

THE RICH, THE POOR AND THE HUNGRY: SOCIAL  
DIFFERENTIATION AND FAMINE IN ANKARA IN 1845

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by

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Title: The Rich, the Poor and the Hungry: Social Differentiation and  
Famine in Ankara in 1845

This M.A. thesis focuses mainly on a social group which is either neglected or misinterpreted within Ottoman historiography, namely the poor. It aims at reconsidering the historical reality by reinterpreting the conditions of the poor, their relations vis-à-vis the local and central authorities, their position within the ever-changing poor relief mechanisms and their survival tactics in a specific crisis period.

In that sense the issue of poverty is reconsidered for a middle-sized Anatolian city, by focusing on the drought and famine of 1845 and its consequences for the poor, official and non-official institutional charity mechanisms, the tactics of survival and the effects of famine upon the conditions of the poor. Through that lens, it argues that in an era for which modernization is interpreted as inevitable and explanatory, the example of the poor of Ankara reveals the fact that state-led modernization was not as explanatory as considered for the Ottoman historiography. Also when interpreted within a more general context of poverty and capitalism, the attitudes towards the poor and vice-versa, becomes more complicated; on the one hand revealing the fact that a different state appears as capitalism becomes the main driving force, on the other hand the lives of the ordinary citizen – and the poor in that case – relies more on “pre-modern” and “pre-capitalist” social relations. In other words, while the bourgeois-state and central authorities tried to control every aspect of social relations, the historical reality of “everydayness” reveals that the poor had to rely on bonds of community, district, family or other “pre-modern” institutions.

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü'nde Tarih Yüksek Lisans derecesi için Semih Çelik tarafından Eylül 2010'da teslim edilen tezin özeti.

Başlık: Zengin, Fakir ve Aç: 1845 Ankara'sında Toplumsal Farklılaşma ve Kıtılık

Bu yüksek lisans tezi Osmanlı tarihyazımı içerisinde ya görmezden gelinmiş ya da yanlış yorumlara maruz bırakılmış bir toplumsal gruba, yani fakirlere odaklanmaktadır. Fakirlerin toplumsal koşullarını, yerel ve merkezi otoritelerle karşılıklı ilişkilerini, sürekli olarak değişen yardım mekanizmaları içerisindeki konumlarını ve hayatta kalma taktiklerini belirli bir kriz dönemi bağlamında yeniden değerlendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Bu çerçevede fakirlik meselesi orta ölçekli bir Anadolu şehri özelinde, 1845 yılı kuraklık ve kıtlığına, bunun fakirler için yarattığı sonuçlara, resmi ve resmi olmayan hayır mekanizmalarına, hayatta kalma taktiklerine odaklanarak yeniden değerlendirilmiştir. Bu gözle bakıldığında, tez, modernleşme kavramının açıklayıcı ve kaçınılmaz olduğu varsayılan bir dönemde, devlet merkezli modernleşme kavramının Osmanlı tarihyazımı için iddia edildiği gibi açıklayıcı olmadığı gerçeğini tartışmaya açıyor. Yine, daha genel bir kapitalizm ve fakirlik çerçevesi içerisinde düşünüldüğünde, fakirlere yaklaşımları ve fakirlerin diğer toplumsal gruplara yaklaşımı daha karmaşık hale gelmektedir; bir yandan kapitalizm önemini arttırdıkça bir başka devlet ortaya çıkarken diğer yandan normal vatandaşın – bu çalışma bağlamında fakirlerin – daha çok “modern öncesi” ve “kapitalizm öncesi” toplumsal ilişkilere bel bağladığı gerçeği söz konusudur. Diğer bir deyişle, burjuva-devlet ve merkezi otoriteler toplumsal ilişkileri olabildiğince kontrol altına almaya çalışmışlarsa da gündelik olanın tarihsel gerçekliği, fakirlerin cemaat, mahalle, aile ve diğer “modern öncesi” kurumlara dayandıklarını göstermektedir.

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## INTRODUCTION

Through the last couple of years, the world has experienced and ‘recovered’ from another crisis of capitalism. One that has been perceived as different from the previous ones. Some expected it to be the end of the capitalist system, the last crisis that will in the end provoke the proletariat to rise up against its exploitators. While the expectations have not been realized, the riots and upheavals in Greece excited the masses that shared the same expectations. The largest companies that stood as the guarantors of the invulnerable capitalism collapsed. As the world has become more globalized, the fear of a possible spread of the crisis had a global aspect. In any case, it has been commented that it was the poor, who suffered most from the crisis and who will bear the burden of it in the long run.

While those who were responsible for the crisis put more burdens on the poor, by using the crisis they created as an excuse, murmurs were heard that the world needed ‘new capitalism’, since the ‘old’ was about to become history. This necessitated a brainstorming on what ‘old capitalism’ was about and the role of the state within this system. Some considered Keynes as the ‘guru’ of the new capitalism, while others demanded a re-reading of Adam Smith, claiming that he was misunderstood. They positioned the modern state more or less into the center of the picture.<sup>1</sup>

Having heard the footsteps of a ‘new capitalism’, the minority<sup>2</sup> wanted to decide on what to do with the bulk of majority. It is very sad seeing that the rich minority, who tried very hard to end poverty in this world, always had to

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<sup>1</sup> Amartya Sen, “Capitalism Beyond the Crisis,” *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. 56, No. 5 (26 March, 2009), p. 1-7.

<sup>2</sup> Minority meant the less than 20 per cent of the world population, accounted more than 75 per cent of world income. *Rethinking Poverty Report on the World Social Situation*, New York: United Nations Publication, 2009, p. 2.

unfortunately fail due to cyclic – unexpected – crises in the economic system, which somehow suddenly appear and disappear. But this time, with a crisis so different than the others, on this very year 2010, the so-called minority thought of ‘rethinking poverty and its eradication’.<sup>3</sup> They also discovered that the previous efforts on eliminating it within the system of ‘old capitalism’ did not work very well, and as a representative, the United Nations under-secretary general for economic and social affairs, Sha Zukang said, “[...] since 2008, *too little* is being done *too slowly* to improve conditions, *especially for the poor*.”<sup>4</sup> What was done in 2008 actually, was to revise the international poverty line to \$1.25 a day, which was \$1 a day in 2004. This meant, by 2008, 1.4 billion people were living under the poverty line,<sup>5</sup> while those who had an income of \$1.26 or \$1.27 a day were living in considerable abundance and wealth.

As the demands for a new capitalism were heard from minority, the majority<sup>6</sup> was shouting to get their voices heard. What they were trying to do was to warn those who they thought were responsible to ‘make poverty history’<sup>7</sup>. As it is understood by now that their call received hardly any responses, and as Barack Obama’s enthronement did not save the world and the poor, once again it seems like it is the business of the poor historian, at least to make the history of poverty, as a first step for making poverty history. While poverty has remained poverty all the time, historicizing it necessitates thinking once again about the concept. It should have been different during the first decades of the ‘old capitalism’ than it is now. And it could also have had various forms and meanings that existed

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. i.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. iii-iv. Emphases added.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p.1

<sup>6</sup> Majority meant the more than 40 per cent of the world population, accounted less than 5 per cent of the global income. Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>7</sup> ‘Make poverty history’ was one of the slogans in the chain concert organizations that took place in 6-9 July, 2005 in Edinburgh, Philadelphia, Berlin, Paris and Rome to make their demands heard, like ‘better aid and trade justice to the world’s poorest people’ by the presidents of G8 countries.

coevally. If the existence of multiple forms of poverty has been possible, then the entity which, for some, has taken care of the poor in a just way, namely the state and its institutions, probably reflected multiple forms too. This meant that official and institutional charity may have had also different forms, while the existence of other forms of charity should also be considered. And if the survival of the majority of the world, who are to be considered 'poor' is possible, as institutions of charity do not seem to cover all the deprived population today, then one must think about other ways than the charity that the poor relied on in order to survive. This necessitates positioning poverty outside of the charity activities, as much as positioning it inside.

This study, having its motives from the above given context, will try to ask the above-given questions in the example of a very strictly chosen time and space, and try to deconstruct both the perception of poverty as it was, and at least led the reader reconsider what it is today. Thus, as 'the world we lost' is perceived as a safe haven for hiding from the miseries of today, it will be seen that the fate of the miserable poor was not defined by nature, but the human-beings had a great deal of agency in the past, as it is now. In the end, excuses will not be accepted for those who had died due to hunger while there had been enough resources to feed everybody. In that sense, this paper is not only an academic study that will explore the unrevealed parts of the past that is lost, but a text, a fiction maybe, which is written in order to arouse questions about the contemporary structures and so-called systems in a critical way.

In order to do this, a case study has been chosen. The reasons of the place and time are totally coincidental, but one that has been a good example for the context of the study. What will be done here is in general to analyze a snapshot of



a middle-sized Anatolian city, its socio-economical and socio-spatial image in general and the existing and evolving social differentiation in particular. The chosen time and space is a means for demonstrating how by the very beginning of its incorporation into the capitalist mode of production, consumption and trade, the Ottoman state and society responded to the transformations and also how these transformations affected the lives of fellow urban inhabitants. Thus, the story of Ankara, once a prosperous city due to its trade relations, and a poor town by the first half of 19<sup>th</sup> century, will be tried to be re-written in the context of social differentiation, poverty and the survival tactics of the poor, with a particular focus on the famine in 1845, and the social relations it re-created.

The afore-mentioned coincidental aspect of the chosen time and space is quite related with the sources on which the study is based. The main sources are the so-called *temettuat* registers of 1845, which were subject to transcription as part of a project about labor-relations in Ottoman towns.<sup>8</sup> The registers, so unique that they were never prepared before and after 1845 with such a geographical extent,<sup>9</sup> were prepared by the center, with the inclusion of local bureaucracies, and they were a product of the so-called Tanzimat reforms.

The economic perception established during Tanzimat period, starting from the 1830's, tied the strong state to the existence of strong financial basis. Taxation was one of the most important revenue generating sources for the state, and since the Ottoman state was unable to collect taxes effectively reforms were needed immediately. The first attempt was to establish a reasonable tax based on

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<sup>8</sup> The project of "Labor Relations in the Nineteenth-century Ottoman Towns based upon 1845 Survey of Income Yielding Assets" is based on the data provided by the *temettuat* registers of more than 10 Ottoman cities, and co-funded by International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam and Istanbul Bilgi University.

<sup>9</sup> Takamatsu Yoichi, "Ottoman Income Survey (1840-1846)," *The Ottoman State and Societies in Change: A Study of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century Temettuat Registers*, Kayoko Hayashi and Mahir Aydın (eds.), London: Kegan Paul, 2004, p. 15.

individual property and ability, to be collected directly by the center, thus eliminating the century-long application of tax-farming, and appoint local officials who would find out the number of people living in provinces and the tax potential they had. These officials (*muhassıl*) were appointed and started collecting information about provincial society and registered them by 1840; yet, this attempt was given up since it proved unsatisfactory.

Then, in 1845, it was decided that a new survey was to be done, this time with a distribution of more fair taxes and with the inclusion of more local notables into the business. The local headmen (*muhtar*) and the religious leaders of each ethno-religious community in each town or neighborhood, with the supervision of director of agriculture (*ziraat müdürü*), were successful this time in the collection of necessary knowledge.<sup>10</sup> While altogether the registers that were sent to Istanbul were composed of more than 17000 volumes, the *temettuat* registers of urban Ankara is composed of more than 200 volumes – about 2500 pages, containing information about more than 5500 households of urban Ankara.

The registers included data about the status and profession of the household head, the amount of tax (*vergi-i mahsusa*) paid in the previous year, the category of non-muslim tax (*cizye*), the amount of tithe paid both in kind and in cash, the immovable properties, their amount and the annual incomes from them, rented immovables, the livestock, the occupational income and household income.<sup>11</sup> Together with these, the conditions of employment/unemployment, the health conditions (sick/unhealthy), conditions of poverty/charity, bankruptcy, migration/fleeing and others were mentioned. While these were determined by a

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<sup>10</sup> For a very detailed analysis of how the registers were prepared and for the problems that emerged, see Takamatsu Yoichi, “Ottoman Income Survey,” *Ibid.*, p. 15-45.

<sup>11</sup> Tevfik Güran, “Temettuat Registers as a Resource about Ottoman Social and Economic Life,” *Ibid.*, p. 5-8.

standard example sent by the center to the provinces,<sup>12</sup> there were exceptional records on the cash that was owned, in some cases details of the occupation, details of the miserable conditions of the poor, age of children and many others which revealed the socio-economic condition more vividly than the standardized numbers in the registers.

While these registers were found in the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives (PMO) and were classified under the Ministry of Finance title (ML.VRD.TMT), many other registers and documents were mobilized within this study. Among them, the most important ones are the population registers from 1831-1836 and the census of 1844, located under the same category. Apart from these, a variety of individual documents were read.

