

THE ORIGINS OF CONSERVATISM IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY OTTOMAN EMPIRE:
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT OF ZİYA PAŞA

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- 1) Ziya Paşa
- 2) Conservatism
- 3) Young Ottomans
- 4) Tanzimat
- 5) Ottomanism

Abstract

The Origins of Conservatism in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire: Social and Political Thought of Ziya Paşa

Along with the reforms of the *Tanzimat*, in order to stop the decline of the Empire, Ottoman statesmen of the time developed a new form of national identity (namely Ottomanism) that would include all subjects of the imperial population. For the Muslims, who had been the dominant element within the empire until that time, this was seen as profoundly negative and many began to feel that their traditional position was under threat. However, blame for this lamentable situation laid in the eyes of many Muslims not with the Sultan but with the high level bureaucrats. The result of this discontent was the formation of the “Young Ottoman” movement from amongst the Ottoman Muslim population.

In traditional historiography, the Young Ottomans have either been regarded as the beginning of the revolutionary or the Islamist movement in Turkey. It is exactly this point of view that this thesis will attempt to question. The basic premise of this work is that Ottoman conservatism, as a modern

political ideology, had some of its origins in the works of Ziya Paşa who was a member of the Young Ottoman movement. It will be tried to examine how the matrix of conservative thought, which was an eighteenth century phenomenon that started after the French Revolution, was expressed in the works of an Ottoman bureaucrat who had lived and written in the second half of the nineteenth century. Also, it will be examined how a political ideology which had been formed in Western Europe, can be adapted to the existing conditions of the Ottoman Empire.

Ottoman conservatism, as can be surmised, was not an ideology that was formed in reaction to the Second Constitutional period or even against the Republican revolution. Its origins lie further back in time. It formed a kind of general source for the model of corporatist society ideal and the Turkish nationalists' questions on representation; for the problems of *hilafet* and Sunnism of Islamists; for the expression of national identity in an Islamist-Turkist context. In a way conservative discourse, that was turned into nationalism and Islamism in the Second Constitutional period, was the legacy of Young Ottomans' ideas.

Conservatism formed its ideological arsenal by some criticisms against the *Tanzimat* in the mid-nineteenth century. Alongside with the other Young Ottoman ideologues, Ziya Paşa played an important role in forming the basis of this ideology. Therefore, it can be claimed that he was one of the 'million stones' of conservatism.

Ottoman conservatism was the only original ideology that could be formed in response to the problems of modernisation in the Ottoman Empire

and Turkey. In this sense it was a modern ideology. It was Western in origin, however as with regards to non-Western modernities, non-Western conservatisms, which formed the other side of the coin, are also possible. Modernity and conservatism can be seen as 'faces of Janus'.

Ziya Paşa was strongly concerned not only about the face that is directed to the past, but about the face that is looking toward the future. He was a supporter of some of the *Tanzimat* reforms. But, while considering about the local institutions and life styles, he was defending making a plan about the future. In his thoughts evolution, not revolution, matters. He might be considered as a reformist-conservative, because he defended change that would be under control.

Until this time, Ziya Paşa was considered as a secondary and unimportant figure who did not participated in the Young Ottoman movement by heart. Some believed it was because of a lack of enthusiasm, and some believed he never understood the nature of the Young Ottoman movement, he joined them because of his personal career. Yet, he formed the basis of Ottoman conservatism.

Özet

Ondokuzuncu Yüzyıl Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda

Muhafazakârlığın Kökenleri: Ziya Paşa'nın Toplumsal ve Siyasal Düşünceleri

Tanzimat reformlarıyla birlikte Osmanlı devlet adamları, imparatorluğun çözümlenmesini engelleyebilmek için, tüm unsurları içeren vatandaşlık bağı temelli, yepyeni bir modern ulusal kimlik yaratma çabasına giriştiler. Bu yeni kimlik, yani Osmanlılık, o zaman dek devletin hâkim unsuru olan Müslüman Osmanlılar tarafında, imparatorluktaki diğer milletler arasındaki ayrıcalıklı konumlarını kaybettikleri duygusunu yarattı. Onlar, bu durumdan padişahı değil, sorumlu olduğuna inandıkları üst düzey bürokratları suçladılar. Osmanlı Müslümanlarının oluşturduğu Yeni Osmanlı hareketi bu memnuniyetsizliğin sonucu olarak ortaya çıktı.

Geleneksel tarih yazımında Yeni Osmanlılar bazen devrimci bazen de İslâmcı hareketin başlangıç noktası olarak kabul edilir. Burada sorgulanmaya çalışılan tam da bu yaklaşımdır. Bu çalışmanın temel iddiası, modern bir

siyasal ideoloji olan muhafazakârlığın Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndaki kökenlerinin, Yeni Osmanlı hareketinin bir üyesi olan Ziya Paşa'ya kadar uzandığını göstermektedir. Bir onsekizinci yüzyıl fenomeni olan ve Fransız Devrimi'yle başladığı düşünülen muhafazakârlığın düşünce kalıplarının, ondokuzuncu yüzyılın ikinci yarısında yaşamış ve yazmış olan bir Osmanlı bürokratında kendini nasıl dışavurduğu belirlenmeye çalışılacaktır. Aynı zamanda Batı Avrupa kökenli bir siyasal ideolojinin, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun mevcut durumuna nasıl uyarlandığı da araştırılacaktır.

Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda muhafazakârlık, zannedildiği gibi, II. Meşrutiyet sonrası ya da Cumhuriyet devrimlerine tepki ile oluşmuş ideolojilere benzeyen bir ideoloji değildir, kökeni daha eskiye dayanır. Gelecekte oluşacak Türk milliyetçi düşüncesindeki “korporatist toplum” modelinin ve temsil meselesinin; İslâmcılardaki Halîfecilik ve Sünnîcilik sorunsallarının; ve İslâmcı-Türkçü sentezcilerin millî kimlik tariflerinin kaynağını oluşturmuştur. Bu anlamda, II. Meşrutiyet döneminde milliyetçilik ve İslâmcılık olarak devam edecek olan muhafazakâr söylem, kendine Yeni Osmanlıların siyasal fikirlerini miras almıştır.

Muhafazakârlık, ideolojik cephânesini ondokuzuncu yüzyıl ortalarında Tanzimat'a karşı yapılmış eleştirilerle oluşturmuştur ve bunun için matbaa kapitalizmini kullanmıştır. Diğer Yeni Osmanlı ideologlarıyla birlikte Ziya Paşa'nın da bu ideolojinin temellerinin atılmasında büyük rolü olmuştur. Dolayısıyla, onun muhafazakârlığın “milion taş”larından biri olduğu iddia edilebilir.

Muhafazakârlık Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda ve Türkiye'de modernitenin sorunsallarına karşı oluşturulabilen yegâne orijinal ideolojidir, bu anlamda kendisi de moderndir. Köken itibariyle Batı Avrupa'ya dayanır, ancak Batı dışı moderniteler gibi, bunun diğer yüzünü oluşturan Batı dışı muhafazakârlıklar da mümkündür. Modernite ve muhafazakârlık, "Janus'un yüzleri"ne benzetilebilir.

Ziya Paşa ise zannedildiği gibi bu yüzlerin sadece geçmişe dönük olanıyla değil, aynı zamanda geleceğe bakarıyla da yakından ilgilidir. Tanzimat döneminde yapılan reformların çoğunun arkasındadır. Fakat o, kurulmaya çalışılan geleceğin yerel kurum ve hayat tarzı göz önünde bulundurularak planlanması taraftarıdır. Fikirlerinde devrim değil evrim önceliklidir. Kontrollü değişimi savunduğu için, reformcu muhafazakâr olarak nitelendirilebilir.

Ziya Paşa bugüne kadar ikincil önemde ve pek de gönülden katılmadığı bir hareketin önemsiz bir üyesi olarak görülmüştür. Bunu şevk eksikliğine bağlayanlar olduğu gibi, aslında Yeni Osmanlı hareketini anlamadığını ve kendi kişisel kariyer merakı sebebiyle dahil olduğunu iddia edenler da olmuştur. Fakat o, Osmanlı muhafazakârlığının temellerini oluşturmuştur.

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To my father, late Arif Meşhur (1946-2008)

“Pederim! I am, *still*, a tree in this mountain”

Introduction

In the nineteenth century, the Ottoman state was exposed to the threat of violent European occupation, that put an end to the traditional Ottoman institutions and economic-social foundations which had guaranteed the survival of the Muslim ways of life. Modernism undermined, among other things, *vakıfs*, *imarets*, and the state-controlled land system, which maintained and assured the society's unique Islamic cultural features. And the European occupation put an end to the Islamic *devlet* which had guaranteed the survival of the Muslim institutions and ways of life and perpetuated the rule of the dynasty, which often used Islam to legitimize their authority. All these structural developments, aided by increased literacy, a modern school system, and the press created a new Ottoman Muslim group with Western modes of thinking that appraised their own social position and Islamic culture in a critical and worldly manner.

This thesis is about a discontented Ottoman Muslim intellectual, Ziya Paşa. Its aim is to show that as a modern ideology, the origins of conservatism in the Ottoman Empire dates back to the Young Ottoman movement,

particularly to Ziya Paşa. In so doing, the social and political thoughts of him will be examined in detail. The nature of Ottoman conservatism, characteristics of this political group, Young Ottomans' suspicions and inconveniences about the transformation of the state, and their reaction against the new identity "Ottomanism" will be argued in historical context. Also, it will be defined how the patterns of thoughts of Western conservatism, which had been an eighteenth century phenomenon and basically a reaction to French Revolution, was manifested itself within the identity of Ziya Paşa, who was an Ottoman bureaucrat that had lived and written in the second half of the nineteenth century. In this way, the basic problems and structure of the Ottoman elites' canon of political thoughts will be analyzed.

Change, Reaction, and Identity

The transformation of the traditional Ottoman state freed the community from the rule of its political elites and opened the way for the community to seek for means based on its own intellectual resources to assure its cultural and religious survival. These efforts to reform the state or the society produced different results. The state appeared as the means for preserving the society's Islamic culture and its identity, but also the instrument used by the social and bureaucratic elites to perpetuate their domination. Hence, under growing pressure from Great Britain, France, and Russia, the Ottoman state accepted a series of reforms designed primarily to facilitate the reception of the Western

political system and then initiated its own dismemberment by according autonomy and independence to its subjects.¹

A variety of economic, cultural, and social forces urged the traditional Ottoman state to create a common Ottoman political identity for all its citizens, regardless of faith and language. The process of Ottomanization sought to remold all existing ancient identities, well preserved under the old system, into something new and which involved a cultural and political transformation and identity change.

Ottomanism came into existence as a key reformist concept and policy mainly after 1839. Its aim was to produce equality between Muslims and non-Muslims and to center political unity on common Ottoman citizenship, it transformed the subjects of the sultan into citizens of the state.² In theory, Ottomanism was intended to depersonalize authority and shift it to institutions, but it also spurred a variety of administrative reforms. These facilitated the political ascendancy of the local notables and literati, who gave new strength to the sense of regional and ethnic identity and economic interest.

As a result, the *Tanzimat* reformers promoted Ottomanism to create a nation as underpinning for their reformed state. Ottomanism produced a series of social and cultural changes and reactions that, paradoxically, increased the sense of common culture among Muslims and, at the same time, stimulated the

¹ Paul W. Schroeder, "The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the Structure", *World Politics*, vol. 39, no. 1 (October, 1986), pp. 1-26.

² Fatma Müge Göçek, "Ethnic Segmentation, Western Education, and Political Outcomes: Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Society", *Poetics Today*, vol. 14, no. 3, (Autumn, 1993), pp. 507-538.

rise of ethnic and regional consciousness. Its main ideal intent, however, was to turn numerous disparate ethnic, religious, social, and regional groups into one homogeneous political bloc -the nation- by making all the subjects of the sultan Ottoman citizens and equal before the law, regardless of faith, origin, and language.³ Before the *Tanzimat* period, the very concept of unitary territorial state-nation by common lay citizenship had no precedent. The traditional Ottoman state consisted of a very large number of religious, tribal, social, and ethnic groups with no single common ethnic and/or political identity. By contrast, Ottomanism implied that the country belonged, or should belong, to its citizens and that their ownership of the state was based on their citizenship status as *Osmanlı*, regardless of religious affiliation.

Ottomanism, being the antithesis of the religious and social segregation that prevailed in the classical Ottoman state, rendered meaningless the concept of government, by which the classical bureaucrats achieved group balance, the practical *raison d'être* of the state. Ottomanism is regarded as a failed principle, mainly because it did not prevent the disintegration of the Empire and, failed to create an ideology of unity. It was the sign of an unbalanced relationship between the bureaucracy and the state.

³ ‘... tebaayı saltanat-ı seniyyemizden olan ehli İslâm ve mileli saire bu müsadaat-ı şahanemize bilâ’istisna mazhar olmak üzere can ve ırz ve namus ve mal maddelerinden hüküm-i şer’i iktizasınca kâffe-i memalik-i mahrusamız ahalisine taraf-ı şahanemizden emniyet-i kâmile verilmiş...’, “Gülhane Hattı”, I. Tertip, *Düstur*, vol. 1, pp. 4-7. Also see, Dora Glidewell Nadolski, “Ottoman and Secular Civil Law”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 8, no. 4 (October, 1977), pp. 517-543.

The traditional Ottoman state apparatus had consisted of a small, well-organized bureaucracy of military origin tied personally to the sultan, who was the god-sanctioned master and personification of the state, the owner of all its main resources, including land, and its officers. The state, that is the sultanate and the bureaucracy, were an organic whole, dependent on each other and able to limit each other's authority under the panoply of some Islamic principles of government.⁴ The sultanate's outwardly absolute authority was curtailed by the system's internal controls. The state claimed to safeguard the highest human virtues, as defined by the faith that formally legitimized its authority, while in practical matters such as defense, tax collection, the land system, the maintenance of law and order, the state acted more or less independently. All this internal balance system was undermined during the reign of Mahmud II. Mahmud destroyed some of the institutions –the Janissaries, and *vakıfs* - which had both sustained the old system and limited the sultan's absolutism. In building his autocracy, Mahmud ousted the bureaucracy from its “partnership” with the sultan in ruling the state and sought to make it a functional group totally subordinate to the sultan. The new modern centralized system of administration and taxation⁵ introduced by Mahmud did not work. The bureaucracy felt deceived and threatened and refused to become the

⁴ Şerif Mardin, “Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 11, no. 3 (June, 1969), p. 259.

⁵ Bernard Lewis, “Ottoman Land Tenure and Taxation in Syria”, *Studia Islamica*, no. 50 (1979), pp. 119-124. Also see; Stanford J. Shaw, “The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue System”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 6, no. 4 (October, 1975), pp. 421-459.

servant of the people it had been for centuries accustomed to govern. Although Mahmud II destroyed the traditional system, he was unable to create a new one. The *Tanzimat* was forced to create new institutions to replace those destroyed by Mahmud.

Tanzimat reforms were, therefore, undertaken to revitalize the empire and to conserve it in a world increasingly ordered by European power and civilization. There was no aspect of Ottoman life that did not require change if this objective were to be attained. Advance was most obviously needed in military strength, to meet the challenge of Europe. But, economic progress was necessary, so also was improvement in the educational system, in the administration of justice, in the revamping of law to meet the needs of modern life, and in the organization and efficiency of public administration. The finances of the central government, the corrupted method of tax collection, the system of land tenure, the manner in which justice was administered, have all been singled out in this fashion.

The needs for reform were also many-military, economic, social, intellectual, legal and political. The Ottoman statesmen undertook projects of reform touching all these areas during the *Tanzimat* period. Sometimes their proclamations of reform measures were used tactically to ward off intervention on the part of the European powers. Sometimes the proclamations themselves were hypocritical. But the basic drive behind the reform movement was to revitalize the empire through measures of domestic reorganization which

should include the adaptation of some western ideas and institutions in these several fields.

Although reforms in the various segments of Ottoman life were interdependent, and progress in each was necessary to insure progress in the others, it is true that the government stood at the center of the reforming process and, therefore, that reform in governmental structure in the efficiency of administration controlled to a large degree what might be achieved in the other fields. Surely, the improvement or reorganization of government itself depended on many other changes, such as educational reform, to produce better bureaucrats and a more reform-minded climate of opinion, or economic progress, to produce a larger national income and augmented revenues for the government. But in this process, wherein each change depended on other changes, the government itself was the planner and executive agent of reforms in all fields.

During the *Tanzimat* period, the Ottoman bureaucrats worked not only at the traditional task of rooting out administrative abuses, but also at the job of adapting western ideas which laid the basis for representative government and the secularization of government. They spoke of the equality of all Ottoman subjects and tried to create something of a concept of common citizenship, initiated the rudiments of a representative system in provincial and in national councils. The trend in governmental reorganization was away from the Islamic concept that the status, rights, and duties of an individual were rooted in his membership in a religious community, and toward the western secular concept that his status derived from his citizenship in the Ottoman

Empire and from his allegiance to the government of that empire. The *Tanzimat Fermanı* was the first tool of expressing these ideas.⁶

When Abdülmecid came to power in 1839, the bureaucracy initiated a series of reforms in education, sanitation, and state administration; it turned from being the servile tool of the sultan to the actual master of the state. Thus, the *Tanzimat Fermanı* assured the political ascendancy of the bureaucracy, which turned the state into its vehicle of power and made the reforms, or modernization, its justification for supremacy. It still used the sultan, however, to provide the old form of religious legitimacy, so Abdülmecid kept his nominal position as the supreme holder of authority.⁷ Power actually was concentrated in the hands of the modern bureaucracy, which controlled chiefly the Foreign Ministry, while other ministries remained in the hands of the traditional conservatives. Abdülaziz, after 1861, partly in reaction to his father's reforms, which had limited the ruler's absolute power, tried to re-establish the sultanate's old authority by emphasizing his position.⁸ The bureaucracy fought back.

The bureaucracy had prepared the ground for its power through various administrative moves over a number of years. Using the expanding telegraph

⁶ Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 8-13.

⁷ Abu-Manneh claims that Abdülmecid was not an as silent and passive figure as he had been claimed for during the period of reforms; see, Butrus Abu-Manneh, "The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript", *Die Welt des Islams*, vol. 34, no. 2 (November, 1994), pp. 173-203.

⁸ Kemal H. Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 3, no. 3 (July, 1972), pp. 243-281.

system, began in 1855 during the Crimean War, it sent direct orders out to the countryside in the name of the sultan, thus centralizing power and demoting the local leaders, who had controlled the local communities and been the sultan's link to them. In order to create a degree of uniformity in political outlook and enhance administrative homogeneity, the bureaucracy eliminated over the years 1862-65, the *millets*, as informal cultural-administrative bodies. The increased centralization of government created a need for more trained personnel, so the number of modern schools was increased also. All of those actions, without intent on the part of the bureaucracy, promoted the rise of a new Ottoman Muslim group with a different political consciousness.

For this new group, as long as the ruler appeared to operate within the framework of uniformly binding religious commandments, the masses accepted the superior economic and social position of the ruling personnel as the consequence of divine will. Some change had been favored by many of the conservatives, but they saw the bureaucracy's domination of the sultan and the Ottomanization of the society as a deviation from the principles of the traditional state and, hence, from the fundamentals of Islam. Realizing that the reforms were separating the state from the religion, they viewed the bureaucracy as the culprit and the sultan as the victim of his own servants. So this conservative group deemed attempts to 'public opinion' or the 'voice of the people', to be no more than a plot by the bureaucracy to gain an independent legitimacy and free itself from the restrictions of the faith and the sultan's authority.

The concerns of the conservatives had some validity. First *Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu*, then *Islahat Fermanı* introduced secular and individualistic concepts of citizenship, and human rights;⁹ yet the bureaucracy that was to put it into effect was hardly aware of the existence of such rights, let alone prepared to implement them. The conservatives feared that the bureaucracy, freed from the constraints of Islam and the sultan's supervision, would make the modernism disregarding the wishes, culture, and aspiration of the individual Ottoman Muslim. Because Islam was the only generally accepted vehicle capable of protecting the freedom of the individual, according to the conservatives, once the traditional *din ü devlet* was abandoned, the godless state would be free to undertake anything it wished in the name of the new god called modernity. The more extreme of these fears were unfounded, but what counted was the conservatives' perception of the bureaucracy's authority rather than of the benefits of the reforms for society.

The Problem of Conservatism in Turkish Historiography

In most of the works that had been written on conservatism it is suggested that conservatism in Ottoman-Turkish history arises with some reactions against either the Second Constitutional period or the Republican Era. However, the main idea in this thesis opposes those views, and claims that the origins of conservatism starts as a reaction to *Tanzimat* reforms. Hence, the Young

⁹ Virginia H. Aksan, "Ottoman to Turk: Continuity and Change", *International Journal*, vol. 61, no. 1, (Winter, 2005/2006), pp. 19-38.

Ottomans are the first organized, modern political conservative group in Ottoman-Turkish history.

For example, Tanıl Bora claims that conservatism should be considered within the close relationship of Turkish nationalism and Islamism.¹⁰ Although, it might be a true assumption in its context, his attempt of dating conservatism is misleading. He thinks conservatism starts with the formation of Turkish nationalist identity in the early Republican Era.¹¹ According to him, Ziya Gökalp's conservative-nationalist ideas are the dominant line in Turkish modernization.¹²

Fırat Mollaer agrees with Bora, and states that as an ideology conservatism appears as a reaction against Kemalist revolutions.¹³ He clearly needs to define a starting-point, so he considers that if the Western

¹⁰ “Önerdiğim, milliyetçilik, muhafazakârlık ve İslâmcılığı, pozisyonlar olmaktan ziyade ‘haller’ olarak anlamaktır... Muhafazakârlık, içeriklerin ve zihniyet kalıplarının ötesinde bir ruh hali, duruş/duyuş biçimi, üslûptur; Türk Sağının havasıdır”; see, Tanıl Bora, *Türk Sağının Üç Hâli* (Birikim Yayınları: İstanbul, 1998), p. 8.

¹¹ “Şunu da eklemeli ki, gerek radikal milliyetçi (ırkçı-Türkçü/ülkücü) gerekse muhafazakâr söylemler, kendilerini resmî millet-inşa sürecinin ‘yapaylığına’ karşı tepki olarak ortaya koyarken, o sürecin bu yazıda özetlenen karakter özelliklerini kuvvetlendirerek sürdüreceklendir.”; see, Bora, *Türk Sağının Üç Hâli*, p. 52.

¹² “Bu bağlamda, Türk modernleşmesinin de, muhafazakâr bir duruş ve düşünüş refakatinde geliştiği söylenebilir... Hâkim çizgi, Gökalp’in simgelediği ama ona özgü olmayan, medeniyet-kültür ayrımıyla belirlenmiştir; modernleşmeyi (yani medeniyeti) ‘Türk Ruhu’nu (Türk Kültürünü) ihyâ edecek ilaç olarak gören bu zihniyet, ‘Türk İnkilâbı’na içsel olan muhafazakâr damardır.”; see, Bora, *Türk Sağının Üç Hâli*, p. 71.

¹³ “Muhafazakâr ideolojinin devrime karşı tepkisi hatırlandığında, soy muhafazakârlığının miladı nasıl Fransız Devrimi ise, Türk muhafazakârlığının Kemalist Devrim’le kendi bilincine ulaştığı başlangıç düzeyinde söylenebilir.”; see, Fırat Mollaer, *Türkiye’de Liberal Muhafazakârlık ve Nurettin Topçu* (Dergâh Yayınları: İstanbul, 2008), p. 73.

conservatism started against the principles of French Revolution, then Kemalist revolutions might be an appropriate date for Turkish conservatism. Surely, his false reasoning relies on impulse of searching for a ‘French Revolution’ in Turkish history. He fails to notice the disruption *Tanzimat* reforms created in Ottoman Muslims’ minds.

Ahmet Çiğdem writes within the same canon, and believes that the Republican Revolution is the right historical moment for positioning Ottoman-Turkish conservatism. He thinks, like Mollaer and Bora, that there is a parallelism between the French Revolution and the Republican Revolution. He compares the social classes of the West and the Ottoman Empire as that king and aristocracy are similar to *padişah* and palace; that church and clericals are similar to *şeyhülislâm*, *hilafet* and *ulema*; and that *ancien régime* to *Osmanlı nizamı*.¹⁴

A good example of moving the date to an earlier time is Erik Jan Zürcher. He states that although he presented himself as a liberal in Europe, it may be assumed that Prens Sabahaddin’s *Teşebbüs-ü Şahsi ve Ademi Merkeziyet Cemiyeti* owed much about its ideals to Frederic Le Play’s counter-

¹⁴ “... muhafazakâr moment varlık nedenini, Fransız Devrimi’ne borçludur ve siyasî bir düşünce olarak modernliğin en önemli kırılma noktalarından birisinin ürünü olmak hasebiyle de, pre-modern bir tarihi yoktur. Muhafazakârlık tarihinin ihtiyaç duyduğu bu moment için modern Türkiye tarihindeki okazyonun Cumhuriyet İnkilâbı olduğunu tespit etmek gerekecektir... Dolayısıyla Türk muhafazakârlığının kendisini anlamlandıracağı, pozisyonunu belirleyebileceği tarihsel an, bu istemin boyutlarının genişliği ve derinliği nedeniyle ancak Cumhuriyet olabilecektir.”; see, Ahmet Çiğdem, “Sunuş”, *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasî Düşünce-Muhafazakârlık*, vol. 5 (İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul, 2003), p. 16.

revolutionist, aristocratic and Catholic conservatives' ideas. But he does not consider Prens Sabahaddin as one of the first political conservatives, instead he prolongs the date even a bit further,¹⁵ and argues that the second half of the twentieth century is the right time to talk about conservatism. However, he underestimates the role and influence of first conservatives' ideas in the formation of the First Constitution.

