REFORM AT THE UNITED NATIONS:
RECONCILING THEORY AND PRACTICE

FULYA SÖNMEZ
103605010

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BİRLEŞMİŞ MİLLETLER'DE REFORM:
PRATİK İLE KURAMI UZLAŞTIRMAK

FULYA SÖNMEZ
103605010

Murat Özbank : ....
Harry Tzimitras : ....
Serhat Güvenç : ....

Tezin Onaylandığı Tarih : ....

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ABSTRACT

The Report of the Secretary-General 'In larger freedom' had set the agenda of the summit meeting of September 2005, which brought together all United Nations member states. The report has put forward a reform agenda for the United Nations. Both the Report of the Secretary-General and the Summit Outcome Document based their proposals for reform on an analysis of the consequences of changing dynamics of international politics, the nature of new and existing threats and an idea of how the international system should address these challenges. The agenda of the UN reform explains how the concept of sovereignty and the idea of collective security are evolving and the ways in which these concepts can be institutionalized within the current Charter system. The way the reports combine the *reality* of world politics with some bold *ideals*, both illuminates the way the international politics *is* evolving and *ought* to evolve. In this respect, the discussion of reform embodied in these documents has both realist and normative concerns. The argument of this thesis is that the theories of international politics are short of conceptualizing both aspects of reform process because they are either realist/rationalist or idealist/normative. To reconcile the consensus realized at the practical level with the controversy in the theoretical level, it is necessary to go beyond realist-idealist dichotomy. The aim of the thesis is to assert how the reform process at the United Nations can be conceptualized by E.H. Carr's concept of "sound political thinking" which is derived from the relationship between realism and idealism.

ÖZET

Eylül 2005'te Birleşmiş Milletler'e üye ülkelerin biraraya geldiği zirvenin gündemini belirleyen Genel-Sekreter raporu dünyanın karşı karşıya kaldığı yeni tehditlere dair bir saptama yaparak BM reformu çerçevesinde geniş çaplı bir dizi öneri sundu. Bu zirvede temel ilkeler üzerinde bir görüşbirliğine varıldı. Genel Sekreter raporu ve zirve sonuç bildirgesinde uluslararası ilişkilerin nasıl olduğu ve nasıl olması gerektiğine dair birtakım tespitlerden yola çıkıldı. Bu bağlamda BM'de reform pratiğindeki tartışmalarda gerçekçi ve normatif kaygıların birlikte ele alındığı ve bu çerçevede bir dönüşüm öngörüldüğünü söyleyebiliriz. Bu tezin temel iddiası BM'de reform tartışmasında gelinen noktanın hem *dünya politikasının gerçekliği* üzerinde hem de *dönüşümün hangi yöne doğru olması gerektiği* üzerinde bir görüşbirliğinin var olduğu ve bu dönüşümü kuramsal açıdan anlayabilmek için gerçekçilik-idealizm ikiliğinin aşılması gerektiğidir. Bu uzlaşmayı sağlayan yaklaşım ise E. H. Carr'ın gerçekçilik-idealizm ikiliği arasındaki ilişkiden türettiği "sağlıklı siyasi düşünce" kavramıdır.

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I

INTRODUCTION: Consensus and Controversy

The main aim of this thesis is to understand the reform process at the United Nations. In order to understand the reform at the UN, it is necessary to comprehend the reasons of the need for reform. There is an apparent need to reform the institution because the nature of the problems that the world faces today is different from those of the post-Second World War period. The UN was established with the aim of preventing interstate wars. Today, we are faced with challenges that cannot be solved with the established mechanisms of the UN. Thus we need to rebuild institutional mechanisms of the UN to adapt to the newly emerging realities of world politics.

We also observe an apparent will to reform the institution among the world community. There is a consensus on the fundamentals of the reform process embodied in the Summit Outcome Document of the 2005 UN World Summit. This consensus has a dual structure that is influenced equally by realist and idealist streams of thought. The realist content of this document is based on an examination of the new threats and challenges that the world faces and lessons learned from the past failures of the UN. Moreover, the document evaluates changing dynamics of the international politics and endorses the evolution of the principles of national sovereignty and security. The idealist content of the consensus manifests itself in the idea that human rights, development and security are interconnected and mutually reinforcing issue areas. Thus, the consensus manifested in the document endorses a *new* concept of "sovereignty as responsibility" and a *new* concept of security as "human security". The resultant reform agenda is built on these two core concepts, which has both realist and normative content. Therefore, in order to understand this process, we need a

theoretical approach capable of dealing with this two-dimensional nature of the UN-reform process.

The problem is, however, mainstream theories of international relations do not present a theoretical framework capable of approaching the two facets of the reform process in the interrelated manner that they deserve. What I have in mind, in this respect, are particularly neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, on the "realistic" side, and David Held's idea of a "Cosmopolitan Democracy" on the idealistic side. I argue that in their respective approaches to the study of international organizations in general and to the question of UN reform in particular, these approaches tend to emphasize one dimension over the other, and therefore fail to establish the much-needed dialogue between the idealistic and realistic perspectives. My argument is that the theoretical framework E. H. Carr introduces in the "Twenty Years' Crisis" helps us to understand the normative and practical content of the reports in the interrelated manner that they deserve. My interpretation of Carr indicates a coherent blend of realism and utopianism with reference to his mostly overlooked use of the realist thought as a critical weapon to attack those who defend the status quo and his argument *for* as well as against utopianism.

In this thesis I try to show how the will for reform at the United Nations, embodied in the reports of the Secretary-General and the High-level Panel, exemplifies what Carr calls "sound political thinking". The agenda of the UN reform explains how the concept of sovereignty and the idea of collective security are evolving and the ways in which these concepts can be institutionalized within the current Charter system. The way the reports combine the *reality* of world politics with some bold *ideals*, both illuminates the way the international politics *is* evolving and *ought* to evolve. As Carr says "we must recognize that theory, as it develops out of practice and develops into practice, plays its own transforming role in the process" (1942: 19). The attempt to understand the current debates of reform in the

light of Carr's theoretical framework can both help us to understand the profundity of Carr's contribution to the theory of international politics and shed a light on the transformation of the international polity.

The focus of this thesis is to a large extent theoretical, in line with the aim to formulate a theoretical framework capable of approaching the two dimensions of the politics of change. To understand the reform process at the UN and tangible proposals for reform at the institution, especially reform in the structure and working methods of the Security Council, is crucial however beyond the limits of this thesis.

1.1. Outline of the Chapters

The first chapter begins with explaining in detail the reasons brought the need to reform the UN, and how the consensus over the principles of the reform came about before and during the 2005 World Summit. In this regard, I will first touch upon the changing dynamics of world politics and how the agenda of reform is prepared in response to these changing dynamics. I explain the preparatory stages of the World Summit with reference to the reports that framed the agenda of the summit and how these reports – the Report of the Secretary General and the High-level Panel Report – reflect the dual nature of the reform process. Then, I go on to present an account of the current reform agenda embodied in the World Summit Outcome Document (2005) and the Report of the Secretary-General (2005) that set the agenda of the summit. I will discuss main areas of reform with reference to the change in the understanding of the key principles of the Charter and how the will for reform embodied in these documents are based on two concepts: "human security" and "sovereignty as responsibility". The evolution of these concepts will be discussed because it was the outcome of this discussion, which produced the consensus on how the world society should

address the new threats and challenges. We will see how in this process, we observe both normative ideals and realistic assessment of the current state of international politics.

The second chapter begins with an examination of the state of the art of the theories of international organizations in general and addresses the question of reform at the UN in particular. I discuss these theories in two main groups: on the one side realist/rationalist models and on the other idealist/normative models. Having different research questions and employing different methodologies, these theories are short of enabling us to conceptualize change in international politics and the reform process at work in the institutional settings. No single theory within these theoretical streams is able to offer a complete explanation of the variation in the case of UN reform. The second part of the chapter is an attempt to develop a theoretical explanation for change in the institutional settings and current reform agenda at the UN. In this respect, I find it necessary to link realist and idealist lines of thought in the theories of international organizations. The theoretical framework Carr introduces as a third alternative to realism and idealism, what he calls 'sound political thinking' will be discussed in detail with reference to the increasing secondary literature on Carr's "The Twenty Years' Crisis".

I argue that the current reform process at the UN can best be conceptualized through the perspective of Carr's understanding of politics as a constant struggle between the two forces: realism and idealism. The dialectic relationship between the two reconciles the controversy between the consensus achieved at the practical level and the controversy in the theoretical debates. My argument is that one of the challenges that stand in the way of realizing the reform agenda are the tools themselves that we use for understanding the world. A bridge between the theory and practice of reform at the UN can be built by searching for possibilities for synthesis between these two lines of thought. This "third way" is a solution to

the controversy in the theoretical level to grasp both normative and positive aspects of both the current reform process and the evolution of international organizations.

In the concluding chapter, I will try to show the key ideas that can be drawn from my study to the larger subject area of international organizations. I will try to explain the implications of my interpretation of the reform process at the UN and the theoretical framework I proposed to comprehend the politics of change.

II

REFORM AT THE UNITED NATIONS: A CONSENSUS

It has been 60 years since the Charter of the United Nations was signed. Since its inception in 1945 in the San Francisco Conference, the UN has continued to adapt to the challenges of a complex and changing world environment, growing from fifty-one members in 1945 to one hundred and ninety-one in 2004. In this process, the quest for reform has been an integral part of the history of the United Nations. Through the years, many governmental studies, independent commissions and scholars have produced proposals aimed at making the UN work better, modify its mandate and operate more efficiently. Successive Secretary-Generals have offered their own reform agendas[1]. This being the case, since its inception in 1945, the UN Charter has been amended only three times, once to enlarge the Security Council from its original eleven members to today's fifteen, and twice to enlarge the Economic and Social Council, which at present has fifty-four members (GA Res. 1991A, GA Res. 1991B, GA Res. 2847). The infrequency of Charter amendment is understandable given the burdensome process provided for adopting them. Under Article 108 it requires a two-thirds majority of the total membership and its ratification by the same majority including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

The chapter will focus on the recent reform initiative of the Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the United Nations. The agenda for reform embodied in the Report of the Secretary-General named "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all" has set the agenda of the UN World Summit of 2005. There is an apparent will to reform the UN manifested in the Summit Outcome Document[2] of 2005 UN World Summit[3]. The

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[1] For an account of the major UN reforms see Edward C. Luck (2004), "Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a history in progress".