Following study is mainly composed of two parts. The first part reserved for the discussion on how the *temettuat* registers and others should be interpreted, since they were a part of the context they were produced, followed by a general outlining of the social composition of Ankara according to the population registers of 1830's and 1844. Then, in the second part, the social differentiation and the conditions of the rich and the poor will be analyzed with particular relation to how the poor survived within such miserable conditions that they had. And lastly, in the third part, the role of the state and the survival of the poor will be reconsidered within the context of a micro case, the famine of 1845 in Ankara.

In general, this study is done as a 'counter re-thinking' on poverty. By only reading a few pages of the report prepared by United Nations, one can easily see how controversial the perception of poverty is. It is being perceived as distinct from the socio-economic system that it is a part and result of, while the system

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<sup>12</sup> Yoichi, p. 20-27.

which is called ‘capitalism’ is perceived as an all-encompassing bulk. In that sense, by focusing on Ankara in 1845, the historical reality will be reconstructed, hopefully leading the reader to reconsider the historical and contemporary situation of poverty.

## **PART I: Political-economy of Ottoman Registers: Temettuat Registers and Population Censuses of 1830 and 1844.**

Historians most of the time forget the discursive side of numbers and numerical tables. The main reason for such neglect can be the scarcity of sources that provide information about numbers especially about socio-economic history of the Ottoman Empire. Due to changes of mentality in the bureaucratic elite and in political conditions, the existing registers and censuses become more problematic. The *tahrir* registers, containing data about 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> century taxes, have been regarded as one of the main archival material for writing Ottoman history, have been produced regularly through 16<sup>th</sup> century, enough at least to reconstruct the socio-economic history of the towns of the century. Yet, when 17<sup>th</sup> century is the subject, it becomes less possible to compare different data with each other through *tahrir* registers since they have been produced only in extraordinary situations.<sup>13</sup> Since the scope of the study is limited to the first half of the nineteenth century, the archival sources are more systematic and rich compared to previous centuries. The fact that the sources are less scarce does not mean that they are less problematic. While the amount of the archival material is detrimental in terms of their 'reliability', quality is another and equally important factor. In other words, in order to consider archival material through the lens of historian, one should think about why and how there had been an increase in the number of archival documents and the changes in the content of it. Through that vein, this part of the study will focus on this side of the story, before diving into the meaning of the data and numbers.

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<sup>13</sup> Suraiya Faroqhi, *Osmanlı Tarihi Nasıl İncelenir? Kaynaklara Giriş*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999, p. 96-109; Amy Singer, "Tapu Tahrir Defterleri and Kadi Sicilleri: A Happy marriage of sources," *Tarih*, 1 (1990), p. 95-125. Some of the *tahrir* registers are published; as an example see Halil İnalçık, *Hicri 835 Tarihli Suret-i Defter-i Sancak-i Arnavid*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1954.

Apart from the individual registers and administrative documents that can be found in the PMO in Istanbul, this study is based on registers that are the products of more complex and empire-wide processes. The *temettuat* registers that have been produced for the whole geography of the empire, excluding Istanbul and some other regions, for the first and last time in 1845,<sup>14</sup> are one of the main sources on which the socio-economic condition of inhabitants of Ankara will be demonstrated here. Together with the *temettuat* registers, the censuses and population registers mainly dating back to 1830's and 1844 are mobilized in order to grasp the larger picture more vividly. The *temettuat* registers contained various data on afore-mentioned conditions of inhabitants; while the censuses and population registers provide a more general picture of horizontal mobilization of the Ottoman population. Given the uniqueness and the amount of data that can be found in these archival material, their relationship with historical reality and history-writing processes has rarely been discussed. Both type of material has been perceived as 'reliable sources of historical information' and most of the time they have not been considered within their socio-political context. The standardized language used in these registers misleads the historians to perceive them as value-free texts and to take the existing data as a given without doubt. Although the registers have a standardized bureaucratic language, ignoring their textuality means ending up with neglecting the complex process of the emergence of that language and the functions of it; while it is also to neglect the set of conflictual or cooperational relationships between the actors within the process of the emergence of these texts.

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<sup>14</sup> For some cases, the process lasted long after 1845. Due to the unsent registers, by 1847, there were some regions still being surveyed. Yoichi, p. 42-43.

Simply, the population censuses and registers and their method of categorization aimed at knowing the potential of Ottoman society in terms of human-power, while the *temettuat* registers aimed at collecting better and detailed knowledge on the socio-economic (read tax) potential – and lack of potential – of the same society; yet with more emphasis on the local level. The officials (*muhassıl*) who were employed by the central administration, for gathering the necessary information for the achievement of fiscal reforms envisaged by the Tanzimat edict in 1839, failed at their first attempt in 1840. In 1845, the Ottoman administration decided to cooperate with local notables and religious leaders in order to succeed this time.<sup>15</sup> Thus both censuses and *temettuat* registers aimed at gathering knowledge about the potential of the society, through the establishment of cooperational and conflictual relationships of the central administration with local elites and societies. This knowledge gathering, together with establishment of different relationships, was part of a larger process of change that had large-scale impacts for the societies of 18<sup>th</sup> and following centuries.

The establishment of apparatus of knowledge gathering happens through a complex process, namely the evolving of ‘art of sovereignty’ into an ‘art of government’ as Michele Foucault explains. From the end of 16<sup>th</sup> century onwards, the evolution of the sovereignty of the ‘prince’ into a different economy of power that did not exist before, while a novel discovery of a ‘political personage’ which is noticed especially after 18<sup>th</sup> century, namely ‘population,’ created a process whereby knowledge of the state has been transformed and new administrative apparatuses developed.<sup>16</sup> This led to the emergence of what can be called as the

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<sup>15</sup> Güran, p. 5-6.

<sup>16</sup> Michele Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978*, Michel Senellart (ed.), Graham Buchell (trans.), Palgrave MacMillan, (no date), p. 94, 138 and elsewhere.

‘population politics.’<sup>17</sup> The main dynamic of this new mode of politics was the ‘police’ according to Foucault, which existed also before its meaning transformed into the one it has today, through the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>18</sup> Police can be said to be the concrete form of what is called ‘the art of government’.

The role of the ‘police’ is managing the populations and their compositors, the individuals, and their activities as long as they are concerned with state, according to a set knowledge of the state, which is actually what is called ‘statistics’. Unlike the traditional ‘art of sovereignty’ of the prince, which put importance on the good quality of the state’s elements in order to have a state of good quality, the ‘art of government’ or the police was not interested in what the men were. The state in that sense was more interested in what men do, in other words in their occupation; yet with only the ones that may constitute difference in the development of the state’s power. In doing this, the statistics are both instrumentalized as means to control and intervene into the populations and at the same time they have become an art of government themselves.<sup>19</sup> In other words, police makes statistics both necessary and possible.<sup>20</sup>

Through the same vein, the emergence of police can be read as the emergence of modern bureaucracies. As Dipesh Chakrabarty states for colonial India, without numbers it would be impossible to practice bureaucratic or instrumental rationality.<sup>21</sup> Thus, the systematic collection of statistics could only be imagined within the rationality of modern bureaucracies. Similarly, according

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<sup>17</sup> Although viewed within a different context, the term can be found in Margo Anderson, “Building the American Statistical System in the Long 19th Century,” *L’ère du Chiffre Systemes Statistiques et Traditions Nationales/The Age of Numbers Statistical Systems and National Traditions*, Quebec: Presses de l’Université du Québec, 2000, p. 112.

<sup>18</sup> Foucault, p. 407-409.

<sup>19</sup> David Owen, *Maturity and Modernity Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault and Ambivalence of Reason*, New York: Routledge, 1994, p.195

<sup>20</sup> Foucault, p. 411.

<sup>21</sup> Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Habitations of Modernity: Essays in the Wake of Subaltern Studies*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, p. 84-85.



to Ian Hacking, the collection of statistics not only paved the way towards the emergence of bureaucratic machinery, but it was also a part of it as a form of technology of power.<sup>22</sup>

Although the Foucault effect has been great on social sciences, critiques of ‘discovery of population’ also have a sound in terms of discussions about statistical knowledge. One of them, Bruce Curtis, criticizes Foucauldian line of argument in that, claiming the population as a discovery by the state meant it has pre-existed to the category of state, thus positioning it outside, as something composed of elements that can be empirically processed.<sup>23</sup> Contrary, the critiques argue that what happened was the re-invention of an existing social realm through and as statistical knowledge.

The establishment of statistical knowledge and its institutionalization parallels a process of extension of public sphere, as against the private. Throughout the 18<sup>th</sup> century, for instance in Britain, any kind of censuses were resisted by the relatively strong ‘civil society’ to protect their private affairs from the intervention of state, which indicated the weakness of bureaucracy.<sup>24</sup> Only during the last decade of 18<sup>th</sup> century did the states succeeded in collecting statistics, which were to be kept secret.<sup>25</sup> This fact demonstrates the inventing of population as a part of state-formation process, as against the social realm. The authority of the ‘police’ that cuts deep into both physical and socio-economical social milieu clashes with the interest of the existing subjects which was

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<sup>22</sup> Ian Hacking, “How Should We do the History of Statistics?” *The Foucault Effect Studies in Governmentality*, Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds.), London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, p. 181

<sup>23</sup> Bruce Curtis, *The Politics of Population: State Formation, Statistics and the Census of Canada, 1840-1875*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002, p. 42.

<sup>24</sup> Theodore M. Porter, “Statistics in the History of Social Science,” *L’Ère des chiffres: Systèmes Statistiques et traditions nationales/The Age of Numbers: Statistical Systems and National Traditions*, p. 491-492.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

organized around different intermingled communities and social bonds. Thus the resistance to activities of governmentality can be said to be about resisting to the implementation of a new homogenizing label on the whole society. In this process of state-formation, statistics and knowledge gathering mechanisms played a crucial role.

As Anthony Giddens demonstrates, statistics do not only represent the analytical aspects of a society but they also intervene into the social universe from which they were gathered.<sup>26</sup> In other words, the statistics formed a fictive reality and further on, in this fictive reality 'everyone' took place and had only one unique place. No fractions to numbers were allowed within the statistical text.<sup>27</sup> As Latour demonstrates, providing information means putting reality into a form.<sup>28</sup> In that sense, the process of making censuses and statistics involves a disciplinary practice. This practice ties the members of population within a homogenous administrative categorization to fix them there as objects of knowledge and government.<sup>29</sup> While these categories which represent the encroachment of public sphere into the private were not irresistible, there are examples like colonial India in which people came to fit in the categories designated for them, by the colonial authorities<sup>30</sup> Through that sense, the statistical surveys may give certain information about socio-economical situation of those in question, yet, according to deCerteau, they ignore the existence of differences and complexities at the same time heterogeneities since the statistical surveys reduce them into 'lexical'

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<sup>26</sup> Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, California: Stanford University Press, p. 42.

<sup>27</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, New York: Verso, 1991, p. 166.

<sup>28</sup> Bruno Latour, *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 223.

<sup>29</sup> Curtis, p. 4.

<sup>30</sup> Chakrabarty, p. 86. Latour, p. 230: "How would you know your 'social category' without the enormous work done by statistical institutions that work to calibrate, if not to standardize, income categories."

categories and classifications and only grab the material of social practices, rather than the form and discursiveness of the ‘statisticized’.<sup>31</sup> The statistical surveys and censuses provide a virtual spatial and temporal textuality in which social life could be invented not only in governmental and administrative forms,<sup>32</sup> but also in terms of everyday structures that constituted the population in general. This textuality is visible from the very beginning on of their making; no need to go further: the information gathered are most commonly expressed by the heads of households, which may be gendered, age-oriented or property/class-specific accounts of social relations. Moreover, editorial processes, which invent social relations, are also at work during the census and statistic making processes.<sup>33</sup>

Another problem arises out of the question, what is the limit to population? Statistical surveys and censuses are exclusive in the sense that they draw boundaries of the population by singling certain groups out. Social groups like the homeless or ‘minorities’ and the domestic and ‘informal’ labor are problematic categories in that they reflect the routine exclusion of statistical knowledge.<sup>34</sup>

In general, what can be said about these statistical surveys and censuses is that they downgrade complex sets of social relations into two-dimensional textual surfaces by the ‘inscription devices’ established by distant authorities; texts which are transportable, unlike social relations and contestations.<sup>35</sup> As for the individuals, just like it is hard to see how many ‘persons’ are at work within one ‘individual’, it is also hard to see how much individuality do the statistical

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<sup>31</sup> Michel deCerteau, *Practices of Everyday Life*, Steven Rendall (trans.), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, p. xviii.

<sup>32</sup> Curtis, p. 24.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24-25.

