or rather bringing to the fore an Armenian question."⁷⁵⁹ Depending on the claims of Milo Augustus Jewett, the consul of United States of America for Sivas, the British consuls in the region put the blame on Memduh and Hüsrev Bey, the chief of the gendarmerie, for the seditious placards which were posted in most of the districts in Sivas. Before detailing the Placard Incident,⁷⁶⁰ it is worth explaining Augustus Jewett and the connection between the American consulate and the Armenian revolutionary activists to comprehend the provincial setting and actors.

The first consulate of the United States of America in Sivas was founded on 20 February 1887. Although it was located in Sivas, the consulate had influence over much of Anatolia, including all the provinces on the Black Sea coastline: in the east, Erzurum, Muş, Bitlis, and Mardin; in the south, Malatya, Maraş, and Antep; and in the west, the province of Ankara. The first consul was Henry Martyn Jewett. He stayed in office until 30 June 1892. After him, his brother Milo Augustus Jewett took over the post and served until 1904. Augustus Jewett had a particular interest in the Armenian issue. During his service, he drafted 182 reports, 80 percent of which were directly related to Armenians. Twenty percent of them were on the consulate's incomes and expenses and the trade

⁷⁵⁷ Two of these trainees were Hacı Agop's daughter Müşkunas Hanım and Dırdırian Garabet's daughter Makruhi Hanım. Their names were printed in the Ankara provincial newspaper on 8 April 1895.

⁷⁵⁸ Suavi Aydın and Kudret Emiroğlu, *Küçük Asya'nın Bin Yüzü: Ankara* (Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 2005), 243-244.

⁷⁵⁹ Dr. Jewett to Consul Longworth, Marsovan April 7 1893, inclosure in FO 424 (172), No. 56, Sir Clare Ford to the Earl Rosebery, April 29 1893 Constantinople

⁷⁶⁰ This incident is called the "1892-1893 Ermeni Yafta Olayları."

possibilities in the region. Augustus Jewett's reports provide valuable data about the activities of Armenian bands in Anatolia. According to his reports, the first Armenians guerrilla activities (referring to Hinchak) emerged in the provinces of Sivas and Van. In 1891, delegates from different parts of Anatolia gathered in Merzifon, a district of Sivas, and made decision about critical issues such as money collection and the procurement of ammunition. According to a report drafted by R. W. Graves, British consul for Kurdistan, "Marsovan was selected on the seat of the organizing Committee, being near the port of Samsoun, and occupying a good central position, from which surrounding Armenian colonies could be affected."⁷⁶¹

One of the most important factors that made Merzifon the head quarter of the revolutionary Armenian society was the Merzifon American College, which was founded in 1886 by the American missionaries. In his report, Jewett also clearly stated the major tactics and strategies the Armenian bands were planning to adopt in order to attract the attention of the European powers so that they could reach their goals. According to the report, Armenians bands were going to engage in violence but put the blame on Turks. They were going to provoke Muslims to act against Armenians so that they could complain about Muslim persecution against Armenians and draw the attention of European consuls, observers, media and public.⁷⁶²

⁷⁶¹ FO 424 (172), 1892-1894 Memorandum on Armenian Troubles in Sivas and Angora Vilayets of January 1893. Inclosure 2 in No. 156, Consul Graves to Sir Nicolson. Erzeroum July 1, 1893

FO 424 (172), 1892-1894 No.156, 1893 Sir Nicolson to the Earl Rosebery, July 31, 1893 Therapia.

⁷⁶² Osman Kubilay Gül and Ülkü Yanıcı, "Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Sivas Konsolosu Milo Augustus Jewett'in Türk Ermeni İlişkilerine Yönelik Yanlı Tutumu," *Zeitschrift Für Die Welt Der Türken*, no. 9, no.3 (2017), 208.

FO 424 (172), 1892-1894 Memorandum on Armenian Troubles in Sivas and Angora Vilayets of January 1893. Inclosure 2 in No. 156, Consul Graves to Sir Nicolson. Erzeroum July 1, 1893

FO 424 (172), 1892-1894 No.156 1893 Sir Nicolson to the Earl Rosebery, July 31, 1893 Therapia.

A Memorandum on Armenian Troubles in Sivas and Angora Vilayets of January 1893. The leaders of this advanced party are largely Russian Armenians, some of whom, no doubt, have seen service in the Russian army, and are familiar with arms and some of

The Placard Incident broke out in January 1893, one and a half months after Memduh's removal from the governorship of Sivas.⁷⁶³ Regarding the perpetrators of the incident, the British consul agreed with Augustus Jewett's theory, according to which

the placards were perhaps composed by malcontent Turks resident abroad, partisans of the ex-Sultan Murad and of the Young Turkey party, and communicated by them to the Armenian agitators, to be made use of for the purpose of creating a belief that a widespread movement of disaffection existed among the Turkish population. It has also been suggested that some of the hangers-on of the ex-Vali of Sivas, Memdoh Bey, were privy to the affair of the placards, and perhaps assisted in their multiplication and distribution with a view to discrediting the administration of the newly-appointed Vali, Khalil Bey.⁷⁶⁴

The British consul asserted that Memduh might have been involved in issuing placards "to prove the existence among Armenians of a smoldering

the details of military organization, while others are fugitives from Russia on account of their Nihilistic or Socialistic tendencies. Others again are merely professional agitators, who find it necessary from time to time to show some results for the funds they collect for nationalistic purposes. A ban agitators of this were established for some time at Geneva, whence some of them some of them at least transferred their activity and the publication of a revolutionary journal called "Hindzak" to Athens. Other similar organizations are said exist in Marseilles, in England, the United States, and the Caucasus, and to have contributed funds, seditious literature, arms, and workers.

⁷⁶³ As stated in the British consul's report, Memduh left Sivas on 17 December and he stayed for ten days near Merzifon.

FO 424 (172), 1892-1894, Inclosure 1 in No. 56, Consul Longworth to Sir Clare Ford, April 20, 1893, Trabizod.

FO 424 (172), 1892-1894, No. 56, Sir Clare Ford to the Earl Rosebery, April 26, 1893, Constantinople.

⁷⁶⁴ FO 424 (172), 1892-1894, Inclosure 2 in No. 56, Dr. Jewett to Consul Longworth, Marsovan, April 7, 1893.

FO 424 (172), 1892-1894, No. 56, Sir Clare Ford to the Earl Rosebery, April 26, 1893, Constantinople.

Even though these claims against Memduh were exaggerated, it is true that Memduh seemed to hold a grudge against Halil Bey, the governor of Sivas after Memduh. It is not known if they had any personal conflicts before Halil Bey's assignment to Sivas, but the petitions delivered by Halil Bey to the court in the ensuing years revealed that Memduh, then the governor of Ankara, was in cooperation with Hüsrev Bey, the chief of the gendarmerie of Sivas, and was disposed to make every effort to disgrace Halil Bey. BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 30.54, 6 Rebiülevvel 1312/7 September 1894.

BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 30.85, 10 Rebiülahir 1312/11 October 1894.

revolution.”⁷⁶⁵ The consul even claimed that Memduh and Hüsrev Bey were “perhaps included to avenge the expulsion from the Marsovan College of Memdouh Bey’s own son, a youth who as student had drawn a knife on Dr. Malcom, the Professor of Chemistry at the college.”⁷⁶⁶ However, neither the British consul nor the American one corroborated their claims about Memduh with sufficient evidence.

Furthermore, the governor of Sivas, Halil Bey, laid all the responsibility for the Armenian events that broke out in Sivas on Memduh.⁷⁶⁷ He probably made such a bold and general claim about Memduh, without any evidence, as a consequence of their personal conflict rather than out of an objective examination of the situation. Halil Bey also held a negative opinion about Hüsrev Bey, the chief of the gendarmerie; and as he did not want to work with Hüsrev Bey in Sivas, the latter was transferred to the province of Damascus.⁷⁶⁸ Halil Bey, however, did not clarify how Memduh provoked the Armenian incidents in the region.

The Placard Incident caused a crisis between the American consulate and the Ottoman central administration not because of the bold claims of the American consul quoted above but because two professors—namely, Karabet Thoumaian and Ohannes Kayaian—and some other fifteen suspects were charged and

⁷⁶⁵ FO 424 (172), Inclosure in No.52 Mr. Newberry to Mr. Thompson, April 12, 1893, Legation of the United States, Constantinople.

No. 52, Sir Clare Ford to the Earl of Rosebery, April 21, 1893, Constantinople.

⁷⁶⁶ FO 424 (172), Inclosure in No.52 Mr. Newberry to Mr. Thompson, April 12, 1893, Legation of the United States, Constantinople.

No. 52, Sir Clare Ford to the Earl of Rosebery, April 21, 1893, Constantinople.

⁷⁶⁷ BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA. 49/103, 29 Zilhicce 1324/13 February 1907. “...Sivas Vali-i cedidi Halil Bey mahall-i memuriyetine muvasalat eder etmez pek çok müşkilata tesadüf etmiştir. Selefi ve elyevm Ankara valisi bulunan Memduh Bey şimdiye değin zuhur eden Ermeni vekayinin hemen cümlesinin müşevviki idi...”

⁷⁶⁸ Halil Bey emphasized the close connection between Memduh and Hüsrev Bey during Memduh’s tenure in Sivas; and to justify his standpoint with regard to Hüsrev Bey, Halil Bey claimed that almost one thousand Circassian immigrants who were engaging in banditry were under the auspices of Hüsrev Bey in Sivas. BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA. 49/103, 29 Zilhicce 1324/13 February 1907.

arrested by the new governor of Sivas, Halil Bey, for involvement in the Placard Incident.⁷⁶⁹

While Halil Bey was trying to put down the unrest in Merzifon, Memduh was in Istanbul, where stayed for thirteen months, from 14 November 1892, to 13 December 1893, as an unemployed functionary. During this period, he did his utmost effort in seeking a way to get back to an official post as soon as possible. Three months after he left the office, he applied for unemployment pay⁷⁷⁰ and after a while demanded the payment of the expenses of the tours (*devriye*) he made in Sivas for administrative purposes during his governorship.⁷⁷¹ He was put on unemployment pay in the late July 1893, eight months after he left the office.⁷⁷² He received 6,000 akçe in monthly pay.⁷⁷³ This was one-third of the salary he used to earn in Konya and Sivas. Managing on a relatively small income must have been difficult for the ex-governor and his family. In June 1893, Memduh wrote to the Ministry of Interior about the fishponds in Antakya that he, together with his brother and sister, had inherited from his father. In his letter, he provided various arguments to persuade the authorities not to destroy the fishponds.⁷⁷⁴ He was making some profit, though the amount is not precisely known, from them that would support his family.⁷⁷⁵ Besides the

⁷⁶⁹ The trial of two teachers of the American College, Thoumaian and Kayaian, and other suspects continued for months. As a result of British pressure, they were pardoned in the beginning of July 1893 and deported from the empire.

"Ankara Mahkemesi'nin mahkum ettiği Tomayan ve Kayayan'ın suçları sabit olmakla beraber, İngiliz Başvekili'nin ve Hükümet'in ricası üzerine İngiliz efkâr-ı umûmiyesinin tatmini için, Padişah tarafından Türkiye'ye bir daha girmemek üzere ihraç edildikleri, bunun başkaları için emsal teşkil etmeyeceği." BOA, HR.SYS. 2819/31, 19 Zilkade 1310/4 July 1893.

⁷⁷⁰ BOA, BEO. 142/10635, 3 Receb 1310/21 January 1893.

⁷⁷¹ BOA, DH.MKT. 2052/69, 29 Receb 1310/16 February 1893.

⁷⁷² BOA, ŞD. 1102/5, 6 Muharrem 1311/20 July 1893.

BOA, İ.TKS. 2/1311, 16 Muharrem 1311/30 July 1893.

⁷⁷³ BOA, DH.SAİD. 1/84, 29 Zilhicce 1255/4 March 1840.

"Mir-i müşarunileyhe bin üç yüz on bir senesi Muharremü'l-haramının on altısında altı bin kuruş mazuliyet maaşı tahsis buyrulmuştur."

⁷⁷⁴ As stated previously, there was an idea of destroying or expropriating all the fishponds in Antakya in order to solve the chronic problems they caused, such as creating swampland and epidemics.

⁷⁷⁵ Memduh and his siblings were letting the fishponds out on hire.

fishponds, he might have continued to carry on the lumber business in Shkodra.⁷⁷⁶ Furthermore, if the allegations were true, he owned a hotel and a bathhouse in Havza, a district of Sivas, which he obtained when he was governor of that province.⁷⁷⁷ So, he seems to have had income-generating private assets to support the family budget when he was unemployed. Yet still, Memduh, justifiably, was exerting all his effort in finding a way out of unemployment by reminding the court how hardworking, successful, and loyal he was.

In mid-June 1893, he presented a long petition to the imperial court explaining the process of his appointment as governor of Konya and his achievements, such as coping with famine and collecting the tithe⁷⁷⁸ in Konya, as well as the reasons, from his perspective, for his dismissal from this post. Waiting for seven months to be appointed to a new position, Memduh might have felt the need to explain himself to the court so that he could restore the sultan's trust.⁷⁷⁹ Furthermore, he submitted an extensive petition to the court disclosing the secret illegal activities of Brigadier Ziya Pasha and the inspection committee while they were undertaking the inquiry into Memduh's conducts in Sivas.⁷⁸⁰ As underscored above, the documents attest that Memduh lost his last job on account of the way he dealt with the Armenian issue in Sivas rather than the

BOA, MVL. 502/20, 4 Rebiülahir 1283/16 August 1866.

⁷⁷⁶ Memduh entered the lumber business in 1877. As an official document drafted on 8 March 1888, attests, he continued to carry on this business during his service in Konya.

⁷⁷⁷ As discussed in detail in the section on the economic activities of Memduh, the way he acquired this asset, which was considered unjustifiable, caused controversy among the inhabitants of Havza. BOA, DH/MKT. 2614/10, 27 Şaban 1326/24 September 1908.

BOA, DH/MKT. 2672/69, 8 Zilkade 1326/2 December 1908.

BOA, DH/H. 37/2, 9 Ramazan 1328/14 September 1910.

⁷⁷⁸ As explained earlier, the amount of tithe that was collected during his tenure (in 1888) was more than had been collected in previous years.

⁷⁷⁹ In fact, Memduh was right to worry about his relationship with the sultan. As exemplified in *Abdülhamid'in Valileri*, once a governor fell into disfavor, it was not easy to make up with the sultan. Therefore, governors tried their best to keep their relationship with the sultan as stable as possible. This situation had some negative effects on the performance of the governors. According to Abdulhamit Kırmızı, "the fear of being disfavored made the governors hesitant and reserved in state affairs." Kırmızı, *Abdülhamid'in Valileri*, 103.

⁷⁸⁰ It is not known if these claims of Memduh about Ziya Pasha were correct.

misconduct allegations against him reported by the inquiry committees. Yet he attempted to neutralize the accusations made in the inspection reports against him. By casting the inspection committee in general and Brigadier Ziya Pasha in particular as untrustworthy, he tried to call into question the merit of the reports furnished by them. As stated in the previous passages, before the inquiry committee headed by Ziya Pasha, another committee came to Sivas to inspect the Memduh's administration. Probably acting strategically, Memduh opted to vilify Ziya, instead of the previous inspector, either because they already had a personal conflict or because, for him, attacking against Ziya Pasha was the easier target.⁷⁸¹

Aiming at refreshing the sultan's memory about his services, loyalty, and acquaintance with critical issues of the empire, Memduh not only provided clarification about his removal from Konya and Sivas, which he probably thought cast a shadow on his career, but also presented a memorandum on Britain's occupation of Egypt.⁷⁸² He began the memorandum by throwing light on his relationship with the Egyptian issue. Memduh acquainted himself with the affairs of Egypt at a young age thanks to his father Mazlum Pasha's long years of official service in Egypt.⁷⁸³ Although the memorandum focused on the necessity of cleaning the British military forces⁷⁸⁴ from Egyptian lands, it

⁷⁸¹ As earlier narrated in detail, Memduh made similar counter accusations against Ziya Pasha a year before this petition.

BOA, Y.A.HUS. 259/50, 8 Şevval 1309/6 May 1892.

⁷⁸² BOA, Y.EE. 88/3, 4 Receb 1310/22 January 1893.

⁷⁸³ "Pederim merhum hıttı-i Mısıryeye aid mesailede senelerce bulunup saltanatı seniyeye hizmet ve sadakat ibraz etmiş. Ve şu sebeble ahvali mahalliyeye ve Muhammed Ali hanedanın etvar ve reftarına vukufu acizanem olarak." BOA, Y.EE. 88/3, 4 Receb 1310/22 January 1893.

As explained in the previous chapter, Mazlum Pasha was commissioned by the sultan himself to bring back the Ottoman navy, which was brought by the chief admiral Ahmed Fevzi Pasha, from Egypt to the Ottoman center. He became the steward to Egypt (*Mısır Kapı Kethudası*) in 1842, mediating the administrative affairs between the Ottoman center and Egypt. He then became the Chief of Justice (*deavi nazırı*),⁷⁸³ and he remained at this post until 1852.

⁷⁸⁴ Fearing French domination in Egypt, the British, under the pretext of maintaining peace and order as the tension escalated in the province, bombarded Alexandria in 1882 and occupied Egypt in 1882 in order to safeguard the route to India, the most profitable colony of the British in the nineteenth century. As the British did not annex

provides a brief background about the Egyptian-Ottoman relations in the nineteenth century and the Russian and French policies on Egypt during the Egyptian crisis. By virtue of the critical location of Egypt for controlling the trade route to colonial India the British took every opportunity⁷⁸⁵ to reinforce her military presence in the region. The British cabinet of Gladstone promised to pull back the British arm forces from Egypt, as did the cabinet of Lord Salisbury. However, there had been no development. Although they did not want a complete British authority in Egypt, Russia and France seemed to be in compliance with the British in order not to meet any obstacle, which would be caused by the British, in achieving their secret ambitions.⁷⁸⁶ According to Memduh, as a Muslim leader, Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha was loyal to the Ottoman sultan at heart and looked forward to Britain's departure from Egypt. Memduh also underscored that other than the small percentage of people who happened to study at the European schools and thus became inclined towards Britain, the majority of the Egyptians would prefer Ottoman caliphal authority to British rule. He completed his memorandum by saying that while many states like Britain were equipped with merely material power, the Ottoman sultanate had both material and spiritual power to gain and maintain the authority in Egypt.

While Memduh was busy with such lofty issues, he was asked to return an antique rug he borrowed from the Ali Pasha Mosque in Sivas to be used as a model.⁷⁸⁷ Apparently, he did not give the rug back immediately. The secretariat of the Ministry of Interior repeated the request after a while.⁷⁸⁸

Egypt, it nominally remained Ottoman land. In 1893, Abbas Hilmi Pasha became the khedive of Egypt, though his rule was restricted by the British authorities.

⁷⁸⁵ As stated in Memduh's memorandum, the British gave the issue of Akabe as a pretext to reinforce their military force in Egypt.

⁷⁸⁶ "*Ve menafiğ-i mesturelerinin istihsaline mümaneat ettirmemek üzere İngiltere ile mânen müttehîd mesabesinde sayılıyorlar.*" BOA, Y.EE. 88/3, 4 Receb 1310/22 January 1893.

⁷⁸⁷ BOA, DH.MKT. 2050/137, 22 Receb 1310/9 February 1893.

⁷⁸⁸ BOA, DH.MKT. 2056/15, 9 Şaban 1310/26 February 1893.

4.4.2. The Yozgat Incident

While Memduh was unemployed in Istanbul trying hard to win the favor of the sultan, Yozgat, one of the sanjaks of the province of Ankara, was about to witness a conflict between Armenians and Muslims, which ultimately changed the fate of Memduh and the inhabitants of the sanjak.⁷⁸⁹ Ankara, like Sivas, was a large and multi-cultural province at the center of Asia Minor. It comprised four sanjaks: Ankara,⁷⁹⁰ Yozgat,⁷⁹¹ Kırşehir,⁷⁹² Kayseri.⁷⁹³ The overall population of the province was 841,917 in 1893, with 36.31 percent of this overall population in the sanjak of Ankara, 13.5 in Kırşehir, 28.46 in Yozgat, and 21.71 in Kayseri. The Muslim population numbered 749,025 (88.95%), and the non-Muslim population 92,892 (11,03%), of which 31,786 (3.77%) were Rum, 51,633 (6.13%) Armenian, 6,183 (0.73%) Catholic, 2,550 (0.30 %) Protestant, 412 (0,05%) Jewish, and 328 (0,03%) Coptic.⁷⁹⁴ As the British consul for Ankara, C. N. E. Eliot, wrote to Sir Clare Ford,

Ankara consists of a hill covered with very houses, with a ring of red fortifications around the top. Its peculiarly spick and span appearance is due to the fact that the authorities have recently had it whitewashed. The streets are naturally very precipitous, but, apart from this, not bad, and quite as well paved as those of Moscow and many other Russian towns. There are no very remarkable buildings or antiquities, but old stones covered with Latin or Greek inscriptions may be seen in the walls of many the houses. As might be expected, very large cats, goats are to be found everywhere. A new European town is gradually growing up round the railway station, which is about the half-a-mile from the city, and civilization is represented by a dirty German inn. Round the town are several fertile valleys filled with vineyards, where all the richer

⁷⁸⁹ In 1893 in the districts (Yozgat center, Boğazlıyan, Akdağmadeni) of Yozgat there were 106,100 Muslims and 18,890 Armenians. This demographic statistic excludes Çorum, which became a district of Yozgat for a while. Kemal Karpat, *Ottoman Population (1830-1914)* (Madison Wisconsin: The Wisconsin University Press, 1895), 113, 119, 120.

⁷⁹⁰ Districts of the sanjak of Ankara: Zir, Ayaş, Beypazarı, Nallıhan, Mihaliççık, Sivrihisar, Haymana, Bala, Çubukabad, Yabanabad, and Kalecik.

⁷⁹¹ Districts of the sanjak of Yozgat: Center, Çorum, Maden, Sungurlu, and Boğazlıyan.

⁷⁹² Districts of the sanjak of Kırşehir: Center, Mecidiye, Keskin, and Avanos.

⁷⁹³ Districts of the sanjak of Kayseri: İncesu and Develi.

⁷⁹⁴ The 1893 Yearbook of Ankara.

inhabitants live during the summer, and only come into town during the day to transact their business.⁷⁹⁵

According to the extensive reports⁷⁹⁶ drafted by Arif Bey, the public prosecutor of the Court of Appeal, two developments triggered the conflict between Muslims and Armenians: the British consul of Ankara submitted a secret notice to the deputy of Armenian delegate and the Eçmiyazin Cathogicos⁷⁹⁷ sent a priest in early December 1893 to Yozgat. It was asserted that in the secret notice the consul said that since he arrived in Ankara there had been no incident instigated by the Armenians and if they were willing to appeal for foreign intervention they had to be involved in disturbances in the region.⁷⁹⁸ An Armenian named Matyos from the village of İstanos delivered this secret notice to Ohannes Efendi, the deputy of the Armenian delegate of Yozgat; the notice was read before the six members of the Armenian Revolutionary Committee,⁷⁹⁹ and they decided to organize an incident in Yozgat such as the one that happened in Erzurum. As planned by the committee, on December 12, 1893, twelve crying Armenian women from Kara Çayır and Kara Yakup villages came to the church located at the center of Yozgat and they pretended to have been abused by the Muslim gendarmes. Responding to the church bells, the Armenian community of the city⁸⁰⁰ assembled around the church and began to

⁷⁹⁵ FO 424 (175), 1893, Inclosure in No. 230, Mr. Eliot to Sir Clare Ford, October 30, 1893, Constantinople.

FO 424 (175), 1893, No. 230, Sir Clare Ford to the Earl Rosebery, November 12, 1893, Constantinople.

⁷⁹⁶ BOA, A.MKT.MHM. 645/1, 22 Cemaziyelahir 1311/31 December 1893.

⁷⁹⁷ "Eçmiyazin Cathogicos, considered in a way the 'papacy' and the oldest clerical center of the Armenian Gregorian Church, came under the rule of the Ottomans with the conquest of Revan in 1583. Ottoman sultans from this date onward appointed cathogicoses. This situation continued to exist even after Eçmiyazin was left to Iran by the Ottomans." [http://turksandarmenians.marmara.edu.tr/en.armenians-and-ecmiyazin-cathogicos.](http://turksandarmenians.marmara.edu.tr/en.armenians-and-ecmiyazin-cathogicos)

⁷⁹⁸ In a correspondence on 16 January 1894, Memduh, who was then the governor of Ankara, asked Arif Bey if it was possible to prove this argument by providing the aforesaid secret notice of the British consul. Arif Bey could not offer the requested evidence. BOA, A.MKT.MHM. 645/1, 22 Cemaziyelahir 1311/31 December 1893.

⁷⁹⁹ "Cemiyet-i Fesadiye"

⁸⁰⁰ According to some official records, around 2,000 Armenians from the villages of Yozgat assembled in front of the church. The long ringing of church bell and the incident's being organized beforehand contributed to the crowd.

call for release of Kuyumcu (jeweler) Simon's murderers, who were also Armenian, saying that if they were not released, the public would free them by force. According to Arif Bey's report, the Armenian agitators were anticipating the death of a few Armenians in the midst of all this, which would provide a pretext for foreign interference. However, Muslims died, not the other way around. Three Muslims were killed⁸⁰¹ by the Armenians with revolvers and rifles and six Muslims were heavily wounded.⁸⁰² The church bells stopped many Armenians who were about to go to attack the Muslim neighborhoods but gunshots were heard all night long from Armenian neighborhoods. Moreover, as part of their protest, the Armenians did not open their shops for couple of days.⁸⁰³ According to Cumberbatch, the British consul for Ankara, the conflict between Armenians and Muslims on 12 December was "caused by fright and foolishness on the part of the former whilst agitators, not necessarily confined

⁸⁰¹ Sufi Hocasade Salih Efendi, who was on his way to the mill, Cavalry Gendarmerie Necib, who was on duty somewhere around the church, and Bailiff (*icra mübaşiri*) Ahmed Efendi, who was passing through the street. BOA, A.MKT.MHM. 645/1, 22 Cemaziyelahir 1311/31 December 1893.

⁸⁰² Two guards of the Regie named Mirza and İsmail and four more Muslim inhabitants. BOA, A.MKT.MHM. 645/1, 22 Cemaziyelahir 1311/31 December 1893.

British consul Cumberbatch reported from Ankara on December 16, 1893, that "from which side the first shot was fired is not cleared up, but that shots came from both parties is proved by the fact that one Armenian has died from wounds inflicted during the affray, though the number of wounded Armenians is not reported."

F.O.424 (178), Inclosure 2 in No. 2, Consul Cumberbatch to Sir A. Nicolson, Angora, December 16, 1893.

No. 2, Sir A. Nicolson to the Earl of Rosebery (Received January 9, 1894), (No. 611) Constantinople, December 30, 1893.

It was, indeed, not possible for the British consul not to have clear information about the number of the wounded Armenians, if there were any, as one of the most essential tasks of the consulate in the province was to make sure that Armenians' rights were safeguarded.

⁸⁰³ BOA, A.MKT.MHM. 645/1, 22 Cemaziyelahir 1311/31 December 1893.

BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK. 34/70, 15 Cemaziyelahir 1311, 24 December 1893.

There are different versions of this event. According to some accounts, armed Armenians forced unarmed ones to take up arms, in order to stir up the Armenian public, agitators gave provoking speeches before the church and, consequently, Armenians attacked the Muslim neighborhoods and three Muslims were killed and six were wounded. Selma Yel and Ahmet Gündüz, "1893 (H. 1309) Yılında Yozgat'ta Hınçak Komitesinin Tertip Etmiş Olduğu Kilise Hadisesi," *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, no. 31, (2008). In the aftermath the Church Incident in Yozgat, 105 Armenians were tried and punished. The Ottoman archival documents (BOA, Y.PRK.AZN. 7/42) provide the names of the convicts and the punishment they received.

to the Armenian community, seized the opportunity to stir up race hatred for purposes of their own.”⁸⁰⁴

This tragic event heralded the appointment of Memduh as governor of Ankara, which served as a stepping-stone for him to further advance in his career. The crisis in Yozgat alarmed the central administration considerably. Abidin Pasha, governor of Ankara, and Şevki Bey, *mutasarrıf* of Yozgat, were immediately dismissed from office on 15 December 1893. The former was replaced by Memduh⁸⁰⁵ and the latter by Bahaeddin Bey, governor of Dedeğaç in the Balkans two years earlier. Furthermore, the police forces were reinforced and a new Chief of Police was assigned in order to restore order and confidence in the sanjak.⁸⁰⁶

Memduh’s appointment to Ankara upon an Armenian riot in Yozgat can be interpreted in various ways: although he was unemployed for a year, Memduh did not fall from the grace of the court and apparently the sultan was content with his *modus operandi*, particularly with regard to the Armenian question, and he seemed to be convinced of Memduh’s administrative competence in coping with an acute crisis such as the one that broke out in Yozgat. It is striking that another tragic event, severe famine, brought him to the governorship of

⁸⁰⁴ FO 424 (175), Inclosure 1 in No. 258, Consul Cumberbutch to Sir A. Nicolson December 12, 1893, Angora.

FO 424 (175), No. 258, Sir A. Nicolson to the Earl Rosebery, December 18, 1893, Constantinople.

⁸⁰⁵ BOA, BEO. 328/24531, 7 Cemaziyelahir 1311/16 December 1893.

Memduh was appointed to Ankara, Abidin Pasha, ex-governor of Ankara, to the province of Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid, Akif Pasha, the governor of Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid, was retired from the governorship. Memduh was informed about his assignment the day after the event, on December 13, 1893. However, Abidin Pasha was not immediately informed about his removal. He came to know the situation once Memduh arrived in Ankara.

In his personnel record, his appointment to Ankara was recorded as below. As in the case of Sivas, his salary was seventeen thousand kuruş. BOA, DH.SAİD. 1/84, 29 Zilhicce 1255/4 March 1840.

⁸⁰⁶ FO 424 (178), Inclosure 2 in No. 2, Consul Cumberbutch to Sir A. Nicolson December 16, 1893, Angora.

FO 424 (178), No. 2, Sir A. Nicolson to the Earl Rosebery, December 30, 1893, Constantinople.

Konya in 1887. This might have been by virtue of his crisis management skills or his being practical in establishing order and taking radical measures during an emergency.

Getting back to the incident in Yozgat, as the court took the situation seriously, a Commission of Inquiry was also quickly dispatched to the spot. The commission comprised high profile functionaries including Hilmi Paşa (commission president, general of an army division, and member of the Commission of Inspection at the War Office), Osman Pasha (a brigadier general and member of staff at the War Office), Hakkı Bey (a colonel and member of the Gendarmerie Council), Husni Bey (chief of the Correspondence Department at the Ministry of the Interior), and Mihalaki Efendi (proctor-general at Pera).⁸⁰⁷

Memduh, as governor of Ankara, and the commission members were sent by private train from Istanbul to Ankara,⁸⁰⁸ and Memduh was given a travel allowance for the journey.⁸⁰⁹ Immediately after Memduh's appointment to the governorate of Ankara, the court wrote to the head of the Provincial Treasury of that province to facilitate the new governor's work. In the telegram, Memduh was praised for being mature and good-natured and the head of the Provincial Treasury was kindly advised to work in cooperation with him to ensure good

⁸⁰⁷ FO 424 (178), Inclosure 3 in No. 2, Consul Cumberbutch to Sir A. Nicolson December 19, 1893, Angora.

FO 424 (178), No.2, Sir A. Nicolson to the Earl Rosebery, December 18, 1893, Constantino

BOA, İ.HUS. 19/14, 4 Cemaziyelahir 1311/13 December 1893.

⁸⁰⁸ BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK. 34/70, 5 Cemaziyelahir 1311/14 December 1894.

On 3 January 1892, a year before his dismissal, Abidin Pasha wrote to the central administration to be appointed to either Konya or Adana. BOA, DH.MKT. 1907/29, 2 Cemaziyelahir 1309, 3 January 1892. After a few weeks, he wrote again to reject the claims about him such as oppressing the public. BOA, Y.EE. 87/70, 22 Cemaziyelahir 1309/23 January 1892. On 12 February 1894, two months after his dismissal, he wrote to the capital again, this time to remind the court about his services in Ankara and express that he was innocent in the Armenian events that happened in Yozgat on 12 December (the Church Incident). BOA, Y.A.HUS. 290/33, 6 Şaban 1311/12 February 1894.

⁸⁰⁹ BOA, İ.HUS. 19/11, 4 Cemaziyelahir 1311/12 February 1893.

governance in the province.⁸¹⁰ Moreover, Memduh received a telegram of congratulation on his appointment from the imperial court on 15 December 1893.⁸¹¹

Perceived as “disquieting,” the appointment of Memduh to Ankara was not well received by the British authorities in the region. In his dispatch drafted on 16 December 1893, Arthur Nicholson⁸¹² expressed his concerns, quoted below, about the newly appointed governor. According to him,

ever since his removal from his former post, [Memduh] has been active in circulating warnings as to the very serious nature of the Armenian movement, and there were suspicious that he had been encouraging agitation indirectly among the Armenians with a view of giving color to his report. His selection at this moment show that the Palace is inclined to give credence to his views, and he will, I fear, not lose the opportunity of exhibiting his zeal by exaggerating the situation, and embarking on severe measures of repression. He has also a bad reputation for corruption, and it is most unfortunate that should replace so able and impartial a Governor as Abedin Pasha.⁸¹³

In the morning of 19 December 1893, the Commission of Inquiry, most presumably with Memduh, left Ankara for Yozgat to inspect the sanjak and restore order. However, the task of restoring order was a difficult and, as proved, a long-term process. Investigation, trials, and judgments took months. Moreover, in the beginning of February 1894, another conflict took place between the Armenians and Muslims in Yozgat. A police commissioner and couple of gendarmes went to the house of an Armenian named Kirkor (Karakin), summoned to be tried at the court. Kirkor refused to obey the summons and a fight between him and the officials resulted in the death of the police commissioner. While the gendarmes were taking the offender to the government office, Armenians in the neighborhood tried to rescue him. Taking

⁸¹⁰ BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK. 34/32, 5 Cemaziyelahir 1311/13 February 1893.

“Ankara Vilayeti valiliğine tayin buyrulan atufetlü Memduh Bey efendi hazretleri gayet haluk ve mütemezzic....İnşallah müşarünileyh hazretleriyle bir kere başbaşa virüb hüsn-i idare-i maslahat ve kemal-i inşirah ve inbisat ile imrar-i eyyam-ı mes’adete muvaffak olursunuz. Cenab-ı hak tevfik-i ilahiyesini refik buyursun...”

⁸¹¹ BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK. 34/34/6 Cemaziyelahir 1311/14 February 1893.

⁸¹² Arthur Nicolson was secretary of the British embassy in Istanbul.

⁸¹³ FO 424 (175), No. 257 Sir A. Nicolson to the Earl Rosebery, December 16, 1893, Pera

the side of the gendarmes, a group of Muslims attacked the Armenians and consequently a few individuals were killed and some were wounded from both sides. A Muslim named Çolak Hüseyin was convicted of the murder of an Armenian, Mendan Bedros' son Serkis, and eventually he was executed. Those involved in the injury were put on penal servitude.⁸¹⁴ Although he did not give any name in his long telegraph, Memduh immediately wrote to the capital enlightening the court about the conflict that occurred in Yozgat on 1 February 1894.⁸¹⁵

According to Cumberbatch, the events of 1 February happened on account of the spirit of animosity that had been aroused by the strict measures the government implemented owing to its readiness to place the whole blame on the Armenians and of the government's "persistence in viewing the disturbances in a revolutionary light, instead of discriminating between what may at the most be called acts of insubordination under provocation and the machinations of "Committee" agents who, with few exceptions, have managed to elude occurrences."⁸¹⁶ At this juncture, remembering a statement of Cumberbatch may help us to have a balanced view of the situation. In one of his reports to the British embassy in Istanbul, he stated that "it is only natural to

⁸¹⁴ BOA, Y.A.RES. 69/16, 27 Receb 1311/6 February 1894.

The British consul's account of the event is below.

On the 1st February, the police attempted the arrest of Kehribardji Kirkor, but he, fearing from ill-treatment inflicted on prisoners, refused to go. A conflict ensued, and he wounded the Police Commissary with a revolver and escaped. His house and those of the neighbors were surrounded by the police....the next day morning Kirkor was caught and bound by armed men after a struggle in which he was wounded.

FO 424 (178), Inclosure 1 in No. 59, Consul Cumberbatch to Sir P. Currie, Angora, February 26, 1894.

No. 59, Sir P. Currie to the Earl of Kimberley (Received March 16) (No. 111) Constantinople, March 11, 1894.

⁸¹⁵ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 32/11, 26 Receb 1311/2 February 1894.

⁸¹⁶ FO 424 (178), Inclosure 2 in No. 101, Consul Cumberbatch to Sir P. Currie, Angora, April 13, 1894.

No. 101, Sir P. Currie to the Earl of Kimberley (Received April 23) (No. 111) Constantinople, April 17, 1894.

suppose that the scenes have been described to me in light as favorable as possible to the Armenians.”⁸¹⁷

Armenians from Yozgat sent petitions to the imperial palace providing names of Muslims who were involved in activities such as plundering, injuring, and murdering during the fighting. The palace wrote to the governorship of Ankara on 22 February 1894, underlining the importance of being impartial in dealing with the conflicts in Yozgat and reminding that not taking action against those who were reported by the Armenians would cause negative effects.⁸¹⁸

While Cumberbatch asserted that the conflicts in Yozgat continued due to the government’s harsh measures, Memduh argued the exact opposite, stating that public order and safety could not be restored in Yozgat since mid-December 1893 because the Inquiry Commission failed to take serious measures. Hence, he wrote to the palace to complain about the commission and to express the necessity of taking firm action against the Armenian armed activities by proclaiming martial law and dispatching a battalion to Yozgat.⁸¹⁹ Thereupon, the palace immediately ordered Hilmi Pasha, the president of the commission, to proclaim martial law in the sanjak on the ground that the Armenian gangs were intensifying their activities; the palace also ordered that they had to be tried and punished without delay.⁸²⁰ Hilmi Pasha proclaimed martial law on the next day, 4 February 1894. The chain of events attested that the words of Memduh with regard to the Armenian issue were highly valued at the Yıldız Palace.

Not long after the declaration of martial law, Hilmi Pasha was replaced by Mustafa Pasha, General of Division (*Levazımat-ı Umumiye Dördüncü Şubesi*

⁸¹⁷ FO 424 (178), Inclosure 1 in No. 59 Consul Cumberbatch to Sir P. Currie, February 26, 1894, Angora.

FO 424 (178), No. 59, Sir P. Currie to the Earl of Kimberley, March 11, 1894, Constantinople.

⁸¹⁸ BOA, Y.A.HUS. 291.6, 16 Şaban 1311/22 February 1894.

⁸¹⁹ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 29/30, 29 Receb 1311/5 February 1894.

⁸²⁰ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 29/30, 29 Receb 1311/5 February 1894.

Müdürü). As reported by Cumberbatch on 8 February 1894, Memduh left Ankara for Yozgat under the instruction of the government. Ali Rıza Pasha, the division general in command of Redifs at Ankara, was appointed acting governor, rather than the head of the provincial treasury, in a departure from the usual practice.⁸²¹ The assignment of a high ranked military officer, instead of a civil official, to the government office in the absence of the governor demonstrated the extent of the state's vigilance.

Upon the Armenians' complaints about the one-sided practice of the Inquiry Committee, Cumberbatch met with Memduh before he left for Yozgat. During the meeting, he requested the governor "try and instill a more impartial spirit in his subordinates and the judicial authorities" and gave him a list of Turks who were accused, by the Armenians, of being the chief instigators of and participants in the recent conflicts. Memduh, as stated by the consul in his dispatch, promised to make inquiries and deal strictly with them if they were really guilty.⁸²²

In addition to above-quoted negative opinions about Memduh, Cumberbatch found the new administrative staff in Yozgat quite unsatisfactory. According to him, Mustafa Pasha was little known, the acting governor was "an ignorant and inexperienced officer," the acting *mutasarrif* was "a nonentity," the judicial authorities were "far from possessing the necessary qualifications," and the chief of the gendarmerie and his major assistants were "new men from Constantinople, with little or no local experience."⁸²³

⁸²¹ FO 424 (178), Inclosure 1 No. 50, Consul Cumberbatch to Sir A. Nicolson, February 9, 1894, Angora.

FO 424 (178), No. 50, Sir A. Nicolson to the Earl Rosebery, February 25, 1894, Constantinople.

⁸²² FO 424 (178), Inclosure 2 No. 50, Consul Cumberbatch to Sir A. Nicolson, February 12, 1894, Angora.

FO 424 (178), No. 50, Sir A. Nicolson to the Earl Rosebery, February 25, 1894, Constantinople.

⁸²³ FO 424 (178), Inclosure 1 No. 50, Consul Cumberbatch to Sir A. Nicolson, February 9, 1894, Angora.

As soon as he came to Yozgat, Mustafa Pasha made a proclamation in which he explained what had been going on in recent months, the motives behind imposing direct military rule in the sanjak, and the measures he would implement, such as confiscating the firearms of all Armenians.⁸²⁴ According to Memduh, Armenians in Yozgat and its vicinity were obtaining banned weapons such as Karadağ revolvers and Martini-Henry guns from the ports of the provinces of Aydın and Trabzon, brought in by the Armenian and Alewits in the camel loads. Based on this information, the central administration warned the governors of these provinces to be careful of the Armenian and Alewit traders and transporters.⁸²⁵

Martial law did not instantly bring peace and security to Yozgat. Conflicts between Muslim and Armenian inhabitants and Armenian guerrilla activities, though smaller scale than the Church Incident, kept occurring in different localities of the sanjak in the ensuing months. Ten to fifteen Armenians who were affiliated with the revolutionary committee launched raids on Muslim villages and conflicts broke out.⁸²⁶ Armenian inhabitants of a village of Boğazlıyan, a district of Yozgat, refused to pay tax to the tax collectors and used force against them.⁸²⁷ Similar conflicts occurred in Sungurlu, a district of Yozgat, in April 1894, and Memduh went to the district to get involved personally with the situation.⁸²⁸ Once stability had been established in Yozgat, Memduh went to Kayseri, where antagonism between Muslims and Armenians had increased.⁸²⁹ Organized by Karayılan Mardiros, one of the leaders of the Armenian revolutionary committee in the region, a group of Armenians in Georgian attire

FO 424 (178), No. 50, Sir A. Nicolson to the Earl Rosebary, February 25, 1894, Constantinople.

⁸²⁴ BOA, Y.A.RES. 69/16, 27 Receb 1311/6 February 1894.

⁸²⁵ BOA, A.MKT.MHM. 645/1, 12 Şevval 1311/18 April 1894.

⁸²⁶ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 29/75, 3 Şevval 1311/9 April 1894.

⁸²⁷ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 29/30, 29 Receb 1311/8 February 1894.

BOA, DH.ŞFR. 163/83, 17 Receb 1311/24 January 1894.

⁸²⁸ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 29/86, 27 Şevval 1311/3 May 1894.

BOA, Y.A.HUS.294/81, 17 Şevval 1311/23 April 1894.

BOA, DH.ŞFR. 166/15, 26 Şevval 1311/2 May 1894.

⁸²⁹ BOA, Y.A.HUS. 291/91, 28 Şaban 1311/8 March 1894.

attacked Muslim villages.⁸³⁰ Later on, Armenian mobs went as far as murdering some of the Armenians from Yozgat who had remained loyal⁸³¹ to the Ottoman administration during the conflicts in 1893 and 1894.⁸³² On the other hand, making use of the situation, some Armenians, Greeks and Jews filed complaints about the Armenians they had personal conflicts with. This made things very difficult for the court martial. The central administration strictly warned the court martial in Yozgat to be careful about false complaints against Armenians, to remain alert to all possibilities, and to be vigilant against the acts and

⁸³⁰ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 29/75, 3 Şevval 1311/9 April 1894.

⁸³¹ Loyalty referred to compliance with the state authorities and sometimes took the form of informing the state authorities about the plans and activities of the Armenian committee. Those who reported Armenians who happened to be involved in inconvenient activities were rewarded or paid. BOA, Y.MTV. 80/73, 11 Muharrem 1311/25 July 1893.

BOA, A.}MKT.MHM. 618/9, 8 Cemaziyelahir 1313/26 December 1895.

BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 29/45, 26 Şaban 1311/4 March 1894.

BOA, DH.MKT. 158/40, 20 Ramazan 1311/27 March 1894.

⁸³² *"Gedikpaşa'da sâkin Rüsümât Eşyâ-yı Ayniye memurlarından Yozgatlı Senekerim Efendiyi revolver kurşunuyla cerh ve telef etmesinden dolayı derdest edilen Pazarköylü Nalband Karakin 11 Eylül sene 311 tarihinde Müdde-i Umûmîliğe tevdi' olunmuştur."* BOA, İ.DH. 1329/59, 5 Cemaziyelahir 1313/23 November 1895.

"Cemiyet-i fesadiyenin arz u ta'dâd olunan mukarrerâtından biri de Matbûât Daireleri memurlarından Tütüncüyan Mıgırdıç ve Hamparsum ve Nezâret memurîn-i hususiyesinden Mampre Efendilerin tevârih-i muhtelifede yine fedailer tarafından suret-i fecî'ada cerh ve itlaf edilmiş olmalarıyla sâbitdir." BOA, Y.PRK.ZB. 16/51, 15 Rebiülahir 1313/5 November 1895.

August 28, 1895 Memduh wrote to the court that as they murdered Hamparsum a few days ago the Armenian Committee was planning to murder family members of Hamparsum and some others who kept being loyal to the Ottoman state. *"Hamparsum'un Ermeni Komitesi tarafından geçen gün Dersââdet'de itlaf edildiği gibi birkaç güne kadar Dersââdet'deki pederiyle efrâd-ı ailesinin ve bu yolda ibrâz-ı hizmet ve sadakat eden sairlerinin dahi buldukları mahallerce imhası komitece mukarrer olduğu ve mahveliceklerin fotoğrafları da alınılmış idiğünden komite fedailerine dağıtıldığı haber verilmekle berây-ı malumât arz-ı keyfiyete ibtidâr kılındı."* BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 32/96, 8 Rebiülevvel 1313/29 August 1895.

Ohannes Efendi from Yozgat was also killed before his house at Kumkapı in the capital. Recep Karacakaya, "Ermeni Komitelerince Öldürülen Yozgatlı Ermeniler," *I. Uluslararası Bozok Sempozyumu Bildiri Kitabı, Vol 2*, 118-121.

The state put the relatives of those who were murdered during the Church Incident of Yozgat on the payroll. BOA, DH.MKT.232.72, 29 Şevval 1311/5 May 1894.

Sofizade Salih Efendi's father, wife and daughter, Eyüzbade Ahmed Efendi's wife, Ohan Arslanyan's family member Fikri Efendi, Camekyan Agop's wife and children were put on salary. BOA, DH.MKT. 391/45, 7 Muharrem 1313/30 June 1895.

attitudes of Armenians.⁸³³ A strict official warning was made not only for the sake of being fair but also for not giving a pretext to the Armenian Committee for complaining about the Ottoman state, which would result in foreign interference. This concern of the state, once more, attested to the internationalization of an internal affair of the empire related to non-Muslims of the empire.

The operation on the ground continued. The Ottoman security forces conducted a large-scale operation to search and seize the ringleader of the Armenian bands in the region, Morok, who was convicted of arming the Armenians in the vicinity of Yozgat, collecting money from the Armenian households for armament, creating military units in the Armenian villages, launching raids on Muslim villages, organizing the abovementioned riots in Yozgat, and plotting a general insurrection in May 1894.⁸³⁴ During the searches, gendarmes found some gunpowder and equipment for gunpowder production in an Armenian village called Albar.⁸³⁵

In the beginning of June, the governor of Boğazlıyan, a district of Yozgat, wrote to the Ministry of Interior that plenty of armed Armenians from Tiflis were planning to come to the village of Terziler to provoke the local Armenians with British support.⁸³⁶ Even though the conflict⁸³⁷ in that village did not entail any

⁸³³ *“Rum ve Musevi ahaliden bazıları icra-yı garaz için Ermenilerden sevmedikleri eşhas hakkında isnadatta buldukları gibi Ermeniler bile alekser beylerinde vukuu bulan münazaat-ı şahsiye üzerine yekdiğerine isnad-ı mefsedetle hükümete müracaat etmekte bulduklarından bu makule ihbarat üzerine dahi ariz ve amik tahkikat icra edilmedikçe hiçbir kimsenin tevkif edilmemesi velhasıl erbab-ı fesada vesile-i şikayet olunabilecek yanlışlık vukuuna katiyen meydan verilmemesi ve bu cümle ile beraber Ermenilerin her hal ve hareketi nazar-ı teftiştin dâr tutulmayarak her türlü ihtimale göre teyakkuzane ve mutabassırane hareket olunması zımında taşralarda icab eden memurlara talimat-ı munasibe ifası”*

BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 29/30, 29 Receb 1311/5 February 1894.

⁸³⁴ BOA, Y.PRK.AZN. 7/32, 7 Zilkade 1311/13 April 1894.

BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 29/86, 27 Şevval 1311/3 May 1894.

BOA, Y.A.HUS. 294/52, 15 Şevval 1311/21 April 1894.

⁸³⁵ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 29/94, 14 Zilkade 1311/19 May 1894.

⁸³⁶ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 166/99 , 29 Zilkade 1311/3 June 1894.

⁸³⁷ Five Armenians launched a raid on the village of Terziler to instigate a riot.

outside intervention, the tone of the governor's report demonstrated how the interference of outside factors such as the Russian Armenians and the British worried the Ottoman administrators. In the succeeding months of 1894, the officials from Ankara kept informing the capital about the preparations of Armenians for an armed uprising, which led to a kind of state of emergency in the region.⁸³⁸

Based on an extensive investigation, the court martial produced eighteen law reports on the 12 December Incident (the Church Incident), providing details about the eighteen cases of murder, attempted murder, and injury. The court martial tried 117 Armenians and on 16 July 1894, declared the names of offenders and judgments on them. In response to the arrest of the Armenian offenders, British authorities in Istanbul and Ankara began to mediate between the Ottoman state and the imprisoned Armenians for the release of the latter. Considering it as an interference into the internal affairs of the empire, the Ottoman leadership initially refused any mediation,⁸³⁹ but later on they could not resist the pressure and first released Karakin Efendi Koundouradjian, the Protestant Armenian preacher in Yozgat, who had strong ties with the British consulate for Ankara.

In order to mold public opinion in England against the Ottoman administration, which was the most valid pretext for the British government to adopt anti-Ottoman foreign policy, various articles as well as letters written by some Armenians from Ankara were published in the British newspapers.⁸⁴⁰ Moreover, protesting the imprisonment of Armenians in Ankara, public demonstrations were organized in London⁸⁴¹ and discussions were held in the British House of

BOA, Y.PRK.DH. 7/67, 29 Zilkade 1311/3 June 1894.

⁸³⁸ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 29/94, 14 Zilkade 1311/19 May 1894.

BOA, Y.A.HUS. 294/52, 15 Şevval 1311/21 April 1894.

⁸³⁹ BOA, Y.PRK.HRC. 19/17, 26 Ramazan 1311/2 April 1894.

⁸⁴⁰ BOA, HR.SFR.3..414/100, 18 Zilhicce 1310/3 July 1893.

BOA, HR.SYS. 2825/65, 22 Zilhicce 1310/7 July 1893.

⁸⁴¹ BOA, HR.SFR.3..414/107, 26 Zilhicce 1310/11 July 1893.

BOA, HR.SFR.3..415/5, 29 Zilhicce 1310/14 July 1893.

Commons.⁸⁴² The Ottoman diplomats delivered health reports and various statistical data about the arrested Armenians and published some articles in the *Morning Advertiser* in order to disclaim the accusations against the Ottoman state, such as forging evidence, suborning, and torturing.⁸⁴³ In the light of these, Memduh argued that Armenian uprisings in Yozgat were instigated by the propaganda of the Armenian agitators and the European politicians' support via mass media.⁸⁴⁴ Both Memduh and the political authorities in Istanbul were sure that the chain of events of Ankara, Sivas, and Bitlis that occurred in the 1890s were organized by the Armenian agitators from outside the empire.⁸⁴⁵

The central administration and Memduh were trying to hard ameliorate the situation in Ankara. Consul Cumberbatch reported from Ankara to P. Currie in Istanbul on 24 January 1895, that he was visited by a group of Armenians from Yozgat who were "not well disposed towards the Government" but also declared that the relations between Turks and Armenians had shown some improvement in recent weeks, "owing to a more friendly attitude on the part of the authorities." This development in Yozgat was, according to Cumberbatch, "mainly due to instruction from Constantinople to the Vali, who admitted as much in the course of a conversation" the consul had with him on 23 January. Confirming the statement of the Armenians from Yozgat, Cumberbatch admitted that he "noticed a better disposition on the part of Memdouh Pasha towards Armenians."⁸⁴⁶

BOA, HR.SYS. 2585/69, 1 Safer 1311/14 July 1893.

⁸⁴² BOA, HR.SFR.3..415/24, 3 Safer 1311/16 August 1893.

⁸⁴³ BOA, HR.SFR.3..416/76, 18 Safer 1311/31 August 1893.

BOA, HR.SFR.3..416/84, 22 Safer 1311/4 September 1893.

BOA, DH.MKT. 130/41, 29 Safer 1311/24 October 1895.

BOA, Y.A.HUS. 279/132, 21 Safer 1311/16 October 1895.

BOA,HR.SYS. 187/7, 12 Rebiülahir 1311/23 October 1893.

BOA, HR.SFR. 3.415/64, 27 Rebiülahir 1311/7 Zilkade 1893.

⁸⁴⁴ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 166/64 , 15 Zilkade 1311/20 May 1894.

BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 29/96, 15 Zilkade 1311/20 May 1894.

⁸⁴⁵ BOA, HR.SYS. 2778/33, 14 Receb 1311/21 January 1894.

⁸⁴⁶ FO 424, 1895-A, Inclosure in No. 128, Consul Cumberbatch to P. Currie, Angora, January 24, 1895.

No. 128. P. Currie to the Earl of Kimberley, Constantinople, January 29, 1895.

With regard to Armenian revolutionary activism in Yozgat during the first half of 1894, the stances of the Armenians denominations were varied. As Cumberbatch observed, Catholic Armenians carefully abstained from participating in the recent Armenian movement. On the other hand, the Gregorian Armenians were quite active in the conflicts. With respect to Gregorians' contribution to the tumult in the sanjak, Cumberbatch referred to the Ottoman officials' opinion according to which the Gregorian Armenians were heartened in their sedition by the belief that "Russia were going to take up their cause, as she did that of the Serbs and Bulgarians while the Protestant Armenians have been worked upon by the American Missions, which are regarded as hotbeds of revolution."⁸⁴⁷

In the early September 1894, an imperial decree was issued declaring that the Ottoman sultan pardoned the Armenian convicts, cancelling most of the penal servitudes and mitigating the capital punishments.⁸⁴⁸ The Yozgat Incident finally came to an end, but, in accordance with the Hunchak Party's memorandum⁸⁴⁹ and the Hunchak meeting in New York on 28 July 1894,⁸⁵⁰ the province of Ankara continued to witness small-scale conflicts in the ensuing months.⁸⁵¹

During the tumultuous months in Yozgat, Memduh had a very hectic schedule, traveling from one district to another to settle the conflicts.⁸⁵² Çorum and its vicinity also witnessed Armenian riots in the same period.⁸⁵³ Memduh mobilized

⁸⁴⁷ FO 424 (178), No. 51, Sir P. Currie to the Earl Rosebery, Febraury 25, 1894, Constantinople.

⁸⁴⁸ BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK. 37/66, 1 Rebiülevvel 1312/2 September 1894.

BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK. 65/1, 1 Rebiülevvel 1312/2 September 1894.

BOA, Y.A.RES. 5/12, 12 Cemaziyelevvel 1312/11 November 1894.

⁸⁴⁹ Hüseyin Nazım Paşa, *Ermeni Olayları Tarihi I* (Ankara, 1998), 159-160.

⁸⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 58-67, Document No: 15.

⁸⁵¹ BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK. 34/70, 9 Cemaziyelahir 1311/18 December 1893.

BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 29/30, 29 Receb 1311/5 February 1894.

More than half a year after the Church Incident, the British consul reported that there was no improvement in the relationship between the Muslims and Armenians and, under these circumstances, that there would be no change.

⁸⁵² BOA, DH.ŞFR. 170/17, 25 Cemaziyelevvel 1312/24 November 1894.

⁸⁵³ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 170/31, 29 Cemaziyelevvel 1312/28 November 1894.

all the security forces at his disposal to cope with the Armenian mutinies, raids on post-coaches,⁸⁵⁴ and arson attempts.⁸⁵⁵ He visited Kayseri in March to deal with a conflict.⁸⁵⁶ At the end of April 1894, he was ordered to come back to his office located at the center of Ankara.⁸⁵⁷ In early June 1894, he wanted to go to Istanbul, but the palace did not allow him to leave Ankara because the situation in the province remained critical.⁸⁵⁸

Taking into account its actors, organization, and repercussions, the Yozgat Incident was by no means a local event. The sometimes tragic developments that unfolded in the latter part of 1894 and then in 1895 and 1896 proved that the conflict in Yozgat was indeed part of a series of events related to that Armenian issue that has been described as the 1894-1896 Crisis in late Ottoman historiography.⁸⁵⁹ As an agent of the state in an Anatolian province, Memduh

⁸⁵⁴ The Armenian bandits' raids on mail-coaches, telegraph lines, and railroads were quite frequent in the region during that time, and Memduh reinforced the security forces to cope with this problem. BOA, DH.ŞFR. 170/82, 20 Rebiülevvel 1312/21 September 1894.

BOA, Y.A.HUS. 314/102, 8 Cemaziyelahir 1312/7 December 1894.

On October 12, 1895, the acting British consul in Ankara, Raphael A. Fontana, reported that the assistant procurer of Çorum, a district of Yozgat, accompanied by his family and the director of the branch office of the Regie, was robbed and injured, in the knee, on the way to Sivas. Authorities in Sivas acted promptly and dispatched nine zabtiehs to catch the band. The highwaymen were caught but Mulazim, who was leading the zabtieh forces, and seven zabtiehs were killed and others were wounded in the firefight. As stated by Fontana, the motive behind the attack on the assistant proctor was not known: "He is believed, however, to have been instrumental in the condemnation, at various times, of a large number of Armenians." FO 424 (184), Inclosure in No. 192, Acting Consul Fontana to Sir P. Currie, Angora, October 12, 1895.

No. 192, Sir P. Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury (Received October 29) (No. 699) Constantinople, October 21, 1895.

Memduh's demands for reinforcement of the armed forces in the province were not always heeded, as the capital had to reinforce all the Anatolian provinces as well as the capital during the 1894-1896 Crisis.

BOA, A.} MKT.MHM. 618/2, 5 Cemaziyevvel 1313/24 October 1895.

⁸⁵⁵ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 31/22, 22 Cemaziyüahir 1312/21 December 1894.

⁸⁵⁶ BOA, Y.A.HUS. 291/91, 28 Şaban 1311/8 March 1894.

⁸⁵⁷ BOA, İ.HUS. 23/37, 23 Şevval 1311/29 April 1894.

⁸⁵⁸ BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK. 36/61, 5 Zilhicce 1311/9 June 1894.

⁸⁵⁹ Details of this crisis are discussed in the subsequent chapter of the thesis, "Restructuring the Hamidian Imperial Context."

personally witnessed and was involved in the resolution process of conflicts on the ground.

4.4.3 Crisis and Opportunity

Memduh successfully completed the first and the most critical two months of his service in Ankara. Assuming that the time was ripe to appeal for appreciation, he wrote to the court to ask for a salary increase.⁸⁶⁰ When he was governor in Konya, Sivas, and Ankara, Memduh's salary was consistently 17,000 kuruş.⁸⁶¹ In the beginning of February 1894, Memduh, then in Ankara, was informed via telegram that his salary was to be increased from 17,000 to 22,000 kuruş.⁸⁶² However, at the end of February 1894 he received another telegram stating that his salary was still 17,000 kuruş. In response, Memduh wrote to the Mabeyn requesting the fulfillment of the promise made in the previous correspondence between the central administration and him. As usual, he raised the largeness of his family as a pretext to convince the sultan of his financial need. Moreover, in order to persuade the central administration to increase his salary, he also stated that people in Ankara could interpret the pay decrease as his having fallen out of favor with the sultan, in view of the fact that

Besides all parts of Ankara (BOA, A.}MKT.MHM. 618/4, 13 Cemazeyilevvel 1313/1 November 1895; BOA, DH.ŞFR. 183/78, 18 Cemazeyilevvel 1313/6 November 1895) Armenian events broke out in Sivas (BOA, DH.ŞFR. 166/99, 29 Zilkade 1311/3 June 1894), Refahiye (BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 33/11, 5 Cemazeyilevvel 1313/24 October 1895), Bitlis (BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 33/13, 6 Cemazeyilevvel 1313/25 October 1895), Gümüşhane (BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 33/16, 7 Cemazeyilevvel 1313/26 October 1895), Erzincan and Bayburt (BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 33/20, 9 Cemazeyilevvel 1313/28 October 1895), Erzurum (BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 33/24, 11 Cemazeyilevvel 1313/30 October 1895), Zeytun (BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 33/21, 11 Cemazeyilevvel 1313/30 October 1895; BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 33/22, 11 Cemazeyilevvel 1313/30 October 1895), Diyarbakır (BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 33/27, 14 Cemazeyilevvel 1313/2 November 1895; BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 33/32, 16 Cemazeyilevvel 1313/4 November 1895), Maraş and Aytap (BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 33/28, 14 Cemazeyilevvel 1313/2 November 1895), Adana and Kozan (BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 33/29, 14 Cemazeyilevvel 1313/2 November 1895), Trabzon, Dersim, Malatya, and Arabkir (BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 33/33, 17 Cemazeyilevvel 1313/5 November 1895; BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 33/35, 17 Cemazeyilevvel 1313/5 November 1895), Hınıs and Pasinler (BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 33/34, 17 Cemazeyilevvel 1313/5 November 1895).

⁸⁶⁰ BOA, Y.MTV. 91/18, 19 Şaban 1311/25 February 1894.

Demanding wage increase was usual among the governors during the Hamidian era. Abdülhamid'in Valileri.

⁸⁶¹ BOA, DH.SAİD. 1/84, 29 Zilhicce 1255/4 March 1840.

⁸⁶² BOA, Y.MTV. 91/18, 19 Şaban 1311/25 February 1894.

the countrymen tended to overinterpret affairs without understanding the real cause.⁸⁶³

As this and many other examples prove, Memduh, like all governors in the Hamidian regime, made use of every opportunity to communicate with the sultan. Even though when he was the Minister of Interior he complained about the governors' by-passing of the Sublime Port,⁸⁶⁴ as the official correspondence attests, over the course of his governorship he generally made direct contact with the sultan, treating him as the sole authority and by-passing the Sublime Porte. This was indeed not merely a personal preference. For efficient and smooth communication between center and periphery, the sultan mobilized all the tools and technology at his disposal, including the telegraph, the railroad, and photography. The use of the telegraph greatly facilitated the penetration of the ever-centralizing nineteenth century Ottoman state into far-flung regions of the empire.⁸⁶⁵ So, as Kırmızı has put it, "although the provincial law decentralized the administration by centralizing the power in the province, Abdülhamid II's policy collected all puppets strings in his hands."⁸⁶⁶ However, this created a tension between the sultan's palace and Sublime Porte.⁸⁶⁷

⁸⁶³ BOA, Y.MTV. 91/18, 19 Şaban 1311/25 February 1894.

⁸⁶⁴ Once, a scribe of the *Mabeyn*, the correspondence office at the sultan's court, visited Memduh, who was then the Minister of Interior, to ask about a statement dispatched by the governor of Ankara, who told the sultan that he had delivered it to the minister. Memduh told the scribe, "the governors submit their petitions to the sultan's court without respecting the authorities and not informing the Ministry; such a writing did not come, it would have been presented when it came and considered important." After receiving this statement of the minister, the sultan said that "if the petition has arrived and been hidden, I will make the Minister suffer pains of separation from his wife and children." The anecdote is from Mehmed Memduh, *Tanzimattan Meşrutiyete II: Kuvvet-i İktisat-Alâmet-i Zevâl, Tasvîr-i Ahvâl-Tenvir-i İstikbâl, Fevâri-i Ezmân*, ed. Ahmet Neziha Galitekin (Istanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1995), 42. The English translation of Memduh's account is taken from Abdulhamit Kırmızı, "Rulers of the Provincial Empire: Ottoman Governors and the Administration of Provinces, 1895-1908" (PhD Dissertation, Boğaziçi University, 2005), 109.

⁸⁶⁵ Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, 104.

