

**T.C. ISTANBUL KÜLTÜR UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE**

EFFECTS OF SYRIZA MOVEMENT ON EU INTEGRATION

Master of Arts Thesis by

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Department: International Relations

Programme: International Relations

Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Özge ZİHNİOĞLU

JANUARY, 2017

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LIST OF ABBRAVATIONS

APIO	: Anticapitalist Political Group
AKOA	: Renewing Communist Ecological Left
ANEL	: Independent Greeks),
BRICS	: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CFSP	: Common Foreign and Security Policy
CPG	: KKE-es
DEA	: Internationalist Workers Left
DIKKI	: Democratic Social Movement
EC	: European Commission
EC	: European Communities
ECB	: European Central Bank
ECJ	: European Court of Justice
ECSC	: European Coal and Steel Community
EDIK	: Union of the Democratic Centre
EEC	: European Economic Community
EKND	: Center Union-New Forces
ESM	: European Stability Mechanism
EU	: European Union
EUROTOM	: European Atomic Energy Community
EUROGROUP	: Composed of Ministers of Finance in Eurozone
GDP	: Gross Domestic Product
GREXIT	: Greek Exit from Euro
IMF	: The International Monetary Fund
KEDA	: Movement for the United in Action Left
KKE	: Greek Communist Party

KOE	: Communist Organization of Greece
LI	: Liberal Intergovernmentalism
MP	: Minister
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ND	: New Democracy
PASOK	: Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement
PP	: Popular Party
Synaspismós/SYN	: Coalition of Left, of Movements and Ecology
SYRIZA	: Synaspismós Rhizospastikís Aristerás
TROIKA	: European Commission, the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank
UK	: United Kingdom
US	: United States
QMV	: Qualified Majority Voting
WB	: World Bank
WWII	: World War II

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ABSTRACT

Although establishing unity in Europe or creating an integrated Europe dates back to medieval ages as an idea, it has been accelerated through all attempts and scholar works in the period after World War II. But while the process of integration has not been completed yet, some new developments which may endanger the process have been emerging within European Union. Lately Syriza which took power in 25th of January 2015 became the focal point for the people living not only in Greece and Europe but in all over the world for its anti- European views. This new situation is of crucial importance for integration regarding the future of European Union.

In this work of thesis the European integration has been analyzed together with integration theories. The effects of Syriza movement to the integration have been evaluated under the light of Liberal Intergovernmentalist Theory. While evaluating these interactions on theoretical basis, the outcomes have been summarized under the headings economical, political, geo-political and social.

Key words: European integration, integration theories, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Syriza Movement

KISA ÖZET

Avrupa Kıtası'nda bir birlik kurma daha doğrusu entegre olmuş bir Avrupa fikri orta çağlara dayanmakla birlikte İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra bu anlamda yapılan çalışmalar daha da hız kazanmıştır. Ancak, tam olarak tamamlanmış bir süreçten bahsedemezken bu süreç için tehlike oluşturabilecek Avrupa'da bir takım gelişmeler yaşanmaktadır. Bunlardan bir tanesi de Yunanistandaki Syriza Hareketi'dir. 25 Ocak 2015 tarihinde iktidara gelen Syriza Partisi, Avrupa Birliği karşıtı söylemleriyle sadece Yunanistanda ve Avrupada yaşayanların değil tüm dünyanın ilgi odağı haline gelmiştir. Bu oluşum Avrupa Birliği' nin geleceği açısından epey büyük bir önem arz etmektedir.

Bu tez çalışmasında da Avrupa Entegrasyonu teoriler ile birlikte ele alınmış ve incelenmiş olup Liberal İntergovernmentalizm teorisi ışığında da Syriza Hareketinin bu entegrasyona etkileri ortaya konulmuştur. Bu etkiler teori bağlamında analiz edilirken de Ekonomik, Siyasi, Jeopolitik ve Sosyal etkiler gibi başlıklardan yararlanılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler : Avrupa Entegrasyonu, Entegrasyon teorileri, Liberal İntergovernmentalizm, Syriza Hareketi.

1. INTRODUCTION

The idea of integrated Europe certainly is one of the greatest and the most important projects of the last century. The process of integration of Europe dates back to middle ages. Although these old ideas had affected the birth of the process it has accelerated after World war II. The political map of Europe has been changing ever since. But the main trend is always in the direction of European Integration. The process gave rise to the emergence of several theories which are not only the cause of the proceedings but also the by product of all these. Conceptually it has evolved a good deal since the crystallization of first theories in the field of international relations. The availability of these theories enabled us to examine the integration process more systematically and more comprehensively.

It will be appropriate here to clarify what is meant by EU. Although, it is very difficult even not appropriate to make concise definitions about what EU is, one may say considering Liberal Intergovernmentalist Theory that is not solely a simple sum of member states but a super structure composed of interacting member states and their total relations embodied as EU regulations and rules.

As an unfinished process and probably as a project which will never be completed the integration has been the subject of the hottest debates among politicians, scholars and even among rank and file people. One of the developments which arose curiosity from the point of view of European Integration was Syriza movement in Greece.

This is because Syriza executed an anti-european and anti-austerity policy and based almost all propaganda on these two points. Clearing off some part of the debts and postponing some other part, leaving eurozone, nationalizing the banks, cutting off military spendings and ending membership to NATO and other pledges like these were some of the promises which are standing out and supporting Syriza's stand.

On the other side, Syriza's advent in 25th of January 2015 was not accidental and a close look into the recent history of Greece will reveal that there were many factors fostering the conditions for the birth of a new party. These factors were originating from mainly two sources; at the first place, these were due to the shortcomings of the Greek Politics which we may call internal factors. And in the second place, the shortcomings of other union members in understanding the real situation in Greece which may be considered as an external factor. The words austerity and eurozone which were heard so often epitomized economical aspects of these two factors.

In fact Greek people expected from their governments to end their misery both economically and socially. Governments now and before tried to optimize the demands of the people and the EU bodies. Unrealistic popular views about EU fostered by the sayings of the politicians especially when they demanded popular support in the elections set the stage for the general unrest among the people. Syriza taking advantage of this new situation exploited all the frustration of the people to come to power. This is clearly a set back in the relations with EU. Once closed chapters was opening again by Syriza.

As far as external factors concerned, the EU and the members was reluctant to pay the bill Greek governments handed to them. The governments before Syriza's coming to power was under pressures coming both from the people and from the EU impositions and expected EU to act in a way to understand the conditions in Greece and be ready for economical assistance for Greece. But this certainly meant new burdens for other member states, since there are already many new members especially the ones which newly participated in integration process and anticipating same kind of assistance from EU. During the past two decades, dissolving of Soviet union had made many countries to line up in front of EU Gates. Thus EU was not at an easy position financially. Besides governing bodies of EU was trying to avoid different approaches towards the member states. All the Greek governments before had given promises to the people that EU could not tolerate. So, Greek governments could not find a way out. Depleting funds and increasing demands of many member states put EU in a set of constraints. These are among the many other external factors to be mentioned at first place. As a consequence the trust of Greek people to Greek governments and to EU has decreased gradually opening a space for a new party.

Exploiting all the frustration of the people and using severe political slogans Syriza gained a considerable support from the Greek people and became the ruling party.

These factors while interactively affecting each other, extend that a single event; entering or leaving the union affects the whole process of integration had become a topic to be handled by Liberal Intergovernmentalist Theory. One of the most remarkable of these events in the last four decades is the Syriza's coming to power as a consequence of the collapse of central policies put into practice by both central left and right parties since they lost the support of general audience due to unkept promises. Two main consequences followed this:

1-A hampered integration process due Syriza's recovering to these unkept promises again.

2-A lowest level of trust of Greek People for EU and its institutions which would be very hard to recover again.

This movement which has a potential of danger in integration process would not have been overlooked. So, the importance of this work in the first place would be setting a general case for the other countries similar to Greece in order to analyze the obstacles and barriers lying in front of integration process and in the second place being the first study in this field, this work would set an example for the other academicians to cast some light on integration process since the literature in this field is not so abundant.

In Syriza example it is aimed to set some hypotheses based on integration theories.

These are:

- 1- Regarding the inertia and the depth of the process we can say that Syriza's coming to power will not reverse the direction of the process but will transform it to a new stage
- 2- And again regarding to magnitude on the momentum gained in mass protest against EU one may claim it will not create a domino effect on the other countries which are more or less having similar conditions with Greece

- 3- Although Greek people's trust to integrated Europe and its institutions had decreased drastically, it would not hamper EU process as Liberal Intergovernmentalism had rightfully envisaged.

In the second section of this study which we have only determined the method for literature survey, integration was handled conceptually and the historical process of EU integration with theories have been examined. Among all theories the Liberal Intergovernmentalism took the front place that we based our analysis on.

In the third section of the study the political atmosphere of Greece after 1974 have been taken into the consideration and the conditions which gave rise to the Syriza movement examined thoroughly. Syriza has been taken into consideration in both periods; before it became a ruling party and after.

In the fourth section, the effect of Syriza's coming to power on the integration process of EU has been dealt from the point of view of Liberal Intergovernmentalist Theory under the headings; economical, political, geopolitical and social. This sections have been written considering the events up to the time of the start of this thesis.

In this work main emphasis has been made on the economical factors due to:

- 1- As epitomized in the phrases that the crowds uttered in the protests "anti-austerity" and "leaving eurozone", the conflict with EU was mainly on economic grounds.
- 2- As far as historical facts considered economy and politics is closely related. It is nearly impossible to isolate completely one from the other. The phrases which may be most closely coined with this interrelation; "political economy" or "the economy politics" best show this peculiarity.
- 3- The events in the other countries similar to Greece may be compared in a detailed way but this is out of scope of this work and may be a good theme

for another work. Though a short political analysis has been made in the 4th section of this work.



2. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE LIGHT OF LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALIST THEORY

2.1. Definition of Integration

Before focusing on European integration it would be better to begin with what the word integration means, its etymology and its substance both in historical context and in current usage.

Root of etymological integration comes from French. Lexical meaning of integration is the act of combining or adding parts to make a unified whole, the act of amalgamating a racial or religious group with an existing community, the combination of previously racially segregated social facilities into a nonsegregated system.¹

Integration is a concept whose meaning depends much more on agreeing a definitional consensus than it does on establishing any abiding or universal properties.² Haas, defined integration as the process whereby political actors in several, distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.³

However Deutsch, explained integration both of “condition” and “process.” As a condition in which a group of people have attained within a territory a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among peoples over a wide range of goods and services. Countries are clusters of population, united

¹ Dictionary, <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/integration> 05 Nov. 2015

² Michael O’Neill, *the Politics of European Integration* (London, Routledge, 2005) 10.

³ Ernst Haas, *the Unity of Europe; Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957* (Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1958) 16.

by grids of communication flows and transport systems, and separated by thinly settled or nearly empty territories.⁴

When he focused on “process”, defined integration the process by which villages become districts, countries, or baronies, which, in turn, are combined into duchies or provinces, only to merge again into kingdoms. Kingdoms, in turn, have sometimes become consolidated into federations or empires.⁵

Based on the definitions put forth by Haas ve Deutsch and in addition to all of the arguments cited above one can think of integration as an act to combine different parts in order to form a unified and a coherent body. It is a process that depends on the denial of all national political issues for constructing a new political system above the nation state. A big transformation proceeds sometimes with small and calm steps and some other times with bursts and jumps.

2.2. Integration of Europe with Theories

The idea of United Europe emerged as one of the most important political ventures of 20th century. That is why there is a multitude of views which had influenced and directed its formation historically. The process of integration was under the influence of several theories from the very beginning. So, this process whose development has been debated with its materializations must be evaluated taking these theories into consideration.⁶

The so called integration process must be taken into consideration together with the theories; according to Diez and Wiener. They handle theories first as a help to formulate expectations about future developments and institutional behavior. Second, apart from the set-up, role, and function of formal institutions, many readers will, for example, be concerned with questions of democratic reform and legitimacy. [...] Third, and arguably more importantly, 'pure' empirical knowledge of how

⁴ Robert L. Pfaltzgraf, “Karl Deutsch and the Study of Political Science,” Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.96.

⁵ Pfaltzgraf, 97.

⁶ Bilge Ercan, Arda Ercan “ Relationship Between European Social Policy and European Citizenship in the Process of European Integration” (The journal of international Social Research, 41, (2015) 408.

institutions work is impossible and would in any case not be very meaningful. The finality of the integration process, which often remain unreflect.[...]To sum this point up, analyzing integration is not only a technical matter, but involves particular understandings and conceptualizations of integration and the EU, for which we need integration theory⁷

In fact, there is one considerable point that just one theory is not sufficient alone to explain whole European integration process. For instance; beginning theories was almost based on how to avoid war? The other group is explaining ongoing integration and the current group focused on evolution of European polity.

The idea of “unity in diversity” in other words idea of European integration is most frequently associated with the period after the end of the World War II (WWII) as Western European states increasingly cooperated during various developmental stages of the European Union (EU). But the concept of governing Europe actually has a far longer history. From the Roman Empire of Julius Caesar to Napoleon, Hitler, and Stalin, European history is marked by many attempts to organize the multitude of nations and ethnicities into a more or less coherent political entity with competing views of how the different states should be related and the degree to which autonomy and sovereignty should be preserved⁸ As cited above the first integration attempts had been made in ancient Greek and Roman Civilizations. The federative structure, parliaments in city civilizations and the jurisdictional mechanisms of the time made big contributions to European Integration.⁹ The period that the real attempts and the plans towards European Integration had been made is the medieval age. Some philosophers of the time had expressed their views on European Integration.¹⁰

Just to mention some of these; the project of Immanuel Kant towards “ensuring everlasting peace”; Victor Hugo’s plans about “ United States of Europe” and other philosophers and politicians like Montesquieu, Voltaire, Proudhon and

7 Antje Wiene, Thomas Diez , European Integration Theory (Oxford , Oxford University Press, 2009

8 Andreas Staab, The European Union Explained: Institutions, Actors, Global Impact (Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 2011) 4.

9 Yalçın Alganer, Müzeyyen Özlem Çetin “Avrupa’da Birlik ve Bütünleşme Hareketleri” Marmara Üniversitesi İ.İ.B.F. Dergisi 2 (2007) 287.

10 Yalçın Alganer, Çağlar Yılmaz “Avrupa’da Birlik ve Bütünleşme Hareketleri” Journal of Life Economics 7 (2016) 95.

Saint Simon who expressed their views on integration and unity that based on peace in Europe.¹¹

The closest proposal to today's EU came from Saint Simon in 1814. Saint Simon in his work "On the Reorganization of European Society" proposed that the Europeans must have established a confederation. So, the similar proposals came from William Jay in 1842 and from Alfred Lord Tennyson in 1847.

Although there are a multitude of views on the matter, the views put forth by Victor Hugo played a distinguished role in forming intellectual infrastructure in the direction of Integration of Europe. In the "United States of Europe Conferences" held in 1848 in Brussels, in 1849 in Paris, in 1850 in Frankfurt and in 1851 in London the political and trade affairs with United States of America and with the World had been defined.¹²

Again in 1834 the removal of customs mutually among German Principalities gave way to Zollverein (Customs Union) which may be considered as the first attempt to set an example for Economic Unity for EU today. The monetary union established by France, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy and Greece in 1876 and the "Scandinavian Monetary Union" formed by the countries Sweden, Denmark, and Norway set as other examples for the economic integration of Europe.

The first federalist attempt to bring European States together in peace as one of the important proposals for organization may be the International Pan European Movement which had been put forth in 1924. This organization was envisaging France and Germany as the center of the federal union keeping United Kingdom (UK) and Soviet Union outside. Austrian politician Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi while leading this movement was expressing his aim as to form European Unity under the framework of four principles; Liberality, Christianity, Social responsibility and Europeanism. This proposal was rejected then but later after WWII, was reconsidered by the politicians who laid the foundations of the project now known as EU.¹³

¹¹ Alganer, Çetin , 288.

¹² Ercan, Ercan 408.

¹³ Alganer, Çetin, 301.

Due to power struggles among the European States, two large scale devastating wars known as world wars had been waged on the soil of European continent leading to severe damages and losses. Together with these wars European continent passed through social, economic, military, political even psychological convulsions leading to deep quakes and breakages and serious crises.¹⁴

Although Europe has continued its attempts towards unity in the early 20th century, the political environment was not suitable for integration due to nationalist tensions and power struggles. After two world wars, which might have taught serious lessons not only to politicians but also to all the European people in mid 20th century attempts for unity resumed. All the organizations formed aiming European Unity laid the foundations for the EU today.

World War II (WWII) has changed Europe completely. Germany has lost the war and devastated and divided into four occupied zones. Communist parties under the control of Soviet Union came to power in Eastern Europe and removed private property and started command economy. West European states struggling with the hardships of the postwar period was in a hopeless situation and what they were after was economic recovery, political stability and military security. United States (US) opened the way for them to manage to achieve all these aims.¹⁵

US encouraged economic cooperation by means of free trade and unrestricted financial movements. The Europe which has become only the western part due to contraction by cold war was the important factor of the global system in US's mind. But West Europe was too weak financially and economically to participate totally to the international order which has emerged just after the war. US stood in the breach for economic recovery by Marshall Plan and for easing the convertibility of the national currencies by establishing European Payments Union. In April 1949 North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington and thus NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) which was formed under the influence and hegemony of US has started to serve as a security umbrella for West Europe.¹⁶

¹⁴ Hasan Mor "Avrupa Birliđi Bütünleşme Süreci ve Sorunları" Gazi Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 1 (2010) 504.

