

THE IMPACT OF EUROPEANIZATION ON GREECE'S
ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY TOWARDS TURKEY

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YUNANISTAN'IN TÜRKİYE'YE YÖNELİK BİRLEŞME
STRATEJİSİNDE AVRUPALILAŞMANIN ETKİSİ

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- 1) Europeanization
- 2) Greek Foreign Policy
- 3) Engagement Strategy
- 4) Political Engagement Strategy
- 5) Financial Engagement Strategy

Özet

Türk ve Yunan taraflarının yeniden yakınlaşmasında her iki tarafın da adımlar attığı bilinmektedir. Ancak bu çalışma tekrar yakınlaşma için Yunan tarafının çabaları ile sınırlı tutulmuştur. Yunan dış politikasının Avrupalılaşması ve Türkiye'ye karşı Yunanistan'ın Birleşme Stratejisi üzerine çok mürekkep harcandı ve çok sayıda literatür oluşturuldu. Bu tezin amacı, bu ikisi arasındaki bağlantıyı kurmaktır. Avrupalılaşma, Avrupa Birliği üyelik stratejisini nasıl etkiliyor ve nasıl şekil veriyor? Avrupa Birliği ailesine üye olmayan ve revizyonist istekleri olduğu düşünülen bir ülkenin bu stratejiyi benimsemede Avrupalılaşmanın etkisi nasıldır? Yunan dış politikasına şekil verenlerin gözünden hali hazırdaki strateji, güvenlik endişeleri yönünden neden uygun bir çözüm olarak görülüyor? Bu politikanın stratejik önemi olduğunu göz önünde bulundurarak, bu kararın arasındaki göstergelerin vurgulanması ve stratejinin nasıl yorumlandığının ve izlendiğinin gösterilmesi tezin amacıdır.

Abstract

Although it is assumed that the improved atmosphere in Greek-Turkish relations since 1999 is composed of the initiatives undertaken by both sides the paper self-consciously restricts its case-study to the contribution to this evolution on behalf of the Greek side. Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy and Greece's Engagement Strategy towards Turkey during the last decade constitute topics in the name of which a lot of literature has been developed. Aim of this thesis is to find out and establish a link between them. How is Europeanization able to influence and shape the formulation of an EU member state strategy? How can it contribute to the adoption of a strategy especially in cases where the targeted state does not belong to the EU family and is perceived to hold revisionist aspirations? Why does the currently employed strategy seem according to the today's Greek Foreign Policy Makers the proper solution to deal with their security concerns? Assuming that the adoption of this policy is of strategic importance the author is interested to highlight the indicator behind this decision and to illustrate the way this strategy was interpreted and pursued.

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ABBREVIATIONS

BOTAS	Turkish Petroleum Pipeline Corporation
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
DEPA	Greece's Public Gas Corporation
EAGGF	European Agricultural Guidance & Guarantee Fund
EC	European Community
EMU	European Monetary Union
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDP	European Security Defense Policy
ESF	European Social Fund
EU	European Union
FIR	Flight Information Region
FYROM	Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia
HiPERB	Hellenic Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans
ICJ	International Court of Justice
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NBG	National Bank of Greece
PA.SO.K	Pan-Hellenic Socialistic Movement
QMV	Qualified Majority Vote
SEA	Single European Act
SEGR	Southern European Gas Ring
TEU	Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty)
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WWII	Second World War

INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the Cyprus events in 1974 Turkey had been formerly perceived by Greece's Foreign Policy Decision Makers, political elites and public opinion as the main threat to Greece's territorial integrity with special reference to the Aegean Sea and Western Thrace. The common participation at NATO from 1952 seemed incapable of preventing crises and armed conflicts among the two members jeopardizing in many cases the existence and the substance of the organization's southeastern flank.¹ Greece's accession at EC proved also not to be an adequate solution to deal with its main foreign policy challenge, since its partners from a Greek point of view did not initially seem eager to comprehend and share its security concerns.² Although the end of Cold War led to the transformation of the military-defense situation in Europe, Greece remained one of the few states that seemed to experience less the occurring changes.³ The newly emerged and globalized context did not even theoretically alter its fundamental security and defense dimension besides the additional new challenges that had been raised (terrorism, human trafficking, and multiple armed conflicts in different regions).

For more than three decades dealing in the most effective way with the conceived threat emanating from the East constituted a question that had drawn the attention of political analysts, journalists, international relations' scholars, military and politicians in Greece. A continuous arms race between the two states was for many years reflecting the preoccupation that was taking place in the framework of

¹ D. Manikas, *The World Order in the 21st Century and Greece's Security* [in Greek], [Athens 2004 ELLHN], p. 74

² Y. Stivachtis, "Living with Dilemmas: Greek-Turkish Relations at the Rise of the 21st Century" http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/03_jb00_25.pdf

³ K. Ifantis, "The New Role of Greece in the Regional System: Trends, Challenges and Capabilities" in P.C Ioakimidis (ed.) *Greece in the European Union: The New Role & the New Agenda*, [Athens Ministry of Press and Mass Media 2002], p. 257

their bilateral relations.⁴ Greek policy towards Turkey had focused on how to prevent a Turkish attack on Greece and pursued strategies that were perceived to constitute a theoretical deviation from the European approach to security by means of achieving regional stability.⁵

After 1999 a thaw is observed in Greek-Turkish relations. Many scholars and people have attributed a “wind of change” in their relations to the understanding that the people from both sides showed to each other during the devastating earthquakes in August and September of 1999. The historical legacies and prejudices were questioned while facing a common human tragedy. The interaction among the people was supposed to pave the way for further cooperation in a political level. Moreover personal initiatives undertaken by the two Foreign Ministers, Cem and Papandreou, during that period supposedly contributed to the change of climate in the bilateral relations. Others sought to ascribe the current rapprochement into commonly shared geopolitical considerations that have emerged in the aftermath of Soviet Union’s and Yugoslavia’s demise. From another perspective the involvement of third parties (USA, EU) seemed to constitute a crucial variable in the amelioration of their relations.

Without ignoring the importance of all these indicators this paper is examining the contribution of the Greek side to the current improvement of the bilateral relations. Which was the underlying factor that influenced Greeks to reshape their policy towards Turkey? Which was the variable that led them to the embracement of a strategy non-similar to the one that had been adopted so far? What

⁴ G. Georgiou, P. Kapopoulos, S. Lazaretou, “Modeling Greek-Turkish Rivalry: An Empirical Investigation of Defense Spending Dynamics” in *Journal of Peace Research*, 33:2, p. (May 1996), p. 229-239

⁵ A. Evin, “The future of Greek-Turkish Relations” in *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 5:3 September 2005, p. 395-404 and E. Peteinarakis, “The Kantian Peace and Greek-Turkish Relations”, Master’s Thesis, Jun 2007 <http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA473386&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>

was the rationale behind pursuing the policy that is going to be described in the following pages? How was this strategy formulated? These are the questions the current thesis is concerned with.

Although the author is aware of the fact that the realm of the recent rapprochement is composed of the initiatives assumed by both sides the paper self-consciously restricts its case-study to the Greek side. Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy as well as Greece's Engagement Strategy towards Turkey during the last decade constitutes topic for which a lot of ink has been spilled and a lot of literature has been developed. Aim of this thesis is to find out and establish a link between them. How can Europeanization influence and shape the formulation of an EU member state strategy? How can it contribute to the adoption of a strategy especially in cases where the targeted state does not belong to the EU and is perceived to hold revisionist aspirations? Why does the currently employed strategy seem in the eyes of today's Greek Foreign Policy Makers the proper solution for their security concerns? Assuming that the adoption of this policy is of strategic importance the author is interested to highlight the indicator behind this decision and to illustrate the way this strategy was interpreted and pursued.

The sources which contributed to the formulation of this paper consist of international relations' and political science's books, journals, magazines, newspapers and web links. It should be noted that the content of the term "engagement" is based on the assumptions that Ifantis, in the context of several articles, has provided with. Regarding the attempt to approach the conceptual framework of Europeanization the author exploits the existing literature as it has been developed mainly by the papers of Radaelli, Ladrech and Olsen. With respect to the link between Europeanization and Foreign Policy in general, Smith's work might facilitate the understanding of any

relationship that exists among the two parameters. The description of the theoretical framework of engagement strategy will be ascribed into the combination of three different theories: democratic peace theory, liberal institutionalism and interdependence theories. The works of Doyle and Nye constitute the main literature on which the approach of engagement as a concept has been theoretically based.

Several articles of Ioakimidis, Tsardanidis, Stavridis and Economides will help the author to describe how Europeanization has generally influenced Greek Foreign Policy. The link between Europeanization and Greece's engagement strategy towards Turkey relies to a considerable extent upon Tsakonas' and Dokos' texts and approaches. The analysis of the way engagement strategy was adopted by Greece towards Turkey is mainly founded on articles published in political and financial Greek newspapers as well as diplomatic magazines.

The first part of the paper is dedicated to the analysis and determination of a variable which according to the author has functioned in a catalytic way for the Greek side to adopt and pursue the aforementioned policy towards Turkey today. The meaning of Europeanization is the question which the first chapter is seeking to focus on. Which are the theories that have been so far emerged for the definition of this term? Which is the link between Europeanization and foreign policy of a state? How can Europeanization exert its influence to the foreign policy of a country considering that foreign policy in general as a study possesses a distinct nature which enables it to maneuver between international relations and domestic politics' studies? These are the questions this part is concerned with.

The second chapter will focus on the definition of engagement strategy in general. How is security perceived in the context of the newly emerged and globalized world? What is the theoretical background of engagement and how does it distinguish

from containment? How is Europeanization able to influence a state pursuing an engagement policy?

The third one is describing the phases that Europeanization had to go through in the Greek Foreign Policy realm. How is Europeanization interpreted in the Greek realities? Could someone claim that Greek Foreign Policy today has been exposed, influenced and shaped by the Europeanization dynamics?

The fourth one is analyzing the way engagement strategy was implemented in the framework of Greek Foreign Policy towards Turkey. Why is Turkey regarded by Greeks as a potential threat for Greece's territorial integrity? What was the content of the containment strategy which had been pursued so far? What was the rationale beyond altering its strategy? How did Europeanization influence Greek Foreign Policy decision makers to pursue an engagement policy?

The 5th and the 6th chapter seek to highlight the way engagement strategy was pursued by Greek officials towards Turkey. The former analyzes the political background on which this policy was based while the latter describes the respective financial one. While pursuing this policy which had been constructed on these two pillars have Greeks managed to deal effectively with their perceived security challenges? These are the issues the current paper is concerned with.

CHAPTER A: EUROPEANIZATION AND FOREIGN POLICY

1. Introduction

The developments of a post Cold-War Europe through the dissolution of Soviet Union and the liberation of Eastern Europe combined with an increasingly interdependent European continent constitute significant changes witnessed by the scholars of International Studies and challenging basic assumptions of Foreign Policy Analysis.⁶ These changes observed also by the Greek Foreign Policy makers made them realize the imperative need to embrace policies adapted to the newly emerged realities.

Concerning the Greek case it is inconceivable to comprehend the fundamentals of its renewed Foreign Policy (with special reference towards Turkey) if the consequences emanating from a concept that has catalytically contributed to its transformation are not taken into account. This concept is named Europeanization.

In the framework of the current thesis, this term is used as the proper analytical tool and independent variable that will facilitate to comprehend an outcome or a dependent variable regarding Greece's Engagement Strategy towards Turkey. Although variety of reasons forced Greece to transform its policy towards its neighbor the main factor that could include all the transforming-elements is reflected in an important extent by "Europeanization". The emerging questions are the following: How can be Europeanization defined and how can it contribute to the transformation of a foreign policy?

⁶ J. M. Rothgreb, "The Changing International Context for Foreign Policy", in L. Neck, J. A. K. Hey, P. J. Haney (eds.) *Foreign Policy Analysis Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1995.

2. The meaning of Europeanization

It constitutes a term commonly used in political science in the name of which many things have been written. Aim of this chapter is to highlight some components of this concept that might be useful for the deeper comprehension of the changes occurred or occurring in the context of Greek Foreign Policy realities. Some theoretical approaches might contribute to the understanding of the concept.

Radaelli is defining Europeanization as “a) construction b) diffusion c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms which are the first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and often incorporated within the logic of domestic discourse and identities”.⁷ Ladrech states that Europeanization depicts “an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy making”.⁸ Inherent in this conception is the notion that the actors involved redefine their interests and behavior in order to get aligned with the imperative norms and logic of EC/EU membership. It connotes the processes and the mechanisms by which European-institution building may change cause at domestic level.⁹ The emerging question that should be raised is the following one: how could be these European values, norms, practices and processes that seem to compose the whole “Europeanization structure” identified?¹⁰

⁷ Radaelli C. M, “Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive change” *European Integration online Papers (EIoP)* Vol. 4 (2000) N° 8; <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2000-008.pdf>

⁸ Ladrech R, “Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions. The case of France.” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 32: 1, (1994) 69-99

⁹ Börzel T. & Risse T, When Europe hits home: Europeanization and Domestic Change in *European Integration online Papers (EIoP)* Vol. 4 (2000) No. 15 <http://www.eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-015a.htm>

¹⁰ S. Bulmer, “Theorizing Europeanization” in P. Gaziano & M. Vink (eds.) *Europeanization New Research Agenda* [Palgrave Macmillan 2003] p. 47-48 and Featherstone K, “In the Name of Europe”, in K. Featherstone & C.M. Radaelli (eds.) *The Politics of Europeanization* [Oxford University Press 2003], p. 7

What might consciously be derived by thinking of the Europeanization concept are the values on the basis of which the European integration process has been built. The end of protectionism, import substitution, and nationalization allowing the emergence of vibrant market societies and powerful business interests could be considered some representative examples. European Union and almost every notion dealing with the up-to date Europe is composed by the aforementioned elements. In the words of Keridis growth of a middle class, the expansion of a mobile, urban and consumer society; the arrival of economic immigrants; and the eruption of ethnic conflicts in the vicinity have stimulated a debate over identity that challenges traditional conceptions of the nation-state and demands an institutional and cultural national redefinition. The image of a state business-friendly, more outward looking, more future and achievement oriented and tolerant to cultural and religion diversities seems close to what is called Europeanized.¹¹ As Ioakimidis points out the loosening of the grip of the state over the social institutions and the reinforcement of the latter's autonomy along with the creation of new possibilities for the participation of pressure and interest groups in the policy-making process at national and European levels are contributing to the same direction.¹²

Olsen seeking to "illumine the depths" of the whole process ascribes its existence and substance into five components:

- *changes in external boundaries* that signify a territorial reach of a governance system and the degree to which Europe as continent is becoming a unified political sphere

¹¹ Keridis D, "Domestic Developments and Foreign Policy Greek Policy Toward Turkey" in Keridis D. & Triantaphyllou D. (eds.) *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization* (Brassey's 2001), p. 2-18

¹² Ioakimidis P. C , "The Europeanization of Greece: an overall assessment" in Iokimidis P.C (ed.) *Greece in the European Union: The New Role and the New Agenda* (Athens Ministry of Press and Mass Media 2002), p.49-63

- *developing institutions at European level* that illustrates a centre-building with a collective action capacity providing some degree of coordination and coherence
- *central penetration of national systems of governance* in the context of which Europeanization involves the division of responsibilities and powers between different levels of governance searching for the “golden mean” between unity and diversity, central coordination and local autonomy
- *exporting forms of political organization* according to which Europeanization focuses on relations with non Europe-actors and institutions and the “path” that leads Europe to find a place in larger world order
- *a political unification project* that highlights the degree to which Europe becomes more unified and stronger political entity in terms of territorial space, central-building, domestic adaptation and how European developments interact with systems of governance outside the European continent.¹³

Seeking to simplify Olsen’s typology, the principal distinction deriving from these aspects oscillates between two understandings of Europeanization: the transfer from “Europe” to other jurisdictions of policy, institutional arrangements, rules, beliefs, or norms, on the one hand; and building European capacity as an outcome of the convergence and interaction among different polities and policies of different countries-members of the European structure on the other. In this perspective we could imagine Europeanization as a “two-way process” entailing a “bottom-up” (or uploading) and “top-down” dimensions¹⁴ whose content the following part of this chapter will attempt to streamline.

¹³ J. P Olsen, “The many faces of Europeanization” in *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40:5 pp. 921-952, (2002)

¹⁴ Börzel T. & Risse T. “Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe” in *The Politics of Europeanization* K. Featherstone & C.M. Radaelli (eds.) (Oxford University Press 2003), p. 57-80

From the other side it is worth noting that Europeanization should not be regarded as identical with the European Integration process. It is a fact that its substance might to some extent depend on the latter one. What can be observed is a kind of interaction, maybe interdependence among these meanings but not identification. European Integration process implies all the necessary procedures and changes emanating from the European bodies' dictates that should occur in the domestic environment of the member-states in order to formulate an increasingly unified EC/EU both in political and financial terms. The Europeanization concept includes more than the consequences (domestic changes) occurring on account of incorporating the *acquis communautaire*. It carries a voluntary dimension of incorporating change beyond the obligatory imposed adaptation to EU templates. Europeanization analyzes what happens to domestic institutions and actors. It describes the outcomes of the occurring changes but not the changes themselves as the European integration process reflects. This means that Europeanization entails both the willingness and capacity of governments to define and execute national policies by placing them into the wider context of EU objectives. It dictates that the imperatives, logic and norms of the EU, as described before, become intrinsically "implanted" into domestic policy, to the extent that the distinction between European and domestic policy requirements progressively ceases to exist.¹⁵

Exploiting the approaches that have been developed so far concerning the definition of the aforementioned concept the following part of the current chapter is attempting to address the following question: how does Europeanization influence foreign policy?

¹⁵ Ioakimidis P. C (2004) "Contradictions between policy and performance" in Featherstone K. & Ifantis K. (eds.) *Greece in a Changing Europe Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration* (Manchester University Press 2004), p. 33-34

3. Europeanization and Foreign Policy

3.1 The distinct nature of Foreign Policy

The analysis of the impact that Europeanization may have on the Foreign Policy of a member-state does not constitute an easy task if the distinct nature of Foreign Policy is taken into account. Its substance relies on its placement on the outer sphere of the 'two-level game' where the statesman is located neither internally nor externally but on the border, trying to find the medium way between two worlds.¹⁶

The applicability of Europeanization on the unique area of foreign policy has to deal with many difficulties because the substance of the latter differs from other policy areas in a number of aspects. In the ongoing, deepening and widening European integration process, and particularly after the abandonment of national currencies, co-operation in this field touches upon one of the last remaining core tenets of national sovereignty.¹⁷

This is reflected by the substance of the pillars on which EC/EU has been built in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty. The legislative content of the first pillar (European Communities) which has to deal with the formulation of the EU member-states' domestic environment that will theoretically contribute to the establishment and maintenance of a transparent, integrated and single European market is based on the initiatives undertaken by the supranational bodies of EC with special reference to the European Commission. Its supranational character lies on the fact that the members it consists of, although picked up by the national governments, are functioning and working there on behalf of the EC as an entity and not of the states they are coming from. The legislative framework they are producing is supposed, to an important extent, to be directly embraced and implemented on the member states'

¹⁶ Putnam R, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the logic of two-level games" in *International Organization* (1988) 42:3, p. 427-460

¹⁷ Major C, "Europeanization and Foreign and Security Policy- Undermining or Rescuing the Nation State" in *Politics 2005*, 25:3, p. 175-190

domestically legislative realm disabling the intervention of the respective national governments.

This is not the case for the second pillar, CFSP. Its structure shows that the majority of the decisions are taken by the Council of Ministers which constitutes an inter-governmental body of the EU. That means that the European Foreign Policy and the formulation of a common European stance towards some external issues presuppose the cooperation, the co-ordination and most importantly the consensus among all its national governments-members. The existence of any possible disagreement or deviation on behalf of one or more member states towards a specific question allows it/them to take advantage of its/their veto power. This with its turn might encumber the creation of common European voice towards issues that occur in its external environment. This shows also that CFSP has not reached the integration and institutionalization point the first pillar has. Why is this occurring?

Although the international system is surrounded by important non-state actors, the dominant paradigm in international relations still conceives of foreign policy matters as essentially the *domaine reserve* of sovereign governments, considered outside and above partisan domestic debate, directly and insolubly linked to the preservation of national sovereignty and highly symbolically entrusted to the national executive.¹⁸ Consequently, defining ‘Europeanization’ as the main explaining factor of foreign policy at national level includes the risk of overestimating its impact if the importance of other endogenous (domestic) or exogenous (international) influences has not drawn the proper attention. The foreign policies are exposed to a number of pressures incentives for change which act at the same time as Europeanization, sometimes in similar directions, sometimes in completely opposite. Some of those

¹⁸ Wong R., ‘Foreign Policy’ in Gaziano P. & Vink M. *Europeanization New Research Agendas* [Palgrave Macmillan 2003], p. 321

factors are closely related to European Integration or affected by it keeping a separate explaining power and some should not be confused and merged under the 'Europeanization label'.¹⁹ That's why factors are grouped in two spheres:

❖ Domestic sphere

- Differences in national policy making styles have remained significant. For instance, although Greece and Germany both belong to EU they perceive in a different way their external environment due to their location in different regions. This differentiation on their perception might lead to a consequent differentiation of the way they handle issues entangled with their foreign policy concerns. Different financial capabilities play also crucial role for the formulation of foreign policy. An economically developed state might adopt in a more effective way what is called financial diplomacy than another whose capabilities hinder the employment of this kind of policy.
- Some countries have been through important processes of political change and transition which have occurred at the same time as Europeanization (democratization processes)
- Changes in the domestic sphere can emanate from the actions of party politics, political events or public opinion pressures. The domestic political arena generates a number of pressures and demands on foreign policy makers.²⁰ The adoption of a policy converged to the dictates of EU might emerge from unilateral initiatives undertaken by an influential leader, political party or effective lobby. Therefore it is essential to separate them from the effects deriving from the European Integration process.

¹⁹ Vaquer J, 'Europeanization and Foreign Policy' Working Paper No. 21 April 2001
http://selene.uab.es/cs_iuee/catala/obs/Working%20Papers/wp212002.htm

²⁰ Hagan J, 'Domestic Policy Explanations in the Analysis of Foreign Policy' in Neack L, Hey J., Haney P, p. 117

❖ International sphere

- The scholars of European studies should be aware of the effects of globalization and the emergence of global politics on foreign policy. Even if European Integration might consider that it constitutes one of the expressions-aspects of this development it would be useful to separate the effects which are general to the whole world and those who are specific to the framework of the European Union and in particular to the foreign policies of EU member states
- The end of bio-polarity and the dissolution of Soviet Union brought a significant change to the equation in which foreign policy makers situated their own countries.²¹

3.2. Europeanization and Foreign Policy

The lack of increased institutionalism in terms of the Foreign Policy of EU, as described before and of supranational power makes Europeanization of foreign policy seem as a learning process about good policy practice for which the EU sets the scene, offering the forum for discussion and a platform for policy transfer as opposed to obligatory imposed adaptation.²² This means that the newly emerged instrumental trajectory of CFSP, despite its intergovernmental character, aims to imbed the interest calculations of EU member states to the general EU framework. Rather than being committed to what is narrowly perceived as national right or interest EU members are supposed to learn entangle many of their foreign policy positions with collectively determined goals and values. They should gradually become aware of the fact that rational decision-making in this case relies to the social norms of the group rather than satisfying self-oriented instrumental utility, as described before. The EU member

²¹ Vaquer J. 2001

²² Bulmer & Radaelli (2004) 'The Europeanization of National Policy?' *Queen's Paper on Europeanisation*, 1/2004 p. 12 <http://www.qub.ac.uk/ies-old/onlinepapers/poe1-04.pdf>.

states seem to embrace a general rule to avoid employing fixed positions on important foreign policy questions and consult each other. The contributing parts start to perceive themselves as colleagues bearing in their mind and sometimes sharing each others' views and not as policy experts focused to fulfill only national goals. The way this foreign policy system has been built seeks to orient the EU members towards consensus-building and the establishment of common understandings and interests which might pave the way for joint actions.²³

This procedure reflects a bottom-up relation between Europeanization and national foreign policies. The attempt on behalf of the member-states to enmesh their national interests and the handling of them to the EU framework reveals an effort to upload their policies onto European level. Taking into account the opinions and the positions of the other states concerning particular issues they are concerned with “incarnates” this bottom-up approach of the Europeanization of their foreign policy. The effort of a member state to convince the other partners that the issue it is concerned with should not be restricted to national views but faced under a prism which reflects the wider EU positions mirrors one more aspect of this Europeanization approach.

