

EUROPEAN SECURITY & DEFENSE POLICY
WHAT IS NEEDED FOR THE EUROPEAN SECURITY?

KASM YIĞİT
103608027

İSTANBUL BİLGİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
AVRUPA ETÜTLERİ YÜKSEK LİSANS PROGRAMI

SOLİ ÖZEL
2006

Content

Introduction.....	2
The Major Milestones of the Idea of European Security.....	7
The Treaty Bases of the European Security Policies.....	14
The Maastricht Treaty (1992).....	15
The Petersberg Tasks (1992).....	18
The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997).....	22
The St Malo Summit (1998).....	26
The Treaty of Nice (2000).....	30
The Policies and Projects for the European Security.....	33
The CFSP.....	35
The EDSP.....	38
The EDSI.....	43
NATO.....	46
What is needed for the European Security.....	53
Common Identity.....	54
Conclusion.....	60
Bibliography.....	64

1. Introduction

The security and defense policies of the European Union has been an important issues since the establishment of the Union, however it has not been completely formed yet based on a common policies due to the lack of the formation of a common identity including common interests, whereas global and regional crises and challenges, coupled with developments within the EU, have made new demands on the EU's security and defense policies for being an effective external actor. Therefore European Union decided to develop a Common and Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) at the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.

While EU members have debated the merits of cooperation in the foreign, security, and defense policies since the 1950s, it was not completely realized until 1992 at the Maastricht Treaty, which members took a step that garnered real attention for the security and defense policies. Thus, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) have been formed as the second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty for supporting a new security and defense perspective of EU. The main goals that were put in the idea of CFSP was to give more political power to the EU for international political influence with connection of its economic weight, however, CFSP faced with severe criticism by the mid-1990s due to the EU's inability to end the violence in the Balkans.

Additionally, in the 1997, Amsterdam Treaty sought to develop a common European defense policy and a European Security and Defense Identity. Particularly, the Amsterdam Treaty aimed to define the EU's common defense policy including "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking", which is called "Petersberg Tasks" concluded by the Western European Union (WEU) at 1992. In fact, the idea of security and defense policies have been becoming a wider concept reflects developments underway since at least the energy crisis of the early 1970's.

However, the evolution of the common security and defense policies has been clearly accelerated after the Cold War.

Furthermore, traditionally, security has been analyzed and managed through sovereign nations and its national identity, including national interests, because a common national security is defined as pivotal symbol for internal and external sovereignty that is formed after political and security unity of the nation states, resulted by the system of Westphalia Treaty in 1648. Although, the EU has just completed its economic union, the EU has not formed a political union yet because; it has the lack of a common identity and interests. Yet, today, the geographical pertinence of security issues has widened to include both sub-national and global levels for the European Union as well; because, the scope of security and defense policies has widened from the purely military to include broader political, economic, social and environmental aspects that lead pressures over the Union for the formation of a common position in international arena. For example, Solana's paper, so-called '*A Secure Europe in a Better World*', defines the current international security environment as characterized by three new threats, which are terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and failed states and organized crime, each of which has the potential influence the roadmap of European security and defense policy project and each of threats combine and interact with the other.

Even though there is no single definition has been elaborated between member states, which encompass all these various aspects and current threats for security and defense policies in the EU, post-September 11, 2001 has led a great consensus among member countries to define security threat for the Union as seen in the Solana's paper. Actually the reason of why there was no single definition until September 11 was that security has a wide concept that often used in the most varying senses ranging from dependability of products, of product supply, security of the citizen and priorities for interests of each member states, and

there has also most important obstacle that is lack of will to form a common European identity based on common interests.

In fact, the end of the Cold War was the turning point for the European Union to be muscle power in international relations. However, more than ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rupture of the Iron Curtain dividing East and West, Europe is still searching for its own common identity, because a coherent new order or new security structure in this region is still little more than a political debate due to lack of a common European identity and consensus over security interests.

Moreover, the link between EU's internal and external aspects of security is becoming more and more obvious today for being an affective actor through development of a common identity including common interests. Therefore, there are many security-related components have been developed in several EU programs since the 1950s. These programs have not only been related specifically to the CFSP and the ESDP, but they are also relevant to the internal security of the Union and for cooperation with partners outside the EU, for example the counter-terrorism roadmap that is regularly updated by the Council of Ministers and the European Commission is a case in point to understand why common security and defense policies of the European Union is so important issues both for continent and the world, but it more depends to achieve a common identity including common interests, because all citizens as well as member states may feel themselves as a unified political entity in global arena, particularly for counter-terrorism roadmap, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and failed states and organized crime, such as drug traffic, illegal migration and so on. Therefore, this study overviews the current debate about the significance of common European security and defense policy and its significant relations with the common European identity, because achievement of a common security and defense policies is particularly depended the creation of a common European identity based on common interests.

Nevertheless, the CFSP/EDSP has close and important relations with NATO, because it is an attempt to save NATO whilst simultaneously giving the EU more military muscle. The European security and defense projects are currently about linking NATO's operational planning to the civilian capabilities of the EU and forcing EU member states to upgrade their military capabilities. At its simplest level it can be argued that the CFSP/ESDP is both a political and legal concept. Thus it encapsulates a number of decisions that have been taken by EU Member States, both on a bilateral and multilateral basis.

Moreover, the CFSP/ESDP based on a common European identity is an expression of the desire of the EU to develop its military and civilian capabilities to strength its power regionally and globally, potentially autonomously from NATO and the USA. Actually, CFSP/ESDP is about finding and forming a new 'burden sharing' between NATO and the EU in the security and defense areas to fight against current global and regional threats. This means cooperation with NATO a more flexible military organization capable of undertaking peace-enforcement and peace-keeping operations, whilst at the same time allowing EU member states to form a common security and defense policies and to have more control over their own multilateral forces and the conduct of military operations.

Addition to that, under the CFSP/ESDP, the EU has announced that it will take full responsibility in the area of conflict prevention and policies in international arena, but also Europe has tried to develop a common identity based on common interests and have to share the same priorities in terms of security and foreign issues, which are maintaining democratic traditions and shared basic values of tolerance and support for civil liberties in the face of religious fanaticism; eradicating or at least neutralizing the common threat to security and prosperity, especially global terrorism; and helping other parts of the world to develop democratic institutions and an advanced economy. Therefore, the main aim behind the project of establishment of common security and defense policy is to strength military and

political capabilities of the EU based on a common security interests with the link of EU capabilities of civilian aspects for crisis management and crisis prevention in the world which must require formation of a common European identity.

2. The Major Turning Points in the Idea of European Security

The major developments in security issues have strengthened the idea of common foreign and security policy through a common European identity due to increasing of a common consciousness for the common interests of the Europe. By the end of the First World War, Western Europe faced to be marred by a multi polar system, for instance there were power politics and differing ideologies of liberalism, fascism and communism which actually clashed and contributed to lead another war in Europe. With the war in 1945, Nazi Germany was defeated and most of Western Europe countries were faced a catastrophic era. Yet it was a new beginning for Europe, because Europe begun to form co-operation in both economic and security areas with the later formation of institutions, such as the European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The USA also ended its pre-war policy, which was called isolationism and became to involve in security arrangements of Western Europe through NATO against Soviet threat

It has taken Western Europe and the United States more than 50 years to reach the level of economic and security interdependence that known today as the EU. The whole process of integration of the European Union has been aimed to stop another conflict happening in European continent, except, which, apart from in the former Yugoslavia, has been achieved. It is a process which now appears to be unstoppable because of economically and politically complex interdependence between the members of the EU. Indeed, in recent years the EU make attempts to create its own common foreign and security policy (CFSP), a strengthened WEU and the creation of the Eurocorps to fulfill Europe's desire for a security and defense identity (ESDI), and monetary integration with the introduction of the EURO, which are the most critical developments in the process of creation of a common European identity based on common security interests. In fact, the European Union successes to form a consensus to fight against terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and failed

states and organized crime. Therefore; theoretically the EU has launched a common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and a rapid reaction force for crisis-management operation and conflict-prevention capability in support of the objectives of the common security and defense policies.

The starting point of milestone of the security and defense project for the whole Europe was the Washington Treaty and subsequent North Atlantic Treaty that was signed between the Brussels Treaty signatories, the USA and Canada. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed, because it was the defense organization against the threat of Soviet Union through a collective security idea. The outbreak of Korean War in 1950 had pulled on US's military resources in the western block. However, after the Korean War, a new debate had been already begun within the western block, because France was against unilateral rearmament of West Germany. Therefore, the European Defense Community (EDC) was proposed by France to form the basis of enhanced Western European security cooperation. The EDC plan includes the formation of a European armed forces and the rearmament of West Germany. But after the EDC plan failed, the Western European Union (WEU) is formed and the Brussels Treaty amended to allow West Germany to rearmament and join NATO.

Nevertheless, in 1973, the Helsinki Final Act was signed at the Conference on Security & Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). It signified the formation of the CSCE, later the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe OSCE, as a major security organization. Yet, the Berlin Wall failed, which has started a new process for whole world, especially for the European Continent, because Germany is reunited, and in 1990, NATO and Warsaw Pact governments signed the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) to reduce the numbers of military personnel and weapons of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. By end of the Cold War as all of USSR collapse, a war broke out in the Yugoslav. At the same

time, German and French Army units formed the Eurocorps, and were later joined by troops from Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain.

In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty was signed to rename the EEC as the European Union and desired to develop a Common Foreign & Security Policy (CFSP) and an eventual European Security & Defense Identity (ESDI). Initially, the main aim of the Maastricht Treaty is to lead shortly thereafter to the creation of certain military structures within the WEU, for instance, “the establishment of a Military Staff, the bidding for and the listing of military forces of the member states, the Forces Answerable to the WEU (FAWEU), which would be called upon when needed and to the creation of the WEU Satellite Centre in Spain.” (<http://www.defcolass.co.za/Archive/kiehnle.htm> Kienhle, G. F.) In addition, The Petersberg Tasks within the WEU marked another stepping point in transformation of security and defense policies.

The CFSP was a new issue since 1990 to argue in favor of the development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). The goal of this new approach was to give a muscle power to the European Union to react and operate in crisis on their own, for example without the assistances of the North Americans. “ESDI was fully accepted by the U.S.A. as the envisaged strengthening of the European component was not only to take place within NATO, i.e. not creating a European rival organization, but was also seen as a possible vehicle to increase the military contributions of the Europeans to the Alliance in the sense of more burden - sharing and as a countermeasure to shrinking defense budgets in Europe.” (<http://www.defcolass.co.za/Archive/kiehnle.htm> Kienhle, G. F.) NATO summits in Brussels in 1994 and Berlin in 1996 were important development to strength the idea of ESDI and led to a closer cooperation between NATO and WEU for the security and defense issues. In fact, the WEU would organize operation in the Petersberg spectrum; therefore the WEU would have been enabled to make use of specific NATO assistances and capabilities, which were

approved by the NATO Council, especially in particular planning and command and control capabilities, strategic air transport and airborne early warning. “Concerning the assets and capabilities, the term separable but not separate was used, indicating that these elements out of the NATO stockpile could only temporarily be made available to the WEU and were not separate or particularly designated for WEU use.” (<http://www.defcolass.co.za/Archive/kiehnle.htm> Kienhle, G. F.) However, the negotiations between NATO and the WEU were rather slow and did not bring justifiable results until the NATO summit of Washington in spring 1999.

Nevertheless, in the parallel of these developments on the institutional level, there have been several bilateral and multilateral arrangements to strength security and defense policies of the EU, for instance, the German-French EUROCORPS or the EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR of the South European NATO members were destined to make a full consensus between member states and to underline the European will to support ESDI and provide capable and ready forces for crisis management and prevention operations.

