

MEANINGS BEYOND WORDS:  
HOW TURKISH MEDIA REFLECT THE GREEK MEDIA  
A STUDY OF NEWS REPORTS

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KELİMELERİN ÖTESİNDEKİ ANLAMLAR:  
TÜRK MEDYASININ YUNAN MEDYASINI YANSITIŞI

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## ABSTRACT

The present study aims to find out how the Greek media was reflected in the Turkish media during times of political crisis and rapprochement beginning from 1950s. By conducting a research in the archives of Turkish daily *Hürriyet*, which may be assumed to be a typical representative of Turkish media, the study tries to clarify whether Greek media's representation by the Turkish media was ever affected by the tone of bilateral state relations between Turkey and Greece. Moreover, the study attempts to reveal how *Hürriyet* and the Greek media in general have positioned themselves in Turkish-Greek relations. Thus, it also questions the strength of the Turkish and Greek media in mutual inter-state relations and the level of their ties with their respective governments and states.

## ÖZET

Bu çalışma, 1950'lerden itibaren, önemli kriz ve yakınlaşma dönemlerinde, Türk medyasının Yunan medyasını nasıl yansıttığını ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Türk medyasının tipik bir temsilcisi kabul edilebilecek olan Hürriyet Gazetesi'nin arşivlerinde Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinin kritik dönemlerini kapsayan bir araştırma yürüterek, çalışma aynı zamanda Yunan medyasının Türk medyası tarafından temsilinin iki ülke ilişkilerinin niteliğinden etkilenip etkilenmediğini de göstermeye çalışmaktadır. Çalışma ayrıca Hürriyet'in ve Yunan medyasının genelinin Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde kendilerini nasıl konumlandıklarını görme gayretinde bulunmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, çalışma Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde, Türk ve Yunan medyasının ağırlığını ve her birinin kendi hükümetleri ve devletleriyle olan bağlarının düzeyini de sorgulamaktadır.

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Finally, I would like to thank my family. I know that they always wish the best for me. Even though we usually argue over what the best is, I am sure the completion of this study will make them very happy, too.

## PREFACE

Writing this dissertation was a pleasant process for me for many reasons. First of all, working on a particular aspect of Turkish-Greek relations is more or less interesting for most of the Turks, since the subject is not just an abstract academic topic but one that we somehow find ourselves as a part of in our daily lives. Analyzing how this experience was reflected by the media was especially appealing because any Turkish newspaper reader encounters news reports about Greece and Greeks almost every day. This brings a political issue closer to the real world outside, as opposed to various academic works that hardly have any relation with reality. This does not mean that kind of works are not valuable. However I chose this topic due to my near obsessional desire for relating the academia with the real world. Therefore, searching for empirical data in the archives was another enjoyable process, even though their evaluation somehow had to be subjective.

Nevertheless, the dissertation took more time to write than I actually planned to spend because of the *ordeals* of archive research. Working on the archives of the Atatürk Library where all newspaper archives are kept, required an unduly excessive time because of bureaucracy, mismanagement, indifference of the attendants, repairs and the almost impossibility of reaching the back issues in time. A researcher has to spend much of his/her time waiting in the library. However it was disappointing to see that after those long waits, some of the issues could not be found, bindings were under construction or they were not allowed to be browsed any longer. The second ordeal was to translate the news into Turkish. Especially headlines and leads which are usually written as phrases without regard to grammatical rules forced me to get assistance. Moreover, it was very difficult to find sources on the media facet of bilateral relations. Yet, it was another disappointment to observe that a

considerable part of the literature on Turkish-Greek relations was biased. In addition, applying discourse analysis was a source of uneasiness for me, since the subjective reading it requires can be too easy to disagree with.

In this dissertation I tried to focus on a relatively untouched aspect of Turkish-Greek relations and attempted to include a psychoanalytical perspective. I hope that this work will help others who are interested in the role of the media in the relations of the two states and lay a few stones in paving their way, although this is only a master thesis with its own inevitable shortcomings.

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

### **A. Aim of the Study**

Turkey and Greece are two neighbor countries that have used to perceive each other as historical and national enemies. Greek – Turkish relations have always appeared as a unique agenda in both states' foreign policies while the relations have had a determining influence on the Turkish and Greek communities' perceptions of each other.

Although both communities often prefer to accuse the aggressive politicians who do not desire to solve the political disputes (Millas, 2004: 19), as Kemal Kirişçi and Ali Çarkoğlu state, it is not possible to think of a government which does not take the population's demands into consideration (2004: 31). Yet, as Herkul Millas points out, Greeks and Turks for years did not hesitate to take the nationalist and chauvinist politicians to the government, to applaud the bigoted columnists and to participate the national meetings, as parts of the populist politics within their countries including Turkish-Greek relations (2004: 19).

This hostility between the two communities has reflected on their literature, art, history writing, media etc. in a way that strengthens the negative image of the other party. The representation of the other nation with an unconstructive attitude has led to stereotypes, and Turks and Greeks have embraced these stereotypes as the truth (Millas, 2005: 18).

Although media are widely called the fourth estate or the fourth branch of government that monitor it as a skeptical and critical way (Siebert & Peterson & Schramm, 1956), media in

Turkey and Greece, the countries in which the political power is centralized enough to tote over the public and the media a somewhat official or at least sanctioned blanket “national” ideology unsympathetic to diverse thinking (İsen, 1998), have presented a different picture. Thus, the perception and reflection of Greek-Turkish relations in Turkish media may be claimed to have been consistent with this framework, including significant crises and rapprochements in bilateral relations (Millas, 2000).

Turkey and Greece even came to the brink of a war in Imia/Kardak Crisis in 1996, and it is widely believed that it was ‘triggered and then aggravated’ by the Greek and Turkish media (Dimitras, cited in Rumelili, 2005: 9). Kardak crisis also confirmed that Turkish media tends to accuse Greeks and their media arguing that they are nationalist, chauvinist, provocative and they distort the truth, whereas Greek media has the same tendency concerning the Turks and Turkish media. Media in both countries have applied the same “blaming the other” routine for the other media and the both societies were persuaded that the guilty of the crisis is the other party (Tılıç, 1998: 305).

The antagonism, however, has left its place to a sense of cooperation and friendship since the earthquakes in 1999. It is widely agreed that after the summer of 1999 when earthquakes shook Turkey first and then Greece, and when on both sides of the Aegean people rushed to each other’s aid, relations between the people as well as the politicians improved considerably and an exchange of civilian interaction began among NGO’s and individuals. The media in both countries played constructive roles right after the earthquakes promoting empathy and communication.

Thus, the motivation of this work is the idea that the Greek and Turkish media which may be said to have had a considerable role on their homeland politics in a way that even led to the possibility of a war, should deserve an analysis. Therefore, the media, which have not been assumed as highly efficient tools of reinforcing and weakening conflicts so far (Hadjidimos, 1999: 34) is going to be the focal point of this work and the connection of Turkish and Greek media with the bilateral state relations is going to be studied.

More specifically, this work aims to see the presentation of the Greek media by the Turkish media beginning from the 1950s, the approximate date in which the problems have started to shadow the bilateral relations. In order to find out how Greek media have been reflected by Turkish media, a survey will be carried of the news reports concerning the Greek media in the mainstream Turkish daily newspaper *Hürriyet*, which may be assumed as a typical representative of the Turkish media. Greek-Turkish relations, however, are characterized by both sudden and constant changes. Thus, in order to see the reflection of the shifts in Turkish-Greek relations on the attitude of the Turkish media towards the Greek media, the research is going to focus on particular crises and rapprochements in which the echoes of bilateral relations in media were at peak.

The study is going to try to answer the following questions: How do the Turkish media position themselves in Turkish-Greek relations? How do the Turkish media position the Greek media in Turkish-Greek relations? What are the outcomes of these positionings? How do the Turkish media reflect the Greek media? Are Turkish media just reflectors of what goes on between the states, or narrators who tell people what goes on between the states enriching them with their own viewpoints, interpretations, biases etc and creating a narrative out of them, or actors just like the states who have their own strategies, own power and own war?

Are Turkish media manipulated by the governments in power or is it the media that manipulate? To what extent are the Turkish media powerful? To what extent the views and outlook of the Turkish media replicate or reflect the governments' or to use a more encompassing term, the state's ideology?

How should the changes in the media's coverage of the events be considered, as of the summer of 1999? Have Turkish media started to detach themselves from the official theses? Or have Turkish media been acting in a consistent way with the fresh moderate attitude of Turkey towards Greece? To what extent have Turkish media seemed to hold the promise of supporting friendship between Greece and Turkey? What are the prospective implications of the friendship atmosphere between Turkey and Greece on Turkish media's coverage? While trying to find the answers of these questions, the work inevitably is going to pay attention to Greek media as well and although there is not going to be an archival search within Greek media, the work is going to hold a comparative perspective which may also answer the mentioned questions for the Greek media.

In order to avoid the nationalistic and ethno-centric attitude which is criticized in this work, contrary to the wide-spread practice of Turkish scholarship that places the word Turkish before Greek in the texts -i.e. Turkish –Greek relations-, the order of the words Turkish and Greek is going to change according to context.

## **B) Literature Review**

Literature on Turkish-Greek relations is plentiful and highly accessible. Nevertheless, this literature is mostly focused on either historical or international relations. Thus, any work on a non-conventional aspect of the relations such as the role of the media suffers from a lack of relevant literature. Therefore, except a few publications specifically on the Turkish and Greek media, the literature referred here is often borrowed from other disciplines such as history, International Relations, social psychology, psychology and psychoanalysis. It might be added that, since the literature on Greek-Turkish relations is chiefly created by Greek and Turkish authors, the work also faced with the difficulty of accessing an unbiased literature.

Concerning the Turkish and Greek media, Doğan L. Tılıç's book whose title may be translated as "I am ashamed but I am a Journalist: Journalism in Turkey and Greece" (*Utanyorum ama Gazeteciyim: Türkiye'de ve Yunanistan'da Gazetecilik*), published in 1998, deserves special attention as a pioneer which still seems like the only one that compares and contrasts the media in both countries. Tılıç points out that journalists in both countries embrace a nationalist stance because of their close relations with the government and the media seem more nationalistic than the private journalists that make up the media in general. Tılıç says that just like the "ordinary" people in the Turkish and Greek communities, the media workers also have false perceptions and stereotypes about each other and the issues concerning Greece and Turkey. Journalists of both sides stand in a position that is consistent with the dominant tendencies among their respective communities and most of the time, their governments.

The report of Katharina Hadjidimos, a Greek journalist, which is based on a project funded by the Robert Bosch Foundation (1998/1999) is another significant work concerning the Greek and Turkish media. Working for 13 months on the topic of “The Role of the Media in Greek-Turkish relations”, Hadjidimos reports how both media cultivate the public opinion while reflecting it, how the structure of Turkish and Greek media influence the practices of journalism and the quality of reportage in Turkey and Greece and how the Turkish and Greek journalists embrace the stereotypes representing the other party.

Herkul Millas, another well-known scholar who has various works on Turkish-Greek relations, was another important source with his distinct focus on especially the psychological aspects of the relations and his insight into what happens at the community level. The works of Millas can be accepted as image studies which try to reveal the respective image of the Turkish and the Greek in each other’s eyes. Millas believes that the media’s coverage and the images they use confirm conventional and negative perceptions of Turks and Greeks about each other. His main publications related to this work are “*Türk ve Yunan Romanlarında ‘Öteki’ ve Kimlik* (Identity and the ‘Other’ in Turkish and Greek Novels)” (2005), “*Türk-Yunan İlişkilerine Bir Önsöz* (An Introduction to Turkish- Greek Relations)” (1995) and “*Türk Romanı ve ‘Öteki’: Ulusal Kimlikte Yunan İmajı* (Turkish Novel and the ‘Other’: Greek Image in National Identity)” (2000).

Vamık Volkan, the noted Turkish Cypriot academic and psychiatrist who has a special interest in the psychoanalytic aspects of Turkish-Greek relations, was also a source for the work with his psychoanalytical explanations. Referring to a theoretical framework that he uses to study the psychology of large groups and neighbours, Volkan offers psychoanalytical explanations on the history of Turks and Greeks, and states that as a part of the polarization they create in almost every facet of their mutual relations, they also obtain gender roles. In

that context, while Turkey mostly embraces masculine qualities, Greece assumes feminine ones. Volkan's books used in this work are "*Türkler ve Yunanlılar: Çatışan Komşular* (Turks and Greeks: Neighbours in Conflict)" (2002), "*Kanbağı: Etnik Gururdan Etnik Teröre* (Blood Lines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism)" (1999), "*Körü Körüne İnanç: Kriz ve Terör Dönemlerinde Geniş Gruplar ve Liderleri* (Blind Trust: Large Groups and Their Leaders in Times of Crisis and Terror)" (2005).

However, the main psychoanalytical approach, forming the basis of Chapter 2 is taken from Swiss psychiatrist Carl Gustav Jung. Jung who is known as the founder of analytical psychology and who worked with Sigmund Freud for years pioneered such significant concepts as the archetype, the collective unconscious, the shadow, the anima and the animus, the complexes, synchronicity etc. In this work, among the concepts he proposed, the shadow, anima and animus are going to be the focal points and various books, mainly, *Man and His Symbols* (1964), *The Portable Jung* (1980) and *Aspects of the Masculine and Aspects of the Feminine* (1989) are going to be referred.

Regarding the political aspect of the Turkish-Greek relations, the two volumes of the "Turkish Foreign Policy" (*Türk Dış Politikası*) edited by Baskın Oran (2003) which divides bilateral relations separate periods and focuses on each period in detail is the main reference. The book often even places newspaper pages to show the political atmosphere in a particular period.

An interdisciplinary book "The voice of the future: Turkish – Greek citizens dialogue" ("*Geleceğin sesi: Türk- Yunan yurttaş diyalogu*") (2004) edited by Taciser Ulaş Belge also appears as an important work in Turkish-Greek relations. The book deals with less frequently



studied dimensions of Greek-Turkish relations such as NGOs in Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, the role of the media in bilateral relations, the role of the youth in the rapprochement process, the role of the European Union etc.

Apart from these sources focusing directly on Turkish-Greek relations, there are other scholars whose views provide the ground for the work. Among these, Stuart Hall who is a cultural theorist working on media studies has significantly contributed with his cultural studies approach since “representation”, which is a main element of that approach has a place in the heart of this work. According to Hall (2002), media is a very powerful system for the circulation of meaning, however although media seem to reflect reality, in fact, they construct it. The news plays a role in defining the events rather than telling us what actually happened. Beyond analyzing whether the depiction of something is true or distorted, Hall thinks that representation does not occur after the event but it is constitutive of the event. Yet, the relation of the event and the way it is defined, or, in other words how it is turned into a fact is a process that is fixed by ideology. The media present this ideologically shaped relation as the only and ultimate one.

The work may also be said to have borrowed one of its main motifs from Michael Billig’s concept of “banal nationalism”. A professor of social sciences at the University of Loughborough, In “*Banal Nationalism*” (1995), Billig states that nationalism is generally and mistakenly identified with separatists and the peripheries, rather than the center. Billig argues that in the case of established nations, nationalism is the ideology of the centre, too, even though it is not expressed loudly. Through routine symbols and habits of language, nationalism is constantly flagged in our daily lives especially by means of the media. Therefore although citizens may not be too heated in their support of nationalism, they do not

forget their national identity, either. Billig supports his argument with an investigation he conducted on daily British newspapers.

Umut Özkırımlı and Arus Yumul have a similar study inspired by “banal nationalism” titled “Reproducing the nation: `banal nationalism' in the Turkish press” (2000). Examining 38 newspapers on randomly selected days, the survey finds that just like the British press, Turkish press follows the nationalist ideology as a natural and ultimate frame of reference and constantly reminds Turkish citizens of their nationality, even though they may not be the bearers of conventional hot nationalism.

## **C. Methodology**

### **1) Concerning Archival Research**

This work aims to find out how Turkish media reflected the Greek media at critical junctures from the mid-1950s and whether the attitude of the Turkish media towards the Greek media has had any consequences within the total scope of Turkish- Greek relations. In order to observe the presentation of the Greek media by the Turkish media, an archival research was conducted in order to investigate the news reports concerning Greek media in *Hurriyet*. Nevertheless, due to time and space limitations and financial constraints that any master dissertation faces, *Hurriyet* was selected as the sole medium since it would be a difficult task to review every mass circulation newspaper published in Turkey to check out their attitude towards Greek media in detail. Therefore, in order to narrow the research field down, a particular mass medium, which boasts enough popularity to be considered to have the power of representing the general approach of whole mass media in Turkey, namely newspapers, were chosen.

Newspapers represent the primary mass medium which people prefer to receive news (Vivian, 1999: 85). Regarding especially Turkish- Greek case, in which nationalistic elements have had strong influences on bilateral state, society and media relations as proposed in this work, newspapers as the major constructors and reinforcers of national consciousness (Anderson, 1983/ 1991), provide a convenient field of research.

Apart from investigating how *Hürriyet* has reflected the Greek media, the work aims to probe whether the attitude of the newspaper has had any parallels with the Turkish- Greek relations at

state level. Therefore, the research has concentrated on particular periods and particular dates when Turkish-Greek relations have cruised through crises or rapprochements. This way, the research was also designed to show whether or how *Hürriyet* was influenced by the changes in bilateral state relations or kept its fourth estate mission regardless of the events in the International Relations arena.

Bearing in mind that bilateral problems between Turkey and Greece have mostly started in 1950s, these selected dates and time periods which were marked by crisis or rapprochements cover the September 6-7 1955 events, Cyprus events in 1963 which is named as Bloody Christmas by Turkish side, 1974 Cyprus Intervention, the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus in 1983, Davos meetings in 1988, the Kardak/Imia Crisis in 1996 and Marmara earthquake in 1999. However in order to compare *Hürriyet*'s attitude toward the Greek media before the beginning of problems in the 1950s, *Hürriyet*'s archives of June 1948 which is a randomly selected time period, were also scanned. Yet, in order to check whether the friendship atmosphere which is said to have started right after the Marmara earthquake in 1999 is still effective, the dog fight between military aircraft and the crash of an airplane in May 2006 was included in the research as well.

## **2) Methodological Framework**

### **a) Discourse Analysis and Methodological Framework**

The starting point of any research is ontology, followed by epistemological and methodological positions. Only then the specific method may enter the picture (Grix, 2002). Following an ontological and epistemological stand typical to Cultural Studies, this work is going to employ Discourse Analysis as its method and try to “read” the printed news as a

cultural text. Combining “culturalism” and “structuralism”, news reports were chosen as a cultural unit on the assumption that culture is a matter of shared social meanings and these meanings are constructed through signs, like those of language, which are not neutral in the sense that language constitutes meanings and knowledge (Barker, 2000: 8). Thus, culture becomes the “signifying practices” of representation. Understanding the signifying practices of representation is actualized by exploring the textual generation of meaning (Barker, 2000: 8). Since it is considered that sounds, inscriptions, objects, images, books, magazines, television programs, newspapers etc. harbour cultural representations and meanings in a materialized form, then it can be realized that all those are cultural texts and they can be investigated to understand the shared social meanings they embed (Barker, 2000: 11).

Thus, this “reading” ontologically carries the constructivist position. Constructivism assumes that although there are many ways to construe the world, there is nevertheless a real world we experience. Yet, there is no ultimate shared reality, but reality is the outcome of the constructive process. It is determined by physical and social experiences and the interpretations of the individual. Therefore the meanings in this world are dependent on the understanding of the individual. Knowledge is always a human construction and is never value free (Bettis & Gregson, 2001: 10).

Epistemologically, the work adopts the Interpretive Social Science (ISS) approach which argues that social science should study meaningful social actions that are enacted for a purpose and that social action is the primary object of interpretive sociology. ISS is closely connected with hermeneutics and discourse analysis, which suggest detailed readings or examination of texts like words or pictures. ISS aims to “develop an understanding” about social life and to observe “the construction of a meaning” in a natural environment (Neuman, 2000: 68).

Therefore, it is possible to say that the ontological and epistemological approaches this work embraces allow a subjective, interpretive and textual reading, namely, Discourse Analysis, in order to explore how the Greek media is constructed and presented as a reality by an active agent, *Hürriyet*, in the natural setting<sup>1</sup>.

It is quite difficult to make a single and a clear-cut definition of what Discourse Analysis is, as a particular research method. Rather than providing a certain framework, or a quantitative or qualitative method to be used in every application, Discourse Analysis appears as a subjective way of approaching and thinking about a problem (Palmquist, 1997). The aim of Discourse Analysis is not to find definite answers to questions but to try to show the hidden motivations and unsaid messages behind cultural texts. It is the analysis of language beyond the sentence. It attempts to clarify how forms of language are used in communication and it examines the way language is used in particular social context for economic, political and social purposes (Blunt, 2004: 5).

Discourse Analysis can be applied to any text or any problem. Since it is basically an interpretative and deconstructive reading, it is not possible to talk about specific guidelines to follow. In addition, there is no agreement in social sciences about either the history of Discourse Analysis or how to use it<sup>2</sup>.

Therefore, it is only up to the researcher and what his/her purpose is to choose the paradigm to be used. It may be Jacques Derrida's "deconstruction", Michel Foucault's "genealogy of power", the Marxist approaches of Louis Althusser and Antonio Gramsci or the Feminist reading of Julia Kristeva. Again it is up to the researcher to combine any and all of these and other stands and conduct a more interdisciplinary and intertextual analysis (Palmquist, 1997).

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<sup>1</sup> This work may be thought as a Positivist one concerning its method of collecting empirical data. In order to see how anti-positivist approaches may have positivist tendencies and how Max Weber coincides positivism and interpretivism see İlkay Sunar (1986).

<sup>2</sup> For more on information on discourse analysis, see Philipps & Jorgenson (2002).

This work is going to refer to various theories and explain the attitude of the Turkish media toward the Greek media in an interdisciplinary framework, which also includes psychoanalysis.

### **b) Reliability and Validity in Discourse Analysis**

Reliability is the consistency or repeatability of a measurement. That is to say, if under the same conditions with the same subjects the conclusion of the measurement is the same, then it can be said that the measurement is reliable. Validity on the other hand is related to the degree to which a researcher is measuring what s/he is supposed to. To put it simply, validity refers to the accuracy of a measurement (Colosi, 1997).

In Discourse Analysis it is not possible to speak of hard data that will give the same results under every condition. The analysis of any cultural text in Discourse Analysis has to be subjective and a matter of interpretation. Therefore, as in many qualitative researches, speaking of the reliability and validity of a research is quite difficult. In Discourse Analysis the researcher is not interested in the questions of reliability and validity, either. Since the researcher is only concerned with providing a comprehensive and internally consistent interpretation that leads to understanding, the quality of the research depends on the force and logic of one's arguments. In Discourse Analysis there will be always counter-interpretations and criticisms. Therefore instead of trying to measure the reliability and the validity of Discourse Analysis, it is better to observe the level of understanding relating to that part of social life under study, since this is the aim of the method (Palmquist, 1997).

### **c) Advantages and Disadvantages of Discourse Analysis**

Discourse analysis can be applied on every text and situation. It depends on the researcher's subjective perceptions and interpretations and allows different readings and understandings to emerge. The researcher does not feel that s/he is constrained with the limits or boundaries of strict science but feels free to creatively borrow from many social sciences as much as possible and have the chance of producing a special work that totally belongs to her/him. In other words, it is impossible to make the same analysis with a researcher and even the same researcher may come up with new linkages while interpreting a text. This may be thought of as a contribution to the social sciences that saves it from monotonous verifications. In addition, the understanding that the analysis yield may cause a change in any part of social life with the consciousness it brings.

Nevertheless, as noted above, problems of reliability and validity may be viewed as a disadvantage. Discourse analysis is not a hard method that can offer universal answers to specific questions. It is difficult to verify or falsify the analysis. In addition, while utilizing the freedom that the method affords, one can sink with the variety of theories and different aspects of different social sciences that may be helpful to the analysis of a particular issue.

As Discourse Analysis suggests no one including social scientists may be value-free ignoring the entire social, historical, political, economic and cultural context they live in. Therefore I do not claim that I am totally neutral but I can say that I am going to try to stay clear of ideological explanations and I will keep myself in check as much as possible, as Barlas Tolan assigns as the duty of a researcher (1983: 334). This is especially needed while working on a



subject which may easily mobilize the nation-analistic feelings and lead to biased readings, as Turkish-Greek relations.

### **3) Analysis of Discourse**

Stating that thoughts, ideas and feelings are represented through language in a culture, Stuart Hall accepts language as one of the “media” and representation through language as a key component of the process by which meaning is produced (2002: 1).

However, what Hall means by language is not only the spoken or the written language but also the things that function to represent, to express or to communicate a thought, a concept or a feeling. Therefore, while written language uses words, musical language uses notes or language of the body uses physical gestures etc. Thus, elements like sounds, words, images, clothes etc have a significant role considering language but for not what they are but for what they function. According to Hall, they construct meaning and transmit it. They signify and serve as signs. These signs therefore represent our concepts, ideas and feelings and allow the others to decode their meaning in the same way (2002: 1-7).

In the production of meaning however, Hall argues that there are two related systems of representation. The first system of representation refers to the shared concepts or the mental representations we carry in our heads. The second refers to language, which enables us to correlate shared concepts with certain words, sounds or images. Hall states that the general term that is used for words, sounds, or images which carry meaning is “signs” (2002: 18-19).

Saussure asserts that there is also a signifier and a signified in representation. The signifier is the form (the word, the image, the photo) whereas the signified is the concept in our heads with which the form is associated (Hall, 2002: 31). Thus, written language itself –i.e. the news reports- may be said to appear as “sign” and a signifier which functions to trigger the related concepts in our minds and they may be analyzed to see what they mean or what they represent. To quote from Hall, “Representation is the production of the meaning of the concepts in our minds through language. It is the link between concepts and language which enables us to *refer* to either the “real” world of objects, people and events, or indeed to the imaginary world of fictional objects, people and events” (2002: 17).

Although Saussure mainly contributed on linguistics, his attitude toward representation was applied to all practices within culture. This general approach that studies the signs in culture, assuming that culture is a kind of language and can be analyzed with Saussure’s linguistic concepts is called semiotics. Deriving from the concepts of sign, signifier and signified, Roland Barthes also argued that, there are two levels of analysis in analyzing cultural objects, the denotative and connotative levels. While denotation is the basic descriptive level, connotation is the decoding level on the basis of our conceptual map and its connection with the broader themes and meanings (Hall, 2002: 31-39).

That is to say, the cultural object at hand in this work is the news reports in the newspapers as the medium that carries a particular language which is both a sign and a signifier in a broad cultural environment. In an intertextual analysis, the news reports are going to be connotated and the myths behind them are going to be investigated in order to reveal them.

Language, both as the system of sounds and words and as the things that function to represent, to express or to communicate something as Hall proposes, was studied by many scholars who reported some diverse findings. Benedict Anderson (1991) speaks of the role of the daily newspapers in the emergence and spread of nationalism, mentioning for the first time that a feeling of national community is produced by the knowledge that all over the nation people are performing the daily ritual of reading the same newspaper. This is what Marshall McLuhan (1964) argues exactly, while stating that “the medium is the message.” McLuhan proposes that not their content they cover but the media themselves affect the societies in particular ways by their unique characteristics. Michael Billig confirms Anderson and partly McLuhan saying that newspapers reproduce nationality through their messages, stereotypes and deictics (1995: 125). Billig states that language plays a vital role in the operation of ideology and in the framing of ideological consciousness (1995: 17).

Investigating the daily British newspapers to find the concrete examples of what he calls “banal nationalism”, Billig argues that nations and citizens and so that beliefs, assumptions, habits, representations and practices are reproduced daily. Billig says, banal nationalism is as dangerous as the phenomenological nationalism since it consolidates the position of nationalism as normality and do not attract attention as the extreme nationalist happenings (1995: 6-7).

