

NATIONALIST DISCOURSES IN TURKEY FROM A
PSYCHOANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE

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Nationalist Discourses in Turkey from a Psychoanalytical Perspective
Psikanalitik Bir Perspektiften Türkiye’de Milliyetçi Söylemler

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Abstract

Nationalist Discourses in Turkey from a Psychoanalytical Perspective

Harika Yücel

This study aimed to explore the psychic characteristics and the dynamics of the nationalist discourses and to analyze the Turkish nationalist discourses through certain psychoanalytic conceptualizations. For this aim, the official texts of fifteen political parties, a press statement of one governmental organization, the founding texts of five non-governmental organizations and one political journal, and two national organizing texts were analyzed using discourse analysis method. The main arguments which were confirmed in the Turkish cases were as follows: Nationalist discourses gain ground in regressive group processes which are generally triggered by new socio-political circumstances. These discourses frequently use primitive defenses, i.e. splitting, projection, projective identification, idealization, and devaluation. Due to excessive use of primitive defenses, the thinking process is impaired and reality can be distorted. In these discourses, the collective superego is harsher and the collective ego ideal is high, rigid, and less realistic. As the essentialist nationalist emphasis increases, these tendencies become more visible. It was concluded that it is important to take these powerful psychic dynamics into account in a long-term struggle for overcoming nationalism.

Özet

Psikanalitik Bir Perspektiften Türkiye’de Milliyetçi Söylemler

Harika Yücel

Bu çalışmanın amacı, milliyetçi söylemlerin psişik özelliklerini ve dinamiklerini araştırmak ve belli psikanalitik kavramsallaştırmalar aracılığıyla Türk milliyetçi söylemlerini analiz etmektir. Bu amaçla, on beş politik partinin resmi metni, bir devlet kuruluşunun basın açıklaması, beş sivil toplum kuruluşunun ve bir politik derginin kurucu metni ve iki milli örgütleyici metin söylem analizine tabi tutulmuştur. Türk milliyetçi olgularının analizinde doğrulandığı üzere temel iddialar şunlardır: Milliyetçi söylemler, genellikle yeni sosyo-politik durumlar tarafından tetiklenen gerilemeci grup süreçlerinde güç kazanmaktadır. Bu söylemlerde sıklıkla ilkel savunma düzenekleri kullanılmaktadır; bunlar bölme, yansıtma, yansıtımlı özdeşleşme, yüceleştirme ve değersizleştirmedir. İkel savunma düzeneklerinin aşırı kullanımı nedeniyle, düşünme süreçleri bozulmakta ve gerçeklik çarpıtılabilmektedir. Bu söylemlerde daha katı bir kolektif üstbene rastlanmakta, kolektif ben idealinin de yüksek, katı ve daha az gerçekçi olduğu görülmektedir. Milliyetçi söylemlerin özcü vurgusu arttıkça bu eğilimler daha görünür hale gelmektedir. Sonuç olarak, milliyetçiliğin üstesinden gelmek için yürütülecek uzun dönemli bir mücadelenin bu güçlü psişik dinamikleri göz önüne almasının önemli olduğu vurgulanmıştır.

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1. Introduction

Subject Matter of the Study

The phenomenon of nationalism has been conceptualized and explained by different disciplines in the 20th century. It is accepted that nationalism is mainly a modern concept which refers to an organizing ideology of nation-states. It is definitely not a simple phenomenon and also it cannot be said that there is a single nationalism. It has different meanings in different geographies and different contexts. Social theorists approach this issue in order to understand its formation, manifestations and functions within the social processes. Social psychologists are interested in nationalism especially in relation to the concept of social identity. However, it is not frequently examined in terms of psychic processes which are both conscious and unconscious.

Nationalism is generally described according to either the principle of citizenship and territoriality or of ethnicity and culture. Turkish nationalism that is the organizing ideology of the Republic of Turkey, is predominantly based on cultural identity, i.e., all people living in Turkey and sharing the “same” culture are accepted as Turkish. Nationalism is still the central part of the dominant political culture of Turkey. Moreover, in recent decades, it seems that Turkish nationalism has been climbing and becoming widespread. Although there are different nationalist discourses in Turkey, these various discourses can be integrated to the dominant political culture. In parallel with the rise of nationalism, there have been many efforts

to understand the characteristics of Turkish nationalism. This dynamic phenomenon can also be examined in the light of psychoanalytic theory.

Although, the primary object of psychoanalysis is the psyche and psychoanalysis is mainly a theory which explains psychic life of the individual, as can be traced in Freud's work as well, the theory is used to understand the communities and to explain societal life and its dynamics. The community is not only understood in terms of its role on the psychic life of the individual, but also in terms of social constructs and processes. From the beginning of the foundation of psychoanalysis, social phenomena and group dynamics have largely been investigated. The idea that psychoanalytic theory can make an important contribution to explaining the social life as well as the psychic life has been increasingly accepted by many theorists. In practice, analysis of small and large groups has contributed to this effort.

It is accepted that just as social and cultural discourses construct the psyche, psychic structures and processes create the sociality. Freud (1930) noted that process of civilization and psychic development follows a similar path. When the social phenomena are handled without taking into consideration the psychic processes which have conscious and unconscious dynamics, the outcome is an incomplete conception of the problem.

Without social, economic and political analysis, it would be impossible to understand the context and effects of phenomena such as these; but without the addition of an investigation of subjectivity and the unconscious, the social explanations fail to give an account of what drives people on, when no objective, rational interests are perceivable. (Frosh, 2001, p.63).

It can be said that social identity or collective identity takes place at the intersection of social and psychic life. In other words, social identities are derived from both the psychic and social life. Today, national identities which constitute an important part of the collective identity and the nationalist discourses which shape that identity can be examined in this context. Frosh argues that rigid self-defining of whole communities in terms of 'nationality' is a powerful organizing principle for people's lives (Frosh, 2001).

In the light of these arguments, this study aims : 1) to examine the concept of nationalism in the light of psychoanalytic theory; and 2) to explore the psychic characteristics of the nationalist discourses and the psychic dynamics which have a role in forming and strengthening of these nationalist discourses. In the psychoanalytical literature, there are just a few studies dealing with the issue of nationalism directly and comprehensively. In the current study, first, psychoanalytic conceptualizations which have been developed in order to understand individuals, groups, and communities are discussed for the purpose of explaining nationalism and nationalist discourses. In the second step, different nationalist discourses in Turkey are analyzed in the light of those conceptualizations.

It can be argued that dominant nationalist discourses tend to shape the collective identities in the large groups, but also those discourses are formed within specific group dynamics. In other words, the groups are both subjected to and subjects who generate the nationalist discourses. Thus, different nationalist discourses being produced at the macro level tend to be

regenerated at the micro levels of the society. In this context, Butler's view (2005a) that the subject is neither determined entirely by the power nor the subject itself entirely determines the power is very meaningful.

The effort to explore the psychic characteristics of nationalist discourses also sheds light on the psychic processes operating in large groups which describe themselves as nationalists and/or display nationalist characteristics and attitudes. In other words, psychic dynamics in the groups in which nationalist discourses emerge are explored. As Balibar emphasizes, racism and nationalism are not simply an attitude of the individuals, but are a social relationship (Balibar, 2000a). It is important to note at this point that the groups are not assumed to be homogeneous constructs. Similarly, all members in a group are not thought to share these attitudes to the same extent. This study does not focus on group characteristics which are usually conceived as static, but on group dynamics or group processes.

While approaching to this phenomenon from a psycho-political perspective, the importance of current context cannot be omitted. In the analysis of nationalist discourses in Turkey, social and political context is taken into consideration. Furthermore, the role of various triggering factors at the social and political levels on the formation of nationalist discourses is considered. The study also aims to look at the question as to how these socio-political factors activate the various psychic dynamics which operate in nationalist discourses.

Questions

The nationalism as an attitude or a tendency of a group which is shaped by specific group dynamics and as a manifestation of a collective identity will be explored in the light of the following questions:

1. Which group processes facilitate the emergence of nationalist discourses?
2. Can the nationalist attitudes be explained in the context of narcissism and the collective ego ideal?
3. Can the nationalist attitudes of the groups be understood in terms of the collective defense mechanisms such as splitting, idealization, devaluation, projection and projective identification?
4. Can the nationalist attitudes be understood in terms of rigid collective superego?

It should be noted that these questions are inherently connected with each other, and these connections will also be highlighted wherever appropriate.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1. Definitions and Explanations of Nationalism

2.1.1. The Concept of Nationalism

Nationalism has been defined and explained by many authors. According to the primordialist approach which is represented by Antony D. Smith, nation and nationalism as a reality have pre-modern roots although they are differently formed in modern world. This approach argues that nationalism should be understood as a product of natural ethnic belongings (Smith, 1989/2001; 1991).

From the modernist viewpoint, it is commonly accepted that nationalism is rooted in modernity and the nation-states of the modern era. In line with this explanation, Gellner thinks that nationalism is a product of certain social and historical conditions. Although nationalism is perceived as a universal, everlasting and self-evidently valid principle, it is neither universal nor necessary (Gellner, 1997a). Benedict Anderson sees the nation as an imagined political community which is not based on actual interaction. It is imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. The members of a nation do not know most of their fellow-members; instead they have an image of their communion in their mind. According to him, nationalism is the result of the development of capitalism and modernism. It is understood in relation to large cultural systems (Anderson, 1991).

Gellner defines nationalism based on a cultural element. According to him, “nationalism is a political principle which maintains that similarity

of culture is the basic social bond” (Gellner, 1997a, p. 3). A state should be composed of people who have the same culture. In other words, the essential component of being a member of a nation is sharing of the same culture. For extreme versions of nationalism, this is the necessary and the sufficient condition of legitimate membership (Gellner, 1997a). Nations tend to be idealized by asserting that it consists of a high and homogeneous culture. In Gellner’s view, nations are prone to sacralization in the modern world, nation-state epoch. Members of a nation are expected to be loyal to the political unit consisting of this shared culture; however memberships of a nation as a political unit may sometimes be sacralized and takes a dangerous form (Gellner, 1997b).

It is commonly accepted that nationalism is constructed and reconstructed according to historical dynamics; therefore it consists of different constructions in each of historical geography. Sometimes bottom-up dynamics can be strongly marked; sometimes top-down dynamics are dominant. However, while nationalism generally reflects the dominant ideology, it is at the same time fostered by cultural and historical bonds, shared codes and myths within the community. Within this frame, among many different types of nationalisms, it is commonly accepted that there are basically two models of nationalism. The first is based on the citizenship and territoriality (political nation/the French model), the second is based on blood, ethnicity and culture bonds (cultural nation/the German model) (Kentel, Ahıska, and Genç, 2007). It can be argued that the latter is closer to racism because it emphasizes blood and ethnicity.

David Brown (2000) summarizes the models of contemporary nationalisms conceptualized in different ways. According to Brown, nationalism is accepted as an embedded loyalty of individual identity to the organic community or as a political resource being used to mobilize individuals for the rational pursuits of common interest or as an ideology appealing to confused individuals who seek simple formulas to understand complex situations. According to these conceptualizations, nationalism may be seen as an instinct, an interest, or an ideology. When it is associated with an instinct, nation is depicted as based upon natural, organic community which defines the identity of its members who feel an innate and emotionally powerful attachment to it. According to this view, the members have collective memories and there are certain myths of common ancestry. The interest implies the resources employed by groups of individuals for the pursuit of their common interest. The constructivist approach sees nationalism as an ideology. It suggests that national identity is constructed on the basis of institutional or ideological frameworks which offer simple and indeed simplistic formulas of identity and diagnosis of contemporary problems because otherwise individuals feel confused or insecure.

Nationalism is seen as a modern ideology which organizes the nation-states. In this frame, the nationalism consists of a series of discourses at the macro level. Because nation-states intend to create a homogenous nation based on citizenship, ethnicity or “shared” cultural history, they describe the nation and demand their citizens to accept this description. National symbols are produced according to this description. This effort can

be seen as the strategy of nationalism at the macro level. This ideology tries to create a desired collective identity. Construction of the collective identity is based on the discourses of power to a large extent; however, people (citizens) regenerate these discourses of ideology at the micro levels while they consume it. Therefore, nationalism cannot remain an official ideology *per se*, and also it does not consist of a homogeneous ideology (Kentel, Ahıska, and Genç, 2007). Here, the concept of popular nationalism can be introduced. The nationalism as a hegemonic ideology forms the daily life and relationships of the people and also it presents a viewpoint that enables people to give meaning to and interpret the world. It is difficult for people to refuse and challenge this ideology. The ideology of nationalism expects volunteer obedience from the citizens by using surrounding discourses and national symbols. Official nationalism is accepted, reproduced at the micro levels, and continuously goes through certain transformations. In other words, popular nationalism is a result of the official ideology but at the same time it has a potential to differentiate itself from official discourses. There are also different nationalisms which to various extents differ from official nationalism at the macro levels. It can be accepted that the mass media is one of the main reproducers of the popular nationalism in the global world (Özkırmı, 2002).

2.1.2. Contemporary Nationalism and Racism

Balibar (2000a), states that racism and contemporary nationalism as a societal relationship are close to each other. It is argued that there is a

reciprocal relationship between these two. Both of them idealize a certain ethnicity, culture, or nation while devaluing and excluding the others.

Racism is differentiated as an exclusive annihilation and inclusive pressure or exploitation. Whereas the former aims to purify the society from danger or contamination that is represented by inferior races, the latter intends to categorize the society. Here, it is argued that contemporary racism is covert and symbolic. It is not simply based on biological origin or blood; rather it is based on cultural origin. According to this point of view, it is possible to have a cultural homogeneity which is to be protected (Balibar, 2000b).

Balibar uses the concepts of “neo-racism” and “differentialist racism” (2000b). This is racism without race. What determines this racism is not biological heredity but cultural differences. This racism does not suggest explicitly that a group is superior to others but assumes that the cultural differences cannot be overcome. Differentialist racism is closely related to xenophobia. It argues that the “mixing of cultures” would be dangerous and bring intellectual death of humanity. Here, it can be noted that there is a discussion on the conceptualization of “new racism”. According to Leach (2005), racism displays historical continuity; therefore it is not appropriate to use the concept of new racism.

2.1.3. Nationalism According to Social Identity Theory

Social identity theory is commonly used for understanding and explaining the nationalist attitudes from a social psychological perspective. National identities are conceptualized as social identities. According to this

theory, social identities ensure people to satisfy the need for a sense of positive self-identity.

According to Dekker, Malova and Hoogendoorn (2003), national attitudes are classified in terms of their type (positive or negative) and strength (moderate, very, and extremely positive or negative) of affection. The positive or negative attitudes refer to whether people like or dislike their nations. Strength of these attitudes refers to the rigidity of these links. Nationalism is seen as the most rigid positive attitude to the nation. Nationalist people tend to keep their nation as pure as possible and they also desire to establish a separate state for their nation (Dekker, Malova and Hoogendoorn, 2003). It must be noted that this conceptualization disregards the context and position of certain ethnic groups in a society.

Positive attitudes toward a nation may also be national liking, national pride, national preference and national superiority. There is also a neutral attitude which is the feeling of belonging to one's own country. National preference and national superiority are also results of intergroup comparison and discrimination. Individual's development of nationalism is related to highly negative attitudes toward other groups living within the country or other countries (Dekker, Malova and Hoogendoorn, 2003). This theory emphasizes the importance of out-group comparisons for people to achieve extremely positive social identity.

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) suggests that people tend to make positive in-group and negative out-group evaluations. To various extents social identity is based on intergroup differentiation. When

intergroup differentiation is applied extremely, people tend to develop out-group derogation. In this context, nationalism can be seen as essentially related to out-group derogation. Some authors differentiate between nationalism and patriotism. Whereas nationalism is related to out-group evaluation, patriotism refers to a positive relation to one's own country independent of out-group derogation. Also, if people formerly have socially comparative perspective, the link between national identification and the derogation of foreigners is expected to be stronger (Mummendey, Klink and Brown, 2001). In intergroup comparison, the people are likely to project their own "bad" characteristics onto the other group which results in a negative description of out-group, in persecutory ways. Also, the people may use devaluation of this out-group in order to idealize themselves. Nationalist identification is actually an idealization.

An identity does not have a static character. It is a continuous and dynamic construct. It also refers to a position; people place themselves in a certain psychic, social, or political position. For instance they define themselves according to the state of belonging to their nation, ethnicity, and class. The character and extent of these belongings may also vary according to specific contexts. According to Hopkins and Murdoch (1999), the identity is not defined as fixed and constant, but defined relationally and fluctuating according to comparative contexts.

2.2. Nationalism from a Psychoanalytical Perspective

2.2.1. Identity in Psychoanalytic Theory

2.2.1.1. The Concept of Identity

Identity was not the concept of psychoanalytic theory at the beginning. It was accepted as a psycho-social construct. Freud used the concept of “inner identity” to describe an individual's link with the unique values, having been raised in a unique history. Here, Freud emphasized the unique character of the identity that is special to an individual, not a social character which is shared by others (Erikson, 1956). Erikson frequently used the concept of identity in his theory. He also expanded the psychoanalytic theory for the sake of explaining the social phenomena. In 1956, he described identity as “a mutual relation in that it connotes both a persistent sameness within oneself (self-sameness) and a persistent sharing of some kind of essential character with others” (Erikson, 1956, p. 57). He emphasized the social aspect of identity and used the term “identity” with a number of connotations; expressing that “It will appear to refer to a conscious *sense of individual identity*; at another to an unconscious striving for a *continuity of personal character*; and, finally, as a maintenance of an inner *solidarity* with a group's ideals and identity” [Italics not mine] (Erikson, 1956, p. 57).

Many authors have contributed to the understanding of the sense of identity. It is stressed that the sense of identity is constructed through the interaction between three links of integration. These links are spatial, temporal and social links of integration. Spatial link maintains the cohesion

of different parts of the self. The temporal link enables the continuity of different representations of the self in time and also establishes a sense of sameness. The third link is the social aspect of identity such that identity is a resultant of identification with the others (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1974).

Two aspects of the identity have been highlighted by various authors. The first emphasizes the similarities with oneself, and the other focuses on the differences between the self and the others. The latter stresses the importance of comparison and contrast for the constitution of identity. While the person seeks the feeling of unity by integrating her fragments into the organization of a whole, she needs to differentiate herself from the others with her unique features (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1974).

Identity is built and formed starting from infancy as the self relates to external objects. According to Brody and Mahoney (1964), three assimilative mechanisms are important for identity formation: introjection, identification, and incorporation. They are distinguished according to ego development and ego functioning. Introjection is the first form of this process where the infant is not aware of objects yet. There are only pleasure-pain experiences. The infant introjects these experiences. Primitive relations to objects are formed through introjections. Introjection is essential for the separation of the self from the outside world. The mechanisms of introjection and projection form a basis for later identifications. Identification is a more mature assimilative process where the ego has been developed and the infant is aware of the objects around her. Here, the developmental step is the transition from primary to secondary thinking

process. Secondary thinking process refers to the capacity of thinking about one's own psychic life and of evaluating the psychic experiences in a complex and multi-dimensional way. It refers to highly complex mental functioning and it also shows the ego strength of the person. Incorporation is a regressive reaction to object loss which may appear during developmental processes. Incorporation is related to the mechanism of denial.

It is expected that the identity formation is mainly based on identifications although to various extents all these mechanisms continue to be used by all of us (Brody and Mahoney, 1964). Volkan (1998) stresses that for identity formation, identifications which include both "good" and "bad" parts of the self and the other should be integrated. Therefore, the individual can perceive herself as having both good and bad parts. People who mainly use introjection and projection have difficulty integrating "good" and "bad" parts of themselves and of the others in which case nonintegrated good or bad parts of the person may be projected to the others.

Erikson (1956) suggested that identity does not consist of only earlier identifications; it is also the result of an additional set of identifications. The identity is formed especially in adolescence in which all significant identifications belonging to childhood are altered in order to be made a coherent whole of them. Actually, identity formation begins when identification mechanism loses its efficacy. It should be emphasized that identity formation does not end with adolescence; it is a life-long process that is mainly unconscious. From the beginning to the end, life is full of

developmental crises. According to him, identity formation is an unconscious process but the sense of identity is both unconscious and preconscious meaning that the person can become aware of it.

According to Erikson (1956), identity and ideology which group identity is based on, are parts of the same process, providing the necessary conditions for individual maturation. Here, it is the solidarity aspect of identity which links common identities. According to him, an ideological system consists of shared images, ideas, and ideals providing people with a coherent and overall orientation in space and time especially when this system simplified. Ideologies add certain meanings to the group ideals but there is a price for it. He (1956) states that:

All ideologies ask for, as the prize for the promised possession of a future, uncompromising commitment to some absolute hierarchy of values and some rigid principle of conduct: be that principle total obedience to tradition, if the future is the eternalization of ancestry; total resignation, if the future is to be of another world; total martial discipline, if the future is to be reserved for some brand of armed superman; total inner reform, if the future is perceived as an advance edition of heaven on earth; or (to mention only one of the ideological ingredients of our time) complete pragmatic abandon to the processes of production and to human teamwork, if unceasing production seems to be the thread which holds present and future together (Erikson, 1956; p. 113).

According to him, the role of superego is likely to dominate the totalism and exclusiveness of some ideologies. In such cases, identity is seen as a manifestation of the superego.

2.2.1.2. Collective Identity

It can be proposed that the mechanisms of introjection, projection, incorporation, and identification are effective on the formation of collective identity. People can identify with different groups, such as their ethnic, national, or political groups and they can adopt these collective identities to various extents. They may identify with both good and bad parts of their own groups or introject the good parts of their groups and project the unwanted parts onto the other groups. The characteristics and dynamics of collective identity are varied according to which mechanisms are mainly used.

Volkan (1998) notes that the people identify with their social groups, ethnicities, nations, etc. The groups have some shared reservoirs which are accessible to all people in a group. And also, these reservoirs have a constant character; for example, a nation has a national flag, national monuments etc. As people emotionally invest their unintegrated good parts in these reservoirs, they connect to the same reservoir and develop a sense of we-ness. This sense of we-ness provides people with a sense of security. Education process in which parents and teachers have an important role contributes to the formation of group identity. In accordance with the focus of large group's identity, the people make an investment in ethnicity, nationality, religion or some combination of these.

Sometimes people project their unintegrated good parts onto their group and project their unintegrated bad parts onto the other group. He states that "The utilization of shared reservoirs from childhood on for the

bad and unintegrated parts, as well as projections of unacceptable thoughts and feelings, also helps create an ethnic marker for the recipient group” (Volkan, 1998, p.96). As one of the many psychoanalysts who study social phenomena, Falk who examined Arab-Israeli conflict from a psychoanalytic perspective also stresses that the groups project or externalize their unacceptable parts onto the other groups while idealizing their own group (Falk, 2004).

It can be argued that the collective identity has narcissistic characteristics in groups which generate nationalist discourses. From the perspective of self psychology, Falk (2004) emphasizes that the group narcissism which is the dominant characteristic of a group self has an important role in interethnic conflicts. He sees that for many, the nation is the part of their extended self; it is especially true for the groups which dominantly display nationalist attitudes. It can also be called as grandiose group self that protects the group from the feelings of inferiority, sense of worthlessness, and helplessness. Pride, which is a manifestation of the grandiose group self, covers these embarrassing feelings. Generally, this narcissism has gained strength as a result of a defense against painful emotional experiences which has created narcissistic injuries in the past, collective history. In other words, group narcissism strengthens as the painful experiences are not processed psychically, and the group cannot mourn its losses.

According to Volkan, individuals are not generally concerned about their large-group identity as long as the sense of threat against this identity

does not prevail. Therefore, a sense of threat is created at the socio-political level in order to strengthen and to activate collective identity. The members of large-groups are mobilized when faced with a sense of danger (Volkan, 1998).

2.2.1.3. The Organizing Role of Collective Traumas for Nationalist Discourses

Collective traumas have important effects at social and historical levels. Regarding severe traumatic events which affect most of the large group, the link between the psychology of the individual and that of the group is spontaneously established. Collective trauma refers to the psychic experience due to a traumatic event which affects a large group or a society. These include unintended and unplanned incidents such as earthquakes or accidents; or intended actions perpetrated by people such as wars, ethnic cleansings, and genocides. The latter is defined as human-made traumas. The term of collective trauma generally implies the destructive actions which are intended by a group of people. These kinds of events cause mass deaths, injuries, migrations, and also serious psychological harms. A threat of destructive action against the people such as a threat of war may also be traumatic. These traumatic cases have an important place on collective memories as well as on survivors' memories. World Wars, Holocaust, Vietnam War, genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia, ethnic cleansings in many countries can be given as an example to some of these kinds of traumatic events. These events are generally triggered by racism and nationalism

arrogating that a group of people is superior to the other, and is entitled to attack other people. The group which attempts these actions not only stigmatizes the other group as an enemy but also it dehumanizes the other. Dehumanizing creates serious psychic damages on the victims *per se*. The victim is unconsciously affected by the perpetrator's unconscious fantasy, and it is most probably transmitted from one generation to the next (Bass, 2003).

Many studies have shown that the collective traumas have important effects not only on the survivors but also on the collective memories and unconscious processes in later generations of survivors. The traumatic stories may be internalized by the children of survivors. The children may try to transform the tragic memory and repair the broken chain of familial and cultural history (Adelman, 1995). As Prager notes, because the trauma is transgenerationally transmitted, the collectivity is deprived of critical sources of social renewal (Prager, 2003).

Transgenerational effects of trauma vary according to the type and the severity of trauma, psychological experiences of the survivors, different coping styles and defense mechanisms used by the survivors, and the attitudes of the survivors about telling these stories and experiences to the next generations. It is well known that even when the traumatic experiences of the survivors are not told to the next generations, unconscious transmission takes place. The survivors may carry over emotional messages relating to these events (Apprey, 2003; Rowland-Klein and Dunlop, 2001). Traumatic experiences are generally encoded in implicit memory that is

unconscious and non-linguistic. Therefore, it is difficult to verbalize but at the same time inevitably transmitted in non-linguistic ways (Brenneis, 1996). To various extents, the next generations become aware of prior generation's experiences regardless of whether or not the stories are told overtly (Rowland-Klein and Dunlop, 2001).

The mental representation of the traumatic event is shared by many people (Volkan, 1998). The traumatic events continue to remain in collective memory on both conscious and unconscious levels. The groups may tend to deny their experiences or to identify with these. Actually, denial and identification processes have similar functions including tolerance of painful affects and allowance to recover one's self-representation and family representation (Klein and Kogan, 1986). While sometimes denial, repression and dissociation defenses are used in social groups which have experienced traumatic events, sometimes the traumatic experiences are remembered and told again and again to the next generations. In the collectivity, there may be a great effort not to forget the trauma. Thus, next generations are identified with these experiences. These narratives construct the collective memory and also they have an organizing role on the collective identity (Kestenbaum, 2003). Dominant political discourses in the society may be organized based on these memories. These memories may be distorted and misrepresented due to their overwhelming characteristic and the transmission process. Historical reality may be distorted, and also fantasy and reality may be interpenetrated.

The collective traumas shape the mental representations of all the members of a group. The group has a common, shared feelings, images, fantasies, and interpretations of the trauma. The defenses against trauma such as denial, dissociation and repression are also common on the collective level as well. These burdensome mental representations may be difficult to carry and therefore the traumatized self-images are transmitted to the next generations. Consequently they become part of the group identity (Volkan, 1998).

Sometimes, the survivors tend to keep distance between themselves and the event; they try to avoid the effects of the trauma. Later generations may also try to erase the memory of the past. Nonetheless, this memory may continue to remain in group's memory and it reemerges under certain conditions (Volkan, 1998). Sometimes the trauma sleeps on the collective level until a threat against the society reactivates the historical trauma (Kogan, 1993). In some cases, a political leader may reactivate the collective memory which carries on traumatic experience in the face of a sense of threat against the society and/or the nation. In this case, mental representation of the trauma gains a mobilizing function (Volkan, 1998). The society may try to protect itself against the sense of threat; this way of protection may be seen constantly in the society. The society may attempt violent actions in order to protect itself.

Volkan uses the term "chosen trauma" to describe the collective memory of a trauma that is activated mainly by political forces. It is doubtless that the people do not choose to be victimized but they may

choose to mythologize the traumatic events (Volkan and Itzkowitz, 1994). The term of chosen trauma refers to the shared mental representation of the collective traumatic event(s) which carries on both realistic and fantasized characteristics. Similar collective traumas are condensed in order to embody the ethnic identity. As an example he explains Milosevic's reactivation of the victimhood of Serbs in The Battle of Kosovo as an effort to build Serbian nationalism. He states that the Battle of Kosovo has not been a sleeping memory for the Serbs; it has already been presented on the collective level, for example it has been the most important history topic for the elementary school children. These mythologized tales of the battle which are carried on from one generation to the next strengthen the Serbs' sense of a traumatized, shared identity. When it was powerfully reactivated by Milosevic at that time, the collective memory was strengthened, and also the sense of entitlement of revenge was created (Volkan, 1998).

In some situations, traumatized societies may subsequently attempt to get involved in violent acts. This may be related to the wish for revenge. Being traumatized may be defined as one's cause for the acts of violence (Apprey, 2003). Similar to the identification with the aggressor on the individual level, people may identify with the perpetrators of trauma on the collective level (Klein and Kogan, 1986). This is an attempt to gain mastery over trauma and it can be adaptive as well as maladaptive, and transient as well as permanent. Because it is related to the projection of blame and guilt, the survivor tends to be not self-critical but critical of others (Blum, 1987). Identification with the aggressor may be seen as an effort to deny being the

victim and the sense of helplessness creating a wish for revenge (Klein and Kogan, 1986).

2.2.1.4. The Organizing Role of Collective Glories for Nationalist Discourses

Large groups are not affected only by traumatic events at the collective level, but also they are identified with collective glories which have been achieved as a result of a triumph and/or any other success. Those glories as well as traumatic events are generally kept in collective memory and also transmitted to the next generations. Nationalist movements generally build their discourses around these glories, called as “national glories”.

Volkan (1998) uses the concept of “chosen glory” to describe a historical event which generally refers to a deserved victory. These events have a crucial role on the formation of collective identity; in fact most of the time they have an organizing role for that identity. The collective glories which usually induce feelings of triumph in large groups can be an important part of the shared reservoir of the group. The mental representations of such events generally bring members of a group together; for example the shared mental representations of independence wars become powerful aspect of a collective identity. These events are mythicized in the same way, as in the case of chosen traumas. In contrast to traumatic events, the symbols of the collective glories are proudly displayed. The members of the groups are expected to identify with those

glories and also carry on the memories of the events. The representations of those events may be reactivated in certain sociopolitical conjunctures to support the self-esteem of the group.

2.2.2. The Group Processes

2.2.2.1. The Rigid Collective Superego and the Capacity to be Individual in the face of the Group

In *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Freud states that a cultural superego which is similar to that of an individual develops in the communities. He says, “It can be asserted that the community, too, evolves a super-ego under whose influence cultural development proceeds” (Freud, 1930, p.141). He continues as follows: “Another point of agreement between the cultural and the individual super-ego is that the former, just like the latter, sets up strict ideal demands, disobedience to which is visited with ‘fear of conscience’” (Freud, 1930, p. 141). Superego is derived from introjected/internalized aggression and it takes a form of conscience. In the civilization process, individual’s dangerous aggression is weakened and supervised by an agency within him. The source of superego is also the fear of loss of love due to aggression. The individual has such a fear because he faces the risk of being deprived of protection from dangers if he loses the love of another person. The individual who is afraid of the authority internalizes this fear, and consequently superego is established. Once the superego is established, the individual begins to be afraid of his superego.

The sense of guilt arises from fear of authority and of the superego. Freud states that:

Conscience (or more correctly, the anxiety which later becomes conscience) is indeed the cause of instinctual renunciation to begin with, but that later the relationship is reversed. Every renunciation of instinct now becomes a dynamic source of conscience and every fresh renunciation increases the latter's severity and intolerance (Freud, 1930, p. 128).

