

**T.C.
ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**



**COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS PUT INTO PRACTICE BY
IRAN AND USA IN THE MIDDLE EAST REGION**

THESIS

Hasan Parwez M.SIDIQ

**Department Of Political Science And International Relations
Political Sciences And International Relations**

Thesis Advisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Deniz ÖZÇETİN

December, 2018

**T.C.
ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**



**COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS PUT INTO PRACTICE BY
IRAN AND USA IN THE MIDDLE EAST REGION**

M.Sc. THESIS

**Hasan Parwez M.SIDIQ
(Y1212.110010)**

**Department Of Political Science And International Relations
Political Sciences And International Relations**

Thesis Advisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Deniz ÖZÇETİN

December, 2018

T.C.
İSTANBUL AYDIN ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ



YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZ ONAY FORMU

Enstitümüz Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı Siyaset Bilimi Ve Uluslararası İlişkiler İngilizce Tezli Yüksek Lisans Programı **Y1212.110010** numaralı öğrencisi **Hasan Parwez M. SIDIQ'**ın **“COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS PUT INTO PRACTICE BY IRAN AND USA IN THE MIDDLE EAST REGION”** adlı tez çalışması Enstitümüz Yönetim Kurulunun 22.11.2018 tarih ve 2018/30 sayılı kararıyla oluşturulan jüri tarafından oybirliği/oyçokluğu ile Tezli Yüksek Lisans tezi 05.12.2018 tarihinde kabul edilmiştir.

	<u>Unvan</u>	<u>Adı Soyadı</u>	<u>Üniversite</u>	<u>İmza</u>
Danışman	Dr. Öğr. Üyesi	Deniz ÖZÇETİN	Kadir Has Üniversitesi	
Üye	Dr. Öğr. Üyesi	Gülay Uğur GÖKSEL	İstanbul Aydın Üniversitesi	
Üye	Doç. Dr.	Burak ÖZÇETİN	Bilgi Üniversitesi	

ONAY

Prof. Dr. Ragıp Kutay KARACA
Enstitü Müdürü

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that all information in this thesis document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results, which are not original to this thesis.

Hasan Parwez M.SIDIQ



FOREWORD

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Asst. Prof. Dr. Deniz ÖZÇETİN for the useful comments, remarks and engagement through the learning process of this master thesis. Furthermore I would like to thank my colleagues for their continuous support and assistance. Also, I would like to thank my loved ones, who have supported me throughout entire process, both by keeping me harmonious and helping me putting pieces together. I will be grateful forever for your love.

December, 2018

Hasan Parwez M.SIDIQ



TABLE OF CONTENT

	<u>Page</u>
FOREWORD	iv
TABLE OF CONTENT	v
LIST OF FIGURES	vi
ABSTRACT	vii
ÖZET	viii
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS	4
2.1 The Foreign Policies of the United States and Iran.....	4
2.2 Terrorism policies of the United States and Iran.....	6
2.3 Weapons of Mass Destruction.....	6
2.4 Economic Development	7
2.5 Energy	7
2.6 Literature Review	8
3. DIMENSIONS OF USA AND IRAN RELATION	11
3.1 Theoretical Explanation Of American And Iranian Foreign Policy.....	11
3.1.1 America: From Isolationism to a World Power	11
3.1.2 The Cold War.....	16
3.1.3 The Idea of the “End of History” and the United States Policy in the Middle East	17
3.1.4 The Theoretical Grounding of Iranian Foreign Policy.....	23
3.1.5 Iran at the Beginning of the 20 th Century.....	25
3.1.6 Constitutional Monarchy.....	26
3.1.7 The Rule of Reza Shah.....	27
3.1.8 The Fall of Reza Shah.....	28
3.1.9 The Reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi	28
3.1.10 Theocratic Rule 1979 – Present	31
3.2 Terrorism: Iran And The United States Antiterrorism Policy.....	33
3.2.1 American Antiterrorism efforts over the Last Decade.....	34
3.2.2 Iran’s Antiterrorism Policies	36
3.3 Weapons Of Mass Destruction Policy: Iran And The United States	40
3.3.1 United States Policy on Weapons of Mass Destruction.....	40
3.3.2 Iran’s Policy on Weapons of Mass Destruction.....	44
3.4 The Energy Policy Of The United States And Iran.....	45
3.4.1 The United States Energy Policy	45
3.4.2 Iran’s Energy Policies	47
4. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION	49
4.1 A Multipolar World.....	49
4.2 Conclusion.....	55
REFERENCES	56
RESUME	59

LIST OF FIGURES

	<u>Page</u>
Figure 5.1: Iranian Fatalities in Syria by Military Affiliation.....	38
Figure 7.1: Changes agreed under Iran deal to limit nuclear programme.....	42



COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS PUT INTO PRACTICE BY IRAN AND U.S IN THE MIDDLE EAST

ABSTRACT

Relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran are influenced by complex historical, geopolitical, and ideological factors. To have a genuine understanding of the relations between the U.S. and Iran requires knowledge of the historical, ideological, and philosophical grounding of the two nations. This report will analyze the history of both the United States and Iran, their geopolitical situation, and the worldview which shapes their foreign policy. Only with this comprehensive level of understanding can American policymakers create a foreign policy towards Iran which is in the national interest of the United States. This report argues that the primary goal of United States foreign policy for the last century is the creation of a liberal world order which respects the rule of law promotes free trade, and respects individual rights. The direction of American foreign policy might be shifting towards a nationalist direction under the leadership of President Trump. Iranian foreign policy is guided by the principle of maintaining its national sovereignty. The primary influence on Iranian philosophical and ideological development is Shia Islam, which serves to re-enforce the independence of Iran from its Sunni neighbors. The tense relationship between the United States and Iran is a product of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, in which a theocratic revolutionary movement overthrew the Shah, an ally of the United States, and took American diplomats hostage. This report recommends a re-examination of Iranian United States relations. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States share a common interest in suppressing radical Sunni extremist groups such as ISIS, and Iran's willingness to sign the Iran Deal indicates a desire to deal in good faith with the United States. This report recommends a re-examination of the Bush II/Obama era policy of regime change and instead argues that is in the national interest to have a policy towards Iran, and the Middle East, which emphasizes stability rather than ideology.

Keywords: *Iran Policy, US Policy, Iran – US relations, Middle East Policy, foreign policy.*

İRAN VE ABD'NİN ORTA DOĞU'DA UYGULADIĞI SİYASETİN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ANALİZİ

ÖZET

Birleşik Devletler ve İran İslam Cumhuriyeti arasındaki ilişkiler karmaşık tarihsel, jeopolitik ve ideolojik faktörlerden etkilenmektedir. ABD ve İran arasındaki ilişkiler hakkında özgün bir anlayışa sahip olmak için, iki ulusun tarihsel, ideolojik ve felsefi temellerini bilmek gerekmektedir. Bu çalışma hem ABD'nin hem de İran'ın tarihini, jeopolitik durumlarını ve dış politikasını şekillendiren dünya görüşünü inceleyecektir. Sadece bu kapsamlı anlayış düzeyi ile Amerikan politika yapıcılarını, ABD'nin ulusal çıkarına olan İran'a karşı bir dış politika oluşturabilirler. Bu çalışmada, ABD'nin son yüzyıldaki dış politikasının temel amacının, serbest ticaretin teşvik edilmesi ve yasalara uyması, bireysel haklara saygı gösteren liberal bir dünya düzeninin yaratılması olduğu tartışılmaktadır. Amerikan dış politikasının yönü, Başkan Trump liderliğinde milliyetçi bir yöne doğru ilerleyebilir. İran dış politikası, ulusal egemenliğini koruma ilkesi tarafından yönlendirilmektedir. İran'ın felsefi ve ideolojik gelişimi üzerindeki birincil etki, İran'ın Sünni komşularından bağımsızlığını güçlendirmesine hizmet eden Şii İslam'dır. ABD ile İran arasındaki gergin ilişki, 1979 yılındaki ABD'nin müttefiki olan Şah'i deviren ve Amerikalı diplomatları rehin alan İslam Devrimi'nin sonucuna dayanmaktadır. Bu çalışma, İran - ABD ilişkilerinin yeniden incelenmesi fikrini savunmaktadır. İran İslam Cumhuriyeti ve Birleşik Devletler, IŞİD gibi radikal Sünni grupların bastırılmasında ortak çıkarları paylaşmakta ve İran'ın İran Anlaşması'nı imzalama konusundaki istekliliği Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ile iyi niyetle anlaşma isteğini göstermektedir. Bu çalışma, Bush II / Obama dönemi rejim değişikliği politikasının yeniden gözden geçirilmesini önermektedir ve bunun yerine İran'a ve ideolojiden ziyade istikrarı vurgulayan Orta Doğu'ya yönelik bir politikanın ulusal çıkarları olduğunu savunmaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler; *İran siyaseti, ABD siyaseti, İran – ABD ilişkileri, Orta Doğu siyaseti, dış politika.*

1. INTRODUCTION

The increasing tensions between Iran and the United States require a thorough understanding of the dynamics driving each nation's foreign policy. To have a genuine comprehension of the foreign policy of Iran and the United States, the reader must understand the historical, cultural, and economic factors driving Iranian and American foreign policy. Two events have played a definitive role in shaping the foreign policy of Iran and United States, the Iranian revolution and hostage crisis and September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. The Iranian Revolution, in which the modernizing Shah Reza Pahlavi was overthrown by the socially conservative Shia cleric Ayatollah Khomeini has its roots in concerns over foreign influence on Iranian social and political life. The Shah was perceived to be a Western puppet, under the control of the United States and Great Britain. The Shah's White Revolution alienated a significant cross-section of the Iranian population. The Ayatollah Khomeini and the conservative Shia clerical faction he represented wished to undo the Shah's liberal reforms and to establish Iran's independence both domestically and on the world stage. The primary goal of Iranian domestic and foreign policy is to preserve the autonomy of the Iranian state. To achieve this end, Khomeini and his successors have created a socially conservative domestic agenda rooted in Shia Islam and a foreign policy, which is designed to protect Iran from foreign influence while building its status as a regional power.

Just as Iranian foreign and domestic policy is a reaction to the perceived Western influence and rooted in a desire to preserve national autonomy, the United States' domestic and international agenda is to create a stable global order designed to protect free trade and liberal values. The goal of American foreign policy is to create an international marketplace governed by Enlightenment principles such as the autonomy and equality of the individual. The desire to create a liberal world order is a reaction to the chaos created by the First and Second World Wars that devastated Europe. Henry R. Luce posited

that American policymakers had a duty to develop a system of organization for the global community. According to Luce, there are four facts that define world politics:

First, our world of 2,000,000,000 human beings is for the first time in history one world, fundamentally indivisible. Second, modern man hates war and feels intuitively that, in its present scale and frequency, it may even be fatal to his species. Third: our world, again for the first time in human history, is capable of producing all the material needs of the human family. Fourth, the world of the 20th century, if it is to come to life in any nobility of health and vigor, must be to a significant degree an American century (Luce, 1999, 167-168).

American foreign policy from the 1940's onwards has been driven by the goal Luce described of creating a stable international community united by the principles of free trade and liberal democracy. After World War II and the defeat of Fascism, the next 40 years would be defined by the struggle between the liberal democratic capitalism of the United States and the Marxist Leninism of the Soviet Union to determine the principles that would organize the international community. The United States won the Cold War, and as a result, liberal democracy would be the ideological foundation for an increasingly small world.

Political philosopher Francis Fukuyama speculated that the victory of the United States over the Soviet Union was not merely the triumph of one nation over another. Instead, the United States victory during the Cold War represented the triumph of liberal democracy, which "may constitute the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the final form of human government and as such constituted the end of history" (Fukuyama, 1992:xi). American foreign and domestic policy since the end of the Cold War is driven by an effort to universalize liberal democracy.

The Clinton administration's military intervention in the Balkan conflict was motivated by a desire to protect democratic norms of pluralism and tolerance. The Bush administrations invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan was motivated by a desire to impose liberal democracy in the Middle East, in addition to concerns about weapons of mass destruction and a desire to project American power in the Middle East. The desire to bring about the "End of History" was the motivating factor for liberal hawks in the Obama administration such as

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and U.N. Ambassador Samantha Power. For the supposed ideological differences between the Obama and Bush II administrations, their foreign policies were remarkably similar. The foreign policy of the Bush II and Obama eras were driven by a belief that “God has planted in every human heart the desire to live in freedom. And even when that desire is crushed by tyranny for decades, it will rise again” (Bush, 2002).

Commitment to building a liberal democratic world order was the driving ambition of American foreign policy from the end of World War II. This commitment has been thrown into question by the election of Donald Trump to the Presidency of the United States. Donald Trump ran on a nationalistic, America First platform, which emphasized repairing relations with Russia, forcing NATO allies to pay for American protection, and staying out of Middle Eastern conflicts. It is debatable how much power Trump has to change the course of American foreign policy radically. The constitution and more than two centuries of legal precedent grant the executive branch a broad leeway when determining American foreign policy. Still, Congress, the courts, and the vast bureaucracy which administers the policies of the Executive branch have considerable influence on the ability of the President to implement his foreign policy agenda. It remains an open question as to whether or not the President will be able to apply his nationalistic foreign policy.

2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The goal of this thesis is to analyse five policy categories in the United States and Iran. They include the theoretical grounding of American and Iranian foreign policies, the policies of the United States and Iran on terrorism, the issue of weapons of mass destruction, economic development in the United States and Iran, and Energy policy in the United States and Iran. Each of these five categories will be analysed from a historical and theoretical framework to get a comprehensive understanding of these issues.

