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POLITICS**

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## DEDICATION PAGE

This thesis is dedicated to my little love ones, Nancy, Efe and David

## LIST OF ABBRIVATIONS

ACC	Anarchy, Conflict and Cooperation
CAFÉS	Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standard
CCOL	Coordinating Committee on Ozone Layer
CFC	Chlorofluorcarbon
COP	Conference of the Parties
EU	European Union
GHGS	Greenhouse gases
IR	International Relations
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ODB	Offense-Defense Balance
ODT	Offense-Defense Theory
ODT	Offense-Defense Theory
ODS	Ozone Depleting Substance
PD	Prisoner Dilemma
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
US	United States

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## INTRODUCTION

International politics since the 17<sup>th</sup> century has always been studied through the interactions of great powers, except a few exceptions occurring in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>1</sup> Scholars like Waltz in 1979 and 2005, Mearsheimer in 1995, Axelrod in 1984, Keohane in 1984 and Moravcsik in 2010 stress on anarchical structures of the international politics. For these scholars, anarchy is the ordering principles of the international system that conditions and creates incentives for state to pursue means that could guarantee its survival. This is necessary because war is always a possibility. For some of the aforementioned scholars, the ordering principles consists of a permissive cause of war, they impose constraints on states' behaviour, foster uncertainty about others' intentions, increase fear and misperceptions, drive states into security dilemma, arms races, spiral, and increases concern for collective action problem.<sup>2</sup>

That scenario is best explained by realists' theoretical perspectives in International Relations (IR). Realists (pessimistic as they are) suggest the structure of the international system under self-help principles foster inevitable conflicts and makes cooperation difficult to achieve. States, under conditions of uncertainty and misperception of intentions from potential adversaries, seek security and power. Anarchy is generally defined lack of central authority in world affairs. This logic, according to realist scholars of international relations, drives states into the "security dilemma". This

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<sup>1</sup> The 1960s produced some exceptions. Some group of scholars (neo-Marxists) began to theorize that the structure of the system is capitalistic and imperialistic with a exploitation tendency that nailed the smaller states, depending on the great powers for their development and finished products. This group of scholars came up with 'dependency theory' but when southAsia states increased in development, these theorists introduced 'Dependent development' concepts to explain SouthAsia's rising development that tended to falsify their dependency theory. See Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, New York: Academic Press, 1974. See also Immanuel Wallerstein, *Historical Capitalism: with Capitalist Civilization*, New York: Verso, 1995.

<sup>2</sup> Realist scholars and analysts generally agreed that anarchy is the single tenet of international relations.

unintended dilemma, sometimes, spiral into vicious circles of arms race, that lead to tragic, conflict and sometime war.

This logic, according to realists, drives states into security dilemma. The unintended dilemma, sometimes, spiral into vicious circles of arms races that lead to tragedy of war. The above scenario is best explain by realists' theoretical perspectives in International Relations (IR). Realists (pessimistic as they are) suggest a self-help system of international relations that fosters inevitable conflicts and makes cooperation difficult to achieve. However, optimistic scholars (Keohane, Nye, Haggard and Simmons,<sup>3</sup> and Arthur Stein) have argued that institutions, regime, rules, norms and principles (formally designed for specific issues area) could increase efficiency and effective inter-states interactions by providing adequate information that reduce information uncertainty and/or reduce transaction cost. For these scholars, institutions, designed properly, will mitigate the effects of anarchy, improve security dilemma, provide solutions for collective action problem, and correct market failures.

Neoliberal institutionalists (optimistic as they are) suggest that cooperation under anarchy is possible and extensive. Thus IR analysts could argue that realists see international politics in the realm of conflictual interactions and less optimistic for any prospect of cooperation. Liberals or neoliberals in contrary believe cooperation is extensive, if the right institutions are designed in specific issue area.

Thus, political analysts argue (in error) that realists see international politics in the realm of inevitable conflictual interactions and less optimistic for any prospects of cooperation. Whereas, liberals or neoliberals contrast to realism believe cooperation is extensive and possible. This notion where cooperation is assigned to liberalist research program and conflicts to realist paradigm is a misunderstanding of the operational code of various strands of

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<sup>3</sup> Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*; Stephan Haggard & Beth Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes", *International Organization*, Volume 41, No. 3, 1987; Arthur Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World", *International Organization*, Volume 36, 1982.

realism in international relations. Cooperation through reassurance and engagement programs among security seeking rivalries have been suggested by defensive realism—a variant of structural realism, as the external means for self-help. Thus, realism, according defensive realism sees cooperation as extensive and possible.

Conflict and cooperation under anarchy have been the primary concern in the study of contemporary international politics. Scholars, in attempts to account for conflicts and cooperation have propose theories, approaches, models and explanatory variables to determined causal factors that influence states behaviour. Among these factors are: ‘nature of human’ (Hans Morgenthau), variation in material capabilities among states (Kenneth Waltz), variation in information and regime (Robert Keohane), variation in state preferences embedded in domestic actors (Andrew Moravcsik), Identity and Interest (constructivists) and recently offense – defense balance (Stephen Van Evera), and other theories have stress domestic factors like economic structure (Marxists), democratic peace (Doyle), geography and elites perceptions (Robert Jervis).<sup>4</sup>

Cooperation under anarchy is one of the most intense topics of debate in IR. The mainstream tradition (structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism and classical liberal) specifies unique explanatory variables that influence cooperative interactions. Structural realism primarily focuses on “distribution of capabilities” balance of power, balance of threats, balance of interest, hegemonic stability, and offensive-defensive balance. These causal variables explain that cooperation is difficult to achieve. Neorealist believes cooperative agreements create relative gains concerns among

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<sup>4</sup> For details discussion of variation in human nature see Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. rev. by K.W. Thompson, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993; for explanation on variation of power capabilities see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979; see also, Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984. For regime and states’ preference, see Andrew Moravcsik, *Liberal Theories of International Relations: A Primer*, Princeton University, 2010. For the efficacy of offence and defence balance, see also Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Structures of Power and the Roots of International Conflict*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.

actors. For realists, absolute gains and relative gains concern are problematic to cooperative interactions, which mean the state that achieves relative gains can threaten the security of others. As a result, states are wary about entering into cooperative arrangements.<sup>5</sup>

Neoliberals argue that cooperation in IR is possible and plentiful than what neorealists presume. Institutions in form of regimes, rules and norms influence positively cooperation under anarchy. Liberal theory emphasizes more of interest and preferences as explanatory variables. Classical liberal theory differs from neorealism and neoliberalism by emphasizing domestic politics and assume interests and preferences as variables rather than given. Like neorealism and neoliberalism, they also stress on anarchical condition.

Neorealist also stress on the security dilemma as the permissive reason for conflictual behaviour in international arena. Security dilemma is define as, an instance where status-quo states seek for security for self-preservation with benign intentions increasing its military capabilities which decrease the security of its adversaries. The dilemma arises when an adversary state increases its own security as a reaction to a status quo state action. This action-reaction follows a spiral path, and results in a reinforcement of the conflict of interests that leads to tragedy, and in some cases, to conflict or war. Neoliberal theorists stress on another dilemma in form of collective action (problem), which arises due to market failures. For neoliberals, a well-designed institutional mechanism can ameliorate the collective action problem and make cooperation possible and extensive. Neoliberals identified five types of dilemma associated with collective action, namely, distribution, defection, co-ordination, disagreement and instability problem.

However, neorealists are pessimistic about these prospects due to concern for relative gains. One good example cited by neorealist is the Kyoto

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<sup>5</sup> See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, and Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism", *International Organization*, Volume 42, No, 3, 1988, pp. 485-507.

Protocol, where United States (U.S.) concerns for relative gains advantage to China through trade competitiveness found it difficult to ratify the Kyoto Protocol even after a compromised agreement was reached with the European Union (EU) countries. In contrast to realism; liberal theory argues that interest and preferences play a primary role in U.S. decision not to ratify Kyoto Protocol. Security dilemma induced an inevitable conflictual behavior under anarchy. And neoliberals contend that a well-designed institutional mechanism can prevent market failure and improve and ameliorate collective action problem. In order to understand these views, it is necessary to examine the nature of security dilemma and collective action problem in international politics.

Security dilemma is a realist assumption termed by John Herz in 1950. This concept is mostly stressed by defensive realism, a variant of neorealism. Security dilemma is a spiral model defined by Herz as,

“a structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs, tend regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening.”<sup>6</sup>

The security dilemma is a concept suitable for defensive realism, which regards conflict as essentially arising from mounting or perceived offensive capabilities advantage in the international system. For this variant of realism, the spiral of dilemma can begin with a status quo state that increases in an anarchical setting its defensive capabilities for security concerns without any malign intentions. This alluded action spurred adversary states' reaction to increase their own capabilities. This reaction will foster mistrust and fear that risk the security of both the status quo state and its rival. It is a dilemma because it can lead to cyclical arms build-up (both offensive and defensive) which can, in turn, lead to offensive advantage or the “cult of offensive” (using Van Evera's term).

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<sup>6</sup> John Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma”. *World Politics*, Volume 2, No. 2, 1950, p. 157.

Most defensive realists (like Jervis, Glaser, Posen, and Tang) make the assertion that the situation in the security dilemma is inevitable, but they also stress that there is a possibility of the dilemma being mitigated but, only if, in an offense-defence balance, the defense has the advantage over the offense. Jervis argues that international actors have varied the understanding of defensive level of capability required by status quo states. Therefore, a state will signal offensive builds up arms that are far beyond the level considered adequate for defence purposes.<sup>7</sup>

It must be noted that offensive realism led by John Mearshiemer rejected the existence of the security dilemma; Offensive realism advocates stress on absolute uncertainty in inter-states interactions, hence states either “benign” or “malign” can change intentions in the future. In addition, some other scholars have argue that offensive realism sees security dilemma amongst power maximizing actors, but suggests that the best way to alleviate the dilemma is to escaped from it through conquest and expansions. Defensive and offensive realists have divergent operational code on how best to solve the security dilemma. It is this divergent operational code on security dilemma that delineates offensive and defensive realism.

Collective action, a term popularized by Mancur Olson,<sup>8</sup> occurs when more than one (individual, unit, actor or state) is required to contribute to an effort in order to achieve an outcome (e.g. climate change solution). States often face with collective action (e.g. for environment issues, climate change, Ozone layer depletion. The logic is that the benefit derived from collective action is non-excludable. This means that some beneficiaries of public goods

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<sup>7</sup> See Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma”, *World Politics*, Volume 30, No. 2, 1978, pp. 167-204; Charles Glaser, “When are Arms Races Dangerous”, *International Security*, Volume 28, No. 4, 2004, pp. 44-84; Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict”, in Michael Brown (ed.), *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997; Shipping Tang, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: Toward a Dynamic and Integrative Theory of Ethnic Conflict”, *Review of International Studies*, Volume 37, 2011, pp. 511-530; Shipping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis”, *Security Studies*, Volume 18, Issue 3, 2009, pp. 587-623.

<sup>8</sup> Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965.

can free-ride, which can result to such goods produced or not produced at all. That is, it is difficult to exclude nonparticipants (State, actor) from the benefit resulted from the collective action (e.g. climate change solution).

The term "collective action problem" describes a dilemma faced by active participants when some individuals, units, actors or states seek not to pay on the cost of collective action or "free ride" to gain short-term benefit from other contributors. Climate change represents best the aforementioned scenario in the international politics. Climate change is fraught with asymmetrical expected costs and benefits that create different incentives for great powers like the United States and the Europe Union which could be expected to bargain in their own national preferences. The dilemma in collective action problems was far more serious in Kyoto Protocol negotiation than Montreal Protocol. This study argues that self-interested states will behave and cooperate in according to their preferences. And hence bargaining strategies by rational choice will determine outcomes in collective negotiation.

Liberal institutionalists often stated with optimism that institutional mechanism designed to provide adequate information and monitoring technical professionals can reduce and improve collective action problem. Institutions, they suggest, will provide required information, reduce transaction cost, and provide enforcement mechanism that consequently encourage cooperation. Liberal theory stress variation in state preferences to complement institutional mechanism in determining improvement in collective action problem. For realism, variation in relative gains play primary role.

These two dilemma(s) (collective action problem and security dilemma) are derived from the ordering principles—anarchy which sometimes creates serious incentives for states to engage in conflictual and cooperative behaviour in international politics. These two conditions serve as the touchstone in the present study.

The present thesis will attempt to answer the following questions: *What ways do relative power, institutionalized information and states' preferences determine cooperative and conflictual outcome?* The Second

question is: *What ways do perceived offensive advantage under security dilemma influences conflictive outcome in anarchical system?* In addition, the thesis will also attempts to explore variation in states behaviour, when international actors are in collective action and security dilemma. In order to answer these questions, realist, neorealist, neoliberal and liberal theoretical perspectives will be examined to determine how these variables are located by these theories. The thesis will also examine the intense debate between neorealist and neoliberal theories on the limits and extents of cooperation in IR.

For the first question, empirical evidence from the negotiation of Kyoto protocol and Montreal protocol will be explored in order to determine what role relative power, institutional information and state preferences played in cooperative outcome. For second question, concise, but necessary theoretical analysis of Offensive—Defensive Balance (ODB) will be done. Also for the second question, empirical evidence will be drawn from the cases of the 1865 -1871 military crisis in Europe and the July 1914 Crisis in Europe, to determine the influence of offensive advantage in conflictual outcome in anarchical international politics.

The hypothesis to be tested in the first question is taken from liberal perspective and for the second question; the hypothesis is drawn from the perspective of defensive realism:

*H1: Cooperative outcomes are more likely when institutional designs are compatible with States' preferences.*

*H2: Conflictual outcomes are more likely when states perceive offensive advantage.*

In order to examine the hypotheses, theoretical and empirical analysis will be undertaken. First the thesis will examine the neorealist and neoliberal theoretical debate to examine what role liberal institutionalists assigned to institutions to encourage cooperation and what the debate on relative gains problem is. Also liberal theoretical perspective will be examined to understand the variation of interest and state preferences formation. For



the purposes of hypothesis II, space will be devoted to the exploration of the theoretical approaches of Offensive-Defensive Balance (ODB). This is necessary to understand how perceived offensive capabilities advantage is measured by defensive realists. The research will focus more on the subjective ODB, since our hypothetical concern is the elite's perception of offensive advantage.

On the empirical analysis, the thesis will focus on two cases of collective action problems (attempted agreements to combat climate change), namely, the Montreal Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol. To explore these cases, institutions like Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) will be examined to determine the role institutions had played in Montreal and Kyoto Protocol formations. The empirical tests will focus more on the US and the EU negotiation strategies to identify the source of state preferences and how their influences outcome, and also to see how these preferences complement institutions to influence negotiations.

For the second hypothesis, the thesis will focus on the role of security dilemma, its consequences in Europe in 1865-1871 and during the July 1914 crisis in Europe, to determine how military technology and elite's perception influence conflict behaviour. The analysis of the July 1914 Crisis in Europe will focus on the three great powers—German Empire, Austria-Hungary and Russia, and will also imply references to France and Serbia

The research will be in most part qualitative in design and methods. Theoretical and empirical analysis will be undertaken. This is necessary to test some of the hypothesis that will be generated in the course of the study. Therefore it will be correct to state that the design or methodology of the study will be wholly qualitative. The hypotheses will be measured by primary and secondary data and relevant theories of IR deductively analysed. Analysis of the cases will be wholly based on the explanatory variables the cases shall generate and develop.

### **Scope and limitation**

The present thesis will limit its focus on the mainstream tradition of realism and of liberalism in international relations. Due to lack of space, concise analysis will be undertaken. The lack of space also limits the number of cases to test the hypotheses. The lack of primary data on environmental climate change negotiation also condemns the thesis to depend partly on secondary data and web-based analysis. Most of the theoretical analysis on the various paradigms is examined concisely due to lack of space.

The purpose of study is to explore the explanatory power of the three mainstream theoretical perspectives—Realism, institutionalism, and liberal theory. The present thesis will attempt at contributing to IR literature by examining the role played by information, preferences, and polarity in the variation of conflict and cooperation under anarchy. More importantly, the thesis is intended to contribute to IR literature by arguing that, to understand each research traditions assertion on their dependent variables—cooperation or conflicts, it is necessary to understand the operational code of multiple variants within the paradigms. Scholars within various paradigms assigned positive auxiliary axioms to complement paradigmatic core axioms that resulted in conclusions that differ from popular belief.

The thesis will examine the structural effect of international anarchy on interstates behaviour. The research will also focus on the causal effect of ODB. Here, the role of ODB will be examined. This part of the thesis will also add to IR literature. Most realist causal explanations are more limited to distribution of or variation in relative capabilities, where emphasis is placed on balance of power and polarity to determine conflictual behaviour. Although this thesis will not claim novel contribution but its contribution to the literature is not in doubt.

