

T.C.

**ISTANBUL KULTUR UNIVERSITY
SOCIAL SCIENCES INSTITUTE**

ARAB SPRING

And

**ANALYSIS OF ARAB SPRING IN TURKEY
OVER GEZI PARK EVENTS**

**MASTER THESIS
KADIR KACAKER**

1010092001

Department: International Relations

Programme: International Relations

Thesis Advisor: Ass. Prof. Dr. NAZLI CAGIN BILGILI

Istanbul, 2017

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ABSTRACT

I discussed the content of social movements according to these protests, in the first chapter of my thesis in which I searched the answer of ‘Is Gezi Park actions Turkey’s Arab Spring?’

In second chapter of my thesis, I disputed the implied the events as “Arab Spring” but I personally name as Arab Awakening. I tried to explain the reasons of why these so called ‘Jasmin, Facebook Revolution’ etc. actions were not defined as a revolution and they should be called as ‘Arab Awakening’ actions. In the following chapter after this ‘What is Arab Spring?’ chapter, I defined the factors preparing Arab Awakening actions. Afterwards depending upon this subject, I explained the events experienced in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen in which the management changes were achieved as the result of these mentioned actions.

In the first part of third chapter, I conveyed the events developed in Turkey on the last days of May 2013 under the title of ‘What are Gezi Park actions?’ I not only tried to convey the events day by day but also specified the comments made on the contents of Gezi Park actions. In the subtitles of this chapter, I struggled to compare the Arab Awakening actions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen and Gezi Park protests in terms of their goals to look for an answer to the question of my thesis. Accordingly, depending on this subject I evaluated these demonstrations in terms of their reasons, the demands of the protestors, the masses participated, methods and effects.

In the conclusion part, I stated the explanations subjected to the decision of ‘Gezi Park actions are not Turkey’s Arab Spring’ by means of information. I reached analyzing the subjects related to Arab Awakening actions and Gezi Park actions.

INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of 2000s, in which the mass media improved depending upon rapid improvement of social network especially by means of technological developments, lots of international and regional incidents have been experienced in our World. Along with the September 11 Attacks still effecting most parts of the earth, some other cases effecting mostly the area on which it takes place have been occurred. The events today called as 'Arap Spring' is just one of them. The protest and rebellions, which provoked upon suicide of 26 age of university graduate Muhammed Buazizi, living in Sidi Buzid in Tunisia, by burning himself after the state police had captured the goods he had been scolding, created a domino effect. The rebellions expanded rapidly onto Arabian Peninsula and specially onto the countries like Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and North Africa called as MENA district. These incidents were highly important, as the mass taking place in these incidents in third World was for the first time so crowded and they reflected their demands on human rights, justice, freedom in a way not could be underestimated. The cases experienced afterwards have ended up in some countries by management change as aimed, but in some other countries they have been suppressed by a bottom feeder way like staffing the protesters in the state or by violence.

During this period, in which the Arab Spring was still going the effect on, the demand of the Turkish government to annihilate Gezi Park, last green-field remaining around, and to build instead of it a Shopping Center along with Artillery Barracks architecture, got protestable reaction of the public on 27 May 2013. With the protests claimed to be primarily against the Justice and Development Party (AKP), governing the state within this period, and named as 'Gezi Park Resistance', it is stated that the demands like individual freedom were voiced by the part especially protesting. As part of this reasoning, some opinions about democratic level of the protest were expressed and some comparisons were made about similarities and differences between Gezi Park Resistance and Arab Spring experienced a little while back.

In the light of the comparisons mentioned, the question ‘Is the Gezi Park Resistance a Turkish Arap Spring?’ will be tried to be answered with this thesis. In order to get the answer in an objective and reliable way, academic resources and books like Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs will be benefited. Because of the fact that the Arab Spring was experienced on a wide geographical area including lots of countries, this thesis will be restricted by countries like Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen in which the management change was achieved that I suppose as main target of the protests. With the intent of comparing the Gezi Park Resistance and Arab Spring, the protestors of these incidents, their demands and the reasons, the effects of protests and also their protesting ways will be studied. Depending upon the data’s derived, this work will be concluded by the evaluation of the question ‘Is the Gezi Park Resistance a Turkish Arap Spring?’ in conclusion part.

1. WHAT ARE THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS?

One of the cases showing that the individuals constituting the society express their demands from the administrations is "social movements". It is stated that the social movements, which are defined as the collective movement of people who come together for a common purpose, appeared to be disturbed by the administrative activities of the various groups to which they belonged. In this case, it is stated that communities are expressed in the context of democratic rights by means of their wishes and requests, and there are people who claim that a repressive environment is necessary for this concept to be revealed. Social movements are explained in Zimbabwe's Harare Daily, on 5th December, 2002 as it is always the task of civil society when operating under an oppressive political environment. . . . A starting point would be to be able to define a social movement. As the name suggests, social movements are inclusive organizations comprised of various interest groups. Social movements will contain the significant strata of society such as workers, women's groups, students, youth and the intellectual component. These various interest sectors of society will be bound together by one common grievance which in most cases will be the commonly perceived lack of democracy in a specific political setting".¹

In addition to this description of the social movement as social groups that come together in line with interests and manifest democracy deficits, Charles Tilly point outs the social movement as "It treats social movements as a distinctive form of contentious politics-contentious in the sense that social movements involve collective making of claims that, if realized, would conflict with someone else's interests, politics in the sense that governments of one sort or another figure somehow in the claim making, whether as

¹ Charles Tilly, "Social Movements, 1768-2004", p. 1, <https://tr.scribd.com/document/152392195/Charles-Tilly-Social-Movements-1768-2004-Bookos-org-pdf>, (A.D. 02.04.2017)

claimants, objects of claims, allies of the objects, or monitors of the contention”² With definition, Tilly sets out a distinctive feature of social movements in conveying the requests of the social groups to governments.

The social movements, which were not seen until the industrial revolution in the world, began to form in the 18th century a privileged way of following public policies in Western countries. Until the mid-nineteenth century, the case was changed slowly and gradually into a permanent element in Western Europe and North America. Thus, this structure, which is defined as a social movement spreading to the western world, includes three elements at the mentioned period:

- 1) Collective demand campaigns on target authorities
- 2) Claimed performance sequence including special purposes such as associations, public meetings, media expressions and demonstrations
- 3) To represent the value of the people, the unity, the numbers and the commitment.³

From the 19th century onwards, the characteristics of social movements include codes formed from a particular political history of a regime. Identity politics has gained importance as the definition of "We" takes priority in this concept. Thus, a combined force demand which will be calculated with claimants is explained. In the actual or suggested situation, the support or opposition issues mentioned for the natural or legal persons have been emphasized and political actors have been interested in deportation or exclusion of immigrants, regime loyal supporters.⁴

² Tilly, **ibid**, p. 3,
<https://tr.scribd.com/document/152392195/Charles-Tilly-Social-Movements-1768-2004-Bookos-org-pdf>,
(A.D. 02.04.2017)

³ Tilly, **ibid**, p. 7,
<https://tr.scribd.com/document/152392195/Charles-Tilly-Social-Movements-1768-2004-Bookos-org-pdf>,
(A.D. 02.04.2017)

⁴ Tilly, **ibid**, p. 12,
<https://tr.scribd.com/document/152392195/Charles-Tilly-Social-Movements-1768-2004-Bookos-org-pdf>,
(A.D. 02.04.2017)

Social movements are largely dependent on political entrepreneurs because of their scale, resistance and effectiveness, when compared to multi-directional policies. The ways of showing reactions which are common throughout the world before the social movements have become in the form of retaliation, rebellion and resistance at the local level. However, in the 20th and 21st centuries, professional political organizers, commissioners and partially autonomous non-governmental organizations in social movements have become important factors in the advancement of social movements. When these factors are included in the related periods, social movement campaigns have been seen by opponents of radical and reformist movements in response to the means of communication such as television, radio, etc., which are among the more important tendencies in the twentieth century. Besides, during the century, impressive changes have taken place in the relations between the social movement-activists and the authorities. At the end of the 20th century, participants of social movements that were local, regional and national organizing still continued to see the police and local authorities as enemies, and said that violence and oppression were repeated. However, when compared to the early times of the century, the legal environment has changed significantly. Where social movements take place on a regular basis, the groups organizing the shows were able to receive permissions for meetings and demonstrations. In addition, state officials were able to track suspicious organizations through tax assessments. At the beginning of the 20th century, when compared to imprisoning the movement activists in order to fight against the demonstrators of the ruling by claiming them to disrupt the public order and wholesale ban of dissident organizations, the mentioned legislative regulations are the developments seen in social movements.⁵

Significant changes in social movements are expressed in the beginning of the 21st century. With the beginning of the century, according to Charles Tilly, people around the world saw the term "social movement" as an opposition to authoritarian rule. At this time, with the development of the communication tools and globalization, individuals could

⁵ Tilly, **ibid**, p. 81, 82,
<https://tr.scribd.com/document/152392195/Charles-Tilly-Social-Movements-1768-2004-Bookos-org-pdf>,
(A.D. 02.04.2017)

communicate more with each other. Thus, the development of communication among communities contributes to the redefinition of the definition of social movement. It has gained international visibility, such as international non-governmental organizations, international organizations, capital-owned multinational corporations and international financial institutions, which allow individual participation.⁶ This has caused activists and analysts to assess regional and national events for global mobilization around global justice and global civil society over the last decade.⁷ Compared to the twentieth century, more recent international attention and intervention can be seen in social movements than in the twentieth-century counterparts such as the anti-Estrada campaign in the Philippines, led by the country in 1998 and carried out protests in 2001 to allow the people of the country to leave for administration.⁸

When we examine the Arab Spring protests and the Gezi Park protests, these protests are similar to the social movements seen in the 21st century. Depending on the impact of globalization and technological developments, the Arab Spring first started in Morocco in December 2010 and then continued in many MENA regions such as Egypt, Libya and Yemen. In addition, although the Gezi Park protests are regional in nature, because of the characteristics of the #occupy slogan, it has become an action on the international scene which has similar effect such as the previous #Occupy Wall Street etc. demonstration. During these actions, social media networks such as Facebook and Twitter have been used by demonstrators to communicate chat rooms, tweets of instant developments, etc. As a result, the protests of the Arab Spring protests and the Gezi Park protests will be taken into account in the later sections of the thesis, taking into account this determination.

⁶ Tilly, **ibid**, p. 3,
<https://tr.scribd.com/document/152392195/Charles-Tilly-Social-Movements-1768-2004-Bookos-org-pdf>,
(A.D. 02.04.2017)

⁷ Tilly, **ibid**, p. 116,
<https://tr.scribd.com/document/152392195/Charles-Tilly-Social-Movements-1768-2004-Bookos-org-pdf>,
(A.D. 02.04.2017)

⁸ Tilly, **ibid**, p. 98,
<https://tr.scribd.com/document/152392195/Charles-Tilly-Social-Movements-1768-2004-Bookos-org-pdf>,
(A.D. 02.04.2017)

2. WHAT IS THE ARAB SPRING?

Mass reaction concept, which goes back to primitive ages, has caused huge changes on the lives of communities and taken an important place in social life. This outpouring structure caused many changes and developments in a long process from primitive ages to today. It featured the political system called mainly as ‘democracy’ in state systems formed by human beings. With this regime the communities voice their ideas and demands by means of democratic actions like ‘protests, voting, syndication’ us.

World politics has witnessed very important civil commotions and street protest for the last decade. Occupy Wall Street Action in the USA by which the citizens uttered their demands and complaints was just one of them. Occupy Central Action in Hong Kong by which Hong Kong citizen demanded democratic elections meeting the international standards and politic reform from China having their decentralization was the other important reaction. But, the rebellions in Arab World during which 29.000 people died⁹ according to Amnesty International report dated 2012 and 4 regimes shifted are undoubtedly the most remarkable ones among all of them. The protests and rebellions, which provoked upon suicide of 26 age of university graduate Muhammed Buazizi, living in Sidi Buzid in Tunisia, by burning himself on the date of 17 December 2010 after the state police had captured the goods he had been scolding, changed the lives of people living in this region. These actions by which the folks of North Africa and Middle East voiced their demand to ‘a more democratic and humanly life’ caused some changes and innovations particularly in regimes, management and director changes. The reasons of these actions will be explained in next chapters in details.

⁹ Amnety International Annual Report, “**The Situation of Human Rights on the World**”, p. 11-18, http://files.amnesty.org/air12/air_2012_full_tu.pdf, (A.D. 28.11.2016)

The social movement beginning in Tunisia where Tunisian young Mohammed Buazizi committed suicide by burning himself, was called as ‘Jasmin Revolution’ at the beginning. Tunisian bloggers had a great effect in giving this name. Bloggers defended the opinion of that the policemen should protect the protestors, instead of using violence, reacting against the cases causing the suicide of Mohammed Buazizi and they introduced the slogan ‘Give Jasmin to Police in return’. This statement voiced in social events pervaded through social networking sites and ‘Jasmine Flowers’ were referred as the symbol of uprising countries. In this way ‘Jasmine Revolution’ occurred.¹⁰

As the rebellions splashed over Egypt and Libya, the idiom ‘Domino Effect’ came to the light meaning that the events were progressing by enlarging its effect. In the progressive aspect, Jasmine Revolution extended its limits and as the idiom ‘Jasmine Revolution’ was inadequate, the name of ‘Arab Spring’ began to be enounced.¹¹ The first one who called the civil commotions beginning in December 2010 and still continuing the effects was Marc Lynch, one of writers of Foreign Policy Magazine. Lynch wrote up a text on 6 January 2011 and titled it as ‘Obama’s Arab Spring?’. In his text, Lynch referred to the events which began with murder of Refik Hariri on 14 February 2005 in Beirut and resulted with resigning of President Ömer Abdulhamit Karami known for being admirer of Syria. Marc Lynch associated the cases began in Tunisia with civil commotions named as ‘Cedar Spring’ and defined the incidents as a new ‘Arab Spring’.¹² While defining the events emerged in MENA district and Middle East Countries, ‘Prag Spring’ expression had also an influence. ‘Prag Spring’ was the name given to the actions¹³ which were started in Czechoslovakia on the date of February 1968 by Communist Party General Secretary Alexander Dubcek in an attempt to gain more free and more democratic social

¹⁰ “**Arab Spring and Its Reasons**”,

<http://www.tuicakademi.org/arab-spring-and-its-reasons/>, (A.D. 28.11.2016)

¹¹ **ibid**,

<http://www.tuicakademi.org/arab-spring-and-its-reasons/>_(A.D. 28.11.2016)

¹² **ibid**,

<http://www.tuicakademi.org/arab-spring-and-its-reasons/>_(A.D. 28.11.2016)

¹³ Rami G. Khour, **Drop the Orientalist term ‘Arab Spring’**, 19 August 2011,

<https://english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/08/19/162970.html>, (A.D. 28.11.2016)

order. This expression shared some similarities with ‘Arab Spring’ in respect of more freedom and more democracy. Some strategists assimilated Arab Spring with fragmentation experienced with democracy cycle in East Europe country Yugoslavia in the late 1989 which occurred towards the end of Cold War period between Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States of America. Thomas L. Friedman mentioned that all Arab countries apart from Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco where the protests occurred at that time, had a similarity with heterogeneous featured Yugoslavia. Because of this reason, he remarked that Arab Countries had the factors causing the split of Yugoslavia with their multi-ethnic, multi-faith and multi-sectarian structure and they were about to face with civil war threatening.¹⁴

While entitling Arab Spring, the social media played also a great role inspiring the protests. According to Philip N. Howard and Malcom R. Marks, the incidents experienced in this process should be named as ‘Facebook Revolution’ or ‘Twitter Revolution’¹⁵. However, it would be an exaggerated reaction or claim to say that the main reason of incidents was ‘social media’. When we examine the role of social media on these cases, we all agree that social media had a mission of bringing the protestors together, arrangement and organization. In ancient times, organization methods of actions were to go out to Street after seeing the other people on the Street with the flags in their hands, to be organized by gathering secretly in houses or whispering quietly when they saw each other anywhere while getting prepared for an action. But today these methods gave their place to chat rooms or forums in social media, the most contemporary mass communication means. That way everybody talked freely and frankly and the managers of governments witnessed openly the communication and organizations. To sum up it can be said that social media helped Arab Spring as one of the most important ways of organization¹⁶. Another name given to ‘Arab Spring’ was the statement of ‘Wikileaks

¹⁴ Thomas L. Friedman, “**Pray. Hope. Prepare**”, April 12, 2011,

<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/13/opinion/13friedman.html>, (A.D. 28.11.2016)

¹⁵ Howard P.N., Parks M.R. (2012). **Social media and Political Change: Capacity, Constraint And Consequence. Journal of Communication**, p. 360,

<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01626.x/full>, (A.D. 28.11.2016)

¹⁶ Danah M. Body, Nicole B. Ellison, “**Social Network Sites: Definition, History and Scholarship**”, *Journal of Computer Mediated Communication*. Vol: 13 210-230 (2008)(e- book),

Revolution'. According to that, that the mistakes of managers in Arab countries especially in Tunisia were unfolded starkly and that the folk and the whole World saw the lord with Wikileaks documentaries, awakened the citizens. The Wikileaks Documentaries were published in November 2010 and Buazizi burned himself in December 2010 and right after the protests began on streets in Tunisia. That the mentioned claim date and the protests occurred at the same time and followed each other make us think about this possibility. However it would be a great conspiracy to claim that solely the Wikileaks Documentary started the Arab Spring up¹⁷.

It would be good to examine why the actions named as Arab Spring weren't defined as a 'revolution' like French Revolution, October (Russian) Revolution, Iranian Islamic Revolution, Colour Revolution, Velvet Revolution. Revolution differs from taking control of management by armed forces in that it is a political changing period where mass social elements demolish existing political regime using violence and achieve to form a new government. It gets its legality from folk and majority. It can be different reasons of why the reactions experienced in North Africa and Middle East don't have the characteristics of a 'revolution'¹⁸. First of all; that the process hasn't been completed yet can be a reason. Even though it has been worked on new constitution drafts and parliament formations or new selections have been hold in care of the ones holding the management temporarily in hand, nothing has come to an end or nothing has returned properly to normal. In Egypt, military forces have still been holding the power against government. Thus, the process has not been completed yet as mentioned above. Why it is insisted on the Word of 'spring' is that the Word evokes a great White hope and also it has a positive meaning. By the way it can also be aimed to keep the resistance alive. One of the people standing against this 'spring' statement is Robert Fisk. Fisk opposes strongly against the

<https://tr.scribd.com/document/291260139/BOYD-ELLISON-Social-Network-Sites-Definition-History-And-Scholarship>, (A.D. 28.11.2016)

¹⁷ **ibid**,

<http://www.tuicakademi.org/arab-spring-and-its-reasons/>, (A.D. 28.11.2016)

¹⁸ **ibid**,

<http://www.tuicakademi.org/arab-spring-and-its-reasons/>, (A.D. 28.11.2016)

name of ‘Arab Spring’ and defines this process as ‘Arab Awakening’¹⁹. As it is asked the reason of this opinion, Robert Fisk stated that the revolutions wouldn’t start up with dramatic incidents and added that self-immolation of a Tunisian young or destruction of a Coptic church could be evaluated as tragic cases. (These are not idle words. Revolutions don't start with dramatic incidents – the self-immolation of an unemployed Tunisian, the destruction of a Coptic church – however dramatic these tragedies may be.)²⁰

While doing these evaluations on base of entitling the incidents occurring in North Africa and Middle East, we can categorize these countries under six different titles. First of them is the countries who experienced management changes, lived and still living the social reactions deeply and intensively. We can rate Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen in this category. The feature of these countries is that they have actually entered into electoralism process after getting rid of a long lasting dictatorial regime. In the second group we see Syria where an international based war has still been continuing. In the third group, there are countries like Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia where rebellion actions were repressed at the very beginning. In the fourth group, we see countries like Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine where antiauthoritarianism couldn’t go beyond of protests. Along with these countries, Qatar and Algeria, who didn’t experience any protests or reactions in this process, build the fifth group. In the last group, there are monarchy regimes like Morocco and Jordan who struggled to configure the structure of state into new reforms, foreseeing the danger coming up, before any serious rebellions.

To sum up, the incidents beginning with self-immolation of 26 aged university graduated Mohammed Buazizi on the date of 17 December 2010, in Sidi Buzid in Tunisia, went forward on the contrary of expectations at the beginning in terms of its extent and turned into massive reaction influencing lots of countries. With these incidents bearing some similarities with the social events experienced before, the folks being troubled with the management policy of their governments carried out some actions to voice their

¹⁹ *ibid*, <http://www.tuicakademi.org/arab-spring-and-its-reasons/>, (A.D. 28.11.2016)

²⁰ Robert Fisk, “**The Arab Awakening Began Not in Tunisia This Year, But in Lebanon in 2005**”, <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-the-arab-awakening-began-not-in-tunisia-this-year-but-in-lebanon-in-2005-2268002.html>, 15 April 2011, (A.D. 28.11.2016)

demands for a freer, more democratic and humanly living standards. Besides it, I can state the realness of the Statement ‘Arab Awakening’ made by Robert Fink instead of calling it ‘Arab Spring’. Generally, a new system referred by Arab Spring in which the folk gets rid of negative effects of history and the folk has the real voice in management has not been achieved in Middle East and North Africa region yet and the process is still going on. However, when we look at the effects of these actions on local people who were weak about mass reaction before these incidents, I am of the opinion that these actions can be explained as a way to find an encouragement in themselves to change their lives and as a wish to reveal their will to correct the mistakes. Because of this reason, I think it would be better to mention about the actions called Arab Spring as Arab Awakening in the further chapters.

2.1. THE FACTORS PREPARING OF ARAB AWAKENING

In the MENA district (Middle East North Africa) where democracy and democratic structuring is less advanced in contrast to rest of the World, the action we call as Arab Spring didn’t show up actually as a result of incidents occurred in short term. The policies and enforcements performed by the governments ruling on these regions, the demand of a freer and democratic life as a result of globalizing World by the local people are just some of these important reasons. Eventually, to examine the reasons of Arab Awakening will help us to better understanding of the aim and characteristics of this fact.

While analyzing this process, it will be useful to study the situation of Middle East before Arab Awakening and inform about the Dynamics of this spring.

1. Political reasons: that the characteristic of forces ruling on the region is repressive, authoritative and that they provide their legality from other factors rather than folk (Turkey, Israel and Iran are left aside of this generalization)

2. International reasons: that the power members are in cooperation with USA and Western countries for their own benefits

3. Cultural reasons: the changes experienced in economic, social, technologic and cultural life along with globalization in the World

4. Economic reasons: unfair distribution of income among communities living these relevant countries²¹

5. Reasons related to external Powers: self-seeker attitude and approaches of Israel and USA causing local reactions.

Now, in order to understand the situation better, we will examine these factors successively:

1. The managements in North Africa and Middle East get their power from reign or military coups being a repressive and despotic regime instead of getting it from citizens which is the base of a democratic regime. In consequence of colonialness lasting for long years, the family, clan and sectarian bonds had a great role in historical process. Along with this, managements grounded their legacy with religion on these districts. As a result of facts like domineering usage of religion fact giving repressive regimes a chance to live and breaking the resistance of change, sectarian bonds, military coups²², the governments of these countries didn't care about political life of folks and they put the idea of 'Teba' forward. Even in countries like Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, the government had an attitude of antidemocratic approaches like hindering the folk from political life, restrictions in freedom of press²³. Because of that reason, in countries where repressive regime gets together with natural wealth like MENA countries, it is possible to refer an important matter: that the ideas of folk don't find a place in government's structure²⁴.

²¹ Saadettin Paksoy, H. Mustafa Paksoy, Erdal Alancioğlu, “**Socio-Politic Effects of Globalisation: Arab Spring**”, *Electronical Social Science Magazine*, 2013, Volume:12 Number: 46, p. 178, <http://dergipark.ulakbim.gov.tr/esosder/article/view/5000068615>, (A.D. 28.11.2016)

²² Paksoy, Paksoy, Alancioğlu, *ibid*, p. 178, <http://dergipark.ulakbim.gov.tr/esosder/article/view/5000068615>, (A.D. 28.11.2016)

²³ Zafer Akbaş, “**Period of Change in Middle East and Turkish Foreign Policy**”, *Academical Attitudes Magazine*, 2012, Volume:13, Number:1, p. 5, https://www.academia.edu/2071943/Ortado%C4%9Fuda_De%C4%9Fi%C5%9Fim_S%C3%BCreci_ve_T%C3%BCrk_D%C4%B1%C5%9F_Politikas%C4%B1, (A.D. 28.11.2016)

²⁴ Duygu Dersan Orhan, “**The Crisis in Middle East: Arab Spring and the Future of Democracy**”, *Atılım Social Science Magazine*, 2013, Volume 3 (1-2), p. 20, [http://asbd.atilim.edu.tr/shares/sbedergi/files/%232_dersan_orhan\(1\).pdf](http://asbd.atilim.edu.tr/shares/sbedergi/files/%232_dersan_orhan(1).pdf), (A.D. 28.11.2016)

2. The governments of these mentioned regions were in cooperation with global Powers like USA and Western countries just for their own benefits. As an example, countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia who acted in conformity with USA policies for their benefits on region were announced as allies of this country. In return, Western countries and especially USA announced with foreign aid report of Foreign Ministry in 2011 that they would generously provide Saudi Arabia 60 billion dollars for their military spending for the next 15 years²⁵. Moreover, the mentioned despotic governments acted against their citizens in an antidemocratic way and they got support on this matter from Western countries. This by USA and Western countries supported policy caused uneasiness in due course on the citizens of region and eventually reliability of governments began to be queried by the folk and this caused mass reactions and protests.

3. Another characteristic of this district is the change of Arab community along with globalization. The region people had a chance to state freely their ideas, demands and discomforts etc. By means of mass media in the globalizing World. So the structures used as legacy source by Arab governments who couldn't keep in pace with changes began to be eroded. The ruling elites of Arab states tried to provide these democratic channels for their own and families' sake instead of detecting these erosions and finding a solution way. As a result of this, political and economic factors made a way to a social boom.