2.1 The Foreign Policies of the United States and Iran

This thesis seeks to understand the foreign policies of the United States and Iran. To understand this, one must comprehend the factors that drive and shape a nation's foreign policy. These factors include the history and culture of each country in question, the dominant religious and philosophical perspectives of each state and the strategic interests of the United States and Iran. Only by having a clear understanding of each element can one hope to understand why each nation behaves in a particular manner.

This thesis hypothesizes that the foreign policy of the United States is driven by a combination of commitment to the ideology of liberal democracy, and the desire to expand its power. It has been the goal of the United States policymakers since the Second World War to create a world order governed by liberal principles. The Cold War between Russia and the United States has its roots in the struggle of each nation to make its ideology the dominant ideology of the international community. After the Cold War, the United States of America began the process of creating a liberal democratic world order. In this process, it attempted to impose this ideology upon the few remaining regions of the world that did not accept the principles of the Enlightenment. The Middle East was the prime target for this campaign of liberalization. Iraq, Iran, and North Korea were labelled part of the "axis of evil" (2002 State of the Union).

These three regimes shared little in common, Iraq was a secular, Ba'athist regime, Iran is a theocracy, and North Korea is one of the few surviving Marxist Leninist nations. The only trait shared by these three nations was their resistance to liberal democratic principles and the power of the United States.

Iranian foreign policy is guided by the principle of maintaining Iran's independence and growing as a regional power in the Middle East. Iran started down the path of modernization under the regime of Shah Reza Pahlavi. The Shah was perceived as a puppet of the United States and Britain because he overthrew the democratically elected government of Mohammad Mossaddegh, the prime minister of Iran. After obtaining power, the Shah engaged in a campaign of modernization known as the "White Revolution." The White Revolution was a campaign that included giving women the right to vote and divorce, secular national education, and land reform (Abrahamian, 2008:131-139).

The Shah sought to protect Iran through modernization, in part in emulation of the model of Ataturk, who preserved the independence of Turkey through becoming a secular, modern regime in the European model. Iran, like most of the developing world, was a pawn in the struggle between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. Because Iran shared borders with the Soviet Union, it was an existential threat, and the Shah chose to ally Iran with the British and Americans during the Cold War. This alliance initially served the Shah well, as the CIA supported the coup to supplant Mossaddegh, who nationalized oil companies owned by the British. The Shah's White Revolution significantly increased the material prosperity of Iran. The program of liberal reforms dramatically increased literacy rates, improved the infrastructure of the nation, and promoted economic growth. The fatal flaw of the program was the perception that it was a foreign program that disrespected the tenets of Shia Islam. This perception undermined the legitimacy of the Shah and culminated in the Iranian Revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini and the revolutionaries established a theocratic government designed to promote Shia social conservatism domestically and advocated a policy of isolation and resistance to the West. The goal of Iranian foreign policy has been to maintain the sovereignty of Iran,

which is expressed through a rigid form of Shia Islam, and to grow as a regional power.

2.2 Terrorism policies of the United States and Iran

Both the United States and Iran share a common interest in suppressing radical Sunni terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and ISIS. The organizations that promote terrorism in the United States and Western Europe are almost exclusively Sunni in origin. Al Qaeda and ISIS are both motivated by a radical form of Sunni Islam. These organizations wish to revive the Caliphate, a type of Islamic government, which united the majority of the Middle East under the Ottoman Empire.

While the 9/11 and a score of other terrorist attacks in the United States and Western Europe underscore the importance of combatting radical Sunni terrorism by the United States, the state of Iran shares an equally pressing interest in suppressing Sunni radicalism. The Iranian nation is founded on Shia Islam, which is regarded as a heresy by Sunni militant organizations such as Al Qaeda and ISIS. It is thus in the interests of Iran to work to limit the power and growth of these organizations.

Iran has supported Shia terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah and has aided Syrian dictator Bashar Al-Assad. While Shia terrorism is a threat to Israel and Saudi Arabia, it has not been a genuine threat to United States or Western Europe since the mid-1970s. Unlike Sunni organizations seeking to install a radical theocratic regime that encompasses the entire Middle East, and frequently engages in terrorist activities in the West, Shia organizations tend to be limited in nature and confined to the region.

2.3 Weapons of Mass Destruction

It is in the national interest of the United States to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. That being said, the United States should consider the destabilizing effect of regime change when deciding to intervene in the region. It should also take into account the reliability of sources providing information on the Iranian weapons program. During the 2003 invasion of Iraq,

much of the intelligence was provided by Iraqi dissidents such as Ahmed Chalabi who had a personal interest in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Policymakers should carefully vet sources of data, taking into account the biases and interests of those providing the information. The overthrowing of the secular regimes of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi created a state of chaos in the region, which has spilled over into Western Europe via the refugee crisis. Because of this fact, the United States should be hesitant to take military action against the Iranian regime.

2.4 Economic Development

The United States has pursued a neoliberal economic policy that promotes low tax rates and free trade. These neoliberal policies created high growth in the tech and consumer goods sectors at the expense of American manufacturing. The election of Donald Trump could fundamentally change the economic policies of the United States. Donald Trump ran on a protectionist, neo-mercantilist platform. If Trump were successful in implementing his economic agenda, the manufacturing sector would see a surge of growth, though this could be offset by the rise in prices of consumer goods.

Iran relies primarily on revenue from selling oil. Until quite recently, this was restricted by sanctions imposed by the United Nations. The Obama administration arranged a deal which allowed Iran to continue developing nuclear energy in exchange for pledging not to create a nuclear capability. As a result of this deal, Iran received a massive influx of capital, and a variety of sanctions were repealed. The Trump administration has pledged to cancel the Iran deal, which could negatively impact the Iranian economy.

2.5 Energy

The United States is mostly self-sufficient when it comes to energy. It has vast reserves of coal, natural gas, and oil, which have allowed it to become less dependent on oil imports from Canada and the Middle East. The United States has developed new technologies such as fracking and extracting oil from sand and shale deposits that allow it to maximize output with available resources.

The Trump administrations pro-oil exploration policies will further enhance United States' self-sufficiency.

Iran has significant reserves of oil. It is one of the largest exporters of oil in the world (Iran Facts and Figures OPEC, 2018). Iran also has substantial reserves of natural gas (Iran Facts and Figures OPEC, 2018). The recent removal of the sanctions on the export of Iranian oil has substantially increased the already lucrative Iranian oil and natural gas industries. Renewed sanctions would have a devastating effect on the Iranian economy. To increase the amount of oil available for export, Iran has begun developing nuclear power.

2.6 Literature Review

The primary sources used to provide information about the United States will be Henry R. Luce's article (1999) "The American Century," Francis Fukuyama's (1992) *The End of History and the Last Man*, and Michael Scheuer's (2008) book *Marching Towards Hell: America and Islam after Iraq*. Henry R. Luce's "The American Century" is invaluable to understand American foreign policy. The essay calls for the creation of a liberal world order in which United States is the dominant power. Luce believes that the tragedies of the First and Second World War can only be prevented by the creation of an international system organized around liberal, democratic principles.

Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man* is essential reading for understanding the foreign policy of the Clinton, Bush II, and Obama administrations. Fukuyama asserts that the American victory during the Cold War created a permanent liberal democratic paradigm. His thesis is that liberal democracy "may constitute the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the final form of human government and as such constituted the end of history" (Fukuyama, 1992:xi). The idea that there was an unstoppable tide of liberalism sweeping aside autocracy was the justification provided by President Bush and Obama for their intervention in the Middle East and impacted both administration's policies towards Iran.

Michael Scheuer's (2008) book *Marching Towards Hell: America and Islam After Iraq* is a scathing critique of the neo-conservative foreign policy of the

Bush era. As a CIA analyst who headed the Bin Laden unit, Scheuer serves a sharp counterpoint to the optimism of Luce and Fukuyama. Scheuer's advocacy of a restrained foreign policy foreshadows President Trump's campaign promises to avoid intervention in the Middle East. Scheuer's work is useful both for his experience in the CIA, and his alternative perspective about the role of American power.

The books that will provide much of the data for Iran are Ervand Abrahamian's (2008) *A History of Modern Iran*, Sydney Nettleton Fisher and William Ochsenwald's (1990) *The Middle East A History*, and Ray Takeyh's (2009) *Guardians of the Revolution Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs*. Abrahamian's book provides a thorough historical and political analysis of Iran. To understand a nation's foreign policy, one must understand its history and culture. Abrahamian's book offers a nuanced and objective account of Iranian history during the twentieth century. Of particular use to the current reader is his section on the reign of Shah Reza Pahlavi and the Iranian Revolution.

Fisher and Ochsenwald's (1990) *The Middle East A History* is used to provide general information about the Middle East so that the reader can have a thorough understanding of Iran's geopolitical situation. The text is also useful for providing insight into Shia Islam, the dominant religion of Iran. It is impossible to understand Iranian history without an understanding of Shia Islam. Iran's Shia background also strongly impacts how it is perceived by other powers in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

Ray Takeyh's (2009) *Guardians of the Revolution Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs* is useful for the insight it gives the reader about Iranian foreign policy after the Revolution. Takeyh delivers a nuanced description of the factions and leaders that shaped Iranian foreign policy after the Revolution. He breaks Iranian foreign policy down to four stages: the Revolutionary period, the pragmatic period, the reformist period, and the Reactionary period dominated by hardliners such as Ahmadinejad and Khamenei.

Supplementary materials for both the United States and Iran comes from respected, scholarly sources such as *Foreign Affairs*, and *The National Interest*. Mainstream sources such as the Washington Post, New York Times, and the British Broadcasting Corporation will be used for information about Iran and

the United States during the recent past. This combination of books from experts on American and Iranian foreign policy and history, academic journals, and mainstream, respected media outlets will provide the reader with a detailed and accurate description of Iranian and American relations.

This thesis claims that it is not in the interests of the United States to pursue a policy of regime change in Iran. United States policymakers do not have definitive evidence that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. Many of the sources purporting that Iran is developing an atomic bomb come from nations and actors which have a vested interest in overthrowing Iran's theocratic regime. Toppling the Iranian government would take substantial resources, and would destabilize the region. There is a considerable possibility that such a move would be opposed by Russia and China.

The United States should fundamentally re-evaluate its relationship with Iran. Iran does not promote terrorism in the United States or Western Europe. Terrorism in the West is mainly the product of Sunni radical organizations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS. These organizations often have the backing of Sunni powers. The United States should make it in the interests of these powers to cease funding radical Sunni terrorist organizations that destabilize the Middle East and commit terrorist acts in the United States and Western Europe.

3. DIMENSIONS OF USA AND IRAN RELATION

3.1 Theoretical Explanation Of American And Iranian Foreign Policy

3.1.1 America: From Isolationism to a World Power

United States was not always a superpower. In the beginning, American foreign policy was geared towards expanding its territory and keeping rival European powers out of North America. The Monroe doctrine guided American foreign policy from its founding until the end of the 19th century (Sexton, 2011:3-13). The Monroe Doctrine declared, attempts by European powers to intervene in the affairs of the New World would be looked upon as an unfriendly act” (Lerner et al., 1998:787). The policy of the United States was thus to acquire as much territory as possible, to become a nation which spanned “from sea to shining sea”¹.

The first step in this process was the Louisiana Purchase, which doubled the territory of the United States and gave it access to a port in the Gulf of Mexico, New Orleans. It created vast regions to explore and settle. This frontier provided Americans with the opportunity to create a new life. The frontier brought with it the promise of social mobility. The next step in the process was the purchase of Florida from the Spanish government. The Louisiana purchase and the acquisition of Florida eliminated the Spanish and French presence on the North American continent.

The next step in the process of Manifest destiny² was the acquisition of the American Southwest. United States acquired what would later become the Southwestern United States during the Mexican-American war. After achieving independence from Spain during the Mexican Revolution, Mexico set out to populate the future states of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California. To accomplish this end, they allowed the immigration of American settlers on the

¹ . It is a famous American song.

² . It means ,they want to control the entire region.

condition that they convert to Catholicism and pledge loyalty to the government of Mexico.

The American settlers in Texas soon began to assert their independence from Mexican rule. They ignored the injunctions to abandon their Protestant faith and prohibitions on slavery. Santa Ana and the Mexican government attempted to enforce the American settlers to abide by the laws of Mexico. The American colonists won the Texas War for Independence. Texas became an independent, sovereign state. It soon joined the Union, which increased tensions between the United States and Mexico.

Border skirmishes led to the Mexican-American War between Mexico and the United States. Mexico was defeated, and as part of the peace settlement lost what would become the Southwestern United States. The United States now legally owned the majority of the territories that would become the Continental United States. Serious efforts to settle the Southwest would begin after the American Civil War. After the Civil War, the United States began to colonize the Western United States aggressively.

The post-Civil War expansion led to the Indian Wars. Native Americans were offered the choice to move to reservations or to be considered enemies of the United States government. The United States government began a systematic effort to force Native Americans to move to reservations. This effort started with a campaign to exterminate the primary food source of the Native Americans, the buffalo. The Native Americans fought bravely but were defeated by the United States military. They could not match the technological capabilities of the United States. Tribes, which would not relocate, were exterminated or fled to Canada. As a result, by the 1890s America was settled.

