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ISTANBUL KULTUR UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

IDENTITY CRISIS OF JORDAN DURING
THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE PEACE PROCESS

Master of Arts Thesis by

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İSRAİL-FİLİSTİN BARIŞ SÜRECİNDE
ÜRDÜN KİMLİK KRİZİ

YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ

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PREFACE

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<div align="right">Volkan GÜLŞEN</div>

22 July 2011

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ABBREVIATIONS

US	: United States
UK	: United Kingdom
TNC	: Transjordan National Congress
AHC	: Arab Higher Commitee
USSR	: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
GNP	: Gross National Product
UN	: United Nations
PLO	: Palestine Liberation Organization
UAC	: Unified Arab Command
IAF	: Islamic Action Front
PFLP	: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

ABSTRACT

IDENTITY CRISIS OF JORDAN DURING THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE PEACE PROCESS

Volkan Gülşen

This study deals with the correlation of the identity crisis of Jordan with the existence of the Palestinians in the Jordanian Kingdom. A key issue is how the Palestinians were ignored by the Israeli state and forced to migrate to Jordan, which changed the foundational dynamics of the Transjordanian entity.

The paper explores how the Arabic and Islamic identities, which have been accepted as the main pillars of Jordanian identity, have turned to the opposition powers and become threats against the stability of the regime. This study specifically questions how the Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Moslem Brotherhood) , which had been one of the Jordanian Kings' most trustable organizations, has become the main threat of the existence of the Kingdom.

It will be revealed that the hybrid Jordanian identity couldn't embrace the peoples of Jordan, especially the ones with Palestinian origins. This lead to the depalestinization efforts of the Kingdom dating back to its foundation. On the other hand, the regional realities, the pressures of the international actors, and the militarist politics applied by Israel resulted in an economical and demographical reality of the Palestinians in the Jordanian Kingdom. This spearheaded later the activism of the Palestinian refugees in Jordanian political life through the Ikhwan al-Muslimin, especially during the Israel-Palestine Peace Process. In this study, it has been stated that these dynamics will lead to a process changing the balances of Jordan as it has changed the administrative level and strategic approaches of the Jordanian branch of the Ikhwan al-Muslimin .

Key Words: Identity Crisis, Jordan, Transjordan, King Abdullah, Islamic Identity, Peace Process, Israel, Palestine, Pan-Arabism, Hamas

**KISA
ÖZET**

İSRAİL-FİLİSTİN BARIŞ SÜRECİNDE ÜRDÜN'ÜN KİMLİK KRİZİ

Volkan Gülşen

Bu çalışma, Ürdün Krallığı içerisindeki Filistinli varlığı ile Ürdün kimlik krizi arasındaki ilintiyi incelemektedir. Filistinlilerin İsrail tarafından yok sayılması ve Ürdün'e göçe zorlanmalarının Mavera-i Ürdün teşekkülünün kuruluş dinamiklerini nasıl değiştirdiği araştırılmıştır.

Araştırmada, Ürdün kimliğinin yapı taşları olarak kabul edilen Arap ve İslam kimliklerinin nasıl muhalefet güçlerine dönüştükleri ve rejimin istikrarına tehdit haline geldikleri araştırılmıştır. Bu çalışmada, özellikle Ürdün Kralları'nın en güvendiği örgütlerden biri olan Müslüman Kardeşler'in Krallığın varlığına karşı ana tehdit haline gelmesi sorgulanmıştır.

Çalışma, melez Ürdünlü kimliğinin Ürdün'ün halklarını, özellikle Filistin kökenli olanları kapsayamadığını ortaya koymuştur. Bu, Krallığın kuruluşundan bu yana defilistinizasyon çabalarının önünü açmıştır. Diğer yandan, bölgesel gerçekler, uluslar arası aktörlerin baskıları ve İsrail tarafından uygulanan militarist politikalar, Ürdün'de ekonomik ve demografik açılardan bir Filistinli realitesiyle sonuçlanmıştır. Bu, daha sonradan, özellikle Israil-Filistin barış sürecinde, Filistinli mültecilerin Müslüman Kardeşler üzerinden Ürdün politik yaşamında aktivasyonunu körüklemiştir. Bu çalışma şunu belirtmektedir ki, bu dinamikler, aynı Müslüman Kardeşlerin Ürdün kolunun yönetim düzeyini ve stratejik yaklaşımını değiştirdiği gibi, Ürdün'ün dengelerini de değiştirecek bir sürece yol açacaktır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: **Kimlik krizi, Ürdün, Mavera-i Ürdün, Kral Abdullah, İslam kimliği, Barış süreci, İsrail, Filistin, Panarabizm, Hamas**

INTRODUCTION

The Middle East, which had been under the rule of the Ottoman Empire for centuries, became the subject of the hegemony conflict of Britain and France after the start of the First World War. After the war, these states became the new rulers of this region and both states started shaping this area in accordance with their own interests. Although the borders of the Middle Eastern mandate states became definite right after the war within a short period, the state structures and constitutions of these states were not easily formulated. In some cases, the tribal or supranational identities became more influential than the identities of the artificial nation-building processes.

The Emirate of Transjordan was founded after the First World War under the British administration through dividing the Palestinian mandate. A short while after, the nation-building process started with the Transjordan National Congress and Tranjordan's Arab Legion. However, the changes in the Middle East and the conflict between Arabs and Jews in Palestine became effective in the Transjordanian policy making. The existence of Israel and the 1948 war changed the borders of the Middle East entirely. The annexation of the West Bank by Transjordan changed the demographic and ideological structure of the state. After this period, existence and identity of the Palestinian refugees became the a reality concerning the Transjordanian internal and external political preferences.

This project examines the correlation of the identity crisis of Jordan with the existence of the Palestinians in the Jordanian Kingdom. The fact that the Palestinians were first ignored and then forced to migrate to Jordan by the Israeli state changed the

foundational dynamics of the Transjordan (Jordan) entity, which resulted later in the activisma of the Palestinian refugees in Jordanian political life, especially during the Peace Process. They were active in the Jordanian Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Moslem Brotherhood) and became the main challengers of the Jordanian status quo. This project will show how these dynamics led to a process, which would change the balances of Jordan as it changed the administrative level and strategic approaches of the Jordanian branch of the Ikhwan.

The first leader of the Emirate and the Kingdom of Transjordan, King Abdullah was the son of Sherif Hussein, an important leader of the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire. It was believed that he was a member of the Hashemite family, the family of the Prophet Mohammed. Although King Abdullah was also dreaming for a unified Arab state he wanted to call Great Syria, he could only unify part of Palestine. He attempted several times to extend his borders, but the British administration didn't allow such a move. Then, after the 1948 war, the international actors and regional balances allowed him to annex the West Bank and rule it. Although he changed the name of the Kingdom from Transjordan to Jordan, he couldn't assimilate the Palestinians into the hybrid Jordanian identity, which included Arabic and Islamic components. This weakened the national identity and organizational structure of the Jordanian regime.

Furthermore, the Palestinian identity didn't disappear after the loss of the West Bank in the 1967 war against Israel. The Palestinians migrated to the East Bank and started living there. With the rise of Palestinian nationalism, Jordan took several precautions against potential Palestinization of Jordan. The Black September in 1971 and *East Banker first* were the initial approachs the Jordanian regime against Palestinization.

However, after the 1970's, the Palestinians became dominant in the economical and social life in Jordan, especially in the private sector and in the urban areas. After the reopening of parliament in 1989 and the First Intifada in Palestine, they started becoming involved in the political life of Jordan through the Islamic Action Front backed by Ihkwan al Muslimin. In a short period, with the influence of the anti-

normalization campaigns against the peace treaty with Israel, the Palestinians became influential in the Ihkwan al Muslimin and started being included in the decision-making mechanisms of the organization. The failures in the peace process between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Israel spearheaded the rise of Hamas, which had also been based on the Palestinian branch of the Ihkwan al Muslimin. After that, the Jordanian regime considered the Islamic organizations and ideology as the main threat to the regime and attempted to prevent the growth of their influence. But the responses of the Jordanian regime made the Kingdom more sensitive and open to security threats. It seems that the Jordanian regime's imbalanced status quo will be changed within a short period due to the identity crisis of the country.

To examine the identity crisis of Jordan, the influence of the Palestine-Israel struggle was considered and the relations between the East and West Bank were investigated. The dynamics of the Middle East and the special relations of the Arab states with the imperialist powers was also responsible for the existence of the identity problem and thus, the dynamics of the Middle East were approached with the historical interpretation methodology.

The Middle East is handled as a special case for the study of international relations, and especially Orientalists see this region apart from the remaining world. They have even built a distinct theoretical structure for the relations of the states and other regional actors in this area. Thus, they approach the regional relations of the Middle East not as a part of the world order with its own originalities, but as a distinct system, which has its own rules. Due to this tendency, the Middle Eastern states and identities became incomparable with other regions of the world. Moreover, the action dynamics of these states have started to be considered independent from the world economic and political system.

This thesis attempts to use a different approach for Jordan and for the Middle East generally. The aforementioned common approach has described Jordan as a product of a special, independent and separate developmental process like the other Middle Eastern

states. On the other hand, the examination of Jordan's history contradicts this notion. Therefore, this thesis accepts that Jordan was shaped parallel to the international system after the first and second World Wars and was developed within the borders created by these wars.

In this sense, dialectic, a unified and hierarchic imperialist world order has been accepted to describe the international system and foreign policy components as they were used in classical Marxist literature. However, this concept was only descriptive for the general balances of the international actors, therefore only used in order to examine the international world order as a superstructure, but not used to understand the political decisions and preferences of the Jordanian state; especially not to understand the reasons of the identity crisis of Jordan since 1948.

The formulation of the Jordanian state, its national identity and its attempts for the creation of its dynamic image are important topics for this paper. Research was carried out with historical chronology and interpretation methods in order to comprehend the political preferences of the Jordanian state. This method helped the description of the identity crisis concept in the Jordanian case. It revealed how and when the different identities existing within the borders of the Jordanian state became influential or conflicting.

However, it has been impossible to examine the Jordanian political life and its identity conflict with the theory of realism, which accepts the national identity of a state as unique and apart from the cultural and social elements, and the state as the only actor in international relations. In this case, the Social Constructivist approach seems the best way to explain the political debate in Jordan.

The Social Constructivist theory makes it possible for us to understand the creation dynamics and ideological background of the Jordanian state, as well as the reasons of the different identities becoming influential in the Kingdom. Constructivists are concerned with human consciousness, treat ideas as structural factors. Social Constructivists such

as Alexander Wendt or Charli Carpenter consider a strong relation between ideas and material reality. According to them, the normative structure shapes the identity and interests of states and other actors. This attitude provides insight into why the Jordanian Kingdom couldn't have a consistent identity and has experienced an identity crisis from the foundation of Transjordan. Moreover, it provides the understanding of how this state has transformed from the 'Home for all Arabs' to a state accepting the 'Jordan First, Arab Second' approach and how the Islamic movement, which had previously been the best ally of the regime, became the main threat of the Kingdom whose King's heritage was based on the Prophet Mohammed.

In the first chapter, the dynamics that played a role in the founding of the Jordanian Kingdom and the intentions of different actors in the region, which would be effective after the creation of the independent Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, are explained. During the steady collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the British Empire started confronting the Ottoman powers in pursuit of their interests, and therefore started searching for allies opposed to the Ottoman administration. In this period, the British administration understood that Arabic identity was a growing national force and Islamic identity couldn't be directed by the Ottoman Caliph. Thus, British forces didn't conflict with these groups directly, but found their representatives and compromised with them. This attitude spurred the alliances of Arab leaders and British forces. In the end, the new Middle Eastern Arab mandates were established in accordance with this approach. The Arab nationalist leaders became more influential than the tribal leaders or sheikhs. On the other hand, The Pan-Arabic leaders such as Sherif Hussein also found appropriate an alliance with the Western Powers in order to build a unified Arab state. The approach of the Pan-Arabism backed with the Islamic identity was appropriate with the British contemporary interest, but in the long term, the strengthening of these ideologies caused tension with the Middle Eastern structure during the development into a nation state system.

The second chapter debates the identity and nation theories and include the definitions of identity and national identity, the necessity of a nation for each state, and the reflections

of these theories on the Jordan case. It argues that the Transjordanian identity and nation came into existence after the Transjordanian state and through the efforts of this state. While Transjordan was being founded, there had been a clear difference in the intents of the regional powers and the British authorities. While the regional actors, especially Emir Abdullah attempted to build a supra-national Pan-Arabic state including Syria and Palestine, the British Empire and its representatives in the region started to build a nation state in Transjordan appropriate to its plans within their desired borders. However, the unrest and uprisings in Palestine and the changes in the world hierarchy altered the British plans, and this spawned the transformation of Transjordan to Jordan, and the attempts of transformation of Transjordanian identity to the hybrid Jordanian identity. While the British interventions for the Transjordanian entity became successful during the years 1920-1948, the changes after the foundation of Israel resulted in a revolutionary conversion in the Jordanian state structure and identity. In this chapter, the reasons for the corruption of the Jordanian national system are highlighted and the dynamics, intentions behinds and international actors that caused this deformation after 1948. Moreover, this chapter focuses the reasons for the identity crisis and how the uncertainties in the region, especially in the Palestinian mandate, had accelerated the need for and the recreation of these sub-identities for the state identity and how the Jordanian state had difficulties with relationships with these identities. The distinctive position of the Palestinian identity is underlined and the chapter attempts to answer how other identities were affected by the Palestinian identity. Furthermore, it is emphasized that depalestinization had always became the main state policy of Jordan and started to be implemented before the creation of the Hashemite Kingdom. However, it is also explained that depalestinization was unsuccessful against the regional dynamics, the ambitions of Jordan monarchs and the Palestinians' conservation of their national identity.

Third chapter describes how the identity crisis of Jordan is revealed after the 90's during the Peace process. During these years, Palestinization became the main economical, social and then the political reality of the country. The activism of the Palestinians in the first Intifada and their involvement in the Islamic Organizations didn't melt the

Palestinian identity into a unanimous identity, but it started to change these Islamic organizations. In a short period, the Islamic organizations in Palestine became a part of the resistance, although they were against these kinds of reactions before the Islamization of the society. Moreover, the Ikhwan, which was an ally to the King since the founding of the Jordanian regime, turned into an opposition power. After this point, the internal balances of Jordan became more dependent on the peace agenda of the international powers of the region and the dynamics in the occupied areas. The peace treaty with Israel and the following anti-normalization campaigns became the main political problems in Jordan, which affected the status quo and democratization attempts of the country entirely.

CHAPTER 1:
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1.1. Era of Ottoman Empire

The land which would later be known as Palestine and Jordan has not been a distinct political unit since the 1920's. However, the reasons that contributed to the formation of an administrative structure started to take effect during the period of collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The land east of Jordan river (today's Jordan) was not distinguished from the west of the Jordan river (today's Palestine or Israel). These lands were also connected with the Damascus (Syria). This section will examine the dynamics leading to the foundation of the Transjordanian entity during the Ottoman Era and thus concentrates on the administrative units of these entities. The main emphasis here is on the Zionist activity during the Ottoman era and the relations between Theodor Herzl and 2. Abdulhamit.

1.1.1. East of the Jordan River

The area that includes today's Jordan was a part of the Ottoman Empire starting from the 17th Century (Robins 5). From 17th Century up to the Tanzimat reforms, the area did not have any important connection with the Ottoman state. With the Ottoman rejuvenation in the 1830s, (Tanzimat reforms) the modernization (Robins 8) process of administrative practice changed the Middle East region. East of the Jordan River was one of the areas that took place in the process latest. In the 1860s, an administrative structure was created

in Ajlun and Salt, both of which would become important cities of the state of Jordan later. In 1867, before the era of Sultan Abdulhamit the Second, the territory had come into contact with the Ottoman state. In 1893, under the rule of Abdulhamit the Second, Karak became an administrative district with his own right under the provincial government in Damascus with Salt (Robins 9). Most of the area was ruled by Damascus of the Vilayet of Syria. The southern part of today's Jordan, which includes the cities like Maan and Aqaba was a part of the Vilayet of Hejaz. The area that became Jordan was ruled by different Ottoman Vilayets that preferred negotiating with the tribe leaders rather than using military power.

From a political and administrational perspective, the area that later became Transjordan had never been a political entity during Ottoman hegemony. The reasons for this dependence of the   area were twofold. First, the economic and geographical inconvenience of the area made it unimportant for the Ottoman Empire. Because of its distance to the trade centers of this desert region, the Ottoman rulers didn't give it any priority, and they thought sending the political elite to the area wouldn't gain much for the Empire. Secondly, creating political distinction in the area would disturb the tribal leaders who didn't have a problem with the Ottoman tax policy. Ruling the area with distance Vilayets was a preference of Ottoman rulers.

From a demographic and cultural perspective, there were linguistic, religious and cultural ties between the populations living east and west sides of the Jordan River. The inhabitants of northern Transjordan had traditionally been associated with Syria. The dynamics that caused an entity in the east of the Jordan River were not inside the area, but they were mostly related with the west of the Jordan river. To understand the dynamics of the change in the west of the Jordan River in the 1900s, we should focus the westside of the river.

1.1.2. West of the Jordan River

During these years, the western region of the Jordan River changed with new laws of the Ottoman Empire, which were accepted after 1830 with the Tanzimat reforms. The

Ottoman Land Code of 1858 was one of the important land reforms in Palestine. Prior to the Ottoman land code in 1858, private ownership of land had been banned and the lands had been used in a collective system. It was called the masha'a system. Since the lands that were parceled in the masha'a system changed hand at regular intervals, no one had the right to claim that the land belonged only to him. With the land code in 1858, the farmlands started to be collected in the hands of the members of wealthy families. They gained the right to dispose of land. Most of the peasants started to work on the farms of these new owners. The peasants continued to act as the original owners of the lands.

> For this reason, registration was either sluggish or at the times it gained momentum it contributed to the concentration of vast amounts of land in the hands of few families including the ones living in today's Lebanese or Syrian territories who did not hold proximate linkage with the lands they owned. With respect to the sales of lands to the Jews, these absentee landlords are regarded as the main culprit and facilitator of the Zionist colonization of Palestine. (Karaş 10)

Nothing had changed in the peasants' life, until the Zionists started buying the lands from the members of the wealthy upper class. With the start of the sales of the lands to Zionists, the first displacements of the Arab peasants also began. The displacement would accelerate in the upcoming decades with the settlements of Zionists and wars in the region.

During the British mandate, the abolishment of the masha'a system was sped up, so the British policy was a facilitating factor for the land sales to the Jews.

> The close involvement of the absentee landlords in transferring the centuries-old Arab lands to Jewish immigrants is evident from the percentage of land purchased by Palestine Land Development Company in 1936. 89% of the land sale transactions were realized as a result of the negotiations with large landowners. (qtd. in Karaş 10)

The Ottoman land code of 1858 started the irreversible demography change in the west of Palestine. The task of collecting taxes was also transferred to the wealthy classes.

Before the land code of 1858 the shaykhs, the religious leaders of the Ottoman society, were the tax collectors for the Ottoman authorities. Shaykhs were taking personal shares from the taxes. After the land code of 1858, the Ottoman government collected the taxes directly from the land owners. With the weakening of the Shaykhs, the urban notables found the opportunity to strengthen themselves in the politics of the region. These notables would be more powerful in time, and they would be able to control the Palestinian Arab nationalist movement. This would be another important point in the politics of Palestine in the following decades.

The effect of Tanzimat reforms were also felt in the west of the Jordan River. In 1863, administrative institutions were created in Jerusalem as a result of the creation of a municipality there. The notables had the chance to be part of politics in Palestine, and more importantly, they gained experience in administrative skills. The area that would become Jordan had never been a separate region in the Ottoman era. It was always seen as a part of historical Palestine or as a part of Greater Syria. During the Ottoman era, there hadn't been a necessity for a separate entity for 300 years in the eastern region of the Jordan River. To understand the dynamics of modern Jordan's creation, and the problems that can be seen in 21st Century Jordan, the reasons that caused the emergence of a separate entity in the east of the Jordan River must be explored. The dynamics that caused an entity in the east of Jordan River were also related with the events in the world. To understand the dynamics of the change in Palestine in the 1900s, we should look outside of Palestine. We have to consider the growing Zionism in the Russia and Europe, and the competition between the imperialist states of that era.

1.1.3. The effects of Zionism

Zionism, as a political idea and movement dates back to the second half of the 19th century. The failure of the integration of Jewish people in the European states because of the anti-Jewish attitude in these states resulted in what is known as 'the Jewish question'. Jewish people were the most oppressed people in European and Russian societies and, at the end of the 19th century, the Jews were forced to emigrate from their lands. This was especially true, after the assassination of the Tsar Alexander III, with the

Aliyah movement, when 149.000 Jews immigrated to other countries. 134.000 of them were moved to US, 5.000 to Palestine and 10000 of them were moved to other counties (Ünalan 27). After the first anti-Semitic wave in 1881, the second anti-Semitic wave and emigration was in Romania: 60.000 Jews were moved to other countries. With the continuing pressures on Jews, in the next few years, 500.000 Jews immigrated from Russia and settled to other countries like the US. A lot of immigrants who escaped from the anti-Semitism in Russia between the years 1882-1924 were settled in Palestine. The first Jews who came to Palestine were financed by a pre-Zionist movement, the Hibbat Zion, from Odessa. Hibbat Zion started to collect money from the Jewish families in 1883 and in the next years, it became the forerunner of the Jewish National Fund. (qtd. in Gümüş 54) The problems between the natives and the Jews started to cause an anti-Semitist Arabian nationalism in Palestine. The Jewish immigrants were insufficient in farming skills and lacked of means of living. The first leaders of the Israel state, like David Ben-Gurion, Yitzhak Ben Zwi and Yosef Shprinzak came to Israel during this period (Ünalan 29).

Before the first immigration period, there were also Zionist thinkers, but their ideology did not have had many supporters. The discrimination in Europe against the Jews kept the Jewish question alive, but it seemed impossible for the most of the Jews to build a Jewish state. However after the emigrations of mass Jewish populations from their lands, the Zionists were taken more seriously.

One of the most important books, in which the Zionist ideology was formulated was Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State) by Theodor Herzl. It was published before the Zionist congress in 1897. Theodor Herzl was a journalist prior to authoring his book, but after it was published, he became one of the important spokesmen of the Jewish people. In this first congress in Basel, the creation of the Zionist Organization was accepted, and Theoder Herzl became the first leader of the Zionist organization.

This title allowed Herzl to be the head of a foundation for his future negotiations with the political powers of the world. He became an important actor in the Jewish question

and in the international relations after his leadership of the Zionist Organization. The main purpose of the Organization was creating a Jewish state that would provide Jews security and equality they could not find in the states where they were living at that time.