4. Considering both existing economic situation and expressions used in protests, poverty and narrow circumstances of folk in the region, economic and politic favoritism in politic structures and illegality can be regarded as the most important matters among the reasons of Arab Awakening. In the countries like Algeria, Lebanon, Iran, Yemen and Palestine where unemployment rates reached to a percentage of 30-35, economic sources are presented to a small group of minority composed of government partisans who are generally the families of government members²⁶. Besides it, the employees get ill-

²⁵ Blanchard: Acting Section Research Manager, “**Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations**”, Congressional Research Service, 2011 March 10, Washington, p. 9, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/159350.pdf>, (A.D. 28.11.2016)

²⁶ Sait Yılmaz, “**To Bring Democracy to Middle East**”, International Economics and Administrative Examination Magazine, 2010, p. 66, https://www.academia.edu/7647534/Ortado%C4%9Fuya_Demokrasi_Getirmek, (A.D. 28.11.2016)

payment, educated young people have difficulty in finding a job, problems like inflation and income inequality are experienced and leaders, their partisans and bureaucracy members get their power from bribery. These reasons triggered social reactions and along with unemployment, displeasure, social anger against regimes of especially young population who formed social base of Arab Awakening increased the reaction. Apart from this fact, that the Arab countries were still continuing to invest on a platform based on agriculture instead of giving sufficient importance to industrialization even though they possessed rich petrol sources increased the reactions against economy²⁷.

5. We can indicate the influence of external Powers as another factor of Arab Awakening. The reason why in Middle East, today suffering from a pain for democracy, democratic order couldn't have been achieved is autocratic and charismatic leadership structure on the region. The reason for this settlement is actually Israel fact who has always been a thread for the region and had an expansionist policy aimed on countries. The Arab countries who lost all wars up to Pollaow against Israel couldn't believe in the necessity of a powerful military and powerful politic leadership against this thread. Besides when we look at the reasons of international system, we see that this is valid case not only for Arab countries but also for all Islamic World. That the relevant countries like USA and Western countries stayed silent for Palestine problem and genocide in Bosnia caused that the distrust in these countries were used in for the benefit of autocratic leadership structures²⁸. While Middle East was suffering from these problems about backwardness of democracy, Western countries didn't force these authoritative leaders for a democratic governing as long as they behaved for their own benefits.²⁹ As a consequence of these cases, the democratic improvement of Arab World was prevented and eventually the response rate arose.

²⁷ Afag Cabbarova Elhan, "The Effect of Social Media on Arab Spring", Azerbaijan State Economy University, Master's Thesis, 2015, Bakü, p. 47, <http://unec.edu.az/application/uploads/2015/05/Afag-Cabbarova.pdf>, (A.D. 28.11.2016)

²⁸ Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Strategical Depth", Küre Publishing, İstanbul, 2001, s. 383-384.

²⁹ Akbaş, *ibid*, p. 5, https://www.academia.edu/2071943/Ortado%C4%9Fuda_De%C4%9Fi%C5%9Fim_S%C3%BCreci_ve_T%C3%BCrk_D%C4%B1%C5%9F_Politikas%C4%B1, (A.D. 28.11.2016)

We have to add among the reasons of Arab Awakening underdeveloped judicial system and legislative system depriving of find a solution to problems.³⁰

Even though the precipitating reason of Arab Awakening seems the suicide of Tunisian Muhammed Buazizi, actually deeper and radical matters come into question. The matters in MENA (North Africa and Middle East) district we mentioned above had a retardant effect on democracy. It is apparent that structural problems made a way to the Arab Awakening not giving primacy to personal rights and freedoms. As we mentioned above, we should look for the reasons of these reactions on the base of economic, historical, social, political, judicial and psychological facts. Undoubtedly, there exist also internal and external factors of these actions.

Docent Doctor Suat Kolukırık, lecturer in department of sociology in Süleyman Demirel University, states the following as one of the reasons of Arab Awakening:

“Communities don’t experience change and conversion actions unless the system worsens. When we look the historical process; we see that the derogation of economic or social systems cause new structuring. If we speak West-based, we observe that collapse of feudal system and occurrence of industrial revolution and along with them, the differentiation of the relations between new production and consumption opened a way to new social structuring. Democracy is just one of them. Accordingly, it is a necessity to understand today’s Arab Spring (Awakening) and fictionalize them as changes according to globalizing system in globalized World structure”.³¹

At this point, it would be better to pay attention to Pollack: According to Pollack, that the Arab economies fall back of Western economies, that the Arab education system doesn’t have a modernized structure, that the Arab schools and universities haven’t

³⁰ Akbaş, *ibid*, p. 5,

https://www.academia.edu/2071943/Ortado%C4%9Fuda_De%C4%9Fi%C5%9Fim_S%C3%BCreci_ve_T%C3%BCrk_D%C4%B1%C5%9F_Politikas%C4%B1, (A.D. 28.11.2016)

³¹ “**Turkey Is Tried To Be Blocked By Arab Spring**”,

<http://akademikperspektif.com/2012/11/11/arap-bahari-ile-turkiyenin-onu-kesilmeye-calisiyor/>, (A.D. 28.11.2016)

prepared their students for a modern information age and economy, common poverty and illegality can be regarded as reasons of Arab Awakening.³²

According to Juan J. Litz, the theories of democratization confirm the theses of the underdeveloped and weak democracies that authoritarian governments, the political system which they cannot correctly analyze the formality of a leader or a small group, but efficiently use at a satisfactory level.³³ The democratization arguments verify that authoritative managements make a way to an underdeveloped and weak democratic countries. According to these assumptions arguing that living circumstances are the most important factors defining democracy tendency, a pressure about democratization needs to be expected in Arab countries who got an unignorably economic improvement between 1960 and 1980. However, as seen on the graphic below, it is clear that the Arab countries are less democratic and more repressive in contrast with other World countries and as a result of this the governments of MENA district don't take a serious step about democratization³⁴.

On the table below, -10 on the left side means 'over-dominant' and 10 means 'developed democracy'. The average of Arab countries in the period of 1960-2003 at the bottom is calculated as -5,3.³⁵

Democracy comparison of Arab countries in contrast with OECD members, Far East, Latin America countries and Sub-Saharan Africa countries.

³² Akbaş, *ibid*, p. 5,


https://www.academia.edu/2071943/Ortado%C4%9Fuda_De%C4%9Fi%C5%9Fim_S%C3%BCreci_ve_T%C3%BCrk_D%C4%B1%C5%9F_Politikas%C4%B1, (A.D. 28.11.2016)

³³ Ergun Özbudun, "**Authoritarian Regimes, Elective Democracies ve Turkey**", Istanbul Bilgi University Publications, Istanbul, October 2016, p. 4.

³⁴ Alp Koçak Konur, "**Tunisia From 'Jasmine Revolution' to 'Arab Spring'**", Legislative Magazine, Nr: 22, 2012, p. 35,
[http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_dergisi/2012/sayi22/22-61.pdf_\(A.D.28.11.2016\)](http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_dergisi/2012/sayi22/22-61.pdf_(A.D.28.11.2016))

³⁵ Konur, *ibid*, p. 35,

[http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_dergisi/2012/sayi22/22-61.pdf_\(A.D.28.11.2016\)](http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_dergisi/2012/sayi22/22-61.pdf_(A.D.28.11.2016))



“This graphic shows that Arab countries have always been ruled by repressive governments in whole period of 1960-2003 in contrast with OECD members, Far East, Latin America countries, Sub-Saharan Africa countries and also the rest of these ones and they have never achieved to live in a more democratic political environment than the other groups in any period.”³⁶

Because of the actions performed by these structures using democratic foundations and factor fractionally to stall the community, the affectedness in Arab World is formed by geographical borders, ethnic factors. Besides fracture politic structures not depending on folk and history, social disunity and as a result of them, economic vulnerability are the other factors causing affectedness. ‘Self-enclosed’ governing and living style, which is an important reason of fracture structure, have prevented sufficient reaction to international developments and interaction of community about improvements. As a consequence of this, changes occurring at an international level in time haven’t been sensed or adequately sensed by these nations. Internationally changes occurred at the end of Cold War couldn’t make an effect in Middle East. The improvements coming up with globalization haven’t been able to make a presence in Middle East until quite recently³⁷. Communities have

³⁶ Konur, *ibid*, p. 36,

http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_dergisi/2012/sayi22/22-61.pdf,(A.D.28.11.2016)

³⁷ Akbaş, *ibid*, p. 6,

been kept away these developments. It has been observed that the changes in Middle East began just in the last decade. This change quickened powerfully with the actions we call Arab Awakening. The direction, concept, effect and speed of changes began in this process are connected with attitude of international actors and other political and social improvements and they will be observed in time. ³⁸



https://www.academia.edu/2071943/Ortado%C4%9Fuda_De%C4%9Fi%C5%9Fim_S%C3%BCreci_ve_T%C3%BCrk_D%C4%B1%C5%9F_Politikas%C4%B1, (A.D. 28.11.2016)

³⁸ Akbaş, **ibid**, p. 6,

https://www.academia.edu/2071943/Ortado%C4%9Fuda_De%C4%9Fi%C5%9Fim_S%C3%BCreci_ve_T%C3%BCrk_D%C4%B1%C5%9F_Politikas%C4%B1, (A.D. 28.11.2016)

Consequently, the factors preparing Arab Awakening are results of long-term reasons. The Hawker Muhammed Buazizi's self-immolation by burning himself, the triggering reason of actions, can give us some clues to understand the reasons of experiences. According to the information we got, there are three questions we need to ask: Why was a university graduated young earning Money just as a Street vendor? Why did the forces garnishee his trolley? Why did this event result with his self-immolation? While trying to give answers to these questions, we come across to classic matters of Arab geography. That a university graduated young earns his Money as a Street vendor refers to educational and economic problems and inequality in income distribution, that the forces garnishee his trolley refers to weakness of democracy and human rights in the country. Eventually his self-immolation points us lack of confidence to the government and personal desperation.³⁹

In the further chapters of our work, improvements in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen where objective management change was achieved by means of Arab Spring, here we define as Arab Awakening. The actions in countries like Jordan, Bahrain, Umman, Saudi Arabia where social reactions were repressed and eased by using violence by the government or employing the protestors in the civil service or by international interference, will be left out of this work as it is another thesis subject.

³⁹ **“Arab Spring: Is it Product Of Mistakes?”**

<http://akademikperspektif.com/2012/10/04/arak-bahari-yanlisliklar-bileskesi-mi/>, (A.D. 28.11.2016)

2.2. THE REASONS OF ARAB AWAKENING IN TUNISIA AND THE ACTIONS

Tunisia is the point where Arab Awakening was fired. Tunisia has a more secular structure in contrast with the other countries in MENA district. That only two different presidents have ruled Tunisia in a period of last 54 years until December of 2010, the beginning date of reactions, is a general indication of that the community of region was being governed by an authoritative management. In this relevant period the country was only governed by Habib Burgiba and Zeynel Abidin Bin Ali. Along with this truth, the opposition part couldn't find himself a place in management of the country as a result of governments restrictions. This is a subsequent fact indicating us the underdevelopment of country.

In 1930s, a period when nationalism was at the peak point, the Tunisian folk began their independence battle under the leadership of Habib Burgiba. Advocator Burgiba, leader of independence action, established firstly in 1934 a party named as 'New Law (New Constitution) Party' which was supported by bourgeoisie and lower class instead of their old and traditional Law Party which was formed by managements, religious leaders and prestigious Ottoman governors living in Tunisia.⁴⁰ According to Samuel Huntington, Burgiba aimed with this party to speed up their independence battle with the thought that the role of mobilized rural regions in developing countries are very important for political stability⁴¹. However, France had an unexpected attribution against this independence battle. Contrary to expectations France preferred to negotiate with the forces under the leadership of Burgiba instead of shooting-out. Along with these improvements, Tunisia gained an important step to its independence with Domestic Authonomy Agreement⁴². After long lasting deals, Tunisia got his independence in 1956 and

⁴⁰ Ruhat Gülşah Erdem, "The Rise of Islamist Movements in Tunisia: El Nahda Example", Thesis Advisor: Ass. Prof. Dr. Cenk Aygül, Ankara-2014, p. 6-14, <http://docplayer.biz.tr/8290567-T-c-atilim-universitesi-sosyal-bilimler-enstitusu-uluslararası-iliskiler-ana-bilim-dali-tunus-ta-islamci-hareketlerin-yukselisi-el-nahda-ornegi.html>, (A.D. 25.11.2016)

⁴¹ Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Order in Changing Societies", Yale University Press, 1968, p. 45, http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/gov2126/files/huntington_political_order_changing_soc.pdf, (A.D. 25.11.2016)

⁴² Oktar Türel, "Thinking About the Middle East In The Summer of 2011", Magazine Magazine, Skin:35, Number: 272, p. 17-18, <http://mulkiyedergi.org/article/view/1003000047/1003000036>, (A.D. 25.11.2016)

Habib Burgiba became first President of Country upon proclamation of Republic in 1957. Tunisia differs from the other countries as it gained its independence by negotiation method instead of bloody battle. ⁴³After declaration of independence in Tunisia, Burgiba, who put a ‘left’ and ‘statist’ economic policy into action, became one of the first Arab statement adopting liberal model and aiming territorial development by the help of private enterprise. ⁴⁴ Along with this, Habib Burgiba is a brave, contrarian and contradictive figure who achieved to establish the most secular Muslim country of North Africa modern history. In contrast with the other countries in the region, Burgiba provided the women in his country some rights and brought a modern and Western legal system. However, in further periods of his government, chronic problems of country like increasing authoritative attitude of Burgiba, instability in economy, unemployment resulted in increasing Islamic actions. ⁴⁵

After Burgiba carried liberal policies into effect in 1970s, autocracy and new elites of cities as its extension began to be effective on the government again. Even though a relative economic growth was achieved in the country between 1970 and 1976, it didn’t lead to a permanent development. Although some policies began to change in a positive attitude in this period, politic and economic instability, dissatisfactions and strikes began to grow up again at the beginning of 1980s. ⁴⁶ In addition, with the belief in representation on personal thoughts, most of the political prisoners were released in these years. Some opposition parties were permitted to stand for elections in 1981. However, these improvements couldn’t be permanent developments regarding democracy. Consequently, opponent Islamic MTI movements (today called as El Nadha), which was undergoing a suppression by Burgiba government was closed down after the

⁴³ Ufuk Ulutaş, Furkan Torlak, “Election of Devolutionary Democracy Tunisia”, Number: 46, November 2011, p. 6, <http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/devrimden-demokrasiye-tunusun-secimi.pdf>, (A.D. 25.11.2016)

⁴⁴ Türel, *ibid*, p. 18, <http://mulkiyedergi.org/article/view/1003000047/1003000036>, (A.D. 25.11.2016)

⁴⁵ Erdem, *ibid*, p. 6-14, <http://docplayer.biz.tr/8290567-T-c-atilim-universitesi-sosyal-bilimler-enstitusu-uluslararasi-iliskiler-ana-bilim-dali-tunus-ta-islamci-hareketlerin-yukselisi-el-nahda-ornegi.html>, (A.D. 25.11.2016)

⁴⁶ Erdem, *ibid*, p. 6-14, <http://docplayer.biz.tr/8290567-T-c-atilim-universitesi-sosyal-bilimler-enstitusu-uluslararasi-iliskiler-ana-bilim-dali-tunus-ta-islamci-hareketlerin-yukselisi-el-nahda-ornegi.html>, (A.D. 25.11.2016)

elections although it was truly supported by the citizens. Finally, the government under the leadership of Habib Burgiba struggled to apply democracy with the aim of calming down Tunisian public, but it is claimed that in actual fact democracy wasn't seen on the country's atmosphere during the 1980s. ⁴⁷

It is amazing that the one who prepared the end of political life of Burgiba, that saved his government till the end of 1980s and elected lifelong state president, was Zeynel Bin Ali. He was assigned as prime minister in September 1987 by Burgiba himself. Military officer Bin Ali, who was assigned to a high degree political position for the first time just after independence of Tunisia, discharged the President Burgiba with a bloodless and constitutional coup on 7 November 1987 and exiled him to house arrest in Manastir, the summer resort of the country. He based this coup to the danger against country's safety because of possible infights and also the report given by seven doctors including the statement of 'not able to rule the state' as Burgiba was over 80's. ⁴⁸

Bin Ali, who got education on military services in France and USA and defined himself years long as a 'Burgiba-fun', got the support of police and army and this fact made the discharge of Burgiba for him easier. ⁴⁹ After taking over the management of country, Zeynel Bin Ali struggled firstly to enable a peaceful environment in the country. At the beginning, he tried to provide a reconciliation with Islamist part who was years long exposed to a repressive attitude by Berguba, he eased them off and released hundreds of political prisoners. ⁵⁰ According to Ergun

⁴⁷ Erdem, **ibid**, p. 6-14,

<http://docplayer.biz.tr/8290567-T-c-atilim-universitesi-sosyal-bilimler-enstitusu-uluslararasi-iliskiler-ana-bilim-dali-tunus-ta-islamci-hareketlerin-yukselisi-el-nahda-ornegi.html>, (A.D. 25.11.2016)

⁴⁸ Jane E Hoffman, "**Democracy And Tunisia: A Case Study**", Thesis Advisor: Ralph H. Magnus, Monterey, California, June 1994 , p. 29,

http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/42897/94Jun_Hoffman.pdf?sequence=1, (A.D.30.11.2016)

⁴⁹Emma C. Murphy, "**Economic and Political Change in Tunisia From Bourguiba to Ben Ali**", London, Macmillan Press, 1999, p. 164.

⁵⁰ Joshua Rogers, "**Shooting Citizens - Saving Regimes? A Case-Centered Approach to the Puzzle of Protest- Repression Interactions**", Berlin, Working Paper No. 3, December 2011, p. 28.

http://www.diss.fuberlin.de/docs/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/FUDOCs_derivate_000000003624/WP3_Rogers_FI_NAL_web.pdf, (A.D.30.11.2016)

Özbudun in 1999, one of the elections was done in which the winner of the single or multi-nominee simple majority, including cases where the opposition was divided and unorganized, or the winner "wins everything".⁵¹ In this election, the government of Zeynel Bin Ali, who decided the case of setting up a parliamentary group as being a minimum 20 deputies, aimed maintaining one-party regime in order to neutralize opposition parties that are not given financial aid and media support.⁵² Zeynel Bin Ali, struggling to build structures around himself to protect his government, brought his party, state and security forces together under the same roof by the help of his new system resembling to a police state. According to a Tunisian academician, that Bin Ali transformed Tunisia to a police state instead of a democratic republic, created a structural problem.⁵³ This state structure would constitute a reason to the rebellions occurring.

Bin Ali, who applied the tradition of 'monopolization of government and suppression of opposition' same as Burgiba since the beginning of 1990s,⁵⁴ followed 'liberal economic policy' suitable to World conjuncture in 1990s after failing in static and socialist economy programs performed during Burgiba period.⁵⁵ Because of the fact that Tunisian economy grew stable but in a limited manner during Bin Ali period, the rate of unemployment increase didn't have speedy rising graphic and thus the social reactions remained limited till his cession of administration. In Tunisia, which became an important tourism center during Bin Ali era and the tourism revenue formed an important economic income, Gross Domestic Proceeds (GSYIH) achieved a gross of 6,3 % in 2007, 4,6% in 2008 and 3,1% in 2009. Besides, inflation growth rate was 5,1 % in 2008 and 3,5% in 2009. In 2010 report of African Economic Outlook⁵⁶, who evaluated the situation of

⁵¹ Özbudun, **ibid**, p. 69, 70.

⁵² Larbi Sadiki, "**The Search for Citizenship in Bin Ali's Tunisia: Democracy Versus Unity**⁵²", Political Studies: Political Studies Association, Published by Blackwell Publishers, Oxford - UK, Vol: 50, 2002, p. 505, <http://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/politics/research/readingroom/SadikiTunisia.pdf>, (A.D. 30.11.2016)

⁵³ Larbi, **ibid**, p. 506, <http://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/politics/research/readingroom/SadikiTunisia.pdf>, (A.D. 30.11.2016)

⁵⁴ İhsan Dağı, "**İslam and Politics in Middle East**", İstanbul, Boyut Publishing, 2002, p. 19.

⁵⁵ Nebahat Tanrıverdi, "**Public Revolt in Tunisia: Its Reasons and Effects**", Middle East Analyses Magazine, Volume: 3, Number: 26, February 2011, s. 29, <http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/OA/26/3nebahat.pdf>, (A.D.30.11.2016)

⁵⁶ "**Africa Economic Outlook Report**", African Development Bank, 2010, p. 28, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/AEO2010_part1_p76.pdf, (A.D.30.11.2016)

Tunisian economy, it was stated as positive and economic variety and banking system was noted as powerful structures able to protect the country from an economic crisis. Besides, in 2010 report of Doing Business of World Bank, Tunisia was listed as one of the most powerful countries in Arab World. In this relevant report, Tunisia economy was defined generally as a stable and powerful structure struggling successfully with economic problems.⁵⁷ The Factors like that Bin Ali stepped to strike a balance among all zones in Tunisia and fastened economic reforms, are results of liberal economy policies of Bin Ali. Besides, that he shared the power with town-dweller elites earned by peasant new elites by declaration of independence is another example of this liberal applications. Along with them, the advantages like small population, restricted population increase, closeness to European market, relativist economic and social recovery effected the country's economic stability positively.⁵⁸ "Despite these positive situations in economy during Bin Ali government, the most important factor, which could hinder the success of government, was the fact that the unemployment rate didn't decrease despite this stable economy. The unemployment rate in Tunisia during 1990s was 14% and a significant decrease in poverty rate wasn't recorded in these years. The number of university graduated unemployed young people was around fifty-five thousand and the business opportunity was low in contrast to high educated population."⁵⁹

Bin Ali leaded a new law in 2012 bringing himself an opportunity of governing the country more than five periods and raised age of candidacy for presidency to 75⁶⁰. In this period,

⁵⁷ "Doing Business 2010 Report", World Bank, p. 18, <http://www.doingbusiness.org/~media/WBG/DoingBusiness/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB10-FullReport.pdf>, (A.D.30.11.2016)

⁵⁸ Erdem, *ibid.*, p. 48, <http://docplayer.biz.tr/8290567-T-c-atilim-universitesi-sosyal-bilimler-enstitusu-uluslararasi-iliskiler-ana-bilim-dalim-tunus-ta-islamci-hareketlerin-yukselisi-el-nahda-ornegi.html>, (A.D. 25.11.2016)

⁵⁹ Erdem, *ibid.*, p. 49, <http://docplayer.biz.tr/8290567-T-c-atilim-universitesi-sosyal-bilimler-enstitusu-uluslararasi-iliskiler-ana-bilim-dalim-tunus-ta-islamci-hareketlerin-yukselisi-el-nahda-ornegi.html>, (A.D. 25.11.2016)

⁶⁰ Sadiki, *ibid.*, p. 505, <http://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/politics/research/readingroom/SadikiTunisia.pdf>, (A.D. 30.11.2016)

the public was of the opinion that financial reforms process related to economic developments was not carried fairly out. Tunisian citizens thought that Bin Ali, who reduced economic and social reforms in 1990s because of his authoritative tendency, was sharing incomes received by economic policies with his family and his connections. According to Philippe Droz-Vincent, of the same opinion with Tunisian, the elites given a place in the management of the country by the authoritative power, like in the example of RCD in Tunisia, support the leader and authoritative regime on behalf of themselves for the continuation of relevant political power. This group, whose aim is to reach the peak point for their own profit, supports and raises the power in economy, policy etc. In this way, the elites who benefits from the state, prefers to increase their incomes received by privatization. This group, who becomes increasingly a part of system by quartering their connections into civil service, constitutes a key point for the future of existing structure obeying the rules of power. Because of this kind of reasons, power collaborates with these elites and tries to balance the system presenting them positions in the management team.⁶¹

Beside these applications performed by Bin Ali, serious problems in economic and social circumstances experienced in all countries of MENA before Arab Awakening were also lived through Tunisia.⁶² The income inequality is the most important one among them. As Bin Ali disbursed economic power to his family and his close connections, Tunisian people couldn't receive a fair distribution of income. For example, in this country which has a lower population in contrast with the countries experienced these protest, income per capita between 2000-2005 increased 4,4% but Gini index indicating the inequality in income distribution raised to 42,1 in 2005 while it was 39,3 in 2000. This rise, which defines income difference between poor and rich part, indicates us the gap in the income distribution among the

⁶¹ “**Authoritarianism, Revolutions, Armies and Arab Regime Transitions**”, Droz-Vincent, Philippe, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, Published Online: 21 Jun 2011, p. 6, 7, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233282434_Authoritarianism_Revolutions_Armies_and_Arab_Regime_Transitions, (A.D. 30.11.2016)

⁶² Ertan Efeğil, “**The Analyses of Developments in Middle East: Libya, Tunisia, Bahrain, Egypt and Syria**”, Ortadoğu Analiz Magazine, Cover: 5, Number: 59, November 2013, p. 13, <http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/OA/59/1ertanefegil.pdf>, (A.D. 24.11.2016)

population. As a result of this, this difference raised the disturbance of public to the government of Bin Ali. ⁶³

The tax system applied by the government had a great effect on inequality of income distribution in the country. 66% of tax income collected duty was originated from indirect tax and 33% was collected from direct tax. This situation meant that the low-income families, who had to spend his whole winning to survive, paid more tax in contrast with rich families. 35% of direct taxes consisted institutions and 65% of it consisted personal taxes. This fact shows that real person had a bigger part than institutions in budget gaining. Arriving at this conclusion, it is observed that tax immunities provided to the companies by government had a great role but these incentives didn't increase investment and employment in private sector in targeted level. ⁶⁴ In addition to that, despite low population, unemployment rate in Tunisia in this relevant period is 14% and this rate is twofold among university graduates. ⁶⁵

Shortly, during Zeynel Bin Ali period who took the president chair on 7 November 1987 with so called 'silent coup' in Tunisia, Tunisia witnessed human rights abuses like lawless arrests, immense control on media, repress against oppositions and human rights defenders, prosecution and violence. This oppression environment beclouded circumstances rather worse along with staggering economic crisis and the social and regional inequalities driving process triggered a social explosion. With the aim of recovering social and political conditions, giving an end to illegality and receiving their freedom, the public gave a start to a new action. ⁶⁶ Philippe Droz-Vincent commented the reactions of protestors as basically 'a honorable social invitation' against authoritative governing concept.