In summary, from the drive theory perspective, internalization of the law of a society is a prerequisite for people to be able to place themselves in the society. When this internalization is succeeded, the superego evolves. It does not mean that people must completely submit himself into this law, rather he sees this law and places himself into that. Consequently, the person can get involved in joint activities with others in the society. In the collective work, the superego of the person can be transferred to the superego of the group. This experience is needed for the participation in the collectivity that leads to productivity. Nonetheless, it is also possible to construct oneself as an individual within the law. Roussillon (1999/2002) stresses that the person can put a distance between himself and the law of the society at the same time. This experience enables the person to generate the things which will be new and original within the culture while he continues to be a part of the collectivity. This is crucial for the development of the capacity to be alone in the group and for maintaining individuality within the group. The attitude of the society or the group is naturally very important in this process. The groups can permit and tolerate this kind of individuality or prohibit it. Roussillon states that the groups which have a

strong narcissistic agreement are most likely to exclude people who challenge this agreement. In this context, nationalist attitudes are seen as a manifestation of or as an extension of the narcissistic agreement of the society in which case nationalist attitudes of the people may be reinforced by the society. Idealization of a group's identity refers to a narcissistic phenomenon. Identification with the value of a group/society is needed but also putting a distance between oneself and the group is important for individuality.

It is most likely difficult to keep one's own individuality within the community with a rigid collective superego. In the presence of a rigid collective superego, the members of the group tend to accept the values of the community and obey the demands of this community without reservation. They identify with the community and its values excessively. The members submit to the collective superego of the community and therefore they relinquish their individuality and their responsibility. This may be due to the fear of losing the love of the community as well as the fear of punishment that will come from the community. In this situation, people do not show aggression in a more neutralized way because the community does not allow assertiveness. Taking individual moves or making personal protests may be seen as dangerous because in such cases displaying aggression is likely to create a sense of guilt in the members. Therefore the people do not have the opportunity to neutralize their aggression. As a result, they may tend to show aggression to the other groups. Moreover, because the members identify with the values of the

community excessively, the other values are likely to be seen as worthless. The other group will also be the container of the group's aggressive tendencies. From this conceptualization, it can be argued that to a certain extent, the rigidity of the collective superego may be seen as responsible for the rigid national identity and nationalist attitudes. Nationalism generally demands people to identify with and idealize the national values; while one's own values are idealized, the other's values are devalued. The attempts of criticism against the national values are perceived as unacceptable and also dangerous. As the members have internalized the collective superego, they avoid criticism which would be perceived as disobedience. The members are afraid of their conscience that would lead to a sense of guilt.

2.2.2.2. The Collective Ego Ideal

Formation of a rigid collective identity may be explained in terms of transferring of the ego ideal to the community. Freud introduced the concept of the ego ideal into psychoanalytic theory in *On Narcissism: an Introduction* (1914). This was conceptualized as heir to primary narcissism. Primary narcissism refers to the early objectless state. It is the condition involving absolute satisfaction for the child. The child takes himself as his own ideal in this stage and there is no dissatisfaction, no desire and no loss. The child does not want to give up this state of perfection, but departure from primary narcissism is necessary for ego development. The child

struggles to recover perfection; therefore he develops an ego ideal. Freud wrote:

As always where the libido is concerned, man has here again shown himself incapable of giving up a satisfaction he had once enjoyed. He is not willing to forgo the narcissistic perfection of his childhood; and when, as he grows up, he is disturbed by the admonitions of others and by the awakening of his own critical judgment, so that he can no longer retain that perfection, he seeks to recover it in the new form of an ego ideal. What he projects before him as his ideal is the substitute for the lost narcissism of his childhood in which he was his own ideal (Freud, 1914/1964, p.94).

Khan (1996) describes the ego ideal from the object relations perspective. According to him, in the psychic development, in order to deal with deprivation of the primary object, the child tends to idealize it. This idealized internal object as the ego ideal is used to ward off all sense of hopelessness, emptiness, and uselessness. In this context, the ego-ideal is the carrier of the earliest psychic experience in which the separateness from the object is not yet stably established. The concept of ego ideal is also explained by Chasseguet-Smirgel. According to her, the ego ideal appears as a substitute for primary narcissistic perfection but there is always a gulf, a split that man is constantly seeking to abolish (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1985). The development of the ego ideal is a usual process but the greatness and/or the rigidity of the ego ideal may be related to wideness of this gulf. This also seems to be related to the unwillingness of giving up the illusionary perfection. It indicates an attempt to regain the lost omnipotence. It tends to return to a previous illusion. (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1985).

The role of the ego ideal is important for the understanding of group experience. The group identity (e.g. national, religious) can be established

as a result of the transfer of the individual ego ideal to the community. Collective ego ideal does not only consist of transferring of the individual ego ideal, communities also develop an ego ideal. Actually, as Freud showed, the ego ideal has a social aspect as well as an individual aspect. He stated that “The ego ideal opens up an important avenue for the understanding of group psychology. In addition to its individual side, this ideal has a social side; it is also the common ideal of a family, a class or a nation” (Freud, 1914/1964; p. 101).

Freud (1921) initiated the psychoanalytic study of group process. He explained the group process in terms of libidinal principle. People in a group, project their ego ideals on to the same object which is usually the group leader and consequently identify themselves with this object. In other words, people in the group put an object in the place of the ego ideal. Thus, the function of self-observation and conscience is attributed to this object. Freud states that “The individual gives up his ego ideal and substitutes for it the group ideal as embodied in the leader” (1921, p.129). The leader represents the primal father which is dreadful for the group. The members of the group have also a passion for authority and obedience. The army and the Christian Church as artificial groups were given as examples by Freud in order to explain this group process (Freud, 1921). In Freud’s view, ego ideal is a part of the superego. Kernberg notes that in Freud’s theory, people in mobs get rid of moral constraints, self-criticism and responsibility when they project their ego ideal onto the leader. Also in this process they have a sense of unity and belonging protecting them from losing their sense of

identity. This process leads to primitive drives and affects to be handed over to and directed by the leader (Kernberg, 1998a). Freud stated that:

There is always a feeling of triumph when something in the ego coincides with the ego ideal. And the sense of guilt (as well as the sense of inferiority) can also be understood as an expression of tension between the ego and the ego ideal (1921, p. 131).

When people put the object (or leader) in the place of their ego ideal, they also attribute the responsibility for the actions to the leader, consequently getting rid of the feeling of blame, guilt, etc (Freud, 1921).

Racist and nationalist identities may be related to the projection of the individual ego ideal onto the group. At a collective level, a nation may be an ego ideal of the group. Chasseguet-Smirgel (1985) uses the ego ideal concept to explain the ideological groups. For her, an ideology always has a fantasy of narcissistic assumption that is related to the wish to return to a state of primary fusion. There is also a wish to exclude the conflict, thus an illusion is created. The wish to return to a state of primary fusion refers to the wish to go back to the primary narcissistic perfection in which there is no conflict which is obviously an illusion. Therefore, the leader in the ideological groups is not a representation of the father; these groups aim to abolish the world of the father. There is a reluctance to respect the father as a carrier of law. The people have wishes for maintaining the illusion of coming back to the primal fusion with the mother. There is a lack of reality testing. In these groups, the role of the reality testing is delegated to the group ego ideal (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1985).

The concept of ego ideal was described differently in Freud and in Chasseguet-Smirgel, and also its role and function within the group process are different. Whereas the ego ideal of the individual is projected onto the leader who is the representative of the father in Freud; group does not seek a substitute father, conversely it cannot endure law of the father in Chasseguet-Smirgel. Here, it can be said that Freud did not describe the process in ideological groups only as Chasseguet-Smirgel did; however his explanation seems to compromise such groups as well. Actually Freud used the concept of ego ideal as a part of the superego, whereas Chasseguet-Smirgel used it as a separate agency. When Freud developed the concept of ego ideal in 1914, it was seen as a separate part of the ego (Garcia, 2003). However, he later defined the ego ideal as a part of the superego within the structural theory developed in 1923. In his formulation, the superego is the heir to the Oedipus complex and involves prohibiting function and also it motivates the individual to aspire toward high ideals which are more or less realistic (Frank, 1999). Chasseguet-Smirgel was faithful to the first conceptualization of the ego ideal by Freud; she argued that there was a fundamental difference between the ego ideal and the superego. In her conceptualization, the ego ideal was to heir the primary narcissism, the superego was heir to the Oedipus complex. She wrote that “positive injunction emanates from the heir to narcissism and the negative form the heir to the Oedipus complex” (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1985; p. 77). In fact, the origin of ego ideal is the same both in Freud and Chasseguet-Smirgel, but according to Freud, it is integrated with the superego. In Freud’s theory,

when ego ideal is projected onto the leader of the group, people are released of the responsibility and self-criticism; therefore reality testing is also likely to be transferred to the leader. Consequently, reality testing may be lacking. In Chasseguet-Smirgel's formulation, too, reality testing is weakened but this is due to the illusion wished to be created by the group.

From these conceptualizations, it can be argued that the rigidity of collective ego ideal is related to the tendency to deny sense of helplessness and powerlessness and also idealization of certain social values belonging to a certain society. Under these circumstances, the communities which are assumed to not share the values of them may be devalued. As a defense against helplessness, omnipotence can be developed. The communities which are established on a rigid ego ideal tend to have grandiosity. There is also a seeking for wholeness. Chasseguet-Smirgel (1985) stated that the group members lose their individualities in such a situation. Each member has an opportunity to identify with the whole group and therefore they acquire omnipotence. In other words, they lose their individuality but they experience a primitive narcissistic gratification of greatness and power by the shared sense of omnipotence. Therefore, members need to destroy any external reality that threatens the group's illusionary ideology (Kernberg, 1998a). A threat against this omnipotence which comes from the other activates the aggression towards the other. In these kinds of groups which are established on idealization, any criticism that shatters this idealization is most likely to be seen as a threat. The people who do not accept the superior characteristics of the group are seen as a threat and they also become targets

of aggression. In the groups which have these kinds of characteristics, there is a demand for mere obedience of the members.

2.2.2.3. Narcissistic Fantasy

Kristeva (1993) describes the withdrawing into the ethnicity, nation or race as an attempt to preserve oneself or to go back to a primal paradise in the face of despair and frustration. The feeling of despair and frustration may increase in social change processes. When the structures which are familiar to the members of group tend to change, people may face a chaotic situation which is felt as unbearable. Nationalist discourses tend to increase when the social despair and frustrations widespread. The sense of threat also increases in parallel with these. In case of these kinds of experiences, the narcissistic world is more trustworthy than interpersonal world which may create frustration. Hatred of others is explained in terms of this phenomenon. Kristeva (1993) states that:

Hatred of those others who do not share my origins and who affront me personally, economically, and culturally: I then move back among 'my own,' I stick to an archaic, primitive 'common denominator,' the one of my frailest childhood, my closest relatives, hoping they will be more trustworthy than 'foreigners,' in spite of the petty conflicts those family members so often, alas, had in store for me but that I would rather forget (pp. 2-3) [Emphasis not mine].

The term of "narcissistic fantasy" refers to a desire for narcissistic wholeness, seeking oneness, sameness and homogeneity. This desire implies a psychic world in which the other does not exist. The other can only be one's narcissistic extension who is expected to be as desired. Because the other cannot be absolutely desired, s/he would be targets of aggression. The

independent existence of the other cannot be tolerated; desire of oneness cannot be given up. Frosh (2001) reminds us that this is a regressive impulse, seeking the lost oneness. The other would be a threat against maintaining the fantasy of oneness, a source of a fear of contamination, of degeneration. He emphasizes that wish to return to the fantasized oneness is common in fundamentalist ideologies. He states that:

In the context of a global social order teetering on the edge of collapse, with fragmentation and disruption of identity always staring the one eye, fundamentalism thus offers a way of staying in one piece, of riding this whirlwind of dissolution by disowning it, projecting it outside. Its narcissistic energy is based on omnipotent fantasies and on the denial of Otherness, the disavowal of legitimate contradiction and alternative ways of being. It offers solace to lost souls, ways of succeeding the world where the forces seem ranged against one, an easily accessible terrain of meaning and value, translated into the language of 'purity' and truth (Frosh, 2001, p. 73).

In this framework, these characteristics can be associated with racism. Racism suggests that a certain race is superior to others, biologically and/or culturally. Contemporary racism highlighted the cultural differences which are irremovable. Where does this need for sense of superiority come from? The claim of purity seems to be related to a narcissistic fantasy. It can be remembered here that racism and nationalism produce some conspiracy theories about those other ethnicities' or nations' intending to destroy their societies. These conspiracy theories are derived from the persecutory anxiety of the groups because they have projected their aggression onto the others but also these theories are emanated from perceiving one's own group as an object of desire. In this frame, conspiracy theories are related to a narcissistic fantasy. The group has grandiosity about the other's wishes to

destroy them because they have very valuable things which the other has not. Grotstein (2000) also relates hate to the narcissistic phenomenon. He sees that hate which implies a narcissistic injury constitutes a manic defense against one's sense of smallness and helplessness in the face of a chaotic situation. Hate is the result of collapse of the narcissistic fantasies. When the narcissistic fantasy of people about being special and deserving of whatever they want (sense of entitlement) is injured due to various reasons, they tend to hate the people who are hold responsible for this injury.

2.2.2.4. Regressive Group Processes

Bion studied with small groups and developed three basic assumptions to explain the unconscious life of the groups. The conceptualization of these basic assumptions has been used for explaining the large group process. These assumptions are dependency, fight/flight and pairing. Another group process which he described is called work group or sophisticated group. The developmental levels of the three basic-assumption groups and the work group are different. In contrast to the basic assumption groups, the work group has a powerful psychological structure and also a capacity for co-operation. There is a similar difference in their relation to the external reality. The basic assumptions refer to the regressive processes of the groups. These group processes are not stable; there are emotional oscillations because powerful emotional drives emerge in the group and the groups frequently have difficulty containing the emotional situations, especially anxiety (Bion, 1959). It can be said that this oscillation is

between paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. According to Hopper (2003), the basic-assumption groups are characterized by the fantasy that their members are under similar states of regression. In these group processes, the members distort the reality.

Dependency basic assumption is “that the group is met in order to be sustained by a leader on whom it depends for nourishment, material and spiritual, and protection” (Bion, 1959, p. 147). Fight-flight assumption is “that the group has met to fight something or to run away from it” (p. 152). Pairing assumption is “that people come together as a group for purposes of preserving the group” (p. 63). The members in this third group have a messianic hope; they wait for an unborn leader such as a genius. Bion states that dependency assumption underlies the church, fight-flight assumption underlies the army, and pairing assumption underlies the aristocracy. Kernberg summarizes these three basic assumptions developed by Bion. In dependency assumption group, the members who are greedy perceive themselves as inadequate, immature and incompetent. They idealize their leader and they perceive him as omnipotent and omniscient. They expect the leader to be a representative of goodness, power and knowledge. The common defense mechanisms which are used by the members are primitive idealization, projected omnipotence, denial, greed, and envy. In fight-flight assumption group, the members get together against external enemies which are vaguely perceived. The leader is expected to combat against these enemies and to protect the members from infighting. The members have serious difficulty tolerating the opposition to their shared ideology; therefore

they tend to split into subgroups in case of conflict. The members of this kind of group commonly deny the existence of intragroup hostility; instead, they project aggression onto an out-group. In fight-flight group, the defenses of splitting, projection of aggression and projective identification are dominantly used. According to Kernberg, this kind of group has a difficulty developing a coherent ideology because its integration capacity is lacking. In pairing assumption groups, members tend to preserve their group's threatened identity. Whereas the first two have a pregenital character, the third has a genital character (Kernberg, 1998a).

Kernberg discusses the regressive group situations using Bion's conceptualization. He proposes an approach for understanding small groups, large groups and the mobs in terms of object relations perspective. Two levels of internalized object relations are described. Basic level refers to multiple self and object representations which consist of primitive fantasy formations linked with primitive impulse derivatives. Higher level is sophisticated, integrated self and object representations linked with higher levels of affect dispositions. The value systems of the groups which have basic level of object relations are simplistic, conventional, black-or-white morality. He states that certain group conditions tend towards regression that activates primitive psychological levels. When the groups lose their ordinary social structure, primitive levels of psychological functioning may also be activated. Aggression is expressed more directly and intensely when group process is unstructured. Hence, large group processes can be controlled by rigid social structuring (Kernberg, 1998a).

Kernberg (1998a) describes the messianic ideology and its characteristics. He states that this ideology splits the world into good and evil; the advocates of this ideology think that the totalistic quality of their belief system will resolve all the problems of the world and/or of the group; their leaders promise their members a golden future; they demand complete submission to the group rules and also full obedience to themselves. Moreover, this ideology tends to regulate the details of the members' daily lives. It tries to eliminate individual boundaries, to discourage private thinking and access to knowledge that can threaten its belief system. Such ideologies transform the unstructured large groups into fight-flight and/or dependency group. The ideology also tends to rationalize the expression of aggression against out-groups. In such cases, it may need to dehumanize all relationships in out-groups.

Kernberg states that "Leaders and members in groups regress between two axes: dependency, narcissism, primitive hedonism, psychopathy; and moralism, paranoid-persecutory control, sadism, violence" (Kernberg, 1998a, p. 47). There is a fluctuation between narcissistic/dependent and paranoid polarity. In the narcissistic/dependent polarity, there is a sense of impotence, of helplessness, and at the same time a search for an idealized but cognitively simplistic leader who is expected to provide total gratification. In the paranoid polarity the world is splitted between "us" and "them". "They" are the objects of aggressive attacks. The people expect violent actions from the combative leader who can take the responsibility of these actions (Kernberg, 1998b). Actually these polarities

can sometimes exist together. From this perspective it can be argued that nationalist groups prefer combative leaders. This kind of leadership is reinforced because there is a wish for preservation of the nation. In Turkey, the nationalist leaders ask the citizens to protect the nation against internal or external dangers. According to these leaders' discourses, the people who are obedient to these discourses are seen as "good us", and the others as "bad other", traitors, and/or enemies.

According to Kernberg (1998b), aggressive tendencies can increase in certain social circumstances. In these situations, regression in the society and the psychopathology of the individual are integrated. Nationalist leaders may frequently activate certain historical traumas. He states that:

Unstable, turbulent, potentially threatening social, economic, cultural, or historical conditions activate a deeper level of paranoid regression: the forthcoming election is perceived as a potential threat as well as a potential opportunity to defy and overcome a real or imagined enemy. Social subgroups become sharply divided and serve as targets for the projection of aggression and paranoid distortions. The potential for political, religious, racial, or nationalist hostility latent in the local ideology and cultural tradition is maximally activated under such conditions (Kernberg, 1998a, p. 286).

Kernberg emphasizes that the mass media may play a major role in intensifying and exploiting the paranoid regression in the groups by producing and reinforcing strong division between good and bad, and between friends and enemies. Moreover, it may reinforce the tendency of aggression in groups justifying the paranoid ideology. In the mass media, while some people are described as members of a valuable, superior and rightfully dominant group; others are represented as members of a group

which displays threatening, aggressive, malignant and revengeful characteristics (Kernberg, 2003, p. 690).

In the study on unconscious life of groups, Hopper (2003) discusses the theory of Bion and the contributions of the subsequent psychoanalysts who focus on group processes. He reported that Turquet, a Kleinian psychoanalyst, described a fourth assumption in addition to the three assumptions conceptualized by Bion. The fourth assumption is “oneness”. According to this assumption, when people participate in a large group in which they are exposed to multiple stimuli and response bombardment, they may perceive a threat to their identity and also have a fear of annihilation. In this situation, people tend to protect themselves against the loss of identity and fear of annihilation; they need feeling of unity. As a result of this process, they choose either isolation or creating homogeneity. As a second choice, the group seeks for the feeling of existence, well-being and wholeness. The group needs absolute equality, absolute sameness of belief, also the use of language as a tool for disclosing their identity instead of as a tool for expressing their ideas. The members in the group refuse role differentiation, and the use of personal authority. These characteristics are also related to their desire for fusion as a defense against envy (Hopper, 2003).

Kernberg also discusses the conceptualization of Turquet. He states that in the large group process, the members feel a complete loss of identity. The members’ capacity for evaluating their and others’ behaviors decreases because the verbal communication disappears. Moreover, people in a large

group may have a fear of aggression coming from other members and also have a loss of control. These fears can emerge in the large groups anytime. Provocative behaviors that follow this fear may be directed at the leader and the members who try to maintain their individuality. Efforts of homogenization are prevalent because of the sense of threat. Envy of thinking and of individuality frequently exists in such groups. Any simplistic generalizations can easily be accepted within group and it can be transformed into absolute truth functioning as a calming doctrine (Kernberg, 1998a).

From this perspective, it can be argued that demand for homogeneity on the basis of blood or culture is seen in racism and nationalism. Neoracism and increase of nationalism can be seen as a reaction to globalization bringing a sense of insecurity, and migration resulting in heterogeneity in the society.

2.2.3. Defense Mechanisms of Splitting, Projection, Projective Identification, Idealization, and Devaluation

Melanie Klein (1946) explained some typical defense of early ego against the paranoid and schizoid anxieties such as splitting, projection and projective identification. She argued that death instinct which is felt as a fear of annihilation and its form, a fear of persecution, is responsible for this anxiety. Destructive impulses which are emanated from death instinct are innate. Splitting is the main ego mechanism and defense against anxiety. The infant splits the psychic world into the good and the bad in the face of

his destructive impulses, envy and persecutory anxiety. He projects his destructive impulses outwards, thus he preserves the good. In other words, in order to overcome anxiety, he throws out the bad parts of himself which are rooted in his aggressive drives. By means of splitting, the frustrating and persecutory object is kept widely apart from the idealized object.

Idealization is the result of exaggeration of the good aspect of the object.

There is a denial of psychic reality which becomes possible through the feelings of omnipotence. Melanie Klein stated that:

In the exploration of early splitting processes, it is essential to differentiate between a good object and an idealized one, though this distinction cannot be drawn sharply. A very deep split between the two aspects of the object indicates that it is not the good and bad object that are being kept apart but an idealized and an extremely bad one. So deep and sharp division reveals that destructive impulses, envy, and persecutory anxiety are very strong and that idealization serves mainly as a defense against these emotions (M. Klein, 1957/175, p. 192).

Projection of hated parts of the self onto the other is likely to lead a form of identification which is called projective identification. When the wish to harm or to control the other is projected, the other is felt to be a persecutor. The fear of being controlled emerges. In the face of destructive impulses, the danger of retaliation may also show itself. In the case of excessive splitting and projective identification, the ego is weakened. These processes operate in paranoid-schizoid position. Here, a feeling of envy is worth mentioning. Envy which makes building good object difficult is an expression of destructive impulses. Klein stated that “Envy is the angry feeling that another person possesses and enjoys something desirable—the envious impulse being to take it away or to spoil it” (M. Klein, 1946, p.

181). Devaluation of the object is a defense against envy; because devalued object is not envied any more. Another defense against envy which is experienced is to activate envy in others by one's own success and possessions in order to reverse the situation. Unfortunately, this method is not effective because it leads to persecutory anxiety (M. Klein, 1946).

The loved and hated aspects of the self and the other cannot be separated for long time. The infant gradually integrates the good and bad parts of both himself and the other within depressive position. In this position, fear of loss and the feeling of guilt arise. In parallel with the integration process between inner and external situations, understanding of psychic reality and perception of external reality enhance. These positions first appear in infancy but all of us continue to fluctuate between them throughout life (M. Klein, 1946). Although there is no clear division between the two positions and the people fluctuate between different developmental levels, and either one or the other is dominant.

These developmental positions may be adapted to the group processes. Groups and communities also fluctuate between different developmental levels. Similar to individuals, communities are neither homogeneous nor static; some dominant elements of the communities at a certain context may emerge and determine the social processes. In the dominant political discourses, mechanism of splitting, idealization, devaluation, projection and projective identification which belong to the paranoid-schizoid position may be used. For example, in the groups in which nationalist discourses are dominantly generated, these defenses are

frequently used. Idealization and devaluation mechanisms in their relation to the splitting function in social life in terms of establishment of the rigid national identity. The splitting into “all good us”, idealized nation and/or ethnicity and “all bad other”, devaluated/derogated nation and/or ethnicity can prevail. While the undesirable parts of one’s own group are denied, the good parts of the other group are also denied. These good parts of the other may stir up envy in the group because they are assumed to have something which is desired. Therefore, feeling of envy may produce the wish to destroy the other and also other may be devalued. Nationalist discourses and attitudes are frequently explained in terms of disintegration of the good and bad characteristics in the specific nation. In order to preserve the good parts, the undesirable parts are thrown out and projected onto the other. For the nationalist discourses which excessively use this defense, the discourses which assert that the other group is good can be seen as a threat and the people who follow such expressions are suspected to be potential enemies because this assertion damages the “us”.

In this frame, it can be said that nationalist discourses are produced within the group process in which narcissistic dynamics display themselves. Idealization and arrogance are important parts of the narcissistic phenomenon. In parallel with these dynamics, the ego ideal of the group is high and rigid. This also creates excessive dependence on the national identity because it is a representative of one’s own good parts. Ego ideal is the resultant of projection of one’s own good parts onto the object (M. Klein, 1946).

According to Emanuel Klein, nationalism provides people with a feeling of superiority and also opportunity to express their aggression. It functions as a container for the aggressive impulses. The sense of “us” in a group also enables people to avoid guilt and anxiety (E. Klein, 1944). Byles (2003) highlights the fact that people’s sadistic fantasies of destructive omnipotence are projected onto the other which is perceived as enemy. This “other” functions as an external stabilizer of people’s sense of identity and inner control. Therefore, the presence of other as enemy is needed. The people make an emotional investment to the enemy. At this point, it can be discussed that linking the aggressive drives directly with extreme nationalism and ethnic hatred leading people to discharge their aggressions are not agreeable. Some ideological movements reinforce these processes in certain circumstances. Here, there are two important questions. Which factors facilitate and justify the expression of aggression? Which factors serve a function of container for aggression? An activation of a sense of threat against one’s identity is partly responsible for it. In the group processes, many factors facilitate regression.

Moscowitz (1995) emphasizes the role of fantasy in the group processes stating that there is no ethnicity. Actually, there is only need to deny people’s own badness and fear of their own hatred. In this frame, ethnicity and race are fantasies in which people’s own badness are denied and projected onto the others (Rustin, 1991). Here, there is the dichotomy of good and bad, love and hate, idealized and devalued. This dichotomy of ethnic differences runs basically not on the cognitive level but the emotional

level. Positive and negative feelings are condensed and then positive ones are introjected while negative ones are projected onto the others. As a result of projection, persecutory anxiety emerges. This is called as projective identification. Persecutory anxiety is the return of the projected elements. Consequently, the people/the group who are seen as a persecutor are feared. The fear is not accepted and then is transformed into rage and hate. Hated other becomes a scapegoat for one's unbearable feelings (Kristeva, 1993). Rustin states that "This process can have a self-reinforcing dynamic, in which the evidence of damage inflicted on projected internal objects generates still more violent persecution, which is again projected on to powerless victims" (1991, p. 66).

From Ogden's perspective, projective identification is understood within the interpersonal process (Ogden, 1979). Once the unwanted parts of the individual are projected onto the other, the other is likely to receive those parts and then concordantly act on them. Ogden explained this process as follows:

Projective identification is viewed as a group of fantasies and accompanying object relations involving three phases which together make up a single psychological unit. In the initial phase, the projector fantasizes ridding himself of an aspect of himself and putting that aspect into another person in a controlling way. Secondly, via the interpersonal interaction, the projector exerts pressure on the recipient of the projection to experience feelings that are congruent with the projection. Finally, the recipient psychologically processes the projection and makes a modified version of it available for re-internalization by the projector (1979, p. 371).

This conceptualization may shed light on the process of nationalist identification. When the "bad" parts of a group are projected onto the other,

for example when the members of the other group are perceived as the enemy threatening the group's unity, the other tends to introject those feelings coming from the projector. In that case, the other group starts to behave in line with the expectation from it. At the same time, the other group is likely to apply the similar mechanism of projective identification. Consequently, nationalist attitudes of different groups foster each other. It can also be argued that the groups who have nationalist tendencies need each other.

2.2.4. Thinking Processes in Nationalist Discourses

It can be argued that thinking processes are also affected due to excessive use of certain defense mechanisms. Splitting, idealization, devaluation, projection and projective identification are primitive defenses. In regressive group processes, the use of primitive defenses increases in parallel with the increase of anxiety level of people. In that case, secondary thought process which is an indicator of a mature psychic structure remains underdeveloped. While primary process is based on pleasure-principle; to a large extent, secondary thought process is based on reality-principle and it is characterized by reason, logic and delay of action (A. Freud, 1965). Rational thinking and integration the information are related to secondary process. In the face of regression, the ability of rational thinking and integration capacity weaken and people have difficulty in understanding complex nature of the world meaning reality testing is impaired to a certain extent.

The development of mentalization capacity or self-reflective function is noteworthy here. Mentalization or reflective function refers to the ability to interpret reactions of others as a result of their mental states and to understand subjective meanings of the other's own feelings. It includes individual's conception of others' attitudes, intentions and plans. This function is closely related to individual's ability to characterize and give meaning to her own psychic experiences. It is derived from multiple sets of self and other representations of the individual and it implies cognitive, affective and experiential capacity to use and integrate awareness of self as a subject and as an object. This ability or function has a crucial role on development of affect regulation, impulse control, self-monitoring and the experience of self-agency (Fonagy and Target, 1998). It can be said that these functions are not developed well in people who have rigid self- and other- representations as seen in the nationalist or racist attitudes. Actually, those representations seem to be insufficiently developed and/or unintegrated. Fonagy and Target point out to the fact that limited mentalization or reflective abilities are responsible for having a difficulty in responding flexibly and adaptively to the symbolic, meaningful components of others' behaviors. People with limited mentalization abilities "find themselves caught in fixed patterns of attribution; rigid stereotypes of response; nonsymbolic, instrumental uses of affect—mental patterns that are not amenable to either reflection or modulation" (Fonagy and Target, 1998, p. 93).

From a Kleinian perspective, Rustin (1991) notes that splitting mechanism which is excessively used in nationalist attitudes affects the thinking processes because intense emotions, especially aggression, cannot be tolerated by the person and therefore cannot be symbolized within the psychic life, rather these emotions are projected to the external life, to the other. Because of excessive use of splitting, projection and projective identification, the person confuses what comes from the self and what comes from the other. When the person projects his own badness, in other words, his undesirable parts onto the other and then he introjects it, projective identification works. Consequently, reality and truth are distorted to some extent. Bion states that:

The dominance of projective identification confuses the distinction between the self and the external object. This contributes to the absence of any perception of two-ness, since such an awareness depends on the recognition of a distinction between subject and object (1962, p. 307).

The use of primitive defense mechanisms of splitting, projection and projective identification is related to the incapacity of toleration of frustration. Bion (1962) points out that when there is lack of capacity for tolerating the frustration, reality principle cannot develop well. This inability impedes the development of thoughts and the capacity to think; by the same token incapacity to think increases the sense of frustration.

In this framework, Bion's contributions to Klein's theory are noteworthy. Rustin adopts Bion's conceptualization in order to examine the phenomenon of racism from a psychoanalytic viewpoint. He reminds us that Bion added a third dimension of knowledge to Klein's conceptualization of

mind being constructed around love and hate (Rustin, 1991). Bion saw a close relationship between affect and cognition. He introduced the concept of “O” which refers to ultimate reality or the thing-in-itself or unknowable (Bion, 1965). The “O” is near to the death instinct in Klein. In order for an experience to be able to be thought, in other words, to be transformed, the intense feeling must be contained and tolerated by the person; otherwise it remains intolerable. If the feeling cannot be tolerated, it creates persecutory feelings because it has not been given a meaning. This experience leads the person to defend himself by projecting this feeling outwards. According to Grotstein (2003), hate is related to manic defenses against one’s sense of helplessness and impotence in the dreadful presence of “O”. This manic defense is an effort to control the anxiety. In summary, containment of an intense feeling is essential for people to process and transform the experience. When people encounter chaotic experiences, they must be moderated in order for them to be transformed into knowledge. Otherwise, they remain as unbearable and therefore are projected onto the other to protect themselves. In the global world, people are likely to have a sense of smallness and powerlessness. Mass media continuously reinforces these feelings. As a defense, people may tend to cling to their ethnic and cultural identities which are idealized and to project their fears onto the others. Racism and nationalism use these defenses to various extents and frequently blame the other for this sense of smallness. To develop some conspiracy theories and to apply them excessively to explain the social, economical and political issues can be understood through that mechanism. To various

extents, nationalist discourses develop conspiracy theories; many times they hold the internal and/or external forces (enemies) responsible for the chaotic situation in the country. These enemies are accused of being the cause of anxiety and of the sense of helplessness in the society. Thereby, the collective unity is maintained by externalizing the malevolent situation and transferring the responsibility to the others. As certain enemies are identified as responsible forces, people get rid of their anxiety somewhat without any attempt to understand the complex reality from different perspectives.