Nazlı İrem, consistent with the others, focuses on the articulation of conservatism to Kemalist modernization project. And she agrees that Kemalist Revolutions are the causes of the formation of Turkish conservatism, as well. She believes that the ideals of Kemalism and Turkish conservatives overlapped since the 1930's. She inquires about the reasons that urged the conservatives to define their political-philosophical orientations and ideals within the confines of Kemalism that ultimately turned conservatism into a historically specific expression of modernism in the 1930's. To her, first the conservatives were part of the first Republican generation's yearning for independence and self-determination. Second, the conservatives believed that the nation as traces of traditionalism had to be followed to drive the revolution to a unique path of development through which the spiritual creative life of the nation would dominate over all universalist claims, whether they emerged from religious

¹⁵ "... siyasal ve felsefi muhafazakârlık Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda ve Türkiye'de, en azından 20. Yüzyılın ikinci yarısına dek, güçlü bir etkiye sahip olmadı."; see, Erik Jan Zürcher, "Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası ve Siyasal Muhafazakârlık", *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce-Muhafazakârlık*, vol. 5 (İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul, 2003), p. 41.

scholasticism or modern ideologies such as liberalism and socialism. Third, they defined their mission as creating a modern Turkey.¹⁶

The first chapter of this thesis will look at the historical conditions of the formation of conservatism in the West. Also, some of the important intellectuals' works will be mentioned. The second chapter will continue by examining the life of the founding father of conservatism, Edmund Burke, and his book *Reflections on Revolution in France* written in 1790. The third chapter will look in historical and social background of the Young Ottoman movement and the members' ideas. The fourth chapter will deal with Ziya Paşa's life, the social group he belonged to and his works. The fifth chapter will constitute the main body of the thesis regarding Ziya Paşa's social and political thoughts that were expressed in *Hürriyet* between 1868 and 1870. This will be followed by a conclusion which it is hoped will draw together the main points raised in this study.

¹⁶ Nazlı İrem, "Turkish Conservative Modernism: Birth of a Nationalistic Quest for Cultural Renewal", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 34, no. 1 (February, 2002), p. 107.

I. Origins of Western Conservatism

The aim of this chapter is to summarize the origin of Western conservatism, to evaluate its historical context, to analyze its main theoretical tendencies, and to comprehend its theories with the Ottoman conservatism. In so doing, the ideas of Namık Kemal, Ali Suavî and Ziya Paşa will be used. Also, it will be tried to present how the Western and the Ottoman conservatives stressed similar ideas under similar situations, although their historical backgrounds were different.

I.a. Definitions

Conservatism arose in direct response to the French Revolution. The seizure of power, the expropriation of old rules, and the impact of new patterns of authority upon centuries old certainties led to a reexamination of ideas of freedom and order. Yet, it was not only against the Revolution in France that the conservatives revolted. It was more fundamentally against the loss of

status¹ that could be seen everywhere in Western Europe as the consequence of economic change, secularism, and political centralization.² For Edmund Burke and Louis de Bonald, the French Revolution was the culmination of historical process of social atomization that reached back to the birth of such doctrines as nominalism, religious dissent, scientific rationalism, institutions, and intellectual certainties which had been basic in the Middle Ages. In a significant sense, modern conservatism looks back to medieval society for its inspiration and for models against which to assess the modern world. The conservative criticism of capitalism³ and political centralization were conjoined with denunciation of individualism and secularism. In all these historical forces the conservatives could see, not individual emancipation and creative release,

¹ In the same sense, it should be noted that Ottoman Muslims felt their dominant position was lost after the reforms of *Tanzimat*.

² This peculiar character of conservative thought explains one frequently commented upon aspect of conservatism cited by Karl Mannheim: “The careers of most conservatives and reactionaries show revolutionary periods in their youth.”, cited in Samuel P. Huntington, “Conservatism as an Ideology”, *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 51, no. 2 (June, 1957), p. 470.

³ Namık Kemal argues that because of the penetration of European capitalism, Ottoman industry had collapsed. He states that “fenn-i servet müelliflerinin kâffesi «bırak geçsin, bırak yapsın» meselini ki manay-i lâzımîsi ticaret ve sanatın hürriyet-i mutlakası demektir şiar ittihaz eylediler... Devlet hürriyet-i ticareti öyle bir zamanda ilân etti ki mülkümüzde sanat ve marifet tamamiyle inkıraz halinde idi.... Tezgâhlar kapandı. Erbab-ı sanat harap oldu”; see, Namık Kemal, “no topic”, *Hürriyet*, no. 7 (10 August 1868), p. 2.

but mounting alienation and insecurity, which were the inevitable products of the disruption of man's traditional associative ties.⁴

From this critical view of history the conservatives were led to formulate certain general propositions concerning the nature of society and man which diverged sharply from those views that the rationalists and individualists had emphasized.

Some of the most important European conservative thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries include: In England, Edmund Burke (1729-1797), as the founding father of conservatism; in France, Joseph de Maistre (1754-1821), Louis de Bonald (1754-1840), Hugues Felicitè de Lamennais (1782-1854), François Renè de Chateaubriand (1768-1848); in Prussia, Justus Möser (1720-1794), Adam Müller (1779-1829), Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861) Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831); in Switzerland, Johannes von Müller (1752-1809), Karl Ludwig von Haller (1768-1854); in Spain, Juan Donoso y Cortès (1809-1853), Jaime Luciano Bolmes (1810-1848).⁵

In order to define conservatism it is necessary to begin by listing the institutions which conservatives have sought to conserve. For conservatives have, at one time and place or another, defended a wide range of social, political, and economic institutions, such as royal power, constitutional

⁴ E. Zeynep Güler, "Muhafazakarlık: Kadim Geleneğin Savunusundan Faydacılığa", 19. *Yüzyıldan 20. Yüzyıla Modern Siyasal İdeolojiler* (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008), pp. 117-162.

⁵ For the biographies and general review of their works see, Robert Nisbet, "Muhafazakarlık", *Sosyolojik Çözümlemenin Tarihi* (Ankara: Ayrac Yayınevi, 1997), pp. 95-99.

monarchy, aristocratic prerogative, representative democracy, free trade, nationalism, and federalism. They have defended religion in general, established churches, and also the need for government to defend itself against the claims of radical religious enthusiasts. Due to this immense diversity in their thoughts, it is difficult to arrive at meaningful generalizations about conservatism, which displays less obvious uniformity across national borders and tends to be more nationally particular than liberalism and socialism, which aspire to be universal goals. Moreover, since conservatism emphasizes the need for institutional and symbolic continuity with the particular past, its symbols and institutional ideals tend to be more tied to specific, usually national, context.⁶

One of the earliest social scientific approaches to the issue was formulated by Karl Mannheim, in his essay *Conservative Thought* written in 1927. He introduced the important distinction between traditionalism, which is a universal psychological tendency to do things as they have traditionally been done, and conservatism, which is an articulated set of inter-related political ideas. Mannheim argued that conservatism is an ideology which arose in response to the new and dynamic historical processes associated with the

⁶ For example, Richard Pipes discusses about how the Russian Conservatism in the second half of the nineteenth century followed a particular way, and hence formed a different and *sui generis* context from the conservatism of Metternich and that of a Bismarck; see, Richard Pipes, "Russian Conservatism in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century", *Slavic Review*, vol. 30, no. 1 (March, 1971), p. 123. And for the American version see; W. Hardy Wickwar, "Foundations of American Conservatism", *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 41, no. 6 (December, 1947), pp. 1106-1107.

Enlightenment, capitalist modernization and the bourgeois class. He claimed that conservative thought was linked to a worldview which could be correlated with class position, roughly that of the feudal nobility. To him, the basic categories of each ideology were unconsciously determined by the experience of the world and self-interest of the class which developed it. In the case of conservatism, it led to a focus on experience and the concrete, as opposed to universalistic, rationalistic theories of liberalism and the Enlightenment. Conservatism, in Mannheim's words, "first becomes conscious and reflective when other ways of life and thought appear on the scene, against which it is compelled to take up arms in the ideological struggle."⁷ Conservatives offered a critique of the rationalistic conceptions on which society could be reorganised as proposed by radicals. At the same time, conservatism focused on explaining the historical particularities of existing societies and the interconnectedness of their institution.⁸

Samuel Huntington have stressed the reactive nature of conservatism, in fact he claims that it arises in response to an intellectual, political or cultural challenge to existing institutions, on behalf of which conservative arguments are then developed. According to him, "the conservative ideology is the product of intense ideological and social conflict",⁹ and "historically,

⁷ Karl Mannheim, "Conservative Thought", *Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 77.

⁸ David Kettler, "Karl Mannheim and Conservatism: The Ancestry of Historical Thinking", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 49, no. 1 (February, 1984), pp. 73-75.

⁹ Huntington, "Conservatism as an Ideology", p. 458. Also, for a detailed evaluation on Huntington's life and works see, Aykut Kansu, "Harvard'daki Adamımız: Samuel P.

conservatism has always been the response to a direct and immediate challenge”.¹⁰ He argues that conservatism is best understood not as an inherent theory in defense of particular classes and institutions, but as a positional ideology. He suggests that “when the foundations of society are threatened, the conservative ideology reminds men of the necessity of some institutions and the desirability of the existing ones”. In other words, rather than representing the self-satisfied acceptance of the institutional status quo, ideological conservatism arises from the anxiety that valuable institutions are endangered by contemporary developments or by proposed reforms. The awareness that the legitimacy of existing institutions is under attack leads conservative theorists to attempt to provide an articulate defense of the usefulness of those institutions. Huntington claimed that “the articulation of conservatism is a response to a specific social situation. The manifestation of conservatism at any time and place. Conservatism thus reflects no permanent group interest”.¹¹

Huntington 1970’li Yıllardan 2000’li Yıllara Bir Neo-Con’un Önlenebilir Yükselişi”, *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 183 (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 2009), pp. 34-41.

¹⁰ Huntington, “Conservatism as an Ideology”, p. 471.

¹¹ According to Huntington, interpretations of the role and relevance of conservative thought on the contemporary scene vary greatly. Underlying the debate, however, are three broad and conflicting conceptions of the nature of conservatism as an ideology. He classifies them as; a) the aristocratic theory that defines conservatism as the ideology of a single specific and unique historical movement, b) the autonomous definition of conservatism that conservatism is not necessarily connected with the interest of any particular group, nor is its appearance dependent upon any specific historical configuration of social forces, c) the situational definition that views conservatism as the ideology arising out of a distinct but recurring type of historical situation in which a fundamental challenge is directed at established institutions and in which the supporters of those institutions employ the conservative ideology in their defense. He criticizes these definitions, and argues that the aristocratic definition limits conservatism to a

In accordance with Huntington's view that conservatism by its nature is reactive, Klaus Epstein focuses on the political and intellectual context of the development of conservatism in German-speaking Europe. He demonstrates how conservatism arose in German-speaking Europe as a response to the Enlightenment, commercial capitalism, and bourgeois liberalism.¹² Taking the reactive approach a step further, Martin Greiffenhagen suggested that because self-conscious conservatism only arises once the institutions it values have lost their hold, conservative thought seeks not a preservation of the status quo, but uses an imaginatively transfigured conception of the past with which to criticize the present. According to him, the romanticization of the past is thus an intrinsic and recurrent element of conservatism.¹³ Huntington highlights a similar point "change is change; history neither retreats nor repeats; and all change is away from the status quo. As time passes, the ideal of the reactionary becomes less and less related to any actual society of the past. The past is romanticized, and, in the end, the reactionary comes to support a return to an idealized Golden Age which never in fact existed".¹⁴

particular social class in a particular social society. The autonomous definition permits the appearance of conservatism at any stage in history. And, finally, the situational definition holds that conservatism appears when challenging and defending social groups stand in a particular relation to each other. Huntington, "Conservatism as an Ideology", p. 468.

¹² Klaus Epstein, "A New German Constitutional History", *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 35, no. 3 (September, 1962), pp. 307-311. For a recent article devoted to German Conservatism see, Hans-Jurgen Puhle, "Conservatism in Modern German History", *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 13, no. 4 (October, 1978), pp. 689-720.

¹³ Quoted in Jerry Z. Müller, "Conservatism: Historical Aspects", *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences* (2004), p. 2625.

¹⁴ Huntington, "Conservatism as an Ideology", p. 460.

It is crucial to understand conservatism as a distinctive mode of social and political thought and draw a distinction between orthodoxy and conservatism.¹⁵ While the orthodox defense of institutions depends on belief in their correspondance to some ultimate truth, the conservative tends to be more skeptical in order to avoid justifying institutions on the basis of their ultimate foundations. The orthodox theoretician defends existing institutions and practices because they are metaphysically true. According to them, the truth proclaimed may be based on particular revelation or on natural laws that are assumed to be accessible to all rational men. As such, truth may be religious or secular in origin. On the other hand, the conservative defends existing institutions because their very existence creates a presumption that they have served some useful function, because eliminating them may lead to harmful consequences, or because the veneration which is attached to institutions that have existed over time makes them potentially usable for new purposes.¹⁶

Although orthodox and conservative thinkers may sometimes reach common

¹⁵ It should be noted that, except for Ali Suavî, Young Ottomans were not devoted Muslims. Their purpose of using Islam, as distinct from the *ulema*, was different. And their Islamic reaction for *Tanzimat* reforms were based on that Islam was turned into an arsenal of modern political arguments for them. So their sensibility was not basicly on Islam, but on loosing the basis of the traditional being of Ottoman state and society.

¹⁶ Robert Nisbet, "Conservatism and Sociology", *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 58, no. 2 (September, 1952), pp. 167-168. In this article, Nisbet argues that conservatism cannot be restricted only to the psychological terms of attitude and evaluative responses. To him, in the contextual terms of history there are also conservative ideas such as status, cohesion, adjustment, function, norm, ritual and symbol. These conservative ideas are not merely in the superficial sense that each has its referent an aspect of society that is plainly concerned with the maintenance or the conserving of order but in the important sense that all these words are integral parts of the intellectual history of European conservatism.

conclusions through very different modes of thought. The main distinction between conservatism and orthodoxy is elided in conservative self-representations, because conservative thinkers may regard it as useful for most people and believe that existing institutions correspond closely to some ultimate truth. As Huntington admits, “conservatism does not ask ultimate questions and hence does not give final answers. But it does remind men of the institutional prerequisites of social order”.¹⁷

As misleading as the confusion between conservatism and orthodoxy is the apparent dichotomy of conservatism and Enlightenment. Contrary to the frequent characterization of conservatism as the enemy of the Enlightenment, it is historically more accurate to say that there were many currents within the Enlightenment, and some of which were conservative.¹⁸ Conservatism as a distinct mode of thought is a product of the Enlightenment. What makes the social and political arguments of conservatives different from orthodoxy is that the conservative critique of liberal or progressive arguments takes place on the enlightened grounds of the search for human happiness, based on the use of reason.

¹⁷ Huntington, “Conservatism as an Ideology”, p. 473.

¹⁸ For an erroneous evaluation on the relationship of conservatism with the concept of change; see, M. Hanifi Macit, “Fransız Devriminin Felsefi Altyapısı ve Edmund Burke”, *Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, vol. 7, no. 39 (December, 2007), p. 292. Macit states that ‘[B]öyle bir değerlendirmenin... bir ürünü olan değişimin tam karşısında kendini konumlandıran muhafazakâr ideoloji açısından ise devlet, manevi ve organik bir niteliğe sahiptir’. In opposition to his assumption, Burke declares that ‘a state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation’; see, Burke, *Reflections on Revolutions in France*, p. 19.

While some conservative theorists have been religious believers, and most affirm the social function of religious belief in maintaining individual morality and social cohesion, none of them base their social and political arguments primarily on conformity with ultimate religious truth.¹⁹ The search for earthly happiness is one assumption which distinguishes conservative social and political analysis from religious orthodoxy. Conservative arguments are utilitarian, when the term is understood loosely as the criterion of contributing to worldly well-being. Conservatism parts company with the sense of utilitarianism because of the conservative emphasis upon social complexity, the functional inter-relationship between social institutions, and the importance of latent functions.

Conservatism is also distinguished from orthodoxy by the conservative emphasis on history. Combining the emphasis on history with utility is the common denominator of conservative social and political analysis, which might be termed “historical utilitarianism”.²⁰

¹⁹ It should be remembered that Young Ottomans also invented some traditions and concepts in Islamic history, such as *meşveret*, *biat*, *meşrutiyet*, etc. Ali Suavî argues on the role of Islam in forming the Ottoman society’s moral patterns. He stresses heavily on how national customs and habits might be lost if religion is put aside. He says “fakat her milletin dinine ve dünyasına müteallik bir takım şeâri vardır ki, o millet değerlerden onlarla tefrik olunur. Eğer o alâmetleri terk ederse milliyetini terk etmiş hükmündedir veya diğer kavmin şe’ârine benzetip taklit ederse o dahi onlardandır”; see, Ali Suavî, “Taklid”, *Le Mukhbir*, no. 20 (18 January 1868), p. 1; quoted in Hüseyin Çelik, *Ali Suavî ve Dönemi* (İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 1994), p. 607.

²⁰ Rodney W. Kilcup, “Burke’s Historicism”, *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 49, no. 3 (September, 1977), pp. 394-395. Kilcup stresses the importance of Burke’s references and appeals to the will of God cannot be dismissed and must be taken seriously, his emphasis on

For the conservative, the historical survival of an institution or practice –marriage or monarchy– creates a case that it has served some human need. That need may be the institution’s explicit purpose, but just as often it will be a need other than that to which the institution is explicitly devoted. Conservatism assumes that institutions, which have existed over a long period of time, have a reason and a purpose inherent in them, and a collective wisdom is incarnate in them.

The conservative emphasis on ‘experience’ is linked to the assumption that the historical survival of an institution or practice is evidence of its fitness in serving human needs.²¹ Hence, Burke’s conservatism owed much to English

the role of historical understanding did open the way to a radical relativization of the standart of political morality.

²¹ During the second half of the nineteenth century the Ottoman legal system was refashioned, together with other fields, such as the educational system, the provincial administration and the financial system. In the mid-1860’s a new court system, the Nizamiye courts, came into being. Largely inspired by French law in terms of legal sources and structure, the new courts were designed to address civil, commercial and criminal cases. See, Avi Rubin, *The Nizamiye Courts after 1879* (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp.3-4. Ziya Paşa is dissatisfied with the situation of *Şeriat Mahkemeleri* on behalf of *Ticaret Mahkemeleri*. He thinks Islamic law and courts, as traditional institutions, had formed the basis of Ottoman Muslim ethics. To him, weakening it leaded the way for Muslims to change their way of life, “işte ticaret mahkemeleri ve temyiz hukuk meclisleri yapılıp şeriat mahkemeleri yalnız karı koca ve nikâh ve miras davaları gibi sırf umur-u mezhebiyeye müteallik işlere munhasır kaldı... İşte bu alafranga âdetler bu zatlerin familyalarından tevabiat ve mensubatlarına ve tevabi-i tevabiat ve hellümme cerrâ efrad-ı âhâda kadar sirayet edip şimdi İstanbul’da ırzlı ve edepli familya mayup hükmünde kaldı. Sayelerinde umum milletin bozulan bu ahlâkına terbiye-i zemâne ismini vermekle iftihar gösteriyorlar”; see, Ziya Paşa, “Karınca Kanatlandı”, *Hürriyet*, no. 35 (22 February 1869), pp. 2-3. Also, Namık Kemal is in keeping with the tradition of conservative Ottoman thought which related the downfall of the empire to a slackening in the observance of religious law. He states “şimdiye kadar mütenevvi mahkemeler, türlü türlü kânûnlar yapıldı. Bunlardan şerî’at-i Ahmediyyenin kadrini kırmaktan başka na fâ’ide hâsıl

common law which was a legal code that had developed historically to meet changing human needs.²²

Historical utilitarianism is the basis of conservatism in another sense as well. Since custom and habit are important features of human conduct, some of the usefulness of a practice comes from the fact that those engaged in it are already used to it, and, as such, are likely to be unsettled by change.

Familiarity breeds comfort. Thus usage is often interpreted by conservatives as a presumption in favour of retaining it.

Conservatives, also, maintain that the existence of a long historical past contributes to the sense of veneration in which institutions are held. Historical continuity therefore strengthens, thus increases the emotional hold of the institution upon its members, and adds emotional weight to institutionally prescribed duties. A sense of historical continuity also augments to the stability and effective functioning of an institution as well as to its utility.²³ This is the

oldu? Bu mahkemeler şeriât mahkemelerinden daha âdil ve kânûnlar ahkâm-ı şerî'atten daha mükemmel zannolunur"; see, Namık Kemal, "Devlet-i Aliyye'yi Bulunduğu Hâl-i Hatarnâkden Halâsın Esbâbı", *Hürriyet*, no. 9 (24 August 1868), p. 1. For a defence of *Hilafet* institution; see, Ali Suavî, "Hilafet", *Le Mukhbir*, no. 13 (21 November 1867), p. 1; quoted in Hüseyin Çelik, *Ali Suavî ve Dönemi*, p. 597.

²² Alfred Cobban, "Edmund Burke and the Origins of the Theory of Nationality", *Cambridge Historical Journey*, vol. 2, no. 1 (1926), pp. 38-39.

²³ For example, Namık Kemal uses historical utilitarianism to convey his idea that monarchical system is not necessarily the only possible Islamic regime, and states that in fact the Islamic state was 'a kind of Republic'. In his own words "halkın hâmiyyet hakkı tasdik olunduğu sûrette cumhûr yapmağa da istihkâkı itirâf olunmak lâzım gelmez mi, demek ne demek?... Bu hâlde pâdişâhların ümmet tarafından beyat nâmıyla, vükelânın pâdişâhlar tarafından memûriyyet sûretiyle istihsâl ettikleri vekâletten başka icrâ-i hükûmet etmelerine hak verecek hüccetleri yoktur"; see, Namık Kemal, "Usûl-i Meşveret Hakkında", *Hürriyet*, no.

reason why conservatives recommend that reform to be presented in a manner which makes it appear continuous with past institutional practice.²⁴

These basic assumptions explain the emphasis of conservative social and political thought upon institutions, that is patterned social formations with their own rules, norms, rewards, and sanctions. Conservatives are predisposed towards protecting the authority and legitimacy of existing institutions because they believe human society cannot flourish without them. The restraints imposed by institutions are necessary to constrain and guide human passion.

Conservative thinkers believe that many valuable institutions arise not from natural rights, or from universal human propensities, but rather are a

12 (14 September 1868), pp. 5-6. Tendency of Ali Suavî's usage of historical utility on state and constitution is more or less the same. He believes that, historically, constitution of Muslims is the *Şeriat*. He writes that "demek oldu ki suret-i hükümeti tayin eden Kavânin-i Esasiyye şeriatıdır. Yani bizim şeriatımız bu ciheti siyaseti şâmilidir. Ve tafsîl-i umûra ait olan kavânin-i tâliyye tanzimattır". Ali Suavî, "Hutbe" *Le Mukhbir*, no. 34 (13 May 1868), p. 1; quoted in Hüseyin Çelik, *Ali Suavî ve Dönemi*, p. 574.