In this connection, the Amsterdam Treaty on June 1997 amended the Maastricht Treaty and brought some changes in several aspects, including the Common Security and Defense Policy. Because the changes reinforced the CFSP by including or identifying the WEU Petersberg Tasks as a possible action area in security and defense issues for the EU, by introducing a High Representative for the CFSP as the central figure to represent and to act on the name of the Union and by further development with the institutional ties between the WEU and the EU. Thus by the mid-1990s there were many documents and declarations of covering European security and defense issues on the conference between and NATO and EU, however the EU globally and regionally, was still not a real player in the security and defense issues because of the lack of a common European identity on the ground of common security interests. Because one of the basic problems were the still dominating in the security

and defense issues in the EU, which is national security interests of the principal actors within the EU, especially France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. For example France had all along, following consequently the gaullistic paradigm, tried to establish defined specific European security and defense policies as well as appropriate capabilities independent from the US. This approach can be traced from the EDC in the early fifties through the so called Fouchet Plans in the early sixties to positions voiced within the EU, WEU and NATO. For France it was no question that Europe needed indigenous armed forces, not wearing the NATO label, with France being the natural leader, the *primus inter pares*. (Soetendorp,1999, 129-139)

However, the British government defines its approach about the issues of security and defense policies as European Question. Therefore they regarded the European security interests have to be covered by NATO and aimed very strongly to maintain the present status quo in order to ensure the continuity American engagement with the European continent and the stability of the North Atlantic Alliance.

On the other hand, Germany has a strong advocate, sometimes even the motor, of the furthering of the EU and its common policies. But it was rather reluctant and hesitant in the field of security and defense, as it was torn between the very strong and close political ties with France and the fear voiced by the UK of losing the security guarantees of the USA partner. This led to a not very convincing “meandering” between the two poles. (Soetendorp,1999, 26-34)

The mid-1995 had many important developments about security and defense issues of the EU, and one of the most important developments was that Germany deployed its troops to Bosnia as part of the successor to IFOR, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) after the NATO's air strike against Serbia in 1995, which is the first German military operation overseas since the end of World War II.

In 1999, with the Cologne Summit Declaration, it confirmed that the EU would eventually take over the crisis management and conflict prevention function of the WEU to strengthen the ESDI that was very significant for improvement of a common European identity in the field of security. Yet, the EU needs more efforts and will to play an active role in international relations, so the Helsinki Summit of December 1999 launched the EU's European Security & Defense Policy (ESDP) and proposed the later creation of a Rapid Reaction Force. By the new millennium, the EU tried to develop its defense industry and capability with to project of Daimler-Chrysler Aerospace, CASA and Aerospatiale Matra, which merged to form Europe's largest defense manufacturer, the European Aeronautic Defense & Space Company (EADS). Simultaneously the Military Capabilities Conference confirmed the creation of a 60,000-strong EU Rapid Reaction Force to deploy on peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations by 2003. However the year of 2001 has changed everything for the European Union, because the on the September 11, global terrorist organization (Al-Quadia) attacked the US, which demonstrated a new security threat for the Western world as well as for the European Union. Therefore NATO evoked Article 5 for the first time and in October, European states contributed to the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

In 2003 March, the EU launched its first military operation, which was called Concordia, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). This operation ended in December 2003. However today, there are serious splits emerged between the EU and the USA as well as NATO over the US-led invasion of Iraq, because the members of the EU have different arguments about the invasion of Iraq, for instance, the UK has advocated and provided substantial numbers of troops to the US-led war, Poland has also provided approximately 200 special forces and chemical warfare specialists while Denmark and Spain provide naval contributions.

However the most important development post- September 11 for the EU is that to act simultaneously and collectively against global terrorism. Therefore, in 2004, at a two-day summit on 25 and 26 March, the EU appointed an anti-terrorism coordinator, Gijs de Vries, to help improve the flow of information between EU member states. Anti-terrorism measures are also enhanced. Finally In 2004 December, the EU launched Operation Althea in Bosnia, replacing NATO's SFOR with the 7,000-strong EU Force (EUFOR). All above development show the historical developments of security and defense policies the EU, but the EU needs much more, that is to strength its common European identity based on its common interests to be an active actor in the world.

3. The Treaty Bases in the European Security Policies

Western Europe had been protected and defined by institutional structures that were provided by an American hegemony and interests with the division of European continent defined by Communist threat. This system had given a stable political and security situations in the European Continent. Simultaneously, this stable structure allowed for a gradual institutionalization of economic and social interaction within countries of Western Europe. However, by the 1980s, these institutional arrangements within Western Europe became the impetus for further economic integration and deepening, rather than the security objectives that had started the process, because economic integration were the priorities of Community during the Cold War. However, by the Treaty of Maastricht, it was agreed that the WEU would act as both the defense and security organization of the EU and it would be the military tool through which the Second Pillar of the Maastricht Treaty. Therefore, since the end of the Cold War, a number of key developments and agreements for restructuring institutional structure of the EU have been occurred, which have responded to the security and defense policies of the Union. These developments and agreements have simultaneously been the cornerstone of what is today the EU has and the ESDI has. Especially, at the beginning of the 1990s there were two important treaties, which were the Maastricht Treaty and the Petersberg Tasks, these two agreements set the agenda for the new European security and defense environment.

Next, toward the end of the decade there were three key agreements: the Amsterdam Treaty, St. Malo Summit, and the Treaty of Nice. These five agreements have improved institutional structure of the security and defense policies of the EU with three potential European defense organizations, which are the WEU and the Eurocorps as representing more Europeanist approach, and the Combined Joint Task Forces, that is representing a more Transatlantic approach. However civil war in Yugoslavia represented the realization that

the EU was unable to articulate a common foreign and security policy due to the lack of a common European identity with common interests. EU's failure in the intervene the war in Yugoslavia also lead to underline the urgency to build a single and common foreign and defense policy to be an active actor globally and regionally. More realistically, it underlined the difficulty of achieving common European identity, because the big EU states, especially the UK, France and Germany, have not think their interests were synonymous with a pan-European interest.

3.1. The Maastricht Treaty (1992)

The Maastricht Treaty on 1992 was a significant development towards ESDI and officially founded the EU. Yet, the Maastricht Treaty could not embody the dreams of the Euro-federalists because it did not even represent a shift of sovereign powers, especially political powers of the member states form national institutions to the supranational institutions.

The Maastricht Treaty on EU was the first agreement to contain provisions anchoring the Union's responsibility for all questions relating to its security and defense policies, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which is related specifically to the defense is Article J.4:

- The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.
- The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union that have defense implications ...
- The policy of the Union in accordance with this article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain member states under the North

Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defense policy established within that framework. (Nugent,1999:74)

Therefore, the CFSP is the second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty “stated that the member states ‘shall endeavor jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy... covering all areas of foreign and security policy’ including all questions related to the security of the Union” (Nugent,1999:74).

By the Maastricht Treaty, there are new rules, which will encourage common security and defense policies, however the issues related with security and defense are still discussed and concluded by intergovernmental conferences- by European Council that shows there is not even to form a common European identity based on security interests, because in the end, national governments will find it harder to pursue common security and defense policies at odds with the EU, and the EU seems to be becoming a coalition of sovereign entities, offering members an additional context for enhancing their security position in the international system.

As part of the Maastricht Treaty, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are to be implemented on two different levels. In first level, there are the common positions for the members of the EU. The Member states must ensure that their national positions tie with institutions of the European Union. Second level is that there are joint actions, which ‘commit the member states in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity’ and are adopted in areas in which the member states have common important interests in security and defense areas. On the basis of the guidelines that are laid down in October, the European Council adopted the first two joint actions: one concerning the convoying of humanitarian aid in Bosnia, and the second concerning the dispatch of observers for the parliamentary elections in the Russian Federation. (Soetendorp,1999)

In fact, the CFSP aimed to equip the Union better for the many challenges it would face at the international areas, by providing it with new means of taking action in issues of foreign relations, but the decision making procedure requires unanimity vote through intergovernmental conferences. Nevertheless, a number of decisions were taken by the European Council at the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 directly influenced the relationships of ESDI with NATO and the WEU. These included, for example, extending invitations to members of the EU to accede to the WEU or to seek observer status, as well as invitations to European member states of NATO to become associate members; agreement on the objective of the WEU of building up the organization in stages, as the defense component of the EU, and on elaborating and implementing decisions and actions of the Union with defense implications; agreement on the objective of strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and the role, responsibilities and contributions of WEU member states in the Alliance; affirmation of the intention of the WEU to act in conformity with positions adopted in the Alliance; and the strengthening of the WEU's operational role. (Bretherton and Vogler, 2002, 171-190)

In fact, The EU's motivation for CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty is clear, and is frequently placed, because it aimed to create a common European security and defense policy to make Europe more of an "equal to the United States, a "counterweight to the United States, to enhance Europe's autonomy from the United States, to make Europe more independent of the United States for the "new world order" in security and defense policy. However it was so difficult to realize it, because foreign and security policy was essentially remained intergovernmental character that means, the CFSP was depended to the consent of member states to apply it, and the creation of a common European identity has been transformed as a policy debate rather than to be realized in reality. The goals of the CFSP, in the Maastricht Treaty, were defined to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and

independence of the Union and to develop and consolidate democracy and rule of law, and respect for the human rights based on a common European identity, because the European Union must establish its political union like economic union. Therefore “the Treaty envisaged that the EU, having no military capabilities of its own, will request the Western European Union (WEU) to elaborate and implement planned military measures on its behalf.” (<http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-117486-16&type=LinksDossier>).

Finally, the collapse of communism in East Europe had removed the most serious immediate military threat-Soviet threat, given pan-Europeanists to adopt a common foreign and security policy and to downgrade their reliance on NATO. It was safer now for the European to develop an independent Common Foreign and Security Policy. These aspirations were crystallized by the Treaty of Maastricht Treaty in 1991, which stated that the CFSP covers “all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense”. (<http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html>: Treaty on European Union). The Treaty also goaled to identify the WEU as the EU’s future defense arm, a hitherto ineffective body that was soon to acquire a bewildering variety of classes of member - five EU states (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) would be ‘observers’; three countries that are members of NATO but not of the EU (Iceland, Norway and Turkey) would be ‘associates’; and a number of East European states would be ‘associate partners’. (<http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html>: Treaty on European Union)

3.2. The Petersberg Tasks (1992)

The research of European Union to strength its security and defense policy was continued with the Petersberg Task. In June 1992, NATO Foreign Ministers organized the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo, announced the Organization’s willingness to support peacekeeping activities globally and regionally. Therefore, in July

1992, the Helsinki Document provided the framework for the commitment of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to peacekeeping.

During the same period, the Member States of the European Communities initiated a process of establishing more appropriate instruments for cooperation in foreign and defense policy. In February 1992, the Maastricht Treaty was concluded and its Title V on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) suggested a stronger role for the European Union in international security issues. Under Article J.4 of the Treaty, the Western European Union (WEU), described as ‘an integral part of the development of the Union’, was called on ‘to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications’. (Dehousee, 1994; 189)

In June 1992, WEU Foreign and Defense Ministers met in Bonn to develop the role of WEU as the defense component of the EU and to strengthen its operational capacity and to define the relations of the WEU with non-member states, particularly with NATO. In the final document, the Petersberg Document was introduced, the Council of Ministers agreed to expand WEU functions in order to include the planning and execution of a range of peacekeeping operations and crisis management. Therefore, Petersberg Task includes that military units of WEU member States, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for:

- Humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- Peace-keeping tasks;
- Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. These tasks have since become known as Petersberg operations or tasks, (Vierucci, 1995; 309; Jørgensen, 1997).