It can easily be argued that to some extent the reality is distorted in racist and nationalist attitudes. The groups which deny and project their badness are not in fact acquainted with the characteristics of the people on whom the badness is projected. Even when there is an acquaintance, only negative characteristics of the other group are perceived and exaggerated by the racist/nationalist tendencies. Rustin argues that racism is also related to hatred of reality and truth. Indeed, these racist attitudes emanate from emotional, not cognitive domain. They are not tested in terms of their appropriateness to reality. Racial categories are not based on real knowledge, they are arbitrary. There is pseudo-thinking as a defense against the apprehension of reality (Rustin, 1991). Many authors writing on racism and nationalism draw attention to this fact. It can also be said that racism and extreme nationalism have a tendency to devalue thinking and to idealize action. This is especially true for critical thinking which may be seen as a threat to the narcissistic fantasy. Fascism (and fascist movements) which is based on racism and/or nationalism bans critical thinking and freedom of

expression. Fascist ideologists have difficulty in tolerating critical/creative thinking; they insist that everybody must think in a certain way. Racism and nationalism frequently strive for determining how people think and speak. As Balibar points out, racist attitude has a fear of words (Balibar, 2000a). Intellectualism is denigrated and labeled as malevolent in these ideologies. As Rustin notes, racist judgments are immune to the effects of logical arguments. He wrote that:

Racist ways of thinking may be so resistant to argument precisely because they don't derive from or really engage with these levels of mental functioning. They derive from preconceptions, not observed facts, and pay little regard to rules of consistency or rational inference in the formation of judgments and strong opinions (1991, pp. 68-69).

2.3. Summary

Although collective and group processes have been examined by psychoanalysts or social scientists who approach to social issues from a psychoanalytic framework, this focus has not yet produced a comprehensive study of nationalism. However, there are some valuable theoretical contributions which enable to examine the nationalism as both a part of the collective identity and a tendency that is produced in a group process. In summary, the issue can be addressed from the following theoretical conceptualizations:

Idealization of collective identity: To various extents the groups have shared images, representations and ideals which shape the collective identity. Nationalist discourses which are a part of an ideological system tend to shape and strengthen these shared images, representations and ideals

of the collectivity. These are denominated as “national” and subsequently idealized. Consequently, a national identity is constituted.

The organizing role of collective traumas and glories for nationalist discourses: The national identity is reinforced through idealizing certain national glories and being identified with some collective traumas.

Frequently, a collective trauma which is kept in collective memory is carried over from one generation to the next; sometimes an embedded historical trauma is reactivated and it becomes a “chosen trauma” which is described by Volkan and Itzkowitz (1994). Nationalist leaders, movements, and the mass media play an important role in reactivating these events. Moreover, national education systems are extremely instrumental in forming national traumas or glories, and keeping them sensitive enough so that they could be easily reactivated.

Harsh collective superego and claim for obedience instead of supporting the capacity for being individual in the face of group: In nationalist discourses, it is frequently expected that all members of the nation should share the idealized images and representations which build the national identity. The members are also expected to identify with and be committed to the national identity. Demand for commitment and obedience comes from the collective superego that can be harsh in groups in which nationalist discourses dominantly appear. These groups also tend to regenerate the nationalist discourses at the micro levels. In these group processes, individuality which may be perceived as disobedience is not likely to be permitted and be tolerated. The groups who have an idealized

self-image tend to develop a narcissistic agreement. The members who display their individuality despite the demands of the collectivity and criticize the so-called “shared” values of the collectivity may be perceived as a threat to the narcissistic agreement. Consequently, people tend to maintain this agreement, because otherwise they may be excluded and punished.

Rigid/high collective ego ideal: It can be said that nationalist groups develop a high/rigid collective ego ideal characterized by grandiosity and denial of the sense of helplessness and powerlessness. In such case, group members forgo their individualities and identify with the group ideal to achieve a sense of omnipotence. This excessive identification may lead to a distortion of reality. Because the group has a tendency to maintain its narcissistic illusion; the external reality may be perceived as a threat against to this illusion. The group members get rid of moral constraints and self-criticism as a result of transferring their ego ideals to the whole group or the leader.

Putting a leader in the place of the ego ideal: In groups, the ego ideal can also be transferred to a leader. In groups which have nationalist attitudes, a leader who may be the founder of the nation or who have played an important role in a triumph can be put in the place of the ego ideal of the group. This leader is idealized and followed by the members of the group without any questioning; he cannot be criticized. The members identify with this leader and consequently his presence protects the members of the group from losing their sense of identity.

Excessive use of splitting, idealization, devaluation, projection and projective identification mechanisms: In nationalist discourses, defense mechanisms which are excessively used are usually primitive defenses. When a group which is described as “national” is idealized, the other groups are likely to be devalued. Idealization and devaluation which is a reflection of the splitting between “all good us” and “all bad other” are generally used together. Because the aggression cannot be displayed moderately within the group, it is projected onto the other group. When idealization is excessively applied, the unwanted parts of the own group are projected onto the other. Moreover, the good parts of the devalued other are denied, because they create envy. As a result of this process, the “other” is perceived as a persecutor who is expected to retaliate. Persecutory anxiety is the result of projective identification. Naturally, other nationalist groups are likely to use similar defense mechanisms which consequently, in that relational matrix, interact with each other, and also maintain each other’s presence.

Regression to the narcissistic internal world: The groups, like individuals, can regress towards more primitive levels of developmental organization. In the face of despair and frustration at the social level, the society may display narcissistic characteristics which have not dominantly appeared before. The periods in which nationalist discourses gain ground may be described as regressive processes. In these processes, the maintenance of current social constructs may be threatened (real or perceived) in various ways and people may have a sense of powerlessness and a fear of annihilation which can also be triggered and/or reinforced by

nationalist discourses themselves. In such a case, people who fear a loss of identity may withdraw into the narcissistic world consisting of a sense of wholeness and homogeneity and cling to their ethnic and/or national belongings, which is more trustworthy than the actual world that is the source of conflict and frustration. From this narcissistic stance, members perceive their national and/or ethnic identity as superior to others. This illusionary perception may create a sense of entitlement. Besides, the group claims itself to be the sole object of desire as it possesses everything that the other groups wish to have. Ultimately, these narcissistic fantasies are doomed to collapse. In that case, the other is perceived as responsible for this collapse, and, as a result, is the object of hate.

Displaying of the characteristics of fight-flight assumption: Using Bion's conceptualization of basic assumptions which refer to the regressive processes within the group, it can be argued that the groups -in which nationalist discourses prevail- predominantly display the characteristics of fight-flight assumption group. Some of these characteristics are similar to those of narcissistic phenomenon. The members of the group idealize their "all good" group, deny the aggression within the group and project their aggression onto the other groups which are perceived as enemy. The common defense mechanism used in this kind of group is projective identification. To various extents, nationalist discourses draw attention to internal and external enemies against the nation and they promise to protect their members. Because the good and the bad parts of the group are not integrated while aggression is denied and projected, the reality is distorted.

Due to the tendency of distortion, their shared ideology is not coherent either. Likewise, the group cannot tolerate any criticisms directed at their ideology. The value system of these groups is based on basic object relations composed of simplistic, conventional, black-or-white morality.

Impairment of thinking process: Because primitive defense mechanisms are predominantly used, thinking processes are impaired. “Good” and “bad” parts of the group cannot be integrated and unwanted parts of the group are projected onto the other. However, development of integration capacity is crucial for complexity and flexibility of thinking; because otherwise the reality is distorted and/or rigid and stereotyping thinking process emerges. In nationalist discourses, this distortion of reality and rigid thinking stand out to various extents.

3. Method

3.1. Sources of Materials

To analyze nationalist discourses in Turkey, fifteen political parties, one governmental organization, five non-governmental organizations and one political journal were selected. Additionally, two national organizing texts which were mainly presented in the national education curriculum, “Atatürk’ün Gençliğe Hitabesi”¹ [Atatürk’s Address to Youth] and “Andımız” (Öğrenci Andı)² [“Our Pledge” (“Student’s Pledge”)] were included in the study (See Table I).

All political parties which participated in the July 22, 2007 Parliamentary General Election were included in this study, except for “Aydınlık Türkiye Partisi” [Bright Turkey Party] because there was access to neither its election declaration nor the party program. In addition to the parties participated in the election, “Büyük Birlik Partisi” [Great Union Party] and “Demokratik Sol Parti” [Democratic Left Party] were also included in this study since they finally made their way to the parliament through elected independents or through candidates elected on another party’s list. Since this study aims to look solely at Turkish nationalist discourses, Demokratik Toplum Partisi [Democratic Society Party] was excluded because the members of this party largely consist of Kurdish

¹ Atatürk’ün Gençliğe Hitabesi was the last part of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s “Nutuk” [Address] which was made in Second General Assembly of Republican People’s Party [Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası] in 1927.

² Andımız (Öğrenci Andı) was written and put into practice in 1933 by the Minister of Education Reşit Galip. According to the Ministry of Education Regulation, it is still an obligation for every primary school student to read it every day.

people and the party declares that its political struggle is predominantly for the rights of Kurdish people. One governmental organization, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri [Turkish Armed Forces] was included as it represents the official ideology in Turkey. Five non-governmental organizations and one political journal were selected considering that their influence on the present political life of Turkey. The two texts, “Atatürk’s Address to Youth” and “Our Pledge”, were included because they are the most powerful representations of the official/dominant nationalist ideology. These texts are commonly used by many political discourses and accepted as national texts which are internalized and carried on in the collective memory.

3.2. Materials

The materials consisted of official documents which have been published by the selected institutions. All of these documents have been published in the official web-sites of the institutions except for the program of Genç Parti [Young Party] because its official web-site could not be accessed. The election declarations of the nine political parties were investigated. For the six parties which did not publish election declaration, their party programs were studied. A press statement of the governmental institution, Turkish Armed Forces, was included. For the aim of analyzing the political discourses of non-governmental organizations, their bylaws and/or programs and/or declarations of organization were used. The manifest of the political journal was examined (See Table I). It should be stated that the extents of these texts were not equal.

3.3. Procedure

First, the literature on nationalism, racism and psychoanalysis was reviewed to formulate a framework to ground the psychoanalytic literature on the issue of nationalism. The literature on both nationalism and psychoanalysis is limited, so the literature on identity, collective identity, group processes and dynamics, the role of the ego ideal and the superego, primitive defense mechanisms from psychoanalytic perspective were also reviewed. The theories of Freud, Klein, Bion, Kernberg and Volkan were especially useful to approach the main issue of this study. In sum, the review did not only aim to make an introduction to the concepts in this topic, but also aimed at developing a systematical understanding to the issue of nationalism from a psychoanalytical perspective.

Sociology, political science and social psychology literatures, especially the ones on social identity theory were reviewed in order to introduce the phenomenon of nationalism through other disciplines. In order to describe and explain the phenomenon of nationalism and different nationalist discourses in Turkey, relevant sociology and political science literatures were reviewed. Turkish nationalism and its history were briefly outlined. Because the study focuses on current nationalist discourses, mainly contemporary studies were used.

In the second step, the selected Turkish texts were evaluated by the author. All parts of the party programs and the election declarations, -for example internal and foreign relations, economical program, education and culture policies- were investigated. However the focus was mainly on the

ones which are more relevant such as internal politics, education and culture policies. The other texts were analyzed in a similar way.

The qualitative analysis method was used to analyze the texts. They were analyzed in terms of their contents and discursive characteristics in the light of psychoanalytical conceptualizations under nine titles which were outlined in the Summary subsection (3.3.). The dominant and repetitious themes in the texts were focused. The author also paid attention to the conflicting statements within the texts.

Table 1: The Sources and Materials Used in the Case Analysis¹

Original name	Abbreviation	Translation of the name	Source
The election declarations			
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi	AKP	Justice and Development Party	AKP, 2007
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi	CHP	Republican People's Party	CHP, 2007
Demokrat Parti	DP	Democrat Party	DP, 2007
Emek Partisi	EMEP	Labor Party	EMEP, 2007
Halkın Yükselişi Partisi	HYP	People's Ascent Party	HYP, 2007
İşçi Partisi	İP	Workers' Party	İP, 2007
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi	MHP	Nationalist Movement Party	MHP, 2007
Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi	ÖDP	Freedom and Solidarity Party	ÖDP, 2007
Saadet Partisi	SP	Felicity Party	SP, 2007
The party programs			
Bağımsız Türkiye Partisi	BTP	Independent Turkey Party	BTP, 2003
Büyük Birlik Partisi	BBP	Great Union Party	BBP, 1993
Demokratik Sol Parti	DSP	Democratic Left Party	DSP, 2003
Genç Parti	GP	Young Party	GP, 2002
Liberal Demokrat Parti	LDP	Liberal Democrat Party	LDP, 2002
Türkiye Komünist Partisi	TKP	Communist Party of Turkey	TKP, 2001
National organizing texts			
Andımız (Öğrenci Andı)		Our Pledge (Student's Pledge)	1933 (MEB)
Atatürk'ün Gençliğe Hitabesi		Atatürk's Address to Youth	1927 (MEB)
A governmental institution			
Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri (The Press Statement of April 27, 2007)	TSK	Turkish Armed Forces	TSK, 2007
NGO's			
Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği (Bylaw)	ADD	Association of Atatürkist Thought	ADD, 2006
Atatürkçü Düşünce Kulüpleri Federasyonu (Declaration of organization)	ADKF	Federation of the Clubs of Atatürkist Thought	ADKF, 2000
Kuvvai Milliye Derneği (Bylaw)		Association of Kuvvai Milliye (National Forces)	Kuvvai Milliye Derneği (2006)
Milli Mücadele Derneği (Bylaw, program, and the text named 'Neden Milli Mücadele Derneği')	MMD	Association of National Struggle	MMD, 2007a; 2007b; 2007c
Vatansaver Kuvvetler Güç Birliği Hareketi Derneği (Bylaw)	VKGB	Association of the Movement of Power Union of Patriotic Forces	VKGB, 2005
Political journals			
Türksolu (Manifest)		Turkish left	Türksolu, 2002

¹ See Appendix A for brief descriptions of the political parties and institutions. See Appendix B for the official results of July 22, 2007 Parliamentary General Election.

A Case Study: Turkish Nationalism

3.4. Introduction

3.4.1. Turkish Nationalism as an Organizing Ideology of the Republic of Turkey

It can be said that Turkish nationalism is the organizing ideology of Turkish nation-state which was established in 1923 (Bora, 2002; Kentel, Ahıska, and Genç, 2007; Yıldız, 2002). Turkish national identity was officially defined when the Republic of Turkey, Turkish nation-state, was built. Turkishness was accepted as the dominant identity in the Republic of Turkey. The strategy of nationalism in Turkey has continued to build the national identity since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey (Kentel, Ahıska, and Genç, 2007) and is still the dominant ideology in Turkey (Belge, 2006; Bora, 2003; 2006a; Kentel, Ahıska, and Genç, 2007). In fact, this nationalism is perceived as a supra-ideological and supra-political principle and is perceived as a natural sense and primordial bond (Bora, 2002).

It can be argued that in the formation of Turkish nationalism, top-down dynamics were dominant, in other words Turkish nationalism was first defined at the official level and was implemented as a national project. Nationalism is one of the six arrows describing the political goals of Mustafa Kemal which was announced in the 1931 Republican People's Party program; others are republicanism, populism, laicism, transformationism and statism (Parla and Davison, 2004). Kemalism and

nationalism can be seen as the main axis of the official ideology in Republic of Turkey (Bora, 2002). It is appropriate here to explain the characteristic of the official nationalist ideology, namely Atatürk nationalism” (or “Kemalist nationalism”). This nationalism is based on cultural identity in Ziya Gökalp’s theoretical synthesis between the principle of citizenship and ethnicity. However, it has oscillated between the nationalism based on principle of citizenship and cultural-ethnicist essentialism since the foundation of republic (Bora, 1995; 2006a).

Ziya Gökalp was accepted as the ideologue of this official project although his theory was sometimes differently implemented at the political level by Kemalists (Parla, 1993). He defined Turkism as dignifying the Turkish nation and a way of working in the service of Turkish nation (Gökalp, 1923/1996). According to him, it should be accepted that Turkish nation consists of people who share the same culture and language, namely Turkish culture and language. He differentiated the culture and civilization [hars ve medeniyet]; whereas the former carries a national character which is shared by all members of the nation, the latter refers to the international, supra-national phenomenon. Turkish nation should protect its collective culture, but at the same time it should belong to the Western civilization. He emphasized that Turkish nation should be a part of the Western civilization provided that it protects its Turkish character.

It can be argued that in Gökalp’s theory, society has a primary role in the sense that collective/shared conscience along with national ideals is the basis of social unity and solidarity. He also emphasized that national

morality should be promoted in order to strengthen the national solidarity. Parla stated that Gökalp's theory can be accepted as a solidarist corporatism that is also the dominant ideology of many political parties (except fundamentalist-essentialist parties) as well as armed forces (Parla, 1993). In parallel with that ascertainment, it is argued that the cultural corporatism which has been adopted by Kemalists also affects the nationalist conservative ideology in Turkey (Taşkın, 2007). However, the parties and armed forces which adopt the solidarist corporatism may slide to fascist polar of the corporatism, for example in the period of the military coup in 1980-83 (Parla, 1993).

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk assigned what Ziya Gökalp called the ideal Turkish nation-state "to reach to the level of and to be part of the Western civilization". The truth of the matter is that Ottoman Empire (OE) had partially started Westernization process in the mid-nineteenth century. The Republic of Turkey which is the successor of OE has maintained and transformed this project. This project was called "attaining the rank of contemporary civilization" which is still a valid project of the present state ideology. However, the attitudes toward the Western world representing this contemporary civilization have been ambivalent since the foundation of Republic. On the one hand, the West is admired; on the other, it is described as a threat because of the perception that the West is dangerous and untrustworthy. In fact, the latter attitude is partially related to the first; because the West is accepted as a high culture, it is envied. Due to this sense, it is assumed that the West humiliates and excludes OE/Turkey. This

sense of humiliation is settled in the Turkish national identity (Akçam, 2002). The Christian West has also been perceived as an enemy because the Christian countries supported the independence movements of minorities who lived in the OE and intended to disintegrate OE (Akçam, 1992).

The history of Ottoman Empire has an important role on the Turkish collective identity. According to Yörük (2002), Turkish identity is based on a collective denial of the past. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire is a political and societal trauma which is still denied. The construction of a Turkish nation is parallel to the construction of the national unconscious. In this context, it is possible to indicate that both the great history of Ottoman Empire as a super-power from the 16th to the 18th and the traumatic history in 19th are the strong images in the Turkish collective memory (Paker, 2004). Paker discusses the characteristics of the super power period of Ottoman Empire which play an important role for the constitution of the dominant political culture in Turkey. Some of these characteristics are a grandiose sense of self; a sense of supremacy; the fantasy of untouchability/invincibility; leadership of the Islamic world; high emotional investment on the West as the other/object. The West is disdained for being infidel, but at the same time wished for its conquest. In the 19th century the Ottomans lost against the West and Russia which resulted with the loss of most of its territories. The major characteristic of the dominant political culture in this period was the sense of being heavily humiliated by the West and by Russia. The narcissistic injury was very deep because of the prior grandiose sense of self. Among the other characteristics were survival

anxiety; blaming Western powers and ethnic minorities (especially non-Muslim minorities) as “external and internal enemies”; blaming plurality and desire for homogeneity; an ambivalent relationship with the West, caught in between envy and hate; and the rise of a Turkish nationalism. The Republic of Turkey was founded upon this traumatic history. According to Paker (2004), the Republic was founded on multi-layered dissociations as a defense in order to cope with this traumatic process. The Republican official ideology accepted the National Independence War as a ground zero. Ottoman trauma was expelled from the political culture and ignored. The nation chose only to identify with the successful periods.

The Republic of Turkey was desired to be a homogeneous nation-state where Turks are the dominant population. Here it should be noted that “the other” is crucial in the formation of self/identity. According to Yörük (2002), Turkish national project needed to define the “other” (non-nation) before defining the nation and the other was formulated as non-Muslims. This choice is also related to the survival anxiety remnant of the traumatic fall of Ottomans and to the perception of non-Muslims as a population which seed of discord aiming to divide the country (Paker, 2004). The discourse of “Happy is a Man who Says I am a Turk!” [“Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene!”] is an organizing theme of the Turkish nation-state. Claiming any other ethnic/cultural identity was seen as treason. Here, it can be argued that ignored Muslim minorities, such as Kurds and Arabs as well as non-Muslims have been defined as the “other” in Turkish national project.

National education process regenerates this nationalist ideology throughout generations.

Bora argues that the survival anxiety (beka kaygısı) is settled down to the Turkish national memory (Bora, 1995). The geopolitical position of Turkey is usually idealized but also there is generated and regenerated conspiracy theories assuming that the enemies set their sights on the territories of Turkey. It is argued that Turkish nationalism develops and shapes a myth of history which is the myth of supremacy (Belge, 2006). The common fear of disintegration and annihilation partially rests on this sense of supremacy. In the texts of Ömer Seyfettin which are seen as the organizing texts of Turkish nationalism, these themes are frequently seen. He stated that Turks have a glorious history and also they are superior to the other cultures. In *Vatan Yalnız Vatan* that was published in *Türklük Üzerine Yazılar*, he also awakened the society to the enemies and he stated that humanity and internationalism are very dangerous because they cause hostility against the homeland. The Europeans are conceived as the greatest enemy of Turkish homeland that intends to engulf the homeland. The Turks should also be alert to the internal enemies who are the extensions of the Western enemies. In order to protect the homeland, Turkish youth has to be ready to fight against these enemies (Seyfettin, 1911/2002). In this context, it can be noted that xenophobia is an essential part of the dominant ideology in Turkey. Humanism is conceived as an enemy of Turkish nationalism because it is a potential danger for the country. In fact, nationalism and racism process side by side (Belge, 2006).

3.4.2. Different Nationalist Discourses in Turkey

Two forms of nationalisms -the first is based on the citizenship and territoriality, the second is based on blood, ethnicity, and culture bonds- can be visible in Turkey. Specifically, there are two nationalist polarities: modern-secular/ Kemalist / “left” and traditional/cultural/ “right” (Kentel, Ahıska, and Genç, 2007). Despite these polarities, in almost all nationalist discourses, the presence of various ethnic groups is denied and it is assumed that Turkey belongs only to Turks and that Turks are the “true owners of the country”. It is expected from the other ethnic groups to define themselves as Turks being voluntary assimilated. Otherwise, they are seen as a threat to the homogeneity of Turkey. According to Özbek (2005), this nationalism may lead to racism. He thinks that the others in Turkey are not humiliated mainly in terms of their biological roots, but their cultures. For example, the racism which is mainly directed at Kurds is based on their social and cultural traits. This is seen as a manifestation of new racism.

Bora states that Turkish nationalism does not consist of a homogeneous discourse, it consists of four main discourses; official nationalism (Atatürk nationalism) that is the root-language of Turkish nationalism, “left-wing” Kemalist nationalism (ulusçuluk or ulusalcılık), liberal neonationalism advocating “civilizationism” and prosperity, and racist-ethnicist neo-Pan-Turkism (Turkist radical nationalism). He argues that Islamism merging with a nationalist discourse can be added as the fifth. The last nationalist discourse is also called as conservative nationalism. It emphasizes the religion, Islam, as the main element of national identity. All

of these nationalist discourses can be intermixed and also integrated with the dominant political pattern in every day life in Turkey (Bora, 2002; 2003).

Atatürk nationalism that is the official nationalism is based on cultural identity in Ziya Gökalp's theoretical synthesis between the principle of citizenship and ethnicity. Although it emphasizes the principle of citizenship, its ethnicist and essentialist character can easily appear in the domains of the popular culture. This nationalism is rigid, cold, and stereotyped. It idealizes the symbols of the nation-state such as the flag, national anthem and the image of Atatürk. The army has an important role in the regeneration of the official nationalism (Bora, 2002; 2003).

"Left-wing" Kemalist nationalism emphasizes secularism and modernization; its principles are anti-imperialism and independence since the 1960 and 1970's. It prefers the term *ulusçuluk* to *milliyetçilik* because the term *millet* belongs to the Ottoman language. Although it describes itself as a humanist-universalistic nationalism based on citizenship and territoriality, it can easily tend to essentialism and uniqueness; therefore its "left wing" emphasis is not convincing (Bora, 2002; 2003).

Liberal neonationalism emphasizes the progressivist-developmental aspect of the modernization. It claims that Turkey has the capacity for attaining the rank of contemporary civilization. The discourse claiming that this capacity is intrinsic displays an essentialist character. This nationalism emphasizes national pride. Its discourse has a loose character; therefore it can be integrated with the hegemony of other nationalist discourses (Bora, 2002; 2003).

Racist-ethnicist nationalism has a radical character which belongs to the fascist ideology. It is suggested that this type of nationalism is a more rigid variety of the official ideology which highlights the culturalist aspect. It generates Turkish mythology; the totem of original Turkism, the *bozkurt* (gray wolf) is the symbol of this ideology. The ideal of becoming purely Turkish is preserved (Bora, 2002; 2003).

It can be argued that there is an apparent rise in all of these nationalist discourses in Turkey recently. Bora notes that Turkish nationalism climbed in the late 1980s and early 1990s in parallel with the nationalist wave around the world. To a large extent, the globalization trend and the collapse of bipolarization of the world are responsible for this rise. In Turkey, the Kurdish issue also gained momentum in those years. The discussions on the full membership of Turkey in the EU have also added on to this socio-political agenda recently. The reaction to the cultural and moral effects of this membership has reinforced the traditional nationalism (Bora, 1995; 2003). According to Kentel, Ahıska, and Genç (2007), especially the strategy of modern secular nationalism in Turkey strives for gaining strength in the face of globalization.

In the studies of Kentel, Ahıska, and Genç (2007), it is highlighted that Turkish nationalism has a masculine language. However, this dominant language of the nationalism is under the threat due to the weakening of modern secular nationalism. For the purpose of protection of this language, it is exacerbated. The researchers reports that the words such as authority, discipline and violence are overly used in the recent period while

punishment is normalized. In many nationalist discourses, the honor of the nation is generally associated with the honor of masculinity. This idealized masculinity easily displays itself in violent actions when the honor [namus] is contaminated. In fact, the honor of masculinity is oversensitive to criticism and challenge. In such cases, the sense of humiliation emerges and the violent actions are attempted to reverse this sense of humiliation.

4.1.3. The Influence of the European Union Membership Negotiations of Turkey and Kurdish Issue on Turkish Nationalist Discourses

The process of EU membership negotiations of Turkey beginning from 2004 has greatly influenced the nationalist discourses in Turkey. The prospect of EU membership has become the most important issue in the socio-political life in Turkey. This membership which can be seen as a part of the collective ego ideal has been desired for many years, but at the same time joining to a supra-national union has created an anxiety based on a perceived threat against the nation-state and national identity. Moreover, this process brings new democratization steps which lead to the weakening of the dominant political structure in Turkey. Therefore, the democratic reforms which should be required for the membership are seen as a concession and lead to a serious disturbance in the dominant political culture (Paker, 2004).

While the political parties which have a liberal nationalist tendency support the EU membership of Turkey, Kemalist “left wing” and

conservative/religious political movements sharply protest that membership. Gradually, some political movements which supported the membership have started to oppose it because of the unwillingness to give up their statist and authoritarian traditions. EU membership process provides a democratization opportunity for Turkey. The Kurdish issue, the Cyprus issue, the status and rights of the minorities, restriction of the authority of the army are the topics which are most discussed in this process.

Liberal wing supports the EU membership mainly on the economical and developmental basis even though certain required democratization steps in this process disturb them. Some left and Kurdish political movements stand for the membership that promises democratic reforms. Traditional socialist camp oppose to the membership because of the view that EU is a capitalist and imperialist union. The Kemalist “left wing” intelligentsia, namely the “nationalist left” has protested the membership on the basis that EU membership is actually a Western imperialist project aiming at disintegrating Turkey and abolishing republican acquisitions. The ones who support the membership are accused of being traitors and collaborators (Paker, 2005). Some fundamental Sunni Muslim political movements also oppose to the EU as it is mainly a Christian union. It should be added that these different oppositions are not only directed to the EU but also to Europe and the West in general (Yeğen, 1005).

It can be argued that the Kurdish issue meaning the social and political demands of the Kurdish population is at the intersection point where different nationalist movements organize their discourses around.

This issue is seen as one of the biggest sources of national insecurity because of the fear of disintegration. The Kurdish people are perceived as dangerous “others”, sometimes as internal enemies. According to Kentel, Ahıska, and Genç (2007), through the Kurdish issue the concept of “us” and “them” are reproduced by the nationalist strategy attempting to achieve the ideal of a homogeneous nation. “The PKK terror” being identified with Kurdish issue reinforces this national strategy. Some limited democratic steps, such as the use of Kurdish language in the media, and opening Kurdish language courses have been resisted in the dominant political climate because of the panic along different nationalist lines. Along with Kurdish issue, the rights and demands of different ethnic groups are conceived as unacceptable. In this socio-political process, “unity and togetherness” [“birlik ve beraberlik”] is given more voice.

4.2. The Analysis of Turkish Nationalist Discourses

In this section, different nationalist discourses are analyzed under the following titles but it should be stated that these categories are not mutually exclusive. As there is a theoretical continuity between the categories, these titles partially overlap with each other.

In this case analysis, nationalist attitudes which are displayed implicitly or explicitly in the texts are examined. However it does not mean that all political parties display nationalist characteristics; the discourses not including nationalist themes are not attributed under these titles in detail.

These discourses are mentioned briefly at the end of this section.

In the analysis the original statements are quoted and the emphases, capital letters, and italics are preserved from the originals. For many quotations, no specific page numbers are reported since they are unavailable in the original web-based documents.

4.2.1. Idealization of Collective Identity

Almost all of discourses which display nationalist characteristics to various extents emphasize a certain collective identity, “national identity” in the context of Turkey. This collective identity generally consists of Turkishness, but in certain discourses Muslim identity is highlighted along with the Turkish identity. While in the former, the emphasis is on ethnicity and nation; in the latter in addition to nation and/or ethnicity dimension, religion is seen as the indicator of the collective identity.

In many discourses, the Turkish nation is idealized and the phrases of “Supreme Turkish Nation” [“Yüce Türk Milleti”] (MHP), “Beloved Turkish nation” [Aziz Türk milleti] (VKGB), “Our Beloved Nation” [Aziz Milletimiz] (AKP, DP, SP) are frequently used. In some discourses, the Muslimness is also called as “supreme” (BBP, VKGB). In these discourses, the good parts of the Turkish nation are generally introjected. Some crystallized examples are:

There is no barrier that the Turkish nation, with its ever-rising self-confidence, cannot surmount (AKP, 2007, p. 4).¹

Our country and our nation, whose history is full of golden pages and has every right to look with hope to the future (...) (DP, 2007, p. 61).²

(...) Adopting the ideal of elevating the Turkish nation to the much-deserved glorious level, we will work undauntedly, trusting the noble blood in its veins, its essence, the Turkish nation and the Turkish history, we will love and make others love those traits which ennoble the Turkish culture and the Turkish nation, and make it a great nation (VKGB, 2005).³

(MMD) sees the only salvation within the power inherent to the Turkish nation (MMD, 2007).⁴

In some discourses, what is idealized is not the Turkish identity but Turkey as a country.