¹⁵ Desmond Dinan, "Avrupa Birliđi Tarihi" Trans. Hale Akay (İstanbul, Kitap Yayınevi, 2013) 31.

¹⁶ Dinan, 31.

After the war, Europe has experienced an ideological split resulting in so called Cold War period. Tired of wars the Europeans put forth the Federalism as the only idea that will enable European Unity not to live again the wars and to ensure a sustained peaceful environment. Even in 1938 the first European Federalist Group had been founded. This act had been followed by some unsuccessful attempts in this direction which had been supported by some prominent politicians like British Winston Churchill and Italian Altiro Spinelli

Thus an enthusiastic interest for the federalist views emerged as a result in postwar period in Europe. Conditions had ripened for a European unity based on shared sovereignty rights and the supremacy of the law. The question of avoiding the war and ensuring a sustained peace which is the starting point of Idealism directed Europe which has emerged from the war devastated and wanted not to live again the similar pains towards the idea of integration. Basically, under the total influence of all federalist views European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) has been founded by the Schuman Declaration dated May 1950.¹⁷ Infact Schuman is the first who put forth the idea and the society has been established by Paris Agreement.

Although ECSC which has been founded in 1952 as the first European Community was formed mainly for connecting German and French coal and steel industries had no intention to restrict itself to be a project belonging only to French and to the Germans. On the contrary, even at the very beginning it was held open to all other democracies in the Europe. Belgium, Italy, Luxemburg and Netherland made best benefit of the this opportunity that was provided for themselves and by proceeding the same way later they participated as the founding members of European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (EUROTOM) in 1957.¹⁸

Community has taken present status by EU Agreement (Maastricht Agreement) which has been signed on 7th of February 1992 in Maastricht of Holland

¹⁷ Ercan, Ercan , 410.

¹⁸ Klaus-Dieter Borhardt, “Avrupa Bütünleşmesi; Avrupa Birliği'nin Kökenleri ve Büyümesi” (Ankara, Avrupa Komisyonu Türkiye Temsilciliği Yayınları, 1995) 15.

and has come into force on 1st of November 1993. The community has changed its name as European Union after this agreement.¹⁹

Signed in October 1997 and was put into force in May 1999 Amsterdam Treaty was made for adapting Maastricht Treaty to the current conditions and passing to single currency and prepairing EU and member nations for the enlargement process of EU. Amsterdam Treaty completed the legal framework that Maastricht Treaty had formed and reinforced the rights within the framework of “European Citizenship”. EU and ES (AT) treaties were have been renumbered and some amendments have been made on these.²⁰

Signed in 2001 and put into force in 2003, Nice Treaty aimed at bringing the institutional reforms that EU has to release within the framework of enlargement process. Treaty determined the distribution of the seats in both European Parliment and European Commission and the proportions of the majority votes to reach a decission in EU Council and changed the weights of proportions of the votes in EU Ministers Council.²¹

The most important of all these was the signing of Lisbon Treaty by the EU presidents and preministers which came together in the capital city of Portugal which was serving the presidency of EU then in 14 of December 2007. Lisbon Treaty, signed by 27 member states which had a meeting in Jerenimos Monastery in Lisbon replaced the Treaty serving as “a constitution for Europe” which was signed in 29 October 2004 but not endorsed.²²

¹⁹ Pınar Yardımcı, “Küreselleşme ve Bölgeselleşme Ekseninde Uluslararası Ekonomik Entegrasyonlar Terori ve Uygulama” (İstanbul, Detay Yayıncılık, 2012) 64.

²⁰ IBB “Avrupa Birliği Kurucu Anlaşmaları” <http://www.ibb.gov.tr/sites/Avrupa-Birligi/Sayfalar/KurucuAntlasmalar.aspx> 04 Dec 2016

²¹ IBB “Avrupa Birliği Kurucu Anlaşmaları” <http://www.ibb.gov.tr/sites/Avrupa-Birligi/Sayfalar/KurucuAntlasmalar.aspx> 04 Dec 2016

²² Delegation of the European Union to Turkey , “Avrupa Birliği Yasal Çerçeve” <http://avrupa.info.tr/tr/avrupa-birligi/ab-yasal-cerceve.html> 04 Dec 2016

2.2.1. Federalism

As we have mentioned earlier although the dream of forming a federal Europe dates back to very old times this longing for a federal Europe has accelerated after the WWII.

The thinkers that can show the way to the politicians who are in the federal line and who might be considered as the pioneering fathers of EU idea like Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Winston Churchill in developing their views are those intellectuals like Lionel Curtis, Philip Kerr and Harold Laski who have founded Federal Union in 1938.²³

In fact although the roots of Federalism have taken shape in the same contemplative climate it has been represented by two names that differed both in method and application: Jean Monnet and Altiero Spinelli.

Jean Monnet said in his book which has been composed of his biographical notes “Memoires” about founding of European Coal and Steel Community:

“If the fear of German industrial domination could be allayed, the greatest obstacle to European Union would be lifted. A solution that put French industry on the same footing as German industry, while freeing the latter from the discrimination born of defeat, would restore the economic and political preconditions for the mutual understanding so vital to Europe. It could, in fact, become the germ of European Unity”²⁴

The ultimate goal of both Monnet and Spinelli was founding of a European Federation and the instincts underneath their approaches were originating from the same point of views: the history of Europe which is full of wars, founding institutional mechanisms to find solutions to the problems and and apply these to them. But the roads they take to arrive these ultimate goals were different. At this point it is important to stress that Monnet was not distinguished as a fiery proponent of a federal union in Europe although he was supporting the establishment of long

²³ Dinan, 23.

²⁴ Jean Monnet, *Memoirs*, trans George W. Ball (London, Doubleday & Company, 1978) 346-347.

lasting European federation. So, some writers expressed their views leery and did not consider Monnet as a federalist instead they accepted Spinelli as the pioneer of the supporters of federal views within the framework of European integration.²⁵

Spinelli's verdict on Monnet's conception of Europe can be succinctly summarized like this; it failed by its own terms of reference. It did not possess that inherent sustaining dynamic which Monnet believed, at least initially, would evolve inexorably towards a union among peoples. The predicted shift from quantity to quantity did not occur precisely because of Monnet's excessive reliance upon functionalist logic. His confidence in it was misplaced because he failed to confront the realities of organized political power. Only strong independent central political institutions could provide European solution to European problems; otherwise national answers would prevail over European solutions. Spinelli acknowledged that Monnet had made the first steps easier to achieve but he had also made the later steps more difficult. The building of 'political' Europe based upon economic performance criteria would not necessarily follow according to Monnet's logic. Europe might very well remain as little more than a 'Common Market'.²⁶

In order to make a general definition taking the views of the both (Monnet and Spinelli) into consideration one may mention about federal thought briefly as: Federalism asserts that resolving political problems would be realized only by dissolving nation states. It can also be named as a theory that challenges nation state.

According to the theory the political problems inherent to the international affairs requires political solutions and this is possible only when nationstate ceases to exist. And this extinction of the nation state requires forms in federal character in the axis of constitutional order. Only by this achievement it is possible to prevent the possibility of a war and to mention about the possibility of a permanent peace. Federalism is the only way to bring peace to Europe.

But Federalism has been criticized at this point for ignoring the sensitivities arising in transferring political sovereignties of nation states to a federal body and limiting its action mostly to practical life. These criticisms even gave birth to

²⁵ M. Burgess, *Federalism and European Union: The Building of Europe 1950-2000* (Londra, Routledge, 2000) 36.

²⁶ Burgess, 36.

another theory; the so called functionalist theory, rising from realist roots as federalism did. To the contrary of federalist theory the functionalist theory claimed that integration would only be possible on technocratic level.

2.2.2. Functionalism

The founder of functionalist theory David Mitrany claimed in his work “A working Peace System” that actors outside nation state should take place in in EU integration. According to Mitrany that the system in which only the nation states are dominant will not bring peace and claimed that non-political technical issues are more important than the political ones.

Mitrany who explained the founding of ECSC which is the the first organization of uniting of Europe in the institutional sense by cooperation concept, diverged in this from the realist theory. Mitrany claimed that cooperation in a field will lead to another in other fields. This concept which has taken its place in literature as ramification claims that cooperation in a certain field (coal and steel) will affect the coming up of other international societies by diffusing into other fields.²⁷

Functionalism does not consider- under the influence of lacking the practice of enlargement waves which has been put forth before but realized in European integration- enlargement of the international organizations with the functions left from nation states with new members. It is also lacking naturally the potential of explaining enlargement movements on political basis and the conditions and the processes of notifying the candidate members as members since it considers EU integration only in technocratic basis and does not take into account political wills and processes.²⁸

²⁷ Tayyar Arı, “Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri: Çatışma, Hegemonya ve İşbirliği” (Bursa, MKM Yayıncılık, 2010) 431.

²⁸ S. Sezgin Mercan “Siyasal Bütünleşme Kuramları Işığında Avrupa Genişlemesi” Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi Vol 10, No 1 (2011) 70.

2.2.3. Neo-functionalism

The federalist and functionalist theories which tried to explain European integration have been lacking at some points. The deficiencies of federalism which arises from its approach which have underestimated how reluctant the nation states were in transferring their political sovereignty and the lacking points in functionalist theory which is due to its aiming at reaching integration solely on technocratic basis by handling international relations independent of political process gave birth to a new theory.²⁹ This new theory is Neo-Functionalism.

Neo-functionalism was a popular theory of European integration in the 1950s and 1960s. The most prominent neo-functionalist writer was Ernst Haas in his book 'The Uniting of Europe' in 1958. The important question that neo-functionalists attempt to ask is: how does cooperation in specific economic policy sectors lead to greater economic integration in Europe and then to wider political integration?³⁰ The question answered by spillover.

Haas explains spill over effect in his book as projecting the spillover effect observed in the case of ECSC, an acceleration of this process under the new treaty can safely be predicted. Even though the parliamentarians will not have the power to dismiss the ministers, it is difficult to imagine that the entire scope of economic relations, even those which went un-mentioned in the treaty, will not be reflected in their debates and votes. The Assembly is bound to be a more faithful prototype of a federal parliament than the ECSC "legislature." As for the Council of Ministers, it is inconceivable that the liberalisation not only of trade, but of the conditions governing trade, can go on for long without "harmonisation of general economic policies" spilling over into the fields of currency and credit, investment planning and business cycle control. The actual functions then regularly carried out by the Council will be those of a ministry of economics. The spillover may make a political community of Europe in fact even before the end of the transitional period.³¹

²⁹ Ercan, Ercan , 411.

³⁰ Civitas, "Theories of European Integration" <http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/OS/OS16.php> 07 Nov 2015

³¹ Haas, 311.

Briefly, summing up spill-over factor; there are three kinds of propagation factors. First of these “Functional Propagation” factor makes the same connotation for both functionalism and the neo functionalism; it claims, for instance, that the integration in coal and steel sector will trigger the integration in other sectors. A new concept “Political Propagation” which is different than functionalism has been added to literature as a gain. In this context, as the functional propagation is being realised interest groups will be directed to the institutions in the center of integration instead of affecting national states and national technocrats will participate in the decision mechanisms created within the process of integration. In the third place, a new approach which is named as geographical propagation and expressing the need for the other nations that have witnessed the success of integration process to demand to take part in this process was adopted.³²

This theory which had put his mark on the literature in the late 1950’s and the first years of 1960 proved insufficient in explaining the developments which has been experienced in mid sixties and has left its popularity to intergovernmentalism.

2.2.4. Intergovernmentalism

Refusal of the appeal for UK’s membership to European Communities (EC) in 1963 made by Charles De Gaulle, President of the fifth republic of France who is the most important representative of nationalist movement which has emerged in elitist level in Europe towards mid sixties and the “Empty Chair Crisis” pursued by EC institutions in 1965 had casted a shadow on the validity of fundamental arguments of neo functionalism. Within the framework of the formulae which has taken its place in history as Luxemburg Accord, accepting the rule that qualified majority vote will not be applied in the case of vital national interests which was the basic indicator of supranationalism, in other words legitimatizing the right of the

³² Sinem Akgül Açıkmeşe, “Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri Işığında Avrupa Bütünleşmesi” Uluslararası İlişkiler 1 (2004) 8

vetoing of member states underlined the fact that the nation state was strong at EC level.³³

Although all these had created negative effects on European integration policy; these developments served as an exit point for a new theory as well. The pioneer of realist movement in international relations, Stanley Hoffman has created the theory of intergovernmentalism basing on these developments.

Hoffman states about integration as follows:

The nation-state is at the same time a form of social organization and in practice if not in every brand of theory a factor of international non-integration; but those who the Fate of the Nation-State argue in favor of a more integrated world, either under more centralized power or through various networks of regional or functional agencies, tend to forget Auguste Comte's old maxim that on ne détruit que ce qu'on remplace: the new "formula" will have to provide not only world order, but also the kind of social organization in which leaders, elites, and citizens feel at home.³⁴

As Hoffman develops his theory, Morgenthau has used state-centrism hypothesis which is the basic hypothesis of realism. Intergovernmentalism differs from classical realism in the sense that it analyzes international cooperation more comprehensively and includes intergovernmentalist theory among its topics. This theory which goes to separation of high and low politics as classical realists did, allows integration in the fields qualified as technical which there is no conflict of interests and there is a norm peculiar to the period that envisages cooperation not in between states but societies. But according to Intergovernmentalist theory in the fields where the factors pertaining to national identity stands out, national interests like money, foreign policy, defense bears vital importance and the governments do not dare to loose control in these fields. So, fields of high politics can not be theme for cooperation and integration.³⁵

³³ Açıkmеше, 9.

³⁴ Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe" *Daedalus*, Vol. 95, No. 3 (1966) 862-863 (915)

³⁵ Ben Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration* (Newyork, St Martin's Press, 2000) 77.

Briefly Intergovernmentalism emphasizes the role of the nation state in integration, and argues that the nation state is not becoming obsolete due to European integration. Alan Milward, an intergovernmentalist writer, argued that the national governments of the member states were the primary actors in the process of European integration, and rather than being weakened by it as some of their sovereignty was delegated to the EU, they became strengthened by the process. This is because in some policy areas it is in the member states' interest to pool sovereignty.³⁶ According to intergovernmentalists the pace of integration depends on the extent that the preferences of member states coincides, if the coincidence is big enough then the radical changes take place otherwise pace integration is very slow.

2.3. Liberal Intergovernmentalism and EU Integration

Andrew Moravcsik put into words his theory “Liberal Intergovernmentalism” for the first time in the article “Negotiating the Single European Act: national interest and conventional statecraft in the European Community”. In *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, Andrew Moravcsik provides a new synthesis for the field of regional integration studies generally and EU studies in particular.³⁷ In this book Moravcsik asked these questions whether;

- “1. National preferences were driven by general geopolitical ideas and interests or by issue-specific (generally economic) interests;
2. Substantive bargaining outcomes were shaped by the manipulation of information by supranational entrepreneurs and information asymmetries or by intergovernmental bargaining on the basis of asymmetrical interdependence;

³⁶ Civitas, “Theories of European Integration” <http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/OS/OS16.php07> Nov 2015

³⁷ James A. Caporaso “Toward a Normal Science of Regional Integration” *Journal of European Public Policy* 6 (1999) 160.

3. The choice of EU institutions reflected federalist ideology, the need for technocratic management, or an interest in securing credible member state commitments”³⁸

Moravcsik, the first and the only representative of theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) states the nations as being the real actors of international politics and claims that the concept of Intergovernmentalism which was founded by Stanley Hoffman (1966) is lacking substance in the themes regarding present state of Europe and its integration process and puts forth the need for bringing new and different dimensions to the theory. So, he tried to explain this theory adding different dynamics into it.

On the other hand this original form of Intergovernmentalism was a critique on Neofunctionalism as well, stating a more realist approach to integration with greater attention to its context.³⁹

But Moravcsik criticizes the Neo-functionalism in these aspects: The first problem arises from the lack of envisaging the path and the process that the new functionalism will embark on. According to Neo functionalists the unity would go on a route which had accelerating phases. But what happened were, on the contrary, Intergovernmental negotiations replacing ‘Liberal Intergovernmental Federalism’ and the route entered in a new state called ‘Empty Chair Crises’. Moravcsik also stated that the unity did not spread out in the political area substantially and supranational authority had increased slowly and unevenly. He also adds to his criticism that the emphasis the neo functionalists put on economic dimensions of unity process was right. The concept of economic gain brought by unity process plays a considerable role in his theory as well. The second criticism Moravcsik puts forth that the Neo functionalist Theory has no say that will enable empirical development. Moravcsik basic his criticism that Neo functionalist Theory does not say anything about the direction that the unity would go after the differences became

³⁸ Andrew Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfennig “Liberal Intergovernmentalism” In Antje Wiener, Thomas Diez European Integration Theory (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009) 69.