Following the decisions taken at Maastricht Treaty and Petersberg Task, goals of the security and defense policies were undertaken to develop the WEU’s operational capabilities

for crisis management and conflict presentation in order to provide the organization with the necessary tools to undertake the Petersberg missions. In this context, a WEU Planning Cell was founded, under the authority of the WEU Council, to carry out planning for possible WEU operations and to establish and to keep up-to-date the list of Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU). Although, the WEU has no standing forces or command structures of its own to develop missions for crisis management and peacekeeping operations, the military units and command structures were designated by WEU's members and associate members can be made available to WEU for its various possible tasks in peacekeeping operations and crisis management. They cover both national units and several multinational formations for the peacekeeping operations, for example the Eurocorps; the Multinational Division Central; the UK/NL Amphibious Force; Eurofor and Euromarfor; the Headquarters of the First German-Netherlands Corps; and the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force. (<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb150401.htm>)

Other measures of the Petersberg Task was to aim for developing the WEU's operational capabilities included the establishment of the Satellite Centre in Torrejon, Spain, inaugurated in April 1993, to interpret and analyze satellite data for the verification of arms control agreement, crisis monitoring and management in support of WEU operations; the creation of a Situation Centre (which became operational in June 1996) to monitor crisis areas designated by the WEU Council and the progress of WEU operations; and the creation of a Military Delegates Committee and the reorganization of the military structure of the WEU headquarters in 1998, in accordance with decisions taken by WEU Ministers at their meetings in Paris and Erfurt in May and November of 1997. (<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb150401.htm>)

Also, it stated that decisions to carry out WEU operations would be taken by the WEU Council of Ministers in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. In fact,

“the Petersberg task incorporated in the Treaty with the reference to the ‘eventual framing a common defense policy’ being replaced by ‘the progressive framing of a common defense policy’; and support mechanism were strengthened with the creation of a CFSP High Representative and the establishment of a policy planning and early warning units” (Nugent, 1999: 449). However, the following years, the performance of the WEU in framing and implementing Petersberg tasks has been disappointed, because its activities have been limited to civilian police exercises and have been lack of common European identity in order to establish common security interests, such as the missions to the city of Mostar within the European Union Administration of Mostar, and to Albania as the Multinational Advisory Police Element were limited. The functioning and results of the CFSP has similarly been the subject of criticism and have largely been considered ineffective due to lack of a common European identity between national identities. Particularly unsatisfactory has been the implementation of Article J.4 TEU, (European Commission, Report on the Operation of Treaty on European Union, 10 May 1995.)

As a result of the Kosovo conflict, but, the Cologne European Council in 1999 would place the Petersberg tasks at the core of the European Common Security and Defense policy, because the missions that were taken at Petersburg are far away from realities of lack of a common European identity and differences between national interests. The fifteen Heads of State or Government and the President of the Commission declared, “In pursuit of our Common Foreign and Security Policy, we are convinced that the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, the ‘Petersberg Tasks.’”(Presidency Conclusion Cologne European Council, 3-4 June 1999). The main goal of this declaration is to increase the capacity of the EU for independent actions, supported by credible military forces organized by Member States, and to decide to use military powers in order to respond to

international and regional crises without prejudice to actions by NATO. However, decision for the implementation of CFSP was still depended to the European Council or intergovernmental conferences held by the Heads of States or Governments of the members, which makes implementation of CFSP more intergovernmental which show to the European Union needs to strength its common identity with common interests.

3.3. The Amsterdam Treaty (1997)

This Treaty incorporated the WEU's "Petersberg tasks" into the Treaty on European Union. This laid the Treaty basis for the operative development of the ESDP that is a critical development in the strengthening of common European identity; because the Amsterdam Treaty enhanced the provisions of Common Foreign and Security Policy under Title V of the Treaty on European Union to contribute towards the progressive formation of a common Defense Policy identity, especially as stated by Article 17; "The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common Defense policy, in accordance with the second subparagraph, which might lead to a common Defense, should the European Council so decide." ... WEU supports the Union in framing the defense aspects of the common foreign and security policy as set out in this Article. The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of integrating the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide."(<http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html>: Treaty on European Union, Title V: Provisions on a Common Foreign & Security Policy, 1992).

Actually, the objectives of the CFSP were not changed, but operational and management mechanisms were strengthened with the view to improve the EU's effectiveness and efficiency with the ground of common European identity. Nevertheless, instruments for the CSFP were redefined as; "definition of the CFSP principles and general guidelines;

common strategies; joint actions; common positions; and strengthened cooperation between the member states.” (Nugent, 1999; 85) Although policy instruments of CFSP were strengthened for improving the EU’s effectiveness and efficiency in crisis management and crisis prevention, the strongest identities that exist at a European level are legal and institutional, while a meaningful European historical identity barely exists, because it is not insignificant that, within Member States, the term ‘Europe’ has become increasingly synonymous with the institutions of the European Union, and the policy instruments were still to be intergovernmental in character in that decision would be taken by the European Council through unanimously decision process. Therefore the member states were still unwillingness to give their sovereignty right, which is the ironical dilemma of the Europeans, in security and foreign policies to a supranational institution the particularly weakened organizational and managerial structure of security and defense policy of the European Union. According to David Calleo (2001) smaller states feared that giving up their outsized voting power would leave them at the mercy of the big states. (272).

Moreover, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced the new office of a High Representative for CFSP. The office is fused with that of Council Secretary General. The HR “shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the CFSP, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third countries.(<http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/amst/en/>: The Amsterdam Treaty,1997) Therefore, the HR assists the Presidency in the external representation of the EU and assists the Council in the implementation of policy decisions in CFSP matters, in fact, it was symbolically the major milestone of the formation of a common European identity, because it is the common voice and common representative of whole Europeans and Mr. Javier Solana was appointed as first HR and took office on 18 October 1999.

However, CFSP was not only the European military backbone that was missing at Amsterdam Treaty strength its supranational nature. As important as this necessary powerbase, or maybe even more important, was the lack of the materializing of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy as defined in Maastricht in 1991 and the political will to react jointly. The differing national security interests of the European partners were still the predominant factors governing the decisions or the lack of a common European identity including common interest at the Amsterdam Treaty.

Finally, as in 1991, the question of the further development of Europe's foreign and security policy capacities have once again been put on the agenda of the 1996-1997 Intergovernmental Conference at Amsterdam. Because the high expectations of 1991 following the transformation in Maastricht of European Political Cooperation (EPC) into CFSP had not been fulfilled yet and following Europe's poor performance in the Yugoslavian crisis brought a higher disappointment for the Europeans. They have increasingly seen the European Union as a paper tiger incapable of acting and not able to take care of its own security. Therefore, after the fifteen months of negotiations between the Member States, the IGC in the area of foreign and security policy would primarily focus on four questions, which are the issue of introducing Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), the introduction of the principle of flexibility, amendments with regard to security and defense, and the question of institutional changes. In the first question, the Treaty introduces that decision making in the CSFP taken by unanimity would remain the general rule (Art. J.13). On the other words there is a special or reinforced Qualified Majority (at least 10 Member States in favor) is possible but only for implementing common strategies, joint actions or common positions which, before, have already been adopted by unanimity but at the same time, there is an additional safeguard to provide the possibility for a Member State to oppose a decision by QMV for important and stated reasons of national policy." (<http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/amst/en/>: The

Amsterdam Treaty). Therefore the Council can bring the matter before the European Council which has to decide by unanimity, which means practically, a Member State that opposes a decision by QMV can always use its veto. Also Member States can maintain their veto for decisions having military or defense implications (Art. J.13.2)

Nevertheless, in the area of security and defense, the most important achievement is completely the introduction of the Petersberg tasks into the Treaty of Amsterdam in the Article of J.7.2). The European Union can undertake humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks involving combat forces in crisis management including peacekeeping through cooperation with the WEU. This development is certainly important for a common European identity to act through common security interests since these kinds of mission have been put into the agenda of the EU in the security challenges of the post-cold war period. Yet, the EU with cooperation of WEU still has a long road to go in further developing its operational capacities before it has the potential to fulfill the whole range of Petersberg tasks in humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management.

Moreover, the intergovernmental character of CFSP has been maintained and even been reinforced by the Amsterdam Treaty, because the decisions in foreign and security policies will continue to be taken by unanimity and the role of the European Council has been strengthened in areas of the general principles, the common strategies to move towards a common defense. Therefore, in the sensitive area of security and defense, there is no major progress has been made, and the Member States continue to have divergent views in this field, and the fact that the EU has been enlarged with three neutral countries. In addition, the future relationships between NATO and EU were discussed in Amsterdam, where there was substantial uncertainty with regard to the future of NATO and the continuing commitment of the US to European security in that time, there was less pressure on the Member States to

make real progress for a common European identity through common security interests. In fact, many countries in the EU thought that NATO would continue to be the principal player on the European security area. With its recent rapprochement with NATO's military structures, even a staunch Europeanist like France seems to be willing to admit that the development of a fully independent European security and defense identity outside the Atlantic framework is not a realistic option. Germany, together with France one of the most active supporters of a fully-fledged CFSP, has been putting all its eggs in the EMU-basket and in Amsterdam the rescuing of the Stability Pact became a more important priority than further developing CFSP. (Bretherton and Vogler, 2002, 207-220). Undoubtedly it can be concluded that despite in number of institutional adjustments, the Treaty of Amsterdam maintains the status-quo in the formation of a common European identity.

3.4. The St. Malo Summit (1998)

Since the establishment of the Union, European continent was primarily focused on NATO for defense cooperation, despite occasional efforts to improve, or rather establish, the EEC/EC/EU's external activities and endow it with a political identity and defense responsibilities. All of this then changed with the United Kingdom's attitude towards EU defense and its lifting of its decades-long objections to the EU acquiring an 'autonomous' military capacity, at the Franco-British summit in St. Malo on 3-4 December 1998. Therefore, St. Malo is widely considered as the start of the European defense project to follow an affective role in international arena through a common political identity. After St. Malo, the European Union would focus on the creation of an elaborate and well-functioning EU defense institutional framework, because headline, capability and police goals for common security and defense policies were set in order to create a pool of forces and other tools available to back up such policy but this process would be ended by disagreement among Member States for War on Iraq in 2003.

The main decisions that taken at St. Malo were the following: “the European Council was to be given responsibility for framing a common security and defense policy under the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); the EU was to be given the capacity for autonomous action, whilst at the same time enhancing the robustness of the Atlantic Alliance; new decision-making institutions were to be agreed, as well as plans to develop significant military means – to be placed at the disposal of the EU.” (<http://www.iss-eu.org/chailot/chai47e.html#3>, Rutten, 2001) The issues which emerged from St. Malo aim to create European security autonomy based on a common political identity, whereas, in the past, Europe has several affords to develop proposals for a security and defense entity, but none has ever borne with a common political identity to make consensus on common security interests. Although there is a positive outcome after St. Malo the precise details and the possible ramifications of a successful common European identity for CFSP remain unclear.

Nevertheless, with the Labor Government an important change in relationships between the UK and Continental Europe took place. Thus during an informal EU summit in Pörtlach in Austria, in October 1998 the United Kingdom advanced for the first time the idea to think about new concepts and approaches in security and defense issues for European crisis management capabilities in light of the unsuccessful policies of Europe in Bosnia and Kosovo, which were marked by weakness, political incoherence, and confusion. After two months a summit was organized between Blair and Jacques Chirac at St. Malo in France to discuss these new concepts for security and defense policies based on a common political identity, leading to the so-called St. Malo Declaration.