<sup>34</sup> Curtis, p. 28.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

aggregation carries.<sup>36</sup> As a last word, it should be noted that, the censuses and statistics are not *taken*, they are made. The process of making them configures social relations in line with the political project they are subjected to. Thus, the knowledge that can be gathered from the censuses is reflexive of conditions of their own production,<sup>37</sup> as demonstrated above.

### **Knowledge Gathering in Ottoman Context**

According to Tevfik Güran, the *temettuat* registers were kept not for gathering statistical data, but for functional reasons.<sup>38</sup> Surely this was a fact. Yet it is debatable to what extent the registers can be considered within a statistical form. The Ottomans institutionalized statistics only during the second half of the century, mainly through 1870's. In 1875, within the Ministry of Commerce (*Ticaret Nezareti*) a department of statistics had been founded (*İstatistik Kalemi*) and a Russian specialist was appointed as the chief.<sup>39</sup> Also, only after 1875 did the Ottoman intellectuals start to be concerned with statistics.<sup>40</sup> Yet, both the logic and rationality behind *temettuat* surveys and the paralleling process of institutionalization of data gathering throughout the empire, in other words the attempts at centralizing empire-wide knowledge, can be said to prove that a mentality similar to that of Foucault and others described was at work.

It is for sure that the Ottoman state, especially after *Tanzimat*, was into a state-formation process, which necessitated it to perceive its subjects differently.

The subject (*tebaa*) of the previous decades has started to be perceived as a

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<sup>36</sup> Latour, p. 54.

<sup>37</sup> Curtis, p. 33.

<sup>38</sup> Güran, p. 4.

<sup>39</sup> The department was abolished due to the war with Russia, in a short time. In 1880's, many regulations were ordered for the establishment of statistical commissions in urban centers concerning variety of different issues. Zafer Toprak, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde Sayısallaşma ya da Çağdaş İstatistiğin Doğuşu," *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Bilgi ve İstatistik/Data and Statistics in the Ottoman Empire*, Halil İnalçık and Şevket Pamuk (eds.), Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası, 2000, p. 97-98.

<sup>40</sup> Toprak., p. 99.

“resource” for the *raison d’etat*; an economic resource mainly, which should be regulated by the state, for the sake of the state.<sup>41</sup> The productivity of the subjects started to bother the Ottoman administration more, especially after *Tanzimat*. The more the subjects produced, both in terms of human and financial capital, or the healthier it is, the stronger the state would be. This can be said to have led the state to see its subjects from a political-economic lens, which corresponds to the ‘invention’ of a population;<sup>42</sup> a population to be governed, not ruled.

Thus, one of the priorities of Ottoman administration has become obtaining information about the population it governed.<sup>43</sup> It should be mentioned that the information was not limited to the individuals that constituted the population, but it was broader including the milieu which should be regulated for the productive well-being of the population.<sup>44</sup> The officials that were appointed by the center for creating the censuses of 1830 not only were responsible for counting the population but they were also in charge of registering annual deaths and births, number of travelers, health conditions and medical capacities, property transfers and losses from fires and disasters alike.<sup>45</sup> Through the same vein, the establishment of councils of reconstruction (*meclis-i mimariye*) aimed at obtaining information about the socio-economic condition of the localities in

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<sup>41</sup> Ottoman ‘intellectuals’ were concerned with this fact before they were interested in statistics. The existence of a ‘public opinion,’ as an actor that has to be controlled and directed towards the well-being of state, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa’s works is representative in that sense. For the existence of public opinion in Ahmed Cevdet Paşa’s *Tarih-i Cevdet*, see Christoph K. Neumann, *Araç Tarih Amaç Tanzimat Tarih-i Cevdet’in Siyasi Anlamı*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000, p. 198-207. Also see, Cengiz Kırılı, “Kahvehaneler ve Hafiyeler: 19. Yüzyıl Ortalarında Osmanlı’da Sosyal Kontrol,” *Toplum ve Bilim*, v. 83, (Winter 1999/2000), p. 69-73.

<sup>42</sup> Nadir Özbek, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Sosyal Devlet Siyaseti, İktidar ve Meşruiyet 1876-1914*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008, p. 47-48.

<sup>43</sup> Selçuk Dursun, “Population Politics of the Ottoman State in the Tanzimat Era: 1840-1870,” unpublished M.A. thesis, İstanbul: Sabancı University, 2001, p. 17.

<sup>44</sup> Foucault, p. 35.

<sup>45</sup> Dursun, p. 21. The population census of urban Ankara was published by Musa Çadırcı. From 1830 to 1836, this same register was used to record the population movements in and out of urban Ankara, together with deaths and births on the bases of districts (*mahalle*). Musa Çadırcı, *1830 Ankara Sayımında Ankara*, Ankara: Ankara Büyükşehir Belediyesi Eğitim Kültür Daire Başkanlığı, 2000, p. 15.

which *Tanzimat* was subject to application. The motivation behind was to know any risks that would cause any decline in the productivity of the population and to minimize those risks.<sup>46</sup>

The applications for providing security for the population also reflect a shift to governmentality applications in Foucauldian sense. Security meant not only the protection of population but also the reorganization of the milieu in convenience with the understanding of maximization of state resources.<sup>47</sup> The police forces (*zabtiye*) were established in every district, where *Tanzimat* was applied, and they have been responsible for security of economic activities and the structures in which they took place.<sup>48</sup> Also other security measures were established, mainly concerning with population movements, which manifested the idea that each individual has only one spatial place. An internal passport mechanism (*mürur tezkiresi*) was established to prevent individuals and families to move without the control and recognition of the state, outside of the regions they produced. While similar measures were taken before 1840, the content and aim of the security mechanisms implied a shift in state-society relations. Surveillance mechanisms like spying (*jurnal*) meant to control and collect information about population continuously and impersonally.<sup>49</sup> The same logic in the ‘invisible’ penetration of state into ‘minute practices of governed population’,<sup>50</sup> was visible in the state’s increasing concern with the population’s health. The plague and cholera during 1830’s forced the government to take modern sanitary measures. According to an imperial order published in the

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<sup>46</sup> Dursun, p. 24-25.

<sup>47</sup> Foucault, p. 35.

<sup>48</sup> Dursun, p. 45.

<sup>49</sup> Kırılı, “Kahvehaneler ve Hafiyeler,” p. 71. Also see *idem.*, “The Struggle Over Coffeehouses of Ottoman Istanbul, 1740-1845,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, SUNY Binghamton, 2000, p. 251-252.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

official newspaper *Takvim-i Vakayi* in 9 May 1838, it was necessary to heal the diseases in order to improve health and increase the population of the empire, thus the power of the state and economy prosper.<sup>51</sup> From then on, sanitary offices were established, that in 1850, they were found all around the empire.<sup>52</sup> Through the same vein the existence of information about the populations of European cities in the official newspapers demonstrates how Ottoman state started to perceive the ‘state power’ analogous to the population. The data given on some issues of *Ceride-i Havadis*, containing tables about the populations of some European cities, together with the annual number of deaths demonstrate this fact.<sup>53</sup>

In that context what can be said for the censuses of early 19<sup>th</sup> century in general and *temettuat* registers of 1845 in particular is that, while an institutionalized mechanism of statistics were not established then, these registers reveal the logic through which the Ottoman state reconfigured itself and its relationship with the population. As discussed above, while many scholars perceived statistical data and censuses as ‘historical sources’ through which socio-economic history can be conducted,<sup>54</sup> others suspected the data due to their being representative information, rather than a ‘mirror image’,<sup>55</sup> about a population that is being invented rather than discovered at the moment.<sup>56</sup> Thus, these registers are outcomes of conflict and cooperation of different social actors involved (or not

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<sup>51</sup> Dursun, p. 20.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 55. Also for health and social control see Foucault, p. 90-91, and other places.

<sup>53</sup> *Ceride-i Havadis*, no. 241, Şaban 5 1261; and no. 224, Rebiyülahir 5 1261.

<sup>54</sup> Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, “Osmanlı Sosyal ve İktisadi Tarihi Kaynaklarından Temettü Defterleri,” p. 395 and 412. Also for a more specific case study through *temettuat* registers, see *idem.*, “İzmir Temettü Sayımları ve Yabancı Tebaa,” 755-773; İsmet Demir, “Temettü Defterlerinin Önemi ve Hazırlanış Şekli,” *Osmanlı*, vol. 6 Teşkilat, Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 1999, p. 315-321.

<sup>55</sup> Alp Yücel Kaya, “In the Hinterland of Izmir: Mid-Nineteenth Century Traders Facing a New Type of Fiscal Practice,” *Merchants in the Ottoman Empire*, Suraiya Faroqhi and Gilles Veinstein (eds.), Paris: Peeters, 2008, p. 263.

<sup>56</sup> For an interesting account of how the *temttuat* registers invented the population and its potential, see A.MKT.167-13. Among many other things, it refers to the mistakes done in Ankara by the officials in charge and explains how some rich people temporarily staying there were registered with 500 guruş of tax and their tax remained since they left Ankara after some time.

involved) in state-building processes. The *temettuat* registers did not only aim at gathering information about the amount of tax that the state will receive but also to eliminate the local power relations in operation<sup>57</sup> and establish the existence of the state (read center) throughout the empire.

### ***From Numbers to Words: What do Population registers and censuses tell about Urban Ankara?***

Ankara, situated at the crossroads of trade routes and military bases for a long time, both profited and suffered from its position. Although located in the middle of a vast land, its history has been disrupted by many occasions. The commercial and military importance made the city a major military supply base and the capital of the Roman Galatia. While some accounts depict a prosperous city which had been commercially important and has been used as a military supply base, many inscriptions mention crisis times of food shortages and barbarian attacks, since the 3<sup>rd</sup> century.<sup>58</sup> As for the Ottoman times, the vulnerability of the city still existed. The effects of *Celali* revolts in the second half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century were harsh. The Ottoman state ordered the pursuit of the *levends* who killed, kidnapped, raped people, burgled houses, wandered around with prostitutes and a new wall had to be built around the city after the revolts.<sup>59</sup> Also, the price of a capricious climate had to be paid repeatedly, like before. In 1705, Paul Lucas mentions a famine for the year, in which even a drop of rain did not fall for 6 months and the hills around the town were naked without a tree.<sup>60</sup>

Richard Pococke, who has been to Ankara by the end of 1730's, mentions the lack

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<sup>57</sup> Dursun, p. 17-18.

<sup>58</sup> Clive Foss, "Late Antique and Byzantine Ankara," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, vol. 31 (1977), p. 30-32, 54, 62 and other places; Rıfat Özdemir, *XIX. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Ankara (Fiziki, İdari, Demografik ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Yapısı 1785-1840)*, Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1986, p 23.

<sup>59</sup> Semavi Eyice, "Ankara'nın Eski Bir Resmi," *Atatürk Konferansları IV 1970*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991, p. 71-73. Özdemir, p. 24.

<sup>60</sup> Eyice, p. 77.



of water resources in urban Ankara. Anyhow his descriptions depict a city which was a prosperous one with a population of 100000 and good trade relations.<sup>61</sup> Yet, the city which John Macdonald Kinneir has seen in the autumn of 1813 was totally a different one. Ankara of 1813 was a city whose welfare has collapsed and trade relations declined, followed by a decline in the population. His Ankara is composed of a maximum 20000 inhabitants, for which there weren't enough grain and foodstuff.<sup>62</sup> Although his observations can be said to be due to the fact that he went there in the beginning of a wave of plague, which could have devastated the population both in economic and sanitary senses,<sup>63</sup> it is also obvious that the socio-economic condition of Ankara was experiencing a structural decline; which might have been the reason why in 1837 Pojoulat described Ankara as the poorest Turkish city he has ever seen.<sup>64</sup>

Leaving aside the catastrophic side, the city had its unique economic dynamics that survived it from cyclical crises. The impossibility of a fertile agricultural production due to the capricious climate and the landscape, the growing of goats and sheep had saved the life of the city for centuries.<sup>65</sup> Especially mohair (*tiftik*), which has been made from the hair of the unique Ankara goat, affected the division of labor and the industry within the whole city. Mohair industry together with the trade, created the key to having active relations with the outside world, reaching out not only to Istanbul, but also to Venetia, England and France.<sup>66</sup> The mohair was so desirable that especially during the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century many – unsuccessful - attempts were made to adapt the

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<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 80.

<sup>63</sup> Özdemir, p. 102.

<sup>64</sup> Eyice, p. 82.

<sup>65</sup> Foss, p. 30. Suraiya Faroqhi, *Men of Modest Substance*, p. 25-26.

<sup>66</sup> Faroqhi, *ibid.*, p. 26.

