

**T.C**

**ISTANBUL KULTUR UNIVERSITY**

**INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**TURKEY'S SYRIAN REFUGEE POLICY AND ITS IMPACTS ON**

**TURKISH ECONOMY AND SECURITY (2011 – 2015)**

**MASTER THESIS**

**NAIL FADHLY**

**DEPARTMENT : INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**PROGRAMME : INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**ADVISOR: Dr. BORA BAYRAKTAR**

**ISTANBUL, 2018**

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## ABSTRACT

Conflict in Syria started in 2011 and turned about in which are 470.000 have been killed, the conflict forced millions of Syrians became refugees. Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and some European countries became their destinations to search of a new life. Turkey was one of the main countries hosting Syrian refugees and the government has been welcoming hope for many Syrian refugees to come to this country. Today, more than 3.2 million Syrian refugees in Turkey since the door was opened, and Turkey is the country with the most refugees in the world. The big numbers of refugees have created many challenges for Turkish people and the government, economic and security became main issues that really need to be concerned and be solved. Some people speculated if the more refugees come and the longer they stay, the more problems will happen but the rest argue that Syrian refugees brought dynamism to Turkey economic and create/provide opportunity for Turkey.

In this thesis I will discuss the pros and cons of refugees issues in Turkey, how Turkey reacted to this crisis and what kind of impact to Turkey's economy and security.

**Keywords** : Syrian Refugees, Turkish Foreign Policy, Economic, Security.

## ÖZET

Suriye'de çatışmalar 2011 yılında başlamış, buna bağlı olarak yüzbinlerce kişi ölmüş, milyonlarca Suriyeli mülteci haline gelmiştir. Bu bağlamda Suriye halkı, Türkiye, Lübnan, Ürdün, Irak, Mısır ve bazı Avrupa ülkelerinde yeni bir yaşam arayışında bulunmuş;Türkiye, Suriyeli mültecilere ev sahipliği yapan ana ülkelerden biri olmuştur.Bugün Türkiye'de üç milyondan fazla Suriyeli mülteci vardırve Türkiye dünyanın en çok mülteci ağırladığıülkedir.Bu oranda mültecinin Türkiye'de bulunmasının ekonomik, sosyal ve siyasal anlamda zorlukları doğmuştur.Bu tezin amacı, Suriye'den gelen yüksek sayıda mülteci ile ilgili Türkiye'nin uyguladığı ekonomik, sosyal ve siyasal politikaları analiz etmek, karşı karşıya kaldığı sorunları ele almak ve özellikle Türk ekonomisine ve güvenlik politikalarına yansımalarını incelemektir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Suriyeli Mülteciler, Türk Dış Politikası, Ekonomik, Güvenlik.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations have been used in the thesis

AFAD	Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management
AKP	Justice and Development Party
AZ	Al – Qaeda
CRC	Convention on the Right of the child
CSR	Convention on the Status of Refugees
CW	Cold War
DGMM	Directorate General of Migration Management
DP	Democrat Party
EU	European Union
FSA	Free Syrian Army
GAP	Great Anatolian Project
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GOLD	General Organization for Land Development
GW	Gulf War
HEPP	Hydro Electric Power Plants
IAF	Israel Air Force
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IRGC	Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

IS	Islamic State
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and Levant
JN	Jabhat al – Nusra
KS	Kurdish State
LFIP	Law on Foreigners and International Protection
MECA	Military Education and Cooperation Agreement
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MD	Ministry of Development
ME	Ministry of Education
MI	Ministry of Interior
MIPEX	Migrant Integration Policy Index
MPL	Merginal Product and Labor
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non - Government Organitation
OE	Ottoman Empire
PKK	Kurdistan Workers Party
SU	Soviet Union
TGS	Turkish Governmental Statistics
TRC	Turkish Red Crescent
UAE	Uni Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
US	United State
WB	World Bank
WBG	World Bank Group
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WWI	World War 1
WW2	World War 2
YPG	People Protections Units

## INTRODUCTION

After 7 years of the civil war, the condition in Syria is still complex, to identify this condition should look so deep from rootcase . Since the 1945 the political structure of Syrian political has been cut in to pieces, and it has resulted a barely functioning of the civilian government and also the military that directly interfares for the politics in that country. Demography of the country should be metered, country composed of different ethnic and it is had to control. Hafiz Al-Assad (1993-2000), father to and the predecessor of Syria's current president Bashar Al-Assad came to power following a coup in 1971. In the end of his reign in 2000, Hafiz Al-Assad built up the country military, infrastructure and politic depending on the personality of the president (himself) with funding from Arab donors and international lending intitutions.

The devastating civil war in Syria started on March 2011 was caused by the complex interretaed factors. The main cause of the conflict is regime change, but the triggers factors are a broad set of religious and sociopolitical, the decreasing of economic stability, a wafe of political reform sweeping over the last Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Levant region, and the challenges associated with the climate variability and change and the aviability and use of freshwater (Peter H. Gleick).

Caused by the insurgency in Tunisia and Egypt, the current president of Syria, Bashar Al-Assad used the millitary to repress peaceful demands for democratic change, and the millitary now becomes the only functioning institution in a country where the majority of Sunnis is ruled by the alawite minority. Because

the military acts as a stakeholder in close alliance with the state, the supernumerary to the military-civilian rule is possibly chaos and further political instability, with the potential for an extremist Sunni regime that provides a haven to terrorist group.

The conflict in Syria has been running for seven years and has evolved in to a multi-sided war of attrition between Bashar Al-Assad government in Damascus. Since the war began on 2011 at least there are 11,5 million Syrian need humanitarian assistance because of the violent civil war, 470.000 people killed. This conflict effected children by getting risk to get illness, malnourishing, abusing or exploitation. Millions of the children have been forced to quit school. Within Syria, 95 percent of people lack adequate healthcare, 70 percent lack regular access to clean water. The economy is shattered and four-fifths of the population lives in poverty. These problems Syria and made most of the people fled from their homes and become refugees or interally displaced people.

According to United Nations, the data shown that 5,5 milion Syrian are currently become refugees, and a half of the total number are children. The Syrian refugees spreaded in some countries, and mostly are in the Middle East Country, such as Lebanon, Yordania, Iraq, Egypt and also Turkey, and the rest of them fled into Europe, or about a half million refugees. But, when the Balkan borders were closed in March 2016, thousands of the Syrian refugees got stucked in Greece, and another big numbers stoped in Serbia, Croatia, and also Macedonia. Due to the harmful condition time by time, these Syrian refugees need assistance for the basic needs, such as foods and living place and the other crucial thing is their status as individual to continue their lives.

In the last few years the refugees coming to Turkey have been growing so badly, the number of Syrians who have fled war to seek refuge in Turkey has reached 3,208,131 as of September, 28 2017 according to Directorate General of Migration Management. Based on this fact in this study the correlation between the refugees coming to Turkey and some problems will be analyzed.

Budgeting for refugees lives in Turkey had spent about 25 billion dollars until march 2017, according to Turkey's Minister of Development, Lütfi Elvan. The other issues that come up because of the growing number of the refugees are many local people lost their job because the refugees paid lower than them and the goods for living and places to stay being more costly than usual, especially in the border area, the increasing of the criminality in Turkey also being attention caused of some cases involved the refugees including the terrorism.

Through those statements, this reaserch try to give the real facts about the increasing number of the criminality in Turkey after the refugees coming, and how much the Turkey government spent to assistance the refugees, in the other side this study also will try to find the corretalation between the terrorism in Turkey and Syrian refugees, and the last, this study will give the solusitions how the way to control the Turkish national security after accepting the refugees coming.

This study has been run through the qualitative and quantitative methods. In order to present a good understanding of the information related to case refugees and the study context, data collection through document analysis, interviews the victims, experts, and the researchers have been provided.

# CHAPTER I

## SYRIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM

### 1.1 The Background of Syrians War

The Syrians are currently leaving their country due to a massive civil war. Many Syrian people want democratic elections, and began to protest against the President, Bashar Al-Assad. Al-Assad responded by jailing and executing members of the protests, which led to protesters turning into rebels. Not helping the situation is ISIS, which took the opportunity of instability in Syria and Iraq to rapidly gain land and power. Finally, the Kurds, an ethnic group in Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, have also decided to join in the fray in the hopes of creating a nation for Kurds (the Kurds are the 4th largest ethnic group without a nation of its own). Because of all this conflict, many Syrians have been forced to flee for their lives.<sup>1</sup>

The Syrian's president, Bashar Al-Assad was asked in interview by the wall street journal about the actual condition in Syrian. Assad confirmed that everything is fine in his country, even there are some conflicts and the decreasing of economic stability but those are still under control, said the President of Syria. He is sure and optimist that he will find the solution for its country's condition, because his political policy is still in line with the Syrian citizen resistance to The United States and Israel.

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<sup>1</sup> Who are the Kurds? "<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29702440>"

The anti Al-Assad regime started the protest just a week after the interview, they clarified that the Syria is much more worse than the President explained in the interview, and the Syria is in instability well on economic or in the political situation. When Assad succeeded to be the president in 2000, he is the president with modernizer and reformer reputation among his citizens. Unfortunately the peoples hope to their new President are unsucceeded fulfilled. In the short period, some of the supporters of Assad regime change to be the oppositioner, and it can not be accepted by Assad, finally Assad did pervasive censorship and surveillance and ruthless violence against the suspected opposition regime.<sup>2</sup> Bashar Al-Assad also look after the significant liberalization Syria state dominated economy, but those only to enrich a network of crony capitalist with ties to the regime. Through this eruption, more than a hundreds thousand people form the opposition regime did demonstration in the street to ask Assad go down from his post as a President, but this incidents created battle between the opposition regime and the militer. The civil war was inevitable since that time in Syria. During the the civil war that has happened in Syria not less than 250.000 people were killed, and for almost the same number for the missing people, this accidents called as the worst humanitarian crisis all the time after World War II. The civil war is not only about the opposition to the government, but it is also about the dispute between Sunni and Shia sectarianism. The complex situation made Syria as a battlefield for the citizens it self, and it has impacted the other civilians should lost their home, wealth, family even their own lives.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid

<sup>3</sup> The Confused Person's Guide to the Syrian Civil War

["https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/syrian-civil-war-guide-isis/410746/](https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/syrian-civil-war-guide-isis/410746/)



In western of Syria is more diverse, the alawite and the minority mostly dominated by Assad regime, and a mosaic of Shia militias funded and trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), while in the central of Syria are Sunni moderate, islamist, and jihadist groups, like ISIS and Al-Qaeda that affiliated with jabhat al-Nusra, share control.<sup>4</sup> In the other side, in the northern part, the Kurdish-based People's Protection Units (YPG) have united two of three contons in a bid to expand "Rojova"-Western Kurdistan. Nowadays some neighboring states had interest to take a part in this case and some cases made the condition in Syria got worse. Assad regime got supporting form Russia and also Iran, while in the opposition side Turkey and some other Arabic countries stand together to support the Syrian citizens to achieve their revolution, United States is the one and only country that stand in the opposition side.<sup>5</sup>

In August 2013 more Syrian fled into northen Iraq that just opened the border crossing due to the conflict in Syria and they were trapped by the insurgent conflict in that country, and it made Iraq struggled to fill the Syrian refugees needs that had reached more than one million refugees. The U.N. estimates until 2017 there are 5.5 million Syrians became refugees, and more than half of the country's pre-war population of 23 million need urgently humanitarian assistance, whether they still stay in their country or has fled accross the Syria's borders.<sup>6</sup> Turkey has faced several migration flows over the history and hosted millions of immigrants both temporarily and permanently. The majority of those flows were composed of mass influx of forced migrants. In the last 30 years, Turkey has provided temporary

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<sup>4</sup> Syria in 60 Seconds <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/syria-in-60-seconds>

<sup>5</sup> Largest battlefield and generator of sunni shia, <https://www.coursehero.com/file/p4fv4lo/largest-battlefield-and-generator-of-Sunni-Shia-sectarianism-the-world-has-ever/>

<sup>6</sup> What is happening in Eastern Ghouta, Syria? <https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/iraq-jordan-lebanon-syria-turkey/quick-facts-what-you-need-know-about-syria-crisis>

protection to refugees largely from Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia. Most of them turned back to their homelands. The civil war in Syria has killed more than 220,000 people, and a half of them are believed to be civilians. Bombings have destroyed crowded cities and horrific human rights violations. Basic necessities such as food and medical care are sparse.

## 1.2 The History of Syrian Comes to Turkey

The Syrian conflict has been raging for more than seven years and it is now the world's largest humanitarian crisis since World War II. The Syrian refugees are now the largest group of refugees from a single conflict. Millions of Syrians, who managed to survive the deadly conflict, have either been internally displaced or have sought asylum abroad. Also, much of the infrastructure has been devastated during this crisis. Many schools, hospitals, and industries have either been destroyed or are out of service. This fighting, destruction, and death inside Syria continues to explode and shift while the suffering of the people worsens. Those who wish to flee the violence and persecution must seek refuge in other countries. The international community is obligated to protect and assist refugees. Turkey has accepted more Syrian refugees than any other country. There are simply too many people fleeing Syria for Turkey to be able to properly protect and provide for all of them. Therefore, many refugees seek passage into Europe.<sup>7</sup> By not having strict observations on the borders, Turkey has allowed smugglers to endanger the lives of these refugees. Many of these smugglers send them across the sea to Greece on dangerous inflatable boats and precarious barges.

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<sup>7</sup> Syrian refugees: Which countries welcome them, which ones don't  
<https://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/09/world/welcome-syrian-refugees-countries/index.html>

Turkey pursues an open-door policy towards refugees fleeing war in their countries. Enacted in April 2011, this unconditional policy originally welcomed Syrians, who were fleeing the conflict, as guests.<sup>8</sup> Since then Turkey has extended “temporary protection” to the Syrian refugees which ensures that they will not be deported and imposes no limit on the duration of their stay. The Temporary Protection Act enacted by the Turkish Parliament in April 2013, secures protections for each person who is forced to leave his country due to life threatening. From all the Syrian refugees in Turkey, they lived in various places in this country, with the total number 2,9 million refugees the total population in Turkey increase significantly. The refugees are registered and get temporary protection, because when they came their status is just a “guest”, that has meaning they will go back to their home country after the condition in Syria has been better. During their tiime in Turkey, these refugees get some facilities from the goverment that cooperated with some international organizations and also local and International NGOs. Some of the facilities that they got are: health care services, basic needs such as foods and living place and work permits and some training to their soft skilled.<sup>9</sup>

The Turksih Disaster Response Agency (AFAD) has led the coordination of the government’s efforts to respond the refugee inflow. Even AFAD is originally established in order to deal with the natural disasters, but it immedaitelly restructed itself since the first arrival of the Syrian refugees and reorganized itself to deal with the increasing humanitarian disaster in Turkey’s southern border.<sup>10</sup> As

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<sup>8</sup> Deconstructing Turkey’s “Open Door” Policy towards Refugees from Syria, *Burcu Togrul Koca*, <http://www.tplondon.com/journal/index.php/ml/article/view/554>

<sup>9</sup> Effects Of The Syrian Refugees On Turkey, page 7

<sup>10</sup> Turkey’s Syrian Refugees: Toward Integration, Kılıç Buğra Kanat, Kadir Üstün, page 15

a greatly well organized and dynamic organization and getting full financial and political support from the government. AFAD ensured that the refugees necessity by utilizing the capabilities of various government ministries and agencies. AFAD also has a task to build the refugees camps that the condition should be above and beyond the international standards set by the United Nations.

Due to the some problems created by the iflux of Syrian refugees, finally the government of Turkey ratified their new regulation especially the regulation that set about the International protection to the foreigners, this policy was created by the General Directorate of Migration Management under this misnistry of home affairs. Through this policy, the government try to reach the integration between immigration policy in Turkey and the rootcase of the problems created. This policy orientates to the human rights and the security issues for this country.