One of the main elements on which EU has sought to construct its stance towards non-EU states is the economic one. In its external relations the existence of a financial character is more than evident. Aiming to tackle poverty in developing countries EU is the world's largest donor of development funding.²⁴ One of the bases on which European Neighbourhood Policy has been constructed is the adoption of

²³ M. Smith, “Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Cooperation” in *European Journal of International Relations*, 10:1, (2004) p. 95-136 and Tonra B. ‘Constructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy’: The utility of a cognitive approach’ *Journal of Common Market Studies* 41:4, (2003), pp. 731-756

²⁴ http://ec.europa.eu/development/policiesgen_en.cfm

economic instruments in order, as it claims, to reinforce existing and sub-regional cooperation and provide them with a “road map” for economic development.²⁵

These collective actions in combination with the aforementioned consultations require EU states to gradually adapt their own foreign policies. Rather than dealing almost exclusively with narrowly defined national issues, issues referring to its problematic relations with neighbouring countries a member state has to face a broadened foreign policy agenda which is emanating from its identity as an EU member. The national foreign policy through its participation in the EU institutions acquires a strong economic element and more generally elements of “low politics”. While a traditional approach can be interpreted as primarily implying the management of ‘high politics issues’ the widened policy agenda as an outcome of state’s participation at EU operations has included issues such as environment, trade, technology, agriculture and culture.²⁶ All these reflect the other dimension of Europeanization’s influence to the formulation of the foreign policy of a state, the top-down approach. This means that instruments, processes, norms and foreign policy making style adopted by the EU become gradually integral part of national foreign policy realm on behalf of the participant states.

4. Conclusions

Europeanization process, as it will be described below, is able to provide a state’s foreign policy that has been pursued so far towards its security concerns with a different substance. In the Greek case the discussion is not restricted in simple changes in the framework of its foreign policy. It is able to contribute to the transition from a traditional approach that Greek foreign policy makers had embraced towards

²⁵ http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf

²⁶ Ioakimidis P. C (2002) “The Europeanization of Greece’s Foreign Policy: Progress and Problems” in Ioakimidis P.C (ed.), pp. 108-117

Turkey “incarnated” by a contentious “containment strategy” to engagement. The following chapter is dedicated to the theoretical analysis of the “engagement strategy” and its linkage with Europeanization.

CHAPTER B: ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY

1. Introduction

The aim of the previous chapter was to delineate Europeanization's role as independent variable that seeks to "operationalize" the respective dependent one, with special reference to one state's foreign policy strategy. The analysis and the conceptualization of this dependent variable constitute the topic which the current chapter is attempting to illustrate. What does engagement strategy mean? How can it be compared towards containment? Which is the theoretical background on which it is based? Which is the rationale for a state beyond adopting this strategy? How can Europeanization operating as "independent variable" influence one state's decision to employ this strategy? These are the questions which this chapter will be concerned with.

In the context of an increasingly globalized and interdependent world some neo-realist assumptions seem capable of being applied in the up-to date realities as they have emerged in the aftermath of Soviet Union's dissolution. According to the first one the international system is likely to keep its anarchic structure and nature bearing in mind that "anarchy" is not necessarily identified with chaos but it implies that no central authority exists which would be able to control every state's behavior.²⁷

The second one implies that the absence of formal relations in a universal context that would guarantee a kind of sub-ordination among the states which still operate as important actors in the renewed international system forces them to take all the necessary means that would ensure their own security. Although the latter term (security) is subject to further questioning regarding its definition, the chapter self

²⁷ K. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 88

consciously restricts its meaning to safeguarding of sovereignty. In this sense states are supposed to behave as instrumentally rational actors.²⁸ This doesn't seem to be the fact. For neo-realist writers with special reference to Mearsheimer, the modern international politics is surrounded by a relentless security competition taking place in a self-help realm.²⁹ In compliance with this view states are obliged to confront “an irresolvable uncertainty” about military preparations made by other states. According to him, this does not allow them to act as rational actors but it forces them to remain mistrustful of each other.³⁰ In order to attain security they engage in both internal (military) and external (alliances) balancing tasks aiming to deter aggressive competitors³¹. Which are the channels through which they are able to ensure in the most effective way their own security?

2. Containment Strategy

As said before in the face of immediate and future external threat the primary motivation of every state is to enhance its own security especially in cases where the latter is supposed to be questioned by revisionist claims posed by another state. The level of threat that a state poses to the other depends on many components, i.e. its aggregate power, geographic proximity, perceived revisionist or expansionist ambitions and offensive capabilities.³² Although a lot has been said as regards different strategies that a state is supposed to pursue and employ towards the one that is claimed to be the revisionist one in order to guarantee in the most possibly effective way its national-state interests, in this chapter the interest is focused on two strategies

²⁸ J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise’ of International Institutions’ in M. Brown, S. M. Lynn and St. E. Miller (eds.) *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), p. 336

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ J. Baylis, “International and global security in the post-cold war era” in J. Baylis & St. Smith (eds.) *The Globalization of World Politics* [Oxford University Press 2005], p. 303-4

³¹ Th. Coulombis & K. Ifnatis, “Altering the Security Dilemma in the Aegean” in *Journal The Review of International Affairs*, 2:2 (Winter 2002), p. 3

³² Randal L. Schweller, ‘Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In’ in *International Security*, 19:1, (Summer 1994), p. 75

among which states are maneuvering in order to ensure their own survival: containment and engagement.

Containment constitutes a strategy that aims to cut down hostile candidate states that hold regional hegemony before they emerge, or in case they do so, it is the one that “prevents them from either expanding territorially or exerting overweening influence over political and economic affairs of states that come within the aspiring hegemony’s orbit”.³³ The conceptual background of this policy can be attributed to Kennan’s ideas that influenced the American policy towards Soviet Union during the Cold War. According to them containment was generally identified with a general sense of blocking the expansion of Soviet influence through defending above all else the world’s major centers of industrial power against Soviet expansion: Western Europe, Japan, and the United States.³⁴

A state which pursues a containment policy aims to keep the perceived as rival state into limits that would encumber the fulfillment of its revisionist claims, as these are perceived. This strategy presupposes that the state towards which it is pursued is seeking to carry out expansionist aspirations while the one which initiates it attempts to preserve the currently formulated status quo. The former is considered as non-status quo power seeking to change norms of bilateral relations. Containment strategy includes the usage of deterrence on behalf of the initiating state towards the theoretically aggressive one. This bears in mind the “balance of power” theories which had been developed in the Cold-War period. In this context the state pursuing this policy is dedicating a part of its own national income and budget to the amplification of its own military capabilities. The dictates of defense concerns force

³³ R. J. Art, “Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement” in *International Security*, 23:3 (Winter 1998-1999), p. 79-113

³⁴ “Kennan and Containment, 1947” <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/17601.htm>.

governments to spend money for the purchase of equipments which would enable them to respond in the most possible effective way in case the opposition would fulfill its expansionist threats or increase the credibility of the response towards a possible attack. That is why under certain conditions the state may focus on expanding its security preparedness through internal mobilization of military resources.³⁵

The viability of this strategy pillar is subject to sort of questioning. Even in case a country possesses the necessary resources and the proper mechanisms to mobilize them, a possible extraction of them may provide short-term military security but it will entail a cost of weakening the long-term economy and therefore the long-term military potential and security of state. It should be also noted that abstracting money for military concerns causes difficulties to a state to fulfill domestic welfare goals both in short term as well as in the long run (guns-butter trade off). A possible inability to satisfy these goals can possibly lead to social discontent which might decrease the political support for the government to remain in power. Military expenditures can undermine the ability of the regime to keep its electoral basis by diverting resources which in other case they would exploit them for the distribution of financial rewards to its coalition partners.³⁶

In case this kind of deterrence strategy does not seem able to protect effectively the state's interests the latter might decide to seek alliances or to become member of it. Small states join alliances because they become aware that they can not attain the goal of their survival alone and the fulfillment of their protection expectations depends more on the strength and credibility of larger patrons than on

³⁵ M. Barnett & J. L Levy, "Domestic sources of alliances and alignments: the case of Egypt, 1962-73" in *International Organization*, 45:3 (Summer 1991), p. 371

³⁶ Ibid. 375-376

their own capabilities.³⁷ In the framework of preserving the status quo it will use the means at its disposal, including those provided by the alliance. The rationale beyond the decision of participating at an alliance rests upon the hope that the latter will provide the containment pursuing state with some security guarantees in response towards an immediate security threat. Alliance formation or participation at an alliance can also entail a rapid infusion of funds and other resources, including military expertise and equipment.³⁸

Besides the economic benefits that the state might draw from its participation at an alliance it can use the latter as a diplomatic leverage towards the opponent maximizing the cost for the rival in case the last one carries out its threats. In the context of it the supposedly endangered member is seeking to convince its partners to align their policies with it. Thus, in case the expansion seeking state aims to cooperate or to apply to be provided with a membership-status of the same alliance the other one is searching for every possible path that might block this evolution. Any possible cooperation between the before mentioned alliance and the rival should be supposedly interrupted. A state which initiates a containment policy is reluctant to enable the revisionist one to obtain the diplomatic mechanisms and tools with which the former has been already equipped and exerting its influence to it. Keeping the expansionist state marginalized and isolated from possible allies in order to avoid the enhancement of its own diplomatic leverage constitutes another pillar of this containment strategy.

Leaving aside the alliances or other institutions, attention should be paid also in case the theoretically threatened state becomes member of EC. In the framework of initiating its containment policy it perceives EC membership as the proper means which would provide it with bargaining advantage and negotiating leverage in its

³⁷ R. Krebs, "Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict", in *International Organizations* 53:2 (Spring 1999), p. 343-377

³⁸ *Ibid.* p. 374

dealings with its rival. The complex nature and character of EC composed by supra-national and inter-governmental instruments can not be compared to any other institution and alliance. It is supposedly a field in the framework of which a state feels that it westernizes its own national interests. Besides its inter-governmental elements the supranational instruments are observing, supervising and regulating the relations among their members disabling every possible revisionist claims or possibility of changing the borders. This does not seem to be the case regarding the alliances in the context of which due to their inter-state character, there is no instrument above the member-states that would prevent any tensions between them. In this EC field a member state feels more secure than it could feel in any other alliance. It perceives itself as possessing a diplomatic leverage towards the theoretically revisionist one. Any possible attack on behalf of the latter is supposed to cause an immediate response not only by the threatened state but also by its other EC partners. This maximizes the cost for the expansionist state to fulfill its revisionist aspirations. This way the deterrence strategy obtains supposedly further credibility.

The containment policy initiating state is seeking to marginalize and isolate the rival from EC. Even in case the majority of EC members would opt for cooperation with the rival, the theoretically exposed to threat state, exploiting the intergovernmental character of Council of Minister's which demands consensus for external relations' procedures is able through veto to block and interrupt opposition's relations with EC. Its rationale lies on its fear that a possible cooperation between EC and the rival will undermine its own strategic position towards the latter. Since it holds its participation as beneficial for the protection of its interests and the suitable diplomatic leverage towards the opposing it seems reluctant to share the advantages it is supposed to exploit under the EU membership label with the state which is

theoretically possessing revisionist aspirations. The use of EC mechanisms as a short-term instrument against its rival seems an attractive solution for the implementation of the containment strategy.³⁹

3. Engagement Strategy

In contrast to containment, engagement strategy has been notionally constructed on different theoretical fundamentals and assumptions. Engagement strategy rests upon a strategic mode of action, in the framework of which building of interdependencies and dialogues on behalf of this policy pursuing state along with seeking to incorporate the targeted state into institutions it already belongs to might shape target state's preferences and supposedly aggressive attitude.⁴⁰ The roots of this policy should be searched in the combination of three international relations' approaches which function in a complementary way with each other in order to justify theoretically the engagement strategy's substance: "democratic peace theory", "liberal institutionalism" and "interdependence theory".

Democratic peace theory, rooted in Immanuel Kant's essay, *Perpetual Peace*, came into political science's surface in 1980's. Its prevailing argument was presupposing that democracies sharing common liberal values and norms do not fight against each other. Based on the Kantian logic it was stating, according to its advocate M. Doyle, that democratic representation, an ideological commitment to human rights and transnational interdependence are adequate conditions to justify the "peace-prone" tendencies of democratic states. If some of the states have not internalized and absorbed these values then the logic of accommodation would give its way to the

³⁹ B. Rummelili, "The European Union's Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict A Review of the Literature", *Working Paper Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies*, No. 6 (January 2004), Birmingham, England: Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Birmingham p. 11 and Th. Veremis, "The protracted crisis" in D. Keridis & D. Triantaphyllou (eds.) *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization*, Brassey's (2001), p. 42-51

⁴⁰ M. Lynch, "Why engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement" in *European Journal of International Relations* (2002) 8:2, p. 187-230

logic of power making these states be war-prone.⁴¹ Supporters of this concept also believe that democracies are more likely to resolve mutual conflicts of interest on the basis of shared norms and institutional constraints which are supposed to restrain them from escalating their disputes to the point where they can threaten to use military force against each other.⁴²

A field where common norms and constraints can be shared and protected among the states is theoretically provided by the supporters of Liberal Institutionalism. The emergence of a new “globalized system” reflected the imperative need to adopt a more “geocentric” approach in the international relations’ study than a “nation-centered” one. The rapidly increasing earth problems couldn’t be handled with the “nation-centered” way of thinking that the previous century has bequeathed.⁴³ The advocates of this theory share a conviction that institutionalized cooperation between them is creating opportunities to establish and consolidate greater security conditions in the following years. According to their argumentation institutions can provide to conflict parties a common access to information which might lead to a gradual elimination of the misperceptions and prejudices that might had traditionally contributed to the formulation of tensions between each other. They have the ability also to decrease transaction costs, make bilateral commitments obtain an increasing credibility and generate new fields for cooperation.⁴⁴ The developments within the EC that had reconciled competition within Western Europe in the aftermath of WWII are used as evidence of their argumentation.

⁴¹ B. Russett, Ch. Layne, D. Spyro M. Doyle, “Democratic Peace” in *International Security* 19:4 (Spring 1995), p. 164-184 and M. Doyle “Kant Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs” in *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 12:3 (Summer 1983), 205-235

⁴² J. Baylis, “International and global security in the post-cold war era” in J. Baylis & St. Smith (eds.) *The Globalization of World Politics* (Oxford University Press 2005), p. 309

⁴³ G. Modelski, “The Promise of Geocentric Politics” in *World Politics*, XXII, Vol.4, July 1970, p. 633-635

⁴⁴ J. Baylis (2005), p. 308

In the framework of these institutions a possible cooperation might lead to interdependent relations. “Interdependence” refers to situations in which actors or events in different parts of a system affect each other.⁴⁵ It examines under which occasions does the cultivation of economic ties, with special reference to the fostering of economic interdependence as a conscious state strategy lead to important and predictable changes in the foreign policy of a target state which possesses revisionist aspirations in military terms.⁴⁶ According to this theory since trade and foreign investments increase, the incentives to ensure these needs using military determination and occupation decrease. Besides, the financial connection between two initially rival countries promotes the communication of “private players” and the governments on behalf of sides. The increasing communication with its turn is expected to improve the political relations and the cooperation between the countries. This financial exchange also generates that kind of benefits both for the exporters and the consumers that create a kind of dependence in the foreign markets. Under this angle, the perspective of a supposed conflict would have a negative impact on the financial relations between the participants and would endanger their profits emerged from the trade. That’s why these groups would put pressure on the governments in order to avoid this potential conflict danger.

Based on these approaches it should be stressed that engagement policy in general can be identified with a strategic action with the help of which the initiator aims to manipulate the attitude of the target actor through the combination of incentives and restraints that might derive from the dictates of international institutions in which the former seeks to enmesh it. The goal of the pursuing this

⁴⁵ J.Nye, *Understanding international conflicts*, 4th edition, Longmann Classics in Political Science, (1993), p.196

⁴⁶ M. Mastanduno (2001), “Economic Engagement Strategies: Theory and Practice”

<http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/bpollins/book/Mastanduno.pdf>

policy state is to re-shape the “revisionist” state’s preferences in a pre-determined direction which will be aligned with its own preferences. Its rationale relies on the intention to induce the opponent power to embrace both foreign and domestic policies in line with the norms of the international institution it wants to integrate it into and the initiator already belongs to. In case the targeted state gets adapted to the pressures and the norms emanating from this institution, according to the before described theories, the logic of accommodation and not of power will prevail in the formulation of its foreign policy.⁴⁷

This policy is accompanied by an economic pillar. By economic engagement what can be implied is a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with the adversary aiming to change its attitude and improve the bilateral relations. This pillar relies on increasing levels of trade and investments aiming to moderate the target’s interests’ conceptions by shifting incentives and building networks of interdependence.⁴⁸ Economic interdependence is able to operate as transforming agent that reshapes the goals of the latter. It can generate and establish vested interests in the context of target society and government undermining old values of military status and territorial acquisition. The beneficiaries of this interdependence become addicted to it and protect their interests by putting pressure on the government to accommodate the source of independence.⁴⁹ Internationalist elites committed to economic openness and international stability might marginalize nationalist elites which are wedded to the threat or use of force. Regardless whether the society of targeted society constitutes a

⁴⁷ M. Lynch (2002), p. 187-230

⁴⁸ M. Kahler & S. Kastner, “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait” in *Journal of Peace Research* (2006), 43:5, p. 523-541

⁴⁹ Mastanduno (2001) and A. Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980)

pluralist democracy or not, interests tied to international economy become a critical part of the electorate to whom political elites must respond.⁵⁰

From the other side it could be said that economic interdependence operates also as a constraint on targeted state's foreign policy behavior. A possible disruption in the developed economic relations between countries, due to tensions among the states, would be costly to the extent that the operating firms might lose assets that could not be readily redeployed elsewhere. Firms involved in bilateral economic exchange may get forced to search for next-best alternatives which might lead to important costs and losses for the economy.⁵¹

There are also other factors that might contribute to the formulation and the implementation of engagement strategy. The latter's sufficiency depends also on the will of the targeted state to accept the influence deriving from this policy. In other words the engagement strategy presupposes that the target is not unalterably revisionist and in case it is not currently a state that serves the existing status quo it might become one. If the state supposes that the gains it has to draw from "accepting" the outcomes of this strategy can substantially replace the losses which might emerge in case it relinquishes its expansionist aspirations then the engagement pursuing policy is able to exert its influence.

Besides the interests' calculation on behalf of a target state other factors might contribute to the formulation and implementation of the engagement strategy. Common geopolitical considerations are able to urge two initially rival states for cooperation and might make the adoption of engagement strategy on behalf of one of them seem a rational solution. A number of extra-regional issues in contiguous areas and a growing potential for instability in some areas might affect common threat

⁵⁰ M. Kahler & S. Kastner (2006), p. 523-541

⁵¹ Ibid.

perceptions on the initially rival countries. Post-Communist developments that have emerged in the aftermath of Yugoslavia's and Soviet Union's dissolution with the consequent modification of borders added more military threats and established many new states in their vicinity. Moreover, the security agenda of the hypothetically rivals has been widened in order to include difficulties of a cross-border and transnational nature with special reference to illegal immigration and trafficking, refugee flows, cross-border crime and environmental threats.⁵² All these make cooperation seem a useful solution in order to ensure their security.

Another factor that might promote the formulation of interdependence relations is the involvement of a third party. Third party involvement can be identified with an actor that seeks to facilitate an agreement on any matter in the common interest of the parties involved. This party hypothetically aiming to stabilize peace in the region where both conflict states belong to pursues policies which aim to normalize their own bilateral relations. In the context of shaping regional diplomacy this party might undertake measures towards this direction. Intervention or operational prevention during crises whose escalation might bring the two parties into an armed conflict and putting pressure on both of them in order to reach agreements and an understanding that would engage them to peaceful and consensual settlement of their dispute(s), promote public debate and create incentives through trade and other activities constitute some of these measures. This way and under the label of "honest broker" third party involvement might function as inaugurating phase for further cooperation.

The adoption of an engagement strategy might also be accommodated by unpredictable incidents. If a humanitarian disaster hits either one or both states some

⁵² O. Anastasakis, "Greece and Turkey in the Balkans: Cooperation or Rivalry" in Ali Carkoğlu and Barry Rubin (eds.) *Greek-Turkish Relations in an Era of Détente*, (Taylor and Francis Ltd 2004) p. 45-60

opportunities can emerge in the context of which new thinking in foreign policy can take place. An incident which entails human costs, in the framework of public opinion, might challenge the importance of territorial dispute(s) in front of human tragedy. Both people from the one or the other side along with governments can participate at aid operations and mobilize NGO's that aim to help the people from the other side indifferent if it has been considered so far as the "enemy". This creates a "communication channel" among the people of both sides which with its turn is able to facilitate or accommodate the formulation of independent relations.⁵³

All these do not imply that a possible implementation of the strategy might not possess limitation(s) with respect either to its effectiveness or to its viability. The restriction relies on the fact that the pursued policy does not automatically entail that the target state will alter its existing positions or its revisionist aspirations as these are perceived by the pursuing state. The limitation that the initiating this policy country has to face is that the indicator or variable that might determine the success or the viability of the strategy rests on the good will of the supposed rival to cooperate or to become part of this strategy and not on the state that initiates this policy. In case the former remains in compliant regarding its initially formulated intentions and reluctant to cooperate it might interpret the pursued engagement strategy as sign of weakness or submissiveness on behalf of the initiating side. In this context it smolders a danger that this possible interpretation and point of view might make the supposedly holding revisionist aspirations state become more aggressive and increase its unilateral claims towards its neighbor. This means that the indicator that might define the effectiveness of the engagement strategy lies not on its successful implementation but on the reaction of the target state to it.

⁵³ D. Keridis, "Earthquakes, Diplomacy and New Thinking in Foreign Policy" in *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 30:1 (Winter 2006), p. 207-214

4. Europeanization and Engagement Strategy

Europeanization, aligned with the way it has been approached in the previous chapter constitutes one of the most influential factors for a state in order to adopt an engagement strategy. The financial difficulties a government has to deal with in case it extracts an important part of its national budget for military purposes become more intensified in the case where the state is member of EC/EU and seeks to get more integrated in institutional, political and financial terms in the whole process. If a state seeks to join the European Monetary Union which constitutes the main core of EU it is obliged to align its fiscal policy with the need to fulfill some financial requirements, know as “convergence criteria”. The need to achieve a rate of inflation within 1.5% of the rates in the three participating countries with the lowest rates, to reduce its government deficits to below 3% of its gross national product and keep its currency exchange rates within some limits⁵⁴ encumbers its ability to abstract part of its national budgets for the satisfaction of national defense concerns. Military expenditures, especially in dealing with a state with which a war is possible, entail increase of possible national budget deficit. This might lead to deviation from the before mentioned criteria. In this case a critical re-thinking of its priorities is inevitable. Can the employed containment strategy be harmonized with the needs of integrating into EU? This shows that Europeanization might function prohibitively for the embracement of containment.

The dynamics of Europeanization are capable of affecting the policy and the strategy of an EU member-state towards the revisionist one by setting the following dilemma: from the one side does it want to become a deeply institutionalized member

⁵⁴ European Council in Copenhagen Presidency Conclusions of Presidency 21-22 June 1993
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/72921.pdf

of EU which will increase its strategic position in economic and political terms being fully integrated in the realities of the newly emerged globalized world? From the other side does it prefer to be marginalized from the European integration process while insisting on the adopted containment strategy with the consequent military expenditures that might cause its deviation from the whole process? In other words does this state want to remain committed to a strategy that might jeopardize its substance as EU member or should it proceed with the revision of its policy? In this case the transition from containment to engagement strategy seems able to satisfy the two concerns: it allows the alignment with the guidelines of European integration process and enables to focus on its security which is built on different theoretical fundamentals.