⁸⁶⁶ Kırmızı, "Rulers of the Provincial Empire," 108.

Having said that, there is a need not to exaggerate the extent of the sultan's ability to reach accurate information about the provinces. Even though the sultan desired to receive genuine and detailed information about what was taking place in the capital and the provinces, as Kırmızı exemplified in his prosopography on the governors of

Getting back to the crisis in Ankara, the Armenian question continued to be the top issue in Ankara during Memduh's two years of governorship, which culminated in his appointment to the ministerial office in the midst of the 1894-1896 Crisis. That is to say, both his assignment to Ankara and his assignment to the Ministry of Interior were directly related to the Armenian issue and his performance with regard to this critical matter. Hence, it can be said that the 1894-1896 Crisis of the Ottoman state significantly contributed to Memduh's advancement in the Ottoman bureaucracy.

He was raised to the rank of vizier on 29 July 1894, probably for his services in the Yozgat events.⁸⁶⁸ The British Consul Cumberbatch's account of Memduh's elevation to the rank of vizier bears witness once more to his judgment about the governor. Upon hearing of Memduh's promotion, Cumberbatch reported from Ankara to Sir Philip Currie in the Ottoman capital

his (Memduh's) object in magnifying the Armenian troubles was to obtain the credit of putting down what he chose to call a "revolution." Now that he has obtained the desired object of his ambition, I think there is a chance of his modifying his policy towards Armenians, and I should not be surprised if the Sultan pardoned a good many of the men sentenced by the court-martial of Yozgat, and proclaimed an amnesty as was done after the great Ankara trial last year.⁸⁶⁹

Because Memduh was a smart and an experienced statesman who mastered the procedures of Ottoman politics and bureaucracy both in the capital and in

Hamidian regime between 1895 and 1908, in some cases, and for different reasons, governors misinformed the sultan. Dependent on the officials, particularly those working as the officials of the *Mabeyn* for the acquisition of information about the empire, the sultan could easily be misguided. Kırmızı noted that because the sultan was not always been informed promptly and correctly by the bureaucrats, there is possibly a need to reconsider the clichés about the extent of Hamidian absolutism. Kırmızı, *Abdülhamidin Valileri*, 105-109

⁸⁶⁷ For a thorough discussion on the tension between the palace and the Porte in the Hamidian era see Chapter 3 of the thesis.

⁸⁶⁸ BOA, İ.TAL. 58/8, 25 Muharrem 1312/29 July 1894.

On the next day, Memduh expressed his gratitude to the sultan for being promoted. BOA, Y.EE. 88/2, 26 Muharrem 1312/30 July 1894.

⁸⁶⁹ FO 424 (178), Inclosure 1 in No. 181 Consul Cumberbatch to Sir P. Currie, August 1, 1894, Angora.

FO 424 (178), No. 181, Sir P. Currie to the Earl of Kimberley, July 30, 1894, Therapia.

the provinces⁸⁷⁰ as well as the sultan's sensitivities, Cumberbatch does not seem to be overstating Memduh's potential to turn the crisis into an opportunity. Equipped with administrative, political, and discursive competence, through experience, observation, and patrimonial ties, he, without question, was able to maneuver in the field of power. Notwithstanding the fact that the Yozgat incident was part of a large-scale crisis seriously threatening the empire, it was a real chance for Memduh to manifest his administrative capabilities as well as his allegiance to Ottoman imperial integrity. His promotion to the positions of vizier and Minister of Interior proved that he managed to attract the sultan's favor.

4.4.4. Alewites & Armenians

As emphasized above, the Armenian question remained the most important issue in the context of Ankara during Memduh's governorship. This served as a pretext for him to request from the central administration, as soon as he was appointed to Ankara, to transfer some of the officials with whom he used to work in Sivas to Ankara. He wanted Tahir Bey, the director of education in Sivas, to be appointed as the director of education in Ankara, and Mehmed Bey, the Commander of Gendarmerie of Amasya, sanjak of Sivas, to be the Commander Gendarmerie of Ankara on account of their experience with the Armenian issue in Sivas. Furthermore, hoping to persuade the court of the necessity of transferring these functionaries to Ankara, Memduh cleverly linked them with the Alewite community of the region.

Using every opportunity to draw the sultan's attention to his accomplishments in the provinces he governed, Memduh began his petition, in which he asked for the transfer of Tahir Bey and Mehmed Bey to Ankara, with a denigration of the previous governors of Ankara.⁸⁷¹ He said that the messiness and the poor

⁸⁷⁰ His mastery of the Ottoman political and administrative system and history is evident in the books he authored in the post-1908 period, particularly the one titled *Hal'ler ve İclâslar*.

⁸⁷¹ Memduh's attempt to ingratiate himself in the eyes of the imperial court and the public by blaming the bygone regime's functionaries for the existing wrongdoings is

conditions proved that the province had been neglected for six or seven years.⁸⁷² Before requesting the appointment of the abovementioned functionaries, Memduh provided an elaborate explanation about the Alewite community in the provinces of Sivas and Ankara. This petition and some other reports he dispatched to the palace clearly demonstrated Memduh's perspective on the Alewites, a denomination of Islam that had an intricate relationship with the Ottoman central state.

According to Memduh's petition, in Sivas there were more than a hundred thousand people having Muslim names such as Ali, Hasan, and Veli but since the state did not rescue them from the trap of ignorance, they bore animosity against their coreligionists and an inclination towards Armenians. He asserted that during his governorship in Sivas he had done his utmost effort to rectify (*islah*) the Alewite community through education and religious preaching. By giving credit to the director of education, Tahir Bey, for the rectification of the Alewites of Sivas, Memduh endeavored to convince the central administration of the need to transferr Tahir Bey to Ankara for the correction of the Alewites of Ankara. This group of people were problematic, from Memduh's point of view, not only because of their beliefs and rituals but also because of their predisposition towards the Armenians. Alewites' being disposed to the cause of Armenians had been used by the Europeans as a pretext to criticize the Ottoman leadership, saying that even the Muslims of the empire were complaining about the Ottoman administration.

identified as "*devr-i sabık yaratmak*" (inventing an ancien regime) in the Ottoman political culture. For more examples see Kırmızı's *Abdülhamid'in Valileri*. Redhouse Türkçe/Osmanlıca –İngilizce Sözlük, 17th edition (Istanbul: Sev Matbaacılık, 1999), 292.

⁸⁷²"...bu vilayete altı-yedi sene bakılmamış olduğunu iğtişas-ı ahval irae ve isbat ediyor" BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 29/40, 19 Şaban 1311/25 February 1894. Although not common, some governors disclosed the failures of their predecessors. As Osman Pasha of Yannina (BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 51/39, 12 Şaban 1318/5 December 1900), Reşid Akif Bey of Sivas (*The 1321 Yearbook of Sivas*, 221).

Furthermore, asserting that it was teachers at their schools who were confusing and poisoning the Armenians in the first place, Memduh linked the necessity of transferring the director of education with the Armenian issue. With regard to shifting the Commander of Gendarmerie of Amasya to Ankara, Memduh referred to the commander's substantial contribution to the security of the sanjak in the face of Armenian question.⁸⁷³ Despite all his insistence, the central administration did not respond positively to Memduh's demands, and these two functionaries remained in Sivas. This anecdote perfectly exemplified Memduh's tendency to manipulate the concerns of the sultan, such as the Armenian issue and the Alewites, to realize his personal objectives, such as staffing.

Although he took every opportunity to use these two matters for his personal ambitions, as his policies and discourse attested, Memduh seemed to believe wholeheartedly that the Armenian question and the Alewites and their collaboration against Muslims posed a great danger to the integrity of the empire, and hence that the state authorities should take necessary measures, without any delay, in the form of education and control.⁸⁷⁴ Memduh was acquainted with these issues from his Sivas years. Memduh skillfully transferred the experience and knowledge he gained and the personal and operational network he created in Sivas to the context of Ankara. This is mostly because of the proximity of these two provinces and the wide range of characteristics they had in common, including ethno-religious composition, social structure, and geography. Indeed, the sultan might have decided to appoint Memduh to Ankara by taking into account the possibility of transfer of experience. As will be addressed in the next chapter, he successfully transferred the experience he obtained in the provincial contexts into his ministerial period.

⁸⁷³ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 29/40, 19 Şaban 1311/25 February 1894.

⁸⁷⁴ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 29/77, 16 Şevval 1311/22 April 1894.

Revealing his pro-Muslim, or, more precisely, pro-Sunni standpoint, Memduh wrote some statements and petitions⁸⁷⁵ about the Alewite community of Ankara, most of whom inhabited in the sanjaks of Kırşehir and Yozgat. He not only disclosed the intimacy between Alewites and Armenians but also provided historical and factual data about the Alewites. For him, being utterly ignorant, this community deviated from the original Islamic creed so much that other than their names they had nothing indicating that they were believers of Islam. Even though in appearance they identified as Muslim, they were indeed practicing all sorts of activities unlawful according to Islam, and the worst part was that they had intimate relations with the Armenians. Making a sweeping statement about the Alewites, Memduh asserted that this community hated the Sunni Muslims and betrayed them on all occasions throughout history. While they were taking every occasion to express their hatred of their Sunni neighbors, they got along well with their Armenian ones. Alewites and Armenians not only respected each other's beliefs and rituals but also mingled with each other. Memduh even claimed that Alewites asserted that the difference between these two communities was as slight as onionskin and if this difference was eliminated they could be deemed as Armenian. Memduh continued his bold arguments about the Alewites with an explanation about the branches of this community in this region and the *cem* ceremony, the most characteristic communal worship of Alewites, by laying particular emphasis on the aspects of drinking, dancing, and intermingling between men and women during the *cem*. He went so far as to say that if a Sunni Muslim by chance came to the place of *cem* the Alewites would murder him as a sacrifice to their lodge and that such cases had happened many times in the past.⁸⁷⁶

⁸⁷⁵ He wrote not only to the imperial court about the Alewites but also to the religious authorities (*meşihat*) in the capital. He pointed out the need for a special inspection committee to come up with an urgent solution to the ignorance and unorthodox beliefs of this community, who were also suffering from poverty. BOA, İ.HUS. 24/107, 11 Zilkade 1311/16 May 1894.

⁸⁷⁶ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 29/77, 16 Şevval 1311/22 April 1894.

According to Memduh's report, the martial court, which was created to investigate and carry out the judicial process relating to the Armenian Incident in Yozgat, discovered the complicity between Alewites and Armenians during the events. As a solution, Memduh proposed that the state should set up a school and a mosque in every village and that Sunni imams should be assigned to convert the Alewites to the Sunni faith.⁸⁷⁷ Rekindling a concern of the Ottoman state, Memduh warned the imperial court that it was not safe to leave such an ignorant, unguided, and crowded Alewite community to their own devices in the middle of Anatolia in view of the fact that they were disposed to the Shias of Persia. He continued by arguing that if Shia preachers and scholars came to this region, the Alewites would easily merge with them and thereby the Shia doctrine would spread rapidly across Anatolia, which in turn would cause a political turbulence for the Ottoman state. Hence, the state authorities promptly had to take radical measures against such a possibility.⁸⁷⁸

In another writing, Memduh repeated his concerns about the threats Alewites posed, their close connection with Armenians, and the need to establish a school and a mosque in each village where Alewites were living on the ground that they went astray basically due to ignorance.⁸⁷⁹ In each case, he kept requesting the transfer of Tahir Bey from Sivas to Ankara as the director of education by directly linking him with the Alewites.⁸⁸⁰ Nevertheless, as stated above, neither Tahir Bey nor Mehmed Bey was assigned to Ankara. Memduh's insistence on the transfer of his staff from Sivas to Ankara might have caused suspicion in the capital, given that he had a bad reputation of collaborating with the men he was working with for personal interests. The imperial palace might have desired to pull Memduh's strings firmly during his service in Ankara.

⁸⁷⁷ The idea of inculcating Sunni tradition through schools and mosques was part of the repertoire for coping with "heretics" such as Yezidis in that period. Deringil, *Well Protected Domains*, 71.

⁸⁷⁸ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 29/77, 16 Şevval 311/22 April 1894.

⁸⁷⁹ BOA, BEO. 384/28766, 8 Şevval 1311/14 April 1894.

⁸⁸⁰ BOA, BEO. 384/28766, 8 Şevval 1311/14 April 1894.

4.4.5. Clash with Halil Bey

Memduh used the Alewite issue to charge the governor of Sivas, Halil Bey. As stated earlier, he claimed that Halil Bey, the governor of Sivas, was supporting the Alewites.⁸⁸¹ Halil Bey defended himself by saying that he would not even support his family members if they were involved in activities against the consent of the sultan, let alone Alewites. Halil Bey reminded the court about Memduh's corruptions in Havza, a district of Sivas, where he appropriated the water resource of an old waqf to establish a private thermal hotel and exiled those who objected to his activities by falsely accusing them. In the same petition, Halil Bey also expressed his annoyance at Memduh's meddling in the affairs of Sivas even though this province was beyond his authority. For instance, Memduh collaborated with the police commissioner of Sivas to procure intelligence about the events unfolding in that province. Memduh entered into a secret correspondence with the commissioner regarding the Armenian bandits' raid on a mail-coach in Sivas.⁸⁸² Halil Bey managed to decipher this correspondence in which the commissioner wrote to Memduh that there was one Alewite among the Armenian bandits who raided the mail-

⁸⁸¹ In the Hamidian system governors were sometimes used, by the capital, to control neighboring provinces. Voluntarily undertaking this mission, Memduh was among the governors who denounced their counterparts. For instance, Ferid Pasha of Konya complained about the governor of Bursa (Hüdavendigâr) for his inability to hinder the tobacco smuggling which affecting the vicinity of Konya. BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 53/37, 11-9-1318.

Conflict between the governors was more common in the Arab provinces. The following list of documents includes details about the conflict between Reşid Mümtaz, governor of Beirut, and Nazım Pasha, governor of Syria, who were not on good terms and corresponded with the central administration for a long period of time.

BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 60/31, 12 Receb 1320/15 October 1905.

BOA, PRK.UM. 48/75, 4 Receb 1317/8 November 1899.

BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 57/40, 3 Şevval 1319/13 January 1902.

BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 45/71, 3 Zilhicce 1316/14 April 1899.

A series of complaints between the governor of Mount Lebanon and the governor of Beirut resulted in the removal of the latter.

Engin Deniz Akarlı, "Ottoman Attitudes Towards Lebanese Emigration, 1885-1910" in *The Lebanese in the World: A Century of Emigration*, eds. Albert Hourani & Nadim Shehadi (London: The Centre of Lebanese Studies and LB. Tauries & Co Ltd, 1992), 126-127.

⁸⁸² The Armenian bandits' raid on the mail-coach in the district of Tokat was reported on 3 September 1894.

BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 30/49, 2 Rebiülevvel 1312/3 September 1894.

coach. Although there was only one Alewite, Memduh put mounting pressure on the commissioner to disclose Alewites' cooperation with the Armenians in such a threatening event. Interestingly, on the same day, Memduh wrote to the court that he tried to collaborate via telegraph with the governor of Sivas, Halil Bey, against the raiders of the Yozgat mail-coach, but Halil Bey was quite aggressive and threatening towards him.⁸⁸³

Memduh seemed to be watching for an opportunity to find not only fault with Halil Bey, which might possibly strengthen Memduh's hand in the region, but also evidence regarding the alliance between Armenians and Alewites. Halil Bey asserted that Memduh wanted to connect the Alewite issue to all sorts of events and sometimes what he was doing was virtually fabricating false evidence.⁸⁸⁴ On 12 September 1894, Halil Bey once more wrote to the court to complain about Memduh's interference in the affairs of Sivas. He even asserted that the chief the Ankara gendarmerie, Ömer Efendi, who happened to be present in Sivas, was making some statements that caused a conflict between the Muslims and Alewites of Sivas. Halil Bey continued his assertion by saying that Ömer Efendi was indeed pushed by Memduh to act that way.⁸⁸⁵

Not long after this, Memduh once more sent a long petition to the court in which he asserted that Halil Bey was supporting the Bektashis and that a split between Sunnis and Bektashis would serve the purpose of the Armenians. He also reported that a teacher at an American school in Sivas named Hubert distributed a booklet about the four caliphs of Islam to the Alewites in Kangal, a district of Sivas. Moreover, this petition reported that in order to escape conscription in the military, Alewites were saying that they were Protestants.⁸⁸⁶

⁸⁸³ BOA, Y.MT. 103/24, 19 Safer 1312/22 August 1894.

⁸⁸⁴ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 30/54, 6 Rebiülevvel 1312/7 September 1894.

⁸⁸⁵ BOA, Y.A.HUS. 308/107, 11 Rebiyülevve 1312/12 September 1894.

⁸⁸⁶ BOA, Y.PRK. 30/85, 10 Rebiülahir 1312/11 October 1894.

Besides some of the Alewites, there were other Muslims such as "İstavriler" who attempted to escape from the conscription by saying that they were Christians. Not recognizing their pretext as legitimate, Memduh insisted on their enlistment. BOA, BEO. 390/29204, 17 Şevval 1311/23 April 1894.

Memduh's reports to the imperial court were planting the seed of fear and anxiety.

4.4.6. Revisiting the Hamidian "New Orthodoxy"

As abovementioned examples attest, Memduh was at all times ready to display his loyalty to the sultan and determined to fight against any group or activity threatening, according to his point of view, the security and integrity of the state, even if it was beyond his responsibility and authority.⁸⁸⁷ As Halil Bey stated in his petition, while he was governing Ankara he kept a watchful eye on the Armenians and Alewites of Sivas, and whenever he obtained evidence about their collaboration he personally reported to the court. Instead of respecting his counterpart Halil Bey's sphere of authority and cooperating with him, Memduh preferred to inform the court—in secret—personally about what he thought valuable and important.⁸⁸⁸ Representing himself as a loyal Sunni Muslim servant of the sultan,⁸⁸⁹ he appeared to be looking for an occasion to demonstrate how

Memduh seemed to be quite proficient in coping with anyone attempting to disturb the order or to mislead the state authorities. The Istavri issue continued in the ensuing years. In November 1903, Memduh, in the capacity of minister of interior, prepared a memorandum explaining the situation. BOA, DH.MKT. 494/18, 27 Şaban 1321/18 November 1903.

The statement made by Memduh encapsulates the problem revolving around the Istavri community of Ankara. If the Istavris were registered as non-Muslims the state military would lose manpower, but if they were registered as Muslims the state treasury would lose the military exemption payment. The uncertainty of the Istavris was solved in 1910, when they were registered as Christians. Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy*.

⁸⁸⁷ His being proactive in these issues or rather being oversensitive about them might have contributed to his appointment to the Ministry of Interior.

⁸⁸⁸ BOA, Y.MTV. 104/46, 6 Rebiülevvel 1312/7 September 1894.

Governors tried to attract the favor of the sultan by informing him about their achievements in the provinces they were governing. For examples see Abdülhamid'in Valileri.

⁸⁸⁹ In some of his petitions and statements to the court, Memduh identified himself as "*azad kabul etmez köleleri*" (a slave of the sultan who does not accept to be emancipated).

BOA, Y.EE. 88/3, 4 Receb 1310/22 January 1893.

BOA, Y.EE. 14/19, 28 Zilkade 1310/13 June 1893.

There were indeed others who used this strong statement to display their loyalty and devotion to the sultan. BOA, Y.EE. 15/8, 20 Şevval 1323/18 December 1905.

Şükrü Hanioglu compared the official correspondence of the Hamidian period with that of the Tanzimat era and concluded that in the former there existed a phenomenal

concerned he was about the empire. Adopting a proactive approach, Memduh seemed to be trying to turn the crisis into an opportunity to prove both his complete loyalty to the sultan under all conditions and his pro-Islamic standpoint, as these two were regarded by many as the formula for a glittering administrative career in the Hamidian system.

Memduh's writings and activities with respect to Alewites of Ankara and Sivas can indeed be examined as part of a wider trend that prevailed in that particular period. In the 1890s, the Ottoman state faced a challenging development in the province of Iraq. The spread of Shiism in Iraq was increasingly undermining the legitimacy of the Ottoman sultan, the caliph of Sunni Muslims. This development alarmed the imperial court. The Ottoman administrators and religious authorities drafted a large number of reports depicting the situation and proposing solutions for the problem, specifically underscoring the importance of primary and higher education for winning the hearts and minds of people in Iraq.⁸⁹⁰ According to Süleyman Hüsnü Pasha,⁸⁹¹ "the spread of education will instill the love of religion, country, nationality, as well as strengthening the salutary allegiance of people to our Master the Caliph of Muslims. While the persistence of ignorance will increase and intensify disunity and disintegration."⁸⁹² This statement of Süleyman Pasha epitomized the views of many of the Ottoman intellectuals and statesmen of the time, including Memduh, as seen in his above-quoted reports urging the integration of the heterodox elements into the official Sunni faith.

increase in the use of specific phrases indicating loyalty to the sultan. As an example, he quoted from the statement of Memduh. Şükrü Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 24.

⁸⁹⁰ Selim Deringil, "The Struggle Against Shi'ism in Hamidian Iraq," *Die Welt des Islams* 30 (1990); Gökhan Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq 1890-1908* (London: Routledge, 2006), 99-126.

⁸⁹¹ Süleyman Hüsnü Pasha was an intellectual and officer who was exiled to Baghdad because of his involvement in the dethronement of Sultan Abdulaziz.

⁸⁹² Deringil, "The Struggle Against Shi'ism in Hamidian Iraq," 53.

Although he did not refer to it in his reports, Memduh might have been aware of the growing concern of the central administration about the rise of Shiism in Iraq,⁸⁹³ as he referred to the danger of Alewites and Shiis uniting against the Sunnis in Anatolia and the political implications of this undesired unity. There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of his views on the Alewites, yet still he might have overemphasized this issue to prove that he shared a common concern with the Ottoman leadership at a time when the empire was going through a legitimacy crisis in the same provinces.

In accordance with the suggestions of Memduh, the central administration decided to appoint Sunni preachers to the villages of Yozgat and Kırşehir, two sanjaks of Ankara, for the purpose of preaching and sermonizing particularly the Alewites.⁸⁹⁴ For Deringil, the measures that were taken by the state to promote and enforce Sunni denomination was part of the sultan's policy of the "new orthodoxy,"⁸⁹⁵ according to which the beliefs of the Nestorian, Yazidi, Bektashi, and Alewite communities were in need of correction in order to realize Muslim unity.

The case Çetinsaya discusses is important, for it demonstrates different processes in the formulation of the policy of Islamic unity under the reign of Abdülhamid II. To stop the spread of Shiism in Iraq, particularly in the provinces of Baghdad and Basra, the Ottoman central administration adopted wide range of measures. Besides the propaganda and counter-propaganda activities in the form of education, the Ottoman state held out an olive branch to the Shia community. The state, though it had been championing Sunni Islam, attempted to unite with the Shia and on behalf of the sultan, Ottoman Sunni ulama⁸⁹⁶ sent

⁸⁹³ Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq 1890-1908*, 99-126.

⁸⁹⁴ "...akaid-i batıla ile İslamiyetten ayrılmış olan Sürhser ismiyle bilinen ahaliye vaaz ve nasihat için tayin edilecek hocaefendiler..." BOA, BEO. 405/30374, 16 Zilkade 1311/21 May 1894. "Sürhser" refers to Alewits.

⁸⁹⁵ Deringil, *Well Protected Domains*, 48.

⁸⁹⁶ The letters were prepared and sent by a group of Sunni scholars who were organized under Jamaladdin Afghani. Abdülhamid decided to implement the scheme of Sunni-Shi'i rapprochement after a long process of consultation with some scholars and

letters to over four hundred Shia ulama in different parts of the world attempting reconciliation. According to an account, “after six months about 200 petitions from the Arab and Iranian Shi’ite ulama with some gifts and antiques were sent to the Sultan through Sayyed Jamal ed Din”.⁸⁹⁷ However, the Iranian Shah decided to continue supporting the Armenian revolts in Eastern Anatolia; and in response, the Ottoman state halted the reconciliation attempt.⁸⁹⁸

This initiative, albeit aborted, for Sunni-Shia unity may entail the reconsideration of some aspects of Abdülhamid’s policy of “new orthodoxy,” which supposedly led to “systematic propaganda and the correction of the beliefs.”⁸⁹⁹ This also means that, while Memduh, in coordination with the central administration, was trying to correct the beliefs of Alewites in Ankara, the Ottoman ulama, on behalf of the central administration, were sending hundreds of letters to the Shia ulama for reconciliation between Sunni and Shia. This should not necessarily be interpreted as an inconsistency on the Ottoman state’s part. As a matter of fact, instead of seeking coherence in the behaviors of the state for an idealized depiction, revealing the contradictory aspects of the state policies would provide a much more realistic picture of the empire. To be more precise, throwing light on multiplicities, as much as—or in some cases more than—regularities, would contribute to the understanding of the nature of the empire, which exhibited diversity and complications in all realms.

As the discussion above suggests, Memduh’s pro-Muslim approach in his relations with Armenians and Alewites is in tune with the scholarly consensus in

bureaucrats, and Jamaladdin Afghani. Afghani was a prominent Muslim political activist and campaigner of Muslim unity, who lived in Iran from 1889 to 1891. He was deported to Basra in early 1891 for he protested the Shah’s decision of giving a monopoly concession of Iranian tobacco to a British. Abdülhamid invited Afghani to Istanbul in the summer of 1892. For Jamaladdin Afghani see Nikki R. Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal ad-Din “al-Afghani”: A Political Biography* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972); for his thought also see Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 103–129.

⁸⁹⁷ Keddie, “Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian Nationalism,” appendix.

⁸⁹⁸ For the details of Abdülhamid’s attempt at Sunni-Shi’i religious rapprochement see Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq 1890-1908*, 111-115.

⁸⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 49.

the Ottoman history literature suggesting that during the reign of Abdülhamid II, the Ottoman state promoted “a form of state patriotism that employed the vocabulary and symbolism of Islam in order to win the support of Ottoman and foreign Muslims alike.”⁹⁰⁰ The sultan’s assumed initiative for solidarity among the Muslims was generally justified or rather rationalized by the dramatic increase in the proportion of Muslims in the Ottoman population caused by the loss of the greater part the European territories of empire together with a significant percentage of its Christian subjects in the Ottoman-Russo War (1877–78).⁹⁰¹

There is a need to zoom out for the correct interpretation of Abdülhamid’s adoption of an Islamic tone as a means of bolstering his regime. Even though most historians are of the opinion that the nineteenth century was an era when science and secular worldview corroded religion, historian Christopher A. Bayly argues that “the nineteenth century saw the triumphal reemergence and expansion of ‘religion’ in the sense in which we now use the term.”⁹⁰² For instance, Abdülhamid’s religion-based politics had similarities with the political projects of his counterparts in Russia and the Habsburg Empire who attempted to reinforce their authority “by creating an aura of sacredness around themselves and their domains.”⁹⁰³ Engin Deniz Akarlı provides a more comprehensive explanation by situating what he calls “defensive Islamism” of the Hamidian regime in a “broader historical context”:

In contrast to the basically liberal mood that had prevailed earlier in the century, religious fervor was becoming an increasingly conspicuous

⁹⁰⁰ Julia Phillips Cohen, “Between Civic and Islamic Ottomanism: Jewish Imperial Citizenship In The Hamidian Era,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 44, no. 2 (2012), 238.

⁹⁰¹ Georgeon, *Sultan Abdulhamid*, 192–212. On Abdülhamit’s Islamic politics, see also Selim Deringil, *The Well- Protected Domains*; Kemal Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Çetinsaya, “II. Abdülhamid’in İç Politikası: Bir Dönemlendirme Denemesi.”

⁹⁰² Christopher Alan Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World: 1780-1914 Global Connections and Comparisons* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004).

⁹⁰³ Cohen, “Between Civic and Islamic Ottomanism,” 239.

For more information on the issue see Michael Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People: Studies in Russian Myths* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991).

aspect of internal and international politics in the age of high imperialism with rapid industrialization and its concomitant social problems. It is not a coincidence that the Dreyfus affair, the Zionist movement, and the Irish question emerged in this period, just as the laicist French government made peace with the church and worked hand in glove with militant missionaries around the world. It is not a coincidence that a profoundly devout person like William Gladstone rose to prominence in British politics. The arrogantly intolerant, even hatemongering, views of Gladstone and others about “the Turks,” which effectively meant “Muslims” in the Ottoman context at this point, left little room for dialogue.⁹⁰⁴

Furthermore, referring to the exclusionary aspect of Islamic Ottomanism, the ideology that Memduh seemed to be following, Kayalı has argued that while Abdülhamid II’s Islamic Ottomanist project did not “jeopardize the legal status and rights that the non-Muslims had gained under the secular Ottomanism of the preceding decades. . . . clearly Hamidian ideology was exclusionary from a social and psychological point of view with respect to non-Muslims.”⁹⁰⁵ In the same vein, Hanioglu has noted that this exclusion stirred up opposition against the sultan by appealing to alienated non-Muslims.⁹⁰⁶ Some others have examined the exclusionary logic of the Islamic Ottomanist project with regard to the relationship between the state and Christian communities of the empire.⁹⁰⁷ Bringing a new perspective to the effects of Islamist Ottomanism on the relationship between the non-Muslim communities of the empire and the Ottoman state, Julia Cohen suggests that “a state’s mobilization and public display of official religion did not always, or necessarily, prevent members of other faiths from identifying with that state. Yet this possibility remains largely unexplored.”⁹⁰⁸ Based on the experience of the Ottoman Jews during the last decades of nineteenth century, Cohen argues that, notwithstanding “the challenges posed by the Islamic version of Ottomanism to non-Muslims,” “the Hamidian turn toward Islamic politics did not categorically foreclose non-

⁹⁰⁴ Akarlı, “The Tangled Ends of an Empire,” 360.

⁹⁰⁵ Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1997), 31. Kemal Karpat has also argued that Islamist politics alienated Ottoman non-Muslims. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 320, 392, 402.

⁹⁰⁶ Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 143.

⁹⁰⁷ Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*, 11; Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 12, 317.

⁹⁰⁸ Cohen, “Between Civic and Islamic Ottomanism,” 239.

Muslim participation.”⁹⁰⁹ The case of Jews indeed epitomizes the multiplicity of processes in the rapidly changing imperial context of the late nineteenth century.

According to Cohen, the dominant narrative of Abdülhamid II’s Islamic Ottomanism is problematic for a few reasons. Islamic Ottomanism coexisted with the civic form of Ottomanism formulated during the Tanzimat period. In other words, the universal characterization of Ottoman citizenship was never officially relinquished under the reign of Abdülhamid II. Furthermore, the responses of non-Muslims to Islamist Ottomanism were, as put by Cohen, “more complex than existing scholarly portrayals suggest.... Certain non-Muslims employed and modified the language of Islamic Ottomanism to their own ends during this period.”⁹¹⁰

The game-changing findings of the research project recently conducted by Abdulhamit Kırmızı on Christian civil officials during the Hamidian era has brought a new dimension to the scholarly discussion on the alienation of the non-Muslim subjects of the empire on account of the Islamist policy pursued under the reign of Abdülhamid II. According to the research, of the 51,698 officials recorded in the Ottoman Personnel Record System, 2,815 (or 5.4%) were non-Muslim (1,476 Armenians; 1,036 Greeks; and 303 Jews). Strikingly, 70 percent of all Armenian and 75 percent of all Greek officials were employed in the Hamidian era.⁹¹¹

It is paradoxical that the golden days of Armenians and Greeks in the Ottoman bureaucracy corresponded to the reign of Abdülhamid II, the period that has always been associated with Islamism and the alienation of non-Muslims, not

⁹⁰⁹ Ibid., 248.

⁹¹⁰ Ibid., 239.

⁹¹¹ Abdulhamit Kırmızı, “II. Abdülhamid’in Hristiyan Memurları” in *Sultan II. Abdülhamid ve Dönemi*, eds. Fahrettin Gün, Halil İbrahim Erbay (Istanbul: TBMM Milli Saraylar, 2017), 659-661.

the Tanzimat era, which is renowned for its liberal and all-embracing policies.⁹¹² Having said that, Kırmızı agrees with Cohen that the official administration and followers of various ethno-religious communities kept upholding the idea that all Ottoman citizens, irrespective of their religions, were equally part of the empire, even though the policies adopted by the state appeared to suggest the contrary. That is to say, both historians agree on the fact that under the reign of Abdülhamid II, “competing definitions of Ottoman-ness” existed simultaneously along with “the choices, challenges, and tensions their coexistence entailed.”⁹¹³




Figure 4.1. The years Armenians joined the civil service.
Source: Kırmızı, “II. Abdülhamid’in Hristiyan Memurları,” 660.

⁹¹² Ibid., 663.

⁹¹³ Cohen, “Between Civic and Islamic Ottomanism,” 239.




Figure 4.2. The years Greeks joined the civil service.
Source: Kırmızı, "II. Abdülhamid'in Hristiyan Memurları," 660.

Kırmızı questions the conventional assumption in Ottoman historiography according to which the three periods of nineteenth-century Ottoman history, the Tanzimat (1839-1876), Hamidian era (1876-1908), and the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918), are respectively matched with Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkish nationalism. According to this narrative, the transition from Ottomanism to Islamism and from Islamism to Turkish nationalism happened smoothly. The problematic aspect of this periodization is, as put by Serhun Al, "the overrated emphasis on sharp ruptures within the political agendas of each governing elite, especially from perspective of identity politics."⁹¹⁴

According to Kırmızı, it is not possible to speak of a period that was under the domination of only one of these ideologies. Kırmızı further adds that political decision-making processes never occur under the influence of a single ideology in any given period. He also suggests that in order not to miss the dynamism of

⁹¹⁴ Serhun Al, "Young Turks, Old State: The Ontological (In) Security of the State and the Community of Ottomanism," in *War and Collapse: World War I and the Ottoman State*, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2016), 156.

the diversity of events and dispositions of a historical period, historians ought to eschew fixed ideological maps that reduce the complex realities of the late Ottoman era to a singular historical narrative.⁹¹⁵ Considering employment practices, the policies of the Hamidian regime emphasizing Islam and the caliphate did not cause the abandoning of civic Ottomanism. Kırmızı argues that the perception of the reign of Abdülhamid II as the period of transition from Ottomanism to Islamism is engendered by the projection of the mentality of the world of nation-states, in which ideologies are mutually exclusive and absolutely defined, onto late Ottoman history.⁹¹⁶

On the other hand, Çetinsaya looks at the issue in a different light. Based on his thorough research on the Ottoman administration of Iraq between 1890 and 1908, he argues that “the controversies over Abdülhamid’s ‘Pan-Islamism’ need to be placed in the contexts of the ‘Shi’i problem’ in Iraq, his attempts at ‘Sunni-Shi’i unity,’ and relations with Iran, as well as the traditionally-acknowledged contexts of ‘India’ or ‘Egypt’.”⁹¹⁷ He explains his argument as follows:

An “Islamic policy” is apparent in the Iraqi provinces, and in particular in Mosul where the Sunni-Kurdish population lived, in the sense that religion was deliberately stressed as a social base or bond, linking rulers to ruled, that there was a certain emphasis on Islam in the field of public education, and there was an appreciation of the important sociopolitical role played by religious notables and tariqas. Beyond this, it is difficult to discern a specific “Islamic” program. Only in the context of the Shi’i problem—a problem posed by the substantial Shi’i population of the provinces of Baghdad and Basra—was a specific and sometimes ideological “(Sunni-) Islamic” thrust to policy observed.⁹¹⁸

As the brief review of the literature on “Islamic policy” of the Hamidian regime suggests, there is a need to revise the conventional Ottoman historiography, which identifies the Hamidian policies as a “new orthodoxy” and explains the ideological transformation of late Ottoman history with the abovementioned linear periodization. It is likely that the imperial administration pursued

⁹¹⁵ Kırmızı, “II. Abdülhamid’in Hristiyan Memurları,” 662-663.

⁹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 664.

⁹¹⁷ Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq 1890-1908*, 151.

⁹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 151.

different policies at one and the same time in different contexts and with different rationales. Therefore, instead of deeming the empire, or in this case the Hamidian regime, as a stable entity that would enable historians to make sweeping statements about its policy on a particular issue in a particular period, treating it like a living organism with the capacity to act in different layers with different logics would more accurately capture the period with all its complexities. As recent historical studies have demonstrated, the Hamidian administration indeed had broad spectrum of strategies, some of which might have been conflicting with each other, for averting the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in its struggle for survival. Therefore, instead of using Memduh's pro-Islamic policy in Ankara and Sivas to come up with hasty generalizations about the Hamidian era, it needs to be seen as but one of the many strategies in a large spectrum.

4.4.7. Another Threat: Protestant Missionaries

Besides the Armenians and Alewites, Memduh thought the Ottoman state needed to be cautious about the Protestant missionaries in provinces such as Ankara and Sivas, where the Armenian community was vulnerable to provocation of Christian outsiders. Thus, on every occasion he drew attention to the harms caused by the missionaries in Anatolia. In one of his statements he depicted the activities of Protestant missionaries and their relations with the Armenians of Ankara.⁹¹⁹ He stated that although they came to this region to spread their sect, in Ankara the Protestant missionaries could neither speak Armenian nor Turkish. Therefore they opened missionary schools to train Armenian students according to Protestant beliefs and ideas. They also provided financial aid to poor Armenian families. Consequently, indoctrinated and articulate Armenian graduates were charged with the task of convincing the Armenians in the villages of Ankara that Armenians could gain their independence from the Ottoman state only with the interference and mandate

⁹¹⁹ Even though he did not spell out in this statement, Memduh seemed to be linking the three groups, Armenians, Protestant Missionaries, and Alewits, in the context of Ankara. He saw in their alliance a great danger for the empire's ontological security.

of a foreign country. Memduh argued that that by stressing the sectarian difference between the Armenians and the Protestant missionaries, he managed to prevent the convergence between them in Sivas. But in the context of Ankara, even those who did not convert to Protestantism were in alliance with the missionaries, who aspired to cause disturbance under the cover of spreading their religion. For Memduh, in accordance with Ottoman state regulations, the missionaries were supposed to teach at authorized schools and preach in churches, and he suggested that they be formally banned from going to the villages where they were instigating the Armenians against the state.⁹²⁰

4.4.8. Immigrants and Settlement Problems

Along with the Armenian riots, the Alewite issue, and missionaries, Memduh dealt with the settlement of a large number of Muslim immigrants from Russia in different regions of Ankara. Memduh was by no means alien to this issue. He already had experience about the settlement processes from his earlier time in Konya and Sivas, both regions, which received a massive number of immigrants. Coping with many problems in various provincial settings, Memduh had been furnished with an intimate knowledge about immigrant relocation, a critical matter that deeply affected the Ottoman socio-economic configuration.

During the period he administered Ankara, Muslim immigrants in large number were regularly dispatched to the province, and in each case Memduh had to find available places to settle them, which was no easy task, as well as funds for their livelihood. If there was no suitable land, or if he was not briefed about the deployment in advance, he had to place new arrivals in temporary accommodations before installing them in permanent places. During his time in office, waves of Circassian and Tatar immigrants from the Kuban and Hamar provinces of Russia were installed in Maden, Boğazlıyan, and Kırşehir;⁹²¹ Ahıska

⁹²⁰ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 29/58, 25 Ramazan 1311/1 April 1894.

⁹²¹ BOA, Y.PRK.M. 3/45, 28 Ramazan 1311/4 April 1894.

BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK. 35/91, 11 Şevval 1311/17 April 1894.

BOA, BEO. 476/35671, 13 Rebiülevvel 1312/14 September 1894.

BOA, BEO. 475/35585, 15 Rebiülevvel 1312/16 September 1894.

Turks travelled, through Batum, to different districts of Yozgat;⁹²² and immigrants from the village of İzan in Russia were settled in various parts of Ankara.⁹²³ Moreover, a new village, named Bünyad-ı Hamid, was founded in Ahırlıkapı, a region in the western part of Haymana district,⁹²⁴ and in that village a mosque was constructed with the sponsorship of the sultan.⁹²⁵

It took time for the immigrants to adjust to an unfamiliar landscape. It seems that they had difficulty in following social conventions and administrative rules. For instance, the leader of the three hundred families from Samara, a province of Russia, Mehmed Zarif, signed a contract declaring that they would adhere to the local regulations in exchange for the settlement facilities provided by the Ottoman authorities.⁹²⁶ Four months after they were settled, sixty more Muslim households from Samara came to Ankara.⁹²⁷ Around the same time, the decision was made to settle in Ankara four hundred households from Movik and Emirhan, two villages of the Sanjak of Buzağlık of the province of Ammar in Russia;⁹²⁸ they received financially assistance until they were provided with land and permanent shelter.⁹²⁹ In addition to previous Tatar groups, two hundred Tatar immigrants from the village of Abazan in Russia were also placed in Ankara.⁹³⁰ Immigrants were coming to Ankara by following two routes: They embarked by ship from Russia's Novorsisk Port and landed at İzmit, and from there they were distributed to neighboring provinces such as Ankara by railroad.⁹³¹ The other route they followed was using land transportation from Samsun, a coastal region in the Black Sea, to reach Ankara.⁹³²

BOA, DH.MKT. 429/85, 26 Rebiülevvel 1313/16 September 1895.

BOA, ŞD. 1343/15, 29 Şevval 1312/25 April 1895.

BOA, DH.MKT. 219/57, 20 Ramazan 1311/27 March 1894.

⁹²² BOA, DH.MKT. 20323, 29 Receb 1311/5 February 1894.

⁹²³ BOA, BEO.439/32817, 17 Muharrem 1312/21 July 1894.

⁹²⁴ BOA, İ.DH.1312/51, 22 Zilkade 1311/27 May 1894.

⁹²⁵ BOA, BEO.412/30871, 26 Zilkade 1311/31 May 1894.

⁹²⁶ BOA, HR.İD.17/13, 24 Safer 1312/27 August 1894.

⁹²⁷ BOA, İ.DH.1318/11, 7 Cemaziyelahir 1312/6 December 1894.

⁹²⁸ BOA, BEO.529/39649, 7 Cemaziyelahir 1312/6 December 1894.

⁹²⁹ BOA, MV. 82/91, 13 Cemaziyelahir 1312/12 December 1894.

⁹³⁰ BOA, HR. 144/40, 24 Muharrem 1312/28 July 1894.

⁹³¹ BOA, HR.TH. 154/90, 8 Şaban 1312/4 April 1894.

During Memduh's time as governor of Ankara, the acting British consul, Fontana, occasionally reported to Sir Currie in Istanbul about the Muslim groups that migrated from Russia to Ankara. In one of his dispatches he described the state of the Circassian community who arrived in Ankara in late September 1895 and made some personal comments on the immigrants.

These emigrants are ignorant of the Turkish language, and, judging from those I have seen, appear to be very poor; although well armed with pistols and other weapons, they are unprovided with agricultural implements of any kind, nor are they likely to possess the means for purchasing a sufficient stock of cattle for breeding purposes. The greater part of their baggage, moreover, has been retained, I am informed, the Railway Company, owing to their refusal to pay their fare from İzmit to this town.

The prospects of these Circassians are, at the present moment, by no means bright, nor is their immigration calculated to contribute in any way to the prosperity of the vilayet.

The Circassians in Turkey, as a class, do not enjoy a reputation either for honesty or for thrift, in fact, they are considered to be the most expert and inveterate cattle-stealers, and the most unsuccessful agricultors. In the latter respect they offer a striking contrast to the Tatar emigrants – some of whom are settled in the outskirts of this town – who have gained a name for industry and thrift, and are said to be far more successful in farming than the Turks.⁹³³

Memduh had to resolve disputes between the local inhabitants and the newcomers over land.⁹³⁴ Georgian Muslim immigrants sometimes came into

BOA, DH.MKT. 429/85, 26 Rebiülevvel 1313/15 September 1895.

Twelve hundred Circassian immigrants came from Russia to the *mutasarrıflık* of İzmit. It was first planned to install them in Tuzla, a region close to Istanbul, for there was no vacant land in İzmit. But this idea was abandoned and they were dispatched to Ankara. As İhsan Seddar Kaynar and Murat Koraltürk detail in their article, the railroad was effectively used in the transportation of immigrants. İhsan Seddar Kaynar and Murat Koraltürk, "Ankara'ya Demiryoluyla Göçler ve İskan Siyaseti (1890-1910)," *Ankara Araştırmaları Dergisi/ Journal of Ankara Studies*, (June 2016).

⁹³² BOA, DH.MKT. 429/85, 26 Rebiülevvel 1313/16 September 1895.

BOA, Y.MTV. 129/48, 8 Rebiülahir 1313/28 September 1895.

⁹³³ FO 424 (184), Inclosure in No. 31, Acting Consul Fontana to Sir P. Currie, September 24, 1895, Angora.

FO 424 (184), No. 31, Sir P. Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury, October 2, Therapia.

⁹³⁴ For instance, a group of Georgian immigrants had to move to Ankara because of a fierce conflict they had with a local family in Fatsa, a district of the province of Trabzon, where they were first installed. BOA, DH.MKT. 358/52, 8 Zilhicce 1312/2 June 1895.

conflict with some Armenians over various issues.⁹³⁵ Moreover, some immigrants had been entangled in unlawful activities such as banditry and tobacco smuggling.⁹³⁶ Memduh was particularly concerned about the Circassian immigrants' assistance to the Armenians in their activities against the state. Presenting himself as a proactive governor, he wrote to the court about the measures he was planning to take to prevent such an alliance.⁹³⁷ On the other hand, on 17 October 1895, the acting British consul for Ankara, Fontana, conveyed the concerns of Armenians about the settlement of Muslim immigrants in the region, saying that "an impression is prevalent among the Armenians here that the settlement of these foreign Mohammedans in the vicinity of Akdağ Maden, Boğazlıyan will be a direct menace to their co-religionists, who are especially numerous in those towns."⁹³⁸

Another dispute arose in the summer of 1894 between 700 Ahıska immigrants who were installed in Çorum and its vicinity and local people. The immigrants were not content with the lands they were offered and they attempted to settle on the local inhabitants' lands, which resulted in friction between the two groups. Local people, particularly the prominent ones, were, by and large, against the settlement of newcomers on the public lands, for they had been using these lands for animal herding. Moreover, 200 immigrants, unexpectedly, were sent from Kütahya and Eskişehir to be settled in Haymana, a district of Ankara, causing tension in the province. Memduh expressed his discontent with the state's relocation of immigrants to Ankara without informing him in advance. He contended that all these troubles arose because the province was not prepared for the new arrivals. He also added that if he had been notified

A large number of Ahıska immigrants also had disputes with the local community in Çorum, a region of Yozgat, over the use of public land. BOA, DH.MKT. 247/47, 7 Zilhicce 1311/11 June 1894.

⁹³⁵ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 32/3, 12 Zilkade 1312/4 November 1894.

⁹³⁶ BOA, DH.MKT. 333/38, 19 Receb 1312/16 January 1895.

⁹³⁷ BOA, Y.MTV. 108/30, 3 Cemaziyelevvel 1312/2 November 1894.

⁹³⁸ FO 424 (184), Inclosure in No. 201, Acting Consul Fontana to Sir P. Currie, October 17, 1895 Angora.

FO 424 (184), No. 201, Sir P. Currie to the Marquess Salisbury, October 23, 1895, Constantinople.

beforehand of the number of immigrants and when and where to settle them, he would have been able to make necessary arrangements.⁹³⁹

Memduh was distressed by the difficulty of finding vacant land for settling new arrivals. Villagers did not generally inform the authorities about the public lands, for they were using these lands for their own needs, such as animal herding.⁹⁴⁰ Memduh formed a commission to inspect each and every village of the province to note the places for the settlement of immigrants on the map.

The commission was

to inquire into the condition of the immigrants, and provide for their well-being; to furnish the poorer among them with farming implements, and with money for their more immediate necessities....A special committee will be called in the chief town of each kaza, where a settlement is to be effected, whose duty it will be to portion out land to settlers, and to provide them with timber and other building material; and further, to report every week to the Vali the progress of their installation.⁹⁴¹

The commission was headed by a secretary and included one official who would be paid 1500 kuruş in monthly salary, two officials who would each get 350 kuruş for measuring the lands, one technician who would get 500 kuruş for drawing maps, and one cavalryman who would be paid 300 kuruş.⁹⁴² This commission would yield valuable data that would be used not only to organize the settlement of immigrants but also to ascertain the public lands that could be cultivated or sold to generate income.⁹⁴³

4.4.9. Industry and Production in Ankara

Memduh tried to establish not only peace and order in the province but also industry. Ankara had been famous for its mohair yard throughout history.

⁹³⁹ BOA, DH.MKT. 247/47, 7 Zilhicce 1311/11 June 1894.

⁹⁴⁰ BOA, ŞD. 1343/15, 29 Şevval 1312/25 April 1895.

⁹⁴¹ FO 424 (184), Inclosure in No. 201, Acting Consul Fontana to Sir P. Currie, October 17, 1895 Angora
FO 424 (184), No. 201, Sir P. Currie to the Marquess Salisbury, October 23, 1895, Constantinople

⁹⁴² BOA, ŞD. 1343/15, 29 Şevval 1312/25 April 1895.

⁹⁴³ BOA, ŞD. 1343/15, 29 Şevval 1312/25 April 1895.

Ottomans had exported mohair to the Venetians and Polish in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to the Dutch in the eighteenth century, and to the British and French in the nineteenth century.⁹⁴⁴ External demand shifted from mohair woven textiles to raw mohair in the nineteenth century in response to the demands of industrialized global markets,⁹⁴⁵ and from the 1830s onward the Ottoman mohair sector depended on Britain's coercive trade policy. This radical change in the sector not only brought about the end of local mohair spinning industry in Ankara but also led to a dramatic decrease in the revenue from the sector.⁹⁴⁶ Besides the transformation of export from commodity to raw material, the Ottoman mohair lost its dominance in the global markets in the nineteenth century with a British entrepreneur's import of thirteen goats from Ankara to South Africa in 1838. Thanks to the British industrial technology, South African mohair production picked up in short time, while the mohair industry in Ankara was still been carried out under pre-modern conditions. This affected the Ottoman mohair industry so much that the establishment of a model farm for rectifying the Ankara goat type began to be discussed in 1892.⁹⁴⁷

Moreover, until the late nineteenth century, the Ottoman policies with regard to Ankara mohair sector were quite conservative, aiming at protecting the pure Anatolian goat type and the local producers and traders. Thus, the Ottoman authorities prohibited the export of goats for centuries. But in tune with the principle of free trade, which was forced on the Ottomans by the European powers and particularly the British, they allowed it with an imperial decree on 12 May 1889.⁹⁴⁸ While Memduh was in office, the Ministry of Interior once more proscribed the export of goats from Ankara to Benghazi and South

⁹⁴⁴ Erman Tamur, *Ankara Keçisi ve Ankara Tiftik Dokumacılığı Tükenen Bir Zenginliğin ve Çöken Bir Sanayinin Tarihsel Öyküsünden Kesitler* (Ankara: Ankara Ticaret Odası, 2003), 140.

⁹⁴⁵ Ottomans first began to export raw mohair in 1820. Mohair yard production and trade continued until the mid-nineteenth century. Tamur, *Ankara Keçisi ve Ankara Tiftik Dokumacılığı*, 133.

⁹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 147-148.

⁹⁴⁷ BOA, A.MKT.MHM. 727/6, 17 Şevval 1310/4 May 1893.

⁹⁴⁸ BOA, İ.MMS. 104/4448, 12 Ramazan 1306/12 May 1889.

Africa.⁹⁴⁹ Yet some British merchants were allowed to export as many as five hundred goats from Ankara.⁹⁵⁰ For instance, a British merchant named George came to Ankara to export goats when Memduh was governor. Despite the official prohibition,⁹⁵¹ Mr. George was allowed to export five hundred goats from Ankara to Europe.⁹⁵² Based on the brief historical background of the mohair industry, we can say that Ankara deeply felt the external pressure on the Ottoman economic structure.⁹⁵³

The creation of the abovementioned sheep fold in the complex of a model farm in Ankara coincided with Memduh's time in office. As a true believer in modern techniques and education for the efficiency of agriculture and animal herding, Memduh started up a shepherd school along with the construction of a sheep fold.⁹⁵⁴ Searching for a proper parcel of land⁹⁵⁵ and organizing the purchase of it in coordination with the Agricultural Bank,⁹⁵⁶ Memduh was personally involved in the establishment of the model farm and shepherd school for the mohair industry. On 8 May 1895, the opening ceremony for the farm and school was held with the attendance of Memduh.⁹⁵⁷

⁹⁴⁹ BOA, DH.MKT. 315/49, 8 Cemaziyelahir 1312/7 December 1894.

BOA, DH.MKT. 2069/7, 8 Cemaziyelahir 1312/7 December 1894.

⁹⁵⁰ BOA, Y.A.RES. 74/15, 19 Receb 1312/16 January 1895.

BOA, Y.PRK.SRN. 4/96, 29 Receb 1312/26 January 1895.

⁹⁵¹ BOA, DH.MKT. 315/49, 8 Cemaziyelahir 1312/7 December 1894.

BOA, DH.MKT. 2069/7, 8 Cemaziyelahir 1312/7 December 1894.

⁹⁵² BOA, Y.A.RES. 74/15, 19 Receb 1312/16 January 1895.

BOA, Y.PRK.SRN. 4/96, 29 Receb 1312/26 January 1895.

⁹⁵³ Seda Tan, "XIX. Yüzyılda Anadolu'dan Güney Afrika'ya Tiftik Keçisinin Yasal ve Kaçak Sevkiyatı," *Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi*, 35 (Spring 2014).

⁹⁵⁴ BOA, Y.A.HUS. 327/40, 13 Zilkade 1312/8 May 1895.

⁹⁵⁵ BOA, ŞD. 518/2, 20 Rebiülahir 1312/21 October 1894.

A parcel of land around the Çubuk Çayı was selected for the establishment of the model farm. This land was at the intersection of couple of villages and districts, and this would boost the economy in a large area. Özkan Keskin, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Modern Ziraat Eğitiminin Yaygınlaşması: Ankara Numune Tarlası ve Çoban Mektebi," *Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi*, 28, Ankara 2010, 90-92.

⁹⁵⁶ BOA, BEO. 361/27034, 12 Şaban 1311/18 February 1894.

BOA, İ.OM. 2/49, 24 Ramazan 1312/21 March 1895.

⁹⁵⁷ BOA, Y.A.HUS. 327/40, 13 Zilkade 1312/8 May 1895.

BOA, Y.PRK.OMZ. 1/87, 12 Zilkade 1312/7 May 1895.

Moreover, under Memduh, special machines were imported from Europe for drying fruit and vegetables to be used in the Ankara model farm.⁹⁵⁸ In the same period, Ankara also witnessed some other agricultural developments. In order to support the potatoes industry in Ankara, the central administration decided not to impose tax on the farmers for five years.⁹⁵⁹ Besides industry and cultivation, Ankara abounded in clay, coal, meerschaum, dolomite, copper, silver, potassium nitrate, and gypsum. There were ten tileries, eight rendering plants, one potassium nitrate plant, three slaughterhouses, fifteen textile looms, and a rice mill plant.⁹⁶⁰

Carpet weaving was another field of economy in Ankara that was revitalized under Memduh. As an enterprising governor, Memduh aspired to convert the resources of the province into income-generating stocks. As expressed by Semavi Eyice, based on Dicran Aslanian's narrative, Ankara did not have a proper carpet-weaving industry. Transferring his experience from Sivas, a province famous for its carpet industry, Memduh ventured to start carpet-weaving workshops at the female division of the Medrese-i Hamidiye. As earlier mentioned, he invited Matok and Nişan, Armenian masters, along with their families from Sivas to Ankara to establish carpet-weaving workshops in the schools. The wives of these masters were assigned as instructors.⁹⁶¹

In addition to the abovementioned industrial and commercial initiatives, educational issues preoccupied Memduh in Ankara. In 1893 there were a total of 1,493 *sıbyan mektebis* in the province of Ankara. Of these, 32 were non-Muslim *sıbyan mektebis*. There were also 24 primary schools, 164 madrasahs,

This project, which included a school, farm for goats, depot for machines, and room for workers, was entirely completed on 21 November 1898, three years after Memduh left the office. Özkan Keskin, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Modern Ziraat Eğitiminin Yaygınlaşması: Ankara Numune Tarlası ve Çoban Mektebi," *Ankara Üniversitesi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi OTAM* 28, (Ankara 2010), 90-92.

⁹⁵⁸ BOA, İ.O. 2/56, 9 Zilkade 1312/4 May 1895.

⁹⁵⁹ BOA, ŞD. 518/17, 18 Cemaziyelevvel 1312/17 November 1894.

⁹⁶⁰ The 1893 Yearbook of Ankara.

⁹⁶¹ Aydın and Emiroğlu, *Küçük Asya'nın Bin Yüzü*, 243-244.

and 14 *rüştiye* schools.⁹⁶² Memduh, like most of the functionaries of the late Ottoman era, wholeheartedly believed in the power of education in creating compliant citizens; therefore, as the above discussion on the Alewites and Armenians suggested, he repeated the need of offering proper basic education in the government schools to bring these communities and create a harmonic relationship between state and society. He exerted himself to improve the conditions of the primary education in the districts and villages of Ankara,⁹⁶³ and his efforts were appreciated by the Ministry of Education.⁹⁶⁴ He strived not only to reform the existing educational institutions but also to founded new ones such as male and female primary schools in Yozgat.⁹⁶⁵ As part of the policy for standardizing education across the empire, the Ministry of Education commanded the teachers of the *rüşdiye* schools in Ankara to follow the educational program they were instructed to use by the ministry.⁹⁶⁶

4.4.10. Public Works and Construction

Ankara witnessed various construction projects under Memduh. It was decided to establish telegraph lines with the financial support of the public in the district of Haymana.⁹⁶⁷ The Ankara Government Office was renovated,⁹⁶⁸ and it was decided to rebuild the Yozgat Government Office.⁹⁶⁹ Memduh furnished an elaborate report to the Ministry of Interior about the wide range of measures he took against fire in the districts, villages, and marketplaces of Ankara.⁹⁷⁰ Nevertheless, six months after this report, all the shops of the district of

⁹⁶² The 1893 Yearbook of Ankara.

⁹⁶³ BOA, BEO. 374/27996, 8 Ramazan 1311/15 March 1894.

BOA, BEO. 569/42609, 25 Şaban 1312/21 February 1895.

⁹⁶⁴ BOA, MF.MKT. 196/95, 16 Şaban 1311/22 February 1894.

⁹⁶⁵ BOA, ŞD. 1342/15, 10 Zilkade 1311/15 May 1894.

⁹⁶⁶ BOA, MF.MKT. 297/83, 6 Receb 1313/23 December 1895.

⁹⁶⁷ BOA, DH.MKT. 188/21, 15 Cemaziyelahir 1311/24 December 1893.

⁹⁶⁸ BOA, DH.MKT. 206/17, 8 Şaban 1311/16 February 1894.

BOA, İ.DH. 1315/57, 29 Rebiülevvel 1312/30 September 1894.

BOA, DH.MKT. 16/34, 2 Receb 1312/30 December 1894.

⁹⁶⁹ BOA, DH.MKT. 102/12, 4 Ramazan 1311/11 March 1894.

⁹⁷⁰ BOA, DH.MKT. 2069/32, 5 Receb 1312/2 January 1895.

Beypazarı burned down in a fire.⁹⁷¹ The precautions he took proved to be inadequate for protecting the environs of the province.

The prison of Çorum was another construction project. Despite a series of correspondence on the planning and financing of the prison, the construction did not even begin during Memduh's time in office.⁹⁷² In the district of İncesu, a building was rented by the governorate to be used to incarcerate women convicts.⁹⁷³ In the district of Develi, in Kayseri, repairs of the fountains and waterways were made and the expenses were paid by the state treasury.⁹⁷⁴ Besides construction of public buildings, Memduh dealt with various healthcare issues. For instance, he took measures against the epidemic of cholera.⁹⁷⁵ In June 1894, some regions of Ankara, including Çankırı and Yenişehir, were put under quarantine for a short period of time.⁹⁷⁶ Under Memduh, a hospital for the poor was also founded in Ankara.⁹⁷⁷

4.4.11. Literary Activities & Private Life

Ankara was a fortunate place for Memduh. Besides the successes in his professional life that led him to rise in the ministry, he also had good times in his private life. Despite his tight schedule, he continued writing poems in Ankara. Some of his poems were published in *Hazine-i Fünun*, a journal owned by Kirkor Faik Efendi of Kayseri, between 1893 and 1896.⁹⁷⁸ He had close relations with the poets of Ankara and its vicinity, such as Osman Hilmi from Kırşehir. Osman Hilmi (1871-1896) was the son of the sheikh of the Kırşehir

⁹⁷¹ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 176/125, 9 Safer 1313/1 August 1895.

⁹⁷² BOA, DH.MKT. 68/45, 20 Zilkade 1312/15 May 1895.

BOA, DH.MKT. 421/53, 11 Rebiülevvel 1313/1 September 1895.

⁹⁷³ BOA, DH.MKT. 412/9, 23 Safer 1313/15 August 1895.

⁹⁷⁴ BOA, DH.MKT. 93/40, 23 Muharrem 1313/16 July 1895.

⁹⁷⁵ BOA, İ.HUS. 24/113, 23 Zilkade 1311/28 May 1894.

During the epidemic the mutasarrıf of Kayseri fell sick of Cholera.

BOA, DH.MKT. 2068/20, 29 Zilhicce 1311/3 July 1894.

⁹⁷⁶ BOA, DH.MKT. 247/25, 6 Zilhicce 1311/10 June 1894.

⁹⁷⁷ BOA, İ.DH. 1320/53, 6 Ramazan 1312/3 March 1895.

BOA, DH.MKT. 357/6, 5 Şevval 1312/1 April 1895.

⁹⁷⁸ Şeker, *Ders ile Sohbet Arasında*, 124.

Mevlevihanesi, Hasan Efendi. Some of Osman Hilmi's poems were dedicated to Memduh.

Memduh had also close relations with some other local poets and folk singers. Aşık Ceyhuni and Aşık Cemali were two Memduh appreciated. He invited them to his mansion, offered them dinner, and, after listening to their poems and songs, he granted each of them four gold liras. Moreover, the governor handed over an official paper permitting them to tour around the province to sing their folk songs in different locations. These two folk singers' request to sing in Çorum had been refused by the gendarmerie.⁹⁷⁹ Therefore, Memduh's approval was quite valuable for their professional life.

In addition to the literary issues some developments came about in the governor's family life during his service in Ankara. Not long after his appointment to Ankara in 1893 Memduh visited Yozgat, most likely for the Armenian riots, and during the visit, Nebile Hanım gave her twelve-year-old daughter Rukiye Şehbal to Memduh in order to secure the future of Şehbal and her own large family. Nebile Hanım was a Circassian from Caucasia who escaped with her children to the Ottoman lands from Russian oppression and settled in the Boğazlıyan region of the Sanjak of Yozgat during the reign of Sultan Abdulaziz. Memduh brought Şehbal to his mansion and from then on she was a member of Memduh's family. As she grew, she became the concubine of Memduh. Thought that she brought good luck to him Memduh decided to take Şehbal to Istanbul along with his family when he was appointed to the Ministry of Interior in 1895.⁹⁸⁰ He married to Şehbal after she gave birth to Ayşe Mualla⁹⁸¹ in the autumn of 1900. As the conflicts between Şehbal and other

⁹⁷⁹ Ahmet Talat Onay, *Tokatlı Âşık Nuri* (Çankırı: Çankırı Matbaası, 1933).

⁹⁸⁰ Vahid, *Boğaz'daki Kırmızı Köşk*.

Şehbal's mother and siblings also came to Istanbul either at that time or after a while. As is stated in *Boğaz'daki Kırmızı Köşk* Şehbal Hanım's family members were living in a green mansion in Yeşilköy, Istanbul. Nebile Hanım's relatives also settled in the same neighborhood. This mansion was probably provided by Memduh Pasha, as Nebile Hanım was a Caucasian immigrant with no husband, wealth, or property whatsoever.

⁹⁸¹ Ayşe Mualla was probably the second daughter and the youngest child of Memduh.

women in Memduh's family increased, Memduh settled Şehbal and their daughter Ayşe Mualla in another mansion in Arnavutköy. As this mansion's exterior was painted red Ayşe Mualla's daughter Nermin Vahid⁹⁸² wrote a novel titled *Boğaz'daki Kırmızı Köşk* recounting anecdotes about her parents, grandparents, and life on the Bosphorus in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. Memduh used to stay in that red mansion once a week together with Şehbal and Ayşe Mualla.

4.5. Conclusion

Memduh's service in three major Anatolian provinces is a telling example illustrating what it was to be a Hamidian governor. In accordance with the 1871 Provincial Regulation, governors played a key role in administering the vast empire in the late nineteenth century. Like all other provincial rulers of the Hamidian era, Memduh connected center and periphery by implementing the orders of the center in the provincial setting and informing the imperial capital about the circumstances of the provinces. As is clear from the experience of Memduh, Hamidian governors were the agents of modernization carrying out the reform projects that were formulated at the imperial capital. And the process was not only one-way. Based on research, personal observation, and opinion, governors oftentimes submitted proposals about the major issues of the provinces. In accordance with the knowledge and suggestions provided by governors, the central administration revised the regulations to introduce a reform program that was compatible with local realities, needs, and values.