Turkey, with its geographical advantage, deep-rooted historical accumulation, multifaceted and rich cultural existence, young and dynamic society, entrepreneur and hard-working people, is not a country that is to be adopted to such a world environment; it is among the few countries that has all the qualities to contribute most to the creation of such an environment (LDP, 2002).⁵

In many discourses, an assumption of and/or claim for that national identity encompasses all members of the nation appear. The aim is to develop and promote a sense of we-ness in the context of desired collective identity. In parallel with that, there is a denial of the presence of other ethnicities and nations.

We comprehend the Turkish nation as a collective unity of our people who have shared the same fate for centuries, molded with the same faith, aiming the same cause and who have asserted the will to continue to exist together (BBP, 1993).⁶

(...) We pursue the aim of elevating the National consciousness, completing National Liberation, protecting the Nation state, expanding National activity and completing the Nationalization process, within the context of Nationalism, regarded as a crucial duty by Atatürk (VKGB, 2005).⁷

There is only one nation in Turkey and that is the Turkish nation (MMD, 2007).⁸

The Turkish language is accepted as an indicator of the national identity transmitting it to the next generations. In many discourses, it is declared that the language of education should only be Turkish; the use of another language cannot be accepted. This is not desired only for the education process; but for daily life as well.

The question of language is as important as defending the Homeland. If you taint the language of a nation, if you make sure different languages exist in a country, then you will be permitting the foreign powers' ploy of dividing and fragmenting the country (VKGB, 2005).⁹

Behaviors that destroy the structure and character of our beautiful Turkish and degenerate it will not be permitted. The natural development of our mother tongue will be assured (BTP, 2003).¹⁰

(MMD) defends the idea of one language, one flag, one state and one land (MMD, 2007).¹¹

The domination of foreign language education, which gives our country the image of a colony, will be put to an end. Foreign languages will not be used as tools of cultural invasion (HYP, 2007).¹²

Preservation, development and protection of The Turkish language, our eternal and never-ending Flag, will be ensured (...) (Association of Kuvvai Milliye, 2006).¹³

There is frequently a reference to “the Turkish culture”, “national and spiritual values” [“milli ve manevi değerler”], and sometimes to the “sacred values”. The national identity is composed of shared images, representations and ideals, although the characteristics of these images and representations are not clearly defined. It is evidently supposed that the culture and “shared values” have a constant and stable character and at the same time they are shared by all members of the society.

The most important factor for a nation to continue its existence is the national and moral values. These values, as a whole, construct the identity of that nation (BTP, 2003).¹⁴

It is our beliefs and cultural values that has made possible for our nation to stand on foot for centuries and enable it to occupy an honorable spot in history (BBP, 1993).¹⁵

In order for a nation to have a word over the dynamics of the age, that nation has to have a strong national identity and self-confidence (MHP, 2007, p. 6).¹⁶

We will consolidate our national unity, which rests upon the will and action to establish the republic, an equal citizenship bond, a common national culture and the wish to live together (İP, 2007).¹⁷

National and spiritual values include religious values, namely Sunni

Islamic values:

The Justice and Development Party sees religious services as an important area in which moral and spiritual values can be preserved and national unity and solidarity can be achieved (AKP, 2007, p. 82).¹⁸

Moral values and the experience of a secular and democratic state are an important source of power for Turkey, whose population consists mostly of Muslims who sincerely believe in religious values (MHP, 2007, p. 115).¹⁹

Our faiths, which determine the Muslim Turkish identity, provide us with the key principles which will take our nation to the spot that it rightly deserves, today and in the future (BBP, 1993).²⁰

It can be stated that along with the emphasis on the shared culture and values, in some discourses there is a stress on cultural diversity as well.

We will emphasize our common cultural values, while preserving diversity (CHP, 2007, p. 60).²¹

Here, it can be asked whether it is possible to respect all differences and diversities despite the claim for protecting the “shared culture and

values”. It is important which components are included in and excluded from the concept of diversity and how this diversity is protected and respected. In the following discourse, it can be seen that shared culture is composed of a nation-state identity and the properties of the republic. Can the criticism of this identity, properties, and basic principles be tolerated, and still be accepted as the manifestation of the diversity?

The core of our common culture is our history, our geography, our identity as a nation-state, the qualities of our republic and the main principles of our Constitution (CHP, 2007, p. 60).²²

As the national identity is generally idealized, the collective values are also idealized in a similar way. In some discourses, it is expected from the members of the Turkish nation to be proud of their national and spiritual values in addition to belonging to this identity. For example, DP emphasizes “the essential values that our nation is proud to have” [“milletimizin sahibi olmaktan gurur duyduğu öz değerleri”] (2007, p. 2). Another example as follows:

(MHP) aims the growth of generations which feel proud and consciousness of being a part of the Turkish nation, which have adopted our national and moral values, whose ability to think, perceive and solve problems has developed, who are open to new developments, who have a high sense of responsibility and social sensitivity, who are apt for producing science and technology, undertaking, democrat, cultured and faithful (...) (MHP, 2007, p. 8).²³

In some discourses, the Turkish culture is accepted as one of the highest cultures, even the highest culture, in the world.

(...) It is our ideal to make sure the high Turkish culture and Civilization, which have set examples to all nations, are promoted, to ensure that the Turkish nation is sensitive in its customs, traditions,

folklore, music, literature, history and other similar areas, to work for our children and youth to grow up and be informed as patriots in these areas (VKGB, 2005).²⁴

The Turkish culture, which changes in its continuity, has also preserved its main character and has become one of the most distinguished members of the world's cultural heritage (AKP, 2007, p. 130).²⁵

In some discourses Turkish nation is idealized through certain myths.

The Turkish nation is the most noble, most deep-seated and biggest nation of the world. The world has developed from the cave ages to normal lives and from the darkness of Middle Ages to today's enlightenment thanks to the Turkish Culture and Civilization (VKGB, 2005).²⁶

All members of the society are generally expected to adopt the collective values. Many nationalist discourses emphasize the importance of this acceptance and but also ask for commitment to the national and spiritual values from the members, especially the young people.

A youth that is qualified, undertaker, **with high self-confidence and upholding national values**, that youth is our main richness which will carry our country to the place it rightly deserves (AKP, 2007, p. 74).²⁷

The Real Power of a Country is neither Its Tanks nor Money, but is the Young Sons and Daughters that are Committed to National and Spiritual Values (SP, 2007, p. 19).²⁸

For a generation that is committed to its faiths and history and respectful to national values, we accept the prevention of the destruction of national culture as a must. The reconciliation of the Turkish society with its past can only be possible if elements of national culture can be installed in the roots of social life (BBP, 1993).²⁹

It is emphasized that the maintenance and the protection of the collective values are as essential as adoption of them. Weakening or

deteriorating of these values should be prevented. The family is conceived as the most important agency which protects the collective values.

We are conscious of the fact that we have to defend independence for Turkey to preserve its national identity and honor (ADKF, 2000).³⁰

Practices that wear our national culture values and result in a confusion of cultural values will be prevented (MHP, 2007, p. 106).³¹

Family is the root of our society. The family institution has a crucial place in the enhancement of national unity and solidarity, in preserving and developing our values (GP, 2002).³²

Family is the root of the society. In order to preserve the power of the traditional Turkish-Muslim family, all societal and state activities which harm it will be forbidden (BBP, 1993).³³

Continuity and transfer of Turkish collective identity to the later generations are conceived as essential in various nationalist discourses. In national education programs, the national identity is formed along with the national and spiritual values. “Our Pledge” (“Student’s Pledge”) which starts with the statement “I’m a Turk” and ends with the sentence “Happy is a Man who Says I am a Turk!” is repeated each morning by the primary school students.

(...) An educational understanding which rivets national unity and cooperation, which strengthens bonds of love, respect and amity, which adopts national values such as land, nation, flag, martyrdom and veteranship and which develops the consciousness of living together and responsibility will be dominant (MHP, 2007, p. 95).³⁴

It will be our main policy to give those individuals that represent with honor the Turkish identity, which is the guarantee of the unity and livelihood of the society an education that is up to modern standards and that is in line with our national and moral values, our traditions and customs (BTP, 2003).³⁵

Association of National Struggle sees the Unity of National

Education, namely Tevhid-i Tedrisat, as the basis of Atatürkist education and national unity (MMD, 2007).³⁶

Our understanding of education is to train generations that have national and moral values and that are up to the science and technology of the age, free-thinking, productive, decent and innovative. The education system should, besides transmitting national culture to individuals, also enable individuals' abilities to show up (BBP, 1993).³⁷

Our Education Program will be based on the consciousness and accumulation of “our national identity, history and values, and the universal culture”, and the principles of “secularity, democracy and the rule of law” (CHP, 2007, p. 56).³⁸

In some discourses, it is emphasized that national education program should include religious education since the protection and the strengthening of the Muslim identity is important.

In order to protect the individual, the family and the society; religious, moral and spiritual education will start from nursery school and be strengthened (SP, 2007, p. 34).³⁹

In this respect, education of religion is an element of and component to the National Education, as necessitated by our Constitution (BTP, 2003).⁴⁰

The lives and philosophies of leading characters that have lived and enlivened the values of Turkishness and Islam will be taught as optional lessons in primary schools (MHP, 2007, p. 95).⁴¹

Because the continuity of Turkish national identity is seen as essential, the effects of other cultures on the national identity are tried to be avoided as they are perceived as having destructive features. Therefore, there is a huge endeavor to prevent these effects of other cultures. There is a common fear of contamination and of being spoilt. This fear indicates a narcissistic phenomenon consisting of the grandiosity and psychic absence of the other. Here, the protection of the self from the possible “harmful” effects

of the other is essential since it is supposed as all-good and self-sufficient; in other words there is no need for the other.

Against different cultures, especially in order to prevent a culture shock and identity crisis in new generations, quality and necessary works of literature have to be produced. In order to do this, the national cultural values will be introduced to the nation and adopted by it (MHP, 2007, p. 106).⁴²

One of the most important issues is the fact that foreign publication houses have started operating in our country. It is debatable how useful these will be in preserving and developing our culture. In the aftermath of foreign acquisition of our banks, our stock market and big institutions, as our publishing sector also falls into the hands of foreigners, the danger our nation faces is highlighted (DP, 2007, p. 51).⁴³

The fear of contamination is so intense that there is an expectation that art should carry out the mission of conserving the Turkish culture.

Taking the Turkish culture and art to universal platforms while preserving their national identity, is among our primary targets (AKP, 2007, p. 130).⁴⁴

Culture and art are crucial in the development of nations and preservation of their national identity (BTP, 2003).⁴⁵

Art that is not contrary to the beliefs of the Turkish individual is an ongoing part of our national culture. Within this measure, it is our aim that art should be granted the value it deserves and the artist should be supported and protected (BBP, 1993).⁴⁶

Westernization efforts and recent globalization process seem to strengthen this powerful tendency, protection of the collective values, as they create an anxiety about the loss of these values under the influence of other cultures. The prevention of such a loss and of corruption of national culture in the face of these processes is an important theme.

It is our main aim to preserve and develop our national culture against globalization (CHP, 2007, p. 60).⁴⁷

We are against importing of foreign elements that have been forced upon our society for 150 years. The alienity of foreign cultures, which destroy the most essential qualities and characters of the Muslim Turkish society, to our people, are evident. It is our aim to extend our national culture to every phase of social life (BBP, 1993).⁴⁸

A state policy that will defend and uncover the high aggregation of the Turkish civilization and history against Western imperialism should be dominant (MMD, 2007).⁴⁹

It can be noted that some political discourses emphasize the protection of cultural values but at the same time they can accept the influence of other cultures.

DSP whose main aim is to protect and enhance the traditional cultural values of our society, will also utilize modern cultural values of the **West** and the **East** (DSP, 2003, p. 109).⁵⁰

To summarize, as it is evidently seen, many nationalist discourses idealize their own nation, ethnic and religious identity which are frequently attributed some essential characteristics.

4.2.2. The Organizing Role of Collective Traumas and Glories for Nationalist Discourses

Certain historical traumas and glories are repeatedly remembered in many nationalist discourses. The role of The Treaty of Sèvres* for Turkish dominant political climate is worth mentioning in this context. It can be argued that this treaty has a traumatic impact on Turkish nation-state and is

* According to the Treaty of Sèvres that was signed by Istanbul government in 1920 after the defeat in World War I, the territories of the Ottoman Empire would be disintegrated and shared by the Allies. Although this treaty was not implemented and the War of Independence was won, its traumatic impact has continued for many years.

still kept fresh in the collective memory. The influence of this traumatic experience becomes more visible in certain socio-political conjunctures. Sometimes, it is reactivated by many nationalist discourses in order to mobilize the citizens for the interest of the nation. The influence of this collective trauma appears in the fear of disintegration of Turkey. Currently, in the process of being a member of the European Union and in the face of the Kurdish issue, this fear gains ground again based on the assumption that the members of EU maintain their imperialist desires and intentions to disintegrate the territories of Turkey.

Turkey literally faces a second Sèvres Project. These dangers and threats had existed during the founding of the Republic and M. Kemal Atatürk had talked of the resurgence of ‘internal and external enemies’. Today, as if history repeats itself, the same dangerous developments are occurring (BTP, 2003).⁵¹

Due to concessions, the State of Republic of Turkey is living through a similar period to the last days of the Ottoman Empire (VKGB, 2005).⁵²

Turkey is today pushed into the similar conditions that preceded the War of Independence. (...) What they are trying to do to Turkey, in respect to where the country is being taken toward, is same as in 1919 (HYP, 2007).⁵³

Association of National Struggle calls upon all the nation to protect the republic against the so-called democracy front that is an enemy of the republic, and which was formed by the collaborator-separatist-reactionary forces fed by Western imperialism which has united against the Turkish nation just as in the last periods of the Ottoman Empire (MMD, 2007).⁵⁴

In the face of this reactivation, recent nationalist discourses call for a spirit of National War of Independence which means hyperalertness and mobilization in daily practices.

The duty of the day is defending the homeland. Our future relies upon the success of the implementation of this duty (İP, 2007).⁵⁵

As the Movement of Power Union of Patriotic Forces, our aim is to break the chains of imperialism and reinstate our National State (VKGB, 2005).⁵⁶

Atatürk was successful as in 1920s, he represented the “progressive” against the rotten “reactionary”. If today’s Turkey is grappling with problems similar to those in 1919, if there is a need to re-struggle for an independent, secular and democratic Turkey, we have to take Atatürk as an example to succeed (ADKF, 2000).⁵⁷

Through the national education system, these traumas are kept in the collective memory and transmitted to the new generations. This way, that traumatic experience acquires an organizing role for this national identity. This process is desired to be more systematized in the following statement.

Our secondary education will include a mandatory lesson whose subject will be “plans to invade Turkey in our near history and the Treaty of Sèvres” (HYP, 2007).⁵⁸

Another trauma that is remembered and reactivated by some nationalist discourses is the Crusades.

Imperialist powers have started the twentieth Crusade in 1990. After the fall of the USSR, as the USA became the sole pole and the dominant force in the world, world zionism and racist imperialism have decided that *‘Time to create Greater Israel has come, after 5700 years. Then, let us start the 20th crusades’*, they said (SP, 2007, p. 2).⁵⁹

Alongside with the role of these historical traumas, national glories have an organizing role for the collective identity. It can easily be seen that various nationalist discourses attribute a sacred feature to the time period which the Republic of Turkey was proclaimed after the National Independence War (1919-1922). There is a desire to go back to this period

because it is assumed that in this period Turkey reached to absolute independence (tam bağımsızlık) which was lost afterwards. That period seems to symbolize primary narcissistic phase in which the people had a sense of omnipotence and absolute power. In current situation, maintaining this illusional sense of omnipotence gets difficult. Collaboration with the USA, the prospect of the EU membership, and the Kurdish issue are perceived as threatening situations against this omnipotence.

At the end of the day, this nation, under the leadership of the Great Leader Atatürk, has reinvented itself with the spirit of National Forces [Kuvayı Milliye] during the War of Independence. A State of Republic of Turkey which manifested national will was founded and it set an example to other nations that were struggling for freedom (BTP, 2003).⁶⁰

The day is one of organizing those who say ‘Liberty or Death!’ for the Second War of Independence (MMD, 2007).⁶¹

Why should Turkey, which won the first War of Independence against imperialism in 1919, feel the need to give away its independence? (ADKF, 2000).⁶²

Imperialism, which forms its hegemony through guns, can only be destroyed by guns. The Turkish War of Independence sets the greatest example for this (Türksolu, 2002).⁶³

Workers’ Party, which has shown the flag to the Western states from Lausanne, Berlin and Paris, has proved its ability to recreate Atatürk’s independent Turkey (İP, 2007).⁶⁴

(...) just in the salvation movement during the War of Independence, in 1918, today we have to unite forces and save the land, the nation and all humanity from the dangers and disasters they face (SP, 2007, p. 22).⁶⁵

Turkish national identity is idealized by focusing on the national glories. This is also true for the glories of Ottoman Empire, however the losses of the empire are not needed to be remembered; rather they are

repressed. In national education discourses, the high period of OE takes a wide place, but for the last period of the empire, internal and external enemies' intentions to destroy are highlighted. In nationalist discourses, Ottoman's glorious heritage is frequently referred to in order to identify the greatness of the Turkish nation, while the internal and external enemies are held responsible for its collapse.

Anatolia and the people on it are the inheritors of the lands that set the stage for the formation and development of world history's greatest civilizations, while Turkey and the Turkish people are inheritors of the six-century old Ottoman Empire, which was one of the strongest states of world history (LDP, 2002).⁶⁶

Behind us stands the legacy of great empires of thousands of years. The culture of empire, in a sense, is the culture to make nations live together (İP, 2007).⁶⁷

Turkey, which had founded universal Empires, has a valuable legacy of history and culture, an experience of a deep-rooted state tradition (MHP, 2007, p. 114).⁶⁸

In summary, the historical narratives which both traumatic experiences and the glories are kept in the collective memory and carried over to the later generations and acquire the most powerful organizing role for the national identity. These narratives, especially traumatic ones, are missing as the unprocessed memories are not symbolized and included in. However, it is argued that even unwanted experiences are transmitted into the next generations although they are not symbolized, verbalized and/or included in the dominant collective narrative. Even the political discourses which do not directly mention about the past traumatic events implicitly make an attribution to these events. The ones which are frequently verbalized seem to strengthen the collective identity more directly. Because

the members of a group tend to be interested in their group's identity in the face of a danger, the nationalist discourses attempt to activate the traumatic experiences which are not psychically processed yet. This is both an unconscious and conscious process. In Turkey, the undigested traumatic experiences still have a deep impact on the collective processes.

4.2.3. Harsh Collective Superego and Claim for Obedience instead of Supporting the Capacity for Being Individual in the face of Group

In the Turkish nationalist discourses, it is frequently seen that there is a demand for adopting national identity, commitment and submitting to the national values. The members of the society who do not identify with Turkish national identity, especially minorities who identify with their ethnic groups and describe themselves according to those, can be pronounced as a traitor and separatist. The presences of people who identify with any other ethnic identity different from Turkish identity are perceived as a threat against the unity of the country.

Those who oppose the “Happy is a Man who Says I am a Turk!” understanding of the Great Leader Atatürk, the founder of our republic, are the enemies of the Turkish Republic and they will remain as such (TSK, 2007).⁶⁹

Association of National Struggle defends the “Turkey belongs to Turks” idea of Atatürk. (...) It rejects every identity which constitutes an alternative to the Turkish national identity as an imposition of imperialism and its local lackeys in order to divide the nation (MMD, 2007).⁷⁰

Minority means a potential source of treachery, privileged under imperialist protection (MMD, 2007).⁷¹

EU has embarked upon creating minorities based on religion and tribes, thus introducing impositions that threaten the indivisible unity of the land and the nation (HYP, 2007).⁷²

It can be argued that idealized Turkish national identity refers to a narcissistic agreement; therefore expressions of other identities and the values of other cultures are perceived as a threat against this narcissistic agreement. The people who do not accept this strong agreement in the dominant political culture face to be excluded. For example, Kurdish people who are assumed to be a threat against this agreement are described as traitor. The word “Kurdish” is not used in many discourses, the presence of “the Kurdish issue” is not accepted.

Under a MHP government, neither the terrorists in the mountains or treacherous separatists in the plains will be able to roam freely (MHP, 2007, p. 30).⁷³

The Prime Minister, in a speech in Diyarbakır, has accepted and repeated separatist rhetoric that is fed by terrorism by naming it “Kurdish issue.” As the EU demands a “so-called solution” to the tribal provocation that is supported by terror and that aims the division of Turkey, it also wants sovereignty in Turkey be divided among two peoples, the creation of a federal state and acceptance of another language as an official one. Against these open and threatening endeavors and impositions, the government has shown no reaction (HYP, 2007).⁷⁴

It can be argued that this approach is not only displayed towards the other identities, but also towards the members who are reluctant to express themselves within the national culture and values. The members who mention the “bad” parts of Turks or the Republic of Turkey, or who criticize the idealized Turkish identity are pronounced as enemy and threat. This indicates a harsh superego as well as a narcissistic phenomenon.

Türksolu adopts the people-military-intellectuals alliance of the National Forces [Kuvayı Milliye], enhancing it with the inclusion of youth and reacts strongly against all efforts to divide this alliance. Especially, it struggles against the so-called left understanding that sees the military as enemy (Türksolu).⁷⁵

Atatürkism is today an adjective that various currents such as liberal, fundamentalist, Graywolf nationalist and Maoist etc. put in front of their own ideological identities. Thus, different ideological identities assume an appearance of Kemalism, but those different ideological identities are preserved. This means that Turkey-hating, Atatürk-hating, nation-state-hating, secular regime-hating tendencies that are at the heart of those liberal, fundamentalist, Graywolf nationalist, Maoist etc. ideologies are also hiding behind the adjective of Atatürkism (MMD, 2007).⁷⁶

The theme on the protection of the collective values is frequently repeated and there is a clear stress on religion in these discourses. Thus, the powerful collective agreement is preserved.

An important dimension of our culture policy is protection of family, national and religious values that are accepted by society and are suitable to science and mind (HYP, 2007).⁷⁷

In order to protect the individual, the family and the society; religious, moral and spiritual education will start from nursery school and be strengthened (SP, 2007, p. 34).⁷⁸

The frequent reference to the morality which is one of the indicators of the harsh superego keeps an important place in these discourses. Here, the morality that is emphasized is communal not individual.

The Only Party that Puts Morality and Spirituality at the Forefront is the Felicity Party (SP, 2007, p. 25).⁷⁹

Pre-school training, aiming to ensure the consciousness of national unity, to strengthen moral and spiritual values and to ensure socialization, will be widespread (...) (MHP, 2007, p. 94).⁸⁰

Turkey has, in recent years, undergone a serious erosion of morals. Our party, thus, sees a revolution of morals necessary (HYP, 2007).⁸¹

Because the influence of different cultures and cultural changes are perceived as uncanny, the theme of cultural and moral corruption prevails in many nationalist discourses. In the following statement, the wish for spreading the Turkish culture reveals in addition to the protection of this culture.

To develop and spread internationally the **Turkish Culture** against the cultural degeneration seen especially in youth recently (...) (Association of Kuvvai Milliye, 2006).⁸²

In many discourses, it is implied that there are some realities or values which cannot be criticized because if they are, it may put the status quo in danger. As well as the criticism against these values, non-acceptance of the national and spiritual values cannot be tolerated.

To organize open and closed meeting and demonstrations when the National and moral values of the State of the Republic of Turkey and the Turkish Nation are under attack or being neglected (...) (Association of Kuvvai Milliye, 2006).⁸³

We are of the opinion that our state should be amongst the modern states in social, political, economic, scientific and basic individual rights and freedoms areas, it should produce sustainable development projects for world peace and be successful, provided that those do not pose a threat to the unity and indivisibility of our country (VKGB, 2005).⁸⁴

We understand the principle of Oneness Amongst Abundance as accepting every difference and every form of opinion and understanding - excluding absolute truths - as legitimate and acceptable (BBP, 1993).⁸⁵

Although in the statement of BBP above it is not clear what the “absolute truths” are, it is likely that the members of society are expected to accept these absolute truths which are described by some forces; they cannot

express their ideas outside the boundaries of these truths, and they cannot criticize them.

Politics is a tool that is necessary to order the good and ban the evil (BBP, 1993).⁸⁶

According to BBP's another statement cited above, the members of the society should obey the collective demands, otherwise they are punished. Goodness and badness are described by a societal agent; the members do not have any options other than accepting these demands. Here, it seems that individual is not described as an autonomous agent; another agent above the individual is emphasized. In other nationalist discourses, it can be encountered with the similar tendency.

We will bring back the Law of Treason (Hıyanet-i Vataniye), against the Nation by extending its reach (HYP, 2007).⁸⁷

The theme of betrayal prevail in many discourses. As the collectivity has a position of priority, the individuality which can conflict with the collective agreement and the collective demands is obstructed.

4.2.4. Rigid/High Collective Ego Ideal

The collective identity inherently includes a collective ideal. When Turkish nationalist discourses are examined, the tracks of this collective ideal can easily be traced. For many nationalist discourses, the collective ideal is to attain (above) the rank of contemporary civilization which is represented by the Western society. DP, HYP, GP, and Association of Kuvvai Milliye directly declare that their ideal is "to attain the rank of

contemporary civilization”. AKP, DSP, VKGB and Association of Kuvvai Milliye declare that their ideal is “to take/carry Turkey beyond the level of contemporary civilization”. In fact, these two ideals which determined by Mustafa Kemal generally exist together.

Certain political movements do not declare the Mustafa Kemal’s ideal, but emphasize the ideal of being a powerful and leader country in the world. It can be noted that similar goal is also declared in other political discourses which adopt the Mustafa Kemal’s ideal. MHP emphasizes that Turkey should be “the leader country” [“lider ülke”] and continues as follows: “A new civilization project, taking Turkey as center, should be implemented” (MHP, 2007, p. 3).⁸⁸ LDP, BTP and Association of Kuvvai Milliye also use the statement of “the leader country” and LDP states that Turkey already deserves this position. The ideal of being a central/powerful country is emphasized in AKP’s text. CHP states that Turkey will be a “pioneer and model” [“öncü ve model”] country.

In some discourses, more ambitious and less realistic ideals are declared. For example BBP states that “The era that lies ahead belongs to the Turkish nation with its mass that extends to a wide geography and it will be the era of the Turk”.⁸⁹ İP expresses that “The 21st century is the century of Turkey” (2007).⁹⁰ SP states that “We will hold on to the National Opinion and with the help of God, be masters of the World one more time” (2007, p. 22)⁹¹ MHP’s statement of “A new civilization project, taking Turkey as center, should be implemented” can be included in this category. Although these ideals seem to be differently formulated, they have a lot in

common. All of them imply that Turkey has a great history because it is the heir of a powerful empire; therefore it has the full capacity to attain these ideals. Here is a clear example:

Turkey, which had founded universal Empires, has a valuable legacy of history and culture, an experience of a deep-rooted state tradition (MHP, 2007, p. 114).⁹²

The political discourse regarding the big task of transcending the contemporary civilization has two sides to it. On the one hand, the collective ideal that emerges in the nationalist discourses is to reach the level of contemporary civilization, on the other hand the Western society in which contemporary civilization has been actualized is perceived as dangerous since it can lead to a degeneration of the Turkish culture. In this context, the culture of Western societies is sometimes decried. It appears that the collective ideal is to reach the Western society only technologically and economically, but not culturally and politically. While the high technological standards of the West are to be imitated, this is not the case regarding its culture and political standards as the Turkish culture is to be protected. Especially in the extreme nationalist discourses in which the ideal of attaining the level of contemporary civilization is not claimed, culture and social values of the West are extremely devalued (all-bad) as a potential source of corruption.

Democrat Party aims to create a society of prosperity that dominates science and technology, that consciously uses technology and can create new technologies, and that has gained the ability to turn technological developments into social and economic gain, in accordance to the aim of reaching the contemporary civilization that Atatürk has signaled (DP, 2007, p. 27).⁹³

(...) To create projects that can compete with World states in science and technology, and help their creation, whilst protecting the **texture of Turkish Culture** (...) (Association of Kuvvai Milliye, 2006).⁹⁴

The Turkish Nation can be elevated to the level of contemporary civilization only if it stays loyal to its own national values (VKGB, 2005).⁹⁵

The anti-imperialism of **TÜRKSÖLU** is not only an objection to the economic aspect of Western civilization. The West exists with capitalism and imperialism. All its values are determined by the anti-people character of capitalism and imperialism. Thus, **TÜRKSÖLU** is against the Western civilization as a whole. The Western civilization is a civilization of imperialism and should be wiped off the face of earth together with imperialism (Türksolu).⁹⁶

Turkey is being pushed to being a subcontractor which carries the interests and rotten values of the West to our kins in Central Asia (BBP, 1993).⁹⁷

For some nationalist discourses, it can be argued that because the West is an object of desire in the context of the collective ideal, there is envy as a result of which, the West is decried and sometimes perceived as a threat. This sense of threat is related to the fear of annihilation manifesting itself in the fear of losing the cultural values of one's own.

In some nationalist discourses, Turkey (and Turks) is already at that high level of civilization. In other words, Turkey is presently a powerful country anyway.

The contemporary Turkey Model, unique in the world and one that is founded upon unconditional respect to humanity, its culture, identity, roots and religious beliefs, continues to dominate, empowered by this unique balance that was installed 84 years ago (CHP, 2007, p. 1).⁹⁸

Turkey, with its historical legacy, vast experience of statecraft, national and moral values, advanced consciousness of national

culture and morality and with its human resources, is a great and powerful country (MHP, 2007, p. 114).⁹⁹

In extreme versions of these discourses, one can see the tendency to deny the sense of powerlessness and to maintain omnipotent fantasies instead. These omnipotent fantasies are related to a denial of the need for others. The ideal of “absolutely independent Turkey” [tam bağımsız Türkiye] which is expressed in some nationalist discourses imply this tendency. In addition to the manifestation of omnipotent fantasies, there is also a tendency to deny the richness of other countries. Thus, there is no need to learn from other countries’ experiences; there is no match for Turkey; it cannot be compared to other countries, especially to the West. In this context, one can sense the assumption that Turkish culture has a completely different, special and self-sufficient character.

There is nothing to learn and make use of the Western civilization for oppressed nations. But the endeavor to return to the roots is not a racist or fundamentalist dream of going back to the “good old days”. TÜRK SOLU sees the role of racism and fundamentalism especially in the oppressed world as one of dividing the nation and strengthening imperialism and defends secularity as a key value. Every nation has the potential to breed a contemporary civilization out of its own history and culture. Today, this potential is tried to be destroyed under the tyranny of Western civilization. Thus, returning to the roots is a struggle for the oppressed nations to create their own contemporary values in the face of Western civilization (Türksolu, 2002).¹⁰⁰

The narcissistic character of these discourses is also seen in the relationship between grandiosity and shame.

Turkey, carrying the potential of a regional power, has been pushed into being a marginal, squashed and ineffective country which has no effect and weight in international relations and whose word cannot be trusted (...) (MHP, 2007, p. 114).¹⁰¹

The government was shown no reaction to the blow dealt against the dignity of the Turkish nation by the sacking of our soldiers [by US soldiers in northern Iraq]. Despite insistent warnings and proposals by the CHP not even a note of protest was delivered and Turkey was humiliated (CHP, 2007, p. 1).¹⁰²

They turned this most honorable nation of history, this country that God has given his biggest blessings into a slave, they facilitated its exploitation, they left it hungry, they brought only tears, and they only destroyed the morals and devastated happiness (SP, 2007, p. 27).¹⁰³

Especially in SP's discourses, tracks of disturbed reality testing can be identified. In fact, it is observed that the reality is distorted a certain extent when the collective ego ideal very high and rigid.