The Zionist Organization started gaining adherents in Europe in a short time, when European states didn't end their assimilation politics for a solution to the Jewish question. The creation of Zionist Organization accelerated the rise of modern political Zionist Ideology, which was different than cultural Zionism. Political Zionists' main aim was the creation of a Jewish state to secure the Jews from the discrimination by the European states. For the cultural Zionists, the Jewish problem was not able to be solved by politics alone. According to them, treating the protection of the religious characteristics of the Jews as a secondary issue was problematic. In other words, they stood for the establishment of a state that would be as a Jewish cultural center, and would not be like the European states. Because of that, its character must be distinguished from the other states of the world (qtd. in Karaş 23). The cultural Zionists argued that creating a state in Palestine would also offer a means for cultural unification of the Jews. The political Zionists did not distinguish Palestine from other alternatives. They searched for a convenient area which would guarantee Jewish people security and rescue them from the discrimination of European states. According to them, the political needs of Jewish people should be priority, and alternatives other than Palestine must be evaluated. The important point for them was that this state would give the Jews the opportunity to be on an equal footing with other nations.

Herzl was a political Zionist. He was not obsessed with Palestine as a solution to the Jewish question. He was not under the direct influence of religious arguments. Herzl imagined a modern state for Jewish people that should nonetheless be secular in character. The political Zionists were not attached to Palestine, but most of the members of the Congress were thinking differently. Palestine assumed precedence in the Zionist movement at this first Zionist Congress. The Congress announced to Jews all over the world that the main purpose of Zionism would be the colonization of Palestinian lands by Jewish people.

After creating the Zionist Organization and the Zionist framework in this first Zionist congress, their tactics were debated. For the political Zionists, the only way for Jews to return to their historical lands from which they were ousted two thousand years ago was to get permission from the Ottoman Empire, which at the time was ruled by Sultan Abdulhamit II. With the Sultan Abdulhamit II's permission, Zionist could put into practice the settlement of Jews in Palestine. According to Herzl, Abdulhamit II needed to be persuaded for the settlement of Jewish people to the Palestine area. He thought that with enough gold, the Ottoman Empire, which was in debt to the imperialist states, would allow the Jewish settlements. As the spokesman of the Zionist Organization, Herzl made some contacts with the Sultan to convince him to create a Jewish home in Palestine.

The era of Abdulhamit II was a period of decline in the Ottoman Empire. The Empire was out of its league among imperialist states, which shared the world through years of colonization. In the first years of his leadership, Abdulhamit II had faced the consequences of the Russian-Ottoman war, which had caused a significant loss of land in the Balkans. As a result of this war, Abdulhamit II started acting more cautious in his political life. He developed his own approach to foreign affairs.

He knew that no states in the 19th Century acted alone in the political arena. They were constantly in cooperation with other states. They were building alliances to become more powerful. So he too sought out alliances. He tried to understand the balances of the world, and he organized his agenda considering these balances with these in mind. Abdulhamit II used balance strategy between the European imperialist states throughout his 33 years in power. Because of that, he gave importance to the people, who could build relations between him and the powerful people of the European states.

Before the Zionist Congress in 1897, Theoder Herzl tried to meet with Abdulhamit II in 1896 with the help of his Polish friend Newlinski who was of Jewish origin and an aristocrat. Newlinski told him, that Abdulhamit II wouldn't let Jews settle in Palestine.

However, according to him, the Sultan could allow settling in Anatolia, if Jews would help the Ottoman Empire with tensions with the Armenian problem population.

Newlinski tried to get an appointment from the Sultan for himself and Herzl, but Abdulhamit II met only with Newlinksi. Newlinksi conveyed Herzl's offer of an amount of gold for the sale of the Palestinian region. The Sultan rejected this offer. After this diplomatic relations of Zionists, Abdulhamit II didn't even change his Palestinian policy, which included the ban of Jewish settlements in Palestine, which included today's Palestine, Israel, Jordan and some parts of Egypt.

After the creation of the Zionist Organization and with his growing sphere of influence, Herzl found new supporters. He travelled to Istanbul to again attempt to meet with the Sultan. He believed that the Sultan would accept the Herzl's proposal to cover a part of the Ottoman public debt and in return let the Jews colonize Palestine. At this time, he succeeded in arranging a meeting with the Sultan, and started building good relations with him. Abdulhamid II invited Herzl to Istanbul for further meetings regarding using the Jews in remedying the Ottoman financial situation, which was in bad condition. He allowed Jewish settlements in the Ottoman Empire, but Palestine was excluded from the lands that the Sultan would allow the Jews to colonize. After a few meetings, it was clear that the Ottoman Empire would not let Jews settle on Palestinian lands.

After the failure of Herzl's policy, which mainly meant persuading the Ottoman sultan to allow Jewish settlement in Palestine, most Zionists no longer believed in political Zionism, which focused on getting the approval of the concerned states to start colonization. A new era started for the Zionists, which was called practical Zionism. The colonization efforts increased during this era. With the revolution in 1908 against Abdulhamit II, the Young Turks started ruling the Empire. Despite the Empire's weaknesses, the Jewish settlements remained limited in comparison to the British era.

1.2. British Era and The First Division in Palestine: Transjordan

With the colonization effects, the European imperialist powers always had the ambitions to spread to the Middle Eastern and North African regions. In the era of decline of the Ottoman Empire, the UK and France began to invade the land of the Ottoman Empire in Northern Africa. Shortly before World War I, it was clear that the Ottoman Empire could not hold its land anymore. So, the Allies made a plan to carve out the Ottoman land to share among themselves. The plan was agreed upon in the secret negotiations of the Sykes-Picot. After the withdrawal of the Russian Empire in the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the agreements were announced to the peoples of the world by the Bolshevik government. According to these plans, "the sick man of Europe, (the Ottoman Empire) would be divided up by the imperialist powers and shared by them. After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in North Africa, World War I provided a great opportunity for the imperialist powers to invade the Middle East region.

1.2.1.Agreements with the Arab leaders

To realize the plans to invade the Ottoman land in the Middle East and especially in Palestine, the UK started negotiating with the regional powers, her allies and the influential groups in the world. At first, the British government began to make promises to the Arab leaders who were ambitious in their intentions to create an independent state in the area.

The British plan was simple: Arabs would rise up against the Ottoman Empire in collaboration with the British army for an independent Arab Kingdom. In the end, the British would build a new Middle East order, appropriate to British interests. Sherif Hussein was one of the Arab leaders who was invested in creating a united Arab state, called Great Syria. He began to negotiate with the English commanders. These negotiations were named 'The Hussein-McMahon Correspondence' due to the letters between the High Commissioner of Egypt – Henry McMahon and Hussein, the Sherif of Mecca. The letters during 1915-16 had discussed the details of the alliance between the United Kingdom and Hussein. According to these documents, a united and independent

Arab state within specific boundaries would be created. The UK had several reasons at that time to support an Arab state in the area. First of all, it seemed that the boundary problem between the UK and France would be continuing after the war in the Middle East. Secondly, some of the Arab leaders were in support of the Central Powers in the World War I. With such an agreement, British influence would increase in the Arab world. To British eyes, Sherif Hussein's demands seemed to be a way to find a compromise with France on the boundaries of the Middle East. Actually, the boundaries of the Middle East were shaped according to the Sykes-Picot agreement as mentioned before, which was signed by the Allies to divide Ottoman lands in the Middle East into pieces. An independent Arab state was a good compromise, which was a solution to the weaknesses of this agreement (Karaş 34).

In 1915, it seemed that UK accepted all the demands of Sherif Hussein, and there would be a United Arab state in the area after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire so the Arabs started an uprising . But soon it was understood that the Arabs did not have got enough power to water down the Ottoman forces. After the defeat of the Sherif Hussein, the UK didn't give much more attention to the agreements with the Arab forces, as the UK's priorities started to change.

1.2.2. Belfour Declaration

On November 2, 1917, with the Balfour Declaration, the UK accepted a new strategy, which included the recognition of the Zionist aims. With the acceptance of the Belfour Declaration, the Zionist aims of a Jewish state in Palestine was accepted. In most of the declaration writings, the results of the Belfour Declaration was described as was accepted by the British administration for the interests of the Zionists. The acceptance of the Balfour Declaration was truly a turning point for the Zionist Organization and the future Israeli state. Moreover, the efforts of the Zionists for this Declaration should not be overlooked . However, the declaration was also beneficial for the United Kingdom. The imperialistic designs of the United Kingdom played the most essential role in recognizing Zionist requests in Palestine. First of all, an agreement with Zionists would make the Jews closer to the United Kingdom in different states. Some of the Jews were

backing the Central Powers. With such an agreement, the Jews and the United Kingdom could start a new cooperation. With the support of the Zionists, the British government had the Jews fight in the Russian army against the Central Powers. Furthermore, the United Kingdom was able to build good relations with the United States with the help of the Jews who were living there. In addition to these reasons, the United Kingdom realized the long-term benefits of a Jewish national home in Palestine. After the war, the Arabs and France were not a necessity for the United Kingdom, so the Zionist colonization became the priority of the British government.

After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in Palestine, the British government faced the problem of securing and governing the area. A military administration was created in 1917 and the civil administration was ruled from 1920 until 1947 in the west side of the Jordan river. At the same time, in October 1918, an Arab state under the Hashemite leader Faisal bin Hussein, the son of Sherif Hussein, was established in Damascus. Faysal bin Hussein became the King of Syria.

After Faysal bin Hussein was crowned, the Zionists began to negotiate with him. Faysal bin Hussein's and the Zionists' agreement after these negotiations was a unique agreement, in which an Arab leader accepted the Jewish colonization in the west of the Palestine region. This was an opportunity for the Zionists to show their cooperation with the 'natives'. This agreement was used by the Zionists to hide Zionists their true motivations and ambitions. Zionists were happy to agree with Faisal bin Hussein, who was the brother of Jordan's first king, King Abdullah I. The agreement between Faisal bin Hussein and Chaim Weizmann, who was the leader of the Zionist Organization during that time, was an approval of the Balfour Declaration from the Arabic side. However, other Arab leaders did not acknowledge either Faisal or his agreement with the Zionists. Although Faisal's demand for an independent Arab state gained a lot of supporters among the Palestinian Arabs, Palestinian people and Faisal weren't able to compromise for the Jewish settlement in Palestine. The other Arab leaders rejected any agreement, which could be seen as a compromise with the Zionists.

After the Paris conference, in 1919 and the French invasion of Damascus in 1920, Faisal understood that it was impossible to rescue the Syrian Kingdom, and escaped from Syria. He went to London after receiving an invitation from the British government. However, the agreement between the Zionists and the Hashemite leader was a milestone in the future relations of the Hashemite family, the Zionists and the United Kingdom. Although Faisal and Zionists had problems after these years, the agreement was a signal for the United Kingdom and the Zionists that the Hashemite family was able to compromise with the Zionists in the Middle East. From the Syrian perspective, Sherif Hussein and his sons were also ready to establish 'Great Syria' with the cooperation of the British government and the Zionists.

1.2.3. Cairo Conference

The end of the First World War could not eliminate the uncertainties in the Middle East. After the War, the balance of powers changed in the whole world, same as in the Middle East. The boundaries between the mandates of French and British governments were not defined. And it was also unclear how the Western Powers would rule the areas. The Battle of Maysalun, which occurred between Syrian and French forces about 12 miles west of Damascus near the town of Maysalun on July 23, 1920, made it apparent that the Palestine (including Transjordan) would remain under British political influence. The San Remo conference approved the new borders. After the loss of Damascus, the United Kingdom understood the importance of the eastern Palestine (later Transjordan). It was important as a buffer and a bridge for the west of Palestine and Iraq. The area needed to be held by the United Kingdom. However, there was neither military reasons nor a trade possibility for the Kingdom east of the Jordan Kingdom. So, the British government, like the Ottoman Empire, started to search for allies from the local elites or leaders to govern the area. The British High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel travelled to Salt in August 1920, met with local notables and announced that Britain would establish local administrations, which would be half-independent. Actually, three self-governing administration were created in Ajlun, Salt and Karak (Robins 14). The notables and elites took part in these administrations. However, the administrations divided in a short time into itself along the traditional lines. Ajlun was divided into four

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sections: Irbid, Ajlun, Mazar, Jarash. The town of Tafilah demanded autonomy from Karak (Robins 14). The area of Salt was the only successful example of these local administrations. After the collapse of the local governments, the United Kingdom searched for other opportunities to secure the area.

Abdullah's move from Mecca to the east of Jordan with 300 men in November 1920 showed the British government the ambitions of the Hashemite family towards an Arab state. He charmed the tribal leaders of the area and his credibility grew in the eyes of the British government.

In the Cairo Conference, in March 1921, it was decided that Abdullah would be the leader of the emirate which would be in eastern Palestine (Transjordan). Faisal became the ruler of Iraq. With the Cairo agreement, the British government made Faisal and Abdullah accept the authority of the United Kingdom in the area, not only in Iraq and in Transjordan, but also in Palestine. They accepted all the results of this conference, because they couldn't see any option other than collaborating with the British Powers. Faisal had understood long before this agreement that he would not be able to force the British Empire to comply with the wishes of the Hashemite family as can be seen from his letter to his brother Zaid on January 1921: " (1)We cannot compel England to fulfill her pledges to the letter; (2) we cannot abandon our heritage; (3) we cannot fight England and take what we want by the sword.... This is the bitter reality" (qtd. in Mousa 186).

So, the sons of Serif Hussein agreed that they wouldn't interfere in the politics in the western lands of the Jordan River, which meant that they wouldn't prevent the settlements in the Palestine area. Faisal was never in a position against Jewish settlements in Palestine, unless he could benefit from his collaboration as we can see from the Faisal-Weizmann agreement on January 3, 1919. Actually, after this agreement, the first diversion was actualized in Palestine. It was divided in two areas by British Government and the Hashemites. The western bank of the Jordan River was named Palestine and the eastern bank was named as Transjordan. After the agreement with the

Hashemites, in September 1922, the British Government presented the League of Nations with their solution for the area, and it was quickly approved.

The two brothers, Abdullah and Faisal were satisfied with the results of the Cairo Conference. Although Sherif Hussein was refusing the British offers for Palestine and the rest of the Arab world and wasn't accepting the mandate governments in Palestine, he also approved the results of the Conference as a first step towards a united Arab state.

> […]a conference in Cairo that he intended would settle 'the Arab Question' on terms that would meet the Arabs half way. As is well known one of the decisions of this conference was the recognition of Abdullah and Faisal as rulers in Transjordan and Iraq, respectively. Faisal returned from London to the Hijaz to inform his father of the new trend in British policy. From there he sent Lawrence a telegram saying that his father approved the Cairo decisions and hoped that these would be a 'good start towards the fulfilment of Arab wishes.. .' (qtd. in Mousa 187)

1.2.4. Socio-Economic structure and administration of Transjordan and foundation of Transjordanian identity

Although Abdullah was satisfied with the results of the Cairo conference, his desires for expansionism did not disappear immediately. West of Palestine, especially the West Bank remained one of the major ambitions of Abdullah bin Hussein like his father. However, the reality of politics, especially after 1921, forced him to concentrate on the survival of the emirate of Transjordan.

Transjordan had a socio-economic structure, which was based on a tribal order. There were a lot of tribes and tribal groups, which were taking advantage of and gaining benefits from the administrative confusion during those years (Robins 23). The United Kingdom gave full responsibility to Abdullah for internal affairs of Transjordan (Robins 23). He taxed the weaker tribes and compromised with the well-organized and powerful ones or at least neutralized them as the Ottoman government had done for centuries in the area. The rebellious tribes were defeated, when they kept continued to resist

collaborating with the state. So, the tribes carried on their traditional power relationship with the new governors of the new born emirate. In a few years, it became clear to the British government that Abdullah was able to manage the internal relations of Transjordan.

Although the Hashemite family agreed on the Cairo conference, which offered Zionists the ability to continue their settlements in the west of Palestine, they were not satisfied with the agreement. First of all, they were promised the area of Palestine by the British authorities and nothing was mentioned about the division. Transjordan was 78% of the whole of Palestine (Wasserstein 102). Their influence in western Palestine was very high proportional to their population. The division prevented the spread of their influence throughout Palestine. Furthermore, the Jewish settlements in Transjordan were banned by the agreements between the regional leaders and the United Kingdom. Thus, in the first years of the emirate of Transjordan was considered an enemy for Zionists and they hoped for the failure of the emirate in order to merge Palestine and Transjordan. However, Abdullah was the only person in the area, who gave encouragements to them (Robins 28).

Zionist ambitions of the consolidation of Palestine was not only a vision of Zionists. Also the British government was unsure about the future of the emirate and whether Emir should be trusted. However, in the late 1920s, these questions disappeared and collaboration between the British governors and Emir Abdullah increased. Up to this time, the disparity of power between Abdullah and the British was as unclear as in the Emirate of Iraq. The influence of the British government was very high in those new born mandates: "[…]The subsequent recasting of the League of Nations Mandate in the form of a treaty between Britain and the new Hashemite Kingdom, rather than the 'usual mandate form', veiled a deep uncertainty about the limits of British power" (Townshend 917).

On 20 February 1928, a new agreement was signed between the Emir and the British government, which abolished any uncertainties (Robins 36). Although it was underlined

in the document that the United Kingdom had ultimate authority in the Mandate, the clarification in the mandate served also as proof of the trust between the British authorities and Abdullah. Furthermore, it became definite that the diversion would stay between Palestine and Transjordan and the agreement formulized the structure of the emirate by the League of Nations' advice, like the military and constitutional organizations. According to the agreement, the Transjordan National Congress (TNC) was established and held its first meeting on 25 July 1928 (Robins 38).

This congress is important for several reasons. First of all, the Congress spearheaded the early Transjordan nationalism, which distinguished itself from the identity of Arab nationalism or Palestinian nationalism. In the following years, it became one of the main concerns of Abdullah, and the proceeding leaders of the Hashemite Kingdom. The unclear borders of this identity and the nebulous decisions of the leadership, as well as the regional conflicts and the foreign affairs management of Jordan, all contributed the deepening of this conflict. Secondly, it was important to build a national economy to replace the tribe-centralized marginal economy. The Transjordan National Congress didn't focus on single economic problems, but it motivated the political activity, and became the supporting structure of most major tribes in Transjordan. So, the coordination beyond the borders and security was established, which spearheaded the acceleration of the economical activity.

After the creation of TNC, the landowners found a major opportunity to be represented in the Congress and take part in the legislative action of the emirate. The rapid change in the economic and cultural areas by the influence of the Congress widened the divide between the periphery and the centre. The major tribes started gaining advantages, whereas the small tribes were suffering. This spearheaded the growing suspicions of the new born state. The Congress, which was built to prevent conflicts by compromising and collaborating with the tribes, became one of the factors, which heightened the level of inequality between tribes, so the relationship between the periphery and the centre became more tense. This situation spurred the British government to take some precautions. The creation of Transjordan Frontier Force was a military example of what

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would happen when a tribe or a tribal group rose up. Moreover, it was a sign that the British government would support Abdullah's regime at any cost.

The creation of the Arab Legion was also an important part of the success story of building security and control over Transjordan against the tribal uprisings. An important character in this era, John Glubb, who was better known as Glubb Pasha was a British soldier who established and led Transjordan's Arab Legion. He created the beginnings of a Desert Mobile Force in 1930, and became very successful in a very short time, because of his strategy of letting the sons of the tribes' leaders join the army. So, he earned the trust of the tribes in the country, which appeared to solve some of the problems in the southern part of the country. In a few years, he was even able to prevent the areas tribal conflicts be it with the state, or intertribal. In the following decades, the Legion was transformed into the best trained force in the Arab world, and played an important role in the war of 1948.

After the annihilation of the tribal and socio-economic dangers, a relatively peaceful period began in Transjordan. The political conflicts were transferred to the Congress, and a democratic structure was started to formalize (Robins 45). With the national congress and army, the tribal leaders could participate in the structure of the newly born mandate and thus, they accepted the authority of Emir Abdullah. This spearheaded the Transjordanian nationalism, identity and commitment to the state.

1.2.5. Expansionist attempts of Emir Abdullah and its effects on Transjordanian identity

The internal concerns of the emirate had never been the main problems of Emir Abdullah. For the whole history of the Emirate, Transjordan was always seen a part of 'the Great Syria'. Regional conflicts and expansionist politics of Abdullah ended the relatively peaceful period in spring 1936. At this point, the demonstrations against the suspension of parliament in Syria converted into a general strike, which strengthened the national movement in this French mandate. The arrests of National Bloc members started the strike in the populated cities of Syria, and spread throughout the whole

country. In the end, the French government agreed to begin negotiations with Syrian delegates and signed a treaty in Paris called Franco-Syrian Treaty, in which French gave autonomy to Syria. With the treaty, the autonomous Druze and Alawite regions were attached to Syria, but not Lebanon. The military and political influence of France was reduced. However, Syria promised to support France in its wars, and to allow use of Syrian bases and territory.

The fluctuations in Syria provided Abdullah with a great opportunity to interfere in the internal affairs of this mandate. Abdullah couldn't gain advantage during the Druze rebellion in 1925 because of the good relationships between the France and Britain and due to his new and unclear position at that period. After 1936, he began to build relations with the elites and with the opposition. During the World War II, he first suggested the Vicky Regime for unity of Transjordan and Syria in 1941 and repeated his suggestions until 1944. However, he had to content himself with the Arab League, which provided more coordination between the Arab states.

Syria was not the only ambition of Emir Abdullah. Another passion of his was becoming the King of the whole Palestine region. Before the creation of the Transjordan entity, Palestine was divided into two pieces after the negotiations between Zionists, the British government and the Hashemite family. In the Cairo Conference, the new borders of the mandates were accepted, so Transjordan and Palestine became two different regions, though they had multiple bonds, like trade and tribal connections. The Transjordan area was administrated by Hashemite family in the name of British mandate, especially in internal affairs.

Even though the remaining part of Palestine was also a British mandate, the problems there were growing since the beginning of the settlements, especially after the division and reformulation of the new mandate. The promises of the British government to the Jews by the Balfour Declaration was building a national home in Palestine, which after the Cairo Conference, meant the remaining part of Palestine, which also included West Bank and Gaza strip (today's Palestine). However, the area of Palestine was reduced by

British authorities first in the Cairo Conference. The reasons were twofold. First of all, historical Palestine was a very large entity including the strategic transitions between Egypt and India for Great Britain. Giving the whole area to Jewish people meant that Zionists would have great power, which could not be controlled by any other regional power. In order to control Zionists and have the opportunity to repress them if needed, there needed be other states in the area, which would serve as possible threats for Zionists. So the diversion would allow Britain to use both states for their purposes. If a state in the region became too strong, or began to exceed full control over Palestine, then Britain would have problems with ruling the area as a colonial power.