United States had achieved its goal of becoming a continental empire, but this brought new questions. According to historian Frederick Jackson Turner, the frontier formed and shaped the American psyche. According to Turner, American history had been defined by “the colonization of the Great West. The existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward explain American development” (Turner, 2007:1). The frontier was a place of renewal of “perennial rebirth” (Turner,

2007:2). The loss of the frontier created an existential crisis. A new goal was required for American foreign policy.

The void left by the frontier was soon filled by becoming a world power. United States abandoned its reticence to be a power player on the world stage. It departed from the policy of isolationism recommended by President Washington in his Farewell address as, “our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.” (Washington, 2008). The United States began the process of transitioning from a regional power to an international power player with the Spanish - American War.

The Spanish - American War marked United states’ entry into the world stage as a significant power. The War was fought between Spain and the United States over the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine. Contemporary historical accounts indicate that Spain more than likely had nothing to do with the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine. The conflict had its roots in the desire of the American policymakers to expand the American sphere of influence and to drive a European power, Spain, out of the Caribbean. Supporters of the Spanish American War such as future President Theodore Roosevelt saw the war as an opportunity to “score the first great triumph of a world movement” (Bradley, 2009:ch. 3).

The Spanish American War resulted in the defeat of Spain in Cuba and the Philippines. The United States took permanent possession of Guantanamo Bay, creating a naval base with which it could project power in the region. The Cubans were allowed self-government, but United States would have significant influence over Cuban politics. United States directly controlled the Philippines, which would not be granted independence until after the Second World War. The expansion was justified by claims that American rule would bring civilization to the colonized. Humanitarian justifications for American intervention would become a staple of American foreign policy from the twentieth century and onwards. With its victory in the Spanish-American War, United States drove out the last significant European power from its sphere of influence, and with the acquisition of the Philippines became a power player in Asia.

The United States continued its advance on the world stage with its intervention in the First World War. World War I is in many ways the defining event of the

twentieth century. The First World War directly led to the Bolshevik Revolution, the fall of the concert of Europe established by Metternich, and Europe's loss of faith in itself. United States waited until 1917 to intervene and played a decisive role in ensuring an Allied victory in the conflict. Initially hesitant to join the war effort, United States would cement its status as a world power both on the battlefield and in the shaping of the post-war order.

United States played a role in shaping what would become the Versailles Treaty. Woodrow Wilson favored a lenient settlement with Germany and the creation of a League of Nations. The League of Nations would be guided by the principle of "self-determination" (MacMillan, 2002:xxix). Wilson's idea of self-determination was the principle that the international order should protect "Autonomous development, the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government, the rights and liberties of small nations, a world made safe for every peace-loving nation, which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions" (MacMillan, 2002:11). Wilson proposed the creation of an international body known as the League of Nations to protect these principles. Under Wilson's vision, the League would include defeated Germany and would operate under the policy of collective security. If one member of the league were attacked, the others would be duty-bound to defend it.

Wilson's vision for the creation of a liberal world order enforced by a League of Nations was not the result of the treaty negotiations at Versailles. Instead, a punitive settlement was imposed on Germany. Its military was significantly reduced in size; it was forced to accept full responsibility for the war, and Germany was saddled with massive war debt. The League of Nations was created but lacked the powers, which Wilson envisioned. Wilson's defeat was due to a combination of factors, including his ill health, the opposition of the Senate to the League of Nations, and the bitterness of the Allied powers that had suffered four years of bloody conflict. Wilson's successors would favor a more isolationist stance, which emphasized American sovereignty rather than international cooperation.

After experiencing the carnage of the First World War, and the limited success in negotiations at the Versailles conference, the American public favored a

return to non-interventionist foreign policy. The Republican administrations of Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover endorsed a foreign policy that emphasized the sovereignty of the United States and sought to escape involvement in European politics. The Great Depression re-enforced this isolationist mood.

Americans during the 1930s were strongly opposed to intervening in European affairs. This isolationist sentiment did not decrease with the rise of Nazism in Germany and Fascism in Italy. During his 1940 campaign, Franklin Delano Roosevelt promised to keep United States out of World War II. While the popular sentiment was in favour of neutrality during the Second World War, there was a growing consensus among the American foreign policy establishment that war was unavoidable. Henry R. Luce most eloquently expressed this sentiment in his 1941 editorial entitled "The American Century." In the article, Luce forcefully argues for the intervention of the United States on the side of the Allies, and the creation of a liberal world order.

Luce envisioned an international system that protected individual liberty, free trade, and collective security. The power of the United States would defend this system. Luce contended that the United States must become "the principal guarantor of the freedom of the seas" and airways, and as the "leader of world trade" (White, 1992:108). In the article, Luce strongly refutes common isolationist talking points. He rejects the assertion that American intervention in the conflict would make United States a British pawn, contending that "In any sort of partnership with the British Empire, Great Britain is perfectly willing that the United States should assume the role of senior partner" (Luce, 1999:164).

Luce's goal was not merely the defeat of Fascism in Europe and Japanese imperialism in Asia, but the creation of an international system that would prevent future world wars. Luce believed that the great powers of the world must create a global system rooted in liberal values. According to Luce, "Freedom requires and will require a greater living space than Tyranny. Peace cannot endure unless it prevails over a very large part of the world. Justice will come near to losing all meaning in the minds of men unless Justice can have approximately the same fundamental meanings in many lands and among many

peoples” (Luce, 1999:168). What Luce proposes in his article is nothing short of the creation of an international order that universalized the principles of the Enlightenment. Luce’s ideas would significantly influence the nature of the postwar order.

3.1.2 The Cold War

After the end of World War II, there were two great powers left on the world stage, the United States and the Soviet Union. The European powers such as Great Britain, France, and Germany were devastated by the war; most of their infrastructure and industry was destroyed in the conflict. The international order was shaped by the competition of these two powers to determine whether there would be an American or Soviet world order. The struggle between the United States and Russia was not merely a contest for resources and territory; it was an ideological contest. The stakes were not just economic or strategic, what would be determined was the dominant ideology of the global marketplace.

Political scientist Philip Bobbit contends that the Cold War was part of a long war fought over “a fundamental constitutional question: which sort of nation-state – communist, fascist, or parliamentary- would lay claim to the legitimacy enjoyed by the imperial state-nations of the nineteenth century” (Bobbit, 2003:19). Fascism was eliminated from the running by the Allied victory during the Second World War. The ideology to shape the world order would be either the liberal democratic capitalism of the United States or the authoritarian communism of the Soviet Union.

The United Nations, the international body, created after the Second World War, recognized this fact and was structured to create stability, appointing both the United States and Soviet Union as permanent members of the Security Council. This attempt to defuse the situation was unsuccessful. Nuclear weapons made the direct conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States suicidal. As a result, the post-war period was defined by a series of proxy wars fought in the developing world. These conflicts include the Korean, and Vietnam wars, and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union lost the Cold War due to internal pressures rather than direct actions by the United States. Communism was economically inefficient. The

planned economy of the Soviet Union could not match the free market economies of the United States and Western Europe in productivity or output. This inefficiency resulted in constant shortages of consumer goods and food, weakening the morale of the Soviet population. The force of nationalism was also a critical factor in the breakup of the Soviet Union. The collection of nations that comprised the Warsaw Pact began to assert their independence, demanding the right to self-government.

As a result of internal pressures Communism collapsed in the Soviet Union. The Warsaw Pact was dissolved, and Russia became a liberal democracy. The United States had triumphed in its struggle with the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War and the fall of Communism, the United States became the world's sole superpower. It had almost complete freedom to determine the nature of the global political order. The dominance of the United States, and by extension the ideology of liberal democracy, constituted what political philosopher Francis Fukuyama termed "The End of History."

3.1.3 The Idea of the "End of History" and the United States Policy in the Middle East

In his book, *The End of History and the Last Man*, political philosopher Francis Fukuyama argues that victory of liberal democracy over Communism "may constitute the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the final form of human government and as such constituted the end of history" (Fukuyama, 1992:xi). According to Fukuyama, Soviet Communism collapsed due to internal contradictions within the ideology. In this case, Communism's promise to create an egalitarian, prosperous society was marred with the reality poverty, repression, and a police state. According to Fukuyama, liberal democracy was free from these internal contradictions. Fukuyama asserts, "liberal democracy remains the only coherent political aspiration that spans different regions and cultures around the globe" (Fukuyama, 1992:xiii).

Fukuyama's thesis is based upon his interpretation of the works of philosopher Alexandre Kojève. Kojève asserted that history is defined by the struggle for recognition. This struggle culminates in the creation of the "homogeneous State, the specific differences of class, race, and so on are overcome...this recognition

is truly universal, for, by definition, the State embraces the whole of the human race” (Kojeve, 1980:237). The victory of the United States during the Cold War means that it will be the foundation for what Kojeve and Fukuyama describe as the “universal homogeneous state.” Liberal democracy’s ability to satisfy all human desires “completes History” (Kojeve, 1980:258). Fukuyama contends that liberal democracy satisfies both the human desire for recognition with its respect for individual liberty and equality, and by providing material abundance through industrialism and free market capitalism.

These ideas filtered down from academia into politics. The indirect influence of thinkers like Luce, Kojeve, and Fukuyama are readily apparent in the speeches of American presidents from 1991 onwards. When justifying American intervention in the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait in his 1991 State of the Union address, President Bush asserted that United States had the responsibility to create “a new world order, where brutality will go unrewarded, and aggression will meet collective resistance” (Bush Sr., 1991). President Bush Sr. was not interested in merely stopping the aggression of Saddam Hussein; rather he intended to create an international system where “diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind - peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law” (Bush Sr., 1991). Echoing Luce’s call for the establishment of an international order governed by liberal principles protected by American power, Bush Sr. asserts that “the United States bears a major share of leadership in this effort. Among the nations of the world, only the United States of America has both the moral standing and the means to back it up.” (Bush Sr., 1991). These ideas, rooted in the thoughts of Luce, Kojeve, and Fukuyama, would guide American foreign policy from 1990’s until 2016.

President Bush Sr’s successor, Bill Clinton showed the same commitment to creating a “new world order.” When justifying the creation of the North American Free Trade Union, President Clinton framed the issue in these terms, “we could not afford to turn away from our leadership responsibilities and our constructive involvement in the world” (Clinton, 1993). NAFTA was part of creating an economically interdependent world in which “The United States must seek nothing less than a new trading system that benefits all nations

through robust commerce” (Clinton, 1993). The Clinton administration worked to create an international order organized around commerce and liberal values envisioned by Luce, Kojeve, and Fukuyama. Clinton’s contribution to this system was primarily economic; his administration created the North American Free Trade Agreement, liberalized China trade policy, and presided over China’s admission into the World Trade Organization.

Clinton did not hesitate to use force to uphold international norms against aggression. While Clinton was less assertive in his application of military force to defend liberal values than President Bush Sr., Bush Jr., or Obama, he was willing to commit American troops when he perceived a threat to international stability. During the 1999 Kosovo crisis, President Clinton used American airpower to stop what he understood to be a massacre of ethnic Albanians by Serbian forces. When justifying this military action in his 1999 speech defending the military operation, Clinton framed intervention in these terms “We act to prevent a wider war, to defuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe, that has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results” (Gellman, 1999).

George W. Bush initially desired to scale back United States’ commitment to maintaining the liberal world order. Bush Jr. campaigned on the promise to conduct a “humble foreign policy” (Joyner, 2012). Bush reflected Republican scepticism to American interventionism, which developed during the Clinton years. Events soon changed this course of action. The 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon caused President Bush to re-evaluate the merits of his “humble foreign policy.” President Bush gave the Taliban in Afghanistan an ultimatum, to hand over Osama Bin Laden to United States custody, or face invasion.

The invasion of Afghanistan was a direct response to the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center. United States quickly invaded and deposed the Taliban regime with the assistance of the Northern Alliance. Osama Bin Laden escaped to Pakistan at some point during the conflict. Wanting to prevent Afghanistan from falling into the hands of the Taliban, President Bush committed American forces to constructing a democratic government in Afghanistan. The

Afghanistan invasion thus marked a transition in favor of nation-building in the Middle East.

While the war in Afghanistan was justified as a response to the terrorist's attacks of September 11, President Bush believed that American security could only be ensured by democratizing the Middle East. President Bush used this logic to justify invading Iraq. The President claimed that the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq would create an unstoppable tide of democracy in the region. President Bush's optimism was rooted in the idea of the "End of History" championed by Fukuyama. Secular authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and radical Sunni terrorist organizations were characterized as backward-looking reactionaries futilely trying to resist the historical trend towards democracy.

Bush justified the Iraq war on these ideological grounds, and with the claim that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. The WMD angle will be explored in further detail in Chapter Three. While the WMD threat is presented to the public, and possibly the President, to explain the necessity of the Second Gulf War, the real driving force for the invasion of Iraq was the goal of democratizing the Middle East. The Bush Administration's foreign policy was in large part determined by a school of thinkers called the neoconservatives. Neoconservatives favoured the creation of a "benevolent global hegemony" (Dorrien, 2004). Officials influenced by neoconservative ideas in the administration include Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, David Frum, and John Bolton. These neoconservative officials were influenced by the ideas of the philosopher Leo Strauss, Allan Bloom, and Francis Fukuyama. Thus Fukuyama's conception of the "End of History" played a role in the invasion of Iraq.

