

TURKEY - EU RELATIONS

FROM 1997 to 2004:

PLACE OF TURKEY IN THE EUROPEAN PROJECT

CEREN PİDECİOĞLU

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EMRE GÖNEN

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**TURKEY - EU RELATIONS
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**1997' DEN 2004' E TÜRKİYE – AB İLİŞKİLERİ:
TÜRKİYE' NİN AVRUPA PROJESİNDEKİ YERİ**

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ABSTRACT

What I will try to do in this thesis project is to give an analysis of Turkey-EU relations from three different perspectives; social, political and economical. The relations that were began in 1959 with Turkey's application to be a full member has gone through several downturns and crises. However each of these crises has created new opportunities for both sides and make sure them that neither sides may ignore the fact that how important they are for each other. Within this respect Turkey's accession process towards being a full member may be slowed down in the future due to changing political circumstances however it can never be abandoned.

ÖZET

Bu tez projesi kapsamında Türkiye – AB ilişkilerini sosyal, ekonomik ve politik açıdan üç ayrı perspektiften incelemek amacındayım. 1959 yılında Türkiye' nin AET' ye tam üyelik başvurusuyla başlayan ilişkilerde birçok krizler yaşandı. Bununla birlikte bu krizler her iki taraf içinde yeni fırsatlar yarattı ve her iki tarafında birbirleri için olan öneminin görmezden gelinemeyeceğini kanıtladı. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye' nin tam üyelik yolundaki ilerleme süreci gelecekteki değişen siyasi şartlara bağlı olarak gerileyebilir veya yavaşlayabilir. Ancak asla sonlandırılmaz.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party
ANAP	Motherland Party
AP	Accession Partnership
CEEC	Central and Eastern European Countries
CHP	Republican People's Party
CU	Customs Union
DP	Democrat Party
DGM	State Security Courts
DYP	True Path Party
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MSP	National Salvation Party
MHP	Nationalist Action Party
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	National Security Council
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PHARE	Poland and Hungary Action for Restructuring of the Economy
PKK	Kurdistan Worker's Party
SHP	Social Democrat People's Party
SU	Soviet Union
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USA	United States of America
VP	Virtue Party
WEU	Western European Union

INTRODUCTION

The story between EU and Turkey which has begun in 1959 by the application for a full membership from the Turkish side is full of crises and downfalls as well as with great endeavors and opportunities. However, there is one fact that Turkey's accession process is nothing like previous enlargement stories which has happened before. While even during the good times there has been significant rejections and suspicions from both sides to each other, neither EU and Turkey could dare to turn their back to each other forever even during the worst days of their relations.

What I plan to do for this thesis project is that I will analyze internal and global aspects of both sides which shape the context of their relations through different time zones and how their attitudes are influenced by these internal conflicts and external pressure. Looking the relations between Turkey and EU from this historical perspective will enable me to make further assumptions for the future of the Turkey-EU relations. Keeping in mind that Turkey has granted the right to begin negotiation process with the current political leadership of Justice and Development party (AKP), the main question which comes to our mind is that is this process sustainable and an irreversible process regardless of any political changes on internal and external political stages of both parties, or is it an endless path only to be exploited by the authorities who hold the power on different time periods.

Based on their background on the second part of my thesis which comes after the introduction, I will try to give historical perspective to Turkey-EU relations between the date 1959 during which the Turkish side had made his first application for a full membership to 1997 when the Luxembourg summit had been organized. I will try to fragment this time period in to four different parts by explaining the signing decision and application of Ankara Agreement and also by providing a brief flashback to crucial events reflected as critical turning points during 1970s, 80s and 90s.

On the third part of my thesis, I will focus on the Luxembourg summit which has been reflected as the down point of the Turkey-EU relations through 1990's and the event which followed the Luxembourg summit, led to moderate policy shifts which resulted by Turkey to grant a candidacy status in Helsinki summit by the help of Greece government which had changed its attitudes towards Turkey's accession process thanks to newly appointed Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou.

Despite to significant improvements in relations within Turkey-EU-Greece triangle there were serious concerns about if this rapprochement era would be limited to individual efforts of Ismail Cem, Turkish Foreign Minister of the time, and George Papandreou. However, the consecutive power changes in both countries after the elections, which took place 2002 and 2003, the both governments had shown their determination for the continuation of the rapprochement process. However newly elected government of Turkey headed by Justice and Development Party has been surprisingly very committed to Turkey's reformation process which has led to it's success to receive a date for the negotiation process. One crucial aspect of Copenhagen Summit was that it took place during a time period when US had declared it's decisiveness for a military action on Iraq in the post September 11th era.

On the fourth part of the thesis, I will try to look at the insight of Turkey and EU relations from political, socio-cultural and economic dimensions. What are the benefits and disadvantages for both sides to integrate? And is the risk which may be caused by a possible non-accession manageable for both EU and Turkey?

Finally, in the conclusion part I will try to make assumptions for Turkey's strategy on its way for being a full member. Definitely there is going to be obstacles which may easily transform in to political crises; however are these crises will maintain new opportunities for progress? Or are they going to be too much to handle for both EU and Turkey.

1959–1997: TURKEY-EU RELATIONS FROM THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

1960's: Ankara Agreement: Application for Associate Membership

The history of Turkey and European Community relations began with the application of Turkey for associate membership of the European Economic Community in July 1959 shortly after the Greek application. Fundamental reasons could be realized in Turkey's application for associate membership status during this period. The first one was the identity issue. Turkish political elites believed that closer relations with the emerging European Community would be coherent with their aim for maintaining the secular, democratic and western-oriented structure of Turkey.¹ The other factor that shaped the Turkey's view to EEC was the hope to hold some opportunity to get rid of the economic gap inside.² In addition to these, Turkey had been an important ally and pivotal state for the United States during the Cold War era. It was among the selected group of countries with whom special strategic relationships had been developed according to the American economic and security interests, as the containment of the Soviet threat constituted the prime anxiety during the Cold War period.³

But the years during the establishment of the European Common Market and the acceleration of the European Integration came across with the years that Turkey's relations with the US became strained. The decrease in the economic aids coming from the US and tied to some conditions, directed Turkey to look for new resources that could open credits for long periods.⁴ So, closer relations would help to develop its external relations with EEC that it would help to reduce the

¹ Ziya Öniş (2000) "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative Historical Perspective", in: *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol.7, No.1, pp.7-8

² Baskın Oran (2002), *Türk Dış Politikası*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, p.813

³ Ziya Öniş & Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey–EU-US Triangle in perspective: Transformation or Continuity", in: *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.59, No.2, p.1

⁴ Baskın Oran (2002), *Türk Dış Politikası*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, p.813

countries dependence on the United States.⁵

Besides these, the most important reason was not to be left out or left behind Greece. The other reason was to prevent Greece from taking unfair advantage in its bilateral relations with Turkey, given the long standing disputes over Cyprus and Aegean Sea.⁶ The two rival countries had similar positions in the Europe's external relations during the 1960's. From the community's point of view, both countries were important NATO partners and critical for Western security interests and important due to their geo-strategic location as natural barriers against possible Soviet expansionism in the Cold war period. Also both wanted to reduce their dependence on the United States by developing their external economic and security ties.⁷

Inside Turkey, there were fragmentations and different beliefs about the membership application. Although Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar were thinking that membership could increase the dependence and it would help the opposition parties to gain power, the Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu believed that entering to the Common Market would increase the economic and political power of Turkey and enable the DP (Democrat Party) power to gain trust inside, so should be applied to membership. But the major turning point was as I mentioned before, the application of the Greece, as Turkey did not want this country to enter the formations and to gain power in economic and political areas that Turkey did not take part.⁸

Furthermore from the economical perspective; the export products of Greece were the same as Turkey, so this would cause Greece to gain some of Turkey's markets. If it was accepted to EEC, by powering its economic and political structure, it could become a more indispensable country than Turkey in the international platforms.⁹ Moreover, the political elites in Turkey noticed the long term

⁵ Ziya Öniş (2000), "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative Historical Perspective", in: *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol.7, No.1, pp.7-8

⁶ Atilla Eralp (1997), "Soğuk Savaştan Günümüze Türkiye Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri" in *Türkiye ve Avrupa*, Ankara: Imge Kitabevi Yayınları, p. 91

⁷ Ziya Öniş (2000), "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative Historical Perspective",....., pp.7-8

⁸ Baskın Oran (2002), *Türk Dış Politikası*,....., pp.814-815

⁹ Baskın, Oran (2002), *Türk Dış Politikası*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp.814-815

benefits which could be achieved through closer interaction with a powerful economic union. On the other hand, a defensive attitude was dominant in the minds of Turkish and Greek political elites in those years. Business community in the two societies strongly supported the idea that domestic industrial development would be jeopardized by the premature trade liberalization and early subjection to strong competitive pressures from the EC.¹⁰

Besides these, there were different approaches among the EEC countries towards the Turkey's application. EEC country's economy experts agreed with the idea that the level of the Turkish economy couldn't cope with the obligations that would be brought by the EEC membership. Especially, the low probability of the Turkish industry's resistance against the competition coming outwards was seen as a problem, although it was protected by the high level of custom barriers and taxes under the state control applications. Moreover, the distribution of the credits by the state banks in an uncontrolled and unplanned way and the idea that political instability could cause economic turmoil decreased the Turkey's attractiveness. On the other side, there were some people who evaluated Turkey as an extreme market with its population, geographical location and its rising economy. Those were thinking that EEC could form a high level of relationship with Turkey without giving membership by developing Turkish economy by the time the constitution of the Common Market.¹¹

As a result of these beliefs, they didn't leave the Turkey aside, there were three reasons for the positive approach to Turkey; first of all Turkey had an international policy that had tendency towards West and to be European. Turkey's strategic location was very important for the EEC which had an aim for political union rather than economic union. In those years Turkey's preference of EEC but not the EFTA which was being established by England as a rival to EEC, was a victory for

¹⁰Ziya Öniş (2000), "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative Historical Perspective", in: *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol.7, No.1, p.9

¹¹ Baskın Oran (2002), *Türk Dış Politikası*,....., p.817

EEC.¹²

It could be noticed that, as both Greek and Turkish applications increased the EEC's importance in the international and political area, EEC had to behave equal to both of these countries. Because if Turkey was left outside while Greece was accepted which were very similar in conditions, could cast a shadow on the neutrality of EEC.¹³ The rejection of the two countries could direct both to the EFTA and if the two countries were accepted, it would create problems for the EEC economy. Also, EC members were aware of the rivalry between Greece and Turkey so they didn't want to upset the balance between these two strategically important NATO allies.¹⁴

But the differences in situation of Turkey and Greece began to rise, while the negotiation process was going on. The reports that prepared during the negotiation process, emphasized that Turkey was trying to get much less responsibilities than Greece while getting the same privileges. While Greece had succeeded in harmonization of its own custom tariffs to EEC, Turkey did not get in to the study of the customs reductions. The EEC which had been following the domestic developments in Turkey closely had realized that Turkey had been dragged on an instability environment rapidly. The tough and interference policy of the DP government in the political and social area were distant from the EEC primitives. The strained environment which was formed by the supervision on the press, the prohibition on striking, the impediment of the labor unions to enter the international organizations and the oppression on the opposition party, were bothering the EEC.¹⁵

So under these conditions, EEC had decided to follow 'wait and see' policy towards Turkey. Turkish industry was standing with the protectionism by the high level of customs barriers and taxes, so these sectors couldn't resist against the EEC's competitive environment. Furthermore, as it was a quite populous country (25 million) which had agricultural, underdeveloped economy, could cause problems according to Greece. Under these circumstances, while the negotiations that had been

¹²Mehmet Ali Birand (2004), *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgası*, İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık AŞ, p.56

¹³ Mehmet Ali Birand (2004), *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgası*,....., p.56

¹⁴ Baskın Oran (2002), *Türk Dış Politikası*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, p.818

¹⁵Mehmet Ali Birand (2004), *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgası*,....., p.65

carried on with Greece had been decided to start, it was decided that the preparations with Turkey had to go on.¹⁶

In Turkey, Menderes government was face to face with the collapse in 1960. So the relations with the EEC had been suspended after the military coup occurred in Turkey, as EEC had accepted democracy as a main element.¹⁷ On the contrary to its old manner of conduct, Turkey wanted to enter customs union as soon as possible. They also started to accept the 12 years process enough despite 22 year process. During this time, after the postponement of the application of England to EEC by France, the EEC which didn't want to be seen closed to new members had started to give big concessions to Greece. As Turkey wanted to be behaved in equal standards with Greece, began to perceive customs union as a priority objective for the partnership.¹⁸

When the association agreement was signed in 9 July 1961 in Athens between Greece and EEC, it was understood that Turkey was left behind Greece. The EC which didn't want to be seen as a rich men's club that was closed to others after the De Gaulle's veto against England, accepted the desires of Athens and had accelerated the Greece negotiations.¹⁹ During these events going on, the Ministry of Finance Polatkan, Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Prime Minister Menderes were executed. With the general elections made in 15 October 1961, Turkey returned to democratic life again. Two years after the conclusion of a similar agreement with Greece, an association agreement between Turkey and EEC was signed in 1963 under a new civilian government İnönü.²⁰ It took a long time to draft an agreement that was satisfactory to both sides as Ankara insisted on signing the same agreement that Greece had signed. But, as the Commission had received so many critics because of the privileges that were given to Greece, didn't want to repeat the same mistakes in

¹⁶Baskın Oran (2002), *Türk Dış Politikası*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, p.823

¹⁷Wendy Asbeek Brusse & Richard Griffiths (2004), "Good Intentions and Hidden Motives: Turkey and EU relations in a Historical Perspective". in Durmuş Özdemir & Richard Griffiths, *Turkey and the EU Enlargement*, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, pp.17-19

¹⁸ Baskın Oran (2002), *Türk Dış Politikası*, , pp.826-827

¹⁹ Mehmet Ali Birand (2004), *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgası*, İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık AŞ, p.78

²⁰Wendy Asbeek Brusse & Richard Griffiths (2004), "Good Intentions and Hidden Motives: Turkey and EU relations in a Historical Perspective". in Durmuş Özdemir & Richard Griffiths, *Turkey and the EU Enlargement*, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, p.18

Turkey's case. Also the negotiations showed that Turkish officials didn't have statistics about their country's economy and they also didn't wish to give the necessary privileges to the EC.²¹

Although EC members were aware of the difficulties that Turkish economy had, they didn't want to refuse Turkey's wish to become an associate member because of the political, strategic reasons. And in economical terms, Turkey was a rich country in energy and underground mining resources and EEC had a significant place in Turkey's external trade; 32% of imports and 35% of exports had been done with EEC. As a result of these, EC proposed Turkey a five years term for assistance, after which a customs union arrangement would be negotiated. But the long and strong efforts of the new civilian government under İnönü paved the way to the Ankara Agreement in 1963 which was the first official step of Turkey to the EEC adventure.²²

The nature of the association agreements signed with the two countries were also very similar, although the agreement with Turkey was less liberal than with Greece, because of the concerns in France and Italy.²³

Article 28 of the treaty lay down as a condition that "as soon as the operation of this agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community".²⁴

The Ankara agreement was an association agreement that contained three stage process; involving a five year preparatory phase, followed by a 12 year transition period that would start in 1973 during which the customs union would come into existence and Turkish economic policy would converge towards to the EEC and the third period would start in 1995 as the final stage, that would contain transition to full membership of the Community which coordination would take place

²¹ Mehmet Ali Birand (2004), *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgası*, İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık AŞ, pp.58-87

²² Mehmet Ali Birand (2004), *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgası*,....., pp.67-88

²³ Wendy Asbeek Brusse & Richard Griffiths (2004), "Good Intentions and Hidden Motives: Turkey and EU relations in a Historical Perspective" in Durmuş Özdemir & Richard Griffiths, *Turkey and the EU Enlargement*,....., p.18

²⁴ Christopher Brewin (2004) "Turkey's right to a date", p.4

in the economic, fiscal and competition policy of both parties.²⁵ The agreement covered a promise of full membership of the Community at an undefined date, if the appropriate conditions had been satisfied.²⁶

The reason of the extended time for transitional periods in the association agreements before full participation to the customs union and full membership was based on the argument that the early subject of the Turkish economy to full competition in the coherence of the free European market, would jeopardize Turkey's industrial development because of Turkey's low per capita incomes and limited industrial development.²⁷ The agreement also planned free mobility of labor between Turkey and the Community at some future date which would create big tensions within the community, especially from Germany who was the most recipient of migrant labor from Turkey after 1963 as cheap labor.²⁸

Although the preparations of the preparatory stage hadn't been completed, Süleyman Demirel who was the head of the Justice Party government which came to power in 1965, started attempts in EEC country's capitals to begin the transitional phase. There were two reasons for the Turkey's impetuous at that time. First one was the idea that Turkey had to pass through necessary levels rapidly because, if England would become the member which was blocked by De Gaulle's veto, Turkey's membership would get into trouble. Turkish statesmen thought that it would be more difficult to get privileges from an enlarged community. The other reason was related with Greece. Turkish officials wanted to close the gap between Greece and Turkey by benefiting from the frozen relations between Greece and EEC because of the military junta.²⁹ The decision of EEC about this

²⁵Ziya Öniş (2000), "Luxembourg Helsinki and Beyond: Towards and Interpretation of Recent Turkey EU Relations", in: *Government and Opposition*, Vol.35, No.4, p.6

²⁶ Ziya Öniş (2000), "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative Historical Perspective", in: *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol.7, No.1, p.8

²⁷ Ziya Öniş (2000), "Luxembourg Helsinki and Beyond: Towards and Interpretation of Recent Turkey EU Relations",..... , p.6

²⁸ Wendy Asbeek Brusse & Richard Griffiths (2004), "Good Intentions and Hidden Motives. Turkey and EU relations in a Historical Perspective". in Durmuş Özdemir & Richard Griffiths, *Turkey and the EU Enlargement*, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, p.18

²⁹ Mehmet Ali Birand (2004), *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgaı*, Istanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık AŞ, p.144

matter was negative. When we came to the 1967, the head of the State Planning Organization was Turgut Özal in which the personnel was divided into two parts as the ones had tendency to left side and the ones had tendency to religious basis. Both of which were against the integration with West as they were defending the idea of domestic industrialization. So they had the tendency to delay the developments for more integration. According to State Planning Organization, before entrance to customs union, Turkey had to bring its economy as the same level with EEC countries and had to industrialize rapidly. Özal didn't reject the common market but believed that Turkey which was not tied to EEC could play a significant play in the Middle East. These approaches caused differences of opinion between Foreign Ministry which defend the idea of beginning the Additional Protocol and State Planning Organization for long years. As a result of these, a new arrangement was made to divide responsibility between these two organizations. According to this arrangement, the arrangement of the technical studies was given to State Planning Organization and international representation and negotiations were left to Foreign Ministry.³⁰

Although Turkey demanded the preparation of the Additional Protocol and the start of the transitional period, it had been delayed by the EEC because Turkey couldn't evaluate the period of preparatory stage which was given for strengthening its economy. Also there were two other reasons behind this idea. First one was the enlargement process of the EEC as it was concentrated on the Ireland, England and Denmark. The other one was the new policy of EEC directed to Mediterranean countries by making trade arrangements with Israel, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia.³¹

The relations between EEC and Turkey cooled rapidly, because of the postponement of the planned reductions in import tariffs by the Turkish authorities caused by the deteriorating balance of

³⁰Atilla Eralp (1997), "Soğuk Savaşın Günümüze Türkiye Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri" in *Türkiye ve Avrupa*, Ankara: Imge Kitabevi Yayınları, p.96

³¹Baskın Oran (2002), *Türk Dış Politikası*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp.839-841

payments but also because of the political pressure applied by Turkish domestic pressures.³² The report which was prepared in 1968 didn't find Turkey adequate enough to start the transitional period. Turkey had insisted on three things: firstly the customs tariffs that were being applied to the industrial products imported from EEC countries to Turkey had to be delayed insofar as it's possible. By the time, the customs tariffs that had been applied to the Turkish agricultural products in the EEC countries had to be delayed as soon as possible. Secondly, the conditions for the free movements of the Turkish workers in the EEC countries had to be prepared. Thirdly, Turkey had to get fiscal aid from the EEC. There also occurred difference between the Foreign Ministry and the State Planning Organization again, although Foreign Ministry believed that the transitional period had to be started, State Planning Organization claimed that Turkey's advantages would be less than the obligations that would be given by the Commission, so it wouldn't be advantageous to pass the second period. But Demirel government insisted on entering the second period, so he could use this as a victory for his government against the rising Republican People's Party (CHP) and he could balance the external relations by getting closer to the EEC as the relations with United States were strained and the American opposition rose in the public opinion because of the opium poppy problem. US had started a campaign insisting that % 80 of opium poppy was being raised in Turkey and transformed in to heroin and inserted to US in an illegal way. So the pressure of the US on Turkey was increasing everyday.³³

The Commission decided that it would be better for Turkey to stay in the preparatory stage because of the economic reasons. But again, as the membership of Britain had been just refused as the second time by the French veto, EC decided to assign the Additional Protocol in 1970. The article of the Additional Protocol composed of nine subjects that were free movement of goods, abolishment of custom tariffs mutually, acceptance of common customs tariff by Turkey, the

³² Wendy Asbeek Brusse, & Richard Griffiths (2004), "Good Intentions and Hidden Motives. Turkey and EU relations in a Historical Perspective" in Durmuş Özdemir & Richard Griffiths, *Turkey and the EU Enlargement*, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, p.19

³³ Mehmet Ali Birand (2004), *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgaı*, Istanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık AŞ, pp. 194-209

abolishment of restriction on quantity and the adaptation of Turkey to the common agricultural policy, free movement of people, services, the harmonization of economic, trade, transportation policies.³⁴ Additional Protocol had put forward Turkey detailed responsibilities, obligations but on the contrary EEC would only delay the customs which applied to Turkish industrial products. Although it appeared to be like an unequal relationship, if Turkey had evaluated the preparatory stage in a better way, it could cope with the obligations easily.³⁵

³⁴ Baskın Oran (2002), *Türk Dış Politikası*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp. 844-845

³⁵ Mehmet Ali Birand (2004), *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgası*,....., pp. 194-209

1970's: Critical Turning Point in Relations

By the time, there occurred deterioration in the internal political climate in Turkey. Following violent clashes between right and left and with the military intervention in 12 March 1971, the Demirel government resigned.³⁶

1973 was an important point in Turkey's relations with the community following the signing of the Additional Protocol which required a significant lowering of protectionist barriers by the EC for Turkish manufactured exports unilaterally, with some exceptions like textiles and agricultural products. It could be said that in 1973 there was no main differences between the expectations of Turkish political elites and actual progress made in relations with the Community in line with Ankara agreement. Furthermore, it could be said that there seems to be not much difference between two major Mediterranean allies Greece and Turkey. At that time because of its level of industrial development, Turkey had needed a significant period of protectionism and adaptation for entering in to the customs union.³⁷ Furthermore, a timetable which involves a 22 years of transition period was laid out for Turkey's full participation in the customs union.³⁸

Indeed, the relations seemed to be progressing in a regular way during the beginning of the 1970's, but the signals of the negative attitude could be perceived that could occur in the free mobility of labor issue which was a major problem for Germany. It could be understood that till that time there was not much difference exist between the positions of Turkey, Spain, Greece and Portugal. Moreover, Turkey and Greece both had similar positions as an associate member, NATO ally during 1960's, 1970's. But after half of the 1970's, the fortunes of Turkey and the others

³⁶ Baskın Oran (2002), *Türk Dış Politikası*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, p.843

³⁷ Ziya Öniş (2000), "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative Historical Perspective", in: *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol.7, No.1, p.9

³⁸ Ziya Öniş (2001), "Greek Turkish Relations and The European Union: A Critical Perspective", in: *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.6, No.3, p.5

diverged rapidly.³⁹

After the signing of the Additional Protocol, the only serious problem that occurred between EC and Turkey was the 12 March military memorandum. EC had warned Turkey that the relations had been suspended with Greece because of the military junta in 1967, so if a situation like this would occur in Turkey; the relations with Turkey also could be suspended. But this didn't happen as it hadn't been done directly as a coup. After the undemocratic applications of the 12 March governors had risen, (Prime Minister: Nihat Erim), the EC started to increase its voice. The first time the European Parliament had mentioned about the violations of human rights.⁴⁰

On the other hand, in Turkey the opinions about the change of the Additional Protocol, started to increase. Turkey wasn't satisfied with the Protocol for various reasons. The economic problems in the world in 1973 because of the petrol crises, which had resulted by the rise of the inflation and unemployment, made the EC member states to turn inwards economically. While they were working on their own economic problems, they have forgotten the necessities of the common market. As a result, EC contrary to the Additional Protocol, unilaterally imposed import quotas on Turkey and the free movement of labor was not realized.