Based on assumptions emanating from liberal institutionalism the Europeanization process can provide the disputing parts with some certain rules and laws that are supposed to be imbedded in the domestic environment and will contribute to the peaceful settlement of disputes between neighboring countries. EU aligned with its integration process and similar to German-French case is enabling reconciliation while providing the means for consolidating peaceful relations.⁵⁵ Europeanization through the channels of integration and association is able to change their policies vis-à-vis the other party toward conciliatory actions. One of the most important sources of influence at EU's disposal to affect border conflicts is its capability to force the dispute parts into resolving their disputes either by promising to provide them with candidacy status or by threatening sanctions to this status. In the context of membership negotiations and by referring conditions that might enable these negotiations, EU insists on the adoption and implementation of its legal and

⁵⁵ H. Jürgen, 'Conflict settlement through Europeanization, Greece and its neighbors Macedonia and Turkey' [in German], <http://www.europeanization.de/downloads/projektantrag.pdf>

normative guidelines, the so called *acquis communautaire*, in the framework of which the peaceful resolution of border conflicts is also incorporated. If the conflict party intends to get entangled to EU road map and become an EU member it has to absorb the EU templates.⁵⁶

This constitutes the “EU carrot”. The initial hypothesis in this case presupposes the following assumption: the supposedly rival state which aims to enter EU has not internalized yet the logic of European unification both in domestic and foreign policy terms. Taking the role of Europeanization as an independent variable for granted, which are these indicators who would “operationalize” a possible transformation of the “aggressors” foreign policy? The arising involvement of public opinion, the establishment of institutional checks and balances and the domestication of norms and rules which have traditionally characterized EU are possible to lead to more rational (according to Western standards) and co-operative results. In the token of the democratic peace argument, an increasingly democratizing⁵⁷ state is supposed to develop cooperative policies towards other democracies wherever they are located. The deriving assumption is that the more domestically closer to EU comes through a multidimensional process the more EU-oriented outcomes is going to generate and more compromising style is going to employ. The logic beyond that is relying on the possibility and the hope that increasing involvement of EU in domestic terms will entail the participation of various societal groups in the formulation of foreign policy leading with its turn to more cooperative policies towards other democracies with which they share common EU-based values.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Th. Diez, St. Stetter, M. Albert, “The European Union and Border Conflicts: The transformative Power of Integration” in *International Organization* 60:3 (Summer 2006), p. 572

⁵⁷ The author being aware of the broadening definition that democracy can be subject to is self-consciously restricting the meaning on the EU standards.

⁵⁸ T. Oğuzlu, “The Impact of ‘Democratization in the Context of the EU Accession process’ on Turkish Foreign Policy” in *Mediterranean Politics* 9:1 (Spring 2004), p. 94--113

Democratization within the EU accession framework does not simply seek to establish democratic regimes in candidate states but also to integrate and domesticate the EU identity both in domestic and foreign policy terms. The identity of EU membership implies that candidate states should pursue policies (domestic and foreign) aligned with the character of EU. A possible successful implementation of the democratization in the context of EU road map might entail the initiation of EU-oriented foreign policies.⁵⁹

The emerging assumption is that in case the revisionist state internalizes the logic of Europeanization, as described in the previous chapter, it will gradually change the substance of its supposedly “revisionist” foreign policy. The case in which the supposedly “revisionist state” has the incentive to follow it does not imply that it has altered or renounced its views of the other party or its beliefs about the conflict. The possible change of its attitude will be of strategic importance in the sense that the compulsory impact deriving from the European dictates will lead it to deeper reforms through continued pressure and socialization. Its possibly gradual transformation will be reflected through the diagrams and reports coming from European Commission and Council of Ministers.⁶⁰ This can probably make the foreign policy makers of the candidate state to restrain themselves from further escalating crises, and worked toward improving bilateral relations.⁶¹

The EU member realizes that the Europeanization of the revisionist state can be seen as a recipe for sustained de-securitization. This means that in case the “revisionist state” becomes member of the EU the bilateral dispute(s) will lose their substance and meaning. The engagement strategy with special reference to integrating

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ B. Rummelili, “The European Union’s Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict A Review of the Literature”, *Working Paper Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies*, No. 6 (January 2004), Birmingham, England: Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Birmingham p. 7

the rival deeper into the European institutions rests upon the existence of an actor as EU which under its supranational identity can be regarded as reference point for the peaceful settlement of disputes, with the imputed capabilities of inducing changes and reforms in other countries. Thus, it justifies its decision on behalf of the EU member to put all its efforts on bringing the rival into the EU.⁶²

5. Conclusions

The question that can be obviously raised is whether Europeanization might remain effective to conflict resolution in case the target state seems either incapable or unwilling to harmonize itself with the “supposed Europeanized spirit” as this is described in the previous chapter and follows a course deviated from the European guidelines and dictates. In case the candidate state deals with a lot of obstacles during the implementation of its “European road map” and seems unable to fulfill its European aspirations how can EU with its existing mechanisms guarantee the effectiveness of the pursued engagement strategy? In a long run how can it ensure the protection and the security of the initiating engagement strategy state? The same question can be posed in case the majority of EU partners seem reluctant to accept the targeted state in their “family”. What is the alternative solution they can provide the initiating state with in order to contribute to a viable co-existence between the supposed rivals?

⁶² B. Rumelili, “The Talkers and the Silent Ones: The EU and Change in Greek-Turkish Relations” *Working Paper Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies*, No. 10 (October 2004), Birmingham, England: Department of Political Science and International Relations, p. 16-17

CHAPTER C: THE EUROPEANIZATION OF GREEK FOREIGN POLICY

1. Introduction

As described in a previous chapter the definition of Europeanization and especially the influence it exerts to the national foreign policies do not constitute an easy research task. The substance and the identity of national foreign policy as one of the last remaining domain reserves of sovereign governments in conjunction with the fact that it is subject to pressures emanating from both its domestic and international (or regional) environment provides the academic community with “theoretical obstacles” while dealing with the contribution of Europeanization on its formation.

The Europeanization itself as a process and generally the debate over the Europeanization in the context of Greek Foreign Policy had in advance to confront some endogenous and exogenous particularities of the Greek state which are ascribed into the following factors:

- Maneuvering between East and West: the Greek nationalism is resulted from two “components” that initially seem to contradict each other-the heritage of classical ancient Greece (language parameter) from the one side and the respective one of the Eastern Roman or Byzantine Empire (religion parameter) from the other. The former reflects the values on which to some extent the Enlightenment and extensively the Modern Western civilization has been founded. The latter provides the Greek culture with the principles deriving from the Eastern Orthodox dimension differentiating it from the other members of the Western world. It should be taken into account that the formulation of the Hellenic identity on the basis of these two components-principles took place in the framework of the Ottoman territory and period, a fact that had left also its marks to the whole self-orientation process. The question of belonging to the West or to the East, terminated, seemingly at least, in the aftermath of the Civil War in

Greece and its alignment with the Western Camp in the beginning of the Cold War.⁶³

- The turbulent region Greek state is surrounded from: Greece is located in the region which is known as “European powder magazine”, and which “produces more history than it consumes”. Although some of its members (Slovenia, Rumania and Bulgaria) are, institutionally at least, fully integrated into the European institutions Southeastern Europe still constitutes an area where the break-up of Yugoslavia generated renewed nationalisms, instability and civil wars.⁶⁴
- Political development pattern: the influential role of charismatic personalities or populist leaders, the important role of the state, the problematic existence of civil society and an economy mainly based on public sector reflect society elements that were following Greece even ten years after its accession in EC.

All these parameters can not be left aside while proceeding with the description of the influence that Europeanization has exerted to the formulation and the outcome of the up to date Greek foreign policy. In the framework of this case and during the last decade a lot of writings have been published on behalf of the Greek academic community concerning the extent to which the impact of Europeanization on Greek Foreign Policy has become evident.

⁶³ Concerning the Greek nationalism and the way it is formulated see J. Koliopoulos & Th. Veremis, *Greece the Modern Sequel, From 1831 to the Present*, [London: Hurst & Company, 2002], U. Özkirmlı & S. Sofos, *Tormented by History: Nationalism in Greece and Turkey*, [London: Columbia & Hurst 2008], P. Kitromilides, *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy: Studies in the Culture and Political Thought of South-Eastern Europe* [Aldershot, Hampshire, UK and Brookfield, Vermont: Variorum. 1994]

⁶⁴ Concerning the Balkans’ region see G. Delastik, *The End of the Balkans*, [in Greek] [Athens 2008 Livanis], Th. Veremis *Construction and Deconstruction of states: Balkans from 19th to 21st Century*, [Athens 2004 Patakis] and A. Huliaras Ch. Tsardanidis “(Mis)understanding the Balkans: Greek Geopolitical Codes of the Post-communist Era” in *Geopolitics* 11:3, (September 2006), 465-483

How could Europeanization in the Greek context be identified with? According to Economides the whole process rooted “in the impulse to join the EC, rather than stemming from the consequences of joining” has received the “form of Westernization, modernization, rehabilitation, denationalization and multilateralisation, to suit particular needs at particular times”.⁶⁵ Ioakimidis states that due to Greece’s participation at EPC and its successive form CFSP its foreign policy has gradually obtained a “distinct European dimension and orientation” underlining that this fact should be located to a wider trend of “Greece’s political, economic, social and institutional status adjustment to the dictates of the Europeanization process”. He observes a progress towards Greece’s Foreign Policy Europeanization in different but interdependent to each other levels (European policy, foreign policy objectives, policy instruments and style, foreign policy making in terms of institutions and procedures).⁶⁶

Tsardanidis and Savvidis seek to use the “bottom up” and “top-down” approaches as theoretical tools- they were presented in the previous chapters- to explain the influence that Europeanization may have on Greek Foreign Policy. They attempted also to discriminate the meaning of Europeanization from other phenomena like modernization, democratization, westernization and globalization arguing that the whole procedure is a “rather superficial development which has only so far, and only partly, affected the elites in Greece”. They point out that although series of developments- that will be described below- have become evident in this context they

⁶⁵ S. Economides, “The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy” in *West European Politics* (2005) 28:2, p. 471

⁶⁶ P. C Ioakimidis, “The Europeanization of Greece’s Foreign Policy: Progress and Problems” in P. C Ioakimidis (ed.) *Greece in the European Union: The New Role and the New Agenda*, (Ministry of Press and Mass Media Athens 2002), p. 108-116

are useful but inadequate conditions in order to talk about a Europeanized Greek Foreign Policy.⁶⁷

Aim of this chapter, based on the literature that has been developed so far, is to present the “adventurous” evolution of the Europeanization process in the Greek context and its contribution to the gradual re-formulation of the Greek Foreign Policy from the day that Greece applied to become full membership in the EC until today.

2. 1975-1981 The origins of Europeanization

A sort of Europeanization impact began to be more evident in the realities of the Greek foreign policy in 1975 when Greece applied to become full membership in the EC and touched mainly upon security considerations. The history of the relationship between the European Community and the Greek state does not begin in that year. In fact it was on 24th July of 1959 when it became the first non-member state that officially applied for Association with the wider perspective of a future membership. The Association Agreement was signed on 9th July of 1961 in Athens (registered as Athens agreement). Greece, as the southeastern pillar of NATO from 1952 (along with Turkey) was supposed not to be concerned with vital external security issues except for the danger “emanating from the North”. The internal disorder of that period in combination with the involvement of exogenous factors resulted to the raise of dictatorship in power “inflicting a severe blow to the implementation of the Association Agreement”.⁶⁸

In the aftermath of Greece’s democracy restoration in 1975 the officials realized that they were obliged to re-orient their foreign policy considerations. The 1974 Cyprus crisis in conjunction with the Turkish invasion and subsequent

⁶⁷ Ch. Tsardanidis & St. Stavridis, “The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy: A critical Appraisal” in *Journal of European Integration* 27:2, (2005) p. 217-239

⁶⁸ K. Botsiou, “Greece in the European Union: A Historical Account” in P. C Ioakimidis (ed.) *Greece in the European Union: The New Role and the New Agenda*, (Ministry of Press and Mass Media Athens 2002), p.20-21

occupation of the northern part of Cyprus created a field for “new thinking” in terms of security.⁶⁹ The threat appeared not from the North anymore besides the rhetoric that was cultivated during the Cold War period, but the East⁷⁰ and made a conflict between Turks and Greeks seem more possible than a respective one between one of them and one member of the Warsaw Treaty. The security issue concerning Greeks in the aftermath of the World War II under the NATO banner was put into question in 1974, making them wonder whether it was worth paying dependence cost on NATO (with the consequent restriction of national security duties) without enjoying any advantages (security and protection). The participation at NATO was identified in the eyes both of Greek officials and the public opinion with an inadequate mechanism for the protection of their vital interests.⁷¹ Thus, the newly emerged C. Karamanlis government, realizing that NATO and especially Americans would underestimate the righteousness of their case in order to favor Turkey due to geopolitical considerations, and seeking to balance Greece’s relationship with the US and the EC, decided to apply for full membership in the European Community.⁷² After a diplomatic marathon that lasted more than four years Greece became a full member on 1st of January 1981.

Besides the economic and political benefits that would derive from its identity as member state (consolidation of democracy and amelioration of the economy) EC was presented as the ground on which Greek Foreign Policy Makers could lay their security concerns. The Greek-Turkish dispute should not remain committed to a bilateral context according to their logic. The projection of Greek security interests should be “uploaded” onto the Community obtaining a more “Europeanized” or

⁶⁹ Th. Dokos, ‘Greece in a Changing Strategic Setting’ in Th. Couloumbis Th. Kariotis F. Bellou *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, Frank Cass London & New York 2003 43-68

⁷⁰ It’s what is called in Greece as “ex Anatolon kindynos” that means danger emanating from the East

⁷¹ P. Ifaistos & At. Platias, *Greek Deterrence Strategy*, [in Greek] Athens: Papazisis 1992, p. 17,

⁷² S. Economides (2005), p. 474

“westernized” dimension.⁷³ The “European path” was characterized by the Greek officials as the “safety valve” to protect and serve their national interests.

The transition of foreign policy issues from a national level to the respective multilateral or European constitutes a form of Europeanization, in the context of “bottom up” approach, as described in the previous chapters. Greece’s security, as a member, was supposed to affect directly EC’s security. The political support on behalf of EC appeared in the political scene as an attractive idea in an era during which the memories of Turkish invasion in Cyprus and Ankara’s demands over the Aegean were still fresh and as diplomatic weapon towards its eastern neighbor.⁷⁴ This entire show that the origins of the Europeanization process of the Greek Foreign Policy are rooted in its *incentive* to “multilateralize” and “westernize” its security concerns.⁷⁵

3. 1981-1985 A deviation from Europeanization

In the context of the current thesis it was notified that identifying ‘Europeanization’ with the main variable that contributes to the formulation of foreign policy at national level runs the risk of overestimating its impact if the importance of other endogenous (domestic) or exogenous (international) influences is not counted in. Its applicability and the evidence of its influence rest also upon the eagerness of the domestic environment to accept and adopt the elements it is composed of.

This was not the case for Greece during the first four years after its accession to EC. Although New Democracy, and personally C. Karamanlis had prepared the “implementation field” of the whole procedure seeking effectively to integrate Greece

⁷³ Ibid. p. 473

⁷⁴ Y. Valinakis, *Introduction to the Greek Foreign Policy 1949-1988*, (Athens Sideris 2005), p. 275

⁷⁵ S. Economides (2005), p. 475

in the EC as a full member the raise of PA.SO.K⁷⁶ in power seems to formulate a different scene for Greece's foreign policy orientations and plans. Greece seems initially to "sheer away from the Europeanization direction" that had sought to draw. At the October 1981 national elections PASOK won a landslide victory with 48% of the vote, and capturing 173 seats; it formed the first socialist government in the history of Greece since 1924. It was founded in 1974 as a radical Marxist-inspired party that called for the dissolution of the country's military alliances and for tighter government regulation of the economy. Its founding declaration was including the following guidelines as its mottos: "National Independence, Popular Sovereignty, Social Emancipation and Democratic Process".⁷⁷

As Economides points out its coming to power under the (objectively influential) leadership of Andreas Papandreou "shook Greece's membership of the West, and hence of the EC, to its very foundations".⁷⁸ "Greece belongs to the Greeks" (in contrast to Karamanlis' motto that "Greece belongs to the West") and "EC and NATO are the same syndicate" were the two slogans that illustrated fundamental positions of its party and its initial intentions towards the two institutions. It considered EC as the tool of "the Western capital" to impose its power to the less financially developed states and social classes.

Andreas Papandreou was opposing the whole concept of Greece's accession to EC because he was afraid that Greece would increase its dependence on the Western powers and reduce its capabilities to undertake an autonomous international role.⁷⁹ Another reason for his opposition was the fact that the management of the economy would be subject to Brussels' observation and control, and that the Greek industries

⁷⁶ Pan-Hellenic Socialistic Movement

⁷⁷ Founding Declaration of basic principles and goals

<http://www.pasok.gr/portal/gr/134/8867/1/7/1/showdoc.html>

⁷⁸ Economides (2005), p. 477

⁷⁹ Bearing in mind the Third World Countries

would face huge obstacles in order to get adapted to the dictates of the new competitive environment. Being aware of the traditional structural problems and dysfunctions the after-war state “was born with” and the stagflation it had to confront in the aftermath of the two energy crises in 1970’s he realized that it would run the risk of inadaptability in the EC requirements. Thus, before the 1981 elections he raised the question whether Greece should remain in the EC or not, promising that he would proceed with a referendum concerning that issue. In the aftermath of these elections he did not fulfil this promise but he sought to implement an expansively populist agenda aiming at “income redistribution”. This resulted to the initial improvement of the social and financial status of the average household from the one side, and to a dramatic growth of public deficit, national debt and inflation and to an important deviation from the EC “economic templates” and macroeconomic figures of the other nine (until then) member-states from the other.⁸⁰ In 1982 the Greek delegation wrote and submitted to EC a Memorandum which emphasized Greece's peculiarities and its consequent need for financial support from the Community and for temporary exemption from EU rules. Following the Commission's reservations on the latter, PASOK's main objective centered on the redistribution of Community financial resources to enable Greece and other less developed countries in the EU to make the necessary adjustments, thereby strengthening the Community's cohesion.⁸¹

The Europeanization process in Greece did not have to deal only with these hurdles. The intense nationalistic language and the anti-Western rhetoric PASOK employed harboured doubts regarding Greece’s honest attitude as member of the Western world. Papandreou, forged links with many leaders of the Arab world and

⁸⁰ P. Kazakos, *Between State and Market Economy Economic Policy in the After War Greece 1944-2000* [in Greek], (Athens Patakis 2001), p. 265

⁸¹ St. Perrakis & P. Grigoriou, *Greece in the European Integration Processes* [in Greek] (Komotini Ant. Sakkoula 1994), p. 108

played the lead with Ulf Palme in the Initiative of Six. Exploiting the anti-American reflexes of the Greek society during that period he cultivated a rhetoric which was demanding the direct withdrawal of the American bases from the Greek ground. To a little extent his rhetoric was effective.⁸² Greek officials viewed with scepticism EC further political integration. Thus, they showed clearly their preference to the amplification of the intergovernmental nature of the processes that were “composing” EPC towards which in general they kept initially a suspicious and cautious stance.⁸³ This behaviour was lying on the following factors:

- PA.SO.K’s constancy of undertaking an autonomous international role.⁸⁴ The rationale beyond this position was touching upon the need to respond to the internal pressure emanating from its own supporters and its leadership that was favoring an independent Greek Foreign Policy and to inactivate every possible “mechanism” with the help of which the “Big Powers”⁸⁵ would impose their opinions in reference to issues that might include a political cost for Athens (Cyprus problem and dispute with Turkey)⁸⁶
- the perception that interposing veto constituted an inalienable right that could be exercised without restrictions and without any repercussions on the positions that

⁸² It is not clear whether Americans had decided to withdraw only few of their military bases from the Greek ground relying on geopolitical considerations since Greece’s geo-strategic importance was supposed that it was decreasing or on the discontent of the Greek public opinion which was stemming out from the American position on the Cyprus events. In case they had already decided to proceed with this move it could be supported that their plans were “accommodated” by this rhetoric. From the other side Papandreou taking advantage of these anti-American reflexes could gain further public support on the one hand paving the way for the realization of the possibly already received American decisions on the other.

⁸³ C. Tsardanidis & St. Stavridis (2005), p. 227

⁸⁴ Y. Valinakis, *Introduction to the Greek Foreign policy 1949-1988* [in Greek] (2005), p. 286-287

⁸⁵ The term belongs to the context of the anti-Western rhetoric cultivated by the policy makers of that period

⁸⁶ C. Tsardanidis & St. Stavridis (2005), p. 227

the other partners would take towards vital as they were perceived Greek national interests⁸⁷

Greek diplomacy was considered the “thorn” for the formulation of a common EC stance towards many external issues and especially in the General Assembly of the UN. The refusal to condemn the imposition of martial law in Poland and the downing of Korean Lines Aircraft are some of the examples that reflect these regarded by its partners “uncooperative policies”.⁸⁸ Greece sought to exploit every “weighty law power” emanating from its participation at EPC in order to get into a “bombardment” of Turkey “pointing its finger” to the latter’s claims over the Aegean and Cyprus. The intention was to set the bilateral issues on the “Community’s table” and “incorporate” them in the wider context of the EC-Turkish relations. Thus, it sought several times to interrupt the financial cooperation between EC and Turkey taking advantage of exercising the veto-right.⁸⁹ Its policy caused its further marginalization in the EPC framework but either intentionally or not it might “had disencumbered” other EC partners that perhaps did not want to cooperate with Turkey (due to internal pressure from public opinion that was opposing the immigration of Turkish workers in the European ground) and were “hiding themselves” behind the dogmatic Greek stance.

All these show that the dynamics of Europeanization had not imbedded in the realities of Greek Foreign Policy. Although Greeks, belonging to the European family, were able to enmesh their own security concerns to an EC context this did not imply that they were influenced by the dynamics of Europeanization. Holding fixed positions in many cases, entangled solely on its national interests, reluctant to

⁸⁷ Y. Valinakis (2005), p. 286-291

⁸⁸ S. Economides (2005), p. 477

⁸⁹ P. Kazakos, “The normalization of the EC-Turkish relations and Greek Foreign Policy” in *Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1988 Critical Summary* [in Greek], Athens Gnosi 1989

communicate or to consulate along with its EC partners and pursuing consensus-breaking policies mirror political choices which are supposedly deviating from the Europeanization dynamic, as this is described in Chapter A. The positive response of EC in 1985 to the Greek Memorandum of 1982 will dramatically contribute to a shift of Greece's positions towards European Integration and the consequent re-alignment of Greek Foreign Policy to the Europeanization process.

4. 1985-1996 The sources of re-adjustment to the Europeanization process

During this period there appears to be a different trend towards the Europeanization process. A degree of "harmonization and adaptation" can be noted since the dynamics of European integration get "incorporated" in the Greek realities⁹⁰. The evolution of Europeanization process question is not coming suddenly into the surface for the Greek case but goes beyond European integration.⁹¹ The evidence of its impact on the Greek Foreign Policy should be ascribed into developments that will be mentioned below.