[2] 2005 World Summit Outcome (U.N. Doc. A/60/L.1) is accepted in the sixteenth session General Assembly meeting as the Outcome Document of the summit at the UN Headquarters held from 14 to 16 September 2005.

outcome document and the reports of the Secretary-General and High-level Panel manifest a strong will for reforming the UN and offer substantial proposals in order to make the UN capable of responding to contemporary threats and challenges as well as making the institution more efficient in decision-making capacities thus enabling it to respond quickly in times of emergency.

In this respect, first I start by a brief examination of the conditions that made the need for reform inevitable. Secondly, there will be concise background information of the 2005 World Summit in which the will for reform was shaped. Third, I will move on to discuss the main concepts on which the international community has decided to build the reform initiative on. In that section I will outline the evolution of the concepts of security and sovereignty with reference to the reports of the Secretary General and the High-level Panel and the Summit outcome Document. Finally, I will try to show how the concept of "human security" became the central reference for the reform process at work at the UN.

2.1. From the need for reform to the will to reform

The history of international organization shows us that both the establishment and reform of the institutions were always a response to solve new problems that need to be solved with a collective effort. Claude identifies four prerequisites for the development of international organization. First two of them relate to existing conditions: the world must be divided into states which function as independent units, and a level of contact must exist between these states. The other requirements are "subjective". States must develop a level of

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[3] UN summit of September 2005 was also the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the organization. World leaders have come together in United Nations Headquarters in New York to review progress made since the United Nations Millennium Declaration. The agenda of 2005 summit however became more than an evaluation of the progress of Millennium Summit outcome and became a world summit on the future and the capacity of the UN itself. The crisis of confidence to the UN has culminated after American intervention in Iraq. In the face of strong opposition from world public opinion and most members of the UN Security Council, Americans became disillusioned with the UN because it did not support war in Iraq and the Europeans and others lost their confidence because the UN could not stop it.

awareness of the problems, which arise out of their coexistence, and perceive a need to create institutional arrangements and methods for regulating their relations with each other (1984: 21). Thus, in order to have the proper conditions for the creation of an international organization, the world must be divided, interdependent, and be aware of the problems that they face and be determined to create a systematic solution to handle these problems. I argue that the same conditions also create the need to reform the international institutions and today these four prerequisites are satisfied.

We live in a global and interdependent world. When one attempts to make a list of the threats and challenges that the world faces today, it becomes clear how they are all "threats without boundaries"[4]. Conflicts between and within states, nuclear, biological, chemical and biological weapons, terrorism, transnational organized crime, challenges to ensure basic health services and primary education, infectious disease surveillance, access to clean water and clean energy, eradication of poverty, and environmental degradation[5], are all threats and challenges nation-states are unprepared and incapable of addressing individually. No state is capable of standing wholly alone because the nature of newly emerging and existing threats to international peace and security is transnational. The transnational nature of these problems makes it necessary to deal with them in a multilateral framework.

However, the world is divided since the international system is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of nation-states and characterized by "anarchy"[6] and the Charter of the United Nations reflects this principle. As such the UN is equipped to prevent interstate

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[4] "Threats without boundaries" is one of the chapter titles of the High-level Panel report (Report of the Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2004: 19).

[5] These threats are the main findings of the High-level Panel report (2004) and the Millennium Report (2000).

[6] The relationship between sovereignty and anarchy works both ways. On the one hand we can say that the nature of the international system is anarchical because states do not recognize any superior authority above themselves, on the other hand, states insist on their sovereignty because the system is anarchic. The questions arising from this relationship is discussed in the literature by asking whether anarchy is real or imagined (Waltz 1979, Bull 1977) and further evaluated under the agent-structure debate (Wendt 1987). In this thesis I follow Bartelson's argument that "there is no need for an acceptance of the structuralist ontology or the solution to the agent-structure problem that derives from it" because the problem of change in international politics remains the same if we only "accept here a certain duality of structure as a provisional touchstone" (1995: 258-9).

wars with Security Council intervention. As the nature of threats changes since the UN was founded in 1945, the organization has to adopt itself to be able to address these newly emerging challenges, to provide the necessary international cooperation between states. The need for reform stems from the fact that the nature of the problems today demands different approaches.

The world community is aware of the problems they face and are determined to find systematic solutions to these challenges as they agreed in the 2005 World Summit. The Summit Outcome Document reflects how the world community first deliberated on the threats and challenges that the world faces today and then reached a consensus over the need to address these challenges by reforming the UN. The dual nature of the politics of change at the UN lies here. One dimension of the process is that the reform agenda[7] embodied in the reports is based on an examination of the evolution of the international politics. Other dimension lies

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[7] The Report of the Secretary-General was prepared to set the agenda of the World Summit which gathered the heads of state and government at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 10 to 16 September 2005. There were two main agendas put forward by the Secretary-General report. First, it was an attempt to evaluate the five-year progress on the implementation of the Millennium Declaration. (Millennium Declaration (2000) was the outcome document of the UN Millennium Assembly of 2000. The declaration puts forward a shared vision for the future of the world as well as medium-term goals with specified deadline and substantial development goals for achieving the vision. The declaration is one of the rare documents in the UN system that specifies verifiable quantitative measures of progress (Peterson, 2006: 139-140). It called for a global effort to achieve the Millennium development Goals by 2015.) In preparing his report Annan made use of the Millennium Project's report "Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to achieve the Millennium Development Goals". It is an evaluation of the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (MDGs, approved by national leaders at the UN Millennium Summit in 2000, were a set of ambitious development goals calling for new efforts from both developed and developing states.) in the five years after their approval in the 2000 summit.

Secondly, Annan's report has drawn upon the conclusions of an independent report, a product of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change appointed by the Secretary-General. It was specifically concerned with security issues. The panel presented their report, "A more secure world: our shared responsibility", to the Secretary-General in December 2004. The vision created by High-level Panel Report addresses the major threats to international peace and security and sets out a new vision of collective security. The Report of the High-level Panel made recommendations on many controversial and core issues regarding international security including defining terrorism, preventive use of force, humanitarian intervention, reforming the UN Human Rights Commission and reforming the Security Council.

The members of the panel was appointed by the Secretary-General Kofi Annan with the task of addressing threats, challenges and change confronting the United Nations in the coming years. Former prime minister of Thailand, Anand Panyarachun, headed the panel. The other members came from Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, France, Ghana, India, Japan, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay. The overall composition reflected the composition of the Security Council by including people on the basis of the geographical distribution of the seat among regional groups, and also nationals of the five permanent members.

in the normative content of the process, which answers the question what the ultimate goal of the reform process will be. The resulting reform agenda is a balanced document between these two dimensions of the politics of change.

The dual nature of the reform process is based on the fact that the Summit Outcome Document both evaluates the nature of the threats the world faces and at the same time represents a broad consensus over the ways in which the international polity ought to evolve. One can easily identify the practical content of the reform agenda that is to respond to the new threats and challenges that the world faces. Identification of these threats is one dimension of the reform process. Another dimension of the current politics of change at the UN is the normative content of the Summit Outcome Document and the reports that set the agenda for the summit. The reports not only explain how the institution will change and adapt itself but why the institutions should change in that direction.

2.2. The nature of new threats and challenges

In order to analyze how the reform process has been shaped as a response to the current reality and how that reality has been interpreted in the reports that shaped the agenda of the Summit we should examine the main findings of the reports and the Outcome Document.

The problems of today are different from the ones that the founders of the UN tried to address. In this respect, both reports and the Summit Outcome Document argue for the UN's need to reconfigure in order to address a world of transnational threats which nation-states are either unprepared or incapable of meeting. Poverty, conflict, terrorism, infectious diseases, environmental degradation and weapons proliferation, all represent threats that have emerged since the UN charter was adopted in 1945. The global character of these issues and the way they combine security, human rights and development explains why the UN must reinvent itself for the future.

The central findings of the report of the Secretary-General (2005) and the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) that frame the current reform initiative at the UN is that security, human rights and development are interlinked (2005: 10). Johanna Mandelson Forman, senior program officer for peace, security and human rights at the United Nations Foundation, considers this as a reaction to the security first approach of the 1990s, which sees security in its traditional understanding. Forman argues that the experience of UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Congo, East Timor, Haiti, Rwanda and Somalia for example, have made the international community aware that armed interventions alone are inadequate to restore security and development in failed states (2005). In line with that argument, the report argues that denial of human rights and poverty greatly increases the risk of instability and violence. Similarly, war and terrorism set back development. Development, security and human rights reinforce each other (SG report 2005: 5).

In Annan's words the relationship between security, human rights and development:

> ... has only been strengthened in our era of rapid technological advances, increasing economic interdependence, globalization and dramatic geopolitical change. While poverty and denial of human rights may not be said to "cause" civil war, terrorism or organized crime, they all greatly increase the risk of instability and violence. Similarly, war and atrocities are far from the only reasons that countries are trapped in poverty, but they undoubtedly set back development. Again, catastrophic terrorism on one side of the globe, for example an attack against a major financial centre in a rich country, could affect the development prospects of millions on the other by causing a major economic downturn and plunging millions into poverty. And countries which are well governed and respect the human rights of their citizens are better placed to avoid the horrors of conflict and to overcome obstacles to development. (SG report 2005: 5-6)

Secretary-General's report includes most of the key findings and proposals of the High-level Panel report, which focuses on security issues. It also focuses on the role of the UN in economic, social and environmental matters because an increasingly complex global polity requires similarly comprehensive international organizations. Both the High-level Panel report (2004: 15) and the Report of the Secretary-General (2005: 16-18) have a broad conceptualization of security arguing that traditional understanding of security, defined as state's defense of their territorial borders is not enough to grasp the meaning of security in the current era because security has social, economic, environmental and humanitarian aspects.

Since World War II, the authority of states has been increasingly compromised by their participation in international institutions such as the United Nations but at the same time the UN enshrines the sovereignty of member states. Indeed, admission to the UN is the highest indication that a regime is accepted within the community of nations. A sovereign state is guaranteed exclusive jurisdiction within its borders and other states are not supposed to intervene in its internal affairs. Two core values of the UN Charter, sovereign equality of member states and respect for human rights, are in an uneasy relationship because human right abuser states set barriers by using the traditional understanding of sovereignty. Furthermore, states which are not capable of providing a secure environment and prospect for development for their citizens are also entitled to full sovereignty over their territory without being able to offer the most fundamental duties of a state. In this respect, the concept of "sovereignty as responsibility" implies that state authorities are not only responsible for the safety and lives of citizens but also promotion of their welfare. It suggests that the national political authorities are responsible to their citizens internally and to the international community externally. Thus, sovereignty becomes no longer only a right but also a responsibility because the state has an instrumental value. State has the rights of sovereignty as long as it fulfills the duties stemming from it. As a consequence of the understanding of

"sovereignty as responsibility" states become obliged not only to protect their own citizens but also to fulfill its duties to the wider international community. This obligates other states in the system to act if a state does not fulfill its basic obligations, such as to provide security to its citizens.