4.2.5. Putting a Leader in the place of the Ego Ideal

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is accepted in various nationalist discourses as an idealized, omnipotent and omniscient father who cannot be criticized. In many of these discourses, he is called as "Great Atatürk" ["Büyük Atatürk"] (MHP), "Great Leader Atatürk" ["Büyük Önder Atatürk"] (Association of Kuvvai Milliye, BTP), "Supreme Atatürk" ["Yüce Atatürk"] (GP), Supreme Leader Atatürk ["Yüce/Ulu Önder Atatürk"] (TSK, MMD), "Great Revolutionist Leader Atatürk" ["Büyük Devrimci Önder Atatürk"] (İP), "Mustafa Kemal who is one of the greatest history creators" ["Tarih yaratanların en büyüklerinden biri olan Mustafa Kemal"] (HYP) etc. The name of Atatürk is frequently typed by bold and/or capital letters.

Faithfulness to this omnipotent leader, his ideals, and “principles and transformations” (“revolutions” in some discourses) are frequently emphasized in different discourses.

Our party is committed to the Principles and Revolutions of Atatürk, to the liberal [hürriyetçi] parliamentary democratic system, to the Constitution and to the law (BTP, 2003).¹⁰⁴

Those who believe that Atatürk’s principles and revolutions have the quality of being a source of light and a creative force in solving our social problems, have founded the “Association of Atatürkist Thought” feeling the need to contribute that His revolutions and principles should continue to dominate and be protected (ADD, 2006).¹⁰⁵

HYP is at the same time committed both to our thousand-year spiritual roots and Atatürk principles. It is a center of mentality and politics that aims to unite these two (HYP, 2007).¹⁰⁶

The Nationalist Democratic Left is the path of Atatürk (DSP, 2007, p. 107).¹⁰⁷

Toward the adoption, protection and spreading of the revolutions and principles of **Veteran Mustafa Kemal Atatürk** (...) (Association of Kuvvai Milliye, 2006).¹⁰⁸

Protection of the collective ideal crystallized on Atatürk’s character, of his principles and transformations is accepted as essential. In order to maintain the collective ideal that was defined by Atatürk is defended via education of all members of the Turkish society according to “the principles and transformations of Atatürk”. The nationalist discourses which are described as *Kemalist* (or *Atatürkçü* – Atatürkist) persist on the idea that children should be educated according to these principles in order for them to internalize national values.

We will not make concessions from Atatürk’s principles and revolutions and the understanding of the unity of education in the field of education (CHP, 2007, p. 56).¹⁰⁹

We aim to work to create a national youth and a patriotic generation which is aware of Atatürk's speech to the Turkish youth, which protects our national, spiritual and moral values and which is proud to be a citizen of the Republic of Turkey (VKGB, 2005).¹¹⁰

Association of National Struggle sees the Unity of National Education, namely Tevhid-i Tedrisat, at the basis of Atatürkist education and national unity. (...) Association of National Struggle advocates an Atatürkist National Education Mobilization, to be launched by the state (MMD, 2007).¹¹¹

In many of the discourses, the ideal of reaching the contemporary civilization is defined through Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In other words, the ideal of Atatürk has also become the national ideal.

(...) Contributing to the adoption, protection and spreading of the understanding of "*We will elevate our national culture above the level of contemporary civilization*" that is written in the Tenth Anniversary Speech of **Veteran Mustafa Kemal Atatürk** (...) (Association of Kuvvai Milliye, 2006).¹¹²

The aim of "**surpassing contemporary civilization**" that **Atatürk** has pointed to **Turkey** was a vision of the beginning of last century. In this civilization, surpassing that aim necessitates being an effective country in the "**knowledge society**" (DSP, 2007, p. 101).¹¹³

Aiming to reach the level of contemporary civilization in accordance with the Supreme Atatürk's principles and revolutions (...) (GP, 2002).¹¹⁴

The CHP will, in power, realize the aspiration of Atatürk and ensure that Turkey ranks among the most advanced countries in the world in every area (CHP, 2007, p. 4).¹¹⁵

We believe that the area of education, which embodies fundamental values of our republic, is a center of opportunity and acceleration for our country to reach the level of "contemporary civilization" that Atatürk has pointed to (AKP, 2007, p. 45).¹¹⁶

(ADD) works to realize national sovereignty fully and prioritize reason, science and pacifism in accordance with the principle of full independence, thus trying to elevate the Nation above the level of

contemporary civilization that was the aim of Atatürk (ADD, 2006).¹¹⁷

It can be argued that the members of the nation gain a sense of unity by projecting their ego ideal to this leader and unquestionably following him. This leader brings the members a sense of unity and protects the group from losing its sense of identity. Moreover, putting Atatürk in the place of the group's ego ideal, the members attribute the responsibility for their actions to him. This seems to be especially true for Kemalist/Atatürkist political discourses.

We are wholeheartedly committed to our Republic and the aims and thoughts of Veteran Mustafa Kemal, the founder of our Republic (VKGB, 2005).¹¹⁸

The aim of the association is to research and study the Turkish Revolution led by Atatürk, the foundations of that Revolution which are Atatürk's principles, in essence the Six Arrows, his system of thought that are open to advancement in every area and that carry the quality of continuous enhancement, results of the Revolution today and its reflections to the future, his thoughts, actions, fights and works and wage a war of ideas in accordance with the laws with undertakings, steps and currents against those (ADD, 2006).¹¹⁹

We will unconditionally claim the ATATÜRK principles and revolutions, the values and institutions of "Our Secular, Democratic Republic" (CHP, 2007, p. 13).¹²⁰

In many discourses, there is an emphasis on accepting Atatürk's principles unconditionally which enables the people to identify with him. This devotion also helps them free themselves from any self-criticism. This is because any criticism is thought to be a betrayal to Atatürk.

(MMD) wages a struggle of law to prevent the violation of Atatürk's Principles, whose practices are deemed mandatory by the constitution and legal guarantees (MMD, 2007).¹²¹

Putting restrictions and conditions to the Sovereignty of the Nation is treason to Atatürk and his Republic (VKGB, 2005).¹²²

It is expected from the members of the society to maintain Atatürk's revolutions in a rigid way. Disagreement with and criticism of so-called revolutions (or transformations) by the members of the society are seen as a disobedience and treason. Because the ideals and principles of Atatürk are also the collective ideal of Turkish nation-state, the criticism of these principles is seen as a betrayal to the homeland. Therefore, this disobedience should be prevented and punished.

Under such conditions, being an Atatürkist or saying that "one loves Atatürk" is only possible if one defends him and his creations. Turkey's youth will, of course, not stay silent in the face of attacks against Atatürk and the Republic (ADKF).¹²³

Association of National Struggle aims to create the organized power of the Turkish nation against those elements at the very top which are "unaware, gone astray or even in treason" and against those lackeys at the bottom, which wage an organized struggle against the independence of the Republic of Turkey, its unity and unchangeable principles set forth by Atatürk (MMD, 2007).¹²⁴

Atatürk as a leader is not only a representation of the father; it can also be stated that he is a carrier of an illusion which is desired to be maintained. He protects the members of the nation from conflictual situations. This illusion is related to the narcissistic assumption which implies that Turkish nation is a self-sufficient nation. Atatürk's presence serves an opportunity for denying the sense of helplessness and powerlessness. Attributing him omnipotent characteristics, the members identifying with him also acquire the same omnipotence. Therefore, in the

face of a sense of threat against this omnipotence, the aggression is directed to the other.

The members of the nation are alerted by some political parties and institutions against the exploitation of Atatürk and his principles for the sake of different political interests. Sometimes, Turkish citizens are invited to punish the enemies of the homeland and the nation who exploit the name of Atatürk.

(...) those who have handed over our economic means to the West are implementing these actions of unawareness, gone astrayness and treason by using the name of “**Atatürk**” (VKGB, 2005).¹²⁵

Thus, Atatürk is being exploited shamelessly (HYP, 2007).¹²⁶

Thereby, those who exploit name of “**Atatürk**” and by enmity toward the land and the nation, aiming to condemn the Turkish nation to slavery will be given the necessary lesson by our citizens (VKGB, 2005).¹²⁷

Finally, it should be stated that not all nationalist movements put Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the place of the collective ego ideal. For example, the name of Atatürk is not used in the discourses of BBP and SP since they do not adopt his ideal, principles and transformations but they cannot find any other leader who is replaced by Atatürk. In fact, one can come across the name of Mehmed the Conqueror, “Sultan Mehmed”, and Necmettin Erbakan in SP’s declaration. This party seems to put Necmettin Erbakan in the place of their collective ego ideal rather than Mehmed the Conqueror. BBP does not use the name of a leader but emphasizes the importance of obedience to the authority in the statement “Politics is a tool

that is necessary to order the good and ban the evil". The party leader is likely to put into place the collective ego ideal. This is also true for MHP.

4.2.6. Excessive Use of Splitting, Projection, Projective Identification, Idealization, and Devaluation

In the nationalist discourses in Turkey, the primitive defenses are excessively used. The supposition that many enemies have a plan to split and share the territories of Turkey prevails. As mentioned before, this discourse is partially based on the past traumatic experiences. Because the influence of these experiences still lasts, there are frequent attributions to them. Besides, there is still a reference to the founding and organizing national texts which have acquired affective, ritualistic, and religious values throughout time. For example "Atatürk's Address to Youth" that was written in 1927 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk has been frequently used recently. In this text, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was talking about the potential internal and external enemies and advised the young people to be aware of these enemies and to take the responsibility of saving the Republic against such threats.

Turkish Youth, Your first duty is to preserve and to defend Turkish independence and the Turkish Republic forever. This is the very foundation of your existence and your future. This foundation is your most precious treasure. In the future, too, there may be malevolent people at home and abroad, who will wish to deprive you of this treasure" (Atatürk's Address to Youth, 1927).¹²⁸

VKGB frequently quotes from this text, and emphasizes especially the statement of "internal and external enemies".

The Great Leader, in this address, has given the Turkish nation the recipe for salvation against possible developments that the State of the Republic of Turkey could live through in the future. It has only been 66 years since Atatürk has passed on to eternity, but activities, rooted inside and outside, which have started right after his passing on to eternity, have given inconsiderable damage to our country and this process still continues (VKGB, 2005).¹²⁹

Discourse of “the internal and external threats” can be seen in many texts although these threats are different in each discourse.

Developments faced by Turkey, in one aspect, include strategic attacks and threats against the existence of the country (...) (MHP, 2007, p. 3).¹³⁰

For the last few years, the delicate balance of our nations, the unchangeable articles of our constitution, are under attack from inside and outside (CHP, 2007, p. 1).¹³¹

Now our country and our nation face the danger of fragmentation and division, being made a province to Israel and destruction (SP, 2007, p. 11).¹³²

As a result of the provocations of foreign sources, our internal peace, unity and indivisibility are under grave threat (BTP, 2003).¹³³

Turkey should immediately cease the “alliance” trick with the West, which has besieged it and aims to fragment and invade it (MMD, 2007).¹³⁴

The fear of disintegration and the perception of “internal and external threats” are not only based on the traumatic experience in the past; but also an indicator of the defense mechanisms, i.e. splitting, projection and projective identification. While the Turkish identity is idealized, the other - generally the Western countries, Kurdish people, the minorities, and the religious groups- is devalued; the bad parts of the own is projected onto these others. As a result of this projection, the other is started to be perceived as persecutory and malevolent. Especially EU process, Kurdish

issue, and the political ascendancy of a religious party reinforce this self-fulfilling prophecy. The use of similar defense mechanisms by the other groups also strengthens the nationalist discourses in Turkey. For example, certain groups within the Western countries have strong negative attitudes toward the EU membership of Turkey.

The recent history of relations between Turkey and EU is a story of disappointment full of blackmails, preconditions, unjust demands and pressures. The EU sees Turkey literally as a crippled nation. In this process, Turkey has always been excluded. It is now clear that the EU does not wish to accept Turkey in it as a country of equal rights (MHP, 2007, p. 119).¹³⁵

4.2.7. Regression to the Narcissistic Internal World

The influence of the EU process, globalization wave, Kurdish issue, and the democratization steps is obviously observed in many nationalist discourses. These socio-political changes seem to create a serious anxiety and strengthen the nationalist wave in Turkey because they bring radical political and social changes given Turkey's rigid, conventional political structure.

In different nationalist discourses, the globalization wave and the EU process are directly referred. In the context of EU process, there is a common perception that the Western countries humiliate Turkey by not accepting it as it is. Here, an archaic feeling of inferiority appears. Basically, Turkey is reluctant to confront with its unwanted parts which were repressed, denied and/or projected. Moreover, this membership is seen as threat to the nation-state leading to a survival anxiety. This indicates a regressive movement which reveals the archaic and long standing anxieties,

fear of annihilation. The common discourse of “absolutely independent Turkey” which implies an omnipotent fantasy is worth mentioning again in this context.

Today and always, there are individuals, organizations and countries that eye our land and that have treacherous aims. Efforts to make foreign domination dominant in the country are of great extent and activity. The incapable running of the country should be prevented at all costs. Nation-States and walls that protect citizens are being brought down with the jive of New World Order. Through international secret powers and some shadowy international companies, even citizens of imperialist countries are bred with imperial thoughts and feelings (VKGB, 2005).¹³⁶

Through globalization and the process of EU, literally a new Sèvres is being imposed (HYP, 2007).¹³⁷

The European Union, wishing to annul Lausanne and implement **SÈVRES** (...) (SP, 2007, p. 21).¹³⁸

There is impoverishment, fragmentation, landmines and bombs at the door and under the guidance of the EU (İP, 2007).¹³⁹

Many arrangements and activities that aim to create the basis for the destruction of the self-esteem of the nation, make it lose hope in the future, create an anonymous, characterless society and a system that irregularity pays, destroy the unitary structure of the state via attacking the fundamental dynamics of our State, have all been realized under the AKP government’s term (MHP, 2007, p. 5).¹⁴⁰

(...) Activities to transfer the right to “**Sovereignty**”, that belongs to the Turkish Nation unconditionally, to another Nation, a Supranational organization, Institution, State, union of States or Unity are accelerating (VKGB, 2005).¹⁴¹

Association of National Struggle is against every kind of membership process to the EU, be it “honorable” or without honor. It fights for sovereignty to be given back “to the nation unconditionally” and against this process which is also against the basic principles of the Republic and the Constitution (MMD, 2007).¹⁴²

In these discourses, it is also encountered with the fear of contamination is based on an assumption that the nation has a homogenous

character. This fear is also related to seeking for sameness which means that the members of the group have same values and ideas which are actually determined by the owner of the nationalist discourses. It is implied that ‘the members of the nation cannot be different from each other, they must be the same’. In this sense, there is a wish for regaining the lost oneness that implies primary narcissistic state in which the other does not exist. There is not a tolerance for the existence of the other; the other can only be a narcissistic extension.

Everything that symbolizes the power, self-confidence and character of the country is open to looting. Foreign supermarkets are selling our own products to us and exploit us. Brands that make us us, that symbolize Turkey’s name and character are being destroyed. On the one hand our subconscious and on the other our safes and purses are being emptied (HYP, 2007).¹⁴³

We are against importing of foreign elements that have been forced upon our society for 150 years. The alienity of foreign cultures, which destroy the most essential qualities and characters of the Muslim Turkish society, to our people, are evident. It is our aim to extend our national culture to every phase of social life (BBP, 1993).¹⁴⁴

As it is seen in BBP’s discourses, the other is accepted all different while the characteristics of Turkish nation are described as essential and shared by all members. In other extreme versions of these kinds of discourses, the other is attributed bad characteristics and is also seen as dangerous.

(...) the destroyed, rotten social structure of those under the control of racist imperialism and the cruelties they endured are before our eyes, but we are to be like them, leaving our essence and our core aside. To do this, we will negotiate for 30 years if necessary and destroy every national presence. Is there a desperation bigger than saying these? (SP, 2007, p. 20).¹⁴⁵

As mentioned previously, because of grandiosity and arrogance recognized in the perception that the nation is seen as supreme, the shame is experienced excessively in the face of failure. Due to this sense of grandiosity, the criticism coming from the other may be perceived as a humiliation that creates rage and hatred.

Our national interests have been made subject to cheap bargains and thrown under danger, our national causes have been regarded as burdens and humps, sacrificed with the understanding of give and be saved, and our national honor and dignity have been wounded severely (MHP, 2007, p. 114).¹⁴⁶

We were subjected to a slave treatment from the EU and faced every possible insult unsuitable with our honorable history (SP).¹⁴⁷

4.2.8. Displaying of the Characteristics of Fight-Flight

Assumption

It can be seen that the characteristics of various nationalist discourses which are examined in this study are similar to fight-flight assumption group developed by Bion (1959). These kinds of groups which have difficulty dealing with the anxiety enter a regressive process in which the members have a sense of threat against their groups from the outside.

Our beloved nation has been besieged from inside and outside; our country is facing great dangers as a result of the activity of lackeys. Those activities have accelerated since the last six years. The State of the Republic of Turkey is facing a global conspiracy that is a hundred-fold stronger than that led the Ottoman Empire to annihilation (VKGB, 2005).¹⁴⁸

This is the real threat that should not be overlooked. The essential hit squads against Turkey, which is besieged from outside and collapsed from inside, are the Islamic Fundamentalists and Kurdistans (MMD, 2007).¹⁴⁹

The sense of threat is directly linked to distrustfulness to the other, which is directly articulated in the following discourse:

We will take Turkish foreign policy, which rests upon the principle of trusting others, and put it onto a base that rests upon the principle of not trusting others (HYP, 2007).¹⁵⁰

The fight-flight assumption groups come together against this threat and therefore attempt to maintain their presence. A similar tendency can be seen in many nationalist discourses in Turkey to different extents. In these discourses there is an intention and sometimes a promise for fighting against the enemies. Atatürk's Address to Youth is frequently attributed in this psycho-political process.

If some day you are compelled to defend your independence and your Republic, you must not hesitate to weigh the possibilities and circumstances of the situation before doing your duty (...) Youth of Turkey's future, even in such circumstances it is your duty to save Turkish Independence and the Republic. You will find the strength you need in your noble blood (Atatürk's Address to Youth, 1927).¹⁵¹

Imperialist powers that have besieged Turkey from the inside and outside have reactivated themselves, aiming to destroy the Republic, fragment the country, invade the Turkish homeland and annihilate the Turkish nation. Every Turkish son and daughter which carries "the Noble Turkish blood in his/her veins", has to rise up to tear up this death decree brought upon the nation (MMD, 2007).¹⁵²

It will be provided that the youth will be trained with national values, in order to be well-prepared to fight against those elements that aim to destroy the indivisible unity of the state with the land and the nation (MHP, 2007, p. 101).¹⁵³

The Turkish youth will, of course, not stay silent in the face of attacks against Atatürk and the Republic. (...) With the force that we derive from the glorious history of struggle of the Turkish youth, we are ready for any sacrifice to do our duties (ADKF, 2000).¹⁵⁴

Turkey, in every front, faces that "vulgar raid" coming from the West. The duty of the day is defending the homeland. Our future rests upon the successful implementation of this duty (İP, 2007).¹⁵⁵

TÜRK SOLU, in this war, leads the nationalist fight against imperialist and their left agents (Türksolu, 2002).¹⁵⁶

In the face of the 20th Crusades that racist imperialism has launched and is waging, are we to stand and watch and support them, like the AKP, while they devour Muslim nations one by one and then aim to destroy our beloved homeland, make it a province to Greater Israel and to annihilate it? Or like our forefathers did for centuries, in the name of the happiness of our nation and whole humanity, prevent the earth being turned into a bloodbath like Palestine and do our duty of humanity to turn this **“World of Oppression”** to a **“World of Felicity”** (SP, 2007, p. 3).¹⁵⁷

The other important dynamic activating the fight-flight assumption characteristics is the Kurdish issue that is perceived as a huge threat against “national unity and togetherness”. Kurdish armed struggle against the state, in official words, “PKK terror”, is the determining factor which shapes the Kurdish issue within the dominant political culture. Political and cultural demands of the Kurdish population are seen as treason, not democratic demands. However as EU expects the cultural and social rights of minorities to be protected, the possible membership of EU creates anxiety since these rights are seen as dangerous for “national unity and togetherness”. In this context, not only Kurdish issue, but also the demands of other minority groups are perceived as threats. Tolerance for the other and for the difference is very limited.

The biggest problem and threat Turkey faces is bloody terror, political separatism and ethnic provocations which aim an ethnical division (MHP, 2007, p. 28).¹⁵⁸

EU has embarked upon creating minorities based on religion and tribes, thus introducing impositions that threaten the indivisible unity of the land and the nation (HYP, 2007).¹⁵⁹

Those who oppose the “Happy is a Man who Says I am a Turk!” understanding of the Supreme Leader Atatürk, the founder of our

republic, are the enemies of the Republic of Turkey and they will remain as such (TSK, 2007).¹⁶⁰

Association of National Struggle objects to the policy of creating new minorities, imposed to Turkey by the West (MMD, 2007).¹⁶¹

The sense of threat against secularism is commonplace in some nationalist discourses, especially in Kemalist discourses. The central focus of these discourses is on the threat against secularism; therefore they invite the members to defend their nation against this threat, namely “Shari’a threat.”

Efforts to besiege “public administration, judiciary, politics, education and commerce” with reactionary sects, lairs of religious interest and mischief and corrode the unitary structure are spreading (CHP, 2007, p. 1).¹⁶²

It is being observed that some circles, which have been striving endlessly to corrode basic values of the state of Turkish Republic, especially secularity, are augmenting their efforts nowadays (TSK, 2007).¹⁶³

We defend secularism, as we are against the threat of Sharia which wishes to take Turkey back to Middle Ages (ADKF, 2000).¹⁶⁴

In some discourses, it is accepted that these different threats are integrated and endangers the state and political order.

Those elements that have created disturbance and division in Turkey as Islamic Fundamentalist and Kurdist movements, have now attained a power to demand a Kurdish-Islam state (MMD, 2007).¹⁶⁵

In these discourses, the sense of threat as a result of projection is a distorted reality; sometimes the threat is completely unreal, sometimes it is exaggerated. Turkey’s deficiencies and defects are not seen; but Turkey is conceived as an excellent and powerful country as long as external forces do

not impede. There is almost no effort for self-evaluation and self-criticism due to the simplistic and black-or-white value system.

Despite this future that offers hope, many obstacles are being put in front of us from today, a thousand plots are concocted to strangle our rising force (BBP, 1993).¹⁶⁶

Thus, it is impossible to understand how the noble Turkish Nation, which has been and still is an example to the world with its way of life, purity, high moral values, Culture and civilization, is being made to wear a dress 20-sizes smaller than its size (VKGB, 2005).¹⁶⁷

In many discourses, the statements related to strengthening of military forces prevail. Here, it should be noted that military forces have a dominant role in the political life of Turkey. The press statement of TSK which is included in this study proves this fact. In this statement, TSK declares that it is ready to interfere in the political process in case of necessity. The role of TSK on the political life is approved by many groups. There is a strong perception of the military being the de facto power holder of Turkey, although it is not explicitly manifested in the texts.

One of the most important forces that defend the unity of the Turkish state, the Turkish homeland and the Republic of Turkey is Atatürk's Army, the Turkish Armed Forces (MMD, 2007).¹⁶⁸

An indication of the power of states is a strong military. Thus, the Turkish Armed Forces is to be made one of the prominent super powers of the world in order to enhance the force of the State of the Republic of Turkey and protection of its existence (BTP, 2003).¹⁶⁹

Parallel to the idealization of the armed forces, fighting in defense of one's country is glorified as seen in the idealization of martyrdom.

Turkey's most valuable underground wealth is the bones of the martyrs below the soil. The duty to protect the Republic and the land includes protection of veterans and the families of martyrs. The National Government, in this respect, strengthens the consciousness

of respect and gratitude to martyrs and veterans in our society. The memories of our martyrs and heroes will be enlivened, their graves and monuments built (İP, 2007).¹⁷⁰

4.2.9. Impairment of Thinking Process

Excessive use of primitive defense mechanisms, such as denial, projection and projective identification causes the impairment of thinking process. When intense affective situations cannot be contained and moderated, they are likely to remain unsymbolized and the reality can be distorted as a result of denial and projection. The tendency to split the good and bad weakens the complex thinking and understanding the reality, and the complexity of the situations. Idealization and devaluation which are frequently applied in nationalist discourses in Turkey consist of simplification of the reality corresponding to rigid and stereotyping thinking.

The intolerance of the anxiety not only leads to an impairment of reality testing but also an emergence of omnipotent fantasies. The omnipotent fantasy reveals itself in the wishful thinking that something will become real since it is wished to be. This kind of thinking is not emanated from a rational thinking.

In the past, the Turkish Nation has ruled the world and taught justice, human rights, science, technology and civilization to humanity, at the time when it claimed the historical mission that lifts up and exalts itself (BTP, 2003).¹⁷¹

Today, the scientific acceptability of the Turkish history thesis is even more, but instead of that, books that take the West's Indo-German and Indo-European thesis as a basis are being written. Taking these books as example, the thousands-years history of the Turkish nation is being neglected and with the allegation that some of our citizens, which constitute the veins of the same race and

essence, have come from different races, our national unity and indivisibility is trying to be destroyed (VKGB, 2005).¹⁷²

Atatürk had created a crucial opportunity. If that opportunity was enhanced a little, Turkey would have outpaced the Japanese miracle today (HYP, 2007).¹⁷³

The era that lies ahead belongs to the Turkish nation with its mass that extends to a wide geography and it will be the era of the Turk (BBP, 1993).¹⁷⁴

Catching the rapid development in data processing and Internet and using these areas ideally, thus making the age of knowledge into the **“Golden Age of Turks”** (...) (Association of Kuvvai Milliye, 2006).¹⁷⁵

The sense of insecurity originating from excessive anxiety and distortion of the reality is likely to foster each other. In the following statements, one can see the exaggerated interpretations or distortion of the reality based on this sense of insecurity.

The picture of public order and security facing Turkey is terrifying in every sense. There is no security of life and property, Turkey has been turned into a heaven for crime and criminals (MHP, 2007, p. 26).¹⁷⁶

Under guises such as **“Garden of Religions”**, **“Dialogue”**, and **“Meeting of Civilizations”** steps have been taken in accordance with the wishes of racist imperialism to change the essence and core of Islam (SP, 2007, p. 19).¹⁷⁷

The foremost target of [US administration] is Turkey. They have not hesitated to reflect maps that show Turkey divided into pieces in NATO meetings (İP, 2007).¹⁷⁸

The lack of mentalization capacity refers not only to a lack of understanding the feelings, intentions and attitudes of the other but also lack of self-monitoring. For instance, in nationalist discourses in Turkey, it is difficult to see the effort to understand the feelings and experiences of other

ethnic and cultural groups. This is not only limited to the experiences of ethnic and cultural groups, but all the members of the nation who describe themselves outside dominant political culture.

(...) with pressure from the USA and the EU, ethnic languages are being concocted and forced upon institutions of education (MMD, 2007).¹⁷⁹

The question of language is as important as defending the Homeland. If you taint the language of a nation, if you make sure different languages exist in a country, then you will be permitting the foreign powers' ploy of dividing and fragmenting the country (VKGB, 2005).¹⁸⁰

It should be stated that some political parties not displaying nationalist attitudes, ÖDP and EMEP, do not emphasize national identity or idealize Turkishness. Accordingly, they do not display the psychic characteristics related with nationalist attitudes. Along with these parties, TKP has no explicitly nationalist emphasis however it is not true that this party which describes itself as patriot [yurtsever] and organizes "Patriotic Front" ["Yurtsever Cephe"] is free of nationalist tendency. As Bora (2006b) states, patriotism of TKP like any other patriotisms is an extension of nationalist ideology.

It can be stated that LDP and DSP which have different ideological and political tendencies do not display nationalist characteristics dominantly according to their party programs, however it does not mean that these parties do not adopt a nationalist line. The fact that the political praxises of these parties are very different from the party programs should be emphasized. Moreover, it can be remembered that the political discourses

along with the group dynamics which shape these nationalist discourses are
neither static nor constant.

5. Discussion

5.1. The Limitations of the Study

It must be considered that the nationalist discourses in Turkey are not limited to the ones which have been represented in this study. Different nationalist discourses are reproduced at micro levels. Therefore, this case analysis may not be an exact representation of the whole picture. The second limitation is that the official texts of the political institutions are examined in this study; however the political praxis of each cannot be reduced to the discourses of these official texts. Many times, the nationalist tone of the discourses becomes more visible and sharper in practice. . In addition to this limitation, it should be noted that some political parties and institutions elaborate on their ideologies and political programs whereas some others only summarize their views. Therefore, inevitably more comprehensive discourses have been given more weight in this study than the others.

Besides the limitations concerning the materials, there are some methodological limitations. Psychoanalytical exploration is more effective when the spontaneous processes within a certain frame are followed. Free association which is a sine qua non for individual psychoanalytical process is naturally not applicable to the analysis of social phenomena. The case analysis is limited to the written structured materials. However it must be kept in mind that

this is a limitation of the psychoanalytical approach in itself when it comes to social research. It must be also emphasized that the psychoanalytical understanding of the social phenomena do not ignore and/or substitute the social, cultural, political, and economical explanations; rather it provides a specific comprehension which can be integrated with other explanations.

5.2. Evaluation of the Psychic Characteristics of Different Nationalist Discourses in Turkey

5.2.1. Common Characteristics

This study aimed to analyze the Turkish nationalist discourses through certain psychoanalytic conceptualizations. In this analysis, the socio-political context in Turkey at the time of this study must be considered since both individual and social processes cannot be understood without the consideration of the context. Globalization in general and European Union membership process in particular has brought some “new” issues into the agenda and changed the socio-political climate in Turkey. Turkey has handled many different economical, social and political problems up to now, but problems such as “the Kurdish issue” and situation of minorities have been more visible and started to be discussed more within the terms of democratic reforms. The different political discourses examining within the framework of this study should be analyzed and understood in light of this socio-political context. In addition to

these points, recognizing the history of social and political culture in Turkey is sine qua non for this analysis. A psychoanalytical understanding of individual or social phenomena cannot be feasible without consideration of the history, the past, and the present.

It can be argued that to various extents most of the political discourses in Turkey have a nationalist tendency. In many discourses, globalization process, the possibility of joining EU, Kurdish issue, and increasing demands of minorities are frequently attributed. To a large extent, these developments are perceived as having a potential of danger/threat against the status quo which is assumed to be trustworthy. In this ground, the nationalist emphasis seems to be strengthened. Kentel, Ahıska, and Genç (2007), state that nationalism provides a meta-language for the people who are in a state of trust-seeking in the face of these new socio-political processes which can lead to social crisis. This ascertainment is consistent with the Turquet's understanding of the groups. According to him, the groups may need for creating homogeneity in case of participating in a larger group (Hopper, 2003). When the members encounter with multiple stimuli in the face of a new group process, they perceive a threat against their identity. In view of these circumstances, they tend to cling to the some social discourses which highlight a homogenous collective identity. It can be argued that the increase of the nationalist wave in Turkey seems to indicate such regressive movement.

When different nationalist discourses in Turkey are examined, it can be seen that, to a certain degree, their discursive and psychic characteristics overlap although their intensity differs and specific characteristics are identified for each of them. The pervasive theme is the “national and spiritual values” and “national unity and togetherness” referring to a certain collective identity which is described based on the Turkish nationality in almost all political discourses except the few ones which do not display nationalist characteristics. The rigidity of this emphasis is varied according to the ideological tendency and it can be argued that this emphasis increases as the essentialist characteristics are more visible. The idealization of these values and the wish for the protection of the unity and togetherness show themselves more in rigid nationalist discourses. In parallel with that, projection mechanisms are commonly used in order to get rid of unwanted parts of own. In case of excessive use of projection, devalued other is perceived as malevolent.

