T.C. İSTANBUL KÜLTÜR ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ

DEFINING AND NAMING THE KURDISH ISSUE: INSTITUTIONS, OPINION LEADERS AND PARTIES

Master of Arts Thesis by

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Department : International Relations

Programme : International Relations

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PREFACE

The subject of this study is, on account of resolving the Kurdish issue, one of the most important domestic issues of the Republic of Turkey; to draw the attention towards the necessity for a general definition and naming which would be used by most of the political parties, institutions and opinion leaders which guide their own groups. The aim is to enlighten the problems faced in defining and naming the Kurdish issue.

The target of the research is to achieve a definition and naming which is independent of the interests of the people and ways of perception towards the issue and can be accepted by everyone starting from the critical theory of Robert Cox. The starting point of the problem and the events which affected the issue is trying to be explained and a general definition is trying to be put for the Kurdish issue. Within this process, the issue was defined and how this issue is named by political parties, institutions and opinion leaders was investigated.

First of all, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Mensur Akgün who supported and guided me in the matter of writing this thesis. I would like to also thank family, especially to my mother, to my husband Şeref Cevheri who have always been by my side not only in my education life but in every aspect of my life very much.

September, 2012   Seda Gizem CEVHERİ

CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BÜSAM	:	Bahçeşehir University Strategic Research Center
İTC	:	Committee of Union and Progress
DEHAP	:	Democratic People's Party
DEP	:	Democratic Party
DSP	:	Democratic Left Party
BDP	:	Democracy and Peace Party
DTP	:	Democratic Socierty Party
ECHR	:	European Court of Human Rights
DDKO	:	Eastern Revolutionary Cultural Hearth
ÖZEP	:	Freedom and Equality Party
GNA	:	Grand National Assembly
AKP	:	Justice and Development Party
KADEK	:	Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan
Kongra-Gel	:	Kurdistan People's Congress
ANAP	:	Motherland Party
NGOs	:	Non-governmental Organizations
MHP	:	Nationalist Movement Party
MP	:	Nation Party
HADEP	:	People's Democratic Party
PKK	:	Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan
HEP	:	People's Labor Party
PPL	:	Political Parties Law

RTÜK	:	Turkish Radio and Television Corporation
CKMP	:	Republican Villagers Nation Party
SHP	:	Social Democratic Populist Party
SETA	:	Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research
TSK	:	Turkish Armed Forces
TESEV	:	Turkish Economic Social Studies Foundation
TGNA	:	Turkish Grand National Assembly
TİP	:	Workers Party of Turkey
DYP	:	True Path Party
ÖZDEP	:	Freedom and Democracy Party
CHP	:	Republican People's Party
TurkStat	:	Turkish Statical Institute
USA	:	United States of America
WWI	:	First World War

LIST OF TABLES

KISA ÖZET

KÜRT SORUNUNU TANIMLAMAK VE ADLANDIRMAK: KURUMLAR, KANAAT ÖNDERLERİ VE PARTİLER

Seda Gizem Cevheri

Kürt sorunu, tarihsel geçmişe dayanan, ekonomik, sosyal güvenlik , kültürel ve demokratik hak sorunları boyutu olan Türkiye'nin yalnız iç siyasetini etkilemekle kalmayan dış politikasını özellikle Ortadoğu ülkeleri, Avrupa Birliği ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ile ilişkilerini derinden etkileyen bir sorundur.

Türkiye siyaseti açısından önemli olan Kürt sorunun çözülememesi, sorunun bir türlü tanımlanamamış ve adlandırılamamış olmasındandır. Bu nedenle Kürt sorununa farklı çevrelerce kabul edilebilecek genel bir tanımlama ve adlandırma yapılmasının sorunun çözümüne katkıda bulunacağını düşünmekteyim.

Tezin birinci bölümünde Kürt sorununun tarihsel geçmişi anlatılacaktır. Bu bölüm Kürt sorununun kısa bir tarihidir. Bugünkü anlamda Kürt sorununun ortaya nasıl çıktığı ve nasıl geliştiği hakkında bizlere ipucu verecektir. Üç dönemden oluşan bu bölümde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Kürtler ve Kürt sorunu, Milli Mücadele Dönemi'nde Kürtler ve Kürt sorunu, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Kürtler ve Kürt sorunu anlatılacaktır.

Kürt sorununun tarihsel gelişimine değinilmesinin ardından tezin ikinci bölümünde, Kürt sorunu tanımlanmaya çalışılacaktır. Kürt sorununu oluşturan unsurlar; yani güvenlik sorunu, sosyo-ekonomik sorunlar ve kültürel ve demokratik haklar sorunu bu bölümde incelenecektir. PKK terörü, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin PKK terörünün bitirilmesine yönelik aldığı önlemler ve diğer devletlerin PKK ile ilişkisi gibi önemli alt başlıklar Güvenlik sorununu oluşturmaktadır. Sosyo- ekonomik sorunlar ise; göç, eğitim, çalışma ve gelir sorunlarını içermektedir. Kültürel ve Demokratik haklar sorunu ise, insan hakları ihlallerinin ve anti demokratik uygulamaların yarattığı sorunlardan oluşmaktadır. Bu başlıkların hepsi Kürt sorununun parçalardır.

Kürt sorunun tanımlanmasının ardından tezin üçüncü bölümünde; Kürt sorunun siyasi partiler, devlet kurumları, sivil toplum örgütleri ve kanaat

önderleri tarafından nasıl tanımlandığı, nasıl açıklandığı ve nasıl adlandırıldığı incelenecektir. Bu kişiler ve kurumlar, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin iç ve dış siyasetini yönlendirdikleri gibi, toplumu da yönlendirmektedirler. Kürt sorununun çözülebilmesi için bu kişi ve kurumların soruna bakış açıları anlaşılmalı ve sorunun çözümü için ortak bir tanımlama yapılması sağlanmalıdır.

Bu tez Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Kürdistan coğrafyasında hâkimiyet kurmasından AKP önderliğinde Kürt sorununun çözümü için politika üretme çalışmalarının durduğu 2009 yılına kadar geçen sürede yaşananları referans almıştır. Farklı bakış açılarındaki kişi ve kurumların Kürt sorununa ilişkin görüşleri incelenerek hazırlanan bu tezin genel amacı; Kürt sorununun çözülmesi için toplumun farklı bakış açılarına sahip bütün kesimleri tarafından kabul edilecek bir adlandırma ve tanımlama yapılmasına katkıda bulunmaktır. Bu noktadan hareketle Kürt sorununun çözümüne mütevazi bir katkı sağlamak amacı taşımaktadır.

Kürt sorununun ve Kürt sorununa ilişkin yorumların ve tanımlamaların normatif olması, soruna ilişkin analizlerin objektif olmasını engellemektedir. Bu noktada Robert W. Cox'un teori tanımı Kürt sorununun tanımlanmasında ve adlandırılmasında yaşanan sorunu açıklamaya yardımcı olacaktır. Robert W. Cox'a göre teori her zaman bir amaç ve birileri içindir yani; değerler ve normlardan bağımsız görülemez. Ayrıca genel bir teori söz konusu değildir. Bakış açısı yer ve zamana göre farklılık gösterir. Yani teori; her zaman bir amaca hizmet eder ve belirli bir grubun problemlerinin çözümünü esas alır. Türkiye'nin en önemli sorunlarından biri olan Kürt sorununun incelendiği bu tezde referans verilen kişi ve kurumların Kürt sorununa ilişkin görüşleri yer almaktadır.

Çalışma Kürt Sorununun birden fazla şekilde tanımlandığını ve adlandırıldığını, sorunun çözümü için tek bir tanımlama ve adlandırılma yapılması gerektiğini göstermiştir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Kürt Sorunu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Türkiye'de Siyasi Yaşam, Terör

Bilim Dalı Sayısal Kodu :

ABSTRACT

DEFINING AND NAMING THE KURDISH ISSUE: INSTITUTIONS, OPINION LEADERS AND PARTIES

Seda Gizem Cevheri

The Kurdish issue is a problem which is based on a historical background, have dimensions of economical, social, security and cultural and democratic right problems. The problem not only affects the domestic policy of Turkey but also the foreign policy and especially deeply influences the relations of Turkey with the Middle East countries, the EU (European Union) and the USA (United States of America).

The fact that the Kurdish issue which is important in terms of the Turkish politics remains unresolved is originating from the problem somehow not being defined and named. Therefore, a general definition and a general naming of the Kurdish issue which would be adopted by different societies will contribute to the resolution of the problem.

In the first part of the thesis, the historical background of the Kurdish issue will be explained. This part is a short history of the Kurdish problem. It will provide clues on how the Kurdish issue emerged and how the issue developed in today's context. In this part, consisting of three periods, The Kurds and Kurdish issue in Ottoman Empire, the Kurds and Kurdish issue in National Struggle Period, the Kurds and Kurdish issue in The Republic of Turkey will be explained.

Subsequent to mentioning the historical development of the Kurdish issue, in the second part of the thesis the Kurdish problem will be tried to be defined. The constituents of the Kurdish issue, such as security dimension, socio-economic dimension and cultural and democratic rights dimensions shall be examined in this part. Important subheadings such as PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) terror, the precautions taken by the Republic of Turkey towards the elimination of PKK terror and the relation of other countries with PKK, comprise the Security dimension. The socio-economic dimension includes the immigration, education, labor and income problems. In case for the cultural and democratic rights dimension is comprised of problems caused as a result of

violation of human rights and anti-democratic implementations. All of these headings are components of the Kurdish issue.

After defining the Kurdish issue, in the third part of the thesis, how the Kurdish problem is defined, how it is explained and how it is named by political parties, government institutions, non-governmental organizations and opinion leaders will be examined. As these people and institutions lead the domestic and foreign politics of the Republic of Turkey, they also guide their groups. In order to resolve the Kurdish issue, the perspectives of these people and institutions towards the problem should be comprehended and the making of a common definition for the resolution of the issue should be ensured.

This thesis has taken the developments beginning from the period in which the Ottoman Empire established sovereignty over the Kurdistan geography, until 2009 when the policy production studies towards the elimination of the Kurdish issue under the leadership of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) ceased as references. The general purpose of this thesis, which was prepared by examining the opinions of people and institutions with different perspectives towards the Kurdish issue, is to contribute to the establishment of a general definition and naming which would be accepted by all parts of the society who have different perspectives for the resolution of the Kurdish issue. From this point forth, the thesis have aim to provide a modest contribution in resolution of the Kurdish issue.

The explanations and definitions regarding the Kurdish issue to be normative, prevents the analysis concerning the resolution to be objective. At this juncture, the theory definition of Robert W. Cox will lend assistance in the definition and naming of the Kurdish issue. According to Robert W. Cox; theory is always for someone and for some purpose, therefore divorced from a stand point in time and space. In other words, theory always serves a purpose and works for the resolution of problem of a certain group. Within this thesis, in which the Kurdish issue, one of the most essential problems of Turkey, is examined, the opinions of the referenced people and institutions towards the Kurdish issue are present.

The research have shown that the Kurdish issue is defined and named in more than one manner and a single definition and naming is necessary to be made for the resolution of the issue.

Keywords: Kurdish Issue, the Ottoman Empire, the Republic of Turkey, Political Life in Turkey, Terror

Science Code:

INTRODUCTION

The Kurds, who are named as the largest stateless minority or 'nation without a state'[1] generally inhabit the region which includes the Northeastern Syria, Eastern and Southeastern of Turkey, Northwestern Iran, south of Armenia and referred to as Kurdistan[2]. The total population of the Kurds who live as minority in more than one country is unknown. David L. Phillips has indicated that the number of the Kurds inhabiting the Kurdistan geography is 30 million and that the Kurdish population living in Turkey constitutes approximately the 20% of the total population of Turkey[3]. Servet Mutlu has stated that the Kurdish population constitutes the 12.60 % of the population of Turkey based on the research he has carried out[4]. In the research of KONDA, concerning the ethnicity of the adult population in Turkey aged 18 and older, the percentage of individuals who identify themselves as Kurdish is indicated to be 13.40%[5].

The Kurdish issue, which is one of the essential matters of Turkey and inherited from the Ottoman Empire, is profoundly affecting the domestic and foreign policies of Turkey. The density of the Kurdish population and for this population to inhabit

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[1] Kemal Kirişçi, Gareth M. Winrow. *Kürt Sorunu Kökeni ve Gelişimi(The Kurdish Qestion and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict).* trans. Ahmet Fethi (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2009) 4.
V.v. M.S. Lazarev,Ş.X. Mıhoyan. *Kürdistan Tarihi(The History of Kurdistan).* trans. İbrahim Kale(İstanbul: Avesta Basım Yayın, 2010) 30.
 V.v. Martin Van Bruinessen. Ağa Şeyh ve Devlet(Agha,Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan). trans.Banu Yalkut,(İstanbul: İletişim Yayınevi, 2008) 25.

[2] Kurdistan is geo-cultural definition of which limits are not accurately known.As a geographical definition, Kurdistan comprise Northern Iraq, Eastern Turkey, Northwestern Iran and Northern Syria. Kurdistan is a region where the majority of the population is mainly Kurds.

[3] David L. Phillips, "Disarming, Demobilizing and Reintegrating the Kurdistan Worker's Party", *American Foreign Policy Interests* (2007) 10.
<http://www.ncafp.org/articles/07%20Report%20on%20Disarming,%20Demobilizing%20and%20Reintegrating%20the%20Kurdistan%20Workers%20Party.pdf>. Phillips defined Kurds as the largest stateless minority in the world.

[4] *Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgeleri Sosyo-Ekonomik ve Sosyo-Politik Yapı Araştırması ve Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgelerinden En Fazla Göç Almış Olan İllerin Sosyo-Ekonomik ve Sosyo-Politik Yapı Araştırması: Sorunlar, Beklentiler ve Çözüm Önerileri(The research on Socio-economic and Socio-politic structure of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia Regions and the Research on Socio-economic and Socio-politic structure of the Most Migration- Receiving Cities :Problems, Expectations and Solution Suggestions)*, Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Proje Raporu (December 2009) 43-44 <http://busam.bahcesehir.edu.tr/rapordosya/Guneydogu-Raporu.pdf>.

[5]Bekir Ağırdır, "*Kürtler ve Kürt Sorunu (The Kurds and the Kurdish Issue)*",KONDA (November 2008) 3-4 <http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar/2008_11_KONDA_Kurtler_ve_Kurt_Sorunu.pdf>.

dispersedly many countries including West Europe, has conducted the Kurds and request and issues regarding the Kurds to reach an important status in the international arena. As Turkey being the country with the densest Kurdish population, this fact leads for the domestic politics of Turkey to be monitored by international actors and the anti-democratic implementations to be criticized.

As for the Kurdish issue to be an ongoing and a much-debated matter, is complicating for an analysis regarding the problem to be performed. For the Kurdish nationalism to be effective in Middle East countries, where the Kurdish population is very much dense, is causing for these countries to see the discussion of the Kurdish issue as a threat. Accordingly, the number of studies concerning the Kurdish issue is fairly low. Due to these reasons, Western scientists and politicians are increasingly drawing more attention to the Kurdish issue day by day.[6]

The Kurdish issue, which can affect the status quo within the region, does not only have historical, socio-economic and political dimensions. The nationalism dimension of the problem also comes into question. The controversial definition of nationalism is complicating the definition of Kurdish nationalism. In addition, as defining the Kurdish nationalism requires describing the Turkish nationalism, the Kurdish and Turkish nationalisms are not mentioned in this thesis, apart from certain important events. The Kurdish nationalism definitions of Hakan Özoğlu and Hamit Bozarslan will provide us clues for the nationalism dimension of the problem. As identified by Hakan Özoğlu, the Kurdish nationalism is based on two essential cornerstones as; the belief in the Kurdish identity of, which origin is based on history, and the inalienable claim on a historical Kurdish homeland which is Kurdistan[7].

On the other hand, Hamit Bozarslan has indicated the Kurdish nationalism, which developed in the history of Republic, cannot be acknowledged as a separate matter from Kurdish Issue but also cannot be acknowledge as inseparable. Bozarslan has divided the Kurdish nationalism within the Republic of Turkey in different periods. The first one of these is the development of Kurdish nationalism under the leadership of Kurdish nationalist between the years of 1920 – 1940. In this period, the Kurdish nationalists are taking the contributions of Kurds to civilization as basis of

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[6] Kirişçi, Winrow 3.
[7] Hakan Özoğlu, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Kürt Milliyetçiliği(Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities, Competing Loyalties, and Shifting Boundaries)*. (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2005) 19.

nationalism. As for the following years, the Kurdish nationalism has defined itself as the "oppressed nation" based on Marxism-Leninism. The Kurdish nationalism in the 1990s was affected by the Pan-Islamism which was dominating the Middle East. For the lands, in which the Kurds inhabited densely to be divided amongst many countries in the post WWI (World War I) period, has an important place in the Kurdish nationalism. Within the established post-war order, on one hand the Kurdish nationalism was breaking to pieces and on the other hand there is a united Kurdish nationalism, in other words 'Kurdishness as a cross-border phenomenon' continued its existence. At this juncture, references such as common geography Kurdistan, a common day 'Newroz', common history have underlined the Kurdish nationalism.[8]

As Turkey has a dense Kurdish population, the requests and the problems of this population becomes an important domestic problem of Turkey. In a more detailed aspect, the Kurdish issue which has an historical background and is fostered by the Kurdish nationalism; has deepened with PKK terror and government policies. Moreover the issue has become complicated with socio-economic problems and democratic and cultural right demands. Therefore, the Kurdish issue is a multi dimensional and a complex issue.

Basically, the Kurdish issue has emerged in consequence of the increasing Kurdish nationalism, and as well as the nation-state policies of the Republic of Turkey during its foundation years implemented with the purpose of converting the multi cultural, multi lingual and Islamic based society structure (in other words, the pluralist structure) taken over from the Ottoman Empire into a structure with one official language, one nation and laic-secular state. For the newly founded Republic to implement a centralist policy has caused, the already worn, center-periphery relationship to break off, due to the changes in the administrative organizations in the last period of the Ottoman Empire. Within the foundation years of the Republic, as the emergence of rebellions supported by the Kurdish nationalist groups, under the leadership of Kurdish tribes and sheikhs, have led the newly founded government to take harsh precautions to repress the Kurdish nationalism, the dissolve the tribe system and reduce the power of sheikhs over the public. The policies such as the

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[8] Hamit Bozarslan, "Kürt Milliyetçiliği ve Kürd Hareketi(1898-2000) (Kurdish Nationalism and Kurdish Movement: 1898-2000)". Bora, Tanıl et. al.eds. Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce(the Political Thought in Modern Turkey), 3rd ed. Vols:9 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları , 2008) 841-843.

Settlement Law, changing the names of the villages of which names are not Turkish, giving children Turkish names and preventing the use of any other language apart from the Turkish language have caused the repression of the Kurdish identity and other ethnical identities.

Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow have stated that the Turkish governments are following an official discourse which refuses 'the separate Kurdish existence in Turkey'[9]. According to the 'The Kurdish Issue Memory of Turkey' titled report of SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research); in the first years of the Republic the Kurdish issue was approached from the 'security' dimension and assimilation and settlement policies were adopted[10]. Doğu Ergil has explained the ideology of Turkish government which leads to the denial of diversity and the repression of other group identities as follows;

> This state is based on a conception of 'nation-building' that calls for standardizing the citizenry to make them Turkish in language and nationality, secular in orientation, and obedient to the state […] Such a conception naturally leads to the denial of diversity and the repression of any other expression of group identity.[11]

In other words, the multicultural/pluralist structure of the Ottoman Empire was altered into a single official language, one nation mentality with the newly founded government. The policies implemented in the early years of the Republic, which were named as assimilation policies by the Kurdish nationalists, were basically the result of a policy to hold the Turkish identity above all ethnical identities and to turn Turkishness into a nation identity during the nation-state creation process.

During the years while the TSK (Turkish Armed Forces) was governed the state, Turkish nationalist policies were adopted. Within these years expressions about the existence of different ethnical identities, were seen as foreign supported ideology which would weaken or even would destroy the territorial integrity of Turkey. The political parties, which emphasized the existence of Kurdish nation in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, were closed down on the grounds that they were trying to

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[9] Kirişçi, Winrow 1.

[10]Hüseyin Yayman. *Şark Meselesinden Demokratik Açılıma Türkiye'nin Kürt Sorunu Hafızası(The Kurdish Issue Memory of Turkey: From the Eastern Question to the Democratic Opening)*. SETA (2011) 35.
< http://www.setav.org/public/HaberDetay.aspx?Dil=tr&hid=69751&q=turkiye-nin-kurt-sorunu-hafizasi>.

[11] Doğu Ergil, "The Kurdish Question in Turkey", *Journal of Democracy*, 11, 3,(2000) 123, March 2011<http://people.stfx.ca/x2003/x2003ypc/Euro/The%20Kurdish%20Question%20in%20Turkey.pdf >.

create a minority in Turkey and as well as they were harming the principle of unity of the state[12]. In a report published by SETA, after the 1960 coup d'état, it was specified that the 'dissertations in the direction of the fact that the Kurds are actually Turkish' reached their apogee[13].

The government implementations such as forbidding speaking and propagating in Kurdish, preventing the naming of children with Kurdish names, changing the name of the places with Kurdish name has triggered Kurdish nationalism, especially after the 1980 coup d'état. This situation was affective in the emergence of PKK terror within the Kurdish issue. Murat Somer has indicated that the Kurd was re-created with the "Fascistic implementations of 12 September"[14]. Cevdet Aşkın has defended that PKK emerged as a result of official denial for existence of the Kurdish issue[15]. In a sense, the denial of the Kurdish issue and the anti-democratic implementations adopted, especially after the 1980 coup d'état, were influential in the emergence of PKK terror. Abdülmelik Fırat has stated that the repressive policies implemented by the governments, in the eastern part of the country, have played "a bigger role in for the Kurdish national conscious to grow stronger than the propaganda of the PKK"[16]. According to Ümit Fırat, after the 1980 military coup d'état, the government started to indicate the Kurdish issue as a matter of security and public order. In this way, the military regime, in other words the martial law regime, turned into a state of emergency regime[17].

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[12] V.v. According to Political Parties Law article 78; political parties do not act contrary to the indivisible integrity of state with country of its nation. As for the article 80, political parties do not conduct and have an activity to change the principle of unity of the state. As per article 81/a and 81/b, political parties do not propound the existence of national minorities and do not act for disintegrating the national integrity by forming national minorities.
Siyasi Partiler Kanunu (the Political Parties Law), Law No: 2820, Number: 18027, September, 2012< http://www.google.com.tr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&sqi=2&ved=0CCAQFjA A&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mevzuat.gov.tr%2FMetin.Aspx%3FMevzuatKod%3D1.5.2820%26so urceXmlSearch%3D5393%26MevzuatIliski%3D0&ei=QARJUPDDIOHj4QSvxoHIDQ&usg=AFQjC NErxRqICZggaJZm2rVLMm72AmrYRQ&sig2=xOql_xt-OGMfW1eYIHVmig>.

[13] Yayman 14.

[14] Murat Somer, "Kürt Meselesini Yeniden Düşünmek (Reconsidering the Kurdish Issue)", KONDA (2011) 16 <http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar/2010_12_KONDA_Kurt_Meselesini_Yeniden_Dusunmek.pdf>.

[15] Cevdet Aşkın, " PKK/Kürt Sorunun Çözümünde Bölgesel Kürt Yönetimi'nin Oynayacağı Role İlişkin Öneriler(The Suggestions to the Role of Kurdistan Regional Administration for the Solution of PKK/ Kurdish Issue) ", GPOT Policy Brief (2009) 1 <http://www.gpotcenter.org/dosyalar/Policy_Brief.pdf> .

[16] Kirişçi, Winrow 115.

[17] Neşe Düzel, "Ümit Fırat: Derin devlet PKK'ya sahte bilgi verip 33 erin öldürülmesini sağladı", Zaman Gazetesi (27 10 2008) 15 February 2011 <http://www.zaman.com.tr/yazdir.do?haberno=754024 >.

With the launching of PKK attacks against the TSK in 1984, the government initiated implementations such as the State of Emergency and the Village Guard System. In other words the government, with the emergence of the PKK terror, started to take more strict measures regarding the Kurdish issue. The government also implemented the policy of burning down of villages and forced migration to prevent the PKK from receiving support from the villagers in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. The strict measures taken by the government assisted PKK in finding more militants and receive more social support; as for the Kurdish nationalism to spread in the social base. The attacks of PKK to harm the officers and local community working in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia region increased the tension in the region.

It is not possible for the Kurdish issue to be regarded as the PKK terror. Because there was a Kurdish issue in the Turkish politics, even before the PKK emerged. However, with the starting of the PKK attacks, the Kurdish issue radicalized, deepened and became more complicated. Doğu Ergil has pointed out that the PKK attacks and the conflict between the PKK and the TSK have caused the deaths of more than 30,000 individuals[18]. Aliza Marcus, on the other hand, stated that more than 40.000 individuals have lost their lives as a result of the conflicts[19]. As for Hamit Bozarslan, this figure is over 37.000[20]. This issue, of which the number of deaths is unknown, has caused material and moral destruction.

Generally, the Kurdish issue is derived from the disregarding of ethnical identities within the nation-state creation process, from anti-democratic implementations and laws like the forced migration, the State of Emergency and the Village Guard System and from the PKK terror. Ümit Fırat has identified the issue with the following statement;

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[18] Ergil 122-123.

[19] Aliza Marcus, *Kan ve İnanç: PKK ve Kürt Hareketi(Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence)*,trans. Ayten Alkan (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009) 17.

[20] Hamit Bozarslan, "Human Rights and the Kurdish Issue in Turkey : 1984-1999", *Human Rights Review*, October-December (2001) 45 <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=2e97c92f-4644-4708-9877-cd126821c517%40sessionmgr11&vid=1&hid=21>.

It is an extensive issue, which has national and international dimensions and which needs to be evaluated within the context of democracy, freedom, human rights, education, development, life standards and vision.[21]

For the resolution of the Kurdish issue, all of the abovementioned dimensions of the Kurdish issue must be examined. Because, as stated by Ümit Fırat; "Without the comprehension of the Kurdish reality and Kurdish issue, there is no chance for 'a real resolution' to find a ground."*[22]*

Another problem faced in the resolution of the Kurdish issue is the problem of the definition and the naming of the problem. In the Turkish politics, the parties, opinion leaders and institutions name and define the problem in accordance with their perspectives. Generally, the Kurdish issue is named in three ways. These are; the Kurdish Issue, the Terror Problem, the Eastern and Southeastern Problem. The former Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök, stated the existence of a difference in the naming of the problem with the following words; "In short, this is our problem, our nation's problem. The issue should not be approached as the Southeastern Problem or the Kurdish issue. It should be accepted as to be an issue of each and every one of us."*[23]*

Opinion leaders, institutions and parties define the problem according to their own manner of naming. Opinion leaders, institutions and parties, who name the issue as 'Terror problem', are defining the subject of the issue as terror and security problem. These individuals and institutions, like MHP, argue that for the resolution of the issue, PKK must be eliminated and the state must concentrate on armed struggle. The individuals, who name the matter as 'the Eastern and Southeastern Problem', identify the issue as a socio-economic problem. According to these individuals and institutions, the reason for the emergence of terror problem is the socio-economic underdevelopment. They argue that for the resolution of the issue, socio-economic investment should be made to the Eastern and Southeastern regions. Bülent Tanör

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[21] Yeni Şafak, Mehmet Gündem "Ümit Fırat: Öcalan İmralı'da telefonla konuşuyor", (10 09 2007) , 15 February 2011 < http://yenisafak.com.tr/Roportaj/?t=10.09.2007&c=16&i=67622>.

[22] Ibid.

[23] "Hilmi Özkök Kürt Açılımını Değerlendirdi", *Radikal Gazetesi* (17 08 2009) 15 February 2011 < http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=950141&CategoryID=77>.

has stated that the naming of 'the Eastern and Southeastern Problem' is used to describe the economical underdevelopment[24].

On the other hand, institutions and parties who name the problem as 'the Kurdish Issue', considers the terror problem, socio-economic problems , democracy and cultural right demands as the reasons of the issue being experienced. These individuals and institutions argue that for the resolution of the issue, all dimensions and subheadings of the Kurdish issue need to be resolved.

For the Kurdish issue to possess many dimension/subheading, has made it hard for the definition of the problem to be made. The lack of constituting a general definition of the issue is also preventing for the resolution of the issue.

The biggest obstacle towards the resolution of Kurdish issue as the approach towards the Kurdish issue approached from a security perspective in order to protect territorial integrity and nation state structure. For years, the government named the Kurdish issue as 'the Eastern and Southeastern Problem' and defined as a socio-economic underdevelopment issue. With the PKK attacks, the problem was begun to be seen as a terror problem, in other words it was named and defined as terror.

After the late 1980s, especially within the years from Özal government – until 1999, the government continued to approach the issue from a security perspective. Within this period, the problem was defined in two different ways. The issue was defined as the terror and the Eastern and Southeastern problem. The terror problem is a PKK terror and the countering terrorism with the continuity of military operations was the main purpose of the state. The Eastern and Southeastern problem was regarded as socio-economic issue. Turgut Özal stated that "The Southeastern problem cannot be resolved with military logic."[25] which indicates that the PKK is regarded as a different problem from the Eastern and Southeastern problem.

In the period started with the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and the negotiations towards the accession of Turkey to the EU, the government realized that the Kurdish issue will not be resolved with the elimination of the PKK terror. The

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[24] Bülent Tanör, "Türkiye'de Demokratikleşme Perspektifleri (Democratization Perspectives in Turkey)", *TÜSİAD*, 1997 <http://www.tusiad.org.tr/__rsc/shared/file/demoktur.pdf.>.
[25] Yayman 38.

impossibility in resolving the issue with a security based perspective and the necessity in taking steps in the area of democracy began to take part in the politics agenda. The different manners of naming and defining the issue by the political parties, institutions and opinion leaders are obstacles in the resolution of the problem. Despite the fact that the problem is started to be named as the Kurdish issue and all dimensions of the problem is started to be taken into account for the resolution of the problem. It is a must for the actors of society and politics to name the issue under a common title and make a general definition of the issue.

Within a process where the Kurdish issue began to be discussed and the policies regarding the resolution of the issue are being developed, it is necessary to produce a general naming and a definition which can be used by all parts of the society. My purpose is to try to define all dimensions of the Kurdish issue; to draw attention to the ways of naming and defining of the issue by institutions, parties and opinion leaders and to the differences observed in the ways of defining the issue from past to present. In my thesis, I preferred to name and use the term Kurdish issue or Kurdish problem for the matter because the term is more comprehensive and in order to better include all dimensions of the matter.

1. THE KURDISH ISSUE FROM THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO PRESENT

The Kurdish issue is a problem which emerged in the Ottoman Empire period, deepened and became complicated in the Republic of Turkey. Therefore, in order to understand the present situation of the Kurdish issue, first of all, it is necessary to examine the changes that the issue went through and essential events. It is possible to divide the Kurdish issue into three parts from the Empire period to present. These are the Kurds and Kurdish issue in the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds and Kurdish issue in National Struggle period and the Kurds and Kurdish issue in the Republican period.

The first part as I entitled as the Kurds and Kurdish issue in the Ottoman Empire, is the old order, the Imperial period. The relation of the Empire which shows differences with respect to regime, administrative divisions and government structure from today's Republic with the Kurds will be tried to be explained. The second part as I entitled as the Kurds and Kurdish issue in National Struggle period, is the transition period from the Empire to the Republic. In this part, the policies of the Kurdish tribes and important events in the name of Kurdish nationalism within the process of collapsing of the Empire and the foundation of the Republic will be explained. The third part is the new order, the Republican period, as I entitled the Kurds and Kurdish issue in the Republican period. In this period, the relation of the Republic of Turkey, which shows differences with respect to regime, administrative divisions and government structure from the Empire, with the Kurdish tribes and Kurdish origin citizens will be tried to be explained.

The Kurds and Kurdish issue in the Ottoman Empire must be studied in three subheadings. The first one of these three subheadings includes period beginning with the Ottoman Empire establishing sovereignty over Kurdistan geography until the reign of Sultan Abdülhamit II. The policies towards the Kurdish tribes and Kurdish emirates of the Empire and the governance of these emirates will be examined. The position of the Kurdish tribes and their relation with the Bab-ı Ali after the Tanzimat reform will be studied.