The idea that American troops would be "greeted as liberators" and Iraq would become a liberal democracy is deeply rooted in the belief that there is a universal longing for liberal democracy championed by Fukuyama. Only this conception of human nature and the course of history would make policymakers believe that Iraq would become a pluralistic democracy rather than something resembling a Hobbesian state of nature after the removal of the only force stabilizing the nation. Iraq was an artificial nation constructed as a result of the

break up of the Ottoman Empire and the division of the Middle East between the British and the French. It was divided among three ethnic groups, the Sunni minority, the Shia majority, and the Kurds, all of which viewed each other with suspicion and hostility. There was nothing in the historical development of Iraq that indicates openness to liberal institutions and values. Instead of the predicted flowering of democracy, the nation of Iraq was destabilized, and this instability spread throughout the region. As of today, the result of the invasion of Iraq was the creation of the Islamic State, which developed in the power vacuum left behind by Saddam Hussein, with the countervailing force of Shia radicals like Moqtada Al-Sadr, who many believe to be the most influential figure in Iraqi politics (Calamur, 2018).

The war in Iraq proved to be deeply unpopular with voters. When justifying the war during his 2006 State of the Union address, President Bush contended that American security was dependent on ending “tyranny in our world.” (State of the Union Address by the President 2006). In his speech, he passionately defended Lucy and Fukuyama’s idea of a liberal order and rejected isolationism “America rejects the false comfort of isolationism. We are the nation that saved liberty in Europe” (State of the Union Address by the President 2006). President Bush’s 2006 State of the Union speech marks the apex of the power of the idea of creating an international order based upon liberal principle and free trade. The catastrophic failure of the Iraq war undermined the legitimacy of this idea among the American public, and a significant cross-section of foreign policy analysts. As a result of the unpopularity of the Iraq war, the Republican Party lost the House and Senate during the 2006 midterms, and Barack Obama defeated John McCain during the 2008 Presidential election.

President Obama maintained the American commitment to creating a liberal international order but preferred a policy of diplomacy and multilateralism compared to the unilateralist policies of the Bush administration. President Obama continued the Bush administration’s policy of attempting to democratize the Middle East but did not deploy ground troops in pursuit of this goal. Obama provided support for efforts to overthrow the regime of Muammar Gaddafi, which created a power vacuum in North Africa, and contributed to the refugee crisis. The Obama administration also supported efforts to overthrow the secular

authoritarian regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad by providing arms to the Syrian rebels.

President Obama attempted to begin the process of normalizing American relations with Iran. He offered to repeal the sanctions placed on Iran by the United States, and release funds held by these restrictions in exchange for a commitment to ending its nuclear program. President Obama and Iran successfully negotiated the deal. In his speech promoting the Iran Deal, President Obama framed the Iran Deal as “a peaceful, diplomatic resolution of the issue” (The White House, 2015). Thus the Obama administration adhered to the vision of United States having a duty to create an international order centered around liberal values envisioned by Luce. This consensus in favor of a global system rooted in the ideas of the Enlightenment was called into question by the election of President Donald Trump, who favored a nationalist foreign policy.

Overthrowing the secular authoritarian regimes of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, and undermining Assad’s Ba’athist regime created a power vacuum in the region. This power vacuum was filled by radical Sunni organizations such as ISIS. ISIS emerged out of the chaos of post-invasion Iraq and was supported by the Sunni population as a counterbalancing force to the Shia majority of the nation. It spread into Syria to aid the Sunni majority of Syria in overthrowing the secular, nationalist regime of Bashar Assad. The brutality of ISIS and the chaos after the regime change caused a refugee crisis as millions of refugees fled the Middle East and Africa to affluent Western Europe.

With the refugee crisis, the instability created by the regime change spread to Western Europe. It played an essential role in the United Kingdom’s electorate voting in favor of Brexit and led to the rise of popularity of right-wing populist movements in Italy, France, Hungary, and Austria. The neoliberal policies of George H.W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama were viewed with growing scepticism by a large segment of the American electorate. The chaos caused by unchecked immigration and de-industrialization created the environment in which Donald Trump could be elected. The idea of an interconnected international liberal world order upheld by Luce and Fukuyama,

and supported by four Presidents increasingly lost legitimacy in United States and Western Europe.

The election of Donald Trump, the re-election of Viktor Orban in Hungary, Brexit, the election of Sebastian Kurz as chancellor of Austria, the election of a right-wing coalition government in Italy, and the electoral success of Marine Le Pen in France demonstrate a loss of confidence in neoliberalism. The American foreign policy consensus of the last 70 years and the ideas that provided its theoretical grounding have become open to question. It is an open question if Donald Trump's nationalism is a paradigm shift or a transient expression of discontent with the status quo. The rise of China, with its authoritarian brand of capitalism, as a superpower, and the dislocation produced by the application of neoliberal economic and immigration policies in United States and Western Europe, and the utter failure of efforts to democratize the Middle East make the assertion that "history has ended" highly questionable.

3.1.4 The Theoretical Grounding of Iranian Foreign Policy

The central concern of Iranian foreign policy for the last 300 years is maintaining the country's sovereignty. To understand why Iranian foreign policy is dominated by the desire to retain its autonomy requires the reader to understand the historical forces that have shaped Iranian development. Iran has a history dating back thousands of years. The nation that would become Iran has historically been a power player in the region. The Persian Empire spread over much of the Middle East and was a severe threat to the ancient Greek city-states. The Persian Empire's power began to wane when the invasion of Greece was thwarted by an alliance between Athens and Sparta. The Persian Empire was conquered by the Greek forces of Alexander the Great, and portions of what was the Persian Empire came to be owned by Rome after the Roman conquest of Greece. Persia reasserted its independence and became a regional power with the rise of the Sassanid Empire.

The Sassanid Empire competed with the Roman Empire, and the Byzantines for influence in the region until they were swept aside during the Arab conquests of the 7th century A.D. The Arab conquest was the defining event for what would become the nation of Iran. Until the Arab conquest, the dominant faith in what

would become Iran was Zoroastrianism. The Arab invaders changed that by introducing the religion that motivated their expansion, Islam. Islam defined and shaped the religion and culture of the nation of Iran. Islam, founded by the Prophet Muhammad, holds that there is only one God, Allah and that Mohammad is its prophet. Iran permanently adopted Islam, but chose a version suited to their needs, and preserved their national independence and uniqueness.

Islam is not monolithic; like Christianity, it has several sects. The two dominant schools of Islam are Sunni Islam and Shia Islam. Sunni Islam believes that the Caliph, the ruler of the Islamic empire after Muhammad, should be elected, while Shia Islam holds that a descendant of the Prophet should be Caliph (Fisher and Ochsenswald, 1990:93-97). The majority of the Islamic world adheres to Sunni Islam. Shia Islam is predominant in Iran, Syria, and Iraq. Iranian support for Shia Islam over the dominant Sunni Islam adhered to the majority of its Arab neighbours can be interpreted as a way to preserve its autonomy.

One prominent theological difference between Sunni and Shia Islam is that Sunni Islam lacks a clerical class, while Shia Islam has an influential class of clerics. The Shia Imams in Iran is believed to have a unique ability to interpret the Koran (Fisher and Ochsenswald, 1990:93-97). They have been influential figures in Iranian history and politics, and wield significant power through to the present day.

Iran was ruled by the Caliphs until the Mongol conquest. The Mongols ruled for several hundred years until Iran regained its independence under the Safavid dynasty. The Safavids were instrumental in making Shia Islam the majority religion in Iran; they offered the choice of “conversion to Shiism or death” (Fisher and Ochsenswald, 1990:186). Shia Islam became the defining feature of Iranian cultural and political life. It set Iran apart from their Arab neighbors, and played a role in preserving Iranian independence from the Caliphate, and the Ottoman Empire.

Iran’s foreign policy from the 16th century onwards was driven by a desire to maintain its national independence, first from the Caliphate, then the Ottoman Empire, and later from the West. The Ottoman Empire was the most significant power in the Middle East and the Balkans from its foundation in the 14th century

until its fall after the First World War. The Ottoman Empire was a legitimate threat to Europe; it conquered the Balkans and Greece, and got as far as Vienna before it was halted. From the 18th century onwards, the Ottoman Empire was a declining power. It gradually lost its territories.

Greece and the Balkans achieved independence from Ottoman rule during the 19th century. Still, the Ottomans retained significant power in the Middle East. The downfall of the Ottoman Empire came from its decision to ally with the Central Powers during the First World War. The Central Powers were defeated by the Allies. As part of the Versailles settlement, the Ottoman Empire was divided between the French and the British. While the Ottoman Empire had been a significant competitor to Iran, it also served as a protecting force by keeping the European powers out of the region. Iran would have to adapt or share the fate of the other colonized nations in the area. Only one significant power, other than Iran, was able to maintain its independence, Turkey. Turkey preserved its national independence by becoming a secular, nation-state. Ataturk, the founder of Turkey, created a nation modelled after European nation-states. The Turkish state allowed freedom of religion built a merit-based civil service and protected women's rights.

3.1.5 Iran at the Beginning of the 20th Century

Iran started the twentieth-century as a decentralized monarchy. The Qajar dynasty had ruled Iran since the 19th century. While in theory, they had absolute power, in practice, the power of the monarchy was limited outside of Tehran. Local feudal lords had more practical effect on everyday life in the provinces than the Shah in Tehran. While Iran retained its territorial sovereignty, this grip on power was precarious. Iran had to contend with the Ottoman Empire and Russia. Iran was economically undeveloped; its economy was weaker compared to that of the more advanced Ottoman Empire. The nation of Iran was deeply in debt to the Russian government, and by 1902, it was unable to secure the loans necessary to remain solvent (Fisher and Ochsenswald, 1990:366). Food prices were rising due to a poor harvest and the Russo-Japanese war (Fisher and Ochsenswald, 1990:367). The Qajar monarchy appeared increasingly unable to manage affairs of state, or to contend with a changing balance of power.

The inability of the Qajar monarchy to adapt to the changing international environment bred discontent throughout Iran. A growing cross-section of the population believed that Qajar monarchy was not up to the task of governing. The time was ripe for a revolution. Revolutions occur when a regime is unable to meet the challenges a nation faces. This causes a government to lose legitimacy among the public, and a new ruling group or system of government replaces the old order that cannot meet the challenges of the present. The decentralized and inefficient monarchy could live up to the challenges created by famine, a fiscal crisis, and vigorous international competition. As a result, there was a revolution against the monarchy supported by a broad segment of Iranian society.

Soaring food prices, inflation, and dissatisfaction with the inefficiency of the Qajar monarchy led to a revolution in 1905. The main actors in the revolution were the middle classes and the clerical class (Fisher and Ochsenswald, 1990:367). The Qajar Shah had a stroke as a result of the stress caused by the Revolution. Recognizing the inevitability of change, the Shah called for Parliamentary elections. The first parliament was primarily comprised of members elected from Tehran, and they met during September 1906 to draft a Constitution. After he recovered, the Shah briefly attempted to re-assert his authority but was unable to garner support. The Shah stepped down in favour of his son, and the Constitutional Parliamentary monarchy in the style of the British system of government was adopted.

3.1.6 Constitutional Monarchy

The Constitutional monarchy experienced the same difficulties as the Qajar monarchy that preceded it. The Russians briefly invaded the country during 1912, and this outside pressure was magnified after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The parliamentary government was unable to manage this chaos, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics proved as imperialistic as the Czarist government and the British were keenly interested in adding Iran to their Middle Eastern government. Democracy was unable to meet these challenges in Iran. At one point the British occupied the Southern part of the country, while the Russian occupied the Northern part. This state of humiliation was ended by the rise of Reza Shah, who defeated the Russians and negotiated with the

British. Reza Shah restored the sovereignty of the Iranian state and won widespread support for his bid to become the Shah of Iran.

3.1.7 The Rule of Reza Shah

Reza Pahlavi became Shah of Iran during 1925 as a result of his pivotal role in expelling the Russians from Iran. Apart from the foreign opposition, the Constitutional monarchy was unable to govern largely due to an inability to get lawmakers to agree to make unpopular reforms. This impediment did not handicap Reza Shah's autocratic government. Reza Shah carried out a program of reform to strengthen and unify the Iranian state. While the changes of Reza Shah, and later his son would strengthen and modernize Iran, they were highly unpopular with clerical class, who favored the conservatism of the Qajar dynasty and the constitutional monarchy.

Reza Shah perceived the Shia clerics to be a class that opposed his authority and to the reforms necessary to strengthen Iran. As a result, he moved to limit the power of the clerisy. The Shah limited the ability of Shia clerics to publicly preach, prohibited the Passion play, which is a re-enactment of the martyrdom of Ali and outlawed the wearing of veils (Fisher and Ochsenswald, 1990:466). While these reforms were mostly symbolic, the Shah did not stop with these token measures asserting the authority of the state over the mosque. In a move resembling Henry VIII's seizing the wealth of monasteries, Reza Shah "confiscated many religious properties and endowments, the income from which went to the support of schools, hospitals, state industries, and other enterprises" (Fisher and Ochsenswald, 1990:466). While these moves were good for the health of the Iranian state, they earned the enmity of the clerical class, which depended on the revenue from the confiscated lands.

The Shah worked to unify and modernize Iran; he worked to standardize the language of the country and created educational institutions. Iran is a diverse nation with many religious and ethnic minority groups, the Shah's reforms emphasizing the Persian language and educational opportunity helped develop a sense of unity in the country (Fisher and Ochsenswald, 1990:467). While the Shah promoted education and a common language, he did censor writers who attempted to undermine his authority or advocated religious extremism (Fisher

and Ochsenwald, 1990:467). Given the precarious situation of Iran at the time, threatened by both British and Russian colonialism, one can understand the desire to use whatever means necessary to strengthen the unity and cohesiveness of the nation.

