

**ISTANBUL SABAHATTIN ZAIM UNIVERSTIY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**COMPATIBILITY OF MUSLIM IDENTITY IN POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS:
FROM CONFLICT TO PEACE**

Ph.D DISSERTATION

Ertuğrul GÖKÇEKUYU

Istanbul

May – 2019

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
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**Istanbul
May - 2019**

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
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
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DECLARATION OF SCIENTIFIC ETHICS AND ORIGINALITY

This is to certify that this MA thesis/PhD dissertation titled "**Compatibility of Muslim Identity in Political Institutions from Conflict to Peace**" is my own work and I have acted according to scientific ethics and academic rules while producing it. I have collected and used all information and data according to scientific ethics and guidelines on thesis writing of Sabahattin Zaim University. I have fully referenced, in both the text and bibliography, all direct and indirect quotations and all sources I have used in this work.



.....
Ertuğrul GÖKÇEKUYU

Acknowledgements

It is quite stirring to observe in the Muslim history that Islamic scholars disagreed on their interpretations about revolts and riots all the while other scholars preferred other methods, such as more positive-passive remonstrance on social injustice. It is a well-known fact that Muslims study the history and the practices of these diverse scholars and seek for knowledge and understanding on how Islam goes about social and political issues where one method seems to override the other. The public image and the deliberation in our current era produced constructs such as ‘political Islam’ or ‘identity politics’, yet the question remains how and why these methods differ or overlap.

This description fits the sort of life experienced by the majority of Muslims around the globe as well as to the Muslim Identity the majority holds on to. The need to know whether identity in political behaviour is a factor, forms the core of this study. Muslims essentially strive to study and know themselves, to set patterns and merge the self into a discernible and comprehensible whole. It is though ironic that modern political institutes have had great impact that in some era eradicated this wholeness as well as constructed new ones, such as this political Islam in the most negative sense of the meaning. During my research I was amazed by the diversity of the concept of Muslim identity with multiple layers of selves that reflect this identity.

I wish to thank people who have been key in making sure that this study became a realizable quest. I first and foremost want to thank Prof. Dr. Ahmed AKGÜNDÜZ who convinced and believed in me to pursue this academic journey and supported me materially and immaterially in every way.

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My wife Zehra and both my beloved daughters Merve and Erva deserve a huge gratitude for their immense patience during my travels and study, and for putting up with my eccentricities: I know I wasn't the easiest. I owe a great gratitude to my dear father, Abdil GÖKÇEKUYU who came to this world as an orphan, stayed an orphan and eventually left this bleak place in my arms: introduced me to myself and always looked after me. The man who gave me my name and told me to know my name.

Ertuğrul GÖKÇEKUYU, 2019

ABSTRACT

COMPATIBILITY OF MUSLIM IDENTITY IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS FROM CONFLICT TO PEACE

Ertuğrul Gökçekuyu

PhD Dissertation, Political Sciences and International Relations

Supervisor: Asoc. Prof. Dr. M. IBISH

May-2019, 221+xii Pages

The aim of this research is to study the perceptions and attitudes of Muslim individuals and the nature of the complexity of these Muslim identities. This research includes for reasons of reliability and validity mixed methods of quantitative and qualitative research and existing constructs and scales for data collection. It is the phenomena of the existence of religious identity and the trending extreme-right narrative that brings about this research. The negative depiction of the image of the Muslim individual and its perceptions are scrutinized in relation to the political institutions in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. This mixed method research focuses on the attitudes and perceptions of the Muslim identity and how this affects its role within the Western societies. The analyses stand in relation to political institutionalization and the civic duties of the Muslim identity.

798 and 517 respondents participated from the Netherlands and the United Kingdom respectively to the survey. In total 24 interviewees participated to the in-depth interviews conducted in the both countries. The research was able to prove a modest significant association according to the constructivist model between the disconnection of the Muslim identity and political actor's trust and support.

.....

Keywords: Muslim identity, religious identity, identity complexity, institutions, centrality, salience, voting, political party, conflict, peace, multiple identities, superordinate identity.

ÖZET

ÇATIŞMADAN BARIŞA: MÜSLÜMAN KİMLİĞİNİN SİYASİ KURUMLARA UYUMU

Ertuğrul Gökçekuyu
Doktora Tezi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler
Danışman: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi M. İBİŞH
Mayıs 2019, 221 + xii Sayfa

Bu araştırmanın amacı, Hollanda ve İngiltere gibi Demokratik Batı toplumlarında yaşayan Müslüman bireylerin dinî ve siyasî kimliğini incelemektir. Batı’da varlığını sürdüren Müslüman kimliğine aşırı sağcı akımlardan yansıyan tehditleri incelemek düşüncesi araştırmamızın ortaya çıkmasında başrolü oynamıştır. Çünkü bu tehditler fiilen siyasî hayata yansıdığı gibi literatüre de yansımaktadır. Ayrıca bu menfi tutumlar Batı’da Müslüman birey imajını zedelemekte ve genel manada söz konusu bireylerin yaşadığı toplumda olumsuz ve çatışmacı kimlikler olarak okunmasına neden olmaktadır. Yaptığımız çalışma Müslüman kimliğinin siyasî kurumlara karşı tutumunu ve algısını, bununla beraber bu kimliğin toplumsal rolünün hangi faktörler tarafından etkilendiğine odaklanmaktadır. Çalışmamızda karma, yani kantitatif (nicel) ve kalitatif (nitel) araştırma yöntemleri kullanılmıştır. Bu kullanımdaki gaye ise, yapısalcı teori üzerinden bahsi geçen iki köklü demokratik ülkeden elde edilen dataların, literatürde geçen yapı ve ölçeklerin de kullanılarak analiz edilmesiyle sorunsala daha sağlıklı bakabilmeyi sağlayacağı düşüncesidir.

Yukarıda zikredilen datalar anket metodu ile elde edilmiştir. Bu ankete Hollanda’dan 798 ve İngiltere’den 517 kişi katılım sağlamıştır. Her iki ülkede yapılan birebir ve detaylı görüşmelere ise toplam 24 kişi katılmıştır. Araştırmanın neticesinde yapısalcı yaklaşım istatistiksel olarak ispat edilebilmiş ve Müslüman kimliğinin toplumsal kopukluğu ile siyasi aktörlerin olumsuz etkisi arasında bir korelasyon bulunmuştur.

.....

Anahtar Kelimeler: Müslüman kimliği, dini kimlik, karma kimlik, kurumlar, sivil görevler, katılım, oylama, siyasi parti, Hollanda, İngiltere, çatışma, barış, çoklu kimlik.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

UKIP	UK Independence Party
BREXIT	Britain Exit
PVV	Partij van de Vrijheid
FPO	Freedom Party Austria
NVA	Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie
AFD	Alternative für Deutschland
SIT	Social Identity Theory
SCT	Social Categorization Theory
MRIM	Multi-Religion Identity Measure
ANOVA	Analysis of variance
FOMON	Federatie van Moslimorganisaties in Nederland
NIF	Nederlandse Islamitische Federatie
SICN	Stichting Islamitische Centrum Nederland
UMMON	Unie van Marokkaanse Moskeeorganisaties in Nederland
IOT	Stichting Inspraak Orgaan Turken in Nederland
SPIOR	Stichting Platform Islamitische Organisaties Rijnmond
CMO	Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid
NIDA	Dutch Local Political Party
DENK	Dutch National Political Party
MCB	Muslim Council of Britain
UMO	Union of Muslim Organizations
FOSIS	Federation of Student Islamic Societies
JIMAS	Jam'iyat Ihya Minhaj Sunnah wal jama'a
OASIS	UK based Movement of Volunteers
TJ	Tablighi Jamaat
BOD	Board of Deputies of British Jews
UK	United Kingdom
NL	The Netherlands
NHS	National Health Service
EFA	Exploratory Factor Analysis

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

'Awakening of nationalism is either positive, in which case it is aroused through compassion for one's fellow men and is the cause of mutual recognition and assistance; or it is negative, in which case, being aroused by racialist ambitions, it is the cause of antipathy and mutual hostility. This Islam rejects'. Said Nursi

Muslim presence in the Western society experiences under anxiety, it feels taunted, disparaged as a devious outcast; it is the primary topic of a rising populist narrative described as living on remote and inaccessible communal islands, that are inherently incapable of socio-political affairs. The Muslim allegiance to Islamic values, the *umma*¹ instead of the nation where it resides, is a central debate and it has become a security threat to the future of Western values and its way of life. The public debate questions Islamic values and the Muslim loyalties in the Western societies and are quickly passed and framed as incompatible. The Muslim existence in Europe itself suffers under the social and political consequences of 9/11, Paris, London, Madrid and Brussels. Against this seemingly brief narrative, the Islamic values and the Western world are not alien to each other, as they have a long tradition of collective pasts. There is a shared history, wherein the social and political impact that has been intensively reciprocal in its interactions between the Western and Muslim civilizations.² Prof. Dr. H. İnalcik even suggests that these interactions and skirmishes between the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empires gave birth to the most important political actor of our age, the 'nation-state'.

¹ Ahmet Akgündüz, *Islamic Public Law : Documents on Practice from the Ottoman Archives* (Rotterdam : IUR Press, 2011), 35.

² Ahmed Akgunduz and Ertugrul Gokcekuyu, 'The Ottoman Sociopolitical Impact on the West during the European Reformation', *Muslim World* 107, no. 4 (2017): 632, <https://doi.org/10.1111/muwo.12213>.

What we see today in the Muslim psychology is that the theological struggles in the new modern and secular Muslim nation-states are in search of national and theological unification through an awareness of an ‘Islamic identity’.³ This process of awareness or the construction of Muslim identity is unmistakably inspired by Islamic scholars and their ideas as well as European ideologies such as liberalism, socialism and nationalism.⁴ Jocelyn Cesari observes that it is prevalent that the Muslim identity in this time frame is undeniably in search for new forms of representation.⁵ It remains yet to be seen as it might be too early to state whether Western political ideologies that opposed the very existence of religion in politics in Europe may be a remedy to the Muslim search in restructuring the Muslim political representation?⁶

For Cesari the Muslim political efforts today are evidence, in the form of political institutions, such as *professional* Islamic parties or factions for contemporary constitutional compatibility around Muslim nations.⁷ These countries prove a Muslim awareness as emergent and utilizes Western modern-day institutions. In this context, Cesari opposes the theory of incompatibility of the Muslim identity in politics as postulated by Wael Hallaq.

³ Adis Duderija, ‘Literature Review: Identity Construction in the Context of Being a Minority Immigrant Religion: The Case of Western-Born Muslims’, *Immigrants & Minorities* 25, no. 2 (1 July 2007): 141–62, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02619280802018132>.

⁴ Sayd Qutb according to Rod Dreher writes in the Dallas Morning News (27th August 2006)

⁵ Jocelyne Cesari, *The Awakening of Muslim Democracy : Religion, Modernity, and the State* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2014), 88, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107359871>.

⁶ Irene Bloemraad and Karen Schönwälder, ‘Immigrant and Ethnic Minority Representation in Europe: Conceptual Challenges and Theoretical Approaches’, *West European Politics* 36, no. 3 (1 May 2013): 564–79, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2013.773724>.

⁷ Idem (Refers to the following countries: Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt)

Cesari argues that modern-day political institutions are existent and there are visible transformations in Muslim narrative against as well as for political, national and religious identities in state institutions. In this sense the movement *political Islam* is probably the only ideology born in the Muslim world as a reaction against the European colonialization; an ideology to bring back religion into the political domain. This ideology is reactionary and coerces itself from the ground and has hegemonic ambitions, but reveals itself as a civil, and transnational player— where this study will focus on a different theoretical area as is explained in the next paragraphs of this chapter.⁸

1.1 Focus of this research

After this brief and general introduction on Muslim identity, the actual focus of this research is the question whether it is justifiable as popularly claimed that the political perception in terms of Muslim identity is incompatible with the ideas and values of established democracies; therefore, is the Muslim perception and behaviour by definition a source, thus a cause of conflict?

In the last four decades the significance of identity in political sciences has been surging and the constructivist theory has become a viable explanatory alternative against neorealism and neoliberalism. Alexander Wendt in his conceptualization of the Constructivist theory attains a central role to identity and the nature of the human agency that is unavoidably a part or a result of the social structures around it.⁹ Since identities in political relations are the actors and actors develop identities and have morals and belong to social groups that determine political outcomes. Identities in the constructivist theory is not a given, but it is constructed due to human interaction within the society. The ideological discourse of the constructivist theory is the

⁸ Jocelyne Cesari and Mehdi Mozaffari, *What Is Political Islam?* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Incorporated, 2018), 7.

⁹ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

ontological presence of an agent having norms and ideas and interacting with other human agents from these normative references.¹⁰ Thus identities of the human actors in the political arena can adapt, learn and thus change by way of ‘interaction’.¹¹ And according to Wendt this human social construction defines anarchy in the international arena and not sole the material argument or the sole institutional argument.

As the human history is moving forward, with a past where religion was reduced to the personal sphere it was Peter Berger¹² who announced a renaissance of religion; for Berger it was obvious that religion would make its grand return back into the political life. Berger’s views triggered new studies looking in political processes and representation of religious identity.¹³ Berger wasn’t as clear whether he also had the Muslim identity in mind, nevertheless the existence of Islamic groups in Europe it is evident and its reflection to the popular sentiment suggests the construction of Muslim political participation. Today the widespread image of the Muslim identity is unfortunately one that is depicted as radical, extremist, and terrorist, a source of social unrest. This identity being a product of a fixed and rigid religion, must also be fixed and rigid. This imagery bounces off the existing rights, liberties and public space that democracies empower the young Muslim Europeans as a valid citizen to construct their own views of religious and political identities.¹⁴ As Europe has been attempting to evolve into a new entity beyond the nation-state, the battle is growing against this

¹⁰ Ibid., 6.

¹¹ Nye Joseph S Jr and A Welch David, ‘Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation’, 2011, 14–15.

¹² Jeremy Menchik, *The Constructivist Approach to Religion and World Politics*, vol. 49, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.5129/001041517821273035>.

¹³ Paul Heelas, David Martin, and Linda Woodhead, *Peter Berger and the Study of Religion* (Routledge, 2013), 97.

¹⁴ Florian Pichler, ‘Affection to and Exploitation of Europe: European Identity in the EU’, 2005, 7.

European unification with its composition of diverse cultures, languages, and support to being and holding different identities. The notion of the nation-state as an old construct is by means of populist ideas attempting to define the cultural and political nation; and this definition wasn't designed to support and hold pluralistic societies. It is observed that in general European societies in fear refuge into reflexes of Euroscepticism, with the far right and populist movements as their leading actors. The big struggle is too reactionary that wants to revert back into the nation-state, with its familiar borders to keep foreigners, immigrants away. The refuge crisis of the recent years has proven to very challenging as the Muslim identity has become source of protests as 'the other'. Yet, these extreme right reactions fuel other sorts of extreme behaviour. Wilder's 'cartoon competition' to be held in September 2018, brought about an act of terror where an Afghani asylum seeker from Germany especially travelled to the Netherlands to do something about it and attacked to people at the Amsterdam Central Station. While many links one act to the other, many citizens feel threatened by the Muslim existence in the Western world. Wilder's too such as UKIP¹⁵ is against the European Union as it supports diversity. Yet, UKIP was significantly a single-issue party and was successful in its role during the referendum to BREXIT. Right after the referendum UKIP vanished from the political scenery.

1.2 The relevance and objectives of the Research

The purpose of this research is to bring some clarification in issues concerning the so-called Muslim threat and how serious this threat is in academic literature. More importantly, how this study can bring some academic understanding to the perceptions of Muslims and their attitudes in two established democracies -the Netherlands and the United Kingdom- towards social-political structures.

The precept on Muslim identity in political arena is not exactly positive. There are obvious reasons for such anxieties in modern societies, yet these precepts are not scientifically justified as in to make overt generalizations that all Muslim attitude is a

¹⁵ See table xii

monolithic danger. Questions need to be asked and answered, whether modern political identities alien are alien to Muslim communities and whether these are to be substantiating differences in perceptions and political institutionalization fo Muslims. The central question is how this Muslim identity is to be defined and described from their own self-perception towards participation in society and political life.

This research is eminently relevant as societies are in need to understand the true nature of the Muslim image from the Muslim himself without letting the void be filled in by others as it be segregant.¹⁶ This argumentation is also supported by the vital and multicultural Muslim subcultures that are blooming. European public and administrative mood is in a temperamental transition from a welcoming Muslim existence as an agrarian-labourer to one that questions its devotion to its country and its religious values. Furthermore, this research questions the justifiability of the populist narrative, in contrast to the distinctiveness of the Muslim survival in democratic societies. This narrative is negating the compatibility of Islamic values and its practice as an existing, prevalent identity in almost all facets of public and administrative life in Western societies.

The constructivist theory is a framework within the field of political sciences that argues that communal norms and values are dependent of the circumstances of dynamic social, national and religious identities; these dependencies exist and change due to the intersections that come in contact with each other in terms of ethnicity, social status, language, gender and immigration.¹⁷ As the atmosphere in European countries is changing, a debate on national belonging sets in, where this narrative has no definition and no meaning to various communities living in the same intellectual and cosmopolitan areas. The compound nature of the concept national belonging requires a profound understanding to get it rooted in the minds of communities, yet the concept

¹⁶ Open Society Institute, 'Muslims in Europe A Report on 11 EU Cities'. (OSI, New York: 201). P. 29

¹⁷ S Jr and Welch David, 'Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation', 50.

doesn't lend itself to be unified or defined by mere secularists or populists. The public debate across Europe is loud, exclusive and separatist in its discourse wherein religious values and identities are targeted.

Muslim attitude towards political solutions in terms of political presence of large communities is in theoretical sense consistent with the doctrines of political sciences. However, the irony in this narrative is whether the Muslim itself is organized and identifies itself with own values as being salient and compatible with the democratic system as a stabilizing and entrusting solution.

Two decades ago minority studies were confined to ethnicity;¹⁸ this is exceptionally observable in United Kingdom. The image of the sub continental Asian citizen was defined by its race, hence the Race Relations Act of 1965 that forbade discrimination based on race by law and religion was added to this bill later. Yet the bill came about due to race relations and not due to discrimination on basis of religion. In this thesis the cultural dimension is not studied as such, whereas the central attention goes to religious identity as being the root cause for conflict.

Constructivists such as Joseph Nye perceive personal interaction as a requirement that reduces social tension for a durable optimistic and constructive approach; yet for Nye it is also fairly inadequate, because when interaction occurs at various levels in public life, the distance between various social groups can decrease and reduce existing hate and conflict. Yet, this argument doesn't always have to be valid as seen in case of the World Wars where social relations between communities were vast but did not stop the murder. The awareness of social relations is eminent and is a crucial factor for mutual sympathy, empathy and acceptance, but it is not the only solution end

¹⁸ Tufyal Choudhury, 'The Role of Muslim Identity Politics in Radicalisation (a Study in Progress)', 2007, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120919132719/http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/452628>.

conflict.¹⁹ Nevertheless, understanding and a positive approach are essential for social harmony.

Countries such as the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are abundantly multicultural, dynamic and diverse in terms of identities; there are compound and intersecting identities with various allegiances. As identities are dynamic, the constructivist theory assumes that these loyalties are also subject to adjustment. This argument is one of the basic tenets of the constructivist theory. The literature suggests that allegiances of social groups may be inherent to change, this may happen when social groups experience inequalities, injustice and discrimination.²⁰ According to Nye conflict usually is a consequence of such grave disruptions in society, where cultures even have a higher rate of clash when minority groups have a vague description of the own identity. These disruptions affect those who have a vague notion of identity to traumatize out of public life, which is then criticized and questioned. At these intersecting roads usually 'national claims' start crystallizing in the souls and minds of the intellectuals and/or deviant religious groups.

Nye describes that social disruptions can have a mobilizing effect on social groups that are still in a process of identity search. Therefore, the partisan involvement of the Muslim identity by way of representation in alienated and disconnected societies is a legitimate need. The disrupted religious minority feels the prerequisite to voice its communal securities and complaints.²¹ The argument that the Muslim actor is incompatible and problematic with the political participation and representation, is easily counter argued due to Muslims being present in established political parties in democratic societies. Yet the lack of unified institutional efforts in society addressing populist narratives, as well as terrorism and extremism are experienced as silent acceptance.

¹⁹ S Jr and Welch David, 'Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation', 72.

²⁰ Ibid

²¹ Ibid

Today populist far right groups have made it into the National parliaments. In the Netherlands it is the PVV²², in Austria it is the FPÖ, in Belgium the NVA, in France the NF, in Germany the AfD and the list goes on and recently in Sweden. The populist far right parties are ideological in their perceptions and attitudes concerning future policy-making on behalf of the Muslim minorities.²³

For Freedom Populism is an ideology that hasn't matured in absolute terms into a true ideology. However, populism around Europe is expanding its influence in points of administrative access to the most important democratic institutions of decision-making, such as the National parliament. This gradual expansion is a cause for concern for the future of minorities in general.²⁴ Against this background the Muslim agent hasn't matured either into a self-evident institution creating a point of access in decision-making as well as to provide content on issues that involve the future and wellbeing of its own community.

Van Klingerén argues that attacks such as on 9/11 in the States, 7/7 in United Kingdom, the murder of T. Van Gogh in the Netherlands have had social consequences in Europe. Van Klingerén claims that the citizenry in Europe moved away from the economic argument to a cultural argument wherein the citizens have become more concerned with the possibility of losing their own cultural, ethnic and national identities.²⁵ Therefore, the open and accepting zeal of European citizenry has shifted into a closed,

²² The Party of Freedom, run by the political leader Geert Wilders

²³ See table xii

²⁴ Michael Freedon, 'Political Concepts and Ideological Morphology', *Journal of Political Philosophy* 2, no. 2 (1994): 140–64.

²⁵ Marijn Van Klingerén, Hajo G. Boomgaarden, and Claes H. De Vreese, 'Going Soft or Staying Soft: Have Identity Factors Become More Important Than Economic Rationale When Explaining Euroscepticism?', *Journal of European Integration* 35, no. 6 (2013): 689–704, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2012.719506>.

disruptive attitude with fear and embroiled with feelings of threat, what now can be perceived as Euro scepticism.

Euroscepticism is inherently connected to populist ideologies.²⁶ Freedon (1996) describes a three-tiered construction for ideologies as being core, adjacent and peripheral. Thick ideologies are encompassing and able to produce policies for societal struggles whereas thin-centred ideologies such as populism are inadequate non-comprehensive in their visions and policies. Therefore, populism can effortlessly adapt to being prejudiced, bigoted, xenophobe, sexist, anti-Europe, and neoliberal, authoritarian, anti-Semitic as long as it serves its purposes. Populism doesn't have to be coherent²⁷ because it easily parasites itself to mature ideologies.²⁸

1.3 Contemporary arguments on Religious Identity versus Politics

For Ruth Braunstein the Western world has become dichotomous as the 'us' and 'them'. On one side secular, liberal and 'Judeo-Christian' and on the other side the Muslims and Jews.²⁹ Braunstein regards religion as an imperative factor for a valid political survival and is a fundamental part of identities. Therefore, it is not if 'religion' is an indicator in political attitudes, but the true question for Braunstein is 'how religion matters'.³⁰ Yet, she observes an escalation of national and international policing that threatens belonging of religious identities. The Muslim identity as a group exists and

²⁶ Benjamin Leruth and Nicholas Startin, 'Between Euro-Federalism, Euro-Pragmatism and Euro-Populism: The Gaullist Movement Divided over Europe', *Modern & Contemporary France* 25, no. 2 (2017): 9, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09639489.2017.1286306>.

²⁷ John Gerring, 'Ideology: A Definitional Analysis', *Political Research Quarterly* 50, no. 4 (1997): 957–94, <https://doi.org/10.2307/448995>.

²⁸ Cas. Mudde and Cristóbal. Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism in Europe and the Americas Threat or Corrective for Democracy?* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2012).

²⁹ <https://tif.ssrc.org/2016/10/04/the-politics-of-national-identity-introduction/> (Access: May 2017)

³⁰ Ibid

it is real; it is inspired by Islamic teachings, its societal, ethical, and political cognitive drawings.³¹ As Muslim countries such as Turkey use Islamic images and institutions; this is a natural way to commonness into the community by identity awareness. Islam as a religion may construct an awareness in the European political and cultural order.³²

Identity is an important 'frame' that functions to mirror the self and social situation to recognize and compare.³³ For a comprehensive frame of awareness it is essential for actors to engage in intentional, conscious pooled efforts of ethics, justice to develop and work out processes social and economic ends. Such an endeavour needs a communal effort on a cognitive level to assess its interests and actions in the society, the state.

1.4 The theory: Constructivism

This research is based on the real and physical existence of Muslim communities in liberal and secular established democracies in Western Europe. Liberalism is inherent to being open, plural and tolerant. As this liberalism may be true, in the words of Walzers³⁴ for the 'old world', it seems to bear flaws according to Modood³⁵. An important criticism in this line of thought is that liberalism and secularism are social constructs that were born as reactions against the notion of 'religion'. In other words, the liberal-secular democratic existence is not inclusive as it is supposed to be for the religious existence.

³¹ M. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (Oxford etc. : Oxford University Press, 2003), 4.

³² *Ibid.*, 5.

³³ *Ibid.*, 6.

³⁴ Brian Barry, "*Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Will Kymlicka," *Ethics* 107, no. 1 (Oct., 1996): 20.

³⁵ Tariq Modood, "*What is multiculturalism and what can it learn from interculturalism?*" *Journal of Intercultural Studies*. (2016): 480-489.

Another important scholastic approach is the work of Lijphart, who explained social cleavages by way of vertical pillars or also called pillarization. This pillarization suggested, as this has happened in the Netherlands during the sixties and seventies a de-pillarization. However, this notion of de-pillarization is under scrutiny from the constructivist perspective. Constructivism argues that neo-liberalists and neo-realists can explain the increase of conflict, yet neither would be able to explain a reduction in conflict. For some scholars such as Mercer theories such as the Social Identity Theory (SIT) are models that defend a neo-realist position.³⁶ Yet, SIT is also very useful for constructivists. Where SIT explains in-group favouritism and out-group bias, it also favours the construction of stable identities. Group memberships may hold individuals true to their shared values and commit to social roles that are stable and predictable.

Peter Berger realised that the secularist theory was too early in its victory over the dead and discarded religion. So 'religion' made a re-entry into the Western Secular and liberal societies by way of migration. As religion was back on the social and political agenda, the initial social reflex was to embrace this shift as the multicultural society. Yet, this reflex shifted once again right after 9/11 and showed fractures. Scholastic literature has exhaustive references about the association between religion and violence.³⁷ Nevertheless, the question remains to be answered whether religion is the cause of conflict or whether there are other causes, since this association mostly remains a normative and descriptive argument.

Social Identity Theory attains individuals and groups as the name of the theory suggests social identities. These social identities in return have a fundamental function in improving the confidence and the self-esteem of the individuals. Individuals being members of their own groups, naturally engage in comparison of their own attributes with those of other groups. Such continual comparisons aid the sense of being a unified

³⁶ Jonathan Mercer. Anarchy and identity. *International Organization*, 49(2), 229-252. doi:10.1017/S0020818300028381

³⁷ ³⁷ Jeremy Menchik, *The Constructivist Approach to Religion and World Politics*, vol. 49, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.5129/001041517821273035>.

body. While according to SIT, the own group is called the in-group, the other groups with which comparison takes place are called the out-groups.

Every group has thus a common and shared set of visible and invisible attributes that constitute the ‘social identity’ of the group. These attributes are the features of the groups that describe the individuals, the members of the groups. These descriptive attributes are those visible distinctive markers that separate one group from the others. Other attributes that are prescriptive are attributes that determine the behaviour and cognitive processes. So, all members of the same group have more or less shared ideas and salience according to these ideas and beliefs. Other attributes according to SIT are the evaluative attributes, these are the way the group members compare their own groups to other groups.³⁸ Ted Hopf puts it brilliantly that identities are very functional in the social environments and the groups individuals reside in: identities describe the individual who he is, it describes to others who he is, and describes to the individual who others are.³⁹

In Consociational theory Arend Lijphart perceives groups in the public domain as pillars. Every group being a pillar in the public domain embodies a unique group with its own characteristics, norms, values and beliefs. The differences between these pillars helps members as well as others there are differences.

Lijphart, does not however put in his consociational theory the notion of identity as a central point of debate. However, for Lijphart the consociational arrangement implies that every nation should be entitled to self-determination in order to preserve their group identity. Referring to a method to give certain rights to groups within the existing state; this by autonomy than sovereignty.⁴⁰ Lijphart’s terrain of study was the political

³⁸ Tajfel, Henri, ‘The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior’, 1981, 15.

³⁹ Ted Hopf, ‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory’, *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998): 171–200, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539267>.

⁴⁰ Arend Lijphart, *Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice* (Routledge, 2007), 66.

setting of the Netherlands in the last century. Especially religious as well as ideological groups were fiercely struggling and striving for power. While there were fierce battles in the streets between the group's members, where cleavages were so deep that one group would not read newspapers of the other or join their football clubs. Against this bottom image, Lijphart observed that the elites, the leaders of the groups had a key function in representing their own groups. The biggest challenge concerning power-sharing was mainly the point that the largest group controlling the resources, such as decision-making, the bureaucracy determined what was to be understood national identity.⁴¹ Obviously, this one-sided definition of the Dutch identity was unacceptable for the rest of the heavily separated pillars. Yet, the rest of the pillars in the public domain had no choice but maintain subnational identity.

The power struggles and the deep rifts in the society and the backlashes in sabotaging policies were unhealthy for the common good and the elites were inevitably led to negotiate with each other. Elites realized that none of the groups would be in a position to grow and fully represent the grievances and interest of the own group members. These negotiations brought about agreements amongst the elites to form a government, share the power, within the consociational institutions, by way of proportional representation and the formation of grand coalitions. These coalitions were the basis of the Dutch-model where the elite negotiation on the top of the pillars led to cooperation, by way of compromise.

Contrary to the consociational theory, the constructivist model places as the main agent in the public domain, the actor 'identity'. This is a main reason why constructivism is chosen in this research. According to the constructive theory there are various layers; they are in multitude, on top of each other, stacked as layer after the other and they overlap each other. The constructivist theory perceives the public domain from a perspective of the individual with having common identities stretching from sub-

⁴¹ Neal G Jesse, *Identity and Institutions* (Ithaca, US: State University of New York Press, 2005), 117.

national level to the regional, national, and supranational.⁴² So there are no deep cleavages that separate the groups and their members from each other but bring individual members together as bricks in a wall without separation. Then, a person with a distinct identity may become a member of a religious group, share a faith-based identity, but also be a member on a regional level, and have an overlap in ethnic, national terms and might even perform overlap in supranational forms of identity.⁴³

Similarly, the constructivist theory can perceive identities and institutions in a similar stacked, layered overlapping organization. In the political domain, the parliament as a representational institution is such a layer. It possesses a hierarchical structure with other local, regional, national and supranational institutions. All these institutions are layered on top of each other. Then, the constructivist theory suggests that the layers stacked as with institutions represent also the multi-layered attribute of identity. In the same way as there are layers with institutions, there are multiple layers in the relationship between the institutions and identities. Thus, the existence of multi-layered institutions supports and creates overlapping identities. The institutions strengthen the multitudinous of the identity.

In this research the theoretical proposition of two constructivist researchers, Neal G. Jesse and Kristin P. Williams is used as a central theorem. Jesse and Williams wrote the book 'Identity and Institutions' wherein the constructivist multi-layered position of institutions and identities is used to reduce social tensions and conflicts in the public domain. Their research is significant for the constructivist empirical field due to the fact the researchers suggest the reintroduction or the introduction of 'identity' as a variable in the field of research in political sciences. Jesse and Williams criticize

⁴² Ibid., 57.

⁴³ Ibid., 117.

Lijphart's consociationalist theory, as it does not use 'identity' as an explanatory variable.⁴⁴

According to Jesse and Williams it is not inherent to Lijphart but political sciences in general assumed the concept 'identity' as belonging to the fields of sociology, anthropology. Besides this critique Jesse and Williams, argue that identity cannot be assumed as a fixed and unchangeable factor. For constructivist theorists assuming identity as fixed has grave societal and political consequences.

From this constructivist frame *identity* as a variable may function as explanatory in relation to perceptions, ideas and attitudes of individuals. On basis of the constructivist theory, as posited by Jesse and Williams minority groups, inspired by their distinct identities should be accommodated in representation and power-sharing through democratic institutions. Or tensions could advance into public imminent conflicts.

Therefore, participation in layered institutions is a key argument in the amelioration of multiple identities to promote and support the enabling of adapted identities that eventually cause a reduction of tensions and conflict. The focus of this research lies for that reason in the question what the attitudes and perceptions are of Muslim individuals in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Whether the Muslim identity is one that is fixed⁴⁵ and rigid as suggested by the populist narrative, as one that is segregant and root cause of conflict.⁴⁶ Or whether the attitudes and perceptions of Muslim individuals show significant overlap in their perceptions of other identities.

⁴⁴ Jesse, Neal G., and Kristen P. Williams. 2005. *Identity and institutions: conflict reduction in divided societies*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

⁴⁵ Renate Ysseldyk, Kimberly Matheson, and Hymie Anisman, 'Religiosity as Identity: Toward an Understanding of Religion From a Social Identity Perspective', *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 14, no. 1 (19 January 2010): 60–71, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868309349693>.

⁴⁶ Nick Hopkins, 'Dual Identities and Their Recognition: Minority Group Members' Perspectives', *Political Psychology* 32, no. 2 (2011): 251–70.

Suggesting that multitude of identities can function as an indicator for the willingness to live in harmony and peace. The assumption of the consociational theory is the assumption that every 'ethnic group' – as groups are termed in the consociational theory - is a pillar where every pillar is heavily alienated of other groups. Which is why a possibility to overlap with other identities is not considered.⁴⁷

Jesse and Williams argue that institutions that allow and support multiple identities and their representation, the process will lead to trust, and allow sincere policies as a result of pooling of sovereignty. This support would lead then to more openness and acceptance and reduce conflict due to equal access to resources. Such an atmosphere would cause strict definitions of the self and the other to loosen the grip. The old images of enemy would transform into images of allies.

1.5 Research Methodology

In this section the purpose, the objectives of this research problem is discussed in its methodological techniques. In the focus of this research lies the perceptions and the attitudes of the so-called 'Muslim identity' and whether it can be considered as a complex composition. All the while the underlying question is why this Muslim identity complexity has a soft and participating attitude or why it has a conflicting approach towards the political institutions in the comparison of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The question is, *is the Muslim identity compatible with political institutions?* Or on the contrary is this Muslim identity *incompatible*, foreign and thus an unqualified human agent in the public arena? This research for that matter studies behaviours, attitudes and views of the Muslim agent concerning political participation filtered by the Islamic locus.

As 'identity' and 'institutions' are primary variables in this research, looking for whether a correlation exists between the two and Muslim perception being single, rigid or multiple and complex. This attitude of readiness and open attitude towards overlapping identities would be a strong indicator for Muslim representation and

⁴⁷ Jesse, *Identity and Institutions*, 5.

participation. Then the question is whether the Muslim identity feels accommodated and supported in its attitudes. If all expectations statistically met, there may be grounds for optimism in social peace and the reduction of conflict.

This research will be a *triangulation* for a more reliable and valid outcome. The purpose of choosing a *convergent parallel sequence* where both quantitative and qualitative research independently take place will deliver a deeper and better understanding. After qualitative data is collected and coded, it will be discussed in chapter four.

The above described constructivist theory by Jesse and Williams will be tested in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom that are considered as the most advanced democracies. Respectively 1.210.000 and 4.130.000 Muslims live in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Both countries have strong diverse Muslim communities. The United Kingdom has a rich and vocal subcontinental Muslim community in cosmopolitan areas. The Netherlands provides many constitutional political rights to its Muslim citizens. For these reasons these two countries are selected to test and conduct a quantitative as well as qualitative method of research.

To have a random, representative and valid research, at least 385 participant responses in each country are needed to be collected for the quantitative part of the research.⁴⁸ Rawi Abdelal argues in his book 'Measuring identity' that a mix of quantitative and qualitative research methods will provide the best results. For reasons of better results, a separate qualitative research will be conducted with at least ten interviewees.

Is political trust in the Netherlands and United Kingdom an explanatory factor for religious and political institutional attitudes of Muslim citizens in relation to their conflict or peace perceptions?

Self-categorization or SCT theory forms the essence of identity research, wherein the uniqueness of the individual is the unit of measure which means that the research

⁴⁸<http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/29/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe/> (Accessed: September 2017)

design is based on the perceptions and attitudes of the individual.⁴⁹ In SCT the assumption is that behaviour shapes along the same lines as the in-group content, so the primary identification is contingent with the norms and values and expectations of the in-group content.⁵⁰ On basis of this assumption, the survey will be spread randomly among individual participants who can voluntarily participate in the research.

1.6 Hypotheses

The hypotheses in this research will be tested in the selected two countries; the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Both countries are consolidated-democracies with a long history of democratic liberties and democratic institutionalization. At the same time both countries have a significant Muslim presence. In this research various correlations will be tested between variables such as *Muslim identity* based on centrality and salience scales, *institutions*, *identities*, attitudes in qualitative and quantitative terms. To ensure random, representative, valid and a reliable research existing scales or researchers such as Roccas and Brewer and Onay will be used to look for associations and relations between variables.

Correspondingly a qualitative research in the form of in-depth interviews with Muslim elites in the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom will be conducted. Expectantly the qualitative part of the research will prove or in the worst case will disprove the former quantitative part of the research.

H1	The politicians' trust correlates with religious attitudes;
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⁴⁹ Duane F. Alwin et al., 'Measuring Religious Identities in Surveys', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 70, no. 4 (2006): 537, <https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfl024>.

⁵⁰ R. M. Levine and S. D. Reicher, 'Making Sense of Symptoms: Self-categorization and the Meaning of Illness and Injury', *British Journal of Social Psychology* 35, no. 2 (1996): 245–56, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8309.1996.tb01095.x>.

H2	The religious attitudes correlate with political institutional salience and civic duties;
H3	The politicians' trust correlates with soft and hard approach;

Sub-questions

- How is religious identity debated in the existing academic literature? In this context what is the degree of religiosity and multiplicity in relation to the Muslim identity in existing literature?
- What is the nature of the problem in terms of rigid Muslim identity, or the debate on fixed and single Muslim identity in terms of general European sentiments?
- Is the attitude and perceptions of the overlapping Muslim identity negating political institutions? Or is it a tolerant and even acknowledging identity?
- Is Muslim identity salient with power-sharing (pooling of sovereignty) in modern democracies?
- Does the Muslim identity have conflict reducing dimensions?

This research will compare various Muslim individuals in the public domain as well as the Muslim elite' perceptions and attitudes. Especially the way they these groups perceive Muslim identities in relation to political participation, as to how this perception relates to perceptions of reduction of tensions in the society.

1.7 Framework of Measuring Hypotheses

Since the debate on identity is not new, there have been multiple studies concerning the measure of the effects of religious identity on human behaviour and attitudes. In this section the main questions and the methodology are debated for the sake of reliability and validity. There are two methods of research being used in this research. Both quantitative and qualitative methods are used. Main constructs to include in the questionnaire for the quantitative research are: Centrality of religion, Muslim identity,

identity complexity, salience of Muslim identity, attitudes of civic engagement to participate in political institution and attitudes towards conflict or cooperation. One way to ensure and achieve a higher reliability and validity is the usage of mixed methods quantitative (survey) and qualitative research methods.

The reliability of the research involves the random methodology used in the research concerning the sample construction. In this research the population are the Muslim individuals in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Multiple channels of approach have been used to reach a random sample frame, which is due to the fact that there are no readily available lists of the populations. The degree of representativeness of these datasets have been achieved by randomly repeating the same methods until a valid minimum of respondents are achieved. For the quantitative research method, a multistage sampling method is used where the questionnaire is randomly distributed to existing and listed organizations by way of telephone calls, e-mails, social media and snowball as well as techniques of random selection of venues are used to collect data. For the qualitative method a list of influential community leaders has been constructed. From these base lists, a random selection has occurred and contacted these interviewees. The lists have been complemented by using the snowball technique and reused for random selection of potential interviewees.

This process of random selection has been repeated until saturation of information has occurred. The method of theoretical framework is conducted on basis of in total 24 in-depth interviews in both countries. The interviews are semi-structured due to the existence of a theoretical framework.

The validity of the research instruments involves the question whether the items and scales used in this research do measure the variable as postulated in this chapter. In order for the method to test the hypotheses in this research, these are stooled on

existing theories and studies such as the *social identity complexity theory*.⁵¹ In this research one of the methods used was developed by Brewer and Roccas and employed in their own studies. I have had the pleasure of contacting Mrs. Brewer and having been able to communicate with her on how and why the scale was used. Brewer and Pierce also discuss further in their article in 2015 the methodology where the overlap between multiple group identities are measured within in-groups. According to Brewer it is considered to have *high complex identity* when the simultaneous member of the multiple in-groups are aware and acknowledge the differences and distinctions between the in-groups and still can remain as members of these various in-groups.⁵² This *high complex* composition of the multiple identities predicts inclusiveness and tolerance. It considered *low complex identity* when a member of various in-groups do not make the distinction between in-groups and they converge the multiple identities to a single dimension. It is this convergence of the *low identity complexity* that predicts exclusive attitudes. Their research employs the attributes and boundaries to determine the membership of an in-group. So, it is the individual member's self-perception of its overlap between the memberships of the in-groups. Brewer embeds the research methodology thus in the cognitive and motivational factors, which then predicts a reduced in-group favouritism.

The Brewer-survey is a written questionnaire that lets respondents to provide from self-perceived approach to whether they belong to any groups. Brewer then ask, in case the respondent answers affirmative to elaborate by way of an open-ended question to assess the ability whether the memberships of the respondents are simultaneous.

⁵¹ Marilyn B. Brewer and Kathleen P. Pierce, 'Social Identity Complexity and Outgroup Tolerance', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 31, no. 3 (2005): 428–37, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167204271710>.

⁵² Marilyn B Brewer, Karen Gonsalkorale, and Andrea van Dommelen, 'Social Identity Complexity: Comparing Majority and Minority Ethnic Group Members in a Multicultural Society', *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 16, no. 5 (2013): 530, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430212468622>.

Prof. Dr. Marilyn Brewer agreed in our brief communication to send me the survey questions. Once Brewer had established the multiple memberships of the respondents she would ask the respondents to *order* their most important identities to establish whether the respondent is able to perceive the differences of the various multiple identities. According to Roccas and Brewer members of multicultural societies are much more inclined to approach multiplicity positively. As Brewer this research too, uses correlation and regression analyses to establish association and relation.

Expected Outcomes

In this research the Brewer-construct is used to assess the complexity by way of ordering the so-called multiple identities of respondents of various in-groups such as social-religious identity and groups as well as the Western society item such as the national identity as the national in-group. Therefore, this construct is adopted and adapted to the target populations. Thus, it is expected to perceive members with high identity complexity to have more positive attitudes and association towards political activities, such as voting, political parties and elections.

1.8 Conceptual Model



Roccas and Brewer observed that different societies with different multicultural backgrounds reacted in unexpected ways. Less diverse society showed less complex social identities. They showed overlap with their own national identity and religious identity but were compared to multicultural societies a much less complexity.⁵³

⁵³ Brewer, Gonsalkorale, and van Dommelen, 'Social Identity Complexity: Comparing Majority and Minority Ethnic Group Members in a Multicultural Society'.