The second subheading is the rising period of Kurdish organizations beginning from the Jön Türk era and lasting until the WWI. In this period, Kurdish organizations were started to be established under the leadership of notable Kurdish families with the effect of the nationalism movement. These organizations are essential with regards to give the first signs of the Kurdish nationalism.

The third subheading, explains the relation of the Kurds with the Ottoman Empire in the collapse period of the Ottoman Empire. This period includes the time span between the breaking out of the WWI until the signing of the Treaty of Sevres. In this period, some Kurdish tribes and sheikhs demanded independence by being active in Kurdish nationalist activities. The Kurdish nationalists, who had close ties with the Allied Powers, took an important step in the foundation of Kurdistan with the Treaty of Serves. In this period, in which separatist Kurdish nationalist activities occurred, the Kurdish tribes reliant to the Caliph and the Sultan fought against the Allied Powers on the side of the Ottoman Empire.

The second part which I have entitled as the Kurds and Kurdish issue in the National Struggle period comprises the time period beginning from the announcement of the National Pact until the acceptance of the Lausanne Peace Treaty. This period is the transition period from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey. The transition period, which is a period in which the uncertainty of establishment of a new order after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire had pervaded, is explaining the opportunities and choices that the Kurdish tribes had faced. National Pact had envisaged for the regions of the Ottoman Empire in which the Muslim population predominated to remain within the borders of the Empire. The National Struggle, based on the National Pact, had aimed to ensure the support of all Muslim ethnic identities such as the Kurds, the Turks, the Circassian, and the Arabian. With the Lausanne Peace Treaty which was signed at the end of the National Struggle designated the rights of all Muslim and non Muslim components. In the wake of the Lausanne Peace Treaty, the Muslim ethnic identities did not benefit from the minority status based on the 'in a Muslim country, Muslim minority is principally the same with majority' statement. In other words, the Kurds were not identified as a minority. In addition, with the acceptance of the Lausanne Peace Treaty, the Treaty of Sevres, which envisaged the establishment of 'Kurdistan', had lost its validity.

It is possible to divide the third part which I have entitled as the Kurds and Kurdish issue in the Republican period into five subparts. The first heading of these five is the 'transformation of Islamic society to nation state' period which takes 1923-1950 years as reference and also can be named as the Foundation period. In this period, the principles of the newly established Republic were designated. The relations with the Kurdish tribes and the newly founded government strained because of the social and administrative differences among the Ottoman Empire and the Republic. The denial of the existence of different ethnic groups and centralist policies within the nation-state creation process procured the rebellion of Kurdish tribes under the leadership of Kurdish nationalist organizations. The Sheikh Sait, the Mt. Ararat (Ağrı Dağı) and the Dersim rebellions which broke out in this period are important for relations of the government with the Kurds.

The second heading of the Kurds and Kurdish issue in Republican period is 1950-1960 years throughout which the DP (Democratic Party) was in power. This period can be described as the recession period of the Kurdish issue. Because the policies implemented throughout the foundation years for the creation of nation state were moderated.

The third heading is the political violence and organization period between the years 1960-1980. The government continued its claims towards the nonexistence of the Kurdish ethnic identity. The new constitutional order and the ideological movements which affected social life provided the Kurdish nationalism to socialization which was based on and was supported by the leftist ideology.

The fourth heading in the Republican period for the Kurdish issue is the denial and acquiescence period between the years 1980-1999. After the 1980 coup d'état, the government made a number of legal regulations in order to prevent the existence of the Kurdish and other ethnic identities, except for Turkish identity, in the social and political life. The establishment of the PKK, initiation of terror activities and commencement of partaking of parties of Kurdish origin in politics caused to be understood that the Kurdish identity could not be repressed with legal regulations and military operations.

The fifth heading in the Kurds and Kurdish issue in Republican period is the period which began with the capturing of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 and the EU membership process. This period can be named as acquiescence and discussion period of the Kurdish issue. In this period, the existence of the Kurdish identity and other ethnic identities were accepted by the government and a number of regulations were put into effect in order to correct the errors made in the past.

All of the abovementioned periods are important turnouts in the Kurdish issue. All historical periods abovementioned, in the process beginning from the Imperial period until present, must be explained for the Kurdish issue to be understood.

1.1. The Kurds and the Kurdish Issue in the Ottoman Empire

In order to understand the Kurdish issue of the Republic, it is necessary to understand how the Kurdistan became a part of the Ottoman Empire and the Kurds relations with the Empire. Therefore, the Kurds and their relations with the Empire must be explained in three subheadings, which are the Kurdistan policy and the management of Ottoman Empire, the rise of Kurdish organizations in the Ottoman Empire and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and Kurds.

The first one of these three subheadings starts with the acquisition of the Kurdistan by the Ottoman Empire, until the reign of Abdülhamit II. This subheading, explains the Empire policies to control over the Kurdistan and the relation of Empire with the Kurdish tribes. The second subheading is the rise of Kurdish organizations in the Empire. The Kurdish organizations increased in number as a result of the Jön Türk revolution. This period lasts with the outbreak of the WWI. The third subheading, called as the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and Kurds, focuses the relation of the Kurds with the Ottoman Empire after the outbreak of the WWI until the National Struggle Period.

1.1.1. The Kurdistan Policy and Management of the Ottoman Empire

The Kurdish tribes which inhabited the geography and region entitled as the Kurdistan, have a very important place in the political history of the Ottoman Empire. The interest of the Ottoman Empire towards the Kurdistan geography dates back to the reign of Sultan Selim the Stern. Kurdistan, which existed between the Sunni Ottoman and the Shia Safavid Empire remained as the buffer zone in the

power struggle and was affected by the conflicts and wars between the two empires. The Ottoman Empire collaborated with the Kurdish emirates in the region in order to prevent the Safavid Empire to establish dominance over the Kurdistan and have control over the geography.

The position of the Ottoman Empire changed with the 1514 dated Amasya Agreement signed between the Sultan Selim and 28 Kurdish Emirs[26]. With this agreement, the Kurdish Emirs recognized the dominance of the Empire over the Kurdistan in order to prevent the sovereignty of Safavid. Pursuant to this agreement, the Ottoman preserved the autonomy of the Kurdish emirates and permitted for the governance to pass from father to son on condition that the Ottoman imperial order is confirmed. In addition, the Ottoman Empire guaranteed to protect the Kurdish emirates against the exterior attacks of Safavid. Furthermore, the Empire demanded for the Kurdish emirates to pay tax and send soldiers in time of war.[27] This order, which is entitled as the Manorial system, was implemented in the Kurdistan geography mostly until the 19th Century.

The Kurdistan region which was annexed to the Ottoman Empire beginning from the 1515 Çaldıran War, were separated into three states as Diyarbakır, Rakka and Mosul. The rulers of the Kurdish emirates which were loyal to the Ottoman Empire were brought to important positions in these states. The lands of the Empire which were unapproachable were left autonomous. The Empire sent documents to the rulers of these unapproachable lands of the Kurdistan geography, in other words to the Kurdish Governments, regarding that they were appointed and permitted for the rights to govern to pass from father to son, by inheritance.[28] The implementation of this policy was necessary as because of the geographical structure of Kurdistan and its buffer zone position between the two rival empires such as Ottoman – Safavid. This policy aims to gain and keep loyalty of the Kurdish Emirates to the Ottoman Empire[29]. This policy was not only implemented to the Kurdish emirates. Some of

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[26] Kemal Burkay, *Geçmişten Günümüze Kürdistan(From Past to Present Kurdistan)*. (Diyarbakır: Deng Yayınları, 2008) 174.
V.v. Şakir Epözdemir, *1514 Amasya Antlaşması Kürt-Osmanlı İttifakı (the Alliance between the Kurds and the Turks: Amasya Agreement 1514)*. (İstanbul: Peri Yayınları, 2005) 27-29.
[27] Ahmet Özer, *Beş büyük tarihi kavşakta Kürtler ve Türkler(the Kurds and Turks in a Five Major Intersection)*. (İstanbul: Hemen Kitap, 2009)119-124.
[28] Bruinessen 232-240.
[29] Ibid. 266-267.

the Armenian emirates benefitted from similar privileges. For example, "Samtskhe", name of the Armenian Princedom, was changed into Çıldır State when it was adhered to the Empire and the ruler of the Princedom was made feudal lord[30].

Consequentially, the Empire which penetrated into and established dominance over the region during the reign of Sultan Selim, permitted for some of the Kurdish emirates to preserve their autonomy. Kurdistan which was taken under the rule of Empire, were continued to be governed by feudal lords, tribe leaders and landlords. This situation indicates that the Empire actually never had full dominance over the region. The trust and order established between the Empire and Kurdish emirates as a result of the Amasya Agreement, continued until the civil and military reforms implemented in the reign of Sultan Mahmut II, from 1808 to 1839. During the reign of Sultan Mahmut, Martin Van Bruinessen who explained the situation of the Kurdish emirates stated that the emirates were not only semi-independent but the emirs were virtually independent rulers[31].

Sultan Mahmut II initiated military and civil reforms and also implemented a centralist policy to prevent the collapse of the Empire, to assign the central authority to all Empire and to bring the landed proprietors and region in Anatolia under control. Sultan Mahmut II wanted take control of the Kurdish emirates, the Kurdish lords and the emirs of which privileges were increasing and which were virtually independent in a period when the central authority was weak.[32] This situation caused the relations between the emirs who wanted for their privileged position in the region to continue and the Bab-ı Ali who was trying to insure the territorial integrity of the Empire to change and regress.

Sultan Mahmut II launched expeditions to the region in order to insure centralized authority by removing the states with special statute. Moreover, Mahmut II increased the taxes received from the Kurdish emirates. These policies caused the notable

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[30] Ibid. 243.
[31] Ibid. 269.
[32] Wadie Jwaideh, *Kürt Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri ve Gelişimi(The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Its Origins and Development)*. trans.İsmail Çeçen (İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları,2008) 113-114 , 153.
V.v. Eric Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi(Turkey, A Modern History)*. trans. Yasemin Saner Gönen (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları,2003) 51.
V.v. Özer 159-164.

Kurdish emirs of the region such as Lord Bedirhan to rebel.[33] The Emirs who lost their powers and privileges such as Mir Muhammed from Rowanduz and Lord Bedirhan rebelled against the centralization policy[34]. After the rebellions were repressed, a number of administrative regulations were implemented in the region. The Central Administration constituted a large state which was entitled as the Kurdistan State (Eyalet-i Kürdistan)[35].

The Empire which was trying to strengthen the central authority in Kurdistan could not reach to the outlying corners of the region because of geographical reasons and could not establish an exact authority in the region. As a result of the emirs losing power in the region, tribes and sheikhs started to be affective. Martin Van Bruinessen stated that as a result of the Emirates in the region being oppressed, the affect of the Ottoman authority in the region only remained on paper[36]. This situation continued until the reign of Sultan Abdülhamit II. Centralist policies in the Ottoman period emerged the Kurdish issue.

Sultan Abdülhamit II, between the years 1876–1909, pursued a pro-reform policy as Sultan Mahmut II. Sultan Abdülhamit followed a centralist policy in order to prevent land losses of the Empire and maintained the Tanzimat Reforms. In contradistinction to Sultan Mahmut II, he tried to prevent the Muslim ethnic groups to rebel against the Empire by using the Islam religion and Caliphate.

After a rebellion broke out in 1880 by Sheikh Ubeydullah from Nehri with the purpose of 'establishing a Kurdish state', Sultan Abdülhamit II started to implement a policy towards the insuring of the loyalty of Kurds. In a sense, Sultan Abdülhamit realized that the commitment of Kurds to Sultan needed to be enhanced. Sultan Abdülhamit, who implemented a Pan-Islamism policy, used the unitary force of Caliphate in order to enhance the commitment of Muslim groups such as Albanian, Arabian and Kurds towards the Empire. Sultan Abdülhamit, who was using the

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[33] Özer 159-166.
[34] Bruinessen 270-271.
[35] Özoğlu 89.
[36] Bruinessen 270-271.

Caliphate in order to promote relations with the Kurds, was referred to as "Bavê Kurdan" by Kurds which means the Father of Kurds[37].

Sultan Abdülhamit II established the Hamidian Troops (Hamidiye Alayları), which were composed of Kurdish tribes in 1891, in order to consolidate the sovereignty over the Kurdistan, to repress the Armenian-Russian activities in the region and to ensure the loyalty of the Kurdish tribe forces to the Ottoman army. The Empire tried to insure the establishment of supervision over the Kurdish tribes and to insure the commitment of these tribes by means of the tribes which joined the Hamidian Troops. In addition, in 1982, he commanded for an Imperial School for Tribes (Mekteb-i Aşiret-i Hümayun) devoted to the children of Kurdish and Arabian tribe leaders in İstanbul. The purpose of this school was to provide education for the children of notable tribe families and to obtain important position in the Empire and in this way to ensure for the tribes to be loyal to the center.

As a result, the Kurdish issue in the history of Ottoman emerged as a result of a power struggle between the Kurdish emirates and the Empire aimed at establishing dominance over the region with the initiation of implementation of the Tanzimat Reforms. In other words, the Kurdish issue in Ottoman Empire emerged as a result of the Empire trying to ensure full authority over the Kurdistan and the Kurdish emirates giving reaction to this fact.

1.1.2. The Rise of Kurdish Organizations in the Empire

With the spread of nationalism in the Empire, which was governed by the Millet system, not only affected the non Muslim citizens but also caused the Muslim citizens to realize their ethnic identities. As from the late 19th Century, the nationalist activities of the Kurdish components began. Especially, the Jön Türk Revolution and the egalitarian and libertarian structure which was introduced by the İTC (Committee of Union and Progress) between the years 1908-1918, increased the Kurdish nationalist activities in the Empire. In this period, Kurdish journals and newspapers were started to be published and unions which addressed to the Kurdish identity were established. In 1898, the Kurdistan Newspaper (Kürdistan Gazetesi); in 1908, the Kurdish Safe and Progress Newspaper (Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Gazetesi), the Orient

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[37] Ibid. 285-287.

and Kurdistan Newspaper (Şark ve Kürdistan Gazetesi); in 1913, the Roji Kürd, the Hetawi Kürd, the Yekbün journals were started to be published[38].

As from 19th century, many Kurdish associations were established. The Kurdistan Strong Determination Association (Kürdistan Azm-i Kavi Cemiyeti), the Kurdish Rise and Progress Association (Kürt Teali ve Terakki Cemiyeti), the Kurdistan Cooperation Association (Kürdistan Teşrik-i Mesai Cemiyeti), the Kurdistan Rise Association (Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti), the Kurdish Social Organization Association (Kürt Teşkilat-ı İctimaiye Cemiyeti), the Kurdish National Committee (Kürt Milli Komitesi, also known as Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti) and the Kurdish Student Khiva Association (Kürt Talebe Hiva Cemiyeti) which was established by Kurdish students, are some of them[39]. Most of these associations were generally affected by nationalist ideologies and were established under the leadership of the notable Kurdish families who were officials in the Empire. In other words, beginning from the late 19th Century, the Kurdish national movement began under the leadership of notable Kurdish families.

Waide Jwaideh and Martin Van Bruinessen defended that the associations established in this period had the characteristic of Kurdish nationalism and that these organizations were effective in the weakening of the Kurdish national movement[40]. In contradistinction to these statements, Hakan Özoğlu states that the purpose of these organizations were to research the language, literature, history and culture of the Kurds, for that matter these organizations were not nationalist organization and that they were only effective in the cultural rebirth of the Kurds. Özoğlu named this period as the Kurdish pre-nationalism period. The Kurdish national awakening began after the WWI[41].

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[38] Özer 297.
V.v. Jwaideh 209–211.
V.v. Fetullah Kaya, " Osmanlı Döneminde Kürt Basını (The Kurdish Press in the Ottoman Era)", *Yükseklisans Tezi*, Marmara Üniversitesi SBE (2008) 39-40.
[39] Özer 297.
V.v. Bruinessen 403-404.
V.v. Jwaideh 209–211.
[40]Bruinessen 403-405.
V.v. Jwaideh 209-211.
[41]Özoğlu 101—102.

These activities which began with the İTC period were labeled as nationalist activities and were repressed with the concerns of separation and land losses, because of the autonomy demands of these organizations[42]. The 'counter revolution' attempt which was substantiated against the İTC caused for the oppression of the committee towards the nationalist organizations to increase. Within this scope, political associations and newspapers were closed; the Empire concentrated on Turkification and centralization policies. In a sense, the close relationship established in Sultan Abdülhamit II period between the Kurds and Sultan was endamaged in the era of Jön Türks.

1.1.3. The Collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the Kurds

With the start of the WWI, the Empire followed the Pan-Islamism policy which envisaged for all Muslim identities no matter from which nation they were from to unite around the Caliph in order to ensure the territorial integrity. As the Allied Powers promised an 'Armenian State' to the Armenian components of the Ottoman Empire and the Russia's support to the Armenian nationalism caused the Kurds who were living on the same lands with the Armenians to fight on the side of the Empire against the Allied Powers and especially to the Russians. The Jihad call of the Bab-ı Ali during the war provided the Muslim Kurds to fight in war as gendarmerie, border unit or as tribes. The Kurdish units which were supporting the Ottoman army, fought against the Russian soldiers and the separatist Armenian-Assyrian units.

The Armenian units combated for the establishment of an Armenian State in Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Elazığ and Sivas which is known as Six Provinces (Vilayat-ı Sitte). The possibility of establishment of an Armenian State conflicted with the interests of the Kurds who inhabited the same lands with the Armenians.

The Imperial lands were begun to be occupied by the Allied Powers with the signing of ceasefire agreement between the Ottoman Government and the Allied Powers on 31th of October, 1918. Şerif Pasha, who was sent by the Kurdish nationalist organizations and tribes to the Peace Talks, which began in 1919, requested for the establishment of an independent Kurdish state. In response to this request of Şerif Pasha, many Kurdish tribes declared their loyalty to the Empire and to the Caliph.

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[42] Jwaideh 208.

The Treaty of Sevres which was constituted to the share the Ottoman Empire lands was signed on 10th of August, 1920 by the Ottoman Empire representatives. The Article 62 of the Treaty of Sevres set forth that, on the areas in which the Kurds are dense, which are on the South of the Armenian border as specified in other articles of the treaty, the east of Euphrates and North of the Syrian border, a Kurdistan Autonomous Region shall be established. Another important article regarding the Kurds is the article 64. According to this article, if the Kurdistan Autonomous Region which specified in the article 62, declare to the Nations League that it desires to be separated from Turkey and to become independent; and if the Nations League advise Turkey to give its independence to this region, Turkey has agreed to fulfill with this advise and to disclaim all of its rights on the region[43].

The WWI has an important place in the development of the Kurdish nationalism. The Wilson Principles envisaged for the post-war order that 'nations have the self-determination right'. According to Baskın Oran, with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, as other ethnic identities living in the Empire, the Kurds also fell into a future precipitance. In this period, the Kurdish nationalist organizations such as the Kurdistan Rise Association were affected by the international platform in which the Wilson Principles were dominating.[44] On the other hand, Hakan Özoğlu stated that the Kurdistan Rise Association demanded independence or autonomy by taking courage from the Wilson Principles[45]. After the WWI, the Treaty of Sevres which was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied Powers holds an important place in the Kurdish nationalism as it mentions a possible establishment of a Kurdish state.

1.2. Transition from the Empire to the Republic: The Kurds and Kurdish Issue in the National Struggle Period

After the Treaty of Sevres was signed by the Ottoman representatives, the resistance groups initiated the guerrilla war against the Allied Powers. The local resistance

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[43]Nihat Erim, " Devletlerarası Hukuku ve Siyasi Tarih Metinleri: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Andlaşmaları (The Texts of International Law and Political History : The treaties of Ottoman Empire)". *Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayınları*,1 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi,1953) 551-552. <http://www.ttk.org.tr/templates/resimler/File/ktpbelge/antlasmalar/sevr.pdf >.

[44] Baskın Oran, "Kürt Milliyetçiliğinin Diyalekti (The Dialect of the Kurdish Nationalism)".Bora Tanıl et. al. Eds. *Modern Türkye'de Siyasi Düşünce*, 3rd ed. Vols: 9(İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları , 2008) 874-875.

[45] Özoğlu 110.

groups which united under the Countrywide Resistance Organization (Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti) under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal in 1919 carried out many activities.

The Countrywide Resistance Organization organized many activities including Erzurum and Sivas Congresses regarding the resistance against the Allied Powers[46]. On 20–23 October 1919, Amasya Protocols were signed which envisaged the protection of territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire between Mustafa Kemal, Rauf (Orbay), Bekir Sami (Kunduh) on behalf of the Anatolia and Rumelia Countrywide Resistance Organization and Salih Pasha, Marine Minister, Naci Pasha, Chief Adjutant of Padishah on behalf of Istanbul Government. According to Amasya Protocol, the borders of the Ottoman Empire comprise the areas where the Turks and the Kurds inhabit. With regard to this protocol, it is impossible for the Kurds to be separated from the Empire. In this protocol, a decision was made towards the Kurds to have better conditions in the social and juridical content[47]. Mustafa Kemal expressed that the Amasya Protocols, the decisions given in Sivas Congress were reconsidered and regularized. The decision of preventing the propagandas performed with the purpose of gaining independence of the Kurds was taken in Amasya Protocols.[48] Amasya Protocols are essential in the sense of mentioning about the National Struggle, which is based on unity and solidarity of the Kurds and the Turks.

1.2.1. Acceptance of the National Pact

Many Countrywide Resistance Organization members became a member of the İstanbul Assembly in elections which took place in 1919. Zürcher stated that the Assembly in İstanbul convened in January, 1920 was the spokesman of the resistance groups and that had unity and nationalist characters[49].

The National Pact which based on Sivas and Erzurum Congresses decisions as was accepted in 28th of January, 1920. The National Pact represents the aims of resistance movement. The idea of protection of territorial integrity which was mentioned with this statement, "Homeland parts within the national borders are a whole. They cannot

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[46] Özer 280.
[47] Ibid. 290.
[48] Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk(the Great Speech)*.(İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2005) 188-190.
[49] Zürcher 202.

be separated from each other."[50], became official and general with the approval of the National Pact by the assembly. The statement, "[…] All of the parts in which the Ottoman-Islam majority resides are a whole which does not acknowledge separation in actuality and by default for any reason."[51] which is included in the article 1 of the National Pact is the fundamental principle of National Struggle. According to this article, the regions which were occupied by the Allied Powers on 30 October 1918 on which the Treaty of Mondros was signed and in which the Muslim population is majority are inseparable parts of the Ottoman Empire.

With the National Pact, the Muslim components were united under the religion of Islam without distinguishing the ethnical identities. In other words, the Islam became a unitary element/force for the Muslim ethnic groups living in the Ottoman Empire. It can be said that the statement of the National Pact based on the unity of Muslim population. The idea of territorial integrity of the lands in which the Ottoman-Islam majority is resident in the National Pact is the indicator that the Kurds are an inseparable part of the Ottoman Empire.[52]

The İstanbul Assembly stopped its open political activities upon the occupancy of İstanbul by the Allied powers on 16th of March, 1920. The Allied Powers aimed to cease the cooperation of the Ottoman Government with the nationalist Countrywide Resistance Organization with the occupancy of İstanbul. With the arrestment of members of the İstanbul Assembly by Allied Powers, members of parliament who escaped from İstanbul gathered in Ankara.

1.2.2. Ankara Government

Ninety two parliamentarians of the İstanbul Assembly arrived to Ankara where the members of the Countrywide Resistance Organization met to continue resistance, after the parliament stopped its political activities. The GNA (Grand National Assembly) convened with the ninety two members of parliament who came from İstanbul and the elected 232 members of parliament by the Countrywide Resistance Organization[53]. With the forming of the GNA on 23 April 1920, legislation and

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[50] Atatürk 49.
[51] Baskın Oran eds. *Türk Dış Politikası(the Turkish Foreign Policy).* 12th ed. Vols.2 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006) 105-106.
[52] Zürcher 203.
[53] Ibid. 221.

execution were embodied within the body of the GNA and the Assembly united the local resistance groups under its body. The Assembly suggested that for the National Struggle to be successful, the accruement of the National Pact, in other words the unity and solidarity of the Muslim population was necessary.

The GNA used the effectiveness of sultanate and caliphate on the Kurdish citizens, in order to prevent the spreading Kurdish nationalism under the leadership of notable Kurdish families and to prevent the land losses of the Empire. In order to ensure the legitimacy of the GNA, it was requested from the Ottoman Padishah to recognize the authority of the new government established in Ankara[54]. The speech that Mustafa Kemal made in the opening of the GNA in Ankara revealed the importance and role of the Islam for the National Struggle. Mustafa Kemal expressed it in the form of, "The estimable constituents of the assembly are not only Turk or Circassian or Kurd, but it is a community formed by all Islamic components and such powerful bond should be held together."[55] With this statement, Mustafa Kemal emphasized that the religion of Islam preceded the ethnic identity and that the Islamic identity is more important no matter what the ethnic identity is.

The Ankara Government, within the period beginning from the acceptance of the National Pact until the succeeding of the National Struggle, put the religion of Islam, in other words religious belonging forward in order to provide the support of the Muslim citizens in the Empire and allow to made jihad calls with respect to this purpose. Because in this period as also stated by Ahmet Özer, "[...] the duty which forms a basis for ethno cultural pluralism and sociopolitical unity could only be obtained from religion." [56]

For the National Struggle to be successful, it was essential to gain support of the Kurds. For the Kurds to be involved in the National Struggle on the Ottoman Empire side, mean that the Kurdish populated lands would remain within the territory of the Empire. Mustafa Kemal indicated that for to provide participation of the Kurds to the National Struggle, several rights must be given to the Kurds. Metin Heper states that

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[54] Stanford J. Shaw, Ezel Kural Shaw, *Reform, Devrim ve Cumhuriyet : Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu 1908-197(Reform ,Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey).* (İstanbul: E Yayınları, 1983) 415.
[55] Metin Heper, *Devlet ve Kürtler(State and Kurds in Turkey).* trans. Kadriye Görsel,(İstanbul: Doğan Kitap,2008)185.
[56]Özer 284.

Mustafa Kemal planned to give autonomy to the Kurds after the War of Independence was won. The telegraph sent to 13th Army Corps Deputy Commander Ahmet Cevdet Pasha and other high ranking commanders by Mustafa Kemal during the National Struggle is as follows;

> In order to increase the loyalty of our Kurdish brothers to the state, to secure its welfare and development, I side with providing them with all manners of right and privileges on condition that the Ottoman Government is not broken into pieces.[57]

Ankara Government did not make any changes in the administrative regularization of the Empire in order to preserve the social integrity and to ensure the support of the Kurdish tribes. The Constitution of 1921 (Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu) which was adopted on 20th of January, 1921 by the GNA and is regarded as the first Constitution of the Republic of Turkey has an essential place in the transition period from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic. The Constitution of 1921 exactly preserved the province and jurisdiction divisions which were regulated with the 1876 Constitution of the Ottoman Empire and conserved the autonomy of the provinces.

With the Constitution of 1921, the Ankara Government exactly preserved the Ottoman administration system and did not interfere with the traditional governance of the Kurds. The purpose of the GNA was to protect the territorial integrity by increasing the commitment of the Kurds to the GNA. The Constitution of 1921 provided the Administrative Councils the rights to organize and manage the executive acts of foundations, sharia and public, and in the fields of health, economy, agriculture, public works, and social welfare on condition that they are not against the laws legislated by the GNA. In this way, the provinces preserved their autonomy in local works[58].

1.2.3. The Kurds in the Lausanne Peace Negotiations

The GNA which insured armed organization through the Countrywide Resistance Organizations fought against the Allied Powers and dissolved the political order which was planned to be established in Anatolia. This success of the GNA, made essential for a new treaty to be prepared in place of Treaty of Sevres. The Lausanne

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[57] Heper 183.
[58] Shaw 416-417.

Peace Negotiations were arranged to which the Allied Powers and Ankara Government attended for the preparation of this treaty.

The calling of Istanbul Government to the Lausanne Peace Negotiations caused for the representation problem. Ankara Government abolished the sultanate on 1th of November 1922, in order to resolve the representation problem in the Lausanne Negotiations and to prevent the İstanbul Government to regain its strength[59]. To the Lausanne Peace Negotiations which began on 21st of November 1922, a delegation under the presidency of İsmet Pasha (İnönü) was sent on behalf of the Ankara Government. The Delegation strived to ensure for the Ankara Government to be recognized as equal, independent and sovereign state.

During the negotiations, the Allied Powers and the Turkish Representative Delegation did not reach a consensus regarding to the protection of minorities and concerning whom the minority provisions would apply to. Throughout the Negotiations, Rıza Nur Bey, who was a member of the Turkish Representative Delegation, stated that there are religious minorities but there are not ethnic minorities. Rıza Nur Bey stated that, for above mentioned reason, the Kurds did not want to benefit from the minority rights[60]. He expressed that there cannot be Muslim minorities in Turkey with this statement;

> The draft of the Allied Powers is speaking of a Muslim minority; however such minority in Turkey is out of the question [...] In a Muslim country, a Muslim minority cannot be present and this so called minority is principally the same with majority.[61]

The speech of İsmet Pasha during the Lausanne Peace Negotiations concerning the use of Muslim minority term is as follows; "There is not a single Muslim minority in Turkey; because any discrimination towards the various components of Muslim population is not executed as much as from the speculative respect, also in practice."[62] With this statement, İsmet Pasha expressed that no matter what the ethnic identity is, all Muslim components are equal.

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[59] Ibid. 434.
[60] *Lozan Barış Konferansı Tutanaklar Belgeler(Lausanne Peace Conference: Proceedings and Documents).* trans. Seha L. Meray. 2nd ed. Vols. 8, Book.2 (İstanbul: Yapıkredi Yayınları, 2001) 152-153.
[61] Ibid. 173-174.
[62] *Lozan Barış Konferansı Tutanaklar Belgeler.* trans. Seha L. Meray. 2nd ed. Vols. 8, Book.1 (İstanbul: Yapıkredi Yayınları, 2001) 306.

In negotiations concerning the Mosul issue of the Conference, English Representative Delegation defended that Mosul province should be cession to another state as for the reason the "Turkish government is not planning to give autonomy to Kurds". İsmet Pasha objected to this allegation of the English Representative Delegation. İsmet Pasha, who state that the Kurds voluntarily came "under the Turkish governance" expressed that there are members of parliament of Kurdish origin and that they are actively participating in the governmental and administrative acts.[63]

Ankara Government justified that the Kurds are an inseparable part of these lands and that it is unnecessary to benefit from the minority status; as the two Muslim communities, the Kurds and the Turks, cannot be seen as two different communities during the negotiations. In consequence of negotiations between the Ankara Government Representative Delegation and the Allied States Representative Delegation, it was agreed that Muslim components shall not be regarded as minorities. For these reasons, Muslim components are not deemed as minorities in any of the articles of the Lausanne Treaty.

The Lausanne Treaty includes articles towards the protection of the rights of only non Muslim components. In article 39 of the Lausanne Treaty, certain rights which should be given to all Turkish citizens whether minority or not are mentioned. According to article 39 of the Treaty;

> No restrictions shall be imposed to any Turkish citizen on the free use of any Language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings. Despite the existence of the official Language, adequate facilities for the oral use of their own language in Courts shall be given to non Turkish speaking Turkish citizens.[64]

With this accepted article, Ankara Government; the Republic of Turkey on the date the treaty was signed; assured to have respect for the language of every Turkish citizen. Baskın Oran stated that the Lausanne Treaty was never implemented with regards to the use of mother tongue specified in the article 39. As Oran indicated, the Republic of Turkey with this article in the treaty enabled any citizen of Turkey to

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[63] Ibid. 348-350.

[64] *Lozan Barış Konferansı Tutanaklar Belgeler*. trans. Seha L. Meray. 2nd ed. Vols. 8,Book.1 (İstanbul: Yapıkredi Yayınları, 2001) 11.

freely use any language and ensured that this freedom shall not be restricted with this statement "no restrictions shall be imposed on the free use of any language." which is included in the treaty.[65] Certain policies implemented in the foundation period of the Republic of Turkey, especially certain articles and implementations of the Constitution accepted after the 1980 coup d'état constitutes contradiction against this article of the Lausanne Treaty.

In the Lausanne Treaty, there are no articles regarding to Armenian and Kurdish states which were specified in the Treaty of Sevres. With the Lausanne Treaty, the Republic of Turkey ensured the integrity of borders designated with the National Pact except from Mosul and Hatay. The Lausanne Treaty has significant importance in the name of ensuring the territorial integrity of the Republic of Turkey.