The perspective of the Single Act and the establishment of a common market until 1992 among the member states underlined the need for greater economic and social cohesion among the diverse countries and regions of the Community. In this context the intentions of the EC officials for further integration were reflected by the partially positive response to the Greek Memorandum through the establishment of Structural Funds, with special reference to European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and European Social Fund (ESF).⁹² The vast transfer of funds both from structural

⁹⁰ C. Tsardanidis & St. Stavridis (2005), p. 227

⁹¹ As claimed in a previous chapter

⁹² The Single European Act and the road toward the Treaty of the European Union (1986-1992)
<http://www.historiasiglo20.org/europe/acta.htm>

programs and the CAP contributed immensely to making the wider Greek public enthusiastically supportive of European integration.⁹³

PASOK's reelection in 1985 inaugurated a process that led to the “curtailment of both its socialist inclinations and its nationalist overtones”.⁹⁴ Gerasimos Arsenis, then the minister of national economy and a supporter of ethnocentric solutions, was immediately replaced by Kostas Simitis, a strongly pro-EU politician. The austerity program that was then introduced reflected not only Greek economic necessity but also the imperative need for further integration and alignment with the Community's market economy rules. This European orientation of the PASOK government obtained a more official dimension with the acceptance of the SEA in 1986 and Maastricht Treaty with the identity of the opposing party in 1992.⁹⁵

The EMU project which emerged from the TEU and the perspective for the new enlargement of the EU functioned also as a catalyst to Greece's further Europeanization process. From the one side the marginalization danger and the risk that the Greek state would run in economic, political and institutional terms inside the EU in case it resisted the need to adjust its economy, society and policy to the EMU “dictates” worked as a “driving force” for the whole procedure. From the other side the fact that all Eastern Europe countries, indeed all countries surrounding Greece aimed to access the EU, illustrated the importance of Greek membership and underlined the imperative need for Greece to become more deeply integrated and a more active player in the EU context.⁹⁶ The fear of isolation in strategic terms and the

⁹³ P.C Ioakimidis, “The Europeanization of Greece's Foreign Policy: Progress and Problems” in Ioakimidis P. C (ed.) *Greece in the European Union: The New Role & the New Agenda*, (Ministry of Press and Mass Media Athens 2002) p. 114

⁹⁴ A. Moschonas, “European Integration and Prospects of Modernization in Greece” in *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 15:2, (1997), p. 325-348

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ P. C Ioakimidis (2002), p. 114

need for adaptation to the newly emerged challenges contributed to the understanding of Greece's harmonization and alignment need with its EU members.

The end of Communism reflected by the dissolution of Soviet Union and Yugoslavia eliminated every theoretical oscillation possibility between West and East and made PASOK's initial claims regarding the need to take over international autonomous roles seem unrealistic declarations. The region from which Greece is surrounded, keeping its reputation as "turbulent", became a field for the emergence of new nationalisms and conflicts.⁹⁷ Greece seemed unable to undertake alone the responsibilities for the reconstruction of the whole area. Consequently, the EU emerges in the eyes of the officials as the institutional framework within which they could promote the stability and their interests in the region. Their expectations were not directly fulfilled. From the one side the CFSP that was established with the Maastricht Treaty did not manage to ensure the peace in the region, paying the cost of the internal contradictory interests among its member-states in the area. From the other side Greece was paying according to its EU partners exaggerating attention on the FYROM question. An issue that was supposed to be conducted in "tactic and diplomatic manner" because its particularity was insolubly linked to the wider Balkan problem entered different "channels" in the context of which it seemed that the manipulation of the public opinion and the determination of political gains would prevail the service of the national interests. The blockade that Greece imposed on FYROM goods moving to and from the port of Thessaloniki with the exception of humanitarian aid on 16th February of 1994, exploiting the advantages deriving from its identity as President of the European Council, was criticized by certain partners as an action opposing the Europeanization of its national Foreign Policy. From the other

⁹⁷ http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1393/MR1393.ch2.pdf and Lesser I. O 'Greece's New Geopolitical Environment' in *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* Vol. 5 No. 2 September 2005, p. 347-363

side the Greek delegation accused its EU partners of handling this issue without taking into account the revisionist nationalistic inclinations behind FYROM's policy.⁹⁸

Leaving aside the FYROM case due to its peculiarities, Greek Foreign Policy becomes more subject to the Europeanization process. The fact that the opinions of two big parties (New Democracy and PA.SO.K) are politically identified with the support of further European integration and Greece's increasing participation at it constitutes an important feature for the Europeanization procedure to accelerate its influence. Despite this progress, it should be noted that the handling of its key foreign policy issues (Cyprus, Turkey, FYROM), remains under the "sovereign umbrella" showing that Europeanization has not reached the point where it can influence the treatment of Greece's vital interests.

5. 1996-Today The acceleration of the Europeanization process

If Papandreu's policies during 80s led to a restraining impact of Europeanization on Greek Foreign Policy, it could be easily claimed that this was not the case with Simitis' policies in '90s. The transformation of the domestic environment towards this procedure relied mainly on the before mentioned external developments. The acceleration of the Europeanization impact on Greece in terms of domestic and foreign policy relies on an evolution in the Greek political system.

The election of Costas Simitis and his installation as a Prime Minister in 1996 constituted a major turning point in Greek politics regarding the increasing influence that Europeanization could expose on them. His rise to power initiated a series of developments that had been underway long before. Simitis symbolizes European

⁹⁸ D. Floudas, "Pardon? A conflict for a name? FYROM's dispute with Greece revisited"
<http://www.intersticeconsulting.com/documents/FYROM.pdf>

normalcy as opposed to Greek “exceptionalism”.⁹⁹ At a personal level Simitis seemed to be a quiet and reserved character. As party leader he never matched the dominance of Andreas Papandreou and his charismatic style. The leadership was consciously shifted to be more managerial and technocratic. The Simitis’ explicit project was to secure Greece’s position at the core of the EU.¹⁰⁰

George Papandreou’s emergence as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1999 played also a decisive role to keep Greek Foreign Policy committed to its Europeanizing direction. The Kosovo crisis in 1999 and NATO intervention cultivated an anti-Western climate on behalf of the Greek public opinion. Greek people due to the feelings of sympathy they were fostering towards Serbia did not want any Greek involvement in these NATO operations. Papandreou following a policy of “constructive ambiguity” managed to inactivate the anti-Western reflexes of Greek people¹⁰¹ by not cooperating militarily in these operations from the one side and to grant NATO forces the rights of passage through Greek territory from the other.¹⁰² His intervention was of determinant importance in order to keep Greek Foreign Policy aligned to its Europeanizing orientation.

In a similar framework another development in the Greek society has been the emergence of a small constituency of scholars, journalists and political activists who are supposed to resist the danger of “national mythologizing”. This group which was strongly supporting Simitis’ policies is small but influential enough to undertake a variety of projects from critically reviewing Greek primary and secondary schooling

⁹⁹ Keridis D, “Political Culture and Foreign Policy: Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of European Integration and Globalization”, Cambridge June 1999 <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-99/keridis.pdf>

¹⁰⁰ Featherstone K. ‘Introduction: Modernisation and the Structural Constraints of Greek Politics’, in *West European Politics* (March 2005), 28:2, 223-241

¹⁰¹ Keridis D, “The Foreign Policy of Modernism: From Controversy to Interdependence”, in Tsakonas P. *Modern Foreign Policy Part A* [in Greek], [Athens 2003 Sideris], p. 316

¹⁰² Economides (2005), p. 485-486

aiming at a more open and friendly approach to neighbors to a number of conferences, publications and articles.¹⁰³

The positive contribution to these developments on behalf of the main opposing party during that period, New Democracy should not be underestimated. Firmly committed to its pro-European profile it supported the foreign policy choices of Simitis and Papandreou.¹⁰⁴ New Democracy, after coming into power in 2004, seems to remain attached to the continuation of Greece's Europeanization process both in domestic and in foreign policy terms. Without the convergence among the two big parties concerning Greece's European future and the strategy on the basis of which the national interests could be effectively served several doubts could be harbored regarding the viability of the whole procedure.

Greece's participation at CFSP forced Greek foreign policy to embrace new policy instruments and a new policy style more congruent with EU requirements.¹⁰⁵ Greek Foreign Policy is beginning to 'absorb' the logic of European unification with great success. Any international issue is immediately seen and treated under the angle of EU, keeping into account the views of all the other member states.¹⁰⁶ The impact of EU membership and the participation at CFSP have underlined "the increasingly pivotal role of multilateral organizations, other than UN, the ineffectiveness of veto and consensus-breaking policy, the importance of building alliances and advancing foreign policy objectives". It illustrated the importance of negotiation and compromise as fundamental instruments for resolving problems and promoting

¹⁰³ <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-99/keridis.pdf> Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy constitutes a good example.

¹⁰⁴ Keridis D. (2003) p. 316

¹⁰⁵ Ioakimidis P.C, "The model of foreign policy making in Greece: Personalities versus Institutions" in St. Stavridis, Th. Couloumbis, Th. Veremis, N. Waites (eds.) *Foreign Policies of the EU's Mediterranean and Applicant Counties in the 1990s*, [London 1999 Macmillan]

¹⁰⁶ Tsardanidis Ch. & Stavridis St., (2005), p. 228

interests in the context of the modern and interdependent world.¹⁰⁷ The traditional line of the Greek Foreign Policy was trapped by an extreme realism that was equating every non realistic analysis with utopian-idealistic and confessedly approaches and negotiations with an act leading inevitably to unacceptable surrender.¹⁰⁸ As Keridis points out this policy line gave its way to a renewed Greek foreign policy that includes realism, flexibility, positive energy instead of rejection and maximalism, undertaking initiatives instead of having a passive role, planning and prevention instead of extemporization and simplified reactions towards events determined by others.¹⁰⁹

This impact seems to be also through the shift from an intense nationalistic horology reflected by phrases like “national rights” and “national issues” to the language of interests and national pursuits not exposed to any sort of questioning.¹¹⁰ As Ioakimidis supports this change is accompanied by a wider attempt to redefine patriotism not merely as a constant drive to fulfill narrowly conceived nationalistic objectives in foreign policy (which have mainly to deal with the evolution of the Turkish-Greek relations) but as multi-faced situation leading to a “stronger Greece, not merely in military terms but primarily in economic, political, institutional and cultural resources, a Greece fully integrated into the European Union”.¹¹¹

The identity as EU membership has contributed to Greece’s acquiring a strong economic dimension in the formulation of foreign policy and more generally elements of “low politics” or “soft power”. The participation at CFSP has affected Greek foreign policy agenda to embrace issues such as trade, environment, technology, culture and agriculture and contribution of NGOs on policy formulation. The

¹⁰⁷ Ioakimidis (2002), p. 113

¹⁰⁸ Keridis D. (2003), p. 298

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. 316

¹¹⁰ P. C Ioakimidis (2002), P. 112

¹¹¹ The definition belongs to C. Simitis See Ioakimidis P.C (2002), P. 112

development of “economic diplomacy” with special reference to the Balkans region belongs to the context of the “top-down” influence that Europeanization exerts to Greek Foreign Policy. Greece in the Balkans seeks for the formulation of a multilateralist foreign policy (with EU partners) designed to establish successful transition policies toward democracy and market economy in almost every state in its northern borders.¹¹² In the words of G. Papandreou, Greek state is aware of the fact that “the Balkanization of the region must be replaced by a coordination of international efforts. The heart of the European ethos lies in building institutions and practices of inclusiveness. That is why Greece has always supported EU enlargement as a means of building a bridge of security, cooperation and development between nations”.¹¹³ To this direction Greek officials prepared the ground for stronger bilateral relations by signing more than 30 economic agreements covering many aspects of economic activities. Nearly 3,000 Greek enterprises and businesses have seized the chance and taken advantage of this newly emerging environment and are now actively conducting operations in these markets. The employment of a diplomacy with evident economic elements aims at a permanent peace in the region.¹¹⁴

Having undertaken certain obligations under the label of the EU member state Greece founded Hellenic Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans (HiPERB) which constitutes an effort on the behalf of Greece to “incorporate certain individual initiatives of development assistance into one single plan, and thus promote

¹¹² Couloumbis Th., ‘Strategic Consensus in Greek Domestic And Foreign Policy Since 1974’ in V. Coufoudakis, H.J. Psomiades and A. Gerolymatos (eds) *Greece and the New Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities* (New York: Pella, 1999)

¹¹³ Papandreou G., “Principles of Greek Foreign Policy” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 12:1, (Winter 2001), p. 1-10

¹¹⁴ Th. Skylakakis, “The importance of economic diplomacy” http://www.bridge-mag.com/magazine/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=81&Itemid=99999999

an integrated development policy”. The ultimate goal is the political, economic and social stability in Southeast Europe.¹¹⁵

The ultimate manifestation of Europeanization’s impact on Greek Foreign Policy is the “multilateralisation” and “denationalization”¹¹⁶ of the national interests’ handling. In the aftermath of Simitis election Greece had to confront an escalated crisis with Turkey which brought the two countries into the “brink of a conflict”. This was averted following the American mediation and involvement. CFSP similarly to the Balkans’ issue seemed unable to take the initiatives that would implicate in the peaceful resolution of 1996 Imia-Kardak crisis. Although someone could wonder whether the participation at CFSP was effective and substantial for the national interests Simitis remained attached to the European orientation he had in mind for Greece. He showed the first signs of the new Greek attitude to its national interests “embarking on concerted, and well orchestrated, diplomatic campaign” seeking to convince its EU partners that the Greek borders were actually EU’s borders and that revisionist according to the Greek claims Turkish policy in the Aegean should motivate EU to defend itself for the “Greek-European” borders. This lobbying in the EU context reflected a transformation regarding the way Greece would conceptualize and handle its key foreign policy issues. The vital national issues as perceived by the Greek side were projected-“uploaded” onto the EU instruments and exposed to a kind of “denationalization and multi-lateralization” bearing in mind the bottom-up approach of Europeanization that was theoretically discussed in a previous chapter.¹¹⁷ The perception that key foreign policy issues should not monolithically touch upon national sovereignty but also conducted through the “European channel” constitutes the most characteristic mark that Europeanization has left on Greek Foreign Policy.

¹¹⁵ HiPERB <http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Economic+Diplomacy/HiPERB/>

¹¹⁶ S. Economides (2005), p. 481-482

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

In a short space of time and as a consequence of the before mentioned evolutions and developments Greece managed to Europeanize gradually its vital foreign interest in the most practical of terms through both the style and substance of its new foreign policy. The top-down and bottom-up impact that Europeanization had on the formulation of Greek foreign policy was not restricted only towards its northern neighbors. As it will be described in the next chapter, Greece is seeking to implement a policy towards Turkey that includes all the aforementioned elements. The desire to integrate Turkey deeper into the western institutions and to develop economic ties within this framework under the “engagement strategy” label constitute a deviation of the traditional line of the Greek Foreign policy (or containment strategy) which had been adopted so far and aimed to keep Turkey marginalized and isolated from EU. A policy fully aligned with its EU partners seeking to bring Turkey closer to the ‘European dream’ with the help of building firm economic relations with it reveal the “indelible marks” of the Europeanization process on the Greek Foreign Policy.

6. Conclusions

It seems clear that the Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy has made progressive steps. The main obstacle is that its viability rests upon one possible evolution that will not derive from the Greece’s “Europeanized policy choices”. The evolution of the further Europeanization process lies on the question whether Turkey seizes the chance and intensifies its efforts to become a credible part of the European world or not. If Turkey decides that the European orientation does not constitute its main political aim and becomes “unhooked” from the EU’s dictates, what will be the future of Greek Foreign Policy in Europeanization terms? It is obvious now that Greece is seeking to exploit every advantage is stemming out from its identity as EU

member in order to push Turkey become more integrated into the EU. If Turkey does not “win the European bet” and returns to an unpredictable for the European given policy, how can Greece being its western neighbor rely on the fact that the Europeanization process will automatically resolve the disputes? This proves again the “vulnerability” of Europeanization to pressures and influences emanating from both the domestic and international environment.

CHAPTER D: FROM CONTAINMENT TO ENGAGEMENT

THE ROLE OF EUROPEANIZATION

1. Introduction

The perception of a threat from Turkey has traditionally dominated Greek thinking about the strategic environment, including defense planning. For many years Turks were regarded as the danger emanating from the East, the age-old enemy and impudent to attack and damage Greece's integrity. Many Greek commentators stated that Greeks should be always on the alert in order to head off every possible "Turkish threat and aggressiveness". This point of view had been theoretically deeply rooted in the Greek national consciousness. It should not be underestimated that in broader political terms, conflict with Ottoman and modern Turkey is supposed to be central to the development of Greek nationalism and the evolution of the modern state.

The content the current chapter is concerned with will focus on the strategy which Greeks adopted in order to deal with their Eastern neighbor. For many years a containment policy (whose conceptual framework is analyzed in chapter B) had been pursued. After 1999 Greeks, under the influence of Europeanization dynamics which started to become evident after 1996, altered their strategy vis-à-vis Turkey. Which was the underlying factor that contributed to this transition? How was the renewed strategy implemented and pursued in the Greek Foreign Policy realm? These are the questions the chapter is seeking to answer.

2. The rationale behind the adoption of Containment Strategy towards Turkey

From the majority of Greek Foreign Policy Makers' point of view since the Cyprus crisis of 1974, the potential for a major clash between Greece and Turkey had become important for the security equation in southeastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean, albeit overshadowed for decades by the East-West competition.¹¹⁸ The Turkish invasion-the term is used in UN resolutions¹¹⁹-and the subsequent occupation of the northern part of Cyprus seemed to pave the way for "new thinking" in terms of security.¹²⁰ The sense of threat felt by Greece from the North, as the Cold-War conditions had imposed, had started to dissolve according to the Greek perceptions. This new thinking was not triggered off only by the Cyprus events but also by the Turkish aspirations in the Aegean which are held as revisionist from the Greek point of view and are supposed to be systematically spread to every direction consolidating the Greek perception that Turkey has set out in an effort of total revision of the international status quo of the Aegean and the relating regulations of the past.¹²¹

Turkish consistent and unilateral claims since 1974-75 over the delimitation of the maritime boundaries and continental shelf, the breadth of territorial waters, the control of the airspace and Greek "militarization" of eastern Aegean Islands reflect, according to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey's "revisionist aspirations" in the Aegean. In the context of holding Turkey as revisionist power in the Aegean the commentators include violations of the Greek airspace, refusal to submit the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf to the International Court of Justice, threats of war in case Greece implements its right to extend its territorial zone from

¹¹⁸ "Greece's New Strategic Environment"

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1393/MR1393.ch2.pdf

¹¹⁹ Security Council's Resolution 353 (20.7.1974)

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/289/72/IMG/NR028972.pdf?OpenElement>,]

¹²⁰ Th. Dokos, 'Greece in a Changing Strategic Setting' in Th. Coulombis Th. Kariotis F. Bellou *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, (Frank Cass London & New York 2003), 43-68

¹²¹ Y. Valinakis, "Greece's Security Policy in the Post - Cold War Era" in *Ebenhausen: Science and Politics, Research Institute for International Politics and Security* [in German], 1994, p. 39-40-233

six to twelve miles (according to the provisions of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) and challenges of the Aegean status quo as established by a number of international treaties (1923 Lausanne Treaty, 1932 Agreement between Italy and Turkey, 1947 Paris Treaty). These perceived challenges are reflected by Turkish unilateral claims for the existence of “grey-zones” in the Aegean. According to what the Turkish side supports, small islands, islets and rocks in the Aegean whose status has not been clarified by the aforementioned treaties are subject to sort of questioning relating to where they belong to.¹²² It should be reminded that this led to the Imia/Kardak crisis in January 1996¹²³ which brought the contributing parts into the brink of an armed conflict.

Turkey claims that the extension by Greece of her territorial waters beyond the present 6 miles in the Aegean will have most inequitable implications and would constitute an abuse of right. Turkey has repeatedly threatened that such an act would be considered a *casus belli*. According to them the whole issue represents an age-old attempt by Greece to turn the Aegean into a “Greek lake”.¹²⁴ They point to the fact that if a 12 mile limit is implemented, then virtually all passage to high seas from Turkish Aegean and Black Sea ports would be through areas under Greek sovereignty and jurisdiction. Under the present 6-mile limit, Greece holds approximately 43.5% of the Aegean Sea and Turkey 7.7%, the remaining 49% being high seas. If the 12-mile limit be applied, the Greek territorial waters in the Aegean will increase to 71.5% whereas Turkey’s share will increase to 8.7%, and the area of high seas will be

¹²² As the Turkish officials state “There are numerous small islands, islets and rocks in the Aegean ownership of which were not ceded to Greece by international treaties.”

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/islands_-islets-and-rocks-in-the-aegean-which-were-not-ceded-to-greece-by-international-treaties.en.mfa

¹²³ For further details <http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Policy/Geographic+Regions/South-Eastern+Europe/Turkey/Relationships+-+Potentials>

¹²⁴ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-breadth-of-territorial-waters.en.mfa>

reduced to 19.7% which will be also fragmented due to the existence of the Greek islands.¹²⁵

Greece on its part considers that according to international law, both customary and contractual, she is entitled to extend her territorial waters to up to 12 nautical miles. One of her additional arguments relies upon the fact that this right has already been exercised by many states including Turkey, which since 1964 has extended her territorial waters in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean to 12 nautical miles, albeit not being contributing part to the UN Convention on the Law of Sea.¹²⁶ Greece also has a coastal zone of 10 nautical miles serving aviation and air policing requirements as established by Presidential Decree 6/18, of September 1931 on the determination of the extent of territorial waters for aviation and air policing requirements.¹²⁷

Turkey's dispute over the breadth of Greek airspace began in 1975-although, as the Greek officials claim, she had, for 44 years (1931-1975), recognized and respected the above rule of 10 nautical miles. Turkish officials since then do not recognize the ten-mile Greek air-limit refusing also to submit flight plans when their military aircraft enter the Athens FIR region.¹²⁸ According to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs the frequency of violations of Greek airspace by Turkish military aircraft (frequently over flying Greek islands) has considerably increased in the last few years and the tendency to engage in mock dogfights increases the probability of a real air engagement with possible escalatory effects.

¹²⁵ Ibid. and A. Wilson, *The Aegean Dispute*, Adelphi Paper (London: IISS, 1980), pp. 36-37 and V. Theodoropoulos, *Turks and Us* [in Greek], (A.E Fytrakis 1988), pp. 266-300

¹²⁶ <http://www.yplex.gov.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Policy/Geographic+Regions/South-Eastern+Europe/Turkey/Turkish+claims/Greek+Territorial+Waters+-+National+Airspace/> and H. Dipla, "The Greek Territorial Zone and the Straits of International Navigation" [in Greek] in H. Dipla and H. Rozakis, *The Sea Law and its Implementation in Greece*, [Athens I. Sideris 2004], p.13-50

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/air-space-related-related-problems.en.mfa>

As to the Moslem minority in Greek Thrace, according to elements deriving from the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it consists of 49.9% Turks, 33.6% Pomaks and 16.5% Gypsies.¹²⁹ Occasional threats according to the Greek commentators-in certain extremist quarters- advocate for Turkish intervention in Thrace aiming to liberate their “oppressed kin”. In this context, the role of the Turkish Consulate General in Komotini is continuously criticized by the Greek mass media for instigating nationalistic irredentism among the Muslim communities of the region. Hence, there is Greek concern, that under certain circumstances, Turkish territorial aspirations vis-à-vis Greek Thrace¹³⁰ might become in the future the most important challenge to Greek security.¹³¹

According to Greek analysts Turkey’s revisionist aims towards Greece have come out and are continuously manifested-even today-through official statements, diplomatic initiatives and military actions (including the deployment of its armed forces). As Platias points out, Turkish official declarations have been intensifying Greek fears. In the same token the Turkish Prime Minister’s Demirel stated in 1975 that “...half of the Aegean is ours. Let the whole world know that this is so... We know how to crush the heads of our enemies when the prestige, dignity and interests of the Turkish nation are attacked”.¹³² Moreover, direct challenges as interpreted by the Greek officials (e.g. “the group of islands that are situated within 50 km of the Turkish coast...should belong to Turkey”), as well as indirect questioning of Greek sovereignty over the Aegean islands have been viewed with great alarm.