An important concern to use standard methods of measure of religiosity of various faiths around the world. An example is the way Christian identity is measured; Duane has developed a scale that is fairly relevant to the Christian faith and content but for example not Islamic identity.⁵⁴ Therefore, in this research some existing scales such as that of Abu-Rayya are borrowed and adapted. Abu-Rayya for example, suggests three dimensions for religious identity that is assumed to cover all faith-based religions: (a) *Religious Affirmation and Belonging*, (b) *Religious Identity Achievement*, (c) *Religious Faith and Practices*.⁵⁵ Abu-Rayya intends to establish a reliable valid measure as he calls Multi-Religion Identity Measure (MRIM). This research distinguishes itself by not using scales developed for denominations. It is this attitude that I borrow from Abu-Rayya. Whereas Duane's scale includes items such as 'Belief in Biblical literalism', 'word of God as is literally', 'Belief in an afterlife', 'Frequency of prayer day', and frequency of church services?'.⁵⁶ These are not usable for my research.

In this research the Muslim identity scales uses the Ahmet Onay's questionnaire that serves the purpose of this research as the best. It needs to be modified according to fit this research. Onay refers in his research to scales developed by Prof. Dr. M.E. Köktaş, who based his items on the research of the brilliant sociologist Hans Mol.

The questionnaire in this research will include socio-demographic questions such as *age, gender, ethnic background, education and income*. However, this research will not look at ethnicity as such, using measure of differences whether race is an independent variable. Nonetheless, other variables such as gender and education and identity are looked at for differences in the means by variance tests such as the t-test or in case if necessary tests such as the ANOVA test. Yet, I expect that the t-test will

⁵⁴ Hisham Motkal Abu-Rayya, Maram Hussien Abu-Rayya, and Mahmood Khalil, 'The Multi-Religion Identity Measure: A New Scale for Use with Diverse Religions', *Journal of Muslim Mental Health* 4, no. 2 (2009): 125.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 126.

⁵⁶ Alwin et al., 'Measuring Religious Identities in Surveys', 539.

yield adequate since both tests produce the same results. Further where relevant correlation and regressions analyses will be conducted to test the hypotheses.

In the survey a five-point Likert scale in agreement will be used. For salience – religiosity a factor analysis will be conducted. The Onay-scale provides best basis to borrow items such as the six fundamental principles of Islamic faith and five pillars of Islam, which are used in this survey. Onay refers to the items in Köktaş's research concerning religiosity. Köktaş refers and borrowed some of Konrad's items in designing his survey. In this research, religious variables such the five 'Pillars of Islam' (*Shahada, Salaat, Fasting, Zakat and Hajj*), six pillars of Islamic Faith (*Faith in Allah, Prophets, Angels, Books and Day of Resurrection*), centrality, salience are used. Consequently, variables for religious identity, political institutions and political actor's trust are employed to measure association and regression amongst these variables.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORY OF IDENTITY AND INSTITUTIONS

“They are living in a world which belongs to others, and obey rules made by others, a world where they are orphans, strangers, intruders or pariahs” Amin Maalouf

This chapter provides an account of the theories in literature on religious identity and how these relate to the position of minorities in Western democracies. The identity debate is relatively contemporary in the field of political sciences, as more work is done to bring a better understanding into the literature. The focus of this chapter is ‘religious identity’ in relation to ‘Muslim identity’ as debated by theological scholars as well as non-Muslim scholars on their views of influence on social peace through political involvement. Therefore, deliberations are confined to relevant studies with a brief touch on theological literature.

2.1 Identity Theories

Definition of the first part of this chapter narrows the debate by organizing the identity debate and its relationship to Islam. A definition of identity and its characteristic attributes by scholars is provided. The identity-discourse is diverse in its nature as there are various angles narrated by many different scholars spread over many disciplines. In this chapter the main theories of identity and the necessary elements of the concept Muslim identity is accounted on how or whether to preserve and uphold in democratic societies.

The Muslim identity is prevalent in the modern Western democracies, yet it is also a weak and divided political voice.⁵⁷ Even though other religious identities are existent, the Muslim identity is the one that is under heavy scrutiny. The terrorist attacks as well as the rapidly growing Muslim populations seem to have contributed to the disdain of

⁵⁷ Steven Pfaff and Anthony J. Gill, ‘Will a Million Muslims March?: Muslim Interest Organizations and Political Integration in Europe’, *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 7 (1 September 2006): 803–28, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414006287237>.

Islam and Muslims. Another dimension of Islam is that the majority of Muslim minorities come from different ethnic, social and economic backgrounds. Therefore, being a Muslim is considered as a theological marker. The name 'Muslim' finds its source in the Qur'an and is a driving force of all behaviour in social life. According to the 22nd chapter and 78th verse in the Qur'an: *'Allah holds the Prophet of Islam and the prior Prophets as witnesses that believers are to be called as Muslims'* (22:78).

This is the term that is designated by the Qur'an to a believer and it is this name that colours the content of the identity for those who choose to follow Islam; submission to the will of Allah. For Farid Essack the main focus of the Muslim identity lies in the meaning of this word. It is the characteristics of the word *Muslim* that defines and covers the term 'identity' and provides content to the *social group* one belongs to.⁵⁸ Whereas for Tariq Ramadan the 'Muslim Identity' debate is broader, due to do the notion of *'ummah'* that is in fact the global social group. Uniquely it is this social group that hold the Muslim identity as a member, presenting differences and separates itself from other social groups in society.

For Essack identities are contextual and thus are inherently multiple and there is a general human tendency to think that identity is fixed and unchanging, yet the reality is that identities are in constant change.⁵⁹ In Islamic philosophy the word identity refers to the 'existent' and thus is associated with the word 'truth', 'content', or 'essence'. In its translation to the ideal society the social behaviour Islam embodies is the very act of being just (as in justice) and translates back into the society as a sincere and just behaviour. This obviously changes when the 'human condition' changes this might

⁵⁸ Farid Esack, *On Being a Muslim : Finding a Religious Path in the World Today* (Oxford : Oneworld, 1999), 137–38.

⁵⁹ Farid Esack, *On Being a Muslim : Finding a Religious Path in the World Today* (Oxford : Oneworld, 1999), 137.

require ethical and strategic acts of justice whether people suffer from hunger or oppression.⁶⁰

2.2 Theory of Identity in Islam: fixed or fluid?

Debate on identity in the Islamic philosophy takes place around the XI century and is an *existential* approach.⁶¹ This approach is about the existence of objects in the outside world, perceived as a truth '*haqiqat*'⁶² and when this presence acquired characteristics in the social existence it is called *Al Huwiyya*. There are sources where the concept '*ayniyya*' is synonymous to identity.⁶³ Thus something has an identity when it represents an existing object that is also outside the mind, which means it to be included in the space of '*maqulât*' '*possibilities*' by its representation of the '*mahiyya*' (content), and because it shows the characteristics that separates it from others that it certainly is fixed and thus real.⁶⁴

Therefore, in Islamic philosophy identity was perceived as absolute whereas identity represents an existence more associated with time and space by specific characteristics. Therefore, we only can speak of the identity of something when that object is out in the social plane and in comparison, to other things shows characteristics that it separates it from others. That is why according to Ibn Rushd the study of identity is

⁶⁰ Farid Esack, *The Qur'an: A User's Guide: A Guide to Its Key Themes, History and Interpretation* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2005), 15 - 28.

⁶¹ <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/mahiyet> (Accessed: 5/2/2017)

⁶² <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/hakikat> (Accessed: 5/2/2017)

⁶³ <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/ayniyye> (Accessed: 5/2/2017)

⁶⁴ As-Saiyid As-Sarif al-Gurgani, *Kitab Al-Ta'rifat: (A Book of Definitions)* (Librairie du Liban, 1985). "el-Mâhiyye", "el-Hüviyye" and *Şerhu'l-Mevâkıf*, III, 17-18; Ebü'l-Bekâ, p. 961.

the study of the object itself and the study of the most fundamental characteristics of that object, which is ontology.⁶⁵

Fârâbî needed a term to refer 'identity', and eventually the Arabic word هو 'huwa' was coined.⁶⁶ The root of the term الهوية comes from هو. To Fârâbî huwa pointed to the unity and existence.⁶⁷ It was Fârâbî who for the first-time distinguished content (mâhiyyet) from identity (huwiyya): the content would be the existence of something on a conceptual level, and the identity the existence in the outer world. According to Farabi 'huwiyya' is the oneness, the personality, the characteristics and the individual existence that belongs to Him.⁶⁸ In conclusion for Muslim philosophers' identity was directly linked to Him (Huwa) and it meant being present. Whereas for scientists in the twentieth century such as Henri Tajfel identity is formulated as *belonging to a social group* where one shares values and norms and legitimizes its security to be able to venture into the world with confidence. When we adapt this definition and compare it to Farabi and Djurdjani we may redefine Muslim Identity as first finding faith in Allah and then belonging to the religious group.⁶⁹

According to Râgîb el-Isphahani, *Haq* in terms of faith and religion is 'real (fixed), the thing that exists in absolute terms is the true belief, being pure rid of hypocrisy deeds and complete intended word, the lasting life the true life, the one after this world. Djurdjani described the reality of something (haqiqa) is 'the thing that makes that thing'.⁷⁰ So the reality is the essence of what makes the object, the nature of the source of absolute perceiving. According to Djurdjânî, the answer to the question 'what is

⁶⁵ İbn Rüşd, Tefsîru Mâ Ba'de't-tabî'a, I, 298).

⁶⁶ Abu Nasr Al-Farabi, *Kitâbü'l-Ĥurûf*. (Bibliotheca Alexandria). No. 42. P. 111-112

⁶⁷ Abu Nasr Al-Farabi, *Kitâbü'l-Ĥurûf*. (Bibliotheca Alexandria). No. 42. P. 112-115

⁶⁸ a.g.e., s. 61-62; Atay, Fârâbî ve İbn Sina'ya Göre Yaratma, s. 15 الهوية

⁶⁹ Leonie Huddy, 'From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory', *Political Psychology* 22, no. 1 (2001): 127-56.

⁷⁰ Et-Ta'rîfât, "Haqîkatü's-Şey" al-Gurgani, *Kitab Al-Ta'rîfat: (A Book of Definitions)*.

this?’ is the content of that object, the reality of an object is that it has acquired existence in the outer realm, some of its necessary associations’ points to its personhood, and what distinguishes it from others defines its identity.⁷¹

2.3 Defining Identity

The *dialectic model* of Hans Mol is pretty much historical in its discourse. For Mol identity is a stable part of the self; not fixed as in fixed, but once identity was manifested it was described as *fairly stable*. However, Mol was also progressive in his observation and believed that in *adaptability* of identity. Literature today accept a more progressive interpretation of identity, where identity may shift according to the situational self, meaning that there is a constant reflection of the individual.⁷² Mol was genuinely ahead of his time and placed a link between identity and religion. He attained religion a determining role in the manifestation of identity in three levels: personal, group and social levels.

Sheldon Stryker stated that individuals could have multiple identities.⁷³ Yet the main question for Stryker was, "How an individual perceived itself in relation to its particular *beliefs, rituals, ideology, group involvement and specific attitudes?*" Stryker then summed up the interrelated features of this multiple layers of the identity. This stacking up of the various layers of identity was for Stryker the best description of the individual self. Social psychologists analyse multiple identities across the three continuums: the cognitive, the behavioural and the affective.⁷⁴ In that order the six fundamental principles of the Islamic faith and the five pillars of Islam similarly are distributed over the three dimensions.

⁷¹ a.g.e., “el-mâhiyye” md.

⁷² Stone, 1970; Hewitt, 1997; Baron and Byrne, 1997.

⁷³ Sheldon Stryker and Peter J. Burke, ‘The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity Theory’, *Social Psychology Quarterly* 63, no. 4 (2000): 285, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2695840>.

⁷⁴ (Stryker, 1977; Stryker and Serpe, 1982; Brewer and Crano, 1994).

Kelime-i shahada is the declaration of faith and it constitutes of ‘Belief in Allah, Angels, holy Books and Prophets. This declaration of core principles are *cognitive principles*. The performing of prayers, fasting, alms giving, and going on hajj (pilgrimage) form the *behavioural principles*. The moral behaviour, which is strongly advised in Islam, is also related to these behavioural principles. Lastly the human expectations, belief in Allah, the here-after (both the future and the day of judgement) and fate (Qader) form the *affective principles*.

Kymlicka as a liberal place the multicultural society in the centre of his narrative where the minority groups are viewed from a moral aspect to acquire specific rights for the social groups. Kymlicka has a positive, liberal approach to promote external protection of identity against the larger society.⁷⁵ Whereas for Mahmood Monshipouri identity is self-awareness, where one has self-understanding that is associated with the self that makes the individual unique. Identity therefore is the set of characteristics or traits that are recognizable and what makes a person distinguish itself from others. These characteristics are the core values, beliefs and convictions and provide stability and harmony to the members of these social groups. These properties may aid in forming personality, the so-called personal identity that provides meaning to ‘*a person’s self-understanding in*’ personal and social interactions.⁷⁶

For Charles Taylor these characteristics and distinguishing markers may all be called as the ‘essential self’.⁷⁷ In a way Taylor brings in the inevitability of an individual to separate itself from its core self. An identity is the self-conception that interacts with

⁷⁵ Keith Banting, ‘Accommodating Cultural Diversity’, *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 31, no. 1 (1 February 2010): 5, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01434630903251112>.

⁷⁶ Mahmood Monshipouri, *Muslims in Global Politics* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 3–4, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt3fj34s>.

⁷⁷ Charles Taylor, ‘*Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*’. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). 177.

the outside world causing others to conceive that identity: it is what we understand of ourselves and others. Therefore, an identity chains the inner world (personal) to the social realm.⁷⁸

Identities translate the individual's self-conception and how this constructs its self-esteem. The individual's self-esteem then reflects back to how others know, judge and value the perceptions and behaviour of that individual. It is this '*essential self*' that Taylor labels as the *human agent*, what he calls the 'selfhood' where his approach is also from the positive perspective.⁷⁹ Taylor stresses in his narrative how the 'good' is being pictured through this identity. For Taylor this identity grows into that 'good' as perceived by others. He too categorizes identity as a *moral argument* that seeks answers and brings the individual to the existential question of the '*meaning of life*'. From this perspective identity is a moral matter at hand that has much implications for the person as well as the society as a whole.

For Taylor this *selfhood* is not just an inner thing that belongs to our personal characteristics, but is a determining factor shaping our perception of both self and society. It is in this society where Taylor's '*politics of recognition*' comes into view.⁸⁰ The consequence of selfhood is the existence of a group that is unique, it morally deserves a good life than it must continue to exist and manifest itself. The contrary image where this unique group doesn't get the chance to develop a good life is immoral. Unique identities are to be acknowledged, accepted, and celebrated. An important part of the debate is that this recognizable *personal identity* is contingent (dependent) meaning that this identity might mean to be inconsistent and unstable where: characteristics that defines a person can be ameliorated (improved) over time.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 4.

⁷⁹ Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 1989), 3.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 150.

Whereas ethnic or national identity remains as a constant factor as a person is a member ethnically or nationally.

For Tajfel '*religious identity is a part of a person's social identity, therefore it is also a part of an individual's self-understanding*'.⁸¹ This self-definition comes from an individual's own awareness of its membership of an in-group, along with the core values and emotional importance that is given to that membership'.⁸² In Tajfel's theory individuals are attained a strong self-sufficiency in picking religious elements where one chooses self to affiliate with. Therefore, religious identity is neither something that is prearranged (meanings imposing such as in prior identities) nor is this identity entirely free (individuals are free in making a choice in terms of religious identity in reference to the religious upbringing).⁸³

For Turner and Tajfel belonging and ownership are emotions that by means of membership of a social group are obviously recognized and approved. On a smaller level_such a social group fulfils an important function and stimulates self-understanding and improves self-esteem. But when the social group or a wider public society disapprove reject the members of a society it leads to negative emotions. Negative emotions result in infringement of relationships and would connect others who feel disowned into groups that may be labelled as gangs or fringe parties.

For Turner and Tajfel one cannot deny the effects of the emotional and cognitive understanding of *the self* as an essential part and representative of a distinct group. The sociological perspective on identity is that it has a uniting but also dividing effect; causing an in-group identity from an out-group identity.

⁸¹ Tajfel, Henri, 'The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behaviour'. International Social Sciences Council. (Cambridge University Press, 1974). Pp. 65 - 93

⁸² Ibid., 255.

⁸³ Abu-Rayya, Abu-Rayya, and Khalil, 'The Multi-Religion Identity Measure: A New Scale for Use with Diverse Religions'.

Literature suggests that identities are superordinate where complexity of identities may be physical, ethnic, social, and cultural and have an existential meaning and thus belonging. As layers of identities may be compatible with each other there is always the risk that layers of identities or certain features may be incompatible with each other. This may come into existence when the markers demand complete and unconditional loyalty'.⁸⁴ It is expected that multiple identities when experiencing social, cultural tension in the inner or external world is to trade-offs.

Ramadan describes a Muslim in exactly the same way as the Muslim literature depicts a Muslim, one who submits to Allah peacefully. By pronunciation of the faith (Shahada) one testifies to Allah and His Messenger Mohammed.⁸⁵ For Ramadan this testimony is also a worldview that complicates a description for the Muslim identity in multicultural and secular societies. In this sense the Muslim Identity consists of what in the Islamic teaching is called the *Shahada*. The *Shahada* has a profound significance meaning that the person declares to be a member of the Islamic faith. While on one side the *Shahada* connotes the individual conviction and a choice as part of the belief, it is also a connection to the social group for accepting the teachings of Islam. This social group in Ramadan's discourse is *the Umma*; this is as Ramadan argues the nation or the wide group that represents Islam. Thus, for Ramadan *Shahada* is the primary essential bond that institutes the divine as well as the social life of the believer. Besides this, the *shahada* can be independent of a membership of smaller sects, group belonging, or attitude of practice. All these elements constitute in the discourse of Ramadan '*faith, practice and spirituality*'. Therefore, for Ramadan the Muslim identity concedes in terms of *Shahada* the faith as well as the salience in daily life. However, for Ramadan this religious identity usually is meshed up with the cultural dimensions of various Muslim cultures that exist around the world.

⁸⁴ Nigel Grant, 'Some Problems of Identity and Education: A Comparative Examination of Multicultural Education', *Comparative Education* 33, no. 1 (1997): 14.

⁸⁵ Tariq Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam* (Oxford University Press, 2003), 76.

Ramadan adds to Shahada which forms the centrality of conviction of faith, the salience as well as the *vocabulary* of Islamic conceptions. This vocabulary is a feature that is shared and embraced by the members of this religious identity and allows the *umma* its unique collective attribute.⁸⁶ This worldwide group is massive collective that has its unique essential self. This ‘essential self’ that can be found and is shared in this colossal *umma* is not inhibited dimensions such as race or ethnicity. Thus, the *umma* is comparable with Tajfel’s in-group where the individual selfhood is enmeshed with the transnational character of the religion. *Umma* in the literal sense of the word means a *community* with a set of beliefs shared in that in-group. It refers to a group of which the attributes are mainly religious. The group shares thus ethical values as their main orientation. For Ramadan, the *umma* is the social group self. It surpasses all other markers ethnicity, race, or national boundaries.

Islam is a source of inspiration for the social group. The group has a common literature, a language and propagates common rituals, symbols and practices. However, as a religious group, it essentially is more than a mere social or cultural group. As the religious group is also a social group and has numerous cultural groups it allows and supports many collections of cultures.

2.4 Complex Identity

Tariq Ramadan joins this lively debate from an Islamic stance. He points out that a person’s identity should not account for its national loyalty. National identity should not obstruct one’s religious identity. This would be a meaningless exercise since such questions find their source in negative and oppositional definition of identity. Ramadan too views that there is a huge array of order to be able to define an identity. Looking for an answer to decide between different identities is looking for trouble; it means one must make decision between being a Muslim or another national identity. Especially in the age wherein Muslims now live such identities and affiliations that seem to be clashing. Ramadan perceives clearly this debate of identity belonging to religion and

⁸⁶ Ibid., 126.

Islamic philosophy. He focuses on the meaning of life and argues that an individual member of being 'atheist, agnostic, Buddhist, Jewish, Christian or a Muslim' cannot be encapsulated by nationality. In other words, for Ramadan the discourse on identity is an existential matter. Politics and voting are a matter concerning national affairs and not existential matters. These fields do not have to contradict each other.

Ramadan too defends that individuals may have more than one identity and may even prioritize one of the existing superordinate identities. This choice of the individual may show variance depending socio-economic human condition. Hence, while in the process of defining a new identity and trying to formulate this distinguishing feature and that uniqueness it might not be a good idea to challenge this process which could lead to a confusing situation. A situation where identities might get reduced to a worthless discussion that causes social unrest.

As Abd-Allah argues the Muslim in general is well equipped to adapt to changes in conditions.⁸⁷ This shows that Islam is able to preserve principles and yet be flexible to contexts. For Abd-Allah the *umma* is that social group that functions to provide the confidence to struggle prejudice, against its members. On the other hand, the *umma* is also a vehicle to provide solutions from within against internal disagreements. For Monshipouri there are examples for such organizations attempting to cease the opportunity to reach beyond ethnic and national boundaries and get as close as possible to the social group called *umma*. Such a social group is in this case global and can provide the Muslims with a description of their identity. For Monshipouri this attempt is universal and goes beyond transnational boundaries and creates identifiable characteristics.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ <http://www.crosscurrents.org/abdallahfall2006.pdf> (Accessed: 1/6/2018)

⁸⁸ Monshipouri, *Muslims in Global Politics*. Organizations such Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and Islamic Circles of North America (ICNA), among many others, illustrate this trend

Siobhán McPhee provides a brilliant account of how identity is structured through individual's reception of social sphere. It is being *secure* in the group, as the group functions as a source for the individual to cultivate confidence and start moving into the wider society.⁸⁹ This widening of the fields causes individuals to embrace new layers of identities. Mahmood Maalouf points out that identities of individuals are complex, this '*complexity*' is associated with factors such as 'language, belief, lifestyle, family relations etc. Malouf calls this '*multiple affiliations*' and considers it as enriching. This is the ideal and free world.⁹⁰ A world that is allowed to be diverse as a society. In this complexity of affiliations one identity seems to be dominant in a minority group as a leading affiliation. The debate on identity starts with an inner journey, yet it has immense amounts of implications for the harmony and peace in societies. There are legal, social, political and economic consequences. It is therefore not surprising that there are disagreements among Western liberal societies on the matter.

While Kymlicka is a defender of minority group's protection and internal conflicts resolution, Michael Walzer opposes Kymlicka that *cultural identity* is a private matter.⁹¹ One should not support or punish through public society. Whereas Maalouf points to the influence of the public society and that it is impossible to rule such an influence and states that minorities affiliate the most with that identification that is most *attacked*.⁹² This attack could be on the skin colour, religion, language, economic class etc. that would be an invasion on the identity in the public society. Within the group such an invasion would bring solidarity such as political mobilisation and force

⁸⁹ Siobhán McPhee, 'Muslim Identity', 2005. No.34

⁹⁰ Amin Maalouf, *In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong* (Arcade Publishing, 2001), 35.

⁹¹ Michael Walzer, ed., 'Politics and Passion', in *Politics and Passion*, Toward a More Egalitarian Liberalism (Yale University Press, 2004), 17, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1npmwc.9>.

⁹² Maalouf, *In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong*, 26.

individuals to pick sides. For those individuals who would stand up for their identity this would be an act of courage, an act of liberation.

Yuval-Davis puts more stress on *belonging* that is an invisible but an adamant bond.⁹³ One may observe in new minority groups that gravitate towards group, language, culture. She states that religion as a dominant affiliation is now visible among Muslims that connects individuals even from various countries. And when such a group that has intense bonds of belonging is to be threatened in a public society, there is a chance that it gets politicized.⁹⁴ Yuval-Davis advises where if minorities are to become part of the larger public society, it is for the common good to acknowledge that identity is a multi-layered and that groups will have multiple loyalties. Such a recognition would cause new groups to be on ease and have security and trust.

2.5 The problem of Fear of the Population

Marcus Hansen makes a generational analysis, where children born and raised in the democratic societies adhere religion instead of ethnicity or culture. Religion is a universal source that provides better answers to existential questions about identity.⁹⁵ In this context, religion functions as a lifebuoy for many individuals who feel disconnected or no feelings of belonging who were unavoidably born in a culture that wasn't theirs. So, for Hansen religion is indeed an important indicator that has stabilizing features and doesn't alter, while other forms of identity can change over the generations.⁹⁶

Therefore, it is expected that the process of self-identification for migrants and their children in democratic societies takes place in terms of religion. The early years of

⁹³ Nira Yuval-Davis, *The Politics of Belonging: Intersectional Contestations* (Sage, 2011), 10.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Derya Iner and Salih Yucel, *Muslim Identity Formation in Religiously Diverse Societies* (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015), 4.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

migration the general approach in the public spaces were negative and especially based on indicators as culture, ethnicity but not religion. It was thus culture and ethnic background that were strongly represented as forbidden in new laws as discrimination. Today discrimination based in religious affiliation is unfortunately just starting to be recognize as anti-Semitic or islamophobic. The jurisdiction still needs to catch up in preventing religious discrimination in the same way. The secular character of Western societies does have a part in this judicial as well policymaking process. Immigrants are nonetheless identified as the other group and still needs to vocalize its individual and religious identity and become aware of the unique distinctiveness as a distinguishing characteristic, as a source to define its identity.

Another, yet similar debate is the rising fear of the European citizen from the Muslim existence in Europe. Various forecasts are executed and done to prove a frightening growth of Muslim existence that could disrupt the societal, cultural, political dynamics into religious insurgencies. According to data Europe's Muslim population is projected to be *'58 million by 2030 and the United Kingdom is expected to have the largest Muslim population increase, doubling from 2.9 million in 2010 to 5.6 million in 2030 (an increase from 4.6% to 8.2%). The increase in two decades is expected to be from 4.1 million to 5.5 million in Germany and from 4.7 million to 6.9 million in France'*.⁹⁷

2.6 Theories of Institutionalization

For Charles Taylor recognition is an instrument that needs to be institutionalized and further worked out in forms of dialogue. This is a form of redefinition that Taylor postulates as his claim for dialogue. The logical reasoning has to do with the fact that for Taylor, the existence of Muslims and the institutionalization of interaction is basically about honour and dignity. It is thus the duty of being a human that it is its obligation recognize the other. The past decades were inherently periods where there were no possibilities to have open dialogues due to inequalities and disparities. Today

⁹⁷<http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-regional-europe/> (28 February, 2018)

and the future should be bright because democratic societies have the means to achieve such dialogue and thus recognition.

The Netherlands is a unique cultural and ethnic landscape where fierce struggles between ethno-religious groups were hard fought to achieve representation, fundamental democratic rights and secure living conditions. These fundamental rights were then anchored deeply in the Dutch constitution. These same fundamental rights by definition apply to ethno-religious minorities to acquire their own institutions as in schools, mosques, foundations and perhaps political parties on basis of the religious identities. Yet, the difference with the past and today is that minority groups are considered as outcasts and do not have the historical broad masses. The reality is that the Netherlands compared to other European countries provides these same fundamental rights to religious minorities, whereas in the wider Europe such fundamental rights are considered as problematic. The public debate is as volatile in the Netherlands in terms of public attacks on the Muslim identity as in the wider European democracies.

In this context scholars such as Paul Gilroy tag identity as something that divides.⁹⁸ Every individual is in fact in search of putting a description on what its identity is to be. Sometimes it functions as a mechanism of protection from others. Such an endeavour draws boundaries between oneself and the others.

The historical development of political sciences has a long tradition of deliberation on how rationalism has shaped the institutional order in the attainment of social, economic, moral and political equalities for all members the state is responsible of. This institution fundamentally being the democratic politics, it has the main characteristic to control power and mould it in a way that it provides equality to all. Today contrary to the past, religious people are judicially not considered as outcasts in liberal democracies yet the democratic deficit in terms of participation and

⁹⁸ Pfaff and Gill, 'Will a Million Muslims March?: Muslim Interest Organizations and Political Integration in Europe'.

acknowledgement of democratic values is heavily scrutinized publicly as well as politically. There ought to be negotiations in power-sharing where such public and political negotiations define disparities, inequalities and preferences of the electorate. Yet, according to March and Olsen the distinctiveness in core values in the interaction of preferences, power-sharing, and institutions frustrates the realization of political equality.⁹⁹

Institutions, yet even strongly the attitudes towards these social and political institutions are the main conditions to formulate and shape preferences of groups in democratic societies. Without the existence of institutions power would be unrestrained and political needs and demands of the people would be irrelevant. March and Olsen suggest an alternative along the lines of Jesse and Williams, something they describe as the '*integrative political institutions*' that represents the *enlightened understanding*, and empathy.¹⁰⁰ Political institutions function as the most important tools within democracies, but come it is not 'democracy' that acts, it is the human agent that acts and thinks and negotiates. In this sense, March and Olsen underline that it is the identities that need to utilize the existing capabilities and translate these definitions of the social groups. This way politics becomes interpretable and meaning can be attained for political choices which is all about trust and confidence which are equally prerequisite if a group desires political equality.¹⁰¹

This point above addresses only the issue of how to attain some political equality, but democracies also must address the degree of inequalities in economic terms. One could claim that it wouldn't be possible to have political equality when the society deals with

⁹⁹ Michael M Atkinson, 'Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics March James G. and Olsen Johan P. New York: Free Press, 1989, Pp. Vii, 227', *Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne de Science Politique* 23, no. 4 (1990): 146.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 118.

¹⁰¹ Robert A. Dahl 1915-2014, Ian Shapiro, and Grant Reeher, *Power, Inequality, and Democratic Politics : Essays in Honor of Robert A. Dahl* (Boulder Colo. etc. : Westview Press, 1988), 514.

grave economic inequalities. Therefore, March argues that institutions with built in ‘empathic’ and ‘integrative’ approaches would be necessary for political as well as economic equality. It is this empathy that appreciates the preferences of individuals.

It is the very definition of democracy to provide political equality for all even though interests and preferences of various groups differ from each other. These political institutions are obliged to present a forum to present these preferences and shape shared interests that are best formed through social processes of identity, learning, and discussion. For Dahl it is this debating and learning what makes power shared, whereas in the absence of it, power would concentrate. It is this process of institutional integrative approach that may produce a collective identity and openness in the light of interests. Probably the biggest challenge is the question of how to construct political institutions that are integrative and emphatic. Today it is this feeling of being robbed with almost all the actors in the public field that causes nationalistic power-concentration, corruption in citizenry and society. There is much need for institutions promoting agreement and by these institutions sustain diversity at a minimum cost to political equality.¹⁰²

2.7 Recognition as an Institution

Taylor’s *politics of recognition* is an important part of the narrative concerning the existence of Muslim identities in the Western democracies one finds itself in. To Taylor this politics of recognition constitutes that “*what is asked is the recognition of unique identities, their distinctiveness from everyone else*”.¹⁰³ The concept of recognition of unique identities lays in the foundation of liberal thinking. Inherently liberal societies by definition must treat minorities with policies of inclusion. This, in the discourse of Taylor is what he calls as ‘the good’, meaning that the human agent must inherently do good. Appreciation is a great good that needs to be granted for

¹⁰² Ibid., 61.

¹⁰³ Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1994), pp. 37–38

those who have been living with a certain meaning for centuries in their own needs and have constructed their unique characteristics. This should be the way even if a liberal society does not agree with certain aspects of that meaning. Besides, *identities* have the potential to define, redefine and if necessary alter its characteristics.

Since recognition must come from the *other*, this very notion of being the other inherently implies to have some degree of influence on unique identities of individuals. Taylor argues that every way we act is either of '*respect or contempt, of pride or shame*'.¹⁰⁴ It is this identity that is approved by others. Sometimes an individual is deprived of this approval and may be denied this meaning in one's own social group. Therefore, not recognizing has grave effects of distorting an individual, a social group in its very essence of being and meaning reflecting back in its self-image. This denying is in Taylor's theory the real mutilation. One may observe that nothing in a Western society may belong to such a minority group, causing it to isolate, exclude or make it a bull mark.

2.8 Responding as an Institution

Literature covers the difficulties of Muslim individuals and groups who perceive and feel the social atmosphere of living in Western countries. Some scholars consider the Muslim existence in these public spaces and their existence in terms of institutions as a matter of national security. National security implies the neo-realist perspective of being a threat to the safety of the nation. Some public debate has described mosques¹⁰⁵, conferences and even educational facilities of teaching extremism, intolerance, discrimination, militancy, and even as far as terrorism. As recently in the case of *Haga Lyceum* in the Netherlands.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.,15.

¹⁰⁵ Charles Hirschman, 'The Role of Religion in the Origins and Adaptation of Immigrant Groups in the United States', *International Migration Review* 38, no. 3 (1 September 2004): 1206–33, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2004.tb00233.x>.

Islamic education in The Netherlands, United Kingdom have come under grave social and political scrutiny. There are concerns these institutions that have been hard earned are or might become a security threat. As being potential places where young minds are trained to radicalize and thus being recruited as future terrorists.¹⁰⁶ Islamic Studies curricula are under constant reflection by agencies to thoroughly review the schools.

Ramadan, Modood, Alshayyal commonly agree that the Muslim actor is an essential partner in a debate where fear plays a great role, to address this fear by ways of exchange, interaction, the conversation and dialogue. Almost all constructivist identity scholars place a central role to interaction and conversation to take place. There are two sides as the in-groups and outgroups where destructive, disruptive behaviour can be tackled such as islamophobia but also internally undesired, damaging behaviour in the inside. This approach suggests a very conscious and trained individual that is able to redefine the meaning of it wants to live in the society. Does this need come from the individual need for form and rituals or more abstract scientific approach? It remains a big question how to celebrate cultures and identities. What the method should be for meaningful interaction between cultures and identities. Such a demand for a meaningful interaction entails to scrutinize existing understandings of societies, which may often lead to blaming of those who are different, all the while the scrutinizer who claims the norm shuns the co-accountability.¹⁰⁷

In this conversation there ought to be a distinction between reacting and responding to cultural and political existence of societal secular institutions. There is a need for a place for Islam in the multicultural fabric that should mainly be a positive approach, reinventing new approaches towards an acknowledgment and redefining shared

106 Will Kymlicka, 'Immigration, Citizenship, Multiculturalism: Exploring the Links', *The Political Quarterly* 74 (2003): 195–208.

¹⁰⁷ Abdullah A Omar, 'Islamic Identity in the Canadian Multicultural Context', *Cultural and Pedagogical Inquiry* 3, no. 2 (2012): 26.

values. Such an endeavour requires the actors to concede contrasts through shared validation and human need to be acknowledged.

2.9 Public Space as an Institution

For Nilüfer Göle the search for Muslim identity moves along the lines of public visibility. It is Göle's discourse this visibility that touches the tensions over the norms of communal life. For Göle there is renegotiation taking place through the public domain. This is the place where the Islamic ethics and secular life, modesty and piety intersect or even confront.

For Göle too, the Muslim identity is about redefine, reconnecting and remembering by being in a constant state of reflexivity, between piety, private life and day-to-day experiences. It is this social movement that brings about social tensions that require readjustments and renegotiations in various ways.¹⁰⁸

For Göle there is a constant daily testing by liberal mores and secular laws of this so-called Muslim identity that disables access of Muslims to new areas of life and where they need to put up a struggle. A specific form of Islam in Europe seems to prompt blurring Muslim claims for recognition as equal citizens while keeping their identity.¹⁰⁹ For Göle this public visibility is about confrontation and interaction.

However, Göle does connect the public to the political sphere, but the consensus-making is not done by Muslims self and the political is confrontational. Whereas the public sphere for Göle is the democratic scene where the Muslim identity visibly argues over physical space and thus its norms. These spaces in the public sphere access and thus manifestation of what the dispute is about.

¹⁰⁸ Nilüfer Göle, *Islam and Public Controversy in Europe* (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2016), 6.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.

The Muslim existence in Europe is very recent and thus not yet included formally in the democratic pluralism of Europe. The Islamic difference is not yet gained an established spot for its cultural pluralism in the context of religious freedom or personal rights discourse. Liberalism is not equipped to provide answers for the existence of Islamic identity. The liberal mind that is rational, puts out irrational reactions as fear, insecurity, invasion, phobia, humiliation, resentment and anger.¹¹⁰

For Lijphart citizenry the recognition of the individual comes first and then followed by citizenship. So, for Göle it all starts with the visibility of the Muslim in the public space as part of the society.

The contemporary public debates are pushed by the high visibility of the Muslim identity to redefine the rising fear of a loss. A loss that is perceived as a loss of European values as being under attack by all that is alien. For Göle the political atmosphere is constrained. The public atmosphere is layered as in terms of streets, but also communication technologies, controversies circulate at uncontrollable speeds, spreading to national, European and even global levels.

Public spaces are physical platforms where human interaction takes place. Some of these representations are aggravating, some of these become violent where human politics becomes more intuitive counteract against human reason and rationale. These emotional outbursts fuel in this open, democratic public platform the prejudices, angers and fears. And prejudices for Göle are emotions and opinions and do not represent the truth. Only a truthful debate can be democratic, that today is breached by political populism threatening the “enlightened public.”

Therefore, the public sphere is losing its role as a democratic platform and becoming a place of scandalous. The Islamic identity is redefining its inner self, there is an Islamic revival with its minarets, headscarf, its presence – the demand for equality,

¹¹⁰ Dr Farid Hafez, ‘Disciplining the “Muslim Subject”’: The Role of Security Agencies in Establishing Islamic Theology within the State’s Academia’, *Islamophobia Studies Journal* 2, no. 2 (2014): 9.

freedom, equal access to public and political space. With the mosque identity is also spatial dimension complicating Europe's relation to its past, as it is reminiscent of colonialism.¹¹¹

Iner and Yücel see as a solution a *mutual effort* in order to have an interaction for recognition that could bring a collective change in society. Muslims being given the necessary recognition and liberties to live their religious duties may very well construct a Muslim identity that is in congruence to ancestral as well as Western culture. Such a transformation would eventually lead to improved social spheres.



¹¹¹ Ibid.

CHAPTER THREE

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM IN THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

In the previous chapter, the theories of identity and institutional dimensions in the literature are debated. In this chapter, the actual social-political actions and events of the Muslim existence in both the Netherlands and United Kingdom will be examined. While both countries are similar as well as different from each other, there are certain characteristics that may function as a source of concern. The Muslim discourse in both countries have historical, social and political shared images yet both are very distinct from each other. Considering arguments of political *culture* and the Muslim *identity politics* have followed diverse paths of development in Britain and in the Netherlands.

This chapter focuses on the distinct characteristics of the problem of the Muslim identity and the development of the *Muslim identity through politics* in the last half century. This unfortunately is an era that compared to the last decade lacks academic attention. In this sense this chapter debates the political culture, the political engagement, institution building of the Muslim identity.

An important debate is the diversity of *theories of incompatibility* of the Muslim existence then and now. Most of this debate nowadays takes place in the general media while a small portion reflects back into the scientific debate. The Muslim existence is rarely portrayed as constructive or contributing to the society or political welfare. Loyalty of the Muslim in Europe groups is under scrutiny while immigration policies, anti-terror laws cause much disparities. Norris and Inglehart debate this very notion and trace the origins of this debate back to Huntington's provocative and contentious thesis of cultures and religions clashing.¹¹² Huntington's narrative included all the ethnic and religious violence in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Caucuses and many other Muslim geographies in the world. For him it was obvious that the Muslim

¹¹² Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, 'Sacred and Secular', *Religion and Politics Worldwide* 1 (2004): 134.

countries would fail in their development due to the identical nature of Islam around the world. For Norris and Inglehart these hypotheses of Huntington were diffused as there is no single Islamic culture around the world. Norris and Inglehart were able to collect empirical data that showed that culture did matter, yet Huntington was wrong concerning the Muslim attitudes toward democracy, because his premise was that the ‘cultural fault lines’ lay on democratic government. While Huntington was wrong in his narrative, Norris and Inglehart provide an analysis that for them make the divide evident ‘*The central values separating Islam and the West revolve around far more centrally around Eros than Demos*’.¹¹³ On the other hand there are scholars who linearly go against Norris and Inglehart, where the *Eros* is used as a synonymous for *demos* and the very same line of Huntington is construed.¹¹⁴ For Norris and Inglehart democratic rule of law is not inherent to ideological values such as that of liberal values.

For Mamdani Islam cannot be understood as a product of culture, whereas the dichotomy of ‘good and bad’ Muslim is a product of the 9/11 that has to do more with *Muslim political identities* and not to cultural or religious identities. As there couldn’t be good or bad Christians or Jews.¹¹⁵ In this context for Mamdani ‘*culture*’ has replaced ‘*ideology*’ of the Cold War thinking. Culture then became the essence of the communal group; the culture element was oddly synonym for religion and it was in that day this ‘green Peril’ of people such as Bernhard Lewis and Huntington: ‘*..that the fundamental source of [...] will not be ideological or economic. [...] it will be*

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Viivi Eskelinen and Maykel Verkuyten, ‘Support for Democracy and Liberal Sexual Mores among Muslims in Western Europe’, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 14 September 2018, 1–21, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1521715>.

¹¹⁵ Mahmood Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror* (Harmony, 2005), 15.

*cultural. Nation-states will remain the most powerful actors [...] The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics.*¹¹⁶

For Gabriele Marranci the Muslim is described as dangerous, but her agent is not the person, but the Islamic culture and identity.¹¹⁷ In this sense this identity is the European 'other' and it can't meet European expectations, because these groups build their identity that is brought from home. This is the Muslim identity that is being accepted by the host countries' national identity. Then there should also be a new identity beyond this respectively Muslim and National identity, towards the supranational, in this case the European identity.¹¹⁸ But because Muslims or Islam doesn't seem to follow hierarchical structures in terms of institutionalization in diaspora it often is considered as to be dangerous. The danger might then be in the construction of hybrid identities; identities that accentuate the differences between Islam, integration and the rest within societies as segregating. While this segregation takes place, Islamophobia emerges as an ideology that characterizes hostility of Muslims, an 'ethno-religious' exclusion and othering. Other damaging images are the homemade terrorists as the 'enemy within'. Then there is the dichotomy between the *Muslims in Europe* and the *Muslims of Europe*.¹¹⁹

3.1 Institutionalization versus Political Culture

Fiona Adamson states that the Muslim existence in Europe is not a new phenomenon, as Muslims are politically salient used by both Muslims and the state authorities.¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ Samuel P Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', *Foreign Affairs*, 1993, 22–49.

¹¹⁷ Gabriele Marranci, *Jihad Beyond Islam* (Berg Publishers, 2011), 56.

¹¹⁸ WP van Meurs, 'Branislav Radeljić, Europe and the Post-Yugoslav Space London: Ashgate, 2013 978-1-4094-5390-1', *Südosteuropa* 62 (2014): 67–69.

¹¹⁹ Kaya, 2013b

¹²⁰ Fiona B. Adamson, 'Engaging or Contesting the Liberal State? "Muslim" as a Politicised Identity Category in Europe', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 37, no. 6 (1 July 2011): 899, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2011.576193>.

Adamson too agrees that it is absurd to talk about monolithic Muslim identity around the world, yet it is a debate on how Islam is to be institutionalized in Europe. For her MCB is a healthy institutional choice for a lobby and interest group that can politically choose to activate Muslim identity when it sees fit. Another example is the Mennonites in the States, a unique in-group with the central idea to never interfere in political life.¹²¹ As a 'religious group' they are also a 'social group' due to the same functionality as an in-group that basically has a social attribute in terms of influencing the members' behaviour. For Deaux too suggests that the '*social identity theory (would) be most applicable to ethnic, religious, political, and some stigmatized identities*'.¹²² Studies confirm these observations that racial-ethnic, political indicators infer on political attitudes and perceptions.

Henri Tajfel elaborates that there are conditions that need to be met, for a social group to succeed in its function towards its members. According to this argumentation protection only comes when members of the group are positively-valued on basis of their distinctiveness. Such a crucial factor is Religion; because religion survives by its degree of stabilization in-group cohesion. This can be achieved when the group identity is preserved by what is called the 'old content', such as its doctrines, rituals, moral frameworks, role expectations and symbols. All this 'old content' forms the solid base to reconstruct identities that are alike, stable and do not change very much in their shared meaning.¹²³ There are studies explaining the religious group's changing attitudes towards political involvement. Research shows that acculturation, due to modernization, and living in modern cities, having enjoyed university education, and

¹²¹ According to Tajfel (1981, 251; see also Tajfel and Turner 1979).