²⁴ Ted Honderich, *Conservatism* (London: Penguin Books, 1990), pp. 4-5. Honderich argues that conservatism cannot be taken to advocate an indiscriminating defense of all of the familiar, since that would be absurd, more so than is likely to be true of any sizeable tradition. According to him, no attempt to summarize conservatism as opposition to change can be made, because conservatism does produce and advocate change. For example, Ziya Paşa is discontented with elimination of *timarlı sipahiler*. He believes it was a mistake, and proposes that instead of eliminating that institution, it was much better to make a reform. In his words "ezcümle Mısır, Bağdat, Erzurum, Bosna gibi kıt'aların kendilerine mahsus idareleri ve askeri ve tophaneleri ve baruthaneleri ve hattâ sikkeleri olup herhangi canipte ya devlet-i mütecavire veyahut dahildeki cebabire taraflarından eser-i tecavüz ve tuğyan zuhura gelse vali-i belde merkez-i idare olan İstanbul'a müracaat ve ondan istizan etmeksizin askerini yani timarlı sipahi ve yerli kulları ve cebeli ve nefir-i am namıyla ahaliden eli silâh tutanları toplayıp düşmana mukabele ile mazarratını defeder ve iş olup bittikten sonra merkezin haberi olurdu"; see, Ziya Paşa, "Yeni Osmanlılardan Bir Zât Tarafından...", *Hürriyet*, no. 37 (8 March 1869), pp. 7-8.

product of historical development. They argue that to the extent that human groups differ as well. So the institutions which conservatives seek to conserve vary over time, and from group to group.²⁵

Conservative thought has also emphasized the imperfection of the individual, an imperfection at once biological, emotional, and cognitive. More than any other animal, man is dependent upon other members of his species, and hence upon social institutions for guidance and direction.²⁶ Conservatives typically contend that human moral imperfection leads men to act badly when they are motivated by their uncontrolled impulses.²⁷ They require the restraints and constraints imposed by institutions as a limit upon subjective impulse. Thus conservatives are sceptical about attempts at liberation.²⁸ They maintain that liberals exaggerate the value of freedom and autonomy, and that liberals fail to consider the social conditions that make autonomous individuals possible and freedom desirable.

²⁵ P. E. Sigmund, "Conservatism: Theory and Contemporary Political Ideology", *International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences* (2004), pp. 2628-2631.

²⁶ Louis de Bonald, *On Divorce*; quoted in Müller, *Conservatism*, pp. 126-133.

²⁷ Honderich states that the origins of the idea of human imperfection goes back to the seventeenth century and Thomas Hobbes. Of his philosophy he took human nature to be such that if certain political arrangements are not made, life will be 'solitary, nasty, brutish, and short'; see, Honderich, p. 45.

²⁸ Namık Kemal argues on the same issue. He starts from the idea that men are naturally inclined to harm one another and that the power to protect man from the attacks of his kind can be provided only by an association of men. Thus the freedom of man can be protected only in society. In his own words "dünyâda cem'iyetin hizmet-i muhâfaza-i hürriyeti için mutlaku'l-vâcib olan evvelâ bir kuvve-i galebenin icâdından ibârettir"; see, Namık Kemal, "Ve Şâvirhum fi'l-emr", *Hürriyet*, no. 4 (20 July 1868), p. 1.

Conservatives have also stressed the cognitive element of human imperfection, insisting upon the limits of human knowledge, especially of the social and political world. They warn that society is too complex to lend itself to theoretical simplification, and that this fact must temper all plans for institutional innovation.²⁹

Conservatives stress the importance of nonvoluntary duties, obligations, and allegiance. For example, Hume argued that social contract theories of political obligation which derived the duty to obey government from the explicit will of the governed were historically untenable and had the undesirable effect of delegitimizing all established governments.³⁰ Burke provides a concise formulation in his definition of the social contract.

Society is indeed a contract. Subordinate contracts for objects of mere occasional interest may be dissolved at pleasure but the state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverences; because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a

²⁹ Nisbet, “Muhafazakarlık”, p. 103. Nisbet describes Louis de Bonald’s ideas in details on society.

³⁰ Müller, “Conservatism: Historical Aspects”, p. 2626. Müller argues that the thought of David Hume marks a watershed in the development of conservative social and political thought into a coherent, secular doctrine. To him, Hume began by borrowing and expanding upon this critique of the politics of religious ‘enthusiasm’. And he went on to criticize what he saw as its secular counterparts in the philosophically implausible and politically subversive doctrines of natural rights and of voluntary contract as the sole legitimate basis of political obligation.

partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.³¹

Since the dissolution of the social order would mean the end of social institutions by which men's passions are guided, restrained and perfected, the individual has no right to opt out of the 'social contract' with the state. According to Burke this noncontractual basis of society was evident in other social relations as well. Concretely, to take one example, marriage was a matter of choice, while the duties attendant upon marriage were not. Parents and children were bound by duties which were involuntary.

Conservatives have tended to affirm religion's social utility. They make several arguments for the utility of religion; that it legitimates the state; that the hope of future reward offers men solace for the trial of their earthly existence and thus helps to diffuse current discontent which might disrupt the social order; and that belief in ultimate reward and punishment leads men to act morally by giving them an incentive to do so.³² Recognition of the social utility of religion is, however, no reflection upon its ultimate truthfulness or falsehood.³³

³¹ Edmund Burke, *Reflection on the Revolution in France* (New York: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 82.

³² Philippe Beneton, *Muhafazakarlık* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991), pp. 34-35. He demonstrates the ideas of Joseph de Maistre on religion.

³³ de Bonald tried to make a consubstantiality between religion and society. He argued that the root meaning of the word 'religion' is social. The parent-word *religare* means to bind together; see, Nisbet, "Conservatism and Sociology", p. 171.

In short, the primary themes of conservative social and political assumptions and arguments include; a) a scepticism regarding the efficacy of written constitutions, as opposed to the informal and political norms and mores of society. For conservatives, the real constitution of society lies in its historical institutions and practices, which are developed primarily through custom and habit; b) the need of the individual for socially imposed restraints and identity, and hence scepticism regarding ideological projects intended to liberate the individual from existing sources of social and cultural authority; c) the central role of cultural manners and mores in shaping character and restraints the passions, and hence the political importance of the social institutions in which such manners and mores are conveyed; d) an emphasis on the family as the most important institution of socialization, and despite considerable divergence among conservatives over the proper roles of men and women within the family, the assertion that some degree of sexual division of labour is both inevitable and desirable;³⁴ e) the legitimacy of inequality,³⁵ and the need for elites, culturally, politically, and economically; f) security of possession of property as a prime function of the political order; g) the

³⁴ On family see, Namık Kemal, “Aile”, *İbret*, no. 56 (18 November 1872), pp. 1-2; quoted in İsmail Kara (ed.), *Namık Kemal Osmanlı Modernleşmesinin Meseleleri Bütün Makaleleri-1* (İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2005), pp. 274-278.

³⁵ To see how Ottoman conservatives understood the principle of equality in *Tanzimat*; see, Namık Kemal, “Müsavat”, *Hadika*, no. 5 (14 November 1872); quoted in İhsan Sungu, “Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlılar”, *Tanzimat* (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940), p. 799. Also see, Ziya Paşa, “Mesele-i Müsavat”, *Hürriyet*, no. 15 (6 October 1868), pp. 2-3. He says that “şu müsavat meselesinin zuhuru hıristiyanların hukukça mugayir-i nasefet ve madelet olan meritebe-i süflâlarını adalet menzilesine isal etmek için idi”.

importance of the state as the ultimate guarantor of property and the rule of law, and hence the need to maintain political authority.

I.b. Edmund Burke and *Reflections on Revolution in France*

Edmund Burke is widely regarded as the founder of modern conservative social and political analysis, and his *Reflections on Revolution in France* written in 1790 is the single most influential work of conservative thought. The book struck every chord of conservative sentiment, was in harmony of conservative analysis, and enunciated every subsequent theme of conservative ideology.

Burke was born in Ireland in 1729. His mother was a Roman Catholic, while his father had conformed to the Protestant Church of Ireland to improve his personal and professional prospects. Burke attended Trinity College which admitted only Protestant students, and in 1750 he entered to Inns of Court in London to receive legal training. His career did not lead him into the practice of law, however, but rather into literature and politics. In 1756 he published *A Vindification of Natural Society*, followed a year later by *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful*, a major contribution to aesthetics. He became a close friend and confidant to many of London's leading men of letters. Burke began his political involvement in 1759.

In 1765, Burke became the private secretary to the Whig marquis of Rockingham, a great landowner and politician, who served briefly as prime

minister. Through Rockingham's patronage and influence he entered into the parliament the same year, remaining for most of his life associated with the Whig opposition to George III and his ministers. As the intellectual engine of the Rockingham Whigs, Burke's function was to enunciate principles, to influence Parliament through his speeches and reports, and to influence public opinion through his own publications and through the accounts of his speeches to the press. Burke served to articulate the principles which were to transform what had begun as a collection of members of Parliament linked by connection and interest into a coherent party united by principle as well. The Rockingham Whigs were led by the landed aristocracy but open to mercantile and commercial interests. They sought to preserve the power of parliament against royal encroachment. Furthermore, they opposed attempts to expand the political influence of the unpropertied majority, whether through more equal and democratic representation or through the influence of mob action.³⁶

For a long period Burke also served as editor of the *Annual Register of the Year's Events*, a publication that covered contemporary political life. He was the colonial agent for the colony of New York and championed conciliation with the North American colonies during the years leading up to the American Revolution. In 1782, when Rockingham became first lord of the Treasury, Burke was appointed paymaster-general, a position he held under two ministries during 1782 and 1783.

³⁶ "Burke, Edmund", Encyclopaedia Britannica, *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online* (16 October 2009), <http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-954>.

In 1782 Rockingham died, and Burke had a more difficult time in politics thereafter. In the late 1780s he undertook the lead in the controversial House of Commons impeachment proceeding over Warren Hastings's maladministration of India which was under the authority of the East India Company at the time. Burke's criticism also touched parliamentary efforts to limit the authority of the monarchy during the regency crisis of 1788-1789. Consequently, when the French Revolution commenced in 1789, Burke was neither a popular nor a powerful political figure in the Parliament.³⁷

Until the publication of *Reflections on Revolution in France*, Burke was better known as a critic than as a defender of the existing British administration. On the eve of the French Revolution, Burke was most closely associated in the public mind with his long campaign against the British East India Company, in its day the largest commercial enterprise in Britain. Burke sought to punish leading figures of the company for what he saw as their predatory behaviour toward the people in India. With the coming of the Revolution in France, and in the face of widespread support for the revolution within the British intelligentsia as well as within his own party, Burke devoted himself to a critique of the theory and practice of the French revolutionaries, and to a principled defence of British institutions. In offering a critical analysis of the origins and dynamics of the Revolution and a pessimistic assessment of its likely course, Burke challenged the dominant prorevolutionary sentiment among the doyens of British public opinion.

³⁷ Frank M. Turner, "Edmund Burke: The Political Actor Thinking", *Reflections of Revolution in France* (New York: Yale University Press, 2003), pp. xi-xiii.

Burke was very conscious of the fact that the spread of commercially distributed means of information had transformed public opinion into an important factor in politics, and that what counted as public opinion was heavily influenced by intellectuals.³⁸ In his analysis of the origins of French Revolution, Burke maintained that the principal actors included ‘moneyed men’ and ‘men of letters’. According to him the circulation of newspapers was infinitely more efficacious and extensive than they ever were. And they were a more important instrument than generally it was imagined.³⁹ What distinguishes Burke’s treatment of the subject is his awareness that the public opinion often hailed as the voice of public reason and good sense was in fact the voice of men of letters. Public opinion, in other words, was increasingly coming to mean published opinion, as Burke stressed in his writings after 1789.

In November of 1790 Burke published his great work of contemporary polemic on which he had laboured for almost a year. *Reflections on Revolution in France* took the form of a letter to a young French correspondent who had written to Burke soliciting his opinion on the revolutionary events in France.⁴⁰ The product was a paragon of literary form.

³⁸ Young Ottomans were also well aware of the power of *efkâr-ı umumiyye* as a political weapon, starting from Şinasi. It may be argued that this consciousness might be the most important factor between them and traditionalists; see, Mümtaz’er Türköne, *Siyasî İdeoloji Olarak İslâmcılığın Doğuşu* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994).

³⁹ Quoted by Muller, *Conservatism*, p. 80.

⁴⁰ Bernard Lewis argues about the impact of French Revolution in the Ottoman Empire, and states that the secularism of the Revolution, which includes the separation of state and church,

It introduced ideas and metaphors early in the work which recur throughout its more than two hundred pages. The framework allowed Burke a certain informality that increased the book's accessibility. Burke also presented the book as a response to a sermon by Richard Price, a Unitarian minister and writer on philosophical, mathematical, and political subjects, who had delivered a sermon praising the French Revolution before the London Revolutionary Society.

In his early *A Vindification of Natural Society*, Burke had ridiculed the propensity of some enlightened intellectuals to judge institutions by abstract principles, and had insisted that in attempting to do so critics would delegitimize all existing institutions without being able to create better ones in their place.⁴¹ In this book, Burke observes that the mode of thought promoted by rationalist intellectuals is likely to have consequences which they do not intend and would find abhorrent. He warned that false claims could easily be made to seem plausible, that true claims were difficult to demonstrate conclusively, and that it was easier to destroy the veneration on which institutions depend than to create such veneration anew. Public criticism might therefore destroy the hold of custom and habit that gave institutions their

the abandonment of all religious doctrines and the cult of reason, was disturbing ruling circles in Istanbul. They also began to appreciate the explosive content of the ideas of equality and liberty, though according to Lewis the latter was at first regarded as a danger to the Christian subjects of the Porte rather than to the Turks (Muslims) themselves; see, Bernard Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 68-69.

⁴¹ Edmund Burke, *A Vindification of Natural Society: or, A View of the Miseries and Evils Arising to Mankind from Every Species of Artificial Society*; quoted in Muller, *Conservatism*, pp. 66-69.

utility. This presumption conditioned his initial response to news of the Revolution in France, and served as the leitmotif of his analysis thereafter. *Reflections on Revolution in France* is a critique of the revolutionary mentality which attempts to create entirely new structures on the basis of rational, abstract principles, a mentality which Burke contrasted unfavourably to his own conception of legitimate reform as building upon existing, historical institutions.⁴²

According to Burke, the revolutionary regime in France was a tyranny. The country consisted of two factions: oppressors and oppressed. The first controlled the state, the army, the public revenue, and the property of the nation. They could pay the poor to control the rest. The outcome was what is called totalitarianism.

Later, Burke was to state clearly that the revolutionary regime in France was a military dictatorship. In his own words “those who arbitrarily erected the new building out of the old materials of their own convention, were obliged to send for an army to support their work... At length, after a terrible struggle, the troops prevailed over the citizens... Twenty thousand regular troops garrison Paris. Thus a complete military government is formed. It has the strength, and it may count on the stability, of that kind of power... Every other ground of stability, but from military force and terror, is clean out of the question... The whole of their government, in its origination, in its

⁴² Michael Freeman, “Edmund Burke and the Theory of Revolution”, *Political Theory*, vol. 6, no. 3 (August, 1978), pp. 277-297.

continuance, in all its actions, and in all its resources, is force; and nothing but force”.⁴³

Burke attributed the revolution in France to the combined influence of men of letters and financiers of government debt. In conjunction, he charged, they were subverting the intellectual and institutional basis of a civilized society. By stripping away the veil of culture and by undermining the traditional institutions of the aristocracy and the Church which had supported that veil, the intellectual and financial speculators were leading France into disaster. To him, the result would be a return of man to his natural state, a state not elevated, but brutish and barbaric.

The question of public revenue appears prominently in Burke’s analysis, as it did in the Revolution itself. From its earliest meetings, the National Assembly was faced with the problem of France’s enormous financial debts. In September 1789, a dramatic suggestion was advanced by Dupont, the deputy for Nemours and a close associate of the reformist former minister Turgot and the school of political economists known as the Physiocrats. Dupont proposed that the government begins collecting the revenues on Church property, while at the same time taking responsibility for Church expenses.⁴⁴ On November 2,

⁴³ Edmund Burke, *Fourth Letter on a Regicide Peace*; quoted in Freeman, “Edmund Burke and the Theory of Revolution”, p. 287.

⁴⁴ Eugene Nelson White, “The French Revolution and the Policies of Government Finance 1770-1815”, *The Journal of Economic History*, vol. 55, no. 2 (June, 1995), pp. 227-255. White states that in the century preceding the Revolution, the French Crown was subject to heavy and persistent budgetary crises. The monarchy’s fiscal problem arose from the political economy of the Old Regime, under which authority over taxation and expenditure was split. Whereas the Crown controlled spending, any new royal tax or loan edict had to be registered

the Assembly approved a bill which declared that “all ecclesiastical properties are at the disposal of the Nation, which undertakes to provide in an appropriate manner funds to meet the expenses of the Church, stipends for its ministers, and relief for the poor”. Those properties were to provide the backing for a new form of government paper which the revolutionary government used to pay the holders of government debt. Upon this issue, Burke stressed that in France, power had fallen into the hands of social outsiders who owned the public debt, and that these men were incapable of governing.⁴⁵

For Burke, the Revolution’s attack on the institutional bases of the Church and the aristocracy threatened to destroy the manners on which a decent commercial society depended. The destruction of the power of aristocracy and of the influence of the Church, would unleash avarice and the

by the Parliament of Paris. The noble judges on this autonomous semilegislative, semijudicial body held the view that no new permanent taxes could be levied, except by the nation as a whole as represented by the *Estates-General*, which had not met since 1614. To White, the result of the constitutional arrangement was that tax rates changed very little, as the Parliament was only willing to grant small, temporary increases to fund wars. He also stresses the budgetary differences between France and Britain. He thinks that France’s budgetary difficulties stood in sharp contrast to Britain, where authority over taxation, borrowing, and expenditure was held solely by the Parliament.

⁴⁵ Burke, *Reflections on Revolution in France*, p. 97. Burke called the revolutionaries as ‘barbarous conquerors’ that ‘they have made so terrible a revolution in property... Their passions were inflamed, their tempers soured, their understandings confused, with the spirit of revenge, with the innumerable reciprocated and recent inflictions and retaliation of blood and rapine. They were driven beyond all bound of moderation by the apprehension of the return of power with the return of property, to the families of those they had injured beyond all hope of forgiveness’.

will to exploit others for one's own pleasure that it would lead to rapine and to rape.

According to Burke, the French intelligentsia in 1788 and 1789 had done everything he had warned against earlier. They had engaged in a wholesale critique of all the premises of their major institutions, and worse still, they had done so publicly. Ergo, Burke stated that the French would live with the result of the fairy land of philosophy, results which they had not anticipated. The French men of letters had delegitimized the monarchy, the aristocracy, and the taxing powers of the state in the eyes of the larger public. He predicted that the result would be ongoing instability and the threat of anarchy, which would be controlled only by the massive use of force, and eventually, military rule.

II. Young Ottomans: Modernity and Its Discontent

One Saturday evening in June of 1865, a couple of young Ottoman intellectuals gathered in a *yalı* located in the Bosphorus, and on the following day they decided to go up to the Belgrade forest for a lunch prepared by a cook and two servants who had been sent on ahead. At the lunch, they decided to form a secret society and their main aim was to bring about change in the Ottoman administration, to promote constitutionalism and to struggle against the absolutism of the *sadrâzams*, especially of Âli Paşa. The first name they had given to themselves was the *İttifak-ı hamiyet*, the Patriotic Alliance. Within two years of time, this group turned out to be the *Yeni Osmanlılar Cemiyeti*, the Young Ottoman Society.¹

¹ For the formation of the Patriotic Alliance and the Young Ottoman movement see, Abdurrahman Şeref, “Yeni Osmanlılar ve Hürriyet”, *Tarih Musahabeleri* (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Âmire, 1339), pp. 172-182. Şeref’s doubt and lack of confidence on their aims and thoughts is noteworthy, see p. 176. For a detailed chronology and information of the Young Ottomans see, Ebuzziya Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlılar* (İstanbul: Pegasus Yayınları, 2006). But it should be considered that he wrote about them nearly forty years after the dissolution of the Young Ottomans. Also see, Mithat Cemal Kuntay, *Namık Kemal Devrinin İnsanları ve Olayları*

Although the origins of the Young Ottomans were recorded by some group members² and contemporary European observers,³ much of the information on the early years remain obscure. The program of the *İttifak-ı hamiyet*, exact date of the first meeting, their organizational scheme, a membership list and the identity of the leadership of the group, if any, are still

Arasında (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1944). Although his book is about Namık Kemal, useful information can be found on the Young Ottoman movement, especially the personal letters and translations of the original articles are useful. For insightful evaluations and good analysis on the Young Ottomans see, M. Kaya Bilgegil, *Yakın Çağ Türk Kültür ve Edebiyatı Üzerine Araştırmalar 1-Yeni Osmanlılar* (Ankara: Atatürk Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1976). This work provides an overall look both on some newspapers, letters, embassy records and gives detailed information about Young Ottomans' publications. It is quite noteworthy that the author makes a division between Young Ottomans' publication as revolutionaries and liberals. His intense research on the publications of the Young Ottomans is valuable, particularly on Mustafa Fazıl's letter and on Mehmed's papers including *İttihad* and *İnkilâb*. For their ideological background see, Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Princeton: Syracuse University Press, 2000).

² Ebuzziya Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlılar*; Hüseyin Çelik, *Ali Suavî ve Dönemi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994), pp. 229-240.

³ Charles Mac Farlane, *Turkey and its Destiny* (London: John Murray, 1850), vol. I, pp. 93-96 and vol. II, pp. 185-187. Although Mac Farlane does not say anything about the *Kuleli Vak'ası* or the *İttifak-ı hamiyet*, he gives interesting information on his personal dialogues with the *Tanzimat* statesmen, vol. I, pp. 185-187, vol. II, pp. 94-97. For some general information about the social and political background that created the Young Ottomans movement see, Jean Henri Abdolonyme Ubigini, *Türkiye 1850* (İstanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, 1977). See also, Andreas David Mordtmann, *Bir Osmanlı'dan İstanbul ve Yeni Osmanlılar: Siyasi, Sosyal ve Biyografik Manzaralar* (İstanbul: Pera Yayıncılık, 1999). His classification between the "conservative Turks" and the "Young Ottomans" is interesting but groundless, pp. 153-158. For general information and *Tanzimat* interpretation see, Ed. Engelhardt, *Tanzimat* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1976). He wrote between the years of 1882-1884. Although he gives information in details, he does not mention much about the Young Ottomans. The reason might be that their influence was not widespread.

unknown by historians. Even the traditional narration of the, so called, famous Sunday picnic does not come to an agreement. For example, Ahmet Cevdet Paşa states in his *Maruzat* that, the Young Ottomans arose from a group of *literati* who gathered habitually in William Churchill's editorial office of the *Ceride-i Havadis*.⁴ But what is clear about them is that they were all young Ottoman Muslims, who had a common knowledge of European civilization, most often had a literary background, some of them were journalists, all were literate in French which gave them the first-hand experience of European thoughts and some were employees of the *Tercüme odası*.⁵ Most of the Young

⁴ Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Maruzat* (İstanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1980), p. 56. Davison quotes the same information from İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal İnal, *Son Asır Türk Şairleri*, p. 1020, Roderick H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 118.

⁵ *Bâb-ı Âli tercüme odası* served as a training ground for diplomats and government officials. Having long employed Greeks as translators, in 1821 the Ottoman Empire reacted to the Greek war of independence (1821 - 1830) by dismissing the last Greek translator of the Imperial *Divan*, appointing a Bulgarian convert to Islam to replace him. In 1821, Mahmut II created the translation office, which led an obscure existence for the next twelve years - serving more as a school than as a translation bureau, because few Muslims then knew European languages well enough to translate. Upgraded during the Ottoman-Egyptian diplomatic crisis of 1832 and 1833 (during which Muhammed Ali of Egypt demanded all Syria as a reward for his aid in Greece), the translation office assumed an important role in preparing young men to serve abroad as embassy secretaries; some of these later became ambassadors, foreign ministers, even grand viziers. Primarily a diplomatic translation bureau, the office became part of the Foreign Ministry [*Hariciye Nezareti*] when it was organized in 1836. For a generation, the translation office was one of the best sources of Western education in Istanbul, and men trained there dominated the ranks of reforming statesmen, Westernizing intellectuals, and opposition ideologues. Patterns of bureaucratic mobility changed within the Ottoman civil service, but this office kept its prestige as a place to begin a career, and it continued to function until the end of the empire. For a detailed explanation of the role and function of bureaucracy

Ottomans, whether by getting a scholarship and being sent to Paris, like Şinasi; or by having permission to translate some examples of the European thought, such as Ziya Paşa's translation of *Émile*, had been given the opportunity to be aware of the European political systems as well as of the way the foreign policy of the empire had been conducted.

The most famous and respected member of the traditional six founders of the Young Ottoman Society was Namık Kemal. He was working in the translation bureau, and was already famous as a poet in the literary circles of Istanbul. After Şinasi Efendi, who had been the editor of *Tasvir-i efkâr*, had to leave Istanbul because of his role in an intrigue directed against Âli Paşa, Namık Kemal became the new editor.⁶

The second member was Mehmed Bey, who has been claimed as being the “spirit and chief” of the society.⁷ He belonged to an important family whose members had served as *ulemas* and high ranked statesmen. Mehmed had received his education at the Ottoman school in Paris. There, he was confronted to and was impressed by the ideas of constitutionalism and

on Ottoman modernization see, Carter Vaughn Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). Also see, Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789 - 1922* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980). And see, Walter F. Weiker, “The Ottoman Bureaucracy: Modernization and Reform”, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, vol. XIII, no. 3 (December, 1968), pp. 451-470.