A study by Umut Özkırmılı and Arus Yumul (2000) on Turkish daily newspapers based on Billig’s concept of “Banal Nationalism” confirms Billig, finding “unwaved, unsaluted, unnoticed flags which unflaggingly flags” (Billig 1995: 40-41), in Turkish newspapers. Özkırmılı and Yumul found that Turkish daily newspapers often use the Turkish flag or the map of Turkey in their logos, and words that emphasise “Turkishness” in their slogans

explicitly or implicitly. They generally separate “homeland” news and “foreign” news in their coverage and the page-setting accordingly in a way that gives a clear sense of separation between “us” and “them” (2000: 792). In weather forecasts, there is no country name on the maps since everybody can understand that it is the map of Turkey, which everybody has already memorized the shape of. In addition, news about the homeland is more in quantity compared to the news about the rest of the world (2000: 790-791). When it comes to the words used in the news texts, Özkırmılı and Yumul point out that there is a strong stress upon Turkishness explicitly and even when there is not an explicit emphasis on it, the reader understands that the unsaid but implied subjects of the news are themselves as the people and their homeland as the country. The study shows that especially in the Cyprus case, Turkish newspapers use an explicitly nationalist and defensive attitude towards Greece and Europe (2000: 794). In the dichotomization of “us” and “them”, Turkish newspapers attribute positive qualities to Turkey and Turks while they refer to the rest of the countries and people with negative characterizations (2000: 795).

Tılıç as well observes that foreign correspondents use the word “us” when they ask questions to the government officials. Tılıç says the same is true for the news reports. Turkish newspapers describe Turkey and Turks as “us”, whereas Greek newspapers describe Greece and Greeks as “us”, as well. Therefore, the binary opposition which is one of the first suppositions of nationalism between “us” and “them” applies in journalism practices in Turkey and Greece. (1998: 312-313). This usage of binary oppositions in the official meetings and news reports is related to another statement of Billig’s, which Özkırmılı and Yumul (2000) verified, that is “they” are “nationalist” which is dangerously irrational, surplus and alien; “we” are “patriotic” which is beneficial and necessary (1995: 55).

Moreover, behind any image study, of which this work may be considered an example, there is the assumption that language –language in the sense that it is the tool of narration of any cultural text – is a political and ideological instrument, rather than merely a reflector of truth (Millas, 2005: 18). According to Walter Lippmann, images are necessary “summaries” that enable people to understand complex data. They also reflect our values and opinions to the rest of the world (cited in Millas, 2005: 19). Eric Fromm and Wilhelm Reich also worked on “image”, connecting it with ethnocentric constructions and claimed that nations actualize themselves with regard to other nations constituting a “binary” between themselves and the others (cited in Millas, 2005: 19). On the other hand, in an image study, the aim is not to show whether that image is consistent with reality or not but to elaborate the underlying reason and sense. In other words, the purpose in image studies is to find the context and the project in which the image is produced, to see the social necessity that the image satisfies, and to show for which ideology and how the image works (Millas, 2005: 21).

Bearing in mind this perspective of Millas, who states that language is a political and ideological instrument rather than a reflector of truth, it is beneficial to return to Hall again to see his point of view concerning the distortion of truth. Hall argues that “messages work in complex ways and they are always connected with the way that power operates in any society”. Instead of arguing that representation is a passive reflection of truth, Hall states that “the true meaning of something depends on what meaning people make of it; and the meanings that they make of it depend on how it is represented”. In other words, representation does not occur after the event but it is the constitutive of the event. Representation is not outside the event but it is within the event itself (1997: 3) Relatedly, Hall proposes that “nothing *meaningful* exists outside of discourse” and without language, there is no representation; without language, there is no meaning (1997: 12). The significance of what

Hall proposes for this work may be found in Hall's position again. According to him, today the world is widely circulated by the media and media constitute one of the most striking and extensive systems that circulate the meanings (1997:14).

On the other hand, Hall criticised the media arguing that media work through ideology. Hall believes that ideology tries to fix the meanings constituting a relationship between the image and its definition and naturalizing that relation and media present that relation as the only and the ultimate one. That is to say when one sees a particular image, one automatically remembers that relationship and that particular "closed meaning" resulting from "closed language" (1997: 21). Hall's definition of ideology reminds a general definition of hegemony. Hegemony is the common-sensical and unquestioned workings of society. It "works through ideology, but it does not consist of false ideas, perceptions, definitions. It works primarily by inserting the subordinate class into the key institutions and structures which support the power and social authority of the dominant order" (Clarke, cited in Baldwin, Elaine & Longhurst, Brian & McCracken, Scott & Ogborn, Miles & Smith, Greg: 1999: 105). A hegemonic cultural order tries to contain all competing definitions of a world within its range. "It provides the horizon of thought and action within which conflicts are fought through, appropriated, obscured (i.e. concealed as "national interest" which should unite all conflicting parties) or contained" (Clarke, cited in Baldwin et. al, 1999: 105).

Clarke's definition of hegemony may call to mind Michel Foucault's term, "government". Foucault uses government to indicate a way in which the acts and manners of individuals or groups may be directed. He says that to govern is to draw a structure to determine the possible field of action that the others may not go outside. That is to say, for Foucault, to govern does not refer simply to a political term but to a term which signals the power relations as in the examples of the government of children, of souls, of communities, of families, of the sick etc.

According to him, it is this government that constitutes a specific discourse. However, by “constitution” he does not mean the creation of something absent but the manipulation of things into the realm of a discourse. Therefore, all discourses are historical for Foucault (2000: 326-348).

To return to Billig, he states that nationalism, which Anderson and Billig himself propose that media have an important role in the imagination and reproduction of, is an ideology that creates and maintains nation-states (1995: 19). Ernest Geller (1983/ 2001) asserts that there cannot be nationalism without nation- and nationalism is the product of the era of nation-states. That is to say, nationalism which holds that political and national unit should be congruent and the nation-state is the natural political unit is a historically specific form of consciousness. Moreover, Edward Said states that nations not only have to be imagined but also have to create their own histories or interpretations of themselves and so that they are “interpretive communities” (cited in Billig, 1995: 70).

These imagined and interpretive communities attribute themselves with positive characteristics while they burden the others with negative ones, which may be summed up as stereotyping, as stated before. Remembering that in the case of Greek- Turkish relations, stereotypes have a significant role but there has been a particular effort to alter them, especially after 1999, Hall makes a statement which is closely related with the representation of the Greek media in the Turkish media. Speaking of “positive representation”, Hall argues that a very common strategy to terminate the stereotypes is to reverse them (1997: 20). In a parallel way, it can be supposed that images of nations are not stable but fragile and they are likely to change depending on the historical context, systemic fluctuations, the perception of oneself and the other and any event that may affect the relations among nations. That means,

resentments may turn into friendships and vice versa (Pageau, cited in Millas, 2005: 21-22). Yet, Hall adds that meanings cannot be fixed and just as the attempt to reverse a negative stereotype, the positive one may also be reversed and where meanings are intertextual and representation is within the event itself, it cannot be assumed that positive representation attempts are going to reach the audience as it is intended<sup>3</sup> (1997: 20).

Findings of the archive research are going to be analysed on the basis of the mentioned theories and suppositions.

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<sup>3</sup> According to Hall, there are three ways of reading messages which are the dominant (hegemonic) reading, negotiated reading and oppositional (counter-hegemonic) reading. In dominant reading, the reader fully accepts the messages in the text as they are intended. In negotiated reading, the reader partly agrees with the messages in the text however s/he contradicts with it as well, and at the end his/her reading appears as a one which consists of both the intended meaning and the reader's own perception. In oppositional reading, the reader disagrees with the message and rejects it (1996: 136-138).



#### **D. Scope of the Study**

The work consists of five chapters. The first chapter covers the methodological framework, a description of the selected method, namely discourse analysis and the literature review.

In the second chapter, history of Turkish-Greek relations is summarized. However while the first part of the chapter focuses on the formal historical data, the second part tries to provide an alternative approach to the bilateral relations using Carl Gustav Jung's concepts of shadow, anima and animus.

The focus of the third chapter is on the Turkish and Greek media. First, the structural aspects of the Turkish and Greek media are covered and then the role of Turkish and Greek media in Turkish-Greek relations is explained.

The fourth chapter is completely devoted to archive research. After a brief information on the research, the findings are going to be cited and the question how *Hürriyet* reflects the Greek media is going to be answered along with the secondary inquiries.

The last chapter summarizes the findings of the study and comment on the future of Turkish media's representation of Greek media.

## **II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND PSYCHOANALYTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF TURKISH- GREEK RELATIONS**

Since the work focuses on the media representations of two countries that have been considered enemies, it inevitably has to assign some place to the state of bilateral relations between them. Thus, in the following part, a brief history of Turkish-Greek relations is going to be recited. Nonetheless, because the central concern of the work is not the international relations between the Turkish and Greek states, this part is going to be relatively short. On the other hand, there is going to be another section in this part of the study in which the history of Turkish-Greek relations will be attended from a psychoanalytic perspective. Thus, the study will attempt to avoid citing the much repeated, usual “time table information” on the history of Turkish-Greek relations but offer a distinct psychoanalytical viewpoint of past happenings and their interpretations.

### **A) Historical background of Turkish-Greek relations**

The historical moment that allowed Turks and Greeks to meet and continue their relations until today goes back to May 29, 1453, the date the Ottoman Empire “conquered” the capital of the Eastern (Greek) half of the Roman Empire, Constantinople. The “glory” of this Ottoman or Turkish –the Turks are accepted as the – descendants of Ottomans victory was the last stroke on the Byzantium Empire and caused its collapse. The replacement of the Byzantium Empire with the Ottoman Empire even closed an age and started another (Volkan, 2002: 54).

The term “Megali İdea<sup>4</sup>” was first presented in 1844 for the first time, when the newly founded and poor Greece, largely disregarded by the West, turned its attention to the rich compatriots in the Ottoman Empire, and Rums in the Empire at least ideologically liked the idea of uniting with the Greek Kingdom (Firat, 2003: 180). However, it is also possible to say that, originally, the basis for Megali İdea was provided with the loss of Constantinople in 1453 (Volkan, 2002: 54-56).

There was a stable relation between the two ethnic peoples in the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, with the concepts of national consciousness, nationalism and citizenship spread by the French Revolution, Greeks started to “rebel” at the beginning of 19<sup>th</sup> century (Aksu, 2001). However it was the Greek uprising in 1821 that changed the atmosphere in relations and led to an obvious hostility between the two nations. Greeks declared their independence in 1828. Greeks and Ottomans then fought against each other in Greco-Turkish War in 1897, in Balkan Wars in 1912-1913, and the hostility between Turks and Greeks was consolidated during the First World War which the Ottoman Empire lost. After the First World War, Greece occupied the Empire’s Western territory as one of the victorious Allies. This and a partition of the country by the winning powers triggered what was to be called later the “The Turkish War of Independence”, beginning in 1919 with the landing of Greek troops in İzmir. In the Balkan Wars, while the Ottoman Empire lost territories, Greece enlarged its own, which raised the hopes that the Megali Idea was plausible (Aksu, 2001). Nikos Svoronos points out that for the Megali Idea to come true, all Helen lands should be possessed and therefore Greece attempted to gain more with the War in Asia Minor than the Turks named Independence War (cited in Aksu, 2001). Although the Allies divided the Ottoman land

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<sup>4</sup> Megali Idea, literally translated as the "great idea" or "grand idea, is a Greek term that refer to the goal of reestablishing a Greek state as a homeland for all ethnic Greeks of Mediterranean and Balkan world. Megali Idea aimed a Greek world extending west from Sicily, to Asia Minor and Black Sea to the east and Egypt to the south (“Greek Nationalism, the Megale Idea and Venizelism to 1923”, Online Lectures on Modern Balkan History, Michigan State University, 2004 ).

among themselves and occupied their respective zones, in practice the Turkish counter occupation forces under Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) mainly made war with Greece to end the occupation in Asia Minor and Turkey's current holdings in Europe. Right after the Independence War or what is referred as the "Asia Minor Catastrophe" in Greece, Lausanne Treaty, the founding treaty of the Turkish Republic, was signed and Turkey started to go through a nation-building process (Aksu, 2001).

Falling into a phase of military, political, economic, social depression after the war in Asia Minor and recognizing that Greece reached the largest territory it could ever have had under the rule of Venizelos (Firat, 2003: 180), according to Svoronos, Greek foreign policy abandoned the Megalo Idea (cited in Aksu, 2001). Dimitris Tsarouhas (2005: 11) also confirms that the Greek army's defeat in 1922 constitutes a defining moment in the evolution of Greek state saying that the population exchange put vast pressure on the government to provide housing and employment for the refugees. Thus the leaders of Turkey and Greece, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Eleftherios Venizelos, tried to normalize the relations between the two states. Venizelos even nominated Atatürk for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1934. In 1934 Balkan Pact was also signed (İsen, 1998).

It may be said that during approximately 30 year period between 1923 and the middle of 1950s, Turkey and Greece had fairly friendly relations which were backed up by a common threat perception coming from Fascist Italy and then the Soviet Union. They joined NATO together in 1952 (İsen, 1998). Between 1950-1955, national interest in Greece and Turkey was perceived in line with the interests of United States and NATO and they determined their foreign policies on this framework (Firat, 2003: 587). However, beginning from the middle of the 1950s, inter-communal troubles started in Cyprus and the Cyprus Problem became the

first and one of the major problems between Turkish Republic and Kingdom of Greece (İsen, 1998).

Cyprus Problem, which in essence erupted with Britain's withdrawal from the Island in 1956, grew complicated. The problem transited through some stages as the declaration of a bicomunal Republic in 1960, the 1964 Crisis which followed the "Bloody Christmas" as the Turks are used to call it which resulted in the emergence of the Green Line, the 1967 crisis during which Turkey was held back from a military intervention at the last moments, Turkey's Cyprus Operation in 1974, the establishment of Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in 1975, the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus in 1983 (İsen, 1998). As Byron Theodoropoulos (2001: preface xi) says, any escalation concerning the Cyprus problem has had a direct negative effect upon Turkish-Greek relations.

The Cyprus Problem and the hostility it caused have led to the emergence of other disagreements, which still shadow the relations between Turkey and Greece and did so especially in the 1970s. As Gündüz outlines (2001: 81), these disputes between Greece and Turkey are mainly over the Aegean - boundaries of territorial waters, continental shelf, extent of airspace, flight information region (FIR), ownership and militarization of some islands and islets- and minorities<sup>6</sup> - Greek minority in Istanbul, Gökçeada (Imvros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos), and the Ecumenical Patriarchate and Heybeliada Clerical School)-.

Yet, as Öniş and Yılmaz (2007) appoint as the second rapprochement cycle, after the first one started by Venizelos and Atatürk, the Davos Process entered the picture in 1988. Davos represented a considerable intention for confidence-building, tension-reduction and a return to

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<sup>5</sup> Until the beginning of the 1950s, Turkey used to support the status quo in Cyprus, which was British rule. On 23 January 1950, Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak said "there was no Cyprus question. The British government will not leave the Island to another state". Turkey's policy towards Cyprus would only be changed when Britain made Turkey party to the problem in 1955 (Firat, 2003: 598).

<sup>6</sup> For the details of the mentioned disputes and Turkish-Greek relations beginning from 1920s onwards, see Oran (2003) volume 1-2.

good neighborly relations. Although it collapsed at the end of 1989 due to Andreas Papandreu's reluctance and electoral defeat, Özal's election to Presidency and European Community's rejection of Turkey's application for full membership, it can be said that the ground was laid for the following friendship attempts in Davos.

Turkey and Greece recently experienced two serious crises which are the Kardak/Imia Crisis in 1996 and the Abdullah Öcalan Crisis in 1997. Nevertheless, after the two earthquakes in Turkey and Greece respectively in the summer of 1999, bilateral relations improved considerably due to the mutual sympathy and cooperation. In the same year, Greece agreed with the European Union's decision of granting candidacy to Turkey as an indicator of good will (Veremis, 2001: 55). It is possible to say that 1999 has been accepted as a real cornerstone in Greek-Turkish relations. The significance of the earthquake in 1999 is, according to Millas, the fact that Turks and Greeks encountered, saw and sensed the other party physically beyond their abstract images. Turks in the televisions and newspapers observed Greeks while they were trying to help the Turkish people. Turks saw that Greeks, their enemies, could cry for the pains of the Turkish people and help them with no further expectation than the consolation of the people they saved. For the first time, Turks saw not a Greek image but the real Greek people. When another earthquake hit Greece after a short time, Greeks saw not a Turkish image but the real Turkish people (2004: 22).

It is widely believed that Turkey and Greece have decreased the tension in the Aegean, promoted low-politics cooperation including mutual visits of Turkish and Greek people and the works of NGOs, started to talk over Cyprus in a softer and subtler tone and have entered a new phase of détente since 1999 (Keridis & Triantaphyllou, 2001: introduction, xvii). Öniş and Yılmaz point that in the post-1999 period, the European Union has also played a constructive role since EU membership has become no longer an abstract ideal but a concrete

possibility for Turkey. Moreover, Turkey and Greece have started to cooperate in trade, investment and tourism (2007). According to Rumelili, in parallel with the improvement in bilateral relations, both Greek and Turkish media have embraced a more progressive, conflict-diminishing attitude as well (Rumelili, 2005: 12).

It is possible to say that since 1999 no serious crisis or a step of rapprochement that have changed the path of Greek-Turkish relations occurred. Therefore, in this work, the moderate environment that started with the earthquakes is going to be referred as the last significant event in Turkish-Greek relations.

## **B) A Psychoanalytical Approach to Turkish-Greek Relations:**

**But we can never admit ourselves that we've wasted 50 years of our lives!<sup>7</sup>**

The history of a community including its glories, losses, perceptions, feelings, traumas, fantasies etc. and its unconscious, which is the carrier of the psychic representations of these, play a vital role in the affairs with other communities (Volkan, 2002: 13). Therefore, the nature of Turkish- Greek relations at the state level cannot be understood solely from a political perspective without paying attention to the psychological background of the relations at the community level (Gündüz, 2001: 83).

This part of the work will attempt to provide a psychoanalytical explanation to Turkish-Greek relations. Carl Gustav Jung is going to be the main psychoanalyst to be drawn from and especially his concept of the “shadow” will be used to explain the attitude of the two states and the two communities towards each other. It is going to be argued that Turks and Greeks and Turkish and Greek states use each other as their shadows in their mutual relations and they reflect the inferior and darker sides of their own psyches to the other by means of this psychological mechanism. However, it is not only the shadow but also the concepts “anima” and “animus” that are included in this structure, and therefore a gender will be assigned to both communities and discuss the relations in view of their sex roles.

Before elaborating the psychological aspects of Turkish- Greek relations based on Jung's concept of the “shadow”, his general perspective is worth a glance to clarify how the relations

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<sup>7</sup> This title is attributed to Carl Gustav Jung's one of the anecdotes by which he clearly explains how “shadow” provides conformity. He speaks of a forty-five-year-old patient who had suffered from a compulsion neurosis since he was twenty and had been totally lost his connection with the world. He says to Jung: “But I can never admit to myself that I've wasted the best twenty-five years of my life!” Jung summarizes the case with the following words: “It is often tragic to see how blatantly a man bungles his own life and the lives of others yet remains totally incapable of seeing how much the whole tragedy originates in himself, and how continually feeds it and keeps it going”. However he also adds that one does not do it consciously, on the contrary it is an unconscious factor that creates the illusions that veil in his world (1980: 147).



between the two countries, normally a subject assigned to International Relations, can be connected with a psychoanalytical approach.

In his works, Jung prefers to focus on certain “problematic occurrences” rather than the normal course in which events appear and he aims to seek answers to problems, which are difficult, questionable, ambiguous and open to doubt. That is to say, Jung’s perspective allows questions to have more than one and ultimate answer (1980: 3).

The significance of Jung’s method of analysis for this study is that the subject here is not the “normal” or peaceful affairs between any states but the problematic relations between Turkey and Greece. That means, following Jung, the work intends to focus on a “problem” and analyze it, bearing in mind that this is only one alternative way of examining Turkish –Greek relations.

### **1. The Shadow**

Jung states that there are three psychic levels, namely, the conscious, the unconscious, and the collective unconscious. The collective unconscious consists of archetypes that have been present from the beginning of human history. The most influential archetypes on the ego are the “shadow”, the “anima”, and the “animus”. Yet, the most accessible and easiest to experience among these is the “shadow” (1980: 144-145).

According to Jung, it is impossible to encounter pure goodness in the realm of human experience. On the other hand, many people prefer to believe that there is an absolute good and they glorify the superiority of consciousness (1989: 103). Nonetheless, every person has

her own dark and weak sides whose existence (s)he tends to renounce, in order not to destroy his/her beliefs in his/her perfect perception of his/herself. Hence, denying negative characteristics and imperfections, one detaches them from oneself and projects the rejected aspects to another level of the psyche which is called the “shadow”. That is to say, a part of ones’ own personality remains to exist on the other and denied side, the “shadow” (1964: 181-182).

In other words, “consciousness requires as its necessary counterpart a dark, latent, non-manifest side, the unconscious, whose presence can be known only by the light of consciousness... This duality of our psychic life is the prototype and archetype of the sol – luna symbolism... This is supported by the self-evident fact that without light there is no *shadow*, so that, in a sense, the *shadow*, too, is emitted by the sun” (1989: 95-96).

The “shadow” is a moral problem that challenges the whole ego-personality since it cannot be realized without an immense moral effort. To be aware of the “shadow”, one needs to recognize the dark aspects of one’s personality as present and real. Thus, no doubt, any effort to achieve this is going to meet with considerable resistance. Yet, the “shadow” itself does not constitute the whole mechanism; it needs the “projection” as its complementary. “Projection” emerges when one realizes the imperfect traits in the world and inside human beings and resisting the fact that they cannot be part of his own world, reflects those to another surface, for example to other people. Allowing one to believe that all those negative qualities are owned by the others and so that one has nothing to be ashamed of in his own personality and in his own world (1964: 174), the projection of the “shadow” brings conformity. The shame or the surprise only comes when one faces with his own “shadow” since it is not the conscious but the unconscious faculty that does the projecting (1980: 156).

The projection isolates the subject from his/her environment and creates an illusionary relation between them. “Projections change the world into the replica of one’s own unknown face” (1980: 146).

These projections applied upon the people of the same sex may also be reflected on the people from the opposite sex (1980: 147). This is the point where the “anima” and “animus” come into play and make the mechanism more complex and difficult to realize.

## **2. The Anima and the Animus**

“Anima is the soul-image of a man, represented in dreams or fantasies by a feminine figure... Animus is the image of spiritual forces in a woman, symbolized by a masculine figure. If a man or a woman is unconscious of these inner forces, they appear in a projection” (1989: 109). Thus, “anima” is an archetype that is found in men while animus is an archetype that is found in women. Man is compensated by a feminine element while woman is compensated by a masculine one (1980: 151-152). “Anima” and “animus” have the same tendencies as the “shadow” and projection works in the “anima” and “animus” too (1980: 158).

In other words, if a man is interested in a woman, that generally means that she has the same qualities with the feminine archetype he unconsciously harbors inside him and vice versa. It is possible although a rare case, to see that a man cares for a woman because she has the opposite qualities with his own feminine side. Whatever the specific case, there is a general rule that the “anima” and the “animus” should be in balance. If not, the “anima” or the “animus” may rebel and start to behave in the opposite direction just as in the cases of transsexuality or homosexuality which are perceived as anomaly- at least for a wide group.

### 3. Turkish- Greek Relations: or Turks' and Greeks' Relations with Their Own Shadows

The comment that “the communities are not sufficiently familiar with each other” is frequently heard in the context of Turkish- Greek relations. However Millas contends that this is not the case. According to him, the case, on the contrary, is that they know each other but in a wrong way (1995: 17). It is possible to argue that this “wrong” refers to the “shadow” and the mutual accusations like “Turks/Greeks are always like that” or “they don’t know us at all”. In the Turkish-Greek case, it is widely believed that the lack of communication between civilians aggravated an officially thwarted, estranged and “hyperreal” perception of the other<sup>8</sup> (İsen, 1998). Nonetheless, Greeks have a negative but a perfect image of Turkey and Turks in their minds<sup>9</sup>, while Greece and Greeks are mostly considered as enemies in Turkey. Thus, it is difficult to disagree with Millas that they know each other. Yet the remaining question is how they know the other party and how they construct this opinion of the other.

Millas as a Rum who lived in Turkey for years states that he does not like to support either side, while admitting that people tend to support one side when there are two (1995: 18). The binary opposition mechanism works the same when people face with two communities- one of them is their own, to which they “normally” feel closer<sup>10</sup>- and with two psychic levels – which are the conscious and unconscious or which are their own being and their “shadow”.

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<sup>8</sup> Among the many, in one of the anecdotes Yiannis Papadakis narrates in his book, *Echoes from the Dead Zone*, tells the story of the meeting of a little Greek girl and a Turkish man. Little girl turns to his father who introduced the Turkish man to her and say “But daddy, he looks like a human being”. The girl thinking that her father was joking turns to the Turkish man and asks “Where is your knife then, where is your moustache?” (2005: 93).

<sup>9</sup> Accordig to a Greece-wide survey by MRB, in June 1995, while %88,1 of Greek population has an aversion towards Turkey, only % 2,1 of Greek population reports sympathy (Neofotistos, 1998: 76).

<sup>10</sup> Separating the self and the others is a starting point of nationalism. Therefore, an explanation may be offered from the perspective of theories of nationalism as well. However since the concern in this part of the work is psychoanalytical, nationalism will not be mentioned. For more information on how one “normally” feels closer to the community and the state one lives in, see Billig (1995).

The “shadow” itself is an already rejected part of the psyche, on the contrary to the conscious or what is believed as the real being.

Nevertheless, the “shadow” is the same with the person. Since it originates from the person and depends on him during his lifetime, it is not possible for the person to move without his “shadow”. In other words, the “shadow” which is assumed as the opposite of self as in sol-luna symbolism, in fact is a part of the psyche. To return to Jung, at this point, Freud’s words on the “narcissism of minor differences” should be noted:

“It is precisely communities with adjoining territories, and related to each other in other ways as well, who are engaged in constant feuds and in ridiculing each other. “Narcicism of minor differences” a convenient and relatively harmless satisfaction of the inclination to aggression, by means of which cohesion between the members of the community is made easier” (1989:72).

Talking about Turks and Greece, it is always said that they are not different at all. Observers often comment how the two nations look alike physically and that it is impossible to distinguish a Greek from a Turk. In the same conversations, it is also mentioned that their cultures – not referring to the past but the current way of living – from their food and drink to music are very similar. The possibility follows that it cannot be a coincidence for two neighbor countries criticizes each other so much while they resemble each other so much<sup>11</sup>.

Vamik Volkan makes a similar statement for neighbor countries arguing that groups which have been living in adjoining territories for years compete with each other for survival and

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<sup>11</sup> In order to see the similarities between Greeks and Turks especially between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, see Papadakis (2005).

territory, while at the same time they constantly affect one another. This competition penetrates to the minds of group members and transformed into a psychological level. This is how concrete tools of arrows, spears, swords etc, become the symbols of power and authority (2002: 13). The connection İsen (1998) makes between territory and “national psyche” supports Volkan’s statement. Saying that disputes between Turkey and Greece are in essence territorial, İsen argues that territorialism in the case of Turkey and Greece may be perceived as a manifestation of collective psychological condition. For Turkey and Greece, territorial competition functions as a psychological symptom of national superiority and therefore any gain or loss directly reflects on the “national” psyche of the masses.

Volkan also reveals that an extreme interest and concern with the “other” or the binaries have always existed since the beginning of human history, giving examples from primitive tribes to ancient China (2002: 14). This polarization between the self and the other on the basis of groups that Volkan mentions, in fact, is exactly the manifestation of the “shadow” in Jung’s terminology concerning the individual.

On the other hand, the “shadow” does not always manipulate the individual. Rather, it tends to repress the ego and dominate it in the face of a difficult situation. That is to say, the “shadow” gains power when the ego is weak (Geçtan, 1981: 60). This explains the rise of the hostile expressions and feelings toward the other groups, especially in crises and situations that are difficult to manage<sup>12</sup>. Jung, who was well aware of the political connotations of his terminology, says that the “shadow” plays an important role in all political conflicts. According to Jung, a person who is not aware of his “shadow” and how it functions can easily identify desperate Frenchmen with the dangerous communists or a prosperous man with the

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<sup>12</sup> This may be perceived as the psychoanalytical reason of choosing crises and rapprochements to investigate Turkish media’s reflection of Greek media.

grasping capitalists. By doing so, he tries to deny that he in fact has such warring elements. For Jung, political agitation in all countries also is full such projections (1964: 179-181).