2.3. Main Conceptual Changes in the Current Reform Initiative
at the United Nations

These reports are not only addressing how the UN can be the central medium of the coming world order, they provide a blueprint for how the new world order should be built. They focus on the fundamental principles of international politics and how the new international order would be legitimized. They also analyze the events and trends in world politics since the end of Cold War and the implications of these events and trends on the coming order. The centrality of the "human security" and "sovereignty as responsibility" can be understood within this perspective. This concept frames the vision of these reports for the coming world order. In order to understand the will for reform embodied in these reports I think it is necessary to examine the evolution of these concepts in more detail.

The broad principles of the Charter are capable of addressing these new threats and challenges. Among these principal aims of the Charter, economic and social development and protection of human rights which were seen as secondary to and separate from the objective of maintenance of international security. Traditional notions of security were concerned mainly with the state's ability to counter external threats. As the nature of threats change, from inter-state war to internal conflict, with the decrease in the capacity of the state to provide basic security, health and education services to its citizen, the concept of security has began to evolve to include human elements of security such as "human rights, good governance, access to education and health care, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her own potential" (Report of the Commission on

Human Security 2003: 4). As the definition of security has broadened to include not only peace between states but also the security of populations within states, the interpretation and implementation of these basic Charter principles gained importance. As a result, the consensus embodied in the Summit Outcome Document refers to these Charter principles and reinterprets them in the contemporary context.

2.3.1. Human Security

The concept of security today must shift its emphasis from state to individuals. This argument leads the way to a new definition of sovereignty as well. The idea of state sovereignty, which is at the core of the UN system, is also evolving from a focus of rights of states to the duties of states stemming from sovereignty. Among the most recent evolutions was the changing focus from national security to the inclusion of "human security" within the state. The notion of state sovereignty is beginning to evolve to include the responsibility of the state to protect its citizens, not just the immunity of the state from interference. The panel report argues that to realize its principal aim, the protection of state security, the concept of security should be redefined so as to include human security aspect as well. The concept of "human security" should be at the core of the new collective security system that the panel report intends to establish (2004: 22-24).

The "new security consensus"[8] that the panel proposes is based on a number of common threats, some old, some new. The panel identifies the threats as including "poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; war and violence within States; the spread and possible use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime." (Panel report, Synopsis, at 11). The threat assessment embodied here is at the core of the concept of "human security". Slaughter identifies the

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[8] The High-level Panel report's first part is titled "Towards a New Security Consensus".

entrance of the concept of "human security" to use in the official language dating back to early 1990s. The Canadian government[9] started to promote and use the concept and later Kofi Annan endorsed the idea in the "We the Peoples" report[10] (2005:623).

It is interesting that the Panel Report refers back to the drafters of the UN Charter arguing that they endorsed the idea of "human security" long before the idea gained momentum by stating in the opening words of the Charter that security, economic development and human freedom are interlinked (Panel Report, *supra* note 1, Synopsis, at 11). This linkage of "human security" to state security can be made with reference to the Charter to the extent that "the drafters of the Charter would have identified only scourges such as poverty and disease as threats to the extent that they directly threatened territorial integrity or political independence of individual states" (Slaughter 2005: 623). Thus, one can link state security to "human security" by arguing that today poverty and disease are important factors contributing to state collapse, and the problem of failed states not only threatens their region but also creates a security threat to the world by being safe haven for terrorists.

The panel report does not see these threats as being directly related to state security because they threaten regional or world security. These threats are regarded as a security issue because they threaten the lives of citizens within states. This line of argument has more implications than the panel report openly discusses. In order to "put human security alongside or even before state security", some core values of the Charter becomes controversial, above all, the idea of sovereignty (Slaughter 2005: 624). The challenge posed by the interrelated threats and the ineffectiveness of states to respond these common threats by themselves calls for a redefinition of the very concept of sovereignty and some core values embedded in the Charter such as the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states (Keohane

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[9] The concept used by the former foreign minister of Canada, Lloyd Axworthy (1997: 183) from early 1990s on.
[10] Annan in his millennial "We the Peoples" report underlined the need for more human-centered approach to security (2000).

1993: 91-2). "Human security" has already started to become a matter of collective security exemplified by the Security Council decisions taken throughout the 1990s. Security Council decision called the starvation in Somalia and Massacre in East Timor threats to international peace and security that requires collective action[11] (Slaughter 2005: 624). In this respect, one can argue that states, taking these measures through Security Council decisions, no longer perceive the idea of sovereignty to be absolute as it was in the ideal of the Westphalia treaty[12].

The problems associated with this trend of intervening in the affairs of other states are twofold. First, some states feel threatened by this newly developing concept of "human security" because they think the concept will be operationalized as long as it serves to the interest of the big powers. Second, the concept of "human security" has implications for the developed countries, to step in to protect the victims from human rights violator governments. In fact, the idea that powerful states have a responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security has a long tradition dating back to the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna, with the advance of the concept of "human security" now the "responsibility to protect" started to have a more comprehensive meaning than in the past. The panel envisions a collective responsibility and commitment to address threats to both human and state security. Slaughter identifies this as collective security system, which the Charter does not foresee, namely a system "based on a positive pledge of affirmative assistance rather than a negative commitment to refrain from the use of force against fellow states" (2005: 625).

The mechanism for such an action the panel foresees is the one that the Charter frames:

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[11] There are a number of similar trends such as accountability of individual leaders for their actions against their own citizens. Justifications for interference in the affairs of other states are increasingly based on the human rights and other problem arising from the so called failed states, see (Slaughter 2005)

[12] The Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648 ending the Eighty Years' War, marked the beginning of the modern state system in Europe. The treaty introduced the principle of sovereignty of nation-states and defined sovereignty tied to the right of self-determination, sovereign equality of states and the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states as guiding principles of interstate relations.

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII" (The Charter of the United Nations, Article 2(7)).

However the Charter prohibits intervening in the affairs of member states, the panel may well build its claim on the articles of the Chapter VII which gives the framework of Security Council authorized measures. To conclude, panel sees the responsibility to protect the "human security" and state security on the issues relating to internal affairs of the states can be legal as long as the Security Council authorizes the decision. Although this seems like a challenge to the principle of state sovereignty which is one of the core values of the UN Charter, a deeper analysis of the debates over the legitimacy and legality of the use of force in the framework of the recent UN reform agenda would illuminate the seeming controversy.

2.3.2. Use of force

One of the most controversial problems of international politics is the question when and under which circumstances the use of force would be considered just. This question is also addressed in the reports of the Secretary-General and the High-level Panel. In this respect, the panel reaffirms the right of states to defend themselves, even preemptively when an attack is imminent. One of the objectives of the panel was to deal with the issue of preventive uses of force. Especially after the ineffectiveness of the UN in Rwanda, Kosovo and Iraq cases, it become evident that the decision making process at the Council was too slow, because the decision was blocked by veto or led to a significant divide between the members of the council. In addressing the challenge posed by the increase in the number of threats that calls for preventive measures the panel proposes the use of preventive measures

before the threat becomes imminent (Panel report, *supra* note 1, at 55, para. 194). The panel sees the source of legitimacy of such preventive measures at the Security Council and does not envisage a change in the Article 51, right to self-defense provisions of the Charter. The panel report does not support the arguments in favor of using Article 51 provisions for justifying preventive measures. It is up to the Security Council to decide if the preventive use of force can be employed in each case (Panel report, *supra* note 1, at 55, paras. 190-2).

The panel recommended the Security Council to agree on a set of guidelines that would guide their decisions for answering whether the force should be used (Panel report, 57, para. 205). The panel puts forward five criteria of legitimacy: seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means, and balance of consequences (Panel report, 57, para. 207).

Eventhough the panel report limits the case for legality and legitimacy of military intervention, there can be cases like the NATO intervention in Kosovo where the Security Council being bypassed did not effect the legitimacy it had in the eyes of the world public opinion. The Kosovo Commission found the act "illegal but legitimate" (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000, The Kosovo report). Thus, in such cases even if the Security Council is bypassed, the act to intervene can be seen legitimate. What the panel offers in terms of legitimacy – five criteria of legitimacy – set the rules that the Security Council itself will apply. In this respect, the Security Council will become both the place that decides the legality and legitimacy.

However positive it may seem that these criteria will set the guidelines for legitimate decisions, there are a number problems associated with it. It can cause further inability to act by the Council, "giving members five new criteria to argue about while Rome, or Rwanda, or Darfur, burns" (Slaughter 2005: 626). Slaughter sees this effort to outline the guidelines for legitimacy test as an attempt to moderate the emphasis on proactive measures and prevention

(2005: 626). Early and preventive action on issues from disease, hunger and environmental degradation to systematic human rights violations and terrorism will be routed through the Security Council. The panel's call for extra caution on the decision-making measures on these matters is understandable since the world is witnessing the consequences of actions that is not envisioning through others' eyes.

The decision at hand will be both legal and legitimate if these criteria will be operationalized however, the argument on the part of the Council that they reached the decision by using these legitimacy criteria may not be enough to make the world public opinion see the decision as legitimate. The legality of the Security Council authorized action does not guarantee their legitimacy in the eyes of the world public opinion. That is why, the panel argues for a Security Council reform as well, for making it both more representative and also calls for the need for the Security Council to be more proactive and effective.

Regarding the Security Council reform, Mr. Annan left it to the General Assembly to decide between basic ideas proposed in November by the High-level Panel. He urged the governments to reach a decision before the September meeting. The council now has five veto-bearing members – Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States – and ten members elected to two-year terms. Panel's report recommends an increase of the members to make the council more representative to reflect modern realities of global power. The current disposition of the Security Council, which institutionalizes the inequality of power, will continue even if the proposed reforms at the Council will take place. However, a more representative Security Council will both be more able to isolate one veto-wielding state to act against the world public opinion and also be more able to claim legitimacy to its decisions in general.