⁶ Ebuzziya Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlılar*, p. 56; Elias John Wilkinson Gibb, *Ottoman Poetry*, vol. V (London: Luzac&Co, 1907), pp. 26-27. Gibb states that Şinasi slipped off to Paris to avoid appointment to an unwanted official post, because he loved freedom and hated office.

⁷ Abdurrahman Şeref, *Tarih Musahabeleri*, p. 181.

representation. He worked in the translation bureau, as well.⁸ He might be the organizer of the first gathering of the Young Ottomans in his father's *yalı*. The third member was Ayetullah Bey. Under the guidance of his father Suphi Paşa, who was a man of learning of both Western and Eastern ideas, Ayetullah had been given enough opportunity to study and absorb Western and Eastern cultures.⁹ He was also known as the member who had drawn up the statutes of the organization in 1865. The fourth one was Refik Bey. He worked in the translation bureau as well as in journalism. He was the owner of *Mirat* magazine which was founded in 1863. In this magazine, he published the translation of Montesquieu by Namık Kemal.¹⁰ Another member, Nuri Bey worked in the translation bureau and later worked as a journalist.¹¹ The sixth member was Reşad Bey, who had been known as a volunteer for the French Army in the Franco-Prussian War.¹²

Among the early members of the Young Ottoman group, especially three members gained the greatest prominence. Their efficiency and fame came from their writings and their impact on creating an *efkâr-ı umûmiye* by the help of the new power of journalism.¹³ They were Namık Kemal, Ziya and Ali Suavi.

⁸ Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, p. 12.

⁹ Ebuzziya Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlılar*, p. 69.

¹⁰ Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, vol. I, p. 293.

¹¹ Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, vol. I, pp. 389-392; Ebuzziya Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlılar*, v. I, p. 67.

¹² Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, vol. I, pp. 381-388

¹³ For a good argumentation about the journalistic activities of the Young Ottomans; see, Mümtaz'er Türköne, *Siyasî İdeoloji Olarak İslâmcılığın Doğuşu* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları,

Namık Kemal was the editor of *Tasvir-i efkâr* and he did not make any attempt to be the spokesman for political reforms and constitutionalism.¹⁴ He was much more concerned with establishing an educational system that could raise the general cultural level of the people. He dedicated some of his articles for a clearer and simple alphabet, closer to the spoken language, so that writing might have been understood easily.¹⁵ He was also trying to promote the early rise of the Ottomans to greatness.¹⁶ His interest and pride in Ottoman history and his use of the concept *vatan*, and his emphasis on Turkish language made the way for him to promote the concept of Ottoman patriotism. Since Namık Kemal, at that point, still could include *gayrimüslim* subjects in his *vatan*, his ideas were not nationalistic.¹⁷ But it surely indicated a strong pride in *vatan*, a real patriotism and contained a proto-nationalist sense.¹⁸ This

1994), pp. 44-45. He argues about the role and function of newspapers as ‘agents of change’ for Ottoman intellectuals.

¹⁴ Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, v. I, pp. 56-58. Kuntay’s reason for that is interesting. He believes Şinasi, as the master of Namık Kemal, was not an *inkılâp fırtınası* but an *inkılâp efendisi*, p. 56.

¹⁵ Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, *Ondokuzuncu Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2006), p. 318.

¹⁶ Osman Nuri Ekiz, *Namık Kemal Hayatı Sanatı ve Eserleri* (İstanbul: Gökşin Yayınları, 1984), pp. 95-98.

¹⁷ Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, vol. I, pp. 50-51, 55.

¹⁸ In the course of the nineteenth century, the concept *vatan*, with derivatives for “patriot” and “patriotism”, passed into common use as part of the new nationalist terminology and began to acquire new meanings. The ideological influences coming from Europe after the French Revolution suggested new concepts of political identity and authority, based, not on communal loyalty and dynastic allegiances, as in the past, but on country or nation; see Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,

potential care turned out to be much more patriotic and acquired an antirebel tone after the Cretan revolt in 1867.¹⁹ In some of his articles, he started to praise the parliamentary government in Egypt, and he expressed progress, free expression of opinion and prosperity as connected closely to parliamentary system.²⁰

Ziya Bey's role, whether he was one of the founders of the *İttifak-ı hamiyet* or a latter member in the *Yeni Osmanlılar Cemiyeti*, is quite obscure. It has been claimed that he was the leader of the Young Ottomans.²¹ He was the oldest, having reached nearly forty in the year of foundation of the *İttifak-ı hamiyet*, and yet he was the most distinguished of the early group, except for the Egyptian prince Mustafa Fazıl Paşa. In the next chapter, there will be a detailed biography of Ziya. Thus only a brief account of his life will be discussed here. In his earlier life Ziya had pursued a more traditional career in administrative offices of the government, then met his colleagues in the translation bureau. He was overwhelmed by Persian poetry, which also he composed. With the help of Mustafa Reşid Paşa, Ziya had been appointed as a *beşinci kâtip* in the palace.²² There, he started to study French and helped Şerif

1991), p. 40. On the role of Islam in forming a nationalist ideology see, Nikki R. Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism", *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 41, no. I (March, 1969), pp. 17-28.

¹⁹ Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, vol. I, pp. 59-60.

²⁰ Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, vol. I, p. 59.

²¹ Ekiz, *Namık Kemal Hayatı Sanatı ve Eserleri*, pp. 13-14.

²² M. Kaya Bilgegil, *Ziya Paşa Üzerinde Bir Araştırma* (Erzurum: Atatürk Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1970), p. 24.

Paşa to translate Viardot's History of Moorish Spain [*Endülüüs Tarihi*] into Turkish. Under the influence of the modes of thoughts from France, he composed some poems. The most famous of these was *Tercî-i bend*, which exhibits the influence of Western science and agnosticism, a cry of intellectual bewilderment in a world of confusion and injustice.²³ Ziya also contributed to Agâh Efendi's *Tercüman-ı ahvâl*. He lost his position in the palace, after the accession of Sultan Abdülaziz in 1861, because of Âli Paşa's jealousy and his influence in the palace. His famous hatred of Âli Paşa and the abuses he had witnessed during his administrative career, convinced Ziya that a political reform was needed. These ideas pushed him closer to the discontented elements of Istanbul. From 1862 to 1866 Ziya held a variety of administrative posts, most of them designed personally by Âli Paşa to keep him out of Istanbul. His governorship in Cyprus established a great reputation for his abilities and energy. He was back in Istanbul in 1866. This gives a clue about the role in the founding of the *İttifak-ı hamiyet*.²⁴

Ali Suavi, who had been described as *sarıklı ihtilalci*,²⁵ had a different personal background and social origin. He was the product of *rüştiye*, later he became a teacher in the new *rüştiyes* in, first Bursa, then Filibe.²⁶ He gave lectures in some mosques which criticized the government and politics of the

²³ Tanpınar, *Ondokuzuncu Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, pp. 287-292.

²⁴ Gibb, *Ottoman Poetry*, vol. V, p. 62.

²⁵ Midhat Cemal Kuntay, *Sarıklı İhtilalci Ali Suavi* (İstanbul: Ahmet Halit Kitabevi, 1946).

²⁶ Çelik, *Ali Suavi ve Dönemi*, p. 59.

sadrâzams. His tone was often political and radical. Sami Paşa, the grandfather of Ayetullah, offered him his patronage for some time. It was Sami Paşa who provided him the teaching jobs.²⁷ When he returned from Filibe to Istanbul in 1865 or 1866, he knew little French, and not much about the Western ideas. In Istanbul, he became a newspaper editor, and also continued his lectures in mosques. His *Muhbir* started to be published on January 1, 1867. Probably before that time, he had some connections with the *İttifak-ı hamiyet* members.²⁸

Although the members of *İttifak-ı hamiyet* had different origins, they thought of themselves as aiming to follow the political guidance of Europe, through their intense patriotism made them think of reform for Ottomans, by Ottomans and along Islamic lines.²⁹ So, in the first days when the differences among them seems harmonious, they charged Ayetullah to draw up the statutes of the *İttifak-ı hamiyet*.³⁰ Ayetullah is said to have had two books on the *Carbonari* and on Polish secret societies, so it can be assumed that *Carbonari* furnished a model for the organization, and that there were secret cells of seven whose members were not supposed to know the members of other cells.³¹ The purpose of the *İttifak-ı hamiyet* had been declared that the

²⁷ Çelik, *Ali Suavî ve Dönemi*, p. 60; Kuntay, *Sarıklı İhtilalci Ali Suavi*, p. 13.

²⁸ Çelik, *Ali Suavî ve Dönemi*, p. 27; Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, vol. I, pp. 466-467.

²⁹ Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 224-225.

³⁰ Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, vol. I, p. 415.

³¹ Ebuzziya Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlılar*, p. 71. In early nineteenth century Italy, member of a secret society (the *Carbonaria*) advocated liberal and patriotic ideas. The group provided the

members would submit to Sultan Abdülaziz on his visit to the Sublime Porte, a petition for constitutional government, to which the sultan should swear in the Chamber of the Prophet's Mantle.³² Also, the members of the *İttifak-ı hamiyet* were opposed to absolute government, and opposed in particular to Âli and Fuad Paşas, and were aiming to depose Abdülaziz. The group was united in its opposition to the government and the members wanted some kind of constitutional check points on administrative authority.³³

In one of his articles, Namık Kemal indicated some information about the early situation and nature of *İttifak-ı hamiyet* in 1867.³⁴ He writes that he identifies himself with pride as a member of a society which is not formally organized with a constitution and a president. He says it has no individual leader. Its members are men who have had the advantages of travel and of contact with Western-educated relatives.

Namık Kemal in *Tasvir-i efkâr*, and Ali Suavi in *Muhbir*, were trying to express the ideas of a limited equality of Ottoman subjects, Ottoman patriotism and a general desire for reform.³⁵ They were aiming to create a

main source of opposition to the conservative regimes imposed on Italy by the victorious allies after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. Their influence prepared the way for the *Risorgimento* movement, which resulted in Italian unification in 1861, see, "Carbonaro" Encyclopædia Britannica 2009, *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, (7 September 2009), <http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article -9020257>.

³² Ebuzziya Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlılar*, p. 70.

³³ Ebuzziya Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlılar*, p. 74.

³⁴ Quoted from Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, vol. I, pp. 183-187.

³⁵ Ülken, also, adds two additional ideals, 'nationalism' and 'idea of progress'; see, Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi* (Konya: Selçuk Yayınları, 1966), p. 76.

public opinion favorable for change. Although their effort had important consequences, it was small. But in 1867, they had an unexpected assistance from the Egyptian prince Mustafa Fazıl Paşa, who came into prominence for the political discontent as the result of Egyptian dynastic plot.

Mustafa Fazıl Paşa was the brother of the *Hüdiv* of Egypt, İsmail Paşa. He enjoyed a Westernized education, and he was fluent in French. From about 1845 on, he occupied some of the highest offices in the Ottoman government in Istanbul. In the early 1860's, he held the responsibility of education and then of finance. He was hoping to have a chance of holding the *sadrâzam* rank, but his priority was to succeed his brother İsmail as the ruler of Egypt.³⁶

Although he worked hard to achieve his ideals, two issues in Istanbul worked against him. One was that, Sultan Abdülaziz had the same desire to change the succession in favor of his eldest son as had İsmail. The second issue was the hostility that developed between the *sadrâzam* Fuad Paşa and Mustafa Fazıl Paşa. When the latter was fired from the treasury council in 1866, he continued his criticism of the government. He was also involved with circulating a letter which criticized the government.³⁷ The result was that he was asked to leave the country. He departed for Paris in the spring of 1866 and lived there.

³⁶ Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, pp. 28-29.

³⁷ For the original letter's transcription in Latin alphabet see, Bilgegil, *Ziya Paşa Üzerinde Bir Araştırma*, pp. 91-94. To read the original letter in French published in *Le Nord*, and a detailed analysis of the ideas in this letter see, Bilgegil, *Yakın Çağ Türk Kültür ve Edebiyatı Üzerine Araştırmalar 1-Yeni Osmanlılar*, pp. 5-10,, pp. 12-40. To read it in Turkish see, Ebuzziya, *Yeni Osmanlılar*, pp. 21-22, pp. 27-40.

On February 5, 1867 Mustafa Fazıl Paşa wrote a letter to the sultan about the dangerous situation of the empire and proposed his plans for reorganization. He sent it to *Le Nord* in Brussels, and it was published on February 7. In this letter, he claimed himself as the representative of the *Jeune Turquie*. He said he was not interested in any financial advantages for himself, then he continued as follows:

It matters not whether one is Muslim, Catholic, or Greek Orthodox to be able to put the public weal ahead of private interest. For that it is sufficient to be a man of progress or a good patriot, which is one and the same thing. Such is at least, Sir, the inmost conviction of the great party of the *Jeune Turquie* which I have the honour to represent. This party knows neither the resignation of fatalism nor the abdication of discouragement. That is to say that the insurrection of Crete, and the other troubles which are promised is in certain quarters, find it unshakable in its resolution to carry out the reform projects which thought, experience and suffering have matured.³⁸

³⁸ [Âmme refâhını, husûsî menfa'atlerinden önce getirmek için Müslüman, Katolik veyâ Ortodoks Rum olup olmamanın ehemmiyeti yoktur. Bunun için terakkî adamı ve iyi vatanperver olmak yeter –ki, ikisi de tek ve aynı şeydir- Kendilerini temsil etmekle iftihâr duyduğum büyük *Jeune Turquie* partisinin samîmî kanâati (de) Mösyö, böyledir. Bu, Girit isyânı ve muhtelif mıntıkalar içinde karşımıza çıkan daha büyük gâileler; onu, fikir, tecrübe ve ıstırabla kemâle erdirdiği reform projelerini gerçekleştirme azmi içinde metîn (bir halde) bulur, demektedir.] see, Bilgegil, *Ziya Paşa Üzerinde Bir Araştırma*, p. 94. English translation is quoted in, Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 201-202. At this point, it should be noted that although it was stressed heavily by the members of the Young Ottoman Society that there were great ideological differences between them and Âli and Fuad Paşas, I believe the gap was not too wide. It seems that their ideas on reforms, equality, Islam, education, state assemblies and role of the sultan are more or less similar. It is really interesting to see Kuntay's statement that Namık Kemal wrote an article in 1866, in favour of the national assembly constituted in Egypt, just because Fuad Paşa personally requested him to do, see, Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, vol. I, p. 59. The only point they differ with was the place of Christian subjects

Then he continued with the disasterous problem of the empire, such as injustices and extortions of the government officials, treasury crisis, lack of agricultural, commercial and industrial development, moral degeneration and depopulation among Muslim subjects. He wrote that the division of the empire was not along religious lines; instead it was along lines of power. Then he compared the situation of the empire to pre-1789 France, implying the need for a radical change. What he suggested to cure the empire was a reformed political system, freely elected provincial assemblies, a constitution which would guarantee individual rights and equality of Muslim and Christian subjects. He believed a constitution would strengthen the empire so that foreign intervention would be unnecessary.

These two letters, one sent to Sultan Abdülaziz, and the other published in *Le Nord*, created an agitated atmosphere in Istanbul, and they created a kind of acceptance among the Young Ottomans. So they tried to reprint and translate Mustafa Fazıl's letter published in *Le Nord*. Ali Suavi translated and published it in his *Muhbir* on February 21, 1867. Two days later Namık

in the Ottoman Empire. Âli Paşa evaluates this situation under the light of taxes, he says nearly sixty percent of the taxes come from Christian subjects. It might be very useful to compare Mustafa Fazıl's letters with Ali Paşa's *layihâ* written in 1867. For this *layihâ* see, Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, pp. 182-183. Also see, Engin Deniz Akarlı, *Belgelerle Tanzimat: Osmanlı Sadrazamlarından Âli ve Fuad Paşaların Siyasî Vasiyyetnâmeleri* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1978), pp. 9-16; Mordtmann, *İstanbul ve Yeni Osmanlılar*, pp. 56-65. For a confusion because of this similarity in their thoughts see, Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*, pp. 58-61, p. 99.

Kemal reprinted *Muhbir*'s translation in his *Tasvir-i efkâr*, and in this print he retranslated the term *Jeune Turquie* as *Türkistan'ın erbâb-ı şebabi*.³⁹ In fact, Namık Kemal did not accept Mustafa Fazıl Paşa as the leader of the group.⁴⁰ Even then, Mustafa Fazıl's open letter to Sultan Abdülaziz was translated into Turkish on March 7, 1867. It was printed fifty thousand copies and distributed widely. This letter drew Young Ottomans near Mustafa Fazıl and created a sympathy between them.

Âli Paşa, by the help of the 1865 press law, issued an edict stating that an immediate actions should be taken against some local journals of the extremist groups that were subversive of public order and of the foundations of the empire.⁴¹ Then Âli Paşa decided to get rid of his opponents and he assigned Ziya to a post in Cyprus, exiled Ali Suavi to Kastamonu and sent Namık Kemal to Erzurum in some administrative posts.

Mustafa Fazıl Paşa invited Namık Kemal and Ziya to come and join him in Paris by the connection of Jan Piétri, editor of the *Courrier d'Orient*, who had direct contact with Mustafa Fazıl. They escaped on May 17 to Italy

³⁹ İhsan Sungu, "Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlılar", *Tanzimat I* (İstanbul: Maarif Vekaleti, 1940), p. 777.

⁴⁰ Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, vol I, pp. 290-291.

⁴¹ [Der-saâdet'de elsine-i muhtelifede tab ve neşrolunmakda olan gazetelerin bir müddetden beri ittihâz etmiş oldukları lisân ve meslek, vazîfelerinden olan tezhîb ve islâh-ı ahlâk merkezinden çıkararak ve menâfi-i umûmiye-i memlekete mugayerât-ı asliyyesi derkâr olan ifrât ve tefrît vâdilerine gidip ve çok kerre esâs-ı devlet hakkında zebân-dırâzlık etmek derecesine kadar mütecâsir olup, yaşadıkları ve servet ü sâ mân tahsîl etdikleri memleket hakkında sâirlerinin vuku bulan itirâzlarının define çalışmaları lâzım gelirken, husemâyâ âlet-i fesâd olarak bir takım efkâr-ı muzzıra ve efkâr-ı kâzibe neşretmektedirler.], see, Bilgegil, *Ziya Paşa Üzerinde Bir Araştırma*, p. 99; Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, vol I, pp. 521-522.

by steamer, Ali Suavi joined them, and then they passed to Paris where they found both Mustafa Fazıl and Şinasi.

The Young Ottomans who joined Mustafa Fazıl in Paris were Namık Kemal, Mehmed, Reşad, Nuri of the original six of the *İttifak-ı hamiyet*. Others were their colleagues in journalism from Istanbul, Ziya, Ali Suavi and Agâh. Also, Kani Paşazade Rıfat Bey, who left his job in the Ottoman Embassy, joined them, too. Mustafa Fazıl Paşa's aim was to use these men's journalistic talents against Âli and Fuad Paşas. He probably hoped that he might regain the right to reign as Egyptian khediv, or decrease the influence of İsmail in Istanbul. So, Mustafa Fazıl provided financial support for the Young Ottomans.

The visit of Abdülaziz to Paris, which lasted from June 30 to July 10, 1868 and caused all of them to leave Paris during this period. Some of them went to London, and some to the isle of Jersey.⁴² But by August they gathered again in Paris and met in Mustafa Fazıl's house to decide on a program of action. In that meeting, they decided Ali Suavi would publish a new *Muhbir* and a fund of a quarter of a million francs would be under Ziya's control.

On August 30, 1867 the statutes of organization have been completed.

It was:

a) The carrying out of the reform program of Mustafa Fazıl contained in his letter addressed to the sultan, and consequently the changing of the regime and of the men who presently oppress the Ottoman Empire.

⁴² Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, vol I, pp. 546-582.

b) The destruction of the Russian influence and propaganda in the East, which are so dangerous for the very existence of the Ottoman Empire, the diminution of czarism by the emancipation of the Christian populations in Ottoman Empire from the Muscovite protectorship and by the reestablishment of the heroic Polish nation in its former independence, as bulwark against the encroachments of the barbarity of Russia.⁴³

After the appearance of the statutes, the Young Ottomans found their ways of action. Ali Suavi published *Muhbir* on August 31, 1867. He had to publish in London, because of the heavy restrictions of Napoleon III government in France. It was issued in the name of *Yeni Osmanlılar Cemiyeti*.⁴⁴ From the first issue on, Ali Suavi's tendency was toward an Islamic tone, and did not give enough importance or priority to the aims of the Young Ottomans. This would create a conflict in the near future between him and the circle of Namık Kemal and Ziya.

Mustafa Fazıl's return to Istanbul, by an agreement with Sultan Abdülaziz and the fact that he accompanied the Sultan on a part of his European tour, made this separation even worse. But before his return in the middle of September 1867, Mustafa Fazıl talked to Namık Kemal in Baden-

⁴³ [Mustafa Fâzıl Paşa'nın Pâdişâh'a gönderdiği mektûbtaki esâslara uygun olarak reform programı tâkibedileceği ve binnetîce Türkiye'de rejimin ve idâreyi ellerinde tutan şahısların değiştirileceği; Avrupa'da Rus propogandası te'sîrinin zayıflatılacağı, Osmanlı ülkesi dâhilindeki Hristiyânlar üzerinden Çarlık himâyesinin kaldırılacağı; Rus barbarlığına karşı, müstakil kahraman bir Leh milleti getirileceği...], see, Bilgegil, *Ziya Paşa Üzerinde Bir Araştırma*, p. 116; English translation is quoted in, Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 213-214.

⁴⁴ Sungu, "Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlılar", p. 777.

Baden that Mustafa Fazıl might become a constitutional *sadrâzam*.⁴⁵ But this was in fact the beginning of a breach that grew wider, and it was Âli Paşa's success that he separated the Young Ottomans from their financial supporter.

Under these circumstances, members of the Young Ottoman Society did not stick together. The problem was not only the differences in their characters and ambitions, it was also their views about the ways of salvation of the Ottoman Empire. Since Ali Suavi's *Muhbir* became more fanatically Muslim in tone, Mustafa Fazıl had to order it stopped in the spring of 1868.⁴⁶ Then, Namık Kemal and Ziya started a new paper in London, *Hürriyet*, which first appeared on June 29, 1868. But not all of the other Young Ottomans admired *Hürriyet*, some considering it not radical enough.⁴⁷ By the middle of 1869, Mustafa Fazıl evaluated the criticism of *Hürriyet* against Âli Paşa and

⁴⁵ Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, vol I, p. 325.

⁴⁶ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 154. Lewis believes that Namık Kemal and Ziya were also sincere and devoted Muslims, but they were not prepared to support him in his insistence on a religious reform as the starting-point of a revived Islamic state and law, nor in his attacks on the Christians.

⁴⁷ Bilgegil, *Yakın Çağ Türk Kültür ve Edebiyatı Üzerine Araştırmalar 1-Yeni Osmanlılar*, p. 138. The name *Hürriyet* that was chosen by the Young Ottomans for their newspaper is interesting and significant, because it is clear that they did not use the term *hürriyet*, which means 'freedom' in the technical language of Islamic law, and thus denotes free as opposed to slave. It connotes two ideas; a) how the Ottoman Muslim *literati* projected themselves in the *Tanzimat* period which explains their reactionary conservative attitudes, b) by the time of their political struggle the term *hürriyet* was already being used in the sense of 'political freedom' which was derivated from French Revolutionary ideas. To read on the transformation of the terms from *serbetiyet* to *hürriyet*; see, Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam*, pp. 110-111.

Ottoman government too much. This discontent, among other reasons, caused Namık Kemal to break with Ziya in the late summer of 1869.

Ziya struggled to continue *Hürriyet* by himself for a while. Namık Kemal stayed in London to see the printing of an edition of the Koran. Ziya had to escape from London, first to Paris, and then to Geneva because of publishing an article of Ali Suavi which encouraged the assassination of Âli Paşa.⁴⁸ Meanwhile Ali Suavi had started an encyclopedic journal of his own *Ulûm* in Paris. Mehmed started his own *İttihad* in Paris, and then Mehmed and Hüseyin Vasfi set up a more radical paper *İnkilâb* in Geneva. In the spring of 1870 the group had fallen into pieces.

The Young Ottoman Society never gathered again. Ziya was in İsmail's pay and was attacking Âli and Mustafa Fazıl. Namık Kemal went back to Istanbul at the end of 1870. There, he continued his journalistic career, he was quite effective with his paper *İbret* for a period. The Young Ottoman group was not reconstituted in Istanbul, either. The other exiles turned back to Istanbul at intervals during the following years, but Ali Suavi did not until 1876.

The Young Ottoman Society was never a political party. Their main function was journalistic agitation to create an *efkâr-ı umumiye* (public opinion). Although their aim was to influence conservative opinions and politics within the empire, they tried to compose European opinion against Âli

⁴⁸ Ali Suavi, "Süâvî Efendi tarafından gelen mektûbun sûreti fî 7 Ramazan sene 1286", *Hürriyet*, no. 78 (20 December 1869). This article is actually a critic of Ottoman finance. For a detailed description see, Bilgegil, *Ziya Paşa Üzerinde Bir Araştırma*, pp. 140-141.

