

**LEGACY OF THE FRENCH COLONIALISM FROM
THE ALGERIAN CIVIL WAR TO THE BEUR RIOTS:
A SHORT HISTORY OF THE 'SELF-OTHER'**

**Elif Kuru
104605009**

**İSTANBUL BİLGİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ
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Doç. Dr. Ayhan Kaya

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by

Elif Kuru

104605009

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**“Legacy of the French Colonialism from the Algerian Civil War to the
Beur Riots: A Short History of the Self-Other”**

**“Cezayir İç Savaşı’ndan Beur Ayaklanması’na Fransız Sömürgecilik
Mirası: İçimizdeki Ötekinin Kısa Tarihi”**

Elif Kuru

104605009

Approved by:

Assoc. Prof. Ayhan Kaya

Assoc. Prof. Emre Işık

Assoc. Prof. Ferhat Kentel

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ABSTRACT

This study, which deals with the effects of the History of Colonialism and Algerian Civil War on the Beur Uprisings, tries to make an analysis on the French migration policies and deals with the problems of being a migrant in a country having a colonial past. Algeria faced serious problems after the independence war in the wake of the years under French colony. Without the fulfillment of state-building and nation-building processes, Algeria went through a harsh civil war. Migration to France is a consequence of the economic and political problems that Maghrebians went through in their homelands. In the aftermath of the migration process, the Diaspora Muslims in France, however, could not integrate into the system due to the assimilationist policies. Migrants who could not benefit from their right of political representation attempt to legitimize their problems in different ways. Therefore, youth riots that occurred in Paris banlieues in October 2005 demonstrated that France is still feeling the ramifications of its colonial past. Overall, this study contends that a strong relationship exists between the consequences of the colonialism, Algerian Civil War and the Beur Uprisings and claims that those third generation riots are the legacy of history of colonialism for France.

ÖZET

Sömürgecilik tarihi ve Cezayir İç Savaşı'nın Fransa'daki Beur Ayaklanmaları'na etkisini konu alan bu çalışma, Fransa'nın göç politikalarının analizini yapmakta ve sömürgeci geçmişe sahip bir ülkede göçmen olmanın sorunlarını ele almaktadır. Cezayir, siyasi, ekonomik ve kültürel olarak Fransa'nın vesayeti altında geçirilen yılların ardından bağımsızlık mücadelesiyle ciddi sorunlar yaşamıştır. Devletleşme ve milletleşme projelerini tam olarak tamamlayamadan iç savaşa yüz yüze gelmiştir. Fransa'ya göç, Mağriplilerin ülkelerinde yaşadıkları ekonomik ve siyasi problemlerin bir sonucudur. Ancak bu göç neticesinde Fransa'daki diaspora Müslümanları asimilasyoncu politikalar nedeniyle sisteme entegre olamamışlardır. Siyasi temsil hakkından gerektiği şekilde yararlanamayan göçmenler, problemlerini farklı yollarla duyurma yoluna yönelmişlerdir. Dolayısıyla, 2005 yılının Ekim ayında Paris banliyölerinde meydana gelen gençlik ayaklanmaları Fransa'nın sömürgeciliğin izlerini hala silemediğini ortaya koymuştur. Sonuç olarak bu çalışma, sömürgeciliğin sonuçları, Cezayir İç Savaşı ve Beur Ayaklanmaları arasında çok önemli bir ilişki olduğunu savunmakta ve bu üçüncü jenerasyon ayaklanmalarının sömürgecilik tarihinin Fransa'ya bir mirası olduğunu iddia etmektedir.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIS: Armed Wing of the Islamic Salvation Front

ALN: Army of the National Salvation

AML: Friends of the Manifesto and of Liberty

ENA: North African Star

FIS: Islamic Salvation Front

FLN: National Salvation Front

GIA: Armed Islamic Group

GSPC: Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat

IMF: International Monetary Fund

La HALDE: High Authority for the Fight Against Discrimination and for Equality

Le CRAN: Black Rights Group in France

MNA: Algerian National Movement

MTLD: Movement of the Triumph of Democratic Liberties

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAM: Non-Aligned Movement

OAU: Organization of the African Unity

PPA: Algerian People's Party

PS: French Socialist Party

RUSI: Royal United Services Institution

UDMA: Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto

UMP: Union for a Popular Movement

INTRODUCTION

The September 11, 2001 attacks paved the way for a change in world dynamics. The attacks, committed by a terrorist group called al-Qaeda, destroyed the World Trade Center in New York City. Those attacks have become a milestone in international relations. According to some observers, the crucial event marked the beginning of a new age. The lives of migrants and minorities, living in both the United States and Europe, changed as a result of the attacks. Before the incidents, they enjoyed the advantages of multicultural societies. Now, they must contend with the discriminating assimilation policies of the Western world.

It is not possible to see a positive outcome stemming from 9/11, which affected the lives of thousands of innocent people. And it is the first pivotal pillar of the confrontation between the West and the Muslim world during the so-called postmodern era. Although Muslims across the globe condemned the attacks, al-Qaeda militants under Osama bin Laden's leadership have not altered their discourse on jihad. In response, the West re-invoked the idea of "*enemies within*."¹ The West has been suspicious of minorities and migrants ever since. While the migrants living in the US and the Europe were dragged into a boiling bowl in the aftermath of the attacks on the one hand, the state administrations looked for various precautions on the other hand. The 2005 *Beur*² incidents in France may be considered a prime example.

Eastern migrants and the Western world came face to face during the October 2005 banlieues uprisings in Paris. I will elaborate the connection between the uprisings and the repercussions of 9/11 in detail with this study. This connection, which is demanded to be elaborated in detail

¹ This definition was initially put forward during the Cold War era.

² This concept was firstly used during the incidents occurred in France in 1980s. Although the migrant youngsters refused the denomination of 'Beur', this notion has been frequently used in the literature of 2005 riots.

by this study, has reminded me Edward Said's eternal study, *Orientalism*, again. As a young international relations graduate who was working for an international online newspaper in October 2005, I had chance to closely follow the Beur incidents in the Paris suburbs. I also gained a chance to pursue the news flow minute by minute. Therefore, the Beur Uprisings has been the originating point in my part to write this study. At that time, it was obvious that these uprisings were no accident or anomaly. This created curiosity in my part to think about the roots of the incidents. Undoubtedly, the 2005 uprisings carried the debate of 'self-other' to the French society once again. The Maghrebin migrants were considered as the 'others' and excluded on the one hand, and were absorbed as the 'self' and tried to be assimilated on the other hand. Moreover, that curiosity opened the gates of the history of French colonialism because it was not possible to separate the Beur uprisings from the history of the French colonialism and, later, the Algerian Civil War. All of these events, from French colonialism, to the Algerian Civil War, to the September 11 attacks, to the Beur uprisings, are links in a larger ringing chain of history that informs the backbone of this study.

Aims of the Study

This study aims to provide an understanding about the relationship between the French colonization of Northern Africa, the Algerian Civil War and the Beur Uprisings. As it has been mentioned before, these three topics are closely related to each other, since the former precipitated the latter. In essence, this study claims that the Beur Uprisings are the consequence of the Colonization period and the Algerian Civil War that broke in 1991.

Chapter I – titled, *the Surrendering to the Aura of Colonialism and Its Consequences* – will try to provide a general understanding of the history of colonization with an emphasis on the

colonization of North Africa. Moreover, Chapter I will also attempt to elaborate the consequences of the French colonization era in Algeria and how this era paved the way for the Algerian Civil War, which fed the long incubating atmosphere for the 2005 uprisings in France.

Chapter II – titled, *the Chasing the Algerian Civil War: A History of Resurrection or Tantalization?* – will try to challenge the reader’s assumptions as to whether the civil war in Algerian that broke in 1991 created an environment ripe for resurrection, or affirms a history of tantalization. In addition, this chapter aims to analyze the road to the Algerian Civil war by starting with a deeper investigation about the time period immediately after Algeria’s independence in 1962. The Algerian Civil War remains hazy because of the domestic dynamics of the country at that time. However, the civil struggle was ostensibly one of the drivers of Algerian migration to France. At the time of the civil war, certain segments of Algerian society struggled to live because of political and economic marginalization. These struggles encouraged many Algerians to migrate to France.

Chapter III – titled, *the Algerian Migration to France: Legacy of the Colonial Regime* – will try to illuminate the pre-developments of this migration to France, specifically, the handicaps within France that affected a larger crises in French society. Dealing with the demographical influence of the Muslim origin migrants, this chapter will also challenge the policies of the French administration with discussions of assimilation and discrimination. Moreover, Chapter III will provide a theoretical background for the Beur Uprisings of October 2005 by pointing out those factors in French society that determined their course.

Methodology

This study, which is composed of three chapters, is an explanatory one aimed at providing an understanding of the chain of relations regarding Colonialism, Algerian Civil War and the Beur Uprisings. Literature review has formed the backbone of this study. I could not use primary sources or records while writing the thesis, since the primary sources were out of reach. Furthermore, I could not benefit the oral history narratives. The reason for this is simple; due to the limitations of time and space, it was not possible for me to reach any first persons or their relatives who experienced or witnessed the events. On the other hand, I could not conduct an archival search, since it was not possible for me to go to France and Algeria. Due to these limitations, current material conditions to conduct a field research have been unattainable as well.

Therefore, I have used secondary sources and movies as visual documents to construct the theoretical framework for this study. Secondary sources were comprised of books, academic articles, newspaper articles and commentaries. It was difficult and took time to access and collect all these documents. Initially, I made a detailed literature review and formed an outline in order to classify the documents that I could gather. Furthermore, I paid close attention those sources that are directly related to the topic. It must be added that Istanbul Bilgi University library and the electronic journals under the structure of the library helped me to create the framework of the thesis. The main electronic journals which benefited this study are mainly the Project MUSE, Journal of African Cultural Studies and Journal of African History.

Additionally, the newspapers published in 2005 have been scanned to form the background of the Beur Uprisings. While all the mentioned documents formed the theoretical infrastructure

of the study, I used visual material as a supportive material. Mathieu Kassovitz's film, *La Haine*, has been very illuminating while analyzing the incidents in France. I would like to use visual documentaries on Algeria during the civil war period and on France about the Beur uprisings; however, since all the documentaries were published in French, it was not possible to access these documentaries.

State of the Art

This study has helped to diversify the reading materials on three main topics: Colonialism, Algerian Civil War and Beur Uprisings within the context of migration. However, there are also some reading materials, which will be mentioned below, that address three of the topics. The history of colonialism has remained a hot issue, despite a decolonization process after the second world war that attempted to mitigate the affect of colonization. There have been important studies on colonialism that benefited this thesis. Raimondo Luraghi's famous book, *Sömürgecilik Tarihi* (1975) (History of Colonialism), constituted an important component to Chapter I. While the author revealed the colonial past in his book, he also emphasized how colonial rules harmed colonized countries.

Edward Said's contribution to this study was inevitable. Without focusing on the understanding of "other" in terms of West towards the East, this study would remain incomplete. Hence, *Orientalism* (1999), and *Culture and Imperialism* (1993) have been very beneficial to outline the divergent understandings of the two worlds. Robert Young's *Postcolonialism: A Historical Introduction* (2001) is another supportive material that lays out the significant, postcolonial discourses. Moreover, Frantz Fanon has established one of the main pillars in this study. All his works, *Toward the African Revolution* (1964), *A Dying*

Colonialism (1965), *The Wretched of the Earth* (1963) draw on the emotional background of the effects of colonialism in Algeria. For further analysis in social sciences, one may need to see the background of the incidents. Hence, Fanon's teachings fulfilled this necessity.

Paul Silverstain's articles, *The New Barbarians: Piracy and Terrorism on the North African Frontier* (2005) and *An Excess of Truth: Violence, Conspiracy Theorizing and the Algerian Civil War* (2002), formulated the infrastructure of Chapter II. Silverstain's aim was to provide an understanding of the Algerian Civil War by clarifying the social, political and economic losses. Moreover, these articles had a multidimensional purpose, since they also served to point out the relationship between colonialism, the civil war and the migration.

Habib Suadiya, on the other hand, contributed an understanding on the deeper relations between the governmental elite and the military in Algeria. In *Kirli Savaş (Dirty War)* (2001), Suadiya tried to articulate the unspoken reasons for the Algerian Civil War and clarify the dimensions of the civil struggle. Furthermore, Ahmet İnsel's article published in *Kirli Savaş* assisted in giving an insight on the civil-military relations in Algeria. Crawford Young's deliberative article composed of four reviews, *Deciphering Disorder in Africa: Is Identity the Key* (2002), also helped to support the arguments of this study.

Chapter III, which basically dealt with the problems of migrants in France and the reasons for the Beur riots, gave an opportunity to more deeply analyse particular studies. Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel's *Euro-Turks* study (2005) has been very helpful in providing a general understanding of the issue of migration in France. Moreover, it must be asserted that Kaya's other work, *The Beur Uprising: Poverty and Muslim Atheists in France* (2005), was an important source for the final chapter. The aforementioned article illustrated the problems of

the Muslim Diaspora in France. Furthermore, the article also outlines the events that on the way to the Beur riots, which has helped to signal the relation between colonialism and the uprisings in France. Moreover, Dominique Maillard's article, *The Muslims in France and the French Model of Integration* (2005), has also contributed to gain an insider eye to analyze the policies of the French government on migrants.

All aforementioned studies assisted the theoretical framework for this thesis. All analysis, ideas and comments have been very valuable to strengthen the objectivity of the study. In this part, I have tried to mention the most referenced books and articles during the formulation of this study. Due to the time and space, all the referenced sources are not mentioned here; however, the utility of the other sources, which will be elaborated during the chapters, are needless to discuss here.

CHAPTER I

SURRENDERING TO THE AURA OF COLONIALISM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

“When white men came to Africa, we had territories and they had the Bible. They taught us how to pray by closing our eyes. When we woke up, we saw that they had the territories and we had the Bible.”³

A General Outlook to the History of Colonialism

The colonization process has been the problem on five continents over the past five-hundred years. Many studies all around the world have provided deep historical investigations toward the colonizers and the colonized for many years. Before the de-colonization process that began before World War II, Europeans were analyzing their colonial past because of the limitations of their own countries and continents. Moreover, globalization and the advance of technology – specifically, the rise of the internet, and the improved political and economic conditions throughout the world – facilitated the Europeans ability to research the history of colonization on a global scale.

Modern human beings have used the glorious past of the Renaissance Age to defend their natural tendency and infirmity. This age heralded the age of colonization, a time when Europeans revealed the bloody past of their countries. Yet, the glorious past of European countries always succeeded in covering, to an extent, the evil face of colonialism. The aim of this chapter is to provide a general understanding of the history of colonization, with a focus on the colonization of the North Africa. Moreover, Chapter I will attempt to illuminate the

³ Raimondo Luraghi, *Sömürgecilik Tarihi*, trans. Halim Inal, (İstanbul: E Yayinlari, 1975), p. 1.

consequences of France's colonization of Algeria, and explain how they shaped the Algerian Civil War.

The social and political system until the end of the Middle Age was mainly based on slavery in countries with agrarian societies. The production was also made through manual labor and craftsmanship whereas the trade was based on coastal navigation. However, after the technological revolution of gunpowder and printing – via China and Europe during the end of the Middle Age -- a new social class, a modern bourgeoisie, emerged. This new class perceived working as a pivotal duty of humans, whereas it was previously perceived as the duty of slaves. Because of the absence of slave based labor, the Bourgeoisie class had to develop new techniques of production, such as searching for new energy resources.

It is beneficial to point out some of the inventions that altered the world order through their influence during the colonial period. First of all, some changes were made on the bottom of ships to fight against the giant waves in the Atlantic Ocean. These changes paved the way for new discoveries. Moreover, the watch spring improved. It was used to determine the exact longitude of a sailboat in the ocean with the invention of the compass. Furthermore, in 1530, German innovator Johann Jürgen created a spinning wheel that improved the production of fibre -- just after the initial hand of Leonardo da Vinci. He solved the problem of the flyer and thread winding. Afterward, new mining techniques and the ability to operate metals in high thermometer ovens were developed.

All aforementioned innovations caused the collapse the Middle Age craftsman. Now, a huge capital that the craftsmen could never imagine was needed in order to ramp-up production. Overwhelmed factory administrators soon became the center of production. Hence, a new

civilization was born in Western Europe, which might be called a machinery civilization, because it was based on serial production and advanced techniques. Francis Bacon, an English Philosopher and a proponent of the scientific revolution, reflected the ideology of the new civilization with these words:

Let's analyze the power, effects and the consequences of the innovations that illuminated itself with mainly three innovations of which they are not known by the olds and of which their roots have been benighted although they belong to the near future. In other words, let's analyze the innovations of printing, gunpowder and compass. All these innovations entirely changed the aspects and conditions of the world. First of them made changes in literature, second in the art of military and third in the navigation. Numerous other innovations followed these changes. We can say that these innovations made the effect on the humanity in such an extent that none of the empires or the possession could make before.⁴

According to Raimondo Luraghi, an Italian scholar, all these innovations had been the start of a revolution that would rootedly change the face of the world. Europeans who were encouraged with the ambition of possessing gold and raw material competed with each other not only to improve the trade adorned with new techniques and to provide new markets but also to discover new territories with the ambitions of invasion. They longed to possess the remaining part of the world with all those ambitions.