Another reason for Turkey's dissatisfaction with the Additional Protocol was the extension of concessions by the EC to many less developed countries called 77's except Turkey under the General Systems of Preferences to gain prestige against US. EC delayed these country's custom tariffs for their exports to maintain their development which caused Turkey to loose its advantages position. Furthermore, EEC made Free Trade Area (FTA) with the EFTA and other European countries so delayed all taxes and restrictions for the industrial products till 1977 and under the Global Mediterranean Policy considerably eroded the preferences granted to Turkey in agriculture and industry. EEC had done this enlargement to maintain its agricultural necessities, raw materials

³⁹ Ziya Öniş (2000), "Luxembourg Helsinki and Beyond: Towards and Interpretation of Recent Turkey EU Relations" in: *Government and Opposition*, Vol.35, No.4, p.6

⁴⁰Baskın Oran (2002), *Türk Dış Politikası*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp.846-847

cheaply and to open new market for its industrial products.⁴¹ Also another factor effecting the EC-Turkey relations was the enlargement of EC (England, Denmark, and Ireland) in 1971. The new structural and economic problems overshadowed the EC relations with Turkey. Turkey was no more given political importance as before. So the governments from 1972 started to argue that the Additional Protocol had to be revised, and Turkey had to be given more privileges and concessions.⁴²

Besides these were going on, other important events had been occurring that effect the fortunes of the Greece, Turkey and their relations with the EC. 1974 was a critical turning point in Turkey's relations with the EC and also the beginning of the divergence in the fortunes of the two countries which had similar positions in their relations with the Community.⁴³

The intervention in Cyprus in 1974 by Turkish forces, legitimized by the need to protect the rights of the Turkish Cypriot minority, caused the collapse of the military government in Greece which had been in power since 1968, led many changes in Turkish-Greek-EC triangle and caused tension between Turkey and US. American Congress had put an embargo to the sales of guns to Turkey and increased the sale of guns to Athens to create equilibrium.⁴⁴ The new government established under the Premiership of Constantine Karamanlis applied for full membership in 1975 for its political, security and economic concerns. Full membership was seen as a means of consolidating the newly developing democratic regime in Greece and to get the security threat from Turkey under control. The first Commission reports about the Greek application pointed at the weaknesses of the Greek economy and also the discrimination that could occur against the other associate member, Turkey who had similar positions. EC cancelled the Commission's recommendation and decided to open negotiations for full membership.⁴⁵

The thought behind this decision was the idea that acceptance to the Community would help

⁴¹Mehmet Ali Birand (2004), *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgaı*, İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık AŞ, pp.213-219

⁴²Mehmet Ali Birand (2004), *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgaı*,....., pp.213-219

⁴³Ziya Öniş (2000), "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative Historical Perspective", in: *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol.7, No.1, p.10

⁴⁴ Mehmet Ali Birand (2004), *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgaı*,....., p.233

⁴⁵ Ziya Öniş (2000), "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative Historical Perspective" in: *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol.7, No.1, p.10

to consolidate the democratic regime in Greece. Under the light of this decision, Greece, Spain and Portugal would be prevented from turning back to authoritarianism. But this idea was not considered in relations with Turkey.⁴⁶

So Turkey decided to ask new guarantees from the Community to prevent the loss that could occur during the Greece's negotiation process. But when the Luxembourg Foreign Minister explained that no new concessions were on the Community's agenda for Turkey, the relations were damaged in a significant way in 1976 in Luxembourg Partnership Council. As a result of this, Turkey unilaterally postponed all its obligations from the Protocol for 1 year by applying the article 60 of Additional Protocol.⁴⁷ In 1978, Ecevit government suspended its obligations to EEC when he couldn't find any response to his demands about the concessions and the financial aid from the EEC that was necessary to find a way to remedy the deterioration in the economic conditions. During this period, there was a decrease in the agreement of opinions about the EEC so the opposite ideas to the customs union had increased in bureaucracy and also in business environment.⁴⁸ By the late 1970's a change of position could be realized on the Turkish side because of the growing concern about the Greece's early accession to the Community became a possibility. Those concerns increased as Spain and Portugal also emerged by struggling for inclusion in the Community after their authoritarian past. The idea of applying for full membership had gained support in Turkey. But the growing domestic political and economic instability combined with the Islamist element in the ruling coalition government, the National Salvation Party (MSP) representing an important obstacle against EEC, had caused the delay of the application process in 1979. Finally the collapse of the democratic regime in September 1980 brought possible full membership to an end in the foreseeable future.⁴⁹

⁴⁶Ziya Öniş (2001), "Greek Turkish Relations and The European Union: A Critical Perspective" in: *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.6, No.3, p.6

⁴⁷ Baskın Oran (2002), *Türk Dış Politikası*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp.848-851

⁴⁸ Atilla Eralp (1997), "Soğuk Savaştan Günümüze Türkiye Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri" in *Türkiye ve Avrupa*, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, pp.98-99

⁴⁹Ziya, Öniş (2001), "Greek Turkish Relations and The European Union: A Critical Perspective" in: *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.6, No.3, p.7

What is surprising is why Turkey had failed to apply for full membership at the same time with Greece in 1975. Many factors for this reason; firstly, there was a miscalculation in the minds of Turkish policy makers about the potential problems that could be caused by Greece if it was accepted to the Community as a full member.⁵⁰ As Turkish policy makers saw Greece as a weak member of the EC and the perception of Turkey as a strategically and economically important country, they believed that the position of the EC towards Turkey wouldn't change after the Greece's accession to full membership. Furthermore, they imagined that acceptance to full membership at some future date was guaranteed by the Ankara agreement.⁵¹

Again, Turkish political elites because of their defensive attitude were reluctant to speed up the integration process and to subject Turkish industry to necessary competition. In spite of this, they believed to complete the timetable which was set by the Ankara agreement and the Additional Protocol would be sufficient based on the understanding that Greece's inclusion wouldn't jeopardize Turkey's situation in front of the EC.⁵²

Some people claims that Turkey, under the Premiership of Bülent Ecevit had missed an opportunity by making a mistake with not applying for full membership in the late 1970's. It is true that domestic political weaknesses and inaction on Turkey's part resulted with its self exclusion from the Community at the time of southern enlargement.⁵³ But it is not definite that applying for full membership at the same time with Greece would create the positive results especially because of the Cyprus intervention, the political and economical instability inside, its size and the existing identity issues.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Ziya, Öniş (2000), "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative Historical Perspective" in: *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol.7, No.1, p.11

⁵¹Ziya, Öniş (2001), "Greek Turkish Relations and The European Union: A Critical Perspective",..... p.6

⁵²Ziya, Öniş (2000), "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative Historical Perspective",.....p.11

⁵³ Öniş, Ziya (2000), "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative Historical Perspective",..... p.12

⁵⁴Ziya Öniş (2000), "Luxembourg Helsinki and Beyond: Towards and Interpretation of Recent Turkey EU Relations" in: *Government and Opposition*, Vol.35, No.4, p.6

1980's: Suggestion of Customs Union System instead of full membership

There occurred new events after the occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet Union and the existence of Iranian revolution in the late 1970's. The détente in the international system left its place to a period with full of international tensions. These developments increased the strategic importance of Turkey and led Turkey to become closer with United States. So the damaged relations between Turkey and United States in 1970's with the Cyprus problem began to recover rapidly. The agreement of defense and economic cooperation was signed between Turkey and United States and Turkey accepted the Rogers Plan that helped the Greece to turn again to the military wing of NATO. The decreasing aids of US in the problematic area of 1970's, began to increase in the period of 1978-1981 by four times before and became the top point in 1985. While Turkey was improving its relations with US, the tensions in the relations with EC increased. Political problems were added to the economic problems. So, new transformations occurred in the relations between West and Turkey, and it was understood that close relations with the US wouldn't bring the similar relations with EC any more. So, it could be said that there couldn't be built a Western alliance in one piece. Turkey entered a period of remoteness from EC.⁵⁵

The early 1980's constituted low point in Turkey-EC relations especially after the military coup led by the Turkish General Kenan Evren against civilian rule in September 1980. The last years of civilian rule occupied an increasing political polarization in Turkey with an armed struggle going on between right and left wing groups that caused thousands of deaths.⁵⁶ There wasn't a negative attitude in United States; but there occurred two different approaches in EC against Turkey about the military coup. Although France, Denmark, Holland suggested to suspend relations with Turkey as it

⁵⁵ Atilla Eralp (1997), "Soğuk Savaşın Günümüze Türkiye Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri" in *Türkiye ve Avrupa*, Ankara: Imge Kitabevi Yayınları, p.100

⁵⁶ Wendy Asbeek Brusse, & Richard Griffiths (2004), 'Good Intentions and Hidden Motives. Turkey and EU relations in a Historical Perspective'. in Durmuş Özdemir & Richard Griffiths, *Turkey and the EU Enlargement*, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, pp.21-22

was done to Greece in 1967. On the other side Germany, England defended the idea that the democratic system wasn't working in Turkey before 12 September, so coup was done to place democracy. In those years different from now, while the socialist and communist deputies were on the side of suspension of the relations, the liberals and the conservatives were against this idea. In the European Council of Ministers, it was mentioned that Turkey had to give attention to built democratic institutions again and give importance to human rights. Evren saw that, because of the events occurred in Iran and Afghanistan and the increasing role of Turkey, US would give support to Turkey and would apply pressure on EC countries in the same way.⁵⁷ In this period, the important event was the implementation of visa to Turkish citizens by France, Germany, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg from 1980's as they didn't want new Turkish workers to enter. Turkey couldn't give reaction to this because of September 12. With the full membership of Greece to EC in January 1981, the Greek side achieved supremacy in the race with Turkey from 1950's.⁵⁸ As Evren and National Security Council Members wanted to catch Greece, in 1981 during the Brussels Partnership Council, it was mentioned that after the return to the democracy, Turkey would apply for full membership. So, the coordination of Turkey-EC relations was given to a commission under State Planning Organization with an establishment of EC institution.⁵⁹ The existence of Foreign Ministry - State Planning Organization confusion and the problems in law showed that there couldn't be made progress in a conscious way in Turkey for EC membership.⁶⁰ Furthermore, in October 1981 the dissolution of the all political parties and the capture of their properties, the abolishment of the peace association and arrestment of its managers paved the way for the suspension of the 4th financial protocol. In 1983, Turkey adopted a new constitution that paved the way for reconstruction of democracy under the observation of the army but this action caused significant restrictions on the

⁵⁷ Baskın Oran (2002), *Türk Dış Politikası*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, p.88

⁵⁸ Baskın Oran (2002), *Türk Dış Politikası*,....., pp.83-87

⁵⁹ İlhan Tekeli & Selim İlkin (2000), *Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği*,. Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, pp.42-43

⁶⁰ Baskın Oran (2002), *Türk Dış Politikası*,....., p.88

political and civil rights.⁶¹ The military government tried to improve, to repair the relations with the EC but couldn't succeed.⁶²

The relations began to improve after the end of the military intervention and the return of the representative government with the election of November 1983.⁶³ When the general president of ANAP Turgut Özal became the Prime Minister, he tried to develop relations with both US, Middle East and EC.⁶⁴

The post 1980 era represented a period of radical transformation for both Turkey and EC. In Turkey, the strongly protected and inward oriented economy of the 1960's and 1970's was transformed through a more open and outward oriented economy in 1980's and 1990's. On the other hand, the attempts to return to democratic government step by step after the military interlude between 1980-1983 was very important in development of the relations with EC.⁶⁵ Turgut Özal in 1984 clarified that the time for the application for membership came. During this time they entered a period in which the meaning of democracy and the human rights were being discussed. By the time, Turkey was accepting democracy as a domestic problem, while the EC had accepted democracy as an indispensable condition for application to EC during Greece, Portugal and Spain applications. So, the turn of Turkey towards an authoritarian regime caused the suspension of relations, while Greece, Spain, Portugal were turning from authoritarian regime towards democracy. The relations began to normalize when the local elections had been done in 1984 as it was accepted as a step through democracy. So after a long period, the Partnership Council assembled. But the 4th fiscal protocol couldn't be come in to force because of Greek veto which showed us the role of Greece in Turkey-

⁶¹ Wendy Asbeek Brusse, & Richard Griffiths (2004), 'Good Intentions and Hidden Motives. Turkey and EU relations in a Historical Perspective'. in Durmuş Özdemir & Richard Griffiths, *Turkey and the EU Enlargement*, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, pp.21-22

⁶² İlhan Tekeli, & Selim İlkin (2000), *Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği*, Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, p.71

⁶³ Ziya Öniş (2001), "Greek Turkish Relations and The European Union: A Critical Perspective", in: *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.6, No.3, p.7

⁶⁴ İlhan Tekeli, & Selim İlkin (2000), *Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği*,....., pp.71-92

⁶⁵ Ziya Öniş (2000), "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative Historical Perspective", in: *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol.7, p.13

EC relations.⁶⁶ ANAP (Motherland Party) used the membership matter as a material for domestic policy, especially during the elections in 1986.⁶⁷ Individual application of Turkish citizens to the European Human Rights Commission was provided in 1987. They also explained that they would abolish the governmental decision that prohibits the sale of the Greek immovable. Furthermore, they gave the signals of the idea that they gave up the insistence on free movement. Özal and Kahveci mentioned that with the increase in the foreign direct investments in the coming years, new job opportunities would be provided in Turkey so, Turkish workers would choose Turkey rather than Europe.⁶⁸

Turkey also mentioned its political importance for the EC beside its economic importance. Turkey was making its duty to protect the Western Europe during the Cold War which was continuing in spite of the policy of Glasnost and Perestroika of Gorbachev. Also, it was mentioned that if Turkey was excluded out of Europe, the radical Islamist movements could gain power.⁶⁹

Turkey under the Premiership of Turgut Özal applied for full membership of the EC. Turkey's attitude under Özal was no more a defensive attitude. Turkey started to adopt a more positive approach towards the Community, more active participation and started to give more importance to maximizing the opportunities provided by the Community. The answer of the application was disappointment. Turkey's application was rejected by the European Council by mentioning that Turkey had failed to satisfy both economic and political criteria for full membership. Also, it was pointed that another round of enlargement was not on the agenda at least until 1993.⁷⁰ Because Community would be busy with the further deepening and the completion of the Single

⁶⁶ Atilla Eralp (1997), "Soğuk Savaşın Günümüze Türkiye Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri" in *Türkiye ve Avrupa*, Ankara: Imge Kitabevi Yayınları, p.102

⁶⁷ İlhan, Tekeli, & Selim Ilkin (2000), *Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği*, Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, pp.78-79

⁶⁸ Baskın Oran (2002), *Türk Dış Politikası*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp.92-94

⁶⁹ Baskın Oran (2002), *Türk Dış Politikası*,pp.92-94

⁷⁰ Ziya Öniş (2000), "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative Historical Perspective" in: *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol.7, p.13

Market by 1992.⁷¹ The recommendation to Turkey was to activate the customs union (CU) which had been planned since 1963.⁷² The old Prime Minister of France Raymond Barre also suggested that EC couldn't give a positive answer to Turkey, but Turkey had to realize that it could run the customs union which was also inside the Ankara Agreement. Nobody could leave a state outside, which had completed customs union, even the Greece couldn't veto customs union as it passed through all the member state's assembly during the signing of the Additional Protocol.⁷³

The report prepared during this time, drew attention to Turkey's democratic deficits especially with a strong emphasis on the issue of minority rights, human rights in addition to underlining the Turkey's economic weaknesses, for example; the rate of inflation, the level of unemployment. The report was also important in understanding the problems that would occur in Turkey EC/EU relations during 1990's with the Greece's inclusion in the Community. If Turkey didn't consider the negative effects of the dispute between Greece and also the situation in Cyprus, examination of the political aspects of the accession of Turkey would be incomplete. The unity, independence, sovereignty and the territorial identity of Cyprus according to the resolutions of the United Nations were at issue.⁷⁴

On the other hand, because of the new enlargement with the memberships of Greece, Portugal and Spain (1986), EC was busy with the rising difficulties of the economic problems and the slow down of the decision making mechanisms. Also EC concentrated on reform regulations as European Industry was loosing its competitive power against Japan and United States.⁷⁵ A point which hadn't been recognized by the Turkish political elite was that Europe was itself undergoing major changes both on the economic and political areas as it was developing itself to turn to a union

⁷¹ Ziya Öniş (2001), "Greek Turkish Relations and The European Union: A Critical Perspective" in: *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.6, No.3, p.8

⁷² Atilla Eralp (1993), "Turkey and European Community in the Changing Post War International System" in Canan Balkır & Allan M. Williams, (eds.) *Turkey and Europe*, UK: Pinter Publishers Ltd, p.37

⁷³ Mehmet Ali Birand (2004), *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgaı*, İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık AŞ, p.360

⁷⁴ Atilla Eralp (1993), "Turkey and European Community in the Changing Post War International System" in Canan Balkır & Allan M. Williams, (eds.) *Turkey and Europe*,....., p.37

⁷⁵ Atilla Eralp (1997), "Soğuk Savaştan Günümüze Türkiye Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri" in *Türkiye ve Avrupa*, Ankara: Imge Kitabevi Yayınları, p.103

from community. Significant steps were being taken in the economic area towards deepening and involving a coordination of economic policies in different policy areas directing towards the completion of a Single Market. The new Europe seemed to give more emphasis on the quality of democracy and human rights. The existence of just representative democracy was no longer sufficient enough for full membership. Deep integration in Europe in the beginning of 1990's constituted a different meaning to the EC, compared to Turkey's first confrontation with the Community in the 1960's. Turkey's relations with the new Europe were again shaped by its domestic politics in the late 1980's and 1990's. During this period the Turkish democracy faced with two challenges; Kurdish separatism and political Islam which seemed to create serious threats to the territorial integrity and the secular character of the state.⁷⁶ The civil war against the Kurdish PKK, a party that began in the 1980's that aims to establish an independent Kurdish state by using guerrilla tactics, was a handicap in the Turkish performance. The nationalism began to influence official Turkish ideology and the rising abuse of civil rights increased the existing humanitarian objections on the EC side against Turkish full membership.⁷⁷

Another factor which effected Turkey's relations with the EC during this period was the role of the Greece as an active member in the Community politics. It is obvious that with the EC membership, Greece had gained a significant political supremacy over Turkey in their mutual rivalry and bilateral relations. As a full member of the Community, Greece started to use the Community platform to voice her demands and use her veto power whenever cooperation between the community and Turkey occurred on the agenda.⁷⁸ The unanimity principle on which the EU decision making process was based meant that Greece could single handedly bloc key decisions taken by the other 11 and then 14 members of the Community. An example of this was the financial package that

⁷⁶Ziya Öniş (2000), "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative Historical Perspective" in: *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol.7, p.14

⁷⁷Wendy Asbeek Brusse, & Richard Griffiths (2004), "Good Intentions and Hidden Motives. Turkey and EU relations in a Historical Perspective". in Durmuş Özdemir & Richard Griffiths, *Turkey and the EU Enlargement*, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, p.23

⁷⁸Atilla Eralp (1993), "Turkey and European Community in the Changing Post War International System" in Canan Balkır & Allan M. Williams, (eds.) *Turkey and Europe*, UK: Pinter Publishers Ltd, pp.38-39

was blocked by Greece which would be given to Turkey as part of the customs union.⁷⁹ EC had maintained an equal approach to the two rivals Greece and Turkey and the resolution of their bilateral conflicts before. After the Greece's inclusion into the community in 1981, the Community's approach towards Greek Turkish bilateral conflicts had changed. Bilateral relations between two partners became between a member of the Community and an outsider. And it became the direct interests of the Community. According to Ankara's point of view, with Greece's inclusion into the Community all Greek-Turkish bilateral disputes and the Cyprus problem would be the obstacles to deepening relations with the EC.⁸⁰

⁷⁹Ziya Öniş (2000), "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative Historical Perspective", in: *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol.7, p.14

⁸⁰Ziya Öniş, (2001), "Greek Turkish Relations and The European Union: A Critical Perspective", in: *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.6, No.3, p.9

1990's: End of Cold War and Turkey's disappointment

In 1990's two characteristic elements were; the end of the Cold War and the rapid progress through the European integration. During 1989, there occurred many events that nobody expected. The unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union, break up of the Communist bloc, the fall of the Berlin wall, which was the symbol of the Iron Curtain, were the reasons of the end of the Yalta order that was built after the 2nd World War. Even the Western world that had worked for the destruction of this world order felt themselves uncomfortable. Another important event was the freedom of the Eastern European countries, which were rescued from the Soviet Union umbrella. These countries, which were rescued from the German occupation had become under Soviet occupation for many years. So their development postponed for nearly forty years.⁸¹ Under these circumstances in 1990, there occurred the problem of uniting two German states. The meaning of this unification for European Community was the enlargement of Europe and its population.

“And it increased the potential for German domination of the Community and led many to conclude that it was necessary to advance the integration process in order to ensure the consolidation of a European Germany rather than German Europe”.⁸²

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, in such conjuncture a new world order appeared spontaneously and increased the sense of uncertainty about the future and stability of European continent. So the need of the new construction by making the community to consolidate and strengthen itself to be able to meet the challenges of the rapidly, transforming Europe in a better way, could be sensed.⁸³ These events caused new perception changes in political, economical and security areas in Europe.⁸⁴ At the same time Western Europe had to make new arrangements for its own interests to prevent the new coming Central and Eastern European countries to fall in to the Soviet

⁸¹Atilla Eralp (1993), “Turkey and European Community in the Changing Post War International System” in Canan Balkır & Allan M. Williams, (eds.) *Turkey and Europe*, UK: Pinter Publishers Ltd, p.40

⁸²Neill Nugent (1999), *The Government and Politics of the European Union*, New York: Palgrave Publishers Ltd, p.61

⁸³Neill Nugent (1999), *The Government and Politics of the European Union*, New York: Palgrave Publishers Ltd, p.61

⁸⁴Baskın Oran (2002), *Türk Dış Politikası*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp.326-327

hands again and Western Europe had to bring them all under the same roof to prevent the reoccurrence of the threat of the Cold war again. While Central and Eastern European countries were absorbing democracy, they also made progress in posing free market economy. The big transformation in the CEEC led to the idea of creating a big Europe containing all. The idea of inclusion of CEEC into the European integration became appropriate for EC from the perspective of politics, economics, security, culture, history and also identity. EC countries, who supposed that developing these countries in democratic and economic areas would be useful for their common and individual interest, started technical and fiscal aids to these countries. The aim was to abolish the ideological division and to ensure the integration of continental market by including these countries to the EC in the near future. The improvements came across with the development of ideas to ensure economic, monetary and political union.⁸⁵

During this time, the Gulf crises that started in August 1990 with the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq was concluded with the Gulf War in 1991, by showing that the only dominant of the new world order is USA. As came out in the Gulf Crises, the European Community faced with dramatic changes in Europe, had become introverted and unable to exercise an effective role in the region. The Gulf war also showed how Turkey's relations with the West have changed. The global events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have posed a serious problem for Turkish governors since the decline of the Cold War, Turkey's geo-politic significance in the East-West conflict had also declined.⁸⁶ During the Cold war period, Turkish foreign policy was shaped under the East and West axis. After the end of the Cold war, as the East West axis had lost its importance, the countries had to examine their foreign policy again. And Turkey was the most effected country from these developments.⁸⁷ The Gulf Crises represents an important turning point at a time which Turkish

⁸⁵ Baskın Oran (2002), *Türk Dış Politikası*,..... pp.326-327

⁸⁶ Atilla Eralp (1993), "Turkey and European Community in the Changing Post War International System" in Canan Balkır & Allan M. Williams, (eds.) *Turkey and Europe*, UK: Pinter Publishers Ltd, p.40

⁸⁷ Atilla Eralp (1997), "Soğuk Savaşın Günümüze Türkiye Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri" in *Türkiye ve Avrupa*, Ankara: Imge Kitabevi Yayınları, p.107

leaders struggled to involve the country in global politics. The Gulf crises led the Turkish leaders to recognize the division existed among the Western powers and to choose the United States rather than Europe. So, they began to emphasize the development of special relations between Turkey and United States. According to his closer cooperation with US, Özal pointed out that Turkey provided a model for Middle East Countries. According to Özal by wedding Islamic identity and aspirations to Western modernity, he hoped that the Turkish example might be recognized and therefore supported financially by the West. He also thought of using his model for social order, with the promotion of trade as a way of minimizing political tensions in the region. The main obstacle was the unwillingness of the Arab nations to accept Turkey as a model, so Turkey had been unable to create an effective role in this aim. But it had succeeded in regional links such as the Black Sea Cooperation Project, improvement of relations with the Balkan countries and with the Turkic republics of the Soviet Union.⁸⁸

In 1990, Matutes package was presented in the European Council of Ministers which envisaged the realization of customs union (CU) in 1995, the start of the fiscal cooperation and the improvement of the political cooperation. With this package, although customs union and partnership relations were given importance, there was any expression about full membership.⁸⁹ The Akbulut government had to go into this package, to get rid of the reactions which could occur in the domestic policy because of the assumption of the full membership application. But to realize the acceptance of the Council, they had to overcome the obstacle of Greek veto. The foundations of customs union had begun after the Matutes Package. The ANAP Government which came to power in 1991 showed their demand for development of relations with the EU, by their efforts for the meeting of Partnership Council that hadn't been met for 5 years since, it was cancelled in 1986 with the leave of Foreign Minister Mesut Yılmaz when EC tried to make a connection between resolution of Cyprus