To put it more specifically, in the case of Turkish- Greek relations, Greece may be perceived as the “shadow” of Turkey while Turkey may be considered as the “shadow” of Greece. Either side considers the other party as the aggressor and a threat while it assumes itself to be the positive, solution oriented, constructive side which is also too intrepid to shy off the aggressive or provocative moves of the other. For instance, the landing of Turkish troops in Cyprus in 1974 was named a “Peace” Operation” by Turks, launched against the aggressive activities of Greek Cypriots, while to the Greeks and Greek Cypriots, it was an invasion which victimized the Greeks in the model of Attila the Hun who was a barbarian.

Still, the “shadow” does not necessarily have to turn out as an enemy. The “shadow” becomes hostile only when it is ignored or misunderstood. If one realizes the projection he makes and faces it fearlessly, then living in harmony with the “shadow” is possible (1964: 182).

Millas, even though he does not speak of the psychoanalytic concept “shadow”, makes a similar observation. According to Millas (2000), neither Turks nor Greeks will forget any event, whether a fact or a myth that serves to blame the other as evil. Since the psyche never refrains from projecting the burden of negative qualities to the “shadow”, and therefore the “shadow” itself as a structure never disappears, it can be argued that where the Greek – Turkish antagonisms are concerned it may be better to avoid attitudes that lead the parties to bear a grudge against the other in the first place, instead of repeating “let’s forget the past” slogans, as Millas suggests.

In order to show how this mechanism works in Greek-Turkish relations, some news reports can be referred as examples. Archival research shows that *Hürriyet* sometimes speaks of Greek press as “extreme right and nationalist<sup>13</sup>”. On the other hand, when some of the news reports *Hürriyet* published are checked, it is seen that *Hürriyet* itself may be called as an “extreme right wing and nationalist”. The following passage was published by *Hürriyet* on 1974: “They said you cannot do it, they threatened us not to land, no no no, they tried to stop us, for 15 years we lent an ear to them, we listened silently (...) How happy is he who says I am a turk. My soldier, my Mehmetçik, thousand grateful thanks to you. We are indebted. I have lived free forever and I will, what fool can dream of putting me in chains, I am like the roaring deluge, I surpass and break my dams, tear mountains down, I will not fit the oceans and overflow<sup>14</sup>”

Another description used by *Hürriyet* for Greek press was “Greek papers that hope to increase their circulation raising a rucus about Cyprus<sup>15</sup>” however Melek Fırat uses the exact phrase for *Hürriyet* and says that *Hürriyet* was interested in Cyprus issue hoping that raising such a national cause would increase its circulation (2003:601). Again, while *Hürriyet* accuses Greek press of publishing “Biased reporting<sup>16</sup>”, *Hürriyet* itself reported that “morale of the the Turkish Resistance Organization members who learnt that the motherland papers wrote of their heroic prevention of EOKA’s plan to destroy Turks, rose considerably<sup>17</sup>”. *Hürriyet* and

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<sup>13</sup> “Aşırı sağcı ve aşırı milliyetçi Ethnikos Kiriks gazetesi”

<sup>14</sup> “Yapamazsınız dediler, çıkamazsınız diye tehdit ettiler. Sakın ha diyenler oldu, biz de varız diye önümüze çıkanları gördük, 15 yıldır bu sözlere kulak verdik, sustuk, dinledik (...)

Ne mutlu Türk’üm diyene. Benim askerim, benim Mehmetçiğim, sana binlerce defa şükran ve minnet. Ben ezelden beridir hür yaşadım, hür yaşarım, hangi çılgın bana zincir vuracakmış şaşarım, kükremiş sel gibiyim, bendimi çiğner aşarım, yırtarım dağları, enginlere sığmam, taşarım”.

<sup>15</sup> “Kıbrıs patırtısı sayesinde satış sağlayan Rumca gazeteler”

<sup>16</sup> “Maksatlı yayınlar”

<sup>17</sup> “Anavatan gazetelerinin, kahramanlıkları hakkında yazılar yayınladıklarını öğrenince, EOKA’cıların Türklerin imha planını önleyen Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı üyelerinin moralleri yükselmiştir.”



Greek media sometimes used even the same words to accuse each other as in the following example: “Greek Cypriots provoking Turks again” and “Apoyevmatini: Turks provoking<sup>18</sup>”

#### **4. Turks and Greeks in the Shadow of the Anima and the Animus**

The essence of the discussion in the following paragraphs is whether it is possible to assume one of the communities in question as female and the other as male. Based on speculations backed by historical information, academic literature, news reports and individual observations, the argument will conclude with an affirmative answer<sup>19</sup>.

The gender polarization between Turks and Greeks goes back to 1453, the date, perhaps, of the most significant historic confrontation between the two. Volkan argues that Greeks could not accept the “conquest” of Constantinople by “Mehmet II the conquerer” and rejected the fact that their capital city now belonged to the Turks. Denying a permanence of the change of ownership of the city and believing that one day Constantinople will belong to Greeks again; Greeks embraced this date as a symbol of their “selected trauma<sup>20</sup>” (2002: 54-56). The fall of Constantinople was the result of the “galloping arrival of the war-hungry, barbaric hordes of the Turks” (Papadakis, 2005: 6).

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<sup>18</sup> “Rumlar yine Türkleri tahrike başladı” and “Apoyevmatini: Türkler tahrik ediyor”.

<sup>19</sup> The gender roles given to Turkey and Greece are open to criticism. In addition, a warning should be noted. I may misinterpret the Greeks’ perception of themselves as a person who was born in Turkey and got used to the point of view of this country. Still this should not be an obstacle to place these assumptions in this kind of work at least as a mental exercise.

<sup>20</sup> Just as individuals, large groups, i.e nations, can also experience traumas which are accompanied by feelings of extreme fear, sometimes the fear of death, terror, powerlessness, and total hopelessness. This may lead to a collapse of central functions of the self, and a fundamental shock to the entire personality. This is called “collective trauma”. When these large groups cannot surpass the traumas and obsessively refer them as justifiers of their own paranoid and aggressive approaches, it is called “selected trauma” (Volkan, 1999: 49-52).

For the Byzantines, the “Turks were nomads, people with no civilization, people of the horse and sword, descendants of Mongols, infidels, people of no religion” (Papadakis, 2005: 6). When they died in this holy war, these people of the Koran, believed that they would go to paradise where houris, lovely female angels, all virgins, would be waiting for them (Papadakis, 2005: 7).

Throughout 400 years of barbaric Ottoman regime or “*Turkokratia*” was a period of oppression and brutal administration in the lore of the Greeks who again, believed they used to live under their glorious, refined and tolerant Byzantine civilization before the fall. Papadakis even mentions what he calls the national vice of Greeks, cheating in deals, which Turks also sometimes accused Greeks of and says that under the hard conditions of *Turkokratia* in the Ottoman Empire, cheating against the authorities was a way to survive (Papadakis, 2005: 7). Outlining the four vital dates, 1453, 1821, 1922 and 1974 (“Attila Invasion of Cyprus”), Papadakis says that every important date in the history of Greeks bespoke of their encounters with Turkish “barbarism” (Papadakis, 2005: 9). Attila, the generic name for Turks used by Greeks and no doubt the symbol of manly power and barbarism, has also been used in Cyprus for what Turks called the “Green Line”. Green Line is mostly called Attila Line by Greek Cypriots since it is the Attila who divided the island with his sword. Yet, it should be noted that Attila Line was also the original name that was given by Turkish authorities (Firat, 2003: 748).

News reports that constitute a major part of this study will be analysed in more detail in Chapter 4, however, in order to show in which manner the “manly characteristics” are attributed to Turks by the Greek press as well, it may be feasible to mention some examples at this stage, too. Headlines<sup>21</sup> in Greek newspapers such as “Attila army marches in occupied

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<sup>21</sup> Respectively, in English: “İşgal altındaki Kıbrıs başkentinde Attila ordusu yürüdü”, “Zorbalık bu kez sökmeyecek”, “Kardeşim Mehmet, metin ol”, “Türklerin mesajı kabadayılık”.

Cypriot capital”, “Brutality won’t work this once”, “Mehmet, my brother, be brave”, “The message of Turks: bullying” may be seen as some examples of manly characteristics Greeks associate with Turkey and Turks.

Volkan also confirms that in Greek newspapers, Turkey was portrayed as an underdeveloped, non- Western, Asian, Muslim, undemocratic, military and barbarian state. In psychoanalytic terms, they tend to see Turkey as a “man” and a “father” who raped the “woman” and the “mother” Greece (2002: 208-209).

To return to the binary opposition perspective, if Turkey is a powerful and cruel male, then it may be argued that Greece perceives of itself as a woman who is weaker, more sensitive, more tender and smaller, such that it cannot be a threat for Turkey. Greeks and Greece are the children of an ancient culture acknowledged as the foundation of today’s Western civilization. They are aesthetic, polite, artistic and sensitive. In Ancient Greece, even in the period of wars which may be said to require toughness and manly characteristics, men were not presented as harsh or brutal characters. Instead, Ancient Greece glorified the male body and beauty over the woman’s and men also were the object of love (Vrissimtzis, 1999). Therefore it may be argued that Turks are men too but they are not the same type of men as the Greek ones. They are men but they cannot be the object for love. They are not sensitive, and their bodies and beauty are not supposed to be respected and glorified. To carry on the description a step forward, it is possible to say that Turkey is the crude and ignorant and uncivilized male who wants to abduct and seduce a spoilt, slender, peevish and cultured girl, Greece. Therefore, it is not inconceivable to argue that the Greeks see themselves as an object of civilization and the Turks as barbaric, brutal and cruel. There seems to be a confrontation between the seafaring people of the Aegean and the Anatolians of the land.

From the news reports<sup>22</sup>, it is also possible to see how Greeks positions themselves. “Kathimerini: (...) Greece will cancel division of Cyprus with Western support”, “Elefteros Tipos: National night of shame”, “Ta Nea: We are hurt badly in the Aegean”, “Etnos: The fate of our policy toward Turkey is a mystery just as the fate of the Greek pilot”. As it is going to be clear in the following sections, these descriptions are not among the ones Turkish press have been used to publish for Turkey.

On the other hand, it cannot be said that Turkey complains of this image it is attributed with. Manly characteristics, the use of weapons and their warlike nature that come from Central Asia always sounded to Turks as some source of pride. In Turkey where the patriarchal structure can be said to dominate the wider society, it may be claimed that there is a consensus on the warrior like features of an ideal man, even tough he is somewhat caricaturized. In order to see how Turks embrace these masculine characteristics, news reports can be called on as an indicator again. Texts<sup>23</sup> such as "Greek papers reflecting the anxiety that the Turkish armed forces may launch a sudden landing campaign from the sea and may thus impose partition (of Cyprus) as a fait accompli", “Our victory has Athens kneeling”, “The fault won’t be ours” [in case things get violent]”, “Turkish exercises in the Aegean have the Greek worrying” and “Heroes of AKUT (Search and Rescue Team) rescue” obviously show that Turkey and Turks are proud of their manly features.

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<sup>22</sup> “Yunanistan, Batı’nın desteği ile Kıbrıs’ın bölünmesini iptal ettirecek”, “Elefteros Tipos: Milli Utanç Gecesi”, “Ta Nea: Ege’de büyük yara aldık”, “Etnos: Yunanlı pilot gibi Türkiye’ye karşı politikamızın da akıbeti bilinmiyor”.

<sup>23</sup> “Türk ordusunun denizden ani bir çıkarma yapmak korkusunun belirlediğini, Türkler’in taksimi bir oldu bitti halinde empoze etmelerinden endişe edildiğini yazan Yunan gazeteleri”, “Zaferimiz Atina’yı çökertti”, “Günah bizden gitti”, “Ege’deki Türk tatbikatı Yunan’ı telaşlandırdı”, “Kahraman AKUT kurtardı”.

Therefore, it is possible to maintain that there is a feeling of satisfaction in both sides concerning their respective perceptions by the other side. Turkey assumes itself as powerful, tough and manly and is proud of this image, while it conceives of Greece as the spoiled little girl of Europe that likes to act like the weak damsel in distress and calls the bigger, powerful states to its aid against the Turkish aggressor. On the other hand, Greece presents itself as a weak and tender while it construes Turkey as masculine, rough, cruel and powerful. That means, both sides in fact are happy and satisfied with their image they are represented in the eye of the other side.

This satisfaction can be attributed to Jung's suggestion that every man has an inner feminine side and every woman has a masculine one. The existence of the "anima" inside him with its female connotations may easily be thought as unbearable information for an "ideal" Turkish man. If it is considered that Turkey, as a nation proudly owns up the manly features above, it is possible to say that Turks as a community, not being able to stand this information about their inner self, claim that it is not them but the others who may have those feminine characteristics. At this point Greeks enter the picture and appear as the female "shadow" that such negatively perceived feminine qualities are to be reflected on to.

In order to see how disgraceful for Turks the acts and connivings of Greece are, once more news reports<sup>24</sup> should be used as evidence: "Greece soldiers abandon trenches", "EOKA arms even the women", "Greece swallows its pride", "Watch out for the tricks at the table", "The customary Greek rabble rousing", "Greeks make Washington a wailing wall."

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<sup>24</sup> "Yunan askeri mevziden kaçmış", "EOKA'cılar kadınlara bile silah veriyor", "Yunanistan gururunu sineye çekti", "Şimdiye kadar işitmeye alıştığımız Yunan yaygaracılığı", "Yunanlılar, Washington'u ağlama duvarı yaptı."

It is also worth noting that in Turkish culture, Istanbul is seen as a woman and it is a fact that the city wears the soul and the atmosphere of Eastern (Byzantine) Romans and Greeks more than the Turks – here the point is not the things that Turks added to the city as buildings for example, but the history which gives the cultural atmosphere and the soul. Istanbul is seen in poems as flirtatious and coquettish as Greece and Greeks (Volkan, 1999: 151).

As a consequence, following the Jungian concepts of “shadow”, “anima” and “animus”, the work suggests that Turks and Greeks tend to project their undesirable characteristics onto the other side while they consolidate the idea that they themselves only possess good ones. That is to say, they view the other side as aggressive and the one who does not leave any room for peace while they represent themselves as if they in fact are the ones who want peace. In addition, the work suggests that Greece may be thought of as a spoilt and capricious woman while Turks are vulgar and brutal at least in the eye of each other. Because they perceive one another in this parallel as their *shadows*, then both the sides appear as “shadows” themselves and it may be argued that the affairs which are seen to occur between their states also occur between these psychic structures. Nonetheless, it is not the state level affairs, intercourse or the leaders that shape the community’s perspective in its entirety. No doubt that political actors and acts have a very important effect on society, however communities have their own perceptions and a community as a whole may have a “shadow” that it uses to comfort itself with the idea that it is not them but the others who create the unrest.

### **III. THE ROLE OF THE TURKISH AND GREEK MEDIA IN TURKISH- GREEK RELATIONS**

Media are not independent from the organization of societies. Depending on the type of economic, political and social system and the interests of groups and individuals within a society, media function accordingly (Severin, Werner J. & Tankard Jr, James W, 2001: 309). Therefore, in order to analyze how and why media act in a particular way, forces effecting the media organization and content need to be mentioned.

Though pretty much the same as the world media, particularly in the Greek and Turkish cases, the most central aspects which should be taken into account appears as media ownership, commercialization of the media, the interlocking interests between the media, politicians and business, circulation and characteristics of journalists and readers (Tılıç, 1998: 19-20; Terzis and Özgüneş, 2000: 405). However, another reason that the structure of Turkish and Greek media has been included in this work is to show how they share similar characteristics. Moreover in order to analyze the weight of Greek media which *Hürriyet* reported on and which are going to be included in the findings section, the part on Greek media is considered necessary. Therefore, in order to understand the features that shape the Turkish and Greek media's reportage, in the next section it should be noted that, from the structure of media ownership and the missions and actual practices of the regulatory institutions, to the usage of the internet, the portraits of the Turkish and Greek media contain rather similar lines and colors.

## A. The Composition of Turkish Media: Statistics and Facts

In Turkey there are 2124 currently circulating newspapers. Among these, the number of national ones is 40, the number of regionals is 23 and the number of locals is 2061. The most popular daily newspapers that have the highest circulation are *Posta*, *Hürriyet*, *Zaman*<sup>25</sup>, *Sabah*, *Takvim*, *Milliyet*, *Fanatik*, *Vatan*, *Pas-Fotomaç*, *Akşam* respectively<sup>26</sup> (Dördüncü Kuvvet Medya, 2006).

Major daily newspapers in Turkey are generally owned by cross media groups and so that the Turkish media is highly monopolised. The Doğan Group which is the largest and the most well-known media group owns the mainstream *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Posta*, *Radikal*, the sports daily *Fanatik*, business daily *Frekans* and English daily *Turkish Daily News*. Doğan Group also has magazines such as *Tempo*, *Istanbul Life*, *Elle*, *Capital*, *Ekonomist*, *Atlas* etc. (Doğan Holding Web Site, 2006).

The Merkez Group which is another major player in the Turkish media landscape owns mainstream *Sabah*, *Yeni Asır*, *Takvim*, sports daily *Pas-Fotomaç*. Merkez Group own magazines like *Yeni Aktüel*, *Yeni Para*, *Şamdan*, *Esquire*, *Cosmopolitan* etc. (Ciner Group Web Site, 2006).

There is another relatively small cross group with a pro- Islamic tendency which owns the TV channel Samanyolu and daily *Zaman*. There is also the Çukurova Group which owns the daily *Akşam* and *H.O Tercüman* and *Güneş*. The İhlas Groups owns another pro-Islamic daily, *Türkiye*. On the other hand, the daily *Birgün* was initiated by a group of journalists as a

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<sup>25</sup> Approximately 92 % of *Zaman* sales are due to promotion dependent subscriptions (Barış, 2006).

<sup>26</sup> In many countries, sports news is reported with a masculine and war-like discourse (Özkırmı and Yumul, 2000). The fact that there are two sports newspapers in the first 10 may be seen as an indicator of collective masculine tendencies if sports is perceived as an cultural arena in which collective identities are materialized (Blain, Boyle & O'Donnell, 1993, *Sports and National Identity in the European Media*, Leicester University Press, Leicester: 12, quoted in Özkırmı and Yumul).



reaction to the monopolistic ownership patterns and embraced the motto “*the newspaper without a boss for independent and unbiased journalism*”. The daily *Vatan* is not owned by a cross media group (Barış, 2006).

There are also other pro- Islamic dailies, *Yeni Şafak* which is the supporter of Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP, Justice and Development Party); *Vakit* which is a more radical and sensationalist one; *Milli Gazete* which is known as the voice of “Milli Görüş”. *D.B Tercüman* is a nationalist daily which was in the past popular among the nationalist right-wingers (Barış, 2006).

*Cumhuriyet* is another national daily which is not entirely owned by a cross media group and known as the voice of the Kemalists. Although it was considered a left-wing newspaper in the past, now it would not be wrong to say that *Cumhuriyet* appears as a nationalist leaning, pro-status quo one. There is also *Özgür Gündem* which is thought as the voice of Kurdish population in Turkey (Barış, 2006).

The state owned Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) was founded in 1964 and until the establishment of the private TV and radio channels in 1990s, had the monopoly in broadcasting. In 1990, the first private channel Star1 started broadcasting via satellite from Germany. Right after Star1, other private commercial TV channels began to spread without any licenses. On August 1993, private TV and radio broadcasting was made legal after the fact (Tılıç, 1998: 86-87). Thus, today, Turkey has 24 national, 16 regional and 215 local TV channels (Barış, 2006).

Right after state monopoly on broadcasting ended in 1993, Radio Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) was established. The duty of RTÜK was stated as allocating frequencies, issuing broadcasting permissions and licenses, and supervising and regulating private broadcasting.

RTÜK also has the authority of passing penalties in the case the private broadcasters do not obey the legal framework (RTUK, 2006). However, even today the distribution of frequencies has not been completed and all television and radio stations operate without licenses (Barış, 2006).

TRT however has maintained its distinct position as the only public broadcaster until today. TRT has 7 nation wide channels. While TRT 1 does not focus on a particular subject, TRT 2 broadcasts on culture and art, TRT 3 on sports and music, especially targeting the younger generations, TRT 4 on education, TRT GAP targets the southeastern region of Turkey. TRT has also two international channels, one of which is TRT-INT designed for the Turks in Europe, USA and Australia, and TRT-AVRASYA targeted Middle Asia and Caucasus (TRT Web Site, 2006). Nevertheless, due to the establishment of private channels, TRT has lost its charm and so its advertising revenues (Tılıç, 1998: 86).

In order to regain its charm and to compete with the private televisions, TRT changed its logo and identity in 2001 aiming to represent Turkey's dynamic structure, passion and cultural diversity (Milliyet Online, 01. 24. 2001).

However TRT has been still known to voice the official standing and the position of the Turkish state and also the government and therefore it has usually been accused of partisanship, lacking objectivity and impartiality and also in diversity of content (Barış, 2006).

The key source of information and entertainment in Turkey is the television. ATV, Kanal D, Show TV and Star TV are the most preferred channels. Pro-Islamic ones like Samanyolu *and* Kanal 7 also have their own audience which cannot be underestimated. There are also news channels such as NTV, CNN-Türk and Habertürk that are 24 hour news channels (Barış, 2006).

These TV channels are again the properties of cross media groups. For instance, Kanal D, Star and CNN-Turk belong to the Doğan Group; ATV belongs to the Merkez Group, Show TV and SKY-Turk belong to the Çukurova Group, NTV belongs to Doğuş Group. That is to say, Turkey's media lanscape is highly ruled by large cross media groups that own most of the mainstream private television and radio stations as well as newspapers (Doğan Holding Web Site, 2006; Ciner Group Web Site, 2006; Dördüncü Kuvvet Medya, 2006).

Therefore, one of the typical criticms that is directed toward the structure of Turkish media is whether particular media are used to serve the interests of their owners and whether the media's objectivity is thus in jeopardy because its power has been patently used to promote their owner's private interests. Moreover, a vast majority of the channels follow populist broadcasting policies which are already proven to attract the viewers (Tılıç, 1998: 86-93).

Turkey also has approximately 1100 private radio channels. There are 36 national, 102 regional and 950 local radio stations. TRT has 4 national radio channels as well (Barış, 2006). Nonetheless, the advertising market has not achieved a size in parallel with the large number of actors in the broadcasting arena and its relatively small range prevents small entrepreneurs to deal with large media conglomerates which provide their financial incomes mostly from non-media activities (Tılıç, 1998: 86-93). The internet usage in Turkey is relatively low (14 %) compared to EU average of % 31 (Barış, 2006).

## **B. The Composition of Greek Media: Statistics and Facts**

In Greece there are 88 national newspapers in circulation. Out of this total circulation, there are 9 morning, 15 evening, 22 Sunday and 17 weekly newspapers, while there are 6 financial and 19 sport newspapers in the category of specialised ones. In terms of circulation, Sunday newspapers are at the top with 51.2 % of the sales, whereas evening newspapers have 17.5 %, sports newspapers have 15.7 %, weekly newspapers have 9.1 %, morning newspapers 6.3 % and financial newspapers have 0.1 % of the circulation respectively. The newspapers *To Vima* and *Kathimerini* have the highest circulation respectively among the daily morning newspapers. The newspapers *Ta Nea*, *Eleftherotypia* and *Ethnos* are the most popular daily evening newspapers respectively in terms of circulation (Athens Daily Newspaper Publishers Association, 2006).

The largest newspaper publishing company in Greece is Lambrakis Press S. A. Lambrakis Publishing Group owns *To Vima* morning daily, *Ta Nea* evening daily and a Sunday edition, *To Vima tis Kyriakis*. Lambrakis Publishing Group is not only interested in newspapers but also magazine publishing and printing, in tourism agencies, terrestrial television stations (Mega Channel), production studios and press distribution agencies. In addition, the Lambrakis Publishing Group owns a call centre and CRM services, and operates the largest Greek internet portal. Among the magazines Lambrakis publishes, are included *Hi Tech*, *ROM*, *RAM*, *Marie Claire*, *Cosmopolitan*, *To Paidi Mou Kai Ego*, *Diakopes*, *Gamos* and *National Geographic* (Terzis & Kontochristou, 2004).

The second major publishing company in Greece is Pegasus Publishing and Printing S. A. Pegasus Publishing has the evening daily *Ethnos* and a Sunday edition, *Ethnos tis Kyriakis*. The rest of the important publishing groups in Greece include Tegopoulos Publishing S.A, which has the evening daily *Eleftherotypia* and a Sunday edition *Eleftherotypia tis Kyriakis*,

Kathimerini Publications S.A., which has the morning daily *Kathimerini* and a Sunday edition *Kathimerini tis Kyriakis*, the Eleftheros Typos Press Institution S.A, which has the evening daily *Eleftheros Typos* and a Sunday edition *Typos tis Kyriakis* and the Apogevmatini Publishing Group, which has an evening daily *Apogevmatini* and a Sunday edition *Apogevmatini tis Kyriakis*. The Tegopoulos Publishing Group, too, has magazines such as *Cinema*, *Idaniko Spiti*, *Menu ke Alla* and the Group also publishes *Elle*, *MAX*, *Car and Driver*, *Armonia*, *Astra ke Oroma*, and *Lipon*, in cooperation with Hachette Rizzoli (Terzis & Kontochristou, 2004).

In Greece, the press currently holds the second place as the source of information. The most preferred source of information, on the other hand, is television. Especially private televisions have a preeminent position, based on their advertising revenues, size of audiences, prestige and prominence (Terzis & Kontochristou, 2004).

Beginning from 1974 in Greece, television gained the most significant role as the source of information and also of entertainment. The Constitution of 1975 stated that Greek broadcasting has a social mission and therefore it was an example of public service broadcasting. That is to say, the Greek media would be under direct state control and even under direct government control (Afentouli, 2003).

Thus, in the mid 1980s, television lost its credibility since it was seen as a collateral of the governments, namely of the conservative New Democracy (ND) and socialist Panhellenion Socialist Movement (PASOK). Therefore the public criticism of state-centered television coincided with the neo-liberal policies, privatisation policies, pressure of powerful interest groups such as publishers and radio station owners and deregulation process started. Deregulation was first applied in radio broadcasting in 1987. Although it was put into effect for radio in particular, the law of 1987 also challenged the state-centric television

broadcasting and opened the door for the liberalization of television. In 1989, a law that enabled the creation of private television stations and the foundation of a regulatory council, the Greek National Council for Radio and Television (NCRTV), was accepted (Afentouli, 2003).

The duty of NCRTV is to watch the operations of both state and private broadcasting and to make sure that they obey the laws and regulations. It is also responsible for granting licenses to private television and radio stations. The Council imposes penalties in case of a violation of the laws and copyright and intellectual property infringements or professional codes. However, Terzis and Kontochristou (2004) argue that it has no real regulatory powers saying that until 2004 it was the The Ministry of Transport and Communications and The Ministry of Press and Information that was granting the licenses consulting with the NCRTV.

Terzis and Kontochristou also state that the broadcasting licences were not distributed according to the procedure required in the law but on the basis of political and power relations. Only Mega Channel gained the necessary licence and started to broadcast legally. Other channels started to operate, too, although they did not get a license. Even today, the majority of private channels operate without license.

Until 1993, Greek broadcasting experienced a period of anarchy because of the television channels that did not obey the legal procedures of NCRTV. In 1993 a law (Law 2173/1993) was finally passed allowing for the setting up of private-commercial television, which could transmit across Greece (Afentouli, 2003).

After 1993, private television broadcasting started to be the most preferred mass medium by the Greek population. It was seen as a pluralistic and democratic ground while it also gave room for a wide range of entertainment for diverse tastes. Therefore, State television lost its

ground and faced with a public criticism and low ratings. In 1997, state television tried to gain its popularity again by changing its image. It modernized its news and programming and tried to give a more modern, democratic and pluralistic sense of broadcasting. In order to show that it was becoming independent from the state, it changed its name and became "Public Television" instead of "State Television" (Terzis & Kontochristou, 2004).

Nevertheless, it was not easy as it was supposed to be for private televisions to follow free broadcasting policies contrary to "Public Television". By the late 1990s, private broadcasting started to be bound with commercialization and populism which led private channels to produce consumer-oriented and advertising revenue-oriented programs (Daremas & Terzis, 2000: 120).