During the National Struggle period, Muslim ethnic groups united around the religion of Islam and the Caliph. The religion of Islam was used as a unitary force to unite the Muslim ethnic groups, especially to ensure the support of the Kurds by the Ankara Government. In the eyes of the public, the National Struggle was described as the war of Muslims against the non Muslim foreign forces. Although, the idea of the foundation of an independent Kurdistan being mentioned in the Treaty of Sevres, most of the Kurdish tribes crusaded on side of the Caliph. During the Lausanne Negotiations, Ankara Government acted upon the statement of unity and solidarity of the Muslim components.

1.3. The Kurds and the Kurdish Issue in Republican Period

The Republic of Turkey initiated the transformation of Islamic society which was taken over from the Empire into a nation-state society between the years 1923–1935. The policies implemented between the years 1925-1950 in the name of creating a nation-state caused for some rebellions to occur under the leadership of Kurdish tribes and sheikhs. These rebellions which were also supported by Kurdish nationalist organizations were described as both religious and nationalist rebellions. The government[66] started to emphasize the Turkish nationalism and to deny the

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[65] Oran 226.

[66] During the one party rule, as there was single party state structure, state policy generally referred to government policy.

existence of all ethnic identities except from the Turkish identity in order to decrease Kurdish nationalism.

With the initiation of multiparty system and the DP coming into power, the Islam once again took on the stage as a unitary element. Transition to liberal economy and the active participation of Kurdish tribe leaders in the politics reduced the tension in the public. Within the frame of the organization rights brought in by the new constitution accepted after the 1960 coup d'état and with the affect of ideologies which spread worldwide, the Kurdish nationalism became politically active. The organizations established in this period started to talk about Kurdish nationalism. After the 1980 coup d'état, the Kurdish nationalism was repressed and the Turkish nationalism was started to be more emphasized. With the establishment of the PKK and the initiation of terror activities afterwards, the Kurdish nationalism gained speed and the government started to develop new policies against the Kurdish nationalism and PKK terror. The capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan made the Republic of Turkey realize that the Kurdish issue was not only the PKK terror. With the affect of the accession process to the EU, the existence of a Kurdish issue was acknowledged and legal reforms were started to be implemented for the resolution of the problem.

1.3.1. 1923–1950 Period: Nation-Building

The period between the years 1923-1950 must be divided into two parts. The first part is the foundation period between the years 1923-1925. In this period, the government initiated some policies in order to transform the Islamic society which was taken over from the Ottoman Empire into a nation-state. Some Muslim components such as Circassian, Laz, and Kurds which are non Turkish speaking components were affected by the implemented policies within the nationalization period. The second part is the period between the years 1925-1950. The reforms implemented by the government and the repressive policies applied by the government caused for the Kurdish rebellions to break out.

1.3.1.1. 1923–1925: Foundation Period

The religion of Islam and the Caliphate which assisted to hold the Muslim ethnic groups together during the National Struggle period became an obstacle for the creation process of a nation-state after the foundation of the Republic. For this

purpose, the founders of the Republic of Turkey abolished the Caliphate on 3rd of March 1924, in order to prevent it to be a threat against the newly established regime. The abolition of the Caliphate and amendments in the religious institutions caused for the ethnic groups which united around the Caliph during the National Struggle period, to be concerned regarding their positions in the newly established order.

Abdülmelik Fırat, grandson of Sheikh Said and old Member of Parliament pointed out that with the abolition of the Caliphate, there is no reason for the Kurds to be committed to the Republic.[67]. The purpose of Mustafa Kemal "is to pull out a new Turkish nation from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire"[68]. For this reason, the religion of Islam which acted as the unitary force to unite different ethnic components during the National Struggle period was started to be deemed as a political and social threat after the establishment of the Republic. Metin Heper expressed that the founders of the Republic aimed to convert the religious society which was taken over from the Ottoman Empire and was frequently emphasized during the National Struggle period, into a modern secular nation[69].

After the abolition of the Caliphate, the Caliph desired for its privileged position to which he possessed in the Empire, to continue its existence in the Republic of Turkey. The President Mustafa Kemal gave an answer which explains the perspective of the newly established Republic of Turkey towards the Caliph and the Caliphate.

> The Caliph and the whole world should acknowledge that caliph and caliphate which was protected up to the present do not hold a real meaning and do not have an actual existence. We shall not allow the existence of the Caliphate to pose a threat to the independence of the Republic of Turkey. For us, the importance of Caliphate only remains as a historical memory.[70]

Even though the government policy aimed to absorb the affect of Islam on the society, there were certain differences in practice. The government benefitted from the Islamic identity in several cases in order to protect the territorial integrity. Bernard Lewis stated that Orthodox Christians which were living in Anatolia and

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[67] Kirişçi, Winrow 120.
[68] Shaw 444.
[69] Heper 135.
[70] Shaw 438.

could speak Turkish were classified as Rums and that these individuals were sent to Greece during the exchange period; that only Bosnian, Albanian, Kurd or Arabians who were Muslims were accepted as Turks[71]. While the government allowed for Muslim components who could not speak Turkish such as Albanian, Pomak and Bosnians to migrate to Turkey, it did not allow Gagauzian Turks to migrate on the grounds that they were Christian[72].

The Constitution of 1924, which was enacted on 20th of April 1924, is important with regards to indicating that the Republic of Turkey entered to the nation building process. The Constitution of 1924 emphasized on Turkish identity. With the enactment of the Constitution, the Turkish nationalism which was based on citizenship, replaced the religion of Islam which was the unitary constituent in the Ottoman Empire. In the nation-state building, the Turkishness was started to be used as a unitary element instead of the religion of Islam. According to Ahmet Özer, the Turkishness was used as "the dynamo of transforming the traditional society into a modern society"[73].

Even though Islam was signified to be the official religion of the state in the 1924 Constitution, with the statement "The people of the republic, regardless of religion and race, as regards citizenship are called Turks."[74] partaking in article 88 of the Constitution, Turkishness in terms of citizenship was made the unitary element instead of Islam.[75] For an article in the form of 'regardless of religion and race of citizens, everyone is called Turks' to exist in the Constitution revealed the question of what is a Turk, who is it. Nationalist Kurds argued that with this article an unethical definition of Turkishness was put forth and other ethnic identities were ignored. Not mentioning the Kurds or other ethnic groups in the Constitution of 1924 increased the social tension.

Mustafa Kemal, in one of his speeches in 1925, expressed that the Turkish nationalism will replace the Caliphate, in other words Islam with this statement;

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[71] Bernard Lewis, *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu(The Emergence of Modern Turkey)*. (Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2007) 354.

[72] Özer 305.

[73] Ibid. 305.

[74] *1924 Anayasası(The Constitution of 1924)* , T.C. Official Gazette, Law no: 4695, Number: 5905, April,2011 <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa24.htm> .

[75] Heper 145.

> The current state structure changed the feature of common ties which have persistent for centuries amongst the individuals of the nation; at present, it is not the religious, factional bonds that will hold the individuals of our nation together but the Turkish nationalism.[76]

As the Turkishness stated in the 1924 Constitution, it is a controversial topic whether the term Turk used here, is an ethnic origin or bears a citizenship meaning. Mustafa Kemal, with this speech, expressed that the word Turk in the Constitution of 1924 is beyond to be just a citizenship bond, but stands for the Turkish nationalism and a new nation building.

It is possible to provide various answers for the question 'Who is a Turk?' which emerged with the enactment of the 1924 Constitution. Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow indicated that the term Turk is sometimes perceived as citizenship and sometimes perceived as ethnic identity by some people in the history of the Republic of Turkey. What meaning does the Turkish Nation holds was never explained or the term Turkish Nation was never clearly defined.[77] From the late 1920s until the mid 1940s, in none of the Turkish governments the nationalism based on citizenship was carried into practice[78]. Kirişçi and Winrow defined the Turkish Nation as, "a national identity which unites all Islamic groups from different ethnic origins in Turkey"[79]. Also, they defended the idea of existence of "a dominant ethnical group in the core of all nations"[80]. In other words, Turks are the dominant ethnic group in the newly established Republic.

The Kurds who took part in the National Struggle under the roof of the religion of Islam and Caliph were disappointed with the adoption of the 1924 Constitution. Official authorities which stated that the Turks and the Kurds took part in the governance as equals in the Lausanne Negotiations, did not mention the existence of Kurds or other ethnic groups in the 1924 Constitution. Kurds, Circassians, Arabians were all defined as Turks.

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[76] Ibid. 135.
[77] Kirişçi, Winrow 31.
[78] Ibid. 115.
[79] Ibid. 109.
[80] Ibid. 31.

1.3.1.2. 1925–1950 Period: The War of Nationalisms

As aforesaid, the Kurdish tribes had certain rights and privileges in the Ottoman Empire. The Kurdish tribes wanted to preserve these privileges provided for them in the Empire, to continue in the Republican period. But it was hard to preserve these privileges in the newly founded state. Because, to provide any autonomy for the Kurdish tribes would damage unitary state creation and nationalization processes. Due to the above mentioned reasons, the state started to recruit and collect taxes from the region as a result of centralization policy[81]. The abolition of the Caliphate by the State and the policy which considers all citizens as Turks according to the 1924 Constitution disturbed the Kurdish tribes and sheikhs. Kurdish tribes and sheikhs who were not pleased with the central governance started organizing against the center.

Under the leadership of Kurdish tribes and sheikhs between the years 1925-1938, seventeen Kurdish rebellions[82] broke out. Some of these rebellions were also supported by associations which defended the Kurdish nationalism. Three of the rebellions which broke out between the years abovementioned are vital importance in the history of the Republic. These are the Sheikh Sait Rebellion (1925), the Mt. Ararat Rebellion (1930) and the Dersim Rebellion (1938). In order to protect the territorial integrity of the newly established the Republic, the state implemented hard policies in order to suppress the rebellions. The autonomy which was planned to be given to the Kurdish Tribes during the National Struggle period by the Ankara Government was not given after foundation of the Republic of Turkey explained by İnönü with this statement;

> Atatürk was going to give the Kurds extensive local freedoms [...]
> However, whenever the English who wished to besiege the Republic
> and get their ways managed to drive the Kurds and get them to rebel,
> from that moment on, Atatürk gave his final decision. He said,
> 'Silence them'.[83]

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[81] Heper 231.

[82] Özer 312.

V.v. *Genelkurmay Belgelerinde Kürt İsyanları I: Nasturi - Şeyh Sait - Raçkotan ve Raman - Sason - Ağrı - Koçuşağı- Mutki – Bicar - Asi Resul – Tendürük – Savur – Zeylan – Oramar (Kurdish Rebellions in the Documents of General Staff I)*. (İstabul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2011).

V.v. *Genelkurmay Belgelerinde Kürt İsyanları II: Plümür-Dersim İsyan Harekatları ve Alınan Dersler (Kurdish Rebellions in the Documents of General Staff II)*. (İstabul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2011).

[83] Heper 187.

Metin Heper expressed that the Republic of Turkey, within the foundation years, aimed to designate the Turkishness as the primary identity and the ethnic identities of the citizens such as Turk/Kurd to be deemed as the secondary identity. After the breaking out of the Sheikh Said rebellion, the state indicated that the Kurds targeted to turn their secondary identity into the primary identity by denying Turkishness which was designated as the primary identity. The state started to implement a policy which rules out the Kurdishness which is a secondary identity in order to prevent for the secondary identities to convert to primary identity[84]. Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow specified the rebellions which broke out after the Sheikh Said rebellion as "rebellions which broke out against the attempt of the dominant Turkish ethnic core to assimilate Kurds"[85]. Mesut Yeğen, on the other hand, believes that the Kurdish rebellions broke out as a result of a conflict between the 'old order-Ottoman' and 'new order-Republic'. The state tried to integrate the Kurds who were autonomous in the Empire, to the center by using political and military force within the scope of the centralist policy which the state had put into practice. This situation causes the Kurds to rebel.[86] Robert Olson stated that the Sheikh Sait, the Mt. Ararat and the Dersim rebellions are important event in the history of Kurdish and Turkish nationalism and that these rebellions are Kurdish nationalist rebellions. The Sheikh Sait Rebellion is a rebellion with a nationalist nature which has a religious nature and the suppression of the rebellion by the state increased the Kurdish nationalism. The Sheikh Sait, the Mt. Ararat and the Dersim rebellions led the single party state to express more strict nationalism statement.[87]

These rebellions are important events in the political history of Turkey and the Kurdish issue. Because these rebellions whether they have a nationalist nature or not, caused to harsh implementation of the Turkish nationalism as a state policy. The state policies implemented after the suppression of these rebellions repressed the Kurdish identity and this situation increased the Kurdish nationalism. Due to

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[84] Ibid. 238-239.

[85] Kirişçi, Winrow 125.

[86] Mesut Yeğen, "The Kurdish Question in Turkish State Discourse", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.34, No.4 (1999) 561-562, February 2010 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/261251> .

[87] Robert Olson, "The Kurdish Rebellions of Sheikh Said(1925),Mt. Ararat(1930) and Dersim (1937-8):Their impact on the development of the Turkish Air Force and on Kurdish and Turkish Nationalism", *Die Welt des Islams*, Vol.40. No. 1. (2000) 67-69, March 2011 <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=7&hid=107&sid=d03e42bf-6e4b-459d-9b09-af8b530ded99%40sessionmgr12>.

defining the revolts as religious and tribal rebellions and for ignoring the nationalist dimension of these rebellions caused the Kurdish issue to deepen.

1.3.1.2.1. The Sheikh Sait Rebellion and the State Policies

The Sheikh Sait rebellion which broke out on 13th of February 1925 under the leadership of Naqshbandi Dervish Sheikh Sait is a revolt with both nationalist and religious dimensions. The rebellion was supported by a Kurdish nationalist organization called Azadi[88], which was established in 1923 and was directed by Mutki tribe leader Hacı Musa. This organization protested the abolition of the Caliphate and surpassing to modern education system[89]. In addition, the organization defended that the Kurd tribes will not be autonomous as in the Empire period and that for this reason the Kurds must establish their own state. Robert Olson proclaimed that the organization named Azadi had three important purposes. These are;

> To rescue the Kurds from the Turkish oppression; to ensure freedom to Kurds; to give a chance for them to develop their country and to provide the support of Britain by being aware of the fact that the Kurdistan cannot stand alone.[90]

The purpose of Sheikh Sait, the leader of Sheikh Sait Rebellion was to insure the return of the Caliphate. Sheikh Sait, who was a religious leader, declared a jihad in order to bring back the Caliphate. Sheikh Sait in his preaches which he gave before the rebellion, stated that the religion of Islam has lost its value in the Republic of Turkey and that the public must react to this situation. The speech which Sheikh Sait gave in Piran town before the rebellion is as follows;

> Madrassahs which are the source of religion and wisdom are closed; The Ministry of Religion and Pious Foundation was removed […] Our religion is officially affronted in newspapers [...] It is a religious duty for a Muslim to defend religion. Today, if I was alive and kicking I would take a gun, gird myself with a sword and start fighting for the enemies of religion.[91]

Sheikh Sait expressed the following in the letter which he sent to the Kurdish origin sheikhs before the rebellion;

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[88] Özer 298.
[89] Kirişçi, Winrow 123.
[90] Robert Olson, "Kürt Milliyetçiliği(Kurdish Nationalism)", Thomas Bois, Volademir Minorsky, *Kürt Milliyetçiliği*. (İstanbul: Örgün Yayınevi,2008) 363.
[91] Heper 225.

> We used to have a common Caliph in the past and this would the feeling of being a part of a community, to which Turks also belonged to, to our religious community. From the abolition of the Caliphate until now we are facing with the oppression of Turks.[92]

In addition to the abolition of the Caliphate, Sheikh Sait also protested against the centralist policies. Tribe leaders and sheikhs began to lose their privileges, which they had maintained until the first years of the Republic, because of the centralist policies.

The Sheikh Sait Rebellion which was planned to break out on 21st of March 1925 was erupted on the 7th of March, 1925[93]. The Sheikh Sait Rebellion threatened the Republic regime with rebellion forces comprised of 15.000[94] individuals of irregular tribe troops. The rebellion spread to all corners of Southeastern in a short time. After the rebellion broke out, the state initiated a military operation and deployed 52.000[95] soldiers to the region. Some Kurdish tribes who were afraid of state intervention, changed sides during the rebellion and sided with the Government Forces. Some tribes, sent telegraphs which stated their commitment to the Republic of Turkey right after the rebellion broke out.[96]

The General Staff stated that the Sheikh Sait Rebellion broke out as a result of the provocation of the British[97]. In the official discourse, the British supported the Sheikh Sait Rebellion in order to ensure the Mosul issue to be solved in their favor and to dissuade Turkey from Mosul[98]. The Republic of Turkey suppressed the rebellion after a short while it broke out. Sheikh Sait and other rebels who were captured on 15th of April 1925 were put on trial in the Independence Courts which were established in 1920 and held the authority for execution. Sheikh Sait and forty six rebels[99] were sentenced with capital punishment at the Independence Court in Diyarbakır on 29th of June 1925. Executions took place on 30th of June[100]. After the executions took place, several rebellions broke out in Bitlis, Muş and Hakkari. Many

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[92] Ibid. 225.
[93] Jwaideh 406.
[94] Olson, "Kürt Milliyetçiliği" 455.
[95] Ibid. 455.
[96] Kirişçi, Winrow 124-125.
[97] Genelkurmay Belgelerinde Kürt İsyanları II 251.
[98] Jwaideh 417.
[99] V.v. Ibid 410. Waideh argues that the 53 rebels were sentenced to death.
[100] Lewis 265-266.

small scaled rebellions broke out in the region until the 1929, the Mt. Ararat Rebellion. It is stated that the expenses made for the suppression of the rebellions by the Republic of Turkey are more than the expenses of the War of Independence[101].

According to studies regarding the Kurdish issue, the Sheikh Sait Rebellion developed the ethnic consciousness / nationalism of the Kurds. Abidin Özmen who was appointed the Primary General Inspectorship by İsmet İnönü in 1935, stated in his report in consequence of his studies in the region, that the Sheikh Sait Rebellion strengthen and enhanced the Kurdishness[102]. For these reasons, Sheikh Sait Rebellion has an essential place in the political history of the Republic of Turkey. Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, who gave a statement after the suppression of the Sheikh Sait Rebellion, explained their purposes as "To make the individuals who live in the Turkish homeland but not a Turk, […] a Turk"[103]. In addition, İnönü stated, "We shall exsect the components who oppose Turks and Turkishness."[104]

Several implementations were put into practice in order to prevent the outbreak of new rebellions. The first one of these implementations is the Law on the Maintenance of Order which was enacted on 4th of March 1925 after the suppression of the Sheikh Sait Rebellion. This law remained in force until March, 1929. In order to provide and protect social order and peace, the Government with the Law on the Maintenance of Order banned all manners of organization and publication which violates the security of the society. Within the scope of this law the individuals who carry out the aforesaid activities, trialed in the Independence Courts. The Law on the Maintenance of Order did not only prepare the appropriate grounds to repress the participants of the Sheikh Sait Rebellion but also all regime encounters.[105] All newspaper and publications, which were against or criticized the policies of the government, were restricted with the Law on the Maintenance of Order[106]. Robert Olson stated that a total of 357 people got death penalty since the law was

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[101] Kirişçi, Winrow 119.

[102] Saygı Öztürk,*İsmet Paşa'nın Kürt Raporu(The Kurdish Report of Ismet Pasha).*(İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2008) 115.

[103] Robert Olson, *Kürt Meselesi ve Türkiye-İran İlişkileri(The Kurdish Question and Turkish-Iranian Relations: From World War I to 2000).*trans. Hikmet İlhan (İstanbul: Avesta,2010) 41.

[104] Ibid.

[105] Lewis 269-274.

[106] Olson, "Kürt Milliyetçiliği" 480.

legislated[107]. Waide Jwaideh stated that the purpose of the Independence Courts were "to prevent the Kurds to resist against the Turkish administration"[108]. The nation-state building process and the reforms gained a momentum with the power sustained from the Law on the Maintenance of Order and Independence Courts. The Law on the Maintenance of Order and Independence Courts were abolished in 1927; however they were reenacted at the end of the same year[109].

The state began to appoint Turkish public officials to Eastern and Southeastern regions where the Kurds densely inhabited. This situation caused for a communication problem among the local people who spoke Kurdish and the public officials who spoke Turkish. For the Kurds, to be not able to communicate with the public officials diminished the trust of Kurdish origin citizens towards the state. In addition to above mentioned policies, the state imposed restrictions in the usage of Kurdish in public spaces. This situation is contradictory to the provision, 'No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use […] by any Turkish national of any Language' specified in article 39 of the Treaty of Lausanne.

Furthermore, as from 1924, names of many residential area of Armenian, Kurdish or Arabian origin in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia were changed on account of the fact that they were foreign language. With a declaration published by the Ministry of National Education in 1925, the use of 'non Turkish' ethnic group names such as 'Circassian, Laz, Kurd' and place names which specify the residential area of any ethnic group such as 'Kurdistan, Lazistan' were prohibited and these names were changed. The use of these names and terms in school books was also prohibited.[110] State policy regarding the changing of place names became official with a memorandum prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1940[111]. The Sheikh Sait Rebellion lift the lid of revealed the power of dervishes in the region over the public. In order to prevent the rebels to get through to the public with the use of religious institutions, monasteries, hermitages and tombs were shut down on 30th of

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[107] Ibid. p.478
[108] Jwaideh 408.
[109] Shaw 453.
[110] Heper 240-241.
[111] Harun Tunçel, "Türkiye'de İsmi Değiştirilen Köyler (Renamed Villages in Turkey)" *Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi.* Vol:10, No:2 (2000) 23-34 <http://web.firat.edu.tr/sosyalbil/dergi/arsiv/cilt10/sayi2/023-034.pdf>.

November, 1925. Moreover, in 1928, the article in the Constitution of 1924, which stated that the religion of the state is Islam, was removed.[112]

With the East Reform Plan constituted with the decision of Cabinet on 8th of September 1925, the martial law was put into practice in the Eastern provinces. The country was divided into certain General Inspectorship Districts within the scope of the East Reform Plan. To the Fifth General Inspectorship District, which comprised provinces in which the Kurds were predominate such as Hakkari, Van, Muş, Bitlis, Siirt, Elazığ, Dersim, Malatya, planned to place Turkish immigrants to Armenian lands which were situated on the west of the district which remained in between of Van and Midyat. The decision to send Kurdish tribe leaders, relatives or supporters to the West was taken. Moreover, it was planned to assure the expenses, made for the suppression of the rebellion from the Kurdish people resident in the rebellion region. Also, it was decided to increase the number of soldiers in the border region and to collect the weapons of the tribes. The use of any other language apart from Turkish in government departments, schools, markets and bazaars in provinces and towns which are under the Fifth General Inspectorship was prohibited. The punishment of the individuals who violated this prohibition was decided. It was deemed appropriate for the Kurdish young men who are recruited to be send to non Kurdish populated places which are situated outside of the region and to work in unarmed services.[113]

The policy of disarmament of Kurdish tribes was implemented in order to prevent rebellions like the Sheikh Sait Rebellion. Within this framework, new gendarmerie garrisons were established in the regions, certain Kurdish tribes were sent to different locations of the country and the construction of railroads was initiated in order to ease the access to the region.[114] Tribes and sheikhs reacted to the policies implemented by the state. The abolition of the Caliphate, shariah provisions and implementations, acceleration of Turkish nationalism policies after the Sheikh Sait Rebellion weakened the commitment of religious and nationalist Kurds to the newly founded state.

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[112] Shaw 457.
[113] Özer 298–301.
[114] Heper 236.

1.3.1.2.2. The Mt. Ararat Rebellion and the State Policies

The precautions taken after the suppression of the Sheikh Sait Rebellion could not prevent the outbreak of new rebellions. In 1938, guerrilla rebellions broke out around the Mt. Ararat which was led by Captain İhsan Nuri, the majority of the rebels participated to the Sheikh Sait Rebellion and were supported by the Hoybun[115] organization. The rebels defended that Kurds must be united for the 'salvation of the Kurdish people from the Turkish suppression'. The rebels declared the Kurdish Republic in the Mt. Ararat.[116]

After the rebellion broke out, the state ceased mandatory settlement policy and declared that individuals, who participated in the rebellion, will be forgiven; if they declare their loyalty to the state. In return for the reconciliation efforts of the state, Kurdish nationalist did not dispense their purposes.[117] The Republic of Turkey, who could not reach to any agreement with the rebels, initiated the military operation in May 1930 and deployed 40 thousand infantries, 10 artillery batteries, 550 machine guns and 10 military aircraft to the region in order to suppress the rebellion[118]. In the Mt. Ararat Operation, most of the rebel units were destroyed and the remaining were scattered. The leader of the rebellion, İhsan Nuri fled to Iran.

According to the Chief of Staff, the rebellion broke out under the name of 'Kurdish Autonomy' supported by foreign powers[119]. In the 16th of July 1930, news of Cumhuriyet Newspaper regarding to the military operation in order to suppress the rebellion stated that; "[...] The villages which take refuge in the bandit are being entirely burnt. The number of the exterminated is around 15 thousand in Zilan operation. Zilan Creek is brimmed with corpses [...]"[120] .

The Minister of Internal Affairs, Mahmud Esad Bozkurt, who gave a statement after the suppression of the Mt. Ararat Rebellion, indicated that Turks are the 'lords' and

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[115] V.v. Jwaideh 418-419.
[116] Kirişçi, Winrow 120.
[117] Jwaideh 420-423.
[118] Lazarev, Mihoyan 240.
[119] Genelkurmay Belgelerinde Kürt İsyanları II 261.
[120] Özer 317.

'owners' of the Republic of Turkey and stated that the individuals who are not the 'descendants of pure Turkish descent' can only be 'slaves'.[121]

> Only the Turkish nation has the privilege of demanding national rights in this country. There is no possibility that other ethnic groups' demands for such a right will be recognized [...] The Turks are the sole owners and the sole nobles of this country. Those who are not of Turkish origin have only one right: to serve and be the slaves, without question, of the noble Turkish nation.[122]

This statement made by the Minister of Internal Affairs indicates that the state is defining Turkishness in terms of ethnic identity, not in terms of citizenship. The state, after the suppression of the Mt. Ararat Rebellion, took a number of precautions in order to prevent new rebellions to break out. The first one of these precautions is the 14th of June 1934 dated, 2510 numbered Settlement Law. This law organized the residency and distribution of the citizens of the Republic of Turkey. According to this law, the Republic of Turkey is divided into three zones in terms of settlement. According the aforesaid;

> Zone Number 1: It was designated as locations to which the Turkish cultured population wanted to be condensed. The condition for the individuals who were to settle in this district to be bound to Turkish culture was stipulated. The condition for the individuals who were to be placed in this zone to be *'of Turkish descent'* was required to be.

> Zone Number 2: It was designated as locations for the population from which the Turkish culture was desired to be absorbed. It was aimed for the placement of individuals who *'are not from the Turkish race and wanted to settle in this district'* from Zone Number 1 and individuals coming from Zone Number 3, émigrés and refugees. According to the Settlement law, the individuals who *'are not from the Turkish race'* must settle in separate neighborhoods in order to prevent the formation of any group.

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[121] Olson, "Kürt Meselesi ve Türkiye-İran İlişkileri" 41.

[122] Robert Olson, "The Kurdish Rebellions of Sheikh Said(1925),Mt. Ararat(1930) and Dersim (1937-8):Their impact on the development of the Turkish Air Force and on Kurdish and Turkish Nationalism" 93.

Zone Number 3: It was designated as locations which were desired to be evacuated and in which settlement is prohibited due to health, economic, cultural, political, military and safety issues.

With this law, it was decided to send members of tribes who were of Turkish nationality but were not bound to the Turkish culture to the Zone Number 2 separately where the Turkish culture was desired to be absorbed. In article 11 of the same law, it was prohibited to form collective neighborhood, village or artist, labor associations for individuals of whom mother language was not Turkish. In accordance with the law no 2510, the Minister of Internal Affairs acquired the authority to migrate the villagers in locations where the soil depreciated, or marshy, forestry, highland or stony locations to the locations of which living conditions are more convenient. Moreover, the Minister of Internal Affairs acquired has a right to prevent the construction of new settlements to the evacuated villages. Through this law, it was aimed to place Gypsies and migrants who were not bound to Turkish culture in villages where the Turkish culture was predominant. The Minister of Internal Affairs acquired the right to take precautions such as to disorganized send individuals who were not bound to the Turkish culture because of cultural, political, military, social reasons or who were bound to Turkish culture but were speaking a language other than Turkish or deprive them of citizenship of Turkey.[123]

Despite the fact that there is an article in the 1924 Constitution as, 'The people of the republic, regardless of religion and race, as regards citizenship are called Turks.', with the settlement law, it was aimed to Turkification of the individuals who were not bound to the Turkish culture and were not of Turkish race. With the implementation of this policy, the demographic structure in the regions where the Kurds were densely populated was tried to be changed. Even if these implementations were carried out with a purpose of integration, the racial classification of the Turkish citizens according to race, as 'Turkish' and 'not Turkish' can cause the regression of the relations between other ethnic identities and the state. This policy is an indication of Kurds and other ethnic identities to being subject to discrimination.

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[123] *2510 Sayılı İskan Kanunu (The 2510 Numbered Settlement Law)*. T.C. Official Gazzette , Law No: 2510, Number: 273321, July 2011
<http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/2733.pdf&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/2733.pdf >.

1.3.1.2.3. The Dersim Rebellion and the State Policies

For the Dersim region to be geographically inaccessible, prevented the Empire to establish full sovereignty over the region. It was unnecessary for the Republic of Turkey to control over the Dersim region where the pillage and robbery was extensive and the tribes were holding the weapons left from the War of Independence.[124]

The State, which was trying to establish political authority over Dersim, requested from the inspectors and governors in the Dersim region in which Shia Zaza Kurds are majority, to carry out researches and to prepare reports devoted to understanding the political situation in Dersim. In the prepared reports, it was stated that the state authority is not exist in Dersim. Cemal Bey, the Governor of Diyarbakır, who carried out a research in Dersim in 1926, expressed Dersim's situation related to the lack of government authority with this statement; "The government dominance have not entered Dersim [...] the government have not established an authority for four hundred years"[125].

Furthermore, the report indicated that the landlords in the region are committing banditry and mistreating the local people. It was stated in the reports that in order to weaken the authority of landlords over the people, the tribes should be disarmed and landlords should be sending to the western part of the country with their relatives. In all of the reports prepared, it was stated that lands should be given to the local people, banks should be opened and roads must be blazed in order for the state to ensure dominance in the region. In addition to all of these, it was expressed that the Turks must be placed in locations where the Kurds were relegated and the Turkish officials must be appointed to the region. After executing all of these activities, in other words "after Turkishness sense and discipline is bestowed upon"[126] the local people, it was advised to start building schools. The purpose of these reports is to repress the idea of Kurdishness. In the report prepared as a result of the research by the Chief of Senior Officers-Military Affairs (the Chief of Staff), the proposal "[...]

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[124]Genelkurmay Belgelerinde Kürt İsyanları II 46-47.

[125] *Dersim :Jandarma Umum Kumandanlığı Raporu (1932)* (Dersim: Report of Gendarme General Command). (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2010) 227.

[126] Ibid. 226.

the Kurdishness must be melted within the Turkish community [...]"[127] was presented for suggestion. The necessity to assimilate the Kurdish identity within the Turkish community is expressed in this sentence. In all of the prepared reports, it is defended that a military operation must be executed in the Dersim region.[128].