³⁹ Engbers Wander, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism; Does ‘Liberal Intergovernmentalism’ provide, as Andrew Moravcsik claims, a superior explanation for the principal historic ‘step changes’ in the process of European integration?” University of Luxembourg, (2014) 4.

apparent on unity process. Moravcsik links these deficiencies of the Neo functionalist Theory to their inability to base their views on the general theory.⁴⁰

Moravcsik while was trying to add new dimensions to classical Intergovernmentalist Theory he made use of the Liberal Theory which has started to gain importance since the early 1990's. On the other hand the deficiencies of neo realist theory in explaining international relations gave birth to Neo-liberal Theory. But this is very different from the traditional Liberalism since they envisage integration on rational grounds like national security and economic development even in an anarchic situation. Thus they think that the international organization of EU will realize regional cooperation and national welfare.

As a result, Moravcsik combined Neo-liberalism and Classic Intergovernmentalism that added new dimensions and these differed from Classic Intergovernmentalism in that it emphasised domestic rather than national interests.⁴¹ It is argue that the bargaining power of member states is important in the pursuit of integration, and package deals and side payments also occur in the process of making deals. They see institutions as a means of creating credible commitments for member governments, that is, as a way of making sure that other governments that they make deals with will stick to their side of the bargain. Liberal intergovernmentalists consider supranational institutions to be of limited importance in the integration process, in contrast to neofunctionalists.⁴²

LI theory defined as a “Baseline theory” as well. Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig clarify its several characteristic under groups:

First, LI is grounded in broader social science theory. It seeks to modernize integration theory by drawing on general political science theory. It is an application of 'rationalist institutionalism', a general approach used to study interstate cooperation in world politics. Although LI draws on insights from traditional schools in European integration studies that treat the EU (or regional integration) as a unique

⁴⁰ Seçil Öraz, “Andrew Moravcsikve Liberal Hükümetlerarası Sistem ile AvrupaBütünleşmesi” Turkish Studies 6/1 (2011) 1612.

⁴¹ European Studies, “Intergovernmentalism& Liberal Intergovernmentalism” <http://hum.port.ac.uk/europeanstudieshub/learning/module-4-theorising-the-european-union/3-intergovernmentalism-liberal-intergovernmentalism/>10 Nov 2015

⁴² Civitas, “Theories of European Integration” <http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/download/OS.16%20Theories.pdf>10 Nov 2015

or sui generis activity-particularly Neofunctionalism but also, to a lesser extent, Traditional Intergovernmentalism', as developed by Hoffmann. LI seeks to ground these insights in a more consistent and rigorous core of microfoundational assumptions. This allows LI, in contrast to traditional schools of European integration, to specify the motivations of social.⁴³

Second, LI is a 'grand theory' that seeks to explain the broad evolution of regional integration. LI is a theoretical synthesis or framework, not a narrow theory of a single political activity. It argues that one cannot explain integration with just one factor, but instead seeks to link together multiple theories and factors into a single coherent approach appropriate to explaining the trajectory of integration over time.⁴⁴

Third, LI is parsimonious. Though multi-causal, LI remains simple. Its basic premises can be summarized in a few general interrelated propositions, which deliberately seek to simplify EU politics, stressing the essential and excluding certain secondary activities. [...]The precise specification of each theory, moreover, varies by issue area and circumstance. This is hardly an overly simplistic account. Still, the aspiration to parsimony differentiates LI from atheoretical concepts like 'multilevel governance' -a descriptive metaphor rather than a theory that subsumes nearly all possible political interrelationships found in the EU, including those predicted by LI.⁴⁵

This theory is state-centric, reflecting both a realistic view of international relations and a rational choice conception of decision-making as maximization of individual self-interest. On this interpretation, EU institutions created by member states for some benefit to themselves not created by supranational entrepreneurs to forge sense of commitment to the European project. In other words, EU institutions are perceived by member states as their tools, not their masters; They are simply instruments fashioned by them to solve problems that cannot be solved at the level of the nation- state, not organism with a life of their own that inexorably evolve into

⁴³ Moravcsick, Schimmelfennig. 67.

⁴⁴ Moravcsik, Schimmelfennig. 68.

⁴⁵ Moravcsik, Schimmelfennig. 68.

uncontrollable forces with the power to impose unexpected and unwelcome demand on member states in the name of some EU deal.⁴⁶

2.4. Analysis of Liberal- Intergovernmentalism

Moravcsik deal with Intergovernmentalist theory in the first place as a two phased theory. Liberal context and Intergovernmentalist content. But as he thought that these two concepts would not be sufficient he added another concept. And that is institutional choice.




Figure 1. 1: The Liberal Intergovernmentalist Framework of Analysis

Source: Andrew Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach", *Journal of Common Market Studies* Vol: 31, No: 4 (1993)

As we indicate above, LI is a two-step sequential model of preference formation and international bargaining. In the first stage of the model, national-chief-of-government (or COGs) aggregates the interest of their domestic constituencies, as well as its own interest and articulate national preferences toward European integration.⁴⁷ For instance, on adopting a common currency before negotiating this

⁴⁶ Craig Mclean, Tim Gray, "Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Historical Institutionalism and British and German perceptions of the EU's Fisheries Policy." *Marine Policy* 33 (2009) 460.

⁴⁷ Mark A. Pollack, "International Relations Theory and European Integration" Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (San Domonica, European University Institute, 2000)4.

among member states every nation state should declare its national preference. The dynamics that are taken into consideration when expressing national preferences shows us why it does not agree with Intergovernmentalist Theory and why it conveys a Liberal attribute.⁴⁸

In the second stage, national governments bring their preferences to the Intergovernmental bargaining table in Brussels, where agreements reflect the relative power of each member state and where supranational organizations such as the European Commission (EC) exert little or no causal influence.⁴⁹ In this step taken as phase of Intergovernmental bargaining, an Intergovernmental bargaining will be realized between sovereign nation states. So this agrees completely with Intergovernmentalist Theory. Again the reform realized by European Single Act and Maastricht Treaty is a result of reconciling individual preferences of member states.⁵⁰

The third stage explores the reasons why states choose to delegate or pool decision-making in international institutions. Delegation in the EU refers to the powers given to the EC and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Pooling of sovereignty refers to the application of majority decisions, in practice mostly qualified majority voting (QMV). To explain institutional choice, Moravcsik contrasts three possible explanations: Federalist ideology, centralized technocratic management or more credible commitment. The answer he gives is that states delegate and pool sovereignty to get more credible commitment. Pooling and delegation is a rational strategy adopted by the member states to pre-commit governments to future decisions, to encourage future cooperation and to improve future implementation of agreements.⁵¹

⁴⁸ SinemAkgül Açıkmeşe, “UluslararasıİlişkilerTeorileriIşığındaAvrupaBütünleşmesi” Uluslararası İlişkiler 1 (2004) 19.

⁴⁹ Pollack, 4.

⁵⁰ Açıkmeşe, 20.

⁵¹ Finn Laursen, “Theory and Practice of Regional Integration” Paper prepared for presentation at the European Union Centre (Florida, University of Miami, 2008) 8.

2.4.1. National Preferences Formation and Demand for Integration

National preferences as a consequence of inspiration from Liberal Theories that focused on state- society relations became a system in various formats. It envisages private individuals and voluntary associations as the main actors in politics. For Liberals, state goals and policies stated by the politicians with the power of the national government should consider views of civil societies, interest groups and even their own voters.

Also, Moravcsik indicate that national political institutions are subject to myriad pressured from nationally based interest, leading to process of preference formation. State preferences as a group compete with each other for the attention of government's elites and these feed into interstate negotiations. To put it another way, national policy preferences are constrained by the interest of dominant, usually economic, groups within society. Resting on a pluralistic understanding of state-society relations, national governments represent these interests in international forums.⁵²

For Moravcsik, the Liberal focus on domestic interests and state-society relations is consistent with a number of plausible motivations for governments to support European integration. These include federalist beliefs, national security concerns and economic interests. The federalist motivation views European integration as a cosmopolitan ideal, justified by a sense of a common European identity and purpose. The Liberal national security motivation is premised on the view of economic interdependence and common institutions as means of reinforcing peaceful accommodation among democratic states with an historical legacy of conflict, assuring a common front against the anti-democratic Soviet Union, or guaranteeing political support for specific, democratically legitimate national projects, such as German unification. The economic interdependence motivation

⁵² Michelle Cini, Nieves Perez- SolorzanoBorrigan, "European Union Politics", (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013) 79.

views the EC as a means of coordinating policy to manage flows of goods, services, factors of production,⁵³

Nevertheless, at the core of Liberal Theories of economic interdependence lies the claim that increasing transborder flows of goods, services, factors, or pollutants create ‘international policy externalities’ among nations, which in turn create incentives for policy co-ordination. International policy externalities arise where the policies of one government create costs and benefits for politically significant social groups outside its national jurisdiction. Where the achievement of domestic governmental goals depends on the policies of its foreign counterparts, national policies are interdependent and policy externalities can arise.⁵⁴

Moravcsik here underlying mostly economic interdependence and indicate that in the specific case of the EU, where most of the initial policy issues were indeed economic and the prospect of internal warfare among democratic capitalist states was remote, Moravcsik's empirical analysis confirms that the preferences of national governments regarding European integration have mainly reflected concrete economic interests rather than other general concerns like security or European ideals. Moravcsik finds that, initially, the central impetus for post-war European integration arose from the great post-Second World War shift from north-south inter-industry trade and investment north-north intra-industry trade and investment.⁵⁵

But after, he thought commonly mistaken considering of all preferences is dominated by economic needs. Since the originally economic character of European integration, most issues were economic, and henceforth with economical stakeholders involved during the formation process. The research of Moravcsik reveals that in half of the cases for Europe, geopolitical and ideological issues played an important role in the preference formation as well. He describes the general preference formation stemming: ‘from a process of domestic conflict in which specific sectoral interests, adjustments costs and, sometimes geopolitical concerns play an important role.’⁵⁶

⁵³ Andrew Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31 (1993) 484.

⁵⁴ Moravcsik, 485.

⁵⁵ Moravcsik, Schimmelfennig, 70.

⁵⁶ Wander, 5-6.

2.4.2. Interstate Bargaining

Interstate bargaining is the second stage of LI that based on precisely Intergovernmentalism part. More specifically, this draws on general theories of bargaining and negotiating argue that relative power among states is shaped above all by asymmetrical interdependence which dictates the relative value of agreement to different governments. It emphasizes the centrality of the strategic bargaining among states and the importance of the governmental elites in shaping inter-state relations. States are now considered to be unitary actors and supranational institutions are deemed to have a very limited impact on outcomes.⁵⁷ Besides this explanation, if needed a framework for theory, it is possible to base on three key assumptions such as:

1. Treaty amending negotiations, and the same is true of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) “take place within a non-coercive system of unanimous voting in which governments can and will reject agreements that would leave them worse off than unilateral policies”⁵⁸ The atmosphere in the union of democratic states would not allow for military threats and severe economic sanctions. On the contrary multilateral benefits of agreements urges member states to take a positive stand in the negotiations.
2. Considering the question of efficiency, benefits of mutual cooperation are high relative to the costs of obtaining information about other states’ preferences, resulting in information-rich environment. It is also a result of the above mentioned non-coercive character of the environment with the absence of military coercion where states do not feel threatened when revealing their interests and demands. The result is an easier achievement of an agreement.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Cini, Perez- Borrigan, 79.

⁵⁸ Jana Hadvabova, “Contentious Issues of Foreign Policy In EU Negotiations: Merging Liberal-Intergovernmentalism and Negotiation Theory” Linköping University, Master Thesis (Linköping, 2006) 15

⁵⁹ Hadvabova, 15.

3. A very important assumption is related to the distribution of outcomes. Distribution is derived from relative bargaining power of the particular state, which is dependent on “relative value the state places on an agreement compared to the outcome of its best alternative policy”⁶⁰ Preference intensity’ is a term that Moravcsik refers frequently to conceptualize power which is one of the central subjects in international relations theory. The term overcomes the difficulties in defining power and functions as a basic tool and thus as a determinant of the negotiations. The asymmetry or the relative intensity of national preferences required a broader term to deal with.

Also, here we must underline, LI posits that in the EU context, asymmetrical interdependence, that is, the uneven distribution of the benefits of a specific agreement (compared to those of unilateral or alternative possibilities known as 'outside options') and information about preferences and agreements play a crucial role. Generally, those actors that are least in need of a specific agreement, relative to the status quo, are best able to threaten the others with noncooperation and thereby force them to make concessions; and those actors that have more and better information about other actors' preferences and the workings of institutions are able to manipulate the outcome to their advantage.⁶¹

According to Moravcsik, negotiation outcomes shaped by three factors. They are “unilateral policy alternatives”, “alternative coalitions” and “the potential for compromise and linkage”.

“First, unilateral alternatives and threats of non-agreement: A necessary condition for negotiated agreement among rational governments is that each perceive the benefits of co-operation as preferable to the benefits of the best alternative available to it. Where there exists a policy more desirable than co-operation, a rational government will forgo agreement. The simple, but credible threat of non-agreement - to reject co-operation in favour of a superior alternative - provides rational governments with their most fundamental form of bargaining power.

⁶⁰ Hadvabova, 16.

⁶¹ Moravcsick, Schimmelfennig , 70.

Second, Alternative coalitions and the threat of exclusion: Where the only alternatives to agreement are unilateral policies, EC negotiations over major reforms can be thought of as taking place within a unanimity voting system in which agreement requires that the minimal demands of each country be satisfied. Sometimes, however, the best alternative to agreement is not unilateral action, but the formation of an alternative coalition from which certain states are excluded.[...]The existence of opportunities to form attractive alternative coalitions (or deepen existing ones), while excluding other parties, strengthens the bargaining power of potential coalition members vis-his those threatened with exclusion.

Third, compromise, side-payments and linkage at the margin: Unilateral and coalitional policy alternatives define a range of viable agreements which all participants prefer to the status quo. Within that range, the precise point at which negotiators will compromise is more difficult to predict, particularly when more than two states are involved.”⁶²

No matter how tough is the negotiation process, the positive stand that the members adopt leads to an optimum point? Negotiation process is in a way an optimization process such that it seeks minimizing the losses and maximizing the gains. There are tradeoffs in the negotiations. Advantages and disadvantages must be balanced in such a way that no member state would feel unhappy or over- happy. Another critical issue is the voting in EU Parliament and in the other bodies like commissions where deputies cast their votes. A qualified vote means a hindrance in the way to get a resolution but at the same time it prevents the rights of the minority votes. A compromise should again be sought here. Again an optimum point arises as a solution.

2.4.3. Institutional Choice

The third stage of LI is choice process of international institutions. Strong supranational institutions are often seen as the antithesis of Intergovernmentalism. Wrongly so. The decision to join all but the most minimalist of regimes involves

⁶² Moravcsik, 502.

some sacrifice of national autonomy, which increases the political risk to each Member State, in exchange for certain advantages. In the intergovernmentalist view, the unique institutional structure of the EC is acceptable to national governments only insofar as it strengthens, rather than weakens, their control over domestic affairs, permitting them to attain goals otherwise unachievable.⁶³ The argument here is that International (European) institutions are set up to improve the efficiency of interstate bargaining⁶⁴ as a way that EU institutions strength the power of governments.

Nevertheless, as an addition increasing the efficiency of interstate bargaining, the existence of a common negotiating forum, decision-making procedures, and monitoring of compliance reduce the costs of identifying, making and keeping agreements, thereby making possible a greater range of co-operative arrangements. This explanation relies on the functional theory of regimes, which focuses on the role of regimes in reducing transaction costs.⁶⁵ Indeed, according to Moravcsik, improving the efficiency of interstate bargaining is possible by limitation sovereignty of states. It is possible just two ways such as; “pooling of sovereignty” and “delegation of sovereignty” as well.

Moravcsik explain these ways as sovereignty is pooled when states “agree to decide future matters by voting procedures other than unanimity” which is done through qualified majority voting. Sovereignty is delegated when “supranational actors are permitted to take certain autonomous decisions, without an intervening interstate vote or unilateral veto” constituting constraint of sovereignty through autonomous institutions.⁶⁶ Thus, in case of the EU, the European institutions create linkages and compromises across issues regarding which decisions have been made under conditions of uncertainty and in instances in- which non-compliance would be a temptation. In other word, institutional delegation reflects the desire for credible commitments.⁶⁷

Also, another way of the strength power of governments by institutions is EC institutions strengthen the autonomy of national political leaders, particularistic

⁶³ Moravcsik, 507.

⁶⁴ Cini- Perez- Borrigan, 111.

⁶⁵ Moravcsik, 507.

⁶⁶ Hadvabova, 17,18.

⁶⁷ Cini- Perez- Borrigan, 111

social groups within their domestic polity. By augmenting the legitimacy and credibility of common policies, and by strengthening domestic agenda-setting power, the EC structures a 'two-level game' that enhances the autonomy and initiative of national political leaders a prerequisite for successful market liberalization.⁶⁸ EC institutions managed to optimize up to date the efficiency of apparatuses linked to these institutions with the domestic influences mainly due to different preferences of member states only with a few exceptions in an environment laden with political risks.