In July 2005, the UN General Assembly deliberated on the issue of enlargement of the Security Council. As a result three draft resolutions were submitted. The first draft was calling

for the adoption of the Model A (one of the two models proposed by the High-level Panel, 2004: 81-3). Only departure was the addition of four new permanent members instead of the proposed three, thus making the Council membership twenty-five. This draft has been put forward by the so-called G-4[13] understandable as the Model A includes the suggestion to add six new permanent seats. Second draft resolution put forward by the African Union, proposing in addition to what G-4 supported enlargement one more additional non-permanent seat. Last proposal, backed by a group of states calling themselves "United by Consensus"[14], offers what Model B of the High-level Panel includes, ten new non-permanent seats. Since none of these drafts has the chance to gather the two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, G-4 and the African Union decide to harmonize their proposals.

Before the UN summit of 2005, the concern of both the Panel members and the president of the General Assembly was that the controversies over the reform of the Security Council could abort UN reform altogether. The president of the General Assembly submitted his own report on UN reform, in which he skipped the issue of the Council's enlargement and called the member states to concentrate on other central issues such as development assistance and nation building (Pisik 2005). Those concerns were well grounded since the UN summit of September 2005 ended with no agreement on the issue of the Security Council debate (Heinlein, 2005).

The discussion over the use of preventive force has been decided by indicating that it is up to the Security Council to call for an action evaluating each case with given criteria of legitimacy and under the current Charter. There is no need for a change in the Charter provisions regulating use of force because these provisions are broad enough to be interpreted

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[13] The so-called G-4 countries, Germany, Japan, Brazil and India launched a joint effort for permanent seats on the UN Security Council in September 2004 (DW-World DE Deutche Welle, 22.9.2004)

[14] Opposing the G-4, the group "United for Consensus" is co-sponsored by Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, San Marino, South Korea, Spain and Turkey. China has also put its backing behind the group strongly opposing the possible permanent seat of Japan in the Council.

in the direction that the concept of "human security" and changing understanding of sovereignty is calling for.

2.3.3. Redefinition of Sovereignty

The principle of state sovereignty is regarded as overwhelming and unconditional in international law for a long time. The Nuremberg trials of 1945, which made individuals directly accountable in international criminal law, were the first challenge against this state-centric tradition. The recognition of binding individuals with international duties led to the recognition of individual human rights as well. This process has been codified right after the Second World War, with the Genocide Convention, the Geneva conventions and their additional protocols, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, two UN International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

With the adoption of the Charter, the principle of state sovereignty and respect for human rights has been integrated at the United Nations establishing promotion of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. However, protection of human rights was not one of the principal concerns of the UN Security Council during the Cold War. The Security Council authorized sanction only in a few cases during this period[15]. With the end of Cold War, the role of the UN in human rights protection has revived. The Security Council has qualified many situations as threats to peace in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Liberia, Haiti, Rwanda, Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone and Sudan. In these cases the Security Council opened the way to legally justified prospects for intervention. However in three other

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[15] In 1950, the UN Security Council authorized UN members to intervene and restore the sovereignty of the Republic of Congo against a secessionist movement. In that case the authority of the Council is applied to a non-international conflict. In another case, the Council imposed sanctions against the racist regimes in southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South Africa, which is considered as a major development of its powers from defending state sovereignty to defending human rights (Popovski 2004).

examples, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, coalitions, not authorized by the Security Council, intervened militarily in sovereign states.

All of these instances had different motivations and different levels of legitimacy but united by being a challenge to the concept of absolute state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. This accumulation of precedents has started to change the concept of sovereignty. Now, "a state cannot pretend absolute sovereignty without demonstrating a duty to protect people's rights" (Popovski 2004: 2). It is becoming to be accepted that when governments fail to protect human rights or in cases they engage in policies leading to crimes against humanity, the international community can intervene by using extraterritorial duty to protect people at risk[16].

The reports of the High-level Panel and the Secretary General support a modern concept of sovereignty that involves a duty to protect human rights. In the paragraphs 29 and 30, the Panel report reinterprets the concept of sovereignty in a way that has crucial repercussions. The report argues that sovereignty gives responsibilities to states as well as privileges:

> In signing the Charter of the United Nations, States not only benefit from the privileges of sovereignty but also accept its responsibilities. Whatever perceptions may have prevailed when the Westphalian system first gave rise to the notion of State sovereignty, today it clearly carries with it the obligation of a State to protect the welfare of its own peoples and meet its obligations to the wider international community. But history teaches us all too clearly that it cannot be assumed that every State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibilities to protect its own people and avoid harming its neighbours. And in those circumstances, the principles of collective security mean that some portion of those responsibilities should be taken up by the international community, acting in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to help build the necessary capacity or supply the necessary protection, as the case may be. (Panel report pg. 17, para. 29).

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[16] The redefinition of the sovereignty to include the responsibility to protect human rights has also went hand in hand with codification of individual accountability for international crimes in 1990s.

This redefinition of sovereignty has its roots in the ICISS[17]. The ICISS report as reflected in its title "The Responsibility to Protect", puts forward the idea that "sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states" (2001: viii).

Sovereign equality of states is one of the cornerstones of the United Nations Charter as outlined in the Article 2.1. The norm of non-intervention is again a cornerstone of the Charter enshrined in Article 2.7. A sovereign state has exclusive and total jurisdiction over its territorial borders under international law. Other states have the duty not to intervene in the internal affairs of the sovereign state. Throughout the twentieth century many examples of intervention in the internal affairs of other states have taken place however this practice did not led to an abandonment of the norm of non-intervention (ICISS report 2001: 12). As the ICISS report has remarked, "the UN was therefore the main arena for the jealous protection, not the causal abrogation, of state sovereignty" (2001: 13).

However the traditional understanding of sovereignty can be seen as a challenge for the idea of the responsibility to protect, as the Panel report underlines "the Charter of the United Nations seeks to protect all States, not because they are intrinsically good but because they are necessary to achieve dignity, justice, worth and safety of their citizens" (Panel report pg. 17, para. 30). The Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated in his own words how the dilemma between the state centric approach to sovereignty and individual sovereignty as

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[17] Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has released its report "The Responsibility to Protect" on December 2001. The main aim of the report was to address the issue of the right of humanitarian intervention. In response to the call of Kofi Annan (2000) for trying to forge unity on the issue of humanitarian intervention, Government of Canada, together with a group of other foundations established this commission. The report is a product of the work of the twelve commissioners of the ICISS.

embodied in the concept of "human security" forces us to reconsider the concept of sovereignty. He said,

> State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined—not least by the forces of globalization and international co-operation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty—by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties—has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we read the charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them (1999).

This line of thinking which combines the idea of individual sovereignty with a commitment to the Charter provisions on sovereignty has found its results in both the ICISS report and the Panel report. What ICISS report did was to conceptualize the term "sovereignty as responsibility" as against sovereignty as control (ICISS report 2001: 13). And as Annan underlined and the panel also endorsed that this change is compatible with the fundamental values enshrined in the UN Charter. The organizing principle of the UN sovereign equality is not challenged by this new interpretation of the Charter because as Slaughter argues nations are free to choose to sign or not to sign the Charter, however they must accept by signing it, they have to accept the responsibilities of membership. One of these responsibilities is to provide the security - as understood as human security not state security - for its citizens. It is actually the fundamental duty of any state. If a state is unable or unwilling to fulfill this duty, the claim of sovereignty does not apply. This understanding of sovereignty is named as conditional sovereignty by Slaughter (2005: 628), which obligates states not only to protect its own citizens but also fulfill its duties to the wider international community (Panel report pg. 17, para. 29). This obligates states to act if a state does not fulfill its basic obligations to provide security to its citizens.

As a consequence of this reinterpretation of sovereignty, and new interpretation of the duties stemming from the Charter, membership to the UN is no longer signifies a validation and protection of the sovereign status of states. The transformation of the concept of sovereignty embodied in Panel report can be seen as a response to the actual transformation of the nature of international politics.

Concepts of "human security" and "sovereignty as responsibility" being at the core, the world leaders deliberated over the reform agenda put forward by the reports of the Secretary-General and High-level Panel and built a consensus over the future of the UN at the World Summit. Shaped by these two concepts, Summit Outcome Document decides on a number of key issues regarding the future of the international polity and role of the UN in it.

2.4. World Summit Outcome

The High-level Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly (the 2005 World Summit) took place in New York, from 14 to 16 September. The summit has brought together an unprecedented number of – one hundred ninety one - heads of states. The summit was seen as a unique opportunity for UN member states to take decisive action to address some of the most important issues before the international community, including reducing poverty, strengthening collective security, and enhancing the protection of human rights. In addition to reviewing the implementation of the Millennium declaration and overcoming the obstacles before realizing MDGs by the target date of 2015, governments attending the summit had the opportunity to discuss the much-needed reform at the UN. Governments had the chance to consider the recommendations put forward by the Secretary-General in his report. In this part, I will examine how the changing concepts of security and sovereignty resonated in the summit outcome document and shaped the decisions over institutional restructuring of the UN.

World summit outcome document, despite all the disappointments on the part of the issues such as the Security Council reform, and provisions on the use of force, was a surprising display of unity of the world community on a number of issues. The document contains decisions on strengthening the UN in the field of peace maintenance, peacekeeping and peace building, including a detailed scheme of creation of a new commission on peace building. It condemns unconditionally by all members-states, for the first time in the history of the United Nations, the terrorism "in all its forms and displays whoever, wherever and with whatever goals is carrying it out", and also includes an urgent call to finish the elaboration of a Universal Convention on terrorism within 12 months and an arrangement on working out of global strategy to fight terrorism. Unfortunately, it was not possible yet to come to consent on defining the term "terrorism" (Summit outcome, 2005: 23). It is expected that the problem could be solved within the framework of elaboration of the Comprehensive Convention on struggle against international terrorism (Daulian, 2005). In fact, Secretary-General has just issued a report as a follow-up to the outcome of the 2005 World summit, "Uniting against Terrorism" on the May 2nd, 2006 that presented recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy.

One of the main proposals is to restructure the discredited Human Rights Commission to keep rights violators from becoming members and redefine terrorism to end any justifications of its use for national resistance. In his report, Annan recommended replacing the 53-nation Human Rights Commission with a smaller council, whose members would be chosen by a two-thirds vote of the 191-nation General Assembly, rather than by regional groups.

The idea of creation of a UN Council on Human Rights as replacement of the present Commission is approved. The mandate and modalities of work of this new body are defined right after the summit and new members has been elected (G.A. Res. 60/251). Fast pace of

development over the implementation of the creation of the Human Rights Commission is followed on the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission (G.A. Res. 60/180).