The chapters that follow do not structure the thesis as a unified or continuous whole for reader to presume continuity of prior chapter. In other

words, each chapter has a relative autonomy. The (un)unified nature is due to the three distinctive phenomena under investigation: Anarchy, cooperation, and conflict (ACC ).

The rest of the thesis will proceed as follows. The next chapter will examine the conceptual insights of sovereignty, anarchy and cooperation. Conceptual Framework will be conducted to examine the concepts of sovereignty and its variants. Its obverse relationship with international anarchy will also be examined. Chapter 2, Realism, liberals and their variants will be examined. Emphasis will be placed to locate their explanatory variables. In addition constructivists' alternative explanation will be examined.

Chapter 3 will examine the debate between neorealists and neoliberals to explore the relative gains problem and the role of institutions. The chapter 4 and chapter 5 are the crux of the thesis. Hypothesis—H1 will be tested with analysis of Montreal protocol and Kyoto protocol's negotiation agreement with emphasises on US and Germany strategic approaches. These two chapters would also introduce a causal factor – ODB to hypothesis—H2—Europe (1865 – 1871) and July 1914 Crisis in Europe. And subsequently the study would close with its conclusion.

## **Chapter 1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMWORK**

This chapter will discuss previous literature on the subject under investigation. First, the chapter will tries to examine *Sovereignty* and argues that the concept can take causal variable and then links sovereignty with anarchy. This is necessary because, it will show that anarchy can sometime vary in degree if its obverse relationship with sovereignty is true. The chapter will, in subsequent sections discuss the implication of anarchy and implicitly explains conceptual framework of ACC. This chapter argues that anarchy permanent condition can be mitigated or lessen.

### **1.1. Sovereignty**

Sovereignty has been prominent in scholarly literature, since the 21st century, mostly due to intense debates by supporters and opponents of globalisation, risk associated with interdependence and the “role of non-state actors” in international relations. Most controversies on this subjects centred on the meaning and the limitation of sovereignty as a function of state to international law. In sum, the debate focused around Jean Bodin’s traditional understanding of sovereignty and Hobbes’ absolute authority assigned to sovereignty. The conceptual framwork review of sovereignty, in this chapter, is not intended to show a master exploration or full review of literature on sovereignty. The intention in this section is to shows an evolving conceptual understanding of modern sovereignty, and also to show the readers that scholars had over time implicitly argued that anarchy like sovereignty can take on measureable variable.

Scholars (Axelrod, Keohane and Nye, Ruggie and others) have argue that anarchy had eroded with time as a result, more interdependent

relations have prevailed in the system. Thus, states behaviour has change.<sup>9</sup> This is an implicit argument for variability of anarchy. Grotius (inspired by Bodin) sees limitations of sovereignty in natural law while some contemporary international relations students have argue that limitation of sovereignty can be seen in creation of institutions formal or informal organisation.

The classical concept or understanding of sovereignty as supreme authority and independence is formulated in line with Jean Bodin, who argues, that the concept of sovereignty primarily stressed complete authority within the boundary of the State and this authority cannot be subjected to any other domestic authority. For Bodin, the sovereignty of the states can only be subject only to supreme law made by God or law that are naturally inculcated. He argues that, "Those who are sovereign must not be subject to the authority of anyone else... This is why the law says that the prince must be excluded from the power of law...The law of the prince depends exclusively upon his pure and sincere will".<sup>10</sup> Bodin regarded sovereign as supreme, but not absolute. The prince, who is the sovereign, is the master of the law and no constitution can limit sovereignty. Thus, it can be argues that Bodin accepts, an actor with supreme authority and without absolute power to be sovereign.

Another emerging concept of sovereignty to alternate the classical understanding is Sovereignty as interdependence and cooperation. In his thesis, Ferreira-Snyman observed that Friedmann tried to clearly differential the traditional system from a new system of interactions among states base on international law that stresses on international cooperation and international peace. According to Ferreira-Snyman, Friedmann view this new

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<sup>9</sup> See Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, New York NY, 1984. see also Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977. Most analysts agree on the point.

<sup>10</sup> Quoted in Alain de Benoist, "What is Sovereignty?", *Journal of Libertarian Studies*, Volume 18. 2004, p. 101.

period of change in international interactions as beginning immediately after the first world war and the second world war.<sup>11</sup>

Friedmann alluded to the fact that contemporary international law stresses international cooperation which produce interdependence. Morgenthau stresses that there are various range of sovereign purview (e.g. Cuba and the U.S sovereignty) when he pointed out that Cuban sovereignty is limited by the consent of the United States. Thus, if Morgenthau's 'variation in sovereign purview' assertion is true, and the scholarly understanding that sovereign is indivisible—that is not more than one or cannot be share; then, Bordin's assertion of sovereignty as supreme and in-absolute; Friedmann's definition of sovereignty as interdependence and cooperation and lastly Falk's concept of responsible sovereignty are plausible, then, this thesis, can argue that sovereignty is a variable phenomenon.

Sovereignty becomes a variable within its limitation of lack of absoluteness and its purview—as noted by Morgenthau. In addition to its variability, its degree can be determined by globalisation and interdependence. Since, the variation of sovereignty is plausible and established. The study can now move ahead to shows how sovereignty and anarchy are related.

Wight in 1986 connected the link between sovereignty and anarchy, when he argues that an actor which claims sovereignty for itself is bound by reciprocal principles to accept the sovereignty of others.<sup>12</sup> Wight, logically but implicitly mean that states have coexisting sovereign within systemic structures; all with same claim of sovereignty, within their geography. International system cannot claim to be anarchic in absence of sovereign states. When states are sovereign, they are in anarchical position within a system. Sovereignty and anarchy resemble the analogy of a coin that showed the head representing the domestic or internal positional relations,

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<sup>11</sup> Ferreira-Snyman, MP., "The evolution of state sovereignty: A historical overview", Thesis, (Johannesburg , 2009), p17.

<sup>12</sup> Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, New York: Penguin, 1986, p. 35.

while the tail represents the external or systemic relation with other states. The presence of one indicates the absence of the other. Hinsley in 1986 stresses similarity of the “inward and outward expression” of sovereignty and anarchy<sup>13</sup> Hinsley can be understood in the context of this section to mean that the internal position of actor is relevant to the claim of anarchic condition. Therefore the variability of sovereignty can explain the same variability of anarchy.

As mentioned above, the purpose here is to establish conceptual relationship between sovereignty and anarchy. This is necessary to show that anarchy can be assigned some factors that can mitigate its nature as an organising principle in international politics. Thus, the variation of sovereignty, which has an inverse relationship with anarchy explains the plausibility of its variation and therefore problematize the permanent nature assigned to anarchy by IR scholars. This review, although not fully developed has shown that anarchy can be mitigated and be assigned variable factors.

## **1.2. Anarchy**

Anarchy is an analytic concept in the study of international relations, in security, in systemic theories and mostly structural realist theories and analysis. It is suggested to mean “absence of government.” It is understood by some scholars to foster conflicts, and argued by pessimistic scholars to discourage and constraint cooperative interactions. For neorealists “anarchy is the first element of structure in the international system”<sup>14</sup>. For Waltz, it is the permissive structural feature from which all other international outcomes lie. These are general accepted mainstream views of anarchy, but it should be noted that constructivists and other social theorists have come up to challenge and criticize these views in recent literature. In this section, the

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<sup>13</sup> See E. F. Hinsley, *Sovereignty*, 2nd ed., New York: Cambridge, 1986, p. 158.

<sup>14</sup> Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 88.

study will review literature that mostly focuses on implication and consequences of anarchy in international politics.

Anarchy is scholarly regarded as a central condition, constant phenomena, a system organising principles and to some scholars, the most single tenet of international politics. Contemporary theories, especially structural realist generally tend to present, an idea of an international system that is define by its anarchical structure. Robert Art and Robert Jervis write that

when using realist theories to explain international politics, one must focus on the behaviour of states in an anarchic environment, where no authority exists above the domestic level. States can make commitments and treaties, but no sovereign power ensures compliance and punished deviation. This – the absence of a supreme power – is what is meant by the anarchic environment of international politics.<sup>15</sup>

Helen Milner asserts that anarchy can be seen as a phenomenon that has a dual meaning, the first meaning, stresses “lack of order” which may implies “chaos or disorder” or the ‘state of nature’ analogical to Hobbesian world. The second meaning is the lack of central government, an assertion universally agreed by scholars.<sup>16</sup> Anarchy depicts or describes current order in international relations in which states are the units of interactions. For Waltz, anarchy is separate and different form of scholarly inquiry and can dictate its rules and international interactions

There is general agreement between neoliberal and neorealist on the influence of anarchical interactions in world politics, and about actor rational choice decision making process under anarchy, but unlike the neorealist, the neoliberal institutionalist sees anarchy as a condition that be upgraded to

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<sup>15</sup> Robert Art and Robert Jervis, *Anarchy and its Consequences in International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, New York: Pearson Education, 2007, p. 1-6.

<sup>16</sup> Helen Milner, *Assumption of Anarchy in International Theory: A Critique*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 69.



cooperative interactions through institutions and regime. For neoliberals, David A. Lake argues that:

“Anarchy does not define the goals that states seek but rather merely permits dilemmas of collaboration and coordination to arise that thwart cooperation between utility maximizing states.”<sup>17</sup>

For Lake, neoliberals believe the effect of anarchy is minimum and merely posed a dilemma on strategic choices. Neorealist argues that anarchy condition conflictual interactions in world politics . This study argues that anarchy to most scholars has been regarded as unchanged condition in international system but this section also revealed that some analysts have questioned the “fuzziness of anarchy”. Milner made this point clear in her articles when she demands clarification for the term. Other critics make the argument that anarchy has eroded and give way to interdependence. Keohane and Nye also made this point in their book.

Some extreme critics have also argued that anarchy had never been an important condition of international system, and hence rejected the anarchy proposition. Wong in his dissertation argues that, K. J. Holsti used the term “anarchies” which indicate various type of anarchies and he moved on to suggests that Zacher, implies that anarchy, is not a constant, when he wrote that ‘the international system is moving from high level of anarchy that previously existed to one in which reasonably important to regime exist.’ Therefore, for Wong, Zacher, implies existence of anarchies.<sup>18</sup>

Some analysts argued that the degree of anarchy in the medieval period was different from the modern era, some have argued for differentiation of anarchy comparing the period before and after Westphalia. When different degree of anarchy have existed in one period, and if is true that scholarly arguments had been made for its erosion and its multiple nature— then the existence of anarchies are plausible; consequently, the variability of its form is a fact than an illusion. Wong noted that Buzan’s book

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<sup>17</sup> David A. Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009.

<sup>18</sup> Wong K.R, “Testing the anarchy tenet: An Empirical analysis of the anarchy and anarchy –Conflict Relationship”, Dissertation; (University of British Columbia, 1997) P.45

entitled “*Logic of Anarchy*” present stresses clear anarchy as a condition that is variable. Although, this study tend to stresses scholarly literatures that defines the existence of “anarchies” note of caution must be emphasize here that while the discussion had created alternative challenges to define anarchy as variable, anarchy as a constant phenomenon still enjoys universal agreement among scholars.

### **1.3. Conflict and Cooperation**

The international system according to international relations theorists is condition by lack of trust and self-help principles. This condition induced by the organising principle of the international system fosters conflict and make cooperation difficult to achieve. Scholars, also believe, cheating and uncertainty over others’ intentions give incentive to the use of force to achieve ultimate goals, hence, cooperation is difficult in international politics. Realist scholars argue that the scenario mentioned above condition interstates interaction to be prone to conflict, and some time spiral to severe conflict of interest through security dilemma, which reinforce itself through a feedback mechanism that could lead to tragic war.

. Neoliberal theorists, like the realists see the problem of cheating and uncertainty over intentions, but believe cooperation is possible, when the right international law, regime, norms and institutions are design as panacea. In this section, the thesis will attempts to review literature to determine; the conceptual meaning and nature of ACC in international politics

Keohane argues that understanding international cooperation, it is important to understands and define “harmony”, “discord” and conflict<sup>19</sup> He explains, harmony, is when actors pursues policies in their self-interest without regards to other actors and such polices automatically fosters the preferences of others’ goals, then harmony in this case has occur. For

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<sup>19</sup> Keohane, *After Hegemony*.

Keohane, harmony is rare in real world, but there is discord when or if a state pursues policies for self-interest without regards to other actors and such policies hindering the preference or attainment of other actors goals—then discord is in existence. It is discord, when state try to induces other states to change their policies in lines with expected goals either through negative or positive inducement, (either through promise for reward or threat for punishment and if they refuse to change their policies)<sup>20</sup>.

For Keohane, if such effort for inducement failed, then Conflict occur but if the effort for inducement enable states actors to adjust their policies, then international cooperation had occurred, therefore cooperation occurs in midst of conflict.<sup>21</sup> Keohane, concluded that cooperation “Occurs when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination.”<sup>22</sup> For Keohane’s institutionalism, cooperation is important part of avoiding collective action failure in world politics through policy adjustment, like trafficking between borders. A good example is Turkey policy adjustment on illegal immigration through policy coordination with the EU countries. In Keohane’s world, cooperation can occurs with or without bargaining.

Empirical analysis of cooperation started with Axelrod’s reciprocity strategy, where a state actor “A” will engages, first, with cooperative policy coordination and thereafter reciprocates actor “B” strategy on previous move.<sup>23</sup> Therefore earlier scientific study on cooperation was guided by Axelrod’s game theory—reciprocity strategy—that explains the nature of interstate behaviour in the system. The waning of the Cold War also advanced the study of cooperation, as scholars began to challenge the sentiment behind “Hobbesian state of nature”. New theoretical approaches under the paradigm of institutionalism emerged. For example, Keohane and

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 256

<sup>21</sup> Ibid

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., P.51

<sup>23</sup> See Robert Axelrod, “More Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Volume 24, No. 3, 1980, pp. 379-403.

Nye—power and interdependence theory stresses a prevailing complex of interdependence that make cooperation available. Keohane also argues the emerging international behaviour from condition of conflict to cooperative interactions. The core assumption of this shift in paradigm was a belief that states were concerned in absolute gains.

Another phenomena conceptualized is “regime” as an intervening institutional mechanism that was widely accepted by some realists—like Krasner. Regime opens the flood gate for cooperation theories, and that the major constraint to cooperation for this group of scholars, as noted by Baldwin, is the collective action problem. And this problem arises due to free-riding in the absence of regime transparency and adequate monitoring.<sup>24</sup> They argue that international institutions can enhance cooperation through mechanisms such as promoting issue linkage or providing necessary information; states therefore create institutions to solve their collective action problems. Classical realists, like Morgenthau downplayed the need for international institutions to maintain order but Waltz recognizes the importance of international institutions, but he argues that institutions effectiveness is determined or influenced by the capabilities of the states, or they might become unable to act without the support of the states concerned within the matter at hand.

Regime to the neoliberals fosters cooperation, regime increases states expectation for other participants to cooperate. Stephen Krasner, defines, regimes, as "institutions possessing norms, decision rules, and procedures which facilitate a convergence of expectations."<sup>25</sup> Krasner recently stressed distributional issues to challenge the neoliberal approaches. Krasner's criticism is that the nature of institutional arrangements is better explained by the distribution of national power capabilities than by efforts to solve problems of market failure. For realists,

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<sup>24</sup> See Keohane, *After Hegemony*. And on discussion about regime See Stephen Krasner *et al.*, *International Regimes*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 29-32.

institutions do not shape actors, they are strategic instruments employed by states to achieve their goals. For realists, relative gains consideration will discourage short term cooperation and foster conflict.

Conflict in general terms mean discord, war, disputes or disagreement of ideas and interest between two actors. Earlier literature on conflicts dates back to the works of Thucydides, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Kant and Rousseau. Contemporary theories on the study of conflicts are primarily embedded in realists' theories that present, an idea of an international system that is defines by its anarchical structure.

## **Chapter 2. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES**

Understanding limits and extents of conflict and cooperation in anarchical international system deduce, the importance to analyse the mainstream theoretical perspectives in international politics. This is necessary, because analysts had explained conflictive and cooperative outcomes according to their paradigmatic views. Critics claimed, realists see inevitable conflictive interactions among actors and very minimum cooperation. The liberals see conflict and war as irrational and explain that anarchy can be mitigated through institutional mechanism when mutual interest is at stake. While constructivist stresses the role of identity and interest factors in shaping international outcome.

This chapter will explore the above theoretical sentiments in a very concise but sufficient manner. First, realist perspectives and some of its variants will be examined in sub-sections. Then liberal perspectives would also be explained in two sub-sections, First, preferences-base liberalism, and then neoliberal institutionalism. In addition, this chapter, will close with, the constructivism alternative approach. And due to lack of space, the thesis will not examine others very important perspectives like Marxism, and feminism.