The apparatuses of EU are very efficient since they run with relatively little bureaucracy and with considerably high financial resources. EU bodies' have little bureaucracy since EU executes its rules via national officials. Mechanisms set forth work in compliance with the liberal views envisaged by LI international theory. Although process of Europeanization seems to contradict LI theory essentially this is not true, on the contrary it occupies a subspace in it. A considerable mass of people think that Europeanism will mark the end of nation state. No, it won't, as a well-known historian, Alan Milwards put it nation state will only "cope with globalization"

⁶⁸ Moravcsik, 507.

3. THE PAST AND PRESENT OF SYRIZA MOVEMENT

3.1. Brief Account of Political Atmosphere in Greece after 1974

Before we examine Syriza Movement, it will be beneficial to explain the political atmosphere and Greek party system to understand clearly social and political background which gave rise to Syriza. While describing the political atmosphere in Greece it will be appropriate to mention about the Greece's integration process with EU and the crucial points in Greece – EU relations.

Twentieth century of Greek history which is a history of wars and civil wars, dictatorship and a coup leading to an occupation became more or less stable and modern after the fall of Junta in 1974. By this way, the Modern Greek political history began.

Besides being a turning point for modern political history of Greece and the starting point of democratization period, the collapse of Junta in July 1974 has the following consequences:

- It signaled the end of oppression mechanism resulting from actions and philosophy of Junta.
- A new political situation arised in Cyprus resulted from Turkish peace operation since Turkey had seen it as its right to stop a nationalist coup depending on the the threelateral agreement signed by itself and other related countries (Greece and UK). As a consequence a bipartioned status arised; A southern part which is recognized internationally as Cyprus Republic and a northen part which is named as Northern Cyprus Turkish Republic which lacks international recognition except Turkey and a few countries.

Following the fall of the junta in 1974, the conservative Prime Minister Constantinos Karamanlis founded a new center-right party, New Democracy (ND) which in the traditional manner of the old dignitary-style parties of Greece, was

mainly centered on his person.⁶⁹ Also, a transitional period began with the formation of a “national unity” government under Konstantine Karamanlis who had played a prominent role as prime minister during the late fifties and early sixties. Three major decisions were taken by the “National Unity” government: First, to organize free parliamentary elections for the election of a constitutional assembly; second, to organize a referendum on the question of the monarchy and third, to legalize the Communist Party (KKE), which had been illegal since its formation.⁷⁰

Relating to this, elections were held in November 1974 and the political parties which participated in this election were as follows; on the right there was ND which had been founded in September 1974, at the center was Center Union-New Forces (EKND), on the left there was Communist Party, KKE (founded in 1918 as Socialist Labor Party of Greece) and in the last group which is center left there was Pasok (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement) which had been founded in September 1974 by Andreas Papandreu, the son of George Papandreu. ND won the election by 54.4%. The Greek monarchy which had been a big constitutional problem from 1915 up to that time was liquidated by 69.2% in the November 1974 referendum.

While all these developments were taking place, one year later in 1975 Greece has applied to EC for full membership. Being a distinguished conservative politician Konstantin Karamanlis had a lion share in Greece’s success in entering EC owing to his diplomatic abilities and being a close friend of Valery Giscard d’Estaing. The Commission had given a negative opinion on Greece’s appeal claiming that economic standing of Greece was still very behind the criteria required for full membership. The Council of Ministers ignored the commission report for political reasons (trying to eliminate the possibility of a dictatorship that political powers would probably try to restore) and approved the entry of Greece. The priority given to political factors constituted a precedent for the Mediterranean, central and east European countries to enter EU.⁷¹ Again in the same period Greece’s reentry to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has also been ratified.

⁶⁹ Sassoon, Donald, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*. (New York: New Press, 1996) 632.

⁷⁰ Christos Lyrantzis-Elias Nikolakopoulos “Political System and Elections in Greece” in *about Greece* (Athens, special volume published by the Greek Ministry of Press and Mass Media, 2004) 87.

⁷¹ Desmond Dinan, *Avrupa Birliği Ansiklopedisi*, Cilt I-2 Trans Hale Akay (İstanbul, Kitap yayınevi, 2005) 454

On the other hand, the issue of Greece's accession to the EC was hotly debated in the post-transition period, as Pasok, headed by Andreas Papandreou, adopted anti-EC rhetoric, full of populist and nationalist slogans. Also the KKE vehemently opposed Greece's joining of the EC.⁷² Similar arguments have been made not only for EC but also for NATO.

And also the party (Pasok) argued that EC membership would complete Greece's historic subjugation to imperialism. As a result Greece would be left at the mercy of foreign decision-making center which would distort or abolish democracy to allow multinational monopolies to plunder economy. Moreover Pasok claimed that as an EU member the country would become even more vulnerable to imperialist pressures for a sellout of national interest in Cyprus and the Aegean. Hence in the party's view EU membership threatened Greece's economic development, democracy, national sovereignty and territorial integrity.⁷³

The period 1977-1981 has become a braking point for Greece's political history. In this period Pasok has started to increase its power. Another reason why Pasok started to increase its strength was due to Karamanlis's decision to abandon parliamentary politics and to seek election as President of the Republic. Indeed, in April 1980 he was elected as President of the Republic. His success or to the leadership of the ND party, though an experienced politician (George Rallis), was not a statesman of Karamanlis' calibre. This fact further weakened his party's position vis-avistherising Pasok.⁷⁴

While Pasok got 48.1 percent of votes in 1981 elections, ND which has not left the leadership in the elections since 1974 has only got 35.9 percent of votes and has started its decline. Pasok was using an anti-Imperialist, anti-NATO and anti-EEC say and defending "third way" policies in 1970's but in 1981 as soon as it has formed the government has given up this language and followed a moderate policy. Although Pasok's coming to power has poked populism and statism into Greek political life as

⁷² Sotiropoulos, Dimitri A. EUBoell, "Democracy in Greece, Forty Years on" <http://eu.boell.org/en/2014/04/12/democracy-greece-forty-years> 25.04.2016

⁷³ John Gaffney, "Political Parties and the European Union" (London, Routledge, 1996) 174-175

⁷⁴ Lyrintzis-Nikolakopoulos, 90.

indispensable elements, the important effect was wrapping the social wounds caused by Greek Civil War in the period 1946-1949.⁷⁵

In fact when talking about 1980's one can claim the following; while ND was leaving its mark on 1970's, 1980's were the decades of Pasok. Government under the determining leadership of A. Papandreou and has substantial consequences on the Greek society.

The collapse of the dictatorship in 1974 paved the way for democracy and Pasok's becoming the ruling party marked the end of the post civil-war era both socially and politically. The class antagonisms and tensions between various strata of the society have been eased by Pasok's coming to the power. This new situation was in a way an approval of the capitalist relations by almost all strata of the society.

In 1990's due to illness of Papandreou and some scandals Pasok's decline became evident. The elections of 1990 finally produced the parliamentary majority (a bare 152 seats) that Mitsotakis had been seeking since 1984. After nine years, the ND had regained sole power; Mitsotakis then served as prime minister for the next three and one half years, through October 1993. The second major political event of 1990 was the assembly's election, with the concurrence of Pasok, of Konstantinos Karamanlis to his second term as president. Coming five years after Papandreou had unexpectedly denied Karamanlis a second term in the presidency, this event was viewed as a vindication of Karamanlis and the capstone of a long and distinguished political career.⁷⁶

The ND government under Constantine Mitsotakis tried to implement to moderate Neo-liberal programme whose major objective was to stabilize the ailing economy. The government's plans met considerable reaction on the part of the trade unions, but despite the increased number of strikes the government was able to proceed with its policies. The major problem emerged in the field of foreign affairs as a result of the creation of new states in the area of the former state of Yugoslavia.

⁷⁵ Taraf, Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, "Yunan Siyasi Partinin Çöküşü Üzerine" <http://arsiv.taraf.com.tr/yazilar/ioannis-n-grigoriadis/yunan-siyasi-parti-sisteminin-cokusu-uzerine/23963/> 25 Mar 2016.

⁷⁶ Glenn E. Curtis, "Greece: A Country Study/Federal Research Division," (Athens, Library of Congress, 1995) 224.

The so called “Macedonian issue” concerned the official name of the former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia.⁷⁷

In 1996 Prime Minister Papandreou has left his office because of his illness to minister of industry, Kostas Simitis. In the elections in 1996 became an elected prime minister.⁷⁸ The policies pursued by Kostas Simitis made Greek economy to grow as much as to be able to enter to Eurozone and to reform foreign policy. The striking example of this new foreign policy was the process of reconciliation between Turkey and Greece and the full support given to the perspective of Turkey’s becoming a member of EU.⁷⁹

On the other side, the 1990s demonstrated the modernity of Greece, not its supposed Balkan mentality. While Balkan wars engulfed neighboring Yugoslavia that decides, Greece smoothly joined the twenty-first century project of the euro.⁸⁰ In the 1990s, as the country’s politics became more integrated within broader EU orientation and the signs of technocratic bureaucratization became the rule, society, and especially the lower social strata, felt that the political system had turned its back on them. The weakening of the mobilization capacities of the party system (left parties included), due to the decline in membership, the intensive functionalism, as well as the overall antiparty sentiments made up the preliminary, though clear signs of the political de-alignment and re-alignment.⁸¹

To name the period starting with 2000’s as “Post War” would not be so wrong in the history of Greek party system. Greek politics underwent a polarization and all the parties were aligned in two separate lines. This has been witnessed clearly in the elections. For instance in 2004 election both parties ND and Pasok and their leaders have emerged renewed. (ND chooses Kostas Karamanlis who has the same name as his uncle as the leader and Pasok brought George Papandreou who is the son of Andreas Papandreou to leadership.)

⁷⁷ Lyrintzis-Nikolakopoulos, 93-94.

⁷⁸ Ahmet Karaaslan, Abdullah Burhan Bahçe “Yunanistan'ın Ekonomik, Hukuki, Siyasi Yapısı ve Yunanistan Vergi Sisteminin Değerlendirilmesi”Dumlupınar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 19 (Kütahya, Yenigediz Matbaası, 2008) 4.

⁷⁹ Taraf, Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, “Yunan Siyasi Partinin Çöküşü Üzerine <http://arsiv.taraf.com.tr/yazilar/ioannis-n-grigoriadis/yunan-siyasi-parti-sisteminin-cokusu-uzerine/23963/> 27 Mar 2016

⁸⁰ Ovenden, 7

⁸¹ Michalis Spourdalakis, “The Miraculous Rise of the ‘Phenomenon SYRIZA’” International Critical Thought 4 (2014): 355

One of the crucial developments which has left its mark on these years was the economical crisis erupted in Greece in 2009. From one point of view, the people assigned the responsibility of the crisis on both parties ND and Pasok: On the other hand, neither ND nor Pasok could persuade the people that they learned the lesson which crisis has given them. They carried out the reform programs proposed by European Central Bank (ECB), International Monetary Found (IMF) and EC reluctantly.⁸²

In every national election from the 1970s until the start of the twenty-first century ND and Pasok gathered well over 80% of the vote. This all came to a dramatic end, however, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and Greek economic meltdown. The parliamentary elections of 2007 and 2009 saw the combined vote for the two major parties for the first time fall slightly below 80% (79.9% and 77.4% respectively). In 2012, however, it collapsed completely to less than one-third.⁸³

Centrifugal forces were mainly due to two party systems which are composed of two parties that resembled each other in many ways. They are different as mirror images one is left handed and the other right handed. As you go in a chamber where formidable conditions prevail than you have no other choice than conceding to the mighty. So neither Pasok nor ND could resist impositions. So as the center when you have put aside people real needs and keep on doing the same every time you came to power, there are no grounds for being excused. They couldn't look in the eye of their followers because of corruption. As in Iliad to remove all the shit from the stables of Augias was a herculean task. If anyone who steps ahead to do the job would be welcomed by the general audience.

The electoral results of 6 May 2012 further shook the main pillars of the Greek political system, engendering the breakdown of the two-party domination of the political scene. Pasok and ND jointly gained a mere 32 per cent of the vote. This translated into 41 and 108 parliamentary seats, respectively, which did not allow

⁸² Taraf, Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, "Yunan Siyasi Partinin Çöküşü Üzerine" <http://arsiv.taraf.com.tr/yazilar/yoannis-n-grigoriadis/yunan-siyasi-parti-sisteminin-cokusu-uzerine/23963/> 30 Mar 2016.

⁸³ Eftichia Teperoglou, Emmanouil Tsatsani "Dealignment, De-legitimation and the Implosion of the Two-Party System in Greece: The Earthquake Election of 6 May 2012" *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 24 (2014): 223

either party to form a majority government. Anti-bailout, anti-establishment and populist forces made substantial gains. Syriza was one of the main winners, coming second with 16.8 per cent, and 12.2 percentage points higher than its 4.6 per cent in 2009. Syriza (Synaspismós Rhizospastikís Aristerás) was formed in 2004 as an alliance between Synaspismos and 11 left-wing factions. KKE received 8.5 per cent, approximately one percentage point higher than 2009. DIMAR, a splinter party from Synaspismos formed in June 2010, gained 6.1 per cent. The Eco-Greens received 2.9 per cent of the vote, marginally increasing their vote share compared with 2009, but failing to enter Parliament. Parties of the right also made substantive gains. ANEL (Independent Greeks), a splinter party from ND formed in February 2012 with a populist right-wing agenda, received 10.6 per cent. Democratic Alliance another splinter party from ND formed in November 2010 and led by Dora Bakogiannis, a former foreign minister and mayor of Athens, gained 2.5 per cent. Golden Dawn gained parliamentary representation for the first time, receiving 6.9 per cent of the votes cast. LAOS, with 2.9 per cent, did not pass the three percent threshold required to gain parliamentary representation. Recreate Greece, a liberal, pro-EU party supporting the free market economy, established towards the end of 2011, gained 2.15 per cent and remained outside parliament.⁸⁴

3.1.2. Social and Political Background Which Gave Rise to Syriza

The history of Greek Left dates back to very old times. In Greece, socialist, anarchist and communist groups had been intensified as small groups mainly in the regions where the industrial workers were. Inspired by Paris Commune of 1871 and workers struggle for 8 hours working day in 1892 in Chicago, a workers organization to gather all the workers under the same roof and to struggle for their rights had been contemplated. Revolutionary movements at the start of 20th century, the conditions of the workers in countries warring permanently led Greek workers to enter the party. Many communist parties would have been founded in the frame work of 3rd

⁸⁴ Sofia Vasilopoulou & Daphne Halikiopoulou "In the Shadow of Grexit: The Greek Election of 17 June 2012" *South European Society and Politics* 18 (2013): 527

International founded by Bolsheviks who had come to power in Russia thanks to the success of October revolution in 1917.⁸⁵ One of these parties was KKE.

It was founded in 1918 under the name Socialist Labour Party of Greece and since then was the avant-garde to all struggles of the labour and agricultural classes of Greece. KKE fought fascism and imperialism during both world wars and resisted the military dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas. It was the largest resistance movement (EAM Greek liberation front) during the Nazi occupation of Greece. Thousands of its members together with many other Greek Democrats and resistance fighters were executed, imprisoned or sent to concentration camps by the Nazis. The same happened also during the dictatorship of Metaxas and the dictatorship of the Greek colonels in the period 1967-74. The civil war that followed WWII resulted in the banning of the Greek Communist party and it wasn't until 1974 that it was finally legalised.⁸⁶

On the other hand KKE has lived a split in itself leading to the subsequent establishment of the Kommoynistiko, (Communist Party of Greece of the Interior, KKE-es) by expelled cadres. The origins of the split lay in the different positions taken on the KKE's political direction and organizational strategy, respectively by the party cadres that operated illegally inside Greece and those in exile in Eastern Europe that operated illegally inside Greece and those in exile in Eastern Europe, before and during the military dictatorship (1967 –74). The former were in favour of an open mass party organization based on a broad political coalition that would extend beyond communist forces, while the latter insisted on preserving the party's Marxist –Leninist characteristics. The split became final after the August 1968 Soviet invasion of Prague, when the cadres of the Interior took a critical stance against the invasion, while those of the KKE remained loyal to Moscow. After the transition to democracy in 1974, KKE and KKE-es (CPG) followed two different political trajectories, respectively 'Orthodox' and Eurocommunist.⁸⁷

After the collapse of Soviet Communism KKE as most of the other communist parties was baffled at the very first instance but later although has

⁸⁵ Seraphim Seferiadis, "The Coercive Impulse: Policing Labour in Interwar Greece" *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.40 (2005).71

⁸⁶ In2Greece, "Political Parties in Greece" http://www.in2greece.com/blog/2008/02/greek-political-parties_196.html 10 Apr 2016

⁸⁷ MyrtoTsakatika, Costas Eleftheriou "The Radical Left's Turn towards Civil Society in Greece: One Strategy, Two Paths" (2013): 3

undergone a major split recovered to its daily practice up to now Greek Marxists separated their ways mainly due to foreign affairs. But now it is the Greek people who occupy the judge's seat. Although not a genuine new doctrine is ready for Marxists, they can do without such a doctrine. Pragmatism now overweighs all the other attitudes. So now one can hardly describe the split as "Orthodox" and Eurocommunist".