⁶³ AFDB, "**Jobs, Justice and the Arab Spring: Inclusive Growth in North Africa Report**", North Africa Operations Department, African Development Bank, Tunisia, 2012, p. 10, 31, <http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Jobs%20and%20Justice%20-%20EN.PDF>, (A.D. 24.11.2016)

⁶⁴ AFDB, **ibid.**, p. 17- 18, (A.D. 24.11.2016)

⁶⁵ Ilham Haouas, Edward Sayre, Mahmoud Yagoubi, "**Youth Unemployment in Tunisia: Characteristics and Policy Responses**", Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies Vol. 14, September 2012, p. 401. http://www.luc.edu/orgs/meea/volume14/PDFS/Youth_employment_in_Tunisia.pdf, (A.D. 24.11.2016)

⁶⁶ Ulutaş, Torlak, **ibid.**, p. 6, <http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/devrimden-demokrasiye-tunusun-secimi.pdf>, (A.D. 25.11.2016)

2.3. THE ARAB AWAKENING ACTIONS IN EGYPT AND ITS REASONS

Arab Awakening actions which began in Tunisia upon self-immolation of Muhammed Buazizi, spread later on over other countries of North Africa and Middle East with a Domino Effect. In Egypt as the second country in which Arab community reflected their demands to a democratic governing and living, the public poured into streets and protested towards the end of 2010 in order to state their displeasure against the despotic governing of Husnu Mubarek.

With its 6 thousand years of history, Egypt has demographically a very rich structure. According to United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report of 2010, Egypt is 101. Country with its development rate of 0,620 among 169 different countries.⁶⁷ Besides, according to USA International Freedom of Religion Report, in Egypt whose population is formed by Sunni Muslims in rate of 90%, the rate of Christian but Copts is between 8-12% and the rate of Shia Muslims is less than 1%.⁶⁸ As a result of these facts, the political system of this country consists of a colorful mosaic including socialism, authoritative regime, liberalism and conservative ideas. Egypt began its process of establishing parties at the beginning of 19. Century⁶⁹ and declared its independence from England on 28 February 1922 unilaterally.⁷⁰ In Egypt, where on 18 Juny 1953 the republic was established⁷¹, the improvements recorded on rest of the

⁶⁷ **“Human Development Report”**, Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development, UNDP, The 20th Anniversary Edition, 2010, p. 144,
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/270/hdr_2010_en_complete_reprint.pdf, (A.D. 02.12.2016)

⁶⁸ **“2010 Report on International Religious Freedom”**, p. 2,
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171733.pdf>, (A.D. 02.12.2016)

⁶⁹ Ali Tandoğan, **“Egypt in the Period of Arab Spring”**, Thesis Advisor Ass. Prof. Ulvi KESER, Ankara, 2013, p. 1,
http://www.assam.org.tr/bolgeler/islam-ulkeleri/kuzeyafrika/misir/download/10_5b952351440060bd2da9b8e15e15c736.html, (A.D. 03.12.2016)

⁷⁰ Musa Yıldız, **“Nefip Mahfuz’s Symbolic Romans”**, Doctoral Thesis, Thesis Advisor Prof. Dr. Rahmi ER, Ankara, 1998, p. 5,
<http://musayildiz.com.tr/public/musayildiz/cv/tez-doktora.pdf>, (A.D. 03.12.2016)

⁷¹ Richard Hattamer, **“Atatürk and his Revolutions in Egyptian Media”**, Researcher, Giessen, Justus, Liebig University Oriental Institute, Trans. Ass. Prof. Dr. Ayten Sezer, p. 391,

World weren't reflected to the public of Egypt during the governing periods of Cemal Abdunnasır (1952-1970), Enver Sedat (1970-1981) and Hüsnu Mubarek (1981-2011). This leaders, who weren't sensitive enough to the demands of public, struggled to make some reforms for purpose of a democratic structure but actually none of them was satisfactory at all. ⁷²

The war between Arab countries and Israel, which was established on 14 Mai 1948, between the years of 1948 and 1949 was resulted in the defeat of Arab countries. Egypt started to live a period of increasing nationalist and Islamic tendency together with other Arab countries after losing this battle. Following this process, a political gap occured in the country and a new leader who could be sensitive to the demands of public was needed. Depending upon this situation, Independent Officers Action under the leader ship of Cemal Abdül Nasır, deterred King Faruk from accession to the throne in the name of his 9 months of son Ahmed Fuad and exiled him to Rome in 1952⁷³. After that development, the military officers, who executed this military coup, announced the republic and assigned General Mohammed Necib as president. President Necib declared the elections to be performed in three years however an attempt under leadership of Prime Minister Cemal Abdül Nasır, elected in 1954, wanted the elections as immediate as possible and so they discharged Necib and Abdül Nasır became the head of state. ⁷⁴ Nasır and the ones under his rules aimed a single party system and closed down all political parties including Muslim Brothers, who helped him during coup process. As a result, a single-party political life began under the name of Hizb't Tecemmu'l-İştiraki (Socialist Union Party). Unopposed single-party political system issued a constitution in 1956 and the single candidate Nasır was elected as president of country in June of 1956. Nasır, who had immense popularity among Egyptians owing to his heavy Arab nationalism, had also a socialist perspective. However despite his socialist ideas, he depused Muslim Brothers action who was opposing him and thereby struggled to ensure his power. Besides, by the help of prohibitions promulgated, he hindered organization

⁷² Tandoğan, **ibid**, p. 1,
http://www.assam.org.tr/bolgeler/islam-ulkeleri/kuzeyafrika/misir/download/10_5b952351440060bd2da9b8e15e15c736.html, (A.D. 03.12.2016)

⁷³ Veysel Ayhan, "**Steps of the Egyptian Revolution**", Ortadoğu Analiz Magazine, Vol: 3, Nr: 26, February 2011, p. 4,
<http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/OA/26/2veysel.pdf>, (A.D. 03.12.2016)

⁷⁴ Tayyar Arı, "**Middle East From Past to Preset**", İstanbul, Alfa Publishing, 2004, p. 266.

and settlement of oppositions in political life. Therewithall Nasır, who didn't abstain from tyrannizing over folk on the ature of his target governing intellection, tried to frighten the public by means of detentions in 1953. Consequently, Nasr management, who didn't permitted any opposition to himself, gave a way to a single party parliament. By applying just his own ruling policies he also revealed an autocratically government style.⁷⁵

Upon death of Cemal Abdül Nasır in 1970 after a sudden hearth attack, Enver Sedat, who had been performing as assistant of President since 1960, was assigned as President by Arab Socialist Union. On the elections performed on 15 October, Sedat became the new leader of Egypt receiving 90% of the votes. According to William L. Cleveland, Enver wasn't supposed as a powerful leader to be able to solve the problems after Nasır. Despite the fact that he was one of the first members of independent military officers' organization, he wasn't able to earn respect from either Egyptian public or his coworkers. He was known for being a weak person and an approver of Nasır and given a name as 'Lap-dog of Nasır'. He was also believed to resign in a hshort span of time. However, he later on proved that he hadn't got a weak personality as thought. Despite his contradictive policy, even his opponents accepted that he was able to lead domestic and foreign policy of Egypt in a basic way as Nasır.⁷⁶

Sedat, whose presidency was responded positively by public in time, had some implementations that could be evaluated as democratic. The repression over Muslim Brothers and other political parties and groups were definitively reduced, freedoms were advanced, legal applications limiting pivate properties were removed, the censorships were reduced and establishing a new party was leaded up. However, the main governing idea of Enver Sedat was, according to Hamdy A. Hassan, not a multi-party system but instead a restrained multiplism. As an example to this claim, Sedat permitted just two different parties, which were loyal to his own system and were able to refer both right and left wings of political frame.⁷⁷ In addition to this, he

⁷⁵ Tandoğan, **ibid**, p. 38,
http://www.assam.org.tr/bolgeler/islam-ulkeleri/kuzeyafrika/misir/download/10_5b952351440060bd2da9b8e15e15c736.html, (A.D. 03.12.2016)

⁷⁶ William L. Cleveland, "**The History of Modern Middle East**", Trans: Mehmet Harmancı, Agora Kitaplığı Publishing, Istanbul, 2008, p. 416.

⁷⁷ "State Versus Society in Egypt: Consolidating Democracy or Upgrading Autocracy", Hamdy A. Hassan, Professor of Political Science, Institute for Islamic World Studies, Zayed University, Dubai. November, 2010, p. 321- 325,

cleaned up all radicals opposing himself in ASB (Arab Socialist Union) in Mai 1971 who were claimed to be close to U.S.S.R. and also who were claimed to be in a preparation of a civilian coup against himself. Enver Sedat achieved with this application to be the sole power both in his party and in country's governing in an short time⁷⁸. He also vacated the socialist policies of Nasr period and initiated politic and economic liberalization movement with the name of renewal revolution. ⁷⁹

Sedat Enver, for his target of economic policies, sought a settlement in 1970 to heal his connections with bourgeoisie, withdrew their support from government and with this purpose, he reduced or almost stopped social policies provided to low-income classes. Egypt's internal policy became fragile as a result of relevant matters. As a solution for economic problems lived in, Sedat believed in bringing economical sources of West, which was dominating foreign capital, into his country. In accordance with this idea, he deported more than 20.000 Soviet experts and technicians. However, the American and Israeli leaders, who refrained from a negative reaction of public because of an alliance between Israel and Egypt during the period of following elections in 1972 in USA and in 1976 in Israel, didn't give Enver Sedat the support he expected. In addition to that, Arab Republic Federation, which was established in 1971 for the purpose of finding a common ground with Libya, Sudan and Syria, disbanded in a short span of time. Additively, Arab Union isolated Egypt by discarding it from Arab Union as a result of his Camp David Agreement with Israel through USA on 17 October 1978⁸⁰ and here at Sedat started to use his state for his own interests. Sedat, who used most of helicopters bought for civil service himself for security purposes, saw his own benefits equal to state interests. Based upon this view, he presented antique Works subjected to Historical Artifacts Administration as a gift on his courtesy visits⁸¹. Consequently, Enver Sedat, who was elected as President in 1970 with hope of

http://www.academicjournals.org/article/article1381837256_Hassan.pdf (A.D. 04.12.2016)

⁷⁸ Ar1, **ibid**, p. 359.

⁷⁹ Ahmet Ateş, “**Egyptian Foreign Policy Between 1952- 2011**”, Master's Thesis, Thesis Advisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Metin Aksoy, 2012, Konya, p. 75, <http://acikerisim.selcuk.edu.tr:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/1192/325862.pdf?sequence=1>, (A.D. 04.12.2016)

⁸¹ Ateş, **ibid**, p. 65- 82,

a more democratic Egypt, performed an authoritative ruling against Egyptian public with an intellection not differing from Cema Abdunnasır. Naturally this situation was met in appreciatively among the public who was demanding a rise in social and personal developments and caused reactions of community.

After Enver Sedat, who draw rebuff of Egyptian public because of his authoritative management, Hüsñü Mübarek, a former member of air forces, took Office in 1981 as President. In this period, an increase in political organizations was observed, the arrestees were released, the supervision on freedom of press was reduced, number of STKs was increased and democratic actions area was widened in contrast to previous periods. However, the expected legitimate governing was not provided because of facts like insufficient regulations on individual freedoms. Hüsñü Mübarek worked on liberal policies same as Enver Sedat during his 30 years of governing but he couldn't achieve serious right ascensions. When compared with Nasır and Sedat periods, it was a period, in which huge disturbances were not experienced, there were no wars, the parliament stayed for long time on duty.⁸²

Like former leaders, Hüsñü Mübarek who stated Arab nationalism, made some regulations in 2005 in order to overcome some political problems in the country. Mübarek legitimated multiple candidates and secret vote system as basic rules of democracy for the first time in his 24 years of ruling, however he prevented reflection of social will fairly on candidate lists because of some restrictions. For example, government of Hüsñü Mübarek stated that the ones presented as candidates by political parties had to have at least 5 years of political history and they also had a necessity of getting at least 5% votes in the last elections. Besides the independent candidates had an obligation of getting support from at least 65 deputies from comitia cruciate.

The reason of this regulation was to prevent MK structuring which was not allowed to be politically represented in Parliament and El-Baradeıy who was thought to be a powerful candidate

<http://acikerisim.selcuk.edu.tr:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/1192/325862.pdf?sequence=1>, (A.D. 04.12.2016)

⁸² Veysel Ayhan and Nazlı Ayhan Algan, “**Egyptian Revolution and Mübarek: The End of a Dictator**”, International Middle East Piece Searches Center (IMPR), , Impr Rapor – No: 6, 2011, p. 41- 42, http://www.impr.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/MISIR-RAPORU_no_6.pdf, (A.D. 04.12.2016)

against Hüsñü Mübarek. According to the results of presidential elections held on 7 September 2005, Hüsñü Mübarek was elected as President again with a voting rate of 88,7%. This proves that some constitutional regulations, made in the year of 2005 by Hüsñü Mübarek who got 93% of votes in the elections of 1993 as single candidate, didn't reflect popular sovereignty and applications performed about democratizations weren't successful. Another incident proving Hüsñü Mübarek Government's sense of rule featuring single man idea in the elections of 2005 is the ban, despite the court decision, introduced by presidency to independent groups demanding to provide an observer during elections. The reaction of public to this application which dealt a big blow to objectiveness of elections was that just 23% of registered voters voted in the election. This data shows the belief of Egyptian public in the democratic sense of rule of Hüsñü Mübarek's government.⁸³ Among the reasons of Egyptian public's opposition to regime, we need to state also economic, political, social demands and problems. This country has the most crowded population of North Africa with 85 million populations and almost half of this crowd survives with an income of 2 dollars per day. Apart from this fact, which reveals a big problem about distribution of income that Hüsñü Mübarek shared his 30 years of state government with his family, his children and his close connections caused an increasing illegality. Along with that, as we mentioned above, anti-democratic sense of governing, suppression of oppositions, bribery, violence and illegality caused the increasing reaction of Egyptian folk against Hüsñü Mübarek. According to Özbudun, in Egypt, where controlled or the semi-competitor elections are held, even though some progress was witnessed in the press, the association, and the freedom of assembly, it cannot go beyond the authoritarian election level. Although, two thirds of the population is under 30 years old, 9 out of 10 unemployed individuals are under 30 years old.⁸⁴ Despite the fact that two thirds of Egyptian population is under 30 years old, 9 of 10 unemployed is formed by the ones under 30 ages.⁸⁵ When we examine the jobless rate between 15-64 ages,

⁸³ Ayhan and Algan, *ibid*, p. 6, 7,

http://www.impr.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/MISIR-RAPORU_no_6.pdf , (A.D. 04.12.2016)

⁸⁴ Özbudun, *ibid*, p. 68, 69.

⁸⁵ Ayhan and Algan, *ibid*, p. 8,

http://www.impr.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/MISIR-RAPORU_no_6.pdf , (A.D. 04.12.2016)

government agencies state this value as 25% while international indexes express it as about 50%. After all, because of not getting permanent applications as promised about liberal policies to recover the country's economy, the growth in unemployment rates and decreasing incomes, effected also by inflation rise, caused an increasing reaction against Mubarek's regime especially among young population.⁸⁶

When we examine the view of World on government of Husnu Mübarek, we observe that social problems in Egypt drew in contrast with previous periods mostly the attention of foreign countries. Former American President George Bush, who felt dissatisfied about relationship between Egypt and Israel, made this speech about adjustment policy in Heritage Institute for Democracy: Egypt contributed greatly in peace process in Middle East and now it is time to do something for democracy in Egypt.⁸⁷

“The most important reason of increase in mass reactions opposing Mübarek was undoubtedly the demand of Hüsnü Mübarek to assign his son instead of himself as president and his attempts on this way. Director of Politic and Strategic Researces Office of Al Ahram Research Center, Abdül M. Said didn't abstain from evaluating this situation as a 'Nightmare scenario for Egypt'. Hüsnü Mübarek, who had been governing the country with state of emergency laws for the last 30 years, concentrated on more police power and also didn't assign a vice-president for himself till January of 2011 despite it was defined in basic law just with the aim of preventing a military coup opposing himself. The most important reason lying behind not assigning a vice-president was the possibility of power grab of the one who would be tasked for this position or the aim of assigning Cemal Mübarek for this position on final phase. In fact, if anything happens to President, according to Egyptian Constitution, Vice President takes Office instead of President. Accordingly, the target of Hüsnü Mübarek to hand on his presidency to his son drew serious rebuff of notably Egyptian public and most parts of Civil ad military

⁸⁶ Ayhan and Algan, **ibid**, p. 8, 9,

http://www.impr.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/MISIR-RAPORU_no_6.pdf , (A.D. 04.12.2016)

⁸⁷ **“Bush Statement: Full Text”**,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2960594.stm, (A.D. 04.12.2016)

bureaucracy.”⁸⁸ Another institution whose attitude was issue of concern during public reactions was Egyptian army, whose soldiers were assigned, out of vice-presidency, for different positions in management by Hüsnü Mübarek and who got the command of right to use force against protestors. Armed forces of Egypt were thought to give support to Hüsnü Mübarek after all these developments. However, according to Andrew England, Egyptian Army was worried seriously about not only losing its prestige but also about the possibility of being kept completely out of new political process. This is why, the army announced, by means of a state television on 31 January that it would not intervene in mass reactions of Egyptian public, who were just using their legal and legitimate rights. Thus it was cued the resign of Hüsnü Mübarek. In addition to that, in the incident of setting National Democrat Party’s corporate Office up on the fire in Cairo, the Egyptian army didn’t disperse the protestors forcefully despite state of siege and curfew decisions and this development revealed the attitude of Egyptian Army in advance.⁸⁹

A great number of Copt Christians were passed away as a result of bomb attacks on Christmas night of 2010 in Alexandria under rule of Hüsnü Mübarek, whose target to assign his son Cemal as successor of presidency got reactions of public. The religionists in Egypt were seen as responsible of this incident, which occurred in a period of increasing religious and ethnic discrimination among public. The public realized that the incidents were created by secret hands with the aim of sowing discord among Egyptian citizens. By communication via social media, whose mass effect is ever increasing, the community started up their reactions on Tharir Square, famous square of Cairo, in January 2010. In order to suppress the reaction partially, Hüsnü Mübarek, who hadn’t assigned anybody as vice-president for last 20 years, tasked Ömer Süleyman as vice-president. On the first days of incidents he made a speech and stated that he wanted to die in Egypt⁹⁰ however also this speech was not able to serve its purpose to prevent reactions. The government of Hüsnü Mübarek left no stone unturned to stop these incidents. “The

⁸⁸ Ayhan and Algan, *ibid*, p. 9,

http://www.impr.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/MISIR-RAPORU_no_6.pdf, (A.D. 04.12.2016)

⁸⁹ Andrew England, “**Army Rules Out Force Against Protesters**”, Financial Times, February 1, 2011, <https://www.ft.com/content/2bdffd86-2d6b-11e0-8f53-00144feab49a>, (A.D. 05.12.2016)

⁹⁰ David Kenner, “**The Egyptian Revolution Through Mubarak’s Eyes**”, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/24/the-egyptian-revolution-through-mubaraks-eyes/>, (A.D. 05.12.2016)

government tried every means available to keep the media quiet. Security forces arrested, attacked, and threatened journalists. Egypt's protests kicked into high gear, not so coincidentally, on Jan. 25, the country's official "Police Day" celebration. For three decades of Mubarak's rule, the police have acted as the regime's primary implementers of repression: Thousands of Egyptians have been arbitrarily detained, arrested, beaten, and held without charge by the police for trumped-up offenses. According to a Jan. 31 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, the security forces have targeted everyone from "political dissidents, Islamists allegedly engaged in terrorist activity, and ordinary citizens suspected of links to criminal activity or who simply look suspicious. Last June, a young man named Khaled Said was beaten to death by policemen after he refused to show his identity card upon entering an Internet cafe in Alexandria." ⁹¹ According to Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Ron Suskind, "When the United States wanted someone to be tortured, we'd send him to Egypt to have them tortured," ⁹² "Mubarak's speech on Tuesday night, in which he announced that he would not seek another term as president, also contained the seeds of a potential deal that could co-opt Egypt's officially sanctioned opposition parties and leave the protesters in Tahrir Square out in the cold. In a seemingly arcane legal point, Mubarak also called on court judgments on the last parliamentary election to be honored. "I demand parliament adhere to the word of the judiciary and its verdicts concerning the latest cases which have been legally challenged," he said. ⁹³ "Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak gave into the demands of the protesters today, leaving Cairo and stepping down from power. That came hours after a speech, broadcast live across the world yesterday, in which he refused to do so. Earlier that day, the Supreme Military Council released a statement -- labeled its "first" communiqué -- that stated that the military would ensure a peaceful transition of Mubarak out of office. In practice, it appears that power has passed into the hands of the armed forces. This act was the latest in the military's creep from applauded bystander to steering force in this month's protests in

⁹¹ Elizabeth Dickinson, "**Anatomy of Dictatorship: Hosni Mubarak**", <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/02/04/anatomy-of-a-dictatorship-hosni-mubarak/>, (A.D. 05.12.2016)

⁹² Dickinson, **ibid.**, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/02/04/anatomy-of-a-dictatorship-hosni-mubarak/> (A.D. 05.12.2016)

⁹³ Kenner, "**Understanding Revolutionary Egypt**", foreignpolicy.com/2011/02/04/understanding-revolutionary-egypt-2/, (A.D. 05.12.2016)

Egypt.”⁹⁴ “History’s first verdict on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was rendered late Tuesday night, Feb. 1, [2011] when thousands of protesters forced the autocrat to vow not to run for office again. The president, they chanted, had to go. On Friday, Feb. 11, after some prevarication, Mubarak appeared to have finally taken the point.”⁹⁵

Consequently, the Egyptian public, who had been suffering from dictatorships of Cemal Abdül Nasır, Enver Sedat and Hüsnu Mübarek under so-called democratic republic regime for the last 58 years of process till Arab Awakening incidents in 2011, indicated their demands for a better future with these reactions. Although we know that this situation wouldn’t bring the demanded democratic and humanitarian living conditions in a short time, it is important in the sense of initiating the aimed process.

2.4. ARAB AWAKENING IN LIBYA AND ITS REASONS

The demonstrations opposing Mübarek in Egypt, one of democratically weak countries in MENA district, spread over Libya with a ‘domino effect’. The protests against Muammer Qadhafi, the leader of the country for the last 42 years, witnessed intensive skirmishes and finally this situation caused the first international intervene on Arab Awakening. France, who didn’t wait for final decision of NATO members just for its own benefits, used his air forces for the intervention in the country and thus it gave the events an international sight and caused intrusiveness of the North Atlantic Pakt in the incidents. However, Muammer Qadhafi couldn’t hinder the actions of public and he was murdered by the protestors in this process tragically and finally the management changed.

Libya didn’t have any income out of the financial supports got from foreign countries till 1959 and along with the discovery of wide oil reservoir around foots of Zelten Mountains Libya

⁹⁴ Ellis Goldberg, “**Mubarakism Without Mubarak**”, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/egypt/2011-02-11/mubarakism-without-mubarak>, (A.D. 05.12.2016)

⁹⁵ Dickinson, **ibid**, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/02/04/anatomy-of-a-dictatorship-hosni-mubarak/> (A.D. 05.12.2016)

reached its most important source of income. However Senusi, the leader of country during this process, promised to apply lots of projects just to improve the country and power the structure but in fact couldn't achieve a true distribution of income among the public and even worse he used this sources to make his connections rich.⁹⁶ The lieutenant Muammer Ebu Minyar El- Qadhafi, taking the advantage of that Senusi was in Turkey for treatment, staged a military coup with his a few military officer friends in the year of 1969 and took the control of Libya, which was governed by kingdom till this relevant date.⁹⁷ When Muammer Qadhafi became the Prime Minister of the country, he was twenty eight years old and he carried this duty of being the head of state for 42 years. When he got the power of government, he declared that he would adopt a different governing style from the previous ones and as his first application, he distrained the Italian and Jewish real properties which had been governed by the state since 1961.⁹⁸

Muammer Qadhafi had had the idea of taking the power in hand by a military coup just as he was a student in high school. When he came to the power, he firstly carried the system of 'Jamahiriya' into effect mentioned in his book 'Green Book'. In this new -in other words 'invented'- governing style, Muammer Qadhafi performed the independence style of 'the force of masses' differing from democracy, 'the force of public'. Qadhafi advocated that public sovereignty had to be the basement in State governing instead of liberal democracy, he thought to be adapted from Western countries. According to him, it had to be established for the power of absolute freedom a public's committee comprising of tribes, villages, settlements, districts and cities. He aimed with this Jamahiriya system, involving 'Third Universal Theory' the composition of Socialism and Islam structures.⁹⁹ In contemplation of these thoughts, Muammer

⁹⁶ Selin M. Böle,, Ufuk Ulutaş, Taha Öztan, Müjge Küçükkelleş, "**Revolt: Intervene and Thereafter: Transition Pains in Libya**", SETA: Politics, Economical and Social Searches Foundation, , No:5, Ankara, December 2011, p. 8, <http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/libyada-donusumun-sancilari.pdf>, (A.D. 11.12.2016)

⁹⁷ Cihat Yaycı, "**The Role and Effect of Libya on Restrictions of Maritime Zones** ", Security Strategies Magazine, Year: 7, Nr: 14, p. 20, <http://dergipark.ulakbim.gov.tr/guvenlikstrtrj/article/view/5000098883/5000092139>, (A.D. 11.12.2016)

⁹⁸ "**Arab Spring Overthrew Him Too**", İzmir Economy University Communication Faculty Application Magazine, Year: 3, Nr.: 25, November 2011, p. 6, http://iletisim.ieu.edu.tr/univers/pdf/Univers_Kasim-2011.pdf, (A.D. 11.12.2016)

⁹⁹ Muammer Kaddafi, "**Green Book: The Solution of Democracy Problem 'Public Authority- Economy- Social Grounds**", Libya Public Bureau Publishing, p. 8-56.