Today, in Greece, there are three public and approximately 150 private television channels. The public operator in Greece is ERT (Hellenic Radio and Television S.A) which is composed of three terrestrial channels (ET-1, NET, ET-3). The most popular television channels are the two private ones, Mega and Ant1, and they have monopolised audience shares and advertisement revenues. The other following television channels are Alter, Alpha (formerly named SKY) and Star Channel ("Communications in Greece", Wikipedia, 2006).

Radio in Greece has also a considerable role as a source of information and entertainment. There are 1200 radio stations in Greece of which most of them has no broadcasting license (Terzis & Kontochristou, 2004). Internet on the other hand as a new technology is limited in Greece compared to other European countries. While the EU average of using Internet is 31%, in Greece the average is 14.7% (Terzis & Kontochristou, 2004).

### **C. Turkish and Greek Media and Imprint of Nationalist Politics**

Rumelili states that in Greek-Turkish relations, “media play a dual mediating role between the governments and public opinion: it ‘manufactures consent’<sup>27</sup>, for government policies towards the ‘Other; and it plays an important role in shaping the public opinion that leaders have to take into consideration” (Rumelili, 2005: 9).

In order to see how Turkish and Greek media have been playing this role, it is beneficial to explore the attitudes of both media from past to today. However, an observation by İlder Türkmen, a former Turkish ambassador in Athens, should be stated before in order to assess the significance of the role the media have been playing in Turkish- Greek relations. Türkmen points out that contrary to the formation of public opinion in internal affairs which occurs through the direct experience of the people, the formation of public opinion in external affairs arises through the news on the media (2001: 13).

Mehmet Ali Birand, a leading Turkish journalist and a news program producer on TV, asserts that the period of the 1970s and 1980s was a dark age for the media in both Turkey and Greece since journalists were not performing their jobs but were working as the speakers of their governments. In the eye of a Turkish journalist, Ankara was always right and supporting Ankara’s point of view was a patriotic duty. For a Greek journalist, on the other hand, Athens was always right and whatever Athens doing was legitimate since the small Greece should have protected itself from the huge Turkey. This polarization was also working for the governments in both countries since the tension between Turkey and Greece was used as opium to distract the attention focused on the internal affairs (2004: 65-67). Carmocolias

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<sup>27</sup> “Manufacturing consent” is a phrase first used by Walter Lippman. The phrase was taken to the title of the book “Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media” ( first published in 1988) by Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman”. To sum, it points out the arguement that media serve to mobilize support for the special interests that dominate the state and private activity.



confirms Birand saying that at the beginning of 1970s, Athens newspapers did not address to reason and ideas but to feelings and prejudices (cited in Tılıç, 1998: 310). Mithat Bereket, who is another well-known Turkish journalist and a news program producer, as well states that politicians and media in Turkey and Greece have had very close ties and they used to act in accordance in the sense that one manipulated the other. Bereket agrees with Birand that they, as journalists, used to reflect what politicians said and accept them as the truth (2001: 12).

In this atmosphere, Birand tells that the Greek media did not post a foreign correspondent in Turkey to get the right information but preferred to gather news from the Greek embassy while the Turkish media sent its most chauvinistic correspondents to Athens not to get objective information but dispatch commentaries about Greek offensiveness (2004: 67).

Katharina Hadjidimos (1999: 13) supports this observation saying that although there are numerous sources journalists may use, Turkish and Greek journalists prefer to obtain information from national sources and especially national press agencies, due to the fact that they do not have good command of any foreign languages.

Moreover, opinions prevail over fact-based reports in both Turkey and Greece. There are many columnists in Turkey whose duty is only to express their opinions. This is due to the definition of journalism in Greece and Turkey which is different than the Western European countries. In addition to the opinion-based news over fact-based ones (1999: 18), Hadjidimos states that in Greece the population is interested in the “political” news, rather than economic or cultural news concerning Turkey (1999: 29).

Ariana Ferentinou (2006), who is a Greek correspondent and columnist in Turkey, on the other hand, says that Turkey has always been a good product to sell and sensational news especially about Turkey has always worked. Ferentinou says beyond the rating the media get, the strategy “if there are internal problems, then make news about Turkey and distract attention” never disappoints the governments. This reminds what Birand tells in a consistent way with Niccolo Machiavelli’s perception of politics and state, that governments manipulate the aggression outside as an instrument of distracting attention in order to hide the internal crisis (2004: 66). This may also be thought as a tool to construct a national unity within a group assembling against an enemy so that all the group members come together as Volkan maintains (2005: 13-15). Ferentionu as well affirms that to the extent that there are political problems between Turkey and Greece, the journalists do not have to search for the real information by double-checking or asking the Turkish side about the truth but they are considered successful if their reportage satisfies the political and editorial greed for clichés and stereotypes. Yet, Ferentinou also mentions that, although there is a fact that there are journalists who report in a way that that consolidates the widespread Turkish image in Greek society, before accusing individual journalists, the role of editors should be taken into consideration. Likewise, the Greek journalists Tılıç interviewed say that even if they are not nationalists personally, they have to be nationalists while they are writing their news texts, since this is their editors’ preference (1998: 313).

Consistently, reporting the political news, both Turkish and Greek media have not distinguished between the states and citizens. Assuming there is one, single and unique Greek and Turkish identity that every citizen inevitably shares, when there is a disagreement between Turkish and Greek states, parties have never been perceived as “Greece” or “Turkey”, i.e. states as political entities, but as Greeks and Turks, and the conversations

followed as “Look at what Greeks/Turks are doing again”. Confirming this, Hadjidimos mentions that the fact that media coverage is designed not for foreign policy but for domestic consumption, one observation that explains the abundance of nationalist statements in the media (1999: 5).

The research “Racism and Cultural diversity in (Greek) Mass media” (ed. by Jessika ter Wal, 2002) partly verifies Hadjidimos with its findings on the representation of the Greek media. The research shows that the representation of minorities, particularly the Turkish minorities, in Greek media is determined by the relations between Greece and Turkey. The report illustrates that the portrayal of Turkish minorities in Greek media, the right-wing press, and private TV channels in particular, is closely connected with the negative stereotypes concerning Turkey. Especially in times of stress like the Kardak or Öcalan Crises, the Turkish minority was presented as ignorant, uneducated, backwards, and culturally inferior and manipulated by Turkish propaganda. The report states that although occasionally the Greek media admitted the discrimination against the Turkish minority, they justify it on the ground that Turkey discriminated against the Greek minority, too (159-160).

According to Birand, the moment that the Turkish media decided to change their attitude was the Kardak/Imia Crisis in 1996 whereas the moment that the Greek media started to criticize themselves was Öcalan’s capture in the Greek Embassy in Kenya in 1997. Birand says that beginning with these events, both media have started to question to what extent their home country could be always right and to what extent they, as the media, should have followed their home governments regardless of its cost in the name of the truth. Right afterwards, Birand explains, the moderate attitude of Papandrea toward Turkey combined with the changes in the media. Experienced and qualified correspondents started to be assigned to the other country; journalists and statesmen started to visit each other’s media etc. (2004: 67-68).

Thus, according to Birand, Turkish and Greek media started to work as real media only beginning from 2000 (2004: 68). Bereket confirms Birand proposing that the traditional relations between media and governments have changed and now the politicians get the truth by means of journalists (2001: 12).

Rumelili (2005: 12) states that since the earthquakes, Greek and Turkish media have still followed a line that supports the official process but this once, one for improving the relations between Greece and Turkey. Observing that Greek media have started to support Turkey's admission to European Union, Rumelili proposes that the Greek media have been following the new national strategy of Greece toward Turkey which can be summed as Turkey's Europeanisation. According to Rumelili, Turkish media have also changed their attitude and turned into a more conducive player in Turkish-Greek relations. For instance, the Turkish media have started to cover alternative perspectives concerning the Cyprus issue and have questioned the price of maintaining the status quo on the island. Moreover Turkish newspapers have been publishing more news reports on daily life, culture and economy of Greece. Yet, Rumelili also adds that regarding Aegean border disputes, Turkish and Greek media still heavily rely on military and official sources.

The archive research will try to check these arguments by providing empirical data in the next section however before moving on the findings of the research, Kardak/Imia crisis which was often referred as a cornerstone in two media's mutual relations should be revisited.

### **1. The Kardak/Imia Case**

On 25 December 1995, a Turkish cargo ship boat was stranded on the coast of the uninhabited islet Imia/ Kardak in the East Aegean. The Greek authorities offered help but the captain of the boat refused, saying that he was in Turkish territorial waters. Thus, a dispute started

between Turkish and Greek authorities on who had the sovereignty over the islet. However, for a month the accident and its aftermath did not find much place in the media. Nevertheless, On 20 January 1996, the Greek periodical *Gamma* ran a story about the accident. Only then the dispute became known by the public and the other media started to become interested. On 26 January, the mayor of Kalymnos and a priest planted a Greek flag on the islet. Right afterward, some Turkish journalists from *Hürriyet* and TV anchors went to the islet with a helicopter and bringing the Greek flag down, planted a Turkish flag. This was broadcast live in both Turkish and Greek televisions (Hadjidimos, 1999: 8-9).

Next day, *Hürriyet* justified its intervention writing “Our colleagues photographed the Greek flag on Turkish territory. This was their duty as journalists. Then they planted the flag of the owners of this territory in place of this foreign flag. We believe that people do not lose their civic feelings upon becoming journalists just as they do not lose their human feelings. We are humans, citizens and journalists. and we are best in all three.<sup>28</sup> The editor also said that. “Yes, we brought the Kardak issue to the attention of the Turkish people. The Greek flag is no longer flying on Kardak. We apologize if we did something wrong.<sup>29</sup>” (*Hürriyet*, February 2, 1996). *Hürriyet* also published the photographs of the journalists while they were replacing the Turkish flag with the Greek one (Rumelili, 2005: 9-11).

On 30 January, the Greek navy replaced the Turkish flag with the Greek flag. Therefore, the dispute evolved into a serious crisis between Turkey and Greece. The Prime Ministers Tansu

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<sup>28</sup> “Arkadaşlarımız, Türk toprağı üzerindeki Yunan bayrağını fotoğraflamışlardı. Bu, gazetecilik görevliydi. Sonra da, o topraklara yabancı bayrağın yerine, o toprakların sahibi bayrağı çekmişlerdi. Bu da onların vatandaşlık sorumluluklarıydı. İnsan gazeteci olunca nasıl insanlıktan çıkmıyorsa, vatandaşlık duygusunu da kaybetmiyordur diye düşünüyoruz. Biz insanız, vatandaşız ve gazeteciyiz. Hem, üçünde de en iyiyiz.”

<sup>29</sup> “Evet, Kardak meselesini de Türk halkının gündemine getirdik. Ve bugün Kardak’ta artık Yunan bayrağı dalgalanmıyor. Fena bir şey yaptıysak özür dileriz.”

Çiller and Costas Simitis made accusations; the naval forces of both countries were alerted, and warships of Turkey and Greece took positions around the islet (Hadjidimos, 1999: 8-9).

Although the crisis came to an end by the interference of the United States and NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana, it took its unique place in Turkish-Greek relations as a symbol of the media's importance, and Turkey's and Greece's sovereignty paranoia even on an uninhabited islet. Dimitras, however, is of the opinion that the Kardak/Imia crisis was also an indicator of the fact that the media are open to the manipulations of political authorities. According to Dimitras, the story was deliberately leaked to the Greek press mainly by the opposition to desire to confront the 'soft' Turkey policy of Simitis government (cited in Rumelili, 2005: 10). Costas Simitis had been appointed to form the new government as prime minister just one day before Gramma's story's publication ("Imia/Kardak", Wikipedia, 2006).

According to Terzis and Özgüneş, Greek and Turkish media would not have been able to "create" a war when there was no political will for it. However, they played their major role in "manufacturing consent" and they legitimized the nationalist positions of both Turkish and Greek governments (2000: 409).

Nevertheless, both Turkish and Greek media were criticised right after the crisis. Le Monde and Association of European Journalists concluded that "The two states are not European yet", "The real crisis is in the media" (Dimitras, 1998: 66).

But the crisis also led to the self-criticism of journalists and a small group of journalists established the Platform of Journalists of the Aegean and Thrace. They had planned to meet on the anniversary of the crisis every year nonetheless, after a short time the meetings had to

be cancelled because of threats and attacks on the journalists. The car of a Platform member and editor of a newspaper was burnt and in front of the Turkish consulate in Komotini, the place where the meeting would be held, a bomb exploded in 1998 (Hadjidimos, 1999: 27).

Afterwards, the Greek and Turkish media professionals initiated contacts as to how they may further their role in conflict resolution. The first Greek-Turkish media conference convened in Athens in February 2000. The follow-up meeting in Istanbul took place in October 2000. A third meeting has recently taken place in Athens in February 2005 (Rumelili, 2005: 12) The fourth one was held in Istanbul on June 2006.

#### **IV. ARCHIVE RESEARCH ON NEWS REPORTS CONCERNING GREEK MEDIA IN *HÜRRIYET***

The archive research on news reports concerning the Greek media in *Hürriyet*'s coverage of the crises and rapprochements in question focused on certain dates on which Turkish-Greek relations experienced events that may be perceived as the cornerstones in the relations. These selected significant dates are as follows: September 6-7 1955 events, Cyprus events in 1963 which is named as Bloody Christmas by Turkish side, 1974 Cyprus Intervention, the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus in 1983, Davos meetings in 1988, the Kardak/Imia Crisis in 1996 and Marmara earthquake in 1999.

The time span every event investigated differed depending on the length of the crisis and rapprochements and their reflections on the media. To be able to point out the changes in *Hürriyet*'s coverage, if there are any, each investigation was started from a few days before the crisis or rapprochements actually began. Investigation periods were generally terminated depending on the media's loss of attention. Nevertheless, on certain occasions, the period under investigation had to be shorter than intended since some newspapers were no more available due to attrition and some volumes have been under repair for months. Therefore, for instance while the beginning date of investigation for September 6-7 1955 events was 10<sup>th</sup> of August, the ending date was the 20<sup>th</sup> of September due to the reason that the rest of the year was no more available although the news reports about the event were continuing. Again, in the 1963-1964 Cyprus events, even though the start of the events was on the 21<sup>st</sup> of December, the beginning date for the investigation was taken as 1<sup>st</sup> January since the archives between the 21<sup>st</sup> of December and 1<sup>st</sup> of January were under repair for four months. This investigation ended on the 1<sup>st</sup> of February. The other periods researched are as follows: 16<sup>th</sup> of July – 30<sup>th</sup> of August for the Cyprus Operations of 1974, the first of which was between 20-22



July and second on 14-16 August; 16<sup>th</sup> of November – 30<sup>th</sup> of November for the establishment of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus which was proclaimed on the 15<sup>th</sup> of November; 25<sup>th</sup> of January- 13<sup>th</sup> of March for the Davos Meetings which were organized on 30-31 January but whose echoes lasted till March; 25<sup>th</sup> of December- 15<sup>th</sup> of February for the Kardak/Imia Crisis which started to have a place in media beginning from 27<sup>th</sup> of January; 18<sup>th</sup> of August- 15<sup>th</sup> of September for the Marmara earthquake which happened on the 17<sup>th</sup> of August.

The investigation focused on all headlines, sub-headlines, leads and the news texts. However only those directly about the Greek media were carried to the tables to be analysed. In order to observe which description was used under which headline; the headlines, sub-headlines and leads under these news reports about Greek media were placed were indicated in the appendix too. Therefore there are two parts in the tables that supply the data for the analysis, one contains the descriptions and adjectives used for the Greek media and the other part includes the headlines, sub-headlines and leads that these descriptions and adjectives were reported under. In the appendix, “H” points out to headline, “SH” to sub-headline, “h” to relatively smaller headline and “L” to lead.

In order to understand and reflect the contexts in which *Hürriyet* reported on the Greek media, other news reports which are not about the media were also scanned and are also going to be referred to in the following analysis although they are not shown in the appendix.

## **A. Reading the Headlines: What They Say and What They Don't**

### **1. What does the absence of news reports tell us?**

Although the purpose of the research was to reveal the way the Greek media was represented by a Turkish newspaper as of the 1950s, the first discovery of the study was the fact that in some of the selected dates investigated, Greek media were not quoted or referred to at all.

The first day of investigation showed that concerning 6-7 September 1955 events, there were no news reports on Greek media until the 20<sup>th</sup> of September the closing date of that period of investigation. Nevertheless, when the beginning date of the investigation was taken a month backward, it was seen that on the 10<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> of August and 2<sup>nd</sup> of September, there were reports on the Greek media. However, during and right in the aftermath of the events in September 1955, *Hürriyet* did not reflect the Greek media. While news reports were found in the 1964 investigation, in the archives of 1974 there again were only two reports on the Greek media. Research conducted in 1983, 1988, 1996 and 1999, on the other hand, reached many news reports consistent with the assumption that *Hürriyet* would reflect the Greek media in its coverage.

However, the absence of reporting on the Greek media in 1955 and 1974 may be the result of the negative reporting on Turkey in the Greek media. Therefore, it may be useful to look at the nature of the events in 1955 and 1974.

On 6-7 September 1955, riots broke out in Istanbul and İzmir. Greek houses, shops and churches were seriously damaged, looted, plundered and destroyed. The motivation behind

the riots was the rumour reported in the daily *Istanbul Ekspres* that M. Kemal Atatürk's house in Salonica was bombed. Although it was never found out who provoked and organized the rioting mob, the "Cyprus is Turkish" association was the organizer of the rally which led to the demonstrations. It is thus clear that the Cyprus issue was one of the central concerns which agitated the population with nationalistic impulses. The fact that the reporting of a newspaper, specifically government-sided *İstanbul Ekspres* (Firat, 2003: 601), was the precipitating cause of between such grand events is significant concerning the motivation of this research. Moreover, according to Firat, *Hürriyet* was highly concerned with Cyprus issue in the hope that raising such a national cause would increase circulation. The role of the media, particularly newspapers, is going to be explored in the following pages with reference to the findings of archival research, however, the question of why there was no news citing the Greek media on 6-7 September events, may throw light on the way to follow. As a matter of fact, the absence of reports should be explained relative to the reportage on other dates. The nature of the events on the selected dates was consistent with *Hürriyet's* general publishing framework, which is going to be analyzed later. Nonetheless, to sum up, it can be said that *Hürriyet* as a daily mainstream newspaper does not contradict Turkey's interests including the ones termed as "national interest" and supports the government of Turkey in the international arena. As it is going to be explained below, *Hürriyet's* representation of the Greek media on other chosen dates, except 1955 and 1974, confirms this argument. Yet, in the 6-7 September 1955 events, the mob who attacked and destroyed the Greek population's property was obviously aggressive and at least for a significant number of people, wrong in nature. Turkish authorities also published a declaration on September 7 and said that the events were a disaster. Turkey, in the international arena, had lost prestige and was referred by the epithet "barbaric Turks". The Greek press wrote that the events were organized by the Turkish authorities, or at least hinted at some complicity while the Greek government was protesting

Turkey (Firat, 2003: 601). Therefore, if *Hürriyet* was to quote or cite the Greek media, the stories would inevitably have been negative and derogatory, accusing and protesting Turkey. Therefore, although *Hürriyet* published news reports on the Greek media prior to the events, it stopped the reportage when the climate obviously became uncondusive.

Before the events, *Hürriyet* published two unfavourable news articles on the 10<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> of August on the Greek media and one on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of September, on the Turkish Greek, or the so called Rum media in Istanbul. As can be followed in the Appendix, on the 10<sup>th</sup> of August, referring to the banner of *Ethnikos Kiriks* newspaper “The Lausanne Treaty needs revision: We want Eastern Thrace<sup>30</sup>”, *Hürriyet* used the headline “The Greeks now demand entire Thrace<sup>31</sup>” with a lead as follows “A Greek rag is insolent enough to say whole Thrace is Greek territory”<sup>32</sup>. On the 19<sup>th</sup> of August, *Hürriyet* published the following sentences in text: “The campaign started by certain Greek media claiming Cyprus, Eastern Thrace, Imbros and Bozcaada (Tenedos) aroused great hate in our country and the revulsion felt against the Greek newspapers’ demands on these territories which are Turkish to the core, has reached the peak<sup>33</sup>. On 2<sup>nd</sup> of September, which is a very close date to the events of 6-7 September, *Hürriyet* criticized the Rum press of Istanbul. While in its headline *Hürriyet* said “The Rum papers quoting Stefanopoulos sell out<sup>34</sup>”, its lead, “These papers who voiced the Greek view did not print one comment on Turkey’s theses”<sup>35</sup> accused these newspapers of being biased towards Athens. Even though the connotations of this are going to be analyzed later, it should be now noted that, *Hürriyet* used the following description “Greek papers that hope to

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<sup>30</sup> “Lozan muahedesi tadil edilmelidir. Doğu Trakya’yı istiyoruz.”

<sup>31</sup> “Yunanlılar şimdi de bütün Trakya’yı bizden istiyorlar.”

<sup>32</sup> “Paçavra bir Yunan gazetesi, Trakya’nın bölünmez bir Yunan toprağı olduğunu söyleme küstahlığında bulundu.”

<sup>33</sup> “Bir kısım Yunan gazetelerinin Kıbrıs, Doğu Trakya, İmroz ve Bozcaada için açmış oldukları kampanya, memleketimizde büyük bir nefret uyandırmış, Yunan gazetelerinin özbeöz Türk olan bu toprakları istemeleri karşısında, yurttan duyulan infial son haddini bulmuştur.”

<sup>34</sup> “Stefanopolos’un sözlerini neşreden İstanbul Rum gazeteleri kapışıldı”.

<sup>35</sup> “Yunan görüşünü belirten bu gazetelerde Türk tezine dair en ufak bir tefsire bile rastlanmıyor”.

increase their circulation raising a rucus about Cyprus”<sup>36</sup> in text, which reminds Firat’s words that *Hürriyet* was highly concerned the with Cyprus issue in order to increase its circulation (2003: 601).

That is to say, before the events, *Hürriyet* was criticizing the Greek press including the Rum press in Istanbul. However, right in the aftermath of the events, *Hürriyet* only focused on how the damaged property was going to be repaired, how the “Reds” were caught and on the government declaration published every day after the event and which included the expression “our neighbour and ally, Greece”<sup>37</sup>.

*Hürriyet* did not report on the Greek media in 1974 either. After the Greek Junta’s coup against the government of Archbishop Makarios in Cyprus, Turkey launched a military intervention arguing that it has to protect the Turkish population there and called it the “Cyprus Peace Operation”. The first military operation of Turkey was found relatively justifiable by other states. However, the second operation that begun one month later and expanded to cover approximately 40 percent of the island was strongly criticized by world opinion. Therefore, once more it is possible to argue that the Greek media was highly critical of and unfavorable towards Turkey. Therefore, apart from the news report published before

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<sup>36</sup> “Kıbrıs patirtısı sayesinde satış sağlayan Rumca gazeteler”.

<sup>37</sup> Here are the some examples of *Hürriyet*’s headlines and leads after the events.

September 9 (Headline): “Nümayiş gecesi tahrikat yapan otuzdan fazla komünist yakalandı (More than 30 communist engaged in provocation on the night of the demonstrations caught)”.

Lead: “Bir kısım dükkanların tamirine başlandı. Yanan ve yıkılan kilise ve okulların tamiri için hükümet tahsisat verecek (Repairs in some shops begin. Government will fund repairs of burnt and demolished churches and schools)”.

September 12 (Headline): “Çalınan bazı eşyalar arsa ve kapı önlerine bırakılmaya başlandı (Some plundered goods are left at doorsteps and vacant lots)”.

September 14 (Headline): “Örfi idare kumandanlığı iki yeni tebliğ neşretti. Huzur ve asayiş bozucu haber yayanların ihbarı isteniyor (Two new declarations from the martial law authority asking citizens to turn in those who spread news that disrupts public peace and order)”.

Lead: “Yunanistan’ın bazı bölgelerinde Türklere zulüm yapıldığı hakkındaki haberlerin de kasten çıkarıldığı tebliğde bildirildi (The declaration also stated that rumors to the effect that Turks in certain parts of Greece are being tormented were created on purpose)”.

the first operation on 16<sup>th</sup> of July “Athens Radio silent<sup>38</sup>” which was designed to accuse the Athens Radio after the Greece-engineered coup in Cyprus, *Hürriyet* reported on the Greek media only on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of July and 15<sup>th</sup> of August. The content of these news articles however was intended to show the power of Turkey and how Greece, Greeks and Greek Cypriots were afraid of Turkey and the Turks. The discourse behind the reportage is going to be explained later. However before that, it is beneficial to observe the signs of this discourse. On the 23<sup>rd</sup> of July, under the banner “Our victory has Athens kneeling<sup>39</sup>”, *Hürriyet* used the description in text “Greek radios that were badly panicked after the Turks’ victory<sup>40</sup>”. On 15 August, *Hürriyet* headlined “Turkish jets silenced Radio Nicosia<sup>41</sup>” and used “Greek radio silenced<sup>42</sup>” as a subheadline.

During both the operations and in their aftermath however, *Hürriyet*, as it is going to be analyzed later, used nationalistic and aggressive headlines and texts in its coverage. The editorials which were published every day during the operations had the following headlines<sup>43</sup>: “They can ask their fathers” [how we taught them a lesson]” (July 17), “The fault won’t be ours” [in case things get violent]” (July 20), “We are proud” (July 21), “We ask for blood for blood, tooth for tooth” (July 22), “We are in, too” (July 23) etc. *Hürriyet* also organized a competition to write the best “Cyprus saga<sup>44</sup>” to “express the glory of the Turkish army in Cyprus and to perpetuate this historic event<sup>45</sup>”.

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<sup>38</sup> “Atina Radyosu susuyor.”

<sup>39</sup> “Zaferimiz Atina’yı çökertti.”

<sup>40</sup> “Türklerin zaferinden fena halde paniğe kapılan Rum radyoları.”

<sup>41</sup> “Türk jetleri Lefkoşe Radyosu’nu susturdu.”

<sup>42</sup> “Rum radyosu susturuldu”.

<sup>43</sup> “Babalarına sorsunlar”, “Günah bizden gitti”, “Övünüyoruz”, “Kana kan, dişe diş istiyoruz”, “Biz de varız”.

<sup>44</sup> “Kıbrıs Destanı”

<sup>45</sup> “*Hürriyet*, bu tarihi olayı ebedileştirmek için bir Kıbrıs destanı yarışması açmıştır. Okuyucularımızdan Türk ordusunun Kıbrıs’taki büyük zaferini dile getirmelerini bekliyoruz.”

After pointing out to the lack of reporting on two particular dates and to its possible reason, now the rest of the news reports and their underlying meanings can be studied.

## **2. The Greek Media According to *Hürriyet***

### **a) Crises, Events and Their Headlines**

Before analyzing the findings of the archival research, the results of the investigation for each selected period will be shortly stated within each category.

As stated above, even though *Hürriyet* reported on the Greek media prior to 6-7 September 1955, during and right after the events, there were no news articles coning the Greek media. However the search held on newspapers published in June 1948 to control whether there were any news reports concerning Greek media showed that *Hürriyet* often referred to the Greek media as a source of information in 1948. Yet, it is very important to note that the news reports concerning the Greek media nat that period were objective and far from containing any disgracing references. *Hürriyet* in 1948 referred to Greek sources mostly under the “Telegraph–Telephone–Radio” section and mainly reported information about the ungoing civil war between government forces and communist guerillas in Northern Greece, as in the following examples<sup>46</sup>: “From the news in the Athens press, it can be deduced that heavy clashes continue in the Sanli plains south of Yanina and partisans have strengthened their hold of a steep rise”, “Reports from Veria inform that the military tribunal condemned 12 prisoners to death for communist activities”. The only descriptions that may be thought as non-

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46 “Atina basınında çıkan haberlerden Yanya’nın güneydoğusundaki Sanli Yaylası için cereyan etmekte olan şiddetli çarpışmanın devam ettiği ve çetelerin gayet sarp bir tepeye sağlam bir şekilde yerleştikleri anlaşılmaktadır”, “Yunanistan’ın kuzeyinde bulunan Veria’dan alınan basın haberlerinde bildirildiğine göre, askeri mahkeme komünist faaliyetlerden suçlu bulunan 12 kişiyi idama mahkum etmiştir.”

objective are a few examples<sup>47</sup> like “The extreme right wing newspaper *Ellenikon Vima*” and “The populist newspaper *Akropolis*”. Nevertheless, it can be said without doubt that *Hürriyet* used neither any negative description toward the Greek media, Greece and Greeks nor any discourse that may be identified as aggressive, disgracing and nationalistic toward them. The significance of this information is going to be clear later when all the findings of the research are elaborated and seen that it was not possible to observe such kind of unbiased reporting concerning the Greek media, Greece and Greeks even in the periods that has been said to be friendly. The hostile expressions directed to the Greek media later may be assumed to be the result of worsening bilateral relations and mutual perceptions as of the mid-1950s.