### **2.1. Realism**

This section examines theories that explain balance of power as a means and ends to security in international politics. While all realists' variants agreed that power is the currency exchange for security. There are however prevailing difference in approaches. These approaches have given rise to different strands of realism. Some are classical; structural and neoclassical in contents. The thesis subsequently will examine these various strands in two sub-sections. First, traditional/classical realism. The second sub-section will examine structural realism as advocated mostly by Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer.

### 2.1.1 Realism: Intellectual Precursors

Realists believe that power is the ultimate means to ensure survival in international politics. Realist explains the international politics as it is, not as it ought to be. Its tradition and literature have dominated international politics since ancient Greek. Some of the realists intellectual precursors are Thucydides' *Peloponnesian War*, Niccolo Machiavelli's *The Prince* and Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*. Machiavelli's *The Prince* is an intellectual precursor of offensive realism. And Hobbes's thesis that stress "power" became the basis of influence for modern and contemporary approaches to international politics.<sup>26</sup>

### 2.1.2. Classical Realism

Classical realism is a reaction to idealist's thoughts that dominated the literature of world politics, after the end of World War 1. Scholars like Edward H. Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, a classic, rejected the role of international law and organizations to maintain international peace. Carr stressed that in reality, nation's selfish concerns dominate international politics and aggressive actions by states are fully rational and natural.<sup>27</sup> Prominent classics attributed to realist thinking (like Nicolson, Niebuhr, Schwarzenberger, Wight, Morgenthau, Kennan, Butterfield) also stressed the role of power politics and rejected the idealist utopian view that found faith in Wilsonian ideas.

Most prominent classical realist in that era – Morgenthau stressed human nature as a causal factor in international politics. "Morgenthau's "Politics among Nations: The struggle for Power and Peace" received more

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<sup>26</sup> Hobbes' primary focus was on domestic politics, but he made a strong arguments for a centralized authority to maintain orderliness for human security.

<sup>27</sup> See E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, London.

and emerged as standard bearer for realism as his book went through six editions between 1948- 1985.<sup>28</sup> Morgenthau six principles of political realism made a landmark contribution to international politics and political realism in particular.<sup>29</sup>

Morgenthau's classical realism contends that flawed human nature induced quest for power as ends and thus conflict is inevitable in international arena in absence of world government or sovereign. In classical realism states are in security dilemma interactions - situation where 'security seeking' states with benign intentions increases its defensive military capabilities, which adversary state, seen as action that reduces its own security. And in reaction, increase its military capabilities. The situation continues in vicious cycle, until it leads to spiral of conflicts and tragedy of war. Realism contend that anarchical condition foster this security dilemma and therefore cannot be overcome.<sup>30</sup>

For classical realist, state goal is to maximize power. Order in the system is achieve through "balance of Power." The logic is that State balance power against rising and threatening powers in the system or against imbalances of power. This behavior, which may be regional, or sometime dyadic is one of the fundamental stability theory of the realist paradigm. For realist, power imbalances lead to conflict, thus, state deters aggression through balancing. Realists believe that powerful states balance by forming alliances with other states in order to checks the power of potential aggressors. Good example of power balancing is the "Concert of Europe" that emerged after the Napoleonic Wars.

### 2.1.3. Structural Realism

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<sup>28</sup> Martin Griffiths (ed.), *International Relations Theory for the twenty-first century: An Introduction*, New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 12.

<sup>29</sup> See Morgenthau, *op. cit.*

<sup>30</sup> See chapter 1.1 above where the thesis have examined a concise meaning of Security dilemma



Structural realism is the contemporary version of realism. It comprises mostly Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer structural explanations on 'why war occurs?'<sup>31</sup> What causes war? And how much power is enough for state survival in the system? Understanding "structural realism" it is fundamental to understand clearly the structure of the system, as explains by Kenneth Waltz. This is necessary, because the tension in the intra-realism debate and of course, the inter paradigm debate revolve around the basic question: why do states want power? For Morgenthau, it is due to human nature and for Waltz and Mearshiemer, it is the structure of the system.

Realists agree that the major interest of states is to survive and the only way to ensure this goal is to increase relative power. Both realists also agree that anarchy is a condition in international politics. But Morgenthau and Waltz disagree on the influences of flawed human nature in international politics. Neorealism disagrees with Morgenthau's human nature assertion. Instead, Waltz argues that anarchy, not human nature, is the "permissive cause of war."<sup>32</sup>

In defining the structure of international system, Waltz, emphasize that it is necessary to abstract the attribute or unit's characteristics behaviour and interactions between units in the system. For example, Waltz argues that "Nuclear revolution in military technology is a unit-level change and not a structural change"<sup>33</sup> Waltz, defined a "system" or "political structure" by its "ordering principle" and the "distribution of capabilities" across its units.<sup>34</sup>

Powell regards Waltz's definition as too restricted and questions Waltz intention to limit definition of structure to achieve his intended transposable form of structure. *In a clear terms, Powell contestation suggests that Waltz prefers a definition that made the concept of structure*

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<sup>31</sup> Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.

<sup>32</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics", in Robert E. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 327.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

more readily “transposable” to any system that has anarchical structure like the market structures in microeconomics theory.

Structural realists believe, power is based on material capabilities, that is, various tangible military assets that states accumulate in time and space. The relative possession of these capabilities determines great power in the system. For structural realist, these great powers are distributed in polarity (Unipolar, Bipolar and Multipolar). These actors, according to realists are rational and operate under the incentives and constraints of anarchical international system where central government is absence to enforce rules. These sovereign actors operate in international independence that is mixed with uncertainty and imperfect information.<sup>35</sup>

Structural realism States fear each other’s motives and are wary of ambiguous intentions of others. These fears present regulated by self-help principles drive states into security dilemma.<sup>36</sup> Mearsheimer argues that structural realist actors will aim at hegemony, if the circumstances allow it. This assertion is rejected by some structural realists like Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt. For Waltz and Walt, an appropriate power is enough to guarantee state security goal.

This thesis, will now consider, in details two types of structural realism namely: Defensive realism and Offensive realism. How much power is enough to ensure survival? This is the fundamental question that divides contemporary realism into: “Defensive realism and Offensive realism.”

#### **2.1.4. - Defensive and Offensive Realism**

How much power is enough to ensure survival? This question divides these two groups of realists? For Waltz, a defensive realist, it is unwise to maximize increment of power because the system will balance against or

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<sup>35</sup>See chapter 2 of this thesis for detail analysis of anarchy and its implication

<sup>36</sup>For details on security dilemma, see Robert Jervis, Butterfield, Shipng Tang’s analysis. The logic presented above, is also noted by Mearsheimer, see “Structural Realism”, p. 74.

punish states that gain too much of power. According to defensive realism, it would not be beneficial for the states to pursue hegemonic power. Offensive realism favours states to maximize power and contends that the pursuit of hegemony is a good strategic to ensure ultimate survival goal.

Defensive realism understands the “anarchical structure of the system” give states an incentive to pursue maximum power, but such goal, they contend, drive states to a disadvantage in balance of power interactions. Realist states will balance against the most powerful actors in the system, leaving the actors less secure. Defensive realists argue that in some situation, excessive power that induced balancing can destroy the most powerful state.

Some defensive realists gave empirical evidence of alliance coalition balancing that caused the demise of Napoleonic France in 1792–1815, Wilhelm Germany in 1900–18, and Nazi Germany in 1933–45, when they set their security goal in excess of what defensive realists would call not appropriate power under anarchy. Defensive realists would argue that Otto von Bismarck recognised offence –defence balance after the victory in Franco –Prussia war in 1870 -1871 that ushered Germany unification, which highlight defensive realist behaviour when Bismarck recognised that further expansion will induce nationalism and spiral war that might unite alliance coalition against Germany.

Offensive realism understands the balance of power coalition strategies against a ‘potential hegemon’ (using Mearsheimer’s term)<sup>37</sup> but rejected the defensive argument and contends that such alliance coalitions are usually end in failure. This failure which sometime came as result of buck-passing rather than alliance coalition motivate a potential hegemon to move swiftly to take advantage to position itself as regional hegemon.<sup>38</sup> Offensive realism also disagree with the logic of defence – offence balance

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<sup>37</sup>The term “potential hegemon” was used by John Mearsheimer in his book *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: Norton, 2001.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

claims, that the defence has advantage over offence, thus, it is foolish to behaviour offensively in anarchical system. They argue that the US, between the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries behaviour offensively and did accomplished hegemony in western hemisphere. Imperial Germany also according to this argument almost achieve expansionist goal.<sup>39</sup>

Sometimes, states act in non-strategic way contrary to structural realist theories, defensive and offensive realists agrees in principles, that sometime, states behave irrationally which contradicts their theories. For defensive realists like Posen and Snyder, contradiction is best explained by theories of foreign policy. While offensive realists contend that states historically acts offensively therefore their behaviour is exclusively explained by structural factors rather than domestic factor which are the purview of foreign policy explanation.

What causes war? This is a question Waltz asked in 1959, in *Man, the State, and War*, where he argued that there are three levels or images that can locate the causes of war, which are according to Waltz: “the individual, the state, and the state system with none of them alone being sufficient to explain why wars do or do not occur For Waltz, the understanding of “System structure” by its “ordering principle”, and the “distribution of capabilities” across the units gives a clue to the causes of war. The structure of the system is the “permissive” cause of conflicts and the reason for little cooperation in international politics.

But Mearsheimer puts the emphasis on different factors like motivation for conquests, Ideology or economic considerations. He argues that “nationalism was the main reason Bismarck launched wars against Denmark in 1864, Austria in 1866, and France in 1870–1. The Prussian leader wanted to create a unified Germany.”<sup>40</sup>

Both defensive and offensive realists agree that conflicts cause by non-security concerns is consistent with their theories but only if the balance

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<sup>39</sup>Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism”, p. 78.

of power logic is not disregarded by actors. For structural realists, relative power concern should rank first to any decision that ensures states' goals. Realist theories have come up with different variables to explain why international politics lean towards conflict and little cooperation. Explanations range from non-structural factors like human nature to structural factors – distribution of capabilities across other states. Some explain sharp change in the balance of power determines international outcomes, others see outcomes regulated by the variation in the defence – offence balance, others stress on the quantity of “polarity” or “number of poles” or “great powers” in world politics.

For classical realists like Morgenthau, a multipolar system is more stable while structural realists, bipolarity tends to be more stable than a multipolar system. Realists, who are proponents of hegemony stability theorists, explain conflictual and cooperative outcomes through the unifying power of the unipole or hegemon. Defensive realists see the existence of cooperation in international or world politics when a state's major goal is limited to security.

#### **2.1.5. Postclassical Realism**

Postclassical realism came in the form of a critique to neorealism. This strand argues that states' behaviour is conditioned not by possibility but by probability of conflicts in international politics.<sup>41</sup> Postclassical realists share a general assumption with neorealists. Brooks asserted that,

“both (postclassical realism and neorealism) have a systemic focus; both are state-centric; both view international politics as inherently competitive; both emphasize material factors, rather than nonmaterial factors,

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<sup>41</sup>The term “postclassical realism” was put by Joseph G. Brooks, who represents the non-Waltzian strand of realism in international relations theory. Brooks argues that Waltz's neo-realism focuses on the possibility of conflict. For post-classical realism the focus should be on the probability of conflict. See details on this work in Stephen Brooks, “Dueling Realisms”, *International Organisation*, Volume 51, No. 3, 1997, pp.445-477

such as ideas and institutions; and both assumed states are egoistic actors that pursues self-help .”<sup>42</sup>

Postclassical realists argue that the international politics is highly conflictive when offensive capabilities have the advantage over defensive capabilities. Inversely, less conflict will trump when defensive capabilities is at the advantage, States in this environment discount short term gains of military preparedness for long term gain of economic capacity.<sup>43</sup>

#### 2.1.6. Neoclassical Realism

Neoclassical realism is a recent strand of realism. Neoclassical realism<sup>44</sup> comprises the scholarly works of William Wohlforth; Thomas J. Christensen; Alastair J. H. Murray; Gideon Rose; Randall Schweller; Fareed Zakaria; Mark Brawley; Colin Dueck; Asle Toje; Tom Dyson. Scholarly contributions by Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Randall schweller, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M Ripsman also stress on the neoclassical realism. They argue that domestic factors intervene in shaping systemic structure in determine the behaviour of states in international politics<sup>45</sup>

This strand of realism derives systemic factors as general determinate and direction of policy. It also agreed, the view of Classical realism that foreign policy is made at the state level by elite leaders and Like Liberalism, it recognizes the domestic values intervene to shape the political outcomes. Taliaferro writing in support of neoclassical realism emphasizes the permanent struggle among states for power and security. In his thesis, he

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 446.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> The term ‘neoclassical realism’, was first used by Gideon Rose in a 1998

<sup>45</sup> See, see the review in Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, *World Politics*, Volume 51, No. 1, 1998.

contended that Thucydides observation of *Peloponnesian* crisis still hold true.<sup>46</sup>

## **2.2. Liberal Perspective**

During modern interwar period (1914-1944), idealistic scholars were the major challengers to realist's power-maximizing perspective of international politics. Idealists, unlike the realists began to promote a belief about how things should or can be in the world and subsequently began to questioned the basic tenets of realism that were inspired by Hobbes in *Leviathan*, Thucydides in *Peloponnesian War* and Machiavelli in *Prince*. The idealists were in belief that idea and norms are intrinsic powerful and when embedded in international law and international organisation could transform the world from power-seeking into peace, cooperation and harmony. The belief of international law and organisations for peace, started to wane down when the League of Nations failed to stop the Second World War.

In this section, a well-developed paradigmatic challenger to realism—the liberal perspective will be examined in two sub-sections. First, liberalism-preferences based as explains by Andrew Moravcsik and then Neoliberal institutionalism advocated by Robert Keohane.

### **2.2.1. – Liberal Theory (Preference base)**

Scholars and analysts interested in the same ontological explanations of idealism have replaced the label with either liberalism or constructivism. In this sub-section, the research would examine the former. In an attempt to distinguish from others liberal approaches,

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<sup>46</sup> Jeffrey Taliaferro, "Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy", Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 5.

Moravcsik's liberal theory is distinguished from other rationalist theories by assuming, and putting emphasises on states preferences that are determine by different societal factors.<sup>47</sup> For Moravcsik, states are not monolithic and states preferences are derive from ranges of societal groups with different varying interests which ultimately shape national preferences. But there is also an understanding that these ranges of societal interests are aggregate of overriding national interest transmitted through the domestic institutions since different societal actors have different interests, the most powerful group exalt more influence through the political institutions . This concept of pluralism, simply tells us that varied self-interested domestic actors play a role in shaping states behaviour in international politics. Think about Turkey-Syria relations (2011 – till date), while some Turkish political groups believe that, the Assad regime represents a threat to his people and the region and there is a need for regime change, in other hand are groups who oppose regime change and others primarily want the Turkey government to be concern on the humanitarian crisis.

Liberals States are embedded in both domestic and transnational society. States are pressure by these varied groups for realization of their competing self-interested goals transmitted through state political institution. These institutional pressures liberals argues define state preferences and a purposive and forceful stake for interstates interactions. Like neoliberal-institutionalists, liberals also assumed realist's anarchical unchanging international environment and rationality. For Moravcsik, Globalization is the basic determinate of international politics.

Globalization induced interdependence across borders and created incentive for economy, social and cultural interaction. For Moravcsik, state preferences are a fundamental cause of state behaviour in world politics. While realists locate permissive causes of war in human nature, and the structure of the international system, Moravcsik argues otherwise that conflict

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid, P.1



is as result of some states possessing revisionist status that were emanated through societal forces. Liberal theory comprises of three categories base on their underlying preferences and their impacts in state behaviour. They are Ideational theories, Commercial theories, and Republican theories.

Ideational liberalism is based on the influence domestic social values like national identity; Political ideology and scope of socioeconomic regulation, which are transmitted through political institutions, affect the interdependence policy of states interactions across borders. Liberal commercialism stresses the importance of domestic economic interests that create common bond across borders that make international cooperation possible. Here emphases are placed in power and interdependence<sup>48</sup> through the processes of globalization.

The third category is; Liberal internationalism or liberal republicanism: This form of liberalism is based on the Kantian notion of 'perpetual peace' and Michael Doyle's 'Democratic peace', which tells us that in places where government is based on consent of the citizenry, there will be a reluctance to go to war because of the hardships that war invariably imposes on those citizens. This strand of liberalism argues that democracy promotes peace and in fact, democracies do not fight themselves.