Qadhafi turned Libya and its public into an object of ‘permanent revolution’ Project pursuant to the eclectic Third Way Project he composed from various sources which time to time confronted each other. According to him, the State of Libya was actually ‘a state without state’, it was ‘the state of mass’ belonging to public. There was no need to political parties because the public participated and a voice in the government directly by means of Public Congress and Revolution Comitees.¹⁰⁰ Qadhafi, defining himself not as a person doing politics but rather as ‘the leader of revolution’, would content himself just with ‘guidance’ according to his own opinion.¹⁰¹ Qadhafi, with his Jamahiriya political structure, revealed in theory a system in which the public was the real power commanding the state and country but in practice he was the one doing absolute politics years long in Libya by placing his partisans and loyal men into key positions of state. Besides, his Family members, having the most important role in Qadhafi’s political continuity, had the second place on the state’s power pyramid. For example, during the conflicts in Libya, Seyfulislam, the son of Qadhafi, was the first name of economic reforms. The other son, Hamisin, was commanding the most equipped and honorable brigade, 32. Brigade, and another son, Mutasım, was in the chair of Security Council of Libya.¹⁰² In brief, Muammer Qadhafi, having the aim of establishing a public with his relevant applications, struggled to create a Libya he imagined. However, he saw the clan structuring which had been the strongest administrative power in the country as one of the biggest obstacles hindering his target. But the assassinations and coup attempts opposing him from 1973 forced him to turn back to clan system and to struggle for powering his government by repelling them. Thus, Qadhafi armed his own clan Sirte and his alliance clans with the aim of keeping them ready as militia forces and in this way he established a patronage and nepotism system.¹⁰³ In addition to that, he regarded a regular army

¹⁰⁰ Kaddafi, *ibid*, p. 22-31.

¹⁰¹ Phillip C. Naylor, “**North Africa: A History from Antiquity to Present**”, Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005, p. 206.

¹⁰² Selin M. Böle, Ufuk Ulutaş, Taha Öztan, Müjge Küçükelleş, Eda Bektaş, “**Libya Between the Scissors of West and Qudhafi**”, SETA: Politics, Economy and Social Searches Foundation, Ankara, May 2011, p. 10, 11, <http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/bati-ve-kaddafi-makasinda-libya.pdf>, (A.D. 08.12.2016)

¹⁰³ Böle, Ulutaş, Öztan, Küçükelleş, Bektaş, *ibid*, p. 21, 22,

as a thread to his own power and because of this he established instead troops formed by Revolutionary Guards and African mercenaries and similar elite troops ruled by his own relatives he trusted. Along with this, he pitted not only the clans but also regions and even cities just with the aim of powering his government. As an example to this, East region of country (Sirenayka) involving Benghazi, where eighty percent of country's oil were drilled, was neglected, western part with the most crowded population of country was driven forward and discrimination between cities like Misrata and Beni Velid in West was manipulated.¹⁰⁴

When we look at the opponent structures during the period of Muammer Qadhafi's power, we observe that the opposition part could survive despite repressive politics of regime in Libya, where political opposition was banned with the law 'Prohibition of Party Line' issued in 1972. As a result of systematic repression, some opposition parts like Libya Islamic Fight Group (LIMG) and Muslim Brothers (Ihvan) engaged in dialogue with Qadhafi regime and another part like Libya Change and Reform Actions were exiled. Both oppositions his 42 years of ruling. Generally, among the political oppositions we categorize as Islamist, democratic and Royalists, The Islamists were in the forefront of opposition against Qadhafi because of their connections and conjuncture of post-colonial period."¹⁰⁵ Libya had a system of oil reserves originating 95% of export revenues and 25% of Gross National Product and covering 60% of government expenditures.¹⁰⁶ But economic and politic areas of Libya were generally badly affected because

<http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/bati-ve-kaddafi-makasinda-libya.pdf>, (A.D. 08.12.2016)

¹⁰⁴ Böle, Ulutaş, Öztan, Küçükkelleş, Bektaş, **ibid**, p. 21,

<http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/bati-ve-kaddafi-makasinda-libya.pdf>, (A.D. 08.12.2016)

¹⁰⁵ Böle, Ulutaş, Öztan, Küçükkelleş, Bektaş, **"ibid"**, p. 19,

<http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/bati-ve-kaddafi-makasinda-libya.pdf>, (A.D. 12.12.2016)

¹⁰⁶ International Monetary Fund, **"Libya- 2013 Article IV Consultation"**, IMF Country Report No. 13/150, Washington DC, USA, May 2013, p. 22, 23, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13150.pdf>, (A.D. 12.12.2016)

of Qudhafi's foreign policy. One of the relevant affects resulting from this foreign policy was the 24 billion dollars of loss as a sanction of United Nations after 'Lockerbie Disaster' experienced in Scotland in 1988 in consequence of supporting opponent armed organizations logistically and economically as a part of this foreign policy. ¹⁰⁷

According to human development report of United Nations in 2010, Libya was at the 53. Rank among 169 countries¹⁰⁸ and its general unemployment rate was 13,5% according to 2010 datas of World Bank. ¹⁰⁹ As a consequence of these developments, Libyan public was influenced by reactions that began in Tunisia in 2011 and then spreaded over Egypt and began protests to make Qudhafi abdicate. That incomes received from oil and gas exports weren't reflected to public and negative effects caused by economic losses resulting from embargos had a strong influence on these protest¹¹⁰. However the weakened positions of social and political institutions had also great effect as defined by Vandewalle and Castel. ¹¹¹ The actions beginning with detention of opponent advocate Fethi Terbil on 15 February 2011 in Benghazi increased its tension along with violent response of security forces against peaceful protests of Libyan folk and these events lead Qudhafi opponents to organize the demonstrations called 'Day of Rage' on 17 February. The reason of so highly public reaction upon detention of Advocate Terbil was the fact that he was the deparative for the relatives of more than 1000 people murdered in the reaction repressed by the state forces in 1996 in Ebu Selim Prison of Tripolitania. Besides the city of

¹⁰⁷ Verenica Nmoma, "**Power and Force: Libya's Relations with The United States**", Journal of Third World Studies, Fall2009, Vol. 26 Issue 2, September 2009, p. 137, <http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/45024761/power-force-libyas-relations-united-states>, (A.D. 12.12.2016)

¹⁰⁸ "**About Libya**", United Nations, <http://www.ly.undp.org/content/libya/en/home/countryinfo.html>, (A.D. 12.12.2016)

¹⁰⁹ "**Labor Market Dynamics in Libya: Reintegration For Recovery**", World Bank, Washington DC, USA, p. 14, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/22015/9781464805660.pdf?sequence=1>, (A.D. 12.12.2016)

¹¹⁰ Harun Öztürkler, "**General Specifications of Libyan Economy**", Ortadoğu Analysis Magazine, Vol:4, Nr: 39, March 2012, p. 83, <http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/OA/39/5harunozturkler.pdf>, (A.D. 12.12.2016)

¹¹¹ "**Libya: Post-War Challenges: Economic Brief**", African Development Bank, September 2011, p. 1, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Brocure%20Anglais%20Lybie_North%20Africa%20Quarterly%20Analytical.pdf, (A.D. 12.12.2016)

Benghazi had a symbolic meaning in terms of being headquarter of King Idris, removed by Qudhafi, and also having the most crowded opponent population. Later on Qudhafi response drastically to the reactions began firstly in Benghazi and then spread over some other cities and thus a serious conflict resembling to a civil war began in Libya. With the aim of taking the vanquished cities back Qudhafi used special units, African mercenaries and various heavy weapons along with warplanes and tanks ¹¹² and carried out attack on rebelling public. The violent attitude of Muammer Qudhafi caused longer and harsher reactions of Libyan in contrast with Tunisia and Egypt. As a result of uncompromising attitude of Qudhafi, the clans taking sides with opposition gained dominance of initially Benghazi and then the other cities of East. After rulership of oppositions on East Libya, Temporal Libya National Council was established on 5 March 2011 under the leadership of Mustafa Mohammed Abdulcelil who was holding duty of General Secretariat of Justice Department and Public Commitee during Qudhafi period. ¹¹³ Following this development, Qudhafi opened fire over protestors by means of warplanes and mercenaries and it was declared that thousands of people were killed under these attacks. Upon this unfortunate events, it was realized that smooth transition experienced in Tunisia and Egypt could not be achieved in Libya. Thereupon some parts called for international communities on duty i order to hinder a civil war or a possible massacre in Libya. Depending upon this call, National Council was legitimized by France, Qatar, Italy and Spain and thus the Arab Awakening actions in Libya were carried over an international area. ¹¹⁴ United Nations Security Council conducted a meeting on 17 March 2011 and decided with the majority of votes in the National Security Council the 1973 numbered decision containing ceasefire call, discontinuance of any violence against civils, protection of civils by getting all precautions without causing any occupation situation, declaration of a no-fly zone, weapon embargo and asset freeze of Qudhafi and his neighborhood. In 48 hours after this decision, an operation was launched in Libya under

¹¹² Öztürkler, **ibid.**, p. 83,
<http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/OA/39/5harunozturkler.pdf>, (A.D. 12.12.2016)

¹¹³ Baran Kuşuoğlu, “**Libya: NATO Contribution to Arab Spring**”, 2012, Number: 22, p. 107, 108,
http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_dergisi/2012/sayi22/99-118.pdf, (A.D. 12.12.2016)

¹¹⁴ Böle, Selin M., Ulutaş, Ufuk, Öztan, Taha, Küçükkelç, Müjge, Bektaş, Eda, **ibid.**, p. 4, 5,
<http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/bati-ve-kaddafi-makasinda-libya.pdf>, (A.D. 12.12.2016)

leadership of France by the coalition formed by USA, England, Italy and Canada. It was decided that any decisions about Libya taken by United Nations Security Council would be assumed by NATO from 27 March onwards. Upon these developments, Qudhafi was killed by Libyan public on 20 October 2011 in Sirte, the place where he was born and hid during the reactions and 42 years of Qudhafi dictatorship culminated in his death. ¹¹⁵

2.5. ARAB AWAKENING IN YEMEN AND ITS REASONS

Another country who experienced Arab Awakening is Yemen. The difference of Yemen, living Arab Awakening after Tunisia and Egypt, from the other countries of this region is that it is being ruled by democracy. In this country, where Islamist parties, by means of the regime based on elections, have been coalition partners since Yemen achieved its independence in 1990, the government is not ruled by a single hand like the other Arab countries. However, Ali Abdullah Salih, the leader of Yemen, caused the coalition partner Al-Islah to be an opponent as a result of his regulations in last years. He resigned from his duty after the protests began in January 2010 as a reaction to this situation. Eventually Yemen, as the other countries like Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, was a country who achieved the government change and made a history as another country who reached the goal of Arab Awakening.

Yemen is accepted among the oldest civilizational and located in the southwest point of Arabian Peninsula. Its regime is Republic. The absolute amount of its population is Muslims and 60 percent of the public is formed by Sunnis, ¹¹⁶ the rest 40 percent is formed by ‘Husis’ expressed as close to Shafii sects, connected to Zeydiyye arm of the shia.¹¹⁷ Yemen, defined by

¹¹⁵ Böle, Selin M., Ulutaş, Ufuk, Öztan, Taha, Küçükkelleş, Müjge, Bektaş, Eda, **ibid**, p. 4, 5,

<http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/bati-ve-kaddafi-makasinda-libya.pdf>, (A.D. 12.12.2016)

¹¹⁶ Mustafa Aydıntepe, İzzettin Artokça, “**Yemen**”, Stratejical Report No: 55, p. 5, 19, http://www.tasam.org/Files/PDF/Raporlar/yemen_raporu.pdf_b7e9f548-3946-4f3d-ac14-b8448ef6b8eb.pdf, (A.D. 16.12.2016)

¹¹⁷ “**Proceedings Book**”, Editor: Prof. Dr. Hasret Çolak, Res. Ass. İtr Aladağ Görentaş, Res. Ass. Derya Özveri, International Middle East Congress, October 2012, Vol: II, Kocaeli, p. 72, <http://www.bilgesam.org/Images/Haberler/HaberlerDiger/imec2.pdf>, (A.D. 16.12.2016)

Romans as 'Happy Arabia', witnessed some developments contrary to its name in historical process. Just in 20. Century, the country witnessed some disagreements in 1960s between Nasır followers and royalists, in 1970s between nationalists and communists and in 1980s between different parts of South. Additionally, Yemen was formed by two different states defined as South and North Yemen before 1990. Although this two states were united in 1990, the country has still been living conflicts of different communities. Because of this reason, the source of problems experienced in Yemen today should be searched in its history.¹¹⁸

We will examine the conflicts occurred in Yemen's history in the period after the mid-century of 20. Century. Yemen has a geography giving the tribes the opportunity of an organized armament owing to its wide deserts and rough structures. In September 1969, Nasır follower Colonel Abdullah El Sallal, who was supported by Haşhid sheik Abdullah El Ahmar, one of the important tribes of North, removed Imam El Bedr from the government by a coup in North Yemen. As a result of this event, Yemen Arab Republic (YAC) was announced.¹¹⁹ 'Royalist powers' supported by Saudi Arabia opposed to the Republic with a riot lasting till the reconciliation came in 1968. Saudi Arabia recognized the Yemen Arabic Republic in 1970 and declared a cease fire. These alliances, occurring as a result of civil war experienced in the country, have continued until today in various forms (states with tribes, all sides in itself and Saudi Arabia, balance and changing alliances between state and tribes) and formed the base of 'fragmental structure' of Yemen.¹²⁰

Depending upon the developments in North Yemen, South Yemen got his share of these events and it began to utter its demands for independence from England who was mandating South Yemen and had an intention to evacuate Aden, the capital city of South. The South Yemen public, who took the advantage of evacuation of Aden, announced in 1967 South Yemen Arab

¹¹⁸ Mehmet Salih Gün, "Yemen'de Arap Baharı", p. 122, 123, http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_dergisi/2012/sayi22/119-140.pdf, (A.D.16.12.2016)

¹¹⁹ Gün, *ibid*, p. 122, 123, http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_dergisi/2012/sayi22/119-140.pdf, (A.D.16.12.2016)

¹²⁰ Ginny Hill and Gerd Nonneman, "Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States: Elite Politics, Street Protests and Regional Diplomacy", Chatham House, May 2011, p. 5, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/19237_0511yemen_gulfbp.pdf, (A.D.16.12.2016)

Republic consisting of Aden and the other cities around it¹²¹. That the Labor Party came into power in this period enhanced an urban proletariat's efficiency in South Yemen and especially in Aden and in this region. This unexampled group in Arabic Peninsula was radical and left-oriented. This class, whose ideology was extraordinary for the local people, tried to convey its thoughts onto whole South and caused some changes, even if just a smidgen, on traditional socio-political Dynamics in the region. Besides Labor Party in England issued a White Book and declared by means of it that South Yemen would get its independence. Upon this, left wing extremists of National Liberation Front toppled Şaabi, who came to power by establishing National Liberation Front in October of 1963, and established a Marxist regime. On 30 November 1970, the country was renamed as South Yemen Democratic Public Republic. This evolution as being the first Marxist state in Arab World approached in time to Soviet Block¹²². Towards the end of 1980s, internal conflicts began to appear in South Yemen. Besides this, the Cold War ended in this period. Upon this, South Yemen, who lost its most important supporter since its declaration upon end of Cold War, began to face with serious problems about carrying its existence on in economy and politics¹²³. With this international environment in earlier 1990s, the requirements of government in South and the greed of government in North in terms of drilling oil sources shared between two states on Yemen land, were joint with publics' demand for union and in 1990 Yemen Republic was announced. It was needed to run an integrative policy to achieve a real integrity between these two different structured states. Correspondingly, compromising, analytical, rational and practical directors were needed who would be able to achieve political moves.¹²⁴ Hence, many South Yemeni leaders, who were in the opinion of being

¹²¹ Zekeriya Kurşun, “**Dead-Ends of Yemen After Arab Spring**”, <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/gorus/arak-bahari-sonrasi-yemenin-cikmazlari>, (A.D.16.12.2016)

¹²² Türel Yılmaz, “**Middle East in International Politics**”, Barış Book, Ankara, 2011, p. 152.

¹²³ Ibrahim Sharqieh, Kenneth M. Pollack, Daniel L. Byman, “**The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East**”, A Saban Center At The Brookings Institution Book, 2011, p. 222, <https://books.google.com.tr/books?id=2Bmejr8WaRkC&pg=PA229&lpg=PA229&dq=Kenneth+M.+Pollack+yemen&source=bl&ots=bxwHA8D9aP&sig=t674OjoxV1Q09XwAzFZ6kG5kde4&hl=tr&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiq8JanuvfQAhUkAsAKHdoYCikQ6AEIRjAG#v=onepage&q=Kenneth%20M.%20Pollack%20yemen&f=false>, (A.D.16.12.2016)

¹²⁴ W. Andrew Terrill, “**The Conflicts in Yemen And U.S. National Security**”, Strategic Studies Institute . January 2011, p. 6, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/PUB1040.pdf>, (A.D.16.12.2016)

inclined to these specifications for a sustainable economical and political success in Yemen Republic, supported the union of Yemen with the hope of getting a role in this new system. However this hope was lost when Ali Abdullah Salih, who had been the leader of North Yemen since 1978, took the control of newly united Yemen.¹²⁵ South Yemeni leaders, who were in the thought of getting a position in the administrative level of newly established government, were excluded from governmental stages by Ali Abdullah Salih polity on the contrary of their expectations. The disappointed Southerners were additionally confronted with political, economic and social differences and they began to think that they were being oppressed and consequently went to a war with North Yemen in May 1994 to get their independence again.¹²⁶ But the results were contrary to their expectations. Upon occupancy of the capital city Aden by North forces after two months from the beginning of conflicts, the war was ended on 7 July. This result was not good for Yemen Republic but specially for South Yemenis. Because the arbiter directors in the government of North Yemen increased the control over national sources including earth and business opportunities in the country just after their triumph and so the legitimacy problem of regime increased rather badly. After these events, the displeasure of South Yemenis was naturally doubled and these negative impressions caused the formation of a group called ‘South Movement’ with the support of many parts in 2007. The subjects uttered by this group were that they were being neglected in terms of Economy, were under political pressure and their identity was under threat. However the ruling Abdullah Salih ignored these demands and preferred suppressing the protest of this group with strict measures instead of solving problems.¹²⁷

According to the report of Human Rights Watch in October 2008, it would be a misleading factor to limit the displeasure experienced in Yemen just with Southern Area. According to this report, Salih granted privileges to different groups during his thirty years of governing and caused riots against the centralized management because of his repressive

¹²⁵ Hill and Nonneman, **ibid**, p. 6,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/19237_0511yemen_gulfbp.pdf, (A.D.16.12.2016)

¹²⁶ Terrill, **ibid**, p. 6-8,
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1040.pdf>, (A.D.16.12.2016)

¹²⁷ Terrill, **ibid**, p. 24-27,
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1040.pdf>, (A.D.16.12.2016)

methods. Furthermore, as stated before, these insurrections were not limited with the southern part of country who had been a separate state till 1990, also serious revolts occurred in northern part where he had been ruling since 1978.¹²⁸ The Husis are a rebellious community allied to Zeydis, a member of Shiite sect. They went on a guerilla warfare against Salih's government on the grounds that there was a discrimination policy on some areas (economical, political and social) against themselves after 2004 and Saudi Arabia allowed them to promulgate their Salafi ideology on the region. Besides the Husis moved their rebellions onto Saudi Arabia lands on the ground that Yemen army allowed them to use their territory; accordingly Saudi Arabia propelled its land and air forces onto this district referring this event¹²⁹. Consequently, according to Bernard Heykel, Saudi Arabia tried to control the weak actors of Yemen administrations during historical process. Depending upon this, the conflicts between Abdullah Salih and Hutis was resulted in deaths of thousands of people and displacements of hundreds of thousands.¹³⁰ These so called 'local problems' shortly summarized above accrued with Al-qaida sourced by Saudi Arabia in 2009. As a result of all these conflicts, presumably two thirds of the country was out of the control of national government even before the reactions began.¹³¹

In consideration of the above given conflicts, Yemen was not a strange to political instability before Arab Awakening. In additional to this, Arab Awakening added naturally a new dimension to the inhomogeneous situation of the country. According to Peter Salisbury, Salih's government, who left the bilateral management of Yemen to his follower elites during the integration period, made his government disputable with this attitude. Abdullah Salih, who caused a questioning about the legitimacy of all institutions and organizations with this attitude,

¹²⁸ **“Disappearances and Arbitrary Arrests in the Armed Conflict with Huthi Rebels in Yemen”**, Human Rights Watch, October 2008, p. 2, <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/yemen1008web.pdf>, (A.D.16.12.2016)

¹²⁹ Hill and Nonneman, **ibid**, p. 17, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/19237_0511yemen_gulfbp.pdf, (A.D.16.12.2016)

¹³⁰ Bernard Haykel, **“Saudi Arabia's Yemen Dilemma”**, June 14, 2011, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/saudi-arabia/2011-06-14/saudi-arabias-yemen-dilemma?page=show>, (A.D.16.12.2016)

¹³¹ Christopher Boucek, **“U.S. Policy in Yemen”**, Middle East Program Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., July 19, 2011, p. 4, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/0719_testimony_boucek.pdf, (A.D.16.12.2016)

gave the control of a great part of economy (including sectors related to importation, management and distributions of basic products) to his elite supporters ineligible on this subject.¹³² However Yemen was on 146. rank among 178 countries in terms of 2010 Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International because of the actions of these people who were claimed to carry Works on unofficial departments (like oil, weapon, human trafficking) near official economic relations¹³³. In addition to that Yemen, whose jobless rate was 40% according to 2010 report of International Labour Organization¹³⁴, has a population growth rate up to 3%. It is estimated that 43% of this population lived below the poverty line and 57,9% of children undernourished. In this country whose population's 2/3 is under 24 years of age, a young, jobless and dissatisfied group comes to the light with the fact that having one of the highest population growth rate around the World. Half of the young population is jobless because of having no self-enhancement possibility¹³⁵. Besides an increase in social gender differences is observed in Yemen. While 69% of men living in the country is literate, this rate is just 29% for the women. Additionally, while more than 50% of girls are not able to graduate from primary school, this rate is 18% for boys. These results make a problematic impression in terms of life standards of community in the country. Besides it is foreseen that the oil sources and water springs would be depleted in ten years¹³⁶.

¹³² Peter Salisbury, “**Yemen’s Economy: Oil, Imports and Elites**”, Chatham House, October 2011, p. 3, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/1011pp_yemeneconomy.pdf, (A.D.16.12.2016)

¹³³ “**Corruption Perceptions Index 2010**”, Transparency International, October 2010, p. 3, http://akgul.bilkent.edu.tr/CPI/CPI_report_ForWeb.pdf, (A.D.16.12.2016)

¹³⁴ Michele Bruni, Andrea Salvini, Lara Uhlenhaut, “**Demographic and Labour Market Trends in Yemen**”, Beirut, Lebanon, 2014, p. 49, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro_beirut/documents/publication/wcms_358144.pdf, (A.D.16.12.2016)

¹³⁵ Jessica Forsythe, “**Opportunities and Obstacles for Yemeni Workers in GCC Labour Markets**”, Chatham House, London, United Kingdom, September 2011, p. 3, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/0911pp_gcc_0.pdf, (A.D.16.12.2016)

¹³⁶ Sharqieh, Pollack, Byman., **ibid**, p. 225, <https://books.google.com.tr/books?id=2Bmejr8WaRkC&pg=PA229&lpg=PA229&dq=Kenneth+M.+Pollack+yemen&source=bl&ots=bxwHA8D9aP&sig=t674OjoxV1Q09XwAzFZ6kG5kde4&hl=tr&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiq8JanuvfQAhUkAsAKHdoYCikQ6AEIRjAG#v=onepage&q=Kenneth%20M.%20Pollack%20yemen&f=false>, (A.D.16.12.2016)

Above summarized political and socio-economical table gave a way to protests and alienation of people to 'official state structure'. The young population, who was inspired by reactions in the other countries specially by Tunisia and Egypt, poured into the streets in almost every cities and stated their demands for freedom, justice, honor and regime change. That the people taking part in reactions were from various parts caused a difference in the demands at the beginning. The protests in Yemen began in January of 2010 with a small group of demonstrators who poured onto the streets. This group was of the opinion that there was no future for the youth in the country, rule of law principle was failed and the regime took the control of all economic opportunities. Soon afterwards, the demonstrators under the name of 'youth movement' began to state their demands for labor, education, public assistance programs, equal rights to women, discontinuance of corruption and they also demanded that Salih and his family would discharge all high level servicemen before forming a new political order¹³⁷. By contrast with students and non-governmental organizations, opposition parties had a self-possessed manner till the last moment and in the first step they demanded permanent reforms instead of Salih's resignation. Opposition parties, who got permission beforehand, stated their demands for a political reform, rather than resignation of Salih, in their official speeches and slogans and they also struggled for not confronting directly with regime supporters. However, their constructive attitudes didn't last long and the opposition parties along with a group of ecclesiastics presented a route map on 2 March to Abdullah Salih including five items which prescribed him to resign till the end of 2011 for a peaceful solution. Besides opposition parties stated that the government had to show respect to the peaceful demonstration right of public and also demanded that the responsible using violence had to be found and punished. They also made a call for a dialogue process with all relevant groups including separatist Southerner oppositions in exile. Salih actualized the dialogue call of opposition on 7 March; however the opposition stated that they would start the surgeries just providing that Salih would accept the abdication in one year¹³⁸.