In addition to the laborious task of maintaining public order in a vast provincial territory, a governor had to work in harmony with various power holders. Though he was the most prominent actor in the provincial setting, the governor was not the sole authority, for he had to operate in tune with Commander Gendarmerie and provincial treasurer, who were respectively responsible for the military and financial affairs of the provinces. As in the case of Memduh's

⁹⁸² Nermin Vahid married Turgut Menemenciöđlu, an outstanding diplomat of Republic of Turkey.

relations with İhsan Bey, Commander of Gendarmerie of Konya, power struggles between civil and military authorities were quite common in the provinces. Moreover, the governor was at the apex of large number of officials who were hierarchically ordered, and power struggles, particularly among the seniors, were frequent occurrences.

The governor also had to achieve a balance between the interests of local actors, such as Muslim and non-Muslim religious figures, notables, foreign consuls, and missionaries, and the multiethnic provincial society. Furthermore, he was under the surveillance of his colleagues and local people. The relations between governors of neighboring provinces were not always peaceful either, for the palace created incentives for them to inform on each other. Indeed, anyone who was able to communicate with the central administration via telegraph could express an opinion about a governor's conduct.

According to Memduh's biography, a governor's misconduct could take various forms, including the exploitation of local resources, ill treatment of people, appropriation of wealth and property, and covering up mistakes of officials. Repeated complaints about a governor would result in a thorough inspection of his activities. Yet, manipulating his power, a governor could silence his opponents in the province; and using influence and connections in the central administration, he could maintain his position in the province.

Memduh's governing experience also casts light on the provincial milieu during the Hamidian era. Drought and famine were chronic problems resurfacing every so often in the Anatolian provinces. Coping with these problems was one of the most formidable tasks of governors, and falling short of expectations during famine might result in the dismissal or reassignment of a governor. The imperial treasury, and particularly the sultan's private treasury, was generally the main supplier of aid to those suffering from famine. The governor along with a relief commission was to ensure the organization of a long chain of operations, including collection, purchasing, transportation, storing, and distributing of

cereals for consumption and cultivation. It was very likely that governor and other officials were accused of misconduct in dealing with this process.

Provinces were also suffering from poor infrastructure, transportation, healthcare, and education. The governor's task was to detect these problems and propose projects to the center to solve them. Besides the construction and repair of roads, bridges, and fountains, the governor was expected to take the lead in modernizing agriculture by establishing model farms.

Education had special place in the agenda of Hamidian governors, who, like the sultan himself, believed that the source of much of the problems in the empire was ignorance and the only solution was education. Competing with the schools founded by the foreigners and missionaries became the main motivation for the education program. The establishment of magnificent high schools in all provinces, such as the one in Sivas constructed during the governorate of Memduh, coincided with the Hamidian era.

However, economic crisis became chronic and the state treasury fell short of meeting the needs of the provinces. Due to a lack of funding, most of the provincial reform projects could not be realized. The basic needs of provincial people, such as education and healthcare, could hardly be met. And a shortage of qualified personnel, such as doctors, engineers, and teachers, was also a big obstacle to improving conditions in the provinces.

Memduh's governorship also provides some insight into the complications caused by the Regie Company's strict control of tobacco production and marketing. Deprived of using the local resources for their own account, the people of Almus got involved in tobacco smuggling. Consequently, serious conflicts broke out between the Regie and the local people in 1891. This case is important, as it reveals the consequences of the policies of the Public Debt Administration at the local level. Caught in the trap of the restrictive program of the Public Debt Administration, local people were in search of alternative ways,

some of which might be illegal. On the other hand, on behalf the central government, the governor had to ensure the smooth operation of the Public Debt Administration's program.

Conflicts were not initially common in the Anatolian provinces. Yet in the mid-1890s, the region became conflict-ridden. Memduh's years in Sivas and Ankara in the 1890s revealed the post-Berlin Congress realities in Anatolia. Thanks to new actors and developments, such as the Armenian Revolutionary committees, Christian missionaries, European consuls, Caucasian Muslim immigrants, and the Hamidiye Regiments, the centralization efforts of the government, the politicization of ethno-religious identities, and the intrusion of Russia and Persia, the Anatolian provinces became a space of competing interests and visions; all were struggling for supremacy. The old and new challenges came together to produce a series of conflicts and incidents between Muslims and Armenians in the region between 1894 and 1896. As suggested by Cumberbatch, the British consult to Ankara, while not all Armenians got involved in the clashes, the Gregorian Armenians were quite active.

The influx of Muslim immigrants from Caucasia and the Balkans to Asia Minor not only contributed to the abovementioned challenges but also changed the urban landscape and demographic configuration of the provinces. The local people did not always welcome immigrants. Disputes between immigrants and local inhabitants over lands were common, for the latter generally did not want to leave the public lands that they had been using for pasturing. On the other hand, immigrants had conflicts among themselves too. Based on Memduh's experience, it is safe to say that the integration of the immigrants at the local level proved difficult.

The chapter threw light on the ways and institutions through which the central government permeated the provinces. In an effort to centralize the vast empire, the Ottoman leadership intensified the construction of government offices, barracks, railroad stations, and schools in the provinces in the later part of the

nineteenth century. Besides realizing the purposes for which they were founded, these buildings also acted as agents of central government in the provincial sphere. They not only connected the provincial society to the central government but also functioned as spaces of political power, making the state more and more visible and palpable in the distant localities of the empire. Moreover, these buildings played a pioneering role in restructuring the Ottoman city centers.

Similarly, the gendarmerie was a modern infrastructural mechanism through which the central government penetrated into the provincial landscape and maintained close control of people and affairs in provinces. Furthermore, in parallel with the modernization of Ottoman statecraft, prisons were introduced to the provinces and incarceration became the main method of punishment. Memduh's biography shows that despite the regulations formulated in the imperial capital, the majority of the prisons in the Anatolian provinces were in miserable conditions. Due to a lack of funding, in all but a few cases the problems of prisons could only be solved temporarily.

Besides offering insights into the realities of the periphery, Memduh's imperial biography also offers some examples of the problem of slow decision-making in the Ottoman central administration. The long and repeated inspection reports about Memduh's activities in Sivas, which produced no result, can also be taken as indications of the cumbersome decision-making process of the Ottoman central government.

The inspectors submitted detailed reports on the misconducts of Memduh in Sivas and strongly suggested removing him from the post. Not following these suggestions, the sultan kept him in the office. But thanks to the growing foreign pressure about the Armenians of the *vilayat-ı sitte*, Memduh was removed from Sivas on 14 November 1892. Even though he was dismissed from the post on the ground of his ill treatment of the Armenians, Memduh had intimate relations with the Armenian notables and religious authorities. The anecdotes

recounted in the memoirs of the Dildilian family, an Armenian family of Sivas, offer a complex account of Memduh's relations with Armenians of Sivas. Different aspects of Memduh's relations with Armenians demonstrate that people of the Ottoman Empire were acting in an extremely flexible socio-economic structure in which political and ethno-religious identities did not necessarily determine the way they were related to one another. The empire permitted its citizens to act differently in parallel realities, and thus to have multifaceted lives that did not force them to stick to only one of their identities.

Memduh's approach to Armenians can be evaluated in another context. Considering the Armenian question and the Alewites and their alliance as great challenges to the integrity of the empire, Memduh wrote to the palace and the Porte on every occasion about the necessity of taking urgent measures against them in the form of education and control. Memduh's pro-Sunni approach towards the Armenians and Alewits in Sivas and Ankara could be taken as an evidence of the "new orthodoxy" of the Hamidian era. However, based on the findings and perspectives offered by the recent studies on the period, I have challenged this view. I argue that it is likely that the Hamidian statecraft followed different policies at one and the same time in different settings with different motivations. As recent historical studies have demonstrated, the Hamidian administration indeed adopted a wide spectrum of strategies, some of which might conflict with each other, for warding off the disintegration of the empire. Thus, instead of using Memduh's pro-Islamic policy in the provincial context to making sweeping generalizations about the Hamidian epoch, that policy needs to be counted as but one of the many strategies in the spectrum.

Memduh's biography also gives us much food for thought about the strategies and tactics governors adopted to win the favor of the sultan and to earn promotions. Using every opportunity to communicate with the palace to recount his achievements was one of the tactics Memduh used. On every occasion, he reminded the sultan about his unconditional loyalty. Moreover, playing with the fears of the sultan, he exaggerated the situations that would

pose threat to the integrity of the empire. In the case of the Yozgat Incident, he managed to turn the crisis into an opportunity to display his administrative capacity and his commitment. He particularly made use of the sultan's concerns about the safeguarding of Sunni traditions among Muslims. In doing so, he depicted himself as a responsible and sensitive governor who deserved to be rewarded by the sultan. Though he did not do it to appeal the sultan, Memduh successfully transferred his experiences and knowledge from the positions he had held previously. Governing three neighboring provinces of Anatolia facilitated his work, for he had to deal with similar issues. Thus, he substantially benefitted from his experiences and connections in the region.

Memduh drew on the intimate knowledge and professional experience he acquired in Konya, Sivas, and Ankara in his ministerial period too. The Ministry of Interior's main task was the administration of the provinces, and it was indeed this ministry through which the governors of all provinces were supposed to communicate with the central government. Plenty of anecdotes demonstrate that Memduh made good use of the practical knowledge he acquired in Anatolia while he was serving as the Minister of Interior.

CHAPTER 5

MEHMED MEMDUH PASHA: MINISTER of INTERIOR

5.1. Introduction

It was 1895, the Hamidian regime had celebrated its twentieth year and the wishes of Mahmud Nedim were almost realized. The Yıldız Palace had managed to knock out its potential rivals and opponents, bring the Porte to heel, and set up the rules of the Hamidian politics to revolve around the cult of the sultan. Abdülhamid reduced the Porte to a subservient branch of the imperial administration. Despite the presence of elaborate civil bureaucracy, the real powerhouse was the palace and the Mabeyn became the center of the state affairs. If we take Nadir Ağa's account as a reference, after 1895 the Mabeyn fell under the hegemony of Mahmud Nedim's disciples thus spy network established.⁹⁸³

The Hamidian state survived the 1894-1896 Crisis and was, for half a decade, released from the pressure of the great powers whose "attention had switched to the Far East and remained there well into 1901".⁹⁸⁴ Thereby, the duration that Fortna described as "the high water mark"⁹⁸⁵ of the Hamidian regime began. Shedding light on a different aspect of the same period, Kırmızı draws attention to the cadre stability in upper civil and military ranks at the central and provincial administrations. Memduh, the record holder of the Ministry of Interior, was part of the constellation of the "Hamidian bureaucracy,"⁹⁸⁶ which emerged in this period. Like his counterparts, Memduh was appointed to the first influential post of his career under the reign of Abdülhamid and he internalized the parameters of the regime the most important of which was the loyalty to the sultan. He reaped the rewards of his efforts in the form of a

⁹⁸³ "Musahib-i Sani-i Hazret-i Şehriyârî Nadir Ağa'nın Hatıratı I," ed. Hasan Ferit Ertuğ, *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 49 (January 1998), 39-40.

⁹⁸⁴ Akarlı, *The Problems of External Pressures*, 136.

⁹⁸⁵ The period between 1896 and 1905.

Fortna, "The Reign of Abdülhamid II," 57.

⁹⁸⁶ Kırmızı, *Abdülhamid'in Valileri*, 11-12.

promotion to the ministry after governing the three major provinces of Asia Minor. While the regime had completed consolidation, the constitutionalist demands resurfaced in the 1890s and in the following fifteen years reached the point of threatening the very existence of the Hamidian political system.

Memduh served in the capacity of Minister of Interior for thirteen years against the backdrop of these political circumstances. This was the last phase of his long professional life and that of the Hamidian regime. This chapter concentrates on Memduh's ministerial career by contextualizing it in the imperial framework, which entails the Armenian crisis, the conflicts in Yemen, the Macedonia question, and the power relations at the triangle of the imperial administration, the palace, the Porte, and the provinces.

5.2. Memduh is Back in Istanbul

On 7 November 1895 Lord Salisbury⁹⁸⁷ received a telegraph from Berlin. Mr. Gosselin reported to the British PM that

Some days ago the Minister of Foreign Affairs telegraphed to the German Ambassador at Constantinople asking his Excellency to report whether, in his opinion, a revolution or the sultan's deposition was imminent. The Ambassador did not think an outbreak was imminent as, in view of the network of the spies which the Sultan had organized, no one dare to make a move. No special instructions have therefore been sent by the German Government.⁹⁸⁸

On the same day Salisbury received another telegraph about the Ottoman Empire. Mr. Herbert reported from Istanbul about the announcement of appointments of Tevfik Pasha; the recent ambassador at Berlin, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Said Pasha; the recent Minister of Foreign Affairs, as the Head of Council of the Empire, and Halil Rifat Pasha; ex-Minister of Interior, as Grand

⁹⁸⁷ British Prime Minister from Conservative Party who ruled Britain between 1895 and 1902. The Boer War in the Cape Colony in South Africa led to his resignation in 1902. Salisbury's nephew, Arthur Balfour, replaced him and stayed in office until 1905.

⁹⁸⁸ FO 424 (184), 1895 No.338, Mr. Gosselin to Marquess Salisbury, Berlin, November 7, 1895.

Vizier. Kamil Pasha was exiled because as a Tanzimat bureaucrat he continued demanding more power for the Sublime Porte.⁹⁸⁹

Kıbrıslı Kamil Pasha was at the office of the grand vizierate between 1885 and 1891. He was appointed to the post for the second time during the crisis in order to appease the British whose approach towards the Ottoman government became very aggressive. However, Kamil Pasha could stay at the post only for a month for he, with the support of the British and the French diplomats, made a last bid for bringing back the power to the Porte by submitting a memorandum.⁹⁹⁰ What Kamil Pasha demanded was to have a strong government resting on bureaucracy. This attempt to reinstate the Porte's authority ended up in the exile of Kamil Pasha and the appointment of Halil Rifat Pasha who was in tune with the sultan's ideas. The dismissal of Kamil Pasha, a defender of the Porte against the palace, and the appointment of Memduh, an old pro-palace statesman, coincided. Abdülhamid was prudently gathering men he could work in harmony, and who internalized the criteria of the regime to constitute the "Hamidian bureaucracy".

The empire was in the middle of the 1894-1896 Crisis; disturbances rapidly expanded across Anatolia and even Istanbul. The empire was in peril. Abdülhamid initiated radical changes in the administrative cadres as part of a series of measures to cope with the deteriorating situation of the empire. On 6 December 1895 Arifi Pasha was appointed as a member of the council of ministers, Abdurrahman Pasha was appointed to Ministry of Justice, Said Pasha to the head of the Council of State, Tevfik Pasha to the Foreign Ministry, Memduh Pasha to the Ministry of Interior⁹⁹¹, Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha to the

⁹⁸⁹ FO 424 (184), 1895, No.332, 333, 334, Mr. Herbert to Marquess Salisbury, Constantinople, November 7, 1895.

⁹⁹⁰ The memorandum was transliterated by Mahmut Kemal İnal. İnal, *Son Sadrazamlar*, 1369-1372 and 1466-1468.

⁹⁹¹ "40,000 kuruş maaşla Dahiliye Nezaret-i celilesi tevcih buyrulmuştur (1313 Cemaziyelevvel 18)."

Ministry of Commerce and Public Works, and Hayri Bey to the Ministry of Finance.⁹⁹²

While Memduh was happily coming back to Istanbul, the province of Ankara was suffering from the power vacuum. On 21 November 1895 Raphael Fontana, Acting British Consul to Ankara, wrote to Mr. Herbert, embassy in Istanbul, that

Ali Rıza Pasha, the Commander of the troops in this province, who is now Acting Vali, is reputed to be a fairly satisfactory officer, but has neither the intelligence, experience, nor administrative powers requisite for the holder of a post such as he temporarily occupies. He has done his best to prevent an outbreak in Angora, but he fails to inspire any portion of the population with confidence; he has neither the fact, personal influence, nor authority over the civil functionaries elsewhere in the vilayet which Memdouh Pasha possessed. In fact, as Ali Rıza Pasha told me himself, he is an officer not an administrator; he is not the man to keep in check the various elements which compose the provincial population.

In this town there exists a general fear, amounting even to terror, and a desire is universally felt that an official of experience, intelligence and discretion may be elected at the earliest possible date to fill the office lately vacated by Memdouh Pasha.⁹⁹³

Fontana's statement reveals Memduh's competency on administering the province and proves that Memduh was appointed as the Minister of Interior not merely because of his loyalty and lobby activities at the Palace, if there was any. While Fontana's dispatch was portraying Memduh as a competent governor Philip Currie's report from Istanbul to Lord Salisbury, dispatched upon the radical changes in the central administration, depicted him as "clever and unscrupulous man, who was always ready for any deed of injustice when it served to forward his personal interests." In the same report Currie provided interesting details about the members of the new cabinet that came to power along with Memduh. Currie notes that the new Grand Vizier Halil Rifat Pasha, who was the Minister of Interior before Memduh, "appears to have no

⁹⁹² BOA, İ.DH. 1328/1313, 18 Cemaziyelevvel 1313/6 November 1895.

⁹⁹³ FO 424 (184), 1895, No. 634, Sir P. Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury, November 27, 1895, Constantinople
Inclosure in No. 634, Acting consul Fontana to Mr. Herbert, November 21 1895, Angora.

qualification for the office except that of having, as Minister of Interior during the last years, been the obedient servant of the Sultan's ill-will against his Armenian subjects. He is now a complete cypher"; Tevfik Pasha, the new Foreign Minister, is "cordial and friendly, but he admits with pleasing frankness that he is entirely without influence over Imperial Master, and that his advice is never taken." According to P. Currie the change at the palace was far greater,

An intriguing Syrian lawyer, named Izzet Bey, has displaced the four most trusted counselors of the Sultan, and appears to be now His Majesty's principal if not only adviser. This man in the course of the past year paid me several visits: at first as an emissary of the late Djavid Pasha, and on the last occasion as a bearer of a message from the Sultan full of assurances of friendship for England. In speaking to me he professed himself an advocate of Constitutional reform; but he had the character of being a notorious spy, and was detected removing from the pockets of his friends at the Pera Club a packet which contained not only compromising letters, but banknotes. The advancement of Izzet Bey appears to have aroused very outspoken indignation at the Palace, especially on the part of the favorites whom he was supplanted, the chief of whom are Hadji Ali Bey, Sheikh Abul Hudar, and Sutfi, the Sultan's valet. It is said that Marshal Osman Ghazi, the hero of Plevna, who is attached to the Sultan's person, has fallen into disgrace, and was actually placed under arrest for some days after the Kamil Pasha.⁹⁹⁴

These radical changes attested that a new term was beginning in the Ottoman central administration, which would change the whole bureaucratic landscape of the imperial capital. After a decade of provincial service Memduh would work and survive in a contentious environment of Istanbul.

Notwithstanding the denigrating accounts of the British authorities, Memduh was indeed a wise choice for the Ministry of Interior. He grew up and socialized in a bureaucratic environment and was equipped with the literary skills and bureaucratic procedures at a young age. Working at different imperial spaces he proved his capacity and loyalty during his four decades of service. When he was

⁹⁹⁴ FO 424 (184), 1895, No.636, Sir P. Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury, November 27, 1895, Constantinople

Ten days ago from this dispatch in the Indianapolis Journal published an "analysis of the present Turkish Cabinet, by a Turk," in which Memduh was portrayed as "dishonest, unpopular and ignorant."

<https://newspapers.library.in.gov/cgi-bin/indiana?a=d&d=IJ18951117.1.4>

appointed to the ministry he was a mature and an experienced statesman who was familiar with the major domestic issues of the empire such as social welfare, security, healthcare, public education, migration, and economy. As important as his competence Memduh's sultan-centered political vision must have played a role in his promotion to the ministry. Abdülhamid was looking for statesmen with whom he could work easily. As a strong believer of the sultan's supreme power Memduh was an ideal figure for the post. In addition to the ministerial duties he was ready to offer all sorts of service to Abdülhamid, such as providing secret intelligence about the activities of the other functionaries particularly Grand Vizier Ferid Pasha. He, like others who formed the Hamidian bureaucracy, seems to have accepted the terms of the regime in advance. It was clear that if they wanted to be a part of the political system they had to play the game by the rules that were gradually established in the early phases of the Hamidian era.

When he came back to Istanbul and settled in the ministerial office at the Porte, this would be the last stop for Memduh, after more than half a century of service in the Ottoman bureaucratic system. According to the memoirs of his contemporaries Memduh's office had four wing chairs, two sofas, and six chairs. All covered with green velvet. Two Moroccan chairs were placed in front of his worktable. When he was handed with the papers he used to stand up to receive them and, sometimes, make witty remarks to the secretaries who brought them.⁹⁹⁵ Memduh's appointment to the Ministry of Interior changed not only the fate of Memduh but also that of the Ministry. This is because, his term corresponded to the most stable years of Memduh's career and the Ministry.

5.2.1. The Ministry of Interior

Like Memduh's career the Ministry of Interior had a long and rough journey before it became a stabilized department of the Ottoman central administration

⁹⁹⁵ Ahmet Semih Mümtaz, *Evvel Zaman İçinde: Tarihimizde Hayal Olmuş Hakikatler* (Istanbul: Hilmi Kitabevi, 1948), 23.

in the Hamidian era. Before the nineteenth century the Ottoman polity did not have a ministerial system. The steward of the grand vizier (*sadaret kethudalığı*) transformed into the Ministry of Interior under the reign of Sultan Mahmud II. The steward together with the corresponding secretary was working under the grand vizierate. Previously the steward was no more than an officer in attendance but eighteenth century onward particularly after Nevşehirli Damad Ibrahim Pasha's grand vizierate its importance increased and it became a prominent member of the government cadre and a first class official. In this period many stewards of the grand vizier were appointed as a grand vizier later on. Steward was the closest man to the grand vizier and all the state affairs were first coming to him before it was passed on to the grand vizier. He was the second man after the grand vizier and he was responsible for all the internal affairs of the empire. He was also an acting grand vizier in his absence. The sultan upon the suggestion of the grand vizier appointed the steward and the grand vizier dismissed him.

All the administrative papers from the grand vizierate were going through the steward and he was responsible for writing the grand vizier's cliché of "ordered" (*buyuruldu*) on each of them. The steward was in charge of all the correspondence between the center and the provinces. He was not part of the imperial council (*Divan-ı Hümayun*) and the protocol. He had his own office and a scribe who assisted him. There were around thirty officials working at the service of the steward. The finance office was under his authority, which was responsible for providing the certificate to the scholar bureaucrats and waqfs. He was the head of the third largest office of the Sublime Porte. Before the steward was transformed into the Minister of Interior his monthly salary was 10,000 kuruş while reisulküttap was earning half his salary. This basic information proves the élite position of the steward in the Porte. So it is safe to say that the rank of steward increased in the bureaucratic hierarchy in parallel with the significance of the role the Sublime Porte played in the imperial administration. As the brief description above attests although he kept the title

steward (*kethüda*) the job description had profoundly changed during the eighteenth century and first quarter of the nineteenth century.⁹⁹⁶

The nineteenth century witnessed a tremendous increase in internal and external affairs of the Ottoman state. In parallel with the domestic and global developments the Ottoman leadership reorganized the imperial bureaucracy and adopted specialization based governance. Sultan Mahmud II restructured the whole administration along the lines of ministerial system. As part of this effort, Sultan Mahmud II transformed the stewardship into the Ministry of Interior. Mehmed Said Pertev Efendi, the grand vizier's steward of the time, became the first minister of interior on 13 March 1836. After a few months he, along with other ministers, was entitled as pasha. On 23 November 1836 undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior was founded and Halil Şerif Pasha was appointed to the post to assist the minister. After Pertev Pasha was removed from the office and exiled to Edirne where he died in 1837, his archrival Akif Pasha came to the post. Upon Akif Pasha's suggestion the ministry was renamed and became Ministry of Interior on 9 October 1837.

This brand new ministry was short lived. Mahmud II abolished the grand vizierate. Attempting to eliminate "the traditional role of the grand vizier as 'absolute delegate' of the sultan, Mahmud went on to parcel out deliberative functions of the grand vizier's Divan"⁹⁹⁷ and in spring of 1838 he abolished the grand vizierate and established the post of prime minister (*başvekil*) and decided to merge this post with a ministry. Not able to perform his duty due to his health problems Akif Pasha, Ministry of Interior, was dismissed and the prime ministry was merged with the Ministry of Interior and the last grand vizier Mehmed Rauf Pasha became prime minister on 30 March 1838.

⁹⁹⁶ Muzaffer Doğan, "Divan-ı Hümayun'dan Babıali'ye Geçiş," *Osmanlı*, VI (Ankara 1999).

⁹⁹⁷ Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 141.

Sultan Mahmud died on 1 July 1839 and his son Abdülmecid came to the throne. Next day Hüsrev Pasha reestablished the grand vizierate. As part of a large scale of administrative reorganization the Ministry of Interior, which was united with the Grand Vizierate or rather Prime Ministry, was entirely abolished and Internal Affairs Undersecretary was transformed into Grand Vizierate undersecretary. Internal Affairs Undersecretary Sarim Efendi was appointed as the undersecretary of grand vizierate in September 1839.⁹⁹⁸

In the following three decades various offices such as Grand Vizierate undersecretary, Grand Vizier's corresponding secretary, Internal Affairs secretary, and Internal Affairs Corresponding Office took on the tasks of the Ministry of Interior. During the Tanzimat era Âli and Fuad Pashas, pupils of Mustafa Reşid Pasha, handled internal and external affairs. Upon the death of Fuad Pasha in 1869 the Foreign Ministry merged with the grand vizierate and the Ministry of Interior was reinstated on 18 February 1869. *Dahiliye Nezaretinin Vezaifi-i Kanuniyesini Havi Kararname*, the arrangement about the organization of the Ministry of Interior, was made on 28 February 1869.⁹⁹⁹ This official decree was comprised of fifteen articles providing general principles according to which the Ministry was going to operate. On 8 September 1869 the grand vizierate undersecretary was abolished and its tasks were transferred to the Ministry of Interior. In August 1871 the Foreign Ministry was detached from the grand vizierate and consequently gave its duties to the grand vizierate undersecretary, and once more the Ministry of Interior was dissolved. Şirvanizade Rüşdi Pasha and Said Mehmed Efendi served as Minister of Interior from 1869 to 1871.¹⁰⁰⁰

⁹⁹⁸ BOA, C.DH. 138/6870, 29 Cemaziyelahir 1255/9 September 1839.

⁹⁹⁹ "Dahiliye Nezaretinin vezaif-i esasiyesini havi olub icra-ı ahkam-ı mündericesine İrade-i Seniyye müte'allık buyurulan Kararname" (BOA, Dahiliye, No: 937; Kararname, İstanbul University Library No: 83.307, 16 Zilka'de 1285/28 February 1869).

¹⁰⁰⁰ Akyıldız, *Merkez Teşkilatında Reform*.

Although the Ministry of Interior was abolished, the regulatory activities continued. The 1871 Provincial Regulation¹⁰⁰¹ was the most elaborate and the fundamental instruction about the activities of the Ministry. From 1871 to 1877 when the Ministry was reinstated; Refik Bey, Nuri Efendi, Ahmed Vefik Efendi, Safvet Pasha, Mehmed Kamil Pasha, Mustafa Nuri Efendi, Hurşid Pasha, Şefkati Efendi, Ahmed Bey Efendi, Servet Efendi, Said Efendi, Refik Bey, Said Efendi, and Hurşid Pasha served as the grand vizierate undersecretary and dealt with the internal affairs of the Empire.

Like many of the fundamental administrative reorganizations the last reinstatement and institutionalization of the Ministry of Interior occurred under the reign of Abdülhamid II. On 5 February 1877 the Ministry of Interior was reinstated for the third and the last time and Ahmed Cevded Pasha was appointed to the post. Since then until the demise of the empire the ministry survived as an independent government office. According to the imperial decree¹⁰⁰² after the announcement of the reinstatement of the ministry, the provinces were directly put under the authority of the Ministry of Interior.¹⁰⁰³

During this period remarkable organizational developments took place in the ministry and the recruitment terms of its officials. New commissions and directorates were founded in an effort to respond to the changing needs of the Empire. Besides the provincial administration affairs of immigrants, press, and civil servants were put under the Ministry of Interior's; thus, its workload was highly intensified. The waves of Muslim migration to Istanbul and Anatolia in the post 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russia War particularly occupied the ministry's agenda. Press was one of the most important fields during the Hamidian era

¹⁰⁰¹ *idare-i Umumiye-i Vilayet Nizamnamesi* (published in *Düstur*, İstanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1289/1872, vol. I, 625-651) was announced to the provinces and the foreign embassies.

Details of formulation process and the content of the 1871 Provincial Regulation are explained in Chapter 3 of the thesis.

¹⁰⁰² Takvim-i Vakayi, Issue 1862, 24 Muharrem 1294.

¹⁰⁰³ Ahmed Akgündüz, *Arşiv Belgeleri Işığında Dahiliye Nezareti Tarihi* (Ankara: TİAV, 2015).

and it was put under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior in 1877. Printing activities were not only centralized but also strictly controlled. The Commission for the Selection of Civil Officials (*Intihab-ı Memurin ve Sicill-i Ahval Komisyonu*) was founded and put under the Ministry of Interior. In 1896 it was renamed as the Commission of Civil Official and it became an independent bureau. Later in 1908 after the reinstatement of the Constitution it was once again put under the Ministry of Interior.¹⁰⁰⁴

Notwithstanding the fact that the ministry had a far more stable place in the administrative structure in the Hamidian era, its organization continued to change, though in a smaller scale. It seems that the ministry had institutionalized in parallel with the growing penetration of the central government into the periphery and broadening of its activities both in the capital and the provinces. The ministry did its share while the Ottoman polity was adapting and resisting to the changing internal and global parameters. The expansion of the Ministry of Interior can be observed in the yearbook of 1908,¹⁰⁰⁵ which provides the list of offices under the organizational scheme of the ministry such as the Office of Corresponding Secretary, the Office of Personnel Records (*Sicill-i Ahval Şubesi*), the offices of accounting (*Muhasebe Kalemi*) and filing (*Evrak Odası*) as well as the commissions and institutions functioning as parts of the ministry including the General Administration of Population Registration (*Sicill-i Nüfus İdare-i Umumiyesi*) which had various subordinate offices particularly dealing with the imperial capital (*Dersaadet Kalem*), the provinces (*Vilayet Kalem*), the demographic statistics (*İstatistik Kalem*), the travel permits (*Mürur Kalem*), and the passports (*Pasaport Kalem*), the Domestic Press Directorate (*Matbuat-ı Dahiliye Müdiriyeti*), Purchasing Commission for the Ministry (*Dahiliye Nezareti Mubaayat Komisyonu*), the Commission for the Expedition of Business and Reforms (*Tesrî-i Muamelat ve Islahat Komisyonu*), the Administration of Poorhouse (*Darülaceze*), the agents of

¹⁰⁰⁴ Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 179-183.

¹⁰⁰⁵ The Yearbook of 1326/1908, 204-226.

the gate (*Kapı Kahyası*), and a special commission (*Komisyon-ı Mahsus*) “whose membership suggests that its mission lay in internal espionage.”¹⁰⁰⁶

As an ambitious and prominent bureaucratic figure Memduh attempted to boost the power and prestige of the ministry. Carter Findley, however, referring to the Ministry of Interior, argues that “the extent to which, like others, became bent to its subordinate role is well symbolized in the character of Mehmed Memduh Paşa.”¹⁰⁰⁷ It is true that the steadily growing power of the palace against the Porte under the reign of Abdülhamid II made the governance cumbersome and confusing and decreased the grand vizier’s and the ministers’ sphere of action and influence in the imperial governance. Yet, “the subordinate role” of the Ministry of Interior should not be overstated for the very fact that the ministry did not even exist until the Hamidian era. Memduh had to struggle to open a space in the increasingly complicated central administration both for himself, after a decade of absence from Istanbul, and for the post he was holding without which the state affairs had been conducted for decades.

Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact that the Porte and the ministers in general lost power and independence under the Hamidian rule, the ministers were still quite influential in drafting legislations.¹⁰⁰⁸ So they were not simple puppets in the hands of the sultan. In fact, as the discussion on the limits of the sultan’s power demonstrated bureaucrats at the palace, the Porte, and the provinces were not only shaped by the Hamidian order but they also played a role in producing and implementing the practices that rendered the order possible.

Not long after his appointment to the ministry, Memduh’s portrait along with the portraits of Grand Vizier Halil Rifat Pasha and Foreign Minister Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, was published on the cover of the journal *Servet-i Fünun* that was issued

¹⁰⁰⁶ Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 253.

¹⁰⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 251.

¹⁰⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 247.

on June 3, 1897 in Istanbul.¹⁰⁰⁹ However, there was no writing about them in the pages of the journal. Their portraits being shown on the cover of an established intellectual journal might have been to publicize the three main figures of the new cabinet that was formed a while ago. This attests that Ministry of Interior gained importance in the 1895 period and became one of the most important offices of the Hamidian bureaucracy.



¹⁰⁰⁹ <http://www.servetifunundergisi.com/sayi/325/>



Photo 5.1. The cover page of Servet-i Fünun
Source: <http://www.servetifunundergisi.com/kisiler/dahiliye-naziri-memduh-pasa/> accessed on 7 November 2019 at 15:46.

5.2.2. Fight for Dominance at the Ministry

Despite this kind of appreciation, serving at the Ottoman central administration was not easy. Memduh had to work with the council of ministers¹⁰¹⁰ whose members were not in harmony with each other, the grand vizier with whom he was constantly at odds with, from 1903 to 1908, and with the palace politics; which had conflicting figures with conflicting interests. Memduh even had to make an effort to gain full authority at the Ministry of Interior, which had not even completed its institutionalization.

The undersecretariat was a post that was assisting the Minister of Interior. Importance of this post increased with the appointment of İsmail Rıdvan Bey (1855-1906), son of vizier Nüzhet Efendi, in 1887. In the beginning of his service, Rıdvan Bey filed a charge against Minister of Interior Ahmed Münir Pasha because of a transaction conducted without his knowledge and the palace strictly advised the minister to consult with Rıdvan Bey for all affairs. Thereafter the ministerial office power remained in the hands of the undersecretary. After Memduh came to office, he tried to concentrate the power in his hands. Ahmed Refik Pasha (1844-1901), the undersecretary at the time, was *persona grata* in the eyes of the palace; relations between Memduh and Ahmed Refik went back a long way. Despite the fact they competed to gain dominance, the tension between them did not turn into an overt conflict. However, Memduh and İsmail Fuad Bey,¹⁰¹¹ the undersecretary after Rıdvan Bey, had a public dispute, according to Ali Fuad Türkgeldi, for the latter had a sharp tongue. Fighting for power between İsmail Fuad and Memduh continued for two years until Fuad Bey was dismissed.¹⁰¹²

¹⁰¹⁰ The Council of the Ministers was highly stabilized during the Hamidian era and it was comprised of grand vizier, the head of the religious establishment (*şeyhülislam*), the head of the Council of State, the ministers of interior, foreign affairs, finance, justice, pious foundations, education, military, departments of navy and artillery, “the combined portfolio of trade and public works” (246), and the undersecretary of the grand vizier. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 245-246.

¹⁰¹¹ Having served in different departments of the Ministry of Interior for more than two decades Fuad Bey became undersecretary once Ahmed Refik passed away in 1901.

¹⁰¹² After being dismissed from undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior he was appointed by the court as governor of Mamüretülaziz but he was removed from the

In *Maruf Similar* Türkgeldi exemplifies the dispute between the minister and the undersecretary. Memduh and İsmail Fuad did not meet very often, during the month of Ramadan. One day after Ramadan Fuad Bey came to the office of the minister to present an imperial decree that the Chamberlain Office had notified him. Ali Fuad Türkgeldi happened to be in the presence of the minister at that moment. After reading the decree, Memduh put it on his table and said “you can leave, I will deal with it”. İsmail Fuad responded by saying that “oh sir, how can I leave a decree of his highness”. Memduh responded with rage and said that “don’t you trust me with a decree. I notify four to five imperial decrees every day. How nice was the month of Ramadan since we were not seeing each other, I wish Ramadan would be twelve months”. “If that makes you glad I will not come” İsmail Fuad responded and Memduh responded “well, don’t come” and İsmail Fuad left the office. After this they did not come face-to-face but continued their dispute.¹⁰¹³

In another case İsmail Fuad locked a copy of an official document Memduh ordered him to prepare. He refused to submit it when Memduh demanded the document. Thereupon, the minister ordered the head clerk to draft an official report of the incident and with that he went to the Corresponding Office of the palace and declared his resign from the ministry and came to his mansion at Kuruçeşme. That night İsmail Fuad was called to the palace and together with Ragıb Pasha he went to Memduh’s mansion to apologize. But still the dispute between them prevailed until İsmail Fuad left the office. For five years, from the time of his removal to the reinstatement of the constitution in July 1908, no one was appointed to undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior.¹⁰¹⁴ Ultimately Memuh managed to gain the sole authority in the Ministerial hierarchy. This

office as the Ministry of Interior found someone else for this post. In 1908 he was about to be appointed as governor of Kastamonu but the Ministry of Interior halted the process and assigned someone else. It seems that Memduh used every opportunity to take revenge on his ex-rival.

¹⁰¹³ Ali Fuad Türkgeldi was at the presence of Memduh at that time.

¹⁰¹⁴ Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, *Maruf Similar* (Istanbul: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2013).

anecdote can be taken as an indication of the value of Memduh in the eyes of the sultan.

5.2.3. “Honest and Principled Statesman”

Although a negative perception about Memduh prevails in the memoirs of some of his contemporaries, Ali Fuad Türkgeldi, who worked at the Ministry of Interior from 1881 to 1908, illustrates him as an honest and principled statesman in his book “Maruf Simalar,” that he completed writing almost a decade after the formation of the Republican Turkey.¹⁰¹⁵ In this work Türkgeldi allocates an independent section about Memduh for they worked together for thirteen years at the ministry. According to Türkgeldi, Memduh was quite intelligent and his memory and poems were very strong. He was quick in understanding what he read and heard. The language of his poems and even official writings were generally bombastic having internal rhyme. However, his official writing capacity could not reach the level of Mehmed Said, Kamil (Kıbrıslı) and Mahmud Celaledin Pashas who were known for their comprehensive protocols. For instance, after the death of Mahmud Celaledin Pasha, Memduh was requested by Grand Vizier Halil Rifat Pasha to take the responsibility of writing important protocols for the Council of Ministers but Memduh did not accept it for he was unaccustomed to this kind of writing. He was good at general issues of the empire but not good at the matters that required specialization. For instance, he would provide proper opinions on the reformation of provinces, police and gendarmerie but if he were asked to come up with a detailed reform regulation (*nizamname*), he would not go further.

¹⁰¹⁵ Türkgeldi, *Maruf Simalar*.

At this juncture it is necessary to remember that Memduh died in 1925 and “Maruf Simalar” was completed, as stated in the introduction of the book, sometime after 1928. Since Memduh about whom Ali Fuad Türkgeldi wrote was not alive anymore and the new political regime did not have any sympathy toward Abdülhamid’s Minister of Interior, Türkgeldi was free to express his views of him. Thus, there is no need to question the objectivity of Türkgeldi’s account of Memduh. There is, however, a possibility of favoring Memduh against the faction of Mehmed Ferid with which Türkgeldi and Memduh were in bad terms.

Türkgeldi argues that if he lived in a convenient period Memduh would be able to serve better and be remembered with gratitude. Although he was aware of the deficiencies of the Hamidian regime, he did not take action because of the severe treatment of those opposing the regime.¹⁰¹⁶ He attempted to resign from the ministry two or three times, but neither the sultan accepted his resigns nor did he stick to his decision. In the post-1908 era he was disgraced and blamed like many others who belonged to the upper echelon of the Hamidian bureaucracy. According to Türkgeldi, while some like Said Pasha cleared his name in the post-1908 period, Memduh could not successfully defend himself in his writings during the Second Constitutional Period.

Türkgeldi also argues that Memduh's concern about the future of the empire was apparent in some of the evaluations he made before the 1908 Revolution. For instance, he said that the note given by Russia and Austria during the Mürzteg Meeting might turn disadvantageous for the Empire. Furthermore, he often expressed his worries about the activities of the Greeks of the Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid¹⁰¹⁷ and the necessity of reforming the administrative system of the island. Memduh said to Türkgeldi that "I cannot articulate my views about the Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid during the discussions of the Council of Ministers but I can freely express my concerns and suggestions about the issue in my personal writings to the palace. This anecdote can be taken as a clue about Memduh's strategy: He seems to prefer written communication to verbal one and conveying his views directly to the palace not to his colleague probably because he was well aware of the fact that the cabinet decisions would be assessed by the palace consultants and ultimately the dominant faction would influence the sultan's view on any given issue.

Memduh was of the opinion that the Ottoman state should resolve all the matters of dispute, particularly with the foreign powers, as soon as possible to

¹⁰¹⁶ By saying this Türkgeldi might have tried to justify his long service along with Memduh in the Hamidian bureaucracy.

¹⁰¹⁷ A province of the Ottoman Empire that was comprised of a group of islands, Rhodes, Mytilene, Chios, Imbros, Kos, and Castellorizo.

prevent further deterioration of the situation. Türkgeldi reported from Memduh that, during a meeting of Council of Ministers on a Ramadan day he expressed his concerns about the issue of Crete and stated that if the state does not solve the issue Crete will soon be out of the Ottoman's possession. In response, the Minister of War Rıza Pasha mockingly said that "apparently today Pasha is fasting" and made the ministers laugh. Memduh responded by saying that "today I am crying and you are laughing, tomorrow you will cry, I will laugh at you". Next year the Ottoman state had to withdraw from Crete and Memduh said to the ministers that "last year I was crying and you were laughing at me now you are crying and I am laughing at you".¹⁰¹⁸

Türkgeldi also reported some anecdotes he heard from Memduh to show that he was aware of the deficiencies of the Hamidian regime but could not do much as he did not have much power. When he was informed about the appointment of Mehmed Ali Bey as governor of Beirut, who showed no ability for the previous task, Memduh deplorably said that, "there is still no awakening." Furthermore, a few days before the 1908 Revolution Memduh, grand vizier Ferid, and second secretary of the court, İzzet Bey, were sitting in the room of ministers at the Mabeyn and talking about the perilousness of the situation. Memduh said to İzzet Bey that "you are always at the presence of the Sultan why don't you warn him about the situation?" and İzzet Bey responded by saying that "you want to make use of the situation". Annoyed by this statement Memduh attempted to throw a chair to İzzet Bey but the others in the office prevented him from doing so. As will be discussed in the later sections Memduh and İzzet Bey were always at odds. Memduh was close to the clique of Tahsin Pasha, and archrival of İzzet Bey.

5.3. Early Years at the Ministerial Office and the Armenian Question

For the Ottoman central administration exercising authority and sustaining peace and order in the eastern Anatolia in the late nineteenth century proved

¹⁰¹⁸ This dialog must have taken place in 1898. Türkgeldi, *Maruf Similar*, 402.

to be difficult. The entanglement of old and new challenges aggravated the situation in the region. The Kurdish tribes kept acting like “parallel authorities”¹⁰¹⁹ in the eastern provinces. The growth of nationalism and revolutionary activities among Armenians, the presence of the foreign, particularly British, consuls as observers, and the large scale Muslim immigration from the Caucasus to Anatolia further complicated the situation in the region. Witnessing the loss of most of the Christian populated territories of the Empire at the beginning of the century, the Ottoman leadership was gripped by the fear of losing the eastern Anatolian territories that were - partially- populated by Armenians.¹⁰²⁰

As detailed in Chapter 4, the issue of reform in the six provinces of the Eastern Anatolia, which was stated in the Treaty of Berlin (1878), became the point of contention between the Ottoman government and the great powers in the early 1890s. According to the Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty, it was imperative for the Ottoman government to protect Armenians in the six Eastern provinces against the Circassians and Kurds. Because it vaguely worded, the article “gave the powers carte blanche to interfere in eastern Anatolia whenever they wished.”¹⁰²¹ The Ottoman government considered the reforms imposed by the European states as interference in the internal affairs of the empire, fearing from the detachment of Anatolia from the Ottoman territories. When Memduh came to the ministerial office in the fall of 1895, the empire was engulfed by

¹⁰¹⁹ Janet Klein, *The Margins of Empire: The Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011), 3.

¹⁰²⁰ The Ottoman State archival files coded as BOA.DH.TMIK.S and BOA. DH.TMIK.M include all the reports and correspondence of the commissions that were formed by the Ministry of Interior to deal with the crisis in Eastern Anatolian provinces in the 1890s. In these files there are 5969 and 19411 documents respectively. For the the British Foreign Office correspondence respecting Anatolia from 1892 to 1897 see the British Foreign Office files FO 424 (172, 175, 178, 181, 182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 188, 189, 191, and 192).

¹⁰²¹ Justin McCarthy, “Ignoring the People” in *War and Diplomacy, The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 and the Treaty of Berlin*, eds. Hakan Yavuz with Peter Sluglett (Utah: Utah University Press, 2011), 442.

conflicts between Muslims, particularly the Kurdish community, and Armenians in the eastern Anatolia.¹⁰²²

According to Janet Klein, the crisis in Eastern Anatolia in the mid 1890s had multiple reasons. The Ottoman state, which was in transition to nation-statehood, endeavored to control its territories, the borders, and the economic resources (mostly land) against the background of “the larger global process of the commercialization of land and the attached rise in the value of land.”¹⁰²³ The second reason was land appropriation. This was, in fact, not a new practice but with the changing parameters of economy and politics, it became more prevalent in the region in this period. Various Kurdish chiefs some of whom signed on the Hamidiye Regiments¹⁰²⁴ grabbed the lands of vulnerable people. Even though Kurds too had lost their lands, Armenians were under greater risk on the grounds of the factors including “the Russian threat to the eastern borderlands, the rise in Armenian revolutionary-nationalist activities, and the process of identity construction from above and below.”¹⁰²⁵ Klein argues that “conflicts hitherto explained as having an ethnic or communal basis started out, in fact, as struggles over concrete material resources but became ethnicized in the process.”¹⁰²⁶

Uncovering the diverse political, social, and economic motivations behind the clashes in Eastern Anatolia in the 1890s, Klein’s account reveals the complexity of the causes and effects of the crisis. However, it is necessary to note that Klein’s narrative in “The Margins of Empire: The Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone” would be more balanced if she consulted the Ottoman State documents as much as she did the British Foreign Office correspondence. Moreover, her narrative would be more balanced if she also emphasized the

¹⁰²² 1894-1896 Armenian Crisis was discussed in previous two chapters: chapter 3 and 4. Therefore, in this context there will be no detailed explanation on the issue.

¹⁰²³ Janet Klein, *The Margins of Empire: The Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011), 14.

¹⁰²⁴ For explanation of the Hamidian Regiments see Chapter 4 of the thesis.

¹⁰²⁵ *Ibid.*, 14.

¹⁰²⁶ *Ibid.*, 183.

influence of the Berlin Congress in complicating the situation in Anatolia, “not only by further weakening the Ottoman administration but also by encouraging the communities involved to take advantage of the fortuitous circumstances to express their national aspirations.”¹⁰²⁷

With regard to the importance of economic factors to explain the sources of the 1894-1896 Crisis, Nadir Özbek is on the same page with Klein. Özbek focuses on the link between the tax-collection and the conflicts in the six provinces. He suggests that the policies and practices that were adopted by the Ottoman central administration for tax collection in Anatolia should be evaluated in relation to the struggle for power and wealth in the region.¹⁰²⁸ As highlighted by Özbek, since the proclamation of the Tanzimat Decree the Ottoman government had tried hard to improve the tax collection procedures by introducing civil organization to replace the armed tax collectors and by abolishing the *iltizam* system (tax-farming). But, the government could not fully achieve these objectives. Thus, in the 1890s the great powers’ demand for excluding the gendarmerie from the tax collection in the six provinces was not surprising. The Ottoman government was already well aware of the necessity of it for having harmonious state-society relations. However, the circumstances on the ground had hindered the employment of civilians for tax collection. Based on some examples Özbek demonstrates how tax collection became a challenging task for the Ottoman administrators in the increasingly complicated Eastern Anatolian context after 1895.¹⁰²⁹

¹⁰²⁷ Gül Tokay, “Macedonian Question, 1878-1908,” in *War and Diplomacy, The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 and the Treaty of Berlin*, eds. Hakan Yavuz with Peter Sluglett (Utah: Utah University Press, 2011), 253.

¹⁰²⁸ Nadir Özbek, “‘Anadolu Islahatı’, ‘Ermeni Sorunu’ ve Vergi Tahsildarlığı, 1895-1908,” *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, no. 9 (Fall 2009), 67.

¹⁰²⁹ Özbek, “‘Anadolu Islahatı’, ‘Ermeni Sorunu’ ve Vergi Tahsildarlığı, 1895-1908,” 78. For the gendarmeries’ involvement in tax collection process in the European provinces of the empire see Nadir Özbek, “İkinci Meşrutiyeti Hazırlayan Koşullar: Rumeli’de Vergi Tahsilatı ve Jandarma,” *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 183, 2009.

In an effort to cope with the crisis in Anatolia and to ameliorate the conditions of Armenians in the region, Abdülhamid appointed Marshal Ahmed Şakir Pasha as the Inspector-General of the Anatolian Provinces on 27 June 1895.¹⁰³⁰ Şakir Pasha stayed at the post until October 1899. Memduh was in constant communication with Şakir Pasha with regards to the implementation of the reforms in Anatolia. In October 1895 governments of Great Britain, France, and Russia recommended a list of provisions from the Ottoman government for the protection of Armenians.¹⁰³¹ The negotiation between the great powers and the

¹⁰³⁰ For details of Şakir Pasha's biography and activities in Anatolia in the capacity of inspector-general see Ali Karaca, *Anadolu Islahatı ve Ahmed Şakir Paşa* (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1993).

As a believer of administrative centralization Abdülhamid indeed was against the idea of empowering any ruler in the provinces. Probably seeing it as a lesser evil than the appointment of non-Muslim general commissioner he made a proactive move and appointed Şakir Pasha as the sole authority in the six Eastern Anatolian provinces. Success of Şakir Pasha motivated the sultan to apply the same administrative solution in the context of Rumelia and Iraq in the subsequent years.

¹⁰³¹ The provisions are quoted from the report of Philip Currie to Salisbury on 10 October 1895. FO 424 (184), No. 95, Philip Currie to Salisbury, Therapia, 10 October 1895

1. The reforms will be formulated in a General Act, which will be drawn up in Agreement with the Powers, and inserted in the Imperial Decree promulgating them.
2. A Christian assistant to Shakir Pasha, whose name should be unofficially submitted to the Powers.
3. The participation of Christians in the administration to be specified, and the posts of Vali and Mutasarrif to be open to Christians.
4. The Dragomans to have the right of addressing to the Commission of Control and complaint, communication, or information which the Embassies may think desirable, but to be debarred from asking for any reforms beyond those granted in the Decree. The Commission of Control to fix the number of Christian functionaries in proportion to the population for each vilayet.
5. Christian assistants to be attached to Mohammedan Valis and Mutessarifs.
6. The right of the Ambassadors to remonstrate against the appointment of incapable, dishonest, or fanatical Valis to be reserved in the note to the Porte.
7. The number of rural guards to be fixed by the Vali on the recommendation of the Mudir and in conformity with local requirements.
8. A note to be addressed by the Ambassadors to the Porte taking act of the promises made respecting prisons arbitrary arrests, amnesty, reinstatement of emigrants, regulations for the Hamidiye cavalry, and insisting upon their complete and immediate execution.
9. A stipulation that the principles of the reform scheme will be applied to all the sandjaks and kazas of Asia Minor, where the Christians form a notable part of the population.

Ottoman government about the reforms continued until the last months of 1896.¹⁰³²

Memduh, in coordination with the other ministers, was expected to play a key role in tackling the crisis. During the early days of his service at the ministry and in the following months there were either conflicts or rumors of conflicts between Muslims and Armenians in much of Anatolia such as Trabzon,¹⁰³³ Van,¹⁰³⁴ Erzurum,¹⁰³⁵ and Muş.¹⁰³⁶ In response to this situation one of the first tasks Memduh undertook was to set up a commission to establish and maintain peace and order in the Anatolian provinces. Besides Memduh who directed it, the commission was comprised of two more associates, Hacı Reşid Efendi; a member of the Council of State, and Nef'i Efendi; a member of the Council of State and the Commission of Personnel Records. This commission was expected to maintain smooth communication between the center and Anatolian provinces, convey the demands of the provinces to the respective departments at the Porte without delay, and guide the governors for resolution of the problems on the ground.¹⁰³⁷

¹⁰³² For the negotiations between the Sublime Porte and the ambassadors of Britain, France, and Russia about the Anatolian Reform Program see the Ottoman Foreign Ministry file BOA. HR.SYS.2836/73, 25 Rebiülahir 1313/15 October 1895.

¹⁰³³ FO 424 (184), 1895, No. 371. Mr. Herbert to the Marquess to Salisbury, Constantinople, November 5, 1895

Inclosure in No. 371, Consul Longworth to Sir P. Currie, October 18, 1895.

¹⁰³⁴ FO (424) 184, 1895, Inclosure 2 in No.451 Vice-Consul Hallward to Consul Cumberbatch, Van, October 15, 1895.

No. 451. Mr. Herbert to the Marquess to Salisbury, Constantinople, November 8, 1895

FO 424 (184), 1895, Inclosure 3 in No. 540. Vice-Consul Hallward to Consul Cumberbatch, Van, October 15, 1895.

No. 540. Mr. Herbert to the Marquess to Salisbury, Constantinople, November 8, 1895

¹⁰³⁵ FO 424 (184), 1895, Inclosure in No. 454. Consul Cumberbatch to Sir P. Currie, October 24, 1895.

No. 454. Mr. Herbert to the Marquess to Salisbury, Constantinople, November 19, 1895

¹⁰³⁶ FO 424 (184), 1895, Inclosure 2 in No. 540. Vice-Consul Hampson to Consul Cumberbatch, Mush, October 29, 1895.

No. 540. Mr. Herbert to the Marquess to Salisbury, Constantinople, November 8, 1895

The Ottoman archival files BOA.DH.TMIK.S and BOA. DH.TMIK.M include details of the conflicts, resolution process, and the measures taken by the government.

¹⁰³⁷ BOA, BEO. 706/52878, 2 Cemaziyelahir 1313/20 November 1895.

At the end of November 1895 the British embassy met with the sultan to talk about the situation and the sultan told him that “order had been restored...troops had also been dispatched to prevent recurrence of disorder, and in fact, everything that could be done had been done.” The reports the embassy received from Anatolia confirmed what the sultan stated but “in some places still continued, though on a relatively small scale”. During the conversation the sultan complained about “a regrettable impression that he was not sincere in his desire to execute the reform without delay” and argued that “the first thing that was needed was to restore order, for only then could the reforms be taken in hand”. Inspectors had been chosen, as well as deputies of governors and *mutasarrıfs*. Şakir Pasha had begun to enroll Christian gendarmeries in the six vilayets.¹⁰³⁸

The meetings between the foreign consuls and the Ottoman leadership continued in the ensuing months to talk about the Armenian issue. In the mid-April 1896, Adam Block wrote a memorandum about the meeting the foreign embassies had with the Ottoman Council of Ministers to discuss the process of carrying out the reforms in Anatolia. Memduh did not appear at the meeting and when Block expressed his regrets for the Minister of Interior was not there to hear the conversation, M. Maximow said that “he had no desire whatsoever to see Memdouh Pasha on this or any other occasion.” However, in the evening of 15 April 1896 the embassies and majority of the ministers including Memduh gathered at the grand vizier’s house to talk about Zeytun question and some issues of the reform schedule.¹⁰³⁹

Besides meeting with the ambassadors about the situation in Anatolia, Memduh’s agenda included variety of issues related to Armenians. For instance, in December 1895 he informed the grand vizier that a village comprised of hundred and eighty Armenian households in Elbistan and some Armenians in

¹⁰³⁸ FO 424 (184), 1895, No. 684, P. Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury, Constantinople November 29, 1895

¹⁰³⁹ FO 424 (186), 1896, Inclosure in No. 41. Memorandum by Mr. Block, April 15, 1896. No. 41. P. Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury, Constantinople, April 16 1896.

Maraş were willing to convert to Islam. But he notified the Foreign Minister not to undertake their official conversion procedures for their conversion would attract the attention of the foreigners at present.¹⁰⁴⁰ At that time, the conflicts between Kurds and Armenians became widespread¹⁰⁴¹ and “many Armenians converted to Islam in order to escape death; some later converted back to their former faith, some did not.”¹⁰⁴²

In addition to coping with the conflicts, the Ministry of Interior was expected to provide reports from the field to respond to the news about the Armenians in the foreign press. In the beginning of June 1896 Memduh prepared a report for the Foreign Ministry to refute the rumors that thirty thousand people lived below poverty line in Diyarbakır to be dispatched to the Ottoman representative in Europe. This rumor was nothing but a fabrication and not even close to the reality. On the same days, Memduh was also busy with searching three Armenian Committee members, Troşaki, Timaksiyan, and Troşakist, in various parts of Istanbul.¹⁰⁴³

After a long negotiation process between the Great Power and the Ottoman government¹⁰⁴⁴ in September 1896 the Ottoman central administration introduced a reform program to be executed in *vilayat-ı sitte* (six Anatolian

¹⁰⁴⁰ BOA, HR.TH. 166/88, 16 Cemaziyelahir 1313/4 December 1895.

¹⁰⁴¹ For concise explanation on the factors disrupted the equilibrium between the Kurds and Armenians see Selim Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 203-204. For instance in May 1896 some Kurds in Hakkari Sanjak rustled the cattle of Armenians, and to resolve the problem Memduh sent orders to that gendarmes, and, if it had been necessary, even soldiers should have been sent against the guilty parties so that they could be captured.

Inclosure in No. 89. Memorandum by Mr. Block, May 6, 1896.

FO 424 (186), 1896, No 89. P. Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury, Pera, May 6, 1896.

¹⁰⁴² Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy*, 201.

¹⁰⁴³ BOA, HR.SYS. 2792/7, 8 Zilhicce 1312/2 June 1896.

¹⁰⁴⁴ For the negotiations between the Sublime Porte and the great powers about the Anatolian Reform Program see the Ottoman Foreign Ministry file BOA. HR.SYS.2836/73, 25 Rebiülahir 1313/15 October 1895.

provinces: Erzurum, Harput (Elazığ), Diyarbekir, Sivas, Bitlis, and Van).¹⁰⁴⁵

Ambassador Phillip Currie dispatched the summary of the reform program, quoted below, to Lord Salisbury on 24 December 1896. The articles that were executed in the six Eastern Anatolian provinces are as follow:

Article 1- Muavins to Valis appointed.

Article 2,3,4 - The Muavins of Mutesarrifs and Kaimakams, as well as the number and the posts of Kaimakams, have been fixed upon by the Government, and their titularies are in course of appointment.

Article 5 - The appointment of Christian officials in proportion to the population is being proceeded with; strict orders have been given that as vacancies occur Christians are to be appointed.

Article 6 - The old Regulations for the elections of Council of Administration are being carried out.

Article 7 to 16 - Nahies have been formed in the Vilayets of Erzeroum and Diarbekir; in the other vilayets the formation and selection of nahies is being proceeded with.

Article 17, 18 - Instructions as to the judicial functions of Councils of Ancients in nahies and villages are being drawn up.

Article 19 - Judicial Inspectors have been appointed.

Article 20, 21 - The formation of the police has been completely carried out.

Article 22, 23 - The formation of gendarmerie – the Vilayet of Van being included – is being proceeded with, and has been completed for Kharput. However, as in this vilayet, the Christians refuse to be enrolled, only twelve of them could be registered.

Article 24 - The appointment of gardes champetres is dependent on the completion of the formation of nahies.

Article 25 - Strict orders have been given that the Prison Regulations shall be completely carried out, and that the registers in which the Inspectors record their opinions, and which are necessary for the reform of prisons, so as to bring them into conformity with the laws of hygiene, shall be forwarded within eight days.

Article 26 - The Council of Inspection has been appointed in each vilayet.

Article 27 - The nomads and Kurds re accompanied by Imperial troops on their return from their summer pasturages.

Article 28 - Privates of the Hamidie cavalry have not carried their arms outside their periods of training, and have become subject to the general Tribunals.

¹⁰⁴⁵ For the Anatolian reform program (*Anadolu Islahatı*) see Karaca, *Anadolu Islahatı ve Ahmed Şakir Paşa*; Musa Şaşmaz, *British Policy and the Application of Reforms for the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000).

Article 29 - Local Commissions have been named for the inspection of the title-deeds to property; four officials from here are also in course of appointment.

Article 30 - The collection of taxes has been entrusted to the collectors appointed, that is to say, the tax collectors have been appointed.

Article 31 - The tithes are nowhere adjudicated *en bloc* and Regulations as to forced labour for public works being exacted in money or in kind are strictly carried out. So also the sums set apart on the Public Instruction Budget for Christian schools have been raised by 35,000 to 40,000 piastres in each vilayet.¹⁰⁴⁶

On 22 September 1896, the above quoted Anatolian Reform Program was reduced to 22 articles to be executed in all Ottoman provinces excluding the Hejaz.¹⁰⁴⁷ The Ottoman central administration did not want the reforms to be implemented only in the regions where Armenians inhabited along with other ethno-religious groups. This was indeed not a new project. The Porte informed the British, French and Russian ambassadors in 1895 about Abdülhamid's plan to introduce a reform program that would be applied in all provinces.¹⁰⁴⁸ By generalizing the reform program Abdülhamid might have two main intentions: preventing the reactions of the Muslims of the empire whose number had been steadily increasing and preventing the European powers' further interference in the internal affairs of the empire.

In October 1896, Memduh, along with Ahmed Şakir Pasha and Abdurrahman Pasha; the Minister of Justice, took part in a commission that was set up to reform the tithe in the six Eastern Anatolian provinces.¹⁰⁴⁹ In the meantime, another commission was set up under the leadership of Memduh to implement

¹⁰⁴⁶ FO 424 (189), Inclosure 3 in No. 369, Sir P. Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury (Received December 28) Constantinople, December 24, 1896.

¹⁰⁴⁷ For the articles of the empire-wide reform program that was promulgated on 22 September 1896 see BOA. Y.A.RES. 82/26, 14 Rebiülahir 1314/22 September 1896.

For the transliteration of the reform program see Ramazan Balcı, "Sultan II. Abdülhamid Döneminde Kudüs-ü Şerif'te Yapılan Islahat Çalışmaları (1896-1905) [Reform Activities in Jerusalem during the Sultan Abdulhamid II Era (1896-1905)]," *History Studies, ABD ve Büyük Ortadoğu İlişkileri Özel Sayısı/Relationships of the USA and The Great Middle East Special Issue* (2011), 62-64.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Esat Uras, *Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi* (Istanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1987), 320.

¹⁰⁴⁹ BOA, DH.SAİD. 1/84, 29 Zilhicce 1255/4 March 1840.

the reforms that were introduced on 22 September 1896 in all provinces across the empire. Memduh sent the reform program via ciphered telegraph to all provinces and after ten days he reported the responses he received from the governors.¹⁰⁵⁰

According to the report presented to the palace Bursa, Edirne, Aydın, Trabzon, and Ankara provinces responded affirmatively and informed Memduh that they would put into practice all the articles of the memorandum. However, responses from Yemen and Basra were not as positive as the ones from Anatolian provinces. In Yemen the Ottoman governance had difficulty maintaining authority over the large part of the province. People did not prefer the Ottoman civil courts, thus the courts were abolished but after sometime they were reestablished with an imposition of lower application fee. Moreover, an inspector was appointed to the province.

In Basra, tax collection was not an easy task thus middlemen were to be accompanied by gendarmerie in the places inhabited by tribal communities. Given that Basra and Syria were generally populated by Muslims, reforms needed to be reformulated according to their demographic structures. Tripoli had the similar situation since a large portion, if not all, of its population was Muslim. Thus, the province would be exempted from the reform program instructed by the Minister of Interior.

Likewise, since the majority of the population in Konya was Muslim, governor and assistant governor had to be Muslim in order not to cause any inconvenience for public. Governor of Adana stated that disturbances had recently been put down and Muslims of the province needed sometime to tolerate the reforms instructed by the center. Thus, for the time being Adana was not ready to implement the reform program. Moreover, he was informed that appointment of non-Muslim officials in Kosovo and Shkodra could excite the Christians of mountainous regions. Therefore, for the time being it was

¹⁰⁵⁰ BOA, Y.PRK.DH. 9/37, 22 Cemaziyelevvel 1314/29 October 1896.

better to postpone the implementation of the reforms in these provinces. On the other hand, according to the telegraph received from Janina it was appropriate to carry out the reforms in the province.