⁸⁸ Atilla Eralp (1993), "Turkey and European Community in the Changing Post War International System" in Canan Balkır & Allan M. Williams, (eds.) *Turkey and Europe*,....., pp.40-41

⁸⁹ İlhan Tekeli & Selim İlkin (2000), *Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği*, Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, pp.208-214

problem and Turkey/EC relations.⁹⁰

The negative attitude which EC assumed, had directed Turkey to look for new alternatives rather than EC. The years between 1989-1992 was the period which Turkey had become distant from EU project. The Greek veto that caused an obstruction before Partnership Council's work also had an influence at this development. After this period it was understood that the regional tendencies couldn't be an alternative to the EU project for Turkey. After 1992, Turkey had started the way of searching to ensure harmony between regional relations and EU policy. So following this period, the relations began to normalize and the Partnership Council started to meet again.⁹¹

The existing integration level of the EC was far away from answering the expectations. So to cope with the new world order Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1993 by making the new bases and aims of the today's construction of Europe that lay the foundations to the roads that goes to the European Union.⁹²

“The Maastricht Treaty that created a new European Union based on the European community marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the people's of Europe.”⁹³

Three new structures had been added which were called Economic and Monetary Union, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs. With the Maastricht Treaty, EC took the name of EU had started to progress through a political union. With the formation of EC to EU, the debates came about if Turkey was belonged to the European ideal and identity and if the European borders include Turkey or not. The human rights had started to play an important role in the Western countries international relations. So the political and economic instability in Turkey, the struggle with PKK terrorism, the disagreements with Greece, and Cyprus problem, all

⁹⁰ Atilla Eralp (1997), “ Soğuk Savaştan Günümüze Türkiye Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri” in *Türkiye ve Avrupa*, Ankara: Imge Kitabevi Yayınları, p.108

⁹¹ Eralp Atilla (1997), “ Soğuk Savaştan Günümüze Türkiye Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri” in *Türkiye ve Avrupa*,....., p.108

⁹² Can Baydarol (2000), “EU Enlargement”, p.13

⁹³ Andrew Duff & John Pinder & Roy Pryce (1996), *Maastricht and Beyond: Building the EU*, London: Routledge, p.19

started to influence Turkey-EU relations. Although Turkey had insisted on the objective of full membership, EU tried to carry on the relations with Turkey through the perspective of partnership, customs union without giving full membership.⁹⁴

The sudden death of the President Turgut Özal and replacement of his place with Süleyman Demirel in 1993 brought a new phase in the relations with the EU. This coalition government of DYP (True Path Party)-SHP under the Prime Ministership of Tansu Ciller (DYP) and Vice Prime Minister Murat Karayalçın (SHP) had different tendency towards EU than Özal did. Özal had supported the idea of full membership in any case. But DYP-SHP government had supported the idea for running the Ankara agreement and to realize customs union as soon as possible. And they considered customs union as the main element of their coalition.⁹⁵ With the Maastricht Treaty, a change was made in paragraph 237 which says that all European states can formally apply for full membership of the Union. And furthermore, the approval of the European Parliament became obligatory for new membership acceptations. The Gulf War convinced the EC members to cooperate on defense matters. So, WEU became the protector of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. Turkey became the partner member to the WEU, but this didn't ensure to involve in the decision making process, so Turkey started to feel the risk of exclusion. In 1990 in Dublin Summit, it was decided the inclusion of East Germany to the EC integration and the start of the enlargement movement. Turkey started to lose its powerful partnership status which it had since 1963. The application of South Cyprus for membership in 1990 was put for process although Turkey's objections. Furthermore, in Lisbon Summit 1992, it was decided to start the membership negotiations of Austria, Finland, and Sweden. This showed that the approach which emphasizes that EC couldn't start new membership negotiations because of the enlargement process and Single Market, was only evident for Turkey. The main turning point in the enlargement process was the Copenhagen Summit in 1993 which determined the conditions and criteria for EU membership. EU

⁹⁴ Baskın Oran (2002), *Türk Dış Politikası*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp.326-327

⁹⁵ Mehmet Ali Birand (2004), *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgaı*, İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık AŞ, p.363

wanted to carry on relation with Turkey on the basis of customs union. So it could be realized that Turkey who had partnership relations older than the CEEC, remained behind these countries.⁹⁶ Enlarging the EU to the East would have major political, economic and security implications and it seemed that the process would be long and complex. Because an enlarged EU has to cope with many problems, diversity, etc. And for its security and stability, the EU has to prepare these countries before accepting them. EU had to shape these countries in an economical and political way according to its needs and interests. So after the European treaties signed in 1993, Copenhagen Summit was made.⁹⁷ These criterias were gathered under three main headlines; which were political, economical criteria and adaptation to the *acquis communautaire*. According to these criteria there would be the institutional structure with the security of democracy, the supremacy of law, and respect to minority rights. And processing market economy, capacity to resist the market powers and rivalry pressure are the economical criteria that were needed. Furthermore, with the adaptation of *acquis communautaire*, the connection to the EU's political, economical and monetary target were determined.⁹⁸ The countries that adaptative to these criteria and make positive developments would get the opportunity to start the negotiations for full membership. The EU had no obligation to open full membership negotiations with all the candidate states that adaptive to the criteria.⁹⁹ It could take states according to its structure and only the EU decides for the right timing. The only restriction before membership is to be the EU.¹⁰⁰

The political reasons directed Ankara to the customs union. Cyprus problem and the membership application of Southern Cyprus to the EU constituted an obstacle before Turkey-EU relations. Realization of customs union was seen as a domestic policy instrument. Customs union would revive the tough Turkey-EU relations. If Turkey would ensure the under construction by

⁹⁶Baskın Oran (2002) *Türk Dış Politikası*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, p. 329-331

⁹⁷ Heather Grabbe, & Kirsty Hughes (2000), *Enlarging the EU eastwards*, London: Royal institute of International Affairs, p.43

⁹⁸ Baskın Oran (2002), *Türk Dış Politikası*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, p.332

⁹⁹ Rıdvan Karluk (2002), *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye*, İstanbul: Beta Basım AŞ, p.19

¹⁰⁰Can Baydarol (2000), "EU Enlargement", p.18

economic integration with customs union, then political integration would be much easier.

In the economic area, the harmonization of laws for customs union would make the economy develop, stable, increase the productivity of Turkish firms which would make production for bigger markets. With customs union, foreign investment would come into Turkey. With the abolishment of trade obstacles in important sectors like textile products, the products that produced in EU standards could enter EU markets without obstacles, so the exports would rise.¹⁰¹ So they believed that with customs union there would be a significant improvement through full membership. EU emphasized that Turkey wouldn't be part of customs union inside EU, EU would start a separate customs union with Turkey. In 1994, the trial of nine DEP deputies in Turkey caused the occurrence of EP obstacle rather than Greek veto. 9-10 December in Essen Summit it was explained that Southern Cyprus would take place in the next EU enlargement. But they didn't use the same explanation for Turkey. They emphasized their worry because of DEP.¹⁰² According to EU, if Turkey wanted to complete customs union, it had to make progress in human rights, democracy and Cyprus problem. Furthermore, EU concerned about the increasing votes of the Welfare Party, an Islamist party in the local elections in 1994. And the other factor was the economic crisis which was felt from the second half of the 1994. Turkey had decided to change the related decision about the Article 8 of the anti-terrorism law, to abolish the restrictions before freedom of thought, to ensure the necessary environment for debate about Kurdish problem, to provide workers to establish a labor union and constitutional change for democracy, and partly applied these till 1995 for customs union. Greece demanded Southern Cyprus to take place in the next first enlargement wave to change its negative attitude against Turkey on the way to customs union.¹⁰³ Turkey in all meeting emphasized that customs union is a right of Turkey from its agreements, if Turkey would be excluded it would be used by the Euro skeptics. And Turkey has a strategic importance because of its relations with

¹⁰¹ İlhan Tekeli & Selim Ilkin (2000), *Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği*, Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, pp.298-309

¹⁰² İlhan Tekeli, & Selim Ilkin (2000), *Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği*, Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, p.386

¹⁰³ Baskın Oran (2002), *Türk Dış Politikası*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp.327-336

Bosnia, Caucasian and Middle East. If Turkey would be excluded, this would be beneficial for the radical Islamists in Turkey. If Turkey would be accepted to customs union, Turkey would be under the supervision of the European Parliament so it would be useful for its development in human rights, freedom of thought, Cyprus problems. At last, it was decided that customs union could become true during 1 January 1996. This decision was welcomed in Turkey. Why EU did not reject Turkey? Firstly, as I emphasized before the Islamists votes were increasing, so it worked in favor of Turkey, EU didn't want to lose Turkey. Secondly, customs union was a good formula for keeping Turkey at an arms length without giving full membership. Thirdly, Turkey's emerging market, its dynamic private sector, growing consumer market and direct economic links to the other Turkic states of the former Soviet Union made it more difficult for the European leaders to reject Turkey. In addition to these, it would also contribute to the stability of the regime in Turkey. Turkey having a customs union with the EU, had to transfer some of its sovereign rights to this body, so, it might be possible for the EU to influence Turkey's politics in a positive way and could become an initiator of the political reforms. In 1995, 10 CEEC countries and Cyprus was invited to the Madrid Summit but Turkey was not between the candidate countries. So, Ciller repeated her demand about full membership. But the Imia Kardak Crises that occurred in 30 January 1996 between Greece and Turkey about the Kardak rocks in Aegean Sea, turned everything upside down. Athens asserted, these islets belonged to Greece, so it needed to guard its own territory against the aggressor Turkey. Council declared that it was caused by Turkey, so responsibility had to be taken by Turkey by taking the case to the International Court of Justice in Hague. During these events going on, in Turkey the new coalition was established by Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz and Foreign Minister Tansu Ciller. But after three months this coalition collapsed because of the corruption arguments. Tension started in Turkey between seculars and anti seculars. Turkey entered an unstable environment with serious of different coalitions.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴ Mehmet Ali Birand (2004), *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgası*, İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık AŞ, pp.365-380

FROM 1997 TO 2004

Luxembourg Summit: Downfall of Relations

Turkish political elite couldn't realize the magnificent change that had taken place in the nature and the direction of the European integration project during the 1980's and 1990's. During those years, it could be noticed that the political elements like democratization and human rights of the European Project had become more important. As a result of this situation, Turkey's democratic deficits started to set a limit to its relations with Europe in the post Communist era.¹⁰⁵

1990s was characterized by poor relations and mistrust in EU-Turkey relations despite the realization of the customs union.¹⁰⁶ Both the EU member governments and the European Parliament were critical of Turkey's human rights record and the Kurdish problem. The EU's call for a political solution to the Kurdish problem and minority rights caused the increase of the Euro-skeptics voices who argued that the EU was only interested in weakening Turkey's territorial integrity. For example, in 1995, Suleyman Demirel reacted in a strong way to the statements made by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Alain Juppe that Turkey should find a political solution to the Kurdish problem. Demirel argued that Juppe's statement was definite indication of Western purposes to create a Kurdish state in Turkey.¹⁰⁷ The problems between both sides reached a high point in 1997. After the EU insisted on Turkey to find a solution to the Cyprus Question, to improve its human rights record and to develop the conditions in Kurdish areas, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Çiller threatened to block the NATO membership of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic if Turkey wasn't given the status of candidate membership of the EU. As a consequence, the EU gave its

¹⁰⁵Ziya Öniş (2000), "Luxembourg Helsinki and Beyond: Towards and Interpretation of Recent Turkey EU Relations" in: *Government and Opposition*, Vol.35, No.4, pp.2-8

¹⁰⁶Ziya Öniş (2000), "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative Historical Perspective" in: *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol.7, p.15

¹⁰⁷Kemal Kirişçi (2004), "The Domestic Politics of Negotiating Pre-accession: Challenges and Consequences of EU Turkish Relations", presented in: *Second Pan-European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, p.17

decision about the membership question at the Luxembourg Council in December that year.¹⁰⁸ The decision of the EU at Luxembourg Summit in 1997 to exclude Turkey from the list of candidate countries for the next round of enlargement increased the intensity of the tension and mistrust between the EU and Turkey.¹⁰⁹

The Luxembourg Summit of the European Council caused a disappointment on the Turkish political elite and the public. Turkey was excluded from candidate status¹¹⁰, while it was decided to be given candidate status to a number of Central and Eastern European countries for full EU membership.¹¹¹ In retrospect, Turkey's feeling of isolation and exclusion has been compounded by two major developments. Firstly, it could be seen that the Mediterranean enlargement process of the EU had provided significant benefits for Greece, Portugal and Spain in economic development but also in their transformation from fragile to consolidated democracies after a short period of time. Mostly Spain, but also Greece and Portugal, made good use of the community's structural and regional funds and benefited from the expansion of trade and inflows of foreign direct investment. Full EU membership had created stability, growth and democratic consolidation in all these countries.¹¹²

Secondly, in 1997, during Luxembourg Summit, the EU agreed that several post-communist states were ready to begin membership negotiations, having sufficiently met the Copenhagen criteria while Turkey was excluded. The EU said that Turkey had failed to meet the economic and political aspects of the Copenhagen criteria for membership and so could not join the EU.¹¹³ These post-

¹⁰⁸ Wendy Asbeek Brusse, & Richard Griffiths (2004), 'Good Intentions and Hidden Motives. Turkey and EU relations in a Historical Perspective'. in Durmuş Özdemir & Richard Griffiths, *Turkey and the EU Enlargement*, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, p.26

¹⁰⁹ Kemal Kirişçi (2004), "the domestic politics of negotiating pre-accession: challenges and consequences of EU Turkish relations" presented in: *Second Pan-European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, p.17

¹¹⁰ Ziya Öniş (2000), "Luxembourg Helsinki and Beyond: Towards and Interpretation of Recent Turkey EU Relations" in: *Government and Opposition*, Vol.35, No.4, pp.2-8

¹¹¹ Ziya Öniş (2000), "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative Historical Perspective" in: *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol.7 pp.15-16

¹¹² Ziya Öniş (2000), "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative Historical Perspective",....., pp.15-16

¹¹³ Paul Kubicek (2005), "Turkish accession to the EU: Challenges and opportunities for the new Europe", prepared for Workshop, *The New Europe II' Center for European Studies*, p.4

communist states seemed to have similar economic structures to Turkey and also more limited experience of democratic government.¹¹⁴ For example, Romans who had weak economic and political records, were seen ready to take place on the membership queue; Turkey was not, although having had a longer relationship with the EU than all other applicant countries.¹¹⁵ The inclusion of the Central and Eastern European Countries into the EU orbit by the European powers, for developing democracy in these countries and the resources given to these countries under the PHARE program made a strong contrast with the Turkish case where the customs union seemed to be a last step in the integration process. For Turkey, quality of democracy was used as a criterion to deny and the promised limited financial resources were not given.¹¹⁶ Less than two years after the introduction of the customs union, the EU door had been closed in the face of Turkey. The period from the signing of the customs union agreement to the disappointments of the Luxembourg Summit helped to show to the Turkish public that the EU's real intention was to develop economic relations with Turkey, without promise of full membership.¹¹⁷ So, this rejection caused the increase of injustice feelings in Turkish people's minds. Some Turks started to think other options like ties to Middle East or Central Asia.¹¹⁸ It was not only Turks who believed that the EU's decision as unjust. Many European newspapers viewed the EU's exclusion of Turkey as a historical mistake.¹¹⁹ Furthermore, Luxembourg European Council of 1997 also confirmed Turkey's eligibility for accession to the European Union. Turkey would be judged with the same criteria as the other applicant states. As the political and economic conditions needed for the start of the accession negotiations were not satisfied, the European Council considered that a strategy had to be written, to prepare Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the European Union in every field until the time

¹¹⁴ Ziya Öniş (2000), "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative Historical Perspective" in: *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol.7, p.17

¹¹⁵ Paul Kubicek (2005), "Turkish accession to the EU: Challenges and opportunities for the new Europe",....., p.4

¹¹⁶ Ziya Öniş (2000), "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative Historical Perspective",....., p.17

¹¹⁷ Chris Rumford (2000), "From Luxembourg to Helsinki", p.333

¹¹⁸ Paul Kubicek (2005), "Turkish accession to the EU: Challenges and opportunities for the new Europe",....., p.4

¹¹⁹ Chris Rumford (2000), "From Luxembourg to Helsinki", p.333

of Helsinki. Together with the other applicant states, Turkey was invited to the forthcoming European Conference.¹²⁰ The strategy consisted of a combination of enhancing existing agreements (Ankara agreement and customs union), progressive adoption of the *acquis communautaire*, and the probability of more financial cooperation. The Presidency Conclusions also repeated that the EU wanted Turkey to continue with the political and economic reforms, including the alignment of human rights standards and practices with those in the EU, respect for and protection of minorities, and the establishment of stable relations with Greece.¹²¹

According to Ankara, Germany was believed to be the reason of the denial of Turkey as a candidate membership in Luxembourg Summit.¹²² Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany declared that the EU was a civilization project in which Turkey had no place. Most states announced their objections to Turkey because of political and human rights grounds. Luxembourg's Jean Claude Juncker declared that a country in which torture existed could not have a place inside the EU.¹²³ Also Greece, by actively opposing every move, was seen the reason of the outcome. As a result, Turkish government broke off the political dialogue with the EU and refused to attend any of the meetings it was invited to.¹²⁴ The Turkish government felt uncomfortable that the EU wanted to form a special relationship with Turkey different than membership.¹²⁵ Turkish reaction was balanced but also tough. Turkey didn't withdraw its application for membership and decided to continue customs union agreement.¹²⁶ But, to force the negotiations that would open about Cyprus, Turkey broke off the dialogue by explaining that Turkish candidature was a gained right from the 1963 agreement.¹²⁷

According to Ismail Cem, there were four possibilities regarding Turkey's position in the EU

¹²⁰ Soli Özel (2004), "It truly is a long and winding road: the Saga of EU Turkey relations", presented in: *AICGS Conference 'Changing Parameters in US-German-Turkey relations: Future Scenarios*, September 20, Berlin, p.4

¹²¹ Chris Rumford (2000), "From Luxembourg to Helsinki", p.333

¹²² Soli Özel (2004), "It truly is a long and winding road: the Saga of EU Turkey relations",....., p.4

¹²³ Paul Kubicek (2005), "Turkish accession to the EU: Challenges and opportunities for the new Europe", prepared for Workshop, *'The New Europe II' Center for European Studies*, p.4

¹²⁴ Soli Özel (2004), "It truly is a long and winding road: the Saga of EU Turkey relations",....., p.4

¹²⁵ Kemal Kirişçi (2004), "the domestic politics of negotiating pre-accession: challenges and consequences of EU Turkish relations", presented in: *Second Pan-European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, p.4

¹²⁶ Mehmet Ali Birand (2004), *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgası*, İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık AŞ, p.386

¹²⁷ Enis Coşkun (2001), *Bütünleşme sürecinde Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye*, İstanbul: Umut Matbaası, p.190

enlargement process prior to the Luxembourg Council. One possibility was its exclusion from the membership process. Its long standing economic and political problems, high population and needs for considerable financial assistance would have caused to disappear its membership hopes. In addition to Greece and Germany's opinions, the Commission's Agenda 2000 report on enlargement which was released just before the Luxembourg Summit suggested this possibility. The report repeated the political and economic arguments against Turkey and made no reference to Turkey's full membership objective.¹²⁸

The second possibility was giving Turkey a special relationship to the EU without membership. But, the attitudes of some EU members, like Italy, and the United States, which sympathized with Turkey's close links with the EU rejected this option.¹²⁹

The third was granting Turkey a special status as a road map towards full membership. Turkey would be included in the enlargement process despite the absence of pre-accession strategy and the financial support that was provided to other eleven candidates to speed up their progress. Turkey's efforts would determine the EU's future decision. In so doing, the EU would not give financial resources and Turkey would be responsible for its European destiny by its reforms according to the Copenhagen criteria.¹³⁰

The fourth approach was to grant Turkey the same candidate status as other applicants. However, no member states supported this option: Germany and Greece were strongly opposed to it. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl was the most opponent of candidate status for Turkey. In retrospect, at that time Turkey was far from adopting the principles of the EU.¹³¹

In such an environment, the EU chose the third option. Turkey's eligibility for membership was confirmed and a strategy to prepare it for accession was designed. The development of Turkey-EU relation was made conditional on certain economic, political and foreign policy questions. In that

¹²⁸ Ismail Cem (2005), *Avrupanın Birliği ve Türkiye*, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, p.30

¹²⁹ Ismail Cem (2005), *Avrupanın Birliği ve Türkiye*, , p.30

¹³⁰ Ismail Cem (2005), *Avrupanın Birliği ve Türkiye*,..... , p.30

¹³¹ Ismail Cem (2005), *Avrupanın Birliği ve Türkiye*, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, p.30

way, the EU avoided actually excluding Turkey while hoping to meet at least some of Turkey's expectations.¹³²

The exclusion of Turkey and the inclusion of the Central and Eastern European countries which had more authoritarian experiences than Turkey into the European enlargement process, provided a justification that the European Union is a civilization project with defined boundaries and it has no place for a country with a majority of Muslim population. So, debates centered on the reasons for Turkey's exclusion from the process of Eastern enlargement. It was started to be questioned that if it was because of the inefficient governance at home, or because of the country's significant deficits in the areas of economic reform, democratization and human rights.¹³³ Turkey's relationship with the community did not follow a smooth route. The community has for long time been reluctant to Turkey's full membership because of the country's size, level of development and its Muslim identity. It is fair to say that the EU in the 1990s had been more desirous to include post communist states such as Poland and Hungary into its orbit, because these countries did not cause boundary questions for Europe. For the EC/EU in the 1980s and the 1990s, Turkey was an important outsider with whom relations had to be developed at a distance. We can say that, Turkish struggle for membership experienced a serious setback with the EU's Luxembourg Summit of December 1997.¹³⁴

¹³²Ismail Cem (2005), *Avrupanın Birliği ve Türkiye*,....., p.30

¹³³Ziya Öniş (2000), "Luxembourg Helsinki and Beyond: Towards and Interpretation of Recent Turkey EU Relations" in: *Government and Opposition*, Vol.35, No.4, pp.2-8

¹³⁴ Ziya Öniş & Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey–EU-US Triangle in perspective: Transformation or Continuity" in: *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.59, No.2 pp.4-6

Luxembourg to Helsinki: Road to Candidacy

Turkey's exclusion from the candidate status in Luxembourg and its inclusion two years later at Helsinki in 1999 which showed EU's dilemma and contradictory behavior could be dedicated to several influences. For the EU, Turkey is an important country and a partner from an economic and security perspective. But when we talk about full membership of Turkey, problems arise from the EU's point of view because of Turkey's size, identity and its political regime.¹³⁵ The foreign policy of the EU has always been characterized by uncertainties as it behaves indecisive between the principles of idealism and realism. An idealistic perspective pointed the exclusion of Turkey from potential full membership of the Union considering its deficiencies in democracy and human rights. On the other hand, realist perspective drew attention to the important role of Turkey for the EU as an economic and strategic partner. Owing to the disappointment on Turkey because of the decision taken at Luxembourg, there was growing recognition on the side of the European political elites during the period of 1998 and 1999 that Europe's own economic and security interests would not be served, if Turkey was allowed to turn towards isolation and authoritarianism. After the Luxembourg decision, Britain and Italy have started critiques, concerning the exclusion of Turkey from candidate status. Self interest constituted the basis of their argument.¹³⁶

The major turning point occurred at December 1999 EU Helsinki Summit when Turkey was given candidate status. There were many factors that played a role in this turn in EU's position. The arrival of the social democrat government of Gerhard Schroeder in Germany in 1999, by replacing Helmut Kohl's Christian Democrat government had a major impact on the Helsinki decision.¹³⁷ The social democratic wave which had influenced all the major countries of Western Europe, with the

¹³⁵ Ziya Öniş (2000), "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative Historical Perspective", in: *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol.7, p.19

¹³⁶ Ziya Öniş (2000), "Luxembourg Helsinki and Beyond: Towards and Interpretation of Recent Turkey EU Relations" in: *Government and Opposition*, Vol.35, No.4, p.8

¹³⁷ Kemal Kirişçi (2004), "the domestic politics of negotiating pre-accession: challenges and consequences of EU Turkish relations", presented in: *Second Pan-European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, pp.4-5

exception of Spain, constituted a critical turning point in Turkey-EU relations. Turkey's relations with the European Socialists or Social Democrats have been problematic as the Social Democrats have been more single minded in their critiques of Turkey's domestic politics and human rights performance compared to the Conservatives or Christian Democrats. It was interesting that a project for the inclusion of Turkey seemed to be convenient with the growing idea of a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural Europe. It would be fair to say that the Social Democrats started to look like the right sight in economic policies and their desire for the large welfare state weakened. Their understanding of multicultural citizenship constituted the main element which helped to distinguish them from the Christian Democrats or Conservatives, whose opinion was an ethnically homogenous Europe, a Europe as a Christian Club with definite boundaries.¹³⁸