Responding to the refugee crisis of Syria in a truly humane manner has become a deliberate policy choice by the Turkish government. As a result, Turkey rearranged its emergency response capacity and took it to the next level, often exceeding International standards. The country host about 2,9 million refugees in both refugees camps and cities, largely bordering Syria. Although AFAD and civil society organizations in the region showed an exemplary accomplishment in accomodating the refugees, the extensions of the conflict may require larger-scale International firm to address the ever-increasing refugee crisis.<sup>11</sup>

According to UNHCR, the Syrian refugees mostly fled to their neighbour countries, such as Lebanon ,Turkey, Iraq and also Jordan. In the histroy, the Syria

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<sup>11</sup> Id page 45


conflicts recorded as a war that create the most displaced people in the world, with not less than 65,6 million people should move from their home country and find a place to get the protection to continue their lives. From that number about a third of them are becoming refugees, or about 22,5 million people and a half of the refugees are children that has a right to live and get basic need as a human. Healthcare, education, employment and freedom movements are the things that they should sacrifice due to this war.<sup>12</sup>



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<sup>12</sup> UNHCR, Figures at a Glance

**Figure 1. The Statistics of Forcibly Displaced People Worldwide In 2017 and The Deployment**



Source: UNHCR / 19 June 2017



### Source : UNHCR

The figure 1 concluded that at least there are 65,5 million people worldwide are forcibly displaced from their home countries, and 22,5 million of them are becoming refugees, which 55% of the refugees come from 3 majority countries, those are South Sudan, Afganistan and Syria as the highest refugee number in the world with total number 5,5 million people in 2017. Among all the countries that become the hosting countries, Turkey, Lebanon and Pakistan are the top 3 countries that has the most refugees in the world with following number 2,9 million; 1,4 million and 1,0 million.

Before the civil war in Syrian happened in 2011, only a small number of Syrian sought refugee in Turkey. The Statistical data from the government between 1995 till 2013 only 635 applicants Syrian that apply as as asylum in Turkey, if compared with other countries such as Iraq and Afganistan, Syria is not even a third of their applications numbers. Totally, iraq had 24.000 application and Afganistan 29.000 application that apply as asylum in Turkey. But all changed constantly after April 2011, when the civil war was started in Syrian and the Syrian refugees crossed the border into Turkey. <sup>13</sup>

Refer to figure 2 that the government of Turkey and the UNHCR reported the total number of Syrian Refugees who lived in 22 camps in Turkey was dramatically increasing started from September 2011 with number 11.010 and reached 220.323 in April 2014, out of that still there are about 700.00 other refugees that live outside the camps. <sup>14</sup>


The refugees who lived outside the camps are spread out of the Turkey, but most of them are located in the four closest states from Syria: such as Kill, Hatay, Gazientep and Sanliurfa. Almost all of the refugees that staying around these four locations should responsible to other 500.000 other registered refugees who staying out of the camps. The other cases is any cities which the refugees almost surpassed the number of the local population in that city it self, for the example is Killis. major cities in the Western part of Turkey like Antalya, Anakara, Mersin, Konya, Izmir and Istanbul observed large number of them to start a new lives there.

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<sup>13</sup> Turkey records largest number of Syrian refugees, UN reports June 20, 2017".  
<https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2017/06/20/turkey-records-largest-number-of-syrian-refugees-un-reports>

<sup>14</sup> "UNHCR Turkey Syrian Refugee Daily Sitrep 08 May 2014",  
<http://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/unhcr-turkey-syrian-refugee-daily-sitrep-08-may-2014>.

**Figure 2. Number Syrian Refugee in camps Turkey Sept 2011 and May 2014**



Source: UNHCR and AFAD

Begun by the conflict happened in Syrian in 2011, about eighty percent Syrians people escaped to Turkey, most of them were from the northern provinces of Syria, and particularly from northern Aleppo, azas, latakia, and idlib, also smaller from Damascus.<sup>15</sup> The Syrian living outside the camps mostly because they were actively involved in the evolution and that caused their name in the “black list” of the Syrian regime . The Syrians escaped escape from torture, persecution also imprisonment.

The Syrians from the bordres areas like Azas state, the citizen should flee to cross the border when the bombing began to attacks their areas and they will turn back to their city when the bombings freez, the Syrian who come from the Azas state, especially for those who currently resides in city of Kilis, stated that, they must wait under olive trees for twelve hours without nothing to eat except the dry bread. In the afternoon they were back homes. And they stucked in this situation about for seven days before being able to enter Turkey.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Syrian Refugees in Turkey, Şenay Özden, MPC Research Report 2013/05, page 3

<sup>16</sup> Id page 4



After arriving in Turkey, these people should register themselves to the Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management that also called AFAD, after registering the refugees would be transferred to the closest camps. There were 22 camps in Syria and most of them located near by the border area between Turkey and Syria, these 22 camps were operated by the Turkish Government that also cooperated with AFAD and Turkish Red Crescent. In these camps the refugees will get some facilities such as health and also food as a human basic need.



## CHAPTER II

### TURKISH POLICY TOWARDS SYRIAN REFUGEES

#### 2.1 Historical Background of Turkey-Syria's Relations

Although Syria and Turkey geographically is a neighbor, but their political relations historically have not been too close, but things were improved, until the Arab spring struck. The last century, Syria - Turkey relation was not good. Turkey at that time known as the Ottoman - Empire that began in 1517, and as nationalis start to take root in Syria at the turn of the twenty century, Turkey started to be visible as oppressorss.<sup>17</sup>

In 1930s, the emergence of water issues during 1950s, and Syria's support of the PKK (Kurdish Worker's Party) have all served as factors that have affected Turkish-Syrian relations. Beginning in 1998, despite all warnings from the Turkish government, the Syrian government maintained support of the PKK, that brought these two countries to the brink of war.<sup>18</sup> However, Syria eventually ceased to support the PKK and deported the party's leader Abdullah Öcalan, which allowed the bilateral relations to begin to normalize. Relations were further aided when both countries signed the Adana Agreement in 1998, and when then Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer took part in Syrian President Hafez al-Assad's funeral proceedings.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Syria and Turkey: A Complex Relationship, <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/syria-and-turkey>

<sup>18</sup> Kurdistan: The Next Flashpoint Between Turkey, Iraq, and the Syrian Revolt  
<http://jcpa.org/article/the-future-of-kurdistan-between-turkey-the-iraq-war-and-the-syrian-revolt/>

<sup>19</sup> Water Dispute And Kurdish Separa Tism In Turkish – Syrian Relations, ÖZDEN ZEYNEP OKT AV, page 107

Relations were also helped after the AKP got the power during general election in November 2002. The bilateral diplomatic and commercial relations that had slowly been established beginning in 2002, had begun to devolve when the Syrian civil war broke out in March 2011, and eventually these relations broke off completely. This chapter will examine and assess Turkish-Syrian relations and the various factors that have served to influence them.

Turkey has changed to build a good relationship with other countries around it, especially to Syria, it was started in 2002, since the AKP came to power, Turkey has not been an isolated country anymore from its region. This changing represent an important strategic to Turkey to achieve economic interest and protect its nationality.

#### **A. Turkey's Foreign Policy Determine of Syria**

The External and Internal determinants that Turkey's foreign policy set in accordance to the standards of National interest and the changing of regional and International environments are as follows

##### **a. Internal Determinates**

##### **i) Geographical Determinant**

Geographically the location of Syria is located in the southern part of Turkey that actually a major crossing into the south of Syria and also the surroundings. And the position of this place is in the fertile crescent that very important to the Turkey's project. In addition its place also an advance front with the Israel (Bakeir, 2013). Although geographically Turkey and Syria is a neighbour but the Turkish annexation of Sanjak of Alexandretta (Iskenderun Bridge) added by the water

problems become the factors for the conflict between these two countries. But since their relationship is increasing, these issues had not become controversial anymore.

ii) The institution of Military

The Institution of military has improved Turkish language officially in Syria. It also disputed with the opening policy of Turkey to Syria based on the suspicion that Syria was as one of the states that threatened the National security of Turkey. The military cooperation signing between Israel and Turkey had led Turkey's foreign policy adoption for Syrian's escalation situation, the other reason is the military institute's influence since the AKP's arrival to power, it also influenced the foreign policy of Turkey.

iii) The Erdogan's Intellectual influence to the orientation of Foreign Policy of Turkey on Syria

A leader's idea has an influence factor to change the foreign policy, included in Turkey, Erdogan as one of the most prominent leader in Turkey has influenced the creating process of foreign policy in this country, added his position as a prime minister made him having more responsible to decide the policy making. Erdogan with the religious background and derived by the Turkish history has influenced him to create the foreign policy formulation. Due to the religious orientation that started since he studied in the high school added by joining the National safety party, his background influenced the orientation of his political. In 1996 when Erdogan became the Istanbul's Mayor, he got jailed because his idea nearly similar with the Erbakan's Ideas. Joining with the AKP at 2001 has changed

his party away from the religious characters. The experienced of his politics carrier has changed his goals to the foreign policy. Adopting the idea of Oglu to open Turkey to all countries. made Erdogan took his mainfocus to develop the relation with Arab countries, and Syria is his priority, he believed the similiar culture among Arab countries and Turkey will contribute the positive progress of Turkey's economic development among these countries, and the foreign policy will be supported by peace undirectly External factors

i) The Regional Determinants

➤ Israel

Israel and Syria stand in the different side, for Israel, Syria is an enemy. Syrian's relationship with Turkey is really important for Syria, especially for the Foreign Policy of Turkey on Syria, so the relationship between Turkey and Israel will have influence for Syria-Turkey relation too. Since Israel established till 2002, the Turkey-Israel intercourse has been so crucial for both countries, especially for the Israel. The Jewish community in Turkey has palyed substantial role between these to countries, Israel and Turkey. The key point of their relations signed by a military cooperation treaty in 1996. This aggrement has expensed the Syria. September 2007 is one the example, when the Syria's facilities got bombed by Israel, which violated the airspace of Turkey's territory, although Israel did apologize for that violation. (Yousef, 2013). Even Turkey became a good mediator for Syria and Israel, but actually the relation between Turkey and Israel has become another problem to Turkey to open with the Syria. In 2010 the relation between Israel and Turkey deteriorated due to the freedom of the crisis of Floretilla,

but however Israel looks the relationship with the Turkey is an indispensable partner, because Turkey can be used as a strategic defend for Israel.

➤ Iran

The development after the US-led war against Iraq in 2003 has influenced The relationship between Iran and Turkey, but the real condition was that they were rival before that year. Turkey, through the justice and development party realized that Iran has an importance role for its country by taking benefit from the oil and gas that Iran has, and Turkey took a real step by signing some agreements to make their billateral relation better and closer. The other way that Turkey took to harmonize its relation with Iran was by supporting Iran's nuclear peaceful purpose project (Demir, 2017). Iran also played important role for Turkey's foreign policy to Syria, because for Iran Syria assured the access of Iran to Palestine cause border, that will give possitive impact for the Iran's regional project. Turkish meditations between Israel and Syria have been followed by Iran closely, and it created fear in Iran side if Turkey made several options excluded the Iran's region.

c. The determinants of International world

Since the world is the state's political frameworks, especially in penetrating regional system such as the Middle East Countries, some countries involved in influencing the restruction to the foreign policy of Turkey, those countries that influenced Turkish Foriegn Policy are:

i) The United States

Turkey and United States's relation has a tight connection, moreover after the world war I ended, it is caused by the Turkey's safety concerned for it's country, especially there is desire and obsession from Russia to get helped from Turkey. As a partner, Turkey has been able to show that it is a trustworthy counterpart for the united states, moreover Turkey gave a high support due to the terrorism action that happend in united state on 11th of September and as the repllies United States gave its support to Turkey to request joining the EU (Kardas, 2011).

From the whole countries in the world, United states includes as one of the most influence country for The Foreign Policy of Turkey. Since Turkey more opened to other Arab countries, especially to Syria, it has brought Turkey's role increased in the regions. At the first time, United States tried to be mediator to Syria and Israel, but it is rejected by the Syria, untill finally Turkey took the role and accepted by both countries, and this successfull has made United States relied the abilities of Turkey for deterring Syria form Syria's defense oncoming and as a penetration for the relationship between Tel Aviv dan Damascus. (Al-Anani, 2010)

## ii) Russia

Besides United States, Russia also played an important role to influence the Foreign Policy of Turkey on Syria. The correlation between Syria and Russia is because Russia and Syria has a great relation, especially for the Russia that has a naval in the Tartous port of Syrian, this port is really critical for the Russia to act more roles in the Middle East area. (Trenin, 2004). The other support that Syria gave to the Russia was when Russia did the military operation in 2008 in Georgia. In the government relation, Russia fully support to the president of Syria, and it

impacted Assad became immune in the security council. So, through the relation between Syria and Russia, it has made Russia opposes with Turkey in support processing to the Syrian oppositon.

### **B. The Issues of the Foreign policy of Turkey on Syria**

The tension between Turkey and Syria just ended when the both countries signed the Adana Agreement in 1998, and through this agreement making the both countries's relation start to improve. Election in 2002, through the victory of AKP has given a boost to this relationship, because the party's power start to solve the main issues that become troubles between Syria and Turkey, the major problems between these two countries are the Kurdish issues and the water problem issues. This party put the Turkish regional roles, Kurdish Issues, economic ties and the revolution of Syria as its priorities in the Foreign policy of Turkey on Syria.

#### **a. The Issue of Water**

Between the 1950s and 1990s, two more factors presented obstacles that stood in the way of perhaps more productive relation Syria and Turkey's, water and the existence of PKK, only 1% of the world's water can be used for human consumption in its current state (Akbaş, 2015, p.95). However, the demand for water increases daily in our industrialized and urbanized world. Water scarcity, especially in a region like the Middle East, can serve as a catalyst for war (Akbaş, 2015). Without water, no country can have a successful agricultural-production industry or participate in industrialization or urbanization (Turan & Kut, 1997). To this end, water can easily be and has been used as a pawn with regard to politics and elections within the Middle East. Further, since the Middle East is a very



volatile region due to abrupt political, diplomatic and military changes (Kabalan, 2013), the inability of the countries in the region to trust one another renders the sharing of water resources between countries difficult.

Since the early 1950s, Turkey, Syria and Iraq began building dams on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. However, shortly after, disagreements began to arise among the countries with regard to water usage. In 1953, Syria gained support from World Bank to finance its first dam project. However, for Syria to secure necessary funding, the other countries, which would be affected by the construction of this dam that would affect the flow of water in the river, had to agree to the project. The Turkish government claimed that the project would alter the direction of the Afrin River and refused to agree to the project (Maden, 2011c). The World Bank failed to convince Turkey and Syria to come to covenant concerning on project, and as a result, it denied Syria's request (Maden, 2011c). Because of this, Syria was forced to finance the construction of the dam via its national budget.

In the early 1960s, when Turkey determined to establish the Keban Dams in the Euphrates River, the three countries began negotiations again in order to determine the amount of water they would obtain during the dam's impounding period (Kibaroğlu, 2004). In June 1964, the three countries held a meeting where they created the Joint Technical Committee, the purpose of which was to determine the average annual flow of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers and the water needed for the proposed projects (Kibaroğlu & Scheumann, 2011). However, Iraq refused to consider any proposals from Syria that involved the Tigris River. In attempt to prevent prospective water shortages Iraq would only

consider water project proposals impacting the Euphrates River (Kibaroğlu & Scheumann, 2011). During the 1970s, even though the three countries met to discuss the matter a number of times, no compromise was achieved.

In 1974, Turkey began building the Keban dam at the same time that Syria finished building its Tabqa dam. This resulted in Iraq blaming Syria for its lack of water resources, and Syria, in turn, blamed Turkey (Kibaroğlu & Scheumann, 2011). Eventually, the problem was resolved when Saudi Arabia acted as mediator and convinced Syria to release water to Iraq to make up for the water that Iraq had lost (Kibaroğlu & Scheumann, 2011). In the mid-1980s, Turkey implemented a new development project called GAP (Great Anatolian Project), which involved nine cities around the Euphrates-Tigris river basin. This project was meant to establish 22 dams and 19 hydro-electric power plants (Daoudy, 2009). The project was focused on making advances with regard to the transportation, health care, agriculture and energy sectors (Oktav, 2003). During the 1980s, an observable economic gap began to appear between the western and eastern halves of Turkey, and Turkish policy-makers believed that this project could help them to minimize this gap and effect change regarding the social, economic and cultural structures of southeast Turkey.

The problem began when Turkey started to fill the reservoir of Atarturk dam. Ankara was committed allowing about 500 cubic meters per second of water from the Euphrates river keep watering the Atarturk dam. Tension raised when Turkey rejected water distribution fundamental and accepted the optimal water using fundamental, that absolutely refused by the Syria. But the problems start to solve when the host countries signed the Adana Agreement in 1998.