### **2.2.2. Neoliberal Institutionalism**

The Neoliberal approaches, includes basic six propositions. First one, neoliberals agree with neorealism that the state is the most important actor of international relations. Secondly, state as the main actor behaves "rationally" and "egoistic." Third, Neo liberal believe, that actors or states that has common interest and want cooperation are marred by "*collective action problem*", which can, however, be overcome. Fourth, international politics is condition by state interests. Fifth, neoliberals assume that the ordering principle in international politics is anarchy. And sixth, time horizon of actors,

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<sup>48</sup> See Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*.

the number of actors in or interdependence are others factor beside the anarchical structure that affect international politics.<sup>49</sup>

Since 1980s, the neoliberal's scholars stress on how the variation of institutional arrangement affect international politics through the provision of needed information; reduction of transaction cost and enable efficiency. These in turn mitigate the anarchical nature of international arena to promote cooperative behaviour when mutual interest is at stake. Institutionalism was answered with trenchant criticism by the neorealist, especially in John Mearsheimer's article entitled "*False Promise of International institutions*":

Rational approach to international institutions stresses that institutions are necessary to reduce costs of cooperation through the reduction of transaction costs and uncertainty. Institutions, according to rationalist approach is necessary to reduce uncertainty of others intentions through the provision of information and among other functions that reduce transaction cost of cooperation.

### **2.3. Constructivism: Alternative Explanations**

Scholars like Onuf in 1989; Wendt in 1992 &1999; Hopf in 1996, who aspired constructivist thinking aimed to challenge rationalist ontological understanding of power structure; military capabilities; international institutions; concept of anarchy; 'agency and structure' and interest and identities assumed by the rationalists to be determinate and objective facts in international relations. For constructivist, international relations themes has social meanings and constructs through inter-subjective understanding, beliefs, and discourse that are reproduced over time and space through social practice. Wendt argues that,

"This meaning is constructed from a complex and specific mix of history, ideas, norms, and beliefs which scholars must

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<sup>49</sup> See Keohane, *After Hegemony*; see also David Baldwin (ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

understand if they are to explain state behaviour. For example, Constructivists argue that the nuclear arsenals of the United Kingdom and China, though comparably destructive, have very different meanings to the United States that translate into very different patterns of interaction.”<sup>50</sup>

Although, constructivism lacks a coherent theory of international politics, the constructivists understanding of some basic concepts have huge challenge to the rationalist theoretical framework.

This thesis, will emphasize these differences (between rationalists and constructivists) on central themes and concepts, such as power, multiple meaning of anarchy, self-help, constitutive nature of agent and structure, Interest and identity, cooperation, capability, conflict and sovereignty.<sup>51</sup> First, Multiple Logic of Anarchy: Constructivists challenged rationalist static conception of anarchy, sovereignty; interests and identities. As popularly stressed and explained by Wendt, “*anarchy is what states make of it.*”<sup>52</sup> Anarchy for constructivists is socially constructed through inter-subjective belief, which leads to cooperative anarchy and other types of socially constructed anarchies. Constructivists suggest that there are multiple forms of anarchies.

Secondly, “Actors” and “Structures” are mutually constituted - constructivists challenge rationalist conception of the relationship between agents (actors) and structures (constraint; incentive). For constructivist, the question is “how an action does or does not reproduce both actors and structures”<sup>53</sup> Actors and structures are mutually constituted. The relationship between agent and structure are not fixed or stable rather it is as result of

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<sup>50</sup> Quoted in Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International Relations; Principal Theories”, Wolfrum, R. (ed.), *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 19.

<sup>51</sup> This point of difference between constructivist and rationalists were also stressed in Nilufer Karacasulu and Elif Uzgoren, Karacasulu, Nilufer and Elif Uzgoren, “Explaining Social Constructivist Contributions To Security Studies” *METU Conference on International Relations*, Ankara, 2006.

<sup>52</sup> Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it”, pp. 391-425.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 172

ongoing interactions through inter-subjective social understanding. These interactions may reinforce or change the broader social structures in which the actors exist, including norms and other forms of shared meaning regarding sovereignty, threat, and interests.

Third, *Construction of "Interest" and "Identities"*: constructivists stress State identity as combination of its "preferences" and "consequent actions." Wendt gave typical example of the ongoing interactions between North Korea and United States to emphasize the preference and identity factors.

*Lastly. Discursive Power.* While structural realism and other rationalist's perspective stressed material power in form of military and/or economic capabilities. Most constructivists scholars draw closer material power and discursive power as necessary factor in determine international politics. "Discursive power" according to Foucault, refers to

"ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and relations between them. Discourse is more than ways of thinking and producing meaning. They constitute the 'nature' of the body, unconscious and conscious mind and emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern."<sup>54</sup>

Discursive power is the type of power that circulates in the social environment through practice

In conclusion, it can argue that constructivists and rationalists share concerns in every major themes in international relations—relationship between actors and structures; the effect of anarchy, meaning of power and form of power, determination of preferences and many other contemporary subjects. However constructivists ontologically disagree with the rationalist approach in most every central concept and themes in IR. In the

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<sup>54</sup> Quoted in Chris Weedon, *Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1987, p. 108.

constructivist worldview, international relations are best understood through sociological constructivism.

### **Chapter 3: THE DEBATE BETWEEN NEOREALISTS AND NEOLIBERALS**

International relations scholars from various paradigms, being realists or liberals have put forward, causal variables, models and theoretical approaches to explain the limit and extent of cooperation in the international system. These different views, sometime have led to extensive scholarly arguments and debates. Sometime, these debates are termed rationalists and relativists debate, idealists and behaviouralist/realists and recently neorealist and neoliberals debate. In this chapter, the thesis will examine the contemporary's debate between neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists. The former, critics claim is pessimistic about the prospect of extensive cooperation, while the latter are much optimistic about cooperation.

This chapter will argue that both theoretical perspectives believe conflictual behaviours is often more seen in anarchical setting due to dominant self-preservation strategy in international politics . In addition, the chapter will also argue that both neorealist and neoliberals see cooperation possible in the system of states. The basic controversy stemming from this debate is how much cooperation is possible in a system constrained by anarchy and self-help principles. The study will examine three (3) approaches, in line with the basic issues of contentions between neorealist and neoliberals—Nature and Consequences of Anarchy; Relative Gains Problem and Role of Institutions.

#### **3.1. Nature and the Consequences of Anarchy**

Neorealist and neoliberals presuppose that anarchy is the ordering principles in international system.<sup>55</sup> Anarchy is best understood as the

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<sup>55</sup> For a detailed discussion on the debate between neorealists and neoliberals, see Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism and Cooperation," *International Security*, vol. 24, no. 1 (summer 1999). For neorealist perspective on relative gain problem see Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation". For neoliberals' views see Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," in David Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*; Robert Axelrod and John Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions", *World Politics*, Volume 8, 1985.

absence of government or more generally the absence of political authority over and between the units of a political system. The debate between neorealists and neoliberals is more centred on the obscured understanding of nature and consequences of anarchy that conditions state behaviour. Realists emphatically stressed that anarchy, naturally subject states to self-help principles that led them to security dilemma.

This environment condition, by interest for self-preservation and misperception of adversary intentions led state to seek security through arms race that could lead to spiral of conflict. For neorealists this scenario makes cooperation difficult to achieve and conflict become a possibility in inter-states relations.<sup>56</sup>

The neoliberals agree almost with the realist's core assumptions about the "structure" of the International system and about the major actor rational choice decision making process under anarchy, but unlike the neorealists, the neoliberals see anarchy as a condition that can be lessen or reduce in effect through institutionalized interactions between states In the international politics.<sup>57</sup> Neorealists argue that the possibility of using force is always present in international political interactions among states, therefore, relative gains concern would discourage cooperation even in the midst of institutions.

### **3.2. Relative Gains Problem**

The "relative gains problem" is second major issue at the centre of the debate between neorealist and liberal institutionalism. This controversy is opened up by Waltz's assertions that

"When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask

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<sup>56</sup> This point is emphasized by Grieco when he outlines realist assumptions . See Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation", pp. 118-119.

<sup>57</sup> See Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations*.

not "Will both of us gain?" but "Who will gain more?" If an expected gain is to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other. Even the prospect of large absolute gains for both parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities."<sup>58</sup>

The contention here is merely ontological misunderstanding of the characteristics of the states (positional or atomistic) and misunderstanding of the state preferences. In this section, the study will explore both views and contentions.

Grieco contends that neoliberal institutionalists assumed the state to be atomistic and hence, are only concerned in utility maximizing, for Grieco, States are positional, and concern on both absolute and relative gains.<sup>59</sup> Absolute gains look at the total effect of the decision while relative gains only look at the individual gains in respect to others. Absolute gains will engage in comparative advantage and expand the overall economy while relative gains is a zero-sum game where one state can only get richer by gaining from others.

Waltz as we may expect, asserted that States under the effect of anarchy consider possibility for cooperation primarily, if their security is assured. On the other hand neoliberals like Keohane disagreed that cooperation is contentious. For liberals, international system is anarchic, but normatively regulated too. It leads to an argument that cooperation in areas of mutual interest may mitigate the effects of anarchy.<sup>60</sup>

In mounting his institutional challenge in *After Hegemony*, Keohane assumes that actors tend to maximize absolute gain or states want to increase its total welfare for her citizens. He then analyzes the problem of

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<sup>58</sup> Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 105.

<sup>59</sup> Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation", p. 489.

<sup>60</sup> Keohane, *After Hegemony*, pp. 51-75.



cooperation in terms of the “repeated prisoners' dilemma”. Grieco, objecting to Keohane stresses that states maximize absolute gains and also concern on relative gains.<sup>61</sup>

In sum, the debate about absolute and relative gains became a debate about what to assume about states' utility functions. Realists argue that cooperative interactions are marred with relative gains concerns and uncertainty of actor's intentions. And as Waltz put it, “what will be the gains of other states”? Realist theorists use single-play ‘prisoner's dilemma’ (PD) to argue convincingly the concept of relative gains.

In a single-play prisoner's dilemma (see figure 1) a state leader has two choices: cooperate or defect. The payoff structure makes defection a dominant strategy for both players because defecting always offers a higher payoff. Each cell (payoff) in *figure 1*<sup>62</sup> above represents a possible outcome in PD game. Cell in upper triangle and lower triangle represent “Row” and “Column” respectively, the higher the number the greater the payoff.

		Player A	
		Cooperate	Defect
Player B	Cooperate	3 / 3	1 / 4
	Defect	4 / 1	2 / 2

<sup>61</sup> See Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation”.

<sup>62</sup> Figure 1 lifted from Smith Shane, “Game Theory”, (Beyond Intractability,2003) <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/prisoners-dilemma> .

Realist single-play prisoner's dilemma is a simple model, but it is useful to understand complex situation in armament race between two states (Eg. US and the default Soviet Union). Prisoner's Dilemma illustrates a "zero-sum situation, each player is motivated to pursue a "winning strategy". The collective result is unproductive, at best, and destructive, at worst. It is beyond the scope of this research, to analyze detail conceptual framework of the PD.

Liberal counter-arguments were led by Duncan Snidal and Keohane. Liberals argue cooperation among states cannot be limited by "Relative gains" unless the structure of the system or anarchy is treated as a prisoner's dilemma problem otherwise absolute gain will be more attractive to initial cooperative interactions.<sup>63</sup> For Keohane, actors or states interests and preferences are absolute and not relative to others.<sup>64</sup> Neoliberals believe that states cooperate to achieve absolute gains and the greatest obstacle to cooperation is 'cheating' or non-compliance by other states.

### **3.3. The Role of Institutions**

Institutions and its designs have been controversial issues between the mainstream tradition and also between rationalists and the constructivists in IR. '*Does Institutions matter*' is the question during the contentious debate between neorealism and neoliberals debate on the existence and the limit of International cooperation. The neoliberal institutionalists led by Robert Keohane are optimistic about the role of institutions and therefore assigns a significant role for institutions to bring about international cooperation where actors has mutual interest .This optimism, was not shared by the structural realists led by Kenneth Waltz, which suggests institutional designs are results of great power self-interest to maximize power and security.

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<sup>63</sup> Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation", *The American Political Science Review*, Volume 85, No. 3, 1991, p. 701.

<sup>64</sup> See Keohane, *After Hegemony*.

This section will examine the role neorealists and neoliberals assign to international institutions. The core arguments in this section is that the neoliberal suggests institutions can solve the collective action problem when actors with common interest create institutional mechanism for specific issues area. They argue that Institution arrangement formerly or informally arranged can mitigate collective action problem through the reduction of information and transactional of international.<sup>65</sup> Thus, institutionalists had recently assumed institutions as their major research programme; therefore, detailed analytical work had been seen in the neoliberal literature. This is contrary to the neorealists who are more pessimistic on the role of institutions in international politics. Other theoretical approaches can be seen from the constructivist groups, which define institutions in terms of inter-subjective interactions

Keohane, in his essay entitled "*International Institutions*" *Two Approaches*<sup>66</sup> refers to institutions as "persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations."<sup>67</sup> Keohane definition of institutions may mean "patterns" and "categories" of activities (for example, religion, statehood, and diplomacy). This may take the form of the Nigeria state, the Catholic Church, EU and UN. Keohane also noted that "Specific institutions may be exemplars of general patterns of activity".<sup>68</sup>

Neoliberals identified problem of cooperation as cheating, uncertainty, distributional and enforcement problem. They argues that institutions, if designs to focus on the above problem, can eradicate, the collective action problem facing actors with mutual goals and want to cooperate in a given issues. For liberals, institution helps state overcome

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<sup>65</sup> It is beyond the scope of this research, to analyze detail constructivist conceptual framework on the role of institutions.

<sup>66</sup> Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches", pp. 158-180.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

collective action problems.<sup>69</sup> According to Institutionists, institutions help to resolve problem in Coordination games which explain coordination or distributional problems and collaboration games that stress on collaboration or enforcement problem.<sup>70</sup> Institutionists' research program offers a quite developed analysis of institutional interactions and how to alleviate the problem of cooperation.

Most of the realists work on institutions was done by the traditional realists and the new wave scholars that called themselves "modified structural realists. In this regards, Schweller, stresses that, the traditional and modified structural realists acknowledge that outcomes do not always correspond to the actual power distribution among the actors in the system but are instead modified by institutional arrangements; they believe that institutions do indeed matter. Schweller et al also noted that their above view contradicts Mearsheimer's assertion that institutions "have mattered rather little" in international politics.

Moreover, they argue that it is important to examine the disjunction between the actual power distribution and the existing institutional order-the system's prestige and hierarchy. Schweller *et al.*, citing Carr and Gilpin, noted that, as this disjunction grows with time, it eventually leads to systemic disequilibrium and war, which, in turn, restores some semblance of stability by creating institutions and outcomes that once again reflect the actual power relationships among the major actors.

Traditional and modified structural realists believe that institutions matter because even the most rudimentary interactions among states require agreement on, and some shared understanding of, the basic rules of the

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<sup>69</sup>In Oye, ed., *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy"; Arthur Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration", pp. 299- 324.

<sup>70</sup> For detailed explanation on this game theoretical explanation on coordination and collaboration games, see Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions", in Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane and Stephen Krasner (ed.), *Explorations and Contestation in the Study of World Politics*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999; Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration".

game. For this reason, order of almost any kind is preferable to chaos; it is the indispensable cement of all social systems.<sup>71</sup>

Generally, realists understand institutions function at the behest of the actors interest that created them.<sup>72</sup> Hitherto, Institutions do not belong to the realist research program. Neorealism claims all institutions are reflections of great power interests, and a balance of power strategic at maximising relative power gains. Robert Gilpin – a realist, asserted that the post-cold war liberal economic order reflected American power and interests. Realists understanding of international Institutions reflect its principles to power politics. And the impact of institutions is “*epiphenomena*” they argued..

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<sup>71</sup> See Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 35-36.

<sup>72</sup> See Krasner *et al.*, *International Regimes*; see also John Mearsheimer, “False Promise of International Institutions”, *International Security*, Volume 19, No 3, 1994/1995, p. 13.

## Chapter 4: HYPOTHESIS 1

### 4.1. Prime Prediction and Hypothesis

#### 4.1.1. Prime Prediction

States will cooperate when designed institutions are compatible with state preferences. The above predictions is derived from its hypothesis below

- *Hypothesis:* Cooperation is more likely when institutional designs are compatible with states preferences

#### 4.1.2. Explanatory Variables

- a) *Institutions* ,
- b) *information* ,
- c) *transaction cost*
- d) *Preferences*

Mainstream international relations theories (discussed in Chapter 2 and 3) emphasize three explanatory factors—Relative power, information and transaction cost, and states preferences. Realism stresses the importance of power and relative gains concerns; neoliberal institutionalism stresses information and transaction cost and liberal theory emphasizes states preferences as factors that shape international cooperation among states. Cooperation is not scientific research program of the realism except defensive realism that stresses the defence-offense balance to explain the possibility of extensive cooperation, for realism, the consequence that follows from anarchy make cooperation difficult among self-interested actors. Realists also suggest that concern for relative gains and uncertainty of others intentions make conflict rather than cooperation prominent in international politics.