At this point, the domestic politics of member states such as Germany, but also Holland and Belgium, becomes an important issue to consider. A large Turkish minority had constituted a significant influence on the domestic German political scene. This growing influence is also related to the rising class differentiation among Turkish population. At the beginning of the migration movement from Turkey to Germany during 1960's, the migrants were among working class, taking on the works which the Germans were not willing to do. Furthermore, these unskilled migrant workers had a strong desire for returning to their homeland after gathering efficient amount of money. Recent empirical research shows that the Turkish minority in Germany at present displays a more heterogeneous character compared to the first generation of migrants in the 1960's. There occurred the rise of entrepreneurial activity among these groups. It is clear that the second or third generation migrants were economically more productive and they aimed to see themselves as a part of the German society with no desire of returning to Turkey. Although, they have no desires to return, they still like to maintain close relations with their homeland. The German Social Democrats and the Greens have tried to appeal to these groups by including the issue of dual citizenship on the

¹³⁸ Ziya Öniş (2000), "Luxembourg Helsinki and Beyond: Towards and Interpretation of Recent Turkey EU Relations" in: *Government and Opposition*, Vol.35, No.4, p.9

electoral agenda, during their electoral campaign that brought victory in the German elections of September 1998. Legislation on the dual citizenship could not be completed, because of the strong opposition from the Christian Democrats. What is significant for our purposes is that the Turks in Germany, a large majority of which will become German citizens at the age of 18, increasingly constitute an intermediating force between the Turkish and German societies. Furthermore, with their developing significant economic role in the German society, they are going to become an influential force in shaping the future of Turkish-German-EU relations, like the 1997-1999 periods on the road to Helsinki.¹³⁹

This negative climate in EU-Turkish relations began to change and cooperation started to emerge from 1999. According to Kemal Kirişçi, the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the Separatist Kurdish Organization, the Kurdistan's Workers Party (PKK), in Kenya and trial and conviction of him to death sentence, and the formations of a new coalition government in April by the Social Democrat Bülent Ecevit opened the way for creating an environment for improving democracy in the country. Ecevit wrote in June 1999 a personal letter to his German counterpart Schröder that he was committed to democratizing and liberalizing the country and expressed his expectation of support for opening the way for Turkish membership in EU. In return the EU's positive response brought the two sides much closer to each other.¹⁴⁰

In December 1999, Ecevit persuaded his coalition government that included the right wing nationalist MHP to respect a call by the European Court of Human Rights for a stay of execution on Öcalan's death sentence.¹⁴¹ Turkey had accepted the rights of Turkish citizens to take complaints against Turkey to ECHR in 1987 and since then had respected the court's rulings. The lawyer of Öcalan had complained to the ECHR that the ruling of the Turkish court was unfair and unjust. Then,

¹³⁹Ziya Öniş (2000), "Luxembourg Helsinki and Beyond: Towards and Interpretation of Recent Turkey EU Relations" in: *Government and Opposition*, Vol.35, No.4, p.10

¹⁴⁰Kemal Kirişçi (2004), "the domestic politics of negotiating pre-accession: challenges and consequences of EU Turkish relations", presented in: *Second Pan-European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, p.18

¹⁴¹Kemal Kirişçi (2004) "the domestic politics of negotiating pre-accession: challenges and consequences of EU Turkish relations",....., p.18

the ECHR issued a stay of execution in November 1999. Respecting the ECHR's call was an extremely difficult and very sensitive issue in Turkish politics. Öcalan was seen as the criminal responsible of death and destruction for many years by the majority of the public. After a debate the government decided to implement the ECHR call. According to Kemal Kirişçi, this decision, which required the lifting of the death penalty as pre-condition for pre-accession, was taken by the EU as a positive move.¹⁴²

Together with the Germany, Greece had been the most resistant country to Turkey's candidacy during the Luxembourg Summit of December 1997. The interesting transformation in this period was the changing approach of Greece towards Turkey-EU relations. As I emphasized before, Greece, as a full member of the Community since 1981, had been creating problems for Turkey by resting on the vetoing power, unanimity principle in the EU's decision making process.¹⁴³ 1999 was a remarkable year because of the improvements in Turkey's relations both with Greece and the European Union. There were several influences at work.¹⁴⁴

The development of closer relations between Turkey and Greece during the period of 1999, which helped to gain the Greek support for Turkish candidacy in the Helsinki Summit, showed a romantic and realistic dimension. The two natural disasters that occurred in first Kocaeli in August in Turkey 1999, then in Athens in September 1999 and the organization of the civil rescue efforts created a magnificent psychological impact for gathering the two societies together.¹⁴⁵ This also brought the process of self-questioning and self-criticism in both societies, which had also influenced political leaders in both countries. So, Greek-Turkish rapprochement constituted the beginning of a new relationship based on mutual trust and cooperation that came from civil initiatives in both

¹⁴² Kemal Kirişçi (2004), "the domestic politics of negotiating pre-accession: challenges and consequences of EU Turkish relations",....., p.18

¹⁴³ Ziya Öniş (2000), "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative Historical Perspective" in: *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol.7, No.1, p.18

¹⁴⁴ Ziya Öniş (2001), "Greek Turkish Relations and The European Union: A Critical Perspective", in: *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.6, No.3, p.11

¹⁴⁵ Ziya Öniş (2000), "Luxembourg Helsinki and Beyond: Towards and Interpretation of Recent Turkey EU Relations" in: *Government and Opposition*, Vol.35, No.4, p.11

countries. And this showed that cooperation could be built in the future. When the earthquake occurred in August 1999, the roots of rapprochement were already visible in the forced resignation of the Theodoros Pangalos, from his position as the Foreign Secretary and his replacement by the moderate George Papandreou. This event gave the signals of the beginning of self criticism within PASOK and the government of Costas Simitis after the Öcalan Affair in early 1999.¹⁴⁶ Furthermore, the efforts of the two Foreign Ministers, George Papandreou and Ismail Cem received growing public support after the earthquakes. An extraordinary rapprochement in Greek-Turkish relations began, both at the governmental and also at the societal level. Greece became advocator of Turkish membership to the European Union.¹⁴⁷

In the late 1999, the traditional basis of the conflict between the two nations had started to be questioned. The rapprochement couldn't only be related to the earthquake or to the civil initiatives. So, the realist dimension also needs to be brought into the analysis. Towards the end of 1999, Greece started to adopt a strategy of active support for Turkey's candidacy and full membership. This development was based on the growing realization on Greece's part that its own economic and security interests would not be served and an appropriate solution to the Cyprus dispute and the Aegean Sea couldn't be found if Turkey was left isolated and excluded from the community. The Greek political and business elites also realized that the two societies had mutual economic gains like the expansion of trade, investment and tourism.¹⁴⁸ Furthermore, Greece could enhance its bargaining power and planned to find solution to its bilateral disputes with Turkey with help of the Community through EU incentives, pressure and discipline.¹⁴⁹ Greece's bargaining power with Turkey would decline if Turkey was left outside with no probability of EU membership like in the aftermath of the

¹⁴⁶ Ziya Öniş (2001), "Greek Turkish Relations and The European Union: A Critical Perspective", in: *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.6, No.3, p.12

¹⁴⁷ Kemal Kirişçi (2004), "the domestic politics of negotiating pre-accession: challenges and consequences of EU Turkish relations", presented in: *Second Pan-European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, pp.4-5

¹⁴⁸ Ziya Öniş (2000), "Luxembourg Helsinki and Beyond: Towards and Interpretation of Recent Turkey EU Relations" in: *Government and Opposition*, Vol.35, No.4, p.11

¹⁴⁹ Ziya Öniş (2000), "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative Historical Perspective" in: *Journal of European Integration History*, Vol.7, No.1, p.18

Luxembourg Summit¹⁵⁰

In addition to these, there existed an important external dimension underlying in the improvement in Greek-Turkish relations. The US, after the Imia Kardak crisis of the 1996 had applied pressure on the Greek leaders to open dialogue with Turkey for resolving their bilateral disputes.¹⁵¹

Another important factor was the TUSIAD, which was the interest association representing the interests of the big business, in shaping the features of Turkey-EU relations in this period. Although states continue to play an important role, it was also recognized that non- state civil organizations are also critical in shaping international relations. Big business in Turkey has been in favor of Turkey's full membership to the EU both because of economic reasons and, also for the democratic consolidation in Turkey. TUSIAD has been significant with its lobbying efforts, not only in Brussels, but also in Germany and Greece, which were against the idea of taking Turkey to the EU. We can not say that diplomatic activity of the state or the foreign policy establishment has not been influential in changing the Luxembourg decision. Interesting thing was the growing reciprocal influences in the civil society and pressures that non-state actors could bear upon foreign governments.¹⁵²

Finally, the role of the US was very important in pressuring and persuading the European political elites for Turkey's inclusion among the candidates before the Helsinki.¹⁵³ The US started to promote Turkey's membership objective for the EU from the late 1990s. After the disappointments of the Luxembourg Summit, the Clinton administration started to ensure active diplomatic support for Turkey. This support was important in providing a favorable outcome for Turkey at the Helsinki

¹⁵⁰ Ziya Öniş (2001), "Greek Turkish Relations and The European Union: A Critical Perspective" in: *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.6, No.3, p.12

¹⁵¹ Ziya Öniş (2001), "Greek Turkish Relations and The European Union: A Critical Perspective",....., p.12

¹⁵² Ziya Öniş (2000), "Luxembourg Helsinki and Beyond: Towards and Interpretation of Recent Turkey EU Relations" in: *Government and Opposition*, Vol.35, No.4, p.12

¹⁵³ Ziya Öniş (2000), "Luxembourg Helsinki and Beyond: Towards and Interpretation of Recent Turkey EU Relations",....., p.13

Summit.¹⁵⁴ It was thought that its vital interests in the Middle East and the Central Asia would be best served by having its strategic ally, Turkey, which would be anchored to the norms of the European Union.¹⁵⁵

In the late 1990s, Turkey's claim of being a pivotal state was based on its attractiveness as an emerging market and its wish to resist against terrorism. Washington realized the importance of Turkey as an ally to cope with rising trans-national crime involving drug trafficking, money laundering, trafficking of human beings and terrorism. Washington took on a strong attitude against the PKK, by classifying it as a terrorist organization. Mark Parris, the former US Ambassador to Turkey, pointed the importance of Turkey in a security-oriented relationship. Turkish participation in peace keeping actions in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia proved to the Pentagon and White House planners Ankara's capabilities and its readiness to take on responsibility as a security producing nation.¹⁵⁶ The Kosovo bombing campaign also made it clear to the EU that it needed to strengthen its military arm, if it wanted to play a serious role in security of Balkans. EU officials started to realize that instability in the Balkans would have harmful effects on the European integration process. It would be difficult to create a Europe based on the idea of peace. And it became clear that the creation of cooperative relationship in the Balkans would be difficult without resolution of conflicts between Greece and Turkey.¹⁵⁷ The decision to declare Turkey as a candidate country to the EU came after the Kosovo operations in 1999. At the same time, Turkey had found itself the position as a security provider within the European integration process it has been seeking for many years.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁴ Ziya Öniş, & Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey–EU-US Triangle in perspective: Transformation or Continuity" in: *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.59, No.2, p.10

¹⁵⁵ Ziya Öniş (2000), "Luxembourg Helsinki and Beyond: Towards and Interpretation of Recent Turkey EU Relations",....., p.13

¹⁵⁶ Ziya Öniş, & Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey–EU-US Triangle in perspective: Transformation or Continuity",....., p.8

¹⁵⁷ Atilla Eralp, "The process of Europeanization in Turkey", p.2

¹⁵⁸ Serhat Güvenç & Oya Memisoglu (2004), "Turkey and regional security" in Durmus Ozdemir, & Richard Griffiths *Turkey and the EU Enlargement*, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, p.219

The United States, from the early periods, tried to link Turkey to the European integration process. The objective was to anchor Turkey to the West by integrating it into its institutional settings. NATO was one of the key institutions and the EC/EU was another. So Turkey's integration in to the Europe would help the US to share the burden of responsibility in creating a strong and stable ally in a critical region of the world. In reality, the US's attitude to Turkey's integration process with the EC/EU contrasted with the uncertain approach of the European states. One of the main reasons for this difference is Turkey's membership of the EU do not have any costs for the US.¹⁵⁹

The Europeans, on the other hand, had to take into account the potential costs of Turkish accessions, for example its impact on employment, community-wide budgetary transfers, common agricultural policy, the decision making process and so on. Furthermore, the EU is a much more inward-oriented and much less security-oriented entity than the US. So, it views Turkey as a security liability more than a security asset. This perception was based on the fear that the incorporation of Turkey would link the EU to the unstable part of the world and would bring instability into the EU. From the US perspective, as a global power, the security producing identity of Turkey was more important than its quality of democracy, democratic deficits, and differences about the market economy.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁹Ziya Öniş, & Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey-EU-US Triangle in perspective: Transformation or Contnunity" in: *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.59, No.2, p.9

¹⁶⁰ Ziya Öniş, & Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey-EU-US Triangle in perspective: Transformation or Continuity" in: *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.59, No.2, p.9

Helsinki Summit: U-turn in Relations

The European Council meeting held in Helsinki during December 1999 represents another critical turning point in Turkey-EU relations. Following the disappointments of Luxembourg, Helsinki has provided a new beginning for Turkey-EU relations, by offering candidate status to Turkey, a decision which created considerable optimism on Turkey.¹⁶¹ The conclusions of the Helsinki Summit foresaw the preparation of an accession partnership document that outlined the economic and political reforms that had to be adopted by Turkey to meet the Copenhagen criteria. This was a procedure that was done with the other candidate countries since the December 1997 Luxembourg Summit. In return, Turkey prepared her national program outlining the reforms she would make in the short and long term.¹⁶²

On the other hand, the Helsinki decision represented a U-turn on the part of the European political elites too, because they have protected themselves from arguments about Turkey's exclusion on cultural grounds. After Helsinki Turkey's turn came to take on duties, so it had to undertake the radical reforms in the domestic sphere both in the areas of democratization and economy. It could be realized that the door is open, if the necessary conditions are satisfied.¹⁶³

By offering Turkey the possibility of full membership, the EU Council's Helsinki decision provided an impetus for change in Turkey's domestic politics and helped to instigate a series of radical reforms on the democratization area. But, to make a balanced view on the impact of the Helsinki Summit, we have to first consider that, parliamentary democracy had existed in Turkey since the post-war period in spite of its limitations and frequent, short lived, interruptions, in contrast

¹⁶¹ Ziya Öniş (2000), "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative Historical Perspective" in: *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.59, No.2, p.18

¹⁶² Kemal Kirişçi (2004), "the domestic politics of negotiating pre-accession: challenges and consequences of EU Turkish relations", presented in: *Second Pan-European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, pp.4-5

¹⁶³ Ziya Öniş (2000), "Luxembourg Helsinki and Beyond: Towards and Interpretation of Recent Turkey EU Relations" in: *Government and Opposition*, Vol.35, No.4, pp.13-15

to the Central and Eastern European Countries.¹⁶⁴ Finally, we should recognize that the end of 15 years old armed conflict with the PKK in the early part of the 1999 also helped to provide a more suitable environment within which democratization reforms could proceed.¹⁶⁵

Furthermore, the process of institutionalized interaction with the EU initiated at Helsinki represented a powerful encouragement for change in Turkish politics. Post Helsinki, the development of a powerful pro-EU coalition in Turkey could be realized which was considering EU membership as an uncertain ideal, but prepared to support the reforms needed to satisfy the basic conditions. Civil society organizations, especially TUSIAD, emerged as the dominant element of this pro-EU coalition. According to Ziya Öniş and Fuat Keyman, this coalition presented a challenge to the Turkish state and the security and foreign policy establishment. The Turkish state elites also looked positive to the notion of full EU membership, as a step in Turkey's modernization. But, the security conscious state elites couldn't understand the post national state and the notion of pooling of sovereignty that occurred with the emergence of the New Europe in the 1980s and the 1990s.¹⁶⁶ According to Ziya Öniş, Turkish political elites and the Euro-skeptics feared from the threat of fragmentation or break down of the nation, so they were reluctant to undertake the necessary reforms.¹⁶⁷

Also the political parties of the right and left continued to resist to EU related reforms in the post Helsinki era. It is fair to say that the two dominant parties of the coalition government formed in 1999, the left wing DSP and the right wing MHP were both characterized by their strong nationalistic look. Both parties resisted the political reforms demanded by the EU such as the

¹⁶⁴Ziya Öniş, & Fuat Keyman (2003), "Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the new Europe and the Turkish state" in: Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe, eds., *Turkey and European Integration Prospects and Issues in the Post-Helsinki Era*. London:Routledge, p.1

¹⁶⁵ Ziya Öniş (2004), "Diverse but Converging Paths to EU Membership: Poland and Turkey in Comparative Perspective" in: *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol.18, No.3. p.25

¹⁶⁶Ziya Öniş, & Fuat Keyman (2003), "Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the new Europe and the Turkish state",....., p.2

¹⁶⁷Ziya Öniş (2004), "Turkish Modernization and Challenges for the New Europe" in: *Perceptions. Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.9, No.3, p.6

elimination of the death penalty and the extension of cultural rights for minority groups.¹⁶⁸

According to Fuat Keyman and Ziya Öniş, only, ANAP, a center right party and a minor member of the coalition government appeared to be more supportive of the EU related reform agenda at that time. Also, inside ANAP, a considerable difference could be realized between the leader and file of the party. It could be realized that political parties in Turkey during 2000-2002 periods displayed a doubtful commitment to EU membership, and their agendas continued to preserve nationalistic outlook.¹⁶⁹

There existed great similarities between the outcomes of the Luxembourg and Helsinki Summit in area of conditions imposed. Turkey's full membership depended on its ability to fulfill the EU requirements in three specific areas: consolidation of economic reforms, democratization and the rights of the Kurdish minority and improvement in relations with Greece which means an internationally acceptable solution to the Cyprus issue. Helsinki represented a definitive turning point in Turkey-EU relations because, previously, the main form of interaction between Turkey and the new Europe in the 1990s was the signing of the Customs Union Agreement.¹⁷⁰ From the Turkish point of view, membership of the customs union or a special country status, which was falling short of full membership, was weak forms of economic and political integration. Harsh conditions had to be fulfilled in order to deepen the relationship. But few incentives were presented for the Turkish political elites to undertake reforms to satisfy the EU Copenhagen criteria.¹⁷¹ In this respect, following the Helsinki decision, Turkey was confronted with a more balanced set of conditions and

¹⁶⁸ Atilla Eralp, "The process of Europeanization in Turkey", p.4

¹⁶⁹ Ziya Öniş & Fuat Keyman (2003), "Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the new Europe and the Turkish state", in: Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe, eds., *Turkey and European Integration Prospects and Issues in the Post-Helsinki Era*. London:Routledge, pp.3-4

¹⁷⁰ Ziya Öniş, & Fuat Keyman (2003), "Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the new Europe and the Turkish state",.....,p.2

¹⁷¹ Ziya Öniş (2000), "Luxembourg Helsinki and Beyond: Towards and Interpretation of Recent Turkey EU Relations" in: *Government and Opposition*, Vol.35, No.4, p.13-15

incentives to undertake the kind of reforms demanded by the EU for full membership.¹⁷² Brussels was not very receptive to the idea of Turkey's early entry into the Union both because of the traditional concerns over Turkey's size, identity and also Central and Eastern European countries were already on the queue for the early round of enlargement. In the case of Ankara, the main problem occurs from the fulfillment of the some aspects of the Copenhagen criteria would be confronted with major resistance in the domestic political arena. There were two obstacles on the way to Turkey's full membership: the granting of the cultural rights of the Kurdish minority and a satisfactory solution to bilateral disputes with Greece and Cyprus problem. Günter Verheugen in his visit to Turkey, EU Commissioner responsible for enlargement, stated that the EU wouldn't open negotiations for full membership with Turkey unless Copenhagen Criteria were fulfilled and definitive steps were taken by Turkish political elites in the sphere of human rights with respect to the position of the Kurdish minority and the resolution of the Cyprus dispute. To make progress and accomplish a smooth entry into the Union, Turkey, itself, needed to develop a program involving extensive democratization and reforms in the political system, in addition to the reforms in the economic sphere. According to Ziya Öniş, an appropriate political strategy of Turkey had to include, a program which recognizes the cultural rights of the minorities within the framework of a unitary Turkish state, as part of democratic deepening and expansion of individual rights, and independent Cyprus with full protection of the Turkish community on the island.¹⁷³

Within the political agendas of the major nationally based political parties in Turkey, both on the left and right, there was only one political party the Republican People's Party (CHP) which had been willing to provide serious attention to the issue of cultural pluralism and minority rights at least as an extension of individual rights and democratic deepening. This party had been left outside of the

¹⁷² Ziya Öniş, & Fuat Keyman (2003), "Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the new Europe and the Turkish state" in: Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe, eds., *Turkey and European Integration Prospects and Issues in the Post-Helsinki Era*. London:Routledge, p.2

¹⁷³ Ziya Öniş (2000), "Luxembourg Helsinki and Beyond: Towards and Interpretation of Recent Turkey EU Relations" in: *Government and Opposition*, Vol.35, No.4, pp.13-15

parliamentary representation after its defeat in the general elections of April 1999. All the political parties and key institutions of state were against the solutions proposed by Greece or the creation of a Cyprus in which Turkish Cypriot community would be associated as a minority without autonomy. The solution suggested by the Ankara and agreed by all political parties in the Cyprus case was a confederation of two independent ethnically based communities on the island. The main challenge to a state of affairs came from the conclusion of the Helsinki Summit itself, which sets a deadline 2004 for the settlement of bilateral disputes between Greece and Turkey. The EU has clarified that a candidate country cannot hope to become a full member of the Union as long as a bilateral conflict with an existing member state exists. As Ankara is keen on full membership, it will be confronted with pressure from the EU to settle its bilateral disputes with Greece. According to Ziya Öniş, the solution suggested by Turkey about the Cyprus problem, which means legitimizing the current status quo established after the creation of an independent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983, has no chance of being accepted as a satisfactory solution from the point of Greece, EU and the international community. The current status quo based on the existence of a separate state in the Northern part of the island which is only accepted by Turkey would only be carried on if Turkey had gave up its interest in becoming part of the EU. The opening up of accession negotiations by the EU with the Republic of Cyprus had complicated the matter further. With its high per capita income and its size, Southern Cyprus acquired the conditions for full membership, more than the new entrants from the CEEC. The entry of Cyprus Republic as the only representative of the island would be confronted with resistance from Turkey. According to Ziya Öniş, Ankara should struggle for an independent Cyprus, in which the Turkish minority would enjoy considerable but not complete autonomy in government as part of a confederation structure. The degree of autonomy enjoyed by the Turkish minority would be the subject of a bargaining process. Such an entity would then apply for and be considered for full membership of the EU as a legitimate representative of both ethnic communities on the island. A solution in this direction would represent a major step in resolving long

standing tensions between Turkey and Greece and would help to remove a major obstacle on the way to Turkey's full EU membership. Such a solution would also help to overcome the isolation faced by the Turkish population on the Northern part of the island and would help to abolish the differences in income and wealth which exists between the Southern and the Northern parts of the island. Benefits of international recognition with significant expansion of revenues from tourism, the EU funds and the free mobility of resources from one part of the island to another could make an enormous difference to the well being of the Turkish population of the North and the well being of the island as a whole.¹⁷⁴ In the summer of 2001, the Turkish Parliament adopted a series of amendments to the Turkish Constitution, by this way fulfillment of the political reforms to meet the Copenhagen criteria would be easier. A major turning point on Cyprus came on the scene when Rauf Denktaş and Glascos Klerides met in December 2001 with the intention to restart negotiations for the settlement of the Cypriot problem. The compromise agreement reached between Turkey, UK and the US about the use of NATO facilities for operations in the context of the European Security and Defense Policy added to the positive climate in EU-Turkey relations. This climate played a critical role in removing the objections among some members of the EU to Turkey's participation in the Convention on the future of Europe. Turkey had gained access to the Convention. In Turkey, this was received as a positive development. According to Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, in 2002, the reform process slowed down when Euro-skeptics in the country like the nationalist right wing partner of the coalition government led by Devlet Bahçeli began to object some of the reforms. These included the lifting of the death penalty and the introduction of some cultural rights for minorities. The spring of 2002 was characterized by a very heated debate on the membership to the EU. The belief that the EU was a Christian club that would never admit Turkey as a member and the reforms that demanded by EU were aimed to weaken Turkish territorial integrity gained intensity. In spite of

¹⁷⁴ Ziya Öniş (2001), "Greek Turkish Relations and The European Union: A Critical Perspective", in: *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.6, No.3, p.13-15

divisions within the coalition, at the end, the government received enough votes to pass the reform package in August 2002 including the sensitive issues.¹⁷⁵ A series of political reforms involving the extension of cultural rights for minorities to the elimination of the death penalty took place in August 2002. The economic crisis that the Turkish economy experienced in late 2000 and the early 2001 were also effective in breaking down the resistance and accelerating the reform process.