⁴ Luraghi, *Sömürgecilik Tarihi*, p. 16.

Now, what remained for the Europeans is only to discover and to seize. Yes, seizure. Because, Europeans used to perceive their civilization as unique in those days. This mentality, of which many Europeans and Americans still have, emerged because of the evaluation of a nation not by moral aspects but its technical level. Other nations that still involved in the civilizations of agriculture and craftsmanship were not anything other than barbarians...They were barbarians, because they did not have cannons, machineries of fiber and guns. Those men did not even think that those civilizations they met were not inferior from their civilizations; however, theirs were only different from them...According to them, those men were only barbarians and deserved to be under their thumb.⁵

Nevertheless, Robert Young draws a distinction between imperialism and colonialism by clarifying that colonial activities were carried out for commercial purposes, whereas imperialism was mostly concerned with cultural expansionism. He claimed that colonization included people whose primary aim was to settle anywhere, rather than ruling others. It was mostly associated with the notions of civilizing or missionary work in the nineteenth century. However, in most cases, it involved the latter as an outcome of the former. Briefly, colonization did not focus on transporting cultural values. That occurred as a by-product of its real goals concerning trade, economic exploitation and settlement. Young continues his argument with these words:

⁵ Luraghi, *Sömürgecilik Tarihi*, p. 17.

*Colonization, as Europeans originally used the term, signified not the rule over indigenous peoples, or the extraction of their wealth, but primarily the transfer of communities who sought to maintain their allegiance to their own original culture, while seeking a better life in economic, religious or political terms- very similar to the situation of migrants today.*⁶

Modern colonialism meant to take control of people whose economy was still agriculturally based and whose craftsmanship used underdeveloped techniques. Those who had advanced techniques bore the economy. In that sense, it may be claimed that colonialism has been a struggle between the civilization of modern industry and another civilization whose economy was based on agriculture and underdeveloped craftsmanship. Henceforth, colonial expansionism continued using the arguments of turning the world into a more civilized and humanized one. On the one hand, while the colonial powers succeeded in adapting their advanced economic and agricultural techniques to relatively underdeveloped areas, they failed to notice how they caused irreparable harm to the cultures of the colonized countries. Moreover, colonized societies adorned with advanced techniques lost their independence, and were controlled and exploited by the colonial powers; and were dragged into inferiority and wretchedness instead of civilization and development. This quotation from Jules Harmand in Edward Said's work seems quite a remarkable position on the moral aspect of colonialism:

They felt a sense of superiority to others; one French proponent of colonialism, Jules Harmand, said: It is necessary, then, to accept as a principle and point of departure the fact that there is a hierarchy of

⁶ Robert Young, *Postcolonialism: A Historical Introduction* (USA: Blackwell, 2001), p. 20.

*racas and civilizations, and that we belong to the superior race and civilization...The basic legitimation of conquest over native peoples in the conviction of our superiority, not merely our mechanical, economic, and military superiority, but our moral superiority.*⁷

As one of the authorities of the postcolonial discourses Edward Said determines in his groundbreaking book, *Orientalism*, that the Orient was almost an invention peculiar to Europe: it was the place of hard adventures, exotic creatures, images filled with haunting memories and extraordinary experiences as of the antique era.⁸ Said adds that French and British colonialists, unlike the Americans, had a rooted Orientalist tradition and had a special compromise with the East because of Orient's special status for the European-Western experience. Therefore, the East is not a neighbor for Europe; but, the region of the major richest and oldest colonies of the European countries. It was the source of their civilization and language, cultural rival and one of the deepest and mostly repeated images of the Other.⁹

The desire of the Europeans was to create a more civilized world by carrying new inventions to the relatively underdeveloped countries. This was the apparent face of the colonial adventure. Their main difficulty was the search for gold to provide capital for the young European industry that was slowly advancing toward the Industrial Revolution. This eventually occurred during the end of the late eighteenth and into the early nineteenth centuries. However, by the end of the fifteenth century, Europe was deeply involved in an economic depression. Ardent voyagers and discoverers hoped to satisfy the European sovereigns by finding new resources for the wealth of their respective country. They also wished to satisfy their own curiosity of discovering new faces of the world. Some of the

⁷ Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism*. (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), p. 17.

⁸ Edward Said, *Şarkiyatçılık*. trans. Berna Ulner. (İstanbul: Metis, 1999) p. 11.

⁹ Said, *Şarkiyatçılık*, p. 11.

Spanish discoverers like Francisco Pizarro (1476-1541), who was the conqueror of the Inca Empire, and Hernan Cortés (1485-1547), who was the conquistador of the Aztec Empire, were honored and rewarded with royal titles and some shares from the captured property of the conquered territories by the Spanish kings.

Since Pizarro and Cortés have been mentioned, it would be illuminating to deal with the invasions of the Aztec and Inca Empires. Their invasions blackened colonial history because of the cultures and civilizations destroyed. As argued above, the European perception of their own civilization as superior and unique dragged the invaders to the abolishment of other advanced civilizations. The Aztec Empire, invaded by Cortés, had developed a wide range of systems to code digits. The system provided to the ability to make mathematical and astronomical calculations. This coding system – developed by their neighboring civilization, the Maya -- was more advanced than the system found by the Europeans, even more advanced than the Greek and the Roman systems. The calendar used by the Aztecs was superior to the contemporaneous Europe calendars.¹⁰

Unfortunately, the ignorance and bigotry of the civilized Europeans razed all the findings of Aztec and Inca Empires. Juan de Zumárraga (1468-1548), who was the first Spanish archbishop of Mexico, suppressed all the books written in the Aztec language. All manuscripts were burned on the Tlatelolco square.¹¹ Henceforth, the Aztec Civilization was entirely abolished. Those sentences by Cortés clarify the dimensions of the incidents known as the Tlatelolco Massacre: *“They no longer had nor could find any arrows, javelins or stones with which to attack us, and our allies fighting with us were armed with swords and bucklers, and slaughtered so many of them on land and in the water that more than forty thousand were*

¹⁰ Luraghi, *Sömürgecilik Tarihi*, p. 70.

¹¹ Luraghi, *Sömürgecilik Tarihi*, p. 70.

*killed or taken that day. So loud was the wailing of the women and children that there was not one man among us whose heart did not bleed at the sound...*¹²

Christopher Columbus (1451-1560), who is known as the pivotal actor of the colonial age and discoverer of America, is also defined as a navigator, colonizer and explorer in many sources. Columbus earmarked the historical flow. He paved the way for colonization and showed the exact direction, while others continued his way and traveled all around the world even until the Island of Cipangu and Cathay. Although others like Pizarro and Cortés conquered empires, he laid the foundation for the invasion and rise of Spain in the New World. Hence, Columbus not only provided a new world for Leon and Castilian, but also for the entire human race. Columbus noted these sentences in his diary about the natives of Africa during his voyages:

*They seemed so honest and generous about everything they had in their hand, it is not possible to believe that without seeing them. It was possible to demand everything belonging to them since they did not refuse anything. They immediately give anything the demander wanted and they do that with such a pleasure that you think they also gave their hearts at the same time.*¹³

It will be quite beneficial to touch upon an anecdote here about the following incidents after the departure of Columbus from the coasts of Africa in 1493. A significant group of Spanish voyagers remained in the newly discovered territories used any kind of violence against the natives on their ruthless quest for gold. They raped women and enslaved the indigenous

¹² Bernal Diaz del Castillo, *The Conquest of New Spain*, trans. J. M. Cohen (Penguin Books, 1963) Available [online]: <http://thedagger.com/archive/conquest/tlatelolco.html> [entry date: 25 December 2007].

¹³ Luraghi, *Sömürgecilik Tarihi*, p. 48.

people. When the natives became impatient, they attacked the Spanish voyagers and killed all of them. Luraghi makes a remarkable comment here: *“The red color of blood and the yellow of gold went hand in hand in the history of bloody colonialism from the beginning. Until the collapse of colonized countries, gold and blood would remain as the symbol of colonialism.”*¹⁴ Colonizers also began to implement a new system called, ‘Encomienda’ for the first time in India. This system provided primarily for the invaders and the sponsors, who supported the voyagers economically. Due to the ‘Encomienda’ principles, the new landowners of the colonized territories could have the right to own slaves along with the land. This system spread to all the other colonies.

Colonization of Africa

The African continent was not perceived ultimate goal for colonization. In order to deal with the reasons why it was left behind, it would be beneficial to acknowledge its linkage with the Portuguese initiatives among the continent. Portugal officially obtained from the Pope Nicholas V. the grant of exclusive right of navigation, conquest, trade, fishery in all seas and countries which they might find between Cape Bojador and the Indies, not occupied by a Christian nation before 1454. Hence, the Dark Continent, Africa, opened its gates for the European colonizers after the discovery of Africa’s Atlantic coasts by Portuguese voyagers. They used these coasts to circumnavigate the Islamic-Venice bloc on their way to the spice route. Although the Portuguese found abundant ivory, ostrich feathers and slaves, there was no spice except pepper. They gained about 2,400 kilos of gold, which exceeded the 1,500 kilos annually panned out in Europe. Furthermore, it was not possible to pan out silver in Africa, whereas, 59,000 kilos silver was annually panned out in Europe.¹⁵ In spite of their

¹⁴ Luraghi, *Sömürgecilik Tarihi*, p. 48.

¹⁵ Luraghi, *Sömürgecilik Tarihi*, p. 30.

early settlement in the African coasts, Portuguese conquistadors did not perceive the African continent as their ultimate goal and did not move into the interiors of the continent. Africa was used as a transit road to reach India.

The African continent named by the ancient geographers as ‘unknown territories’ (*terra incognitae*) was still not discovered until the end of the nineteenth century. This continent, which was the first one discovered by the conquistadors, had been the final one that abided the European colonialism. The reasons why Africa had been colonized lately lie behind the hard geographical conditions of the continent basically. Since the African continent had an arid climate and immense deserts, those conditions caused the invaders’ hesitation to go inside the continent. European vessels held to their perception of Africa as a hindrance. And they left the continent to its fate since they were not aware of the fact that the African continent, the other coast of the Mediterranean Sea, was face to face with the European coasts.

Although Africa did not sound very attractive for the invaders due to the lack of gold and silver and limited spices, the continent turned into a shiny asset for the colonialists in terms of the slave trade. Since the rapid eradication of the redskin natives reached dreadful dimensions in America, landowners faced difficulty in finding workers on the fields. Therefore, one of the darkest pages of the history was opened in 1501, with the transfer of the African natives to America: the Slave trade.¹⁶ For centuries, Europeans used to capture and transport African natives. They were renamed, “*black ivory*” and were used in America in the agricultural areas. Three dangerous activities that would harm the world up until today were rooted and carried out in three different zones in the world: Opium smuggling in China, arm traffic in

¹⁶ Luraghi, *Sömürgecilik Tarihi*, p. 58.

Japan and slave trade in Africa. Rit Nosotro summarizes the colonization of Africa and the start of slave trade in his comparative essay by these sentences:

Prior to the 19th century, the rest of the world knew very little about Africa, the Dark Continent. What trade was transacted between Europeans and African traders occurred on the coast. However, beginning in the early 1800s, explorers began to explore the African interior. Many of the first European explorers in Africa were missionaries who felt called to minister to the pagan African tribes. Many of these missionaries also wanted to eradicate the poisonous trade that wrecked havoc on so many poor Africans, the slave trade. After seven centuries of being brutalized by the Arab slave traders, Europeans took great advantage of the existing system of blacks capturing blacks to feed the huge demand of large plantations in the Americas. So Swahili or black traders trekked throughout Africa, capturing blacks or buying prisoners from other native tribes to sell as slaves on the coast.¹⁷

All in all, in the aftermath of the French Revolution in 1789, the system of colonization in the New World began to fracture. Africa, the first continent stepped on by the voyagers, was also the last to bear European colonialism. Colonialism began on this continent, even while it was collapsing in others.

¹⁷ Rit Nosotro, *Europe's Colonization of Africa*. Available [online]: <http://www.hyperhistory.net/apwh/essays/comp/cw25colonizationafrica.htm> [entry date: 3 January 2008].

Colonization of Algeria

The colonial process in Algeria started with a very simple cause; however, it ended with very heavy consequences. The French Republic was having domestic problems in 1830. In Paris, bread prices soared as wages were cut creating rampant unemployment; some 64,000 Parisians had no stable employment. This signified that they were dependent either on charity or crime. King Charles X and his minister, Prince de Polignac, were planning a revolution to mobilize the public and turn the country into an absolute monarchy. Alison Tarwater summarizes the starting point of the colonial rule in Algeria with these sentences:

On April 29, 1827, the dey of Algiers made an unfortunate mistake; in the midst of an argument with French diplomats over the settlement of debts, he struck the French consul in the face with a fan. Less than two months later, French troops landed in Algeria, beginning the process of colonization that would soon give them control of the entire Maghreb region. France's conquest of Algeria sparked the imperialist movement that continued well into the 20th century, not ending until after World War II.¹⁸

This incident provided France with an apparent excuse to invade Algeria. Although the fan incident is frequently cited as the cause of France's invasion of Algeria, the situation is actually much deeper and more complex. During the French Revolution, France borrowed large amounts of grain and money from the Jewish houses of Bacri and Busnach in Algeria.¹⁹

¹⁸ Alison Tarwater, "French Colonization in the Maghreb: A Central Influence in Both Regions Today". (Master's thesis, Howard Community College, 2005), p. 1.

¹⁹ Elijah Beaver, "A Brief History of Algeria". Available [online]: http://www3.baylor.edu/~Elijah_Beaver/algeria.htm [entry date: 15 January 2008].

When the two houses found themselves in debt to the *Dey of Algiers*²⁰, they began to pressure France to finally repay its debts at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Additionally, the two houses informed the Dey of Algiers that they would be unable to pay their debts to Algeria. The Dey took over negotiations at this point and began pressuring France for the money. It was during an argument over France's payments that the Dey hit the French consul with a fan, insulted over the French King's lack of response about the country's debts. To the French, this act was a personal insult to the King. After the Dey of Algiers refused their request for an official apology, they attacked the city without considering the French opposition in Paris. Within one month, the entire country was under French occupation -- where it would stay for over 100 years.²¹

The attempts of Charles X and Polignac by announcing *Four Ordinances*, which would annul the constitution and aimed to declare the absolute monarchy, precipitated the July Revolution in France. Charles X had to escape in the same year and Louis-Philippe d'Orléans ascended to the throne by giving wide constitutional guarantees. France claimed Algeria as an heir despite challenging domestic developments. Because Charles X left behind only feudal ruins, his successor, Louis-Philippe, had to grapple with problems coming from banks, and the capitalist interests of grand traders. As it is already known, capital owners had a great penchant for colonial exploration. Furthermore, the Parisian chief of police had already deployed 1,500 Parisians to Algeria to secure the welfare of the French capital. According to him, Algerian society would not be civilized without France.²²

²⁰ This title is given to the rulers of the Regency of Algiers during the Ottoman period from 1671 onwards.

²¹ Alison, "French Colonization in the Maghreb: A Central Influence in Both Regions Today," p. 11.

²² Luraghi, *Sömürgecilik Tarihi*, p. 233.

France employed French as the official language in its colonies. This paved the way for hegemony within the colonies, and cultural imperialism. Secondly, the economies and political life of colonized countries became dependant on France in order to be productive. In economical terms, France created the Franc Zone, an economic system in African countries that used the CFA franc as their currency after World War II. The system was designed to create interdependency between France and the countries of the Maghreb so that they could still support each other, even after the decolonization period. In political terms, the governments established in the colonized countries were basically puppets, since France was deeply involved in the political affairs of its colonies.

After the French occupation, Algerians fought against the French soldiers under the leadership of Emir Abdulkadir. He was the son of an Algerian dervish who knew guerilla tactics. He liberated a wide range of Algerian territory. Abdulkadir was attacked on 23 September 1847 and besieged. He surrendered only after his food and ammunition ran out. Thus, the Congress of Berlin, held in 1878, gave France a green light to establish a protectorate in North Africa. The congress' outcome was uneventful for North Africa, since it mainly focused on the problems in the Balkans related to the Ottoman Empire and Russia. Moreover, the Treaty of Bardo was signed between the French Republic and the Tunisian Bey Muhammed as-Sadiq on 12 May 1881. The pretext of the treaty is mentioned by these acknowledgements:

A raid of Algeria by the Tunisian Kroumer tribe served as a pretext for French armed forces to invade Tunisia. Jules Ferry, the French foreign minister, managed to send a French expeditionary force of approximately 36,000 troops to defeat the Kroumer tribe. The French met little resistance from both the Kroumer tribe and from as-Sadiq.