On the other side after 1974 the party (Coalition of both sides KKE and CPG) led by the charismatic Leonidas Kyrkos, competed in elections with unimpressive result and the CPG/KKE remained the dominant force in the left. While barely, if at all represented in Parliament due to Greece's prohibitive majoritarian electoral laws. The party developed a following among Greek intellectuals, students, journalists and urban professionals.⁸⁸

In the late 1980s forced by the crisis of world communism and the decline in the fortunes of the Pasok, the CPG/KKE and the Eurocommunists joined forces, creating the Coalition of the Left and Progress. Despite initial Euphoria in the elections of 1989, the coalition failed to unseat Pasok as the main governmental alternative to the conservatives of ND and later paid an electoral price for cooperating with them. In 1991 the majority of the CPG/KKE decided to leave the coalition and run independently. A reformist or revisionist minority remained in the coalition and together with the old Eurocommunists turned it into a party. In 1993 the Coalition failed to cross the 3 percent threshold and enter Parliament. However in recent years helped by the crisis in Pasok and dynamic oppositionist leadership, the Coalition is enjoying a mild upsurge.⁸⁹

In these years another party who created the roots of Syriza was founded. It emerged from a split in the KKE in 1991. Both sides were weakened in the split, especially with the loss to both of the party's youth section, KNE, which went off to form its own organization, NAR, the New Left Current. The Orthodox Communist Party, the KKE, through a combination of fabled discipline and steering left based on an ideology and verbal radicalism which could hold some attraction for militant

⁸⁸ Dimitris Kerides "Historical Dictionary of Modern Greece; Historical Dictionaries of Europe, No. 71" (Scarecrow Press, Maryland, 2009)35.

⁸⁹ Kerides, 35.

young people was able in the course of 1990s to rebuild its student and youth presence and avoids fading away.⁹⁰

However, from the mid-90s to the mid-20 the fortunes of Sinaspismos were pretty dire and they opened up the electoral subsidy to other groups on the far left and many joined them to get a slice of the pie.⁹¹

Thus the small leftist groups who took part in an organization have come together to found Radical Left Coalition. This was at the same time birth of Syriza. The parties that originally formed the Coalition of the Radical Left in January 2004 were the:

- Coalition of Left, of Movements and Ecology (Synaspismós or SYN)
- Renewing Communist Ecological Left (AKOA)
- Internationalist Workers Left (DEA)
- Movement for the United in Action Left (KEDA) (a splinter group of the Communist Party of Greece)
- Active Citizens (a political organisation associated with Manolis Glezos)
- Other independent left-wing groups or activists⁹²

In 2004 Sinaspismos (or Coalision of Left) wouldn't have received more than 3%.⁹³ But the tension in the coalition has increased since the most of the six expelled members were from Snapsimos, so Snapsimos have decided to vie for the elections for European Parliament 3 months ahead and Alekos Alevanos became the new leader.

In autumn 2007, Syriza contested national elections, and its radical left stance won more than 5 percent of the vote--which at that point represented a major success for the coalition. Other organizations of the revolutionary left joined Syriza, some before and some after the election. Unorganized people were attracted as well. Both new activists engaged in radical politics for the first time in their lives and veterans

90 Ovenden 21.

91 VN Gelins, Syriza in Greece: Neo-Liberals in Disguise,(San Bernardino CA, Createspace, 2014) 2.

92 CRWflags, "Coalition of the Radical Left (Political party, Greece)"

<http://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/gr%7Dsyr.html> 05 Oct.2016

93 Gelins, 2.

of the left-wing movement who were inactive in previous years saw Syriza as something new and hopeful. After the elections of 2007, the left-wing character of Syriza was confirmed in many ways, both through the involvement of its forces in the resistance movement, and with the presence of its representatives in parliament. In particular, Alavanos' harsh attacks on then-Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis represented a break with the traditional parliamentary politeness. With a right-wing party in office, it was not Pasok, historically the main opposition party against ND, but Syriza that was considered the most serious rival to the government. For months, the coalition polled around 15 to 18 percent of the vote in surveys about upcoming elections. This was the first "spring" of the Greek radical left. As we shall see, it didn't last long, but it was proof that the current turn of the electorate towards Syriza isn't an accident--and that the working class has been aware of Syriza for some years.⁹⁴

In 2012 elections Syriza has increased its seats four folds but this was not enough to form the government. The elections in 2012 brought to an end the two-party system which had dominated the post-dictatorship era. The main characteristic of the elections was anger after three years of austerity policy and six months of an "unelected" government. Both hit her to dominant parties had to take steep losses.⁹⁵

The Greek people drew back its support from Pasok and other ruling party not right away. People warned them for years but they are used to not to listen them. After every election and after people casted their votes they began to bypass the people.

Also the party's policy is based on ending austerity and re-negotiating the existing bailout agreements and the Greek debt, which it believes is unsustainable. Syriza has promised tax cuts, protection of vulnerable social groups, and measures to end what it calls a 'humanitarian crisis' in the country. Tsipras' party has also pledged to restore the minimum wage to pre-memorandum levels, halt privatization plans and annul several laws regarding the restructuring of the Greek public sector and its administration.⁹⁶ Syriza with its revolutionary and radical content attracted

⁹⁴ Socialist Workers, "The Making of Syriza" <http://socialistworker.org/2012/06/11/the-making-of-syriza> 20.Oct.2015

⁹⁵ Jannis Komposopoulos, JannisChasoglou "The Collapse and Transformation of the Greek Party System" *Socialism and Democracy* 28 (2014): 101

⁹⁶ Europe Decides, "SYRIZA's Historic Win Gives Europe's Leaders a Headache"

the interest of working class and the Greek people. They adopt what Syriza expressed heartily and never left them alone.

In the third and the last round of voting on 29th December 2014 the Greek Parliament couldn't elect the President and as it is envisaged by the constitution Greek Parliament was dissolved and the prime minister of the time Antonis Samaras had declared the early election date as 25th January 2015.⁹⁷

At last, Syriza as a unitary party was formed through the merger of the following parties;⁹⁸

- Active Citizens (*Ενεργοί Πολίτες*)
- Anticapitalist Political Group (ΑΠΟ)
- Citizens' Association of Riga (Velestinli)
- Coalition of Left, of Movements and Ecology (Synaspismós or SYN)
- Communist Organization of Greece (KOE)
- Communist Platform of Syriza
- Democratic Social Movement (DIKKI)
- Ecosocialists of Greece
- Internationalist Workers' Left (DEA)
- Movement for the United in Action Left (KEDA)
- New Fighter
- Radical Left Group Roza
- Radicals (*Ριζοσπάστες*)
- Red (*Κόκκινο*)
- Renewing Communist Ecological Left (AKOA)
- Union of the Democratic Centre (EDIK)
- Unitary Movement
- Also a number of independent leftist activists

<http://europedecides.eu/2015/01/syrizas-historic-win-gives-europes-leaders-a-headache/>20.Oct.2015

⁹⁷ Büşra Çatır “Yunanistan’da ‘UmutKazandı’: Peki ya Avrupa? İktisadi KalkınmaVakfı 111 (2015) 1.

⁹⁸ CRWflags, “Coalition of the Radical Left (Political party, Greece)”

<http://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/gr%7Dsyr.html> 05 Oct.2016

The elections of 25th January 2015 gave Syriza, the left-wing anti-austerity party over 36% of the vote, thus allotting the party 149 of Parliament's 300 seats (the winner of the election receives 50 extra seats in the Greek system). The center-right Independent Greeks, an equal vigorous anti-bailout party, won 4.75% which will give them 13 seats. The two parties have agreed to form a coalition government with a total of at least 162 seats which will be presented for a vote of confidence before Parliament of February 2015.⁹⁹

On the other side while the other former ruling parties reentered Parliament, including ND and Pasok the latter lost big, getting the lowest percentage of any party qualified to enter Parliament, behind the Independent Greeks. The fascist Golden Dawn came third with 17 seats followed by to Patomi with 17 seats. These two parties were created only to take votes away from the real opposition. The communist KKE received 15 seats and will most likely cooperate with the government from outside the coalition. No other parties, including former Prime Minister George Papandreou's Movement of Social Democrats were able to pass the 3% threshold required for entry to Parliament.¹⁰⁰ But it renewed its coalition with the nationalist Independent Greeks. Opposition ND gained 28%.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ Dean Andromidas, "Greek Election Can Spark Shift to European 'New Deal'" Executive Intelligence Review 42 (2015): 4

¹⁰⁰ Andromidas, 4

¹⁰¹ BBC, "Greece election: Alexis Tsipras hails 'victory of the people'" <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34307795> 21. Oct. 2015




Figure 2.1. : Results of Greek Elections (October 25, 2015)

Source: The Ministry of Interior of Greece, <http://www.ypes.gr/en/Elections/>

3.1.3. Economic Crisis and Decline of Pasok Behind Power of Syriza

The fallout of the global economic crisis, whose roots are to be traced to the US financial crisis of 2008, has impacted severely on Greece, a high-public debt country of the EU which has become the epicenter of global attention.¹⁰²

First time, with Pasok's electoral victory on October 2009, new Prime Minister G. Papandreou announced that the public deficit would reach 12.7 per cent, contrary to the preelectoral prediction of 6 per cent. From late 2009 onwards, Greek bond yields skyrocketed and investors rushed to dump Greek assets, marking the beginning of the Greek crisis. Since then, the country has suffered a series of downgrading by various rating agencies, while bond spreads have kept rising to the

¹⁰² Joseph N. Lekakis & Maria Kousis "Economic Crisis, Troika and the Environment in Greece" South European Society and Politics 3.(2013) 305.

degree that the country would soon be unable to borrow from the international markets.¹⁰³

In 2010, Greece had become the first Eurozone recipient of a bailout from the EU, and the IMF, accompanied by a programme of economic austerity and structural reform. The bailout had been agreed to avert a Greek sovereign debt default whose reverberations threatened to trigger a new deepening of the international economic crisis, following the precedent of the Lehman Brothers collapse two years earlier. The local government elections were widely regarded as the first post-bailout test of the Greek government's popularity and, by extension, of the legitimacy and sustainability of the Greek reform programme.¹⁰⁴ And also, after Papandreou moved to sign the first of the austerity memorandums with the Troika (European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Central Bank) of lenders, the social devastation that caused and the reasons why successive Greek government imposed austerity. A general strike and nationwide protest demonstration held on 5 May were gigantic. Half a million people took the streets of Athens.¹⁰⁵

Greece was not alone in signing the memorandum Ireland in November 29th and Portugal in May 2011 had signed bailout package. Moreover, the austerity doctrine has produced dramatic consequences not only in Greece, but all over Europe. As the President of the European Central Bank (ECB), Mario Draghi, has often pointed out, excessively restrictive fiscal policies have caused deflation (inflation is now 0.3%) and deepened recession. As a consequence, the Eurozone Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has registered a decrease of 10% in the period 2013-2014. Apart from Greece, Portugal and Italy are in difficult situations as well.¹⁰⁶

Mr. Draghi is warning about the damages that the excessively restrictive fiscal policies do a country. In his terms these damages are deflation and deepened recession. Greek people have been struggling to take itself out of this disaster in vain.

¹⁰³ Maria Markantonatou, "The State and Modes of Regulation in Greece from the Post-War Period to the 2009 Financial Crisis" *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 4 (2012) 424,425

¹⁰⁴ Susannah Verney "The Eurozone's First Post-bailout Election: The 2010 Local Government Contest in Greece" *South European Society and Politics* 2 (2012) 196

¹⁰⁵ Ovenden

¹⁰⁶ Mediterranean affairs, "Syriza's Victory a Greek Lesson for Europe"

<http://www.mediterraneanaffairs.com/en/events/syriza-s-victory-a-greek-lesson-for-europe.html> 15 Apr. 2016

Not only Greece but Italy, Portugal are also sliding towards the economic crises. All European countries accepted for a few suffering from the same problems for years. It seems it is not integration waiting in the horizon but may be an unexpected disintegration roaming like a ghost in all over the world.

On the other side, Syriza and some figures within such economist Costas Lapavitsas—argued that the debt was unpayable and that trying to pay it would lead to a ‘debt trap’; whereby sucking money out of the economy for debt repayments leads to recession. That is exactly what happened over the next five years. Further, handing money to the European banking system was giving it back to the business class who were the ones who had been bailed out by the memorandum deal. And it was that which had left the public footing the bill in the first place.¹⁰⁷

As Lapavitsas put it openly and clearly this is the game played against the many countries and as economies already in problem was running from recession to another, the bailed out businessmen who otherwise must have gone bankrupt have been funded with people’s money.

In the run-up to the Eurogroup (Composed of ministers of finance in Euro zone) meeting in October 2011, the Greek Parliament was required to pass another bill of measures: more expenditure cuts, ‘Labour Reserve’ (a kind of quasi-redundancy until further notice for tens of thousands of public servants), deregulation of collective labour bargaining—in particular, flexibility of dismissals and reduced compensation, individualized employment contracts, non-arbitration and other means ‘to improve competitiveness’. In the Eurogroup meeting of 26 October 2011 in Brussels, a debt ‘haircut’ of 50 per cent was proposed, to bring Greek debt down to 120 per cent of GDP by 2020, with the participation of private holders of Greek bonds. The agreement would be accompanied by a new loan, on condition of more austerity measures, adjustments and expenditure cuts.¹⁰⁸

The first memorandum of the Greek government with the troika of the EC/ECB/ IMF in May 2010 was followed by the second in February 2012 and by the third in November 2012, tying a package of savage ‘austerity’ measures, more and

¹⁰⁷ Ovenden,

¹⁰⁸ Markantonatou, 425.

more barbaric, to a totally fruitless ‘bail out’ of an already bankrupt country with an unsustainable debt.¹⁰⁹

This is recognized by the Troika itself as well as by Moody’s, in their latest two figures published in the international and Greek press. The gigantic amount of debt, despite an important ‘haircut’ on private bondholders (the 2012 ‘Private Sector Involvement’ PSI) remains nearly unchanged: in March 2013 it was 309 billion Euros; while before the first memorandum in May 2010 was 310.3 billion Euros. However, as the economy plunged during the last three years into a great depression of the order of 25 per cent (a depression which still continues to worsen), the debt in relation to the GDP became even more unsustainable: in May 2010 it was around 145 per cent but in 2014 will continue to climb to 175 per cent of the GDP.¹¹⁰

On the other side, the movements of 2011 shifted majority opinion, in society and the left, towards repudiating at least the “odious debt”, that is the portion run up profligately by corrupt previous governments. “Cant’t pay, won’t pay” provided a doable, individual instantiation of what collective refusal to pay the debts of the bankers and oligarchs might mean.¹¹¹

In looking now from the point of view of their impact on Syriza’s rise first to eclipse Pasok and then to form a government, it is necessary to repeat that the movements has a life, potential and effect of their own. They were not simply, as the kind of routine thinking which had failed to anticipate such developments maintains a means to stir people up and then corral them behind an electoral force to do the real job of bringing about change. That had been view of pasok over the years when as in 2009, it had rhetorically supported popular protests against the right wing in government with a singular strategy of winning votes to hoist it back into office.¹¹²

Second, the mobilization of traditionally Pasok supporting trade unionists and others against Papandreou’s imposition of austerity deepened and long-term rift between the party and its voters. That also led a range of Pasok politicians to break

¹⁰⁹ Savas Michael-Matsas “Greece at the Boiling Point” Critique; Journal of Socialist Theory 3 (2013)438.

¹¹⁰ Matsas ,438.

¹¹¹ Ovenden, 26.

¹¹² Ovenden ,27.

from the party in an effort to save themselves from defeat at one election or another. That, in turn has a contradictory impact on Syriza.¹¹³

3.1.4. Propaganda Period of Syriza

Propaganda duration is another main point besides the political atmosphere that we have tried to summarize above. According to Spourdalakis, in this situation Syriza has developed quite a distinct propaganda strategy;

First, Syriza has participated in social movements without being in forefront. Although not under party's banner, Syriza's activists were present in almost every resistance movement and together with members of parliament they provided political and legal support for the participants suffering the consequences of their resistance.

Second, the representatives of Syriza have not limited themselves only with their presence in these institutions and have been involved in almost all social initiatives without refraining from using their status making their presence in those institutions visible.

Third, Syriza's program is not a "static and timeless text. According to party's chief program coordinator, Yiannis Drasagis; it is a political process of building new paths and precluding new dangers and making use of new possibilities. The program was a concrete alternative to previous governmental policies offering realistic perspective to those actively involved in movements and to the people in general. Program in a way was fulfilling the need of concretizing the ideas like "empowering the powerless" and "the society of needs versus the society of profit making" and all the like making them to seem more realistic.

Fourth, unusual for a party on the left, this call which appeared as unrealistic to many which was made by Syriza's young leader Alexis Tsipras a few months prior to the May 2012 elections became inspiring response for the disappointed people with the previous bipartisan political system.