Water became the crucial factor for the Turkey and Syria relation, especially for the foreign policy that Turkey created for the Syria. Finally the problem faced the deal, when the both countries agreed to build the friendship dam that located between their borders, and this made the administrative boundaries of Alexandretta undirectly was confirmed by the Syria that located in the border with Turkey. Beside that it has given 50%-50% benefit for both side, and despite the develoment of their relationship

#### b. The Kurdish Issue

One of the other reasons as to why Turkey wanted to implement the GAP project in the southeast was the existence of the PKK (Kurdish Worker's Party), a Kurdish organization that was established with the aim of forming an independent Kurdish state within the borders of Turkey. To meet its goals, this organization was prepared to engage in an armed struggle if necessary. At the time, the Turkish authorities believed that some of the Kurds, who were angered over the conditions and unfair treatment they experienced in the region, were aligning with the PKK. Over the years, the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish government has resulted, so far, in the loss of 30,000 civilian lives and has cost more than \$100 billion (James & Özdamar, 2009). Turkey attempted to undermine the PKK via projects such as GAP, which would serve to develop the region economically (James & Özdamar, 2009), instead of fighting the organization. However, Turkey's neighbours were not happy with GAP, as it would decrease the amount of water that they received and hamper their agricultural development projects (Bağış, 1997). In addition, in Syria, where the economy is based on agricultural production, such a decrease in water would greatly hamper socio-economic

developments (Turan & Kut, 1997). Syria also objected to the project because the country was experiencing an increase in population, which called for an increase in water resources (Oktav, 2003). Also, due to a decline in oil income at the time, meant that Syria had to depend even more on its agricultural production (Oktav, 2003), which was directly tied to its dam construction and water usage.

On September 12, 1980, a military coup that began in Turkey resulted in the exile of most of the members of the PKK, and Syria was one of the countries that provided refuge to many of these exiled members. Syria not only gave military, financial and logistical support to the PKK, but it also allowed the PKK to have its own military training camps (Aykan, 1999) in Lebanon's Beqaa Valley. By doing this, Syria planned to use the PKK against Turkey in order to negotiate its rights over the Euphrates-Tigris basin.

Between December 22 and 25, 1980, Turkey and Iraq formed a Joint Technical Committee during the first meeting of the Joint Economic Commission; this purpose of this committee was to address the water issue (Maden, 2011b). In 1983, Syria joined the committee (Maden, 2011b). Sixteen meetings took place, but no agreements were signed (Kibaroğlu, 2004). When the Joint Technical Committee meetings failed in 1984 due to existing frictions related to water allocation, Turkey suggested the creation of the "Three Stage Plan" (Çarkoğlu & Eder, 2001). The aim of this plan was to determine the water needs of each party and distribute the water resources accordingly (Çarkoğlu & Eder, 2001). However, the downstream countries did not agree with some of the provisions of the agreement. For instance, while both Syria and Iraq contended that the Euphrates and Tigris rivers were international waterways and Syria stated that the allocation

of water should be based on each country's demands, Turkey claimed full sovereignty over the rivers since they originated and flowed within Turkish borders (Oktav, 2003). Since the parties could not reach a compromise, the Three Stage Plan was never implemented. On July 17, 1987, during the Turkish-Syrian Joint Economic Commission meeting, Turkey signed two Economic Cooperation Protocols with Syria.

In the first protocol, Syria agreed to stop supporting Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, as well as the organization itself (Kibaroglu, 2004). In the second protocol, Turkey agreed that, during the Atatürk Dam's impounding period, it would provide at least 500 m<sup>3</sup>/sec of water annually to Syria and would compensate Syria for any amounts it received that were less than this (Kibaroglu, 2004). Turkey hoped that by signing these protocols, it would encourage Syria to stop lending support to the PKK. Eventually, however, Syria violated the provisions of the agreements, as it continued to support the PKK, denying the existence of Öcalan in Syria (Olson, 1997) and claiming that the amount of water received was insufficient (Aykan, 1999). Turkey, on the other hand, limited the amount of water that flowed from the Euphrates to Syria due to these violations (Olson, 1997).

In January 1990, another water crisis broke out among the countries when Turkey decreased the flow of water from the Euphrates to its neighbors in order to fill the Atarturk Dam. Turkey had informed its riparian neighbors that it would be filling the dam, and the government promised that it would cover its neighbors water losses during this time, but the dam was filled a week ahead of schedule (Maden, 2011b). Still, Syria and Iraq accused Turkey of not releasing the agreed upon amount of water (Maden, 2011b). Even though Turkey claimed that it took

every necessary precaution to reduce any prospective damage to the riparian areas, Syria criticized Turkey and claimed that Turkey was behind its agricultural losses that resulted from insufficient water flow to Aleppo (Bağış, 1997). Further, though Turkey notified its downstream neighbors that there would be a onemonth interruption in the flow of water during the Atatürk Dam's impounding period, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad participated in the PKK ceremony in Beqaa Valley in order to force Turkey to negotiate with Syria regarding the usage of the river water (Oktav, 2003).

In 1991, when the Gulf War began, the possibility of the Kurds gaining an independent state within the borders of Iraq caused Turkey's security concerns to escalate. In particular, the existence of a power vacuum in Iraq, which caused an increase in the attacks perpetrated by the PKK on Turkey, was the primary source of Turkey's concerns. Syria had become vulnerable, however, because the Soviet Union (one of the country's prominent allies) had collapsed, leaving Syria without Soviet aid (Süer, 2013). In 1992, the countries' respective security concerns pushed both parties to sign a security agreement. With this agreement, the parties reached a compromise that would necessitate they join together to fight terrorism (James & Özdamar, 2009). In January 1993, Turkey and Syria signed another security agreement, the Joint Memorandum, in order to hamper any type of activity within their borders that would harm the other country (James & Özdamar, 2009). However, due to Syria's uninterrupted support of the PKK, both agreements were eventually invalidated.

During the mid-1990s, while Syria was in support of the PKK, it was also improving its relations with other countries, such as Greece, Armenia and Iran,

which was problematic for Turkey (Benli Altunışık & Tür, 2006). As a result, Turkey aligned with Israel against Syria (Benli Altunışık & Tür, 2006; Kabalan, 2013; Süer, 2013). In September 1995, Turkey signed a memorandum of understanding with Israel, which stipulated that Turkish pilots would be trained by the Israel Air Force and allowed the Israel pilot's to stage military's field practices in Turkish's air spaces (Kanat, 2012). On February 24, 1996, Turkey and Israel signed another agreement called the "Military Education and Cooperation Agreement" (Olson, 1997). Via this agreement, Turkey aimed to halt Syria's support of Öcalan and the PKK as well as benefit from Israeli technology and lobbying activities in order to counterbalance the Armenian and Greek lobbies in the U.S. (Benli Altunışık & Tür, 2006).

In late September 1998, the Iraqi central government signed the Washington Agreement, which paved the way for a Kurdish federal administration in Iraq, and this alarmed the Turkish government. As a response and in order to prevent the emergence of similar demands from its Kurdish people, the Turkish government began to implement harsher and more decisive policies against Syria to force it to cease supporting the PKK. On October 8, 1998, Turkish military chief of defense Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu sent a note to Syria, which stated, "There is a state of undeclared war between our countries. We are being patient, but there is a limit to our patience" (Kinzer, 1998). Soon after, Turkey placed 10,000 Turkish troops on the Turkey-Syrian border. Turkey's decisive stance toward a military intervention in Syria prompted Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak and Iran's Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi to serve as mediators between the parties (Sever, 2001). On October 20, 1998, the parties signed the Adana Agreement, which

called for Syria to recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization (Aykan, 1999), close its camps, deport the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, and commit itself to the prevention of any PKK propaganda and commercial activities within Syria. In addition to Turkey's willingness to go to war over this issue, several other factors influenced Syria's decision to withdraw support from the PKK.

According to Oktav (2003), a key reason had to do with the collapses of the Soviet's Union's and the loss of the financial support that came from the Soviets. An additional reason behind Syria's withdrawal of support to the PKK involved Turkey's increasing economic and military power, both of which resulted from Turkey's relationship with Israel (Süer, 2013). While Turkey was renewing its armament, Syria was unable to benefit from advanced arms technology because of the collapse of the Union Soviet (Süer, 2013). As such, Syria began to recognize its vulnerability and the weak position it was in when faced with a fight against Turkey (Süer, 2013). Hale (2000) adds a third reason. In order to get Israel to withdraw from Golan Heights, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad wanted to form more moderate relations with the U.S. due to its influence on Israel (Hale, 2000). Since Assad wanted to remove Syria's name from the list of states that support terrorism and help his son, Bashar al-Assad to develop favorable relationships with neighboring countries, he decided that it was in his best interest to cease support of the PKK (Hale, 2000).

After Syria signed the Adana Accords and deported Öcalan and his sympathizers, the relationship between Syria and Turkey began to improve. As a result, Turkey increased the flow of water from Turkey to Syria to 900 m<sup>3</sup>/sec (Aras, 2008). Then, in March 1999, the two parties decided to open their borders



for reciprocal visits that would allow families to visit one another during religious holidays (Çarkoğlu & Eder, 2001). In May 2000, the Turkish Minister of State Recep Önal, as well as more than 100 businessmen and state officials, visited Damascus for the 4th Joint Economic Council (Çarkoğlu & Eder, 2001). This meeting was the first council meeting to be held in twelve years (Çarkoğlu & Eder, 2001). The most important factor that served to improve the countries' relationship, however, occurred when Turkey President Ahmet Necdet Sezer Participated in hafiz al-Assad funeral on June 2000. This was followed by an official visit by the chief assistant to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Abdul Halim Khaddam. During this visit, Khaddam expressed his country's desire to build a strong relationship with Turkey (Milliyet, 2000). Other issues, such as preventing double taxation, encouraging reciprocal investments and abolishing custom duties, were also settled at this meeting (Milliyet, 2000). On August 23, 2001, the Turkey's GAP Council and the Syrian General Organization for Land Development (GOLD) signed a Joint Communiqué aimed at discovering the most effective techniques to benefit from the region's lands and water resources (Kibaroglu & Scheumann, 2011).

On September 9, 2001, the Turkish Minister of Internal Affairs Rüştu Kazım Yücelen and his board visited Damascus and signed a new agreement called the "Security and Collaboration Agreement." The purpose of this agreement was to ensure that Turkey and Syria would fight terrorism as a joint effort. In June 2002, Syrian Chief of General Staff Hasan Turkmani visited Turkey and signed the "Training, Technical and Scientific Cooperation in the Military Field" and "Military Training" agreements (Çakırözer, 2002). These agreements allowed Syrian

military officials to train in İstanbul and Ankara, and Turkish military officers to train in Damascus and Aleppo (Çakırözer, 2002). From the signing of the Adana Agreement in 1998 until the middle of 2002, Turkish-Syrian slowly began to improve. Relations between the two countries improved dramatically after Turkey's general election in November 2002, which resulted in the AKP coming to power. Consequently, this period saw not only a radical transformation in Turkey's traditional relationship with Syria, but it also saw a transformation in Turkey's overall foreign policy, which will be discussed in the next section.

When the United States occupied Iraq in 2004 there were some general interests to Kurdish's problem, especially when the Iraq Kurds successfully reached its autonomy, that indirectly became an incentive for the neighboring countries of Kurds. And this situation is dangerous for Turkey, because it could prevent Turkey's growth regionally. In 2003, Syria began to launch the military operation to counter PKK that base in the border of Turkey and Syria, and in 2008 Syria also gave support to the military operation of Turkey contrary to the militant party that located in north of Iran.

#### c. Syria and Israel negotiation mediator

Turkey started to mediate Syria and Israel negotiation since 2008. In 2006 Turkey began to ask the Syria and Israel to stop giving support to terrorism organization, especially in Syria's side such as Hamas and Hezbollah (Bar 2006). The implementation of the regional role like the mediation actually has been tried by Turkey before, one of the successful mediations that Turkey has done was the alienation of Iran from Al-Mashreq. For the next stage Turkey aimed to transform the world's vision of it, from the Israel and West's ally into Syria-Israel's mediator.

The things that Erdogan did for the issues in the middle east countries has reflected the Ottoman returns in the two major fighting lines namely Iran and Syria, and Saudi Arabia and Egypt in another (Abdel-Aziz, 2008). The both factors assisted Turkey playing his role as mediator are: firstly the trust conflict among Turkey's party, secondly, the economic relation between Syria and Turkey increased positively significant.

#### d. The Crisis of Syrian

The Situation of Turkey in the crisis of Syrian was linked to some of the decisive factors, which effected Turkey facing this crisis. These determinants are as follows: a). Syria's importance towards The policy of Turkey, Syria can be said as one of the most victorious example to the nil policy problem. b). There was a worrying of Turkey that the sectarian conflict happening in Syria would effect and threaten the stability of Turkey's national security. c.) the existence of regional competition in the midts of Syria and Turkey. Thus, to transform the Syria regime, Turkey started to adopt a more watchful attitude to Syria. Nevertheless, The regime of Syria were not reacted and even used the force. Turkey's best way to gave penetration to Syria and took control of the Kurdish's problem is by the Syrian National Council, because the other way that Turkey has tried to Intervene Syria was failed due to the supression from China and Russia by using their right of Veto.

Since the Syrian crisis outbreaking and the PKK rising, it became a factor of the unstable condition in Syria and through the PKK risen, Syrian regime served the party by facilitating to conduct the operation of military in Turkey. But, in the summer of 2012, the regime handed over the rule to the democratic Union Party

(PYD), and in the spring of 2013, Turkey agreed to achieve the peace with PKK, the reason was to the political calculation, because in the election Erdogan needed additional support from the Kurds to win the presidential election in 2014.

The both prominent jihadist groups that occupied big attention in the northern and northeastern part of Syria were the Islamic Iraq and Syria and also the front of Nasra. In the other side Turkey that supported Mujahedin tried to attract more power from them, because this group was the most effective group against Al-Assad. But, the clashed that erupted between Jihadist group and PYD troops dragged Turkey in hard situation.

In October 2014, Turkey dealed acrossing Peshmerga to Syria, The Kurdish's triumph at Kobani was a stroke to the pece proces of Turkey with the Kurds (Barkey, 2016). The talks that Turkish goverment did in 2015 with PKK was failed, and it caused the PKK rockets several assaults to Turkey.

Establishment of the bufferzone in the whole borders area between Turkey and Syria was the thing that Turkey wanted. The purpose of this desire was to stop the refugees influx from Syria to Turkey and the other hiden purpose is to weaken the regime and also bring down the Aleppo (Nour Al-Din, 2016).

#### i. The Formation of Syria's Buffer Zone

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ii. Establishment the Northern Part of Syria as a no-fly zone

The purpose of the establishment of the no-fly zone was to protect the opposition camps from bombing and the other hidden goal was to prevent the Syrian Kurds of controlling area.

### **C. Turkey's Foreign Policy implementation Tools on Syria**

Diplomatic, economic and cultural are some of the Turkey's soft power tools to tight its relationship with the Syria. The prime minister's office in 2010 arranged a public diplomacy office to define the Turkey's new policy to several countries and set up a communication channel to divers people (Kalin, 2011).

a. Political and Diplomatic Tool

Turkey began to be in to diplomatic and political in handling the crisis was since the AKP took the power. The critical tools for the performance of Turkish diplomatic is mention below:

- Assad and Erdogan had a good relationship, both of them have done several exchange visit, for seven years Davutoglu have visited Syria over sixty times, started on 2003 until 2010 (Shadid, 2011). But, for the President of Turkey at the time, Abdullah Gul became the first time in Turkey's history to visit Damascus, this historical story happened in 2008. Syria and Turkey achieved the institutionalization stage of relationship through forming a council strategic cooperation in 2009, in this year, exactly on October, has happened the first meeting that dealt about the cancelation of the entry feature of it citizen and besides that has been signed thirty Momerandum of

Understanding (MoU) and agreements. In the same month next year held the second of ministerial council (Mahfud, 2010).

- In 2008, Turkey succeed became the mediator for the negotiation between Syria and Israel, through five sensitive issues talked Hamaz, Hezbollah and Omlert dealed to abide, in written, based on six points document presented by Al-Assad through Turkey, the five sensitive points that mediated by Turkey were: the arrangement of Security, the issus of borders, Israeli withdrawel schedules of Golan, water files and the relation between Syria and Iran. Unfortunetly, this triumph did not stay fo so long, the aggression that Israel did in Gaza in 2008 has stopped the negotiations in the same time (Al-Quda, 2008).