¹²² Kay Deaux et al., 'Parameters of Social Identity.', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 68, no. 2 (1995): 228.

¹²³ Jeffrey R. Seul, 'Ours Is the Way of God': Religion, Identity, And Intergroup Conflict', *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 5 (1 September 1999): 558, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343399036005004>.

a greater social environment have been crucial in affecting individual member's self-conception and behaviour.

3.2 Theory of Political Culture and Muslim Identity in Western Politics

Political culture of a society according to Howard Wiarda is not something that changes easily in a short period of time. This political culture constitutes '*deep-seated ideas, beliefs, values and behavioural orientations that people have, or carry around in their heads, toward the political system*'.¹²⁴ All these deep-seated ideas are related to a nation's history. They are shared experiences and may thus be something totally different than political systems of other nations. The political culture is more or less on a national level and ought to respect the social and political culture of that nation.¹²⁵

Wiarda believes that social groups in contrast to national societies may propose perils because they do not necessarily share national culture or the political culture. Even though he does not agree with the negative or pessimistic ideas of Huntington, he too perceives that there ought to be respect towards other nations in international terms, yet there should be solidarity within the nation itself; therefore, even a migrant must adapt to the nations' political system once it becomes a member of that society. Social groups have their own culture and their own *interest-politics* and causes that brings its own dynamics into *political culture*. Actually, political culture is not a part of an individual's character but a part of a long historical, generational learning process where this culture is conveyed from one generation to the next. Wiarda states that political culture consists of all the fundamental core beliefs that is existential and is derived from one's core self, its identity. Culture and identity are thus interrelated, they answer existential questions, and thus form an individual's self-interest in politics.

However, for Wiarda this political culture is not subjugated to change, at least if there is going to be a change than that change is a very slow process. Wiarda sums up

¹²⁴ Howard J Wiarda, *Political Culture, Political Science, and Identity Politics: An Uneasy Alliance* (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2014), 1.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

political culture in terms of democratic, authoritarian, socialist, technocratic etc., and believes that urbanization, industrialization and societal modernization may have great impact on individual's political culture. Even when migrants who have different political cultures move to the West they must change by adjusting and absorbing another political culture.

Therefore, for political culture to take shape, the category forms an important pillar. Contemporary scholars are not able to ignore cultural values but attempt to rename it. There are new names now, 'identity politics' and 'constructivism'. In a way constructivism addresses the value of ideas, beliefs and it also includes religion, identity, and behaviours and attitudes; this for Wiarda sounds new, but is the same thing as understood by political culture. Therefore, Wiarda asks whether 'identity politics' isn't the same thing as 'constructivism'.¹²⁶

For Almond there are four functions to all political systems: *political socialization*, *interest articulation*, *interest aggregation*, and *political communications*. These are to be summed up as *political culture*, these were the values, beliefs, opinions, political orientations, and behaviour undergirding the political system. That is, how these values are learned or taught (political socialization); how they are articulated (interest articulation); how they are aggregated or brought together (interest aggregation); and then how they are communicated to political decision-makers (political communication)? In formulating this design, Almond relied heavily on the earlier work of cultural anthropologists.¹²⁷ In their conclusion, Almond and Verba argue that democracy requires *active citizens* and a strong, *participatory civic culture*. Education, literacy, and socioeconomic development provide an opportunity for civic culture to grow. Social trust and cooperation are absolutely required for democracy.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 164.

¹²⁷ Muhammad Shoaib Pervez, 'Political Culture, Political Science and Identity Politics: An Uneasy Alliance. By Howard J. Wiarda', *International Affairs* 92, no. 5 (2016): 66, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12720>.

3.3 Institutionalization in the Netherlands

Both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have had moments in the last five decades amongst themselves to represent their Muslim constituents. However, these grass-roots processes of institutionalizations did not have the Muslim identity assist central focus.

In five decades the migrant populations in the Netherlands as well as the United Kingdom grew where Islamic institutions arose as a part of their institutionalization in these democratic countries. Needless to say, the generational differences today become more visible in the process of institutionalization and the way different generations view their stay in these countries. The advent of Muslim institutionalization was conceived as the construction of the mosque in the Netherlands. For Landman the challenges of the time were mainly reasons such as unqualified leadership, bureaucracy, and communal economic problems. For Landman this period of migrant institutionalization is characterized by five phases: *'the immigration itself, construction of mosques, mosque-based organizations, umbrella organizations and Islamic schools, media'*.¹²⁸

All these five phases were characteristic of local and national policies that were based on the prospect of the re-emigration of the migrants to their home-countries. This is especially a period wherein the term 'Muslim' is not employed as a characterizing feature for the migrant, instead it was mainly terms such as ethnic, and cultural. The end of the seventies also marked the political awareness that the migrant was here to stay. Policies were generated to enable citizenship, such as dual-nationality and improvement of housing, employment and as Landman describes it *'adaptation and acceptance of the minorities and the Dutch majority'*.¹²⁹

¹²⁸ Nico Landman, 'Muslims and Islamic Institutions in the Netherlands', *Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs. Journal* 12, no. 2 (1991): 410.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 411.

While there was a partial (1976 – 1984) aid for the construction of mosques, a parliamentary debate in 1984 led to the debate of separation of church and state. Mosques as institutions were for Landman the landmark that shaped the Dutch political response to what later became the Dutch Islamic existence. Thus, the mosque and its physical existence stands symbol for the future Muslim institutionalization. Which was a reason for latent perceptions of anxiety due to the elevation of fundamentalist movements and violence. There was a genuine fear these movements could potentially become a threat to the Dutch society.

The Muslim mobilization in the Netherlands, did not follow the historical path of Church Communities or their legal position as churches. They primarily chose legal entities as Foundations and Associations, which were deeply divided and thus unstable.

Probably the most serious attempt in terms of Muslim institutionalization in the Netherlands was that of *the Federation of Muslim Organizations in the Netherlands* (FOMON) during the end of seventies. The attempt was unique due to the fact that such an institutionalization already took place during the seventies. Unfortunately, no matter how visionary the attempt was a common faith or common interests were inadequate in the overcoming of problems such as language or different loyalties to the home-countries.

The second strongest and well organised umbrella organization was and still is the Diyanet. Yet, Diyanet and her secular attitude has always been a source of conflict in Muslim organizational institutionalization. In that sense the Muslim landscape has a number of organizations such as the SICN, a movement that actually had originated from Turkey. This organization was considered to be the biggest rival of Diyanet. This organization was primarily very influential within the FOMON. One of the main reasons for this influence was the fact there were Dutch converts who were very capable of interaction and representation.

Another Umbrella organization was the NIF. This umbrella organization still exists and this too was developed as a chapter from Turkey. Compared to the Turkish organizations the Moroccan community was far less organized. Today there are more

small factions of umbrella organizations that are led by volunteers. The only umbrella-organization still at the moment belonging to the Moroccan imams is the UMMON.

Then there is the IOT, a more general based Turkish organization that has had great influence during the seventies and eighties. Yet the non-religious nature of its members and organizations has left the organization crippled in its distinct ethnic and social and economic representation of the Turkish community.

The Dutch governments have always required a single council of representation of Muslims in the Netherlands. Yet, such a single council has never had any success of survival. The analogy being the Council of Churches, has proven to be challenging for the authorities. With the Muslim care takers and professional Spiritual Care in the Dutch army and in prisons made the requirement of a representative body ever more necessary.

Probably the most successful of the project-based organizations was the (SPIOR) started in 1988, as an advisory Platform of Islamic Organizations in and around the city of Rotterdam. SPIOR still exists today and has had a pivotal role in launching awareness projects such Islamophobia, religious marriage and prevention of fundamentalism at schools. Another unsuccessful initiative was the attempt to establish a national confederation in 1989. It was the Rushdie-affaire that gave way to this *ad hoc* 'National Islamic Committee' in order to address the events of 1988 riots and protests towards the Dutch government.

In 2004, it was Minister Verdonk of Integration who made the real change by setting up the CMO. The CMO was the equivalent of the MCB in United Kingdom. Yet the main difference was that the CMO was funded by the Dutch government, resembling the Quilliam Foundation today in the United Kingdom. Even though the CMO had serious claims of representing the majority of the Muslims at government level, she did not enjoy much trust. It was not a visible organization for the Muslim communities and Muslim communities had no say in how this representation was.

Probably the most important institutionalization in terms of representation comes with the two political parties. The emergence of NIDA on a municipal level and afterwards the emergence of DENK as a political movement and later as an elected political party.

NIDA came into existence with a very explicit party programme where Islam is explicitly mentioned, whereas DENK is a political party that describes itself as a minority party. Besides a strongly visible MCB, Muslim communities in the United Kingdom do not have any form of political party opting for power-sharing. Due to the two-party system it isn't a viable process of institutionalization for Muslims.

3.4 Institutionalization in the United Kingdom

In Britain there were initially the UMO and FOSIS. These were not established to represent Muslims in Britain, they did share a common preoccupation with Muslim identity, and with preserving it, as well as promoting it (in the form of da'wa, the evangelical call to Islam). Whereas the Muslim 'umbrella' organisations in Britain did aim to represent and came about during 1980s and 1990s. Probably the most important difference was that the British umbrella organizations did have the support of the Muslim communities and their organisations, acknowledging the benefits of collective representation and a unified voice for their interests and engagement with the government.

Sadek Hamid places contemporary Muslim organisations under six categories: '*Salafi literalism, scholastic traditionalism, political Salafi literalism, Salafi reformism, Sufism and liberal rational reformism*'. Both countries have the same six categories within them. Most of Dutch and British Muslim organisations were established during the period 1960s–1980's.

In Britain the most well-known Salafi organisation is the JIMAS (Jam'iyat Ihya Minhaj Sunnah wal jama'a). JIMAS had a strong pull for the younger generations of British Muslims who were drawn to the same theological positions. Where young Muslims felt unattached to the national identity, they felt the void and the need as well as the pull to 'back-to-basics' and religious practice. Corruption of the religion by new practices or new ideas that could be interpreted as renovation, innovation or for that matter such as the protestant reformation are in absolute terms fought against.

OASIS was another organization that had lines with the Saudi government scholars. They promoted political quietism in the name of 'loyalty' to the Muslim ruler. They argued that there was a more pressing need to correct 'deviant' beliefs and practices

among Muslims that were rooted in culture, rather than to call for political reform. This led to their being dubbed rather dismissively ‘Saudi Salafis’ or ‘Super Salafis’ by their opponents.

The Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) or the Deobandis is a South Asian form of Sufism generally more active in Britain than in the Netherlands. The most obvious reason is that the largest minorities in the Netherlands are the Turks and Moroccans. The Tablighi’s emphasize traditional rituals and follow the teachings of saints; something where Salafi movement and Tablighi’s disagree on. For the Salafi it isn’t about the sainthood but about individual piety and purity together within the social-religious group. The Tablighi’s are probably best described as a missionary, who work more on developing methods and training through schools and seminaries (Darul Uloom). In Britain the Tablighi’s are the most successful and stable in training imams and religious leaders.

Hizb-ut-Tahrir is a movement that broke away from the Muslim Brotherhood. They have views that cause much public debate and their views are more polarizing in the sense that they are great supporters of establishing an Islamic state (or khilafa). The Khilafa is thought to bring an end to Muslim suffering and oppression. Where they do not perceive violence as a method for their views, they are very much debated to be guilty for ‘cultivating the right conditions’ for violence.

Inequality was in the back of the Muslim mind and in the appearance caused (1990) the most prominent umbrella organization the MCB to be established. The MCB was in its own right a prominent representative body and remained so through to 2001. The MCB came to a position of primacy, the key issues that framed its relationship with government and mainstream politics, and how and why this relationship developed during the time period under discussion.

The BOD became quickly an example of successful representative body that had superior political leverage that defined the British Jewish identity politics. The BOD had a Chief Rabbi, which was also voiced as an alternative to achieve as a Grand Mufti. The aspiration to have similar Jewish success in achieving effective ecclesiastical leadership is also illustrated by attempts in October 2010 to create a ‘Grand Mufti’ for the UK, claiming credence from Egypt's Al-Azhar University, and envisaged as some

sort of counterpart to the Chief Rabbi and the Archbishop of Canterbury. However, the enterprise failed to take off and was disowned by several quarters as inauthentic, ‘divisive’.

3.5 Identity Politics in the United Kingdom

According to Alshayyal Muslim existence in the United Kingdom is deeply connected to the Rushdie-affaire that took place in 1988.¹³⁰ Alshayyal describes this specific moment as a communal turning point that made the Muslim existence publicly visible in the United Kingdom. This turning point was a defining moment of what is now coined as *identity politics*.

In the previous pages Wiarda argued that this term actually meant the same discourse as political culture; in essence *identity politics* is the political participation based on community-interests and community identity. These groups transfer public scrutiny and suffering as injustice or inequality into political messages. It is this specific identity that forms the base to define the self-interests and use negotiation. However, this identity is never a part of the political negotiations. The negotiations are not about the identity but about the injustices that cause the suffering. It usually is about the redefinition on its own terms, by way of raising awareness in the community.

Even though *Identity politics* is associated with party politics, not every democracy enables distinct identities to establish own political party. This probably is the main reason and also the main critique against liberal democracy as unfit for *identity politics*. Usually a social group is too small to be organised around a political party and reverts to become an interest group or a lobby organization. Where the nature of the latter is that individuals can join or leave at will, the identity politics is much harder to leave where membership is often by way of birth.

The party membership in the United Kingdom within the political system of Muslims has always been marginal. There are today around 30 MP’s in the national parliament

¹³⁰ Khadijah Elshayyal, *Muslim Identity Politics: Islam, Activism and Equality in Britain*, vol. 20180228 (IB Tauris, 2018).

that causes confusion, due to the fact that the established parties never actually are representative bodies for the Muslim communities. These representatives make contributions, but these are not considered real towards their own communities.

For Alshayyal with the Rushdie-affair Muslim societies actually started to see their inability and powerlessness. Therefore, the burning of *The Satanic Verses* was the ultimate way to dramatize and demand attention from media and politics to be reminded of their lack of empathy and scorn in this deep offence and hurt. Although the riots and protests, the Rushdie-affair caused a momentum for unity and representation. It eventually came about through civic organisations to voice and articulate the 'Muslim viewpoint' and the response instead of the initial reactionary method against the attack. This ability to organize was followed by an immense amount of critique, scrutiny on behalf of the Muslims within the public domain, the academic world, and the media and eventually even in diplomatic relations.

Alshayyal also criticises the strong bond not to be able to divorce from the '*back home*' influences. It only makes it more complicated due to the fact that there are many Islamic cultures and beliefs practiced in a multitude of ways across the globe. Identity deserves respect and recognition because it is an unchosen aspect of someone's existence and it relates to conscious decisions as with religion. And it is this freedom of decision that puts 'religious politics of identity' and liberal principle together. Convictions and belief are a matter of choice, beyond any control or restriction. It makes freedom of belief 'special' and should be respected. Yet, all this frustration and polarization created a space for the development of community organisations, leaderships and other efforts of representation on a new level.

Therefore, it is a real question whether the Muslim will ever be accepted as equal citizens without giving up essential aspects of their beliefs and identities. For Modood, there are however differences between the way countries cope with their own minorities. The French method against the riots in 2005 in the streets of Paris is distinctly different than that of Britain. The French are characteristically more Jacobin and ideological in terms of secular adherence where the British way is

characteristically in the form of 'devolution of power to the constituent. This practice of devolution may be seen in the Act of Union between England and Scotland.¹³¹

3.6 The Netherlands versus the United Kingdom

The path followed by the British Muslims in the formation of *identity politics* is totally different than that of the Dutch Muslims. The British Muslims carry the characteristics of *Muslim Identity Politics*. In other words they possess '*intra-community, national- and regional- level communal coordination among Britain's Muslims; high-profile and consistent media coverage and public interest in British Muslim affairs; serious conversation and negotiation with the state; as well as significant international attention and intervention*'.¹³² Even though British Muslims enjoy the above communal mobility, for Alshayyal this has been a result of a civic void that Muslims find themselves as she calls it the *Equality Gap*. It was this expectation of equality from where the Muslim advocacy was born from. This eventually became the MCB a representative body, the legitimate reference for all Muslims in Britain.

Alshayyal analyses the political climate as one where Muslims perceived the tactics chosen by government representatives as to only fuel resentment and frustration among Muslim protesters. For Asad politicians were both 'lecturing' and 'colonial' in tone and in content.

For Alshayyal it was this frustration of Muslims that was deep and extensive and needed to be defended. This eventually became a cause by itself to struggle for their 'rights'. Against this need it was the determination of the '*liberal establishment*' to hold on to hard-fought freedom of expression. For the liberal it was the free-expression that was under threat. Whereas for the Muslim it was the human dignity that was under

¹³¹ Stephane Héas, 'GG Raymond and T Modood (Eds), The Construction of Minority Identities in France and Britain, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007', *International Sociology* 26, no. 5 (2011): 15, <https://doi.org/10.1177/02685809110260050903>.

¹³² Elshayyal, *Muslim Identity Politics: Islam, Activism and Equality in Britain*.

threat and counteracted with great force on the grounds that it offended the religious sensitivities of members of this minority faith.

The Rushdie-Affair for the Muslim community in Britain meant losing hope and the need to convince the other. But for many politicians this act of book-burning became the image of backwardness and intolerance. For Muslim scholars the perception is a certain amount of double standard; how could protests and demonstrations outside of Britain be peaceful, and ones within Britain not? The Muslim community in Britain were hurt in their sense of belonging to their society in the insult of their Prophet being attacked and offended. For them this debate was between the powerful and the less powerful. It was their personal honour and not about criticism but ridicule the Prophet.

There were many reasons for the Muslim communities such as '*Innocence of Muslims*' to take it out to the streets. These events were insulting and voiced the setting for riots. For Alshayyal the foreign policy also adds to these inner frustrations such as the military presence in Muslim countries perceived as interventions. So, it is not just about the availability of *equality of opportunity*, but it is more how 'equality' is to be redistributed. It is this redistribution of equality from the institutional process. Redistribution is something that is connected to recognition, where the latter is a social as well as a political act that is not the same as economic redistribution to improve dissimilarities physically. Recognition is considered as one of the most important conditions for Muslims to gain access to equality. For Alshayyal Muslim minorities were experiencing unjustifiable disadvantages. Muslim communities felt oppressed because of the social norms, preferences and privileges in favour of the majority.

The biggest difference between Britain and the Netherlands is probably the fact that most Muslim bodies in Britain today have lobbying as the most central of their functions. So far, the British Muslim organisations have only achieved the establishment and formalisation of a direct, centralised channel of communication towards government as decision-making bodies and the media.¹³³

¹³³ Ibid.

Another difference between the two countries is the funding of Muslim schools. The British Muslims had to struggle to change policy that was consistently rejected, whereas in the Netherlands uniquely all minority schools are automatically funded by law. The MCB needed to debate and be in active engagement on the census' religion question consultations, and on the issue of religious discrimination legislation, were both also seen as promising signs of a future of greatly enhanced cooperation and understanding between Muslim groups and the government.

Other symbolic and practical encouragements where MCB had to fight for were in 1999, the post of Muslim Advisor to the Prison Service was created. The role included coordination of the work of dozens of imams who were already providing (often voluntary) religious support services for Muslim inmates within the UK's prison system, as well as the provision of official advice and guidance on all matters relating to Islam and Muslims, including dietary needs, religious obligations and religious holidays. This development had come about after several years of consultation and representations to the government.

During the period between September 2001 and July 2005 there was a tremendous increase in Muslim agency and self-organisation. Mostly this was explained as being a direct response to the rapid alterations that were taking place in the global and national arenas as reaction against 9/11.

The 'war on terror' discourse however did cause much concern in silencing, restricting or channelling of expression and dissent as imposed by anti-terror laws, and disenchantment with perceptions of attitudes and domestic policies. This was a defining moment in the relationship, leading to a somewhat cool and more cautious attitude between them. This was obviously a new period between the far-right to justify Islamophobia and an increasing Muslim involvement in social and political coalitions such as the anti-war movement, as well as the emergence and development of various new and more creative modes of Muslim self-expression to join pre-existing ones.

While the British Muslim's public and political life seems outgoing and proactive, the British-Muslim is also socially and politically aware. The British Muslim inherited its religious identity and engages in social interaction to promote its identity in the public

space he lives in. Contrary to this image the Dutch Muslim is passive and has a waiting attitude that seems to struggle with its social-political and religious identity.

At the same time the socio-economic status of the Muslim communities is still relatively low, yet the British Muslims enjoyed access to good education, often better than that of their parents. Their entry into universities and the professions injected greater levels of confidence within their communities, not to mention diversity of opinion, aptitude and expertise. Strides had been made in political representation, too, and the number of Muslims entering local politics was on the increase.

In both countries the political membership of individuals were personal endeavours rather than group participation or mass-organising. In Britain¹³⁴ there are 15 MP's and in the Netherlands 11¹³⁵ MP's in the year 2018.

As in group participation in politics, the Islamic Party of Britain and the MP, results were poor and projects were short-lived. In the Netherlands there were also initial projects but were also short-lived. Yet the last decade shows a strong political leadership. Especially two parties NIDA, a local Islamic political party and DENK a more liberal party that arose out of a protest are actively engaging in politics.

While in the recent years, particularly in respect to Muslim communities and the debate on multiculturalism, critics argue that New Labour excessively fostered identity politics that is unhealthy, divisive. The second turning-point wasn't actually 9/11 but the London bombings and the debate on the so-called 'Home-grown terrorists'. This caused a massive wave of indifference and great challenge to the *Muslim Identity politics* concerning the social situation of Muslim communities to address the issues.

3.7 The Narrative of Offence

The narrative on offence is a subject that comes up quite frequently. For Ramadan *special laws* to protect Muslims from offence and real hurt are not prerequisite.

¹³⁴ <http://muslimnews.co.uk/newspaper/home-news/record-number-muslim-mps-elected/>

¹³⁵ Of only 5 practising Muslims.

Ramadan seeks more public and political sensitivity as he describes the '*intellectual empathy*' to stop offence. The sensitivity towards Holocaust and the protection of Jewish minorities by law in cases of denial of the Holocaust is for Ramadan one example. Where there may not be special laws to protect Muslims, examples such as the Holocaust could be utilized as a measure against offence. For Modood the *debate of offence* during 2006 'Muhammad cartoons' was one committed against Muslims as a community. This is where Modood broadens the offence debate as not just offence against the Prophet Muhammad as an individual, but as the whole Muslim community. Modood describes the cartoons as a racist act against all Muslims collectively. Modood's solution is not to ban or censor such cartoon acts but to enable Muslims to be able to respond against Islamophobic acts with appropriate measure in the form of protests.

Talal Asad debates the secular liberal attitude and why the Muslim offence is so easily expressed. For Asad the secular is per definition against religion which is why liberal attitude becomes a source of legitimacy for offense and brought under 'freedom of expression'. Today this offence is even harsher when it is specifically about Islam. Assad entitles this as a real paranoia, a *secular intolerance and hostility*. Yet for Asad this kind of legitimacy is unacceptable. Especially when the foreign policies in the Middle East are taken into account it is perceived as if it is fine to kill in the name of the *secular nation, of democracy*. For Asad it is this prejudice born out of secularism that is not admitted.

Islam is about upholding the human dignity when under threat. For the Western perspective Islam restrict expression in the form of apostasy against blasphemy and is associated with violence and capital punishment. For the Muslim mind Islam protects the honour and the dignity of the peoples. With the Satanic Verses, movie the Submission and cartoons Muslims were worldwide deeply offended and hurt. It was

this international dimension, and the ignorant attitude of politician's initial objections.¹³⁶

Recognition is a crucial aspect of equality in a pluralist political community. Members of minority or disadvantaged groups who are denied such recognition are therefore seen to be lacking in necessary tools for attaining genuine equality with the mainstream and are denied an important aspect of their personal well-being.

Charles Taylor criticizes liberalism as an *ideology* that is blind: even though it has a built-in tolerance discourse liberalism doesn't perceive differences as valid. It is biased and partial because true (complete) neutrality does not exist in any political community since the political structures, institutions and the norms of public life of each are inevitably shaped by its historical experience as well as the culture, tradition and even preferences of the majority. Along the lines of Jesse and Williams Taylor too stresses the need of recognition of individuals and social groups. The political system should support multiplicity and support trust whereas a 'difference-blind liberalism' is incapable of genuinely accommodating the notion of authenticity.¹³⁷

An important consequence for an individual is that it cannot be true to the self if society does not recognize the essence of herself. For scholars such as Honneth, recognition is important in identity politics to reverse a situation of injustice that exists in terms of interaction, where redistribution may become the remedy. For Honneth there are three factors that may disrupt an individual's image of itself. If the physical integrity is violated through 'practical maltreatment' such as physical abuse which can destroy a person's self-confidence and underlying trust in herself. And if rights such as basic respect or legal protection on a level with that enjoyed by other members of society are denied, thus damaging a subject's moral self-respect by signalling that her status is somehow below that of others around her. Solidarity or esteem denigration of a certain individual or collective ways of life as inferior or deficient, depriving the subject of

¹³⁶ Elshayyal, *Muslim Identity Politics: Islam, Activism and Equality in Britain*.

¹³⁷ Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*, 82.

social support and thus impacting eventually on the opportunities that she has for self-realisation.¹³⁸

Denial of recognition in a society is considered as an act of injustice. Such an act causes much more injury to the self-image that it brings about social consequences that individuals are also restricted of their freedom to act. While the term toleration is a very much liberal view and suggests a plural society, achieving that kind of recognition for equal and fair treatment in social public, is not an easy task. There is the factor of dominance and power of force and quantity that majority preferences that may very well work against this tolerance.

For Bhikhu Parekh the politics of recognition must come along with redistribution. For Parekh the state has become justice blind and has a limited vision, it disregards the suffering in the society. For Parekh, Taylor and Honneth there is the downside of recognition, the misrecognition which is the failing of an actual ‘communication’. This communication should be about the *meanings* in the neighbourhoods and streets between individuals. It is this failure of communication that causes polarisation between social groups. This polarization then creates a sense of tension, conflict and clash creating the feeling to defend itself as being under attack.

¹³⁸ Axel Honneth, ‘Recognition or Redistribution?’, *Theory, Culture & Society* 18, no. 2–3 (1 June 2001): 49, <https://doi.org/10.1177/02632760122051779>.

CHAPTER FOUR

QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

In order to prove the hypotheses as postulated in *chapter one* as to be true or wrong both quantitative as well as qualitative research methods are conducted. The analyses of both methods are analysed by way of triangulation, more specifically by way of Converging Parallel Sequencing.

Both methods of research techniques have delivered data of which the results are analysed and categorically summarized in this section. Therefore, this section starts with the descriptive analyses of the socio-demographic data that are presented in the form of crosstabs displaying a comparative analysis on both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. These descriptive analyses are then followed by the conducted correlational and regression where relevant analyses in order to probe an in-depth analysis to look for associational and predictive attributes among the variables. All these analyses deliver explanation about the postulated hypotheses based on the constructivist theory as debated in chapter two.

As discussed in chapter one, the questionnaire is constructed to measure variables such as the *Muslim identity* on basis of the centrality and salience scales by using the Brewer identity complexity-scale and further by measuring single items such as political attitudes towards *institutions*. Besides these variables behavioural and attitudinal variables such as social and civic roles are included in this questionnaire. In order to measure the variable *Muslim identity Complexity*, the Brewer-construct is used, which is based on single item questions as this point is also discussed in chapter one. These items function as probe-questions attempting to determine by self-categorization the respondent's views on multiple identities. As in Brewer¹³⁹ open-ended items are used to assess the importance (centrality) and the awareness of the respondents to distinguish the differences between in-group and outgroup attitudes. The questionnaire

¹³⁹ Brewer, Marilyn B., and Kathleen Pierce, "Social Identity Complexity and Outgroup Tolerance", *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 31.3 (2005): 433.

also contains questions including the institutional attitudes that are also used as single items. The questionnaire amongst the Muslim populations in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are randomly distributed by *multi stage sampling* in order to ascertain the reliability of the random sampling; this is all the more important since there are no *sampling frames* to randomly select samples.

The questionnaire is drawn upon *multi stage sampling* by sampling randomly in provinces, cities and institutions where high concentrations of Muslim minorities live. These populations then are approached repeatedly, by testing and retesting through methods such as telephone contact, social media, interviewing on site in both the Netherlands as well as the United Kingdom. This process has been repeated over a period of six months until a valid sample size has reached a saturation for both the target countries. All the collected data through the questionnaires were by way of structured method which are then analysed and summarized for the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in this chapter.

Besides the quantitative analyses, a semi-structured qualitative content analysis is also conducted by way of theoretical framework method on basis of in total 24 in-depth interviews of which 12 were conducted in the Netherlands and 12 in the United Kingdom. The interviews were semi-structured from a selected category of community leaders in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Participants were selected as influential actors in religious, theological, social and political fields who have influential backgrounds in their in-groups, outgroups or both. Recruitment and data collection were conducted until saturation was achieved. The interview questions were open-ended questions encouraging the respondents to probe into their personal experiences and insights. Almost all interviews are taped, except those in the United Kingdom where most respondents only agreed to cooperate to the interview if it was written down simultaneously. In these cases, the respondents agreed to take more time to transcribe the interviews in full length. In this chapter both the quantitative as well as qualitative data for the research on Muslim identity in relation to political institutions are merged. A qualitative method of research generates a better understanding according to which insights, attitudes and perception of an individual take place in social interaction and the complex nature of the subject.

All interviews are transcribed and as a separate appendix (Appendix II) to this thesis. After reviewing, reading and rereading all the transcriptions by country, the main labels and categories are constructed. In this chapter the categories are analysed according to the emphasis by the respondents in relation to the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. For ethical reasons the names of the participants are coded, upon requirement of anonymity.

4.1 Qualitative Data Analysis: In-depth Interviews

In this section I will provide an analysis of the qualitative research of the conducted in-depth interviews in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. This chapter functions as a *convergent parallel sequencing* for a triangulation of the quantitative and qualitative data.

This section only provides the analysis and coding of the most important key themes. Further in this chapter the quantitative data and qualitative data will be merged in order to deepen the understanding for converging or diverging results. The triangulation will function best to increase reliability and validity of the research.

The various stages in the analysis are: (i) the transcription of the in-depth interviews, which can be found as a separate manuscript attached to this thesis (ii) analysing the transcripts and (iii) coding the key themes.

Table 1 Key Themes Qualitative Analysis

Key themes	The Netherlands	The United Kingdom
Historical attitude	From fixed economic identity to fixed Muslim. Short labour history.	Ethnic identity to Muslim identity. Long colonial history
Identity attitude	Complex, Muslim identity	Complex, Muslim identity
Social attitude	Disconnected. Not claiming identity	Connected. Claiming identity, locally active
Religious attitude	Non-productive, dogmatic, no self-reflection	Productive, questioning, self-reflective
Institutional attitude	Self-elected Party, direct, dispersed, unprepared, non-vocal, non-effective, distrust primitive thinking politicians (crimi/fundi), Kipa – headscarf (no equality, no justice)	Lobbying, self-elected party separatist, indirect, strategic, united, well thought, vocal, frustrated, non-effective, yet more effective than NL, demand for consultation
Economic attitude	Burden	The green pound

Trust	No trust, pushed, broken communication, injustice, mutual distrust, no advisor, distrust in policymakers	No trust pushed (PREVENT), suspicious, communicative, persistent, distrust, frustration, government wrong people advisor, distrust in policymakers
Integration	Unclear what values, Hidden agenda, majority determined identity, hypocrisy, ME,	Values agenda unclear what is extremism, unclear what values
Causes and Solutions of Peace conflict	Tensions later. Yet virtual. Muslim unreflective, unresponsive, framing. Solution, democratic participation. Identity Complex, yet one-fits all identity imposed. Islam unknown. United front, more knowledge, production of argumentation, normalize Islam, better organized,	Tensions were always present. Framing. Today we are more conscious. UK more tolerant. Learn to resist. Learn to articulate your concerns. Muslims must show they care. Common good. Hold accountable.
Islamophobia	Just started	Years ahead,

4.2 The Structure of the Key Themes

The key themes will be arranged and analyzed from less importance to higher importance. This chapter has started with demographic data analyses and is followed by:

- Demographics;
- Single Identity;
- Identity Complexity;
- Religious Attitudes;
- Democratic Attitudes;
- Politicians' Trust;

All data analysis results in each Key Theme in the below paragraphs are presented according to the APA-standards.

4.3 Demographics

4.3.1 Quantitative Data Analysis: Gender

The data of respondents in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands is observed and summarized descriptively in this section. 51.9% of the respondents (N=798) who cooperated in the questionnaire in the Netherlands are males and 48.1% consist of females. 58.2% of the respondents (N=518) in the United Kingdom are males and 41.8% are females.

The number of total respondents participating to the survey in both countries consists of 60.5% males and 39.9% females. In both countries the proportion of males and females have the almost same composition. This composition provides a normal distribution across the variable gender as well as across the research samples in both countries ($M = 1.39$, $SD = 0.49$, $P < 0.028$) making the difference between the two countries in terms of gender meaningful and significant.

Table 2, Crosstab Gender

		Gender * country N = 1276			
		Country		Total	
		NL	UK		
Gender		% within GenderNL2	59.0%	41.0%	100.0%
	Male	% within country	51.9%	58.2%	54.3%
		% of Total	32.1%	22.3%	54.3%
		% within GenderNL2	65.0%	35.0%	100.0%
	Female	% within country	48.1%	41.8%	45.7%
		% of Total	29.7%	16.0%	45.7%
Total		% within GenderNL2	61.8%	38.2%	100.0%
		% within country	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	61.8%	38.2%	100.0%

The survey has collected single and ungrouped age responses which are later grouped by method of recoding into a new variable in SPSS version 20. The distribution of ages is grouped into five categories and are normally distributed ($M = 32.75$, $SD = 11.28$).

4.3.1.1 Hypothesis Testing: Gender Correlations

The variable gender has a negative correlation with the variable *income* ($r = -0.229^{**}$, $M = 1.46$, $SD = 0.498$, $P = 0.000$). Males compared have higher earnings than females. More the individual is male, the higher the earnings are. Gender also has a negative correlation with *complexity of identity* ($r = -0.103^{**}$, $M = 1.48$, $SD = 0.500$, $P = 0.001$). In other words, females compared to males usually categorize themselves as having a more *complex identity*. Even though females earn much less than males, females have a more tolerant attitude towards being or having a more complex identity. The negative correlation between gender and single identity confirms the previous finding; according to this last correlation males compared to females are significantly apt to categorize themselves as having a single identity then females ($r = -0.121^{**}$, $M = 1.49$, $SD = 0.500$, $P = 0.000$).

An interesting finding in relation to gender is that there is a positive correlation between gender and hard approach ($r = 0.097^{**}$, $M = 3.84$, $SD = 1.218$, $P = 0.001$). Males differ from females in their response for the variable hard approach, by having more tendency towards a harder approach in social and political attitudes in society. As a result, males and females differ in their attitudes of self-categorization and approach towards society.

Chi-square test $\chi^2 (1, N = 1276) = 4.81$, $P = 0.028$ for the difference in age groups for both countries is significant. This suggests that the difference between the age groups in both countries is very significant. The difference between the two countries is significant and the null hypothesis is rejected.¹⁴⁰

4.3.2 Age Groups

The overall age distribution across the survey data is normal ($M = 2.73$, $SD = 1.12$). The difference between the age groups between the countries is significant, $\chi^2 (1, N = 1295) = 27.74$, $P = 0.000$. The highest category of ages represented are between 21 - 30 that is followed by 31 – 40. This is also the expected normal ages of Muslims who are representing the second and the third generation Dutch and British Muslims.

Table 3, Crosstab Age Groups

Age Groups * N = 1295		
	Country	
	NL	UK
<20	7,1%	8,8%
21 – 30	48,9%	36,5%
31 – 40	24,7%	26,5%
41 – 50	12,2%	18,8%
51 – 60	5,6%	5,9%
>60	1,4%	3,5%
Total	100,0%	100,0%

¹⁴⁰ Appendix 1, Correlation Table Gender. P. 160

4.3.2.1 Hypothesis Testing: Age Correlations

The variable *age* has a strong negative correlation with the variable *hajj* ($r = -0.423^{**}$, $M = 2.17$, $SD = 0.825$, $P = 0.000$). The older the respondent, the higher the tendency of the respondent to have performed the *hajj obligation*. Another relevant and expected finding is that the variable *age* is positively correlated with the variable *income*; this means the older a respondent is, the more this older respondent earns ($r = 0.378^{**}$, $M = 2.17$, $SD = 0.825$, $P = 0.000$).

However, it is also observed that the variable *age* is inversely correlated with the variable *right to vote* ($r = -0.230^{**}$, $M = 2.32$, $SD = 1.063$, $P = 0.000$). This suggests that the younger the respondent the more the respondent embraces *voting* to be a part of the own identity. Whereas the older the respondent the more the perception exists that voting is not a part that composes the own identity.

Age and feeling of being a *member of the society* are also inversely correlated ($r = -0.178^{**}$, $M = 2.17$, $SD = 0.825$, $P = 0.000$). The older the respondent the less the feeling to be a member of the society. The feeling of being a member to the *umma* is positively correlated with the variable *age* ($r = 0.120^{**}$, $M = 1.63$, $SD = 0.867$, $P = 0.000$). The younger the respondent the more being part of the *umma* is part of their identity. The older respondents do not perceive being a member of the *umma* as an essential part of their identity.

The variable *age* has a negative correlation with the variable *policies in the Middle East* ($r = -0.130^{**}$, $M = 2.04$, $SD = 0.913$, $P = 0.000$). The younger the respondent the more foreign policies towards the Middle East are perceived as worrisome.¹⁴¹

4.3.3 Ethnicity

As it is expected the composition of the respondents in the Netherlands is with 34.9% of Turkish heritage, 23.40% of Moroccan heritage and 17.70% are of Dutch heritage. The largest ethnic Muslim minorities in the United Kingdom is with 25.7% of

¹⁴¹ Appendix 1, Correlation Table Age-Groups. P. 160

Bangladeshi heritage, 22.8% of Pakistani and 11.6% of British heritage. According to the Chi-square $\chi^2 (1, N = 90) = 0.89, P = 0.000$ test the difference between the ethnic compositions between the two countries is significant and meaningful.

Table 4, Crosstab Country

Country * N = 1312		
	NL	UK
African		6,60%
Arab	0,90%	5,00%
Asian		10,30%
Bengali		25,80%
British		11,60%
Dutch	17,70%	
Moroccan	23,40%	3,50%
Pakistani	1,00%	22,90%
Turkish	34,90%	2,90%
Other	22,10%	11,40%
Total	100,00%	100,00%

In addition to the variable ethnicity, respondents in the United Kingdom indicate that 72.8% of the respondents have always lived in the United Kingdom whereas 94.8% of the respondents have always lived in the Netherlands ($M = 3.92$ for the Netherlands) and ($M = 3.54$ for the United Kingdom). This suggests that the null hypothesis gets to be rejected, meaning that there are significant differences between the two countries in regards to the duration of stay in both countries. From $\chi^2 (1, N = 90) = 0.89, P = 0.000$ it is confirmed that the differences in length of stay of the respondents between the two countries is significant and the null hypothesis can be rejected.

4.3.4 Income: Economic Argument

In terms of annual income, it is observed that both countries ($M = 2.17$ and $M = 2.27$) which are not too far off from each other. A significant difference was not expected between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in regards to income. However, in relation to annual income in both samples both countries show similar percentages; the difference lies in the higher category of income where the British Muslims tend to have a higher income than Dutch Muslims who participated in the research. The $\chi^2 (1, N =$

90) = 0.89, P = 0.000 suggests that the differences in income between the two countries is very significant in regards to annual income.

Table 5, Crosstab Income

		Country * N = 1239		
		NL	UK	
Income	0-10000	31.7%	30.3%	31.2%
	10000-30000	30.8%	29.9%	30.4%
	30000-50000	26.6%	22.1%	24.8%
	50000 and higher	10.9%	17.7%	13.6%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

4.3.4.1 Hypothesis Testing: Income Correlations

Again, as the variable *income* has a negative correlation with the variable *hajj* ($r = -0.217^{**}$, $M = 2.17$, $SD = 0.825$, $P = 0.000$). This finding is an expected outcome since *hajj* is a religious duty that is contingent of financial means. This is an expected outcome since the religious duty to perform the *hajj* is a financial contingent religious duty. Since *income* and *zakat* are also inversely correlated the same is here the case; the more a person earns the more a person pays *zakat* ($r = -1.127^{**}$, $M = 1.41$, $SD = 0.919$, $P = 0.000$).

It is very surprising to see that *income* is inversely correlated to the variable *right to vote* ($r = -0.139^{**}$, $M = 2.32$, $SD = 1.063$, $P = 0.000$). The lower the income the more stronger the tendency to disagree that *voting* is a part of one's identity. This means that the more a person earns the more the person (1 is strongly agree to *vote* and 1 is for 0-10000: so if inversely correlated) perceives *voting* to be a part of its own identity. Lower income correlates positively with the variable that Islam *forbids* politics ($r = 0.122^{**}$, $M = 3.88$, $SD = 1.050$, $P = 0.000$). The socio-economic conditions seem to have an influence on the belief that Islam forbids political participation.

The variable *income* correlates negatively with feeling to be a member of the *society* ($r = -0.118^{**}$, $M = 2.30$, $SD = 0.982$, $P = 0.000$). This means that the higher a respondent has earnings the higher the inclination of the respondent to feel a *member of the society*.

Variables annual *income* and having a *self-elected* party in the parliament has a positive correlation. The higher the *income* the stronger to perceive a self-elected political party of its own ($r = 0.103^{**}$, $M = 2.64$, $SD = 1.153$, $P = 0.000$).

Another finding is the positive correlation between the variable *income* and the variable *pillars of Islam*. The higher the *income* of a respondent the more important the *pillars of Islam* are ($r = 0.094^{**}$, $M = 1.17$, $SD = 0.529$, $P = 0.001$). The economic independence provides the Muslim individual to be more aware of the value of faith.

A very significant finding is the correlation between the variable *income* and the need to *follow* government policies. The lower the *income* the less important it is to follow policies ($r = -0.074^{**}$, $M = 1.17$, $SD = 0.805$, $P = 0.009$). This means that economic independence does have influence on that following policies is a necessary to act upon.

Finally, there is a correlation between the variable *income* and the need to do more to increase *trust* in society. This means the lower the *income* of the Muslim respondent the less important it becomes to do more in order to *increase trust* in society ($r = -0.058^{**}$, $M = 2.23$, $SD = 1.083$, $P = 0.042$).¹⁴²

4.3.4.2 Qualitative Analysis: Economic Attitude

During the interviews the *economic argument* has frequently surfaced. In general, British Muslims underlined the importance of this economic position of the Muslim communities as being the *green pound* and this position is considered to provide some degree of social freedom translated as a significant contribution of Muslim households and businesses towards the British authorities. It is argued that the economic position of the British Muslim communities provide a more tolerant attitude towards the Muslim minorities. Besides the economic argument, the argument of interdependence goes so far that certain labour fields (NHS) would suffer in the absence of the Muslim

¹⁴² Appendix 1, Correlation Table Income. P. 161

communities. The economic argument helps to enable a tolerant attitude towards Muslims being safe in the society.¹⁴³

According to another interviewee the Muslim economy is estimated at least 33 billion pounds a year. Together with the economic prosperity, there is also the growth of literacy in the Muslim community which has been phenomenal in the last decades. Muslims embrace the idea of being an essential and integral part of the wider society. Even though there is significant strength in this development, Muslims remain underrepresented in public life. In political life there are differences compared to 10 years ago.