*Eventually, the French withdrew their forces after signing the treaty. However, the terms of the agreement gave France responsibility for the defense and foreign policy decisions of Tunisia. Henceforth, Tunis became a French protectorate.*²³

The Berlin West African Conference was held in 1884-1885 under the initiative of the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898). This conference enabled both big and small states to appease one another as they carved out their share of North African colonies without touching big states' spots. According to Bismarck, Germany, having already completed its unification in 1870 was positioned amongst the developed European states, to have a large share of the colonies. As Catherine Savage Pulsipher defined, the European diplomats shared Africa in Berlin like a cake.²⁴ Foreign ministers from fourteen European states and the United States established important guidelines for the future exploitation of the Dark Continent. France, Germany, Great Britain and Portugal were major actors in the meeting. Africans were not invited to the conference. And they had no say in their future, as it was determined in the Berlin Conference Document.²⁵

Decolonization Period Starting with World War I

The decolonization process goes back to the atmosphere of the World War I. To understand the background of the decolonization period, one must know the global events that led up to World War I (1914-1918). Great Britain and France used the League of Nations as a justification to annex Syria and Palestine as colonies. When the African and the Middle

²³ *The Encyclopedia of World History*, 6th ed., s.v. "1880, June- Nov." Available [online]: <http://www.bartelby.net/67/1110.html> [entry date: 15 January 2008].

²⁴ Luraghi., *Sömürgecilik Tarihi*, p. 336.

²⁵ *Convention Revising the General Act of Berlin, February 26, 1885 and the General Act and Declaration of Brussels, July 2, 1890*. Available [online]: <http://wysinger.homestead.com/berlin-conference-doc.html> [entry date: 20 January 2008].

Eastern colonies realized this, they were despondent because they knew they would only be allowed to set up puppet governments, whose fingers the European states could twist. The people of the colonized territories finally noticed that promises of reform were only a deception.

During WWI, the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 established the Soviet Republic in Russia. The leader of the Republic, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, announced following the revolution that the colonized world was the guarantee of the capitalist world. In the aftermath of this announcement, communist initiators attempted to agitate people who were under the protectorate of the European countries. According to Luraghi, this policy incited turmoil in the colonies, and heralded the decolonization process after the World War II. The European countries were worried that their colonies would come under the influence of the Communist bloc. And they realized that they had to give up their hegemony to stop the communist expansion.²⁶

During the WWII, Algeria and Morocco were under the control of the US and Britain. France was occupied by the Nazis. Although France regained her colonies after the end of the war, she could no longer control them. Tunisia and Morocco declared their independence in 1956; however, Algeria was the only remaining French colony in the North Africa. The squabbling between and amongst the European countries forced them to be more dependant on the resources of their colonized territories. It was not possible to avoid the reflections of the grand war given against the Nazi and Fascist bloc to the entire world. The armed struggle against the Nazis in Europe had spread from Indonesian jungles to Maghrebian deserts. This was the final stage: The stage of the Decolonization.

²⁶ Luraghi, *Sömürgecilik Tarihi*, p. 21.

The Bandung Conference was held in the city of Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955 and had twenty-nine participating countries from Africa and Asia. It had a remarkable impact on colonialism. The ultimate goal of the conference was to determine the methods for rescuing the countries that were still under colonial rule. The conference made a catalyzing impression on the people in colonized countries.

Decolonization of Algeria

The decolonization process in Algeria was intertwined with the French political life. French rulers tried ‘assimilate’ the country in 1871 to combat the Algerian revolt. Luraghi criticized this system as a French policy that was eradicating the Algerian nation.²⁷ The system of assimilation had two primary pillars. First, the Algerian citizens were treated as equals to the European settlers. However, they were considered socially and morally inferior, especially when it came to official matters. Second, this system turned the French settlers of Algeria into gendarmes because of rulers’ racist attempts. It might be enlightening to reference Alison Tarwater’s article when dealing with the French policy of assimilation:

*France focused its power on assimilation. It attempted to create in its colonies the same feelings of loyalty toward France that “real” French people felt. Thus, France’s colonization of countries created a territory almost fully dependent on the French government. Algeria in particular is evidence of this tendency, and although Morocco and Tunisia were more autonomous colonies, they were relatively dependent on the authority of France.*²⁸

²⁷ Luraghi, *Sömürgecilik Tarihi*, pp. 308-309.

²⁸ Tarwater, “French Colonization in the Maghreb: A Central Influence in Both Regions Today,” p. 5.

One might claim that the road to independence for Algeria began with the establishment of the North African Star (ENA) in Paris in 1919. The organization under the leadership of Ahmed Ben Messali Hadj (1898-1974), a former combatant, initially limited the actions of ENA only to Northern African workers in France until 1927. Following his critical decision to spread the actions to the entire Algeria in 1936, the ENA was immediately banned. In the aftermath, Messali founded Algerian People's Party (PPA) in 1937. PPA was banned as well and Messali was put on trial for agitation, and imprisoned for several years in 1941.

After World War II broke out, the right-wing Vichy government was established in France in 1940. Many Europeans living in Algeria supported the Vichy government that showed cooperationist tendencies. The Allies sent troops into Algeria in 1942. To the contrary, General Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970) called all the Algerians to fight against Nazism and Fascism. De Gaulle received the expected reply from Ferhat Abbas (1899-1985), an Algerian political leader who was deeply influenced by the French culture. Abbas had already denounced an Algerian nation and agreed to cooperate with France in 1936. In 1943, without altering his ideology, Abbas decided to support Algerian independence only under the roof of liberty. Abbas and twenty-eight local members published the Manifesto of Algerian People in 1943. In the manifesto, Abbas and his friends called for autonomy and a constitution prepared by a constitutional assembly elected by the public.²⁹

In the aftermath of these developments, France arrested Abbas; however, they had given some concessions and detainees were released. After his release, Abbas met with Messali, who was in custody in France, and with some representatives from the Algerian Ulema. In 1944, they

²⁹ Luraghi, *Sömürgecilik Tarihi*, p. 309.

formed the Friends of the Manifesto and of Liberty (AML). The aim of this organization was to establish a federal Algeria based on equality under French control. Half a million people joined the AML; however, the ongoing war delayed the French response. However, a series of skirmishes had already broken out between the French and Algerians by the end of the war. Luraghi contributes those days in his book:

*Algerian people experienced arrestments, executions without trials and village bombardments from sea during this period. According to the data provided from the American Consulate, 40,000 Algerian were killed and all organizations were banned. Europeans who demanded Ferhat Abbas and other Algerian leaders to be executed by shooting recommended the need of cruel gendarme in Algerian territories.*³⁰

Nevertheless, Frantz Fanon (1925-1961), whose works have inspired countries under colonial rule, claimed that five years of struggle brought no political change. The French authorities continued to proclaim Algeria to be French.³¹ Moreover, the French National Assembly approved the Organic Statute of Algeria in August 1947. This new statute provided some political rights for the Algerians. Moreover, it considered all Algerians to be French citizens; however, they were divided them into two categories: the First part consisted of half million French electorates who had returned from France by giving up their Muslim identity. The second part consisted of nine-million second class French citizen Algerians. Only half a million of this group had the right to vote. Each of the two categories had the right to elect sixty members to a local assembly; however, forty-three of the sixty members were

³⁰ Luraghi, *Sömürgecilik Tarihi*, p. 310.

³¹ Frantz Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism* (New York: Grove Pres, 1965), p. 23.

candidates of the ruling French elites. All the mentioned policies brought the French injustice and inequality into sharp relief, since the forty-three members were French sympathizers.³²

Meanwhile, Ferhat Abbas engaged in a more decisive fight against France by establishing the Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto (UDMA) in 1946. While the Algerian National Movement (MNA) demanded separation, Messali denominated his old party as the Movement of the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD) and aimed to replace PPA that same year. The MTLD had a publishing arm that only existed for a few weeks, but nevertheless succeeded in crystallizing many MTLD arguments. The MTLD's publications clarified that despite Messali's lowly actions predicated on racist principles, the ideological content of the Algerian independence movement should be clearly defined. Furthermore, published articles highlighted the idea that supporting Algerian nationalism because of racial prejudices or religious intolerance should be unconditionally rejected. The ideology of the MTLD did not have any relations with hostile nationalism. The MTLD also emphasized through its publications that the Algerian independence movement was the direct reaction of a colonized nation against fanatic imperialism.³³

The Algerian riot started in Cebel al Aurés in November 1954. The Revolutionarist Union and Action Committee turned into the National Salvation Front (FLN). The Algerian combatants who formed the Army of the National Salvation (ALN) obeyed the FLN. The French rulers easily suppressed the riots after banning the MTLD, which was then still not aware of recent incidents; however, this ban also led members of the MTLD to join the national front as well.

³² Luraghi, *Sömürgecilik Tarihi*, p. 310.

³³ Luraghi, *Sömürgecilik Tarihi*, p. 311.

The riots that broke out in Aurés spread to other Algerian provinces like Constantine and Oran in 1955.³⁴

Forty-nine Algerian deputies of the National Assembly demanded absolute equality among the Muslim Algerians. Jacques Soustelle, Governor General of Algeria, offered a new method for the Algerians that would replace assimilation: Integration. For Allison Tarwater, the French killed more than just Algerians during the war for independence. Tarwater emphasized in her article that French settlers also lost many people in Algeria:

However, the Algerians continued their fight against the settlers, and after a massacre of pieds-noirs that killed more than 3,000 French settlers, the majority of the French living in Algeria left the country and returned to France. In 1962, with the French population almost gone, the country was finally granted its independence, a feat which had taken as many as 1,000,000 lives.³⁵

The new Prime Minister Guy Mollet, who thought he would win a victory against the National Salvation Army, asserted in 1956 the formula of ‘truce, elections and bargaining’.³⁶ That policy fueled the war, and increased military intervention in French politics. As a result, Robert Lacoste was sent as minister to Algeria. Lacoste was definitely sent there with more authorization to perform oppression and coercion of any kind. Lacoste’s deployment was followed by the launch of two barbarous systems that paralyzed the entire world. The first one implemented systematic torture while the second formed concentration camps. Countless detainees and suspects became victims of inconceivable tortures by SSs. The foreigners’

³⁴ Luraghi, *Sömürgecilik Tarihi*, p. 313.

³⁵ Tarwater, “French Colonization in the Maghreb: A Central Influence in Both Regions Today,” p. 5.

³⁶ Luraghi, *Sömürgecilik Tarihi*, p. 314.

legion was already full of former SSs. Regarding all those events, numerous documents have been collected even in France and these documents will always remain as evidences of the acute pain that the people of Algeria once suffered. Fanon makes a significant remark about the injuries of the Algerians:

*Question any woman or any man anywhere on the earth's surface and ask her or him if the Algerian people have not already acquired the right to be twenty times independent. There is no one, in 1959, apart from those Frenchmen who have dragged their country into this horrible adventure, who does not yearn to see the end of this slaughter and the birth of the Algerian nation.*³⁷

In 1958, the National Salvation Front (FLN) formed the interim government of the Republic of Algeria. Ferhat Abbas, this time inclining to fight against the enemy till the end, became the first prime minister of that government. Even General De Gaulle's remarks that Algerians had the unconditional right to vote on issues related to 'Algeria's necessary development' and 'Algerians self-determination right', as well as his will to 'solve the problem consciously, concisely, and without any conditions' did not prevent further strife. Not even the Algerians' decision to be known as a nation. Fanon's contribution about De Gaulle is quite worthy:

General de Gaulle, addressing himself to Algeria's extremists recently, declared that "Papa's Algeria is dead." That is quite true. But it is not the whole truth. Big Brother's Algeria is dead too. There

³⁷ Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism*, p. 27.

*is a new Algeria, an Algerian nation, an Algerian government. These obvious facts will sooner or later have to be recognized.*³⁸

On June 14, 1960, the President said, “*Algeria belongs to Algerians,*” and in that way, a tie was established with the Interim Government of the Republic of Algeria. But soldiers immediately reacted against that. General Challe, Jouhaud, Salan, and Zeller rebelled in April 1961.³⁹ However, their failure resulted in the organization of a number of officers into the Secret Army Organization, which later launched macabre acts of carnage, slaughter and looting since it knew that there was nothing else to do from that time on. That terrible vulgarity lasted till the French left Algeria.

The war lasted for eight years. It turned everything into a blood pool and its economic costs were astronomical. And the French in Algeria ... At the beginning, they never wanted to give anything. But in the end, they had to give everything they previously owned. A French delegation headed by Louis Joke and another delegation headed by Kerim Belkasim and comprised of some members of the Republic of Algeria’s Interim Government met in Evian on May 20, 1961. Negotiations were halted on June 13, but started again on March 7, 1962. Eleven days later, on March 18, both parties signed a couple of agreements that were later called the Evian Agreements. Finally, the independent Republic of Algeria was founded on July 1, 1962.

It will be beneficial to make some concluding remarks for this chapter about the affects of Algerian independence. Algeria, which was one of the first colonies, was one of the last to gain independence. The rebirth of Africa due to decolonization, and the establishment of the

³⁸ Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism*, p. 32.

³⁹ Luraghi, *Sömürgecilik Tarihi*, p. 318.

Algerian Republic in 1962, practically ended the colonial world and opened-up a restructuring period in Africa. A French Arabic named Jacques Berque, who specialized in the North African, region comments:

*France and Algeria? We did not intertwine for 130 years without being profoundly implicated in our souls and bodies. The depth of the French impact has far exceeded here the habitual alienations of colonialism, colonial exploitation, and mercantilism. A great fortune and misfortune. Here, being afflicted down to the marrow; hence the violence of this resentment, a frenzy leading to terrible adventures. But from there, perhaps, also originates the source of a solution that can only come from shared expiation.*⁴⁰

“Nevertheless, the colonial regimes caused the major harm over North Africa and especially on Algeria where France tried to cause the natives forget their nationalities and impose a European elite class”, Luraghi says.⁴¹ However, the age of colonialism left major problems in its wake. It may be supported that although the French policy of colonialism ended years ago indeed, its effects are still evident in France and throughout the Maghreb. These problems still involve all humanity. It should not be considered as an exaggeration that the peace in the world mainly depends on the rapid and correct solutions to these problems.

⁴⁰ Jean Daniel. “Dissident Algeria,” *Research in African Literatures* 30, no. 15 (Fall 1999), p. 11.

⁴¹ Luraghi., *Sömürgecilik Tarihi*, p. 326.

CHAPTER II

CHASING THE ALGERIAN CIVIL WAR: A HISTORY OF RESURRECTION OR TANTALIZATION?

*"The Civil War is not ended: I question whether any serious civil war ever does end."
--T. S. Eliot*

Algeria: Reborn from Its Ashes

Analysing a country's past cannot be independent from an investigation of its present. A general outlook on Algeria – about its location, demography, population, borders and politics – will provide the reader with a better understanding of its past. Algeria, a country that faced two civil wars after it gained independence from colonial rule, has many peculiarities today that enlighten its past. Algeria has a chequered history because of its location amidst Europe, the Middle-East, Africa and Asia. During its long history, the country faced six different invasions starting with the Carthaginians, followed by the Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, Arab and Ottoman, before being colonized by France.

The People's Democratic Republic of Algeria is the second largest Arab-African country after Sudan. It is almost one-third of the size of the US continent and resides on the Mediterranean coast of Africa, midway between Tangier and Tunis. Algeria is also the eleventh largest country in the world in terms of its total surface area. The country lies opposite of Majorca. Its territorial characteristic runs a gamut between the mountainous, fertile terrain of the north and the great area of arid desert in the south. Ninety percent of the population lives on the fertile coastal strip that extends about 50 miles inland and stretches about 950 miles from Morocco in the west, to Tunisia in the east. The cities of Algiers, Oran and Annaba, are situated in this area along the coast. The rugged hills and mountains of the Kabylie and the Aures rise to the south of the coastal plain. A high plateau, which is semiarid, lies behind the mountains.

Moreover, about 200 miles inland, is the vast Sahara Desert, which accounts for almost ninety percent of the country.

Algeria, is dominated by a young population – just like the other North African countries. It has one of the world’s largest population growth rates at 1.88 percent. According to recent census data, the population has climbed to over thirty-two million. One third of it is thought to be under the age of fifteen while seventy-five percent is under the age of forty.⁴² The Algerian population is mostly composed of the indigenous ‘Berber’ or ‘Amazigh’ people, who constitute ninety-seven percent of its population. The presence of the Amazigh culture can be traced back to 4000 B.C.E. Moreover, about 45,000 Roman Catholics and 350,000 Protestant Christians, along with some 500 Jews, shape the minority groups in the country. According to the 1996 Constitution, Algeria is defined as an Islamic, Arab and Amazigh Country.⁴³ Although, it will be illuminated in the “civil war” title, acknowledgments about the role of demography in this part will be noteworthy. Paul A. Silverstain makes a determination on this role in his article, *The New Barbarians*:

Berberophones in Algeria likewise constitute themselves as occupying a frontier zone. Kabylia in particular, with its vertiginous mountains, has a long and self-conscious history of resistance to the authority of the center. It was the last region to be pacified by French colonial forces and the site of important rebellions and fierce fighting through the long period of decolonization. Since independence, Kabyle men have repeatedly engaged in violent battles with state forces, in 1963, April 1980, July 1998, and most recently in April 2001. Such opposition politics translates into not only a

⁴² Anthony McGee, “Algeria,” Available [online]: www.rthonbrucegeorgemp.co.uk/pdfs/16.pdf [entry date: 20 February 2008].