Governor of Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid informed Memduh that the number of Muslims in the province was little; therefore, if the police forces and administrators were to be appointed according to the proportion of Muslims and non-Muslims, almost all of them would be appointed from non-Muslims. Thus, it was better to preserve the status quo. Raising some issues to be reconsidered the governor informed Memduh about the changes that needed to be made in the articles of the reform program. For instance, when gendarmeries go to the villages they will not take anything free of charge and tax papers (*tezkere*) were to be distributed to people by middlemen selected from the public. The collected taxes were to be submitted to provincial treasury via middlemen.

Salonika responded favorably but attached some conditions. Accordingly, in Salonika civil officials would be recruited based on the proportion of Muslims and non-Muslims, but due to some political considerations some restrictions were made, and the issue of elected members was adapted to the reforms peculiar to the Rumelia provinces. Many of the Bulgarians were living in mixed neighborhoods. Thus the article about the election of headmen from all ethnic groups in each neighborhood had to be limited with the condition of living en masse. Moreover, non-Muslims too would be recruited to the profession of gendarmerie and in accordance to their qualifications and performance they were even going to be officers.¹⁰⁵¹ The responses Memduh received prove the impracticality of standardization in the Ottoman Empire, a political enterprise characterized by multiplicity in all realms.

&

¹⁰⁵¹ BOA, Y.PRK.DH. 9/37, 22 Cemaziyelevvel 1314/29 October 1896.

The six Eastern Anatolian provinces kept being the topmost issue for Memduh in the following months. For instance, in summer of 1897 Memduh, along with some other upper level bureaucrats in Istanbul and Şakir Pasha, was involved in the process of restructuring the police organization in the province of Erzurum in harmony with the reforms that were scheduled. Armenians were employed as police and gendarmerie in accordance with the demographic proportion of Armenians to Muslims in Erzurum. All this was carried out in coordination with the European consuls in the region who were assigned as observers.¹⁰⁵²

The 1894-1896 Crisis was gradually defused but problems related to Armenians continued to break out in different parts of Anatolia in the later years and Memduh was involved in solution processes. He was not only concerned about the activities of suspected Armenians in the Eastern Anatolia but those of the Christian missionaries and the foreign consuls in the region who were in close contact with the Armenians and ready to exacerbate, according to Memduh, the situation if something was to go amiss.¹⁰⁵³ For instance, he informed the grand vizier about the provocations and mischief of French vice-consul, Per Defrance, in Van. He provided some examples to show how the vice-consul politicized a simple dispute between the tribes in the region.¹⁰⁵⁴

¹⁰⁵² BOA, Y.EE. 133/13, 13 Safer 1315/14 July 1897.

¹⁰⁵³ BOA, A.MKT.MHM. 673/25, 7 Rebiülahir 1323/11 June 1905.

For instance a dispute sparked between a Muslim and non-Muslim during a transaction of dried meat in April 1897 in the bazaar of Maraş. The deputy of the French consul of the neighborhood showed up and exaggerated the situation. The abovementioned deputy of consul, Barthelemy, attempted to exacerbate the small problems between Muslims and non-Muslims or provoke non-Muslims against the government in cooperation with some missionaries in Maraş, Adana, and Zeytun. In response, the Ministry of Interior and the Foreign Ministry filed complaints against him to the French consul of the province of Aleppo for his dismissal. As the chain of correspondence from 1897 to 1899 attest, the French consul of Aleppo ignored the requests of the Ottoman Ministries and Barthelemy stayed on task. BOA, A.MKT.MHM. 651/17, 1 Zilhicce 1313/14 May 1896; BOA, Y.MTV. 168/65, 9 Cemaziyelevvel 1315/6 October 1897; BOA, Y.A.HUS. 377/54, 12 Cemaziyelevvel 1315/9 October 1897; BOA, HR.SYS. 2793/12, 16 Cemaziyelahir 1317/22 October 1899.

¹⁰⁵⁴ BOA, A.MKT.MHM. 642/2, 8 Rebiülevvel 1317/17 July 1899.

Disturbances caused by the Armenian Revolutionary activists spread to Istanbul in the later months of 1896. With regards to the series of incidents disturbing the public order in Istanbul an official proclamation was issued on 22 August 1896 to inform the public about the government's view of the developments and measures it took against them. According to the proclamation, "...the disturbances recently caused in Constantinople by certain wrongdoers belonging to the Armenian Revolutionary Committees, have been suppressed under the auspices of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan" and furthermore "a Special Tribunal has been established and Armenians who took part in these disturbances will be sent, and will suffer severe penalties." Those who were involved in pillaging were going to be "arrested at once and brought before the Special Tribunal, and will incur the severest punishment". This proclamation attests that the central administration became alarmed and attempted to take immediate steps to defuse the crisis in the capital.¹⁰⁵⁵

In the aftermath of the incidents in Istanbul, a small number of Armenians who were charged with involvement in the disturbances in Istanbul in August and September of 1896, such as ex-Armenian Patriarch İzmirlian¹⁰⁵⁶ and ex-Murahhas (deputy) of Muş Priest Nersis Horasanyan, were exiled to Mutasarrıflık of Kudüs and there they were employed to work in the service of the Patriarch.¹⁰⁵⁷ In the post 1908 era one of the first undertakings of the new

¹⁰⁵⁵ FO 424 (186), 1896, Inclosure 3 in No. 221, Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury, Constantinople, September 14, 1896.

¹⁰⁵⁶ As reported from Istanbul to London on 26 November 1896 that at a meeting convened at Kumkapı "Mgr. Maghanian Ormanian was elected as Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople, in the room of Mgr. İzmirlian, by votes out of total of 62." FO 424 (186), 1896, No. 251. P. Currie to Marquess of Salisbury, Pera, November 26, 1896

¹⁰⁵⁷ BOA, Y.PRK.DH. 13/46, 22 Cemaziyelahir 1323/24 August 1905.

Kudüs hosted some Muslims too as exile and Mutasarrıf Reşid employed them in various fields.

regime was to replace the Armenian Patriarch Mgr. Ormanian¹⁰⁵⁸ with Mgr. İzmirlıan, who was in exile in Kudüs since 1896.¹⁰⁵⁹

Later in 1903 the Istanbul Chief of Police strictly expressed his worries to the government about Ormanian Efendi, the Armenian Patriarch who was giving inflammatory speeches at the church of the patriarchy. The chief Police also called the attention to another Armenian named Bülbülyan, who was, as he described, much more dangerous than Ormanian and some other anarchist Armenians. As part of Armenian intrigue, Bülbülyan approached the Minister of Interior and deceived him (Memduh) by saying that he was exchanging correspondence with the Armenians in Europe and reporting Memduh about them. On the contrary, Bülbülyan had been reporting all the information he obtained from the Minister of Interior to the Armenian Committee. By using his close connection with the minister, Bülbülyan even secretly managed to bring fierce and famous anarchists to the imperial capital. Due to these offenses it was imperative to arrest Bülbülyan as soon as possible without taking into consideration his intimate relationship with the Minister of Interior.¹⁰⁶⁰ This document attests to the complexity of the relations between the Ottoman officials and the Armenians as well as the different strategies, though unsuccessfully, as the Istanbul Chief of Police argues, Memduh adopted to deal with the Armenian revolutionary activities.

In May 1897 Memduh wrote a note expressing his view on the Armenian issue. His note is valuable to understand how the Ottoman statesmen saw the 1894-1896 Crisis. Besides overviewing the background of the events recently took place in Istanbul, Memduh made various suggestions against the Armenian issue in the imperial capital. Since the Berlin Treaty Armenians had been causing disturbances in Anatolia under the pretext of demanding reform. With regard to

¹⁰⁵⁸ Ormanyan was also charged with having peculated a sum of 30,000. He was first arrested but soon released. FO 424 (186), 1896, No. 251. P. Currie to Marquess of Salisbury, Pera, November 26, 1896

¹⁰⁵⁹ FO 421, 1908, No. 303, Gerard Lowther to Edward Grey, Therapia, August 11, 1908

¹⁰⁶⁰ BOA, Y.PRK.ZB. 33/15, 29 Zilhicce 1320, 29 March 1903.

the Armenians the British adopted a policy, which seemed friendly to the Ottoman State, thus British opposing Russia respecting the reformation in Anatolia but indeed inciting the Armenians behind the scene.¹⁰⁶¹ Armenians who were not satisfied with the reform program last year proposed by the European powers and accepted by the Ottoman government, launched insurrections in Anatolia and in Istanbul. As part of the chain of events broke out in the capital some Armenians attempted to perpetrate a massacre in the Ottoman Bank. The rebels at the Bank submitted to Russian embassy's head-translator Maximov. That is to say, ardent Armenians flamed by the British were under the control of Russia. Offended by this situation the British authorities made a move and the British mass media turned against the Armenians to change the British public opinion on the Armenian issue. This situation provided an opportunity to the Ottoman government to recover and take measures against the threat. Anatolian Armenians had to be urgently sent back to their hometowns, from Istanbul, without delay.¹⁰⁶²

In the meantime, Memduh was persecuting the cases of Armenians who were found guilty for their involvement in rebellious activities some of whom escaped to Russia and waiting for a convenient time to return.¹⁰⁶³ He often corresponded with the province of Aydın to prevent the entry of Armenian revolutionary activists, armaments, inappropriate journals and newspapers and through the sea.¹⁰⁶⁴

¹⁰⁶¹ “...İngilizler’in politikası ise suret-i zahirede Devlet-i Aliyye’ye dostane ve binaenaleyh Anadolu kıtasınca icra-yı ıslahat bahsinde Rusya’ya karşı hasmane görünüb, fakat iç perdeden Ermenileri tahrike alet olmak yolunu tutdu...”

¹⁰⁶² BOA, Y.PRK. 9/87, 29 Zilhicce 1314/28 May 1897.

¹⁰⁶³ BOA, A.MKT.MHM. 620/48, 22 December 1897 Nerses and Serkis Agopyan in Bitlis BOA, Y.PRK.HR. 27/37, 4 Muharrem 1317/15 May 1899.

BOA, HR.SFR.3...449/65, 13 Muharrem 1314/6 June 1896.

¹⁰⁶⁴ BOA, Y.EE.KP. 13/1307, 10 Cemaziyelevvel 1319/24 September 1901.

BOA, Y.EE.KP. 13/1295, 20 Rebiülahir 1319/2 November 1901.

BOA, Y.EE.KP. 8/711, 06 Rebiülevvel 1316/25 July 1898.

BOA, Y.EE.KP. 8/788, 4 Şaban 1316/18 December 1898.

In the same period Istanbul witnessed a new disturbance. In May 1897 a conflict broke out between a group of Muslims and Armenians. In an effort to handle the situation Memduh had a hectic schedule; he visited hospital of the Sixth Department (Municipality of Beyoğlu) to see the injured from both sides and then to the Ministry of gendarmerie for the statistical data of the casualties. Though the number was not specified in Memduh's text to the palace, there were deaths from both sides. In the same correspondence he also informed the palace that he saw thirty to forty Armenians at the French consulate at Beyoğlu. They were collecting their papers to migrate to France. During his short visit to the French embassy, Memduh also had an unpalatable talk with the translator of the embassy about the Armenians.¹⁰⁶⁵ The conflict between some Armenians and Muslims and the above-referred dialog attests that the relations between Muslims and Armenians, the government and Armenians, and the government and European embassies were still tense in the capital in the spring of 1897.

In the next year a tension between Muslims and Armenians erupted in Ankara.¹⁰⁶⁶ Sivas had a great number of Avşar and more than sixty thousand Circassian Kurds, Turks, and some other Muslim ethnic groups along with non-Muslims from different backgrounds. In May 1898 four thousand Avşar and Circassian from Sivas went to Kayseri, a sanjak of Ankara province, upon hearing that Armenians were about to act inappropriately. As he successfully dealt with the settlement and many other issues related to the Caucasian immigrants during his governing years, Memduh communicated with rulers of Aziziye, a district of Sivas, Yozgad and Çorum, districts of Ankara, to calm Kurds, Circassians, and Avşar tribes.¹⁰⁶⁷ Because he was influential on Circassians, Memduh managed to turn them back to their villages and ward off a conflict that could have easily turned into a civil war in the region.

¹⁰⁶⁵ BOA, Y.PRK.DH. 9/75, 29-12-1314/28 May 1897.

¹⁰⁶⁶ BOA, Y.PRK.DH. 10.54, 29-12-1315/21 May 1898.

¹⁰⁶⁷ BOA, Y.PRK.DH. 10.54, 29-12-1315/21 May 1898.

Some of the problems related to Armenians that Memduh tried to solve were quite complicated and involved places and individuals outside the Empire. For the inquiry of these cases Memduh cooperated with the Foreign Ministry for using its means and connections. For instance, In July an Armenian named Serkis was caught in Muş and he informed the official authorities that he was a Russian from the village of Kazan of the province of Gence. The Ministry of Interior ordered the governor of Bitlis province to inquire if the testimony of Serkis was true.¹⁰⁶⁸ Soon after this correspondence Memduh received another telegraph about another Armenian, Mighirditch, who was known to be from Van, though originally he was not, due to his stay almost a decade in Van sometime in the past. Mighirditch was in Marsilya and when he was in Van he had a school for Armenians and once his involvement in malicious activities was discovered he had to leave Van about seven to eight years ago. According to the intelligence the governor of Bitlis obtained, in Marsilya Mighirditch was publishing a newspaper named "*Ermeniler*" (Armenians). Memduh kindly wrote to the Foreign Ministry to check if this information was accurate.¹⁰⁶⁹ Besides Russia and Europe, there were cases related to Armenians for which Memduh, through the Foreign Ministry, had to cooperate with Iranian authorities to resolve, as some of the rebellious Armenians crossed the Iranian border and continued their activities there.¹⁰⁷⁰

Memduh was also in collaboration with the police forces of Rumelia and the Rumelia Inspectorship to inquire the secret organization and activities of Armenians in the region. For instance, a group of Armenian who came to Filibe from Trabzon, Russia, and Iran planned to have a secret meeting. The Ministry of Interior strictly inquired about it by cooperating with the Ottoman authorities

¹⁰⁶⁸ This and some other cases (e.g. BOA, A.MKT.MHM. 547/30, 22 Muharrem 1321/20 April 1903) demonstrate how blurred the borders in the Eastern Anatolia between Russia, Ottoman Empire, and Iran causing confusion and difficulty of control on the Ottoman part.

¹⁰⁶⁹ BOA, A.MKT.MHM. 642/2, 8 Rebiülevvel 1317/17 July 1899.

BOA, A.MKT.MHM. 698/16, 15 Rebiülevvel 1316/3 August 1898.

¹⁰⁷⁰ BOA, HR.SFR.3.. 449/65, 13 Muharrem 1314/24 June 1896.

in the ground.¹⁰⁷¹ All this tells us that the Ottoman central administration was using all the means and connections to cope with the Armenian revolutionary groups.

Furthermore, in April 1900 Zabtiah Minister communicated with the governor of Sivas stating that, although artisan Armenians who were trusted and traded with had been previously received to the imperial capital, recently it was decided that no Armenians were to be received to the capital and those who resided in the capital were gradually sent back to their hometown. Therefore, the governor was ordered by the minister to prevent anyone from the Armenian community of Sivas to leave the province for Istanbul.¹⁰⁷² Considering direct communication between the Zabtiah Minister and the governor inappropriate, Memduh wrote to the palace to express his disturbance. Given the fact that the provinces were attached to the Ministry of Interior, the Zabtiah Minister's direct connection to a province to give an order, according to Memduh, was a violation of official procedure. Memduh's concern, which seems reasonable, about protecting and if possible increasing his and ministry's authority and prestige he was holding for over a decade manifested itself in many occasions, as happened in this case. In that sense, as underscored earlier, Memduh's contribution to the development and institutionalization of the Ministry of Interior was noteworthy.

To deal with the Armenian question more effectively, according to his own account, Memduh also nominated personages as governor and mutasarrif. In December 1902 he wrote to the grand vizier that due to the importance of protecting the province of Diyarbakir, it would be the right decision to appoint Tahir Pasha, governor of Van who proved to be competent in establishing peace and order, as governor of Diyarbakir, which was larger and more significant than Van. Memduh also recommended appointing Reşid Pasha, mutasarrif of the district of Zor who had an experience in coping with the Armenian disturbances,

¹⁰⁷¹ BOA, TFR.I.MKM. 3/238, 10 Rebiülevvel 1321/6 June 1903.

¹⁰⁷² BOA, Y.PRK.DH. 11/35, 29 Zilhicce 1317/30 April 1900.

as governor of Van. These appointments were not carried out¹⁰⁷³ as happened earlier in some other cases. This event, once more, proves that Memduh was not very influential in the decision-making processes; it was rather dominated by the palace circle. Memduh and the sultan had an old and trust based relationship. As we have seen in different contexts, Memduh was one of the favorites of Abdülhamid. Yet, he could not enter into the palace circle in the Hamidian era. It became particularly difficult for him to have favorable place in the central politics; for the palace increasingly fell under the hegemony of two rivals: Tahsin Pasha and İzzet Bey. He was not on bad terms with the former but he never got along with the latter. It was not easy for Memduh to get things done probably because he did not have strong connections with the cliques at the palace.

Although the Ottoman polity weathered the 1894-1896 Crisis, Armenian issue kept its importance in the agenda of both the foreign consuls and the Ottoman government. In October 1905, Mr. Marinitsch, on behalf of the British embassy, had a long interview with Memduh on the Armenian question and prepared a confidential memorandum on this interview to be dispatched to London. A few days before this interview “two large sized bombs were found in the Cercle d’Orient, in the Grande Rue de Pera, and some more in a small coffee-house close to the Embassy, which was kept by an Armenian”. The Cercle d’Orient was a famous club frequented by diplomats. As Memduh stated, bombs and explosives were, also, discovered in İzmir. In accordance with the instruction of the Minister of Interior, Kamil Pasha, governor of Aydın, made an inquiry and took necessary measures for peace and order. Memduh added that, because the Armenian Revolutionary Committee named Hincak released a notice after the explosion at Yıldız, this made the Ottoman Government to come to conclusion that there was a connection between Yıldız outrage and Armenian revolutionaries. Besides his evaluation of the current developments, Memduh made an explanation about the procedure he adopted for dealing with the

¹⁰⁷³ BOA, Y.PRK.DH. 12/17, 19 Şaban 1320/1 December 1902.

Armenian question in the provinces when he was governor. This explanation is critical to comprehend Memduh's perspective and way of relating himself to the Armenian community in the provincial context.

When I held the post of *vali*, and heard that the Armenians were planning an outbreak, I took precautionary measures which stopped the evil to a certain extent. For instance, I put myself in communication with the respectable Armenians residing in the *vilayet*, and, in consultation with them, the Armenians whose revolutionary ideas were well known to their compatriots were removed to remote places the Armenians whose revolutionary ideas were well known to their compatriots; and in return for the assistance afforded to me by honest Armenians, I gave them every possible kind of assistance in my power.

The Armenian Patriarch ought to let me know the persons, who, in his opinion, are dangerous men, and ask for my assistance. If he would frankly co-operate with me in dealing with such matters many good results might be obtained and evils averted. But the Patriarch is not inclined to approach me with that object.

After making such statements about his practices in the provincial setting, Memduh responded to a question about the likelihood of a fresh Armenian revolutionary movement in the capital and provinces; and the measures the government took against it. He noted that at present there seems to be no reason to be concerned about any insurrectionary movement, because the government made necessary arrangements and gave orders regarding the issue to the authorities. He also added that he received no information from the provinces about an apprehension. With respect to the claims about the severe measures taken in the provinces "against the Armenians even those confined in prisons," Memduh replied that "Armenians who are now in prison in accordance with judgments delivered by the Courts cannot be subjected to any further punishment." Before concluding his talk by congratulating "England from the bottom of my heart on the renewal of the alliance signed with Japan" he made a final remark on the Armenian revolutionary movement, which, for him, was in vain. He argued that,

The Greeks, Serbians, Romanians, Montenegrins, and Bulgarians have struggled for their independence and have set forth some rational grounds in justification of their movements against Turkey; but I cannot

understand how the Armenians can hope to change or improve their present political status. Under these circumstances I think their sacrifices are hopeless and useless.

Once Memduh completed his statement, Marinitsch said to him that “the Ambassador had wished to show that he considers his Excellency as an enlightened and powerful member of the Cabinet, capable of rendering faithful services to his Sovereign and of doing good to his country when occasion presented itself”. In response Memduh stated that, unlike his predecessors, he, regrettably, did not have power; “the more so as now the Valis in many instances, instead of applying to him, write straight to the Palace or to the Grand Vizier, thus lessening his prestige and authority over his subordinates.”¹⁰⁷⁴ This statement seems not fully against the reality, yet still it sounds like Memduh politely refused to be an agent by downplaying himself. Acting strategically, he remained faithful to the sultan and the empire without losing the friendship of the British.

Despite him being characterized as an anti-Armenian in the literature, Memduh’s approach to Armenians varied from one case to another. His intimate friendship with the Dildilian family of Sivas is a great example that shows the different faces of Memduh. As he frankly stated to his British interlocutor, he prudently differentiated the Armenian revolutionary activists from the Armenian community who were intrinsic part of the Anatolian society. One of his notes to the palace from the late 1907 also demonstrates how he avoided making and spreading sweeping generalizations about the Armenians.

In December 1907, Memduh received a note from the governor of Sivas, Reşid Akif Bey, saying that the majority of the populations of the villages named Me’li Perkiynik and Tare were Armenians who were involved in mischief. These Armenians and some others from surrounding regions had been gathering at

¹⁰⁷⁴ FO 424/208, 1905, No. 99, N. C’Onor to the Marquess of Lansdowne, Therapia, October 10, 1905.

the place known as Soğuk Çermik for five to six years under the pretense of taking a bath. Thus, governor of Sivas argued that there was a need for setting up police stations in these villages. Soğuk Çermik was a mountainous region two hours away from the center of Sivas. According to Memduh, unlike what the governor said these villages of Sivas did not have a significant number of Armenian population and there was no danger of Armenian disturbance in Sivas as there had been no big event for five years when Memduh governed the province. Armenians were coming to these villages every July, not to make trouble but for medical purposes, since, Çermik, had a natural mineral spring. People who came to Çermik for thermal treatment were staying at rented tents and Armenians who came from surrounding villages were setting up the tents. In exchange of their labor they got thermal treatment for fifteen to twenty days and then they would leave Çermik. It was not possible for them to stir up trouble for they were very little in number when compared to the Muslim population and they must have been aware of the possible consequences of such an attempt. Putting aside the unlikelihood of Armenians' getting into mischief in Çermik, setting up a police station in the region in December is an extremely ill-timed demand because during this time Çermik is under heavy snow and birds do not even go there. Such a proposal, Memduh contended, would only be offered to show as if he was working hard.¹⁰⁷⁵ The explanation Memduh presented makes sense and having such an intimate knowledge about a locality of Sivas indicates not only the strength of Memduh's memory and his comprehension of the circumstances of the places he governed, but also his diligence as not to fall into the fallacy of hast generalization about the Armenians.

In the following years Memduh continued dealing with the Armenian issue. For instance, he was asked by the British embassy in June 1906 to solve some problems faced by the Armenians in Muş¹⁰⁷⁶ and in June 1908 in Diyarbakır.¹⁰⁷⁷

¹⁰⁷⁵ BOA, Y.PRK.DH. 14/27, 2 Zilkade 1325/7 December 1907.

¹⁰⁷⁶ F.O.424, 1906, From N. O'Connor to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, June 7, 1906 No.47 (20661)

The Ottoman government survived the 1894-1896 Crisis and the administrative cadres were stabilized but large part of the Empire, Kuwait and Basra Gulf, Yemen, Aqaba, Iraq, and Macedonia, was engulfed by the crises and riots particularly between 1902 and 1908, the time span corresponding to the sixth sub-period in Çetinsaya's periodization of the Hamidian domestic policy. Besides considering the wide range of internal dynamics, remembering above-referred Akarlı's notice about the great powers' attention turning back from the Far East to the Near East may be helpful to comprehend the complications of the last six years of the Hamidian regime as well as Memduh's bureaucratic career.

5.4. Yemen: A Place of No Return

There are no clouds on air, why is this smog?
There are no deceased in neighborhood, why is this outcry?
Mum, I haven't died yet, why is this groan?
This is Yemen, its rose is grass,
Whoever goes there does not return back, I wonder why?¹⁰⁷⁸

Being situated at a geopolitically strategic spot¹⁰⁷⁹ Yemen was critical for the Ottomans not only for accessing the global commercial routes but also -and more importantly- for maintaining their authority in the Arabian Peninsula in general and the Hejaz in particular. Yemen preventing illicit arms trafficking in the Red Sea was added to the concerns of the Ottoman state from the mid-

¹⁰⁷⁷ F.O.424, 1908, From Mr. G. Barclay to Sir. Edward Grey, Therapia, June 12, 1908 No. 158 (21354)

¹⁰⁷⁸ <https://lyricstranslate.com> accessed on 1 August 2019 at 15:32.

*Havada bulut yok bu ne dumandır
Mahlede ölüm yok bu ne figandır
Şu Yemen elleri ne de yamandır.
Anu yemendir
Gülü çemendir
Giden gelmiyor
Acep nedendir.*

This is the lyrics of an Ottoman folk song that was composed for Anatolian soldiers conscripted to be dispatched to Yemen for fighting against the Zaidi rebellions. Yemen was infamous among the Anatolian public for its being a remote place of no return.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula, bordering the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea.

nineteenth century onwards. The British occupation of Aden¹⁰⁸⁰ alerted the Ottoman leadership in 1839.¹⁰⁸¹ With these concerns in mind, the Ottoman State reconsolidated¹⁰⁸² its power in Yemen in 1871. Suppressing the riots in Asir, taking control of Sana, establishing Ottoman administrative and military system in large part of the region, and undertaking wide range of public works Ahmed Muhtar Pasha reorganized Yemen as an Ottoman province¹⁰⁸³ and ruled it until May 1873. In the ensuing two decades relative peace and stability had endured in the region.

However, Zaidi pressure on the Ottoman station in Yemen significantly increased in 1891–1892, 1898–1899, 1904–1907, and 1910–1911 as Imam al-Mansur and his son and successor Yahya dramatically expanded their riots.¹⁰⁸⁴ In this period a vicious cycle emerged between the Zaidi insurgencies and the Ottoman State; “counter insurgency operations became larger and longer (and hence, an even bigger drain on the empire’s human and financial resources),

¹⁰⁸⁰ Aden is a port-city of Yemen having border with Indian Ocean and the Red Sea.

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, along with other factors, raised not only the importance of Yemen for the British but also the influence of the British in the Red Sea.

¹⁰⁸¹ Caesar E. Farah, *The Sultan’s Yemen: Nineteenth-Century Challenges to Ottoman Rule*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002).

¹⁰⁸² Yemen was added to the Ottoman territories in 1538 by Hadım Süleyman Pasha, governor of Egypt. Under the governorship of Özdemir Pasha Yemen was fully under Ottoman rule. However, the prevalence of public unrest between 1549 and 1635 in the region prompted the Ottomans gradually to withdraw from Yemen. Since then local Qasimi Dynasty led by Zaidi Sheikhs became the authority in Yemen following much of the administrative and financial system established by the Ottomans. Next two centuries Yemen was controlled by the Qasimis. In 1872 the Ottoman State regained the authority of Yemen. But as the unfolding events proved ruling the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula was far from easy due to the rapidly changing power configurations of the late nineteenth century in Yemen as well as in the world. At this juncture recalling Engin Deniz Akarlı’s “world order” would be helpful to make sense of the power configurations in the global scale and the Ottomans’ concern to control Yemen.

¹⁰⁸³ As will be discussed below, ruling, let alone fully implementing Tanzimat reforms, Yemen was not easy at all for the Ottoman Government.

¹⁰⁸⁴ The increasing availability of modern breech-loading rifles in the northern highlands from about the second half of the 1880s is one of the factors that helps explain why the two *imāms* and their supporters were able to strike much more forcefully against the Ottomans from the early 1890s than the rebels led by al-Hādī Sharaf al-Dīn b. Muḥammad had in 1880–1881.

but remained inconclusive.”¹⁰⁸⁵ Yemen had become a point of no return for the great number of conscripts from different provinces of the Empire.¹⁰⁸⁶ Moreover, the growing military and political power of the Zaidi imams posed a great challenge to the legitimacy of the Ottoman sultan. While the Zaidi imams were severely threatening the Ottoman position in Yemen between 1891 and 1911, the British, French and Italians were vigorously expanding their colonial power on the shores of the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa increasing the vulnerability of the Ottomans in the region.

Ottoman administrators in Yemen and Istanbul were very decisive to eradicate the challenge posed by Zaidi imams because they suspected that Britain and Italy were assisting the uprisings with the intent of undermining the Ottoman power in the southern Red Sea and southwest of Arabian Peninsula. The Ottomans’ suspicion was indeed quite reasonable. With regard to 1891-92 insurgence of the Zaidi imam and his followers, Thomas Kuehn refers to the statement of the British vice-consul in Hudayda stating that, “...the Turks and the general public attribute the rise of the Arabs to the British Government, who they say has armed them; but strange to say the Rifles found with the Arabs are of Italian make.”¹⁰⁸⁷ Furthermore, particularly during the large-scale uprising of 1899-1900 the Zaidi *imam* “al-Mansur and his supporters received weapons from the Sultan of Lahj, perhaps the most important vassal ruler of the

¹⁰⁸⁵ Thomas Kuehn draws attention to the impact of the ecological parameters on the uprisings in Yemen. The tribal groups who joined the Imam’s rebellious troops were living on the northern highlands where agriculture entirely depended on rain. “To some extent, in 1891–92, and definitely in 1898–99 and 1904–7, severe drought and the specter of starvation prompted many locals to join the ranks of the *imām* because the fighters received at least daily food rations.” Thomas Kuehn, *Empire, Islam, and Politics of Difference: Ottoman Rule in Yemen, 1849-1919* (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2011), 153.

¹⁰⁸⁶ This situation was described by Memduh in his work *Yemen Kit’ası Hakkında Mütalaat* (p. 9). “...emekler boşa gitti ıslahata müteferri mukarrerat durdu da erbab-ı isyan durdurulamadı. Seneler yine hal-i tezebzübde geçer oldu. Hazine-i maliyeden Yemen’e mesarif için peyderpey sim u zer ve Anadolu’dan imdada asker yetiştirilmek tarik-ı muzayyıkı kapattırılmadı.”

¹⁰⁸⁷ Kuehn, *Empire, Islam, and Politics*, 197. Italians armed the rebellions against the Ottomans in Asir during the Ottoman-Italian War of 1911-1912. John Baldry, “Anglo-Italian Rivalry in Yemen and Asir 1900-1934,” *Die Welt des Islams*, 17 (1976-1977), 160.

British in the hinterland of Aden.”¹⁰⁸⁸ All these developments demonstrate that after centuries of having control over much of the Arabia, the presence of the Ottomans in the region began to be seriously challenged in the late nineteenth century by the internal actors such as the Zaidi imams and competing European imperial powers which were expanding into the Ottoman territories and gaining “economic and political influence through alliances with local communities and leaders.”¹⁰⁸⁹

Aiming at maintaining authority over the Arabian Peninsula in general and its southern tip in particular, the Hamidian state apparatus adopted a variety of strategies based on the wide spectrum of opinions proposed by the high ranking Ottoman administrators and army officers. Yet it was not easy at all for the Ottoman government to have a full authority in this remote province. According to the memorandums, which were prepared upon the request of the sultan, Yemen was suffering from incompetent and weak governors and corruption and bribery of the civil officials. The problem of inadequacy and late payments of salaries of the government officials was also addressed in the memoranda.

The tax arrears (*bekaya*) and inability to collect taxes in full was another serious problem that was repeatedly brought up in the reports on Yemen. The government had difficulty recruiting officials to serve in Yemen and particularly in the countryside and therefore had to work with local people such as sheikhs (tribal leaders and small lords), notables, and village headmen (*muhtar*) for the tax collection. In this way the tax-collection affair span out of control and irregularities caused by this situation further damaged the state-society relations in the province. In every year tax arrears substantially increased because no more than half of the imposed taxes could be collected while the other half remained in arrears.¹⁰⁹⁰ These are not the only problems the Ottoman central administration faced in Yemen. Indeed, the desired

¹⁰⁸⁸ Kuehn (p. 198) quoted this information from R. J. Gavin, *Aden under British Rule, 1839–1967* (London: C. Hurst, 1975), 214-215.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Kuehn, *Empire, Islam, and Politics*, 2.

¹⁰⁹⁰ BOA. YEE. 9/12, 29 Muharrem 1309/4 September 1891.

administrative structure could not be established in this province because the 1871 Provincial Regulation could not be implemented there.

Memoranda submitted to the sultan also offered solutions to the above-mentioned chronic problems such as:

conducting censuses and cadastral surveys as soon as possible; restoration of the security destroyed by rebellious tribes and leaders; the appointment of conscientious and reliable people instead of selfish, corrupt and incompetent ones as tax collectors; extension of telegraph lines and roads to facilitate communication and transportation, levying taxes at rates compatible with agricultural and stockbreeding capacity of every region in Yemen; introduction of efficient and effective methods of tax collection and drafting an administrative regulation (*nizamname*) specially designed for Yemen.¹⁰⁹¹

As will be elucidated in the ensuing passages, the commissions under the presidency of Memduh put forward similar kind of solutions but implementing them proved to be difficult, if not impossible.

Between 1889 and 1895 two major insurgencies broke out in Yemen. Ahmed Feyzi Pasha, in the capacity of governor and commander of the province, managed to bring the province under control in the first occurrence. However, his appeal for help from the imperial capital during the second insurgency ended in his removal from the post and the separation of the military and administrative powers in the province. Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha became governor on 21 April 1898¹⁰⁹² and Abdullah Pasha was appointed to the commander of the seventh army in Yemen. When Memduh became Minister of Interior, Ahmed Feyzi Pasha was the governor and military officer of the province. Due to the rebellious activities and difficulty in establishing imperial governance, Yemen became one of the top issues Memduh had to deal with during his

¹⁰⁹¹ Hümeyra Bostan, *Institutionalizing Justice in a Distant Province: Ottoman Judicial Reform in Yemen (1872-1918)*, 2013, Istanbul Şehir University, Unpublished Master Thesis, 44.

¹⁰⁹² Disappointed by A. Feyzi Pasha's failure to suppress the second insurgency the Sultan with the advise of Arap İzzet Pasha- appointed Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, an experienced governor, to Yemen hoping to put the province in order.

service at the Ministry. From the time he took up the office until he resignation in July 1908 Yemen, as an alarming issue, along with the Macedonian question always occupied Memduh's agenda. He not only exchanged correspondence almost on a daily basis with the governors of Yemen regarding the problems and developments of the province but also chaired three interdepartmental commissions on Yemen and prepared long memoranda describing the situation and proposing short and long-term solutions for stabilizing the Ottoman rule in the province.

5.4.1 Yemen Kitası Hakkında Mütalaat: Proposing Local Autonomy

Soon after his resignation from the Ministry of Interior, which was the last official post he held, Memduh published a 132 pages book on Yemen, *Yemen Kitası Hakkında Mütalaat*. This book is a compilation of some personal notes of Memduh about Yemen, the memoranda commissions that were drafted when he was the chairman, various correspondences he personally exchanged with the grand vizierate and the governors of Yemen. Besides this book dealing with the recent past, between 1904 and 1908, Memduh penned another book in the summer of 1909: *Miftah-ı Yemen*. The book narrated the Ottoman conquest of Yemen in 1539 and the reforms undertaken there for preventing insurgencies as well as a brief history of Sana Castle. These two works attest to the significance of Yemen for Memduh as a bureaucrat and an intellectual.

In the beginning of his work *Yemen Kitası Hakkında Mütalaat* Memduh sums up his views about the developments taken place in Yemen during his Ministry (1895-1908). Memduh refers to the past flexible policies to prove that the recent –particularly the Hamidian- practices in the late nineteenth century were inappropriate.¹⁰⁹³ According to him, bringing order to Yemen is not possible only with the armed forces. For four decades the Ottoman state had inflicted

¹⁰⁹³ “Benim mütalaa-ı kasiraneme nazaran Yemen kıta-ı vasiyasının ahalisini emre ram ve icra-yı meram etmek yalnız silah kuvvetiyle olamaz. Kırk seneden beri hep vurduk kırdık halkı kendimize asla ısındıramadık müttehazımız olan meslekte daha nice zaman anlara eman vermeğe uğraşmış olsak mesai bilahare yine müşkilatı dai olur...” Mehmed Memduh, *Yemen Kit’ası Hakkında Mütalaat*, 7.

force upon people of Yemen and this treatment had deterred them. In order to demonstrate the impropriety of this strategy Memduh refers to the reigns of Yavuz Sultan Selim (1512-1520) and Sultan Süleyman I (1520-1566) during which the Empire expanded unprecedentedly and lived its most glorious period. Yemen was added to the Ottoman territories in this period and by employing effective and flexible policies it continued to be so for centuries. Despite the grandeur of the Empire, Zaidi imams were acknowledged and honored by the Ottoman authorities and in order to establish peace and order in Yemen some of the local magnates were authorized to rule the province on condition of observing the Ottoman laws. The same happened in the context of Çaldıran Battle. Yavuz Sultan Selim defeated Iranian army and to keep the conquered lands in peace the Sultan imposed some political rules and allowed the leaders of Kurdish military to administer the region along with İdris-i Bitlisi (1452-1520), an Ottoman statesman known for his Persian Ottoman history: *Tarih-i Heşt Behişt*. It is noteworthy to mention that Memduh refers to earlier Ottoman state practices to prove the appropriateness of internal autonomy in the context of Yemen instead of European colonial framework.

Memduh also draws attention to the fact that the Zaidi insurgents and the Ottoman soldiers who are conscripted from various provinces of the Empire to fight against them are both Muslims, and making them kill each other would yield no benefit. Memduh certainly does not take the European colonial framework as a model for organizing the relations between the Ottoman capital and the provinces. Yet, he makes a reference to the religious freedom of the millions of Muslims living under the domination of colonial powers¹⁰⁹⁴ to show the inappropriateness of the Ottoman policy towards the Zaidi community of Yemen.

¹⁰⁹⁴ “Zeydiler Müslüman ve bunları takdir ve imhaya uğraşan vilayet-ı şahaneden üftan ü hızan askerlik sıfatıyla şitaban ehl-i iman olmasıyla iki din kardeşi karşı karşıya gelerek asırlarca mütemadiyen adavet ve husumet etmekte bulunmaları kaziye-i gayri marziyedir...” Mehmed Memduh, *Yemen Kıt’ası Hakkında Mütalaat*, 11-12.

He continues his opening remarks by suggesting the need for incorporating the local people into the administrative and military service for breaking the resistance and forging alliance with those who might otherwise get involved in opposition.¹⁰⁹⁵ Moreover, Memduh argues that if the Ottoman State is to avoid tragedies caused by the chaos in Yemen, first of all, the province has to be divided into four sub provinces and each of them has to be ruled by different governors who proved their competence.¹⁰⁹⁶ This is because; in terms of territory and population Yemen is too large to be ruled by one governor. Even worse, much of its terrain is not safe and connected by railroads and telegraph lines.¹⁰⁹⁷ These conditions create both problems, especially during a state of emergency that is almost impossible to be solved, and lack a smooth communication among the provincial functionaries at all levels. Therefore, for the good governance of Yemen it is essential to divide it into four provinces ruled by individual governors who can take initiatives to get the things done without delaying it to obtain formal permission or instruction from his seniors in the province.

In almost all of his reports about Yemen Memduh expressed this argument as a solution to the disorder prevailing across much of the province. In another context Memduh stated that the proposal of dividing Yemen into four provinces had been accepted by the Ottoman central administration in 1900, with the condition that the Governor of Sana received twice the salary and had veto

¹⁰⁹⁵ “...umumunu bize vesail-i meşrua ile ısındırmak ve kendi işlerimizde onları da tavzifen ve taltifen kullanıp.....memleketin terakkiyatı emrinde yerlileri çalıştırmak icab eder. Şu lüzumu bir gün meclis-i mahsus-ı vükelada esbab-ı mucibesıyla izah ve ifade eylediğimde şeyhülislam efendi rey-i acizanemi tervic etmiş olduğu gibi bazı zevat dahi itirazda bulunmadıklarından Zeydi imamıyla söyleşmek için bizden ve o canibden memurlar tayinine karar verildi. İş yoluna girmek istidadını aldı lakin hal ve zaman müsaade vermediğinden yine netice-i matlube müyesser olmadı.” Mehmed Memduh, *Yemen Kit’ası Hakkında Mütalaat*, 12.

¹⁰⁹⁶ The Reform Committee of 1898 made the same recommendation of dividing Yemen into four: the province of Sana, with the districts of Dhamar and Hajja; of Ta’izz, with the districts of Hujariya and Qataba; of Hodeida, with the districts of Makhail and Ghamid. Mehmed Memduh, *Yemen Kit’ası Hakkında Mütalaat*, 51-52.

¹⁰⁹⁷ At this juncture Memduh highlights the difficulty of maintaining telegraph lines due to the rebel attacks deep in the province despite all the efforts and investments of the Ottoman State.

power over other three governors in the province. But due to the financial constraints this plan could not be realized.¹⁰⁹⁸

Overall, Memduh seems to prefer soft power to hard power proposing that the Ottoman leadership should recognize and adapt to the realities of Yemen rather than denying and fighting against them. To put it more explicitly, although he does not provide a clear and full-fledged scheme for the terms and conditions of it, Memduh implicitly advocates the idea that the Ottoman central administration needs to acknowledge that Zaidi imam is a religious and political power broker having profound influence on a great majority of Yemeni people. Such an acknowledgment would definitely entail power sharing and local autonomy.

At this juncture, it is meaningful to notice that Memduh's view of the Zaidi community in the early 1900's was very different than his view of the Alewites of Asia Minor in the early 1890's. As discussed in detail in the previous chapter Memduh, in the capacity of governor, was utterly intolerant of the Alewite community of Sivas and Ankara and warned the Sultan on all occasions about the challenge they were posing to the coherence of the Empire in general and these two provinces in particular. Finding them unreliable and deviant, he suggested various strategies to bring them to the right path: Sunni Islam. However, Memduh was much more prudent and suggested a reconciliatory approach when it came to the Zaidi community of Yemen.

Such a radical change in his approach to a denomination of Islam other than Sunni can be explained or rather speculated in different ways. One is although this is just an outside chance, Memduh's perception of others possibly changed in ten years. Another way of explaining it is that he was realistic enough to recognize the unlikelihood of the Ottoman triumph against the Zaidi Imam and his followers who had considerable advantages over the Ottoman State

¹⁰⁹⁸ Mehmed Memduh, *Yemen Kit'ası Hakkında Mütalaat*, 56.

apparatus such as familiarity with the terrain and being able to access the latest weaponry and ammunition due to their proximity to the arms trade network¹⁰⁹⁹ and being directly or indirectly supported by the Great Powers. Furthermore, Memduh might have seen that Anatolia and its inhabitants, particularly the Muslims, as essentials to the Empire, without which the Ottoman polity could not maintain its integrity. On the other hand, Yemen was a distant and difficult terrain having a semi-autonomous background and a mounting opposition led by the Zaidi imams who claimed the title of caliph. The imperial treasure was also suffering from a chronic budget deficit ; thus, the government in Istanbul was not able to carry out most of the substantial reform projects that would contribute to the improvement of all provinces including Yemen. Considering all of these, Memduh might have seen the dedication of great deal of financial and human resources to Yemen unavailing.

5.4.2. “Politics of Difference”

Thomas Kuehn interprets Memduh’s proposal for autonomous status of Yemen as politics of difference. According to Kuehn, the politics of colonial difference and the Ottoman politics in Yemen had common grounds: “they were based on the assumption that the ‘backward’ could not be governed like the “civilized” and they “institutionalized the difference and perceived inferiority of the local population by leaving them outside the purview of political practices and administrative regulations that were theoretically universalist or empire-wide in nature”.¹¹⁰⁰ Compared to the European colonialism the Ottoman provincial

¹⁰⁹⁹ The increasing availability of modern breech-loading rifles in the northern highlands from about the second half of the 1880s is one of the factors that helps explain why the two *imāms* and their supporters were able to strike much more forcefully against the Ottomans from the early 1890s than the rebels led by al-Hadi Sharaf al-Dīn b. Muḥammad had in 1880-1881. As R. J. Gavin has shown, these weapons came into southwest Arabia from across the Red Sea, mainly from the port city of Obokh and later from the nearby French colony of Djibouti, where French merchants established the main entrepôt for the arms trade in the Red Sea region after 1880. It seems that the *imāms* imported fire-arms primarily through Asir. See Gavin, *Aden under British Rule*, 204-205.

¹¹⁰⁰ Thomas Kuehn compares the Ottoman governance in Yemen to the colonial rules. “The politics of colonial difference was expressed in “dual structures for the governance of Europeans and ‘natives’” that often included separate legal codes and

administration in Yemen, according to Kuehn, was ambiguous and hybrid, therefore he describes it as Ottoman colonialism. Regarding Memduh's statements about Yemen as a strong indication of the politics of difference Kuehn notes that

Memduh Paşa proposed to reinvent the Zaydis as a community that would be safely contained within institutional boundaries drawn by the central government in Istanbul. In so doing, the government would erase every ambiguity as to the appeal of its leader beyond these Yemeni boundaries. In this way, the *imāms* and their community would be assigned a station within the larger context of Ottoman governance—a position that unambiguously designated them as part of the “backward” and “uncivilized” sphere of the local. This sphere would, however, be ordered and hence made subservient to the imperial sphere represented by the caliphate of the Ottoman sultans. This understanding was reflected in the minister's statement, that making the local Zaydī population abandon the belief that there must always be an *imām* to lead them would be impossible because of their large numbers and, more to the point, their “savagery” (*vahşet*). Thus, the arrangement that Memduh Paşa proposed was firmly grounded in the larger context of institutionalizing perceived difference.¹¹⁰¹

The discourse analysis of the reports and memoranda drafted by some of the Ottoman bureaucrats and military officers like Memduh, Tahsin Pasha,¹¹⁰² Mustafa Şevket, and Namık Efendi provide some discursive evidences to support the claim of Kuehn. Yet, instead of taking some officials' selected discourse at face value to label the Ottoman State's policy on Yemen as

courts of law, the exclusion of the “natives” from the democratic politics of the metropole, as well as efforts to segregate space and regulate sexual relations between the two groups.” (Kuehn, *Empire, Islam, and Politics of Difference*, 11). “The predominance of politics of difference also characterized Ottoman imperial rule over a number of other provinces during this period, notably Shkodër (İşkodra) in present-day northern Albania, as well as Tripolitania (Trablusgarb) and the Hijaz, which today are part of Libya and Saudi Arabia, respectively.”

¹¹⁰¹ Kuehn, *Empire, Islam, and Politics*, 228.

¹¹⁰² Kuehn quotes from the memoirs of Tahsin Pasha, the first secretary of Abdülhamid II; that were written down after the disintegration of the Empire. “There was a special policy that Sultan Hamid pursued toward distant regions [of the empire], such as Iraq and Yemen, and that one could term a colonial policy. Sultan Hamid, who fully understood that the people of these areas could not be administered like those living in other parts of the empire and according to the same laws and modes [of governance], had accepted an administrative system that was in accordance with the capabilities of the local population.” (*Sultan Abdülhamid. Tahsin Paşa'nın Yıldız Hatıraları*, ed. Ali Ergenekon, Istanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1990, 205).

“colonial,” one is supposed to examine much more reliable parameters of the center-periphery relations most particularly the economic parameters which would provide hard data for assessing and comparing the Ottoman enterprise to European colonial governance. This is so because the bulk of the literature associates colonialism with economic exploitation in the form of putting the colony’s economy in the service of the metropole’s extractive industry and large-scale commercial enterprise.

Kuehn himself refers to the chronic budgetary constraints of the Ottoman administration in Yemen by quoting Jon Mandaville according to whom “in 1899 provincial income on paper reached 35 million [kuruş] while military expenditures topped 25 million. The military figures were real; the income figures were not, since more than 5 million in taxes could not be collected.”¹¹⁰³ This is one of the many instances Kuehn mentions the difficulty of collecting taxes in Yemen to meet the basic needs of the provincial administration, let alone exploiting its economic resources to be used in large-scale industrial and commercial undertakings organized by Istanbul.

Furthermore, Yemen, like all provinces of the empire, was represented in the Ottoman parliament during two Constitutional periods, 1876-1878 and 1908-1918. That is to say, people of Yemen were entitled Ottoman citizenship, like all Ottomans, and therefore a “dichotomy of citizens versus subjects,” a distinctive characteristic of colonial power relations, was out of question in the Ottoman case.¹¹⁰⁴ Knowing all of this, Kuehn seems to be aware of the difficulty, or rather implausibility, of applying the modern colonial framework to the Ottoman context. Hence, he introduces the term Ottoman colonialism, which is grounded on nothing but discourse of difference articulated by some bureaucrats.

¹¹⁰³ Kuehn, *Empire, Islam, and Politics*, 196; Jon Mandaville, “Memduh Pasha and Aziz Bey: Ottoman Experience in Yemen,” in *Contemporary Yemen: Politics and Historical Background*, ed. B. R. Pridham (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984), 29.

¹¹⁰⁴ Kuehn, *Empire, Islam, and Politics*, 135.

In order to substantiate his proposal of local autonomy Memduh's reference to the "golden age" of the Ottoman Empire is also noteworthy in providing insight into Memduh's frame of mind. Rather than appealing to the contemporary imperial examples he prefers looking back into the Ottoman past to find out an ideal policy from which the Hamidian regime needs to get inspired. Similarly, as earlier stated, even though he adopted various modern elements Memduh, like other *Encümen-i Şuara* poets, was very much inspired by the classical Ottoman Literature. Thus, it is possible that he preferred the classical over novel in seeking an effective political strategy for stabilizing Ottoman rule in Yemen.

With regard to Memduh's reference to the earlier practices of the Ottoman state Kuehn makes a comparison between Memduh and those such as Ahmed İzzet Pasha, who played a critical role in the arrangement of the Daan agreement in 1911, and Ali Emiri, according to whom "the form of indirect rule that the British exercised over the princely states of India and the local leaders in the hinterland of Aden" could be taken, partially if not fully, as a model to govern the Ottoman Yemen.¹¹⁰⁵ But in his 1905 report Memduh "invoked the Ottoman practice of devolving degrees of autonomy to religious communities, a practice which, in various forms, had been a standard feature of the Ottoman imperial rule for several centuries."¹¹⁰⁶

5.4.3. Trial and Error: Seeking the Most Appropriate Way of Governance

The *Yemen Kitası Hakkında Mütalaat* Memduh presents the Ottoman government as an uncompromising authority. However, numerous official practices and regulations shed light on different, far more inclusive and reconciling, aspects of the Ottoman policy in the context of Yemen. For instance, the reports belong to the 1880s and 1890s reveal that the Ottoman policy makers in Istanbul and executors in the province were aware of the sensitivities of the Yemeni people particularly with regards to practicing Islamic law such as prohibition of alcohol. Therefore, the Ottoman authorities in

¹¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 210, 215.

¹¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 215.

Yemen, in accordance with the instruction from Istanbul, prohibited alcohol production, consumption and sale.

Furthermore, in an effort to be in harmony with the local people or winning their hearts all civil officials in Yemen were ordered to dress like local people while at work wearing cloak and turban not frock coat, trouser, and fez. On 16 August 1902 Memduh, as a Minister of Interior, issued a memorandum that was first sent to the grand vizier stating that “it is obligatory for all civil officials working in the Province of Yemen to dress the attire specific to ulema.”¹¹⁰⁷ It is obvious that the Ottoman policy makers were aware of the power and prestige held by the religious scholars in Yemen. Formally ordering the functionaries to abstain from non-compliant Sharia activities, such as alcohol consumption and to dress like ulema attests to the concern of the government to render the Ottoman rule appealing to the people of Yemen.

However, not everyone had the opinion to stabilize the Ottoman rule in Yemen by adapting to the local culture. Seeing the diplomatic and administrative methods insufficient to cope with the opposition, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, governor of Yemen between 1898 and 1902, prioritized the military. In July 1901 he demanded reinforcement of the Ottoman forces in Yemen to launch an offensive against Zaidi imam and his followers.¹¹⁰⁸ But the policy makers in Istanbul preferred diplomacy rather than the use of force and sent a committee led by the son of Abū'l-Hudāal-Şayyādī to persuade Imām al-Mansūr to yield to the Ottoman State and acknowledge Abdülhamid II as caliph.

Although the sultan opted for peaceful measures, but in any case the Ottoman military in Yemen had to be strengthened to convince the Imam to submit to

¹¹⁰⁷ BOA, Y.A.RES. 117/84, 12 Cemaziyelevvel 1320/16 August 1902.

One of Hüseyin Hilmi's successors as governor-general, Mehmed Tefrik [Biren], says in his memoirs that he abolished the new dress code for civil servants shortly after his arrival in 1904 because he did not think that this measure had contributed to making Ottoman rule more acceptable to the local population.

¹¹⁰⁸ Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa's memorandum, 20 Haziran 1317/3 July 1901, in Ātîf Paşa, *Yemen Tarihi*, 211.

the Sultan. Yet, as Kuehn notes, “maintaining this level of military presence left hardly any funds for the reforms that the *vāli* had envisaged.”¹¹⁰⁹

Inconsistent practices of the governors also contributed to the instability of the imperial administration in Yemen. For instance, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha put all of his effort in removing civil officials, who in cooperation with various local sheikhs, steadily overtaxed the people of Yemen. However, the *shaykhs* purged by Hüseyin Hilmi were reinstated Mehmed Tevfik Biren, and in 1905 Ahmed Feyzi Pasha appointed the most infamous of them: Mahmud Rauf, kaymakam of Kawkaban, a kaza of Yemen.¹¹¹⁰

The mission that was sent to the imam ended in failure and afterwards two large-scale insurgences that broke out in October 1904 and in April 1905 ended with the victory of Imam Yahya and his followers and they seized Ottoman Sana and later on Manakha, the most significant government position between the coast and the provincial capital.

5.4.4. Memduh’s Commissions

The First Commission

Responding to Imam Yahya’s uprising in the fall of 1905, Memduh was ordered by the Sultan to set up a commission on Yemen. Chaired by Memduh the commission was comprised of Turhan Pasha, the minister of Foundations and Hüsnü Efendi, who was among the reform committee that went to Yemen alongside governor Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha. This commission prepared a memorandum proposing the division of Yemen into provinces and the internal autonomy of the provinces. According to Jon Mandeville, this commission signifies “the beginning of shift of policy”¹¹¹¹ as it proposed a program which “would allow Yemen to benefit from ‘progress and civilization (*terakki ve temeddün*).... Just as the other provinces had’, a program which would win the

¹¹⁰⁹ Kuehn, *Empire, Islam, and Politic*, 197. “Vali” here refers to Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha.

¹¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹¹ Mandeville, “Memduh Pasha and Aziz Bey,” 22.

people away from the rebels.”¹¹¹² The commission under the presidency of Memduh came up with a comprehensive memorandum, which not only offered solution to the increasing disorder but also surveyed the reports on Yemen prepared by different authorities between 1898 and 1904.

The compiled documents were valuable in revealing the major issues that the Yemen government had tackled. One of these documents is the one submitted by Reform Commission of 1898 to the Council of State. It explains the necessity of establishing railroad between Sana and Hodeida, the Yemeni’s view of the Ottoman criminal law procedure and how the existing sharia courts should be arranged, and necessary actions that ought to be taken to stabilize the province. The memorandum also included two reports telegraphed by Governor of Yemen in 1898. One proposing the reorganization of the province into four provinces and the other dealing with the issues of agriculture, improvement of local wealth and government revenue in the province. Some correspondences between the palace and Yemen about the reasons behind delays in solving the problems in Yemen and a group of reports prepared by the Ministry of Interior between 1902-1904 about the general situation of Yemen were also attached to the commission memorandum.

The commission report argued that poverty was the root for the most of the problems in Yemen; therefore, there was an urgent need of undertaking an economic development program in the province. Majority of people were becoming soldiers in the Imam Yahya’s army since it provided daily meals. Furthermore, because of poverty the tax revenue of the government was very low which in turn exhausted the treasury in the imperial capital. According to the commission there were three major sources of the widespread poverty in Yemen: lack of proper road network for marketing, being ignorant of techniques to increase production, and having very complicated land laws.¹¹¹³

¹¹¹² Mandeville, “Memduh Pasha and Aziz Bey,” (22) quoted from Mehmed Memduh, *Yemen Kitası Hakkında Bazı Mütalaat*, 39.

¹¹¹³ Memduh, *Yemen Kit’ası Hakkında Mütalaat*.

The commission revived and suggested the 1898 proposal of establishing a 300-kilometer railroad between Hodeida and Sana by way of Hujaila. This would promote the growth of agriculture and commerce in Hodeida and Sana and the profit gained from these activities would not only pay the investments but also yield revenue for the state treasury. Because it was essential for carrying out the whole reform program in Yemen the road project had to be implemented as soon as possible.

In order to boost the agricultural production, the commission recommended sending a group of experts to Yemen for agricultural training. The state would formulate a feasible reform program in accordance with the information reported by this team about the conditions of the lands, the prevalent agricultural practices and land-tenure system in the province. The experts would stay there for a long period to collect accurate data, introduce new methods for cultivation to improve the production, establish model farms, distribute free seeds and saplings to people, import seeds from different parts of the Empire to be cultivated in Yemen, train the farmers to improve tobacco, indigo, and fruit-tree cultivation. Moreover, the sustainable water supply system for agriculture had to be provided by drilling wells and cleaning the old watercourses. For this, engineers, technicians, and necessary machines would be sent to Yemen.¹¹¹⁴

The commission also brought forward the issue of education in the report. It proposed to improve the present educational programs. The Ottoman Public Education Law began to be applied in Yemen in 1900; since then all education, the primary and the secondary level, had been free to all children. The expenses of education, maintenance of schools and salaries of teachers, had been met by the five percent of the zakat. Already in 1899 an imperial decree was issued which allocated thirty percent of the coffee tax to maintenance of primary school as well as vocational schools in Sana and Hodeida. According to the

¹¹¹⁴ Ibid., 55-56.

Public Education Law there had to be a chief director for the educational affairs of the whole province as well as a director of education in each district (sanjak). The commission reviewed the documents about education in Yemen and concluded that the current system was quite satisfactory for it was functioning well. In the recent years six *rüşdiye*, twenty-three primary schools, two night schools for vocation education, two institutes for teachers, and two boarding middle-schools were opened and training 1600 students. The commission members were content with the condition of education in Yemen; yet, they pointed out the need for developing curriculum for schools in Yemen according to the local requirements.

On the other hand, the commission did not find the judicial aspect of the Ottoman administration in Yemen as satisfactory as the educational one. The Ottoman judicial system was undermining the Zaidi Imam's legitimacy therefore implementation of the Ottoman law in the form of *şeriye* and *nizamiye* courts became the main aspect of conflict between the Ottoman government and the Zaidi Imam. Tanzimat reforms profoundly transformed the Ottoman judicial system by promising equality of all citizens before law regardless of their religious background. Consequently, Islamic principles began to be codified, selected Western laws were adapted, new judicial bodies in the form of local councils were introduced, and in order to apply the new legal codes new courts were founded in 1864¹¹¹⁵ and new judicial organization were stabilized by 1879.¹¹¹⁶ In parallel with the new legal arrangements the *şer'iyye* and *nizamiye* courts were gradually founded to handle the legal matters in the Ottoman provinces.¹¹¹⁷

¹¹¹⁵ As part of the 1864 Provincial Regulation.

Already in 1840s Commercial Courts were established for the commercial matters between Ottoman subjects and non-Ottomans.

¹¹¹⁶ The Procedural Code for the Criminal Codes (*Usul-i Muhakemat-ı Cezaiye Kanunu*) was issued in 1879. The French legal codes served as model for this new Ottoman criminal codes.

¹¹¹⁷ According to Avi Rubin "the Ottoman project of judicial change was a typical case of legal borrowing that was highly selective, hence yielding a hybrid judicial legal system

Establishing the new legal organization in Yemen took time for it was remote and reincorporated late (in 1872) into the Ottoman imperial system. By 1879 most of the districts and sub districts of Yemen had Ottoman şer'iyeh courts and the first instance courts¹¹¹⁸ but people were indifferent to them. Despite all the efforts of the central administration the Ottoman courts could not perform their function in Yemen for the people did not prefer these courts. Putting an end to the nizamiye courts¹¹¹⁹ the Ministry of Justice decided to handle "both civil and criminal cases in the şer'iyeh courts where court observers selected from among local scholars served as consultants and facilitators of the courts' popular acceptance."¹¹²⁰ However, in the ensuing years the Ottoman central administration repeated its efforts to set up Nizamiye courts in Yemen. Subsequently, the şer'iyeh courts were transformed and some of the Nizamiye courts began to implement some nizami laws besides Sharia law.

Thanks to the repeated attempts of the central government to establish the most appropriate legal procedure in Yemen a large number of documents on the court system piled up. Thus, the commission led by Memduh had to go through many reports on the legal organization in Yemen and they attached three of them to their memorandum. One of them, produced in 1882, was about the alteration of the system to adjust the lack of judges in the province of Yemen who had new legal codes training and the necessity of setting up an Inspection Court (*Teftiş Mahkemesi*) to underpin the Ottoman court system in

that consciously preserved indigenous, Islamic-Ottoman legal elements." Avi Rubin, *Ottoman Nizamiye Courts: Law and Modernity* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 23.

¹¹¹⁸ The Nizamiye Court System was comprised of three courts: the court of first instance (*bidayet mahkemesi*), the court of appeal (*istinaf mahkemesi*) and the court of Cassation (*temyiz mahkemesi*).

¹¹¹⁹ Avi Rubin considers this as a failure of nizamiye court system but Hümeyra Bostan argues that "the abolition of the nizamiye courts was not a failure literally if we consider the gradual transformation of the court organization and the new legal system in time. The outcome deviated from the original plan, but it was also influenced by that plan." Bostan, *Institutionalizing Justice in a Distant Province*, 3.

¹¹²⁰ Bostan, *Institutionalizing Justice in a Distant Province*, 3.

Yemen.¹¹²¹ Reports prepared in 1898¹¹²² and 1901¹¹²³ on court system in Yemen were also added to the commission memorandum.¹¹²⁴

With regard to the issue of military service of the Yemenis, the commission noted that due to the fact that the feeling of being Ottoman had not yet fully established in Yemen and people in the province had been avoiding enlistment, it was not appropriate to introduce conscription in Yemen for the time being.¹¹²⁵ Yet, the commission also suggested that local people would be encouraged to join the Ottoman army and recruited soldiers should be paid and distributed to different troops.¹¹²⁶ Furthermore, the commission proposed that tax collection task was to be given to the muhtars (headmen of villages), who were elected by the public of a given village.¹¹²⁷

All in all, according to the commission of Memduh economic development was absolutely critical for Yemen, as it would yield on the one hand an adequate amount of income for the public expenses, and on the other hand prosperity to eradicate the bases of support for the Imam's rebellions. The final passages of the commission report dealt with the 1904 revolt, which was the top issue in the imperial capital at that time. It was suggested that people who were involved in the rebellion were divided into three. The first group received a monthly salary by the head of the rebellion, the second benefited from the conflicts by pillaging and plundering, the third group was indeed loyal to the Ottoman state but overcome with the pressure and force of the rebellions because of insufficient protection of the Ottoman military.

¹¹²¹ Memduh, *Yemen Kitası Hakkında*, 48-49.

¹¹²² *Ibid.*, 60-61.

¹¹²³ *Ibid.*, 63.

¹¹²⁴ For the content of the earlier reports on court organization in Yemen see Bostan, *Institutionalizing Justice in a Distant Province*, 84-86.

¹¹²⁵ Memduh, *Yemen Kitası Hakkında*, 63.

¹¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 79.

¹¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 80.

The commission led by Memduh argued that those who constituted the first group would join the Ottoman Army if they were to be paid a monthly salary that was few riyals more than the rebels gave them. Furthermore, they would instantly change their mind if they were assured of stable revenue through agriculture and trade.¹¹²⁸ The commission suggested that

Yemen under local sheikhs and leaders offered no security and justice; thus, the people are prepared to accept firm and just rule. Once the rebellion is put down, institutional measures for useful reform should be pursued..but...Unless money is appropriated for these long-term measures, the suppression of the revolt will have only a temporary effect; revolt will break out again.¹¹²⁹

Before ending the report the commission also remarked that there was a need of establishing a permanent commission under the Ministry of Interior to deal with the affairs of Yemen.¹¹³⁰ But it was not established. Protesting the grand vizierate for not making policies in accordance with the commission's suggestions, Memduh decided to withdraw from further work on Yemen.¹¹³¹ According to Mandaville, even though Memduh dismissed it as "impractical under the present circumstances"¹¹³² "the 1901 Report of Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, Governor of Yemen between 1898-1902, is far better reasoned and sensibly presented"¹¹³³ therefore "it would in fact have been difficult for the Prime Minister's Office to use the Commission's report as a basis for action, though it contains a useful collection of previous reports and studies."¹¹³⁴

Interestingly enough, the issue of caliphate, the central point of contention between the Ottoman Sultan and Zaidi Imam, is not mentioned in the commission memorandum. Despite its flexibility in allocating administrative power to the province the commission report is strict in protecting the Ottoman

¹¹²⁸ Ibid., 80.