Ankara goat in Europe.<sup>67</sup> In that manner, agricultural production has never been as important as manufacture industry for Ankara. This unique trade of the city made it vulnerable to changing trade patterns and production relations that were realized especially after the first decade of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

In any case, long and middle term changes in socio-economic and political structures had its impact upon the population of the city. From this perspective, the population of Ankara seems to reflect the structural socio-economic fluctuations and conjunctural impacts of the natural disasters and alike.<sup>68</sup> The births and deaths together with horizontal mobilization of the population were highly correlated with these structural and conjunctural changes. In that sense, in the censuses of 1830 and 1844, and the registers about the population from 1830 to 1836 - although it is of doubt that they give the exact true number of male inhabitants living in Ankara - the fluctuations or stability of the population are meaningful within the socio-economic context of the first half of 19<sup>th</sup> century.

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<sup>67</sup> Arthur Connoly, "On White-Haired Angora Goat and on Another Species of Goat Found in the Same Province Resembling the Thibet Shawl Goat," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1841), p. 161. According to the same reference, Also an interesting account on the history and origins of the Angora goat was written by John L. Hayes, who was the secretary of the National Association of Wool Manufacturers in United States. John L. Hayes, *The Angora Goat, Its Origin, Culture and Products*, Boston: Press of A. A. Kingman, Museum of the Boston Society of Natural History, 1868.

<sup>68</sup> Foss, p. 56 gives the example of a bubonic plague in 534 AD.

**Table I – Population of Urban Ankara**

Year	m	ch	a	Oc	c	J	Total
1830 <sup>69</sup>	6303	5022				135	11460
1831 <sup>70</sup>	6066	4919				136	11264
1836	5528	4260				135	9883
1844 <sup>71</sup>	6427		564	1143	3504	173	11811
	(h) 3103		(h) 269	(h) 458	(h) 1343	(h) 59	5232
1845 <sup>72</sup>	(h) 3187		(h) 314	(h) 558	(h) 1442	(h) 59	5512

Within the above-given context, the Ottoman state starting from 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards, necessitated knowledge about its own population as the main source for its strength and wealth. The first attempt at counting the population aimed at estimating the potential of soldiers for the establishment of a new army right after the abolition of janissaries in 1826. This attempt was interrupted by the war with Russia, so it was re-attempted in 1830 empire-wide.<sup>73</sup> This time again, this was not an easy task for the state since in some parts of the empire, local notables together with the inhabitants – and the tribes in some cases – resisted the officers that were in charge.<sup>74</sup> In that sense, the censuses can be read as an area of contestation between state, local notables and inhabitants.

According to censuses, it is obvious that during the first half of 1830's, the urban population of Ankara was in a constant decline. Between 1830 and 1836, the Muslim and non-Muslim population fell continuously. The most dramatic fall

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<sup>69</sup> The estimations of 1830 census are from Çadırcı, *1830 Sayımında Ankara*. Yet, the figures for 1830 census is an issue of debate. While the official in charge, Sadık Bey, noted in the register that the urban population of Ankara was composed of 6108 muslims, 5050 christians and 135 jews, Çadırcı's own counts estimate to 6303 muslims, 5157 non-muslims, and Enver Ziya Karal who has published these estimations for the first time claimed the urban population to be composed of 6338 muslims, 5022 christians and 136 jews. See, Çadırcı, p. 113.

<sup>70</sup> For figures between 1831 and 1836, see, ML.CRD. 168, p. 82.

<sup>71</sup> For 1844, see, ML.CRD. 825, p. 4-6 for muslims. The following page includes the foreigners (*yabancıyan-ı reaya* and *yabancıyan-ı müslüman*) who were staying in *hans*, and the *medrese* students in urban Ankara. Pages 8-9 were reserved to non-muslim population.

<sup>72</sup> The 1845 estimations which are only in terms of households are from *temettuat* registers.

<sup>73</sup> Çadırcı, "1830 Genel Sayımına Göre Ankara Şehir Merkezi Nüfusu Üzerinde Bir Araştırma," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları/Journal of Ottoman Studies*, vol. I, 1980, p. 110.

<sup>74</sup> Çadırcı, "1830 Genel Sayımı" p. 111, footnote, 6. Eric Jan Zürcher, "The Ottoman Conscription System in Theory and Practice, 1844-1918," *International Review of Social History*, 43 (3), 1998, p.442.

happens through the years 1830-31-32, in which the falls estimate from %4 up to %5 of the urban population of Ankara. Compared to these first three years, the last three seems more stable.

**Table II – Population of Urban Ankara 1831-1836<sup>75</sup>**

Year	Muslim	Christian	Jew	Total
1831	6066	4919 <sup>76</sup>	136	11121
1832	5741	4496	136	10373
1833	5527	4396	133	10056
1834	5523?	4258	130	9911
1835	5587	4290	119	9996
1836	5528	4260	135	9923

There can be said to be many historical reasons for such a fall in the urban population of Ankara. It can be explained within the context of the existing wars and revolts that spread many parts of the empire from 1820's to 1830's. The Greek revolt lasted between 1815 and 1830, the Ottoman-Russia war in 1828-1829 and maybe most importantly, the ongoing revolt of Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa in 1831-1833<sup>77</sup> and the invasion of the city by the Egyptians,<sup>78</sup> can be said to have been some of the reasons. These may have caused a fall in the population in two ways: either by the sending of troops demanded by Ottoman center, 1000 soldiers from Ankara and Kengürü,<sup>79</sup> or the hiding of able-bodied Muslim males in order to not to be sent to the front. Of course both could have happened at the same time. Also the locust and the famine during late 1820's may have caused the

<sup>75</sup> ML.CRD. 825, p. 82.

<sup>76</sup> Only for this year, the estimations for Christians refer to a population of 148 inhabitants who are in Istanbul at the moment ('*asitanede*'). These are not included in Table II.

<sup>77</sup> Özdemir, p. 256-257.

<sup>78</sup> HAT. 364-20158, HAT. 698-33703 and Özdemir, p. 44.

<sup>79</sup> C.AS. 18590-446 "Ankara ve Kengiri sancaklarından istenilen bin neferin bedeliyesinin her birinin yarımşar kese akçeden iktiza eden 250000 *guruşun* yüz bin *guruşu* tahsil ve irsal kılındığı. (Memuru silahşorlardan Hidayetullah tarafından)" C.AS. 446-18592 "Rumların isyanı dolayısıyla Ankara ve Kengiri sancaklarından istenilen bin neferin 250şer *guruştan* bedeliyelerinin gönderildiği. (Ankara ve Kengiri sancakları mutasarrıfı Nurullah Paşa'nın)"

population to suffer from hunger and economic deprivation.<sup>80</sup> According to Ainsworth, who has been to Ankara in 1838, due to the fall of prices in *tiftik*, many weavers, hand spinners, dyers and others were ruined and “the Ankara Khan [sic.] [was] nearly deserted.”<sup>81</sup> Such crises must have decapitated many people living at the subsistence level and created impoverishment. Thus the complaints of a group of Muslim and non-Muslim residents to the *kadı* in 1820, 1822, 1823 and 1826, claiming that they were poor and demanded the *avarız-hane* number to be decreased,<sup>82</sup> is meaningful in this sense.

These crises and the structural changes in economic relations altogether caused fluctuations in prices throughout the empire. Starting from 1815, prices rose in an unprecedented speed and in 1833-34, the rises in the prices reached to a highest point.<sup>83</sup> The consequence of this period of price crises for Ankara was an average of annual rise of %18.75 in the price of normal bread. In the years 1828-29, bread price rose by %33.3, and in 1832-1833, it rose by %44.<sup>84</sup> This fact could have led the poor and unemployed inhabitants of the city flee from Ankara to places where they believed they could find better nutrition and job opportunities.

The period from the beginning of 19<sup>th</sup> century up to the second half of 1830's has been an era in which Ottoman economy experienced the highest inflation rates. After the last years of 1830's, the prices turned back to a stable

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<sup>80</sup> Özdemir, *ibid.* Also see, C.İKTS. 652-14 “Çekirge dolayısıyla Ankara'da kıtlık olduğundan civar kazaların mevcut zahirelerini rayiciyle Ankaralılarına satmaları emrine Yabanabad ahalisinin itaat etmedikleri.”

<sup>81</sup> William Francis Ainsworth, *Travels and Researches in Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Chaldea, and Armenia*, London: John W. Parker, West strand, 1842, p. 166 and footnote 1. In 1840, 1 *okka* of good common Tiftik was sold at 9 guruş, while the finest picked wool was sold at 14 *guruş* per *okka*. See Connoly, *ibid.*

<sup>82</sup> Rıfat Özdemir, *XIX. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Ankara*, 103.

<sup>83</sup> Şevket Pamuk, *Osmanlı Ekonomisi ve Kurumları*, İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2007, p. 104. Faruk Tabak, “Bereketli Hilal'in Batısında Tarımsal Dalgalanmalar ve Emegin Kontrolü,” *Osmanlı'da Toprak Mülkiyeti ve Ticari Tarım*, Çağlar Keyder and Faruk Tabak (eds.), İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2010, p.146. For the Mediterranean, the prices tripled in the period between 1800 and 1840.

<sup>84</sup> Özdemir, p. 257, and “Tablo I” on p. 257-258.

condition, which will last no more than 10 years.<sup>85</sup> As urban consumers were the most vulnerable sects of society, due to the fact that the rises in the foodstuff prices high exceeded the rises in the wages,<sup>86</sup> the population of urban Ankara must have been effected harshly from the price fluctuations in 1830s.

In order to talk about the population of later years, such figures for late 1830s and early 1840s are not yet available for Ankara.<sup>87</sup> Although records made by census officers about the population movements fro and to urban Ankara in those years exist,<sup>88</sup> these records were not gathered together continuously due to the ‘disinterest’ in Istanbul.<sup>89</sup> It is interesting that there are no estimations given by the travelers for the population of Ankara after 1837 until 1848.<sup>90</sup> But what is more striking is the fact that the population census register for 1844 of Ankara has never been considered, whilst the register can be found easily in the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives.<sup>91</sup> Many historians considered the 1830 estimations as reliable while they denounced the 1844 censuses to be ‘unsuccessful’ due to the resistance posed by the population. Yet as explained above, both censuses are the

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<sup>85</sup> *İstanbul ve Diğer Kentlerde 500 Yıllık Fiyat ve Ücretler 1469-1998/500 Years of Prices and Wages in Istanbul and Other Cities*, Şevket Pamuk (ed.), Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası, 2000, p. 54, table 3.1, “Osmanlı kentlerinde gıda mallarının fiyatları 1469-1865.”

<sup>86</sup> Pamuk, *Osmanlı Ekonomisi*, p. 99.

<sup>87</sup> Yet, it should be noted that the register which is used to demonstrate urban population of Ankara between 1831 and 1836 is the population register for the whole Anatolia. The first part of this voluminous register is reserved for 1831-36 population movements while the second part is composed of population estimations for 1837-39 period. Unfortunately, in this second part, there is no record for Ankara.

<sup>88</sup> Some of them can be found in PMO archives. ML.CRD.d. 7 is composed of some pages of a register which gives the names of inhabitants who migrated or went to other cities for economic reasons of Hendek, Debbağın and an unknown *mahalle* between 1253/1838 January and 1255/1839 March . Also, ML.CRD.d. 310 gives the same information for Balaban, Boyacı Ali, Tiflis, Efî, Hallac Mahmud, Börekçiler, Hoca Paşa, Hacı Ashab, Leblebici, Hacendi and Öksüzce neighborhoods between 1835 and 1839. These two registers are specifically about the non-muslim populations.

<sup>89</sup> Stanford Shaw, “The Ottoman Census System and Population, 1831-1914,” *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, v.9, no. 3 (Oct., 1978), p. 327.

<sup>90</sup> Özdemir, p. 145-146, table 6, “Ankara’nın 18.-19. yy’lara Ait Nüfus Verileri ve Nüfusun Etnik Dağılımı.”

<sup>91</sup> ML. CRD.d. 825 is catalogued as “the population register for Ankara” (*Ankara eyaleti nüfus tahrir defteri*), and no date is given, which makes one think of it as the register for 1830 census. Yet this register includes the neighborhood-based estimations of population of Ankara in 1844.

consequence of the same logic, thus both bear the same ‘reliability’ problem. What was specific about the 1844 census that created further suspicion among the modern historians is that it specifically aimed at functioning of the new conscription system, which was established in 1836 (*redif asakir-i mansure*), and the local populations were aware of this fact. This, according to many historians, led to ‘misinformation’ and to hide the men suitable for conscription.

The hiding of members of the household was not the case for only the census of 1844. The societies always tended to hide and evade from the registrars whenever they could. For the Ottoman case this was not an exception. Opening shops where the state could not reach, cultivating lands that were not registered, or migrating from one place to other were so common<sup>92</sup> that one cannot expect the same hiding and evading to not to happen in the case of conscription. In that sense the official documents always bear the problem of reliability.