⁴³ *The Constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, 1996.* Available [online]: <http://www.apn-dz.org/apn/english/constitution96/preamble.htm> [entry date: 12 March 2008]

*social movement for linguistic rights but also a significant third pole in the Algerian civil war, with Kabyle villages arming themselves in “self-defense” militias under the control of political parties and regional associations.*⁴⁴

Furthermore, Algeria can be classified as a middle-income country with an annual per-capita income of \$2,031. Unemployment is roughly thirty percent, seventy-five percent of which is below the age of thirty. The civil war occurred between 1991-2002 and effectively bulldozed the country, which now needs two million new houses. Many of the existing ones are claimed to be out of use. Anthony McGee claims in his article, *Algeria*, that the country has made progress under the rule of President Bouteflika. He also emphasizes that because of improved security, the country has become more attractive to international investment. Furthermore, its attempts to modernize its financial markets through the creation of secondary credit markets, has met with some success.⁴⁵

Pre-Civil War Period (1962-1991)

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Algeria declared its independence in 1962. There was a war for independence that occurred between 1954 and 1962. The success of the reconstruction period in the aftermath of the war of independence, which sought to build the state, is still debated. However, the prior to the Civil War, many incidents occurred that paved the way for the Civil War that broke out in 1991. During this transition period, Ahmed Ben Bella, the leader of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) which assumed power upon independence, became the first Prime Minister of the country. Ben Bella, however, was later removed by

⁴⁴ Paul A. Silverstein, “The New Barbarians: Piracy and Terrorism on the North African Frontier,” *CR: The New Centennial Review* 5: 1(Spring 2005): 202.

⁴⁵ McGee, “Algeria.”

Colonel Honari Boumedienne. During this time, Algeria was led by a military regime until Boumedienne's death in 1978. Subsequently, a civilian government was established in 1978. After this power change, the military's control became more subtle. Civilians began to take up significant posts such as that of President. However, filling these posts was always at the military's behest.⁴⁶

A British security journal published by the Royal United Services Institution (RUSI) listed the reasons of corrosion in Algerian society, along with those in Egypt; and chronicled the rise of Islamic extremism that precipitated the civil war. This list repudiated the arguments of those who pointed at religious extremism as the pivotal reason for the civil war. Instead, it pointed to economic factors:

*In both Egypt and Algeria the rise of militant Islam is symptomatic of a crisis of identity and loss of direction echoed across the Arab world. The cause of Arab nationalism, used by governments to galvanize popular support in the post-colonial age has failed to achieve its goals. Socialist economic programs, followed by faltering attempts at liberalization, have not succeeded in stemming the tide of growing unemployment and impoverishment in the face of rapid population growth.*⁴⁷

The ruling Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) was meaningless for the young urban generation in Algeria. That's because they were the malcontents of the slogans of the national liberation and socialist revolution during those days. The October 1988 uprisings were the first volley of incidents against the regime. And it was violently suppressed. In the aftermath

⁴⁶ McGee, "Algeria."

⁴⁷ McGee, "Algeria."

of these uprisings, the FIS emerged as the most potent rival to the FLN and won a surprising success in the 1990 local elections. Along with the local success, the FIS declared a triumph during the parliamentary elections in January 1992; however, the military-civilian intervention did not allow for a second ballot of the elections. So the military-civilian intervention prevented an Islamist regime to take root. Graham E. Fuller makes a remarkable contribution in his book, *Algeria: The Next Fundamentalist State?* on the regime discussions:

Several concerns were prominent in this context, but so far none has developed to the extent many analysts feared. The first and overarching concern was the possibility of a government collapse and the advent of an Islamic regime in Algiers. In retrospect, this scenario seems far-fetched, but in the early 1990s, against a background of active Islamist movements elsewhere, the potential for Algeria to become the “next fundamentalist state” was taken seriously in many quarters.⁴⁸

Shortly after the military intervention, civil war broke out. More than a hundred thousand people died, according to official estimations. It will be beneficial to mention the attitude of the Western countries toward domestic events in Algerian. At the beginning of the crisis, Western policy toward Algeria was one of containment rather than intervention. Algiers had already been forcefully opposed to any role of outside actors in Algeria’s internal affairs, whether by governments, the European Union, or any nongovernmental organizations, Ian Lesser claimed.⁴⁹ Hence, Algeria, reborn from its ashes in the aftermath of the country’s decolonization, fell into the trap of civil war in the 1990s.

⁴⁸ Graham E. Fuller, *Algeria: The Next Fundamentalist State?* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1996), pp 116-17.

⁴⁹ Ian O.Lesser, “Policy toward Algeria after a Decade of Isolation,” *Mediterranean Quarterly* (Spring 2001): p.10.

Algerian Civil War: A Civil War or a Deep State Struggle?

In every war, whether it is a civil war or not, there are at least two parties fighting with each other, and ultimately, a loser. Habib Suadiya, who was an army officer in Algeria, wrote sincerely about the two parties of the Algerian Civil War in his memoir, *La Sale Guerre (Dirty War)*: “This was not a simple fight between the “good” soldiers who came to rescue democracy and “bad” Islamist terrorists who were decisive to eradicate democracy.”⁵⁰ The loser of this war was the Algerians. For Suadiya, Algeria was not a country that had an army; to the contrary, the army was the one that had a country: Algeria.⁵¹

The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won local elections in 1990 after the single party regime collapsed in 1988. The 1990 elections were a turning point for the outbreak of the civil war in Algeria. In January 1992, the FIS swept the first ballot of parliamentary elections by winning 188 seats out of 231. However, the military-civilian junta abolished the elections and declared martial law in February 1992. Because of the military-civilian intervention, more than one hundred thousand people died in conflict, massacres and assassinations. Thousands of people were lost and many of them were tortured. Algeria was dragged into chaos. The causes of the Algerian Civil War primarily have two dimensions. Under the general topic of civil war, the notion of civil war, and the details of its consequences on the interior struggle in Algeria, will be discussed. Moreover, the economic and religious dimensions of the Algerian Civil War will be examined under the following sub topics.

It can be claimed that the surge of independence in the North African countries paralyzed its economies and patrimonial autocracies that subsequently faced bankruptcy and political illegitimacy. At the beginning of the 1990s, a continental tide of apparent democratic

⁵⁰ Habib Suadiya, *Kirli Savaş*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), p. 32.

⁵¹ Suadiya, *Kirli Savaş*, p. 38.

awakening and economic reform raised hopes, briefly, of an African resurrection.⁵² On the other hand, during the 1980s and 1990s, more than a quarter of the African states that faced armed struggles were engaged in civil wars. First, the economic factors of these insurgences can be listed as falling oil revenues and rising unemployment; second, political factors consisted of power struggles between the military and elite classes; third, an identity crisis, stemming from cultural and religious factors, created divergent understandings of Islamic jihad that occurred within Algerian communities. All the aforementioned factors will provide a general understanding of the roots of the civil war, along with the factors that sustained it.

Although some scholars interpreted the state's weakness as an outcome of colonial polity, other scholars perceived the conditions as a resurgence of older modes of political practice. According to Crawford Young, these earlier works offered many productive insights to explain the full implications of the prolonged state crisis; however, they were still far from making determinations for further inquiries to enlighten the endemic civil war.⁵³ For Zaki Ergas, "*Others attributed the striking state deflation to the scope of the hegemonic pretensions of the postcolonial state, which incorporated and expanded the legacy of its colonial predecessor by pushing political monopoly and command economy far beyond the bounds of sustainability.*"⁵⁴ In that sense, Young makes a remarkable contribution here by criticizing the past political or economic elaborations. These previous elaborations only partially explained the state crises and civil disorder. That's because they failed to provide a dimension of ethnicity, race and religion. They should have included a multidimensional perspective by emphasizing the importance of cultural diversity among the Algerian society with a comparative analysis of ethnicity, race and religion.⁵⁵

⁵² Crawford Young, "Deciphering Disorder in Africa: Is Identity the Key?," *World Politics*: 54 (July 2002): p. 532.

⁵³ Young, "Deciphering Disorder in Africa: Is Identity the Key?," p. 535.

⁵⁴ Zaki Ergas, ed., *The African State in Transition* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 57-8.

⁵⁵ Young, "Deciphering Disorder in Africa: Is Identity the Key?," p. 536.

The disintegration of existing armies in North Africa after decolonization was another factor that eased tensions within the countries, especially in Algeria. The dissident militias of the disintegrated armies, along with reservoirs of the emergent unemployed that had no marketable skills other than soldiering, were the ready communes to take a part in the civil war. Unemployed soldiers combined with former military officers; and together, they became actors in Algeria's civil war. Some of those former officers had been educated in the finest military institutions of France, Britain, and the United States. They brought sophisticated warfare knowledge to insurgent groups. Moreover, fighters from the guerrilla war against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan were another significant source of military experience and skills. Indeed, the international militias of jihad fighters included a number of Africans and Afghans. They had an important role in the Algerian armed insurrection. The aim of this chapter is not to deal with the massacres and number of deaths in the civil war.⁵⁶ The main focus will be on discussing the political and economic consequences of the civil war. Hence, the contributions of Ahmet Insel, a Turkish scholar, will enlighten the essence of the civil war, apparently a deep state plot:

There was concrete information from different sources about an existing junta composed of high ranking and retired generals and its domestic hierarchy by the middle of 1990's. A "band" had filled the gap of FLN that virtually collapsed at the middle of 1980. The emerged scene was awesome. A band in the Algerian army composed of high ranking officers was inspecting oil and gas exports of Algeria behind the policy of the "uprooting Islamists" and seizing some of the income and gaining a systematic

⁵⁶ For further investigation on the notion of civil war you can read, H. Magnus Enzensberger, *Civil Wars from L.A to Bosnia*, New York: The New Press 1990.

*commission from the entire import. All the income was collected in a wide pool and was being shared.*⁵⁷

While thousands of Algerian youngsters joined the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the armed wing of the FIS, many others joined the armed groups in the suburban areas. The youths that joined these groups sought to escape the violence of the private military corps that were established in 1993. These private corps were bound to the Head of the General Staff, Mohammed Lamari. The private forces had 15,000 members to start and reached 60,000 by 1995. The private forces began a so-called “cylinder operation” to the districts that voted for FIS in the final elections. Insel explains the army’s goal for the operation with those words:

*The official aim was to destroy the relations of the armed groups and the suburban districts who harshly opposed the government for thirty years by terrorizing them. Any kind of method was used to do so: collecting men from the streets, dynamiting houses, targeted murders, shootings in the mosque exits, secret arrestments, lost men or showy massive arrestments and unbelievable smashed bodies dynamited after beheaded.*⁵⁸

Describing the violence as a struggle between the Muslim insurgents and the Algerian government is simplistic, if not highly dubious. That’s because the violence in Algeria became more divergent and less political over time -- observers of the Algerian struggle emphasized that the essence of this violence changed significantly over time. The violence that rapidly escalated after the cancellation of the 1992 elections was an insurgent dominated struggle, led by urban terrorism that sought to defeat the secular regime and establish an

⁵⁷ Ahmet Insel, “Generaller Çetesinin Elindeki Cezayir,” *Kirli Savaş*, trans. Siren İdemem (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), p. 22.

⁵⁸ Insel, “Generaller Çetesinin Elindeki Cezayir,” p. 18.

Islamic state. For Lesser, the violence has turned into a more personalized and chaotic one, driven by vendettas, family and village rivalries, factional struggles on all sides, and economic opportunism:

The Algerian conflict, like many civil wars elsewhere, has produced an entrenched war economy, bolstering diverse interests in a continuation of the violence. In short, the violence has become privatized and increasingly anarchic, and this newer manifestation of Algeria's turmoil coexists alongside hardened remnants of the Islamic insurgency. The current violence may not threaten the survival of the military backed regime, but it may prove even more intractable and less amenable to political solutions than in earlier phases of the crisis.⁵⁹

When it comes to the political arena of the country during the civil war, one should acknowledge that the suspicious assassination of the President Mohammed Budiaf in June 1992 offers a notable revelation about the political situation. After two transitional years, the Algerian army appointed Liamine Zeroual for presidency; however, the violence increased because of the new president's policies. According to some scholars, massive destruction followed any kind of dialogue experience between the government and FIS. The most destructive three attacks occurred in succession in autumn, 1997. According to Insel, the aforementioned three massacres sent many political messages:

These were the messages of the Algerian army: To give the President Zeroual the message that the restructuring the political era by establishing

⁵⁹ Lesser, "Policy toward Algeria after a Decade of Isolation," p. 14.

*a direct dialogue with the FIS leaders was not his duty; to remind the FIS and other Islamic organizations that they have to accept their conditions without any exception if they demand to end the terrorist activities including their followers and sympathizers; to mention the Algerian public that they do not have any choice other than to be subjected to the decision makers in this massive bloody wildness hysteria; and to show to the international public opinion that they are the only ones who can oppose the Islamic barbarism by showing its dimensions once more, although their hands are dirty as well.*⁶⁰

The resignation of Zeroual was arguably the first step toward the end of the civil war. After his resignation, Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected in February 1999. It can be claimed that the amnesty efforts by the President Bouteflika in September 1999 were put into affect partly to end domestic fighting; however, international observers began to doubt Bouteflika government's ability to implement new strategies that would end the struggle. Moreover, at a major international conference, President Bouteflika interrupted a questioner who figured the number of the victims at sixty thousand by insisting that the correct figure was at least one hundred thousand.⁶¹ Rather than showing the outspoken personality of Bouteflika, this anecdote was evidence of the Algerian government's infirmity to quell the ongoing violence. The resignation of government members in 2000 and increasing violence during the holy month, Ramadan, were other factors that precipitated these concerns. On the other hand, according to official numbers, 98.6 percent in favor of Bouteflika's peace initiative, giving amnesty for Islamist fighters. Nevertheless, the FIS disbanded its armed faction, and a

⁶⁰ Insel, "Generaller Çetesinin Elindeki Cezayir," p. 19.

⁶¹ Lesser, "Policy toward Algeria after a Decade of Isolation," p. 15.

majority of its militants surrendered in a government amnesty program in 2000. The GIA was largely defeated in 2002, although the organization continues with a small group.

Role of Economy during the Civil War

Economic factors made positive and negative contributions to the civil war. The role of economics had three pillars during 80's and 90's. First, it enabled an economic machine necessary to provide the equipment and machinery to wage a civil war. Second, it provided a crucial role for an international actor, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to intervene. Third, it heralded the emergence of Algeria's energy resources into the markets of Western countries.

The Algerian war machine provided itself, and neighboring countries, with armaments during the civil war years. Young claims that the expansion of black markets in weaponry was essential to the expansion of armed conflict.⁶² Lenient security measures eased the establishment of the black markets and accelerated the armament process in the country. Moreover, while some GIA groups had financial support from peri-urban communes, rural, local traders, on the other hand, were able to finance their own operations. By the end of the 1990's, however, GIA assassinations devolved into haphazard operations. This opened the way for repressive security forces to have greater affect. Therefore, GIA forces had to finance themselves through criminal activities like the dug trade and stolen cars.⁶³ Actually, the inclusion of the Moroccan factor will be beneficial here. *"Some quarters also claimed that Moroccan leadership facilitated the infiltration of insurgents and weapons along the border.*

⁶² Young, "Deciphering Disorder in Africa: Is Identity the Key?," p. 538.

⁶³ Young, "Deciphering Disorder in Africa: Is Identity the Key?," p. 543.

Wariness and competition with Morocco is likely to be a hallmark of revived Algerian diplomacy and a focus of the country's security planning," Lesser claims.⁶⁴

The IMF played a crucial role in the Algerian economy. The international fund not only dilapidated the understanding of a foreign intervention as an economic solution, it also played a key role to end the civil war. Jacques Derrida's evaluation is quite remarkable: "*With respect to Algeria's foreign debt and what is linked to it, the matter is that unemployment, despair, dramatically increased poverty are the essential components of the civil war and all of today's sufferings.*"⁶⁵ To understand the effect of the IMF, one should know about Algeria's economic situation during that time. The 1980's had been a decade of stagnation and escalating debt. By 1992, Algeria's total debt had reached \$26 billion, requiring anywhere from \$8 billion to \$12 billion of state revenue to service.⁶⁶ The fiscal crisis circumscribed the capacity of the state to respond to the Islamist uprising militarily. Members of the FIS anticipated the Algerian government's imminent collapse. However, the salvation of the economic crisis came from a startling source, the IMF. Young summarizes the Algerian-IMF relations and its involvement in the process:

The structural adjustment program the IMF provided the government in 1993 brought debt relief and, by 1995, the resources necessary to redouble army counter insurgency capacities, to greatly enlarge its ranks, and to construct a repressive network that first contained then gradually

⁶⁴ Lesser, "Policy toward Algeria after a Decade of Isolation," p. 18.

⁶⁵ Jacques Derrida, "Taking a Stand for Algeria," *College Literature*: 30.1 (Winter 2003): p. 119.

⁶⁶ Luis Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War, 1990-1998*. Trans. Jonathan Derrick. (New York: Colombia University Press, 2000), p. 92.