¹¹³ Ovenden, 28

In fact one of the main themes of the propaganda process was the promises made by Syriza. Based on basically rejecting austerity measures the program declared by Tsipras on 14th September 2014 had the following headlines:

- Partly Debt write-offs of Greece's foreign debts. Reducing interest rates, Postponing debt payments until sustaining economic growth and employment increase,
- Limiting the role of European Central Bank to regulating public investments and negotiating the Greece's role in the unity,
- Applying 75 percent income tax to the incomes greater than 500.000 Euros,
- Increasing minimum wage to 750 Euro level,
- Nationalization of banks,
- Cutting military spending and ending NATO membership.¹¹⁴

In addition to all these one of the reasons Syriza's success is the active use of social media. The critical strategy here lies in the fact that limited financial resources of the party and many and mostly unemployed young people who are eager to propagate party's messages voluntarily enabled Syriza to run a very effective election campaign. This also led to development of a dialog between voters of the party over social media which enabled breaking the fear that the main branch of social media created on the voters. The use of digital media enabled Syriza to strengthen ties with it's supporters in Europe and to stand against strongly to the anti-propaganda coming from Europe.¹¹⁵

3.2. After Victory: The Conflict Within and Outside the Syriza

In his victory speech, Syriza head Alexis Tsipras declared "Hope has won. Greece is leaving the austerity of catastrophe and fear. There are no losers and

¹¹⁴ Çatır "Yunanistan'da 'Umut Kazandı': Peki ya Avrupa? , 6.

¹¹⁵ Radikal, "Syriza'nın Başarısında Dijital Medya Etkisi"

<http://blog.radikal.com.tr/politika/syrizanin-basarisinda-dijital-medya-etkisi-8753022> Oct 2015

winners. We are regaining our dignity, our sovereignty” he added that party’s victory will herald a change in Europe.¹¹⁶

A change in Europe, a change but in which direction? That is the question. What direction Europe (read as Germany) would take should have not been so important for Tsipras. Rhetoric is good but usually harms the owner. What Syriza tried to find an answer for the fate of its compulsory unity with EU.

In addition, Syriza leader Alexis Tsipras said his party’s victory marked an end to the “Viscous cycle of austerity”. Referring to the neoliberal conditions set by the IMF, the EC and the ECB, he said: “The verdict of the Greek people renders the troika a thing of the past for our common European framework.” Outgoing Prime Minister Antonis Samaras conceded defeated by acknowledging some mistakes. But he added: “We restored Greece’s international credibility”.¹¹⁷

The intensity of the wording “leaving Euro-zone” has lessened gradually and the phrase “our aim is not to leave Euro-zone but to restructure the debts cancelling partly” replaced it. In the summit of European leaders on 20 February 2015 Tsipras was asked to make a reform list and Tsipras declared the first comprehensive reform list of his government on April the 1st of the same year. Later the negotiations with credit institutions had started.

The result of negotiations between Greece and the rest of the Eurozone based on three key areas as following;

First, Syriza has made debt relief a priority and was seeking a debt cut although debt was no longer the main obstacle to the economic recovery. But EU and Germany were unwilling for a formal debt structuring. Instead, they were ready to grant some further reductions in interest rates and further maturity extensions.

Second, Greece’s economic depression was mainly due to fiscal retrenchments dictated by EU’s monetary institutions. Syriza pledged to run a balanced budget and trying to stay within the budget limitations removed some of the

¹¹⁶ Andromidas, 5

¹¹⁷ The Guardian, “Tsipras Declares end to 'Vicious Cycle of Austerity' After Syriza Wins Greek Election – as It Happened” <http://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/jan/25/greek-election-syriza-confident-of-victory-live-updates> 22 Oct 2015

spending cuts in order to improve the living conditions of the poorest sections of the population.

Third, Structural Reforms: Some of the Troika's demands which would have minor effects on the Greek economy could be dropped. On the other hand judicial reform, overhaul of public administration and tax collection and land rights issues could be agreed upon. The most problematic of all these was overhauling public sector since there are many public employees among Syriza supporters. And the effect of raising minimum wage which was in Syriza's agenda was another controversial issue.

Troika presented an agreement program to Tsipras Government on 25th June 2015. Greek people rejected this program in the referendum of 5th of July by casting 61% "No" votes against 39% "yes" votes. So there was no need to resign his office for Tsipras since he promised to resign in the case the program got an approval from the voters. The agreement for the third bailout package signed bilaterally on 15th of July.

European authorities holding their breath waited for the first promising signals and at last they got it in the Syriza's memorandum. Greece would stay in the Eurozone or in other words it would stay in borders drawn for it. Besides as far as wording is considered new government had already embarked the way Pasok and ND had done before. There is no surprise; Greek people lived a couple of months in the false paradise. Reality reverted back again.

Before signing the 3rd packet the crackling had started within the party. Tsipras lost the far-left wing of his leftist Syriza coalition, which has belatedly figured out that Tsipras' bailout negotiations have been a disaster. Those leftists want a return to the drachma and closer ties with Russia. 109 out of 201 committee members denounced the bailout packet as a coup committed against Greek People since the packet imposed very heavy conditions on Greek people. They expressed themselves by using the phrase "A demolition for Greek people" for the bailout packet.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ AB Haber "Kritik Oylama Öncesi SYRIZA İkiye Bölündü" <http://www.abhaber.com/kritik-oylama-oncesi-syriza-ikiye-bolundu>/25 Oct. 2015

Syriza, deputies or in other words one third of the party either voted “No” or “non committal”. But he had democracy and the center-left Pasok and Potami--after more than one-quarter of Syriza members of parliament voted "no" or otherwise registered their opposition.¹¹⁹

Bailout packet gave way to reactions among people. 500 demonstrators who are members of Anti-Capitalist Front walked towards Sintagma Square. They carried banners with the expressions “No to the further impoverishment of the people”, “Tsipras ruined everything”, “No to new austerity policies” and they chanted antigovernment protests in Sintagma Square.¹²⁰

Upon all these he declared on a TV channel that he decided to resign his office on 20th of August and declared the early elections as of 20th September of the same year.

The elections of September 20 were an initiative of Alexis Tsipras, who aimed to achieve two goals:

“a) To confirm the balance of political forces and reestablish the viability of the Syriza-led government before the workers and popular classes realize through their own bitter experience the actual content of the agreement that was signed with the creditors on July 13.

b) The second goal of Alexis Tsipras was the purging of the left wing of his party, even if the price that he had to pay for that was the organizational disintegration of Syriza. In this goal, Tsipras was again supported fully by the bourgeois mass media, which slandered the Left Platform ruthlessly, while hiding the extent of the wave of resignations and withdrawals of a huge number of activists who had built Syriza all those years--among them, the secretary of the party, half of the elected members of the Political Secretariat, a

¹¹⁹ Socialist Workers , “Provoking a Split With the Working Class”
<http://socialistworker.org/2015/08/12/provoking-a-split-with-the-working-class>25 Oct. 2015

¹²⁰ AB Haber, “Kritik Oylama Öncesi Syriza İkiye Bölündü” <http://www.abhaber.com/kritik-oylama-onesi-syriza-ikiye-bolundu/>25 Oct. 2015

big part of the members of the Central Committee, and leading cadre from lots of local and working-place branches.”¹²¹

25 deputies left the party after Tsipras’s resignation and they formed a new party. The old energy minister Panaigiotis Lafazanis became the president of the new party. But surprisingly old finance minister Yannis Varoufakis and the president of the parliament Zoi Konstantopulu did not join to this new party.

But there was a big question: How strongly can the new left-wing party, called Laiki Enotita (Popular Unity), challenge Tsipras? So far it has 25 people Syriza (Minister) MPs, who object to Tsipras's acceptance of more austerity demanded by Greece's creditors. He argued - reluctantly - that more budget cuts and higher taxes were inevitable conditions for Greece to stay in the euro and get the third bailout. Popular Unity is led by former energy minister Panagiotis Lafazanis, who argues that Greece would be better off leaving the euro and going back to the drachma.¹²²

Purging out Popular Unity or other words revolutionary elements Tsipras made his first big concession to EU and to the finance capitalists it represents. This round is won by Troika but the audience applauded Tsipras for his boldness and for his style. As far as left is in question artistic manners or the style outweighs the grim realities.

So, real alternative policy is now lying with Lafazanis not with Tsipras. Actually what people should vote is their fate, with or without Europe. Otherwise pity politics soon will take its prominent place.

As a result of 20 September 2015 election; Syriza won just over 35%, slightly down on its previous result and still short of an overall majority. But it will renew its coalition with the nationalist Independent Greeks.¹²³ The conservative ND party, the results showed it had taken 28%. The far-right Golden Dawn party came third with 7%. Mr Tsipras called the snap election in late August following a series of revolts

¹²¹ Socialist Workers, “Tsipras' Pyrrhic Victory and the Struggle Ahead”

<http://socialistworker.org/2015/09/22/tsipras-pyrrhic-victory-and-the-struggle-ahead> 26 Oct. 2015

¹²² BBC, “Syriza split: What Next for Greece and Bailout?” <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34014817> 26 Oct. 2015

¹²³ BBC, “Greece Election: Alexis Tsipras Hails 'Victory of the People'” <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34307795> 27 Oct. 2015

from Syriza MPs. The rebels have since formed a new party called Popular Unity, which won roughly 3% of the vote.¹²⁴




Figure 2. 2. : Results of Greek Elections (September 20, 2015)

Source: The Ministry of Interior of Greece, <http://www.ypes.gr/en/Elections/>

After third victory Tsipras told supporters that he would tackle endemic corruption in the country: “The mandate that the Greek people have given is a crystal clear mandate to get rid of the regime of corruption and vested issues. We will show how effective we will be. We will make Greece a stronger place for the weak and vulnerable, a fairer place.”¹²⁵

It is note worthy that the Tsipras took the prime minister’s chair again although he signed the same bailout package which Greek people rejected by 61% vote. From this point of view it is expected that the Greek people would like to see a party at the government which would relief the negative effects of the debt crisis. On

¹²⁴ The Economist, “Syriza Wins, Again” <http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/09/daily-chart-greece-s-election> 27 Oct. 2015

¹²⁵ The Guardian, “Greek Election Live: Alexis Tsipras Celebrates Victory - as it Happened” <http://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/sep/20/greek-general-election-results-alexis-tsipras-syriza-meimarakis-new-democracy-live> 28 Oct. 2015

the other hand realizing the elections only one month after elections may have led the undecided voters to vote for Syriza.¹²⁶

Yanis Varoufakis, the Finance Minister in the previous Syriza Government accurately described the election result:

“The greatest winner is the Troika itself. During the past five years, Troika-authored bills made it through parliament on ultra-slim majorities, giving their authors sleepless nights. Now, the bills necessary to prop up the third bailout will pass with comfortable majorities, as Syriza is committed to them. Almost every opposition MP (with the exception of the communists of KKE and the Nazis of Golden Dawn) is also on board.”¹²⁷

Probably Troika prepared the scene for Tsipras by its uncompromising attitude to ease his hand. Finance capital would not risk losing such a country like Greece at any cost. Money matters are the ones which are most quickly and efficiently solved. Besides Syriza’s ranks have already been filled by old Pasok high ranking members.

“Tsipras must now implement a fiscal consolidation and reform programme that was designed to fail. Week in week out, the troika will be demanding more recessionary, antisocial policies: pension cuts, lower child benefits, more foreclosures. “The prime minister’s plan for weathering this storm is founded on three pledges. First the agreement with the troika is unfinished business, leaving room for further negotiation of important details; second, debt relief will follow soon; and third, Greece’s oligarchs will be tackled. Voters supported Tsipras because he appeared the most likely candidate to deliver on these promises. The trouble is, his capacity to do so is severely circumscribed by the agreement he has already signed. “His power to negotiate is negligible given the agreement’s clear condition that the Greek government must ‘agree with the [Troika] on all actions relevant for the achievement of the objectives

¹²⁶ BūşraÇatır“Yunanistan’da Sular Durulmuyor: Üçüncü Kurtarma Paketi, Siyasi Kriz ve Erken Seçim” İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı150 (2015) 5.

¹²⁷ Global Research, “SYRIZA’s Pyrrhic Victory, and the Future of the Left in Greece” <http://www.globalresearch.ca/syrizas-pyrrhic-victory-and-the-future-of-the-left-in-greece/5478356>27 Oct. 2015

of the memorandum of understanding' (Notice the absence of any commitment by the troika to agree with the Greek government.)¹²⁸

You do elections to open barriers, to solve knots. When you win an election you get rid of your hindrances, but in Syriza's victory just the opposite happened. We understand from above excerpt that Tsipras's capacity severely circumscribed by troika. One just wonders, did this new situation ease Tsipras's hand or not. That is the question.



¹²⁸ Global Research, "SYRIZA's Pyrrhic Victory, and the Future of the Left in Greece"
<http://www.globalresearch.ca/syrizas-pyrrhic-victory-and-the-future-of-the-left-in-greece/547835628>
Oct. 2015

4. EFFECT OF SYRIZA MOVEMENT ON EU INTEGRATION

The primary topic of interest in the thesis “Effect of Syriza movement on EU Integration” was to see the aftermath of the Syriza movement on the development of the ongoing process of integration in the EU. Is this movement a threat to the union, could similar movements in Europe come to power and pave the way to the foundation of a different order in Europe?

In the first part, set out with the above questions in mind, we tried to explain EU integration in light of Liberal-Intergovernmentalism theory which our study is based on. In the second part, we conveyed how the Syriza movement had emerged, progressed and the significant developments consequent to assuming power. In this part, the effects on EU integration of all the concerning developments that have transpired in the time period from the movement's coming to power to the day of writing this thesis will be elaborated on. We, however, deem it rather more appropriate to cover said effects in the following subparts: "economic", "political", "geographic", and "social".

4.1. Economical Effect of Syriza on EU Integration

Not only the Greeks but the whole European continent and financial markets had awaited almost with bated breath the governmental election that was to be held on October 25th, 2015. That Syriza, whose tough and resolute statements were well known and which based its program on anti-austerity policies, emerged in first place and got into a coalition with Anel, which also was against austerity policies, duly had raised questions across Europe regarding the Eurozone because the measures that this new government would take concerning the Eurozone and possible scenarios had already become a matter of debate prior to the elections. The most important one

among these scenarios was Grexit (Greek exit from Euro), or, the withdrawal of Greece from the Eurozone.

4.1.1. Grexit

As it is well known, Syriza has swept to power in Greece promising to end years of painful austerity policies, in an election victory that puts the country on a collision course with the EU and international creditors.¹²⁹ More specifically, the opposition leader argued that his party would pursue a new haircut for the Greek debt, so that it can become sustainable, similar to the debt haircut that happened with Germany in 1953. Mr. Tsipras spoke of introducing a “growth clause” and grace period regarding the payment of debt in order to encourage growth. Furthermore, Syriza would exempt public investments from the Stability and Growth Pact, work towards a “European New Deal” with public investments and funding from the European Investment Bank.¹³⁰

On account of this, in the EU leaders’ summit held on the 20th of February 2015, it was demanded that Syriza prepare a list of reforms. On April 1st, Greece submitted its first and most comprehensive reforms list to date. These 26 pages of document say that the country's financing needs in 2015 are €19 billion. It expects to get €1.5 billion from selling off state assets, a far cry from the €4 billion envisaged by the agreement with the previous government. The government pledges to crack down on tax fraud, raise tax on luxuries and review asset sales on a case-by-case basis. It also proposes reintroducing an extra payment for poor pensioners and a gradual hike in the minimum wage and retaining government administration staffing levels.¹³¹

¹²⁹ AlJazeera, “Anti-austerity Syriza sweeps Greece parliamentary poll”
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/01/voting-begins-greece-general-election-150125045236130.html> 05 Dec. 2015

¹³⁰ To BHMA, “Tsipras Presents SYRIZA Program at International Fair in Thessaloniki”
<http://www.tovima.gr/en/article/?aid=631486> 05 Dec. 2015

¹³¹ EuroActive, “Greek Reform List Fails to Impress Lenders”
<http://www.euractiv.com/sections/euro-finance/greek-reform-list-fails-impress-lenders-313491> 05 Dec. 2015

But, the larger purpose of this document is, in the first instance, to unlock short-term financing that will permit the Greek government to meet its immediate obligations,” the document states in a short introduction. “The Hellenic Republic considers itself to be a proud and indefeasible member of the EU and an irrevocable member of the eurozone.¹³²

Diluting their initially adamant stance which was in favor of withdrawal from the Eurozone, Syriza noted in said list of reforms that they wished to exit neither the Eurozone nor the EU. The list has since been revised many times in accordance with negotiations between concerning parties. Syriza MP Lapavitsas evaluated the key point of these negotiations as follows:

“This is the key point. This is what I have called in my own work the “good euro” approach. That, by changing politics, by winning elections, by changing the balance of political forces in Greece and in Europe, we will negotiate and we will transform the monetary union and Europe as a whole because of the political cards that we will bring to the table. That’s how they went in. And their negotiating strategy was determined by that.”¹³³