Paşa, as well. They also aimed to persuade westerners that there was a salvation for the Ottoman Empire and Islam might have been the basis of this resurrection. They believed Islam, Ottoman institutions and customs were compatible with reforms.

Despite the individual variations among the exiles, some of the ideas were held in common. Basic to all of their arguments was that the Ottoman Empire had to be preserved intact by increasing its strength. The love of *vatan* (fatherland) was expressed by Namık Kemal in both prose and poetry.⁴⁹ It can be argued that not only Namık Kemal but the Young Ottomans in general, had the concern with the Turkish language, their use of the term *Türk* and *Türkistan* as names for their people and country, and their interest in the Turkish past. Especially, Ali Suavi developed a feeling for Turkish racial qualities more than other members.⁵⁰

However, the Young Ottomans generally defended *Osmanlılık*, but there was an ambivalence in their defense. Sometimes they argued that all people of the empire should have equal treatment. They believed all of them should equally love and defend the empire, that it was impossible to separate

⁴⁹ Kemal Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 328-336. Karpat explains how language (plays, novels, poems) played a crucial role in forming a modern nation from a religious community. Also see, Namık Kemal, “Vatan”, *Namık Kemal Bütün Makaleleri I* (İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2005), pp. 474-479.

⁵⁰ Çelik, *Ali Suavî ve Dönemi*, pp. 696-697.

them.⁵¹ But they were contradictory in terms when they defended Islam as the legal base for the state.

Their views about the reforms in the empire were influenced by their reaction against Âli Paşa. According to them, Âli Paşa was the symbol of a tyrannical bureaucracy and their political theories were formed within the framework of this hatred. To break Âli Paşa's authority, they even proposed to reestablish the provincial *âyans* and Jannissaries.⁵² But their real understanding for political reform involved popular sovereignty, representative government, and some form of constitutional monarchy. They envisioned a representative assembly which should have legislative power and act as a brake on the executive authority. Their ideas might be evaluated as original response to the challenges of Western modernity.⁵³ They created and formalized the first conservative arguments in the Ottoman Empire. Namık Kemal was insistent that legislative and executive powers had to be separate; otherwise absolutism remained. He believed the parliament representing all people of the empire should have a general supervision over the actions of the administration.⁵⁴

The Young Ottomans also claimed *şeriat* would be the fundamental framework both for the parliament and the political reform that would operate

⁵¹ Roderick H. Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century", *The American Historical Review*, vol. LIX, no. 4 (July, 1954), pp. 844-864.

⁵² Sungu, "Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlılar", pp. 821-822.

⁵³ Şükrü Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 104.

⁵⁴ Sungu, "Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlılar", pp. 844-851.

within. One of the basic criticism of Âli and Fuad Paşas was that they exhibited secularism and abandoned the *şeriat*.⁵⁵ To them the *Tanzimat* statesmen, not only lost important ties to the past, but they also abandoned the essential democracy of Islam. The duality of law introduced by the *Tanzimat* was unnecessary and what should be done was to interpret *şeriat* and apply to all. The Ottoman constitution should be based on Islam, because it was democratic and a kind of republic in the beginning.⁵⁶ So their definition of Ottoman patriotism and representative government grounded on *şeriat*.

⁵⁵ Sungu, “Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlılar”, pp. 800-801.

⁵⁶ Sungu, “Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlılar”, pp. 804-807. However Türköne believes, the Young Ottomans were not totally sincere in defending Islam as a base for the state and society, instead they were purposefully using Islam as a tool to set the Ottoman Muslims into action. Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslâmcılığın Doğuşu*, p. 78, p. 279.

III. Life and Works of Ziya Paşa

Abdülhamîd Ziyâüddîn was born in Istanbul in 1829. He was the son of Ferîdüddîn Efendi, who was a native of Erzurum, and Itır Hanım.¹ His father was a clerk in the Galata custom-house, and, according to Ziya Paşa, he was a man who understood his business well. He, generally, was content with his salary.² During Ziya's childhood they lived summer and winter alike at Kandilli. To accompany Ziya to school and to do the household errands, his father bought a Circassian slave-boy, called Ömer, who was seventeen or eighteen years of age. Ömer took Ziya along with him to the vineyards to steal such fruit as Ziya could reach, and then they ate together.

As this slave had in his own country been brought up to thieving, he used when the cherries and grapes were ripe, to take me along with him to the vineyards and steal such fruit as he could reach,

¹ Edith G. Ambros, "Ziya Pasha", *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. XI (Leiden: Brill, 2002), p. 518.

² [Benim pederim Galata Gümrüğü'nde kâtib ve işini gücünü iyi bilir ve vazîfesiyle kanâat eder bir merd-i muhâsib idi.], see, Ziya Paşa, "Ziyâ Paşa'nın Evân-ı Tüfûliyyeti Hakkında Makalesi", *Mecmûa-i Ebüzziya*, no. 13 (May, 1881), p. 419; quoted in, M. Kaya Bilgegil, *Ziya Paşa Üzerinde Bir Araştırma* (Erzurum: Atatürk Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1970), p. 4.

which we would eat together. One day, when I must have been six or seven years old, we went together to a vineyard called the Tank Vineyard, which was one of those above Kandilli belonging to the *Kapudân-ı esbâk* Damâd Halil Paşa. As this vineyard was protected by thorny shrubs which surrounded it on every side, the slave could find no way to get in. So he parted the shrubs with a stick that he had, and made a little hole. “I can’t squeeze through there”, said he to me, “but you are little; in you go, pull the grapes from the vines near you, hand them out to me, and we will eat them together.” “All right”, said I, and pushing my way in, I set to work to gather the grapes.³

One day, when they were caught up by the *Kapudân-ı esbâk* Damâd Halil Paşa who was the owner of the vineyard, Ziya’s father freed the slave and sent him back to his own country. This was one of his memories made him to start thinking about the importance of education in forming a child’s mind, and these thoughts gave him a way of translating Rousseau’s *Emile*. Ziya started his education in *Mekteb-i Ulûm-ı Edebiyye*, which had recently been opened near the Süleymaniye Mosque under the direction of his new *lala*, İsmail Ağa.

To Ziya Paşa, İsmail Ağa was a competent and experienced man.⁴ He never remissed in encouraging Ziya in every way he could to apply himself to

³ [Köle memleketinde hırsızlıkla terbiye olduğundan, kiraz, üzüm mevsimlerinde beni bağlara götürür; ve kendisi eli yetiştiği meyveleri çalardı. Birlikte yedik. Tahmînime göre altı yedi yaşlarında idim. Bir gün köle ile berâber Damâd Halîl Paşa’nın Kandilli üzerinde vâki bağlarından (Havuzlu Bağ) derler, bir bağına gittik. Bağın etrâfı dikenli çalılarla mahfûz olmağla, köle bir medhal bulup da giremedi ve elindeki sopa ile çalıkların etrâfını aralayarak, güçle bir küçük delik açabildi ve bana hitâb ile “Ben buradan sığamam! Sen küçüksün; içeri gir! Yatındaki kütüklerden üzümleri koparıp bana ver; birlikte yiyelim” dedi.], see, Ziya Paşa, “Ziyâ Paşa’nın Evân-ı Tüfûliyyeti Hakkında Makalesi”, *Mecmûa-i Ebüzziya*, no. 15 (March, 1881), p. 421; quoted in, Bilgegil, *Ziya Paşa Üzerinde Bir Araştırma*, p. 7.

⁴ [Bizim lala Kayseriyye kazâsı dâhilinde (Efke) karyesinden olup, yeniçeri devrinde taşra vüzerâsına iç ağalığı etmiş; ve çok şey görmüş oldukça dünyayı anlamış, hakikatde pişkin ve

his studies. Ziya's beginning to write poetry owed much to the influence of İsmail Ağa. The latter was reciting verses which he knew by heart from Aşık Ömer and Gevherî. He, also, composed *kıtas* or *gazels*.

My lala was very fond of poetry; for all that his spelling was so bad that it was difficult to read what he wrote, he was for ever, in season and out of season, reciting verses which he knew by heart from Aşık Ömer and Gevherî. At times too he would compose things something like *kıtas* or *gazels*, which occasionally contained lines in metre.⁵

In *Mekteb-i Ulûm-ı Edebiyye*, a teacher of Persian named İsa Efendi had been appointed and came on the Tuesday of each week. Although some of the children took lessons from him, Ziya avoided just because of his father's advice that was actually showing how Ottoman *Sünnîs* looked upon it as the special language of heresy and of the mysticism which to them was atheism, "Take good heed that you do not learn Persian, for who Persian read lose half their creed".⁶ But his lala persuaded Ziya to learn Persian. Then, he began his

edîb ve evlâd harîsi bir adam idi.], see, Ziya Paşa, "Ziyâ Paşa'nın Evân-ı Tüfûliyyeti Hakkında Makalesi", *Mecmûa-i Ebüzziya*, no. 15 (March, 1881), p. 421; quoted in, Bilgegil, *Ziya Paşa Üzerinde Bir Araştırma*, p. 7.

⁵ [Bizim lâlanın eşâra pek muhabbeti vardı; hattâ kendinin yazısı güç okunur derecede imlâsız olduğu halde Aşık Ömer ve Gevherî âsârından mahfûzu bulunan beyitleri münâsebetsiz sıra getirüp okur ve ara sıra kendi de kıta ve gazel gibi şeyler nazmedüp, içinde mevzûn olanları da bulunurdu.], see, Ziya Paşa, "Ziyâ Paşa'nın Evân-ı Tüfûliyyeti Hakkında Makalesi", *Mecmûa-i Ebüzziya*, no. 14 (March, 1881), p. 422; quoted in, Bilgegil, *Ziya Paşa Üzerinde Bir Araştırma*, p. 15.

⁶ [Sakın olmaya ki Fârisî okuyasın! Zirâ her kim okur Fârisî, gider dînin yarısı.], see, Ziya Paşa, "Mukaddime-i Tertîb-i Harâbât", *Harâbât* (1874); see, Bilgegil, *Ziya Paşa Üzerinde Bir Araştırma*, p. 13.

studies and borrowed a copy of *Tuhfe-i Vehbi*. Under the influence of his *lala*, Ziya started to realise and understand the basics of language and poetry.

In 1846, Ziya received an appointment in the office of the Chief Secretary of the Grand Vezirate. Soon after, he entered upon his duties at the *Bâb-ı Âli* and worked there for nine years. During these years, he was exercising poetic talent and was leading a wild and bohemian life in some taverns where drinking parties used to be held.

By the help of his talent and intelligence he managed to attract general attention at the *Bâb-ı Âli*. When his colleagues saw the extraordinary ease and grace with which he composed in highly elaborated official style, they constrained to acknowledge and admire his talent and ability. However, in spite of his talent Ziya could not manage to make money by his pen. His father had to support him. But this situation gave little concern to Ziya, all of whose serious efforts were directed to the increase and advancement of Otoman culture.

In 1855, Ziya was appointed as the *mâbeyn-i hümâyûn beşinci kâtibi* to the Sultan, through the influence of Mustafa Reşid Paşa. Ziya's skill in secretarial work, as well as his poetic talent, had come under the notice of Reşid Paşa and *Şeyhülislâm* Arif Hikmet.⁷ From the day he entered the Sultan's palace, he felt that he owed the honourable position in which he found himself neither to his birth nor to any favouritism, but to his own merit and talent

⁷ Nazım Paşa, *Selanik Vali-i Sabıkı Nazım Paşa'nın Hatıraları: Bir Devrin Tarihi* (İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1992), pp. 99-100.

alone. He was determined that he would maintain and increase his fame. Therefore, he turned his back on his former life, gave up his bohemian companions, and set himself to walk in the straight path.

In the palace, *Mâbeyn Ferîki* Edhem Paşa strongly advised him to study French. Ziya followed this advice and within six months he learned French fair enough to help Edhem Paşa. As mentioned before, they translated into Turkish an historical treatise by Viardot on the ‘History of Moorish Spain’, as *Endülüis Târîhi* and it was published under the name of Ziya on February 6, 1859. Thus quite early the defensive and conservative cast of Ziya’s thought was visible.

Among some other French books, mentioned as having been translated by Ziya during these years in the palace, are Molière’s *Tartuffe*, a ‘History of the Inquisition’ as *Engizisyon Târîhi*, Fénelon’s *Télémaque*⁸ which was the first Western novel translation into Ottoman Turkish in the Ottoman Empire, and La Fontain’s *Fables*. But most of these works remained unpublished because there was little demand for such literature in those days. The only exceptions are the *Tartuffe* which was issued in 1881, the year after his death, from the print-house of the *Vakit* newspaper, and the ‘History of the Inquisition’ which was published in 1882 by Ebuzziya Tevfik. The translation of Rousseau’s

⁸ Johann Strauss, “Who Read What in the Ottoman Empire-19th and 20th Centuries”, *Middle Eastern Literatures*, vol. 6, no. 1 (January, 2003), pp. 39-76.

Emile is dated in 1870 and was translated at Geneva, where Ziya was living in exile.⁹

Besides these translations, Ziya was not neglecting poetry. His best known poem, *Tercî-i Bend* was written during his tenure of office in the palace. In his poems the clarity and directness of the thought, simplicity and sobriety of the expression shows the effects of Ziya's European studies. According to Gibb, the outlook on life is Western rather than Eastern, though the external form and mechanism of the verse remains Oriental.¹⁰

How passing strange a school this workshop of creation shows!
Its every fabric doth some script of the unknown expose.
The whirling heaven is a mill whose yield is agony;
Bewildered man is e'en the grain it grinds the while it goes
Like a demon fierce and fell its offspring it devours;
How strange a nest doth this old hostelry of earth disclose!¹¹

In 1861, Ziya ceased to be a member of the *mâbeyn* after the accession of Abdülaziz. This was probably a result of the hostility which existed between him and Âli Paşa, whose influence had become powerful with the new Sultan.

⁹ Ambros, "Ziya Pasha", *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, p. 519. Also see, Önder Göçgün, *Ziya Paşa* (İzmir: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1987), pp. 14-31.

¹⁰ Elias John Wilkinson Gibb, *Ottoman Poetry*, vol. V (London: Luzac&Co, 1907), p. 59.

¹¹ [Bu kârgâh-ı sun acep dershanedir,
Her nakş bir kitab-ı fedünden nişânedir.
Gerdün bir asiyab-ı felâketmedardır,
Gûya içinde âdem-i âvâre dânedir.
Mânend-i div beççelerin iltikam eder.
Köhne ribat-ı dehr acep âşiyanedir!]

See, Ziya Paşa, *Tercî-i Bend ve Terkiib-i Bend* (İstanbul, 1327), p. 3. English translation is by Gibb, *Ottoman Poetry*, v. 5, p. 87.

Âli and Fuad Paşas had been the rivals of Mustafa Reşid Paşa and Ziya, resented the growing power of the former. Ziya tried to bring about the fall of Âli Paşa by representing to Abdülaziz how Âli was in reality usurping the imperial power,¹² and his attempts against Âli Paşa entailed the dismissal of Ziya from his position as secretary to the Sultan.

Then, Ziya was appointed to a succession of nominal offices after his removal from the palace. It was during this time that he laid the foundations of the *İttifak-ı hamiyet*. With several of the educated and talented of his younger contemporaries, they had begun to realise the backward state of their country, and were filled with a desire to do something to bring about a brighter and better state of things. Their aim was the regeneration of Ottoman Empire as one of the great civilised powers of the world. The solution they found a constitutional régime with a parliament of which the members were elected from all of the *millets* within the empire. But this idea brought them into collision with Ziya's old enemy *Sadrâzam* Âli Paşa. In fact, Âli Paşa was sincerely desirous of the welfare of the country.¹³ However, he did not approve of the revolutionary ideas of the reformers. So, he thought to break up the group by sending its leading members away from the capital. Naturally, Ziya was amongst those unlucky members. In January 1862, he was appointed as *zabtiye müsteşârı* and sent off from the palace. He was sent to Athens as a

¹² Bilgegil argues about how Ziya evoked in front of Abdülaziz just to disgrace Âli Paşa; see, Bilgegil, *Ziya Paşa Üzerinde Bir Araştırma*, pp. 30-31.

¹³ Roderick H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 234-235.

sefir, but he rejected because of the situation in Greece. Then, he was given a *mîr-i mîrânlık* rank and was sent to Cyprus as a *mutasarrıf*. In Cyprus, he and his son, who had died soon after in Istanbul, were infected heavily. While he was on duty in Cyprus, he was given a *irâde-i mahsûsa*, so he was appointed as a *Meclis-i vâlâ azâhğî*¹⁴ and got away from there. After five months in Istanbul,

¹⁴ Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu states that *Meclis-i Vâlâ-yı Abkâm-ı Adliyye* was created in 1838 by the reformer Mustafa Reşid Paşa for the purpose of taking over the legislative duties of the old *Divân-ı Hümayûn* in order to originate or review proposed legislation and thereby create an ordered and established state by means of beneficent reorderings of state and society, with all other legislation being turned over to a second legislative body, the *Dâr-ül Şura-yı Bâb-ı Âlî* [Deliberative Council of the Sublime Porte]. The *Meclis-i Vâlâ* hardly had a chance to begin its deliberations when, following the accession of Sultan Abdülmecid and promulgation of the *Hatt-ı Hümayûn* of Gülhane which proclaimed the *Tanzimât* reform movement as the major goal of the new regime, it was expanded into the principal legislative body of state with the abolition of its sister body. Beginning its work on 8 March 1840 in a new building constructed especially for it near the office of the Grand Vizier at the Sublime Porte, it originated most of the *Tanzimât* legislation, though its powers were severely limited by regulations which allowed it only to consider legislation proposed to it by the ministries or the executive. It was supplanted for reform legislation by the *Meclis-i Âlî-yi Tanzimât* in 1854, but it continued to originate lesser laws and regulations and also to act as supreme court of judicial appeals. Conflicts of jurisdiction between the two bodies, however, and a substantially increasing workload created such a backlog of legislation that in 1861 the two were brought back together into a new *Meclis-i Vâlâ-yı Abkâm-ı Adliyye*, which was divided into departments for Laws and Regulations, which assumed the legislative functions of both councils, Administration and Finance, which investigated complaints against the administrative misconduct, and Judicial Cases, which assumed the old council's judicial functions, acting as a court of appeals for cases decided by the provincial councils of justice and as a court of first instance in cases involving misconduct on the part of higher officials in the central government. Regulations allowing it to originate as well as to review proposed legislation, and to question members of the executive and to try such officials for misdeeds, greatly increased its ability to act decisively in order to meet the problems of the time, with the sultans interfering only rarely to veto or change the results of its work. In 1867, however, in response to complaints about

he was sent to Bosnia as an inspector. After an unseccesful assignment, he left for Istanbul on June 6, 1863. Thereafter, he was commissioned to Amasya as a *mutasarrıf* starting from the December 15, 1863. He worked really hard and built several schools, government offices, clock towers, a bridge and a jail in Amasya.¹⁵ But, because of a struggle against the local *beys*, he was dismissed from his post and returned back to Istanbul. He had to wait for five months to be posted to an official duty. Finally, he was appointed to *Meclis-i Vâlâ* again. At the same time, he started to write critics against the politics of the government in *Muhbir* of Filip Efendi. Âli Paşa tried to send him to Cyprus again just to get rid of his strong political voice. But, instead of shipping off to Cyprus, he escaped to Europe in the early summer of 1867.

As already mentioned before, some of the Young Ottomans were invited to join Mustafa Fazıl Paşa in Paris. Mustafa Fazıl was excluded from his hereditary rights by Abdülaziz, so he turned against him after June 1866. In order to carry out his plan of revenge by attacking the government through the press, he wanted to have with him in Europe some other Ottoman writers who

the autocratic nature of the *Tanzimât* system, the *Meclis-i Vâlâ* was replaced by separate legislative and judicial bodies, the *Şûrâ-yı Devlet* [Council of State], whose members were at least partially elected and representative, and the *Dîvân-ı Ahkâm-ı Adliyye*, chaired respectively by the famous *Tanzimât* leaders Midhat Paşa and Ahmed Cevdet Paşa. See, Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, *Tanzimat Devrinde Meclis-i Vâlâ 1838-1868* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1999), pp. 35-55. Also see, Stanford J. Shaw, "Medjlis-i Wala", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, second edition, Volume VI (Brill, 2009), p. 972; also see, Ali Akyıldız, *Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilâtında Reform* (İstanbul: Eren, 1993), pp. 179-197.

¹⁵ Kenan Akyüz, *Ziya Paşa'nın Amasya Mutasarrıflığı Sırasındaki Olaylar* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1964), p. 3.

were opposed to Âli Paşa and the system he represented. Mustafa Fazıl was enormously wealthy, and he promised to maintain as long as they lived those who came to Europe at his request, a promise which he soon afterwards broke, as he made piece with the Ottoman government, and leaving the Young Ottomans to shift for themselves as best they could, returned back to Istanbul where he was granted high favours. Ziya utterly criticized him in his famous satire called *Zafernâme*.

While safe and snug was his home in the midst of his maiden fair,
And while with his servants' jests his nights enlivened were.
 Unbidden did he all such delights and peace forswear;
 He chose this hard campaign in the winter-tide to share
 While never an one had wished of him to be rid or free.¹⁶

After Mustafa Fazıl's return to Istanbul, Ziya and his friends moved from Paris to London. There, they published two newspapers named *Muhbir* by Ali Suavi and *Hürriyet* by Ziya and Namık Kemal. In these papers, generally, they continued their propaganda in favour of a limited monarchy and representative government.

From London, Ziya first had to go to Paris, then to Geneva where he dated the preface to his translation of *Emile* in the spring of 1870. About this

¹⁶ [Sıcacık halvet iken cariyeler ile yeri,

Turfegûyalık ederken geceler bendeleri,
 Bîsebeb terkederek böyle huzur-u hazarı,
 İhtiyar eyledi bu kışta şu müşkil seferi,
 Yoksa kim etmiş idi kendisini istiklâl.]

Ziya Paşa, *Zafernâme* (İstanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, [no date]), p. 32. English translation is by Gibb, *Ottoman Poetry*, v. 5, p. 98.

time some of the Young Ottomans, including Namık Kemal, had been pardoned by the sultan for their departure and began to return back to Istanbul. Ziya did not, because his political enemy Âli Paşa was still in office. However, on September 1871, Âli Paşa died and Ziya addressed to the sultan a *kasîde* in which he apologised for his departure which was due to the hatred of an enemy who banished him to Cyprus in order to kill him there. His wish was granted, and he shortly afterwards received the permission to return. After his return in the beginning of 1872, Ziya was once more enrolled in the government service as a *reîs* in *Dîvân-ı ahkâm-ı adliyye icrâ cemiyyeti*.¹⁷ In his spare time, he completed his great anthology, named *Harâbat*, the publication of the three volumes of which extended from 1874 to 1875-6.

On the accession of Abdülhamid on August 1876, Ziya was promoted to the rank of *vezir*, and acquired the title of *paşa*. At the same time, he was nominated as the Governor of Syria. Like Namık Kemal, Ziya was not permitted to stand as a candidate for the parliament which his influence had so greatly contributed to the creation of it. From Syria, Ziya was transferred to Konya, and from Konya to Adana, where he died as a governor early on May 17, 1880.¹⁸

Besides his translations from French, Ziya wrote in prose a number of articles and treatises on various political and social questions. But his best literary works were produced between the years 1854, when he became a *kâtip*

¹⁷ Nazım Paşa, *Selanik-i Vali-i Sabıkı Nazım Paşa'nın Hatıraları: Bir Devrin Tarihi*, p. 50.

¹⁸ Seyit Kemal Karaalioğlu, *Ziya Paşa, Hayatı ve Eserleri* (İstanbul: İnkilâp ve Aka Basımevi, 1984), pp. 27-28.

of the sultan, and 1867 when he fled to Europe. The verses he had written during this period present the earliest examples of Turkish poetry produced under the direct influence of Western culture. His best known work is *Tercî-i bend* which he wrote in 1859, and it consists of twelve stanzas. It is the spirit of Western agnosticism that breathes throughout this poem; it is Western science that has revealed to the poet and the attitude of his mind that of the European of the nineteenth century.¹⁹

One of the most important innovations Ziya made was bringing the poetry into harmony with modern life by employing it, much as employed prose, as a vehicle for expressing what he regarded as the truth. In the past the general tendency had been to consider poetry as a medium for the expression of transcendental ideas. It can be argued that his poems are the expression of a mind which is essentially Eastern, has been open to the influence of European culture. Ziya's work is never an imitation of European poetry, although he was inspired by them.