*circumscribed the Islamist guerrillas, mostly limiting them to a few mountain and high plateau zones.*⁶⁷

As noted earlier, the IMF's adjustment program facilitated an end to the civil war. That's because it provided the needed financial asset for the Algerian army. The AIS, the Armed Wing of the Principle Islamist Group, had to end armed combat in 1999 and announced an amnesty for its six thousand members. Moreover, the GIA and GSPC, The Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat, pursued rare activities in the aftermath. The army, enriched with new economic drift, killed GIA leader Antar Zouabri in February 2002 and about fifteen hundred and three thousand were almost disintegrated.

By making a comparison between Algerian politics and economics, Lesser advocates that the civil war affected Algeria's economy in a positive way and provided an attractive zone for foreign investment:

*If Algeria's politics remain highly unsettled, the Algerian economy is in a healthier position...First, high prices for oil and gas have bolstered revenues in an economy overwhelmingly dependent on hydrocarbon exports....As noted earlier, energy production and exports remained relatively unaffected by Algeria's violence. In fact, foreign investors proved willing to undertake new projects even during the height of the Algerian crisis. Second, today's somewhat more stable internal situation is beginning to encourage new investment from Europe and the United States outside the energy sector.*⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Young, "Deciphering Disorder in Africa: Is Identity the Key?," p. 542.

⁶⁸ Lesser, "Policy toward Algeria after a Decade of Isolation," p. 15.

Moreover, the ideas of Martinez -- a pseudonym for a scholar of Algerian ancestry who settled in France -- concurs with Lesser's arguments. Martinez, whose richly detailed book is based upon extensive interviews with participants in the Algerian civil war, especially members of the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA), makes a correlation between the jihadist understanding and economics. *"The practice of jihad, whether for corsairs or Islamist terrorists, is a lucrative economic activity,"* Martinez claims.⁶⁹ He also concludes that the civil war fed some groups who wanted to gain an advantage: *"War is, to the protagonists, a virtuous way of accumulating wealth and prestige and that, in that sense, the consolidation of violence is the result of the opportunities for social advancement which it creates."*⁷⁰ Nevertheless, Silverstain adds: *"The economic liberalization and structural adjustment policies imposed on Algeria in 1994 as part of the IMF's rescheduling of debt repayment, rather than undercutting the maquis' popular base, provided new economic opportunities for the "emirs" (as well as local notables), whose accumulated capital allowed them to enter newly privatized spaces (import-export, trabendo, shipping) and thus expand their local authority."*⁷¹

Role of Religion during the Civil War

Religious fundamentalism, as perceived in the West, reached its peak with the September 11 attacks because the al-Qaeda militants declared that they committed the attacks in the name of God. Although this declaration was condemned in most of the Muslim quarters and societies, its root goes back to the role of religion in the history of the North African and Middle Eastern countries. Michael G. Schatzberg points to the role of religion and politics in his article: *"Most middle Africans understand that "politics" and "religion" are parts of the same terrain, that power flows between the visible material world and the invisible spiritual*

⁶⁹ Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War, 1990-1998*, p. 216.

⁷⁰ Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War*, p. 245.

⁷¹ Silverstain, "The New Barbarians: Piracy and Terrorism on the North African Frontier," p. 203.

world, and that the political kingdom contains a politically significant spiritual terrain."⁷²

Nevertheless, this topic will not go into the details of the role of religion in the North African countries, since it would detract from the topic at hand. However, one should know that the role of religion during the Algerian civil war must not be underestimated.

Retrospectively, Islam played a significant role in mobilizing opposition against French colonialism in Algeria. A number of presidents enjoyed close relations with key Islamic organizations in the aftermath of declared independence in 1962. Ben Bella, for instance, had spoken of Islamic socialism; however, while the state was forming in the 1970s and 1980s, the existing Algerian regime found that Islam could be an equally powerful tool in uniting support for its causes. One claim is that the Algerian urban youth, whose curriculum was saturated with Arab influences, had limited access to the public bureaucracy. Their perception of Islamism as an outcome of their Arabization would pave the way for their social ascent, ultimately resulting in the recognition of their social and political importance. Nevertheless, the readiness of those numerous unemployed young men for the protest is quite understandable. For them, the protest meant a call for employment and recognition. Young criticizes the Martinez school of analysis: *"In the Martinez analysis Islam figures more as an idiom of protest than as an irrepressible surge of religiosity. The three million FIS votes were not necessarily endorsements of Islamism, nor were the thousands who enlisted as guerrilla fighters beginning in 1992 all motivated by jihadism."*⁷³

Furthermore, in the 1990s, the electoral support for the FIS inspired doubts about the FLN regime; the FIS leaders were religious activists. Young determines that the FIS elite was in touch with the currents of radical Islamic thought; however, details about the FIS' theological

⁷² Michael G. Schatzberg, *Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa: Father, Family, Food* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), p. 74

⁷³ Young, "Deciphering Disorder in Africa: Is Identity the Key?," p. 541.

orientation and internal debates are still hazy.⁷⁴ Islamism was used as discourse by armed organizations, like the GIA and the AIS (Armée Islamique de Salute) -- the armed wing of the FIS. For the FIS, the overthrow of a corrupt and faithless regime was a valid ideological motivator to increase commitments to jihad and establish an Islamic state. However, for some of the groups -- and especially GIA combatants -- worldly interests overcame the Islamic ideology in their mind. All in all, participants of the Algerian civil war had different motivations. Religion was one of them. It could be a decisive factor for a minority. However, Young claimed that the Islamist order was the source of an unknowable threat, and advanced the cause to back the regime as a lesser evil.⁷⁵

Foreign Policy in Algeria during the Civil War Years

Two pillars shaped Algeria's foreign policy during the civil war years. The first pillar consisted of Algeria's relationships with other countries in the North African region, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The second pillar was composed of its relationship with Western countries. This part of the study will address the affect of Algeria's participation in the Organization of the African Unity (OAU), the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as other regional developments that influenced Algerian diplomacy during the civil war years. NATO and the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Barcelona Process and Algerian-French and Algerian-American relations will be the topics to be dealt with in the second pillar.

Algeria could have been a leading power in Africa, the Mediterranean and the Middle East today if violence and instability had not isolated the country; however, while analyzing the Algerian foreign policy during the civil war period, developments in its neighboring countries

⁷⁴ Young, "Deciphering Disorder in Africa: Is Identity the Key?," p. 543.

⁷⁵ Young, "Deciphering Disorder in Africa: Is Identity the Key?," p. 543.

should not be overlooked. Hence, the Algerian Civil War should not be perceived as independent from regional events. In the immediate aftermath of Algeria declaring its independence, the establishment of the Organization of the African Unity (OAU) in 1963 provided hope for African countries who were seeking solidarity within the region. The OAU had two primary aims: To promote unity and solidarity among the African states, and act as a collective voice for the African continent. Although the organization was established with the admission of fifty-three states (These are some of the countries: Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Léopoldville), Dahomey, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, The Sudan, Tanganyika, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zanzibar) in its very first year, this paper will address the significant incidents that ultimately derailed the OAU from its mission.

First of all, the 1979 events in Uganda were a prelude to a significant new pattern. That pattern was the destruction of a regime by insurgents from its rural periphery, or infiltration from another country. In Uganda's case, the infiltration came from Tanzania. The same year of the Tanzanian incursion, Uganda would retaliate with a military incursion into Tanzania. Similar incidents occurred in Chad and Liberia in 1990, Ethiopia and Somalia 1991, Somalia 1991, and Rwanda in 1994. Moreover, seven African armies had intervened in the Congo-Kinshasa Civil War in 1998.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), established in the 1950s, was another factor that contributed to the formation of Algeria's international relations. Fidel Castro had announced the ultimate purpose of NAM in his famous speech that was added to the Havana Declaration in 1979: *To ensure the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of*

*non-aligned countries in their struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, Zionism, and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, interference or hegemony as well as against great power and bloc politics.*⁷⁶

It can be claimed that the foreign policy outlook of the Algerian political elite was formed by the struggle against French rule during the war of independence, an attachment to Arab socialism during the pre-civil war period, and the country's experience on the periphery of the Cold War during the civil war years. Lesser makes an analysis of Algeria's role within NAM by highlighting the years when Algeria's civil war coincided with the Cold War: "*Algiers, with Egypt, Yugoslavia, India, and others, was a founder of the Non-Aligned Movement that dominated developing world discourse on international politics in the 1970s and well into the 1980s. The fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War coincided roughly with Algeria's descent into turmoil at the start of the 1990s.*"⁷⁷ The author, on the other hand, points to NAM's function as mediator between the South and the North. Moreover, his determinations about how Algeria positioned itself within the surge of globalization are quite remarkable:

The Non-Aligned Movement itself has reshaped its agenda to focus on the interests of the developing South in its relations with an increasingly rich North. President Bouteflika with his experience and interest in foreign policy—he is a former foreign minister—has emerged as a leading champion of this Southern agenda. He has been especially eloquent in addressing the threats posed by globalization to the have nots in the international system and the perceived exploitation of the South by international financial institutions and corporations. To the extent that an

⁷⁶ Fidel Castro, "Meets Officials at UN: Departs for Home," Available [online]: <http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro/1979/19791012> [entry date: 10 February 2008].

⁷⁷ Lesser, "Policy toward Algeria after a Decade of Isolation," p. 16.

*antiglobalization backlash becomes an even more prominent feature of international diplomacy, Algeria is likely to be at the forefront. As part of its reintegration into international affairs, Algeria is likely to pursue several special interests beyond North-South themes. Algeria has its own regional security concerns, many seen through the lens of the country's internal security problems. From the start of the crisis, Algiers stressed the role of Iranian, Sudanese, and Afghan volunteers and other external actors in fomenting and sustaining the violence in Algeria.*⁷⁸

As noted earlier, contemporary politics in North Africa had been inseparable from the events and processes occurring across the Mediterranean during the civil war years. Therefore, to propose that Algeria naturally claimed a role for itself in the Middle East peace process through the end of 1990s will not be a faulty discourse. Following the inconclusive July 2000 Camp David Summit, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat held conferences in Algiers that endeavored to involve Algerian diplomacy on security initiatives not only in the Mediterranean, but also in the larger Arab world.

The second pillar of the Algerian foreign policy consists of its relationship with the West. This process can be summarized under three topics previously mentioned: the NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue process, the Barcelona Process with the European Union (EU) and relations with France and the US. It will be beneficial to emphasize that many Western scholars defined Western policy toward Algeria as containment during the civil war: *“Western policy toward Algeria will need to evolve from an unspoken policy of containment toward reintegration and engagement.”*⁷⁹

⁷⁸ Lesser, “Policy toward Algeria after a Decade of Isolation,” p. 17.

⁷⁹ Lesser, “Policy toward Algeria after a Decade of Isolation,” p. 20.

Algeria decided to play a more active role in international affairs by the end of 90's. Admission to NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue in 2000 was one result of these initiatives. The dialogue aimed to provide confidence and enhance regional security in the Mediterranean for non-NATO members. Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia have also participated in NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue. Algeria was criticized by some regional countries for strengthening its hand in the Mediterranean by having a more active role in such security cooperation.

Moreover, Algeria's involvement in the Barcelona Process also influenced Algerian foreign policy at that time. Algeria could not refrain from engaging in affairs with the European Union (EU). The French mentality had been stamped into the country from years of colonization. The Barcelona Process, of which Algeria is one of 12 Mediterranean partners, has been a link between the 27 Euro-Mediterranean states. Its goals are to work toward political and security partnerships, and to develop socio-cultural and human partnerships. In a way, the Mediterranean Partnership, the so-called Barcelona Process launched in 1995, had been a bridge through the EU. For Lesser, the Barcelona Process had been a win-win process. The results of the Barcelona process enabled Algeria to enhance its cooperation with the EU, and for the EU to buttress Algeria's security, and contain its instability: *"Developments in Algeria in the early years of the 1990s gave new impetus to a variety of Mediterranean initiatives and inspired some new arrangements. Arguably, the development of a more concerted EU policy toward nonmember Mediterranean states was a direct response to fears about instability in Algeria and its regional consequences."*⁸⁰

⁸⁰ Lesser, "Policy toward Algeria after a Decade of Isolation," p. 11.

To deliver a final assessment about the aim of European countries on the process will be valid here. As noted earlier, the Barcelona Process mutually benefited Algeria and the EU. Through investing in Algeria's economic development, the EU aimed to prevent the rise of new crises along its southern periphery. Moreover, for the European states, especially France, the Barcelona Process augmented the risks posed by Algeria to a risk posed for the EU. Therefore, it can be claimed that the Algerian Civil War – which created a perception of risk for the EU, and encouraged a passive response from other countries – led directly to the NATO initiative for the Mediterranean Dialogue and the EU's Barcelona Process.

This paper will elaborate Algeria's relationship with France and the USA simultaneously. That's because Algeria was ostensibly the setting for a rivalry between the two nations after Algeria gained its independence. Some scholars insist on the myth of a French-American competition in Algeria. In 1962, in the immediate aftermath of Algerian independence, relations with France remained ambivalent and complex. Algerian society continued to be attached to France via language and culture. Furthermore, Silverstain perceives this socio-cultural attachment as a positive stance in terms of economy: *“This disavowal of the Mediterranean did not imply the erection of ironclad physical and ideological borders between France and North Africa. While dependent commercially and financially on European Union (EU) member states as a whole, North African states have retained special trade ties to their ex-metropole.”*⁸¹

While Algeria held to its anti-colonial attitudes with regard to France, French criticism of Algiers increased significantly in the aftermath of the GIA hijacking of an Air France jet in December 1994. An escalation of hostility between the two countries was averted since the

⁸¹ Silverstain, “The New Barbarians: Piracy and Terrorism on the North African Frontier,” p. 193.

hijackers' plan was unsuccessful. Despite the civil war's negative atmosphere, France and Algeria still held strong ties. President Bouteflika's visit to France underlined a new development in diplomatic relations between the two countries in 2000. Although the cooperation was mostly held in economic and non-governmental relations, both countries remained sensitive because of the politics of their historical relationship.

Algeria's attitude toward the USA was markedly different. The Algerian public had a positive opinion of the USA's influence because of the Kennedy administration's support during Algeria's struggle for independence. The Algerians had not forgotten Senator John F. Kennedy's call for the recognition of Algeria's right to independence. He had been the first international statesman to make such speech in 1958. The USA described Algeria as a "pivotal Middle Eastern, African and Mediterranean state".⁸² A strategic rationale for closer American relations existed. Algeria is an attractive country not only for the US and France, but for Spain, Portugal and Italy in terms of the latter's increasing reliance on natural gas resources and energy security. Although the United States perceives Algeria as the backyard of France, it is obvious that the US is deeply interested in Algerian affairs over all. That's because developments in Algeria can impact European security and become an important matter on the USA's list of topics with its European partners, especially France. Lesser's ruminations offer a clue for future suggestions in terms of the perception of Algerian foreign policy by the Western countries:

Recognizing the strength of Algerian nationalism and resistance to outside intervention, the West should still make clear that a full transformation of Algeria's political and economic relationships will be difficult or impossible

⁸² Lesser, "Policy toward Algeria after a Decade of Isolation," p. 19.

*without progress toward democratization and reform of a statist economy... The United States and Europe should make clear to Algiers that the development or transfer of nuclear and ballistic missile technology is incompatible with Algeria's membership in NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and closer security cooperation with the West more generally...Europe and the United States now have an opportunity to engage and anchor a resurgent Algeria as part of a new transatlantic approach to areas of shared interest on Europe's periphery.*⁸³

Consequences of the Civil War

The most painful consequence of the Algerian Civil War is that over one hundred thousand people lost their lives during violence that took the form of assassinations, car bombings, village massacres, acts of vengeance, and military assaults.⁸⁴ During the heat of the civil war, the FIS members were accused of committing terrorist attacks by the United Nations (UN). This accusation ostensibly paved the way for the notion of “fundamentalism”. It should be mentioned that notions of religious fundamentalism firstly emerged in 1920s by the Evangelical Church in the USA.⁸⁵ The September 11 attacks took the notion one step further; however, since the focus of this dissertation is not to deal with the linkage of Algerian combatants with the Al-Qaeda militants, the issue will not be analyzed here.

Although the regime was badly weakened when the civil war broke out, there was no military or administrative discontinuity, except for a brief moment in 1992: *“Algeria was able to turn*

⁸³ Lesser, “Policy toward Algeria after a Decade of Isolation,” p. 21.

⁸⁴ Silverstain, “The New Barbarians: Piracy and Terrorism on the North African Frontier,” p. 202.

⁸⁵ For further research on religious fundamentalism you can look at, Donald Luidens’ “American Fundamentalism: Implications for US Policy.” Paper presented to the Arab Working Group for Muslim-Christian Dialogue, Lebanon (June 2003).

*“structural adjustment” to its advantage and successfully repudiate its earlier commitment to socialist orientation. Algeria’s substantial oil resources provided a revenue base sufficient to reshape and enlarge its security forces to cope with GIA, AIS, and other Islamist militias.”*⁸⁶

Since the consequences are relative, Young’s determinations can be disproved in terms of Insel’s criticisms elaborated during previous topics.