Thus, the first assumption of the research emerges as the news reports in 1948 are compared with the rest. We observe that *Hürriyet*'s position toward the Greek media- and also to Greece and Greeks as they are thought as a unified body as it is going to be explored in the following stages- is affected by the change in the international relations between Turkey and Greece. Yet, this supposition is going to be backed by other findings as well.

In 1964, news reports on the Greek media were highly hostile. Turkish Cypriots were presented as the “victims” of the Greek Cypriots and the news reports mostly included the homes, the shops, the possessions pillaged confiscated by the Greek Cypriots and the people killed by them.<sup>48</sup> The Greek media were also presented by antagonistic words and *Hürriyet* accused them of being biased and harsh to the Turks. The following examples<sup>49</sup> show

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47 “Müfrit sağcı *Ellenikon Vima* Gazetesi”, “Halkçı *Akropolis* Gazetesi”.

48 Examples: (Banner) “Greeks want to starve Turks into surrender” (“Rumlar, Türkleri açlıkla dize getirmek istiyor”) (01.04.1964).

(Headline) “Greeks stop and plunder food trucks to Turkish villages”. (“Rumlar, köylere yiyecek nakleden Türk kamyonlarının yolunu kesip talan ediyor”) (01.05.1964).

(Banner) “EOKA and Greek police raid two villages” (“EOKA’cılar ile Rum polisi iki köyü bastı”). (01.23.1964).

49 “Kıbrıs’ta Rum gazeteler, menfur cinayetlerini Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı’na yüklemek istiyor”, “Maksatlı Yayınlar”, “Çatışmaların durması ve barikatların kaldırılmasından sonra, mütemadiyen tahrik edici resimler



*Hürriyet*'s general approach toward the Greek media in the Cyprus events in 1964: "Greek papers in Cyprus try to frame the Turkish Resistance Organisation for the hateful murders they commit", "Biased reporting", "Greek Cypriot papers that insistently print agitative photos and continue their anti Turkish reports after the end of fights and the lift of the barricades", "Newspapers in Greek that unanimously blame the Turks for all that happened", "Greek Cypriot radios that bellow 'crush the Turks' " etc.

The case in 1974 is already explained above. During the declaration of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983, however, *Hürriyet* followed both a derogatory and impartial policy toward the Greek media. In some news articles, the news on the Greek media was quoted with no accompanying comments. The quotations contained criticism<sup>50</sup> toward Turkey as well. *Hürriyet* also used negative headlines and descriptions, nevertheless. On October 18, *Hürriyet* headlined "Greek press spewing hostility"<sup>51</sup> and the following leads<sup>52</sup> "Trying to lay blame on Turkey for the assassination of the American officer" and "The highest circulation daily in Greece, Ethnos, claimed Israeli and Turkish agents together killed the American Colonel Tsantes". However, it should be noted that concerning news reports other than the one on October 18 and those quoted directly, *Hürriyet* employed a relatively neutral or at least a non-aggressive tone. The following examples<sup>53</sup> can be taken as the

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kullanan ve Türkler aleyhine yayınlarına devam eden Kıbrıs'ta yayınlanan Rum gazeteler", "Bütün suçun Türkler'de olduğuna dair sanki ağız birliği etmiş olan Rumca gazeteler", "Barbar bağırarak 'Türkler ezilmeli' diyen Kıbrıs Rum Radyoları".

<sup>50</sup>An example is as follows (11.17.1983):

Alithia: Kipriyanu hükümeti uykuda bastırıldı (Alithia: Kipriyanu government busted awhile asleep).

Agon: Türk küstahlığını yok etmek için (Agon: To abolish Turkish insolence).

Simerini: Cumhuriyet ilanından sonra durum patlayacak hale geldi (Simerini: After declaration of Republic, the situation became explosive).

Elefterotipia: Kuzeyde korku yönetimi (Elefterotipia: Reign of terror in the north).

Haravgi: Kıbrıs'ı Türklerden kurtarmak için birleşelim (Haravgi: Let us unite to save Cyprus from the Turks).

<sup>51</sup> "Yunan basını düşmanlık saçıyor."

<sup>52</sup> "Amerikalı subayın öldürülmesi olayını, Türkiye'nin sırtına yüklemeye kalkıştılar", "Yunanistan'ın en yüksek tirajlı gazetesi Ethnos, Amerikalı albay Tsantes'i, İsrail ve Türk ajanlarının birlikte öldürdüklerini iddia etti".

<sup>53</sup> "Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti'nin ilanının, önceki gün tüm sayfalarını işgal ettiği Yunan gazeteleri", "Büyük başlıklarla, Yunan hükümetince Türkiye'ye verildiği açıklanan protesto notasını duyuran Yunan gazeteleri".

indicator of this relative neutrality: “Greek newspapers who devoted all their pages to the declaration of the TRNC”, “Greek newspapers that announced the protest nota given to Turkey by the Greek government with large headlines”. On the other hand, it should be noted (see: Appendix) that news reports on the Greek media in 1983 were relatively fewer.

News reports on the Greek media before the Davos meeting in 1988, were generally focused on how Greek media expected “concessions” from the Turkish government. For instance, it is possible to see some remarks<sup>54</sup> such as “Greek papers published commentaries that voiced an expectation that Turkey would take a step backward in Davos”, “Pro- government Elefterotipia wrote that Papandreu expected a flexible and concessionist attitude from the Turkish side during the negotiations”, “Greek and Greek Cypriot press that contained claims that the research ship Piri Reis would divide the Aegean into two and Prime Minister Ozal would advance gestures in the Cyprus problem”. Other news reports in the same period speak of how Greece may deceive Turkey in the diplomatic games at the table and therefore the Turkish government should be very careful. Hostile descriptions were also used in these news reports as in the following examples<sup>55</sup>: “Do not be tricked by Papandreu”, “A call to Özal for caution”, “Demirel and Ecevit, talk of their Greek experience’ before the meeting with Papandreu”, “Greek police attacks Turks prior to the ‘Peace rendezvous’”, “Athens positioning troops near the our border”. Yet, right after the meetings, looking at the following examples<sup>56</sup>, it is easy to follow that *Hürriyet* began to adopt a more moderate attitude: “Hand in hand for peace”, “Ozal and Papandreu break the ice in Davos”, “Davos censure on history

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<sup>54</sup> “Türkiye’nin Davos’ta geri adım atmasını bekleyen yorumlar yapan Yunan gazeteleri”, “Papandreu’nun Türk tarafından görüşmede esnek ve ödün veren bir tavır beklediğini yazan iktidar yanlısı Elefterotipiya gazetesi”, “Piri Reis araştırma gemisinin Ege’yi ikiye böleceği ve Başbakan Özal’ın Kıbrıs konusunda jest yapacağı iddialarına yer veren Yunan ve Rum basını”.

<sup>55</sup> “Papandreu’nun oyununa gelme”, “Özal’a dikkatli ol çağrısı”, “Demirel ve Ecevit, Papandreu buluşmasından önce yaşadıkları ‘Yunan tecrübeleriyle’ konuştular”, “‘Barış Buluşması’ arifesinde Yunan polisi, Türklere saldırdı”, “Atina, sınırimıza asker yığıyor”.

<sup>56</sup> “Barış için ‘el ele’ ”, “Özal ve Papandreu, Davos’ta buzları eritti”, “Tarih kitaplarına Davos sansürü”, “Atina’dan dört jest”, “ ‘Türk korkusu’na Davos süngeri”, “Avrupa Parlamentosu’nda Türk- Yunan flörtü”.

books”, “Four gestures from Athens”, “A Davos wipe against the ‘fear of Turks’ ”, “Turco-Greek flirt at the European Parliament” etc. In a paralel way, the Greek media were referred as the reflector of this “flirt”. *Hürriyet* used such descriptions<sup>57</sup> for the Greek media: “Kathimerini wrote that the Greek government totally ignored the events in Komotini which PM Özal evaluated as small incidents, thus not allowing them to distort the Davos process”, “Papers published in Greece generally commented that the first round negotiations between Özal and Papandreau the previous day in Davos were positive”, “Mesimvrini: They agree in Davos and say no to war” etc. On the other hand, after a short while, it becomes possible to see news reports<sup>58</sup> in *Hürriyet* such as “Reluctant support from the Greek”, “Athens quite brazen”, “They insist on 12 miles for the Aegean but expect gestures from us, “Greek demands concessions against gesture”, “Turkey stealing Greek territory” etc. When it comes to news reports concerning the Greek media, it is possible to see examples<sup>59</sup> like “Greek press claim: Papandreau’s men rebel”, “Messimvrini, Estia, Apoyevmatini, opposition papers claim Papandreau dragged Greece into a dangerous adventure”, “Greek papers, the majority of which printed headlines as ‘Özal eats Papulias and Pangalos’”, “Ta Nea claimed that Turkey stole territory from Greece by building perpendicular barriers on the banks of the Euros, thus changing the river bed”, “Ta Nea claimed quoting an unnamed high ranking officer that the

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<sup>57</sup> “Gümölcine’de meydana gelen olaylarla ilgili olarak Yunan hükümetinin olayı tamamen görmezlikten geldiğini,

Başbakan Özal’ın ise küçük hadiseler şeklindeki değerlendirmesiyle, bunların Davos programını bozmayacağını

bildirdiğini yazan Kathimerini”, “Özal ve Papandreau’nun Davos’ta önceki gün yaptıkları ilk raunt görüşmelerini, genellikle olumlu olarak değerlendiren Yunanistan’da yayınlanan gazeteler”, “Mesimvrini: Davos’ta anlaşılabilir, savaşa hayır dediler”.

<sup>58</sup> “Yunanlı’dan gönülsüz destek”, “Atina çok pişkin”, “Bizden ‘jest’ beklerken, Ege için ‘12 mil’de ısrarlılar”, “Yunanlı, ‘jest’e taviz istiyor”, “Türkiye, Yunan toprağı alıyor”.

<sup>59</sup> “Yunan Basını’nın iddiası: Papandreau’nun adamları başkaldırdı”, “Papandreau’nun Davos ile Yunanistan’ı ‘tehlikeli bir maceraya sürüklediği’ yorumları yapan muhalefet gazetelerinden Messimvrini, Estia, Apoyevmatini”, “Çoğu, ‘Özal, Papulyas ve Pangalos’u yedi’, ‘Papandreau-Özal anlaşması ciddi görüş ayrılıklarına yol açtı’ şeklinde manşetler atan Yunan gazeteleri”, “Meriç nehrinin Türkiye kıyı boyuna dikey şekilde setler çekildiğini ve akan suyun yönünün değiştirilmesi yoluyla, Yunanistan’dan toprak çalındığını öne süren Ta Nea”, “İsmi açıklanmayan yüksek rütbeli bir subayın, İpsala’da yapılan barajın savaşta kullanılmasının planlandığı yolundaki iddialarına yer veren Ta Nea”.

new dam in Ipsala will be used in war”. Once more, it is possible to argue that *Hürriyet* bonds itself with the shifts in the bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey.

During the Kardak/Imia Crisis in 1996, the archival research showed that *Hürriyet* followed an obvious antagonistic attitude toward Greece and the Greek media. While news reports<sup>60</sup> regarding Greece and Greeks are as follows, “Greeks dared to plant their flag on Bodrum's Kardak rocks yesterday”, “Tension mounts as Greece lands civilians and armed persons on Kardak islets where they lowered the Turkish flag yesterday”, “Greece asking for a slap as in Cyprus”; news reports on Greek media were quite hostile as well as in the following examples<sup>61</sup>: “Greek media blowing a storm in a teacup”, “Ethnos, which reported the crisis as the new and ugly Turkish comedy”, “Greek media attacking *Hürriyet*”, “Antenna TV team who, according to the Greek media, along with a bishop from Kalimnos with a few islanders and children landed on the islet singing the Greek national anthem” etc. Yet, it should be noted that before the crisis, in December 29 1995, *Hürriyet* used headlines<sup>62</sup> such as “our war plane teased in the Aegean crashes” and “Greek provocation” which were hostile as well. On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that there was only one news report, a very favourable one, on February 10 which was about a Greek journalist who was attacked by extreme nationalists. *Hürriyet* reported this event in its last page by the banner “Pro-peace greek journalist's office raided<sup>63</sup>” and attributed the journalist with positive and friendly traits<sup>64</sup> like

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<sup>60</sup> “Yunanlılar, Bodrum'daki Kardak kayalıklarına dün kendi bayraklarını dikme cüretini gösterdi”, “Kardak kayalıklarındaki Türk bayrağını indiren Yunanistan, dün de Ada'ya bir grup sivil Yunanlı ile silahlı kişileri çıkarınca hava aniden gerginleşti”, “Kardak kayalıklarındaki Türk bayrağını indiren Yunanistan, dün de Ada'ya bir grup sivil Yunanlı ile silahlı kişileri çıkarınca hava aniden gerginleşti”.

<sup>61</sup> “Bir bardakta fırtına koparan Yunan medyası”, “Krizi ‘yeni ve çirkin Türk komedisi’ başlığıyla veren Ethnos Gazetesi”, “*Hürriyet*'e saldıran Yunan medyası”, “Yunan televizyonlarının yayınladığı haberlere göre, Kalimnos Adası'ndan bir papaz, birkaç adalı ve çocukla birlikte Kardak kayalığına çıkarak, ellerinde Yunan bayraklarıyla Yunan milli marşını söyleyen Antenna TV ekibi”.

<sup>62</sup> “Ege'de tacize uğrayan savaş uçağımız düştü” and “Yunan tacizi”.

<sup>63</sup> “Barışçı Yunanlı'nın gazetesini bastılar”.

“The brave journalist who was attacked because of his pro-peace ideals”, “Giannis Tzumas who labored intensively to establish a bridge of peace between Çeşme and the island of Xios lying 9 miles away”, “Giannis Tzumas who frequently printed pro-peace messages in his newspaper”etc. Nevertheless, no doubt that although *Hürriyet*’s attitude toward Giannis Tzumas was friendly, this cannot be taken as *Hürriyet*’s general approach to Greece, Greeks, and the Greek media at the time. On the contrary, this news article may be perceived as a continuation of the other news published during the crisis since by way of honoring a particular Greek, *Hürriyet* disgraced other Greeks and tried to establish an identification with the ones who attacked Tzumas and the rest of the Greeks using the anti-Turkey sentiment as a basis, and implied that this nationalistic point of view is the general tendency in Greece and among the Greeks. For instance, the expression “The brave journalist who was attacked because of his pro-peace ideals” is an example of this hostile approach, since *Hürriyet* implies that such peaceful thoughts invite attacks in Greece. Another sentence<sup>65</sup> in this report, “Giannis Tzumas who said ‘the Greek government is acting as if a war will break. We are surprised on the other hand that you are so cool’ ” also shows that while honoring Tzumas, *Hürriyet* humiliates the Greek government and points out to Turkey’s serenity and power. Therefore, as another example of this manner is going to be observed in the friendship messages of 1999 as well, it is possible to say that even though the message, in the surface includes friendship, *Hürriyet* uses these news reports to dishonor Greece, Greeks and the Greek media while honoring Turkey, Turks and the Turkish media.

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<sup>64</sup> “Barışçı düşünceleri nedeniyle kendi memleketinde saldırıya uğrayan cesur gazeteci”, “İzmir’in Çeşme ilçesi ile 9 mil uzaklıkta bulunan Yunanistan’ın Sakız Adası arasında dostluk köprüsü kurmak için büyük uğraş veren Giannis Tzumas”, “Gazetesinde sık sık barış mesajları içeren yazılar yayınlayan Giannis Tzumas”.

<sup>65</sup> ‘Yunan hükümeti savaş çıkacakmış gibi davranıyor. Sizin ise rahat olmanıza şaşırıyoruz’ diyen Giannis Tzumas”.



fresh minds were washed with enmity but it did not work. Their politics backfired. Nature's power smashed everything. They thwarted history and were defeated by the reality of geography. The Greek people whose roofs collapsed on them after the quake are now like they were reborn (...)"

## **b. How visions shape: The Idea of Greece and Greeks on Newsprint and Media Ink**

One of the findings of the archive research is that *Hürriyet* tends to describe the Greek media as the supporter of government or the voice of particular political parties or groups. In order to see how *Hürriyet* performs this, the following descriptions<sup>68</sup> may suffice as examples that need attention: "The mouthpiece of the Archbishop Elefteria", Mahi the Spokessheet for EOKA", "A paper that is the mouthpiece of the red Archbishop, called Filelefteros", "Pro Papandreau weekly To Vima", "Pro Makarios Greek Cypriot papers", "Pro government Elefterotipia", "Pro Pasok Ta Nea" etc. Such descriptions of the Greek media do not change depending on particular dates and periods. As can be seen in the tables (see: Appendix), beginning from the 1950s, *Hürriyet* has always portrayed the Greek media in that light, including the two periods of rapprochement processes that this investigation covered. Even when the actual message in the news report was a positive one, *Hürriyet* assumed an implicitly distrusting or wary attitude toward the Greek media as in the following example<sup>69</sup>:

" 'Cards opened under shadow in Davos': Pro- government Ethnos which headlined that the two prime ministers are optimistic reported that they gave the impression neither the sailing of

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<sup>68</sup> "Papazın organı olan Elefteria Gazetesi", "EOKA sözcüsü Mahi Gazetesi", "Kızıl papazın sözcüsü olan Filelefteros isimli bir gazete", "Papandreau yanlısı haftalık To Vima Gazetesi", "Makariosçu Rum Gazeteler", "İktidar yanlısı Elefterotipiya gazetesi", "Pasok yanlısı gazete Ta Nea".

<sup>69</sup> " 'Davos'ta kağıtlar gölge altında açıldı, iki başbakan iyimser' başlığı ile verdiği haberinde her iki başbakanın gerek Piri Reis gemisinin Ege'ye açılması, gerekse Gümülcine'de meydana gelen olayların, bu görüşmeyi etkilemeyeceği imajını verdiklerini belirten, hükümet yanlısı Ethnos gazetesi."

the Piri Reis in the Aegean nor the events in Komotini will affect the negotiations”. Furthermore, apart from the Greek media’s portrayal as the supporter of the government or the voice of particular political parties or groups, the research showed that *Hürriyet* views the Greek media as the architecture or the carriers of particular political policies or projects. The following examples<sup>70</sup> can be seen as the indicators of this attitude: “Some Greek papers that launched a campaign about Cyprus, Eastern Thrace, Imbros and Tenedos”, “Greek radios which attempted to provoke the Turkish people against each other and blame the Turkish leaders for all that happened”, “Elephteria which claimed that Dr. Nihat killed his wife and children and then attempted shoot himself and was suddenly transported to Turkey on an aircraft and purported as corroboration that nobody else was hurt in the Kumsal region where Dr. Nihat lived”, “Some Greek papers that attempted to spread the seeds of hostility among Turkish and Greek people using the Cyprus question as an excuse”, “The Greek press who has been using headlines for two days that Turkey has set its eyes on Greece’s territories” etc. In the Davos process, while before the meeting, *Hürriyet* was very cautious of the Greek media as in the example of “Greek papers published commentaries that voiced an expectation that Turkey would take a step backward in Davos<sup>71</sup>”, after a short time *Hürriyet* again referred to the Greek media as the source of some claims as in the following example “Ta Nea claimed that Turkey stole territory from Greece by building perpendicular barriers on the banks of the Euros, thus changing the river bed<sup>72</sup>”. In 1996, *Hürriyet* spoke of the Greek media in the same

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<sup>70</sup> “Kıbrıs, Doğu Trakya, İmroz ve Bozcaada için kampanya açmış olan bir kısım Yunan gazeteleri”, “Türk halkını yekdiğeri aleyhine tahrik etmeye ve bütün sorumluluğu Türk liderlerine yüklemeye çalışan Rum radyoları”, “Dr. Nihat’ın eşi ve çocuklarını öldürdükten sonra kendisinin intihara teşebbüs ettiğini ve sonradan ani bir uçakla Türkiye’ye götürüldüğünü ve delil olarak da Dr. Nihat’ın evinin bulunduğu Kumsal semtinde başka hiç kimsenin burnunun dahi kanamadığını ısrarla ileri süren Elefteria Gazetesi”, “Kıbrıs konusunu bahane ederek, Türk ve Yunan halkları arasında düşmanlık tohumları saçan bazı Yunan gazeteleri”, “İki gündür ‘Türkiye, Yunanistan topraklarına göz dikti’ başlıkları atan Yunan basını”.

<sup>71</sup> “Türkiye’nin Davos’ta geri adım atmasını bekleyen yorumlar yapan Yunan gazeteleri”.

<sup>72</sup> “Meriç nehrinin Türkiye kıyı boyuna dikey şekilde setler çekildiğini ve akan suyun yönünün değiştirilmesi yoluyla, Yunanistan’dan toprak çalındığını öne süren Ta Nea”.



framework as can be seen in the following description “Elefteros Tipos that claimed Turkey has targeted the Dodecanese<sup>73</sup>”. In 1999, the Greek media were still presented as the architect or the carriers of certain policies, yet this time the projects they are involved in were considered positive. The following examples<sup>74</sup> are the indicators of these constructive projects the Greek media is supposed to have initiated: “Greek newspaper Ta Nea which opened a bank account called Greeks to donate for children hit by the quake”, “Greek State Television ENA, which, without loss of time, launched a campaign with the governor and a musical band to help the disaster struck Turkish people” etc. However the perception that Greek media have the capability of initiating or carrying certain policies and projects persists in *Hürriyet*'s approach, even though the ones in 1999 are mostly in the civilian basis.

The point is that *Hürriyet* perceives the Greek media as the representative of the Greek government and of the Greeks and their national interests. In other words, *Hürriyet* implies that the Greek media are far from performing the media's ideal mission of reporting and reflecting the truth but they are the bearers of the interests of their government and nation. While implying this, *Hürriyet* does not distinguish between the Greek government, nation, people, and media and reflects them as a unified body, and one, which is summarily all together against Turkey. For instance *Hürriyet* in 1955, used the headline “The Greeks now demand entire Thrace<sup>75</sup>”. However in the lead, *Hürriyet* continued with the sentence that “A Greek rag is insolent enough to say whole Thrace is Greek territory<sup>76</sup>”. In the news text, *Hürriyet* used such descriptions that it was obvious that the paper did not distinguish between

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<sup>73</sup> “Türkiye'nin hedefinin 12 Adalar olduğunu ileri süren Elefteros Tipos Gazetesi”.

<sup>74</sup> “Depremden etkilenen çocuklara yardım etmek isteyenler için bir banka hesabı açarak, Yunan vatandaşlarını para yardımı yapmaya çağıran Yunanistan'ın Ta Nea Gazetesi”, “Türk halkının başına gelen felaketten sonra gördüklerinin karşısında hiç vakit kaybetmeden Valilik ve bir müzik grubuyla kampanya başlatan Yunan Devlet Televizyonu ENA”.

<sup>75</sup> “Yunanlılar şimdi de bütün Trakya'yı bizden istiyorlar”.

<sup>76</sup> “Paçavra bir Yunan gazetesi, Trakya'nın bölünmez bir Yunan toprağı olduğunu söyleme küstahlığında bulundu.”

the Greek state, Greek people and Greek media. Some examples of these descriptions follow<sup>77</sup>: “Scandalous headlines that open the final curtain of legendary Greek insolence”, “an editorial that completely becomes an extreme right wing and nationalist newspaper which decorates its banner with the motto ‘everything for Greece’”, “a dirty and nefarious editorial yell that is a mind boggling example of the customary Greek rabble rousing”, “an editorial example of matchless insolence, which reveals what our ferocious friends, the Greeks think about us and how they yearn to grab our motherland” etc.

It is obvious here how *Hürriyet* fails or does not bother to differentiate the Greek government from a newspaper that voices territorial demands from Turkey, assuming a mission that is certainly beyond any newspaper’s and totally within the scope of state and government affairs.

*Hürriyet* emphasizes that the paper is extremely nationalist and pursues the interests of the Greek state (“an extreme right wing and nationalist newspaper which decorates its banner with the motto ‘everything for Greece’ ”), but it also disgraces the Greek people (“legendary Greek insolence”, “customary Greek rabble rousing” etc) because the same lack of differentiation between the Greek media and the Greek government extends to the people of the country, too.

*Hürriyet*, however, adopted the same attitude, failing to differentiate the three elements during the rapprochement processes as well. A news text published on August 21, 1999 says:

“The *Greeks* as a people who are familiar with earthquakes were the society that probably felt the most grief about what happened in Turkey. Perhaps that was why they acted so

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<sup>77</sup> “Dillere destan Yunan küstahlığının en son perdesini açan rezil başlıklar”, “Gazete başlığının üstünü ‘her şey Yunanistan için’ motosu ile süsleyen aşırı sağcı ve milliyetçi gazeteye tam yakışır bir başyazı”, “Şimdiye kadar işitmeye alıştuğumuz Yunan yaygaracılığının akılları dondurtacak soyundan en pis ve mülevves narası olan başyazı”, “Şu yaman Yunan dostlarımızın hakkımızda ne düşündüklerini ve biraz sıkışınca anavatan topraklarımıza da göz dikmeye nasıl can attıklarını bütün çıplaklığı ve çirkinliğiyle meydana döken eşsiz küstahlık örneği yazı”.

sensitively. *Not only the state but the people, too*, wants to extend a helping hand. The *Greek press*, perhaps for the first time, is full with editorials and commentaries that are so friendly and loving toward Turkey and beckoning the people to help Turkey”<sup>78</sup> (Italics added).

Yet, the same tendency can be observed in the Greek media as well. Since the study is also interested in the Greek media’s reporting on Turkish-Greek relations, it is possible to see that the Greek media do not distinguish between themselves, Greece and the Greek nation, and even Cyprus and the Greek Cypriots. They do not distinguish between Turkey, Turks and Turkish media, either. Following the texts *Hürriyet* quoted from Greek newspapers, this approach becomes quite visible<sup>79</sup>: “Kathimerini: Washington, Bonn, London, Paris and Brussels violently condemn the new Turkish faits accompli and do not recognize them”, “Apoyevmatini: the whole world condemns the new Turkish crime”, “Haravgi: let us unite to rid Cyprus of Turks”, “the daily ethnos that informed the crisis with the headline ‘the new and ugly Turkish farce’”, “Adesmoftos Tipos criticized the Greek government as it informed that the *Hürriyet* crew hung the Turkish flag on Imia and commented ‘where were our warships? Why did they allow the Greek flag to be lowered?’”, “Elefteros Tipos headlined ‘the national night of shame’ and trashed the Simitis government”, “Ta Nea: We are greatly wounded in the Aegean”, “Elefterotipia: Alone in the international arena”, “Kathimerini: National defeat

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<sup>78</sup> “*Yunanlılar* depremi çok yakından bilen bir halk olarak Türkiye’de olup bitenlere herhalde en çok üzülen toplum oldu. Belki de bu yüzden çok hassas davrandılar. *Yalnızca devlet değil*, insanlar da ellerinden geldiğince Türkiye’ye yardım eli uzatmak istiyor. *Yunan basını* belki de ilk kez Türkiye’ye karşı bu kadar sıcak ve sevgi dolu makalelere yer veriyor ve Yunan halkına Türk depremzedelere yardım etmeleri için çağrıda bulunuyor”.