A Dutch Muslim interviewee reverberates this economic argument, by stating that economy is a predictor factor. '*It is the boss of politics, the basis and the boss*'. It is eventually the economy that dictates policy, such as the education policy. The education policy should be more humane and more social. This is where the new generations learn about a *social economy* by being in a social education system. Yet, today the present education system aids criminality and fails in coaching young generations. The youngsters are left on themselves to find their own ways in the society.¹⁴⁴

Another Dutch interviewee active as a teacher as well as a politician states that the existing hate has economic causes. Muslim communities being alien to the general public is just one cause. Another important factor is very much the economic position of the Muslims in general. In the past it was the Muslim individual and today it can be observed that the Polish, Romanian or other Eastern Europeans are the hated outsiders; the reasoning behind is that these people migrate and take people's jobs. Eventually, this economic underlying thought affects general public views and perceptions. All societies eventually have a 'scape goat mechanism', that constantly looking out for the black sheep. Those who lose their jobs blame the newcomers. Most of the time the

¹⁴³ UK-JR, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 71.

¹⁴⁴ NL-AB, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 5.

hate isn't even a 'culture or ethnic' problem, but usually starts as an economic problem. This is the main cause of the tensions.¹⁴⁵

Yet, education is a fundamental and essential element that awakens and makes people critical citizens. Once a person receives knowledge he/she starts asking questions. Where the first generation took things for granted thus the younger generations want good information about who they are and thus ask questions. Besides education, these generations are naturally born into Islam. It is this socialization that needs to be merged.

4.3.5 Hypothesis Testing: Length of Stay Correlations

Table 6, Crosstab Length of Stay

		Country* N = 1087	
		NL	UK
How_long?	1-5 years	1.2%	6.5%
	5-10 years	0.5%	5.9%
	10-15 years	3.5%	14.8%
	Always	94.8%	72.8%
Total		100.0%	100.0%

The variable overall *length of stay* in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom is positively correlated with the variable that Muslims should *influence policies* ($r = 0.108^{**}$, $M = 2.28$, $SD = 1.023$, $P = 0.000$). In other words the longer a respondent has been living in the country, the more the respondent is willing to influence the policies through political processes to enable better living conditions. This infers that those respondents who have been briefly in the country are much less interested in political participation. Another important correlation is between the variable *length of stay* and the variable the right to *vote* ($r = 0.090^{**}$, $M = 2.32$, $SD = 1.063$, $P = 0.003$). This positive correlation means the longer a respondent has been living in the two countries the more the respondent feels that *right to vote* is an essential part of the personal

¹⁴⁵ NL-MM, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 10.

identity. As it can be deduced from this data, the length of residence in both countries contributes to democratic values.

Besides voting as part of the identity, the length of stay also has a positive correlation with the variables: having *equal rights* ($r = 0.074^{**}$, $M = 2.69$, $SD = 1.142$, $P = 0.016$), feeling *recognized* in the society ($r = 0.067^*$, $M = 2.68$, $SD = 1.055$, $P = 0.028$) and having an *own party* in the parliament ($r = 0.066^*$, $M = 2.55$, $SD = 1.102$, $P = 0.000$). In almost all cases the variable length of stay has a positive effect on these democratic values.

On the other side, the variable *length of stay* is holds a correlation with the variable *wellbeing* ($M = 2.36$, $SD = 1.080$, $r = 0.095^{**}$, $P = 0.000$). According to this correlation, the longer a Muslim has been living in the country the more the respondent feels the wellbeing on the streets is under threat.

Length of stay has a positive correlation with the variable *Multiple identity* ($r = -0.086^{**}$, $M = 1.49$, $SD = 0.500$, $P = 0.004$). This means that the longer the respondent has been living in the West, the higher the choice for *multiple identity* and vice versa.¹⁴⁶

4.3.6 Religious Education

According to the table below 29.3% of the respondents in the United Kingdom have enjoyed a formal theological education which percentagewise is not too far off from the 22.4% of the respondents in the Netherlands. The difference between the two countries is noticeable in the 46% of mosque education in the Netherlands versus 23% in the United Kingdom. Another observation is the 10.3% of the British Muslims having followed private lessons against the much significantly lower 2.9% of the Dutch Muslims.

¹⁴⁶ Appendix 1, Correlation Table Length of Stay. P. 162

Table 7, Crosstab Religious Schooling

ReligScholing * Country Crosstabulation N = 1266					
		Country		Total	
		NL	UK		
Relig Scholing		% within ReligSchol	52.70%	47.30%	100.00%
	Theology Education (Formal)	% within Country	22.40%	29.30%	25.20%
		% of Total	13.30%	11.90%	25.20%
		% within ReligScho	49.60%	50.40%	100.00%
	Madrassa style	% within Country	15.30%	22.70%	18.30%
		% of Total	9.10%	9.20%	18.30%
		% within ReligSchol	74.40%	25.60%	100.00%
	Mosque	% within Country	46.00%	23.10%	36.70%
		% of Total	27.30%	9.40%	36.70%
		% within ReligSchol	29.30%	70.70%	100.00%
	Private lessons	% within Country	2.90%	10.30%	5.90%
		% of Total	1.70%	4.20%	5.90%
		% within ReligSchol	58.70%	41.30%	100.00%
	Self-taught	% within Country	11.20%	11.40%	11.30%
		% of Total	6.60%	4.70%	11.30%
		% within ReligSchol	48.50%	51.50%	100.00%
	Other	% within Country	2.10%	3.30%	2.60%
		% of Total	1.30%	1.30%	2.60%
		<hr/>			
Total	% within ReligSchol	59.20%	40.80%	100.00%	
	% within Country	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	
	% of Total	59.20%	40.80%	100.00%	

The difference in religious education between the two countries according to Pearson Chi-square test $\chi^2 (1, N = 90) = 0.89, P = 0.000$ is significant thus meaningful.

4.3.6.1 Religious Education Correlations

As expected *religious education* has a strong positive correlation with individual *religious items* in the questionnaire. The most important are the positive correlation between the variable religious education and *centrality* ($r = 0.171^{**}, M = 1.24, SD = 0.510, P = 0.000$). This means the more a respondent believes Islam is central in its life, the more the respondent has enjoyed a formal religious education.

Another variable that has a positive correlation with religious education is the variable *Religious Attitude* ($r = 0.161^{**}$, $M = 4.31$, $SD = 0.870$, $P = 0.000$). This means the more a respondent has a stronger *Religious Attitude* in life, the more the respondent has enjoyed a formal religious education.

The next highest correlations can be found concerning *political items* such as, having an own political *party* in parliament ($r = 0.105^{**}$, $M = 2.55$, $SD = 1.102$, $P = 0.000$). The more formal the religious education of the Muslim respondent the more the respondent is inclined to feel the need to have an own political party in the parliament. On the other hand, the variable *Religious Education* is negatively correlated with the variable *Islam forbids politics* ($r = 0.100^{**}$, $M = 3.88$, $SD = 1.050$, $P = 0.000$). This suggests that the more formal theological the education has been, the more the respondent is inclined to know or feel that Islam does not prohibit political activities, participation in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

The variable *Religious education* is also positively correlated with the variable *following policies* ($r = 0.097^{**}$, $M = 1.77$, $SD = 0.805$, $P = 0.001$), which means that the more formal religious education, the more the Muslim respondent is interested in following policies through political processes.

The variable *Religious Education* is also positively correlated with the variable *soft approach* ($r = 0.087^{**}$, $M = 1.84$, $SD = 0.920$, $P = 0.000$). This means that religious education, in terms of the more the religious education is formal and theological, the more the respondent is inclined again to follow policies of the government and to have an open, tolerant and *communicative attitude* towards society and politics. Whereas, as this outcome confirms the former correlations, where there is as expected a negative correlation with the variable *hard approach* ($r = -0.077^{**}$, $M = 3.84$, $SD = 1.218$, $P = 0.007$).

The variable *religious education* and the variable *Politicians Trust* in Islam also are also negatively correlated ($r = -0.057^{*}$, $M = 2.40$, $SD = 0.929$, $P = 0.043$). This finding provides explanation on behalf of the *constructivist theory* where the role played by

the variables *trust* received from *political institutions* on identity seems to be confirmed.¹⁴⁷

4.3.6.2 Secular Education

In terms of *secular education* there are significant differences between the two countries P-value is equal to 0.001. In this respect it is observed that M for the Netherlands is equal to 2.08 and for the United Kingdom 1.57. There is a noticeable significant difference between the two Means. University education of British Muslims 71.3% is remarkably higher than the level of university education of Muslims in the Netherlands. On basis of the P-value 0.001 the null hypothesis is rejected and the differences in regards to secular education between the two countries is significant and meaningful.

Table 8, Crosstab Secular Education

Secular Education * Country Crosstabulation N = 1182					
		Country		Total	
		NL	UK		
University	% within Sec_Educ	42.70%	57.30%	100.00%	
	% within Country	28.00%	71.30%	43.00%	
	% of Total	18.40%	24.60%	43.00%	
HE/ Occup	% within Sec_Educ	87.80%	12.20%	100.00%	
	% within Country	44.70%	11.80%	33.30%	
	% of Total	29.30%	4.10%	33.30%	
Sec Educ	% within Sec_Educ	86.10%	13.90%	100.00%	
	MBO/Occup	% within Country	19.30%	5.90%	14.60%
	% of Total	12.60%	2.00%	14.60%	
HAVO, VWO	% within Sec_Educ	54.10%	45.90%	100.00%	
	% within Country	6.80%	11.00%	8.30%	
	% of Total	4.50%	3.80%	8.30%	
		% within Sec_Educ	100.00%	100.00%	
		% within Country	100.00%	100.00%	
		% of Total	65.50%	34.50%	

¹⁴⁷ Appendix 1, Correlation Table Religious Education. P. 164

4.3.6.3 Hypothesis Testing: Secular education Correlations

Since (1 is highest education and 0-10000 is also 1) *secular education* is negatively correlated with the variable *income* ($M = 2.21$, $SD = 1.031$, $r = -0.253^{**}$). This means that those who have a university degree are also inclined to the earn most. *Secular education* has a negative correlation with *Islam forbids politics* ($M = 3.88$, $SD = 1.050$, $r = -0.216^{**}$). So, the higher *secular education* the more inversely correlated it is with the agreement on statement that *Islam forbids* political activity.

Secular education has a negative correlation with the variable *hard approach* ($M = 3.84$, $SD = 1.218$, $r = -0.148^{**}$). The higher secular education the less agreement on hard approach. In this context this outcome is an expected one and seems to have the same effect as religious education. *Secular education* also has a positive correlation with the variable *following policies* ($M = 1.77$, $SD = 0.805$, $r = 0.143^{**}$). Therefore, the higher the secular education the more respondents feel that there is a need to follow policies through democratic processes. An important finding is that the variable *secular education* has a positive correlation with the variable *soft approach* ($M = 1.84$, $SD = 0.920$, $r = 0.134^{**}$). This finding confirms the above correlation concerning the attitude on hard approach. Muslim respondents are inclined to go for democratic solutions rather than undemocratic solutions. *Secular education* also has a positive correlation with other democratic variables such as the need to do more for *creating more trust* ($M = 2.23$, $SD = 1.083$, $r = 0.109^{**}$) and feeling the need to *influence policies* ($M = 2.28$, $SD = 1.023$, $r = 0.105^{**}$).

Secular education has a negative correlation with the variable *multiple identity* ($M = 1.49$, $SD = 0.500$, $r = -0.099^{**}$). Meaning that the higher the secular education, the less the identity is singular. This finding gets to be confirmed due to the finding that there is a correlation between the variable secular education and the variable *ordered complexity* ($M = 1.48$, $SD = 0.500$, $r = 0.88^{**}$). This means that Muslim respondents who have enjoyed a secular education have far more inclined to have higher degrees of identity complexity. As expected those who have enjoyed secular education also are more inclined to believe that the variable right to vote is a part of their identity ($M = 2.32$, $SD = 1.063$, $r = 0.083^{**}$). However, an interesting find is that there is a negative correlation between the variable Secular education and the variable being a member

of an own in-group ($M = 2.26$, $SD = 1.080$, $r = -0.074^{**}$). This means that respondents who have enjoyed a secular education are more inclined to be independent of an own in-group. On the other side, the variable secular education has a positive correlation with the variable feeling to be a member of the *society* ($M = 2.30$, $SD = 0.982$, $r = 0.061^*$). Thus, the higher the secular education the more the Muslim respondent is comfortable feeling a member of the society, which does confirm the previous finding about membership of an own in-group.¹⁴⁸

4.4 The variable Multiple Identity: Self-Categorization

In this section the independent variable *multiple identity* is further discussed. Both the qualitative as well as the quantitative data results that are relevant are combined by way of triangulation (Parallel Convergent Sequencing) to look for significant relationships. Data has provided that Muslim *identity* can possess degrees of *complexity*, meaning that Muslim identity as experienced by the Dutch Muslims as well as by the British Muslims may go hand in hand with other social, national and political identities.

This *complexity* would suggest that the Muslim identity is more open, tolerant towards other identities. As discussed earlier in the theoretical frame the respondents were asked to make a choice between a dichotomous item of ‘having only single identity’ or ‘having more than one single identities’. Afterwards, the respondents were asked, in case of more than one single identity to bring an order in the identities of preference. In this respect the total survey dataset is analysed in comparison to both countries, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom ($M = 1.39$, $SD = 0.489$). From the table below, it is observed that 45.5% of the respondents in the Netherlands and 53.7% in United Kingdom chose the answer category of having *only one identity*. Whereas 54.5% in the Netherlands and 46.3% in United Kingdom responded to have *more than one identity*. Here it can be seen that there are significant differences between the countries. Muslim respondents in the United Kingdom seem to be more inclined to categorize

¹⁴⁸ Appendix 1, Correlation Table Income. P. 165

themselves as having more a single identity, whereas Dutch Muslims this figure is comparatively lesser. Again, the Dutch Muslims have a higher percentage for the category having more than one identity compared to the British Muslims.

Table 9, Crosstab Multiple Identity

Single Identity * Country Crosstabulation N = 1305				
		Country		Total
		NL	UK	
Identity	% within Single Identity	56,4%	43,6%	100,0%
	I only have 1 identity			
	% within Country	45,5%	53,7%	48,7%
	% of Total	27,5%	21,2%	48,7%
	% within Single Identity	64,3%	35,7%	100,0%
	I have more than 1			
% within Country	54,5%	46,3%	51,3%	
% of Total	33,0%	18,3%	51,3%	
Total	% within Single Identity	60,5%	39,5%	100,0%
	% within Country	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	% of Total	60,5%	39,5%	100,0%

4.4.1 Hypothesis Testing: Correlations Single Identity

According to the null hypothesis the assumption is that the difference between both countries do not present any significant differences in regards to the perception of the respondents about their *multitudinous of identity*. The *Pearson* Chi-square is $\chi^2 (1, N = 1305) = 8.35, P = 0.004$; means that the null hypothesis can safely be rejected, and it can be confirmed that the difference in identity responses between the two countries is strongly significant and thus meaningful.

Probably one of the most important findings is that the variable *single identity* has a *negative correlation* ($M = 4.31, SD = 0.929, r = -0.082^{**}$) with the variable *politician's trust in Muslims and Islam*. This means that across the two countries the more respondents categorize themselves as having *multiple identities* the more they disagree with the statement that Dutch and British *politicians trust Islam or Muslims*. According

to the Ordinal Regression Analysis *Politicians Trust* is a significant predictor ($P = 0.05$, Nagelkerke 0.012) of the variable *multiple identity*.¹⁴⁹

It is important to discover that the variable *multiple identity* negatively correlates with the variable feeling to be a member of an *in-group*. This means, the more respondents categorize themselves as having *single identities* the more they feel being a member of their own in-groups. *Membership* to an in-group is considered to be an important factor in the ability to distinguish oneself from other groups.

Respondents who categorize themselves as having a *single identity* negatively correlate with the variable of believing to have *equal rights* in the society ($M = 1.49$, $SD = 0.500$, $r = -0.082^{**}$). Therefore, respondents who believe to have a single identity also believe that they do not have democratic equal rights in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

Another finding is that *multiple identity* also negatively correlates with the variable *Islam forbids politics* ($M = 2.69$, $SD = 1.142$, $r = -0.192^{**}$). The respondents who categorize themselves as having single identity are inclined to believe that Islam does not forbid political activity.

The variable *multiple identity* also has a negative correlation with the following variables: having an own *party* in parliament ($M = 3.88$, $SD = 1.050$, $r = -0.102^{**}$), the variable *self-elected party* ($M = 2.64$, $SD = 1.153$, $r = -0.105^{**}$), the variable *hard approach* ($M = 3.84$, $SD = 1.218$, $r = -0.188^{**}$).

In short those who categorize themselves as having *single identity* are not inclined to *vote*, because they are more inclined to believe that *Islam forbids* political participation. Due to this belief they do not wish to have an *own political party*, even if it is *self-elected*. They also believe in a *harder approach* and are thus less tolerant and open towards social and political participation.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁹ Appendix 1, Regression Table Politicians' Trust. P. 166

¹⁵⁰ Appendix 1, Correlation Table Single-Identity. P. 166

4.4.2 Qualitative Analysis: Identity Attitudes

Single Identity as an independent variable in this research has been extensively deliberated by interviewees. The expert views generally depict an initial description of a *single identity*, that in the early years of migration to Europe where the image of the migrant was mere ‘cheap temporary labour migrant’ that possessed the attributes of either being ‘*temporary*’, ‘*agrarian*’, ‘*conservative*’ or a mere utility. Coming from an interventionist secular police state this type of migrant was in fact unfit to integrate in the Western societies. These migrants being placed in alien environments had a specific role as just an economic asset; this all the while the migrant was silently being immersed in a mode of fear and reducing itself and its offspring to a mere morality against a promiscuous existence.¹⁵¹

A shared observation amongst the interviewees is that this initial image of the migrant was one that was ‘*fixated*’. As a temporary economic agent that was physically part of an industrial production process and mentally absent and primarily connected to a social context back home. These were identities, different than the image depicted today, physically removed from a *traditional* and *agrarian* communal life into an artificially constructed technologically advanced and information-based industrial life. These actors had abandoned and traded their meaningful lives in for meaningless lives. A former life that probably took place out in the nature and under the stars guided by a religion that is cosmological to a life on the assembly-line that was mind-numbing work. It was this fictive agenda-based life that was in stark contrast with the natural and cosmological life. It is this identity that determined the perception due to the recent migration history of this one-dimensional former *religious identity* today that still is associated with dogma and thus has a biased self-evident understanding of Islam ‘natural and preachy’ daily reality that is misguided and still *disconnected* from the rational society. Such an identity was thus due to be complacent.¹⁵²

¹⁵¹ NL-AB, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 4.

¹⁵² NL-AB, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 5.

The Muslim scholar in the Netherlands takes Islam for granted and lacks thus a critical look at the self, all the while Islam is all about *self-reflection*. This image is usually reduced to two categories of Muslim identities 1) the social Muslim identity: these are most common types of Muslims in Europe. These members of the Islamic faith are Muslim because their parents are. These are usually depicted as horizontal identities, meaning that these represent some kind of a horizontal Islam that is the strongest represented. Interviewees in their own ways refer to a *Taqalidi-Muslim*; meaning that they lack serious religious education and thus knowledge and thus imitate and act the way as others do, because they don't know any other way. In this narrative the image of the Muslim identity is one that is dependent on social context; it acts, feels or knows because of its social milieu, such as membership of its family, the mosque, community, group. Not only is one a member of such social groups, but interviewees also reflect upon the acts of comparing each other which can be quite nasty. One is either in the group or out of the group, there is no important central orientation point from where it could be said 'this is Islam'. Which causes disorientation and a religious gap that reflects back in terms of a social incapacitation.¹⁵³

4.5 Ordered Complex Identity

In regards to the variable *Single Identity* bias of the Muslim image, the narrative in the qualitative analysis above compared to the next table provides more relevant data about the variable *identity complexity* of the Muslim individual. The data presents information on how the Dutch and British Muslim individuals perceive and categories themselves by bringing order in their perceived identities.

It is observed that Muslims among the respondents in the Netherlands perceive themselves 48.3% as having a complex identity and 58.5% British Muslims score themselves as having a *ordered complex identity*. This complexity includes at least a Muslim identity in combination of a Dutch and/or British identity.

Table 10, Crosstab Identity Complexity

¹⁵³ NL-AB, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 5.

Complexity * Country N = 1101				
		Country		Total
		NL	UK	
	% within Complexity	54,0%	46,0%	100,0%
Ordered	% within Country now?	48,3%	58,5%	52,5%
	% of Total	28,3%	24,2%	52,5%
	% within Complexity	63,9%	36,1%	100,0%
Not Ordered	% within Country now?	51,7%	41,5%	47,5%
	% of Total	30,3%	17,2%	47,5%
	% within Complexity	58,7%	41,3%	100,0%
Total	% within Country now?	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	% of Total	58,7%	41,3%	100,0%

On the other hand, there are differences between the countries where 51.7% of the Dutch respondents and 41.5% of the British respondents perceive themselves as having a not ordered complex identity. From the data in can be inferred that a majority of Dutch as well as British respondents base their choices on sound awareness by combining their religious identities with distinct *national identities* such as the Dutch and British. It is this combination that makes it highly complex, yet it is necessary to note that this open question is not answered by all respondents!

These respondents are said to realize the differences and similarities between the own in-group as well as identify with national outgroups. Literature shows that members of in-groups are more able to distinguish differences and thus feel more comfortable and thus be more tolerant to other groups. Being a member of an in-group provides a positive self-image and confidence in being more tolerant towards the other.

The data shows that the overall M is 1.39 and the SD is 0.488. This finding suggests that both countries are not very different from each other concerning the perception of complex identities where the P-value is 0.001, which is lower than 0.05 meaning that we can reject the null hypothesis.

4.5.1 Hypothesis Testing: Ordered Complex Identity

Since the variables ‘*multiple identity*’ and ‘*Identity complexity*’ both are dichotomous variables, two statistical tests are conducted to see control the strong correlation

between Single Identity and Complex Muslim Identity. Two statistical methods parametric as well as non-parametric tests are conducted in this section to see whether both deliver significant correlations.

At the first place a Phi coefficient (non-parametric) is calculated by SPSS version 20 that uses the correlation matrix. According to this test the overall Phi coefficient for both countries is 0.497 and has a significance P-value of 0.000. So, it is safe to infer that the overall correlation in both countries is meaningful.

After the Phi coefficient, the Bivariate Correlation Analysis (parametric) is conducted to check for the overall totality of both countries. Again the Pearson Correlation is equal to 0.497**, showing a strong correlation, which essentially is the same to the earlier calculated Phi coefficient.¹⁵⁴ This means that in both countries the variables *single identity* and *identity complexity* are positively correlated. The more the respondents' choice for multiple identities, the more complex the identities of the respondents are.¹⁵⁵

The variable *complex identities* have a negative correlation (Spearman's rho -0.068*) with the variable politician's *trust* in Muslims and Islam. This means that complexity doesn't go hand in hand with politician's trust. The more the identity is complex the more the respondent feels the distrust of the politicians. The variable *complex identities* have a negative correlation (Spearman's rho -0.113**) with the variable *Islam forbids political participation*. This means that complexity doesn't go hand in hand with politician's trust. The more the identity is complex the more the respondent feels the distrust of the politicians.

The variable *complex identities* have a negative correlation (Spearman's rho -0.072*) with the variable *hard approach*. This means the more the identity is complex the more the respondent feels the distrust of the politicians. This is confirmed as discussed that

¹⁵⁴ See Appendix 1. P. 167 for the Calculation of Phi Coefficient and Bivariate Correlation results.

the variable *Ordered Complex identity* as a variable has a strong positive correlation with the variable *soft approach* (Spearman rho = 0.064**).

4.5.2 Regression Analysis Identity Complexity

According to the binary regression analysis the variable multiple identity, religious schooling, feeling as a valuable member of the society, trust of politicians, doing more for trust, influencing policies, education to Muslims and a soft approach are all variables that are significant predictors for the variable ordered identity_complexity.¹⁵⁶ The Pearson's Chi Square P-value is 0.000 and is a good model as a predictor. According to Nagelkerke R Square 59.6% of the variance can be explained by these independent variables.

Table 11, Variance Table Nagelkerke

Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	689.492 ^a	.447	.596

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 8 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

4.5.3 Qualitative Analysis: Complex Identity Attitudes

These findings suggest a certain degree of self-awareness in both countries in terms of attaining oneself *complex identity*, where one embraces the country one lives in. In this context interviewees in general confirm with the above findings that the identity description of the Muslim has gone through *phases of changes in the last decades*.

In the Dutch context shifts have been taken place from an *economic* identity towards a horizontal religious identity, as suggested earlier¹⁵⁷: Muslim identities, as in the Netherlands are usually described as *hybrid* identities, where Muslims have learnt to

¹⁵⁶ Regression Table P. 164

¹⁵⁷ NL-AB, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 5.

adapt to the society as well as according to their own interests. One theologian academic called this type of identity a horizontal identity, meaning a superficial and theologically *fixated identity*. *These superficial identities within the social existence are also labelled as 'fictive identities'*. This fictive mind-set, is one wherein the Muslim actor has lost its connection to the real society. It is a cause of concern because a fictive mind-set is not mature enough to engage societal debates and tackle issues. This specific analysis is inherent to the Dutch context.

Interviewees in the United Kingdom depict a different image wherein Muslim communities have attained a level of societal awareness and maturity where social engagement is happening right now. For example, for many British interviewees the language and the vocabulary used such as Islamic identity is of strategic concern. In the contemporary social and political life the term is loaded and it has become a term that suggests islamising things.¹⁵⁸ Thus, the Muslim communal awareness dictates on many fronts to prevent a potential mass hysteria taking over. It wouldn't only be Muslims but also politics or media may feel they should do something about certain incidents. There is always the risk of 'going along'. As a community there is a maturity to foresee the consequences.

British Muslim interviewees have a distinct view on what belonging means. According to this it is about the *ownership* and the claiming of an identity within the society.¹⁵⁹ Muslims in Britain embrace the thought 'we are British-Muslims' and thus also have the right to be heard and must strive for equality like everybody else; live, eat, pray and pay taxes. Being British means that the Muslim presence too makes up 'the society', as being an integral part of the society as a whole.

A British researcher and author supports this maturity of the community in the United Kingdom and confirms the care of the community Islamic Identity which is a challenging term and is usually being associated with negative images. She too prefers

¹⁵⁸ UK-ID, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 70.

¹⁵⁹ UK-JR, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 72.

to use the term ‘Muslim identity’. An important distinction between Islamic identity and Muslim identity is that the former refers to the Qur’an and Sunnah.¹⁶⁰ While the Muslim community is conscious of this social approach, she argues that this social maturity has its sources by way of mosques. Another example is the 7/7 terrorist acts in London, which was devastating yet caused more interfaith work in Britain than ever.¹⁶¹

The general attitude of community leaders such as the vice-chairmen of the most important umbrella organization confirms that social awareness of the Muslim communities also accommodates complexity in their communal identity as both being British and still be proud of one’s religious and ethnic identities.¹⁶² As it is the case that Muslim communities are very diverse. Yet, the community is sensitive for social debate and thus the British Muslim is much more aware in understanding society and the use of language.

In the Dutch context identities are described as not being fully aware of the historical and social bounds. It is remarked by one of the Dutch interviewees that Islam is a religion of ‘tolerance seekers’ therefore that such an attitude is the most natural disposition; that is to do good.¹⁶³ Identity in the Qur’an may be understood as in diversity, referred in the Qur’an to in a verse as *‘litarrafu*; meaning to get to know each other. As opposing to not kidnap diversity by our own personal and communal lacking’s. Islam’s genius is to *act*: it is commanded do the *salaat*, just do it, do the fasting, just do it’. In this context the genius of Islam suggests a practice where identity too is all about doing and developing an identity and ‘it can only be done when we mirror ourselves to the other’.¹⁶⁴ By mirroring the self to others one can criticize the

¹⁶⁰ UK-KS, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 78.

¹⁶¹ UK –U, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018.

¹⁶² UK-AT, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 81.

¹⁶³ NL-AB, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 6.

¹⁶⁴ *Idem*

self and perceive its *lacking self-reflection*. This would then cause to redefine and reposition an identity that has the ability to plan ahead, learn and claim a social position.

Other interviewees approach this point from a theological stance and ascertain the lack of the Muslim maturity to the gap of religious education. For an accomplished and well respected Muslim scholar the central pillar of identity is essentially composed of religion, then language and lastly by the existence of a country.¹⁶⁵ The central actor is then the Muslim individual and its community. Even though, a Muslim identity requires in this definition a country, it doesn't mean that a Muslim can't be living in a non-Muslim country. This situation can be observed in the wider Western world; Islam then dictates upon Muslim-lives to become a part of that society and to integrate in a way that doesn't transgress the boundaries of Islam. According to this theologian '*without religion there is no identity*'.¹⁶⁶ Thus, it is this testifying that makes a person 'a Muslim'; which is inherent to a Muslim identity. Testifying theologically is the principle of '*acknowledgment by heart and confirmation by the tongue*'. Therefore, this theological principle dictates that acting upon this principle a Muslim adequately complies with the *Muslim identity*.¹⁶⁷

This according to the majority of Islamic world would mean the bare minimum of what is called the Muslim identity; the condition for the Muslim actor is then to not deny the principles of the faith and the Qur'an. Because denial means losing one's Islamic Identity. Since the bare minimum doesn't include salience or in other words the acting upon the obligatory religious duties narrates that not living according to Islam does not separate the individual from its Muslim identity. It just means behavioural inconsistency. The individual is still said to retain the Muslim identity, except the required duties are said to be absent. An explanation to the lacking's of Muslim

¹⁶⁵ NL-AA, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 8.

¹⁶⁶ Idem

¹⁶⁷ Idem

maturity and awareness may thus be related to the lack of religious education where this lack causes a disconnectedness and disembodies the individual from the religious knowledge-base and the society. Causing a negative existence in relations between the Muslim-identity and the debate on integration.

In the qualitative research many interviewees place as key the young Muslims as an actor in their narratives. As a main actor the young Muslim today is socially and religiously challenged where in their environments they face push as well as pull factors that function as internal as well as external determinants.

One important example is the narrative of the director of a distinguished umbrella organization in the Netherlands that represents hundreds of mosques towards the government officials; according to her people in Western societies shouldn't normatively be categorized as something which they are not. Every group is in need of a positive identity to be able to function properly in the society. The question of identity is very essential. The biggest concern are youngsters who were born and raised in the West and yet do not feel connected to the society they were born into. It is only natural when *young actors* in a society *do not feel appreciated* or have that kind of feelings that they can't be themselves. This obviously would translate itself into an identity issue. The society where one is born into and is raised in, is a society that forms its own individuals. In a way the society produces these *alienated* young people by making them feel unwelcome. This is something that we as a society should feel responsible for. There is also the push and pull factors. Turkish youth feels pushed away in this society and they probably feel pulled by events and incidents in Turkey. Eventually, it is the young person who is responsible for its claim of an own identity. They should be able to do this and not let others define their own identity by others.¹⁶⁸ It is unanimous that almost all interviewees, besides the exceptions prefer the usage of the term *Muslim identity* instead of the term *Islamic identity*. An influential Dutch representative who established two umbrella organizations in the Netherlands, one which today is the main body towards the national government prefers the Muslim

¹⁶⁸ NL-MV, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 31.

Identity rather than the notion that is labelled as an Islamic identity. As Muslims living in secular societies where social *tensions* are increasing it is the latter identity that is under political pressure.¹⁶⁹

He brings up the notion of *justice* which is essential in a society and is the most and single important factor. When the labourers came during the sixties of the last century they were not assisted and they had to solve their own problems as they went along. These labourers did not have a vivid awareness of their own identities. The reasoning behind the choice for the term Muslim identity finds elaboration where the term 'Islamic identity' seems to suggest some kind of a common identity, which is socially and scientifically impossible! As Qur'an is universal, it does not represent one geography or one particular people. The Qur'an is universal and teaches the individual to merely organize its life independent of one's geographical location in the world.¹⁷⁰

According to a leader of an existing political party in the Dutch parliament identities can never be *unambiguous*.¹⁷¹ Meaning that they can never be one dimensional. When the Dutch Queen once said that: '*The Dutch identity doesn't exist*'. The Dutch politicians conforms that the Queen was right in her narrative. Therefore, according to this political leader there isn't one specific or solid form of *unambiguous identity*; there are seventeen million people living in the Netherlands and this whole body constitutes a collective Dutch identity with all of its diversity. One of the first Islamic Spiritual Care giver in the Netherlands, Islamic identity means *unselfishness (ihsaan)*, that a Muslim lives its life and undertakes deeds for the blessing of Allah.¹⁷² The *Muslim identity* isn't either an individual's *personal prayers*, it would only mean that these prayers would benefit the individual itself. Usually these personal prayers are *disconnected* from the societal life; this suggests then that there is a need for the

¹⁶⁹ NL-EA, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 25.

¹⁷⁰ Idem

¹⁷¹ NL-TK, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 51.

¹⁷² NL-RF, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 51.

societal Muslim. There is a role for the Muslim within the society and the Muslim actor has *forgotten* about this, which it needs to remember again. For example, the notion of *justice* has always been present in the lives of Muslims and is an important aspect in Islam. Justice is a universal principle and must be upheld at all times. When the Muslim communities are observed it can be seen that these communities aren't always '*just*'. As an individual and as a Muslim one needs to be as just in the society as he/she is for its own.¹⁷³

A prominent famous young imam in the Netherlands doesn't want to reduce *identity* to just one dimension. From an Islamic point of view, it is '*Islam, Iman, Ihsaan*'. Religious identity concerns rituals. When these rituals are executed completely one may speak of Islamic Identity. These *rituals* form and shape the person from inside. And then there is one more level of identity that also comes from within. This is very personal and this *inner identity* is *imaan* and fuels all the external deeds.¹⁷⁴

For the Dutch Imam the Qur'an does not teach what one should do, but why one should do. '*Tabarak Ellezi Biyedihi Mulk ve Ala Kulli Seyin Kadir*' '*Elleziy Ghalaka Al Mevte ve Lhayata Ve Yeblugul Eyyukum ve Ahsenu*'. Doing *the best* deeds to ones best ability. The *Muslim identity* is different than the Islamic identity! *Islamic Identity* is everything in the Qur'an and everything the Prophet Muhammad taught. Islamic identity is in that sense something that is set and fixed. Islamic identity forms the outer boundaries that are described as in the main sources. This is the space that a Muslim functions and operates in. Yet a Muslim does the things that he/she can undertake as a Muslim, so operating within these boundaries constitutes a Muslim identity. We say that Islam is holy but the Muslim isn't.¹⁷⁵

An educator and imam in Britain and states that the *Islamic identity* is a better fit rather than Muslim identity. The Islamic identity as a broader understanding suggests and

¹⁷³ NL-EA, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 26.

¹⁷⁴ NL-AK, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 52.

¹⁷⁵ *Idem*

reminds the Muslim identity to be in a constant realization of knowledge and understanding of one's purpose and striving for perfection in every aspect of life. Not only religious with Allah but also social as *Diyn* and *Dunya* are inseparable and one cannot completely abandon one or the other. In non-Muslim countries there are grave debates on this point and generally the opposite is argued. But *Islam is a distinct identity*; it distinguishes the Muslim as an ambassador of Allah on earth. There are Islamic values as well as non-Islamic values for Muslims in Western countries. The differences become more vivid when *values* are pushed and in a way imposed upon Muslims.¹⁷⁶

A scholar and a researcher in Britain, who perceives the Muslim existence in Britain as being Muslim as well as British states that being British and Muslim is a *natural* combination and is considered to be unique identities. That Muslims in Britain consider themselves as *naturally British* should not imply that there is no islamophobia in Britain, on the contrary there is definitely a trending and emerging Islamophobia. Yet, there is also a strong communal awareness as a civic duty to challenge Islamophobia. The Muslim community in Britain have a *rooted awareness* to tackle islamophobia or policies such as Prevent or even have as a community *inner dynamics* that stop young people from radicalization. Yet, probably the challenge in Britain is the inability to *define terrorism*. What does it mean? This debate between the Muslim communities and the policymakers keeps the debate *scrutinized* by the Muslim communities.¹⁷⁷

As the two terms have similar meanings, the personal preference in both usages should be to strive for Islam. As a good Muslim it is central to realize to work towards an *Islamic identity*. Yet, the societal and political reality suggests from a Muslim to recognise the need for the *strategic positioning* within the societal fabric. If the usage of *Muslim identity* is strategically important it is for the wellbeing of the Muslim life

¹⁷⁶ UK-AS, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 62.

¹⁷⁷ UK-ID, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 69.

to make use of this terminology. However, in terms of religious argumentation *Islamic Identity* is a religiously important and sound choice. From an Islamic perspective a *multitude of identities*, in terms of a Muslim having a *complex* degree of identity is valid. This in so far as they can be accommodated in the Islamic world view.¹⁷⁸

According to an academic and Principal of a theological Higher Education program in Britain, the good thing in Islam is that Islam does accommodate a great deal of *multiplicity* and *complexity* in the identity of a Muslim. To the contrary notion of Islam being theologically monolithic is thus for the not true. It can be observed that Islam is culturally very *diverse*, and it is also legally very diverse. Therefore, there is not much of a discomfort or a contradiction between *Muslim identity and Islamic identity* on the point of multiplicity and *plurality* of identities.

For interviewees it is not having or acknowledging the Islamic identity that could form a problem, especially since this identity is not an internal debate or even an issue amongst Muslims. However, being a Muslim in a wider non-Muslim community brings about the question of Muslim identities versus the Islamic identity. The British Muslim interviewees *reiterate* in the general discourse on the point of having a conversation as a *Muslim identity* deserving a position in these Secular Societies that should be taken serious and be *heard as a valid* member as the others. Otherwise, there can be no *conversation* about the so-called British values without the Muslim individual around the table. It is not up to a Prime Minister or a politician to articulate a set of values that impose on Muslim values and to suggest these to be on a *collision* course. In this context a political actor has not achieved or done its duty to address the Muslim as a British citizen.

4.6 Muslim Identity

In this section I have looked into various individual religious items to determine the factor loadings of what constitute the *religious attitude*. This means that all the variables used in the questionnaire measuring the attitudes towards religion are

¹⁷⁸ UK-SE, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 113.

factored together to reduce the data into one super-variable. These individual items that factored are *centrality, being active in an in-group, salience, pillars of Islam, Islam in daily decisions and obligatory duties such as shahada, salaah, fasting, zakat and hajj*. Although all the religious items are studied separately in this research; an attempt is undertaken in order to see whether an Exploratory Factor Analysis delivers the *internal validity* in the above mentioned separate religious items to compose one super-variable.

4.6.1 Exploratory Factor Analysis: Muslim Identity

An EFA is conducted to check for new factors that could provide more correlations that were initially missed. In this section an EFA is conducted to see whether these separate items can be factored together as a measure for Religious Attitude.

This religious attitude is perceived as a form of *Muslim Identity*. The following items: *shahada, centrality and decision* are factored in the first attempt. For this reason, an Exploratory Factor Analysis is conducted which provides a determinant-value of 0.475, which is greater than 0.001. Thus, we can safely assume that these three individual items can be factored together. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure is 0.596, which is a moderate score of validity and is higher than 0.0005. According to the KMO Bartlett's Test the Factor analyses is strongly significant at a P-value of 0.000.¹⁷⁹ The Cronbach's Alpha calculated for this new variable *Muslim Identity* is 0.7, which is a strongly fair internal reliability.

¹⁷⁹ See Table Appendix I, P. 165.

Table 12, Table Pattern Matrix Principal Component Analysis

Pattern Matrix ^a				
	Component			
	1	2	3	4
Pilars_Islam	,849			
Decision_Isl	,772			
Centrality_Isl	,767			
Salaat5_ADay	,767			
Applic_Salience	,756			
Fasting	,742			
Shahada	,739			
Member_Ummah	,620			
Party_Parl		,860		
Party_EU		,838		
Self_Elec_Party		,763		
Sharia_Comm		,524		-,401
Self_Elec_Mufti		,450		
Do_More_Trust		,421		
Equal_Rights			,765	
Member_Society			,723	
Feel_recognized			,687	
Feel_discriminated			-,610	
PolTrustRECODED			-,594	
RechtvanStemmenNL			,403	
Single_Identity				,697
Ordered_Complexity				,659
Isl_Forbids_Pol				-,647
Hard_Approach				-,566

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.


On basis of the Exploratory Factor Analysis table above, there are four components of factor loadings that load together quite tightly; in the table are associated with in general *religious attitudes, institutional attitudes, trust attitudes and conflict and peace attitudes*. Bellow all these themes are discussed *concurrently* with the quantitative and qualitative data analyses.

According to the Exploratory Factor Analysis the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin is 0.818 and P-value is 0.000 significant. The purpose of the Factor Analysis is to reduce the amount of items in the questionnaire. The selection is based upon the promax. The analysis

delivered four components of which the total variance explained for the first component is 21.90%, 11.34%, 10.55% and 8.34%. Besides all the scores below 0.4 are excluded.

4.6.2 Correlations Hypothesis testing: Muslim Identity

On basis of the EFA in the previous section the variables Shahada, Centrality and Salience are factored together and has a Cronbach's Alpha of 0.689 which is fairly high. Having configured a new variable called *Muslim Identity* a hypothesis test is conducted. According to this correlation-analysis an association between *Muslim Identity* and the variable *identity complexity* is not found. This against the expectation to find a correlation between the variables *Muslim Identity* and *Identity Complexity*. However, since there is a correlation between the variable *Decision-Making on basis of Islam* and the variable *Single Identity* ($M = 1.45$, $SD = 0.668$, $r = -0.086^{**}$), I can infer that the Muslim individual who lives by Islamic creeds has a strong preference for *single identities* and when controlled for a *Mediation effect* for the variable *Politicians trust*, a significant mediating effect is found. This effect indicates that the variable *Politicians' Trust* has significant effect on variables *Decision-Making on basis of Islam* and the variable *Single Identity*.



The above mentioned new composed variable *Muslim Identity* also has a positive correlation with items such as *following policies* ($M = 1.77$, $SD = 0.870$, $r = 0.200^{**}$). This means that the stronger the Muslim identity the stronger the tendency to follow policies that are made by the government. Another significant finding is that the variable *Muslim Identity* a negative correlation has with the variable *Islam forbids politics* ($M = 3.88$, $SD = 1.050$, $r = -0.075^{**}$). In other words the stronger the *Muslim*

Identity the less inclined the respondents are to believe that Islam *forbids* political participation.

In other words, *Muslim Identity* has a positive correlation with *democratic values* such as having an *own party* in parliament (M = 2.55, SD = 1.102, r = 0.131**). *Self-elected party* (M = 2.64, SD = 1.153, r = 0.119**), *self-elected umbrella organization* (M = 2.44, SD = 1.027, r = 0.150**), *Muslim Identity* even has a positive correlation with the variable believing to *influence policies* as a solution for a better society (M = 2.28, SD = 1.023, r = 0.153**).

The positive correlation between *Muslim Identity* and the variable do more for *trust* and recognition (M = 2.23, SD = 1.083, r = 0.109**) suggests that the Muslims are said to believe that there is lack of trust in the society, which is why Muslims believe they should do more for better understanding and better relations. Yet, *Muslim Identity* also positively correlates with the variable having *special laws* (M = 2.45, SD = 1.176, r = 0.158**). Obviously, Muslims do fear that there is need for protection. Thus the more respondents have salient *Muslim Identity* the more respondents believe that it is important to *follow policies*, the more they believe to have their *own parties* that are self-elected. Probably the most interesting is the negative correlation between *Muslim Identity* and the variable **Islam forbids** politics.