Reza Shah massively improved the infrastructure of the country. He ordered the construction of railways to promote transportation and commerce (Fisher and Ochsenwald, 1990:467). These railways served to connect the nation, making it easier to ship agricultural and commercial goods and helped to create a centralized nation-state. Reza Shah promoted the development of modern agriculture techniques and created public projects such as dams and irrigation systems to increase crop yields (Fisher and Ochsenwald, 1990:467). The Shah also promoted the development of the industrial sector.

The Shah modernized and expanded the Iranian army. He stressed modernization and the adoption of European military tactics and organization (Fisher and Ochsenwald, 1990:468). Reza Shah dramatically increased the material prosperity of Iran and its security. He rapidly developed the country following the model established by Turkey and Ataturk. His one mistake which cost him his throne was his decision to aid the Germans during the Second World War.

3.1.8 The Fall of Reza Shah

Iran officially maintained a policy of neutrality during World War II. Unofficially, Reza Shah favored the Germans, and covertly aided them. The British and the Russians both threatened the sovereignty of the Iranian nation-state, and the Shah hoped that a German victory would enhance the security of Iran. His policy had the opposite effect; the British and the Russians invaded Iran, and used Iran as a base of operations throughout the war. Reza Shah was forced to abdicate his throne in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

3.1.9 The Reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi initially started from a position of weakness after his return to the country. The Iranian parliament returned to power after the Second World War. Due to the improvements of the infrastructure by Reza Shah, Iran

was in a position to have a democratic rule without compromising the security of the nation. The Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossaddegh, continued the policies, which emphasized the independence and economic development of the land. Mossaddegh was a nationalist who believed that the wealth produced by the Iranian oil fields should enrich the Iranian nation rather than foreign corporations. During 1951, the Mossaddegh government nationalized the Iranian oil industry, which was owned by the Anglo-Iranian oil company (Fisher and Ochsenwald, 1990:517). The nationalization of the Iranian oil industry soured relations between Iran and Britain and the United States. As a result, the United States supported a coup against Mossaddegh organized by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. While the coup restored his royal authority, it did so at the price of his legitimacy in the eyes of much of the Iranian public

The Shah, like his father, set out to reform and modernize Iran. The Shah built up “the military, the bureaucracy, and the court patronage system” (Abrahamian, 2008:123). While he was perceived by the Iranian clerical class and supporters of Mossaddegh as a pawn of American and British interests, the Shah merely made the necessary concessions to reality to survive in a hostile international environment. He perceived the Soviet Union to be a more significant threat to Iranian interests than the United States, a reasonable view considering the fact that Iran had been invaded twice by Russia during the 20th century. The Shah believed that Iran’s only chance at maintaining its sovereignty was to adopt a path of modernization similar to that of Turkey, or Iran under the rule of his father.

The Shah began a program known as the “White Revolution” to modernize the Iranian state. The White Revolution was a program that focused on economic development, improving infrastructure, creating an efficient bureaucracy, education, and secularization (Abrahamian, 2008:131-139). The Shah expanded the military, established universal compulsory education, promoted secularism, women’s rights, and land reform. The reforms that made up the White Revolution created economic growth and enhanced the security and unity of the Iranian state. The economic growth and policies promoting industrialism created a new Iranian middle class. The White Revolution benefited the nation as a whole, but there were losers in this program of reform who had a vested interest

in undermining the system. The Shah's inability to provide those segments of Iranian society who lost wealth and prestige as a result of reform would be the cause of his undoing.

While the White Revolution strengthened the nation as a whole, there were significant portions of Iranian society who were damaged by reform. The losers of the White Revolution were the clerical class and feudal landholders. The campaign of secularization and women's rights offended the Imam, a historically influential group with significant influence on Iranian social and political life. The Imams viewed secularization and giving women the right to divorce and vote as heretical, foreign ideas. The distress caused by these reforms was magnified due to the loss of income and prestige that came with the changes of the White Revolution.

Another loser group created by the reforms of the White Revolution were feudal landholders damaged by land reform. Land Reform was necessary to increase agricultural production. It significantly enhanced the efficiency and output of the Iranian farming industry and lowered food prices. The feudal farm owners lost a great deal of land, and the new industries often did not have enough demand for displaced tenants. As a result, these tenants fled to the cities. While the program of industrialization provided jobs for many displaced workers, many led a hand in mouth existence. These conditions created a potentially revolutionary class the theocratic revolutionaries would use as a base of support.

Contrary to popular myth, revolutions do not happen when a population is long accustomed to poverty and hopelessness. Hence the lack of rebellion during the period of the Black Death during the Middle Ages. Instead, revolutions occur when a formerly prosperous class or elite experiences a dramatic reversal of fortune and the ruling body of the country appears unable to address the problems causing the decline. Historian James C. Russell calls this phenomenon "status inconsistency", which is created when a group dramatically loses wealth or influence over a short period or when "achieved status is higher than their attributed status" (Russell, 1994:82-84). The displaced farm workers and clerics fell into the former category, and the emerging middle class fell into the later. Together they would be the foot soldiers of the Iranian Revolution.

During the mid-1970s instability intensified, and the Shah responded by banning all political parties except the Resurgence Party. This move was opposed by the Ayatollah Khomeini, an exiled Imam with great respect among conservative elements of Iranian society. Khomeini pronounced the Resurgence Party to be “Haram (forbidden) on the ground it was designed to destroy not just the bazaars and the farmers but also the whole of Iran and Islam” (Abrahamian, 2008:153). Khomeini’s socially conservative interpretation of Islam captivated both the emerging middle class and those displaced by the reforms of the White Revolution. The Shah attempted to maintain his authority through the use of repression by the state security service, the Savak but was unable to keep his grip on power.

The Iranian Revolution was a theocratic movement designed to restore traditional Shia Islam as the defining feature of Iranian social and political life. The Iranian Revolution’s base of support was a rising middle class dissatisfied with the authoritarianism of the Shah and displaced clerics and the feudal workers who were damaged by the reforms of the White Revolution. Undergirding this was the perception that the Shah was a puppet of United States rather than a true sovereign. These factors led to the collapse of legitimacy of the Shah’s regime. The Shah abdicated in 1979, and the Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile in France. Iran transitioned from a secular monarchy to a theocratic Republic.

3.1.10 Theocratic Rule 1979 – Present

Despite the radical differences in ideologies between the Shah and Khomeini and his successors, the goal of Iranian foreign policy remained consistent, maintaining the sovereignty of Iran. The Shah believed that Iran could continue its independence through modernization and Westernization, whereas Khomeini thought it could be kept only through the creation of a rigidly theocratic regime. Khomeini’s goal was “fusing religion and politics” (Takeyh, 2009:12). Khomeini believed that this could only be achieved through a strict interpretation of Shia Islam, which influenced both domestic and foreign policy. To maintain this, Khomeini created a network of institutions designed to protect theocratic rule and the authority of Shia Islam. A council of clerics was established which could overrule the laws created by the democratically elected

government, and a Revolutionary Guard was formed to enforce adherence to Sharia law.

Internationally, United States rather than the Soviet Union became the primary opponent of Iran. United States was an ally of the Shah, and tensions were increased during the 1979 hostage crisis. This crisis lasted until 1981, when Iran released the hostages, fearing retaliation from the hawkish Reagan administration. During the reign of Khomeini, "Iran's policy toward the United States was defined by an ideological antagonism that largely defied practical considerations." (Takeyh, 2009:58). As a result, United States ended diplomatic relations with Iran and supported Saddam Hussein in his bid to conquer Iran during the Iran/Iraq War during the late 1980s. This status quo would dominate Iranian foreign policy until the death of Ayatollah Khomeini.

After the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Iranian regime became less focused on revolutionary activity at home and abroad, and more concerned with stability. The primary focus of Iranian foreign and domestic policy became to "rehabilitate its war-shattered economy now pressed the Islamic Republic toward a pragmatic redefinition of its national interests." (Takeyh, 2009:111). While there have been ideological differences between the various clerical councils and elected governments which have governed Iran since 1989, the prime goal of Iranian foreign policy has been to maintain its autonomy and act as a regional, rather than hegemonic power, in the Middle East.

Iranian efforts to develop nuclear power can be interpreted as a desire to enhance its status as a regional power and retain its sovereignty. It is unclear as to whether or not Iran is using its nuclear energy program to develop enriched uranium to build a nuclear weapon. Our intelligence sources come from allies who have a vested interest in regime change in Iran and must be regarded with scepticism. The Obama administration's deal with Iran was a historic accomplishment and should only be abandoned if there is legitimate evidence supporting the contention that Iran is not fulfilling its obligations to the treaty. Quitting the agreement could well cause the regime to attempt to develop the weapons. Instead, an international body should be created which is comprised of parties with no conflict of interests that would inhibit their objectivity. Now that historical and theoretical grounding of Iranian and American foreign policy has

been explained, the questions of anti-terrorism, weapons proliferation, and energy policy can be addressed with the proper frame of reference.

3.2 Terrorism: Iran And The United States Antiterrorism Policy

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, the United States' foreign policy is the prevention of terrorist attacks on American soil. During the Bush era, anti-terrorism policies included increased airport security, surveillance of suspected terrorists, and invasion of regimes suspected of harboring terrorists or possessing weapons of mass destruction. The first response to the 9/11 attacks was a national effort to improve airport security. This was done by federalizing the process and the creation of the Transportation Safety Administration

Before the 9/11 attacks, airport security was handled mostly by private contractors. The quality of the security varied depending on airport policy and the diligence of the company providing screening. After the 9/11 hijackers were able to smuggle knives and box cutters on three flights, policymakers realized that a nationwide effort was required to enhance airport screening and security. As a result, Congress passed Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which standardized screening procedures and federalized airport security personnel (Transportation Security Administration Mission). Those flying in the United States were subjected to pre-flight screening to ensure that they were not bringing in weapons or explosives, and to ensure they were not members of a terrorist group. The TSA security screening has become a routine feature of traveling. Opinion is mixed as to the effectiveness of TSA screening. Many believe that TSA screening provides the illusion of enhanced security rather than having an actual impact (Levenson, 2014). Others contend that the TSA provides a valuable service to the American people. For example, Ron Nixon of the New York Times contends that TSA screening, including the "no-fly list" is a valuable safeguard that protects the American people (Nixon, 2018).

The primary response to the threat of terrorism during the Bush years was the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. President Bush believed that it was "better to fight them over there than over here" (Transcript of President Bush's Speech at the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention, 2007). President Bush believed that

it was possible to democratize the Middle East, starting with Iraq and Afghanistan. CIA analyst Michael Scheuer contends that the result was a catastrophic failure largely because “Iraqis had no appreciable experience with a democratic system, and are deeply torn by sectarian differences” (Scheuer, 2008, 144). Scheuer contends that liberal democracy requires historical and institutional support, which is absent in the Middle East (Scheuer, 2008:144). The disastrous results of the Iraq war soured the mood of the American public on intervention in the Middle East. As a result, President Obama adopted a course that emphasized diplomacy and airpower, rather than a commitment of ground troops.

3.2.1 American Antiterrorism efforts over the Last Decade

The most significant terrorist threat for American policymakers over the last decade is an organization known as the Islamic State, commonly abbreviated as ISIS or ISIL. ISIS has its roots in the Second Gulf War. Iraq is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious society comprised of mutually antagonistic groups. Saddam Hussein’s secular, authoritarian regime maintained order and suppressed ethnic and religious conflict through a combination of secularism, nationalism, and brutal suppression of dissent. While Hussein’s methods may strike human rights advocates as excessively harsh, they were the only thing keeping the nation from descending into ethnic conflict and civil war.

Iraq is comprised of three ethnic groups, the Sunni, the Shia, and the Kurds. The majority of the country is Shia and was ruled by a Sunni minority under Saddam Hussein. When Iraq was democratized, the Shia minority took power and shut the Sunni majority out of positions in government. The rise of Shia militia groups, like those held by Moqtada Al-Sadr, made the Sunni population of Iraq supportive of militant Sunni organizations which protected their interests. In this environment of ethnic conflict, ISIS was born.

Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi formed ISIS in 2013. The goal of ISIS is to establish “a "caliphate" – a state governed in accordance with Islamic law, or Sharia” (BBC, 2018). ISIS quickly gained support among the Sunni minority as a means of protection against the Shia majority government and private Shia militias. The organization aimed to recreate the Caliphate, and institute a harsh version of

Islamic law. The organization quickly won victories in North Iraq, conquering the city of Mosul in 2014 (BBC, 2018).

The organization soon grew beyond its Iraqi roots. The Syrian Civil War between the secular, authoritarian regime of Bashar al-Assad and Sunni Islamic radicals presented an opportunity for growth for the Islamic State. ISIS intervened in the Syrian Civil War on the side of the Sunni majority attempting to overthrow Assad. ISIS spread to Libya, and the entire Middle East, primarily as a result of the power vacuum created by the U.S. supported ousting of the Gaddafi regime. The chaos of the Syrian Civil War and the tribal civil war which followed the fall of Muammar Gaddafi caused a wave of refugees to flood into Europe. ISIS took advantage of Europe's liberal immigration policies and began attacks in Western Europe.