Secondly, the limitation would accelerate the foundation of the Jewish National Home. The ban of British authorities for Jewish settlements in Transjordan was also aimed towards increasing the percent of Jewish people in a particular area in a short time, and to prevent their spreading too thinly over the region, which would reduce them to being a minority in these lands. The United Kingdom was always aware that the demographic structure should be organized in the Mandate before building a Jewish national state in the area, and after the British invasion of Palestine, the first attempt of the civil administration under British authorities was reducing the Masha'a lands, which were obstacles in land sales for the Jewish settlements. The land reforms of 1928 and 1930 purported to divide large sections of lands and to allow ownership for individuals; a system by the name of mafruz. The partitioning of land into smaller tracts was a formulation of the British land policy to accelerate the Jewish settlement on Palestine lands (Karaş 10). Masha'a system had always been an obstacle to Jewish settlements, and the British were aware that they needed to change the land tenure system in Palestine to affect the demographic structure. With the collective ownership of the lands, Arab peasants found the power to resist the Jewish settlements. British land policy was an activator for the land sales to the Jews. However, the Arab politicians, which were representing in the Arab Higher Committee, were also not opposed to the land sales, though they weren't in a position to prevent them.

The British land policy was not only beneficial for Jewish settlements, but also for the Arab upper classes. Wealthy Arab families were searching to find a way to gain more land in Palestine. This meant that the masha'a system was also an obstacle for them. While Jews were moving together and not divided by representation, the Arab politicianss' social structure was not representing Arab society and their problems. For example, the members of AHC were mostly landowners, which belonged to the clans (%64.3) with large lands (Nashif 115). Only %12,5 of them were bourgeois, known as the spearhead of nationalism, but none of them were from the working class or peasants (Nashif 115). As we can see from this distribution, the Palestinian Arabs were represented generally by the upper classes, whose benefits were compromising with interests of the British and Jews in the land policy of Palestine.

Additionally, these Palestinian mostly clan-orientated Arab politicians were also divided amongst themselves, so it is hard to say if their behaviors were framed by any specific ideology, like pan-Arabism or Palestine nationalism.

> By contrast, the clashes within the Arab Higher Committee were more disruptive and the priorities less well-defined. Although the AHC's rhetoric emphasized a strong ideological commitment to the interlocking goals of pan- Arabism and Palestine Arab nationalism, and its manifestos, writings, and speeches portrayed the Palestine Arab national movement as an organic part of the general awakening of "the Arab nation" throughout the Middle East, the reality was that pan-Arabism was not an immediate concern of the AHC or its predecessor movements in any practical sense. (Nashif 120)

The members of the AHC were mostly from two notable families, which were the Husseini family and Nashashibi family. The competition between these two families is notable.

> The capture by the Husseinis of these two prestigious positions so deepened the rift between them and the Nashashibis that this conflict came to dominate the political life of Arab Palestine. Powerful factions incorporating allied clans developed around the two protagonists the pro-Husseini Councilites (a name derived from the Supreme Muslim Council over which Amin Husseini

presided) vs. the Oppositionists or Anti-Councilites headed by Raghib
Nashashibi. (Nashif 120)

Due to disagreements between Jews and Arab Palestinians and among different fractions
of Arab Palestinians, the western bank of the Jordan River was never a silent place. The
Jewish settlements caused uprisings and conflicts in the area. The difficulties in the
administration of this region encouraged the ambitions of Emir Abdullah. It also affected
the attitude of the British through their Middle East projects. Especially after the 1936
Riot of Arab Palestinians, the British authorities started questioning their policies about
the Balfour Declaration, which accepted the remaining part of Palestine (after the
division of Transjordan) as a Jewish national home.

The Peel Commission's report (1937) symbolized an important cleavage in the history
of Palestine. Moreover, it is a sign how Transjordan was perceived from the eyes of
British authorities. The Peel Commission's decision to divide Palestine was not only
unimplemented decision about Palestine. First of all, it included not only Palestine (west
of the Jordan river), but also the Transjordan part of it, which spearheaded forthcoming
solutions in the area. Furthermore, it symbolizes an attitude change of British authorities
after the Belfour Declaration. The Arab revolts of 1921, 1929 and 1936 led the British
authorities to question the decisions they had made. According to the Belfour
Declaration, after the division of Palestine, the western part of the Jordan River, which
includes today's Palestine and Israel was reserved for the Jewish national home. It was
forbidden for Jewish people to settle in the eastern part, which later became the Emirate
of Transjordan. However, increasing the Jewish population in the area started the
resistance movement of Arabs against the Jewish and British authorities. 1936 revolt
showed the British that they should change their understanding for the area. The Peel
commission report was not a report for division, but it also meant that the concept of a
Jewish national home started being questioned. The report mentioned that the area
would be divided into two independent Jewish and Arab states. Transjordan and the
remaining parts of Palestine would become a united Arab state.

> Lost in the British domestic controversy over other features of the plan was
> the suggestion by its architects that of the two sovereign independent states

to be established, one would be an Arab state, "consisting of Transjordan united with that part of Palestine which lies to the east and south" of the Jewish frontier. (Klieman 295)

After the division of Transjordan and Palestine, it can be clearly seen that the borders and the existence of Transjordan was always optional for the future plans of a Jewish national home. The impossibility of the preconceived borders of a Jewish national home resulted in a search for a new vision by British authorities. The Arab uprisings, Zionist uncompromising nature, demographic realities of Palestine and economical realities of the United Kingdom forced British authorities to change their policies in Palestine. The Peel Commission report symbolized the reduction of land, in which the Jewish population could settle. It restricted new Jewish settlements to the partition of Arab and Jewish regions in Palestine. Although the plan never materialized, it was important in showing the change of the British attitude towards the Palestine problem.

The Peel Commission's plan was accommodated to Abdullah's ambitions. At his first meeting with the British officer Winston Churchill in Jerusalem in March 1921, he explained his idea for unifying Transjordan and Palestine under a single Arab entity (Robins 48). Churchill laid out the blueprints, which were mostly formulated in the Balfour Declaration, and in the Congress, Palestine was split up into two distinct regions: Transjordan and a Jewish national home. However, after approximately 20 years, Abdullah decided the best option was to thwart the uprisings of the Arab radicals in Palestine. Yet, his relations with the Arab politicians, especially with the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Hussaini would be one of the obstacles hindering the realization of the Peel Commission's plan. On the other hand, despite opinions of the critics of Arab nationalists, Abdullah and the Jewish community became allies since the 1930s. The most important factor was also their common enemy, the Arab national movement led by the Grand Mufti (Robins 49). Robins states that "pragmatic cooperation between Abdullah and the Zionist movement prior to the establishment of the state of Israel reached its zenith during the early to mid 1930s over the issue of land transactions"(49).

Abdullah was always aware that his political life was dependent on British needs and interests. By implementing his politics for the region, he calculated mostly this British factor, and its desires for the foundation of a Jewish national homeland. He focused on creating solutions involving the wishes of all parties in the area. Selling land in Jewish settlements was a tool strategy for him to enable collaboration with Zionists and to clear the way for annexation of Palestine.

> […] almost continuous low-key contracts taking place between Abdullah and principally the Jewish Agency throughout much of the 1930s, as the amir attempted the latter of the utility of a bi-communal state of Arabs and Jews under his leadership. (Robins 50)

The Palestine resistant between 1936 and 1939 changed the power balances, or made it visible for the British. It was impossible for Arab communities to accept a Jewish national home. The attempt of the Peel Commission symbolized a change in the British policies, and the White Paper in 1939 was a sharp turning point.

> The good relations between the Zionists and Britain were conducted without any serious interruption until the British officials happened to understand the grave mistake they begot in Palestine on account of the intensifying grievances of Arabs that manifested itself in sporadic insurrections as in 1921, 1929 and 1936. The "surrogate colonization" of Jews in Palestine came to an end with the issuance of the White Paper in 1939. As the British officials took measures to reverse the two-decade long pro-Zionist policies and prevent the entrance of Jews in Palestine, Jews emerged as the most ardent enemies of the British mandate rule. (Karaş 46)

Although Abdullah's main aim was the development of Great Syria or a unified Arab state, he couldn't achieve his ambitions during this period. The nationalist approach of the British authorities became dominant in the Mandate and the Transjordanian identity began to overshadow the supra-identities such as Arabic identities or tribal identities.

1.3. The Clash of Imperialist States for the Middle East and the start of an identity crisis of Transjordan

After the 1936- 1939 uprisings, it was clear for the British authorities that their plans for Palestine needed to change and the Peel Commission report was an attempt at it. The plan never materialized, but it served as a foundation of the British attitude for the future challenges of the Palestine region. It formulated Palestine as a whole, including Transjordan, and divided it into Jewish national home and a united Arab state.

> Treaties of alliance should be negotiated by the Mandatory with the Government of Trans-Jordan and representatives of the Arabs of Palestine on the one hand and with the Zionist Organization on the other. These Treaties would declare that, within as short a period as may be convenient, two sovereign independent States would be established--the one an Arab State consisting of Trans-Jordan united with that part of Palestine which lies to the cast and south of a frontier such as we suggest in Section 3 below; the other a Jewish State consisting of that part of Palestine which lies to the north and west of that frontier. *(Jewish Virtual Library)*

After the second World War, the balances of the world changed forever. The economical crises of the European states and the emerging superpowers, the United States and USSR, brought a new world order into the global system, the changes from which were felt soon after in every part of the world. However, the power shift between the US and UK in some particular areas didn't occur only through discord, but in fact often through collaboration against a common enemy, the USSR. However, the UK had some priorities and some continuing interests in Palestine, which drew the destiny of Transjordan in its whole history and caused the identity crisis in the next decades.

Although all the borders of the nation-states in the Middle East were drawn by imperialist powers in accordance with the existing power balances in the world order, the identities of this state couldn't be formulated or changed easily. After uprisings and bloody conflicts, it was clear that the borders and administration of Palestine (and maybe

Transjordan) should be changed. This rearrangement was not only affecting the borders of the states, but also the identities of the peoples in these states. Therefore, the rapid reformulations of the imperialist states for the Middle East caused a clash of identities in the whole area, especially in Transjordan.

1.3.1. The clash and compromise of the solutions of the UK and US for Palestine and the identity problems due to this reformulation

After World War II, the British Empire was one of the victors, though it had lost its hegemonic power and became entrenched deep in economical problems. At this point, it became impossible for United Kingdom to maintain her responsibilities as a world hegemonic power. Especially in the Middle East, the British Empire wasn't able maintain its influence.

After the White Paper in 1939, which was also known as the MacDonald White Paper and recommended a bi-national state governed by Arabs and Jews in proportion to their numbers in the population by 1949, the United Kingdom implemented limitations for the Jewish settlements, but faced problems in relations with the United States. The immigrants, who escaped from Europe, wanted to settle in the Promised Land, but British restrictions kept them from achieving their goals. On the other hand, the Jewish immigrations preferred the United States as a second option. The restrictions spurred a strong anti-British atmosphere in the US, rather than an anti-German one (409). The United States didn't want to take the refugees, but pass along responsibility to the British. The British planned to change the United States Palestine Policy to involve the Middle East. So, the United States would also see the contradictions in the area, and approach the problem from an other perspective. In 1943, the British requested the participation of the US in a common Anglo-American action plan. In 1945, American President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced that the Palestine policy would be an 'international responsibility' and the United Kingdom shouldn't be 'asked to carry it alone' (Ovendale 409).

After the election of the Labour Party in 1945, the British focused on solving the problem in Palestine. The Labour Party didn't have a clear solution planned, but they knew the cornerstones that a solution should incorporate. First of all, India played an important role in this decision. India was still a vital area for British interests, and the Middle East was one of the main trade routes, which linked it to British Empire (Ovendale 410). England's strategic interest and historical responsibilities in the Middle East were the key topics the new party needed to consider before acting. Furthermore, the Labour Party also needed to calculate the economical situation of the mother country. The military outcomes from providing security to Palestine were higher than the United Kingdom could afford. Moreover, the Labour Party also had to consider the relations with the United States and continue sharing responsibilities of the Middle East.

During 1945, the situation in Palestine became explosive. The Zionists built extremist organizations, which were constituted by mostly young Jews, who had no tolerance for Palestinian nationalists. On the other hand, the pressure of Zionism to achieve its goals was provoking Arab nationalism. Arabs were unorganized after their failure in the uprisings of 1936 and 1939, but capable of resisting and fighting against dispossession and threats to their lands.The United States was creating long term solutions, but the United Kingdom was facing the problem directly and needed an immediate solution to alleviate some of the tension before starting a long term process. The elements for making a short-term plan, however, were in contradiction to a long-term plan.

First of all, in World War II, the Palestine Arabs had wanted support from the Nazi Germany, so they wrote telegrams to Nazi leader (Reichsführer) Heinrich Himmler. Against the Jews, Nazis supported Palestine Arabs, but it was inefficient. There were also Palestine Arabs, who joined the British forces. Jews unanimously supported British forces in Europe. However, Zionist organizations were the crucial enemies of British forces in the Palestine region.

Moreover, the immigration problem continued its importance after the war period. The Holocaust phenomena created a new immigration problem in Europe and the US, and

this was a new pressure for the British government in Palestine. The short term solution of the immigration problem, including the Palestine option, was harmful for the long term solution for obtaining security and peace. At least, the British needed to focus on creating good relations with the United States against their common enemy, the USSR. However, the expectations and wishes of United States were unobtainable for the British government.

One of the biggest disputes occured with the 100.000 Jewish immigrants after the war. The United States wanted the Jews immigrate to Palestine, but the British Government could not allow this because of the sensitive balances between the Arabs and Jews in the area. The British government rejected the immigration into Palestine several times. However, the new US President, Harry S. Truman wanted to use this situation to gain advantage in the Middle East. He thought that United States would develop problems with Jewish immigration if Palestine wouldn't eliminate the restrictions for the Jewish immigrations and settlements.

E.R. Stettinius, the US Secretary of State, advised Truman in April 1945 that the Palestine question should be handled with the long-range interests of the United States in mind. Immigration would aggravate the conflicts in the Middle East, but Truman thought that the United States could create a solution in the area. The inexperienced new British Labour Government was pressured by Truman, so the British government changed its opinion several times and tried to find a way to satisfy the United States.

The United States would do nothing about the taking refugees, but it was also clear that British government could not handle it alone. The position of United Kingdom in the Middle East was not as strong as before. They feared the United States because of the USSR influence in the area. For the British Government, it was also clear that the America's help with economic and military issues was needed in the area. Ovendale states that the British had no other solution, because "[…] there was the possibility of Russian penetration in the area which would weaken the whole situation in the Middle

East. Only the assumption of some responsibility by the United States could improve the situation" (419).

However, that doesn't mean that there were no conflicts between the US and UK. They were in cooperation on the Palestine issue, but each of them wanted to solve the problem via its own perspective and desires. On the other hand, the pressure of USSR throughout the world urged both the US and UK to find an acceptable solution quickly. The conference of the British government in September 1945 shows us the competition between the US and UK:

> In general terms the conference decided that a British influence which rested on military or political props could not be enduring. Britain should broaden the base on which its influence rested and developed an economic and social policy that would make for the prosperity and contentment of the area as a whole. But the Middle East was to remain largely a British sphere of influence: Britain should not make any concession that would assist American commercial penetration into a region which for generations has been an established British market. (Ovendale 412)

With the Conference, the British Labour Government determined its position in the Middle East. The Palestine Committee, which examined the results of the Conference made the perspective of Britain's position in the area more precise. The British government would cooperate with Arabs more, and the attitude of the Arabs would be top priority. So, Britain determined that it should implement its position after the White Paper in 1939. 'Jewish National Home' was postponed to an indefinite time.

Britain wanted to limit immigration and other problematic issues for the Palestine Arabs, which was a sensitive problem for all the Arab World.

> British prestige at that time was 'immensely high' and relations with the various rulers 'friendly and cordial'. But this could be transformed overnight if Britain took any action which the Arabs might construe as injurious to their interests: Arab sentiment was sensitive about the future of Palestine. The situation was made more difficult by the formation of Arab League

which increased the will and the power of individual states to resist the implementation of policies to which they objected. (Ovendale 412)

In this contradictory situation, the United States and United Kingdom created a commission, which was Anglo-American. The commission rejected the west bank of the Jordan River and recommended "a bi-nationalist state for Jews and Palestinians" in a unanimous report (Ovendale 416). However, the Colonial Secretary, George Glenvil Hall didn't agree with the Commission, and according to him, there was only one solution for long-term: 'two semi-autonomous area, one Jewish, one Arab, under a central trustee government must be established in the west of the Jordan River. The mandate should continue for a while, and the way would be left open for partition into two states, or a federation in the 'Palestine' area.'

British and US officials met in London in July and decided on a modified Hall's Plan (Morrison-Grady plan). The plan was accepted from neither the Arab leaders nor the Jews. Still, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine agreed to the separated Arab and Jewish states in the area. The five members of the Arab League voted against the plan. Britain wanted a more acceptable plan for the Arab states in the area, but to get American support Britain accepted the plan. With this plan, the United States gained more responsibility in the area.

Aiming to control the whole region, Britain had also made other preparations. Transjordan was always considered a part of Palestine by the British and the other actors in the area. Moreover, an option creating a united Arab state from the west of Palestine and Transjordan seemed more realistic than the other options. Furthermore, the Hashemite family and the Emir Abdullah proved their trustworthiness during the mandate period from 1922, and Emir Abdullah was an accepted figure in the whole Arab world.

> […]The Chief of Staff had advised that Britain did not have the means to impose a solution that was resisted by both sides. […] the third possibility

was a propose a scheme of partion which might provide for the Arab part of
Palestine to be merged into Trans-Jordan. (Ovendale 429)

The United Kingdom feared losing her hegemony in the Palestine area after a possible division between the Palestine Arabs and Jews. So, Britain focused on a united Arab Kingdom, which would include Transjordan and parts of Palestine. The first step of this plan was the independence of Transjordan. In 1946, the Emirate of Transjordan became an independent state named the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan. (in 1949 the name changed to Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan)

The United Kingdom refused the partition plan of the United States solution, which didn't calculate the regional powers' attitudes and their desires. This was also harmful for British interests in the area, but also wouldn't mean responsibility of the area. In 1947, the British agreed to terminate its administration of Palestine and started a withdrawal during a transitional period. While preparing to terminate the Mandate, Jewish leadership declared independence on 14 May 1948. The State of Israel was recognized by the Soviet Union and United States immediately. Another reason for the United Kingdom to be against the Jewish state was that the two-state solution would bring conflicts in the area, and damaged her relations among the Arab states.

After a few days, the troops of Lebanese, Syrian, Iraqi and Egyptian troops invaded Israel. The Jordanian troops were commanded by the British officers, who had quitted from the British army 2 weeks before the war. According to the British government, the invasion of Palestine by Jordan wouldn't counter British interests. On the other hand, according to British officers, the two-state solution would increase the conflicts in the area, which would damage British interests. However, the victory of Israel established a new balance in the Middle East. After the withdrawal of the Arab states, it was clear that a new era in the Middle East had started for the domestic powers in that area.

Due to the interests of the UK, Transjordan became an independent state in a very short time and was prepared for a war against the Zionists, which had extended the borders of

the British authorities, and was supported by the US. However, in the end, a compromise between the imperialist states was made and the new borders were drawn very similarly to the British Peel Commission Report in 1939. But this rapid reformulation didn't end the border conflicts between the regional states. Moreover, the new borders were not accepted by the peoples living within them. After 30 years under British rule, there had been strong Transjordanian and Palestinian identities in existence. The change in the Middle East due to the Israeli existence caused Palestinians and Jews to live together in Israel, and the Transjordanian and Palestinians people under Jordan. These resulted in uncountable identity conflicts of both states.

CHAPTER 2:

THE REASONS FOR THE CLASH OF IDENTITY IN JORDAN

An identity is able to have an ethnic, religion, class or even a state origin. They have no strict borders, but relations and transitions between them. Usually, an individual in a society is able to identify himself with his religion, ethnicity or with his state. It is most common that these identities are used together. A society has always more than one identity. As Gartzke and Gleditsch mention, nation-states mostly include more than one ethnic group, with shared and different cultural bases. They exemplify the Iraq case with its mixed cultural population and minority government (11). However, it is common for some identities to reflect one point in history, and to begin being the unification motivator of a group or a society. Identity distinguishes the borders of 'us' and 'the others'.

> […] was developed to provide one account of the motivations underlying group identification that would acknowledge the dynamic nature of social identity and at the same time provide for chronically high levels of identification with specific groups. The theory postulates that social identity is derived from the opposing forces of two universal human motives- the need for inclusion and assimilation, on the one hand, and the need for differentiation from others on the other. (Brewer 188)

National identity is the subject of one of the important debates for political scientists. For some scientists, the existence of national identity was based the interactions of world power groups and became the key answer for conflicting issues. However, it is certain that the nation-state concept gain importance at a certain point in history. The French

Revolution in 1789 brought the concept of nation as a sovereign power, which gave the political figures the right to rule as the spokesmen of the nation (qtd. in Biswas 178). However, since then, it has been debated, if the nation creates the nation-state, or the other way around.

> Nationalist movements over the world have and continue to produce these communities, that sometimes demand their own states leading to irredentist movements, and at other times seek various concessions and accommodations within the political parameters of existing states. But ``nation building'' has always been a project of the state as well and the widespread existence of global norms on sovereignty and self-determination (and the continuing appeal of the ideal of the ``nation-state'') now ensure that existing states themselves have to engage to some extent in attempts at nation building. In other words, it is not simply that nations often seek and demand states, but states need nations as well. (Biswas 180)

After the proliferation of the nation state, national identity has become the dominant identity of a nation-state. The state becomes its authority from the 'nation'.

> Claims to ``nationhood'' give the state authority over its people as well as international standing within a larger system of states. It is the way for states to seek and ensure legitimacy within a system of states in which the ideal of the nation-state is a universal organizing principle for collective identity. This is perhaps part of the reason that state discourse hardly ever refers to ``nations'' within its borders, even though particular groups might themselves or by others be designated as such. States instead prefer to use the safer label of ``ethnicities'' (or ``tribes'' or ``races'') for such groups. State legitimacy requires the state to speak in the name of a singular nation, and this generates efforts toward nation building. (Biswas 181)

However, one must remember that national identity is not the only identity in a nation-state. Other identities may be culturally-, religion- or linguisticly-based identities. The domestic politics or foreign affairs often spearhead the recreation of an identity with the interpretation of contemporary circumstances; however these identities, with the

exception the national identity are usually ineffective in reshaping the political atmosphere of a country. However, in certain circumstances they could be determinant:

> If subordinate groups that find their identities submerged, marginalised or erased through such nation-building efforts of the state are able to politicize group consciousness through laying moral claims to territory, these should be seen as legitimate ethical claims to nation-state status. (Biswas 184-185)

On the other hand, there are other political approaches, which totally ignore the importance of the national or ethnical differences in the globalism era after the end of the Cold war. These are easily exemplified through the writings of the doctrinal Marxist attitude and the 'Clash of Civilizations' approach.