¹³⁷ Gün, *ibid*, p. 128, 129,

http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_dergisi/2012/sayi22/119-140.pdf, (A.D.16.12.2016)

¹³⁸ **"Popular Protest In North African And The Middle East (II): Yemen Between Reform And Revolution"**, International Crisis Group, Middle East/North Africa Report No: 102, 10 March 2011, p. 2-4, http://www.observatori.org/paises/pais_64/documentos/102%20Popular%20Protest%20in%20North%20Africa%20and%20the%20Middle%20East%20II_%20Yemen%20between%20Reform%20and%20Revolution.pdf, (A.D.16.12.2016)

Arab Awakening protests were initiated by a group who hadn't been a threat against Salih beforehand. Salih took some cautionary judgements in economy like rise in salaries of civil servants, serious decreases in taxes, subventions, new price corrections. He also backed down from implementation of constitutional amendment which would take period restrictions off in presidential elections. However, he was not able to terminate the protests. In addition to these, Salih made a call for formation of a government of national unity and restart of national dialogue process in stuck¹³⁹. However he resorted to violence like all other authoritarian governments of the region because of increase in the opponents against himself. Salih poured his own supporters onto the streets and tried to repress the demonstrators with the help of undercover cops and sharpshooters. But as he could not suppress the protests, he declared a state of emergency and the conflicts between Salih and opponent groups revealed a possibility of civil war¹⁴⁰. This possibility caused Gulf Cooperation Organization to start a series of initiatives movement in April 2011. Gulf Cooperation Organization interposed in April and May of 2011 with the support of Saudi Arabia (member), USA, England and European Union and made a suggestion to Ali Abdullah Salih¹⁴¹. This a short document consisting suggestion, proposed Salih to turn over the management to his vice president in return of not being judged. Besides this agreement defined general terms of early presidential election which would be hold after constitutional amendment and also contained the items about constitution referendum and accordingly constituency elections. Salih rejected to sign this document three times¹⁴². Because Salih and his followers hoped to retard the resignation or reach an agreement with better conditions. On the date of 22 May on which Salih rejected to sign the document for the last time, the conflicts began between

¹³⁹ Boucek, **ibid**, p. 2,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/0719_testimony_boucek.pdf, (A.D.16.12.2016)

¹⁴⁰ Gün, **ibid**, p. 130,
http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_dergisi/2012/sayi22/119-140.pdf, (A.D.16.12.2016)

¹⁴¹ Hill, and Nonneman, **ibid**, p. 6,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/19237_0511yemen_gulfbp.pdf, (A.D.16.12.2016)

¹⁴² Gün, **ibid**, p. 130,
http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_dergisi/2012/sayi22/119-140.pdf, (A.D.16.12.2016)

Salih sympathizer soldiers and the militias allied with El-Ahmar family in the capital city¹⁴³. The bomb attack in a mosque in area of presidency on 3 June resulted with head of the Privy Council's death and injury of Salih seriously. And so the protest started by Yemenis with a peaceful target turned into a gun battle between well-armed elite groups and the country got to a civil war. During the negotiations tried to maintain during summer season of 2011, the followers of Abdullah Salih struggled to protect their power but armed opponent groups tried to take over the management¹⁴⁴. In this political and military gridlock, United Nations Special Representative Cemal Benoma started to intervene in negotiations for a document including a calendar related to authorization and responsibilities of counterparties. On 24 September, United Nations Security Council made a call to 'stop violence' and start 'a political transition process including Yemenis based on Gulf Cooperation initiatives'. On 21 October, upon Security Council's 2014 numbered decision, a message was given to the parties for signing the agreement as immediate as possible under the threat of international compulsion and sanction¹⁴⁵. Salih accepted the demand of Yemen public for his resignation (the same for the opponent afterwards), the 'Attempt' of Gulf Cooperation Organization and the mechanism needed for its implementation (called as Agreement hereupon) by signing the document on 23 November 2011.¹⁴⁶

With the signed 'Attempt' the particulars below were defined:

¹⁴³ Jeremy M. Sharp, "**Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations**", Congressional Research Service, November 1, 2012, USA, p. 4, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl34170.pdf>, (A.D.16.12.2016)

¹⁴⁴ Eva Sohlman, "**Yemen Fractures on the Brink of Civil War as Al-Qaeda Gains Ground**", American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 2011 (33:5), p. 237, <http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/uafp20/33/5>, (A.D.16.12.2016)

¹⁴⁵ "**Popular Protest In North African And The Middle East (II): Yemen Between Reform And Revolution**", International Crisis Group, Middle East/North Africa Report No: 102, 10 March 2011, p. 2, http://www.observatori.org/paises/pais_64/documentos/102%20Popular%20Protest%20in%20North%20Africa%20and%20the%20Middle%20East%20_II_%20Yemen%20between%20Reform%20and%20Revolution.pdf, (A.D.16.12.2016)

¹⁴⁶ "**Popular Protest In North African And The Middle East (II): Yemen Between Reform And Revolution**", International Crisis Group, Middle East/North Africa Report No: 102, 10 March 2011, p. 1, http://www.observatori.org/paises/pais_64/documentos/102%20Popular%20Protest%20in%20North%20Africa%20and%20the%20Middle%20East%20_II_%20Yemen%20between%20Reform%20and%20Revolution.pdf, (A.D.16.12.2016)

- “A government would be formed in latest 7 days by which both power and opponent would be represented fairly (Article 1),
- A law would be legislated by the parliament in a month which would prevent the trial of president and his coworkers for her actions during their period of duty (Article 3),
- The president would resign after this law and the vice-president would take over the management (Article 4),
- The new president would hold presidential elections in 60 days (Article 5) and a constitutional committee would be established (Article 6) for the preparation of new constitution, which would be voted by a referendum (Article 7).”¹⁴⁷

Abdullah Salih, who resigned from presidency on 23 November 2011 as he promised, stayed on duty according to the provision of Yemen constitution till the election of new president. According to this constitution Salih, who was obliged to hold the presidential elections in 90 days, completed his duty upon election of Abid Rabbu Mansur Hadi as president on 21 February 2012.¹⁴⁸

In sum, Yemen, one of the countries of Arabic Peninsula experiencing conflicts for long years, have not reached a homogeneous structure yet because of various cultures it possessed. Along with this, Yemen experienced an ‘exclusionist’ policy by Ali Abdullah Salih, the leader of Yemen since 1990 formed by union of North and South Yemen. His attitude to use economic, political and cultural sources of state just for his beneficiaries caused his management to weaken. Because of difficulties he experienced in controlling two thirds of country as a result of his manners, he could not practice a management even against settlements of terror organizations on Yemen’s land. His attitude to defend the benefits of elites and ignore the public caused protests beginning in his first years of government and

¹⁴⁷ Gün, *ibid*, p. 132,

http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_dergisi/2012/sayi22/119-140.pdf, (A.D.16.12.2016)

¹⁴⁸ “**Popular Protest In North African And The Middle East (II): Yemen Between Reform And Revolution**”, International Crisis Group, Middle East/North Africa Report No: 102, 10 March 2011, p. 2, http://www.observatori.org/paises/pais_64/documentos/102%20Popular%20Protest%20in%20North%20Africa%20and%20the%20Middle%20East%20II_%20Yemen%20between%20Reform%20and%20Revolution.pdf, (A.D.16.12.2016)

lasting till Arab Awakening actions. Depending upon this, Arab Awakening actions emerged to utter the demands for democracy and freedom and Salih was forced to resign. Consequently, the political stability, which was not achieved during Ali Abdullah Salih period, does not appear to be succeeded in a short term in Yemen, one of the oldest civilizational of the World. However the Arab Awakening demonstrations experienced in this country, attaining its aim, increased the hope for a successful political management.



3. WHAT IS GEZI PARK RESISTANCE?

After Arab Awakening actions, in the first hours of 27 May 2013, that Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality pulled down the walls of Gezi Park facing Divan Hotel with the aim of removing Gezi Park, last remaining green field in Taksim, and started to uproot the trees in this area caused reaction of a score of people. The rejection of these people surrounding the trees with the aim of preventing their removal was carried afterwards on to social media by Taksim Community of Interest ¹⁴⁹ formed by 128 different labour organizations, syndicates, political parties and democratically mass organizations. With the effect of disproportionate use of force by police, these actions took in a short span of time the form of protests encouraged by a large mass who expressed their displeasure with ruling sense of Justice and Development Party. According to Polat S. Alpman, these demonstrations, named as ‘Gezi Park Actions’ later, turned in time from objection into reaction and then from reaction to resistance. Besides this Alpman stated that these protests became the most important social movement which indicated the importance of transmission from individual projections to institutionalization of democracy in Turkey. ¹⁵⁰

Examining the development process of Gezi Park actions, we observe that these protests lasted from 27 May 2013 to the mid-July with different events like standing man etc. Gezi Park is a small city park (38.000 square metre) located in Taksim Square, the geographical and culturel center of Istanbul. Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality,

¹⁴⁹ Mustafa Görkem Doğan, “**Gezi Resistance as a Social Movement: Search for Permanent**”- **Refereed Article**, Education Science Social Magazine, Vol:12 Nr:48, Autumn 2014, p. 100, <http://www.egitimilimtoplum.com.tr/index.php/ebt/article/viewFile/579/pdf>, (A.D. 18.12.2016)

¹⁵⁰ S. Polat Alpman, “**Gezi Park: ‘City Right’ Discussions and Defence of Sociology**”, Internationally Attended VII. National Sociology Congress- Proceedings Book III, Editor: Prof. Dr. Muammer Tuna, Muğla-Turkey, 02-05 October 2013, p. 382, http://www.sosyolojikongresi.org/ekitap/cilt_3.pdf, (A.D. 28.12.2016)

authorized over this area, legalized the proposal of building a shopping center instead of the park and rebuilding Taksim Square as a way just for pedestrians. As a result of this, a small group of environmentalist activists organized a campaign in spring of 2013 and went to law in order to cancel the Project. But this attempt was failed.¹⁵¹ On 27 May, the demolition plan of the park was put into effect and the bulldozers broke a small part of the walking train on the area and pulled down some of the trees. During this process, the environmentalist activists on this scene prevented the progression of this demolition. On the next day, a more crowded number of demonstrators including some delegates from Turkish Grand National Assembly came to the area to prevent this demolition. Some of the demonstrators put up tents on the park in order to inspect and watch the events and to prevent the progression of destruction. After police response to these ‘occupation activists’ in the morning of 29 May, more people took their places on the park.

On the date of 30 May, police intervened to the protestors violently and this development caused an increase in the number of protestors. But the main fraction point of the actions was after insurance of many protestors by the last police intervene on 31 May. While on 27 May just a small number of people were protesting on the area, hundreds of thousands of people poured onto the streets at the night of 31 May upon increasing violence during police responses. At this night, hundreds of thousands of people got to the Taksim and Istiklal Avenue, constructed barricades and struggled to enter the Taksim Square and Gezi Park under the control of police till this moment. Meanwhile the protests spread over the other parts of Istanbul.¹⁵² On 31 May, Istanbul 6. Administrative Court granted a motion for stay of execution related to cancel of ‘Taksim Artillery Barracks Project’. Upon these developments, in the morning of 1 June thousands of people from Anatolian Side stride on the First Bosphorus Bridge with the

¹⁵¹ Erdem Yörük, Murat Yüksel, “**Social Dynamics of the Gezi Park**”, p. 133, https://www.academia.edu/14825238/Toplum_ve_Bilim_Gezi_eylemlerinin_toplumsal_dinamikleri, (A.D. 28.12.2016)

¹⁵² Yörük, Yüksel, **ibid**, p. 134, https://www.academia.edu/14825238/Toplum_ve_Bilim_Gezi_eylemlerinin_toplumsal_dinamikleri, (A.D. 28.12.2016)

aim of reaching Taksim Square and they got to Gezi Park. The date of 1 June 2013 was the date on which the Gezi Park protests spread over the whole country. Millions of people, who learned the developments via social media, poured onto the streets all around the country. Thus this area became the center of the actions expanded into a crowded revolt in time. After the conflicts at the night of 31 May between police and hundreds of thousands of people trying to enter to the Park, the police retreated from the area at the midday hours of 1 June and left the area to the protestors. After the conflicts during which more than 1000 people got injured according to the numbers got from Turkish Medical Association, hundreds of thousands of protestors achieved to occupy Taksim Square and Gezi Park.¹⁵³

The reactions developed between 28 May and 15 June 2013 began at the beginning on Gezi Park and moved in a short span of time onto Taksim Square.¹⁵⁴ On first days of demonstrations, especially environmental sensitivity and financial requests were uttered but on the third day of actions, on 29 May, the President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality cut down the trees with the aim of building an ‘artillery barracks’¹⁵⁵ on this relevant area. It is stated that his speech during which he uttered that ‘Any way you slice it! We made a decision about this area. We will do it!’¹⁵⁶ Caused an increasing reaction among public. In addition to this, Tayyip Erdogan’s declaration ‘Yes, we will build also a mosque. I will not get any permission from a few free looters. The ones voted for us gave this authorisation to

¹⁵³ Yörük, Yüksel, *ibid*, p. 134, 135,
https://www.academia.edu/14825238/Toplum_ve_Bilim_Gezi_eylemlerinin_toplumsal_dinamikleri, (A.D. 28.12.2016)

¹⁵⁴ Ayşe Çolpan Kavuncu, “**Not ‘Civil’ ‘Political Gezi Park With Its Civil Apperance**”, Individual and Social Magazine, Spring 2014, Vol 4 . Nr 7, p. 116,
<http://bireyvetoplumdergisi.com/article/download/5000071600/5000065918>, (A.D. 18.12.2016)

¹⁵⁵ Artillery Barracks, the point where the 31 March Incidents were started, is denoted as the main reason of Gezi Park actions. The protestors claim that the governing Justice and Development Party aimed to build a shopping center and a hotel copying the architect of Artillary Barrack instead of Gezi Park.

¹⁵⁶ “**Gezi Park actions: What Happened day by day?**”, 29 May 2016,
<https://indigodergisi.com/2016/05/gezi-parki-olaylari-gun-gun-neler-yasandi/>, (A.D. 18.12.2016)

us!¹⁵⁷ caused more reactions among the public. Esin Kalaycıoğlu explains the reasons of these actions spread later over 79 cities of Turkey as following: “The individuals felt themselves inately singled out, abased and punished seem to take part in the demonstrations both in Istanbul and in the other cities of Turkey to utter their reactions. Against tyrant, violent, censor, arrogant, derogatory and dismissive wordings of Government, reactions in various formations and artistic applications like verbal and written slogans, graffiti’s, humor magazines, musical titles voiced by choirs emerged to state their demands for freedom, respect to law, democratization, equal treatment. As a reaction to the sense of that Justice and Development Party was evolving into a single man government moving away from democracy, a liberation and democratization demand occurred as a reason of basic political participation. When we handle it as a political participation action, 28 May- 15 June 2013 Gezi Park actions were emerged as a reaction to the attempts of government related to Gezi Park.”¹⁵⁸ Besides, according to the survey of a think tank called GPOT including interviews held with 16 people from various parts, main reasons of this demonstrations were the policies of Justice and Development Party and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who defined the protestors as ‘freebooters’ and used a harsh wording against them.¹⁵⁹ According to Emiliano Allesandri, Nora Fisher Onar, Ozgur Ünlühisarcı from Foreing Affairs, the reason gathering the mass together to protest during Gezi Park actions was the sense of displeasure against sardonic and offensive statements of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Despite the large variety of ethnic and religious structure of Turkey, common disappointment sensed on basis regulating social life along with the shared experiences on repressions

¹⁵⁷ **ibid.**

<https://indigodergisi.com/2016/05/gezi-parki-olaylari-gun-gun-neler-yasandi/>, (A.D. 18.12.2016)

¹⁵⁸ Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “**Anatomy of Political Attandence**”, Science Academy Association, p. 4, 5, <http://bilimakademisi.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Siyasal-Katilmanin-Anatomisi.pdf>, (A.D. 18.12.2016)

¹⁵⁹ Mensur Akgün, Burak Cop, Yunus Emre, Çağla Gül Yesevi, “**What happened in Gezi Park? An Evoluation from the Windows of Participants**”, GPOT- Kültür University, İstanbul, May 2014, p. 11, http://www.gpotcenter.org/dosyalar/Gezi_Parkinda_Ne_Oldu_May2014.pdf, (A.D. 18.12.2016)

gathered public from various living spaces together.¹⁶⁰ Other reasons for pouring onto streets were the thought of injustice, ineligible opposition and problems about urban life.

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According to the report explained on 2 June 2013 by Turkish Medical Association, more than 1000 people got injured by teargas and y guns in Istanbul and Ankara during the demonstrations¹⁶² and thousands of people were arrested. After these events, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Mayor Kadir Topbaş made a statement and remarked that no shopping centers, hotels or residences would be built onto area of Gezi Park, a city museum could be possibly built and in this situation they would discuss it with architects. On 10 June, Vice Prime Minister and Government Spokesman Bulent Arınç made a speech after the meeting of Ministerial Cabinet and stated that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan would negotiate with some parts making requests from government related to Taksim Gezi Park. On 12 June, Tayyip Erdogan met the representatives of different groups demonstrated on Gezi Park. On 14 June, he met for the second time the representatives of various groups including Taksim Platform.¹⁶³ The Taksim Platform representing protestors of Gezi Park uttered their demands for the first time with a written text titled ‘we demand’. In this text, along with special requests about Gezi Park and Taksim, general demands about freedom of expression were stated. They also requested that the responsible for deaths and injuries during demonstrations would be discharged and the ones arrested during protests would be released. According to Seval Unlü Gok, as Taksim Platform- Gezi Park had a process developed

¹⁶⁰ Emiliano Alessandri, Nora Fisher Onar, Ozgur Unluhisarci, “**Triumph in Taksim Square?**”, June 12, 2013, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2013-06-12/triumph-taksim-square>, (A.D. 18.12.2016)

¹⁶¹ Akgün, Cop, Emre, Yesevi, **ibid**, p. 11, http://www.gpotcenter.org/dosyalar/Gezi_Parkinda_Ne_Oldu_May2014.pdf, (A.D. 18.12.2016)

¹⁶² “**Unbalanced Violence Used Cannot Be Accepted!**”, Turkish Medical Association, <http://www.ttb.org.tr/index.php/Haberler/siddet-3832.html>, (A.D. 18.12.2016)

¹⁶³ **ibid**, <https://indigodergisi.com/2016/05/gezi-parki-olaylari-gun-gun-neler-yasandi/>, (A.D. 18.12.2016)

improvisational by various demands, it was difficult to define this period's itself.¹⁶⁴ However Tayyip Erdogan continued later on to use a harsh wording although he negotiated with some parts of demonstrations. As a consequence of this, on 15 June 2013 the police intervened the protestors, took down their tents and forbid entrance to the park¹⁶⁵. As Erdogan continued his harsh wordings, the mass political actions went on in different forms: The protests in forms of standing man, memorial meetings of deaths, woman in bikini, forums etc. reflected the same demand like freedom, democracy, a good management, locality, superiority of law with the aim of drawing attention to Gezi Park actions again.¹⁶⁶

Another specification of Gezi Park actions was the 'occupy' method typical in urban demonstrations. Gazi Park was the first demonstration around the World arranged with the aim of defending a municipal area.¹⁶⁷ According to Ass. Prof. Erdal Yoruk and Murat Yüksel, Taksim Square and Gezi Park turned into a communal region during the actions. A liberated area was created during these 15 days lasting actions. On this isolated area caaled as 'Taksim Commune', foods, beverages, medicines and all the other requirements were out of charge.¹⁶⁸ "A system reforming by itself emerged in the Park. [...] The spatialized places; treatment points, food supply points, library, coloring

¹⁶⁴ Seval Ünlü Gök, "Gezi Resistance as a Movement experienced Politics", Marmara University Political Science Magazine, Vol: 2, Number: 1, March 2014, p. 81, <http://e-dergi.marmara.edu.tr/marusbd/article/download/5000040067/5000038907>, (A.D. 18.12.2016)

¹⁶⁵ **ibid**,

<https://indigodergisi.com/2016/05/gezi-parki-olaylari-gun-gun-neler-yasandi/>, (A.D. 18.12.2016)

¹⁶⁶ Kalaycıoğlu, "ibid", p. 4, 5,

<http://bilimakademisi.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Siyasal-Katilmanin-Anatomisi.pdf>, (A.D. 18.12.2016)

¹⁶⁷ "Negotiation / Space as a Conflicts Base/ Place/ Negotiation Spaces from Paving Stone to City Scale", p. 40,

<http://www.md1927.org.tr/media/PDF/38.pdf>, (A.D. 28.12.2016)

¹⁶⁸ Yoruk, Yüksel, **ibid**, p. 135,

https://www.academia.edu/14825238/Toplum_ve_Bilim_Gezi_eylemlerinin_toplumsal_dinamikleri, (A.D. 28.12.2016)

activities for children, banner preparation points, halay routes, music points, portable food sellers, points for magazines and newspapers were created for the requirements and a living space was emerged.”¹⁶⁹

Various ideas are presented about the reasons of Gezi Park actions, which began on 27 May 2013. According to Burak Bilgehan Ozpek, who stated that Gezi Park actions occurred depending on Turkey’s democracy experience developed for the last 150 years, the people took part in the actions emphasized on ‘advanced democracy’ observed in developed countries. In connection with this relevant ideology, this mass emphasized that the legitimacy source of government was not just the free elections. They focused on the nature of relationship between Justice and Development Party and individual freedom areas of public. ¹⁷⁰ According to Foti Benlisoy, Gezi Park actions were not a logical result of a social movement or political fight or not a product of evolutionary development, but they were social fractions starting a different political period. ¹⁷¹

According to Prof. Dr. Songul Sallan Gul, the Gezi Park actions as an unprecedented civil resistance occurred in its first days against restructuring policies of Justice and Development Party representing the global capital. From this aspect, these actions had the aim of defending the city. Another reason was that the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality wanted to apply restructuring on public places without receiving any opinion from different parts. ¹⁷² The other reason of the demonstrations was the ignorance of demands for various cultures by the political managements.

¹⁶⁹ *ibid*, p. 40,
<http://www.md1927.org.tr/media/PDF/38.pdf>, (A.D. 28.12.2016)

¹⁷⁰ Burak Bilgehan, “**Arab Spring-Gezi Protests and the Legitimacy of Governments**”, Ortadoğu Analysis Magazine, vol: 5 - Nr: 56, August 2013, p. 53.
<http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/OA/56/5burakbilgehan.pdf>, (A.D. 18.12.2016)

¹⁷¹ Foti Benlisoy, “**Gezi Resistance: The Interesting Beginning of Turkey**”, Istanbul, Agora Publishing, 2013, p. 124.

¹⁷² Songül Sallan Gül, Merve Sezer, Özlem Kahya Nizam, “**Gezi Park Actions as a Demand of City Right and a Social Movement from the Activists’ Point of View**”, Süleyman Demirel University Social Sciences Institute Magazine, Year: 2015/2, Nr: 22, p. 8,
<http://sbedergi.sdu.edu.tr/assets/uploads/sites/343/files/22-01-12012016.pdf>, (A.D. 29. 12. 2016)

Depending on this, a movement was created with the requests of a democratically, pluralist, solidarism and fair system along with an opposition against Justice and Development Party. It is also claimed that another reason gathering this mass together was the individualist government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. As an example to this, that he named a sculpture in the city of Kars as ‘freak’ and also his Project to pull down the Atatürk Culture Center in Istanbul and to built an opera house instead. ¹⁷³

When we examine the specifications of protestors in Gezi Park actions, we observe that at least 2,5 million people took part in demonstrations country-wide according to Turkish Republic Ministry of Interior. ¹⁷⁴ According to Konda Research Company, the age average of people protested country-wide was 30,3 and 57,6% of demonstrators were formed by young generation between the ages of 17-30. Besides 50,8% of protestors were the women and 49,2% of them were the men. ¹⁷⁵ Opposition groups fighting on different areas like feminists, LGBTs, environmentalists and Anti-capitalist Muslims, organized left groups and parties, opposition parties, occupational groups, unions, fan groups, students and individual participants not belonging to these groups took part in Gezi Park actions. According to Nail Bayram Yılmaz and Kemal Ali, despite of the generation gap and World-view differences, the protestors built a disorganized group who could move in totalitarian manner and solidarity. ¹⁷⁶ A poll conducted by Bilgi University with 3,000 thousand people took part in these actions in this period gives us some information about the profiles of activists. The demonstrators defined themselves as libertarian and secular individuals. Besides 70

¹⁷³ Gül, Sezer, Nizam, *ibid*, p. 8, 9,
<http://sbedergi.sdu.edu.tr/assets/uploads/sites/343/files/22-01-12012016.pdf>, (A.D. 29. 12. 2016)

¹⁷⁴ Pınar Gümüş, “**Emergency In Protest: Young People’s Politics in Gezi Protests**”, Justus-Liebig-University, Giessen, Germany, May 30, 2016, p. 2,3,
http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2016/12069/pdf/On_Culture_1_Gumus.pdf, (A.D. 18.12.2016)

¹⁷⁵ “**Gezi Report: The Sense ‘Gezi Park Actions’ of Society, Who were the ones in Gezi Park?**”, Konda Research Company, p. 5-8,
http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar/KONDA_GeziRaporu2014.pdf, (A.D. 18.12.2016)

¹⁷⁶ Nail Bayram Yılmaz, Ali Kemal, “**Taksim Gezi Park Actions And The Alevis As An Opposition Factor**”, Marmara University Political Sciences Magazine, March 2016, Vol 4, Nr1, , p. 5,
<http://marmara-universitesi.dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/159418>, (A.D. 18.12.2016)

percent of these people stated that they were nonpartisans.¹⁷⁷ Along with this, the demonstrators did not want the political factors to be used during actions on its first days. For example, the activists on social media criticized the presentation of some protests in a way reflecting any political party. It was also seen that they shared some messages to warn about political differences and structuring as they were of the opinion that these actions were not based on politics. As an example, the participation of some groups to the protests with their flags drew rebuff of the others on social media. The following message was posted related to this situation: “the friends claiming ‘the barricades and flags had a conflict!’ On its first day, 100 people struggled for 3 hours and the destruction was stopped. There were no flags. I always say the same, if you are marching, get your flags with. However, there is no need to be separated with flags. The aim is a Gezi without flags. Although there were some groups helping us here, it got so much support as it is a civil resistance. Don’t ruin it!”¹⁷⁸ “During the same process, the protestors followed a right method in their behalves and prevented direct intervention of politicians on the process. As an example to this, the leader of Republican People's Party Kemal Kılıçdaroglu couldn’t find what he expected and had to retreat.¹⁷⁹ To sum up, the mass protested during the first days of Gezi Park actions reacted under the frame of freedom, secularism, environmental sense as a citizen.