The aim and intention of the bilateral conferences between France and the UK was to ensure “a European capability to act autonomously in the international environment”. This new approach should be based on and supported by a gradual build-up of a Common European Security and Defense Policy including a common political identity. Therefore a

closer scrutiny of the declaration of St. Malo reveals indeed a convergence of the two former opposing positions of France and the UK, with quite some concessions by the latter. The basic principles thought, the French view of European independence from NATO in security and defense matters and the British intent to ensure the cohesion of the transatlantic link was not discarded, just hidden behind a consensual diplomatic language.

Before St. Malo, the United Kingdom had an effective veto of power on any institutional linkage between the EU and European defense policies. This situation condemned to impotence or irrelevance any initiatives that aspired usually by French to establish such a linkage between Union and defense policies. Therefore, “the biggest single stumbling block to both a CFSP and a ESDP was the inability of Britain and France to agree on fundamentals, a problem that dates back to the negotiation of the Treaties of Dunkirk and Brussels.” (<http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillet/chai47e.html#3>, Chaillot Paper 43, Rutten, 2001) There were some differences between the United Kingdom and France, for example, “one fundamental difference centered on the respective attitudes in Paris and London to the impact of ‘CESDP’ on Washington. While Paris considered that the emergence of a ESDP with teeth would consolidate and enhance a more balanced Atlantic Alliance, London feared that the opposite would be the case: that if Europe demonstrated a serious capacity to manage its own security affairs, Washington would retreat into isolationism and NATO would eventually collapse (<http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillet/chai47e.html#3>, Chaillot Paper 43, Rutten, 2001). In fact, the St. Malo Summit is seen the partial incorporation of WEU mission in the European Union and includes preservation of Article V, covering Collective Defense as committed by the WEU full members.

However, there was still a chronic question, which is national sovereignty, in the formation of a common European identity based on common security interests, so this summit was held. Because this Policy was to be executed on an intergovernmental level involving the

European Council, the EU General Affairs Council and the Ministers of Defense, but not the European Parliament, thus guaranteeing the maintaining of national sovereignty and national interests, which would be sources of divergence and disagreement among France and Britain in the War on Iraq in 2003 to due national interests, in these questions while at the same time ensuring the collective and harmonized approach.

At the same time the St. Malo paper concluded the build-up of effective military capabilities to back-up the credibility of the common policy, a badly missing building block in the past, was declared inalienable. The declaration specifically called for appropriate structures and a capacity of analysis of situation, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication of what already exists within NATO. Thus, the St. Malo Summit sparked off an intensive debate about European security and defense, giving the process of developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy as envisaged in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties an unexpected and strong dynamic push.

Actually, the near historical background of the St. Malo meeting was formed by the process of war in Bosnia and Kosovo, particularly; this process was intensified tremendously by the escalation of the Kosovo war. Because the current developments in the Balkans forced the European leaders into having to accept three essential insights: A crisis with a high potential of escalation can develop in the very backyard of Europe, requiring a comprehensive and coordinated crisis management, ranging from crisis prevention to peacemaking. Secondly, the member states were still lacking the basis to develop the collective and consensual European will and a common European identity including common security interests to act in such a crisis situation as seen in Bosnia and Kosovo. Thirdly, the politicians had to recognize that they did in no way have the proper military means to support their crisis management, once the decision to act would have been taken, and were thus to a very large extent dependent on the Americans.

3.5. The Nice Treaty (2000)

With developments in the Balkans and lessons learned by the St. Malo paper, during the German double presidencies in EU and WEU during the first half of 1999, a further process was started to define the European Security and Defense Policy based on a common European identity including common security interests. Also, with the new NATO Strategic Concept, which was papered by NATO's Washington Summit in April 1999 backing up the new European aspirations to develop the European Pillar, the EU Summit in June 1999 in Cologne laid out the way ahead and the time table for the development of the ESDP for crisis management and conflict prevention.

It also put into office the High Representative for CFSP. In the final statement, Cologne Summit was stated that the "Union must have the capability for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis without prejudice to actions by NATO" (http://www.pfpconsortium.org/WGS/42/posts/maastricht_treaty.htm Cologne European Council, 3-4 June 1999). In addition to this, the summit aimed to strengthen European capabilities in the fields of intelligence, strategic transport, command and control, the necessity to adapt and exercise national and multinational European military formations and the urgent need to strengthen the base of the European defense industry.

Moreover, the aim of the European Security and Defense Policy, as formulated in the respective summit papers in Cologne Summit and later the at Nice in December 2000 finalized by the Nice Treaty, is to give the European Union the means to play its role fully, for example, beyond the mere economical issues, on the international stage and to enable the EU to assume its responsibilities in the face of crises by adding to the range of instruments already at its disposal, an autonomous capacity to take decisions and to act in the security and defense field. Thus, the European Union must be able to mobilize a vast range of both civilian

and military means and instruments in order to give it an overall crisis management and conflict prevention capability in support of the Common Foreign and Security Policy based on a common European identity to reach common security interests in international relations.

The Nice Treaty, which is not yet in force, contains a number of modifications reflecting the operative development of the ESDP as an independent EU project of a common identity for the security and defense policy. The Nice European Council adopted a report by the French Presidency of the EU on the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) which provided a detailed account of the many activities which have been and are being undertaken to achieve ESDP. The Nice Treaty aimed to establish and consolidate both the institutional and the operational arrangements of the European Union based on the common identity for a European Security and Defense Policy.

The objective of the activities under way is “to give the European Union the means of playing its role fully on the international stage and of assuming its responsibilities in the face of crises by adding to the range of instruments already at its disposal an autonomous capacity to take decisions and action in the security and defense field.” (http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/nice1_en.htm: Presidency report to the Nice European Council, 7-8 December 2000.)

In fact, this autonomous capability should allow the European Union to take decisions and to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises where NATO as a whole is not engaged, if a common European identity is full formed in terms of building consensus among members over common security interests, because the European Union has always tried to eliminate its incoherent policy, which is result of divergences of national interests of the member states. In this way, the EU will be able to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks.

The activities the EU after the Nice Treaty is undertaking to establish a European Security and Defense Policy that are described below; the development of military capabilities; the strengthening of civil crisis-management capabilities; establishment of permanent political and military structures, such as Political and Security Committee (PSC), European Union Military Committee (EUMC), European Union Military Staff Organization (EUMS); and arrangements for consultation and participation of non-EU European NATO members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the European Union; and consultation and cooperation between the EU and NATO, but the Union has still weakness and unwilling to strength its common identity based on common security interests.

4- The Policies and Projects for the European Security

The end of Cold War brought a great chance for the European Union to strength its security and defense policy based of a common security identity, which has leaded, in December 1991, a European summit took place in Maastricht to open a new phase for an active role for the EU in international relations that was decisive not just for the future of the EU as a whole, but also in respect of security and defense issues within the Union. Thus the Treaty of Maastricht created a basis and logic of the new EU based on three pillars, which are EMU, CFSP and JHA, focusing institution of the European community into a real union.

At the same time the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was introduced and incorporated in the construction of the EU as the so-called Second Pillar. The CFSP defined the obligation for the member states of the EU to develop a coordination and harmonization of all activities of the Union in security and foreign affairs matters on the basis of a common European identity including loyalty and mutual solidarity within the European Union. However, this meant that the CFSP remained a matter of intergovernmental cooperation, but recognizing the individual national security interests of the member states, and was not subject to discussions or decision making within the European Council, in contrast to most other fields of co-operation, such as the economic issues. That meant national sovereignty and national identity were still priority over common European identity and its supranational nature.

The Maastricht Treaty also outlined the perspective of a future common defense by envisaging the formulation of a Common Defense Policy (CDP) in the long run which might at the proper time lead to a common defense in the EU (Peterson, 1998; 14-16). Yet this very vague hint at defense matters restricted the CFSP to a political understanding of security, because it was understood that the EU did not intend to develop a military and defense component on her own. To compensate for this missing link, the Maastricht Treaty declared

the WEU an integral part of the development of the European Union, thus creating the possibility for the EU to call upon the WEU in order to have this organization work out and execute, if so decided by the Union, decisions and actions in the field of security and defense, for instance, for crisis management operations. (Nugent, 1999) Therefore, the European Union, only one year later defined the Petersberg Tasks for the framework of crisis management including peace-making measures to be carried out by the WEU. In fact, this led shortly thereafter to the creation of certain military structures within the WEU, for example, the establishment of a Military Staff, the bidding for and the listing of military forces of the member states, the Forces Answerable to the WEU (FAWEU).

Nevertheless, the second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty has been a new issue since 1990 when NATO in London for the first time, and very vaguely at that, argued in favor of the development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). The aim of this approach was to enable the European members of the North Atlantic Alliance to react and operate in a crisis situation on their own. Also, the NATO summits in Brussels in 1994 and Berlin in 1996 developed the ESDI issue and led to a closer cooperation between NATO and the WEU. Later, the Amsterdam Treaty of June 1997 amended the Maastricht Treaty in several aspects, including the Common Security and Defense Policy. The changes did not bring a revolutionary change, but reinforced the CFSP by covering or defining the Petersberg Tasks as a possible action field for the EU, by introducing a High Representative for the CFSP as the central figure for representing and acting on the name of the European Union and by further developing the institutional ties between the EU and the WEU. So all in all by the mid-nineties there were a lot of documents and declarations of intent covering European security and defense issues on the conference tables and NATO and the WEU were joining, even though cautiously, hands, but the EU herself was still not a real player in this game. (Peterson, 1993:1129-138) That means the European Union has still the lack of creation of a

common European identity based on common interests for acting collectively in international arena for crisis management and prevention. Therefore, one of the basic problems was the still dominating national security interests of the principal actors within the EU, particularly France, the United Kingdom and Germany.

Briefly, all future developments of the ESDP and the CFSP will depend on the common vision and security identity within the EU for an effective international role, and thus on the objective and use of power. Since Maastricht, which established the CFSP, and Cologne created EDSP, European security and defense policy has been implemented within the limits of two essential constraints: the national sovereignty of member states on the one hand, the role of lack of a common European identity on the other. The basic dilemmas have been how to reconcile national sovereignty and political integration within a common identity and interests, and how to reconcile a strategic and political Union with a strong and permanent NATO. The European Union has tried to eliminate this dilemma through introducing his policies and projects for security and defense issues, which are CFSP, EDSP, EDSI, and NATO.

4.1. The CFSP

By end of the Cold War, global and regional crises, challenges and new international conjuncture, coupled with developments within the EU, have brought demands on the EU's external activities. Therefore the member states decided to develop a common foreign and security policy for the European Union based on a common identity and interests; although more than ten years after the end of Cold War, Europe is still searching for an own common identity in regard to questions of common security and defense in Europe. However, a coherent new order or new security structure in this region is still little more than a political debate, which leads to the inclusion of first vague annotations of a CFSP in the Treaty of Maastricht and to a new impetus to the proceedings of the WEU, defining for instance the so-

called Petersberg Tasks in 1992, because there is still no real advance to be noted for the CFSP, it has been an issue discussed as a political debate through intergovernmental conferences, such as the European Council.