No edition of Ziya's poems was published during his life-time, but in 1881, a selection of these was brought out under the title of *Eşâr-ı Ziya*. However, *Zafernâme* that was written in 1870 is still considered as his *opus magnum*. This satire is directed against the political enemies of the Young Ottomans. While the main target is *Sadrâzam* Âli Paşa, many of his colleagues, notably Fuad Paşa, were attacked as well. Even the name, *Zafernâme*, was chosen by Ziya on account of the irony because it was a very common title in

¹⁹ Gibb, *Ottoman Poetry*, vol. V, p. 65.

the old Ottoman and Persian literature for an account of the military triumphs of some great warriors. Its object is the celebration of Âli Paşa's expedition to Crete in the autumn of 1867 in order to give an end to the rebellion which had for some time devastated the island. However, the great part of the work is in prose, so *Zafernâme* might not be criticized as poetry but it is the one great satire in Ottoman literature.²⁰

Another work of Ziya, *Harâbat*, is a great Persian, Arabic and Turkish anthology compiled by him after his return from Europe. This work of Ziya marks the last endeavour of the old Eastern culture to retain what was left of its ancient supremacy in Ottoman literature.²¹ *Harâbat* consists of three volumes, the first was published in 1874 and the remaining two in the following year. But his old friend, Namık Kemal wrote *Tahrib-i Harâbat* to criticize Ziya's attitude. He believed a dedicated reformer like Ziya, should have had nothing to do in setting up as models of literary excellence many of the pieces included in *Harâbat*. Secondly, Namık Kemal was disgusted at the poems which Ziya had been in the habit of addressing to Abdülaziz. But it is the best anthology of old Ottoman poetry and within the three volumes it presents a fairly adequate picture of the achievements of the Eastern School.²²

²⁰ Ziya Paşa, *Zafernâme*.

²¹ Gibb, *Ottoman Poetry*, vol. V, p. 77.

²² Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, *Ondokunuzcu Asır Türk Edebiyat Tarihi* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2006), pp. 285-286.

IV. Social and Political Thought of Ziya Paşa

IV.a. *Tanzimat* According To Ziya Paşa

Ziya Paşa was an Ottoman patriot, and his greatest concern was for the weakening of the Ottoman Empire after the *Tanzimat*. In some of his articles, he describes the ruin of the Turkish [Muslim] trading classes by European traders, due to the privileges that had been forced by Western Powers. He feels humiliated of seeing the Christian subjects granted the special protection of the West, the financial ineptitude of the government. He believes that the Muslim Ottoman traders were being pushed out of commerce, and then, they went into government service, so this placed an additional burden on the shoulders of the state.

Ziya Paşa's experience as a state administrator and his cautious personality defines his ideas on *Tanzimat* and its reforms. In general, as with the other Young Ottomans, he really had respect for Mustafa Reşid Paşa and his accomplishments, as the architect of the *Tanzimat* reforms. He believes Mustafa Reşid Paşa dared to execute the bases of administrative reforms, and

adds that *Tanzimat-ı Hayriye* was required as a necessity of the era to alter the beliefs of Europe that were hold for some years and that to establish the sovereignty in the European lands. To him Reşid Paşa was the one who had seen the dangers of European's sick beliefs about Ottoman state and acted to eliminate the reasons.¹

Ziya Paşa, at the same time, feels uneasy about the direction in which the reforms had taken. So, he expresses strong reservation with regard to the *Gülhâne Hatt-ı Hümayûnu*, and the era of reforms it initiated. Ziya considers it, as a missed opportunity and as a concession granted to Western states.

He, heavily, criticizes the things that had been done in the *Tanzimat* and believes that *Tanzimat* was a medicine to cure a seriously ill patient, but somehow it failed. His organic conceptualization between “the nature of a person or community” and “the *şeriat*” is noteworthy. He states that although the *Tanzimat* changed the form of administration instantly, the state came into possession of disputed [unexperienced] doctors, instead of old [experienced] doctors. He criticizes the actions which were applied to stop decline, and adds that the nature of actions should have been interrogated first. He thinks because actions have got nothing to do with *şeriat*, it is impossible to

¹ “Avrupa'nın Devlet-i Âliye hakkında seksen yüz seneden beri beslediği itikâdı tahvîl ve esâsı saltanâtı Avrupa toprağında tesis ve takvim için iktizây-ı asr üzere lâzım olan ıslahât-ı mülkiye deayimini Tanzimât-ı Hayriye nâmiyle vaz ve icrâyâ cesaret eyledi.
... Avrupa'nın Devlet-i Osmaniye için sahip olduğu ahide-i sâkimenin tehlikesini herkesten evvel gören ve def-i esbâbına teşebbüs eden Reşid Paşa'dır.” Ziya Paşa, “Hâtıraya Zeyl”, *Hürriyet*, no. 34 (15 February 1869), pp. 2-3.

strengthen the situation of state. Here, it is interesting to see his conceptualization of the Ottoman state as a Muslim's body.²

He, also, tries to compare the situation of the *Tanzimat* period with with the pre-*Tanzimat* period. He says, up until *Tanzimat* noone was feeling safe about their lives and honours.

Tanzimat eliminated this harmful circumstances, and by this destruction, it ensured everyone's lives, properties, chastities and honours. Namely, it executed the requirement of the Holy Law.³

He criticizes the way government officials and civil servants made their livings, and the way they applied the law as they wish. To do that, the officials did not avoid putting pressure on the people. He thinks, bribe was a common method of having a work done. The mechanism of government was totally choked up. To Ziya Paşa, *Tanzimat* swept these kinds of affairs away, and set the administration in order back again.⁴ Surely, his post in the government service

² “Tanzimât şekl-i idâreyi hemen külliyyen tahvil eylediği ve eski etibbâdan daha ziyade davâlı tabipler eline geçtiği halde devletin bin tarihinden bin iki yüz elli beşe değin canib-i inhitâta bir çift beygirli araba süratiyle yürümüş ise elli beşten seksen beşe kadar şimendifer hızıyla koşmuştu. Bu tesîr-i makûse sebep ne oldu? Burası bilinmek için evvelemerde ilacı tahlil ile müfredâtına bakılmak lâzımdır.

... Bunların içinde şer-i şerife mugâyir, yani hastanın mizac-ı tabiüsine muhalif hiç bir madde bulunmadıktan başka, belki cümlesi bimârın vücûdunu terkip eden cezâ-yı hulkiyesinden olmağla bu ilaç ile hastanın sağılması şüphedenberî görünür.” Ziya Paşa, “Hatıraya Senâ'ye”, *Hürriyet*, no. 36 (1 March 1869), pp. 6-7.

³ “Tanzimat, bu ahvâl-i muzırrayı lâğiv ve imha ile herkesin canı ve mal ve ırz ve namusunu taht-ı emniyete koydu. Yani muktezay-ı şer'i icra etti.” Ziya Paşa, “Hatıraya Senâ'ye”, *Hürriyet*, p. 7.

⁴ Ziya Paşa, “Hatıraya Senâ'ye”, *Hürriyet*, p. 7.

had given him the chance of observing the situation in the pre-*Tanzimat* period. He, also, writes that in the pre-*Tanzimat* period recruitment of military service was distorted, because the statesmen never thought about the social and economic consequences.⁵ When *Tanzimat* was proclaimed, one of the first things they had changed was putting into practice.

⁵ The introduction of conscription in the Ottoman Empire was closely linked to the introduction of an European-style army. The first attempt to create an army which was trained, equipped and dressed in the contemporary European fashion was made by Sultan Selim III in 1792. His *Nizam-ı Cedid* troops constituted a professional army. They were not recruited on the basis of universal conscription, but rather in a reminiscent system. However, when pressure against him and his new army on the part of the old army establishment, primarily the Janissaries, mounted the sultan succumbed without any attempt to use the considerable strength of his new army and disbanded the corps in 1808. In 1826 Mahmud II tried to continue Selim's military reforms. He formed his modernized army from within the active parts of the Janniserics, named as *Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye*. Recruitment age was between fifteen and thirty years and the minimum term of service was twelve years. *Dâr-ı Şûrâ-yı Askerî* was established in 1837, and a year later it was proposed that a five-year term of military service should be introduced and this suggestion was incorporated in the *Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayûn* in 1839. The edict noted that the burden of defence had so far fallen very unequally on different areas and that lifetime service had damaged the population as well as the quality of the army. In March 1870 the whole system of recruitment was reviewed and codified in a new *kur'a kanunnamesi*, published in 1871. The first conscription law of 1848 allowed a conscript to send a personal replacement (*bedel-i şahsi*) but the 1870 regulations, while still mentioning personal replacement as a possibility, also detail the way in which service could be brought off. The reaction of the Christian communities to the new law were mixed. Many young Christian men, especially Greeks, who could afford it and who had the overseas connections opted to leave the country or at least to get a foreign passport. This was totally unacceptable to the Young Ottomans, such as Ziya Paşa, who saw it as unfair. The system of exemptions through payment meant that the burden never fell equally on all Ottoman subjects. At the end, the Ottoman army remained an army of Anatolian Muslim peasants. For detailed information see, Erik Jan Zürcher, "The Ottoman Conscription System in Theory and Practice 1844-1918", *Arming the State: Military Conscription in the Middle*

Ziya Paşa examines how slow the bureaucracy works. He mentions the situation of *Serasker* Mehmet Rüşdü Paşa as an example. Rüşdü Paşa sent a petition to *Bâb-ı Âli* to find a couple of lumbar for gun carriages. After a couple of months, he found out that the file was sent to *Maliye Nezâreti*, then back to *Bâb-ı Âli* again. Then, it was sent to some state offices continuously. After a while, when Mehmed Rüşdü Paşa discovered that the file came back to his office without a proper answer, he simply burned it out.⁶ Especially, after the institutionalization of government offices in Mahmud II's period, it seems that modernization of the state functions did not spread widely from the center to the periphery.

In so doing Ziya Paşa, also, complains about the centralization of bureaucracy, as well. He believes centralization, especially out of Istanbul, caused the works got completed in a long period of time. Although he does not like the idea of using the people in *corvée*, he believes sometimes it should be done to achieve a result. What he offers is not pertaining to a form of government in which separate *vilayets* unite under a central authority while retaining limited powers of governing, but a limited self-authority. However, he has some doubts about the state officials who executed the law and the local notables who had some influence on them. He says that up until *Tanzimat*, in every country there existed a couple of men named *derebeyi* and

East and Central Asia 1775-1925 (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), pp. 79-94. Also see, Jan Lucassen and Erik Jan Zürcher, "Introduction: Conscription and Resistance, the Historical Context", *Arming the State*, pp. 1-19.

⁶ Ziya Paşa, "no topic", *Hürriyet*, no. 38 (15 March 1869), pp. 7-8.

âyân who had authority and dignity, and they did not give any chances to the destitutes of the area to complain. But, whenever they got out of control, their brigands came to Istanbul to give petition to the Sultan and thereupon the complained legislations were investigated. If the brigands' complaints became evident, the brutal's head was cut off, or his property was confiscated. As a result, the brutal was punished as an example for the other potential ones. He continues as after *Tanzimat*, in every city assemblies were established and members were appointed away from the city.⁷ So, the former *derebeyis* were provided with the ranks of members.⁸

He states that according to the law of *Tanzimat*, execution and confiscation of property were banned. So, the ones who behaved unjustly towards people, can only be reported to Istanbul, and if they have strong

⁷ “Tanzimâta gelinceye kadar her memlekette derebeyi ve âyân namıyla yerliden bir kaç adam kesb-i nüfuz ve taayyün edip fukarây-ı beldeye cevr-ü sitemden hâli padişaha arzuhal ederler ve anın üzerine mevadd-ı müştekâbiha tahkik olunur. Ve şâkîlerin hakkı tebeyyün ederse zâlimin ya başı kesilir, ya malı müsadere edilir, velhasıl sair zalemeye medâr-ı ibret ve intibah olacak bir cezaya uğrar.

... Tanzimattan sonra her beldede meclisler yapıldı ve âzası vücûh-u memleketten tayin olundu. Yani evvelki derebeyleri, âza ünvanına haiz oldular.” Ziya Paşa, “Misâl”, *Hürriyet*, no. 41 (5 April 1869), p. 6.

⁸ The *Tanzimat* period has usually been interpreted as a top down reform process planned at the center and forcibly applied in the provinces. However, there is a growing literature that approaches the reforms as outcomes negotiated between the state and local groups, which means the reforms were not implemented as planned at the center, but changed in the process of application at the local level, with the final result depending on negotiations and bargaining between the imperial center and local groups, especially the local elites. For detailed evaluation on the process of reform implementation with local responses to this process, see, Yonca Köksal, “Imperial Center and Local Groups: Tanzimat Reforms in the Provinces of Edirne and Ankara”, *New Perspectives on Turkey*, vol. 27 (Fall, 2002), pp. 107-138.

supporters there, like the local *Kocabaşıs* and *despots*, the government can not do anything, because the local assembly consists of the same people. For that reason, the brutal can put a much more heavier pressure on the people than before. Ziya Paşa argues whether Ottoman Empire made a progress or it was a regression.⁹ He does not believe state affairs were getting into a good shape in comparison to pre-Tanzimat periods.

İstikraz is another issue that Ziya Paşa criticizes. He says, for the last five or six hundred years the Ottoman state had been in some very difficult situations, such as in Kaynarca and Edirne Treaties, but they never had to borrow money,¹⁰ even one *akçe*, from the foreign countries up until 1855. It all started with a fashion of mimicking Europe after 1844. The subsidies of the Palace and statesmen started to increase day by day, so their salaries were accrued. The state's income did not cover all of these expenses, so they started to sell a piece of paper [*kaima*] for huge amounts of money, and they liked that a lot. When these papers' compound interests accumulated, they printed more money to pay it. But, the European Powers were much more experienced than Ottomans. To ensure their commercial activities in the Ottoman lands, they asked for money as a guarantee. This was the time when the statesmen sobered down. After that, they tried to cut down the expenses and luxuries, and

⁹ Ziya Paşa, "Misâl", *Hürriyet*, pp. 7-8.

¹⁰ For historical background of borrowing revenues which started firstly in 1854 and secondly in 1855 during the Crimean War, see, Şevket K. Akar and Hüseyin Al, *Osmanlı Dış Borçları ve Gözetim Komisyonları 1854-1856* (İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 2003), pp. 7-11.

imposed heavy taxes on people. Meanwhile, Russian problem had occurred. The Ottoman statesmen had a bright idea. They thought if they could manage to get the investments of the European states, they could have their support for the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The European Powers asked that Ottoman state should have done some reforms in building roads, schools and railways.¹¹ Because of this reason, the statesmen doubled the taxes, so the financial situation had been stucked in the middle.¹²

Another subject Ziya Paşa heavily opposed to is the permission given to foreigners in the *Tanzimat* period to possess lands and properties in the Ottoman lands. He is quite pessimistic about this situation, and he thinks that it was the first step of losing the country.

So to strictly speaking, this is to say that we have already given away all our commerce and industry to the foreigners, and they have entered into our huts as we were watching outside as

¹¹ Although potential resources existed within her borders, the Ottoman Empire lacked the technical skill and capital for their development during the *Tanzimat* period. The limited amounts of native capital were in the hands of the Ottoman subjects, namely Greeks, Armenians and Jews. It is doubtful whether sufficiently large sums could have been realized from this source to develop the Ottoman Empire's natural resources effectively. In any event, capital which Ottoman subjects did advance to the government was used for more pressing needs, such as the payment of the fighting forces and of the administrative departments. Foreign capital was a necessity, therefore, if the natural resources of the empire were to be put into condition to bear a just portion of the charges on the foreign dept. See, Donald C. Blaisdell, *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1929), pp. 74-77. For some detailed information and analysis on how the Ottoman State managed to finance the *Tanzimat* reforms, see, Ali Akyıldız, *Para Pul Oldu Osmanlı'da Kağıt Para, Maliye ve Toplum* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), pp. 35-154.

¹² Ziya Paşa, "İstikraz-ı Cedîd Üzerine Yeni Osmanlılar Cemiyetinin Mütalâti", *Hürriyet*, no. 22 (23 November 1868), pp. 3-5.

audiences, thanks to the present administration. Now, we will give away even our humble huts to them and emigrate to Anatolia, as totally homelesses. When the Sublime Porte declared the rights of expropriation, the time of migration [*hicret*] had come for the people living in Istanbul.¹³

He writes about how the commerce came into possession of foreigners in the *Tanzimat* period, and explains how traditional Ottoman production had collapsed. He believes any Ottoman who had a double-priced offer from a foreigner for his property, would sell it as soon as possible. So, the Muslims would not find a place for themselves in Istanbul, they had to immigrate to Anatolia. The interesting point about his reasoning is that he makes a division between the Muslim subjects and the Ottoman Sultan. He thinks it did not matter for Sultan Abdülaziz if Muslim subjects had left Istanbul totally, and foreigners had settled to their places. But he is cautious about his accusation that Âli and Fuad Paşas were the ones who were trying to manage that process. He says that the reason how the present statesmen who got hold of the state, had the claim that no one can administrate as well as they can, and they were not satisfied for the *akçes* of the treasury and beneficences of the sultans. They, untimely, had given authorization to foreigners to possess lands in the Ottoman Empire, just to have their appreciations. But the sultan was not interested in whether the Muslim population would live in Istanbul, or not. No matter what

¹³ “Bu tabirin Türkçesi biz idâre-i hazıra sayesinde ticaretimizi, sınaatımızı ecnebilere verip birer çürük ahşap kulübeye başımızı sokmuş seyirci gibi kalmış idik. Şimdi bu kulübelerimizi dahi onlara verip haneberduş olarak Anadolu yakasına hicret edeceğiz demektir. Bâb-ı Âli ecnebîler için hukûk-u istimplâki ilân edince zımnen İstanbul ahalisine kûs-ü rıhlet çaldı.” Ziya Paşa, “no topic”, *Hürriyet*, no. 47 (17 May 1869), pp. 2-3.

happens to Muslims, Sultan Abdülaziz would still live in his palace and will receive a salary. Even Âli and Fuad Paşas would continue their duties in the Sublime Porte and Foreign Office. To him, the filthy streets of Istanbul were destroyed to build up new ones which were as wide as twenty or thirty meters, like in Paris, and neat-stoned residences were built in both sides of streets.¹⁴

Ziya Paşa thinks Ottomans had a certain way of administration according to their own order. For the last five hundred years, everything went well and they never had the reason to obey foreigners. Although, they did not wear or eat as well as foreigners, they owed or borrowed nothing from them. When Ottomans started to imitate Europeans' way of living, they changed the way they had consumed. To him, it was the starting point of collapse for the economy of the Ottoman state. Ottomans tried to get jobs in some newly established bureaus, instead of working in some traditional Ottoman arts. He thinks, when the way of money flow changed, the loyalty of Christian merchants had changed, as well.¹⁵

¹⁴ “İşte devletimizin kabza-i istilâlarına alıp bunu bizden iyi idâre edecek kimse yoktur davasıyle yere göğe sığmayan ve hazinenin akçası ve ne de padişahların lûtf-u ihsanları hâlâ gözlerini doyurmayan vükelây-ı hazırânın, mücerret Avrupa'ya yaranıp memdûhiyet kazanmak için böyle vakitsiz ecnebîlere müsaade-i istimlâk etmelerinden akıbet hâsıl olacak netice budur. Amma İstanbul'da Hacı Ahmet Efendi ve Hasan Ağa bulunacağına, Mösyö Laurant ve Mösyö Merton otursun; bundan ne zarar gelir? Devlet yine devlettir, Sultan Abdülaziz Han yine sarayında oturup maaşını alır. Âli ve Fuad Paşalar dahi Sadâret ve Hariciye Nezâretinde devam edip eteklerini acezeye öptürürler ve bununla beraber, İstanbul'un o murdar sokakları bozulup, Paris'teki bulvarlar gibi kırk elli arşın arzında vasi caddeler açılır ve iki taraflı kâgir ve muntazam konaklar yapılır.” Ziya Paşa, “Ecnebîlerin Tasarruf-u Emlâk Salahıyyeti”, *Hürriyet*, no. 21 (26 November 1868), p. 3.

¹⁵ Ziya Paşa, “no topic”, *Hürriyet*, no. 45 (3 March 1869), pp. 1-3.

IV.b. Idea of Equality

Equality, that had been embodied in the *Islahat Fermanı* of 1856, is a basic problematic for Ziya Paşa. His conceptualization of the situation of Christian subjects in the Ottoman state apparatuses, their relationship with the government, and their role in the Ottoman financial system formed the basis of Ziya Paşa's political thoughts. By discussing this topic, he tries to find answers of who an ideal Ottoman was, and what the basis of an Ottoman identity was.

However, it is not only his patriotic sentiment that makes him thinking in that direction, but his concern of the common man, and of the Turkish language, of his use of terms “*Türk*” and “*Türkistan*” as names for the people and country, and of his interest in the Turkish past.

Yet, Ziya Paşa remained as an Ottoman conservative, and never made the transition to Turkish nationalism, which in view of the desire to defend the whole Ottoman Empire would have been almost impossible. Instead, he defended *Osmanlılık*, but there was an ambivalence in his defence. Sometimes, he argued that all people of the empire should have equal treatment, that all should equally love and defend the empire, that it was impossible to separate them. But, his *Osmanlılık* suffered whenever he defended Islam as the proper legal base for Christians, or when he vented his wrath on Âli Paşa for his supposed favoring of Christians.

If but the help of God assist in his purpose dear,
Full soon will these gypsies sit on the couch of the Grand Vezier;
It is but the Jews alone that form the exception here,

For of Greeks and Armenians both he make Bey and Müshir;
The equality of rights to perfection brought hath he.¹⁶

In the period, when Ziya Paşa was a government official, the major accusation leveled against the *Bâb-ı Âli* had been that the Christian subjects could not have governmental careers open to them. *Bâb-ı Âli* had countered by the argument that the *Gülhâne Hatt-ı Hümayînu* had established such equality in law. He states that the appearance of the matter of equality was for carrying the nominal level of inappropriate legitimacy and conscientiousness of the Ottoman Christians to the circle of justice. However, although they could not reach to a conceived level, they defrauded the rights of Muslims for more, again. Namely, state or present administration sacrificed the task of protection of Muslims' rights, just to assure the protection of Christians' rights, which are under three or four guarantees. To him, all of the European states defended Christians, supposing that they were the only ones oppressed, they did not say anything about the improvement of the situation of Muslims. The foreign embassies were the primary protectors of Christians. Secondly, they had patriarchates, who had some privileges. Thirdly, they had community assemblies and elected deputies in the national assembly. He believes, if a local

¹⁶ Azmine yâver olur ise eğer kasd-ı Huda

Kıptıyan câyı olur mesned-i sadr-ı vâlâ.

Yalnız etti Yahudiler için istisna

Rumdan Ermeniden yaptı müşir ü bâlâ

Eyledi resm-i müsâvât-ı hukûku ikmal

Ziya Paşa, *Zafernâme* (İstanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, no date), p. 35. English translation is by Elias John Wilkinson Gibb, *Ottoman Poetry*, vol. V (London: Luzac&Co, 1907), pp. 105-106.

government official tyrannized over a Christian from Harput, first the *kocabaşıs* of state assembly, and then community assembly could sue him and asked him to act fair. If they could not make the governor listen to them, they gave a report to the patriarchate to be their advocate. With this appliance, even some unfair affairs seemed to be fair. Within this situation, there seemed that even head official of a district or a province and governor were removed from their posts. And, if noone could make patriarchate and *Bâb-ı Âli* listen, embassies which were counted as their spiritual protector, namely Russian embassy for Greek *millet*, French embassy for Catholics, and English embassy for Protestants, could arrange things in order by a confidential announcement. Likewise, if a Christian was put into jail unjustly, suddenly a *kapuoğlanı* or a *kocabaşı* barge in, and that Christian was released one way or another. But he asks that, if a Muslim, even though the truly rights of him was clearly seen, and was faced a cruelty by a government official or someone brutal from a province, against whom he would make a complaint, and who would have mercy on him. He adds that if a Muslim, even though he has no criminal act, stays behind bars for years, who would be litigant. He, also, criticizes that Christian Ottomans had the right to pay for military missions of their sons, but Muslims did not. He asks if this is what they called equality. However, he was well aware of the fact that Ottoman Empire was still a multi-religious empire, and there were lots of Christian bureaucrats in the state. So he chooses to stress the poor condition Ottoman Muslims were in, as if every Muslim was having difficulties in their lives. By this way, he tries to imply that if the

Christian Ottomans had the protection of foreign countries, Muslims could only get help from the Ottoman state, which did not belong to Muslims only after Tanzimat. His aim was to offer revitalising the strong bond between Ottoman Muslims and the state.¹⁷

... But it should be understood well that, our purpose of telling these thoughts does not mean Christians should not attain their legitimate rights, and they don't attend government service and be government officials, or they suffer an affront. Maybe our wish is that the state should not only guarantee the rights of Christians' privileges, but declared officially the rights of equality of all the people. It is only a wish, even for these helpless Muslims that, they should have their legitimate privileges.¹⁸

Ziya Paşa argues that whenever equality among subjects is mentioned, it should mean “equality in honours”, not “equality in state administration”. He sees the situation of Muslims as unequal, if every political rights are given to Christians, as well as Muslims. So, his belief explains a lot about why he and Namık Kemal picked a name for their newspaper as “*Hürriyet*”.