The revolution of Syria started when Turkey used the politcal diplomatic as a tool to supress the Assad's Authority. Through this occasion Turkey tried to propose the initiative reform from the Syrians, but unfortunately Assad did not give any reaction of this case and caused the Turkish Embassy in Damascus closed insted in March 2011. The shuttingdown of the Turkish Embassy in Damascus did not become the last step to stop Turkey's political in Syria, Turkey kept maintaning its Consul in Aleppo and Turkey also continuing consultations with China and Russia to make an international coalitions to meet the Syrian's demands, another Turkey's way to help the Syrian was by working to include the Syrian files in the startegy of NATO during the security council mechanism reminds not to operate.

In October 2012, Foreign Minister Davutuglu and Prime minister Erdogan, held talks with the Arab League Secretary General, that focused on Syria condition. In January 2014 Turkey participated in Geneva confrence that resulted

a chemical agreement between The U.S. and Russia. The deal disrupted Turkey as it prevented any chances of a military strike against Al-Assad (Nour Al-Adin, 2014). The purpose of Turkey's participation in that conference are to reach a solution to the crisis and include the resignation of Al-Assad. In October 2013, Erdogas discribed that Assad is a terrorist, although he told that until February 2011 Assad was a good mate. The Al-Assad Regime, even before the revolution was authoritarian (Werz et al., 2013).

Turkey fully support the opposition of Syria, the problem that happened in Syria made Turkey tried its best to help the Syrian, from the steps that Turkey took to support the Syrian's opposition were: Turkey did Syrian confrence in Antalya on June 2011, The national salvetion confrence in July 2011, announcement about the Syrian National council in 2011, opening the headquarter in Cairo then moved it in to Istanbul that functions as Nasional coalition for revolutionary forces of the Syrian, Turkey also accept warmly the temporary Syrian government (Sobara, 2016), another support that Turkey gave was by supporting the jihadist Al-Nusra contrary the Kurdish forces in the northestern Syrian since late 2012, and to balance the organizational forces that support the regime of Syria.

#### b. Economic Tool

For AKP, economic is a political driving enforcement which is really important and crucial for every country, so does the Syria. Turkey just realized that Arab countries are substantial tradding ally in 2002, since that year Turkey started to build a functional approach with the Arab countries through the foreign policy, and finally it gave priority to the expansion of the relationship in economy and Syrian used this approach. (Mouwad, 2009).

Several agreements have been assigned by these two countries in 2004, such as the Prevention of Double Taxation Agreements, the investment of Protection and Promotion Agreements, and the Agreement of Free trade. All the agreements came into force in 2007, and in 2010, Ankara dealt with Syria, Jordan and Lebanon to establish a free trade zone. There are no visas among these countries, which can be considered the founders of the Middle East Union (Besheir, 2012). In 2010 Turkey allocated \$ 247 to support Syria's economy for the projects of infrastructure and in 2011 the Turkish companies invested about \$223 million in Syria. The Syrian tourist visiting Turkish increased significantly, from 154.000 tourist in 2003 and became five hundred thousands tourist in 2010, and it impacted the level of foreign trade increasing too. The trade balance supported Turkey shows in table 1.

**Table 1 The volume of Turkish Imports and Exports to and from Syria from 2001 until 2014**

Year	The Turkish exports to Syria	The Turkish imports from Syria
2001	281.141	463.476
2002	266.772	314.770
2003	410.755	261.193
2004	394.783	247.551
2005	551.627	142.585
2006	609.417	187.250
2007	797.766	259.282
2008	1.115.013	323.697
2009	1.421.637	221.454
2010	1.844.605	452.493
2011	1.609.861	336.646
2012	497.960	67.448
2013	1.024.473	84.909
2014	1.800.962	115.499

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

### c. The Military Tool



In April 2009, Turkey and Syria made cooperation by signing the agreement for the security issue and both sides for the first time launched their joint military exercise between the borders forces (Mouwad, 2012).

#### d. The Cultural Tool

Turkey used culture as an asset to improve its relations with Syria, proved by some cultural projects cooperation succeeded creating a good image of Turkey in the Syria, some culture programs that bring Turkey and Syria in to the top of their relation are: some school in Syria started to learn Turkish language, even it put in the Syria's curriculum, historical Turkey drama that played in Syria to share the positiveness of the Ottoman empire that before mostly think in different thought. Not only from the performances and projects, but also the Turkish media became the most crucial factor that dragged Syria's thought about the Turkey's positive image, moreover by supporting that Turkey gave when the Syrian citizen live under pressure due to the war that happened in their country, not only the assistance for humanitarian need but also the assistance to help Syria reached their revolution.


## **2.2 Turkey Helps the Syrian Refugees**

The Turks and the government, especially through the Prime Ministry's Disaster and Emergency Management (AFAD), responded generously to the refugees, offering them protection and friendliness. Since 2011, both countries had made an effort to cultivate ties between the two countries. In 2014, a free trade agreement was made, whilst visa restrictions were lifted. This relationship helped the Turkish economy prosper, and as a result, the interests of Turkish

government lay with a stable Syria. Also, Syria was marked as the access point from where Turkey could tap into the markets of the Gulf.

The Turkey Authority which is AFAD, declared the total numbers of the Syrian refugee in Turkey starting from December 2011 increased significantly, In December 2011 only eight thousands of the Syrian refugees living in Turkey, but from year by year the Syrian refugee number grew till reach 1.858.009 refugees in March 2015. Only 12,3% of them live in refugee camps. Remaining refugees are spread almost all around the country. Some cities are highly congested with Syrian people (e.g. 467.000 refugees in the city of Sanliurfa,330.000 in Istanbul, 253.000 in Gaziantep). (Oguzman Demir Emir, 2015, p 13-14) -> "Migration Policies, Social Concern, and the Syrian's Refugee in Turkey" article.

**Figure 3. Number Syrian's Refugee living in Turkey  
(December 2011 – March 2015)**



The majority of Syrians reside outside camps, and they have been in urgent need for even the most essential elements for survival. Upon that, the primary focus of the local response in the beginning was on providing emergency shelter and supplies to families in need. As it became clearer that the war in Syria will not

be short lived, local NGOs have recently started to shift their focus on initiating long-term projects that would contribute to the personal development of Syrians, most importantly providing education to children.

The number of school-aged Syrians surpasses 800,000 children. Temporary Education Centers (GEM) host the largest number of Syrian children, with over 300,000.<sup>20</sup> This clearly sheds light upon how important these centers, initiated by local NGOs, are in providing even a basic form of education for children. Local Turkish and Syrian NGOs have clearly proven themselves to be successful in establishing GEMs. Without them, efforts of the UN and other major donors are destined to fail, as those NGOs are the ones in charge of implementing such projects in the field.

Turkey is a milestone within the global humanitarian system. The world could have certainly expended more effort to address the Syrian refugee crisis. Turkey has surely taken the initiative, except that it cannot face the challenge all by itself.<sup>21</sup> An attempt ought to be made to put an end to the suffering of the most vulnerable. A global initiative under the name of “No Lost Generation” has already been launched to secure the future of Syrian children. The efforts of humanitarians and governments to strengthen the capacities and potential of young children is considered to be amongst the largest initiatives attempting to solve this situation. Yet more work needs to be done.

It is immoral to look upon the number of Syrian children as statistics – every child matters. Providing access to education ought to be the main target for

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<sup>20</sup> Turkish NGOs Facing the Refugee Crisis, <https://thenewturkey.org/turkish-ngos-facing-the-refugee-crisis/>

<sup>21</sup> ibid

international organizations, and that can only be achieved by enhancing and developing the capacity of local NGOs working in the field. Turkish NGOs are overwhelmed and much work has yet to be done. The fate of Syrian refugees rests on the shoulders of the international community.

### **2.3 Health and Shelter for the Refugees**

The two main challenges that have existed since the first Syrian refugee's arrival are health and shelter. And these two challenges have largely been fulfilled so far, and the Syrian refugee's condition in the refugee camps are attended well. Nevertheless, another challenge after setting up 22 camps within the first three years, government need more area to build a new camps, especially to build the health care centers, even the vaccination and some medical treatments for children already exist, but the other obstacles that reported by Turkish medical association was the lack of specialized medical service, the overworked of the personnel and the language barrier that made condition harder.

For the food in the camps, every camp got a fixed monthly funding through an electronic card that funded by government that cooperated with World Food Program, and the electronic card can be used not only for the food but also for any necessities items from the supermarkets that located inside the camps.

The problems for the refugees that living outside the camps were much more complex, because they do not get any facilities for facing the problems, added by the higher cost for rent living place in the border area made the refugee's lives tougher, not a small number of them should stay in the unused buildings or even in the replacement shelters because the inability to pay the living cost. The NGOs and the local government attempt to cope all the problems but the demands scale

beyond the resources availability. The barrier getting worse when some of the urban refugees have not been registered and compiled systematically.

Government did concern about Syrian refugees health, proved by the supporting giving to all refugees to be able to access in all hospitals and the payment was paid by the government. But health condition still be the biggest challenge that need to be solved, the result of

- a. There were some reports that report if the refugees were difficult to access the hospitals, due to the big number of refugees and also the lack of awareness of the health workers about the issues for covering health problem for all Syrian refugees that AFAD required.
- b. Secondly, the over population of the Syrian refugees in the border area made the service for the local people were not satisfactory, and it rose complaint among the local people about the services
- c. Thirdly, the refugees with the chronic diseases and the illness need to do follow-up or ongoing care face great difficulties shortcomings.
- d. Fourth, the problem to communicate because of the different language used, made the understanding between the patients and doctors hard to reach.

The problem started to solve when the International NGOs that have been professional to handle health cases for victims in the war came to help, collaborated with the local NGOs made the situation a bit under control, although there were many tasks to do, but the support from other level such as HYD and also ASSAM gave more power to solve the Syrian refugee's health problems in Turkey.

Some of the refugees currently living in the dessert, this situation made them became very vulnerable, especially by scorpions and snakes sting, due to this case, WHO delivered several anti-venom medication to them, the first delivery of the medicines was in 2012.<sup>22</sup>

There is also a contagious diseases challenge. Soon after WHO announced that there are polio cases recorded among Syrian childre, Turkish government conducted vaccination campaigns in camps and in provinces along the Syrian borders. However, AFAD notes that there are important percentages of children inside and outside of unvaccinated camps or measles and polio. As AFAD's note "realatively high percentage of unvaccinated Syrian refugee children against polio and measles make Turkey at risk because the virus can spread to Turkey".

The services given to the refugees were depending on every host country, here below shows the estimated of the total number of Syrian refugees in some host countries and the facilities that they got, such as living condition and health services from the government where they live. The sources is from UNHCR.

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<sup>22</sup> WHO continues its assistance to Syrian refugees July 2017 <http://www.emro.who.int/jor/jordan-news/syrian-refugees.html>

**Table 2. Refugees Arrival, Condition and Access Health Services**

Country of Asylum	Syrian Arrivals*	Living Conditions	Access to Health Services
<i>Iraq</i>	227,971	38% camp 62% non-camp [13]	Specific services offered to select registered refugee populations [14-16].
<i>Jordan</i>	655,833	82% urban or informal settlements [13]	Syrian refugees (registered with UNHCR) can access the public health system [17].
<i>Lebanon</i>	1,017,433	Urban areas (Beirut); Informal tent camps (Bekaa Valley); Sabra and Shatila camps (Beirut) [18]	UNHCR registration is required for Syrian refugees to access primary healthcare services [17]. Registration of new arrivals was halted in May 2015 per the request of the Lebanese government [12].
<i>Turkey</i>	2,764,500	Districts (known as a satellite cities); Camps along Turkish-Syrian border [19]	Registered Syrian refugees, living in satellite cities, are enrolled in the Turkish General Health Insurance Program and are able to access free health services. In camps, nongovernmental organizations provide clean water, sanitation, and other health services [19].
<i>Egypt</i>	115,204	Urban [20]	Syrian are granted access to the public health system, but are required to pay the same fees as Egyptians [17]. Services are overburdened and often inaccessible due to cost [20].

\*Number of UNHCR-registered refugee arrivals as of October 31, 2016

It can be concluded that the government has been succeeded to set up and manage the refugee camps, many countries give appreciation and recognition of these shelters's quality and service provided for the refugees. Even some article mentioned if these camps are the best camps for refugees in the world, included the New York Times Newspaper mention the same thing about the camps. The praised gave not without reason, but it caused by the complete facilities that the refugees received such as medical centers, school, the facilities for recreation, and also vocational training programs. But, however camps are just a temporary place that will not last and long, even the refugees got the complete facilities, but living in own house is much better. And the Syrian refugees are waiting for the time to come back to their country without knowing when it will happen.

## 2.4 Education

The second policy challenge for Turkey of Syrian refugees influx is the refugee children's education. Although there is no specific statistical number, but approximately a half of the total number of Syrian refugees are children and

UNICEF estimated 74% of the children that lived outside the camp did not have a chance to schools.<sup>23</sup> due to this problem, the Turkish government cooperated with the major donor countries and also the civil society to meet this challenge. Turkey and other organization put their high concern to this case, because children are the future leader, if the children do not get access to study, it will be a major problem for the country, because education can reflect the capability of an individual to face the problem in the future, if the children are not well educated, it is not impossible if the children will do crime, threat the peace and bother the social stability in their environment it can be later even soon.

The language barrier that the Syrian refugee faced, especially for the children who aim to take education has been started to solve, The Syrian commission education have provided curriculum in Arabic language. The other schools inside and outside the camps also have given similar curriculum, some schools are built on the land that granted from some donors or municipalities. Gaziantep is one of the example of School for Syrian, in this school having education started from class one until class twelve, and the other building is projected to build soon due to the high number of waiting lists, another example that concerned to Syrian refugee children's education is Kayseri, this city has served 690 Syrian refugee children. In whole Turkey at least there are one hundred schools exist to help the Syrian refugees children for the education barrier. The other convenience, for the Syrian refugees that have resident permit may to send their children to Turkey regular schools.

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<sup>23</sup> Syria Regional Response Plan 2014 Turkey, p. 26, <http://www.unhcr.org/syriarrp6/>.



Although Syria and Turkey is neighbor country, but they have significant differences for the culture, community and histories, and these differences influenced the curriculum and the regulation at the schools. The examples of these differences are: in Syria, the older girls and boys study in saparete schools, but not in Turkey. The Syrian refugees children who recieved the curriculum based on their origin country need to be adabtable and funtonate within the Turkish environment. Education outside the camps must be more concreded, becuae the false explanation and wrong acceptance will be really serious problems, especially for the security of Turkey, the condition of Syrians refugees children psychologically is not 100% stable, so the miss understanding might be a serious cases.

In the terms of Syrian curriculum and Arabic teaching media were to be chosen, the government will certainly face additional challanges arising from the old Kurdish demands in Turkey to get education in the Kurds. Turkey has come a long way from the days when Kurdish identity in Turkey was rejected and Kurdish was referred to as "Mountain Turks". The Efforts to meet the European Union's (EU) criteria for initiating the accession process of membership see the adoption of cultural reforms that are important to minorities in Turkey. This allowed radio and TV to be broadcast and Kurdish publications appeared, something unimagivable even twenty years ago.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, in the souteastern part of Turkey where the majority of Kurds live, Kurds are increasingly being used locally for the provision of public service. The government also paved the way for Kurdish language teaching in private schools. However, the broader education in Kurds, the

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<sup>24</sup> Kemal Kirişci, "The Kurdish Issue in Turkey: The Limits of European Reform" South European Society and Politics, Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 2011).

application of Kurdish curriculum and the teaching of Kurdish in public schools, remains a highly controversial and contentious issue. Therefore, it enables a parallel education system in Turkey that will teach Syrian refugee children in Arabic, making it easier to level double standard allegations in government. So far the Turkish Ministry of Education has not officially provided Syrian education in Arabic, although they secretly permit Syrian widespread education outside the Arabic camps.

Beyond these complex political questions, there are also political problems that require attention. One such problem relates to the educational certification the Syrian children receive. Following the Syrian curriculum is not a realistic option because students must go to Syria to take the national exam in order to receive a recognized certification. The Syrian curriculum is not recognized in Turkey. To offer Syrian accredited degree after passing the 9th grade exams and baccalaureate exams at the end of the 12th grade, the Syrian Education Commission and Turkish Ministry of Education determined that Syrian students from grades 9th until 12th must follow the Libyan curriculum. There are practical problems resulting from access to textbooks and incompatibility between the regular Syrian curriculum and Libyan ones especially in relation to graduation exams. Nevertheless, about 5,000 students successfully complete this exam and their equality in which is given by the Turkish Ministry of Education.