Whereas, Europe's incoherency policy to prevent the Yugoslav conflict in the 1990s and its dependence on the United States during NATO's action in Serbia and Kosovo have moved many to argue that the EU needs to build defense structures and common security policy capable of standing alone to deal with violent conflicts; because there are ongoing conflicts and instability in Middle East and on the periphery of Europe. Those in favor of an EU, the CFSP argue that although NATO and the United Nations exist for collective security, neither can fully protect European interests. Furthermore, the CFSP supporters suggest that a common defense structure would utilize defense resources more efficiently and allow Europe to compete with the United States technologically. (Peterson, 1993:155-167)

In addition, the CFSP was established as the second pillar of the European Union in the 1993 the Maastricht Treaty. The Amsterdam Treaty introduced some significant changes, and since 1997 there have been many developments in the CFSP. It has been agreed to strength a common identity including common security interests on a common security and defense policy within the overall framework of the CFSP. Therefore, the European Council at Laeken of 14-15 December 2001 adopted a declaration on the operational capability of the ESDP, officially recognizing that the Union is now capable of conducting some crisis management operations. Therefore, institutional and policy structures for a common identity in security and defense areas established after the Amsterdam treaty have become permanent. With the Nice Treaty, certain amendments to the CFSP provisions of the treaty were agreed. Especially, the Amsterdam Treaty spells out five fundamental objectives of the CFSP:

- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principle of the United Nations Charter ;

- to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principle of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter , including those on external borders
- to promote international co-operation;
- To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. (The Amsterdam Treaty,1 May 1999)

The treaty also identifies several ways in which these objectives are to be pursued:

- defining the principles and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, which is done by the European Council ;
- Deciding on common strategies. These instruments were introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty and set out overall policy guidelines for activities with individual countries. Each strategy specifies its objectives, its duration and the resources that will have to be provided by the EU and the Member States. So far there are Common strategies on Russia, Ukraine, Mediterranean and the Middle East Peace Process. They too are decided by the European Council.
- Adopting joint actions and common positions. These commit the Member States to adopting a certain position and a certain course of action. They are decided by the General Affairs Council. (The Amsterdam Treaty,1 May 1999)

The CFSP, therefore, has been backbone of the security and defense policy of the EU since the Maastricht Treaty, because the Maastricht Treaty is also a basic document for a Common Foreign and Security Policy, because, this was a new departure for the European Union and the Treaty leded the creation of a common European identity and common interests. Therefore now the EU is shaping not only a new identity in foreign and security policy but also new institutions for acting globally. Because, the EU's motivation for the CFSP is to make Europe autonomy from the United States as an active global actor. For example, Former Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok spoke of CFSP as a way to make the EU more of a "counterweight" to the United States; (Wim Kok 1998:2).

Actually, the European Union has always wanted the Europeans to do more in defense; and the EU has also always encouraged them to coordinate their efforts in order to maximize the effectiveness of those efforts based on a common European identity. However, this issue has been discussed in political platforms and can not still totally implemented due to priority of national sovereignty and national interests of the member states.

4.2. The EDSP

The EDSP is the integral and ongoing part of the CFSP, but a common security and defense policy has been a European ambition for some decades. However, the legal basis for such a policy was only laid down with the adoption in 1992 of the Maastricht Treaty, which first established a common foreign and security policy, and speaks of the progressive framing of a common European identity. Although, since the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty, and spurred by external events such as the Kosovo crisis, the ESDP has developed rapidly, between 1999 and 2000 decisions taken by the European Union heads of state and government at the Helsinki and Nice European Councils in December strengthened much more the ESDP. Therefore, developing a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is an ongoing project, like enlargement, and it will play a significant role in determining the future of the Union, if a common European identity is desired to implement.

The central aim of the EDSP is to complete and thus strengthen the European Union's external ability to act through the development of civilian and military capabilities, including a common identity, for international conflict prevention and crisis management. Actually, the ESDP is an attempt to save NATO whilst simultaneously giving the EU more military muscle. Therefore, the ESDP is currently about linking NATO's operational planning to the civilian capabilities of the EU and forcing EU member states to upgrade their military capabilities. These developments represent the end of the EU as a 'civilian' power. Thus, the significance of the development of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) for

European security is very important issue for the future of the EU, because the ESDP will makes the EU an international actor, if a common European identity is completed as a result of transformation of national sovereignty to supranational institutions of the European Union

In fact, the ESDP is both a political and legal concept for Europe that is why the European Union needs to found its legal and political infrastructure. The ESDP encapsulates a number of decisions taken by EU Member States, both on a bilateral and multilateral basis, beginning from the autumn of 1998 at St. Malo and culminating in the Nice Treaty. “The French Presidency Report on the European Security and Defense Policy, adopted at Nice, is one of the most authoritative documents on ESDP.” (Bono, 2002) It states that the aims of the efforts made over the past two years at Cologne, Helsinki and Feira European Councils are as follows: “to give the European Union the means of playing its role fully on the international stage and of assuming its responsibilities in the face of crises by adding to the range of instruments already at its disposal an autonomous capacity to take decisions and action in the security and defense field.” (Presidency Report, Brussels, December 4, 2000). Therefore, this statement means that ESDP is an expression of the desire of the EU to develop its military and civilian capabilities to project its power regionally and globally, potentially autonomously from NATO. Implicitly, “The ESDP is about finding a new ‘burden sharing’ between NATO and the EU in the security and defense areas. This means cooperation in making NATO a more flexible military organization capable of undertaking ‘peace-enforcement’ operations, whilst at the same time allowing EU Member States to have more control over their own multilateral forces and the conduct of military operations.” (Presidency Report, Brussels, December 4, 2000). Simultaneously, another goal is the restructuring of common European identity including common security interests for the member states.

In addition, at Nice Summit in December 2000, EU member states decided to continue with the establishment of a number of political and military structures to make the ESDP a

reality and made these decisions independent from the ratification of the Nice Treaty. By January 2002, therefore, the ESDP has resulted in a number of key changes in European security. Yet, the defense aspects of Europe's common foreign and security policy are no longer framed by the EU's former defense arm, the Western European Union. Rather they are framed by the EU. In the Nice Treaty, it was agreed that most of the functions of the WEU would be transferred to the EU (European Commission, Treaty of Nice, 2001.). This has meant the setting up of new military and political structures in the EU. Therefore, under ESDP, the EU has announced that it will take full responsibility in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management, and a decision was taken to strengthen the EU capabilities for civilian aspects of crisis management. These include the establishment of a police force of 5,000 police officers to be operational by 2003, measures to strengthen the rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. (European Commission, Treaty of Nice, 2001). The EU has also agreed to the establishment of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), at the disposal of the Commission, to facilitate the allocation of resources for civilian crisis management. Thus if the EU member states work together successfully in these fields, this may help formation a common identity based on common interests in security issues and promote integration of the European Union.

Nevertheless, the European Council agreed political objectives, so called Petersberg Tasks and structures of the EDSP at Cologne in June 1999. To support the aims of ESDP and ensure its credibility, the primary mandate for the European member states is to create the inalienable power bases, the military assets and capabilities, so badly missing during the Kosovo war. This indisputable necessity for a common security and defense policy was taken on the conference tables at the EU summit in Helsinki in December 1999 and led to the formulation of the European Headline Goal (EHG) and responding Military or Collective Capabilities Goals. The envisaged EHG requires the EU members to be able to employ with a

preparatory time of 60 days a Rapid Reaction Force of approximately 15 Brigades or Corps size, totaling up to 50 000 or 60 000 men, for crisis management operations in the Petersberg spectrum. (Helsinki European Council, 1999)

In November 2000 a Capabilities Commitment Conference was held in Brussels with the European protagonists pledging their intended contributions to such a Reaction Force. The results were, on paper at least, quite encouraging. Besides the EU clientele, non-EU European NATO members, such as Turkey, Norway, and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU were invited to declare forces for possible participation in future EU-led operations. (Capabilities Commitment Conference, December 2000). At this conference the members of the European Union also declared their resolve to make all efforts necessary to improve the operational capabilities of their forces further to be able to cope with even the most demanding of the Petersberg tasks, which is pointer of willing of member countries for acting together based on a common identity in security issues. However, in addition to the military capabilities of the EDSP, civilian aspects were on the agenda of the Union more than military aspects, focusing on the four areas denoted by the Feira Summit in spring 2000, namely police matters, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil protection, because for the implementation of military capabilities of the EDSP, military structure of the EDSP has been formed based on a common identity including common security interests. Therefore, the European Council decided in 2000 to establish, besides the already acting High Representative (HR) for CFSP, the following permanent political and military bodies: The Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee of the EU (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS). Additionally a European Union Situation Centre was envisaged to support these bodies.

Practically, in order to enable the EU to develop a consistent European Approach in crisis management and conflict prevention, the EU has organized some military operations,

for example, European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina on January 2003; EU Military Operation in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM/CONCORDIA) on March-December 2003; European Union Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL PROXIMA); and EU Military Operation in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC/ARTEMIS). However to ensure synergy between the military and the civilian aspects and to execute strategic control over forces employed, the European Union needs appropriate political and military elements, including identify new capability requirements; promote EU military and political credibility; boost solidarity between Member States; and increase international prestige that are possible only a common identity appears including common interests in security issues.

Moreover, the ESDP needs a strong industrial and technological base to achieve its goals and industry is expecting appropriate measures to work in an adapted regulatory framework. From a Commission point of view it is also important to note here that some of the more significant shortfalls as regard ESDP Headline Goals relate to a number of industrial and technological sectors such as aerospace and IT where there is no clear demarcation between civilian and defense industries.

Finally, since Maastricht and Cologne, European security and defense policy has been implemented within the limits of two essential constraints: the national sovereignty of member states on the one hand, the US role and the Atlantic Alliance, which leads disintegration between members for security issues on the other. This two essential constraints are resulted of the lack of a common identity among members including common interests in security issues, and this basic dilemmas have been how to reconcile national sovereignty and political integration of the Union with each other based on a common identity, and how to reconcile a strategic and political Union with a strong and permanent NATO. The ESDP has been created and implemented in the room for maneuver left by these two issues, and by the

beginning of 2002, these two issues, the national sovereignty of member states on the one hand, the US role and the Atlantic Alliance on the other hands, have still constraints of common security and defense policy of the EU to explain both the progress and the limits of ESDP, but there is now a marked difference between these two traditional constraints: “the US/NATO factor has drastically changed since 11 September. One of the consequences of this evolution is that the United States is now pushing (more than preventing) the Europeans to take the lead in crisis management. The US today acts more as a driving factor than as a limitation on future EU military responsibility.”(The IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, Brussels, 2001)

4.3. The EDSI

The process leading to the development of European Security and Defense Identity within NATO has taken place progressively over a period of about ten years after the end of the Cold War. In fact, developing the European Security and Defense Identity within NATO is an integral process for the European Union to adapt NATO’s military and political structures. At the same time, it is an important element of the development of the European Union to act independently and collectively in the issues of security based on a common European identity including common interests. Both of these processes have been carried forward on the basis of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and Amsterdam in 1997, subsequent declarations made by the Western European Union and the European Union, and decisions taken by the Alliance at successive Summit meetings held in Brussels in 1994, Madrid in 1997 and Washington in 1999 and at regular ministerial meetings. Therefore, common security and defense policy of the EU has been shaped through transatlantic security relations and intergovernmental meeting between member countries. For example, accordingly, at their meeting in “Washington in April 1999, Heads of State and Government had set in train work on the further development of the European Security and Defense Identity within the

Alliance.” (<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0401.htm>: Chapter 4: The European Security and Defense Identity) Therefore, discussions were initiated to address a number of specific aspects, such as the development of effective mutual consultation and cooperation within the European Union, based on the mechanisms that had been established between NATO and the Western European Union (WEU); the participation of non-EU European Allies; practical arrangements for EU access to NATO planning capabilities and NATO’s assets and capabilities. (NATO Summit: Documents, Updates & Analysis, 1999a)

Nevertheless, the improvement of European military capabilities and common security identity including common interests are a fundamental aspect of ESDI. Thus, a Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was launched in Washington to ensure increasing of the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full range of European Union missions with the NATO. (http://www.assemblee-ueo.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2000/1720.html.REPORT1, 2000) And, the decisions that have been taken the basis for an effective role on ESDI in the future including cooperation with NATO based on these principles in Washington Summit, these arrangements, referred to as “Berlin plus”, which will respect the requirements of NATO operations and the coherence of its command structure, include issues such as: “the provision of assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations; the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations; the identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations and further developing the role of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities; the further adaptation of NATO’s defense planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations.”(NATO Summit: Documents, Updates & Analysis, 1999b)

On the other hand, the question is at the heart of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) debate. This debate is characterized by two competing archetypes: Europeanism and Atlanticism. Europeanism advocates that, in the long term, the EU must be in charge of common European security and defense policies and act independently on those policies. Atlanticism accepts a more significant European role but asserts that NATO must remain as the centre of security and defense policy and decision-making. (Gordon, 1997; 257-70) However, the European Pillar for a common European identity in security and defense issues has been a new issue since 1990 when NATO in London for the first time, and very vaguely at that, argued in favor of the development of a European Security and Defense Identity including common interests. The aim of this new approach was to enable the European Union to react and operate in a crisis situation on their own, for instance, without the North Americans.