¹¹²⁹ Ibid., 81. Translation is quoted from Mandaville, "Memduh Pasha and Aziz Bey," 27.

¹¹³⁰ Ibid., 82.

¹¹³¹ Ibid., 82-83

¹¹³² Ibid., 75, translation is quoted from Mandaville, "Memduh Pasha and Aziz Bey," 27.

¹¹³³ Mandaville, "Memduh Pasha and Aziz Bey," 27.

The complete text of Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha's report was published in *Atıf Paşa's Yemen Tarihi* (Istanbul, 1326/1910), vol. II, 211-28.

¹¹³⁴ Mandaville, "Memduh Pasha and Aziz Bey," 27.

sultan's right of being the only legitimate religious leader in the Ottoman realm. The denial of the title of imam, according to Kuehn, "reflects the central concern to create an institutional framework that would formalize the subordinate position of the Zaydīs within the structures of a Sunnī-led Ottoman state."¹¹³⁵

This commission memorandum was read and discussed at the Chamber of Ministers (*Meclis-i Vükela*) after Memduh reminded the Chamber a couple of times. With regard to the memorandum an imperial deed was issued but this scheme, like many others, littered by setbacks. The invasion of Sana by the Imam's forces changed the priorities of the State and in order to regain the lost territories and reinforce the Ottoman rule in Yemen Ahmed Feyzi Pasha launched an expedition with additional 10,000 troops; but defeating the Imam's army and maintaining Ottoman military forces in the province proved to be difficult.¹¹³⁶

The Second Commission

In the ensuing months (in 1904) Memduh was ordered by the sultan to set up another commission on Yemen. This time the commission consisted of Abidin Pasha and İzzet Pasha alongside Memduh and initially was ordered to convene at the palace. According to Memduh, because he knew that the commission would not bring him any economic profit İzzet Pasha did not take part in the discussions.¹¹³⁷ However, İzzet Pasha continued having dealings with the commission. Although the commission was planned to convene at the palace, İzzet Pasha asked Memduh and other members to continue working at the Sublime Porte. Assuming that İzzet Pasha was planning to play tricks Memduh

¹¹³⁵ Kuehn, *Empire, Islam, and Politics*, 227.

¹¹³⁶ Besides the never ending rebellious activities in the ground lack of sufficient financial resources became a very important setback for the reform programs including the one prepared by Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha and that submitted in the fall of 1904 by the commission under the presidency of Memduh could not be put into practice.

¹¹³⁷ "*Mesalih-i mühimme-i Yemaniye üzerine teati-i efkar olundu. Ancak İzzet Paşa bu komisyon para kazandırmayacağını bildiği için müzakereye gelmezdi.*" Memduh, *Yemen Kitası Hakkında Mütalaat*.

attempted to resign from the commission but the sultan refused his resignation. After a while Arif Hikmet, the sultan's groom, also joined the commission. During that time, a group of religious scholars from Yemen were invited to the imperial court to mediate between the Ottoman central administration and Zaidi community of Yemen. Interestingly enough, not being officially informed Memduh heard of this important development from others.

He was invited to the palace. Memduh assumed that the Yemeni group had representatives of Imam Yahya and he was expecting to have a conversation with them about the issues in Yemen. Some other ministers were also invited to the palace on the same day. While they were waiting İzzet Pasha came into the room and declared the sultan's order for Memduh to set up a new commission on Yemen. During this brief talk Memduh came to know that the Yemeni group had no one representing Zaidi Imam and even worse there was no one associated with the Zaidi order because the government did not invite Zaidis to Istanbul. Memduh could not have a conversation with the Yemeni group for there was no meeting set up for him.¹¹³⁸

Given that the conflicts between the government and the Zaidi Imam and his supporters lie at the heart of the problems in Yemen, Memduh thought that if the government wanted to solve the problems in Yemen, Zaidi community had to be represented in the Yemen group alongside the Sunnis otherwise negotiations would yield anything. His assumptions were correct, the invited Sunni Yemeni group of notables brought no results, for the Yemenis paid homage to the Sultan Caliph and they left Istanbul after being awarded with orders, gifts, and wages. Once they reached their homeland Imam Yahya punished, imprisoned and executed most of the notables. Back in Istanbul the grand vizier and Memduh along with some other officials for the sake of formality prepared a report on the visiting committee.¹¹³⁹

¹¹³⁸ Mehmed Memduh, *Yemen Hakkında Bazı Mutalaat*, 10.

¹¹³⁹ *Merkez-i hilafete adamların emre muti'iz demekten gayr-i söz söylemeyecekleri rehin-i rütbe-i bedahet bulunmakla komisyonlarca kaleme alınması mu'tad olan usulde*

Memduh wrote to the Mabeyn declaring his resignation from commission and demanding its dissolution. Besides the commission reports Memduh presented, probably upon request, some notes on affairs of Yemen. In one of his extensive notes on Yemen he submitted to the grand vizierate on 27 November 1904, he drew attention to the major problems such as the widespread insecurity particularly in the sanjak of Asir where the Ottoman troops, due to their insufficiency, were unable to prevent the brigandage, and arms smuggling. Furthermore the report covered the increase opposition against the Ottoman rule, the local authorities' arbitrary activities and punishments because of the inability of the Ottoman state to have a full authority over much of the places outside the district centers, the famine which affected large part of the province over two years and resulted in the death of fifty to sixty thousand people. The inappropriate activities of the Ottoman troops, the corruption of the tax collectors, and the Ottoman army's outdated weapons compared to those of the rebels were all mentioned in the report. In the same note Memduh proposed various solutions such as being kind and just in tax collection process and the necessity of winning the hearts of the people to have an authority in Yemen. Memduh also reminded that in 1900 the sultan and the Council of Ministers accepted the idea of dividing Yemen into four districts but they wavered in implementing it due to the lack of fund for such an administrative arrangement. Before ending his note Memduh repeated the necessity of discussing this arrangement thoroughly at the Council of Ministers.¹¹⁴⁰

On 19 January 1905 Memduh wrote¹¹⁴¹ to the sultan first complaining about the functionaries at Babiali for they did not executing the decisions and regulations that were issued by the Sultan. After providing a historical background about the relationship between the Ottoman government and Yemen in the

bir şey yazılarak ve gelenlerin rütbe ve nişan ve maaş ve atıyye misillü telifata nailiyetleri ile...bir mazbata tanzim ve takdim kılınmış olmakla iş görmüş sayıldık. Gelenler memleketlerine iade olundu. Yerlerine muvasalatlarında belli başlı olanları İmam Yahya darb ve habs ve ifna ettirdi. Memduh, Yemen Hakkında Bazı Mutalaat, 10.

¹¹⁴⁰ Memduh, *Yemen Hakkında Bazı Mutalaat*, 15-19.

¹¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 23-27.

nineteenth century Memduh underscores that one of the most important reasons causing discontent and opposition against the Ottoman state was the military-origin governors' attempt to make the people of Yemen obey by force. A great number of soldiers from Anatolia who had been dispatched to Yemen to suppress the rebellions died either because of the epidemics or combatting against the rebels. Other issues referred in the report were the conflict between governor and military commander in Yemen and corruption in tax collection. He also emphasized the importance of respecting the traditions and values of the people in the region and keeping the promises given to them due to the fact that the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* was very significant for Arabs. Memduh pointed out that Arabs in Yemen had the latest European weaponry, which must have been directly given by the European states, for they were acting to the advantage of the European policies in the region.¹¹⁴²

As put by Kuehn, in mid-1907 the central administration was about to accept the Zaidi imam's autonomy on the highlands of Yemen if he ceased his claim to the caliphate. The issue of caliphate was not negotiable for the Ottoman state: "there is evidence that this insistence and Yahyā's refusal to renounce the title of "Commander of the Faithful" was the crucial issue that prevented the parties from reaching an agreement by 1907 and actually prolonged the fighting".¹¹⁴³

The Third Commission

In the summer of 1904 the rebellion was going on in Yemen. The third commission, comprised of Memduh, Grand Vizier's Undersecretary Mehmed Ali Pasha, and Minister of Trade Zihni Pasha, was formed at the Mabeyn. The commission prepared a report on affairs of Yemen such as the method of selection and appointment of the judicial, administrative, and financial officials, major issues of reform, public work, agriculture, education, finance, and security. According to the report naib of the provincial center had to be competent and able to speak Arabic and was to be appointed by the central

¹¹⁴² Memduh, *Yemen Hakkında Bazı Mutalaat*, 26-27.

¹¹⁴³ Kuehn, *Empire, Islam, and Politics*, 198.

administration while the naibs of the districts and neighborhoods were to be elected locally. The provincial treasurer and his secretary, mutasarrifs and their accountants, civil officials who were dealing with tax, education, communication (telegraph and post), public work, and healthcare were to be appointed by the central administration while district kaymakams (governors), nahiye mudirs and their scribes and secretaries were to be elected by the local council. As in the case of all the provinces, governor and mutasarrifs had to go on inspection tours three months in a year to familiarize with the people, geography, and culture as well as to collect accurate data about the conditions, problems, and needs outside the center.

After 1908 Revolution the new regime entered into a series of negotiations with Imam Yahya to stabilize the relations between the Ottoman state and the Zaidi leadership. But, they could not meet at a common ground and by the end of 1910 Imam waged war against the Ottomans blocking the road between Hodeida and Sana. In response the Ottoman government dispatched military force under the command of Ahmed İzzet Pasha. But neither the Imam nor the Ottoman government achieved their goals of gaining victory; thus, by May 1911 a new round of talks began between two sides which resulted in the Daan Agreement on 20 October 1911.¹¹⁴⁴ This agreement provided the imam an administrative autonomy in Sana and mountainous regions and some financial concessions in return of ending his opposition, pledging of loyalty to the Ottoman sultan by renouncing the title of the “commander of Muslims” (*amiru’l mu’minin*) and promising not to make deals with any foreign power.¹¹⁴⁵

Yemen had been a chronic problem in the agenda of the Ottoman state and Memduh until the very end of the Hamidian rule. Despite all the efforts

¹¹⁴⁴ To show the Committee of Union and Progress’ “distaste for strong legislatures” Şükrü Hanioglu refers to the Daan Agreement for it was ratified as a temporary law, like many other important decisions, “without any question in the Chamber”. Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 163.

¹¹⁴⁵ The peace between the Imam and the Ottoman State continued during the First World War and accordingly the Imam helped the Ottoman forces. İdris Bostan, “Yemen”, *TDVİA*, Vol. 43, 2013, 406-412.

Memduh personally exerted there had not been much development, in line with the will of the Ottoman government in Yemen. Even though Memduh's endeavors could not change the direction of the events in Yemen, they were compiled into a booklet for the next generations to appreciate the difficulty of having authority for the Ottomans at the tip of the Arabian Peninsula in the age of neo-imperialism.

5.5. An Institution under the Ministry of Interior: *Darülaceze*

Like the issue of Yemen, the institution of *Darülaceze* was also a part of Memduh's schedule during his service at the ministry. Looking into *Darülaceze* can help us to have an idea not only about the activities of the Ministry of Interior but also about the development of a modern welfare institution of the empire, which is still operating. *Darülaceze*, a social welfare institution that was founded in 1895 a little while before the appointment of Memduh to the Ministry of Interior. Its aim was to provide basic needs for the poor, orphans and elderly. Since *Darülaceze* was under the command of the Ministry of Interior, Memduh was personally involved in its administration and improvement as well as the recruitments of its personnel and the solution to its problems.

Darülaceze had a large number of personnel: a director, accountant, deputy director, head clerk, assistants of head clerk, accountant clerks, cashier, chief-doctor, four doctors, three surgeons, three chemist/pharmacist, steward (*vekilharç*), deputy of steward, chief of patients, storehouse employee, footman, imam, muezzin, Greek priest and his assistant, Armenian priest and his assistant, two teachers, weaver, craftsmen, five inspectors, four servants, doorman, two gardeners, barber, eighteen male and sixteen female janitors,¹¹⁴⁶ four male and two female bath attendants, four laundrymen, and four cooks. According to the records of March 1899, total amount of their monthly salary

¹¹⁴⁶ Some of them were Muslim while some others Greek and Armenian.

was 28,800 kuruş.¹¹⁴⁷ Thanks to its remote location transportation to *Darülaceze* was inconvenient and costly. Acknowledging the complaints of the staff Memduh managed to increase the salaries of the staff in 1897.¹¹⁴⁸ Besides the administrative and medical personnel there was a special commission dealing with the affairs of *Darülaceze*.

Darülaceze had been funded by various sources. Some fees were imposed for the transactions taking place at the General Directorate of the land registry and cadaster, the Ministry of Navy and Maritime Lines, the Cityline Ferryboat (*Şirket-i Hayriyye*), and theaters and places of entertainment. Revenues generated from various industrial and mining enterprises allocated to *Darülaceze*; profits made by the workshops within *Darülaceze*, and donations funded the institution.¹¹⁴⁹ Besides offering shelter to everyone in need of help, *Darülaceze* had a broad range of services and facilities. In addition to the departments of accommodation and food service, it also had an orphanage, a kindergarten, a primary school, a school for deaf and mute a music-training center, industrial workshops, a hospital and various medical units, places of worship, *Darülaceze* philanthropic association, and the *Darülaceze* Foundation. In the beginning *Darülaceze* did not have a special place for children (0 to 4). Later in 1903 one of the sections was assigned for this purpose upon the suggestion of Memduh.¹¹⁵⁰ In the subsequent years Memduh proposed to form a children's choir at *Darülaceze*. Necessary equipment and instruments were ordered to famous trader of the time Ernest Comendinger and a choir was formed.¹¹⁵¹ Furthermore, after 1898 various industrial workshops such as carpentry and iron forging were founded to improve the skills of the residents of *Darülaceze* and generate fund for the institution. Again with the initiative of

¹¹⁴⁷ BOA, ŞD. 2690/23, 4 Rebiülevvel 1317/13 July 1899.

This total amount was after the salary increase that was made upon the initiative of Memduh.

¹¹⁴⁸ BOA, İ.DH. 16, 15 Şevval 1314/19 March 1897.

¹¹⁴⁹ Nuran Yıldırım, *Istanbul Darülaceze Müessesesi Tarihi* (Istanbul: Darülaceze Vakfı Yayını, 1996).

¹¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 162.

¹¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 170.

Memduh, sewing and shoe making workshops were founded to meet the needs of residents of *Darülaceze*.¹¹⁵²

From the beginning there was a special kitchen and a cook for the Jewish residents of *Darülaceze*. In 1896 the sultan ordered the construction of a synagogue for Jews living at *Darülaceze* but this could not be realized. In July 1900 Memduh forwarded the demands of Jews to the palace.¹¹⁵³ Later on one of the sections of the institution was converted to synagogue and opening ceremony was held in May 1903 with the attendance of around three hundred Jews some of whom were outstanding religious and economic figures from outside the institution.

Despite all the efforts and good intentions life at *Darülaceze* was not straightforward. On 15 September 1899 news was made about a corrupt employee named Rizo who was responsible for provisioning of *Darülaceze*. The Ministry of Interior immediately set up a committee to investigate the case.¹¹⁵⁴ In accordance with the recommendation of the report produced by the committee, the director was changed and the accounts of the ex-director and some other officials were put under examination. In June 1900 the assistant of the accountant of the institution informed the authorities that the accountant took 80,000 kuruş from the Ottoman Bank but recorded as 60,000 kuruş and he used 20,000 kuruş for his personal needs for six months. The assistant continued by saying that the amount, around 4000 kuruş, earned from the sale of the carpets, prayer rugs, and couches made at *Darülaceze* was not submitted to the institution's treasury. On top of that, assistant claimed that the accountant embezzled 1000 kuruş that was cut from the salaries of *Darülaceze* personnel as a relief for the Hejaz. Upon these corruption allegations an

¹¹⁵² Ibid., 171.

¹¹⁵³ BOA, ŞD. 2706/51, 17 Şevval 1318/7 February 1901.

¹¹⁵⁴ Details of the corruption claims are filed in the following state document. BOA, ŞD. 2707/15, 25 Zilkade 1318/16 March 1901.

inspection was carried out and relevant individuals working at the institution gave testimony and consequently some changes were made to the staff.¹¹⁵⁵

These disappointing developments and the reports delineating the poor conditions of *Darülaceze* prompted the sultan to issue a decree underscoring the insufficiency of the facilities and the urgent need of improving the sorry state of the administration at the institution.¹¹⁵⁶ Memduh presented a detailed report to the sultan on 21 July 1902 based on the data he obtained from the commission. He made some suggestions to better the conditions such as the need of dismissing the head doctor and to increase the revenues of *Darülaceze*. In agreement with Memduh's suggestion, the head doctor was replaced by the one Memduh recommended. Interestingly, as a remedy to the problems of *Darülaceze* the inspection committee proposed that the institution needed to be put under military rule. Opposing this idea Memduh stated that nowhere in the world welfare institutions were administered by military and the sultan consented to Memduh's opinion.¹¹⁵⁷

In the beginning of June 1903, a few months after Mehmed Ferid Pasha's appointment to the grand vizierate, Memduh wrote to the palace that he had been doing his best for the *Darülaceze* Institution for seven years. *Darülaceze* was founded in 1895 and was given under Memduh responsibility. Since then the institution showed a great deal of improvement. Its annual revenue rose from 8500 kuruş to 1,400,000 kuruş. *Darülaceze* included wide range of vocational activities including carpet weaving, carpentry, relief carving and so forth. Having such an economic capacity it became a home to around one thousand needy, many of whom were orphans. According to Memduh there were still many things to be done to improve the conditions of the institution and all required funding. Sometime ago he explained the situation to the palace and the council of ministers. Consequently, an imperial decree was issued about

¹¹⁵⁵ BOA, ŞD. 2707/15, 25 Zilkade 1318/16 March 1901.

¹¹⁵⁶ BOA, İ.HUS. 76, 19 Rebiülevvel 1320/26 June 1902.

¹¹⁵⁷ BOA, İ.DH. 30, 27 Receb 1320/30 October 1902.

the payment of 50,400,000 kuruş for the *Darülaceze*. The decision was also passed in the council. Yet, the decree could not be put into practice or rather it was postponed. Memduh argues that this was ill intentioned to make things difficult for him. Finding all these wearisome and disheartening, Memduh requested from the sultan to appoint someone else to *Darülaceze*. However, Memduh continued to be the in charge of the institution until July 1908.

The corruption allegations about *Darülaceze* resurfaced in 1905. The sultan ordered the Council of the Ministers to specify measures to prevent misconducts at the institution.¹¹⁵⁸ Memduh presented a long note to the Council refuting the allegations and recounting the contributions he made to the institution. Satisfied with the explanation of Memduh, the members of the Council declared that *Darülaceze* was properly working and the allegations against its management were groundless.¹¹⁵⁹

In 1906 celebrating the thirty-first year of the enthronement of Abdülhamid II a special book, *Ebasin-i Müessesat-ı Hayriye-i Hazreti Hilafetpenahiden Darülaceze*, was written about the foundation of *Darülaceze* and the phases it went through since then. The book was presented to the sultan and also sent to the provinces.¹¹⁶⁰ In the succeeding years the institution kept developing in accordance with the needs and demands of its residents. For instance, besides hospital and clinics specialized in various fields, a maternity hospital (*viladethane*) was established in 1907 with the initiative of Memduh. Its opening ceremony was held on the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad in April 1907. All Muslim residents of *Darülaceze* gathered at the mosque of the institution and prayed to Allah and Prophet Muhammad before the opening of

¹¹⁵⁸ BOA, İ.HUS. 21, 5 Receb 1323/5 September 1905.

¹¹⁵⁹ BOA, İ.DH. 16, 24 Şaban 1323/25 October 1905.

¹¹⁶⁰ Yıldırım, *Istanbul Darülaceze Müessesesi Tarihi*, 86. For Abdülhamid II's welfare institutions and their use to form public opinion, give political message to Ottoman people and the foreign powers, and to legitimize his power see Nadir Özbek, "The Politics of Modern Welfare Institutions in the Late Ottoman Empire (1876-1909)," *The International Journal of Turcologia*, vol. III, no. 5, (2008).

the maternity hospital. Photographs of the ceremony were sent to the Ministry of Interior.¹¹⁶¹

The empire was vast and so were its problems. While the central government was trying to find remedy for the structural problems such as poverty, migration, ignorance, and corruption, rebellious activities were ongoing in different parts of empire threatening its integrity. After Eastern Anatolia and Yemen, 1902 onward uprisings began in Rumelia; the central government had to struggle to survive by repressing uprisings, introducing reforms, negotiating with the great powers, and making compromises.

5.6. The Macedonia Question

The Berlin Congress and the Treaty were arranged to settle down the complications emerged out the Russo-Turkish of 1877-78 and to maintain peace in Europe. Yet, as put by Justin McCarty, “the effects of the congress’s decisions on the peoples of the Ottoman Empire were never a consideration of the delegates” and “their decisions had a great and largely destructive effect on the peoples of the Ottoman Empire”.¹¹⁶² With a similar claim Gül Tokay argues that

The congress left many unresolved local disputes for future arrangements, however, and no doubt brought further complications to the region. One of the major issues left for future arrangements was the Christian reforms: the Macedonian reforms in Europe and Armenian reforms in the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire. In both cases European intervention under the guise of “reforms” no doubt brought complications, not only by further weakening the Ottoman administration but also by encouraging the communities involved to take advantage of the fortuitous circumstances to express their national aspirations.¹¹⁶³

Rumelia in this period referred to the Ottoman lands in the Eastern Europe. It was made up of six provinces: Salonika, Edirne, Kosova, Ionnina, and Shkoder.

¹¹⁶¹ BOA, Y.MTV. 297/60, 14 Rebiülevvel 1325/27 April 1907.

Abdülhamid II was almost obsessed with record of the developments taking place each and every corner of the empire through photography.

¹¹⁶² Mccarthy, “Ignoring the People,” 429.

¹¹⁶³ Tokay, “Macedonian Question, 1878-1908,” 253.

Macedonia, a region comprised of "*Vilâyat-ı Selase*" (the Three Provinces) namely Salonika, Kosova, and Manastır, was the most contentious and chaotic place in Rumelia. Macedonia had a multi-ethnic and multi-religious social structure. Motivated by nationalist as well as economic ambitions each ethno-religious group had a claim over the same territory rendering the region war ridden. In the post Berlin Conference structure, it became highly difficult to maintain peace in Macedonia as some revolutionary groups including the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) in Salonika and the External Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (EMRO) in Sofia emerged. They were involved in activities against the Ottoman authority. Bulgarians and Greeks were also fighting against each other in the region to gain the upper hand in Macedonia. After 1902 the region bore witness to the fierce fighting of armed national bands over who would win the Macedonian population.¹¹⁶⁴

¹¹⁶⁴ For the activities and reports of the Ottoman General Inspectorate of Rumelia between 1902 and 1909 see İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi (Center for Islamic Studies) *Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa Evrakı* (Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha Papers) (ISAM-HHP). For the Austrian archival documents on the Macedonian Question see F. R. Bridge, *Austro-Hungarian Documents relating to the Macedonian Struggle, 1896-1912* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976). For the French diplomatic documentation of the Macedonian issue from 1903 to 1905 see *Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires des Macédoine, 1903-1905*, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (Paris Imprimerie Nationale, 1905). For the British Foreign Office correspondence respecting the affairs of the South-Eastern Europe between 1902 and 1908 see the files FO 421 (193, 194, 196, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 208, 210, 211, 212, 213, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 240, 241, 243, 244, 245).

For the Ottoman Macedonia Question in the secondary literature see Fikret Adanır, *Makedonya Sorunu* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2001); Fikret Adanır, "The Socio-political Environment of Balkan Nationalisms: the Case of Ottoman Macedonia 1856-1912." in *Regional and National Identities in Europe in XIXth and XXth Centuries*, eds. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, M. G. Müller, S. J. Woolf (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1998); Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Gül Tokay, "Macedonian Question, 1878-1908," in *War and Diplomacy, The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the Treaty of Berlin*, eds. Hakan Yavuz with Peter Sluglett (Utah: Utah University Press, 2011); Süleyman Kani İrtem, *Osmanlı Devleti'nin Makedonya Meselesi* (Istanbul: Temel Yayınları, 1999); Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu, *Jön Türkler ve Makedonya Sorunu* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2008); İsa Blumi, "The Great Powers' Fixation on Ottoman Albania in the Administration of the post-Berlin Balkans, 1878-1908." in *The Russo-Ottoman War of 1877- 1878*, ed. Ömer Turan, 187-196 (Ankara: METU Press, 2006); Sadiye Sena Dinçyürek, "An Ottoman Administrative Response to the Macedonian Question: The General Inspectorate of Rumelia (1902-1909)," PhD Dissertation, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2018.

As it was done first time in the Eastern Anatolia during the 1894-1896 Crisis, a general inspector team and a commission were set up in December 1902 in an effort to respond to the demands of reform and to improve the administrative conditions of the Rumelia. The general inspectorship was put under the authority of Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha and the commission under Mehmed Ferid Pasha of Vlore.

Hoping to gain Macedonian autonomy Bulgarian-backed Ilinden Uprising erupted in August 1903 as part of the wave of terror against the Ottoman rule in the region. The European powers' unwillingness to be involved in the process strengthened the Ottoman's hand and the rebellion was crushed by the Ottoman forces. Yet, an event unfolded soon that deeply troubled the Ottoman administration as well as the region. The Russian and Austrian authorities' meeting at Mürzteg in October 1903 yielded a reform program for Macedonia proposing a gendarmerie under the control of the European Powers and foreign advisers as well as some other substantial reforms. The article of the program commanding that Macedonia ought to be split into districts according to ethnicity escalated the conflict between the armed groups as each of them wanted to gain control over specific area.¹¹⁶⁵

Reform demands such as the establishment of an international financial commission and restructuring of the Macedonian gendarmerie furthered disruption, gravely eroding the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman government firmly resisted the clauses of the Mürzteg Program, by extended negotiations and delaying tactics, deepening the friction between the Porte and the palace. Challenged by the European powers' naval demonstration and military occupation of the Aegean islands of Limnos and Mytilene the Ottoman state grudgingly approved, in 1905, the management of Macedonian finance by the international commission. Despite all the effort exerted, the government ultimately failed to take the mounting chaos in Macedonia under control. This

¹¹⁶⁵ Jelawich, *History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century*, 94.

became one of the decisive factors stimulating the armed opposition towards Abdülhamid II, thus reinstating the Ottoman Constitution in July 1908.

At the Sublime Porte Grand Vizier Ferid Pasha was predominantly dealing with the issues of Rumelia since he was Albanian and had an outstanding career that led to him becoming the grand vizier. Yet still Memduh was also involved in the processes related to the region. He communicated with Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, the general inspector of Rumelia¹¹⁶⁶ and every so often met with the European ambassadors to discuss the Macedonian question and provide his views about the affairs of Rumelia to them as well as to the palace.

Memduh reported every detail of his meetings with the European ambassadors to the palace. For instance, on 19 December 1900, he reported to the palace about the visit of Russian ambassador and details of conversation they had. The Russian ambassador and his head translator visited Memduh's office at the Porte around 10:30 and stayed for thirty minutes. After talking about the chilly weather the ambassador inquired after Memduh's health for he had recently been sick. Finally, they came to the point. The ambassador asked about the situation in the provinces and if any worrisome incident broke out in the provinces. Memduh responded by saying that there has been no incident in any of the provinces. While the translator was saying that according to information reported by the consuls notable Albanians were causing trouble, the embassy cut in and said that as the reports dispatched by the embassies and consuls from Erzurum and Bitlis attest in Anatolia too some incidents were occurring and the Russian authorities wanted to affectionately warn the Ottoman government about its practices towards these incidents. Upon this warning Memduh responded by assuring them of the implementation of law in dealing with the disobedient ones.¹¹⁶⁷ This anecdote is sufficient enough to understand

¹¹⁶⁶ İSAM İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi, Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa 3-166, 2 Ramazan 1320/3 December 1902.

¹¹⁶⁷ BOA, Y.PRK.DH. 11/76, 26 Rebiülahir 1318/19 November 1900.

how the Ottoman government was cornered and put in a position of giving an account of its activities and incidents within the Ottoman realm.

In another instance, the undersecretary of Russian embassy and his translator paid a visit to Memduh to talk about the disruption that broke in the village of Patala in Rumelia in early July 1902. Before proceeding the causes of the disruption Memduh explained how the situation was taken under control by the Ottoman forces in that village. Then he said that there were two types of disturbances in Rumelia. One was caused by the conflict between the Armenian bands, one of which was Hinchak. The bands were occupying some villages and forcing people to be on their side and even sometimes armed conflicts broke out between the bands in the villages. This was what had happened in the village of Patala. One of the conflicting bands took the village under blockade. As Memduh put, Patala was not the only place suffering from banditry. The second group of disturbances in Rumelia was caused by the Muslim Albanians' blood revenge and some other personal hostilities. Memduh assured the undersecretary of Russian embassy that Muslims were not doing any harm to the Christians. If there were even a small-scale incident the foreign inspectors in the region would immediately be informed by the local people about it.¹¹⁶⁸

In the following months upon the diplomatic nota sent by Russia and Austria to the Ottoman government in March 1903, Memduh prepared a long memorandum proposing an organization and reform order in Rumelia.¹¹⁶⁹ As part of the reform program that was proposed by Russia and Austria to the Ottoman State about Salonika, Kosovo, and Manastir provinces, one of the European princes would be the governor of these provinces. This was, for Memduh, an intervention into the Ottoman domestic affairs and long before the European powers' reform proposals the Ottoman government appointed Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha as an inspector to deal with the affairs of these three provinces. Thus, appointment of a European prince was neither appropriate nor

¹¹⁶⁸ BOA, Y.PRK.DH. 12/8, 4 Rebiülahir 1320/11 July 1902.

¹¹⁶⁹ BOA, Y.EE. 88/12, 3 Zilhicce 1320/3 March 1903.

necessary. According to Memduh, things escalated because the matters of these provinces were not thoroughly examined and discussed at the council of ministers during the grand vizierate of dear departed Rifat Pasha and ex-grand vizier Said Pasha, though in different manner, followed his predecessor.

According to Memduh, Muslims of these provinces might react to the European imposed reforms in times to come, if not immediately. The Ottoman government had gradually lost its grip on these three provinces. Incidences taking place in different localities were exaggeratedly reported by European consuls to their embassies in Istanbul, and European inspectors were sent from Istanbul to Rumelia to investigate the situation. The reports of these inspectors were dispatched to the European states. Moreover, newspaper reporters travelled across Macedonia to gather information about the incidences. Using this opportunity, the Macedonian bands managed to capture the attention of the European states and the public. Escalation of unfortunate events resulted in the Ottoman government to receive diplomatic correspondence. The same scenario could be seen in Anatolia therefore the Ottoman authorities in the provinces that bordered Russia had to be careful in preventing any crisis that would lead the Ottoman Armenians to appeal the European powers.¹¹⁷⁰

Memduh's memorandum, furthermore, stated that the reform program only referred to Salonika, Kosovo, and Manastır and void with respect to other three provinces of Rumelia namely Edirne, Shkodra, and Janina. Based on his personal observation Memduh provided an explanation on the excluded provinces to emphasize the necessity of undertaking reforms in these places as well. Shkodra, as Memduh noted, was very rich in terms of natural resources, rivers, and forests but people of the province was ignorant of what they were blessed with and of means and ways of benefiting from them. People were not only living under poor and wild conditions but they also had long-standing feuds. Thus, they were in need of substantial economic and cultural reform program.

¹¹⁷⁰ BOA, Y.EE. 88/12, 3 Zilhicce 1320/3 March 1903.

Being located at a strategic spot Janina had always been desired by the states of Italia and Greece. According to Memduh, it was possible to regain full authority in these districts by appointing competent governors and introducing regulations and practices congruent with the local needs and conditions that would improve the provinces. This might cause a financial burden on the government but eventually the government would get great benefit out of it. Moreover, local resources could cover some of the expenses.¹¹⁷¹

At the end of March 1903 Memduh wrote once again about the Macedonian question. This time he proposed a number of measures against the rebellious activities of the Bulgarian bands.¹¹⁷² Recently, Bulgarian bands mobilized the Bulgarian artisans in Istanbul to help their countrymen in Rumelia as if they were in danger and in need of an emergency action. Thus, in the upcoming twenty days more than three thousand Bulgarian artisans left Istanbul for Salonika and Manastir but they did not set out for their homeland. They rather took the road to the mountains where Bulgarian bandits were hiding. Bulgarian villagers' voluntary aid became insufficient for the livelihood of newcomers and thus the Bulgarian committees began to force the Orthodox communities at the city centers to pay for provisioning the bandits up on the mountains. Those who denied giving extortion at first had to double the first amount and if they kept refusing they had to pay triple the amount. The steady defiance ended with the death of the disobedient at the hands of young murderers aged eighteen to twenty five.

Memduh proposed three measures to tackle these problems. First of all, a court martial should be set up to establish peace and order in the region and as an exemplar some of the members of the Bulgarian committees who were found guilty should be executed after being charged by the court martial. In an effort to help those who were oppressed by the bands, the oppression cases should be recorded and presented to the European consuls in the provinces. The third

¹¹⁷¹ BOA, Y.EE. 88/12, 3 Zilhicce 1320/3 March 1903.

¹¹⁷² BOA, TFR.I.MKM. 2/107, 2 Muharrem 1321/31 March 1903.

measure that needed to be taken was to make a compliant about the bandits to the local governing authorities and also closing the shops at the marketplace for a while.

On 25 April 1903 Memduh presented another long memorandum¹¹⁷³ on the disturbance that broke out in Herzegovina region of Rumelia providing a brief historical background, criticizing both the grand vizier's suggestion to solve the problem and the general tendency of the Council of Ministers on the matter and offering a solution. According to Memduh, the problems in Rumelia had two aspects and the Ottoman government had to resolve them in a peaceful manner. He reminded the sultan that he drafted a memorandum on Rumelia upon the request of the palace some four years ago. Memduh also referred to the memorandum he presented in the beginning of March 1903 after Russia and Austria sent a diplomatic nota to the Ottoman government. In this memorandum he explained the harms that, the program offered by Russia and Austria, would cause for the Ottoman state and suggested a number of measure to be taken against these harms.¹¹⁷⁴

What the Bulgarian bands were demanding was quite clear but who and which powers were inciting them was to a certain extent obscure. Some argue that those who were involved in the rebellious activities were doing so because of their ignorance. However, Memduh was not of the same opinion and he expressed his disagreement with this assumption during a recent meeting of the Council of Ministers. According to Memduh, among those acting stubbornly there were definitely some who had the capacity to separate the grain from the chaff. The cause of what was taking place in Rumelia was not only ignorance but also deception and an act. During a recent meeting of the Council of Ministers the grand vizier, Ferid Pasha, stated that Austria would have military action in the area of Taşlıca, Temeşvar and two other places.¹¹⁷⁵

¹¹⁷³ BOA, Y.PRK.DH. 12/44, 27 Muharrem 1321/25 April 1903.

¹¹⁷⁴ BOA, Y.PRK.DH. 12/44, 27 Muharrem 1321/25 April 1903.

¹¹⁷⁵ BOA, Y.PRK.DH. 12/44, 27 Muharrem 1321/25 April 1903.

For the sake of the survival of the Ottoman State, Memduh felt that he had to present his view on the issue. Before making his point about the current situation he went back in time to substantiate his proposal. Some thirty years ago Memduh was working as the secretary of grand vizier and the Herzegovina question broke out. The Ottoman government put a great deal of effort to handle the issue. While Russia had an aggressive diplomatic approach, Austria preferred lenient and reconciliatory way of dealing with the Herzegovina question. The emperor of Austria even gave the Ottoman sultan a pledge to prohibit the transition of mischief-makers from Dalmatia. Contrary to this friendly attitude of Austria disturbances increased in the region. Subsequently Russia, using this as an opportunity, waged a war against the Ottomans; Austria invaded Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was not a secret that for a long period of time Austria was intending to give a new form to Rumelia for her benefit and for that purpose she made promises to different groups to gain their allegiance. Despite the fact that number of Catholics in Bosnia and Herzegovina was far less than Muslims, Austria granted concessions to the Catholics. Muslims were deprived of their rights; consequently they left their homeland and migrated to the Ottoman lands. Some of the Bosnian immigrants settled in Kosovo and Manastır. The immigrants must have shared the painful experiences they had with the power shift in their homeland with the local people in these provinces. Bulgarians particularly must have derived lessons from the stories that were told by the immigrants. According to Memduh, in order for Bulgarian bands to concede their weapons, they should be imbued with advices that they could understand.¹¹⁷⁶

The grand vizier recently proposed to confiscate the weapons of the people in the villages of Bulgaria by using military force. Villagers might think that the government was disarming them before turning them over to the Christians and they might attack the Christians in the region. This would certainly attract the attention of European powers and they would intervene in the process.

¹¹⁷⁶ BOA, Y.PRK.DH. 12/44, 27 Muharrem 1321/25 April 1903.

Therefore, collecting the weapons of villagers by using force seemed inconvenient. Memduh concluded his memorandum by stating that since the other European states were not backing the Ottoman side at the moment the Ottoman government had no option but to fulfill its pledge to Austria and Russia and to undertake the reform program. On the other hand, in the region using all the means possible including military force, Ömer Rüşdi Pasha was trying hard to establish an order in the region and convince people in the ground to gain back their loyalty to the Ottoman state.¹¹⁷⁷

In an effort to challenge the demands of the Bulgarians in Rumelia, Memduh presented some demographic statistics about the region.¹¹⁷⁸ Of the six million people living in the three provinces of Rumelia around three and a half million were Muslims and around two and a half were Christians. Out of over two million Christians one million one hundred sixty thousand were Greeks and only seven hundred sixty thousand were Bulgarian. That is to say, Bulgarians were making up only twelve percent of the overall population. Furthermore, the statistics published by the Greek Patriarch in Istanbul documented that number of Bulgarian schools and students were far less than the Greek schools and students in the three provinces of Rumelia. According to the statistics in the province of Manastır there were 447 Greek schools, 632 Greek teachers, and 25157 Greek students while there were 273 Bulgarian schools, 424 Bulgarian teachers, and 9704 Bulgarian students. In Salonika Greeks had 521 schools, 789 teachers, and 32534 students while Bulgarians had 319 schools, 493 teachers, and 9044 students. In the province of Edirne, the gap was even wider, there were 416 Greek schools, 644 teachers, and 32210 students while Bulgarian schools were only 162, with 226 teachers, and 4441 students. Since Bulgarians were not making up the majority in any of these provinces therefore their demands in these regions were baseless.¹¹⁷⁹

¹¹⁷⁷ BOA, Y.PRK.DH. 12/44, 27 Muharrem 1321/25 April 1903.

¹¹⁷⁸ BOA, TFR.I.MKM. 2/141, 6 Safer 1321/4 May 1903.

¹¹⁷⁹ BOA, TFR.I.MKM. 2/141, 6 Safer 1321/4 May 1903.

Besides challenging the arguments of Bulgarians Memduh worked through the issue of schooling in Rumelia. On 8 June 1903 he wrote to the Rumelia Inspector saying that establishing high schools in Elbesan, Prizren and Dıraç and primary schools in Preveze and Shkodra was to be postponed and the funds of these projects were to be used to establish primary schools at the villages and teachers' training colleges. Since it was not possible for the Ministry of Education to find funds for the construction and maintenance of schools the Ministry of Finance would cover the cost of establishing a high school that was 253,420 kuruş.¹¹⁸⁰ The fund, 97,946 kuruş, that would be received from a postponed high school construction in Prevez and Shkodra could be used for establishing forty-one primary schools. Of these forty-one primary schools twenty were to be in the province of Manastır and twenty-one in Kosovo. After completing the establishment of forty-one primary schools four hundred fifty-nine more primary schools were planned to be constructed in the villages of provinces in Rumelia. However, neither the Ministry of Education nor the Ministry of Finance had sufficient financial sources for such an enterprise. In order to set up a fund for over four hundred primary schools a new tax¹¹⁸¹ was imposed in some provinces of Anatolia, at the center of Kosovo, Janina, Shkodra, Edirne, Salonika, and Manastır. This proposal was accepted by the palace and the Council of Ministers and presented to the Ministry of Education and Finance.¹¹⁸² Besides the schools in Rumelia and Crete Memduh was also busy with the registration process of foreign schools. Since his governing years, he was very strict about controlling foreign schools thus he was involved in the registration process of the British schools in Syria and other places some of which were not legally registered.¹¹⁸³

Things got more and more complicated in the subsequent years in Rumelia. Revolutionary bands' activities dramatically increased so did the involvement of

¹¹⁸⁰ BOA, TFR.I.MKM. 2/141, 6 Safer 1321/4 May 1903.

¹¹⁸¹ For each animal that was slaughtered people in these regions were expected to pay some tax to fund the schools in Rumelia villages.

¹¹⁸² BOA, TFR.I.MKM. 3/242, 12 Rebiülevvel 1321/8 June 1903.

¹¹⁸³ BOA, Y.PRK.DH. 12/15, 19 Receb 1320/22 October 1902.

the European powers in the affairs of the region. In December 1906 Memduh wrote his thoughts about the European powers' policies and plans about the Ottoman Empire.¹¹⁸⁴ For hundred and fifty years the Russian tsars had been negotiating with Austria and France about partitioning the Ottoman territories. Since the formation of Bulgaria as an independent state after the Berlin Conference they had been negotiating places to capture in Rumelia. The rivalry among the great powers over Ottoman lands and the protection of Istanbul, according to Memduh, were the key factors that kept the Empire from being partitioned. If Istanbul were lost the Ottoman state would be able to protect Asia and Muslims from being wrecked.

The rivalry among the great powers was caused by two reasons in the nineteenth century. They could not agree on any scheme for Istanbul. Controlling Istanbul meant to controlling Europe through trade activities in the region and they did not want anyone of them having such a dominant position thus Istanbul remained in the hands of the Ottoman Empire. However, construction of the Suez Canal changed the parameters of the region and the political and economic calculations of the European powers. Istanbul lost her key position for dominance in Europe through trade network. Realizing the risk of losing Istanbul's significance ex-grand vizier Mustafa Rüşdü Pasha opposed the idea of establishing the Suez Canal but thanks to French emperor Napoleon III's insistence the Canal began to be constructed and hereupon Mustafa Reşid Pasha, known for his pro-British attitudes, withdrew from the grand vizierate.¹¹⁸⁵ However, the war between France and Germany resulted in a heavy defeat of the former. The British gradually purchased majority of shares of the Canal and gained upper hand in the region. In the Ottoman capital, Reşid Pasha returned to power. Once he passed away, pro-French Âli Pasha came to the grand vizierate position. In the ensuing years, distressed caused by the improving relationship between the Ottoman government and Russia, Britain

¹¹⁸⁴ BOA, Y.EE. 88/15, 3 Zilkade 1324/19 December 1906.

¹¹⁸⁵ This shows the extent of the entanglement of the Ottoman domestic politics in the developments in Europe.

broke her promise, made during the aftermath of the Crimean War, to the Ottoman state to prevent Russia from reinforcing her navy in the Black Sea. Moreover, during the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russo War Britain provided neither military nor financial assistance to the Ottomans and consequently independent Bulgaria was formed. The British possessed almost all shares of the Suez Canal but officially Egypt was still under the Ottoman rule thus the British interfered in the post-1877-78 war settlement and Berlin Conference was held to reconsider the heavy terms of the Saint Stefano Treaty. But still the Ottoman government could not prevent the formation of Bulgaria. Russia's was still interested in Istanbul and settling in Bulgaria would help her to realize this age-old dream. On the other hand, European powers were using Bulgarians as a shield against Russia in the Balkans. The dissolution of Bulgaria and the restoration of the old order in the vicinity of Danube was a strong desire of Muslims in the region. But, unfolding events proved that it was far from easy. The Ottoman victory against the Greeks in 1897 did not even change the situation. Backed by Austria and other European powers Bulgaria became an actor in the region. According to Memduh, compared to strong, aggressive, and expansionist Russia, small and weak Bulgaria was a preferable neighbor in the frontier for the Ottoman state. He completed his report by stating that if the Ottoman state recovered its economy it would prepare an army of a million soldiers against the Russian assaults in Rumelia and this was in the interest of the British. Yet, Britain was constantly causing trouble for the Ottomans rather than supporting them.¹¹⁸⁶

Memduh was also concerned about the conditions of the Muslims of Crete. Muslims in the villages of Crete were vulnerable and they were exposed to the constant propaganda of the Christian Greeks for they were able to communicate only in Greek. In an effort to refresh religious and patriotic sentiments of Muslims in Crete a mobile Muslim preacher needed to be appointed. This preacher had to work in cooperation with the Mufti of the

¹¹⁸⁶ BOA, Y.EE. 88/15, 3 Zilkade 1324/19 December 1906.

island and submit an extensive report about his activities once in three months to the commission, which was comprised of Mufti, district governor, principle of high school, and three selected local members.¹¹⁸⁷

5.7. A Tangled Web of Relationships

5.7.1. Minister of Interior versus Grand Vizier

Interpersonal relations constitute a great part of bureaucratic life determining the efficiency of the organization. Lack of harmony among the partakers at a work place may jeopardize the organization's objectives. The Ottoman Empire was in peril in eve of the twentieth century. The inner circle at the palace and Porte had to work hard and in harmony to keep the empire intact and to produce practical and effective solutions to the mounting problems. Any dissonance among the high-ranking bureaucrats at the central administration would produce far-reaching effects.

Memduh had to work with the council of ministers and the palace in harmony. Yet, relations neither at the Porte nor at the palace were cordial and peaceful, particularly after 1902. In relation to the developments taking place in domestic politics, Akarlı provides an illuminating account on Abdülhamids foreign policy in the context of the Macedonian crisis. Employing his delay tactics to get away with minimum concessions "Abdülhamid sought an honorable compromise with the British without losing security of German support".¹¹⁸⁸ Thus he appointed Mehmed Ferid Pasha who was known for his pro-German stance. In the meantime, he kept Ferid Pasha under surveillance through the pro-British ministers. However, "It became virtually impossible for the Council to get any work done, while the Sultan aroused Germany's suspicion without winning the British over. Meantime, Abdülhamid's desperate moves eroded the Porte's authority as well as his own."¹¹⁸⁹ Furthermore, this time Abdülhamid had a disadvantageous position in his relations with the great powers. The hostility

¹¹⁸⁷ BOA, KB.MAA.FE. 7/50, 16 Rebiülevvel 1325/29 April 1907.

¹¹⁸⁸ Akarlı, "The Problems of External Pressures," 107.

¹¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 107.

and alliance between them had reached to a point that Abdülhamid's diplomatic maneuverability had been dramatically reduced.¹¹⁹⁰

Memduh was not comfortable with the configuration that Abdülhamid set up to deal with the Macedonian question. He was particularly at odds with Mehmed Ferid Pasha. Indeed their relations were quite friendly before Ferid came to Istanbul. In *Esvat-ı Sudur* Memduh explains how Ferid was appointed to the Council of State (*Şura-yı Devlet*). In the same work Memduh represents himself as the patron of Ferid claiming that Ferid would not have been appointed as governor of Konya in 1898 if Memduh, who was then the minister of interior, did not recommend him to Akif Pasha, who was the head of the Council of State.¹¹⁹¹ On the other hand, Mahmud Kemal İnal, based on Ali Fuad Türkgeldi's account, argued that Ferid became governor of Konya under auspices of Ghazi Osman Pasha.¹¹⁹² In any case the relations between Memduh and Ferid were not bad when the former was minister and the latter was governor of Konya. The communication between them was smooth and Memduh was punctual and understanding in dealing with the demands of Ferid.¹¹⁹³ However, Tevfik Biren reported from Süleyman Kani İrtem that when he was in Konya, Ferid used to challenge the Ministry of Interior by writing harsh notes to him and the conflict between them intensified when they both served at the Sublime Porte.¹¹⁹⁴ Despite this argument, it seems that their relationship began to strain after Ferid came to Istanbul in 1902 to lead the Reform Commission of Rumelia.

¹¹⁹⁰ Akarlı, "The Problems of External Pressures," 107.

¹¹⁹¹ *Ferid Beyefendi bir valiliğe tayini emelini beslemekte idi. Said ve Kamil Paşalar sadrazam iken kenidisini bir valiliğe arz etmişler ise de, istizan tezkiresinin cevabı ma'kus suretde Babialî'ye gönderilmiştir. Valiliklerde dolaşıp Dahiliye Nezareti'yle Dersaadet'e geldiğimde miyânede müesses ülfet-i kadime teceddüt etdiğinden, Konya valiliği münhal olunca Meclis-i Mahsus-u Vükela'da müşarünileyhi tavsiye eyledim. Bazı zevat evvelki istizanların makbul olmadığını bildikleri için yüzüme baktılar. Ben yine sözümü kesmedim, kararı verildi, mazbatası saraya takdim kılındı. Vâkıa hakan-ı sâbık, Ferid Beyefendi'nin ismini bile işitmek istemiyordu. Fakat tecellî-i ilahî adem-i arzu-yı padişahî ile tağyîr bulmak mahal idüğünden, mazbata-i ma'rûza mucibince irade-i seniyye çıkdı. Mehmed Memduh, *Esvât-ı Sudûr*, 48.*

¹¹⁹² İnal, *Son Sadrazamlar*, 1592.

¹¹⁹³ For examples see BOA, DH.TMIK.S. 28/3, 3 Receb 1317/7 November 1899.

BOA, ŞD. 1753/10, No.1, 14 Zilkade 1320/12 February 1903.

¹¹⁹⁴ Biren, *Bürokrat Tevfik Biren*.

Immediately after he started working at the Sublime Porte, Ferid presented a long list of demands to the Ministry of Interior and then to the grand vizierate to settle at the small room next to the Head Clerk's office of the Council Of State where his commission was placed. As a bureaucrat who spent most of his life at various offices of the Sublime Porte, Memduh was quite strict about the organizational hierarchy at the work place. Thus, he found Ferid's furniture and stationary equipment demand from the Ministry of Interior very inappropriate and responded rebuking, writing in detail the offices he had to apply to meet his demands. Ferid was annoyed by this and took revenge after three weeks by putting Memduh in a difficult position before the sultan.

The sultan asked the Minister of Interior about the conditions of Rumelia on those days and the minister requested an explanation on the issue from Ferid for he was chairing the commission specifically dealing with Rumelia. Using this opportunity to take revenge, Ferid denied providing an explanation with an excuse that he did not get such an order from the sultan. He hesitated to share the information he had with Memduh even the latter demanded it with the order of the sultan afterwards. This being the case, Memduh requested information from the provinces in Rumelia about the situation but only Shkodra immediately replied and Memduh embarrassingly submitted a report to the sultan only about Shkodra saying that the information from other provinces was going to be submitted at a later period. It was clear that Ferid wanted to make his commission accountable only to the grand vizierate for the very reason that it was established under the grand vizierate and Ferid did not want to relegate to a position of giving an account of his activities to the Ministry of Interior.¹¹⁹⁵

The fight for power and dominance between Memduh and Ferid increasingly continued in the succeeding years. Ferid's promotion to the grand vizierate was the decisive development that changed the parameters of their relationship. As

¹¹⁹⁵ Kırmızı, *Avlonyalı Ferid Paşa*, 221-222.

a careerist, bureaucrat Memduh could not tolerate the appointment of Ferid who until recently was one of the many provincial governors under the Ministry of Interior. As the documents attest, Memduh's intolerance and animosity continued until he resigned from the Ministry right after the reinstatement of the constitution in July 1908.

As an aspiring bureaucrat Memduh must have been preparing to become grand vizier after serving sometime at the Ministry of Interior but this never happened. This hope was quite reasonable, as his predecessor at the Ministry Halil Rifat Pasha had become grand vizier in the process of reshuffling in late 1895. He was one of the strong candidates for the grand vizierate position. A document dated 11 May 1899 having neither a signature nor a name recounts that Minister of Interior Memduh Pasha was appointed to as the grand vizier and head of Council of State, Said Pasha was appointed to the Foreign Ministry. The same document also states that the newspapers in Vienna were reporting the telegraphs from Istanbul about Memduh and Said Pashas' advocacy of the British policy.¹¹⁹⁶

Memduh's aspiration to become a grand vizier was no secret. Apparently the upper bureaucratic echelon was aware of it. The relations between the Sultan and grand vizier Said Pasha was troubled and Said Pasha resigned in January 1903. During the talk he had with Adam Block at his mansion on 13 January Said Pasha underlined his determination to resign from the grand vizierate saying that "let anyone else, Ferid Pasha, or the Minister of Interior, or any of those who were intrigued by this post succeed me, but he would not remain to bear responsibility and odium of the coming dismemberment."¹¹⁹⁷

¹¹⁹⁶ BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK. 59/52, 30 Zilhicce 1316/11 May 1899.

"Dahiliye Nazırı Memduh Paşa'nın makam-ı sadarete ve şura-yı devlet reisi Said Paşa'nın hariciye nezaretine tayinleri mukarrar olduğuna ve her ikisinin İngiliz politikası tarafgirani bulduklarına dair Viyana gazetelerinde Dersaadet'ten telgraf şeklinde neşriyatta bulunulduğu haberi verilmek berayı malumat maruzdur."

¹¹⁹⁷ FO 421 (196), 1903, Inclosure in No.62, Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Landsdowne, No. 62.

The sultan appointed Mehmed Ferid Pasha, who was from an Albanian noble family, to the post and Ferid Pasha stayed at the office until the 1908 Revolution. Although he did not serve in the imperial capital for a long time, Ferid had a successful administrative career in different parts of the Empire working at variety of offices.¹¹⁹⁸ Recently he was the governor of Konya (1898-1902) and December 1902 onward he was the chair of a commission that was set up to investigate and improve the general conditions of the Rumelia province. Ferid was not only competent but also Albanian. This made him the best option as the Macedonian Question was the most vital issue of the Empire in 1903 and remained so until a large part of Balkan territories was lost in 1912.

Ferid's relations with other actors at the Porte may help to see the tension between him and Memduh in a bigger picture. Ferid and grand vizier Said Pasha's had been friends for a long time. In 1880 when Ferid was inspector at Diyarbekir, Britain's consul to Kurdistan wrote that Ferid was under the patronage of Said Pasha. In the subsequent years Said Pasha continued to support Ferid in his appointment to different posts but according to Tahsin Pasha, the first court secretary, Said Pasha suspected something was happening with Ferid's move to Istanbul in 1902. As he suspected, Ferid replaced him in mid-January 1903. Said Pasha believed that the central government had to adopt all means possible including using force to pacify the Albanians uprising. On the contrary the sultan was of the opinion of using soft power to calm them down. Ferid agreed with the sultan and this agreement, together with his

On 13 January 1903 Adam Block visited grand vizier Said Pasha at his house and had a long talk on the current situation in Ottoman politics and the reasons lying behind Said Pasha's resign from the post and on the same day Block wrote a long and confidential memorandum to London recounting the details of his talk with Said Pasha. According to Block's memorandum Said Pasha said that "he could not continue in office any longer ... he was unable to carry through any of his ideas or proposals for the better government of the country. His colleagues obstructed him, and all kinds of irresponsible people in the entourage of the Sultan, quite ignorant of the state of things, were able to intrigue him in every matter, and to thwart him in his best endeavors...."

¹¹⁹⁸ For details of Mehmed Ferid Pasha's career see Kırmızı, "Experiencing the Ottoman Empire as a Life Course"; Kırmızı, *Avlonyalı Ferid Paşa*.

Albanian background and pro-German stance, paved the way for him to become the grand vizier. The crisis between the sultan and grand vizier Said Pasha resulted in the resignation of the latter and the appointment of Ferid.

It was not easy, however, for the senior bureaucrats at the central administration to acknowledge Ferid for he abruptly became grand vizier without previously occupying any important post in the central administration.¹¹⁹⁹ Disappointed with this appointment, Memduh did not come to the office on grand vizier's first day.¹²⁰⁰ The unceasing conflict between the abruptly appointed grand vizier Ferid and Memduh who had an eye on the position of the grand vizierate continued until the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. Yet, Memduh was by no means an exception. Indeed, Ferid was not in good terms with any of the ministers for he was generally harsh in his treatment of the bureaucrats he was working with.¹²⁰¹

Illustrating the conspiracy and dispute that marked the relations of the most of the officials at the Porte, Memduh presented several secret reports (*ariza-i mahremâne*)¹²⁰² to inform Abdülhamid II about the wrongdoings and shortcomings of grand vizier Ferid. Reports proved that Memduh was, indeed, deeply disappointed that he had not been chosen for the grand vizierate, and that he used every opportunity to complain about the attitudes of Ferid, who served as the grand vizier from 1903 to 1908. The rivalry between the two pashas was not only because of the passion for the most precious post in the Ottoman realm, but also due to the fact that "Abdülhamid played the pashas off against one another, thereby keeping their conflicting interests and views in check."¹²⁰³ Exemplifying this situation in the beginning of one of his notes to the court Memduh stated that the head-clerk of the chamberlain office notified him

¹¹⁹⁹ Ferid became grand vizier after working only fifty-five days at the Commission of Rumelia.

¹²⁰⁰ Kırmızı, *Avlonyalı Ferid Paşa*, 226.

¹²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 348

¹²⁰² *Ibid.*, 349-355.

¹²⁰³ Akarlı, "The Problems of External Pressures," 142.

of the sultan's order of having watchful eye on all the activities of the grand vizier.¹²⁰⁴ In this note that was presented to the palace on 2 December 1907 Memduh vilified Ferid by emphasizing how the grand vizier went beyond his duty by taking both internal and external affairs into his own hands leaving no room to the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, he asserted that if someone voiced an opposing view on any issue during the meetings, Ferid would not only angrily respond to that person but he would also play tricks on him.

In the same report Memduh conveyed the statements of Ferid that he made during the meeting of the Council of Ministers that astonished the associates of the council. Ferid said that, "a few days ago foreign consuls came and gave an effective speech. I made the necessary defense but the economic distress of the government is obvious. All the things that need to be done require cash. That being the case, state expenditure is endless. There are many officials who get pay raises when they privately request it from the sultan. When it comes to our foreign affairs, this is another issue. What can I do alone? I present the current situation to the sultan orally and in writing." It is astonishing that the members of the council of ministers were astonished by Ferid's frankness about the situation that the empire was in. Supposedly, the ministers were aware of the financial difficulties that the empire was suffering. Why should admitting such a crystal clear fact be astonishing? Even worse, Memduh's was reporting it to the sultan as if telling the truth was wrong.

After reporting Ferid's description of the circumstances of the state, Memduh draws attention to the grand vizier's close relations with the foreign consuls which was a worrisome issue for the Sultan. Moreover, he highlighted the sad state of affairs under Ferid's grand vizierate. He finalized his words by providing his personal views of the grand vizierate and harms he had caused. According to Memduh, he was obligated to oppose anyone who was disloyal and acting

¹²⁰⁴ "...sadrıazamın gördüğü işlerde şu aralık ziyadesiyle dikkat kılınması ferman buyurulduğu Başkatip paşa kulları tebliğ eyledi..."
BOA, Y.EE. 88/19, 26 Şevval 1325/2 December 1907.

against the benefit of the state even if that person was the grand vizier. Ferid had caused enormous and irreparable damages to the state during his five years of service, discrediting the post of grand vizierate. He implied that under these circumstances he even did not want to stay at the Ministry of Interior let alone wish to be grand vizier.¹²⁰⁵ It is obvious that Memduh tried to prove that he did not have an eye on Ferid's position though he did.

An anecdote from the diary of Lütfi Fikri Bey, the deputy of Dersim,¹²⁰⁶ dated 17 April 1904 shows the level of animosity between Memduh and Ferid. Fikri Bey applied for the post of *mektupçu* while he was in Paris but his application was rejected because, as Fikri Bey claims, the Minister of Interior assumed that he in grand vizier Ferid's clique. Fikri Bey added that previously they were in good terms with one another and accepting each others' recommendations. This statement of Fikri Bey was confirmed by some examples. A journal drafted in 1891 reported that Nevzat Bey, an administrative school graduate, from a notable family of the sanjak of Ergiri of Janina was appointed as governor of Suşehri, a district of Sivas, by virtue of the close connection between Memduh, governor of Sivas, and Ferid, who was a relative of Nevzat Bey.

The tension between Ferid and Memduh continued. On 6 March 1908 Memduh received a note from the grand vizierate saying that from now onward the appointment of the provincial secretary examiners, head clerks of administrative councils, correspondence officials and governors of districts, liva registrars and translators of provinces were to be examined by the Civil Service Commission (*Memurin-i Mülkiye Komisyonu*).¹²⁰⁷ Moreover, the provincial

¹²⁰⁵ BOA, Y.EE. 88/19, 26 Şevval 1325/2 December 1907.

¹²⁰⁶ Lütfi Fikri, *Dersim Mebusu Lütfi Fikri Bey'in Günlüğü: Daima Muhalefet*, ed. Yücel Demirel (Istanbul: Arba, 1991), 34.

¹²⁰⁷ This commission was founded for appointment, promotion, supervision, transferring and retirement of all civil servants. The establishment of human resources of civil officialdom was one of the remarkable developments of the bureaucratic reforms during the Hamidian Era. Shaw, Stanford J. & Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume II, Reform, Revolution and Republic, 1808-1975* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 215.

secretary examiners and head clerks of administrative councils were to be appointed with the imperial decree; the appointment of the rest of the abovementioned personnel was carried out by the grand vizierate. Memduh was shocked with the grand vizier's will for appointment of petty officials while he had so many tasks to handle. For him by disempowering it the grand vizier, in fact, wanted to tarnish the reputation of the Ministry of Interior and render the Ministry of nothing but an officer in attendance. Memduh argued that the grand vizier interfered in the Ministry of Interior's area of responsibility to such extent that the Ministry was left with no task to undertake and it was reduced to a distributor.¹²⁰⁸ Though exaggerated this statement of Memduh indicates the precarious position of the Ministry of Interior in the administrative scheme thanks to its unstable background and loose job description as well as the changing organizational chart of the Sublime Porte.

On 30 June 1908 Memduh wrote one more note to the sultan against Ferid and he described his writing as supplication (*tazarru*). He told that Ferid was backbiting and spreading fabricated information about him. Memduh was ready to stand face to face with Ferid. In order to clarify the situation, he requested from the Chamberlain Office to appoint a committee, comprised of those who were approved by the sultan, to look into the claims of the grand vizier. At this juncture he emphasized his fifty-five years of successful official service and loyalty to the state under all conditions during this period. After highlighting that such personal disputes would cause big harms to the state, Memduh alluded to the intimacy between Ferid and the foreign consuls claiming that the grand vizier was reporting all the talks taking place at the Council of Ministers to the consuls.¹²⁰⁹

Memduh, also, informed against the grand vizier about the financial matters. Even though in his private dialogs with Baron Marshal, the German consul, and Perdekali, the director of the company, Ferid expressed his support for the

¹²⁰⁸ BOA, Y.EE. 88/21, 3 Safer 1326/7 March 1908.

¹²⁰⁹ BOA, Y.EE. 88/24, 30 Cemaziyelevvel 1326/30 June 1908.

extension of the Tram Company concession, during the discussions at the Council of Ministers he said the exact opposite. Memduh, as he asserted in his note to the sultan, examined the situation and came to know that as the negotiations continued Ferid invited Perdekali many times to his mansion to win him over by saying that he will make the Council of Ministers come to a decision that will benefit Perdekali. Memduh asserted that Ferid took ten thousand grant from the German company in exchange of issuing a decision in favor of the company. The fact of the matter is, Ferid was sincere in opposing to give the Tram concession to the German company for he shared his concerns with the sultan by substantiating his arguments against the Germans on that particular issue.¹²¹⁰ Moreover, Memduh claimed that on those days Ferid seemed to be opposing to the Regie concession but the Regie director Monsieur Ramber was often invited to his mansion at nights. He also reminded the palace that the commission dealing with this issue was comprised of those who supported the grand vizier.¹²¹¹ Since tobacco was one of the most important source of revenue of the state, Memduh emphasized the necessity of strictly controlling the business procedures related to tobacco.