In the report which was presented to Mustafa Kemal by İsmet İnönü after his travel to Anatolia in 1935, a plan with three stages regarding to the rehabilitation of Dersim was included. First of all, İnönü argued that Dersim should be disarmed. Secondly, the reconstituting of the administrative regularization of Dersim province was deemed necessary. Thirdly, the appointment of soldiers or governors as district governors was planned. The appointment of the local people to official posts at the district governorates is not envisaged within this regularization. The report proposed for the government to possess special authorities construct roads and sentence to death as to maintain the order and safety of the community.[129]

Hamdi Bey, the Civil Inspector, stated in the report he prepared on 2nd of February 1926, that Dersim is in the process of Kurdization and for this reason, Dersim poses a threat. The report stated that the present situation of Dersim is originating from the mismanagement of the Empire.[130] Abidin Özmen, the Public Inspector, proposed in the report, he wrote that Turkish migrants should be placed in the Eastern provinces, Turkishness propagandas should be executed in order to ensure the Kurds to speak Turkish instead of Kurdish, the Turks who came to the region from the western part of the country should marry the Kurds, officials should not speak Kurdish with the local people and should be punished with administrative penalty in case they do, approximately 3000 people should be immigrated every year to the west.[131]

In accordance with the prepared reports, reform policies were concentrated on with the intention of ensuring control over the Dersim province. The state enacted the 2884 numbered Law on Administration of Tunceli Province in 1935 in order to centralize the semi-independent tribes in Dersim. With the Tunceli Legislation, Dersim was started to be governed by a General Inspectorship formed under the

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[127] Ibid. 242.
[128] Ibid. 223-262.
[129] Saygı Öztürk 57.
[130] Genelkurmay Belgelerinde Kürt İsyanları II 47-48.
[131] Saygı Öztürk 71-82.

presidency of a governor and a commander with Lieutenant General. The governor and commander possessed the authority to change the borders and centers of districts and sub-districts, to appoint military officers to district governorates. The governor and commander possessed the authority to transfer people of the province and their families to another place or to prevent the people to reside within the province in order to ensure safety if deemed necessary.[132] Facility and building constructions were begun in the region for police station units in 1937. The policies implemented and the legislations enacted by the state increased the tension of tribe leaders who have not sighted a public servant in the region.

The leader of the Dersim Rebellion, to which approximately 30.000 participated, Seyid Rıza sent a letter to the Special District Commander General Alpdoğan requesting for the repeal of the Tunceli legislation and the recognition of Kurdish rights. Upon this request of Seyid Rıza, soldier deployment to the region was initiated. In the beginning of the year 1937, the conflicts between the Kurdish rebels and the state forces increased. On 5th of September 1937, Seyid Rıza was arrested, brought into court and executed with his 11 friends. Despite the execution of Seyid Rıza, the conflicts continued until October, 1938.[133]

During the rebellion, the state restricted the access to Dersim and used modern weapons in order to suppress the rebellion. Following suppression of the rebellion, the state executed special administration regime in the region, declared the martial law and forced the people to migrate out of the region.[134] With the suppression of the Dersim Rebellion, public order was ensured in the region[135]. The tribe leaders and sheikhs/sayyids who organized the rebellion were exiled from the region. The gendarmerie forces and army in the region were continued to carry out operations. The government and government representatives started to make propagandas in order to increase the administration of the state in the region.[136]

As the Kurdish populated region is geographically rugged and the Kurdish population lived disorganized; and the Kurds are separated into different religious

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[132] Genelkurmay Belgelerinde Kürt İsyanları II 21-215.
[133] Lazarev, Mihoyan 245-246.
[134] Jwaideh 428-429.
[135] Genelkurmay Belgelerinde Kürt İsyanları II 103.
[136] Ibid. 205-206.

communities that prevented the Kurdish rebellions to have a common qualification. The Sheikh Sait Rebellion was not supported by Alevi Kurds as it was the rebellion of Sunni Zazas. This is because the Shiah Kurds would rather live in Sunni but the secular Republic of Turkey than to live in an independent Sunni Kurdish state in which Naqshbandi tariqa is effective. Furthermore, the abolition of Caliphate did not have a meaning for the Shiah Kurds in Dersim. Moreover, the Dersim Rebellion did not receive the support of Sunni Kurds as it was the rebellion of Shiah Kurds. The fact that many rebellions broke out between the years 1925–1938 but none of them was successful in expansion to the general is proving this circumstance.

The rebellions which broke out in the first period of the Republic economically weakened the region. The state policies implemented after the encountered conflicts weakened separatist-religious, feudal and nationalist groups in the region. Mandatory settlement policies prevented for a new rebellion to break out after the Dersim Rebellion. As a result, the Sheikh Sait, the Mt. Ararat and the Dersim rebellions which broke out in the first 20 years of the Republic and possess the characteristic of Kurdish nationalism emerged as a reaction in consequence of centralization and modernization policies of the Republic of Turkey.

The Turkish identity was used as the dynamo of nation-state building in the Foundation years; the ethnic identities except from the Turkish identity were overlooked and even were regarded as nonexistent. The General Staff published a work in 1946 entitled as *"The Past Rebellions in Eastern Region and the Lessons Learned"* with the intention for to inform the army officers about the past events and rebellions. In this work, it was stated that the true owners of Ararat province, in other words Ağrı province, are the Turks. Moreover in this publication, it was stated that there was no nation called the Kurds, that they were of Turan[137] origin and that they have lost their identity as they were on the path of occupancy with the following statement;

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[137] V.v. "Turanlı", Türk Dil Kurumu <http://tdkterim.gov.tr/bts/>. Turkish Language Society defined Turanlı (Uralaltaic) as people who lived in Central Asia.
V.v. "Turan", Türk Dil Kurumu <http://tdkterim.gov.tr/bts/>. According to Turkish Language Society, Turan is the oldest homeland of Turks in the Central Asia.

> As it can be understood from briefly reviewing the three thousand years of old history that there is no a nation called 'Kurd'. This public of who are of Turan origin lost their origins […] as they are settled on the East-West occupancy paths.[138]

It was stated that Kurds were actually Turks and that they were warriors as a result of the geography that they inhabited. Also, the General Staff attributed the reason for the disorderly behaviors of the region people to the impoverishment of the region. The statement of the Chief of Staff regarding the aforesaid;

> These people of this mountaineer region who are originally Turkish are courageous as they had to fight against the nature all their lives […] For the region to be arid […] and them to be poor […] promoted them to pillage and banditry.[139]

1.3.2. 1950–1960 Period: Inactivity Period

With the transition to multi-party system in Turkey, Turkification policies implemented for the Muslim ethnic groups were interrupted. With the transition to the multi-party political life, the Kurdish tribe leaders and Kurdish intellects participated to politics more effectively. The Kurdish tribe leaders who were exiled during the single-party period became members of parliament through the DP.

The DP, during its ruling years, adopted a nationalism policy based on citizenship. The DP softened hard policies implemented on Kurdish tribes within the scope of centralization policy after the establishment of the Republic. The officials in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia region were started to be appointed from the region rather than the center.[140] The purpose of this policy is to strengthen the bond between the state and local people. Moreover, the DP, in its last years in power, published books in Kurdish.

The DP, which was pursuing liberal economy policy in the period between the years 1950–1960, supported agricultural mechanization to disintegrate the tribe system by bringing capitalism to the region and to increase the productivity in the region. Roads were constructed in order to integrate the region to the Turkish economy. However, economic problems prevented agricultural and industrial investments towards the region.

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[138] Genelkurmay Belgelerinde Kürt İsyanları II 229-234.
[139] Ibid. 235-236.
[140] Heper 183.

According to Celal Bayar, who was the President between the years 1950-1960, all the citizens of Republic of Turkey, regardless of their religion and race are Turks[141]. Celal Bayar justified that hard policies which were implemented in the single-party period should be changed and that services should be procured to the region through public enterprises. On the other hand, the TSK argued that the "Kurdish national consciousness" increases because of the liberal policies of the DP, implemented in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia[142].

The emphasis on Islamic values and the Islamic identity of the DP provided the support of the public, especially the people living in the countryside to the party. The embedding of Islamic identity into the ideology of the party by the DP ensured the support of Sunni Kurds to the party. Notwithstanding the policies regarding the resolution of the experienced problems were adopted while the DP was in power, the existence of the issue was continued to be denied.

1.3.3. 1960–1980 Period: Political Violence and Organization

After the 1960 coup d'état, the TSK pursued a policy to strength official discourse as 'The Kurds do not exist as a different ethnicity' which was worn in the DP period. On 24th of July 1960, Cevdet Sunay, the 5th President of the Republic of Turkey, who gave a speech as the Chief of Staff in Diyarbakır stated that "No Kurds, everyone is a Turk. The land of Ziya Gökalp cannot belong to the Kurds. Not just here, but in all of East only the Turks live" which means that the Kurds did not exist and there are only Turks exist[143].

The official discourse regarding that Kurds do not exist was restated, on the other hand the law no 105 was enacted in addition to the Settlement Law, 2510 numbered law, on 19th of October 1960. With this law, internal migration and settlement of citizens who threatens the habitants, disturb the peace, attacks the rights of individuals or prevent the exercise of individual rights and harm national interests under the effect of religious feelings or traditions or ideologies, was decided.[144]

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[141] Ibid. 192.
[142] Kirişçi, Winrow 127-128.
[143] Lazarev, Mihoyan 332..
[144] *2510 Sayılı İskan Kanununa Ek Kanun (Appendix to the 2510 numbered Settlement Law)*. T.C. Official Gazette, Law no: 105, Number: 10638, July 2011 <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/10638.pdf&main= http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/10638.pdf>.

Within the scope of this law, many Kurdish tribe leaders were forced to exile. Forced settlement annoyed the Kurds and after a short while, the state allowed for the tribe leaders, who were exiled, to return.[145] David McDowall indicated that 55 landlords were exiled and their lands were seized by the state after the 1960 coup d'état. In 1961, the National Unity Committee[146] allowed for the relegated the Kurds to return to their hometowns and their seized lands were returned.[147]

The Constitution of 1961, which was prepared during the National Unity Committee period, increased the individual rights and freedoms, provided autonomy to the universities and gave the students the right to organization. In this period, left-wing organizations were begun to be established which defended the brotherhood of the Kurdish and the Turkish nations and defend that these nations must get rid of imperialism. Another aim of these left-wing groups was to provide an economic development in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions where the Kurds were densely populated and which were economically underdeveloped. Another aim of these organizations was to end denial policy which was implemented after 1924. However, the state policies towards the denial of the Kurdish culture and the prevention of speaking the Kurdish continued. The Voice (Deng) Journal and the New Day (Roja Nü) Newspaper which were started to be published in Istanbul in 1963 were closed down after a little while.

The nationalist Kurds who were receiving education in universities in big cities and were aware of their ethnic identities began to organize around the Marxist-Leninist organizations. Left-wing organizations justified that Kurds must be recognized as a nation and that they can execute proletarian revolutions themselves. These organizations arranged the East Meetings (Doğu Mitingleri) in 1967, in order to attract attention towards the backwardness of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia.

The TİP (Workers Party of Turkey) defended that the feudal order in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia must be demolished. In 1969, under the leadership of the TİP, a student club named as the DDKO (Eastern Revolutionary Cultural Hearth) which

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[145] Hassan Arfa, *Kürtler: Tarihsel ve Politik Bir Çalışma(The Kurd, a Historical and Political Study).* trans. Faysal Nesre (İstanbul: AVESTA, 2006) 61.

[146] National Unity Committee is a military junta which took over the Democrat Party government with a military coup on 27th of May,1969.

[147] David McDowall, *Modern Kürt Tarihi(A Modern History of the Kurds).*(İstanbul: Doruk Yayınları,2004) 531-532.

worked for the recognition of Kurdish language by the state and to provide cultural rights to Kurds, was established. Ş.X.Mıhoyan stated that the number of members of the DDKO rose to twenty thousand in a short time[148]. The Kurdish origin undergraduate youths worked for to enhance cultural rights and freedoms of Kurds and to economically develop the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions.

In the 4th Congress of the TİP in 1970, it was declared that Kurdish people existed on the Eastern part of Turkey and that they were subjected to oppression and assimilation policies. The TİP stated that the East problem was not only the issue of regional backwardness, but the struggle of Kurdish people to be able to achieve their constitutional citizenship rights.[149] After the 1971 Memorandum, many organizations were closed down and members of these organizations were arrested. The Kurdish intellects and the Kurdish activists such as Musa Anter, Kemal Burkay, M. Emin Bozarslan were arrested. The Kurds realized their own identity by the activities of Kurdish nationalists[150].

1.3.4. 1980–1999 Period: Denial and Acquiescence

The TSK seized control of the country on 12th of September 1980, because of the increased density of violence between the left-wing groups and the nationalist right-wing groups and the political instability in the country towards the end of 1970s. All political parties were nullified with the military intervention. The Constitution of 1961 was laid aside and the 1982 Constitution was put into effect with a referendum. The policies which were put into practice by the military regime and were legislated with the 1982 Constitution, caused for the Kurdish nationalism to spread to the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia.

Bülent Tanör expressed that there is not a direct exclusionary and discriminatory regulation towards the Kurds or any other ethnic group in the laws enacted in the 1982 Constitution and afterwards. But nonetheless, he stated that there are provisions and regulations which have "discrimination and exclusionist" characteristics.[151] The

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[148] Lazarev, Mihoyan 335.

[149]*Türkiye İşçi Partisi 4. Büyük Kongre Kararları, 28 April 2011* <http://www.behiceboran.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=43>.
V.v. Lazarev, Mihoyan 336.

[150] Kirişçi, Winrow 131-132.

[151] Tanör

1982 Constitution imposed many restrictions concerning the use of Kurdish. In article 26 of the 1982 Constitution there is a provision as, "Any language prohibited by law shall not be used for the expression and dissemination of ideas"[152] The military government imposed restrictions to the usage of Kurdish with this article.

The law no 2932, on Publications in Languages other than Turkish, which was enacted on 19th of October 1983, prohibited the expression, dissemination and publication of ideas in languages other than the first official language of countries recognized by the government of the Republic of Turkey in order to protect the national security and public order of the country. There is no existing prohibition concerning the usage of languages other than Turkish in daily life. However, the permission of the highest ranking civilian authority of the location where the demonstration and meeting was going to be held, was required for the printing of means such as posters, banners etc. and for the publications of imagery and voice recordings which were to be used in the organized meeting and demonstrations in a language other than Turkish. The related penalty provisions were implemented for those who did not obey to the prohibitions specified in the law.[153] With this article, the usage of Kurdish in demonstrations and meetings was banned. The criticisms towards this policy increased towards the end of 1980s. This law was abolished with the article 23 of the 3713 numbered law in 12th of April 1991.[154]

The Legal and illegal Kurdish organizations were started to be established and the Kurdish journal and newspapers were started to be published as a reaction towards the implemented policies. However, the established organizations were closed down, the journal and newspapers were banned and denunciations towards the publishers and organizations members were made. With the establishment of the PKK and the initiation of activities, the Kurdish issue turned into a matter of armed struggle.

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[152] *Türkiye Cumnhuriyeti Anayasası (The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey).* T.C. Official Gazette, Law no: 2709, Number: 17844, July, 2011
<http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/17844.pdf&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/17844.pdf>.
[153] *Türkçeden Başka Dillerde Yapılacak Yayınlar Hakkında Kanun(The Law on the Publications in Languages other than Turkish)*, T.C. Official Gazette, Law no: 2932, Number: 18199, July, 2011
<http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/18199.pdf&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/18199.pdf >.
[154] Kirişçi, Winrow 134-135.

Kenan Evren, who was the President between the years 1982-1989, argued that the purpose of Kurdish resistance is to split Turkey and that the resisters received support from foreign powers. Evren expressed that he did not recognize any national right to the Kurds; according to the following statement, "The Kurds exist. However we will not give them the opportunity to divide Turkey. They cannot take anything from us. We will do everything to eradicate this problem."[155]

The Islam and the Turkish nationalism which have important places in the society were began to be used in official discourse, in order to decrease the effect of Marxism and separatist Kurdish movements. In this period, it was stated that the ancestors of Kurds and Turks are the same, in fact that Kurds are originally Turks. It was asserted that western states supported Kurdish nationalism in order to divide Turkey. In society, a perception towards the fact that if the Kurds will provide cultural rights it would mean the dissolution of Turkey, which can be named as Kurdistan Syndrome. The perception that all Kurds were sympathizers of the PKK and that all Kurds wanted independence also emerged in this period.

Turgut Özal who came to power after the end of military regime and was the President between the years 1989-1993 suggested an idea different from the official view concerning the Kurdish issue. Özal, as distinct from the policy towards the 'nonexistence of Kurdish ethnicity' in the official discourse, thought that Islam is necessary to enhance the bonds between ethnic groups. Özal defended that everyone is a citizen of the Republic of Turkey no matter what their ethnic identity is, that all of these ethnic groups form a single nation and that is Turkishness.[156] According to Özal, Terror and Southeastern problems are different from each other. The terror problem is the PKK terror and the state should exercise severe precautions against the PKK terror.[157] Özal stated, "The Southeastern problem cannot be resolved with military logic. This logic is playing into the hands of PKK."[158] Özal also pointed out that military operations are not sufficient for the resolution of the issue.

Özal expressed that for the resolution of the Southeastern problem, democratic local administrations must be established in the region. According to Özal, certain rights

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[155] Lazarev, Mihoyan 358.
[156] Heper 194-195.
[157] Ibid. 199.
[158] Yayman 38.

which are to be given to Kurdish origin citizens would make them see themselves as an indivisible part of the state. He also emphasized that it is essential to give the rights of broadcasting in Kurdish in local televisions for the Kurds, freely usage of their mother tongues in public spheres and receiving education in Kurdish at public schools on condition that Turkish is the official language.[159]

The 9th President of Turkey, between the years 1993-2000, Süleyman Demirel also defended the nationalism policy based on the foundation of citizenship as Turgut Özal did. According to this view, everyone who is contingent upon the Republic of Turkey with the bond of citizenship is a Turk and this is the constitutional citizenship. Süleyman Demirel declared that he recognized the Kurdish reality during the years he was the President.[160] Demirel stated that the single party period and military governments have wounded the Kurdish origin citizens.[161] As Özal did, Demirel separated the PKK problem from the Kurdish issue. According to Demirel, harsh policies must be implemented in order for the resolution of PKK problem.[162] The statement which Demirel gave to journalist in 1992 is as follows;

> Our ethnic diversity is our prosperity. Our original purpose is to live all together with language, religion, race differences but with realizing those differences. It makes no difference if you are a Kurd, a Circassian, you are who you are. You see, right at this juncture, constitution citizenship comes out. Constitutional patriotism comes out […] It is necessary for everyone to know that they are constitution citizens and to hold on to Turkey as a part of this community.[163]

Demirel defended that the region must be economically developed in order to end terror problem. He initiated the Southeastern Anatolia Project in order to develop the region economically.[164] The DYP (True Path Party) – The SHP (Social Democratic Populist Party) Coalition Government gave different statements from the official discourse concerning the Kurdish issue. The speech of Süleyman Demirel which he gave during the trip he made to the Southeastern Anatolia, in 1991, with Erdal İnönü is historically essential. Süleyman Demirel made a statement as, "Turkey has

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[159] Heper 202.
[160] Ibid.135.
[161] Heper 199. Kirişçi, Winrow 3.
[162] Heper 199.
[163] Yayman 41.
[164] Heper 203.

recognized the reality of the Kurd. From İstanbul to Hakkari, it is all yours. This homeland is all of ours."[165]

The policies implemented after the 1980 military intervention, could not prevent the Kurdish nationalism from growing and expanding. The PKK drew all attention towards itself with the Eruh raid in 1984. Abdülmelik Fırat stated that the oppressive policies in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia were more effective in the building-up of the Kurdish national consciousness than the PKK activities[166]. In official discourse, the PKK terror was not regarded as an ethnic problem but an issue of backwardness and interference of foreign powers. For this reason, it was concentrated on the military operations in order to terminate the PKK. This situation increased the violence in the region. The denial of the Kurdish issue and the existence of the Kurds in the official discourse and not removal of constitutional restrictions, caused for the Kurdish national consciousness and nationalism to grow.

1.3.5. 1999 and After: Acquiescence and Discussion Period

With the capturing of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, the Kurdish issue entered a different period. The state supposed that the PKK would lay down their weapons with the capturing of the PKK leader and accelerated the military operations towards the PKK. The PKK terror continued despite the capture of Öcalan provided the state to realize that armed struggle is not sufficient to resolve the Kurdish issue.

By the declaration of Turkey as a candidate country in 1999 by the EU and the economic crisis in 2001, the state realized necessity for solution of its domestic issues like the Kurdish. During the DSP (Democratic Left Party) -the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) - the ANAP (Motherland Party) Coalition Government period, from 28 May 1999 to 18th of November 2002, certain amendments were made in thirty three articles of the 1982 Constitution in order to fulfill the Copenhagen Political Criteria. The provision of article 28 of the 1982 Constitution, "Broadcasting shall not be executed in a language prohibited by law"[167] was abolished on 3rd of October 2001. At first, the prohibition regarding the usage of

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[165] Yayman 39.
[166] Kirişçi, Winrow 134.
[167] *Türkiye Cumnhuriyeti Anayasası.*

languages other than Turkish was abolished in 1991 and afterwards with the abolition of article 28, one more obstacle for broadcasting in Kurdish was eliminated.

In the General Elections of Turkey in November of 2002, only the AKP and the CHP (Republican People's Party) managed to get into the parliament with passing the 10% threshold. According to the results of the election, the AKP came to power alone by receiving 34.29% of the votes throughout Turkey. The AKP Government continued the EU reforms which were initiated by the DSP- MHP-ANAP Coalition Government. The AKP Government executed many reforms in order to fulfill the Copenhagen Political Criteria.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan followed in the footsteps of Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel and declared that only armed struggle would not be sufficient for the resolution of the issue. Tayyip Erdoğan suggested the constitutional citizenship idea with the following statement;

> […] Every person from every ethnic origin including the Turk, Laz, Kurd, Circassian, Georgian, who fall within the upper identity of citizenship of the Republic of Turkey is our brother, no one can overshadow that.[168]

The AKP tried to develop policies in order to resolve the Kurdish issue. The 14th of October 1983 dated 'Law on Education and Training in Foreign Language' was changed on 3rd of August 2002, as 'Law on Turkish Citizens Learning Different Language and Dialects with Education and Training in Foreign Language'. With this law, the opening of courses for learning different language and dialects which are conventionally used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives was legislated.[169] In this way, a huge barrier in front of learning the Kurdish language was lifted and Kurdish special language courses were begun to open.

On the 25th of January, 2004 dated official gazette 'The Regulation on Radio and Television Broadcasts in Different Language and Dialects Which Are Conventionally Used by Turkish Citizens in Their Daily Lives' was issued. According to article 5 of this regulation, the broadcasting in different language and

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[168] Yayman 43.

[169] *Çeşitli Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına İlişkin Kanun (The Law Related to the Change in Several Laws)*. T.C. Official Gazette, Law no: 4771, Number: 24871, July, 2011 <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2002/08/200208 09.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2002/08/20020809.htm>.

dialects which are used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives was based on certain principals;

> […] Broadcasting can be done by means of permission from Supreme Board. Broadcasts such as news, music and towards the presentation of traditional culture only for adults can be made in these language and dialects. Broadcasts regarding the education of these language and dialects shall not be made. […] Radio organizations can broadcast a total of five hours a week not to exceed 60 minutes a day and television organizations can broadcast a total of four hours a week not to exceed 45 minutes a day. […][170]

With this law, radio and television channels possessed the right to broadcast in Kurdish a total of four hours a week with 60 minutes a day for radio channels and 45 minutes a day for television channels, on condition that they obtain permission from Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (RTÜK). Consequently, this law paved the way for broadcasting in Kurdish. In addition to this, certain amendments were made to the 5767 numbered 'Law on Radio and Television Organizations and Broadcasts with Turkey Radio and Television Law' on 11th of June, 2008. With this law, the right to "[…] broadcast in different language and dialects other than Turkish" was given to TRT.[171] With respect to this law, TRT 6 (Şeş – the number "6" in Kurdish) started to 24 hours Kurdish broadcast on 1st of January, 2009.

With the 5233 numbered 'Law on Terror and Compensation of Damages from Fight against Terrorism' which was enacted on 17th of July 2004, the compensation of damages of people who has material damages because of terrorist actions and fight against terrorism was ensured. The damages which are to be compensated by the state and are declared in article 7 of the related article are as follows;

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[170] *Türk Vatandaşlarının Günlük Yaşamlarında Geleneksel Olarak Kullandıkları Farklı Dil ve Lehçelerde Yapılacak Radyo ve Televizyon Yayınları Hakkında Yönetmelik (*The Regulation on Radio and Television Broadcasts in Different Language and Dialects Which Are Conventionally Used by Turkish Citizens in Their Daily Lives)**,** T.C. Official Gazette, Number: 25357, July 2011 <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2004/01/200401 25.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2004/01/20040125.htm>.

[171] *Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kanunu ile Radyo ve Teelevizyonların Kuruluş ve Yayınları Hakkında Kanunda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun(*Law on Radio and Television Organizations and Broadcasts with Turkey Radio and Television Law**,** T.C. Official Gazette, Law no: 5767, Number: 26918,July, 2011 <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2008/06/200806 26.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2008/06/20080626.htm>.

a) All kinds of damages given to animals, trees, products and other movables and real estates. b) Damages faced in cases of injury, disablement and death, treatments and funeral expenses. c) Material damages arising from the individuals not being able to reach their assets as a result of activities, executed within the scope of counter terrorism.[172]

In 1990s, the Returning to Village and Rehabilitation Project was initiated in order to ensure the return of families to their villages which they had to leave because of the terrorist activities in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. The execution function of this project was given to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1998. The Ministry of Internal Affairs executed infrastructure investments, repaired facilities in the region such as ravaged schools, health care centers, procured residential construction products to the citizens who returned to the region within the scope of the project. In addition to these, the ministry carried out projects for getting professions to the citizens residing in the region. A total of 111.860.000 TL was transferred to the project from the governmental budget between the years 1999–2011[173]. The AKP declared that a total of 2, 5 billion TL payments were made to terror-strickens[174].

The CHP and the MHP, together with supporting the Democratic Initiative/Opening, argued that it would enhance the ethnic based separatism and discrimination.The CHP believes that the Democratic Initiative will harm the territorial integrity and constitutional order of the Republic of Turkey.[175]

Apart from the Kurdish issue, the AKP stated that it is necessary to execute certain reforms in order to resolve the problems which the Alevi and Roman citizens face with. The purpose of this enterprise, no matter how it is named as Kurdish, or Alevi or Democratic Initiative, is to strengthen the social unity and solidarity of the Republic of Turkey. The AKP aimed to turn down the social tension experienced with the Kurdish Initiative and to eliminate the PKK terror.

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[172] *Terör ve Terörle Mücadeleden Doğan Zararların Karşılanması Hakkında Kanun (The Law on Terror and Compensation of Damages from Fight against Terrorism)*, T.C. Official Gazette, Law no:5233, Number:25535, July, 2011 <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2004/07/20040727.htm>.

[173]"Köye Dönüş ve Rehabilitasyon Projesi (the Returning to Village and Rehabilitation Project)", İller İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü , 15 July 2011<http://www.illeridaresi.gov.tr/default_B0.aspx?id=174>.

[174]*Kürt Sorununda Çözüm Sürecini Başlattık(We started the process of solution of the Kurdish Issue)*. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, July 2011 <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/icraat/347/kurt-sorununda-cozum-surecini-baslattik>.

[175] Fuat Keyman, "The CHP and the 'Democratic Opening': Reactions to AK Party's Electoral Hegemony". *Insight Turkey*, Vol.12, No.2 (2010) 93.

1.4. Evaluation

There are certain determinant periods of the Kurdish issue. The reigns of Sultan Selim, Sultan Mahmut II and Sultan Abdülhamit II have essential periods in terms of the relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Kurds. In Sultan Selim period, Kurd-Ottoman alliance was established and autonomy was given to the Kurds. This policy continued until the Sultan Mahmut reign. In this period, the centralization policy which was pursued by Sultan Mahmut wounded the Ottoman-Kurd alliance. On the other hand, in the reign of Sultan Abdülhamit II, this Ottoman-Kurd alliance was revived.

The outbreak of the WWI and the declaration of the 14 Principles by the USA President Woodrow Wilson which characterized the fundamental principles of the post-war order and included the self-determination right of nations opened a new chapter for the Kurdish issue. The Kurds with the Treaty of Sevres, which was signed between the Ottoman Empire and Allied Powers at the end of the WWI, acquired the opportunity to establish a state. The loyalty of Kurdish tribes towards the Islam, consequently towards the Caliph, and their advantageous position in the Empire; ensured the participation of many Kurdish tribes to the resistance in Anatolia. Even though the 'Self-determination of Nations' principle and the Kurdish State envisaged to be established in the Treaty of Sevres enhanced the Kurdish nationalism, many Kurdish tribes worked for to protect the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire during and after the WWI. Nevertheless the break out of separatist rebellions under the leadership of certain Kurdish tribes during the WWI and in the National Struggle period, the National Struggle took place on the basis of the Turk and Kurd unity.

During the National Struggle, Mustafa Kemal declared many times that certain rights will be bestowed to Kurds within the order to be established after the war. The founders of the Republic of Turkey tried to establish a unitary nation state comprised of single language and nation, from the multilingual and multi-faith social structure of the Empire. The secular order which was began to be established after the War of Independence drew reaction from conservative Kurds and caused for several Kurdish rebellions to break out with the effect of the enhancing Kurdish nationalism.

In Lausanne Negotiations, it was specified that there is no Muslim minority in a Muslim community no matter what their ethnic identity is. In addition to this, it was stated in the 1924 Constitution that everyone is a 'Turk' in terms of citizenship regardless of their religion and race. However in practice, as Metin Heper stated, "[…] citizens could only be real Turks to the scale that they adopt the ideals, values and manners of ethnic Turks."[176] For this reason, the use of Turkish by all citizens was grounded on and the reflecting of other cultural features of ethnic groups was prevented. The policies which were implemented by the state during the nation building process were regarded as assimilation efforts by some specialist and according to some specialist they were integration efforts.

Hassan Arfa stated that the reason why the Kurds took sides with the Ankara Government during the War of Independence is the Islam identity. Moreover, Arfa expressed that the preservation of the religious identity of the state in the first years of the Republic, provided comfort for the Kurds.[177] The abolition of the Caliphate caused the reaction of religious Kurds. In addition to the abolition of the Caliphate, centralist policies of the state caused the rebellion of Kurdish tribes and/or religious leaders.

The statements given by officials from various levels of the state and the policies pursued by the state after the repression of Kurdish rebellions in the Republican period indicates that the Turkish nationalism statement refers to the Turkish ethnic identity.

The tension between the State and the Kurds which scaled down in 1940s was revived in the 1960s and gained momentum in 1970s when the leftist ideology was effective. Left-wing groups and parties emphasized the brotherhood of Turkish and Kurdish communities and defended the necessity to soften the policies pursued by the state.

With the Military Intervention in 1980, the Kurdish nationalism which developed under the roof of leftist ideology in 1960s was repressed. With the Constitution accepted after the coup d'état, the existence of all ethnic identities other than the

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[176] Heper 264.
[177] Arfa 47-48.

Turkish ethnic identity was denied and all manners of revelation of these identities were prevented by laws. As a result of the oppressions executed by the state and the enhancement of Kurdish nationalism, PKK emerged. With the emergence of PKK, terror dimension was also added to the Kurdish issue.

Beginning from 1990s, the Republic of Turkey realized that the ethnic identities other than the national identity were supposed to be released as a condition of being a democratic state. In order to eliminate the perception existing in the society regarding that the Turkish national identity is the same with the Turkish ethnic identity, the state was obliged to execute certain reforms. However, the increase in PKK activities and terror complicated the resolution. The declaration of Turkey as the EU candidate state and the obligation of Turkey to take its democratic right and freedoms to the EU standards on the path to the EU caused the Kurdish issue to be discussed amongst politicians and certain reforms to be mandatorily executed.

In brief, the Kurdish issue in the single party period was retrieved as the reaction of Kurdish tribes and sheikhs as a result of the nation-building policy, security concerns of the state and the Kurdish nationalism. In this period the issue was denied and pressure was applied. With the transition to multi-party period, the Kurdish issue was acknowledged as a security concern, nothing was done regarding the resolution of the problem and in fact the issue was regarded to be nonexistent. In 1970s, the issue was majorly discussed on the basis of right and left ideology. With the 1980 coup d'état and the start of PKK attacks, the issue was completely dealt from security perspective and approached by a violence/oppression model.

With the rise of the Kurdish nationalism in 1990s and the initiation of activities of Kurdish politics, it was understood that the issue cannot be resolved only by an approach based on security. The period, which began with the acquiescence of the existence of issue at first by Turgut Özal, then Süleyman Demirel, continued with the AKP which deals with the all dimensions of the issue together and develops policies towards the resolution of the problem. Statements of Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel concerning the Kurdish issue changed the official discourse. With the AKP government, the state started to discuss the Kurdish issue with all of its dimensions.