The liberal immigration policies of the United States and Western Europe allowed members of the ISIS to commit attacks in the region. In the United States, ISIS is responsible for the Miami nightclub shooting, the San Bernardino massacre, and the 2017 New York City truck attack. In France, ISIS claimed responsibility for the Bataclan massacre and numerous other attacks. The terrorism brought by ISIS was one of the key factors fuelling the surge of popularity for right-wing populist movements in Western Europe.

The American response to the threat of ISIS has been to increase surveillance of potential radical groups and to increase intervention in the Middle East. American intervention efforts so far exacerbated rather than alleviated the problem, the prime example of this being American support for anti-Assad rebel groups. While the Assad regime is authoritarian by Western standards, it shares a common interest with the United States in suppressing ISIS. The Assad regime is a secular regime with its base of support in the minority Shia and Christian communities in Syria. The primary opponent of the Assad regime is radical Sunni terrorist organizations such as ISIS. If the Assad regime were to be overthrown, it is quite likely that ISIS would obtain control of Syria because they are the most heavily armed and ruthless non-state actors in the country. Instead of undermining the Assad regime, American policymakers should actively work with the government of Syria to eliminate ISIS in the region. Whatever the defects of the Assad regime, it does not sponsor terrorist attacks

in the United States or Western Europe. A stable Syria would also contribute to staunching the flow of refugees, which increase crime rates in Western Europe, and fuel the popularity of right-wing populist parties.

The recruitment pool for ISIS is not limited to recent refugees from war-torn countries. Citizens and immigrant communities often present opportunities for radicalization. In the case of domestic terrorism in the United States, recruits of a radical Sunni organization such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda often come from alienated, second-generation immigrants who until their radicalization did not devoutly practice their faith. The most prominent example of this phenomenon is the 9/11 hijackers. The 9/11 hijackers were less than devout in their personal lives; they went to bars and strip clubs (Harnden, 2001). The 9/11 hijackers were not unique in this respect; a similar dynamic was present with the Bataclan shooters and the gunman in the Pulse nightclub attack. In light of this fact, it is essential for policymakers to remember this when creating attacker profiles in surveillance metrics. Terrorism may be rooted as much in nihilism and social atomization as religious fanaticism.

Given the fact that radical organizations such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda often draw recruits from second or third generation immigrants, it is essential that policymakers take this dynamic into account when creating immigration laws. President Donald Trump's travel ban is an excellent first step in this direction, but broader reforms are needed. When shaping immigration policy, lawmakers should emphasize cultural compatibility and job skills rather than family unification and multiculturalism. Immigration policy should not merely be viewed through the lens of finding cheap labor for multinational corporations; instead it should attempt to create an environment in which newcomers are a good fit for the host nation's culture and tradition. Sensible immigration policy should emphasize security, skill, and compatibility with the host culture.

3.2.2 Iran's Antiterrorism Policies

Iranian antiterrorism policies are primarily geared towards preventing radical Sunni terrorism from groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda. While the war in Iraq significantly enhanced the power and influence of the Iranian state by removing a significant competitor, it also created chaos that gave birth to a new threat.

The spread of ISIS is a genuine threat to the security and stability of Iran. While majority of Iran's population is Shia, it has a significant Sunni minority, which could be a potential recruitment pool for ISIS and Al-Qaeda. While the chances are remote that ISIS could directly conquer Iran, it is not a threat to be taken lightly given the success of ISIS in Northern Iraq. Even without being a direct threat to the sovereignty of the Iranian state, ISIS is quite capable of causing bloodshed and damage to infrastructure.

Given this threat, Iran has cooperated with the Shia government of Iraq in its fight against ISIS (Beauchamp, 2015). Chaos in Iraq will not be confined to Iraq, as recent history abundantly demonstrates. ISIS spread from Iraq to Syria and Libya after it was founded in 2013 and has made attacks throughout the world. It is in the national interest of Iran to cooperate with the Iraqi government in eliminating this threat to its sovereignty. Apart from the threat of increased terrorism, an ISIS takeover of Iraq would create a wave of refugees, many of which would attempt to enter Iran. The relative stability and wealth of Iran, and the cultural compatibility of the potential refugee wave, which most likely be majority Shia, would make Iran an attractive haven.

Apart from consideration of terrorism and preventing a wave of refugees, which would tax the resources of the Iranian state, suppressing ISIS in Iraq is in Iran's interest at a geopolitical level. It is in the national interest of Iran for Iraq to remain governed by its Shia majority. The Shia majority of Iraq is more likely to favor a friendly foreign policy with Iran. A Shia-led Iraq is unlikely to repeat the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s which was devastating to both sides. Millions died because of the war on both sides. The fight was conducted by Saddam Hussein, a secular Sunni nationalist, and covertly supported by the United States in reprisal for the hostage crisis. A Shia-led Iraq would be highly unlikely to support an attempted invasion of Iran. This alone would make it worthwhile for Iran to assist Iraq in eliminating the threat of ISIS.

Iraq's Shia majority tends to side with Iran in foreign policy matters. An alliance is in the interest of both powers, as the other prominent nations in the region, with the exception of Syria, are Sunni. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey are power-players in economic and military terms and present a significant threat, which cannot be ignored by Iran. An economically

and militarily weakened Iran serves the national interests of Saudi Arabia and Turkey, thus the strong Saudi support for regime change by the Saudi monarchy. United States lawmakers should bear this inclination of the Saudi, Israeli, or Turkish intelligence when making decisions about Iranian foreign policy. A friendly Iraq serves as a counterbalance to the influence of the major Sunni powers in the region, thus explaining Iran's strong support of the Iraqi government's efforts to control and eradicate ISIS.

A similar dynamic is at play with Iran's support of the regime of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad. Iran has directly intervened in the Syrian conflict on the side of Bashar Al-Assad (Asadzade, 2017). The Revolutionary Guard has organized missions in Iran, with support from the army and volunteers (Asadzade, 2017). This chart from Asadzade's article in the Washington Post breaks down the casualty rates by branch.




Figure 5.1: Iranian Fatalities in Syria by Military Affiliation. (Asadzade, 2017).

As seen in Figure 1, the majority of casualties from Iranian intervention are from the Revolutionary Guard, with second highest being volunteers. This fatality chart reflects the enthusiasm of the Iranian people in supporting efforts to combat ISIS in Syria. As of 2017, over 2000 Iranian's died fighting in Syria (Asadzade, 2017). The strong support of the government of Iran, and its people make sense from a strategic point of view.

Bashar Al-Assad's base of support comes from the minority Shia and Christian population. The Anti-Assad insurgency's base of support comes from the Sunni majority of Syria. If the Assad regime were to fall, the newly empowered Sunni majority would likely ally with strategic rivals of Iran such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. Contrary to the line propagated by the media, if the Assad regime were to fall, the likely beneficiaries would not be moderate, democratic rebels but ISIS. ISIS and other radical Sunni terrorist groups comprise the bulk of the opposition to Assad's secular authoritarian regime. Keeping the minority Shia government in power in Syria thus serves the interests of Iran, and explains the commitment provided in men and munitions to the Assad regime.

Taken as a whole, Iran has been the primary beneficiary of the Iraq War. The Iraq War eliminated the regime of Saddam Hussein, the biggest threat to Iranian security. It allowed the creation of a Shia national government in Iraq, which was positively inclined towards Iranian interests. Iran, Syria, and Iraq are the three central Shia powers in the region and are united by their shared religious traditions and national security interests. Thus Iran's anti-terrorism policy has primarily centered on assisting the Iraqi and Syrian governments in crushing ISIS, a radical Sunni insurgency. Iran currently does not sponsor terrorism in the United States or Western Europe. While Iran is linked to Hezbollah and Hamas, these terrorist groups primarily impact Israeli and Lebanese targets and thus they are not a direct threat to American and European interests. That being said, this was not always the case.

During the 1980s, Iran sponsored terrorist attacks in France (Karmon, 1998). The attacks were conducted to force France to stop providing aid to Saddam Hussein's Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war and to compel the French to unfreeze Iranian assets (Karmon, 1998). Iran ceased terrorist activity in France after the French ceased providing aid to the Iraqis and released their bank funds. Unlike radical Sunni terrorist groups, which have produced a near constant stream of attacks in United States and Western Europe over the last decade, Shia activity has been quite limited since the 1980s.

Iranian terrorism primarily impacts Israeli and Lebanese targets. Iran has a history of supporting Hezbollah and Hamas. While this presents a serious threat to Israeli and Sunni targets of Iranian sponsored terror attacks, however

repugnant they might be they do not directly impact American or European nations. Given the catastrophe produced by American intervention in the region in the last fifteen years, American policymakers should be hesitant to intervene unless the Iranian non-state actors target Americans or threaten the military, strategic, or economic interests of the United States. As of now, United States and Western Europe and Iran share a common interest in suppressing the growth of radical Sunni terrorist organizations such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda. ISIS and Al-Qaeda frequently carry out attacks in United States and Western Europe, so United States and its European allies have a genuine interest in crushing them domestically and abroad. The counterterrorism policy priorities which United States and Iran both share to eradicate Sunni terrorist organizations should prompt leaders of both nations to explore cooperative efforts to address the shared threat.

3.3 Weapons Of Mass Destruction Policy: Iran And The United States

3.3.1 United States Policy on Weapons of Mass Destruction

The international community has a compelling interest in controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons have the potential to cause carnage, and thus must be tightly regulated. The slaughter of the Second World War and the threat of human extinction resulted in the established international powers agreeing to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The United Nations created an international treaty limiting the spread of nuclear and biological weapons. Non-state actors were also of concern. The Tokyo subway attacks highlighted the danger presented by chemical weapons to the public. A cult known as Aum Shinrikyo released Sarin gas in the Tokyo Subway system, killing a dozen people. The Tokyo subway attacks demonstrated the need to strictly control these weapons.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks dramatically increased the emphasis American foreign policy put on controlling weapons of mass destruction. The threat of radical Sunni extremism magnified concerns about attacks from chemical or biological weapons. The Bush administration claimed that Saddam Hussein's regime was stockpiling chemical and biological weapons. It contended that Hussein possessing these weapons posed a clear and present danger to American

citizens. The contention that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons was used, along with the goal of democratizing the Middle East, to justify the invasion of Iraq. No weapons of mass destruction were ever found in Iraq. The intelligence justifying these attacks was provided by Iraqi dissidents with a direct interest in overthrowing the Hussein regime.

The Bush administration claimed that Iran was developing nuclear weapons. As a result of this belief, Congress passed stricter sanctions on Iran, and the Bush administration threatened with war. The failure of the invasion of Iraq soured the public mood towards intervention in the Middle East. As a result, the Republican Party lost both the House and the Senate to the Democrats in 2006. The Bush administration was thus unable to invade Iran, as a Democratic Congress would be highly unlikely to authorize an invasion or even a bombing of Iran. Instead, the Bush administration quietly retreated from the neoconservative foreign policy priority of regime change in Iran. Prominent neoconservatives such as Donald Rumsfeld resigned, and the Bush administration adopted a more restrained foreign policy.

The Obama administration favored a diplomatic approach to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. Instead of relying solely on threats of invasion or sanctions, the Obama administration began to negotiate with the Iranian regime. It was offered a repeal of sanctions, access to European markets for the oil exports, and the unfreezing of seized assets in exchange for agreeing not to enrich uranium for a bomb. Under the conditions of the deal, the Iranians would be allowed to continue developing peaceful nuclear power. The fuel for the reactors would be provided by the international community and Iran would be subject to random, unannounced inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency of the United Nations (BBC Iran Nuclear Deal Key Details, 2018). All spent nuclear fuel rods would have to be surrounded by the regime as part of the agreement (BBC Iran Nuclear Deal Key Details, 2018). The deal represented a historic achievement and could be part of an effort to normalize diplomatic relations with Iran.

Figure 2 shows the chart provided in the article BBC Iran Nuclear Deal Key Details. It gives insights about Iranian program and the limitations placed upon it by the Iran nuclear deal.

Changes agreed under Iran deal to limit nuclear programme



Figure 7.1: Changes agreed under Iran deal to limit nuclear programme. (BBC Iran Nuclear Deal Key Details, 2018)

As established by the chart, the primary center for the enrichment of uranium for nuclear fuel is located in Natanz, in the center of Iran (BBC Iran Nuclear Deal Key Details, 2018). The Iran Nuclear Deal prohibits Iran from opening new centrifuges for enrichment until 2026 and requires Iran to reduce its stockpile of enriched nuclear fuel (BBC Iran Nuclear Deal Key Details, 2018). While neoconservatives and governments which have a vested interest in regime change in Iran claim to have intelligence which proves Iran is breaking the deal, these claims should be viewed with scepticism. Instead of relying on claims from sources that will directly benefit from regime change in Iran, American

policymakers should create an international panel to investigate allegations of Iranian subterfuge independently. If the intelligence proves incorrect after independent, international investigation by objective parties, the Iran Deal should be honored. If there is evidence that our allies have fabricated the information in an attempt to deceive American lawmakers into going to war when it has no compelling interest in doing so, those governments should have any aid provided by the American government terminated indefinitely, and possibly face more severe consequences.

There is more at stake than just Iranian-American relations with the Iran Deal. United States' reputation as a nation which honors its agreements and treaties is at stake. If United States gains a reputation for not honoring its treaties, countries will be hesitant to make deals with it. The Libya situation is a prime example of the statement mentioned above. The Gaddafi regime agreed to give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for normalizing relations with the United States. Gaddafi voluntarily surrendered Libya's atomic weapons, and the United States provided air support to the rebel groups that deposed him several years later.