Besides such accusations Memduh oftentimes complained about his efforts not being appreciated by the grand vizier. In order to solve some Bulgarian problems, a commission that was composed of some officials from Bulgaria and Istanbul was set up in the Ministry of Interior and the commission drafted a report. Memduh submitted the report to grand vizier Ferid Pasha. He later on reminded the grand vizier a few times about the report but he neither got any feedback about it nor the suggestions of the report were put into practice. Memduh thought that, as Türkgeldi conveyed, the report was shelved because of the animosity between Memduh and Ferid Pasha for the latter did not want Memduh to succeed in any of his initiation. Türkgeldi became the secretary of

¹²¹⁰ BOA, YA.HUS. 493/4, 16 Receb 1323/16 September 1905.

¹²¹¹ BOA, Y.EE. 88/20, 5 Muharrem 1326/8 February 1908.

the grand vizier in the post-1908 period and saw that the report was left aside, untouched.¹²¹²

Similarly, as detailed in the section on Yemen, Memduh often accused Ferid for not paying attention to the issue of Yemen; merely because, according to Memduh, Yemen was under Memduh's responsibility, for he chaired three commissions on Yemen. Tefvik Biren who happened to serve at Yemen and Konya wrote in his memoirs that "Memduh wrote, on 1 April 1904, to the head scribe of the chamberlain office that Tefvik Biren's writings from Yemen were not processed in Istanbul because of the hindrance grand vizier Ferid had towards Mahmud, for they were at odds with each other since Biren was the governor of Konya."¹²¹³ In the same note to the head-clerk of the palace, Memduh expressed his disappointment with the treatment of the issues of Yemen at the Sublime Porte as the report he presented to the grand vizierate was not even read at meetings of the council of the ministers.

As some anecdotes from his governing years demonstrated Memduh believed that "some ill-intentioned ones" were tripping him up. He sometimes openly blamed Ferid Pasha for not allowing him to do his job and give a good account of himself to the sultan. In some instances he alluded that İzzet Pasha, the second secretary of the palace, too, was sabotaging him.¹²¹⁴ One of the cases that Memduh believed that "someone," though unidentified, was lobbying against his work at *Darülaceze*. Memduh demanded 50,400,000 kuruş from the palace for the needs of *Darülaceze*. As mentioned before, the demand was both approved by the council of the ministers and the sultan. But the payment was postponed. According to Memduh, this was due to the meddling of some ill-intentioned people to inconvenience him.

¹²¹² Türkgeldi, *Maruf Simalar*, 403.

¹²¹³ Mehmet Tefvik Biren, *Bürokrat Tefvik Biren'in Sultan II. Abdülhamid, Meşrutiyet ve Mütareke Hatıraları*, V. 1, ed. Fatma Rezan Hürmen (Istanbul: Pınar Yayınları, 2006).

¹²¹⁴ Mehmed Memduh, *Yemen Hakkında Bazı Mutalaat*, 10.

Moreover, Tevfik Biren recounts another anecdote exemplifying the conflict between Memduh and Ferid.¹²¹⁵ Aleksandros Karatodori Efendi and Ferid were good friends from the time when both were members of the Council of State but once the former became Samos Island's ruler (Sisam Beyi) their friendship ended and Ferid began searching for something to charge Karatodori Efendi with. On those days some incidents broke out in Samos and disturbed the peace in the island. During one of the meetings at the Council of Ministers, this issue was discussed and the grand vizier gave the long reports on Samos to Memduh to be examined. Next day during the meeting Memduh explained the situation in Samos based on the reports he scanned. Ferid did not find enough to charge Karatodori Efendi and rebuked Memduh's report by saying that "you did not read the reports." When Memduh said that "I read and everything in it as I explained" Ferid responded "if so, you did not understand it." Memduh said "I read and understood it even better than you" and threw the papers with anger.¹²¹⁶ This and other anecdotes above demonstrate the extent of difficulty in reaching an agreement in the Council of the Ministers particularly in the last years of the Hamidian era due to highly personalized power struggles.

5.7.2. Governor of Sivas: Reşid Akif

Memduh had other ongoing personal disputes in addition to the grand vizier. Memduh's relationship with some of the governors were sometimes strained. Official correspondence attests that he was at odds with Reşid Akif, governor of Sivas from 1902 to 1908. Interestingly enough, after 1908 Revolution, Reşid Akif was appointed to the post of Memduh, Ministry of Interior, in the Kamil Pasha cabinet. He came from Sivas to Istanbul to take over the post but his ministerial adventure ended before it began, for he withdrew, at least some sources say so, from the post claiming his ill health as an excuse. Yet, he took some other administrative responsibilities, though less important than ministry, during the Second Constitutional Period. From such a professional record one can conclude

¹²¹⁵ Given that Tevfik Biren and Ferid were at odds with each other Biren, expectedly, had a tendency to take the side of Memduh or villainize Ferid in his account.

¹²¹⁶ Biren, *Bürokrat Tevfik Biren*, 365.

that Reşid Akif had some sort of connection with the constitutionalists who overturned the Hamidian regime. On 30 December 1901, Reşid Akif wrote a long note to the palace to clear his name for he was suspected of writing an inappropriate article, probably critique of the government policies, in the provincial newspaper. He stressed his loyalty to the Sultan, and to prove that he said he was not the author of that article. He also deplored the Minister of Interior and asked if it was him who pointed the finger at him on the article issue.¹²¹⁷ Reşid Akif might have gotten intelligence about the involvement of Memduh in that matter otherwise he would not be able to say his name in a report given to the Sultan.

Six years after this note of Reşid Akif, Memduh wrote a note to the palace to express his criticism about some of the governors who sent telegraphs for unimportant matters. This was inconvenient for it was costing the state treasury and causing anxiety and sadness on the part of the Sultan. In order to exemplify his argument, he continued writing about a recent case he experienced. He received a telegraph from Reşid Akif, the governor of Sivas, stating that the Armenian communities of Me'li Perkiynik and Tare villages were making trouble. Therefore, these villages were in need of police stations. As recounted earlier in the context of Memduh's relations with Armenians, he submitted a long note to the palace to show the baselessness of the argument and the uselessness of the demand that was made by Reşid Akif.¹²¹⁸

5.7.3. Palace, Porte, and Provinces: The Triangle of the Imperial

Administration

As earlier discussed in detail, power was concentrated in the palace and the notion of loyalty was reintroduced in the Hamidian era. Abdülhamid was at the

¹²¹⁷ BOA, Y.EE. 14/160, 18 Şaban 1319/30 November 1901.

¹²¹⁸ BOA, Y.PRK.DH. 14/27, 2 Zilkade 1325/7 December 1907.

Though he was not part of the Young Turk movement Reşid Akif served as Ministry of Interior for less than a month after 1908 Revolution, sometime after Memduh's resigned from the post. While Memduh was not given any chance to work in the Second Constitutional Period, Reşid Akif continued holding different posts in that period.

apex of the complex imperial administration. He had been serving as arbitrator of diverse views and interest, continuously coordinating rival groups at the palace, Porte and provinces. However, the role and power of Abdülhamid had gradually decreased given his age and the increasing factionalism among the officials of the palace and the Porte. Furthermore, the sultan's "favoritism in his relations with the senior officials contrasted sharply with the universalistic achievement values and administrative rationality."¹²¹⁹ Description of the relations at the palace may provide an idea about the situation.

1895 onward Tahsin and İzzet Pashas, avatars of the Hamidian regime,¹²²⁰ respectively the first and second secretary of the sultan, became two major actors in the politics of the palace. Competing with one another to affect the sultan's view and to determine the state policies, they had become hubs around whom officials from the palace, the Porte, and the provinces gathered and created various capitals.¹²²¹ Their influence dramatically increased in the last decade of the Hamidian epoch in parallel with the sultan's dependence on the immediate circle around him to rule the empire and his inability to mediate the conflicting interests of the upper echelon.

In the late years of the Hamidian period, factionalism was out of control as the sultan was old and unable to control the intensifying struggle between the power holders at the triangle of the imperial administration: the palace, the Porte, and the provinces. As discussed in the previous chapter, this situation makes the Hamidian absolutism questionable. Yet still, whomever the real power holders were, this situation, together with acute economic problems, the crisis in Rumelia, and mounting external pressure, substantially contributed to the erosion of the Hamidian regime. Overshadowing the formal and legal values

¹²¹⁹ Akarlı, "The Problems of External Pressures," 142-143.

¹²²⁰ Borrowing from Jens Hanssen describes İzzet Paşa as "the avatar of the Hamidian system". Jens Hanssen, "'Malhamé–Malfamé': Levantine Elites and Transimperial Networks on the Eve of the Young Turk Revolution," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43, no. 1 (2011), 33.

¹²²¹ The sultan's wet nurse (*esvapçıbaşı*) İlyas Bey was in the camp of Tahsin Pasha against

and procedures factionalism damaged the people's sense of justice. Personal interests and antagonism of the high-ranking bureaucrats at times eclipsed the essential problems of the empire.

Memduh did not get along with İzzet Pasha at the palace. Both of them wrote quite negative descriptions about each other in their texts.¹²²² For Memduh, İzzet was greedy and self-seeker. For İzzet, Memduh gained the grace of the sultan only because of secret intelligence, some of which was fabrication, he constantly provided to the sultan.¹²²³ Memduh would probably describe İzzet with far more negative features, but the book in which he referred to İzzet was published during the Second Constitutional Period and at that time all of the actors of the Hamidian regime were still around. Memduh and Tophane Müşiri Zeki Pasha, according to İzzet Pasha, were in the same category, since both were secretly informing the sultan about the developments taking place at the Porte.¹²²⁴ In his memoirs İzzet Pasha provides some anecdotes to prove his argument about Memduh. In an occasion Memduh presented fake notes supposedly prepared by the Central organization of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress declaring that some Young Turks and Armenians were in cooperation to realize their dream of reform. Indeed, Memduh and undersecretary of the Foreign Minister Artin Pasha, as claimed by İzzet Pasha, fabricated the note. In the succeeding days Memduh's lie was exposed but, surprisingly, the sultan did not do anything to punish him.¹²²⁵

¹²²² In Mehmed Memduh, *Yemen Hakkında Mütalaa*.

Arap İzzet Holo Paşa'nın Günlükleri - Abdülhamid'in Kara Kutusu (Istanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2019).

¹²²³ "Memduh Paşa gibilerin malumat-ı mahremane hıdmet-i hususiyesinde bulunarak teveccühat-ı şahanelerini kazanmış olmaları." *Arap İzzet Holo Paşa'nın Günlükleri*, 73.

It is necessary to highlight the fact that Memduh was no exception. In his diary İzzet Bey describes most of the bureaucrats of the upper echelon and even Abdülhamid II with very negative attributes.

¹²²⁴ "Dahiliye Nazırı Memduh ve Tophane Müşiri Zeki Paşaların öteden beru müttehaz oldukları adetleri vechile işi hafıyyen Zat-ı Şahanelerine arz etmekle..." *Arap İzzet Holo Paşa'nın Günlükleri*, 278.

¹²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 264.

İzzet Holo's memoirs were released and published long decades after the demise of the empire and his death in accordance to his will. He knew that his notes would not be

On the other hand, Memduh's archenemy Grand Vizier Ferid Pasha was at first on good terms with Tahsin Pasha but after a while he shifted to the clique of İzzet Pasa¹²²⁶ so two "enemies" of Memduh teamed up. Thanks to this agreement Memduh sided with Tahsin Pasha's faction. Memduh and Tahsin Pasha, must have collaborated in compliance with the logic of "my enemy's enemy is my friend". Though not so severe, Tahsin Pasha has a critical approach towards Memduh. In his memoirs he refers to Memduh on few occasions. According to Tahsin Pasha, in the early 1890s the Balkan union project did not yield anything because of Minister of Interior Memduh's opposition to it. Memduh submitted a report on the issue that fueled Abdülhamid's suspicions. If Tahsin Pasha's argument is true, in the early phases of his ministerial years Memduh was a strong figure who could influence the sultan's view on such an important issue. Moreover, Tahsin Pasha's statement reinforced the fact that Memduh had played with Abdülhamid's fears and suspicions.¹²²⁷

Though relations at the Council of the Ministers were by no means peaceful, there were some intimate ties among some ministers. For instance, Memduh's elder son Mazlum Hamid and the Foreign Minister Tevfik Pasha's¹²²⁸ daughter Fatma Zehra got married while both, Memduh and Tevfik Pasha, were active in the Hamidian bureaucracy. Having such an affinity they should have been supporting each other in the context of contentious politics.¹²²⁹ Memduh's

public until all prominent actors of the Hamidian era would disappear from the face of the earth. This might encourage him to bold in his description of the period.

¹²²⁶ Biren, *Bürokrat Tevfik Biren*.

The sultan did not enjoy the intimacy between Ferid and İzzet. (İnal, *Son Sadrazamlar*).

¹²²⁷ Tahsin Paşa, *Abdülhamid ve Yıldız Hatıraları* (Istanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitaphanesi, 1931), 87, 97.

¹²²⁸ He stayed at the office of Foreign Ministry from 1895 to 1909.

¹²²⁹ A good example of this is their common stance in, though not very strongly, defending the pro-British decision in İzmir-Aydın Railway contract against Grand Vizier Ferid Pasha.

FO 424, 1904-1905, No. 57. N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Landsdowne, Therapia June 12, 1905

daughter Handan married Minister of Navy Hasan Pasha's son Admiral Rüşdü Pasha.¹²³⁰

Grand Vizier Ferid Pasha, the key person at the Council, was at odds with Minister of Forests, Mines and Agriculture Selim Melhame Pasha, Minister of Justice and Abdurrahman Pasha, Minister of Navy Hasan Pasha in addition to Memduh. Abdurrahman Pasha, like Memduh, did not come to work when Ferid Pasha was appointed to the grand vizierate using the cold weather as an excuse. Ferid and Abdurrahman Pashas never had good relations but 1907 onward the resentment between them deeply affected the state affairs for the latter did not attend the meetings of the Council of Ministers. While Rumelia was in need of urgent judicial reforms and the British were exerting great pressure on the Ottoman government, the Minister of Justice Abdurrahman Pasha had been absent in the Council of Ministers due to personal disputes with the grand vizier.¹²³¹ According to the 4 February 1907 issue of the *Neu Frei Presse*, Ferid would be unseated and Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, the General-Inspector of Rumelia and ex-governor of Yemen, would be the grand vizier. Neither Ferid was removed nor Abdurrahman Pasha nor the resentment between them was recovered. Furthermore, Minister of Navy Hasan Pasha wanted to resign from his position in the end of May 1908 due to the disputes he had with the grand vizier.¹²³² Such chronic discords marked the central administration during the last years of Abdülhamid's reign.

The relationships between the cabinet members became very tense particularly after 1907 and the around summer of 1908 it became intolerable.¹²³³ Furthermore, factionalism and tension at the palace and the Porte intertwined

¹²³⁰ Handan who was an artist and Rüşdü Pasha's second child Sabiha became one of the first illustrators of Turkey. For more information about the life, art, and memoirs of Sabiha Bozcalı see Istanbul Şehir University Taha Toros Collection.

¹²³¹ Kırmızı, *Avlonyalı Ferid Paşa*, 359.

¹²³² BOA, Y.PRK.ASK. 257/6, 23 Rebiülahir 1326/28 May 1908.

¹²³³ Kırmızı, *Avlonyalı Ferid Paşa*, 359.

with the ones in the provinces. The case of Yenişehirli Edhem Pasha¹²³⁴ exemplifies not only the intricate relationships between the palace, the Porte, and the provinces but also shows how corruption, friction, factionalism, bribery, and spying discredited the Hamidian system and paralyzed the judicial and executive procedures in the final years of the Hamidian era.¹²³⁵ The events around Edhem provide intimate details about the power relations at the imperial center and periphery in the last decade of the regime. Memduh got involved in the controversies arouse concerning the affairs of Edhem. Thus, surveying the case of Edhem would allow us to see Memduh within the complex relations of the Hamidian bureaucracy.

As highlighted in the previous chapter, Abdülhamid forged direct links between the palace and the provincial notables and consequently an alternative communication channel was created besides the formal communication between the center and the provinces through governor, minister of interior, and grand vizier. This situation strengthened the relations between the center and periphery. However, in the long run this practice had produced various side effects on account of the inability of the center to evenhandedly deal with the local groups who had various ambitions and expectation. As discussed in the part “Echoes of Mahmud Nedim in the Hamidian Era” of the thesis with regard

¹²³⁴ An influential notable from Yenişehir, a district of the province of Hüdavendigâr (Bursa). In her PhD dissertation, “‘Periphery’ in the Heartlands: Yenişehir and İznik, 1863-1909,” Fatma Melek Arıkan focuses on “local political arena of relatively small, predominantly rural setting that was historically within the close orbit of the Ottoman state” (p. iv) in order to analyze how various actors and groups experienced and involved in the course of modernization in Yenişehir and İznik during the later part of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. One of the actors she examines is Yenişehirli Edhem Pasha. While delineating the events revolving around Edhem she examines the major problems of the Hamidian political system. Fatma Melek Arıkan, “‘Periphery’ in the Heartlands: Yenişehir and İznik, 1863-1909” (PhD Dissertation, 2018, Sabancı University). Besides Arıkan’s dissertation, the memoirs of Tevfik Biren, who happened to be the governor of Bursa from 1906 to 1909 provide an extensive data about the processes related to Edhem’s activities, investigation, relations with the palace and the Porte as well as the local people and the economic power holders such as the Régie. Mehmet Tevfik Biren, *Bürokrat Tevfik Biren’in Sultan II. Abdülhamid, Meşrutiyet ve Mütareke Hatıraları*, Vol. 1, ed. Fatma Rezan Hürmen (İstanbul: Pınar Yayınları, 2006).

¹²³⁵ Arıkan, “‘Periphery’ in the Heartlands,” 384.

to another case, favoring any of these groups not only caused distrust and alienation on the part of the provincial society but also upset the balance of power in the provincial context.¹²³⁶

Edhem was far from an exceptional figure for “he seemed to be the political type that flourished within the specific political circumstances of the late Hamidian era.”¹²³⁷ Therefore, his case summarizes the complications of the central and provincial administrations. Though he was coming from one of the established families of Yenişehir, Edhem indeed obtained all his wealth and power after 1894. He was given the title of Pasha in 1900 by the palace at the risk of disturbing the political equilibrium of Yenişehir and its vicinity. Using all means and methods ranging from political to illegal and even violent¹²³⁸ he managed to acquire lands for cultivation and *çiftlik*s in the succeeding years.

From 1902 onward, local people from different of backgrounds had filed charges against Edhem due to the disputes about the use of rural resources such as the land. Though his adversaries were quite tough, Edhem, somehow had gotten off easy from most of the charges. Establishing direct links between the provincial notables and the palace, the Hamidian system, according to Arıkan, ultimately obscured the judicial and administrative procedures “thereby enabling Edhem Paşa to persist in his illegal and mischievous conducts unobstructed by law and executive power. Whenever Edhem Paşa was seriously challenged and cornered by his opponents and victims, his protectors in the palace intervened to help him.”¹²³⁹

İbrahim Halil Efendi, recently appointed governor (naib) of Yenişehir, presented a report to the Şeyhülislam at the end of 1902.¹²⁴⁰ The report was delineating the power and illegal activities of Edhem in the district and asking if Şeyhülislam

¹²³⁶ Ibid., 345.

¹²³⁷ Ibid., 347.

¹²³⁸ Edhem had about 200 armed men at his disposal. Arıkan, 357.

¹²³⁹ Arıkan, “‘Periphery’ in the Heartlands,” 355.

¹²⁴⁰ BOA, DH.MKT. 644/56, 2 Zilkade 1320/31 January 1903.

could render help for Edhem's thoroughgoing trial. Though he returned empty-handed from the office of Şeyhülislam¹²⁴¹ it is interesting that a local ruler thought to appeal to the top religious authority for justice at a local sphere. The office of Şeyhülislam dispatched the report to the Ministry of Interior who was "overtly sympathetic towards Edhem Paşa."¹²⁴² Thus, Halil İbrahim Efendi's efforts remained inconclusive. Later on the provincial authorities had attempted to stop Edhem's unlawful actions but the judicial bodies of the province seemed to be hesitant to get involved in his affairs for he was supported by very influential palace officials.¹²⁴³

Appointment of Tefvik Biren as governor of Bursa in 1906 and another Tefvik Bey as kaymakam disturbed the comfort of Edhem for they were very committed to halt his ruthless and illegal business activities. The kaymayam paid the price for dismissing Edhem from the municipal mayorship without informing the governor Tefvik Bey . Without delay the governor kindly wrote to the Minister of Interior saying that for the sake of the prestige of the provincial administration it would be better to allow kaymakam Tefvik Bey to remain in office in Yenişehir or to appoint another district of Bursa otherwise the provincial community might think that Tefvik Bey was dismissed from the post as a result of Edhem Pasha's interference.¹²⁴⁴

In the ensuing months the central administration received many complaints about Edhem with regard to his ruthless treatment, exploitation of people's labor and land, and the great damages caused by the irrigation of rice farms of Edhem. Subsequently, Grand Vizier Ferid Pasha commanded governor Tefvik Bey to detain Edhem at the center of Bursa during his trial. As usual Edhem begged Esvapçıbaşı İlyas Bey and Head-Clerk Tahsin Pasha from the palace

¹²⁴¹ Holding the office of Şeyhülislam from 1891 to 1908 Mahmud Celaleddin Efendi was under the close scrutiny of the Hamidian government.

¹²⁴² Arıkan, "'Periphery' in the Heartlands," 357.

¹²⁴³ Ibid., 384.

¹²⁴⁴ BOA, DH.ŞFR. 372/47, 10 Ramazan 1324/28 October 1906. Biren, *Bürokrat Tefvik Biren*, 458.

organization to help him against the governor. Immediately afterwards İlyas Bey put a great pressure on governor Tevfik Bey to kindly deal with Edhem. İlyas Bey also reminded the governor how the prominent figures at the palace service were deeply divided on the case of Edhem and these rival factions could step in the provincial affairs for the benefit of their supporters in the region.¹²⁴⁵

Although governor Tevfik Bey succeeded in keeping Kaymakam Tevfik Bey in Yenişehir during the first incident, another attempt was made to remove Edhem from his post during the summer of 1907. The governor once more connected with Minister of Interior Memduh to keep the kaymakam in Yenişehir but this time the governor had no chance against the protectors of Edhem at the palace. Edhem, still at the capital of Bursa, was appealing Memduh and Mehmed Ferid to help him. At the same time, his protector İlyas Bey continued pressing governor Tevfik Bey. Though slow and cumbersome the trial of Edhem was still on in Bursa and the complaints were still coming. Eventually, Edhem was released against the will of the provincial authority and community.¹²⁴⁶

However, a new problem broke out in Yenişehir in the fall of 1907. Wrongly constructed mill dikes of Edhem and some others were flooding some people's farms. Mill owners were asked to rebuild the dikes properly. The governor called Edhem to Bursa to talk about the issue, but Edhem secretly left Yenişehir and came to the residence of Esvabçibaşı İlyas Bey in Istanbul. The governor heard the rumors spread by Edhem's supporters in the province, of Edhem's prospect of promotion by the sultan upon the recommendation of İlyas Bey, Tahsin Pasha, and Minister of Interior Memduh. Frightened from falling into disfavor of Abdülhamid, because of the lobby against him, governor Tevfik Bey wrote a letter to the sultan to clarify the situation. Meanwhile, Tevfik Bey was receiving letters with intimidating tone from Tahsin Pasha, who was supporting Edhem. This dispute would end up in Tevfik Bey's removal from office. Thus, showing the white flag, the governor responded to Tahsin Pasha with in

¹²⁴⁵ Biren, *Bürokrat Tevfik Biren*, 459.

¹²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 463-464.

conciliatory manner. Having a recommendation letter from Tahsin Pasha, Edhem came back to Yenişehir in October 1907.¹²⁴⁷ However, not long after another crises broke out. Edhem demanded renewal of the investigation about his rice farm and mill in order to invalidate the previous complaints against him. İlyas Bey and Tahsin Pasha once more interfered upon the governor's negative response to Edhem.¹²⁴⁸

Furthermore, after dismissal of Kaymakam Tevfik Bey from the district an acting kaymakam administered Yenişehir for some time. Thanks to the strengthened ties between Memduh and Edhem during the latter's stay in Istanbul, Yenişehir's new Kaymakam was Rüşdü Efendi, an official part of the same palace clique as Edhem. The alliance of Edhem and Rüşdü Efendi once more caused tension in the district. Opponents of Edhem began to complain about the impartiality of Kaymakam for he was rendering his administrative power into the service of Edhem. Consequently, Mutasarrıf of Ertuğrul, a district of Bursa, initiated an investigation in the spring of 1908. Ambiguity prevailed the whole report on the investigation. Interestingly, the investigation commission could not find any evidence to charge Edhem despite all the allegations against him.¹²⁴⁹ The report put all responsibility on Kaymakam Rüşdü Efendi and Naib Tevfik Efendi.

Rüşdü Efendi, on the other hand, was busy sending a threatening letter to Kaymakam of Ertuğrul who initiated the investigation. Kaymakam Rüşdü Efendi was also doing his best to prevent Edhem's adversaries from cultivating tobacco by not submitting their application to the Régie Administration, which was under the protection of Edhem. What Rüşdü Efendi did was considered a disobedience to the Mutasarrıf who ordered him to deliver Edhem's opponents' permit applications to the Régie. As he explained in his letter to Mutasarrıf, Kaymakam's excuse was if the Edhem's adversaries were allowed to cultivate

¹²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 465-471.

¹²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 472-473.

¹²⁴⁹ BOA, DH.MKT. 1236/6, 23 Muharrem 1326/26 February 1908. Arıkan, "Periphery' in the Heartlands," 391-393.

tobacco they would sell the harvest to the smugglers. In response Edhem, on behalf of the Régie, would have to use coercion and this would cause disorder in Yenişehir.¹²⁵⁰ Once he was informed about this situation Governor Tevfik Bey straight-forwardly asked the Minister of Interior to remove both Kaymakam Rüşdü Efendi and naib of Yenişehir. But the Minister of Interior was supporter of Edhem, thus in his note on the issue to the grand vizier he put the blame on governor Tevfik Bey. According to Memduh, the governor had to stay neutral about this issue but he did not. His attitudes paved the way for the ventures of Edhem's adversaries. Furthermore, dismissing Rüşdü Efendi was not a solution because he was in Yenişehir only for a few months, but Edhem and his adversaries had been in conflict for a long time. Memduh also reminded Grand Vizier Ferid that the allegations against Edhem were all groundless, as the investigations could not reach any conclusion so far. Memduh suggested to solve the conflict at the local level through judicial mechanism. The problem, however, was, as Arıkan put, that "the courts were not immune to prevailing relations of power at the local and imperial levels."¹²⁵¹

As they could not reach any solution through formal channels Governor Tevfik Bey and Edhem's adversaries sought the assistance of another political faction in Istanbul. Violating the administrative hierarchy Tevfik Bey bypassed the Minister of Interior and sent Kaymakam Rüşdü Efendi's inappropriate letter from Mutasarrıf to Grand Vizier Ferid Pasha. United against İzzet Holo Pasha, the second secretary at the palace, relations between Tahsin Pasha and Ferid were very intimate at the outset of Ferid's grand vizierate. However, after sometime Ferid shifted to the clique of İzzet Holo.¹²⁵² Thus, a case related to the faction of Tahsin Pasha and Memduh such as the one Governor Tevfik Bey informed would strengthen his hand against them. Without delay Ferid dismissed Rüşdü Efendi from Yenişehir and cancelled Edhem's official position at the Régie.

¹²⁵⁰ BOA, DH.MKT. 1236/6, 23 Muharrem 1326/26 February 1908.

Arıkan, "Periphery' in the Heartlands," 394.

¹²⁵¹ Arıkan, "Periphery' in the Heartlands," 396.

¹²⁵² Biren, *Bürokrat Tevfik Biren*, 254-255.

In the spring of 1908 Abdülhamid sent Brigadier Yusuf Kenan Pasha to Bursa to conduct a secret investigation about the activities of Edhem. The imperial decree Kenan Pasha brought from the sultan set Governor Tevfik Bey at ease, for he appreciated the governor's efforts and admitted the complications the palace factions caused.¹²⁵³ It was not the end of the story. Soon afterwards rice cultivation season came Edhem wanted to get a permit from the provincial authorities for rice cultivation. His application was refused for the distance of his lands from the settlements was not sufficient according to the rice cultivation regulation. Edhem did not enter into conflict with Tevfik Bey and said that he would cultivate somewhere else. Tevfik Bey attempted to assign some officials from the province to examine the lands Edhem was planning to cultivate from, but Edhem opposed this idea and requested the Minister of Agriculture, Forest and Mines, Selim Melhame Pasha, to send an official for the inspection. Assigned by the Ministry of Agriculture, Lebib Bey came to Yenişehir. Governor Tevfik Bey also sent officials for the authenticity of the investigation. Both parties produced the report and the result was negative. Even so, Selim Melhame Pasha allied with Memduh to change the result of the report in favor of Edhem. Soon, a newspaper reported that Edhem Pasha's lands in Yenişehir were convenient for rice cultivation thus the Ministry of Agriculture permitted him to cultivate rice. Edhem started cultivating rice.

Tevfik Bey once more communicated with the grand vizier and proved that Edhem's lands were not suitable for rice cultivation. In response, Memduh and Selim Pasha brought some arguments from the rice cultivation regulation to justify Edhem's cultivation. However, the grand vizier showed determination and did not accept them. Edhem did not give up. He requested a new inspection done by officials from the imperial capital. The inspection was carried out by the provincial officials and the result was the same: his lands were not suitable for rice cultivation.

¹²⁵³ Ibid., 476.

As a last resort Edhem wrote a petition to the sultan and after explaining his situation he requested some officials from the imperial capital to conduct a new investigation. He probably hoped to get help from his protectors at the palace to send inspectors that would give him positive results. Tevfik Bey, on the other hand, ordered to uproot Edhem's rice field. Fearing from Edhem's armed men the officials could not dare to do so. Edhem even proposed to pay cash-fine yet he could not succeed to convince Tevfik Bey. It was the middle of July 1908, Abdülhamid was forced to reinstate the constitution and convene the parliament after three decades. Tevfik Bey was still in Bursa and now free from the pressure of the palace faction in his dealings with Edhem. Edhem lost his rice field and his patrons at the palace at once.

Abdülhamid's governance had deformed in the last years of the Hamidian era for the locus of power lost its capacity to work efficiently and in harmony. As observed by Arıkan, once Abdülhamid ceased to arbitrate the competing interests of different power holders "the powerful machinery he created at the Yıldız compound filled in the vacuum of power."¹²⁵⁴ Consequently, the palace and the Porte suffered from factionalism more than ever and this situation had disrupted the working of the political system. As in the case of Edhem, thanks to the interruption of the different factions at the central administration the formal institutional procedures could not be properly carried out. Crippled checks and balances of the political mechanism rendered the government ineffective and irresponsible, which in turn alienated the people in the provinces.¹²⁵⁵ Convergence of the factions at the imperial center and the province further harmed the provincial people who were already subjected to a great deal of difficulties.

¹²⁵⁴ Arıkan, "'Periphery' in the Heartlands," 408.

¹²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 347.

5.7.4. Memduh and the British: Friend or Foe?

Memduh's relationship with the British is quite a controversial issue. Memduh was illustrated negatively in most communications from Anatolia to Istanbul during his service as governor in Sivas and Ankara and from Istanbul to London when he was a minister. Moreover, according to the Ottoman records, he was removed from governorate of Sivas because of the foreign pressure, which must have been coming from the British, since they were the major foreign power watching the *vilayat-ı sitte*, due to his Armenian policy.

Yet, in some primary sources he was portrayed as a statesman advocating the British policy. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, an anonymous document dated 11 May 1899 reported that the newspapers in Vienna were mentioning telegraphs from Istanbul about Memduh and Said Pashas' advocacy of the British policy.¹²⁵⁶ Moreover, Ghazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, the Ottoman commander in Egypt, reported to the imperial capital on 24 April 1906 that he heard from British Lord Cromer that during a dialog between the British embassy and the B Foreign Minister of Egypt, Boutros Pasha, the British embassy said that "I could not remove that Albanian (referring to Ferid) and bring Memduh to the grand vizierate. He is the most credited person."¹²⁵⁷ In accordance with this account, Memduh's becoming grand vizier was beneficial to the British interests.

Besides these claims about his pro-British standpoint Memduh visited London twice. He had his first visit in the summer of 1895 when he was the governor of Ankara and the second visit in the summer of 1901 when he was a minister. On 1 July 1895 Memduh wrote to the provincial administration of Aydın demanding

¹²⁵⁶ BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK. 59/52, 30 Zilhicce 1316/11 May 1899.

"Dahiliye Nazırı Memduh Paşa'nın makam-ı sadarete ve şura-yı devlet reisi Said Paşa'nın hariciye nezaretine tayinleri mükerrer olduğuna ve her ikisinin İngiliz politikası tarafgirani bulduklarına dair Viyana gazetelerinde Dersaadet'ten telgraf şeklinde neşriyatta bulunulduğu haberi verilmek berayı malumat maruzdur."

¹²⁵⁷ BOA, Y.EE. 87/3, 29 Safer 1324/24 April 1906.

İnal, *Son Sadrazamlar*, 1606.

his salary arrear for he had to stay in London for some time.¹²⁵⁸ Available documents do not provide any clue about the reason and duration of his stay in London. Interestingly enough after six years, on 1 July 1901, once more he wrote from London to Kamil Pasha, governor of Aydın, requesting his salary as he had to extend his stay in London.¹²⁵⁹ Similar to the previous case the reason and duration of this visit is not clarified by any document.

Furthermore, Memduh's relationship with the British embassy in Istanbul seems quite harmonious. For instance, in March 1896 he was granted a Mecidiye order and the British embassy Anthopoulos Pasha wrote to the Minister of Interior to congratulate him.¹²⁶⁰ At the end of 1896 the same embassy wrote again to the Ministry of Interior this time to ask him a favor; he demanded from Memduh to appoint his brother in law Dimitraki Efendi as assistant of mutasarrif.¹²⁶¹ The British embassy might have felt quite easy and comfortable with Memduh to ask such a favor so openly.

Though not necessarily an indication of his pro-British stand, in 1905 with regard to the prolongation of the İzmir-Aydın Railway Abdülhamid II issued an imperial deed in connection with the protocol of the Council of Ministers. The imperial deed was unfavorable to the British. Memduh and Foreign Minister Tevfik Pasha expressed their opposition to the decision of the Council of Ministers but the contract in favor of Germans was "strongly advocated by the grand vizier, who, in this as well as in most other matters, is pledged to support German interests". Despite their opposition two ministers, Memduh and Tevfik Pasha, did not strongly stand against the decision by not signing the ratification

¹²⁵⁸ "Bir müddet Londrada kalmak mecburetiyetinde bulduğumdan mütedahil maaşat bakiyesiyle ihsanı..." BOA, Y.EE.KP. 5/462, 08 Muharrem 1313/1 July 1895.

¹²⁵⁹ BOA, Y.EE.KP. 13/1266, 14 Rebiülevvel 1319/1 July 1901.

¹²⁶⁰ BOA, HR.SFR.3. 721/54, 5 Şevval 1313/20 March 1896.

¹²⁶¹ BOA, HR.SFR.3. 721/88, 10 Receb 1314/15 December 1896.

document, which eventually “went up to the sultan as an unanimous decision of the Council.”¹²⁶²

On the other hand, in the 1906 annual report Memduh was depicted as “narrow-minded and anti-Christian, but outwardly courteous and correct in his relations towards foreigners.” The report also said that “he has, indeed, at times posed as favoring British interests, with the apparent object of uniting all the non-German elements in support of his candidature for the grand vizierate, in which it is his ambition to supplant Ferid.”¹²⁶³

According to some accounts¹²⁶⁴ Memduh’s relationship with the British continued to his old age. In May 1919 the Association of the Friends of England in Turkey (*İngiliz Muhipleri Cemiyeti*), was founded in Istanbul and Memduh was recorded as an honorary leader. This association was founded to promote British mandate in the territories that were previously under Ottoman rule. The active leader of the association was Said Molla who sent telegraphs to the mayors of the provinces calling them to join the association and establish branches all over the empire. However, neither this call was well received by the mayors nor the association was supported by the people. The extent of Memduh’s support and involvement in the activities of this pro-British initiation is unknown however as an eighty year old man his contribution might have been very little, if there was any.

Having said that, Memduh by no means surrendered unconditionally to the will of the British. A good example of this is provided by the British documents. This anecdote from the British archives is important not only to analyze Memduh’s relationship with the British but also to have an up-close look into one of the many complicated issues that Memduh had to deal as the Minister of Interior.

¹²⁶² FO 424, 1904-1905, No. 57. N. O’Conor to the Marquess of Landsdowne, Therapia June 12, 1905

¹²⁶³ FO 424, General Report on Turkey for the year 1906, 32.

¹²⁶⁴ Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler II: 1918-1922 Mütareke Dönemi* (Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1986), 472.

In 1906 the European Powers on behalf of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration demanded that the Turkish Customs Administration increase the collection of custom duties to three percent. The Foreign Ministry informed the British representative, Mr. G. Barclay, that the Council of Ministers were in favor of accepting the European demands. However, the decision was unanimous. Minister of Justice Abdurrahman Pasha and Minister of Interior Memduh were dissentients. At the palace both Tahsin and İzzet Pashas were also against the idea of increasing the custom duties. The grand vizier and the Foreign Minister particularly put a great deal of effort to convince the dissentients in the cabinet and the palace.¹²⁶⁵

At this juncture, one needs to keep in mind that there is a possibility that the grand vizier and the foreign minister might not be supporters of the European demands. They might pretend to be so just to earn time for the Ottoman government. As exemplified in the biography of Ferid Pasha, the grand vizier and the Sultan sometimes adopted the good cop bad cop strategy in their negotiation with the European powers to prolong the time they were given to make critical decisions as was in this case.¹²⁶⁶ In the absence of a better option Abdülhamid used the card to delay against the pressures of the European powers. Akarlı offers a plausible explanation about the way and the logic of this policy.

Abdülhamid II managed to ward off European powers' pressure, to a certain extent, "by taking advantage of their differences and by resorting to delaying tactics". Abdülhamid pursued a two-fold strategy against the British drive. While he resisted foreign pressure as much as the differences among the powers allowed, wherever he had to yield, he used the Porte as a shield to thwart the commitments Britain and other powers imposed upon the government. Whenever the Porte was forced to consent to the implementation of a set of "reform measures" after extended negotiations, Abdülhamid could instruct the provincial

¹²⁶⁵ F.O.421 (224), December 1906, No.7, Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, October 31, 1906

¹²⁶⁶ Kırmızı, *Avlonyalı Ferid Paşa*.

According to Hanioglu, "with the military odds stacked heavily against the Ottoman state, and its enemies multiplying, shrewd diplomacy remained the only way to buy time". Hanioglu, *A Brief History of Late Ottoman History*, 129.

inspectors, governors or other officials to delay action on the formal orders the Porte until further notice from the Sultan.....He could always use the Porte as an excuse for inability to carry these measures out.¹²⁶⁷

In June 1907 the Ottoman government was still hesitant about accepting the custom payment increase. After six months of prolonging, O'Connor concerted with his colleagues to present a joint note to the Sublime Porte to bring further pressure on the Ottoman government. Before taking such an action German and Austrian representatives preferred to wait a little longer. Meanwhile, O'Connor received a telegram from Edward Grey to inquire whether Imperial decree sanctioning the increase of the custom duties according to the will of the Public Debt was issued. In the middle of June 1907 O'Connor visited the palace and met with Tahsin Pasha and reminded him the urgency of the situation. Kindly threatening the palace O'Connor also highlighted London's unwillingness to receive a negative answer, which would inevitably produce undesirable effect. Tahsin Pasha responded that there was no imperial decree yet sanctioning the arrangement as the Council of Ministers had yet to make a decision. Thus, for the time being the best thing for the British authority, according to Tahsin Pasha, was to communicate with the ministers on the issue. O'Connor left the palace empty-handed and proceeded to the Council of Ministers. He explained the situation to the Foreign Minister Tefvik Pasha. After Tefvik Pasha, Memduh who, as put by O'Connor, "is generally supposed to be the leader of the opposition to the proposed arrangement" came to continue the meeting with O'Connor. Memduh obliged O'Connor to go over the whole ground once more. After a while Memduh turned back to the Council and O'Connor was requested to go back to the palace secretary.

After O'Connor left the palace, Tahsin Pasha able to talk to the Sultan about the meeting he had with O'Connor. Abdülhamid II instructed Tahsin Pasha to tell O'Connor that "the question of the agreement with the Administration of the Public Debt was still under consideration by his Government, which might either

¹²⁶⁷ Akarlı, "The Problems of External Pressures," 135.

accept or reject it. A decision, without any doubt, would arrive shortly.” Not satisfied with this message from the sultan, O’Conor insisted Tahsin Pasha to tell the sultan that the British government was waiting for the positive response no later than that night otherwise consequences would be unavoidable. Tahsin Pasha, however, put up resistance and declared that “it was indispensable that the ministers should arrive at a decision.” O’Conor returned to the Council of Ministers and met with the Grand Vizier and the Foreign Minister again. They requested him to wait for few more days.

On 22 June 1907 the Council of Ministers met at the Yıldız Palace to consider the demand of the Public Debt Administration to increase the percentage of the custom revenues the Public Debt was collecting. The meeting lasted until 10 PM. It was reported that the Council “resulted in the Minister of the Interior, Memdouh Pasha (who is a candidate for the office of Grand Vizier and steadfast opponent of Ferid Pasha) and his partisans opposing the Grand Vizier.” However, Ferid Pasha, as reported by O’Conor, succeeded in keeping the other ministers together, and on Wednesday they all, with the exception of Memdouh Pasha, reported in favor of accepting the proposals of the Council of the Debt.” Yet, the Yıldız Palace kept its silence until Thursday evening. Mr. Lamb, an official from the British embassy, was ordered by O’Conor to wait at the Selamlık of the palace until the declaration of the decision. In the meantime, O’Conor and other European associates of the Public Debt Administration “agreed to send a strongly worded note to the Porte next morning in case his representations failed in obtaining the Sultan’s consent.” That night the Grand Vizier informed O’Conor that “the matter was satisfactorily settled.”¹²⁶⁸

Overall, having these conflicting aspects of situations regarding Memduh’s relations with the British remain to obscure the contemporary researchers. We are still in the dark about the reasons behind his visits to London and the extent

¹²⁶⁸ F.O.421 (233), May and June 1907, N. O’Conor to Edward Grey, Therapia, June 19, 1907. No. 128. (No. 369) 20779
F.O.421 (234), July and August 1907, N. O’Conor to Edward Grey, Therapia, June 24, 1907. No. 3. (No. 375) 21512

of the cooperation, if there was any at all, between the British and Memduh during his ministerial years and afterwards.

5.7.5. Memduh and the Young Turks

Except for a few sources, the evidence that would shed light on the relationship between Memduh and Young Turks is quite limited. In June 1901 Abdullah Cevdet Efendi,¹²⁶⁹ the doctor of the Ottoman Embassy in Vienna wrote to Memduh requesting a decoration (*nişan*) of appreciation for his loyalty and service to the sultan. On 12 June 1901 Memduh wrote to the palace to convey the message of Abdullah Cevdet to the grand vizierate.¹²⁷⁰ However, it is not clear if he was granted a decoration. Important part of this anecdote is that Abdullah Cevdet felt comfortable enough with Memduh to make such a demand. Furthermore, as stated by Hanioglu, İshak Suphi, another prominent member of the Committee, experiencing financial difficulty sponsoring the

¹²⁶⁹ Abdullah Cevdet was a well-known figure opposing the Hamidian regime. He graduated from the medical school (*Mekteb-i Tıbbiye*) in 1894. He was one of the founders of the Committee of Ottoman Union (*İttihâd-ı Osmânî Cemiyeti*, the association that became the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*) afterwards. While he was practicing his profession he continued working to expand the membership of the Committee. An invention about him was carried out upon the manifesto he penned in response to the Armenian incidents in Istanbul in 1896 and he was exiled to Tripoli in January 1896 but soon released. As he learned that he would be exiled to Fezzan, a region of Tripoli at Sahara Desert, he escaped to Paris where he met with the other unionists including Ahmed Rıza and Mizancı Murad and intensified his writing activities to criticize the Hamidian regime. On the other hand, the sultan's representatives were offering him and the other opponents in Paris money and position to stop opposition activities. In 1899 on the condition of not writing against the Ottoman government he was appointed as the doctor of the Ottoman Embassy to Vienna. But indeed he clandestinely continued writing at the Ottoman, the journal that started to be published in 1897. He worked at the Embassy for sometime but never gave up opposing the regime. Later in September 1904 he initiated another journal named *İctihad*, which had a deep effect on the Ottoman cultural and intellectual life besides the political function it served. Şükrü Hanioglu, "Abdullah Cevdet", *TDVİA*, Vol. 1, 90-93, 1988. In the context of a discussion on the tendency towards materialism among the Ottoman intelligentsia in the late nineteenth century Hanioglu notes that "various journals linked materialism to Westernization (*Garbcılık*), portraying it as the driving force behind the material progress of the West. The most prominent of these, *İctihad*, also waged a war of ideas against Islam and ridiculed many Muslim practices." (Hanioglu, *A Brief History of Late Ottoman Empire*, 185.) Hanioglu refers to Abdullah Cevdet's article "Softalığa Dair" in the 60th issue of *İctihad*, (17 April 1913).

¹²⁷⁰ BOA, Y.EE. 88/9, 22 Safer 1319/10 June 1910.

committee's activities in Europe, bargained with the Minister of Interior and got a small sum from him.¹²⁷¹

Besides the CUP members living outside the empire, Memduh had some contacts with Derviş Vahdeti who had close relations with the Constitutionalists opposing the Hamidian regime. Derviş Vahdeti came to Istanbul in 1902. After a while he wrote a petition to the Minister of Interior and was appointed to a post at the Immigrant Office with 400 kuruş salary. As he did not like the job he was given he submitted complaint. Consequently, he was arrested for a month and afterwards exiled to Diyarbakır. Later in the Second Constitutional Period he became the editor-in-chief of the Volkan Newspaper and not long after he was found guilty of his involvement in the 31 March Incident and executed.¹²⁷²

By his own account, though a supporter of constitutionalism, Memduh was not in favor of the people's involvement in state affairs because he assumed that they were ignorant and unable to comprehend the facts (*hakikatler*).¹²⁷³ In relation to this, he thought that education was the only path by which the empire could overcome its many problems, including poverty, backwardness, ethnic and sectarian conflicts, and national uprisings. That is to say, if the empire was to survive, then the provinces in Anatolia and Rumelia had to be mobilized for education.¹²⁷⁴

5.8. Economy & Rewards

5.8.1. Memduh's Proposal for the Ottoman Economy

Drawing from his experience in the secretary of the Ministry of Finance, the Council of Financial affairs, and some other commissions on state finance, Memduh was familiar with the major issues of the Ottoman state economy; and

¹²⁷¹ Şükrü Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 154.

¹²⁷² Zekeriya Kurşun, Kemal Kahraman, "Derviş Vahdeti", *TDVİA*, Vol.9, 198-200, 1994.

¹²⁷³ Memduh Paşa, *Mir'at-ı Şuunat* (İzmir: Ahenk Matbaası, 1328).

¹²⁷⁴ Memduh Paşa, *Kuvvet-i İkbâl Alamet-i Zeval* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Hayriye ve Şürekası, 1329, 1911/12).

as a Minister of Interior, he not only took part in some commissions but also raised a comprehensive proposal to improve the state welfare and economy.

For the prosperity it was believed that the number of schools had to be increased and students should be taught, along with religion, sciences that would promote agricultural and industrial skills and knowledge. With this object in mind Memduh, with the Minister of Education, and the Minister of Foundations established a commission in November 1901.¹²⁷⁵

Memduh came up with a long report proposing some solutions to the budget deficit problem of the state treasury.¹²⁷⁶ Memduh argued that the empire had sufficient number of world-class experts on sciences such as medicine for there had been schools specialized on these sciences, yet there was a shortage of experts on economics. This was because of the lack of a special school to produce professionals for the Ministry of Finance. As the first measure a special branch on economics had to be found at the *Darülfunun* to provide training at the European level. To substantiate his argument, he gave an example from Europe.

While in Europe there are factories for source of income, the Ottoman people generally are relying on farming and animal herding for their livelihood. Since both the Ottoman state revenue and society's living depend upon agriculture there is a dire need to improve the conditions of farming. This will definitely contribute to the welfare of both. Tithe and cattle taxes are the state's major revenue sources. Until now the state has not made anything good out of the lands, forests, and mines of the empire. The income obtained from tithe and cattle tax is quite limited. This is so because agriculture is not all about farming the land. Rather in order to increase the productivity there is a need to adopt scientific practices, change the seeds, strengthen animals for farming, procure new-fangled agricultural tools and techniques, establish hydraulic conduits for

¹²⁷⁵BOA, DH.SAİD. 1/84, 29 Zilhicce 1255/4 March 1840.

¹²⁷⁶BOA, Y.EE. 88/14, 29 Safer 1324/24 April 1906.

water supply to the farms. Unfortunately, in the Ottoman territories people still farm the lands according to the techniques from four hundred years ago. When cattle and sheep get sick they just die due to the lack of medical facilities. Great number of animals decimate for they cannot get any treatment.¹²⁷⁷

The Ottoman government borrowed two hundred million lira from Europe in six decades but even its two million was not used for the welfare and construction of the enterprises of the country. Using sea and land trade routes Europeans work hard to secure their benefits. During the Hamidian era the government decided to borrow three million lira to be used for the construction and prosperity of the county. Two million of this amount would be devoted to the construction. Hüdavendigâr, Aydın and Ankara provinces were selected as testing ground for they had rivers, railroads and were close to sea and ports. The remaining one million would be used for the modernization of agriculture in central Anatolia. For the management of this process a commission would be established from experts and put under the leadership of a hardworking and loyal official. Due to the high interest rates the government could not borrow three million from outside thus it was decided that the Agriculture Bank could provide the necessary amount to rehabilitate and improve the farming by importing modern agricultural machinery from Europe. Memduh completed his report by stating that the improvement of agriculture would increase the tax revenues and trade activities and this would definitely contribute to the state economy.¹²⁷⁸

5.8.2. Economic Benefits of Being a Hamidian Bureaucrat

Memduh was not only good at proposing ideas to improve the state economy. He, as earlier exemplified, was also an entrepreneur in his personal life. During his lifetime he not only served in government offices but also used all opportunities to make a fortune. At the zenith of his bureaucratic career, he was an affluent man possessing a waterfront residence and a mansion on the

¹²⁷⁷ BOA, Y.EE. 88/14, 29 Safer 1324/24 April 1906.

¹²⁷⁸ BOA, Y.EE. 88/14, 29 Safer 1324/24 April 1906.

Bosphorus, mansions, shops, ateliers, and various other profit-yielding real estates in Istanbul and some other locations of the empire. Memduh's interest in business activities continued in parallel with his career in the bureaucracy. As he advanced in official life, his chances of acquiring assets and access to contract opportunities increased.

As stated in Chapter 2, in addition to lands, shops, and fisheries Memduh also owned residences. One of them was in Erenköy, a neighborhood located on the Asian side of Istanbul. Memduh and his family used to stay at that residence during summers.¹²⁷⁹ In April 1894, when Memduh was governor of Ankara, the royal groom Ahmed Pasha insistently demanded to rent this house. Memduh refused this request with the excuse that his family was quite crowded and they did not own any other place to reside during summers.¹²⁸⁰

After returning to the capital as Minister of Interior in 1895, Memduh consistently demanded a comfortable and cheap, if not free, residence in a convenient neighborhood such as Bosphorus or Nişantaşı. Majority of the bureaucrats were living in these places due to their proximity to the Yıldız Palace. On 18 November 1897, Memduh wrote to the sultan that since he had returned from Ankara he and his family had been staying at a seashore residence with 300 kuruş monthly rent. He said that this amount was more than he could afford,¹²⁸¹ as he had accumulated much debt because of his daughters' marriage. He requested that the sultan allow him to settle in the house in Nişantaşı where Süreyya Pasha used to stay. Since the house was empty, as Süreyya Pasha passed away, Memduh and his family could move there.¹²⁸² After five months, he repeated his demand for the same house, saying that his family was quite crowded and it was very hard for them to stay at rented houses. He also emphasized that what he wanted was not possession of the house, but

¹²⁷⁹ Nermin Vahid, *Boğaz'daki Kırmızı Köşk*.

¹²⁸⁰ BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 29/76, 14 Şevval 1311/20 April 1894.

¹²⁸¹ Memduh's ministerial salary was 40,000 kuruş. The net pay he received was thirty six thousand after the tithe from his salary.

¹²⁸² BOA, Y.EE. 14/187, 8 Cemaziyelevvel 1315/5 October 1897.

simply to reside in it as a guardian.¹²⁸³ Documents do not clarify if Memduh's family was allowed to settle in the house that he had been requesting.

Soon, he wrote to the sultan again. After a long introduction to convince the sultan how he was in dire need of the sultan's blessings, Memduh highlighted his disadvantageous position in terms of his residence compared to all the other high officials. To prove his argument, he listed eleven officials, matching them with the type and location of the residences they had been granted by the sultan.¹²⁸⁴ As discussed earlier, Abdülhamid was quite generous in rewarding high-ranking officials who proved their loyalty to the sultan. Rewards of the sultan could be in the form of cash, orders, decorations, and business contracts or as in this case residence. Though new (due to ten years absence) in the central administration he was, according to Memduh, indeed senior and loyal enough to be granted the rewards that his counterparts had been enjoying.

In this petition, Memduh notes that since he had returned from Ankara, he and his family had been staying at a house in disrepair in Kuruçeşme and that he was paying a monthly rent of 700 kuruş. In order to demonstrate how pitiful his situation was he compares himself with an ant, which at least has a convenient shelter while Memduh did not. After this self-dramatization, he asked the sultan if it would be possible for him to settle on land or in a residence in Kuruçeşme that was on sale.¹²⁸⁵ It is not clear if this land or residence was granted to him, but an official document prepared on 23 March 1899 refers to an imperial decree ordering the payment of the cost of furnishing Memduh's newly built

¹²⁸³ BOA, Y.EE. 88/5, 29 Zilhicce 1315/21 May 1898. "*Kesret aile-i abidanemle kira köşelerinde muzdarip kaldığıma mebni temlik suretiyle olmayıp bekçilik yolunda derununda ikamet...*"

¹²⁸⁴ The grand vizier had been granted a mansion, the sheik al-Islam a waterside mansion, the minister of justice a waterside mansion, the serasker a mansion, the minister of the navy several residences, the head of the Council of State a mansion, the foreign minister a mansion, the minister of finance a mansion in Istanbul and a waterside mansion on the Bosphorus, the minister of foundations residences in different parts of Istanbul, the minister of education four mansions on Büyükağa, on the Bosphorus, and in Nişantaşı.

¹²⁸⁵ BOA, Y.EE. 88/34, 6 Rebiülahir 1327/27 April 1909.

mansion from the private treasury of the sultan.¹²⁸⁶ This must have been the mansion, what is now known as Memduh Pasha Mansion,¹²⁸⁷ which was designed by an Italian architect Raymonde D'Aronco upon a 3095 square meter land.

The mansion had 12 rooms and three salons. Memduh had a large library in one of the kiosks in the garden of the residence. The library was decorated with antique Italian busts. The mansion was surrounded by high walls. Purple ivy flowers were all over the walls. The garden was full of flowers too. There was also a pool in which red fishes were swimming. The residence also had one of the first hydraulic elevators of the empire.¹²⁸⁸

In addition to the mansion in Kireçburnu neighborhood on the Bosphorus in the ensuing years he managed to acquire a mansion at Arnavutköy, another neighborhood on the Bosphorus. Circassian Rukiye Şehbal, one of the wives of Memduh, and her daughter Ayşe Mualla were living at this mansion. Memduh was staying at this mansion once a week to accompany his wife Şehbal and his youngest daughter Ayşe Mualla.

Being a minister not only made Memduh owner of luxury residences on the Bosphorus but also entrepreneur. In the summer of 1896, he requested from the sultan that a contract for a chrome-mining interest be given to him.¹²⁸⁹ Chrome mines were located in Finike, a district of Elmalı, sub-province of the sanjak of Tekir, of the Konya Province. Memduh said that the Ministry of Forests and Mines had been calling for a tender for these mines in the newspapers for a year but that so far there had been no aspirants for the contract. He said he would like to be given the contract with the right to a ten percent share¹²⁹⁰ as

¹²⁸⁶ BOA, HH.İ. 122/3, 11 Zilkade 1316/23 March 1899.

¹²⁸⁷ The residence is also called Cemil Bey Mansion probably in reference to Memduh's son in law Cemil Bey who lived with his family there after Memduh died in 1925.

¹²⁸⁸ Vahid, *Boğaz'daki Kırmızı Köşk*, 26-27.

¹²⁸⁹ BOA, Y.EE. 14/213, 20 Muharrem 1314/1 July 1896.

¹²⁹⁰ "Yüzde on rüsum nisbiye."

stated in the mining regulation. It is not clear if he was granted the contract but it is clear in the state documents that Memduh persistently continued to ask for favors from the sultan highlighting his absolute loyalty and gratefulness to the sultan, under all circumstances.

Four years after this request he asked for another mining interest. He began his petition with a long passage praising the sultan. He then said that he was deeply thankful for and proud of occupying such a prestigious position but that recently he had overspent in order to set up a residence befitting his official post, referring to his position in the Ministry of Interior. He also said that he had splurged on his five children and consequently that he had been forced to mortgage his estate to cover to his enormous debts. Finally, he requested from the sultan a contract for a copper-mining interest in the Küre-i Nühas district of the Kastamonu Province so that he could get out of the debt hole.¹²⁹¹

In the following years, Memduh continued to make requests of the sultan. For instance, he asked for the contract to clean two straits named Dolap and Dalyan at the port of Ayvalık on the northern Aegean Sea.¹²⁹² These two straits were very critical for the passage of ships and ferries, many of which were merchant ships. He stated that he would like to be granted this contract “because he was an old and a very loyal servant of the sultan”¹²⁹³. Memduh’s discourse shows that loyalty to the sultan was a magic key opening most of the gates in the Hamidian era. Interestingly, this time he wanted the contract under the name¹²⁹⁴ of his son-in-law Cemil Bey, who had been working at the Ministry of Agriculture for a long time, but indeed it was Memduh who was going to undertake the job.

¹²⁹¹ BOA, Y.PRK.DH. 11/31, 23 Zilhicce 1317/24 April 1900.

¹²⁹² BOA, Y.EE. 88/37, 6 Rebiülahir 1327/27 April 1909.

¹²⁹³ “*Hazreti hilafetpenahiye ubudiyet ve sadakatle mübahi bir memluk kadim olduğum için bu imtiyazın...*”

¹²⁹⁴ “*Ayvalık Limanında Dolap ve Dalyan namlarında iki boğazın temizlenme imtiyazını damadı Cemil Bey nam-ı müsteariyle kendisine verilmesi..*”

Memduh's requests to the sultan were not only about contracts. For instance, four months after being appointed to the Ministry of Interior, he asked for three of his relatives to be rewarded by the sultan. The document on this demand of Memduh is undetailed, giving no clue about the identity of the relatives or the nature of the reward.¹²⁹⁵ Furthermore, probably Memduh's request, on 15 August 1885, Mazlum, Memduh's younger son, was registered for the *Mekteb-i Sultani* (Galatasaray Imperial High School) on the condition of paying the two-thirds of its fee.¹²⁹⁶ The *Mekteb-i Sultani* was the most prestigious high school of the empire, producing high Ottoman officials. Young Mazlum was preparing to walk on the same path as the seniors of his family. Furthermore, Memduh felt free to demand some financial grants from the Sultan. For instance in May he was granted two hundred liras upon his request to use for certain needs.¹²⁹⁷

5.8.3. Orders, Medals, and Rewards

Abdülhamid II was generous not only in granting properties and contracts to the loyal dignitaries but also appreciating them by bestowing imperial orders, medals, titles, and decorations. In an effort to recharge the policy of legitimation, Abdülhamid made use of the power of symbolism through state ceremonies, architecture, and the act of granting decorations, medals, and honors.¹²⁹⁸

In fact, Abdülhamid did not invent the tradition of granting decoration. The Ottoman leadership began to reward those offering meritorious service to the state in 1830s. With the addition of the Mecidi and Osmani Orders in 1850s and

¹²⁹⁵ BOA, Y.MTV. 137/142, 23 Ramazan 1313/8 March 1896.

As Kırmızı exemplified in "Abdülhamid'in Valileri" governors used their patrimonial ties with the palace for personal interest by seeking work for relatives or begging for royal decorations for their family members." Kırmızı, *Abdülhamid'in Valileri*.

There are many examples: BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 57/104, 19 Zilhicce 1319/29 March 1902.

BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 73/20, 28 Zilkade 1322/3 February 1905.

BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 41/110, 12 Zilhicce 1315/4 May 1898.

BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 68/120, 29 Zilhicce 1321/17 March 1904.

¹²⁹⁶ BOA, MF.MKT. 87/64, 4 Zilkade 1302/14 August 1885.

¹²⁹⁷ BOA, ML.EEM, 310/14, 3 My 1315/15 May 1897. This was a relatively humble amount given that the Minister of Interior's monthly income was four thousand liras.

¹²⁹⁸ Deringil, *The Well-protected Domains*, 13.

60s this practice was expanded. Later in the Hamidian era they became particularly important and diversified as new orders were introduced such as Şefkat (Compassion) order specifically for women.¹²⁹⁹ As earlier highlighted many of the Hamidian high profile bureaucrats were so keen to get orders and decorations. Using their patrimonial ties with the palace they were even openly demanding them from the sultan for their family members.¹³⁰⁰

The official documents do not clarify if Memduh personally demanded any order or decoration from the sultan. Yet he was treated quite generously and bestowed majority of the orders, medals and titles existed in the Hamidian political system. In addition to the ones he was granted by the Ottoman government Memduh received some decorations from other states. He was granted a silver medal on 18 March 1897,¹³⁰¹ the Alexander Order by the Bulgarian government on 2 September 1897,¹³⁰² the Mecidiye Order on 22 August 1898,¹³⁰³ the Murassa Osmani Order on 13 July 1899,¹³⁰⁴ the Şir u Hurşid Order by the Iranian government on 12 November 1900, for his contribution to the Hijaz Railway project the Gold Legion Merit on 28 January 1901,¹³⁰⁵ a special order from the Russian government on 9 March 1901,¹³⁰⁶ the *rutbe-i bala*

¹²⁹⁹ Hanioglu, A Brief History of Late Ottoman, 126.

A very good example of increasing importance of medals and orders is provided by Nadir Özbek: "The sultan awarded the 'Greek War Medals' (*Yunan Harbi Madalyası*) to 190,000 individuals, military and civilian, who had contributed to the war effort. Press coverage of the award ceremonies seems intent on enhancing feelings of confidence in and familiarity toward the sultan, represented as a combination of father figure and commander in chief." Nadir Özbek, "Philanthropic Activity, Ottoman Patriotism, and the Hamidian Regime, 1876-1909," *International Journal Middle East Studies*, 37 (2005), 71.

¹³⁰⁰ As mentioned in the earlier section even Abdullah Cevdet, an opponent of the Hamidian regime, would like to be granted one decoration. This is an indication of the fact that orders, medals and decorations were appealing to people from all walks of life. So, the Ottoman leadership seemed to achieve the main objective behind inventing this tradition.

¹³⁰¹ BOA, DH.SAİD. 1/84, 29 Zilhicce 1255/4 March 1840.

¹³⁰² BOA, DH.SAİD. 1/84, 29 Zilhicce 1255/4 March 1840.

¹³⁰³ BOA, İ.TAL. 148/39, 4 Rebiülevvel 1316/22 August 1898.

¹³⁰⁴ BOA, İ.TAL. 181/87, 4 Rebiülevvel 1317/13 July 1899.

¹³⁰⁵ BOA BOA, DH.SAİD. 1/84, 29 Zilhicce 1255/4 March 1840.

He was given the medal together with Foreign Ministry Tevfik Pasha.

¹³⁰⁶ BOA, DH.SAİD. 1/84, 29 Zilhicce 1255/4 March 1840

promotion on 9 September 1901,¹³⁰⁷ the Murassa Pride Order on 23 December 1902,¹³⁰⁸ and the Pride Order on 27 February 1903.¹³⁰⁹ Though it was not documented upon which incident it happened, Memduh declared his loyalty to the sultan on 2 March 1901 by submitting a short note to the palace.¹³¹⁰ It was not only Memduh himself who was rewarded. Due to their volunteer services his wife on 18 March 1896¹³¹¹ and his daughter in law on 30 May 1896¹³¹² were given the Compassion Oder.

¹³⁰⁷ BOA, HSD.AFT. 4/61, 25 Cemaziyelevvel 1319/9 September 1901.

¹³⁰⁸ BOA, İ.TAL. 291/76, 22 Ramazan 1320/23 December 1902.

¹³⁰⁹ BOA, Y.PRK.AZJ. 46/114, 29 Zilhicce 1320/29 March 1903.