The discourse of “national and spiritual values” refers to a nationally shared culture which is assumed to consist of shared images, representations, and the ideals. This discourse reflects the desire that the culture has a homogenous, stable and constant character. The fact that the culture should acquire a national character is seen as unquestionable. The expression of “national and spiritual values” also refers to a collective identity which is supposed

to exist or wished to exist. It highlights the similarities among Turkish people and also dissimilarities in relation with the others. In other words, what appears in these discourses is the need to differentiate oneself from the others with its unique features. It can be said that the identification with Turkish identity characterized with some national and spiritual values is desired but rather than identification, introjection mechanism is at work. Identification is a more mature process referring to the capacity of evaluating oneself in a complex and multi-dimensional way; whereas in introjection, only selected good parts are taken in. As Volkan (1998) emphasizes, identification requires an integration of both good and bad parts of oneself and the other. In case of Turkish nationalisms, as intrinsic to all nationalist attitudes, predominantly good parts of own nation are introjected while the “bad” ones are tended to be denied and/or projected onto the other. The political discourses which have nationalist tendency, the so-called “shared” national and spiritual values are attributed high and ideal traits. This tendency heightens as the essentialist emphasis increases. In the end, these values are positioned as uncriticizable, and are desired to be protected at all costs. Some political approaches, for example those of MHP, BBP, SP, VKGB, and HYP which highlight ethnic and/or religious identity emphasize the national and spiritual values in a more rigid way not leaving any space for criticism (self-reflection). Erikson (1956) stated that the ideologies which display totalistic and exclusive

tendencies are dominated by a rigid collective superego manifesting itself with the themes of commitment, obedience, protection, and conservation. In this study, it is observed that the political discourses in which essentialist emphasis is evident call for obedience to the tradition as well as the national and religious values more than the others.

According to Erikson (1956), all ideologies call for commitment to a certain value system and rigid principle of conduct. He continues that an ideology may ask for total obedience to the tradition when the eternalization of ancestry is promised. The discourses of ethnicist/religious nationalism are understood within this framework. The discourses which overemphasize Atatürk and his principles also call for similar commitment, but to the Republican tradition.

In many discourses the (re)activation of the historical trauma, the Treaty of Sèvres, and the historical glory, National Independence War, are frequently mentioned. The historical traumas of Ottoman Empire are not frequently recalled in these discourses but they are crystallized in the Treaty of Sèvres. In fact, the victimhood due to Treaty of Sèvres is remembered as the treaty was reversed through national independence struggle, therefore it does not lead to a sense of shame. In certain socio-political circumstances, it is reactivated in order to mobilize the people under the spirit of *Kuvayı Milliye* [National Forces]. While the historical trauma is reactivated,

collective glory which provides pride is reactivated, as well. In fact, this historical trauma has been carried over in the collective memory for many decades (especially through the national education system); therefore it does not require being reactivated because this traumatic experience is more accessible psychically in the sense that it took place in the recent past and has a place in the collective memory at the conscious level. Thus it gains a more mobilizing effect because of the current socio-political circumstances. Possibility of joining a supra-national organization and its requirements are perceived as a threat against the nation-state, republic, and status quo.

The (re)activation of the collective traumas cannot be understood only as a conscious and purposeful process or as a political strategy, but also it emerges as a result of a psychic process remained unconscious. These traumas and the glories have been stored in the collective memory and transmitted from one generation to the next, thus they acquire an organizing role for the national identity of the next generations, as well. Volkan (1998) indicates that when a collective trauma is not mourned properly, its influence on the present is more severe. It can be argued that the difficulties accepting the “bad” parts of Turkey or “Turkish nation” are rooted in the unassimilated trauma where the badness is projected onto the enemies, and the tendency to perceive oneself “all-good” emerges due to the sense of being “victimized”. In many discourses, the propensity not to forget the prior trauma and being victimized

explicitly appears. As Volkan and Itzkowitz point out (1994), such traumas are mythologized. This tendency also serves for the next generations' identification with that victimization. When it is formulated with Kestenbaum's conceptualization (2003), the narratives concerning with that trauma and following national glory has acquired an organizing function for the collective identity. The importance of "Atatürk's Address to Youth" can be understood as an effort of the next generations to carry on the "national" trauma and glory of their ancestors in their memory.

It is argued that the huge trauma due to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire is rarely remembered; rather the traumatic memories of the past are re-experienced (Paker, 2004). Although the attributions to Treaty of Sèvres are frequent in dominant political climate, it cannot be said that the traumatic memoirs are remembered and processed at the psychic level. This is truer for the prior traumatic experiences of the empire. Remembering and re-experiencing are different psychic phenomena; the former requires a psychic processing, for the latter that kind of processing is not possible, therefore the traumatic memories are repressed, denied, and/or dissociated. This psychic process requires mourning for the losses which involves accepting the vulnerability and also allowing or submitting to transformation due to these losses (Butler, 2005b). When it is not possible to mourn for the losses, the people continue to deny their vulnerabilities leading to the fantasy that the losses will

be regained. In the context of Turkish nationalisms, it can be argued that because the official ideology and dominant political discourses have not gone through a psychic processing for the collective traumas and losses, people find themselves re-experiencing similar sense of threats. As a result of this tendency, dominant political approaches are unwilling to confront Turkey's weaknesses and wrongdoings; they rather project them onto the others. In the dominant political culture, there is a reluctance to accept the responsibility of Turkey as a perpetrator of the violence against the other ethnic and cultural groups, i.e. Armenians, Kurds (Paker, 2004; Sancar, 2007). The nationalist discourses do not face up to certain disabilities and wrongdoings of Turkey. Hence, such attempt to confront these wrongdoings in unofficial level by the help of the democratic reforms in the EU process leads to the rise of nationalist wave (Paker, 2007).

As the nationalist discourses gain ground, the fear of disintegration based on the sense of threat become more visible. This finding is consistent with the observation of Kentel, Ahıska, and Genç (2007) who suggest that the danger of disintegration is the most important element in new nationalist discourses in Turkey. It is connected to the fact that Turkey's cultural diversity is expressed more openly recently. This kind of expression is perceived as a threat against the narcissistic agreement implying that the Turkey is a homogeneous country.

5.2.2. Specific Characteristics

To explore the specific characteristics of nationalist discourses, it is possible to group them in terms of their discursive and psychic features although this grouping is synthetic, flexible and labile, and are not mutually exclusive. If Bora's (2002, 2003) grouping of nationalist discourses in Turkey is followed, it would be possible to identify official nationalism/"Atatürk nationalism", "left-wing" Kemalist nationalism, liberal neonationalism, racist-ethnicist nationalism, and conservative nationalism including Islamism. Bora differentiates these nationalist lines according to their ideological tendencies but he adds that these lines are not mutually exclusive, in other words a discourse which dominantly display characteristics of a certain nationalist line is also likely to interfuse with other lines and can be integrated with the dominant political discourse. In fact, different nationalist approaches are nourished by the others by spreading their ideologies. In this study, as a preliminary step this grouping can be useful to examine different nationalist discourses keeping in mind that most of them can be put into more than one group. It can be argued that to various extents, the psychic dynamics as well as their ideological tendencies of the discourses clustering around a group are similar.

The discourses of Turkish Armed Forces General Military Staff (TSK) and ADD are examined within the official nationalism/ "Atatürk nationalism". As for CHP's discourse, it may be included in the group

official nationalism/”Atatürk nationalism”, although its ideological tendency has been claimed as “left-wing” or “centre-left” in certain political conjunctures in Turkey. However, in the recent period, CHP has slid into its prior political position, a line of conservative republicanism and statism, namely official nationalism which is claimed by the armed forces (Laçiner, 2005). The change in its political tendency can be linked with increasing sense of threat against certain characteristics of republican regime, statism, and laicism. Consequently CHP, as a party which was advocate of civilization/Westernization project, refused to support EU membership and democratic reforms, and adopted an anti-Westernist, anti-minority line (Alper, 2006). It can be argued that it became close to current Kemalist “left-wing” discourses, but for now its ideological tendency is not same as these discourses which display ethnicist-racist tendencies. As for DSP’s discourse, although the party program of DSP does not include nationalist themes frequently, it describes itself as “nationalist democratic left”. It can be argued that DSP, as a social democratic party, has slid into more nationalist and statist position, like CHP. In fact, these two parties have already that political tendency (Alper, 2006).

The discourses being assessed under the official nationalism excessively idealize Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who is perceived as the substitute for the collective ego ideal. He is described as an excellent leader who rescued the homeland and who must be followed. The language of authority and obedience is predominantly used in these discourses while the loyalty to the custody of Mustafa Kemal is

demanded. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, immortal leader/chief, is the person who cannot be criticized. Freud (1921) described such groups in which the members are expected to have passion for authority and obedience as artificial groups; he also gave some examples for those kinds of groups such as the army and the Christian Church. In the context of Turkey, it is not a casual event that the army that is also the nation founder maintains the official nationalist discourses and its followers from civil society are the groups in which ego ideal is rigidly developed and projected onto an omnipotent leader. Ökten (2006) emphasizes that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as an omnipotent leader who is feared can be seen as the united power of the society. The members of the society are afraid of this omnipotent leader but also protected by him; they express their wishes, demands and complaints through his name. It can be argued that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk seems to represent the primal father which Freud thought was a substitute for the ego ideal of the society (Freud, 1921).

The protection of republican tradition and Atatürk's principles and transformations is the dominant theme in the official nationalist discourses. In fact, they display hypervigilance for threat against the republic, its acquisitions, and Atatürk's principles and transformations. Consequently, certain internal and external enemies are identified. This perception of threat is partially related to the assumption/fear that the current government, i.e. AKP as a conservative party, opposes the laicism and other Atatürk's

transformations. The Kurdish issue and PKK terror are the other sources of this fear. Besides, it seems to be emanated from the European Union membership process and some required democratic reforms which would lead to the destruction of the power of the official ideology which nationalist characteristics are intrinsic into. Paker (2001) argues that this prospect of membership disorientates the official ideology which places the West on the position of the ego ideal on the one hand, but perceives it as an external danger on the other; this settled perception of threat reveals the paranoid position. As Paker indicates, the collective ideal of attaining (above) the rank of contemporary civilization is implicitly or explicitly declared in these discourses. In fact, for this kind of nationalism like any other nationalism, the West seems to represent the economical and technological aspects of the civilization, not cultural and social ones.

In the official nationalist discourses, the presence of a rigid collective superego stands out. The criticism of “settled values” cannot be tolerated; this criticism and also expressing oneself differently from these values are seen as a manifestation of treason. Here, it can be noted that some issues, for example the demands of the Kurdish people, are likely to be seen as going to the extremes in social life as shown in the research of Kentel, Ahıska, and Genç (2007). In this case, setting limits to the extremes can be perceived as necessary. The statement of “extreme” seems to imply a priority

of the collective agreement which is possibly directed by a harsh collective superego. In official nationalist discourses, people's or group's efforts to place themselves in a different position can be sufficient for being declared as "traitor", "internal enemies" or "collaborators of external enemies". Here, the value system seems to consist of the "black or white" morality as Kernberg (1998a) formulates. In parallel with that, the thinking process is sometimes impaired in this nationalist tendency.

It can be argued that new socio-political processes which cause anxiety in the official nationalism lead to a regression to the narcissistic world, to the fight-flight assumption in Bion's conceptualization (Bion, 1959). In these discourses, the military forces are idealized and the role of these forces on the political process is seen as required. The press statement of Turkish Armed Forces Military General Staff which has been included in the study is an indicator in itself for the role of the army on the political life. As Aydın states (2006), the army is accepted as the security of the republican regime. When the sense of threat against the republican values increases, these discourses expect from the army to combat against these enemies and to protect the country.

Discourses of İP, *Türksolu*, ADKF and MMD can be examined in "left-wing" Kemalist nationalism when Bora's grouping is followed. These discourses explicitly display fight-flight group characteristics developed by Bion (1959). The discourses become

firmly fixed to the perception of enemy. The statement of “allies and enemies” is frequently used; the enemies refer to the Western countries and their values, and also to the internal enemies which attempt to disintegrate Turkey. In these discourses, there is a call for a national independence as if Turkey is under an occupation. As Bion described (1959), the members (as well as military forces) are expected to come together against that external enemy. This perception of threat has a paranoid character as well as a narcissistic one as a result of which many conspiracy theories are generated. The historical trauma, the Treaty of Sèvres is continuously evoked. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who fought against the annihilation of national territories is extremely idealized. A myth of national savior is maintained while a new messiah is expected to combat against current threat.

In “left-wing” Kemalist nationalist discourses, Turkey is assumed to be an “all-good” country having a glorified history, and the other countries, especially the Western countries having all-bad characteristics intend to destroy Turkey. The omnipotent fantasy appears in these discourses; Turkey as a self-sufficient country is assumed not to need anybody. “Absolute independence” is a dominant discourse. Due to the use of excessive splitting in narcissistic-paranoid level, the thinking process (e.g., sense of reality) is seriously impaired.

It can be argued that the discourses of MHP, BBP, VKGB,

and Association of Kuvvai Milliye correspond to racist-ethnicist nationalism according to Bora's grouping. Bora (2002, 2003) states that Turkishness is defined based on culturalist ethnicity by this kind of nationalism in Turkey; it displays essentialist characteristics at cultural and historical dimensions. Kentel, Ahıska, and Genç (2007) argue that the discourse of pure Turkishness constructs itself highlighting an ethnic essential and seeking homogeneity. Here, it can be noted that in some periods Kemalist ideology has slid to a semi-totalitarian and fascist line although it has never adopted that line entirely (Parla, 1993). The discourses of VKGB and Association of Kuvvai Milliye seem to carry Kemalist ideology to a fascist line.

When these ethnicist discourses are examined in terms of their psychic structures, the wish for homogeneity discloses itself. The themes of the commitment to the national identity, national and spiritual values, religious and family values and also of the protection of the national identity and values are dominant. The values of other cultures are devalued and Turkish values are excessively idealized. The influence of other culture cannot be accepted; the fear of contamination and degeneration is a considerable feeling. National honor, dignity and pride [milli onur, milli haysiyet, milli şeref, and milli gurur] are strongly emphasized by essentialist nationalism as well as by other nationalist discourses in varied degrees. An assumption that Turkish nation has essential characteristics and values which are fixed and constant is intrinsic to

these discourses. The past, history of Turkish nation, is idealized. The ego ideal is very high and rigid but also very far from the reality as seen in the expression “twenty first century will be the century of the Turks”. This is an indicator of a narcissistic structure and grandiosity. Due to that narcissistic tendency, the feeling of shame frequently emerges in the face of international conditions which activate the sense of weakness. As Kentel, Ahıska, and Genç point out (2007), essentialist movements in Turkey are preoccupied with their feelings of humiliation due to their difficulties accepting to be a small community while being a glorious community in the past. According to Chasseguet-Smirgel (1985), feeling of “inferiority” is related to shame and this feeling of shame is translated to arrogance. Yet, shame and arrogance are two sides of the same coin. Shame is generally attributed to a conflict between the ego and the ego ideal.

The collective superego is very harsh and punitive in this essentialist ideology. The concept of “morality” is frequently attributed in these discourses. The themes of protection and prohibition are pervasive. Being individual in the face of the group is not allowed. Supreme power and authority is perceived as given. The people or groups who do not accept to submit to this authority are likely to face exclusion and/or punishment. The criticism of and “disobedience” to national values cannot be tolerated. The people who attempt to criticize or disobey are easily described as traitors. There is a direct reference to the term “traitor” in MHP’s discourse.

In these racist-essentialist nationalist discourses along side other nationalist discourses which highlight essential characteristics and values of the Turkish nation to various degrees, the aggressivity is more visible. In the narcissistic world, the tolerance for otherness does not exist; the other is perceived as having a discomposing influence. In the face of an attack against the illusion of homogeneity, aggression shows itself. This aggressive tendency is also projected onto the other, the West and Kurdish “terrorists” who are perceived as a threat against the unity of Turkey and then a fight against those threats is called for. This intense aggressivity is also responsible for a harsh collective superego that demands for obedience, prohibits the acts threatening the narcissistic agreement. This harsh superego has a controlling function in these discourses.

In the discourses of VKGB and Association of Kuvvai Milliye, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is extremely idealized. His ideal of attaining to rank of contemporary civilization is protected; however it is not clear what contemporary civilization means and who represents it. The West does not seem to represent the contemporary civilization; their political, social and cultural values are devalued, different than Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who is accepted as the substitute of the ego ideal of the group. Turkish nation is extremely idealized and seen as “all-good” and self-sufficient country almost having acquired (above) the level of contemporary civilization. In this narcissistic and omnipotent world, the presence of the other is

denied; the existence of the other ethnic groups, minorities, is not accepted. The EU membership process is perceived as a huge threat against the independence of Turkey; therefore there is an evident call for fighting against this so-called threat. The historical trauma, the threat of disintegration of the territories of Ottoman Empire and the Treaty of Sèvres, is frequently remembered and also (re)activated in order to mobilize the people around the struggle for independence. Due to excessive use of primitive defenses, the reality is distorted to a great extent.

The discourse of SP can be discussed within Islamism merging with nationalism. The ideology of BBP which emphasizes the Muslim identity partially overlaps with this Islamist line. Here, Islamism displaying nationalist characteristics and Islamic-conservative nationalism can be distinguished. While SP's discourse should be described as Islamism, discourses of HYP and BTP display mixed characteristics. In SP's discourse, Muslim identity of Turkish nation is extremely idealized; the people who live in Turkey are expected to describe themselves Muslim; the Muslim identity refers to Sunni Muslimness in that discourse. In parallel with an extreme idealization of oneself, the ego ideal is very high, rigid and unrealistic as reflected in the objective of "being the masters of the world one more time". Here, one can see the traces of a narcissistic fantasy and a wish/illusion to go back to the lost perfection. As Chassequet-Smirgel points out (1985), this kind of narcissistic

fantasy is related to the wish to return to a state of primary fusion referring to primary narcissistic perfection. In SP's discourse in which this wish is obviously declared, the past is mystified attributing a sense of perfection to it. Chasseguet-Smirgel reminded that the reality testing is lacking in such ideologies; the loss of that "perfection" is not accepted; the truth of the matter is that there is a serious difficulty accepting the fact that there is no such perfection. Therefore in order to maintain the narcissistic fantasy, the reality is distorted; otherwise that fantasy is to collapse. In SP's discourse, shame (and arrogance as the other side of the coin) which is emanated from narcissistic structure is also visible. The deficiencies, failures, sense of "smallness" and criticism from the other cannot be tolerated due to this grandiosity and arrogance. Rather, they cause a sense of humiliation as an indicator of shame.

As expected, the extreme idealization indicates the mechanism of splitting in SP's discourse. While the Muslim identity is idealized as a manifestation of grandiosity, the other religious identities are devalued. Moreover, the paranoid tendencies are evident; a huge threat from other religious identities against the Turkish nation and the Muslim identity is perceived. Because of the wish to regain the lost sovereignty, the other is also perceived as having the same wish. In fact, the other religious nationalisms, Christian and Jewish nationalisms may have similar tendencies but those nationalist attitudes are attributed to all members of the other

groups in SP's discourses. Here, it can be argued that these different religious nationalisms feed each other like any other nationalism does. In SP's discourses, the historical traumas, Crusade and Treaty of Sèvres, are reactivated; there is again a call for fighting against this perceived threat. In this context, SP seems to regress to a deep level of paranoid-narcissistic situation in the face of cultural "liberal" politics being maintained in Turkey. Besides, the seeking for wholeness and homogeneity is observed as the theme of protection is overemphasized. In consistent with that, the superego has a harsh character; morality is frequently emphasized. There is a frequent attribution to the spiritual leader, Necmettin Erbakan, who is most likely to put in the place of the ego ideal.

In the discourses of HYP, religious identity - Muslimness - is emphasized; but the national identity, Turkishness is valued as much as the Muslim identity. This political approach endeavors to compromise with the official ideology. The laicism and the ideal of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his principle and transformations are protected in this discourse differently from SP. This discourse is based on a perception of a threat against the unity of Turkey, as well as of its national and religious identity. This perceived threat seems to have currently an organizing role for their nationalist emphasis. Due to that sense of threat, they call for fight against the enemy, the Western forces. In this context, the activation of national trauma, Treaty of Sèvres is frequently used. The discourse of "absolutely

independent Turkey” is explicitly or implicitly dominant. Here, an omnipotent fantasy that “we do not need anybody” displays itself as well as the wish for return back to years of National Independence War.

In HYP’s discourse, the Muslim Turkish identity is subtly idealized while the influence of the other cultures is tried to be dismissed. In consistent with that idealization, the need for homogeneity is intense. Diversity of ethnic, cultural or other identities tend to be denied; the existence of ethnic identities other than Turkishness cannot be accepted. Moreover, the people who attempt to express this existence is seen as collaborators of the external enemies who intend to disintegrate Turkey. The members of society are assumed not to have their own will, their individuality. The people’s own will may exist but if they express the ideas that are not consistent with the national values, they are seen as traitors. In this context, it can easily be stated that the collective superego is harsh which means that the individual conscience is not allowed in the case of contradiction with collective conscience. The themes of protection, fidelity and punishment are prevalent. Due to excessive narcissistic needs, grandiosity and the impairment of thinking process are evident.

To a certain degree, BTP’s discourse resembles HYP’s discourse in terms of ideological tendency and psycho-political characteristics when their political texts are compared. Although it is

well known that BTP highlights the Muslim identity in its political life, this emphasis on Muslim identity does not explicitly appear in its party program; rather Turkish identity is emphasized and idealized. It can be argued that BTP tends to show itself as faithful to official ideology and republican tradition. According to the party program, the national glory following National Independence War and also Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as a savior are frequently idealized. It is also stated that Atatürk's principles and transformations are adopted by the party. The historical trauma, the Treaty of Sèvres, is frequently attributed in order to draw attention to a similar threat against Turkey by EU process and globalization wave. While remembering the trauma, a sense of pride also emerges just like the conditions of Sèvres were not accepted resulting in the national glory.

DP and GP develop a liberal nationalist discourse, although their ideological tendencies are not identical. LDP does not overemphasize Turkish ethnic identity, differently from DP and GP, but it can be included in this political line. A high collective ego ideal seems to organize the discourses of these political parties. Turkey which is already assumed to be a powerful country deserves a leading position in the world. In the discourse of DP and LDP, the validity of this ideal is grounded on the glorious history in the past, on the Ottoman heritage. The ego ideal, here, is emanated from prior narcissistic perfection which consists of an illusion. In the discourses

of DP and GP, the collective ego ideal which is to attain the level of contemporary civilization level is protected. To a certain extent, Turkish identity and national values are idealized, and the national pride is emphasized. These values are qualified as “essential values” of which Turkish people should be proud of reflected in the term “cultural genetic”. It can be argued that the claim for homogeneity is crystallized in this statement along with the expression of “cultural genetic”. In these discourses, the other cultures are not explicitly devalued while there is a clear idealization of the Turkish national identity; however the Turkish identity is intended to be protected from the influence of others. It should be noted that the EU membership has been supported by DP, especially in terms of economical aspect of that membership.

AKP deserves to be evaluated under a separate title for reason of its specific characteristics and also its success with 46.58% in the last election (See Appendix I). AKP can be described as a party whose ideological tendency is a synthesis of conservative/religious and liberal neonationalism, according to Bora’s categorization (2002, 2003). However, AKP seems to be closer to the liberal line than the conservative/religious nationalism which is represented by HYP and BTP in this study. In AKP’s discourse, the ego ideal is to attain above the level of contemporary civilization and also to be a big and central country. It can be argued that the ego ideal is neither rigid nor irrational although it is high.

Differently from other nationalist discourses, this ideal is not frequently highlighted. The dominant theme in that discourse is the search for homogeneity, crystallized in the statement of “one nation, one flag, one homeland, and one state” [“tek millet, tek bayrak, tek vatan, tek devlet”] (AKP, 2007, p.4). The protection of the characteristics of the national identity which are assumed to be stable and constant is frequently emphasized. Moral, religious and spiritual values of Turkish nation are highlighted. It can be argued that AKP’s political discourse promise the citizens to carry higher standards while protecting and strengthening the national identity. In order to do these, it does not need to devalue the others or to indicate a threat; it seems to have self-confidence to a certain degree. The protection theme indicates the role of collective superego; the collective superego appears as a providing a sense of “we-ness” and as having a protecting function; the prohibitive and punitive characters of the superego are not highlighted.

To a large extent the 22 July 2007 Parliamentary General Election results show that , the conservative and liberal nationalist discourse of AKP, based on the “the unity and togetherness” theme seems to be adopted by many people in Turkey. AKP highlights the sense of “we-ness” by also promising higher standards for the citizens. Its discourse is not based on an “aggressive” theme, namely on a sense of threat and call for fight against certain enemies; rather it tends to provide the citizens with a sense of security. It can be

argued that the election results indicate that many people in Turkey do not buy the sense of threat rhetoric which is highlighted by almost all nationalist discourses. Taşkın (2007) also draws attention to the fact that highlighting only malevolent sides of the socio-political processes and reacting with the rage in the face of social crisis do not give hope to the masses. The success of AKP in last election seems to be related to its more positive discourse differently from those of other political parties.

On the other hand, it should be stated that the ratios of vote of CHP (20.88%) as an official nationalist party and MHP (14.27%) as an essentialist nationalist party, show that this sense of threat cannot be disdained in the society. It can be suggested that prevalent nationalist discourses highlighting the sense of threat and also calling for fight against those threats influence the psychic condition in the society, in other words, the dominant themes take hostage the collective mood. The discourses of many nationalist movements seem to increase xenophobic and exclusive attitudes based on the perception of threat from the others. MHP's election success is likely to be related to this fact. For example, the harsh discourses of "left-wing" Kemalist movements do not increase their own ratio of vote but contribute to the success of MHP and CHP. This argument is consistent with the observation of Yaşlı who states that "left-wing" nationalist [ulusalcı] line strengthens the dominant nationalist movements (2006).

Table 2: The Psychic Characteristics of Different Nationalist Discourses in Turkey

Psychic characteristics	Types of Turkish nationalisms					
	Official/“Atatürk nationalism”	“Left-wing” Kemalist nationalism	Liberal neonationalism	Racist-ethnicist nationalism	Conservative nationalism	Islamism
Idealization of collective identity	High	Extremely high	Moderate to high	Extremely high	High	Extremely high
The organizing role of collective traumas and glories	High	Extremely high	Low to moderate	Extremely high	High to extremely high	Extremely high
Harsh collective superego	High	Extremely high	Moderate	Extremely high	Extremely high	Extremely high
Rigid/high collective ego ideal	High	Extremely high	Moderate	Extremely high	High to extremely high	Extremely high
Putting a leader in the place of the ego ideal	Extremely high	Extremely high	Moderate	Extremely high	High to extremely high	Extremely high
Excessive use of primitive defenses	High	Extremely high	Low to moderate	Extremely high	Extremely high	Extremely high
Regression to the narcissistic world	High	Extremely high	Low to moderate	Extremely high	Extremely high	Extremely high
Characteristics of fight-flight assumption	High	Extremely high	Low	Extremely high	High to extremely high	High to extremely high
Impairment of thinking process	High	Extremely high	Low to moderate	Extremely high	High to extremely high	Extremely high
Institutions	TSK, ADD, CHP, DSP	İP, Türksolu, ADKF, MMD, (CHP)*	AKP, DP, GP, (LDP)*	MHP, BBP, VKGB, Kuvvai Milliye	HYP, BTP, (AKP)*	SP, (BBP)*

* The institutions which are in brackets partially display the characteristics of that type of nationalism.

5.3. Reexamination of the Psychoanalytic Conceptualizations

This study aimed to explore the psychic characteristics and the dynamics of the nationalist discourses. Psychoanalytic conceptualizations which have been introduced in the beginning of this study seem to be convenient for this exploration. As seen in the Turkish case, to a large extent, different psychoanalytic conceptualizations which are connected to the questions of the study are integrated with each other. In the beginning, it has already been stated that the questions of the study were not completely independent; a fortiori they are inherently related to each other.

Typically, all nationalist discourses refer to a collective, namely, national identity that is assumed to encompass all citizens. Basically, many social/political discourses tend to describe a collective identity but the attributions to a collective identity are varied in each of them. In nationalist discourses, the characteristics of the national identity are generally positive and also tend to be idealized more, many times described as “all-good” as the nationalist emphasis increases. Members usually wish to introject the good parts instead of identifying with both good and bad/disliked parts. More rigid nationalist discourses, essentialist ideologies, have difficulty adopting the characteristics of other cultures which are devalued repeatedly; rather they wish to cling to and protect theirs. Besides, such discourses attribute certain essential features to the national identity which is described by them. These essentialist features are likely to be perceived as constant and permanent indicating a search for homogeneity that is a mere narcissistic illusion. This narcissistic tendency explains why rigid social and

political discourses are generally essentialist ideologies. Essentialist ideologies which usually display racist tendencies apply to primitive defense mechanisms much more than to others. The seeking for “purity” is a narcissistic fantasy *per se*. When the national characteristics are supposed to be pure and homogeneous, they are also likely to be extremely idealized, while the other nations are devalued and/or hated. This tendency is related to the fact that the other group is also described as a homogeneous union that is composed of malevolent individuals. In such cases a fear of contamination emerges in the effort to avoid from the so-called malignant parts of the other arises. Essentially, this nationalist tendency is an end result of the avoidance of confronting the bad parts that they own which have been splitted and projected; as if the bad parts annihilated the good ones. Therefore, the members who criticize the society, namely the “nation”, are objected to the aggression. This tendency refers to the basic level of self/object (Kernberg, 1998a).

The excessive use of primitive defense mechanisms is responsible for the impairment of thinking process. In other words, sophisticated thinking process remains not well-developed in case of applying to primitive defenses. These discourses try to repress or deny the traumatic past of the nation instead of processing it. For almost all nations, traumatic experiences did exist in the past; what is important is how to deal with these experiences. Sometimes traumatic past as a victim and/or perpetrator are not confronted and processed psychically because of the difficulties in accepting the vulnerable position. Consequently, there is no capacity for the toleration

of frustration. In this case, the reality principle does not develop well. As Bion emphasizes (1962), the frustration toleration and the capacity to think are interconnected acquisitions. The low frustration tolerance obstructs the capacity to think; the lack of capacity to think leads to intolerable frustration.

It is suggested that the severity of nationalist emphasis is also related to the toleration threshold for the criticism against the characteristics by the people both from own and other nations. Here, the rigidity of the collective superego has a determining role for how the collective identity is perceived. It can be suggested that while examining the large group processes and the character of the collective identity in these groups, there is a need to see the role and the function of the collective superego. In the groups in which collective identity is rigidly idealized and the other identities are devalued, the collective superego tends to be harsh. Erikson (1956) highlighted that the superego has a dominating role in totalistic and exclusive ideologies; in these kinds of social processes the identity is like a manifestation of the superego. The nationalist discourses which have a rigid collective superego also tend to have a rigid collective ego ideal. Here, the conceptualization of Freud about the superego and ego ideal is verified as he viewed that the ego ideal is a part of the superego (Frank, 1999). Freud (1921) stated that people transfer their ego ideal to the leader of the group and/or give up their ego ideal and identify with the group's ego ideal. The passion for authority and obedience is related to this psychic process. As essentialist and exclusive tendency increases, the collective ego ideal becomes more high, rigid and

irrational. In consistent with that, the rigidity of the superego also increases due to the wish to maintain the narcissistic agreement indicated by the collective ego ideal. In order to maintain the narcissistic fantasy, the punitive aspect of the superego stands out.

Nationalist discourses tend to gain ground in the face of social change. This leads to a regression that implies a wish for and an unconscious attempt to return back to the psychic world which is assumed to be more trustworthy than that of the current. Volkan (1998) points out that individuals do not care much about their large group identities unless a sense of threat against those identities emerges. Kernberg (1998a) also shares this point of view reminding the reader that the sense of threat appears in the face of possibility of losing the ordinary social structures in which case the groups may regress towards more primitive levels of psychological functioning. Bion's conceptualization about the group assumptions is consistent with these theoretical approaches as well. When a group is not able to tolerate the anxiety which has emerged in the group process, tends to regress towards more primitive levels, namely dependency or fight-flight or pairing group assumption processes (Bion, 1962).