4.6.3 Exploratory Factor Analysis: Political Institutions

An EFA is conducted for a new variable called Political Institutions of the individual items; voting, equal rights, following policies, having a party in parliament, in European Union, self-election of own party and an umbrella organization and influencing policies, it can be seen that these items load together well. The determinant of the Correlation Matrix is 0.088 which is a fairly strong determinant (>0.0001). Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value is 0.671 and is significant at a level of 0.000.

Pattern Matrix^a

	Component		
	1	2	3
Single_Identity	-.350	-.119	.432
Right to Vote	.107	.739	.224
Equal_Rights	-.109	.792	-.184
Follow_Policies	.013	.371	.664
Party_Parl	.892	.072	-.009
Party_EU	.886	.048	.023
Self_Elec_Party	.766	-.153	.131
Self_Elec_Umbrell	.346	-.097	.568
Influence_Policies	.114	-.030	.638

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 9 iterations.

The Cronbach's Alpha for these eight individual items is equal to 0.668 which is also a fairly strong indication for internal reliability.

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.668	8

4.6.4 Correlations Political Institutions

Having composed a new variable called Political Institutions of the above eight individual items, this section studies the correlations with other variables. A very important finding is that the variable *Political Institutions* positively correlates with the composed variable *Muslim Identity* ($M = 3.90$, $SD = 1.427$, $r = 0.282^{**}$). This means that respondents who have strongly agreed to variables composing Muslim lifestyle also agree to democratic political institutions. It also observed from religious variables such as *salaat* ($M = 4.52$, $SD = 1.017$, $r = 0.133^{**}$) and Islam as source for *daily decisions* ($M = 1.45$, 0.668 , $r = 0.247^{**}$) that the *variable Political Institutions* are positively correlated. These items also present that practice of Islam do not contradict the political participation process of the Muslim individual.

The variable *Political Institutions* also positively correlates with the variable *Soft Approach* of the Muslim individual (M = 1.84, SD = 0.920, r = 0.209**). This association connotes that the respondents strongly agree with the *variables Political Institutions* agree with soft approach as viable solutions for peaceful society. It was earlier discussed that the composed Muslim Identity negatively correlates with the variable *Hard Approach* (M = 1.81, SD = 0.920, r = 0.189**). All these correlations are significant at p = 0.000.

4.6.5 Overall Correlations of Islamic Duties

85.1% of the Dutch respondents and 90.8% of the British respondents reply as extremely important to the variable *pillars of Islam*. 88.2% of the Dutch respondents and 90.3% of the British respondents reply as extremely important to the variable *shahada*. 77.1% of the Dutch respondents and 70.2% of the British respondents reply as always to the variable *praying five times* a day. 92.9% of the Dutch respondents and 89.0% of the British respondents reply as always to the variable *fasting* every year during Ramadan. 78.2% of the Dutch respondents and 80.8% of the British respondents reply as always to the variable *paying zakat* every year.

4.6.6 Regression Analysis

Religious Attitude is predicted by *Salaat, Fasting, Zakat, Hajj, Shahada* with Nagelkerke value of 97% of explaining of the variance.¹⁸⁰

4.7 Being Active in Own Local Group

The *Social Identity Theory* as discussed in chapter two attains much value to the group identity and the membership to the in- or out-group. In this section group membership will be discussed in relation to the items posed in the questionnaire.

4.7.1 Variable Locally Active

In the table in the Appendix I it is observed that 39.5% and 36.4% of the respondents in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom respectively are actively engaged in their own *local in-group*. The *Pearson Chi-square* is $\chi^2 (1, N = 1294) = 22.68, P = 0.000$

¹⁸⁰ See Table Appendix I, P. 168 - 172.

and the differences between the two countries regarding the variable being locally active is very significant and meaningful.¹⁸¹

4.7.1.1 Correlations Active Locally

When controlled for the variable *Muslim Identity*, it can be observed that being locally active has a strong positive correlation with it ($M = 3.90$, $SD = 1.427$, $r = 0.310^{**}$). This means that the more an individual feel to have a Muslim identity the more inclination the individual is active in the local in-group. Being locally active also correlates positively with the variable *Political Institutions* ($M = 19.22$, $SD = 4.615$, $r = 0.241^{**}$). However, a very interesting finding is that the variable being locally active has no correlation with the variable *Single Identity*.

A finding is that the variable being *locally active* correlates positively with the variable feeling to be a member of the *umma* ($M = 1.63$, $SD = 1.325$, $r = 0.373^{**}$). This means that the more a respondent is active in its own local group, the more it is inclined to perceive the self as a member of the *umma*. Besides the latter correlation, being *locally active* also has a positive correlation with the variable perceiving the self to be a *member of the society* ($M = 2.30$, $SD = 0.982$, $r = 0.121^{**}$). In a way, the respondents who are locally active are more inclined to perceive themselves as members of religious as well as non-religious Western societies. This suggests that these respondents do not perceive a clash between the Muslim global community values and societal values where they live.

Another important finding is that the variable being *locally active* correlates positively with feelings of being *recognized* in the society ($M = 2.68$, $SD = 1.055$, $r = 0.112^{**}$). There may be a suggestion that having an active local life in the own group does aid the feelings of being recognized in society. The SIT confirms that knowing the own group usually functions as a determining factor for being for more tolerant towards others (107).

¹⁸¹ See Crosstab Table Appendix I, P. 171 - 173.

The variable being *locally active* also correlates positively with the following democratic values: *voting* (M = 2.32, SD = 1.063, $r = 0.130^{**}$), with *following policies* (M = 1.77, SD = 0.805, $r = 0.146^{**}$), with *Party in parliament* (M = 2.55, SD = 1.102, $r = 0.158^{**}$), with *party in EU* (M = 2.50, SD = 1.071, $r = 0.177^{**}$). There is also a strong and positive correlation between the variable being *locally active* and having a *self-elected party* (M = 2.64, SD = 1.153, $r = 0.161^{**}$). Being *locally active* correlates positively with *influence policies* (M = 2.28, SD = 1.023, $r = 0.087^{**}$). The variable being active in the own local group seems to the case in the own micro level and has positive implications on being active within the society on a political and democratic level.

Being *locally active* correlates positively with *special laws* (M = 2.45, SD = 1.176, $r = 0.091^{**}$). Muslims being active in their own group are more inclined to participate in political values such as voting, following policies through political processes and believing that there is a need for Muslims to have parties in the parliament as a *viable solution* to reduce possible conflicts. However, there is also the need felt to have *special laws* to protect Muslim communities, as this does suggest that Muslims feel unprotected or unsafe within the social context.

4.7.2 Membership Umma

In the next table the proportions of respondents who perceive themselves as member of the global *umma* are seen. 55.6% and 59.1% of the Dutch and British respondents respectively perceive themselves as member of an *international in-group*. The British respondents are compared to the Dutch respondents higher. The P-value is 0.001, thus are the proportional differences between the two countries very significant.¹⁸²

4.7.2.1 Correlations Membership Umma

As it was expected the variable feeling to be a member of the *umma* correlates strongly with the variable *Muslim Identity* (M = 3.90, SD = 1.427, $r = 0.556^{**}$). However, a very significant finding is that the variable being a member of the *umma* doesn't show

¹⁸² See Crosstab Table Appendix I, P. 174 - 175.

any correlation with the variable *Single Identity*. Yet, as expected being a member of *umma* has a negative correlation with the variable Politician's Trust ($M = 4.31$, $SD = 0.929$, $r = -0.157^{**}$). Against this finding the variable correlates positively with the variable Political Institutions ($M = 19.22$, $SD = 4.615$, $r = 0.240^{**}$).

An interesting finding is the positive correlation between the variable being a member of the *umma* and the variable *feeling recognized in the society* ($M = 2.68$, $SD = 0.867$, $r = 0.070^*$). This means that again the perception of the Muslim respondent feeling a member of the *umma* does not obstruct its feelings of being recognized in the society. Being member of the *umma* also correlates with having *equal rights* ($M = 2.69$, $SD = 1.142$, $r = -0.70^*$). Thus, the more a respondent feels to be a member of the *umma* the more the respondent is inclined to vote in society it lives. Being a member of the *umma* also correlates with the variable *following policies* ($M = 1.77$, $SD = 0.805$, $r = 0.185^{**}$). The stronger the perception of a respondent to feeling being a member of the *umma*, the more it is inclined to follow policies at home.

This probably is one of the most important findings as the variable being member of the *umma* positively correlates with the variable *Islam forbids politics* ($M = 3.88$, $SD = 1.050$, $r = -0.060^*$). This means that the stronger the membership to *umma*, the more the respondent is against the belief that Islam forbids political participation. Another important finding is the positive correlation between the variable being a member of the *umma* and the variable *soft approach* ($M = 1.84$, $SD = 0.920$, $r = 0.145^{**}$). The more the respondent feels to be a member of the *umma*, the more it favors a softer approach as a viable solution that reduces conflict in the society they live in.

4.7.3 In-Group Membership

Here it may be observed that the proportions of respondents who perceive themselves as member of an own in-group. 29.9% and 28.9% of the Dutch and British respondents respectively perceive themselves as member of an in-group. The P-value is 0.610, thus are the proportional differences between the two countries not significant.¹⁸³

¹⁸³ See Crosstab Table Appendix I, P. 174.

4.7.3.1 Correlations In-Group Membership

The perception of considering oneself of being a member of an *in-group* correlates with the perception of considering oneself to have a *Muslim Identity*; there is a strong positive correlation ($M = 3.90$, $SD = 1.427$, $r = 0.363^{**}$).

Feeling to be a member of an in-group also positively correlates with the variable Political Institutions ($M = 19.22$, $SD = 4.615$, $r = 0.314^{**}$).

The variable perceiving oneself to be a member of an in-group also correlates with being *discriminated* ($M = 2.57$, $SD = 1.025$, $r = 0.135^{**}$). This means that the more a respondent feels itself to be a member of an own in-group, the more it is inclined to believe that it is being discriminated in society.

There is a negative correlation between the variable being member of an *in-group* and the variable *Single Identity* ($M = 1.49$, $SD = 0.500$, $r = -0.091^{**}$). This means that the stronger the tendency of membership of an in-group, the more a respondent perceives itself to be a single identity.

Another important finding is that the stronger the feeling of being a member of an *in-group* the more inclined a respondent to perceive *Hard Approach* as a viable solution ($M = 3.84$, $SD = 1.218$, $r = 0.112^{**}$). Yet, there is also a positive correlation between being a member of an *in-group* and *Soft Approach* ($M = 1.84$, $SD = 0.920$, $r = 0.066^*$).

Another important finding is the positive correlation between the variable being member of an *in-group* and the variable having special laws as a remedy for conflict in society ($M = 2.45$, $SD = 1.176$, $r = 0.193^{**}$). This means that respondents with stronger membership feelings, consider themselves as vulnerable in society and feeling of being in need of special laws.

4.7.4 Membership Society

In the next table the proportions of respondents who perceive themselves as member of the society is 17.3% and 27.5% of the Dutch and British respondents respectively perceive themselves as member of the society. The British respondents are compared to the Dutch respondents higher. The P-value is 0.000, thus are the proportional differences between the two countries very significant.

Table 13, Crosstab feeling a valuable member of the society

			Member_Society * Country N = 1306		
			Country now?		Total
			NL	UK	
Member Society	Strongly Agree	% within Member_Society	49.1%	50.9%	100.0%
		% within Country now?	17.3%	27.5%	21.4%
		% of Total	10.5%	10.9%	21.4%
	Agree	% within Member_Society	61.4%	38.6%	100.0%
		% within Country now?	42.5%	40.9%	41.9%
		% of Total	25.7%	16.2%	41.9%
	Neutral	% within Member_Society	64.6%	35.4%	100.0%
		% within Country now?	25.8%	21.7%	24.2%
		% of Total	15.6%	8.6%	24.2%
	Disagree	% within Member_Society	69.1%	30.9%	100.0%
		% within Country now?	12.2%	8.3%	10.6%
		% of Total	7.4%	3.3%	10.6%
	Strongly Disagree	% within Member_Society	68.0%	32.0%	100.0%
		% within Country now?	2.2%	1.6%	1.9%
		% of Total	1.3%	0.6%	1.9%
Total	% within Member_Society	60.5%	39.5%	100.0%	
	% within Country now?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	60.5%	39.5%	100.0%	

4.7.4.1 Correlations Membership Society

It is worthwhile to note that there is a positive correlation between the variable being a *member of the society* and the variable to *vote* ($M = 2.32$, $SD = 1.063$, $r = 0.354^{**}$). This means that the more a respondent feels to be a member of the society the more it is inclined to believe that voting is a part of its identity. There is a positive correlation between the variable being *member of the society* and the need to follow policies ($M = 1.77$, $SD = 0.805$, $r = 0.118^{**}$). The stronger the perception of a respondent to be a member of the society the more the respondent is inclined to follow policies.

An important finding is the negative correlation between the variable being *member of the society* and the variable *wellbeing* ($M = 2.36$, $SD = 1.080$, $r = -0.115^{**}$). The more a respondent feels itself to be a member of the society the less the respondent feels itself being in danger in the streets. Probably the most important finding is the negative correlation between the variable being *member of the society* and the variable *politicians trust* ($M = 4.31$, $SD = .929$, $r = -0.232^{**}$). The more a respondent feels to be a member of the society the more the respondent does not agree that politicians trust Muslims and Islam. Thus, the more a Muslim respondent feels politicians distrust Muslims and Islam, the more they feel detached from the society they live in.

4.7.5 Regression Analysis Membership Society

Feeling to be a valuable *member of the society* is predicted significantly by the following items: *feeling to be recognized* in the society, that *voting* is a part of the personal identity and by *distrust* of the political actor.¹⁸⁴

4.7.6 Qualitative Analysis: Membership and Integration

In general sense interviewees emphasize communal as well as societal responsibilities. In this context the contestation between ‘*we*’ and ‘*you*’ is an indication of not being able to show any empathy. Empathizing with the core issues while actually the Dutch and British might think reasonably the same, is a problematic situation, where the membership in the wider society is suddenly in a grave contrast, while emphasising the ‘*we*’ and differences. This would suggest a stiff *identity* while there are also values that are common. *Dutch interviewees in general acknowledge that there is a communication vacuum in the society. Besides the lack of self-knowledge on Muslim behalf, stiffness in behaviour, opinion or empathy, there is also the mutual distrust.*¹⁸⁵ Even though, both countries are democratic and every citizen possesses rights, *values* and freedoms yet, these values and freedoms are not equally utilized. There are those who are ‘*different equal*’ than others, such as in cases of freedom of speech.¹⁸⁶

Respondents agree with each other that Muslim communities *lack self-reflection*. The labour migration as being a root cause, prevented the present Muslim minorities to invest in the cultural history. Even though, the British Muslims are an integral part of this cultural history, the critique against the Dutch Muslim is the inability to empathize with the wider Dutch society; and not willing to distance itself from lamentations or *narrow-mindedness petty bourgeois life* that eventually lead to a clash of values. A Dutch interviewee argues that the Dutch Muslim experienced difficulty in believing that the Dutch really thought in a *negative and scrutinizing* way about the Muslim

¹⁸⁴ See Table Appendix I, P. 174 - 175.

¹⁸⁵ NL-AB, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 4.

¹⁸⁶ NL-TK, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 16.

minority. The Dutch Muslim who was also an industrial labourer believed that he was doing well. There was an image or better an identity problem.¹⁸⁷ This image was a *fixated* identity of the self and it was one that wasn't a harmonious model.

Another interesting point made by a Dutch interviewee is the religious life in a *secularized society*; this religious life was a *handicap* for progress. *Religiosity* was not considered as a progressive model and the mosque just like the church was pushed aside. Both the mosque as well as the church are considered as islands in vast progressive and modern society.

Religion was becoming an underground personal and communal experience. So, the Muslim identity started to crystalize in the Netherlands into a still standing project. An own communal model was coming into shape with limited growth possibilities that was merely focused on *morality*, which was born out of fear.

The Dutch Muslim identities today are categorized as *conservative* that do not join the wider society and neither are they able to use their rights. The labour migration of the seventies and eighties perceived Europe in the present Muslim perception as the wrong kind of freedoms. These freedoms were quickly perceived as immoral and they represented promiscuity. Islam as a religion wasn't able to look further and see the wider pallet of freedoms. The Muslim teachers or Islamic Primary Schools often are underdeveloped concerning Islam and teaching younger generations the rights they possess in the Netherlands. There is a degree of inability to answer questions and accommodate children.

Another important point is that this still standing societal project is thus failing in to *unification*; as a *Muslim community this progress has failed*. Muslims generally fall back into their own language and culture. These are the social and cultural areas that Muslims feel safe and retreat. Which is why a united Muslim society cannot become a trusting and building group. Thus, the great majority of Muslims are *Identity-Muslims*. The young Dutch Imam confirms the above narrative that Muslim

¹⁸⁷ NL-AB, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 1.

communities and community leaders are *unable to organize*. The Jewish community or the LGBT movements have been longer existent and yet these movements were able to create *strong identities* that were very successful in their *lobbying*.¹⁸⁸

The first generation was unable or better yet they were *not equipped* to explain or answer questions. The balance was not structured, and they were separating themselves from the dominant culture. The *balance* is the true problem. It did not become an extension of the dominant culture.¹⁸⁹ Most respondents indicate that Islam is *multicultural*, yet the Muslim upon coming to the West, wasn't able to fit into the Multicultural society that it was going to become. Today, the *labour identity* has become inevitably a Muslim one. And the Muslim doesn't know how to reflect upon its own religion, teachings, itself and the community they live in.

One interviewee predicts that no minority community in any larger society is able to resist to maintain its unique self and to coexist permanently in that society then becomes an impossible task. A *transformation* is then an inevitable outcome. This would suggest an adaptation from cultural orientation to a stronger religious orientation. Merely due to the fact that *cultural orientations* are far more difficult to maintain in an alien society. A much bigger community would be necessary for that purpose. So the next generation started to take on *a more religious identity* and shed itself from cultural orientations.¹⁹⁰

Today the Dutch Muslim generations distance themselves from their own culture that they received from their parents. The young Muslims perceive in their social and cultural adaptation in the Netherlands especially their cultural heritage as a *burden*. The young Muslims feel the societal pressure and develop arguments to resist the growing discrimination. So they attempt to portray an image towards the wider Dutch society and a stance against *theory cultural heritage*; as being a *hindrance* for the true

¹⁸⁸ NL-AK, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 51.

¹⁸⁹ NL-RB, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 39.

¹⁹⁰ NL-RB, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 40.

integration. The hope in doing this is that by this the discrimination will stop. According to a Dutch academic this pressure in the Netherlands won't stop. This is due to the fact that Dutch politicians believe that the problem mainly lies with the *religious identity*. The Dutch politicians and policymakers believe that it is Islam that doesn't relate to the dominant culture.¹⁹¹

So the political discourse in the Netherlands according to this academic is that religious *identity* needs to be purified of cultural elements and relate to the secular, rational, individualistic modern society. The next generations have made a type of leap, but dominant culture doesn't think this leap is *compatible*. The *modern society wants to be convinced* that topics that *seem to contradict with the dominant culture* can be tackled. So the new generations *position these topics as cultural* and not as religious. This is the debate that takes place right now.¹⁹²

According to a Dutch imam, the imams and leaders in general have difficulty with *diversity*. They have their own *nest smell* and they tend to wish to keep it that way. Therefore, there is no collective decision-making. The imam today is not cosmological and sees no universality and dictates everything by *haram* and *halal*.¹⁹³ The answer to the question '*what is the true Islam?*' wasn't fully processed and defined in the early years, and there is still a void in this context. And one could say that Islam becomes more and more fluid. The *new generations* do not have the cultural baggage or the societal experience to fill in this definition. Yet, on the other side the young Muslims' Islamic identities are constructed as a reaction against the angry outside world. Living in a modern society *has its price*. Islam as a religion was able to relate to the Turkish and Moroccan cultures and my optimism is that it will relate to the Dutch secular and modern culture too. That is the price to pay. The Islamic *religious identity* will have to adapt to the Dutch culture and not the other way around. That is how it will find the

¹⁹¹ Idem

¹⁹² Idem

¹⁹³ NL-AB, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 6.

balance that wasn't able to be constructed in the beginning. This is how Islam will nest itself and imbed itself into the Dutch society. It will become secular and modern.¹⁹⁴

4.7.7 Attitudes towards Trust and Communication

Most British interviewees agree that the government is *selective*. Some organizations and foundations are favoured above others and they serve a useful purpose for the policymakers. Even though these organizations are not representative of the British Muslims. Muslims perceive such practices and organizations as pariahs.¹⁹⁵

Community leaders in Britain are genuinely *frustrated* and angry. The other problem that Muslims or the imams face is the authority to address Jihadi extremism is taken away from the imam. This is due to the fear that the imam might be suspected of encouraging extremism. The space for Muslims and imams to speak *freely* to people is drastically reduced. Young curious Muslims now seek for answers through Google. The trust in the imam within the community should be restored.¹⁹⁶

Muslim communities are divided into different groups and generally these are perceived as an evidence of *hypocritical* attitude within the British government towards the Muslim community; the selectiveness of the policymaker, whether there is genuine hypocrisy or genuine double standards is also supported by the now existing *Prevent Policy*.¹⁹⁷

4.7.8 Historical Colonial Attitudes

An important difference between the British and Dutch Muslim heritage is the colonial history. Even though the British Muslims have weaker bonds with their home countries, there still is a *lack of maturity*. These affiliations to home countries will only weaken more. There will be a more develop and a more indigenous *UK based identity*.

¹⁹⁴ NL-RB, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 41.

¹⁹⁵ UK-SE, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 110.

¹⁹⁶ UK-MK, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 99.

¹⁹⁷ UK-SE, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 110.

This could then function as a more *natural move towards* unification even though denominational differences will remain. This *maturity* still doesn't exist in Britain. The reason is that *continental sectarianism* is very immature and very harsh and some of that has been carried over here.¹⁹⁸

The colonial history is felt more amongst the *older generations* who are immigrants and always have had a relationship in terms of *power*. This was formed by the colonial history and it is strongly internalized. This is now fading with the younger generations, who are more secular and who are Muslims just by name. In Britain too, Muslim young *generations shed parts of their identity* off. This does not change the truth that Muslims are an important part of the society.¹⁹⁹

There is the *colonial* history, the British application to colonialism is paternalistic; the British perceived themselves unlike the Dutch to be out on a civilization mission. The French were also different in their approach and brutally oppressed Algeria, Morocco. So there was a constant conflict. For the French colonialism meant that one had to comply; *laissez faire*. For the British colonialism meant that it was *fine to be yourself*, whereas for the French one had to be French. For the British, the other was not perceived as a threat to civilization. In this relation the situation in the Netherlands for the Muslim minorities is different than that of the Muslim minorities in United Kingdom.²⁰⁰

There is a *common past* where personal law was unofficially recognized with in these commonwealth nations for example during the time of British rule in India. The communities are diverse and not homogeneous.²⁰¹ Various former colonial people such as from Pakistan and India were invited here by the ex-lords. Muslims in the United Kingdom, the vast majority are from the *sub-continent* and have a common

¹⁹⁸ Idem

¹⁹⁹ UK-CG, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 58.

²⁰⁰ IK-IL, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 66.

²⁰¹ UK-ID, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 67.

history and have dealt with the British people before. They know how the *British think*. This is probably one of the most important contributing factors for the sub-continental British-Muslim that there is a good level of *unity*. Muslim leaders here have developed a formula, where Muslim leadership even though are not publicly organic, but have in times of need regular meetings. Even the most marginal Muslim communities are included in these meetings. There *is no power in disunity*. This helps unity and makes the Muslim communities stronger.²⁰²

4.7.9 Differences between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom

Almost all respondents agree that the United Kingdom is much more tolerant towards Muslim communities than elsewhere in Europe. Yet, they also all agree that there is a values-agenda, together with the ‘Prevent Policy’ there is much vilification, suspicion and dislodging of the Muslim communities.

Secularism practiced in United Kingdom is different from that of France. There is obviously more change, and United Kingdom is more tolerant in some sense, but there is no tolerance in *values*.²⁰³ On one side *cultural differences* are celebrated in the United Kingdom which is a good thing but there is also a debate on the definition of extremism; nobody is able to define what it the definition is and what the *British values* are? What does it mean to be British? The question is foreign policy allegiance: can we have *Muslim identity* and are we an *umma*? Today younger generations hold on to their *single identities* because of the *identity crisis*. *umma* is an abstract concept. Mostly *romanticized* by the youth.²⁰⁴

United Kingdom is tolerant and there are no restrictions on for example the *hijab* in public spaces, thus the United Kingdom compared to other counties is more open. This is also because the government is open and attempts to involve Muslims when religious matters arise. They ask and take advice, they engage open discussion and

²⁰² UK-SAH, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 74.

²⁰³ UK-CG, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 75.

²⁰⁴ UK-ID, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 68.

maintain good relations.²⁰⁵ There is this religious tolerance, yet the real threat was initially the deep ingrained *racism*, and the Muslim voice was not its strongest feature.²⁰⁶ Much was learnt from the experiences of the recent British memory of the British Colonial efforts and the resistance against the *Colonial effort* in partnership with the Hindu movement; particularly the Gandhi's movement was very interesting which was an effort of cultural boycott and a kind of a retention an aggressive type of retention of one's own identity. And these experiences are brought here.

4.8 Democratic Attitudes

From the crosstab *right to vote* (see Appendix I for the table) it can be observed that British Muslims 30.6% are much more attached to *voting* as a party of their identity, whereas this percentage for the Dutch Muslims remains at a 20.6%.²⁰⁷ Concerning the variable believing to have *Equal Rights* again (see appendix for the table) is observed that the British Muslims have a much higher awareness of *having equal rights* 23.5% versus the 11.6% of the Dutch Muslims.²⁰⁸

Concerning the variable having the need to *Follow Policies*, Dutch Muslims seem to have an edge; 52% Dutch versus 48% British Muslims (see appendix for the table) respond to agree that there is a need to follow policies.²⁰⁹ Again, when the variable the need to *do more for Trust and Recognition is observe, it is seen that a 25.8%* with the Dutch Muslims and 31.6% of the British Muslims Strongly Agree that they should do more for trust. These latter percentages are close to each other when the two countries are compared (see appendix for the table).²¹⁰

²⁰⁵ UK-SE, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 75.

²⁰⁶ UK-U, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 77.

²⁰⁷ See Crosstab Appendix I, P. 177.

²⁰⁸ See Crosstab Appendix I, P. 178.

²⁰⁹ See Crosstab Appendix I, P. 178.

²¹⁰ See Crosstab Appendix I, P. 179.

When looked at the variable *Having Own Party in the Parliament* again the percentages between the two countries are very close to each other; 19.1% of the Dutch Muslims and 18.8% of the British Muslims Strongly Agree to have an own party (see appendix for the table).²¹¹ When asked whether the variable *Influence policies* is a viable solution to decrease the level of conflict a staggering 38.4% of the British Muslims showed to Strongly Agree, whereas for the Dutch Muslims it is 15.3% (see appendix for the table).²¹² The latter figures perform a much bigger difference between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

From the crosstab an important finding can be observed where a 37.2% of the British Muslims and 30.6% of the Dutch Muslims do not agree with the statement that *Islam Forbids Politics* (see appendix for the table).²¹³

4.9 Politicians' Trust Islam and Muslims

The next crosstab shows the responses upon asking whether Dutch and British *politicians trust Islam* or Muslims. An immense amount of Dutch Muslims 31.3% Extremely Disagree and 42.8% disagree with the statement that politicians trust Muslims or Islam. For the British Muslims 28.1% of the Muslims Extremely Disagree and 41.3% Disagree.

Table 14, Crosstab Politician's Trust in Muslims and Islam

		PolTrustRECODED * Country		
		Country		Total
		NL	UK	
	% within PolTrustRECODED	62.9%	37.1%	100.0%
1	% within Country now?	31.3%	28.1%	30.0%
	% of Total	18.9%	11.1%	30.0%
PolTrus	% within PolTrustRECODED	61.3%	38.7%	100.0%
2	% within Country now?	42.8%	41.3%	42.2%
	% of Total	25.9%	16.3%	42.2%

²¹¹ See Crosstab Appendix I, P. 180.

²¹² See Crosstab Appendix I, P. 202.

²¹³ See Crosstab Appendix I, P. 202.

	% within PolTrustRECODED	61.3%	38.7%	100.0%
3	% within Country now?	22.4%	21.5%	22.0%
	% of Total	13.5%	8.5%	22.0%
	% within PolTrustRECODED	42.6%	57.4%	100.0%
4	% within Country now?	2.9%	6.0%	4.1%
	% of Total	1.8%	2.4%	4.1%
	% within PolTrustRECODED	23.8%	76.2%	100.0%
5	% within Country now?	0.6%	3.1%	1.6%
	% of Total	0.4%	1.2%	1.6%
	% within PolTrustRECODED	60.4%	39.6%	100.0%
Total	% within Country now?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	60.4%	39.6%	100.0%

4.9.1 Hypothesis Testing: Politician's Trust

As expected the variable *politicians trust* in Muslims or Islam has a negative correlation with the variable *Religious Attitudes* ($M=2.40$, $SD= 0.870$, $r= -0.143^{**}$). The more the Muslim respondent disagrees with the statement that politicians trust Muslims and Islam, the more these respondents have strong tendency towards religious attitudes in terms of centrality and salience.

The variable whether Dutch and British *politicians trust* Muslim or Islam also negatively correlates with the variable *Single Identity* ($M=1.49$, $SD= 0.500$, $r= -0.082^{**}$). This means that the more respondents disagree with the statement of politicians trust in Muslims and Islam the more the respondents perceive themselves as single identities. The variable *politicians trust* Muslim or Islam negatively correlates with the variable feeling a *Member of umma* ($M=1.63$, $SD= 0.867$, $r= -0.157^{**}$). The more respondents feel distrusted, the more they feel a member of the global *umma*.

Another intriguing finding is the variable *politicians trust* Muslim or Islam correlates negatively with *feeling recognized* in the society ($M=1.49$, $SD= 0.500$, $r= 0.271^{**}$). The more respondents feel that they are trusted by politicians the more the respondents feel being recognized in the society. Feelings of recognition are thus dependent on perceptions, vocabulary and attitudes of politicians towards the minorities in the two countries.

The variable *politicians trust* in Muslims or Islam correlates negatively with the variable *feeling of being discriminated* (M=2.57, SD= 1.025, $r = -0.306^{**}$). The more respondents feel distrusted the more they feel discriminated in the society. Another confirmation is the negative correlation with the variable *feeling of Member of Society* (M=2.30, SD= 0.982, $r = -0.232^{**}$). The more a respondent feels distrusted the less the respondent feels member of the society. On the other side the more a respondent feel *trusted* by politicians, the more the respondent feels to believe if having *equal rights* (M=2.68, SD= 1.055, $r = 0.250^{**}$).

The more a respondent feels distrusted the less tendency or willingness to *follow policies* (M=1.77, SD= 0.805, $r = -0.082^{**}$). Also the more there is distrust, the more a respondent feels its *wellbeing* is under threat (M=2.36, SD= 1.080, $r = -0.142^{**}$). As stated earlier the distrust of the politicians does have an effect on how Muslim minorities perceive their democratic rights and whether these rights can become a part of their personal identities.

Another important finding is the positive correlation between the variable *politicians' trust* in Muslims or Islam, the more respondents are inclined to believe that *Islam forbids politics* (M=3.88, SD= 1.050, $r = 0.161^{**}$). Again, this is an important find where the distrust of the political actor has a correlation with the way Muslim respondents legitimize their participation in political processes.

The same tendencies go for the variables *Policies conducted in the Middle East* (M=2.04, SD= 0.913, $r = -0.200^{**}$) and that these policies in the *Middle East function as a Cause* (M=2.37, SD= 0.983, $r = -0.134^{**}$) of conflict in society. The distrust of the politicians does have implications and effect on whether the respondents feel that these policies are cause of concern or even are causes of conflict in the two countries.

Probably one of the most important finding is that this distrust of the politicians also correlates with the variable *Hard Approach* (M=3.84, SD= 1.218, $r = 0.178^{**}$). The more a respondent feels *distrusted* the more the respondent feels that a harder approach is suitable as a viable solution in society. This finding can be confirmed by the next important observation where respondents who feel distrusted by politicians also feel that they should be protected by *Special Laws* (M=2.45, SD= 1.176, $r = -0.114^{**}$).

Table 15, Correlation Table Politician's Trust

Correlations

		PI_Vot_Eq_ Fpol_ParNL _EU_ElecP_ ElecU_InfP	MI_SH_S AL_CEN	Pol_Trust _Isl	Single_I dentity	Hard_Ap proach	Soft_A pproac h
PI_Vot_Eq_Fpol_ ParNL_EU_ElecP_ ElecU_InfP	Pearson Correlation	1	.282**	.020	-.094**	.118**	.209**
	Sig. (2- tailed)		.000	.484	.001	.000	.000
	N	1242	1241	1241	1239	1234	1239
MI_SH_SAL_CE N	Pearson Correlation	.282**	1	-.164**	-.024	-.012	.189**
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.000		.000	.390	.657	.000
	N	1241	1307	1302	1304	1264	1274
Pol_Trust_Isl	Pearson Correlation	.020	-.164**	1	-.082**	.178**	-.111**
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.484	.000		.003	.000	.000
	N	1241	1302	1303	1300	1263	1274
Single_Identity	Pearson Correlation	-.094**	-.024	-.082**	1	-.188**	.096**
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.001	.390	.003		.000	.001
	N	1239	1304	1300	1305	1262	1272
Hard_Approach	Pearson Correlation	.118**	-.012	.178**	-.188**	1	-.177**
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.000	.657	.000	.000		.000
	N	1234	1264	1263	1262	1265	1261
Soft_Approach	Pearson Correlation	.209**	.189**	-.111**	.096**	-.177**	1
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	
	N	1239	1274	1274	1272	1261	1275

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

4.9.2 Regression Analysis for Hard Approach

It is very important to note the finding that the variable *Hard Approach* holds a negative correlation with the variable *politicians' trust* (M = 4.31, SD = 0.929, r = 0.178**). This means that the more an individual disagrees with politicians' trust the more the individual believes in a *harder approach*.

It is very interesting to find out that the variable *Hard Approach* doesn't hold any correlation with the variable *Muslim identity* or any single item such as centrality, *salaat*, *fasting* or *religious decision making*. It is even the case that *Hard Approach* negatively correlates with the variable *Shahada* (M = 1.17, SD = 0.558, r = -0.057*).

As it is expected the variable *Hard Approach* negatively correlates with the variable *Soft Approach* ($M = 1.84$, $SD = 0.920$, $r = -0.177^{**}$). Hard approach also positively correlates with the variable Islam forbids Politics ($M = 3.88$, $SD = 1.050$, $r = 0.247^{**}$). This suggests that Hard Approach in society from the Muslim individual may come from marginalization by political actors as well as radical views.

According to the Ordinal Regression Analysis *single identity* is a good predictor of the variable '*hard approach*'. Therefore, the more a respondent perceives *the self to have multiple identities* the more the respondent is inclined to believe that *hard approach* is not a suitable solution. The variables *Politicians Trust*, *Islam Forbids Politics* and *Single Identity* also predict the variable *Hard Approach* (Nagelkerke 0.108, $P = 0.000$).²¹⁴

4.9.2.1 Qualitative Analysis: Institutional Attitudes

According to the general views of the interviewees *political participation* is a part of religious duties. One participates in society and politics from a consciousness point of view. This awareness is a goal, to bring about a meaningful life that is fair and beholds an intention to be aware. As said in the vers *La Allekum Tattaqoen*: so you may be aware.²¹⁵

Yet, even though religion is considered as important in the Western value, religious people usually feel unprotected, and are not always represented. *Representation* is an important democratic value and must be encouraged by the authorities and yet the image today in the West is as if authorities need to protect themselves from religion and religious people because of the political climate of 'enemy thinking'.²¹⁶

Another Dutch interviewee states that the problem with Muslim political participation is that the Dutch *do not trust the Muslim politicians*. These Muslim politicians usually

²¹⁴ See Regression Table, Appendix I, P. 201.

²¹⁵ NL-AK, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 52.

²¹⁶ NL-TK, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 16.

use the argument of them having Constitutional rights, but the question is for wider public is whether these Muslim politicians misuse these so-called rights or their strategic benefits versus whether they genuinely believe in these rights. There is a much suspicion! If that is the case than there is abuse of the constitutional rights. Muslims should internalize these rights and demonstrate and normalize Islam in the Netherlands.²¹⁷

On the other side the Dutch have a serious *lack of trust* in these people and are they truly serious or are they out to get short term wins. The price to pay for imbedding Islam and Muslims in the modern society is to transform and interact. The *established institutions* do not interact and won't transform so they don't have any future.²¹⁸ Their theological understanding is unfit in this modern society.

Probably the most ideal future for Islam, according to this academic is an Islam in the society that is *imbedded*, and Muslims are fully integrated and are *not visible* in the streets. A future wherein the name of the Muslim doesn't bother; a future wherein these increased tensions have brought about an Islam that is different that the Islam in Turkey and Morocco. It would be a future where Muslims in Turkey or in Morocco will blame Muslims here for having *reformed* Islam as Christians did.²¹⁹

It is not the umbrella organizations such as the MCB that purportedly represent Muslims, rather it is the Muslims engaging widely present in all levels of the society. This variety of multiple organizations makes lobbying efforts in the United Kingdom very effective.²²⁰ Then, the negotiations between the Muslim Community and Society contains roughly three types of institutions in the United Kingdom. Institutions that

²¹⁷ NL-RB, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 44.

²¹⁸ NL-RB, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 32.

²¹⁹ *Idem*

²²⁰ UK-ID, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 69.

some are *complying* with the government owned and are usually perceived as *collaborators by the Muslim communities*. They have a stake as in money and position. Then there are organizations that *capitulate*. They just agree with the demands rather than *renegotiate*. Policymakers concede in these situations more ground. Then there are *independent organizations*; which are generated from genuine community response. These are *independently funded*, and the leadership is from common communities and mostly mosques. These are middle class people – and engage with politics to justify the need to engage and not at the expense of our identity on our terms.²²¹ Umbrella organizations *cater niche needs* that have specific identities. Islamic needs rather than *ethnic needs*. I am never asked whether to join an event. The MCB as an umbrella organization has had its own challenges and did lose some credibility *liasioning* with the government during 9/11.²²²

Also, each Muslim institution in the United Kingdom works *independently* some get registered as charities. They are registered independently regulated independently. There is no collaboration. They serve their own communities. But it requires to address *unity* in religious terms yet celebrate differences. Appreciate and recognize each other. For British understanding it is strange that imams (Diyanet) are paid from Ankara. That some foreign entity interferes is something we as British Muslims do not have in the United Kingdom. The imams in the United Kingdom are independent and regulate themselves.²²³

4.9.2.2 Muslim Views on Political Parties

All interviewees agree that the Parliament is an important *institution*. In terms of *representation* minorities must have a voice in the parliament. Except the form of this presence in the parliament has two distinct approaches in both countries.

²²¹ UK-CG, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 59.

²²² UK-ID, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 69.

²²³ *Idem*

According to a representative of an Umbrella organization a *religion based political parties* cannot be a solution in any part of the world, let alone in a Western secular democracy. Such an endeavour would hinder; ultimately people have their choice for dealing free society. A political party espousing religious views wouldn't be able to offer solutions to the wider society capable of engaging responding to exude aspirations in the needs of every citizen a Muslim religious political party.²²⁴ A secular *broad-based party in a secular democracy* would not never offer things everything that Muslims could agree with so we see that as a part of our lives there policies you would find eminent and some deplorable it's a balancing exercise.²²⁵

A British-Muslim researcher confirms the former view and states that a political party would be a *negative step* to take; it would be perceived as separatist on basis of religion, due to the fact that public success requires appeal to the broad base. In case o a political party one would have to rely on the religious community to be successful. In the British political history there have been a couple of examples in the past in terms of Islamic political parties neither of them have been successful. Also Islam in Britain is quite different than the European version.²²⁶

Another British community leader shares the former point of view and states that a Muslim Political party has been attempted and has not been successful. In this current scenario where the whole *British values debate* is happening, people are very conscious of every step they take. Such a direction or debate would mean that the mainstream politics would accuse Muslims of treason.²²⁷

²²⁴ UK-AT, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 90.

²²⁵ Idem

²²⁶ UK-KS, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 92.

²²⁷ Idem

Another conforming quote is '*I think it is not good to have Muslim political parties*'.²²⁸ Most of the organizational efforts are disparate (essentially different) meaning these efforts are *not organized collectively* but by lots of individual groups; there are *multiple efforts* for *unification*. Therefore, there is quite a long way to go before these efforts reach *maturity* before having any kind of broad-base. There are different groups and different ethnicities; the United Kingdom has large blocks of different ethnicities as well as large blocks of different inter Islamic denominations.²²⁹

Another shared view is that of a Principal of a Higher Education programme, that a *political party* shouldn't be a requirement for an effective *Consultation*. A *political representation* is definitely necessary and knowing that Politics is about *power*, the existence of large representative groups that do *lobbying* is adequate and wins ground. They get their endorsement and that's a big part of the political infrastructure in the United Kingdom.

Yet, an important argument in the United Kingdom is the *Muslim vote*. This is important due to the fact that established parties try to win the Muslim Votes. In this context a *Muslim party wouldn't work* simply because in Britain there are no smaller parties that are single issue parties. Another problem is once that door opens then the Muslim community will end up with four or five parties. Because the Muslim community is not monolithic and yet *politically mature*.²³⁰

4.9.2.3 Policymaking Suspicion

In the United Kingdom the Government pushes a *Values-Agenda*, by word it is secular-liberal values; but this is also very *nationalistic*. It is expected of you to adopt these

²²⁸ UK-MK, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 96.

²²⁹ UK-SE, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 106.

²³⁰ *Idem*

values. If a British person belongs here, this means that this person is *secular and liberal*. This is the discourse that is followed.²³¹

Government has started *bogus charities* fronted by Muslims. There is much infiltration going on. The moral leaders in most organizations 2004 worked hard to change the landscape. Strong religious base. Unfortunately, European model and an Islam run by Arab minorities. They do not come from Muslim base and run over by the French. The indo-pack have a strong base and have many scholars, callers and preachers. One can't fight this, so go around and infiltrate or pressurize influence by money and position.²³²

Government mistakes this, wrong people to take advisor. What is Islam? Islam doesn't say anything about the place one lives. Even though atrocities, one should understand that one lives here. The name of the place one lives doesn't change Islam or being Muslim.²³³ There is a huge push on controversial *non-Islamic values*. Muslims have the right to have Islamic schools, but *must show British values*; parliament, democracy and tolerance of *homosexuality*. There is still the romance of what used to be the British version of the *Multicultural society*. This is in a transition, because policies are changing, you see it with Brexit, Trump and I think things might get harder; *populism* as political motive. This also bad for liberals.²³⁴

The Home-Secretary saying that British-values are Muslim-values. I don't know whether it is that simple; but I can say that *British in general do not feel threatened* as in the case of the French. The French concern is to protect their language and culture; we don't have that.²³⁵ Targeting policy making, *Prevent Policy* the government policies need to be addressed, as these can't be security issues. Terrorist attacks are under

²³¹ UK-CG, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 58.

²³² UK-JR, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 72.

²³³ *Idem*

²³⁴ UK-AS, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 62.

²³⁵ UK -U, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 66.

criticism and some of these are addressed.²³⁶ Mosques are spiritual spaces –told by the government under its ‘*Prevent*’ strategy to monitor the congregation, however, people started to *distrust these policies*. As a community we should not panic. An *attack on identity* requires *addressing the policy* on racism, or the judiciary challenging at different levels.²³⁷

There are Muslims who are employed as spies. Took away the integrity and credibility. Commissioned by the government; there were youth organizations suddenly get financial aid.²³⁸ There are serious questions concerning the *Prevent program*, counter terrorism initiatives that the government has taken, and is imposed on academics, medical professionals and schools etc. its impact on our society in terms of free speech we do have issues *young people alienated, confused, feeling* adding to the crisis.²³⁹

Prevent as a policy has the capacity to make every single Muslim an individual suspect.²⁴⁰ The biggest problem with the *prevent strategy* (because you need something to prevent), is that it *disproportionately targets* Muslim community and that is messed up. In some places it has clearly been seen as almost as *spying* on each other. *Prevent* needs to be scrapped, the work however can simply be done through the police because the work needs to be done, extremism needs be stopped but it can be done through the police and through local government community engagement work social cohesion, engagement that kind of work.²⁴¹

So, this *Prevent strategy* is actually *Un-British* due to what you told me. Another thing they did in this case they disempowered the Muslim community from being able to do

²³⁶ Idem

²³⁷ UK-ID, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 69.