Yet, when the census register of 1844 is examined in detail, it can be seen that the data provided is coherent in itself. The consistency in the population/household ratio proves the fact that even though it was possible that the inhabitants of Ankara hid some of its members, the data is still representative of the socio-economic structure of contemporary Ankara. The average men population of Muslim households is 2,05 and the range is from 1 to 3 persons. 52 out of 74 *mahalles* (in which Muslims were present) were composed of households with a population range from 1,8 to 2,3 men.

The general trend of Ottoman population which declined in and before 1830s and increased at an average of 0.8 per cent annually after 1830s,<sup>93</sup> can also be observed for the case of Ankara. Compared to the figures from *temettuat*

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<sup>92</sup> Necmi Erdoğan, “Devleti ‘İdare Etmek’ Maduniyet ve Düzenbazlık” *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 83 (Winter 1999/2000), p. 15-19.

<sup>93</sup> Dursun, p. 81.

registers, it can be said that the population of Ankara during the first half of 1840's was increasing. While it is not possible to derive any exact number about the population of 1845 from the *temettuat* registers, the %6 increase in the overall number of households indicates also an increase in the population. Yet it would be simplistic to assume an equal increase in the population since number of households may have increased due to marriages, deaths or even economic changes within a household. Since household is a unit which was determined by taxation procedures, the increase in the number of households may indicate that the taxpayers within the population increased, which does not always mean that the inhabitants did.



## PART II: The rich and the poor: social differentiation in urban Ankara

Having set the mentality behind the archival texts and the socio-economic scene for 1830s and the general picture for 1840s, here primarily an attempt at giving a snapshot of the socio-economic composition of urban Ankara in 1845 will be tried. More than a population and tax survey, as discussed above, the *temettuat* registers of Ankara provide on the one hand a general picture of social differentiation and socio-economic relations, while on the other hand in some cases they allow, with the details they give, the historian to penetrate into individual lives and social relations. Yet, also from the process of writing of the registers, how the local elites competed and bargained with state can be observed.<sup>94</sup>

Although the number of *temettuat* registers of Ankara in the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives is very high, due to the fact that many of them are repetitions of each other, only 100 different authentic neighborhood registers could be identified within this study. Nearly all of the registers of urban Ankara, whose dates are still visible, date back to Receb 1261 / July 1845. It can be said that the whole process was completed within a month and the registers – both urban and rural – were sent to Istanbul on the last day of the next month, Şa’ban.<sup>95</sup> Yet, it should not be assumed that the registers had arrived to Istanbul in a short time; and even though they did, their control and analysis must have had taken a lot of time. Some registers of Ankara were controlled for the first time nearly a

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<sup>94</sup> A.MKT. 25-52 05 Receb 1261 / 10 July 1845

<sup>95</sup> A.MKT. 27-63 29 Şaban 1261 / 2 September 1845. According to that document, the sent registers did not include the registers for Armenians.

year after their completion.<sup>96</sup> Although the local council of Ankara claimed the authenticity and truthiness of the information in the registers, leaving no place for doubt,<sup>97</sup> the process involved inconsistencies so that some registers had to be re-written.<sup>98</sup> While the registers in question were rural registers, inconsistencies are also visible in urban *temettuat* registers of Ankara.<sup>99</sup>

With all its insufficiencies, state-centrism and textuality in contestation, the *temettuat* registers are useful in terms of telling the story of social differentiation on economic bases, within a frozen time and strictly-defined spatial bases. Although the Ottomans officially did not establish a ‘poverty line’, one can also get the idea who can be considered as poor and rich, and their inter-relations through the *temettuat* registers.<sup>100</sup> It is also possible to see the social stratification that started to emerge during the first half of the nineteenth century, with the emergence of a new social class, the bureaucrat, while the traditional ‘upper classes’ were still there. The registers allow the historian to observe the different structures that contributed to the well-being of the well-off, while they reveal the possible tactics of survival of the poor.

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<sup>96</sup>ML.VRD.TMT.d. 71, the *temettuat* register for the *rum* inhabitants of neighborhood of Hacı Ashab was controlled only on 9 Cemaziyelevvel 1261 / 5 May 1846 by Şevket Efendi from the department of assets; and ML.VRD.TMT.d. 54, which was the register for the neighborhood of Leblebici, was controlled by Ahmed Bey from the *mektub-i maliye* department in 13 Zilkade 1261 / 13 November 1845.

<sup>97</sup> “[M]eclis-i mezkurda cümle marifetiyle tahkik ve ... kılınıđı vechle şubhatdan arı olarak ve muharrir olan temettuatın ziyade temettuu ve tohumları olmadığı tabiyet ve tahkik ederek deruntorbaya konarak ve postaya teslimen [...] takdim olunmuş [...]” A.MKT. 27-63. Also see, Takamatsu Yoichi, “Ottoman Income Survey,” p. 34-35.

<sup>98</sup> A.MKT. 26-47 16 Receb 1261 / 21 July 1845.

<sup>99</sup> The register for a neighborhood was written for 2 times and the estimations for the two are different. Also some registers were copied out, in some examples of which the entries were written differently. According to Kütükođlu, most of the registers that did not have any seals, which can normally be found at the end of each register, were most probably copies written in Istanbul. Kütükođlu, “Temettü Defterleri,” p. 398. Although these differences were not of major importance, the reproduction of the textuality of information is important in the sense of the discussions about statistics above.

<sup>100</sup> Tevfik Güran, “Temettuat Registers as a Resource about Ottoman Social and Economic Life,” p. 11-12.

In general the population of Ankara in 1845 represents a stratified structure. Based on the household incomes, it can be said that most of them reflect a laboring middle-class structure. Unlike a modern, industrialized town, urban Ankara was composed of mixed neighborhoods in which both the high income groups and lower income groups were present. Yet this fact does not mean that the social relations were determined accordingly. Also it has to be mentioned that while the economically mixed neighborhoods were general, there were also highly stratified neighborhoods. Some neighborhoods were composed highly of the well-off households while in some, only the poorer households were present. This fact can be understood within the context of differentiation of consumption patterns and living standards, together with the spatial organization of different occupational groups. Also it can be said that the social networks play an important role in this. The networks organized by the same socio-economic or occupational group can be said to have created both symbolic and financial capital for the rich and a space for the survival of the poor. Neighborhoods can be said to have created a spatial dynamic for these social networks. Thus, it is necessary to see how social differentiation was distributed within spatial organization of neighborhoods of Ankara in 1845. While doing that, one should keep in mind that the agency of the organization of neighborhoods as spaces for social differentiation or social cohesion, was dependent upon the agency of the inhabitants and the effects of structural changes on them. Thus it should be noted that, as explained in the discussion about statistical data, the spatial definitions in the registers fix the inhabitants into strictly defined spaces, while in the social realm, the neighborhood represented a space that was dynamic and an ever-

changing space, defined by its inhabitants and more complex structural processes.<sup>101</sup>

### **1) Neighborhood Profile**

While there were 91 neighborhoods in 1830 censuses, according to the population register of 1831-36 there were 98 neighborhoods and in 1844, 92 neighborhoods. As explained above, from the *temettuat* registers of 1845, 100 neighborhoods could be identified. Since so much an increase and fluctuation in the number of neighborhoods seems rarely possible, the changes can be said to have been caused by the fact that registers for 1831-36 and 1845 included the neighborhoods inside the castle, while the 1830 and 1844 censuses did not.<sup>102</sup>

The neighborhoods were organized according to a very complex set of determinants. One of these determinants was ethno-religious identity, which is claimed to be the most effective of all, in the socio-spatial organization of Ottoman cities. The frozen picture of Ankara neighborhoods in 1845 seems to reflect more or less an ethno-religious distribution of population. According to *temettuat* registers, more than half of the neighborhoods were homogenously muslim, while only %15 of non-muslim neighborhoods were composed of homogenous ethno-religious identity. Although the importance of ethno-religious identity should not be underestimated since the church, mosque or the synagogue has played a vital role in structuring the neighborhood, it should always be kept in

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<sup>101</sup> The 'traditional' structure of Ottoman neighborhoods allowed their inhabitants to define the symbolic and spatial borders. Zeliha Etöz's study on the social life in Ankara during the first half of the 19th century proves this dynamism of the neighborhoods of the city. Zeliha Etöz, "19. Yüzyıl Ankara'sında Mahalleler ve Gündelik Yaşam," *Sanki Viran Ankara*, Funda Şenol Cantek (ed.), İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006, p. 11-42.

<sup>102</sup> Musa Çadırcı mentions that the neighborhoods inside the castle were recorded as one neighborhood in the 1830 census register. Çadırcı, "1830 Nüfus Sayımına Göre," p. 113 As for the 1844 census, it can be said that while it included the muslim neighborhoods inside the castle, the neighborhoods for non-muslims could possibly be recorded as one neighborhood. According to Ergenç's and Faroqhi's studies, the number of neighborhoods in Ankara was 85 by the end of the 16th century, and still remaining the same a century later. Faroqhi, *Orta Halli Osmanlılar*, 48.

mind that such categories were more heterogeneous than they were reconstructed in these registers. Ethno-religious borders were always subject to transgression, both in legal and illegal ways. The abstractness and complexity of these categories can be demonstrated in the case of catholics, who were actually Armenians who were converted to Catholicism, through a process of conflicts with both the Ottoman authorities and the Armenian millet.<sup>103</sup> In that sense the composition of neighborhoods, in terms of ethno-religious borders, must be read in a critical way. Also the existence of ‘mixed’ neighborhoods can be understood as a sign of realization of such transgressions. About %25 of the whole urban population was living in mixed neighborhoods, which necessitated overcoming clashes between different ethno-religious identities.

**Table III: Ethno-religious distribution of Neighborhoods**

<b>Ethno-religious identity</b>	<b>Neighborhoods</b>
Muslim	56
Armenian	2
Catholic	8
Jew	1
Rum	4
Mixed <sup>104</sup>	29

Although social differentiation and stratification is not visible through the general composition of districts of Ankara, there were some districts which represent a highly stratified structure. This was also visible from the desirability of different districts. For instance, the neighborhoods within the castle (*derun-u hisar*) were more preferable than the others that even some French and foreign

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<sup>103</sup> Charles A. Frazee, *Catholics and Sultans, The Church and the Ottoman Empire 1453-1923*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 178-190.

<sup>104</sup> In this study, mixed neighborhoods are considered as the ones containing at least 2 different ethno-religious group.

traders bought houses and lived there.<sup>105</sup> Ainsworth mentions that the best of the houses were built within the castle.<sup>106</sup> Although the castle was used for many purposes including storage, incarceration and even as a place for hiding,<sup>107</sup> which does not sound desirable to modern ears, the fact that it was close to the trade centers, covered bazaar (*bedesten*) and Atpazarı must have been the reason that it was so desirable that the prices of houses were much higher than normal.<sup>108</sup>

While most of the neighborhoods were composed of a mixed socio-economic structure, in terms of household incomes, the Ahi Hacı Murad and Dürdane neighborhoods were composed highly of the better-off households, while 23 other neighborhoods also represented higher incomes.<sup>109</sup> The economic composition and desirability of the neighborhoods are also identifiable from the existence of administrative facilities. The palace of the mayor was in one of the districts which was composed of highly well-off households, in the neighborhood called Tüllice.<sup>110</sup> Thus, the architectural designation of the neighborhoods also represented an indicative aspect of social differentiation in terms of space. Since renting a house was not the rule in Anatolia,<sup>111</sup> it can be assumed that the

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<sup>105</sup> Özdemir, 43.

<sup>106</sup> An example, Ainsworth, p. 132.

<sup>107</sup> Faroqhi, *Orta Halli Osmanlılar*, p. 45. In 1829, the mayor of Ankara, Mustafa Bey took refuge in the castle, due to an insurgency among the inhabitants as a result of his misbehaviour. Özdemir, 42.

<sup>108</sup> Özdemir, 43. The derun-u hisar neighborhoods were desirable even 200 years ago. Faroqhi, *Orta Halli Osmanlılar*, p. 46. For an analysis of characteristics of Ankara houses mainly of 17th century, see Faroqhi, *ibid.*, p. 86-97 and other places. By the beginning of 17th century, half of the houses of Ankara had at least one room, and by the end of the same century, the percentage of those houses with more than one room increased dramatically. Faroqhi, p. 110-116 According to Faroqhi, the merchants who had ties with centers like Bursa and Ankara might have imitated the houses in İstanbul and Bursa.