Although Karl Marx had built the class system theory and explained the bases of the world capitalist system, he didn't emphasize a nation theory. In one of his writings, he dealt with the Ireland problem, and explained that the Irish would be released whenever the British working class gained their economical independence. However, after his daughter became involved the Irish national struggle, he announced that he changed his opinion and had accepted the importance of the national struggles, and reformulated his famous sentence: "For a long time, I believed it would be possible to overthrow the Irish regime by English working class ascendancy.... Deeper study has now convinced me of the opposite. The English working class will never accomplish anything before it has got rid of Ireland. The lever must be applied in Ireland. This is why the Irish question is so important for the social movement in general." Besides this, Lenin also gave significant importance to national struggles. He reformulated "Workers of the world, unite!" the slogan of the Marxists since the Communist Manifesto into the "Workers and oppressed peoples and nations of the World, unite!" However, most of the Marxists or neo-Marxists claim that the national struggle has ended with the end of the Cold War. According to them, if there isn't a state like the USSR, it is impossible for the nations to be independent. In a case of achievement, they will be mere puppets of the imperialist states. Therefore, they see the national struggles whether unimportant or dangerous because it conceals the real class struggle. However, they don't totally reject the existence or the future existence of the national struggles.

The second approach is the approach of the supporters of the famous article of Huntington. According to him, the new struggle of the world will be between the civilizations.

> It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. (Huntington 22)

He accepts the national struggle before or during the Cold War, but after the cold war, he totally refuses the inter-civilization struggles or identity making processes.

> These conflicts between princes, nation states and ideologies were primarily conflicts within Western civilization, "Western civil wars," as William Lind has labeled them. This was as true of the Cold War as it was of the world wars and the earlier wars of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. With the end of the Cold War, international politics moves out of its Western phase, and its centerpiece becomes the interaction between the West and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations. (Huntington 23)

According to him the failure of the Western ideals of nationalism and socialism caused a reshaping of the civilizations.

> Increasingly one hears references to trends toward a turning inward and "Asianization" in Japan, the end of the Nehru legacy and the "Hinduization" of India, the failure of Western ideas of socialism and nationalism and hence "re-Islamization" of the Middle East, and now a debate over Westernization versus Russianization in Boris Yeltsins country. (Huntington 26)

According to him, this will lead a war among the civilizations. But Edward Said rejects Huntington's concept in his article 'the clash of ignorance'.

> At some level, for instance, primitive passions and sophisticated know-how converge in ways that give the lie to a fortified boundary not only between "West" and "Islam" but also between past and present, us and them, to say nothing of the very concepts of identity and nationality about which there is unending disagreement and debate. A unilateral decision made to draw lines in the sand, to undertake crusades, to oppose their evil with our good, to extirpate terrorism and, in Paul Wolfowitz's nihilistic vocabulary, to end nations entirely, doesn't make the supposed entities any easier to see; rather, it speaks to how much simpler it is to make bellicose statements for the purpose of mobilizing collective passions than to reflect, examine, sort out what it is we are dealing with in reality, the interconnectedness of innumerable lives, "ours" as well as "theirs." (The Clash of Ignorance 3)

If the approaches of Biswas was taken as true, in our case, the national state of Jordan and its domestic and internal politics are based on the national identity of the Transjordanian identity. The national character was shaped long before the creation of the Jordan Kingdom. The Transjordan National Congress was a commonly accepted authority, which started the nation-building process long before many Middle Eastern states. The Congress caused the early Transjordan nationalism, which distinguished itself from the identity of Arab nationalism or Palestinian nationalism. It was established and made its first meeting on 25 July 1928. Most of the tribes participated in this new authority from the starting point. However, the domestic and external relations of Jordan were mostly affected by the Arab, Palestinian and Islamic identities. These identities came into existence or were reshaped during the transformation of Palestine into Jordan throughout historical progress. Moreover, the importance of Palestinian, Islamic and Arab identities became a security threat for the survival of the Jordanian Kingdom. Especially, the Islamic identity needed to be questioned in accordance with the national approach and the approach of the 'civilization identities' of Huntington. The Islamic identity in Jordan became of significant importance in the past two decades. Moreover, it was perceived as the main threat of the Jordanian Kingdom. According to the

Huntington approach, there is a re-Islamization of the Middle East and it is normal that a transformation occurs in Jordan through the Islamic opposition. If not, we should mention how the national approach explains the progresses in Jordan.

This chapter focuses on how and why different identities create crisis and began clashing in the political arena in the Jordan history, how the weakness of Jordanian identity and uncertainties in the Middle East, especially in the Palestinian region, resulted in the need of other identities for the governing elite, especially how the expansionist policies of the regional actors accelerated the need and the recreation of these sub-identities. Moreover, we will see the historical progresses, how the Jordanian state had relations and difficulties with these identities. At this point, it should be also mentioned why these different identities, which are normal and non-problematic in every country, are creating an identity crisis in Jordan that threats Jordan's security and unity. We will underline the distinctive position of Palestinian identity from the other identities and explain how the different identities, like the Arabic identity or Islamic identity, was affected by the national struggle of the Palestinians.

2.1. From Transjordanian to Pan Arabic Jordanian identity

After the Cairo Conference and the determination of the borders of the Mandate, the distinction started building its own identity with the establishment of the Transjordan National Congress. The recruitment of the tribal leaders' sons to the army and the right of the tribal leaders to present themselves in the Congress increased the involvement of the East Bank dwellers into the nation-building process of the Transjordan entity.

> To insure continued Transjordanian loyalty, the state provided subsidies and preferentially recruited key tribes into various parts of the state apparatus. Although not all Transjordanians belonged to the favored tribes, there is no question that a central part of what it meant for many Transjordanians to be "Jordanian" was associated with employment by the state, especially in security services or the military. (Brand, Palestinians and Jordanians : A Crisis of Identity 48)

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However, the ambitions of the Hashemite family and the process creating the state of Israel changed the structure and the attitude of the Jordan nation-state and its nation-building process.

As the first chapter mentions, Sherif Hussein and his sons were the leading figures of the 'Arab Revolt' against the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, their claim was that their roots came from the Prophet Mohammed. After the creation of the Transjordan mandate, Abdullah continued to be conscious of his heritage with its mix of Arabic and Islamic identities. Although these identities involved irredentist approaches, the nation-building process progressed and was supported by the cultural essences of these identities. The identities of Arab and Islam were foundational factors for the Transjordanian identity. However, this changed with the opportunities that rose out of expansion his land.

Abdullah had always desired to play a more important role in the Middle East and acted as a unifing factor in the area to involve areas like Syria and Palestine though he never had the chance to implement it. The changes in the balance of the global world before and during the second World War also changed the balances of the Middle East. The Peel Commission's report and the White Paper of 1939 were the first attempts of the British authorities to change their Palestine projects. In the Peel Commission's report, the East and West Bank, Gaza and some other parts of Palestine were included under Abdullah's rule. The weakening of the United Kingdom and its attempts to share the responsibility of Palestine with the United States made the regional balance more sensitive after 1945.

The creation of the Israeli state in the year 1948 created a mass migration of Palestinians to the east. The extended borders of the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan had involved 700.000 Palestinians. 70.000 of them settled directly in the East Bank. The annexation of the West Bank in 1950 changed the composition of the population of the neophyte Kingdom. As Laurie A. Brand points out, the annexation of the West Bank in 1950 needed to remodel the bases for identification and regulation of the relations

between the state and society under its rule. Abdullah's first aim was to involve the Palestinians and Transjordanians under a united identity. As a result, the Transjordanian identity wasn't imposed on the Palestinians, but a new hybrid Jordanian identity was created to eliminate the Transjordanian and Palestinian individual identities (Palestinians and Jordanians : A Crisis of Identity 50). The name of the Kingdom was changed from the 'Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan' to the 'Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan' after the annexation of the West Bank. The need for this new identity was a result of the irredentist policies of Abdullah and the basic elements of this new identity included also irredentist characteristics and Pan-Arabism.

The new Jordan identity was different from the Transjordanian identity, which was mostly the result of the efforts of the British administrations. The recruitment of the national army and representation in the National Congress were the unifying factors of the Transjordanian identity. This institutional and ideological structure changed after the annexation of the West Bank.

According to Brand, this new Jordanian identity had four basic elements. First of all, the existence of the monarch was symbolized as the unification of the Jordan Kingdom. The monarch was the father of the larger Jordanian family and this was reinforced by the television programs, Monarch's photographs in the offices, shops, and even homes. (Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity 50) Secondly, it made a commitment to Arabism. Jordan was seen as a home for all Arabs, just like it had became home for the Hashemite family from Hijaz and a large number of citizens, who weren't originally East Bankers (Brand, Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity 51). Arab Revolt and Arab (Bedouin) values were used as symbols for commitment to Arabism. Third, commitment to Palestine was another important basis for the Jordan identity. The involvement of Palestine and the sacrifices made for it, as well as the importance of the Jordan monarchy for the defense of Jerusalem was another important part of this hybrid Jordanian identity. Fourth, the unity of the two peoples (Transjordanian and Palestinians) and their shared familial roots were highlighted by the Jordan monarchs to strengthen this new identity(Brand, Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity 52).

However, this new identity didn't reduce the problems in the Kingdom and couldn't embrace the Palestinian people, rather, as a side effect it lead to growing the uncertainty of the national identity of the East Bankers.

After Abdullah's annexation of the West Bank, prohibition of the word "Palestine" on government documents and in social life was seen as an attempt to alienate the Palestinians at that time, who were expecting to return home in a short period of time. Although the term 'Jordanization' was applied, the Palestinians felt it was the obliteration of Palestinian identity (Brand, Palestinians and Jordanians : A Crisis of Identity 52).

The annexation of some parts of Palestine, while banning Palestinian identity seemed contradictory, and Abdullah, who was assassinated by a Palestinian nationalist, was the first victim of this contradiction. However, successor King Hussein, the new leader of the Jordan Monarchy, continued the annexation of parts of Palestine and the irredentist policies, that strengthened Pan-Arabism. The Jordanian identity, with its basic elements, allowed for the increasing popularity of Arab nationalism through the peoples and the governing elite in the Kingdom. The period 1950-60 witnessed the growing interest of the Jordanian peoples in Arab nationalism. However, this cannot be explained only by the internal politics of Jordan, but also must be tied to the USSR's Middle East policies and the growing Arab socialist/nationalist movement in the region.

2.2. The Clash between USSR and US and its effects on Arab nationalism

After the second World War, the Soviet Union became a major world power. The Yalta Conference approved its domination in Eastern Europe. Before the war, the Soviet Union was a lonely revolutionary state, which was named 'socialism in one country' by the founders of this state. However, after the war, its military victory and increased diplomatic capability made it a threat for other states, which saw the Soviet Union as capable of achieving its expansionist ambitions (Ro'i 15).

The worsening relations of the United States and Soviet Union influenced the Middle East politics of the USSR. The anti-communist behavior of the United States was reflected in policies such as the Truman Doctrine or the Marshall Plan (Ro'i 73). On the other hand, the Soviet Union started attacking the United States' Middle Eastern policies. Soviet media focused on 'American oil interests', and positioned the US as a partner of the United Kingdom, whose 'colonial efforts' caused Arab suffering. By approaching the Palestine problem, the Soviet Union's first aim was winning support of the Western public opinion; especially the Jews in western and northern America were an obvious target for Soviet propaganda (Ro'i 74).

When the partition became an option in Palestine as a result of the United Nations General Assembly resolution, the USSR used the Palestinian issue to penetrate into the Middle Eastern policies. The Soviet desire at this point was primarily to replace British influence in the Middle East. Moreover, it wanted to get a strong position in the Middle East as the other states. They wanted to establish a new equilibrium, which would emerge after the change in Palestine's status (Ro'i 97). These reasons caused the Soviet Union to support the partition of the Palestine and recognition of Israel after its creation.

However, a few years later, the USSR changed its pro-Israeli policies. This became distinctively with the Soviet- Arab rapprochement (Ro'i 491). The coup d'état in Egypt in 1952 changed Soviet tactics in the region. The pan-Arabic nationalism of Nasser got the Soviet support and an Arab 'Cold War' began in the region between the 'radical states' and 'liberal Arab states' (Little 504). Nasser's radicalism seemed an anti-Western Arab nationalism and strengthened the anti-imperialist approach in the Middle East.

The anti-imperialist Pan-Arabism became popular in the Arab world rapidly, and got serious support from the Transjordanians and the Palestinians in Jordan. The popularity of this new Arab nationalism was directly affecting the Hashemite regime. The heritage of the Hashemite family symbolized the unification of Arabs for the great 'Arab Revolt' and creating an 'Arab Home' state like 'Great Syria'. However, the reality was that

Jordan was limited with the desires of the 'Colonial Powers'. The rising of Nasser showed the contradictions of Jordan's ideology and the Jordan state, which produced a Jordanian character with a Pan-Arabic nature for uniting the Palestinians and Transjordanians in one identity or to unite the West and East Bank under one state. As a result of the different implications and implementation of Arab nationalism by these two leaders, a natural rivalry occurred between Nasser and Hussein.

Nasser strengthened his position as the true spokesman of Arab nationalism with his consistent policies. The spread of Arab nationalism through the Middle East worsened Jordan's identity crisis. With the influence of Nasser, Arab nationalism started to mean the unification of Arabs against their colonist or neo-colonist states, which included the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel and sometimes France. On the other hand, the USSR seemed to be a supporter of this new Arab nationalism. This new anti-imperialist component of Arab nationalism threatened Jordanian identity until 1967.

Jordan's weak relations with the other regional forces motivated it to strengthen its relations with the Western Powers throughout the 50's and 60's. In this sense, the modernization process of Jordan was supported through foreign aid of the United States and the United Kingdom. Although Jordan had no significant natural sources, it had the highest GNP between of the non-oil producing Middle Eastern countries. Although Jordan didn't want to get into problems with the Western Powers and Israel, the growing tension pushed it to establish a clear position in the Arab-Israeli conflict before 1967.

Shortly after the 1948 war, the conflicts between Israel and its neighbors continued and in 1953, Syria and Israel approached war because of water problems. The US attempts to solve the water problem for the whole region by signing a common agreement with Israel, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt was an attempt to bring peace and stability to the region, which now included the state of Israel. However, Jordan and the other Arab states refused this agreement, which meant the recognition of Israel. Jordan's position against this agreement reflected the relations of Jordan-Israel relations at that time. Jordan's attacks of Israeli villages and the death of a Jewish and her two children was

countered with the 'Qibya massacre', which resulted in death of 67 people including mostly women and children in a Palestinian village by Ariel Sharon's commando troops (Çendek 21).

The armament of Egypt with the Czechoslovakian arms and the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company by Nasser and the reaction of Israel with a rapid armament accelerated the pre-war period.

In 1953 Nasser attempted to build a giant dam to solve the water and electricity problems of Egypt. To finance his projects, he appealed to the World Bank, but the project wasn't approved, so he went to the USSR for help. This, however, irritated the US and the UK, both of which decided not to help the states in contact with the USSR.

In September 1956, the announcement of Egypt about the nationalization of the Suez Canal resulted in a reaction by the United Kingdom and France, which had common interest in the canal. The United Kingdom and France threatened Nasser and blocked the bank accounts of Egypt. The USSR announced that they supported Nasser's actions. The United Kingdom and France wanted to build an Western alliance against Nasser, but the United States had another agenda.

The United States sent a solution proposal named the 'Five States' Plan to the related parties. After the refusal of this plan, it was sent to the United Nations, but with the veto usage of the USSR, the plan became non-functional. After the refusal of the plan, Israel, the United Kingdom and France made a plan and started to attack Egypt. According to their plan, Israel would attack Egypt, then France and the US would call for a cease-fire agreement. The refusal of this call by Egypt would create an opportunity for a legal invasion by France and England. The plan was executed as planned. However, after the movement of France and England against Egypt, the United Nations made another decision, which was prepared with the US and the USSR in the UN General Assembly. This resolution declares that an intervention of third parties should not be considered as legitimate. Although the United Kingdom and France didn't abandon their agenda for

the invasion of Egypt after this resolution, the involvement of the USSR prevented this invasion. The USSR moved their forces, and threatened Israel, France and the United Kingdom, and sent a letter to the United States requesting a common army of the US and the USSR be sent to stop the war, and added "otherwise this war could be a first step of the Third World War." (qtd in Çendek 24)

The pressure of the United States and the USSR resulted in the withdrawal of Israel, France and the UK. The acceptance of the withdrawal was seen as the victory of Nasser and the USSR. The formation of the state of Egypt was approved by the related parties. The Suez crisis changed the balance of the Middle East radically. France and the United Kingdom's influence in the region was annihilated after this crisis, and the USSR strengthened its position. The gap left by France and the United Kingdom was filled by United States presence in the region and competition between the two superpowers, (US and USSR) emerged. The period of the Suez Canal Crisis was a distortion of the traditional parties of the Cold War. The conflict between the United States and the England-France ended with a victory for the United States, but with the glory of Nasser and the USSR. After the crisis, the United States became irritated with the increasing influence of the USSR in the Middle East. Moreover, the victory of Nasser strengthened the opposition of the Arabs against all Western Powers (qtd in Çendek 25). The results of the Crisis were not acceptable for the United States, although it was on the winning side.

The results of the war were not satisfying as the US expected. After the Suez crisis, the US was the only state that could take responsibility in the Middle East against the USSR resulting from the declaration of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The Eisenhower Doctrine was a clear turning point in the US foreign policy which would prevent the increasing power of the USSR in the Middle East. Instead the United States would take the responsibility of the Middle East like the other hegemonic powers in the past and would face the USSR in every regional conflict. The announcement of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which symbolized the enlargement of the anti-communist Truman Doctrine from Europe to the Middle East, changed the parties after the Suez crisis. The main aim

of the United States during the Suez Canal crisis was to prevent the status quo in the Middle East against an invasion of France and Britain. However, the withdrawal of these states seemed a victory of Nasser and the USSR. This victory directed Arab people and the Arab states to radical states like Egypt, which were supported by the USSR. The main aim of the Eisenhower Doctrine was to prevent the reduction of the western influence in the Middle East region and to provide the Arab states with a different alternative than Nasser and the USSR. There were remarkable signs of the increasing influence of Nasser among the Middle Eastern states. Jordan was one of them.

During the Suez Canal Crisis, the young King Hussein reacted to the changing realities in the Middle East and allied himself with Nasser and his supporters, the US and the USSR. He announced that Jordan would fight side by side with Egypt, and moreover he added that the Egyptian people faced a crucial attack by the Zionist Jews and their supporters Britain and France (Armağan 24). He deposed the Jordanian army commander British General John Glubb and canceled the 36 year-old Jordan-Britain agreement in 1957. However, after the crisis Jordan faced a lot of problems resulting from the withdrawal of the Western Powers. The changing balances, regional uncertainties and rising Pan-Arabism strengthened the expansionist reactions and unification attempts of the Arab states, but they were not successful. Rising Arab nationalism with Nasser's anti-imperialist influence began to be a security threat for the other regional states.

The unification attempt of King Hussein with Iraq was prevented with mass protests, which included the Palestinians participants and the influence of Nasser increased among the army of Jordan (Armağan 16). In 1957, with the leadership of a pro-Nasserist and Jordanian officer, Ebu Navvar, an attempt at a coup d'état was made, but resulted in failure (Armağan 16). The increase of Nasser's influence didn't stop after the failed coup d'état, though King Hussein came to understand that the influence of Nasser should be limited in the region, so he took some precautions. In 1958, the alliance between Egypt and Syria, and the deposition of the Hashemite family in Iraq disturbed King Hussein who called for help of the British and American states. The western Air

Forces, RAF and USAF came to help and started to control the Jordanian airspace while British troops were placed in Amman. The arrival of Western Powers indicated that Jordan could not split from the Britain and Western states (Armağan 17). This exposed another contradiction between the Arab nationalist identity of the Hashemite family and their pro-western attitude.

Although the growing Arabic identity in Jordan seemed a success for the unification of the Palestinians in the Jordanian regime, which had declared itself as a 'Home for all Arabs', it didn't end the alienation of the Palestinians by the Jordanian state as we can see above. Contrarily, it unified the opposition including the Palestinians under an ideology which had reflections in the political arena against the collaborative regimes of Israel and the Western Powers. The influence of Nasser and Arab nationalism grew during this period until the end of the Six Days War in 1967.

2.3. The Six Days War in 1967 and its influence on Arab nationalism

Between the years 1956 and 1962, several problems occurred between Arab states and Israel, but they didn't create any major crisis, which resulted in a total war. The creation of the PLO and El-Fatah and the successes of Algeria in its independence war against France were some factors that strengthened the Arab-Western antagonism, which was materializing in the Arab-Israel struggle in the region. The border conflicts between Syria and Israel arising from the Palestinian issue were the main reasons for increasing tension in the region. In 1963, Israel finished its National Water Carrier designed to carry water from the Sea of Galilee to southern Israel. When the Arab states learned this, they saw Israel's Water Carrier program as a threat to their existence. In the Cairo Conference of January 1964, they took action to prevent the water usage of Israel from the Sea of Galilee. Arab leaders approved the establishment of a common Arab military force, the Unified Arab Command (UAC) for a necessary military conflict. The main aim of the Command was to provide coordination between the Arab states to prevent Israeli diversion of water from the Jordan River (Bunch, Balancing Acts: Jordan and the United States during the Johnson Administration 522). Another important decision was

the establishment of Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Ahmad Shuqayri was chosen as leader of the organization. After the conference, King Hussein took on the role of moderator between the regional and international actors (Bunch, Balancing Acts: Jordan and the United States during the Johnson Administration 522). After several meetings with the US and Israel, King Hussein understood that the balance tactics would not prevent a war and Israel wanted to take over the West Bank. Moreover, the US had armed Israel more than any Arab state. At this point, Jordan signed a defensive pact with Egypt, although the rivalry between Nasser and Hussein had increased (Bunch, Balancing Acts: Jordan and the United States during the Johnson Administration 535).

Nasser's request for the withdrawal of the United Nations Peace Force and the closure of the Tiran Straits to Israel resulted in an air assault on Egypt by Israel in July 1967. After the attack, the air force of Egypt was completely destroyed. The war continued six days and resulted in absolute failure of the Arab states. In six days, Israel had overcome its enemies and expanded its borders from the Sinai Peninsula to the Jordan River. It became six times larger than before.