It would seem in place to mention here a significant development. As is well known, Greece held a referendum on July 5th that resulted in as high a majority of votes as 61% against austerity measures, upon which Mr. Tsipras indicated he would continue negotiations with creditors flat out and went on air to make a statement regarding the vote results:

“He said that the vote was not a mandate for “rupture” with Europe. “The people today replied to the right question,” he said. “They did not answer to the question in or out of the euro. This question needs to be taken out of the discussion, once and for all.”¹³⁴

Meanwhile Papaioannou remarked in more detail on the surprise referendum:

¹³² Financial Time, Peter Spiegel, “Greece Submits New List of Reforms to Eurozone” <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e19a3228-d883-11e4-ba53-00144feab7de.html#axzz3wNs6EEyz05> Dec. 2015

¹³³ Jacobin, Sebastian Budgen & Costas Lapavitsas, “Greece: Two Phase” <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/03/lapavitsas-varoufakis-grexit-syriza/> 07 Dec. 2015

¹³⁴ New York Times, Susanne Daley, “Greeks Reject Bailout Terms in Rebuff to European Leaders” http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/06/world/europe/greek-referendum-debt-crisis-vote.html?_r=007 Dec. 2015

“It was a decision that was taken quite in a rush and it was an effort by the Prime Minister Tsipras to engage the three pro-EU opposition parties and to engage the Greek people. I think even himself did not expect that the No vote would be victorious but at the end it backfired against him because many conservative circles in Europe interpreted this No vote as a No to Europe while my reading is that most of the Greek voters who voted No in the referendum voted for a No in a further round of economic austerity.¹³⁵

There was however an unexpected development on July 15th, much to the chagrin of not only the Greek voters at large but also the the left-wing people in particular who had been keenly keeping tabs on and supporting the Syriza movement, on account of the fact that although having opposed austerity policies that were further disapproved by a majority of Greeks who voted "no" in the referendum, Syriza conceded to the new list of reforms submitted by the Troika on July 12th and thus the third austerity package with a €86 billion aid. This austerity deal dictated harsher requirements in comparison to the two others prior to it. The following is a general outline of the terms involved:

- “Until 15 July 2015 , The streamlining of the VAT system and the broadening of the tax base to increase revenue;
- upfront measures to improve long-term sustainability of the pension system as part of a comprehensive pension reform programme;
- The safeguarding of the full legal independence of ELSTAT;
- full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union;
- Until 22 July 2015, The adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is a major overhaul of procedures and arrangements for the civil justice system and can significantly accelerate the judicial process and reduce costs;
- The transposition of the BRRD with support from the European Commission.”¹³⁶

With Tsipras’ has signed the austerity deal, a 6-month period of negotiation had come to an end, thereby shelving the Grexit scenario. As previously

¹³⁵ Research Turkey (October, 2015), “Interview with Professor Elias Papaioannou: Understanding Stormy Greek Political Economy” Vol. IV, Issue 10, 60-79 Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (Research Turkey), London, Research Turkey

¹³⁶ Euro Summit Statement, (Brussels, 12 July 2015) 2.

mentioned, however, the negotiations proceeded in a direction very much opposite to that Syriza said they had in mind; not only Syriza failed to have the negotiating parties accept Syriza's terms on the initial reforms list but they also wound up signing the Troika's terms instead; rendering the exit from Eurozone no longer an option. Why, then, had it all come to this? If accepting the Troika's terms had even been a possibility, why have a 6 month period of bargaining in the first place? The answers to these questions, we believe, can be explained in the framework of liberal-intergovernmentalism and this is what we will be doing henceforth.

In the first part, it was said that Moravcsik deemed states to be the main actors of international politics and he said states achieve their goals through intergovernmental negotiation and bargaining, rather than through a centralized authority making and enforcing political decisions.¹³⁷ On the other side Moravcsik said states are rational. It means, actors calculate the utility of alternative courses of action and choose the one that maximizes (or satisfies) their utility under the circumstances. Collective outcomes are explained as the result of aggregated individual actions based on efficient pursuit of these preferences-albeit subject to the information at hand and uncertainty about the future. Agreement to cooperate, or to establish international institutions, is explained as a collective outcome of interdependent (strategic) rational state choices and intergovernmental negotiations.¹³⁸

It could accordingly be said that Greece and even Tsipras on one side and the creditors on the other are the actors in this case. Tsipras had made clear his national preferences and predilection, as mentioned in detail above, and thus withstood austerity policies and demanded that part of Greece's debt be expunged while the rest be restructured. His initial list of reforms announced on April 1st covered his demands in full detail. Tsipras pointed out that if these reforms were not agreed upon, the worst case scenario would be to leave Eurozone. He agreed to meet creditors under these conditions and indicated that he would be doing so to achieve

¹³⁷ Moravcsik, Schimmelfennig, 68.

¹³⁸ Moravcsik, Schimmelfennig, 68.

the best outcome possible: “We would cooperate with fellow euro zone leaders for ‘a fair and mutually beneficial solution.’ ”¹³⁹

The EU's response in regard to the matter was at first very strict. Merkel made her position very clear from the start by stressing that there would be no renegotiation and exiting the eurozone was Greece's only option. A senior lawmaker in Merkel's conservative party, Wolfgang Bosbach, had taken on a milder approach and said;

“The result showed Greek voters had turned away from austerity but he said Europe could not accept rejection of the bailout. We must not reward the breaching of agreements. That would send completely the wrong signal to other crisis-stricken countries that would then expect the same treatment.”

Also, U.S. investment bank J.P. Morgan too, milder about it and said:

“The result could weigh on markets but that it considered speculation over a possible Greek exit from the euro was "a stretch" and a negotiated deal appeared the most likely outcome.”

The EU toned down its response in time. The interests and demands of both parties were very clear. A decisive conclusion was definitely going to finalize these negotiations. As stated in the first part, possible outcomes of the talks comprised unilateral alternatives and threats of non-agreement, alternative coalitions and the threat of exclusion or compromise, side-payments and linkage at the margin.

Therefore, responses from both sides made it obvious that neither parties wished to settle for Greece's exit from Eurozone and hence there would definitely be a consensus, notwithstanding the fact that whether the deal would close in favor of Tsipras or the creditors depended on which overpowered the other. Indeed, Tsipras was well aware of his inexperience and the power of the creditors. He hoped to empower position in the deal-making process by prolonging the deal period by six months and tried to enforce the terms that he submitted on April 1st. Although discussed and revised many times, the demands involved were declined by the

¹³⁹Reuters, “Greek Election” <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-election/idUSKBN0KY00520150126#O54E6YIzZOLeVPPf.9708> Dec. 2015

creditors. To the contrary, Syriza had to accept the list of reforms called the third bailout package that was revised by the creditors, which designated Syriza's defeat by the more powerful creditors.

Lapavitsas assessed the reasons underlying Syriza's defeat as follows:

“Greeks went in there, they had high hopes, and they fell into the trap that those institutions had set up for them. And that trap basically meant (a) a liquidity shortage and (b) a financing shortage for the government. This is how the institutions translated their structural advantage in relation to the Greeks. The Greeks had no options. They could not deal with that. Syriza could not deal with that, because it had accepted the confines of the euro. As long as you accept the confines of the Euro, you’ve got no effective answer. That’s the reason why this in the end took the form that it took. They tried, they strove for something different. The other side, particularly the Germans, dug their heels in. And, towards the end of the negotiations, it was a matter of days before the banks would have had to be shut down. In that situation, the Greeks basically accepted a poor compromise.”¹⁴⁰

At this point, another question arises as to what both parties would be losing had they not reached a consensus and Greece thereby opted out of Eurozone. Put another way, which would be favorable for both sides; for Greece to stay in Eurozone or opt out of it? There has not been an agreement on it from the Greek standpoint. Nevertheless, analyses on the matter in general suggest that short-term problems will be overcome in mid-term or long-term, whereas some of the interpretations deem this process an existential threat with harsh economic and political costs that could drive Euro into disintegration.¹⁴¹ It is, however, the more dominant view that in case Greece abandons Eurozone and returns to its own currency, the Drachma, a heavy domestic economic recession will inevitably ensure.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ Jacobin, Sebastian Budgen & Costas Lapavitsas, “Greece: Two Phase”

<https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/03/lapavitsas-varoufakis-grexit-syriza/> 10 Dec. 2015

¹⁴¹ Özgür Uçar, “Yunanistan’ın Euro Bölgesi’nden Ayrılmasının Olası Ekonomik Etkileri” Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Avrupa Birliği Bakanlığı Maali Politikalar Başkanlığı (2012) 21.

¹⁴² Döviz, Eral Karayazıcı, 'Ocak Ayında Piyasalar'

<http://haber.doviz.com/doviz-haberleri/haftalik-strateji-raporu-eral-karayazici-ocak-ayinda-piyasalar-pusula-raporu/158132> 10 Dec. 2015

- For the Greeks, being out of the Eurozone would mean being locked out of the global private capital markets or paying such a high price to borrow that economic growth will be a distant memory. Any new money the Greeks create (new drachma) will lose 50 percent of its value the day it is printed. Thus the only salvation for the Greeks is to stay in the Eurozone no matter how painful.¹⁴³
- Eurozone departure will be real hardship for the people of Greece. Their short-term expectations of lifestyle and affluence will be significantly reduced. And although the spending power of their money will be dramatically lower than the Euro, their competitiveness will dramatically improve as a result of this devaluation. There will be increasing demand for Greek goods and services, particularly in industries like tourism, and gradually they will earn back their affluence.¹⁴⁴
- If Greece leaves the euro the costs of using its own currency will push the country into chaos. Banks will fail, businesses will face massive euro-denominated debts they'll have to pay with a nearly worthless drachma, and the costs of basic necessities will skyrocket.¹⁴⁵
- It demonstrates that, the growth curve of Greece's GDP in case it exits the Eurozone will not, in the next ten years, catch up with the one it will have otherwise.¹⁴⁶

Papaioannou, too, states that staying in the Eurozone is the wiser option at this conjuncture:

¹⁴³ U.S.News, Scheherazade Rehman, "Greece Leaving the Eurozone Would Be a Disaster" <http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-greece-leave-the-eurozone/greece-leaving-the-eurozone-would-be-a-disaster> 10 Dec. 2015

¹⁴⁴ U.S.News, Maurica Mctigue, "Greece's Influence on the Eurozone Is Ludicrous" <http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-greece-leave-the-eurozone/greeces-influence-on-the-eurozone-is-ludicrous> 10 Dec. 2015

¹⁴⁵ U.S. News, Alexei Monsarrat, "A Greek Exit From the Euro Would Lead to Chaos" <http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-greece-leave-the-eurozone/a-greek-exit-from-the-euro-would-lead-to-chaos> 10 Dec. 2015

¹⁴⁶ Büşra Çatır, "Tsipras'ın İlk 6 Ayında Kriz, Referendum ve Darbe: Oyun Teorisi Perspektifinden Bir Analiz" İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı 143 (2015) 6.

“Given the situation that the Greek economy was at the end of June 2015, clearly, it is better to have a third economic adjustment programme, a third memorandum (bail-out) deal rather than having to leave the Euro, either temporarily –which was the proposal of the German Finance Minister Mr. Schauble– or permanently –which was the most likely outcome.”¹⁴⁷

From the vantage point of creditors on the other hand, data comparison suggests that it is more likely that the Eurozone would prevail than disintegrate had Greece left the Eurozone. As for credit institutions, even if Greece's departure would not lead to the disintegration of the Eurozone, it would raise questions as to the reliability of the monetary union.¹⁴⁸ In other words, Greece's exit from the Eurozone would not constitute a serious financial loss seeing as Greece, with its less than 2% contribution to the EU's GDP, had already caused as much loss as possible. The exit of the weakest link from the Eurozone would only impart more power to the union.¹⁴⁹

But, on the other side for the global economy, a Greek euro exit risks contagion to countries such as Portugal, Ireland, and most prominently Spain and Italy. Europe will enter a period of increased uncertainty, threatening the Euro's very existence and very likely resulting in a major international recession through two channels. First, through a new credit crunch: The international banking system is highly exposed to European bonds. A collapse of the EMU periphery bond market will result in significant balance-sheet losses, leading to a financial crisis similar to, or perhaps worse than, the one of 2008-9. Second, through the trade channel: With the world's largest economy, the Eurozone, in recession, international trade will be suppressed, affecting growth in developed as well as emerging countries.¹⁵⁰

The risks of a Grexit for the entire Eurozone are manageable and the ECB would use all measures at its disposal to defend the currency union. On the political

¹⁴⁷ Research Turkey (October, 2015), “Interview with Professor Elias Papaioannou: Understanding Stormy Greek Political Economy” Vol. IV, Issue 10, 60-79 Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (Research Turkey), London, Research Turkey.

¹⁴⁸ Çatır, “Tsipras’ın İlk 6 Ayında Kriz, Referendum ve Darbe: Oyun Teorisi Perspektifinden Bir Analiz” 6.

¹⁴⁹ Ulusal Kanal, Sait Yılmaz, “Yunanistan Hakkında Herşey”
<http://www.ulusalkanal.com.tr/yunanistan-hakkinda-hersey-makale,4509.html> 11 Dec.2015

¹⁵⁰ U.S. News, Michael Arghyrou, “Greece Must Reform Its Economy and Stay in the Eurozone”
<http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-greece-leave-the-eurozone/greece-must-reform-its-economy-and-stay-in-the-eurozone> 11 Dec. 2015

side, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the Euro backstop fund that has already proven to be an effective instrument in providing countries emergency funds, can be used should there be a spillover effect. The majority of the half-trillion Euros in the fund has not been touched. The IMF has praised the Euro Group for building a "fire wall" to prevent Grexit-related turbulence from spreading to other countries.¹⁵¹

In fact, when panned out to a wider view, it could be said that the Greek exit from the Eurozone would not bear positive outcomes for either of both.¹⁵² Reconciliation to reach an agreement however provides the maximum possible benefit for one side, while the other has to settle for the minimum. Indeed, Syriza who had been criticized by their voters for going against their own policies, made, consequent to a cost-benefit judgment, a decision on rational basis by choosing to stay in the Eurozone.

4.1.2. Troika Becomes Brussels Group

The period of negotiations saw another development whereby, while Greece was preparing to begin technical talks concerning the new reform plan, the Troika which comprised the EC, the IMF, and the ECB went on to change its structure so as to include an additional institution, the ESM as of March 12, 2015 and was renamed as the Brussels Group.

Let us now briefly elaborate on this new addition to the Troika, the ESM. It is an intergovernmental organization located in Luxembourg City, which operate under public international law for all Eurozone member states having ratified a special ESM intergovernmental treaty. It was established on 27 September 2012 as a permanent firewall for the eurozone, to safeguard and provide instant access to financial assistance programmes for member states of the eurozone in financial

¹⁵¹ Spiegel Online, "The Grexit Dilemma: What Would Happen if Greece Leaves the Euro Zone?" <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/what-a-grexit-would-mean-for-greece-and-for-europe-a-1019542.html> 12 Dec. 2015

¹⁵² Dilek Aydın "Yunanistan'da Yeni Hükümet ve Avrupa Birliği" Avrupa Birliği Temsilciliği (Brüksel, 26 Ocak 2015) 4.

difficulty, with a maximum lending capacity of €500 billion.¹⁵³ The money it uses to provide loans to member states comes from shares, bonds, and other products placed on the capital market, plus an obligatory contribution from the member states – each country in the euro area is automatically a member of the ESM.¹⁵⁴

The ESM is authorised to make use of the following lending instruments for the benefit of its Members, subject to appropriate conditionality:

- “Provide loans in the framework of a macroeconomic adjustment programme;
- Purchase debt in the primary and secondary debt markets;
- Provide precautionary financial assistance in the form of credit lines;
- Finance recapitalisations of financial institutions through loans to the governments of ESM Members.
- Directly recapitalise financial institutions (as an instrument of last resort - when bail-in and contribution from resolution fund are insufficient to return an institution to viability)”¹⁵⁵

As mentioned in the first part, one of the elements that Moravcsik's theory is based on is institutional choice, by which Moravcsik intends to mean that institutions facilitated and increased the efficiency of intergovernmental negotiations. He also indicates that “States have exploited the EU's institutional identity to justify their domestic policies and pursue their own interests, and that governments lend their authority to international institutions so as to secure the deals they make, which also helps to express a wish of the dealing parties to cooperate.”¹⁵⁶ It can further be seen that the decisions that supranational institutions make tally with state interests.

In this case, while the mention of a newly established institution is out of question, the transformation of current ones is not. That the Troika has altered its structure by incorporating yet another institution and becoming the Brussels Group has evidently shown that it had failed to adequately resolve the crisis with Greece

¹⁵³ European Stability Mechanism, Annual Report, 31 Dec. 2014: 4.

¹⁵⁴ Corporate Europe Observatory, “The European Stability Mechanism (ESM): No Democracy at the Bailout Fund” <http://corporateeurope.org/economy-finance/2014/06/european-stability-mechanism-esm-no-democracy-bailout-fund> 13 Dec. 2015

¹⁵⁵ European Stability Mechanism, Annual Report, 31 Dec. 2014: 4.