²³⁸ UK-AS, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 63.

²³⁹ UK-AT, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 84.

²⁴⁰ Idem

²⁴¹ UK –SE, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 111.

its own prevent work! But it seems it had been developed with *Muslims in mind* and Muslims weren't even around the table. For me the issue is that there isn't enough genuine consultation with Muslim community leaders where there is a kind of genuine soul searching to try arriving at something that is truly representative.²⁴²

4.9.3 Challenges Moments of Polarization

It was the Salman Rushdie moment that polarized everything in the United Kingdom. Multiculturalism meant to not interfere with or to keep hands off from the people as long as the people obeyed the laws, but Salman Rushdie politicized the whole debate.²⁴³ Questions such as '*when you are not British, how does one integrate?*' poses challenges and makes it hard to find, to discover the own identity and then there is the challenge of identity politics. Muslims having to go through airport security cautious and can be perceived as targeted, think of prevent policy. Such policies define a person's identity, because one becomes a potential threat.²⁴⁴

Yet, real change came some ten years ago the United Kingdom with especially the 7/7. Relationship started, and the interaction meant cooperation between different and moderate Muslims.²⁴⁵ It was the Salman Rushdie affair that for the first time made the Muslim attitude in Britain be felt. Where the Muslim Community made its attitude clear against the attack to its Prophet. Before that these people were considered as just Asians. And nobody thought of them as Muslims. Their identity was 'Asian'. This affaire did challenge the liberal values; freedom of speech; and it was a journey of 'freedom from' to 'freedom to'.²⁴⁶

²⁴² Idem

²⁴³ UK-IL, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 66.

²⁴⁴ UK-AS, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 60.

²⁴⁵ UK-KS, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 76.

²⁴⁶ UK -U, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 77.

It is interesting that under bad situations such that of the Salman Rushdie moment the Muslim community had united. It was a bad thing, but it had united the Muslims. Every society has ‘tensions’ such as ethnic, racial or religious and it is these tensions that can fracture a society and even the smallest things can tip things over. The society always remains fragile. When there is unemployment the far-right plays in on fears.²⁴⁷

It was the Rushdie moment that brought the Muslim *umma* onto the TV screen in a moment of polarization. From this moment on a communal maturity came about and real changes started to take place such as in tactics.²⁴⁸ Today, the debates that take place are not clearly defined and as Muslim communities one can't hold people to a set of values that are not clearly defined. Especially, when these unclear values are political values, these are values as articulated by a Government for the sake of people's allegiance. They are not values that people subscribe to in their way of life. The fact that the idea of values disputed by non-Muslim people, meant that they have little validity.²⁴⁹

The debate the United Kingdom was about whether a Muslim can be a British-Muslim? It was Labour that started push this sense of belonging and they weren't following the discourse of Islam. They were pushing the sense of loyalty to the country and there were certain think-tanks promoting loyalty to the nation instead of the *umma*. It was national versus the *umma*.²⁵⁰

4.9.3.1 Civic Duties: Vocality

Another British interviewee observes that there is a stronger tendency for a *communal awareness* and a stronger *vocality* to take on government issues and policies in the United Kingdom. Muslims today face suspicion of extremism and influential

²⁴⁷ UK –U, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 79.

²⁴⁸ UK-SE, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 108.

²⁴⁹ *Idem*

²⁵⁰ UK-JR, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 72.

organizations scrutinize by coining terms such as *counter-vilification*. This counter-vilification means to psychologically enable people so that the Muslim *voices are heard*, and that Islam and the entire Muslim community cannot become a suspect. The *strength* comes from the focus on the Muslim community who are so-called suspects. Now the debate has morphed from ‘*terrorism*’ into ‘*extremism*’; and *extremism has no definition* in law. This way Muslims made it to be a potential suspect.

There is thus a need to be *intelligent, courageous, and confident* to live as an equal citizen. It is expected from Muslims to *influence the conversation*; the mainstream to shift the debate from terror and law. The repetition of this message is the power; to adhere to the rule of law. Because one needs the law for justice to take place. It is about *dislodging Islam as a cause violence* by research and commentary. It is thus a duty to try to shift (the tone of voice) the individual Muslims to give a way out to emerge with positive signs become more assertive and bold.²⁵¹

Strong public voice and the consistency in the message must be coordinated consistently and *must be the same*. There is now a growth of organizations the United Kingdom and there is lobbying and much engagement.²⁵² Muslims are *educated in huge numbers and well* represented.

The United Kingdom the vocality is not about one organization but it is about a combination of many organizations.²⁵³ Another British Imam argues that *Muslims do not have a powerful voice*, yet identity came about through mosque activities and especially with the existence of ‘Muslims schools’ during the 1990 – 2000; but in fact Muslims are *not as vocal as the Jewish Council*. This might have to do with the internal problems amongst Muslims. There is also *disunity*; that *different people get out there*

²⁵¹ UK-CG, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 58.

²⁵² UK-AS, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 59.

²⁵³ UK-HI, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 64.

and try to *speak out* for the whole community. This is a problem unless there is a unity.²⁵⁴

The MCB argues that a *powerful voice* comes from the broad base that the Umbrella organisation enjoys in keeping the best relations with the community.²⁵⁵ The *sophistication* in the messaging came especially with the 7/7 terrorist attacks in London, which had more fundamental impact than the 9/11 attacks in New York. 7/7 had such an impact that it made the Muslim community *think* about society. It was 7/7 that brought terrorism home.

Another important argument is that MCB was able *rise above sectarianism* and racial divisions during 7/7. Post 7/7 period was a very *challenging and difficult* period for Muslim communities in England. In a way 7/7 functioned as a blessing in disguise. All the past incidents and events in Muslim history in the United Kingdom culminated in the experiences of today.

The MCB official acknowledges that the Muslim voice is repeatedly iterated and that it causes *noise that is high enough* not to be ignored, and it gives strength but again this effect today is not by design. Another important determinant why Muslim voice is loud, is the fact that *Muslims permeated in every aspect* of life. Not even the politics can think of the society without the Muslim communities.²⁵⁶ This *consistent messaging* is considered as an important factor to align with the politics and particular policy of that party. It is a much better and beneficial option than closing the doors. This method is followed by MCB without endorsing any party politics and without taking a precedent position.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁴ UK –U, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 78.

²⁵⁵ UK-AT, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 87.

²⁵⁶ *Idem*

²⁵⁷ UK-AT, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 91.

A narrated argument is the attitude of the British government towards the Muslim communities. Most British interviewees confirm the *selective attitude* of the government officials where the established, broad based umbrella organizations are ignored. However, this selective behaviour is counteracted by the community leaders without hesitating and by claiming to persuade political parties.

For most interviewees this *selective behaviour* of the government officials to speak to one leader, or one single Muslim institution is ridiculous that echoes a *colonial mentality*. This *picking and choosing* concedes an *unequal and unfair* treatment that provides *access* to one organization and prevents access to others.²⁵⁸

Yet, unanimously the British Muslims agree that Britain certainly is a more open society. Muslims are much better embedded in all walks of life. There are Muslims in the central government to Ministerial Secretary of State level and all the way down to local government Muslims are professionally very well imbedded. Muslims are in the army, in the police services and a huge number of disproportionate Muslims are in the Medical Profession. Muslims are also well established in terms of own internal infrastructure; seminaries, schools, charities and so on.²⁵⁹

4.10 Safety, Security and Wellbeing of the Muslim Respondent

4.10.1 Feeling recognized

In the following table it can be seen that 18.8% of the British Muslims feel recognized in the British society. Whereas in the Netherlands this percentage is 8.7%. There is a 10% difference in these percentages. The $P = 0.000$ and means that the difference between the countries is significant and meaningful.

²⁵⁸ UK-KS, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 94.

²⁵⁹ UK-SE, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 105.

Table 16, Crosstab Feeling Recognized in Society

Feel_recognized * Country N = 1305					
		Country now?		Total	
		NL	UK		
Strongly Agree	% within Feel_recognized	41,6%	58,4%	100,0%	
	% within Country now?	8,7%	18,8%	12,7%	
	% of Total	5,3%	7,4%	12,7%	
Agree	% within Feel_recognized	62,5%	37,5%	100,0%	
	% within Country now?	35,1%	32,2%	33,9%	
	% of Total	21,2%	12,7%	33,9%	
Neutral	% within Feel_recognized	63,5%	36,5%	100,0%	
	% within Country now?	32,2%	28,3%	30,7%	
	% of Total	19,5%	11,2%	30,7%	
Disagree	% within Feel_recognized	64,3%	35,7%	100,0%	
	% within Country now?	19,1%	16,3%	18,0%	
	% of Total	11,6%	6,4%	18,0%	
Strongly Disagree	% within Feel_recognized	62,3%	37,7%	100,0%	
	% within Country now?	4,8%	4,5%	4,7%	
	% of Total	2,9%	1,8%	4,7%	
Total	% within Feel_recognized	60,5%	39,5%	100,0%	
	% within Country now?	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	
		% of Total	60,5%	39,5%	100,0%

4.10.2 Feel Discriminated

A similar situation arises in the next table, where 20.3% of the British Muslims feel discriminated in the British Society. Even though 18.8% of the Muslims feel recognized a similar amount of British Muslims also feel discriminated. Again the figure for the Dutch Muslims 10.1% feeling discriminated is much lower. This difference between the two countries is significant $P = 0.000$.

Table 17, Crosstab Feeling Discriminated in Society

Feel_discriminated * Country N = 1307				
		Country now?		Total
		NL	UK	
Strongly Agree	% within Feel_discriminated	43,2%	56,8%	100,0%
	% within Country now?	10,1%	20,3%	14,2%
	% of Total	6,1%	8,0%	14,2%

	% within Feel_discriminated	55,2%	44,8%	100,0%
Agree	% within Country now?	33,8%	42,1%	37,0%
	% of Total	20,4%	16,6%	37,0%
	% within Feel_discriminated	73,2%	26,8%	100,0%
Neutral	% within Country now?	35,7%	20,0%	29,5%
	% of Total	21,6%	7,9%	29,5%
	% within Feel_discriminated	67,5%	32,5%	100,0%
Disagree	% within Country now?	17,8%	13,2%	16,0%
	% of Total	10,8%	5,2%	16,0%
	% within Feel_discriminated	47,7%	52,3%	100,0%
Strongly Disagree	% within Country now?	2,7%	4,5%	3,4%
	% of Total	1,6%	1,8%	3,4%
	% within Feel_discriminated	60,5%	39,5%	100,0%
Total	% within Country now?	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	% of Total	60,5%	39,5%	100,0%

4.10.3 Wellbeing

A very interesting finding is that 41.4% of the British Muslims feel that their wellbeing is under threat in public places. There is stark contrast with the Dutch Muslims, where only 13.9% of the Dutch Muslims feel that their safety is under threat. The $P = 0.000$ making the difference between the two countries significant and meaningful.

The research shows that the variable *wellbeing* correlates with the variable *length of stay* ($M = 3.74$, $SD = 0.688$, $r = 0.095^{**}$). This means that the longer the respondent has been in either of the two countries the more they are worried about the safety of their *wellbeing*.

Wellbeing inversely correlates with the respondents to *feel being recognized in society* ($M = 2.68$, $SD = 1.055$, $r = -0.138^{**}$), feeling to be a *member of society* ($M = 2.30$, $SD = 0.982$, $r = -0.115^{**}$), and believing to *have equal rights* ($M = 2.69$, $SD = 1.142$, $r = -0.155^{**}$).

Table 18, Crosstab Wellbeing on the Streets

Wellbeing * Country N = 1302			
	Country		Total
	NL	UK	

	% within Wellbeing	33,9%	66,1%	100,0%
Strongly Agree	% within Country now?	13,9%	41,4%	24,7%
	% of Total	8,4%	16,4%	24,7%
	% within Wellbeing	62,1%	37,9%	100,0%
Agree	% within Country now?	35,3%	33,0%	34,4%
	% of Total	21,4%	13,1%	34,4%
	% within Wellbeing	75,9%	24,1%	100,0%
Wellbeing Neutral	% within Country now?	29,2%	14,2%	23,3%
	% of Total	17,7%	5,6%	23,3%
	% within Wellbeing	72,5%	27,5%	100,0%
Disagree	% within Country now?	18,4%	10,7%	15,4%
	% of Total	11,1%	4,2%	15,4%
	% within Wellbeing	86,2%	13,8%	100,0%
Strongly Disagree	% within Country now?	3,2%	0,8%	2,2%
	% of Total	1,9%	0,3%	2,2%
	% within Wellbeing	60,4%	39,6%	100,0%
Total	% within Country now?	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	% of Total	60,4%	39,6%	100,0%

4.10.3.1 Qualitative Analysis: Tensions and Causes

Respondents mainly reported that *social tensions* weren't prevalent in the beginning. Even though, the atmosphere was welcoming and positive at first arrival of the labourers the first signs of problems started with the family reunion during the seventies and eighties. There was much goodwill and the atmosphere was positive. Yet, labour migrants were not prepared as Muslims for a permanent stay; there was no planned future and the Netherlands was not prepared for hosting Muslim minorities.²⁶⁰

Today the tensions have a different nature, and yet some of the respondents question whether these tensions are truly '*real*' or *created*. For some interviewees *tensions* are virtual and thus not real. Most of these tensions are actually born out *social fears, distrust and suspicion* due to the lack of human contact. The debate today is also framed as in the *dichotomy* of 'Muslims' versus 'non-Muslims' which already is

²⁶⁰ NL-AB, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 4.

problematic in its nature. According to most interviewees Muslims in the Netherlands need to learn to resist the idea that there is a *fundamental irreconcilable conflict*. This could become a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’. This is truer for the social media and the *media* itself.²⁶¹

Today this debate continuous since 2001 with the famous title ‘the Clash of civilizations’, meaning that the Islamic civilization clash with the Western values. This debate automatically renders Muslims in the West as *bad*. There is now this *ideal identity* propagated by *politicians and policymakers* that everyone needs to fit in a single ideal identity and that is far off from the reality.²⁶²

On the other hand, islamophobia and discrimination are very real. Even though there are *equal rights* in the Netherlands, these are not applied to everyone. People do not *have equal access*. These groups haven’t been able to acquire these rights. The society and the analysis are complex; when one speaks of the ‘own groups’ there is this tendency to categorize the society. There is no monolithic one Muslim community. Some respondents believe that Muslims are in a process; a positive process.²⁶³

While some respondents remain optimistic some influential respondents argue that *tensions will increase*. To fix the problem, sometimes these problems are to be accelerated. According to a theologian the tensions and conflicts are real. The reason for these tensions can be found in *ignorance*. Ignorance of Non-Muslims is they don’t know Islam and they base their views of Islam according to Muslims today. States are unaware of application of the ‘State Laws of Islam’ for Muslims in Non-Muslim countries.²⁶⁴ For some interviewee’s tensions are not only present in society but these tensions will *increase*. One way to mend the conflicts is to increase the tensions. The

²⁶¹ NL-MV, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 30.

²⁶² NL-TK, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 43.

²⁶³ NL-MV, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 30.

²⁶⁴ NL-AA, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 7.

dominant culture today is increasing these tensions. The 2nd and the 3rd generations go along with these tensions.

However, the State is well organized, and the Muslim young generations aren't. This means that the State can intervene easily. The risk is that the State will become *political theological*. This could speed up the process, but the counteraction could be that the young people could become resistant.²⁶⁵

One young imam suggests to turn the question around; one should ask why young Muslims don't radicalize instead of why they radicalize. The latter is negative, yet when the question is asked in a correct way, then we can focus on the positive. There is a *tendency to focus on the negative*. This causes genuine fear and exclusion. There is a big portion that does not reflect reality. Islam doesn't hold a Kalashnikov and Islam doesn't pray either. These are done by people. *Shortcomings* belong to the people and not Islam.²⁶⁶

A British interviewee narrates that *islamophobia* does exist in the United Kingdom and it is on the rise however it's nowhere near how bad it is in Europe and in some European countries far right has reached political acceptability and is even in power and this is a key difference between the United Kingdom where the British people are far more tolerant.²⁶⁷

4.10.3.2 Media

Other respondents generally agree that the seriousness of the so-called *tensions* are debatable. As an addition to the historical skewing of the initial social relations, some explain the nature of the tension as emergent due to *lack of empathy* as others to *ideological parties* who abuse the situation for own interests, while others blame the *media* for a continuous framing. Those tensions are present, but real life on the streets

²⁶⁵ NL-RB, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 38.

²⁶⁶ NL-AK, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 47.

²⁶⁷ UK-SE, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 75.

is different than on the TV. There are *tensions* but *no real threats*. These tensions had always been present, but in a different form. There are emotions abused by ideological parties that have interest in these tensions. They translate worries of people into hate, discrimination and exclusion.²⁶⁸

There is a *continuous framing* going on right now, which is why people exclude each other. Parents, media, schools and politics are all responsible for helping children in their search. In that sense *political participation* does help. Democratic *participation* and *voting* does help as the debate does not disappear under the radar. Now the debate is going it is important to look for that *reconnection*.²⁶⁹

The British Muslims in the context of the umbrella organizations focus on a narrative that is connective and emphasizes the common good within the society. This considered as a blessing in disguise due to the fact that the media focus on counterterrorism, extremism, which means that *media in Britain balance* in the wrong way.²⁷⁰

The media representation or the *media* portrayal of Muslims is very aggressive, very negative, and feeds directly into the growth of Islamophobia.²⁷¹ British Muslims have become confident, resourceful and effective in challenging the government but holding *the media accountable* still remains and present position is of non-engagement still because of 7/7. The Muslim community are now better in dealing with issues. The objective is to *Win Friends* as a whole in every section of the society.

Muslims consider the government as only one player in the society so although Muslims in the United Kingdom have limited success with the government they would stay focusing on the *Civil Society* who receive the Muslim message. The message may

²⁶⁸ NL-AK, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 105.

²⁶⁹ NL-MV, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 29.

²⁷⁰ UK-AT, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 17.

²⁷¹ *Idem*

not be received by the government as belonging to Muslims, but the essence of the message is being sent and received throughout all channels.

According to the MCB official the government needs to change its vocabulary and language and have new policies where it is recognized that Muslims have the same problems as the wider Society, such as unemployment, economic prosperity, housing, education. These policies should not be part of *Prevent policy*. The government should be fair in its treatment. Muslims for example do recognize that terrorism is a problem, and that *counterterrorism* can be dealt with not because we are Muslims but because we feel responsible to do something about it.

*The media should be regulated, and the print media should be more accountable to what to write and publish. Today the media regulates itself. Maybe an external regulator is necessary, due to the fact that many tabloids are literally untrue and they fabricate things to sell and think they can get away with it. When there is a complaint the minimum one gets is a small apology.*²⁷²

Respondents indicate that there is a *normalizing hypocrisy* that is becoming a culture. This culture is through *media* and is deliberately political wherein the migrant is either criminal or fundamentalist. Either of the two indicate a double standard and deny the success of Muslim young people in education and labour market. This imagery is now called islamophobia.

There is a cultural sphere now where the *general media*, politics societal midfield culture where people because of their identities, can't get any jobs due to the *majority determined identity*. They cannot manifest themselves anymore. Enormous *hypocrisy* who claimed on identity development couldn't integrate and yet youth that is very successful in education and well integrated still face 'look out, they are still Muslims'.²⁷³

²⁷² UK-KS, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 95.

²⁷³ NL-AB, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 5.

Thankfully, against this primitive thinking mechanism fortunately there is a reasonable thinking midfield who keep the balance in influence the *primitive thinking* of new political figures. There is much repetition of this Muslim identities as dangerous and inferior. All became *deliberately political*. Deliberately not willing to understand each other at all. Media portrays *images* wherein a Muslim is either a 'fundi' or a 'crimi'. Muslims have failed, and the image profile is one where the Muslim cannot self-reflect and the social rift slowly made it into labels such as fundi and *crimi* that now became parts of that *Islamic identity*.²⁷⁴

The emphasis of the argumentation is to *communicate* from a knowledge basis. Such a contribution should be local, regional and international. Even though it is a slow process, Muslims need to take this approach step by step. As Islam supports and acknowledges diversity, it is the Muslim who should be *educated*, self-reflecting, mature, organized, agree to disagree and participate in the whole of the society in social, cultural and political terms. Yet, the Muslim contribution needs to be met by having or getting *equal access*, so a lack of political participation would be very much worrisome.

Muslims should be able to exchange crucial thoughts about the future of the world. Muslims should be present on that platform and as a patron should open new areas to think about and show the *fruitful inspiration* source of Islam. To encourage and future thinking new ideas such as the two biggest challenges *economy and ecology*.

Contribute patiently step by step, argument by argument: descriptive integration. I wouldn't know what failed or succeeded in our society. Key is '*li'taarrafu*' and grow to a common interest, an interest agreement. Previously no distinct identity in politics. Now very clear. It is annoying, but it is there.²⁷⁵

For other interviewees another solution is *academic and religious education*. Religious leaders educated here can *educate* the Muslim communities. Western States should not

²⁷⁴ Idem

²⁷⁵ NL-AB, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 6.

discriminate between religious leaders who sympathize with Western values and those who do not. The State should *communicate* with everyone. Politicians and Muslims need to learn more about Islam. Participation in the society and politics is essential. There must be more communication and exchange. These social and political activities will decrease the tensions, because all takes place within the boundaries of law.²⁷⁶

4.11 Some Suggestions

The Dutch Muslim minorities have access to politics through two political parties such as DENK and NIDA and thus there is political representation unlike in the United Kingdom. It is good that Muslims have their own political movements is good and can help get and use their rights for *equal access*.

A director of an important Dutch Muslim umbrella organizations argues that Muslims now are more able to take common standpoints. Muslims don't have to agree on all issues (*fiqh*) etc. as long as we agree on crucial social and political terrains. And move in a *unified way*. *Due to disunity* Muslims are easily driven out. The government should actually assist the Dutch Muslim minorities as disadvantaged groups to have equal access to their rights, but today Muslim groups are treated in negative ways. Besides the Central Umbrella Organisation in the Netherlands doesn't work.

The common view is that the Central Umbrella organization even works against the common Muslim interests by excluding them from talks. And they do not have the strength because everyone works as volunteers. This makes it very fragile.²⁷⁷

Many people in the Netherlands used to feel not being represented. Participation in politics does help. With political parties Muslims feel like having a voice now. This will have a positive effect for rooting in the society. I do not prefer the word integration, rather to give a place to Islam in the society. With parties there is

²⁷⁶ NL-AA, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 7.

²⁷⁷ NL-MV, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 34.

participation.²⁷⁸ *Islam today has become a part of the Dutch identity* as we all represent our countries. Islam must be localized in the Netherlands. Muslims don't know what Islamic identity holds. This identity is bound with the place where one should not make the difference between ethnicity and citizenship. One should stop considering itself as just a Turk.²⁷⁹

Such a process shouldn't be strategic from external interference but be *genuine* and authentic. That is how an authentic balance can come about. A strategic or reactive identity is schizophrenic and can't be maintained. Yet there is much that Muslims can learn from Christians.²⁸⁰ Just like the Christians *reformed*, Muslims have no choice but reform. A reformation of Islam is no problem, as long as the process as religious identity is balanced with the society and is authentic.²⁸¹

²⁷⁸ NL-AK, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 46.

²⁷⁹ Idem

²⁸⁰ NL-RB, Attached Appendix to this Thesis *Transcriptions*, 2018. P. 45.

²⁸¹ Idem

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCONNECTED IDENTITY

In this fifth chapter the outcomes of this comparative research as presented in the previous chapter are discussed and analysed. One of the important priorities in this research was the focus on how to operationalize variables such as *Muslim identity*, and *Political Institutions*. The main theoretical frame originated from the constructivist theory of Jesse and Williams and their book called ‘Identity and Institutions’.²⁸²

As discussed earlier the choice for the two countries, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom originated due to the fact that both countries are established democracies with obvious fundamental political freedoms as well as the existence of large settled Muslim communities. In this context it is vital at this stage to *reconnect* to the main research question as formulated in chapter one which is; ‘*whether the politician’s trust is an explanatory factor for religious and political attitudes and perceptions towards Dutch and British Muslims in relation to peace and conflict*’.

Prior to this concluding chapter, the previous chapters featured the contextual discussion, the hypotheses, relevance, methodology and the research goal. In chapter two an array of the existing theoretical literature is debated and chapter three features the discussion of the nature of this societal problem in the target countries. Therefore, the main attempt of this chapter is to simply provide answers to my central research question as well as to provide propositions for the wellbeing of the *Muslim identity* as a citizen in the aforementioned established democratic countries.

To begin with, the *constructivist* theorem as moulded by Jesse and Williams in their book ‘Identity and Institutions’ is proposed on basis of their two main *case studies* as discussed in their book. The difference in comparison to their endeavour to

²⁸² Jesse, Neal G., and Kristen P. Williams. 2005. *Identity and institutions: conflict reduction in divided societies*. (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press).

hypothesise their version of the constructivist theory, I attempted in this thesis to collect data based on quantitative as well as qualitative research methods in order to prove their attempt of constructivist theory as postulated. This chapter summarizes both the datasets in both countries having used triangulation specifically *Convergent Parallel Sequencing* technique as discussed in the previous chapters.²⁸³

Chapter four presented, analysed and reported both the quantitative and qualitative datasets, which eventually are worked out in this chapter to summarize the central findings. In the aforementioned postulation of a new constructivist approach a central importance is placed to the factor *trust from political actors* as an explanatory independent variable in the approach of minority groups towards conflict and peace; as having a tremendous amount of impact on the wellbeing of communities and societies. In the previous theoretical construction of *social identities* -as they exist in societies- one is expected to have access to *political institutions and platforms* which in return conditionally must support and celebrate these different *identities* in order for them to develop complex identities. This institutional support should then catapult these identities into a social position of embracing *multiple identities* that are in their nature complex and as a consequence more tolerant and supportive of other existing identities in society.

Nevertheless, Jesse and Williams do not provide a detailed account of how the term *identity* is to be defined. For them identities are unique and belong to social and religious groups that have societal existence in their own political realities. For them it is obvious that these groups being politically involved and institutionally supported have a positive societal effect, which is peace and stability. Therefore, in this thesis the contemporary literature on the *definition of identity* has been widely debated. Not only the modern scholars and their work are deliberated, but also the

²⁸³ Creswell, J. W., Klassen, A. C., Plano Clark, V. L., & Smith, K. C. *Best practices for mixed methods research in the health sciences*. (Bethesda, Maryland: National Institutes of Health, 2013), 541-545.

Islamic literature is briefly analysed for whether there are differences and similarities between the way's *identities* are perceived. After careful deliberation it may safely be assumed that the concept identity is perceived almost in a similar way in the existing Islamic literature as well as Western scientific literature.

Then, the second concern involved with the work of Jesse and Williams is that they have not worked with quantitative or qualitative data analysis. Their book however, provides new ways of looking at political processes and religious minorities on the brink of clashing with other groups in societies; there is thus need for new ways of understanding and looking at these political developments in the West from a social sciences stance. As Jesse and Williams conducted case studies it was plausible to verify by way of quantitative and qualitative research techniques in order to prove whether the case studies debated by Jesse and Williams may hold the postulated *constructivist peace theory*.

Since Jesse and Williams did not use (due to case studies) questionnaires or scales in their research, other research and scales are borrowed and adapted to measure the Muslim identity. During the research a new variable called *Religious Attitude* is also factored to look into attitudes and perceptions towards political institutions. A last point that Jesse and Williams didn't use in their research is my target group in this dissertation. Since Jesse and Williams chose in their study the Catholic-Protestant conflict in Great Britain and the conflicting situation of the Catalans and Basks in Spain, it was *significantly relevant* for me to look into the Muslim minorities as a target group to see whether the theorem was to be proven.

Due to these reasons chapter two has mainly studied the existing literature on *identity*. During the research phase it became apparent that political sciences is

fairly new to the notion of *identity*. As a result, it was Tajfel²⁸⁴, Taylor²⁸⁵ and Mol²⁸⁶ who initially paved the way for scholars such as Kymlicka²⁸⁷ and Nye²⁸⁸ who have researched '*identity*' from psycho-sociological perspectives. Hans Mol was way ahead of his contemporaries and saw an association between *identity* and *religion*.

It also became clearer in this research that *religion* functions as an anchor in the lives of individuals who immigrate to new countries. Religion has characteristics that initially in its central core may be described as unchanging and *fixed* leading to familiarity. Yet, it must be understood that *religious identity* is not equal to *religion*. And religious identity has the unique characteristic that it can shift-shape and doesn't always have to be perceived as a fixed conceptual anchor, as religion. This understanding of a pragmatic approach provides *identity* to be more constructive instead of a fixed identity perception, especially in the field of political sciences.

The Lijphartian approach as the eminent consociationalist theorem gets to be scrutinized by Jesse and Williams due to its generalizing approach towards all concepts such as *identity, ethnicity and/or religion*. These concepts all mean more or less the same thing for Lijphart. For Lijphart identity has never been a variable as such that mattered or impacted the outcome of communal or individual attitudes and perceptions towards politics. Contemporary researchers such as Jesse and Williams demonstrate that the multicultural, plural societies have different

²⁸⁴ Tajfel, Henri, '*The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behaviour*'. International Social Sciences Council. (Cambridge University Press, 1974). PP. 65 - 93

²⁸⁵ Charles Taylor, '*Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*'. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989). 177.

²⁸⁶ Hans Mol. *Identity and the sacred: a sketch for a new social scientific theory of religion*. (Bristol: Kemp Hall: 1976)

²⁸⁷ Will Kymlicka. *Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995)

²⁸⁸ Joseph Nye and David Welch. '*Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: Intro to Theory and History*'. (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2014)

compositions in terms of their fixed characteristics such as ethnicity or the place a person was born into, as well as those non-fixed characteristics such as values and norms that are shared or even not-shared in these free and democratic societies.²⁸⁹

In this research it has also become clear that the phenomenon of *identity* has the ability to attach itself to any human condition, such as social, ethnic, national or religious that have important and unavoidable impact and the roles of humans and their behaviour in diverse societies.

Individuals may be members of religious groups and thus have religious identities in societies but they are also members of other social-religious groups that may be local, regional, national and even international with various multiple allegiances. As a consequence, chapter three demonstrates that these different allegiances of Muslim individuals and groups towards either their own groups or others beyond the democratic society can easily be perceived as a threat in the host countries, and therefore become a risk factor causing imbalance as a security threat and social conflict.

For Jesse and Williams, the core of their theorem is that different allegiances of *identities* need to be accepted and represented by *political actors* that once supported will contribute to peace and negotiations, as allegiances towards the host-society will also increase in time proportionally to the degrees of support and acceptance. This specific notion of change then contributes to a more diversified layers of *complexity in the identity* of individuals. It is this constructivist school-of-thought that inserts the idea of *complex-identities* as it is called *multiple identities* by Jesse and Williams that hold variance with human agents' approach, attitude and perception according to the socio-economic as well as political circumstances.

It also became apparent in chapter three that an alien environment brings about feelings of *alienation*. These sentiments are known to strengthen the religious

²⁸⁹ Jesse, Neal G., and Kristen P. Williams.. *Identity and institutions: conflict reduction in divided societies*. (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005).

association that becomes a counter-balance against these circumstances. Religion has a powerful effect in such new environments on individuals in understanding and making sense of certain alien conditions. Religion brings back memories of home and rituals provide a sense of security. It seems that this search for *recognition, safety and security* is harder for the second and third generation Muslims in Europe because they have never known any other place than the one they were born into.

The nature of the human being necessitates it to find that natural and familiar fundamental base, the root that associates itself with the familiar to anchor itself and define this new environment and to give a new meaning to this new societal existence. Therefore, the notion of identity especially in new environments is probably one of the most important instruments that magnifies and highlights the perception to life in diverse societies in existential terms. This existential understanding has a direct link to the real contextual life. So identity has an existential meaning that has profound contextual consequences.

Once the two important concepts *religion* and *identity* in existential and contextual terms are combined into what is labelled as *religious identity*, it bears the visible behaviours, thought patterns and the ultimate religious legitimacy of these behaviours of the human agent in these diverse societies. When a human agent has a religious-image, a religious identity in mind that also lacks this meaning, the self-understanding in relation to this new societal existence, or even religious education it may become negative and it may *legitimize conflictious behaviour* that embraces hard approach and rigid, unchanging dogmatic look on other members of the society. However, on the contrary once this religious-image in mind, or self-categorisation of identity is blessed with understanding of the self, its unique differences, it may existentially have a positive, contributing and constructive approach, a religious source to constructive behaviour towards communities.

Most identity researches utilize the *centrality – salience* scales. In chapters two and three it is demonstrated that '*centrality*' is an important tool for self-diagnosis of how an individual would describe or categorize the self. Therefore, it is assumed that *centrality* of an identity automatically implies what is called *salience*, or in

other words the application of behaviour that is congruent with the self-categorized central identity attributes. However, what is *centrally* important to an individual may not always be congruent with the central-self, for example a person's religious actions and duties and obligations may be extremely important yet may not automatically suggest the application of these obligations and duties.

On another level, one may expect a Muslim individual who strongly and centrally identifies the self with Islam, to also act upon Islamic creeds, duties and obligations. *Yet, there are in this research* cases of individuals who have strong central Islamic identification and yet indicate that they do not act upon prayers or religious duties. No matter how important the *centrality – salience* research is, the scale proves to measure only what is centrally important to a respondent and whether the respondent acts upon the centrality of identity.

5.1 Socio-Demographic Variables

A brief discussion on the variable gender is that the previous chapter shows that males earn more than females and females categorically categorize themselves as having a more *complex identity*. Even though *females* earn much less than males, females have a *more tolerant* attitude towards being or having a more *complex identity*. *Males* compared to *females* are significantly more inclined to categorize themselves as having a *single identity*. *Males* also differ from *females* in their response for the variable *hard approach*, by having more tendency towards a harder approach in social and political attitudes in society.

For the variable *age*, results have shown that the older the respondent, the higher the tendency of the respondent grows for more religious duties such as performing the *hajj obligation*. *Yet the older* the respondent gets the less *voting* is perceived as a part of the identity and the less one considers the self as a *member of the society*. On the other side the younger the respondent is, the more the respondent considers the self as being a member of the *umma* a part of the identity and the more the young respondent perceives *foreign policies* towards the *Middle East* as worrisome.

Further, the variables *faith principles*, *five times prayer*, *fasting*, *zakat* and *hajj* as single items show a strong inter-correlation amongst each other as these items form

the most important religious obligations from an Islamic stance. Data shows that respondents who indicate to ‘*pray five times a day*’ have a strong correlation with the variable *multiple identities*. So, practicing Muslims show more inclination towards having *more than one identity*.

The variable *income* shows that religious duty to perform the *hajj* depends on the level of the *income*, since this religious obligation is financially contingent. As Hajj, *zakat* also depends on a person’s *earnings* the more a person earns the more *zakat is paid* and the higher the perception is to feel to be a *member of the society* to have a self-elected political party of the own community. However, the lower the *income* the stronger the tendency is to perceive that *voting* is not a part of one’s identity and a reason to believe that Islam *forbids* politics. The lower the *income* also means that the respondent perceives following policies and to do more to *increase trust* as less important.

The quantitative data proved that *income* on a personal level has a significant effect, whereas the qualitative data proved the importance of the economic argument on a higher, at national levels. British Muslims argued that a better economic position enjoyed by Muslims in the United Kingdom aids a tolerant attitude towards Muslims who on their behalf experience a more open and tolerant public life. This economic prosperity goes hand in hand with growth numbers of literacy amongst Muslims in the United Kingdom causing a conscious ownership of a more integral identity in society. In both countries Muslim elite are aware of the role of economy and the influence of economy on policy and politics where the so-called pie gets to be distributed.

A Dutch Muslim reverberates this economic argument and states that economy is an essential factor determining policy. In this context the *education* policy has failed. The youngsters are left on themselves to find their own ways in the society. This economic weak position constitutes one of many causes of the existing hate towards Muslims. Muslims function as a ‘scape goat’, and are blamed for stealing jobs, which essentially is an economic underlying factor that triggers ‘cultural or ethnic’ hate.

The variable *length of stay* proved that the *longer* a respondent has been living in the country, the more the respondent is willing to *influence policies* and participate by way of using the *right to vote* and believing to have *equal rights*, and having an *own party* in the parliament. Yet, the length of stay also correlates with feelings of anxiety concerning wellbeing on streets.

As much as the Muslim identity perceives *Political Institutions* as part for the own identity, it is also the case that the *longer* a respondent has been living in the two countries, the more the *wellbeing* on the streets is considered as being under threat. The *length of stay* does have an effect on the choice of *identities*, as the *shorter* a respondent has been living in the West, the higher the choice for a *single identity*.

5.2 Religious and Secular Education

Theological education corresponds with democratic values such as having an own political *party* in the parliament and *following policies*. This finding gets confirmed that *theologically educated* respondents do not believe that *Islam forbids politics* or that a *hard* approach is a viable option. Theologically educated respondents do however prefer *soft approach*.

There is no correlation between *religious education* and *single identity*; yet a correlation is found between *Islam as the source of decision in daily life* and *single identity*. When this association is controlled for mediation of the variable *Politicians Trust* it is found to explain the association as a *mediating variable*. This finding provides explanation on behalf of the *constructivist theory* where the role played by the variables *trust* and *support* received from *political institutions* on *identity* seems to be confirmed. A conflictious behavior that seems to be originated from a religious stance can be explained by the support it receives from the Political Actor's Trust. A very important finding is that the variable *Muslim identity* positively correlates with the variable *Political Institutions*, yet negatively correlates with the variable *Politicians' trust*. The variable *Muslim identity* positively correlates with the variable *Soft Approach* where the variable *Politicians' trust* correlates negatively with the variable *Hard Approach*.

On the other side, *secular educated* Muslims too show a preference towards softer approach and salience towards political participation as the general attitude is against a *hard approach*. These respondents also believe that Muslims should do more to *create more trust*. *Secular education* also means more willingness to *influence policies, being or having more complex identities*, perceiving right to vote as a part of the self-identity and feeling to be a member of the *society*. On the other side, secular education also means respondents do not perceive membership of an own in-group as a party of their identity.

5.3 Single Identity

Probably one of the most important findings is that the variable *single identity* doesn't correspond with *politicians' trust in Muslims and Islam*. This means, the more respondents who feel distrust from politicians the more they categorize themselves as having *single identities* and the more they feel being a member of their *own in-groups*.

Respondents who categorize themselves as having *single identity* are far more to believe that they do not have *equal rights* in society, yet they also do not believe that *Islam forbids political participation, thus they believe that having an own party in parliament, a self-elected party are necessary as solutions*. A confirming other finding is that these respondents do not believe in *hard approach* is a solution.

During the interviews, it came about that the initial image of the migrant was a cheap and temporary labour migrant. It possessed features of being '*agrarian*', '*conservative*' and thus unfit for the modern society. This conservative image was struggling with morality issues against a promiscuous existence. This was a *fixated, traditional* identity that was *disconnected*. *The critique is that this image still holds for the Dutch Muslim*.

A main difference with Muslims in United Kingdom is the maturity and awareness of the British Muslim, who view their existence as a connected and natural to the country they live in; they seem to claim a social and religious identity. However, this present image also comes from a challenging past. One that is in stark contrast of the Dutch Muslim, yet one that was very much polarized unlike any other.

The British Muslim today is aware of the language and vocabulary used. As in the Dutch case Muslims in general are depicted as more *fictive* or meaning not being fully aware. These internal and external factors cause a disconnectedness in the society the young Muslims are born into.

Western society in terms of the two selected democratic countries thus, does create disconnected Muslims who feel *unappreciated* and *alienated*. Even though, the British Muslims are far more optimistic in their attitudes, the Dutch are more pessimistic. A British intellectual believes that *Islam as a distinct identity* invokes a natural bond between being British and Muslim as *natural*. The Muslim communities in Britain narrate to possess *rooted awareness* and believe that this awareness is crucial to tackle islamophobia or policies such as Prevent.

5.4 Complex Identity

The two variables *single identity* and *identity complexity* correspond with each other. As it was expected the more a respondent believes to have *multiple identities* obviously the more complex the identity is. This complexity of the Muslim identity doesn't however agree with the variable *politician's trust* in Muslims and Islam.

Respondents who categorize themselves as having *complex identities* believe they are distrusted by their politicians in both countries. Muslims in general perceiving themselves as having complex identities do not believe that Islam *forbids political participation*, neither are they inclined to perceive that *hard approach is a viable solution*. This means the more the identity is singular the more the respondent feels distrusted by politicians. Yet, the more the Muslim identity prefers a *soft approach*. The variable *Muslim identity seems to be complex*, and compliant with the variable *political institutions*. Thus, even though there is distrust, this distrust doesn't prevent complex *Muslim identity* to prefer democratic political participation or prefer the variable *Hard Approach*. Yet, the variable *Politicians' trust* does correlate and predict the variable *Hard Approach*.

As it is expected a complex *Muslim identity* correlates with *Islamic religious obligations*. The 'Exploratory Factor Analysis' proved this point. So, a higher degree of *identity complexity* goes together with the variable *Muslim Identity*,

centrality, salience and practice of the religious duties. Those respondents who were able to bring order in their religious identities in combination with the national identities such as the Dutch or the British are considered to have a higher degree of *identity complexity*. Regression analysis indicates that the variable *Identity complexity* is a strong predictor for respondents' perceptions of being a '*valuable members of the society*'.

5.5 Centrality and Salience

85.1% of the Dutch and 90.8% of the British respondents perceive pillars of *Islam* as extremely important. 88.2% of the Dutch and 90.3% of the British respondents perceive *shahada* as extremely important. 77.1% of the Dutch and 70.2% of the British respondents pray always *five times* a day. 92.9% of the Dutch and 89.0% of the British respondents reply as always to the variable *fasting* every year during Ramadan. 78.2% of the Dutch and 80.8% of the British respondents reply as always to the variable *paying zakat* every year.

85.1% of the Dutch respondents and 90.8% of the British respondents reply as extremely important to the variable *pillars of Islam*. 88.2% of the Dutch respondents and 90.3% of the British respondents reply as extremely important to the variable *shahada*. 77.1% of the Dutch respondents and 70.2% of the British respondents reply as always to the variable *praying five times* a day. 92.9% of the Dutch respondents and 89.0% of the British respondents reply as always to the variable *fasting* every year during Ramadan. 78.2% of the Dutch respondents and 80.8% of the British respondents reply as always to the variable *paying zakat* every year

So as a result, regression analysis conducted indicates that *centrality is a strong predictive variable for salience*. This means that a respondent who perceives Islam as *central* to its life, also has a high degree of willingness to act upon its religious duties and obligations. Regression analysis also indicates that *Centrality* is also strong predictor for the variable *soft approach*. Meaning that those respondents who have indicated to have Islam as extremely central in their personal lives also are to be predicted to prefer in their attitudes a *softer approach*.

5.6 Muslim Identity

A new variable constructed by factoring the items *shahada*, *salience* and *centrality* called *Muslim Identity* was expected that it would hold some correlation with the *identity complexity*. Yet there was none; the only variable having an association with the *variable complexity* is the variable *Islam as source of Decision*. When this association is controlled for a *Mediation effect* of the variable *Politicians trust* a mediating effect is found. The latter can explain the association between the two variables.