If United States loses its credibility as a power that honors its agreements and act in good faith, it is unlikely that hostile nations will agree to negotiate. While diplomacy is not always the right choice, it can be a useful tool that benefits both countries. An example to support this contention is Nixon's historic move to normalize relations with China. The agreement helped both the United States and China. It allowed China to join the international community, to be viewed as legitimate and sovereign, and it isolated the Soviet Union. This isolation played an essential role in winning the Cold War.

United States must maintain its reputation as a nation that honors its word. This concern is not born out of any idealistic moralism, but for the security of the United States. An example of current events about why it is essential for United States to be perceived as both credible and strong is the recent progress towards ending the Korean War made by the Trump administration and the governments of North and South Korea. The possibility of ending the Korean War would be a historic achievement for both Donald Trump and the United States. For this agreement to have any chance of being ratified the United States must maintain

its credibility. Reneging on the Iran Deal without proof that Iran violated its agreement not to enrich uranium to develop nuclear weapons would more than likely kill any prospect of reaching a settlement in Korea. It is highly unlikely that Kim Jong-un will agree to surrender North Korea's nuclear weapons if he believes that he will share the fate of Muammar Gaddafi. Restoration of normal relations between North and South Korea and an end to the Korean War is in the national interests of the United States; policymakers should work to retain the credibility that makes such agreements possible.

3.3.2 Iran's Policy on Weapons of Mass Destruction

Due to the secretive nature of Iran, it is difficult to tell if it possesses chemical or biological weapons (Cordesman, 2006). United States policymakers can be relatively confident that Iran does not have nuclear weapons because nuclear testing is relatively easy to detect. The detonation of a nuclear device that is required to test an atomic device is easily recognizable on satellite imagery. It is an open question for debate whether or not Iran has chemical or biological weapons (Byman, 2008). Iran has not provided chemical or biological weapons to non-state actors as of yet (Byman, 2008).

It is not in the interest of Iran to provide chemical or biological weapons to non-state actors such as Hamas or Hezbollah. If non-state actors used chemical or biological weapons, and it was found out that they were supplied by Iran, the consequences would be severe. At best, there would be a return to the pre-Iran deal status quo, which would cost Iran billions of dollars in oil revenue made from sales on the European market. At worst, an attack could result in international support for regime change.

The policymakers should take the sources for claims that Iran is developing a nuclear weapon with a grain of salt, because they are provided by nations which have a vested interest in regime change in Iran. These claims should be investigated. Neutral parties respected by both countries should conduct the investigation. If Iran is found to have developed centrifuges contrary to the Iran Deal, or if it is found that Iran is actively working to develop nuclear weapons, sanctions should be reimposed.

Iran acquiring nuclear weapons is not in the interests of the United States or the world as a whole. The danger comes not just from a theocratic regime possessing atomic weapons. If Iran were to acquire an atomic bomb, it would set off an arms race in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Jordan would quickly acquire nuclear warheads to match Iran. Given the instability of the region, it is easy to imagine a scenario in which a once moderate regime falls and radicals come to possess nuclear weapons. An arms race in the Middle East does not serve the interest of the United States, Russia, China, or ultimately, the nations of the Middle East.

3.4 The Energy Policy Of The United States And Iran

3.4.1 The United States Energy Policy

The oil crisis of the 1970s proved to the United States the dangers of being dependent on foreign oil. During the late 1970s gas prices skyrocketed and supplies contracted. There were queues of people that spanned for blocks trying to buy some fuel. Record high gas stations devastated the American economy and contributed to the unpopularity of the Carter administration. It thus became the national policy of the United States to develop its energy resources. Strategies included easing the restrictions on oil exploration, creating new clean energy sources, nuclear power, and increasing coal and natural gas production. Becoming energy independent is something which took several decades to achieve, and has improved the security of American economy and military. Energy production is a top priority for any wealthy, industrialized nation.

The goal of energy independence from Middle Eastern oil imports was achieved through boosting domestic oil production, creating sources of clean energy, and increasing coal and natural gas production. Nuclear power plants were constructed in several states but were not an acceptable solution because of environmental concerns. Love Canal and Three Mile Island disasters in the US revealed the dangers of nuclear power. The plants at Three Mile Island and Love Canal had catastrophic accidents, which made the land around the facilities uninhabitable. While nuclear power is a viable option that provides electricity for millions in France, the power source is not without risks. The

environmental concerns and waste storage caused many regions of the United States to reject nuclear power.

The Oil Crisis in the 1970s was primarily a product of oil producing companies restricting supply to drive up costs. Oil was, and is, the commodity that drives most Middle Eastern economies. Thus, low oil prices are not in the interests of OPEC nations. The United States compensated for this first by importing most of its oil from Canada. It then began efforts to boost domestic oil production. The oil industry and fiscal conservatives favored a policy of decreasing regulations on oil drilling, arguing that increased production would make American energy independent. These efforts were controversial; environmental groups contended that loosening regulations on oil drilling were only a temporary solution, and endangered the environment. The Exxon-Valdez oil spill and the Deepwater Horizon Spill lent some credibility to their arguments.

Domestic oil production increased during the Bush years. George W. Bush favored a policy that made it easier to drill for oil. As a result, United States was able to expand its oil producing capabilities. The Obama administration was less friendly to the oil industry and drilling than Bush administration. It blocked the construction of the Keystone oil pipeline, which would have extended from Canada to the American Gulf Coast. Obama's opposition to the creation of the Keystone pipeline was rooted in environmental concerns. Environmental advocates believed that the Keystone pipeline would damage the environment and discourage the development of clean energy sources.

Environmental concerns also motivated the Obama administrations opposition to increased coal production. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under President Obama increased regulations that impacted the coal industry. These regulations reduced the output of coal producers and were unpopular in the industry. While the oil and coal industries were damaged by the pro-environmental bias of the Obama administration, the natural gas industry flourished. There was controversy over the procedure known as fracking, which environmental advocacy groups claimed damaged the environment and contaminated drinking water supplies, but the output of natural gas reached record levels. The increased level of natural gas production was due mainly to the fact that the United States possesses some of the world's largest reserves of

natural gas. The abundance of natural gas played an essential role in United States becoming energy independent from Middle Eastern oil.

Another factor which contributed to United States' independence from Middle Eastern oil imports was the development of new technologies to extract previously inaccessible oil reserves. The extraction of oil from shale sands was made possible through technological progress. As of now, Middle Eastern imports account for only a small percentage of petroleum products imported into United States.

3.4.2 Iran's Energy Policies

Iran is one of the world's largest producers and exporters of petroleum products. For most of the twentieth century, Iran's most profitable source of income was oil exports. This was made possible through the efforts of Reza Shah, and his son, Mohammad Reza Shah, who drastically improved the infrastructure of the country, and began to tap oil resources. The Iranian oil industry was first managed by the British. The situation continued until the mid-1950s when Mossaddegh nationalized the Iranian oil industry. The nationalization of the Iranian oil industry soured relations with Iran and the British and the United States. As a consequence, Britain and the United States supported Mohammad Reza Shah's coup against the democratically elected government of Iran.

Under the leadership of the Shah, combined with continued industrial and agricultural reform, the oil industry boomed in Iran. As discussed earlier, the changes of the White Revolution were unpopular with many segments of Iranian society and monarchy was replaced with theocracy in Iran. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was an ally of the United States, so this move strained relations between Iran and United States. The hostage crisis caused Iran and the United States to cease diplomatic relations.

As a result of the strained relations created by the hostage crisis during the Iranian Revolution, the United States supported sanctions on Iranian exports. These sanctions prevented Iran from selling oil to American companies. Sanctions forced the Iranians to develop other sectors of their economy. The Bush years and the 9/11 attacks made the Middle East a primary focus of American foreign policy. One of the central goals of the Bush years was to stop

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As a result of concerns that the Iranians were developing an atomic bomb, Congress passed sanctions on Iranian exports, including oil. The United Nations also placed restrictions on the use of Iranian oil.

The Obama administration favored a more diplomatic approach to Iran. As a result, Iran and the United States created an agreement in which Iran would promise not develop atomic bombs in exchange for the lifting of sanctions and unfreezing of assets. Iran accepted the deal. As a result, Iranian oil came onto the market, contributing to already low oil prices throughout the world. The primary market for Iranian oil is Western Europe. If the Iran Deal were to be repealed, and sanctions renewed on Iranian oil imports, prices of oil would climb in Europe if European nations agreed to resume the sanctions. It is by no means entirely assured that Europe would agree to reimpose sanctions on Iranian petroleum imports (Wintour and Boffey, 2018). There is a real possibility that the European Union will decline to renew the sanctions. France, in particular, depends on Iranian oil and has economic ties with Iran. It is thus questionable how much of an impact sanctions would have on Iran as the United States oil comes mostly from domestic and Canadian sources.

4. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Now that the reader has been provided with the theoretical and historical foundations of Iranian and American foreign policy, and policies of the two nations on terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and energy, I can present a series of recommendations based on this information. If the United States is to create a foreign policy suited for the twenty-first century, it must begin to re-evaluate its position in the world and the nature of the international community. The present moment in history calls for a radical re-evaluation of our priorities on par with the shift from the Monroe Doctrine to Wilson and Luce's vision of the creation of a liberal world order.

4.1 A Multipolar World

The rise of China as a superpower, and Russia as a regional power with increasing influence in Eastern and Western Europe, make it highly unlikely that United States will be able to create a liberal world order of the type envisioned by Wilson, Luce, and Fukuyama. China is an authoritarian capitalist regime. China has no interest in cooperating in an international order constructed on a foundation of the Enlightenment ideas of individual liberty. Instead, China believes that its national interests are best protected by adopting an authoritarian domestic policy, combined with mercantilist economic policy. China believes that it must project power in East Asia to remain a significant power, and has spent the last three decades constructing a mighty army and navy using the money acquired through its more than two-decade-long trade surplus with the United States. Due to China's economic and military power, the United States will not be able to impose its wishes unilaterally and must accept its role as a shaper of the international order.

After the Cold War, Russia was initially quite receptive to adopting an American form of liberal democratic capitalism. Russia became a democracy after the fall of Communism and restructured its economy. Russia enacted a

series of economic reforms known as “shock therapy”, which were designed to create a free market society. However, instead of creating a free market with vigorous competition and economic growth, an oligarchy was formed as a few wealthy investors purchased entire sectors of the Russian economy. Prices rose, and wages fell. The economic chaos and corruption created an attitude of skepticism towards American style democracy in Russia.

After the fall of the Warsaw Pact, United States began to expand the boundaries of NATO. Previous members of the Warsaw Pact, such as Poland, were allowed to join NATO. Russia saw this as an attempt to encircle it and diminish its regional influence. Russia’s economic and international decline caused many people in Russia to become skeptical of United States and liberal democracy. President Boris Yeltsin’s popularity was at all time low when he decided to resign at the end of 1999. His successor, Vladimir Putin, favored a more autocratic style of rule. Putin adopted a mercantilist economic policy and cracked down on the oligarchs. His foreign policy was nationalistic. These policies earned Putin widespread approval from the Russian public and ensured the popularity of his regime. As of now, Russia is expanding its influence in Eastern Europe, in response to the perceived weakness of the United States. Due to the perception that United States wishes to encircle and diminish Russia, it would be unlikely to cooperate in the establishment of a world order of the type envisioned by Luce.

The challenges presented by the rising power of Russia and China are magnified by the abject failure of the last two decades of American foreign policy. The American goal of deposing secular dictators in the Arab world has been an unqualified disaster. Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya have not become liberal democracies as foretold by neoconservative and liberal internationalist policymakers. Instead, something resembling a Hobbesian state of nature has been created. Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan are ravaged by ethnic and religious warfare. This chaos, combined with the effects of the Syrian Civil War, has created a refugee crisis that is threatening the stability of Western Europe. The failure of liberal democracy in the Middle East presents a significant challenge to Fukuyama’s idea that it is the final evolution of human political development.

It would seem that liberal principles are not universally applicable as Luce, Kojeve, and Fukuyama imply.

Apart from a loss of philosophical legitimacy, United States' failure in the Middle East has caused it to go deeply into debt and has put enormous strain on its all-volunteer army. The ability of United States to organize another multifront war of the type fought during the 1940s is highly questionable. The American industrial base has been significantly reduced as a result of two decades of free trade. The effect of two decades worth of neo-liberal domestic and foreign policy initiatives has been the decline of American influence. United States should re-examine the ideas that have brought it from an apex of power in 1991 to an increasingly diminished status. Rather than vainly attempting to create a new world order based on Wilsonian principles, American policymakers should establish an international system which recognizes the principles of balance of power and global stability.

Instead of fighting the inevitable, American policymakers should accept the fact that the international community will be multipolar rather than unipolar. Instead of attempting to construct a liberal world order of the type envisioned by Luce, Kojeve, and Fukuyama, United States should build a world order resembling that of Metternich's Concert of Europe. Instead of attempting to universalize liberal democracy, the purpose of this international order would be to maintain stability, which is of the highest importance when each of the great powers can annihilate all life on earth with nuclear weapons.

United States, Russia, and China would each be recognized as great powers with a sphere of influence under this system. Other states would respect this sphere of influence. This arrangement does not diminish American power and prestige, it merely acknowledges reality and prevents another tragedy like the First and Second World War from occurring. While it has become a cliché among American policymakers to remember 1939, and thus fight any signs of the rise on an illiberal power, the analogy does not hold up. Politicians should fear another 1914 rather than 1939, as that is far more likely.