¹²⁹ Official elements from the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs www.mfa.gr

¹³⁰ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-minority-of-western-thrace.en.mfa>

¹³¹ Y. Valinakis „Greece’s Security Policy in the Post – Cold War Era“ Ebenhausen (ed.) *Science and Politics, Research Institute for International Politics and Security* [in German], 1994, pp. 39-40 and for further details P. Hidirolou, *Thrace in the Light of the National Ideal of the Turks 1985-1991*, Hellenic University Press 1992

¹³² A. Platias, ‘Greece’s Strategic Doctrine’: “In search for autonomy and deterrence” in D. Konstas(ed.) *The Greek Turkish Conflict in the 1990s* [London: Macmillan, 1991] p.93

Greece, in order to deal with the perceived Turkish threat came up with the decision to adopt a containment strategy towards Turkey reflecting the Cold-War situation and the zero-sum perception that were shaping their bilateral relations. The establishment of national forces out of the NATO context and exposed to the control by national administration constituted one of Greece's containment pillars. The rationale beyond this was that though paying dependence cost on NATO (with the consequent restriction of national security duties) they were not supposed to enjoy any advantages (security and protection) they should stem out from their participation at the alliance.¹³³ For more than twenty years, Greece, on average, allocated approximately (and maybe more than) 6% of GDP to defense compared with a NATO average of 3.8% for the same period.¹³⁴

The other pillar on which the pursued policy had been constructed was concentrating on how to avoid an increase in Turkey's political, economic and diplomatic power relative and leverage comparing to that of Greece. This would include efforts to slow down the development of Turkey's relations with the EU whose member was already Greece, thus limiting its expansion of influence. Containment assumes that allowing Turkey to strengthen its relations with Europe will not lead to its behavior change, but rather it will embolden its leadership, making an eventual clash with Turkey even more likely. This is the reason why even modest progress of EC/EU-Turkish relations should be resisted in the Greek perception. Under the umbrella of containment strategy all elements of EU-Turkish relations would be subordinate to the aim of preventing Turkey's European (and international) standing. This kind of policy assumes that the impasse in Turkish-Greek relations will

¹³³ For further details see P. Ifaistos & A. Platias, *Greece's Deterrence Strategy*, [Athens 1992 Papazisis]

¹³⁴ Ch. Kollias, "Greek Turkish Conflict and Military Expenditure 1960-1992" in *Journal of Peace Research*, 33:2. (May, 1996), pp. 217-228

remain because given its political tradition of Kemalist nationalism, Turkey is unlikely to let its policy become more conciliatory, since it would have to respond to the nationalist passions of a large part of both its elites and populace. Taking all these for granted, the Greek state should both demonstrate its resolve to deter Turkey and take steps to get prepared for a conflict.¹³⁵

3. The rationale of Europeanization behind the adoption of Greece's Engagement Strategy

Imia-Kardak crisis could be perceived as the zenith of the Greek-Turkish tensions since it brought, as it was said before, the two countries into the brink of an armed conflict. This incident could be regarded as the point where the first motives were created towards a rapprochement in Greek-Turkish relations. It generated strong pressure from the United States and the European Union, on both countries (especially on Athens), to reach an understanding and compelled Simitis' government to abandon Greece's long-held policy of 'no talks with Turkey'.¹³⁶ Besides the incidents that followed this crisis (S-300 missiles and Ocalan case), a "wind of change" improved the atmosphere in the Greek-Turkish relations and contributed to the gradual adoption of an engagement strategy on behalf of the Greeks towards Turkey.

Many people either subconsciously or not have associated the employment of this strategy with some other important incidents that had taken place during 1999, mainly the Kosovo crisis and the earthquakes in both countries. It is a fact that the Kosovo crisis had a crucial influence in pushing the officials of both states toward regional cooperation and clearly marked a shifting from traditional patterns of foreign policy. NATO's Kosovo operation had a strategic impact on Greek-Turkish relations,

¹³⁵ Ifantis K, 'Greece's Turkish Dilemmas: There and Back Again...' *Southeast European and Black Studies*, 5:3, 379-394

¹³⁶ E. Athanassopoulou, "Blessing in Disguise? The Imia-Kardak Crisis and Greek-Turkish Relations," *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Winter 1997), p. 97.

providing the two countries with a common goal, which consists of the stability in NATO's southeastern flank.¹³⁷ It became clear that a possible conflict would endanger stability in Southeastern Europe and complicate further the settlement of disputes in the Balkans.¹³⁸ In the words of G. Papandreou, "the harrowing war in Kosovo brought home to the Greek people the importance and necessity of good, neighborly relations... Greece has made an effort to take the lead in promoting stability, cooperation, and democracy in the Balkans. Given this basic, but determined, foreign policy outlook, it would have been incongruous to exclude Turkey".¹³⁹

In August and September 1999 successive devastating earthquakes hit the two countries. The so called "earthquake or seismic diplomacy" initiated by the peoples generated an outpouring of sympathy and generous assistance provided by ordinary Greeks and Turks in both cases. These acts were encouraged from the top and took many foreigners by surprise, preparing the public for a breakthrough in the climate of bilateral relations, which had been marred by decades of hostility over pogroms, territorial disputes and the situation in the divided island of Cyprus.¹⁴⁰ This process included not only a public legitimization of a new policy course but also a process of "demystifying the enemy".¹⁴¹ It is worth mentioning that it was the first time since the public neighborliness that every side showed for the others' trauma inaugurating a

¹³⁷ Ath. Kotsiaros., "The change of the Greek Foreign Policy towards Turkey: the Greek official political discourse", Institute for European Integration and Policy, Athens, January 2006

¹³⁸ http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1393/MR1393_ch2.pdf

¹³⁹ G. Papandreou, "Revision in Greek Foreign Policy," Western Policy Center, January 2000
http://www.papandreou.gr/february2000/wpc_jan2000.html

¹⁴⁰ D. Keridis, "Earthquakes, Diplomacy and New Thinking in Foreign Policy" in *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vo. 30, No. 1, Winter 2006, p. 1-8
<http://fletcher.tufts.edu/faculty/Keridis/pdfs/KeridisForum.pdf>

¹⁴¹ A. Gundogdu, "Identities in Question: Greek-Turkish Relations in a Period of Transformation?" Middle East Review of International Affairs <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2001/issue1/jv5n1a8.html>

new “communication channel” among the people, something unusual for the bilateral relations’ standards.¹⁴²

Although these events contributed to the implementation-acceleration of the whole engagement strategy process the dynamics of European integration and Europeanization could be regarded as the main driving force behind the adoption of the rationale of this strategy. It is assumed in the framework of this chapter that Europeanization functioned as the main variable or indicator that could contribute to the “operationalization” of the whole engagement strategy adoption. In the context of the previous chapter it was referred that every government since 1975, the year during which Greece applied for full membership to the European Community, sought to “up-load” and project the Greek-Turkish dispute onto a European level. The logic was that utilizing every possible advantage deriving from Greece’s participation at these institutions in contrast to Turkey would motivate EC to employ a similar to Greeks’ stance towards its neighbor and hindering the materialization of Ankara’s revisionist policy as it was perceived by Greeks. These expectations were not fulfilled to the degree Greek officials had imagined or expected. Against their will they found themselves many times marginalized and isolated from the majority of their European partners. One obvious example constitutes the before described crisis which was averted following mainly US’ prompt mediation.

Simitis’ policies, entangled to Greece’s “European guidelines”, made several attempts to convince its EU partners¹⁴³ that Greece’s borders were supposedly identified with the respective EU borders’ signaling a kind of “denationalization and multilateralisation” of Greece’s handling of national interests. This fact was consequently revealing the inaugurating and evident impact of Europeanization on the

¹⁴² Th. Veremis, *History of Greek-Turkish Relations 1453-2003* [in Greek], [Athens 2004 Sideris] pp.184

¹⁴³ As mentioned in the previous chapter

formulation of Greek Foreign Policy towards Turkey. This does not mean that the whole strategy was resting upon EU partners' eagerness to defend the Greek borders. Greece was obliged to devote an important part of its national budget for security concerns' 'channel'.¹⁴⁴

Simitis' government had to deal with two main challenges: from the one side it had to follow Turkish arms' race committing itself to financial expenses in order to amplify Greece's deterrence capabilities¹⁴⁵ and from the other it was committed to secure its position at the core of the EU which in institutional, economic and political terms was reflected by the positive response to the EMU challenge. Between 1996 and 2000, Greece spent \$14 billion in revamping its military equipment whereas Turkey declared a \$150 billion military spending program for 30 years period beginning in 1996. It should be noted also that military spending in Greece increased by 30 percent between 1989 and 1999.¹⁴⁶ It seemed that the whole armament competition did not affect Turkey the same way it affected Greece, since the former as a non EU member did not have to deal with the imperative need to satisfy the EMU requirements. It became also clear that this armament competition against Turkey in quantity terms would lead Greece to an impasse situation. According to analysts these armament programs would exert a negative influence on the Greek economy with special reference to what is called "the steam engine of financial development", the

¹⁴⁴ For further details concerning Greece's military expenses See Th. Dokos, "The Counterbalance of Turkish Threat: The Military Dimension" in Ch. Jallourridis- P. Tsakonas (eds.) *Greece and Turkey In the Aftermath of Cold War*, [in Greek] Athens 1999 Sideris, p. 201-224

¹⁴⁵ According to the estimations of special analysts the rectification of a military balance in the Aegean demanded from Greece additional expenses for the acquirement of renewed equipment worth approximately 1.2 billion Euros (400 billion drachmas) for the 10 following years. See P. Tsakonas, (2003) "Socializing the Opponent: Greece's Counterbalance Strategy towards Turkey and Greek-Turkish relations" in P. Tsakonas (ed.) *Modern Greek Foreign Policy Part B* [in Greek], Athens Sideris, p. 49-97 and Th. Dokos-P. Tsakonas, *National Security Strategy* [in Greek], [Athens 2005 Papazisis], p. 111

¹⁴⁶ D. Lucas, Working Paper 2004-2005 "Greece's Shifting Position on Turkish Accession to the EU Before and After Helsinki (1999)" http://www.thesis.net/greece/greece_contence.htm

investment expenditure as a share of GDP.¹⁴⁷ The national deficit emanating from these expenses would jeopardize Greece's "road map" to the EU core. The policies of Simitis government, to an important extent influenced by the military budget, resulted in the initial exclusion of Greece from EMU that year. Greece was supposed not to belong to the 11 member states that would introduce the new Euro currency in 2002.¹⁴⁸

PASOK was exposed to an imperative need of raising Greece to the level of material prosperity enjoyed by its EU partners. A fully integrated to the EU member would emerge as "core European actor" in the framework of a globalized economy and avoid the repercussions of remaining peripheral and isolated from its EU partners.¹⁴⁹ The Greek think tanks of that period realized that the "actual strategic bet" that would strengthen Greece's position should be the EMU project. Greece had to confront a "guns-butter dilemma" dealing with its capability to connect successfully its need for direct and expensive arms from the one side with the realization of its long-term goal from the other which was identified with the fulfillment of the financial criteria imposed by EMU demands.¹⁵⁰ How could Greece manage a combination between an effective deterrence strategy towards Turkey and the consequent financial costs, with the fulfillment of its obligations as candidate EMU member?¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁷ P. Tsakonas (2003), p. 63 and Ch. Kollias & A. Refenes "Modelling the Effects of Defence Spending Relations Using Neural Networks: Evidence from Greece", *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy* (1996) 3:2, p. 1-12

¹⁴⁸ http://www.ethesis.net/greece/greece_contence.htm

¹⁴⁹ O. Güzer, "Greek Foreign Policy The case of Greco-Turkish Relations under the two consecutive Kostas Simitis Premierhips (1996-2000) and (2000-2004)", Working Paper

<http://www.ep.liu.se/undergraduate/abstract.xsql?dbid=4555> and Arghyris N. "Globalization and Domestic Political Discourse: The Case of Greece" <http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/arghyris.html>

¹⁵⁰ Th. Dokos-P. Tsakonas *National Security Strategy* [in Greek], Athens Papazisis 2005, p. 114

¹⁵¹ Kostas Simitis *Policy for a creative Greece 1996-2004* [in Greek], [Athens 2005 Polis] In the context of this book the ex Greek Prime Minister explains all the considerations and the rationale beyond Greece's Strategy shift towards Turkey.

It should not be underestimated that in the mid 1990s Greece was still trying to convince its European counterparts that its “black sheep” reputation was not any more existent. Until then Greece was judged by its partners for holding back the CFSP because it was often taking foreign policy decisions solely based on its own national interests and avoiding the position of the EU. The FYROM question example which was described in the context of the previous chapter belongs to this criticism category. The fact that EC-Turkish financial cooperation was several times interrupted due to Greeks’ involvement is also remarkable. The actual outcome of this veto-policy especially towards Turkey¹⁵² led in many cases to Greece’s isolation from the other member states. Keeping Turkey marginalized from EU had contributed to its own marginalization. This also meant that Greece did not manage to convince its EU partners that its national interests are actually identified with EU’s respective ones. As Loukas Tsoukalis points out, the reason behind Greece’s isolation was relying on her claims that its European partners mostly remained indifferent to her concerns and fears.¹⁵³

For the Greek Foreign Policy decision makers the adoption of a redefined or renewed strategy towards Turkey seemed to become more and more imperative. In the context of its formulation, EU could become the proper forum that would ask for the observance of certain rules and criteria on behalf of these candidate states that sought to enter the EU. Greece should take a decision to support Turkish integration in Europe in order to “stabilize the bilateral relationship by anchoring it in a European matrix”.¹⁵⁴ Thus, the enhancement of the confirmed by Turkey “European

¹⁵² Which became evident also at the Luxembourg Summit in 1997 concerning Turkey’s EU candidacy

¹⁵³ Loukas Tsoukalis, "Is Greece an Awkward Partner?" in Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis (eds), *Greece in a Changing Europe: Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 28

¹⁵⁴ I. Lesser, “Greece’s New Geopolitical Environment”, in *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol.5, No. 3, September 2005, p. 349

orientation” would supposedly involve and “enclose” the latter in long-term process pushing it in consequently to the abandonment of its revisionist policy (as claimed by the officials) towards its Western neighbor. This policy is supposed to include the embracement of an attitude firmly and fully aligned with the perceptions of modern European states concerning their relations with their neighbors, with special reference to these which already belong to EC/EU.¹⁵⁵ According to an important number of Greek Foreign Policy Analysts amplifying Turkey’s European guidelines would establish a procedure in the framework of which Turkish elite might relinquish “the aggressive attitude” against Greece and embrace a policy which would solely be based on the templates of international law and pacts and not statecraft.¹⁵⁶ Greece anticipated that providing Turkey with a possible EU candidacy would establish a kind of confidence atmosphere that might lead to an essential decrease of the arms race. The relations of good neighborliness would function as a condition that might open more easily “EU’s door” to Turkey. The whole rationale might guide Greek officials to the Europeanization of their national interests’ handling since the Greek-Turkish dispute would become integral part of EU-Turkish relations.

This situation gave food for a critical re-thinking regarding the channel in which the dynamics of Europeanization might effectively serve national interests. A “bottom-up interpretation” of Greek Foreign Policy’s Europeanization process might be useful. For Greek officials EU could emerge as the “opportunity window” that would enable Greece to become the main actor in the whole Turkey’s “European road map”. It could appear as the “European participant” and the “globalization partner” during that period in the eyes of the Turkish officials. Greece being supposed to seize the chance and exploit every advantage emanating from its identity as EU member

¹⁵⁵ P. Tsakonas (2003), p. 67

¹⁵⁶ Tsakonas P., “Turkey’s Post Helsinki Turbulence: Implications for Greece and the Cyprus Issue” in *Turkish Studies*, Vol.2, No. 2 (Autumn 2001), p. 1

and in full cooperation and alignment with its EU partners' positions could lead and introduce Turkey into the framework of the European integration system where "European style rules of the game" should be followed by the latter.¹⁵⁷ This was considered the way in which Greece's security concerns might become European. Its own bilateral dispute should be handled under the angle of EU, bearing in mind the views of all the other member states. This reflects a bottom-up influence of Europeanization on the re-formulation of Greek Foreign Policy's rationale. While for the period between 1981 till 1993 the identity as EC member was exploited by Greek officials as "diplomatic lever and a constraining mechanism" with special reference towards Turkey since 1999 Europeanization has reached the point where Greece's foreign policy is imbedded to its framework which is conceived as "panacea for eventually resolving or impacting on all of Greece's key foreign policy concerns".¹⁵⁸ Under Europeanization's angle and its "magnetic pull" for its neighbor in the East, Greece seizes the chance to promote the EU perspective for Turkey resting upon the hope that over time tension will be reduced and dispute(s) resolved.¹⁵⁹

The logic behind adopting a new strategy towards Turkey through encouraging it becoming part of European integration process was relying on its goal to justify successfully the interests of the Turkish state elite on certain, defined and according to internationally accepted standards attitudes. Europeanization acted as a catalyst on the employment of this logic on behalf of Greece towards Turkey. As explained before, the concurrence of (un)fortunate events (Kosovo crisis and earthquakes) accelerated the implementation of this newly conceived and adopted rationale.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ D. Triantaphyllou, "The Priorities of Greek Foreign Policy Today" in *Southeastern European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol.5, No. 2, [September 2005], p. 332

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

The adoption of this decision should be attributed on the bottom-up influence that Europeanization had on Greek Foreign Policy. Bearing in mind the views of the other EU partners, seeking to avoid any possible marginalization by them, consultations, avoiding the sole entanglement with narrowly defined national interests and gradually transforming these into EU considerations reflect the up-load of foreign policy formulation onto the EU level, as this was theoretically described in Chapter A. This means that the decision to enmesh Turkey into the EU institutions should not be ascribed only to the EMU necessity as aforementioned but also as an outcome of Greek Foreign Policy's influence by the Europeanization dynamics.

Europeanization had also a top-down effect on Greek Engagement Strategy towards Turkey, with special reference to the development of financial ties with its Eastern neighbor. As said before Greece's participation at CFSP with the consequent economic character it possesses while dealing with non-EU partners entailed the acquirement of a financial element in the context of its foreign policy formulation. This economic pillar of Greece's Europeanized Foreign Policy was supposed to be exploited by the Greek officials while dealing with Turkey resting their hope on the aspiration that conducting financial interdependence relations with the latter might lead to conflict resolution. The background of this logic was conceptually and theoretically analyzed in Chapter B.

4. Conclusions

Taking into account Ifantis definitions, engagement aims to maintain and enhance relations with Turkey as much as possible in the various policy realms. It is composed by some specific dimensions. With regard to politics, it is identified with the efforts to maximize contacts at every level as a "product" of pushing Turkey deeper into the European Integration system. These contacts will be solely held on EU

dictates. This political dimension of Greece's Engagement Strategy towards Turkey has emerged, as explained before, from the bottom-up influence that Europeanization dynamics had exerted to the rationale behind the adoption of this strategy. With respect to economics, the other element of this strategy reflects the effort to expand financial relations and exchanges with the Eastern neighbor. As stated before, this aspect constitutes the outcome of a top-down impact that Europeanization has exerted to Greece bearing in mind the fact that the participation in CFSP "forced" Greek Foreign Policy to employ this financial element while being formulated.¹⁶⁰ The following two chapters analyze the way the pillars of engagement strategy were developed in the context of the Greek Foreign Policy towards Turkey.

¹⁶⁰ K. Ifantis, "Perception and Rapprochement: Debating a Greek Strategy Towards Turkey" in M. Aydin & K. Ifantis (eds.) *Turkish-Greek Relations The Security Dilemma in the Aegean*, Routledge London and New York 2004, p. 261

CHAPTER E: THE POLITICAL PILLAR OF ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY

1. Introduction

In the “road” towards the Helsinki Summit in December of 1999 it had not been clarified whether Greeks would lift their veto on Turkey’s EU candidacy status. Greece’s stance was dependent on its considerations whether Turkey was eager to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria of 1993 as well as the latter’s intention to contribute to feasible resolution of the Cyprus question.¹⁶¹ Leaving aside the value of Europeanization’s impact on reconsidering the Greek national interests, a possible shifting from a veto to the Turkish EU candidacy would be also enhanced by domestic support (public opinion and media) due to the above mentioned tragedy that brought the two people closer to each other. It should be noted that these natural catastrophes caused a wave of compassion across the Aegean borders which in its turn led to cooperation on non-controversial areas with reference to low politics agreements including tourism, science, technology, police matters, and to Greek and Turkish NGOs collaboration.¹⁶²

These parameters were taken into account while leading up to the Helsinki Summit. Despite these steps that were promoting the Greek-Turkish rapprochement, EU summit in Helsinki in December would constitute the main question on whether Greeks would actually redefine their strategy towards Turkey or not.¹⁶³

¹⁶¹ D. Lucas, “Greece’s Shifting Position on Turkish Accession to the EU Before and After Helsinki (1999)” MA Thesis in European Studies Catholic University of Leuven
http://www.thesis.net/greece/greece_contence.htm

¹⁶² G. Koukoudakis, “The Role of Citizens in the Current Greek-Turkish Rapprochement” Paper for the 56th Annual Conference of Political Studies Association April 4-6, Reading 2006
http://www.ekem.gr/archives/2006/05/the_role_of_cit.html

¹⁶³ Jürgen Reuter, “Reshaping Greek-Turkish Relations: Developments before and after the EU-summit in Helsinki” <http://www.eliamep.gr/eliamep/files/op0001.PDF>

2. Helsinki 1999

At the last days of November 1999 the Greek government submitted a memorandum to the Finnish presidency of the European Union in the context of which it was outlining its position concerning the Turkish EU candidacy. Its structure was composed by three main concerns expressed on behalf of the Greek side that would be raised also at the Helsinki Summit:

- The Greek delegation stated that Cyprus should become member of EU regardless of whether any resolution on the Cyprus question would be reached or not before its accession. This way Greeks sought to dissociate Turkey's application from the Cyprus problem.
- Greece required by EU to push all the potential candidates to recognize the jurisdiction of International Court of Justice
- Greek government encouraged the EU to provide Turkey with a "solid road map" for its EU accession and not just with the candidacy status. Greece supports a realistic and not a "virtual" nominee for Turkey which would simply rest on empty gestures of goodwill.¹⁶⁴ According to the Greek claims, Ankara should go through all these procedures and fulfill all these criteria and conditions that would bring it closer to the realization of its "European dream".¹⁶⁵

These points were revealing Greece's inclination to embrace a renewed strategy towards Turkey. This memorandum was followed by more announcements and press releases that were reflecting these newly formulated Greek guidelines.¹⁶⁶ "We believe that our neighbor's strength is our strength. To exclude a country from the full benefits of international society is a sure path to the kind of crises we have faced for too long in Southeast Europe... The heart of the European ethos lies in

¹⁶⁴ G. Papandreou, "Greece Wants Turkey to Make the Grade", in Newspaper International Herald Tribune, 10.12.1999 <http://www.iht.com/articles/1999/12/10/edgeorge.2.t.php?page=1>

¹⁶⁵ http://www.ethesis.net/greece/greece_contence.htm

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

building institutions and practices of inclusiveness. That is why Greece has always supported EU enlargement as means of building a bridge of security, cooperation, and development between nations”.¹⁶⁷ These words belong to the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs during that period, George Papandreou, mirroring to some extent the intentions and the strategy that Greek officials would employ towards Turkey in the Helsinki Summit.

On December 10, 11, the Helsinki European Council Summit was taking place. The 14 other member states expected Greece to function (again) as the only “stumbling block” towards providing Turkey with the candidacy nominee. After several diplomatic contacts the Summit led to the conclusion that “Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States”.¹⁶⁸ Regarding Greece’s considerations the European Council forces candidate States to seek the resolution of any *outstanding border disputes and other related issues* on the basis of principles deriving from UN Chapter. In case they do not manage this they are supposed to bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review what has been done until then concerning the outstanding disputes, in particular regarding the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004.¹⁶⁹ It should be also noted that in the same text it is noted that Cyprus will access EU even if no political settlement has been reached by the completion of its accession negotiations.