<sup>109</sup> Hisar Ağniya, Şeyh İzzeddin, Tüllice, Sabuni, Kurd, Kul Derviş, Yakub Harat, Hacı Arab, Ekinci, Efi, Kethüdalı, Dellal Karaca, Baklacı, Müruri, Papani, Ahi Turan, Yeğen, Halife-i Beyazıd, Hacettepesi, Börülcek-i Atik, Yaviler, Makremacı and an unidentified district represent a structure that is distinct from the overall distribution of economic condition of population to neighborhoods of urban Ankara.

<sup>110</sup> The mansion which was sold by Ümmühan Hanım binti El-Hac Halim Ağa for 4000 *guruş* in 1824, was used as the mansion of the mayor most probably until 1897, when a new mansion was built at the same place. Özdemir, p. 45.

<sup>111</sup> Faroqhi, *Orta Halli Osmanlılar*, p. 143.

grandeur of the house and the composition of the building can be regarded as an indicator of wealth and prestige for the owner.

One can also talk about neighborhoods that were representative of poor household incomes. In other words, for the wealthy ones, some neighborhoods were undesirable. 10 neighborhoods represented a high concentration of poorer households.<sup>112</sup> Yet, the desirability can be said to have been determined by many factors apart from economic conditions. Connected to that, it can be said that kinship relations was also an important determinant. In that sense, as Kütükoğlu demonstrates, in many cases, the inhabitants belonging to the same family usually lived in same neighborhoods.<sup>113</sup>

## **2) Labor Profile**

While there are too little studies on the labor profile of cities in Ottoman Empire,<sup>114</sup> the *temettuat* registers give the historian a great opportunity for such a survey. When thought together with the distribution of income and wealth/poverty in terms of neighborhoods, one should also consider the occupational data, especially for those highly homogeneous neighborhoods. This consideration is indicative to prove how the division of labor, income and neighborhood overlapped in many cases. When the neighborhoods in which wealthier households were concentrated are examined, it can be seen that the occupational aspects of the neighborhood reflect the fact that most of the households were occupied with qualified labor, like goldsmith (*kuyumcu*), tailor (*dikici*), furrier (*kürkçü*) and administrative occupations.

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<sup>112</sup> Hisar, Hocapaşa, Hoca Hindi, Ali Bey, Debbaghane, Öksüzce, Koçhisar, Kureys, Emregülü and Mukaddem neighborhoods.

<sup>113</sup> Kütükoğlu, "Temettü Defterleri," p. 399-400.

<sup>114</sup> Cengiz Kırılı, "A Profile of the Labor Force in Early-Nineteenth Century Istanbul," *ILWCH*, 60 Fall, 2001, p. 126.

The distribution of some specific occupational groups in some districts may be as a result of spatial distribution that is in parallelity with the distribution of occupational income, while the geographical proximity of the neighborhood to the marketplace could have also played an important role in determining the geographical profile of labor. The latter possibility seems to have been more efficient since even the most homogeneous neighborhood in terms of income and occupation has a considerable number of poorer households. This fact is also indicative in terms of the existence of occupational networks that were intertwined with other networks of religion, age, homeland etc.

While most of the neighborhoods seem to follow a mixed pattern in terms of division of occupations, the most representative one is the neighborhood called Bölücek-i Atik.<sup>115</sup> Composed of 55 Armenian, 106 Muslim and 95 *Rum* households, the neighborhood had a variety of occupations in which at least two of the ethno-religious groups took place. The 24 weavers (*çulha*) for instance, were composed of Armenians and Muslims. The same pattern applies also for the apprentices and journeymen of those weavers. Cotton fluffers (*hallaç*), shoemakers (*pabuşçu*), combers (*tarakçı*), servants (*hizmetkar*) and day-laborers (*ırgad*) were concentrated in the neighborhood and the ethno-religious division of labor was not visible. This may imply the existence of occupational networks that went beyond the myths of ethno-religious division of labor. Of course some specific occupations were reserved by some groups; like Rums who constituted the very majority of goldsmiths (*kuyumcu*). Yet, what is interesting in that context is that all the journeymen and apprentices of goldsmiths were Catholic Armenians in Ankara in 1845.

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<sup>115</sup> ML.VRD.TMT.d. 16327.



When considered in terms of income distribution, the most crowded occupational group, the casual laborers (*amele*) composed of 335 inhabitants were the ones with the least household income, nearly all of which was composed of their occupational income. The average income was 160 *guruş* annually. The neighborhood distribution of the casual laborers included a wide range; there were a considerable number of casual laborers in more than 50 neighborhoods, with a heterogeneous composition of ethno-religious identity. Following the laborers, the more than 210 tailors (*terzi*) – without the more than 120 tailor apprentice and journeymen – constitute the second largest occupational group in Ankara. Their average annual income indicates a better-off occupational group, with 290 *guruş*. As textile has been one of the pioneering industries in Ankara, as mentioned before, one expects the tailors to be richer. Their relative poverty can be explained with the collapse of Ottoman textile industry as a result of the rush of cheap European textiles into Ottoman markets. Yet, compared to a register giving the number of artisans in Ankara and other cities, which gives the number of tailors as 187, in 1827,<sup>116</sup> the increase in the number of the artisans prove the fact that their relative poverty cannot be explained only with the so-called ‘de-industrialization’ model. The distinction in the *temettuat* registers between tailor (*terzi*) and tailor shop (*dükkanda terzi*) may imply that the production relations were due to change,<sup>117</sup> rather than the disappearance of an industry, as the 55 tailors working in shops earned a great deal of money annually, an average of 645

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<sup>116</sup> MAD.d. 19450, p. 6-7 is reserved for the artisans of Ankara, while composed of 14 pages, this register gives the estimations for other cities also. For a published and transcribed version of the referred pages of the same register, see Halit Ongan, “Ankara’nın Eski Esnafını Açıklayan bir Vesika,” *Türk Etnografya Dergisi*, vol. II, (1957), p. 56-61.

<sup>117</sup> The distinction implies existence of production out of the workhouse, most probably production in the house, including the members of the household who are not listed within the workforce. The houses of Ankara mostly had rooms specially used as ateliers for producing sof. By the beginning of 17th century, 28 out of 348 houses had such ateliers and by the end of the century 29 out of 289 houses did. Faroqhi, *Orta Halli Osmanlılar*, p. 129.

*guruş*. The result of such a shift in the production relations can be said to be observed in the fact that nearly half of all tailors, who were of catholic Armenian *millet*, had migrated to other cities in order to find better job opportunities.

Yet, another comparison reveals the story from the other side. The decrease in the number of mohair weaver and dyer (*şalici* and *şali boyacısı*) from 546 in 1827 to 164 in 1845 implies a sharp decline in the urban existence of the mohair industry. From this fact, it can be said that for urban Ankara, the mohair industry can no longer be considered as lucrative as it has been before. Although again in decreasing numbers compared to 1827, the few fabric dealers (*bezzaz*) with a population of 86 households – all *rum*, catholic armenian and muslim – represented one of the wealthiest occupational groups in urban Ankara. Their average annual income was about 1130 *guruş*. It is not possible to determine what kind of fabric they were selling, yet, compared to a declining textile industry, their wealth might mean that these artisans were either getting incorporated into changing trade patterns and selling European fabrics, or had other income generating activities. The latter seems more possible since in most cases, agricultural and property incomes constitute a very important portion of the total annual income.

Another group of artisans, which were not listed in 1827, namely the yarn makers/sellers (*iplikçi/iplik sarıcı*) were composed only of 23 households. The existence of this group can be read as a consequence of the incorporation of Ottoman Empire into world-system. Especially during the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the European traders lost interest in the final products and started importing raw materials from Ottoman Empire. That was also true for the mohair industry in Ankara. Since European traders were interested more in raw mohair;

like the British merchant Henri Lakonten who bought 30000 *kıyye* (12 tons) of mohair and 8417 goats from Ankara.<sup>118</sup>

As mentioned earlier, no ethno-religious division of labor can be observed in Ankara. Within members of any occupation – of course apart from occupations related with religion and administrative posts – it is the rule seeing at least two households belonging to different ethno-religious communities. What is more important, especially for the scope of this study, is the composition of the two ‘poorest’ occupational groups, namely the casual laborers and servants, the latter with 103 households and average of 185 *guruş* of annual income. It is possible to see all the ethno-religious groups, Muslims, Catholics, Rums, Armenians and Jews within these two categories. This means as the class composition of occupational group becomes more lower-class oriented, ethno-religious and other identity borders blurred and became less visible.

In general, with variation and complexity of occupations from the least specialized to highly specialized ones, urban Ankara reflected the structure of a middle-sized city, in the first half of the century. Yet, as the majority started to suffer from the consequences of incorporation into the capitalist mode of production and consumption, it can be said that the labor profile in general followed a ‘pre-capitalist’ structure, since it was common to find households which did not specialize on only one occupation but had incomes from other income generating activities. It was possible to find households involved in an urban trade while having an income from agricultural activities. While the labor profile had a mixed structure, the effects of transformation can be observed in terms of social differentiation.

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<sup>118</sup> A.MKT. 38-59.

**Table IV: Ethno-religious distribution of various occupations**

	Armenian	Catholic	Rum	Muslim	Jew
Amele	25	64		248	
Berber	11	13	1	28	
Berber ırađı/kalfası	4	11		13	
Dyer (Bez Boyacı)	10	6			
Bezzaz	7	33	33	16	
Bostancı				103	
Boyacı	2	10		5	
Boyacı ırađı	11			1	
Canbaz				14	
eri	10	35	8	24	26
ulha	12		7	27	
ulha ırađı/kalfası	13	1	2	10	
Tanner (Debbađ)				26	
Debbađ ırađı/kalfası/amelesi				23	
Miller (Deđirmenci)	4		3	4	
Sewer (Dikici)	8	72	3	50	
Dikici ırađı/kalfası	12	24	2	25	
Duhancı		7	4	45	1
Tailor Shop (Dkkanda Terzi)	55				
Dlger	12	7		3	
Dlger ırađı/kalfası		24			
Baker (Ekmeki)	1		9	27	
Ekmeki Amelesi/hizmetkarı/tezgahtarı	4		3	9	
Scrap Metal Collecor (Eskici)	1	37	10	23	
Haffaf	2	15	5	23	
Carrier (Hamal)	1	4		21	
Servant (Hizmetkar)	18	27	4	48	5
Agricultural Laborer (Irgad)	1	1	18	90	
Coffee Seller (Kahveci)	1	2	1	47	
Kalaycı		3	10	21	
Kalaycı ırađı/kalfası	2		4	9	
Butcher (Kasap)	2	12		36	
Kasap ırađı/kalfası	5	7		35	
Kazzaz		12	1		
Fur Seller (Krk)		10	25		
Krk ırađı/kalfası	1	2			
Jeweler (Kuyumcu)		3	48	1	
Kuyumcu ırađı/kalfası		11	2		
Shoemaker (Pabuu)	19	1	11	8	
Pabuu ırađı/kalfası	3	1			
alici	3	32			
alici amelesi		98			
alici kalfası	13				
Tailor (Terzi/ırađı/kalfası)	23	269	24	30	

### 3) The 'Rich' in the *Temettuat Registers*

Although most of the studies concerning consumption and socio-economic history of cities and regions focus on the well-off parts of the society, very few of them consider the structural aspects behind the richness while other parts of the society remain poorer.<sup>119</sup> Here, first, the means of income according to the *temettuat* registers will be considered within a structural context. In that sense, the stratification that has existed among inhabitants of Ankara did not mean that social differentiation and stratification existed only between the poor and the wealthy. A deeper examination into the possessions and incomes of the wealthy inhabitants prove that the rich were not homogenous in itself and had their own structures of stratification. The visible structure reveals the dynamism that was due to rapid change within the context of *Tanzimat* reforms. The effects of both the *ancien-regime* and the new *Tanzimat* mentality coexisted together, yet the conditions seem in favor of the newly emerging social classes.