<sup>79</sup> “Kathimerini: Washington, Bonn, Londra, Paris ve Brüksel yeni Türk emrivakilerini şiddetle kınadı ve tanımıyor”, “Apoyevmatini: Yeni Türk cinayetini tüm dünya kınıyor”, “Haravgi: Kıbrıs’ı Türklere kurtarmak için birleşelim”, “Krizi ‘yeni ve çirkin Türk komedisi’ başlığıyla veren Etnos Gazetesi”, “*Hürriyet* ekibinin Kardak Kayalığı’na bayrak diktiğini bildirirken, ‘bizim savaş gemilerimiz neredeydi? Niye Yunan bayrağının indirilmesine izin verildi?’ diyerek Atina Hükümeti’ni eleştiren Adesmoftos Tipos”, “‘Mili utanç gecesi’ başlığı ile çıkan, Simitis Hükümeti’ni yerden yere vuran Elefteros Tipos Gazetesi”, “Ta Nea: Ege’de büyük yara aldık”, “Elefterotipia: Uluslararası alanda yalnız kaldık”, “Kathimerini: Ulusal hezimet yaşadık”; “ ‘Hepimiz Türküz’, “ ‘Kardeşim Mehmet metin ol’ başlıklı duygusal yazıların çıktığı Yunan basını”, “Fileleftheros: Kader, Türkiye’nin kurtarma timi tarafından kurtarılmasını istedi. Olayın trajikomik yanı ise bu üyenin isminin Attila olmasıydı. Böylece 1974’te adasının bölündüğüne şahit olan ve yaşamı Attila yüzünden altüst olan Andreas Markus, artık hayatını Attila’ya borçlu”.

for us”, “The Greek press printed such emotional editorials like ‘We are all Turkish’ and ‘Mehmet, my brother, be brave’ ”, “Fileleftheros: Fate wanted him saved by the Turkish rescue team: the tragicomedy was that the team member was called Attila, thus, Andreas Markus, whose life was upside down in 1974 when he saw his island divided by Attila, now owes his life to” etc.

As stated in Chapter 2, the origin of the idea that Turkey and Turks may be considered as the male party of the relationship, while Greece and Greeks are the female, comes from the way the Turkish and Greek newspapers address the other side in their reports. It is possible to see that *Hürriyet* prefers to use a masculine way of talking, while the Greek media adopt a milder, female tone. This polarity may be observed clearly in the news reports.

First, taking a look at how *Hürriyet* speaks of Greece, Greeks and the Greek media, the common aspect of the texts<sup>80</sup> is that almost all refer to the Greek party as weak and portray them as if they are full of fear due to any action that may come from Turkey and the Turks: “Greek papers reflecting the anxiety that the Turkish armed forces may launch a sudden landing campaign from the sea and may thus impose partition (of Cyprus) as a fait accompli”, “EOKA arms even the women”, “Priest demands money to hoist the flag”, “The Greek Cypriot radios which badly panicked after the Turks’ victory”, “Turkish exercises in the Aegean has the Greek worried” “Davos wipe against the fear of the Turk”, “Greece wants a

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<sup>80</sup> “‘Türk ordusunun denizden ani bir çıkarma yapmak korkusunun belirdiğini, Türklerin taksimi bir oldu bitti halinde empoze etmelerinden endişe edildiğini yazan Yunan gazeteleri”, “EOKA’cılar kadınlara bile silah veriyor”, “Papaz, bayrak dikmek için para aldı”, “Türklerin zaferinden fena halde paniğe kapılan Rum radyoları”, “Ege’deki Türk tatbikatı Yunan’ı telaşlandırdı”, “ ‘Türk korkusu’na Davos süngeri”, “Yunanistan, Kıbrıs gibi şamar istiyor”, “Yunanistan gururunu sineye çekti”, “Yunan askeri mevziden kaçmış”, “Yunanlılar, Washington’u ağlama duvarı yaptı”.

slap in face as in Cyprus", "Greece swallows its pride", "Greece soldiers abandon trenches", "Greeks make Washington a wailing wall" etc. On the other hand, *Hürriyet* speaks of Turkey and Turks as follows<sup>81</sup>: "Turkish jets shut up Nicosia radio", "they put the fear of God in friend and foe (about the SAT – Underwater Assault Team – commandoes after the Kardak/Imia crisis), "Heroes of AKUT (Search and Rescue Team) rescue", "Praise for Turkish rescuer from Cypriot Greeks", "We are superior" etc. It is also possible to see that the Greek newspapers speak of Turkey and Turks as "Attila" and "zorba" most of the time, which definitely carry masculine overtones. In order to see the male-female polarity better, it should be realized that this mechanism *Hürriyet* reflects in its news texts is a binary opposition. Analyzing the news reports, it is seen that there is a clear-cut separation between Turkey and Greece in a way that implies or suggests that they have nothing in common. The two countries are portrayed as if they have totally dissimilar features and as if one feature of Turkey cannot be a feature of Greece and vice versa. Bearing this mechanism of binary oppositions in mind, it may be easier to identify the characteristics of one country, solely by focusing on the characteristics of the other country. It must be noted however that binary oppositions do not necessarily point out to a polarity between male and female. Therefore, some further analysis is necessary to bring to light traces of the underlying gender polarization.

For instance, the headline "EOKA arms even the women" implicitly means "Turkish Cypriots or TMT will never arm women; that is to say, the Turkish men are strong and brave enough not to need to involve women in a conflict. On the other hand, Greek men who are afraid of Turks' power stoop so low to even give weapons to women who should not be a part of men's fight. Greek men are so cowardly and weak that they need the support of women who are not capable of fighting at all. Similarly, "Greek soldiers abandon trenches" means "The Turkish

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<sup>81</sup> "Türk jetleri Lefkoşe Radyosu'nu susturdu", "Dosta düşmana korku salıyorlar", "Kahraman AKUT kurtardı", "Kıbrıslı Rumlardan Türk kurtarıcıya övgü", "Biz üstünüz".

soldier never deserts from duty”. Turkish soldiers are again strong and determined, while the Greek soldiers are cowardly and run away from Turkish soldiers. That is to say, Turkish soldiers and by association, Turks defend their homeland while Greek soldiers are incapable of it. Thus, Turkish soldiers and Turks love their homeland, while the Greeks do not have enough courage to love their homeland and do whatever this love requires them to do. Moreover, even in a very serious crisis, in which nationalistic concerns, feelings and impulses were nearly at a peak, a priest “demands money to fly (the Greek) flag”, *Hürriyet* reported. While *Hürriyet*'s correspondents do not need anything apart from their love and respect for their homeland to plant a flag, a Greek and a religious leader at that, needs money to carry this honorable mission. *Hürriyet* also implies that Turks never cry as to be understood from the headline “Greeks make Washington a wailing wall”. These are just few examples from *Hürriyet*'s news texts. On the other hand, it is seen that *Hürriyet* often disdains and ridicules the Greek side implying that they are not manly enough as “Turks that put the fear of God in friend and foe”. On the contrary, they have womanly characteristics like escaping from ordeals or crying.

Analyzing what *Hürriyet*'s language actually speaks of and arguing that *Hürriyet* voices a discourse may raise the question whether *Hürriyet* is conscious of the implications of its reportage, or is the newspaper so involved and preoccupied in the social and cultural conditions of which the existing discourse is born, that it no longer is capable of locating its position within the discourse. The answer may lie with *Hürriyet*'s news reports focusing on how the Greek media present particular news articles. *Hürriyet* often refers to the way the Greek media design their news reports and what they imply<sup>82</sup>: “Below the scandalous

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<sup>82</sup> “Dillere destan Yunan küstahlığının en son perdesini açan bu rezil başlıkların altında, yine bütün ilk sahifeyi boydan boya örten ve kalın siyah 12 punto ile dizilmiş, tam 6 çift sütun tutan kocaman bir başyazı var. Gazete başlığının üstünü ‘Her şey Yunanistan için’ motosu ile süsleyen bu aşırı sağcı ve milliyetçi gazeteye tam yakışır bir başyazı!”, “Yunan görüşünü belirten gazetelerde Türk tezine dair en ufak bir tefsire bile rastlanmıyor”,

headlines that open the final curtain of legendary Greek insolence, there is a huge editorial which was written as 12 font, bold and black and which completely covered the whole front page with 6 columns. The editorial completely becomes an extreme right wing and nationalist newspaper which decorates its banner with the motto ‘everything for Greece’”, “These papers who voiced the Greek view did not print one comment on Turkey’s theses”, “Yesterday's Mahi carried an extremely provocative and large photo showing Nicos Sampson of EOKA with a gun in one hand and a Turkish flag in the other. In the background were pictured Turkish prisoners of war. (...) Another paper claimed that Turks had put a bounty on Sampson's head, quoting Sampson ‘let them come and take it if they dare’”, “Greeks receive *Hürriyet*’s headline Efharisto Poli File (Thanks a lot Friend) with sympathy, Greeks call *Hürriyet*’s Athens office offering condolences”, “The Greek TVs made sure not to film the troops in position on the rocks though they shot long footages of the civilians”, “Ethnos reported the programmed Turkish military maneuvers north of Lesbos and east of Kos with the headline "another hot day begins in the Aegean" with an aura of anxiety” etc. Scanning these examples, it is quite difficult to conclude that *Hürriyet* is not aware of the importance of how news is designed, how certain messages can be underlined through page lay out by aligning in certain ways the photographs and symbols used and managing words to create particular balances of what is said or what is unsaid in headlines or other texts. This way, *Hürriyet* also accuses the Greek media of distorting the truth. As in one of the news texts above, *Hürriyet* stresses that while picturing the civilians, the Greek televisions did not show

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“Dünkü Mahi gazetesinde son derece tahrik edici bir resim büyük boyda yayınlanmıştı. Resimde EOKA’cı Nikos Sampson, bir elinde tabanca, diğer elinde de bir Türk bayrağı ile görülmekteydi. Resmin geri planında Türk esirleri yer almıştı. (...) Diğer bir gazetede Sampson’un başına Türkler tarafından para verileceği haberi yer almakta ve Sampson’un şu sözleri büyük puntolarla yayınlanmaktaydı: Cesaretleri varsa gelip alsınlar”, “*Hürriyet*’in depremzedelere yardım eli uzatan Atina’ya Efharisto Poli File diye teşekkür etmesi, Yunanistan’da büyük sempatiyle karşılandı. Yunanlılar, *Hürriyet* bürosunu arayarak başsağlığı diliyorlar”, “Yunan televizyonları, sivilleri uzun uzun görüntülerken, kayalıklarda mevzilenen askerleri filme almamaya dikkat ettiler”, “Etnos gazetesi, Ege’de Midilli Adası’nın kuzeyinde ve İstanköy Adası’nın da doğusundaki deniz ve hava sahalarında gerçekleştirilecek olan TSK’nın programlı tatbikatı ile ilgili haberini ‘Ege’de yine sıcak bir gün başlıyor’ başlığı altında ve bir telaş havası estirecek üslupta yayınladı”.

the soldiers landed on Kardak islet of *Hürriyet* criticizes the tone of a Greek newspaper because it tried to generate a panic atmosphere. That is to say, *Hürriyet* gives the signs of being well aware of the strength of the particular uses and implications of language, symbols, signs and signifiers by the media, and of the fact that they themselves might be the means of manipulation.

This means that *Hürriyet* attributes a considerable role to the media, specifically the Greek and Turkish media, in inter-governmental affairs. The case where the indicators of such an assumption became quite obvious was the Kardak/Imia Crisis. In the Kardak/Imia<sup>83</sup> Crisis, *Hürriyet* presented itself as a hero who fought bravely against the enemy, as in the following text: “ (...) The *Hürriyet* correspondents who arrived at the islet in a helicopter landed despite a strong gale when they noticed the Greek flag. Our correspondents Aykut Fırat and Cesur Sert<sup>84</sup> pulled down the Greek flag replacing it with the Turkish as the Greeks watched them and went on to run away<sup>85</sup>”. Nevertheless, *Hürriyet* was not alone in attributing this mission to itself. On January 30, 1996, *Hürriyet* published Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit’s declaration “Thank heaven there are the news people<sup>86</sup>”, in its front page. According to the report, “(...) Ecevit, punctuated that “Greece initiated a de facto occupation process in the islets and had not some bravehearted journalists become aware of it, the case might never even hit the agenda<sup>87</sup>”. *Hürriyet* had already adopted this mission Ecevit assigned, in its direct description of itself as “*Hürriyet*, the leader of the Cyprus Cause<sup>88</sup>”, as far back as July 23, 1974, in the middle of the Cyprus intervention and would keep its “major” role as it declared itself as “a

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<sup>83</sup> *Hürriyet* referred to Kardak in Turkish or Imia islet in Greek as “Asıl adı Kardak olan Imia Kayalıkları” (January 28, 1996).

<sup>84</sup> Cesur means “brave”, sert means “tough”.

<sup>85</sup> “Helikopterle adaya ulaşan *Hürriyet* muhabirleri Yunan bayrağını fark edince şiddetli rüzgara rağmen yere indi. Muhabirlerimiz Aykut Fırat ve Cesur Sert, Yunan bayrağını alıp, yerine Türk bayrağını dikerken, Yunanlılar da onları teknedeki izleyip kaçtılar”.

<sup>86</sup> “İyi ki gazeteciler var” (30 Ocak 1996).

<sup>87</sup> “Ecevit, Yunanistan’ın kayalıkları fiilen işgal süreci başlattığını, bazı yürekli gazeteciler olayı saptamasaydı, konunun gündeme bile gelmeyeceğini vurguladı.”

<sup>88</sup> “Kıbrıs davasının önderi olan *Hürriyet*.”



fair and just hawk in Turkish-Greek relations”<sup>89</sup> on August 26, 1999. The Antena television, on the contrary, claiming that a newspaper cannot plant a flag on some disputed territory by its own initiative, was reflected in *Hürriyet*’s coverage with considerable amount of sarcasm as “ The Greek TV that claims Turkish intelligence services are behind the event and newspapers cannot of themselves adopt such (internationally controversial) attitudes<sup>90</sup>”. *Hürriyet*’s Editor in Chief Ertuğrul Özkök, defended what *Hürriyet*’s correspondents had done by placing the Turkish flag on Kardak and argued that the act constituted a “glory of journalism”<sup>91</sup>.

In addition, the archive research revealed that *Hürriyet* tends to identify itself with Turkey in its relations with the Greek media and reciprocally views the Greek media to be identical with Greece. That is to say, *Hürriyet* perceives any critical reports in the Greek media about itself as an “assault” on itself, whereas it is proud of the praise it receives for example, those that note and translate *Hürriyet*’s coverage into Greek, assuming them to be signs of being considered important. The examples of the first approach can be seen in such descriptions<sup>92</sup> published during the Kardak Crisis “Attack on *Hürriyet*”, “Greek papers which reported the *Hürriyet* correspondents' mounting of the Turkish flag on Kardak in their front pages and attacked *Hürriyet*”, “*Hürriyet* in the headlines”, “Antena TV which claimed *Hürriyet*'s replacing the Greek flag with Turkish flag is a provocative act”, “Adesmoftos Tipos criticized the Greek government as it informed that the *Hürriyet* crew hung the Turkish flag on Imia and

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<sup>89</sup> “Türk- Yunan ilişkilerinde adil bir şahin olmayı ilke edinmiş *Hürriyet*.”

<sup>90</sup> “Bu olayın ardında Türk istihbaratının bulunduğunu, gazetelerin böyle bir tutum takınamayacaklarını iddia eden

Antenna Televizyonu.”

<sup>91</sup> In order to see how Özkök interpreted Kardak crisis and justified the relation between journalists and the homeland, see his articles on January 1 and January 2, 1996.

<sup>92</sup> “*Hürriyet*’e saldırın”, “*Hürriyet* ekibinin Kardak kayalığına bayrak dikmesini birinci sayfadan manşet veren ve *Hürriyet*’e saldıran Yunanistan gazeteleri”, “*Hürriyet* manşetlerde”, “*Hürriyet* Gazetesi’nin Kardak kayalığındaki Yunan bayrağını indirip Türk bayrağı çekmesinin tahrik edici olduğunu öne süren Antenna Televizyonu”, “*Hürriyet* ekibinin Kardak Kayalığı’na bayrak diktiğini bildirirken, ‘bizim savaş gemilerimiz neredeydi? Niye Yunan bayrağının indirilmesine izin verildi?’ diyerek Atina Hükümeti’ni eleştiren Adesmoftos Tipos”.

commented ‘where were our warships? Why did they allow the Greek flag to be lowered?’ ”. Examples of the second approach come with the articles the Greek press published mostly after the earthquakes<sup>93</sup>: “Eleftherotipia which published a full translation of *Hürriyet*’s report which raised significant response”, “*Hürriyet*’s headline sentimentalized the neighbour”, “Great support from Greek press for *Hürriyet*’s proposal of Turkish and Greek search and rescue teams AKUT and EMAM for the Nobel Peace Prize” etc. Even though the reports in the second category may be taken as examples of the cooperation between *Hürriyet* and the Greek media, it should be noted that *Hürriyet* also manifestly refers to its own attributes and its magnitude and the recognition it receives from the Greek media.

Yet, as mentioned while explaining the reasons for a lack of news reports concerning the Greek media on particular dates, it should be realized that *Hürriyet* tends not to cite any items critical of itself. Those that it publishes despite a seemingly negative tone, in fact serve a particular aim: that of expounding *Hürriyet*’s prominence in the media. For instance, the quotations<sup>94</sup> from *Hürriyet* “Greek papers which reported the *Hürriyet* correspondents’ mounting of the Turkish flag on Kardak in their front pages and attacked *Hürriyet*”, “Adesmoftos Tipos which noted the flaws in the Greek defence system noting that the *Hürriyet* helicopter could land on Kardak to lower the Greek flag”, “TVs that broadcast for minutes how the *Hürriyet* team landed on Kardak and lowered the Greek flag” may be argued

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<sup>93</sup> “*Hürriyet*’in büyük yankı uyandıran haberini tam çevirisiyle yayınlayan Eleftherotipia Gazetesi”, “*Hürriyet*’in başlığı komşuyu duygulandırdı”, “*Hürriyet*’in iki ülkedeki depremzedelerin yardımına koşan Türk ve Yunan kurtarma ekipleri AKUT ve EMAM’ın Nobel Barış Ödülü’ne aday gösterilmesi önerisine Yunan basınından büyük destek geldi”.

<sup>94</sup> “*Hürriyet* ekibinin Kardak kayalığına bayrak dikmesini birinci sayfadan manşet veren ve *Hürriyet*’e saldıran Yunanistan gazeteleri”, “Bölgede güvenlik tedbirleri alındığı halde, *Hürriyet* helikopterinin kayalığa inmesine seyirci kalındığını öne sürerek, Yunanistan’ın savunma sisteminde boşluk olduğunu vurgulayan Adesmoftos Tipos”, “*Hürriyet* ekibinin Kardak Kayalığı’na çıkıp Yunanistan bayrağını indirişini ve Türk bayrağını çekişini dakikalarca yayınlayan televizyonlar”.

to have been designed to point out how desperate the Greek media are before the Turkish media.

### 3. Friends Fighting? Dog fight in the Aegean

In order to inspect whether the friendly atmosphere initiated in 1999 has been maintained between the Greek and Turkish media, a small search was conducted in the Internet on dog fight on 22 May 2006, a few months before the completion of this work. On May 24, *Hürriyet* used the headline “(Turkish) Air Force: Greek aircraft teased ours<sup>95</sup>” and the lead “The Air Force communique said the Grek F 16 approached the Turkish F 16 from behind without any dogfight and crashed<sup>96</sup>” . *Hürriyet* also used the headline “A new crisis risk in the Aegean<sup>97</sup>” and subheadline “Greek Press: Turks' message is bullying<sup>98</sup>”. In the texts, on May 25, (See: Appendix) *Hürriyet* stated that Greek press mostly accused the Turkish side while some reported that Greek and Turkish authorities acted calmly. *Hürriyet* carried the reports of the Greek press some of which were critical toward Turkey as in the following examples<sup>99</sup>: “Ta Nea claimed in its report headlined ‘Turks' message is bullying’ that Turkey demands grey zones in the rescue area and the Turkish pilot drew his gun and rushed away the Greek rescue teams”, “While Ethnos reported the incident with the headline ‘Ankara draws the gun in the Aegean’ commented ‘the future of our policy toward Turkey is as mysterious as the fate of the Greek pilot’ . On the other hand, *Hürriyet* also cited news from the Greek press which can be viewed as examples of a calm attitude in Greek-Turkish relations: “To Vima comments

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<sup>95</sup> “Hava Kuvvetleri: Yunan uçakları uçaklarımızı taciz etmiştir.”

<sup>96</sup> “Hava Kuvvetleri’nden yapılan açıklamada Yunan F16’ sının it dalaşı olmadan doğrudan Türk F16’ sına yaklaştığı ve arkadan çarptığı bildirildi.”

<sup>97</sup> “Ege Denizi’nde yeni kriz riski”

<sup>98</sup> “Yunan Basını: Türkler kabadayılık yapıyor”

<sup>99</sup> “Ta Nea gazetesi ‘Türklerin mesajı kabadayalık’ başlıklı haberinde Türkiye'nin kurtarma bölgelerinde gri bölgeler istediğini ve Türk pilotun silah çekerek Yunanlı kurtarma ekiplerini kovduğunu iddia etti.”, “Ethnos gazetesi haberi ‘Ankara Ege’de silah çekti’ başlığıyla verirken, ‘Yunanlı pilot gibi Türkiye’ye karşı politikamızın da akıbeti bilinmiyor’ yorumunda bulundu.”

'Athens and Ankara keep their tones low' while headlining 'clash in the air calm on land'<sup>100</sup> ". Nevertheless, the hostile Greek news reports were announced more readily by *Hürriyet*, rather than the calmer ones (see: Appendix). In addition, concerning news texts cited from the media of third countries, *Hürriyet* preferred to cover those which implied that the dog-fight crisis between Turkey and Greece was serious and it might have even turned into a clash<sup>101</sup>. For instance, *Hürriyet* reported that *The Guardian* said that the event was "a new Turkish-Greek crisis risk", and according to *The Daily Telegraph*, "it was the most serious incident between Turkey and Greece since the Kardak crisis". On the other hand, on the same day, *Hürriyet* also used the headline "Headlines of reason in *Hürriyet* and *To Vima*<sup>102</sup>", implying that both *Hürriyet* and *To Vima* acted calmly and tried not to accuse the other side, causing an escalation of the incident. Yet, on 26 May, *Hürriyet* used the headline "Watch out for the rage dive<sup>103</sup>" and mentioned within the text that "Turkish pilots were warned that Greek pilots mourning the death of their friend might attempt at rage dives and ordered to fly moderately and be wary of provocative dive actions by Greek aircraft. It was also ordered that Greek aircraft should not be allowed to violate Turkish airspace<sup>104</sup>". *Hürriyet* also stated that "it was stated that despite the tease by the Greek F 16 pilot lieutenant Halil İbrahim Özdemir refrained from engaging and it was observed that the Greek F 16 crashed into the Turkish aircraft<sup>105</sup>". Regarding the incident that the Turkish refrained from calling a "dog fight",

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<sup>100</sup> "To Vima gazetesi 'Havada çarpışma, karada soğukkanlılık' başlıklı haberinde 'Atina ve Ankara'nın tonlarını alçak tutuyor' yorumunda bulundu."

<sup>101</sup> "The Guardian: Savaş uçaklarının çarpışması nedeniyle yeni bir Yunan-Türk krizi riski."

"The Daily Telegraph: Kardak krizinden bu yana iki ülke arasında en ciddi olay."

"Le Monde: İki komşu sık sık birbirini hava sahası ihlal etmekle suçluyor."

"The Times: Ege'deki karasuları ve hava sahası anlaşmazlıkları ile ilgili olarak 1974 yılından bu yana üç kez savaş tehdidiyle karşılaşan Yunanistan ve Türkiye, çarpışma nedeniyle birbirini suçladı."

<sup>102</sup> "*Hürriyet* ile *To Vima*'da aklın manşetleri".

<sup>103</sup> "Hınc dalışına dikkat"

<sup>104</sup> "Türk pilotlara, Yunanlı pilotların, arkadaşlarının ölmesi nedeniyle 'hınc dalışı' yapma ihtimallerinin bulunduğu, bundan dolayı uçuşlarda itidalli davranılması, Yunan uçaklarının provokatif dalışlarına karşı uyanık olmaları emri verildi. Yunan uçaklarının Türk Hava Sahası'nı ihlal etmesine kesinlikle izin verilmemesi de emirler arasında yer aldı."

<sup>105</sup> "Yunan F-16'sının tacizine rağmen pilot üsteğmen Halil İbrahim Özdemir'in hiçbir angajmana girmediği ve Yunan F-16'sının Türk uçağına çarptığının net şekilde görüldüğü belirtildi."

*Hürriyet* on June 1 reported “Greek TVs claimed Turkish and Greek fighter aircraft were involved in a dog fight in the Aegean airspace above the islands of Xios and Lesvos<sup>106</sup>”.

Therefore, it is conceivable to argue that during and after the dog-fight incident, *Hürriyet* did not completely abandon its usual of narration that was summarized in the previous examples. Yet, comparing the prior headlines and news texts, *Hürriyet* followed a more moderate tone in its reporting. However it should be noted that even though the words and the descriptions can be said to have become milder, *Hürriyet* still pursued its traditional approach of “choosing” which news to cover. It continued to give place to the negative reportage of third countries that evaluated the incident as a serious crisis, while it applied the same mechanism towards the Greek media. Moreover, *Hürriyet* maintained that the incident was not a dog-fight but a direct attack from the Greek pilot in which the Turkish pilot and the Turkish authorities were not involved. That is to say, although the attitude toward Greece, Greeks and the Greek media has become softer, the structure in which *Hürriyet* has been in the habit of reporting remained the same.

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<sup>106</sup> “Ege'de Sakız ile Midilli adaları arasında, Türk ve Yunan savaş uçakları arasında ‘it dalaşı’ yaşandığını ileri süren Yunan televizyonları”

## V. CONCLUSION

### **No Crises Without Words: Making Foes and Friends by News**

Turkey and Greece, the two neighbor countries of the Aegean, have been going alternately through serious crises and rapprochement processes since the beginning of the 1950s. The media in both countries have also been a significant party in the bilateral relations and have even appeared as the leading actors and the provocateurs in case of Imia/Kardak crisis in 1996, which may also assumed to be as a crisis between the Turkish and Greek media apart from being a crisis between the two states. The event indicated that the attitude of the media toward one another carries a vital role in the states' relations. Nevertheless, it is not reasonable to argue that the manner of any media especially regarding the politics can be independent from the policies and stances of their government and more comprehensively, of their state since the media function accordingly within the general organization of societies. Thus, this work aimed to explore how the national daily *Hürriyet*, as a representative of the Turkish media reflected the Greek media at critical junctures since the beginning of the 1950s and whether this representation of Greek media has had any parallels with the changes, specifically at times of crisis and rapprochement in Turkish-Greek relations.

The analysis of the news reports at critical junctures pointed out that the tone of the news reports *Hürriyet* published on the Greek media has been largely determined by the tone of the relations between Turkey and Greece and has had a “banal” nationalist discourse –regarding Cyprus, it may be argued that *Hürriyet* had even carried the “signs” of hot nationalism in its newsprint. That is to say, *Hürriyet* has tended to support Turkish government's actions and attitudes toward Greece during critical phases and has reported on the Greek media in a way that did not contradict the government's policies. In times of crisis it has maintained an

antagonistic attitude toward the Greek media, while in times of rapprochement it has produced more friendly news.

During crises *Hürriyet* has mostly presented Greek media as the voice of the Greek government, the carriers of certain Greek political projects, and as biased and nationalist. Moreover, *Hürriyet* has often accused Greek media of provocation and manipulation in Greek-Turkish relations and has reflected the Greek media as an enemy of the Turkish side. According to *Hürriyet*, Greek media have published news that helps the Greek government to create the atmosphere of unrest Athens desired and all reports have been consciously produced as a tool of reinforcing the hostility with Turks. Yet, when the relations between Turkey and Greece have been relatively peaceful and friendly, the Greek media as well as Greece and Greeks have been presented as an ally and a friend which Turks – in fact – have always sympathized with. That is to say, *Hürriyet* broke its “closed language” in parallel with the tone of relations between Turkey and Greece and embraced “positive representation” in 1988 and 1999. Nonetheless, as Hall proposes positive representation is a part of “closed representation” and it probably does not have the power of historically –beginning with 1950s- constructed Turkish- Greek animosity discourse.

This may imply that regarding Turkish-Greek relations, *Hürriyet* has had close relations with the governments in power rather than the public, though the most substantial mission of the media is to inform the public as the fourth estate. However *Hürriyet* did not support government policies despite the public, on the contrary identifying public with the state which is after all an abstract entity, *Hürriyet* has bridged a perfect harmony between those two and its own approach to Greece, Greeks and the Greek media. Yet, *Hürriyet* assumed the Greek media to replicate a similar practice of identification too, and designed its own reports

in a way that implied that Greece, Greeks and the Greek media are a more or less homogeneously united body and depending on context, they are, as a whole entity, the friend or the enemy of the Turkish side, i.e. Turkey, Turks and Turkish media.