Algerian international diplomatic policy during its civil war provides a framework to define its international relationships, and the results of those relationships despite domestic unrest. By 1990, the European Economic Community (EEC) and, later, the EU, developed a “Renovated Mediterranean Policy” to establish a partnership for the environmental and urban co-development of the region. Further, a “Horizon 2010” has been set for the creation of a “Euro-Mediterranean space” of free trade and regional economic and political integration.⁸⁷ Paralleling these arrangements, France initiated a “Mediterranean Forum” for political and cultural solidarity in the region. Under the aegis of this latter program, France has been able to maintain a privileged relation with its ex-colonies in the form of state visits, subsidies, and cultural exchanges.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, underlining the IMF as an economic tool to end the civil war will be enlightening; however, one should pay attention to Silverstain who rightfully criticized the international organization as interest-seeking:

It implies that the structures of neo-liberal globalization have tended to underwrite violence and not decrease it as some political science measures indicate. It implies that supranational organizations like the IMF are content to watch civil warfare continue as long as their debts are repaid and their taxes collected. It implies, furthermore, that the logical end game to

⁸⁶ Young, “Deciphering Disorder in Africa: Is Identity the Key?,” p. 544.

⁸⁷ Sami Nair, “L’Europe à l’assaut commercial de la Méditerranée,” *Le Monde*, 4 October 1995.

⁸⁸ Silverstain, “The New Barbarians: Piracy and Terrorism on the North Africa Frontier,” p. 194.

*the current violence is not the progressive democratization of the regime and the peaceful negotiation of conflict resolution but rather the imposition of external sovereignty, the reconstitution of a French (or American?) mare nostrum.*⁸⁹

The main aim of Chapter II has been to show the reader that Algeria, which underwent a civil war for more than a decade, was broken politically and socio-culturally after it gained its independence.⁹⁰ If massacres and economic dimensions are left behind, the migration has been one of the most significant consequences of the civil struggle. For some, Algeria had turned in to an insecure, unbearable country. The Algerians, sickened by ongoing violence and inertia in their homeland, chose to migrate to France as a solution. The following chapter will elaborate the details of this migration.

⁸⁹ Silverstain, "The New Barbarians: Piracy and Terrorism on the North Africa Frontier," p. 204.

⁹⁰ For a more detailed analysis on Algerian civil war you can read, Paul Silverstain, "An Excess of Truth: Violence, Conspiracy Theorizing and the Algerian Civil War." *Anthropological Quarterly* 75: 4 (Fall 2002): 643-74.

CHAPTER III

THE ALGERIAN MIGRATION TO FRANCE:

A LEGACY OF THE COLONIAL REGIME

“No rights as a community, every right as individuals.”⁹¹

Clermont Tonnerre

Migration: An Oxymoron in Understanding French Society

State policies, and how they govern migration, have always been a sensitive issue in most European countries. This relationship in France was a gangrenous one in the wake of the October 2005 Beur uprisings. France and its ex-colony, Algeria, ostensibly attempted to get rid of each other. But the effort was futile because they remain intertwined.

The French policy of colonialism ended years ago, but its effects linger today from France to Maghreb. With a 150 year tapestry of interwoven history, these two countries share a relationship almost unknown to other countries around the globe. For better or for worse, France and the Maghreb are forever linked. Following an anecdote mentioned by Jean Daniel in his article, *Dissident Algeria*, will be helpful in describing the intertwined position of the two countries: “An Algerian singer/songwriter ‘brings the roof down’ when he ends his repertoire with the following remark: ‘Oh, you used to tell us that Algeria was France’; well, we have replied, ‘France is Algeria’.”⁹² This initial part of this chapter seeks to illuminate the pre-developments of the migration to France from Algeria -- its handicaps and consequent crisis.

Immigration, the settlement of foreigners on French territory, dates back to the nineteenth century. At first, their demographic contribution to French society was positive because France benefited from the added workforce. After World War II, Algerian workers were

⁹¹ This famous injunction was made by Tonnerre for the assimilation of the Jews during the French Revolution.

⁹² Daniel, Jean. “Dissident Algeria,” *Research in African Literatures* 30 (Fall 1999): 15.

indispensable to the French economy in sectors like public contracting, foundries, and textiles. The Évian Agreements promised *pieds-noirs*⁹³ their civil rights such as freedom on religion, language, and property. The Algerian workers living in France wanted the same rights as the French citizens had -- except for the political rights. A third wave of immigration started in 1956 and rapidly swelled. By 1976, the number of immigrants had reached 3.7 million (7 percent of the total population). Maillard's comments on the issue are quite remarkable: "*The economic slump of the mid-1970s put an end to the growth of legal immigration flows. For the first time, immigration posed to France as a nation a kind of colonial problem planted within itself, triggering strong political reactions that tended to overshadow complex phenomena of mutual repulsion.*"⁹⁴

As mentioned above, France had the same need for labor other European countries needed immediately following World War II. From the middle of 1950s to the beginning of 1970s, France had become an attractive country for immigrants. In the aftermath of the Algerian independence war, an incursion of Algerians migrated to France to look for jobs and a new future. Peter Kivisto clarifies this process of migration to France: "*By separating residence permits from work permits, the government opened the Gates to workers seeking employment and their families. This helped migrants view themselves not as temporary workers, but as permanent residents.*"⁹⁵ In spite of the ethnic quotas, the French government mostly preferred European immigrants rather than those coming from Africa and Asia. But, Algerians were the most numerous seeking to immigrate in those days. Portugal, Morocco, Italy, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey were the other countries that sent migrants to France for employment. Today,

⁹³ The European settlers named after the color of their leather boots at the beginning of colonization in Algeria.

⁹⁴ Dominique, Maillard, "The Muslims in France and the French Model of Integration." *Mediterranean Quarterly* (Winter 2005): 62-3.

⁹⁵ Peter, Kivisto, *Multiculturalism in a Global Society*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002): 172.

approximately four million Maghrebins inhabit France, making them a strong minority at approximately eight percent of the population.

Retrospectively, French citizens living in Algeria, known as *pieds noirs*, were the first immigrants that returned to their homeland. Algerians known as *harkis*, who fought for the French army during the Algerian independence war, happened to follow. After the French defeat, most of its allies were executed by the Algerian nationalists; however, many of them escaped to the mainland. Shortly after Algeria's declaration of independence in 1962, France and Algeria signed a workforce agreement. This agreement concentrated the Algerian population in France in Paris, Lyon and Marseille.⁹⁶ In 1974, the French government headed by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing ended the employment process of the migrants. The administration paid 10,000 Francs for the unemployed migrants and their families who voluntarily accepted to return home between 1971 and 1981. This compensation payment was essentially offered to persuade the North African immigrants to return their homelands; however, very few migrants went back. Those who returned to their home were basically Spanish and Portuguese immigrants. It can be clarified that according to the population statistics and through these measures, the population of the immigrants remained constant throughout the last quarter of the 20th century. Therefore, over four million Muslims live in France today according to the data below.

⁹⁶ Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel, *Euro-TürklerTürkiye ile AB Arasında Köprü mü Engel mi?*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2005), p. 27.

National Origins of the Muslim Population in France⁹⁷

| Emigrants' countries of origin | Population | Emigrants' countries of origin | Population |
|-----------------------------------|------------|-----------------------------------|------------|
| Algeria | 1,550,000 | Turkey | 341,000 |
| Morocco | 1,000,000 | Converts | 40,000 |
| Tunis | 350,000 | Legal/Illegal refugees | 350,000 |
| Central Africa | 250,000 | Asians | 100,000 |
| Other | 100,000 | | |
| Total | | | 4,181,000 |

Having dealt with the causes of immigration in the wake of the Algerian war of independence, it will be beneficial to emphasize the impacts of the Algerian civil war on the migration process. The potential for a large-scale influx of refugees from the ongoing war in Algeria in 1990s greatly concerned the French administration. Ian O. Lesser pointed out, “*From 1992 onward, French observers in particular began to speculate about the risk of uncontrolled migration across the Mediterranean as French-speaking Algerians fled political violence and economic collapse.*”⁹⁸ Moreover, it was possible to speak about the potential spillover of the political violence and terrorist movements from Algeria to France. There was a spate of terrorist attacks linked to the GIA (Armed Islamic Group) in France throughout the civil war. The bombings were related to developments in Algeria, and were not a part of a terrorist agenda. Despite arguments that Algeria's problems have not spilled over and threatened the security of the west reflects the success of its policy of containment, rather than intervention, for the duration of the crisis. On the other hand, groups such as the armed wing of the FIS (the

⁹⁷ This table is taken from the *Euro-Turks (2005)* study.

⁹⁸ Lesser, “Policy Toward Algeria After a Decade of Isolation”, p. 9.

Islamic Salvation Front) and the GIA (Armed Islamic Group) had established networks for fund raising, arms smuggling, and political advocacy in Europe.

French politicians were worried about the possible radicalization and involvement of young Algerians, many of whom were alienated residents of poor suburbs. The spate of terrorist bombings in Paris connected to the GIA reportedly showed some connections with the GIA cadres and the fundamentalist aims. However, the reason behind much of the violence in France related to the Algerian war were mostly derived from factional struggles. And Algerians were the principal victims. It can be asserted that few Algerians in Europe appeared to want any part of the conflict taking place in their country. Nonetheless, it was the spillover of terrorism that emerged as the leading concern for Western policy makers.

A wider consideration of France's population will help to clarify the effects of immigrants on French society. According to the French High Council of Integration, France is home to four million to five million Muslims—defined by culture rather than religious observance—of whom up to half have French citizenship. Of the Muslim total, almost three million are of North African origin or ancestry, with 1.5 million from Algeria, one million from Morocco, and the rest from Tunisia. Of the other Muslims, Turks probably number about 350,000, sub-Saharan Africans about 250,000, and assorted Middle Easterners (Iranians and Kurds, as well as Arabs) the remainder.⁹⁹ It must be added that more than one-third of the immigrants have taken French citizenship.

⁹⁹ Maillard, "The Muslims in France and the French Model of Integration", p. 62.

French Policies of Migration and Citizenship: The Lack of Political Representation of Muslim Origin Migrants

Policies on citizenship and migration have been hot discussions in France throughout the decades. This section will try to discuss the roots of migration problems by dividing them into three topics: The affects of the principles of *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis*; the lack of political participation; and the dilapidation of immigration policies. France pursues the republican version of citizenship. It defined its prerequisite by *jus soli*. This principle refers to when an individual adopts republican ideals and replaces their local identity with the national identity.

The French Republican ideal of race-blind nationalism has been a kind of cult for the distinction between the principles of *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis*. The 1792 Decree provided French citizenship for foreigners who defended republican principles. It supplements the principle of *jus sanguinis*, which automatically provided citizenship for those having French parents. Revolutionaries attributed certain aspects for the *jus soli* principle that guaranteed loyalty to the French Republican ideals. Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel signify in their study, *Euro-Turks* – conducted in 2004- that the principle of *jus soli* has not changed since the revolution.¹⁰⁰ The 1851 Citizenship Code ceased to grant citizenship to third generation immigrants while arrangements applied in 1889 automatically provided citizenship for second-generation immigrants.¹⁰¹

The speeches of Jean Marie Le Pen, the Leader of the National Front, re-visited the principles of *jus soli* during a paradoxical era. By that time, French laws had determined over the previous century that second generation immigrants were citizens. But extreme right groups in

¹⁰⁰ Kaya and Kentel, *Euro-Türkler*, p. 29.

¹⁰¹ Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and German*, pp. 85-6.

France attacked the notion of jus soli during the 1980s. “*Etre Français, cela se mérite,*”¹⁰² shouted Le Pen in a speech. Center right parties under the influence of the National Front, however, objected to automatic French citizenship. This issue was brought up during the 1986 legislative year.

According to the new legislation, second generation migrants would no longer obtain citizenship unless they gained the consent of the state. A commission was formed in the aftermath of the failure of Chirac’s attempts. This commission defended the expansion rather than the limitation of French citizenship rights. Moreover, the commission report shaped the foundation of the 93.933 Code adopted on 22 July 1993. Finally, through harsh discussions in the French parliament, the proposal was removed from the agenda. To sum up, despite the changes on these declarations, the requisition of French citizenship required five years of permanent residence, knowledge of the French language, assimilation into French society, a clean jail record for at least six months, and a criminal record devoid of crimes against the security of the state.

On the other hand, a lack of political participation by minorities may be considered a major problem in France. It is clear that a lack of political participation or diverse representation of migrants or minority groups causes political frustration. Almost no Muslim has a seat in local and national parliaments. If efforts to adopt a quota law for parliamentary representation are abandoned; the failure of the French administration to rehabilitate political participation with better integration policies will inhibit social mobility. Therefore, Alasdair MacIntyre’s contribution, which is also referred in Kaya’s article, makes an eloquent sign in the minds. For MacIntyre, there are two modes of politics: *Politics of the insiders* and *politics of the*

¹⁰² Trans. “You must deserve to be a French!”

outsiders. The insiders carry on their political practice via legitimate political institutions such as the parliament, political parties and the media; while the outsiders resort to culture, ethnicity, religion, and traditions to achieve their goals:

It should be noted that marginal groups who cannot enter the political platform through legitimate political channels will sometimes use the language of religion, ethnicity, and sometimes of violence. The language used by Muslim atheists in France is, in this respect, the expression of such a political search. Many Muslims can find places in the French national team, the hip-hop culture, in cinema, plastic arts and many other fields, while having absolutely no place in the political arena. This imbalance must be corrected. From this perspective, the events in France are actions of immigrants seeking political recognition.¹⁰³

The paradox found in the struggle between migrants and the state can be explained by the politics of outsiders. Because of the lack of representation in the French local or general parliament, immigrants express their grievances via alternative channels. These channels will be more deeply elaborated in the following sections.

There are multiethnic towns where whites are the minority; however, every elected representative is still white. The city of Tourcoing had only four or five North African town councilors in 2004 and yet the city led the nation in having the highest percentage of visible minorities among its population. Citizenship can seem less meaningful if citizens cannot

¹⁰³ Ayhan Kaya, "The Beur Uprising: Poverty and Muslim Atheists in France." *Varlık Dergisi*, (December 2005).

identify with their representatives. Therefore, people from both sexes, all classes, and all visible minority groups should have a chance to be elected.

A study conducted by a famous poll institute, TNS Sofres, during a conference held by Sciences-Po on March 8, 2007, revealed French perceptions toward diversity in politics. When the participants were asked questions revolving around the “What it means to be French today?”, a significant majority confirmed that personal characteristics such as sex, age, and religion, would not influence their decision to elect a candidate, and more than two-thirds of the participants in the survey -- sixty-nine percent – think that parties and politicians poorly represent French people who are visible minorities or come from diverse backgrounds. It must be added that this opinion is quotidian for socialist sympathizers’, and it ranks seventy-seven percent and in the middle and upper classes. These polls showed that many French people, seventy percent, think that an increase in political diversity will improve the lives of not only minorities, but, in fact, the whole country. The example of Sarkozy’s cabinet, on the other hand, is an improvement when compared with the past administrations. And it will enrich the ongoing argument here. Clémentine Dardy and David Bradley make a good point in their mutual study by claiming that the diversity of the Sarkozy cabinet has a long way to go. Sarkozy’s authoritarian management style has a significant impetus to feed the mentioned argument:

Out of 33 heads of cabinet, only three are from visible minorities: Rachida Dati, Fadela Amara, and Rama Yade. Louis-Georges Tin, founder of black rights group Le CRAN, contests how much power Dati, Amara, and Yade will have...Rama Yade and Fadela Amara, the Secretary of State for Urban Policies in the current government of French Prime Minister François

Fillon, “have no power,” Weil says. Yet Weil believes that Dati’s appointment as Minister of Justice “is a change.” Certainly having someone with an immigrant background sit as Minister of Justice is an “important move,” as Weil puts it. But that does not mean Dati will exercise power in the government.¹⁰⁴

Founder of LE CRAN, the Black Rights Group, Louis-Georges Tin emphasized in his study about the political representation of minorities that there has been a slight improvement in the diversity of the candidates engaged in political action. The study published in June 2007 found that about twenty people for the Socialist Party (PS), and around thirty for the center-right Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) were engaged. Dardy continues his rightful criticisms: *“Of 3,777 candidates, 19 are black (0.5%). The PRG and the Green Party made important efforts in promoting diversity within their own system. Unfortunately, their following is too small to have a significant influence.”¹⁰⁵* According to LE CRAN, 2.5% of the French population is black, yet only 0.5% of recently nominated National Assembly candidates were black. If these statistics are correct, they add more weight to an already substantial body of evidence that France’s political parties consistently dismiss minorities.

It might be time to speak about the possible solutions for the problems deriving from the political participation in France. It must be asserted that there is not a panacea for the solution; however, there are significant attempts on the way. The cultural autonomy granted to Corsica, the election of two Muslim members to the European Parliament, the establishment of the Islamic Council of France in 2003 and the Union of Public Movement (UMP) government are important indications that the French Republic is becoming more democratized. Moreover,

¹⁰⁴ Clémentine Dardy and David Bradley, “White is Not Enough: Political Diversity in Contemporary France.” Available [online]: www.humanityinaction.org/docs/Dardy_Bradley_Report.pdf [entry date: 13 April 2008].