The EU membership and the material benefits that it promised appeared more attractive during a time of a deep economic crisis.¹⁷⁶ Also, support from pro-EU civil society groups like Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD), Economic Development Foundation (IKV) and ad hoc groups such as the Europe Movement and also media campaigns helped to mobilize the necessary parliamentary support that was needed to adopt these reforms. A powerful pro-EU public opinion contributed to this outcome too. However, relations within the coalition making up the government became strained and the government had to take the decision to make an early election in November 2002.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁵Ziya Öniş, & Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey–EU-US Triangle in perspective: Transformation or Contunity" in: *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.59, No.2 p.6

¹⁷⁶ Ziya Öniş (2004), "Turkish Modernization and Challenges for the New Europe", in: *Perceptions. Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.9, No.3. p.6

¹⁷⁷Kemal Kirişçi (2004), "the domestic politics of negotiating pre-accession: challenges and consequences of EU Turkish relations", presented in: *Second Pan-European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, p.5

New Government: Justice and Development Party and Copenhagen Summit 2002

There had been different events in the political arena of Turkey till the end of 2002. The Justice and Development party (AKP) had come to power in general elections of November 2002. Despite to suspicions about the historical background of the founder of the AKP rooted from the radical Islamists Welfare and Virtue parties, they (AKP) claimed that the new party would follow a center-right and moderate policy with an aim to end the political turmoil which endured throughout the 1990's.¹⁷⁸

The victory of AKP in November 2002 elections may also be reflected as a response of Turkish electorates to the former coalition governments mainly known by their corrupted structures and over populist tendencies. As a result of 2002 general election, AKP had granted enough number of seats to enable it to establish a one party government. AKP had won 363 of the total 541 elected seats in Grand National Assembly. The second and the only opposition party which achieved enough votes to enter to the GNA was the leftist Republicans People's Party (CHP) which won 178 seats.¹⁷⁹

When we look at the results of 2002 elections the first question comes to our mind, what makes the Turkish electorate so angry and reactive to former governments that the parties which had dominated the Turkish politics were left out of the parliament, while the AKP newly established just a few months before the general elections acquired the majority of the seats in the Grand National Assembly. What were the reasons for the sudden shift?

First issue was the economic problems which made the majority of population suffered from high unemployment and high inflation rate and lack of purchasing power. According to Ziya Öniş and Fuat Keyman, in elections of 1995 and 1999 the major concerns of the parties were to tackle the

¹⁷⁸ Ziya Öniş, & Fuat Keyman (2003), "Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the new Europe and the Turkish state", in: Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe, eds., *Turkey and European Integration Prospects and Issues in the Post-Helsinki Era*. London:Routledge, p.4

¹⁷⁹Ziya Öniş, & Fuat Keyman (2003), "Turkey at the polls, A new Path Emerges" in: *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.14, No.2, p.98

political problems such as radical Islamist movement and Kurdish separatist rebels. National security issues had the priority over the difficulties of daily life issues. Democratic Left party and the Nationalist Action party (MHP) had state-centred or nationalist agendas. Second, the 2002 results were not only influenced by parties but also by non-state actors such as economic pressure groups, civil society organizations and furthermore supranational entities such as IMF and EU. These institutions had always determined the importance of obtaining the political stability for long term progress. We should remember the fact that the decision for the early general elections of 2002 had been taken by the initiations of Kemal Derviş the independent ministers of state (responsible of economics of the time and former Vice President of World Bank). Derviş had many times stated that the main reasons for the economic turmoil of the time were based on political reasons rather than economic. Consecutive economic crises of 2000 and 2001 had reminded Turkish public that a national security policy without a stable economic environment is not achievable. Within this respect we can easily say that the characteristic theme of the 2002 elections were society and its social prosperity rather than the security issues. In this kind of a political environment the AKP strategy for having votes from various segments of Turkish society had three dimensions. First of all, the leader of AKP and the former Major of Istanbul Recep Tayyip Erdoğan shifted their political sayings from a radical Islamists motive to a more moderate pro-Western, pro-democratic and pro-free market context, in order to attract the attention from the wide segments of voters, by representing their party as a center-right political entity. Second, AKP had argued that sustainable economic recovery could never be achieved without openness and transparency in government. In order to maintain a permanent economic growth, the wider masses of the population should be enabled to make inputs to the preparation and implementation of macro-economic policies. However CHP on the other hand seemed to be too much dependent on the Kemal Derviş's unquestioning acceptance of IMF

mandated structural adjustment as the main pillar of economic policies.¹⁸⁰ What makes the AKP distinctive at this point was that it had given priority to the issues of social and distributive injustice despite to the resistance from IMF. Third AKP had emphasized on the assumption that promoting democratic reforms is the only solution to overcome the political issues on the agenda.¹⁸¹

Furthermore, the three governing coalition parties Democratic Leftist Party (DSP), Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and the Motherland Party (ANAP) were too distant from economic lobbying groups and civil society organizations. And the Republican People's party (CHP) and Kemal Derviş were too worried about the IMF, but not worried enough about social justice or the need to support the small and medium sized enterprises that form the most energetic sector of the Turkish economy. The AKP built up its support among the small and medium sized businesspeople that has a significant number and influence in the Turkish society. It could be seen that what put the AKP over the top was the economic crises and the voter's urgent desire for solutions to the problems of unemployment, poverty and economic growth.¹⁸²

The AKP, with its Islamist roots but moderate qualifications, seemed to be keen on to the EU membership, as a commitment to satisfy the associated conditions.¹⁸³ The new AKP government proved to be endeavoring in its push for EU membership in the two months before the Copenhagen Summit of December 2002. The underlying reason for the party's active support for EU membership was not only the material benefits related with full membership, but also the extension of religious freedoms that challenged the secularism of the Turkish state.¹⁸⁴

When Justice and Development Party came to power, it introduced a new reform package to enhance democracy on individual liberties, concerning the shortcomings in the fight against torture.

¹⁸⁰ Ziya Öniş, & Fuat Keyman (2003), "Turkey at the polls, A new Path Emerges" in *Journal Of Democracy*, Vol.14, No.2, p.99

¹⁸¹ Ziya Öniş (2004), "Turkish Modernization and Challenges for the New Europe", in *Perceptions. Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.9, No.3, p.9

¹⁸² Ziya Öniş, & Fuat Keyman (2003), "Turkey at the polls, A new Path Emerges",....., p.102

¹⁸³ Ziya Öniş, & Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey–EU-US Triangle in perspective: Transformation or Continuity" in *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.59, No.2, p.7

¹⁸⁴ Ziya Öniş (2004), "Diverse but Converging Paths to EU Membership: Poland and Turkey in Comparative Perspective" in *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol.18, No.3, p.20

Moreover, it ended the 15 year state of emergency in the last two provinces in the South Eastern parts of Turkey, which are mostly populated by the Kurds. Since 1987, the Turkish government had applied emergency rule in this region to undermine Kurdish separatist activities. People in the region welcomed the end of emergency rule.¹⁸⁵

Another complicated issue was reducing the military's role in politics. The Islamic roots of the Justice and Development Party and the strong public perception of the army as the guarantor of the secular state made the government to treat this issue under the European framework.¹⁸⁶ According to Ziya Öniş and Fuat Keyman, despite the legislative changes outlined, progress achieved was less than EU expectations in several areas. From the EU point of view, a vital consideration was the ability to translate these legislative changes into effective implementation.¹⁸⁷ According to Brewin, the civil-military relation continued to be a serious concern. Political changes were not sufficient if they were not accompanied by economic reforms.¹⁸⁸

Another important event in November 2002 was the introduction of the UN Plan, the Annan Plan for the resolution of the Cyprus dispute. The UN plan for Cyprus (Annan plan) announced during November 2002, shortly after the general elections in Turkey, also raised hopes because of the possibility that the long standing dispute over Cyprus could be resolved in a peaceful way through diplomatic initiatives, which was the other obstacle on the path to Turkey's EU membership.¹⁸⁹

The question of Cyprus is one other area where the government met constant resistance. The previous government had compelled to encourage Rauf Denktaş to enter negotiations over the plan

¹⁸⁵ Suhanaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey EU relations in perspective: Domestic and Foreign Linkages", in: *Second-Pan European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, p.6

¹⁸⁶ Suhanaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey EU relations in perspective: Domestic and Foreign Linkages",....., p.6

¹⁸⁷ Ziya Öniş, & Fuat Keyman (2003), "Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the new Europe and the Turkish state", in: Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe, eds., *Turkey and European Integration Prospects and Issues in the Post-Helsinki Era*. London:Routledge, p.6

¹⁸⁸ Christopher Brewin (2003), "A changing Turkey: Europe's Dilemma", in: *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, vol.5, no.2, p.10

¹⁸⁹ Öniş Ziya & Fuat Keyman (2003), "Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the new Europe and the Turkish state" in: Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe, eds., *Turkey and European Integration Prospects and Issues in the Post-Helsinki Era*. London:Routledge, p.5

announced by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in November 2002. According to Kemal Kirişçi, this detailed and comprehensive plan projected the establishment of reunited Cyprus by establishing a balance between the two sides on the island.¹⁹⁰ Finally, the Cyprus dispute, in spite of a rapprochement between the key actors, had not been resolved. All these considerations prevented a favorable decision emerge from the Copenhagen Summit from a Turkish perspective in spite of the high hopes.¹⁹¹

With these developments in the background, at the Copenhagen Summit, the position of Franco-German alliance dominated and Turkey was given a date, December 2004, with the prospect of opening accession negotiations depending on the implementation of reforms in the interim period. If the outcome of the negotiation process was seen favorable, then accession negotiations would be started without any further delay.¹⁹² According to Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, the outcome of the Copenhagen Summit could have been better from the Turkish point of view. If the EU had provided more powerful signals to Turkey, such as earlier and definitive date for accession negotiations, this would have strengthen the hand of the AKP government to confront the powerful anti-EU coalition in Turkey and resolve the Cyprus dispute according to the Annan Plan.¹⁹³ While Turkish leader succeeded in getting a firm rendezvous date, they were concerned that the newcomers especially Cyprus might block Turkey. To alleviate Turkish fears, 25 countries of the enlarged union issued a joint statement endorsing Turkey's accession process. This was a promising development, but it did not provide any guarantees for Turkey.¹⁹⁴ Indeed, following the Copenhagen Summit, the AKP government made a U-turn in its policy towards Cyprus and the Annan plan was sidelined in the

¹⁹⁰ Kemal Kirişçi (2004), "the domestic politics of negotiating pre-accession: challenges and consequences of EU Turkish relations" presented in: *Second Pan-European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, p.5

¹⁹¹ Ziya Öniş, & Fuat Keyman (2003), "Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the new Europe and the Turkish state", , p.6

¹⁹² Ziya Öniş, & Fuat Keyman (2003), "Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the new Europe and the Turkish state", in: Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe, eds., *Turkey and European Integration Prospects and Issues in the Post-Helsinki Era*. London: Routledge, p.6

¹⁹³ Ziya Öniş, & Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey-EU-US Triangle in perspective: Transformation or Continuity", in: *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.59, No.2, p.7

¹⁹⁴ Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey EU relations in perspective: Domestic and Foreign Linkages" presented in: *Second-Pan European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, p.4

early months of 2003.¹⁹⁵

From the Turkish point of view, the decision made at Copenhagen could be interpreted as a double-edged decision. It could also be represented as a definitive step forward. At Helsinki Turkey had been offered the possibility of full membership but no date had been given. Three years later, at the Copenhagen Summit, Turkey was given a time table and a commitment by EU that progress satisfying EU conditions would be rewarded by opening up accession negotiations. Significant progress that was possessed in the interim period did not mean that it was completed. EU wanted to monitor the implementation of the main legislative changes before opening up accession negotiations.¹⁹⁶

The Copenhagen Summit was also important that it forced Europe itself to think seriously about what Turkish membership requires. Up to that point, Turkish membership, because of the difficulties in undertaking the reforms required, appeared to be a distant probability that could be postponed into the future. But, the reforms in the post Helsinki era recommended that Turkish membership had to be confronted with a serious prospect.¹⁹⁷

In addition to the concerns clarified before, the EU officials were worried about the meaning of the November 2002 elections that brought the AKP to power. Although the AKP presented itself as moderate, the EU elites were anxious about the possibility of future clashes between the governing party and the state establishment because of the issues like the secular character of the Turkish state. So, it was not surprising that the EU approached the AKP's electoral success with suspicion. The EU authorities feared that the AKP's position would change into radical attitude or religious identity issues could take priority like the headscarf dispute. Taking into consideration the uncertainty surrounding the state AKP relationship, EU made sense to postpone negotiations with Turkey in

¹⁹⁵ Ziya Öniş, & Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey–EU-US Triangle in perspective: Transformation or Continuity",....., p.7

¹⁹⁶ Ziya Öniş, & Fuat Keyman (2003), "Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the new Europe and the Turkish state",....., p.6

¹⁹⁷ Ziya Öniş, & Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey–EU-US Triangle in perspective: Transformation or Continuity" in: *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.59, No.2, p.8

order to be able to determine the ability of the Turkish state to accommodate a moderate Islamic party which promised to remain within the boundaries of a secular constitutional order.¹⁹⁸

What was important about the Copenhagen decision was that it was reached under unordinary circumstances. One critical aspect of Copenhagen Summit was that the new enlargement with the accession of Eastern European Countries and Republic of Cyprus had been approved. Although Republic of Cyprus has not been able to solve the political disputes with Northern part of the Island, approval of its accession had strengthened the position of nationalist groups in Turkey that EU one more time had proved that it did not have an objective position towards Cyprus dispute. The decision also abandoned a further incentive for Greek side to comply with the UN approach to the dispute.¹⁹⁹

By the end of the Copenhagen Summit deeper and more difficult question had come into light with respect to European identity and the process of Europeanization. Actually, a clear distinction between social democratic and conservative groups within Europe had come into existence. Social democrats in a more positive manner with an aim of structuring a more multicultural Europe had insisted that Turkey is heading towards a further accession by reminding that Turkey had complied with all the norms of Copenhagen criteria. On the other hand, conservatives emphasized on the idea that Turkey in terms of both its historical and cultural aspects are far from becoming a part of identity. The opposition bloc was relied on the assumption that Turkey would never achieve to fully comply with the Copenhagen criteria and this will provide a tool for them to postpone Turkey's possible accession to an indefinite time period.²⁰⁰

In this respect Copenhagen Summit initiated a serious debate about the future of Europe trying to absorb a country like Turkey with a huge Muslim population. It had also highlighted the

¹⁹⁸ Ziya Öniş, & Fuat Keyman (2003), "Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the new Europe and the Turkish state", in: Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe, eds., *Turkey and European Integration Prospects and Issues in the Post-Helsinki Era*. London: Routledge, p.6

¹⁹⁹ Ziya Öniş, & Fuat Keyman (2003), "Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the new Europe and the Turkish state", in: Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe, eds., *Turkey and European Integration Prospects and Issues in the Post-Helsinki Era*. London: Routledge, p.15

²⁰⁰ Ziya Öniş, & Fuat Keyman (2003), "Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the new Europe and the Turkish state",....., p.11

concerns about the limitations of the European integration stemming from the fact that it is becoming an inward oriented process.²⁰¹

Despite to its cultural differences, Europe had also concerns about Turkey's size, economic problems and volatile neighbourhood. Former French president and European Convention Chairman Valery Giscard d'Estaing tend to define Europe in culturally distinctive and strongly object to Turkey's membership by arguing that it would mean the end of Europe.²⁰²

In addition to these discussions if the European identity would be restricted by religious and cultural terms, what would happen to Europe's own substantial Muslim population? Is this kind of approach would threaten the liberal ideals which constitute the main aspects of open societies and which the EU claim to stand for? At the most fundamental level, an open society is characterized by rule of law, respect for human rights and minority opinions and freedom of thought and expression.²⁰³

The controversies around Turkey's possible accession had showed that despite the attempts to constitute a supranational state in Europe, the distinctive approaches of nation state towards such fundamental issues became more clear-cut and self-centrist. For example, UK which has always implemented a more distinctive policy regarding EU due to its Anglo-Saxon tradition of policy making, had followed a more optimistic and supportive approach towards the issue of Turkey's accession in Copenhagen Summit. Besides the differences in approaches between UK and Franco-German pact, the Copenhagen Summit had also uncovered the divergence of opinions and policies between the Franco-German pact and Mediterranean member states who were concerned about the

²⁰¹ Ziya Öniş, & Fuat Keyman (2003), "Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the new Europe and the Turkish state",....., p.4

²⁰² Christopher Brewin (2003), "A changing Turkey: Europe's Dilemma" in: *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, vol.5, no.2, p.4

²⁰³ Suhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey EU relations in perspective: Domestic and Foreign Linkages", presented in: *Second-Pan European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, p.21

increasing dominance of the previous two over themselves and others.²⁰⁴

The Copenhagen Summit had also highlighted the question that does EU prefer to have a prominent role in the political affair of world stage by integrating Turkey into its own structure in order to strengthen its multicultural context, or it would prefer an inward oriented structure that aims to focus on regional sphere by withdrawing from its claim to act as a global power on political arena. Currently, EU has seemed to complete the significant steps of economic integration, democratization and establishing peace within its boundaries. On the other hand, it lacks the ability to play significant role in the world politics as being a global actor. This deficit is significantly influencing the direction of EU policy towards Turkey. The main difference between the Helsinki and Copenhagen Summit is that, in Helsinki the main question was that if Turkey would be able to comply with Copenhagen criteria or not, where as the main question in Copenhagen Summit was what would be the further direction of European integration and European identity in the foreseeable future.²⁰⁵

One other important signification of Copenhagen Summit, it took place during a time period when US had been articulating controversial claims about Iraq's hidden plans for producing weapons of mass destruction, and try to initiate the UN Security Council to approve a multilateral military action towards Iraq.²⁰⁶ However, the claims of US were strongly rejected by Franco-German pact (German was the temporarily member of Security Council at that time) and a major rift had emerged within the transatlantic alliance. Moreover, the disagreement over the Iraq issue had widened the differences and distinctions among the member states. Due to its strong traditional and cultural links, UK had preferred to take a position behind US in favour of imposing a unilateral military action to Iraq. Once again it was begun to be criticized by the Franco-German pact if UK really want to

²⁰⁴ Ziya Öniş, & Fuat Keyman (2003), "Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the new Europe and the Turkish state", in: Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe, eds., *Turkey and European Integration Prospects and Issues in the Post-Helsinki Era*. London: Routledge, p.7

²⁰⁵ Ziya Öniş, & Fuat Keyman (2003), "Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the new Europe and the Turkish state" in: Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe, eds., *Turkey and European Integration Prospects and Issues in the Post-Helsinki Era*. London: Routledge, pp.6-7

²⁰⁶ Ziya Öniş, & Fuat Keyman (2003), "Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the new Europe and the Turkish state",....., pp.6-7

become a part of the European integration. However, UK was not the only member who was in support of US. Countries like Spain, Portugal and Italy and the some of the new Eastern European entrants such as Poland had declared their full support in favour of a military action in partnership with US. Consequently, at the end of the Copenhagen Summit, EU had seemed to be much more fragmented than it has ever been.²⁰⁷

One can easily conclude that the overall result of Copenhagen Summit had led all the parts, the member states and Turkey into confusion, and to uncertainty. Turkey without obtaining the date to begin negotiations in its mind would have difficulties to position itself and the global political stage. It was totally clear that strong connection with US wouldn't be sufficient enough for Turkey to quicken its accession process and even in some respect it can impose a negative aspect.²⁰⁸ However, on the other hand one can not over estimate US impact on Turkey's acquiring a candidacy status in Helsinki Summit and there were still pro-American governments were in power in several member states. UK, at the first hand, as we have mentioned above. While keeping close connection with US could help Turkey to have the support of these countries in EU, it could also be strongly criticized by the Franco-German pact which seemed to be dominant controlling power within EU. Therefore, what Turkey could do was to implement a balance of power policy by enduring its support for US as long as its position is not stressed by the Franco-German pact and destruct its accession process. With respect to Iraq while unquestionable support for US policy would disturb the Franco-German pact, an opposition to US stand would weaken its long term strategic ties with US.²⁰⁹

In this respect the Copenhagen Summit decision had two negative effects on the relations between EU and Turkey. The one is that we indicated previously it curbed the enthusiasm to take moderate steps regarding to find a solution to Cyprus dispute. According to Ziya Öniş and Fuat

²⁰⁷ Ziya Öniş (2004), "Turkish Modernization and Challenges for the New Europe" in: *Perceptions. Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.9, No.3, p.13

²⁰⁸ Stephen Larrabee, (2004), "American perspective on Turkey and Turkey-EU relations" presented in: *AICGS Conference 'Changing Parameters in US-German-Turkey relations: Future Scenarios*, September 20, Berlin, p.27

²⁰⁹ Ziya Öniş, & Fuat Keyman (2003), "Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the new Europe and the Turkish state" in: Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe, eds., *Turkey and European Integration Prospects and Issues in the Post-Helsinki Era*. London: Routledge, p.6

Keyman, the ability to resolve the Cyprus dispute within the context of the Annan Plan, involving the reunification of the island on the basis of two essentially sovereign states, encountered a major set back at the Copenhagen Summit.²¹⁰

Besides, a more positive decision which would create an optimistic mood in Turkey's further accession, Turkey would have chance to implement a more European oriented foreign policy with respect to US preparation attempts for a military act against Iraq. No doubt that a more Europe oriented Turkey would prefer to follow a much tougher and resistive approach against US demands. Such reposition of Turkey would strengthen the cards in the hands of Franco-German pact against US and UK alliance.²¹¹

The government had hoped to have negotiations start before ten new countries joined EU in May 2004. The major concern was that they would have to deal with each of 25 countries rather than 15. Obviously the most problematic of the all the new members was the Republic of Cyprus, which would possibly use its veto threat against Turkey's further accession before finding a stable solution to the dispute in the Island. Besides, the contradiction over the Cyprus issue was one of the main reasons why Turkey could not get an earlier date to begin the accession negotiations.²¹²

In the following, Rauf Denktaş, the president of the TRNC and Chief Negotiator for the Turkish Cypriot side walked away from the last round of talks in Hague in March 2003 without accepting a solution. In accordingly, the Turkish side was blamed for providing the main obstacles by not agreeing on a common reconciliation within the UN context, on the Cyprus report prepared by Kofi Annan, the General Secretary of UN.²¹³

²¹⁰ Ziya Öniş, & Fuat Keyman (2003), "Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the new Europe and the Turkish state", in: Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe, eds., *Turkey and European Integration Prospects and Issues in the Post-Helsinki Era*. London: Routledge, p.6

²¹¹ Ziya Öniş, & Fuat Keyman (2003), "Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the new Europe and the Turkish state",....., p.6

²¹² Kemal Kirişçi, (2004), "the domestic politics of negotiating pre-accession: challenges and consequences of EU Turkish relations", presented in: *Second Pan-European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna,....., p.6

²¹³ Kemal Kirişçi (2004), "the domestic politics of negotiating pre-accession: challenges and consequences of EU Turkish relations",....., p.6

Besides the problems in the international politics, one other major difficulty which the AKP had to tackle was that the president of the party Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was not entitled to be appointed as Prime Minister since he was allowed to participate in general elections in order to become a member of the parliament. The uncertainty about the control power over the prime ministership had weakened the position of the party both in external and internal politics.²¹⁴

However, with its majority situation in the parliament, AKP had been able to amend the law which posed a barrier to Erdoğan's participation in election and succeeded in the election of the former Prime Minister Abdullah Gül as an MP from Siirt province in March 2003. Afterwards the government began to give its full attention to legislative reforms.²¹⁵

In the second half of 2003, the AKP had achieved an upwards trend both in political and economic areas. The high performance of the stock exchange together with the decreasing level of inflation rates and increasing values of the Turkish currency had strengthened the hand of AKP government. The progress report of EU had mentioned that there had been considerable improvement in fulfilling the EU norms however also noted that there were still things to do for the government. The Commission report also determined that Turkey's accession process is strongly related to the success of the conciliation process in Cyprus dispute.²¹⁶

The EU's attempt to impose such kind of a connection between two issues had been severely criticized by the domestic public. Moreover in his visit to Turkey, the President of the European Commission of the time Romano Prodi had emphasized on the fact that although the basis of the Commission advise to European Council would be constituted by the Turkey's ability to comply with Copenhagen criteria, the Cyprus issue is a political reality which Turkey must confront in one

²¹⁴ Kemal Kirişçi (2004), "the domestic politics of negotiating pre-accession: challenges and consequences of EU Turkish relations", presented in: *Second Pan-European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, pp.6-7

²¹⁵ Kemal Kirişçi (2004), "the domestic politics of negotiating pre-accession: challenges and consequences of EU Turkish relations",....., p.7