Commitments of donors, as well as of developing countries are fixed with regard to the measures that are needed for achievement of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. Provisions on creation of the world system of early warning on natural calamities, on mobilization of new resources to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria are included. Also problems of counteracting organized crime, corruption and drug trafficking have not remained without attention[18].

Most important decision in the outcome document was the one discusses the "human security" concept in one separate paragraph, not attaching it the section named "Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" where the concept of responsibility to protect is outlined (Summit outcome 2005: 31-2). Even without voicing up too much[19], the outcome document summarizes the basic arguments of the High-level panel and the ICISS report on the responsibility to protect. Even if it is a positive account that the outcome document argues that "each state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity", it is very limited compared to the "human security" concept the High-level panel endorses which includes threat from poverty and infectious disease to human rights abuses and terrorism.[20] However, the link that the High-level panel made between sovereignty and responsibility remains intact, as each state declared that all of them are responsible to protect their own populations and if they fail to do so the international community "is prepared" to take the necessary measures.

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[18] Progress on the UN reform based commitments of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document is under constant review, for the most recent updates please see <http://www.reformtheun.org/index.php/eupdate/2270>.
[19] Lynch (2005) stated that it was due to U.S. pressure that the agreement removed the call to permanent members of the Security Council "to refrain from using the veto in cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" (Revised Draft Outcome Document 2005: 120).
[20] A brief summary of the how High-level Panel report defines the concept of human security is outlined on pg. 6. For more please see Report of the High-level Panel 2005: 9-19.

The Outcome Document represents a consensus over the fundamentals of this reform referring to the concepts of "human security" and "sovereignty as responsibility". Redefinition of two core concepts, security and sovereignty, has significant implications for the conduct of international politics. The Summit Outcome Document endorsed these two concepts "human security" and "sovereignty as responsibility". In the ninth paragraph of the resolution, the world leaders declared they "recognize that development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing". The outcome document endorses the idea in a separate paragraph titled "human security" by stating

> We stress the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. We recognize that all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential. To this end, we commit ourselves to discussing and defining the notion of human security in the General Assembly. (World Summit Outcome 2005: 2, 32)

In the section titled "Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" the Outcome Document states that "each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity." The agreement continues to argue for the responsibility of the international community to act through the UN to help protect populations by using appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means. If peaceful means are inadequate and national authorities manifestly failing to protect its citizen, the resolution calls for taking collective action under Chapter VII of the Charter. (World Summit Outcome 2005: 31-2)

The central massage of the document is that security, human rights and development are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. This relationship results a shift in the understanding of security and a reinterpretation of sovereignty. The new security understanding goes beyond

the traditional concept of state security towards what is called "human security". The concept of "human security" complements state security, understood as state's monopoly on the rights and means to protect its citizens, in a way that enhances human rights and strengthens human development. These ideas have been set out in recent discussions of security and declared through the reports on the "Sovereignty as Responsibility" and "Human Security"[21].

The agreement broadens the concept of "international peace and security" that underlies Chapter VII of the UN Charter and implies that even if the consent of the nation concerned is not taken, a Chapter VII action can be justified in the name of regional security. And it does so, as the High-level panel offers, without a need to amend the Charter, with a reinterpretation of the fundamentals of the founding document. As Ian Williams has expressively worded "in reality, it is not the Charter that needs reform – but what use the member states put it to" (2005).

When we think that the motivation behind the agreement is the organization's past inaction in Darfur, Sudan and Rwanda, it is important to outline the scope of possible unilateral action for future humanitarian intervention. Alicia Bannon, interpreting the summit agreement, argues that "the Summit agreement strengthens the legal justification for limited forms of unilateral and regional action, including military action, if the United Nations fails to act to protect population from genocide and other atrocities" (2006: 1158). The agreement supports unilateral action in a very narrow way that is limited to extreme human rights abuses and allows for unilateral action only in U.N. inaction, if the peaceful measures do not resolve the matter. The Summit agreement codifies the recent trend in international law and strengthens the development of a new international norm regarding humanitarian protection (Bannon 2006: 1158). A clear understanding is fixed by all UN members of a collective duty to protect civilians from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansings and crimes against humanity.

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[21] For more on these concepts please see ICISS (2001) report "The Responsibility to Protect", Report of the Commission on Human Security (2003), "Human Security now" and Axworthy (2001) "Human Security and Global Governance".

The Millennium Declaration's call for the eradication of poverty, access to clean water, sanitation, and access to clean energy sources is also seen as an example of the new emphasis on "human security" (Krasno, 2004a: 3). In this respect, the report reinforces this idea and calls for taking the necessary measures that would realize the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. In order to reach that aim Annan urges the governments of each developing country to strengthen governance, to combat corruption and adopt transparent, credible and properly costed development strategies by 2006. He also urges the developed countries to establish timetables to achieve the 0.7 per cent target of gross national income for official development assistance by 2015.

The report also calls for and offer strategies for promoting gender equality, achieve universal primary education, eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, investing in better resource management for the environment, increasing food output and incomes, promoting jobs, upgrading slums, ensuring universal access to essential health services, debt relief, ensuring environmental sustainability, infectious disease surveillance, preventing catastrophic terrorism, organized crime, nuclear, biologic and chemical weapons, strategies for war prevention, and monitoring, migration, regulation of small arms, light weapons and landmines.

During the negotiations for the draft outcome document of the world summit, Amnesty International, OXFAM, Human Rights Watch and the Global Call to Action Against Poverty issued a joint press release on September 5, 2005, and called the attempt to include "responsibility to protect civilians from genocide and grave human rights abuses" in the summit outcome document as a historic opportunity. They named the document as a *historic draft measure* that would urge the governments to take measures to prevent genocide (Joint press release of Sept. 5, 2005). The final document, passed as a resolution from the General Assembly as the 2005 World Summit Outcome, endorsed the idea of responsibility to protect

by stating under the heading "Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" in paragraphs 138 and 139:

> Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

> The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out. (World Summit Outcome 2005: 31)

These two paragraphs are the signs of the beginning of the institutionalization process of the idea of responsibility to protect from being a landmark General Assembly resolution to an international norm, and to international law and institutional enforcement mechanisms under the law. Built on the "human security" and "sovereignty as responsibility" concepts, which are beginning to be accepted by the international community, "responsibility to protect" is an important achievement for the future of world politics. Built on this achievement, on the 28th of April 2006, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1674 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. Resolution contains the historic first

official Security Council reference to the responsibility to protect: it "reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" (S. C. Res. 1674). The repercussions of the adoption of the idea of responsibility to protect in the General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions are unknown. However, the endorsement in the Summit Outcome was a great achievement in the way of codifying this principle and making it a regular feature of international law.

Edward C. Luck, in his conclusion to the review of history of reform at the UN, argues that change does not come easily in the UN system however the process of reform is constant. He also underlines the fact that the course of reform tends to be unpredictable. A reform rarely ends up in the way its initiators had expected (2004: 389-90). The reform may sometimes take place during implementation, not at the negotiating table. Thus, the fact that only a number of small steps towards making the UN more accountable have been accomplished in the September 2005 summit does not necessarily mean that the will embodied in these reports cannot be realized. The consensus reached over the two concepts will continue to shape future reform processes at the UN and the evolution of international polity.

2.5. The Challenge Ahead

Claude argues that "if international organization is a process; international organizations are representative aspects of the phase which has been reached at a given time." (1984: 4) In this sense, we can interpret the current structure of the UN as a 'phase' in the process of the international organization. Within this process, in order to realize the current will for reform reflected in the reports in the short term, or different ideals for reforming international politics with the aim of limiting the role of power in the long term, first, we need

to identify the challenges on the road. The realistic aspect of the reform process lies in the fact that "international organizations are never simply the product of creative planning and institutional evolution; they find their sources deep in the context of national interests and the power configuration of the international setting out of which they arise" (Claude 1984: 48). To understand the obstacles on the way to realize the ideal, we need to reveal underlying power relationship and its consequences through realist glasses.

On the other hand, the normative aspect is an indispensable part of the reform process since both the history of international organizations and the reform at the UN shows us that change in the institutional settings are always a product of a compromise between some bold ideals and the constraints of the world politics. In this last reform drive what we observe is as a similar process. The reform initiative was first and foremost based on a realistic assessment of the current threats and challenges that the world faces. As a response to this fact, we see an apparent consensus, reached at the 2005 World Summit, over a number of fundamental concepts that the UN reform and the future of international politics will be based on. Thus, the normative aspect of this last reform drive was that both the reports and the Summit Outcome Document represent a broad consensus over the ways in which the institution ought to evolve. This consensus reflects the dual nature of change in international organizations. It brings together a realist interpretation of current challenges with an attempt to reform the UN with reference to the ideas which are present in the Charter that are neglected for a long time. This relationship between these two constituents has resulted in a policy proposal which aims to reform the institution in the direction of institutionalizing the concepts of "sovereignty as responsibility" and "human security".

Next challenge before understanding and studying the politics of change at the UN lies in the fact that mainstream theories of international relations are not capable of grasping the normative and realistic aspects of the reform process at the UN in the interrelated way they

work. To comprehend the process of change, we need a theory that can link realist and idealist streams of thought. The argument in the next chapter will be that the theoretical framework E. H. Carr introduces as "sound political thinking" brings realism and idealism into conversation with each other and explains the politics of change at the UN.

III

THEORIZING REFORM AT THE UNITED NATIONS: A CONTROVERSY

The manifest will embodied in the Reports of the Secretary General and the High-level Panel indicates the presence of a consensus on the fundamentals of the international politics and defines the concepts of "human security" and "sovereignty as responsibility" as both representative and compatible concepts to the UN Charter principles. Fundamental Charter principles, human rights, development and security, are reinterpreted in these documents opening the way to the idea of "human security" and "sovereignty as responsibility" to be the guiding principles for both reform at the UN and the future of the international polity.

The evolution of the UN shows us how the process of institutional change at the UN works complex and unevenly. Main conclusions that Edward Luck (2004: 388-9) draws from the historical review of the UN reform are that reform does not come easily however the process of reform is constant. Generally, high-visibility initiatives come every five to seven years whereas less publicized change never cease. "At times, process seems more important than results, while at other times process is the desired result" and "change happens even if reforms doesn't" (Luck 2004: 389-390). The lessons from the history of international organizations and the history of reform at the UN is that change in the institution is a process of give and take between normative and realistic aspects of politics.