Another problem is infrastructure issues. Existing place and building for Syrian school is not that easy, because building a new school will take more time and spend much money, added by the lack of professional teachers that will teach the children become another barrier. Turkey government and some other donors

like international organization sought funding to build and run more schools for the Syrian refugee children. In progression at least there have been fifty prefabricated schools run in 2014 through the cooperation between AFAD, Ministry of Education and UNICEF.

## **2.5 Status of Refugees**

LFIP defines the meaning of refugee is : A person who as a result of events occurring in European Countries and because of reasonable fear to be persecuted for reason of race, religion, nationality, membership of particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and can not or, because of such fear, refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country; or who, having no nationality and residing outside his previous residence as a result of the incident, can not or, because of the fear, refuses to return there, will be granted refugee status upon completion of the refugee status of the determination process.

Although Turkey is a signatory to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, Turkey's asylum policy is characterized by "geographical boundaries" that implement the convention. Turkey initially accepted the Convention with "time", and "geographical" limit implying that the Turkish state grants refugee status and asylum rights only to "those who become refugees as a result of events occurring in Europe." Outside Europe is assessed in collaboration with UNHCR such asylum seekers are given temporary protection until the decision is reached. The asylum seekers who are accepted as refugees are then resettled in a third country with support of UNHCR.

In line with Syrian " geographical restrictions" who have fled to Turkey are recognized as "guests" and not as "refugees", and camps where Syria residence

officially “guest-camps”, not “refugee camps”. However, Syria in Turkey is not treated like an asylum seeker coming from other non-European countries. They can not register with UNHCR to apply for asylum in a third country. Some Syrians who arrived Turkey in May 2011 have stated that UNHCR carried out initial interviews with them in order to start processing their files. However, later, due to a change of the policy by the Turkish state, UNHCR stopped registering Syrians. One of the interpretations of the change of policy by the Turkish government is that technically it is very difficult to process asylum applications for such a huge number of asylum seekers. Another commonly made comment by experts and journalists is that through such a policy, The Turkish government aims to prevent the interference of UNHCR or other international agencies in Turkey's control over the situation of Syrian migrants.


Nevertheless, the Turkish state has implemented a “temporary protection regime” for Syrian. The principles of temporary protection are: an open border policy, No non-refoulement registration with Turkish authorities and support within the borders camps.

Officially, Syrian in Turkey are recognized not as refugees but as “guests.” Not being given refugee status is an important factor that increase the vulnerability of Syrian who have left their country for political and humanitarian reasons. Many Syrian stated that their main complaint about the Turkish government because they are not given refugee status and “guest” status implies uncertainty about their presence in Turkey. The fear about the urgency of their status is not unfounded. (Senay Odzen, 2013, p3) -> article “MPR-RR-2013-05”.

According to UNHCR, the number of registered Syrians in Turkey since 2012 till 2016 and the top ten provinces with the highest number of Syrians in Turkey are as follows:



**Figure 4. The Total Number of Registered Syrians that Living in Turkey (2012-2016). CRISIS GROUP/UNHCR**



**Table 3. Ten Provinces with highest number of registered Syrians**

(as of 10 November 2016)\*

Province	Total Population (excluding Syrians)	Number of registered Syrians	% of Syrians**
1. Istanbul	14,657,434	413,406	2.7
2. Şanlıurfa	1,892,320	398,551	17.4
3. Hatay	1,533,507	377,731	19.8
4. Gaziantep	1,931,836	318,802	14.2
5. Adana	2,183,167	149,049	6.4
6. Mersin	1,745,221	135,921	7.2
7. Kilis	130,655	122,734	48.4
8. Bursa	2,842,547	100,665	3.4
9. Izmir	4,168,415	95,610	2.2
10. Mardin	796,591	93,071	10.5

\* Figures of the Turkish Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM).

\*\* Figures rounded.

The deterioration of the domestic situation continues to put great pressure on Turkey's ability to manage the refugee situation within its borders as well as its capacity to ensure the continue flow of humanitarian aid to Syria. More over with

the number of refugees in Turkey that reach almost three million people have created numerous problems especially in economic and security.

## 2.6 Turkey's Refugee Law and Policy

In the last decades, Turkey can be said as one of the country that sending migrant the most to abroad and also include as a source of asylum seekers country.<sup>25</sup> But all changing in last few years, Turkey born as new country that changed the pattern of migration by respecting ilegal migrant workers, regular migrant, tarnsit migrant and asylum seekers and refugees.<sup>26</sup> And finally Turkey tarnsformed form the emigration country into immigration counrty due to the intensity of the migration movement in this country.<sup>27</sup>

From 22 camps in Turkey that become a place to stay of 217.000 Syrian refugges. According to UNHCR data in 2014, there are about 11% of all refugees in the world lives in Turkey, and from the 11% refugees , 45% of them are Syrian refugees who are trying to get protection form the conflict that happening in their contry.<sup>28</sup>

Nevertheless, In june 2015 report published by Migration Intergation Policy Index (MIPEX), which spans the year 2014, has mantioned if “Turkey’s legal framework blocks the integration of migrants.” The state “fails to integrate migrants

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<sup>25</sup> Ahmet İçduygu, Turkey's Evolving Migration Policies: A Mediterranean Transit Stop at the Doors of the EU 1 (IAI Working Papers 15/31, Sept. 21, 2017), <http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiw1531.pdf>.

<sup>26</sup> Ahmet İçduygu & Damla B. Aksel, *Turkish Migration Policies: A Critical Historical Retrospective*, 18:3 Perceptions 179 (Autumn 2013), <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Ahmet-%C4%B0%C3%A7duygu-and-Damla-B.-Aksel.pdf>.

<sup>27</sup> İçduygu, *supra* note 1, at 3.

<sup>28</sup> Press Release, UNHCR, UNHCR: Total Number of Syrian Refugees Exceeds Four Million for First Time (July 9, 2015), <http://www.unhcr.org/559d67d46.html>.

amid rising refugee flows from Syria.<sup>29</sup> “The report criticized the fact that there were “limited rights and little-to-no-state support” for immigrant workers and their families, and stated that “Turkey also has the weakest protections against discrimination because of its dedicated anti-discrimination laws and agencies are still lacking and waiting approval of Parliament”.<sup>30</sup>

## **A. Some of the Primary Laws and Policies Applicable to Refugees**

### **a) Law on Settlement**

from 1934 until 2006, Turkish Law on Settlement, Law number 2510, govern the official foreigners’ settlement in Turkey, limit the asylum’ rights and the right of immigration just to people of “Turkish culture and descent”. After the latest regulation on Settlement starting to adopt in 2006, the stress on the surface was maintained, so that it can be understood if in Turkey, a formal facilitate for settlement channel, that also lead to citizenship in a short time, it is still reserved to a person or a group.

### **b) Law on Foreigners and International Protection**

Started in 1995, Turkey just joined for the new regulation of the United Nation convention about refugees . Turkey had a law about the immigration that actually part of 1934 Legal settlement. Finally in 1999, when Turkey tried to join with the EU there was a special regulation about Asylum and migrants that Turkey should have, and this chance became a turning back point for Turkey to re-set and complete its regulation that adjust about Asylum and Immigration. Now, Turkey

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<sup>29</sup> *Turkey Ranks Bottom in Migrant Integration Report with Flow of Refugees*, Hürriyet Daily News (June 23, 2015), <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-ranks-bottom-in-migrant-integration-report-with-flow-of-refugees.aspx?pageID=238&nlD=84424&NewsCatID=339>.

<sup>30</sup> Huddleston et al., *supra* note 8, at 210.



has 2005 National action plan about the Asylum and migration cases.<sup>31</sup> In April 2013 Turkey renew its immigration regulation and effectively used in 2014. The objective of Law on Foreigners and Intenational Protection is the regulation about the principles and procedures that related with the foreigner's entry, living or not in Turkey, that the scope and implementation of the safeguards to be provided to foreigners seeking protection from Turkey, duties, mandates and responsibilities of the DGMM under the Ministry of Home Affairs.

### **c) Temporary Protection Regulation**

The temporary protection is only gien to the people who need protection or the ones who should leave their contry and unable to come back due to the security protection issues. And the request of the temporary protection can not be diciced by personal judgment.<sup>32</sup>

### **d) Law and Work Permits for Foreigners**

The Foreign Employment Permit Act provised by the Ministry of labor and Social Security will make a final decision in the application of a foreigner to get permission to work in Turkey for thirty days. If the work permit is rejected, the applicant may do an appeal within 30 days to an court of administrative. The thirty days is used to access the labor market, asylum seekers and prospective employers must jointly file letters for work permit.<sup>33</sup> However, restrictions may apply to certain periods. "where labor market situations and working development

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<sup>31</sup> Öner & Genç, *supra* note 12, at 27.

<sup>32</sup> Geçici Koruma Yönetmeliği [Temporary Protection Regulation], Oct. 22, 2014, <http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/files/20141022-15-1.pdf>, archived at <https://perma.cc/H8PQ-QUQL>, English translation available at <http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/files/temptemp.pdf>

<sup>33</sup> Durukan et al., *supra* note 11, at 84

life as well as economic condition and sectoral required,” or to specific sectors or geographic or administrative areas. The ministry of Labor and Social Security decides whether or not to approve the application of work permits under the “evaluation criteria”.

Another subject that regulates about work permit for foreigners is the agreement of the Turkey and European Union joint action plan 2015. 29th of November 2015 Turkey and EU signed an covenant whereby the European Union will transfer to Turkey € 3 billion (about US\$ 3,25 billion) to handle the country’s refugee cases, that the 2,2 million Syrian refugees and 300.000 Iraqis will be prevented to entry to the EU countries. By joining the action plan, “Turkey should be responsible for marine patrols and enforce border restrictions to manage refugee flows to EU countries, combat human trafficking and counterfeit forgery, and send them back to their home countries if they do not fulfill the refugee requirements.”<sup>34</sup>

On 10th of February 2016, the European Commission Published a report Turkey’s progress in implementing the agreement. Among the conclusions and recommendations is that Turkey need to “make significant progress in preventing the departure of irregular migrants and refugees from their territories”; take urgent action to align their visa policy with EU, “prioritizing the countries that are the source of the irregular migrations to the EU”, aligning its draft law on the protection of personal data with European Standards and rapidly adopting it to enable closer operational cooperations between Turkey and Europol, Eurojust and law enforcement agencies of the EU member states; enhance bilateral cooperation with Greece in border control, anti-migrant-smuggling efforts, and implementation

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<sup>34</sup> *Repercussions of Euro-Turkey Refugee Deal*, The Regional Center for Strategic Studies, Cairo (Dec. 10, 2015), <http://www.rcssmideast.org/en/Article/551/Repercussions-of-Euro-Turkey-Refugee-Deal#.VqgNPChyHdk>

of bilateral re-admission obligations; and strengthening measures against people smuggling in coastal areas. For its part, the European Union, under an agreement on the refugee facility in Turkey, should begin as soon as possible to provide assistance and meet the needs of refugees under the agreement. In addition, the Commission and Turkey should be ready to re-prioritize existing aid programs to Turkey “to respond quickly to emerging needs” in the field organization.



## CHAPTER III

### THE IMPACTS OF THE REFUGEES ON THE TURKISH ECONOMY

#### 3.1 Turkey's Economic Condition

Since the beginning of March 2011, the Syrian civil war has had a major impact on Turkey's economy. As a northern neighbor of Syria, Turkey has received a large influx of refugees, participating in war zones, constantly changing its relationship with foreign powers. Turkey firstly involved in the Syrian refugee crisis in 2011 and after this date the flows of refugees intensified into Turkey (European University institute, 2011, Timeline). Due to its geographical conditions and accessibility, Turkey attracts more and more Syrian. The Turkish government decided to do an open door policy and set up places for refugees's living , the impacts of these influx could be seen most obviously by analyzing the growth of Turkey's economic.

During 2000 until 2012, Turkey's economic flourished greatly. In less than a decade, the country's per capita income is nearly threefold and in 2012 it stood at about \$ 10.500, making Turkey as an-upper-middle-income country. Incidence of poverty decreased by more than a half of the time period (World Bank, 2017, Turkey Overview). from 2002 until 2012, the extreme poverty dropped 9,5 % to 4,5% and the moderate poverty dropped for 23% to 21%, And the health access, urban services and also education greatly showed the positive trend improvement for the less well-off (World Bank, 2017, Turkey Overview). After the financial crises over in 2008, Counted 6,3 million occupation has been created by the Turkey. The biggest increasing is in the labor force, including the increasing the women's

participation, has made unemployment around 10% (World Bank 2017 Overview of Turkey).

### 3.2 Economy Impacts of Refugee's influx

The Syrian Crisis has affected many aspects of life in Turkey. Economically, the Turkish government acknowledged, in various reports, that they have spent more than \$7.6 billion<sup>35</sup> for the relief of Syrians and most of this aid went to help refugees. \$418 million of this amount were contributions from the international community.<sup>36</sup> The Turkish government's commitment to provide assistance and services to over two million refugees must be a source of pride for the Turkish government. This massive expenditure provides strong evidence of Turkey's committed response to the emerging crisis in Syria. It also raises questions about the viability of this aid in the long-term and points to the need for the international community to share the burden with the Turkish government.

The economic impact of the presence of Syrian refugees in Turkey has surpassed the government's own expectations. For example, prices in the country rose significantly for rented houses.<sup>37</sup> The increase was seen more drastically in the border towns than in the other in-land cities.<sup>38</sup> This increase in the border towns is due to the fact that only ten percent of the refugees live in government-

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<sup>35</sup> For the purposes of this paper all monetary increments will be stated in terms of US dollars

<sup>36</sup> *Turkey spends \$7.6 billion on 2.2 million Syrian refugees in the country, Deputy PM says*, DAILY SABAH TURKEY, Sept. 18, 2015, <http://www.dailysabah.com/nation/2015/09/18/turkey-spends-76-billion-on-22-millionsyrian-refugees-in-the-country-deputy-pm-says>

<sup>37</sup> *Syrian refugee inflow doubles house prices in Turkish border cities*, DAILY NEWS, Mar. 5, 2014, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/syrian-refugee-inflow-doubles-house-prices-in-turkish-bordercities.aspx?pageID=238&nID=63204&NewsCatID=345>

<sup>38</sup> Oytun Orhan, *Effects of the Syrian Refugees on Turkey*, ORSAM (Jan. 2015), [http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/enUploads/Article/Files/201518\\_rapor195ing.pdf](http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/enUploads/Article/Files/201518_rapor195ing.pdf).

run camps with the vast majority living in the border towns near Syria.<sup>39</sup> Many citizens of Turkey also believe that Syrian refugees have taken their jobs since the hiring of illegal workers is increasing and since Syrian refugees accept work for insignificant wages and in areas that Turks do not usually work. In cities like Mardin, the unemployment rate increased from 12,3% in 2011 to 20,6 % in 2013. Not being able to obtain a work permit from the Turkish government forces refugees to find a way to reach Europe. Murat Erdogan, director of the Migration and Politics Research Center at Ankara-based Hacettepe University said:

“the giving of work permits to the refugees will not change any situation, because the refugees with high skilled will manage to get a good job and make a living, but most of the Syrian refugees will keep doing the same thing by working illegally for unacceptable wages like they do today, and in the end they will always try to go to European Country.”<sup>40</sup>

More than two million Syrian refugees in Turkey, approximately only 6000 Syrians got to work legally in the formal labor marketplace. This low number is due to the the Turkish nationals' concerns of being replaced in the workforce.<sup>41</sup>

Another direct impact on the Turkish economy is the loss of a trading line between the two countries. In the past Turkey had a strong economy because of

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<sup>39</sup> Elizabeth Ferris & Kemal Kirişçi, What Turkey's open-door policy means for Syrian refugees, BROOKLINGS BLOG (July 8, 2015, 12:45PM), <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/07/08-turkey-syrianrefugees-kirisci-ferris>

<sup>40</sup> Birce Bora, *Turkey's refugee crisis: Time for Europe to take action*, ALJAZEERA (Feb. 11, 2016), <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/turkey-refugee-crisis-time-europe-action-160210115931274.html>.