Although the Western Powers thought that it would be easier to achieve peace between Israel and the Arab states after this conflict, the post-war conditions only encouraged Israel to make a favorable agreement based on the new territorial balances with the Arab states. This meant that Israel did not want to withdrawal from the territories it occupied in the war. Israel declared that it would withdrawal only if security was provided. The occupied territories were viewed as bargaining means for future peace negotiations with the Arab states. In June 1967, the Israeli government expressed to the United States that Israel was ready for a peace agreement and would accept the international borders with Egypt and other Arab states. However, Jerusalem would be a unified city under Israeli control. It wanted separate negotiations to determinate the fate of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and the Palestinian refugees. The Israeli government wanted to start peace negotiations with its neighbors to ensure its position was accepted by all parties.

The failure of the war fought by Arabs against Israel had a great impact on the Arab states and nationalism in the region. Nasser resigned from his position, but he returned after a short period. However, the war had already built a new balance in the Arab world, in which the radical states, like Egypt and Syria lost their powers and influence, and the liberal Arab States, like Saudi Arabia became powerful. The radical states started to change their politics, moving away from the USSR and building close relationships with the Western Powers.

> In the immediate aftermath of the war there was no competing system of legitimacy in fact, very little if any legitimacy remained in Arab politics as a whole. The regimes had survived, but the defeat had dishonored practically all of them and had devastated, in particular, the pan-Arabists in Cairo and Damascus. No regime could have gone its separate way then. The "radical" regime in Cairo would capitulate to the will of the oil states led by Saudi Arabia, but the oil states would not press their victory too far or too hard. The military defeat was sustained directly by the armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan-for all practical purposes and in terms of inter-Arab politics, by Egypt-but the defeat had underlined the vulnerability of the Arab system of states, the bankruptcy of the Arab order and its guardians, whether radical or conservative. The champions of pan-Arabism were defeated in the Arab system; the idea had lost its magic. Yet particular states were still captives of a status quo erected by the defeat, which they could neither undo nor indefinitely live with.(Ajami 357)

Although Arab identity had always been a part of the Transjordanian identity, it did not remain in the Transjordan mandate due to the annexation of the Cisjordan (today known as the West Bank). However, after the annexation, Arabic identity was used to unify the West Bank and East Bank under one regime. This was unsuccessful; especially since the growing influence of Nasser and other Pan-Arabic movements were mobilizing Arab nationalism against the Western Powers. The Arabic identity affected by Nasser's anti-imperialist and anti-Western approach became the main threat of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. It also found great support among the Palestinians. The growing influence of Arab nationalism ended with the failure of Six Days War in 1967. Although the extremist Arab states and Pan-Arabism supporters hadn't change their ideology overnight, they started approaching the Western states after this point. The Camp David

agreement in 1978, which started the normalization between Egypt and Israel, is a remarkable example of that. The failure of Pan-Arabism had eliminated one of the biggest threats to the existence of the Hashemite Kingdom and on the other hand, one of the unifying factors of the Jordanian regime. The Arabic identity among the Jordanian and Palestinian people also weakened after the '67 war. As a result, the foundation and growth of the Palestinian national movement became effective within the borders of Jordan.

2.4. The Palestinization of Jordan

2.4.1 Reasons for the Palestinization of Jordan

After the establishment of Israel, it seemed that the Palestine problem had already been resolved by the division of Palestine into two states: Israel and Jordan. Jordan's occupation and then reunification of Cisjordan was approved by the Second Arab-Palestinian Conference held in Jericho on December 1, 1948. In this conference Abdullah was proclaimed King of Palestine and it was decided that a union of Arab Palestine with the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan would be built. The Transjordanian government agreed to unification on December 7, 1948, and the name of the Kingdom was changed to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The Union was established by the series of parliamentary acts, conference decisions and proclamations to legalize the annexation and to postulate it to the Western Powers. The annexation was recognized by the United Kingdom immediately, the United States declared that they could recognize the new borders of the Kingdom except for Jerusalem. These new borders were similar to the borders that the UK had passed as one of the acceptable solutions to the Palestinian question. Although it was never implemented, the solution of the Peel Commission's report in 1937 suggested a joint Palestine-Transjordan state for the Arabs under the monarchy of Abdullah. The United Kingdom was against the establishment of Israel, but after the war, the two-state solution (Jordan and Israel) was the best solution for the United Kingdom.

The US approach to Jordan was a result of its long-term desires for the Jewish state. The United States agreed to recognize the Transjordan Government and the Israel Government on the same day, January 31, 1949. These two states were linked in US President Harry Truman's mind. Israel was important for solving the Jewish refugee problem in Europe and Jordan was absorbing the Palestinian people displaced by the creation of Israel. Truman knew that Zionists and King Abdullah had some secret negotiations and agreements and he supported them (Bunch, Strike at Samu: Jordan, Israel, the United States, and the Origins of the Six-Day War 58). According to the President, existence and security of Israel was dependent on the stability of the Jordanian Kingdom. This point of view determined the structure of US-Jordan relations.

After the 1948 war and the annexation of the West Bank, Jordan became a land of two people with its own unique identity. King Hussein like his father King Abdullah wanted to build a Pan-Arabic Jordanian identity. However, the regional problems and the internal balances made it impossible to create a state system while using a Pan-Arabic identity. The regional problems were mostly related to the conflicts of the imperialist states, the competition between the USSR and the US, and the Arab Cold War related to global challenges. The most important internal problem was the demographic changes after the Arab-Israel wars. The reasons for these demographic changes were twofold. First of all, after the creation of Israel and the 1948 war, 700.000 Palestinians began to live within the extended borders of Transjordan. Some Palestinians started to live in the East Bank. The ambitions of King Abdullah and King Hussein to involve Palestine under their rule was the main reason why a new hybrid identity was created and all Palestinian people got Jordan passports. Secondly, the United States project for solving the Jewish and Palestinian questions was appropriate for the new borders of Jordan and Israel. US President Truman thought of Jordan as a home for Palestinian people, who would get used to living in Jordan and forget their lands, which became Israeli territory. Israel would be a land for Jews and Jordan would be a land for Palestinians under the Jordanian identity, which would help these immigrants to forget their origins. According to Truman, Israel and Jordan were twin states; the solutions of Palestinian radicalism through the influence of the Israeli and Jordanian leaders. Truman's plan was the

Israelization and Jordanization of Palestine. This attitude increased the Palestinian immigration to the east. However, the rapid change in demography and the failure of Pan-Arabism in the 1967 war created a counter dynamic, which started the Palestinization of the Jordanian region.

At this point, it is important to remember that the Jordanian hegemony over Palestine was not a new project of the United States, but the Peel Commission report in 1937, though it was never implemented, shows us that this project was appropriate to the British attitude. The borders after 1948, with the creation of Israel and the border extension of Jordan reflect a compromise between the attitudes of the United Kingdom and the United States.

The defeat of Arab states against Israel and the failure of Pan-Arabism to find a common solution for the Palestine problem accentuated the distrust of Palestinian people against the Arab leaders.

> There is, first of all, a deep distrust of the motives of Arab leaders and regimes: "Our problem is that none of the Arab states truly supports us, unlike the Vietnam situation where Hanoi helped the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam. The Arab governments are all reactionary and with the Americans. " (Secondary school student, male, 18 yrs.) Fighting a liberation struggle from "countries that do not truly support us" was often given as the Palestinians' most serious problem, more often than personal insecurity or the difficulty of finding jobs. This view parallels another which saw the complicity of "certain Arab leaders" as one of the causes of the 1948 disaster: "Palestinians had the potential power to defeat their enemy, but opposing forces. . . were too strong for them. Then, as now, Arab governments conspired against us." (R. Sayigh 9)

The creation of the PLO in the first Arab summit of 1964 had already started a debate about the Palestinian question. This debate grew after the failure of Pan-Arabism. The distrust of Palestinian people against the Arab leaders led to a cleavage between

Palestinian and Arab nationalism. Palestinian nationalism started to distinguish itself from other Pan-Arabic ideologies.

> The Palestinians launched the first post-1967 attack against pan-Arabism. Given their predicament, their economic and political dependence upon the Arab states and their lack of a territorial base, theirs had to be a different kind of attack. But there was no doubt that those who rallied around Yassir Arafat and George Habash in the aftermath of the Six Day War had given up on pan-Arabism—the first group in the name of Palestinian nationalism, the second in the name of social revolution. The duel that raged between the Palestinians and the Nasserites from early 1968 until Nasser's death in 1970 was in essence a fight about the independent rights of Palestinian nationalism. (Ajami 360)

Then in 1969, the Arab states, especially Nasser in Egypt lost their influence on PLO. Yasser Arafat was selected as the new leader of the Organization. Arafat traced a road to independence getting support of the Palestinian people, especially of the strengthening new Palestinian bourgeois and Palestinian Diaspora.

> If the Arab states could not protect themselves against Israel, let alone do something for the Palestinians, then the latter were to construct their own independent politics. In the final analysis, it was Arafat's brand of nationalism, with its pledge of nonintervention in the internal affairs of Arab countries, that found its way into the organized Arab state system, rather than George Habash's revolution. Arafat's narrow focus on Palestinian nationalism and his avoidance of social and ideological issues were in keeping with the new tenor of Arab politics, and that is why Arafat's course found a reasonable measure of support […](Ajami 360)

The Palestinian bourgeois became more powerful after the oil boom of the mid-1970's and Palestinians started to invest in Jordan, especially in the construction sector in Amman. The Jordanian Palestinians became a minority group in the Jordanian state, despite being a demographic majority and having the economic strength in Jordan through the private economic sector. After the 1970's, these dynamics began shaping the Jordanian internal relations and increased the inter-community tensions.

Meanwhile, Palestinian capital earned in the Gulf during the oil boom of the mid-1970s began to pour into the country, making its most obvious mark through a construction explosion in Amman. Whatever gaps had existed between the two communities before The influx of Palestinian could only widen as a result of the dramatic display of overwhelmingly Palestinian wealth. Combined with the government's post-1970 "East Banker first" policy of preferential hiring of Transjordanians, the influx of Palestinian money exacerbated a public sector/private sector divide that closely followed intercommunal lines. (Brand, Palestinians and Jordanians : A Crisis of Identity 53)

The economic and demographic reality in the East Bank and the growing Palestinian nationalism all over the region increased the influence of Palestinian identity, although another process, depalestinization was applied by Jordan as the main policy of the state.

2.4.2. The reasons for the Depalestinization of Jordan

Transjordan was a part of the British Palestinian mandate before the British administration decided to divide it into two mandates. The eastern part was placed under Emir Abdullah's rule, and it was named Transjordan, which would be Jordan as an independent state in 1946. The depalestinization of Transjordan started immediately after the division by British authorities and it increased after the creation of the Transjordanian National Congress and Transjordanian Army of Glubb Pasha. After a successful process, the Transjordanian identity was split off from the Arab and Palestinian identities. However, after the 1948 war, the creation of Israel led to the problems of Palestinian refugees and Palestinian statehood. President Truman wanted to solve these problems through Jordan citizenship, so he approved the annexation of West Bank de facto. According to Truman, Jordan would be home for the Palestinian refugees. This also meant the end of the Palestinian statehood problem. The American attitude with Abdullah's expansionist ambitions started a new approach of the palestinization of Jordan. Although the second Arab-Palestinian Conference proclaimed Abdullah king of Palestine and Transjordan, Abdullah knew that becoming King of Palestine meant the responsibility of all Palestine, which involved the region of Israel.

This led to new problems with Israel and the Western Powers. Abdullah needed to discourage and eventually end Palestinian nationalism in the West Bank. This was appropriate to the Western Powers' plan, which was decreasing the power of radical Palestinian nationalists in the region. Although Jordan became the best option for solving the Palestinian refugee problem and Palestinian radicalism, it never desired to be a Palestinian state, although it included parts of the old and new Palestine. A Palestinian state was not appropriate to the plans of Western Powers, which wanted to guarantee the existence of the Israeli state. They could not accept a Palestinian state near Israel, the demographic structure of which involved an important number of Palestinians, although it would be control by a reliable ally. As a result, after the annexation, Abdullah took some precautions to prevent the Palestinization of the social sphere and the state.

First of all, the changing demographic structure needed to be balanced with building a new hybrid identity, Jordanian identity, which was different than the Transjordanian and Palestinian identities. Moreover, the word 'Palestine' was banned in official writings and state documents. This assimilation process resulted in the assassination of King Abdullah by a Palestinian nationalist. Despite the death of King Abdullah, the depalestinization continued by his grandson and successor King Hussein. The cleavage became deeper after the 1967 war, which resulted in the failure of the Pan-Arabism. The Palestinian influx of more than 250.000 refugees after the 1967 war, and the growing influence of the Palestinian nationalism and the PLO, led to the war between the Palestinian guerrillas of the PLO and the Jordanian state in 1971. This civil war ended in the expulsion of the Palestinian guerrillas from Jordan, which spearheaded the emergence of the "East Banker first" policies in Jordan. Whatever the reasons were, it was clear that the government began to prefer the Transjordanians into the bureaucracy. Military personnel had always been selected from those of Transjordanian origins. These factors strengthened the Palestinian identity of the Palestinian Jordanians as a counter reaction. The cleavage between the state and Palestinians grew with the "East Banker first" trend.

The recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in 1974 by the Arab League led to a new depalestinization process in Jordan. The recognition meant that the claim of King Hussein being the representative of the West Bank was now invalid. The Palestinians rose up in many areas of the West Bank, and inter-communal tensions started to grow. As a result, the King suspended the Jordanian parliament where the West Banker stationed representatives for an indefinite period (Brand, Palestinians and Jordanians : A Crisis of Identity 53). The 'East Banker first' attitude grew during this period, while Palestinian nationalism became more attractive for the Palestinian people in East Bank. The cleavage between the two peoples grew rapidly after this period. During the 1950s and 1960s, the two peoples were not so strictly separated. There were notable Palestinian families, who supported King Abdullah rather than Palestinian leader Haj Amin al-Husayini in the mandate period (Brand, Palestinians and Jordanians : A Crisis of Identity 53). There were also Transjordanian people, who supported the PLO even during the Black September and fought against the Jordanian armed forces.

The First Intifada and the possible peace negotiations of the Parties of the Palestinian question made it clear that the regime could not survive without a plan of dealing with the Palestinian problem and a democratization process. These preparations started with the disengagement process, and ended in the Jordan-Israel peace agreement in 1994. On 30 July 1988, King Hussein announced the disengagement of Jordan from West Bank and Gaza and mentioned that the Palestinians had the right to own these regions. With this decision, King Hussein canceled the work agreements of 21.000 Palestinian workers, who worked in the Jordanian establishments.

The disengagement in 1988 was not only a short-term policy of the Jordanian Kingdom. It had great impact on the identity creation process. Before the diversion and creation of the Transjordanian mandate in 1920's, there was neither an identity conflict nor a common national identity, which involved all the people in the East Bank. The tribal identities were dominant in the region. However, during the mandate period, the Transjordanian identity started to involve the different tribes and began to be a common

national identity of the East Bankers. However, the involvement of the Palestinian people after the 1948 war and the annexation of the West Bank resulted in a new hybrid, Pan-Arabic identity. The internal and external challenges of Jordan during the period of 1950-1967 made it impossible to be accepted by both the Palestinian and Transjordanian people. Thus, the disengagement satisfied both the Palestinian and Jordanian people after its announcement. However, it created new expectations and problems in the Kingdom. The Transjordanian nationalists started to expect that the Palestinians would return after a short period to their homes, and Jordan would be independent from the Palestinian identity, both politically and also demographically. However, the disengagement of Palestinian could not solve the Palestinian problem in Jordan. The 1967 war had not only changed the borders of Jordan, but also the demographic structure of the East Bank. King Hussein's unilateral declaration about the need for a Palestinian entity did not reflect a comprise between Israel and Jordan. It was still a matter of negotiation. Moreover, the expectations of Transjordanian nationalists and Jordanian Palestinians were dependent on a peace process. The Palestinians' expectations for a Palestinian entity and the Transjordanian expectations of the demise of Palestinian domination in Jordan turned into a disappointment for both parties in a short period after the announcement of the disengagement.

Although King Hussein disengaged from the West Bank, he was not disengaged from the whole Palestinian question. The demographic reality of Palestinians in Jordan still continued. The disengagement helped King Hussein to prevent Israel's policies that included Jordan as an alternative homeland for Palestinians. However, the Palestinization of Jordan was not only a political move of Israel, but also a demographic, economic and cultural reality of Jordan. Although King Hussein and the leader of PLO, Yasser Arafat took some precautions to prevent the Palestinization of Jordan, and compromise on the opposition the alternative homeland policies of Israel in the international area, another political movement involved the Palestinian activity, and the elections in 1989 clearly reflected this.

2.4.3. The effects of the Palestinization and Depalestinization processes on other identities

The Depalestinization after 1948 had caused the Pan-Arabism in Jordan as previously mentioned. There were external and internal reasons. First of all, the unsuccessful social revolution attempt in Egypt and the following coup d'état of Arab Nationalist Nasser changed the political environment in the Middle East. Furthermore, the split in the Middle East became an instrument of the Cold War of the global imperialist powers, like the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR. Arab nationalism was slowly accepted by the Transjordanian population, but also by the West Bankers. Secondly, the annexation process of West Bank spearheaded the creation of a new Jordanian identity, whose components were mostly Pan-Arabic rather than Transjordanian or Palestinian. The attempt of the assimilation the Palestinian identity into the Pan-Arabic Jordanian identity failed in a short period, because of the radicalization of the Pan-Arabism, which reflected itself in the unsuccessful coup d'état of Ebu Navvar and the protests against the unification in Iraq, which became dominant and a rival to the liberal approach of King Hussein. Although King Hussein wanted to act as a bridge between the Western Powers and the Arab states, he could not prevent the polarization between Israel and the Arab world. The failure of the 1967 war ended the Pan-Arabic radicalization and Soviet influence in the Middle East. This solved the Jordanian foreign crisis, but the failure of Pan-Arabism started an internal division with the rise of Palestinian nationalism. This spearheaded the depalestinization efforts after the 1967 war, which resulted in the deportation of the Palestinian guerrillas in 1971, which was named Black September. The depalestinization efforts continued in the legislative and political area. However, palestinization progressed in Jordan economically and demographically. The majority of the Palestinian population and its economical dominance in the private sector expanded the cleavage between East Bankers and the West Bank origins, mostly due to fear of the regime from the Jordanian Palestinians. 'The East Banker first' approach became dominant in the Kingdom, especially in the bureaucracy and in the army. Although the Palestinization of Jordan was a social reality, it never reflected itself in politics of Jordan. It was a side effect of the PLO's policies in the occupied areas. Contrarily, both King Hussein and the PLO were against the Palestinization of Jordan. The ideological

background and the relations of King Hussein with the Western Powers positioned him against a political Palestinian movement within the borders of Jordan. Although there were different approaches in the PLO, Yasser Arafat was against the Palestinization of Jordan in the political arena. He thought that a Palestinian political movement in Jordan would result in the acceptance of the Israel's Alternative Homeland projects globally. Despite the democratic process and parliamentary elections, and the demographic and economic dominance of the Palestinian population, Palestinian activism after the first Intifada wasn't reflect in the Parliamentary elections in 1989. There was not even a political party, which included a word like Palestine or Palestinian in its name.

The lack of an option for the Palestinians directed the Palestinians towards another alternative: to the Islamic Action Front, which was backed by the Ikhwan, one of the oldest and organized political powers in Jordan.

The Jordanian Ikhwan al-Muslimin is founded as a branch of the Ikhwan al-Muslimin, which is one of the oldest and largest Islamic groups and which has founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. The Jordanian branch was founded in 1942, having built its organizational structure in a short period in Jordan.

After the annexation of West Bank in 1950, relations between the Ikhwan and the Hashemite leadership were usually mutual. The Ikhwan didn't have any political activity in the West Bank nor in Transjordan; it was like a charity organization with a religious ideology. The heritage of Hashemite family, who claimed coming from the Prophet Muhammed, made it easier for King Hussein to build close relationships with the Ikhwan. King Abdullah had recognized and legalized the Ikhwan in the Mandate period in 1945.

The Ikhwan backed King Hussein against the Nasserists in the 50's and 60's. Moreover, the Ikhwan was always seen as a counter-ideology of the Palestinization of Jordan. Islam was a common point for both the Palestinians and East Bankers. However, the evolution

of the Ikhwan in the occupied areas changed also the relations between the Jordanian Ikhwan and King Hussein.

While the Palestinian resistance grew in the occupied areas during the 1970's and influenced all the Palestinians in the region, the Ikhwan completed its new organizational structure, which was the result of the centralization projects of the Ikhwan throughout the region. According to Ziad Abu-Amr, the Ikhwan in Gaza, the West Bank and Jordan united under one organization, which spearheaded an improvement in the organizational structure of the Ikhwan in the occupied areas. This improvement started to push the Ikhwan to take more responsibilities in Palestine (9). The reluctance of the Ikhwan to participate in the active resistance in the occupied areas resulted in the split of Islamic Jihad from the main body of the Ikhwan. Although they had no dispute in ideologiy, the approach of the founder of the Islamic Jihad was different than the Ikhwan in the emergency rescue of Palestine. According to them, the Ikhwan needed to participate in the resistance movement in the occupied areas. On the other hand, the Ikhwan also wanted rescue Palestine from a Jewish hegemony. However, the Ikhwan's priority was the Islamization of the public. So, they had rejected participation in the resistance movement. The dispute caused the split of Islamic Jihad from the Palestinian Ikhwan. However, the organizational improvement of the Ikhwan, the influence of the resistance movement and the pressures and arrests of Israel against the Ikhwan caused radicalization tendencies in the organization. The first Intifada in 1987 pushed the Ikhwan to decide to join the resistance. They started to use the name of Hamas rather than the Ikhwan to avoid harm to the organizational structure. After a short period, Hamas would become one of the biggest political movements in the occupied areas.

This transformation didn't only affect Palestinian policies, but it was influential upon Jordanian internal balances. After the first intifada and the Maan uprising, King Hussein announced a new political agenda, which involved political and economical liberation. One of the important reforms was the opening of the Parliament and the approval of the participation of different ideological movements for selections. The Ikhwan al-Muslimin achieved election success; they gained 22 of the 80 seats in the National Assembly. They

joined the Mudar Badran's government with the education, Islamic affairs, social development, justice and health ministers. The reasons for this success were twofold.