Another point to be emphasized about the events is to express the most active group and method among the protesting mass. Gezi Park actions were peaceful actions like ‘Wall Street Occupy’¹⁸⁰ started on 17 September 2013 on Wall Street, the financial

¹⁷⁷ Meltem Banko, Ali Rıza Babaoğlan, “**The Impact of Digital Citizen in the Gezi Park Process**”, p. 16, <http://www.geziparkkitabi.com/ekitap/GeziParkiKitabi.pdf>, (A.D. 18.12.2016)

¹⁷⁸ Gülcan Işık, “**New Social Movements and Gezi Park Actions in Virtual Reality**”, Selçuk University Communication Faculty Academical Magazine, Vol: 8, Nr:1, July 2013, p. 26, <http://www.selcuk.edu.tr/dosyalar/files/009/dergi/7/temmuz%202013.pdf>, (A.D. 18.12.2016)

¹⁷⁹ “**Taksim Gezi Park Actions Report**”, Strategical Ideas Institute, June 2013, p. 16, <http://www.sde.org.tr/userfiles/file/SDE%20Taksim%20Gezi%20Park%C4%B1%20Raporu%20Haziran%202013.pdf>, (A.D. 18.12.2016)

¹⁸⁰ John L. Hammond, “**The Significance of Space in Occupy Wall Street**”, University of Windsor, Volume 5, November 2013, p. 500-519,

center of the United States of America and ‘Occupy Central’ on 28 September 2014 in Hong Kong. Besides most of the protestors were educated young population. According to Martijn Lampert and Haroon Sheikh from Foreign Affairs, the young Gezi Park protestors in Turkey, who moved as a united power against increasing conservative and authoritative policy of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, used social media effectively for communication during these actions as in the other two ‘Occupy’ movements and Arab Awakening actions.¹⁸¹

While doing these examinations about Gezi Park Actions, another discussion matter is that the Gezi Park actions were not Turkey’s Arab Awakening. Although some parts claim that it was Turkey’s Arab Awakening as it occurred with the aim of overthrowing the government of elected Justice and Development Party and reaction against injustice in the country, the remaining parts argue against it. The ones defending the thesis that the demonstrations centered in Gezi Park were not ‘Turkey’s Arab Awakening’ claim that these actions could not even be compared with anti-democratic manner of ruling in Middle East. In connection with this, they state that the definition of ‘Turkish Spring’ without examining it in details or the comparison of it with ‘Arab Awakening’ would be wrong.

In order to find an answer to the general question ‘Are The Gezi Park actions Turkey’s Arab Awakening?’ of our thesis, we will compare the Arab Awakening actions in MENA district and Gezi Park Resistance in further chapters and look for a response pursuant to politics terminology. The actions in Turkey will be compared with those in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, the countries where the management changes were achieved.

<http://www.interfacejournal.net/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Interface-5-2-Hammond.pdf>, (A.D. 18.12.2016)

¹⁸¹ Martijn Lampert, Haroon Sheikh, “**Millennial Values**”, July 6, 2016, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-07-06/millennial-values>, (A.D. 18.12.2016)

3.1. ARAB AWAKENING IN TUNISIA AND GEZI PARK RESISTANCE

The public demand for resignation of Bin Ali power in Tunisia, the first country experiencing Arab awakening reactions, was originated from the passion for a government who would take the demands seriously and apply them. Although these protests have similarities with Gezi Park Resistance in terms of emphasis on democracy, they differ from Gezi Park Resistance by which individual freedom was emphasized, in terms of the demand in Tunisia for termination of authoritative Bin Ali power whose legitimacy did not depend on democratically elections.

3.1.1. The Reasons of Arab Awakening Actions in Tunisia and Gezi Park Actions and The Demands Uttered During These Actions

In this chapter of my thesis, the reasons of Arab Awakening in Tunisia and Gezi Park actions, the specifications of the mass protesting in these actions, their demands, the methods used during actions and their effects will be examined.

We stated in the previous chapters that the most distinctive specification of Arab countries was their being governed by a single hand for years long and we also explained, with their local and international reasons¹⁸², that this situation deactivated the national/reformist sensibilities legitimating the regimes and formed some facts disgracing these parts in the community. Depending upon these relevant facts, to examine the reasons of Arab Awakening protests in Tunisia and Gezi Park resistance will help us to understand the reasons of these two actions and the demands uttered during protests. Tunisia, the country where the Arab Awakening reactions were started in 2010 upon self-immolation of university-graduated Muhammed Buazizi, was experiencing many problems in this period. Although some evaluations claimed that its economy was sufficient, it was also stated that new employment areas were needed. According to some predictions made in 2011, the registered unemployment rate reached

¹⁸² Türel, *ibid*, p. 12-15,
<http://mulkiyedergi.org/article/view/1003000047/1003000036>, (A.D. 21.12.2016)

up to 16% of population. Some inequalities were uttered in inner parts of the country. Common Tunisian were inbuilt of socio-economic problems faced as a result of increasing commodity prices and decelerated growth rate beginning with inflation from 2008 and all these matters triggered political requests. One of the slogans during Arab Awakening actions uttered against Bin Ali government was that: “We can survive just with bread and water, but not with the RCD party ruled by Bin Ali.”¹⁸³ Depending upon these reasons the subjects expressed during Arab Awakening actions in Tunisia were based on socio-economical facts. As to Gezi Park Actions, the continuity of living style was concentrated on rather than pecuniary advantage as we see active roles of businessmen belonging to Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association during protests. During Gezi Park Demonstrations, it was protested on one hand against cutting down the trees in Gezi Park and on the other hand the definitions of matters related to intervention on secular living style were effectively expressed.¹⁸⁴ It is stated that Gezi Park actions criticized existing democracy and liberalism structure in Turkey. However, it is uttered that the protestors taking part in these reactions were not suffering from an economic crisis.¹⁸⁵ According to Vehbi Ayhan, there is not a goal congruence between Arab Awakening and Gezi Park actions, but their methods and tactics correspond to each other.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸³ Katerina Dalacoura, “**The 2011 Uprisings In The Arab Middle East: Political Change And Geopolitical Implications**”, International Affairs, Oxford, U.K., 2012, p. 67, http://www.brooklyn.cuny.edu/web/aca_socialsciences_polisci/150422_IA_Comps_2011-Uprisings-Arab-Middle-East.pdf, (A.D. 21.12.2016)

¹⁸⁴ Vehbi Bayhan, “**New Social Movements And Gezi Park Resistance**”, Vol 4 . Nr 7, Spring 2014, p. 24, <http://bireyvetoplumdergisi.com/article/download/5000071597/5000065915> , (A.D. 21.12.2016)

¹⁸⁵ Bayhan, **ibid**, p. 41, 42, <http://bireyvetoplumdergisi.com/article/download/5000071597/5000065915> , (A.D. 21.12.2016)

¹⁸⁶ Bayhan, **ibid**, p. 24, <http://bireyvetoplumdergisi.com/article/download/5000071597/5000065915> , (A.D. 21.12.2016)

3.1.2. The Specifications of the Mass Participated in Arab Awakening in Tunisia and Gezi Park Actions

The Arab Awakening actions in Tunisia and Gezi Park actions differ from each other in terms of the specifications of the mass participated in the actions. Among the mass took part in Arab Awakening protest in Tunisia, the parts reflecting whole community like women, young generation, labor professional unions attracted the attentions. During the start-up process of Arab Awakening protests in Tunisia, the mass took part in the demonstrations was not well-organized, however the chief trade union of country, Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT) and Professional unions played a great role for organization.¹⁸⁷ It is stated that Tunisian army was not a party to the actions.¹⁸⁸ Islamist parties and political parties were not effective in organizational meaning.¹⁸⁹ Another group drawing attention during these demonstrations was the women. Tunisian women played a great role on streets during Arab Awakening protests against Zeynel Abidin Bin Ali, the president of Tunisia since 1989, and against his authoritative and repressive attitude. They uttered their demands for right in a more political manner compared to past. They made a significant contribution on gathering of community on streets especially by using social media actively.¹⁹⁰ Besides the young population was at the forefront during the demonstrations. They increased participation rate into protests by using new technological devices actively.¹⁹¹ In regard to organized

¹⁸⁷ Dalacoura, **ibid**, p. 64,
http://www.brooklyn.cuny.edu/web/aca_socialsciences_polisci/150422_IA_Comps_2011-Uprisings-Arab-Middle-East.pdf, (A.D. 21.12.2016)

¹⁸⁸ Lisa Anderson, “**Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya**”, May/June 2011 ,
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2011-04-03/demystifying-arab-spring>, (A.D. 21.12.2016)

¹⁸⁹ Maria Syed, “**Egypt and Tunisia: Testing Grounds for Goldstone’s Assertions on the Revolutionary Process**”, Security Strategies Magazine, Ankara, Year:9, Nr:18, p. 8,
<http://dergipark.ulakbim.gov.tr/guvenlikstrj/article/view/5000098857/5000092113>, (A.D. 21.12.2016)

¹⁹⁰ M. Aktaş, “**Arap Spring and Democracy Problem in Middle East**”, In Aktaş, Murat (ed.) Arab Spring Democracy Search in Middle East and Turkey Model, Ankara: Nobel Publishing, 2012, p. 39.

¹⁹¹ Syed, **ibid**, p. 8,
<http://dergipark.ulakbim.gov.tr/guvenlikstrj/article/view/5000098857/5000092113>, (A.D. 21.12.2016)

or disorganized formation of Gezi Park actions, Asst. Prof. Ferihan Polat stated that the protest was restructured disorganized and common people also took part in the demonstrations.¹⁹² Besides this according to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Vehbi Ayhan, middle-class, urban and highly trained students and White-collar young generation fee-earners, who are supported by the parents for a better living style and defend universal human values, and also professionals like architects, artists and city planners and the associations, trade associations and similar platforms took place in the center of these actions.¹⁹³ In addition to that, according to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Bezen Balamir Coşkun, a hacktivist group called Redhack, whom the pioneers of Gezi Park actions sympathized, and also Carsı fan group are the other factors indicating that these protests did not have a political meaning.¹⁹⁴

3.1.3. The Methods Used in Arab Awakening Actions in Tunisia and Gezi Park Actions

During both Arab Awakening in Tunisia and Gezi Park actions, mobile phones, social media and forums were used to increase the effect of protests. When we look at the methods used both in Taksim Gezi Park actions and Arab Awakening protests in 2011, the effect of social media cannot be ignored. During both of these actions, internet, social networking sites twitter and Facebook and mobile phones were used as devices to communicate and gather together. On 31 May 2013, the date of first police response, it was tweeted 3 thousand times per minute. 88% of these tweets were in Turkish and half of them were sent from Istanbul. These headlines stand out:

“#direngezi: 950 thousand tweets, #occupygezi: 170 thousand tweets, #gezipark: 50

¹⁹²Ferihan Polat, “**Political Actions of Apolitical Activists: Gezi Park Resistance**”, Tematical Writings, Society and Democracy, January-December 2015, Pamukkale University, p. 182, <http://toplumdd.dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/210818>, (A.D. 21.12.2016)

¹⁹³ Bayhan, **ibid**, p. 24, <http://bireyvetoplumdergisi.com/article/download/5000071597/5000065915>, (A.D. 21.12.2016)

¹⁹⁴ Bezen Balamir Coşkun, “**Arab Spring and Thereafter: What Do The Social Movements In Middle East Tell Us?**”, Ortadoğu Analysis Magazine, Vol: 5, Number: 58, October 2013, p. 70, <http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/OA/58/6bezenbalamir.pdf>, (A.D. 21.12.2016)

thousand tweets, #switch off TVs today: 50 thousand tweets”. By means of Twitter and Facebook, the groups were able to be gathered and led swiftly. However, twitter and Facebook were also used for a provocative target, some shares went beyond its aim reflecting some imaginary and presumptive events as if they had occurred. ¹⁹⁵ As to Arab Awakening actions, according to Arab Social Media Report of 2011, 94% of Tunisian received information via social media. ¹⁹⁶ Besides almost everyone was able to get a mobile phone. Anonymous and Telecomix hacker groups abroad helped to install new software in order to give a hand to activists and interrupt the operations of government by means of attacks depending on ‘Tunisian Operation’ service refusal. ¹⁹⁷ Salwa Ismail explained it as below, how the individual hopelessness related to Arab actions turned into a collective action:

“ The community was formed by disappointed individuals sharing unpleasant emotions and experiences against regime, agencies, police and political structure which specially caused anger against government. By means of social networking sites, these individual voices revealed a common voice. They communicated each other and realized that they were not alone. Thus they tried to find a solution for a change. Individual emotions, a collective will and a collective” ¹⁹⁸

Another common point between the protests we study is the ‘Humor’ used. During Arab Awakening actions in Tunisia, activists uploaded some videos on some internet sites like YouTube including some humorous factors to reflect their displeasure

¹⁹⁵ Bayhan, *ibid*, p. 41,

<http://bireyvetoplumdergisi.com/article/download/5000071597/5000065915> , (A.D. 21.12.2016)

¹⁹⁶ Madeline Storck, “**The Role of Social Media in Political Mobilisation: a Case Study of the January 2011 Egyptian Uprising**”, 20 December 2011,

<http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/content/pdf/participant-papers/2012-02>

bifef/The_Role_of_Social_Media_in_Political_Mobilisation_-_Madeline_Storck.pdf, (A.D. 21.12.2016)

¹⁹⁷ Philip N. Howard, Muzammil M. Hussain, “**Democracy’s Fourth Wave? Digital Media and the Arab Spring**”, Oxford Studies in Digital Politics, New York, 2013, p. 19,

<https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/117564/Democracy's+Fourth+Wave.pdf?sequence=1>, (A.D. 21.12.2016)

¹⁹⁸ Syed, *ibid*, p. 12-14,

<http://dergipark.ulakbim.gov.tr/guvenlikstrj/article/view/5000098857/5000092113>, (A.D. 21.12.2016)

against Bin Ali government. Besides they shared some dictatorship jokes via short message services (SMS) of mobile phones.¹⁹⁹ As to Gezi Park demonstrations, the idiom of ‘disproportionate use of intelligence’ was mooted. Related to this idiom proving the cultural fortune of this community, some of the discourses shared on social media are following: ‘With pepper gas, you cannot frighten a public who controls gas leakage with fire!’, ‘Pepper gas is excellent, brah!’, ‘We are in a relationship with Toma, we are serious!’²⁰⁰

Another different method between Arab Awakening actions in Tunisia and Gezi Park protests is acting style. During the actions in Tunisia, the public reacted on the squares and streets. However, as we mentioned above, the activists of Gezi Park occupied the park and turned it into a living space.²⁰¹

As we mention the factors gathering the mass together during Arab Awakening of Tunisia and Gezi Park actions, we have to handle also the role of media. During the reactions in Tunisia, Qatar centered El-Jazeera satellite channel continued to break the news about actions although Bin Ali government warned Qatar about calling the broadcast off.²⁰² During Gezi Park actions, while the media all around the World was announcing these actions as breaking news and Norwegian channels were broadcasting live, Turkish media preferred generally to keep silent. The public, following the events via internet, reacted against the channels broadcasting cooking shows or documentaries. Numerous channels including CNN and BBC broadcasted the developments in Taksim instantly. Depending upon these developments, the activists criticized the institutions

¹⁹⁹ Howard, Muzammil M., *ibid*, p. 18, 19,
<https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/117564/Democracy's+Fourth+Wave.pdf?sequence=1>, (A.D. 21.12.2016)

²⁰⁰ Bayhan, *ibid*, p. 24,
<http://bireyvetoplumdergisi.com/article/download/5000071597/5000065915> , (A.D. 21.12.2016)

²⁰¹ Konur, *ibid*, p. 40,
http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_dergisi/2012/sayi22/22-61.pdf, (E.T. 28.12.2016)

²⁰² Dalacoura, *ibid*, p. 67,
http://www.brooklyn.cuny.edu/web/aca_socialsciences_polisci/150422_IA_Comps_2011-Uprisings-Arab-Middle-East.pdf, (A.D. 21.12.2016)

introduced as mainstream media harshly. As a result of this, some channels like National Channel and Halk TV, having a limited audience previously, started to lift their effectivenesses.²⁰³

3.1.4. The Effects of Arab Awakening in Tunisia and Gezi Park Actions

It is claimed that the time period of beginning and turning in to mass reactions of Arab Awakening actions in Tunisia bare some similarities with development process of Gezi Park reactions. When we examine the process in Tunisia beginning with self-immolation of Buazizi and resulting with the escape of Bin Ali to abroad, we observe that the Tunisian public aimed at the beginning, instead of demanding management change, just to protest repressive policy of government and serious living conditions. It is stated that the actions in Tunisia gained a political meaning, going beyond an individual protest, just after security forces tried to defuse the public on the streets by using weapons. In other words, it is expressed that the demonstrations began at the end of December 2010 turned into a reaction aiming to overthrow the government reaching to an unplanned and unexpected point in the middle of January 2011.²⁰⁴ It is claimed that a similar situation was experienced during Gezi Park actions. On 27 May 2013, 3 metric part of Gezi park, facing to ‘Asker Ocagi Street’, was pulled down pursuit to Taksim Pedestrianization Project and 40-50 people took part in the demonstrations started by Taksim Solidarity Group as a reaction of cutting down of some trees on this area. However, ‘disproportionate use of force’ and strong reaction with pepper gas during police response gave a way to walking out of thousands of people gathered in Anatolian side of Istanbul over First Bosphorus Bridge on 1 June 2013. Thus the actions started by a small group turned into a mass reaction.²⁰⁵

²⁰³ Özge Dertdeğil, “**The Role of Graphic Desing in Period of Gezi Park Resistance**”, Istanbul Arel University, Master’s Thesis, January 2015, p. 71, 72, <http://earsiv.arel.edu.tr:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1/948/10065511.pdf?sequence=1> , (A.D. 21.12.2016)

²⁰⁴ Koçak, **ibid**, p. 41, 42, http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_dergisi/2012/sayi22/22-61.pdf, (A.D. 21.12.2016)

²⁰⁵ Dertdeğil, p. 68-70,

Another difference between Arab Awakening actions in Tunisia and Gezi Park resistance is the acting form of demonstrations. During actions in Tunisia, the public reacted on streets or on areas like Burgiba square.²⁰⁶ However, Gezi Park actions were in the form of ‘occupy’, a common reacting form during urban demonstrations depending upon occupying an area. According to Ass. Prof. Erdal Yoruk and Murat Yuksel, with these actions during which the mass occupied an urban area to defend it for the first time around the World²⁰⁷, Taksim Square and Gezi Park turned into a common place. During these demonstrations lasting 15 days, a protected area cleared of state government was created. On this isolated area called ‘Taksim Commune’ no Money was spent for the necessities like food, drink, medicine²⁰⁸. “A system taking its form independently was emerged on Gezi Park. [...] New places spatialized unwittingly were created like treatment points, food supply points, libraries, painting activities for children, places to prepare banners, halay routes, music points, portable food suppliers, places for newspapers and magazines.²⁰⁹”

Consequently, the mass taking part in Arab Awakening actions in Tunisia and Gezi Park actions have some common and different grounds. Tunisia, who was previously under the sway of Ottoman Empire, experienced some reforms in 1850, was effected by constitutionalism movements of this relevant state. In Tunisia resembling this period called as Abdü’leman in terms of life safety, taxation according to financial power, parliamentary system with Imperial Edict of Gulhane and in terms of freedom of religion and language, assurances related to criminal procedure with Edict of Reform,

<http://earsiv.arel.edu.tr:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1/948/10065511.pdf?sequence=1> , (A.D. 21.12.2016)

²⁰⁶ Konur, **ibid**, p. 40,
http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_dergisi/2012/sayi22/22-61.pdf, (E.T. 28.12.2016)

²⁰⁷ “**Negotiation / Space as Conflicts Base/ Place/ Negotiations Spaces from Paving Stone to City Scales**”, p. 40,
<http://www.md1927.org.tr/media/PDF/38.pdf>, (A.D. 28.12.2016)

²⁰⁸ Yörük, Yüksel, **ibid**, p. 135,
https://www.academia.edu/14825238/Toplum_ve_Bilim_Gezi_eylemlerinin_toplumsal_dinamikleri, (A.D. 28.12.2016)

²⁰⁹ **ibid**, p. 40,
<http://www.md1927.org.tr/media/PDF/38.pdf>, (A.D. 28.12.2016)

the beginning of formations of democratic and political culture of Tunisian folk and the mass protesting in Gezi Park actions occurred at the same period. Besides, in Tunisia, who had an authoritative management since the date it gained its independence, restricted democracy and unfair income distribution lasting almost 70 years caused the public revolt. Similarly, the 'social displeasure' against government was frankly expressed during Gezi Park actions. These two parts have also some differences. The mass taking part in Gezi Park actions in Turkey and in Arab Awakening actions in Tunisia have a common point about a fair management. However, they differ from each other about the time on which the women were give right to stand for election, partial representation of different parts of public in parliament. The number of delegates in the parliament was defined just with a permission of president till the period that the relevant actions began. The public had no freedom of selecting their delegates to represent themselves in parliament. Besides while the president is determining the foreign policy of Tunisia, in Turkey it is determined by the public. These existing situations caused some level differences on democratic and political culture between these two publics. While Tunisian was defending a fair, transparent and representative democracy, first steps for democracy, during Arab Awakening reactions, the mass protesting in Gezi Park actions was defender of 'individual freedoms', indication of democratically development. Consequently, the community taking part in Gezi Park actions has a more democratic, participant and political culture in terms of expressing their ideology in contrast with Tunisian public.

3. 2. ARAB AWAKENING IN EGYPT AND GEZI PARK ACTIONS

Egyptian public, who had limited competences in terms of both social and individual freedoms and rights, poured onto the streets with demand of more democracy and social independence in December 2010. The requests of Egyptian public were democracy, independence, economic development. However, the result they wanted to get from these actions was rather different. They got their answer with the election of Muslim Brothers, who claimed to take Islam religion as references and be a liberal party, after toppling the government of Mubarek. Because of this reason as we mentioned above, the actions in Tahrir Square resemble to the Gezi Park actions in terms of

democratically demands. However, they differ from each other in terms of aimed manner of ruling to use these democratically rights, although in both actions individual freedom and secularism were voiced.

3.2.1. The Reasons of Arab Awakening Actions in Egypt and Gezi Park Actions and The Demands Uttered During These Actions

In this part of our work, we will examine Arab Awakening in Egypt and Gezi Park actions in terms of the specifications, demands, effects of the mass took part in demonstrations and the methods they used.

Although Egypt has the most crowded population and the second economy of Arab World after Saudi Arabia²¹⁰, it is a country whose democratically factors are underdeveloped as we mentioned above. This country has been governed by three different state presidents (Cemal Abdül Nasır, Enver Sedat and Hüsnu Mübarek) since its independence in 1953. It has always been a country where the public had difficulties in individual rights and freedoms because of the fact that the Powers exploited the governmental and social management. Egyptian public poured onto the streets in January 2011 after Tunisia as a reaction to the authoritarian manner of ruling and emphasized on unemployment, injustice in income distribution and pressure during their protests²¹¹. Another matter reacted was the aim of Hüsnu Mübarek to turn over the management to his son. ²¹² During the protest where all parts of community were represented, a female protestor expressed her thoughts with this sentence: “We want to live humanly!”. Another young woman stated her demands in this sentence: “I want the

²¹⁰ Öztürkler, **ibid**, p. 54,
<http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/OA/38/6harun.pdf>, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

²¹¹ **“This is Begining”**, University of Oxford,
<http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/news/beginning>, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

²¹² Ashley Barnes, **“Creating Democrats? Testing the Arab Spring”**, Middle East Policy Council, Summer 2013, Volume XX, Number 2,
<http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/creating-democrats-testing-arab-spring?print>, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

whole government to change. All I want is democracy. I want a country with whom I can be proud!”²¹³

Along with these demands, economical requests were also uttered during Arab Awakening protests. During last years of Mübarek’s governing, 20% of Egyptian population were under poverty line and the inflation on staple food prices caused most of the population to survive on poverty line. In addition to this, that the state shared source of incomes among his followers and political elites caused corruptions and unsuccessful economic policies and this situation made a way to increasing complaints of public. Besides, according to official data the unemployment rate in this country was more than 10% and the inflation rate was above 10% before Arab Awakening actions.²¹⁴ Labor force participation rate was 48% in this period but while labor force participation rate among men was 74%, among young population between 15- 24 ages this rate was approximately 20% and among women it was 50%.²¹⁵

As an example to the economical demands of public, the statement of a young demonstrate can be given: “Look at the price of one kilo of meat, how many kilos of tomato is equal to it?”²¹⁶ Along with these requests, ‘the bread’ was put forward as the symbol of economic problems against Mübarek who got reaction as he wanted to change the subvention applied during Nasr period. With the symbol ‘bread’, Egyptian public revealed their requests for solutions of systematic problems in financial areas like closed circuit distribution order performed by autocratically management for long years.²¹⁷

²¹³ **ibid**,
<http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/news/beginning>, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

²¹⁴ Öztürkler, **ibid**, p. 52.
<http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/OA/38/6harun.pdf>, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

²¹⁵ Öztürkler, **ibid**, p. 53, 54,
<http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/OA/38/6harun.pdf>, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

²¹⁶ **ibid**,
<http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/news/beginning>, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

²¹⁷ Selin M. Bölme, Müjge Küçükkeleş, Ufuk Ulutaş, Taha Özhan, Nuh Yılmaz, Yılmaz Ensaroğlu, “**Transmission Anatomy in Egypt**”, S E T A | Politics , Economy and Social Researches Foundation, Ankara, April 2011, p. 4,

In addition to this, another reason for reactions against Mübarek's government was his foreign policy as we mentioned before. In this country where Arab nationalism took an important place, Egyptian government had a moderate relationship with Israel as part of Camp David Agreement for long years. The management ignored the negative perspective of the public on this subject. Upon all these matters, the unresponsiveness against occupation of Iraq began in 2003 was an intolerable manner for Egyptian public.²¹⁸ These examples given are efficient data revealing the demands of public demonstrated during the actions, we think.