¹⁰⁵ C. Dardy and D. Bradley, “White is Not Enough: Political Diversity in Contemporary France,” p. 5.

the initiatives of the 21st Century Club may be considered an initial pillar for the solution. The 21st Century Club proposed to the UMP and the PS a Political Diversity Charter in January 2007 -- a document which aims to pressure political parties into nominating and appointing more minority candidates. Whether it has been effective or not is still blurred. The charter is unlikely to have had any direct impact, since it puts no binding restrictions on political parties, even if it is signed:

The charter indicates that whites and elites, rather than just working-class minorities, feel that French discrimination is a problem which must be dealt with. And there is no indication that requirements or repercussions will eliminate discrimination in the political sphere. Indeed, it would be quite undemocratic if citizens had to in part choose their representatives based on race, gender, ethnicity, or any other measure. Further there is no evidence that instituting quotas or any other firm measure will change the heart of French prejudice.¹⁰⁶

The immigration policy in France has been another pillar that shaped the relations between the migrants and the government. The November 1945 Decree that formalized the major principles of immigration proposed that the migrations of the Algerian workers to France should take place within the framework of special provisions. Moreover, due to those special provisions, Algerian Muslims were allowed to circulate freely between France and Algeria. Dominique Maillard exemplifies those days: “*Since they already held French citizenship by assimilation once they were in France, they did not need to apply for citizenship. The exceptional arrangement for the Algerian Muslim French was justified by the “blood debt” of*

¹⁰⁶ C. Dardy and D. Bradley, “White is Not Enough: Political Diversity in Contemporary France,” p. 7.

France toward the Algerians in two world wars."¹⁰⁷ The famous speech of General de Gaulle in 3 October 1958 eased social considerations to come back. The French General referred to the concept that the people of Algeria were "full-fledged Frenchmen." Some demographic determined below will help to understand the French immigration policy in 1950s and 1960s.

About 14,000 single workers and 1,800 families from Algeria lived in the shantytowns of Lyons, Marseilles, or the Paris area; more than 130,000 people were considered as not having adequate housing and lived in overcrowded, furnished rental units.^s Housing had become a crucial issue for the Algerians migrating to France. However, the authorities then had only the housing of single-male workers in mind. Family housing did not look like a priority, but the tensions in Algeria in the 1950s had triggered a migration of families, rising from three thousand to twenty thousand between 1953 and 1960.

Due to the oil crisis in the early 1970s, France's economy suffered a downturn and slipped into a recession. One may claim that the oil crisis influenced the social welfare of the immigrants. That precipitated political concerns over immigration policy. The return laws along with illegal immigration remained disputes. Moreover, while labor migration almost stopped and the level of immigration started to decrease; return laws could not accomplish their purpose. Nevertheless, Maillard's three considerations about the immigration policy are quite remarkable:

France's immigration policy has been at the crossroads of three considerations:

¹⁰⁷ Maillard, "The Muslims in France and the French Model of Integration," p. 64.

1. *First is a logic of values, of political principles that distinguishes among political asylum, labor migration, and population immigration, and guarantees residence to the immigrant.*
2. *Second is a logic of demographic politics, based on the principle that France needs population to remain or become again a world power. Young people likely to start families or with young families are welcome. Their children, born in France or coming at an early age, will be raised and educated in France. Furthermore, some demographers differentiate among the ethnic groups that are more likely to be integrated—or assimilated—into French society.*
3. *Third is an economic logic, which is looking for male, single, flexible, usually low-paid workers—preferably in good health—who can adapt to the contradictory needs of the various economic sectors.*¹⁰⁸

The current French President Nicolas Sarkozy was the Minister of Interior during the Beur uprisings in 2005. He makes a startling analysis in his book, *İtirafılarım*,¹⁰⁹ wherein he states that the districts need new arrangements for their immigrants. Whether sincere or not, Sarkozy's analyses have a share of veracity: *“Our districts especially need new arrangements for the immigration. Without the fulfillment of this precondition, nothing will be possible. This is a reality, although it is disturbing: Many problems in banlieus are the results of uncontrolled immigration, which failed integration, therefore. The offsprings of the first generation migrants feel less French than their parents and grandparents; however, they are legally more French than their ancestors.”*¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ Maillard, “The Muslims in France and the French Model of Integration,” p. 63-4.

¹⁰⁹ Trans: My Confessions.

¹¹⁰ Nicolas Sarkozy, *İtirafılarım*, (İstanbul: Karakutu, 2006), p. 116.

Assimilation versus Integration

Societies learn to discriminate during the process of socialization; migrants are typical victims of this process. One in ten residents in the Western European nations is a migrant and is inherently different than the majority in terms of culture. Migrants living in Western Europe face monumental structural problems. Because of the de-industrialization process in Europe that has taken place over the last two decades, immigrants to those countries face problems like unemployment, poverty and racism. The case in France is not an exception. The notions of assimilation, discrimination and integration have been issues within the homes of European families for centuries. Many of the more significant problems have strong ties with the past. The heavy burdens of today are linked with a strong chain to the colonization process in the past. The memories of humiliation at the hands of the French during colonization, followed by the atrocities of the Algerian civil war, still weigh on the conscious of Algerian migrants to France, as well as their posterity. Every Algerian has a brother or a relative who lives—or has lived—in France, which enables him to have access to a foreign market, with all of its goods and services. To the contrary, every Algerian who lives in the Hexagon has parents or relatives who voted for the FIS in 1990 or 1991. *“Facing the contrary interpretations of these two worlds, what did the diabolical presentation of France mean for the Algerian citizens living in Algeria, the Algerian immigrants to France, and the naturalized French of Algerian origin and their French-born children in their daily lives and in the long-term?”* Maillard asks.¹¹¹

Many reasons created structural problems for the immigrants. Unemployment, poverty and racism are some of the major ones. Kaya posits that the root of these problems were political and economic. These sentences will be quite helpful to understand the relationship between

¹¹¹ Maillard, “The Muslims in France and the French Model of Integration,” p. 69.

the notions of assimilation, and discrimination on one side; and economic and political affairs on the other:

This mode of relationship has created tension over the centuries, leading to the intimidation, annihilation or assimilation of some neighbors. Such tension has generally existed during eras of sociopolitical or socioeconomic structural problems. We know that peaceful coexistence can prevail during times of wealth. However, during times of political, legal and economic crises, we have borne witness too many accounts where our "next door neighbors" have been subject to exclusion, isolation or minorization mechanisms to become "the Others" and "the enemies within".¹¹²

The process of industrialization and rising inequality in education resulted in alienation for immigrants involved in the Republican Project of “liberty, equality, fraternity”. Asserting that religion, ethnicity, language and tradition have been the only values to which they could identify themselves is a righteous argument. Muslims living in the banlieus of large cities attend their isolated schools, pray at their mosques, shop at their isolated stores and develop their own marginal economy, Kaya says. For him, *“In an age when industrial production is in rapid descent, these people cannot adapt to the changing economy, fall into a state of constant exclusion and loneliness.”¹¹³* This idea advances the idea of parallel societies concomitant to the notion of “hyper-isolation”. Kaya’s argues that the existence of structural problems such as unemployment stemming from de-industrialization, as well as racism, are what lie behind the formation of parallel societies. This has largely been ignored:

¹¹² Kaya, “The Beur Uprising: Poverty and Muslim Atheists in France.”

¹¹³ Kaya, “The Beur Uprising: Poverty and Muslim Atheists in France.”

Conservative political elites like Nicolas Sarkozy, who only aim at getting votes, indulge in deliberate misreadings, which result in the notion that immigrants are "enemies within" who must be eliminated. Given the problematic representation of immigrants and Muslims in the media, the issue runs into a dead-end. When all misinterpretations and misevaluations add up, it is easy to see how smoothly "neighbors next door" can be turned into "enemies within".¹¹⁴

It is now obvious that there is a concrete asymmetry in the French society. This asymmetry leads to assimilation and discrimination, and obstructs the integration of migrants. “France is all the French,” said General de Gaulle in a speech; however, he forgot that some among the French are Muslim. And most of those Muslims are immigrants, or the French born second generation children of immigrants. Alec Hargreaves makes a remarkable distinction between the first and last generations of the immigrants:

The virtual invisibility of former generations of immigrants and their children as well as grandchildren is perceived as the evidence of their successful integration. It is felt that post-war migrants and especially the migrants of last two decades threaten this tradition. It has become a common claim that it is harder to integrate migrants from the Third World as opposed to those from Europe. Instead of dissolving within the society without a trace, they are becoming more visible in an era when consecutive governments claim that “migration is over”. What is frightening is that

¹¹⁴ Kaya, “The Beur Uprising: Poverty and Muslim Atheists in France.”

migration is beginning to create permanent and diverse minorities within the French society."¹¹⁵

The unemployed masses that are now becoming progressively poorer are simultaneously becoming more visible in the Paris suburbs. Although some of the unemployed immigrants benefit from the social welfare system, many are excluded from the social security system because of their chronic unemployment. Due to these facts, it is important to once again emphasize that unemployment among the émigré population still increasing.

In addition to the negative affects of unemployment in French society, the failure of the national education system is another hurdle that immigrants face in the public sphere. Discrimination in the education system should influence French governors to formulate a fresh package of reforms for the integration of migrant youngsters into French society. Tribalat, who defines French society as a "Melting Pot", emphasizes that discrimination toward the migrants causes an inconsistency between France's republican ideals and the reality of the its society. He also asserts that, until recently, speaking about discrimination was a taboo because it was a threat to republicanism. The following words reveal the psychology of an immigrant student: *"If I am to meet with discrimination, what is the point of working hard for success in school?"*¹¹⁶ The argument made by the Sociologist Francois Dubet also unveils the discrimination in the educational era:

Relations in schools, much like relations in society as a whole, are becoming increasingly racist. Individuals are perceived and branded as people with "ethnic identities". To put it simply, whereas schools would define some students as working-class children in the past, now they define

¹¹⁵ Alec Hargreaves, *Migration, Race and Ethnicity in Contemporary France*, (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 26-7.

¹¹⁶ Kaya, "The Beur Uprising: Poverty and Muslim Atheists in France."

them as children of emigrants. While a child's problems would be attributed to his/her father's poverty in the past, now they are being attributed to the fact that his/her father is a migrant, even though the child belongs to the third generation. The behavior of male children would be described as "hostile" in the past; now the behavior itself is being described as "ethnic".¹¹⁷

Discrimination in the education arena has become more apparent with the headscarf issue in France. The issue came to a head with a report in the French press on 5 October 1989 that three students wearing the Muslim headscarf had not been accepted at Gabriel Havez Middle School in the city of Creil. One can claim that the headscarf issue highlighted the tension between Muslim migrants and the French state, as well as the issue of secularism in the French state. Tahar Ben Jelloun makes a remarkable opening on the gender discrimination within the Algerian community that cannot be separated from the issue of headscarf: *"Only four percent of the children of immigrants get to university, compared with twenty-five percent of their native contemporaries.¹⁸ Moreover, a French-born and French-educated Abdel-Karim or Samira may not get the same career opportunities as a Jean-Pierre or a Marianne."*¹¹⁸ This chapter, however, will not detail this issue because the related discussions on it may become a topic of another thesis.

Certain snapshots played a crucial role within the French society. These may be listed under the topic of religious inclinations of the migrants and minorities in France. It must be emphasized that after the September 11 attacks, many things changed in the countries that are home for Muslim minorities. Not to widen the topic, the consequences of the al-Qaeda attacks will not be discussed here; however, it must be asserted that al-Qaeda's understanding of jihad

¹¹⁷ Kaya, "The Beur Uprising: Poverty and Muslim Atheists in France."

¹¹⁸ Maillard, "The Muslims in France and the French Model of Integration," p. 73.

not only harmed the Muslim minorities living in the European countries along with the United States, it also re-invigorated xenophobia in the Western countries.

When looking at the case of France in retrospect, it is apparent that some Muslim youngsters had chosen a more fundamentalist view of Islam under the influence of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). Hargreaves focuses on the recent studies conducted in France emphasizing that young Muslims hold their Islamic identity only at a symbolic level, that most do not observe religious rites such as daily prayers and fasting (during the month of Ramadan), and that they adopt an increasingly secular (material) worldview.¹¹⁹ Nevertheless, according to the works of Hargreaves and Taibalat, some young Northern Africans in France, *Beurs*, see themselves as “*Atheist Muslims*”.¹²⁰

Structural problems such as poverty, unemployment, racism, xenophobia, isolation, constraints in political representation and the threat of assimilation cause an increase in religious values. To overcome these problems, a new discourse on culture, identity, religion, ethnicity, traditions and the past is urgently required to appease immigrants in France. Without realizing the significance of religion and cultural values within the migrants, it seems impossible to cope with the problems. The following passage gives a clue on how to understand the role of religion within the immigrant demographic:

Religion is an important cultural source for the development of identity among the Diaspora. However, religion no longer has an essentialist but rather a symbolic meaning for the third and later generations of the Diaspora. The significance of religion for youth lies in the fact that these young people are perceived in a prejudiced manner by the majority. The

¹¹⁹ Hargreaves, *Migration, Race and Ethnicity in Contemporary France*, p. 30.

¹²⁰ Kaya, “The Beur Uprising: Poverty and Muslim Atheists in France.”

*majority uses Islam as the main reference point when defining young people from North Africa, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Morocco, Tunisia, or Turkey. For example, young adults of North or Central African origin, who are defined as Islamic by the general French public, believe that their identities are recognized with prejudice. As a reaction, they show increasing symbolic loyalty to religion.*¹²¹

Many research studies conducted in France conclude that a significant portion of the French population believes that discrimination exists and that it should end. For instance, La HALDE, the High Authority for the Fight against Discrimination and for Equality argues that affirmative action is too drastic a measure; therefore, other initiatives, including the Political Diversity Charter, should be implemented to cope with problems stemming from the assimilation policies of the French government. Moreover, there is a growing public awareness about the reality of discrimination. French society has great difficulty talking about the differences upon which such discrimination is based—in terms of sex, religion, and skin color. France has to learn how to speak about differences in its own way. Indeed, discrimination against ethnic minorities overwhelms the republican national framework and creates tension not only in the socio-economic field—for housing, for job applications, and so on—but in political representation as well.

The argument that the French model for integrating immigrants is unsustainable has merit. Many scholars believe that France is an unsuccessful example of integration. Baudrillard is one of those who criticize the French model of integration harshly. “If we are talking about in the name of France that has no definition for its integration policies, this is only the reflection

¹²¹ Kaya, “The Beur Uprising: Poverty and Muslim Atheists in France.”

of their own integration dreams that French people hopelessly made up,” says Baudrillard in his article. The following passage entirely shows the level of his exegesis on the integration of the migrants:

While the immigrants are virtually out of circle, we face a deep crisis because of lack of heritage and insufficient identity. Immigration and its consequences are the symptoms of the struggle of our dissolving society with himself. In other words, the social problem in the shape of immigration clearly shows the exile that Europeans encounter within their own society. What is unacceptable is that we even could not integrate our own values. Nevertheless, we offer and insist those values to the immigrants, since we failed to accept and defend those values, whether they want or not. Indeed, we are not in the case of making any suggestions about integration so far.¹²²

The Beur Uprising: The Bell Tolls for France

The discrimination against, and belittlement of, migrants marginalized them within French society. Immigrants – especially those came from North Africa who faced policies of assimilation due to their difference in color, names and religion – preferred to live in the suburban areas, especially banlieues. This is the place to where French society marginalized them. Furthermore, the Islamic Diaspora, which used to be politically underrepresented and were perceived as a threat to the national and social security, formed parallel societies in France, as previously mentioned. It can be claimed that the parallel societies established in the Western countries are a kind of reaction to the structural and political mechanisms of

¹²² Jean Baudrillard, “Bizden Neden Nefret Ediyorlar?” *Zaman Gazetesi* 11 December 2005.

exclusion. *“In other words, religiosity is too important to be limited to the beliefs of the said minorities, because what lies beneath religiosities are the structural problems of racism, xenophobia, poverty and unemployment,”* Kaya says in his article.¹²³

The humiliation that immigrant children felt nourished their anarchist tendencies. The uprisings during the 1980s expressed the demands of life in the banlieues. The beurs wanted help from the French state for integration into the civil society through the redistribution of goods and services. But the French state does not define itself according to minorities. Power comes from the citizens, whose atomistic individualities form the nation; the French republic is the gathering of the citizens, not the gathering of the communities. The 1980 uprisings may be defined as a milestone for the immigrants in French society who made their voices known to the French political elite. What Dardy and Bradley emphasize in the following passage points to the significance of the 1980s riots:

*As a matter of fact, France’s face is multi-colored—it’s the face of a Black-Blanc-Beur society that has difficulty accepting itself and whose growing violence underlines a deep malaise. Since the 1980s, this violence has been fueled in particular by the successive uprisings of the young coming from the banlieues. These young people have advocated for their right to exist within French society and have denounced their marginalization within that society. Such concerns make us question what it means to be French.*¹²⁴

¹²³ Kaya, “The Beur Uprising: Poverty and Muslim Atheists in France.”