Neoliberal institutionalism and liberal theory see extensive cooperation in interstate interactions than the realism. For neoliberal institutionalism variation in the provision of efficient information and reduction in transaction cost influences and determine the extent and limit of cooperation, while liberal theory stresses, the variation of states preferences embedded in individual; groups and trans-national. Neoliberal institutionalism identified cheating and market failure as the major problem of international cooperation.

According to neoliberals, institutions and regimes can help prevent market failures and alleviate collective action problem by providing efficient information and reduce transaction cost during cooperative negotiations. For Liberal theory, problem of cooperation are located in the units level and that the states act as agent to domestic interest groups, liberal theory, stresses that regimes and institutional mechanisms are necessary but, are not sufficient for cooperative agreements to be reached. Liberal theory asserts that states must have compatible preferences for cooperation outcome to achieve these preferences according to liberals are embedded in individuals, groups and other domestic interests.

The neoliberal and liberal theory explanatory factors are useful in environmental cooperative negotiation and predictions. As argued above, neorealist will predict that climate change agreements will not be possible because of relative gains concerns. Neoliberal institutionalism predicts climate change agreements are likely, as long as a collective action problem is identified and adequate regimes and institutions are created to provide information and reduce transaction cost. Like neoliberal, liberal theory is also useful to explain environmental cooperative agreements as long as a collective action problem is identified and state preferences are compatible.

In the next section, this research will examine two environmental collective action negotiation cases—The Montreal Protocol and The Kyoto Protocol, that predict—States will cooperate when designed institutions are compatible with state preferences, a prediction that is derived from its

hypothesis—Cooperation is more likely when institutional designs are compatible with States preferences.

## **4.2. Test 1: Montreal Protocol**

In the year 1974, at the University of California, two chemists (Rowland and Molina) began to study the impacts of chlorofluorocarbons (widely used set of industrial chemicals) in the earth's upper atmosphere (stratosphere). Their major discovery was that “the earth protective shield (ozone layer) might be threatened by, the continuing emissions of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs).”<sup>73</sup> The finding concluded that depletion of the ozone layer by CFCs would lead to an increase in radiation at the surface, resulting in an increase in skin cancer and other impacts.<sup>74</sup> These scientists met strong rejection from the representatives of the aerosol and halocarbon industries especially DuPont (United State. industrial giant).

### **4.2.1. Negotiation**

The “Montreal Protocol” negotiation focuses on an effort to control and eradicate to some level Ozone Depleting Substance (ODS). This Protocol with its wide ratification and implementation is a good test of collective action problem. The first session of working group for the negotiation of a framework convention established by the United National Environmental programme (UNEP) Governing Council met on 20 January 1982. Subsequently, the first round of negotiations on a framework convention was conducted along with the Protocol’s negotiations “Working Group”, no substantive decision was reached on adoption of the convention during this first session. Previous session on “Co-ordinating Committee on

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<sup>73</sup> See: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montreal\\_Protocol](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montreal_Protocol)

<sup>74</sup> Ibid



the Ozone Layer (CCOL)” and the UNEP Secretariat reported that a significant decrease of the total column of ozone had not been observed but troposphere of 2-8 km above ground level concentrations of ozone had increased.<sup>75</sup> These two findings suggested that the concentration of stratospheric ozone of 10-50 km above ground level might have decreased.<sup>76</sup>

At the beginning of negotiation, the Working Group was faced with the Nordic Draft Convention. The working group was informed also that an informal group within the Nordic group had already discussed the content of a possible annexes and protocols based on measures already being implemented in some countries. Most efforts of the earlier proposal of the Nordic group were not discussed, but three Nordic countries submitted a draft proposal on the best way to proceed. According to this proposal all representatives would be committed to end the use of CFC-11 and CFC-12 in aerosol cans<sup>77</sup>

The second session of the Working Group opened with a rather strong statement by the United States' chief delegate Richard Benedick who openly accused the participating countries of viewing the ozone issue mainly in terms of narrow economic self-interest. He threatened that the US Congress was increasingly prepared to advocate unilateral measures accompanied by appropriate steps to protect U.S. industry from competition by countries which continued to ignore the threat to the environment. At this session, Canada explained that according to its approach the reduction scheme would be based on the recommendations of a panel taking into account scientific considerations alone. Whereas United States' proposal control measures could, ultimately, be determined by the industrial capacity to substitute ozone depleting substances and not by scientific considerations,

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<sup>75</sup> For details on the finding and resolution of the committee, see CCOL: An Environmental Assessment of Ozone Layer Depletion; UNEP/WG.69/6.

<sup>76</sup> UNEP/WG.69/5, para. 16.

<sup>77</sup> UNEPAVG.69/10, para. 27. UNEPAVG.69/10 is the Report of the first session of the working group,

Canada considered its own approach as science driven and incremental in nature<sup>78</sup>

The United States still focused mainly on the facilitation of research, monitoring and exchange of information. In fact, the report listed U.S., the UK, France and Japan among the countries which accepted a framework convention under the condition that it was necessary to eliminate economic or social danger.<sup>79</sup> In effect, these countries are in consideration primarily only if the agreement will be compatible with their domestic socio-economic policies. After intense negotiation following from pressure from Nordic group and conditional position of the U.S., Japan and the UK, the second session ended with an agreement to place Control measure on the agenda of the Working Group. Though, there was no urgency to develop a decisive position.<sup>80</sup> The negotiations proceeded under considerable time-constraints. The EU representative called for postponement of session since the EU Environment council was yet to consider the subject matter.<sup>81</sup>

Thus, there was an indication that the Nordic countries shown much interest for measure to control ODS. Canada was another country that shown more interest based on scientific evidence than domestic consideration. In December 1986, negotiations resumed. The US maintained a strong position which called for a “near-term freeze on the production of CFCs” and “halons and a long-term phase out”. Richard Benedick, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and EPA Administrator Lee Thomas were brain US position.<sup>82</sup> The U.S. position channelled along new research report that pointed to a serious threat that CFCs posed to the ozone layer.<sup>83</sup> The European countries on other hand

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<sup>78</sup> Toward Agreement on Substance: The Montreal Protocol, Chapter 6, (Author unknown) [http://www.unibamberg.de/fileadmin/uni/fakultaeten/sowi\\_professuren/politikwissenschaft\\_insb\\_intl/Dateien/Mitarbeiter/Publikationen\\_Texterkennung/dynamic\\_intl\\_regimes/DynamicRegimes6\\_text.pdf](http://www.unibamberg.de/fileadmin/uni/fakultaeten/sowi_professuren/politikwissenschaft_insb_intl/Dateien/Mitarbeiter/Publikationen_Texterkennung/dynamic_intl_regimes/DynamicRegimes6_text.pdf)

<sup>79</sup> See the working group report, UNEP/WG.78/11

<sup>80</sup> see Environmental Policy & Law 11 (1983), p. 58.

<sup>81</sup> Johan G. Lammers, Efforts to Develop a Protocol on Chlorofluorocarbons to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, in: 1 Hague Yearbook of International Law 1988, pp.239

<sup>82</sup> Johan G. Lammers, Efforts To Develop A Protocol On CFC to the Vienna Convention

<sup>83</sup> Quoted in Peter M. Morrisette, 1989. The evolution of policy responses to stratospheric ozone depletion. *Natural Resources Journal* (1989) pp.793-820

were searching for compromised agreement. First, the Europeans favoured only a “freeze level”, but their position change around February 1987 when they agreed for 20 percents. The shift in EU position was due to strong publicity that followed strong scientific assessments, but importantly the pressure exerted by their own national environmental groups. The EU and Japan were also concerns of unilateral action from united States.

In 1987 the U.S. position was hit by internal political opposition and other U.S. agency representatives (like the Office of Management and Budget, and the Departments of Commerce, Energy, and Interior). Support for the U.S. government from the agencies was due to “failure of EPA and the State Department to keep other agencies fully informed on the rapidly evolving U.S. position, particularly at the highest levels.

It may be, however, that these agencies were fully informed, and that in fact they were simply surprised by the success of the EPA and State Department negotiations on the Protocol.”<sup>84</sup> The strong internal oppositions from domestic politics appeared to weaken U.S. negotiation power at the Protocol until the U.S Senate overwhelmingly passed a resolution supporting a 50 percent reduction and eventual phase out of CFCs. Although, the oppositions initially appear problematic to U.S. representatives but remained the major advocate for a strong protocol.

During the negotiation, the Europeans believe that the United States, position was influenced by American chemical giant “DuPont”. The rumour was that Dupont are in advance stage for an alternative products. Although, these allegations were strongly denied by the U.S representatives but they appeared to been founded when DuPont publicly announced a plan to market a non-ozone-depleting CFC within five year.

In Montreal the U.S. position prevailed mostly due to strong domestic support from local actors but it can be argues also that the lack of economy interests from the EU representatives gave strength to the U.S. positions.

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<sup>84</sup> Ibid., p.800

The European lack united coherent presentation during the negotiation. The protocol was signed and ratified in 1987. The Protocol was ratified by eleven members amounting to two-thirds of global consumption of regulated ODSs.

#### **4.2.2. Montreal Protocol Highlights**

The Vienna Convention the precursor of the Montreal protocol did not itself regulate ODSs due to strong disagreement between U.S. and EC (now EU). The major disagreement during the negotiation was conflict of economic interests between the two parties (U.S. and the EC). Though U.S. dominated the CFC and ODS market during the 1960s and 1970s. CFC and ODS products became significant for national economy growth element to the EC in the 80s. The concern between these two parties was that any outcome not properly negotiated would structure the market in way that it might favour or give market incentive to opposing parties. The EC were concern that their U.S. counterpart favour rapid elimination of CFCs because U.S.'s chemical giant DuPont has begun a process to introduce non ozone –depleting products as a substitute.

Though these allegations were denied subsequently by the American negotiator—Richard Benedick but evidence by media reports and strong backing of strict regulation by U.S. industries proved those allegations to be well founded. And the discovery of a “hole” in the “Ozone layer” above Antarctica by some British scientist played a decisive influence in the “Vienna convention”

The Montreal negotiation was marred by conflicting interests among the EU countries (Those who had significant economic interest and some representative with no or little economic interests. Some observers at the negotiation noted that the EU presidential rotational system helped the negotiation when Belgium took over presidency. And the four hundred Million fund earmarked to developing countries for compliance also influence

cooperation in the negotiation, though those countries play no major role in the consumption of ODS.

### 4.3. Test 2: Kyoto Protocol

The “Kyoto Protocol” was initiated out of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It was international agreed Protocol mandated to sets binding obligations on advance and industrialized countries to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs). The objective of UNFCCC as stated in Article 2 which stated that,

“stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.”<sup>85</sup>

The successful negotiation of the Montreal Protocol on ozone depletion established a model for subsequent meeting in Kyoto. The Montreal Protocol was adopted within 18 months. The negotiation that adopted the Protocol took over two and half year. Negotiation for Kyoto Protocol’s climate change regulations was marred by conflicting uncertainties and by “collective action problem” compare to the Montreal Protocol’s Ozone layer, this was as result of disagreements between participants. Once again most of the major disagreements were between the United States and European Union. like Montreal Protocol, however, the United States and European Union were able to reach a compromise on a final agreement. But the US, irrationally,

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<sup>85</sup> See “*United Nation Framework convention on climate change*”, (2004): <http://unfccc.int/2860.php>

withdrew completely from the ratification of the Protocol. This thesis will argue that liberal theory does the best job of explaining these events.

#### 4.3.1. Negotiation

The UNFCCC parties agreed on the Convention, the month of May 1992, which came into force the month of March, 1994 with the required minimum 15 members' ratification. The ratification was followed-up with a plan for first Conference of the Parties (COP 1). In 1995, a year after the ratification of the UNFCCC, Germany hosted the first COP in Berlin. Most interested parties especially countries from the EU were concern that the provisions would not be sufficient to adequately address climate change. Therefore, a new round of talks was launched to discuss stronger and more detailed commitments.<sup>86</sup>

Beuermann *et al.* write that Germany took a number of proactive moves before COP 1, domestically and internationally. Hatch also noted that in September 1994, an inter-ministerial working group led by Klaus Topfer released a report listing measures to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Angela Merkel who replaced Klaus Topfer reached an agreement with 15 industry associations requiring them to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions 20% below 1987 levels by the year 2005.<sup>87</sup>

The Berlin's COP 1, major purpose, was to assess active participation of parties and devise way to use latest scientific knowledge to designs new commitment. Major mandate reach at COP 1 are: (1), parties agreed developed countries needed to make emission reduction

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<sup>86</sup> For additional information on the negotiations in Kyoto and related background, see CRS Issue Brief IB89005, Global Climate Change

<sup>87</sup> See Christiane Beuermann & Jill Jager, "Climate Change Politics in Germany: How Long Will any Double Dividend Last?". in Tim O Riordan & Jill Jager (ed.), *Politics of Climate Change: A European Perspective*, London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 186-22. See also Michael Hatch, "Voluntary Agreements: Cornerstone or Fig Leaf in German Climate Change Policy?", in Michael Hatch (ed.), *Environmental Policymaking: Assessing the Use of Alternative Policy Instruments*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005, pp. 97-149.

commitments beyond the year 2000. (2) Developing countries were mandated to continue to develop reports detailing their greenhouse gas emissions, and advised to introduce greenhouse gas reduction policies when possible. But no commitment from developing countries was required. The COP 1 mandate was famously known as Berlin Mandate.

One issue at COP 1 that divided the U.S. and Germany was the Norwegian proposed joint implementation incentives at UNFCCC. Parties to the convention and parties in the proposed Protocol could be able to get credit for emissions reductions through a project that reduced emissions in other countries. The main goal was cost reduction, joint implementation could enable one party to derive credit for emission reduction in another country at less domestic cost than its own country.

As Grubb *et al.* noted that Norway with her reliance on hydro-power for energy can use joint implementation opportunity to get credit for lower emissions. Germany was cold to joint implementation and viewed it as a way to dodge responsibilities by developed countries. Bodansky also noted that “Germany suggested that the credits given for emissions reductions in developing countries be discounted so as to encourage developed countries to take domestic measures unless joint implementation is substantially cheaper.”<sup>88</sup>

The non-commitment mandate given to developing countries at the Berlin Mandate became a major concern in the domestic politics of the U.S. Members of U.S. Congress became concerned that the proposed Protocol could harm the U.S. economy. These concerns questioned trade competitiveness due to developing countries' non-commitment emissions cuts. Some concerns were on carbon tax. The concerns of Congress were echoed by the Global Climate Coalition, which complained that the administration was moving too quickly.

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<sup>88</sup> Daniel Bodansky, “The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary”, *Yale Journal of International Law*, Volume 18, 1993, p. 521.

New IPCC reports that spurred U.S. active participation confirmed that there was growing evidence of anthropogenic actions in global warming. This report was released before COP 2. Fineman *et al.* noted that U.S. Vice president Al Gore convinced Bill Clinton, then U.S. president to commit to binding emissions reduction target. According to the head of the U.S. contingent at the conference of parties 2 (COP 2), Mr. Timothy Wirth addressed the COP that,

“the United States recommends that future negotiations focus on an agreement that sets a realistic, verifiable, and binding medium-term emissions target. We believe that the medium-term target must be met through maximum flexibility in the selection of implementation measures, including the use of measures such as reliable activities implemented jointly and trading mechanisms around the world.”<sup>89</sup>

The Clinton administration proactive participation faced a growing domestic resistance especially from a powerful lobby group (The Global Climate Coalition), chemical industrial sectors and the senate. Falkner noted that the Clinton administration proposed effort to begin GHGs emission reduction through Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards (CAFÉ) was rejected. Although some of these group, question the IPCC finding. The COP 2 ended with hope and promises. The U.S. plan called for use of joint implementation and an emission trading scheme model after the ‘Clean Air Act’ in the United States.<sup>90</sup>

In COP 3 Cushman writes that the United States agreed to commit to a reduction of emissions to 1990 levels (emission had risen by 13% since 1990) between the years 2008 and 2012. But COP 3 was marked by strong

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<sup>89</sup> Timothy Wirth, Making the International Climate Change Process Work, Dispatch, 7/30. (U.S. Department of State (1996),p. 377.