<sup>41</sup> Michael Pizzi, *Turkey to let Syrians work in bid to stem refugee flow into EU*, ALJAZEERA AMERICA, Jan. 11, 2016, 4:00 PM, <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2016/1/11/turkey-to-let-syrians-work-in-bid-to-stem-refugeeflow-into-eu.html>

the successful trade between Turkish businessmen and Syrians.<sup>42</sup> Tourism in Turkey has also been adversely affected. After removing the visa problem between Turkey and Syria in 2009, Syrian tourist greatly contributed to the amount of tourism in Turkey. Some Syrians used to visit Turkey for daily shopping. Or they could take a relaxing trip where they could enjoy weekends and holidays. Due to the current crisis the income from Syrian tourists has dropped to zero.<sup>43</sup> On the other hand, the Turkish economy has been growing consistently despite the massive immigration of Syrian refugees.<sup>44</sup> This is due in part to the increased demand for goods due to the refugees themselves. If refugees were afforded more opportunities to work, then they would be of further benefit to the host countries like Turkey since they would increase their net fiscal contribution to government revenue.<sup>45</sup>

The improvement that has taken place from 2012 has staggered on the Turkish economic development that has previously occurred. Since 2012, the growth of economic came to slow down, for the per capita income and living standards have fallen, more competition are created in the labor market, and business and individual confidence has declined. The influx of the Syrian refugees creates new social, economic and political demands in the towns and municipalities where most refugees live. The terrorist attacks that happened in Turkey in 2015 and 2016 has influenced the economic stability of Turkey.

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<sup>42</sup> Mert Baran Turan, *The Impact of Syria's Conflict on the Turkish Economy*, THE MARKET MOGUL BLOG, <http://themarketmogul.com/impact-syrias-conflict-turkish-economy/>.

<sup>43</sup> *Id.*

<sup>44</sup> Massimiliano Cali & Samia Sekkarie, Much ado about Nothing? *The Economic Impact of Refugee 'Invasions'*, BROOKINGS BLOG (SEPT. 16, 2015, 9:30 AM), <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/futuredevelopment/posts/2015/09/16-economic-impact-refugees-cali>.

<sup>45</sup> *Id.*

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is one of the biggest indicators that can be used to measure how big the impact of Syrian refugee influx to Turkey especially for the economic sector. Global Domestic Bruto in Turkey grew with an annual average 5% in 2011, but after the Syrian influx in 2011, the GDP slowed down in the next three following years, 2012 until 2014. In 2012 the GDP grew only 3% as an annual average, and increased to 4,2% in 2013 but slowed down again in 2014, that only grew an annual average of 2,9% (Candemir, 2016). But, the unpredictable thing happened for Turkey's economic condition in 2015, the Turkey's economic grew for 4% which outperformed estimates, and because of this condition Turkey was included as the world's best performing markets despite the political's condition was unstable and the security issues were threats (Candemir, 2016). Although the GDP grew very slowly even the worst in the 3 years, but in 2015 the GDP rose to 1,95 trillion Turkish Liras, and recorded as the highest achievement since 2013, in percentage the GDP grew for 5,7% in the last quarter of 2015, and this achievement beyond the prediction that would be only 3,9%. (Candemir, 2016). An Economist in Turkey, Sertan Kargin said based on the long-term growth in Turkey's GDP on an increase in domestic demand caused by 6,7% accretion in government spending, and a 4,5% increase in private consumption because of the population increase, by 2015. Whilst the economic improvement has been stagnant stated in the end of 2012, Turkey's population has grown fastly.

In 2011, the increasing number of Turkey's population was 3,5 million people from 2014 to 2015, which with 74,2 million in 2014 and reached 77,7 million in 2015, due to the Syrian refugees influx to Turkey. The economists,



Morgan Stanley and Ercan Ergusel write a report about the latest of economic condition in Turkey, and they believed that the Syrian refugees influx to Turkey has taken a big portion of the economic problem in its country (2017), instead of customer loans or wage and salary increased, they are sure that at least several portions of this strong domestic consumption are able to be explained by the large influx of refugees. The total of Syrian refugees influx to Turkey reached a fantastic number, especially in the last two years that nearly reached three million refugees that fulfil their basic needs from Turkey. The increasing of the basic need impacted to the agricultural sector, in 2015 the agricultural sector grew in level 7,6% Y (4Q tariling) which is the highest number ever since 2005. (as quoted in karakaya, 2016). As the biggest electricity company in Tukey, CLK Bogazici Elektri added a new personil that is able to speak Arabic to the customers to increase their service, because there are a lot callers are speaking in Arabic since 2015 due to one milliion Syrian refugees influx to turkey, which is the highest number since the civil war erupted in 2011 in Syria. It is always a positive and negative of an event, so does the Syrian influx, with the influx of Syrian refugees to Turkey, it has given a boost to Tukey's economic through the bussiness. Recorded there are 2.827 Syrian companies In Turkey on June 2015, confirmed by the report entitled prespectives, expectations, and suggestions from the Turkish bussiness sector in Syria arranged by academicians. More than 60% of companies are registered with the chambers of commerce and industry in Istanbul, the report states (as quoted in Karakaya, 2016).

Based on the the Economic Policy Research Foundation reported that an Ankara-based think-tank, there are 1.600 companies were established in 2015,

and 590 others in the first three months of in the next following year (Financial Times, 2017). The head of Think-tank, Guvan Tack said there are enough proofs that the Syrian refugees have given possitive impact to Turkey Economy. With the total number of Syrian refugees that have reached about 4% of the total number of the Turkey's population itself. With this big numbers, a standard and poor's state reported that the refugees have played and important role to boost the Turkey economic because corporate and consumer loans that has been slowed down in the last few years. The report's author, Frank Gill, stated that the recent influx of refugees enhances Turkey's appeal to foreign inverstors because has a potray that Turkey is as a country with a young population that is still active economically.

Syrian refugees hope the conflict in their contry will end up soon, then go back to Syria, another one Syria refugees hope to find the way to start their new lives in Turkey. Through the report of Banking regulation and Supervision Agency, In the Turkish bank, the Syrian refugees's deposite has been more that 408 million dollars in the first quarter 2016, which increased sharply that compared with 2012 that was only 106 million dollars, according to the Haberturk daily (Orient, 2017). The significant increasing of the Syrian deposit because the uncertainty of the Syrian refugees status in the future. The reason of the refugees to do deposit in dollars and also in gold because to decrease the unexpected economic condition and the changing in their circumtances. According to Oytun Orhan, an analyst at the center for Middle Eastern strategic studies, Syrian bussiness owners and inverstors offset Turkey's declining export by using their extensive knowledge of the Midlle East and by distributing products (Orient, 2017). However, the large Syrian refugee's counter income is begger than the pro, and the government

should try to solve this problem to continue the long-term positive trend in GDP growth. Most of the Syrian refugees in Turkey are not able to speak Turkish language, and it has become another obstacle to Syrian refugees to find a job due to the language barrier. The total of unemployment in Turkey has reached 11% and the local workers complain due to the Syrian refugees they are fired, because the Syrian refugees are paid less than the local people. Thus, the positive trend of GDP in 2015, it does not straightly mean the increasing of living standards in Turkey. Looked from the per capita income, 2015 was worse than 2014, in 2015 per capita income was \$9.261 which less than 2014 with \$10.395 due to the decreasing of Lira (Candemir, 2016). This is despite the government's proposed expansionary policy to ease the Turkish economy. Despite the unexpected expansion in GDP by 1035 2016 dose not continue this positive trend.

The coup attempt that happened in Turkey in 2016 has given negative impact to the stability of Turkey's economy, some of The consequences of July coup attempt are a number of terrorist attacks, a wear currencies and political uncertainty are weighing on the Turkey's economy in the third quarter of 2016 (Focus Economic, 2017). Reducing the market, for the first time in the seven years the Turkey's GDP is contracted (Focus Economic, 2017). The Private consumption drops every year, and net external sector ecounter deterioration. In fact the impressive expansion of two digit in government consumption is still not sufficient to avoid the economic's contraction (Focus Economy, 2017). The depretiation of Lira hited the lowest on January 9, 2017. Nevertheless, the government kept trying to lift the economy condition, but unfortunately the private investment still depressed in a deteriorating bussiness climate. The main factors affecting Turkey

economic growth are the weakening business and household confidence in Turkey due to regional geopolitical tensions and the unstable condition of domestic political climate. The Turkish Prime Ministry informed the action plan for transparency and anticorruption to be implemented during the period 2016 to 2019.


The implementation of the 2016 action plan would increase the trust between the both nationally and internationally. Refer to an article that written by Maroglu Arseven, the action plan of transparency and anticorruption that issued by the Turkish Ministry prime is to evolve a fair, transparent, responsible and the credible management mentality, thus to prevent the corruption approach by raising the anti corruption awareness in the social environment. (Arseven, Ersin and Centikaya, 2017). Arseven added by giving additional statement, that the action plans were made to consider the preventive measure, legislative amendment and also as the ways to give punishment or sanction and to increase the the awareness on the social environment to more concern to the related cases (Arseven, Ersin, and Cantikaya, 2017). Refer to the figure 5, the chart shows although consumer confidence remains low, driven by election uncertainty, real GDP growth is mainly due to private consumption, the data collected from The Turkish Statistical Institute. The economist mentioned that The currency depreciation has impacted the real wage growth, the falling of oli prices and wealth. (Aeseven, Ersiin adn Cetinkaya, 2017).

Nevertheless, the decline in business and household confidence immediately affect the private consumption and it is an important factor to consider

the Turkey's future economic growth. There is no guarantee that these factors will offset a further decline in individual and bussiness confidance.



**Figure 5. Consumer Confidence and Domestic Demand**



Source: OECD Economic Outlook 99 database; and Turkish Statistical Institute.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933368148>

The increasing of the nation's productivity is the main cause that made the future Long Run Aggregate Supply curve or Production Possibilities Frontier. Nevertheless, government regulations in Turkey, and also the gaps in the business sector aroused from the anticipated three million refugees's arrival that come to Turkey, have a negative impact on productivity. An efficient company can not grow at its full potential because of insufficient regulation. At the same time, low productivity entities, employing significant parts of low-skilled ones, survive due to incomplete rules and regulations (OECD, 2017). The growth of this low productivity entity has a negative impact on the economic growth as well as the standard of living for both Syrian refugees and Turks.

## A. The labor of Market

By the Syrian refugees influx, that unemployment rate in Turkey already changed fastly for years. The unemployment rate in Turkey went up from 10,30% to 11.3% in September 2016. Non-Agricultural unemployment also rose 1,3%, and the unemployment rate among 15 to 24 years old rose 1,4%. See the table below to see the increasing of the unemployment rate since 2011

**Table 4. The Unemployment Rate of Turkey year 2011-2015**

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Unemployment Rate	9.2	8.4	9.1	10.0	10.3

Source : Journal of Turkish Social Sciences Reaserch

Before january 2016, The Syrian refugee were not allowed to work legally by the government fo turkey, because the refugees are more to be a guest and temporary. Even there are moe than 22 camps that built in Turke for refugees but about 85% or the Syrian refugees living outside the camps and tried to find formal or informal work to continue their lives.The Sryian refugee are not allowed to work in the formal industry due to they do not have work permit. For the refugees with the profesional skilled such as fector and lawyer can not work based on their capability, thus they should work with the low skilled work, such as a labor. But for the Syrian that has a low skilled has eiminate the local Turkey worker indirectly because the refugees do not get any incentives so get paid less than the local people, and this case making the businessmen recruited more Syrian then the local will get fired.

The restrictive of government to the permission of working policy that issued local permits binding refugees to work only in their own communities focused on increasing labor supply to certain regions rather than letting workers spread to different markets and sectors. In case, for the Syrian refugees that do not work in their own area should fulfil their own necessity or go finding an illegal job, and it has caused the government should allocate funding about 5 billion dollar for the Syrian refugees. (Cato Institute, 2016). The work permits that limited by the government to Syrian refugees before 2016 has impacted the local low skilled workers in Turkey should compete tightly with the Syrian refugees that working as an illegal worker in the informal markets, and this case has impacted that the every six local Turkish worker should lose their job and replaced for every ten refugees. (Del, Carpio and Wagner, 2015).

The displacement case for the low skilled workers in Turkey that happened to the local Turkish workers is not exiled for any status, well on single age, gender or even education group. However this case has particularly looked so obvious among Turkish workers that do not have formal education. which in August 2015 comprises 14% of the private sector (Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015). The net impact on demand of formal labor is still ambiguous. If there is a company that more considers to the formal and informal worker to be prioritized, the increasing of the supply for the informal workers will get lower salary, and due to this reason, the company owner will prefer to work the informal workers, and in the same time will reduce the formal workers in their companies. With the lower production expand will cause the leading of higher demand for formal workers, this is because with newly lower prices there will be more demand for certain products that will



increase the need for more inventory and as a result, more formal workers. The estimated average (World Bank) shows the positive impact of refugees on the Turkish tendency to be officially employed, about three additional for every ten refugees.

The increase in formal employment all occurred by the men that did not complete the secondary level study (Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015). And unfortunately the Women with high-skilled workers can not take any vantage of this conditions.

**Table 5. Industry Distribution and Informality by Gender for Private Sector, Paid Employment, Pre-Refugee 2011 (%)**

	Male		Female	
	(1) Industry Share	(2) Share Informal	(3) Industry Share	(4) Share Informal
Agriculture	17.3	67.5	18.4	95.5
Mining	0.7	11.0	0.1	0.0
Manufacturing (textiles, clothes, leather, food, wood)	14.6	26.7	22.2	48.0
Other Manufacturing	9.6	9.8	5.0	10.5
Construction	11.7	53.5	1.4	13.0
Wholesale, Retail	18.0	33.0	15.7	29.6
Transportation (land)	5.3	44.4	0.6	18.9
Accommodation, Food, Beverages	6.3	41.3	4.7	35.2
Education	0.8	18.0	3.3	13.6
Household work	0.2	35.5	6.1	92.7
Other services	15.5	24.3	22.5	20.6

Note: Data from the Turkish Household LFS. Employment is defined as private sector, paid employment. The columns "Industry Share" report the distribution of private sector, paid employees across industries, by gender (the columns each sum to 100). The columns "Share Informal" report the fraction of employees in each industry who are employed informally (by gender).

Source : Journal of Turkish Social Sciences Research

Those who are high skilled can not take advantages through this condition because their industry does not have a high level of informality. These disadvantages also applies to women that do not aim to work in certain industries

like the construction project that has a high level of informality. Agriculture is one of the example that there are many women works in this industry that employ the refugees, at least in the agriculture sector there are almost 20% of the total workers are the women. Nevertheless, the informal women workers in informal industry reached 96%, while male was 67%. Any informal work produced in agriculture is impossible for women (Del Carpio and Wagnerr, 2015).

Some politicians in turkey are sure that legality given to the Syrian workers might cause the decreasing of the informal market in the future in Turkey that has fallen so deep into 7% between 2011 to 2014 (Rubiin, 2016). Otherwise there are significant investment improvement from the capital city of Syria to invest in the companies in Turkey. The economist, Van Den Berg, Hassink and Akgunduz estimated that there are about 40% of the companies that just built and opened after getting support from the foreign capital (Del Carpuo and Wagner, 2015). The increasing of the total refugees influx in Turkey also a positive demands shock to the market place especially for services and goods. In addition, the government of Turkey has spent much money to operate the syrian refuges camps, even the refugees have opportunity to work, that it limited only inside the refugees, such as to work in textile and construction industries. Those are ilegal works and just available for the Syrian reugees that living insede the camps. Al these regulation have impacted the possitive trend for the demand for formal and informal factor. By getting less payment than the local workers make the standard of the salary is hard to compile, and throught the less payment the Syrian refugees got has influenced the payment that the local worker's salery in various industry. With the new challanges, there is a decrease in informal, part time, and female jobs. Formal

employment on averages paid double of informal employment and men earn more than women, about 15% (Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015). As a result, a simple analysis of changes in wage rates will not give a complete picture of the labor market. According to research conducted by the World Bank Group, before 2016, compared to 2011, marginal products were found to be negative for workers in informal sector, women, and low-educated workers, and close to zero for others (Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015).

Before 2016 and the World Bank Forum confirm, the refugees influx to Turkey overall has impacted the increasing of individual's average income to 42 Lira Turkey per months (for sub-region), or in percentage about 5% more than the average wage (Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015). In the formal industries also there is an increasing for the average wage in the amount is 49 Lira or same as 9% from the average wage in 2011. (Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015). Female, part time job worker, and less education workers have contributed in the amount 128 Lira per

When one analyzes two workers in 2011 and in 2015 with the same marginal product, the average wage of Turkish workers in 2015 in the informal sector is lower at around 79 TL per month than the average worker's wage in 2011 (Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015). In the formal labor market, there is no change in the average wage, contrary to what is expected with increased demand for workers, since newly hired workers have lower marginal products compared to 2011 (Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015).