Nationalist movements tend to show fight-flight group characteristics. In such case, these nationalist approaches activate and reinforce the sense of threat in the society in order to strengthen the collective identity and mobilize the people. To a large extent, whereas the former is an unconscious process, the latter implies a presence of conscious dynamics. Nationalist movements in which primitive defense mechanisms are predominantly used

are likely to attempt consciously to expand their psycho-political world view.

Nationalist discourses are not usually generated in the group process of fight-flight assumption. As formulated by Turquet, the groups may regress to a situation which is characterized with seeking for homogeneity (Hopper, 2003). In case of participating in a large group, as it is in the globalization process today, people face multiple stimuli which may lead to a perception of a threat against the existing identity of the people. As a defense against this threat of loss of identity, they tend to cling their identity and to create an illusion of homogeneity indicating an absolute sameness of belief and a sense of wholeness. It can be argued that the tendency of homogeneity is likely to lead to intolerance for the individuality in the face of the group and to bring the perception of threat against that stronghold. One can follow the tracks of that tendency in Turkish case related with the process of socio-political changes.

6. Conclusion

This study aimed to examine the concept of nationalism from a psychoanalytical perspective and to explore the psychic characteristics of the nationalist discourses through certain Turkish cases. The most important outcome of this study is that psychoanalytic conceptualizations can enrich and also deepen the frame of understanding the nationalism issue. It can be concluded that in the light of the questions of the study, the psychic characteristics of Turkish nationalist discourses are discovered.

Nationalist discourses are likely to gain ground in the regressive group processes which are frequently triggered by new socio-political circumstances, as seen in the Turkish case. When the large groups face to lose their relatively ordinary structures, they may cling to their collective identities which provide them security (Hopper, 2003; Kristeva, 1993). Similarly seeking for homogeneity is evident and the distinction between “we” and the “other” is sharper. These dynamics are commonly observed in different Turkish nationalisms in varied degrees. Sometimes, the group may regress to a position which the group members project their aggression onto the homogenized other. This “other” is perceived as a threat against the group. In such case, the members tend to come together against this threat/enemy and at the same time need a protection. Turkish nationalist discourses frequently promise the members such protection while also calling for a struggle.

Nationalist discourses in Turkey frequently use primitive defenses, i.e. splitting, projection, projective identification, idealization, and devaluation. Due to excessive use of these mechanisms, the thinking process is impaired and consequently reality is distorted to various extents. These defenses impede mature thinking processes which enable to understand and also interpret the world. Under these circumstances, the frame of understanding may be boxed in a simple categorization of good and bad.

The collective identity is described in a rigid way in many nationalist discourses, while this identity is also idealized. Unmourned collective traumas increase the tendency of this rigidity because they could not be processed psychically. The idealized collective images and representations are homogenized especially in the presence of a rigid collective superego. The group members are expected to identify with the national identity voluntarily but also be obedient to that demand. It is difficult to tolerate the individuality and individual conscience that may conflict with the harsh collective superego. In such group processes, collective ego ideal is also high, rigid, and less realistic. This kind of collective ego ideal indicates a narcissistic phenomenon. As the essentialist nationalist emphasis increase, these agencies, namely collective superego and the ego ideal tend to be more rigid.

6.1. Suggestions for Overcoming Nationalism

It is important to take these powerful psychic dynamics into account in a long-term struggle for overcoming nationalism. As nationalist attitudes

are shaped and reinforced through psychic dynamics within the group processes, these take powerful psychic roots. Therefore, these are likely to be ingrained and long lasting attitudes. Usually, these attitudes are regenerated again and again in the socio-political contexts. Nationalist discourses also shape these psychic dynamics in the groups. In any case, since thinking processes are simplistic in the groups in which nationalist attitudes are powerful, the way of interpreting the world has no complexity. As Özmen (2006) emphasizes, people need to get rid of their sense of helplessness and powerlessness in the face of ambiguity of the current world and as a result of this need paranoid regression can be seen. Therefore, nationalist discourses which provide people a simple way of understanding are easily accepted and it is very hard for them to leave this powerful position. Besides, since criticisms against the settled values are not tolerated, breaking this closed loop is not a simple struggle.

It can be concluded that the struggle against the nationalism requires a long time and, thus, also patience. In the face of questioning the common attitudes, the severity of nationalist discourses tends to increase. In fact, such struggle can meet with success in a long term process. Development of thinking process, in other words, change in the simple, conventional, and black-or-white mentality is very crucial for overcoming nationalist attitudes. In this long-term process, confrontation with the weak and “bad” parts of the own group and then accept them is necessary. To accept the deficiencies and weaknesses requires giving up the narcissistic fantasies, the sense of omnipotence. As well as this acceptance, mourning of the historical losses is

a sine qua non component of this process. These psychic processes contribute to development of self-reflecting capacity. Permanent change requires an experience of confrontation with ourselves, especially with the parts which are repressed and/or denied. Such continuous attempt leads to a transformation of thinking process into a more mature and complex state.

In the case of Turkish nationalisms, the homogenization of the collective characteristics is prevalent. Despite the fact that it is not observed in detail in the official texts of the nationalist institutions, the characteristics of the other, i.e. the Western countries, Kurdish population, and minorities are homogenized as well. Homogenization of the devalued other generally brings dehumanizing. Here, it is concluded that to be receptive to the heterogeneity in both own group and the other groups lead to a rupture of rigid and stereotyped perception of “us” and “them”. In Butler’s words, acceptance of the fragility and vulnerability of the other as a subject is required in order to overcome dehumanizing attitudes (Butler, 2005). This acceptance reduces the power of nationalist attitudes in a long-term process. However, nationalist discourses are likely to resist such rupture because of the conventional, simplistic and black-or white thinking and they are even likely to grow stronger due to their need/wish for maintaining this tendency. In fact, to accept the heterogeneity and differences of the own group can be more possible as the people are more open to interpersonal contact with the people who are within the same group. Such experience can enable to meet the “other” as a subject and to see the heterogeneity of the other groups. In this long-term process, the nationalist approaches can lose their power.

6.2. Suggestions for Further Study

This study is based on the written texts of the different nationalist approaches. It can be suggested that further studies which focus on the political praxis more will make an important contribution to the understanding of the psychic dynamics of nationalist discourses. In a future study, nationalist discourses can be explored in different socio-political contexts in a comparative way. Besides, for a better exploration of group dynamics, it is suggested to conduct a research study on small groups in which spontaneous processes can be directly observed.

Notes

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- ¹ Özgüveni giderek yükselen Türk milletinin aşamayacağı hiçbir engel yoktur (AKP, 2007, p. 4).
- ² Tarihi altın sayfalarla dolu olan ve geleceğe aynı umutla bakması için her türlü haklı nedeni bulunan ülkemiz ve milletimiz (...) (DP, 2007, p. 61).
- ³ (...) Türk Milletini tarihte hak ettiği şanlı yerine oturtmak ülküsünü benimseyerek yılmadan çalışacak, damarlarındaki asil kana, cevhere, Türk milletine, Türk tarihine güvenerek, Türk kültürünü, Türk milletini yükselten ve büyük millet yapan hasletlerimizi sevecek ve sevdirmeye çalışacağız (VKGB, 2005).
- ⁴ (MMD) Yegane kurtuluşu Türk Milletinin kendi öz gücünde görür (MMD, 2007).
- ⁵ Türkiye, coğrafi avantajı, köklü tarihsel birikimi, çok yönlü ve zengin kültürel varlığı, genç ve dinamik toplum yapısı, girişimci ve çalışkan insanları ile böylesi bir dünya ortamına değil uyum sağlamak, bu ortamın oluşmasına en büyük katkıda bulunacak tüm özelliklere sahip, dünya üzerindeki sayılı ülkeden biridir (LDP, 2002).
- ⁶ Türk milletini, yüzyıllardır kader birliği etmiş, aynı inançla yoğrulmuş, aynı gayeye yönelmiş, bundan böyle de birlikte varolma iradesini serdetmiş insanlarımızın müşterek birliği olarak idrak ediyoruz (BBP, 1993).
- ⁷ (...) Atatürk'ün esaslı bir vazife olarak telakki ettiği Milliyetçilik, Milli şuuru yükseltmek, Milli İstiklali tamamlamak, Milli devleti korumak, Milli faaliyeti genişletmek, Milletleşmeyi tamamlamak gayesini gütmekteyiz (VKGB, 2005).
- ⁸ Türkiye'de tek bir millet vardır. O da Türk milletidir (MMD, 2007).
- ⁹ Dil meselemiz Vatan topraklarının savunulması kadar önemli bir meseledir. Bir milletin dilini bozdunuz mu, bir ülkede farklı diller oluşmasını temin ettiniz mi dış mihrakların ülke üzerinde bölme ve parçalanma oyunlarına geçit vermiş olursunuz (VKGB, 2005).
- ¹⁰ Güzel Türkçe'mizin yapısı ve karakterini bozacak, onu yozlaştıracak hareketlere yol verilmeyecek, ana dilimizin gelişimi tabii seyri içinde temin edilecektir (BTP, 2003).
- ¹¹ (MMD) Tek dil, tek bayrak, tek devlet tek vatan düşüncesini savunur (MMD, 2007).
- ¹² Ülkemize bir tür sömürge görüntüsü veren yabancı dille eğitim egemenliğine son verilecektir. Yabancı diller, kültür istilasının birer aracı olmaktan çıkarılacaktır (HYP, 2007).
- ¹³ Ezeli ve ebedi Bayrağımız olan Türkçe'mizin öncelikle korunması, geliştirilmesi ve yozlaşmaması için çalışmalar yürütmek (...) (Kuvvai Milliye Derneği, 2006).
- ¹⁴ Bir milletin varlığını devam ettirmesinde en önemli amil, o milletin milli ve manevi değerleridir. Bu değerler bir bütün olarak o milletin kimliğini oluşturur (BTP, 2003).
- ¹⁵ Milletimizi yüzyıllardır ayakta tutan ve tarihte şerefli bir mevki işgal etmemizi sağlayan inançlarımız ve kültürel değerlerimizdir (BBP, 1993).
- ¹⁶ Çağın dinamikleri üzerinde söz sahibi olmanın yolu, güçlü milli kimliğe ve özgüvene sahip bir millet olmaktan geçer (MHP, 2007, p.6).

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- ¹⁷ Cumhuriyeti kurma iradesi ve eylemine, eşit yurttaşlık bağına, ortak millî kültüre ve birlikte yaşama arzusuna dayanan millî birliğimizi pekiştireceğiz (İP, 2007).
- ¹⁸ Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi din hizmetlerini, ahlaki ve manevi değerlerin yaşatılması ve millî dayanışma ve bütünleşmenin sağlanması için önemli bir alan olarak görmektedir (AKP, 2007, p. 82).
- ¹⁹ Nüfusunun çoğunluğu dini değerlerine samimiyetle inanan Müslümanlardan oluşan Türkiye'nin manevi değerleri ile laik ve demokratik devlet tecrübesi de önemli bir güç kaynağıdır (MHP, 2007, p. 115).
- ²⁰ Müslüman Türk kimliğinin belirleyicisi olan inançlarımız, milletimizi bugün ve gelecekte layık olduğu yere ulaştıracak vazgeçilmez prensipleri vermektedir (BBP, 1993).
- ²¹ Çeşitliliği koruyarak ortak kültürel değerlerimizi öne çıkaracağız (CHP, 2007, p. 60).
- ²² Ortak kültürümüzün özü, tarihimizdir, coğrafyamızdır, ulus-devlet kimliğimizdir, Cumhuriyetimizin nitelikleridir, anayasamızın temel ilkeleridir! (CHP, 2007, p. 60).
- ²³ (MHP) Türk Milleti'ne mensubiyetin gurur ve şuuruna sahip, millî ve manevî değerlerimizi özümsemiş, düşünme, algılama ve problem çözüme yeteneği gelişmiş, yeni gelişmelere açık, sorumluluk duygusu ve toplumsal duyarlılığı yüksek, bilim ve teknoloji üretimine yatkın, girişimci, demokrat, kültürlü ve inançlı nesillerin yetiştirilmesini (...) hedeflemektedir (MHP, 2007, p. 8).
- ²⁴ (...) Bütün milletlere örnek olmuş yüksek Türk Kültürü ve Medeniyetinin tanıtılmasını sağlamak, Türk Milletinin adet, töre, anane, folklor, müzik, edebiyat, tarih ve benzeri alanlarda duyarlı kılınması, çocuklarımızın ve gençlerimizin bu yönlerde vatansever olarak, yetişmeleri ve bilgilendirilmeleri için çalışmak ülkümüzdür (VKGB, 2005).
- ²⁵ Süreklilik içinde değişen Türk kültürü, aynı zamanda temel kimliğini muhafaza etmiş ve dünya kültür mirasının en seçkin üyelerinden biri haline gelmiştir (AKP, 2007, p. 130).
- ²⁶ Türk Milleti dünyanın en asil, en köklü, en büyük milleti olup, dünya mağara devrinden normal yaşam biçimine, Ortaçağın karanlığından bu güne aydınlığa, Türk Kültür ve Medeniyeti sayesinde ulaşmıştır (VKGB, 2005).
- ²⁷ Nitelikli, girişimci, **özgüveni yüksek ve millî değerlerine sahip çıkan** bir gençlik, ülkemizi hak ettiği yere taşıyacak temel varlığımızdır (AKP, 2007, p. 74).
- ²⁸ (...) "Bir Ülkenin Asıl Gücü, Ne Tankıdır, Ne Parasıdır. Millî Ve Manevî Değerlere Bağlı Genç Evlatları"dır (SP, 2007, p. 19).
- ²⁹ Türkiye'de inançlarına, tarihi geçmişine bağlı, millî değerlerine saygılı olarak yetişmesini istediğimiz bir nesil için, millî kültürün tahrip edilmesinin önlenmesini önşart olarak kabul ediyoruz. Türk toplumunun mazisiyle tekrar barışması, ancak Türkiye'de sosyal hayatın temeline millî kültür unsurlarının yerleştirilmesiyle gerçekleşebilecektir (BBP, 1993).
- ³⁰ Türkiye'nin ulusal kimliğini ve onurunu koruması için bağımsızlığı savunmak zorunda olduğumuzun bilincindeyiz (ADKF, 2000).
- ³¹ Millî kültür değerlerimizin yıpratılması sonucunu doğuran ve kültürel değerler kargaşasına sebebiyet veren uygulamalar önlenecektir (MHP, 2007, p. 106).

³² Aile toplumumuzun temelidir. Ulusal bütünlüğün, dayanışmanın pekiştirilmesinde, değerlerimizin korunması ve geliştirilmesinde aile kurumu çok önemli bir yer tutar (GP, 2002).

³³ Aile toplumun temelidir. Geleneksel Türk-İslam ailesinin gücünü muhafaza etmek için toplum ve devlet her türlü faaliyet men edilecektir (BBP, 1993).

³⁴ (...) Milli birlik ve beraberliği perçinleyen, sevgi, saygı ve dostluk bağlarını güçlendiren, vatan, millet, bayrak, şehitlik ve gazilik gibi milli değerleri özümseten, bir arada yaşama ve sorumluluk bilincini geliştiren bir anlayışla eğitim vermesi sağlanacaktır (MHP, 2007, p. 95).

³⁵ Toplumun birlik ve dirliğinin teminatı olan Türk kimliğini onurla temsil eden bireylerin, milli ve manevi değerlerimize, gelenek ve göreneklerimize uygun olarak çağdaş standartlarda bir eğitim alması temel politikamız olacaktır (BTP, 2003).

³⁶ Milli Mücadele Derneği, Atatürkçü eğitimin ve ulusal birliğin temelinde Milli Eğitim Birliğini yani Tevhid-i Tedrisatı görür (MMD, 2007).

³⁷ Eğitim anlayışımız, milli ve manevi değerlere sahip, çağın ilim ve teknolojiyle mücehhez, hür düşünceli, üretken, ahlaklı ve yenilikçi nesiller yetiştirmektir. Eğitim sistemi, fertlere milli kültürün aktarılması yanında, fertlerin kabiliyetlerinin ortaya çıkmasını sağlayacak bir uygulamanın içinde olacaktır (BBP, 1993).

³⁸ Eğitim Programımız; “Ulusal kimliğimiz, tarihimiz ve değerlerimiz ile evrensel kültür” bilinç ve birikimleri, “laiklik, demokrasi ve hukukun üstünlüğü” ilkelerini temel alacaktır (CHP, 2007, p. 56).

³⁹ Fert, aile ve toplumun korunması için dini, ahlaki ve manevi eğitim anaokulundan başlatılacak ve güçlendirilecektir (SP, 2007, p. 34).

⁴⁰ Bu kapsamdaki din eğitimi ve öğretimi, Anayasa’ımızın gereği olarak Milli Eğitimin bir parçası ve tamamlayıcısıdır (BTP, 2003).

⁴¹ Türklüğün ve İslamın değerlerini yaşayan ve yaşatan önder şahsiyetlerin hayatı ve felsefesi ilköğretim okullarında seçmeli ders olarak okutulacak (MHP, 2007, p. 95).

⁴² Farklı kültürler karşısında, özellikle yeni nesillerin kültür şokuna uğramasına ve kimlik bunalımına düşmesine engel olacak kaliteli ve ihtiyaca cevap veren edebi eserler ortaya konmasına yönelik millî kültür değerlerinin millete tanıtılması ve benimsetilmesi sağlanacaktır (MHP, 2007, p. 106).

⁴³ En önemli meselelerden biri ise yabancı yayınevlerinin ülkemizde faaliyet göstermeye başlamasıdır. Yabancı yayınevlerinin kültürümüzü korumak ve geliştirmek konusunda ne kadar faydalı olacağı tartışmalıdır. Bankalarımızın, borsamızın ve büyük kuruluşlarımızın yabancıların eline geçmesinden sonra yayıncılık sektörümüzün de yabancıların eline geçmesi ülkemizin ne kadar büyük bir tehlike ile karşı karşıya olduğunu göstermektedir (DP, 2007, p. 51).

⁴⁴ Türk kültür ve sanatının milli kimliğini muhafaza ederek evrensel platformlara taşınması, öncelikli hedeflerimiz arasındadır (AKP, 2007, p. 130).

⁴⁵ Kültür ve sanat, milletlerin gelişmesi ve ulusal kimliklerini korumak bakımından çok önemlidir (BTP, 2003).

⁴⁶ Türk insanının inançlarıyla ters düşmeyen sanat, milli kültürümüzün de süregelen bir parçasıdır. Bu ölçüler içerisinde sanata, haiz olduğu kıymetini verip, sanatçının desteklenmesi ve

korunması hedeflerimiz arasındadır (BBP, 1993).

47 Ulusal kültürümüzün, küreselleşme karşısında korunarak geliştirilmesi temel hedefimizdir (CHP, 2007, p. 60).

48 Türkiye’de son 150 yıldır toplumumuza dayatılan yabancı unsurların ithaline karşıyız. Müslüman Türk toplumunun en asli özelliklerini ve hasletlerini günden güne tahrip eden yabancı kültürlerin insanımıza olan yabancılığı açıktır. Milli kültürümüzü sosyal hayatın her safhasına yaymak hedefimizdir (BBP, 1993).

49 Türk medeniyetinin ve tarihinin yüksek birikimini Batı emperyalizmine karşı koruyacak ve açığa çıkaracak bir devlet politikası egemen kılınmalıdır (MMD, 2007).

50 Toplumumuzun geleneksel kültürel değerlerini korumayı ve geliştirmeyi temel hedef alan **DSP, Batı’nın** ve **Doğu’nun** çağdaş kültürel değerlerinden de yararlanacaktır (DSP, 2003, p. 109).

51 Türkiye’ye adeta ikinci bir Sevr Projesi dayatılmaktadır. Bu tehlike ve tehditler Cumhuriyet’in kuruluşunda da aynıyla yaşanmış M. Kemal Atatürk de bizzat ‘dahili ve harici düşmanların’ olacağından bahsetmiştir. Bugün sanki tarih tekerrür ediyor gibi aynı tehlikeli gelişmeler yaşanıyor (BTP, 2003).

52 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti verilen tavizler nedeniyle Osmanlı Devletinin son günlerini yaşar hale gelmiştir (VKGB, 2005).

53 Türkiye bugün, Kurtuluş Savaşı’na ön gelen günlerin şartları içine itilmiş bulunuyor. (...) Türkiye’ye yapılmak istenenler Türkiye’nin götürülmek istendiği yer bakımından durum 1919’dakinin aynı (HYP, 2007).

54 Milli Mücadele Derneği, tıpkı Osmanlı’nın son dönemlerinde olduğu gibi Türk milletine karşı birleşmiş olan, Batı emperyalizminin beslediği işbirlikçi-bölücü-gerici güçlerin Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’ne karşı oluşturduğu Cumhuriyet düşmanı sözde demokrasi cephesine karşı tüm milleti Cumhuriyeti savunmayı çağırır (MMD, 2007).

55 Günün görevi vatan savunmasıdır. Geleceğimiz, bu görevin başarıyla yerine getirilmesine bağlıdır (İP, 2007).

56 Vatansaver Kuvvetler Güç Birliği Hareketi olarak amacımız emperyalizmin zincirlerini kırarak Milli Devletimizin yeniden tesisini sağlamaktır (VKGB, 2005).

57 Atatürk 1920’lerde çürümüş “geri”ye karşı “ileri”yi temsil ettiği için başarılı olabildi. Bugünün Türkiye’si de 1919’un Türkiye’si’ne benzer sorunlarla boğuşuyorsa, bağımsız, laik ve demokratik bir Türkiye için yeniden mücadele vermek gerekiyorsa, başarılı olmak için tarihimizdeki o büyük örneği, Atatürk’ü örnek almalıyız (ADKF, 2000).

58 Orta eğitime ‘yakın tarihimizde Türkiye’yi işgal planları ve Sevr Antlaşması’ gerçeğini konu edinen zorunlu bir ders konacaktır (HYP, 2007).

59 (...) Emperyalist güçler, 1990 yılında 20. Haçlı Seferi’ni başlatmışlardır. SSCB çöktükten sonra, ABD tek kutup olup dünyaya hâkim tek güç olarak gözükünce, dünya siyonizmi ırkçı emperyalizm, ‘Artık 5700 seneden beri beklediğimiz, Büyük İsrail’i kurmanın vakti gelmiştir. O halde 20. haçlı seferini başlatalım’ dediler (SP, 2007, p. 2).

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- ⁶⁰ Neticede İstiklal Savaşı'nda bu millet, Büyük Önder Atatürk'ün öncülüğünde Kuvayı Milliye ruhuyla kendine dönmüştür. Milli iradenin, tecelli ettiği, bir Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti kurulmuş ve özgürlük mücadelesi veren ülkelere örnek olmuştur (BTP, 2003).
- ⁶¹ Gün 'Ya İstiklâl, Ya Ölüm' diyenlerin İkinci Kurtuluş Savaşı için örgütlenme günüdür (MMD, 2007).
- ⁶² 1919'da emperyalizme karşı ilk Bağımsızlık Savaşı'nı kazanmış Türkiye, bağımsızlığından neden vazgeçmek zorunda olsun? (ADKF, 2000).
- ⁶³ Hegemonyasını silahla kuran emperyalizm ancak silahla yıkılabilir. Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı bunun en güzel örneğidir (Türksolu, 2002).
- ⁶⁴ İşçi Partisi, Lozan, Berlin ve Paris'ten Batı devletlerine bayrak göstererek, Atatürk'ün bağımsız Türkiye'sini yeniden kurma yeteneğini kanıtlamıştır (İP, 2007).
- ⁶⁵ (...) tıpkı 1918'de İstiklal Savaşımızı yaparken gerçekleştirdiğimiz kurtuluş harekâtında olduğu gibi, bugünde elbirliğiyle vatanımızı, milletimizi ve bütün insanlığı karşı karşıya bulunduğu tehlikelerden ve felaketlerden kurtarmamız gerekmektedir (SP, 2007, p. 22).
- ⁶⁶ Anadolu ve Anadolu halkı, dünya tarihinin en büyük medeniyetlerinin kurulduğu ve yeşerdiği toprakların; Türkiye ve Türk halkı dünya tarihinin en güçlü devletlerinden biri olan, 600 yıllık Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun mirasçılarıdır (LDP, 2002).
- ⁶⁷ Arkamızda binlerce yıllık büyük imparatorluklar mirası bulunuyor. İmparatorluk kültürü, bir yönüyle kavimleri birarada yaşatma kültürüdür (İP, 2007).
- ⁶⁸ Evrensel İmparatorluklar kurmuş olan Türkiye, çok değerli bir tarih ve kültür mirasına, köklü bir devlet geleneği ve tecrübesine sahiptir (MHP, 2007, p. 114).
- ⁶⁹ Cumhuriyetimizin kurucusu Ulu Önder Atatürk'ün, "Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene!" anlayışına karşı çıkan herkes Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin düşmanıdır ve öyle kalacaktır (TSK, 2007).
- ⁷⁰ Milli Mücadele Derneği Atatürk'ün "Türkiye Türklerindir" düşüncesini savunur (...) Türkiye'de tek bir millet vardır. O da Türk milletidir. Emperyalizmin dayattığı ve yerli işbirlikçilerin ulusu bölmek için ortaya attığı Türk ulusal kimliğine alternatif her türlü kimliği Milli Mücadele Derneği reddeder (MMD, 2007).
- ⁷¹ Azınlık demek emperyalist koruması altında imtiyaz sahibi olan potansiyel ihanet odağı demektir (MMD, 2007).
- ⁷² AB, Türkiye'de dine ve kavmiyete bağlı azınlıklar yaratma gayreti içine girerek ülkenin ve milletin bölünmez bütünlüğünü tehdit edici dayatmalar getirmiştir (HYP, 2007).
- ⁷³ MHP iktidarında teröristler dağlarda, bölücü hainler ovalarda cirit atamayacaktır (MHP, 2007, p. 30).
- ⁷⁴ Başbakan da Diyarbakır'da yaptığı bir konuşmada, terörle beslenen bu bölücü söylemleri, 'Kürt sorunu' adını vererek kabul ve tekrar etmiştir. AB, Türkiye'nin bölünmesini amaçlayan terörle desteklenen kavmiyetçi kışkırtmaya 'sözde çözüm' isterken Türkiye'de egemenliğin iki halk arasında bölünmesini, federal bir devlet oluşturulmasını, Türkçe'den başka bir dilin de resmî bir dil olmasını istemektedir. Bu açık ve tehditkâr teşebbüs ve dayatmalara karşı hükümet hiçbir tepki ortaya koymamıştır (HYP, 2007).

⁷⁵ (Türksolu) Kuvayı Milliye'nin, halk-ordu-aydın ittifakını, gençliği de katarak geliştirir ve bu ittifakı bölmeye yönelik tüm çabalara şiddetle karşı çıkar. Özellikle de Türkiye'de orduyu düşman olarak gören sözde sol anlayışla mücadele eder (Türksolu, 2002).

⁷⁶ Atatürkçülük bugün liberal, dinci, ülkücü, maocu vb. akımların kendi ideolojik kimliklerinin önüne koydukları bir sıfattır. Dolayısıyla farklı ideolojik kimliklere Atatürkçü bir hava verilmektedir ama farklı ideolojik kimlikler korunmaktadır. Bu ise liberal, dinci, ülkücü, maocu vb. ideolojilerin özünde var olan, Türkiye düşmanı, Atatürk düşmanı, üniter devlet düşmanı, laik rejim düşmanı eğilimlerin de Atatürkçü sıfatı ardında saklanması, gölgelemesi demektir (MMD, 2007).

⁷⁷ Kültür politikamızın önemli bir boyutu toplumda kabul gören, bilime ve akla uygunluk zemini taşıyan ailevi, ulusal ve dinsel değerleri korumaya yöneliktir (HYP, 2007).

⁷⁸ Fert, aile ve toplumun korunması için dini, ahlaki ve manevi eğitim anaokulundan itibaren başlatılacak ve güçlendirilecektir (SP, 2007, p. 34).

⁷⁹ Önce Ahlak ve Maneviyat Diyen Tek Parti Saadet Partisi'dir (SP, 2007, p. 25).

⁸⁰ Milli bütünlük bilincinin geliştirilmesi, ahlaki ve manevi değerlerin güçlendirilmesi ve sosyalleşmenin sağlanması için okul öncesi eğitim yaygınlaştırılacak (...) (MHP, 2007, p. 94).

⁸¹ Türkiye son yıllarda ağır bir ahlak erozyonuna uğramıştır. Bu erozyonun giderilmesi için partimiz bir ahlak devrimini gerekli görür (HYP, 2007).

⁸² Son zamanlarda özellikle gençlerde görülen kültürel yozlaşmaya karşı, **Türk Kültürünü** geliştirerek dünyaya yaymak (...) (Kuvvai Milliye Derneği, 2006).

⁸³ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devletinin ve Türk Milletinin Milli ve manevi değerlerine saldırıldığında ya da kayıtsız kalındığında kamuoyu oluşturmak amacıyla kapalı ve açık hava toplantıları ve gösterileri düzenlemek (...) (Kuvvai Milliye Derneği, 2006).

⁸⁴ Ülkemizin birliğine, bütünlüğüne yönelik tehlikeler teşkil etmemesi kaydıyla devletimizin sosyal, siyasal, ekonomik, bilimsel ve kişi temel hak ve hürriyetleri alanlarında çağdaş dünya devletleri arasında yer alması, onlarla dünya barışı adına sürdürülebilir kalkınma projeleri üretmek için atılacak her adıma ve alınacak olumlu her karara destek verilmesine özen göstermek düşüncesindeyiz (VKGB, 2005).

⁸⁵ Çokluk İçinde Birlik prensibini, mutlak hakikatler dışında her türlü farklılığın, her türlü görüş ve kavrayış biçiminin meşru ve makul kabul edilmesi olarak anlıyoruz (BBP, 1993).

⁸⁶ Siyaset iyiliği emretmek, kötülükleri yasaklamak için lüzumlu olan bir vasıttır (BBP, 1993).

⁸⁷ Devre dışı bırakılan Vatana İhanet (Hıyanet-i Vataniye) Kanunu'nun kapsamını genişleterek geri getireceğiz (HYP, 2007).

⁸⁸ Türkiye merkezli yeni bir medeniyet projesi hayata geçirilmelidir (MHP, 2007, p.3).

⁸⁹ Önümüzdeki çağ, Türk milletinin, geniş bir coğrafyaya uzanan kütlesiyle, Türk asrı olacaktır (BBP).

⁹⁰ 21. yüzyıl, Türkiye'nin yüzyılıdır (İP, 2007).

⁹¹ Milli Görüşe sarılacağız, Allahın yardımıyla yeniden Dünyanın efendisi olacağız (SP, 2007, p. 22).

⁹² Evrensel İmparatorluklar kurmuş olan Türkiye, çok değerli bir tarih ve kültür mirasına, köklü bir devlet geleneği ve tecrübesine sahiptir (MHP, 2007, p. 114).

⁹³ Demokrat Parti, Atatürk'ün işaret ettiği muasır medeniyet seviyesine ulaşma hedefi doğrultusunda, bilim ve teknolojiye hâkim, teknolojiyi bilinçli kullanan ve yeni teknolojiler üretebilen, teknolojik gelişmeleri toplumsal ve ekonomik faydaya dönüştürme yeteneği kazanmış bir refah toplumunu var etmeyi hedeflemektedir (DP, 2007, p. 27).

⁹⁴ (...) **Türk Kültürü dokusunu** koruyarak, Dünya devletleri ile bilim ve teknoloji konusunda yarışacak projeler üretmek, üretilmesine katkı sağlamak (...) (Kuvvai Milliye Derneği, 2006).

⁹⁵ Türk Milleti, muasır medeniyet seviyesinin üzerine kendi milli değerlerine bağlı olursa çıkabilir (VKGB, 2005).