#### A) The State Officials

Among the richest groups of urban Ankara in 1845, the top was reserved by the new bureaucratic elites. Their economic well-being reflects the growing importance of the state officials during the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards as against the local notables, landowners and the pre-existing 'traditional' upper-classes. One of the richest of the town was Mehmed Efendi bin Ali, living in the Kayabaşı neighborhood who was the scribe (*katib*) in directorate of financial administration of Ankara. He earned 1000 *guruş* monthly. He also owned a

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<sup>119</sup> Of course exceptions do exist. For analyses on the economic activities and wealth accumulating sources of the rich, see Halil İncalcık, "Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire," *The Journal of Economic History*, vol. 29, no. 1, The Tasks of Economic History (Mar., 1969), p. 97-140; Suraiya Faroqhi, "A Builder as Slave Owner and Rural Moneylender: Hacı Abdullah of Bursa, Campaign Mimar," *Stories of Ottoman Men and Women Establishing Status, Establishing Control*, Istanbul: Eren, 2002, p. 95-113; *idem.*, "How to Prosper in Eighteenth Century Bursa: The Fortune of Hacı İbrahim, Tanner," *ibid.*, p. 113-130.

lucrative vineyard of 10 acre (*dönüm*). In sum his annual income was 12108 *guruş*.<sup>120</sup> Another well-off household belonged to Ömer Efendizade Seyid Mehmed Efendi, living in Leblebici neighborhood, who was the director of agriculture (*ziraat müdürü*) of Ankara. His annual income was 6500 *guruş*, most of which he earned from the property and the shops he owned. A courthouse (*mahkeme*)<sup>121</sup> a bakery shop and a coffeehouse in Aşağıyüz Çarşıboğazı, a sum of 50 acre (*dönüm*) of weed field (*cehrilik*) and three cows, together with a sum of 4350 acres of field in many places around Ankara.<sup>122</sup>

Another official, a member of the local council of Ankara, Es-seyid Mehmed Efendi was living in Hatuniye district. He owned a number of fields and shops with an annual income of 5522 *guruş*. His main source of income was the *çiftlik* belonging to the Gazi Çelebi vaqf. He collected the incomes of over more than 1000 acres of field, and some vineyard and meadows belonging to the vaqf. He also owned the incomes of a vineyard of 5 acres belonging to Yeşil Ahmed vaqf and a vegetable garden belonging to another vaqf.<sup>123</sup>

Living in Börülcek-i Atik neighborhood, Hacı Şeyh Alizade Hafız İbrahim Efendi who was one of the *kaza* directors, earned 5405 *guruş* a year. He owned 136 acres of field and 3 acres of vineyard together with a shop that he has rented out. Yet one of his largest sources of income was the *timar* he had, which annually earned him a 4000 *guruş*.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> ML.VRD.TMT.d. 61, p. 7.

<sup>121</sup> Until 1897, the court of Ankara did not have its own place; instead a building was rented. According to a register from 1841, the court building was two-floor with more than 6 rooms. Özdemir, p.46-47. According to the *temettuat* register, Mehmed Efendi earned an annual income of 720 *guruş* from the court. Whether it was still the same building mentioned in 1841 is a question.

<sup>122</sup> ML.VRD.TMT.d. 94, p. 7.

<sup>123</sup> ML.VRD.TMT.d. 118, p. 1.

<sup>124</sup> ML.VRD.TMT.d. 16327, p. 8.

Two court scribes who live most probably very close to each other since they were recorded one after the other, in the same unidentified neighborhood, create an example of how occupational relations determined the composition of neighborhoods. The one with much larger income, an annual of 2484 *guruş*, Arif Efendi, living in number 65, owned 385 acres of field and 18 acres of vineyard, together with a shoemaker's shop. He also owned many animals like Angora goat (*tiftik keçisi*), sheep, goats, cows which earned him more than his annual wage of 350 *guruş* from the court. One other source of income was the *vaqf*, which in sum earned him 500 *guruş*. While he earned this amount from the Yeşil Ağa *vaqf*, he also collected the incomes of 5 shops belonging to Mahmud Paşa *vaqf*.<sup>125</sup> The other court scribe, Said Efendi, had an annual income of 1500 *guruş*, and owned 3 shoemaker's shops, one tinner (*kalaycı*) shop, one *tekneci* shop, one clothier (*bezzaz*) shop while he owned an 8 acres of field, 10 acres of weed field and 12 acres of garden. He earned 250 *guruş* from the court. Like his scribe friend, he collected the incomes from the 5 shops belonging to Mahmud Paşa *vaqf* and 2 others belonging to another *vaqf*.<sup>126</sup>

## **B) “Traditional” Elites**

Apart from the new officials in town, the *ulema* and the sheiks formed an important part of the better-off class in Ankara in 1845. It can be said that the symbolic capital, their relationship with administrative posts that they established previously, which paved their way to material capital, still continued to profit them or their families.

The richest household of Ankara in terms of income was with an annual income of 21066 *guruş*, belonged to three orphans of Arif Efendizade Lütfullah

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<sup>125</sup> ML.VRD.TMT.d. 17760, p. 7.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*

Efendi: Rafet Molla, Eşref Molla and their sister. It is impossible to determine either Rafet or Eşref was the household head, thus it is impossible to know who is a student of *ulema*, as recorded in the register. Either way, it can be said that the network they could establish through their deceased father, living in İmam Yusuf district, the three orphans owned a total 40 acres of field, 32,5 acres of meadow, 12 acres of garden lot, 15 acres of vineyard, 58,5 acres of vegetable field (*bostan*), 12 acres of weed field, 24,5 lucrative shops, and the income of 1,5 shop belonging to Rum Mehmed Paşa vaqf. What is more important in terms of their financial strength is that the registrar also noted that they have 200000 *guruş* cash.<sup>127</sup>

Another member of the traditional elite, the sheikh of the Hacı Bayram Veli dervish lodge, Halil Efendi oğlu Ahmed Nuri earned 4119 *guruş* from his property, composed of about 500 acres of field and some shops.<sup>128</sup>

### C) Tradesmen

As the literature on the last century of the Ottoman empire suggests, the economic power of the tradesmen, mostly non-muslims, has grown stronger as the trade patterns changed by the first half of the century.<sup>129</sup> Parallel to that, among the wealthier groups in Ankara, the tradesmen had their place. One of the tradesmen with the highest income, Bay oğlu Peter Bezirgan, who was a catholic, living in Kethüdalı neighborhood, number 167, had an annual income of 8000 *guruş*, and only owned a vineyard of 20 acres and two weed fields, 51 acres in total.<sup>130</sup> From another document that can be found in the archives, it can be learned that Peter is a European garment trader and the reason that he has taken place in the archives is that three non-muslims in Ankara, Tilki oğlu Andon,

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<sup>127</sup> ML.VRD.TMT.d. 16818, p. 2.

<sup>128</sup> ML.VRD.TMT.d. 38, p. 3.

<sup>129</sup> REF!

<sup>130</sup> ML.VRD.TMT. 174, p. 28.



Dumanlı oğlu Ohannes and Damad oğlu Andon, owed him a sum of 74500 *guruş*.<sup>131</sup> The example of Peter, with some others stated above, proves the fact that the income that is scribed in *temettuat* registers does not fully represent the wealth of the economically better-off sects of the inhabitants of Ankara. Another tradesman with higher income is Aslangil oğlu Osyeb, who was also a catholic, had an annual income of 6000 *guruş*. He only owned 11 acres of vineyard and animals.<sup>132</sup> Bedros who was a catholic, also living in Kethüdalı district, earned 5000 *guruş*, owned 10 acres of vineyard, and a field of weed more than 1300 acres.<sup>133</sup>

#### **D) Land and Property Owners**

Not everyone belonging to the wealthier sects of Ankara had an occupation. Affluence is not always correlated with having an occupation. As can be seen from the above given examples, apart from earning wage and having occupational income, income from properties, lands and vaqfs were equally important. One of the wealthiest property owners was Selahaddin Ağa, living in Hoca Hindi neighborhood. His annual income was 10142 *guruş*, and he owned 1990 acres of fields in different places, a garden of 10 acres, a vineyard of 5 acres, a weed field of 100 acres, a mulberry grove of 14 acres, animals (sheep, goat, horses) amounting nearly to 400 and 2 perfume shops.<sup>134</sup>

Although not as wealthy as Selahaddin Ağa, Toygarzade Naim Efendi, Hallac Mahmud neighborhood number 1, earned 4140 *guruş* annually, and owned a sum of 600 acres of field, 23 acres of meadow, 20 acres of bean orchard, 60 acres of pasture, 20 acres of clover field, 12 acres of vineyard. Yet, he earned

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<sup>131</sup> A.MKT. 14/75.

<sup>132</sup> ML.VRD.TMT.d. 127, p. 8.

<sup>133</sup> ML.VRD.TMT.d. 174, p. 14.

<sup>134</sup> ML.VRD.TMT.d. 132, p. 1.

much from the shops he owned: 4 shops in Atpazarı, which was one of the most important places for trade, since most of the inns and *bedestens* were situated there,<sup>135</sup> and 6 in other places. He also owned the incomes of 25 shops and 30 inn rooms, belonging to Toygarzade vaqf.<sup>136</sup>

Dizdar Ağazade Mehmed Salim Ağa, living in Sultan Alaaddin neighborhood, number 1, earned 3200 *guruş*. Among his sources of income, there was a water-mill (*esyab*) which was lucrative, a field of 10 acres close to his water-mill, another field of 100 acres and 30 acres of weed field. He also owned a rope-maker's shop<sup>137</sup> and a tobacco shop in Atpazarı. Together with them, he also collected the income of a shoe-repair shop that belonged to his mother and a sum of 280 *guruş* from his wife's shop in Atpazarı.<sup>138</sup>

Müderriszade Vahid Efendi, living in Yakub Ne'al district, had an annual income of 4952 *guruş*. He has a long list of properties. 7 coffeehouses, 15 sewing shops, 3 shops in Kurşunlu inn, which was situated in Atpazarı and was composed of 58 rooms inside and 20 shops around,<sup>139</sup> 2 shops in Atpazarı, 12 tailor shops, an alpaca mill, a mill and more than 300 acres of field and some gardens.<sup>140</sup>

## E) Women

What can be derived also from the same two entries in the registers is that, in 1845, the women of upper classes were involved very much in property relations and contributed to the incomes of households which they were a part. Possessing property and estate, and contributing to household economy with them had been an important part of state of "womenness," which also opened the way

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<sup>135</sup> Özdemir, p. 25, 38.

<sup>136</sup> ML.VRD.TMT.d. 107, p. 1.

<sup>137</sup> Which was most probably run by Polad oğlu Hacı Abdi, living in Kattanin *mahallesi* number 90, who was the only *urgancı* of the town and who also owned shops in Atpazarı.

<sup>138</sup> ML.VRD.TMT.d. 58, p. 1.

<sup>139</sup> Özdemir, p. 27.

<sup>140</sup> ML.VRD.TMT.d. 17, p. 1.

to the accession of the women into legal-judicial processes.<sup>141</sup> As an example, the wife of Vahid Efendi, contributed to the household income with 1838 *guruş*. She owned 8 shops, coffeehouses and 3 rooms in Kurşunlu inn, 7300 acres of field, 150 acres of meadow and a water-mill.<sup>142</sup>

In comparison to İnalçık's overview of capital formation and wealthy classes in three big cities of the empire, Bursa, Edirne and Istanbul, which claimed the merchants, landowners and money changers (*sarraf*) to be the wealthiest during the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries,<sup>143</sup> the structural changes worked in favor of the bureaucratic elite, so that by the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, they formed the wealthiest households in Ankara. All the above given examples represent the few within the population of Ankara in 1845. The 337 households, which have an income over 1000 *guruş* represent only the %6 of the whole. Most of these households were either wage-earners or self-employed tradesmen and artisans who had lucrative business. While the wage-earner public employees were concentrated mostly over the line of 2000 *guruş* of income, the artisans were rarely found within the same income range. What constitutes the richness of the wage earners was not their wage which was mostly 2000 *guruş* annually;<sup>144</sup> it was the symbolic capital that provided them with access to other income sources. It can be seen that the upper classes in Ankara in 1845 had a great deal of means to increase their incomes. Apart from the wages, they earned large amounts of money from the property they owned. Also the shops in various trade centers and production facilities like *cenderes* and mills were among sources of income. It can

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<sup>141</sup> Suraiya Faroqhi, *Orta Halli Osmanlılar*, p. 7.

<sup>142</sup> ML.VRD.TMT.d. 58, p. 2.

<sup>143</sup> Halil İnalçık, p. 125, 136 and especially Conclusion part.

<sup>144</sup> Apart from the scribe Mehmed Efendi bin Ali whose wage was 12000 *guruş* annually and the *kaza* director Hacı Şeyh Alizade Hafız İbrahim Efendi with an annual wage of 4000 *guruş*, other wages did not exceed 2000 *guruş*.

be said that the difference in registering whether the shops in question were rented or they were owned may indicate that in the case where they were owned, the owners intervened in the production processes and production relations, and controlled them. This can also indicate that the role of the guilds was minimized and the labor relations were determined by the propertied classes.

Apart from the income by the mobile and immobile properties, one of the important sources for income was the *vaqf*. The income from the *vaqfs* are quite indicative of the role of the status in having access to the means of income.<sup>145</sup> It can be seen that one's having a high income does not mean that he/she had full access to all the income sources all the time. *Vaqf* incomes, as recorded in *temettuat* registers, can be said to be a privilege of minority who had strong connections with official and administrative posts. As can be seen from the examples above, the officials in Ankara enjoyed a great income as a consequence of their access to the *vaqfs*, while the land and property owners who did not have any kind of state affiliation did not have any incomes from the *vaqfs*. When examined in detail, the *temettuat* registers prove this fact also for the muslims affiliated with unofficial occupations. Only those occupied in administrative jobs like those of above, or police (*zabita*, *zabtiye*, *zabita neferi*, *zabita sipahisi*), former members of the army (*sipahi tekaidi*), the members of the education system (*ders-i amm*, *müderris*) and those of religious occupations (*imam*, *şeyh*) could get access to the *vaqf* system. In that sense the symbolic capital of the social status goes hand in hand with financial income in Ankara of 1845, in defining who was rich.<sup>146</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> İnalçık, p. 109.