First of all, the relations of King Hussein and the Ikhwan were very close after the support of the Ikhwan in many crises in Jordanian history, like Black September and the opposition of the Nasserists throughout the 50's and 60's. This coordination was reflected in the results of the 1989 selections. Secondly, as Juan José Escobar Stemmann mentioned, the Ikhwan occupied the political space, which was left by the PLO and other Palestinian organizations in Jordan (39). Palestinians in the refugee camps and in other areas were seen as a logistical backup for the Palestinian armed forces in the occupied areas. As a result, the Jordanian Palestinians started to support an organized political option, which were not denying the Palestinians rights and identity in general, in the selections. Moreover, the political rise of the Islamist in the Middle East and especially in Palestine helped the Ikhwan in the 1989 elections. However, the grow of the Ikhwan with all this dynamics created a cleavage in the Ikhwan's main body. This would be visible in the Peace Process period of the 90's.

CHAPTER 3:
THE IDENTITY CRISIS DURING THE
PALESTINE-ISRAEL PEACE PROCESS

As demonstrated in the last chapter, although the depalestinization processes in Jordan became the main state policy and started to be implemented before the creation of the Hashemite Kingdom, it failed against the regional dynamics, imperialist powers' wishes, ambitions of Jordan monarchs, and the conversion of the identities of Palestinian people. After the 90's, the Palestinization became the main economical, political and social reality of the country. The involvement of Palestinian activism by the Islamic Organizations in 1989 didn't blend Palestinian identity into Islamic identity, but it started to resemble the Palestinian intransigence against the Jordanian regime. The Islamic identity, which reflected a reliable ally of the King and the Jordanian regime, changed into an opponent of the Jordanian policies in the region.

At this point, the internal balances of Jordan became more dependent on the international powers' peace agendas and the dynamics in the occupied regions. The peace treaty with Israel and the following anti-normalization campaigns became the main political problem in Jordan, which affected the Jordanian democratization attempts entirely.

3.1. Peace Agreements and their effects on the Jordanian politics and identity crisis

After the first Intifada and the labefaction of the Soviet bloc, a new negotiation era started between the Palestinians and Israel which was different than the former negotiations. During the 80's, there were several actors, who spoke for the Palestinians, but the 1990s Peace Process started with the recognition of the legitimate rights of them, their right of self-determination and 'the PLO' as the spokesman of the Palestinian people.

3.1.1. Madrid and Oslo Peace Processes and their effects on identity development

The Middle East Peace Conference, which started the peace process took place in Madrid and purported to solve the Arab-Israel dispute and the Palestine problem permanently (qtd in Armağan 88). The main aim of the Middle East Peace Process was finding a solution in accordance with the United Nations 242 resolution. The process was supported by the Arab states including Jordan. Before the start of the Madrid negotiations, King Hussein organized a national meeting, in which political organizations, Arab states and other actors met and agreed on a proposal to start the peace negotiations with Israel. It can be clearly seen that King Hussein wanted to take responsibility for the peace process, especially in the acceptance of this process by other Arab states (qtd in Armağan 89). The authorities of Syria, Lebanon and the PLO gave their support to King Hussein in this national meeting (qtd in Armağan 89). This conference initiated the dialogue of the Arab states with Israel. They announced that they were ready to begin direct negotiations with Israel throughout their representatives (qtd in Armağan 90).

The Madrid conference materialized in 1991 from September 30th until November 4th. The Palestinians were represented in the Jordanian delegation due to the refection of the PLO representatives by Israel (qtd in Armağan 90). The conference was a repetition of the classical positions of the parties. The Arab states emphasized that Israel should withdraw from the occupied areas. The PLO focused on the independent Palestinian state. Israel wanted to sign peace treaties with the bilateral agreements (qtd in Armağan

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91). Although the context of the negotiations seemed a failure for a peace treaty, the importance of this Congress was the configuration of it. The direct dialogue didn't result in a peace treaty, but the beginning of some dialogue was a step forward for the 1990s peace process. Another important point was that King Hussein emphasized that he supported a confederation of a Jordan-Palestine state.

After the '92 elections in Israel, the Workers Party took power of the government, which accelerated the peace negotiations (qtd in Armağan 92). The secret negotiations in Oslo started in January 1993 between Israel and the PLO. At the end of the negotiations, the PLO and Israel agreed on the recognition of each other and the Declaration of Principles, which included some cultural and social rights of Palestinian people, but didn't clearly declare an independent state of Palestine or the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people. As a result, some Arab states like Syria and Iraq claimed that the declaration was not acceptable. Jordan's position was unique. Although King Hussein didn't accept the PLO's policy to negotiate with Israel without Jordan and felt that the process was out of his control, he announced supportive opinions for the Oslo negotiations.

> The PLO has approved an international situation with its own total free preference and basing on historical responsibility. It has come to an end in the Declaration on Principles on September, 13th of 1993 with Israel and Israel has recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The old enemies had shaken hands. We will do everything to enhance this support. (qtd in Armağan 96)

The negotiations between Israel and the PLO resulting in King Hussein's signing a peace treaty with Israel and the normalization of Jordan-Israel relations. Although the Madrid and Oslo peace negotiations were big steps for recognizing the PLO and the collective rights of Palestinians, it started a big discussion among the Palestinians in the occupied areas and Jordan. The PLO and their supporters advocated the peace negotiations, which for the some of the Palestinians meant recognizing the Israeli existence. Newly founded Hamas, however, was against the peace process. In spite of the increasing political influence of Hamas, most of the Palestinians were hopeful about

the peace negotiations due to their trust in the PLO. On the other hand, the Madrid and Oslo negotiations spearheaded the Israel-Jordan peace agreement. The Islamic organizations including the Ikhwan were against the peace treaty. The Islamic political organizations became the a significant power opposing the recognition of Israel and the peace negotiations. Although they were not powerful enough to stop this process, the identifying with Islamic organizations became more popular in the political arena, so they started to lead the opposition against the peace negotiations and Israeli oppression, while the PLO was blamed for compromising with the Israelis.

3.1.2. Normalization with Israel and Anti-Normalization campaign and the transformation of Islamic identity

Although there were close relations between Israel and Jordan after the Black September and the 1973 war, the political environment of the Middle East, Jordan's connections with other Arab states and Jordan's internal demographic balances made it impossible for Jordan to sign a peace treaty with Israel. As Paul L. Scham and Russell E. Lucas mentioned, the borders of these two countries were silent and King Hussein met with Israeli leaders periodically(141).

Jordan had been one of the main actors in the Peace Process with other actors like the PLO for a solution based on the United Nations resolutions. King Hussein argued that a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan should handle security, Palestinian refugees and water problem simultaneously. The Middle East Peace Process which continued with the negotiations between the PLO and Israel, allowed King Hussein to end the 50 year-long problem between the two countries. After the acceptance of the PLO for an Israeli existence in the Middle East with the Declaration of Principles, there were no obstacles preventing Jordan from signing a peace treaty with Israel. There were several reasons that motivated the signing of this treaty.

First of all, the strategic and economical requirements of Jordan were dependent to the Western states and a peace treaty with Israel helped King Hussein repair his relations, which became problematic after the Gulf War. Secondly, the historical bounds of Israel

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and Jordan, which were built on historical Palestine, made them both sensitive to the Palestinian problem, especially after the first Intifada. The Palestinians in both countries collaborated between the two states on security issues. Moreover, the peace treaty would prevent the Israeli propaganda of the 'Great Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates'. The US intervention in Iraq pulled Iraq out of the struggle between Israel and Arab states. This resulted in the superiority of Israel to the Arab states, which didn't accept the state of Israel's existence, in the military arena.

On the Israeli side, a peace treaty with the Arab states seemed a success of dictating the status quo.   The Camp David Treaty in 1978 between Egypt and Israel was not only a peace treaty, but also the first step of recognition of Israel by the Arab states. However, the Declaration of Principles in 1993 was not comparable with the peace treaties between Israel and the Arab states. The peace treaties were the acceptance of Israel. Although the Declaration of Principles included the acceptance of Israel, it was also the acceptance of the PLO by Israel. The Declaration of Principles was not maintaining the status quo, but changing it with the recognition of the Palestinians national rights. Israel's main aim to sign the Declaration of Principles was spearheading the bilateral agreements with the Arab states, like the Jordan-Israel peace treaty. So the status quo and the 67 borders would be accepted by the Arab states. According to Israel, this would end the security problems and the dangers against the Israeli existence.

Although the Israel-Jordan treaty resulted from the Peace Process and the Declaration of Principles, it was also an attempt of King Hussein to become again a figure in the peace process. The recognition of the PLO with the Declaration of Principles and the start of direct contact between Israel and the PLO made Jordan out of the process. The peace treaty between Israel and Jordan in 1994 made it possible for King Hussein to have a voice in the solution of the Palestine problem, which had always been critical for Jordan's security.

The negotiations formulized in the Washington Declaration and one year later, the Israel- Jordan peace treaty was signed on September, 26 1994. The treaty included the

dependence on the United Nations resolutions of 242 and 338, the political independence and hegemony of both states, prevention of armed forces, which were harmful for any of these states, the acceptance of the borders, which were drawn in the Mandate period, starting of the diplomatic relations, a solution for the water disputes and other economical and cultural relations between two countries.

Despite the Declaration of Principles, the treaty was strictly criticized by the PLO and other Arab states. The PLO announced that Jordan's treaty with Israel was an attempt to intervene in the status of Jerusalem, which was thought of as the capital of the possible Palestinian state. Syria declared that this treaty was too early, and even Egypt didn't support this treaty entirely. The peace treaty caused not only external problems, but also internal political problems.

While most of the regime supporters were supporting the peace treaty with Israel, the leftist movements and the Ikhwan declared their uncompromising attitude against the treaty. Although the treaty seemed unacceptable for most of the Jordanian people, especially for the Palestinian origins, the 1993 elections demonstrated that the peace treaty was accepted by them. The political powers, which supported the peace treaty, became victorious and the opponents such as the Ikhwan, which were against the Jordan-Israeli normalization, were defeated completely. This picture was interpreted by most of the politicians and academics that majority of the Jordanian people, both the Palestinians and East Bank origins had accepted the peace treaty.

However, subsequent events revealed that the peace treaty was not accepted as it was thought by the political interpreters: First of all, the change in the electoral system was the main reason for that image. The open-list system changed to a 'one-man, one-vote' system. The urban population had benefited by the 'open-list' system, but the new system tended to benefit for the tribal leaders. With the change of the electoral system, the representation of the Palestinians, who lived mostly in urban places, decreased. It was reflected in the election results of the Islamic Action Front (IAF) backed by the Ikhwan, which gained the Palestinian as of the '89 elections. With the new electoral

system, King Hussein prevented an increase in influence of the Ikhwan, which had the potential to be an influential anti-peace power in the parliament. According to Scham and Lucas, King Hussein moved to amend the law with the early reports of the Oslo negotiations (145). The 'open-list' system had changed with the "one-man, one-vote" system to prevent an election triumph of the possible opponents of peace. Secondly, King Hussein's charisma used to support the peace treaty. In 1992, King Hussein underwent a serious operation in the United States for cancer. When he came back to Jordan, he was greeted by great public support. His personal charisma was combined with a media campaign of the government to influence public opinion for the peace treaty. According to Scham and Lucas, King Hussein made it clear in his speeches that the peace treaty was "his." (146) Therefore, those opposed to the treaty were also positioned against the King, monarchy and the regime itself.

Moreover, the economical benefits mentioned in the media campaigns also made the Jordanian people hesitant. According to the government's propaganda, the treaty would bring new investments and economical opportunities to Jordan, especially in the areas of tourism and industry. The economical benefits were important for those of East Bank origins, but perhaps even more so for the Jordanian Palestinians because of their position in the private sector. According to the government, Jordan would gain aid and funding from the United States with the signing of the Peace Treaty. As Scham and Lucas point out, Egypt was a model for Jordanian people after the Camp David Conference in 1979 with its economical boost provided by American and Israeli investments (147).

The treaty and the normalization with Israel was not accepted by the Jordanian peoples, especially by the Palestinians. The normalization with Israel after the 94 Peace treaty spearheaded a big discussion in Jordanian society and mobilized a great following that didn't want to accept the normalization. The so-called anti-normalization campaigns found great support in the late 90's.

In May 1994, Islamist and leftist political parties agreed on building the 'Popular Arab and Jordanian Committee for Resisting Submission and Normalization'. This was a

unique agreement, in which the Communists, the Baathists and the IAF backed by the Ikhwan compromised on a national agenda. This agreement didn't only influence the peoples of Jordan, but also the governing elite. Most of the supporters of the Peace negotiations between the PLO and Israel criticized the Jordanian peace treaty with Israel. However, the participation in the protests against the treaty was not as much as expected. After the Amman protest with 5000 people, any kind of demonstration was banned and muted in a short time. However, the Islamists and Leftists continued their propaganda against the peace treaty.

The most important reason for the lack in support of the Jordanian peoples during the protests was the success of the regime's propaganda for the economic benefits of the treaty (Robins 190). Most of the Jordanians were expecting that regional peace would bring financial prosperity to Jordan, especially in the foreign investments. Before the second Intifada, there was hope for the end of violence in the region. However, the failure of the peace negotiations, the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and the failing of expectations of the US aid program for the private sector directed the Jordanians to rethink the Israeli peace agreement. The second Intifada strengthened the opposition against the peace treaty, but also the Palestinization of Jordan.

Although the main target of organizers of the anti-normalization campaigns was clear and simple, there were many different reasons for opposing the treaty, because of the diversity of political organizations. Most of the opposition did not reject a regional peace (including Israel) but they were against the signed peace treaty of 1994. One of the worries of the opposition was that the peace treaty would end the ties of Jordan with the Arab and Muslim states in the region. Another fear was that the peace treaty was in violation of the principles of the UN resolutions. Moreover, the opposition mentioned that the treaty dealt with refugees only as a humanitarian problem, but not as a political one. Finally, they claimed that the Jordanian government slowed the political liberalization of Jordan after the signing of the Israeli-Jordan peace agreement. The pressures of government against the media were not acceptable for a country that began

a democratic opening only a few years before. This was also problematic for the proponents of normalization.

Like the other internal conflicts of Jordan, the acceptance of the normalization process was also dependent on the events in Palestine and relations between the regional actors. Thus, the peace process and political environment in Palestine were the main determinants of normalization. Although the PLO started negotiating with the Israelis, it was against the peace treaty of Jordan with Israel. According to them, the recognition of Israel by Arab states could harm the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The critics of the PLO were influencial on the Jordanian Palestinians and caused them to unify against the peace treaty with Israel. However, as a result of its strategic position against the Israeli politics "Jordan option", the PLO had always refused interference into Jordan's politics. Despite the PLO's refusal of the peace negotiations, it had no political structure or organization to unify people against the treaty and encourage them to struggle against it in accordance with the PLO's stance. On the other hand, the growing influence of the Islamic organizations and Islamic identity started influencing the Palestinians both in the occupied areas and in Jordan. Their consistent approach against the peace negotiations started to be embraced by the Palestinians. The Ikhwan became the main organization of the Jordanian Palestinians after the 90's. So the Islamic identity started to be considered a threat by the regime for the Jordanian status quo.

3.1.3. Oslo II and Hebron Agreements – Wye River Memorandums and Palestinization of Islamic identity

According to the second part of the Declaration of Principles, the clarification of the borders and other details of the Palestine administration would be determined in a short period. With the participation of Arafat and Rabin, and the representatives of the United States, Jordan and Egypt, the Oslo II agreement was signed to ensure the creation of a Palestine administration in October 1995. Although the assassination of Rabin on November 4th 1995 was an attempt to prevent the materialization of this agreement, Israel started to withdraw from the occupied areas on the 13th of November. Several steps were to be taken according to the agreement. First, in January 1996, the Palestinian

elections would take place, resulting in the presidency of Arafat. All the Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank had the chance to participate in the elections. For the Palestinians of Jerusalem, there special arrangements were made by Israel. Moreover, the withdrawal of Israel occurred according to plan, which included the simplification of the elections and security by the armed forces. The withdrawal was nearly complete by December 1995.

The start of the 1996 Grapes of Wrath operation in Lebanon aimed to change the political atmosphere in the peace process and resulted in the death of more than one hundred Palestinians to Lebanon was controversial due to its approach and brought about the failure of Simon Peres in the elections, but the Likud Party and its leader Netanyahu, who was elected in May 1996 was more radical and irreconcilable. He did not accept a Palestinian state, but only limited autonomy in the region. The policies of Netanyahu, especially the archeological tunnel project into the region of the Temple Mount, (a holy site for the Muslims), cut the peace negotiations with the Palestinians. There were also Israeli politicians who criticized Netanyahu's policies, such as the foreign minister David Levy, who resigned to protest Israeli politics in 1998.

In 1996, Netanyahu's policies were confronted by riots by Palestinians. A general increase in violence in the region brought the peace process to crisis status. But in January 1997, a Protocol was signed in Hebron. This included Israeli troop withdrawal from Hebron. The Hebron Agreement spearheaded the start of the negotiations between Arafat and Likud Party, despite doubts that they would never negotiate with the Palestinians and never follow the Rabin's policy of 'land for peace'. The Hebron agreement was seen as the defeat of Israel's foreign policy, especially by the supporters of the Likud Party. However, the most important gain of Israel from this agreement was the continuation of the Jewish settlers in Hebron.

According to the agreement, the Israeli forces would start withdrawing on March 1997 and would end on September 1998. Arafat's speech in Hebron surprised the world community when he announced that they made peace with all Israel and its political

parties. However, the creation of new Jewish settlements in the south of Jerusalem was seen as a betrayal by the Jews against the peace process. At this point, Arafat started to find a way to apply the agreements by negotiating with then US President Bill Clinton. Clinton announced his support for Arafat after several meetings (qtd in Armağan 106) After an effective pressuring by the United States, Hamas leader of Seyh Ahmet Yasin was released by Israel. Arafat thought that Hamas would end the armed resistance against Israel, but the continuing of violence against the Israeli citizens by Hamas and Islami Jihad caused a loss of Arafat's prestige in the Western world.

In response of this, Arafat arrested the members of Hamas and Islami Jihad. After this point, Arafat was confronted with a strong opposition of the Islamic organizations. Moreover, corruption in the Palestinian administration and the failure of the Oslo agreements poorly affected Arafat and the PLO's reputation in the eyes of the Palestinian people. The internal pressures led Arafat to announce the creation of the Palestinian state unilaterally, if there wouldn't be any agreement with Israel. The declaration resulted in a new start for the negotiations between Netanyahu and Arafat.

The Wye River Memorandum was signed in October 1998 between Arafat and Netanyahu. Ariel Sharon was also involved in the negotiations after taking David Levy's position due to reassignment (qtd in Armağan 107). The President Clinton and King Hussein were also involved in the process. Although the memorandum included the acceptance of the evacuation from the occupied areas, Israel didn't withdraw from the lands agreed in the agreement due to reasons like continuing terror and responsibilities of security. The political responsibility of Israel's continuing occupation had also a heavy price, which was paid by two political Powers. First of all, the maintain of the static quo in spite of the treaties and memorandums changed the Israeli image in the international public eye. Most of the pro-Israeli writers changed their positions or became neutral (meaning a recognition of Israel as a terror-state, that didn't want to make peace with Arabs). Not only Israel, but also another political power was affected by the continuing problem. The failures were also seen as shortcomings of the PLO. There were some Palestinians who thought that the failure to implement the agreements

was an attempt of the Likud Party to end the peace initiatives with the PLO. The supporters of the PLO and Palestinians who still had faith in the peace process didn't lose their entire hope for a peace agreement with Israel. At this moment, the electoral success of the Labor Party gave the PLO a boost towards the peace process.

The Israeli elections, which resulted in the victory of Labor Party leader Ehud Barak, started a new era in the peace process. The political environment changed rapidly, and some Palestinian intellectuals declared that Jews had preferred peace over war with Palestinians at the moment of the elections (qtd in Armağan 108). However, the death of King Hussein in 1999 was also important for the peace process, since he had been involved from the beginning. Abdullah II became the King of Jordan after his father.

Another agreement, which was based on the Wye River Memorandum, was signed on September 1999 in Egypt. With the so-called Wye II agreement, Israel would release 350 Palestinian prisoners, withdraw from the 11 percent land of Palestine and open 2 corridors, which would be between Gaza and the West Bank. According to this agreement, September 10th 2000 would be the final date for the peace agreement (qtd in Armağan 110).

Although the parties had agreed on a detailed action plan in the agreement, it had never been implemented. The leader of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmut Abbas, mentioned in June 2005 at the meeting with Sharon that the Wye II agreement had only been applied in two towns. The agreed number of prisoners hadn't yet been released. Moreover, the Jewish settlements had still continued to be built (qtd in Armağan 110).

Despite the signing of several declarations, the content of the declarations couldn't be applied. Thus, the image of the negotiating parties, the PLO and Israel was harmed in the eyes of the world. The Palestinians in the occupied areas lost their hope for solving the Palestinian problem by negotiating with the Israeli state. Most of them joined the anti-peace camp of Hamas and other Islamic organizations. Meanwhile, the Jordanian Palestinians became strongly influential in the Jordanian branch of the Ikhwan. While

the Islamic organizations intensified the Palestinian resistance in the occupied areas and in the national assembly of the Jordanian Kingdom, the Palestinian nationalists took important responsibilities and positions in these organizations and thereby led them towards the national resistance. As a result, Islamic identity became one of the branches of the Palestinian national resistance with its growing influence in the occupied areas and in Jordan, while the PLO lost its reliablity and prestige among the Palestinians.

3.1.4. The Camp David negotiation and its consequences on identity conflict

After the failure of the Wye II, the United States started an initiative for signing a final agreement before September 2000, which was agreed on as the last date. Madeline Albright, the representative of the United States, met with both the leaders of Israel and the Palestinian authority. In July, Israel and Palestine came together at Camp David, where the first step of the peace process was taken between Egypt and Israel in 1979. The place, the date, and all other details were arranged for a historical moment to end the Middle Eastern war era. As a result of this, the expectations grew very high for the Palestinians and the Israelis to begin a peaceful future starting with the Camp David negotiations in 2000. However, the parties couldn't compromise and so returned home without an agreement. Edward Said explained the results of the negotiations with these sentences:

> The culmination of the July Camp David meetings virtually collapsed. It was understood to be the final solution to the Palestine-Israel conflict. The chaos created in the Middle East and the compensations required to be paid by Israel for the Palestinian refugees not only were refused by Israel completely after 1948 disaster, but additionally, all the inflicted damages since the 1967 invasion was ignored. (qtd in Armağan 112)

Actually, both leaders came to the negotiations under pressure of their competitors. While Barak was afraid of the radical nationalist or religious groups blaming him for giving concessions to the Palestinians, Arafat was afraid of giving concessions that

would invoke reactions from radical groups like Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Hamas or Islami Jihad.

Before the negotiations, Barak announced that it was impossible to return to the borders of 1967. This exposed a contradiction with the basic principle of the Peace Process, which began with the acceptance of the borders from 1967. Moreover, he mentioned that the refugees would stay where they were and there wouldn't be any change in their rights as well as refusing any concession in Jerusalem (qtd in Armağan 113). Although Arafat didn't announce such limitations, he could not accept any solution that didn't include a compromise on Jerusalem.