*Hürriyet*'s identification with the Turkish state and the Turkish public has obviously allowed it to assume the power to speak in their name. Therefore, *Hürriyet* has not hesitated in behaving like a major actor in bilateral relations. More specifically, it can be argued that *Hürriyet* has participated in history writing and history making at the same time. Considering the Kardak/Imia case, it may even be claimed that beyond reflecting it, *Hürriyet* has become the producer and manipulator of the truth, and has created the impression that it is not far from aspiring to act as if it is the state. This may be seen as an example of Hall's argument that "representation does not occur after the event but it is within the event itself".

Nonetheless, it is widely agreed that relations between Turkey and Greece after 1999 have assumed a far more civilian and moderate character and have grown out of the monopolistic discourse of the state. Cooperation and expanding relations in trade, investment, tourism, cultural exchange, in the academic field and at NGO level etc. have all gained their own dynamics that cannot be suppressed by sheer political whim. Therefore, the approach that reduces international relations to the attitudes, perceptions and dictates of the states or other political mechanisms, leaving little room to play for such social forces as business and cultural or civilian intercourse has lost its power to explain the relations. The Turkish media in general and *Hürriyet* in particular also adopted this relatively moderate approach toward the Greek side.



Therefore, after analyzing *Hürriyet*'s relations with the Greek media in a time frame of the critical phases in Turkish-Greek relations and finding that the nature of the relations between *Hürriyet* and Greek media has been highly influenced by bilateral political relations, it is pertinent to question how long this rapprochement process *Hürriyet* has said to be carried will last.

It should be kept in mind that softening the bilateral relations was government policy and therefore, rather than detaching itself from the government and pursuing a brand new approach, *Hürriyet* adopted the new pacifistic and friendly attitude toward Greece. Nonetheless it should also be remembered that in the case of the dog fight between Greek and Turkish military aircraft in May 2006, *Hürriyet* did not hesitate to accuse Greece, Greeks and Greek media once again where it felt the need of advocating the Turkish side. Therefore, it can be argued that the post-1999 rapprochement process is not a lasting period that Turkish-Greek relations have achieved a step that cannot be turned back. The survey displayed that *Hürriyet* can be influenced by any positive and negative changes in the bilateral relations and will let the political relations between the two states determine its presentation of the Greek media as well as of the Greek government & public.

The mass media is the most powerful institution and public space for disseminating popular cultural knowledge and values, and therefore the discourses (Blunt, 2004: 15). As this study tried to show, media is also a crucial part of the political relations between states which have the capability to portray the bilateral relations in a certain way. Yet, "the media's selective and value-laden representations are not 'accurate' pictures of the world but the site of struggles over what counts as meaning and truth" (Barker, 2000: 31). However, academic literature indicates that there are not sufficient interdisciplinary works that combine the International Relations with media studies. The same can be argued regarding Turkish-Greek

relations and Turkish and Greek media. This work tried to achieve that interdisciplinary goal and point out to the importance of the media and its representation of events in a particular way that may influence and manipulate the relations of the states and communities. The more the role of the media is acknowledged, the more studies combining International Relations with media studies can be expected.

It is a genuine hope that Greek-Turkish relations will be friendlier in the future and will not allow political crises to throw a shadow over them. Moreover, to the extent the media is an *organ* of the public as well as the state, it is possible to say that it will also function for promoting good will and friendship within the two communities, although by nature and by habit, clash is often more newsworthy.

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A	
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4	Sarol, Yunanlıların Türk toprakları üzerindeki iddialarını takbih etti. (H) (08.19.1955)
5	Stefanopulos'un sözlerini neşreden İstanbul Rum gazeteleri kapışıldı. (H) (09.02.1955)
6	Yunan görüşünü belirten bu gazetelerde Türk tezine dair en ufak bir tefsire bile rastlanmıyor. (L) (09.02.1955)
7	Türkleri imha planını Makarios hazırlamış.(B) (01.01.1964)
8	Makarios: Masadan dönerim. (h) (01.09.1964)
9	Rumlar yine Türkleri tahrike başladı.(B) (01.11.1964)
10	Kıbrıs'ta Rum gazeteler, menfur cinayetlerini Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatına yüklemek istiyor.(L) (01.11.1964)
11	Rumca Gazeteler (SH) (01.11.1964)
12	Maksatlı Yayınlar (SH) (01.11.1964)
13	Gülünç İddialar (SH) (01.11.1964)
14	Küçük, azimliyiz, dedi. (h) (01.13.1964)
15	Dr. Küçük, Makarios'tan 14 soru soruldu. (H) (01.21.1964)
16	EOKA'cılar ile Rum polisi iki köyü bastı. (B) (01. 23.1964)
17	Aradaki uçurum (SH) (01. 23.1964)
18	Yunanistan ve Kıbrıs'ta panik (B) (01.27.1964)
19	Kıbrıslı Rumlar Nato kuvveti istemiyorlar. (h) (01.30.1964)
20	EOKA'cılar kadınlara bile silah veriyor. (H) (02.01.1964)
21	Kıbrıs'ı çiğnetmeyeceğiz. (H) (07.16.1974)
22	Atina Radyosu susuyor (H) (07.16.1974)
23	Zaferimiz Atina'yı çökertti.(B) (07.23.1974)
24	Türk jetleri Lefkoşe Radyosu'nu susturdu (H) (08.15.1974)
25	Rum radyosu susturuldu (SH) (08.15.1974)

A	
26	Atina, sert nota verdi. (H) (11.17.1983)
27	Yunan ve Rum basını şaşkınlık içindekilerin baş sırasında... "Darbe", "Emrivaki", "Kınama", "Kıbrıs'ta suikast", "Tanınmıyor" gibi sözleri başlıklarına çıkardılar. (L) (11.17.1983)
28	Yunan gazeteleri (SH) (11.17.1983)
29	Rum basını (SH) (11.17.1983)
30	Yunan basını düşmanlık saçıyor. (H) (11.18.1983)
31	Amerikalı subayın öldürülmesi olayını, Türkiye'nin sırtına yüklemeye kalkıştılar. (L) (11.18.1983)
32	Yunanistan'ın en yüksek tirajlı gazetesi Ethnos, Amerikalı albay Tsantes'i İsrail ve Türk ajanlarının birlikte öldürdüklerini iddia etti.(L) (11.18.1983)
33	Rum gazeteleri ne diyor? (h) (11.18.1983)
34	Atina'nın sert notası boş çıktı. (H) (11.25.1983)
35	Altı kritik gün. (H) (11.29. 1983)
36	Atina'nın Özal'dan ödün beklentisi.(H) (01. 25.1988)
37	Atina, sınırimıza asker yığıyor. (h) (01.30.1988)

A	
38	Dünya gözüyle Davos: "Diyaloğu Özal başlattı". (02.01.1988)
39	Davos, Batı'da olumlu karşılandı.(H) (02.01.1988)
40	Yunan basını (SH) (02.01.1988)
41	Yunan Basını'nın iddiası: Papandreu'nun adamları başkaldırdı. (H) (03.08.1988)
42	Türkiye, Yunan toprağı çalıyor. (h) (01.10.1988)
43	Yunan tacizi (12.29.1995) (H)
44	Ege'de restleşme (H) (01.27.1996)
45	Yunan birlikleri alarmda (H) (01.29.1996)
46	Hürriyet'e saldırı (SH) (01.29.1996)
47	O bayrak inecek. (B) (01.30.1996)
48	Ada'da Yunan marşı (H) (01.30.1996)
49	Asker çıkardılar. (H) (01.30.1996)
50	Papazlı şov (H) (01.30.1996)
51	Hürriyet manşetlerde (H) (01.30.1996)
52	Yunanistan gururunu sineye çekti.(H) (02.01.1996)

A	
53	Yunan basını, Kardak krizinin ardından "milli hezimet ve utanç" başlıkları atarken, İngiliz Reuter Ajansı, "Yunanistan gurunun sineye çekti" yorumunu yaptı. (L) (02.01.1996)
54	Yunan basını: Tarihi hezimet (H) (02.01.1996)
55	Yunan askeri mevziden kaçmış.(H) (02.02.1996)
56	Yunanlılar İstanköy'e yığınak yapıyorlar (H)
57	Yunan basını kelle istiyor (H)
58	Yunanistan Aliğa'yı vuracaktı. (H) (02.03.1996)
59	Yunan basını: Tarihi hezimet (H) (02.03.1996)
60	Atina "suçluyu" bulamadı. (02.04.1996)
61	İşte Türk- Yunan farkı (H) (02.05.1996)
62	Çiller'in açıklamaları Yunanistan'ı karıştırdı (H) (02.07.1996)
63	Yunanlılar, Washington'u ağlama duvarı yaptı. (H) (02.09.1996)
64	Barışçı Yunanlının gazetesini bastılar.(B) (02.10.1996)
65	Savaş karşıtı Yunanlı gazeteci Giannis Tzumas'ın Kardak krizinden sonra da barış mesajı içeren yayınlar yapmasından rahatsız olan bazı fanatik Yunanlılar, genç gazetecinin işyerini bastılar.(L) (02.10.1996)
66	Dostluk elçisi (SH) (02.10.1996)
67	Başkanları buluşturmuştu. (SH) (02.10.1996)
68	Ege'deki Türk tatbikatı Yunan'ı telaşlandırdı. (h) (02.12.1996)
69	Ege'de yumuşamanın perde arkası sertti. (H) (02.14.1996)
70	Teşekkürler Komşu/ Efharisto Poli (H) (08.21.1999)
71	Ta Nea'dan yardım hesabı (H) (08.21.1999)
72	İçeride başlık: Hürriyet'in başlığı komşuyu duygulandırdı.(H) (08.23.1999)
73	Ankara- Atina hattında gizli diplomasi iddiası (SH) (08.23.1999)
74	Yunanistan'da yardım kampanyasına büyük ilgi. (SH) (08.24.1999)
75	Ta Nea: Hepimiz Türküz. (H) (08.25.1999)
76	Halk, bizden önce koştu.(B) (08.29.1999)

A	
77	Vetoya deprem koşulu (H) (08.31.1999)
78	Batı Trakya'da depremzedeler için Türk –Yunan Konseri (SH) (08.31.1999)
79	Her şeyimizi paylaşabiliriz. (H) (09.02.1999)
80	Yunan basını da yanımızdaydı.(SH) (09.08.1999)
81	Kahraman AKUT kurtardı. (B) (09.09.1999)
82	Türk-Yunan dayanışmasına dünya basınından büyük ilgi (H) (09.10.1999)
83	Kıbrıslı Rumlardan Türk kurtarıcıya övgü (SH) (09.10.1999)
84	Ege'de deprem diplomasisi (H) (09.11.1999)
85	Yunan gazetecilerden depremzedelere yardım (h) (09.14.1999)
86	Deprem, dostluk için milat oldu.(H) (09.15.1999)
87	Nobel'e destek yağmuru.(SH) (09.15.1999)
88	Ege Denizi'nde yeni kriz riski (H) (05.24.2006)
89	Yunan Basını: Türkler kabadayılık yapıyor. (SH) (05.24.2006)
90	Havada Çarpışma Karada Soğukkanlılık" (SH) (05.24.2006)
91	Türk pilot silah çekti mi? (H) (05.25.2006)
92	Yunan gazeteleri, Türk pilot Özdemir'in kendisini almaya gelen Yunan kurtarma ekibine silah çektiğini iddia ederken, Türkiye bunu yalanladı. (L) (05.25.2006)
93	Yunan gazetelerinde, Ege'deki kazayla ilgili Türkiye'ye karşı suçlamalar yer alsa da Karamanlis hükümeti de Ege anlaşmazlıklarının çözümünü hedefleyen istikşafi görüşmeleri askıya aldığı için eleştirildi. En dikkat çeken gazete başlığı ise Hürriyet ile hemen hemen aynı söylemi kullanan To Vima'nın manşeti idi. (L) (05.25.2006)
94	Hürriyet ile To Vima'da aklın manşetleri (H) (05.25.2006)
95	Kardak'ta gerginlik (H) (05.30.2006)
96	Yunan medyası: Mini kriz yaşandı (SH) (05.30.2006)
97	Yunan botunun Türk kara sularına girme girişimini Sahil Güvenlik botları önledi. (L) (05.30.2006)
98	Yunanlı pilot için gıyabi cenaze töreni (H) (06.01.2006)

B	
1	<b>Descriptions Used for Greek Media in the News Texts</b>
2	Aşırı sağcı ve aşırı milliyetçi "Ethnikos Kiriks" gazetesi (08.10.1955)
3	Dillere destan Yunan küstahlığının en son perdesini açan rezil başlıklar (08.10.1955)
4	Gazete başlığının üstünü "her şey Yunanistan için" motosu ile süsleyen aşırı sağcı ve milliyetçi gazeteye tam yakışır bir başyazı (08.10.1955)
5	Şimdiye kadar işitmeye alıştığımız Yunan yaygaracılığının akılları dondurtacak soyundan en pis ve mülevves narası olan başyazı (08.10.1955)
6	Herze ve yavelerine kulak asmadığımız Atinalı gazeteciler (08.10.1955)
7	(...) Rum gazetelerinin yayınlarından çıkardığımız sonuca göre, Türklere karşı girişilen katliam teşebbüsünün başında Makarios, Temsilciler Meclisi Başkanı Klerides, İçişleri Bakanı Yorgacis bulunmaktadır. Türklerin imhası planı ve Kıbrıs'ın ele geçirilmesi projesi bu üçlünün başında buldukları bir Kurmay Heyeti tarafından hazırlanmıştır. (01.01.1964)
8	Şu yaman Yunan dostlarımızın hakkımızda ne düşündüklerini ve biraz sıkışınca anavatan topraklarımıza da göz dikmeye nasıl can attıklarını bütün çıplaklığı ve çirkinliğiyle meydana döken eşsiz küstahlık örneği yazı (08.10.1955)
9	Kıbrıs, Doğu Trakya, İmroz ve Bozcaada için kampanya açmış olan bir kısım Yunan gazeteleri (08.19.1955)
10	Özbeöz Türk olan toprakları isteyen Yunan gazeteleri (08.19.1955)
11	
12	Dün akşam Rumlar tarafından kapışılan şehrimizde çıkan Rumca gazeteler (09.02.1955)
13	Kıbrıs patirtisi sayesinde satış sağlayan Rumca gazeteler (09.02.1955)
14	Türk görüşünü sadece haber şeklinde vermekte hala ısrar eden, bunu belirtmeyi ve bir dava gibi ele alarak bir Türk vatandaşına yakışacak tarzda yorumlamayı hiç akıllarına getirmeyen Rumca gazeteler (09.02.1955)
15	Türk halkını yekdiğeri aleyhine tahrik etmeye ve bütün sorumluluğu Türk liderlerine yüklemeye çalışan Rum radyoları (01.09.1964)
16	Londra Konferansı'nda Anayasa tadilinin dışında hiçbir şey görüşemeyeceklerini, taksim tezini gündeme bile aldirmayacaklarını yayınlayan Kıbrıs Rum Radyosu (01.09.1964)
17	Çatışmaların durması ve barikatların kaldırılmasından sonra, mütemadiyen tahrik edici resimler kullanan ve Türkler aleyhine yayınlarına devam eden Kıbrıs'ta yayınlanan Rum gazeteler (01.11.1964)
18	Büyük boyda son derece tahrik edici bir resim yayınlayan Mahi Gazetesi (01.11.1964)
19	Sampson'un başına Türkler tarafından para verileceği haberinin yer aldığı ve Sampson'un "Cesaretleri varsa gelip alsınlar" sözlerini büyük puntolarla yayınlayan diğer bir gazete (01.11.1964)
20	Bütün suçun Türklerde olduğuna dair sanki ağız birliği etmiş olan Rumca gazeteler (01.11.1964)
21	Talan ve yağmanın Türkler tarafından maksatlı olarak yapıldığını iddia eden Rumca gazeteler (01.11.1964)
22	Enosis'in imkan dahilinde bulunduğunu, taksim in ise asla kabul edilmeyeceğini ifade eden Elefteria Gazetesi (01.11.1964)
23	Dr. Nihat'ın eşi ve çocuklarını öldürdükten sonra kendisinin intihara teşebbüs ettiğini ve sonradan ani bir uçakla Türkiye'ye götürüldüğünü ve delil olarak da Dr. Nihat'ın evinin bulunduğu Kumsal semtinde başka hiç kimsenin burnunun dahi kanamadığını ısrarla ileri süren Elefteria Gazetesi (01.11.1964)
24	Papazın organı olan Elefteria Gazetesi (01.11.1964)
25	Barbar bağırarak "Türkler ezilmeli" diyen Kıbrıs Rum Radyoları (01.13.1964)

B	
26	EOKA sözcüsü Mahi Gazetesi (01.13.1964)
27	Türkler, köylerdeki yurttaşlarının yerlerini değiştirerek muayen bölgelere toplama politikasına devam ederlerse, Rum idarecilerin buna mani olmak için her çareye başvuracaklarını söyleyen Rum Radyosu (01.21.1964)
28	Türklerin teknik imkansızlıkları bilindiği halde, aynı zamanda dört yerde birden radyo kurmasının dikkati çektiğini ve bu radyoların kurulmasında Türk Alayı ve İngilizlerin yardımcı olduklarını fasılalarla ileri süren Rum Radyosu (01.21.1964)
29	Büyük manşetlerle Makarios'un Grivas hakkındaki demecinin yer aldığı Makariosçu Rum Gazeteler (01. 23.1964)
30	"Türk ordusu"nun denizden ani bir çıkarma yapmak korkusunun belirdiğini, Türklerin taksimi bir oldu bitti halinde empoze etmelerinden endişe edildiğini yazan Yunan gazeteleri (01.27.1964)
31	Nato birliklerinin Adaya gelmelerine katıyen rıza gösterilmeyeceğini ve ihtiyaç olursa BM polisinin Adaya gelmesine müsaade edilmeyeceğini yazan gazeteler (01.30.1964)
32	Rusya'yı ve taraftarlarını metheden yazıların çıktığı ve Fransa hariç bütün Batı Bloku devletlerine çatan Rum gazeteleri (02.01.1964)
33	Kızıl papazın sözcüsü olan Fileleferos isimli bir gazete (02.01.1964)
34	Yunanlı subayların ele geçirerek, askeri marşlar çalarak bildiriler okudukları Lefkoşe Radyosu (07.16.1974)
35	Türklerin zaferinden fena halde paniğe kapılan Rum radyoları (07.23.1974)
36	Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti'nin ilanının, önceki gün tüm sayfalarını işgal ettiği Yunan gazeteleri (11.17.1983)
37	<p>Akropolis: Darbeden sonra tehlikeli gerginlik. ABD ve Avrupa Türkiye'yi şiddetle kınadı. Moskova susuyor. (11.17.1983)</p> <p>Ankara, Denктаş'ın kuzeydeki sahte devletini tanıdı. Protesto yürüyüşleri.</p> <p>Kathimerini: Washington, Bonn, Londra, Paris ve Brüksel yeni Türk emrivakilerini şiddetle kınadı ve tanımiyor.</p> <p>Yunanistan, Batı'nın desteği ile Kıbrıs'ın bölünmesini iptal ettirecek.</p> <p>Elefteri Gnomi: Andreas, Türkiye ile hiçbir görüşme yapılmayacak dedi.</p> <p>Denктаş'ı protesto için tüm Yunanistan'da gösteriler.</p> <p>Apoyevmatini: Ordu alarında. Seferberlik yok. Yunanistan dondu kaldı. Olaylar kötü.</p> <p>Papandreu ile Karamanlis arasında dramatik görüşme. İşgal altındaki Kıbrıs başkentinde Attila ordusu yürüdü. Yeni Türk cinayetini tüm dünya kınıyor. Batı ayaklandı.</p> <p>Moskova susuyor. Türkler tahrik ediyor.</p> <p>Ta Nea: Kıbrıs'ta suikast. CIA, Yunanistan ve dünya, suikasta karşı. Tüm dünya kınıyor.</p> <p>Eleftheritipia: Bütün hükümetler Türkiye'ye karşı. Zorbalık bu kez sökmeyecek.</p> <p>Andreas: Dost ve müttefiklerimizi şimdi göreceğiz. Moskova'nın tepkisi bugün bekleniyor. Amerika şiddetle karşı.</p> <p>Vradini: Yunanistan'ı sarsan iki olay: Denктаş'ın cinayeti ve Amerikalı albayın öldürülmesi. Türkler nereye? Attila Kıbrıs'ta yeni darbe yaptı. Üçüncü Attila harekate başladı.</p>

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38	Alithia: Kipriyanu hükümeti uykuda bastırıldı. (11.17.1983) Agon: Türk küstahlığını yok etmek için Simerini: Cumhuriyet ilanından sonra durum patlayacak hale geldi. Elefterotipia: Kuzeyde korku yönetimi. Haravgi: Kıbrıs'ı Türklere kurtarmak için birleşelim.
39	Kıbrıs konusunu bahane ederek, Türk ve Yunan halkları arasında düşmanlık tohumları saçan bazı Yunan gazeteleri (11.18.1983)
40	Büyük bir küstahlık örneği gösteren, Pasok iktidarının yayın organlarından biri olan Ethnos adlı akşam gazetesi (11.18.1983)
41	Kıbrıs Rum Kesimi'nde KKTC'nin bağımsızlık ilanının şaşkınlık ve tepkileri devam ederken, bu duyguları yansıtan haberler ve yorumlar yayınlayan Rum basını (11.18.1983)
42	Ta Nea: Yunanistan, KKTC'yi yıkmak için Türkiye ile bütün diyalogunu kesiyor. (11.18.1983)  Simerini: İngiliz üslerinde çalışan yaklaşık bin Türk'ün işine son verilecek. Bunun nedeni de Kıbrıslı Türklerin bundan böyle yabancı bir ülke vatandaşı sayılmalarıdır. Bu arada Grivas öldükten sonra EOKA-B'nin başı olan Yunanlı emekli korgeneral Yorgo Karusos, EOKA örgütünü yeniden kurup Türklere karşı savaş açmak için Kipriyanu'ya başvurdu.  Alithia: Sovyetler Birliği, KKTC'nin bağımsızlık ilanını kınamadı, aksine cesaretlendirici bir tutum içine girdi.  Agon: Yunan halkı Türklere karşı ateşli gösteriler yapıyor ve Rum kardeşlerinin yanında savaşıma hazır olduklarını bildiriyor. Yunanlı subaylar ise Kıbrıs'a gitmek için komutanlarına başvurular.
43	Büyük başlıklarla, Yunan hükümetince Türkiye'ye verildiği açıklanan protesto notasını duyuran Yunan gazeteleri (11.25.1983)
44	Protesto notası ile birlikte, Yunan başbakanının Paris'teki temaslarına geniş yer ayırarak suçlamalarda bulunan muhalif basın (11.25.1983)
45	"Yunan taarruzu" deyimini kullanan Yunan gazetecileri (11.29. 1983)
46	Türkiye'nin Davos'ta geri adım atmasını bekleyen yorumlar yapan Yunan gazeteleri (01. 25.1988)
47	Papandreaunun Türk tarafından görüşmede esnek ve ödün veren bir tavır beklediğini yazan iktidar yanlısı Elefterotipiya gazetesi (01. 25.1988)
48	Muhalif eğilimli Kathimerini gazetesi ise, Özal'ın Davos görüşmesi öncesi kozlarını gizli tuttuğunu ancak Papandreaun ile görüşmeyi iki ülke arasında iyi niyet diyalogunun bir başlangıcı olarak gördüğünü ifade etti. Gazete, Batı'ya dönük bir politika izleyen Özal'ın bu yüzden Yunanistan ile ilişkilerini düzeltmeyi amaçlandığını da savundu. Kathimerini, ikinci Anap iktidarının, iktidara geldiği günden bu yana Yunanistan'a karşı yeni bir politika oluşturmaya çalıştığını da kaydederken, yine aynı gazetede Emmenuil Gunaris imzalı bir başka yazıda ise, Türkiye'nin barış yanlısı ve iyi niyetli gibi gözükmesinin bir tuzak olduğu iddia edildi. Gunaris, Özal'ın Davos'taki tek amacının, Türkiye'nin AET'ye tam üyeliğini Yunanistan'a kabul ettirmek olduğunu da öne sürdü. Aynı yazar, Ege kıta sahanlığının yüzde 97,4'ünün Yunanistan'a ait olduğunu da savundu. (01. 25.1988)
49	Papandreaun yanlısı haftalık To Vima Gazetesi (01. 25.1988)
50	Piri Reis araştırma gemisinin Ege'yi ikiye böleceği ve Başbakan Özal'ın Kıbrıs konusunda jest yapacağı iddialarına yer veren, Yunan ve Rum basını (01.30.1988)
51	Nato'nun hafif baskı yaptığını yazan Yunan ve Rum basını (01.30.1988)
52	Gümülcine'de meydana gelen olaylarla ilgili olarak Yunan hükümetinin olayı tamamen görmezlikten geldiğini, Başbakan Özal'ın ise küçük hadiseler şeklindeki değerlendirmesiyle, bunların Davos programını bozmayacağını bildirdiğini yazan Kathimerini (01.31.1988)



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53	Özal ve Papandreu'nun Davos'ta önceki gün yaptıkları ilk raunt görüşmelerini, genellikle olumlu olarak değerlendiren Yunanistan'da yayınlanan gazeteler (02.01.1988)
54	"Davos'ta kağıtlar gölge altında açıldı, iki başbakan iyimser" başlığı ile verdiği haberinde her iki başbakanın gerek Piri Reis gemisinin Ege'ye açılması, gerekse Gümölcine'de meydana gelen olayların, bu görüşmeyi etkilemeyeceği imajını verdiklerini belirten hükümet yanlısı Etnos gazetesi (02.01.1988)
55	Bu iki olayı "gölge" olarak niteleyen Etnos gazetesi (02.01.1988)
56	
57	
58	Elefterotipiya: Özal Atina'da. Davos'ta tarihi karar. Gazete, Davos'ta Türk- Yunan ilişkilerinde hiçbir sorun çözümlenmese de tehdit yerine artık diyalogun söz konusu olduğunu yazdı. (02.01.1988)  Mesimvrini: Davos'ta anlaşılabilir, savaşa hayır dediler.
59	Papandreu'nun Davos ile Yunanistan'ı "tehlikeli bir maceraya sürüklediği" yorumları yapan muhalefet gazetelerinden Messimvrini, Estia, Apoyevmatini (02.12.1988)
60	Davos ile birlikte Papandreu'nun yedi yıldır Türkiye'ye karşı izlediği politikanın yanlış olduğunun ortaya çıktığını öne süren Elefterotipia (02.12.1988)
61	Ege'de geçen mart ayında yaşanan krizin Türk ve Yunan başbakanlarının dikkatlerini başka yöne çekmek amacıyla hazırladıkları "diplomatik bir hamle" olduğunu ileri süren muhalefet yanlısı Vradini Gazetesi (03.01.1988)
62	Çoğu, "Özal, Papulyas ve Pangalos'u yedi", "Papandreu-Özal anlaşması ciddi görüş ayrılıklarına yol açtı" şeklinde manşetler atan Yunan gazeteleri (03.08.1988)
63	Meriç nehrinin Türkiye kıyı boyuna dikey şekilde setler çekildiğini ve akan suyun yönünün değiştirilmesi yoluyla, Yunanistan'dan toprak çalındığını öne süren Ta Nea (01.10.1988)
64	İsmi açıklanmayan yüksek rütbeli bir subayın, İpsala'da yapılan barajın savaşta kullanılmasının planlandığı yolundaki iddiaları yer veren Ta Nea (01.10.1988)
65	Uçağın Türk ve Yunan savaş uçakları arasındaki "dog fight- it dalaşı" diye bilinen karşılıklı taciz uçuşları nedeniyle düştüğünü duyuran Yunanistan'da yayın yapan özel Sky Radyosu (12.29.1995)
66	İki gündür "Türkiye, Yunanistan topraklarına göz dikti" başlıkları atan Yunan basını (01.27.1996)
67	Bir bardakta fırtına koparan Yunan medyası (01.27.1996)
68	Olayı ilk haber olarak veren Yunan televizyon ve radyoları (01.27.1996)
69	Krizi "yeni ve çirkin Türk komedisi" başlığıyla veren Etnos Gazetesi (01.27.1996)
70	Türkiye'nin hedefinin 12 Adalar olduğunu ileri süren Eleferos Tipos Gazetesi (01.27.1996)
71	Hürriyet'e saldıran Yunan medyası (01.29.1996)
72	Hürriyet Gazetesi'nin Kardak kayalığındaki Yunan bayrağını indirip Türk bayrağı çekmesinin tahrik edici olduğunu öne süren Antenna Televizyonu (01.29.1996)
73	Bu olayın ardında Türk istihbaratının bulunduğunu, gazetelerin böyle bir tutum takınamayacaklarını iddia eden Antenna Televizyonu (01.29.1996)
74	Ege'de muhtemel sıcak olaylara karşı, Türkiye'nin önerdiği ve ABD'nin de desteklediği güven artırıcı önlemlere ihtiyaç bulunmadığını öne süren Pangalos'un demeç verdiği haftalık To Vima Gazetesi (01.29.1996)
75	Milli marşlarını söyleyen Yunanlıları görüntüleyen ancak Yunanlı askerlerin görüntülerini yayınlamayan özel bir TV (01.30.1996)
76	İlk önce kayalıklara asker çıktığını duyuran, daha sonra bu kişilerin Antenna Televizyonu ekibi olduğunu bildiren Yunan Mega televizyonu (01.30.1996)