2. DEFINITION OF THE MULTI DIMENSIONAL KURDISH ISSUE

The Kurdish issue is a multi dimensional problem which has historical, socio-economic, security, cultural and democratic rights dimensions. All of these dimensions are both the reasons and the results of the Kurdish issue. As the historical background of the matter was explained in the first part of the thesis, in this part, the security dimension, socio-economic dimension, cultural and democratic right demands and deficiency dimension of the issue shall be discussed.

The security dimension of the Kurdish issue involves the PKK terror, the relation of other countries with PKK and the precautions taken by the Republic of Turkey in order to eliminate the PKK terror. It must be acknowledged that the security dimension of the issue is not only comprised of the PKK terror. The policies implemented by the Republic in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia region in order to eliminate the PKK have affected the region's economic and social life. For the PKK, to receive support from the Middle Eastern and the European countries or from the Kurdish Diasporas caused the issue to acquire an international dimension.

The socio-economic dimension of the Kurdish issue contains the subjects of immigration, education, employment and income. All of the subheadings of the socio-economic problem are directly interrelated. Because as the socio-economic problems cannot be resolved by the Republic of Turkey, it causes for the spread of the PKK's support among the Kurdish nationalists, increasing the legitimacy of PKK in the eyes of Kurdish origin citizens and the spread of statement that 'the state is underwhelmed in the region' which is repeated by PKK. The most important subheading of socio-economic dimension is the immigration fact. The PKK terror in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions, state policies implemented in the region and the conflicts between the PKK and the TSK cause compulsory and voluntary immigrations from the region. Lack of education and low income in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions are the other subheadings of the socio-economic problems. The lack of education and poverty or low income enable the

perception towards the state not making sufficient investments to the region and accordingly PKK to spread in the basis.

Another dimension of the Kurdish issue is the cultural and democratic right deficiencies and demands encountered in accordance with the mentioned situation. Policies such as the Village Guard System, Anti-Terrorism Law and Emergency State which the state put into practice in order to eliminate the PKK caused the violations of human rights. Another reason for the violations of human rights in the region is the PKK to commit violence towards the people in order to attain militants and to accomplish its goal. The no fulfillment or not being able to fulfill democratic right demands such as the request to plead in Courts in Kurdish, the problems originating from the deficiency of cultural rights of these rights are amongst the reasons of the Kurdish issue. The Kurdish nationalists demand the right to plead in courts in Kurdish based on the provision specified in article 39 of the Treaty of Lausanne, 'No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national […]of any language'. In addition to all of these, they also demand for the restrictions imposed on the use of Kurdish especially after the 1980 coup d'état.

The definition of the Kurdish issue which includes many dimensions and subheadings and the explanation of these dimensions and subheadings have capital importance to comprehend the definitions of Kurdish issue and statements of political parties, institutes and opinion leaders which will be put forth in the third part of the thesis.

2.1. Security Dimension

When it comes to the security dimension of the Kurdish issue, the first thing that comes to mind is the PKK terror. The PKK terror holds an essential position in the Kurdish issue. Because the PKK terror is both in the position of the reason and result of the Kurdish issue. Terrorism is a subject which not only has a negative effect on the social life in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions but also profoundly affects all of Turkey. The terror problem is not the only subheading of the security dimension. The implementations of the state towards the PKK terror and the relations of other countries with PKK are other subheadings of the security dimension.

The PKK is an illegal armed organization which benefited from the Kurdish ethnic identity. The PKK, which adopts violent methods in order to reach its political and ideological purpose, is trying to create fear in the public. The PKK organizes attacks towards the security forces, civilians and civil servants not just only in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions but all around Turkey.

As it was explained in the first part of the thesis, the Kurdish issue in the Turkish politics was for many years perceived from a point of view based on security. Beginning from the emergence of the PKK terror, the Kurdish issue was comprehended as a PKK terror and security based approaches were adopted for the resolution of the problem. Within this process, the reason for the emergence of PKK terror and constituents which trigger PKK terror were not discussed.

The security dimension does not only have a subheading of PKK terror. The implicitly supports of the Middle Eastern countries in which the Kurdish population is dense such as Syria and Iraq in order to inspect the Kurds in their country and to ensure a strong position in their relations with Turkey, redounded an international nature to the Kurdish issue. Moreover, certain European countries objected to the EU membership of Turkey because of the democratic deficit and the human rights violations, which affects the Kurdish issue. Some PKK militants fled from Turkey as a refugee to certain Western European countries and to execute PKK propagandas. Moreover some Kurdish origin citizens, who live in these countries giving support to PKK, led the Kurdish issue to be discussed and brought to the international agenda.

In this section, the PKK, the state policies towards the elimination of the PKK and the relations of other countries with PKK which are subheadings of the security dimension shall be mentioned.

2.1.1. The PKK Terror

The PKK was established on 28th of November 1978 in Şanlıurfa by the program which was prepared by Abdullah Öcalan and other "Kurdish Revolutionaries"[178]. The PKK aimed to establish an independent socialist Kurdistan State within the framework of Marxist-Leninist ideology and with armed struggle. The PKK, which

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[178] Andrew Mango, *Turkey and the War on Terror: for Forty Years We Fought Alone.* (New York: Routledge , 2005) 34.

benefits on the Kurdish ethnic identity to accomplish its goal, adopted terror as a means. For the ideology of the organization to be Marxist-Leninist obstructed to receive the support of Muslim Kurdish origin citizens in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia in which the tribe system was dominate. The PKK receives not only the support of Kurdish nationalist groups in Turkey but also Kurdish nationalists who reside in Iraq, Syria and Western Europe. Aliza Marcus stated that the PKK caused the Kurdish national movement to be radicalized[179].

The PKK started its attacks towards the security forces in 1984. The exact number decedents are not known because of PKK attacks and conflicts between the TSK and PKK. Aliza Marcus states that the number of decedents is 40,000[180]. Human Rights Watch, on the other hand, stated that approximately 44,000 people died including soldiers, PKK members or civilians as a result of the conflicts[181]. As for Hamit Bozarslan, he stated that the number is over 37,000[182].

Because of the PKK terror many civilians, public servants lost their lives. The PKK, beginning from 1992, targeted the teachers who were stationed in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia and the families of the student and performed armed assaults towards the local community. The PKK carried out and is still carrying out attacks towards journalists, doctors, human rights activists, members of parliament, political leaders, lawyers, businessmen and even former members of PKK (confessors). Due to the attacks towards public servants, many public servants do not wish to perform their duty in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia and are residing.[183] In terrorist attacks between the years 1987-2002, 307 public servants died and 204 public servants were wounded. 96 teachers and 4 doctors were killed. Furthermore, 114 schools were completely destroyed and 127 schools were damaged.[184] The PKK carried out a bombing attack in Tuzla train station in February of 1994. In consequence of this attack 5 cadets died and 31 people were injured.[185]

[179] Marcus 17.
[180] Ibid. 17.
[181] *Protesting as a Terrorist Offense: The Arbitrary Use of Terrorism Laws to Prosecute and Incarcerate Demonstrators in Turkey*. Human Rights Watch November 2010 ,9 <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/turkey1110webwcover.pdf>.
[182] Bozarslan,"Human Rights and the Kurdish Issue in Turkey : 1984-1999" 45.
[183] Kirişçi, Winrow 148-149.
[184] Mango 39.
[185] Marcus 305.

The PKK, which pursued the policy to gain supporters through fear, developed the compulsory military service policy in order to provide militants. The decision of compulsory soldier recruitment from the Southeast was taken at the 3rd Congress of PKK in 1986. Many Kurdish origin citizens (villager) were kidnapped by the PKK within the scope of compulsory military service policy. The PKK named this policy as 'Military Service Law'. Apart from this policy, the PKK forced the Kurdish groined families to make their children PKK militants.[186] The PKK, which adopts armed struggle as a means, is carrying out assassinations, bombing attacks and suicide activities. Land mines are one of the most used weapons by the PKK in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia.

The PKK which abandoned the policy of establishing an independent Kurdish State at the 4th Congress in 1990 designated the establishment of a federal structure within the borders of Turkey as its new target. In other words, as from the 4th Congress, the PKK gave up its purpose to establish an independent Kurdistan State. Within the following period, reasons such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the declaration of the PKK as a terrorist organization by the USA and the EU, and moreover the USA and Turkey to get into a strategic partnership, enabled PKK to degrade its federal structure demand and purpose to democratic confederation or democratic autonomy. Democratic confederalism or democratic autonomy aims to establish local administrations while protecting the unitary structure of the Republic of Turkey and to ensure for citizens of Kurdish origin to live their ethnic identities within the borders of the Republic of Turkey.[187] Murat Karayılan explained the new purpose of the PKK with the following statement;

> The PKK is on a more reasonable line when compared to its past. For instance, formerly it requested an independent Kurdistan state. That was in the past. In a sense, it is not 'a separatist' any more. We want the Kurds to live equally and freely within the borders of the Republic of Turkey […] See, from now on we say 'democratic autonomous Kurdistan'. The intention of this autonomy is not federation. It is not rearrangement of borders. It is a solution which does not disturb the unitary structure of the state. Local administrations law would be amended and local authorities could be empowered.[188]

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[186] Mango 37.

[187] Aşkın 2.

[188] Hasan Cemal," Kuzey Irak Notları-5 ,Karayılan: PKK artık eski PKK değil", *Milliyet Gazetesi*,(05 05 2009) 6 May 2009

Abdullah Öcalan explains the abandonment of the purpose to establish a state of PKK and its new purpose with the following statement;

> The Kurds will earn existence as a democratic nation. They will execute their own sports, education, religious organizations, assembly, municipalities if they can. […] Formerly, I thought that everything would solve if we established a state. Then I reached to the conclusion that the state is not the solution but the source of the problem. […] For this reason, I do not see the state as a resolution. [...] The state will exist, and on the other side there will be a democratic Kurdish nation. The Kurds will recognize, accept the existence of the state. The state, on the other hand, will acknowledge the right of Kurds to be a democratic nation […] In my solution, both the Turks and the Kurds will put forth their languages, cultures, styles, both of them will adjoin […]"[189]

The PKK indicates that it carries out terror activities for Kurdish origin citizens to possess more political and cultural rights within the borders of the Republic of Turkey. The PKK is benefiting from the Kurdish identity and culture in order to accomplish its purpose. The decision to be active in politics in order to attain cultural and democratic rights apart from the terror activities was taken at the 4th Congress of PKK. The organizing of protests and demonstrations, hartal and gathered marches activities of citizens of Kurdish origin in major cities are an extension of this policy.

At the 5th Congress in 1995, the attacks towards the teachers were described to be as a mistake. Beginning from the 5th Congress, the PKK started to emphasize the Islamic ideas as the Marxist-Leninist ideology did not receive support from the Kurdish community and as the support of the Soviet Union was no longer existent. Andrew Mango described the new ideology of PKK which emphasizes Islam with this statement; "The PKK represents the application to Kurdistan both of revolutionary socialism and of revolutionary Islam."[190]

The PKK causes the deaths of not only the security forces but also the deaths of citizens of Kurdish origin. In other words, while trying to receive the support of the Kurdish origin citizens, the PKK is also harming the citizens of Kurdish origin.

<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Yazar.aspx?aType=YazarDetay&ArticleID=1091211&AuthorID=63&Date=06.05.2009>.

[189]Namık Durukan, "Öcalan'dan ilk sinyaller", *Milliyet Gazetesi*, 17 08 2009 <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Siyaset/HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&ArticleID=1129021&Date=17.08.2009&b=Ocalandan>.

[190] Mango 43.

2.1.2. The Relations of Other Countries with the PKK

According to official discourse, there is not a reason for the Kurds to rebel or demand cultural and democratic rights. For this reason, both the state and the armed forces defended for years that the Kurdishness or Kurdish nationalism was created and supported by other countries. This statement of the state is actually true in a sense. The PKK, which is the radical defender of Kurdish nationalism, was supported by other countries from time to time. As the PKK being supported by other countries, the state increased military operations and implement precautions in order to eliminate the PKK terror. The Kurdish nationalism being supported by other countries and the ascending of terrorism are seen as primary elements which threaten the territorial integrity of Turkey.

European countries such as Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and France gave the right of asylum to some PKK militants who escaped from Turkey after the 80 coup d'état. This situation eased for PKK militants to carry out propagandas in Europe and to receive financial support from nationalist Kurdish origin citizens residing in Europe[191]. Many Western Europe countries included the PKK to the terror organizations list, after the 9/11 attacks in the USA. The EU defended that the Kurdish issue must be resolved and reforms in democracy and cultural field must be executed in order to become a member of the EU.

On the other hand, in the Middle East, Syria and Iraq have special role in the organization of the PKK. Aliza Marcus expresses that Syria is the country with the closest ties with the PKK[192]. Upon the request of Abdullah Öcalan, some PKK militants fled from Turkey to Syria after the 80 coup d'état. Syrian authorities supported the PKK because of its territorial claims over Hatay and requests regarding the sharing of the Euphrates river water. Syria provided camps for the training of PKK militants and trainings for its own militants. However, even though Syrian authorities allowed Abdullah Öcalan to take shelter within their territories, they denied the existence of Öcalan in their territories.

The PKK policy of Iraq is of capital importance from the point of the Republic of Turkey. Iraq is one of the countries where the Kurdish population is dense. The PKK

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[191] Marcus 86-88.
[192] Ibid. 138.

accelerated its organizing process by benefiting from the political structure of Iraq. After the First Gulf War, the creating of a no fly zone over locations where the Kurds densely populated on the northern part of 36th latitude of Iraq with the decision of United Nations' Security Council caused for an authority gap to evolve in northern part of Iraq. The PKK, which benefited from the authority gap in the region, expanded its movement area in the region as from 1991. Militants, who are entering to Turkey from mountainous northern Iraq border to carry out terror attacks, received instructions from Öcalan who was in Syria. As the Turkey-Iraq border is mountainous, it prevents the control of the Armed Forces of the entrances and exits of PKK militants to and from the country.

The TSK operations in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia carried out to eliminate the PKK could not be successful because the PKK has terror camps in the Northern Iraq and it receives logistic support from that region. This situation necessitated the Armed Forces to carry out hot pursuit and cross-border operations to the Northern Iraq against the terrorist organization. The Republic of Turkey signed a Security Protocol on 15th of November 1984 with Iraq to prevent the PKK. With this protocol, the Turkish Military Units obtained the authority to carry out cross-border operations up to 5 km inside the Iraq border without receiving permission from Iraqi authorities against groups which pass over to Turkey from Iraq for various terrorist activities. This protocol, also, gave the authority to the Iraqi Military Units to carry out cross-border operations up to 5 km. inside the Turkish border. [193]

In the new order[194] established after the intervention of the USA to Iraq in 2003, the establishment of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region in northern part of Iraq and the lack of Barzani authority in the region, expended the movement area of the PKK and increased the PKK attacks towards Turkey.[195]

The AKP government initiated a dialogue with Talabani, the President of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government Leader Mesut Barzani in order to be successful in Kurdish initiative and anti terrorism. Iraq government does not support Turkey's

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[193] Kamuran Reçber, "Türkiye'nin Irak'ın Kuzeyi'nde Sınır Ötesi Operasyon ve Sıcak Takip Hakkı (The Cross-border Operation and Hot Pursuit Right of Turkey in the Northern Iraq)", *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika* , Vol: 3, No:9, (2007) 19-23 ,May 2011
<http://www.usak.org.tr/dosyalar/dergi/0aDMogLoI2x6S0r9Dgg4Za5oR7EHbN.pdf >.
[194] Kurdistan Region, ratified by the Constitution of Iraq, is an autonomous region which has its own flag, assembly and army and mainly inhabited by Kurds.
[195] Reçber 19-23.

cross-border military operations towards Iraq in struggle against the PKK[196]. Iraq Kurdish leader Mesut Barzani defends that a dialogue must be initiated and that the Kurdish minority in Turkey must be recognized for the resolution of the PKK issue[197].

2.1.3. Precautions/Measures Taken towards the Elimination of the PKK Terror

The Eruh and Şemdinli attacks which took place in 1984 made the Republic of Turkey realize the PKK. After these attacks towards the state forces, military operation which intended to eliminate the PKK were initiated and certain policies were put into practice. The most important policy of the policies which were put into practice is the State of Emergency law which was enacted on 25th of October 1983. With the State of Emergency law, the state authorized the governor of the region where the State of Emergency was declared to take precautions such as to prohibit settlement in certain locations of the region, to restrict the entrance and exit to residential areas, to evacuate the residential areas and to transfer to other regions, to recess the education in all levels of education, training institutions, to benefit from all manners of tools and equipment in the region and to confiscate these tools when necessary, to destroy movable and real estate's which pose threat.[198] There are two purposes of the State of Emergency law; the first one is to protect the local community and villages from the PKK terror; the second purpose is to prevent the PKK militants to fulfill their needs such as food and shelter from the local community. The State of Emergency implementations involved the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions.

The second biggest implementation, which the Republic of Turkey initiated in struggle against the PKK, is the Village Guard System[199]. The purpose of this system, which was initiated in 1985, is to ensure the protection of the periphery of the village or rural areas and therefore the protection of local community against the PKK attacks and propagandas[200]. The duty of the guard is to determine the individuals who harm the lives of the villagers and their goods, to track these

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[196] Marcus 405.

[197] Ibid. 404.

[198] *Olağanüstü Hal Kanunu(State of Emergency Law)*, T.C. Official Gazette, Law no: 2935, Number: 18204, May,2011 <http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/652.html>.

[199] V.v. McDowall 559. David McDowall argues that the village guard system resembles Hamidian Units which was constituted as a local paramilitary system in the Ottoman Empire.

[200] Yayman 21.

individuals, to inform the village headman and the nearest gendarmerie, to prevent these individuals from escaping and to capture these individuals. Even though the village guards carry out their duty in connection with the village headman, they are under the control and command of the Gendarmerie Commander to whom the village where they perform their duty is connected to. The duty of the guards is within the boundaries of the village to which they were stationed. The number of village guards is estimated to be between 50 thousand and 70 thousand[201]. The village guards have the authority use their fire arms in enforced situations and in situations where the warning to stop is complied with, against individuals who attack the guard while performing his duty or others or individuals who put their lives in danger[202].

The guards are put on the payroll by the state throughout their period of service. For this reason, village guard has become an important source of income in the region.[203] David McDowall stated that there are many reasons for the community to participate in the Village Guard System. However, he stated that the unemployment in the region and the salary given to village guards being higher than the average of the region are the most important reasons which increase the participation to the Village Guard System[204]. Another important reason for the community to participate in the Village Guard System is the kidnapping by the PKK in order to win supporters. People who live in hamlets and villages in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia prefer to become a member of the Village Guard System because the PKK threatens citizens to give money and material or to become a PKK militant. Moreover, the state was in the need of village guards in order to prevent the PKK militants to cross the Iraq border and to ensure the control of the mountainous border.[205] As a result of this policy, the income and material which the PKK gathered from the local community decreased and the PKK started to have difficulty in finding militant.

The Republic of Turkey pursued the village evacuation policy within the scope of State of Emergency policy in order to prevent the PKK from receiving support from the local community and to harm the local community. According to the Turkish

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[201] Ibid.

[202] *Köy Korucuları Yönetmeliği (The Regulation of Village Guards)*, T.C. Official Gazette, Law no: 24096, May 2011 <http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/20524.html>.

[203] Marcus 163.

[204] V.v. McDowall 559. McDowall stated, in 1992, the monthly income of a village guard, in 1992, was about 230$ when the annual income per person was about 400$.

[205] Ibid 561.

Grand National Assembly (TGNA) Migration Committee Report, 3.428 villages and hamlets were evacuated due to security reasons in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions.[206] The state allowed for some of the villages to be burned in order to prevent the PKK to use these villages. In addition to all of these, there are also villages which were evacuated by the villagers due to the conflicts between the TSK and the PKK. Between the years 1990-1996, due to security issues, 287 villages out of 417 villages of Tunceli province was either evacuated or burnt; 242 schools out of 268 nearby Tunceli was closed, livestock farming was prohibited and freedom of travel was restricted. Necati Bilican, who was a State of Emergency governor in 1996 expressed that 706 villages out of 918 villages were completely and the remaining 212 villages were partially evacuated and that 329 thousand 916 people migrated.[207]

In addition to the above-mentioned implementations, the state placed an embargo on certain regions in order to prevent the people to 'aid and join' to the PKK. Families were able to buy foodstuffs by the report cards according to the number of population in their household within the scope of the food embargo which was implemented on account of the fact that aid was provided to terrorist organization. The food embargo, which was implemented for the first time in Şırnak in 1992, was majorly implemented in Tunceli province. Moreover in villages of Siirt, Batman, Bitlis, Bingöl, Diyarbakır, Ağrı, Kars, Ardahan and Erzurum food embargo was also implemented.[208]

The policies put into practice and wide range of military precautions taken by the Republic of Turkey in order to eliminate the PKK terror could not prevent the PKK to gain Kurdish nationalist members, militants and supporters.

2.2. Socio-Economic Dimensions

The second important dimension of the Kurdish problem is the socio-economic dimensions. Socio-economic indicators are affecting the Kurdish issue. Migration, education, employment and income problems are all subheadings of socio-economic

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[206] Yayman 21.

[207] *Türkiye İnsan Hakları Raporu: 1996(Human Rights Report of Turkey: 1996)* . September 1998, Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı, 119-122. <http://www.tihv.org.tr/index.php?TArkiye-AEnsan-HaklarAE-Raporu>.

[208] Ibid.

dimension. When it comes to socio-economic dimension, the first thing that comes to mind is the economical underdevelopment of the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions. As for many years the state does not have any regional development policy which will boost the economic development in the Eastern and Southeastern regions. Moreover, the PKK terror prevents to make investments in these regions; as because the terror may harm the economic enterprises. For this reason, the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions are the most underdeveloped regions when compared to the other regions of Turkey when considered economically.

The PKK terror in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions, the conflicts between the Armed Forces and the PKK and the incomplete or insufficient infrastructure of the region prevent the investments to be made to the region. The western part of the country being industrially developed causes the economic imbalance between the eastern part of the country and the western part. The PKK terror activities make it difficult for the private sector to make investments to the region. The Kurdish issue is preventing economical development and the economical underdevelopments provoke the Kurdish issue.

Additionally, citizens who were exposed to the oppression of the state and the PKK and of whose villages were evacuated or burnt were forced to migrate to cities and to industry centers such as Diyarbakır, Van, Elazığ, İstanbul, İzmir, Mersin, Antalya and Adana[209]. Most of the citizens who migrated are living in poverty and working in day labors or as worker at constructions.

The migration, education, employment and income problems are all mingled with each other. The migration problem causes unemployment and unemployment causes migration. The Lack of education causes unemployment and unemployment causes low income. Economical underdevelopment of the region is one of the reasons behind the emergence of the PKK. As a result of the conflicts between the PKK and the state/TSK, the economy of the region sustained a greater injury. As a consequence of the damaged region economy, the social disturbance increased. For this reasons, the solution of socio-economic problems are important dimensions of the Kurdish issue.

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[209]Ibid.

2.2.1. Migration Problem

Another most important subheading of socio-economic dimension is the migration problem. The migration problem is composed of reasons such as the settlement policies which were put into practice after the Sheikh Sait, the Mt. Ararat and the Dersim rebellions, the relegation of tribe leaders on the purpose of resolving the tribe system, the forced migration of citizens who reside in the area where the PKK can receive support, mechanization in agriculture and unemployment.

In consequence of economic underdevelopment and the terror, the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions have vast numbers of emigration. According to the TurkStat (Turkish Statistical Institute) data the emigration in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions are higher than immigration. The net migration of Southeastern Anatolia in 2009-2010 periods was -28,917; the net migration of Northeastern Anatolia was -30,104; the Middle Eastern Anatolia was -33,255 net migrations (Table 2.1.).

Table 2.1. TurkStat Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics-Immigration, Emigration, Net Migration, Net Migration Rate of the Regions Level 1 (2009-2010) [210]

Level 1	Region	Immigration	Emigration	Net Migration
TRA	Northeastern Anatolia	68.624	98.728	-30.104
TRB	Middle Eastern Anatolia	90.770	124.025	-33.255
TRC	Southeastern Anatolia	142.862	171.779	-28.917

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[210] This table was constituted from the TurkStat Reports. The net migration is the difference between immigration and emigration of an area in a period of time. A negative value means, more people are leaving the specified area.

Adrese Dayalı Nüfus Kayıt Sistemi, İBBS-Düzey 1 Bölgelerin Aldığı Göç, Verdiği Göç, Net Göç ve Net Göç Hızı (2009-2010). Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu
<http://rapor.tuik.gov.tr/reports/rwservlet?adnksdb2&ENVID=adnksdb2Env&report=wa_adnks_net_goc_duzey1.RDF&p_kod=1&p_yil=2010&p_dil=1&desformat=html>.

According to 2009-2010 data of the TurkStat, Van, Muş, Hakkari and Bitlis where terrorist activities are densely experienced have a net migration ratio of -21,899 (Table 2.2.).

Table 2.2. TurkStat Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics- Immigration, Emigration, Net Migration, Net Migration Rate of the Regions Level 2 (2009-2010) [211]

Level 2	Region	Immigration	Emigration	Net Migration	Net Migration Rate
TRB2	Van, Muş, Bitlis, Hakkari	2.022.373	67.584	-21.899	-10,77

The migration within the country has changed the demographic situation of Turkey. Migration caused to change the general description towards the fact that the majority of Kurds resided in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions. Major cities such as Ankara, İstanbul, Adana, Mersin, Antalya, Aydın, İzmir, Manisa, Bursa and Kocaeli are letting in immigrants from the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions. Migration towards the western part of the country caused for the Kurdish issue to spread throughout the country. In consequence of the migration PKK not only received the support of radical Kurdish nationalist in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions but also started to receive support from the radical Kurdish nationalist residing in major cities.

The Migration, whether forced by the government or as a result of the fear from the PKK, is causing social traumas. Squatting and ghettoization are occurring in provinces which allow immigrants. Correspondingly, the infrastructure, security, education and health problems are emerging in immigrant receiving cities. The

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[211] This table was constituted from the TurkStat Reports. The net migration rate is the difference between immigration and emigration of an area in a period of time, divided per inhabitants.
Adrese Dayalı Nüfus Kayıt Sistemi, İBBS-Düzey 2 Bölgelerin Aldığı Göç, Verdiği Göç, Net Göç ve Net Göç Hızı (2009-2010). Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu <
http://rapor.tuik.gov.tr/reports/rwservlet?adnksdb2&ENVID=adnksdb2Env&report=wa_adnks_net_goc_duzey2. RDF&p_kod=2&p_duzey1=TRB2&p_yil=2010&p_dil=1&desformat=html>.

emigrating individual or individuals are having trouble in to be integrated to the social life of the locations where they migrated to. For emigrated families to reside nearby families who came from the same region also causes alienation.

According to the researches, the basic reasons for migration in Turkey were characterized as state oppression, fear from terror and economic problems. In the report published by The TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation) entitled *"The State and the Kurds Following The 'Forced' Migration"*, it is stated that the main purpose of the hamlet evacuations and the forced migration implementation which especially intensified in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Turkey, was that they had a Turkification purpose[212]. In the research carried out by the BÜSAM (Bahçeşehir University Strategic Research Center) on 3556 migrated individual pointed out that 16, 2 % of the participants migrated because of economic reasons. The percentage of individuals who claimed to have migrated because of security reasons was stated to be 9, 4%. The individuals who stated to have migrated because of security issues pointed out that, they migrated as a result of the dislocation request of the security forces, terror reasons and because of the pressure from the state to be a village guard which is based on the Village Guard System.[213]

According to the TGNA Research Committee report to which 13 members of parliament participated from different political parties in 1998, 820 villages, 234 hamlets were evacuated in the State of Emergency region in 1997. In 9 provinces which are out of the State of Emergency region, 85 villages and 178 hamlets were evacuated. The number of people, who migrated from the evacuated villages, is over 400.000. In the report, it is expressed that the migration experienced in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia region has three main reasons. The first reason is the damage in the agriculture and stock farming as a result of operations and conflicts; the pressure applied by the PKK to villages which accepted the village guardianship, discrediting of the security forces of villages which did not accept village guardianship and the community leaving villages as a result of the oppression. The

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[212] Dilek Kurban, Mesut Yeğen, " Adaletin Kıyısında: ' Zorunlu' Göç Sonrasında Devlet ve Kürtler(Along the Justice: the State and the Kurds Following the 'Forced Migration')", *TESEV yayınları* (2012) 45 < http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Publication/0d2ecdeb-a40a-4c0a-b66c-d0d02c235542/12045TazminatRapor31_01_12.pdf>.
[213]Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgeleri Sosyo-Ekonomik ve Sosyo-Politik Yapı Araştırması ve Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgelerinden En Fazla Göç Almış Olan İllerin Sosyo-Ekonomik ve Sosyo-Politik Yapı Araştırması: Sorunlar, Beklentileri ve Çözüm Önerileri 86-89.

second reason is the PKK's evacuation of the villages which accepted the village guardianship. Other reasons of the evacuation of villages by security forces are; the state did not provide the security in the evacuated villages, the villagers of the evacuated areas did not want to be village guard or to prevent aiding PKK.[214]

In the research carried out in 15 provinces in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia in 1998 by the Prime Ministry Family Research Association about the reason for migration, was put forth as 34% of the individuals answered to "What is the most important reason for you to migrate?" question with 'the PKK', 24,4% of the participants answered the question as a result of 'state impact', 13% of the participants said it was 'economic reasons', 12% of the participants stated it was 'unemployment', and the 11% of participants stated it was 'the Village Guards'.[215]

David McDowall expressed that 400 border villages were evacuated in 1989, after the appointment of the State of Emergency Governor in 1987, and that this figure went up to 2000 border villages in 1994[216]. Michael Gunter stated that 3 million people were relegated within the country as a consequence of the PKK terror[217].

Individuals are migrating because they are unpleased, unhappy or unsettled with the environment they are living in. However the migration is not enough to dissolve their unhappiness or displeasure. The forced migration of the people because of state oppression, terror or economic reasons causes for emerging of reactions towards individuals or institutions which caused the migration.

2.2.2. Education Problem

The insufficient education ratio in the region affects the socio-economic development negatively. The low number of schools and teachers, deficiency of classrooms and class tools in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions are decreasing the education and training level. The insufficient education levels results in unqualified personnel, difficulty in finding jobs, low salaries or working without

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[214] Dilek Kurban,Deniz Yükseker, Ayşe Betül Çelik et. al. "'Zorunlu Göç' ile Yüzleşmek: Türkiye'de Yerinden Edilme Sonrası Vatandaşlığın İnşası (Facing with the 'Forced Migration': the Construction of the Citizenship after the Forced Migration) ",*TESEV* (2008) 126< http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Publication/87df637c-1f5c-454e-a436-1aaff138c65f/Zorunlu%20Goc%20ile%20Yuzlesmek%2003_2008.pdf>.
[215] Ibid. 130-131.
[216] McDowall 564.
[217] Michael M. Gunter, Historical *Dictionary of the Kurds*.(United Kingdom: The Scarecrow Press Inc. 2011)48. < http://www.scribd.com/doc/42632897/A-to-Z-of-the-Kurds>.

social security, poverty and social unhappiness. On the other hand, individuals with high level of education are migrating to cities where job and social opportunities are greater. This situation negatively affects the social and economic development in the region.