<sup>90</sup> See Robert Falkner, *Business Power and Conflict in International Environmental Politics*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.



disagreement between the U.S. position and EU (especially Germany). Grubb *et al.* argued that disagreement induced by two opposing blocks, one led by U.S. and another larger block comprises of the Europe countries and developing countries. Opposing issues formed around three major points: (1) the size and timing of emission reduction targets, (2) use of flexible mechanisms, and (3) commitments by developing countries.

The U.S. took a position that favoured flexibility in a number of areas in order to reduce costs. These include “carbon sinks”, a “basket of six gases” namely “carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulphur fluoride, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons” to count towards emission reduction targets and joint implementation; an emissions trading scheme; flexible target dates that allowed countries to bank and borrow emission credits between commitment periods; and differentiation of targets based on each country’s unique circumstances.

The U.S. maintained a position that was subjected to developing countries commitment to emissions reduction target. Fletcher, also noted that, at COP 4 in Buenos Aires, Argentina and Kazakhstan, agreed to make a commitment to take on a binding emissions target between the period 2008-12, Consequently in November 12 of 1998 the U.S. announced and did signed the Kyoto Protocol. But till date (2005)<sup>91</sup> the EU block rejected most of the U.S. positions which they view as gold-bricking of responsibility by the U.S. to commit to emission reduction domestically. countries (7.5% reduction by 2005 and 15% by 2010), EU also rejected sinks and emission trading and the so-called joint implementation.<sup>92</sup>

This disagreement went all through to COP 4. At some point, the EU and the U.S. reached a compromise agreement, where all U.S. positions were agreed upon. The U.S. agreed for 7% reduction and the EU 8%. But the next U.S. government faced by tough opposition from his own party withdrew

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<sup>91</sup> Susan R. Fletcher, *Global Climate Change: The Kyoto Protocol*, CRS Report for Congress, CRS 09, 2005.

<sup>92</sup> Michael Grubb & Farhana Yamin, “Climate Collapse at The Hague: What Happened, Why, and Where do We Go from Here?”, *International Affairs*, Volume 77, No. 2, 2001, p. 263.

the U.S. from Multilateral commitment and U.S. never ratified protocol. This irrational withdrawal pose a puzzle not only for the Protocol and other members of the convention but also to the students of international relations.

#### **4.3.2. Kyoto Protocol Highlights**

Unlike Montreal Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol had significant and various interests at stake directly from different parties including the developing countries, as developing countries are keenly interested in developing their economy. Hence, increasing energy production and consumption was a major interest at staked in the Kyoto Protocol negotiation . As noted by some analysts, Montreal Protocol-like compensation for developing countries will be impossible to think of because compensation estimation could be to huge to offset major economy loss that will resulted in regulating fossil fuel and other Green House Gases (GHGs) emission.

Under the Kyoto Protocol, economy interest and most importantly energy security concerns, a realist's element 'power' played a major countervailing interests between the major powers in the negotiation to the Kyoto Protocol. One other major highlights of the Kyoto Protocol was the lack of reliable and cost effective substitute for fossil fuel unlike the Ozone issue where a readily process was available to substitute ODS products in the market. Under the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, there was no major Montreal's DuPont-like company with self interests to influence tight regulation. Instead, interested companies were vigorously against any regulation of GHGs. This marks a very distinguished atmosphere at the negotiation leading up to the Kyoto Protocol.

The underlying facts in Kyoto Protocol, is that, reducing GHG emission come with huge collective action problem than the Montreal Protocol's of global ozone depletion especially, the conflict of interest among US political and economy players. Even the Kyoto Protocol major negotiators were in dilemma about developing countries fossil fuel needs for economy

development and a regulation that will slow that effort. While the risk of ignoring climate change is high it is also unwise for negotiator to ignore competing economy interest of the developing countries and other major interests. So it became difficult, for US negotiators, when the US senate included a condition that at least, one developing country must ratified the Protocol to secure the senate support. The Kyoto Protocol as liberal theory would predict that the U.S. refused to ratify the Protocol due to incompatibility of US interest with others—EU and developing countries. But, it must be stress here that liberal theory alone cannot explain this puzzle. The liberal and its neoliberal counterpart must complement to understand the puzzle.

#### **4.4. Hypothesis 1- Test Analysis and Results**

As stated above it is a puzzle for neoliberal institutionalism. Why the U.S. withdraw from the Kyoto negotiation after reaching a compromised agreement with the EU? And, why the U.S. refused to ratify the Protocol after over 3 year's negotiation? This test shows that liberal theory can complement neoliberal institutionalism to explain these puzzle. The liberal institutionalism could help explain the formation of institutions (like the IPCC, COP,) that emerged during the negotiation, but, as the conclusion section indicated above, institutional mechanisms alone were not enough to solve the collective action problem faced in the ozone depleting issues and the GHG emission problem.

Liberal theories are useful in explaining the influence of DuPont and other domestic group that promote tight regulation. In test 2, Liberal theory's preferences-base can help explain why Kyoto Protocol negotiation was so difficult and, While Montreal Protocol was easy. DuPont tight regulation preferences played a major role in the United States preferences formation on the ozone depletion. European community (now European Union) economy interests for loose regulation preference was incompatible with the U.S. preferences for tight regulation. Thus the institutional mechanism

established for smooth negotiation and expected cooperation (as explained by liberal institutionalism) could not provide the necessary cooperation for these two opposing parties.

The test showed that the outcome in the two cases need the two theories—The institutions base and the preferences base to provide sufficient answers to the hypothesis. Liberal theory stresses that, state preferences are embedded in individuals and other societal groups that transmit their interest to the state through political institutions, the state acts as an agent to societal interests. Therefore, solution to collective action problem required complementary explanations. Environmental institutions, such as IPCC, UNEP and COP formed during the negotiation are neoliberal factors. These institutional mechanisms were complemented by domestic factors (individuals/norm entrepreneurs, political systems, and powerful industry groups) which help explained the actions of the United States in Montreal and Kyoto Protocol negotiation.

As in the case of Montreal Protocol outcome, DuPont was particularly important. For Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. vice president to Clinton) Al Gore played an influential role in the earlier favourable position of the US. But preferences of the United States shifted dramatically in 2001 when the U.S. senate opposition was very strong, and also the change in U.S. government that brought in President George W. Bush exacerbated the U.S. opposition that resulted U.S withdrawal. In Germany, Klaus Topfer and Merkel was a major influenced in Germany position. The EU rotating presidency swunged EU position back and front during negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol. The Green Party in most EU countries played major role in the EU shifting position.

The realists' relative power and concern for relative gains played a role also on US rejection of the Kyoto Protocol. Energy security was in the mind of the US position. China which fall under the annex 2 (developing countries) would not need to make binding commitment under the Protocol. These proposed China relative advantage over US companies also explained US hard bargaining position. More importantly neoliberal assertion of

information played a major part in both cases. The IPCC provided an updated scientific information to negotiators from time to time. During the COP 2 meeting, the IPCC, Second Assessment Report built more confidence on the controversial belief of anthropogenic contributing to climate change. This timing report highlighted the need for actions and was used by the Clinton administration as justification for accepting a binding treaty, although, this report also created some problem for negotiator (like the leaked third assessment report of the IPCC in the run-up to COP 6).

Grubb *et al.* noted that IPCC report created some problem for a compromise position which “Raised European expectations and increased public concern, especially in the absence of more in-depth understanding of the political situation and constraints of other countries, further widened the gulf between the European and US positions”.<sup>93</sup>

The neoliberals cannot explain why the US dropped out of Kyoto Protocol and abandoned it. This is anomaly in Robert Keohane’s liberal institutionalism. The theory expected US to remain in the negotiation process till the very end. But become a puzzle, when the US change her views from multilateral solution and asserted that climate change was no longer a collective action problem. This justified Andrew Moravcsik assertion that, institutions alone cannot explain states cooperative behaviour unless they have an interests to do so, consequently, institutionalists need preferences base theories to explain state outcome in international politics.<sup>94</sup>

Thus, there is no reason to reject the hypothesis—Cooperative behaviour is more likely when institutional designs are compatible with States preferences. And also the prediction hold if there is no reason to reject its hypothesis.

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<sup>93</sup> Grubb *et al.*, *Climate Collpase at the Hague*, p. 265

<sup>94</sup> Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously”, p. 543.

## CHAPTER 5. Hypothesis 2

### 5.1 Prime Prediction and Hypothesis

- i. Prime Prediction : Conflict behaviour will be common when state elites think the offensive have the advantage
- ii. Hypothesis: *Conflictual behaviour is more likely when states perceived offensive advantage.*

### 5.2. Offense-Defense Theory

The Offense-Defense Balance (ODT) tends to explain variation in the degree of the Security Dilemma. The ODT also try to explain the influence of military technology and the cause of war. The logic of ODT has been formulated to understand factors that regulate the security dilemma, spiral model and other international issues such as, war; conflict, peace; problems of cooperation and ethnic conflict. ODT stresses the efficacy of offence and defence at given period of time. The ODT had been formulated in various ways, some theorists (for example Robert Jervis, Sean Lynn Jones) follow the narrow definition that include only military technology; and others (for example, Stephen Van Evera, Charles Glaser) follow the broad definition, that include—military technology, geography, military posture, and diplomatic issues.

ODT has been powerful influence in contemporary realist's literature especially the defensive realism variant of structure realism. Lynn Jones, a believer of ODT, noted that, Offense-defence theory is strongly and likely to contributes in part to modern realism and its agenda. Lynn also stresses that modern realism should be classified under neorealism and that offense – Defense theories have prospect to increase the explanatory power of waltz'neorealism that came under scrutiny in the early 90s. The ODT theories stresses that conflicts are possible or more likely when “offensive military technology” has the advantage over the “defensive military technology”. On

the other hand, peace or cooperation is achievable when the defence has advantage over the offensive military technology.

The offense-defense theories stress the variation of innovation in military technology and its degree of influence on conflict and cooperation international politics. The ODT uses “offense-defense balance” as its “explanatory variable”.<sup>95</sup> The remaining part of this chapter will examine the theoretical and empirical influence of the Offense-Defense Balance (ODB) and its variation on causes of war, and conflicts in international politics. The thesis will be particularly interested on the subjective version of ODB.

### 5.3. Offense-Defense Balance

The Offense-Defense Balance stresses causal factors like military technology; geography; military posture and military doctrine as main factor that influences the variation of military outcome. Thus ODB, have been used by defensive realism as a factor that regulate the Security Dilemma in international politics. ODT proponents argue that ODB exacerbate the security dilemma when the offense have the advantage—leading to arm race, spiral of conflict and tragedy of war. For defensive realist, It can also reduce the “security dilemma” when the defence have the advantage by reducing perceived uncertainty about others intentions.

The offense–defense balance is divided into two approaches, the objective approach and subjective approach. The subjective approach depicts the balance as perceived by states, while the objective approach is the actual balance. As Shipping Tang noted, the objective offense-defence balance influences actual outcome of conflicts however the subjective

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<sup>95</sup> The narrow definition of ODT espoused by Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), p. 167–214 and the broad definition by Van Evera, *Causes of War*; see also, Stephen Van Evera, “Offense, Defence, and the Causes of War”, *International Security*, Volume 22, No. 4, 1998, pp. 5–43. For a critical analysis of the ODB, see Keir A. Lieber, “Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defence Balance and International Security”, *International Security*, Volume 25, No. 1, 2000, pp. 71–104.

offense-defence balance *influences actor's calculation of war and peace, including reassurance*. Consequently, defensive realists and ODB critics have admitted that, the actual or objective balance is difficult to measure either in the narrow military technology version or in even in the broad version. These give the subjective approach more utility to explain the variation of ODB on conflicts and cooperation.

The condition of “anarchy” in the international system enable states to be concern on the uncertainty of intentions of their adversaries for their own survival—since intentions of others can change over time, therefore, it gives states incentives to be concern on others capabilities. Offensive realism stresses that intentions of adversary can be infer from capabilities. Therefore, when “offense military technology” is perceived to have the advantage, it reinforces the uncertainty of others intentions, which also reinforced, the irreconcilable conflict of interests through a feedback mechanism. On the other hand, when, the defense has the advantage, states become more secure and need not to worry much about what others intentions are, fear and mistrust are reduced and cooperative gestures through reassurance program can be perceived as genuine.

As Jervis argues, “this situation is approximated when it is easier for states to defend themselves than to attack others, or when mutual deterrence obtains because neither side can protect itself.”<sup>96</sup> As stated above, Tang argues that, “the objective ODB mostly explain outcome of battle and war while the subjective approach explain *cause and timing of war and pattern of alliance* formed before outbreak of war.”<sup>97</sup> This study argues that “offense-defense balance” theory provides a testable hypothesis that acts to explain conflict and cooperation under anarchy through the variation of military technology and other factors.

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<sup>96</sup> See Jervis, *Cooperation under Security Dilemma*. See also Van Evera, “Offense, Defence, and the Causes of War”; George H. Quester, *Offense and Defence in the International System*, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1977; Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, “What Is the Offense-Defence Balance and Can We Measure It?”, *International Security*, Volume 22, No. 4, 1998, pp. 44–82.

<sup>97</sup> Shipping Tang, “Offense-Defence Theory: Toward a Definitive Understanding”, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Volume 3, 2010, p. 230.



### 5.3.1. Subjective Offense-Defensive Balance

Proponents of the “offense -defense balance” tend to differentiate the perceived and the objective Offense and Defense balance on the outcome and causes of conflicts. Thus while the objective ODB influences the outcome (War or peace) from interstate interaction, the subjective ODB influences state behaviour (conflictive or cooperative behaviour).<sup>98</sup> Proponents of ODB are mostly defensive realists that use structural factors to explain social facts but, the subjective ODB deals primarily on how state actors or elites make decision of war and conflict of interest base on their perception of ODB. Thus, this aspect of ODB may pose some difficulty to the realists and its proponents since state actors’ perception is not a structural variable.

The subjective ODB stress that, state actors are more likely to engage in (conflict) war when, the actual offensive military technology are perceived to have the advantage over the defensive military technology, while state actors will be more secure to signal cooperative gestures, if the actual military technology are perceived to favour the defense. Thus misperception by state actors of offensive balance advantage can lead to conflictual behaviour, even if, the actual balance is defensive advantage (one example is the period up to the First World War). In the other hand, perceived defensive advantage can induce cooperative behaviour or lack of conflict, even, if the actual balance face the offense (good example British leaders’ perception running to the Second World War). Most ODT proponents has argues that offensive realism states are more likely to accumulate more offensive capabilities either due to the nature of the state or due to anarchy, thereby perceiving offensive advantage than defensive advantage.

According to Christensen, perception during the Franco-Prussian War explains the Russian behavior. Christensen contended that, “Russian

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

leaders believed that France was likely stronger (with offensive arsenals) than Prussia and, therefore, warned Austria early that if it entered the war on the side of France, Russia would attack it from the east. The Russians believed that the short-term threat was to Prussia (not France) and so they chained themselves to Prussia by threatening to enter the war if Austria mobilized.”<sup>99</sup> ODB proponents argue that some states want to attack and conquer, if they perceive or belief that conquest is easy.

Christensen, drawing on the relationship between balance of power and offense-defence writes that, state political leaders may tailored their preferences in line with their perceived capabilities or ratio of their forces<sup>100</sup> Most scholars are in agreement that pre-world war 1 was actually defensive advantage before the breakout of the war, while pre-world war II actually favoured the offense. Policy makers and state elites perceived the former as offensive dominant and the latter defensive dominant against the objective ODB at that time.

One proponent of ODT, Lynn-Jones and other structuralist argues that events in past shows actors behaving in line with offense-defense prediction but most ODT critics including Shipping Tang has criticized these assertion claiming that ODT proponents has used WW1 as the only empirical evidence and thus the arguments lack an extensive empirical claims.

Having established the influence of perceptions in conflict and war decision making process, the thesis will now examine empirical cases to support the hypothesis. First, the next section will highlight the explanatory variables and move on to test the hypothesis in subsequent sections.

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<sup>99</sup> Thomas J. Christensen, “Perceptions and Alliances in Europe, 1865-1940”, *International Organization*, Volume 51, No. 1, 1997, p. 81.

<sup>100</sup> Thomas J. Christensen, art. cit., p. 70.