He claims that in the red book that had been published, *Bâb-ı Âli* did not deny that the verdicts of the *Gülhâne Hatt-ı Hümayûnu* were divergent to the national customs and principles. Moreover he says, what was done to these customs and principles, and weird illegitimacy of the topic of equality among

¹⁷ see, appendix 1.

¹⁸ “... Amma şurası iyice anlaşılmalıdır ki, bizim bu mütaleaları irat etmekten maksadımız Hıristiyanlar hukûk-u meşrualarına nail olmasınlar ve asla mansıp ve memuriyette kullanılmasınlar, hakaret görsünler demek değildir. Belki muradımız, madem ki devlet yalnız tebâa-i Hıristiyanın imtiyazını taahhüt etmeyüp, bilcümle tebâanın hukûk-u müsâvatını resmen ilân eyledi. Şu kimsesiz Müslümanları dahi hakkı olan imtiyazât-ı tabîyesine mazhar etmesini arzudan ibarettir.” Ziya Paşa, “Mesele-i Müsâvat”, *Hürriyet*, no. 15 (5 October 1868), p. 3.

men as if noone saw either the book of *fiqh* or the history of Islamic state and with this reminding, he says that this condition became a part of the Ottoman state politics, and that *Gülhâne Hatt-ı Hümayûnu* was the reason of this illegitimate topic.¹⁹

He thinks equality that was declared in *Gülhâne Hatt-ı Hümayûnu* was a result of a great ignorance. To him equality, regardless of any religion, had no meaning. He believes equality was a matter of personal rights, not of ethnic or religious communities. It was natural to accept that a Muslim and an Armenian should have had the same rights in the courts, but it is unthinkable to claim that if Muslims had one thousand mosques, Greeks should have had the same number of churches. Likewise, it was also ridiculous to say that, the state appointed some officials from Muslims, so it should have appointed some officials from other religions or sects, as well. He argues that having one Muslim, one Jewish, one Catholic, and one Orthodox Greek general in the army would have no more meant the granting of equality of status to the various minorities than would an obligation imposed on the Sultan to change the colour of his trousers every day of the week. He says what really meant in the demands of the Great Powers was the establishment of political rights.

¹⁹ “Bâb-ı Âlî geçende neşreylediği kırmızı kitapta fermân-ı mezkûr (Islahat Fermanı) ahkâmının ne derece âdat ve ahlâk-ı milliyeye mugayir olduğunu inkâr etmemekle beraber bu âdat ve ahlâkın tağyirine ne himmetler edildiğini ve garip olarak ne bir fıkıh kitabı ve ne de devlet-i İslâmiye tarihi görmemiş gibi âdem-i müsâvat maddesinin gayri meşruîyetini ve bu halin Devlet-i Âliyye’de esas politika hükmüne girdiğini teskâr ile işbu madde-i gayrimeşruanın lâğvına Gülhâne Hattı bais ve mebde olduğunu zikreder...” Ziya Paşa, “Mesele-i Müsâvat”, *Hürriyet*, p. 4.

These would not be obtained by employing Christians in the highest state functions by providing them with an opportunity to control the government.²⁰ He also adds that establishing equality among Ottomans was a meaningless term, as long as the upper classes of Istanbul would be steeped in wealth while the paupers in Izmir had to drown their children, because they were too poor to afford any.

IV.c. The Origins of Government

Ziya Paşa thinks that a government might be considered as a good government only if it executes the Islamic law, namely the *şeriat*. But it is not very clear if the political authority of sultan and government are divinely ordained institutions. Although he is not very interested in the problematic of “freedom”, he believes that freedom of man can be protected only in society. In opposition to Rousseau,²¹ he thinks men are naturally inclined to harm one

²⁰ Ziya Paşa, “no topic”, *Hürriyet*, no. 23 (30 November 1868), pp. 3-4.

²¹ Rousseau thinks that civil and natural liberties are two different concepts. He believes natural liberty is limited only by the strength of the individual, and civil liberty is limited by the general will. He argues by the social contract man loses his natural liberty, but gains his civil liberty. He states this passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a most remarkable change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving his actions the morality they previously lacked. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (London: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 64-65.

another, and that the power to protect man from the attacks of his kind can be provided only by an association of men.²²

So a government, as an association of men, exists because all members of the community can not deal all of their times with governmental matters. To him, government arises as the result of an agreement among citizens to appoint an authority in government. Society is a form of association which is distinguished by its being regulated by certain principles, generally agreed upon which keep men from hurting one another. It means some members are assigned the task of enforcing this force.

Although, at first sight, it may indicate a secular state theory, it gets complicated how this mechanism works within the limits of the *şeriat*. He thinks secular nature of law is not contradictory to the *Şeriat*. To him, the *şeriat* already consists of these secular laws, such as *meşveret* and *biat*.

This juxtaposition of secular and religious elements in Ziya Paşa's political theory, goes back to the dual origin of his thought. His secular explanation of the origins of government, leads him to a conclusion that the

²² Rousseau depicts the state of nature as one of innocence. What distinguishes men from beasts is first their faculty of self-improvement and secondly man's only natural moral quality, which is compassion or sympathy. In the state of nature, man lives alone. It is when he becomes sociable that he becomes wicked. In the early stages, when each begins working together with other men in hunting or in joint defense against natural disasters, association sharpens man's feelings of sympathy, and so breeds notions of consideration and obligation. The cultivation of the earth gives rise to the idea of property. So, Rousseau thinks once men begin to claim possession, the inequality of men's talents and skills leads to an inequality of fortunes. Wealth enables some men to enslave others. So, to limit that, an agreement between men to live under a political system is set. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *A Discourse On Inequality* (London: Penguin Books, 1984), pp. 96-98.

rights of sovereignty belongs to all. But, as an authoritarian figure of Ottoman state, sultan's role, as being the head of government and Islam, remains as an open question in his theory.

To him, Rousseau's secular theory "social contract" can only be possible if the sultan/caliph enforces divine law. But, he is cautious of claiming that if the ruler can not carry out his obligations, the community has the right to break the contract. However, a justified revolt is never evolved in his theory. His career as a state official and his loyalty to sultan might be the reasons.

The origins of society and how the nature of it plays a role in Ottoman decline are other problematics that he tries to conceptualize in a series of articles. He believes, government and its institutions are matters of evolution, and social contract is its natural result. To him, earliest political ties are the basis of it. He says that if one ever brings to mind the fashion in which society arose and which in turn gave rise to tribal origins and government, reason leads one to the following explanation: at first a few families were roaming completely naked through the mountains, remaining on an elevation in summer and living in lower parts in the winter, inside caves and feeding on wild fruit. With the establishment of the contacts between families, this roaming was undertaken by a few families at one time. The single families who saw two or three families gathered in one place joined them, and thus a new form was evolved and the community progressively came into being. However, ambition and greed and the desire of the victorious to subjugate the defeated being congenital tendencies of human character, the result of daily intercourse between families was the rise of dispute and enmity. To settle these disputes a

principle became necessary. Thus the wisest and the oldest man among the families was chosen and these words were said to him: 'Because of your superior qualities, the members of the community have agreed that you be brought to the office of government. You shall serve them by taking care of such and such a matter. Since you consequently will not have time to gather nourishment like others, as long as you occupy this function everybody or every family shall give you thus much victuals every day. If you do not fulfill your duty satisfactorily, they shall find somebody to replace you.' In short he was brought to this office with the words: 'You shall be a paid servant of the community.' According to Ziya Paşa when with the passing of time the community grew and houses and villages were built and other families began to gather in various places in a similar fashion and were shaped into society, and when disputes began to arise between them and the judge who had been chosen to settle disputes who was not sufficient any longer, the need was felt for a superior chief to protect the community from the attacks of the enemy and to enforce the execution of the orders of the judge. Thus, again the one person who was best known among all families, for his ability and material spirit, was again brought to the executive office of government with a salary. Ziya Paşa adds that the *Emirs* and the monarchs were at first paid servants of the community who were given the duty of ministering to its needs and performing services for its benefit. Later, when societies grew larger and took the form of tribes and nations, the task fulfilled by the *Emir* assumed greater importance and since naturally respect and prestige for the office increased as it became more and more important, the title of *Emir* was transformed into

that of King or '*Padişah*', and with the passing of time and centuries, the foundations were forgotten, and it was believed that pomp and luxury and the executive power were beyond question. Thus a situation arose which completely contradicted the original purpose. It was now believed that the people were no more than servants of the King, among the majority the King was believed to be the master. Matters went so far that to keep the people from being enlightened about this secret, the seizure of their natural rights, the government of antiquity used them as they would cattle, and undertook by guile to keep science and learning a monopoly of the spiritual caste, and the simple people were always kept in blind ignorance, and the cultural patrimony of the majority of humanity began to consist of such things as stones and trees and spiders and hellfire. And this was only natural, for just as insects those live in dirt think that no other state exists than that in which they find themselves, when men are born in centuries of oppression they go on in life believing oppression to be customary and slavery to be a requisite of nature. And after a while they meet with disaster and decline. The number of nations which have thus been born and lived and died has not been ascertained. However, these precautions were effective only as long as ignorance and blindness continued, but when civilization began to spread and the eyes of humanity began to open with the light of science, all nations saw the state in which they were and began to sue for their rights.

According to Ziya Paşa those, whose support was derived from being in power, decided not to change their unbounded rule, and used the very power and force they had taken from the people against the people. This conflict gave

rise to many civil revolutions and national wars. He gives some examples that a few nations such as Rome and Sparta and Athens established republican rule to escape from unbounded tyranny, but even then, those who were appointed to political office made it their aim to use this power without recognizing any bounds. This gave rise to innumerable clashes and troubles, too. While these clashes were taking place in the world, the exalted religion of Islam arose. The saintly person of the Prophet did not established a sultanate, and the four Caliphs were brought to power by the election of the Companions of the Prophet. The affairs of the state were decided by the votes of selected Companions of the Prophet and carried out in accordance with the sacred law of the *şeriat*.²³

Ziya Paşa thinks that the state of nature was an historical occurrence. He believes, the state of nature can be regarded as a state of peace, good-will and mutual assistance. To him, it is a perpetual contention for honours, richness and authority.²⁴

In Ziya Paşa's political system the *şeriat* is the basis of governmental machinery. But, he does not see it as a fundamental statement of political obligation, instead it is more likely to be a perfect statement of law. A law that is obliged to control the ruler from oppressing people. He states as:

The efforts of the Young Ottoman Society are primarily concentrated to the substitution of the will of the nation, that is to

²³ see, appendix 2.

²⁴ Ziya Paşa, "İstanbul'dan Diğer Mektup", *Hürriyet*, no. 28 (4 January 1869), p. 4.

say of the population of the Empire, without distinction of race or religion, for the arbitrary power of a few individuals.²⁵

Another aspect of Ziya's thoughts is that he believed the salvation of the Empire lay in the creation of a national assembly. But, the questions of how it would be achieved and what the situation of the Sultan would be, are not concluded well. It seems that his ideas are divided between his loyalty to sultan, utility of the monarchy and establishing a national assembly that balances the power of the ruler. In his 'dream', he tries to explain the reason to the sultan why he had been driven to criticize government, and he shows his respect for the monarchic principle. He says the national assembly would no way be curtailed the legitimate independence of the monarch.

... For since the national assembly, which has been thought of by your humble servant, would not be anything that would trespass the limits set by the order of the *Şeriat*, just as the independence of the Sultan is bound by religious law, so with the new system would it be limited. For example, what is there in holding ministers responsible before a national assembly for their actions that could be considered a limitation of your will? Can it be considered a sign of your independence if ministers feel free to oppress the people and rob the treasury? Would you want such independence?²⁶

²⁵ Quoted in Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, p. 347.

²⁶ [... Millet Meclisi zât-ı şahânenizin meşrû istiklâlinizi katiyyen ihlâl etmez. Zira, tasavvurumdaki millet meclisi'nin nizâmı hudûd ü şerîden ibaret bir şey olduğundan istiklâl-i saltanat nasıl ahkâm-ı şeriye ile mahdûd ise nizâm ile dahi o kadar mahdûd olur. Meselâ, vükelânız harekât ve efâl-i vâkıalarından nâşi millet meclisi'nden mesûl tutulmakla sizin istiklâlinize mi dokunacaktır? Eğer vükelâ istedikleri gibi ahâlîye zulüm ve cefâ ve hazineyi yağma ederlerse sizin istiklâlinizin kemâline mi delâlet eder? Böyle istiklâli siz ister misiniz?] Ziya Paşa, *Edibi Muhterem Merhum Ziya Paşa'nın Rüyası* (İstanbul: Tefeyyüz Kitaphanesi, 1932), p. 7.

Although Ziya Paşa is faithful to the monarchic principle, he also thinks that tyranny has a degenerative effect on people and that civilization is dependent on good government. In his political thinking, law plays a crucial role. To him, freedom without law could not be conceived. He says throughout every nation in history, elaborate laws were made. A tribe, without being tied to a more or less regular system of laws, never existed. He believes liberty is found with attachment to laws.²⁷

The similarity of his ideas with Montesque's 'the spirit of the laws'²⁸ is clear. To Ziya Paşa, every nation should have laws according to the particular composition of its society. What he tries to explain is that the *Şeriat* is the elaborate law of the Ottoman Empire, and without the loss of cultural identity and the danger of decline, it could not be abandoned.

²⁷ Ziya Paşa, "no topic", *Hürriyet*, no. 2 (6 July 1868), p. 2.

²⁸ Montesquieu believes that the key of understanding different laws and social systems is to recognize that they should be adapted to a variety of different factors, and cannot be properly understood unless one considers them in this light. Specifically, laws should be adapted "to the people for whom they are framed..., to the nature and principle of each government, ... to the climate of each country, to the quality of its soil, to its situation and extent, to the principal occupation of the natives, whether husbandmen, huntsmen or shepherds: they should have relation to the degree of liberty which the constitution will bear; to the religion of the inhabitants, to their inclinations, riches, numbers, commerce, manners, and customs. In fine, they have relations to each other, as also to their origin, to the intent of the legislator, and to the order of things on which they are established; in all of which different lights they ought to be considered". When legal and social systems are considered in relation to these various factors, Montesquieu believes many laws and institutions that had seemed puzzling or even perverse are in fact quite comprehensible. Hilary Bok, "Baron de Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2008 Edition).

In one of his last articles in *Hürriyet*, Ziya Paşa explains which political system works best, and should be used in the Ottoman Empire. But, his beliefs in defending government of republic must be evaluated cautiously, because at the time he wrote this article, he had to run away from London to Geneva, because of publishing an article of Ali Suavi about assassination of Âli Paşa. He went into jail for a while, then he escaped. So, his personal situation might be the reason of dispraising the political system of Britain.

His article “The Difference Between Government of Republic and Regime of Personal Authority” is a declaration of republicanism. He defends it, because it is the political system of individuals. He believes in a republic, there is freedom of expression, a national assembly and a civil law that has to be obeyed both by the people and the high state officials. This article, also, represents a break off from his previous ideals. He believes that in a government of republic, there was no sultan, no emperor, no grand vizier, no foreign minister. People of the country were the sultan, the emperor, the grand vizier, the foreign minister of the country. In a government of republic, more or less, one million people are not the slaves of a couple of self-seeking individuals’ judgements and enchantments. Everyone, rich or poor, is free to sustain his rights of liberty. He continues as in a government of republic, there was no principle of enlisting some hundred thousand person as soldiers by conscription based on a drawing of lots, and compulsion and cruelty and no principle of removing them from their hometowns, and from their profit of income and keeping them waiting for a long time in barracks. Because the country belonged to everyone and it was very usual to protect their properties

as much as they could do from the provocation of their enemies, young or old everyone was soldier. Whenever it was needed, people grasped their arms and run. Therefore, the republic of Switzerland was able to impel a couple of hundred thousand soldiers, if it was attacked by a foreign power, although the population consisted of one, two million people. According to Ziya Paşa this was the reason why they were so sure about the molestation of the countries around it. In a government of republic, the people could not be used as corvees for lumber and rope, the government paid and bought them from the people.

Ziya Paşa also thinks that in a government of republic, the newspapers were not under obligation of licking the government's boots, but they were authorized to do any kind of satirizing within the limits of law. Therefore, they raised caine to find a fault of administration and exaggerate it. In a government of republic, there existed a national assembly. Members of the assembly were elected by the people, namely, the most respected and erudite ones were elected and nominated as members for a while to get inspected. And again one person among the people who was surpassing the others by his dignity and erudition, was elected as a president of the assembly.

To him every person, no matter how free and untrammelled of obeying the civil law, was obliged to obey the current law. The law, which was formed according to one country's principles and national morals and requirements of status, consisted of verdicts and regulations that was arranged and established by the majority of national assembly. All of the procedures were attached to this law and assembly was its protector and observer and even the president was an executive tool. Even the trait of honour, that was qualified to privilege

of the members of assembly from the rest of the people, was made up of being successful to attain the status of an elected presidency, shortly they didn't have any differences and privileges from the ordinary people.

Privileges and equality are the issues Ziya Paşa was sensitive. He believes everyone, regardless of his rank, should be equal. He says that none among them disposed of any other privileges because they did not become member and president for monthly, yearly granted ranks. President and members, like everybody else, paid their shares of accrued taxes. They didn't have either phaetons or adjutants or foremen or fancy uniforms or palaces, and either of them had handicaps of being rich, and they could earn money by their official duties. Courts were totally independent from the government, each executed the law within the circle of current law. Either the national assembly, or the president never had the right to interfere. Therefore, president and member and the common people, everyone was bounded strictly to the authority of law, there was no possibility of going out of it, even a pace. Because of this reason, in a government of republic, intrigues of the statesmen never worked out.

But, regimes of personal authority is totally contrary of this administration, some of the statesmen, who have the title of counselors, come over the administration. Supposing that, the country is their farm which is inherited from their ancestors, and they rub and set to work millions of people as if they are studs in the farm. They take everything they've got. They spend it to their personal debauches. In a regime of personal authority, the man whoever is in charge, does whatever he wants. He sends any person he likes to

heaven, any person he does not like to hell. He saves persons under his protection, from the hands of the law, even if he has been accused. He legitimizes that person even if he has something unfair. He sends the person who has no accusation to exile if he is hostile. He violates the person's means of making a living, he makes his life poor and miserable. No one can say anything about it. The newspapers, in a regime of personal authority, make their livings licking the boots of holders of matters. They write in praise to government, even if it makes something terrible. They try not to exhibit the country and the people, but to earn money. And that is the way of earning money. The worst regime of personal authority is in Iran, then in the present Sublime Porte, then in the states of Russia, and in Italy, and in Austria, and in Prussia, and in France, and in England. The state of England is the lesser of other evil administrations, but sometimes, even there, the law is sacrificed for the benefit of some statesmen. Furthermore, English are the most self-seeker, conceited nation than the others, and they have the tendency of domination, so when they feel there is something around for their benefit, they don't care about the law and they can do anything, including sacrificing their souls.

Hürriyet newspaper experienced the difference of these two administrations in itself by four hypocrites. Although, these four presented hypocrites have every kind of confidences of Âli Paşa, the statesmen of England violated their country's law, and they tyrannized over the print house of *Hürriyet*, just to please Âli Paşa. While his highness Âli Paşa, was sacrificing a set of state laws, and was supposing to carry out a hidden hatred, supposing it as an acceptable politics in everywhere, this time he applied to the republic of Switzerland

through the agency of French Embassy to stop printing and publishing of *Hürriyet*. But he received an answer that everyone in a government of republic is free, even regulations of printing is highly capacious, everyone may publish a newspaper, the administration does not ban it. While the fellow diplomat was praised himself of being the hot shot in the science of politics, and was attacking without knowing anything about the laws of Geneva Republic, he thought there was another kind of Clarendon, if he sacrificed the law of state as a response he might have let him. However, his teeth met to stone, instead of flesh. By this reason, the other day it was interviewed with the president. Because no gatekeeper is waiting in front of his office's door, anyone who wishes to see him can come in freely and tell him his problem and it is surprisingly seen that he considers everyone as if they are his old friends, asks kindly how they are doing and their occupation and he strictly tells whether their requisition is possible or not, according to the law and it is remembered of the highly majesty, grand vizier's magnificence in the Sublime Porte, the difference among them are striking. To understand if a government's administration is fair and the people are happy, the roads have to be observed carefully in the first days of entrance to that country. If the beggars and policemen are more seen, one should make a decision of tyrannie of administration and repression of people without any doubt. If not, the opposition is definitive. What would a foreigner assume within these two situations when he enters Istanbul?²⁹

²⁹ see, appendix 3.

Conclusion

In every country conservatism, just like nationalism, stressed different cultural and historical aspects of the local, suggested to conserve different traditions, institutions and cultural characteristics, and positioned itself in a different condition of daily and local political area. However, a group of basic principles and parameters can be observed if conservatism is to be discussed. Especially after the nineteenth century, conservatives tried to produce flexible answers to some theoretical and practice problems, and to some social transformation that they had to face.

At the end of the eighteenth century in Western Europe conservatism, as an intellectual movement, was about continuous rise of bourgeoisie that was unsatisfied with the results of the Enlightenment, French Revolution, capitalism and traditional political systems, and that asked for change. It was a strong reactionary movement against the intense transformation, and the perception and will of change. Its basic principles appeared as; a) confidence on historical continuity and traditional past; b) nonconfidence on human nature, individual, and untested social and political systems. It was a sum of opinions that belongs to traditional periods, to diminishing classes, to aristocrats that were corrupted after the Revolution, reform, capitalism and

modernity which destroyed the structure of all European system. According to conservatives, it was not only the French Revolution that ruined old society and order in the social and political area, but it was also steam machines, mechanization, urbanisation, overpopulation, industrialization, and capitalism. Hence, conservatism was a reactionary movement against social, cultural, and political changes which were caused by modernity.

The peak of the great transformation, which was shaped until the eighteenth century on, appeared after the French Revolution. After that, bourgeoisie demanded ability for social movement, and equality before the law and among traditional structures. Those demands used to be unthinkable in traditional societies. Some thoughts, such as secularism, equality, self-governed society, started to appear after the middle of the eighteenth century. And conservatives had serious problems with these thoughts. However, the real concept they were opposed to was radical and progressive groups, which wanted to rebuild the society under the guidance of the Enlightenment, and which dedicated themselves to change the status quo, and to create a new social order. So, conservatives constituted a self-conscious opposition movement against those who tried to transform the traditional society into a secular, equal and self-governed one.

Conservatism, as a nineteenth century ideology, consisted of some debates those were carried on against the arguments of the Enlightenment and modernity. In other words conservatism, and the Enlightenment and modernity were like two sides of the same coin. For conservatism, shaping itself as a modern ideology had been possible only within the atmosphere of the French

Revolution. To them, the wish of getting back to the origins reinforced an optimist hypothesis of the idea that human nature had always remained the same throughout the centuries. In an order like that, people needed a family, a patriarchal authority that protected justice and order, and provided the continuity of society, and, similar to that functions, a state authority.

In the West, conservatives defended a powerful state, and superiority of law and order, but they respected a balanced and reasonable constitution because of their fear on state despotism. Law, according to conservative thought, was a sum of customs that had been authorized politically. It was important to protect an order of law that worked in a proper way. So the constitution must have been continual.

The order, that conservatives idealized, did not consist of political institutions only. People needed family and children to satisfy their biological needs; property and possession for security and freedom; local ties and neighbours for not being an unhappy migrant; traditional religious beliefs to tell them where they had come from, where they would go and their being on earth. Religion could not be separated from the sacred society, in other words society was the other face of religion. To them, religion had a social function, a mission to form a congregation, and to create a state of belonging. Religion, as a social and congregational form, was important because of social stability and authority, namely society preceded the individual and without the feeling of a ruling holyness there would have been no society. A structure of a society would have been corrupted if there were no congregation, which created some bounding ties between the individual and society. Without congregations, ties

would break off, individuals would melt into air, and get isolated from each other. Institutions, that had ensured social homogeneity, were patriarchal family, ancient commune life and guilds. According to conservative thought, freedom of an individual was restricted if they were away from these institutions. Conservatives trusted these mediator societies as alternatives against power of state.