This processes and the politics of change in such processes are very poorly studied at the theoretical level in the literature. In this respect, the first aim of this chapter is to understand the reason why the discipline of international relations has not contributed to policy making in the area of institutional change. To this end, I first examine the neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist approach to international organizations with an attempt to assess their contribution to the study in international organizations as well as their shortcomings while trying to understand the UN reform process. Then, I move on to the discussion of

liberal internationalism in general and David Held's model of "Cosmopolitan Democracy" in particular and their contribution to the study of politics of change at the UN. After evaluating each of these theoretical streams in their own terms, I will try to compare and contrast their respective contributions to our understanding of the current reform process at the UN. I argue that each of these perspectives has a lot to contribute to our understanding. However what we need is an approach that would bring the empirical knowledge brought by neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist research agenda and normative understanding that Held's vision offers, into dialogue. The argument of the chapter is the theoretical framework Carr calls "sound political thinking" brings these perspectives together. In this respect, the second part of the chapter is devoted to outlining this alternative reading of Carr as a dialectician. On this part, I will first explain how Carr defines realism and idealism respectively and how he positions the two perspectives as dichotomies. The chapter concludes by presenting how Carr uses the dialectical relationship between realism and idealism as correcting each other perspective's shortcomings and formulating a third alternative framework that he calls "sound political thinking".

3.1.   The Study of International Organizations

The study of international organizations in general and the United Nations in particular was not among the central research areas of the discipline of international relations especially in the Cold War period (Rochester 1986, Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986). The debate of the 1980s and 1990s centered on whether international institutions matter in altering state behavior and providing information for promoting cooperation under anarchy. This state-centric approach sees international institutions as forums for interstate bargaining. International politics is marked by anarchy. It encourages actors to seek their interests and struggle for power, and therefore makes it hard to design institutional solutions to problems.

From this perspective designing institutions can be counterproductive or simply does not make sense. That can answer why the discipline of international relations has a poor record of contribution to the design of institutions while the debate over whether and how institutions matter in world politics occupied a great attention[22].

3.1.1. Neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist approach

The skeptical approach to institutions is marked by the realist tradition in international relations. The main aim of this strand is to understand the dynamics of international politics. The central research question in this stream is why do actors choose institutions to further their interests, why do institutions have the features they do? These questions were driving neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist research on institutions. These questions become irrelevant to understand the politics of institutional change in the UN reform process because this process is not motivated by particular interests of individual states but by a common interest perceived by the world society.

Furthermore, both these theoretical perspectives are nor capable of conceptualizing the normative content of the reform process. Conventional theories of international relations do not consider the role of norms and institutions in the transformation of international politics important. They view underlying distribution of political and economic power as the main determinant in the equation. Institutions are seen as by-products of the relations of force or the relations of production. The explanation of the hegemonic stability theory of the extensive institutionalization in the international system is that hegemonic power creates institutions to legitimize its power (Keohane 1980, Stein 1983, Snidal 1985).

One of the leading theoretical mainstreams in the discipline, neorealism, even dismisses the UN's role in world politics entirely. Kenneth Waltz's only comment in the

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[22] For a through review, please see Martin and Simmons 1998.

Theory of International Politics on the UN is that the institution has no regulatory role in the system because it simply reflects state interests (1979: 42, 164). International organizations according to neorealists play little or no role in maintaining international peace and security because international organizations rarely constrain state behavior in areas where interests are diverse and opposed. Mearsheimer reflects the neorealist position by saying "the most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it." Internationally, outcomes are "mainly a function of the balance of power" and institutions at best are "intervening variables" (1994/95: 13)[23].

Although neoliberalism systematically studies the role of international institutions in world politics[24], few neoliberal institutionalists have examined the UN's potential contribution to international security, since they believed that the conditions under which institutions matter are not present particularly in the security area during the Cold War (Barnett, 1997: 528). However, like neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism too argues that international organizations rarely constrain state behavior in issues where interests are different and conflicting. Neoliberal institutionalism is broadly concerned with explaining how rational states under anarchy conditions can engage in cooperation and how institutions overcome barriers to cooperation by providing states mutual gain (Keohane 1984: 9, 51-2, Axelrod and Keohane 1993). In trying to explain change in the institutional design, neoliberal institutionalism conceptualizes a de-politicized forum in which states bargain over the distribution of gains while keeping account of the distributional histories providing to correct past discrepancies (Keohane 1984: 91, Martin 1992: 775-7). Accordingly, while the theoretical framework of neoliberal institutionalism is capable of analyzing how institutions change the incentives of actors in particular strategic environments, it is short of explaining

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[23] For other important realist approaches to institutions please see Schweller and Priess 1997, and Glaser 1994.
[24] There are also notable constructivist approaches to institutions, see Barnett and Finnemore 1999, March and Olsen 1998, Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986. Although constructivism provides a framework that explains change as an outcome of the continuous interaction among the members of society, constructivists in international relations have not yet managed to devise a theory with analytical specification.

the kind of change in the norms and institutions. When it comes to the issue of UN reform, neoliberal institutionalism can only say that international organizations foster cooperation between states in non-controversial issues where states have common interests. Thus, neoliberal institutionalism can explain what functions institutions can fulfill in international politics if there are common interests but they cannot explain how states come to realize that there are common interests and how to respond when common interest are realized and how to transform the institutional setting accordingly.

Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism share more than their proponents would admit. Both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism depict institutions in strictly instrumental terms. In this respect, neorealist-neoliberal institutionalist debate is not an inter-paradigm debate because they share an epistemology; focus on similar questions and assumption about international politics. Neoliberalism gives greater importance to the role of institutions, but their role in international politics is similarly functionally determined by political market failures in this case rather than power relations and paying little attention to the normative meanings of institutions[25]. While both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are useful in explaining the material conditions in which the politics of change takes place, they cannot conceptualize the normative dimension of the transformation process.

3.1.2. Liberal internationalism and Held's vision of a "Cosmopolitan Democracy"

As opposed to the positivist approach of realist explanations to institutions in IR, from Kant onwards, liberal theorists have approached the issue of reform in the international relations from different angles focusing on normative as well as positive research agendas. Some have argued that the reform at the global level is necessary because of the progress

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[25] For a through critical review of the neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist debate on institutions see Ruggie 1998:1-44.

attained in economic relations, some argued for an escape from the anarchic structure of international politics. What was common to all was the idea that the current state of international politics is not acceptable and thus all argued for a change of the status quo. This conviction for reform is an identifying feature of the liberal tradition in international relations. And while the liberal tradition to international relations disagrees among themselves on a number of issues from the principle of non-intervention to the role of nationalism, they all agree on the need for reform of existing institutions[26]. At the international level, two of the plans for international organizations have been realized. Both the League of Nations and the United Nations have their philosophical origins in liberalism (Claude 1984: 78). Thus, as Smith (1995: 218) argues "despite frequent accusations of naiveté from realists, or of hypocrisy from Marxists, liberals have continually, and justifiably claim some success". Although, the criticism directed towards liberal internationalists that the visions they create are utopian remains because they all address the question what international politics ought to be but they do not formulate strategies to achieve in the short term.

As a normative theory of world order, liberal internationalism is concerned with how the system of states can be reformed with the aim of abolishing power politics and war (Long, 1996). Internationalism is concerned with systemic transformation. However, there is disagreement over the kind of transformation, one envisaging the abolition of international anarchy and the establishment of world government, the other arguing for a gradual easing of international anarchy by the strengthening of international institutions (Bartelson 1995: 256).

Liberal internationalism, which is the philosophical backbone of both the League of Nations and the United Nations, has also been regarded among the category of idealist stream. In the twentieth century, liberal-internationalist ideology has played a critical role in the design of historical world orders, in the aftermath of both the First and Second World Wars.

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[26] For a through review of liberal tradition and international reform please see Smith 1995: 201-24.

In the context of the post-Cold War, liberal-internationalist ideas have acquired a new strength (McGrew 2000: 409). The idea that not just nations themselves but relations between nations could also be democratic was revived in the mid-1990s. Annan draws our attention to the fact that it was almost unthinkable for the UN to take sides between democracy and dictatorship, or seeks to intervene in the internal affairs of its members in the past. However, "today, almost all UN members accept democratization as something desirable, at least in theory, and the UN itself does more than any other single organization to promote and strengthen democratic institutions and practices around the world" (Annan 2005).

Some streams of liberal internationalism aim for institutionalizing democracy at the global level. David Held's model of 'cosmopolitan democracy', which addresses contemporary problems of liberal democracy under conditions of globalization, is one of them. His model is among the gradualist line. The argument of the model is that "national democracies require an international cosmopolitan democracy if they are to be sustained and developed in the contemporary era" (Held 1995: 23). The main aim of the model is to establish the condition for the realization of democratic autonomy, "an entitlement to autonomy within the constraints of community" (Held 1995: 156). Necessary condition is the establishment of a cosmopolitan democratic law that "transcends the particular claims of nations and states and extends to all in the universal community" (Held 1995: 228).

The establishment of the cosmopolitan democracy at the global level requires that international organizations and the UN system be made more representative and accountable. To this end, a directly elected assembly of peoples which would form a second chamber would complement UN General Assembly. Regional forms of governance with regional parliaments would be developed. Cosmopolitan law also requires to be backed up by a coercive force which will be established through international and accountable military

forces. The institutions of the global economy would also be subject to democratic intervention.

Held argues that contemporary globalization has already contributed to the transformation of the nature and future of democratic political community in the ways that the model of cosmopolitan democracy suggests. For example, the use effective political power is no longer in the monopoly of nation-states. Forces and agencies at national, regional and international levels share it. The development of EU has created intensive discussion about the future of sovereignty and autonomy within individual nation-states (Held 2000: 423-424). The essence of the cosmopolitan democracy is an attempt to identify the principles and institutions that would make the forms of power operating beyond the scope of democratic accountability.

3.1.3. Two Perspectives in Dialogue

Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism have the means to transform the reality since they have the theoretical tools to conceptualize the reality of world politics. They know the material that needs to be changed very well so they have the means to change. However, they cannot recognize the need for change in response to common challenges based on common interests and they do not ask the question of what ought to be. That is why; they do not have a vision that would guide the neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist scholarship when it comes to policy making in the issue of reform at the UN. On the other hand, David Held has a well-developed vision of what the ideal state of international politics looks like and formulates a UN that would work in this environment. However, he cannot tell us how that idea can be realized, cannot answer how we can get from here to there. What we need is a theoretical approach that would combine the respective strengths of these two perspectives, capable of conceptualizing both the practical and the normative content of politics of change.