¹³¹⁰ BOA, Y.EE. 88/8, 11 Zilkade 1318/2 March 1901.

¹³¹¹ BOA, İ.TAL. 93/13, 3 Şevval 1313/18 March 1896.

¹³¹² BOA, İ.TAL. 97/59, 17 Zilhicce 1313/30 May 1896.



Photo 5.1. Memduh with the decorations he was granted
Source: Istanbul Şehir University Taha Toros Collection, Memduh Paşa File.

5.9. The Fall of Abdülhamid II and Memduh

The intensifying tension in Rumelia in addition to the stalemate in Yemen precipitated the fall of the Hamidian regime and Memduh. The empire was in peril. The delay tactics were not working anymore in dealing with the demands of the great powers. Internal opposition to the Hamidian regime had been on rise since the 1890s. Finally, the regime was toppled by the Young Turks in July 1908.

5.9.1. Memduh Efendi: Unemployed and Exile

In the 1890's an alliance of various groups under the leadership of the Young Turks united by their opposition to the Hamidian regime. They were advocating for constitutionalism. Originated as a student club at the military medical school in Istanbul, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) transformed into a political movement led by the exiled figures, such as Ahmed Rıza, Bahaddin Şakir, and Abdullah Cevded; who were called the Young Turks. They published newspapers and journals to criticize Abdülhamid and his regime. After 1902 the CUP gradually developed into a military organization. This is because it merged with the Ottoman Freedom Society, which was founded in Macedonia by some army officers in 1907 and the involvement of Enver, Talat, and Cemal.¹³¹³ The Young Turks were also deeply affected by the Constitutional movements of other countries such as Iran¹³¹⁴ and Japan.¹³¹⁵ In July 1908 the CUP forced Abdülhamid to reinstate the Constitution of 1876. The sultan gathered the Council of Ministers to evaluate the demands of the Ottoman Third Arm. The council and the sultan decided to restore the Constitution and conduct an election.¹³¹⁶

¹³¹³ Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*; Sina Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İtihat ve Terakki* (Istanbul: Remzi, 1987).

¹³¹⁴ Nader Sohrabi, "Global Waves, Local Actors: What the Young Turks Knew about other Revolutions and Why It Mattered," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 44, no.1 (2002).

¹³¹⁵ Robert E. Ward and Dankwart Rustow (eds), *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).

¹³¹⁶ Mehmed Memduh, *Esvât-ı Sudur*, 77-80.

The empire turned into constitutional monarchy and Abdülhamid continued to be the sultan. CUP gained a victory and was able to hold on to the power that was fixed at the Yıldız Palace for a long period. Consequently, many civil officials such as Memduh, who had vested interest in the palace-centered system had lost their positions, prestige, titles, wealth, and even independence. The 1908 Young Turk Revolution was assumed to bring freedom, equality, fraternity, and justice to the Ottomans, but certainly not to all Ottomans. The fates of the Hamidian Regime and Memduh intersected. Their rise and decline coincided.

In the early phase of the Second Constitutional Period little change had been made in the administrative cadre because the CUP neither had an administrative experience nor capable men to recruit. Thus, Said Pasha, one of the favorites of Abdülhamid, became the grand vizier of the first government after the revolution that was formed on 23 July 1908 and Memduh stayed at the office of Ministry of Interior. During this transitional period, one of the primary tasks of the government was proclaiming a general amnesty for the political offenders who were either exiled or prisoned by the Hamidian regime. It was Memduh who, in the capacity of minister of interior, read the declaration of the amnesty to the people who assembled around the Sublime Porte.¹³¹⁷

Memduh's ministerial service lasted only a week. The presence of the Hamidian bureaucrats such as Memduh, Hasan Rahmi Pasha, the Minister of Navy, Selim Melhame and İzzet Holo Pashas in the new government was highly criticized.¹³¹⁸ In the beginning of August, Memduh resigned from the post and Said Pasha's government was dissolved. Kıbrıslı Kamil Pasha, who was dismissed from the grand vizierate and exiled to Aydın by Abdülhamid in 1895, due to his attempt to restore the power of the Porte, replaced Said Pasha. In the meantime, Tahsin Pasha and Ragıp Pasha were dismissed from the Mabeyn. Kamil Pasha formed a cabinet from the bureaucrats who were close to the CUP. Besides the upper officials at the Porte, many of the provincial rulers of the Hamidian regime were

¹³¹⁷ Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, *Görüş İştiklerim* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2010).

¹³¹⁸ Bayur, *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi*, vol 1, 71.

removed. The unplanned purge had continued in the following months and caused a power vacuum both in Istanbul and the provinces.¹³¹⁹ On 6 August 1908, Memduh, along with some others such as Hasan Rahmi Pasha, Abulhuda Efendi, Şehremi Reşid Mümtaz, Tophane Müşiri Zeki and Tahsin Pashas, was arrested.¹³²⁰ They were detained at the Ministry of War for a month. Within this period, Memduh wrote a petition to Grand Vizier Kamil Pasha demanding to be put on retirement pension.¹³²¹ As explained earlier, Memduh was at odds with Kamil Pasha. When Kamil was dismissed from the grand vizierate and exiled from Istanbul in 1895, Memduh came from the province of Ankara to take part in the new government formed by Halil Rifat Pasha who was in tune with Abdülhamid's ideas. Kamil did not respond to Memduh's petition.

During the trials, Memduh and the others, who were detained at the Ministry of War, were exiled to the Island of Prinkipo.¹³²² They were described as "*enkaz-ı istibdat*".¹³²³ Their titles were terminated and they were to be called "efendi," not pasha anymore. In May 1909, Memduh, Tahsin, and Reşid were transferred to Chios Island.¹³²⁴ At the end of July 1909, one year after the Young Turk Revolution, Memduh wrote a petition to Istanbul requesting to be put on retirement pension.¹³²⁵ In August 1909, they were allowed to stay outside the castle in the island due to health problems.¹³²⁶ His appeals to the government had been ignored. Thus, in June 1910, Memduh, once again, wrote a petition to

¹³¹⁹ Kudret Emiroğlu, *Anadolu'da Devrim Günleri: II.Meşrutiyet'in İlanı* (Ankara: İmge, 1999).

Abdulhamit Kırmızı, "Meşrutiyette İstibdat Kadroları: 1908 İhtilalinin Bürokraside Tasfiye ve İkame Kabiliyeti," *1908-2008 Jön Türk Devrimi'nin 100. Yılı Uluslararası Kongre*, 28-30 Mayıs 2008, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi.

¹³²⁰ *Tanin*, 24 July 1324 (6 August 1908), no: 6, p. 3.

¹³²¹ İnal, *Son Şairler*, 921.

¹³²² Mehmed Memduh, *Tasvir-i Ahval Tenvir-i İstikbal* (1912/13).

For the political exiles during the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918) see Hasan Ali Polat, "II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde Siyasi Sürgünler (1908-1918)" PhD Dissertation, Akdeniz Üniversitesi, 2018.

¹³²³ Hamidian statesmen were described as "wreckage of despotism" during the Second Constitutional Period.

¹³²⁴ BOA, BEO. 3558/266831, 7 Cemaziyelevvel 1327/27 May 1909.

¹³²⁵ BOA, BEO. 3607/270514, 11 Receb 1327/29 July 1909.

¹³²⁶ BOA, DH.MKT. 2889/63, 15 Receb 1327/2 August 1909.

the capital saying that he was forced to stay in Chios without any trial and he had not been put on pension.

While Memduh was in exile, the Italians attacked Tripoli and the later on the Aegean islands. Because of safety concerns, the exiles were transferred to İzmir. In May 1912 Memduh moved to İzmir.¹³²⁷ On July 30, 1912, the general amnesty was granted to 130 political convicts including Memduh¹³²⁸ and they were allowed to return to Istanbul. Soon, his properties (houses) were released from confiscation¹³²⁹ and he started receiving pension. Despite his positive attitudes to the Constitutionalists he was not assigned to any administrative post.

5.9.2. Becoming an Ottoman Historian

The Hamidian bureaucrats adopted different strategies to survive with their dignity under the hostile circumstances of the Second Period. While some of them like Tahsin and Said Pashas wrote memoirs in order to legitimize their past deeds, Memduh chose to write Ottoman history besides poetry.¹³³⁰

When he was in exile Memduh wrote some books. He either personally witnessed or learned through his family most of the political developments that took place in the empire throughout the nineteenth century. He not only worked under the reign of three sultans but also had a chance to meet and spend time with many of the prominent Ottoman statesmen of the century. Thus, he was well equipped with knowledge, experience, and writing skills needed for being a historian. He wrote more than ten books on different issues of the late Ottoman history.

¹³²⁷ BOA. BEO. 4039/302883, 27 Cemaziyelevvel 1330/14 May 1912.

¹³²⁸ BOA, DH.SYS. 41/2, 16 Şaban 1330/31 July 1912.

¹³²⁹ BOA, BEO. 4185/313836, 17 Receb 1331/22 June 1913.

¹³³⁰ According to Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, Memduh could not defend himself against the aggression of the new regime as successful as Said Pasha. Türkgeldi, *Maaruf Similar*, 400.

Some of the books he published are briefly summarized here. *Feveran-ı Ezman*¹³³¹ is a pamphlet that is made up of thirteen pages. It explains the development of the 1908 Revolution and provides Memduh's personal view on the issue. In this work, Memduh is highly critical of the mentality of the Hamidian regime. As earlier evaluated, *Yemen Kit'ası Hakkında Bazı Mütalaat*¹³³² offers the measures needed to be taken in order to deal with the revolts in Yemen. It is composed of telegrams, petitions, letters, reports, and memoranda submitted to the sultan and the grand vizier by Memduh when he was Minister of Interior.

*Serair-i Siyasiyye ve Tahavvulat-ı Esasiye*¹³³³ includes Memduh's family background, his activities and a brief description of the pre-Tanzimat and post-1908 Revolution periods. *Esvat-ı Südur*¹³³⁴ contains brief biographies of thirty-three grand viziers who served between 1839 and 1912. Memduh was acquainted with most of the Ottoman high officials. Therefore, the book provides valuable data based on first-hand experience. The appendix of the book contains some documents on the Second Constitutional Period as well as Memduh's response to Said Pasha's memoirs.

*Mir'at-ı Şuunat*¹³³⁵ throws light on the manners of the ministers, particularly those of Mustafa Reşid Pasha, Fuad Pasha and Ali Pasha. This work consists of several diplomatic letters, petitions, and original documents regarding various political affairs of the nineteenth century. Though it was written in 1876, the book was published in 1912. In *Tasvir-i Ahval Tenvir-i İstikbal*,¹³³⁶ Memduh analyzes the Hamidian political system, the reinstatement of the Constitution in July 1908, and the transformation of the institution of caliphate. He also reveals

¹³³¹ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Feveran-ı Ezman* (İzmir: Vilayet Matbaası, 1324).

¹³³² Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Yemen Kit'ası Hakkında Bazı Mütalaat* (Dersaadet: Numune-i Tıbaat Matbaası, 1324).

¹³³³ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Serair-i Siyasiyye ve Tahavvulat-ı Esasiyye* (İstanbul: 1328).

¹³³⁴ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Esvat-ı Südur* (İzmir: Vilayet Matbaası, 1328).

¹³³⁵ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Mir'at-ı Şuunat* (İzmir: Ahenk Matbaası, 1328).

¹³³⁶ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Tasvir-i Ahval Tenvir-i İstikbal* (İzmir: Vilayet Matbaası, 1328).

his views about the reforms introduced throughout the nineteenth century and the future of the Empire.

*Hal'ler ve İclaslar*¹³³⁷ “provides information on accessions, dethronements, abdications, causes of death, as well as burial places of Ottoman sultans from Murad I (r. 762-91/1361-89) to Abdülhamid II.”¹³³⁸ Details in this book are remarkable, for Memduh personally witnessed some of the critical events in the last century of the Ottoman Empire. *Kuvvet-i İkbal Alamet-i Zeval*¹³³⁹ deals with the political events of the period between 1876 and 1878, the reign of Abdülhamid II, and the Second Constitutional Period, giving special emphasis on the 31 March Incident. This work also includes six letters submitted to the sultan regarding several issues. Memduh provides an account of Abdülhamid II's personality and thought. He also explains a number of social and political factors leading to the dethronement of Abdülhamid and the emergence of the 31 March Incident. *Miftah-ı Yemen*¹³⁴⁰ narrates the conquest of Yemen in 1539, the history of the castle of Sana'a, and the reforms undertaken to prevent revolts.

5.9.3. Leaning towards Constitutionalism

Examining his writings is important to see how he perceived and presented himself and how he remembered the past after the 1908 Revolution. He seems to adopt different discursive strategies in his historical accounts. He situated himself in such a way that the contemporary readers would acknowledge him. In his narratives he relates himself to the historical figures who were appreciated by the constitutionalists. In order to reconstruct his own image he prudently used some historical events and the positions he took in regard to them.

¹³³⁷ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Hal'ler ve İclaslar* (Istanbul: Matbaa-ı Hayriye, 1329).

¹³³⁸ Cemal Kafadar, Hasan Karateke, Cornell Fleischer, “Mehmed Memduh,” *Historians Of The Ottoman Empire*, (2006), 4.

¹³³⁹ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Kuvvet-i İkbal Alamet-i Zeval* (Istanbul: Matbaa-ı Hayriye, 1329).

¹³⁴⁰ Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Miftah-ı Yemen* (Istanbul, 1330).

In an effort to show the discursive strategies that Memduh adopted in his writings, a poem and a pamphlet will be examined. As earlier highlighted, in the introduction of his *Divan-ı Eş'ar* Memduh made a reference a poem he composed in the form of ode (*gazel*) that rhymed with the word “*millet*” (nation).¹³⁴¹ According to explanation he provided, he wanted to include it in the *Eser-i Memduh*,¹³⁴² which was first published in 1872 during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. He thought that his book would be banned, therefore he decided to wait for the right time to publish this poem. He added the poem to the *Divan-ı Eş'ar* and published it in 1913. As he discussed in the abovementioned explanation with the declaration of the constitutional regime (he prefers the phrase *hakimiyet-i milliye*) he got an opportunity to put forward this old poem with rhyming word of *millet* (nation) implying pro-constitutionalist sentiments.

This explanation in the introduction of such a seminal work is crucial to see how the post 1908 political atmosphere made Memduh to feel that he had to attest to his pro-constitutionalist stand. He argues that those who were considered pioneers of liberty (*hurriyet*) now, did not even exist forty years ago. He tries to

¹³⁴¹ This poem is quoted from *Divan-ı Eş'ar*, compilation of Memduh's poems. Mehmed Memduh, *Divan-ı Eş'ar* (Istanbul: Matbaa-ı Hayriye 1332).

Mefâ'ilün Mefâ'ilün Mefâ'ilün Mefâ'ilün

*Mezâlimden bulur hâl-i teşettüt kuvvet-i millet
Olur adl ile hâsıl iktidâr u servet-i millet*

*Medâr-ı a'zamı her devletin âlemde milletdir
Değildir devlete vâbeste ammâ satvet-i millet*

*Ne devletdir o mülke dâima kim ittihâd üzre
Gelirse gayrete devlet olursa kimmet-i millet*

*Miyânın tîğ-i âteş-bâr ile tefrîk müşkildir
Teşebbüs kılsa bir kâra eğer cem'iyet-i millet*

*Bu gaflet-hânedede tahsil-i ilme bestedir Fâ'ik
Terakkî-i şükûh u izdiyâd-ı rif'ât-i millet*

¹³⁴² Memduh dedicated this poetic book to İbrahim Edhem Pertev Pasha, the governor of the province of Kastamonu.

demonstrate that he was one of the first constitutionalists in the Ottoman realm.

The pamphlet titled *Feveran-ı Ezman*, which was written and published in 1909 when he was in exile, also reveals Memduh's ideological strategy in the post-1908 period. The translated quotations from the book are critical to see how in such a short time Memduh made a radical discursive shift from being a "slave" of the sultan¹³⁴³ to a champion of the Constitutionalism. As quoted below, he begins *Feveran-ı Ezman* by highlighting the power of time and the temporality of everything.

Time prevails over everything. Time changes everything. It is nothing but natural for the time to prepare causes and produce effects. The lofty, majestic mountains eventually crumble. What is left from the Taq Kasra and the golden throne of King Dârâ? Did not they all become dust? It is time, which blew the thirty-two years of autocracy that had been making people sleep with magic and tales, and ordered the reinstatement of the Constitution.¹³⁴⁴

Memduh continues his narrative by giving background information on constitutionalism in the Ottoman lands. He details the accounts of 1870, and describes the events of the constitutionalism movement and the first parliamentary experience of the empire. According to Memduh, the whole effort was a failuer because the authority of the time disbanded the deputies and suspended the constitution.¹³⁴⁵ It is striking that he abstains from spelling the name of Abdülhamid. Then he states that

for thirty years the provisions of the Constitution were forgotten and abandoned. But time prevailed and like the resurrection of humanity with the blowing of the trumpet by Israfil, one of the archangels, the

¹³⁴³ Remembering the following address of Memduh would be helpful to see the revolutionary change in his discourse even if not in outlook.

"Despite neither having the ability nor worthiness to be your slave, due to your kindness am I a slave who has grown happy through service as the Minister of the Interior. . . . I dare, impelled by devotion and loyalty, to present my humble thoughts before your exalted throne." Hanioglu, *The Young Turk in Opposition*, 24.

¹³⁴⁴ Mehmed Memduh, *Feveran-ı Ezman*, 2.

¹³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 4-6.

sleeping (Ottoman) souls were awakened by the touch of the public-spirited military men of the Ottoman Third Army.¹³⁴⁶

He continues his account by explaining the reasons behind Salonika's being the center of the Young Turk movement. Without giving any names he recounts how the Young Turks consolidated in exile and allied with different groups including some Armenians who suffered from the pressure of the regime. Memduh also makes a comparison between the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks. He thinks that giving speech is not enough to succeed. Taking action is critical. He refers to Namık Kemal, Ziya Bey, and Suavi Efendi, the prominent Young Ottomans, and his friendship with them forty-five years ago. Memduh seems to blame the Young Ottomans for confining themselves to writing and not being committed enough to take action. On the other hand, according to him, the Third Army, which consists of educated, enlightened, and able-bodied soldiers had the honor of reinstating the Constitution by taking action.

Memduh finishes *Feveran-ı Ezman* by making some clarifications about his ideological position. He states that he was already convinced that there was a need to change the political system for it was not possible for the Ottoman state to continue with the autocratic regime. He continues,

Time made this dearest wish to come true. Fortunately, unlike in the case of European revolutions, there was no bloodshed. The most primary reason of this is the faith of the Muslims. This is because, the motive and power for undermining the autocracy and the restoration of the Constitution stem from Islam. It was Muslims who exerted heroic efforts in the process. As believers of the oneness of Allah they are conscious of the fact that human beings are His creation and therefore they would not murder anyone. There was no bloodshed also because the people were aware that the constitution would bring freedom and justice to everyone regardless of ethnic and religious background. Thus, they all came together and celebrated the reinstatement of the Constitution.

¹³⁴⁶ Ibid., 7.

The discourse analysis of the quoted accounts of Memduh would reveal how he employed discursive strategies. It is paradoxical that Memduh lost his job, property, prestige, and freedom after the Constitutional revolution yet he still talked about it with gratitude. As quoted from Türkgeldi earlier in this chapter, it is likely that Memduh was aware of the problems of the Hamidian regime when he was a minister. It is also likely that he believed in the necessity of making changes in the political system. But, it is less likely that he truly appreciates the whole process of the revolution, since it deprived him of everything he had accumulated under the reign of Abdülhamid. He might have supported the new regime to protect himself.

Furthermore, his criticism of the Hamidian regime without referring to the sultan, his use of Islamic elements to justify the constitutional revolution and regime, his favor of Muslims over non-Muslims and of action over speech are critical aspects of Memduh's statements in *Feveran-ı Ezman* that need to be closely examined. This would contribute to the understanding of not only Memduh but also the zeitgeist of the time. Other books of Memduh include much more complex accounts and subtle meanings about the late Ottoman history. Thus, his works deserve to be analyzed separately in another research.

5.10. Conclusion

The ministerial section of Memduh's imperial biography provides in-depth information on the last decade of the Ottoman Empire before it fell under the control of the opponents of the Hamidian regime: the Young Turks. Despite the conflicts in Yemen and later on in Rumelia, the chronic economic crisis, and the mounting foreign pressure the Hamidian era was the last stable period of the empire. Large part of Memduh's professional life coincided with the reign of Abdülhamid II who struggled to keep the empire intact and independent in the age of neo-imperialism. During the last thirteen years of his career he, in the capacity of Ministry of Interior, became a critical part of the Hamidian bureaucratic constellation. The course of his career was determined by the fate of the regime.

Memduh stayed at the Ministry for uninterrupted thirteen years. Thus, he is the longest-serving Ministry of Interior in the Turkish political history. He owed his success not only to his professional competence but also his ability to work in harmony with the palace and Porte axis. Above all, he was loyal to the sultan. The 1894-96 Crisis became an opportunity for him to show his capacity. Anatolia and Istanbul were suffering from Armenian disturbances and Memduh proved his capability to cope with this problem during his service in Ankara. He was experienced and loyal. All these factors merged and paved the way for his appointment to the ministry. As in other cases in the early phase of his career contingency and chance played a determining role in his promotion to the ministry. When Armenian disturbance broke out in Yozgat, Memduh was unemployed in Istanbul since he was half-heartedly dismissed from Sivas for his ill-treatment of Armenians. Thus, he was a perfect candidate to solve such a problem in the neighboring province. The dissemination of the crisis across Anatolia and Istanbul changed the direction of Memduh's career.

The last thirteen years were the most stable period of Memduh's career and of the Ministry of Interior. The Ottoman state had gone through a comprehensive restructuring process throughout the nineteenth century and this process reached its apex in the Hamidian era. Many of the departments such as the Ministry of Interior took their final forms in this period. The Ministry of Interior had a long and rough journey in parallel with the administrative changes. Thanks to the modernizing state machinery and the revolutionary developments in communication and transportation the central government had increasingly penetrated into the periphery. Besides these structural transformations factors such as influx of Muslim immigrants to the Ottoman domain, institutionalization of social welfare, increasing civil officials and the processes related to their recruitment and recording, public schooling, and emergence of modern control and punishment mechanisms made the Ministry of Interior a critical branch of the central government. However, as Memduh once regretfully stated to a British official he had little power because "the more so as now the Valis in many instances, instead of applying to him, write

straight to the palace or to the Grand Vizier, thus lessening his prestige and authority over his subordinates.” Indeed, other ministries were suffering from the same problem because Abdülhamid’s centralization policy made the Yıldız Palace as the single locus of power. Yet, having an unstable background until the Hamidian era and a loose job description rendered the Ministry of Interior much more vulnerable against the interferences of the palace and the grand vizier.

After witnessing the dramatic events of the 1870s, Abdülhamid was, with good reason, careful about delegating power to the Porte and initially his “legitimate arbitrator” role saved the Ottoman state from falling into a deadly political crisis. This was a difficult equilibrium to maintain even for a genius like Abdülhamid. In the long run this situation made the administration cumbersome, slowing down the decision-making processes and multiplying the correspondence. Growing power of the palace against the Porte did not only strengthen the sultan but also the palace servants whose number dramatically increased in the Hamidian era. The consultants and the commissions of the palace were working like an alternative government. However, as the sultan’s moderating power had decreased in the later period the palace had become a space of conflicting interests of the rival cliques.

Relations at the Porte were no better than the palace. After the appointment of Ferid Pasha to the grand vizierate the relations strained further. Memduh, particularly, was in great distress, for he was one of the strongest candidates for the grand vizierate position. The quarrel between Memduh and Ferid marked the last six years of the council of ministers. In fact, Memduh was not alone, there were other ministers who were at odds with the grand vizier. Ferid was competent, Albanian, and pro-German. He was fitting to the equilibrium that Abdülhamid wished to achieve to appease the foreign powers and to check the different views at the cabinet. It was not the first time he merged opposing figures to produce a composition assisting in the good of the empire. But this time, his move could only save a little more than half-decade for his regime.

Memduh's almost routine secret notes about Ferid's activities demonstrate how the sultan collected intelligence about the members of the council. However, this way of checking and balancing the council of ministers was seriously harming the relations between the top officials and generating an insecure work environment, which most likely reduced the efficiency of the political system.

Abdülhamid's model of governance had degenerated in the later years of the regime as the sultan had ceased to arbitrate the conflicting interests of the stakeholders of the regime. Convergence of the factions at the imperial capital and provinces disturbed the functioning of the checks and balances of the system. Overshadowing the formal and legal values and procedures factionalism damaged the people's sense of justice. Personal interests and antagonism of the high-profile actors at the center and periphery had sometimes eclipsed the essential or rather existential problems of the empire.

The relations were tense and intriguing at the imperial capital, not only because of the personal disputes and Abdülhamid's "playing the pashas off against each other"¹³⁴⁷ but also because after 1901 the European powers intensified their pressure on the Ottoman State. Railroad contracts, affairs of the Public Debt Administration, matters related to Armenians of the Eastern Anatolia, and the most importantly the Macedonia question were the major issues over which the European powers drove a hard bargain. As anecdotes, recounted in this chapter, demonstrate the ministers including Memduh and the grand vizier were the interlocutors of the European embassies. Thus, in cooperation with the palace they had to negotiate with the embassies to ward off the pressures by delaying tactics. The great powers were very demanding and ready to offer anything to collaborate with anyone who had any connection with the state apparatus. Memduh was also overtly asked if he would like to work in service to the British. According to the British archival records he kindly refused by

¹³⁴⁷ Akarlı, "Friction and Discord," 21.

alleging his limited power as a pretext.¹³⁴⁸ Bureaucrats' collaboration with European powers was one of the great fears of the sultan and Memduh manipulated this fear by claiming that Ferid Pasha was in collaboration with the Germans. So, their personal and factional concerns, propensity to any one of the European powers, and the state's interests played a role in determining the bureaucrats' approach to the issues that were negotiated with the great powers.

The state was suffering not only from the Macedonian question and demands of the Europeans but also from the bloody and inconclusive conflicts in Yemen. The Zaidi Imam and his followers were refusing to acknowledge the Ottoman sultan-caliph and hence they were revolting against the Ottoman forces in the province. Memduh was the person in charge of the affairs of Yemen at the Porte. As detailed in this chapter he formed commissions and produced extensive reports delineating the situation and recommending solutions to the chronic problems of the province. Though he had reservations about the issue of caliphate, Memduh had a quite reconciliatory approach towards the Zaidis of Yemen proposing a kind of autonomy. Memduh had far stricter approach to the Alewits of Anatolia when he was governing Sivas and Ankara. This differentiation might stem from Memduh's awareness of the realities of these two cases and the power(lessness) of the Ottoman government. Yemen was a distant and difficult terrain having a semi-autonomous background and the imam's army was equipped with the latest weapons; whereas, Alewits lacked any of these and Anatolia was an essential part of the empire without which the Ottoman polity would not maintain its integrity.

Thomas Kuehn interprets Memduh's proposal for autonomy for Yemen as politics of difference. However, I argued that the economic exploitation, the key parameter for colonialism, was not determinant in the relations between Yemen and the Ottoman center. Furthermore, Yemenis were entitled to

¹³⁴⁸ FO 424 (208), 1905, No. 99, N. C'Onor to the Marquess of Lansdowne, Therapia, October 10, 1905.

Ottoman citizenship, like all Ottomans, and thereby a “dichotomy of citizens versus subjects,” a distinctive feature of colonial power relations, was out of question in the Ottoman case. Memduh’s proposal of autonomy was carried out in the Second Constitutional Period. His efforts in Istanbul and others in Yemen bore no fruit during the Hamidian era. The reports of the commissions chaired by Memduh were generally disregarded. In some of his writings Memduh implied that İzzet Pasha, the second secretary of the palace, and Ferid Pasha, the grand vizier, were tripping him up. It is true that his recommendations were not put into practice and İzzet and Ferid Pashas had no sympathy towards him. But still, Memduh seems to focus too much on himself. The reforms recommended in the reports were not feasible for they all required large-scale reorganization, qualified personnel, and most importantly great funding. The government was bankrupt. Furthermore, with respect to Yemen Memduh was an armchair politician. He did not have an intimate knowledge of the circumstances of the province for he depended on the accounts of the governors and committees who went to Yemen.

Holding a ministerial post brought not only great responsibilities such as resolving the acute crisis in Yemen but also great opportunities. “The state is in fact a set of positions to be conquered, where these positions offer the possibility of accumulating resources that can be converted in other arenas.”¹³⁴⁹

As he advanced in official life, Memduh’s chances of acquiring assets and access to contract opportunities increased. He benefitted from the resources of the state in the form of housing, investment, contract, and some favors for his family members. Though he was disturbed by some of the practices of the Hamidian political system he preferred to stay in it and attached his fate to the fate of the regime. Thus, together with it he faded away from the scene.

¹³⁴⁹ Benjamin Gourisse, “Order and Compromise: The Concrete Realities of Public Action in Turkey and the Ottoman Empire,” in *Order and Compromise: Government Practices in Turkey from the Late Ottoman Empire to the Early 21st Century*, eds. Marc Aymes, Benjamin Gourisse, and Elise Massicard (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2015), 12.

In the aftermath of the 1908 Revolution, the political regime Memduh had invested in toppled and the sultan he admired was dethroned and exiled. Memduh not only lost his job and freedom but also fell into disfavor. During the Second Constitutional Period he did not get into politics. He published more than ten books between 1909 and 1913. Many of these books were about the issues, events, and statesmen of the late Ottoman Empire. In his writings, he adopted various discursive strategies to justify himself to the new power holders. He even attempted to demonstrate that he was a constitutionalist as early as the 1860s. As an evidence he added a poem in the form of ode (*gazel*) that rhymed with the word “*millet*” (nation) to his *Divan-ı Eş’ar*. According to explanation he made, he composed the poem in the late 1860s but could not publish it. This anecdote is critical to see how the post 1908 political environment made Memduh to feel that he had to attest to his pro-constitutionalist outlook. Memduh became one of the honorary founders of the Association of the Friends of England in Turkey in 1919 but did not play an active role in it. Memduh died in his residence in 1925 in Kireçburnu. And before his death, he witnessed the fall of the empire that he believed in and served for most of his life.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

After a period of existence “as submerged streams,”¹³⁵⁰ in recent decades, biography has re-turned as a format to become one of the essential tools for social scientists and historians to study a broad range of topics. The new approaches to the genre made the researchers to use biography to unravel the structural complexities in different theoretical and thematic contexts. The latest perspectives on biography consider individuals as the “meeting points for influences, no longer static but mobile, effusive, decentered, a process not a thing.”¹³⁵¹ Focusing on the background as much as the subject, new biography relates the individual to “the fields in which the person was active, to the networks that he or she helped to construct, and to the social background conditions that influenced, shaped, or even prompted individual decision and actions.”¹³⁵² As a method of historical inquiry, biography reveals invisible and captures the multiple aspects of a historical reality. Thus, “biography is to history what a telescope is to the stars.”¹³⁵³

Realizing the potential of biographical research for better comprehending empires, historians have been increasingly looking into life stories and careers of individuals to investigate the personal experience within the imperial context. Imperial biography, a recently introduced framework, situates an individual in the fluid political and cultural space of empire, demonstrating the

¹³⁵⁰ Barbara Merrill, “Using Life History and Biographical Methodologies in Researching Adult and Lifelong Learning: Challenges and Achievements in Building a Global Conversation,” Paper presented at *the 36th Annual SCUTREA Conference*, 4-6 July 2006, Trinity and All Saints College, Leeds.

¹³⁵¹ Michael Shortland and Richard Yeo, “Introduction” in *Telling Lives in Science, Essays on Scientific Biography*, eds. Michael Shortland and Richard Yeo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 14.

¹³⁵² Simone Lassig, “Introduction: Biography in Modern History-Modern Historiography in Biography” in *Biography Between Structure and Agency: Central European*, eds. Volker R. Berghahn and Simone Lassig (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 10-11.

¹³⁵³ *Ibid.*, 45.

ways through which structure and agency continuously construct each other. The burgeoning literature on the lives of individuals and families of empires demonstrates that having a biographical eye tremendously enriches one's perspective on imperial space. In the meantime, examining individuals in an imperial cosmos by referring to the larger developments and connections enables one to portray a fuller biographical picture.¹³⁵⁴

Moreover, this way of writing imperial and individual history contribute to the deconstruction of the grand narratives of nationalist historiographies, which in the twentieth century have virtually imprisoned multidimensional imperial subjects in the "imagined communities" of the modern nation state and its constructed boundaries. In this respect, biographical studies are convenient for "addressing some of the historiographical fractures and neglect of imperial diversity."¹³⁵⁵

Adopting imperial biography as a methodological framework this study explores Ottoman statesman Mehmed Mehmed Pasha's bureaucratic career by dealing with the major issues of the late Ottoman Empire. Drawing upon the new approaches to personhood and life writing, it focuses on the complexities of lived experience of the empire. In this study, the pieces of Memduh's career are woven together into a comprehensive account of both Memduh's life and the nineteenth century Ottoman history.

¹³⁵⁴ Achim von Oppen & Silke Strickrodt, *Biographies Between Spheres of Empire: Life History Approaches to Colonial Africa* (Oxon: Routledge, 2018); Tim Buchen und Malte Rolf, *Elites im Vielvölkerreich, Elites and Empire: Imperial Biographies in Russia and Austria-Hungary (1850-1918)* (Berlin: de Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015); Malte Rolf, "Einführung: Imperiale Biographien. Lebenswege imperialer Akteure in Groß- und Kolonialreichen (1850 -1918)", *Imperiale Biographien, Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, Vol. 40, Issue 1 (2014); Fredrik Lindström, *Empire and Identity: Biographies of the Austrian State Problem in the Late Habsburg Empire*, West Lafayette (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2008); Lambert, David and Lester, Alan. *Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial Career in the Long Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

¹³⁵⁵ A. Mackillop and Steve Murdoch (eds.), *Military Governors and Imperial Frontiers C 1600-1800* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), xxviii.

This research adheres to the synthesizing framework provided by the theoretical discussions on structure and agency.¹³⁵⁶ It alternates its gaze between Memduh and the imperial context, investigating the ways in which they interacted and made each other. In doing so, it attempts to bridge the gap between structure and agency. The data for this research is collected from a wide range of primary sources including the Ottoman state archives, the British Foreign Office correspondences, memoirs, the Ottoman yearbooks, and journals as well as diverse secondary sources on biography, imperial biography, and a wide array of themes of the late Ottoman history.

As suggested by the recent literature,¹³⁵⁷ the task of a biographer is not to build an orderly world in which an individual acts “properly” and coherently. Thus, in this study Memduh is portrayed as realistically as possible, with its incoherent and conflicting aspects. Furthermore, Memduh’s biography is written with the awareness of the fact that historical biography is subject to various contingencies. Life is “complex, situational, fragmented, nonunitary, nonlinear, non-coherent, and constantly in flux.”¹³⁵⁸ Compared to the complex and fluid nature of individual and context, historical biographers have quite limited sources on the basis of which to construct an individual’s life with all its complications.

¹³⁵⁶ Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society* (Oxford: Cambridge Polity Press, 1984).

Sabina Loriga, “The Role of the Individual in History, Biographical and Historical Writing in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century” in *Theoretical Discussions of Biography: Approaches from History, Microhistory, and Life Writing*, eds. Hans Renders and Binne de Haan (Leviston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2013).

¹³⁵⁷ Volker R. Berghahn and Simone Lassig, *Biography Between Structure and Agency: Central European Lives in International Historiography*, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008); Katherine P. Ewing, “The Illusion of Wholeness Culture, Self, and the Experience of Inconsistency,” *Ethos*, 18/3 (1990); James Clifford, “Hanging Up Looking Glasses at Old Corners: Ethnographical Prospects” in *Studies in Biography*, ed. Danial Aaron (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978).

¹³⁵⁸ J. Amos Hatch and Richard Wisniewski, *Life History and Narrative: Questions, Issues, and Exemplary Works*, in *Life History and Narrative*, eds. J. Amos Hatch and Richard Wisniewski, 113-135 (London, Washington D. C.: The Falmer Press, 1995), 122.

In addition to providing a general picture of the empire, there are two main motivations to explore Memduh's professional life. Both motivations relate him to the imperial context, exhibiting how his career and outlook had been shaped by the structures of the empire and how he acted in different political and geographic settings in the imperial landscape. Thus, investigating the life story of Memduh allows us to "disaggregate and reconstruct large heavenly pictures"¹³⁵⁹ of the empire.

First motivation is his biography offers a window through which we can analyze the power structure of the late Ottoman Empire. Memduh's career evolved against the backdrop of the contest between two powerhouses, the sultan's palace and the civil officialdom's Sublime Porte (*Babiali*). The pendulum of power swung between the Porte and the palace throughout the nineteenth century. Memduh's rise in bureaucracy overlapped with the rise of the pro-palace group, the civil officials who promoted the consolidation of power of the palace and the sultan, and the palace-centered Hamidian regime. His career stagnated if not declined when authority shifted from the palace to the Porte.

After destroying the Janissary Corps in 1826, Sultan Mahmud II consolidated power in his own person. The pendulum swung in favor of the Porte upon his death. Between 1839 and 1871, the Tanzimat period, the state affairs were under the control of the civil officialdom at the Porte. Two groups challenged the Porte's autocracy in the 1860s: the constitutionalists such as Namık Kemal, Midhat Pasha, and Mustafa Fazıl Pasha and the pro-palace group led by Mahmud Nedim Pasha.¹³⁶⁰

¹³⁵⁹ Barbara Finkelstein, "Revealing Human Agency: The Uses of Biography in the Study of Educational History," in *Writing Educational Biography*, ed. Craig Kridel (New York: Garland Publishing, 1998), 45.

¹³⁶⁰ According to Mahmud Nedim, the sultan was the keystone in the Ottoman political system and if the empire was to recover, the strength of the sultan's power had to be restored.

Memduh, his father Mazlum Pasha, and his father in law Mustafa Naili Pasha were from the pro-palace group who advocated the idea of an all-powerful sultan. There are various indications of this. Mazlum Pasha served at military-based bureaucratic posts, which were mostly occupied by those either from the palace circle, son-in-laws of the imperial family, or the pro-palace group.¹³⁶¹ In 1861, Abdülaziz, who had a tendency to strengthen the palace against the Porte, ascended to the throne. In this new political configuration, Mazlum Pasha began to hold two critical posts: the stewardship to the sultan's mother and the Ministry of Private Treasury of the sultan. In the meantime, Memduh was appointed as a clerk to the Mabeyn (Palace Secretariat). However, soon afterward, Mazlum Pasha was removed from the both posts with the request of Grand Vizier Âli Pasha who was determined to preserve the Porte-centered administrative system of the Tanzimat. Memduh was also transferred from the palace service to the Office of the Receiver probably to prevent the grouping of pro-palace officials around the new sultan.¹³⁶²

The demise of Âli Pasha, the most prominent Tanzimat statesman, marked the end of an era when the sultan had a limited authority. Between 1871 and 1876, Mahmud Nedim came to the grand vizierate twice and attempted to restore power of the sultan and the palace. But, the circumstances were not favorable for this initiative. During his second term in 1875, he appointed Memduh as his secretary, considering him as more trustworthy than Said Bey, later known as Küçük Said Pasha.

There is another indication of Memduh's affiliation to the pro-palace group. He dedicated a poetry book that he published in 1872 to İbrahim Pertev Pasha, an

¹³⁶¹ Butrus Abu-Manneh, "The Roots of the Ascendancy of Âli and Fu'ad Paşas at the Porte (1855-1871)," in *Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century*, edited by Butrus Abu-Manneh, 115-124 (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2001), 116.

¹³⁶² As suggested by Abu-Manneh, besides imprisoning the offenders Âli and Fuad Pashas, the Kuleli Affair (1859) was seen as an opportunity to remove bureaucrats who were considered as unfit to the Porte-based system such as Mahmud Nedim Pasha. Young Ottomans including Ziya Bey and İbrahim Şinasi were also dismissed in this period. Mazlum Pasha and Memduh's case need to be seen as part of this purge.

upper bureaucrat from the pro-palace group, and he composed a poem to Mahmud Nedim.¹³⁶³ Furthermore, both Memduh and his father, like Mahmud Nedim's family and some other members of the pro-palace group, were followers of Naqshbandhi Sufi order.¹³⁶⁴ There might have been a correlation between the affiliation to the Naqshbandhi order and the pro-palace group.

After a period of crisis (1871-1876) when neither the palace nor the Porte had a full authority over the state affairs, Abdülhamid II ascended to the throne. Mahmud Nedim's pro-palace group came out victorious. Developing various strategies, Abdülhamid had prudently established his palace-based political system. The Yıldız Palace became the locus of power until the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 after which the pendulum swung back to the Porte.

Abdülhamid appreciated the pro-palace officials including Mahmud Nedim and Memduh for their advocacy of the Palace and the sultan. Mahmud Nedim was appointed as the Minister of Interior. However, as he died in 1883 he could not witness his proposals in his *Ayine-i Devlet*,¹³⁶⁵ being put into practice by Abdülhamid in the next twenty-five years. There is a parallel between the political system that Mahmud Nedim idealized and attempted to realize when he was grand vizier in cooperation with Abdülaziz and the one Abdülhamid established. Capturing the similarities between the policies and approaches of Mahmud Nedim and Abdülhamid would allow us to lay the foundation for exploring Memduh's integration into the Hamidian regime.

There was continuity between the recruitment pattern between the term of Mahmud Nedim and the reign of Abdülhamid. Like Mahmud Nedim, Abdülhamid rewarded the officials who remained loyal to the palace and

¹³⁶³ We are in dark about the date of Memduh's composition of the poem.

¹³⁶⁴ Butrus Abu-Manneh, "The Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi in Istanbul in the Early Tanzimat Period," in *Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century (1826-1876)*, (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2001).

¹³⁶⁵ *Ayine-i Devlet* is a treatise that Mahmud Nedim authored. He submitted it to Sultan Abdülaziz in 1861, hoping to reinstate the old Ottoman order.

punished those with exile or exclusion from key positions, who supported the Porte-centered system of the Tanzimat. Memduh's career track exemplifies this pattern. Mahmud Nedim trusted and appreciated Memduh because of his pro-palace outlook and family background. Likewise, Memduh became one of the trusted officials of Abdülhamid and remained so until the end of the Hamidian era.

Abdülhamid, like Mahmud Nedim, regarded loyalty as a crucial element of the state administration.¹³⁶⁶ Another resonance of Mahmud Nedim in the Hamidian era is the policy of Islamic unity. The doctrine of Islamic unity, which accentuated the role of the caliph of the Ottoman sultan for the unity of Muslims, was advanced for the first time under the reign of Abdülaziz.¹³⁶⁷ Since Âli and Fuad Pashas had reservations about such policies, this attempt must have been made when Mahmud Nedim became grand vizier.¹³⁶⁸

On the other hand, as part of his domestic policy Abdülhamid backed some religious groups at the expense of the others. Abdulqadir al-Qudsi and Rifa'i Shaikh Abulhuda al-Sayyadi from Aleppo, and Shaikh Muhammad Zafir, the head of Shadhili-Madani suborder from North Africa, who were already supported by the pro-palace group during the reign of Abdülaziz, pledged allegiance to Abdülhamid and provided their service to him. Last but not least, if we take the account of Nadir Ağa, the second gentleman-in-waiting (*musahib*) of Abdülhamid, as reference, spying (*jurnalcilik*) became prevalent at the Yıldız Palace after the associates of Mahmud Nedim were recruited to the Mabeyn.¹³⁶⁹

¹³⁶⁶ Mahmud Nedim allocates a section to the notion of "loyalty" in his *Ayine-i Devlet*. Mahmud Nedim Paşa, *Âyine ve Hasbihâl* (Istanbul: Karabet Matbaası, 1327/1909).

¹³⁶⁷ Bernard Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 124.

¹³⁶⁸ Butrus Abu-Manneh, "The Sultan and the Bureaucracy: The Anti-Tanzimat Concepts of Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Paşa," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 22, no. 3 (Aug., 1990), 267.

¹³⁶⁹ Hasan Ferit Ertuğ, "Musahib-i Sani-i Hazret-i Şehriyârî Nadir Ağa'nın Hatıratı I," *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 49 (January 1998), 39-40.

Even though he never served at the Yıldız Palace, Memduh, a junior member of the pro-palace group, had contributed to Abdülhamid's regime, working in different capacities at the Porte and the provinces. Memduh's career continued upwards until the demise of the Hamidian regime in July 1908. He had been a member of the Council of State from 1881 to 1887. After nine years of governing service in Konya, Sivas, and Ankara, he became the Minister of Interior in 1895. He made substantial contribution to the construction of an omnipotent cult of personality around the Sultan-Caliph. All in all, Memduh's professional life evolved in parallel with the power struggle embedded in the late Ottoman political structure. Due to his support of the palace and the sultan, his career had been on rise in the Hamidian era; with the Young Turk Revolution, it abruptly ended. The fates of the Hamidian Regime and Memduh intersected. Therefore their rise and decline coincided with each other.

The second main factor that makes Memduh's biography worth exploring is linked to the first one. Memduh was one of the multiple agents who were motivated and shaped in certain ways by the Hamidian political structure. In the meantime, served in different capacities under the reign of Abdülhamid, he contributed to the crystallization of the Hamidian statecraft by actively participating in the production and reproduction of the Yıldız-centered political system. His personal interest lied in the success and consolidation of the Hamidian regime.

Abdülhamid, though he was at the apex of the elaborate administrative organization, was not alone in creating, implementing, and upholding the regime. He established mutual interest-driven relationships with actors and groups from diverse backgrounds. Moreover, as can be seen in the first-hand accounts from the time, Abdülhamid was assisted, influenced, and even encouraged to act in "despotic" ways by careerist high-ranking officials at the palace, the Porte, and the provinces.¹³⁷⁰ Thus, putting all the blame upon the

¹³⁷⁰ Tahsin Paşa, *Abdülhamit: Yıldız Hâtîrâtı* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1990), 106.

sultan for the “despotic” and “oppressive” policies of his reign seems to be fallacious; the Late Ottoman historiography direly needs a revised and nuanced view of the Hamidian regime. Instead of treating the Hamidian era as a dark age under the despotic rule of an absolute sultan, uncovering different forms of actions, conflicting realities, and agents who had vested interests in the status-quo is crucial for laying out a more complete picture of the period, paying heed to the subtleties of the intricate networks of relationships. This approach would contribute to the deconstruction of the common narrative about Abdülhamid’s neo-absolutism.

Examining the lives of agents such as Memduh who participated in the politics and administration both at the center and provinces would provide insight into the parameters of the Hamidian political system. Though carefully orchestrated by the sultan, these actors who were involved in the state apparatus facilitated and executed the procedures established by the Sultan. Their lives, thus, correspond to mechanisms and situations beyond themselves, a characteristic that makes their biographies imperial. To put it differently, their lives have deep significance for they incorporate and represent the realities and intricacies of the system in which they served, survived, and negotiated. Therefore, exploring their biographies allow us to analyze the networks and trajectories of the Hamidian political matrix. Overall, the case of Memduh leads me to suggest that instead of distinguishing Abdülhamid as an independent and absolute actor, it is necessary to evaluate all these agents and actors on the same ground—the Hamidian regime was a result of the complex exchange and interaction.

The investigation of Memduh’s life with these two overarching concerns allows us to unravel the social and political fabric of the late Ottoman Empire. For instance, based on Memduh’s career pattern we can make some inferences about what a bureaucratic career entailed in Istanbul in the second half of the

“.....hünkarın istibdad yolunda muttasıl teşvik edildiği de o kadar doğrudur”
Hatirât-ı Sadr-ı Esbak Kamil Paşa, Cild-i Evvel (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Ebuzziya, 1329), 190-197.

Mahmut Kemal Inal, *Son Sadrazamlar*, Vol. 3 (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1982), 25.

nineteenth century. In the Ottoman bureaucratic tradition, being an official was a lifetime experience, which began at a young age as an apprentice and generally lasted for more than fifty years, as in the case of Memduh. Both Memduh and his brother Ahmed Tevfik started their careers and built their sets of skills through long years of apprenticeship at the offices of the Sublime Porte.

Despite the formalization efforts in the age of reform, informal practices such as patronage —having a patron as a stepping-stone— persisted for official appointments. Memduh's father Mazlum Pasha became an official through his father-in-law Ömer Lütfi Efendi, a senior bureaucrat. Similarly, having a bureaucratic family background paved the way for Memduh and his brother's entrance into the government service. However, as the difference between the career tracks of Memduh and his brother proves, the informal procedures were not sufficient to advance in their career. One had to possess certain personal and educational qualifications to rise in Ottoman bureaucracy. As in the case of Memduh, having modern education such as the rüşdiye school graduation might have served as a facilitator for a better career. Probably equally, if not more, important factor was having a literary capacity. Memduh, like his father, was a poet and, as exemplified earlier, he benefitted from his literary skills to consolidate personal and professional relations with his seniors. He was even promoted to the Mabeyn by Sultan Abdülaziz for a poem he composed for his enthronement.

Literary activities were common among the civil officials in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Literary circles of the officials marked the cultural life of Istanbul. Memduh used to attend regularly some of these gatherings such as the one at Hersekli Arif Hikmet Bey's house between 1861 and 1862. These meetings served as spaces for socializing and possibly fostering class-consciousness among civil officials. In addition to literary activities, many officials, like Memduh and his father, affiliated themselves with various Sufi orders. Based on Memduh's biography and other cases that were examined through the secondary sources, it is safe to say that there was a nexus between

bureaucracy, Sufi orders, and poetry in the late nineteenth century in the imperial capital and the large part of the Ottoman elites of this period emerged out of this nexus.

Put more explicitly, Memduh's biography enables us to observe the increasing role bureaucracy had played in the Ottoman political and social spaces. In the absence of strong traditional institutions of the empire such as artisan guilds and janissary corps, bureaucracy surfaced as a new powerhouse in the late Ottoman period. Bureaucracy also had served as an engine for producing Ottoman elites. Poetry and Sufism accompanied it in cultivating the big portion of the elite of the time. Memduh could be seen as an example of this group who worked at government offices, wrote poems, and were affiliated with the Sufi orders.

Memduh's biography also reveals the importance of luck, skills, and strategy for building a successful official career. He had both the competence in administration and the capacity to act in a calculated and strategic manner to remain in office and to advance his career. Though it backfired after the Young Turk Revolution, loyalty to Abdülhamid played a key role in underpinning what Memduh obtained by hard work, chance, and strategy.

Besides the secrets to have an impressive career, Memduh's life story includes some elements displaying the transformation of the Ottoman bureaucratic traditions, manners and language. Thus, his career illustrates how old and new recruitment, promotion, and training procedures were integrated into the system. During his more than fifty years of professional venture, Memduh operated on a spectrum ranging from very traditional to modern. He was one of the few officials who received modern education in the early 1850s. In the meantime, he had been trained in the traditional apprenticeship program that had been in practice for centuries. Moreover, patronage played a role in his career adventure. In the meantime, he was bounded by modern and rational practices of bureaucracy.

The presence of different recruitment and training patterns in the Ottoman politics and administration in the nineteenth century could be regarded as an indication of the gradual and sensible nature of change in the Ottoman Empire. This may seem problematic and confusing and yet, the adaptation of traditional administrative practices to modern needs and institutions should not necessarily be seen as a flaw. The combination of traditional practices, developed throughout centuries in accordance with the needs of the Ottoman state and society, and modern practices, together created a unique amalgam providing opportunities for agents like Memduh and his father who had different forms of capital, to enter the bureaucracy.

Memduh was born and raised in Istanbul in a bureaucratic environment. He attended the gatherings of civil officials, studied in a newly founded *rüşdiye* school, and served as an apprentice for more than a half decade at the Foreign Ministry. Thus, he perceived himself as an “Ottoman” at a young age and the empire had become “the main point of reference for his mental horizon and his loyalty.”¹³⁷¹ Memduh’s identity formation as an imperial bureaucrat developed in parallel with his career.

The Hamidian political landscape served as a background for Memduh’s career for three decades during which he occupied key positions. Both his career and bureaucratic identity were shaped by the Hamidian social and political context. There was a reciprocal dependence between Memduh and the Hamidian structure—one produced the other. A survey of the structure requires an understanding of the individuals such as Memduh who acted within it. However, understanding the individuals depends on knowledge of the structure.¹³⁷² Thus, looking into the parameters of the Hamidian regime would

¹³⁷¹ Malte Rolf, “Einführung: Imperiale Biographien. Lebenswege imperialer Akteure in Groß- und Kolonialreichen (1850 -1918),” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, Vol. 40, Issue 1 (2014).

¹³⁷² Binne de Haan and Hans Renders, *Theoretical Discussions of Biography: Approaches from History, Microhistory, and Life Writing* (Leviston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2013), 140.

provide us with a framework within which we can examine Memduh's professional life.

The Hamidian system has been associated with patrimonialism, which concentrated on the household, based on personal loyalty and personal association with the ruler. Inspired by a variety of sources ranging from Europe to the old Ottoman traditions, Abdülhamid initiated various new traditions to substitute those abandoned in previous decades. Placing loyalty to the sovereign was one of the practices he restored. Memduh's biography includes a host of examples of his declaration of unconditional obedience and loyalty to the sultan. Synthesizing the Western political and cultural elements with the Ottoman traditions and practices, Abdülhamid introduced an alternative modernity.¹³⁷³ It is possible to observe the same synthesis in some aspects of Memduh's life too. Abdülhamid's way of reforming the empire was similar to the pro-palace group who were not against Tanzimat reforms but critical of the British and French influence on the Ottoman state affairs.

It would, however, be inaccurate to designate these practices as reestablishment of patrimonialism, which had gradually lost its relevance during the Tanzimat era. Abdülhamid indeed wished to be "the single patrimonial leader, ruling with the help of a rational bureaucracy."¹³⁷⁴ To put it differently, thanks to bureaucratization and "systematization of state–society relations,"¹³⁷⁵ what the late Ottoman Empire, particularly in the Tanzimat era, experienced

¹³⁷³ Selçuk Akşin Somel, *The Modernization of the Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839–1908: Islamization, Autocracy and Discipline* (Leiden: Brill, 2001); Kemal Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Selim Deringil, *The Well-protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999); Benjamin Fortna, *Imperial Classroom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

¹³⁷⁴ Şükrü Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 24.

¹³⁷⁵ Karen Barkey, "The Ottoman Empire (1299-1923): The Bureaucratization of Patrimonial Authority" in *Empires and Bureaucracy in World History: From Late Antiquity to the Twentieth Century*, eds. Peter Crooks and Timothy H. Parsons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 116.

was “the bureaucratization of patrimonial authority.”¹³⁷⁶ The same pattern was maintained in the Hamidian period. Thus, understanding of the policies of Abdülhamid and the practices of the Hamidian bureaucrats such as Memduh entails a nuanced view.

Abdülhamid strongly supported administrative centralization. He revamped the palace as the center of state affairs. Bypassing the Porte, the Yıldız Palace eventually established its sole authority, entering relationships with all institutions and individuals. The Mabeyn was the most critical office of the palace for it undertook the constant communication between the sultan and his vast empire. Besides the Mabeyn, the palace had consultants from a diverse set of backgrounds to rely on their expertise in different issues. Working with such a strong palace organization was not easy for the statesmen at the Porte.

Within this administrative structure, Memduh had worked at the Porte and the provinces. After six years of service at the Council of State (1881-1887), he was appointed as a governor first to Konya, then Sivas and finally Ankara. Memduh’s governing experience is an illuminating example, showing the foundations of being a Hamidian governor. As is clear from the case of Memduh, Hamidian governors were the mediators between the center and periphery. They were the agents of modernization, who implemented reform projects that were formulated by the imperial capital. Moreover, the know-how of governors informed the central government so that the revisions and regulations could also be done in accordance to the local realities and needs.

As Memduh’s experience suggests, in addition to the laborious task of maintaining public order in a vast provincial territory, a governor had to work in harmony with various power groups. He had to achieve a balance between the interests of local actors, such as Muslim and non-Muslim religious figures, notables, foreign consuls, and missionaries, and the multiethnic provincial

¹³⁷⁶ *ibid.*, 116.

community. The governor was under the surveillance of his colleagues and local people. Memduh's biography reveals that a governor could exploit local resources, treat their people badly, appropriate wealth and property, and cover up the corruption of local officials. If there were repeated complaints about a governor, an investigation would be conducted by the central administration.

Memduh's governing experience also sheds light on the provincial milieu during the Hamidian era. Provinces suffered from poor infrastructure, transportation, healthcare, and education. The governor's task was to detect these problems and propose projects to the central government to solve them. The governor was also expected to take the lead in modernizing agriculture by establishing model farms. Education held a particular place in the agenda of the Hamidian governors. The establishment of magnificent high-schools in all provinces, such as the one in Sivas constructed during the governorate of Memduh, coincided with the goals of the Hamidian regime. However, as the economic crisis became chronic and the state treasury fell short of meeting the needs of the provinces, most provincial reform projects were either left half finished or terminated.

Memduh's biography also discloses the ways and institutions through which the central government permeated the provinces. As the efforts to centralize the empire were underway, government offices, barracks, railroad stations, and schools in the provinces were intensified in the late nineteenth century. These buildings acted as embodiments of the central government in the provinces. Connecting the provincial community with the central government, these landmarks served to exhibit political power and to be visual, tangible reminders of the state. They also became the architectural beacons of the restructuring of the Ottoman urban centers.

Besides social and economic aspects of the provinces, Memduh's governance in Sivas and Ankara in the early 1890s revealed the post-Berlin Congress realities in Anatolia. The various actors and developments, such as the Armenian Revolutionary committees, Christian missionaries, European consuls, Kurdish

tribal chiefs, Caucasian Muslim immigrant, and the Hamidiye Regiments, the centralization efforts of the government, the politicization of ethno-religious identities, commercialization of land, and the intrusion of Russia and Persia, made the Anatolian provinces a space of competing interests and visions, leading to the 1894-1896 Armenian Crisis.

Memduh's dealings with Armenians in Sivas reveal the complexity of the relationship between the non-Muslim community and Muslim rulers in the provinces. Memduh is known for the strict measures he took against the Armenian Revolutionary movement. However, he had intimate ties with the Armenian community. The appreciative telegraphs sent by more than fifty Armenian artisans from Sivas to the palace and the memoirs of the Dildilian family depict him as a compassionate figure.¹³⁷⁷ The different aspects of Memduh's relations with Armenians demonstrate that people of the Ottoman Empire acted in an extremely flexible socio-economic structure in which political and ethno-religious identities did not necessarily dictate their relationships. The empire did not impose monolithic structures and allowed the continuation of multifaceted lives and identities, thus facilitating this versatile social and cultural arrangement.

Furthermore, Memduh's pro-Sunni approach towards Armenians and Alewites in Sivas and Ankara could be regarded as evidence of the Hamidian "new orthodoxy." Based on the conclusions and perspectives offered by the recent studies of the period,¹³⁷⁸ I have challenged this view. I argue that it is likely that the Hamidian statecraft followed different policies simultaneously in different

¹³⁷⁷ Armen T. Marsoobian, *Fragments of a Lost Homeland: Remembering Armenia* (London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 2015).

¹³⁷⁸ Gökhan Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq 1890-1908* (London: Routledge, 2006); Julia Phillips Cohen, "Between Civic and Islamic Ottomanism: Jewish Imperial Citizenship In The Hamidian Era," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 44, no. 2 (2012); Serhun Al, "Young Turks, Old State: The Ontological (In) Security of the State and the Community of Ottomanism," in *War and Collapse: World War I and the Ottoman State*, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2016); Abdulhamit Kırmızı, "II. Abdülhamid'in Hristiyan Memurları" in *Sultan II. Abdülhamid ve Dönemi*, eds. Fahrettin Gün, Halil İbrahim Erbay (Istanbul: TBMM Milli Saraylar, 2017).

settings with different motivations: the Hamidian administration adopted a wide spectrum of strategies, some apparently in conflict with each other, to ward off the disintegration of the empire. Thus, instead of using Memduh's pro-Islamic policy in the provincial context for making sweeping generalizations about the Hamidian epoch, that policy needs to be considered as only one of the many strategies implemented within a wide spectrum.

Memduh's biography also provides us with insight into the strategies and tactics governors adopted to win the favor of the sultan and to earn promotions. Using every opportunity to communicate with the palace to recount his achievements was one of the tactics Memduh employed. He also played with Abdülhamid's fears, magnifying the situations that would pose threat to the integrity of the empire. In doing so, he depicted himself as a responsible and sensitive governor who deserved to be rewarded by the sultan.

Memduh's strategies, experience, competence, loyalty, and luck merged and paved the way for his appointment as the Minister of Interior in 1895. He stayed at the ministry until the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. Memduh's term at the ministry is important for some reasons. The phase from 1896 to around 1905 is considered as "the high-water mark"¹³⁷⁹ of the Hamidian regime. Moreover, the period from 1895 to 1908 was marked by stability in higher civil and military echelons of both central and provincial administrations, leading to the emergence of the "Hamidian bureaucracy."¹³⁸⁰ Memduh was a representative example of the Hamidian bureaucrats, who worked within the parameters of loyalty that was inculcated through educational and bureaucratic procedures.

Memduh owed his success to his professional competence as well as his ability to work in harmony with the axis of the palace and the Porte. His loyalty was

¹³⁷⁹ Benjamin Fortna, "The Reign of Abdülhamid II" in *Cambridge History of Turkey, Vol 4*, ed. Reşat Kasaba (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 57.

¹³⁸⁰ Abdulhamit Kırmızı, *Abdülhamid'in Valileri* (Istanbul: Klasik, 2008), 11-12.

always to the sultan. The 1894-96 Crisis provided him with an opportunity to display his capacities as an administrator. Memduh was appointed to the province of Ankara upon a disturbance broke out in Yozgat, a district of Ankara, in 1893 and he managed to cope with the problem. The spread of the crisis across the Anatolian provinces and Istanbul redirected Memduh's career. In November 1895 he was promoted to the Ministry of Interior.

The last thirteen years were the most stable period of Memduh's career and of the Ministry of Interior. The Ottoman state had gone through a comprehensive restructuring process throughout the nineteenth century and this process reached its apex in the Hamidian era. Many state departments, including the Ministry of Interior, took their final shape under the reign of Abdülhamid. The Ministry of Interior's restructuring was in parallel with the changes that were underway on a more major scale. The modernization of the state machinery and the revolutionary developments in communication and transportation led to the state's deep permeation into the peripheries. The structural transformations, triggered by the influx of Muslim immigrant, institutionalization of social welfare, increasing number of civil officials and the processes related to their recruitment and recording, public schooling, and emergence of modern control and punishment mechanisms led to the Ministry of Interior to become a critical apparatus of the central government.

However, like other ministries, the Ministry of Interior did not have much power as Abdülhamid made the palace locus of power. The instability of the Ministry of Interior until the Hamidian era and its loose description rendered it much more vulnerable to the interferences of the palace and the grand vizier. In several cases Memduh complained of this situation but his complaints did not yield any result. As a pro-palace bureaucrat, Memduh advocated the idea of all-powerful sultan. The sultan, not the Porte, appointed him as governor in 1887. Thus, he was indebted to the sultan for his rise first to governorship and then to ministry. Furthermore, when he was governor, Memduh capitalized on the palace-centered administration by willingly communicating with the palace to

win the favor of the sultan. He, in the capacity of Ministry of Interior, became a member of the cabinet that was formed in November 1895 after Kamil Pasha was removed from the grand vizierate due to his bid to restore the Porte's authority. Memduh could take part in the cabinet thanks to his achievement in coping with the Armenian question in Ankara and his pro-palace outlook. But eventually, the mechanisms and practices that helped him to rise undermined his authority when he became Ministry of Interior. He had no influence on the appointment and removal of governors. He had been easily by-passed by governors who were supposed to communicate first with the Ministry of Interior according to the administrative hierarchy.

After witnessing the dramatic events of the 1870s, Abdülhamid was, with good reason, careful about delegating power to the grand vizier and the ministers. Initially his "legitimate arbitrator"¹³⁸¹ role saved the Ottoman state from falling into a deadly political crisis. However, this situation not only alienated the ministers but also made the administration cumbersome, slowing down the decision-making processes and multiplying the correspondence. Furthermore, the increase of the number of servants at the palace eventually led to the conflicting interests of rival cliques, overshadowing the relations between the palace, the Porte, and the provinces. The Hamidian regime further eroded in the later part of it, as the sultan failed to negotiate the conflicting interests of the stakeholders. The cliques and conflicts disrupted the system's checks and balances, playing a crucial role in degenerating and discrediting the regime. This situation particularly makes the Hamidian absolutism questionable.