²¹⁶ Kemal Kirişçi, (2004), "the domestic politics of negotiating pre-accession: challenges and consequences of EU Turkish relations",....., p.7

way or the other.²¹⁷

In March 2003 all attempts of the Turkish government to convince Rauf Denktaş to relent had been unsuccessful. In that respect the Greek Cypriot would be accepted as a full member to EU as being the representative of the whole island. The Helsinki Summit had noted that although settlement in dispute with the Northern side would make the circumstances more positive in favour of Greek Cyprus, the reach of solution would not be a must for it. Moreover Rauf Denktaş's attitudes that were far from reconciling on the context of the Annan Plan had abandoned the entire obstacle for the Greek Cyprus on its way to full membership.²¹⁸

The unwillingness of Rauf Denktaş and his supporters in Turkey to agree on the rapprochement presented by the Annan Plan had been articulated on the international arena in a way that, these pro-status quo groups were the main barriers to reach a common solution on the Cyprus dispute. Nevertheless, in 2003 Turkish Cypriot demonstrations in support of a solution and EU membership changed the overall climate. During 2003 the government had also succeeded in consolidating its power. In the following the result of December 2003 elections, which brought the supporters of a more positive attitudes towards Annan plan to the power, had highlighted the fact that Denktaş's popularity and the legitimacy of his policies began to be shaken. Tayyip Erdoğan had argued that Turkey's new strategy was always to be one step a head of Greek Cypriot regarding to find a solution.²¹⁹

Both EU and US had supported the accession process of Cyprus to EU based on the idea that it could be much easier to find a common solution to dispute on the island within the perspective of a European context. In the eyes of Greek Cypriots, the accession powers would drastically change the

²¹⁷ Kemal Kirişçi (2004), "the domestic politics of negotiating pre-accession: challenges and consequences of EU Turkish relations", presented in: *Second Pan-European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, p.7

²¹⁸ Kemal Kirişçi (2004), "the domestic politics of negotiating pre-accession: challenges and consequences of EU Turkish relations",....., p.10

²¹⁹ Kemal Kirişçi (2004), "the domestic politics of negotiating pre-accession: challenges and consequences of EU Turkish relations",....., p.11

no reconciling attitudes of the Turkish side.²²⁰

Despite to several statements from EU indicated that Turkey would only be criticized on its compatibility with Copenhagen criteria, it was also emphasized that the disputed sides must reach a settlement over their conflict prior to accession on May 1st 2004. In this respect the EU had tried to initiate both side one at a time in order to take the necessary steps for the reconciling of the dispute. However, acceptance of the membership of the Greek side prior to a settlement on disputed issues, had led to imbalanced relationship between the two sides and to an increasing aggression and suspicion on Turkish side. Greece's position as already being a full member, and further entrance of Cyprus on the may 1st, and Turkey's candidacy status since the Helsinki Summit, had moved the Cyprus issue with all it's aspects to European arena.²²¹

While there was resistance from Denktaş and some other sources in Turkey, the attempts for a compromise along the lines of the Annan Plan were also supported by the majority of Turkish Cypriot Community, who wanted to end their international isolation and were attracted by the economic benefits of EU membership. The economic embargo, which lasted for the three decades, has caused economic poverty in the Turkish Cypriots side and widened the economic gap between the Northern Turkish Cypriot and the Southern Greek Cypriot parts of the island. December 2003 elections in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) had been seen as an early referendum on the Annan Plan that reunites the island before Cyprus accession to the European Union on May 2004. The parliamentary elections, ended in a deadlock with no victors. The opposition parties that were supporters of the UN plan and the governing parties which opposed to it split the 50 seat parliament winning 25 seats each and neither side received enough mandate to take control of the parliament. In the end, the pro-European CTP under the leadership of Talat was assigned by President Denktaş to form a coalition government. With these election results, the Turkish Cypriot

²²⁰ Suhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey EU relations in perspective: Domestic and Foreign Linkages", presented in: *Second-Pan European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, p.12

²²¹ Suhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey EU relations in perspective: Domestic and Foreign Linkages",....., p.12

people have showed that they wanted a settlement and to join the EU, but they also wanted to ensure that their rights, sovereignty and security will be protected. The Annan Plan, which resulted from efforts made by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and the UN envoy to Cyprus Alvaro de Soto, has been a rather problematic document and was revised 5 times until the final version. In the meantime, it has encouraged urgency in political dialogue which, indirectly, led to the opening of the borders to allow free passage from North to South in April last year. This was a vital moment after 30 years of partition and allowed Cypriots to see what was on the other side of the wall. The election results in 2003 saw the election of hard liner Papadopoulos in the South. In Burgenstock, Switzerland, the two sides, supported by their respective mother countries could not reach a final agreement. In the end, the destiny of the island had to be determined by the two communities in referendum for the Annan Plan on April 24, 2004.²²²

In the public opinion surveys before the election, the Turkish Cypriots seemed to have more tendency to vote favorably, while the majority of Greek Cypriots opposed the plan. The North welcomes the opportunity that abolishes the international trade embargo against its republic, although feared a return to a minority status in the new United Republic of Cyprus. Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, refused to approve anything that legitimized the Turkish intervention of 1974. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot government had hopes of renegotiating the Annan Plan in the post May 2004 period as a full member of the EU. Consequently, on the April 24, 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the UN reunification plan, but the Greek South rejected it with 76 percent against. According to Şuhnaz Yılmaz, although, it had shortcomings and was not satisfying for both sides, the Annan plan presented an opportunity for the long lasting Cyprus dispute to be resolved.²²³ Within the European context, with the rejection of the plan by the Greek Cypriot side, as stated by Alvaro de Soto: a historic chance to resolve the Cyprus problem has been missed. The Greek Cypriot

²²² Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey EU relations in perspective: Domestic and Foreign Linkages", presented in: *Second-Pan European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, p.14

²²³ Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey EU relations in perspective: Domestic and Foreign Linkages", presented in: *Second-Pan European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, p.15

rejection of the reunification of the island according to the Annan Plan put the Turkish Cypriots who supported it in a frustrated position. Turkish Cypriots would be punished for having said yes by continuing economic and political isolation from the rest of the Europe. While the pressure on Turkey regarding the Cyprus issue is diminished, Greek Cypriots hold a strong card as a member of the EU. For example, they are pressuring Turkey to extend its customs union with EU to the Greek Cypriot part of Cyprus. By accepting the Greek half of the Cyprus as a full member state, in spite of its rejection of the unification plan, the EU found itself importing an old conflict, which is not limited only to Cyprus but is linked to Greece and Turkey. The fortified Green line dividing the two parts of Cyprus had become an external EU border. Günther Verheugen said: there is shadow over the accession of Cyprus. What we seriously consider now is finding a way to end the economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. According to Şuhnaz Yılmaz, in this respect, although recognition is not an option at this stage, the EU and the US has already showed their willingness to correct this situation by extending financial assistance, relaxing restrictions on trade and starting direct international flights to Northern Cyprus and it is important that these measures are put into action.²²⁴

One other development during the AKP government was that the 7th adjustment package to Copenhagen criteria had been ratified by the Turkish Parliament. The critical aspect of the 7th adjustment package was that it laid down the civil military relation on the table by imposing changes on the structure of the National Security Council (NSC).²²⁵ The reform package had made changes on NSC by reducing its responsibility and executive power, increasing its civilian members and subjecting military expenditure which were not publicly audited in the past to the inspection of the Court of Accounts.²²⁶ The 7th adjustment package ratified by the Turkish Parliament and went into effect on August 8, 2003, had been welcomed by the EU.

²²⁴ Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey EU relations in perspective: Domestic and Foreign Linkages",, pp.15-16

²²⁵ Senem Aydın, & Fuat Keyman (2004), "European Integration and Transformation of Turkish Democracy", *EU-Turkey Working Papers*, No.2, p.20

²²⁶ Serap Yazıcı (2004), "The Impact of the EU on the Liberalization and Democratization Process in Turkey" in, Durmuş Özdemir & Richard Griffiths *Turkey and the EU Enlargement*, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, p.99

The Turkish Parliament also introduced a series of constitution amendments on 7 May 2004. This new reform package had a quite extensive insight including the legislature on judicial reforms, civil military relations, and freedom of press. The other changes are the abolishment of the State Security Courts (DGM) and the withdrawal of military officers from the board of the higher education council (YÖK) and from the supervision board of the cinema, video, music.²²⁷ However, AKP seemed more reluctant on implementing reforms improving gender equality. A law proposed by the opposition party, Republican People's Party allowing affirmative action favouring women, was rejected by the MP's of AKP. A statement indicated that the equality between men and women is under the state guarantee was added to the end of article 10.²²⁸

On the other hand AKP government had made progress in the economic circumstances by maintaining economic growth, reducing the inflation rate and the interest rates together with the increasing value of the Turkish currency against US Dollar.²²⁹

In June 2004, the Turkish government has made two things regarding the accession process and fulfilling with the Copenhagen criteria. The first one was the beginning of TV broadcasting on the native languages of the minority populations in the state TV. The second was the court decision ordering the release of former Kurdish activists Hatip Dicle, Leyla Zana, Selim Sadak, Orhan Doğan.²³⁰ The broadcasts on state TV were conducted on Bosnian, Kurdish, Circussian and Arabic. According to regulation duration of the broadcast are at most 60 minutes a day and 5 hours a week on the radio and 45 minutes a day and 4 hours a week on TV. TRT has to inform the media about the content of the programmes.²³¹

According to Serap Yazıcı, although there has been significant improvement at the top

²²⁷ Senem Aydın, & Fuat Keyman (2004), "European Integration and Transformation of Turkish Democracy",....., p.97

²²⁸ Serap Yazıcı (2004), "The Impact of the EU on the Liberalization and Democratization Process in Turkey" in, Durmuş Ozdemir & Richard Griffiths *Turkey and the EU Enlargement*,.....,p.97

²²⁹ Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey EU relations in perspective: Domestic and Foreign Linkages", presented in: *Second-Pan European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, p.8

²³⁰ Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey EU relations in perspective: Domestic and Foreign Linkages", presented in: *Second-Pan European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, p.8

²³¹ Senem Aydın, & Fuat Keyman (2004), "European Integration and Transformation of Turkish Democracy", in *EU-Turkey Working Papers*, No.2, pp.35-39

legislative level in practice the situation sometimes could be a little more challenging. For example, some of the officials refused to approve the Kurdish names given to new born babies unless they were told by a court order.²³²

The most extensive reforms were made in areas like human rights, protection of minorities, improvement of judicial system and the role of the military in politics. After granting a candidacy status in Helsinki Summit the pro-EU sphere in Turkey had acquired a more decisive position in politics in order to adopt the necessary legislations required by the Copenhagen criteria.²³³

According to Ziya Öniş, military had doubts with the efforts of adopting regulations to Copenhagen criteria, especially about the ones which required the restriction of military role in politics. However, there is also the fact that the military did not oppose to abandoning the emergency rule at the South East part of the Turkey. In addition, Turkish Military Forces had also accepted new arrangements made on the structure of the National Security Council, a body through which military officials had made direct interventions to political decision making from time to time. Moreover, the military had even made a positive contribution to negotiation process in Cyprus dispute. When Rauf Denktaş seemed reluctant to support the initiations of AKP government, the Chief Commander of the General Staff Hilmi Özkök had urged him that the military was in favour of the initiatives.²³⁴

According to Kemal Kirişçi, although there is a rigid command chain within the hierarch of Turkish Army, it is not a secret that there is a significant level of disturbance in lower levels of military towards Hilmi Özkök because of his moderate approach towards the AKP government. Whereas, Özkök indicated that the reforms are adopted in context of Copenhagen criteria and AKP government practice its obligations within the norms of a democratic system, some generals are more sceptical about the process. According to Kirişçi, positive relations have strengthened the hands of

²³² Serap Yazıcı (2004), "The Impact of the EU on the Liberalization and Democratization Process in Turkey" in, Durmuş Ozdemir & Richard Griffiths *Turkey and the EU Enlargement*, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, p.99

²³³ Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey EU relations in perspective: Domestic and Foreign Linkages",....., p.7

²³⁴ Ziya Öniş (2004), "Diverse but Converging Paths to EU Membership: Poland and Turkey in Comparative Perspective" in: *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol.18, No.3, p.21

Europhiles and the prospects of reform. Similarly, positive moves on the part of Turkey have enabled the EU side to be supportive of Turkey's probability of pre-accession and membership.²³⁵

In order to have a better understanding of Turkey-EU relations, it is also necessary to have a triangular approach by integrating the US factor. Although the US influence was important before Helsinki Summit, however, the limits of the US influence came out during the Copenhagen Summit, when pressure by the Bush administration to accelerate the progress for Turkish membership was rejected. There were three reasons for this difference. First, in Helsinki it was just giving candidate status to Turkey, whereas in Copenhagen the issue was about determining a date to start accession negotiation. Second, as a result of the hawkish policies of the Bush administration concerning Iraq, a number of European countries such as France and Germany were reluctant to submit to US diplomatic pressures. Third, in the aftermath of the 9/11 and on the eve of the war in Iraq, the US favored Turkey's closer integration with the EU as a strategic asset. But for the Union countries expanding the EU borders to Turkey's neighbors that has been destabilized by the developments in Iraq was perceived as a security liability.²³⁶

The strategic partnership between Turkey and the US was also challenged during 2003 in the context of the war on Iraq. The decision of the Turkish Parliament on March 1 refusing to authorize the deployment of US troops to Iraq over its territory was resulted as a serious setback in the relations. What is significant for our purposes is the effect of this tension in Turkey-US relations on Turkey's relations with the Union. This question becomes more complex at a time when the Iraq war caused a major rift in the transatlantic alliance and deep divisions within the EU.²³⁷ I will give the details about this issue in the next part.

²³⁵ Kemal Kirişçi (2004), "the domestic politics of negotiating pre-accession: challenges and consequences of EU Turkish relations" presented in: *Second Pan-European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, p.14

²³⁶ Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey EU relations in perspective: Domestic and Foreign Linkages" presented in: *Second-Pan European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, p.19

²³⁷ Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey EU relations in perspective: Domestic and Foreign Linkages",....., p.18

September 11 and Iraq War: Main Turning Points and its Consequences

The tragic events of 9/11 and the terrorist attack that the US had experienced in its territory had a significant impact on the USA. The Bush administration gathered the support of the American public in developing an attack on international terrorism and the states in the Middle East, which formed a potential home for terrorist activities.²³⁸

Because of the impending war on Iraq, the Bush administration started to apply diplomatic pressure on European states to guarantee an early accession date for Turkey. According to Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, American pressure for Turkey's EU membership had one important negative side. Because, for a long time, it caused the state in Turkey, especially the security and foreign policy elites, to believe that they could avoid implementing some key elements of Copenhagen criteria.²³⁹ Strong American support also caused the strengthening of the anti-EU coalition in Turkey, who did not oppose EU membership but uncomfortable with the political and economic conditions attached to it. These groups perceived the US-Israel-Turkey axis as a basis for Turkish foreign policy and security interests and as an alternative to EU membership. The position of these groups in Turkish politics was shaken by the war on Iraq and the straining of the Turkish American relations during that time.²⁴⁰

As it was understood that after 9/11 the Bush administration would pursue a hawkish domestic and international security oriented agenda, the perception of the methods and policies diverged sharply between the US and its key allies in Europe. The differences reached a high point over the crises in Iraq. Bush administration's quick desire to military action by avoiding the

²³⁸ Ziya Öniş, & Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey-EU-US Triangle in perspective: Transformation or Continuity", in: *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.59, No.2, p.10

²³⁹ Ziya Öniş, & Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey-EU-US Triangle in perspective: Transformation or Continuity", p.11

²⁴⁰ Ziya Öniş (2004), "Turkish Modernization and Challenges for the New Europe" in: *Perceptions. Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.9, No.3, p.7

diplomatic pressures, received a strong reaction.²⁴¹ The EU is far from having a Common Foreign and Security Policy. It has been trying to develop its CFSP since the adoption of the treaty on the EU in 1992. The crises came into surface with the US intervention in Iraq, which created deep divisions within the EU.²⁴² For example, a number of EU members, especially Britain and Spain, with the new candidate countries from Eastern Europe led by Poland separated from the Franco-German position and supported American military initiatives in Iraq.²⁴³

The global dynamics of the post 9/11 era had a deep influence on Turkey's fortune on its road to EU membership. Firstly, the increase in the US support for Turkish membership was motivated by its immediate security priorities. In the long run, the US favored strengthening of the Turkish model of a secular democratic state, with a Muslim population, as a model for the Arab World. In the short run, its main concern was to ensure the full cooperation of Turkey to overthrow the Saddam regime. With the cooperation of Turkey, US could use the Turkish territory and air space for the attack on Iraq from the North. So, a direct parallel could be established between the impending war and the diplomatic support provided by the US during the last months of 2002. This came into scene with the Annan Plan in November 2002 and the strong pressures applied on the European leaders by the Bush administration before the Copenhagen Summit of 2002.²⁴⁴

The US administration considered Turkey's cooperation for Iraq War as inevitable. According to US, with its problematic economy, Turkey needed the financial support from the US. Furthermore, Turkey's foreign policy initiatives in areas like EU membership, Cyprus question or the Baku Ceyhan pipeline projects were dependent on American support. But Washington failed to take into consideration the fear of Turks because of the political and economic burden and unfulfilled

²⁴¹Ziya Öniş, & Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey-EU-US Triangle in perspective: Transformation or Continuity", in: *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.59, No.2, p.10

²⁴² Kemal Kirişçi (2004), "the domestic politics of negotiating pre-accession: challenges and consequences of EU Turkish relations", presented in: *Second Pan-European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, p.19

²⁴³ Ziya Öniş (2004), "Turkish Modernization and Challenges for the New Europe" in: *Perceptions. Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.9, No.3, p.13

²⁴⁴ Ziya Öniş, & Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey-EU-US Triangle in perspective: Transformation or Continuity",p.10

promises of the Gulf War of 1991 at the time of Turgut Özal government, the different views among the main political actors in Turkey, and the division within the new AKP government itself. In addition to these, Northern Iraq is a problematic area that has always created troubles between Turkey and US.

After a long period of bargaining over financial, political and logistical matters, the failure of the Turkish Parliament to ratify the decision on March 1, 2003 involving the development of American troops in Turkish territory caused a significant shock among the Bush administration and the defense establishment in Washington.²⁴⁵ As a result, the frustrated Bush administration had to change its plans and had to send as many as 62000 troops through Turkey to open a second front in Northern Iraq. Turkey has opposed and warned the US about the ill-conceived war against Iraq. But there were also different views about the war. According to Soli Özel, one of the first reasons of the Parliament's will when the Turkish Parliament voted against the deployment of US troops on Turkish land to open a Northern front, was the state's domestically focused strategic vision. Özel added that the concern with the domestic Kurdish problem kept Turkey from having a more comprehensive Iraq policy. The war and Turkey's non participation in it ensured the Kurds to be the main partners of the American military.²⁴⁶

In the post Copenhagen period, the most important issue on Turkey's foreign policy has been the war in Iraq. Turkey supported the idea of clearing the region from weapons of mass destruction and the fight against terrorism. But it was difficult for Turkey to support a military operation in Iraq. Both civilian authorities and the military security elite were worried that a long transition period and chaos following the war could cause regional instability and an increase in terror.²⁴⁷

As I have mentioned earlier Turkey had experienced difficulty because of considerable

²⁴⁵Ziya Öniş, & Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey-EU-US Triangle in perspective: Transformation or Continuity", in: *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.59, No.2, p.10

²⁴⁶Soli Özel (2004), "It truly is a long and winding road: the Saga of EU Turkey relations", presented in: *AICGS Conference 'Changing Parameters in US-German-Turkey relations: Future Scenarios*, September 20, Berlin, p.8

²⁴⁷Ziya Öniş, & Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey-EU-US Triangle in perspective: Transformation or Continuity", in: *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.59, No.2, p.10

amount of economic losses in the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991. Furthermore, Turkey had difficulty because of the massive flow of refugees from Northern Iraq. According to Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, maybe, the Gulf War has helped to create a political vacuum in Northern Iraq that caused the task of fighting the PKK more difficult during the 1990s. The Turkish government was very worried about the reoccurrence of similar problems again.²⁴⁸

Turkey wanted to protect the territorial integrity of Iraq because of its anxiety about the establishment of an independent or a federated Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. Turks were worried that the establishment of a neighboring Iraqi Kurdish state could cause reoccurrence of the problems as in the past and could cause for more demands for autonomy among the Kurds living in Turkey who are about 12 million. Furthermore, a wealthy autonomous Kurdish state, which is in control of the rich oil reserves of the Mosul-Kerkuk region, could support the Kurds in Turkey and could cause instability in this area. Syria and Iran, which have also Kurdish minorities wanted to protect the territorial integrity of Iraq. Also the fate of the Iraqi Turcoman and the protection of their rights, who are seen as a counterbalancing factor, has been a major concern for the Turkish government.²⁴⁹

There were some diplomatic attempts to repair the ties. But, the humiliating US arrest on July 4 of 11 Turkish Special Forces in Sulaimaiyah by claiming that they were attempting to kill the Kurdish governor of Mosul, pointed out the lack of trust among the parties. As a result of these developments, Turkish-American relation reached their lowest point.²⁵⁰

These international developments also had significant consequences for Turkey's domestic politics and its relations with Europe. The developments about the Iraq, which caused the Turkish American relations become strained, brought Turkey closer to the EU. Firstly, they ensured the political leadership in Turkey to give importance to the reform process. Secondly, they showed that

²⁴⁸ Ziya Öniş, & Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), "Turkey-EU-US Triangle in perspective: Transformation or Continuity", , p.10

²⁴⁹ Mehmet Ali Birand (2004), *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgası*, İstanbul: Doğan, Kitapçılık AŞ., pp.438-439

²⁵⁰ Mehmet Ali Birand, 2004, *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgası*, İstanbul: Doğan, Kitapçılık AŞ., p.440

in Turkey the democratic system worked in spite of strong US pressure.²⁵¹ The decision of the Turkish Parliament on March 2003, not to allow US troops to transit through Turkey, came as a surprise to many Europeans. Many Europeans especially France and Germany believed Turkey of being too pro-American and too dependent on the US. And also could serve as a “Trojan horse of the US” if it enters the EU. Finally, the March 2003 decision also showed that Turkey was able to reach a democratic decision on such a critical issue.²⁵²

Furthermore, according to Ziya Öniş, the anti-EU coalition has been affected in a negative way by the poor developments in Turkish American relations. With the US based in Iraq, the ability of the Turkish military and security establishment to develop an independent policy towards Northern Iraq has disappeared. Moreover, the security oriented Turkey-US-Israel triangle, which was perceived as an alternative to the EU by anti-EU coalition, came under serious challenge. Following the deterioration of relations with the US, the AKP had been able to go ahead with EU related reforms at full speed during the course of 2003.²⁵³

There is a consensus in Turkey that in the post Iraq War world, in addition to its trained and effective military, the strategic importance of the country would also stem from the nature of its regime and the strength of its alliances. So, developing relations with regional powers, while continuing with the efforts to join the EU, gained validity. Those who favor a Turkey that turns its back to Europe and forms partnerships with Russia and Iran are out of favor.²⁵⁴

Furthermore, Turkey has been complaining that Washington did not keep promises given to Ankara on two issues. The American military made no effort to disarm the PKK in spite of the promises. In fact, Condoleeza Rice said that the US was trying to deal with the PKK through non-

²⁵¹ Ziya, Öniş & Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2004), “Turkey–EU-US Triangle in perspective: Transformation or Continuity”, in: *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.59, No.2, p.10

²⁵² Soli Özel (2004), “It truly is a long and winding road: the Saga of EU Turkey relations”, presented in: *AICGS Conference ‘Changing Parameters in US-German-Turkey relations: Future Scenarios*, September 20, Berlin, p.8

²⁵³ Ziya Öniş (2004), “Turkish Modernization and Challenges for the New Europe” in: *Perceptions. Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.9, No.3, p.7

²⁵⁴ Soli Özel (2004), “It truly is a long and winding road: the Saga of EU Turkey relations” presented in: *AICGS Conference ‘Changing Parameters in US-German-Turkey relations: Future Scenarios*, September 20, Berlin, p.8

military means. Such a position is unacceptable to the Turkish government. Ankara also believed that the Americans did not much care about the rights of the Turcoman minority in Iraq, whose well being was a priority for the Turkish public. Turkish government gave importance to the status of the province of Kirkuk and the developments that took place there. Turkey made moves that brought it closer to the positions of the EU. It also developed its relations with its two neighbors, Syria and Iran, which are the countries on Washington's black-list. Turkey, like the EU member states, favored a more diplomatic approach towards both countries. In the meantime, relations with Israel, had lost some of their importance. Turkey saw that the stability and prosperity of Turkey will depend on the continuation of its process of integration with the EU. Such a Turkey would play both a stabilizing role in its environment and be the center of economic activity for its neighboring regions.²⁵⁵