According to the data of TurkStat, the ratio of illiterated people of the Northeastern Anatolia region constitutes 9, 25% of the total population. This ratio in the Middle Eastern Anatolia is 10, 54% and in the Southeastern Anatolia 10, 81% of the total populations. On the other hand, the ratio of illiterated people in İstanbul is 3, 11% of the total population. (Table 2.3)

Table 2.3. The Literacy According to Gender and Age Population -2010 [218]

	Region	Illiteracy	Total Population
TRA	Northeastern Anatolia	178.641	1.930.168
TRB	Middle Eastern Anatolia	333.528	3.165.129
TRC	Southeastern Anatolia	691.537	6.398.205
TR1	İstanbul	371.084	11.933.257

There are many problems related to the education system in the region. Apart from negativities such as the marriage of girls in early ages and not being send to school, boys worked in farms or for tribes, the PKK terror is an another important issue which affects the education in the region. Between the years 1992 and 1994, 5.210 schools were closed because of the PKK attacks in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia region.[219]

The PKK pressured the teachers, who work in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, to leave the region. Moreover the PKK kidnapped or killed the teachers. Five teachers

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[218] This table was constituted from the TurkStat Reports.
Okuma yazma durumu, cinsiyet ve yaş gruplarına göre nüfus-2010, Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu <
<http://rapor.tuik.gov.tr/reports/rwservlet?adnksdb2&ENVID=adnksdb2Env&report=wa_duzey1_cinsiyet_yasgr
p_egitim_top.RDF&p_kod=2&p_duzey1=TR1&p_duzey2=TRB&p_duzey3=TRC&p_duzey4=TRA&p_xkod=o
kuryazar_kod&p_yil=2010&p_dil=1&desformat=html>.
[219] Kirişçi, Winrow 148-149.

were murdered in Mardin, 1988.[220] In 1993, a total of 34 teachers were killed by the PKK[221]. The PKK also carried out attacks towards the schools in the region. This situation prevented the children of the region to receive education. The attacks of PKK towards teachers and other public servants complicated the appointments to the region. Not being able to find public servants to work in the region is an indicator of the PKK achieving its goal to create fear in the society.

2.2.3. Employment and Income Problems

Generally in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions the employment percentage is low. In the assessments of TurkStat in 2010, the provinces with the lowest percentage of employment were indicated to be Diyarbakır with 27, 5%, Siirt with 29, 1% and Şanlıurfa with 31, 1%. In the same report, the provinces with the highest unemployment rate were pointed out to be Hakkari with 17, 4% and Van with 17, 2%.[222] All of the above-mentioned provinces are the cities that receive the highest percentage of migration in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions.

According to the research of the KONDA, 20% of the Kurds have an income of less than 300 TL and 32% of the Kurds have an income of between 301-700 TL[223]. This situation presents that more than half of the Kurds are poor. According to a survey concerning the village guardianship, the first three reasons for villagers to want to become a village guard are unemployment, poverty and security concern[224].

The increase in the population of a household, decrease in the income provided from land. The industrial and social underdevelopment in cities is causing for necessary investments to not (be able) to be made and caused to migration of qualified and unqualified workers. The terror and geographical conditions is preventing the private sector to make investments in the region. The job and employment to be increased in the region will assist the region to economically develop. The state must make investments in the region and encourage private investments in the region.

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[220] Marcus 163.

[221] McDowall 294.

[222] "İl Düzeyinde Temel İşgücü Göstergeleri, 2010". *Haber Bülteni*, Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu. No: 29, (June 2011), September, 2011 <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=8536>.

[223] Ağırdır 8.

[224] Soner Karataşoğlu, Mahmut Akpınar, "Geçici Köy Koruculuğu Sistemi Üzerine Bir Saha Çalışması:Beytüşşebap Örneği(A Field Research on Temporary Village Guardianship: the Example of Beytüşebap)", *Elektronik Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*,Vol: 10, No:38 (2001) 367-397 < http://www.sosyalsiyaset.net/documents/27122011_SK.pdf>.

2.3. The Cultural and Democratic Rights Dimension

Another important dimension of the Kurdish problem is the issue concerning the cultural and democratic right deficiency and requests. As a result of the enhancement in Kurdish nationalism, the democratic right requests are also on the rise. For cultural and democratic rights request to not (be able) to be fulfilled is causing the PKK to gain more supporters and the enhancement of Kurdish nationalism.

Human rights violations, arising from democratic deficit, are an important reason of the Kurdish issue. The conflicts between the PKK militants and the TSK are leading to the deaths of soldiers, civilians and militants and causes to the violation of the most essential human right which is the 'the right to life'. State implementations such as the Village Guard System, the Anti-Terrorism Law and the State of Emergency which were put into practice after the emergence of PKK terror are causing human rights violations. Moreover, the concentration towards the armed struggle and military methods for the resolution of the Kurdish issue has increased the violence, oppression and destruction in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions.

Many individuals in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions were put on trial and tortured on the account of the fact that they 'aided and abetted to the PKK'. After the 1980 coup d'état, prisoners of Diyarbakır Military Prison, in other words No. 5 Prison where generally the Kurds, the PKK supporters or the PKK militants were held were tortured.

The TSK carried out operations against villages who supported or who were assumed to be supporting the PKK.[225] In the three week operation carried out in September of 1994, military troop of 40,000 personnel prosecuted a hot pursuit against the PKK militants. The state burnt down 30 villages and hamlets connected to Tunceli province in order to prevent villagers from helping PKK militants during this hot pursuit. Deputy Prime Minister, Murat Karayalçın of the SHP and the Minister of Human Rights, Azimet Köylüoğlu characterized the relegations and village burning

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[225] V.v. McDowall 562, 298.

incidents in the region as the 'state terror' in consequence of the visit they made to the region.[226]

Forced migration policy and village burning policy were implemented in order to prevent the PKK from gaining supporters, fulfilling its shelter and food needs. Village evacuation and burning implementations are violations of many constitutional or human rights such as; equality before the law principle, everyone's right to protect and develop their lives, principle on the respect towards private life and family, respect to residence principle, right to education and training[227].

The PKK which is responsible for the destruction and human rights violations in the regions is using violence and applying pressure to the local community in order to gain militants and to threaten the state. The PKK is executing terrorist activities towards the local people on the purpose of receiving the support of the local community and to weaken the control of the Republic of Turkey over the region. The local community is affected the most from the conflicts within the region. The PKK which besieged a village nearby Mardin in 1987 murdered 8 village guards, 16 children and 6 women[228]. The PKK labeled the village guards as 'collaborator of the state' and targeted the village guards in their attacks. The PKK attacked Pınarcık village of which some villagers participated in the Village Guard System in June of 1987 and killed a total of 29 people, 8 of them women and 5 of them being children. The PKK carried out attacks to 33 villages between the years 1987 and 1991; killed 36 people with 16 of them being children and 8 of them being women[229].

The local community is affected the most by the conflicts between the TSK and the PKK. Many people, women, men, young, old were caught in the cross-fire[230]. In August 1992, the PKK militants carried out attacks towards public buildings in Şırnak. State forces fought back for three days with opening random shots. Within this period of time the electricity and telephone lines of the city were cut. A total of 22 people lost their lives as a result of the opened fire. This incident caused many

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[226] *Forced Displacement of Ethnic Kurds from Southeastern Turkey.* Human Rights Watch (1994) 3 <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/TURKEY94O.PDF>.
[227] Kurban, Yükseker et. al. 127.
[228] Marcus 159.
[229] Mango 38.
[230] McDowall 562.

people to leave Şırnak.[231] Fire was opened by the state to thousands of people who gathered in streets to receive the corpses of the three PKK militants, who died as a result of the conflict which occurred in the mountains nearby Lice which is connected to Diyarbakır province on 24th of December in 1991. Seven people died as a result of this struggle.[232] In a sense, both PKK and the state are responsible for the human rights violations.

The Village Guard System, which has been in practice for 26 years, creates great anxiety in the community. The Village Guard System, which is based on the protection of citizens against terrorist organization, has led for the emergence of a privileged and armed group in the locations where the Village Guard System is implemented. The continuance of the dominance of the tribe system leads for the village guards to act in the line of the interests of the tribe to which they belong to. Some guards are taking advantage of their duties in matters which rise between tribes. Furthermore, some village guards were involved in illegal activities. There are also many incidents which involves the negligence of village guards in the PKK raids. Due to these reasons, the dependability of the Village Guard System is questioned. The Village Guard System is fundamentally aiming to have the local community to fight against the PKK. The dominant state/privileged condition of the village guards in the region, in other words the state providing fire arms to incompetent villager can cause the public to be drawn to the PKK.

The attacks carried out by the PKK towards the village guards and their families caused for the Village Guard System to lose its charm in the eyes of the public. The PKK which interprets the village guards as the 'collaborator of the state' threatened the region citizens in the direction of not participating in the Village Guard System and warned the village guards in the direction of resigning from their posts. The PKK, after the initiation of the Village Guard System, concentrated its activities around the village guards and village headmen in order to give the image that the state could not protect the public and to receive support from the local community.[233]

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[231] Marcus 237.

[232] Ibid. 224.

[233] Nihat Ali Özcan. *PKK (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi) Tarihi, İdeolojisi ve Yöntemi (the PKK:History, Ideology and Methods).* (Ankara: ASAM Yayınları,1999) 96-100.

Aliza Marcus stated that many village guards were hung on trees with money stuffed in their mouths[234].

The operations carried out towards the PKK camps/bases in Iraq within the scope of cross-border operation of the state caused the deaths of many Iraqi and Turkish civilians. Cross-border operations and struggle against the PKK put the lives of the civilians in the region in jeopardy. Civilians, terrorist organization members, soldiers are losing their lives in the conflicts. The continuance of conflicts in the region caused for the schools in the region to be closed and accordingly the education to halt. Because of PKK attacks, the absence of students due to emigration, failure of teacher appointments, teachers do not beginning their duties or not being able to begin their duties.[235]

The use of Kurdish was indirectly prohibited with the 1982 Constitution enacted after the 1980 coup d'état and the delegated legislations. The use of Kurdish names, singing of folk songs was prohibited and Kurdish place names were changed. The most known and most common example for the subject of changing the names of the residential areas is Tunceli province. The name of Dersim province was changed to Tunceli in 1935. Moreover, the use of Kurdish and to plead in Kurdish in courts was in defiance of the Treaty of Lausanne. The problems originating from the no fulfillment of cultural right requests such as the rights to education, broadcast and publication in mother tongue or the deficiency of these rights are of capital importance within the Kurdish issue.

The State of Emergency and Anti Terror Law, which was enacted in 1991, put into effect restrictive precautions concerning freedom of thought, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. For the State of Emergency governors to have the authority to prohibit settlement in certain locations of the region, to restrict the entrance and exit to residential areas, to evacuate the residential areas and to transfer to other regions, to recess the education in all levels of education, training institutions, to benefit from all manners of tools and equipment in the region and to confiscate these tools when necessary, to destroy movable and real estate's which pose threat proves that the State of Emergency is an anti-democratic implementation.

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[234] Marcus 159, 160.
[235] "Türkiye İnsan Hakları Raporu:1996" 150.

Individuals who expressed or defended their own political views regarding the Kurdish issue, human rights violations and the anti-democratic implementations of Turkey were put on trial within the scope of Anti Terror Law. Article 7 of the Anti Terror Law regards carrying the emblem or the signs of a terrorist organization, shouting slogans or broadcasting them though sound systems [loudspeakers] in a way to demonstrate that a person is a member or supporter of the organization, or wearing uniforms on which there emblems and signs belonging to a terrorist organization as a crime. Individuals who completely or partially conceal face for the purpose of concealing identity during assemblies and demonstrations that become propaganda for a terrorist organization are sentenced in accordance with the provisions of article 314 of the Turkish Penal Code.[236] Demonstrators who request their Kurdish rights or participate in demonstrations which criticize the attitude of the state towards the Kurds in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia are put on trial in accordance with the article 7 of Anti Terrorism Law.

The 220/6 article of the Turkish Penal Code provides opportunity for an individual who is not a member of an organization but commits a crime on behalf o the organization to be published for the crime of being a member of the aforesaid organization.[237] According to article 8 of Anti Terror Law;

> Written and oral propaganda and assemblies, meetings and demonstrations aimed at damaging the indivisible unity of the Turkish Republic with its territory and nation are forbidden, regardless of the methods, intentions and ideas behind such activity.[238]

These laws cause for the freedoms of thought, expression and assembly to be suppressed and restricted. According to article 7 of the Anti Terror Law, an individual who committed a crime, for example who shout slogans can be punished as a member of an organization even though that individual is not a PKK member or militant. With this law, civilian protestors and PKK militants are identified as the same.

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[236]*Terörle Mücadele Kanunu (Anti-Terror Law)*, T.C. Official Gazette, Law no: 3713, Number: 20843, May,2011
<.http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/20843_1.pdf&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/20843_1.pdf >.
[237]Ibid.
[238] Ibid.

Within the scope of Anti Terror Law, many Turkish and Kurdish intellects were put on trial and received imprisonment. Musa Anter, Kurdish journalist and writer, was punished several times for the crime of making Kurdish propaganda. Kurdish politician Şerafettin Elçi was punished because of his statement indicating that there are Kurds in Turkey and that he is Kurdish. Aliza Marcus, Istanbul News Reporter of Reuters was sued by the State Security Court for the crime of agitation of racial hatred in consequence of publishing an article which explains the oppression of Turkish soldiers towards the Kurdish civilians to abandon their villages in order to prevent any aid to PKK militants.[239]

2.4. Evaluation

All dimensions of the Kurdish issue are interlocked with each other and these problems are affecting one another. None of these issues can be thought as a separate from one another. For instance; all reasons and results of cultural and democratic right requests and deficiencies are triggering the terror problem. Human rights violations and nonfulfillment of or not being able to fulfill cultural and democratic right requests is causing the PKK to gain more supporters. In other words, they trigger terrorism.

The terror problem on the other hand is preventing the economic investments to be made in the region. This situation is causing for the region to be economically underdeveloped. For terror organization members to find supporters and the supporters to support the organization members financially causes the state, in other words, the security forces to pursue hard policy in the region. Hard policies pursued by the state are causing the increase in the human rights violations. The state, with the concern that the terror organization might upsurge, is delaying the fulfillment of democratic right demands. In other words, the state interprets the fulfillment of democratic right demands as PKK accomplishing its purpose. The unemployment and infrastructure deficiencies in the region cause the terror organization to gain more supporters.

Socio-economic underdevelopment triggers the PKK terror and the PKK terror provokes Kurdish nationalist's democratic and cultural right demands. The PKK

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[239] Marcus 21.

terror prevents for social and economic investments to be made in the region. In other words, the PKK terror is an obstacle for socio-economic development. For citizens of Kurdish origin to express democracy and cultural right demands and to pursue a policy is legitimating the purpose of the PKK.

Consequently, the above-mentioned dimensions and subheadings cannot be seen as independent reasons. For the issue to be multi dimensional and every one of these subheadings to be interlocked with each other is beclouding the defining of the problem. In general terms, the Kurdish issue is a complex and a comprehensive problem which dates back to the Ottoman Empire, blazed out in the nation building process of the Republic of Turkey and became deepened in consequence of reasons such as the Kurdish nationalism, terror, interference of other countries, state implementations, migration, economic problems, lack of education, human rights violations, and democratic deficit.

3. DEFINING AND NAMING THE KURDISH ISSUE BY INSTITUTIONS, OPINION LEADERS AND PARTIES

The Kurdish issue, which roots date back to the Ottoman Empire, is an important problem in terms of Turkish politics and society. This issue which destabilizes the domestic and foreign policy of Turkey has been on the agenda since the establishment of the Republic. The issue is complicated because there are many actors, which deal with the problem, and as the issue is multi dimensional. As every government, which came to power, pursued different policies regarding the Kurdish issue, this prevented a consistent policy to be pursued towards the resolution of the problem.

In general, the state implemented an oppression and denial policy towards the non dominant Muslim ethnic groups or identities between the years 1925-1989. There is not another identity apart from the Turkishness which the constitutional identity in the official discourse. In this period, state authorities and governmental institutions avoided using terms such as 'Kurd, Kurdish' and named the issue as 'Eastern and Southeastern Problem' which implies that the issue originated from socio-economic problems.

The state, beginning from 1989 when Turgut Özal came to power started define Turkishness as constitutional citizenship and accordingly abandoned the denial policy of other ethnic identities. In other words, the state began to implicitly recognize the Kurds and other Muslim ethnic groups. In this period, even though the political power felt discomfort in expressing the existence of different Muslim ethnic identities out loud, it started to pronounce the term 'Kurd' from time to time. In this period, the government authorities continued to define the issue as a socio-economic problem and name the aforesaid as 'Eastern and Southeastern Problem'.

The reforms initiated within the EU membership process and the AKP government made the Kurdish issue discussable. With the AKP government, for the first time a political party / ruling party pursued an official policy in the name of resolving the

Kurdish issue and recognized the issue officially. In other words, the existence of the problem was recognized by the state.

Aside from discussions made with regard to the reason and the way to resolve the issue, the problem of defining and naming the issue is faced in the Turkish politics. Basically, the defining problem of the Kurdish issue is a problem which remains from the period when the state denied naming the Kurdish issue as such. The policies pursued by governments affected and is still affecting the naming and defining manners of political parties and government institutions regarding the issue and also the approach of citizens towards the issue. Individuals and institutions are naming the issue in accordance with their position and manners of defining the problem. The issue, generally, is entitled in three ways; The Kurdish Issue, the Eastern and Southeastern Problem and Terror Problem by academicians, politicians and government officials. The naming and defining of the issue is as follows;

> The Kurdish Issue: The individuals who name the issue in this way generally accept that the problem has an ethnical dimension. Furthermore; the PKK terror, lack of democracy and human rights violations, the deficiencies in the economic and social conditions within the Eastern and Southeastern regions are seen as the reasons and dimensions of the issue. Generally, individuals who name the issue as such, argue that the political institutions need to have a more active role in the resolution of the problem.

> The Eastern and Southeastern Problem: Individuals who name the issue as such define the problem as economical underdevelopment. They believe that the developments in terms of economy of the Eastern and Southeastern regions will resolve the problem. In addition, they regard the terror problem independent from the Eastern and Southeastern problem.

> The Terror Problem: Individuals, who name the issue as such, see the PKK and its terror activities as the source of the problem. In other words, they define the issue as the PKK terror. They argue that with the elimination of the PKK terror, the issue will be solved.

In addition to the abovementioned naming, there are also individuals who define the Eastern and Southeastern problem and the terror problem as the subheading of the

Kurdish issue. So, according to some people, the Kurdish issue is constitutes only economical underdevelopment and the PKK terror.

In the same manner, there is also a group of people who think that the Kurdish issue and terror problem is constituted the economical underdevelopment within the Eastern and Southeastern regions. According to these people, the poverty within the region causes the citizens of Kurdish origin to emphasize their ethnical identities, consequently causing the Kurdish nationalism to rise and the emergence of the PKK terror.

In addition to all of these, there are also individuals who see the terror problem independent from the Kurdish issue and the Eastern and Southeastern problem. These individuals believe that the PKK terror serves to the benefits of certain individuals and institutions and therefore that the terror problem must be dealt with separately.

There are institutions and individuals who believe that everyone who lives in Turkey is a Turk regardless of their ethnic identity, so whether the problem is named as the Kurdish Issue or the Eastern and Southeastern Problem, they think that all of these naming are activities towards the establishment of ethnic group in Turkey. Not just these individuals do not believe in naming the issue they also deny the existence of such issue as well.

Consequentially, for individuals or institutions to possess different standpoints regarding the Kurdish issue cause the problem to be named and defined differently. The naming and defining of the Kurdish issue differently by the political parties, institutions and opinion leaders prevents for a general naming and definition to be put forth which is adopted by all segments of society.

The researches carried out and reports published by the NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) are essential resources to assist us in understanding the policy of the government and the standpoint of the society regarding the Kurdish issue. The standpoint towards and manners of naming the Kurdish issue shall be analyzed based on the reports prepared by the NGOs such as SETA, TESEV, KONDA and BÜSAM. In addition, the different opinions of specialists who different standpoints such as

Bülent Tanör, Mesut Yeğen, Robert Olson, Henry J. Barkey, Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow shall be addressed.

The political parties which have different standpoints and are supported by different parts of the society are important actors who affect the perception and correspondingly the naming of the Kurdish issue. Therefore, naming and defining of the Kurdish issue of parties such as the AKP, the CHP, the MHP and BDP (Democracy and Peace Party) which is supported by Kurdish nationalists and known as the Kurdish political party; should be analyzed.

Moreover, it is of capital importance to have an opinion regarding the defining and naming of the Kurdish issue of the PKK which radicalized the Kurdish nationalism and is carrying out terrorist activities against the state of Republic of Turkey and its leader Abdullah Öcalan who is now in prison. For this reason, it is necessary to study the history and party program of the PKK.

One of the easy ways to understand the perspective of the state towards the Kurdish issue is to top the perspective of institutions towards the Kurdish issue. The TSK affectively took part in every period of the political life of the Republic of Turkey. In coup d'état periods, it directly governed the politics of the state. Due to these reasons, the naming and defining manners of the TSK should be analyzed. Briefly, in this part, I will analyze the naming and defining manners of NGOs, institutions , opinion leader's and legal and illegal party's regarding the Kurdish issue which affect the domestic and foreign policies of the state.

3.1. The Kurdish Issue in the Researches of the Non-Governmental Organizations

The NGOs, whether state-funded or not, are essential to test the pulse of the society, examining the state policies and researching the affects of these policies on the society. In this regard, the easiest way to learn the views of the citizens of the Republic of Turkey towards the perception and defining of the Kurdish issue is to analyze the researches of NGOs which they have carried out regarding the subject. Many NGO reports were published concerning the Kurdish issue. The reports

published by the SETA, TESEV, KONDA and BÜSAM are the most important ones out of these reports.

Important data was acquired regarding the Kurdish issue in a research carried out by the SETA and POLLMARK in 2009. In consequence of the carried out research, the Kurdish issue was found to be the most important political problem of Turkey. The 39, 3% of the individuals who participated in the research think nothing of the issue or do not believe in the existence of the issue. The SETA, in its analysis, stated that the individuals, who think nothing of the Kurdish issue or think that the Kurdish issue does not exist, actually do not deny the existence of the issue but that the actual reason for their denial is the naming of the issue. Furthermore, it stated that these individuals preferred to name the issue as Terror Problem and defended that the TSK must take part in the resolution of the matter. In the report, it appeared that the 51, 2 % of the individuals who defined themselves as Turks and the 75, 8 % of the individuals who defined themselves as Kurds believed in the existence of the Kurdish issue. These individuals expressed that the political institutions must take responsibility in the resolution of this issue.[240]

The 23, 1 % of the participants of the carried out research see socio-economic reasons such as economic underdevelopment and migration as the primary sources of the Kurdish issue. The 14,1 % of the participants of the carried out research see foreign powers as the reason of the Kurdish issue while the 13 % believe that it is discrimination, the 12,3 % state that it is the PKK terror, the 11,6 % express that it is state policies and the 8,1 % see the Kurdish nationalism as the reason of the Kurdish issue. According to the SETA, the reason for most of the participants to choose socio-economic reasons as the primary source of the problem is because the political parties and state elites are avoiding naming the problem as the Kurdish issue and naming it as a socio-economic problem. Moreover, the political parties and state elites define the issue as the interference of foreign powers, terror and underdevelopment problems.[241]

In the same report, the percentage of individuals who think nothing about the Kurdish issue is 16, 4 %. The SETA, in this report which was published in 2009,

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[240] Bülent Aras, Ertan Aydın, Selin Bölme, et. al. eds. *Turkiye'nin Kürt Sorunu Algısı (The Kurdish Issue Perception of Turkey)*. SETA, POLLMARK (2009) 11-12, 51-53 <http://www.setav.org/Ups/dosya/8523.pdf>.
[241] Ibid. 39-40.

interpreted the percentage of individuals who do not even accept the existence of such issue in a period where the Kurdish initiative is on the table to be 16% as an obstacle for the creation of a social consensus / reconciliation. Furthermore, it indicated that the different ways of defining the issue and the existence of different explanations regarding the source of the Kurdish issue will be an obstacle for the resolution of the problem. It was expressed that the different manners of definitions of the issue can cause polarization in the society. [242]

In the research, the 40 % of the individuals who define themselves as Turks and the 20 % of the individuals who define themselves as Kurds name the matter as Terror Problem and assume that the issue will be resolved with the termination of terror. For this reason the role of the TSK is essential in the struggle against terror.[243]

The *'A Road Map For A Solution to the Kurdish Question: Proposals From The Region For the Government'* entitled report of the TESEV was prepared based on the views of Kurdish opinion leaders, politicians and specialists. In this report the matter was named as the Kurdish issue and the avoidance of the government to face the Kurdish issue was adverted. In the report, it was stated that the Kurdish issue existed before the PKK emerged. Therefore, the Terror Problem, even though it is seen as a reason for the Kurdish issue, in essence it is in the position of being the result of the Kurdish issue. It was stated that armed struggle against the PKK will not be essential for the resolution of the Kurdish issue and that political steps must also be taken in this sense. For that purpose, the operation carried out against the PKK must be ceased and policies regarding language and cultural rights must be developed. In the report, it was stated that individuals who name the issue as inter-regional inequality, poverty and underdevelopment name the issue as the Southeastern Problem. It was indicated that the official discourse, in other words the 'dominant official approach' also adopts this approach.[244]

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[242] Ibid. 39-40.
[243] Ibid. 60-61.
[244] "A Roadmap for a Solution to the Kurdish Question: Policy Proposals from the Region and for the Government",TESEV (2008) 5, 11.< http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Publication/d947a015-9505-421c-ae1d-c1c058e7d4a7/Report%20on%20Kurdish%20Question.pdf>.

In the 2009 dated report prepared by the BÜSAM, it is stated that the issue is named according to the "perception/ prejudice/ belief/ attitude/ ideology/ concerns"[245] of individuals or institutions and that for this reason a general naming cannot be made regarding the issue. It was indicated that not being able to name the issue is beclouding the resolution of the problem in the short term. Furthermore, it was pointed out that the government institutions must also name the issue in the same way. In addition to all of these, it was emphasized that a state policy must be developed for the resolution of the issue rather than a government policy. [246]

In the *'Reconsidering of the Kurdish Issue'* entitled report of the KONDA, the problem faced towards the naming and defining of the Kurdish issue was addressed. For the issue to have many dimensions such as terror, democracy and human rights, economic underdevelopment is beclouding the discussion of the problem. In the report, it was stated that many citizens of Kurdish origin perceive the issue as the state or government not treating Kurds equally. The citizens, who define themselves as Turks, on the other hand, define the issue as citizens of Kurdish origin believing that the state is not treating Kurds equally and rebelling against the state.[247]

In the *'The Kurds and The Kurdish Issue'* entitled report which is also published by the KONDA, the problems faced regarding the naming and determining the reasons of the Kurdish issue were addressed. In the report, it was expressed that it is a mistake to perceive the issue only as a terror problem. In addition to this, it was stated that terror and the Kurdish issue intertwined and that each of them are in the position of being both the reason and the result of the other. [248] In other words, terror is both the reason and the result of the Kurdish issue. As it is a mistake to say 'If terror did not exist, then the Kurdish issue would not either' it is also a mistake to say 'If the Kurdish issue did not exist, then the terror problem would not either'. In this report, the Kurdish issue and the terror problem were regarded as two different issues but were described to be intertwined.

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[245] "Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgeleri Sosyo-Ekonomik ve Sosyo-Politik Yapı Araştırması ve Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgelerinden En Fazla Göç Almış Olan İllerin Sosyo-Ekonomik ve Sosyo-Politik Yapı Araştırması: Sorunlar, Beklentileri ve Çözüm Önerileri" 445-447.
[246] Ibid.
[247] Somer 7.
[248] Ağırdır 28-29.

3.2. The Kurdish Issue in the Eyes of Opinion Leaders

The Kurdish issue has not been discussed for years and in the periods when it started to be discussed, an agreement could not be reached. For the Kurdish issue to be a difficult topic to be discussed with regards to the Turkish politics beclouded for the subject to be researched and commented on. The studies regarding the Kurdish issue carried out by Prof. Dr. Bülent Tanör, one of the founders of Turkey Human Rights Institution Foundation, who is known in international academic and political arena and who carried out studies on the subjects of Human Rights and Constitutional Law, sociologist Prof. Dr. Mesut Yeğen who carries out studies concerning the Kurdish issue, Prof. Dr. Kemal Kirişçi who carries out studies concerning the foreign relations and security issues of Turkey and Prof. Dr. Gareth M. Winrow, who carries out studies concerning the foreign policy and energy security of Turkey, the Kurdish issue and Middle East specialist Dr. Robert Olson and political scientist Dr. Henri J. Barkey who specialized on Turkey are important. For this reason the perspectives and analysis of the above-mentioned specialists will be mentioned.

The Kurdish issue was dealt with in the 1997 dated and *'Democratization Perspectives in Turkey'* entitled report which was prepared by Bülent Tanör for Turkish Industry and Business Association. Tanör defined the Kurdish issue as a social and economic matter and that the problem has an identity dimension. He stated that the Southeastern problem expression is used to explain the underdevelopment.[249]

According to Mesut Yeğen, the state denied the existence of Kurdish identity within its territory between the years 1920 and 1980. Moreover, the official discourse is based on the nonexistence of the Kurds. The state, beginning from the 1950s began to recognize the Kurdish issue as economic underdevelopment problem. The Kurdish issue, after started to be discussed, was rendered to be a political reaction, regional underdevelopment and resistance of tribes or sheikhs. However the state and institutions continued to deny the ethnic dimension of the Kurdish issue. Within this process, the word 'Kurd' was avoided to be used during discussions regarding the

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[249] Tanör.

issue.[250] According to Yeğen, the state implemented assimilation policies against the Kurds, and disciplined and banished the Kurds.[251]

Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow stated that the state assimilated / tried to assimilate non-dominant ethnic groups such as Albanians, Circassians, Bosnians and Kurds for the nation building process which began right after the establishment of the Republic to be a success.[252] Most of the government officials regard the Kurdish issue as the PKK terror and consider the elimination of the PKK as the primary objective for the resolution of the problem. Some of the government officials regard the Kurdish issue as a socio-economic underdevelopment problem. In addition to all of these, there are individuals and institutions who regard the Kurdish issue as a problem of democratic rights. These individuals and institutions defend that the issue can be resolved by granting rights to the Kurds such as to receive education in their mother tongue.[253]

Robert Olson considers the issue as a Kurdish national movement which emerged as a result of the oppression by Turkish nationalism. Additionally, the Kurdish issue emerged as a result of repression of Kurdish nationalism and forced migration policies.[254]

Henri J. Barkey considers the Kurdish issue as the result of assimilation policies implemented by the Turkish Republic. According to Barkey, the Kurdish issue emerged as the result of forced migration policies, implementations which prohibited the use of Kurdish language and state policies which denied the existence of the Kurds.[255]

It can be observed that even the opinion leaders who carried out researches regarding the Kurdish issue could not put forth an acceptable / a universal definition and naming of the issue which can be acknowledged by everyone. Generally, the opinion leaders emphasize that a single naming and defining is not made concerning the

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[250]Yeğen ,"The Kurdish Question in Turkish State Discourse" 555 -560.

[251] Mesut Yeğen, "Müstakbel Türk'ten Sözde Vatandaşa: Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler (From future Turks to So-called Citizen: The Republic and the Kurds)", Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi (2009)2
<http://www.obarsiv.com/pdf/MesutYegen.pdf >.

[252] Kirişçi, Winrow 17.

[253] Ibid. 141.

[254] Olson , "Kürt Meselesi ve Türkiye-İran İlişkileri" 33-42.

[255] Henri J.Barkey, Preventing Conflict Over Kurdistan. (Washington: CEIP,2009) 8-9.

subject of the Kurdish issue. So they identified the problem and emphasize to the divergence in naming of the issue which prevents to take a step for the solution of the problem.

3.3. Definitions and Namings of Political Parties on the Kurdish Issue

Political parties are essential actors which affect the perception of the Kurdish issue and correspondingly the naming of the issue. The political parties in the Assembly determine the domestic and foreign policy of the state. In addition to this, the political view and statements of each party which have a seat in the Assembly affect the views of the society, especially the supporters of these parties. For that reason, it will be essential to examine the perceptions of four parties in Turkey which has a seat in the Assembly and of which each of them has different political ideology in terms of understanding the Kurdish issue. For this reason, it is necessary to analyze the naming and definitions of the Kurdish issue of the center right party the AKP which is ruling party, of center left party the CHP which is the main opposition party, of the Turkish nationalist right party the MHP which was in the Assembly in 2007 and 2011 elections and of the Kurdish nationalist the BDP which entered the Assembly with independent candidates in order to surpass the 10% threshold. Therefore, I will analyze the party programs and statements of the AKP, the CHP, the MHP, and the BDP regarding the Kurdish issue.

3.3.1. The Position of the AKP towards the Kurdish Issue

After the declaration of Turkey as a candidate state by the EU, Turkey began to put into practice constitutional and legal reforms in the field of human rights and freedoms. The AKP, which identified itself as a center party, executed many law amendments in the field of human rights and freedoms within the scope of European Harmonization Law right after it came into power in 2002. The AKP put into practice a series of reforms for the resolution of the Kurdish issue. The AKP which came into power for three periods and received major support from the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia attached great importance to the resolution of the Kurdish issue.