Bill Clinton ended the Camp David negotiations after he understood that there wouldn't be any agreed-upon solution between the both leaders. This came as a great disappointment for the Palestinians in the occupied areas. Proponents of the peace process blamed the attitude of the Likud Party for conflicts in the peace negotiations with Israel. After Camp David, they couldn't find any reasonable explanation for the dissent of the Labor Party. Moreover, the Palestinian intellectuals started to think that there wasn't any peace partner in Israel to negotiate. To the Palestinian people, this meant an end to the peace process with Israel. The hopes of Palestinians were demolished.

In this political environment, the visit of Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount, where the holy mosque Mescid-i Aksa is located encouraged demonstrations of Palestinian people against Israel. The counter-response of Israeli security forces couldn't stop the uprising of Palestinian people. This was later identified as the start of the second Intifada.

Although the Camp David negotiation occurred between the PLO and Israel, the Jordanian Palestinians would be the most related party of a possible agreement, especially related to the negotiations of the refugee problem. However, during the whole negotiation period, the problems of refugees weren't even discussed. Moreover, according the most Palestinians, the long process since the 90's had proven that it was

impossible to find a fair and peaceful solution with the Israelis. Especially after the Camp David negotiations, the Palestinians lost all hopes for a peace treaty. They reflected their feelings and their commitment of the Palestinian state with the second Intifada. Besides this, the Jordanian Palestinians started becoming involved in the political activity in order to work towards a solution in Palestine. The normalization process and anti-normalization campaigns period gave a chance to the Jordanian Palestinians to be active in Jordanian politics. They started organizing through the anti-normalization political activity around some political organizations, but mostly around the Ikhwan. The Palestinians who were already familiar with the Ikhwan's activity from the anti-normalization campaigns had entered the organizational body of the Ikhwan and after the second Intifada, they started becoming part of decision-making mechanisms in the organization. On the other hand, with the anti-normalization campaigns, the Ikhwan took a political position against the King for the first time in its history. The Islamic identity was always seen as one of the main pillars of the Jordanian regime and therefore, the Kings of Jordan had always given importance to relations with the Islamic organizations, especially with the Ikhwan. However, peace with Israel couldn't be accepted by the Islamic organizations. Therefore, the Islamic identity became attractive for the Palestinians who were seeking a political movement against Israeli oppression. On the other hand, the political environment and the influence of the Palestinians in its organizational structure forced the Ikhwan to take counter-stance position during the peace process. As a result, the Ikhwan became the main address of the opposition including the Palestinians. This caused the perception of the threat to the regime against the Ikhwan and the Islamic identity. The whole process and failures of the peace process, especially the failure of the Camp David negotiation, resulted in the Palestinization of the Ikhwan.

3.2. Taking responsibility of Islamic identity in Palestine and in Jordan

Islam was always a component in the struggle of Palestine and in the creation of the state of Jordan. While the struggle between Jews and Arabs were continuing during the British Mandate, the national movement which was led by the Palestinian elites

employed Islamic symbols in order to gain support of the Palestinians for the national movement. Moreover, Arafat and the Fatah movement (not the entire PLO) used Islamic terminology to influence the masses. However, these movements and their aims were not religious or religious based, but mostly national and secular (qtd in Litvak 2). After the first Intifada, Hamas, a new political movement was born in Palestine. It defined itself clearly as religious and announced its main aim as forming an Islamic state.

> In the Covenant of Hamas, it is defined such as: "The Islamic Resistance Movement: The Movement's programme is Islam. From it, it draws its ideas, ways of thinking and understanding of the universe, life and man. It resorts to it for judgement in all its conduct, and it is inspired by it for guidance of its steps." (*Mid East Web*)

Hamas's strategy had been defined in 1988 including its goals for Palestine, but also its position for social life, Islamic attitude and the role of woman in political life. It was determined how Hamas would approach Arab countries, the PLO and other Islamic movements. It was agreed that Hamas was a branch of the Ikhwan, so it accepted the main ideas of the Ikhwan like transforming the society and building an Islamic civil life step by step. For the Ikhwan, the Islamic transformation was a prerequisite for saving Palestine from the Jewish invasion. According to them, Islam should be understood by the society before an attempt of Jihad, which would mean Islamic holy war against non-believers of all kinds.

> In the early Hamas thinking and among rigid Palestinian Islamists the liberation of Palestine and the Islamization of society can never be reached simultaneously, but must come in sequence. For them, it would be futile to try to liberate Palestine before achieving a satisfactory degree of Islamization in Palestinian society. To their way of thinking, only religious and Islam-disciplined individuals would be able to defeat Israel. (qtd in Aburaiya 63)

Although Hamas's main aim was defined as transforming the civil society and Islamization of the Palestinian people, Hamas's practice was different than the other Ikhwans as mentioned in its declaration.

Nothing of the sort is to be found in any other regime. This is an undisputed fact. If other nationalist movements are connected with materialistic, human or regional causes, nationalism of the Islamic Resistance Movement has all these elements as well as the more important elements that give it soul and life. It is connected to the source of spirit and the granter of life, hoisting in the sky of the homeland the heavenly banner that joins earth and heaven with a strong bond. (*Mid East Web*)

The charter of Hamas declared Palestine as a waqf (an Islamic trust) for the Muslim generations (*Mid East Web*). Thus, Hamas declared that every Muslim was required to join the fight against Israel and peace negotiations would not be acceptable. In article 13 of its declaration, it was written: "What are called 'peaceful solutions' and 'international conferences' to solve the Palestine question all conflict with the doctrine of the Islamic Resistance Movement, for giving up any part of the homeland is like giving up part of the religious faith itself" (*Mid East Web*). The declaration had explained Hamas's belief that the Jews or any other enemy who occupied Muslim land must be fought for by all Muslims with the holy war of Jihad. Therefore, the representatives of Palestine should withdraw from the negotiations (*Mid East Web*). Hamas materialized its doctrines by determining its position for the peace initiatives starting with the Madrid Conference, for which it called an immediate withdrawal from negotiations.

3.2.1. Formation of Hamas and reformation of Islamic identity

Although Hamas, even today, identifies itself as a branch of the Ikhwan, it distinguishes from its mother organization in its political practice. While the Egyptian branch's priority was the Islamization of the country and with the creation of an Islamic state, Hamas participated in the resistance movement before the spread of the Islamic lifestyle to the Palestinian people during the first Intifada. However, the participation of the Ikhwan in the first Intifada was a result of the nationalist movements and the former separations from its main body. To understand the formation of Hamas, we should look at the history of the Ikhwan in Palestine and in Jordan.

After Hasan al-Banna founded the Ikhwan in Egypt in 1928, it started to spread to other countries like the Emirate of Transjordan and Palestine. Hasan al-Banna sent his brother, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Banna' to find believers for the Ikhwan in Palestine. In 1947, there were 25 towns that had a branch of the Ikhwan. After the annexation of the West Bank in 1950, the Ikhwan established strict relations with the Hashemite leadership. Their activities were mainly social, not political. The Gaza Strip was controlled by Egypt and the problems between the Ikhwan and the Egyptian leadership, like Nasser flowed into the Gaza Strip, and some of the leaders of the Ikhwan were arrested and punished. After the '67 war and the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by the Israelis, the Ikhwan didn't change its policies of building schools and hospitals and being a religious based charity organization. The growing resistance movement in West Bank and Gaza started to affect the supporters of the Ikhwan and the organization was feeling pressure for participating in the resistance movement. The Ikhwan's main aim of religious restructuring of Palestine hadn't been criticized by other organizations and the Palestinian people fighting for liberation from colonization. With the growth of the organization and continued silence against the occupation, the pressure of the nationalist movement became strengthened. This initiated the split of the Islamic Jihad and transformation of the Palestinian Ikhwan to Hamas.

> Although Islamic Jihad has always been a small organization, its effect became always more than its organizational power. Moreover, its split revealed the political debates in the main body of the Ikhwan, which could be caused the need of Hamas. Islamic Jihad was founded by Fathi al-Shaqaqi and 'Abd al-'Aziz Auda, who were refugees in Gaza. Although they shared the same principles with the Ikhwan, the determinant difference of them was the place of Palestine in the Ikhwan's priorities. The centrality of the Palestine question in the Islamic holy war against the non-believers and the proper timing for liberating the country was the main difference between the notables of the Ikhwan and the founders of the Islamic Jihad. (qtd in Abu-Amr 9)

Furthermore, Islamic Jihad criticized Ikhwan's close relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, which were considered an "actual security belt for Israel." These regimes claimed being results of the Western invasion of the Islamic world like Israel (qtd in

Abu-Amr 9). The approach to the PLO was also different between the two organizations. Islamic Jihad didn't see the PLO as a rival organization, but as a partner organization, sharing similar objectives. The Ikhwan blamed the Islamic Jihad for being part of the Fateh and called it sometimes the 'Islamic Fateh'. The separation of Islamic Jihad and its critics for the Ikhwan made it easier to understand the requirement of the transformation of the Ikhwan to Hamas during the First Intifada.

While the First Intifada started in 1987, the Ikhwan was the second biggest and most influential organization in Palestine. When the uprising first started, the notables of the Ikhwan met in Ahmed Yasin's house and discussed the surprising events. They made the decision to participate in the protests and to call people to stand up against the Israeli occupation. Although they decided to participate in the Intifada, they didn't want to harm to the name of the Ikhwan, especially considering the failure of the uprising. They chose the name Hamas, the short form of Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamfrya (the Islamic Resistance Movement) while participating in the demonstrations. The transformation of the Ikhwan to Hamas took some time and was confronted with internal resistance. The traditional leaders didn't want to get involved with the uprising. Especially the leaders of West Bank in the organization maintained their traditional position and rejected to participation in the resistance. However, the reality of resistance and the critics of the PLO, which blamed the Ikhwan for not participating in the uprisings, weakened the traditional leaders' position and the main body of the Ikhwan transformed to Hamas in a short time. Hamas started to become an organized and effective political actor in Palestine. Although it never lost its Islamic appeal, it became an actual political organization with the involvement of the nationalist approach.

The PLO participated in and started to manage the first Intifada, though it couldn't benefit from it as much as Hamas. First of all, the PLO was mostly a guerrilla organization, which hadn't got an organizational structure like Hamas. The schools, charity organizations or the hospitals, which were built by the Ikhwan and continued by Hamas were part of their strategy for the Islamization of the Palestinians, but during and after the Intifada they were used as centers for the spread of the uprisings and Hamas

propaganda. Secondly, Hamas didn't get involved with the peace negotiations and didn't share in the failures of these negotiations.

The consistent opposition of Hamas changed the classical power balance of Palestinian politics. Most of the Palestinians politicized with the first Intifada and the twenty year PLO's resistance started joining Hamas, which began to influence the opposition against the Israeli state. As a result, the reformist attitude and image of the Islamic structure in Palestine started to change during the first Intifada until the Second Intifada. The Islamic identity started to involve the nationalist and revolutionist characteristics. This resulted in Hamas's lead of during the second Intifada and became the leader of the resistance movements.

3.2.2. The Second Intifada and the prominence of the Islamic Identity

After the failure of the second Camp David negotiations in 2000, Ariel Sharon visited the Muslim holy site: Temple Mount. The Palestinians considered this visit an assault to them and started protests, which were later accepted as the start of the second Intifada, against this visit and the occupation in general. With the second Intifada, the Palestinians showed their commitment and will power for the end of the occupation and for founding an independent Palestinian state. The Second Intifada started a new era in the Israeli-Palestinian relations (qtd in Armağan 114). The protests during the second Intifada were considered a rejection of the peace initiatives by the Palestinians through the eyes of the Western and Israeli peoples and the selection of Ariel Sharon as the President of Israel was a response of the Israeli people against this uprising. The polarization between Israel and Palestinians weakened the peace initiatives and destroyed the hopes of both sides.

After the elections, Sharon interpreted the uprising as an "intentional provocation for changing the Jewish and democratic structure of Israel" (qtd in Armağan 114). He attempted to squash the uprising by force, but it was unsuccessful. The armed conflict against the Intifada caused more Israeli civil causalities in urban areas and using force couldn't stop the Palestinian population from protesting the occupation.

As a result, thousands of Palestinians died during the Second Intifada between 2001 and 2005, while hundreds of Israeli people were killed by the suicide bombers of the Palestinian organizations. The militarization of the Palestine question destroyed the hopes of both nations for the peace initiatives, although the peace initiatives of the third states continued incessantly. The pressures of Israel against the Palestinian organizations and the siege of the headquarters of Yasser Arafat harmed the image of Israel through the eyes of the public.

The second Intifada concluded in Şarm El Şeyh in February 2005 with an agreement signed by Mahmud Abbas and Ariel Sharon, after it caused 5000 deaths from its start. King Abdullah II of Jordan was also invited the negotiations that ended with this agreement. The second Intifada changed the political atmosphere of the Middle East and Israel: While Palestinians gained motivation and courage against their occupiers, the response of the Israeli nationalists for bringing security and stability in the region failed in the eyes of the Israeli citizens. The politics of Israel maintaining security like the security wall was criticized strictly by not only Palestinians, but also by Israeli intellectuals. In a letter from Israeli citizens to the Czech Government, the policies of Israel had been criticized harshly:

> Fundamental principles of international law, as well as numerous European Union laws, have been violated by Israel's policy of founding illegal colonies on Palestinian territories as well as imposing blockade on Gaza, not to mention Israel's numerous military operations which have targeted civilians and civilian infrastructure and property, Israel's policy of extra-judicial execution and Israel's continued building of the illegal separation barrier (wall) inside occupied Palestinian territory. (*Alternative Information Center*)

Moreover, the second Intifada made it clear that the peace agreements, which are not solving the refugee and border problems would not bring lasting peace to the Middle East. Furthermore, during the first Intifada newly founded Hamas was the main political actor and controller of the second Intifada. Although the PLO had participated in the

resistance and not rejected it entirely, the failure of the Camp David negotiations was considered the failure of the PLO's perspective towards peace.

> The Al-Aksa Intifada is not only a convulsion and resistance against Oslo, against whom they started this process and against Ehud Barak, but also against the authorities who call themselves Palestinian. These people who committed errors before now, they should accept their mistakes in front of the public if they can and if they have a liberation plan in the name of their people, they should seek support for that. (Said, Yeni Binyılda Filistin Sorunu 72)

The 2006 elections of Palestine highlighted this reality by an undeniable success of Hamas against the PLO. Hamas won 74 out of 132 parliamentary seats, while the PLO won 45 seats, and the other parties won 13 seats on January 25, 2006.

As a result of the second Intifada, Islamic identity became significant in the resistance movement of the Palestinians, while the PLO was considered responsible for the failures of the absence of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. The resistance movement in Palestine became more visible in the international scene. Although the Palestinians started supporting Hamas in the occupied areas, Arafat seemed the unifying leader of the Palestinians and he became the symbol of the resistance after the second Intifada as he was before. However, the Palestinians ended up trusting the negotiations with Israel and the political solutions founded by the PLO. After the second Intifada, the reformulation of Hamas and its Islamic identity was complemented. The Islamic identity started involving values such as nationalism, revolutionism, which were irreconcilable with Israel and being a part of the resistance. The old attitudes of the Palestinian Ikhwan before the transformation to Hamas were completely changed. The Islamization of the society was no longer the priority of the Hamas, and the political struggle was determining the theoretical and practical requests, and the aims of the armed struggle of the organization. Islamization was also one of these political tools. So, the transformation of Hamas resulted in a new nationalist political movement with an Islamic appearance. This also spearheaded the reformulation of the Jordanian branch of the Ikhwan.

3.2.3. Islamization of Palestine or Palestinization of Islamic identity?

The emergence of Hamas with its radical policy against Israel and Jews, its participation in the resistance movement against Israel, and the growing support of Palestinian people were all interpreted as signs of an an Islamization of the Palestinian people and Palestinian problem. According to Meir Litvak, the attitude of Hamas towards the political resistance is evidence for the Islamization of the Palestinian question (148). Hamas has considered reading the Qur'an or fasting during Ramadan as a part of the resistance. Moreover, the Islamic dress of women, especially the scarf is even described as part of the resistance against the non-Muslim occupiers. Women who dressed differently were charged with helping the occupiers or being traitors against the Palestinian struggle by the supporters of Hamas (Litvak 158). Furthermore, Hamas distinguished itself from the former nationalist movements like the PLO due to its extreme attitude against the Jews. The PLO had separated the Jews and the Zionists and declared its respect for the Jews who were not participating the invasion of the Palestinian lands (Litvak 152). However, Hamas claimed that all Jews were racists. While Hamas defines its war as a Holy war, fought against the Jews to rescue Palestine for building an Islamic state, the approach of the PLO for the structure of the future Palestinian state is much different than that of Hamas:

> Islamic symbols and references are important as tools of mobilization. At the same time, Fatah wants to clearly demonstrate that its basic message and vision of the state is nationalist rather than religious and as such clearly distinguishable from Hamas and Islamic Jihad not only in terms of political objectives on matters relating to Israel and statehood, but also in characterizing the nature of the future Palestinian state. (Frisch 402)

As a result, some authors indicate Hamas as evidence for the Islamization of the Palestine National Struggle.

> 'The Palestinian cause is not about land and soil, but it is about faith and belief' This statement by the Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakat al-muqawama al-Islamiyya, or Hamas, its acronym) reflects an important development in the Arab-Israeli conflict, that of Islamizing it. (Litvak 148)

However, most of them don't reject that Hamas's approach to the politics is different than the other Islamic organizations of the region:

> Initially, Hamas endorsed and Islamized Palestinian nationalism in order to appeal to wider constituencies. While rejecting nationalist ideology as such, it viewed it as a means to advance its Islamic agenda. Yet, paradoxically, this very process has led to the draping of the original pan-Islamic ideal with so much Palestinian cloth, that Hamas appears now to have almost subordinated Islamic unity to Palestinian symbols and meaning. Overall, however, this Palestinization of Islam remains secondary to the dominant discourse of Islamizing Palestine. (qtd. in Aburaiya 66)

Most of the authors believe that Hamas has a dual character:

> […] a blend of national liberation movement and Islamist religious group. By virtue of such a nature its driving forces are dual, its daily functioning is biaxial and its end goals are bifocal, where each side of each binary serves the other. The word 'and' is pivotal here and cannot be replaced by the word 'or,' though the balance between the two motives need not be equal or the same in everyone (qtd. in Aburaiya 66).

It is true that Hamas has a dual character, but this definition doesn't explain which dynamics from these two ideological structures became dominant when Hamas made political decisions. The political history of Hamas indicates that it changed from an Islamic organization to a national resistance organization during the first Intifada. The transformation of the Palestinian Ikhwan to Hamas during the first Intifada was not a result of Islamization of the Palestinian people. The Ikhwan had an organizational structure in Palestine since the 1940's. Between the years 1948 and 1967, Gaza and the West Bank were a part of Egypt and Jordan. While the Ikhwan in Gaza had problems with the Arab nationalist Egyptian leadership, and was exposed pressures against their organizations, the Ikhwan organizations in the West Bank chose to compromise with the Jordanian regime. However, after 1967, these lands were occupied by Israel and the Ikhwan organizations faced the pressure of becoming a part of the Palestinian resistance

against the Zionist invasion. Although the arrests and pressures of Israel continued increasingly against the Ikhwan like other armed nationalist movements in the region, the Ikhwan kept its reformist position as a religious and charity organization in Palestine, not a political one. However, the main body of the organization was influenced by the nationalist resistance organization, which was exposed by the split of Islamic Jihad from the Ikhwan. Interference of the PLO in the continuing peace processes and the numerous failures of these processes distracted the Palestinians from the PLO, and motivated them to search for new political movements, able to bring solutions for their basic identity problems. During the first Intifada, the leaders of the Ikhwan in Gaza made the decision to participate in the uprising under Hamas, although there was strong opposition in the Organization, especially from the leaders of the West Bank. However, the success of the Intifada and propaganda of Hamas changed the organizational structure in a short period. The nationalist resistance movement had changed the reformist structure to a revolutionary, resistance organization in a short period.

The PLO's willingness to giving concessions to Israel and Hamas's propaganda against any peace treaty with Israel changed the political situation in time. The second Intifada changed the political environment and the nationalist powers started to back Hamas. In the 2006 elections, it was easy to see that Hamas took partnership in if not full leadership of the nationalist movement. This historical process shows us that the strengthening of Hamas was not a result of the Islamization of Palestine, but a result of resistance for the national aims of the Palestinian movement, like the first and second Intifada. It's possible to say that Hamas was the only option for the radical nationalist Palestinian people, who wanted a legitimate solution for the refugee problem and Palestinian statehood. Hamas's embracing of Palestinian nationalism did change the size and influence of the organization, but paved the way to Islamization in Palestine. However, this is only the visual side of this process. The most important part of this process is that the Islamic organization and identity was effected by Palestinization. The Palestinian branch of the Ikhwan, which had always stayed out of the resistance since the first Intifada, took responsibility for the resistance, which started because of the

PLO. The Palestinian people gave their support to the resistance, and Hamas also benefitted. Thus, one of largest and most influential Islamic organizations became part of the resistance in Palestine during this process. This impacted the Islamic movement in the Middle East, especially in Jordan. The Palestinization in Jordan had already started to express itself in the opposition movements, especially in the Ikhwan. This created a ever-growing cleavage between the King and the anti-normalization supporters and thus a identity crisis in the Jordanian Islamic identity. This crisis exists also in the organizational body of the Ikhwan.

3.2.4. Growing cleavage in Jordanian Islamic Identity

Although Jordanian leaders always had good relations with the Western Powers and Israel, they had never had problems with the Islamic organizations until the start of the Madrid negotiations. King Abdullah I and King Hussein had a mutually beneficial relationship with the Ikhwan, especially during the years when the regime was in danger from Nasser's pan-Arab ideology,which was supported by international Communism. The Ikhwan was also beside the King during the war against the PLO in 1971. However, the changing political environment after the first Intifada changed the political environment of Jordan. One year later, King Hussein announced the disengagement of Jordan from Palestine and highlighted Jordan's policy of "Palestine is Palestine and Jordan is Jordan", which was also appropriate to UN resolutions. In 1992 with the Oslo Records, the first meeting between Israeli leaders and the PLO took place and was accepted as the start of the peace process. Although King Abdullah wanted to interfere in the negotiations, and therefore criticized Arafat, in a short time, he realized that this political environment was a chance for him to normalize Jordan's relations with Israel. Although most of the political actors in the Middle East were not against a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, they found the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty unacceptable, such as the PLO.