The tragic events of 9/11 and the Iraqi war showed that peace and security in the global community necessitates closer mutual understanding and dialogue between the West and the Muslim world. As a result, the incorporation of Turkey as a full member acquired a new meaning. There was a growing realization within Europe that Turkey's inclusion would help to overcome the image of a narrowly based civilization project, an inward oriented club of Christian nations, an image which would constitute a poor ground for developing not only close relations with the external world, but also in incorporating the Muslim minorities that exist within the Europe.²⁵⁶

It can also be noticed that achieving a progress towards EU membership will be difficult without US support. But also from a Turkish perspective, the relations with the US must be balanced. This is also important for the future of Turkey-EU relations. The enhancement of the Turkey-EU-US triangle will not only help Turkey's aim for EU membership, but it will also enable Turkey to develop a more balanced relationship with the US. It will enable Turkey to act as a benign regional power and to play a constructive regional role. In this respect, both for the US and the EU, Turkey is also critical country in a confused region and has the potential to play a pivotal role in the

²⁵⁵ Soli Özel (2004), "It truly is a long and winding road: the Saga of EU Turkey relations", pp.8-9

²⁵⁶ Ziya Öniş (2005), "Turkish transformation and the future of the new Europe", in: *MedObs Paper*, No.4, p.7

democratization efforts in the greater Middle East. Turkish leaders underline that as a country with a Muslim population, which succeeded in establishing a secular democracy, has many things to offer for the region. In this respect, serious obstacles need to be overcome in relations with both the EU and the US. In doing this, passive attitudes based on reliance on geo-strategic importance must be left aside, a strategy designed to enhance relations with the EU and the US has to be ensured.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁷ Ziya Öniş (2003), “Turkey and the Middle East after September 11”, in: *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp.2-8

17 December 2004 and Aftermath: Date for Negotiations

It is clear that the decision that the EU took in December 2004 to start negotiations with Turkey for full membership is a historic decision as it is also a decision concerning Europe's own future. Critical issues concerning the future of Europe are on the scene. For example, does Europe want to play the role of a global actor or will choose the option of remaining as an inward-oriented secondary power in the global context? Does the European Union want to establish a multi-cultural Community or not? The decision is not only about Turkish membership, it about Europe's own future.²⁵⁸

After two days of straining negotiations, the European Council, decided to open membership negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül were welcomed as a hero in their return from the European Council Summit. Most of the media clarified the outcome as a success. On the other hand some people both in Turkey and in Europe emphasized the empty part of the glass.²⁵⁹ The Turkish public is supportive of EU membership. On the other hand, there is also a deep mistrust of the EU thinking that EU has double standards against Turkey and when the day comes it will not meet its end of the bargain. In 1999 Helsinki Summit decision, Turkey is ensured to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to other candidate states. The decision had left the possibility of no membership or a relationship with the EU that falls short of full membership, open. Under the section on Framework for negotiations, the European Council declared that the objective of negotiations is accession by adding that these negotiations are an open ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed before. This wording not only caused many people in Turkey to believe that the EU wants to keep the door open for a special enhanced relationship falling short of

²⁵⁸ Ziya Öniş (2005), "Turkish transformation and the future of the new Europe", in: *MedObs Paper*, No.4, p. 7

²⁵⁹ Kemal Kirişçi (2004), "The December 2004 European Council Decision on Turkey: Is it an historic turning point?", in: *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol.8, No.4, p.87

membership.²⁶⁰ This idea has long been supported by Christian Democrats in Europe, particularly in Austria and Germany, by Angela Merkel, leader of German Christian Democrats, and Valéry Giscard D Estaing, former President of France and president of the Convention on the Future of Europe which drafted the European Constitution. They argue that Turkey is simply too big, too different in cultures, and economically too underdeveloped to gain EU membership. They also add as Turkey is geographically not in Europe, so, it is not appropriate for membership. Instead, to prevent losing Turkey, they recommended a special relationship, which remains undefined.²⁶¹ A paragraph mentioned that long transitions periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguards... may be considered... for areas such as freedom of movement, structural policies or agriculture including the reference to permanent safeguards disturbed Turkish people.²⁶²

Treaties have included long transition periods especially in the area of freedom of labor movement in the past enlargements too. For example, the nationals of new member countries are not able to enjoy the freedom to movement for up to seven years according to the transitional arrangements that was insisted by Austria and Germany. But we can see that, these are still transitional arrangements. In the previous enlargements there hasn't been a member that has been admitted to the EU with permanent safeguards which prevents to enjoy the rights, free movement of labor, structural and agricultural support funds.²⁶³ Furthermore, the European Council has also included in its decision a practice about the possibility to suspend accession negotiations if a candidate state is in breach of the Copenhagen political criteria. This is another practice that has created tension, because it was thought that this has done for Turkey.²⁶⁴ The EU had also criticized candidate states such as Slovakia and Romania for their inefficient or slow progress in implementing the Copenhagen political criteria in the past. But, it had never been written as a condition. It can be

²⁶⁰Kemal Kirişçi (2004), "The December 2004 European Council Decision on Turkey: Is it an historic turning point?", in: *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol.8, No.4, p.90

²⁶¹Mehmet Ali Birand (2004), *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgası*, İstanbul:Doğan Kitapçılık AŞ, p.549

²⁶²Mehmet Ali Birand (2004), *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgası*,.....,pp.464-465

²⁶³Kemal Kirişçi (2004), "The December 2004 European Council Decision on Turkey: Is it an historic turning point?",....., p.90

²⁶⁴Mehmet Ali Birand (2004), *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgası*, İstanbul:Doğan Kitapçılık AŞ, pp.477

said that some of these conditions are outcome of a bargaining process between those who have supported Turkish membership and those who opposed. The governments mostly the Mediterranean countries, Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, Finland and Sweden argued that the EU must respect its previous decision and treat Turkey as equal as all other candidates. The second group, especially France and Austria objected to this idea as they opposed Turkish membership because of their fears that Turks may flood the Union's labor market and cause immigration related problems in these countries. The second group's anxieties are reflected in the Presidency Conclusions saying that the adoption of permanent safeguards may be considered by leaving the issue open-ended. But, many Turks especially the anti-EU coalition in Turkey see these paragraphs as a reflection of a European rejection of Turkey.²⁶⁵

One last challenge in the Presidency Conclusions is the issue of the recognition of Cyprus. This is a very complex issue and on the first day of the summit it caused a crises occur. As a result, Turkish Prime Minister became at the brink of walking out. The draft Presidency Conclusions had included a paragraph welcoming the Turkish decision to adopt a protocol extending the implementation of the 1963 Association Agreement and the Customs Union Agreement of 1995 to the ten new members including Cyprus. Although they didn't mention of the name of Cyprus openly, a crisis occurred, that such a protocol could mean the recognition of the Greek Cypriot government as government for the whole of Cyprus. Many people believed that this would make Turkey's presence on the island defenseless, furthermore would leave Turkish Cypriots as a minority in a Greek Cypriot dominated Cyprus. Moreover, both the Turkish public and Turkish Cypriots are disappointed that despite their support for the Annan Plan, the Greek Cypriots who rejected it had joined the EU and could block promised EU policies about ending the Turkish Cypriots international isolation. They reached an arrangement compromise which allows Turkey time until the date for negotiations in October 2005 to adopt the relevant protocol. But, still the issue of the recognition of

²⁶⁵ Kemal Kirişçi (2004), "The December 2004 European Council Decision on Turkey: Is it an historic turning point?" in: *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol.8, No.4, p.91

Cyprus has been left unresolved.²⁶⁶

According to Kemal Kirişçi, an important role also falls to the EU, for taking some initiative on Cyprus. EU governments must both revive the Annan Plan and need to look over the legislation promised to the Turkish Cypriots for ending or easing their isolation from the international community. These efforts would ease the hand of Turkey's government to find a formula for the extension of the Ankara Agreement to include Cyprus. Preparing Turkey to meet the EU standards and practices will be a very costly and difficult period. The EU will provide funds to assist, but, these funds will be too small. So, it will be difficult for the government to maintain public support for its will towards EU membership.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁶ Mehmet Ali Birand (2004), *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgası*, İstanbul:Doğan Kitapçılık AŞ, pp.464-471

²⁶⁷ Kemal Kirişçi (2004), "The December 2004 European Council Decision on Turkey: Is it an historic turning point?", in: *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol.8, No.4, pp.92-93

PLACE OF TURKEY IN THE EUROPEAN PROJECT

What is European Project ?

The idea of a United Europe had come to stage after the end of WWI. Count Richard Coudenhove Kalergi was the first person who established the pan European Union in 1923 as a non-party mass movement for the unification of Europe. Aristide Briand was another person who offered to create a European Federal Union at the assembly of the League of Nations. However, none of these ideals turned into reality but rather they remained as weak attempts of some intellectual groups.²⁶⁸ Throughout the two World Wars the countries, due to economic depression and the rise of fascism with the Hitler, were forced to focus on their own individual security issues rather than the ideal of European Integration. However with the end of WWII in 1944 the idea of Federal Europe with a written constitution and a supranational government with an army under its control began to be discussed in the Geneva Conference. Moreover there should be a judicial tribunal in order to guarantee the application of the federal constitution and to conciliate the matters between the federal and national governments.²⁶⁹ The conference also emphasized to establish Common Market which would avoid the causes of great depression of 1930's.²⁷⁰ The establishment of such kind of a federal structure was reflected as inevitable in order to have a prominent place in world politics together with US and USSR.²⁷¹

However the European powers were too much destructed during the two World Wars and the level of poverty was rapidly increasing among the European population. The Soviets began to impose a serious threat by the attempts of exporting Communist ideals to Western European

²⁶⁸ Martin Dedman (1996), *The Origins and the Development of the European Union 1945-95: A History of European Integration*, London: Routledge, p.16

²⁶⁹ Derek W. Urwin (1995), *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945*, London: Longman., p.7-9

²⁷⁰ Martin Dedman (1996), *The Origins and the Development of the European Union 1945-95:*, p.8

²⁷¹ Derek W. Urwin (1995), *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945,*, p.9

countries.²⁷² The Germany was divided into two different blocs and the Eastern Europe was generally within the influence area of Soviets.²⁷³

On the other hand, US located on the opposite side of the Atlantic was not deeply effected by the destructive impact of the two World Wars. In the beginning of the post-World war era the US had owned 80 % of the total gold reserves of the world economy. The US had soon recognized the dangers on democracy and free market systems. The increasing level of poverty among European populations could urge the sympathy for a communist regime. Therefore, US decided to take economical and political steps in order to keep Soviet hands of the Western Europe. Within this respect the Truman doctrine was made which committed the US to the world wide containment of Communism gaining ground within the Western States.²⁷⁴ This was followed by Marshall Plan, which was an economic aid for the recovery that was open both all European states including the SU. The US was also initiating the attempts for the establishment of a Federal Europe.²⁷⁵

In the following OEEC was established. Its duty was the allocation of US aids among the recipients.²⁷⁶ Although UK under the Prime Ministership of Churchill was the major supporter of United Europe, it never favoured taking place within such establishment. UK was concerned for destructing bonds with the Common Wealth countries and the Anglo Saxon world. In the light of Churchill proposal, and initiations of Belgium Prime Minister Henri Spaak and France Foreign Minister Robert Schumann, Council of Europe was signed as the treaty of Westminster in 1949.²⁷⁷

At last six states France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg formed the ECSC with the treaty of Paris in 1951. The general objective of the ECSC treaty was economic expansion, growth of employment and rising standard of living in member states through

²⁷² Derek W. Urwin (1995), *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945*, London: Longman., p. 10

²⁷³ Alfred Grosser (1980), *The Western Alliance: European-American Relations since 1945*, New York: Macmillan, p.42

²⁷⁴ Derek W. Urwin (1995), *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945*, , p.10-15

²⁷⁵ Martin Dedman (1996), *The Origins and the Development of the European Union 1945-95: A History of European Integration*, London: Routledge, p.25

²⁷⁶ Derek W. Urwin (1995), *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945*, , p.19-22

²⁷⁷ Derek W. Urwin (1995), *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945*, , p.35-42

the development of common market in coal and steel by reducing tariffs and trade restrictions.²⁷⁸

ECSC provided an atmosphere of mutual confidence among leaders of member states that helped the way for the creation of the EEC in 1957.

In 1955 the Foreign Ministers of six states met in Messina Italy and they drafted a proposal for the work on nuclear energy and for the removal of all trade barriers among the European nations. As a result, in 1957 the two treaties, one establishing EEC and the other EURATOM were signed by the six states in Rome treaty.²⁷⁹

Membership to EEC was meaning a commitment to free movement of capital, labour, a common investment policy and the coordination of social welfare goals. As a result of these 3 institutions were created, European Social Fund, European Investment Bank and a European Development Fund. After these improvements, by 1961 internal tariff barriers had been reduced and quota restrictions in industrial products had been eliminated.²⁸⁰

By the mid 1950's and especially after the failure of the EFTA which was established by Britain as an alternative to EEC, Britain turned towards EEC. By the time passed EEC started to attract attention and began to enlarge with entrance of the England after the resignation of De Gaulle, Denmark and Ireland in 1973, Greece in 1981 after the collapse of military dictatorship in 1974 following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Spain and Portugal after returning democracy from dictatorship in 1986, Austria, Sweden, Finland in 1995, CEEC Countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) and Southern Cyprus, Malta in 2004, also Romania and Bulgaria are waiting their turn. And today became a Union with 25 member countries

EU has been the most successful integration project of the world history until today. During the post WWII era European nation states had all the initiatives to take necessary steps for a united Europe. The high level of poverty and the existence of a Soviet threat made the unification process

²⁷⁸ Derek W. Urwin (1995), *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945*, London: Longman., p.48-49

²⁷⁹ Derek W. Urwin (1995), *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945*, , p. 75

²⁸⁰ Derek W. Urwin (1995), *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945*, , p. 80-87

inevitable for the European countries. As we have mentioned in the beginning although US has never preferred to be a part of such integration she has been the boosting power for the ideal of a United Europe. During the post WWII era the economic circumstances were forcing the Europeans to begin a political unification. In another means, the unification process was supported or even forced by the economic realities of the time.

Almost all the European countries has based their development strategy on a “social consensus” model with respect to Keynesian model of economics, in order to struggle with wide spread poverty all over Europe, the governments took the initiative to provide employment opportunities and increased the productivity levels in the over all economies. This kind of a developmental model provided very successful outcomes in terms of high GDPs, lower levels of unemployment and higher productivity levels.²⁸¹ However, one thing should be mentioned that most of these governmental spending were supported by US treasury both in terms of direct financial aids (Marshall aid, Truman plan) or import oriented trade policies with a fixed USD rate to gold value.

Everything was happening just like a fairy tale which was ended by the oil prices in the mid 1970s during which the Nixon government of US had abandoned the fixed exchange rate regime of USD. After this point, Europe was on its own to finance its governmental budget deficits and make the necessary investments to keep the low unemployment levels. Furthermore, 1980s was the era for the beginning of a new Economic understanding called as globalization.

The liberalization attempts for the nation state economies had gained pace which certainly had a reflection on European nation states. The governments were taking their frontiers back from economics and leaving the control to the free market dynamics. In this kind of an economic sphere, the European companies began to suffer from competition with their rivals in US and Japan. Therefore, they began to seek for new resources of factors of production in order to lessen their costs caused by high rates of labour wages. European companies began to shift their manufacturing

²⁸¹ Osman Ulagay (2005), *Tepki Cephesi Piyasa Imperatorluđuna Karşı*, İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, p.125

facilities to overseas locations with lower labour wages or some countries in Europe began to accept labour migrations from developing countries such as Turkey.

The changing economic environment also began to change the nature of European integration process. Although in this essence the idea of a united Europe was stemmed from the need for improving the life standards of mass populations in Europe, in a globalizing world the institutions of Europe were began to be established on priorities of business elites of the European economies. Competitiveness became more favourable than full employment.²⁸²

With the beginning of 1990s the collapse of Communist regime in Soviet republics and Eastern European countries has marked the end of Cold war, one of the major initiatives for the establishment of a united Europe. The former Communist regimes of Eastern bloc rapidly tried to make attempts to transform their planned economies to a market oriented structure and tried to maintain a democratic consolidation model in their political institutions. However, change would require time and help in terms of knowledge and finance. Europe took the lead in order to assist these countries for adopting their internal dynamics to liberal democratic principles.

While the level of unemployment began to rise in Western European countries both the governments and multinational companies of Europe had been transferring tremendous budgets to these new candidates for EU membership. Although, since the end of WWII era European integration process was supported by the inputs from the mass populations at the bottom, now all the progress were being leaded from the top in a more technocratic and elitist manner. Therefore, the political unification has not been supported by the economic realities of the nation states anymore.

In this respect, the rejection of European constitution in 2005 referendum was the outcome of decreasing levels of belief to European integration among the mass populations of Europe. The ideals of a unified Europe began to be questioned and criticized. The main question is that how long Europe can go on like this? What was the aim in the beginning of the path and where are we now?

²⁸² Osman Ulagay (2005), *Tepki Cephesi Piyasa Imperatorluđuna Karşı*, İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, p.104

Therefore, the issue of Turkey's possible accession to European Union seems to have much more critical meaning than it is supposed to have for both sides. The major concern about Turkey's acceptance is that is Europe capable enough to tackle with the new problems which will come together with Turkey's accession.²⁸³ We should keep in mind that Turkey is a country with a huge young population and high levels of unemployment. The Europe has already suffered enough from the burden of last enlargements and it is doubtful that they are ready for another huge one. Therefore the main question about Turkey's possible accession is not only oriented around Turkey's performance on its reformation process but also the inner dynamics of Europe. On the other hand by the end of Soviet threat and changing economic circumstances, all the reasons which initiated the ideal of Federal Europe seem to be abolished. Therefore, some political groups in Europe try to adopt a new meaning for a further integration process by emphasizing on cultural and the religious characteristics of Europe. Transforming the EU in to a Christian club will provide a new common aim to keep the pace of the integration process. The September 11 attacks seem to provide enough support for this kind of an ideological approach. The Soviet threat of post WWII era can be replaced by Muslim threat against which Europe should still stand together and unified. This will stop the populations of Europe to question the institutions and the policies of European Union. In this kind of a political environment, it seems that Turkey's membership is not only related with the developments within both sides but also related to developments on global political arena.

²⁸³ Osman Ulagay (2005), *Tepki Cephesi Piyasa Imperatorluğuna Karşı*, İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, p.152

Political Dimension

EU is a global player sharing the responsibility for global security and constituting a better world as an enlarging union about 450 million people, which is producing the quarter of the world's GNP. Turkey shares the objective of the European Countries to deal peacefully with disputes through cooperation. She also shares the EU aim to create security and prosperity for European people internally and on the world. Moreover, Turkey is aware that solving today's complex security struggles, existing global problems necessitates close cooperation than before. Turkey, which has positioned its foreign and security policy in line with the Union, is ready to take on its duty to make the EU as a stronger global player.²⁸⁴ We have to analyse the effects of Turkey's accession to the EU in different parts.

Regional Stability and Peace

Turkey is an important country as a strategic ally because of its location at the centre of the Eurasian geography. Its historic ties and the relations with Eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle East provides Turkey historical and cultural resource with its strategic location and influence and have enabled it to make positive contributions to the shaping of the European policies towards these sensitive regions. For example Russia is about the biggest trade partners of Turkey. And with its cultural ties with the five Turkic republics, Turkey has been able to establish and improve relations both politically and economically. Middle East is a special area for Europe both for historical reasons and because of its impact on European security. The EU can gain much in this region. Turkey has established close relations with Israel. Turkey shares the same religion and a history of over 500 years with the Arab countries and the relations with these countries has improved since the end of Cold War. Turkey is the only country which the Israel and Palestine has both trusted in solving the Middle East Conflict. Its membership will increase the Union's

²⁸⁴Bahadır Kaleağası (2004), "What Turkey could bring to the EU", in: *International Herald Tribune*, p.1

weight in the Middle East which will be effective in peacemaking and stabilisation in this critical region.²⁸⁵ Many problems occurred after the Cold War era, which are because of the lack of integration between Middle East and the rest of the world. One of the Turkey's objectives is to integrate the Middle East to the global system.²⁸⁶ Turkey's balanced attitude in the recent Iraq War has also determined its strategic importance to the EU at a time even EU itself was divided. Turkey has experience both in the prevention of regional conflicts and reconstruction of the crises region. Turkey took part in every international peacekeeping operation in Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, Albania, Middle East and Georgia. Turkey took over the command of ISAF from Britain and successfully carried out this job. One of the former foreign ministers of Turkey is NATO's civilian representative in Afghanistan. With its entry to the EU, Turkey' stabilizing role in these regions will be strengthened.²⁸⁷

Security

Turkey's military capabilities and its potential will be important for the emerging European Security and Defence Policy. As a full member of the EU, Turkey will enhance the operational capabilities of the ESDP.²⁸⁸ The geographical, historical and cultural ties of Turkey with the countries in the Middle East, Balkans, and Caucasus will make good effects in the prevention of the probable conflicts that can occur in these regions, so it will prevent the threat on European stability and security.²⁸⁹ Turkey's accession to the EU and ESDP as a NATO member will reinforce the unity of transatlantic alliance and will strengthen the European security. It will relieve the liability of the US for European defence. Turkey's frontiers are the security frontiers of Europe within NATO

²⁸⁵ "Turkey in Europe: More than a promise" (2004), Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, p.17
<http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/pdfs/english.pdf>

²⁸⁶ Sedat Laçiner & Mehmet Özcan & İhsan Bal (2005), *European Union with Turkey: The Possible Impact of Turkey's Membership on the European Union*, Ankara: Publication of Strategic Researches Foundation Press, p.45

²⁸⁷ "Turkey in Europe: More than a promise" (2004),....., p.18

²⁸⁸ "Turkey in Europe: More than a promise" (2004),....., p.18

²⁸⁹ Paul Kubicek (2005), "Turkish accession to the EU: Challenges and opportunities for the new Europe", prepared for Workshop 'The New Europe II' Center for European Studies, p.13

framework. Turkey will make the EU stronger in its fight against terrorism, illegal immigration, xenophobia and racism, organised crime, trafficking of drugs, arms and human beings.²⁹⁰

As a member of the EU, a stable Turkey will make positive effects to the stability and peace in these regions. The other argument is if Turkey becomes a member, the EU will become neighbours with Iran, Iraq and Syria. So, Turkish accession will pull Europe in to the conflicts of the Middle East.²⁹¹ The idea that EU will be more affected by regional instability when it becomes neighbours with Middle East is baseless. Developments in this turbulent region have profound effects on European security and stability whether or not the EU has direct borders with Iran, Iraq and Syria. In the globalizing world, the events whether it is distant or near will have impact on Europe or the other countries. Europe has long been neighbours with the region through Turkey's long standing membership of NATO. Turkish membership will politically draw the EU closer to the region facilitating the Europeans contributions to peace and security in the region.²⁹² Turkey's accession to the EU is a chance both for Turkey to encourage successful modern democracy in the Muslim world and for the West to strengthen an ally in the fight against terrorism, deepen its diversity, and improve liberalization in the Islamic World. The countries in this region will achieve democratic, social and economic development in the future.²⁹³

Will we succeed in avoiding the clash of civilizations between the West and the Islamic world that many have predicted since September 11? The significance of Turkey as a bridge between Europe and the Islamic World due to its strategically important location mustn't be overestimated. Turkish membership is indispensable in order to realize the European security and defence policy. As a secular democracy with a predominantly Muslim population, Turkey can contribute to the prevention of international terrorism. Turkey is one of the guarantors of the stability of the Black sea

²⁹⁰ Bahadır Kaleağası (2004), "What Turkey could bring to the EU" in: *International Herald Tribune*, p.2

²⁹¹ Ali Tekin (2004), "Turkey's place in Europe's future", presented in: *Second-Pan European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, p.13

²⁹² "Turkey in Europe: More than a promise" (2004), Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, p.18

²⁹³ Paul Kubicek, (2005), "Turkish accession to the EU: Challenges and opportunities for the new Europe", prepared for Workshop 'The New Europe II' Center for European Studies, p.13

region, balances Russia in the Caucasus, and controls the strategically important connection from Black sea to the Mediterranean and the pillar of NATO's South East defence system. The countries surrounding Turkey supply the 60% of the natural gas and petroleum demand of Europe.²⁹⁴ As a stable democratic country after joining the EU, with close political, cultural and commercial ties to countries possessing the world's largest natural gas and oil sources in the Caspian Sea and Near East Turkey will contribute to the security of the EU energy policies.²⁹⁵

Multi-cultural

Some argue that Turkish accession will be a Muslim invasion of Europe destroying its culture and civilisation. Some also argue that especially after the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, with the inclusion of Turkey, the radical Islam inside Europe will cause Islamization of Europe. The EU membership of Turkey, which has predominantly Muslim population, will contribute to the establishment of necessary bridge between Islam and West. Turkey's membership will enhance the multicultural structure of Europe. As Tony Blair said that, it will prove that EU is a tolerant union, getting strength from its diversity of cultures, races, religions and built on common values of liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights.²⁹⁶ A multiethnic, multicultural Europe will help to declare that the scenario of clash of civilizations is untrue. Turkey's membership will prove that cultural differences can coexist, and Islam and modernity can be harmonious, and can constitute an effective answer from the West to the Christian- Islam conflict.²⁹⁷