The questions asked from both perspectives are relevant to the study of international organizations. The question is how to bridge the gap between the explanatory knowledge and normative approaches. As Wendt stated what is required for the study of institutional design is a knowledge that brings positive and normative inquiries into conversation with each other (2001: 1022-3). The dichotomy between positive and normative inquiries in its most basic form can be understood by understanding the relationship between realism and idealism.

What brings these two aspects of the process of change together is the theoretical framework E. H. Carr introduces in the "Twenty Years' Crisis". Carr, in his seminal book, tried to accomplish one of the most challenging tasks of an international relations scholar: to conceptualize change in international politics at a time of constant change and uncertainty. His understanding of politics as a constant struggle between two forces, status quo and change (or reality and utopia) has far reaching implications for understanding contemporary world politics, which has similarities with the time Carr wrote. We are in a similar period of uncertainty in which a new order has not been yet established and we are having a hard time trying to conceptualize what will replace the Cold War system even after almost sixteen years after its demise because the process of transformation has not yet been finished.

3.2. E. H. Carr and the Concept of "Sound Political Thinking"

It has been 67 years since Edward Hallett Carr wrote his book *The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (hereafter referred as *Twenty Years' Crisis*). His work was and still remains to be highly influential on the literature of international relations theory. His work is considered to be one of the founding texts of the discipline of international relations in general and the realist school in international relations in particular. The Twenty Years' Crisis is a fruitful source of debate and controversy among IR scholars because some have argued that The Twenty Years' is

flawed because the text shows Carr to have been confused as to where he stood in relation to utopianism and realism. He is recently started to be seen as the father of "critical approach" (Cox 1981). His increasing popularity has been related to the approval by the "post" movement as Kubalkova argues (1998: 27)[27]. Some have argued Carr's work introduces more than Carr himself was consciously intended to accomplish[28]. Although there is a consensus over the continuing relevance of Carr's work on international relations, there are a number of different Carr interpretations, sometimes complementary sometimes conflicting ones, at work[29].

However none of these scholars has considered the category Carr introduces as "sound political thinking" as a consistent third alternative to realism and utopianism that he criticizes[30]. The source of misunderstanding lies in the fact that people give attention to the parts of his work where he criticizes utopianism from a realist perspective and tend to overlook those parts where he criticizes realism from a utopian perspective. He uses both critiques to formulate a third standpoint in which realism corrects utopianism and utopianism corrects realism. The result is what he calls "sound political thinking" which is a third alternative to realism and utopianism.

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[27] Along with Cox 1981, Linklater 1997, Booth 1991, Linklater 1992, Howe 1994 and Jones 1996 have evaluated Carr's work beyond the limits of realist interpretation. Each in their own way valued what is generally been considered as inconsistency and ambivalency in Carr's Twenty Years' Crisis. Their common point is that Carr's reputation for realism distorts his relevance to contemporary debates (Linklater 1997, 321). For more on the secondary literature on Carr, please see Cox 2001.

[28] Linklater argues that Carr's writings "contain a striking analysis of the changing nature of the modern state and the possibility of new forms of political association" (1997: 321).

[29] Jones analyzes some textbook definitions of realism to identify the extent that Carr was (seen to be) realist and concludes by saying "while Carr may meet some of the criteria of political realism he signally fails to meet others" (1998:4). He identifies his method as "Mannheimean social constructivist" which provides the possibility to build a 'pragmatic liberalism' (Jones 1998:11).

[30] Booth argues "The twenty years' crisis is flawed because the text shows Carr to have been confused as to where he stood in relation to utopianism and realism" (1991: 530).

3.2.1. Carr as a dialectician[31]

The "twenty years" Carr refers was the interwar period and the crisis he analyzes was a crisis stemming from a misunderstanding of the nature of the science of international politics. Carr (1942: 11) finds the science of international politics being "markedly and frankly utopian" at its initial stage[32]. On the one hand, he argues that in the interwar years, the end, which is the desire to prevent war, had prevented both policy-makers and academics of international politics from the acceptance of facts and the analysis of their causes and consequences (Carr 1942: 12-14). On the other hand, he also argues, "political thought itself is a form of political action. Political science is the science not only of what is, but of what ought to be" (Carr 1942: 7). These sentences put together represent a snapshot of what many believes as inconsistency in his writing. There is however no inconsistency because in the Twenty Years' Crisis Carr takes a mid-standpoint towards realism and utopianism. He argues that both have their limitations but they are at the same time unavoidable in politics. He makes use of a number of oppositions between theory and practice, free will and determinism, the intellectual and the bureaucrat, left and right, ethics and politics to illustrate the dialectical relationship between the two. These repeated dichotomies serves Carr's purpose to "create a science and to offer policy recommendations formed by a compromise between the two extremes" (Jones 1998: 130).

According to Carr we need realism for two reasons: First, realism helps us to recognize that power is an essential element in international politics. He develops the realist arguments in his work by criticizing the liberal tradition that he finds dominating the interwar European politics and especially the belief that the establishment of the League of Nations meant the elimination of power from international politics (Carr 1942: 132). He argues that

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[31] Kubalkova (1998: 29) argues if one "rereads Carr's Twenty Years' Crisis with the help of dialectics", one can see how he relates realism dialectically to idealism.

[32] The page numbers are from the 1942 printing of the first edition originally published in 1939.

formal equality and the participation of all members in the debates did not limit the role of power factor because important disputes cannot be solved without the agreement between the great powers (Carr 1942: 133). Referring to interwar years he says "It is profoundly misleading to represent the struggle between satisfied and dissatisfies Powers as a struggle between morality on one side and power on the other. It is a clash in which, whatever the moral issue, power politics are equally predominant on both sides" (Carr 1942: 135).

The second reason Carr appreciates realism is the idea of relativity of thought in realist thinking is more important than recognizing the role of power in international politics. Relativity of thought reveals the relative and pragmatic character of thought that has demonstrated that intellectual theories and ethical standards of utopianism are products of circumstances and interests and not of absolute principles (1942: 87). He argues that the realist idea of relativity of thought must be used to "demolish the utopian concept of a fixed and absolute standard by which policies and actions can be judged" (Carr 1942: 96). He says:

> The realist has thus been enabled to demonstrate that the intellectual theories and ethical standards of utopianism, far from being the expression of absolute and *a priori* principles, are historically conditioned, being both products of circumstances and interests and weapons framed for the furtherance of interest (Carr 1942: 87).

After outlining positive aspects of realist thinking, Carr goes on to explain limitations of realism. He criticizes realism from the idealist point of view. He is critical of the kind of realism that is deterministic:

> Representing a reaction against the wish-dreams of the initial stage, realism is liable to assume a critical and somewhat cynical aspect. In the field of thought, it places its emphasis on the acceptance of facts and on the analysis of their causes and consequences. It tends to depreciate the role of purpose and to maintain, explicitly or implicitly, that the function of thinking is to study a

sequence of events which it is powerless to influence or to alter. (Carr, 1942: 14)

He argues that realism is incapable of providing four essential features of political thinking: a finite goal, an emotional appeal, a right of moral judgment and a ground for action (Carr 1942: 113). In trying to explain what he meant by these principles he quotes Laski's view that "communism has made its way by its idealism, and not by its realism, by its spiritual promise, not by its materialistic prospects" (quoted from Harold Laski's Communism in Carr 1942: 115). He goes on to explain that after demolishing the current utopia, which is a representation of the interests of the prevailing powers of the time, with the weapons of realism, we must built a new utopia which will be subject to the same weapons one day (Carr 1942: 118-9). In this case we need utopianism to think of alternatives to the dominant idea of the time[33]. Thus, what he proposes is to overcome the limitations of realism by utopian thinking. He says:

> … we cannot ultimately find a resting place in pure realism; for realism, though logically overwhelming, does not provide us with the springs of action which are necessary even to the pursuit of thought. Indeed, realism itself, if we attack it with its own weapons, often turns out in practice to be just as much conditioned as any other mode of thought (Carr 1942: 113).

He then criticizes the kind of utopianism that is ignorant of the reality of international politics. This is where realism corrects this shortcoming of utopianism with providing us with the tools to understand the reality. He also says that the bankruptcy of utopianism is not in its inability to live up to its promises but its inability to form a disinterested standard for the

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[33] Carr thinks that only left, which he associates with utopianism, could think out principles of political action and evolves ideals for statesmen to aim at and that the political right is not able to create original political ideas (1942: 20).

conduct of international affairs (1942: 111). This critique reflects the realist idea of relativity of thought and realism helps us to reveal underlying interests.

Carr's massage is not complex if we understand that he "related realism *dialectically* to idealism" (Kubalkova 1998: 29). Kubalkova argues that if we understand the dialectical logic we can see how his advocacy of realism is "a transition, a station on the way" and "what was wrong with idealism is that it developed without realism" (1998: 29, 31). Dialectical reasoning works as realism corrects the excesses of idealism and idealism corrects the shortcomings of realism. Carr presents this dialectical relationship as "sound political thinking":

> … any sound political thought must be based on elements of both utopia and reality. In international politics, post-War utopianism became a hollow and intolerable sham, which served merely as a disguise for the interests of the privileged powers; and the realist performs an indispensable service of unmasking it. But pure realism can offer us nothing but a naked struggle for power which makes any kind of international society impossible. Having demolished the current utopia with the weapons of realism, we still need to build a new utopia of our own, which will one day fall to the same weapons. …Here, then, is the complexity, the fascination and the tragedy of all political life. Politics are made up of two elements – utopia and reality – belonging to two different planes which can never meet. There is no greater barrier to clear political thinking than failure to distinguish between ideals, which are utopia, and institutions, which are reality. …The ideal, once it is embodied in an institution, ceases to be and ideal and becomes the expression of a selfish interest, which must be destroyed in the name of a new ideal. This constant interaction of irreconcilable forces is the stuff of politics. Every political situation contains mutually incompatible elements of utopia and reality, or morality and power. (Carr 1942: 118-9)

In order to understand how the relationship between realism and idealism works we can examine the relationship between morality and power in Carr. He identifies two kinds of theory of international morality: on the one side there are realists who consider relations between states solely governed by power and that morality has no place. On the other side, there are utopians arguing for the existence of some code of morality between states as well as

individuals (1942: 194-5). He gives examples of international moral code for not to inflict unnecessary death or suffering on human beings, or violation of treaties, even frequently practiced, are condemned and felt to be a special case requiring special justification (Carr 1942: 196-199). However he does not equate the ethical standards of individuals to that of the states. International morality has lower standards compared to individual morality because to Carr there is no means to compel states to behave morally similar to individuals' feeling of conscience grows within a society. Logically he goes on to answer the question if there is an international community (1942: 204-6). His answer is "there is a world community for the reason (and for no other) that people talk, and within certain limits behave, as if there were a world community" (Carr 1942: 206). Therefore, international community exists because we think that it exists.