The same characteristics are identified in the informal labor, especially for the women. Even though, at the time their wages look increasing, but when they are displaced into the other job, the wages will be sharply decreasing. (Del Carpio and

Wagner, 2015). It is caused by the women that left their informal job can not find a new formal job due to the regulations. For the men is different, the increasing wage is possible even not significant as statistical. All the same thing also occur to all Turkish workers, based on the ages and their education achievement background. (Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015).

For women, the same characteristics are observed as the informal labor market. Even though, at the beginning, it may seem like their wage is increasing, when the displacement effects are accounted for, there is a sharp decrease in wages (Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015). This is because women leave the informal labor market and cannot find jobs in the formal labor market. For men estimated wage changes are positive, but not statistically significant. The same is true for Turkish workers of different ages and those with medium and high educational attainment (Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015).

The average wage of uneducated workers is not significantly influenced by the refugees. However, because most work in the informal labor market, they face a large one for a move in the informal and part-time jobs (Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015). The marginal product for low-educated Turkish workers with observed characteristics has remained virtually substantially decreased. The change in marginal product is a decrease of Turkish Lira by 369 per month, although it also reflects a significant decrease in Turkish unemployed worker productivity that remains in sub-regions (Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015). In addition, a 30% increase in the minimum wage was approved in January 2016. According to Suleyman Soylu, the Minister of Labor and Social Security, the Turkish government should cover about 40% of the cost, around TL110, of the increase,

totaling approximately TL9.7 billion about US \$ 3.3 billion). However, this only applies to 2016. The increase, said to affect 8.5 million employees, is expected to cost the private sector about 20 billion lire [about US \$ 6.7 billion], directing criticism to warn of job losses (Global Legal Monitor 2017 ). Some economists take a completely different path and claim that the influx of refugees has impacted the labor market in a positive way by making Turkish workers more productive

Through an article written by Cato Institute, the operational expand is lower for goods, and it is in line with the increasing in demand for goods and services, the price for goods and services already decreased in average 2,5% since 2011 due to the increasing of competition in the market, and make the price is more achievable for the Turkish customers. (Cato Institute, 2016). Further, the Turkish people being more compatible by increasing their skilled due to the competition became tougher among the Syrian refugees workers and the local Turkish workers . (Cato Institute, 2016). The percentage of Turkish people in higher education increased 3% from 2011 to 2014, which 20% in 2011 and became 23% in 2014.

According to data taken from UNHCR, 47.4% of Syrian refugees in Turkey are children under 18 years old (UNHCR, 2017). Some of these children can not go to school because they have to work to support their families, especially if they are men. If they are women, they get married at an early age. The children have been part of Turkey's workforce for a long time, a problem that Turkey has improved upon. However, with the influx of about 1.420.000 refugee children to Turkey, the problem is only worsening. In 2012, the last year in which data is available, Ankara says nearly one million Turkish children are between the ages of 6 and 17 working. Many of them help make clothing, textiles or shoes, an industry

that accounts for \$ 40 billion a year for the Turkish economy and employs 2.5 million people - more than half as casual laborers, according to unions (Afanasieva, 2017). However, it is not easy to find a job as a child. There is competition between Turkish children and Syrian children. In the southern city of Gaziantep, near the border with Syria, a 30-year-old Turkish who gave his name as Selim stated that Syrian children underestimated pay. He gave his textile business as an example of a business that now exclusively employs Syrian children (Afanasieva, 2017). In May, the Turkish education ministry reported that 665,000 Syrian children living in Turkey's majority Syrian school-age children in the country - are not in school. In addition, less than 15% of 6 to 11 year olds living outside camps, as the Turkish Disaster Management and Emergency Management Authority says, are in school (Afanasieva, 2017). There is no data to report how many of these children are working. However, according to a survey conducted by Turkish Charity Support for Life, of 125 households, one in four households with children said at least one child could not go to school because the family depended on their wages. Half of the children work in the textile industry (Afanasieva, 2017).

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **TURKEY'S SECURITY CONCERNS RELEVANT TO SYRIAN CRISIS**

#### **4.1 Crime**

There are many people were allowed to stay out of the camps in Turkey. According to Kirisci "The government had clearly made no allowance for an eventuality in which large numbers of refugees would live outside the camps" Government authorities have taken fingerprints, photos, and identity information of the refugees after their entry to Turkey. Another study on the effects of refugees on Turkey, discusses that Syrian refugees out of the camps are vastly settled together in slum neighborhoods, which makes difficult their integration into local communities. This situation, in the long run, has a significant potential to cause conflicts and security problems. (Oguzman Demir Emir, 2015, p 16-20).

Despite a high tolerance over the Syrian refugees in the Turkish society, experts underline the potential conflict between Syrian refugees and local people. For instance, it is observed that local people are often strict and intolerant against criminal incidents when Syrian refugees are involved. Almost two-third of Turkish people (62.3%) believe that refugees are involved in violent acts, burglary, smuggling, and prostitution, which threatens the peace and security and ruins the ethical and moral values of Turkish society.

Confrontations between local residents and Syrian living outside of official camps seem unavoidable given these large numbers. The angry crowd in the southern city of Sanliurfa, reportedly organazing through social media, recently

tried to demonstrate back to Syrian, but was prevented from doing so after the city's governor mobilized the riots to protect the refugees.<sup>46</sup>

One possible security concern that could be caused by Syrian refugees is a violent mass uprising that might be caused by provocation stemming from anger and frustration that existed against Syrian refugees. Small examples of such behavior have occurred in almost every Turkish border town. If current conditions continue, it is possible that events occurring in Gaziantep and Kahramanmaraş in July 2014 may occur again in other cities. The most dangerous consequences of such a reaction from the locals is that Syria feels the need to organize themselves and provide their security and justice. More recently, Syria has discussed the possibility of organizing to protect themselves. Such development can cause minor local problems to turn into large-scale conflicts. The possibility of organizing Syrian groups among themselves causes reaction even from previously friendly communities. It also creates polarization among locals and refugees, and this polarization can emerge as a barrier to integration.<sup>47</sup>

Refugees living in the cities continue their lives in this urban ghetto. This situation poses a serious challenge to the integration process, but also creates environments that may generate security problems in the long term. Also, living in harsh conditions makes Syrians open to the possibility of involving in criminal and violent acts. It can be said that youth who grow up in poverty, who have feelings of being ostracized or who have identity crises, could be a source of future evil. The locals claim that if precautions are not taken right away, this lost generation may be

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<sup>46</sup> Attacks on Syrians in Turkey increasing, Nov. 21, 2014 <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/05/turkey-attack-on-syrians-in-country-on-the-rise.html>

<sup>47</sup> Effects Of The Syrian Refugees On Turkey January 2015, ORSAM and TESEV, P.20



the reason for an increase in future criminal acts, this possibility means that even if it has not been felt, there may be more serious security issues in the near future,

A study by Murat Erdogan, head of the Center for migration and refugee studies at Hacettepe University In Ankara, seems to reinforce Ozilal's clearly partisan assessment. Erdogan's research, "Syria in Turkey: Social acceptance and integration," Suggested that AKP followers are more like to be compassionate towards the Syrian that followers are more inclined to campaign towards Syria that followers of their parties. He cautioned, however that xenophobia among some groups increases the risk of spreading hostilities against Syria in Turkey unless the government in swiftly managing this situation.

"The attitude shown to date is credit to Turkish people, but there is risk that this situation may change rapidly," Erdogan wrote. His survey, conducted in 20 provinces, showed that 64% of those questioned believe it was an ethical duty to help Syrian. The majority of these people continue to express serious concerns over the problems Turkey facing because of the refugees.

The Survey shows, for example, that 70,7% of respondents believe that the refugees are doing serious damage to the economy, and 61,2% feel that poor Turkish people should be helped before Syrians. While 62,3% think the refugees disturb the social order through involvement in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution. In addition, those who say Syria steals employment opportunities from Turks fall between 56% and 69%, depending on the city.

More than 70% believe that Syria will create a lasting problems for the country, while almost 50% think that the government's management of the refugee crisis has not been satisfactory. These figures seem to indicate that most of those

who believe it is true to help the Syrian also feel the refugees should be sent home as soon as conditions in Syria permit.

More than 70% believe that the Syrians will create lasting problems for the country, while nearly 50% think the government's management of the refugee crisis has not been satisfactory. These figures appear to suggest that most of those who believe it is right to help the Syrians also feel the refugees should be sent home as soon as conditions in Syria permit.

In addition to the sheer weight of the new situation with large numbers of foreigners suddenly being highly visible in the communities, rumours, xenophobia and deeply rooted anti-Arab sentiments have most likely led to the misconception that Syrian refugees are violent and inclined to criminality. Isolated acts bear a serious risk of being attributed to all Syrians, creating potential for violent reactions from host communities. To counter this prejudice and combat widespread group stereotypes, the government should devise policies and initiate information campaigns that reflect the diversity of the country's Syrian population.


#### **A. Crime in the Cities of Turkey since 2007 until 2014**

Crime rate is the main dependent variable of this study. The data comes from the Turkish Statistical Institute, with the collaboration of the Ministry of Justice in Turkey. The data is available for multiple types of crimes in the 81 provinces. The study combines all the crimes to calculate the total number crime. The Turkish statistical institute has data for the following crimes: theft, defamation, traffic crimes, swindling, homicide, assault, sexual crimes, kidnapping, robbery, making drugs, purchase of drugs, forgery, bribery, smuggling, firearms and knives, forestry

crimes. The study combines all these type of crimes to develop total crime measure, and

then divides the number by the total population to get an actual crime per capita.

**Figure 6. Total Crime in Turkey from 2007-2014**



Source: Turkish Statistical Institute.

Figure 9 illustrates the crime data in Turkey from 2007 to 2014 to understand the trend of crime. The data is collected and reported by Turkish Statistical Institute. The figure clearly shows a jump in total crime in Turkey post 2011.


But through this data we can not conclude directly that Syrian refugee caused the crime significantly, so to get more trusted information I divide the data in to detail for each provinces in turkey and for data result can be seen through figure 10 nd 11 below.

Figure 10 explains about the 10 provinces in Turkey that have the most highest increasing crime from period 2007-2010 and 2011-2014 which is 2011 counted as the firts year syrian influx to turkey, and figure 11 explains about the

most syrian refugees ratio in ten provinces in Turkey and compared with the increasing crime before and after syrian refugees influx.




Figure 7 The Top Highest Ten Provinces With Crime Increasing Before And After Syrian Refugee Influx Compared With The Refugee Ratio



Source: Turkish Statistical Institute.

**Figure 8 The Top Highest Ten Provinces With Refugees Ratio Crime Increasing Before And After Syrian Refugee Influx**



Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

Crime rate explain about the total number of crimine devided 100.000 and made in % from 2007-2014, and for the refugees ratio is explain about the total number of refugees in every province devided by the total number of the citizen in that area except the syrian refugees.

From the above figure, Isparta province demonstrates the largest increase in crime from 81 provinces in Turkey, the increasing of crime is 16,90%, which is 1,34% in 2007-2010 and become 18,23% in the 2011-2014, the second number followed by istanbul in 15,98% and become the provinces with the highest cime from all provincess in Turkey, with percentage 41,51% after syrian refugees influx.

Comparing between the crime increasing and the refugess ration in each province it does not reflect the linier result, becuase the top 10 provinces with the highest crime increasing do not included in to the highest refugees ratio in Turkey, see figure 11. Bease the highest refugees ration is in Agri Province, but it only cause 0,80% crime increasing from 2007-2010 to 2011-2014, so we can not conclude if the syrian refugees influx surely become the main reason of the increasing number of crime in Turkey.

## **4.2 Terrorism (ISIS / PYD-PKK)**

### **A. Defining Terrorism**

Terrorism became a popular subject and topic for academic interest after the 9/11 incident in the U.S., the concept of terrorism is not a new topic and public attention and professional attention from the Turkish government and Turkish National Police. Turkey has sufferd terribly from terrorism over the last few decades, but understanding the dynamic of terrorism has not had much academic

attention in Turkey as opposed to fighting through government troops. Turkish academic studies on terrorism are limited both in number and scope mainly focused on the reasons for terrorism, the relationship between socio-economic dynamics and terrorism, the impact of migration on terrorism and the financing of terrorism, but understanding the motives of terrorist acts and terrorists at an individual level is crucial in solving equations.

The word “terror” has a Latin origin, and it was first used in its current form during the French Revolution. The term “terror” that we use today comes from the Latin word “terrere” which refers to being filled with fear, to long-winded with fear (Kaplan, 2011). The word “terrorism” was first used in 1795, right after the French Revolution with the meaning of “intimidation by the state by creating fear”, and it was used as “terrorism” in France. The concept of terrorism was introduced to the world literature by the British in 1798 and is considered a “systematic use of terror”. The term “terrorism” in its modern sense was first used in 1947 referred to the tactics used by the Jews to counter terrorism. England in the Palestinian territory. In addition, the word “terrorist” was used for revolutionaries in Russia in 1866 and for radicals and reformers, called “jacobins” during the French Revolution of the 1790s (Reitan, 2010).

In the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act (12 April 1991) terrorism is defined as follows: “Terror is any kinds of activity undertaken by members or members of an organization for the purpose of altering the characteristics of the Republic stated in the constitution, and the political, jurisdictional, social, secular, the economy, destroying the territorial integrity of the state and the government and its people, weakening or destroying or attacking government authorities, destroying right and



freedoms, endangering the existence of the Turkish and Republican Government, destroying public order or peace and security “(Law of Terror Prevention 1991)

The definition of the United Nation is that “Terrorism” means any acts of violence or threat not by standing motives or intensions committed to carrying out individual or collective criminal plans with the aim of terrorizing people of threatening to harm them or endanger their lives, honor, freedom, security or right or expose any environment or facility or property publicly or privately to harm or occupy or confiscate them, or endanger national awesomeness, or international facilities, or threaten the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of states, independent state “(Freezing Funds, 2003).

In the British Anti- Terrorism Act (Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989) it is stated, “terrorism is the use of violence for political ends (including) any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public, or any section of the public in fear” (prevention of Terrorism, 1989). On the other hand, France defines terrorism as “an act by an individual or group that uses intimidation or terror to disrupt public order” (How five foreign countries, 2000). Moreover, “ In Germany, terrorism has been describe as an enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, which are intended to be achieved by means of assaults on the life and property of other persons, especially by means of severe crimes”( Martin, 2002).

FBI’s defenition of terrorism is “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons, or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives”(Terrorism in the United States, 1997). In addition, according to the definition formulated by the US, “ terrorism is any violence perpetrtrted for political reason by sub national

groups or secret state agents, often directed at noncombatant targets, and usually intended to influence an audience” (Terrorism and America, 1998).

Different governments have different definitions. Likewise, different federal institutions have their own definitions of terror. For instance, the definition used by the FBI is different from that of the U.S. State Department. According to the definition of the FBI, individuals, as well as groups, have the possibility to carry out terrorist actions. In addition to political aims, the FBI includes social aims as well. However, the U.S. State Department’s definition comes from its own field.

As it can be understood from all these definitions, the element of “violence” has a dominant role. Violence is the most common characteristic in all the definitions stated above. Just as we have listed the definitions here, Alex P. Schmid has made a study of about 120 different definitions of terror in his book titled *Political Violence*. He has tried to figure out the common element appearing in about 90% of the 120 definitions. Therefore, violence and the use of force turn out to be the element accepted in most general terms.

## **B. Terrorist organizations in Syria**

### **i. PKK, PYD and YPG**

PKK established in 1974 by a group of Kurdish student university in Turkey, and this party is leftist nationalist Kurdish organization that activated in the communism activity in Turkey, this party now cooperated with Partiya Yektiya Demokrat (PYD)/ People’s Protection Democratic Union Party and Yekineyan Parastina Gel (YPG) / People’s Protection Units that established in 2003, those are a Syrian offshoot of the PKK movement. But these party officially are not

allowed to be established in Syria. Now, these party are mostly located in the northern part of Syria.

Erdogan and Davutoglu clearly showed the their dislike to Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat (PYD), and Yekiniyen Parastina Gel (YPG). For Erdogan PYD nada YPG are the terror organizations similiar with IS and also PKK. Unfortunately, United States is not in line with Erdogan, United States support PYD instead, by transfered weapon to the PYD, in this side, Erdogan showed his worry that the weapon given to PYD will belong to PKK in the end.