According to Ayhan Kaya, modern interpretation of Islam proves that this religion does not constitute a security threat to the Western values; its main concern is to incorporate itself into the social and political system in search of justice and fairness.²⁹⁸ The successful inclusion of Turkey in

²⁹⁴ Ali Tekin, (2004), "Turkey's place in Europe's future", 2004, presented in: *Second-Pan European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, pp.10-14

²⁹⁵ Bahadır Kaleağası (2004), "What Turkey could bring to the EU", in: *International Herald Tribune*, p.2

²⁹⁶ Paul Kubicek (2005), "Turkish accession to the EU: Challenges and opportunities for the new Europe", prepared for Workshop 'The New Europe II' Center for European Studies, p.8

²⁹⁷ "Turkey in Europe: More than a promise", (2004), Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, p.16

²⁹⁸ Ayhan Kaya (2004), 'Recoding Europeanness: A Comparative Study on German-Turks and French-Turks'. in Durmuş Özdemir & Richard Griffiths; *Turkey and the EU Enlargement*, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, p.65

the Europe will show the Islamic world that it is possible to find answers to the dilemma of combining religious beliefs and traditions with the universally accepted principles of modern societies.²⁹⁹ Turkish accession will prove that Muslims and Christians can live together under the same European roof. It will end the criticism that EU is a Christian Club that will never admit Turkey. It will have a positive impact on views of the Islamic World. Turkey's membership will help to guide the Muslim community in Europe to a modern democratic interpretation of Islam. Protecting this population from the radical tendencies of Islamic fundamentalism is possible only if they offered a model in which Islam and modernity can exist together. A democratic and modern Turkey will have a positive impact on the 14 million Muslims who are already living in the EU. It will be a contribution to Christian-Muslim dialogue in the World.³⁰⁰

Not European

The other argument is that Turkey is not European. They argue that cultural differences are an obstacle for Turkey's membership to the EU. This view which makes discrimination between Turkish and European cultures arguing that it is impossible to reconcile the two, contradicts with the philosophy of the EU which defines integration based on common values. Prime Minister Erdoğan argues that EU must recognize that EU is a union of values, not a narrowly defined geography.³⁰¹ The Union shall be open to all European States which respect its values and are committed to promoting them together" says article of the treaty establishing the constitution of Europe. It is too late to debate whether Turkey is European or not. Turkey has been a long standing member of NATO and Council of Europe. Turkey today is a full member of all main Europe-wide institutions. European leaders in 1963 decided that Turkey was sufficiently European to be a candidate one day.³⁰²

²⁹⁹ "Turkey in Europe: More than a promise" (2004), Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, p.17

³⁰⁰ Bahadır Kaleağası (2004), "What Turkey could bring to the EU" in: *International Herald Tribune*, p.3

³⁰¹ Paul Kubicek (2005), "Turkish accession to the EU: Challenges and opportunities for the new Europe", prepared for Workshop 'The New Europe II' Center for European Studies, p.13

³⁰² "Turkey in Europe: More than a promise" (2004),....., p.17

Economic Dimension

In addition to the benefits in the political and security field, Turkey could add to Europe's economic power in the world. Turkey is large and has significant resources. Turkey's population is young and dynamic. Its economy is the fastest growing on the continent. Europe will face many problems in the next decades if it does not produce more dynamic growth and find a solution to its declining population and growing deficit of labour. With its population more than seventy million at present and its increasing purchasing power, Turkey's potential as a market for goods from EU member states will gain importance.³⁰³

With Turkey's accession to the EU, enlargement of the European internal market will supply benefits to European citizens. This will develop the benefits and opportunities for business and consumers. The business sector will gain benefits of this enlargement through economies of scale, enhanced competition and expanded market access and a rising information society. Turkey's accession will contribute to Europe's global competitiveness. The EU economy is undergoing a relative crisis.³⁰⁴ According to the Sapir report member states are far from achieving the goals set by the Lisbon Strategy which sets the goal to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge based economy with sustainable economic growth and greater social cohesion and to make a success of the enlargement by raising the living standards in the new member states.³⁰⁵ European business community in every occasion voices the urgent need for economic reforms necessary to reinforce the competitiveness and growth in the EU. Turkey's business community supports the EU's Lisbon Strategy and shows the potential contributions of the country's membership to the Europe's global competitiveness.³⁰⁶ Turkish economy is the world's 18th largest one in the world.³⁰⁷ It exports mostly

³⁰³ Ali Tekin (2004), "Turkey's place in Europe's future", presented in: *Second-Pan European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, p.7

³⁰⁴ Bahadır Kaleağası (2004), "What Turkey could bring to the EU", in: *International Herald Tribune*, p.3

³⁰⁵ Ali Tekin (2004), "Turkey's place in Europe's future",....., p.5

³⁰⁶ Bahadır Kaleağası (2004), "What Turkey could bring to the EU",....., p.3

industrial goods (90%). Its service sector is about 65% of its GDP, and the public procurement market amounts more than 30 billion. Integration of such a dynamic economy in to the EU will boost economic growth in the EU. Turkey's full integration will bring impetus to the internal market with its dynamism, large market demand, entrepreneurial culture and trade creation potential. This will turn to the EU citizens as more and better job opportunities, more competitive prices and better investment opportunities. If Turkey takes measures to realize its full productivity potential, she can create million additional jobs by 2015 and achieve annual GDP growth as high as 8.5 %. This would bring the GDP per capita in Turkey around 55% of the EU average per capita income. To avoid paying more taxes and drawing fewer pensions in an older Europe, countries can create together to sustain the European social model. Europe is facing a significant problem of an aging population. The fertility rate has fallen since 1965 although life expectancy has increased. With the current demographic trends, Europe's population is seemed to decrease. New member states with lower fertility rates than the rest of EU make the continent older. The problem of the EU's aging population turns into shrinking markets, less taxable income and lower revenues from social contributions. This means more working years, higher taxes, and fewer pensions. According to recent UN study, the EU would need an average of 6.1 million immigrants a year from 2015 to 2040 to maintain a ratio of 3 working age adults for each retiree. To maintain the European social model, the EU needs to increase its labour productivity and its employment rate quickly. In this way, demographically, Turkey is an opportunity for Europe. With a population of 70 million people, Turkey has more than 30% of its population below 15 years old and its demographic growth is expected to be stabilized by 2030 at about 85 million people. Turkey's young, dynamic and qualified human resource is the social insurance of Europe. A Turkey engaged in the EU accession process will benefit from higher

³⁰⁷ Can Baydarol (2003), *AB Sürecinde Medeniyetler Buluştuğunda*, İstanbul: Universal Dil hizmetleri ve Yayıncılık A.Ş., p.160

economic development, better and more European education. Consequently, Turkey's human capital will meet Europe's standards and needs.³⁰⁸

Turkey's role as a transit country for energy supplies gain importance after the construction of the Baku-Tiblis-Ceyhan oil pipeline following the emergence of the Caspian basin as one of the world's largest sources of oil and natural gas. Turkey's geo-political importance and its close links with 10 millions of Turkic people living in the neighbouring countries could establish European access to the enormous resources in Central Asia and regions of Siberia, making Turkey a significant factor for Europe's security of energy supplies coming from the Middle East, Caspian Sea and Russia.³⁰⁹ This gives advantages in terms of transportation, expenditure, time and security which will contribute to EU's competitiveness. Furthermore, Turkey is important for the water supplies of neighbouring countries in the Middle East.³¹⁰ When the issue of Turkish membership to the union is discussed, anxieties and resistance could be seen in many parts of Europe.

The impact of Turkey's size

The first argument against the Turkish membership is the population size of the country. They criticise that with its large population of more than 70 million people, Turkey will dominate the work in EU institutions, effect decision making mechanisms. Furthermore, Turkey will dominate the workforce in the EU. Although, Turkey will be the biggest country in the EU, Turkey's large population will not create a big problem as it is thought.³¹¹ As Turkey's birth rate has being fallen by the years, it is considered that it will be 82 million by 2015. Total fertility rate (average children per woman) decreased to 2.5 at present from 3.5 in 1970s and it is expected that with the increase in the economic prosperity, it will decline more. Furthermore, according to the UN figures, Turkey's population growth rate has fallen to 1.4%. EU's population will have reached about 570 million with

³⁰⁸ BahadırKaleağası (2004), "What Turkey could bring to the EU", in: *International Herald Tribune*, p.3

³⁰⁹ Ali Tekin (2004), "Turkey's place in Europe's future", presented in: *Second-Pan European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, p.7

³¹⁰ Sedat Laçiner, & Mehmet Özcan & İhsan Bal (2005), *European Union with Turkey: The Possible Impact of Turkey's Membership on the European Union*, Ankara: Publication of Strategic Researches Foundation Press, pp.77-78

³¹¹ Ali Tekin (2004), "Turkey's place in Europe's future",....., p.2

the entry of the Balkan countries, so Turkey with a population of 71 million will amount to a minority. When the new constitutional treaty is adopted, a majority in the council will require that at least 50% of the member states vote in favour of a proposition, and that these countries constitute 60% of the EU's total population. This shows that Turkey will have no more weight than Denmark at first, while population wise it will have the same weight as Germany. It is unnecessary to argue that Turkey will alone affect the decision making mechanisms of the EU when 80 % of the decisions are made by compromise and where qualified majority voting has replaced unanimity. Current problem in the decision making of the EU must be solved even if Turkey will join or not.³¹²

Most of the immigration from Turkey to Europe is to Netherlands, Austria, Germany and Belgium during the years of 1960s and 1970s, when Europe introduced guest workers programmes because of shortage of labour problem. Turkish workers settled in the big cities of the countries. After those years, the immigration policies started to become more restrictive. For example, Turkish migration flows into the EU countries were reduced and limited to family reunification, migration with marriage. Most of the Turkish immigrants were unskilled workers from rural areas of Anatolia. They tried to overcome the shock of moving from small places to big cities leaving their homeland. As they were moving to a foreign environment, they encountered many difficulties in integrating into the society of the foreign country. The first generation of the immigrants favoured the establishment of ethnic and religious enclaves characterized by family-based structures, the preservation of the native language and strong dependence to religious beliefs and cultural traditions because of the feeling of economic and social exclusion. Islamic organizations and community associations became significant factor in providing Turkish immigrants a sense of belonging and identity, maintaining cultural, political and commercial ties with the country of origin. Many Turks in Germany showed willingness to incorporate themselves into the political, economic and social system of their new country. More than 3rd of the workers acquired citizenship. By the time passed, middle class of Euro

³¹² "Turkey in Europe: More than a promise" (2004), Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, p.24

Turks has engaged entrepreneurially in sectors like services, tourism, catering, telecommunication and construction. And some of them participated in the local and national activities of the political parties. As a general rule, integration takes place in the second or in the third generation and measured by increased mastery of the local language, better performance at school, improved position at the socio-economic level, rise in mixed marriages, decline in birth rate, and decrease in religious practices. The complaints about them are about poor educational performance, high unemployment, alienation from the society, isolation of women wearing veil, forced marriages and honour killings which were attributed to Islam and traditions. But there is also a positive awareness among governments and civil society about integration.³¹³ Not only the immigrants have to make an effort to integrate but also host governments must adopt policies to help their integration. The governments must adopt citizenship laws that form a counterweight to the tendency among migrant groups to emphasize their own ethnicity, religion and nationality to avoid conflicts and alienation.³¹⁴ Furthermore, society itself has to change reconsidering attitudes like xenophobia. The difference between integration and assimilation must be understood better. The effect of Turkey's accession is very difficult to forecast. It will depend on the demographic developments in Turkey and the EU, economic situation in Turkey including income levels, prospects of employment and economic opportunities, foreign demand for labour and the development of European migration policies.³¹⁵

Also it is discussed that Turkey with its big population will affect the EU labour market in a negative way. Furthermore, they argue that Turkish entry can create a mistrust of citizens to the member country governments because of the transfer of resources to the others. They claim that Turkish membership will open the way for the xenophobic reactions of the right wing parties. Some people argue that by giving Turkey candidate status, the EU enabled the increase in the support for

³¹³ "Turkey in Europe: More than a promise" (2004), Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, pp.31-32

³¹⁴ Ayhan Kaya (2004), 'Recoding Europeaness: A Comparative Study on German-Turks and French-Turks'. in Özdemiş & Griffiths; Durmuş, Richard *Turkey and the EU Enlargement*, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, p.66

³¹⁵ "Turkey in Europe: More than a promise" (2004),....., p.32

right wing parties. EU citizens who started to worry about immigration and their future will start to support the right wing party's beliefs.³¹⁶ The situation of Turkey is not different from 1963, Ankara agreement. They argue that too many Turks will emigrate Europe mostly Germany. The study by the European commission on the immigration from Spain, Portugal and Greece showed that the will to leave the home country is not affected by the right of free movement in the EU. This argument could be seen reasonable when one considered the wealth gap between the west and east part of Turkey and the current socio-economic conditions. It is expected that the low income people from the east parts of Turkey can immigrate to Europe in the first decade of EU membership. But the agreement for restricting the free movement for some period after accession like Poland will prevent the immigration. In this period Turkey must take the necessary economic and social precautions under the EU contributions to Turkey in tackling this issue. Nobody likes to leave the home land if they see the signs of a good future. According to the some independent think tanks 2.5 or 3.0 million people will leave their country during the first 15 years of the Turkish membership of the EU. With Turkey's success in stabilizing economy in its harmonization process with the EU and increasing the living standards of its citizens, the immigration to Europe can be expected to decline.³¹⁷

The impact of Turkey's poorness

The other argument is Turkey is too poor and it will bring significant burden on EU economy. If we compare Turkey with the other European member state standards, Turkey is still poor and 35% of the population is employed in agriculture and has weak, insufficient infrastructure development.³¹⁸ Moreover, Turkey still has the problem of regional disparities between east and west. Turkey also must narrow the economic gap between different regions. The opening of negotiations can give a boost to the Turkish economy. The argument is Turkish membership will be too expensive for the EU. Calculations show that Turkey will receive EU assistance per capita not

³¹⁶Ali Tekin (2004), "Turkey's place in Europe's future", presented in: *Second-Pan European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, p.4

³¹⁷"Turkey in Europe: More than a promise" (2004), Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, p.33

³¹⁸ Ali Tekin (2004), "Turkey's place in Europe's future",....., p.6

more than the ten new EU members receiving today. Turkey can take place in the EU as a young, dynamic, developing and large market which can stand on its feet. This large market will become more prosperous and it will have adopted its infrastructure with the EU and there will be more increased flow of foreign direct investment. Its membership can increase the economic power of the EU in the world. Turkey's membership will add a population of 70 million people to the EU with high consumptions of goods and services, which will be a direct advantage to EU exporters as seen in the customs union. Turkey, as a full participant in the European internal market, Turkey will be a prize asset.³¹⁹ Turkey is located at the centre of the important energy, transportation and communication networks that link the East to the Europe. Turkey has developed extensive trade relations with the Central Asia, Caucasus, the 13 nation black sea economic cooperation and economic cooperation organization. As Turkey know these countries business climate, social and cultural structure, can contribute to Europe's access to these markets and procurement of raw materials and inputs which are very significant for the EU.³²⁰

Turkey's macroeconomic instability because of poor public finance management and a fragile banking system, culminated in 2001 financial crises. It caused fall of 7.5% in Turkish GDP, interest rates reached 400%. For Turkey, this crisis was a serious setback but it also showed its dynamism and flexibility. With the reform programme with the help of IMF, including clean up of the banking system, independence of the Central Bank, the closure of extra budgetary funds, flexible exchange rates, tough fiscal policies, new legal framework for the energy sector, agriculture, telecommunication; recovery was done in a rapid way. It can be seen that within a year growth resumed at over %7, inflation dropped, Turkish lira gained its value, foundations for sustainable economic turn was established. Despite these developments, there were many things to be done to overcome the deficiencies and imbalances. Public debt and the government budget deficit are still

³¹⁹ Ali Tekin (2004), "Turkey's place in Europe's future", presented in: *Second-Pan European Conference*, 24-26 June, Bologna, p.7

³²⁰ Sedat Laçiner, & Mehmet Özcan & İhsan Bal (2005), *European Union with Turkey: The Possible Impact of Turkey's Membership on the European Union*, Ankara: Publication of Strategic Researches Foundation Press, p.76

high above the Maastricht treaty criteria. Also the interest rates are like that, inflation was at 18.4 at the end of 2003, and unemployment was at 10.8% in line with the European average. The low level of foreign direct investment is because of Turkey's macroeconomic volatility and political uncertainties, and the institutional environment troubled by bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption. Also the disparity in the regional income is still a serious problem which cause migration flows inside Turkey. The agricultural sector employs 32.8% of the Turkish workforce. It places a heavy burden on the Turkey's taxpayers. With the help of WTO requirements, IMF programmes and the prospect of EU accession, Turkish agricultural policy is being reformed. Price supports and subsidies will be replaced by direct payments to farmers. Import tariffs will be reduced and state enterprises in the agriculture sector privatised. With the reforms completed, Turkey will have an agricultural policy similar to EU. Turkey's foreign trade has been rising with the continuing economic recovery. EU countries were the most significant trade partners, with 52% of exports and 46% of imports. With the increase of the trade, Turkey's foreign trade deficit widened. Turkey's accession would be very beneficial for its economy. According to some estimation, with the full access to the internal market, including for agricultural products not covered by the customs union of 1996, and the elimination of the technical and administrative barriers could cause bilateral trade increasing by around 40%. A developed investment climate enabled by the establishment of the stable Turkish economic system would increase domestic and foreign investment. So this would create job opportunities and high level of economic growth. As it could be seen in the previous experience of the accession countries, benefits of EU membership would begin with the opening of negotiations. So this accession process would make the Turkish government to continue structural and institutional reforms and help to maintain a stable economic regime under the cooperation with the EU and IMF. By this way the economic risks and political uncertainties would be reduced. This would strengthen trust in the sustainable stability of the Turkish economy.³²¹

³²¹ "Turkey in Europe: More than a promise" (2004), Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, pp.36-37

CONCLUSION

While we are in a time period during which Turkey's negotiation process for the accession to the EU has been taking place the main question in the minds of both internal and external spheres has been that is this progress towards a full membership sustainable for Turkey?

The best way to seek for an answer to this question is to look at the issue from a historical perspective and try to make further assumptions for the future developments in the same context. The answer that I will give to this question is that, as Turkey progress through a full membership the process can be slowed down due to changing circumstances. However, it can never be stopped totally because first of all both sides are able to calculate the risks and consequences that may hamper their political benefits in case of a possible step back from the integration process. Second, the progress in relations between EU and Turkey does not only stem from their internal dynamics but also forced by the pressure from the global political structure.

Within both sides there have been distinctive groups which defend different opinions and approaches towards Turkey's accession process to EU. While some of the political developments which took place in different time periods has strengthened suspicions within both sides towards each other, some others has served to the ideas in favor of implementing a more constructive and moderate policy option. Moreover, all the gains achieved by the progress in the relations have made it compulsory for both EU and Turkey to go on with the process.

The radical spheres in Turkey which are mainly against Turkey's accession process to EU have based their claims on the idea that EU has been imposing a major threat to Turkey's territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Besides they reflect the union as a Christian club which will never admit Turkey to become a full member and part of European identity. Moreover, they reflect the accession process as a tool for EU to achieve its devil aims on Turkey's territorial unity. Within this

context, these spheres are opposed to almost any legislative action, which is required by the EU criteria. What is surprising about these people with radical opinions is that they do not only present traditionally nationalistic groups such as nationalist people's party (MHP) but also in Leftists Republicans people party (RPP), radical Islamists Virtue party (FP) and socialists Labor party.

Coming together around an anti EU ideal these groups may constitute the building blocks for the same opposition group to EU despite to their political struggles in the past. However, we should also add the fact that AKP's pro EU policy has also been supported by some liberal spheres, although they are not fully in support of AKP's policy ideals with respect to all political issues. For example, Kemal Derviş the former treasury minister and previous MP of RPP has declared his open support for the reform process for EU. The people who are against the reforms claim that existing government has been exploiting the reforming process and democratization process to achieve radical Islamist aims. In addition, inside military, bureaucratic institutions there are some opposition groups who are against some of the EU reforms. The statements from some of the high rank generals have been approving these claims.

Moreover if we look at moderate side, the big capital-financial groups organized under the structure of TUSIAD has been giving its full support to reformation process, in order to maintain the regulations for the establishment of free-market requirements accompanied with economical and political stability. TUSIAD's liberal pro-EU approach has been supported by some part of the scholars and media institutions.

What has been learned from the AKP' s experience till today, that any political party which comes to power regardless of their political background must stay fixed and decisive on the reformation process in order to establish longer term political and economical stability, despite to a possible negative demand from its electorate group.

On the other hand also within the European side there has been similar dynamic which shaped the attitudes towards Turkey. The optimistic approach which has begun with the Helsinki

Summit during which the Turkish side had been granted a candidate status, has led to chain of events which has extended till Turkish side has followed a positive approach towards Annan's plan for Cyprus issue.

This brings us to the point that a Turkey kept on the path for the EU will be more willing to take moderate steps in order to consolidate disagreements. In this manner the ideals of conservative spheres which struggle to prevent socio-cultural unity of European Identity doesn't seem to be practical in realist term. Within this respect, for instance Andrea Merkel openly against Turkey's full membership to EU, and also a supporter of U.S policy on Iraq intervention, will have difficult times to implement an efficient policy on Middle East region.

If we look at the political crises between Iran and US about Iran's attempts to built nuclear power production facility, US spends tremendous efforts to maintain Turkey's political and military support again because of its geographically strategic importance. Different from the Iraq case the Western world (US and EU) has seemed to be sharing the same concerns about the Iran issue. In this respect EU aims to have a more efficient strategy on the Iran issue than it did on the Iraq issue. Therefore, obtaining the full supports of Turkish side is not only important for US but also for EU.

Despite to its huge economic problems, Turkey with its seventy million population acquires 18th largest GDP of the world. Besides, Turkey has been one of the major customers for the Western defense technologies industries. These aspects highlighted an important fact that its strategic importance is not only related to defense and security policies but also Turkey is located on the intersection point for the major energy and trade pathways. In this respect, two months before now, the Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan together with Russian president Puthin and Italian President Berlusconi have signed a new agreement about distribution of Russian natural gas to Eastern Europe and Mediterranean region through Turkish pipeline.

Continuation of the improving relations provides lots of benefits for Turkish side also. EU criteria will help any government, which will try to stand against the populist demands from the

public opinion as in the case of AKP government has faced severe criticism for implementing a low inflationary economic policy. Adopting Maastricht criteria such as low inflation level, lower budget deficits will enable governments to achieve sustainable development. Moreover, Turkey is going to be a more attractive market for foreign direct investments, which will provide a long-term solution to Turkey's chronic problem of balance of payments deficits.

It is one of the EU's main duties to urge Turkey on several issues which seem to be problematic. However the timing and the place for such attempts are also very important. EU officials should avoid from making over exaggerated statements on the issues about which Turkish side has sensitivities. Otherwise any destructive attempt will support the position of anti EU opposition groups in Turkey. Especially, on controversial issues like Cyprus conflict, EU has to maintain its objective position towards all the concerning parties as much as it can achieve. The judgement criteria on such issues should not be related to being a full member or not, but it should be about fulfilling the requirements of international law. Moreover, Turkish public should never be forced to think that whatever the Turkish side has done or will do, it is not going to be possible for them to be accepted as a full member although they achieve to comply with all requirements. On other crucial point is that both sides should be very careful not to use issue to attract domestic popular attention. For instance, during the last general elections in Germany, Turkey's accession to EU had been at top of the propaganda material for all the political parties. As we have discussed previously it doesn't seem possible for Merkel government to insist on its anti Turkish statements due to Germany's new efforts to revise its policy strategies regarding Middle East. The same problem also exists within French politics through the indications of Minister Sarkozy which has several times declared his opposition to Turkey's full membership.

One other claim of the radical groups is that integration with Europe will damage our socio-cultural aspects. For these groups being European is something equal to alienating from our own essence. In response to such arguments what the liberal spheres of the society indicates that

becoming a part of common identity is not about one-sided process but it is about a social development through mutual influence. Increasing social interaction will improve the insight of both individual and social identity.

The same approach is also accounted for the European perspective whereas conservative groups tended to protect the uniformity of the EU identity by rejecting a multicultural approach. According to their opinion, with its distinctive cultural aspects, Turkey will not be able to be a part of European culture neither today nor tomorrow. In response to this argument, socialists reflect Turkey's accession as an opportunity to maintain the diversity of cultures within the EU structure. This approach is also a reflection which lies beneath the idea of a United Europe.

Finally, regardless of what ever perspective you look from; political, economical or social, the integration of Turkey into European identity is two-sided process. Both sides have something to offer as well as to receive. Social development can only be maintained through communicative interaction and mutual understanding. In this respect, Turkey's accession provides a perfect opportunity for such action.

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