However the existence of an international community does not necessarily mean that international morality is very strong. There is a dilemma between the sense of obligation to an international community and to one's own country. That is why "in the international order, the role of power is greater and that of morality less" (Carr 1942: 213). He goes on to say:

> Any international moral order must rest on some hegemony of power. But this hegemony, like the supremacy of a ruling class within the state, is in itself a challenge to those who do not share it; and it must, if it is to survive, contain an element of give-and-take, of self-sacrifice on the part of those who have, which will render it tolerable to the other members of the world community. It is through this process of give-and-take, of willingness not to insist on all prerogatives of power, that morality finds its surest foothold in international – and perhaps national – politics. (Carr 1942: 213)

He views this process of give-and-take as a strategy for the status quo powers to give concessions to the challengers. In the long run, challengers will not be satisfied with the continuation of the status quo. Carr argues that it is also the responsibility of the great powers

to make the changes in the system in an orderly way (1942: 213-5). Next, he goes on to examine problems of change in international politics and he argues that constant change and revision of rights is one of the most important characteristics of organized societies and in the realm of international society the most vital problem is to find alternatives to war in transforming these rights (Carr 1942: 263). The problem of peaceful change should be solved in such a way that bases "its operation not on power alone, but on that uneasy compromise between power and morality which is the foundation of all political life" (Carr 1942: 279).

3.3. Theorizing the Politics of Change

When it comes to the discussion of reform at the UN, the problem of peaceful change, both in theoretical and practical level also revolve around two streams of thought. On the one side there are realists who think UN as the institution in reality only a representative of the interests of the great powers of the time and thus do not give much energy to think about the future role of the institution. On the other side there are utopians who think that the UN represents something very distant to the ideal institution in their mind and thus blame the institution for not living up to its ideal premises. For both lines of thinking, it is important to note, "the ideal, once embodied in an institution, ceases to be an ideal and becomes the expression of a selfish interest, which must be destroyed in the name of a new ideal" (Carr 1942: 119). It is not healthy to think that the UN as a representative of an ideal or the agent of the selfish interests of a minority. The constant interaction between the ideal and the institution (or reality) is what Carr (1942: 119) considers the essence of politics.

If we take pure realism and pure idealism as ideal types and what Carr calls "sound political thinking" as the outcome of the dialectical relationship between these ideal types, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism can be evaluated as standing somewhere near to pure realism. Not only they have all limitations of realism that Carr describes, they also lack

the most important contribution of realist thinking. Carr would say that the most significant shortcoming of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism reside not in their failure to help us understand and explain reality but in its inability to provide the realist critique that would reveal the relative character of thought.

What is important here is their contribution to formulate a theoretical framework that has the capability to understand the politics of change at the UN. In this respect, contribution of neorealist thinking is its ability to explain the dynamics of contemporary world politics.[34] Neorealist understanding of the world politics helps us to see the structural constraints in terms of which actions are rewarded and which are punished in the system. Understanding of the world system as anarchic, and states as the unitary and rational actors seeking power-maximization, neorealism shows us an important part of the reality[35]. We still see the rise of international institutions as a reality in world politics. Neoliberal institutionalism argues that this is so because international institutions carry out some functions that states are not capable of fulfilling. Moreover, neoliberalism can explain the durability of institutions despite changes in the circumstances. Institutions shape state preferences by forcing them into cooperative arrangements. States are rational actors and choose cooperation over conflict. New institutions can be created or existing ones can be reformed according to changing circumstances however neoliberal institutionalism cannot explain the transformation process itself.

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[34] Explaining world politics as outcomes of the characteristics of the system and structure, within the limits framed by stronger competitors in the system, itself can be subject to the realist critique of relativity of thought and be evaluated as being "both products of circumstances and interests and weapons framed for the furtherance of interest" by those actors which gain most from that structure (Carr 1942: 87).

[35] However, we need other theoretical approaches that challenge and try to show different aspects of the reality. Above all constructivist approaches and post-positivist approaches to international relations challenged and offered alternative explanations with regard to the system and the structure of international politics. Giving an account of the basic assumptions of these approaches is beyond the limits of this thesis.

Both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism has explanatory knowledge however they both lack the normative aspect which we need to have a viable plan, and a ground for action that would enable us to create a political vision. In this respect, Held's idea of "Cosmopolitan Democracy" represents the utopian thinking Carr describes. He creates a vision for the future of the international politics, however Held's vision, just as Carr described as valid for all utopias, ignores the constraint of the reality of current world politics thus cannot formulate a viable policy to turn the utopia into reality.

What we need here is to take both perspectives and use their power of correcting each other's deficits as Carr does. Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism being in the realist side and Held's vision being in the utopian side of the picture, they can work in a dialectical relationship resulting in a sound political thinking. This way positive and normative research agenda will complement each other formulating a theoretical framework that has the capacity to explain the evolution of international organizations and recent reform initiative at the UN.

This thesis has demonstrated that the manifest will to reform at the reports Secretary-General and the High-level Panel and the consensus over the principles of reform embodied in the Summit Outcome Document exemplifies what Carr calls sound political thinking. These documents reflect the constant relationship between the two facets of politics by being a product of the compromise between an adjustment strategy of the institution to the necessities of the current world politics and reflection of some bold ideals.

IV

CONCLUSION

The main problem with understanding the reform at the UN lies in the fact that some regard it impossible to achieve since the institution is only reflective of the existing power relations and some believe that it will always be short of the ideal model in their minds. These two perspectives also reflect the way theories of international relations conceptualize change in international politics in general and the reform at the UN in particular. The theoretical framework Carr puts forward in the "Twenty Years' Crisis" reconciles idealist and realist perspectives and formulates a third standpoint.

This thesis argued that last reform initiative at the UN in particular can best be conceptualized from the theoretical framework of E. H. Carr presents in the Twenty Years' Crisis as "sound political thinking". To Carr, every political situation contains elements of utopia and reality, of morality and power. He does not believe in an essential harmony. He believes in a constant struggle between the proponents of status quo and its enemies. Politics is the struggle between change and status quo. In the constant relationship between realism and utopianism, which makes up politics, sometimes utopian thinking veils our ability to understand and evaluate the constraints of reality. In that case, realist critique – the idea of relativity of thought – helps us to reveal underlying interests. And sometimes realist thinking leads us to determinism and inaction. In that case, we need utopianism to think of alternatives which will lead to political action. Sound political thinking rests on this constant relationship where utopia and reality keep correcting each other.

We can say that the development of the concept of "human security" reflects that process. The idea of "human security" was based on the identification of some threats such as poverty, infectious diseases, environmental degradation, terrorism and international organized

crime. Thus, in the evolution of the concept, the point of departure was based on a realistic assessment of new challenges to security. According to traditional understanding of security these threats can be interpreted as being challenges to the survival of the state and thus become a security issue. However, the High-level Panel report does not assess these issues as threats because they threaten state security per se, but because they threaten the lives of the citizens in these states. This idea has gained momentum and started to be institutionalized in 1990 through Security Council Resolutions, such as the one that considered starvation in Somalia as a collective security issue. This decision challenges the traditional notion of sovereignty and the traditional understanding of state security because it is in conflict with the idea of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the states. This process worked through a number of other cases and it became an established understanding that the idea of "human security" can be considered as a collective security issue, which surpasses the concept of sovereignty.

This challenge to the absolute sovereignty has led to a new understanding of sovereignty, sovereignty as "responsibility to protect". Linked to the "human security" concept, and as a result of the lessons learned from former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Liberia, Haiti, Rwanda, Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone and Sudan, now it is becoming accepted that governments have the rights of sovereignty within their territorial borders as long as they can provide security and human rights to their citizens. This conditional sovereignty obliges the international community, that is to say other states to act if a state fails to fulfill its fundamental responsibilities to its citizens.

In both cases, namely, the institutionalization of the concept of "human security" and "sovereignty as responsibility", what we see is a process in which an ideal becomes a reality. In this process we observe incremental changes over time from state security to "human security", from traditional understanding of sovereignty to conditional sovereignty. Each of

these new concepts was at one time an idea only, and in time they became institutionalized. In the process of change, realism enables us to see the constraints before materializing the idea, and the idea directs our policy by providing an ultimate goal. The resulting policy is neither the ideal getting institutionalized fully nor the reality remaining the same. We can understand this process of constant change by starting to think that contemporary state of international politics is neither a historical inevitability nor an ideal world.

The view of peaceful change in Carr is not merely a resonance of utopian ideal to eliminate power from international politics and to base the bargaining process of peaceful change on a common feeling of what is just and reasonable. He draws our attention to the fact that realist view of peaceful change, which is a process of adjustment to the changed relations of power. In this process of adjustment, the party that is able to bring most power to bear emerges successful. He sees the successful achievement of peaceful change on the compromise between the utopian idea of a common feeling of right[36] and the realist conception of a mechanical adjustment to a changed equilibrium of forces (Carr 1942: 283-4).

No single realist or idealist model appears to offer a complete explanation for the case of reform process. They do not develop satisfying explanations for design and change in international organizations. Admittedly, it is not easy to link realist and idealist explanations that would achieve theoretical precision beyond single case studies. In order to make further progress in developing such a bridge-building theory, what we need to do is to test the model

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[36] Car refers to a "utopian conception of a common feeling of right" in the section named "the role of morality in political change" and he argues that in order to establish orderly procedures of peaceful change in international relations, there must be a certain measure of common feeling of what is just and reasonable in the mutual relations of the parties. He compares two cases of demands for change, one case between Ireland and Great Britain and the other between Germany and Great Britain. He argues that the chances of peaceful chance is more likely between Ireland and Great Britain because "the stock of common feeling between Great Britain and Ireland was considerably greater" which is necessary to have a certain readiness to sacrifice self-interest to the demand of home rule coming from Ireland. Eventhough the Anglo-Irish Treaty was concluded after a successful rebellion, it had its necessary moral foundation in the acceptance of a common standard of what is just and reasonable in mutual relations of the two countries (Carr 1942: 279-84). The conception of a common feeling of right is utopian in the sense that it is not easy to establish the stock of common feeling on a global scale.

in other cases of institutional change. This would contribute both to identifying the prospects for reform and to exploring how elements of each approach might be combined to provide richer explanations for causes and processes of change in international organizations, including both institutional reform and change in organizational norms.

V

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