The speeches of Prime Minister Erdoğan regarding the Kurdish issue as from 2005, gave an opportunity for the Kurdish issue to be spoken out in political platform and

to be discussable. The speech which Erdoğan gave in Norway in April of 2005 started the supra identity- sub identity discussions in the Kurdish issue. The speech which Erdoğan gave is as follows;

> […] We are all Turkish citizens with the Kurds, Laz, Abkhazian and Circassian. Our supra identity is the citizenship of the Republic of Turkey. We have three hot lines. We will not commit ethnic nationalism, regional nationalism and nationalism based on religion […] There is not a 'Kurdish minority' concept in Turkey. The Kurds are one of the identities which constitute our country […][256]

With this speech, Prime Minister Erdoğan cleared up the 'Turkishness' definition which has been a matter of debate since the establishment of the Republic up to the present. With this speech, Erdoğan stated that the citizenship of Republic of Turkey is above the ethnic identity. In other words, he declared that the citizenship of the Republic of Turkey must be above the ethnic identity of the individual and that ethnic nationalism is a mistake. In addition, he expressed that citizens of Kurdish origin are not minorities and that every ethnic identity is one of the identities which constitute the Republic of Turkey. This statement is along the same lines with the statements of Ankara Government in the Lausanne Negotiations. During the negotiations, Islamic identity was used as a supra identity in order to unite sub identities of Turkey. However, the AKP uses the citizenship of the Republic of Turkey as a supra identity with recognizing sub identities of the citizens which is their ethnic identities.

In the same year, Erdoğan referred to the problem faced regarding the naming of the issue in his speech which he gave in Diyarbakır public meeting. The speech of Prime Minister Erdoğan is as follows;

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[256] "Kürtler azınlık değil asli unsurumuzdur" *Yeni Şafak Gazetesi*. 12 04 2005, 1August 2011<http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2005/nisan/12/p01.html>.

> There is absolutely no need to name every issue. Because the issues are ours. But, if you insist on 'Naming' the issue, the Kurdish issue is not just a part of this nation, but everyone's issue. It was mine also [...] All issues are common issues of all citizens of Republic of Turkey whether you are a Turk, a Kurd, a Circassian, an Abkhazian or a Laz. […] A great state, powerful nation is a nation and state which has the confidence to look to the future by facing itself and by talking over its mistakes and sins.[257]

In this speech, Erdoğan emphasized the problem faced in the naming of the issue. He stated that terror; economic underdevelopment and democracy problems are not only the issues of citizens of Kurdish origin but problems of all citizens of the Republic of Turkey. He implicitly expressed that the state must derive lessons from its mistakes and repairs its mistakes in order to resolve the issue.

The policy which was initiated in 2009 by the AKP for the resolution of the Kurdish issue and was named Kurdish Initiative was later labeled as the Democratic Initiative, the National Unity and Fellowship Project. The changes which were made and are planned to be made within the scope of this Project are of capital importance for the resolution of the issue and the assuaging of social tension. The purpose of the initiative is to struggle against terrorism through democracy. Democratic improvement is the purpose and instrument in this project. For the first time in the Turkish political history, a ruling party or government developed and implemented policies in order to decrease the tension in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, to terminate terror and to resolve the Kurdish issue. In addition to this, a political party, for the first time pursued a policy which included the word *'Kurd'*.

3.3.1.1. Party Program of the AKP

The issue was examined under the heading of Eastern and Southeastern within the party program of the AKP. The Kurd and Kurdish issue terms were avoided to be used in the program. In the party program, the AKP stated that the issue is named in different manners such as Southeastern problem, the Kurdish issue and the Terror problem and that no matter how the issue is named; it is the reality of Turkey. It was also emphasized that the issue does not only consist of terror but also that the issue included economic underdevelopment and democratic rights dimension.

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[257] "Erdoğan: Kürt Sorunu Hepimizin Sorunu"*, 1 August 2011<http://wwwi.bianet.org/bianet/bianet/65194-erdogan-kurt-sorunu-hepimizin-sorunu>.

In addition to the aforesaid, the issues faced in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions were also included. In the AKP's party program, actually made references to the issues regarding the right and freedoms of citizens of the Kurdish origin while mentioning the problems of the public residing in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. In the program, the issues faced regarding the right and freedoms of citizens of the Kurdish origin were explained without using the words the Kurd and Kurdish.

The necessity for languages other than Turkish, in other words Kurdish, to be used was defended on the account of Turkish being the official language and the language of education. It was defended that the underdevelopment in the region can be resolved with democratization policies. It was stated that the hard policies implemented by the state with the purpose of terminating the terrorist activities is harming the local community. In addition to this, the necessity to abolish the State of Emergency implementations was asserted. The necessity to develop economy projects which can increase the employment for the resolution of the increasing economical problems because of terror and service inadequacy was emphasized. In this way, it was aimed to dissolve the victimhood of the citizens who were harmed because of the terrorism. It was asserted that the economic underdevelopment on which the terrorism is feeding will be resolved and that terrorism will be terminated. The AKP, which emphasized the indivisible integrity and the immutability of the unitary structure of the state in the party program, declared that it is necessary to ensure a social unity and solidarity on the basis of citizenship of the Republic of Turkey by protecting the cultural diversity.[258]

3.3.2. The Position of the CHP towards the Kurdish Issue

The CHP is the party which took part in almost every period of Turkish political life since the establishment of the Republic up to the present; therefore it is party which has been the object of the Kurdish issue, for the longest period of time. Moreover, the CHP is one of the few parties which stated in the 1990s that armed struggle is not sufficient to resolve the Kurdish issue and that democratic resolution proposals must be developed. Fuat Keyman expressed that the approach of the CHP towards the

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[258] *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Parti Programı (The Party Program of AKP).* January 2011
<http://www.akparti.org.tr/parti-programi_79.html>.

resolution of the issue in the 1990s can be referred as the first democratic initiative.[259] When looked at its political history, the CHP was one of the parties which were preferred by the Kurdish voters especially in the 1970s and 1980s period of Turkey. Because of its vital position in the history of the Republic of Turkey, the defining of the issue and the statements of the CHP concerning this subject are of capital importance.

The SHP, which superseded the CHP after the 1980 military coup d'état which closed down all political parties, published a report entitled, '*The Report on the Standpoint and Resolution Proposals of Social Democratic Populist Party towards the Eastern and Southeastern Problem*'[260]. This report is essential in terms of being published in years when the issue was perceived with only security based approach and regarded only as the PKK terror. Even though the SHP report was entitled as the Eastern and Southeastern problem, it rendered the problems faced in democratic rights and democratization subjects as the Kurdish issue. According to the SHP, the Kurdish issue contained human rights violations such as the forced migration, the martial law and the State of Emergency implementations, democratic right issues such as the prohibition of use of mother tongue, economic underdevelopment and armed struggle of ethnic separatist group in other words the terror elements. According to the SHP, ethnic differences are not the source of the issue.[261] Furthermore, criticisms and resolution proposals towards the policies implemented by the state for the resolution of the issue, the State of Emergency implementations and antidemocratic implementations such as the Kurdish prohibition were included in the report.

In 1999, after the SHP went under the roof the CHP, CHP published a new report entitled *'The Eastern and Southeastern Report'*. In the report, terror problem and the Kurdish issue was analyzed under the main title of the Eastern and Southeastern problem. The Kurdish issue was defined as 'a domestic democracy issue generating from democratic deficit'. According to the CHP, the existence of terror and

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[259] Keyman 94.

[260] *Sosyal Demokratik Halkçı Parti'nin Doğu ve Güneydoğu Sorununa Bakışı ve Çözüm Önerileri Raporu 1989(The Report on the Standpoint and Resolution Proposals of Social Democratic Populist Party towards the Eastern and Southeastern Problem)*. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Raporları. 2011 <http://www.chp.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/rapor_1989.pdf>.

[261] Ibid.

democratic deficit developed the political, economic and social problems. Moreover, economic underdevelopment, feudal structure, forced village evacuations and state implementations such as human rights violations are issues which promote and nurture terrorism. The CHP defended that in order for the terror problem to be resolved, new security policies must be put into practice and for the Kurdish issue to be resolved, the democratization and socio-economic development policies must be concentrated on. According to this report, for the state to see this issue only as a security problem causes the issue to take root.[262]

The Central Executive Board of CHP published another report in 2009 and in this instance named the problem as *'The Kurdish Issue'*. In this report, the CHP evaluated the political advancement regarding the Kurdish issue and addressed the terror problem. It stated that in order for the resolution of the Kurdish issue, the PKK terror must be terminated. Furthermore, it was emphasized that importance must be attached to individual cultural rights, equality and justice concepts, and socio-economic development. In this report, the CHP named the report which was published in 1989 as 'The Kurdish Issue Report'. However, the title of the 1989 dated report is *'The Report on the Standpoint and Resolution Proposals of Social Democratic Populist Party towards the Eastern and Southeastern Problem.*[263]

We observe that the definition of the Kurdish issue and the naming manners of the CHP underwent a change within the years. In the report which was published in 1989 by the CHP, the issue was named as the Eastern and Southeastern problem and the Kurdish issue term was used only once. In the report which was published in 1999, the issue was again named as the Eastern and Southeastern problem. The Kurdish issue was seen as one of the basic elements and dimensions of the Eastern and Southeastern problem. In the Central Executive Board report which was published in 2009, the matter was entirely named as the Kurdish issue. While the issue was named as the Eastern and Southeastern problem in the report published in 1989, the matter was named as the Kurdish issue in 2009. While terrorism was defined as an element / subheading of the Kurdish issue in 1989, the Kurdish issue and terrorism were

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[262]*Doğu ve Güneydoğu Raporu 1999(The Eastern and Southeastern Report).* Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, SETA <http://www.setav.org/ups/dosya/10329.pdf >.

[263] *CHP Parti Meclisinde Sunulan Merkez Yönetim Kurulu Raporu (The Central Executive Board Report of CHPpresented to the Assembly) .*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. (Ankara, 2009) < http://www.chp.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/myk_12haziran2009.pdf>.

referred to as two separate issues in the report which was published in 1999. It can explicitly be seen that, the pronunciation of the Kurdish issue got easy from 1989 up to the present, due to democratization process and the pressure from international actors for the solution of issue.

The role of the SHP in the Kurdish legal political formation is as essential. The SHP discarded seven of party members from the party on the grounds that this group attended to a Kurdish Conference in Paris. Afterwards, twenty two candidates of the parliament from the HEP (People's Labor Party)[264], which was established under the leadership of the members discarded from the SHP, joined the election list of the SHP in order to pass the 10% threshold in the 1994 elections. Leyla Zana, who was a member of parliament in the SHP list, pledged in Kurdish and the SHP voted for the continuance of the State of Emergency and the Village Guard System which policies are contrary to the HEP policies; caused the candidates of the HEP which entered the Assembly from the lists of the SHP to resign and to joining the HEP once again.[265] This policy pursued by the SHP, the Kurdish legal political formations were began to be represented in the Assembly.

Altan Öymen, who became the Chairman of CHP in 1999, carried out negotiations with the HADEP (People's Democratic Party). After Deniz Baykal become the Chairman of CHP, the dialogue of the CHP with Kurdish parties came to an end. For the CHP to pursue neo-nationalist policy caused the marginalization of the CHP in regions where the Kurdish population was dense. The CHP opposed to the AKP for initiating the Democratic Initiative policy.

3.3.2.1. Party Program of the CHP

In the party program, the CHP avoided the use of Kurdish Issue naming and instead preferred to use *'issues faced by our citizens of Kurdish origin'* statement. In the party program, the CHP examined the elements which constituted the Kurdish issue instead of making a general definition.

The CHP emphasized the necessity of the continuance of existence of different ethnic structures, cultures and identities in the country in its party program. The CHP

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[264] For more details about Kurdish Legal Parties infra.97.
[265] Kirişçi, Winrow 161-162.

considers these different ethnic structures, cultures and identities as national treasures. Also, it defended that it is necessary for the state to accept different ethnic identities. In addition to all of these, the CHP opposed to the view of any race being superior to other races and to the assimilation policies. In the program, it was expressed that the existing issues must be resolved by regarding the ethnic identity differences and by basin on to cultural pluralism within the compass of unitary and nation state system. Moreover, it opposed to the creation of minorities apart from the minorities identified in the Treaty of Lausanne.[266] According to the view defended and accepted in the Lausanne Negotiations, no Muslim is a minority regardless of their ethnic identity and religious sect. In other words, there are no Muslim minorities in Turkey.

Additionally, the CHP stated that citizens of every ethnic origin must have the right to freely use their own mother tongue and to learn and teach this mother tongue through private teaching institutions and courses, to publish newspaper and journal, to oral and written broadcast in their mother tongue.

> To give an opportunity for our citizens of every ethnic origin […] To be able to freely use their own mother tongue, to be able to freely learn and teach their mother tongue through private teaching institutions and courses, to be able to publish newspaper, journal, book in their mother tongue and be able to broadcast in oral and written, to be able to engage in other branches of music and art […] To be able to freely reach all of these and similar individual cultural rights to their heart's content is regarded as the requirement of contemporary democracy mentality.[267]

In addition to this, the CHP defended that the issues in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions where citizens of Kurdish origin densely populate can be resolved within the framework of the above-mentioned rights. The CHP stated that the policies which will be implied in the resolution of the Kurdish issue or as the CHP has put it, the issues which our citizens of Kurdish origin have faced can meet the request of other ethnic groups (Kurd, Arabian, Circassian, Bosnian, Georgian, Laz,

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[266] Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Parti Programı(The Party Program of CHP). July 2011, 46-48
<http://www.chp.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/chpprogram.pdf> .

[267] Ibid. 48.

Abkhazian, Albanian, Roman) also.[268] This statement is included in the party program of the CHP;

> We will also resolve the problems intensively faced in the region by our citizens of Kurdish origin who are one of the most common identities which shares the same mother tongue and has the same ethnic origin as our country with this mentality.[269]

It is possible to reach a conclusion from this sentence towards the fact that the mother tongue of the Kurds is Turkish and that Kurds are Turks in terms of ethnic origin. According to the CHP, in order for the termination of the terrorist organization the struggle through the armed forces must be maintained. In addition to this, the CHP defended that all institutions whether official or civil must play an active role in the struggle against terrorism. Moreover, the CHP considered the implementation of economic and social reforms necessary for the termination of terrorism. In other words, the CHP regard the economic and social problems particularly unemployment the source of terrorism. The CHP expressed that Village Guard System must be annulled right after the termination of the terrorist organization.

The CHP did not mention the Kurdish issue while explaining the political violence and terror policy. However, the CHP indicated the existence of the political dimension of the issue with the following statement which takes part in the party program, "Toleration must not be shown to those who wish to use terror as a political struggle purpose […]"[270]. The fact that terror must not be used as a political struggle purpose was defended[271]. For this reason, the CHP defended the necessity of prevention of the PKK acquiring political rights and gaining such as right to education in Kurdish mother tongue through acts of terrorism. Furthermore, the CHP defends the necessity of prevention of explanations of Kurdish legal political formations, in other words parties which support the acts of terrorism.

Even though the issue was named differently from time to time, the issue was always defined in the same manner. According to the CHP, terror, economic

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[268] Ibid. 49.
[269] Ibid. 48. "Ülkemizin aynı ana dili paylaşan ve etnik kökene sahip en yaygın unsurlarından birini oluşturan Kürt kökenli yurttaşlarımızın yoğun biçimde yaşadıkları bölgemizdeki sorunlarını da bu anlayışla çözeceğiz."
[270] Ibid.115.
[271] Ibid. 113-116.

underdevelopment, democracy and human rights problems are regarded as the reasons of the issue.

3.3.3. The Position of the MHP towards the Kurdish Issue

The history of MHP which is a Turkish nationalist party dates back to the nationalist and conservative the MP (Nation Party) which was established in 1948. Alparslan Türkeş superseded to General Presidency of the party in 1965 which continued its political life with the title of the CKMP (Republican Villagers Nation Party) after the MP was closed. In 1967, the party adopted "9 Lights Doctrine"[272] under the leadership of Alparslan Türkeş. In 1969, the name of the party was changed to the MHP and remained the same up to the present.

The ideology of the MHP is extreme right-wing Turkishness which correlates the Islam and the Turkish nationalism, in other words which is the Turk-Islam synthesis. According to the MHP, a community which comes from a common history, has a common historical consciousness, belongs to the same religion, is connected to the same culture, established and maintains the same state is the Turkish Nation. According to the MHP, "[…] everyone who feels himself as a Turk, who embraces the Turkishness and bears the willingness to serve the Turkish nation, Turkish state, is a Turk"[273] and this definition forms the basis of Turkish nationalism. According to the MHP, Turkish nationalism is an ideology which regards everyone who lives within the borders of the Republic of Turkey and think himself as a part of the Turkish Nation as one.[274] The MHP considers the Islam as an inseparable part of the Turkish culture.[275]

In 1970s, the MHP struggled against the left wing organizations and the Kurdish nationalism which it regarded as a threat to the existence of the state. For this reason, the MHP was considered to be an ultranationalist, militant party within the above-mentioned period. In the 1990s, on the other hand, the MHP defended that a struggle

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[272] Nine Lights Doctrine is based on nine principles which are Nationalism (based on Turkish nationalism), idealism, moralism, scientism, communitarianism, industrialism and mechanism, villagism, improvement and populism, freedom and honor.

[273] Öztürk, Harun. *Temel Görüşlerimiz (Our Main Views)*. 150 <http://www.ulkuocaklari.org.tr/egitim/temelgoruslerimiz/files/assets/downloads/TemelGoruslerimiz.pdf#page=144 >.

[274] Ibid.

[275] Ibid.153.

against the PKK must be carried out because of the fact that the PKK poses a threat to the existence of the state.[276]

After the death of Türkeş, in 1997, Devlet Bahçeli was elected to be the Chairman. Devlet Bahçeli executed a number of reforms in order to improve the image of the MHP in the media and in the eyes of the society of being ultranationalist and militant. For that purpose, he decreased the number of Grey Wolves[277] which struggled against the left winger organizations and the Kurdish nationalism especially in the 1970s. The MHP, under Bahçeli, valued the interest of the state above the interests of the party.

Alparslan Türkeş defended that the Southeastern problem originated from foreign governments supporting terrorism and alleged that the majority of Kurds descends from the Turkish descendence. He was opposed to Kurdish education and Kurdish publications.[278] According to Bahçeli, the Southeast issue is an economic issue.

For the MHP, to have taken part in the 57th Coalition Government as the second biggest party in the Assembly when the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured in 1999 is of capital importance in the Kurdish issue. The Coalition Government clashed over on the subject of the execution of sentence of Abdullah Öcalan who was condemned to the death penalty. The DSP defended that the execution of the sentence of Abdullah Öcalan would destabilize Turkey. On the contrary, the MHP defended that the sentence must be executed because with the execution of the sentence the PKK terror would come to an end. For Abdullah Öcalan to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) after the declaration of death penalty and for the ECHR to make statements towards the adjournment of the death sentence caused turning up of the suppression of the EU which declared Turkey as a candidate state in 1999 on Turkey towards the execution of Öcalan. Due to these reasons, the government was obliged to take a decision which would profoundly affect the Kurdish issue and foreign policy of Turkey in 2001. The Government made law

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[276] Çınar, Alev. Arıkan, Burak. "The Nationalist Action Party: Representing the State, the Nation or the Nationalists?"*Turkish Studies*, Vol: 3, No: 1(2002) 25-30 <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=addb4176-3fb0-4d20-96ba-92652b028550%40sessionmgr115&vid=1&hid=112>.

[277] Grey Wolves are ultra-Turkish nationalist youth organization of MHP, created by Alparslan Türkeş in 1969.

[278] Kirişçi, Winrow 166.

amendments regarding the annulment of capital punishment towards terror and war crimes.

For the MHP to have a signature under a law amendment towards the annulment of capital punishment is diametrically opposite to the party policy regarding the fact that the capture and execution of Abdullah Öcalan would decrease the terrorist activities. For the MHP to support the law amendment carried out in the 57th Coalition period caused for it to get reactions from party supporters and individuals who believed that the PKK terror would decrease with the execution of Öcalan.

The AKP, right after it came into power, annulled capital punishment for all crimes. Consequently, as the capital punishment of Abdullah Öcalan was completely removed and the AKP pursued a policy under the title of *'Kurdish Initiative'* increased the ongoing discussions amongst political parties especially the ones between the MHP and the AKP. The MHP accused the AKP for saving Öcalan from death penalty in most of its public meetings[279]. Moreover, Bahçeli defended that the Democratic Initiative Project would harm the indivisible integrity of the Republic of Turkey, would pave the way for ethnic discriminations and would encourage terrorism.[280] The AKP, on the other hand, interposed to the claims of the MHP and declared that capital punishment was annulled many times in the MHP period.[281]

3.3.3.1. Party Program of the MHP

The Kurdish issue or Eastern and Southeastern problem or the reasons of the ongoing issues were not addressed in the party program of the MHP. Moreover, the MHP avoided the use of the word *'Kurd'* in the meetings, demonstrations and the published reports. Generally, the issue is not considered as the Kurdish issue but as a terror and security problem. In other words, according to the MHP, the problem is only a terror and national security problem. The MHP denies the identity dimension of the Kurdish issue. The MHP asserts that the state does not harm or does not and will not execute any implementation which will harm the citizens of Kurdish origin

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[279] "Apo'yu İpten Alan Belge" *Sabah Gazetesi* 24 08 2009, 24 March 2011 <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Siyaset/2009/08/24/apoyu_ipten_alan_belge>.
[280] "Devlet Bahçeli'nin Kürt Açılımı Görüşü", 21 March 2011 <http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xa5k8n_devlet-bahceli-nin-kurt-acylymy-tep_news>.
[281] Michael M. Gunter "The continuing Kurdish problem in Turkey after Öcalan's Capture" *Third World Quarterly*, Vol: 21, No: 5(2000) May 2011 <http://www.jstor.org/pss/3993622>.
V.v. "Türkiye'de Ölüm Cezasının Kaldırılması Süreci ve Avrupa Birliği'nin Sürece Katkısı" *İstanbul Barosu.* March 2011 <http://www.istanbulbarosu.org.tr/images/haber/idamcezasiturkcemetin2007.doc>.

as alleged by the PKK and the Kurdish nationalists. For that reason, the MHP defends that the PKK and the Kurdish nationalist do not have any reason to demand any requests such as their democratic right requests.[282] As a result, the MHP names and defines the Kurdish issue as terror and security problem.[283]

3.3.4. The Position of the BDP towards the Kurdish Issue

The BDP receives votes from citizens who are affected by the Kurdish issue and from nationalist Kurdish origin citizens. In other words, the majority of the BDP's voters are Kurds, because it defends the rights of the Kurdish origin citizens on political platform. The formation of Kurdish legal political parties which defend the rights of citizens of the Kurdish origin goes back to the early 1990s. The establishment of these Kurdish legal political parties helped for the view of Kurdish issue not only being originated from terror, to spread in the society and politics.

The party members and members of parliaments and these political parties which conveyed the Kurdish issue to the politics entered the elections as independent candidates in order to surpass the 10% country threshold which is a part of the Turkish election system. The elected candidates provided the representation of their parties by forming a group in the parliament.

The root of the Kurdish legal political parties dates back to the HEP which was established in June of 1990. The HEP was closed down due to the under-mentioned reasons by the Constitutional Court on 14th of July 1993;

> […] contrariety to the indivisible integrity of state with country and its nation (The Political Parties Law (PPL), art.78), to the principle of unity of the state (the PPL, art.80) and to the prohibition of allegation of existence of national minorities (the PPL, art. 81/a) and to prohibition of disintegration of national integrity by forming minority (81/b) […] [284]

As for the ÖZEP (Freedom and Equality Party), it was established on 25th of June, 1992. This party dissolved itself by joining to the HEP. The ÖZDEP (Freedom and Democracy Party) was established by party members of the HEP on 19th of October

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[282] Ödül Celep. "Turkey's Radical Right and the Kurdish Issue: The MHP's Reaction to the 'Democratic Opening'". *Insight Turkey*. Vol. 12, No. 2 (2010) 136.

[283] Yayman 16.

[284] Doğu Perinçek. *Anayasa ve Siyasal Partiler Rejimi: Türkiye'de Siyasal Partilerin İç Düzeni ve Yasaklanması (The Constitution and Political Parties Regime: The prohibition and Internal Order of the Political Parties in Turkey.* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2008) 311.

1992, after pressing charge against the Constitutional Court regarding the closing down of the HEP. The ÖZDEP dissolved itself on 30th of April 1993 in order not to be affected by the result of over-closure case which was prosecuted on 29th of January 1993 and a potential closure verdict.

On 7th of May 1993, the DEP (Democracy Party) was established while the over-closure case of the HEP was ongoing and this party was closed on 16th of June 1994 by the Constitutional Court by the reason of Hatip Dicle, the DEP General President, defending the existence and activities of the PKK. The members of parliament of the DEP established the HADEP on 11th of May 1994 before the DEP was closed down. The Constitutional Court decreed to the closure of the HADEP on 13th of March 2003 on account of the fact that the party supported, aided and abetted the PKK. The hanging of the PKK flags and Öcalan posters in party congress of the HADEP caused the arrestment of party executives. Over-closure case was filed against the DEHAP (Democratic People's Party), which was established on 24th of October 1997, on the grounds that it 'entered the elections before completing its organization'. As for the DEHAP, it dissolved itself in 2005.

The DTP (Democratic Society Party) was established on 9th of November, 2005. The DTP, in order to surpass the 10% threshold in the General Elections of 2007, it entered the election with 22 independent candidates who are also known as 'The Candidates of Thousand Hopes'. The DTP was closed down on the accounts of the fact that it "[…] became a focal point where activities which are contrariety to the country of state and indivisible integrity of the nation when its connection to the terrorist organization as well as its activities are evaluated".[285] The BDP was established under the leadership of members and members of parliament of the DTP which was closed down by the Constitutional Court.

There is a general opinion that the Kurdish legal political parties have relations with the PKK and that the existence of these parties within the Turkish political life is inconvenient. The closing of Kurdish legal political parties by the Constitutional Court also strengthened this opinion. Generally, members of parliaments of the BDP get reactions from political institutions and media for not criticizing the PKK and for

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[285] S.Erdem Türközü, Evren Özer, "Türkiye İnsan Hakları Raporu: 2009 (Human Rights Report of Turkey: 2009)", *Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı Yayınları* (2010) <http://www.tihv.org.tr/index.php?turkiye-insan-.haklari-raporu>.

various statements which indicate Abdullah Öcalan as a party in the resolution of the issue. For the BDP parliamentarians to pronounce the words 'The Esteemed Öcalan' while addressing Abdullah Öcalan in their speeches is causing tensions in the politics of Turkey.

Moreover, the BDP is being criticized for having an organic bond with the PKK. Even though the base of the majority of the Kurdish legal political parties is constituted by the PKK sympathizers, these parties also receive the votes of Kurdish nationalists who are opposed to terrorism.

3.3.4.1. Party Program of the BDP

The BDP which puts forward proposals for the Kurdish issue in its party program, made a definition of the issue in a roundabout way. According to the BDP, the denial of the issue by totalitarian regimes and managements, the existence of a nationalist, statist, centralist constitutions which is based on ethnic reference, human rights violations, not researching tortures and unsolved murders, forced migration policies, regional underdevelopment and pursuance of violence based policies such as the State of Emergency and Village Guard System comprise the reasons of the Kurdish issue.[286]

According to the BDP co-president Gülten Kışanak, "The Kurdish issue is fundamentally a rights and freedom issue. It is a Democracy issue."[287] According to the DTP former co-president Ahmet Türk, the problem is an issue of nonrecognition of the Kurdish reality in the constitution[288].

3.4. The Standpoint of the PKK towards the Kurdish Issue

The primary objective of the PKK, which began its political organizing in the early 1970s with a Marxist ideology, is to attract supporters, make propaganda and provide financial support. Abdullah Öcalan who is the founder and leader of the PKK was

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[286] *Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi Parti Programı (The Party Program of BDP).* February *2011*
<http://www.bdp.org.tr/hakkimizda/program.html >.
[287] "BDP: Kürt Sorunu Demokrasi Sorunudur", 24 February 2011
<http://www.haber7.com/haber/20101026/BDP-Kurt-sorunu-demokrasi-sorunudur.php >.
[288] "Türk: Öcalan'ın Sağlık Koşulları Türkiye'deki Gelişmeleri Etkiler" *Milliyet Gazetesi*, (02 12 2009), 14
February 2011 <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Siyaset/SonDakika.aspx?aType=SonDakika&ArticleID=1168756 >.

appointed to the office of secretary general of the PKK which concluded its organizing on 27 November 1978 in Lice district of Diyarbakır.

The purpose of the establishment of the PKK is to establish an independent and united Marxist-Leninist Kurdish state, in other words an independent and the united Kurdistan State. The PKK adopted political violence and guerilla struggle as a tool and declared the 'Long Term Public War'. The PKK began its armed struggle in regions where the populations of villagers were dense and the affect and effectiveness of the state was low. The purpose here is to provide the public to correlate with the organization by isolating the villagers from the state. The PKK is trying to politicize the citizens of the Kurdish origin and create a nation through armed struggle.[289]

The PKK considers 'fascists, state representatives and state sanctioned channels, religionists and feudal leaders' as obstacles for it to achieve its goal and to provide the support of the public. For that reason, the PKK carried out its first attack towards Bucak tribe in 1979. After the 1980 military coup d'état, the PKK to cadres escaped to Syria and Lebanon. The PKK, which achieved its desired organization in Turkey after the coup d'état, began organizing in the Bekaa Valley and set up a base for the training of militants. PKK militants who were trained by members of the Palestine Liberation Organization at the Bekaa Valley executed its first massive attack against security forces and civilians in Eruh and Şemdinli in 1984.

For the Allied Powers to create a no fly zone in the Northern Iraq after the Gulf War, provided a new training and attacking area for the PKK militants.[290] The PKK began to gather in Iraq by benefiting from the authority gap in Northern Iraq in order to execute its operations. PKK changed its purpose of establishing an independent Kurdistan State in the fourth congress in 1990 with establishing a federal structure within the borders of Turkey.[291]

Nihat Ali Özcan expressed that the already insufficient public organization in the region because of challenging geographical conditions and deficiency of

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[289] Özcan 69-78.

[290] "The case of the PKK: History, Ideology, Methodology, and Structure (1978-99)", *Ankara Papers*, Vol: 9, No: 1, (2004) 26-28 <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=19&hid=11&sid=d03e42bf-6e4b-459d-9b09-af8b530ded99%40sessionmgr12>.

[291] Kirişçi, Winrow 148-149.

infrastructure became more insufficient as the armed activities of the terrorist organization rose.[292] Moreover, the PKK activities enhanced the Kurdish ethnic awareness and polarized the society as Kurd-Turk based on the ethnic identity.[293]

As the PKK to introduce itself to the local community with Marxist-Leninist ideology, prevented PKK to receive support from the locals in regions where Islamic faith was dense. The PKK, which pulled away from Marxist ideology with the collapse of the Soviet Union, tried to receive support from the local community through religious leaders, religions or religious sects. The PKK, with that purpose, established the Kurdistan Nosairians Union, the Kurdistan Islamic Movement and the Kurdistan Yezidis Union. In addition to all of these, the PKK started to give examples from hadiths and verses in its propagandas in order to increase the legitimacy of the movement amongst the local community. [294]

In order to receive the support of the public opinion, it declared a unilateral ceasefire in 1993. The PKK, which continued its armed activities even though it declared a ceasefire, took a decision to expand its activities and attacks to major cities in the 3rd Conference in 1994. At the 6th Conference, which was held in 1996, the decision to increase the number of suicide attacks was taken. In 1998, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire in consequence of Turkey increasing its pressure over Syria. Within the same year, left Syria as a result of the pressure implied by Turkey to Syria and was captured in Kenya on 15th of February, 1999. The capture of Öcalan is a milestone in struggle against the PKK and the Kurdish issue. For Öcalan to state his commitment to the Republic of Turkey during his trial and to tell the PKK that the ceasefire must continue created an image amongst the society that PKK was dissolved. Öcalan was sentenced to death penalty on 29th of July, 1999. The PKK, on the other hand, continued its armed activities in order to prevent the decision of Öcalan being to be executed.