¹⁵⁶ Öraz, 1619.

prior to the change and actually needed this transformation to do so. It can be concluded that it was Syriza that compelled the EU to implement such change.

Another important point to make is that during this process Hollande proposed "a government of the Eurozone (with) a specific budget as well as a parliament to ensure its democratic control" and he underlined "Europe had let its institutions become weaker and admitted the EU's 28 members were "struggling to find common ground to move forward. Parliaments remain too far away from decisions. And people are turning away after having been bypassed so much."¹⁵⁷

All these steps taken by the EU indicate that the EU has toned down its initially strict approach to the matter, adopted a softer manner of discourse and sought for tangible resolutions, leading the Greeks to think that creditors were not as unyielding as before. Additionally, the locations of the talks have moved to Brussels. International teams have supported these talks, fostering a more fertile environment that would render positive outcomes regarding both negotiations and distinct interests.

4.2. Geopolitical Effect

In the first part, Moravcsik noted in relation to the EU integration that it was fallacious to recognize only economic interests as the sole concern in the identification of national preferences to which geopolitical and political issues are also of paramount importance.

The following could be said about the geography of Greece: Greece is a mountainous country located in Southeastern Europe. It borders Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria and Turkey. The Rhodope and Pindus Mountains form natural barriers with its northern neighbors. The Aegean, Mediterranean and Ionian seas surround Greece giving it one of the world's longest coastlines.¹⁵⁸ Moreover, it is close to the Middle East and North Africa.

¹⁵⁷ Reuters, "Hollande Calls for the Creation of a Eurozone Government" <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-eurozone-france-idUKKCN0PT0B220150719> 14 Dec. 2015

¹⁵⁸ Stratfor, "Greece's Geographic Challenge" <https://www.stratfor.com/video/greeces-geographic-challenge> 14 Dec. 2015

On this front, it can be inferred from above that Greece is situated at a geopolitically important location. While China has kept on making massive investments in the Port of Piraeus, Russia has maintained a tight-knit relationship with Greece and Southern Cyprus in terms of intelligence and economy. According to news media reports, in case Russia leaves Syrian ports, it will hire Greek ports. Russia-Greece relations have been improving since the 1970s and as such Greece has turned to Russia time and again when in the face of predicaments. Drawing nearer to Russia and further away from the USA and the EU, Greece once more turned to Russia for the crisis.¹⁵⁹

As a matter of fact, Kammenos, the Independent Greeks leader who had been in the Syriza coalition government prior to the January 2015 governmental elections, stated in a speech that he gave in October 2014 at a conference entitled “The New Silk Road and China’s Lunar Program” held in Frankfurt, that “The future of Greece could be better if a strategic orientation were taken to establish links with some of the most dynamic economies of the world, and to find new sources of economic support. One of these countries besides Russia is China.”¹⁶⁰ It should also be noted that, in the days before the election, he had visited Russia to secure an appointment with political leaders.

The Syriza emerged as the first party in the elections and established a coalition with the Independent Greeks party, after which President Putin issued a congratulatory message to Tsipras, expressing “Confidence that Russia and Greece will continue to develop their traditionally constructive cooperation in all areas and will work together effectively in resolving current European and world problems.”¹⁶¹

Syriza had developed warmer relations with Russia such that it participated as observer to the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) conference held on June 6th, 2015. When Greece asked for financial aid, Russia responded that it was not possible to make a loan, and the more viable option was to buy off some Greek assets. Russia also pointed out that it could be guaranteed to deliver the Russian natural gas to Europe by extending the Turkish Stream gas pipeline through

¹⁵⁹ Ulusal Kanal, Doç.Dr. Sait Yılmaz, “Yunanistan Hakkında Herşey”
<http://www.ulusalkanal.com.tr/yunanistan-hakkinda-hersey-makale,4509.html> 15 Dec. 2015

¹⁶⁰ Andromidas,5.

¹⁶¹ Andromidas,5.

Greece. Greece's bankruptcy allows Russia to handle NATO and Ukraine better. As for China, it was presumable that China would find it risky to loan a sum of \$10-15 billion at the cost of aggravating its relations with the EU.¹⁶²

Dempsey dwelled on the possibility that, in case Syriza adopts a distinctively pro-Russian politics in comparison to former Greek governments, those Euroskeptical parties with leftist tendencies might follow in the footsteps of Syriza, which could give rise to problems in the EU's foreign policy conduct. She goes on to explain the major concern about Syriza that worries the EU: "What is different about Syriza and some of its ministers is that they are overtly sympathetic toward Russia and, in turn, anti-Ukrainian. During a visit to Moscow in May 2014, Tsipras accused the Kiev government of harboring neo-Nazis."¹⁶³

As mentioned in the Grexit part, if Merkel kept her "do or die" attitude and the negotiations were instead laid aside resulting in Greece's exit from the Eurozone, then Syriza could maybe cooperate with BRICS and employ financial reforms. Greece, however, was well aware of the fact that its salvation lied in the EU and would therefore have closer relations with Russia only to a certain extent. Prof. Dr. Tark Oğuzlu who had works on Greece has noted these:

"It is in the power of Europe to end the Greek crisis. Greece cannot stray too far as long as Europe and the USA have this aid money. The Greek tendency for financial gain without putting in effort by working and production has come to a dead end. Greece has to go through a very serious structural transform, for which reason, making radical anti-West moves is out of question."¹⁶⁴

Indeed, it is in the mutual interest of both sides for Greece to stay in the Eurozone.

¹⁶² Ulusal Kanal, Doç.Dr. Sait Yılmaz, "Yunanistan Hakkında Herşey"
<http://www.ulusalkanal.com.tr/yunanistan-hakkinda-hersey-makale,4509.html> 16 Dec. 2015

¹⁶³ Carnegie Europe, Judy Dempsey, "Alexis Tsipras and Greece's Miserable Foreign Policy"
<http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=58864> 16 Dec. 2015

¹⁶⁴ Aljazeera Turk, Ece Göksedef "Syriza'nın Yeni Dış Politikası"
<http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/al-jazeera-ozel/syrizanin-yeni-dis-politikasi> 16 Dec. 2015

4.3. Political Effect

With Syriza emerging as the first party in the 25 January 2015 governmental elections, Europe has been confronted for the first time with a political formation against neoliberal policies.¹⁶⁵ Syriza's victory could arguably be seen as a unique opportunity to rise electorally in its own national political arenas. It could be proven to be, thus, a highly influencing event for the future of the left in Europe. Inside the European left, the idea of the domino effect that a government of the left could provoke has been ever present in recent times. According to said notion, a government of the left in one of the EU member states, would bring about a series of chain reactions leading to the drastic change of the balance of powers inside the Union.¹⁶⁶

Moreover, just days before the elections representatives from all major parties of the European left were arrived in the capital city of Athens. The German Die Linke, the Spanish IU, the Portuguese Bloco de Esquerda, the Italian Partito della Rifondazione Comunista, and the French coalition Fronte de Gauche were amongst the parties that opted to send representatives in the Greek capital. The President of the EL, Pierre Laurent, as well as the party's Vice Presidents Maite Mola and Marisa Matias led the group of representatives. The message was that they were conveying was one of support and solidarity towards their Greek counterpart.¹⁶⁷

Following Syriza's victory, countries such as Spain, Portugal, and Ireland, which, too, had been struggling with austerity measures supported Greece.

For instance; In Spain, Pablo Iglesias, the leader of anti-austerity party Podemos, which is expected to win local elections in May and general elections in November, declared. "Hope is coming, fear is fleeing. Syriza, Podemos, we will

¹⁶⁵ Bianet, "SYRIZA Toplumsal Radikalleşmeyle Bağ Kurabildi" <https://m.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/161814-syriza-toplumsal-radikallesmeyle-bag-kurabildi> 17 Dec. 2015

¹⁶⁶ E-International Relations, Nikolas Nikolakis, "Syriza, Podemos, Venceremos? Syriza and the Future of the European Left" <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/05/06/syriza-podemos-venceremos-syriza-and-the-future-of-the-european-left/> 17 Dec. 2015

¹⁶⁷ E-International Relations, Nikolas Nikolakis, "Syriza, Podemos, Venceremos? Syriza and the Future of the European Left" <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/05/06/syriza-podemos-venceremos-syriza-and-the-future-of-the-european-left/> 17 Dec. 2015

win!” Podemos is the sister party of Syriza in the European elections and Iglesias has close personal ties to Tsipras.¹⁶⁸

In Ireland, another country suffering under a huge bailout debt, Sinn Fein spokesman Pearse Doherty declared the Tsipras victory “an opportunity for progressive change in Europe” and voiced support for Syriza’s call for a ‘European Debt Conference’ which would be in Ireland’s interests also. Blasting Irish Prime Minister Enda Kenny for not supporting a debt conference he said. ‘They should remove themselves from office and allow the people to elect a new government that will.” Sin Fein which is the sister party of Syriza in the European Parliament, won the European Parliamentary election in Ireland and could very well be the winner if early elections were to be held in Ireland.¹⁶⁹

Antonio Costa, the new Secretary General of the Socialist Party of Portugal which is expected to win the general elections next October called the triumph of Syriza “a sign of change” that gives strength to Portugal and other European Countries to change policy.¹⁷⁰

As specified earlier the Greeks intended to send a message to European decision makers by electing Syriza. Similar messages were delivered by those Union countries which have been going through a debt crisis akin to that of Greece, although it was only Podemos, who called Syriza their brothers, were able to pick up said message. They outvoted one of the two major parties in the country, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, and came in second in the local elections of May 2015, thus showcasing a markedly surprising success as a one-year-old party. And also Podemos made big gains in the general election of 21 December 2015 and was the third one. On the other side as the conservative Popular Party (PP) lost its majority.

As for those countries that have had elections in 2015: While the Conservative Party emerged as winner in the UK general elections held in May 2015, Portugal's center-right coalition which had been in power in the previous term won the elections again in October 2015, whereas Left Bloc, which has been likened to Syriza, doubled the votes it had in the 2011 elections and reached 10%. The

¹⁶⁸ Andromidas, 6.

¹⁶⁹ Andromides, 6.

¹⁷⁰ Andromides, 6.

examples cited here might mistakenly be taken as a clear sign of the rise of the left in EU. To make such a claim needs detailed further research which is out of scope of this work.

4.4. Social Effect

Syriza movement has influenced integration process not only in geographic and politic aspects but also in social aspects as well. Although Greece's signing of 3rd bailout packet and not leaving euro zone has lessened the tension in Europe, the damage created both on Greek people and on the integration process was deeper.

As the LI concerned, the social effect would be the strengthened national feelings of Greek people. Worsened economical situation of any people normally would lead to increasing national spirit as in the case of Greek people. The figures that we are going to present in the following tables is a clear sign of the resentment and disappointment of Greek People from integration. Nevertheless this is not a situation which has been overlooked by LI theory. The authorities and the policy makers who side with integration should better take into account the Greek- case not as a unique case peculiar only to Greece. One may think of social effect of Greek people on integration as a chance to refine integration theories to tackle the future integration problems. Greek case will most probably serve as a laboratory experiment for EU integration.

As seen in the below figure, 97 percent of the Greek pople were qualifying current economic sutatus as being bad this figure was 59 percent for EU countries.




Figure 4. 1. : The situation of the (Nationality) economy

Source: Eurobarometre 83 "Life in the European Union"

When we look at the expectations for the coming year 46 percent of Greek people anticipated it as worsened while this figure was 21percent for other EU countries. Regarding employment situation, 53 percent of the Greek people believed that it was going to be not good while this figure was 22 percent for other countries. When it comes to personal job situation 55 percent anticipated no change while this figure was 60 percent for the other countries of EU.




Figure 4.2. : What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to ?

Source: Eurobarometre 83 "Life in the European Union"

When it comes to the trust to the EU Institutions, 73 percent of Greek people answered this question negatively and this figure was lower again for other EU countries, it was 46 percent. When it comes the (Nationality) Parliament 73 percent of the people has declared the answer negatively while only 62 percent of the others answered this question negatively. In (Nationality) Government question these numbers were 59 percent for the Greek people and 63percent for the other EU countries again in negative sense.




Figure 4. 3. : I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust

Source: Eurobarometre 83 “Life in the European Union”

The answer the Greek people has given to the question how they conjured up EU was 38 percent neutral and 25 percent positive while this figure was 41 percent as positive for other people.





Figure 4. 4. : In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive neutral, fairly negative or very negative image

Source: Eurobarometre 83 “Life in the European Union”

Again as seen in the graph below while 51 percent of the Greek people did not feel as EU citizens this figure was 31 percent for the other countries. 57 percent of the Greek people said no to the question if they knew their rights as EU citizens and this ratio was 48 percent for the citizens of other EU countries. But 70 percent of the Greek people answered yes to another question if they wanted to know their rights while this ratio was 69 percent for the other people.



Source: Eurobarometre 83 "European Union Citizenship"

5. CONCLUSION

The idea of a unified Europe evolved from an utopia based on “everlasting Peace (Saint Simon, Proudhon)” through a more political but still an utopian idea “The united states of Europe” towards more realistic definitions of unity. The terms “condition and process” have been coined for a more realistic definition of unity as integration. The process must have been based on some theory.

The ideas went by in conformity with practical steps towards integration. Removal of the customs among German Principalities (Zolverrein Customs Union), the monetary union between France, Belgium, Switzerland and Greece and the Scandinavian Monetary Union between Sweden, Denmark and Norway and the International Pan Europe movement which envisaged France and Germany as the center were the preliminary practical steps towards integration.

Process of integration in practice has been followed by a series of theories of integration. It was envisaged by political leaders and by some scholars that the political problems would only be solved by dissolving nation states. This view can be interpreted as Federalism. But federalist theory proved inefficient in solving political problems since it has underestimated national sensitivities. The criticisms on federalist theory gave way to another theory which has been rooted in the same ground as federalist theory had been; it was functionalist theory which has defined problems on technocratic level. This new approach has also proved inefficient since it underestimated all the factors other than technocratic ones. Now it was Neo-Functionalism’s turn to find solutions to the problems arising en-route towards integration. This new theory which is very popular in 1950-1960 eras was coined with Ernst Haas. In his book ‘The Uniting of Europe’ Haas had underlined some basic features of the theory. According to this theory, cooperation in a certain economic policies would lead to greater economic integration then to a wider political integration by spillovers.

Though, there were strong nationalist responses. As a result, Luxemburg Accord which has envisaged not using qualified majority vote in case of vital national interests has been signed. Accord was legitimatizing the right of vetoing of member states. This was in fact evidence that nation state was still strong at EC level casting a shadow on Neo-functional Theory.

The negative effect of national interests on European integration would have been overcome by a new theory on realist basis. So, one of the pioneers of realist movement, Stanley Hoffman has created theory of Intergovernmentalism which emphasizes the role of nation state in integration and claims that nation state will not be obsolete because of integration. The pace of integration greatly depends on the extent that the national interests of the member states coincide.

The inefficiencies of Intergovernmentalism led Andrew Moravcsik to formulate Liberal Intergovernmentalism in his article “Negotiating the Single European Act: national interest and conventional statecraft in the European Community”. He added some dynamics to Intergovernmentalist Theory bringing new dimensions to it. Actually he did this by combining Liberal Theory with Intergovernmentalist Theory.

Defined as a baseline theory Liberal Intergovernmentalism has three aspects.

I-It is a theoretical synthesis not a narrow theory and links together multiple theories and factors into a single coherent approach.

II-It seeks to simplify the EU politics.

III- It is state-centric, reflecting both a realistic view of international relations and a rational choice.

Regarding theories and the integration process as summarized above, the Syriza case has been examined under the light of Liberal Intergovernmentalism. Greek Politics could only no way can be analyzed solely only by a single theory other than Liberal Intergovernmentalism. The Syriza case reflects all aspects of this theory. On one side a member state which put emphasis on its national interests stronger than ever and the other side EU institutions insisting on the requirements of the integration process. Syriza case showed that a successful international theory should be state centric. And a realistic Liberalism together with Intergovernmentalism should

have been put in the practice. So it happened in this way and the case now is under control and sets no vital danger for integration. The current situation in Greece politics is not reversing the direction of integration; it is only slowing down the pace.

The latest development which would hamper the process is the no-vote for the EU membership of the British people. But looking into the details one can see that in actual case this is an interim period and a phase that can be reversed in the long run by utilizing Liberal Intergovernmentalism. What the British people did is to remind EU national interests of British people which are not so surprising regarding the theory.

Both events the Greek case and the British case show us that European Integration is not a smooth process. There will probably be other set-backs even in core members like France and Italy. In both countries one can see these negative potentials by regarding strong national feelings increasingly spreading among the people of both countries.

The power of Liberal-Intergovernmentalism arises from the fact that it never dismisses these possibilities. But Liberal-Intergovernmentalism is probably not the last word, the refinements and even the turns in the theory will continue parallel to the practice.

The long way for European integration showed us that it has been fostered by a strong desire shared by the peoples of different countries. Even two world wars waged on the soil of the continent could not stop the process.

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