In addition, the ESDI was fully accepted by the USA as the envisaged strengthening of the European component was not only to take place within NATO, such as, not creating a European rival organization, but was also seen as a possible vehicle to increase the military contributions of the Europeans to the Alliance in the sense of more burden sharing and as a countermeasure to shrinking defense budgets in Europe. Therefore, a common European identity for security and defense policy has been shaped according to transatlantic relationships and intergovernmental meetings between members of the EU that is resulted by incoherent diplomacy and lack of political will within the EU to completely form a common European identity including common interests for security and defense issues.

Although, given the lack of political will, inadequate unimilitary capabilities and ineffective decision making structures within the European Union after the end of the Cold War, the Europeans have agreed to build the European Security and Defense Identity within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Therefore because of the decisions made in Brussels

and Berlin in 1994 and 1996 respectively, NATO has developed the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) as a means of carrying out EU-decided Western European Union-led military operations on behalf of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy and the future Common Defense Policy. However, the building of ESDI within NATO on the basis of CJTF is a tentative outcome. (Peterson, 1993)

4.4. NATO

The NATO and the EU had in the past no cooperation or communication for security issues, the first contact was not occurred until the Kosovo war. However, this had to change very quickly and extensively in the wake of the new ESDP taking shape, as ESDP and ESDI within NATO are closely linked, they are the two sides of the same coin as indicated above. (Solana, 1998) The urgent need for respective arrangements covering the consultation and the cooperation between NATO and the EU was recognized after that crisis. On the other hand, since the end of the Cold War, there has been discussion within the European Union about creating a common security and defense policy to be an active actor in international arena, but the EU efforts to create a common security and defense policy has led a fear that an EU defense capability would undermine NATO and the transatlantic relationship. Especially, after international intervention to Kosovo, a new process has been started by U.K. to develop an independent defense identity for the European Union. Therefore, "Blair joined French President Jacques Chirac in pressing the EU to develop a defense identity outside of NATO. This new British engagement, along with deficiencies in European defense capabilities exposed by NATO's 1999 Kosovo air campaign, gave momentum to the EU's European Security and Defense Policy." (Donfried, 1999)

In addition, arrangements made for cooperation between NATO and the EU from 1991 to the present laid the groundwork for the development of a strategic partnership between NATO and the European Union. These included: "taking WEU requirements into account in

NATO's defense planning procedures for developing forces and capabilities; introducing procedures for identifying NATO assets and capabilities on which the WEU might wish to draw with the agreement of the North Atlantic Council; establishing multinational European command arrangements within NATO, which could be used to prepare, support, command and conduct an operation under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU; introducing consultation and information-sharing arrangements to provide the coordination needed throughout a WEU-led operation undertaken with NATO support; and developing military planning and exercises for illustrative WEU missions." (Solana, 1998) Therefore, in practice these arrangements are designed to make sure that if a crisis occurs in which the WEU decided to intervene and the NATO chose not to, it could request the use of members of NATO assets and capabilities of NATO, possibly including a CJTF headquarters, for conducting an operation under its own political control and strategic direction.

Fortunately the work affected by NATO and WEU in the past on their cooperation, with the Washington NATO Summit in April 1999 several documents could be finalized, for example, on command and control to include the use of CJTF elements, on the use of NATO planning facilities and on security matters, can be used as a basis to develop respective arrangements between NATO and the EU. The overarching aim for close relationships between the NATO and the EU is to ensure transparency, cooperation and dialogue in matters of security, defense and crisis management of common interest, while fully respecting the decision-making autonomy of both NATO and EU. In fact, one of the cornerstones reiterated by the EU in this respect is the ability, when necessary, to make use of the assured access to NATO's planning capabilities and to count on the availability of NATO assets and capabilities as stated in the Washington Summit of April 1999.(NATO Summit: Documents, Updates & Analysis, 1999c). However, there is a dilemma in the relationships between NATO and EU, because when cooperation with NATO strengthen military capabilities of the

EU, it is simultaneously a barrier against the EU to form its common security identity to be a muscle military power collectively and independently based on its common interests to act independently from NATO.

The relationships between NATO and the EU have been influenced by transatlantic relations as well. For example, “the transatlantic agreement on the new common threats, the NRF, and the PCC, there are significant differences between the United States and its allies over appropriate responses.” (Archick & Gallis, 3:2005) “Most allied governments contend that the Administration places excessive emphasis on military over political means to counter a threat, and that the allies have other domestic budget priorities that compete with allocations for defense.” The most important difference among transatlantic alliance has been formed over the doctrine Bush doctrine of “pre-emptive” “The Administration’s *National Security Strategy* (2002) notes that the United States reserves the right to take military action “to forestall or prevent... hostile acts” by an adversary. While most allies would concede such a right, some view the doctrine as an example of U.S. unilateralism at the moment of U.S. global military pre-eminence. In general, they believe that military action must be undertaken within a multilateral framework.” (Archick & Gallis, 5:2005)

The debate over pre-emptive attack among transatlantic partners and within the European Union has been affected by the U.S. decision to terminate UN weapons inspections and to go to war against Iraq in March 2003 that damage also relationships between NATO-EU. Therefore the initial refusal by France, Germany, and Belgium to approve NATO military assistance to Turkey in February 2003 in anticipation of a possible attack by Iraq sharply divided transatlantic partners as well as relationships between NATO-EU. The three allies contended that such assistance would amount to tacit approval of a U.S. belief that war with Iraq was necessary. Most allies said then, and maintain now, that a UN resolution is a requisite step, whenever possible, for NATO military action. The inability of the Bush

Administration to locate WMD in Iraq has led to renewed insistence among the European allies that their opposition was correct and that a UN imprimatur should be sought for NATO operations. (Archick & Gallis, 4:2005) Therefore the debate between NATO and the EU about “pre-emptive attack, out of area engagement, and legitimization of military operations has been brought to a head by the Bush Administration’s frustration with cumbersome alliance decision-making procedures.” (Archick & Gallis, 2005)

Moreover, the evolution of relationships between NATO and the EU has generated some disagreement among transatlantic partners over the security responsibilities of the two organizations, which has particularly increased after September 11 in 2001. The difference between U.S. and the European Union has been centered on threat assessment, defense institutions, military capabilities, and pre-emptive attack, out of area engagement, legitimization of military operations and fighting against global terrorism post-September 11. On the other hand “USA has called for enhanced European defense capabilities to enable the allies to better share the security burden, and to ensure that NATO’s post Cold War mission embraces combating terrorism and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. U.S. policymakers, backed by Congress, support EU efforts to develop a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) provided that it remains tied to NATO and do not threaten the transatlantic relationship.” (Archick & Gallis, 7:2005)

Nevertheless, many members of the European Union have supported close relationships between NATO and the EU, but at the same time, to form a common security and defense policies for the union as a means to give themselves more options for dealing with future crises, especially in cases in which the United States may be reluctant to become involved. On the other hand minority of EU countries, spearheaded by France, continue to favor a more autonomous EU defense identity to an active player in international arena. This desire has been fueled further recently by disputes with the United States over how or whether

to engage international institutions, such as the United Nations and NATO on security matters and over the weight given to political versus military instruments in resolving international crises as seen in the case of Iraq in 2003. Therefore the European Union has created three new defense decision-making bodies to help direct and implement the ESDP including a common European identity. These are: the Political and Security Committee, which is composed of senior national representatives; the Military Committee that is composed of member states' Chiefs of Defense or their representatives in Brussels); and the Military Staff, consisting of about 130 military experts seconded from member states. At the same time, the European Union has also established cooperation mechanisms with NATO, intended to enable the EU to use NATO assets and meet U.S. concerns about the EDSP. These include regular meetings between NATO and EU at ambassadorial and ministerial level, as well as regular meetings between the EU and non-EU European NATO members. "This framework allows for consultations to be intensified in the event of a crisis, and permits non-EU NATO members to contribute to EU-led operations; the EU agreed to establish ad hoc "committees of contributors" for EU-led missions to give non-EU participants a role in operational decision-making." (Archick & Gallis, 10:2005) The NATO-EU link was formed and officilized in December 2002; this paved the way for the implementation in March 2003 of "Berlin Plus," an arrangement allowing the EU to borrow Alliance assets and capabilities for EU-led operations and thereby prevent a needless duplication of NATO structures and wasteful expenditure of scarce European defense funds. "Berlin Plus" gives the EU "assured access" to NATO operational planning capabilities and "presumed access" to NATO common assets for EU-led operations "in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged." (<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm>)

In addition to close relationships between NATO and the EU, U.S. Administrations have supported the EU's ESDP project as a means to improve European defense capabilities,

thereby enabling the allies to operate more effectively with U.S. forces and to shoulder a greater degree of the security burden. Thus “U.S. supporters argue that ESDP’s military requirements are consistent with NATO efforts to enhance defense capabilities and interoperability among member states. They point out that the EU has made relatively quick progress on its ESDP agenda, and its missions in the Balkans and in the Congo demonstrate that the EU can contribute effectively to managing crises, both within and outside of Europe. As noted previously, U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress insist that EU efforts to build a defense arm be tied to NATO.” (Archick & Gallis, 11:2005)

On the other hand, France and some other members of the European Union have aimed to press over member states for a more autonomous EU defense identity. “Washington grudgingly approved the December 2003 agreement to enhance the EU’s planning capabilities, but some U.S. officials still fear that the new EU planning cell of 20 to 30 officers could grow over time into a larger staff, which could duplicate and compete with NATO structures. They also worry that the “mutual assistance clause” and “structured cooperation” in the EU’s constitutional treaty could ultimately lead to a multi-tiered security structure that could destroy the indivisibility of the transatlantic security guarantee.” (<http://discuss.agonist.org/smf/?board=1%3Baction=display%3Bthreadid=13730%3Bstart=5>) Therefore there has been a dilemma between transatlantic partners about relationships between NATO and the European Union, because the European Union, especially under the leadership of France, has aimed to create an autonomous security policies based on common European identity, and “they suggest that the possible development within NATO of an “EU caucus”, pre-negotiated, common EU positions, could complicate alliance decision-making and decrease Washington’s leverage.” (Archick & Gallis, 13:2005) Furthermore, if the EU missions overstretch European militaries, ESDP could compete with NATO efforts to develop an affective Response Force, impede the sustainability of NATO forces in Afghanistan, or

hinder the deployment of a possible NATO-led mission in Iraq. Others fear that “the EU’s success in establishing defense decision-making bodies has not been matched by capability improvements, potentially leading to a situation in which the EU gets bogged down in a conflict and requires the United States and NATO to bail it out.” (Archick & Gallis, 13:2005)

The successful of the European Union in security issues, in that sense, requested could then be made available for the EU’s use by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis. Conditions for their transfer to the EU, as well as for monitoring their use and for their eventual return or recall, would be registered in a specific agreement between the two organizations. During the operation, NATO would monitor the use of its assets and regular political liaison with the EU would be maintained. European commanders from the NATO command structure could be nominated to act under EU political control. The assets would be returned to NATO at the end of the operation or when required. (<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0401.htm>.Chapter 4: The European Security and Defense Identity) Therefore, throughout the operation, including its preparatory phase, NATO and the EU would cooperate with each other closely. Yet, the future of relationships between the NATO and the EU is still debatable and unclear because of security dilemma between transatlantic partners, the incoherent policies and lack of cooperation within the EU about security and defense policies.