In 2001, the PKK dissolved itself; first it changed its name to the KADEK (Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan) and then changed the name into the Kongra-

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[292] Özcan 102.
[293] "The case of the PKK: History, Ideology, Methodology, and Structure (1978-99)" 37.
[294] Özcan 216-218.

Gel (Kurdistan People's Congress). In 2005, the organization which was again named PKK supported the politicization process in addition to armed struggle.

3.4.1. Party Program of the PKK

The PKK did not name the matter in its establishment program and addressed only the negativities which the local community was experiencing. The PKK defended that as a result of the region named Kurdistan being under different empires caused the local community to live in tribes and inhabit the mountainside. The PKK regard Ottoman and Turkish governance as the reasons of the divided structure in Kurdistan. Furthermore, the PKK defended that the religion of Islam prevents for the Kurdish national awareness to develop.

The PKK defended that the Kurdish feudal lords held a wide autonomy in the region within the period of time until the 18th Century, however that the Ottoman turned up the pressure in the region after adopting capitalist system. According to the PKK, Kurdish resistances and rebellions occurred, as a result of the Ottoman and the Turkish pressures. The PKK renders the Kurdish resistance and rebellions as indicators of the local community not wishing to remain under the Turkish sovereignty.

According to the PKK, the region possessed the right exterior conditions for independence after the WWI, however that the independence could not take place as a result of negative domestic conditions such as tribalism-feudal structure. According to the PKK, the Republic of Turkey colonized the Kurdistan as a part of the capitalist system. The PKK asserted that the Republic of Turkey used military forces, benefited from religious sect differences and provoked views towards the Kurds being rebellious during the Turkish nation building process in order to establish dominance over the region and to colonize the region. The PKK stated that the Republic of Turkey carried out massacres, overpowered the local authorities and accordingly consolidated the central authority in order to prevent other rebellions to break out in the region between the years 1925–1938. The progress of capitalism in the region caused for an intelligentsia of Kurdish origin to originate which grew up under the influence of Turkish culture and language.[295]

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[295] Özcan 355-359, 363.

Several changes were put into practice in the party program at the 5th Congress, which was held in 1995. The purpose of PKK was explained as revolutionary socialist leadership and national liberation movement in this congress.[296] Afterwards, the PKK which set off to on the path to establish an independent Kurdistan lowered its demand to democratic autonomy. In 1996, Abdullah Öcalan sent a letter to the prime minister of that time Mesut Yılmaz. In this letter, Öcalan described his aim as, "An equalitarian federation based on the brotherhood of Turkish and Kurdish communities and the restructuring of the republic within the compass of the aforesaid principles".[297]

In 1998, Abdullah Öcalan, a year before he was captured by Turkey, stated in the interview with the Middle East Quarterly that there is a dominant view in Turkey towards the fact that there are no Kurds and in fact that Kurds do not exist. Öcalan stated that governments and in fact professors in certain universities asserted this idea. He defended that Turkey only recognized the Kurds who denied their own Kurdishness. He alleged that the Kurds were unkindly treated and acts towards disregarding Kurds are present, which enhances the Kurdish nationalism. According to Öcalan, the reason for the emergence of the issue and terror is the denial policies of the Republic of Turkey towards the existence of Kurds.[298]

The PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, who was captured in Kenya in 1999 and has been at İmralı Prison as a result of the penalty of aggravated life imprisonment ever since he was brought to Turkey, is regarded as the sole authority in the resolution of the PKK issue. For the PKK terror to be both the reason and result of the Kurdish issue transforms Abdullah Öcalan as an important agent in the Kurdish issue. Öcalan defends that a negotiation must take place under the leadership of the political party of Kurdish origin in the Assembly with the participation of himself and the Kandil governance for the Kurdish issue to be solved through democratic ways.[299] The PKK,

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[296] Ibid. 386-391.

[297] "Türkiye İnsan Hakları Raporu: 1996" 56.

[298] Abdullah Öcalan, "We Are Fighting Turks Everywhere" *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol: 5, No: 2(1998) June 2009 <http://www.meforum.org/399/abdullah-ocalan-we-are-fighting-turks-everywhere >. Abdullah Öcalan stated that; "In Turkey, they say there are no Kurds, that they don't exist. The government says this. Even the professors at universities say this […] Turkey only accepts the Kurd who denies he is a Kurd […] Turkey's harsh, ignorant treatment of the Kurds has helped give birth to a greater sense of Kurdish nationalism. I use Turkish mistakes to build up my power."

[299] "Öcalan'a göre Kürt açılımında muhatap DTP", *Radikal Gazetesi*, 03 10 2009, 29 May 2012< http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=957405&CategoryID=77>.

which began its activities with the purpose of establishing Independent Kurdistan, in this day and age abandoned its separatist aim especially based on the road map presented by Abdullah Öcalan and tended towards the demand of Autonomous Kurdistan within the boundaries of Turkey. Murat Karayılan, who became the president of the organization after the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, expressed that armed struggle of the PKK might lose its meaning if the Republic of Turkey abandons its denial of Kurdish public policy and does not prevent democratic and political struggle[300].

3.5. The Position of the Turkish Armed Forces towards the Kurdish Issue

The relation of the TSK, which has an essential place in the Turkish political history, with the Kurdish issue dates back to the Kurdish rebellions which broke out in the first years of the Republic, in other words the mid 1920s. This institution, which defends the territorial integrity of the Republic of Turkey, approaches the Kurdish issue from the point of national security by its nature. The TSK considers the issue as the PKK terror and asserts that hard power should be implemented in order to terminate the PKK terror. The TSK ensured the evacuation of many villages and prevented the local community from returning to the region within the scope of state policy in order to prevent the PKK to receive support from the villagers.

Marshall Fevzi Çakmak, who was the Chief of General Staff between the years 1921–1944, issued a circular letter to all military units which stated that permission must be taken from the General Staff for all manners of investments which will be made in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions.[301] Fevzi Çakmak claimed that the whole village must be burnt and the villagers who participated in the rebellion must be punished in case the entire village interfered in the rebellion for the rebellions which broke out in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. Fevzi Çakmak asserted that the Kurds must be suppressed in order to prevent new rebellions to

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[300] Cengiz Çandar, " Dağdan İniş- PKK Nasıl Silah Bırakır? Kürt Sorunun Şiddetten Arındırılması", TESEV (2011)33 < http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Publication/674c1f00-fc7f-4f91-b2e4-2ef8d91f1815/11452%20SilahsizlandirmaWEB.pdf>.
[301] Heper 205.

break out in the region. Moreover, he alleged that the increase of education opportunities in the region would trigger separatist movements.[302]

Cemal Gürsel, who was 4th President of the Republic of Turkey after the 1960 Coup D'état also was the Full General, pursued a disarmament policy in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions. Gürsel, who published a Government Decree for that purpose, put into practice the relegation policy of landlords who did not abide by the circular to the western part of Turkey.[303]

Doğan Güreş, who was the Chief of General Staff between the years 1990–1994, objected to the idea of establishing a federative structure on the eastern of the country of Özal and stated that these kinds of opinions would negatively affect the morale of TSK which is carrying out an armed struggle against PKK.[304] On the other hand, Güreş defended that economic conditions in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions must be improved and that cultural rights must be entitled to Kurds. Güreş expressed that struggle against terrorism is different from the Kurdish issue and that the state must continue to struggle against terrorism.[305]

Hilmi Özkök, who was the Chief of General Staff between the years 2002–2006, stated that the different ethnic identity and religious belief groups in the Republic of Turkey constituted the Turkish nation.[306] The speech made by İlker Başbuğ, who was the Chief of General Staff between the years 2008–2010 at Turkish War Colleges Command indicates that the standpoint of the TSK based on security had changed. In his speech, Başbuğ expressed that he agreed with the academicians' views which assert that the issue originated from economic underdevelopment, mistreatment of local community by the government officials and the centralist and secularism policies of the state. Başbuğ denied the view which pronounces the issue as a problem which originated from ethnic origin.[307]

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[302] Ibid. 208

[303] Ibid.

[304] Ibid. 206

[305] Ibid. 209.

[306] Ibid.

[307] İlker Başbuğ, "14 Nisan 2009,Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral İlker Başbuğ'un 14 Nisan 2009 tarihinde Harp Akademileri Komutanlığında Yaptığı Yıllık Değerlendirme Konuşması" *TSK* (2009) April 2009<http://www.tsk.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2009/org_ilkerbasbug_harpak_konusma_14042009.html >.

The TSK, during the foundation years of the Republic, asserted that the disarmament in the region must be ensured in order to increase the commitment of the region tribes to the state. The TSK, after rebellions broke out in the region, became the implementer of suppression and forced migration policy within the region. In addition to this, the TSK was opposed to all manners of expressions of Kurdish ethnic identity and considered everyone who lived within the border of the Republic of Turkey as Turks. The TSK, which named and defined the issue as the PKK problem after the initiation of activities of the PKK in the region, adopted armed struggle as a means for the resolution of the issue as required by the state policy. In time, it was understood that armed struggle and the pursued repressive policy is not sufficient enough for the resolution of the Kurdish issue. It was obliged to accept the truth that the economic development of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions and taking services to the region are of capital importance in the resolution of the issue.

3.6. Evaluation

As I stated in the second part of the thesis, the Kurdish issue is a multi dimensional problem with more than one subheading and that prevents to have a general definition and a naming for the issue. As the issue to have many reasons and to affect every level of the society is beclouding the resolving of the issue. It is hard to comprehend the issue as it is complicated. The number of actors, which deals with the issue, increased because the problem affects the domestic and international politics of the Republic of Turkey. Opinion leaders, NGOs political parties, the PKK and the TSK, which has a role in the international and internal politics of the state and take part in the resolution of the issue, defend different views regarding this issue. All actors named and defined the issue in different ways.

Generally, Opinion leaders, NGOs, institutions and parties are naming the issue in three ways; The Kurdish Issue, the Eastern and Southeastern Problem and Terror Problem. The naming 'Kurdish Issue' consist not only the security and the socio-economic dimensions of the issue, but also democratic and human rights dimensions of the problem. The naming 'Eastern and Southeastern Problem' compromise the issues related to economical underdevelopment. The naming 'Terror Problem' describes the PKK and its activities as sources of the issue. There are also actors who

describe the Kurdish Issue and the Terror Problem as a sub-heading of Southeastern Problem which means the terror problem and Kurdish issue derived from economic underdevelopment. Moreover, there are also actors who distinguish the Terror Problem from the Kurdish Issue. On the other hand, there are actors who believe there is no such a Kurdish Issue and so the ongoing problems and discussions are the result of a policy towards the creation of an ethnic minority group in Turkey.

As it can be seen in the above mentioned paragraphs, there is variety of namings of the issue. Therefore, opinion leaders, NGOs, institutions and parties name and define the issue according to their perceptions, standpoints and even their ideologies. The researches carried out and reports published by SETA, KONDA, TESEV and BÜSAM give clues about the public's perception towards the Kurdish issue. As a general review from the data's published by the NGOs, the Kurdish issue is one of the most important problems of Turkey. There are individuals who do not believe in the existence of the Kurdish Issue and who refrain from naming the issue. There is considerable number of individuals, who name the issue as terror problem, assert that the TSK has a prominent role for the resolution of the issue. There are considerable numbers of individuals, who do not believe the existence of the Kurdish issue. The KONDA, TESEV and BÜSAM emphasize that there is a lack of consensus for defining and naming of the issue which is an obstacle for the resolution of the problem.

Bülent Tanör defined the issue as a socio-economic problem with an identity dimension and the Southeastern Problem used to explain economic underdevelopment in the East and Southeastern regions. According to Yeğen, for many years Kurdish Issue refers to economic underdevelopment. The state and its institutions denied the ethnic dimension of the Kurdish issue. Kirişçi and Winrow indicated that most of the Turkish governments defined the Kurdish issue as a terror problem. Yeğen, Kirişçi, Winrow, Barkey and Olson mentioned that the official discourse based on the denial of the Kurds as an ethnic group in Turkey emerged the Kurdish issue.

The namings and definitions of the political parties towards the Kurdish issue are also different. The AKP has been dealing with the Kurdish issue since came to power in 2002. The AKP launched Kurdish Initiative/ Democratic Initiative policy in 2009

for the resolution of the Kurdish issue. The main aim of this policy is to solve the Kurdish issue through democratization. The AKP mentions about the divergence in naming of the Kurdish issue in its party program and in its demonstrations. The AKP prefers to use the naming 'Kurdish Issue' in public speeches and defines the issue as terror, socio- problem and democratic rights problems.

The naming manners of CHP towards the issue were changed within the years. In the early 1990s, the issue was named as the Eastern and Southeastern Problem. In the late 1990s, the issue was also named as the Eastern and Southeastern Problem and the Kurdish issue defined as a subheading of the Eastern and Southeastern Problem. Since the late 2000s, the CHP was naming the problem as the Kurdish issue. On the other hand, the CHP was continued to define the issue as the terror, socio-economic, democracy and human rights problem.

The MHP names the issue as Terror Problem which was derived from the PKK and from foreign states corroborations. On the contrary, the BDP defines the problem as the Kurdish Issue which is a result of the policies pursued by the Turkish Republic. The standpoint of TSK, as an institution of the Turkish Republic, must be parallel to the official discourse. Although, TSK perceives inherently the issue from security perspective, the perception of TSK towards the issue began to change as from the 1990s. The PKK is a radical actor of the Kurdish issue which defines the issue as a result of the feudal structure, democratic right demands and imperialism.

As you can see, the divergence in naming and defining of the issue prevents the resolution of the issue and prevent for a general policy to be developed for the resolution of the issue. For these individuals and institutions who and which have different standpoints and are supported by different communities to be in agreement on the subject of the Kurdish issue, will ensure for the issue to be more easily resolved. In a sense, it will provide public accord. In other words, the naming of the Kurdish issue and for this naming to be accepted by every part of the society is an important step for the resolution of issue. Even though opinion leaders, NGOs, political parties, the PKK and the TSK name and define the issue differently, the problem could be named as the Kurdish issue and dimensions like; security issue, socio-economic underdevelopment, cultural and democratic right demands are the factors/ headings of the definition of the issue.

4. CONCLUSION

As I stated before, the emergence of the Kurdish issue dates back as far as to the Ottoman Empire. The relation between the Kurdish emirates and the Ottoman Empire which began with Sultan Selim the Stern establishing dominance over Kurdistan geography and which possesses special conditions continued for 300 years, until the reign of Sultan Mahmut II. The relation of the Empire with the Kurdish emirates began to change after Sultan Mahmut came into power. Even though the relations between the Kurdish emirates and the Bab-ı Ali, which perished because of the centralist policy and the implementations regarding this policy in the reign of Sultan Mahmut, were recovered in the reign of Sultan Abdülhamit, it was not as dynamic as it was. The nationalism trend and nationalist movements which affected the non Muslim citizens in the final period of the Empire caused for the Kurdish (pre) nationalism to emerge under the leadership of leading Kurdish tribes. The infringement of unspoken agreement of 300 years between the Empire and Kurdish emirates and the rise of Kurdish nationalist organizations comprises the Ottoman period Kurdish issue.

The National Struggle period is the transition period from the Empire to the Republic of Turkey. The Treaties of Sevres and Lausanne which were signed in this period are of capital importance to Kurdish nationalism and the Kurdish issue. During the WWI, certain Kurdish nationalists were on the side of Allied Powers for the purpose of the establishment of an independent Kurdistan. The Kurdish nationalist acquired the opportunity to establish an independent Kurdistan with the articles 62 and 64 of the Treaty of Sevres which was signed after the WWI. However the Kurdish tribes, which participated to the National Struggle around the religion of Islam and the Caliph, considered the War of Independence as a struggle from independence of Muslim community against the non Muslim occupants and objected to the independence views of the nationalist Kurds. During the National Struggle period, the Ankara Government accepted the integrity of the borders of the National Pact and ensured social support based on the unity and solidarity of all Muslim identities in

order to ensure the territorial integrity. In the National Struggle period, the asserting of certain Kurdish tribes the idea of independent Kurdistan is essential in terms of the development of Kurdish nationalism. At the same time, for certain Kurdish tribes to be on the side of the Ankara Government during the National Struggle around the religion of Islam and the Caliph show the importance of the religion of Islam within the Kurdish society. During the Lausanne Negotiations, the Turkish Representative Delegation asserted that all of the Muslim identities are the founder constituents of Turkey and that they are equal and due to these reasons that there cannot be Muslim minorities within the Republic of Turkey.

After the success of the National Struggle and signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, the Republic of Turkey implemented certain reforms in order to convert the multi-faith and multilingual structure which was taken over from the Empire into nation-state and unitary structure. The transition to unitary state structure meant that the privileges such as autonomy or semi autonomy which were possessed by the Kurdish tribes in the Empire would no longer be valid in the new order. Moreover, the Islamic identity is being pushed into the background and then being removed, in addition to all of these, the Turkishness idea being put forward and the official discourses and policies being put forth based on this idea during the nation-state building process caused for the Kurdish nationalism to be triggered.

The rebellions which broke out in the establishment years of the Republic originating from whether identity, right demands or religious concerns were repressed by the government through harsh precautions. The state put into practice policies such as the Settlement Law, the Reform Plan in order to prevent new rebellions to break out, repress Kurdish nationalism, dissolve Kurdish tribe structure and to bring tribes under control. These policies which were put into practice caused the question of whether the state implemented these policies with a purpose of integration or a purpose of assimilation to emerge. Metin Heper stated that the purpose of the implementations were integration. According to Heper, the state ensured for Kurds to ignore their secondary identity because of the possibility of Kurds converting their ethnic secondary identity into primary identity. He stated that it would be a mistake to evaluate the implemented policies as assimilation policy for that reason.[308]

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[308] Heper 264-265.

According to Mesut Yeğen, on the other hand, the state exposed Kurds to 'assimilationist practices' and considered them as 'future Turks'. So, the Kurds were exposed to segregationist citizenship practices.[309]

Between the years 1960-1980, the Kurdish nationalism was affected by Marxist ideology and found a place in the Turkish politics with this ideology. In other words, as from the 1970s the Kurdish issue took part in the Turkish politics with left wing ideology. Left wing organizations rendered themselves as the representatives of the oppressed Kurdish nation.

The pursuance of Turkish nationalist policies after the 1980 coup d'état, in other words the denial of all ethnic identities except from the Turkish ethnic identity caused for a Kurdish nationalist terrorist organization entitled the PKK, external supported, which was supported by other countries, to emerge. Hamit Bozarslan expressed that the symbolic resources of Kurdishness was prohibited with the 12 September Military Coup and that Kemalism and Turkishness were imposed as the sole ideology, consequently that the 'socialization' of Kurdish youth 'to be pulled underground' was inevitable.[310] Hamit Bozarslan stated that the criticism of PKK was directed to Kemalism in the first years when it began its armed struggle and to 'the Republic of Turkey which turned into a fascist dictatorship and to militarism' after the 12 September Coup.[311] So, the initiation of terrorist activities of the PKK is actually the result of state abating the political platform and the following harsh precautions which the state implemented. For that reason, the 80 coup d'état and the following policies which were put into practice are of capital importance in the Kurdish issue.

The PKK's terrorist activities moved the Kurdish issue to the terror and security platform. Due to the PKK terror, the state realized that the Kurdish issue cannot resolve with oppression or denial methods. As the PKK terror continued despite the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, revealed the impossibility that the Kurdish issue cannot resolved by security procedures. The EU put pressure over the Republic of Turkey to resolve the Kurdish issue and to improve democracy during the EU

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[309] Mesut Yeğen,*Müstakbel Türk'ten Sözde Vatandaşa Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler*.(İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları,2006) 47-49.
[310] Bozarslan, "Kürt Milliyetçiliği ve Kürd Hareketi (1898-2000)" 861.
[311] Ibid.

membership process. Accession process provided the Turkish politics to discuss the Kurdish issue. The effort of Kurdish nationalist political parties which were based on leftist ideology to enter the Assembly conveyed the problem to the assembly.

There are two important issues which the Turkish politics faced during the discussion stage of the Kurdish issue. The first one of these two is towards the defining of the Kurdish issue and the other one is towards the naming of the Kurdish issue. The Kurdish issue is basically constituted from three main headings apart from the above-mentioned historical development. These are security issue, socio-economic issues and cultural and democratic rights dimensions. There are also subheadings of these three main headings. The security issue is not only the PKK terror. It also comprises the relations of other countries with the PKK and the precautions taken by the Republic towards the termination of the PKK terror. PKK's receiving support from other states caused the PKK to gain strength, the Kurdish issue to be carried onto international platform and deepening of the Kurdish issue.

The socio-economic dimension is composed of migration, education, employment and income problems. The PKK terror and state implementations negatively affected the economic growth and education level in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions and forced the local community to migrate to the more developed regions or major cities of the country. The migration accelerated the spreading of the Kurdish issue not only in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions but thorough out the country. Education problems, high level of unemployment and low income in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions trigger the Kurdish issue.

Cultural and democratic right insufficiency and demands regarding this topic are of capital importance in the Kurdish issue. Democracy insufficiency comprises the human right violations and anti democratic implementations. Implementations such as the State of Emergency, Village Guard System and Anti Terror Law which was put into practice within the scope of struggle against terror caused many citizens to get harm. Certain law and directives, which were enacted after the 1980 coup, caused the cultural right demands to be a part of the Kurdish issue. The prevention, connivance of or not producing solutions for demands regarding cultural and democratic rights deepened the issue.

All dimensions of the Kurdish issue which is defined as security problem, socio-economic problems and cultural and democratic rights problems are interlocked with one another. So, the Kurdish issue is multi dimensional problem. These issues cannot be discussed, thought and resolved apart from one another. For one of the above-mentioned dimensions to be considered the sole reason of the Kurdish issue or one of the above-mentioned heading to be solely defined as the Kurdish issue and trying to resolve the issue based on this defining will not provide the resolution of the Kurdish issue. According to Kirişçi and Winrow, the violence faced causes the migration, socio-economic and political situation to worsen and complicates the resolution of the issue[312]. Unemployment and economic problems, on the other hand, is strengthening the PKK and stimulating violence. With the surging of the violence in the region, the economic issues are also enhancing[313]. In other words, all of these issues are interlocked and for the resolution of the issue, all of these subheadings must be handled and must be resolved one by one.

Another subject of which must be understood is the relation between the PKK and the Kurdish issue. As it is a mistake to say 'If the PKK did not exist, then the Kurdish issue would not either' it is also a mistake to say, 'If the Kurdish issue did not exist, then the PKK would not either.' Because the PKK-Kurdish issue relation resembles the chicken-egg relation. The activities of PKK deepen the problems of the Kurdish origin citizens and not resolving the Kurdish issue is strengthening the PKK. The termination of PKK terror does not mean the resolution of the Kurdish issue[314]. Under no circumstances can terror be rendered rightful and it should not be. For operations to be carried out towards the PKK in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions is hurting the region economy; on the other hand, the occurring deaths is instigating the Kurdish nationalism and legalizing the PKK in the eyes of the Kurdish nationalists. Investments that can be made in the region or the ensuring of the regional development would provide the local community to economically build up and prevent the terrorist organization to gain supporters. Another point which must not be neglected is the policies which will be implemented for the resolution of the issue to not to be seen as the triumph of PKK terror.

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[312] Kirişçi, Winrow 142.
[313] Ibid. 146.
[314] Aşkın 3.

Another problem faced in the Turkish politics during the discussion stage of the Kurdish issue is naming case of the problem. The Kurdish issue is defined and named differently by state institutions and political parties. In general, the issue is named in three ways as the Kurdish Issue, the Eastern and Southeastern Problem and the Terror Problem.

The NGOs which define the issue as socio-economic underdevelopment, security and democratic rights problems and name the matter as the Kurdish issue draw attention to the problem faced in the naming and defining the Kurdish issue. The SETA states that there are individuals in the society who do not believe the existence of the Kurdish issue. It states that the individuals who do not believe the existence of the issue, actually deny the naming of the issue and that they prefer to consider the issue as Terror Problem. Moreover, the reason for the issue to be regarded as socio-economic underdevelopment is originating from the state and political institutions considering and naming the issue as socio-economic underdevelopment.

The TESEV expresses that there was a Kurdish issue before the PKK broke out and for that reason that the issue should not be considered as consisting only PKK terror. The state named the issue as the Eastern and Southeastern Problem because of the fact that it regards to economic underdevelopment. On the other hand, the KONDA just like the TESEV emphasizes that there was a Kurdish issue before the PKK emerged. For that reason, it defends that it would be a mistake to regard the issue only consisting PKK terror.

The naming and defining manners of the political parties of the Kurdish issue differs according to their standpoints. The CHP avoids making a general naming regarding the issue. The naming manners of CHP differ in time according to the defining and naming attitudes of the state. The CHP, which named the issue as Eastern and Southeastern Problem in the late 1980s and early 1990s, defined the issue as terror, democratic right demands and socio-economic underdevelopment. The CHP, which continued to name the issue as the Eastern and Southeastern Problem in the late 90s, defined the Kurdish issue as democracy problem. Furthermore, the Kurdish issue means terrorism and democratic right demands and is the source of socio-economic problems. The CHP, which began to name the issue as the Kurdish issue as from 2009, assigned the resolution of the issue to the termination of the PKK.

On the other hand, the MHP approaches to the issue from a security approach. The MHP, which define and name the issue as Terror Problem, regard the Eastern and Southeastern Problem as an economic issue. The BDP, which is a Kurdish nationalist legal political party, name the issue as the Kurdish Issue and regard the state implementations as the basis of the issue. It avoids making any statements concerning the terror dimension of the issue. The terror problem is not addressed either in the party program or at the public meetings of the BDP.

The PKK, which is the radical defender of the Kurdish nationalism, does not make a general naming of the issue. It considers the feudal structure, democratic right demands and imperialism in other words the colonization of the Republic of Turkey of the region as the reason of the issue. The TSK, which struggles against the terrorism dimension of the Kurdish issue, defines and names the problem as security problem by its nature. The standpoint of TSK towards the issue began to change as from the 1990s and it started to address the socio-economic dimension of the subject.

The AKP name the problem as the Kurdish Issue and expresses that the problem originated from terrorism, economic underdevelopment and issues regarding democratic rights. The broadest naming and defining of the Kurdish issue is made by the AKP. In 2009, the AKP played an important role and is continuing to take an important role in the resolution of the issue because of the fact that it pursued a policy to which it gave various titles such as the Kurdish Initiative/Opening, Democratic Initiative/Opening, National Unity and Brotherhood Project. The AKP provided for many law and regulation amendments to be made which affected the Kurdish issue. For instance, the State of Emergency implementation and the obstacles before naming the children after Kurdish names were lifted. Moreover, not just the obstacles before broadcasting in Kurdish were lifted but also TRT 6 which broadcasts in Kurdish was opened. Kurdish language courses were opened in İstanbul and Diyarbakır. Also, the AKP provided the return to the village projects to be initiated.

The initiative which was started by the AKP was paused at the ending of 2009. As from 2012, news regarding the AKP Government trying to determine a new road map towards the initiative was started to published. The new road map / strategy, in other words views of the government regarding the issue are comprised of five items.

These are the camps of the PKK located in the Northern Iraq, so incorporating the Northern Iraq governance as the desire the issue to be resolved through politics; the TSK recognizing the Northern Iraq Government, annulling of the annotation in the Local Administrations Autonomy Condition which was enacted in the Council of Europe by Turkey; education in mother tongue becoming elective course for all ethnic identities and bringing of all PKK leaders to Turkey.[315]

Of course these steps taken are not sufficient for the resolution of the Kurdish issue. The implementations and policies regarding the resolution of the Kurdish issue are made up of the policies of the parties which come into power. For the resolution of the Kurdish issue, the development of a long term state policy is a must. For this to happen, first of all the naming and defining of the Kurdish issue which will be accepted by most of the political parties if not all and opinion leaders and institutions must be provided. Because in a period where political studies are carried out for the resolution of the Kurdish issue, it is a fact that a consonance does not exist on the naming of the issue and this also is an important issue.

After making a general naming and definition regarding the issue, the parties in the Assembly must provide support for the initiative which the AKP started. Etyen Mahçupyan summarized the attitude of the political parties in the Assembly towards the Kurdish issue in the initiative which was started in 2009 in the following statement;

> […] while the CHP and the MHP which are acting as the owners of the regime set forth certain redlines which imply 'what should not happen', the BDP which want regime to change emphasized other redlines which indicate 'what should happen'.[316]

So, while the CHP and the MHP were opposed to developing policy towards the resolution of the Kurdish issue, they regarded the reforms which were planned to be put into practice as incompatible to the regime. On the other hand, the BDP adopted an attitude which is irreconcilable in the process by describing what should be done as sine qua non.

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[315] "Çok Tartışılacak 5 Öneri", *Milliyet Gazetesi*, 27 02 2012 , 25 April 2012 <http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/cok-tartisilacak-5-oneri/siyaset/siyasetdetay/27.02.2012/1508429/default.htm>.

[316] Etyen Mahçupyan"Kürt Meselesinde Türk Açılımı", Zaman Gazetesi, 20 03 2012 , 25 March 2012 <http://www.zaman.com.tr/yazar.do;jsessionid=7DE77F12329F8AF10A5F8A91B26DC988?yazino=1265507>.

Consequently, big responsibility falls into the hands of the NGOs, state institutions, opinion leaders and political parties which guide the society in the naming and defining of the Kurdish issue. If these individuals and institutions could make a common naming and defining, for the resolution of the issue that will provide unity and solidarity in the society. The citizens will support political and economical policies if the institutions, NGOs, opinion leaders and legal political parties consent on the naming and defining of the Kurdish issue. If the social consensus about the name and definition of the Kurdish issue will be achieved; the policies; such as building schools, in order to increase the education level, and procuring economic conditions in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions will easily adopted. It is easier to deal with and to solve an issue which is acknowledged by most every segment of society; rather than undefined, untitled and much debated issue.

An opposite attitude will delay the resolution of the issue and cause for the issue to become inextricable. If the NGOs, state institutions, opinion leaders and political parties do not find a common naming and a common definition for the issue, the problems that the issue involves will deepen and will be much more complicated. Briefly, the naming and defining of the Kurdish issue is essential for the resolution of the Kurdish issue which one of the most essential domestic issues of the Republic of Turkey.

The resolution of the Kurdish issue is not just essential for the domestic policy of Turkey. The resolution of the issue will provide strengthen the image of Turkey on the international platform. As the Turkey is an important actor in the international arena because of both its geopolitical location and developing economy, Turkey has to adopt fundamental principles of the EU such as the rule of law, the procuring of democracy, the procuring of the stability of institutions, the protection of minorities and the respect for human rights. The resolution of the Kurdish issue does not only mean the resolution of one of the important issues of Turkey but also the reforms which will be put into practice in the field of democracy for the resolution of the issue would contribute to the EU membership process of Turkey. According to Doğu Ergil, the Kurds demand the recognition of their cultural rights. The fulfillment of

this demand would not only provide the resolution of the Kurdish issue in a peaceful manner but also would pave the way for the EU membership of Turkey.[317]

A Turkey which provides civil peace and social integrity would not only pave the way for its membership to the EU but also assist in the strengthening its relations with Middle East countries where the Kurdish population is dense. The interference of the USA to the Iraq and afterwards the formation of the Kurdistan Regional Governance in the determined area on the Northern part of Iraq by the Iraq Constitution caused for the fact, 'The Northern Iraq to be an example or attraction center for the Kurds residing in Turkey' to emerge. The resolution of the Kurdish issue would not only assist Turkey in promote relations of Turkey with the Iraq and the USA but also promote Turkey's economic and political relations with the Kurdistan Regional Governance where natural gas and oil reserves are located.

The reforms which were initiated with the purpose of fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria within the EU membership process provided the issue to be discussed. The Kurdish issue, which has been neglected since the establishment of the Republic, was legitimized with the initiation of Kurdish Initiative by the AKP. Reforms such as the annulling of the State of Emergency, the initiation of returning to village implementations, the lifting of obstacles before the use of Kurdish in radios and televisions ensured the tension existed in the Kurdish issue to be defused. Today the PKK is mentioning autonomy within the borders of the Republic of Turkey rather than independence and Abdullah Öcalan and Murat Karayılan are speaking of the guns to be silenced. Due to these reasons, we are in the most convenient period of time within the history of Republic for the discussion of the Kurdish issue.

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[317] Ergil 122-123.

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