Through the speech that Erdogan and Davutoglu delivered in Turkish Government Peace Talks on July 2015, can be seen that both these leaders having tension to PKK. Davutoglu said "We will make any agreements to anyone who betray us," and this statement refers to PKK due to the attaks that PKK did to Turkey.

The vision of why PKK estانبished is to stir up the Kurdish and make an independdent Kurdish state, this party operated by Abdullah Ocalan informaly until 1978. Since this party was establised, it has completly contradicted with the Turkish Government. Kurdish believed that Independent Kurdish country can only estabshed if the Turkish governmen'st suppressive and colonialist defeated (MIPT Database, 2006). The PKK is one of the worst terrorist organizations in history ever. The PKK seeks to establish an independent Marxist state in southeastern Turkey. It was formally formed in 1978 in the capital city of Turkey, Ankara. It soon launched a violent campaign againts people who openly support the government and its policies and kurdish tribes that had historically been living peacefully with the Turkish government (Saladino, 2008)

By 1980, Turkey's internal security situation had gotten noticeably worse because of randomly applied PKK terrorism. By the early 1980s, the group had ruthlessly murdered about 250 people. Since 1984, random violence and the terrorist activities held by the PKK have claimed thousands of lives. Women, children and the old are not excluded from their attacks. People have been murdered in front of their family members or kidnapped and executed ruthlessly. Furthermore, the PKK has maintained a position as a sub – contractor of the international terror and drug dealer networks. It preserved interactions with some Middle Eastern, African, European, and Latin America terrorist groups as well as many drug traffickers. Today, the PKK still tries to maintain its activities in Turkey ; however, its terror has dramatically declined after the capture of its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, who was arrested in Kenya and extradited to Turkey abolished the death penalty in 2002 and his sentence was changed to life imprisonment. The arrest of Ocalan seriously weakened the PKK. Following his arrest, Ocalan declared a unilateral cease- fire and announced his desire to establish a “peace initiative” with Turkey on Kurdish issues. The PKK affirmed Ocalan’s wishes, purportedly disavowing its violent history. Currently, the PKK struggles to maintain its activities especially in Northern Iraq, Syria, and throughout Europe.

## **ii. The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) on Syrians**

The People's Democratic Party (HDP) is the first group of Kurds that has resulted in access to the kingdom as the sole party in Turkey. HDP focused to the condition of Syria refugees in Turkey, this party only want the freedom for the refugees, which is if the Syrian refugees want to come back to their country after the war is over in Syria, Turkish government should allow them to go out, but if the

Syrian refugees want to stay in Turkey, the Turkey government should allow them to stay, because for the HDP party, the world is a home country for anyone, that means, anyone can stay anywhere where they want. Probably this case that became a problem for the Turkey government, because in chapter two of this reasearch alrady mentioned about the foreign polity towards Syria that set about the regulation of refugees in Turkey. The status of Syrian refugees are guest, so when the condition in Syrian has been stable, they will be sent home, because living in Turkey in only for temporary until the Turkey government think that the Syrian refugees do not need any protection anymore.


By addition of Syrian refugees transfered year by year, the security issue become really serious, especially from year 2004 to 2005 where the number of refugees rew significantly from 1,5 million Syrian refugees become 2,5 million Syriain refugees. The more Syrian refugees come, the more complex the problem will exist, so Turkey government should watch closely for the activities around the country.

On July 24, 2015 after for almost two years, the Turkish Army issued a weapon with Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane (PKK or Kurdistan Workers Party) and attacked PKK bases in northern Iraq that soon formed a chain. While the PKK and the Turkish government have never had a completely peaceful relationship, 2013 and 2015. Before July 2015 there was a buildup, between the government and the PKK and the wider Turkish community. Between 2013 and 2015 unrest spread throughout the country as evidenced by the Gezi protests of 2013 and May Day protests 2013, 2014, and 2015. What causes this? The PKK is not the only concern given the number of protests across the country. Larger social problems may underlie the means. Perhaps, by compensating for the countries that live in

Turkey and those who bring to the country, caring governments are generated from different understandings of the meaning of citizenship and democracy in Turkey and the rights that each gives to the Turks.

One of the largest inhabitants is a feeling vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Local residents have confidence that among refugees there are people who might want to punish Turkey and create provocations. Some locals also believe that there are individuals among Syrian refugees who are very close to Assad, ISIS or PKK. PYD-PKK and others could easily find a way to enter Turkey without any registration or registering with false information, and it will bother the Turkey security, because the terrorism could happen increasingly not only in border areas but also in all places in Turkey. This belief is particularly widespread in border cities such as Sanliurfa and Killis. Any judicial or terrorist retaliation considered by Syria could have influenced Turkey's perception of all Syrians critically. Such incidents have the possibility of turning into a larger security problem. Thus, it is important that local tensions be observed with extreme caution.

**Figure 9. PKK attacks on Turkish targets over time. (Start/UMD)**




Turkey has tried to negotiate with the PKK in 2013 to do a ceasefire as part of a discussion on a permanent peace agreement. The peace process, as it's called, has not gone very far and now, it's on the brink of collapse.

It is correct that most of the refugees are decent and decent people who fled the slaughter caused by Islamic militant groups. They are not supporters of Islamic radicalism; they are victims of Islamic radicalism. The danger does not come from them, but from Islamic radicals who use them as a cover to infiltrate into operations to the West.<sup>48</sup>

### C. The Total Number of Terrorism Cases in Turkey from 2000-2015

During 2000 until 2015 there are 1076 terrorism attacks in Turkey and the highest number is in 2015 with 420 terrorism cases.

Figure 10 The Number of Terrorism in Turkey from 2000-2015



Source : Global Terrorism Data


<sup>48</sup> How Isis Smuggles Terrorists Among Syrian Refugees April 27, 2016, <http://www.newsweek.com/how-isis-smuggles-terrorists-among-syrian-refugees-453039>

From the figure 10, there are fluctuation of the number of terrorism cases in Turkey since 2000 until 2015, but post 2011 the number of cases is bigger than before, even in 2012 reach number of 189 cases and 420 cases in 2015, which is the highest one among others.

Before 2011 the terrorism number never reached 50 cases, the highest one only in 41 terrorism cases, but a year after syrian influx the terrorism number increased dramatically, even almost five times higher than before the Syrian influx. Even there is no correlation between the refugees rate in an area in Turkey with the total number of Terrorism cases, but we need to know and concern where the most terrorism happen in Turkey, what kind of terrorism cases happend and who are the perpetrators behind all these terrorist activities, to answer these questions, the data can be seen below.

**Figure 11 The Highest Number of Terrorism in Ten Cities in Turkey**

**The Highest Number of Terrorism in Ten Cities in Turkey**



Source : Global Terrorsim Data



Analyzing based on the cities in Turkey, Istanbul becomes the most terrorism attacks during 2000-2015 with the total number of cases is 161 accidents, even Istanbul is not the highest refugees ratio in Turkey (look figure 7 and 8) but Istanbul become the most terrorism attacks and the second highest number of crime increasing in Turkey, it is such as symbol if Istanbul as the biggest city in Turkey becomes more vulnerable of the Security Issues.

Istanbul as the central economic becomes really crucial for the Turkey, added by Ankara in number 4 shows that the terrorists try to attack the two central cities of Turkey, because Ankara and Istanbul are the central of government, economic and education activities in Turkey, if the security of these cities are not under control, it is not impossible that Turkish national security will be in warning, and if it happening of course will impact to all activities in Turkey, including political and economic stability.

For the For the Attack Type for Terrorism In Turkey From 2000-2005 Bombing/explosion stand in the first rank with total 431 cases, and followed by armed assaults and facility/infrastructure attacks with 304 and 81 cases in sequences. whilst for the perpetrator PKK becomes the most terrorism cases in Turkey during 2000-2015, which total 703 cases or more than 60% of all the terrorism cases. This number much more than other perpetrators, due to this data, it is not a mistake if the Turkey government put high attention for this party, because its existence completely bother the Turkey's national security.

Table 6 Attack Type for Terrorism In Turkey From 2000-2015

ATTACK TYPE	NUMBER OF CASES
Bombing/Explosion	431
Armed Assault	304
Facility/infrastructure attack	81
Hostage taking (kidnapping)	77
Bombing & Explosion	55
Assassination	32
Unknown	30
Bombing/Explosion, Armed Assault	24
Armed Assault, Facility/Infrastructure Attack	5
Unarmed Assault	4
Hijacking	3
Hostage Taking (Barricade Incident)	3
Armed Assault,Bombing/Explosion	2
Facility/infrastructure attack, Hostage taking (Kidnapping)	2
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping),Armed Assault	2
Armed Assault,Facility/Infrastructure Attack Firearms	1
ArmedAssault,Facility/InfrastructureAttack, Hostage Taking (Kidnapping),	1
Bombing/Explosion/Armed Assault	1
Bombing/Explosion, Facility/Infrastructure Attack	1
Facility - Infrastructure Attack	1
Facility & Infrastructure Attack	1
Facility/infrastructure attack, Bombing/Explosion	1
Facility/Infrastructure Attack,Hostage Taking(Kidnapping)	1
Facility/InfrastructureAttack, Hostage (Kidnapping)	1
Hijacking	1
Hijacking, Armed Assault	1
Hijacking, Bombing/Explosion	1
Hostage Taking	1
Hostage Taking (Barricade Incident)	1
Hostage Taking (Barricade Incident), Bombing/Explosion	1
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)	1
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping),Armed Assaul	1
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping),Bombing/Explosion	1
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping),Facility/Infrastructure Attack	1
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping), Facility/Infrostructure Attack Firearms	1
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping),Unarmed Assault	1
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>1076</b>

Source : Global Terrorsim Data

**Table 7 Perpetrator of Terrorism in Turkey From 2000-2015**

<b>PERPETRATOR GROUP</b>	<b>NUMBER OF CASES</b>
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)	652
Unknown	280
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) (Suspected)	51
Devrimici Halk Kurtulus Cephesi (DHKP/C)	17
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)	12
Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK)	10
Devrimici Halk Kurtulus Cephesi (DHKP/C) (Suspected)	7
Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA-C)	6
Al- Qaida (Suspected) & Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK)	3
Chechen Rebels	3
Eastern Islamic Raiders Front	3
Al - Qaida (Suspected)	2
Gunmen	2
Levant (ISIL) (suspected),Syrian Resistance	2
Turkish Communist Party/Marxist (TKP-ML)	2
Turkish Hezbollah	2
Turkish Hezbollah (Suspected)	2
Unknown (suspected)	2
Democratic Union Party (PYD),Kurdistan Workers' Party(PKK)	1
Devrimici halk kurtulus Cephesi	1
Devrimici Halk Kurtulus Cephesi (DHKP/C), Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)	1
Free Syrian Army (Suspected)	1
Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front (IBDAC)(suspected	1
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK)	1
Kurdish Militants (suspected)	1
Kurdish Separatists (suspected	1
Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK) (Suspected)	1
Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), People's Defense Unit (Turkey)	1
Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), Turkish Communist Party/Marxist (TKP-ML)	1
Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), Turkish Communist Party/Marxist (TKP-ML) (suspe	1
Maoist Communist Party (MKP)	1
People's Defense Unit (Turkey (suspected)	1
PKK, Turkish Communist Party/MARXIST (TKP-ML)	1
Revolutionary Headquarters( Turkey) (suspected	1
Turkish Communist Party (Suspected)	1
Turkish Communist Party/ Marxist TKP (Suspected)	1
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>1076</b>

Source : Global Terrorsim Data

The descriptive data in this chapter has illustrated the growth in the overall crimes and terrorism cases before and after the Syrian refugees influx to Turkey, Even most of people have argued that refugees play a significant role contributing to the increase in the outcome of crime and terrorism cases, but this increasing can not be judged directly, even this analysis finds indicate refugees' influx is positive factor contributing to an increasing crime rates and terrorism, However the further investigates the findings, exploring the ratio of refugees in each of the provinces, that found that the first analysis is not supported and the lack of data poses serious concerns to draw conclusions about refugees' ratio on crimes and terrorism.

### **4.3 Health**

The health's service providing to the Syrians refugee is essentially explained through the Provosional Protections and Social Insurance Regulations and Universal Health and Insurance law. The implementations of this law for the Syrian refugees are undertaken by the Directorate of General Migration Management working under the Misnistry Home Affairs. Those registered at the provincials level Directorate of General Migration Management having rights to become an individual insurance holders according to the regulations. Nevertheless, the healths insurance applies just to municipalities which th persons under the temporary protection and registered in some limited circumstances prescribed by law in a city other than where he or she is registered. So, that person with health's insurances is able to acces primary health cares service that are family health cares center, maternal and child health also contraceptive methods, conseling center, tuberculosis clinic also migrant polyclinics. The latter is design to offer the

equal services as family health centers to migrants but some of the people are still under development.<sup>49</sup>

Family health center comes to give preventive case services especially for the pregnant and postpartum women, vaccinations, and follow up for the chronic illness, as well as examination and organization of health therapies when unnecessary hospitalization.

There are also-called secondary and tertiary health services, which can be sequentially defined as general hospitals followed by research and training hospitals and university hospitals. Public hospitals are divided into two types based on their providing services and the basis of structural organization. Among the hospital services we can mainly distinguish between polyclinic services, emergency services and inpatient services. To access the clinic's services in a hospital, an individual must make an appointment first and the health insurance beneficiaries must pay a small sum for the polyclinic services as a contribution fee set by the Health Ministry's Health Budget Act. The contribution fee for Syrian refugees are paid by the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority of the Prime Minister, and Turkey has spent about 4,5 million dollars for Syrian refugees during April 2011 until November 2014. However, hospital emergency services are accessible for everyone and free unless you protected by health insurance. This condition also applies to inpatient services.

All the provisions described above apply when the person under the temporary protection with access to health insurance coverage to the health

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<sup>49</sup> Right to Health and Access to Health Services for Syrian Refugees in Turkey, F. Deniz Mardin\*, March 2017

service in the city where they are registered. When a person wants to access health services in different cities, he must pay the full amount prescribed by the Health Budget Act for the polyclinic services. Emergency services are paid only after necessary medical interventions are implemented. Nonetheless all primary case services are free.

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<sup>50</sup> Right to Health and Access to Health Services for Syrian Refugees in Turkey, F. DenizMardin, MiReKoc Policy Brief Series 2017/01– March 2017, p.5

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

The relation between Syria and Turkey has a long story, having some problems for sensitive issues such Kurdish Issue and water issue have made this country hard to be united before the Adana agreement signed in 1998. Some factors influenced Turkish Foreign Policy towards Syria, both internal and external. But the great relation that can be achieved due to the Adana agreement made Turkey very welcome to help the Syrian refugees.

Turkish Government is just so generous in all aspects, especially in helping the refugees; Turkey is a host with the most refugees in the world. Millions of refugees come to this country to continue their lives after they got conflicts or war. Turkish government gives really good camp houses to get stayed by the refugees, and this country spent much money for this.

With the entire assistance, for some reasons this condition has influenced this country's stability, whether in economic or in security. For the economic the government and some NGOs spent much money to help the refugees and some citizens lost their jobs because the employers more like to employ the refugees, because they can be paid lower than the native people and the employers do not need give them work insurance either, even the refugees coming has brought negative impacts for some people, but their coming has also grown the Turkey economic generally, and it is even better than before. The other side for the security: with many refugees that stay out of the camps make the security so hard to be controlled. Sometimes there are some conflicts happens among the civilians and the refugees take a part in these situations that make the Turkish got mad

on the refugees, and for the other concern for the security is about the terrorism from PYD-PKK that enter to Turkey as a refugee.

The Turkish Government should more concern about how to control the refugees, especially for them who stay out of the camps, because if it keeps happening, it can make the conditions of Turkey gets worse. It is such a dilemma for the Turkish government and the citizens too, from the humanity we should help each other, moreover most of the Syrians are Muslim and so are the Turkish, but in the other side there are some troubles that make the Turkish people and government get because of the refugee's coming.

Security issues due to the Syrian Influx need to be concerned, moreover by the data analysis that there are significant increasing number of crime and terrorism cases post 2011, even this analysis finds indicate refugees influx is positive factor contributing to an increasing crime rates and terrorism, However the further investigates the findings, exploring the ratio of refugees in each of the provinces, that found that the first analysis is not supported and the lack of data poses serious concerns to draw conclusions about refugees ratio on crimes and terrorism. The big cities in Turkey should more warn about these, such as Istanbul and Ankara, because the data shows Istanbul becomes the most terrorism cases city and the second highest increasing of crime before and after Syrian Influx in Turkey.



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