5- What is needed for the European Security?

The European Union is needed to form a common identity based on common security interests. However the EU's defense identity is still inefficient in providing both common actions in international relations. Also compared with the United States, the EU lacks a single Army, Navy and Air Force and its associated large national market for defense equipment that are very needed for forming a common defense identity based on common security interests. Instead, the EU's Armed Forces are characterized by massive duplication of defense ministries, by duplicate armies, navies and air forces together with duplication of their training, support and bases. (Delanty, 1995) As a result, the EU states are failing to complete its common European identity based on common security interests and scope from large-scale operations in the provision of Armed Forces, because national sovereignty is still, or is still perceived to be, an essential constraint on future European political integration.

The result is that national sovereignty remains the main obstacle to the development of a military Europe based on a common identity. Therefore, implementing CFSP and ESDP depends more upon the political will of member states to transfer their severing right to a supranational institution in the EU. The problems are well known: first, the discrepancy in the EU between interventionist and abstentionsist states, and between the specific military strength of each of them. Second, the different perceptions of power among the member states. Third, the question of big and small, which can be a kind of red flag in all debates on the future organization of a more political EU. (The IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, 2001). In fact, the biggest obstacle or dilemma between national sovereignty and supranational nature of the EU, which is more related to the discussion of nature of system structure and nature of EU's institution, because, structure of the EU can not easily be defined that makes more difficulty the formation of the common European identity, because if a common European identity is formed based on common security interests, Europeans can act

unanimity and independently in external and security issues. Therefore, the European Union is needed a most important thing, which is common identity based on common security interests within the EU.

5.1. A Common Identity

The European Union has a single currency, open borders, and free flows of capital and people. But in the midst of all this unity and oneness, and calls for even closer ties, is there a common European identity emerging from the Continent's diversity? The answer is more tentative, but, there is a European economic identity, but there is no absolutely European political identity, because nobody is so far willing to say 'I am a European' and not French or Spanish. Because, identity is something people feel, because each members of community is different. Although it is subjective, a sense of belonging to Europe, Europe has been unified in many ways for over thousand years and Europe does have its own identity, but it is also made up of multiple identities rather than common identity.

A lively political and academic debate has emerged about the normative viability and the empirical possibility of a common European identity and how it relates to national identities (Duchesne and Frogner 1995; Delanty 1995; Giesen 1999; Jenkins and Sofos 1996). Of course, the debate is directly linked to the controversy about the democratic or legitimacy deficit of the European Union, because creation of European Union is a top-down and ruling elite projects. Whereas, there is general agreement that modern democracies rely upon the diffuse support of their citizens in order to gain legitimacy, which is necessary to ensure compliance with inconvenient and costly norms and rules. Collective identification with a polity provides one source of diffuse support for political systems. (Delanty, 1995)

Furthermore, "to begin with, it is no longer controversial among scholars and policy-makers alike that individuals hold multiple identities." (Risse, 2002). "It is wrong to conceptualize European identity in zero-sum terms, as if an increase in European identity

necessarily decreases one's loyalty to national or other communities." (Duchesne and Frogner 1995). Therefore a common identity for the European Union is dependent on how people feel themselves, because the "citizens" of the Union can feel as part of both national identity and supranational identity of the European Union without having to choose some primary identification, because "survey data suggest and social psychological experiments confirm that many people, who strongly identify with their nation-state, also feel a sense of belonging to Europe" (Duchesne and Frogner 1995). However there is a contradiction also between national identity and supranational identity of the Union when Eurobarometer are analyzed and data sources show that people particularly feel firstly to belong their national identity, then feel themselves as a part of supranational European identity, which shows why formation a common security is a difficult process for the member countries, because they have to pay attention to their national public opinion. Thus the empirical evidences show that formation of a common identity based on cultural terms, because it is generally defined through "civic" terms such as: to be a stable democracy, respecting human rights, the rule of law and the protection of minorities; have a functioning market economy; and to adopt the common rules, standards and policies that make up the body of European Union law. In addition to, people define their identity through historical, political, and economic spheres of the European Union rather a territorial entity, including cultural elements.

Actually the "real cleavage in mass opinion is between those who only identify with their nation and those perceiving themselves as attached to both their nation and Europe." (Risse, 2002) The number of those Europeans identifying with both their nation-state and with Europe has steadily increased during the 1990s and continues to do so in 2002 (spring 2002: 55%), while the percentage of those feeling only attached to their nation-state has decreased to 38% in early 2002 (European Commission 2002, 60).

Moreover, “the individual willingness to support further European integration increases quite dramatically from those who exclusively identify with their nation-state, to those feeling a second attachment to Europe” (Risse, 2002) Thus, people in the European Union have unwillingness to give priority of a common European identity over their national identity as also Risse states that “individual willingness to grant the EU authority does not require an identification that actually prioritizes Europe over the nation. The European polity does not need a community that replaces a national with a European identity, but one in which national and European identities coexist and complement each other.” (Risse, 2002)

Nevertheless, the most important deficit in the formation of a common European identity is the democratic deficit or legitimacy of the European Union, because the European Union is an elite project like similar to other nation-building projects during the formation of nation-state, therefore there is a gap between elite and citizens of the Union that is defined as “entitativity” by social psychologists. In fact both national identity and civic identity of European Union is “imagined communities” as defined by Anderson. For instance, for the citizens, the EU is still a more distant community than the nation-state, despite the fact that EU rules and regulations cover almost every political issue-area by now. “There are at least three reasons for this. First, while EU law is the law of the land, has direct effect, and overrides national law, EU authorities do not implement European rules and regulations, but national and sub national authorities do. Thus, when citizens are confronted with, say, environmental regulations in their daily lives, they rarely know that these are EU rules. Second, ‘Europe’ has fuzzy boundaries. While there are plenty of indicators telling me that I have left Germany, it is unclear when I have left “Europe.” Yet, boundedness is a crucial ingredient for the perceived “realness” of a community. Third, the elite discourse about the EU is ambivalent at best when it comes to ‘shared values’ and ‘common fate.’ (Delanty, 1995).

Furthermore, formation of a common identity for the European Union is depended to draw the boundary of identity, because identity also defines who is the belong it and who is outside of the identity. Yet “neither Europe in general nor the EU in particular has clear boundaries...and the Eastern enlargement won't make things any easier.” (Risse, 2002). In this sense, the EU has achieved identity hegemony in that it defines Europe in political terms, because the EU is an elite-driven project, like to other nation-building projects. Therefore, “an imagined community becomes real in people’s lives when they increasingly share cultural values, a perceived common fate, increased salience, and boundedness.” (Risse, 2002). The EU is certainly very real for Europe’s political, economic, and social elites rather than for citizens of European Union, because the EU is still a more distant community than the nation-state, for the citizens, despite the fact that EU rules and regulations cover almost every political issue-area by now.

Today, European identity based on various empirical findings. The main cleavage in identity terms is no longer between those who feel loyalty to their nation against those who identify with Europe. Rather, most people identify with their national or regional communities and with Europe. (Duchesne and Frogner 1995). They also distinguish between Europe as a cultural and historical space and the EU as the dominant political space in Europe. Yet, identification with Europe and the EU still suffers from the lack of realness of Europe in people’s daily lives and from its fuzzy boundaries. Even though the lack of European political identity does not exist in the daily life within the European Union, the available evidence shows that there is an increasing sense of community among the European citizens, among elites and ordinary people alike. The EU clearly represents a genuine community for the political, economic, and social elites in Europe and it essentially defines post-modern political identity in Europe for them. Among the citizens, identification with and attachment to Europe has also grown in recent years, while exclusive loyalties to the nation-state are in decline.

(Delanty, 1995) However, the EU is still understood as a civic community as distinct from cultural understandings of Europe in general. As a result, there is more to an emerging European community than many seem to realize. In particular, the European polity does not require a community that replaces a national with a European identity, but one in which national and European identities coexist. Therefore, Europeanization, European integration, and European identities seem to co-evolve over time, both at the elite and the mass levels. The causal arrows between European integration and institution building, on the one hand, and the evolution of European identities, on the other, seem to run both ways. The increasing realness of the EU in people's daily lives seems to affect their identification with Europe as a political community. At the same time, support for European integration and attachment to Europe appear to be closely related motivating European elites toward continuing on the path of institution building for the common security and defense policies. (Delanty, 1995)

Nevertheless, Within the European Union the development of common strategies and crisis management procedures are examples of efforts to improve coordination for the common interests within the European Union based on a common European identity. However, there is the lack of fully formation of common identity within the Union, because when even one state says no, there will not be a common policy through common interests, as also happens now. An example of disagreement is the war in Iraq. Member states have expressed disagreements and there is no common policy due to clash of interests and lack of fully completed a common European identity. But that is not the end of the story, because there are both good and bad news for the importance of European identity. The good news is that there is a multinational identity for the European Union that means "the main cleavage in identity terms is no longer between those who feel loyalty to their nation against those who identify with Europe. Rather, most people identify with their national or regional communities and with Europe. They also distinguish between Europe as a cultural and historical space and

the EU as the dominant political space in Europe.” (Risse, 2002) On the other hand, the bad news is about the superiority of national identity over the supranational identity of European Union that is “identification with Europe and the EU still suffers from the lack of “realness” of Europe in people’s daily lives and from its fuzzy boundaries (Risse, 2002)

In the European Union, there are three mechanisms are proposed to allow for groups of countries to go further together. The first is called “enhanced cooperation”. This would apply across all EU policies, but in the foreign affairs and defense fields it could be done only by agreement from everyone. The second would allow a state or states to abstain on an issue, allowing the others to go ahead and declare a common policy. If however, a third of the member states representing at least a third of the population abstained, the policy would be blocked. The third allows for a majority vote on implementing certain agreed policies. (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3945001.stm>) In such a case a country want to use its veto for a vital national reason could do so, but it might have to have the issue discussed by heads of state and government first. Although, there is no common interest based on common European identity to act effective in security and defense issues, there will also be a new EU foreign minister. This post will combine the current roles of the EU’s “high representative” and the external affairs commissioner, so he or she will be a more prominent figure that may help to complete common European identity, because the minister will speak for the EU, but only when there is a common position based on the common interests within the European Union.

6- Conclusion

The CFSP has been the legal basis of the European Union, which is one of the external relations instruments of the Union. In fact, the common security and defense issues have been depended the sensitive nature of this policy, which is controlled by member state through European Council based on the intergovernmental meetings.

The European Union has tried to improve a common security policy, since failure of the Pleven Plan and Fouchet Plan in 1960s. However two important turning points have leaded improvement of CFSP that are Maastricht Treaty and Amsterdam Treaty to strength decision-making procedures and instruments. Therefore the common and security policy has been improved through more unified perspective, because they views of leaders of EU is to strength CFSP based on as one of the next great projects on the road to European integration, and will likely seek to enhance ESDP based on more integrated identity including common interests. As noted above, most EU members assert that EU efforts to improve defense capabilities of the Union based on common identity to be an effective actor in international relations for crisis management, prevention and humanitarian intervention. For example, the UK aims to bringing more and better military hardware to the agenda for giving the European allies an effective role in alliance decision-making during the crisis.