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77	Yunan televizyonlarının yayınladığı haberlere göre, Kalimnos Adası'ndan bir papaz, birkaç adalı ve çocukla birlikte Kardak kayalığına çıkarak, ellerinde Yunan bayraklarıyla Yunan milli marşını söyleyen Antenna TV ekibi (01.30.1996)
78	Hürriyet'i manşet yapan Yunanistan gazeteleri (01.30.1996)
79	Sivilleri uzun uzun görüntülerken, kayalıklarda mevzilenen askerleri filme almamaya dikkat eden Yunan televizyonları (01.30.1996)
80	Hürriyet ekibinin Kardak kayalığına bayrak dikmesini birinci sayfadan manşet veren ve Hürriyet'e saldıran Yunanistan gazeteleri (01.30.1996)
81	"Türkler bayrak dikti" başlığıyla verdiği haberinde, Ankara'nın ilk kez Yunanistan'dan toprak talebinde bulunduğunu öne süren Elefterotipia (01.30.1996)
82	Hürriyet ekibinin Yunan bayrağını indirip, Türk Bayrağı'nı adaya çekmesiyle krizin tırmandığını iddia eden Ta Nea Gazetesi (01.30.1996)
83	Türkiye'nin iç sorunlarını ört bas etmeye ve dikkatleri dışarıya çekmeye çalıştığını öne süren Ta Nea Gazetesi (01.30.1996)
84	"Türk ajanlarının gösterisi... Türkiye'nin hedefi Ege adaları" başlığıyla verdiği haberde, Yunan hükümetinin Türkiye'yi sert bir dille protesto ettiğini duyuran iktidardaki PASOK'un yayın organı olan Etnos Gazetesi (01.30.1996)
85	Bayrak indirme olayıyla Türkiye'nin Yunanistan'ı uluslararası alanda küçük düşürdüğünü savunarak Yunan ordusunun alarma geçirildiğini bildiren sağ eğilimli Elefteros Tipos (01.30.1996)
86	
87	Hürriyet ekibinin Kardak Kayalığı'na bayrak diktiğini bildirirken, "bizim savaş gemilerimiz neredeydi? Niye Yunan bayrağının indirilmesine izin verildi?" diyerek Atina Hükümeti'ni eleştiren Adesmoftos Tipos (01.30.1996)
88	
89	Bölgede güvenlik tedbirleri alındığı halde, Hürriyet helikopterinin kayalığa inmesine seyirci kalındığını öne sürerek, Yunanistan'ın savunma sisteminde boşluk olduğunu vurgulayan Adesmoftos Tipos (01.30.1996)
90	Hürriyet ekibinin Kardak Kayalığı'na çıkıp Yunanistan bayrağını indirişini ve Türk bayrağını çekişini dakikalarca yayınlayan televizyonlar (01.30.1996)
91	Genel Yayın Yönetmeni Ertuğrul Özkök'le yaptığı röportajı yayınlayan, krizi başlatan Antenna Televizyonu (01.30.1996)
92	"Özkök, krize ılımlı yaklaşıyor" diyen Antenna Televizyonu (01.30.1996)
93	
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95	"Tarihin en büyük diplomatik yenilgisi" yorumlarını yapan Yunan gazeteleri (02.01.1996)
96	"Mili utanç gecesi" başlığı ile çıkan, Simitis Hükümetini yerden yere vuran Elefteros Tipos Gazetesi (02.01.1996)
97	Kardak'a yakın Kilimli Adası'ndaki Yunan topçusunun, mevzileri terk edip kaçışını fotoğraflı olarak veren Adesmeftos Tipos Gazetesi (02.02.1996)
98	Başbakan Simitis'in istifasını isteyen Yunan basını (02.02.1996)
99	Ta Nea: Ege'de büyük yara aldık. Elefterotipia: Uluslararası alanda yalnız kaldık. Katmerini: Ulusal hezimet yaşadık. Etnos: Asıl savaş Atina'da patladı. Sorumlular istifa. Ades Eftos Tipos: Simitis, Arsenis ve Pangalos, Yunanistan'ı yaktı. (02.02.1996)

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100	Genel Kurmay Başkanı Limberis ve kuvvet komutanlarının istifalarının istendiğini yazan To Vima Gazetesi (02.03.1996)
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103	Televizyon kanallarının görüntülerinde sık sık ortaya çıkan C130 Transall tipi uçağın geçişini "Taciz uçuşu" olarak değerlendiren televizyon muhabirleri (02.02.1996)
104	"Şimdi Türkler saldırısın" başlığıyla verdiği haberde yeni hükümetin krizde hezimete uğramasına rağmen güvenoyu almasını şaşkıncı bulan Elefterotipia (02.02.1996)
105	"Ege'de büyük yara aldık" diyen Pasok yanlısı gazete Ta Nea (02.02.1996)
106	"Türk askerleri Yunan kuvvetlerinin haberi olmadan nasıl adacığa çıktı?" diye soran Ta Nea (02.02.1996)
107	Krizden sonra bu hükümet niçin istifa etmedi, nasıl güvenoyu alabildi? Yunanistan'ın ulusal bir hezimet yaşammasına nasıl izin verdiler? Sorularını ortaya atan Katimerini (02.02.1996)
108	Ades Eftos Tipos: Simitis, Arsenis ve Pangalos Yunanistan'ı yaktılar (02.02.1996)
109	Kilimli Adası'ndaki bir mevzide modern bir uçaksavar topu ile yedek namlusu ve diğer parçalarının terk edilmiş halde bulunduğunu resimli geniş bir haberle duyuran Adesmeftos Tipos Gazetesi (02.02.1996)
110	Kilimli Adası'nın Türk sahillerine bakan kesiminde inşa edilmiş beton mevzide, terk edilmiş halde bulunan modern uçaksavar topu ile ilgili haberinde "Deniz kuvvetlerimizin burnunun dibindeki Kardak grubuna dahil ikinci kayalığa Türk komandolarının çıktıkları bir sırada, Kilimli'de bir uçaksavar ile donatılmış mevzide tek asker bile yoktu" diyen Adesmeftos Tipos Gazetesi (02.02.1996)
111	Mevzideki topun "sandıktan yeni çıkarılmış olduğunu" belirterek Kilimli'yi bu boş mevzilerle mi savunacaktık?" diye yazan Adesmeftos Tipos Gazetesi (02.02.1996)
112	Pasok İcra Komitesi'nde Yunanistan'ın Türkiye karşısında ağır bir yenigiye uğranmasından, başta Dışişleri Bakanı Pangalos ile Savunma Bakanı Arsenis'in sorumlu tutulduğu, Başbakan Simitis'in de eleştirilere hedef olduğunu belirten Yunan basını (02.04.1996)
113	Kardak Krizi sırasında Türkiye'ye gelip istediği gibi çalışan Yunan gazetecileri (02.05.1996)
114	Kardak Krizi sırasında, İstanbul ve Bodrum'da hem Türk meslektaşlarından, hem de Türk görevlilerden yardım gören Yunan gazetecileri (02.05.1996)
115	Manşetlerinde Özkök'ün yazısından alıntılar yaparak, Başbakan Çiller'i eleştiri bombardımanına tutan Yunan gazeteleri (02.07.1996)
116	Çiller'i ipleri yeniden germekle suçlayan Yunan gazeteleri (02.07.1996)
117	Ellerinde önceden yazılmış sorularla, toplantıdan toplantıya koşarak, soru sorma bahanesi ile Amerikalı yetkilileri Yunan görüşü doğrultusunda etkilemek için nutuk atan Yunanlı gazeteciler (02.09.1996)
118	Yunanlılara bazı ABD Dışişleri görevlileri yardımcı oluyor. Önceki gün Avrupa Dairesi'ndeki bir Amerikalı görevli, Dışişleri Bakanlığı'nda gerektiğinde gazetecilerin sorunlarını cevaplandırın görevlilere yardımcı olmak amacıyla hazırlanan bir bilgi notunu önce Yunanistan'ın Washington Büyükelçiliğine, oradan da sanki Beyaz Saray sözcüsü McCury'nin açıklamasıymış gibi Yunan basınına sızdırdı. Bu haberlere göre ABD yönetimi, Türkiye ve Yunanistan'dan vakit geçirmeden Lahey Adalet Divanı'na gitmelerini istedi. Yunan basını ve Washington'daki Rumlar dün bu haber üzerine tekrar zafer havasına büründüler. (02.09.1996)
119	Barışçı düşünceleri nedeniyle kendi memleketinde saldırıya uğrayan cesur gazeteci (02.10.1996)
120	Saldırının Kardak krizinin ardından dostluk mesajı içeren yayımlar yapmasından kaynaklandığını belirten gazeteci Giannis Tzumas (02.10.1996)
121	"Yunan hükümeti savaş çıkacakmış gibi davranıyor. Sizin ise rahat olmanıza şaşırıyoruz" diyen Giannis Tzumas (02.10.1996)
122	İzmir'in Çeşme ilçesi ile 9 mil uzaklıkta bulunan Yunanistan'ın Sakız Adası arasında dostluk köprüsü kurmak için büyük uğraş veren Giannis Tzumas (02.10.1996)
123	Çeşme- Sakız" kardeş şehir kampanyasını başlatan ve belediye başkanlarını bir araya getiren Giannis Tzumas (02.10.1996)

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124	Gazetesinde sık sık barış mesajları içeren yazılar yayınlayan Giannis Tzumas (02.10.1996)
125	Sakız Adası Belediye Başkanı Georgi Zorzi Vakaris ile Çeşme Belediye Başkanı Nuri Ertan'ı yan yana getirerek, dostluğun mimarlığını üstlenen Giannis Tzumas (02.10.1996)
126	Ege'de Midilli Adası'nın kuzeyinde ve İstanköy Adası'nın da doğusundaki deniz ve hava sahalarında gerçekleştirilecek olan TSK'nın programlı tatbikatı ile ilgili haberini "Ege'de yine sıcak bir gün başlıyor" başlığı altında ve bir telaş havası estirecek üslupta yayınlayan Etnos Gazetesi (02.12.1996)
127	Ege'deki Yunan kuvvetlerine ıssız adalar ile kayalıkların koruma altına alınması için emir verildiğini ve "Tanagra", "Nea Anghialos" ile "Girit-Suda" hava üslerindeki Yunan uçaklarının da hazır olmasına geçildiğini belirten Etnos Gazetesi (02.12.1996)
128	(...) Elefteros Tipos Gazetesi'nin iddiasına göre, Yunanistan, Kardak Krizi'nden kısa bir süre sonra, Ege'deki "egemenlik hakkını koruma" iddiasıyla toplam 25 kayalık ve ıssız adacığa asker çıkardı, bayrak dikti. Aynı habere göre, Yunanistan'ın bu hareketi üzerine Türkiye devreye girdi ve adacıkların askerlerden arındırılmasını istedi. (...) Gazete, ABD Dışişleri Bakan Yardımcısı Richard Holbrooke'un, Yunanistan Dışişleri Bakanı Teodoros Pangalos ile geçen hafta yaptığı bir telefon görüşmesinde, Yunan askerlerinin sözkonusu adacıklardan çekilmelerini istediğini kaydetti. Türk Dışişleri Bakanlığı yetkilileri ise söz konusu olaydan haberdar olmadıklarını söylediler. Bazı güvenilir kaynaklar, geçen hafta Ege'de küçük çaplı bir krizin yaşandığını, ancak Elefteros Tipos'un iddia ettiği gibi Yunanistan'ın asker çıkardığı ada sayısının 2 olmadığını söylediler." (02.14.1996)
129	Türkiye'ye karşı belki de ilk kez bu kadar sıcak ve sevgi dolu makalelere yer veren ve Yunan halkına Türk depremzedelere yardım etmeleri için çağrıda bulunan Yunan basını (08.21.1999)
130	Depremden etkilenen çocuklara yardım etmek isteyenler için bir banka hesabı açarak, Yunan vatandaşlarını para yardımı yapmaya çağıran Yunanistan'ın Ta Nea Gazetesi (08.22.1999)
131	Açtığı hesaba, ilk olarak kendisi 6 milyon drahmi (yaklaşık 8,5 milyar lira) yatıran Ta Nea Gazetesi (08.21.1999)
132	Hürriyet'in Yunanistan'ın deprem felaketi karşısında gösterdiği duyarlılığa teşekkür etmek için "Teşekkürler Komşu" başlığı ve "Efaristo Poli File" notuyla yayınladığı haber Atina'da büyük yankı uyandırdı. Hürriyet'in haberine geniş yer ayıran Yunan radyo ve televizyonları, "Hürriyet, Türkiye'nin yardımına koşan tüm ülkelere teşekkür etti. Ancak Yunanistan'a özel ve çok güzel bir şekilde teşekkür etti" dediler. Yayın organları, Hürriyet'in Yunanistan'a teşekkür etmesinin çok hoş ve nazik bir hareket olduğunu belirttiler. Türkiye'deki deprem felaketi Yunan basınında ilk gündem maddesi olmaya devam ederken, özel TV kanalı Antenna, haberin kúpürüyle birlikte Yunanca tercümesini de verdi ve Yunanistan'ın depreme ilgisinin Türk kamuoyunda yarattığı duygusallık Hürriyet gazetesi tarafından Efaristo Poli File başlığıyla dile getirildi dedi. Star özel TV kanalı ise Türkiye'nin en büyük ve en saygın gazetesi Yunanistan'a çok özel bir şekilde teşekkür etti, dedi. (08.23.1999)
133	Başbakan Kostas Simitis ile Dışişleri Bakanı Yorgo Papandreau'nun, bu konuda (Yunanistan'ın son günlerde Türkiye'nin AB ile olan ilişkileri konusunda ortaya koyduğu tavır değişikliği) kesin bir karar almalarında, AB'nin Türkiye ile olan ilişkilerini geliştirmek amacıyla uyguladığı yeni bir strateji çerçevesinde, Brüksel'de Türk ve Yunan temsilciler arasında yapılan bir dizi gizli temaslar sonucunda, Türkiye'nin verdiği "garantilerin" etkili olduğunu yazan, iktidar yanlısı To Vima gazetesi (08.23.1999)
134	Selanik'te çok sayıda sivil toplum örgütü ve vatandaşların depremzedelere yardım amacıyla Selanik Türk Başkonsolosluğu'na başvurduğunu belirten Yunan Makedonya Haber Ajansı (08.24.1999)
135	"Hepimiz Türküz", "Kardeşim Mehmet metin ol" başlıklı duygusal yazıların çıktığı Yunan basını (08.25.1999)
136	Hürriyet'in büyük yankı uyandıran haberini tam çevirisiyle yayınlayan Elefterotipia Gazetesi (08.25.1999)
137	İki ülke ve komşuluk ilişkileri konusunda duygusal yorumlar yapan, bir zamanlar Türkiye'yi yerden yere vuran Yunan gazeteleriyle radyo ve televizyonları (08.25.1999)

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138	Efharisto Poli başlığını ve haberi çok sıcak olarak nitelendiren Elefterotipia gazetesi (08.25.1999)
139	Yunan basınında halkın duygu ve düşüncelerine tanıklık eden kalemlere teşekkürler, elleri dert görmesin. (Özdemir İnce) (08.26.1999)
140	Geçen hafta Hepimiz Türküz başlığını atan Yunanistan'ın en büyük gazetesi Ta Nea'nın Genel Yayın Yönetmeni, şaşkırtan desteği Hürriyet'e anlattı: Hepimiz Türküz başlığını attıktan sonra bir iki arkadaş sıkıntıya girmez miyiz diye sordu. Yaptığının doğruluğuna inanıyordum. Ama hiç tepki gelmedi. Ben bile şaşkırdım. (...) Türkler bu yardımla silah alır diyen Pasok'lu parlamenterin çatlak sesi azınlıkta kaldı. İki ülke arasındaki bu sıcak atmosferi devam ettirmek için şimdi çaba harcamak gerekiyor. (08.29.1999)
141	Kranidiotis ile Papandreu arasında Türkiye'ye dair görüş ayrılığı olduğunu söyleyen Yunan basını (08.31.1999)
142	İskeçe Valiliği ile beraber konser düzenleyen Devlet Televizyonu ENA (08.31.1999)
143	Türk halkının başına gelen felaketten sonra gördüklerinin karşısında hiç vakit kaybetmeden Valilik ve bir müzik grubuyla kampanya başlatan Yunan Devlet Televizyonu ENA. (09.02.1999)
144	Anons yapıp "her an kafasına bir şey atılabilir" diyerek, halka Pangalos'un kullandığı yollardan geçmeme uyarısında bulunan bir Yunan radyosu (09.02.1999)
145	Papandreu için demediğini bırakmayan Pangalos'u azgın bir boğaya benzeten Yunan basını (09.02.1999)
146	Sağ olduğunu saptadığı üç Yunanlıdan ikisini kurtaran Akut'un bu başarısını, "enkaz altındakileri Türk ve Yunan elleri hayata çekti" deyimini kullanarak canlı olarak yayınlayan Yunan TV'leri (09.09.1999)
147	Türk kurtarma ekibinin Atina'daki çalışmalarından büyük bir övgüyle bahseden, Akut'un en tehlikeli yerlerde görev yaparak, depremden 33 saat sonra enkaz altında canlı insan bulmasını büyük bir başarı olarak değerlendiren Yunan televizyon kanalları (09.09.1999)
148	Deprem sonrasında hızla Atina'nın yardımına koşan Türkiye'nin, özellikle Akut'un çabasına övgüler yağdıran Yunan basını (09.10.1999)
149	"İnsanlığın etnik kimliği yok" başlığını atan Ta Nea (09.10.1999)
150	"Türkler Yunanlılarla el ele" diyen Apoyevmatini (09.10.1999)
151	Türk gazetelerinin Yunanca komşu geçmiş olsun başlıklarından mutlu olduklarını, moral buldukların yazan ve Türk basınının büyük bir dayanışma örneği gösterdiğini vurgulayan Eksusia (09.10.1999)
152	(...) Güney Kıbrıs'ta yayınlanan Fileleftheros Gazetesi, "onu Attila kurtardı" başlıklı haberinde (...) "Kader, Türkiye'nin kurtarma timi tarafından kurtarılmasını istedi. Olayın trajikomik yanı ise bu üyenin isminin Attila olmasıydı. Böylece 1974'te adasının bölündüğüne şahit olan ve yaşamı Attila yüzünden altüst olan Andreas Markus, artık hayatını Attila'ya borçlu" dedi. (09.10.1999)

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153	<p>(...) Yunan basını, yatırımların korunması ve çifte vergilendirmenin önlenmesi konulu iki anlaşmanın imzaya hazır olduğunu yazdı. Yapılan görüşmelerin ikinci derecede önem taşıyan konuları kapsamına rağmen görüşmelerde büyük ilerleme kaydediliyor olmasının Türk- Yunan ilişkileri açısından umut verici olduğunu vurgulayan gazeteler, Yunan hükümet yetkililerinin de itiraf ettikleri gibi, iki ülkeyi vuran depremlerin iki ülke yakınlaşmasına büyük ivme kazandırdığına işaret ettiler. Gazeteler, "Türkiye ve Yunanistan"ı yönetenlerin, vatandaşlarının yüksek sesle dile getirdikleri dostluk ve barış taleplerini duymuşa benzedikleri" yorumunu yaptılar. Bu arada Kathimerini Gazetesi, Türkiye ile Yunanistan'ın yakınlaşmasına uluslararası basının "deprem diplomasisi" adını verdiğine dikkati çekerek, "sismik hareketler, iki ülkeyi ayırdığı gibi yakınlaştırdı da" dedi. Bir dönemlerin ünlü araştırma gemisi Sismik-1'e atıfta bulunan gazete, "bir zamanlar bu geminin Çanakkale Boğazı'ndan geçmesi bile iki ülkenin sallanmasına neden oluyordu. Şimdiki sismik hareketler ise Ege'de gerginliğe yol açmak bir yana, yumuşama ve dostluk ortamına yol açtı" ifadesini kullandı. (09.11.1999)</p>
154	<p>(...) Avrupa Gazeteciler Birliği (AEJ)'nin onursal başkanı olan Yunanlı gazeteci Athanase Papandropulas da yaptığı konuşmada Türkiye'deki depremin Atina'dakinden 180 kat daha şiddetli olduğunu belirtti. Papandropulas, Türk depremzedelerle dayanışma amacıyla Yunanistan ve Kıbrıs'taki (Rum Kesimi) gazetecilerden 16 bin dolar yardım topladıklarını ve bu parayı Türkiye'ye giderek depremzedelere vereceklerini ifade etti. (09.14.1999)</p>
155	<p>Hürriyet'in iki ülkedeki depremzedelerin yardımına koşan Türk ve Yunan kurtarma ekipleri AKUT ve EMAK'ın Nobel Barış Ödülü'ne aday gösterilmesi önerisine Yunan basınından büyük destek geldi. Elefterotipia Gazetesi, "Hürriyet'in bu önerisini selamlıyoruz" diyerek Mikis Teodorakis'in "onlar zaten gönüllerimizin Nobel'ini kazandılar. Nobel için bundan daha iyi bir seçim yapılamaz sözlerine yer verdi. Böyle bir öneriye kimsenin hayır deme hakkı yok, diyen Elefterotipia Gazetesi, Hürriyet'in iki ülkede peş peşe yaşanan deprem afetlerinden sonra komşu ülkedeki felaketzedelerin yardımına koşan yardım ekiplerine Nobel verilmesi yolundaki önerisine Yunan kamuoyundan hemen cevap geldiğine dikkat çekti. (09.15.1999)</p>

Türk ve Yunan jetlerinin dün Ege Denizi üzerinde çarpışarak düşmesi Yunan basınında geniş yer buldu. Yunan gazetelerinde ağırlıklı olarak Türk tarafı suçlanırken, bazı yayın organları da kaza sonrası Yunan ve Türk yetkililerin soğukkanlı davranarak krizin önlendiğini vurguladı. Yunan gazetelerinin birinci sayfalarının neredeyse tamamını kaza haberine ayırması dikkat çekti.

Etnos gazetesi haberi "Ankara Ege'de silah çekti" başlığıyla verirken, "Yunanlı pilot gibi Türkiye'ye karşı politikamızın da akıbeti bilinmiyor?" yorumunda bulundu. Gazete, "Ya Türk pilot kayıp olsa ne olacaktı? diye sordu. Etnos, neden sadece Yunanlı pilotun öldüğü, ikinci Yunanlı pilotun ifadesinin neden açıklanmadığı, Dışişleri Bakanı Abdullah Gül ve Yunanistan Dışişleri Bakanı Dora Bakoyanni'nin gerilimi azaltmak için hangi formülü kullandığı gibi sorulan cevapsız kaldığını yazdı.

Ta Nea gazetesi de "Türklerin mesajı kabadayalık" başlıklı haberinde Türkiye'nin kurtarma bölgelerinde gri bölgeler istediğini ve Türk pilotun silah çekerek Yunanlı kurtarma ekiplerini kovduğunu iddia etti. Apoyevmatini gazetesi ise "Çatışma son anda önlendi" önledi başlıklı haberinde, Türk pilotların kabadayılık yapmaları için emir aldığını savundu. Gazete, Paris'te bulunan Başbakan Kostas Karamanlis'in olayın ardından ülkeye dönmemesini de eleştirdi.

To Vima gazetesi ise "Havada çarpışma, karada soğukkanlılık" başlıklı haberinde 'Atina ve Ankara'nın tonlarını alçak tutuyor' yorumunda bulundu. Kazayı, Katimerini gazetesi "Ege'de ölümcül çarpışma", Avgi, "Önceden bilinen trajedi", Rizospastis, "Ege'de ateşle oynamak", Elefteros Tipos "Çarpışma kriz yaratmadı", Elefterotipia da "30 dakikalık savaş gerilimi" başlıklarıyla duyurdu.

Yunanistan Komünist partisinin yayın organı Makedonia ise

156 "İşte dostluk! Trajediye kaza dediler" başlığını kullandı. (05.24.2006)

PİLOT Üsteğmen Halil İbrahim Özdemir'in Panama bandıralı "Gas Century" gemisinde kendisini almaya gelen Yunan kurtarma ekibine tabancasını çekerek karşı koyduğu iddiası tüm Yunan gazetelerinde yer aldı. Yunan NET televizyonuna göre, gemide yaşananlar Yunan kurtarma ekibi tarafından görüntülendi. Görüntülerin televizyonlara verilip verilmeyeceğine Yunan genelkurmayı karar verecek. NET, bu görüntüler arasında Türk pilotun tabanca çektiğinin görülmediğini bildirdi.

Yunan Etnos Gazetesi ise Gas Century gemisinde yaşananlar için çarpıcı iddialarda bulundu ve şöyle dedi: "Türk pilot, paraşütle denize düştükten sonra gemiye binmedi. Puma timi Yunan askeri helikopterini görünce gemiye çıktı. Yunan helikopterinden iki kişi iple gemiye doğru inerken tabancasını çekti. Geminin Filipinli mürettebatı durumu görünce Türk pilotun üzerine saldırarak onu etkisiz hale getirdi. Mürettebat, Türk pilotu kaptan köşküne götürerek kapıyı kilitledi. Türk pilot, yarım saat kaptan köşkünde kaldı."

157 (05.25.2006)

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	<p>To Vima: Havada çarpışma. Karada soğukkanlılık. Atina da Ankara da olayı küçümsemeye çalıştılar.</p> <p>Apoyevmatini: Beş kala çatışma önlendi.</p> <p>Etnos: Ankara Ege'de silahını çekti. Ege semalarında trajedi. Hem Yunanlı pilot hem de Türkiye politikamız kayıp.</p> <p>Elefteros Tipos: Çarpışma kriz getirmede. Ege'de beklenen kaza.</p> <p>Elefterotipia: 30 dakikalık korku filmi. Büyük bir krizden nasıl kaçınıldı.</p> <p>Ta Nea: Türklerden kabadayılık (tabanca iddiası). Türkler Ege'de arama ve kurtarma çalışmaları için de ihtilafli bölgeler istiyor.</p> <p>Kathimerini: Ege'de ölümcül it dalaşı. Atina ve Ankara büyük kriz tehlikesi atlattı.</p>
158	(05.25.2006)
159	Yunan televizyonlarındaki haberlere göre, öğlen saatlerinde bölgeye gelen Türk botu, Türk karasularında olduğu gerekçesiyle Yunan teknesinden bölgeden ayrılmasını istedi. Bu sırada bir Yunan sahil koruma botu da Kardak'a doğru harekete geçerken, Türk botunun bölgeden ayrıldığı iddia edildi. Yunan televizyonları mini-gerilimin büyümeden sona erdiğini belirtirken, balıkçı teknesi ile bir Yunan sahil güvenlik botunun Kardak yakınlarında beklemeye devam ettiğini duyurdu. (05.30.2006)
160	Ege'de Sakız ile Midilli adaları arasında, Türk ve Yunan savaş uçakları arasında "it dalaşı" yaşandığını ileri süren Yunan televizyonları (emphasis original) (06.01.2006)