World War I was not a spontaneous eruption of violence driven by irrationality. Instead, it was the result of a system of entangling alliances, which turned a regional conflict into a global war. This threat, not some megalomaniacal tyrant,

is the real danger of our current moment in history. It is easy to imagine some Eastern European member of NATO drawing United States into a conflict that is not in its national interests. If another global conflict were to occur, its cause would be far more likely to resemble the scenario mentioned above than to be an attempt by a would-be Napoleon bent on world domination.

United States should re-examine its every commitment and support given to nations throughout the world. Many of them were made under radically different circumstances than the present day. If an alliance is no longer in the interest of the United States, it should be discarded. A prime example would be the protection guarantees given to Eastern European nations after the fall of the Iron Curtain. It does not serve American interests to pledge assistance to minor powers in the event of a conflict with Russia. The USSR no longer exists, and the Russian Federation is a reactionary rather than revolutionary power. Extending NATO to Ukraine or Georgia does not serve the interest of the United States, and would serve as a potential trigger for another world war rather than an enhancement of global security.

Part of creating a stable world order is recognizing the limitations of American power and influence. American Middle Eastern Policy including Iran needs a critical re-evaluation. United States should accept that the Middle East has its own traditions, customs, and history, which make it highly unlikely that it will embrace liberal democracy. A democracy requires a culture and history friendly to the values of openness, tolerance, and individualism. Liberalism in Europe did not appear from thin air. Instead, it was the product of centuries of historical, philosophical, cultural, and political development. There is no evidence that a similar trend is occurring in the Middle East. The fall of authoritarian regimes has brought chaos rather than Enlightenment, and the instability of the region is spreading to Western Europe. Instead of trying to turn the Middle East into Western Europe, United States and Western Europe should promote policies that encourage stability rather than radicalism.

The move by President Donald Trump to impose harsh new sanctions upon Iran is not in the interests of the United States or the world as a whole. It serves to weaken, instead of re-enforce, American power. It is very likely that Western European nations will refuse to ratify the sanctions as a good portion of their oil

comes from Iran. France, in particular, has financial ties with the Iranian oil industry and will be unlikely to support measures that damage it economically. If the European Union, or individual European nations refuse to ratify the sanctions it will be a sign of a weakening American influence. If Europe does not approve the new sanctions on Iran, these measures will be impotent, lacking in force.

Instead of taking a course that will weaken our alliances with Western Europe, United States should create a panel to determine if there is any truth to the allegations that Iran is constructing a nuclear weapon. This panel should be comprised of parties respected for their fairness and objectivity. If it were found that Iran is in breach of its agreement, then there would be support for renewing the sanctions. These renewed sanctions would be meaningful, as Western Europe would adopt them if there were conclusive proof of Iranian malfeasance. If the intelligence provided by our allies in the region indicating that Iran is violating its agreement turns out to be incorrect, an investigation should be conducted to determine if this information was offered in good faith. If there is proof that the report was a fabrication, there should be consequences for the involved parties. These consequences could include severing diplomatic relations and suspension of aid. The United States should not tolerate attempts to manipulate its foreign policy.

The goal of American foreign policy in the Middle East should be to establish stability in the region. In service of this goal, United States should refuse to support efforts to overthrow authoritarian regimes, which maintain order in service of an ideological agenda. American policymakers should also rethink the country's alliance with Sunni monarchies and other powers in the region. Instead, we should have a transactional foreign policy in which we support whichever party best serves the interests of stability in the area. American lawmakers should not allow a sentimental attachment to particular regimes in the area to cloud their judgment when crafting policy.

Our primary goal when dealing with Iran should not be regime change; rather it should be the prevention of instability in the region. To achieve this, United States should formally normalize diplomatic relations with Iran. United States should recognize that Iran is a regional power with unique interests, which

sometimes align with American goals, and are sometimes oppose them. This recognition is not a call to ally with Iran or to give in to its every whim. Instead, this change of relations is merely a recognition of the fact that Iran is a regional power to be dealt with like any other nation in the area.

An area where American and Iranian interests intersect is the elimination of the radical Sunni terrorist group ISIS. ISIS frequently engages in terrorist activity in United States and Western Europe and is a threat to Iran. United States should cooperate with any regime that offers assistance in eradicating this threat. United States should also discourage allies in the region who provide ISIS tacit support to end their aid.

The stabilization of the Middle East should be the ultimate goal of American foreign policy in the region. To help with this goal, United States should cooperate with all nations in the area, and other powers that have an interest in stability. United States should assist Russia and the Assad regime in the efforts to eliminate ISIS. ISIS's ability to inflict carnage will be significantly diminished when it no longer controls territories that serve as a base of operations.

Paradoxically, American normalization of relations with Iran may be more likely to produce a secular, democratic regime. The Shia theocracy in Iran draws much of its support from the impression that it is resisting American imperialism. That impression is re-enforced when Iran is cut off from relations with the outside world, and its economy is strangled by sanctions. There is evidence that a significant percentage of the Iranian population is dissatisfied with Shia conservatism. A substantial portion of the Iranian community owns illegal satellite dishes to follow Western media (Rouhani, 2016). The fact that a significant proportion of Iranians illegally watch Western entertainment is a sign of dissatisfaction with the rigid Shia conservatism promoted by Iran's counsel of clerics. It indicates a loss of legitimacy of Iranian Shia norms and an interest in Western culture. An attempt to impose regime change, or renew sanctions, would more than likely cause the Iranian people to rally behind their leaders. Resistance to foreign intervention is part of human nature, American policymakers should be careful to avoid renewing support for the mullahs by allowing the claim to be defenders of Iran against American imperialism.

4.2 Conclusion

This thesis explored the theoretical and historical foundations of American and Iranian foreign policy. American foreign policy is guided by the desire to establish a liberal world order as described by Luce and Fukuyama. It has been a guiding belief of American foreign policy analysts and decision makers that United States must take a leading role in global affairs. The end goal of this policy is the creation of an international community guided by the Enlightenment principles of individual liberty, free trade, and rationalism.

Iranian foreign policy is guided by a desire to retain its national autonomy and its status as a regional power. The Qajar monarchy, the Shah, and the current Iranian regime have made it a top priority to maintain Iranian sovereignty. Understanding this fact allows American policymakers to create a realistic foreign policy towards Iran. Contrary to the media narrative, Iranian foreign policy is not motivated by religious fanaticism or desire for irrational bloodshed.

Iran does not sponsor terrorism in Western nations, and has interest in assisting United States in cracking down on radical Sunni terrorist organizations such as ISIS. United States should work with Iran to eliminate ISIS. United States should create an international panel composed of respected and objective parties to determine if Iran is violating its agreement to refrain from developing nuclear weapons. If Iran is found to be in breach of the Iran Deal, renewed sanctions should be imposed. If Iran is honoring its agreement, the United States should consider renewing diplomatic relations with Iran, and treat it like any other power in the region.

REFERENCES

- Abrahamian, E. (2008).** *A History of Modern Iran*. Cambridge University Press.
- Asadzade, P. (2017)** “Iran’s Involvement in Syria is Costly. Here’s Why Most Iranians Still Support It.” *The Washington Post*, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/10/19/irans-involvement-in-syria-is-costly-heres-why-most-iranians-still-support-it/?utm_term=.a9d1c6ecd466.
- BBC, 2018,** “BBC Iran Nuclear Deal Key Details.” <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33521655>.
- BBC, 2014,** “What is ”Islamic State.“ BBC, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29052144>.
- Beauchamp, Z. (2015).** “Iran is Fighting on the Iraqi Government’s Side.” *Vox.com*, <https://www.vox.com/cards/things-about-isis-you-need-to-know/iran-interven-es-iraq>.
- Bobbit, Ph. (2003).** *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History*. Anchor Books.
- Bradley, J. (2009).** *The Imperial Cruise A Secret History of Empire and War*. EPUB ed, Back Bay Books.
- Bush Sr., G. (1991).** “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union.” *presidency.ucsb.edu*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19253>.
- Byman, D. (2008).** “Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction.” *The Brookings Institute*, 2008, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/iran-terrorism-and-weapons-of-mass-destruction-2/>.
- Calamur, K. (2018).** “The Man Who Could Shape Iraq’s Future.” *The Atlantic*, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/iraq-elections-sadr/560456/>.
- Clinton, W. (1993).** “Remarks on Signing the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act.” *presidency.ucsb.edu*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46216>.
- Cordesman, A. (2006).** “Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction.” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/irans-weapons-mass-destruction>.
- Dorrien, G. (2004).** “Benevolent Global Hegemony” William Kristol and the Politics of American Empire.” *Logos Journal*, vol. 3, no. 2, Spring 2004, <http://www.logosjournal.com/dorrien.htm>.
- Fisher, S. & William, O. (1990).** *The Middle East A History*. Fourth Edition ed., McGraw-Hill Publishing Company.
- Fukuyama, F. (1992).** *The End of History and The Last Man*. The Free Press, 1992.
- Gellman, B. (1999).** “U.S., Allies Launch Air Attack on Yugoslav Military Targets” *The Washington Post*, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1999/03/25/us-allies-launch-air-attack-on-yugoslav-military-targets/39c11e71-977c-4a61-90e2-a56a45549303/?utm_term=.6ef9fd2f4c15.

- Harnden, T. (2001).** “Seedy Secrets of Hijackers Who Broke Muslim Laws.” *The Telegraph*, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1358665/Seedy-secrets-of-hijackers-who-broke-Muslim-laws.html>.
- Opec, 2018,** “Iran Facts and Figures.” *OPEC.org*, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/163.htm.
- Joyner, J. (2012).** “The Future of Conservative Foreign Policy.” *The Atlantic*, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/11/the-future-of-conservative-foreign-policy/265344/>.
- Karmon, E. (1998)** “Counterterrorism Policy ” *Middle East Quarterly* , vol. 5, no. 4, <https://www.meforum.org/articles/other/counterterrorism-policy>.
- Kojeve, A. (1980).** *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit*. Edited by Raymond Queneau and Allan Bloom, Cornell University Press.
- Lerner, R. (1998).** *Western Civilizations Their History and Culture*. Thirteenth Edition ed., W.W. Norton and Company.
- Levenson, E. (2014).** “The TSA is in the Business of Security Theater, Not Security.” *The Atlantic*, 2014, <https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/01/tsa-business-security-theater-not-security/357599/>.
- Luce, H. (1999).** “The American Century.” *Diplomatic History*, vol. 23, no. 2, Spring pp. 159-171, <http://www-personal.umich.edu/~mlassite/discussions261/luce.pdf>.
- MacMillan, M. (2002).** *Paris, 1919 Six Months that Changed the World*. Random House.
- Nixon, R. (2018).** “Watch List Shields T.S.A. from Threatening, and Unruly, Travelers.” *The New York Times*, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/17/us/politics/new-watch-list-tsa-screens-ers-.html>.
- Rouhani, H. (2016).** “Iran destroys 100,000 ‘depraving’ satellite dishes.” *Al Jazeera*, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/iran-destroys-100000-corrupting-satellite-dishes-160724202722493.html>.
- Russell, J. (1994).** *The Germanization of Early Medieval Christianity*. Oxford University Press.
- Scheuer, M. (2008).** *Marching Towards Hell America and Islam After Iraq*. Free Press.
- Sexton, J. (2011).** *The Monroe Doctrine Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America*. Hill and Wang.
- Whitehouse, 2006,** “State of the Union Address By the President.” *georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.org*, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/>.
- Takeyh, R. (2009).** *Guardians of the Revolution Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs*. Oxford University Press.
- The Washington Post, 2002,** “Text of President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address.” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/sou012902.htm>.
- The Washington Post, 2004,** “The Text of President Bush’s 2004 State of the Union Address.” *The Washington Post*, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/transcripts/bushtext_012004.html.

- The White House, 2015**, “Remarks By the President on Iran Nuclear Deal.”
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov,
<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/05/remarks-president-iran-nuclear-deal>.
- The New York Times, 2007**, “Transcript of President Bush’s Speech at the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention.”
<https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/22/washington/w23policytext.html>.
- Transportation Security Administration Authority**, “Transportation Security Administration Mission.” <https://www.tsa.gov/about/tsa-mission>.
- Turner, F. (2007)**. *The Frontier in American History*. Project Gutenberg, 2007.
gutenberg.org, <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/22994/22994-h/22994-h.htm>.
- Washington, G. (2008)**. “Washington’s Farewell Address 1796.”
avalon.law.yale.edu, 2008,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp.
- White, D. (1992)**. “The American Century in World History.” *Journal of World History*, vol.3, no. 1, pp. 105-127,
<http://www.uhpress.hawaii.edu/journals/jwh/jwh031p105.pdf>.
- Wintour, P & Daniel, B 2018**, “EU sets course for US Clash with Law Blocking Iran Sanctions.” *The Guardian*,
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/17/maersk-tankers-pull-out-of-iran-in-blow-to-nuclear-deal>.

RESUME

Name Surname: Hasan Parwez M.SIDIQ

Place/Date of Birth: Afsaran- Erbil – Iraq, 13.3.1979

E-mail: hasanparwez@yahoo.com



Education:

Bachelor:

2004- University of Salahaddin, College of Law, Law Department

Master:

2018- Istanbul Aydin University, Department of political science and international relations, Political science and international relation