The main goal Greeks managed to fulfill at Helsinki could be considered the transition of the Greek-Turkish dispute(s) from a bilateral field to multilateral and to

¹⁶⁷ G. Papandreou, “Greece Wants Turkey to Make the Grade”, *International Herald Tribune*, Friday, December 10, 1999 <http://www.iht.com/articles/1999/12/10/edgeorge.2.t.php?page=1>

¹⁶⁸ Appendix I Helsinki Summit 1999 Presidency Conclusions

<http://www.presidency.finland.fi/doc/summit/index.html>

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

embed it as integral part of Euro-Turkish relations. The EU clarified that a resolution on the Cyprus question does not constitute a necessity for Cyprus' accession to EU. With regard to the Hague Court question, the EU sets 2004 as the deadline for referring border and other disputes to the ICJ. The European Council takes over for the first time this kind of responsibility. This clause directly forces both sides to undertake initiatives for bilateral negotiation, and in case no outcome emerges the European Council looks into the question.¹⁷⁰ The “up-load” of national interests in EU's forum is supposedly achieved.

The messages stemming out from the result of the Greek renewed strategy towards Turkey, known as the “Helsinki strategy”, were optimistically perceived by the Greek delegation. In this token the words of Papandreou do not enable any misinterpretation margins relating to the impression that had been left to the Greek side. “We assured that Cyprus would enter EU, independent from solution of the Cyprus problem. Contrary to Turkey's reaction and the opposing will of many counterparts from both sides of Atlantic we made it”.¹⁷¹

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, with special reference to the bilateral issue(s) ascribes Helsinki's success to the fact that these might become subject to International Court of Justice redress. This is a process which Turks (according to the Greek Foreign Policy Makers of that period) were seeking to avoid. This remark is interpreted in a way where the disputes with Turkey were defined as disputes with EU and consequently every offensive action towards Greece would be regarded as a move turning against the EU as a whole. He stresses that the resolution of the disputes on the international law basis is the “only way to commit Turkey to play in the law and

¹⁷⁰ J.Reuter “Reshaping Greek-Turkish Relations: Developments before and after the EU Summit Helsinki” <http://www.eliamep.gr/eliamep/files/op0001.PDF>

¹⁷¹G. Papandreou “Benefits from Helsinki” <http://www.papandreou.gr/papandreou/content/folder2.aspx?d=6&rd=7739474&f=1388&rf=1372074253&m=1&r m=-1&l=2>

democracy ground which constitutes the best possible field and framework for a democratic country like Greece”.¹⁷²

From the other side some observations abstracted from this optimistically cultivated “Helsinki spirit” should not be excluded. The official EU-term “bilateral differences” (which seems to reflect the Turkish point of view) rather than “unilateral Turkish claims” (which represents the respective Greek position) should supposedly alleviate the manifested optimistic tones. A danger smolders that this term might become an issue for EU and Greek diplomacy. Although Prime Minister Kostas Simitis sought to clarify that the only formal and legal difference with Turkey that Greece recognizes is the delineation of the continental shelf, his view did not find positive response by all the other EU partners. Besides what matters in international treaties and pacts is that “scripta manent”. The absence of a specific definition of the term seems not to be totally aligned with Greek optimism in the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit. Until the time where dispute(s) would reach the point where they could be led into a legal redress there was still a deviation among Greeks and Turks officials relating to the substance of “outstanding disputes” term should be provided with. Since the two sides had not reached an agreement concerning its definition, the Turkish side was able to hold a broad interpretation of the term. This means that the latter could increase the unilateral claims that should be imbedded in the term in order to bring these also in the court.

3. From Helsinki to Copenhagen

In the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit Greek Foreign Policy sought to remain aligned with the Engagement Strategy it had adopted pursuing to establish a climate of reconciliation and rapprochement towards Turkey. Greece’s decision to lift

¹⁷² Ibid.

its veto and to encourage Turkey's European orientation amplified the dynamic of bilateral relations' amelioration that had been created after the earthquakes. Having absorbed the logic of Europeanization due to its participation at the CFSP, Greece promoted collaboration with Turkey in "low policy sectors". Influenced by the EU thinking, the Greek Foreign Policy makers realized that controversial and sensitive questions should be left aside at initial level. According to the officials, what should be given priority is the construction of a mutual confidence framework that would prepare the ground for "hard politics" discussion.¹⁷³ In the context of creating this atmosphere both Minister of Foreign Affairs Papandreou and Cem visited Ankara (January 2000) and Athens (February 2000) respectively. The visit of the former one was hailed by the latter as being one of "historic significance" since it was the first by a Greek foreign minister in 38 years.¹⁷⁴ The visits were accompanied by signing agreements in fields like tourism, science and technology, maritime transport, cultural cooperation, mutual assistance between customs administrations, reciprocal promotion and protection of investments, environmental protection, combating Crime, especially terrorism, organized crime, illicit drug trafficking and illegal immigration.¹⁷⁵

Although some important disagreements in the framework of NATO exercises could jeopardize the rapprochement road the two sides had decided to follow¹⁷⁶ EU had become an important tool for promoting Greek national interests the way they were perceived. On 7th of December 2000, Turkey was invited by EU to participate at

¹⁷³ L. L. Ntilsizian, "Greek Foreign Policy towards Turkey and the role of the EU and the US", Working Paper, Master Degree in Southeast European Studies, Athens September 2006, p. 38

¹⁷⁴ <http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=3&folder=293&article=5249>

¹⁷⁵ <http://www.mfa.gr> <http://www.mfa.gov.tr>

¹⁷⁶ In October 2000 during the NATO exercise 'Destined Glory' Greece decided to withdraw after several mock dogfights which were pursuing to question the Greek sovereignty over the Greek islands Lemnos and Ikaria L. L. Ntilsizian, "Greek Foreign Policy towards Turkey and the role of the EU and the US", Working Paper, Master Degree in Southeast European Studies, Athens September 2006, p. 39

the preparations of Ministers' European Conference that would take place in Nice, in France and would aim at the institutional reform of EU. This way a systematic dialogue between the Community and Turkey illustrated a new era for the EU-Turkish relations.¹⁷⁷ EU showed its eagerness to enhance its relations with Turkey and this was reflected by the Presidency Conclusions which were calling the latter "*to submit its national programme for adoption of the acquis, basing it on the Accession Partnership*".¹⁷⁸

Although this program is supposed to be compatible with the priorities established in the Accession Partnership, it does not constitute an integral part of the Accession Partnership. Concerning the Greek-Turkish relations it argues that Turkey will continue to develop its relations on the basis of a peace-seeking foreign policy and take over actions pursuing the settlement of bilateral problems with Greece through dialogue.¹⁷⁹

The next significant step in Turkish-EU relationships came with the December 2002 Copenhagen European Council. According to it, "the EU would open negotiations with Turkey 'without delay' if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission decides that Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria".¹⁸⁰

The Greek government was determined to become the leading supporter for Turkey in the Copenhagen Summit. In the days leading up to the meeting, Greek Prime Minister Simitis and Foreign Minister Papandreou toured European capitals to

¹⁷⁷ N. Marakis, "The New EU's strategy towards its relations with Ankara", Newspaper To Vima 12.11.2000

¹⁷⁸ PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS NICE EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEETING 7, 8 AND 9 DECEMBER 2000

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00400-r1.%20ann.en0.htm

¹⁷⁹ Tsakonas (2001), p. 9

¹⁸⁰ http://www.europa.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf/european_council_.pdf and A. Podimata, "European Commission's Report for Turkey" Newspaper To Vima 6.10.2002

have talks with EU leaders about Turkey's EU prospects as well as Greece's presidency of the EU that would start from January 2003. Most of the EU's leaders, such as French President Chirac and German Chancellor Schroeder were not convinced with the pace of Turkey's reforms and were persistent about not giving a date until all of the Copenhagen Criteria would be met by Turkey. Italy was one of the few countries which agreed with Greece on giving a date for Turkey to start negotiations in 2004. In his meeting with Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, Greek Prime Minister Simitis outlined the Greek/Italian viewpoint by saying that "the more the date for the initiation of accession negotiations is delayed, the more the message becomes less clear and positive." The meaning of prime minister's message was that a postponement of a date for accession negotiations might be misunderstood as regards EU's sincere intentions to accept Turkey as an EU member.¹⁸¹ Greece was worried what such an interpretation by Turkey could spell for Greek-Turkish relations. Finally the EU leaders agreed on December 16, 2004 to start accession negotiations with Turkey from October 3, 2005. Despite an attempt by the Austrian government to offer Turkey less than full membership, EU accession negotiations were officially launched. Greeks managed also to secure the decision that Cyprus along with nine other candidates would be admitted to the EU, independent from whether the Cyprus issue would reach any resolution or not.

4. Greek presidency 2003

The first semester of 2003 was coincided with the Greek presidency of the EU, in the framework of which it sought to forward the dialogue with Turkey. This period concurred with the Iraq war which created, phenomenally at least, a break-through in the American-Turkish relations. This evolution could supposedly amplify Turkey's

¹⁸¹ Athens News Agency, *News in English*, <<http://www.hri.org/news/greek/apeen/2002/02-12-07.apeen.html>>, 12 February 2002

European orientation as a counterbalance towards American operation that did not take into account the national Turkish interests, as claimed by the Turkish side.

Greek Foreign Policy during the war, working towards the “political implementation of the Helsinki spirit” sought to give an impulse to its relations with Turkey.¹⁸² Greece’s decision to enhance Turkey’s perspective did not entail the automatic resolution of their bilateral dispute(s). According to Greek claims, the violations in the national airspace on behalf of the Turkish planes and the daily dogfights had been multiplied. These events compelled the Greek Foreign Minister to proceed with the submission of a letter of complaint to the member of the European Committee that is responsible for EU’s enlargement, G. Verheugen. Within this text, Turkey’s “aggressive attitude”, as described, towards Greece is condemned illustrating that its policy is consisting of a deviation from the “good neighborliness’ dictates” the aforementioned summits’ reports have sought to establish.¹⁸³ This implied that the adoption and the implementation of the strategy might possess some limitations.

In the Brussels Summit which would be the last one in the context of which the Greek side would be delegated by PASOK’s government, EU, along with Greece, decided to enhance its relationship with Turkey. According to the Presidency conclusions, Turkey was fulfilling the economic criteria and was highlighting its will to contribute to the resolution of the Cyprus question. However, further progress in judiciary and freedom fields was required.¹⁸⁴

Greek foreign policy, aligned with its partners was fully advocating EU’s policy towards Turkey and sought through several meetings and conferences to “keep the spirit of cooperation and dialogue” alive. Once again, it should be stressed that the

¹⁸² L. L. Ntilizian (2006), p. 43

¹⁸³ A. Podimata, “Papandreou’s Letter to Verheugen” [in Greek], Newspaper TO VIMA 18.05.2003

¹⁸⁴ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/78364.pdf

agenda of “low policy issues” could be implemented. Meetings among ministers and prime ministers became integral part of the daily diplomatic life without any involvement that could emanate either from EU or US. However, the thorny Aegean issue(s) had been left aside under the perception that it or they could easily jeopardize the whole rapprochement process.¹⁸⁵ In accordance with information deriving from a Greek journalist, A. Papahelas both sides were close to achieve an agreement that would project the dispute(s) into the ICJ. Turkish unilateral claims that “grey zones” constitute vital issue for their interests and a topic that should be leaded also in Hague prevented, according to the same sources, the Greek side to proceed with this act. These words were perceived as a *modus operandi* on behalf of Turks to increase the part of the Aegean that might be distributed in the Aegean by the ICJ. Greek diplomats were supporting that Greece was not able to run this kind of risk.¹⁸⁶ As described below, this fact justifies to some extent the deviation from Helsinki’s text that was suggesting to the contributing parts to bring the dispute(s) into the European Council in order to be reviewed and then to ICJ.

5. Brussels 2004

2004 was the year marked by many important developments: besides the organization of the Olympic Games which would be held in Athens and constituted the main challenge for Greeks, the holding of the National Greek elections, New Democracy’s victory, the referendum in Cyprus concerning the evolution of the Annan Plan and the official visit of the Turkish Prime Minister after 16 years justify the aforementioned.

¹⁸⁵ L. L. Ntilizian (2006), p. 44

¹⁸⁶ A. Papahelas, “Grey Zones in the Negotiations with Ankara”, Newspaper TO VIMA [in Greek] 16.05.2005

In the aftermath of the Greek elections, New Democracy had to deal with the thorny Cyprus question. In March 2004, during the negotiations among Greek, Turkish, Greek-Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot side taking place in Lucerne, due to UN mediation, in order to achieve a resolution of the whole issue¹⁸⁷, New Democracy opted for formulating a policy deviating from what PASOK did. The latter was officially favoring the arrangements of the last formulated Annan Plan. Although Greek prime minister sought to improve this plan for the benefit of the Greek-Cypriot side at the end he “threw the ball” to the Cypriot people claiming that they should be the one that would decide for the fortune of their own future. The Annan Plan which was brought into referendum in Cyprus was rejected by the Greek-Cypriot community (75%). On the contrary it was approved by Turkish-Cypriot one (65%). Karamanlis’ avoidance of taking a clear position towards the Annan Plan was condemned by the opposition party as a “hands off approach”.¹⁸⁸ Kostas Simitis, the ex Prime Minister, stated that Karamanlis’ inactiveness and hesitation to favor the Annan Plan was illustrating the end of the Helsinki strategy that started in 1999 and had been developed on the basis of Greece’s active role towards a resolution of the whole question.¹⁸⁹

Besides that, the newly emerged government remained in general committed on the policy guidelines that PASOK had drawn and did not instigate a change in Greece’s policy towards the EU-Turkey relationship. Prime Minister Karamanlis decided to continue the policy of rapprochement and the policy of pushing for the advancement of Turkey’s EU application. Commission’s report for Turkey, presented in October 2004, was claiming that Greek-Turkish relations had noted a positive

¹⁸⁷ http://www.bbc.co.uk/greek/domesticnews/story/2004/03/040327_annancyprus.shtml

¹⁸⁸ L. L. Ntilsizian (2006), p. 45

¹⁸⁹ Ibid. and K. Simitis, “End of a Strategy” [in Greek], Newspaper Ta Nea, 23.4.2004

evolution without recalling the Helsinki conclusions about the 2004 deadline.¹⁹⁰ As it is going to be described below, the non-reference to this deadline marked on behalf of New Democracy a kind of deviation of Helsinki's spirits dictates. New Democracy preferred to proceed with negotiations and further dialogue rather than appealing to ICJ with the rationale that EU perspective might force Ankara become more compliant and convince it to bring the continental shelf issue to ICJ.¹⁹¹

In accordance with Brussels Summit Presidency's Conclusions Turkey finally received a date for the commencement of accession negotiations. Greece aligned and committed to the engagement strategy and willing to entangle Turkey into the "EU hooks" advocated the Turkish application. Turkey's EU orientation had become the official Greek guideline besides the skepticism coming from some delegations (French and Austrian) which did not seem so eager to provide Turkey with full-membership status. Their objections were officially justified by Turkish reluctance to sign the Customs Union which would indirectly lead to a de facto recognition of the Cyprus Republic. Mr. Erdoğan had warned that if EU rejected Turkish application then an escalation from Islamic fundamentalists would have increasing possibilities to occur.¹⁹² He was stating that it was not only Turkey, but also EU that should be called to "pass the exams".¹⁹³ Finally after negotiations and with the contribution also of the Greek side EU gave Turkey the date to start negotiations (3.10.2005).¹⁹⁴ This fact was warmly welcomed by both Greece and Turkey. K. Karamanlis, in the aftermath of the European Council in December 2004 declared that all goals set by the Greek

¹⁹⁰ <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=DOC/04/5&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> and L. L. Ntilsizian (2006), p. 46

¹⁹¹ Ibid. and Axt-Heinz Jurgén, 'Relations with Turkey and their Impact on the European Union' in *Southeast European and Black Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3, (September 2005), p. 375

¹⁹² N. Meletis, "Finally bargaining with pressure" Newspaper ETHNOS 14.12.2004

¹⁹³ K. Zoulas, "Incompliant Erdoğan, calls on EU to pass successfully the exams", Newspaper Kathimerini 8.12.2004

¹⁹⁴ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/83201.pdf

government concerning Turkey were achieved. According to him the main target that was fulfilled consisted of the establishment of a European framework for Turkey's attitude towards Greece that can lead to "stable reconciliation path" to the extent the irrevocable commitment of Turkey in good neighborhood relations with Greece and Helsinki's formality concerning border disputes was improved by deleting the term "*any outstanding disputes*". The point that was calling the contributing parts deadline of projecting the dispute(s) into the ICJ until 2004 was not mentioned again reflecting Greek representation's decision not to appeal to this international institution.

As aforementioned, the decision of not bringing the dispute(s) to the ICJ constituted a deviation from the Helsinki strategy. In the words of I. Lesser the Greek delegation had to deal with the following dilemma: from the one side the current time was considered the most proper in order to redress in a legal way the dispute(s) that shadow the peace in the Aegean. From the other side some circles were wondering whether Ankara's European obligations agenda would be overburdened disabling thus its capability to comply with the European standards and demands.¹⁹⁵ Based on this logic, the Greek delegation supposed that there was no pressure to appeal at that moment to the ICJ. They were considering that a Turkey closer to EU would embrace at the future means of solving its differences based on international law and not on statecraft.

The opposition exerted criticism on the way Karamanlis handled the whole issue. In the context of the Helsinki Summit Turkey was forced to accept as dispute resolution a process about which it generally, as they claim, harbors doubts. They advocated that the policy pursued in Brussels by the newly-elected New Democracy government accommodated the fulfillment of Turkish wishes (as Greeks had

¹⁹⁵ I. Lesser interview in Newspaper IMERISIA [in Greek] 12-13.2.2005

perceived) to avoid ICJ jurisdiction. New Democracy's inactiveness or reluctance to follow the guidelines concerning this issue that had been drawn in 1999 was accused because, according to PASOK's claims, exonerated Turkey from this obligation. They believe that this way and with its tactic it brought all the disputes/points of friction concerning the International Sea Law with EU and its borders in one Greek-Turkish legal difference disentangled from the EU context and projected them onto a bilateral table.¹⁹⁶

The difference between Karamanlis' and Simitis' point of view was the reading of the messages deriving from the Helsinki Conclusions. On the one hand, Simitis was supporting that the deadline of December of 2004 to bring the disputes in Hague was forcing Ankara to achieve the best possible agreement. Ankara was theoretically urged to contribute to the legal redress of the bilateral dispute(s) until 2004 although this was supposedly not what Turks wished. The period until 2004 was considered by PASOK government as the context where Greece "should seize the chance to solve a very important abeyance".¹⁹⁷

On the other hand Karamanlis' think tanks, with special reference to the Minister of Foreign Affairs during that period P. Molyviatis, gave a different interpretation to the same text. The outstanding dispute(s) as a term was not given a clear definition. As claimed before, the Turkish side was claiming the existence of "grey zones" in the Aegean. This claim might be also enmeshed into these outstanding disputes' term which would be led into the ICJ. The current government, having been just elected, was reluctant to run the risk to legalize the questioning of the Greek authority on an important number of islets that the Turkish side might set. Newly raised to power he could not afford the political cost emanating

¹⁹⁶ Ei. Karanasopoulou, "They open the road for Turkey" [in Greek], Newspaper Ta Nea 23.11.2004

¹⁹⁷ A. Papahelas, "From Simitis' to Karamanlis' doctrine" [in Greek], Newspaper To Vima 12.09.04

from a possibly harmful for the Greek national interests distribution of the Aegean. It should be noted that in the name of the “grey zones” it was not quite clear which islets were included or not. Turkey had not submitted any list that would exhaustively mention the number and the name of the islets whose authority was questioned by it. Ankara, according to the Greek officials, is giving a broadening interpretation of the term while claiming that it considers as “grey zones” every area whose status has not been clarified in the context of the existing international treaties. Although both Simitis and Karamanlis had embraced an attitude towards Turkey constructed on an “engagement platform” they were reflecting different kind of thoughts¹⁹⁸.

6. Limitations of Engagement Strategy

In the framework of continuing the implementation of engagement strategy the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Ankara in April 2005. In this context he sought to propose the consolidation of Conflict Building Measures in the Aegean among the two states. These were implying the efforts of both sides to decrease the number of violations in the Aegean as well as to minimize the danger that might emanate from possible accidents or the economic drain for defense expenses of the two states. Greece’s engagement strategy was supposedly amplified by the gesture of good will on behalf of the President of the Turkish Assembly, Bülent Arınç that proposed to renounce *casus belli*, which had been *viva voce* embraced by it in 1995. It should be noted that this move, as the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs during that period pointed out, does not automatically bring on a revised position of Turkey towards the possibility of Greeks’ extending their territorial zone.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ A. Podimata, “What is Mr. Molyviatis going to do in Ankara” [in Greek], in Newspaper TO VIMA 10.04.2005

This visit rather than keeping the hope for the positive evolution of Greek-Turkish relations live it turned out to the “upload” of sovereignty issues to the surface and remind the fact that the bilateral issue(s) had not been yet resolved. During the visit Greek and Turkish vessels confronted each other around the Imia-Kardak rock calling the remembrance of the crisis that had taken place nine years ago. Under the danger of further escalation the incident terminated just before Molyviatis’ departure from Ankara. The latter decided not to proceed with any official expostulation towards Ankara. He opted for shortening his visit. Athens, committed to whole engagement strategy, sought to undermine the importance of the tensions and not get involved in any procedure that might jeopardize the basis of the rapprochement process.²⁰⁰ This option was also helped by the (non) reaction of the Turkish press that generally, as perceived by the Greek press, did not pay that much attention neither to the crisis nor to the visit.²⁰¹

It should be stressed that Europeans had started raising the question whether Turkey should become a Member of EU or just develop a “special relationship”. The reason was that in the aftermath of European Constitution’s rejection on behalf of French and Dutch people in respective referenda the fate of the European integration seemed to be ominous for the future. One of the reasons that led the people to this decision was claimed to be Turkey’s EU full membership perspective. Many Europeans harbored doubts whether the whole concept would not contribute to the

²⁰⁰ L. L. Ntilsizian (2006), p. 47

²⁰¹ Ch. Poulidou, “Molyviatis and Imia in the Turkish columns” [in Greek], Newspaper Kosmos tou Ependyti 16-17.4.2005

stagnation of the European political integration.²⁰² EU had been facing a crisis which had to deal with the future of its own substance and identity.²⁰³

In the context of EU-Turkish relations the report of the European Commission focusing on the Greek interests was mentioning that “the Commission is satisfied with the declaration of the President of the Turkish Grand Assembly about the repeal of *casus belli* in April 2005 which was repeated through the words of Abdullah Gül, noting also that there was no continuity from the Turkish side concerning the same issue. This report states also that Turkey’s progress will be measured in particular against its “unequivocal commitment to good neighborly relations and its undertaking to resolve any outstanding disputes” aligned with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes as UN Chapter defines, including compulsory jurisdiction of ICJ. It is required to continue the “support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework and in line with the principles on which the Union is founded”.²⁰⁴ Turkey is also called on to take immediately the essential measures in order to secure the rights of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, to protect the religious foundations and to promote the re-opening of the Theological School of Halki.²⁰⁵ These exhortations on behalf of Europeans towards Turkey are reflecting according to Greek officials, Greece’s diplomatic manipulations and

²⁰² D. Konstantakopoulos, “Rain shower in Europe but here... it drizzles” [in Greek] Newspaper Kosmos tou Ependyti 1-2.10.2005

²⁰³ F. Savvidis, “Double No and Turkey” [in Greek], Newspaper To Vima 19.6.2005 and G. Roumbini “The consequences of the Double No”, [in Greek] Newspaper Apogevmatini 23.6.2005

²⁰⁴ European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2005

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2005/package/sec_1426_final_progress_report_tr_en.pdf

D. Konstantakopoulos, “Ankara’s Road Map to EU” [in Greek], Newspaper Kosmos tou Ependyti 24-25.9.2005

²⁰⁵ H. Poulidou, “The black list of the Turkish violations” [in Greek], Newspaper Kosmos tou Ependyti 12-13.10.2005

intentions to “encircle” the Turkish aggressive attitude, as perceived, into the context of the European-Turkish relations.²⁰⁶