Nevertheless, "Italy and Spain, among others, think that ESDP's military requirements will eventually provide the necessary ammunition to pry more defense funding out of reluctant legislatures and publics more concerned with social spending and struggling economies."(Archick & Gallis, 8:2005). On the other hand, "incoming EU member states from central and eastern Europe, such as Poland and the three Baltic states, back ESDP but maintain that it must not weaken NATO or the transatlantic link. The EU's four neutral members (Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden) prefer to concentrate their efforts on ESDP's civilian side. Germany, given its size and wealth, is considered critical to the success

of ESDP, but has played a rather passive role in much of ESDP's development." (Archick & Gallis, 8:2005)

In addition, the member state of the European Union, have discussed, especially French, German, Belgian, and Luxembourg, to create a separate European military headquarters, planning staff, and armaments agency form the NATO and transatlantic alliance to play an effective role in international relations. "Although not under EU auspices, this four-power meeting suggests that France is still intent on slowly developing a more autonomous European defense identity; whether Germany will support this position in the future remains an open question." (Archick & Gallis, 8:2005) Also, there have been ongoing efforts of the members to build a common security and defense policy based on common identity including common interests, because both common identity and interests have lead the creation of an effective role for the European Union in international relations. Therefore "the EU in December 2003 adopted a new agreement on enhancing the EU's military planning capabilities. This agreement represents a compromise negotiated by the UK, France, and Germany. It entails Establishing a British-proposed EU planning cell at NATO headquarters (SHAPE) to help coordinate "Berlin Plus" missions, or those EU missions conducted using NATO assets. Adding a new, small cell with the capacity for operational planning to the existing EU Military Staff, which currently provides early warning and strategic planning, to conduct possible EU missions without recourse to NATO assets." (http://www.assemblee-ueo.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2004/1854.html)

Moreover, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe has still searching for a common security identity based on common interests for an active role in external affairs. However a coherent new order or new security structure based on a common identity in European Union is still a political debate because of overemphasis of national sovereignty and interests as overvalued than supranational and common values of the Union. On the other words, the

European Union itself, as a community and organization generally including intergovernmental characteristic in the significant issues, such as enlargement, defense and security policies and institutional reforms of the union, have still not been a part of the picture. Because the primary concern of the European Union is related with the stabilizing and forming the community based on the economic power through intergovernmental meeting. Although a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 was settled as second pillar to bring a new process for the WEU, there is still no real advance to be noted to create a common identity based on the common interests in the issues of security and defense policies. However, it is not only the European military backbone that has been missing. As important as this necessary powerbase for acting together, or maybe even more important, is the lack of the forming a common identity to materializing of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy as political and military actor in international affairs.

The differing national security interests of the European partners are still the predominant factors governing the decisions. Therefore the creation of a Common Security and Defense Policy needs to strengthen ESDP based on common identity, including common interests with strong industrial and technological in order to establish its goals for crisis management and prevention in international relations. Whereas, CFSP supporters argue that a common defense structure would led a reaction of a common identity to utilize defense capabilities of the Union more efficiently and bring Europe to compete with the United States in security and defense issues. Yet, the majority of EU member states are not truly consider to importance in a European defense organization, based on a common identity including common interests to separate from NATO, as seen in the last case of the war on Iraq.

In addition to this, goals of the European Union for CFSP is theoretically to make Europe more effective equal partner to the United States to counterweight to the United States, based on an autonomy policy from the United States in security and defense issues.

For example, the British and French governments declared their intention at St. Malo to strengthen military credibility and effectiveness the European Unions as a security actor. Yet the EU leaders can not bring clear objectives in developing of rapid reaction capability based on collective defense, due to lack of common identity including common interest. Therefore European security and defense policy has been implemented and discussed within a dilemma, which is the national sovereignty of member states on the one hand, the US role and the Atlantic Alliance on the other. This dilemma has brought a limitation on the creation of a common identity to be an active actor in international relations. Especially the factors of the USA and NATO have been transformed since the 9/11, which also prevented the Europeans to create a common identity, because this process has brought a divergence between member states due to clash of national interests among them in the European Union.

Finally, national sovereignty is still an essential constraint on future European political integration based on a common identity including common interests. That is, the result is that national sovereignty has remained the main obstacle to the development of a military Europe in the crisis management and prevention. And the implementation of CFSP and ESDP are depended mostly the political will of member states to create a common identity for an active actor in international relations. Thus at the final end, the European Union needs to created a common identity based on common interests for implication of CFSP, which is also a dream of the Union to develop military and civilian capabilities for its power to act regionally and globally, potentially autonomously from NATO and the USA.

7- Bibliography

Anderson, Benedict. (1991). *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.

Archick, Kristin & Gallis, Paul (2005) NATO and the European Union, CRS Report for Congress, Received through the CRS Web

Article 10 of the Washington Summit Communiqué, April 24, 1999
<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm>

Borinski, Philipp. "Realism And The Analysis Of European Security," *Journal of European Integration*, XX:2-3 (Winter-Spring 1997). 131-52.

Bono, Giovanna. (2002). *European Security and Defense Policy: Theoretical Approach, Nice Summit and Hot Issues*. Research and Training Network

Brenner, Michael. "Multilateralism and European Security," *Survival*, 35:2 (Summer 1993), 138-55.

Bretherton, Charlotte and Vogler, Johan (2002). *The European Union as a Global Actor*. London and New York: Routledge Press.

Building the means and capabilities for crisis management under the CESDP - reply to the annual report of the Council submitted on behalf of the Defense Committee² by Mr. Rapson, Rapporteur 4 December 2000

Delanty, Gerard. (1995). *Inventing Europe - Ideas, Identity, Reality*. London: Macmillan Press.

Delanty, Gerard. (1995). *Inventing Europe - Ideas, Identity, Reality*. London: Macmillan Press.

Donfried, Karen (1999) the European Security and Defense Policy: The British Dimension <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/crseu.htm>

Duchesne, Sophie, and Andre-Paul Frogner. (1995). Is There a European Identity? In *Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance*, in Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

European Commission. (2002). Eurobarometer 57. Spring 2002 - EU 15 Report. Brussels: European Commission, October 21.

European Commission. 2002. Eurobarometer 57. Spring 2002 - EU 15 Report. Brussels: European Commission, October 21.

European Commission, Report on the Operation of Treaty on European Union, 10 May 1995.

European Security and Defense Policy: Presidency Report Brussels, December 4, 2000
<http://www.info-france-usa.org/news/statmnts/2000/defenrep.asp>

European Commission Treaty of Nice, 2001
http://europa.eu.int/comm/nice_treaty/index_en.htm

Giesen, Bernhard. (1999). Collective Identity and Citizenship in Germany and France. In European Citizenship and the National Legacies, in Klaus Eder and Bernhard Giesen (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gordon, Philip H., (1997). 'The Western European Union and NATO's "Europeanization"', in Philip H. Gordon, ed.. NATO's Transformation The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, p. 257-70.

Grosser, Alfred (1980). *The Western Alliance: European-American Relations Since 1945*, London: Macmillan Press.

Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 10-11 December 1999
http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99_en.htm

Howe, P. (1995). 'A Community of Europeans: The Requisite Underpinnings' Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol.33, No.1.

Judy Dempsey, "EU big three in deal over defense," FT, December 12, 2003; Interviews of U.S. and European officials, December 2003-February 2004
<http://discuss.agonist.org/smf/?board=1%3Baction=display%3Bthreadid=13730%3Bstart=50>

Laffan, B. (1996). 'The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe.' Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. 34, No.1.

Moravcsik, A. (2002) 'In Defense of the "Democratic Deficit": Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union'. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4, pp. 603-24.

NATO Summit: Documents, Updates & Analysis, 1999a.
<http://www.basicint.org/europe/NATO/99summit/docs&updates.htm>

NATO Summit: Documents, Updates & Analysis, 1999b.
<http://www.basicint.org/europe/NATO/99summit/docs&updates.htm>

NATO Summit: Documents, Updates & Analysis, 1999c.
<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0401.htm>

Chapter 4: The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI):Evolution of the ESDI
<http://www.basicint.org/europe/NATO/99summit/docs&updates.htm>

Nugent, Neill (1999). *The Government and Politics of the European Union*, London: The Macmillan Press.

Nye JR, Joseph (2000). 'The US and Europe: Continental Drift?'. *International Affairs*, 76 (I): 51-59.

On the security and defense implications of the Treaty on the European Union see Morgan, 'How Common Will Foreign and Security Policies Be?', in R. Dehousse (ed.), *Europe after Maastricht. An Ever Closer Union?* (1994) 189, at 192; J. Cloos, G. Reinesch, D. Vignes and J. Weyland, *Le Traite de Maastricht. Genese, analyse, commentaries* (1994) 468, 481

http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/nice1_en.htm: Presidency report to the Nice European Council, 7-8 December 2000.

Prime Minister Wim Kok quoted in *Der Standard* Vienna, 27 October 1998, p.2.

Peterson, John (1993). *Europe and America*. New York and London: Routledge Press.

Pond, Elizabeth (2000). *The Rebirth of Europe*. Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution Press.

Prepared for the IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, Brussels, 8 July 2001

<http://www.eusec.org/gnesotto.htm>

Reynolds, Paul, Analysis: Quest for EU identity
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3945001.stm>

Risse, Thomas (2002) The Euro and Identity Politics in Europe, Paper presented at the conference The Year of the Euro, Nanovic Institute for European Studies, University of Notre Dame, Dec. 6-8, 2002 <http://www.fu-berlin.de/atasp>

Risse, Thomas. (2001). *A European Identity? Europeanization and the Evolution of Nation-State Identities*. In *Transforming Europe. Europeanization and Domestic Change*, in Maria Green Cowles, James A. Caporaso and Thomas Risse (ed.). New York: Cornell University Press, 198-216.

Smith, Anthony D. (1992). 'National Identity and the Idea of European Unity'. *International Affairs*, Vol. 68, No.1.

Schild, J. (2001) 'National v. European Identities? French and Germans in the European Multi-Level System'. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 331-51

Soetendorp, Ben (1999). *Foreign Policy in the European Union*. London and New York: Longman Press.

Solana, Javier. "A European Security and Defense Identity within NATO," remarks at the WEU Colloquy "European Defense and Security Identity" in Madrid (May 4, 1998). www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s980504a.htm

Treaty on European Union, Title V : Provisions on a Common Foreign & Security Policy, 1992

<http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/amst/en/>: The Amsterdam Treaty, 1 May 1997

Vierucci, 'The Role of Western European Union (WEU) in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security', 2 International Peacekeeping (1995) 309; Jorgensen, 'Western Europe and the Petersberg Tasks', in K. E. Jorgensen (ed.), European Approaches to Crisis Management 1997

Wistrich, Ernest. (1994). The United States of Europe. London: Routledge.

<http://www.defcolass.co.za/Archive/kiehnle.htm>

Kienhle, G. F. European Security and Defense Policy: A New Factor in the World

<http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html>: Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992

<http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillet/chai47e.html#i> Rutten, Maartje (May 2001) From St-Malo to Nice: European Defense: Core Documents

http://www.pfpconsortium.org/WGS/42/posts/maastricht_treaty.htm Cologan European Council, 3-4 June 1999

http://www.assemblee-ueo.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2000/1720.html

The implementation of the Common European Security and Defense Policy and WEU's future role - reply to the annual report of the Council, REPORT1, submitted on behalf of the Political Committee² by Mr. Marshall, Chairman and Rapporteur. 6 December 2000

http://www.assemblee-ueo.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2004/1854.html

Parliamentary scrutiny of the ESDP and CFSP - debates and replies to parliamentary questions, DOCUMENT A/1854, 2 June 2004