Muslim Identity corresponds with democratic values such as *following policies*, meaning that the stronger the Muslim identity the stronger the tendency to follow policies that are made by the government. Yet, respondents who have strong Muslim identities do not believe that *Islam forbids politics*. In other words, the stronger the *Religious Attitude* the less inclined the respondents are to believe that *Islam forbids* political participation. *The same correspondence goes for other democratic values* such as having an *own party* in parliament, a *Self-elected party*, *self-elected umbrella organization*, *willing to influence policies* as a solution for a better society and *the readiness to do more for trust* and recognition suggests that the Muslims believe that there is lack of trust in the society, which is why Muslims believe they should do more for better understanding and better relations. Yet, *Muslim Identity* also positively correlates with the variable having *special laws*. Obviously, Muslims do fear that there is need for protection.

5.7 Politicians' Trust

As mentioned in the previous paragraph *identity complex* Muslims do not believe that '*politicians trust Islam and Muslims*'. This is a grave concern where citizens of both highly democratic countries and may suggest a democratic deficit and causing unwanted radical behaviour and perceptions. On the other side, respondents who have a higher degree of *identity complexity* positively correlate with the variable '*full members of the society*'. It is regardless the case whether a respondent perceives oneself as a *single identity* or even as having *multiple identities* and a higher degree of *identity complexity*, the perception of distrust of the political actors in the Netherlands and United Kingdom remain the same.

Respondents who perceive *distrust from politicians* consider themselves as being more *single identities*, the more they feel being a member of their *own in-groups* and the more they do not believe to have democratic *equal rights*, yet believe that *Islam does not forbid* political activity. Therefore, these respondents are not inclined to *vote*, or wish to have an own political *party*, even if it is a self-elected party. They also believe in a *harder approach* and are thus less tolerant and open towards social and political participation. In this sense the variable *Hard Approach* negatively correlates with the variable *Shahada*. Regression Analysis shows that *single identity* is a good predictor of '*hard approach*' but *Politicians Trust*, *Islam Forbids Politics* also predict the variable *Hard Approach*.

Data analysis shows that respondents who believe to have a *Complex identity* are strongly inclined towards *soft approach*. Yet, those respondents who have strong *Muslim Attitude* do not usually have *complex* identities. This means that the stronger the *Muslim Identity*, the *less complex the self-ordered* identity is. *Religious Attitudes* and *Complexity* have a partial correlation where the variable *politician's trust* is controlled for mediation. On the other side the stronger the *Muslim identity* is, the stronger the tendency to follow *policies* yet the less that respondents believe that *Islam forbids* political participation and thus do more for *trust* and recognition.

The more the Muslim respondent disagrees with the statement that *politicians trust* Muslims and Islam, the more these respondents have strong tendency towards *religious attitudes* in terms of centrality and salience. This means that the more respondents disagree with the statement of *politician's trust* in Muslims and Islam the more the respondents perceive themselves as *single identities*. The more respondents feel *distrusted*, the more they feel a member of the global *umma*. The more respondents feel that they are *trusted* the more they feel being *recognized* by the society. The more respondents feel *distrusted* the more they feel *discriminated* in the society.

On the other side the more a respondent *feels trusted by politicians*, the more the respondent feels to believe in having *equal rights*. Also, the more there is *distrust*, the more a respondent feels its *wellbeing* is under threat. *Politicians trust* in Muslims or Islam, the more respondents are inclined to believe that *Islam forbids*

politics. The same tendencies go for the variables *Policies conducted in the Middle East* (and that these policies in the *Middle East function as a Cause* of conflict in society).

Probably one of the most important finding is that this *distrust* of the politicians also correlates with the variable *Hard Approach*. The more a respondent feels *distrusted* the more the respondent feels that a *harder approach* is suitable as a viable solution in society. The more respondents feel *distrusted by politicians* the more respondents feel that they should be protected by *Special Laws*. This research thus suggests that a conflictious behavior that seems to be originated from a religious stance can be explained by the support it receives from the *Political Actor's Trust*. The variable *Muslim identity* positively correlates with the variable *Political Institutions*, yet this variable correlates negatively with the variable *Politicians' trust*. The variable *Muslim identity* positively correlates with the variable *Soft Approach* where the variable *Politicians' trust* negatively correlates with the variable *Hard Approach*.

The contemporary public debates in United Kingdom on issues such as *terrorism, radicalism are very much* lively. Yet, the Muslim communities are also established enough in scrutinizing these public debates, where Muslim elite emphasize the societal and political reality for the necessity to enable a better *strategic positioning in its messaging, vocabulary and language*. The British Muslim it is extremely important to stay in the conversation; creating a position in being taken serious and to be *heard*. Having no *conversation* about these important issues would be concerning and worrisome.

Dutch community leaders acknowledge a stiff *identity* that is unable communicate and thus cause a *communication vacuum*. Dutch elite also complain of a selective behaviour of the authorities; while the British Muslims strive to be a party around the table, the Dutch elite find themselves dislodged and also being treated *unequally*; thus finding themselves in a reluctant and resistant position where values seem to be clashing. According to some Dutch intellectuals the Dutch Muslims still is focused on *morality*, and *unification is a failed project*. Yet, some younger professional elite differ in their opinions and perceive a transition. Certain

organizations are contrary to this discourse able to find common ground and deliberate with each other. Even though, the attempts are present, these are still immature and voluntary work. Some Dutch Muslim scholars believe that a future permanent coexistence means to reform in theological sense. This would be the only way *to convince others in a modern society*.

As the Dutch elite, the British elite also agree that the British government is *selective in whom the authorities talk to causing a genuine frustration* and anger. The other problem is the policymaking, such as Prevent Policy that dislocates the authority of the community and imams to address Jihadi extremism. Young Muslims are forced to search for answers through social media. It is thus crucial to address policymakers and to lobby to alter policies perceived as *hypocritical*; the selectiveness of the policymaker corresponds with the *Prevent Policy*.

The advantage of British Muslims is the argument that there is a common history between British Muslims and the British Empire. Having dealt with the British people before, Muslims know how the British think and are better in having a good level of *unity*. Even though Muslim leadership do not agree on every theological or social stances, they have regular meetings, with the slogan there *is no power in disunity*. The Prevent Policy causes thus much vilification and suspicion which contributes to the younger generations holding on to their *single identities*. The *umma* then becomes an argument of identity that separates itself from the society that is also much *romantically attractive for the youth*. Another argument for the Muslim awareness was the struggle against *racism in the past*; it was the Hindu movement particularly the Gandhi's movement that as a cultural boycott, an aggressive retention of one's own identity that was brought here to Britain.

5.8 Democratic Values

Interviewees agree that *political participation* doesn't contradict the religious identity and it is almost required to participate in society and politics from a consciousness point of view. This awareness should in general be a goal that could contribute to bring about a meaningful life that is also fair.

Muslims in general who are *locally active* are more inclined to perceive themselves as *members* of the *society*. Interestingly feeling to be a member of the *umma* also corresponds with *feeling recognized in the society*, with having *equal rights and following policies*. Being a *member to umma* also means that respondents do not believe that Islam *forbids* political participation and thus also it favors a *softer approach* as a viable solution. However, feelings to be a strong member of an *in-group* means that respondents perceive a stronger need for *special laws* as a remedy for conflict in society. This means that respondents consider themselves as *vulnerable* in society and feeling in need special laws.

On the other side, the more a respondent feels to be a *member of the society* the more it is inclined to believe that *voting* is a part of its identity, to be a *member of the society* and to *follow policies*. And the less the respondent feels itself being in danger in the *streets*. Probably the most important finding is that being a *member of the society* corresponds with distrust from politicians. The more a respondent feels to be a *member of the society* the more the respondent does not agree that *politicians trust Muslims and Islam*.

30.6% British Muslim and 20.6% Dutch Muslims believe that *right to vote* (see appendix for the table) is a party of their identity. 23.5% British Muslims and 11.6% of the Dutch Muslims believe that *that they* have equal rights. Concerning *Following Policies* the Dutch Muslims seem to have the edge, 52% versus the 48% British Muslims (see appendix for the table). For the response agree the Dutch Muslims are at 48.2% versus 36% for the British Muslims.

25.8% of the Dutch Muslims and 31.6% of the British Muslims Strongly Agree that they should do more for trust. 19.1% of the Dutch Muslims Strongly Agree to have a own party in the parliament where 18.8% of the British Muslims Strongly Agree to have an own party. When asked whether *Influence policies* is a solution to decrease the level of conflict a staggering 38.4% of the British Muslims showed to Strongly Agree, whereas for the Dutch Muslims it is 15.3%. 37.2% of the British and 30.6% of the Dutch Muslims do not agree with the statement that Islam forbids political participation.

Unanimously by the interviewee's *representation* is considered as a very important democratic value that Muslims should benefit from. Yet, the political climate in both countries suggests much 'enemy thinking'. The most important distinction between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom is that Dutch Muslims are more open and welcoming towards having an own political party, whereas British Muslims reject the notion of having an own political party as creating some type of apartheid.

Thus, a general accepted view for British elite is that a *religion based political parties* cannot be a solution. A *political party* cannot be perceived as a requirement for an effective *Consultation*. A *political representation* however is a vital yet *lobbying or identity politics* and using the argument of *Muslim vote as leverage for the established political parties is a formula that works*. Yet, there arises much frustration when the *government chooses to take* wrong people as advisors and policies are made to monitor congregations. The social-political climate for the British Muslim is one where much *distrust has arisen and as a community such practices are perceived as attack on identity*.

Some Dutch interviewees acknowledge such a condition where Dutch politicians find Muslims to be dishonest and anti-democratic exploiting the constitutional rights in theory own communal interests. Muslim communities are blamed in this respect as impotent to communicate or address issues, even Muslim groups (pillars) that are *established are unable to interact*. For this interviewee such a reality would suggest a theological reform to shed a religious understanding that is incompatible within a modern society. Thus, there is no future for these pillars without a *reformation in Islam* as was the case for Christians.

5.9 How Polarization Unified British Muslims

The Prevent policy in the United Kingdom causes polarization and needs to be scrapped according to almost all the interviewees. It is not only very *un-British, British being open and tolerant, but it is also* time to try arrive at something that is truly representative for all citizens and communities. Prevent Policy focuses on Muslims and excludes all other communities; it is in this sense very odd that Muslims were never consulted in this policymaking.

Other polarizing moments for the British Muslims were ten years ago the 7/7 terror attack and the Salman Rushdie moment. Both moments of polarization are referred as blessing in disguise, meaning that the Muslim community in Britain was able to unite. As every society is sensitive to ‘tensions’ such as ethnic, racial or religious there is always there the potential that these tensions can fracture a society. Even the smallest things can tip things over making a society very fragile.

It can be observed from British interviewees that a *communal awareness* and *vocality* in addressing government issues and policies requires Muslims facing suspicion. Being upfront thus means to counteract with counter-arguments such as counter-vilification *as opposed to vilification*. A *strong public voice* and the consistency in the message must be coordinated consistently through a broad-base. Yet, according to a British Imam such attempts do not necessarily mean that *Muslims have a powerful voice*. On the contrary Muslims have a weak voice because the authorities do not listen. Most British interviewees confirm the *selective attitude* of the government officials where the established, broad based umbrella organizations are ignored. This *picking and choosing* concedes an *unequal and unfair* treatment that provides *access* to one organization and prevents access to others.

Today the public debate is dominated and framed in terms of *dichotomies* such as ‘Muslims’ versus ‘non-Muslims’ where *ideological actors* abuse the situation for own interests. Muslims do not *have equal access to channels as others do, and yet the British Muslim* has grown confident, resourceful in challenging the government.

An important challenge would be to hold *the media accountable in order to prevent further polarization*. *Regulation of the media* should be a priority, otherwise *hypocrisy* will *normalize* and become a mainstream accepted culture. *Besides these regulations* the government needs to change its vocabulary and language and provide Muslims recognition that Muslims too have the same problems as any other communities.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

The main conclusions of this research are briefly summarized in this sixth and final chapter. This research is a product of qualitative and quantitative data analysis, which is analysed by triangulation (Convergent Parallel Sequencing); the quantitative data is collected by way of *multiple stage sampling*. Whereas, the qualitative data is collected by way of saturation.

Both qualitative as well as quantitative data analysis have delivered some key themes which in both analyses overlap each other. For this reason, chapter four has discussed the following themes in the following order: demographics, multiple identities, identity complexity, religious attitudes and politicians trust.

To summarize these findings, the variable *Muslim identity* in both countries has performed to possess degrees of complexity. The findings of this research shows that the *Muslim Identity* does not obstruct diversity and plurality. According to the interviewees Muslim communities across both countries cannot be considered as monolithic blocs, but these communities have their own specific cultures, languages and perceptions.

In terms of religion, *centrality* is an item that is scored very high by the respondents in both countries. This is also the case for the item *salience* as well as for the items shahada, praying five times a day, fasting, zakat and hajj. I saw that centrality and salience are two items that are strong correlated with each other. Centrality of Islam in the lives of Muslims is supported by readiness to act upon religious duties. However, I also found that some religious obligations are not stand alone and are dependent of other factors such as income.

The socio-economic situation of the respondent proved that items such as zakat and hajj have strong inverse correlations with the item income. It is also the case that especially males have higher earnings compared to females amongst the respondents in both countries. Yet, females are also ones to score higher in terms of categorizing themselves as having complex identities and having multiple identities. Interestingly the item gender has a positive correlation with hard

approach in society as a solution to do something about conflict situations. It is also the case that the older the respondent is, the higher the earnings are and the more able the respondent is to comply with religious duties such as hajj and zakat. Income also has a positive influence on having an own elected-party, all the while voting is considered of a less part of the personal identity.

A much-heard point is the so-called economic argument that according to interviewees counteracts as a balance against the religious argument. The economic burden of the Muslim communities in the Netherlands seems to weaken the community as a liability in the eyes of policymakers. The economic situation of the Muslim presence in the United Kingdom has a far stronger base and is referred to as the '*green capital*'.

In general, the Muslim identity in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom shows to be complex and *multiple*. This is a strong indication for a tolerant attitude salience in society towards others. This is also seen from item *multiple* identity having a positive correlation with the variable *complex identities*. The more an individual perceives the self as having more than *one identity*, the more the respondent is inclined to order a complex range of identities. Another important confirmation is that individuals indicating to have *multiple identities* inversely correlate with items such as *hard approach* or that *Islam forbids political participation*. The Muslim identity having complex features in these two multicultural societies, also prefer *soft approach* and show readiness and willingness to *participate* in democratic political processes. Yet, having respondents who perceive to have *multiple identities* believes that politicians *distrust* Muslims.

The less *complex the identity of a Muslim individual* is, the more this item predicts *hard approach* and vice-versa the more a respondent perceives the self as *single-identity*, the more the respondent is inclined to believe that *hard approach* is a viable solution. The more complex the Muslim identity the more the respondent believes that Islam does not obstruct political participation. On the other side, it doesn't matter whether a Muslim individual has *complex or single identities*, in almost all cases individuals strongly agree on the item that politicians *distrust* Muslims and Islam.

The *Muslim identity* in the two countries is also aware of its distinct memberships; in this case there is a distinct preference towards being a member in the own group while there is no correlation with the item feeling to be a member in the wider society. Having a distinct awareness of the own social-religious group is an important indication of the ability to perceive differences between groups accordingly. According to the research Brewer conducted, one may conclude that group-distinction is far better indicator for tolerance, as data shows that being a member of the own in-group has a positive effect on feelings of recognized within the wider society. This also the case with democratic values such as that voting is a part of the personal identity, the need for the Muslim communities to follow policies, not believing that Islam prohibits political participation and having distinct preference for a soft approach instead of hard approach. Further the more a respondent perceives to be a *valuable member* of the society, the more it predicts *multiple identities, recognition in society, having equal rights* and *achieving recognition by striving for more trust* through political involvement.

Another important finding is the effect that *formal theological education* has; those respondents who have enjoyed a theological education are inclined to perceive *voting as part of their identity or following policies*. As expected religious education also has a positive effect on centrality, salience and soft approach items. But also indicates that theologian does not believe that Islam prohibits political participation. Yet, the theologian also doesn't agree that politicians would trust Muslims in the two countries, nor does the Muslim complex identity believe that they have equal rights in society.

After having constructed a new variable called *Muslim Identity and Political Institutions* where Muslim Identity is composed of items; shahada, centrality and Islam as central for decision-making, a correlation analysis is conducted to see whether a correlation exists between *Muslim Identity* and the item complex identities. I was not able to find any correlation between this super-variable and complexity. Yet, the research delivered a correlation between *decision-making* and the variable *complexity*. When a mediation analysis was conducted by Hayes' Process method, I was able to see that the item *politician's trust* did have a

mediating effect explaining this former association. When the item *politicians' trust* controlled for, the items identity complexity and religious attitude showed a significant variance.

In other words, the correlation between Muslim practice and complexity can be explained by the support it receives from the *Trust by Political Actors*. Another very important finding is that the variable *Muslim identity* positively correlates with the variable *Political Institutions*, yet negatively correlates with the variable *Politicians' trust*. The variable *Muslim identity* positively correlates with the variable *Soft Approach* where the variable *Politicians' trust* correlates negatively with the variable *Hard Approach*. The Muslim practice to embrace Islam by way of *Shahada* negatively correlates with the variable *Hard Approach*.

A very important finding is that Muslim elite in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom agree with each other that the Dutch as well as the British governments are very selective in their consultation attitudes. The selective attitude of governments cause Muslims to be frustrated and angry believing that there is hypocrisy and that constitutional rights such as equal access for specifically the Muslims is obstructed. This negative approach towards the Muslim communities does not help the public debates, where media also cause much harm where Muslims have serious problems not being able to communicate properly. All the while misunderstandings and problems such as extremism are existent.

A major difference between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom is that British Muslims experience much more freedom in the public space. Even though data shows that British Muslims are far more worried about their wellbeing on the streets than the Dutch Muslims. Much of this public freedom in the United Kingdom is tied to economic prosperity of Muslims as well as the historical ties that British Muslims have with the British State. The British Muslims are also different in their degree of unification and the ability to exercise *resistance* by way of consistent messaging. The British Muslims are more vocal and have a louder voice than Dutch Muslims, yet the inner actors perceive this vocality as inadequate. This effect should be tangible changes once the lobbying activities have taken place. The British

Muslims do perceive policies such as Prevent as polarization of the community. Previous moments of polarization were the Rushdie moment and the 7/7 incidents. Both moments of polarization had devastating effects, but yielded Muslim communities the much needed push to unify the very diverse Muslim British communities. Therefore, the British Muslims are more visible and exercise scrutiny as Muslim identity politics position. This model could be an inspiration for all other Muslims in the European countries encouraging engagement from a religious identity. Thus far, the most important consequence of selective picking and choosing and policies that damage Muslim citizenry is the connectedness of the Muslim communities with the society and social realities.

The British Muslims are much more *confident, articulate and more aware* of the connection between their religious identities and their social identities, that similar problems in both countries are perceived from an optimistic constructive elite position versus a pessimistic and negative Dutch elite position. The British Muslim feels the need to proactively show that Muslims care about matters that affect all ordinary British people and not just care about Muslim issues. As Islam teaches justice is universal, and Muslims are to lend their voices to it.

It is almost unanimous that respondents use the concept *Muslim identity* instead of the term *Islamic identity*, where the latter represents a formal and full definition according to the main sources of Islam. Yet the *Muslim identity* is almost unanimously pursued as a normative position where the Muslim individual can only strive to as the end ideal, the Islamic identity.

Almost all respondents indicate that there is a predominant emphasis on differences in the media between Muslims and the majority, whereas the emphasis should be more on the common values. In terms of media and policies, institutions are perceived as hypocritical, a tendency in the society that has the potential to legitimize and normalize dangerous movements such as populism, radical right and islamophobia. This culture is perceived to be fueled by the media and is perceived as deliberate and unaccountable wherein the Muslim identity is either portrayed as rigid, fixed, criminal or extremist. Either of these indicate according to interviewees as double standard and denies the constructive potential of Muslim communities.

In short, both the quantitative as well as qualitative data indicate the existence of social and political tensions in both countries concerning the Muslim existence. Yet, the Muslim identity is nevertheless complex and has a high degree of awareness and willingness to participate in democratic institutions.

A crucial final finding in both countries on basis of the qualitative as well as quantitative data is the unanimous Dutch and British Muslim views that the political actors and authorities lack faith in the constructive and solution-based capabilities of the Muslim communities. The policies in place and the new policies with the Muslim in mind, without any Muslim consultation is a dislodging and immobilizing causing a social and communal trauma. The channels of Muslim representation and the Muslim maturity in both countries differ in their nature, but the necessary communication between the Muslim concerns and the authorities is seriously lacking. This lack of communication functions as a source of cause for debilitation, *distrust* and suspicion. In both countries representatives of Muslim communities wish the government policies be based on mutual exchange with the views that represent the true majority of the Muslim communities.

No matter how farther the British Muslims are in their communal and organizational abilities and the communal confidence in being more vocally present, the *dissatisfaction* of not being heard or listened is loudly existent and is a source of concern for the wellbeing of the Muslim communities in both countries. Even though, the Dutch Muslims are less mature in their communal civic visibility and critical communal voice, both communities do struggle in their access and participation to deal with social and public tensions that are found in the changing societal definitions and political negotiations. This finding may very well be diagnosed as a *democratic deficit*.

Even though the British Muslims compared to the Dutch Muslims are more mature and able to scrutinize their communal concerns e.g. about the so-called '*values agenda*', and the Dutch Muslim are much less visible in their communal scrutiny, the Dutch Muslims are more confident about their established and self-elected political representation. The British Muslim elite are absolutely apprehensive in their views on having an own elected-party. Yet, the same cannot be said about the Muslim respondents who had very much the same ideas about having an own

political party. Obviously, the elite are right concerning the fact that the British democracy is a bi-party system, yet a Muslim political party could be a potential solution for future representation.

Another very important finding is that the Dutch Muslims seem to have a much more superficial and latent identity compared to the British Muslims, which is much more connected, rooted and well-defined within the British society. It is a communal challenge for the Dutch Muslims to achieve the same quality of awareness, articulation and a united religious representation. The qualitative data presents that the distrust of political actors has grave social, religious and political consequences for the Muslim communities. The item distrust has negative influence on Muslim respondent's perceptions of feeling to be a valuable member of the society or believing in having equal rights, or whether they should follow policies. The negative influence goes so far as respondents are more inclined to believe that Islam forbids political and democratic activities. Muslims who feel distrusted also are far more inclined to believe that their safety on the streets is in jeopardy. Respondents who feel distrusted by political actors also feel that a harder approach in society is a legitimate solution. As a final point Muslims who feel distrusted also believe that special laws are necessary to provide protection and safety.

As a conclusion, the Dutch as well as British governance are to enable access to religious minorities to resources and communication with political actors. An open and a tolerant fair approach towards Muslim minorities where Muslims are involved and consulted on issues concerning Muslim communities has a higher probability on basis of the data collected in improving the negative climate that is experienced as selective and exclusive. It would be a recommendation for authorities to acknowledge that Muslim citizens' trust is impaired that functions as a push-factor out of the society. Dutch Muslims ought to be more confident in their messaging, vocalization, unification efforts and encourage authorities on consultation; the Dutch Muslims are to strive and attain a mental maturity to become an essential and unavoidable coalition around the policy-table. On the other side the British Muslim elite could be more open for alternative ways of political participation. Political representation is a democratic fundamental right, even though the British political

system is bipartisan, the general mental approach of the elite is confining, whereas the British-Muslim shows to be open for alternatives. For Dutch Muslims is recommended to learn from British Muslim's active citizenship, coalition-building amongst Muslim organizations and embrace the Netherlands as the own home country and strive to lobby for a policy that holds the media accountable in case of incorrect news.



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APPENDIX I

Correlations

		Gender	Income	Complexity	Single_Identity	Hard_Approach
Gender	Pearson Correlation	1	-,229**	-,103**	-,121**	,097**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000	,001	,000	,001
	N	1276	1211	1065	1273	1233
Income	Pearson Correlation	-,229**	1	-,024	-,016	-,021
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000		,444	,571	,477
	N	1211	1239	1038	1236	1204
Complexity	Pearson Correlation	-,103**	-,024	1	,497**	-,077
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,001	,444		,000	,012
	N	1065	1038	1101	1095	1062
Single_Identity	Pearson Correlation	-,121**	-,016	,497**	1	-,188**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,571	,000		,000
	N	1273	1236	1095	1305	1262
Hard_Approach	Pearson Correlation	,097**	-,021	-,077	-,188**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,001	,477	,012	,000	
	N	1233	1204	1062	1262	1265

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Correlations

		Age	Hadj	Income	VotingL	Member_Society	Member_Ummah	Policies_ME
Age_Group	Pearson Correlation	1	-,423**	,378**	-,230**	-,178**	,120**	-,130**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000	,000	,000	,000	,000	,000
	N	1295	1293	1232	1294	1293	1286	1285
Hadj	Pearson Correlation	-,423**	1	-,217**	,164**	,105**	,080**	,124**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000		,000	,000	,000	,004	,000
	N	1293	1302	1238	1301	1300	1293	1292
Income	Pearson Correlation	,378**	-,217**	1	-,139**	-,118**	,049	-,043
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000		,000	,000	,087	,127
	N	1232	1238	1239	1238	1237	1232	1233
RechtvanStemmenNL	Pearson Correlation	-,230**	,164**	-,139**	1	,354**	,024	,049
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,000		,000	,392	,077
	N	1294	1301	1238	1307	1305	1294	1297
Member_Society	Pearson Correlation	-,178**	,105**	-,118**	,354**	1	,007	-,028
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,000	,000		,799	,308
	N	1293	1300	1237	1305	1306	1293	1296
Member_Ummah	Pearson Correlation	,120**	,080**	,049	,024	,007	1	,171**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,004	,087	,392	,799		,000
	N	1286	1293	1232	1294	1293	1295	1289
Policies_ME	Pearson Correlation	-,130**	,124**	-,043	,049	-,028	,171**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,127	,077	,308	,000	
	N	1285	1292	1233	1297	1296	1289	1298

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).



Correlations

		Income	Hadj	Zakat	RechtvanStemmenNL	Isl_Forbids_Pol	Member_Society	Self_Elec_Party	Party_Par	Pilars_Islam	Follow_Policies	Do_More_Trust
Income	Pearson Correlation	1	-.217**	-.127**	-.139**	.122**	-.118*	.103**	.060	.094**	-.074**	-.058**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.035	.001	.009	.042
	N	1239	1238	1232	1238	1229	1237	1216	1236	1238	1237	1234
Hadj	Pearson Correlation	-.217**	1	.107**	.164**	-.047**	.105**	-.003	.050	.107**	.122**	.117**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.000	.091	.000	.902	.072	.000	.000	.000
	N	1238	1302	1293	1301	1285	1300	1272	1295	1301	1299	1293
Zakat	Pearson Correlation	-.127**	.107**	1	.115**	-.136**	.003	.067**	.123**	.283**	.025	.053
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000		.000	.000	.904	.017	.000	.000	.365	.055
	N	1232	1293	1297	1296	1280	1295	1267	1290	1293	1294	1289
RechtvanStemmenNL	Pearson Correlation	-.139**	.164**	.115**	1	-.223**	.354**	.112**	.203**	-.044	.256**	.252**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000	.114	.000	.000
	N	1238	1301	1296	1307	1289	1305	1276	1299	1302	1304	1297
Isl_Forbids_Pol	Pearson Correlation	.122**	-.047**	-.136**	-.223**	1	-.059	.092**	.046	-.057	-.172**	-.208**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.091	.000	.000		.035	.001	.099	.042	.000	.000
	N	1229	1285	1280	1289	1290	1288	1266	1288	1285	1290	1285
Member_Society	Pearson Correlation	-.118**	.105**	.003	.354**	-.059	1	-.004	.005	-.065**	.118**	.150**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.904	.000	.035		.880	.860	.019	.000	.000
	N	1237	1300	1295	1305	1288	1306	1275	1298	1301	1303	1296
Self_Elec_Party	Pearson Correlation	.103**	-.003	.067**	.112**	.092**	-.004	1	.532**	.157**	.095**	.120**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.902	.017	.000	.001	.880		.000	.000	.001	.000
	N	1216	1272	1267	1276	1266	1275	1277	1275	1272	1277	1273
Party_Par	Pearson Correlation	.060**	.050	.123**	.203**	.046	.532**	.532**	1	.147**	.179**	.230**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.035	.072	.000	.000	.099	.860	.000		.000	.000	.000
	N	1236	1295	1290	1299	1288	1298	1275	1300	1295	1299	1297
Pilars_Islam	Pearson Correlation	.094**	.107**	.283**	-.044	-.057	-.065**	.157**	.147**	1	.106**	.054
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.000	.000	.114	.042	.019	.000	.000		.000	.054
	N	1238	1301	1293	1302	1285	1301	1272	1295	1303	1300	1293
Follow_Policies	Pearson Correlation	-.074**	.122**	.025	.256**	-.172**	.118**	.095**	.179**	.106**	1	.219**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.009	.000	.365	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000		.000
	N	1237	1299	1294	1304	1290	1303	1277	1299	1300	1305	1297
Do_More_Trust	Pearson Correlation	-.058**	.117**	.053	.252**	-.208**	.150**	.120**	.230**	.054	.219**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.042	.000	.055	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.054	.000	
	N	1234	1293	1289	1297	1285	1296	1273	1297	1293	1297	1298

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
 * . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Correlations

		How long now?	Influence_Policies	Wellbeing	RechtvanStemmenNL	Equal_Rights	Feel_recognized	Party_Parl	Single_Identity
How long now?	Pearson Correlation	1	,108**	,095**	,090**	,074**	,067**	,066**	-,086**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000	,002	,003	,016	,028	,030	,004
	N	1087	1063	1081	1086	1073	1085	1081	1085
Influence_Policies	Pearson Correlation	,108**	1	,105**	,073**	-,075**	,025	,176**	-,001
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000		,000	,010	,008	,367	,000	,958
	N	1063	1270	1267	1269	1256	1267	1270	1267
Wellbeing	Pearson Correlation	,095**	,105**	1	,041	-,155**	-,138**	,090**	-,035
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,002	,000		,142	,000	,000	,001	,213
	N	1081	1267	1302	1301	1288	1299	1297	1299
RechtvanStemmenNL	Pearson Correlation	,090**	,073**	,041	1	,280**	,201**	,203**	,015
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,003	,010	,142		,000	,000	,000	,597
	N	1086	1269	1301	1307	1293	1304	1299	1304
Equal_Rights	Pearson Correlation	,074**	-,075**	-,155**	,280**	1	,411**	-,015	-,082**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,016	,008	,000	,000		,000	,601	,003
	N	1073	1256	1288	1293	1294	1291	1286	1291
Feel_recognized	Pearson Correlation	,067**	,025	-,138**	,201**	,411**	1	,071**	-,046
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,028	,367	,000	,000	,000		,011	,099
	N	1085	1267	1299	1304	1291	1305	1297	1302
Party_Parl	Pearson Correlation	,066**	,176**	,090**	,203**	-,015	,071**	1	-,102**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,030	,000	,001	,000	,601	,011		,000
	N	1081	1270	1297	1299	1286	1297	1300	1297
Single_Identity	Pearson Correlation	-,086**	-,001	-,035	,015	-,082**	-,046	-,102**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,004	,958	,213	,597	,003	,099	,000	
	N	1085	1267	1299	1304	1291	1302	1297	1305

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Correlations

		Rel_Educ	Party_Parl	Isl_Forbids_Pol	Follow_Policies	Soft_Approach	Hard_Approach	Single_Identity
Rel_Educ	Pearson Correlation	1	,105**	-,100**	,097**	,087**	-,077**	,004
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000	,000	,001	,002	,007	,894
	N	1266	1262	1252	1264	1237	1229	1263
Party_Parl	Pearson Correlation	,105**	1	,046	,179**	,035	,077**	-,102**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000		,099	,000	,210	,006	,000
	N	1262	1300	1288	1299	1273	1263	1297
Isl_Forbids_Pol	Pearson Correlation	-,100**	,046	1	-,172**	-,097**	,247**	-,192**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,099		,000	,001	,000	,000
	N	1252	1288	1290	1290	1263	1254	1287
Follow_Policies	Pearson Correlation	,097**	,179**	-,172**	1	,202**	-,022	,037
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,001	,000	,000		,000	,434	,182
	N	1264	1299	1290	1305	1274	1265	1302
Soft_Approach	Pearson Correlation	,087**	,035	-,097**	,202**	1	-,177**	,096**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,002	,210	,001	,000		,000	,001
	N	1237	1273	1263	1274	1275	1261	1272
Hard_Approach	Pearson Correlation	-,077**	,077**	,247**	-,022	-,177**	1	-,188**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,007	,006	,000	,434	,000		,000
	N	1229	1263	1254	1265	1261	1265	1262
Single_Identity	Pearson Correlation	,004	-,102**	-,192**	,037	,096**	-,188**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,894	,000	,000	,182	,001	,000	
	N	1263	1297	1287	1302	1272	1262	1305

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Parameter Estimates

	Estimate	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval		
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound	
Threshold	[Ordered_Complexity = 1]	.460	.369	1,553	1	.213	-.263	1,182
	[ReligScholingNL=1]	.743	.390	3,631	1	.057	-.021	1,507
	[ReligScholingNL=2]	.510	.395	1,665	1	.197	-.265	1,284
Location	[ReligScholingNL=3]	.246	.383	.412	1	.521	-.504	.996
	[ReligScholingNL=4]	-.367	.452	.659	1	.417	-1,253	.519
	[ReligScholingNL=5]	-.038	.414	.008	1	.927	-.850	.774
	[ReligScholingNL=6]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.

Link function: Logit.

a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

Parameter Estimates

	Estimate	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval		
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound	
Threshold	[HardeAanpNL = 1]	-3.628	.180	406.086	1	.000	-3.980	-3.275
	[HardeAanpNL = 2]	-2.075	.138	226.690	1	.000	-2.345	-1.805
	[HardeAanpNL = 3]	-1.156	.128	81.509	1	.000	-1.408	-.905
	[HardeAanpNL = 4]	.018	.124	.020	1	.887	-.225	.260
	[Single_Identity=1]	.500	.107	21.914	1	.000	.291	.710
Location	[Single_Identity=2]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.
	[PoliticiVertisNL=1]	-.885	.430	4.243	1	.039	-1.728	-.043
	[PoliticiVertisNL=2]	-1.074	.259	17.210	1	.000	-1.581	-.566
	[PoliticiVertisNL=3]	-.517	.181	8.127	1	.004	-.873	-.162
	[PoliticiVertisNL=4]	-.331	.120	7.619	1	.006	-.566	-.096
	[PoliticiVertisNL=5]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.
	[IslamVerbodPoNL=1]	-1.319	.303	18.955	1	.000	-1.912	-.725
	[IslamVerbodPoNL=2]	-1.377	.243	32.165	1	.000	-1.853	-.901
	[IslamVerbodPoNL=3]	-.763	.144	28.228	1	.000	-1.044	-.481
	[IslamVerbodPoNL=4]	-.524	.131	16.021	1	.000	-.781	-.267
[IslamVerbodPoNL=5]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.	

Link function: Logit.

a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

KMO and Bartlett's Test		
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.596
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	966.979
	df	3
	Sig.	.000



Correlations

		Sec_Educ	Income	Isl_Forbidns_Pol	Hard_Approach	Follow_Policies	Soft_Approach	Influence_Policies	Single_Identity	Complexity	RechtvanStemmenNL	Member_Ingroup	Member_Society
Sec_Educ	Pearson Correlation	1	-.253**	-.216**	-.148**	.143**	.134**	.105**	.099**	-.088**	.083**	-.074*	.061*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.006	.005	.011	.037
	N	1182	1127	1166	1141	1180	1150	1146	1179	982	1181	1179	1180
Income	Pearson Correlation	-.253**	1	.122**	-.021	-.074**	.014	-.030	-.016	-.024	-.139**	.030	-.118**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.477	.009	.629	.303	.571	.444	.000	.293	.000
	N	1127	1239	1229	1204	1237	1213	1209	1236	1038	1238	1236	1237
Isl_Forbidns_Pol	Pearson Correlation	-.216**	.122**	1	.247**	-.172**	-.097**	-.017	-.192**	-.112**	-.223**	.025	-.059*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000		.000	.000	.001	.551	.000	.000	.000	.364	.035
	N	1166	1229	1290	1254	1290	1263	1261	1287	1081	1289	1288	1288
Hard_Approach	Pearson Correlation	-.148**	-.021	.247**	1	-.022	-.177**	.131**	-.188**	-.077*	-.006	.112**	.057*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.477	.000		.434	.000	.000	.000	.012	.842	.000	.043
	N	1141	1204	1254	1265	1265	1261	1257	1262	1062	1264	1263	1263
Follow_Policies	Pearson Correlation	.143**	-.074**	-.172**	-.022	1	.202**	.251**	.037	.016	.256**	.148**	.118**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.009	.000	.434		.000	.000	.182	.603	.000	.000	.000
	N	1180	1237	1290	1265	1305	1274	1270	1302	1095	1304	1303	1303
Soft_Approach	Pearson Correlation	.134**	.014	-.097**	-.177**	.202**	1	.385**	.096**	.059	.044	.066*	.037
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.629	.001	.000	.000		.000	.001	.055	.119	.018	.190
	N	1150	1213	1263	1261	1274	1275	1266	1272	1072	1274	1272	1273
Influence_Policies	Pearson Correlation	.105**	-.030	-.017	.131**	.251**	-.385**	1	-.001	.039	.073**	.119**	.005
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.303	.551	.000	.000	.000		.958	.198	.010	.000	.852
	N	1146	1209	1261	1257	1270	1266	1270	1267	1068	1269	1268	1268
Single_Identity	Pearson Correlation	.099**	-.016	-.192**	-.188**	.037	.096**	-.001	1	.497**	.015	-.091**	-.040
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.571	.000	.000	.182	.001	.958		.000	.597	.001	.149
	N	1179	1236	1287	1262	1302	1272	1267	1305	1095	1304	1301	1303
Complexity	Pearson Correlation	-.088**	-.024	-.112**	-.077*	.016	.059	.039	.497**	1	.102**	-.042	.015
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.006	.444	.000	.012	.603	.055	.198	.000		.001	.162	.631
	N	982	1038	1081	1062	1095	1072	1068	1095	1101	1096	1093	1096
RechtvanStemmenNL	Pearson Correlation	.083**	-.139**	-.223**	-.006	.256**	.044	.073**	.015	.102**	1	.193**	.354**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.005	.000	.000	.842	.000	.119	.010	.597	.001		.000	.000
	N	1181	1238	1289	1264	1304	1274	1269	1304	1096	1307	1303	1305
Member_Ingroup	Pearson Correlation	-.074*	.030	.112**	.148**	.066*	.119**	-.091**	-.042	.193**	1		.110**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.011	.293	.364	.000	.018	.000	.001	.162	.000			.000
	N	1179	1236	1288	1263	1303	1272	1268	1301	1093	1303	1304	1302
Member_Society	Pearson Correlation	.061*	-.118**	-.059*	.057*	.118**	.037	.005	-.040	.015	.354**	.110**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.037	.000	.035	.043	.000	.190	.852	.149	.631	.000	.000	
	N	1180	1237	1288	1263	1303	1273	1268	1303	1096	1305	1302	1306

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
 * . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Correlations

		Single_Identity	Pol_Trust_Isl	Member_Ingr roup	Equal_Ri ghts	Isl_Forbid s_Pol	Party_P arl	Self_Elec_P arty	Hard_Appro ach
Single_Identity	Pearson Correlation	1	-.082**	-.091**	-.082**	-.192**	-.102**	-.105**	-.188**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,003	,001	,003	,000	,000	,000	,000
	N	1305	1300	1301	1291	1287	1297	1274	1262
Pol_Trust_Isl	Pearson Correlation	-.082**	1	-.018	,250**	,161**	,005	-.001	,178**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,003		,528	,000	,000	,853	,967	,000
	N	1300	1303	1299	1289	1286	1297	1274	1263
Member_Ingroup	Pearson Correlation	-.091**	-.018	1	-.029	,025	,246**	,223**	,112**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,001	,528		,298	,364	,000	,000	,000
	N	1301	1299	1304	1290	1288	1297	1275	1263
Equal_Rights	Pearson Correlation	-.082**	,250**	-.029	1	,011	-.015	-.095**	,032
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,003	,000	,298		,682	,601	,001	,262
	N	1291	1289	1290	1294	1276	1286	1263	1251
Isl_Forbid_Pol	Pearson Correlation	-.192**	,161**	,025	,011	1	,046	,092**	,247**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,364	,682		,099	,001	,000
	N	1287	1286	1288	1276	1290	1288	1266	1254
Party_Parl	Pearson Correlation	-.102**	,005	,246**	-.015	,046	1	,532**	,077**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,853	,000	,601	,099		,000	,006
	N	1297	1297	1297	1286	1288	1300	1275	1263
Self_Elec_Party	Pearson Correlation	-.105**	-.001	,223**	-.095**	,092**	,532**	1	,165**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,967	,000	,001	,001	,000		,000
	N	1274	1274	1275	1263	1266	1275	1277	1261
Hard_Approach	Pearson Correlation	-.188**	,178**	,112**	,032	,247**	,077**	,165**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,000	,262	,000	,006	,000	
	N	1262	1263	1263	1251	1254	1263	1261	1265

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Parameter Estimates

	Estimate	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval		
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound	
Threshold [Single_Identity = 1]								
	[PoliticiVertIsINL=1]	,135	,075	3,231	1	,072	-.012	,282
	[PoliticiVertIsINL=2]	,828	,469	3,119	1	,077	-.091	1,747
Location [PoliticiVertIsINL=3]								
	[PoliticiVertIsINL=4]	,211	,190	1,234	1	,267	-.162	,584
	[PoliticiVertIsINL=5]	,051	,127	,163	1	,687	-.198	,300
	0 ^a			0				

Link function: Logit.

a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

Model Summary			
Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	1109,528 ^a	,260	,347
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than ,001.			