Up to this point, general principles and developments of a Western European ideology is mentioned. But with regards to different religious, cultural, social, political and historical past, is it possible to talk about conservatism in the Ottoman Empire as a modern ideology? At first glance, the answer might be negative, because of the lack of basic parameters to conceptualize conservatism in the Ottoman Empire. However, the aim of this thesis challenges this point of view. It centers the idea that conservatism can not be evaluated only by the norms of the West, instead it should be thought as a general political attitude against a great transformation in a particular society that creates a deep split, and that every social and political transformation, such as *Tanzimat*, is tried to get balanced with a reaction, which emphasizes the importance of local and traditional values. In other words, searching for a French Revolution in the Ottoman history is meaningless and unimportant in this sense, because conservatism, as a modern political reaction, is not only about a particular Western historical situation, but it is about a universal reaction against change in all around the world after the nineteenth century particularly. However, it is not to say that Western and Ottoman conservatisms are totally two different schools of thought. Instead, what is

claimed in this thesis is, although they are both reinforced by two different historical sources, both conservatisms have much in common, like similar arguments and critics.

The first modern transformation movement in the Ottoman Empire began with the *Tanzimat* period, although it did not cause such a great impact as the French Revolution did in the West. It was a period of great political and social changes. *Tanzimat* reforms were prepared by Mahmud II to transform the Ottoman Empire to a modern, centralized state. He annihilated the Janniseries, destroyed the centrifugal power of *ayans*, and shut down the *Enderun mektepleri* and established new schools, in which the main actors of *Tanzimat* would be raised. These changes, paradoxically, created a feeling of a conservative reaction among the Ottoman Muslims, who thought that they had lost their economic and legal superiority. From this reaction, the important and unique characteristics of the Ottoman experience appears as; a) *Tanzimat* was a conservative reformation movement, because it was materialized by some high officials of the state to strengthen the state apparatuses. Even if it seems controversial, the general inconsistency in the *Tanzimat Fermanı* might be considered as a good evidence. It begins by imputing the decline of the Ottoman Empire principally to the transgression of old laws, proceeds to adapt new regulations in the state and end by praising the restoration of old manners and customs; b) as being the children of *Tanzimat*, the Young Ottomans oriented their critics against some reforms, which were already the results of a conservative reformist movement. Namely, the difference between the group of

bureaucrats that constituted the reforms, and the Young Ottomans is not as clear as the French Revolutionaries and the monarchists. In this sense, it might be claimed that the source of the reformists and the conservatives was the same. The main difference seems like both groups approved the reforms for the sake of state, but could not agree on the degree, context and form of them.

Ziya Paşa was one of the brightest members of this cloudy formation. He, just like Burke, never claimed himself as an Ottoman conservative, but he put important contribution in forming an Ottoman conservative argument. So, it is important to compare and designate the similarities and differences of his arguments with Burke's. Firstly, there is a similarity between Ziya Paşa's criticism about *Tanzimat*, and Burke's critics on the French Revolution. Ziya Paşa attacks *Tanzimat* by the arsenal of religion. He defends that the *şeriat* was totally removed out from the state affairs, and that none of the new regulations were consulted to the *ulema*. By this discourse, he tries to defend the Ottoman Muslims. However, he pretends not to see the superiority of the *örfi* law to the *şeri*. For him, the reason might be a trial of joining the tradition of Ottoman state with the destiny of *sünni* Ottoman subjects. By this way, he might want to imply that only the *sünni* Ottomans could have full commitment to the person, who holded the title of both *padişah* and *halife* at the same time. It can be understood much clearly that the search for Ottoman identity had started with the *Tanzimat* period.

Ziya Paşa did not believe in the divine rights of *padişah*, also. So, he can easily justify defending an idea of a constitutional monarchy. In so doing, he

believes that the rights of *padişah* would not get limited by the constitution. He shares the same suspicion of all conservatives: they were all against a strong, authoritarian central government. He tries to balance and limit the power of *padişah* and bureaucracy by the help of constitution. Sometimes his fear gets so deep that he wants to revive the Janniseries and *ayans* back again as alternative forces.

Essentially, Ziya Paşa was only interested in the situation of Ottoman Muslims and their political unity. As a result, he was opposed to *Tanzimat*'s principle of equality. By this way, he defends that Muslim and Christian Ottomans can only be equal by law, other than that Muslims must continue enjoying their superior situation. Because of it, he believes that the Ottoman parliament have to be consisted of Muslims only. He wants Christian Ottomans to have limited and local political rights, such as *vilayet* and *millet meclisleri*. He stresses the heavy conditions of the Ottoman Muslims had. He states that Christian subjects were protected and patronized by some Western countries, and that the Christians were very succesful in commerce and got richer every day. He believes Muslims were in a very poor condition, because they had to send men to the army and the *esnaf loncas* were weakened after *Tanzimat*. He believes that the *loncas* must have been conserved as buffer institutions. Surely in Ziya Paşa's mind, there are only Christian merchants living in some cosmopolitan cities, like Istanbul, Izmir and Salonika. Ho chooses to be quite about the poor situation of Christian peasants living in the

Balkans and Anatolia, and to tell that the real discrimination occurs not only between Muslims and Christians, but between oppressors and oppressed.

The ideal of revolution is never mentioned by Ziya Paşa. He, just like Burke, defends that every society should change and evolve within its historical and cultural formations. So evolution, not revolution, matters him most. To him, the Ottoman constitution should be formed reasonably under the guidance of traditions, namely religion. He thinks, law can not be imported from foreign countries, like from France. He, unawarely, becomes the spokesman of the *Mecelle*, which will be formed in the near future, and will have an unexpected result as secularization of the Islamic law. However, he is not clear about the question how it would be possible for a kind of law that was based on a certain sect of a certain religion, will be put into practice in the multi-religious Ottoman society.

As a result, by the help of a new perspective, it can be understood that Ottoman and Western conservatisms defended the same kind of views against change. No matter how different they seemed because of their historical and social contexts, the discourse of ‘every traditional social and political institution must be preserved’ is their main similar tendency. Surely, inventing traditions was a part of it. However, it should be kept in mind that this discourse was directed against modernity to balance and rehabilitate it. In this sense, it might be claimed that Ottoman conservatism formed an original ideology against the problems of modernity in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire.

Appendix 1

A partial quote from Ziya Paşa.

Şu müsâvat meselesinin zuhûru Hıristiyanların hukukça mugâyir-i nasefet ve madelet olan mertebe-i süflâlarını adalet menzilesine isâl etmek için idi. Halbuki fiili icrâda her ne kadar tasavvur olunan dereceye varamadılarsa da yine yalnız Müslümanları fersah fersah ileri tecavüz ettiler. Şöyle ki, Hıristiyan tebaanın muhafaza-i hukûku üç dört kabza-i kefâlet altında temin olunup, hattâ bu emniyeti teyit maksadiyle Devlet-i Âliyye veyahud idâre-i hazıra, hukûk-u İslâmiyenin vikayesi vazifesini feda eyledi. Bütün Avrupa devletleri mazlum-u sırf zannettikleri Hıristiyanlar üzerine kanat açıp kat'â tebâa-i İslâmın ıslahına dair şakki şefe etmedikleri cihetle Hıristiyanların birinci derecede hamileri ecnebî sefaretleridir. Ve ikinci derecede malûm olan imtiyazâtı havi patrikhâneleri vardır. Ve üçüncü derecede cemâat-i milliyeye meclisleri ve intihâb-ı umumî ile mansup mecalis-i memlekette vekilleri bulunur. Meselâ Harput kurasından birinde bir Hıristiyan hakkında memurîn-i mahalliye taraflarından zulmedilecek olsa evvelâ meclis-i eyaletteki kocabaşlar ve saniyen cemâat meclisi davacı olup ihkâk-ı hakka gayret ederler. Ve eğer bunlar valiye söz geçiremezler ise patrikhâneye mazbata edüp ikinci derecede patrikhâne avukatlık eder. Ve bu vasıta ile ekseriya haksız işler bile hak gibi görünür gider. Ve bu aralıkta kaymakam ve mutasarrıf ve vali bile azl ü tebdil olunduğu kesir'ül vukûdur. Ve eğer patrikhâne ve Bâb-ı Âli'ye söz anlatamaz ise üçüncü derecede milletin hâm-i ruhanisi addolunan sefâret, yani Rum milletinden ise Rusya ve Katolik ise Fransa ve Protestan ise İngiltere sefaret-i tebligât-ı müessire-i mahremâne ile işi yoluna koydururlar. Kezalik nahak bir Hıristiyan hapis olursa derhal kapuoğlanı ve yahut kocabaşısı dikilüp şöyle böyle tahlis olunur. Amma bir Müslümanın güneş gibi hakkı zâhir olduğu halde memurîn ve zaleme-i eyaletten birinin pençe-i gadrine dūçar olsa halini kime şikâyet ve hakkında kim merhamet ve sahâbet eder? Hiç cürmü yok iken senelerce mahpus kalsa davacısı kim olur? Müsâvat buna mı derler?

... Ahalî-i İslâmiyeden birinin esnan dahil iki oğlu olsa bunların tahliyesi için bedel-i naktî ve altun olarak altışar bin ve sekiz ve onar bin kuruş vermek ve vermez ise evlâdının huzur ve muavenetinden mahrum olmak mecburiyetinde bulunur. Amma Hıristiyan ahaliden iki oğlu olan senevî nihayet kırkar ve ellışer kuruş bedel-i askerî itâsiyle ikisinin dahi muavenetinden müstefit olur. Ya askerlik meşakkı ve telefâtı ve hanesinde oturmak istifadesi yine başka. Böyle müsâvat mı olur?

Ziya Paşa, "Mesele-i Müsâvat", *Hürriyet*, no. 15 (5 October 1868), pp. 2-3.

Appendix 2

A partial quote from Ziya Paşa.

Yeryüzünde en ibtidâ teşkil-i kavmiyyet ve hükümet eden cemiyetin sûret-i tahaddüsü pîşe-i nazar-ı tefekküre getirilse, akl hükmeder ki, bir takım familyalar çırılçıplak dağlarda gezip yazın yaylalar ve kışın engin yerlerde ve mağaralar derûnunda hüdâ-yi nâbit meyvalarla taayyüş edip dururlarken familyalar beyninde üns-ü ihtilât ile birlikte gezmeğe başlanılmış ve iki üç familyayı bir yerde gören yalnız familyalar dahi onlara iltihâk ile bit-tedric şekli cemiyet husûle gelip ancak hırs u tama ve gâlib olan zebûnu taht-ı hükümüne almak insanla beraber yaradılan hasâil-i cibilleyeden olmakla ictimâ eden familyaların efrâdı beyninde vesâil-i gûnâgûn ile nizâ ve muhasamat başladığından, bunların nizâmını fasl etmek zımında bir hâkimin vücûdu iktizâ eylemiştir. Ve bu iş için familyaların akıl ve esenni ihtiyâr ile, “senin şu hasâil-i mümtâzân hasebiyle makâm-ı hükümete nasbını efrâd-ı cemâat tensîb eyledi; onların şu işlerini görüvermek için hizmetkâr olacaksın ve bu sebeple, mâdem ki sâir âzâdeler gibi tahsîl-i erzâka vaktin müsâid olmayacaktır, bu hizmeti gördükçe herkes ve yâhud her familya yevmiyye sana şu kadar erzâk vereceklerdir; eğer hizmeti hakkıyla edâ etmez isen, yerine diğerini bulurlar; ve'l-hâsil sen cemâatin ücretli hizmetkârı olacaksın” denilerek bu mevkie nasb olunmuştur. Mürûr-ı zamân ile cemâat büyüyüp ve hâneler ve köyler yapılmaya ve şâir taraflardaki müteferrik familyalar dahi bu vechile toplanarak cemiyet şekline girmeğe ve cemiyetler beyninde nizâ ve muhâsamatlar zuhûra gelmeğe başladıkda fasl-ı nizâ için ihtiyâr olunan hâkim kifâyet etmeyip cemâati tecâvüz-i adâdan muhâfaza edecek ve hâkim-i nizâm hükmünü icrâya götürececek bir büyük emîrin tayînine ihtiyâc hissetmekle familyalar erkânından en ziyade seçâat ve fütüvvet ile marûf olan bir zât yine ücret ile makâm-ı hükümet-i icrâiyyeye getirilmiştir. Bu vechile ümerâ ve hükkâm cemâatin hâcet ve hıdmetini görmek için getirilmiş ücretli hizmetkârlar iken sonra cemâatler daha tekessür ederek kavm ve millet sûretini kesb ile ümerânın mükellef olduğu hizmete ehemmiyyet gelmiş ve ehemmiyyet arttıkça rağbet ü hürmet bi't-tabi ziyâdeleşmiş olduğundan ‘emîr’ tabiri ‘padişâh’ ve ‘melik’ unvânlarına tahvîl ve mürûr-ı zamân ile halk bu esâsı unutup meliklerin debdebe ve kudret-i icrâiyyesini fevkat-tasavvur görmekle kasd-i evvel külliyyen aksine tebdîl ederek güyâ halk melikin hizmetkârı ve melik pek çok akvâm içinde halkın kirdigârı zum ve itikâd olunmuştur. Hattâ bu sırr u hikmete, yanî ahâliyi gasb olunan hukûk-ı tabîyyelerinden ââh etmeyerek devâbb ve mevâşî gibi kullanmak murâdına mebnîdir ki, asâr-ı kadîme hükümetlerinde ulûm u maârif yalnız memûrîn-i rûhâniyyeye mahsûs u münhasır olup avâmm u nâs dâimâ cehâlet içinde bî-haber ahcâr u eşcâr ve âfitâb u nâr gibi şeyler nice asır secdegâh oldu. Ve bu da tabîi idi. Zîrâ miyâh-ı müntenede tekevvün edenler buldukları halden başkasını bilmediklerinden kâni oldukları gibi, insanlar dahi bir idâre-i zâlimâne asırlarında doğup büyüdüklerinden zulm ü adâlet ve

esâreti muktezâ-yı tabîat zannedip giderler ve bir müddet sonra mahv-u münkariz olurlar. Şimdiye kadar bu vechile doğup ve yaşayıp vefât eden millet ü akvâmın adedi malûm değildir. Ancak bu tedbîr yalnız cehl devâm ettiği müddetçe tesîr edip, medeniyet yayılmağa ve envâr-ı ulûm ile halkın gözü açılmağa başladıkda her millet evvel nazarda kendi bulunduğu hâli görüp hukûkunu davâyâ tasaddî eyledi. Mesned-i iktidârda bulunanlar melûf oldukları hükm-i müstakillâneyi ellerinden çıkartmamağa kasd ile ahâliden aldıkları kudret ü kuvveti onların aleyhine istimâl eylediler. Bu nizâdan nice ihtilâlât-ı mülkiyye ve muhâberât-ı milliye vukû bulduğu gibi, bir takım milletler idâre-i istiklâliyye-i mezâliminden yanmış olduklarından cumhûr ile idâreyi iltizâm eylediler. Fakat bu hâlde bile makâm-ı istiklâlde icrâ-yı nüfûz etmek itiyâdına düşüp bundan dahi nice şûriş ü keşâkeş tahaddüs etti. Arz-ı âlemde bu arbedeler olup dururken Zât-ı Cenâb-ı Peygamberi teşkil-i saltanat etmedi ve Hulefâ-i Râşidîn intihâb-ı ashâb ile idâre-i umûra nasb olundular. Hall ü akd, ârâ-yı eşrâf, ashâb-ı güzîn ve hükm-i şer-i mübîn ile karâr-pezîr-i icrâ olunurdu.

Ziya Paşa, “Hâtıra”, *Hürriyet*, no. 25 (14 December 1868), pp. 7-8.

Appendix 3

A partial quote from Ziya Paşa.

İdâre-i cumhûriyyede pâdişâh imparator sadr-ı â'zam hâriciye nâzırı yokdur. Memleketin pâdişâhı imparatoru kralı sadr-ı â'zamı ahâlî-i memleketdir. İdâre-i cumhûriyyede bir nice milyon halk bir kaç şahs-ı menfaat-perestin hüküm ve keyfine esîr olmayup bâ-yü gedâ herkes hukûk-ı hürriyetini muhâfazada âzâdedir. İdâre-i cumhûriyyede kur'a ve cebr ü zulm ile asker yazmak ve nice yüzbin kişiyi dâr ü diyârından ve kisb ü kârından mehcûredüp kışlalarda çürütmek usûlü yokdur. Zirâ memleket herkesin olduđu ve herkes malının tasallut-ı adâdan vikâyesine bezl-i makdûr etmek umûr-ı tabî'iyyeden bulunduđu cihetle küçük büyük herkes askerdir. Hîh-i iktizâda silâhını kapan koşar. Buna mebnî İsviçre cumhûru bir iki milyon nüfûsden ibâret iken bugün kendisine hâricden ta'arrûz edilse birkaç yüzbin asker sevkine muktedirdir. Ve bu sebeptendir ki İsviçre idâresi civârındaki devletlerin tasallutundan emîndir. İdâre-i cumhûriyyede tersâne lüzûmu olan kereste ve halat için ahâlî angarye kullanılmaz. Eğer idâreye kereste ve halat lâzım ise parasını verir ahâlîden satın alır.

İdâre-i cumhûriyyede gazeteler hükûmete müdâhane etmeđe borçlu olmayup hükûm-i kânûn dâ'iresinde her dürlü ta'rîze me'zûndurlar. Binâen'aleyh idârenin en küçük kusûrunu dev aynasıyla görür gibi büyüdüp kıyâmetler koparırlar.

İdâre-i cumhûriyyede bir millet meclisi olur. Bunun a'zâsını ahâlî intihâb eder yâni ahâlînin en ehemmiyetli ve ma'lûmâtlı olanları seçilüp bir müddet-i mu'ayyene için a'zâ nasb edilür. Ve yine ahâlîden hamîyyet ve ma'lûmâtda ser-efrâz-ı akrân olan bir zât dahî yine muvakkaten bu meclisin riyâsetine intihâb olunur.

İdâre-i cumhûriyyede her şahs hukûk-ı medenîyesince ne kadar hür ve âzâde ise kânûn-ı mevzûa itâ'atde o kadar esîr ü fermânberdirler. Kânûn usûl ve ahlâk-ı milliyeye ve iktizâ-yı mevki-i memlekete göre mezkûr millet meclisinin ekseriyyet-i azâsı üzre tanzîm ve te'sîs olunmuş ahkâm ve nizâmâtdır. Kâffe-i mu'âmelât bu kânûna merbût olmađla mezkûr meclisin hâfız ve nigeş-bânı ve re'îs dahî âlet-i icrâsıdır. A'zâ-yı meclisin ahâlî-i sâ'ireden imtiyâzı muttasıf oldukları hasâ'il şerefi dahî bir müddet-i muvakkate için mevki-i riyâseti intihâb ile ihrâza muvaffak olmasından ibâret olup sâ'ir ahvâlde ahâlî-i sâ'ire-i âdiyyeden aslâ fark u imtiyâzları yokdur. Bunlar aylık yıllık rütbe nişân için a'zâ ve re'is olmadıklarından hiçbirisi âherden imtiyâz etmez. Re'is ve a'zâ herkes gibi tevzî olunan vergüden hisselerini verirler. Bunların faytonları yâverleri çavuşları sırmalı cicili üniformaları sarayları köşkleri yokdur ve hiçbirinde me'mûriyetleri üzerinden zengin olmak para kazanmak kusûru olamaz. Mahkemeler ise büsbütün bir hükûmet-i müstakille olup herbiri kânûn-ı mevzû'a üzre icrâ-yı ahkâm eder. Ne millet meclisinin ne re'isinin aslâ müdâhaleye salâhiyetleri yokdur. Ve'l-hâsil re'is ve a'zâ ve ahad-i nâs herkes bir kânûnun gerden-beste-i hükmü olmakla kimsenin bu dâ'ireden bir hatve

hârice çıkmak ihtimâli olamaz. Bu sebebe mebnî idâre-i cumhûriyyede vükelâ entrikaları aslâ yürüyemez.

Ammâ hükûmet-i şahsiyyeler tamâmiyle bu idârenin hilâfına olup anların vükelâsı müsteşârları unvânıyla bazı şahıslar idârenin başına geçerler. Gûyâ memleket bunların ecdâdından mevrûs çiftlik ve ahâlî dahî çiftlikde damızlık gibi milyon milyon halkı çalışdırırlar soyarlar. Elleriindekini alurlar. Kendi sefâhatlerine sarf ederler.

Hükûmet-i şahsiyyede işin başında bulunan kim ise istediğini yapar. İstedğini cennete istemediğini cehenneme koyar. Himâye etdiği eşhâsdan biri müttehem olsa pençe-i kânûndan kurtarır. Mahkemede haksız bir işi olsa haklı çıkarır. Adâvet etdiği bir adamı kat'â töhmeti yoğiken habs ü nefy eder. Medâr-ı t'ayyüşünü ihlâl ile zarûret ve sefâlet çekdirir. Kimse sesini çıkaramaz.

Hükûmet-i şahsiyyedeki gazeteler evliyâ-yı umûrun dalkavukluğuyla geçinürler. Hükûmet bir fenâ işde bulunsa da yine medh ü senâsını göklere çıkarırlar. Yapılan fenâlığı iyilik şeklinde göstermeğe çalışurlar. Zîrâ asıl maksadları vatan ve millete hizmet olmayup para kazanmaktır. Ve para kazanmanın da yolu böyle olur.

Hükûmet-i şahsiyyenin en kötüsü İrân andan sonra bizim şimdiki Bâb-ı Âli ba'de Rusya ve İtalya ve Avusturya ve Prusya ve Fransa ve İngiltere devletleridir. İngiltere devleti bu idârelerin en ehven-i şerri iken orada dahî kânûn ba'zı kerre vükelânın menâfi-i mahsûsası için fedâ olunur. Husûsâ İngilizler her kavimden ziyâde menfa'at-perest ve hod-pesend ve mâ'il-i tahakküm olmalarıyla kaz gelen yerden fazla bir fâ'ide hisseyleseler artık kânûn hakkaniyet gibi şeylere bakmayup o menfa'at uğrunda vazîfe-i insâniyeti bile fedâ ederler.

İşbu iki nev'i idârenin farkını Hürriyet gazetesi dört mâh zarfında nefsinde tecrübe etdi. Bundan dört mâh mukaddem Âli Paşa'nın her dürlü itmâ'ına mebnî ise İngiltere vükelâsı memleketin kânûnunu ayak altına alup Âli Paşa'yı hoşnûd etmek için Hürriyet'in matba'asını zulm ile ihlâl etdi. Âli Paşa hazretleri hâmil olduğu hukûk-ı devletden bir takımı fedâ ederek icrâ-yı nefsâniyyet etmeği her yerde cereyân eder politika sanup bu kerre dahî Hürriyet'in men'i tab ü neşri için Fransa Sefâreti vâsıtasıyla İsviçre cumhûriyyetine mürâcaat eyledi. Lâkin idâre-i cumhûriyyede herkes hür ve âzâde olduğu gibi mabû'ât nizâmâtı dahî derece-i nihâyede vâsidir, herkes istediği gibi gazete çıkarır anı idâre men edemez cevâbını aldı. Koca diplomat politika fenninde yegâne-i dehrim deyû gert gert geçirir iken Cenevre Cumhûriyyetinin kavânîninden aslâ haberi olmamağla orada bir dürlü Clarendon vardır ben devlet-i âliyye hukûkunu fedâ ederim o da bi'l-mukâbele bana müsâid bulunur zumuyla güremeden saldırdı. Lâkin dişleri et yerine taşa rast geldi.

... Şu münâsebetle geçen gün Re'îs-i cumhûr ile mülâkat olundu. Odasının tezyinâtı dört beş aded meşin kaplı ve hasır sandalye ile bir tahta trepeze ve bir yazıhânedan ve elbisesi tozlu bir setre ve âdi bir pantolon ve yelek ile hasır şapkadan ibâret idi. Kapsunun önünde perdecı uşak çavuş gibi kimse olmadığından herkes yanına gelüp bî-pervâ işini söylediği ve her gelenin gûyâ eski dostu imiş gibi el uzatıp hâl ü hâtırını ve işini uzun uzun sordukdan sonra söylenen

iŝi olacak ŝey ise derhâl icâbını söyleyüp olmayacak ise hükm-i kânûnu bi'l-etrâf tefhîm ile nâzikâne itizâr etdiđi nazar-ı hayretle görülerek ve bir de o esnâda bizim Sadr-ı â'zam hazretlerinin Bâb-ı Âlî'de etvâr-ı azâmet-ŝiârı hâtıra gelerek aradaki fark-ı fâhiŝ mûcib-i büht ü istiğrâb oldu.

... Bir hükûmetin idâresi âdil midir ahâlisi bahtiyâr mıdır anlamak murâd olunursa onun memleketine girildiđi gün sokaklarına dikkat etmeli. Eđer dilenci ve zabtiye çok ise idârenin zulmüne ve ahâlinin makhûriyyetine bilâ-tereddüd hükmetmeli böyle deđil ise aksini mukarrer bilmeli ya bizim İstanbul'a bir ecnebî girdikde bu iki hâlin hangisine hükmeder?

Ziya Paŝa, "Idâre-i Cumhûriyye ile Hükûmet-i Ŝahsiyyenin Farkı", *Hürriyet*, no. 99 (14 June 1870), pp. 1-3.

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