¹²⁴ C. Dardy and D. Bradley, “White is Not Enough: Political Diversity in Contemporary France,” p. 2.

As a matter of fact, the Beur uprising that broke in 2005 was not an un-expected occurrence. Director Mathieu Kassowitz even tried to attract the attention of the third generation youth across the world in his film, *La Haine*.¹²⁵ Kaya's elaborations about the movie are quite enlightening: *"This cult film brought an acute and uninhibited perspective on the daily lives of the Muslim and Jewish youth living in the suburbs of Paris. It disclosed the isolation, loneliness, and hopelessness of these young people as well as the problems of education, employment, and xenophobia they face, and made an accurate depiction of the protest culture (rap, graffiti, break-dance, hip-hop) they produce. Kassowitz underlined that especially the Northern African youth (beurs) found their salvation in militant Islamic movements and in street gangs."*¹²⁶ The film, shot in 1996, showed a whole day of three young boys, Said, Hubert and Horbinne, who were unemployed and hopeless for their future. They may not be bad guys; however, their ethnic group and cultural belongings presented them as potential criminals. Thus, Kassowitz tried to illuminate the problems of the banlieue youth almost ten years before the 2005 uprisings and almost declared that the bells had already tolled for both the French administration and the third generation youth. Following cue of a ten-year-old boy leaves a striking impression in the audiences' conscious:

Did you watch the news in the afternoon? They call us vagabonds. They say we will never mend our ways and the best thing is to send the immigrants like us away from this country. They also say they do not have any other remedy. For them, we are the source of mess. They provoke the public opinion against us. This is an inhuman thing. I am sure they will do whatever they can to expel us. They always show our bad habits on TV. We should take some precautions for their attitudes. Perhaps, we should also

¹²⁵ Trans. Hate.

¹²⁶ Kaya, "The Beur Uprising: Poverty and Muslim Atheists in France."

*attend a TV program. We can voice our problems in a legal way. For me, this is the best method. We cannot overcome anything with illegal methods.*¹²⁷

The Beur uprisings of 2005 had always simmered beneath the surface of the minority diaspora in France. When two young North African men were electrocuted while trying to hide from the Paris police in a power transformer, nobody anticipated that millions of young Muslims, most of them North Africans, would rush to the streets in protestation. They were not only protesting the Paris police and the French government, they were also protesting the colonial rule and the Algerian civil war that caused that much pain and forced them to live in a foreign country that showed no intention to sincerely integrate them. Kaya's diagnosis on the uprising underlines the subconscious of the Beur youngsters that became apparent in the aftermath of the demonstrations:

The recent uprising in suburban Paris expresses the reaction of North African Muslim youth to unemployment, poverty, lack of education, inequality, racism, xenophobia, assimilation, loneliness, isolation, and exclusion....The attempt to construct a "politically equal citizen" has manifested itself as the citizen who has not fully achieved political rights. The fact that there is not one Muslim representative in the National Parliament of a nation that harbors nearly five million Muslim citizens, and that Muslim citizens are faced with similar representation issues in local councils has become the leading dilemma of the French Republic. This dilemma is the product of a misinterpretation of recent developments by the

¹²⁷ A speech from the movie.

*French political elite, who have shut their eyes to differences and who been seduced by the myth that all French citizens are equal regardless of religion, language, race, ethnicity, class and gender.*¹²⁸

The youngsters of the Islamic Diaspora in France reacted to the system in different ways. Rap music, graffiti, dance, looting and arson were some of the methods these unemployed third generation youngsters used to attract attention. It can be claimed that the Beur uprisings that erupted in 2005 was an eruption of the children of the migrants for being underestimated by the French political elite; however, the attitudes of the rulers raised that tension. The president of France Jacques Chirac implied that the uprising was the consequence of structural problems within France, which tacitly acknowledged the root of the riots. Meanwhile, the Secretary of Internal Affairs Nicolas Sarkozy, chose to describe the Muslim suburban youth with attributes such as "criminal", "vagabond", "ruffian" and "scum", demonstrating his effort to win the support of French public opinion. Baudrillard perceived the uprisings as a chance to overcome the gap between the Beurs and the French administration: *“These incidents of uprisings unveil the disengagement in the society. At the same time it creates a conscious even it is insufficient. If our society intends to integrate those youngsters, then, it will exactly withdraw to exist for only itself. Let’s repeat: Along with the world-wide globalization, the French type discrimination is a small model of division which caused the emergence of two opposite worlds that will never reunite.”*¹²⁹

Many criticisms were made in the wake of the uprisings in 2005. While some argued that the uprising was a result of social insanity, many scholars contended that most of the rioters were primarily victims of assimilation and discrimination. Some leftist groups also claimed that the

¹²⁸ Kaya, “The Beur Uprising: Poverty and Muslim Atheists in France.”

¹²⁹ Baudrillard, “Bizden Neden Nefret Ediyorlar?”

blame belonged to the French government because it did not pay any sufficient attention to and did not make enough investment in education and social improvement for the suburban areas. Nicolas Sarkozy, who is the former Minister of Interior and current French President, answers all these crises in his book, *Ëtirafllarım*.¹³⁰ “*These incidents caused a definite consciousness,*” says Sarkozy by declaring that these events also played a precipitating role to write the mentioned book that has a special meaning for him.¹³¹ Sarkozy refutes the leftists who accuse him of increasing the tension in the banlieues with his speeches and public statements. The former Interior Minister had called the banlieue youth “vagabonds” and “ruffians”. Defending the French administration, Sarkozy puts forward an opening for a possible solution in banlieue crisis: “*France has spent millions for banlieues as of 1980s. Tens of plans were implemented one after another. These efforts did not alter anything. Nevertheless, the situation went worse. What banlieues need is not money, but different methods and sincere discourses.*”¹³²

The jury is still out as to whether the Beur incidents constituted an uprising or a riot, and, furthermore, whether the Beur incidents reached the peak pitch of excluded immigrant frustrations. The incidents that occurred in the suburbs of Paris during late 2005 seem to be the most recent expressions of those frustrations, and they might not be the last. Similar events, such as the burning of several hundred cars, attacks on public buildings, aggravation of social tension and the championing of Muslim identity have been frequent in France in the past two decades.

This chapter will end with the remarks of Sarkozy over his understanding of a future France; however, the reader should determine for themselves whether these sentiments are sincere or

¹³⁰ Trans. “*My Confessions*”

¹³¹ Sarkozy, *Ëtirafllarım*, p. 113.

¹³² Sarkozy, *Ëtirafllarım*, p. 115.

not: *“I hate racism; however, I detest xenophobia. I believe in the power and richness of multiplicity. On the other hand, I blame those who condemn the French Republic into darkness, passivity and immobility; and those who deny the reality that our most modest citizens are in the center of increasing extremism.”*¹³³

¹³³ Sarkozy, *İtirafılarım*, p. 120.

CONCLUSION

Colonialism was a process that affected five continents throughout its five hundred years of history. I find it quite useful to briefly re-explain here the very roots that paved the way for colonialism. Slavery was the only existing political and social system in agricultural societies all around the world in the Medieval and the following ages. But with the technological developments, the invention of gunpowder and typography, a new social class, a modern bourgeoisie, emerged in Europe. Inventions of gunpowder, typography and compass changed the world balances. These inventions were the evident of the precipitating ideology behind the colonialism. Thus, it can be claimed that aforementioned inventions were the concrete and supportive faces of the colonialism; however, they are not sufficient to elaborate the hidden ideology that will be dealt in the following passages. While typography paved the way for a revival in literature, gunpowder began to be used in wars and the compass in discovery of new lands. All these inventions served Europe to progress.

Before the emergence of slave trade, bourgeoisie used to believe new energy sources should be discovered for they needed both labor force and new energy resources to process the material resources in their hands. This was what prompted adventurous European sailors to set the sail for unknown lands. Unlike imperialism, colonialism caused serious transformations in economies and cultures of societies it dominated. Still, arguing that colonization did not bring about imperialism would be a naïve approach since imperialism appeared as a natural outcome in all colonized societies. Although the idea of colonialist expansion initially stemmed from an ideal to make the world a more civilized and humanized place, its roots were concealed in Europe's claim to be the only superior and unique civilization in terms of moral aspects. The result was cultural imperialism. A crystal clear example to cultural imperialism was France's declaration of French as the official language in

her colonies. Although the colonialist states led the economies of their colonies progress, they also paved the way for irrecoverable pains and hate in those societies.

Today, it is impossible to ignore the very existence of many traumatic and oppressed societies that are products of a long-established colonial tradition, which was masked by Europe's ideal to convert the world into a more civilized and more developed one. An analysis of the history of colonialism cannot be made without taking into account the slave trade, a big shame that marked the history. Unfortunately, the grandchildren of thousands of slaves abducted from the Dark Continent, Africa, to the European and the American continents to meet the labor force until the industrial revolution took place today do not have a respected place in societies they live in. Therefore, how rightful is it to expect grandsons of these races that experienced the bitterest historic traumas to integrate with societies they currently live in? The following anecdote Fanon tells in his book *A Dying Colonialism* is concrete evidence that the descendents of the colonized societies cannot have normal lives in the countries they migrated. Mrs. Christian Lilliestierna, the Swedish newspaperwoman, talked in a camp with some of the thousands of Algerian refugees. Here is an extract from her report:

The next in the line was a boy of seven marked by deep wounds made by a steel wire with which he had been bound while French soldiers mistreated and killed his parents and his sisters. A lieutenant had forcefully kept the boy's eyes open, so that he would see and remember this for a long time... This child was carried by his grandfather for five days and five nights before reaching the camp. The child said: "There is only one thing I want: to be able to cut a French soldier up into small pieces, tiny pieces!"

*Does anyone think it is easy to make this child of seven forget both the murder of his family and his enormous vengeance? Is this orphaned child growing up in an apocalyptic atmosphere the sole message that French democracy will leave.*¹³⁴

What has been told so far was about the problems that the history of colonialism paved the way in general. As a matter of fact, there is a huge corpus of literature on these problems. However, the main subject of this study is French colonization of Algeria and its outcomes that display different aspects colonialism. The only links France had with the Muslim world were the Crusades and Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt. France and the Muslim world have always had significant cultural, political and commercial contacts especially through the Ottoman Empire. These links deepened with the colonization of Algeria and the other parts of Africa from 1830 onwards. The riots that took place in the suburbs of Paris in October 2005 reminded us once again that the deep wounds caused by colonialism have not been recovered yet.

As it is mentioned in detail in the first chapter, Algerians' struggle for independence that started in Cebel al Aurés in 1954 ended in 1962, with the death of hundreds of thousands of people. This struggle for independence was, without a doubt, a resistance by Algerians against the inequalities and injustices they were subjected to in their own country. It is also not possible to make an analysis of the struggle for independence of the colonized societies, which was fuelled by the discourse of "national self-determination" following the First World War and furthered instigated following the Second World War, without making attributions to Europe's phobia for expansion of the Soviet Communism. Following the Second World War

¹³⁴ Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism*, p. 27.,

that erupted in 1939, the United States of America and the United Kingdom took control of Algeria because France was under Nazi occupation. This somehow saved Algeria from French yoke since the war against the Nazis in Europe had begun to resonate in the deserts of Maghreb. The Bandung Conference in 1955 was a crucial step in putting an end to colonialism. Algerian society, fed up with assimilating French policies, pressures and oppression, raised the independence flag after the Evian Agreements in 1962. An eight-year bloody war finally ended the French colonization that started in 1830.

Today, Algeria, the last North African country that won its independence, still carries the traces of the French colonization. Although that colonization ended years ago, its outcomes, namely the civil war and the accompanying migration in present day Algeria, bitterly reflect those traces. The People's Democratic Republic of Algeria is the second biggest Arab-African country after Sudan. It is also the country where the world's highest population growth rates take place. With the Constitution in 1996, Algeria defined itself as an Islamic, Arab, and Amazigh country. It underwent state-formation and nation-formation processes during 30 years following the date it won its independence. But the eruption of the civil war clearly showed us that these two processes ended in failures. The Algerian Civil War that took place between 1991 and 2002 is analyzed in detail with references to its economic, political and religious dimensions in the second chapter of this thesis. The civil war in Algeria erupted when the 1990 general elections were cancelled following some concerns that the country would turn into a fundamentalist one. Following the success of FIS, an Islamic party, in the first tour of the 1992 elections, military took the power in Algeria. The Algerian Civil War is still cannot be discussed with all its dimensions simply because it is a quite recent event and normalization could not have fully occurred in the country. We see that studies on the civil war in Algeria are so few both in Algeria and in France. This is the reason why it is still a

topic of debate that whether the clashes in Algeria were a genuine civil war or a deep state fight. However, the evidences display very well the multiple dimensions of what has happened in Algeria. International observers comment that the clashes in Algeria that lasted more than 10 years underwent some evolution. It might be argued that the clashes that started in the form of an insurgent-dominated struggle after the cancellation of the 1992 elections later turned into an urban terrorism. Some academics say the violence in the country has taken a more individualized and chaotic state and turned into clashes among vendettas, families and villagers.

In this thesis, I mentioned about some international initiatives regarding Algeria's foreign policy. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the EU's Barcelona Process are two of these initiatives. Although it is still debated whether these initiatives became successful or not, they definitely saved Algeria to become a fully inward-looking society. All in all, no initiatives could have prevented death of more than 100,000 people in Algeria as a result of several assassinations, car bombings, village massacres, acts of vengeance and military assaults. What happened in Algeria was a slaughter carried out by state or revenge of a nation, which could not save itself from the traumatic effects of colonization, from its own people? Was it the economic and political circumstances that dragged people into such a slaughter? Or was it a fight by deep state? Or was it simply the result of deep desperation?

The Algerian Civil War that ended with a truce in 2002 has many economic, social and political aspects. Migration to France is one of them. Formerly, migration to that country was caused by economic reasons. But during the civil war and in the period that followed it, migration to France was seen as an alternative way for new chances. Throughout this study, I tried to analyze whether the immigrants in France are a part of the integration practice or not

and how much they were affected by the assimilating policies of the state. The following quote from Kymlicka is quite illuminating in interpreting the migration as a phenomenon in France: “*Nation-states are composed of diverse ethno-cultural, socioeconomic, and linguistic groups due to the existence of internal minorities, or the settlement of new ones through immigration flows, asylum-seeking or border changes.*”¹³⁵

In the final chapter, I tried to explain migration and citizenship policies of France and how these policies affected minority groups and immigrants politically and socially. As a result, it is possible to argue that about five million immigrants could not be integrated to the system since even the third generation members cannot describe themselves as genuine French. “*Are we still living in the time when man must fight and die in order to have the right to be the citizen of a nation? Is anything more grotesque and humiliating and obscene than the appellation, ‘French-Moslems’?*” asks Fanon.¹³⁶

Besides the serious unemployment levels among immigrants, discriminations they face in social and economic spheres pushed them to live in the suburbs. Unless problems caused by discriminations and inequalities, and the crisis in suburbs are not solved, integration of immigrants, most of whom are the Maghrebians, to French society seems impossible. The headscarf issue and discussions on secularism in recent years also fuelled the debates on migration policies in France. Dominique Maillard’s comments in the following passage display the mentality of immigrants in France quite clearly: “*Whatever the depth of their religious faith, they felt that the same secularists had not been so finicky when it came to tolerating the Jewish kippa and absenteeism on Saturdays or the display of Christian crosses dangling at the end of small chains. They suspected that behind the blaring opposition to*

¹³⁵ Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. (Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press, 1996).

¹³⁶ Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism*, p. 30.

*fundamentalism heralded by the secularists lay a less respectable xenophobic and racist purpose.”*¹³⁷

Also, lack of political representation causes immigrants to politically express their existence and rights. Given all the said circumstances, the eruption of Beur Uprisings in October 2005 was no surprise. The following two questions by Kaya are quite valuable in explaining that: *“Is it really their cultural differences, their anti-integrationist, reactionary attitude, and their Islamic identity that considers fighting against Christianity a religious duty, which takes Muslims to the street? Or, are their mass-opposition and social movements the manifestation of a resistance against almost two centuries of colonialism, exclusion, racism, xenophobia, and the more recent conditions of poverty?”*¹³⁸ The Beur Uprisings were not the first resistance. Nor they will be the last one. However, it would be a too naïve and one-sided perspective to attribute the reasons of these uprisings to assimilating and discriminative policies of France against the Maghrebians within the last ten years. This thesis tries to provide a multi-dimensional social scientific analysis to the issue. Its main argument is that the Beur Uprisings are a legacy of colonization to France.

In sum, this study argues that many events in history triggered each other. Thus, neither the history of colonization can be analyzed independently from the Algerian Civil war nor the latter can be grasped without attributions to migration policies of France and the problems of immigrants in that country. Chain of events that made up the subject of this thesis began with colonization and ended in the Beur Uprisings. But as a Chinese proverb says, “A long trip begins with a small step.” Therefore, this study tries to find a contributive place to itself in all these chain of events.

¹³⁷ Maillard, “The Muslims in France and the French Model of Integration”, p. 76.

¹³⁸ Kaya, “The Beur Uprising: Poverty and Muslim Atheists in France.”

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