Variables in the Equation							
	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	
Step 1 ^a	Single_Identity	2,322	,150	238,544	1	,000	10,191
	ReligScholingNL	-,226	,056	16,460	1	,000	,797
	VolwaardLidNL	,107	,078	1,890	1	,169	1,113
	PoliticiVertIsINL	-,077	,085	,838	1	,360	,926
	MeerVertrNL	-,055	,073	,572	1	,450	,946
	InvloedBeleidNL	,129	,084	2,352	1	,125	1,138
	MeerOnderNNL	-,015	,090	,029	1	,864	,985
	ZachteAanpNL	-,025	,091	,078	1	,779	,975
	Constant	-3,035	,543	31,280	1	,000	,048

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Single_Identity, ReligScholingNL, VolwaardLidNL, PoliticiVertIsINL, MeerVertrNL, InvloedBeleidNL, MeerOnderNNL, ZachteAanpNL.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.468	.000
	Cramer's V	.468	.000
N of Valid Cases		845	

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

Correlations

		Identity	Complexity
Identity	Pearson Correlation	1	.468**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	1305	845
Complexity	Pearson Correlation	.468**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	845	847

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Parameter Estimates

	Estimate	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval		
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound	
Threshold	[MI_Shada_Centrality = 2]	-15.246	1.315	134.488	1	.000	-17.822	-12.669
	[MI_Shada_Centrality = 3]	-11.004	1.228	80.312	1	.000	-13.410	-8.597
	[MI_Shada_Centrality = 4]	-7.253	1.101	43.379	1	.000	-9.411	-5.095
	[MI_Shada_Centrality = 5]	-4.459	.922	23.400	1	.000	-6.266	-2.652
	[MI_Shada_Centrality = 6]	-1.740	.804	4.680	1	.031	-3.317	-.164
	[MI_Shada_Centrality = 7]	-1.255	.822	2.332	1	.127	-2.865	.356
	[MI_Shada_Centrality = 8]	.706	1.062	.443	1	.506	-1.375	2.788
	[MI_Shada_Centrality = 9]	1.766	1.381	1.636	1	.201	-.940	4.472
	[Bidden5XNL=1]	-2.076	.381	29.684	1	.000	-2.823	-1.329
	[Bidden5XNL=2]	-.774	.383	4.078	1	.043	-1.525	-.023
	[Bidden5XNL=3]	-.290	.548	.281	1	.596	-1.364	.784
	[Bidden5XNL=4]	-.157	.451	.121	1	.728	-1.042	.727
	[Bidden5XNL=5]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.
	[VastenNL=1]	-.386	.545	.501	1	.479	-1.453	.682
	[VastenNL=2]	-.279	.574	.236	1	.627	-1.403	.846
[VastenNL=3]	-.966	.787	1.506	1	.220	-2.508	.576	
[VastenNL=4]	2.295	.993	5.344	1	.021	.349	4.241	
[VastenNL=5]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.	
Location	[ShahadaNL=1]	-13.163	1.162	128.342	1	.000	-15.440	-10.886
	[ShahadaNL=2]	-7.643	1.078	50.251	1	.000	-9.757	-5.530
	[ShahadaNL=3]	-3.761	.969	15.078	1	.000	-5.660	-1.863
	[ShahadaNL=4]	.144	.918	.025	1	.876	-1.655	1.942
	[ShahadaNL=5]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.
	[ZakaatNL=1]	.631	.487	1.684	1	.194	-.322	1.585
	[ZakaatNL=2]	.772	.528	2.142	1	.143	-.262	1.806
	[ZakaatNL=3]	.494	.532	.863	1	.353	-.548	1.537
	[ZakaatNL=4]	.211	.780	.073	1	.786	-1.317	1.740
	[ZakaatNL=5]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.
	[HadjNL=1]	-2.797	.460	36.970	1	.000	-3.699	-1.896
	[HadjNL=2]	-2.044	.423	23.369	1	.000	-2.873	-1.215
	[HadjNL=3]	-2.485	.435	32.586	1	.000	-3.338	-1.631
	[HadjNL=4]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.

Link function: Logit.

a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

Identity * Rel_Educ Crosstabulation

Country		Rel_Educ						Total	
		Formal Theology	Madrassa Style	Mosque	Private lessons	Selftaugt	Other		
NL	I only have 1 identity	Count	59	50	162	13	41	10	335
		% within Identity	17.6%	14.9%	48.4%	3.9%	12.2%	3.0%	100.0%
		% within Rel_Educ	35.3%	43.9%	47.1%	59.1%	48.8%	62.5%	44.8%
	Identity	% of Total	7.9%	6.7%	21.7%	1.7%	5.5%	1.3%	44.8%
	I have more than 1 identity	Count	108	64	182	9	43	6	412
		% within Identity	26.2%	15.5%	44.2%	2.2%	10.4%	1.5%	100.0%
		% within Rel_Educ	64.7%	56.1%	52.9%	40.9%	51.2%	37.5%	55.2%
	Total	% of Total	14.5%	8.6%	24.4%	1.2%	5.8%	0.8%	55.2%
	Total	Count	167	114	344	22	84	16	747
		% within Identity	22.4%	15.3%	46.1%	2.9%	11.2%	2.1%	100.0%
		% within Rel_Educ	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	UK	I only have 1 identity	% of Total	22.4%	15.3%	46.1%	2.9%	11.2%	2.1%
Count			90	71	59	23	25	9	277
% within Identity			32.5%	25.6%	21.3%	8.3%	9.0%	3.2%	100.0%
Identity		% within Rel_Educ	59.6%	60.7%	49.6%	43.4%	42.4%	52.9%	53.7%
I have more than 1 identity		% of Total	17.4%	13.8%	11.4%	4.5%	4.8%	1.7%	53.7%
		Count	61	46	60	30	34	8	239
		% within Identity	25.5%	19.2%	25.1%	12.6%	14.2%	3.3%	100.0%
Total		% within Rel_Educ	40.4%	39.3%	50.4%	56.6%	57.6%	47.1%	46.3%
Total		% of Total	11.8%	8.9%	11.6%	5.8%	6.6%	1.6%	46.3%
		Count	151	117	119	53	59	17	516
		% within Identity	29.3%	22.7%	23.1%	10.3%	11.4%	3.3%	100.0%
Total		% within Rel_Educ	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	29.3%	22.7%	23.1%	10.3%	11.4%	3.3%	100.0%	

Identity * Sec_Educ Crosstabulation

Country		Sec_Educ					Total	
		University	Voc. Ter.	Voc. Sec	Secon.	Prim.		
NL	Count	93	139	90	23	3	348	
	I only have 1 identity	% within Identity	26.7%	39.9%	25.9%	6.6%	0.9%	100.0%
	Identity	% of Total	12.1%	18.0%	11.7%	3.0%	0.4%	45.1%
	Count	123	206	59	29	6	423	
	Ik heb meer dan 1 identiteit	% within Identity	29.1%	48.7%	13.9%	6.9%	1.4%	100.0%
	Identity	% of Total	16.0%	26.7%	7.7%	3.8%	0.8%	54.9%
	Count	216	345	149	52	9	771	
	Total	% within Identity	28.0%	44.7%	19.3%	6.7%	1.2%	100.0%
	Identity	% of Total	28.0%	44.7%	19.3%	6.7%	1.2%	100.0%
	Count	136	34	15	36		221	
Ik heb alleen 1 identiteit	% within Identity	61.5%	15.4%	6.8%	16.3%		100.0%	
Identity	% of Total	33.3%	8.3%	3.7%	8.8%		54.2%	
UK	Count	155	14	9	9		187	
	Ik heb meer dan 1 identiteit	% within Identity	82.9%	7.5%	4.8%	4.8%		100.0%
	Identity	% of Total	38.0%	3.4%	2.2%	2.2%		45.8%
	Count	291	48	24	45		408	
	Total	% within Identity	71.3%	11.8%	5.9%	11.0%		100.0%
	Identity	% of Total	71.3%	11.8%	5.9%	11.0%		100.0%



Correlations

		MI_SH_Cen_Dec	Complexity	Follow_Policies	Isl_Forbids_Pol	Party_Parl	Self_Elec_Party	Self_Elec_Umbrell	Influence_Policies	Do_More_Trust	Special_Laws
MI_SH_Cen_Dec	Pearson Correlation	1	-,057	,200**	-,075**	,131**	,119**	,150**	,153**	,109**	,158**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,059	,000	,007	,000	,000	,000	,000	,000	,000
	N	1307	1096	1304	1289	1299	1276	1267	1269	1297	1273
Complexity	Pearson Correlation	-,057	1	,016	-,112**	-,079**	-,063*	,009	,039	-,005	-,012
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,059		,603	,000	,009	,038	,778	,198	,857	,695
	N	1096	1101	1095	1081	1092	1072	1065	1068	1090	1072
Follow_Policies	Pearson Correlation	,200**	,016	1	-,172**	,179**	,095**	,237**	,251**	,219**	,151**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,603		,000	,000	,001	,000	,000	,000	,000
	N	1304	1095	1305	1290	1299	1277	1268	1270	1297	1273
Isl_Forbids_Pol	Pearson Correlation	-,075**	-,112**	-,172**	1	,046	,092**	-,017	-,017	-,208**	,113**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,007	,000	,000		,099	,001	,549	,551	,000	,000
	N	1289	1081	1290	1290	1288	1266	1258	1261	1285	1263
Party_Parl	Pearson Correlation	,131**	-,079**	,179**	,046	1	,532**	,241**	,176**	,230**	,285**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,009	,000	,099		,000	,000	,000	,000	,000
	N	1299	1092	1299	1288	1300	1275	1268	1270	1297	1272
Self_Elec_Party	Pearson Correlation	,119**	-,063*	,095**	,092**	,532**	1	,483**	,161**	,120**	,255**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,038	,001	,001	,000		,000	,000	,000	,000
	N	1276	1072	1277	1266	1275	1277	1265	1261	1273	1265
Self_Elec_Umbrell	Pearson Correlation	,150**	,009	,237**	-,017	,241**	,483**	1	,262**	,170**	,145**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,778	,000	,549	,000	,000		,000	,000	,000
	N	1267	1065	1268	1258	1268	1265	1268	1260	1267	1261
Influence_Policies	Pearson Correlation	,153**	,039	,251**	-,017	,176**	,161**	,262**	1	,232**	,304**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,198	,000	,551	,000	,000	,000		,000	,000
	N	1269	1068	1270	1261	1270	1261	1260	1270	1269	1263
Do_More_Trust	Pearson Correlation	,109**	-,005	,219**	-,208**	,230**	,120**	,170**	,232**	1	,085**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,857	,000	,000	,000	,000	,000	,000		,002
	N	1297	1090	1297	1285	1297	1273	1267	1269	1298	1270
Special_Laws	Pearson Correlation	,158**	-,012	,151**	,113**	,285**	,255**	,145**	,304**	,085**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,695	,000	,000	,000	,000	,000	,000	,002	
	N	1273	1072	1273	1263	1272	1265	1261	1263	1270	1274

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Pseudo R-Square

Cox and Snell	,506
Nagelkerke	,624
McFadden	,424

Link function: Logit.

Parameter Estimates

		Estimate	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
							Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Threshold	[MI_Shada_Centrality = 2]	-15,246	1,315	134,488	1	,000	-17,822	-12,669
	[MI_Shada_Centrality = 3]	-11,004	1,228	80,312	1	,000	-13,410	-8,597
	[MI_Shada_Centrality = 4]	-7,253	1,101	43,379	1	,000	-9,411	-5,095
	[MI_Shada_Centrality = 5]	-4,459	,922	23,400	1	,000	-6,266	-2,652
	[MI_Shada_Centrality = 6]	-1,740	,804	4,680	1	,031	-3,317	-,164
	[MI_Shada_Centrality = 7]	-1,255	,822	2,332	1	,127	-2,865	,356
	[MI_Shada_Centrality = 8]	,706	1,062	,443	1	,506	-1,375	2,788
	[MI_Shada_Centrality = 9]	1,766	1,381	1,636	1	,201	-,940	4,472
	[Bidden5XNL=1]	-2,076	,381	29,684	1	,000	-2,823	-1,329
	[Bidden5XNL=2]	-,774	,383	4,078	1	,043	-1,525	-,023
	[Bidden5XNL=3]	-,290	,548	,281	1	,596	-1,364	,784
	[Bidden5XNL=4]	-,157	,451	,121	1	,728	-1,042	,727
	[Bidden5XNL=5]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.
	[VastenNL=1]	-,386	,545	,501	1	,479	-1,453	,682
	[VastenNL=2]	-,279	,574	,236	1	,627	-1,403	,846
	[VastenNL=3]	-,966	,787	1,506	1	,220	-2,508	,576
[VastenNL=4]	2,295	,993	5,344	1	,021	,349	4,241	
[VastenNL=5]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.	
Location	[ShahadaNL=1]	-13,163	1,162	128,342	1	,000	-15,440	-10,886
	[ShahadaNL=2]	-7,643	1,078	50,251	1	,000	-9,757	-5,530
	[ShahadaNL=3]	-3,761	,969	15,078	1	,000	-5,660	-1,863
	[ShahadaNL=4]	,144	,918	,025	1	,876	-1,655	1,942
	[ShahadaNL=5]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.
	[ZakaatNL=1]	,631	,487	1,684	1	,194	-,322	1,585
	[ZakaatNL=2]	,772	,528	2,142	1	,143	-,262	1,806
	[ZakaatNL=3]	,494	,532	,863	1	,353	-,548	1,537
	[ZakaatNL=4]	,211	,780	,073	1	,786	-1,317	1,740
	[ZakaatNL=5]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.
	[HadjNL=1]	-2,797	,460	36,970	1	,000	-3,699	-1,896
	[HadjNL=2]	-2,044	,423	23,369	1	,000	-2,873	-1,215
[HadjNL=3]	-2,485	,435	32,586	1	,000	-3,338	-1,631	
[HadjNL=4]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.	

Link function: Logit.

a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.



Correlations

		Active_Local	Member_Ummah	Member_Society	Feel_recognized	RechtvanStemmenNL	Follow_Policies	Party_Parl	Party_EU	Self_Elec_Party	Influence_Policies	Special_Laws
	Pearson Correlation	1	,373**	,121**	,112**	,130**	,146**	,158**	,177**	,161**	,087**	,091**
Active_Local	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000	,000	,000	,000	,000	,000	,000	,000	,002	,001
	N	1294	1285	1292	1292	1293	1291	1286	1286	1263	1256	1260
	Pearson Correlation	,373**	1	,007	,070**	,024	,185**	,178**	,217**	,200**	,155**	,164**
Member_Ummah	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000		,799	,012	,392	,000	,000	,000	,000	,000	,000
	N	1285	1295	1293	1293	1294	1294	1288	1288	1266	1260	1263
	Pearson Correlation	,121**	,007	1	,447**	,354**	,118**	,005	,011	-,004	,005	-,048
Member_Society	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,799		,000	,000	,000	,860	,685	,880	,852	,086
	N	1292	1293	1306	1303	1305	1303	1298	1298	1275	1268	1272
	Pearson Correlation	,112**	,070*	,447**	1	,201**	,060*	,071**	,078**	,014	,025	-,034
Feel_recognized	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,012	,000		,000	,030	,011	,005	,611	,367	,231
	N	1292	1293	1303	1305	1304	1302	1297	1297	1274	1267	1271
	Pearson Correlation	,130**	,024	,354**	,201**	1	,256**	,203**	,190**	,112**	,073**	,039
RechtvanStemmenNL	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,392	,000	,000		,000	,000	,000	,000	,010	,161
	N	1293	1294	1305	1304	1307	1304	1299	1299	1276	1269	1273
	Pearson Correlation	,146**	,185**	,118**	,060*	,256**	1	,179**	,186**	,095**	,251**	,151**
Follow_Policies	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,000	,030	,000		,000	,000	,001	,000	,000
	N	1291	1294	1303	1302	1304	1305	1299	1299	1277	1270	1273
	Pearson Correlation	,158**	,178**	,005	,071**	,203**	,179**	1	,858**	,532**	,176**	,285**
Party_Parl	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,860	,011	,000	,000		,000	,000	,000	,000
	N	1286	1288	1298	1297	1299	1299	1300	1299	1275	1270	1272
	Pearson Correlation	,177**	,217**	,011	,078**	,190**	,186**	,858**	1	,520**	,204**	,275**
Party_EU	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,685	,005	,000	,000	,000		,000	,000	,000
	N	1286	1288	1298	1297	1299	1299	1299	1300	1276	1270	1272
	Pearson Correlation	,161**	,200**	-,004	,014	,112**	,095**	,532**	,520**	1	,161**	,255**
Self_Elec_Party	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,880	,611	,000	,001	,000	,000		,000	,000
	N	1263	1266	1275	1274	1276	1277	1275	1276	1277	1261	1265
	Pearson Correlation	,087**	,155**	,005	,025	,073**	,251**	,176**	,204**	,161**	1	,304**
Influence_Policies	Sig. (2-tailed)	,002	,000	,852	,367	,010	,000	,000	,000	,000		,000
	N	1256	1260	1268	1267	1269	1270	1270	1270	1261	1270	1263
	Pearson Correlation	,091**	,164**	-,048	-,034	,039	,151**	,285**	,275**	,255**	,304**	1
Special_Laws	Sig. (2-tailed)	,001	,000	,086	,231	,161	,000	,000	,000	,000	,000	
	N	1260	1263	1272	1271	1273	1273	1272	1272	1265	1263	1274

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Parameter Estimates

		Estimate	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
							Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Threshold	[VolwaardLidNL = 1]	2.738	1.560	3.079	1	.079	-.320	5.795
	[VolwaardLidNL = 2]	5.315	1.565	11.530	1	.001	2.247	8.382
	[VolwaardLidNL = 3]	7.109	1.568	20.559	1	.000	4.036	10.182
	[VolwaardLidNL = 4]	9.457	1.580	35.814	1	.000	6.360	12.555
	[ActiefLidGemNL=1]	-.540	.220	6.025	1	.014	-.971	-.109
	[ActiefLidGemNL=2]	-.352	.227	2.409	1	.121	-.796	.092
	[ActiefLidGemNL=3]	-.278	.233	1.427	1	.232	-.734	.178
	[ActiefLidGemNL=4]	-.569	.266	4.569	1	.033	-1.091	-.047
	[ActiefLidGemNL=5]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.
	[EigenGemNL=1]	-.296	.398	.556	1	.456	-1.076	.483
	[EigenGemNL=2]	-.127	.394	.103	1	.748	-.898	.645
	[EigenGemNL=3]	.041	.387	.011	1	.916	-.718	.799
	[EigenGemNL=4]	.308	.407	.573	1	.449	-.490	1.106
	[EigenGemNL=5]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.
	[InkomenNL=1]	.348	.196	3.138	1	.076	-.037	.733
	[InkomenNL=2]	.160	.192	.696	1	.404	-.216	.536
	[InkomenNL=3]	-.176	.198	.783	1	.376	-.565	.213
	[InkomenNL=4]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.
	[Geloof5PiINL=1]	.547	1.213	.203	1	.652	-1.830	2.924
	[Geloof5PiINL=2]	.642	1.223	.276	1	.600	-1.754	3.038
[Geloof5PiINL=3]	-.590	1.316	.201	1	.654	-3.170	1.990	
[Geloof5PiINL=4]	-.460	1.424	.104	1	.747	-3.250	2.331	
[Geloof5PiINL=5]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.	
Location	[ErkenningNL=1]	-2.847	.340	70.054	1	.000	-3.514	-2.181
	[ErkenningNL=2]	-2.354	.316	55.614	1	.000	-2.973	-1.736
	[ErkenningNL=3]	-1.812	.308	34.612	1	.000	-2.416	-1.208
	[ErkenningNL=4]	-1.016	.306	11.040	1	.001	-1.615	-.417
	[ErkenningNL=5]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.
	[GediscrimNL=1]	1.160	.404	8.234	1	.004	.368	1.953
	[GediscrimNL=2]	.685	.385	3.167	1	.075	-.070	1.440
	[GediscrimNL=3]	.470	.386	1.487	1	.223	-.285	1.226
	[GediscrimNL=4]	.119	.395	.091	1	.763	-.655	.893
	[GediscrimNL=5]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.
	[HadjNL=1]	1.577	.447	12.470	1	.000	.702	2.452
	[HadjNL=2]	1.445	.431	11.224	1	.001	.600	2.291
	[HadjNL=3]	1.687	.436	14.985	1	.000	.833	2.542
	[HadjNL=4]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.
	[RechtvanStemmenNL=1]	-2.143	.315	46.174	1	.000	-2.761	-1.525
	[RechtvanStemmenNL=2]	-.937	.296	10.044	1	.002	-1.516	-.357
	[RechtvanStemmenNL=3]	-.545	.295	3.406	1	.065	-1.123	.034
	[RechtvanStemmenNL=4]	-.247	.338	.533	1	.465	-.908	.415
	[RechtvanStemmenNL=5]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.
	[BeleidPoIVolgNL=1]	1.952	.840	5.395	1	.020	.305	3.599
[BeleidPoIVolgNL=2]	2.385	.841	8.036	1	.005	.736	4.034	
[BeleidPoIVolgNL=3]	2.148	.850	6.381	1	.012	.481	3.814	
[BeleidPoIVolgNL=4]	2.447	.907	7.277	1	.007	.669	4.224	
[BeleidPoIVolgNL=5]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.	
[WelzijnStraatNL=1]	.603	.443	1.857	1	.173	-.264	1.471	
[WelzijnStraatNL=2]	.534	.436	1.497	1	.221	-.321	1.389	
[WelzijnStraatNL=3]	.532	.441	1.453	1	.228	-.333	1.397	

[WelzijnStraatNL=4]	.113	.445	.064	1	.800	-.759	.984
[WelzijnStraatNL=5]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.
[IslamVerbodPoINL=1]	.028	.367	.006	1	.939	-.691	.747
[IslamVerbodPoINL=2]	.293	.284	1.064	1	.302	-.264	.850
[IslamVerbodPoINL=3]	.093	.165	.321	1	.571	-.230	.416
[IslamVerbodPoINL=4]	.012	.148	.006	1	.936	-.278	.302
[IslamVerbodPoINL=5]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.
[PolitcTrustRECODED=1]	2.910	.816	12.722	1	.000	1.311	4.509
[PolitcTrustRECODED=2]	2.408	.813	8.767	1	.003	.814	4.001
[PolitcTrustRECODED=3]	2.227	.815	7.475	1	.006	.631	3.824
[PolitcTrustRECODED=4]	1.981	.852	5.404	1	.020	.311	3.651
[PolitcTrustRECODED=5]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.
[HardeAanpNL=1]	-.546	.312	3.058	1	.080	-1.157	.066
[HardeAanpNL=2]	-.028	.189	.022	1	.881	-.399	.342
[HardeAanpNL=3]	.101	.176	.327	1	.568	-.245	.447
[HardeAanpNL=4]	.172	.145	1.415	1	.234	-.112	.456
[HardeAanpNL=5]	0 ^a	.	.	0	.	.	.

Link function: Logit.

a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

Equal_Rights * Country now? Crosstabulation					
		Country now?		Total	
		NL	UK		
Equal Rights	Strongly Agree	% within Equal_Rights	43.8%	56.2%	100.0%
		% within Country now?	11.6%	23.5%	16.2%
		% of Total	7.1%	9.1%	16.2%
	Agree	% within Equal_Rights	67.0%	33.0%	100.0%
		% within Country now?	33.8%	26.3%	30.9%
		% of Total	20.7%	10.2%	30.9%
	Neutral	% within Equal_Rights	63.3%	36.7%	100.0%
		% within Country now?	26.8%	24.5%	25.9%
		% of Total	16.4%	9.5%	25.9%
Disagree	% within Equal_Rights	61.2%	38.8%	100.0%	
	% within Country now?	21.3%	21.3%	21.3%	
	% of Total	13.1%	8.3%	21.3%	
Strongly Disagree	% within Equal_Rights	69.9%	30.1%	100.0%	
	% within Country now?	6.4%	4.4%	5.6%	
	% of Total	3.9%	1.7%	5.6%	
Total	% within Equal_Rights	61.2%	38.8%	100.0%	
	% within Country now?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	61.2%	38.8%	100.0%	

RechtvanStemmenNL * Country now? Crosstabulation				
		Country now?		Total
		NL	UK	
Strongly Agree	% within RechtvanStemmenNL	50.8%	49.2%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	20.6%	30.6%	24.6%
	% of Total	12.5%	12.1%	24.6%
Agree	% within RechtvanStemmenNL	61.5%	38.5%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	36.2%	34.7%	35.6%
	% of Total	21.9%	13.7%	35.6%
Voting Neutral	% within RechtvanStemmenNL	62.8%	37.2%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	28.4%	25.8%	27.4%
	% of Total	17.2%	10.2%	27.4%
Disagree	% within RechtvanStemmenNL	75.7%	24.3%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	10.2%	5.0%	8.2%
	% of Total	6.2%	2.0%	8.2%
Strongly Disagree	% within RechtvanStemmenNL	64.3%	35.7%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	4.6%	3.9%	4.3%
	% of Total	2.8%	1.5%	4.3%
Total	% within RechtvanStemmenNL	60.5%	39.5%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	60.5%	39.5%	100.0%

Follow_Policies * Country now? Crosstabulation				
		Country now?		Total
		NL	UK	
Strongly Agree	% within Follow_Policies	52.0%	48.0%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	35.7%	50.4%	41.5%
	% of Total	21.6%	19.9%	41.5%
Agree	% within Follow_Policies	67.1%	32.9%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	48.2%	36.0%	43.4%
	% of Total	29.1%	14.3%	43.4%
Follow Policies Neutral	% within Follow_Policies	67.3%	32.7%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	13.3%	9.9%	12.0%
	% of Total	8.0%	3.9%	12.0%
Disagree	% within Follow_Policies	54.8%	45.2%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	2.2%	2.7%	2.4%
	% of Total	1.3%	1.1%	2.4%
Strongly Disagree	% within Follow_Policies	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	0.6%	1.0%	0.8%
	% of Total	0.4%	0.4%	0.8%
Total	% within Follow_Policies	60.5%	39.5%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	60.5%	39.5%	100.0%

Isl_Forbids_Pol * Country now? Crosstabulation				
		Country now?		Total
		NL	UK	
Strongly Agree	% within Isl_Forbids_Pol	35.4%	64.6%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	2.2%	6.0%	3.7%
	% of Total	1.3%	2.4%	3.7%
Agree	% within Isl_Forbids_Pol	57.4%	42.6%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	5.0%	5.6%	5.3%
	% of Total	3.0%	2.2%	5.3%
Neutral	% within Isl_Forbids_Pol	67.9%	32.1%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	27.0%	19.2%	23.9%
	% of Total	16.2%	7.7%	23.9%
Disagree	% within Isl_Forbids_Pol	62.2%	37.8%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	35.1%	32.0%	33.9%
	% of Total	21.1%	12.8%	33.9%
Strongly Disagree	% within Isl_Forbids_Pol	55.2%	44.8%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	30.6%	37.2%	33.3%
	% of Total	18.4%	14.9%	33.3%
Total	% within Isl_Forbids_Pol	60.0%	40.0%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	60.0%	40.0%	100.0%

Do_More_Trust * Country now? Crosstabulation				
		Country now?		Total
		NL	UK	
Strongly Agree	% within Do_More_Trust	55.3%	44.7%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	25.8%	31.6%	28.1%
	% of Total	15.6%	12.6%	28.1%
Agree	% within Do_More_Trust	58.1%	41.9%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	37.5%	40.9%	38.8%
	% of Total	22.6%	16.3%	38.8%
Neutral	% within Do_More_Trust	64.0%	36.0%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	19.8%	16.9%	18.6%
	% of Total	11.9%	6.7%	18.6%
Disagree	% within Do_More_Trust	75.7%	24.3%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	13.6%	6.6%	10.8%
	% of Total	8.2%	2.6%	10.8%
Strongly Disagree	% within Do_More_Trust	55.3%	44.7%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	3.3%	4.1%	3.6%
	% of Total	2.0%	1.6%	3.6%
Total	% within Do_More_Trust	60.2%	39.8%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	60.2%	39.8%	100.0%

Party_Parl * Country now? Crosstabulation					
			Country now?		Total
			NL	UK	
Strongly Agree		% within Party_Parl	60.7%	39.3%	100.0%
		% within Country now?	19.1%	18.8%	19.0%
		% of Total	11.5%	7.5%	19.0%
Agree		% within Party_Parl	61.2%	38.8%	100.0%
		% within Country now?	32.4%	31.2%	31.9%
		% of Total	19.5%	12.4%	31.9%
Party Parl	Neutral	% within Party_Parl	61.4%	38.6%	100.0%
		% within Country now?	29.8%	28.5%	29.3%
		% of Total	18.0%	11.3%	29.3%
Disagree		% within Party_Parl	60.5%	39.5%	100.0%
		% within Country now?	15.1%	14.9%	15.0%
		% of Total	9.1%	5.9%	15.0%
Strongly Disagree		% within Party_Parl	45.2%	54.8%	100.0%
		% within Country now?	3.6%	6.6%	4.8%
		% of Total	2.2%	2.6%	4.8%
Total		% within Party_Parl	60.3%	39.7%	100.0%
		% within Country now?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	60.3%	39.7%	100.0%

Influence_Policies * Country now? Crosstabulation					
			Country now?		Total
			NL	UK	
Strongly Agree		% within Influence_Policies	36.7%	63.3%	100.0%
		% within Country now?	15.3%	38.4%	24.6%
		% of Total	9.1%	15.6%	24.6%
Agree		% within Influence_Policies	55.4%	44.6%	100.0%
		% within Country now?	34.6%	40.7%	37.1%
		% of Total	20.6%	16.5%	37.1%
Influence Policies	Neutral	% within Influence_Policies	81.9%	18.1%	100.0%
		% within Country now?	38.5%	12.4%	27.9%
		% of Total	22.8%	5.0%	27.9%
Disagree		% within Influence_Policies	67.4%	32.6%	100.0%
		% within Country now?	7.7%	5.4%	6.8%
		% of Total	4.6%	2.2%	6.8%
Strongly Disagree		% within Influence_Policies	65.2%	34.8%	100.0%
		% within Country now?	4.0%	3.1%	3.6%
		% of Total	2.4%	1.3%	3.6%
Total		% within Influence_Policies	59.4%	40.6%	100.0%
		% within Country now?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	59.4%	40.6%	100.0%

Member_Ummah * Country now? Crosstabulation

		Country now?		Total
		NL	UK	
Strongly Agree	% within Member_Ummah	59.2%	40.8%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	55.6%	59.1%	57.0%
	% of Total	33.7%	23.2%	57.0%
Agree	% within Member_Ummah	68.3%	31.7%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	30.9%	22.2%	27.5%
	% of Total	18.8%	8.7%	27.5%
Neutral	% within Member_Ummah	49.4%	50.6%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	9.9%	15.7%	12.2%
	% of Total	6.0%	6.2%	12.2%
Disagree	% within Member_Ummah	66.7%	33.3%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	2.3%	1.8%	2.1%
	% of Total	1.4%	0.7%	2.1%
Strongly Disagree	% within Member_Ummah	62.5%	37.5%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	1.3%	1.2%	1.2%
	% of Total	0.8%	0.5%	1.2%
Total	% within Member_Ummah	60.7%	39.3%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	60.7%	39.3%	100.0%

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Gender	Between Groups	1.194	1	1.194	4.821	.028
	Within Groups	315.436	1274	.248		
	Total	316.629	1275			
Age_Group	Between Groups	15.790	1	15.790	12.640	.000
	Within Groups	1615.298	1293	1.249		
	Total	1631.089	1294			
Complexity	Between Groups	2.758	1	2.758	11.152	.001
	Within Groups	271.805	1099	.247		
	Total	274.563	1100			
MI_SH_Cen_Dec	Between Groups	4.741	1	4.741	6.295	.012
	Within Groups	982.979	1305	.753		
	Total	987.720	1306			
Pol_Trust_Isi	Between Groups	16.189	1	16.189	19.036	.000
	Within Groups	1106.429	1301	.850		
	Total	1122.619	1302			
Single_Identity	Between Groups	2.088	1	2.088	8.399	.004
	Within Groups	323.953	1303	.249		
	Total	326.041	1304			
How long now?	Between Groups	38.961	1	38.961	88.922	.000
	Within Groups	475.397	1085	.438		
	Total	514.359	1086			
Ever study Islam?	Between Groups	1.657	1	1.657	2.067	.151
	Within Groups	1043.680	1302	.802		
	Total	1045.337	1303			
Rel_Educ	Between Groups	2.923	1	2.923	1.595	.207
	Within Groups	2316.297	1264	1.833		
	Total	2319.220	1265			
Sec_Educ	Between Groups	71.633	1	71.633	78.868	.000
	Within Groups	1071.755	1180	.908		
	Total	1143.387	1181			
Income	Between Groups	3.205	1	3.205	3.023	.082
	Within Groups	1311.653	1237	1.060		
	Total	1314.859	1238			
Centrality_Isi	Between Groups	3.879	1	3.879	15.054	.000
	Within Groups	335.471	1302	.258		
	Total	339.350	1303			
Active_Local	Between Groups	26.935	1	26.935	15.523	.000
	Within Groups	2241.918	1292	1.735		
	Total	2268.854	1293			
Member_Ummah	Between Groups	.027	1	.027	.036	.850
	Within Groups	971.538	1293	.751		
	Total	971.564	1294			

Pilars_Islam	Between Groups	.001	1	.001	.004	.947
	Within Groups	364.834	1301	.280		
	Total	364.835	1302			
Applic_Saiience	Between Groups	3.362	1	3.362	6.358	.012
	Within Groups	688.879	1303	.529		
	Total	692.241	1304			
Feel_recognized	Between Groups	13.427	1	13.427	12.161	.001
	Within Groups	1438.685	1303	1.104		
	Total	1452.112	1304			
Feel_discriminated	Between Groups	27.754	1	27.754	26.951	.000
	Within Groups	1343.871	1305	1.030		
	Total	1371.625	1306			
Salaat5_ADay	Between Groups	.314	1	.314	.304	.582
	Within Groups	1347.280	1302	1.035		
	Total	1347.594	1303			
Fasting	Between Groups	.006	1	.006	.015	.904
	Within Groups	562.242	1303	.431		
	Total	562.248	1304			
Shahada	Between Groups	.036	1	.036	.114	.736
	Within Groups	405.492	1301	.312		
	Total	405.527	1302			
Zakat	Between Groups	.224	1	.224	.265	.607
	Within Groups	1094.644	1295	.845		
	Total	1094.868	1296			
Hadj	Between Groups	36.913	1	36.913	56.552	.000
	Within Groups	848.549	1300	.653		
	Total	885.462	1301			
Decision_Isl	Between Groups	2.157	1	2.157	4.846	.028
	Within Groups	581.002	1305	.445		
	Total	583.160	1306			
Member_Ingroup	Between Groups	.030	1	.030	.025	.873
	Within Groups	1519.394	1302	1.167		
	Total	1519.423	1303			
Member_Society	Between Groups	17.586	1	17.586	18.465	.000
	Within Groups	1241.951	1304	.952		
	Total	1259.538	1305			
RechtvanStemmenNL	Between Groups	19.693	1	19.693	17.638	.000
	Within Groups	1456.984	1305	1.116		
	Total	1476.676	1306			
Equal_Rights	Between Groups	12.753	1	12.753	9.850	.002
	Within Groups	1672.832	1292	1.295		
	Total	1685.586	1293			
Follow_Policies	Between Groups	7.934	1	7.934	12.339	.000
	Within Groups	837.831	1303	.643		
	Total	845.766	1304			
Wellbeing	Between Groups	132.530	1	132.530	124.374	.000
	Within Groups	1385.249	1300	1.066		
	Total	1517.779	1301			
Isl_Forbidden_Pol	Between Groups	.101	1	.101	.092	.762
	Within Groups	1421.301	1288	1.103		
	Total	1421.402	1289			
PoiTrustRECODED	Between Groups	7.852	1	7.852	9.531	.002
	Within Groups	1071.703	1301	.824		
	Total	1079.555	1302			
Policies_ME	Between Groups	6.713	1	6.713	8.097	.005
	Within Groups	1074.585	1296	.829		
	Total	1081.298	1297			
ME_Cause	Between Groups	.310	1	.310	.321	.571
	Within Groups	1247.895	1292	.966		
	Total	1248.205	1293			
Do_More_Trust	Between Groups	12.957	1	12.957	11.130	.001
	Within Groups	1508.627	1296	1.164		
	Total	1521.584	1297			
Party_Parl	Between Groups	1.880	1	1.880	1.548	.214
	Within Groups	1576.351	1298	1.214		
	Total	1578.231	1299			
Party_EU	Between Groups	5.995	1	5.995	5.240	.022
	Within Groups	1484.998	1298	1.144		
	Total	1490.993	1299			
Sharia_Comm	Between Groups	10.978	1	10.978	6.913	.009
	Within Groups	2023.200	1274	1.588		
	Total	2034.178	1275			
Self_Elec_Party	Between Groups	28.645	1	28.645	21.893	.000

	Within Groups	1668.237	1275	1.308		
	Total	1696.882	1276			
Self_Elec_Umbrell	Between Groups	2.389	1	2.389	2.268	.132
	Within Groups	1333.437	1266	1.053		
	Total	1335.826	1267			
Self_Elec_Mufti	Between Groups	6.981	1	6.981	5.396	.020
	Within Groups	1631.235	1261	1.294		
	Total	1638.215	1262			
State_Appoint_Mufti	Between Groups	1.861	1	1.861	1.566	.211
	Within Groups	1494.489	1258	1.188		
	Total	1496.349	1259			
Hard_Approach	Between Groups	.922	1	.922	.622	.431
	Within Groups	1874.180	1263	1.484		
	Total	1875.102	1264			
Soft_Approach	Between Groups	38.552	1	38.552	47.211	.000
	Within Groups	1039.516	1273	.817		
	Total	1078.067	1274			
Influence_Policies	Between Groups	97.257	1	97.257	100.202	.000
	Within Groups	1230.735	1268	.971		
	Total	1327.991	1269			
Special_Laws	Between Groups	23.682	1	23.682	17.359	.000
	Within Groups	1735.398	1272	1.364		
	Total	1759.081	1273			
More_Educ_Muslims	Between Groups	48.146	1	48.146	60.371	.000
	Within Groups	1020.815	1280	.798		
	Total	1068.961	1281			
More_Educ_NonMus	Between Groups	76.884	1	76.884	95.305	.000
	Within Groups	1030.987	1278	.807		
	Total	1107.872	1279			

Member_Ingroup * Country now? Crosstabulation

		Country now?		Total
		NL	UK	
Strongly Agree	% within Member_Ingroup	61.3%	38.7%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	29.9%	28.9%	29.5%
	% of Total	18.1%	11.4%	29.5%
Agree	% within Member_Ingroup	61.1%	38.9%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	31.9%	31.0%	31.5%
	% of Total	19.2%	12.3%	31.5%
Neutral	% within Member_Ingroup	56.9%	43.1%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	24.0%	27.7%	25.5%
	% of Total	14.5%	11.0%	25.5%
Disagree	% within Member_Ingroup	64.0%	36.0%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	11.3%	9.7%	10.7%
	% of Total	6.8%	3.8%	10.7%
Strongly Disagree	% within Member_Ingroup	62.2%	37.8%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	2.9%	2.7%	2.8%
	% of Total	1.8%	1.1%	2.8%
Total	% within Member_Ingroup	60.4%	39.6%	100.0%
	% within Country now?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	60.4%	39.6%	100.0%

Questionnaire ‘Survey Muslim Identity’

1. What is your gender?

- Male Female

2. What is your age?

3. What is your ethnicity by birth?

4. In which country do you live now?

5. How long have you been living in this country?

- 1-5 years 5-10 years 10-15 years I have always lived here

6. Have you ever studied Islam?

- Yes No Partly

7. If you studied Islam, what is the type of your religious education?

- Islamic Theology (Formal recognized education)
 Madrasa Style
 Mosque setting
 Private lessons
 Self-taught
 None
 Other...

8. What is your highest completed level of education?

- University Further Education Occupational Education
 Secondary school Primary school Other...

9. What is your occupation?

10. What is the level of your gross annual income? (EUR)

- 0-10000 10000-30000 30000-50000 50000 or higher

11. How important is Islam for you personally?

- Extremely important Important Neutral Not important
 Not important at all

12. Would you consider yourself to be an active member of a local, regional, international Islamic group?

- Yes, an active member Yes, but just sometimes active
 Neutral No, but sometimes active
 No, and I never visit

13. Would you agree to be a member of the global Ummah?

- Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree

14. Do you believe in Allah, His Prophets, Books, Angels, the Judgement Day and Fate?

- Strongly believe Believe Neutral Don't believe Strongly don't believe

15. Applying Islamic knowledge in society is important to 'Who I am'

- Extremely important Very important Neutral Not important
 Not important at all

16. Would you feel as a Muslim you are recognized in this Western society?

- Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree

17. Would you feel as a Muslim you are discriminated because of your religion in this country?

- Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree
 Strongly disagree

18. Do you pray five times every day?

- Always Sometimes Neutral Rarely Never

19. Do you fast during Ramadan every year?

Always Sometimes Neutral Rarely Never

20. Do you believe and acknowledge the Shahada?

Strongly believe Believe Neutral Don't believe
 Strongly don't believe

21. Do you pay Zakat every year?

Always Sometimes Neutral Rarely Never

22. Have you performed the Hajj?

Yes No I can't wait to go It is not a priority for me

23. How important is Islam in your daily decisions?

Extremely important Important Neutral Not important
 Not important at all

24. Would you say you have 1 or more than 1 identity?

I only have 1 identity I have more than 1 identity

25. If you have more than 1 identity. What are the most important top 3 identities for you? Start with the most important. _____

26. My own 'Islamic group' I belong to is an important reflection of 'who I am'.

Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree

27. I feel as a valuable member of this country I live in

Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree

28. My 'right to vote' is an important reflection of 'who I am'.

Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree

29. As a Muslim I feel I have equal rights in this country

Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree

30. It is important to follow policies and political developments concerning Muslims in this country

Extremely important Important Neutral Not important
 Not important at all

31. I do worry about the wellbeing of my family on the streets (attack, verbal abuse etc)

Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree

32. Islam forbids political participation in non-Muslim countries

Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree

33. Western politicians trust Islam and Muslims

Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree

34. Foreign policies in the Middle East of this country worry me very much

Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree

35. I feel that foreign policies in the Middle East of this country are the main cause of distress

Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree

36. Muslims should strive for more trust and recognition through political involvement

Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree

37. Muslim Political Party based on Islamic teachings in National parliament can bring more trust between Muslims and non-Muslims across the Nation

Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree

38. Muslim Political Party based on Islamic teachings in European parliament can bring more trust between Muslims and non-Muslims across Europe

Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree

Which of the solutions would be best to reduce tensions between Muslims and Non-Muslims

	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Sharia Council				

<i>Muslim Political Party elected by Muslims</i>				
<i>Umbrella organization elected by Muslims</i>				
<i>Umbrella organization elected by State</i>				
<i>Own elected Mufti</i>				
<i>State elected Mufti</i>				
<i>Hard approach: physical if necessary</i>				
<i>Soft Approach: interaction and dialogue</i>				
<i>Influence or change foreign policy</i>				
<i>Special laws to protect Muslims</i>				
<i>More Islamic education to Muslims</i>				
<i>More Islamic education to Non-Muslims</i>				

Mr. Drs. E. Gökçekuyu

Personal details

Name	Ertuğrul
Family name	Gökçekuyu
Date of birth	3 August 1975
Place of birth	Rotterdam

Education	University of Leiden, Faculty of Political Sciences (2002)
1990 – 1995	International School of The Hague - International Baccalaureate (IB).
1996 – 2002	University of Leiden, ‘Influences of Lobbying in Decision Making processes.
1999	Intern Dutch Parliament studying decision making and lobbying.
2004 – 2006	Secretary General of Islamic University of Rotterdam
2007 – 2010	Manager Communications KALEOS, Consonant
2008 – 2013	Owner Institute for Language and Success (Isuccess).
2010 – 2013	Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Islamic University of Rotterdam
2013 – Present	Member of the Executive Board IUR and teaching position Study Skills & Research Methods and Competence Based Learning.

Symposia and Conferences

2018	Symposium ‘The Future of Islamic Spiritual Care’, the Netherlands
2018 in the	Symposium ‘Religion, Social Involvement and Citizenship West’, the Netherlands
2017 or	Symposium Oxford University ‘Muslim Identity: Conflict or Peace?’ Oxford
2017	Conference Hartford Seminary ‘Refugee Crisis in Europe’
2016	‘Obama President’s Challenge’ program White House, at the George Town University

2016
World

Symposium Berkeley Centre for Religion, Peace and

Affairs

Activities

Leadership Program United States of America 2007

Member Council RTV Rijnmond, Local News Agency (2005 – 2010);

Member Union of Public Affairs The Hague (2004 – present);

Member Rotterdam City Board (2010 – 2012);

Member Cooperation Justitia et Pax and CORDAID (2005 – 2007);

Member Knowledge Centre ‘Religion and Development’ Oikos, ICCO, Cordaid and ISS/ of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2005 – 2006);

Teaching Staff Euro College and Islamic University of Rotterdam;

Certified Teacher BKO-Certificate, Erasmus University Rotterdam;

Books and articles

Published in Peer reviewed Journal The Muslim World, ‘The Ottoman Sociopolitical Impact in the West during the European Reformation’ Co-Authored with Prof. Dr. A. Akgunduz

Published in Peer reviewed Journal ‘Lack of Islamic Knowledge and the Trust Issue’, IUR-press: Rotterdam 2014 JRISS Edited Book ‘Rotterdamse Islam Debatten’, IUR-press: Rotterdam 2013