The relations at the Council of Ministers were tense particularly after the appointment of Mehmed Ferid Pasha to the grand vizierate. Memduh was in great distress, as he was one of the strongest candidates for the position. Ferid

¹³⁸¹ Engin Deniz Akarlı, "The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdülhamid II (1876-1909): Origins and Solutions" (PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, 1976), 142.

was competent, Albanian, pro-German, and backed by the palace circle.¹³⁸² Thus, he was a good fit for the equilibrium that Abdülhamid wished to achieve to appease the foreign powers in the context of the Macedonian Crisis and to “play the pashas off against one another, thereby keeping their conflicting interests and views in check.”¹³⁸³

The relations were strained at the imperial capital also because after 1901 the European powers applied more pressure on the Ottoman State. Railroad contracts, affairs of the Public Debt Administration, matters related to Armenians in Eastern Anatolia, and the most importantly the Macedonia question were major issues over which the great powers drove a hard bargain. The Macedonia Crisis had to do with the unsettled disputes that were left at the Berlin Congress to be arranged afterwards, rendering the Ottoman government vulnerable to the European intervention and encouraging the local groups to take advantage of the fortuitous political conditions to manifest their national aspirations.¹³⁸⁴ The ministers including Memduh and Grand Vizier Ferid Pasha were the interlocutors of the European ambassadors. In addition to seeking solutions to the conflicts and demands of the communities of Rumelia, they had to negotiate with the ambassadors to ward off the pressures by using delaying tactics.

Besides the steadily increasing crisis in European provinces the Ottoman State suffered from the bloody and inconclusive conflicts in Yemen. The Zaidi Imam and his followers refused to acknowledge the Ottoman sultan-caliph and they revolted against the Ottoman forces in the province. Memduh chaired three commissions and produced extensive reports, outlining the situation and recommending solutions to the province’s chronic problems. Though he had

¹³⁸² Since Ferid Pasha was indebted his appointment to the palace circle, he could resist the demands of the palace. Kırmızı, *Avlonyalı Ferid Paşa*, 234-235.

¹³⁸³ Engin Deniz Akarlı, “Friction and Discord within the Ottoman Government under Abdülhamid II (1876-1909),” *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi*, Vol 7 (1979), 21.

¹³⁸⁴ Gül Tokay, “Macedonian Question, 1878-1908,” in *War and Diplomacy, The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 and the Treaty of Berlin*, eds. Hakan Yavuz with Peter Sluglett (Utah: Utah University Press, 2011), 253.

reservations about the issue of caliphate, he had a quite reconciliatory approach towards the Zaidis of Yemen, proposing a kind of autonomy. Thomas Kuehn interprets Memduh's proposal for autonomy for Yemen as politics of difference.¹³⁸⁵ However, I argue that economic exploitation—the key parameter for colonialism— did not determine the relations between Yemen and the Ottoman center. Furthermore, the Yemenis were entitled to Ottoman citizenship, and thereby a “dichotomy of citizens versus subjects,”¹³⁸⁶ a distinctive feature of colonial power relations, was out of the question in the Ottoman case.

Holding a ministerial post brought great responsibilities such as resolving the acute crisis in Yemen and Rumelia as well as great opportunities to make prestige and wealth. Memduh was granted majority of the orders, medals and decorations existing in the Hamidian era. Moreover, as he advanced in official life, his chances of acquiring assets and access to contract opportunities increased. He benefitted from the resources of the state—housing, investment, contracts— and he also guaranteed some favors for his family members. Despite their verbal servility, the upper officials, like Memduh, could demand favors in variety forms and privileges from the sultan. Besides the business contracts that he received from Abdülhamid, Memduh had engaged in various entrepreneurial activities alongside his official career.

The stability of Memduh's life depended on the stability of the Hamidian regime. He was one of the many stakeholders of the regime. He believed and invested in it. Therefore, he preferred to stay in tune with it, even though some aspects of it disturbed him. Overall, the rise and decline of the Hamidian Regime and Memduh intersected. The Young Turk Revolution ended the regime and Memduh's career and prestige. Memduh not only lost his job but also stayed in exile from 1908 to 1912 and he never went back into politics. The Hamidian

¹³⁸⁵ Thomas Kuehn, *Empire, Islam, and Politics of Difference: Ottoman Rule in Yemen, 1849-1919* (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2011), 228.

¹³⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 135.

bureaucrats adopted different strategies to survive with their dignity under the hostile circumstances of the Second Constitutional Period. While some of them like Tahsin and Said Pashas wrote memoirs in order to justify their past deeds, Memduh chose to write Ottoman history besides poetry. He published more than ten books, many of which were about the late Ottoman history. In his writings he employed discursive strategies, situating himself in such a way that the contemporary readers would acknowledge him. However, his strong Hamidian background and rapid changes in the political landscape of the empire did not allow him to incorporate into the new political order. The unfolding events in the aftermath of the revolution propelled the course of his career and the empire in unexpected directions. Memduh died in 1925 in Istanbul. And before his death, he witnessed the fall of the empire that he had believed in and had served for most of his life.



Photo 7.1. Memduh's grave at the yard of İsmet Efendi Sufi Lodge in Istanbul
Source: Özlem Sarıtepe, "Sivas Valisi Memduh Paşa" MA Thesis, Sivas Cumhuriyet University, 2011, 129.



Photo 7.2. Memduh in the 1880s

Source: Mithat Cemal Kuntay, *Namık Kemal, Devrinin İnsanları ve Olayları Arasında*, Vol. 1, İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2010.



Photo 7.3. Konya Government Office
Source: Postcard




Photo 7.4. Sivas İdasisi (High School)
Source: Library of Congress, Abdul Hamid II Collection.



Photo 7.5. Exterior of Memduh Pasha Mansion, Kireçburnu, Istanbul
Source: SALT Research, Sabiha Rüştü Bozcalı, Photograph Collection.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri (BOA)

A.MKT.MHM	Sadaret Mektubi Mühimme Kalemî Evrakı
BEO	Babıali Evrak Odası Evrakı
C.DH	Cevdet Dahiliye
DH	Dahiliye
DH.H	Dahiliye Hukuk
DH.İD	Dahiliye İdare
DH.MKT	Dahiliye Nezareti Mektubi Kalemî
DH.MUİ	Dahiliye Muhaberat-ı Umumiye İdaresi
DH.SAİD	Dahiliye Nezareti Sicill-i Ahval İdare-i Umumiyesi
DH.SYS	Dahiliye Siyasi
DH.ŞFR	Dahiliye Nezareti Şifre Evrakı
DH.TMIK.S	Dahiliye Nezareti Tesr-i Muamelat ve Islahat Komisyonu
HH.İ	Hazine-i Hassa İradeler
HR	Hariciye
HK.MKT	Hariciye Mektubi Kalemî
HR.TH	Hariciye Tahrirat
HR.HMŞ.İŞO	Hariciye Hukuk Müşavirliği İstişare Odası Belgeleri
HR.İD	Hariciye İdare
HR.SFR.3	Hariciye Nezareti Londra Sefareti Belgeleri
HR.SYS	Hariciye Siyasi
HR.TH	Hariciye Tahrirat
HSD.AFT	Ali Fuat Türkgeldi Evrakı
İ.DH	İrade Dahiliye
İ.HUS	İrade Hususi
İ.MMS	İrade Meclis-i Mahsus
İ.ŞD	İrade Şura-yı Devlet
İ.TAL	İrade Taltifat

İ.TKS	İrade Tekaüd Sandığı
KB.MAA.FE	Kıbrıs Milli Arşivi Fetva Eminliği Evrakı
MF.MKT	Maarif Nezareti Mektubi Kalemî
ML.EEM	Maliye Nezareti Emlak-ı Emiriyye Müdüriyeti
MV	Meclis-i Vükela Mazbataları
MVL	Meclis-i Vala Evrakı
ŞD	Şura-yı Devlet Evrakı
TFR.I.MKM	Rumeli Müfettişliği Makamat Evrakı
Y.A.HUS	Yıldız Sadaret Hususi Maruzat Evrakı
Y.A.RES	Yıldız Sadaret Resmi Maruzat Evrakı
Y.EE	Yıldız Esas Evrakı
Y.EE.KP	Yıldız Kamil Paşa Evrakı
Y.MTV	Yıldız Mütenevvi Maruzat Evrakı
Y.PRK.ASK	Yıldız Perakendi Evrakı Askeri Maruzat
Y.PRK.AZJ	Yıldız Perakendi Evrakı Arzuhal Jurnal
Y.PRK.AZN	Yıldız Adliye ve Mezahip Nezareti Maruzatı
Y.PRK.BŞK	Yıldız Perakendi Evrakı Başkitabet Dairesi Maruzatı
Y.PRK.DH	Yıldız Perakendi Evrakı Dahiliye Nezareti Maruzatı
Y.PRK.EŞA	Yıldız Perakendi Evrakı Elçilik, Şehbenderlik ve Ateşemiliterlik
Y.PRK.KOM	Yıldız Perakendi Evrakı Komisyonlar Maruzatı
Y.PRK.ML	Yıldız Perakendi Evrakı Maliye Nezareti Maruzatı
Y.PRK.MYD	Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Yaveran ve Maiyyet-i Seniyye Erkan-ı Harbiye Dairesi
Y.PRK.PT	Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Posta Telgraf Nezareti Maruzatı
Y.PRK.UM	Yıldız Perakende Umumi Evrakı
Y.PRK.ZB	Yıldız Perakendi Evrakı Zabtiye Nezareti Evrakı

The (British) National Archives (TNA)

The following files are consulted

FO 421/196	Confidential Print, Southeastern Europe, 1903
FO 421/224	Confidential Print, Southeastern Europe, 1906
FO 421/240	Confidential Print, Southeastern Europe, 1908
FO 421/233	Confidential Print, Southeastern Europe, 1907
FO 421/234	Confidential Print, Southeastern Europe, 1907
FO 424/172	Confidential Print, Asiatic Turkey, 1890-1908
FO 424/175	Confidential Print, Asiatic Turkey, 1890-1908
FO 424/178	Confidential Print, Asiatic Turkey, 1890-1908
FO 424/184	Confidential Print, Asiatic Turkey, 1890-1908
FO 424/186	Confidential Print, Asiatic Turkey, 1890-1908
FO 424/208	Confidential Print, Asiatic Turkey, 1890-1908

Published Primary Sources

Karaman, Fikri. *Sâlnâme-i Vilâyet-i Sivas (1308/1890)*, 2001.

The Yearbook of 1326/1908 (*Devlet salnamesi*)

The 1305/1887 Yearbook of Konya

The 1308/1890 Yearbook of Sivas

The 1310/1893 Yearbook of Ankara

Journals

Idare-i Umumiye-i Vilayet Nizamnamesi (published in *Düstur*, İstanbul: Matbaa-ı Amire, 1289/1872, vol. I, pp.625-651)

Düstur, I. Tertib, vol 3, p. 24-33. For the transcription of the Instruction “Vilayet ve Mahalli İdareler Mevzuatı (1864-1996)”

Servet-i Funun, no. 325. <http://www.servetifunundergisi.com/sayi/325/>

Takvîm-i Vakâyi, 10 Şevval 1265, no. 410.

Takvîm-i Vakâyi, 29 Şaban 1266, no: 427.

Tanin, 24 July 1324 (6 August 1908), no: 6, p. 3.

Books of Memduh Pasha

Mehmed Memduh Paşa, *Eser-i Memduh*. İstanbul: Matbaa-i Âmire, 1289 (1872/1873).

Berg-i Sebz. İstanbul: 1289 (1872/1873).

Yemen Kit'ası Hakkında Bazı Mütalaat. Dersaadet: Numune-I Tıbaat Matbaası, 1324 (1908/1909).

Feveran-ı Ezman. İzmir: Vilayet Matbaası, 1324 (1908/1909).

Mir'at-ı Şuunat. İzmir: Ahenk Matbaası, 1328 (1912/1913).

Serair-i Siyasiyye ve Tasavvulat-ı Esasiyye. İstanbul: 1328 (1912/1913).

Tasvir-i Ahval Tenvir-i İstikbal. İzmir: Vilayet Matbaası, 1328 (1912/1913).

Esvat-ı Sudur. İzmir: Vilayet Matbaası, 1328 (1912/1913).

Hal'ler ve İclaslar. İstanbul: Matbaa-ı Hayriye, 1329 (1913/1914).

Kuvvet-i İkbal Alamet-i Zeval. İstanbul: Matbaa-ı Hayriye, 1329 (1913/1914).

Miftah-ı Yemen. İstanbul, 1330 (1914/1915).

Divan-ı Eş'ar. İstanbul: Matbaa-ı Hayriye, 1332 (1916/1917)

Publications

Abu-Manneh, Butrus. "Sultan Abdulhamid II and Shaikh Abulhuda Al-Sayyadi." *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 15, no. 2 (May, 1979): 131-153.

Abu-Manneh, Butrus. "Sultan Abdülhamid II and the Sharifs of Mecca (1880 1900)." *Asian and African Studies*, 9 (1979): 1-21.

Abu-Manneh, Butrus. "The Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya in the Ottoman Lands in the Early 19th Century." *Die Welt des Islams*, 22 (1982-84): 1-36.

- Abu-Manneh, Butrus. "The Sultan and the Bureaucracy: The Anti-Tanzimat Concepts of Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Pasa." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 22, no. 3 (Aug., 1990): 257-274.
- Abu-Manneh, Butrus. "The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript." *Die Welt des Islams New Series*, vol. 34, Issue 2 (Nov., 1994): 173-203.
- Abu-Manneh, Butrus. "The Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya and the Khalidiyya in Istanbul in the Early Nineteenth Century." In *Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century*, edited by Butrus Abu-Manneh, Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2001.
- Abu-Manneh, Butrus. "The Roots of the Ascendancy of Âli and Fu'ad Paşas at the Porte (1855-1871)." In *Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century*, edited by Butrus Abu-Manneh, 115-124. Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2001.
- Abu-Manneh, Butrus. "Transformations of Naqshbandiyya, 17th and 18th Century." *Die Welt des Islams*, 43, 3 (2003): 303-308.
- Abu-Manneh, Butrus. "Mehmed Ali Paşa and Sultan Mahmud II: the Genesis of a Conflict." *Turkish Historical Review* 1 (2010), 1-24.
- Abu-Manneh, Butrus. "Two Concepts of State in the Tanzimat Period, the Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane and the Hatt-ı Hümayun." *Turkish Historical Review* 6 (2015): 117-137.
- Adanır, Fikret. "The Socio-political Environment of Balkan Nationalisms: the Case of Ottoman Macedonia 1856-1912." In *Regional and National Identities in Europe in XIXth and XXth Centuries*, edited by Heinz Gerhard Haupt, M. G. Müller, S. J. Woolf. Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1998.
- Adanır, Fikret. *Makedonya Sorunu*. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2001.
- Adil, Abdurrahman, "Tanzimatta İlk Cürm-i Siyâsî-Kuleli Vak'ası ve Ahmed Rasim Bey." *Hâdisât-ı Hukukiyye*, XV. Istanbul: İkdâm Matbaası, 1340.
- Akar, Metin. *Veled Çelebi İzbudak*. Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1999.
- Akarlı, Engin Deniz. "The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdülhamid II (1876-1909): Origins and Solutions." PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, 1976.
- Akarlı, Engin Deniz. "Friction and Discord within the Ottoman Government under Abdülhamid II (1876-1909)." *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi*, c. 7 (1979): 3-26.

Akarlı, Engin Deniz. "Abdülhamid II's Attempt to Integrate Arabs into the Ottoman System." In *Palestine in the Ottoman Period*, edited by David Kushner. Leiden: Brill, 1986.

Akarlı, Engin Deniz. "Provincial Power Magnates in Ottoman Bilad el-Sham and Egypt, 1740-1840." In *La vie sociale dans les provinces arabes a l'epoque ottomane*, vol. 3 edited by A. Temimi, 41-56. Zanghouan, Tunisia, 1988.

Akarlı, Engin Deniz. "Ottoman Attitudes Towards Lebanese Emigration, 1885 1910." In *The Lebanese in the World: A Century of Emigration*, edited by Albert Hourani and Nadim Shehadi. London: The Centre of Lebanese Studies and LB. Tauries & Co Ltd, 1992.

Akarlı, Engin Deniz. "The Tangled Ends of an Empire: Ottoman Encounters with the West and Problems of Westernization—an Overview." *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 2006, vol. 26, no. 3, 2006.

Akgündüz, Ahmed. *Arşiv Belgeleri Işığında Dahiliye Nezareti Tarihi*. Ankara: Türkiye İdari Araştırmalar Vakfı, 2015.

Aksan, Virginia, *Savaşta ve Barışta Bir Osmanlı Devlet Adamı Ahmed Resmi Efendi (1700-1783)*, translated by Özden Arıkan. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1997.

Akün, Ömer Faruk. "Namık Kemal". *TDVİA*, Vol. 32, 2006, 361-378.

Arap İzzet Holo Paşa'nın Günlükleri-Abdülhamid'in Kara Kutusu. Istanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2019.

Asım, Necib. "Veled Çelebi Hazretleri." *Türk Yurdu*, Vol. VII, no.15 (1917): 2471 2476.

Akyıldız, Ali. *Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilatında Reform*. (İstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 1993.

Akyıldız, Ali. "II. Abdülhamid'in Çalışma Sistemi, Yönetim Anlayışı ve Babıali'yle (Hükümet) İlişkileri." In *Osmanlı*, Vol. III, 286-297. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 1999.

Akyıldız, Ali. "Mabeyn-i Hümayun." *TDVİA*, Vol. 27, 2003, 283-286.

Akyıldız, Ali. "Mahmud Nedim Paşa." *TDVİA*, Vol. 27, 2003, 374-376.

Akyıldız, Ali, "Meclis-i Vâlâ-yı Ahkâm-ı Adliyye." *TDVİA*, Vol. 28, 2003, 250-251.

- Akyıldız, Ali, "Şura-yı Devlet." *TDVİA*, Vol. 39, 2010, 236-239.
- Al, Serhun. "Young Turks, Old State: The Ontological (In) Security of the State and the Community of Ottomanism." In *War and Collapse: World War I and the Ottoman State*, edited by M. Hakan Yavuz. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2016.
- Algar, Hamid. "The Naqshbandi Order: A Preliminary Survey of Its History and Significance." *Studica Islamica*, no. 44 (1976): 123-152.
- Ali Cevad Bey. *İkinci Meşrutiyet'in İlanı ve Otubir Mart Hadisesi*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1985.
- Altundaş, Ali. "Konya-Çumra Ovası'nın Sulanmasının Tarihçesi ve Kuru Kafa Mehmed Efendi." In *Bildiriler, I. Uluslararası Çatalhöyük'ten Günümüze Çumra Kongresi, 15-16 Eylül 2000*, 149-160. Konya: Çumra Belediyesi, 2001.
- Akar, Metin. *Veled Çelebi İzbudak*. Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1999.
- Akşin, Sina. *Jön Türkler ve İtihat ve Terakki*. İstanbul: Remzi, 1987.
- Aktepe, Münir (ed.). *Vak'a-nüvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988.
- Anscombe, Frederick "Islam and the Age of Ottoman Reform." *Past & Present*, 208 (2010): 159-189.
- Ardıç, Nurullah. *Islam and the Politics of Secularism: The Caliphate and Middle Eastern Modernization in the early 20th Century* London and New York: Routledge, 2012.
- Arıkan, Fatma Melek. "'Periphery' in the Heartlands: Yenişehir and İznik, 1863 1909." PhD Thesis, Sabancı University, 2018.
- Asım, Necib. "Veled Çelebi Hazretleri." *Türk Yurdu*, vol. VII, no.15.
- Aslantaş, Selim. "Bir Osmanlı Bürokrati: Mehmed Memduh Paşa." *KÖK Araştırmalar: Kök Sosyal ve Stratejik Araştırmalar Dergisi*, III/1, (Bahar 2001): 185-202.
- Atıf Paşa's Yemen Tarihi, vol. II*. İstanbul, 1326/1910.
- Avcı, Yasemin. *Bir Osmanlı Anadolu Kentinde Tanzimat Reformları ve Kentsel Dönüşüm: Denizli (1839-1908)*. İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınları, 2010.

- Aydoğan, Bedri. "Edebiyatçıların Arkası Şiirli Armağan Fotoğrafları." *Çukurova Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, vol. 15, no. 1 (2006): 43-68.
- Aydın, Suavi and Emiroğlu, Kudret. *Küçük Asya'nın Bin Yüzü: Ankara*. Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 2005.
- Aydoğan, Bedri. "Edebiyatçıların Arkası Şiirli Armağan Fotoğrafları." *Çukurova Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, vol. 15, no. 1, (2006): 43-68.
- Bab-ı Alinin İç Yüzü*, An anonymous Ottoman author.
- Balcı, Ramazan. "Sultan II. Abdülhamid Döneminde Kudüs-ü Şerif'te Yapılan Islahat Çalışmaları (1896-1905) [Reform Activities in Jerusalem during the Sultan Abdulhamid II Era (1896-1905)]." *History Studies, ABD ve Büyük Ortadoğu İlişkileri Özel Sayısı/Relationships of the USA and The Great Middle East Special Issue* (2011): 35-64.
- Baldry, John. "Anglo-Italian Rivalry in Yemen and Asir 1900-1934," *Die Welt des Islams*, 17 (1976-1977): 155-193.
- Ballantyne, Tony. *Orientalism and Race, Aryanism in the British Empire*. UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001.
- Ballantyne, Tony. "The Changing Shape Of The Modern British Empire And Its Historiography." *The Historical Journal*. vol. 53, Issue 02 (June 2010): 429-452.
- Barkey, Karen. "The Ottoman Empire (1299-1923): The Bureaucratization of Patrimonial Authority." In *Empires and Bureaucracy in World History: From Late Antiquity to the Twentieth Century*, edited by Peter Crooks and Timothy H. Parsons, 102-126. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- Baydan, Esra Birkan. "Tanzimat Dönemi Çeviri Romanlarında 'Yeniden Çeviri' Örnekleri." *International Journal of Social Science*, no: 39 (Autumn III 2015): 173-187.
- Bayly, Christopher Alan. *The Birth of the Modern World: 1780-1914 Global Connections and Comparisons*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004.
- Bayrak, Orhan. *Osmanlı Tarihi Yazarları*. Istanbul: Milenyum Yayınları, 2002.
- Biren, Mehmet Tevfik. *Bürokrat Tevfik Biren'in Sultan II. Abdülhamid, Meşrutiyet ve Mütareke Hatıraları*, Vol.1, edited by Fatma Rezan Hürmen. Istanbul: Pınar Yayınları, 2006.

- Blumi, Isa. *Rethinking the late Ottoman Empire: A Comparative Social and Political History of Albania and Yemen, 1878-1918*. Istanbul: Isis, 2003.
- Blumi, Isa. "The Great Powers' Fixation on Ottoman Albania in the Administration of the post-Berlin Balkans, 1878-1908." In *The Russo Ottoman War of 1877-1878*, edited by Ömer Turan, 187-196. Ankara: METU Press, 2006.
- Blumi, Isa. *Destroying Yemen: What Chaos in Arabia Tells us about the World*. Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2018.
- Bornat, Joanna; Chamberlayne, Prue; Wengraf, Tom. *The Turn to Biographical Methods in Social Science: Comparative Issues and Examples*. London and New York: Routledge, 2000.
- Bostan, İdris. "Yemen." *TDVİA*. Vol. 43, 2013, 406-412.
- Bostan, Hümeýra. "Institutionalizing Justice in a Distant Province: Ottoman Judicial Reform in Yemen (1872-1918)." MA Thesis, Istanbul Şehir University, 2013.
- Bozkurt, Günihal. "The Reception of Western European Law in Turkey (From the Tanzimat to the Turkish Republic, 1839-1939)." *Der Islam* 75 (1998): 283-295.
- Bridge, F. R. *Austro-Hungarian Documents relating to the Macedonian Struggle, 1896-1912*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976.
- Burçak, Berrak. "Modernization, Science and Engineering in the Early Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire." *Middle Eastern Studies*, 44:1 (2008): 69-83.
- Buzpınar, Tufan. "Opposition to the Ottoman Caliphate in the Early Years of Abdülhamid II, 1877-1882." *Die Welt des Islams*, 36 (1996): 59-89.
- Buzpınar, Tufan Ş. and Çetinsaya, Gökhan. "Midhat Paşa (1822-1884)". *TDVİA*, 2005, Vol. 30, 7-11.
- Buzpınar, Ş. Tufan. *Hilafet ve Saltanat: II. Abdülhamid Döneminde Halifelik ve Araplar*. Istanbul: Alfa, 2016.
- Cevdet Paşa, Ahmed. *Maruzat*. Istanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1980.
- Cevdet Paşa, Ahmed. *Tezakir*, Vol. II. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1953.
- Cherniavsky, Michael. *Tsar and People: Studies in Russian Myths*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1991.

- Clifford, James. "Hanging Up Looking Glasses at Old Corners: Ethnographical Prospects." In *Studies in Biography*, edited by Danial Aaron, 41-56. Cambridge: Harward University Press, 1978.
- Cohen, Anthony Paul. *The Symbolic Construction of Community*. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Cohen, Julia Phillips. "Between Civic and Islamic Ottomanism: Jewish Imperial Citizenship In The Hamidian Era." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 44, no. 2 (May 2012): 237-255.
- Couser, G. Thomas. *Memoir: An Introduction*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Crooks, Peter and Parsons, Timothy H. Empires, "Bureaucracy and the Paradox of Power." In *Empires and Bureaucracy in World History: From Late Antiquity to the Twentieth Century*, edited by Peter Crooks and Timothy H. Parsons, 3-28. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- Crosbie, Barry. *Irish Imperial Networks Migration Social Communication And Exchange In Nineteenth-Century India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Çağdaş, Haluk. "Sivas İdâdîsi." *Tarih ve Toplum*, 90 (June 1991): 30-33.
- Çakır, Müjgan. "Gelenekten Moderne: Encümen-i Şuara'da Şekil Değişiklikleri ve Mehmed Memduh Paşa." In *Eski Türk Edebiyatı Çalışmaları 2, Eski Türk Edebiyatına Modern Yaklaşımlar 1, 24 Nisan 2006 Bildiriler*, 62-78. İstanbul: Turkuaz Yayınları, 2007.
- Çakır, Müjgan. "Mazlûm-zâde Mehmed Paşa'nın Poetikasına Dair." *Atatürk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Dergisi*, no. 39, (2009): 709 719.
- Çeçen, Mehmet Korkut. "Encümen-i Şuara'nın Tanzimat Birinci Dönem Sanatçılarına Etkisi." *Çukurova Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, vol. 15, no.2, (2006): 133-152.
- Çetin, Ali. "Mevlevilik ve Bektaşilikteki Bazı Benzeşmeler." *Türk Kültürü ve Hacı Bektaşî Veli Araştırma Dergisi* (2016/78): 15-34.
- Çetinsaya, Gökhan. "Kalemiye'den Mülkiye'ye Tanzimat Zihniyeti." *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşünce Vol 1, Cumhuriyet'e Devreden Düşünce Mirası Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi*, 3. Baskı, edited by Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil, 54-71. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001.

- Çetinsaya, Gökhan. "Din, Reform ve Statüko: II. Abdülhamid Dönemine Bir Bakış, 1876-1909." In *Osmanlı Medeniyeti: Siyaset, İktisat, Sanat*, edited by CoşkunÇakır, 125-148. İstanbul: Klasik, 2005.
- Çetinsaya, Gökhan. *Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890-1908*. London: Routledge, 2006.
- Çetinsaya, Gökhan. "II. Abdülhamid'in İç Politikası: Bir Dönemlendirme Denemesi." *The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, 47, (2016): 353-409.
- Çetinsaya, Gökhan. "Sultan Abdülhamid II's Domestic Policy: An Attempt at Periodization." In *Abdülhamid II and His Legacy, Studies in Honour of F. A. K. Yasamee*, edited by Ş. Tufan Buzpınar and Gökhan Çetinsaya, 39-63. İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2019.
- Çiçek, Nazan. *The Young Ottomans: Turkish Critics of the Eastern Question in the Late Nineteenth Century*. London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 2010.
- Dale, Stephen F., *The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Davis, Natalia Zemon. *Women on the Margins: Three Seventeenth-Century Lives*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997.
- Davison, Roderic H., *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
- Davison, Roderic H., "Midhat Paşa and Ottoman Foreign Relations." *The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, V (1986): 161-173.
- Değirmenci, Kevser. "Mustafa Naili Paşa'nın Hayatı ve Girit Valiliği." PhD Thesis, İstanbul University, 2013.
- Demirel, Fatmagül. "Sultan Abdülhamid'in Kamusal Alanda Görünürlüğü." In *Siyaset, İktisat, Dış Politika, Kültür, Eğitim: Sultan II. Abdülhamid Dönemi*, edited by Mehmet Bulut, Muhammet Enes Kala, Nuri Salık, Maşallah Nar, 95-111. İstanbul: İZÜ Yayınları, 2019.
- Denizli, Hikmet. *Sivas Tarihi ve Anıtları*. Sivas: Özbelsan A. Ş. Yayını, 1995.
- Deringil, Selim. "The Struggle Against Shi'ism in Hamidian Iraq." *Die Welt des Islams* 30 (1990). 45-62.
- Deringil, Selim. *The Well-protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909*. London: I.B. Tauris, 1999.

- Deringil, Selim. *Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Develi, Hayati. *Tanzimattan Meşrutiyete I: Mir'at-ı Şuunat*. Istanbul: Nehir, 1990.
- Dinçyürek, Sadiye Sena. "An Ottoman Administrative Response to the Macedonian Question: The General Inspectorate of Rumelia (1902-1909)." PhD Dissertation, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2018.
- Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires des Macédoine, 1903-1905*, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris Imprimerie Nationale, 1905.
- Doğan, Muzaffer. "Divan-ı Hümayun'dan Babıali'ye Geçiş." *Osmanlı Ansiklopedisi*, vol. VI, 199-210. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 1999.
- Eldem, Edhem. "26 Ağustos 1896 'Banka Vak'ası' ve 1896 Ermeni Olayları" [The Ottoman Bank Incident of 26 August and the 1896 Armenian Incidents]. *Tarih ve Toplum*, 5 (2007): 113-146.
- Elms, C. Alan. *Uncovering Lives: The Uneasy Alliance of Biography and Psychology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Emiroğlu, Kudret. *Anadolu'da Devrim Günleri: II.Meşrutiyet'in İlanı*. Ankara: İmge, 1999.
- Engin, Vahdettin. *Rumeli Demiryolları*, Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1993.
- Engin, Vahdettin. *II. Abdülhamid ve Dış Politika*. Istanbul: Yeditepe, 2005.
- Eruz, Fulya. "Yalı". *TDVİA*. Vol. 43, 2013, 301-305.
- Ersoy, Ahmet A., *Architecture and the Late Ottoman Historical Imaginary: Reconfiguring the Architectural Past in a Modernizing Empire*. London and New York: Routledge, 2016.
- Ertuğ, Hasan Ferit. "Musahib-i Sani-i Hazret-i Şehriyârî Nadir Ağa'nın Hatıratı I." *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 49 (January 1998), 39-40.
- Eyice, Semavi. "Eflatun Mescidi". *TDVİA*. Vol. 10, 1994, 477-478.
- Ewing, Katherine. "The Illusion of Wholeness, Culture, Self, and the Experience of Inconsistency." *Ethos* 18/3 (1990): 251-278.
- Gabrieli, Francesco. "Adab." *Encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986, vol. 1. 175-176.

- Farah, Caesar E., *The Sultan's Yemen: Nineteenth-Century Challenges to Ottoman Rule*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2002.
- Findley, Carter V., *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.
- Findley, Carter V., *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- Fleisher, Cornell. *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: the Historian Mustafa Ali, 1546-1600*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Fortna, Benjamin. *Imperial Classroom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Fortna, Benjamin. "The Reign of Abdülhamid II." In *Cambridge History of Turkey, Vol 4*, edited by Reşat Kasaba. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Foucault, Michel. "Governmentality." In *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, edited by Colin Gordon, Graham Burchell and Peter Miller. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
- Freadman, Richard. *Threads of Life*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
- Galitekin, Ahmet Nezi. *Tanzimattan Meşrutiyete II: Kuvvet-i İktisat-Alâmet-i Zevâl, Tasvîr-i Ahvâl-Tenvir-i İstikbâl, Feverân-ı Ezmân*. Istanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1995.
- Gavin, R. J., *Aden under British Rule, 1839-1967*. London: C. Hurst, 1975.
- Georgeon, François. *Sultan Abdülhamid*. Istanbul: İletişim, 2012.
- Ghosh, Durba. "Another Set of Imperial Turns?." *The American Historical Review*, (2012) 117 (3): 772-793.
- Giddens, Anthony. *The Constitution of Society*. Oxford: Cambridge Polity Press, 1984.
- Gourisse, Benjamin. "Order and Compromise: The Concrete Realities of Public Action in Turkey and the Ottoman Empire." In *Order and Compromise: Government Practices in Turkey from the Late Ottoman Empire to the Early 21st Century*, edited by Benjamin Gourisse, Elise Massicard Marc Aymes, 1-24. Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2015).

- Gül, Osman Kubilay and Yanıcı, Ülkü. "Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Sivas Konsolosu Milo Augustus Jewett'in Türk Ermeni İlişkilerine Yönelik Yanlı Tutumu." *Zeitschrift für die Welt der Türken / Journal of World of Turks [ZfWT]*, vol. 9, no.3 (2017), 205-220.
- Gündüz, Ahmet and Yel, Selma. "1893 (H. 1309) Yılında Yozgat'ta Hınçak Komitesinin Tertip Etmiş Olduğu Kilise Hadisesi." *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, no. 31, (2008): 31-52.
- Gürpınar, Doğan. "The Politics of Memoirs and Memoir- Publishing in Twentieth Century Turkey." *Turkish Studies*, 13:3, (2012): 537-557.
- Haan, Binne de and Renders, Hans. *Theoretical Discussions of Biography: Approaches from History, Microhistory, and Life Writing*. Leviston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2013.
- Hacısalıhoğlu, Mehmet. *Jön Türkler ve Makedonya Sorunu*. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2008.
- Hall, Catherine. *Civilizing Subjects*. University of Chicago Press, 2002.
- Hall, Catherine. *Macaulay and Son: Architects of Imperial Britain*. Yale University Press, 2012.
- Hanioglu, Şükrü. *Preparation for a Revolution: the Young Turks, 1902-1908*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Hanioglu, Şükrü. *A Brief History of Late Ottoman History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
- Hanioglu, Şükrü. *The Young Turks in Opposition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Hanioglu, Şükrü. "Abdullah Cevdet". *TDVİA*, Vol. 1, 90-93, 1988.
- Hanssen, Jens. "Malhamé–Malfamé": Levantine Elites and Transimperial Networks on the Eve of the Young Turk Revolution." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43, no. 01 (2011): 25-48.
- Harvey, Elizabeth, A., "'Layered Networks': Imperial Philanthropy in Birmingham and Sydney, 1860–1914." *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 41:1 (2013): 120-143.
- Hatch, J. Amos and Wisniewski, Richard. "Life History and Narrative: Questions, Issues, and Exemplary Works." In *Life History and Narrative*, edited by J. Amos Hatch and Richard Wisniewski, 113-135. London, Washington D. C.: The Falmer Press, 1995.

- Hourani, Albert. "Ottoman Reform and Politics of Notables." In *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East; The Nineteenth Century*, edited by William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, 41-68. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969.
- Hourani, Albert. *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Heper, Metin. *Bürokratik Yönetim Geleneği: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Gelişimi ve Niteliği [The Tradition of Bureaucratic Administration: Its Development in the Ottoman Empire an Turkish Republic]*. Ankara: ODTÜ, 1974.
- Heyd, Uriel. "The Ottoman 'Ulemâ and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II." In *Studies in Islamic History and Civilization*, edited by Uriel Heyd, 63-96. Jerusalem, Hebrew University, 1961.
- Hirst, Paul. *Space and Power: Politics, War, and Architecture*. Cambridge Malden: Polity Press, 2005.
- Hut, Davut. "Mustafa Naili Paşa". *TDVİA*, EK-2, 2016, 328-329.
- Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa Evrakı* (Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha Papers), İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi (Center for Islamic Studies).
- Hüseyin Nazım Paşa. *Ermeni Olayları Tarihi I*. Ankara: Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 1998.
- Iggers, Georg G., *Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge*. Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 2005.
- Israel, Kali A. K., "Writing Inside the Kaleidoscope: Re-Representing Victorian Women Public Figures." *Gender & History*, 2.1 (1990): 40-48.
- İğdemir, Uluğ. *Kuleli Vak'ası Hakkında Bir Araştırma*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1937.
- İnal, Mahmud Kemal. *Son Sadrazamlar*. İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1982.
- İnal, Mahmud Kemal. *Son Şairler*. İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1988.
- İnalçık, Halil. "Application of the Tanzimat and its Social Effects." *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6 (1980): 283–337.
- İngiliz Said Paşa ve Günlüğü (Jurnal)*, edited by Burhan Çağlar. İstanbul: Arı Sanat Yayınevi, 2010.

- İpek, Nedim. *Rumeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri (1877-1890)*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1994.
- İpşirli, Mehmet. "Mülazemet". *TDVİA*. Vol. 31, 2006, 537-539.
- İrtem, Süleyman Kani. *Osmanlı Devleti'nin Makedonya Meselesi*. İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 1999.
- İrtem, Süleyman Kani. *31 Mart İsyanı ve Hareket Ordusu, Abdülhamid'in Selanik Sürgünü*. İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2003.
- Jelawich, Barbara, *History of the Balkans, Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Kafadar, Cemal; Karateke, Hasan; Fleischer, Cornell. "Mehmed Memduh." *Historians Of The Ottoman Empire*. 2006.
https://ottomanhistorians.uchicago.edu/sites/ottomanhistorians.uchicago.edu/files/mmemduh_en.pdf accessed on 21 December 2019 at 13:46.
- Kahraman, Kemal and Kurşun, Zekeriya. "Derviş Vahdeti". *TDVİA*, Vol. 9, 1994, 198- 200.
- Kamil Paşa, *Hatırat-ı Sadr-ı Esbak Kamil Paşa, Cild-i Evvel*. İstanbul: Matbaa-ı Ebuziyya, 1329.
- Kara, İsmail and Aydoğdu, Nergiz Yılmaz. *Osmanlı Modernleşmesinin Meseleleri: Bütün Makaleleri 1*. İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2019.
- Karaca, Ali. *Anadolu Islahatı ve Ahmet Şakir Paşa (1838-1899)*. İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık 1993.
- Karaca, Ali. *Anadolu Islahatı ve Ahmed Şakir Paşa*, İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1993.
- Karacakaya, Recep. *Kaynakçalı Ermeni Meselesi Kronolojisi (1878-1923)*. İstanbul, Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 2001.
- Karacakaya, Recep. "Ermeni Komitelerince Öldürülen Yozgatlı Ermeniler." In *Uluslararası Bozok Sempozyumu Bildiri Kitabı, Vol 2*, 118-121. Yozgat: Bozok Üniversitesi, 2016.
- Karal, Enver Ziya. *Osmanlı Tarihi, VII*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1967.
- Karpat, Kemal. *Ottoman Population (1830-1914)*. Madison Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1895.

- Karpat, Kemal. *The Politicization of Islam*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Kasaba, Resat. *A Moveable Empire: Nomads, Migrants and Refugees*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009.
- Kaya, Gökhan. "Bürokratik Nüfûza Karşı Monarşik Egemenliği Yeniden Kurgulamak Üzerine Bir Girişim: Mahmud Nedim Paşa'nın Görüşlerinde Ahlâk ve Devlet İdaresi." *Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi*, 38 (Fall 2015): 55-94.
- Kayalı, Hasan. *Arabs and Young Turks*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1997.
- Kaynar, İhsan Seddar and Koraltürk, Murat. "Ankara'ya Demiryoluyla Göçler ve İskan Siyaseti (1890-1910)." *Ankara Araştırmaları Dergisi / Journal of Ankara Studies*, (June 2016): 1-12.
- Keddie, Nikki R., *Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani": A Political Biography*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972.
- Kenanoğlu, Macit. "Nizamiye Mahkemeleri". *TDVİA*, Vol. 33, 2007, 185-188.
- Keskin, Özkan. "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Modern Ziraat Eğitiminin Yaygınlaşması: Ankara Numune Tarlası ve Çoban Mektebi." *Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi*, 28, (Ankara 2010): 87 106.
- Kılıç, Filiz. "Giritli Divan Şairleri." *Hacı Bektaş Veli Araştırma Dergisi*, 32 (Winter, 2004): 275-294.
- Kırmızı, Abdulhamit. "Rulers of the Provincial Empire: Ottoman Governors and the Administration of Provinces, 1895-1908." PhD Dissertation, Boğaziçi University, 2005.
- Kırmızı, Abdulhamit. "Şikayat Tezayüd Etmekte: Memduh Bey'in Sivas Valiliğinde Ermeni Politikası (1889-1992)." In *Osmanlılar Döneminde Sivas Sempozyumu Bildirileri, Vol. I*. Sivas: Sivas Valiliği İl Kültür ve Turizm Müdürlüğü, 2007.
- Kırmızı, Abdulhamit. *Abdülhamid'in Valileri*. Istanbul: Klasik, 2008.

- Kırmızı, Abdulhamit. "Hem Efendi Hem Tutsak: Sultan Abdülhamid Mutlakiyetinin Sınırları." Paper presented at the Conference *Vefatının 90. Yıldönümünde II. Abdülhamid ve Dönemi, Bilim ve Sanat Vakfı*, Istanbul, 18-19 October 2008.
- Kırmızı, Abdulhamit. "Meşrutiyette İstibdat Kadroları: 1908 İhtilali'nin Bürokraside Tasfiye ve İkame Kabiliyeti." In *100. Yılında Jön Türkler Devrimi*, edited by Sina Akşin, Sarp Balcı, Barış Ünlü, 332-355. Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2010.
- Kırmızı, Abdulhamit. "Oto/Biyografik Vebal: Tutarlılık ve Kronoloji Sorunları." In *Otur Baştan Yaz Beni*, edited by Abdulhamit Kırmızı, 11-27. Istanbul: Küre. 2013.
- Kırmızı, Abdulhamit. *Avlonyalı Ferid Paşa: Bir Ömür Devlet*. Istanbul: Klasik, 2014.
- Kırmızı, Abdulhamit. "Experiencing the Ottoman Empire as a Life Course: Ferid Pasha, Governor and Grandvizier (1851-1914)." *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 40. (2014): 42-66.
- Kırmızı, Abdulhamit. "II. Abdülhamid'in Hristiyan Memurları." In *Sultan II. Abdülhamid ve Dönemi*, edited by Fahrettin Gün, Halil İbrahim Erbay. Istanbul: TBMM Milli Saraylar, 2017: 654-664.
- Kırmızı, Abdulhamit. "19. Yüzyılı Laiksizleştirmek: Osmanlı-Türk Laikleşme Anlatısının Sorunları." *Cogito*, 94, (2019): 1-17.
- Klein, Janet. *The Margins of Empire: The Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011.
- Kodaman, Bayram. "Hamidiye Hafif Süvari Alayları (II. Abdülhamid ve Doğu Anadolu Aşiretleri)." *Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi*, 32 (1979): 427-480.
- Kodaman, Bayram. "The Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments: Abdülhamid II and the Eastern Anatolian Tribes." In *War and Diplomacy, The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the Treaty of Berlin*, edited by Hakan Yavuz with Peter Sluglett, 382-426. Utah: Utah University Press, 2011.
- Köprülü, Orhan. "Fuad Paşa". *TDVİA*, Vol. 13, 1996, 202-205.
- Kuehn, Thomas. *Empire, Islam, and Politics of Difference: Ottoman Rule in Yemen, 1849-1919*. Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2011.
- Kuntay, Cemal. *Devrinin İnsanları Arasında Namık Kemal*. Istanbul: Milli Eğitim, 1949.

- Kurşun, Zekeriya. "Küçük Said Paşa." PhD Dissertation, Marmara University, 1991.
- Kurşun, Zekeriya. "Mehmed Memduh Paşa". *TDVİA*, Vol. 28, 2003, 495-497.
- Kuzucu, Kemalettin. "Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyete Şehircilik, Mimari ve Eğitim Anlayışındaki Değişmeler Bağlamında Sivas Kongresi Binasının Tarihçesi." *Atatürk Yolu (Atatürk Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Dergisi)*, 37-38 (May-November 2006): 103-125.
- Kuzucu, Kemalettin. "Osmanlı Modernleşme Sürecinde İki Sivas Valisinin Raporlarının Karşılaştırılması ve Vilayetin Kentsel Dönüşümüne Etkileri." In *Osmanlılar Döneminde Sivas Sempozyum Bildirileri*, Sivas: Sivas Valiliği İl Kültür ve Turizm Müdürlüğü, 2007.
- Lambert, David and Lester, Alan. *Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial Careerism in the Long Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Lambert, David. "Reflections on the Concept of Imperial Biographies." *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, vol. 40, Issue 1 (2014): 22-41.
- Lässig, Simone. "Introduction: Biography in Modern History-Modern Historiography in Biography." In *Biography Between Structure and Agency: Central European*, edited by Volker R. Berghahn and Simone Lässig, 1-26. New York: Berghahn Books, 2008.
- Le Goff, Jacques. *Saint Louis*. Paris: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996.
- Lester, Alan. *Imperial Networks: Creating Identities in Nineteenth-Century Africa and Britain*. London and New York: Routledge, 2001.
- Lester, Alan. "British Settler Discourse and the Circuits of Empire." *History Workshop Journal* (2002 Autumn) 54 (1): 24-48.
- Lester, Alan. "Imperial Circuits and Networks: Geographies of the British Empire." *History Compass* 4/1 (2006): 124-141.
- Levi, Giovanni. "Uses of Biography." In *Theoretical Discussions of Biography: Approaches from History, 89-112. Microhistory, and Life Writing*, edited by Binne de Haan and Hans Renders. Leuven: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2013.
- Lewis, Bernard. *Emergence of Modern Turkey*. London: Oxford University Press, 1968.

- Lindström, Fredrik. "Imperial Heimat: Biographies of the Austrian State Elite in the Late Habsburg Empire." In *Elites im Vielvölkerreich, Elites and Empire*, edited by Tim Buchen und Malte Rolf, 368-394. Berlin: de Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015.
- Loriga, Sabina. "The Role of the Individual in History, Biographical and Historical Writing in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century." In *Theoretical Discussions of Biography: Approaches from History, Microhistory, and Life Writing*, edited by Binne de Haan and Hans Renders, 75-93. Leuven: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2013.
- Lütfi Fikri, *Dersim Mebusu Lütfi Fikri Bey'in Günlüğü: Daima Muhalefet*, edited by Yücel Demirel. Istanbul: Arba, 1991.
- MacKenzie, David. *The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism 1875-1878*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967.
- Mackillop, Andrew and Murdoch, Steve (eds). *Military Governors and Imperial Frontiers, C. 1600-1800: A Study of Scotland and Empires*. Leiden: Brill, 2003.
- Mahmud Nedim Paşa. *Âyine ve Hasbihâl*. Istanbul: Karabet Matbaası, 1327/1909.
- Mandaville, Jon. "Memduh Pasha and Aziz Bey: Ottoman Experience in Yemen." In *Contemporary Yemen: Politics and Historical Background*, edited by B. R. Pridham, 20-33. London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984.
- Mardin, Şerif . *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000.
- Mardin, Şerif. *Türk Modernleşmesi*. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991.
- Marsoobian, Armen Tsolag. *Fragments of a Lost Homeland: Remembering Armenia*. London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 2015.
- Massey, Doreen. *For Space*. Los Angeles: Sage, 2005.
- Mayakon, İsmail Müştak. *Yıldız'da Neler Gördüm?*. İstanbul: Sertel Matbaası, 1940.
- Mccarthy, Justin. "Ignoring the People." In *War and Diplomacy, The Russo Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the Treaty of Berlin*, edited by Hakan Yavuz with Peter Sluglett. Utah: Utah University Press, 2011.
- Mehmed Âtîf Efendi. *Hatıra-ı Atîf*, edited by Nurettin Gemici and Hikmet Toker. Ankara: TBMM Milli Saraylar Daire Başkanlığı, 2016.

- Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmanî*. İstanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1327/1909.
- Mehmet Tevfik Bey'in II. Abdülhamid, *Meşrutiyet ve Mütareke Devri Hatıraları*, Vol 2, edited by F. Rezan Hürmen. İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1993.
- Midhat, Ali Haydar. *The Life of Midhat Pasha*, London: J. Murray, 1903.
- Millman, Richard. *Britain and the Eastern Question 1875–1878*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.
- Mitchell, Timothy. "Society, Economy, and the State Effect." In *State/Culture: State Formation after the Cultural Turn*, edited by George Steinmetz. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.
- Mizancı Mehmed Murad, *Enkaz-ı İstibdat İçinde Züğürdün Tesellisi*. İstanbul: Matbaa-ı Amedi, 1335/1917.
- Mizancı Murat Bey'in 2. *Meşrutiyet Dönemi Hatıraları*, edited by Celile Eren Ökten Argıt. İstanbul: Marifet Yayınları, 1977.
- Murphey, Rhoads. "Continuity and Discontinuity in Ottoman Administrative Practice during the Late Seventeenth Century." *Poetics Today* 14:2 (1993): 419–443.
- Musahib-i Sani-i Hazret-i Şehriyârî Nadir Ağa'nın Hatıratı I*, edited by Hasan Ferit Ertuğ, *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 49 (January 1998).
- Mümtaz, Ahmet Semih. *Evvel Zaman İçinde: Tarihimizde Hayal Olmuş Hakikatler*. İstanbul: Hilmi Kitabevi, 1948.
- Mümtaz, Ahmet Semih. *Sultan II. Abdülhamid ve Zamanı*. İstanbul: Kapı Yay. 2008.
- Mümtaz, Ahmet Semih. *Eski İstanbul Konakları*. İstanbul: Kurtuba Kitap, 2011.
- Münir Süreyya Bey. *Ermeni Meselesinin Siyasi Tarihçesi (1877-1914)*. Ankara: Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2001.
- Odunkıran, Fatih. "Mehmed Memdûh Paşa ve Dîvân-ı Eş'âr." MA Thesis, Trakya University, 2011.
- Olney, James. *Metaphors of Self*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972.
- Onaran, Burak. *Padişahı Devirmek: Osmanlı Islahat Çağında Düzen ve Muhalefet: Kuleli (1859), Meslek (1867)*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2017.
- Onay, Ahmet Talat. *Tokatlı Âşık Nuri*. Çankırı: Çankırı Matbaası, 1933.

- Oppen, Achim von and Strickrodt, Silke. "Introduction: Biographies Between Spheres of Empire." *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 44:5 (2016): 717-729.
- Ortak, Şaban. "Türkiye'de Millet İradesi Prensibinin İlk Savunucularından İnkılapçı Mehmed Bey." *Atatürk Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Dergisi*, vol. 3, no. 1 (2000): 245-263.
- Ortaylı, İlber. *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyete Yerel Yönetim Geleneği*. İstanbul: Hil, 1985.
- Ortaylı, İlber. *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*. İstanbul: Hil Yayınları, 1983.
- Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre Ermeni-Fransız İlişkileri I (1879-1918)*. Ankara, Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 2002.
- Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni-İngiliz İlişkileri I (1845-1890)*. Ankara: Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 2004.
- Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni-İngiliz İlişkileri III (1894-1895)*. Ankara, Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 2005.
- Önen, Nizam and Reyhan, Cenk. *Mülkten Ülkeye: Türkiye'de Taşra İdaresinin Dönüşümü*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2011.
- Özbek, Nadir. "Philanthropic Activity, Ottoman Patriotism, and the Hamidian Regime, 1876-1909." *International Journal Middle East Studies*. 37 (2005): 59-81.
- Özbek, Nadir. "Policing the Countryside: Gendarmes of the Late 19th Century Ottoman Empire (1876-1908)." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 40 (2008), 47-67.
- Özbek, Nadir. "The Politics of Modern Welfare Institutions in the Late Ottoman Empire (1876-1909)." *The International Journal of Turcologia*, vol. III, no. 5 (2008): 42-62.
- Özbek, Nadir. "'Anadolu ıslahatı', 'Ermeni sorunu' ve vergi tahsildarlığı, 1895-1908." *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, no. 9 (Fall 2009): 59-85.
- Özbek, Nadir. "İkinci Meşrutiyeti Hazırlayan Koşullar: Rumeli'de Vergi Tahsilatı ve Jandarma," *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 183, 2009.
- Özdenses, Engin, *Abdullah Freres Osmanlı Sarayının Fotoğrafçıları*. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2016.

- Özel, Oktay. "Migration and Power Politics: The Settlement of Georgian Immigrants in Turkey (1878–1908)." *Middle Eastern Studies* 46, no. 4 (2010): 477-496.
- Özgül, Metin Kayahan. *XIX. Asrın Özel Bir Edebiyat Mahfili Olarak Encümen-i Şuarâ*, Ankara: Kurgan Edebiyat, 2012.
- Özgül, Metin Kayahan. *Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, Vol. 3. Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2006.
- Pakalın, Zeki. *Son Sadrazamlar ve Başvekiller*, Vol. 3. İstanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası, 1940.
- Pakdil, Nuri. *Bağlanma*. Ankara: Edebiyat Dergisi Yayınları, 2017.
- Parvikko, Tuija. "Memory, History and the Holocaust: Notes on the Problem of Representation of the Past." *Redescriptions: Yearbook of Political Thought and Conceptual History*, (8/2004): 189–209.
- Peters, Rudolph. *Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from Sixteenth to Twenty-First Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Piker, Joshua. "Lying Together: The Imperial Implications of Cross-Cultural Untruths." *The American Historical Review* (2011) 116 (4): 964-986.
- Philliou, Christine M., *Biography of an Empire: Governing Ottomans in an Age of Revolution*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2011.
- Polat, Hasan Ali. "II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde Siyasi Sürgünler (1908-1918)." PhD Dissertation, Akdeniz Üniversitesi, 2018.
- Reynolds, Nancy. "Difference and Tolerance in the Ottoman Empire. Interview with Aron Rodrigue." *Stanford Electronics Humanities Review* 5:1 (1996).
- Rhiel, Mary and Suchoff, David. *The Seductions of Biography*. Oxon: Routledge, 1996.
- Rolf, Malte. "Einführung: Imperiale Biographien. Lebenswege imperialer Akteure in Groß- und Kolonialreichen (1850 -1918)." *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, vol. 40, Issue 1, (2014): 5-21.
- Rubin, Avi. *Ottoman Nizamiye Courts: Law and Modernity*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

- Rudolph, Lloyd I. and Rudolph, Susanne Hoeber. "Authority and Power in Bureaucratic and Patrimonial Administration: A Revisionist Interpretation of Weber on Bureaucracy." *World Politics* 31:2 (1979): 195–227.
- Sa'îd Paşa, *Sa'îd Paşa'nın Hâtîrâtı, Vol. I-II*. Istanbul: Sabah Matbaası, 1328/1912.
- Saliba, Najib. "The Achievements of Midhat Pasha as Governor of the Province of Syria, 1878-1880," *International Journal of Middle East*, IX (1978): 307-323.
- Sami, Şemsettin. *Kamusu'l-Âlam IV*. Istanbul, 1894-1311.
- Saritepe, Özlem. "Sivas Valisi Memduh Paşa." MA Thesis, Sivas Cumhuriyet University, 2011.
- Schultz, William Todd. "Introducing Psychobiography." In *Handbook of Psychobiography*, edited by W. Todd Schultz, 3-17. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Shaw, Stanford J. and Shaw, Ezel Kural. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume II, Reform, Revolution and Republic, 1808-1975*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
- Shortland, Michael and Yeo, Richard. *Telling Lives in Science: Essays On Scientific Biography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1996.
- Schull, Kent. *The Prisons in the Late Ottoman Empire: Microcosms of Modernity*. Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 2014.
- Schull, Kent. "Criminal Codes, Crime, and the Transformation of Punishment." In *Law and Legality in the Ottoman Empire and Republic of Turkey*, edited by Kent F. Schull and M. Safa Saraçoğlu, and Robert F. Zens, 156-178. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016.
- Sohrabi, Nader. "Global Waves, Local Actors: What the Young Turks Knewabout other Revolutions and Why It Mattered." *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 44, no. 1 (2002): 45-79.
- Steedman, Carolyn. *Past Tenses*. London: Rivers Oram Press, 1992.
- Stojanović, Mihailo. *The Great Powers and the Balkans 1875-1878*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939.

- Şahin, Nilay. "Mehmed Memdûh Paşa'nın Hayatı, Sanatı, Eserleri ve Divân-ı Eş'âr'ı Üzerine Bir İnceleme." MA Thesis, Ondokuz Mayıs University, 2012.
- Şaşmaz, Musa. *British Policy and the Application of Reforms for the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000.
- Şeker, Şemsettin. *Ders ile Sohbet Arasında: On Dokuzuncu Asır İstanbul'unda İlim, Kültür ve Sanat Meclisleri*. İstanbul: Zeytinburnu Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, 2013.
- Tahsin Paşa. *Abdülhamit: Yıldız Hâtırâtı*. İstanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitaphanesi, 1931.
- Tahsin Paşa. *Tahsin Paşa'nın Yıldız Hatıraları, Sultan Abdülhamid*. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1990.
- Tamur, Erman. *Ankara Keçisi ve Ankara Tiftik Dokumacılığı Tükenen Bir Zenginliğin ve Çöken Bir Sanayinin Tarihsel Öyküsünden Kesitler*. Ankara: Ankara Ticaret Odası, 2003.
- Tan, Seda. "XIX. Yüzyılda Anadolu'dan Güney Afrika'ya Tiftik Keçisinin Yasal ve Kaçak Sevkiyatı," *Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi*, 35. (Spring 2014): 137-152.
- Tansel, Fevziye Abdullah. "Bir Mevlevi Nâsir ve Şair: Mehmed Nâzım Paşa." *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, vol. 14, no. 1 (1966): 155-174.
- Tevfik, Ebuzziya. *Yeni Osmanlılar Tarihi*. İstanbul: Hürriyet, 1973.
- Todorova, Maria. "Midhat Paşa's Governorship of the Danube Province." In *Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire*, edited by Cesar E. Farah (Kirksvill, MO: Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993).
- Tokay, Gül, "Macedonian Question, 1878-1908." In *War and Diplomacy: The Russo Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the Treaty of Berlin*, edited by Hakan Yavuz with Peter Sluglett, 253-270. Utah: Utah University Press, 2011.
- Toptaş, Rahşan. "Bergama Hükümet Konağı Örneğinde II. Abdülhamit Dönemi Hükümet Konakları." *The Journal of International Research*, vol. 9, Issue 47, (December 2016): 411-426.

- Tuchman, Barbara W., "Biography as Prism of History." In *Telling Lives: The Biographer's Art*, edited by Marc Pachter. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981.
- Tunaya, Tarık Zafer. *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler II: 1918-1922 Mütareke Dönemi*. İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1986.
- Türkgeldi, Ali Fuat. *Maruf Similar*. İstanbul: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2013.
- Türkgeldi, Ali Fuat. *Görüş İstiklerim*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2010.
- Uras, Esat. *Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi*. İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1987.
- Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hakkı. *Midhat Paşa ve Yıldız Mahkemesi*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000.
- Vahid, Nermin. *Boğaz'daki Kırmızı Köşk*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2008.
- Varol, Muharrem. "Bektaşiliğin İlgası Sonrasında Osmanlı Devleti'nin Tarikat Politikaları (1826-1866)." PhD Dissertation, İstanbul University, 2011.
- Varol, Muharrem. *Islahat, Siyaset, Tarikat: Bektaşiliğin İlgası Sonrasında Osmanlı Devleti'nin Tarikat Politikaları (1826-1866)*. İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2013.
- Varol, Muharrem. "Kahramanlıktan Kalebendliğe: Kuleli Vak'asının Baş Aktörü Süleymaniyeli Şeyh Ahmed'e Dair Bilinmeyenler." *Tasavvuf: İlmî ve Akademik Araştırma Dergisi*, 35 (2015/1): 97-143.
- Wacquent, Lorc J. D., "From Ruling Class to Field of Power: An Interview with Pierre Bourdieu on La noblesse d'Etat." *Theory, Culture & Society* (SAGE, London, Newbury Park and New Delhi), vol. 10 (1993): 19-44.
- Walter, James. "The Solace of Doubt? Biographical Methodology after the Short Twentieth Century." In *Theoretical Discussions of Biography: Approaches from History, Microhistory, and Life Writing*, edited by Binne de Haan and Hans Renders, 63-68. Leviston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2013.
- Ward, Robert E. and Rustow, Dankwart (eds). *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968.
- Weber, Max. *Economy and Society*. New York: Bedminster Press, 1968.
- Whimster, Sam. Empires and Bureaucracy: Means of Appropriation and Media of Communication. In *World History: From Late Antiquity to the Twentieth Century*, edited by Peter Crooks and Timothy H. Parsons, 437-457. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

- Winning, Alexa von. "The Empire as Family Affair. The Mansurovs and Noble Participation in Imperial Russia, 1850-1917." *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 40 (2014): 94-116.
- Yalçın, Hüseyin Cahit. *Siyasal Anılar*. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1976.
- Yasamee, Feroze A. K., *Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdülhamid II and the Great Powers, 1878-1888*. İstanbul: The Isis Press, 1996.
- Yazan, Ömer. "Ziraat Bankası'nın İlk Yirmi Yılına Ait Bazı Kayıtların İncelenmesi." *Abant İzzet Baysal Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, vol. 17, no. 4 (2017): 221-237.
- Yeşil, Fatih. "How to be(come) an Ottoman at the End of the Eighteenth Century." *Osmanlı Araştırmaları. The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, XLIV (2014): 123-139.
- Yavuz, Mustafa. "Mehmed Memdûh Faik Bey (Hayatı, Sanatı, Eserleri)." MA Thesis, Erzincan University, 2016.
- Yıldız, Gültekin. *Mapusane: Osmanlı Hapishanelerinin Kuruluş Serüveni (1839 1908)*. İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2012.
- Yıldırım, Nuran. *İstanbul Darülaceze Müessesesi Tarihi*. İstanbul: Darülaceze Vakfı Yayını, 1996.
- Yılmaz, Mehmet. "Konya Havalisinde 1303 (1887) Kıtlığı ve Alınan Tedbirler." *Yeni İpekyolu Dergisi Özel Sayısı* (1988): 135-146.
- Yılmaz, Ömer Faruk. "Osmanlı'nın Konya Ovası Sulama Projesi." *Yedikıta*, 22 (June 2010): 16-27.

VITA

Personal Information:

First Name & Last Name: Fikriye Karaman

E-mail (1): fikriyekaraman@sehir.edu.tr

E-mail (2): fikriyekaraman@gmail.com

Education:

2007-2011 BA in Sociology and Anthropology (major), Political Science (minor),
International Islamic University Malaysia

2011-2013 MA in Sociology, Istanbul Sehir University, Turkey

Work Experience:

Feb 2005-June 2006 Social worker at an orphan complex, Islamabad,
Pakistan

July 2006-July 2007 Public Relations & Customer Service, Beltur A.Ş.
Istanbul

Feb 2009-Apr 2011 Teaching assistant at Core Curriculum Center,
International Islamic University Malaysia

May 2010-July 2010 Sociology internship, Amnesty International

Feb 2012-Jan 2013 Teaching assistant, Istanbul Sehir University

Feb 2013-Nov 2013 Research assistant, Institute of Social Sciences

Sep 2013-Jan 2015 Teaching assistant, Istanbul Sehir University

Feb 2015-present Instructor, Istanbul Sehir University

Publications:

Karaman, Fikriye. "The Great War in the Middle East." *Insight Turkey*, 20, 4,
(2018): 271-281.

Karaman, Fikriye, "Arab Intellectuals under the Young Turks: a Comparative
Historical Analysis on Salim Ali Salam's Memoirs." In *Osmanlı'da Siyaset
ve Diplomasi*, edited by H. Şahin, H. Kılıçarslan, İstanbul: Mahya Yayınları,
2017.

Karaman, Fikriye. "The Young Turk Revolution and Ottoman Ethno-Religious Communities." *The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, 47 (2016): 411-424.

Karaman, Fikriye. Review of the book *Avlonyalı Ferid Paşa: Bir Ömür Devlet* [Avlonyalı Ferid Pasha: Experiencing the Empire as a Life course] by Abdulhamit Kırmızı, *İslam Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 33, (2015): 107-114.

Karaman, Fikriye. Review and Critique of the book *Picturing History at the Ottoman Court* by Emine Fetvacı, *İslam Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 32 (2014): 199-203.

Karaman, Fikriye. Review and Critique of the book *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in a Comparative Perspective* by Karen Barkey, *Divan (Disiplinlerarası Çalışmalar)*, 37 (2014): 194-199.

Karaman, Fikriye. Review of the book *Medieval Islamic Historiography and Political Legitimacy* by A.C.S. Peacock. *İslam Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 30 (2013):139-145.

Karaman, Fikriye. Review of the book *Kısa Türkiye Tarihi* [Brief Turkish History] by Kemal Karpat. *Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi/Journal of Academic Inquiries (AID)*, 1/8 (2013): 405-410.