A strong anti-normalization front including the Ikhwan was established in Jordan after the agreement. Against the campaign of anti-normalization supporters, the peace treaty was appropriated by the King and the regime. This increased the gap between the regime

and the Ikhwan, which started to be identified as the main opponent of the Jordanian regime. On the other hand, the anti-normalization campaigns saw a rapid increase of Ikhwan's influence on the Palestinian people. This resulted in growing support of the Palestinians for the Ikhwan and taking responsibilities in the organization. This made Ikhwan more sensitive to what happened in Palestine and Hamas. The identity crisis based on the Palestinian-Transjordanian dilemma started to reveal the conflict between opposition camps including the Ikhwan and the Jordanian regime, but also within the main body of the Ikhwan itself.

> A new class of professionals, representing the Jordanian middle class, gained control of the organization. Under this new leadership, the Ikhwan maintained its policy of cooperation with the regime, although its program took on more political overtones in calling for the installation of an Islamic state governed by Shari'a. (Stemmann 38-39)

While the Islamic Action Front supported by the Ikhwan protested the 1997 elections with an electoral boycott due to the unfair electoral system, they decided to participate in the 2003 elections and got the best results in their history. The resistance movement and growing influence of Hamas was one of the reasons for these results. However, the growth strengthened the debates inside the organization. Right after the elections, the regime changed the electoral system again to prevent another success of the Ikhwan.

The growing influence of the Ikhwan involving the radical Palestinian dynamics in Jordan after 2003 became a real threat to the Jordanian Kingdom. The Iraq war in 2003 was another subject causing conflict between Ikhwan and the regime. The arrests of Ikhwan preachers (imams) in 2004 was resolved when the Ikhwan gave in to the government's power (Stemmann 40). After the victory of Hamas in 2006, the influence of the Palestinians inside the Ikhwan increased. After several months, the Islamic Action Front secretary general became Zani Bani Irshad, a Jordanian of Palestinian origin, which symbolized an increase of the influence of Hamas within the organization (Stemmann 40). After this point, the Jordanian regime started a counter campaign against the Islamic Action Front. The regime wanted to reveal the internal debate of the Ikhwan about Hamas and reduce the Ikhwan's election efforts. Two prominent IAF

leaders, Ahmad Sukkar and Muhammad Abu Faris were arrested by Jordanian forces due to their visit to the family of Zarqawi, the al Qaide leader killed in Iraq. Although they were released after several months, the Jordanian authorities revealed their conflict with the Islamic Action Front. This disturbed the non-radical Ikhwan members and supporters. Moreover, the charity organizations of the Ikhwan were closed down like the society for the Protection of Koran and university lecturers, who were members of the Ikhwan were taken from the universities. Under such circumstances, the Ikhwan members started to discuss not participating in the 2007 elections. The government announced that they would not accept some members of the Islamic Action Front; these were mostly of Palestinian origins. The pressures of the regime was considered as a struggle between the Jordanian regime and the leaders of the Ikhwan. Therefore, the pressure of the government by forcing the moderate leaders of the Ikhwan to exclude members of Palestinian origin from the list became successful in two ways. First of all, the Shura Council of the Ikhwan agreed on more 'acceptable' candidates by sidelining the decision mechanism of the IAF. Thus, yet another debate began in the Ikhwan. The Palestinian sector of the IAF criticized the moderate wing of the Ikhwan for their decision. The debate didn't end after the elections due to the date. Secondly, excluding the Palestinians from the list was unacceptable for Hamas. Hamas criticized the decision made at the Council and exposed that it wouldn't support the Islamic Action Front in the 2007 elections. Furthermore, the members of the Ikhwan in some refugee camps announced that they canceled their memberships and joined Hamas. This led to a conflict among the supporters of the Ikhwan. This conflict was said to be between the hawks- who wanted stronger ties with Hamas and the doves- who wanted to focus on the Jordanian politics –which led to one of the biggest defeats in the Islamic Action Front at the 2007 elections. After this election, dissent in the organization became bigger and bigger. According to Stemmann, two opposing agendas coexisted in the organization during the later years. One is focused on Jordan's internal problems and resolving the problems through the eyes of Jordan and the other interests for the involvement in Palestinian matters and the other side by Hamas in the Palestinian issues (47).

The elections in the Ikhwan occurred according to this balance in the Ikhwan. The reason for the withdrawal of the 2010 Jordanian elections should be also considered the prevention of a possible defeat, which would have split the organization apart.

To sum up, the Islamic identity in Jordan was also split into two sides like the Jordanian and Arab identities in the 1960's. It reveals the clash between the King's Hashemite family heritage (coming from the Prophet Mohammed), which symbolizes the commitment to the Jordanian Monarchy and its decisions and the Islamic opposition, which is against the Jewish invasion and normalization with Israel. It also represents that the conflict in Islamic identity is visible inside the Ikhwan, in which the parties are being called the hawks and the doves. However, the historical progress of these conflicts made it clear that the lines drawn within these conflicts are related to the Palestinian question.

Although Jordan has a large population of Palestinians within its borders, there was no political entity, within which they could express their collective rights and be a part of the Jordanian politics. The PLO didn't take part in Jordanian politics as an opposition power and didn't have a political strategy for Jordan. The Jordanian Palestinians started to support the Islamic Action Front after the 1990's. They started to take responsibilities within the Ikhwan, especially in the decision-making mechanisms. After a short time, the apolitical charity organization appeal of the Ikhwan had disappeared and the organization became the main opposition power to the regime. It seems that the Jordanian Palestinians will be more influential in the organization in the near future, and the cleavage in the Ikhwan between the hawks and doves will be more critical. This can lead the Ikhwan to an internal division. However, whether it will be a split or whether the old leaders or the doves let the Jordanian Palestinians take more responsibility and participate in decision-making mechanisms, the Jordanian Palestinians will be more effective in the next years in the politics of Jordan and apply their agenda related to Palestinian statehood and refugee problems in accordance with the Hamas agenda.

3.3. Regime's Response to the Palestinization of the Opposition

The Jordanian regime has tried several tactics to prevent the Palestinization of the opposition in Jordan. These were the Defensive Democratization, the pressures against the civil or legal organizations related to Hamas or Islamic terrorist organizations, the 'Jordan first, Arab second' campaign and the King's full support of the peace process.

The Maan uprising in 1989, which resulted from the budgetary crisis and the cuts of the public expenditures motivated the regime to start its new policy of democratization and liberalization (Robinson 389). As a result, steps for the rights to self-expression were taken and the parliamentary elections took place. Although the Palestinians were not involved in the Maan uprisings or other protests and the main aim of the protests were the opposite, they found ground to express themselves in Jordanian politics.

> The riots were primarily about higher prices for basic commodities, not the right to vote. To the degree that there were political messages included in this bottom-up pressure, those messages were about ending corruption and about renewing the special relationship between the Hashemite monarchy and the East Bank/Bedouin communities, a relationship that was perceived to be weakening. Structural adjustment has been seen by East Bankers as primarily benefiting Palestinians, who dominate the private sector, at the expense of East Bankers, who are found disproportionately in the public sector. (Robinson 391)

The 1989 elections took place after the first Intifada, when the Palestinians all over the world were activated and sought an opportunity to be a part of the ongoing struggle against Israel. The Jordanian Palestinians decided to express themselves in the Ikhwan. The involvement of the Palestinians and their support made the Jordanian regime suspicious of the Ikhwan. Moreover, the participation of the Ikhwan in the anti-normalization campaigns fed this suspicion as well as, the support of the Palestinians to the organization. Besides this, the regime was ready for the reactions against the peace treaty and of the Ikhwan. Before the start of the normalization process, the regime had begun to take some precautions for a smooth transition to make a peace treaty with

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Israel. In July 1988, the disengagement of Jordan from the West Bank was one of the attempts of the King to prepare for the peace process of the 1990's. Another precaution was the establishment of the parliament and decision mechanisms of approval for the King.

> The process used for the approval of the charter would be utilised again by the king in the autumn, to legitimise Jordan's participation in an international conference in Madrid, thereby skirting the potential hostility of an opposition-dominated national assembly, initiating at last a proper Arab-Israeli peace process. (Robins 175)

After the elections of 1989, Tahir al-Masri, a prominent Palestinian was appointed by the King as the Prime Minister to represent him in the upcoming Madrid Conference and other peace negotiations. After Masri, the King's cousin, Zayd ibn Shakir became the prime minister. Although the Ikhwan had the most seats in the parliament, the parliament couldn't make a decision without the approval of the King. Zayd ibn Shakir and the other political parties rejected all the demands of the Ikhwan, such as the segregation of sexes in schools or vocal opposition to the peace talks. The parliament was only legalizing the decisions of the Kings'.

> The other legislative achievements during this period-the Political Parties Law, the Press and Publications Law, and the successful push for the lifting of martial law-could not have occurred without the support of the monarchy. In other words, the Parliament could act only within the political parameters set by the king and enforced by his chosen prime minister. Any moves beyond those parameters, especially those which could threaten elite privilege, were quickly quashed. Parliament had little real power to substantially change policies or course. In the end, Parliament's primary task was to legitimate King Hussein's political agenda. (Robinson 391)

This kind of democratization was called 'Defensive Democratization' by Glenn E. Robinson. Through the parliamentary elections and other actions, the regime attempted to defeat the Ikhwan (in which the Palestinians express themselves mostly) and make the group ineffective in the eyes of the Jordanian public. The changes in the electoral system

were used several times by the Jordanian regime to reduce the influence of the Ikhwan in the parliament. However, the Ikhwan gained power up until the 2003 elections and has maintained its political influence ever since.

The Defensive Democratization of the Jordanian regime didn't convince the Jordanian people of being a real democracy, especially after the normalization period, when the protests were banned and political pressures increased. The electoral changes since 1993 seemed a prevention of the democratic rights of the Jordanian people. The 9/11 bombings in US reminded Jordan of the Amman bombings in 2005. The 'security first' motto was the main aim of the Jordanian regime and this security approach was used to cut democratic rights. Since then, the struggle against Islamic terrorism became the main political objective of the Kingdom. The ban of some civil organizations and democratic mass organizations were applied. So, the democratization of Jordan has become limited and virtually void.

Another political campaign against the Palestinization of the opposition was the 'Jordan First, Second Arab' Campaign. After the accession of King Abdullah II, the 'Jordan First, Second Arab' Campaign began to limit the influence of external events of the Middle East on the Jordanian peoples. What happens in the Arab states had always been influential within the borders of the Jordanian Kingdom and had mobilized masses against the regime. The uprisings or interventions in a state such as Iraq or Syria always had an impact in Jordan previously. But, Palestine is different from these states. An event in Palestine could change the internal balances of the Jordanian regime as has been seen in the case of Hamas. Therefore, the regime has attempted to prevent the influence of Palestinian politics and to focus the Jordanians, no matter what their origin is, on the interests of the Jordanian regime and state. Therefore, 'first Jordan, Arab second' should be understood as the message that the Jordanian people should think first of their homeland, their state and the economic benefits of their country, before thinking about their ethnical or religious commitments such as the Palestine. Therefore, Israel and the Palestine problem should be prevented from being a determinant in Jordanian internal politics.

Moreover, the 'first Jordan, Arab second' motto has a much deeper meaning than a daily tactic to save the day. As a modern, forward-thinking educated leader, King Abdullah II wants to build strong pillars for a national state.

> […] The former has crystallised in a political vision that has been called 'Jordan-first'. In spite its Madison Avenue feel, the initiative represents something much older; it is the latest of the number of attempts to articulate a political community to correspond with the state in Jordan, a search that has been taking place since the 1948. Abdullah's Jordan first concept is an attempt to override all the disparate divisions that cross-cut the kingdom and to offer an over-arching basis upon which people should cleave together. The slogan exemplifies loyalty to Jordan over loyalty to other causes, whether ethnic, religious, ideological or tribal: in short, to foster unity in diversity. (Robins 203)

According to him, a national state in which the different identities such as the ethnicity, religious, tribal identities don't lead to a division between the citizens because of the unification of a common national identity can end the security threats and identity conflicts in the long term.

In short, Jordan became ever aware that its security depends on regional peace and cooperation. However, after the first Intifada, King Hussein had accepted the two-state solution in Palestine and the statehood of a Palestinian entity near Israel. The disengagement in 1988 didn't mean only a tactical withdrawal, but also a new concept for building a Jordanian nationality based on East Banker identity against the demographical and economical dominance of the Palestinians in the Kingdom. However, since 1967, the most of the Palestinians hadn't been living in West Bank, but they populated the East Bank, where they gained control of the economical majority of the private sector. Thereby, the disengagement didn't solve the growing trend of Palestinization. However, the strategy was closely combined with the Peace negotiations between the Arabs and Israel, where the statehood of the Palestinians and refugee problems might be discussed and solved. Without a state of Palestine, it was inevitable

that the Palestinians would gain influence wherever they live or radicalize and threaten the security and peace initiatives of regional states. Moreover, the politicization of the Palestinians with the peace negotiations and mass uprisings such as the second Intifada influenced the Jordanian Palestinians. Thus, the national identity of Palestinians stayed alive. This has ensured their involvement in the political organizations such as IAF, but they weren't much concerned with the Jordanian policies. They revealed their commitment to Palestine with their active opposition against the normalization with Israel. Therefore, King Hussein and King Abdullah II have taken the peace negotiations seriously, and tried with full effort to convince both sides to move towards peace. They have warned Israel several times that their intransigence doesn't harm only the Israeli citizens, but it also contributes to the security threat for all Middle Eastern nations including Jordan.

CONCLUSION

The Emirate of Transjordan formed as a result of British policy, which was formulated appropriate to the aim to found a Jewish National Home policy as well as the balance between the British and French after the First World War. The formulation of the Transjordanian nationality and the structure of a national state were accomplished during the years 1920 to 1946. Although Emir Abdullah always had an agenda other than being the leader of Transjordanian nation, the British model of nation-states progressed during these years. So, there were two different identity approaches in the Mandate from the start of the identity formulation process. The British approach was building a national identity based on the Transjordanian borders, but Emir Abdullah wanted a unified Arabic state based on the Arab and Islamic identities. During the mandate period, the first approach became dominant not only because the influence of the British administration, but also the second attitude was supported with organizational mechanisms such as the Transjordan National Congress and Transjordanian Arab Legion. These mechanisms led the tribal leaders and Bedouin natives to join the structure of the Transjordanian state, and unify them under a national identity. The announcement of the formulation of the independence state of Transjordan was partly a result of the British economic crisis after the war, but also a result of the successful development of the national identity and organization of the Transjordanian state. Although Transjordan was a part of the historical Palestine, the progress between 1920 and 1946 made the split acceptable for all parties of the region. The Transjordanian identity was accepted by most of the internal and external powers. However, after the 1950's, the second approach of a hybrid Jordanian identity embracing the Arabic and Islamic identities became more dominant. The formulation of the Israeli state and the

1948 Arab-Israeli war changed the balances of the Middle East. The annexation of the West Bank by Transjordan and the creation of the hybrid Jordanian identity started an identity conflict which has been continuing through the present. The heritage of the Hashemite family, and Arab and Islamic identities were the main components of this hybrid. After the assassin of King Abdullah by a Palestinian nationalist, King Hussein tried to assimilate the Palestinians into this new hybrid identity. The Islamic and Arabic components were strengthened as a policy of the Kingdom. However, the attempts of interference of the USSR to the Middle East policies by using the Arab identity and Arab nationalist leaders led by Nasser changed the balances of the Middle East. Arab nationalism started to involve anti-imperialist and anti-Western approaches. The growing Arab identity backed by the regime of Jordan was strengthening the attempts of the rivals of the regime and the King controversially. This materialized with the coup d'état attempt in 1954 by the Arab nationalist army members. Although Arab identity was considered one of the main pillars of the Jordanian Kingdom, and used to unify the West Bank and the East Bank as well as, the Palestinians and the Transjordanians under one identity, Nasser's influence throughout the Middle East started impacting the Arab nationalists and Pan-Arabic efforts, while accentuating the distance between the liberal Arab states and the anti-imperialist Arab nationalists. This evolved into a new identity crisis in the Jordanian regime. Every party started interpreting the Arabic identity related to its ideological approach or its side in the Cold War. These regional and ideological conflicts made it impossible for King Hussein to unify the Palestinians and Transjordanians under Jordanian identity including Pan-Arabic characteristics. Although pan-Arabic identity was defeated in 1967, the integration of Palestinians into the Jordanian identity couldn't be achieved. The invasion of the West Bank by Israel and the growing Palestinian nationalist movement created a Palestinian demography and a Palestinian identity in East Bank. However, PLO leader, Arafat, rejected the Palestinian policy in Jordan and limited its struggle to guerrilla tactics. Although the Palestinians were always distinct from the Transjordanians, they never played a political role in Jordan until 1989. The liberalization process, which started after the Maan uprisings and involved mostly Transjordanian origins, made it possible for Palestinians to be a part in Jordanian political life through Ikhwan. Moreover, the first Intifada not only mobilized

the Palestinians in the occupied areas, but also the Palestinians in the states, where some were living.

The Ikhwan became the meeting place of the Jordanian Palestinians in the 1989 elections. The active participation and support of Palestinians in the Ikhwan changed the political balances of the regime. The involvement of Palestinians in the Islamic identity seemed an opportunity for the peaceful integration of Palestinians into the Jordanian political life. The close ties between the regime and the Ikhwan had been reinforced against numerous threats of regime rivals like the Communists, Nasserists and the PLO in Black September. Moreover, the Islamic identity was one of the main pillars of the Hashemite Kingdom, which traced its heritage to the Prophet Mohammed. However, the transformation of the Palestinian Ikhwan into Hamas influenced also the inner-balances of the Jordanian branch of Ikhwan. Before 1987, the Palestinian Ikhwan had worked for the Islamization of the society, and according to them, the Palestinian liberation would be a result of the success of the Islamization. However, with the transformation that started in 1987, the rescue of Palestine became the main objective of the organization. The increase of the influence of Hamas became a reality for the Jordanian Palestinians. After the peace process started at the Madrid Conference, the failures of the peace attempts and collaboration of the regional powers with Israel made the Palestinians more suspicious of the PLO and the Arab regimes. The Palestinians started to support Hamas in Palestine and the Ikhwan in Jordan. But, this was not only traditional electoral support, the Jordanian Palestinians also started to express themselves in the Ikhwan. They started to take responsibilities in the organization and became influential in the determination of its political strategies and tactics. During the anti-normalization campaign, the Ikhwan became the main opponent of the regime, which maintained close ties with Israel and the Western Powers. The support of Palestinians was not unconditional, but related to the Ikhwan's Palestinian policies as revealed in 2007 elections, in which the Ikhwan faced one of its worst defeats in history. The success of the pressure of the government by forcing the moderate leaders of the Ikhwan to exclude the Palestinian members from the list of the IAF candidates, revealed the influence of the Palestinians and the Hamas with electoral defeat. The conflict between the traditional

leaders (the doves) and the Palestinian members of the organization strengthened and started to threaten the unity of the Ikhwan.

Although the identity crisis of Jordan has been revealed in different forms and within the identities of the pillars of the regime, the examination of the political history of Jordan makes it clear that the Kingdoms's failure of the integration of Palestinian refugees after the period 1948 to 1967 is the main reason for the endless identity conflicts of the Jordanian regime. The Arab and Islamic identities, which had been the main components of the Jordanian identity, had become the main threats of the regime, when they started to embrace the Jordanian Palestinians. With the activism of the Palestinians in the occupied areas, the political activities of Jordanian Palestinians grew after the first Intifada and during the peace process started with the Madrid Conference. Their involvement in the political life of Jordan under Islamic identity changed the balance of the Jordanian system. The response of the Jordanian regime against the Palestinization of the opposition and the Palestinization of Islamic identity became the main political struggle of Jordan. The change of the electoral system, the bans against the civil and charity organizations, 'Jordan first, Arab Second campaign' and the interruption of the democratic steps made the Jordanian regime more unstable in the last decade.

Thus, the contemporary struggle in Jordan shouldn't be identified as a conflict between the secular Jordanian regime and the Ikhwan based on Islamic ideology. The struggle between the Kingdom and the Ikhwan should be seen as the regime's continuing efforts of the depalestinization against the Palestinian dynamics, which had found themselves inside the Jordanian branch of the Ikhwan. Therefore, the struggle is revealed not only between the Ikhwan and the regime, but also inside the organization itself.

The historical progress and the national dynamics show that the Palestinians will be more influential in the organizational structure of the Ikhwan and dominate the decision-making mechanisms of the organization. This is true only if there isn't a division inside the organization between the hawks following the Hamas' agenda and the doves preferring closer relations with the King. The 2007 election was proof of the

influence of Hamas and the Palestinians in the organization. The boycott of the 2010 elections should also be considered a withdrawal of the organization from active politics, which could lead to an increase in the division dynamics within its structure. If the Ikhwan participates in the national assembly, they would continue to support Hamas and the opposition movements of the Middle East. This would cause pressure on the regime and the increasing conflict between the hawks and doves. Therefore, the boycott of the 2010 election was not due to the external reasons, but rather for the unity of the organization.

A division would be the worst-case scenario not only for the Ikhwan, but also for the Jordanian regime and Israel. Despite the fact that Ikhwan is the main political power, which includes the Palestinians threatening the regime, a division in the Ikhwan would not hinder these dynamics, but rather strengthen and radicalize them. Whether a division occurs or not, it is a reality that the Jordanian Palestinians will be more organized and effective in upcoming years in Jordanian politics. It seems that the regime's efforts to depalastinize Jordanian political life will be precluded by the reality of the Palestinian demography, the interests of which are dependent on the solution to the Palestinian problem, especially concerning refugees. Therefore, the regime's efforts to bring security and stability to the Jordanian state will remain limited, if the Jordanian regime doesn't end its oppression of civil organizations and extend its democratization to embrace the rights of the different identities. The structure of the Jordanian Monarchy will be changed by the Palestinians in the future as they have changed the structure of the Ikhwan. However, the direction of the change is related to the decisions of the Jordanian regime, whether it will evolve to a more democratic structure embracing the collective rights of the Palestinian people or it will be a police state, where bans on self-expression will be limited.

Since the Palestinian problem has moved beyond the borders of the national-states, the identity conflict based on the Palestinian reality cannot be solved within the borders of Jordan. The solution of the identity conflict of Jordan is dependent on the fair solution of the Palestinian problem. This means a solution must be aware of the national self-

determination of the Palestinian people and the right of return of the Palestinian refugees. These demands of Palestinians were always handled as the requests of the occupied areas, and the problems of Israel and a possible Palestinian state. However, these demands are also important for the security and peace of the Arab states, especially Jordan, where the Palestinians are living. A fair solution for the Palestinian problem should be considered for the internal balances of the Arab states. Therefore, regional and international actors should evaluate the Palestinian problem as a transnational problem and try to solve it within this framework.

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