## 5.4. Explanatory Variables on the Effect of Offensive Advantage<sup>101</sup>

- a) Defensive, and Hegemonic Expansionism
- b) First Strike Advantage is Rewarding
- c) Window for preventive strike is large
- d) Diplomatic Fails Accomplis are common
- e) Arms Race become Harder and Faster

### 5.4.1. Expansionism

Offense advantage induce various pernicious factors that loom danger when the offense have the advantage, state tend to perceive that conquest is easy and conflict are irreconcilable. Most offensive states including benign states become aggressive and tend to measure gains beyond security seeking to hegemonic expansionism. Under offense dominant states perceive their border is insecure and less defensible, and state tend to worry more on the military activities of their geographical neighbour. Uncertainty about other offensive intentions become high, mistrust on others military operation like partial mobilisation, military postures and military doctrine become suspicious. State sees incentives to expand their border and state frontiers for security purposes.<sup>102</sup>

### 5.4.2. First Strike Advantage

When the offense is dominant, military and civilian leaders perceived first strike as rewarding. The incentives to strike first will close every window

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<sup>101</sup> Most of this explanatory variables were also mentioned by Van Evera, for details see Van Evera, "Offense, Defence, and the Causes of War", pp. 5-43

<sup>102</sup> See Van Evera, "Offense, Defence, and the Causes of War", pp. 5-43.

of conflict reconciliation, this will open window for pre-emptive attack and this exacerbate the already worsen crisis. Moving first or pre-empt actions are common in real or perceived offense dominant period, because, when conquest is easy it give incentive to expand border and frontiers. Offensive state increases war aims that reinforce irreconcilable conflict of interest.

#### **5.4.3. Window for Preventive strike is Large**

When the offense is perceived dominant, State leaders presage future vulnerability and seize opportunity for preventive strike. This false perception is one the most dangerous cause of conflict in interstates interactions.

#### **5.4.4. Diplomatic Fait Accompli**

This tactics are perceived by civilian leaders as promoting quick victory when they are applied. They are usually inducer of dangerous conflict of interests among states. When the “offense–defense balance” favour the offense, state actors adopt diplomatic fait accompli tactics which reinforce irreconcilable differences. As noted by Van Evera,

“Faits accomplis are more common when the offense dominates because the rewards they promise are more valuable. When security is scarce, winning disputes grows more important than avoiding war. Leaders care more how spoils are divided than about avoiding violence, because failure to gain their share can spell their doom. This leads to gain-maximizing war-risking diplomatic strategies-above all, to fait accompli tactics.”<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> Ibid., p.10

#### **5.4.5. Arms Race become Harder and Faster**

Perceived offense advantage intensify armaments competition among states as one state leads in the competition, it open window of opportunity and window of vulnerability to the other-side in the conflict.

#### **5.5. Test 1: Europe, 1865-1871**

One year before the Austria-Prussian war in 1866 and the subsequent Franco-Prussian war of 1870, false belief on the relative distribution of capabilities and offensive military advantage prevailed among European leaders, both the French, Austrian and Prussian leaders perceived the relative offensive capabilities that prevailed before the started. This perception induced loose alliance among the great power. In multipolar Europe 1865-1871 the relation of perceived offensive advantage among great powers interactions increases uncertainty. This false perception exacerbated mistrust and uncertainty of among the great power.<sup>104</sup>

Most IR literature had argued that Napoleon III in 1866 refused to allies with Austria (at the beginning of conflict) to defeat Prussian aggression because Napoleon misperceived the superiority of Austrian capabilities against Bismarck's Prussia. The implication is that Austria ceded Venetia to Italy due to misperception of the balance of power and not lust for Bismarck's clever promise. Cobban and Christensen believe that Napoleon's misperception of 1866 balance of power in Europe conducted to a false belief on the superiority of Austria in intra-German power struggles and Napoleon's national interest to mitigate Austria's relative power became a critical factor in

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<sup>104</sup> Ibid., p. 67.

Napoleon decision to remain neutral in 1886.<sup>105</sup> Even Austrian elites believed that a war between Austria and Prussian army would be easy and in favour of the Austria. For European leaders, Austrian superiority meant quick victory and Austrian victory means mitigated balance of power, so desired by France.

The same false scenario was also observed during the Franco-Prussian war, the balance of power in Europe before 1870 was perceived in favour of France. France military were perceived to being the most powerful and only Austrian military could come close to rival France. Civilian and military leaders in France may have believed that offense-defence balance favour the offense.

On the eve of the Franco-Prussian war, Napoleon was quoted to have said to the Austrian ambassador, "the winner will be the one who can be ready first."<sup>106</sup> This calculation by French leaders spurred the confidence that enable France to declared war on Prussia. For France, the offensive advantage favour the French military, therefore, war with Prussia would be quick and victory could be sure. This false perception again explained the reason why Austria did not join the conflict at the beginning.

## **5.6. Test 2: July 1914 Crisis—Pre-World War 1**

The infamous July crisis of 1914 leading to World War I (WW1) culminated on June 28, the day the Arch-duke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary and his wife were shot by Serbian terrorist Gavrilo Princip in Sarajevo. The assassination exacerbated the already mistrust, misunderstanding and misinterpretation among Europe elites. Before the year 1914, tensions induced by hype- nationalism, militarism and urge for

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<sup>105</sup> See Christensen, art. cit., pp. 72-73 for that paragraph. Also Coban was cited by Christensen, p. 71. See Alfred Cobban's book, *A History of Modern France: Vol. 2, 1799-1871*, New York: Penguin Books, 1965.

<sup>106</sup> Quoted in *Ibid.*, p.79

expansionism was over Europe. There was prevailing disconnect between objective and the realities of warfare in the years before 1914. As Van Evera pointed out,

“Despite the large and growing advantage which defenders gained against attackers as a result of the invention of rifles and repeating small arms, the machine guns, barbed wires, and the development of railroads, Europeans increasingly believed that attackers would hold the advantage on the battlefield, and that wars would be short and "decisive"-a "brief storm.”<sup>107</sup>

There was a growing anxiety of a prevalent offensive window of opportunity, ODT literature describe the scenario as "cult of the offensive" (using Van Evera term). This offensive belief was the policy 'order' among the leaders of Europe powers during the July crisis. Militaries glorified the offensive and adopted offensive military doctrines, while political elites and publics assumed that the offense had the advantage in warfare, and that offensive solutions best resolve conflict of interest.<sup>108</sup>

The European powers ignored the importance of the Crimean War of 1853 -1856 between Russian and a group of nations including Turkey, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the Second “Boer war in 1899-1902, which demonstrated the power of the defence. Instead, European powers embraced a set of political and military perceptions which obscured the prevailing defensive advantages. This offensive mind-set increase offensive military doctrines during 1892- 1913 European crisis, which was prevalent among all European leaders, including the civilians and military leaders.<sup>109</sup> In Germany, a social Darwinist militarism was promoted in the military; the

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<sup>107</sup> Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War”, *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1984, p. 58.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> See Ibid., p.59; see also Jack Lewis Snyder, *Defending the Offensive: Biases in French, German, and Russian War Planning, 1870-1914*, Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1981.

German introduced new policy to increase offensive weapons, thus the military's influences was large and their Darwinist doctrine fed the public dangerous ideas.

Van Evera writes that "In Germany, the military glorified the offense in strident terms, and inculcated German society with similar views. General Alfred von Schlieffen, author of the 1914 German war plan, declared that "Attack is the best defence", while the popular publicist Friedrich von Bernhardi proclaimed that "the offensive mode of action is by far superior to the defensive mode," and that "the superiority of offensive warfare under modern conditions is greater."<sup>110</sup> The German leaders were convinced that offense is easy and windows of opportunity are looming very large for preventive war and it is now and never. Thus the German leaders emphasized "surprise first strike" as essential for survival of the Reich. Germany leaders perceived opportunistic window for preventive strike against their enemies because empires are valuable and Germany need expansive frontiers to defend against the enemy, war would be short, conquest easy and German victory is now. These myths were prevalent in all societies.

This belief on the "cult of offensive" spurred quick mobilization policy among Russia, France and then Germany during the July crisis. The Russian military was the first to perceive the need for mobilization during the July crisis. The Russian leaders saw Russia as Serbia's ally. And on June 28 1914, decided on partial mobilisation against the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This Russian confidence spurred from the belief that war was imminent, therefore, offensive measures was necessary and essential. But the Russian failed to understand that mobilization meant war to the German military. Scholars had argued that Russian partial mobilization was motivated by Russian elite's perceptions that Germany unconditional support for Austria meant to have an excuse for offensive attack or preventive war. Therefore

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<sup>110</sup> Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War", p. 59.



Russian felt compelled to pre-empt Germany alluded intentions, for Russian the Austrian ultimatum was brinkmanship.

Scholars had also asserted that the Russian quick mobilization effort gave credence to support pre-emption as one cause of WW1. Van Evera alluded to this point, when he writes that "The war was pre-emptive if Russia and France mobilized preemptively, since these mobilizations spurred German and Austrian mobilization, opening windows which helped cause war. Thus while the mobilizations were not acts of war, they caused effects which caused war. The war was also preemptive if Germany struck Liege pre-emptively, since the imperative to strike Liege was one reason why "mobilization meant war" to Germany."<sup>111</sup> For Russian military leaders, offensive advantage mean, quick mobilization advantage in an inevitable war that the Germany is prepared to fight. The belief that whoever mobilized first would have the upper hand thus quick mobilization made sense.

This measures and beliefs sparked spiral of mobilization that exacerbated the July conflict of interests in 1914. European leaders communication during the July crisis was understood to mean that leaders believed in ordering mobilization of roughly one to three days would be significant. Russian civilian leaders, Sazonov and the Czar were apparently unaware that mobilization meant war until later in the crisis. Even in Austria, General Conrad believed that "every day was far-reaching importance," since "any delay might leave the [Austrian] forces now assembling in Galicia open to being struck by the full weight of a Russian offensive in the midst of their deployment."<sup>112</sup> The perception of the offensive also awaked nationalism.

Another consequence following the July 1914 pre-world war crisis was the believed that there was "window of vulnerability and window of opportunity." The Germany leaders were preoccupied with the Russian armament program that expected to be complete by 1917. The fear was that if Germany didn't act now, Germany would be destroyed in two years time

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<sup>111</sup> Ibid., p.72

<sup>112</sup> Quoted in Ibid. 72

when Russian increased her power. This perception of 'window' was spurred again by the belief that the offensive had the advantage and it is expedient for Germany to take the opportunity when the, balance of power still favour Germany. The German sold this false idea to their German public to win public support for war—the idea, that Germany was encircled with enemies and attack on German was imminent.

These myths were meant to mobilize public support for expansion and preventive war. This point was also noted by Evera, when he stressed that the central power alliance pursued bellicose policies in 1914 partly to shut the looming "windows" of vulnerability which they perceived ahead, and partly to exploit the present window of opportunity which, they thought the summer crisis opened. This perception, no doubt, in turn, grew partly from the cult of the offensive, since it depended upon the implicit assumption that the offense was strong. Also war propaganda that emanated from European war theatres indicated that German leaders are filled with false warnings and propaganda that German power was in relative decline, and that Germany was doomed in future unless it took drastic action—such as provoking and winning a great crisis now, which accordingly could shatter the Triple Entente.<sup>113</sup>

German officials repeatedly warned the German public that Russian military power would expand rapidly in the coming years, as Russia carried out its 1913-1914 Great Program, and that the relative balance of power will be against the Germany in near future because Russian resources would be greater.<sup>114</sup> Another offensive element that contributed to the spiral of conflict during the July crisis was the *fait accompli* strategy. Three major incident—the ultimatum given to Serbia by Austria; the declaration of war by Austria; and Russian partial mobilization, are *fait accomplis*. This strategy deprived German elites of warning that their actions would push Germany into disaster and a world war, by depriving the Entente of the chance to warn Germany

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<sup>113</sup> Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War", p. 79.

<sup>114</sup> Van Evera p.79

that it would respond if Austria attacked Serbia. The Russian mobilisation also deprived Britain to warn Russia to restraint. Austria earlier than expected declaration of war also deprived diplomats of the chance to resolve the Austro-Serbian dispute in a manner acceptable to Russia.<sup>115</sup>

This thesis argues that Germany and Austria decision to adopt *fait accomplis*, no doubt were induced from the perception of offensive advantage and that the belief that conquest is easy. These offensive strategic belief, spurred the perceived “window of opportunity”; Mobilization, mistrust and misunderstanding of other intentions. These strategic decisions became very critical in the infamous outcome that followed the WW1.

Counterfactually, this study argues that if the European leaders had believed and not ignored the actual defensive advantage that followed from The Crimean war of 1853 -1856; Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78”; the Second Boer war in 1899-1902”, Balkan conflict of 1912 and the “new defensive military technology”; new invented machine guns, fortification equipment’s, barbed wire, railroads, and mass armies, then, the most devastated world war could have be avoided.

Thus, perception of offensive advantage that was actually missing during the July crisis became the order that gave false hope to leaders, so engrossed with the spoils of nationalism; militarism and imperialism. These leaders became the leaders of offensive realism world, a world that produced the infamous phenomena that Stephen Van Evera termed the “Cult of the Offensive”. The belief that an offensive-defensive balance, favour the offense, a belief that caused the first war that robbed the entire world.

## **5.7. Hypothesis 2 Analysis and Result**

State elites’ perceptions of offensive advantage foster policies that induce hegemonic expansionism, pre-emptive and preventive strike, diplomatic *Fait Accompli* tactics and arms races. These variables act as

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid.,94

intervening mechanism to cause conflict and maybe war. These explanatory mechanisms are in linear correction with offensive advantage. Even if the actual balance is not offense dominant, states could still assume offensive advantage.

As shown in test analysis, the “offense-defence theory” has two parallel balances—the objective and subjective balance, although, only the subjective balance have been tested in the previous section. The tests showed that the five explanatory variables have linear correlation with offensive advantage in both the real or subjective offensive advantage. Significant change in any of these five variables would change the intensity of conflictual behaviour among the states in the 1868-1871 and the states during July crisis. These variables, can independently assume causal relationship with conflict, cooperation and alliance formation.

Hence, “offense-defence theory” provides an umbrella opportunity to assume all variables in one explanation. Political leaders wrongly thought conquest was very easy when in fact it was very hard. Thus the pattern of reality and perception run roughly parallel, Tides of war and peace correlate tightly with the perceived offense-defence balance in July 1914.<sup>116</sup>

Expansionism and war were more common during the Von Bismarck era when conquest was perceived easy than when it was difficult, and were far more common when conquest was believed easy than when after 1871 when was believed difficult. Moreover, states that believed they faced large offensive opportunities and defensive vulnerabilities especially Germany were the largest expansionist and troublemakers in the system. They were more aggressive, they were involved in more wars, and they started more wars than other states.<sup>117</sup> The objective offense-defense balance favour the defense before and during the 1914 July crisis but leaders erroneously perceived offensive advantage, “European militaries were seized by the “cult of the offensive.” This erroneous perception of offensive advantage by

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<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

<sup>117</sup> Van Evera, “Offense, Defence, and the Causes of War”, p. 26.

European leaders in July 1914 induced dangerous diplomatic faits accomplis that caused the worst (conflict) crisis that human can ever imagine culminating to the First World War.

The events in July 1914 clearly support the subjective offense-defense theory prediction derived from the hypothesis and correlate with the explanatory hypotheses. During the July crisis, the German civilian and military leaders perceived an open window of opportunity of defensive conquest to act against France and Russian. In July 1914, the German feared the (then) ongoing Russian military armament program and the perceived defensive vulnerability when if, Russian complete their program, this false perception, enable the German to drawn policies toward a preventive strike during July crisis, hence, most German policies following the July crisis was channelled toward preventive strike against Belgium France and Russia.

During the Austro-Prussian War (test 1), Although no documented direct statement by Napoleon III to determine his perception during the war about the advantage of defense or offense, but there was well-documented belief that Prussian leader were fortunate that French civilian and military leaders perceived defensive advantage.

The test on Austro-Prussian War and Franco-Prussian War showed that perception played an important role, although, Napoleon III perceived defensive advantage during the war between Austria and Prussia but the perception during Franco-Prussia was offensive for both France and Prussia. The test on the 1914 July Crisis showed strongly how leaders perceptions induced offensive policies towards preventive and pre-emptive strike . Both tests correlated well with the intervening variables discussed in the previous section. There is no evidence to reject the hypothesis.

## CONCLUSION

This research was marked by two related puzzles, the puzzle of conflict and cooperation—the two core contemporary issues in international relations, replacing war and peace that dominated the field of international relations during the interwar periods, which peak with the advents of nuclear weapons and also during the Cuban missiles crisis” of 1962. The other puzzle is the implication of the anarchical structure of the system analogical to Hobbesian “state of nature”. Contemporarily defines as the absence of government. These puzzle—an assertion of self-preservation—self-help world and whether states is marked by inherent conflicts or extensive cooperation, “shape and shove” international interactions.

This research had trenchantly and clearly put forward the various mainstream theoretical understandings of conflict, its limits and the extents of cooperation. The thesis contends that scholars have obscured the meaning, implications and the nature of anarchy; the inevitability of conflicts and extents of cooperation among states in international politics, these phenomenon are distinctively explain by different ideologues, depending on which paradigmatic scholarly literature one is reading.