As to Gezi Park actions, the basic reason for Gezi Park Resistance was the democratic demands of public who was not pleased with applications of governing Justice and Development Party. This situation can be commented as representative democracy crisis depending upon usage of independence by the elected rulers or the questioning of legitimacy source of government. Because, the Justice and Development Party governing in this period was criticized seriously regarding interference in private life and environmental matters.²¹⁹ The first subject cruised was 'the Law Draft about Reproductive Health and Child Abuse' presented by Justice and Development Party to the Turkish Grand National Assembly and called also as 'Abortion Law'. According to this proposal, the abortion was just permitted under the condition that it would be curreted by senior physicians and solely in state hospitals. Besides, to perform an abortion, the embryo had to be three week or younger. However, these articles were criticized by particularly employees of health sector and many non-governmental organizations for women. They caused some arguments claiming that this proposal

http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20121126135944_setav-25_ocaktan_yeni_anayasaya_misirda_donusumun_anatomisi.pdf, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

²¹⁸ Bölme, Küçükkeleş, Ulutaş, Özhan, Yılmaz, Ensaroğlu, **ibid**, p. 4, http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20121126135944_setav-25_ocaktan_yeni_anayasaya_misirda_donusumun_anatomisi.pdf, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

²¹⁹ Sila Sabancılar Eren, Yücel Özden, "**Representative Democracy Crisis and Gezi Park Actions as a Demand for Advanced Democracy**", Birey ve Toplum Magazine, Vol 4, Nr 7, Spring 2014, p. 165, 166, <http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/40815>, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

prevented the service, caused abortion to be understood as a birth control method and the permission period of abortion was shorter than international standards. As a result, the demonstrations under the name of ‘Don’t touch my Body!’ occurred as a reaction.²²⁰ Another point causing the criticism of Justice and Development Party in terms of interference in private life was ‘Alcohol regulation’ in connection with the Change Proposal of Rules and Procedures about Sales and Presentations of Tobacco Products and Alcoholic Beverages. In this relevant law drift, new regulations generally about tobacco products and alcoholic beverages were presented by Turkish Medical Association and it was forbidden to sell these products to young people under the age of 18, to employ the ones under 18 on those areas, to sell alcoholic beverages between the hours of 22.00 and 06.00 by retail, to sell or advertise them in many areas (near education institutions, courses, houses of prayers etc.)²²¹ According to the survey held by Konda Research Company about this regulations change in February of 2011, 9% of the ones defining themselves as ‘ascetic’, 11% of religionists, 41% of ‘believers’ and 65% of ‘non-believers’ stated that they drank alcoholic beverages. As a consequence of this, it was expressed that Turkey was not a country using plenty of alcohol according to this figures. And because of this reason, some parts evaluated this law drift as a regulation against their freedom of drinking alcohol.²²² Another point, indicating the intervention in private life of governing political party was the demand of President Erdogan for ‘at least three children’ that he stated in his speeches. The ones in state management explained the aim of this statement as his concern on the increasing elderly population. The reason why this statement got reaction during Gezi Park actions was claimed not to depend actually on socio-economical bases. The basic matter of criticisms was the guidance of president about the wills of individuals to give a birth to a child or

²²⁰ Eren, Özden, *ibid*, p. 180-182,
<http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/40815>, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

²²¹ Eren, Özden, *ibid*, p. 182-183,
<http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/40815>, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

²²² “**Konda February ’11 Barometer- Drinking or Smoking**”, Political and Social Researches Series, p. 12,
http://kadehimekarisma.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/icki_sigara.pdf, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

not. The ones protesting evaluated this situation as interference on private lives of people in bedrooms. Another point indicating the interference of Justice and Development Party on the individual freedoms was explained as restriction on freedom of organization for meetings or marching. In connection with this thought, it was expressed that the state did not allow the Gezi Park demonstrators to use their right to organize a meeting or marching which is a constitutional right of individuals and a democratic way of uttering the demands in relationship between state and public. As an example to this claim, 4.900 people among approximately 2.5 million people took part in Gezi Park protests were put under house arrest as ‘suspects’ and about 4 thousand people got injured and 6 people died. ²²³

“Examining the reasons of Gezi Park actions, it is observed that the public interest could not be socialized. [...] Gezi Park actions, whom we can evaluate as a social movement, is the expressing way of whole social demands not seen in public spaces. Democracy requests are diacritical susceptibilities of different social classes who do not agree with social decisions. Although these requests were generally about identities, they were based on respect to differences. The idea of respect to differences formed the solidarity culture among public. Because the political power is determined in connection with the preferences of community. The determining factor of legitimacy of decisions is the free participation of the ones effected by the decisions in the resolution process. Gezi Park actions were reflection of social opposition formed as a result of this reason. Not to apply a public consultation or ignorance of opposition caused the legitimacy of government to be questioned.” ²²⁴

²²³ Eren, Özden, **ibid.**, p. 183-186,
<http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/40815>, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

²²⁴ Eren, Özden, **ibid.**, p. 162-166,
<http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/40815>, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

3.2.2. The Specifications of the Mass Participated in Arab Awakening Actions in Egypt and Gezi Park Actions

According to political scientist Samir Amin, the mass took part in Arab Awakening protest in Egypt was formed by three different parts:

1. The young generation who started the demonstrations up and facilitated the movement with their active usage of communication devices.
2. Left-wingers
3. Middle class members participating in protests for their democracy demands.

Although the structure and requests of young groups were pretty different, these requests were on a common ground with the demands of left-winger political groups and laborer organizations.

These common demands were the following:

- a. Establishment of democracy and termination of soldier/police repressions
- b. Actualization of economic and social applications to increase welfare level of communities (it was uttered weakly)
- c. Pursuance of an independent foreign policy²²⁵

Middle classes focused on just first of these three demands. ‘Mediatic’ and ‘Americanized’ wealthy part of this group are not completely opposed to neo-liberal model, ‘market’ and dependencies formed by international structures. ²²⁶ However, the member of this group, who had a risk in finding a job or finding a secured job despite their high educations and were disappointed about respectability in community, remained close to young people and laborers. These three groups in protests achieved to overthrow the

²²⁵ Samir Amin, “**Whither the Arab Spring?**”, 16 Jun 2011, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/4/0/14417/Opinion/Whither-the-Arab-Spring.aspx>, (A.D. 25.12.2016)

²²⁶ Amin, **ibid**, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/4/0/14417/Opinion/Whither-the-Arab-Spring.aspx>, (A.D. 25.12.2016)

despotic government incorporating the urban poor and even low-income peasants into Arab Awakening protests.²²⁷

Another structure supporting the Arab Awakening actions indirectly was Egyptian army. The Armament, who had had a main determining role in state management since the independence of country, stayed neutral at the beginning of protests. In February 2011, the Marshall Mohammed Hüseyin Tantawi, Defence Secretary and claimed to be effective on the army, asked Mübarek for his resignation. Thus, the army, the most important structure in Egypt, took up its position near activists²²⁸. Besides, the participation of organized opposition movements, particularly Muslim Brothers, their strikes and the support of wide-based laborer movements were distinguishable actions. By means of these supports, young groups achieved to turn their dead-end protests, because of limited participations and their conflicts with more crowded policemen in contrast with their population, into a public movement at the end of 2010²²⁹. However, another point to be emphasized is that 90% of this young population was jobless. According to Ass. Prof. Harun Öztürkler, it was not a coincidence that these young people were at the front of actions just because of this reason.²³⁰

According to Vehbi Ayhan, the participants of Taksim-Gezi Park actions, began on 31 May 2013, were formed in three different groups.

“1. The group which started the demonstrations up with the aim of defending the trees. Individualist, an ‘anti-politic’ group in terms of being opponent to political structures and politicians. The converse of low class protestors named as Desperados,

²²⁷ Türel, *ibid*, p. 23, 24,
<http://mulkiyederji.org/article/view/1003000047/1003000036>, (A.D. 25.12.2016)

²²⁸Magdi Abdelhadi, “**Egypt Army's 'Helped Oust' President Mubarak**”, 19 February 2011,
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12514316>, (A.D. 25.12.2016)

²²⁹ Bölme, Küçükkeleş, Ulutaş, Özhan, Yılmaz, Ensaroğlu, *ibid*, p. 4,
http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20121126135944_setav-25_ocaktan_yeni_anayasaya-_misirda_donusumun_anatomisi.pdf, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

²³⁰ Öztürkler, *ibid*, p. 52,
<http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/OA/38/6harun.pdf>, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

Descamisados, Indignados. A typical dialectic formation in terms of being a product of increasing welfare and urbanization in the last 10 years. This circuit, including ‘Taksim Platform’ formed by a small group of academicians, can be coded as ‘Gezici’.

2. The second ring around it was rather nonhomogeneous. The organizations and parties most of whose common ground was ‘opposition to Justice and Development Party’ and ‘nationalism’. They had flags and pennons. They were prompted by ‘Taksim solidarity’ established after Platform and formed by 118 units among which community houses were effective.

3. The third ring around them: ‘looters’ seen all around the World. The ones dirtied the movement by using violence. The marginal groups and the ones defined as violent terrorist organizations in this group terrorized Taksim and Istiklal Squares and vandalised public properties, public devices and workplaces. Even after the termination of actions upon police intervene, these groups continued to conflict with police at every turn.”²³¹

Consequently, the participants were state institutions like army, non-governmental organizations, Muslim Brothers and youth organizations. Owing to this situation, the actions contained the groups which could be organized in a national frame. The mass participated in Gezi Park actions were including the young population taking part for the first time in a political protest, different political parties having different ideologies, organizations and also provocative. Because of this reason, Gezi Park actions and Arab Awakening protests in Egypt differ from each other in terms of the mass having organization substructure.

3.2.3. The Methods Used During Arab Awakening Actions in Egypt and Gezi Park Actions

Arab Awakening actions in Egypt and Gezi Park Resistance differ from each other in terms of the methods used. An example to this is the formation processes of these actions. The demands of 6 April Movement, an active group during the protests in Egypt,

²³¹ Bayhan, *ibid*, p. 40,
<http://bireyvetoplumdergisi.com/article/download/5000071597/5000065915> , (A.D. 21.12.2016)

were rise in wages, reformation in public services like health, education, transportation, termination of corruption, political devolution, police violence, tortures, arbitrary custodies and establishment of a fair judicial system. These requests formed the basic agenda of actions.²³² In addition to this, the point emphasized by the founders of group from the just beginning was that this movement did not have a political identity, did not have any connection with a political party, and it was just a platform formed by people demanding freedom and change in Egypt²³³. In 10 days after overthrow of Bin Ali's government in Tunisia, the public poured onto the streets and this action drew the attentions onto 6 April Movement known for their previous protests. Using social networking sites effectively, this movement not only persuaded the Egyptian public to pour onto streets but also drew the attention of international arena. It is claimed that the preparations done by 6 April Movement for a long while had a great effect on Arab Awakening actions. Although the follower population in Facebook reached tens of thousands in the period between 2007 and 2009, they faced also some problems too. First of them was that they were remained incapable of prompting the community supporting them and the second was that they did not actually know what they would demand from the public. That the opposition went out to the streets after elections in Iran, they used social networking sites and that the public sent the videos recorded on the streets to international media drew the attention of this group. Based on this, the second name of 6 April Movement Muhammed Adel visited 'the Center of Passive Resistance'²³⁴ in Serbia, whose symbols they copied. In this period Adel was educated about how to activate and organise the public, how to keep away from violence, how to mislead the police and get

²³² Marina Ottaway, Arn Hamzawy, "**Protest Movements and Political Change in the Arab World**", Carnegie Endowment and International Peace, January 28, 2011, p. 3, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/OttawayHamzawy_Outlook_Jan11_ProtestMovements.pdf, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

²³³ Samantha M. Saphiro, "**Revolution, Facebook-Style**", January 22, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/25/magazine/25bloggers-t.html>, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

²³⁴ Bölme, Küçükkeleş, Ulutaş, Özhan, Yılmaz, Ensaroğlu, **ibid**, p. 18, http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20121126135944_setav-25_ocaktan_yeni_anayasaya-_misirda_donusumun_anatomisi.pdf, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

the support of them and about details to choose the demonstration centers²³⁵. Meanwhile they improved themselves about technology, internet connectivity and telephone lines. Another youth movement at the front with 6 April Movement was ‘We are all Halid Said’. The beginning of this movement was based on the death of 28 aged Halid Said upon police violence and torture on 7 June 2010. On that date, two police officers came to the internet cafe and started to perform an arbitrary identity check on Halid Said and his friends. Upon the question of Halid Said, disturbed by the manner of policemen, about the reason of this control, two officers took him out of the cafe, brought him to a stairwell of next building and beat him to death in front of the eyes of his friends and the public around. The policemen involved were not put on trial at the beginning. However, as a result of pressure created by witness statements, pictures and videos of the event, the police officers were taken to the court not for attempted murder but for overkill and reasonless detention. Along with the call of 6 April Movement for the public to go out to the streets on 25 January, Halid Said Movement started to organize its members and tried to draw the attention of international public into Egypt by means of its connections abroad and via Facebook.²³⁶ Two days before the protests, both movements issued a guide for their followers during demonstrations to educate them about how to keep away from conflicts with security forces and how to behave. In a few days after this call, 80.000 thousand people country-wide reported via Facebook that they would participate in demonstrations. As they were experienced before, the members of these movements distributed also published fly sheets and talked to the people on streets and called the Egyptian public for support. On 25 January in Cairo, 6 April Movement was supported by the followers of Youth for Justice and Equality, Popular Front for Freedom, Future Party and Baradey along with Halid Said Movement. During the demonstrations in Alexandria, Mansura and Suez, Halid Said Movement, Baradey Supporters, Future Party and Democratically Front came to the forefront. In Şarkiye and Ismaliye, 6 April Movement was supported by

²³⁵ Tina Rosenborg, “**Revolution U**”, February 17, 2011, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/02/17/revolution-u-2/>, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

²³⁶ Bölme, Küçükkeleş, Ulutaş, Özhan, Yılmaz, Ensaroğlu, **ibid**, p. 20, http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20121126135944_setav-25_ocaktan_yeni_anayasaya-_misirda_donusumun_anatomisi.pdf, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

National Unity for Evolution and later on many members of Muslim Brothers gave individual supports to them²³⁷. During this process, youth movements achieved both to prevent serious conflicts by the help of their preparations and previous experiences and to make their calls heard by international media by using internet. While Hüsni Mübarek's government going to the end, young population, 60% of the total population, was in the forefront during this process. Especially by using social media effectively, they played a pushing role to pour public onto streets²³⁸. However, the development process of Gezi Park action began, as we mentioned before, with a sharing at the first hours of 27 May 2013 by Taksim Solidarity Platform in social media about timber drawing of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality with the aim of demolishing Gezi Park. Later on as the protestors got injured by the police in 1 June 2013, these protest turned into a country-wide action in a process of 6 days. Consequently, there were not any groups in Gezi Park actions, who had preparations for national actions or an aim of leading them as in Egypt.

In addition to this, we need to approach realistically to the role of communication devices used during these two actions effectively. According to 2010 reports of Internet World Stats, the company for marketing and researches of Internet, while more than 21% of 80 million population in Egypt use internet, more than 4,5 million people have a Facebook account²³⁹. Besides, according to 2010 reports of the Ministry of Egyptian Communication and Information Technologies, more than 70% of country's population use mobile phone²⁴⁰. According to researches of Kate Starbird and Leysia Palen, the

²³⁷ Bölme, Küçükkeleş, Ulutaş, Özhan, Yılmaz, Ensaroğlu, **ibid**, p. 20,
http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20121126135944_setav-25_ocaktan_yeni_anayasaya-_misirda_donusumun_anatomisi.pdf, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

²³⁸ Bölme, Küçükkeleş, Ulutaş, Özhan, Yılmaz, Ensaroğlu, **ibid**, p.-20,
http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20121126135944_setav-25_ocaktan_yeni_anayasaya-_misirda_donusumun_anatomisi.pdf, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

²³⁹ **“Egypt Internet Usage and Telecommunications Reports”**, Internet World Statistics,
<http://www.internetworldstats.com/af/eg.htm>, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

²⁴⁰ Nahed Eltantaway, Julie B. Wiest, **“Social Media in the Egyptian Revolution: Reconsidering Resource Mobilization Theory”**, International Journal of Communication 5, High Point University, 2011, p. 1212,
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.470.1197&rep=rep1&type=pdf>, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

tweets shared inland about the actions in Egypt were just 30% of total tweets. During Arab Awakening actions, the tweets with hashtag #jan25 could not reach 1 million²⁴¹. According to the reports of New York University Social Media and Political Participation Laboratory, in contrast with the other actions around the World lately, the 90% of the tweet shared during Gezi Park actions were posted from Turkey and 50% of them were posted from Istanbul. Besides, the hashtag of #direncezipark was the most popular hashtag and was tweeted more than 1,8 million. 88% of tweets during the demonstrations in Turkey were in Turkish and this situation indicates that the tweets aimed the Turkish public rather than international media²⁴². Consequently, the effect power and aim of media used during Arab Awakening in Egypt and Gezi Park protests differ from each other.

3.2.4. The Effects of Arab Awakening Actions in Egypt and Gezi Park Actions

Another point to be emphasized in this part is the protesting culture of the masses in Gezi Park and Arab Awakening actions in Egypt. As we mentioned above, Egyptian public reacting against the government of Mübarek, occupied public spaces, fired police buildings, raided the jails during these actions.²⁴³ This situation reveals that the main aim of the demonstrators was not to protest using their democratically rights but in fact to disturb the state order. However the attitude of protestors in Gezi Park was pretty different from this behavior²⁴⁴. This community had a structure which was not in the aim of demolishing the state order but having a disturbance because of the fact that their

²⁴¹ Kate Starbird, Leysia Palen, “(How) Will the Revolution be Retweeted? Information Diffusion and the 2011 Egyptian Uprising”, https://cmci.colorado.edu/~palen/StarbirdPalen_RevolutionRetweeted.pdf, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

²⁴² “SMaPP: Social Media and Political Participation”, New York University, USA, Arpil 7, 2016, p. 2-4, https://wp.nyu.edu/smapp/turkey_data_report/(A.D. 27.12.2016)

²⁴³ Davut Buzkıran, Hüseyin Kutbay, “Economic and Social Effects of Arab Spring on Turkey”, Social Science and Humanities Magazine, Vol 5, Nr 1, 2013, p. 152, http://www.sobiad.org/ejournals/dergi_sbd/arsiv/2013_1/davut%20buzkiran.pdf, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

²⁴⁴ Coşkun, *ibid*, p. 70, <http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/OA/58/6bezenbalamir.pdf>, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

demanded democratically rights were not actualized sufficiently by the civilian administrations. As an indication of this, they did not occupy government agencies and institutions, except for exceptional events caused by some provocative activists, and demanded dialogue with state representatives under the platforms they established to voice their demands in democratically ways. Consequently, the attitudes of these two communities during Gezi Park and Arab Awakening actions are important for us to understand their democratically culture while protesting and using their democratically rights.²⁴⁵ This reveal the differences between these two countries in terms of democratically reaction and protesting culture.

Consequently, there are some similar and different points between Arab Awakening actions in Egypt and Gezi Park Resistance. While reacting against Hüsnu Mübarek who formed an anti-democratic country during his 30 years of governing and granted privileges to his family and close relationships, the demand of Egyptian public was democracy and a better economy. As the negative situations effected the whole country, most of its population participated in Arab Awakening protest. However, Gezi Park actions were carried on generally by social-economically middle class protestors. And this data indicate that the aim of Gezi Park actions was not economy, instead the requests for pluralistic democracy and respect for right to life. While Arab Awakening actions in Egypt and Gezi Park actions are having similarities in terms of demand for improved democracy level, they differ from each other in terms of some matters like methods used and their targets and spotlighting the individual freedoms.

3.3. ARAB AWAKENING IN LIBYA and GEZI PARK ACTIONS

The Arab Awakening actions began 2010 in Tunisia, encouraged also Libyan public and caused demonstrations in this country too. At the end of these demonstrations, that spread over abroad and moved to an international area politically and militarily, Muammer Qadhafi was murdered tragically by the Libyan public. Because of this reason, Libya differs from the other countries experienced these Arab

²⁴⁵ Coşkun, *ibid*, p. 70,
<http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/OA/58/6bezenbalamir.pdf>, (A.D. 27.12.2016)

Awakening reactions on the ground that it was the first and unique country getting a military intervention under the control of United Nations during this process. Besides Libyan public performed these Arab Awakening actions with the aim of a free, independent and democratic Libya in peace, welfare and justice. The democratic life demand emphasised during the actions by Libyan corresponds to the requests uttered during Gezi Park actions. However, the aim of overthrowing Qadhafi's government, whose legitimacy did not base on democratical elections, differs from Gezi Park actions during which individual freedom was particularly emphasised.

3.3.1. The Reasons of Arab Awakening Actions in Libya and Gezi Park Actions and the Demands Uttered During These Actions

Arab Awakening actions began on 17 February 2011 and led to a civil war in Libya²⁴⁶, which was ruled by 'Jamahiriya' system of Qadhafi for 42 years. The basic requests expressed during these actions were democracy, human rights, freedom²⁴⁷, justice, more share in economical sources. The often stressed matters by the protestors were unemployment, inadequate share got from petrol revenues, lack of education, development problems, repressive and arbitrary applications of Qudhafi government and freedom²⁴⁸. The constituent National Assembly established in 2012 by two hundred delegates with the purpose of governing the country for 14 months reflected these democracy demands. For the National Assembly elections after termination of Qudhafi's government, more than 100 political parties and approximately 3000 independent candidates stood for parliament. Besides, 65% of registered voters voted for the

²⁴⁶ **Arab World Uprisings: A Country-by-Country Look**, 10 December 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/world/africa/in-tripoli-libya-a-transformation-for-better-and-for-worse.html>, (A.D. 29.12, 2016)

²⁴⁷ **"Voices In The Streets- Mass Social Protest and And Right To Peaceful Assembly"**, A 12 Country Special Report By Freedom House, January 2015, p. 30, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/03202015_updated_Freedom_of_Assembly_report.pdf, (A.D. 29.12,2016)

²⁴⁸ Zafer Akbaş, Zeynep Arslan Düzgün, **"A Constructivist Attitude to Turkish Foreign Policy in Terms of Arab Spring in Libya"**, *Economical and Social Researches Magazine*, Vol:8, Year:8, Nr:2, 8: 57-81, Fall 2012, p. 69, <http://iibfdergi.ibu.edu.tr/index.php/ijesr/article/view/263/496>, (A.D. 29.12,2016)

elections²⁴⁹. In addition to this, these demands were uttered on the official internet site of National Transitional Council established by opponents of Qudhafi during Arab Awakening actions. On the site, justice, freedom and democracy were announced as 3 slogans of National Transitional Council as against the freedom, socialism and unity slogans of Qudhafi period. Besides, the Council defined the Qudhafi period as dictatorial regime in their publishment under the name of ‘Democtarical Libya Vision’ and they also agreed that the Libyan public had no other choice than establishing a democratic and free community with respect to international human rights law and declarations.²⁵⁰

Various thoughts are presented concerning Gezi Park actions began on 27 May 2013. According to Prof. Dr. Sallan Gül, Gezi Park actions as an unrepresented civil resistance in Turkey’s historical process developed on its first days against the designing policy of Istanbul by Justice and Development Party representing the global capital of Turkey. Another reason of these actions aiming to defend the city, was that Istanbul Metropolian Municipality applied demolition on communal areas of the city without receiving any opinion of different parts of public²⁵¹. The other reason of demonstrations was that the political management had been ignoring the cultural demands of various parts in community for a long while. Depending on them, a accumulation of problems formed among the mass. As a consequence of that a movement with the demands of a democratically, pluralist, solidarism and fair system occurred against Justice and Development party. Besides it is claimed that another reason gathering the mass together for these actions was the customized government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. That he defined a sculpture in the city of Kars as ‘freak’ and his decision to pull down Atatürk

²⁴⁹ Nihat Akbıyık, Musa Öztürk, “**Arab Spring and ‘Occupy Wall Street’ Actions in Civil Society and Social Media Perspective**”, <http://www.acarindex.com/ziya-gokalp-egitim-fakultesi-dergisi/sivil-toplum-ve-sosyal-medya-perspektifinde-arap-bahari-ve-wall-streeti-islam-et-eylemleri-30768#.WGYt3IOLTIU>, (A.D. 29. 12. 2016)

²⁵⁰ Hakan Demir, “**Turkey and Western Sense in Benghazi: A Work based on Fieldwork**”, Ortadoğu Analiz Magazine, Vol: 3 - Nr: 33, October 2011, p. 51, <http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/OA/33/5hakan.pdf>, (A.D. 29. 12. 2016)

²⁵¹ Songül Sallan Gül, Merve Sezer, Özlem Kahya Nizam, “**Gezi Park Actions as a Social Movement and a Demand of City Right from the View Point of Activists**”, Süleyman Demirel University Social Sciences Institute Magazine, Nr: 22, Year: 2015/2, p. 8, <http://sbedergi.sdu.edu.tr/assets/uploads/sites/343/files/22-01-12012016.pdf>, (A.D. 29. 12. 2016)

Culture Center and build an opera house instead²⁵² are given as the examples of customized ruling of Prime Minister Erdoğan.

3.3.2. The Specifications of the Mass Participated in Arab Awakening Actions in Libya and Gezi Park Actions

In Libya, it was not possible to find any real and effective non-governmental organization or institutional structuring²⁵³. Because of this reason, Arab Awakening actions of Libya was started under the leadership of the young people belonging to Şebab (Libya Youth Movement). Along with these young population in the forefront of actions, the middle aged civil public also took part in these actions²⁵⁴. That this reaction contained actors having a background of opponent political manner and socio-economy revealed a lack of organization among opponent parts during conflicts increased after 17 February. The opponents gathering around the common aim of overthrowing the Qudhafi government established National Transitional Council on 27 February to coordinate the organization and resistance²⁵⁵. However the role of clans forming the 85% of Arabian public in the country²⁵⁶ cannot be ignored at this point. According to Ali Resul Usul, these groups²⁵⁷ whose numbers were about 140 and position in politics

²⁵² Gül, Sezer, Nizam, **ibid**, p. 8, 9,
<http://sbedergi.sdu.edu.tr/assets/uploads/sites/343/files/22-01-12012016.pdf>, (A.D. 29. 12. 2016)

²⁵³ Ali Resul Usul, “**Arab Public Movements, Democratisation Opportunities on the Region, Libya and Turkey’s Attitude**”, p. 5,
http://www.gpotcenter.org/dosyalar/Resul_Presentation_11APR2011.pdf, (A.D. 29. 12. 2016)

²⁵⁴ Demir, **ibid**, p. 51,
<http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/OA/33/5hakan.pdf>, (A.D. 29. 12. 2016)

Bölme, Küçükkeleş, Ulutaş, Özhan, Yılmaz, Ensaroğlu,

²⁵⁵ Böle, Ulutaş, Öztan, Küçükkelleş, Bektaş, “**ibid**”, p. 22,
<http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/bati-ve-kaddafi-makasinda-libya.pdf>, (A.D. 08.12.2016)

²⁵⁶ Veysel Ayhan, “**Libya’s Civil War: Power Struggle between Clans**”, Ortadoğu Analysis Magazine, Vol: 3 - Nr: 27, March 2011, p. 9,
<http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/OA/27/1veysel.pdf>, (A.D. 29.12.2016)

²⁵⁷ Usul, **ibid**, p. 5,
http://www.gpotcenter.org/dosyalar/Resul_Presentation_11APR2011.pdf, (A.D. 29. 12. 2016)

was a matter of debate in Qudhafi period were the main actors of communal reaction during Arab Awakening actions and their opinions and expectations defined particularly the political, massive and economical demands of public. These structures²⁵⁸, that had a great effect on overthrowing of Muammer Qudhafi, gained legitimacy in political arena owing to their supports to the social movements during actions²⁵⁹. Warfallah clan, the most crowded clan in Libya, was the first to declare his opposition directly to Qudhafi government in the period after ‘Day of Rage’ on 17 February 2011. Tarhuna clan, whose population is claimed to be approximately between 900 thousand and 1 million, was another group supporting the actions. Another clan taking part in revolts was Zintan clan. Its members waged a persevering struggle against Qudhafi government from 16 February on. Apart from them, Zuwayya, Avagir, Misurate and Obeidat clans encouraged participation in these protest too²⁶⁰.