⁹⁶ **TÜRK SOLU**'nun antiemperyalizmi Batı uygarlığının sadece ekonomik yönüne yönelik bir karşı çıkış değildir. Batı, kapitalizm ve emperyalizmle birlikte vardır. Onun tüm değerleri ister istemez kapitalizmin ve emperyalizmin halk düşmanı karakteri ile belirlenmiştir. Bu nedenle **TÜRK SOLU**, Batı medeniyetine tümüyle karşı çıkar. Batı uygarlığı emperyalizmin uygarlığıdır ve emperyalizmle birlikte yeryüzünden silinmelidir (Türksolu, 2002).

⁹⁷ Türkiye, Orta Asya'daki soydaşlarımıza Batı'nın menfaatlerini, çürümüş değerlerini taşıyan bir taşeron konumuna itiliyor (BBP, 1993).

⁹⁸ Dünyada eşi benzeri olmayan, insana, onun kültürüne, kimliğine, kökenine ve dini inancına koşulsuz saygıyı esas alan çağdaş Türkiye Modeli, 84 yıl evvel çakılmış bu çok özgün dengeden güç olarak egemenliğini sürdürmektedir (CHP, 2007, p. 1).

⁹⁹ Türkiye, tarihi mirasıyla, engin devlet tecrübesiyle, milli ve manevi değerleriyle, yüksek milli kültür ve ahlak şuuruyla ve insan kaynaklarıyla büyük ve güçlü bir ülkedir (MHP, 2007, p. 114).

¹⁰⁰ Ezilen ulusların Batı medeniyetinden öğrenecekleri, faydalanacakları bir şey yoktur. Ancak öze dönme çabası, ırkçı ve dinci bir 'eski güzel günlere' dönme hayali değildir. **TÜRK SOLU**, özellikle ezilen dünyada ırkçılığın ve dinciliğin ulusu bölücü ve emperyalizmi güçlendirici rolünü görür ve laikliği vazgeçilemez bir değer olarak savunur. Her ulus, kendi tarihinden ve kültüründen çağdaş bir uygarlık çıkarma potansiyeline sahiptir. Bugün Batı medeniyetinin tahakkümü altında bu potansiyel yok edilmeye çalışılmaktadır. Bu nedenle öze dönüş, Batı medeniyetine karşı ezilen ulusların kendi çağdaş değerlerini yaratma mücadelesidir (Türksolu, 2002).

¹⁰¹ Bölgesel bir güç potansiyeli olan Türkiye, uluslararası ilişkilerde hiçbir etkisi ve ağırlığı olmayan, sözüne itibar edilmeyen marjinal, ezik ve etkisiz bir ülke konumuna itilmiş (...) (MHP, 2007, p. 114).

¹⁰² Hükümet, askerlerimizin başına çuval geçirilerek Türk milletinin haysiyetine vurulan darbeye karşı da hiçbir tepki gösterememiştir. CHP'nin ısrarlı uyarı ve önerilerine rağmen bir protesto notası bile vermemiş, Türkiye'yi küçük düşürmüştür (CHP, 2007, p. 1).

¹⁰³ Tarihin en şerefli milletini, Allahın en büyük nimetlerini vermiş olduğu bu ülkeyi; sadece köle yaptılar, sadece sömürttüler, sadece aç bıraktılar, sadece gözyaşı getirdiler, sadece ahlak tahribatı yaptılar, sadece saadeti tahrip ettiler (SP, 2007, p. 27).

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- ¹⁰⁴ Partimiz; Atatürk İlke ve İnkılaplarına, hürriyetçi parlamenter demokratik sisteme, Anayasa'ya ve kanunlara bağlıdır (BTP, 2003).
- ¹⁰⁵ Atatürk devrim ve ilkelerinin, toplumsal sorunlarımızın çözümlenmesinde ışık tutucu niteliğe ve yaratıcı güce sahip olduğuna inananlar, "Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği"ni kurarak, O'nun devrim ve ilkelerinin gelecekte de egemen olmasına katkıda bulunma ve onlara bekçilik yapma zorunluluğunu duymuşlardır (ADD, 2006).
- ¹⁰⁶ HYP, bin yıllık ruh köklerimizle Atatürk ilkelerine aynı anda bağlı ve bu ikisini bütünleştirmeyi esas alan bir zihniyet ve siyaset ocağıdır (HYP, 2007).
- ¹⁰⁷ (...) Ulusalçı Demokratik Sol, Atatürk'ün yoludur (DSP, 2007, p. 107).
- ¹⁰⁸ **Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk**'ün inkılâp ve ilkelerinin benimsenmesi, korunması, yaygınlaştırılmasına yönelik (...) (Kuvvai Milliye Derneği, 2006).
- ¹⁰⁹ Eğitimde, Atatürk ilke ve devrimleriyle öğretim birliği anlayışından ödün vermeyeceğiz (CHP, 2007, p. 56).
- ¹¹⁰ (...) Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşı olmaktan gurur duyan milli, manevi ve mukaddes değerlerimizi koruyan Atatürk'ün Türk gençliğine hitabesinin idrakinde olan milli gençliğin vatansever bir kuşağın yetişmesi için çalışmak amacındayız (VKGB, 2005).
- ¹¹¹ Milli Mücadele Derneği, Atatürkçü eğitimin ve ulusal birliğin temelinde Milli Eğitim Birliğini yani Tevhid-i Tedrisatı görür. (...) Milli Mücadele Derneği, devletin başlatacağı Atatürkçü Ulusal Eğitim Seferberliğini savunur (MMD, 2007).
- ¹¹² (...) **Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk**'ün Onuncu Yıl Nutku'nda yer alan "*Millî kültürümüzü muasır medeniyet seviyesinin üstüne çıkaracağız.*" anlayışının benimsenmesi, korunması ve yaygınlaştırılmasına katkıda bulunacak (...) (Kuvvai Milliye Derneği, 2006).
- ¹¹³ **Atatürk'ün Türkiye'ye gösterdiği "çağdaş uygarlığı aşma"** hedefi, daha geçen yüzyılın başlarındaki bir vizyondur. O hedefi aşmanın yolu, bu yüzyılda "**bilgi toplumu**"nda etkin bir ülke olmaktan geçmektedir (DSP, 2007, p. 101).
- ¹¹⁴ Yüce Atatürk'ün ilke ve devrimleri doğrultusunda çağdaş uygarlık düzeyine erişmeyi hedef alan (...) (GP, 2002).
- ¹¹⁵ CHP, iktidarında Atatürk'ün özlemini gerçekleştirecek ve Türkiye'nin her alanda dünyanın en ileri ülkeleri arasında yerini almasını sağlayacaktır (CHP, 2007, p. 4).
- ¹¹⁶ Cumhuriyetimizin temel değerlerine vücut veren eğitim alanının, ülkemizin Atatürk'ün işaret ettiği "muasır medeniyet" seviyesine ulaşması için bir fırsat ve ivme merkezi olduğuna inanmaktayız (AKP, 2007, p. 45).
- ¹¹⁷ (ADD) Ulusal egemenliği tam olarak gerçekleştirmek, Ulusu tam bağımsızlık ilkesi uyarınca usa, bilime ve barışseverliğe öncelik vererek Atatürk'ün amaçladığı çağdaş uygarlık düzeyinin üstüne çıkarmak için gerekli çalışmaları yapar (ADD, 2006).
- ¹¹⁸ Cumhuriyetimize, Cumhuriyetimizin kurucusu Gazi Mustafa Kemal'in hedef ve düşüncelerine yürekten bağlıyız (VKGB, 2005).

119 Derneğin amacı; Atatürk'ün önderi olduğu Türk Devrimi'ni ve bu Devrimin temelini oluşturan başta Altıok, Atatürk ilkelerini her alanda ilerlemeye açık ve sürekli geliştirici nitelikteki düşünce sistemini, Devrimin bugünkü sonuçlarını ve yarınlara uzantılarını, Atatürk'ün düşüncelerini, davranışlarını, savaşımalarını ve yapıtlarını inceleme, araştırma konusu yapmak, bunlara karşı girişim, adım ve akımlarla yasalar çerçevesinde düşün savaşımı vermektir (ADD, 2006).

120 ATATÜRK ilke ve devrimlerine, "Laik Demokratik Cumhuriyetimizin" değer ve kurumlarına koşulsuz olarak sahip çıkacağız (CHP, 2007, p. 13).

121 (MMD) Anayasal ve yasal güvencelerle uygulanması şart koşulan Atatürk İlkelerinin çiğnenmesini engellemek için hukuksal mücadele eder (MMD, 2007).

122 Milletın Egemenliğine bir takım kayıt ve şartların konulmak istenmesi Atatürk'e ve onun Cumhuriyetine ihanettir (VKGB, 2005).

123 İşte bu koşullarda Atatürkçü olmak ya da "Atatürk'ü seviyorum" demek onu ve onun yarattıklarını savunmakla mümkün olabilir. Türkiye gençliği Atatürk'e ve Cumhuriyet'e yapılan saldırılara tabii ki sessiz kalmayacaktır (ADKF).

124 Milli Mücadele Derneği, en tepedeki "gaflet, dalalet ve hatta hıyanet içinde" olan unsurlardan, en dipteki işbirlikçilere kadar Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin bağımsızlığına, bütünlüğüne ve Atatürk tarafından saptanmış değiştirilemez ilkelerine karşı örgütlü mücadele yürütenlere karşı, Türk milletinin örgütlü gücünün oluşturulmasını hedefler (MMD, 2007).

125 (...) Ekonomik imkanlarımızı Batı'ya teslim edenler gaflet, dalalet ve ihanet içerisindeki bu davranışlarını "**Atatürk**" adını kullanarak yapmaktadırlar (VKGB, 2005).

126 İşte, Atatürk böylesine hayasızca istismar ediliyor (HYP, 2007).

127 Böylece "**Atatürk**" adını sömürenler, onun adına vatan ve millet düşmanlığı yaparak Türk milletini esarete mahkûm etmek isteyenlere vatandaşlarımız gerekli dersi verecektir (VKGB, 2005).

128 Ey Türk gençliği! Birinci vazifen, Türk istiklâlini, Türk Cumhuriyet'ini, ilelebet, muhafaza ve müdafaa etmektir. Mevcudiyetinin ve istikbalinin yegâne temeli budur. Bu temel, senin, en kıymetli hazinendir. İstikbalde dahi, seni bu hazineden mahrum etmek isteyecek, dahili ve harici bedhahların olacaktır. (Atatürk'ün Gençliğe Hitabesi, 1927).

129 Büyük Önder bu hitabede Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devletinin ileride yaşaması muhtemel hadiselerle karşı Türk Milletine kurtuluş reçetesi sunmuştur. Atatürk ebediyete intikalinin henüz 66. yılı olmasına rağmen onun ebediyete intikaliyle başlayan iç ve dış mihraklı faaliyetler ülkemize büyük zararlar vermiş halen vermeye devam etmektedir (VKGB, 2005).

130 Türkiye'nin karşısına çıkan olaylar bir yönüyle ülkenin varlığına yönelik tehditleri ve stratejik saldırıları ihtiva ederken (...) (MHP, 2007, p. 3).

131 Son birkaç yıldır, ülkemizin bu hassas dengesi, anayasamızın değiştirilemez kuralları, içeriden ve dışarıdan tehdit altındadır (CHP, 2007, p. 1).

132 Şimdi ülkemiz ve milletimiz, parçalanma ve bölünme, İsrail'e vilayet yapılma ve yok olma tehlikesiyle karşı karşıya bulunmaktadır (SP, 2007, p. 11).

133 Dış odakların kışkırtması sonucu iç barış, birlik ve bütünlüğümüz ciddi tehdit altındadır (BTP, 2003).

134 Türkiye, kendisini kuşatan, parçalayıp işgal etmeyi hedefleyen Batıyla “müttefiklik” aldatmacasını derhal terk etmelidir (MMD, 2007).

135 Türkiye-AB ilişkilerinin yakın geçmişi; şantajlar, önşartlar, dayatmalar, haksız talep ve baskılarla dolu bir hayal kırıklığı hikayesidir. AB, Türkiye’yi adeta özürsüz bir ülke olarak görmektedir. Bu süreçte Türkiye sürekli dışlanmıştır. AB’nin Türkiye’yi eşit haklara sahip bir ülke olarak içine kabul etmek istemediği artık anlaşılmıştır (MHP, 2007, p. 119).

136 Bugün ve her zaman yurt topraklarımız üzerinde gözü olan, hain emellere sahip kişi, örgüt ve ülkeler bulunmaktadır. Ülkeye yabancı etkenliğini egemen kılma gayretleri büyük bir ölçüde ve eylemli olarak girmiştir. Memleketin kötü yönetilmesinin mutlaka önlenmesi gerekmektedir. Milli Devletler ve vatandaşlarının korunduğu duvarlar; Yeni Dünya Düzeni yutturmacası ile yıkılmaktadır. Uluslar arası gizli güçler ve bir takım arkası karanlık Uluslararası şirketler vasıtasıyla emperyalist ülkelerin vatandaşları dahi emperyal düşünce ve duygularla yetiştirilmektedir (VKGB, 2005).

137 Küreselleşme ve AB süreciyle ülkemize adeta yeni bir Sevr dayatılmaktadır (HYP, 2007).

138 Avrupa Birliği’nin Lozan’ı kaldırıp, açıkça **SEVR**’i uygulamak istemesi üzerine (...) (SP, 2007, p. 21).

139 AB güdümünde ve AB kapısında yoksullaşma var, parçalanma var, mayın var, bomba var (İP, 2007).

140 Millettin öz güvenini yok etmek, gelecekte ümidini kesmek, kimliksiz ve kişisiz bir toplum ile kuralsızlığın prim yaptığı bir düzen oluşturmak ve Devletimizin temel dinamiklerine saldırmak suretiyle üniter devlet yapısını tahrip etmek amacıyla yönelik alt yapıyı oluşturmayı hedef alan bir çok düzenleme ve eylem, AKP döneminde gerçekleştirilmiştir (MHP).

141 (...) Kayıtsız şartsız Türk milletine ait olan “**Egemenlik**” haklarının Türk Milleti dışındaki bir başka Ulus, Ulus üstü kurum, Kuruluş, Devlet, Devletler topluluğu veya Birliğe devir ve kullanımına yönelik faaliyetler hızla devam etmektedir (VGKB, 2005).

142 Milli Mücadele Derneği, AB’ye “onurlu” veya onursuz her türlü üyelik sürecine karşıdır. Cumhuriyet’in ve Anayasa’nın temel ilkelerine de karşı olan bu sürece karşı egemenliğin yeniden “kayıtsız şartsız millete” teslim edilmesi için mücadele eder (MMD, 2007).

143 Ülkenin gücünü, güvenini ve kişiliğini ifade eden ne varsa talana açık haldedir. Yabancı süper marketler, kendi mallarımızı bize pazarlayıp bizi sömürmektedirler. İçeride bizi biz yapan, Türkiye’nin adını, kişiliğini simgeleyen tüm markalarımız yok ediliyor. Bir yandan bilinçaltımız, öte yandan kesemiz ve kasamız boşaltılıyor (HYP, 2007).

144 Türkiye’de son 150 yıldır toplumumuza dayatılan yabancı unsurların ithaline karşıyız. Müslüman Türk toplumunun en asli özelliklerini ve hasletlerini günden güne tahrip eden yabancı kültürlerin insanımıza olan yabancılığı açıktır (BBP, 1993).

145 (...) ırkçı emperyalizmin kontrolündeki onların çökmüş, çürümüş sosyal yapısı ve yaşadıkları zulümler göz önünde dururken ahlâmımızı özümüzü bırakıp onlara benzeyeceğiz. Bunun için gerekirse 30 sene müzakere yapıp, her türlü milli varlığımızı ortadan kaldıracamız demekten büyük bedbahtlık olur mu? (SP, 2007, p. 20).

146 Milli çıkarlarımız ucuz pazarlıkların konusu haline getirilerek tehlikeye atılmış, milli davalarımız adeta bir yük ve kambur olarak görülmüş ve ver-kurtul anlayışıyla feda edilmiş ve milli onur ve haysiyetimiz ağır yara almıştır (MHP, 2007, p. 114).

147 AB'nin yaptığı köle muamelesine muhatap olunmuş ve şerefli tarihimize yakışmayan her türlü hakarete maruz kalınmıştır (SP).

148 Güzel vatanımız içeriden ve dışarıdan kuşatılmış, ülkemiz işbirlikçilerin faaliyetleri neticesinde büyük tehlikelerle karşı karşıya bırakılmıştır. Bu faaliyetler bilhassa son altı yıldır hızlandırılmış bir şekilde devam etmektedir. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti, Osmanlı Devletini yıkılmaya götüren hadiselerin en az yüz misli şiddetinde bir global komplo ile karşı karşıyadır (VKGB, 2005).

149 İşte üzerinden atlanmaması gereken gerçek tehdit de budur. Dışardan kuşatılan, içerden çökertilen Türkiye'de esas vurucu güç Şeriatçılar ve Kürtçülerdir (MMD, 2007).

150 Türk dış politikasını başkalarına güven esasından çıkarıp başkalarına güvenmeme esasına oturtacağız (HYP, 2007).

151 Bir gün, istiklâl ve cumhuriyeti müdafaa mecburiyetine düşersen, vazifeye atılmak için, içinde bulunacağın vaziyetin imkân ve şeraitini düşünmeyeceksin! (...) Ey Türk istikbalinin evladı! İşte, bu ahval ve şerait içinde dahi, vazifen; Türk istiklâl ve cumhuriyetini kurtarmaktır! Muhtaç olduğun kudret, damarlarındaki asil kanda, mevcuttur! (Atatürk's Address to Youth, 1927).

152 Türkiye'yi içten ve dıştan kuşatan emperyalist güçler Cumhuriyeti yıkmak, Türkiye'yi parçalamak, Türk vatanını işgal etmek ve Türk milletini yok etmek için yeniden harekete geçmiştir. "Damarlarında asil Türk kanı" taşıyan her Türk evladına düşen, milletine biçilen bu ölüm fermanını yırtmak için ayağa kalkmaktır (MMD, 2007).

153 Gençliğin; devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle bölünmez bütünlüğünü ortadan kaldırmayı hedefleyen unsurlara karşı mücadele etmek üzere milli değerlerle mücehhez yetişmeleri sağlanacaktır (MHP, 2007, p. 101).

154 Türkiye gençliği Atatürk'e ve Cumhuriyet'e yapılan saldırılara tabii ki sessiz kalmayacaktır. (...) Türkiye gençliğinin şanlı mücadele tarihinden aldığımız güçle üzerimize düşeni yerine getirmek için her türlü fedakarlığa hazırız (ADKF, 2000).

155 Türkiye, her cephede Batı'dan gelen o "hayasız akın"la karşı karşıyadır. Günün görevi vatan savunmasıdır. Geleceğimiz, bu görevin başarıyla yerine getirilmesine bağlıdır (İP, 2007).

156 **TÜRK SOLU** bu savaşta hem emperyalistlere hem de onların sol komradorlarına karşı milliyetçi mücadelenin önderliğini yürütür (Türksolu, 2002).

157 İrkçi Emperyalizmin başlatmış olduğu ve yürütmekte olduğu 20. Haçlı Seferi karşısında AKP gibi onlara destek verip, Müslüman ülkelerin bir bir yutulmasına ve arkadan aziz vatanımızın parçalanıp, bölünüp Büyük İsrail'e vilâyet yapılıp yok olmasına seyirci mi kalacağız, yoksa asırlar boyu ecdadımızın yaptığı gibi Milletimizin ve bütün insanlığın saadeti için yeryüzünün, Filistin gibi kan gölüne çevrilmesini önlemek, hâlihazır "**Zulüm Dünyası**" yerine, bir "**Saadet Dünyası**"nı kurmak için üzerimize düşen insanlık görevimizi mi yapacağız (SP, 2007, p. 3).

158 Etnik bölünmeyi amaçlayan kanlı terör, siyasi ayrılıkçılık ve etnik tahrikler Türkiye'nin önündeki en büyük sorun ve tehdittir (MHP, 2007, p. 28).

¹⁵⁹ AB, Türkiye’de dine ve kavmiyete bağlı azınlıklar yaratma gayreti içine girerek ülkenin ve milletin bölünmez bütünlüğünü tehdit edici dayatmalar getirmiştir (HYP, 2007).

¹⁶⁰ Cumhuriyetimizin kurucusu Ulu Önder Atatürk’ün, “Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene!” anlayışına karşı çıkan herkes Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin düşmanıdır ve öyle kalacaktır (TSK, 2007).

¹⁶¹ Milli Mücadele Derneği, Batının Türkiye’de dayattığı yeni azınlıklar yaratma politikasına karşı çıkar (MMD, 2007).

¹⁶² “Kamu yönetimini, yargıyı, siyaseti, eğitimi ve ticareti”, gerici tarikat odaklarıyla, dini çıkar ve fesat yuvalarıyla kuşatma, üniter yapıyı aşındırma çabaları giderek yaygınlık kazanmaktadır (CHP, 2007, p. 1).

¹⁶³ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti devletinin, başta laiklik olmak üzere, temel değerlerini aşındırmak için bitmez tükenmez bir çaba içinde olan bir kısım çevrelerin, bu gayretlerini son dönemde artırdıkları müşahede edilmektedir (TSK, 2007).

¹⁶⁴ Türkiye’yi tekrar ortaçağa döndürmek isteyen Şeriat tehdidine karşı çıktığımız için laikliği savunuyoruz (ADKF, 2000).

¹⁶⁵ Düne kadar Şeriatçı ve Kürtçü hareketler olarak, Türkiye içinde huzursuzluk yaratan, bölücülük yaratan unsurlar artık Kürt-İslam devletini talep eden bir güce erişmiştir (MMD, 2007).

¹⁶⁶ Bu umut vaad eden geleceğe karşılık daha şimdiden önümüze bir yığın engel çıkartılıyor, doğmakta olan gücümüzü boğmak için bin türlü oyun oynanıyor (BBP, 1993).

¹⁶⁷ Bu nedenle dünyaya yaşam biçimiyle, temizliğiyle, yüksek ahlaki değerleriyle, Kültür ve medeniyetiyle örnek olmuş, halende örnek olmaya devam eden asil Türk Milletine kendisinden yirmi beden küçük bir elbisenin giydirmeye çalışılmasını anlamak mümkün değildir (VKGB, 2005).

¹⁶⁸ Türk devletinin bütünlüğünü, Türk vatanının topraklarını, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’ni koruyan en önemli güçlerden biri Atatürk’ün Ordusu, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri’dir (MMD, 2007).

¹⁶⁹ Devletlerin gücünün göstergelerinden birisi de güçlü orduya sahip olmalarıdır. Bundan hareketle Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti’nin gücünün artması ve varlığının muhafaza edilebilmesi için Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, dünyanın sayılı süper güçlerinden biri haline getirilecektir (BTP, 2003).

¹⁷⁰ Türkiye’nin en değerli yeraltı zenginliği, toprağın altındaki şehit kemikleridir. Şehit ailelerinin ve gazilerin korunması, Cumhuriyet’in ve vatanın savunulması görevi içindedir. Milli Hükümet, bu anlayışla toplumumuzda şehit ve gazilere minnet ve saygı bilincini güçlendirir. Şehitlerimizin ve kahramanlarımızın anıları yaşatılacak, mezarları ve anıtları imar edilecektir (İP, 2007).

¹⁷¹ Geçmişte Türk Milleti, kendisini yükselten ve yücelten tarihi misyonuna sahip çıktığı dönemlerde dünyaya hükmetmiş; insanlığa adaleti, insan haklarını, ilmi, teknolojiyi ve medeniyeti öğretmiştir (BTP, 2003).

¹⁷² Bu gün ilmi gerçekliği daha da kabul edilir halde bulunan, Türk tarih tezi yerine ilmen hiçbir geçerliliği bulunmayan Batı’nın İndo Germen - Hint Avrupa nazariyeleri esas alınarak kitaplar yazılmış, bu kitaplar örnek gösterilerek Türk milletinin binlerce yıllık tarihi yok sayılmak ve aynı ırkın, aynı cevherin damarları olan bir kısım vatandaşlarımızın farklı ırklardan geldiği iddiasıyla milli birliğimiz ve bütünlüğümüze kastedilmek istenmiştir (VKGB, 2005).

¹⁷³ Atatürk, çok büyük bir imkân yaratmıştı. Ona en küçük bir ekleme yapılıyorsa Türkiye bugün Japon mucizesini geride bırakmış olacaktı (HYP, 2007).

¹⁷⁴ Önümüzdeki çağ, Türk milletinin, geniş bir coğrafyaya uzanan kütlesiyle, Türk asrı olacaktır (BBP, 1993).

¹⁷⁵ Bilişim ve internet alanında hızlı bir gelişimi yakalamak ve bu alanları ideal şekilde kullanarak, bilgi çağını **“Türk’lerin Altın Çağı”** haline getirmek (...) (Kuvvai Milliye Derneği, 2006).

¹⁷⁶ Türkiye’nin karşısındaki asayiş ve güvenlik tablosu her bakımdan ürkütücüdür. Can ve mal güvenliği kalmamış, Türkiye suç ve suçlular cenneti haline gelmiştir (MHP, 2007, p. 26).

¹⁷⁷ **“Dinler Bahçesi” “Diyalog” “Medeniyetlerin Buluşması”** gibi kamuflej arkasında yine ırkçı emperyalizmin istediği şekilde İslam’ın aslının ve özünün değiştirilmesine yönelik adımlar atılmıştır (SP, 2007, p. 19).

¹⁷⁸ [ABD yönetiminin] Bugün öncelikli hedefleri Türkiye’dir. Ülkemizi parçalanmış gösteren haritaları NATO toplantılarında duvara yansıtmaktan çekinmediler (İP, 2007).

¹⁷⁹ (...) ABD ve AB’nin baskısıyla etnik diller yaratılmakta ve zorla eğitim kurumlarına sokulmak istenmektedir (MMD, 2007).

¹⁸⁰ Dil meselemiz Vatan topraklarının savunulması kadar önemli bir meseledir. Bir milletin dilini bozdunuz mu, bir ülkede farklı diller oluşmasını temin ettiniz mi dış mihrakların ülke üzerinde bölme ve parçalanma oyunlarına geçit vermiş olursunuz (VKGB, 2005).

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Appendices

Appendix A:

Brief Descriptions of the Political Parties and Institutions

a. Political parties

1. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) [Justice and Development Party] was established in 2001. It is a right-wing political party and its dominant ideological tendencies are conservatism and neo-liberalism.
2. Bağımsız Türkiye Partisi (BTP) [Independent Turkey Party] was established in 2001. Its ideological tendencies are nationalism, conservatism, and Islamism.
3. Büyük Birlik Partisi (BBP) [Great Union Party] established in 1993. It is an ethnicist-essentialist, radical right party. Its ideological tendencies are ultra-nationalism and Islamism.
4. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) [Republican People's Party] was established in 1923. It is the first political party in the republican regime and the parliament in Turkey. It defines itself as a centre-left party. Its dominant ideological tendencies are Kemalism, secularism and statism.
5. Demokrat Parti (DP) [Democrat Party] was established in 2007. It is the successor to Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP) [True Path Party] which was established in 1983. It is a right-wing party and its dominant ideological tendencies are secularism, conservatism and neo-liberalism.

6. Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP) [Democratic Left Party] was established in 1985. It presents itself as a social democrat, center-left party. Its dominant ideological tendencies are social democracy and secularism.
7. Emek Partisi (EMEP) [Labor Party] was established in 1996. Its ideological tendency is declared as scientific socialism.
8. Genç Parti (GP) [Young Party] was established in 2002. Its dominant ideological tendencies are nationalism, secularism and liberalism.
9. Halkın Yükselişi Partisi (HYP) [People's Ascent Party] was established in 2005. Its dominant ideological tendency is declared as a combination of Islamic conservatism, secularism, and Kemalism.
10. İşçi Partisi (İP) [Workers' Party] was established in 1992. Its ideological tendency is nationalist socialism and Kemalism. Its political aim is an anti-imperialist struggle for absolute independence.
11. Liberal Demokrat Parti (LDP)[Liberal Democrat Party] was established in 1994. Its dominant ideological tendency is liberalism.
12. Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP) [Nationalist Movement Party] was established in 1969. It is an extremist nationalistic party which emphasizes an ethnicist-essentialist ideology. "Greywolf" is the symbol of MHP.
13. Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi (ÖDP) [Freedom and Solidarity Party] was established in 1996. It was founded by several left-wing

political groups. Its dominant ideological tendencies are libertarian socialism and democracy.

14. Saadet Partisi (SP) [Felicity Party] was established in 2001. A group from Fazilet Partisi [Virtue Party] founded it, while the Justice and Development Party was founded by another group from the Virtue Party. The ideological tendency of SP is Islamism.

15. Türkiye Komünist Partisi (TKP) [Communist Party of Turkey] was established in 2001. Its ideological tendency is the Stalinist version of Marxism, Soviet communism. It founded Yurtsever Cephe [Patriotic Front] in 2005 with an attempt to organize a struggle against the membership of EU and liberalism.

b. Governmental institutions

1. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri [Turkish Armed Forces General Military Staff] is the governmental institution which is officially overseen by the Prime Ministry, but it has a de facto influence over the politics in Turkey which experienced four military coups, in 1960, 1971 (memorandum), 1980, and 1997 (a post-modern coup). The statement of General Military Staff in April 27, 2007, during the crisis over the election of the President of the Republic, can also be accepted as a memorandum.

c. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's)

1. Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği (ADD) [Association of Atatürkist Thought] was founded in 1989. It is a country-wide association which also has branches in four countries. Its ideological tendencies

are Kemalism, Turkish nationalism, and laicism. Its main aim is to preserve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's principles and transformations.

2. Atatürkçü Düşünce Kulüpleri Federasyonu (ADKF) [Federation of the Clubs of Atatürkist Thought] was founded in 2000. It is a country-wide youth organization which aims to mobilize the young people around "left-wing" Kemalism, Turkish nationalism, laicism, and anti-imperialism. It is closely linked with Türksolu [Turkish Left].
3. Kuvvai Milliye Derneği [Association of Kuvvai Milliye (National Forces)] was founded in 2006. It is a country-wide association which has limited number of branches. Its ideological tendencies are Kemalism, Turkish nationalism, and anti-imperialism.
4. Milli Mücadele Derneği (MMD) [Association of National Struggle] was founded in 2007. It is a country-wide association which aims to mobilize Turkish people around "left-wing" Kemalism, Turkish nationalism, laicism, and anti-imperialism. It is closely linked with Türksolu.
5. Vatansever Kuvvetler Güç Birliği Hareketi Derneği [Association of The Movement of Power Union of Patriotic Forces] was founded in 2005. It is a country-wide paramilitary organization. Its dominant ideological tendency is ethnicist-essentialist nationalism.

d. Political journal

1. Türksolu [Turkishleft] started to be published in 2002. Its ideological position is described as “national left” which consists of “left-wing Kemalism” and anti-imperialism.

Appendix B:

Official Results of July 22, 2007 Parliamentary General Election

(YSK, 2007)

Total number of registered voter	42.799.303
Total number of voter who voted	36.056.293
Total number of valid vote	35.049.691
Total number of invalid vote	1.006.602
The ratio of participation in election	84,25%

The Name of the Party	Translation of the Name	Vote	Ratio(%)
Aydınlık Türkiye Partisi	Bright Turkey Party	100.982	0,29
Bağımsız Türkiye Partisi	Independent Turkey Party	182.095	0,52
Saadet Partisi	Felicity Party	820.289	2,34
İşçi Partisi	Workers' Party	128.148	0,37
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi	Republican People's Party	7.317.808	20,88
Halkın Yükselişi Partisi	People's Ascent Party	179.010	0,51
Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi	Freedom and Solidarity Party	52.055	0,15
Genç Parti	Young Party	1.064.871	3,04
Demokrat Parti	Democrat Party	1.898.873	5,42
Liberal Demokrat Parti	Liberal Democrat Party	35.364	0,10
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi	Nationalist Movement Party	5.001.869	14,27
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi	Justice and Development Party	16.327.291	46,58
Emek Partisi	Labor Party	26.292	0,08
Türkiye Komünist Partisi	Communist Party of Turkey	79.258	0,23
Bağımsızlar	Independents	1.835.486	5,24