This thesis noted that scholarly understanding of international outcome is determined by what level of analysis independent variable is located and what assumptions scholars had taken for granted. This distinctive approaches have obscure tacit understandings of some core concepts and phenomena—the elements of power; extent of cooperation; limit of security seeking goal; distinguishing preferences over strategy and preference over outcome; what constitute state utility function (concerns for absolute or relative gains) and recently offensive and defensive intra realists debate about how much power is enough.

These scenario leave students of international relations confused as ever to determine which scientific research program is more appropriate in understanding cooperation or conflict under anarchy. This research argues that one paradigm or research tradition among the mainstream approaches is

not sufficient to understand the meaning, nature and implication of anarchy or possibility or limit and extent of cooperation and conflicts. Each of these perspectives would, in different ways supplement or complement one another for complete understanding of cooperation under anarchical environment.

As clearly shown, on the test on climate change, the neoliberal institutionalism is not enough paradigm to understand why cooperation was easy in Montreal Protocol and become so difficult to achieved during Kyoto Protocol negotiation, or why US withdrawn completely from the Kyoto Protocol even when compromised agreement had been reached with the EU. This thesis argues that neoliberal institutionalism need liberal theory to understand why the U.S. withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol negotiation.

This study postulates that the four mainstream theoretical perspective—Realism; neoliberals; liberal theory; and constructivism examined in this study see the existence of conflict and cooperation under anarchy, thus, the notion that realists believe cooperation is impossible and conflict inevitable is wrong, and, also wrong, is the notion that neoliberals and liberal theorists see harmony of interest in interstate interaction and also the notion that constructivist dismissed existence of anarchy is misplaced.

This thesis is of the view that the degree of conflicts, limits and extents of cooperation noticed in international relations, by scholars in each scientific research program varies with different variants within paradigms, especially, realism, that accommodate multiple variants and sub-variants—structural realism—Offensive/Defensive realism. Each of these variants assigns more positive axioms that complement the core assumptions of the umbrella scientific research program.

The research contends that the debate between neorealists and neoliberals is more about the distinctive conclusion each paradigm drawn from the consequences of anarchy and intensity of uncertainty among actors in the system and what means each paradigm assigns to international actors to survive a self-help regulated system. The obscurity of the debate is also due to the dual definitions assigned by some scholars to anarchy—anarchy define as “absence of government” and anarchy define to implies, a

phenomenon that give states incentives for the “use of force” in international politics.<sup>118</sup> And more importantly the debate on the “role of institutions” has divided some rationalist scholars (which hold similar assumptions in IR) into neorealists and neoliberals. Scholars are not in disagreement whether institutions matters but not agreement whether they are endogenous or exogenous variables and, also if institution can assumed “life of its own.” Most of these debate stemmed from misunderstanding of what constitute state preferences, induced by what Robert Powell argues, a misunderstanding of the differences between preferences over strategy and preferences over outcome.<sup>119</sup>

This thesis also noted that attempts by some strands within the mainstream theoretical perspectives to conflate different level of analysis in locating causal mechanism or structural modifiers (to use Snyder terms) in explaining war and peace and/or conflict and cooperation had introduced more rigorous intra-paradigmatic debate within paradigms. For example, neoclassical realism locate variables in structural level of analysis and states level of analysis by assuming that the perceptions of international actors or leaders influences the effectiveness of structural variables, and hence international outcome.

Defensive realists also argue that elite’s perception of offensive – defensive balance determine the variation of conflict and cooperation. Neoliberal institutionalism a variant of liberal theory has locates structural and domestic factors to explain the role of institutions in international politics. And recently debate had assumed ontological dimension, between what Robert Keohane termed “rationalist and reflectivist debate”—structure and agent problem; learning and process in international politics; nature of anarchy; the problem of cooperation. The question that follows is whether, these concepts are socially constructed or they are objective reality.

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<sup>118</sup> Powell also noted this distinction, see “Anarchy in International Relations Theory”.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.



These debates have position constructivism, though not an independent theoretical perspective as alternative explanation in international politics.

As stated above, this thesis contends that understanding the mainstream theoretical position on the nature and implications of anarchy; the limit and extent of cooperation and conflicts, one need to understand, the various operational codes assigned to each variant within the mainstream theoretical perspectives. Therefore, it will be wrong, to “rush to judgement” that realists assumed impossibility of cooperation in international politics without analysing the operational code of each realist variant. This research concludes, (contrary to popular belief) that some realists assumed the possibility of extensive cooperation in international politics, though; realists see more problem of cooperation than what neoliberals would allow. This is true because defensive realism, a variant of structural realism argues that cooperation and cooperative mechanism are the external means of self-help system.

According to defensive realists, a defensive realist states will rely on “balance of power” and “balance of treat” as internal-means of self-help system, while cooperative mechanism as external means of self-help system.<sup>120</sup> Defensive realism unlike offensive realism sees limit to state power. For defensive realism, state maximizes security and it is irrational to attempt to increase power beyond what state needs to survive. This variant of realism reject hegemonic goal and warn that states that tends to acquires more power will meets counter balancing measures by other states in the system, which make such attempt self-defeating and irrational in international politics.

Unlike offensive realism, defensive realism state does not assumed “worse case” about the uncertainty of others intentions instead defensive realism states are benign security seekers that enter interstate interactions under a dormant security dilemma induced by fear and mistrust of others

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<sup>120</sup> This point has also been made by Robert Jervis and Shipping Tang.

intentions. States in this variant, interact not to escape but to alleviate the security dilemma. According to defensive realism, security dilemma is regulated by psychological and materials factors. One material factor is the policy of engagement through a series of Confidence Building Measure (CBM)—signalling and series of reassurance program embedded with robust deterrence measures. Defensive realism assumed evolutionary international system from offensive world that relied on conflicts and wars as means to an ends to world of defensive realism where cooperative measures are the most viable external means of self-help international system. Thus realists, like neoliberal suggest extensive cooperation in international politics.

The difficulty seen in cooperation by realism is suggests by another strand of structural realism—offensive realism. In line with this thesis arguments that paradigmatic understanding of phenomenon like conflict and cooperation is best understood by their various variants operational code, offensive realism, sees no cooperation in international politics, either due to anarchy or due to the inherent make-up of state in self-help system. For offensive realism, states are inherently aggressive and states mistrust each other due to uncertainty of others intentions.

Offensive realism unlike defensive assumed that there is no way state will decode intention of others in the system, therefore, the only means available to state is to assumed a “worst case” scenario on the intentions of others and maximize power as means and ends. For offensive realism states should acquire more power to escape the security dilemma. The theory assumed irreconcilable conflict is permanent in international politics. States would be concerns with relative gains and hence will not or in the extreme, offensive realists assumed states will never cooperate.

This thesis argues that during July 1914 crisis, most of the states (as the test shown) are offensive realism states. German military leaders perceiving offensive advantage assigned to Russia and France “the worst case” intents to harm Germany. For Germany in pre-world war I and Von Bismarck’s Germany after 1871 assumed that France intentions was to attack Germany. The German civilian and military leaders believe that

conflicts between France and Germany are irreconcilable. For offensive states, cooperation in any form is impossible not when conquest is perceived easy. As shown in the tests above, German leaders saw window that reinforced their irreconcilable conflicts of interest. Austrian leaders perceiving offensive advantage dismissed Serbian gestures to cooperate with the issued ultimatum. Defensive realism argues that before and after 1914, there was no security dilemma among the states in Pre-World War I conflicts. This is true in the sense that defensive realism assumed that security dilemma can only exists between benign states or lack of malignant among states. The Austria; German; Russia and France involve in the July crisis are all malign states hence they were not in security dilemma during the July crisis.

Security dilemma is very important variable in international politics, it has the ability to explain and predict frequency and intensity of military conflict in an anarchical environment and it has the utility to predict international military outcome or where military conflict can actual take place in ethnic or international politics when the central authority or government is absence. It also highlights the danger of self-defeating arms race in international politics. Where status quo state with security goal increasing its military arsenals, decreasing the security of others which reinforce mistrust and fear that induced adversaries to react in the same way, which in cycle, resulting to insecurity of both actors.

Security dilemma has the explanatory mechanism to predict and explain to policy analysts when it is necessary to signal intentions that reduce uncertainty and mistrust in interstate interactions. But one major setback of security dilemma is the difficulty in distinguishing offensive and defensive military technology. But its logic can also be use by realist scholars to explain causes of ethnic conflict in the absence of central power. Barry Posen, a realist, had used the logic of security dilemma to explain ethnic conflict in

Eastern Europe.<sup>121</sup> And recently this phenomenon had to be applied mostly by proponents of offense-defence theory.

Collective action problem—the tests on Montreal protocol and the Kyoto Protocol conducted has difficulty finding a compromised agreement. The conventions that induced these protocol negotiations were easily created but, Unlike the Montreal protocol on ozone layer depletion, states found it much more difficult to reach agreement on the Kyoto Protocol This thesis argues that the Kyoto Protocol was a failure in absence of US—being the largest emitter of green-house gases.

The major puzzle on the Kyoto protocol—is why the US withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol negotiation even when a compromised agreement have been reached with the EU? Why was the negotiation easy in Montreal protocol but almost seen impossible in Kyoto Protocol. It is, the thesis' view that both realism; liberal theory and neoliberal have insufficient theoretical explanations to this puzzle, though, liberal theory can complement neoliberal institutionalism to give complete explanations.

The research question posed in introductory section—What ways do relative power, institutionalized information and states preferences determine cooperative and conflictual outcome? Realism (as shown in the test analysis), has a poor theoretical background to explain this puzzle, realism would argues that US was concerned for relative gains make cooperation difficult because the US fear that non-committal countries like China, other developing countries and international trade competitors might gain in trade competitiveness more than U.S, this explanation is not sufficient, because, even if, China agreed to reduce her emission, the US would still be face with harsh domestic opposition from the US Senate and other industrial lobby groups (like The Global Climate Coalition). The strong domestic opposition faced by US negotiators problematize how state interests or preference is

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<sup>121</sup> For detail formulation on ODB on ethnic conflict, see Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict”.

form. For realism and neoliberal, these preferences are given, realism and neoliberal has no theory on preference formation hence realism and neoliberals would find it difficult to explain or solve this puzzle.

Liberal theory, has the better explanatory factors to solve this puzzle, liberal theory postulate that information as perfect, it would be, will not alone determine state preferences. For liberal theory, institutions like the IPCC, COP are necessary but they are not sufficient to induce cooperation, therefore, liberal theory asserts that domestic players—the individual, societal pressure groups aggregate their interest which are transmitted through the political institutions, which in turn influences state preferences. Cooperation in climate change, state preferences were largely form by domestic actors' economic and environmental interests. In our tests, Predictive factors from liberal theory explain how domestic groups were able to influenced state preferences.

In the case of US, the political institutions—the US Congress played a pivotal role. Other liberal powerful industrial groups and high profile politicians also influenced and determined the US interests, during the negotiations. During the Kyoto Protocol negotiation, the EU and U.S preferences were largely influence by domestic politics that altered government preferences. Liberal theory also posits the role of individual in preferences formation. This explains the vital role the U.S. vice president Al Gore's environment interest played in the negotiations.

The Second question—what ways does the perceived offensive advantage under security dilemma influences conflictual outcome in anarchical system? ODT is a good theory that has the characteristics to supplement realism over-dependent on relative distribution of capabilities or polarity as the only explanatory variable to explain international outcome.

ODT has the attribute to complement realism to explain extensive cooperation in international politics. The theory objective and subjective balance have the attribute to explain the variation in cooperation as well as conflict when, there is structural variation in military technologies. The theory postulate that when the minimum ratio of actual offensive military technology

to actual defensive military technology is increasing, the offensive has advantage and conflict is more likely, but when the ratio is decreasing the defensive has the advantage and consequently, cooperation and peace is more likely in international politics. In other words, offense-defence balance is the efficacy of offense and defence military technology.<sup>122</sup>

Although, ODT has large prescriptive value, when used by rational international actors. The subjective side of the offense–defence theory also has the explanatory attributes as the actual or objective balance. But the danger also looms because state elites usually misperceived the balance in favour of the offense especially during international crisis.

And importantly, the offense-defence theory can answer such very important historical questions as why Europe experienced more than two decades of relative peace after a series of crises that culminated in the Prussian-Franco? Why did British prime minister during the pre-World War II engage in cooperative policy of appeasement with Hitler? Fearon also maintains that the theory can account for why the defensive effect of nuclear weapons does appear to matter empirically as the traditional military offense-defence suggests, hence, the argument that nuclear weapons favor defence is not straightforward. If nuclear weapons favour the defender, they do so by rendering defence in the classical sense impossible. Instead, nuclear weapons favour the defender by making deterrence the inescapable condition, although nuclear states retain the power of absolute destruction.<sup>123</sup>

Finally, this thesis sees attempts by scholars (including realist scholars) to channel most of their paradigmatic strengths to argue for extensive cooperation under anarchy. Independent variables that explain cooperation are not exclusively liberals' factors, as this study has shown,

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<sup>122</sup> For detailed formulation and measurement and definition on the ODB see Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma", pp. 186-214; see also James D. Fearon *The Offense-Defence Balance and War Since 1648*, Draft, International Studies Association, (Chicago, Illinois, - April 8, 1997); Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited", *World Politics*, Volume 50, No. 1, 1997, pp. 185-188; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defence Theory and Its Critics," *Security Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 660-691;

<sup>123</sup> James D. Fearon *The Offense-Defence Balance and War Since 1648*, Draft, International Studies Association, (Chicago, Illinois, - April 8, 1997), P.37

ODT, a realist theory has rich explanatory factors aggregate under umbrella to explain international outcome. Cooperation outcome is not (or no more) the exclusive dependent variable of liberalism (as some liberals claimed).<sup>124</sup> And as, the cost of conflict or war is skyrocketing, international politics is evolving from offensive realism world to defensive realism world. Thus there is need for scholars to focus theoretical adventures into this evolution. If this, prediction is true; the Security dilemma will be a very important phenomenon for security studies and international relations in general.

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<sup>124</sup> Andrew Moravcsik and Jeffrey W. Legro, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?", *International Security*, Volume 24, No. 2, 1999, pp. 5–55.

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### **Abstract**

Anarchy meant as an absence of supreme authority in international politics and inherently defines as self-help principles that foster uncertainty that creates incentives for international actors to be concern about their security and at most their survival. State's uncertainty of others intentions, and difficulty to secure perfect information induces states onto Security dilemma and collective action problem. These effects yield distinctively two international outcomes—conflict and cooperation. The thesis hypothesized that conflict outcome will be more likely if state elites perceived offensive advantage in military technology, doctrine and postures. While cooperation is likely when institutions are designed to improve information uncertainty, and reduction in transaction cost are compatible with states preferences. This thesis argues that neoliberal institutionalism requires liberal theory factors (State preferences) to explain cooperation outcome where there is collective action problem. Whereas realist's offensive-defensive theory that stresses subjective offensive–defense balance variables can explain conflict outcome in international politics.



## OZET

Uluslararası politikada anarşinin, reel politik düzlemde yüksek otoritenin bulunmayışı ve doğası gereği, uluslararası aktörlerin güvenlik ve çoğunlukla da yaşamsal güvenliklerine ehemmiyet vermelerine teşvik eden, toplumda başına buyruk yaşam prensiplerinin gelişmesi olarak tanımlanır. Devletler, başkalarının maksatlarının yarattığı belirsizlikler ile kusursuz bilgiyi güvenceye almanın zorluğunun yarattığı açmaza düşmenin yanında müşterek eyleme geçmenin sorunsalını da yaşıyorlar. Bu etkenler uluslararası iki farklı sonucun oluşmasına sebep oluyor. Çatışma ve işbirliği. Bu tez çalışması, devlet seçkinlerinin askeri teknolojilerde, doktrinde ve sosyal imajlarında saldırganlıkları sonucu avantajlı oldukları algılanması durumunda sonucun muhtemelen çatışma olacağını varsaymaktadır. Bununla birlikte kurumların, devletlerin tercihlerine paralel olarak, bilgi belirsizliğini geliştirmek ve işlem maliyetini düşürmek amacı ile tasarlanmaları durumunda sonucun muhtemelen işbirliği olacağı varsaymaktadır. Bu tez; Neoliberal kurumsallığın, sonucun işbirliği olmasını açıklamak için, devletlerin müşterek eyleme geçme sorunsallığını yaşadıklarında liberal kuram faktörlerinin ( Devlet tercihleri ) bulunmasını savunur. Oysaki uluslararası politikada öznel saldırgan-savunmacı denge değişkenlerini baskılayan gerçekçilerin saldırgan-savunmacı kuramları sonucun çatışma olmasını açıklayabilir.