The followings are the results of a questionnaire conducted with about three thousand people on 3-4 June online (accessible for 20 hours on the net) to analyze the specifications of mass took part in the actions: 39.6 percent of the supporters were between the ages of 19-25 and 24 percent of them were between the ages of 26-30. 75.8 percent went out to streets during the protests²⁶¹. On 6-7 June 2013 KONDA Research and Consulting Company interviewed 4.411 activists and 93.6% of these protestors expressed that they did not represented any political party and they got to the park just as a citizen²⁶². Emre Kongar stated according to his observations and recognitions that the young people participated in the actions individually. Besides Kongar stated that the

²⁵⁸ Akbaş, Zafer, Düzgün, Zeynep Arslan, *ibid*, p. 69,
<http://iibfdergi.ibu.edu.tr/index.php/ijesr/article/view/263/496>, (A.D. 29.12,2016)

²⁵⁹ Hasan Duran, Çağatay Özdemir, “**Was the Arab Spring the Solution for the Pains in Middle East?**”, *Academical Researching Magazine*, Number: 59, 2013-2014, p. 59.

²⁶⁰ Akbaş, Düzgün, *ibid*, p. 68,
<http://dergipark.ulakbim.gov.tr/esad/article/download/1068000263/1068000495>, (A.D. 29.12,2016)

²⁶¹ *ibid*, p. 14,
http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar/KONDA_GeziRaporu2014.pdf, (A.D. 29.12.2016)

²⁶² *ibid*, p. 14,
http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar/KONDA_GeziRaporu2014.pdf, (A.D. 29.12.2016)

groups were lack of a hierarchical organization or leader but had an effective and communicational structuring. He also uttered that the most specific qualification of this group was a common mind and creative intelligence. The first ring of this movement was formed by these young people, the second ring was formed by classical parties and resistance organizations and third ring was formed by the families and friends of the young people.²⁶³

3.3.3. The Effects of Arab Awakening Actions in Libya and Gezi Park Actions

The Arab Awakening actions in Libya did not occur not only in this country but it also moved to an international platform politically and militarily as a result of civil war between Qudhafi and his oppositions.²⁶⁴ During this process on 17 Mart 2011, United States Security Council decided with the decision no. 1973 as part of 7. Section of United States terms that a no-fly zone would be defined, military forces would intervene to protect the citizens and the member states of UN would get all precautions to protect the citizens under the mailed fist in Libya. With the same decision, it was emphasized on ending the violence in the country up, taking the demands of public into consideration, sticking to the human rights and international human rights agreement and selling no weapons to Libya.²⁶⁵ Intervene was performed by NATO in accordance with the decision taken by United Nations. Western World became a part of actions in Libya as being the first and unique country experiencing military intervention. Another important specification of this relevant intervention was that the assigned area of NATO was expanded till North Africa for the first time²⁶⁶.

²⁶³ Emre Kongar, “**Thirty Days Shaking Turkey. Gezi Resistance**”, Documentary-Research, Cumhuriyet Books, Istanbul, 24. Edition, 2013, p. 43.

²⁶⁴ Akbaş, Düzgün, **ibid**, p. 70,
<http://dergipark.ulakbim.gov.tr/esad/article/download/1068000263/1068000495>, (A.D. 29.12,2016)

²⁶⁵ “**Resolution 1973**”, United Security Council, 17 March 2011,
http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110927_110311-UNSCR-1973.pdf,
(A.D. 29.12,2016)

²⁶⁶ Akbaş, Düzgün, **ibid**, p. 70,
<http://dergipark.ulakbim.gov.tr/esad/article/download/1068000263/1068000495>, (A.D. 29.12,2016)

3.3.4. The Methods Used During Arab Awakening Actions in Libya and Gezi Park Actions

Arab Awakening demonstrations in Libya began firstly on 15 February 2011 in Benghazi, the city where advocate and opponent Fethi Terbil was arrested, and later on spread on the cities of Al Bayda and Az Zintan in East Libya. The actions expanded in East and South parts of Libya in the cities like Derne, Kufra, Tabruk and Jalu, where the clans like Zavayya, Tibbu, Warfalla and Majabba were living.²⁶⁷ The protestors reacted on streets and squares. During the demonstrations, conversations, concerts, live broadcasts and discussion programs were scheduled on the plazas.²⁶⁸ But to mention about effect of social media on these actions was evaluated as being weak.²⁶⁹ According to the data of March 2011, internet usage rate was only 5,5% in Libya. It is stated that the internet was not used prevalently during the protests and also the Facebook did not have enough account at that time in Libya²⁷⁰. It is stated that the social media was used for encouraging the ideas like democracy and human rights, transmitting the displays of events experienced during protests to the TVs, organizing the mass for the actions.²⁷¹ Besides this, it is also expressed that social media was used to share some practical information like how to use cola and lemon to counterattack the gas bomb. While internet and social media was being used for these kind of posts, it is stated that the most

²⁶⁷ Ayhan, *ibid*, p. 9,
<http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/OA/27/1veysel.pdf>, (A.D. 29.12,2016)

²⁶⁸ Demir, *ibid*, p. 51,
<http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/OA/33/5hakan.pdf>, (A.D. 29. 12. 2016)

²⁶⁹ Suat Tayfun Topak, “**The Comparative Analysis of Processes of ‘Colorful Revolutions And Arab Spring’ In Civil Society Organizations and Social Media Context**”, Eskişehir Osmangazi University Magazine, December 2014, p. 248,
http://iibfdergi.ogu.edu.tr/makaleler/12331227_9-3_ARALIK%202014_Makale_0.pdf, (A.D. 29. 12. 2016)

²⁷⁰ Akbıyık, Öztürk, *ibid*, p. 1020,
<http://www.acarindex.com/dosyalar/makale/acarindex-1424356091.pdf>, (A.D. 29. 12. 2016)

²⁷¹ Topak, *ibid*, p. 248, 249,
http://iibfdergi.ogu.edu.tr/makaleler/12331227_9-3_ARALIK%202014_Makale_0.pdf, (A.D. 29. 12. 2016)

contributing devices were mobile phones during the protests. It is claimed that the mass messages and multimedia messages sent via mobile phones were contributed considerably to the organization of Libyan public. The activists expressed that the sharing they posted via mobile phones triggered firstly the followers on social media and then international public. ²⁷² “The most effective and striking duty of social media in Libya was possibly the transmission of death instant of Muammer Qudhafi to the World. After the decrease of repression in the country, the number of ones getting a Facebook accounts increased strikingly. The social media devices, prohibited by Qudhafi, started to be sought after the termination of Qudhafi’s government.” ²⁷³

Another method used during Gezi Park actions was the establishment of alternative media organizations against mainstream media institutions. As seen in the example of ‘Freebooter TV’ formed in internet, alternative media organizations occurred with the thought of creating different communication ways against commercialized, common and traditional media institutions. ²⁷⁴ According to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Aydan Ozsoy, “under the skin of this belief, there are alternative criticism focuses, resistance, alteration, freedom, equality and democracy. Alternative media made also an effort to change mainstream media with reference to the thought of participant broadcasting and journalism. This effort was, in one sense, the actions performed to change and order the unbalanced, unequal, partisan and common/traditional communication and media.” ²⁷⁵

²⁷² Topak, **ibid**, p. 249,
http://iibfdergi.ogu.edu.tr/makaleler/12331227_9-3_ARALIK%202014_Makale_0.pdf, (A.D. 29. 12. 2016)

²⁷³ Murat Tekek, “**Social Media and Arab Spring**”

<http://www.orsam.org.tr/index.php/Content/Analiz/2576?s=orsam%7Cturkish>, (A.D. 29. 12. 2016)

²⁷⁴ Aydan Özsoy, “**Alternative Media, Gezi Parkk Actions and Çapulcu TV Example**”, p. 2,
https://www.academia.edu/9790101/ALTERNAT%C4%B0F_MEDYA_GEZ%C4%B0_PARKI_EYLEMLER%C4%B0_VE_%C3%87APUL_TV_%C3%96RNE%C4%9E%C4%B0, (A.D. 30.12.2012)

²⁷⁵ Özsoy, **ibid**, p. 2,
https://www.academia.edu/9790101/ALTERNAT%C4%B0F_MEDYA_GEZ%C4%B0_PARKI_EYLEMLER%C4%B0_VE_%C3%87APUL_TV_%C3%96RNE%C4%9E%C4%B0, (A.D. 30.12.2012)

Another method seen during Gezi Park actions was outdoor library in Gezi Park. Upon the campaign started by an organization named ‘Yitik Ülke Yayınları’, Gezi Park Library was built and lots of books were distributed to the demonstrators in the organization supported by publishing houses, writers, activists and artists. As a result of campaign with the message of ‘Let Gezi Park stay as park, let’s open a beautiful library here. Let’s do a book end as Yitik Ülke Publishing, let the brotherhood win. Is it difficult? That is the Free Library we aim” posted on Twitter, the presentation of books was enabled on the area free of charge.²⁷⁶

Consequently, the similarities between Arab Awakening in Libya and Gezi Park actions, which turned into a national movement after the security forces pulled down the tents of protestors defending the trees on 1 June 2013, are the demands of democracy, right to live humanly and justice. However underlying matter causing Gezi Park demonstrations was the objection of the activists to the pluralist democracy. This mass demanded more democracy from the government with the opinion that their requests were ignored by the governing Justice and Development Party. They also were of the opinion that their cultural demands were ignored because of individualist governing manner of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. As to Arab Awakening actions in Libya, the public demanded complete termination of Qudhafi government. Even with this opinion they moved their actions onto an international platform and caused NATO intervention. Consequently, the demands of these masses from their governments differ from each other. Besides, the methods used in both actions, the specifications of people participated in actions, the areas they represented, the development level between these communities and their protesting cultures differ completely from each other. These situations form another different point between Arab Awakening actions in Libya and Gezi Park actions.

²⁷⁶ Işık, **ibid**, p. 26,
<http://www.selcuk.edu.tr/dosyalar/files/009/dergi/7/temmuz%202013.pdf>, (A.D. 30.12.2016)

3.4. ARAB AWAKENING IN YEMEN and GEZI PARK ACTIONS

Yemen, the country of ousted leader Abdullah Salih governing since 1978, experienced Arab Awakening reactions as Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. During the protests began in January 2011, Gulf Cooperation Organization, one of whose members is Yemen, stood between the parts in order to be able to stop conflicts. However this relevant intervene based on a political method, not the army of Salih, using the diplomacy. With this specification, it differs from Libya as it achieved the aim of protests owing to an international intervene. Along with this, the emphasis for a democratic life corresponds to the demands of democracy uttered during Arab Awakening actions in the other countries and Gezi Park actions, however the demand of overthrowing authoritative Abdullah Salih differs from Gezi Park actions during which especially individual freedom was voiced.

3.4.1. The Methods Used During Arab Awakening Actions in Yemen and Gezi Park Actions

In this part of my thesis, the reasons of Arab Awakening in Yemen and Gezi Park actions, the specifications of the mass took part in these actions, their demands, the methods used and the effect of actions will be examined.

Yemen was defined as a ‘happy and lively country, Happy Arabia’ by important civilizational in historical process.²⁷⁷ Before the Arab Awakening actions in Yemen began in January 2011, Sheik Sultan Barakani, head of parliamentary group of governing party, explained that they were aiming to rescind the period restriction for presidency. It is stated that the ‘exclusionist’ policy of Abdullah Salih, the leader of Yemen since mid-1990s, to defend himself against his opponents got reaction of Yemen public upon this development, upon this, Arab Awakening actions was started up by a small group of protestors who were uttering that there was no future for the young

²⁷⁷ Gün, *ibid*, p. 127,
[http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_dergisi/2012/sayi22/119-140.pdf_\(A.D.02.01.2017\)](http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_dergisi/2012/sayi22/119-140.pdf_(A.D.02.01.2017))

people and the rule of law principle was not applied in the country. It is expressed that another reason for these protests was that Salih and his family was using the power and opportunities of the state just for their own benefits.²⁷⁸ Besides it is also stated that the decrease of petrol and water sources in Yemen, having one of the fastest population growth around the World, caused the government to take control of all economic opportunities of the state.²⁷⁹ The demonstrations in Yemen was began to be named as ‘youth movement’ in record time. The demonstrators were stating their demands about job opportunities, education, social assistance programs, equal rights to women, termination of corruption, resignation of Salih and also the resignation of all his family members from high level military missions before formation of a new political structure. The activists requested the resignation of Salih from government as fast as possible and rejected any proposals pertinaciously foreseeing his government to rule till the end of a gradual transitional period during which constitutional changes would be formed.²⁸⁰

It is observed that right-wing parties ruled predominantly in the government or coalition governments since the establishment of Turkish Republic till the period of Gezi Park actions. It is necessary to define some points regarding this neo-liberal conservative area which is thought to lead the social and political sense and thus the politics and its practical. First of all, this part, owing to its neo-liberal dominance on the state, provided some privileges and opportunities to the capital owners following them politically and ideologically²⁸¹. Because of this, the governing Justice and Development Party during

²⁷⁸ Gün, Mehmet Salih, **ibid**, p. 128, 129,
[http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_dergisi/2012/sayi22/119-140.pdf_\(A.D.02.01.2017\)](http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_dergisi/2012/sayi22/119-140.pdf_(A.D.02.01.2017))

²⁷⁹ Gün, Mehmet Salih, **ibid**, p. 126,
[http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_dergisi/2012/sayi22/119-140.pdf_\(A.D.02.01.2017\)](http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_dergisi/2012/sayi22/119-140.pdf_(A.D.02.01.2017))

²⁸⁰ Hill, Ginny and Nonneman, Gerd, **ibid**, p. 3,
[https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/19237_0511yemen_gulfbp.pdf,\(A.D.02.01.2017\)](https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/19237_0511yemen_gulfbp.pdf,(A.D.02.01.2017))

²⁸¹ Ayşe Buğra, “**Turkey: What Lies Behind The Nationwide Protests?**”,
[https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/ayse-bugra/turkey-what-lies-behind-nationwide-protests,\(A.D.02.01.2017\)](https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/ayse-bugra/turkey-what-lies-behind-nationwide-protests,(A.D.02.01.2017))

Gezi Park actions applied some policies giving opportunities to its followers owing to the deficiencies of administrative system. The conservatism of political power turned into a different kind of conservatism by which mostly the religious factors were used. In other words, Justice and Development Party seemed to give importance to the liberal concerns of its public in the first years of its power, but later on followed a policy based on a particular stage (Sunni Islam). The government adopted an increasing authoritative manner in both configuration and enforcement of neo-liberal and conservative policies. The authoritativeness of government revealed its intolerance to the objections uttered against its different policies.²⁸² According to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hayriye Özen and Dr. Özgür Özen, “Gezi Park actions were an objection and resistance against authoritative managing perspective and politics regarding to both neo-liberal policies and the restructuring of public basing on conservative codes. Actually, participance of particular classes does not give the movement a class characteristic directly, because the social demands voiced, not their class belongings, give the color of a movement. We observe that the demands related to any class did not dominate during Gezi Park actions and the class demands were the ones stated just along with the other requests like spatial, ethnic, religious and gender identities.”²⁸³ “Gezi Park protests did not contain just the objection against the destruction of Gezi Park; far beyond it, they questioned more extensive structures giving a way to some kind of social displeasure including also problems and complaints related to urban spaces. These extensive structures, to mention it in general, were neo-liberal capitalism, the authoritative ruling manner and the policies adopted for the imagination of a more conservative/religious community using ‘victimization’ policy. Finally, that the political power adopted an authoritative, anti-democratic and arrogant manner of ruling basing particularly on the leader figure contrary to the hopes for democratisation and that the public was isolated from various decision making

²⁸² Hayriye Özen, Özgür Avcı, “**Taksim Everywhere Resistance Everywhere: National Spread of an Urban Movement**”, *Atılım Social Sciences Magazine*, Vol 3, Nr: 1-2, 2013, p. 35, [http://asbd.atilim.edu.tr/shares/sbedergi/files/%233_%C3%B6zen_avc%C4%B1\(1\).pdf](http://asbd.atilim.edu.tr/shares/sbedergi/files/%233_%C3%B6zen_avc%C4%B1(1).pdf), (A.D.02.01.2017)

²⁸³ Özen, Avcı, *ibid*, p. 38, 39, [http://asbd.atilim.edu.tr/shares/sbedergi/files/%233_%C3%B6zen_avc%C4%B1\(1\).pdf](http://asbd.atilim.edu.tr/shares/sbedergi/files/%233_%C3%B6zen_avc%C4%B1(1).pdf), (A.D.02.01.2017)

mechanisms accordingly and also the intolerance against differences and objections caused deeper sufferings lasting for years on these matters.”²⁸⁴

“As Gezi Park actions were an objection and resistance against authoritative managing perspective and politics regarding to both neo-liberal policies and the restructuring of public basing on conservative codes, it mobilized a mass having rather heterogamous demands and identities. In other words, it turned into a movement gathering various kinds of groups together as it created an area to express different requests excluded by the hegemonic system.”²⁸⁵ “As Gezi Park actions were an objection and resistance against authoritative managing perspective and politics regarding to both neo-liberal policies and the restructuring of public basing on conservative codes, it mobilized a mass having rather heterogamous demands and identities. In other words, it turned into a movement gathering various kinds of groups together as it created an area to express different requests excluded by the hegemonic system.”²⁸⁶

Internet usage was 1,8% in Yemen according to 2010 datas²⁸⁷. In this country the public protested on different squares and streets like El Tağyir.²⁸⁸ As we mentioned before, social media, some channels broadcasting on internet like ‘Çapulcu TV’, humor etc. was used during Gezi Park actions.

Consequently, Arab Awakening in Yemen and Gezi Park protests bare some similarities and differences. Both actions resemble to each other in terms of demand for a developed democracy and economic recovery, reaction against authoritative manner of

²⁸⁴ Özen, Avci, **ibid**, p. 44,
[http://asbd.atilim.edu.tr/shares/sbedergi/files/%233_%C3%B6zen_avc%C4%B1\(1\).pdf](http://asbd.atilim.edu.tr/shares/sbedergi/files/%233_%C3%B6zen_avc%C4%B1(1).pdf), (A.D.02.01.2017)

²⁸⁵ Özen, Avci, **ibid**, p. 43, 44,
[http://asbd.atilim.edu.tr/shares/sbedergi/files/%233_%C3%B6zen_avc%C4%B1\(1\).pdf](http://asbd.atilim.edu.tr/shares/sbedergi/files/%233_%C3%B6zen_avc%C4%B1(1).pdf), (A.D.02.01.2017)

²⁸⁶ Özen, Avci, **ibid**, p. 43, 44,
[http://asbd.atilim.edu.tr/shares/sbedergi/files/%233_%C3%B6zen_avc%C4%B1\(1\).pdf](http://asbd.atilim.edu.tr/shares/sbedergi/files/%233_%C3%B6zen_avc%C4%B1(1).pdf), (A.D.02.01.2017)

²⁸⁷ <http://www.internetworldstats.com/me/ye.htm>, (A.D.02.01.2017)

²⁸⁸ Gün, **ibid**, p. 126,
http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_dergisi/2012/sayi22/119-140.pdf, (A.D.02.01.2017)

ruling. Besides, the actions in Yemen resulted in the resignation of Ali Abdullah Salih and the management transfer to Abdo Robo Mansur Hadi on 23 November 2011. Because of this reason, the effect created by the management change as a consequence of protests in Yemen was not observed during Gezi Park actions. In addition to this, neo-liberal-conservative policies and denominational attitudes of governing Justice and Development Party caused reactions during Gezi Park actions. Besides, as we mentioned in previous chapters, Arab Awakening actions in Yemen moved to an international area with the mediation of Gulf Cooperation Organization. But Gezi Park actions were the protests which began and resulted in national framework.

CONCLUSION

Arab Awakening actions, which emerged upon self-immolation university-graduated peddler Muhammed Buazizi as a result of the police garnishee on his stall in December of 2010, were experienced in the geography called as MENA district. The suicide of university-graduated but also a peddler Muhammed Buazizi by burning himself was defined as ‘Arab Spring’ by some parts. However, I stated in first pages of my thesis that it would be truer to name these actions as ‘Arab Awakening’. First of all, self-immolation of Muhammed Buazizi was a reaction to this situation. As we know, the police or city police’s garnishee on a stall of a peddler is an event that can be observed as a simple situation in countries with a developed democracy. In countries with high democracy conditions, the solutions for such situations are either that the interested party applies to the governmental institution to get it back after paying its punishment or that they find another source of income instead. However, I am of the opinion that main idea of such events is rather different. The last resort of a university graduated young who had problems about finding a job was being a peddler. I think, it would be a true detection to see his self-immolation as “a reaction, a revolt against the desperation on the living conditions in his country”. I am of the opinion that the protests arranged by the publics of the other countries in this district having the similar kind of management attitude are the indication of the same perspective. Because of these reasons, according to Ass. Prof. Durgu Dersan, the leaders had to resign for the first time in this region as result of communal protests.²⁸⁹ Just with this reason, to name the events as ‘Arab Awakening’ would be a truer manner as these actions, called by some as ‘Arab Spring’, reveal the demand for termination of their governments in MENA district.

As a result of these requests voiced on squares and streets, the management changes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen was achieved and the protests obtained their goals.

²⁸⁹ Orhan, *ibid*, p. 27,
[http://asbd.atilim.edu.tr/shares/sbedergi/files/%232_dersan_orhan\(1\).pdf](http://asbd.atilim.edu.tr/shares/sbedergi/files/%232_dersan_orhan(1).pdf), (A.D. 02.01.2017)

I discussed the reasons of the protests, the demands uttered during actions, the methods used and their effects under the frame of the main question of my thesis “Are Gezi Park actions Turkey’s Arab Awakening?”.

When we examine the reasons of Arab Awakening actions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, we see that the requests on freedom, a developed economical welfare, human rights, women rights, justice etc. were emphasized during the actions. Besides, the most important aim of these people was the resignation of the government. These publics demanded firstly to be governed by the people who would be elected by free and fair elections. Because, the leaders of these relevant four countries provided the opportunities of the state to their families, clans and security forces instead of their folks. These managements defended their power owing to the privileges they supplied for their followers. In order not to get reaction from the public, they used also the subjects like nationalism, Israel antagonism, anti-imperialism for years long. The policies they applied, their manner of ruling and their legitimacy were questioned by the public under their power. However, the idea defended by the people acted during Gezi Park actions was rather different. The activists emphasized on “advanced democracy” seen in developed countries. Depending upon this perspective, this mass stated that the legitimacy source was not just made up of the free elections. Besides they focused the legitimacy of the power on the nature of relationship with the individual freedom area of citizens, independent from how they were elected. Because of this reason, the Arab Awakening actions, during which management change was aimed to reach a democratically level, were different in terms of their ‘goals’ from Gezi Park actions emphasizing on “individual freedom”.

Another indication explaining the different between Gezi Park and Arab Awakening actions was the question if the actions were nationwide or moved to an international area. It was observed that the actions in Libya and Yemen was terminated by intervene of NATO and Gulf Cooperation Organizations and dependently with the management change. But the Gezi Park actions were not intervened by any international institution. Taksim Solidarity Platform negotiated with the governing Justice and Development Party. Thus the protestors were able to convey their demands to the state

management with this dialogue method. However, the requests of demonstrators were not taken into consideration specially because of harsh attitude of the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. But the dialogue established without intervene by international institutions reveals the difference between the democracy level of Turkey and the countries experienced Arab Awakening actions.

Another similarity and difference point between Gezi Park actions and Arab Awakening actions was the methods used during the demonstrations. The activist reacted on squares and streets like Tahrir Square during Arab Awakening actions. They used public spaces while uttering their demands. Also during Gezi Park actions, the public demonstrated on squares and streets specially out of Istanbul. But the activists of Gezi Park actions 'occupied' an area and established there a living space. As a result of this actions whose another aim was to 'defend the urban spaces', a communal living space was emerged on that area. Thus, the protestors were supplied food, beverages, books etc. and a common living sense was revealed by this mass, claimed to be otherwise by Justice and Development country.

Another methodical difference between Arab Awakening and Gezi Park actions was the communication devices used. During Gezi Park actions, the demonstrators communicated mainly via social media like Facebook and Twitter. However, immense usage of social media devices and internet, an indication of a developed democracy, was not observed in Arab Awakening actions. The people communicated mainly by mobile phones in Arab Awakening reactions because of repression applied by the authoritative managements.

Another difference between Arab Awakening and Gezi Park actions was the outstanding groups. The youth organizations and non-governmental organizations were mainly at the fore during Arab Awakening actions. However, Gezi Park actions were not activated by any groups or organizations on first days of it. The protestors defined themselves as common citizens at the beginning and rejected the usage of any flame or flag of any political party or organization. They rejected even the participation of Kemal Kılıçdaroglu, the leader of Republican People's Party, who supported the protests.

Besides, Besiktas fan group 'Çarsı' and hacker group 'Redhack' were the other outstanding groups during Gezi Park actions.

Consequently, the Gezi Park actions and Arab Awakening protests differ from each other despite the similarities in terms of their aims and methods used. Turkey, the country experienced Gezi Park actions, has been a democratically country since the Declaration of Imperial Edict of Gulhane in 1856. Depending on this, the mass protested during Gezi Park actions did not utter their demands about democracy and the representation in parliament. The subjects voiced were the demands like consideration of pluralist democracy, protection of urban spaces, individual freedom etc. which are an indication of developed democracy. However, this was not the case in the countries experienced Arab Awakening protests. The social requests like humanly living right or the change of existing dictatorial governments were expressed as the beginning stage of a democratically living culture. Because of this reason, Gezi Park actions and Arab Awakening protests were the events experienced by two different societies having different development levels. So, to define the Gezi Park actions as equal to the Arab Awakening protests in political science would be a wrong and deficient evaluation, not taking the political science facts into consideration

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