Objections were raised by the opposition. The generally formulated phrases concerning “the commitment for good neighborhood and resolution of outstanding disputes in accordance with the UN Charter” still exist. According to the same interpretations there are no committing phrases that would allow Athens to force Ankara to fulfill the aforementioned criteria in order to continue its “European journey”. For instance in this text there is no reference that condemns the expressed by Turkish assembly *casus belli* resolution in case Greece extends its territorial zone.²⁰⁷

According to Thanos Dokos it would be a naivety to anticipate that the start of negotiations between EU and Greece would lead to direct and radical shift of the Turkish Foreign Policy and abandoning of the classic Turkish positions over the Aegean. Turkey will not pursue to abrogate them unilaterally. Even Greece’s European partners will not opt for putting more pressure on unilateral concessions of behalf of Ankara. EU can be used as the framework that will contribute to the accommodation of a (re)resolution that will lead to reciprocal concessions.²⁰⁸

In December of 2006 Turkey’s European orientation had started to become a question. As the European Commission had pointed out, Turkey had not fulfilled its obligation of full non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement accusing it of posing restriction policies towards Republic of Cyprus.²⁰⁹ This urged EU to slow down membership talks and freeze EU-Turkish

²⁰⁶ St. Lygeros, “Grey zones and shady intentions” [in Greek] Newspaper Kosmos tou Ependyti 28.4.-1.5.2005

²⁰⁷ St. Lygeros, “The beast’s domestication policy failed” [in Greek] Kosmos tou Ependyti 1-2.10.2005

²⁰⁸ Th. Dokos, “The scene after Luxembourg” [in Greek], Newspaper To Vima 5.10.2005

²⁰⁹ European Commission Turkey Progress Report 2006

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/Nov/tr_sec_1390_en.pdf

relations in eight fields, calling on Turkey to open its ports to Cypriot ships.²¹⁰ Regarding the Greek interests, the European Council stated that Turkey should be committed to positive relations with its neighbors and to peaceful settlements of disputes in accordance with the UN Charter, including if necessary, jurisdiction ICJ. The above mentioned justified EU's decision to "freeze its relationship" with Turkey while "keeping locked" chapters covering policy areas relevant to Turkey's restrictions towards Cyprus until the Commission verifies that Turkey has fulfilled its commitments emanating from the Additional Protocol.²¹¹

Although Greeks had strongly advocated Turkey's application as full member they had to align themselves with the Commission's recommendations and the position of the other EU partners since Turkey's attitude was perceived as ignoring basic EU norms and principles. In the words of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Y. Valinakis, reflecting the official Greek position, EU having formulated a clear and integrated position among its member states traced out a line of Turkey's "European conduct" and rejected every rationale of an "a la carte" integration. He stated that Turkey is not able to anticipate any negotiation that would question the foundations and the substance of European integration. He pointed out that Greek government has constructed the pillars of a strategy that would combine from the one side Greece's sincere support towards Turkey's adaptation needs and from the other a clearly defined process of tight rein and fair judgment. He concluded that this strategy aims to achieve the Europeanization of Turkish attitude and to ensure the authenticity of this perspective which can be realized only in the framework and the base of its full

²¹⁰ Brussels European Council 2006 14/15 December 2006 Presidency Conclusions http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/92202.pdf "EU urged to freeze talks" <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6194492.stm>

²¹¹ Ibid.

adaptation. According to him full adaptation is identified with transformation and the latter with becoming full EU member.²¹²

After a diplomatically unfruitful and stagnation period in November 2007 Greek-Turkish relations were given a kind of priority in the Foreign Policy Agendas on behalf of both states as this was reflected by Turkish Foreign Minister's visit to Greece. His visit was initially accompanied by the signing of 5 CBM's regarding the military cooperation of the two states in the Aegean and raising hopes for the re-opening of a new era for the Greek-Turkish relations.

The statement of the current Greek President, K. Papoulias to the Turkish Minister "you choose your friend but not your neighbor... we are determined by history to live together and we must live peacefully in order to be able to provide our people with cooperation perspectives" was supposed to condense politically the substance and the content of Babacan's visit in Greece. It should be mentioned that Papoulias, as ex Foreign Minister and contributor to the Papoulias-Jilmaz Memorandum signed in 1988 was aware of the fact that CBM's was and is functioning as the "pillow" that would absorb the tensions emerging in the context of a long-term Greek-Turkish dispute.²¹³

The continuity was not perceived the same way by the Greek officials. As it was leaked out from the press, Babacan seemed to raise a question whether Kurdish organizations are operating in the Greek ground and getting financed by the Greek authorities springing a surprise on the Greek government. Phenomenally at least, he adopted also Turkish headquarters' claims which were blaming during the same period Greece for harassment of Turkish planes on behalf of respective Greek and

²¹² Y. Valinakis, "No to a la carte integration" [in Greek], in F. Adonopoulos (ed.) Greek Magazine *Diplomatia* (Diplomacy), November 2006, p. 9

²¹³ P. Mavridis, "Ali (kai tris ali...) Babacan" [in Greek] "Woe is Ali Babacan" (play on words), in F. Antonopoulos (ed.) Magazine *Diplomatia* (Diplomacy), November 2007, No. 47, p. 16-17

violating the Turkish national airspace. His visit to Thrace with the consequent presence in front of a minority audience of Turkish origin, the fact that he was repetitively calling them as “Turkish brothers”, his exhortation towards them to appeal to the European Court in order to assert their rights and his recommendation not to feel afraid (obviously because Turkey would be close to them) raised a question among the Greek diplomatic circles concerning the “friendly” intentions beyond his coming to Greece.²¹⁴

7. Conclusions

As a conclusion, the political pillar of the engagement strategy has not brought into the surface the expected outcomes. The bilateral dispute(s) are still alive. Greeks are afraid that Turkey is going to work as a revisionist power also in Thrace.²¹⁵ The main element that encodes clearly Turkish strategy, as Greek diplomats claim, is the intention to officially integrate the Thracian Muslim minority issue into the Greek-Turkish agenda. The fact is that what the political engagement strategy has achieved is the establishment of a political atmosphere where the dispute(s) can be more easily discussed. Moreover, as the Greek official position states, if Turkey softens its hard-line approach towards the Cyprus dispute, then its chances to access EU would most likely increase.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ “Kosovo drums sound in Xanthi” [in Greek], Newspaper To Paron 16.03.08

CHAPTER F: FINANCIAL PILLAR OF ENGAGEMENT

1. Introduction

In the context of the previous chapter it was mentioned that Greece's participation at CFSP entailed the adoption and the acquirement of a financial element in the formulation of its foreign policy. Economic diplomacy has gradually become vital mechanism of Greek Foreign Policy. In the name of economic diplomacy what could be meant is the use of political influence in order to advance international and bilateral trade and financial relationships, decrease the cost and risks that could possibly emanate from cross-border transactions, develop energy and transport networks and establish a climate that would facilitate all these objectives.²¹⁶

This policy was to a large extent embracing the majority of the states in the Balkan region. Greece in the Balkans, as referred in the previous chapter, sought to develop a multilateral foreign policy (along with its EU partners) designed to establish successful transition policies toward market economy in almost every state in its northern borders. Could Turkey constitute an "implementation field" of Greece's newly formulated economic diplomacy concept?

Greece's decision to align itself with the other member-states in order to provide Turkey with the EU candidacy status and to advocate the Turkish application constitutes part of the previously described engagement strategy in political terms. But as Ifantis points out, this should be composed and amplified also by an economic feature. The complementary concept of it should reflect Greece's intention to expand financial relations and grow exchanges with the Eastern neighbor.²¹⁷ Being influenced

²¹⁶ Th. Skylakakis, "The importance of economic diplomacy" http://www.bridge-mag.com/magazine/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=81&Itemid=99999999

²¹⁷ K. Ifantis, "Perception and Rapprochement: Debating a Greek Strategy Towards Turkey" in M. Aydin & K. Ifantis (eds.) *Turkish-Greek Relations The Security Dilemma in the Aegean*, Routledge London and New York 2004, p. 261 and Th.Couloumbis & K.Ifantis, "Altering the Security

by its participation at CFSP, and taking into account the “top-down” impact that Europeanization had on imbedding economy and “soft-politics” issues in Greek Foreign Policy Agenda, Greek officials are realizing that they could “operationalize” the concept of the before described economic diplomacy on the “engagement platform” towards Turkey. Exploiting the dynamics that have been emerged from the development of an EU context for their bilateral relations in the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit, Greeks seem eager to remain committed to this strategy by enmeshing to it a financial dimension. The last one might be initially considered inconceivable out of the European basis on which the Greek-Turkish relations are seeking to be built. It should be taken into due consideration that the economic aspect in the historical context of the bilateral relations was almost absent. The EU Turkish application and the perspective of enmeshing Turkey deeper into the European institutions motivated the Greek side to enhance its financial relations with it and work parallel to the whole European process.

2. Investments

Turkey’s European “road map” and the consequent dictates for the formulation of an attractive to foreign investments domestic environment has drawn Greek businessmen’s attention. In the aftermath of a significant economic crisis in 2001, Turkey under the templates of International Monetary Fund was obliged to implement a program of structural changes that would pull the inflow of foreign capital and investments. The system of subsidizing investment that Turkey has developed to attract foreign capital relates to a big variety of goods and investment. Foreign businesses, including Greek, could take advantage of subsidies and the incentives which are also given to local businesses. This equal treatment of businesses

Dilemma in the Aegean: Greek Strategic Options and Structural Constraints-A Realist Approach” in *Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Winter 2002), p. 1-25

is emerged and ensured by the legislation and the Agreements for “Mutual Protection and Promotion of Investments” after they have obtained the “Certificate” from the General Directorate of Foreign Investments. Turkey offers Greek businesses also other great opportunities as a result of its rapidly growing economy, its large domestic market, its large manual labor supply, its geographical proximity and its strong bonds with the countries of Caucasus and Central Asia.²¹⁸ All these along with the existence of a government during that period which was supporting the whole concept and the fact that Turkey was carrying the identity of an EU candidate seemed in the eyes of the Greek entrepreneurs a convenient ground for further cooperation. Services with special reference to banking sector, constructional materials, industrial and communication equipment, information technology, perfumery and cosmetic products, silver and steel consist of fields in the context of which the Greek investments could operate.²¹⁹

Until 2008 it is estimated that more than 80 firms are doing business in Turkey, with Greek investments climbing to over €3 billion in 2006 instead of €400 million in 2005 and €50 million in 2004.²²⁰ The most significant kind of investment takes place in the bank sector. As it is well known, in 2006 National Bank of Greece, the largest bank in Greece and the biggest company by value on the Athens Stock Exchange during that period, paid \$2.774bn for a controlling stake in Finansbank AS, Turkey's sixth-largest publicly traded bank.²²¹ The buy out has been dubbed as the largest ever overseas investment by a Greek company. Turks and analysts pegged the

²¹⁸ “P. Koutsikos, “Greek Investments in Turkey” http://www.acci.gr/trade/No26/TRADE_4_7.pdf

²¹⁹ N.Tsitsas, ‘Business in the Balkans’ [in Greek], in Supplement of Newspaper ETHNOS *Business and Investment Yearly Economic & Diplomatic Review for Greece, the Balkans, the Southeastern Europe and the Arab World*, December 2007, p. 108

²²⁰ V. Georgas, “Greek businesses who are present in Turkey” [in Greek] <http://www.capital.gr/news.asp?Details=286593>

²²¹ National Bank of Greece buys \$2.7bn controlling stake in Turkey's Finansbank 4.4.2006 <http://www.freshfields.com/news/dynamic/Pressrelease.asp?newsitem=802>

deal as an endorsement of Turkey's efforts to join the European Union and a sign of greater cooperation to come between the two nations. This purchase reached totally a cost of €5billion integrating the future evolution of Greece's biggest bank into the developments of Turkish economy and domestic politics. It should be also noted that this acquisition in Turkey was provided with the tacit support on behalf of the Greek government and it could be supposed that "it renders credible the prospect of Greece benefiting from Turkey's EU accession".²²² In this context it facilitates in domestic terms the development of foreign policy advocating Turkey's European orientation.

NBG and Finansbank, exploiting the dynamic that has been developed in the aftermath of the before mentioned buy out, undertook the initiative to bring into touch delegates from 50 Greek companies activating in the fields of tourism, energy, shipbuilding yards and agriculture products with Turkish entrepreneurs operating in similar areas. 'Tsakos Group', 'Attiki Business', 'Capital Maritime', 'Jet Oil', 'Redestos Agriculture-Technology', 'SATO', 'Delta Chemical Products', 'Mihailidis Smoke Industry', 'Greek Textile Industry' and 'Seloda' constitute some of the enterprises which were represented in the context of these meetings. The conclusion of them was that wider "business communications channels" for further cooperation had been established. This cooperation can be detected in the sectors of credit-financial services, insurance system, structures and purchases, joint ventures and consolidations of companies emanating from both states.²²³

Other Greek banks sought to seize similar opportunities that were emerging from the wind of change in the Greek-Turkish relations. Without achieving the size and the importance of NBG investment, Eurobank came up with the decision to proceed with buy out of Tekfenbank, a bank with 31 branches join forces in the

²²² "National Bank of Greece & Finansbank: The deal", in *Bridge* (quarterly review on Greece's Presence in S.E Europe and S.E Mediterranean), 02/2006-issue 1, p. 26

²²³ "Greek-Turkish Business discussion in Istanbul" [in Greek], Newspaper Navtemporiki 21.11.2006

Turkish financial services market.²²⁴ Greek Alpha Bank also sought to proceed with the 50% purchase of the Turkish Alternatif Bank from Anadolu Endustri Holding.²²⁵ The transaction was unsuccessfully terminated in 2007 in accordance with a decision made by Turkish authorities responsible for supervising the function of credit foundations. The official Turkish position claimed that reason for this evolution was lying on the presence of Mr. Apostolidis, ex Head of Greek Intelligence Services, at the Board of Directors of the Bank. This decision harbored doubts and raised questions whether Turkish officials were eager to accept the further inflow of Greek banks in their ground.²²⁶

Besides the banks, other Greek companies are operating in Turkey also. INTRACOM HOLDINGS Group is today one of the largest multinational groups in Greece activating in Telecommunications, e-Government, Banking & Enterprise IT Systems, Defense Electronics and Construction. A typical example is the successful joint venture of TURKCELL and INTELTEK, a company of INTRALOT Group that runs the local popular game IDDAA since 2004.²²⁷ In the same context Pouliadis Information Technology Group in cooperation with Index Computers, a Turkish company entered the Istanbul Stock Market under the perspective to cooperate with small-sized enterprises emanating from every Turkish city.²²⁸

Sarantis Group, known cosmetics business in Greece established Sarantis Türkiye (subsidiary), whose main activity constitutes the distribution of mass market

²²⁴ Speech delivered by Oktay Varlier “Golf courts and golf resorts”

http://www.invgolf.com/golf_turkey.htm

²²⁵ Alpha Bank reached an agreement with Anadolu Group for Alternatif [in Greek]

<http://www.in.gr/news/article.asp?lngEntityID=757302&lngDtrID=251>

²²⁶ Ev. Georgy, “Blocking the Eastern Orientation of Alpha” [in Greek], in Newspaper Kathimerini, 9.8.2007

²²⁷ S. Kokkalis, “Greece benefits from Turkey’s political stability and economic development”

<http://www.intracombg.com/news.php?n=125>

²²⁸ Pouliadis Information Group in Stock Market of Istanbul [in Greek]

http://www.grtrnews.com/gr/publish/article_223.shtml

fragrances and sun care products of Sarantis GR.²²⁹ Fresh Homemade Cosmetics, a soap making industry, has also done significant investments in Istanbul and Ankara.²³⁰ SATO, a Greek furniture industry possesses a subsidiary company in Turkey, TCC Buro Koltuk Ltd.

Titan Company specialized in freight brokerage, bulk transportation, and commodity brokerage²³¹ entered the Turkish market while purchasing 50% of Adocim Cimento Beton Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S stock for €90.5 million. Halkor, large-scale modern industrial company with over sixty years of expertise in metal processing²³² was given recently the “green light” by the Turkish Competition Board and the ability to buy out 50.1% of Segal Bakir S.A stock which is activating in the field of pipes’ production and sale in Turkey.²³³

Nireus, a Greek company which constitutes the biggest producer of sea bream and sea bass worldwide, had installed its operations in 2006 in Turkey by acquiring the Turkish company IKLNAK A.S.²³⁴ Selonda, an aquaculture company who aims at the reproduction, on-growing, and commercial distribution of Mediterranean fish species²³⁵ possesses also subsidiaries in Turkey (Fjord Marin Turkey AS and Elektrosan Deniz Ürünleri). Greece’s Thrace Plastics teamed up with Turkey’s Teknik Plastik, established a food packaging factory in Istanbul, labeled as "Thrace

²²⁹ G. Sakkas, “Sarantis sallies forth to ‘Turkey’”[in Greek], in Newspaper Imerisia 3.9.2004 and http://www.sarantis.gr/en/sd_tur.asp

²³⁰ 2nd Development Pillar of Freshline in Turkey, 27.6.2007
http://www.grtrnews.com/gr/publish/article_843.shtml

²³¹ <http://www.titanco.com/>

²³² <http://www.halcor.gr/online/generic.aspx?mid=57&smid=58>

²³³ A. Dokas, “Halkor was provided with the ‘Green Light’ by Turkey for the buy out of Segal Bakir [in Greek], in Newspaper Kathimerini 19.3.08

²³⁴ “Greek companies jumped at the chance in Turkey”
http://www.enet.gr/online/online_text/c=114,id=37957996 and

<http://www.nireus.gr/mainfrm.jsp?entity=16&presentationID=1&lang=EN#>

²³⁵ http://www.selonda.gr/en/selonda.php?show=omilos/aee.ecm&lf=lf_om_gr.ecm

Teknik Ambalaj Sirketi A.S”.²³⁶ In a similar fashion Crete’s Plastics has purchased 75% of Turkish company Sanchroma from “Gumussuyu Carpet Group”.

It should be noted that the largest-scale business partnership constitutes the one between two major construction companies, Turkey’s ENKA and Greece’s Technodomiki which have jointly taken over the construction of a new city in Oman (Blue City) with a budget over than €12 billion.²³⁷

However, it should be stressed that according to Turkish assertions the existing legislative framework in Greece prevents Turkish business people from investing in Greece. The Greek officials support that these problems don’t exist and argue that the national Law facilitates new investments the fact is that the Turkish Businessmen with the exclusion of some examples (Ipekyol, Koton which have to do with clothes and Inci Shoes) haven’t managed to make remarkable investments or mixed investments in Greece.

3. Bilateral trade

Mainly based on the initially positive developments that emerged after Turkey had been provided with the EU candidacy status bilateral trade became part of Greek-Turkey relations’ realities. Being influenced by the political tensions that had shadowed previous years the bilateral relations this sector was not able to flourish. It should be stressed that Turkey according to Greek exporters, represents an increasingly dynamic export market orientation for their products, especially after the beginning of EU-Turkey’s agreements’ implementation. In their perspective this market might become even more attractive since Greek firms, considering the

²³⁶ “In Turkey ‘Thrace Plastics’ [in Greek], in Newspaper Imerisia 10.7.2004

²³⁷ T. Coulombis and A. Kentikelenis, “Greek-Turkish Relations and the Kantian Democratic Peace Theory” in *Southeast European and Black Studies* Vol.7 No. 4 , p. 526 and “The contracts for financing the project have been signed” [in Greek] <http://www.kerdos.gr/default.aspx?id=436676&nt=103>

difficulties they might face in order to place their products in the competitive EU markets, turn out to find an easy outlet in Turkey.²³⁸

The Economic Cooperation Agreement signed on 4 February 2000 and which was mentioned before, rules the institutional framework of Greek-Turkish economic cooperation.²³⁹ The volume of bilateral trade between the two financially strongest members of Southeastern Europe has been on an “upward trajectory”.²⁴⁰ The numbers in Table 1 show that the trade volume which was approximately €415 millions in 1996 increased to €1050 billion in 2000, €1245 in 2003, €1547 billion in 2004 and €1666 billion in 2005.²⁴¹ The bilateral trade exceeded \$2.17 billion in the framework of 10-month period from January to October 2006.²⁴² Greek exports of goods to Turkey have noted a significant average annual growth rate of approximately 30% making Turkey 5th as an exporting market size covering 4.5% of the total Greek exports and 14th supplier of Greek market’s good corresponding to the 2,25% of the total imports. From the other side Turkish exports to Greece have recorded an average annual growth rate of 14% which, however, constitutes a small share of total Turkish exports.²⁴³ In 2005 the value of the 20 most important Greek exporting products was absorbing 74% of the total exports’ value, while the value of the 20 most important importing products only the 31% of the imports from the neighbor country.

Although Turkey has become important trade partner of Greece, the contribution of the latter to the trade exchanges of the former is relatively limited.

²³⁸ P. Liargovas, “The Economic Imperative: Prospects for Trade Integration and Business Cooperation” in M. Aydin & K. Ifantis (eds.) *Turkish-Greek Relations The Security Dilemma in the Aegean*, London and New York Routledge 2005, p.147

²³⁹ <http://www.ypex.gov.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Policy/Geographic+Regions/South-Eastern+Europe/Turkey/Approach/Bilateral+financial-commercial+relations/>

²⁴⁰ A. Kamaras, “Complementary bilateral relations” in “*The Bridge* (a quarter review on European integration SE Europe and SE Mediterranean) Q2/2007-issue 5, p. 71-75

²⁴¹ See Table 1 and B. Myisli (2005), “Financial Interdependence and Regional Conflict Resolution: The Greek-Turkish Example” [in Greek], Working Paper, p. 25

²⁴² “Greek-Turkish trade tops \$2.17bl in Jan-Oct '06”

<http://www.hri.org/news/greek/apeen/2007/07-02-01.apeen.html#03>

²⁴³ Ibid. For further details see Table 2 and 3.

According to recent data the Greek exports to the neighboring country represents 0,9% of the Turkish imports and the Greek's imports from Turkey 1,6% of the total Turkish exports.²⁴⁴ The Greek imports during that period of time are higher in value from the exports, resulting to a deficit in the trade balance which arose from 11 million dollars to 528 taking into account also that the Turkish exporting trade has continuous deficits with other partners. Structural reasons occur which enable Turkey to have more exports more than Greece. Turkey turns out to be a more open economy "equipped" with a greater concentration of exports in capital intensive-sectors than Greece.²⁴⁵ The contribution of manufacturing to GDP is higher in the case of Turkey than in the respective one of Greece and Turkey's GDP is larger than Greece's. The exporting products on behalf of Greeks are mainly restricted on stocks and especially cotton and fuels.²⁴⁶ That means that these exports consist of commodities with a low value-added component. From the other side, the main part of Turkish exports, due to the structure of Turkey's economy as aforementioned, consists of much more diversified manufactured goods with a higher value-added component.²⁴⁷ It is also claimed that the other reason this deficit exists is that Greek exporters face various bureaucratic obstacles in accessing Turkish markets.²⁴⁸

The largest increase seen in trade figures between Turkey and Greece has become more evident in the Aegean Region of Turkey. The proximity of the Aegean Region to the Greek Islands in the Aegean Sea has also affected the amount of export from the Aegean Region. In the first six months of 2005 Aegean Region exports

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ K. Angelos & G. Petrakos, "The Industrial and Trade Structure of the Greek and Turkish Economies: Possibilities for Cooperation", Discussion Paper Series 9:1, 233-248
http://www.prd.uth.gr/research/DP/2003/uth-prd-dp-2003-11_en.pdf

²⁴⁶ "Increase of Greek cotton exports to Turkey"
http://www.grtrnews.com/gr/publish/article_448.shtml

²⁴⁷ A. Kamaras (2007), p. 71

²⁴⁸ <http://greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=3&folder=221&article=18659>

levels were at nearly \$42.5 million, while during the first six months of 2006 Aegean Region exports reached nearly \$71 million.²⁴⁹ Smyrna had exports to Greece with a value of €183.156.896 while the imports of Greece came up to €77.773.296. Generally the exports to the Turkish coasts was close to €3.255.159, while the imports had a value of €6.730.300. Although the numbers could not be considered impressive, especially if the geographical proximity of the referred places is taken into account, it could be assumed that the improvement perspectives can be positively regarded.

In this framework Smyrna's Chamber of Commerce proceeded with the establishment of a network of the Aegean Portal in order to contribute to the process of the Greek-Turkish trade relations improvement and to the amplification of the existing trade dynamic. With the help of this system companies which want either to export or to import from the one country to the other, can deal and function in a more transparent field for cooperation.²⁵⁰

Sarik Tara, President of the Greek-Turkish Business Council, in an interview states that "the share of bilateral trade in the total trade volume is just 1% and 2% respectively. If we can increase this figure up to 5%, then we can say that we have become good partners".²⁵¹ According to the future prospects of trade integration between Greece and Turkey, these will definitely depend on the bilateral political stability between the two.

²⁴⁹ <http://www.aegeanportal.org/>

²⁵⁰ "Web link instrumental for Greek-Turkish trade relations"
http://www.grtrnews.com/gr/publish/article_731.shtml

²⁵¹ Interview of Sarik Tara to P. Protea "The goals for Greek-Turkish Business Co-operation"
http://www.acci.gr/trade/No26/TRADE_12_14.pdf

4. Energy Cooperation

It is a fact that international energy policies constitute an important aspect of the newly emerged globalized arena during the 21st century. Both states, realizing the increasing gravity that this sector would have in the contribution of their foreign policy formulation came up with the decision to cooperate in energy issues. Greece and Turkey, eager to become significant transit hubs for natural gas towards major European markets, reached an agreement concerning the establishment of a natural gas pipeline that would bring natural gas from Azerbaijan and then export the majority of it to Italy and extensively to Western Europe. This cooperation should be imbedded also in the whole rapprochement process that is taking place among the two states.

The Turkish-Greek pipeline concept consists of a key component of the EU's Southern European Gas Ring (SEGR) program, which aims to interconnect the gas grids of Turkey, Greece and Italy by the end of 2010²⁵² and transport non-Russian produced and exported natural gas to Europe from the Caspian Sea with special reference to Azerbaijan and its main natural gas sources which lie in Shah Deniz. The initial ¼ part of this Russian by-pass will be covered through creation of the South Caucasus Pipeline which is supposed to transfer Shah Deniz's output to Ankara. From Turkey's capital it crosses Turkish national grid up to the Greek border at Evros River.²⁵³ The rationale behind the construction of this pipeline rests on geopolitical concerns and the will of both states to provide the Western markets with a reliably alternative supply.²⁵⁴

²⁵² Energy Information Administration Country Analysis Brief
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Greece/Full.html>

²⁵³ Tsakiris Th. G., "Pipelines for Peace? : The Greater Geostrategic Framework behind the Greek-Turkish-Italian Natural Gas Cooperation", Working Paper <http://www.ekem.gr/pdf/pipeline.pdf>

²⁵⁴ G. Winrow, "Becoming an Energy Hub" in *The Bridge*, Q4/2007-Issue 7, p. 78

In this framework a Memorandum of Understanding was initially signed by Greece's Public Gas Corporation (DEPA) and Turkey's BOTAS, the Greek and Turkish state-owned natural gas utilities. According to it the gas-pipeline runs from Karacabey on the south side of the Marmara Sea to Ipsala on the Turkey-Greece border. Greece has built a 57-mile section of the pipeline, which links with Greece's natural gas transmission network at Komitini. The Turkey-Greece pipeline which is operational pumps formerly 28 Bcf per year starting from late 2006. The pipeline will eventually pump 407 Bcf per year by 2012, 111 Bcf of which will be consumed by Greece with the rest potentially shipped to Italy via a new link currently under development between the two countries under the Adriatic.²⁵⁵ The \$720 million Aegean pipeline (also known as the Greece-Turkey pipeline), a joint venture developed by DEPA and BOTAS has been completed and already operational. Its estimated annual transport capacity is 11.6 billion m³ of natural gas. Construction work on the section of the pipeline between Karacabey of Turkey and Komotini (Greece) has finished whilst the part between Greece and Italy is currently in the phase of feasibility studies and probing.²⁵⁶



<http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Economic+Diplomacy/Energy+Affairs/>

Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan illustrating the importance of this agreement met on the bridge over

²⁵⁵ <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Greece/Full.html>

²⁵⁶ <http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Economic+Diplomacy/Energy+Affairs/>

the Evros River, at the border between Greece and Turkey, for the inauguration of the Greek-Turkish natural gas pipeline that went into operation on that day.²⁵⁷ In 2007 they met again on the same place in order to underscore the significance of the venture in boosting ties between the rival nations”.²⁵⁸

5. Aegean cooperation

A supposed cooperation in the Aegean Sea could mainly concern the islands of the Northeastern Sea, the Dodecanese and Turkish coast lines. In this region, due to the proximity of the Greek islands with the Turkish coastlines a new cooperation area among Greece and Turkey could emerge, especially in the field of tourism and sea transfers. Although for many years there was a kind of competition in the context of these sectors some timid steps on behalf of both states for increasing cooperation can be observed. Regarding the cooperation in the tourism sector, besides the Turks and Greeks that visited each others country, some initial attempts have been done that could help the two coasts profit from every tourist period. In the Financial Cooperation Memorandum that was signed in 30.6.2005 the two countries came up with an agreement in order to establish a coastal navigation connection between the ports of Ainos, Dardanelles, Alexandroupolis, Maronia, Sam Thrace and Imvros.²⁵⁹

As we see from Table 6 the Greek visitors in the Turkish islands are rapidly increasing. The corresponding Turks have not achieved to reach Greeks' number. Many Turkish citizens that wish to visit the Greek islands have to overcome important

²⁵⁷“Karamanlis and Erdogan inaugurate Greek-Turkish natgas pipeline” November 2006
<http://www.ana.gr/anaweb/user/selectlang?lang=el&currpageurl=/user/showplain?maindoc=5892898&maindocimg=5464319&service=6>

²⁵⁸ “Greek, Turkish premiers open taps on Europe's first supply of Caspian gas”, in International Herald Tribune 17.11.2007
<http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/11/18/europe/EU-GEN-Greece-Turkey-Pipeline.php>

²⁵⁹ “Greece, Turkey seek to boost trade”
http://www.mjourney.com/news/News_from_Greece/e/2122.GR_TR_TO_BOOS_TRADE.html

obstacles which consist of the strict EU visa policy concerning their accession in the territory of some EU members.²⁶⁰

In 13 November 2006 Greece and Turkey signed a tourism cooperation protocol envisioning a greater exchange of information on issues of infrastructure and especially maritime tourism, including potential marina partnerships and the hosting of joint sailing regattas. The protocol was signed on the sidelines of the 2nd joint declaration by the Greek Minister of Tourism Fani Palli-Petralia and her Turkish counterpart Atilla Koc. The committee agreed to enable and make travel of third country tourists between the two countries and to inaugurate new ferry boat links. In her brief comments, Petralia noted that through mutual cooperation in the tourism sector, Greece and Turkey can better prepare for the future and achieve better results vis-à-vis international competition.²⁶¹

6. Conclusions

The question that still concerns the Greek foreign policy makers is whether a possible formulation of financial interdependence relations between the two countries is entailing a conflict resolution that would enable both Greece and Turkey be much better off reaching a final reconciliation, a new historic compromise, reminiscent of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 and the Venizelos-Ataturk Treaty of Friendship of 1930.²⁶² The financial aspect of Greek-Turkish relations is based and reinforced by Turkey's "EU road map". The majority of financial bilateral agreements and investments occurred in the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit in 1999 in the context of which Greeks decided to lift their veto that was supposed to be its traditional

²⁶⁰ T.A Couloumbis & A. Kentikelenis (2007), p. 526

²⁶¹ "Protocol of Touristic Cooperation with Turkey"
http://www.grtrnews.com/gr/publish/article_748.shtml

²⁶² Th. Couloumbis, "Greek-Turkish relations in an European setting", P. C Ioalimidis (ed) *Greece in the European Union: The New Role & the New Agenda*, Athens 2002, p.213-223

foreign policy line in the framework of EU-Turkish relations and draw with its other partners some EU guidelines for Turkey. All these imply that the financial part of Greece's engagement strategy towards Turkey relies to an important extent on the respective political one which consists of enmeshing Turkey deeper into the European institutions. The arising question is the following one: if the evolution on EU-Turkey's relations is not the expected one, as envisaged from the Greek side, and the hopes for imbedding Turkey in the EU context begin to "evanesce", how could Greek officials predict the future of Greece's financial engagement strategy towards Turkey? Can Greek-Turkish financial cooperation remain unaffected by a possible negative development in Turkey's European orientation?

What emerges from the before mentioned is that the financial interdependence is only a good basis for the Greek-Turkish conflict resolution. It doesn't mean that the bilateral financial improvement entails automatically the political problems' resolution since the whole financial cooperation is placed in the European political realm. It could be assumed that the stability in the political relations with special reference to the continuity of Turkey's EU course can establish the suitable framework in which the financial one can be improved.

CONCLUSIONS

As stated in Chapter B every strategy pursued by a state aims to protect and ensure in the most effective way its national security, as the latter is perceived by the officials that draw the guidelines of state's foreign policy. The arising question is whether Greece, having embraced during the last decade an engagement strategy towards its Eastern neighbor, has eliminated every security concern related to it.

In a short run the signs regarding the effectiveness of this strategy seem not the optimistic ones the officials might have initially anticipated. Among the major parties in Greece (PASOK and New Democracy) which have pursued this policy, what has been observed so far, is a remarkable continuity, even during the recent thaw period, in holding the perception that Turkey still remains the country's major security concern. Reports emanating from the comments and analyses of various Greek security and political analysts and policymakers²⁶³ state that Turkey still possesses revisionist aspirations

The question that could easily emerge is whether the recent rapprochement period of Greek-Turkish relations, a phase that has come about during the past nine years, involves risks and/or opportunities. It is a question that arises naturally as the Greek-Turkish relationship has oscillated between entente and détente for the past 50 years. Given their fundamental divergent approaches and positions, Greek and Turkish foreign policy makers do not seem able to reach an agreement regarding the resolution of the Aegean dispute(s) in the foreseeable future. Greece has rested its hope on EU support for its position on a legal settlement of the Aegean problems with Turkey. However, it should be taken into account that Athens would prefer its EU

²⁶³ A. Tarkas, "The crucial second semester of 2008 and the secret conclusions of Athens" in *Defense and Diplomacy*, Vol. 202, February 2008, p. 11-12, Th. Dokos Integrating Greece into the European Security Architecture: Greek Security Policy in the 21st Century, Executive Summary, ELIAMEP 2008

partners to become more active and helpful in coping with what it considers to be a Turkish threat to its sovereign rights in the Aegean.

From the other side, in a long-term analysis Greek optimism is relied on the expectation that Turkey will be gradually integrated into the dictates of the European system on the basis of which European practices and norms of behavior and certain European-style ‘rules of the game’ have to be followed while dealing with Aegean dispute(s). The dealing with the bilateral issue(s) will be held on a European platform where the disputing parts are supposed to have renounced the use of military force. The more Turkey follows and implements the European “road map” the more possible it is to adopt policies aligned with it. The EU-membership carrot is able to put pressure on Turkey in order to modify its narrow nationalistic outlook as it is perceived by the Greek officials and enable it to embrace policies constructed more on international law and agreements than on geopolitical considerations and statecraft as it is supposed to pursue till today’s.²⁶⁴

Greeks, taking advantage of the EU framework that had been built for Turkey, managed to cultivate financial ties with Turkey. The rationale behind this operation was lying on the hope that the establishment of possible economic interdependence among the two states will function in a prohibitive way towards every armed conflict possibility. This might contribute to the creation and emergence of a new platform on which the bilateral dispute or points of friction can be discussed and analyzed.

According to the aforementioned it becomes clear that this strategy presupposes patience and domestic support on behalf of the state that initiates it. The avoidance of polarization among the political parties concerning the implementation of this strategy should be considered a prerequisite not only for the viability but also

²⁶⁴ P. Tsakonas & A. Tournikiotis, “Greece’s Elusive Quest for Security Providers: The “Expectations-Reality Gap” in *Security Dialogue* 34:3, (September 2003), 301-14

for the success of it. The consensus between the political parties should contribute to the appeasement of public opinion and media in case a tension between the two states arises. It is possible that the people and the media, being neither able nor willing to comprehend the complexities diplomacy has to cope with, will come up with foregone conclusions according to which the pursued policy is interpreted as a sign of weakness and submissiveness towards a state whose unilateral “revisionist” claims (as these are perceived) are by the time increasing. The entanglement of these sensitive foreign policy issues with populism channels might jeopardize the effectiveness of the strategy and the ultimate goal it aims to serve which consists of the national security enhancement. Thus, the formulation of this consensus constitutes an imperative need that might safeguard this strategy, especially in cases whereas the implementation of it does not lead to a gesture of good will on behalf of the other side.

Having said this every policy is subject to sort of criticism and questioning. The relative abatement of tension in Greek-Turkish relations that became apparent after 1999 has been reinforced by the EU’s decision in Helsinki to grant candidate status to Turkey.²⁶⁵ The main obstacle both for further Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy in general and for the engagement strategy towards Turkey have to deal with the fact that their viability rests upon an evolution that is not stemming out from Greece’s foreign policy choices. The whole structure of the strategy has been constructed on Turkey’s full integration perspective into the EU. That means that the further development and continuity of both variables (Europeanization and Engagement Strategy) depend on the question whether Turkey seizes the chance and intensifies its efforts to become a deeper part of the European world or not. If Turkey decides that the European orientation is not considered its main political priority and

²⁶⁵ B. Theodoropoulos, “Peremptory reasoning”, *Greek-Turkish relations in the Era of Globalization* (ed.) D. Keridis-D. Triantaphyllou, Brassey 2004, ix

becomes “unhooked” from the EU’s dictates, how what will be Greek Foreign Policy’s future in Europeanization and engagement terms? It is obvious that during this period Greece is seeking to exploit every advantage is emanating from its identity as EU member in order to push Turkey become deeper integrated into the EU. If Turkey does not “win the European bet” and returns to an unpredictable for the European and Greek given policy, how can Greece being its western neighbor rely on the fact that Europeanization process will automatically resolve the disputes?

This question becomes more crucial if someone bears in mind that till now EU does not seem to hold a clear and coherent position concerning its future relation with Turkey. The messages coming from EU circles claim that the majority of EU members seem willing to turn down the full membership status and provide Turkey with the idea of “special-preferential relationship” as an alternative choice. Although the content of this status is exposed to further investigation it seems that this possible relationship might be constructed on two pillars: a) Custom Union and Turkish participation at a more enlarged internal market (like Norway) and b) selective participation of Turkey at CFSP.²⁶⁶

This argumentation seems to be adopted by one of the contributors of Greece’s Engagement Strategy towards Turkey, C. Simitis. Although during his incumbency as Prime Minister he was favoring the full membership status for Turkey, according to him now this possible evolution might encumber the further progress of European integration and unification.²⁶⁷ Claiming that Greeks should seek the maintenance of engagement strategy towards Turkey, the guidelines which drawn in the Helsinki should be differentiated. In his words Greece, should not commit itself to specific

²⁶⁶ P. C Ioakimidis, “Greece and the Preferential Relationship for Turkey” in Newspaper TA NEA, 7.7.2006

²⁶⁷ Costas Simitis’ Speech at The Cambridge University with subject «European Challenges And the Lisbon Treaty» 31.1.2008 <http://www.costas-simitis.gr/content/137>

directions (i.e. full membership for Turkey) but make clear that its position will depend on the coming evolutions. As he states the Greek delegation should proceed with discussion with its EU partners on the topics it is occupied with and bring out the existence of issues that still remain unresolved.²⁶⁸

If this evolution comes true it means that the Turkish state will not participate at the EU institutions and bodies (European Council and European Commission) and common policies. It is argued that this way EU may become enabled to control Turkey's market and its geo-strategic position without being obliged to "baptize" Turkey as the new member of its "family". Raising questions whether this possible evolution serves EU interests or not the author would like to draw the attention on the Greek case: does this possible evolution help Greece ensure the effectiveness and viability of its strategy? In the context of this relationship status it is probable that Turkey will not be forced to discipline itself and comply with the norms, principles, rules and mechanisms of EU. That implies that the further Europeanization of Turkey both in domestic and in foreign policy terms might remain an illusion for the Greek Foreign Policy Makers that were envisaging a more Europeanized Turkey in the future with whom they could discuss the bilateral issue(s) from a different point of view than they do now.

This possible evolution might cause a critical re-thinking among the Foreign-Policy Makers, international relations' scholars and political analysts. Which is the most effective "channel" through which Greece is able to protect its national interests and enhance its own security if Turkey's EU full membership does not take effect? Does the adoption of containment strategy which has been pursued so far until 1999 constitute an adequate solution or does it lead to a non-exit situation as described

²⁶⁸ C. Simitis, "Turkey's Relationship with Europe Why Should We Change Tactic [in Greek] in Newspaper TO VIMA 17.2.2008

before? Greeks might anticipate that the cultivation of stronger financial ties might facilitate interdependence relations which would lead to a possible conflict resolution and reconciliation without EU's contribution. Is it possible? Future will show...

APPENDIX I

HELSINKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL 10 AND 11 DECEMBER 1999 PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS

I. PREPARING FOR ENLARGEMENT

The enlargement process

4. The European Council reaffirms the inclusive nature of the accession process, which now comprises 13 candidate States within a single framework. The candidate States are participating in the accession process on an equal footing. They must share the values and objectives of the European Union as set out in the Treaties. In this respect the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004. Moreover, the European Council recalls that compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations and that compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria is the basis for accession to the Union.

9. (a) The European Council welcomes the launch of the talks aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in New York and expresses its strong support for the UN Secretary-General's efforts to bring the process to a successful conclusion.

(b) The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors.


11. In the negotiations, each candidate State will be judged on its own merits. This principle will apply both to opening of the various negotiating chapters and to the conduct of the negotiations. In order to maintain momentum in the negotiations, cumbersome procedures should be avoided. Candidate States which have now been brought into the negotiating process will have the possibility to catch up within a reasonable period of time with those already in negotiations if they have made sufficient progress in their preparations. Progress in negotiations must go hand in hand with progress in incorporating the *acquis* into legislation and actually implementing and enforcing it.

12. The European Council welcomes recent positive developments in Turkey as noted in the Commission's progress report, as well as its intention to continue its reforms

towards complying with the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States. Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This will include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession with particular reference to the issue of human rights, as well as on the issues referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9(a). Turkey will also have the opportunity to participate in Community programmes and agencies and in meetings between candidate States and the Union in the context of the accession process. An accession partnership will be drawn up on the basis of previous European Council conclusions while containing priorities on which accession preparations must concentrate in the light of the political and economic criteria and the obligations of a Member State, combined with a national programme for the adoption of the *acquis*. Appropriate monitoring mechanisms will be established. With a view to intensifying the harmonisation of Turkey's legislation and practice with the *acquis*, the Commission is invited to prepare a process of analytical examination of the *acquis*. The European Council asks the Commission to present a single framework for coordinating all sources of European Union financial assistance for pre-accession.

APPENDIX II

Table 1. Trade volume between Greece and Turkey
(Million €)



Source: Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.mfa.gr) and Kotios A. and G. Petrakos (2003) "The Industrial and Trade Structure of the Greek and Turkish Economies: Possibilities for Cooperation". (Volos: University of Thessaly Discussion Papers) (available at: www.prd.uth.gr/research/DP/2003/uth-prd-dp-2003-11_en.pdf and T.A Couloumbis & A. Kentikelenis (2007)

Table 2. 20 first countries for the Greek exports
(In million €)

	Countries	2005	2004	Increase/decrease percentage
1	Germany	1,721.2	1,617.5	6.4
2	Italy	1,456.4	1,238.5	17.6
3	United Kingdom	938.7	928.3	1.1
4	Bulgaria	817.9	779.6	4.9
5	Turkey	754.1	555.0	35.9
6	USA	735.3	651.9	12.8
7	Cyprus	716.9	580.1	23.6
8	France	577.4	520.9	10.9
9	Spain	497.6	413.7	20.3
10	Rumania	408.7	383.4	6.6
11	Albania	348.5	344.5	1.1
12	Netherlands	333.0	332.8	0.1
13	FYROM	327.0	310.3	5.4
14	Russia	275.1	268.1	2.6
	United Arab Emirates			
15		208.3	104.0	100.3
16	Belgium-Luxembourg	190.1	195.0	2.5
17	Libya	157.7	169.7	7
18	Syria	157.4	77.3	103.6
19	Sweden	141.3	128.4	10.1
20	Poland	134.1	115.2	16.4
	E.U. (25)	7,377.4	6,781.2	8.8
	E.U. (15)	6,317.8	5,852.2	8
	TOTAL EXPORTS	13,963.6	12,348.1	13.1

Source: www.pse.gr & B. Miyisli (2005)

Table 3. 20 first states for Greek imports

	State	2005	2004	Increase/decrease percentage
1	Germany	5,796.4	5,607.2	3.4%
2	Italy	5,366.0	5,406.9	0.8
3	Russia	3,389.5	2,303.7	47.1
4	France	2,507.0	2,716.4	7.7
5	Netherlands	2,409.5	2,361.8	2.0
6	Saudi Arabia	1,805.8	1,287.7	40.2
7	Spain	1,713.0	1,631.9	5.0
8	China	1,702.7	1,423.1	19.6
9	Belgium-Luxembourg	1,569.4	1,589.5	1.3
10	USA	1,496.5	1,888.7	20.8
11	Iran	1,488.6	1,155.1	28.9
12	South Korea	1,178.8	1,724.4	31.6
13	Turkey	956.7	992.5	3.6
14	Japan	926.8	1,239.3	25.2
15	Libya	615.0	290.2	111.9
16	Switzerland	596.0	602.2	1.0
17	Bulgaria	589.0	464.4	26.8
18	Sweden	573.1	624.1	8.2
19	Austria	457.7	451.7	1.3
20	Rumania	434.3	503.7	13.8
	EU(15)	23,561.0	23,664.4	0.4
	EU(25)	24,603.4	24,546.2	0.2
	TOTAL IMPORTS	43,896.8	42,411.3	3.5

Source: www.pse.gr & B. Miyisli (2005)

Table 4. 20 first states for Turkish exports
(in million dollars)

	State	2004	2005
1	Germany	8,745,282	9,453,011
2	United Kingdom	5,544,303	5,917,074
3	Italy	4,648,475	5,615,843
4	USA	4,860,041	4,899,126
5	France	3,668,418	3,805,577
6	Spain	2,619,784	3,010,092
7	Iraq	1,820,802	2,745,921
8	Netherlands	2,138,004	2,469,036
9	Russia	1,859,187	2,375,868
10	Rumania	1,235,485	1,785,090
11	United Arab Emirates	1,143,728	1,669,719
12	Israel	1,315,292	1,463,155
13	Belgium	1,183,181	1,291,594
14	Bulgaria	894,326	1,178,935
15	Greece	1,171,203	1,125,693


Source: www.dtm.gov.tr

Table 5. 20 first countries for Turkish imports
(in \$ million)

	State	2004	2005
1	Germany	12,515,655	13,618,590
2	Russia	9,033,138	12,868,349
3	Italy	6,865,811	7,560,964
4	China	4,476,077	6,867,358
5	France	6,201,348	5,883,631
6	USA	4,745,195	5,371,514
7	United Kingdom	4,317,140	4,690,092
8	Switzerland	3,404,540	4,053,558
9	Spain	3,253,675	3,549,425
10	South Korea	2,572,537	3,478,586
11	Iran	1,962,059	3,469,669
12	Japan	2,684,287	3,106,795
13	Ukraine	2,509,351	2,639,328
36	Greece	594,351	726,498

Source: www.dtm.gov.tr

Table 6 Greek-Turkish Tourism



Sources: T.A Couloumbis & A. Kentikelenis (2007), p. 526 & **Greek Statistical Service**
(www.statistics.gr)

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