<sup>146</sup> Mahmoud Yazbak, "The *Waqf* as a Tool for Enrichment/Impoverishment: Nablus 1600-1750," *Pauvrete et Richese dans le monde Musulman Mediterraneeen/Poverty and Wealth in the Muslim Mediterranean World*, Jean Paul Pascal (ed.), Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2003, p. 93-94.

Of course exceptions were present, yet they indicate far more than existence of exceptions. The too few who could get access to vaqf incomes may have had connections with those who have access to these institutions. This indicates the importance of social networks in terms of accessing to different means of income. Or, as in the case of Toygarzade Naim Efendi, for whom it had been possible to get access to income sources of a vaqf, founding vaqfs were tactically used to guarantee incomes, even though one does not have direct contact with official posts.<sup>147</sup> Also, even though no connection with officials is indicated in the register, from the names of Dizdar Ağazade Mehmed Salim Ağa and Müderriszade Vahid Efendi, it can be said that their families had ties with administrative – since *dizdar* was the official warden of the castle, and *müderris* was a rank in the *ulama* class). What should be stated when talking about the *vaqf* incomes during the first half of 19<sup>th</sup> century is that the vaqfs in Ankara were also in economic deprivation, as the general trend of *vaqfs* for the whole empire has been. There were cases which the vaqf did not even have the money to repair the belongings like public fountains, shops and other facilities like conduits. In some cases the money for these reparations were collected from the inhabitants.<sup>148</sup> Although this was the case, as seen in the examined registers, among income generating activities and sources, vaqfs have an important share, as also a determinant in social differentiation.

As for the gendered division of property relations, the registers prove the fact that the women were involved in property relations and furthermore, that in

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<sup>147</sup> It should also be added that the family Toygarzade had connections with officials according to PMO archives. Toygarzade Seyyid Efendi was most probably an official. C.ML. 361-14781, DH.SAİD.d. 141-459 and 185-107.

<sup>148</sup> Özdemir, p. 221-224.

some cases women contributed more than the men to the household income, or own more property than most of the men in the city.

#### **4) The Poor**

Although the Ottoman officials did not have any sense of ‘poverty line’ while preparing the *temettuat* registers, it is explicitly visible that one of the aims, apart from collecting information about the tax potential of the population, was to ‘know’ how the population functioned. While the social control mechanisms on the populations of European – and non-european – societies were getting stronger, Ottoman officials must have attempted to understand who was living on what. Thus, the registering of the occupations of the household heads who were supposed to pay taxes and other household members who were not responsible for paying tax, is meaningful. Also the registering of ways of making a living of those who were somehow unable to get occupied can be regarded as evidence of this perspective. In that sense while the *temettuat* registers provide a textual area on which state and the lower-classes involved into conflict and cooperation, through them one can read how social relations were positioned according to social differentiation patterns.

From the registers it can be understood that the Ottoman state’s perception of the poor was mainly based on one’s distance to ‘officially recognized’ income generating activities, and among them the most determinant was having an occupational income. Nearly in all cases the households recorded as ‘poor’ (*fukaradan, efkar-ı fukaradan, fakir-ül hal*) had no occupational ties. The ones even with a minimum of occupational or land income were not labeled as such. This fact implies the existence of a mentality of distinction between what is called ‘structural poverty’ and ‘conjunctural poverty.’ In that sense, it can be said that

Ottoman administration considered only long-term poverty that was caused by individual and social circumstances as poverty while ignoring the temporarily self-sufficient poor. The labeling of poor is important for the reason that it can qualify people to receive assistance or exempt them from paying taxes.

Ottoman administration's consideration of having an occupation as a determinant does not mean that households which had occupational income could not be considered as poor; just as the opposite, not having an occupation did not necessarily mean being poor. It should be noted that the determinacy of being occupied must not be overestimated. It must have been very easy for one to lose his/her job<sup>149</sup> and fall into an undesirable economic condition in times of immediate economic hardship. This possibility blurs the lines drawn between the two categories of structural and conjunctural poverty. Two exceptional registers prove this fact very vividly. İbrahim oğlu Hacı Ömer, living in the neighborhood of Dellal Karaca, number 5, was a grocer (*bakkal*). Although his household income was considerably high, an annual of 700 *guruş*, an entry indicated that due to the fact that he did not own the capital, he sometimes became unemployed.<sup>150</sup> The other example, Rahim Koca was living in the neighborhood Hacettepesi, number 16, and he was a casual laborer (*amele*). In his case, the note indicates that due to his unhealthy physical state, he spent most of his time unemployed and he rarely worked.<sup>151</sup> This latter case must have been the rule for most of the poor households. Thus, it can be said that the distinction between structural and conjunctural poverty blurs when conjunctural aspect of poverty is a structure

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<sup>149</sup> Sadullah el-Ankaravi complained about how fast his servants left the job. He records some servants who did not even stay for 3 days in his service. Some of them left right after their master has given them a pair of shoes or some clothes. Gülçin Tunalı Koç, “ ‘Sözüm Bu İki Gözüm el-Vefâ ve Tam Vefâ’: Müneccim Sadullah el-Ankaravi'nin Kaleminden 19. Yüzyıl Ankara'sında Hizmetkarlar,” *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, No. 5 (Autumn, 2007), p. 52-56.

<sup>150</sup> “Sermayesi kendinin olmayub ahirin olub bazan boş gezüp bazan ticarete olarak [...]” ML.VRD.TMT.d. 175, p. 2.

<sup>151</sup> “Alil olup ekser evkatı boş geçüb aralık aralık amelelikten [...]” ML.VRD.TMT.d. 193, p. 2.

itself. Also Efkar oğlu Andon, a merchant living in Kethüdalı neighborhood, who seems to have had a good business, has fallen into bankruptcy due to the fact that he owed a sum to a French merchant, David Gulliani and could not pay him back.<sup>152</sup> It is obscure in the documents why he had to declare bankruptcy, but his situation demonstrates how one can easily become ‘poor’ when for once he had a considerable amount of wealth.<sup>153</sup>

Given the ambiguity of the category, and as the Ottoman administration did not apply any poverty line, it is hard to classify who the poor has been in 1845. Nearly half of the whole population lived under an annual income of 199 *guruş*. Compared to a total average of the whole city, 345 *guruş*,<sup>154</sup> much more than half of the households were living under the average income. This fact demonstrates the ever-growing social gap and differentiation in social milieu of Ankara in 1845. These numbers mean much when considered together with the fact that the annual nutrition expenditure by 1840’s was close to 300-500 *guruş*;<sup>155</sup> meaning more than %70 of the households of urban Ankara were living in conditions of hunger. It can be said that this fact made the poor and the temporarily self-sufficient households more flexible especially during crisis times. The poor invented and resorted to many ways in order to cope with the miserable position they are in, which are here called ‘survival tactics’.

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<sup>152</sup> ML.VRD.TMT. 174, p. 6 and A.MKT. 24-54 p. 1-3.

<sup>153</sup> Amy Singer, *Charity in Islamic Societies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 152.

<sup>154</sup> Compared to the result of another study about socio-economic statuses of some towns according to *temettuat* registers, the average income in Ankara fell well below the estimated averages of Samokov, Tatarpazarcığı, Balıkesir, Güzelhisar-ı Aydın. Only Erzurum had a lower average income with 271.7 *guruş* annually. See, “table 1a: Summary Statistics of Five Cities” in Hayashi Kayoko, “The Ottoman Temettuat Registers: Significant Results from a Failed Venture,” *The Ottoman State and Societies in Change*, p. 214.

<sup>155</sup> Tabak, *ibid.*, p. 147-148.



## Survival

The last two cases analyzed, belonging to households of different socio-economic statuses, proves not only the fact that it was very easy to move between having an occupation and being unemployed, but they also demonstrate another part of the story. The wealthier households in Ankara –as elsewhere – obviously were luckier in terms of dealing with unemployment. In the example of İbrahim oğlu Hacı Ömer, although he seems to have been occupied with his job for the period, his and his wife’s property seems to have been the main guarantee for making a living during times of unemployment.<sup>156</sup> Yet, someone like Rahim Koca, who did not have any access to other income generating sources, must have sought other ways for survival especially during times of unemployment or economic crisis. Thus, as for one having an occupation was not the guarantee for the survival, other mechanisms for guaranteeing it must have been sought and developed. The recording of such mechanisms such as informal charity (*şunun bunu ianesiyle geçinir*), begging (*sa’il*), peddling and migration/fleeing as distinct from ‘recognized’ ways of making a living is meaningful in the sense that they imply the existence of ‘tactical’ ways of survival for the poor.<sup>157</sup> This fact undermines the general understanding of poor and poverty that regards the poor only in terms of their relations with official/institutionalized charity mechanisms. The detachment of both individuals and households from systematic charity and poor-relief mechanisms and replacing of them with tactical ‘ways of operating’<sup>158</sup> makes it necessary to deconstruct the homogenizing perceptions that also

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<sup>156</sup> Hacı Ömer himself owned a vineyard of 5 acres, and his wife owned 4 shops in İplikpazarı and Çubukçular districts. ML.VRD.TMT.d. 175, p. 2.

<sup>157</sup> De Certeau, *Practice of Everyday Life*, xxiv. Also for an attempt at Ottoman social history from the perspective offered by de Certeau see, Necmi Erdoğan, “Devleti İdare Etmek: Maduniyet ve Düzenbazlık,” *Toplum ve Bilim*, vol 83.

<sup>158</sup> De Certeau, xiv.

attributes passivity and weakness to the poor against the agency of the rich.<sup>159</sup> Living so close to the margins of subsistence, it can be said that both the unemployed and the laboring poor had to make do with what they had in their hands.<sup>160</sup> Here the ones that are visible in the *temettuat* registers will be reconsidered.

### **Charity**

One of the most common tactics that the poor utilized for their survival throughout history has been receiving charity and alms. Departing from this reality, some scholars even claimed that poverty implied not only an economically deprived social condition, but it also, and more, implied a social relation between the poor and the rich that is based on charity relations.<sup>161</sup> While this perspective is based on historical grounds, the setbacks it brought created an historiographic tradition in which the history of the poor and poverty automatically equaled to history of charitable activities and the beneficence. It is true that charitable activities reveal a great deal of the story of the poor, yet on the discursive level, the hierarchic relationship between the charity receiver and the giver homogenizes and passivizes the poor within the philanthropic activity. Yet, historically speaking, charity and the relations that operate within it, create more complex social forms that cannot simply be explained with an asymmetric relationship between the poor and the rich.

Another problematic in parallel with the afore-mentioned perspective is the perception of charity activities only within an institutionalized social milieu. This also homogenizes the complexity and downgrades the charity activities only

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<sup>159</sup> Amy Singer, *Charity in Islamic Societies*, 147.

<sup>160</sup> De Certeau, 18.

<sup>161</sup> For instance, Georg Simmel, *On Individuality and Social Forms*, Donald N. Levine (ed.), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971, p. 175-178.

to institutionalized ones, excluding other ways of charity. This does not only mean exclusion of other charitable activities from the historical realm, but it also means the exclusion of intertwined social relations intrinsic to the activities.

Among the 306 households that survived with the charity given by others, none – according to *temettuat* registers – benefited from any kind of institutional charity. The registers do not imply any kind of poor stipend (*muhtacin maaşı*) or any other form of state support, nor do they indicate any institutionalized help, which is said to be, in the Ottoman historiography, the basis of Ottoman society based on egalitarian social relations, regardless of class or social differentiation. Contrary, the registers obviously imply the existence of ‘unofficial’ charity based on social relations other than a hierarchical relationship between the poor and the rich.

None of the poor households which survived with charity got help from the vaqfs that profited the minority of the wealthier classes. The poor were very frequently registered as ‘makes a living with someone’s charity’ (*şunun bunun ianesiyle geçinir*). The statement may imply the existence of very complex social processes and networks within survival activities. On the other hand, one can also claim that compared to larger urban centers like Istanbul, Izmir or Salonika, in the provincial level, institutionalized charity did not develop.

Again, some exceptional entries in the registers give clues about who provided charity, if it was not the state or any other institution. For the non-muslim population, most of the households with charity received it from the members of their religious community (*millet-i mezbur ianesiyle idare olduğu, milletin nafakasıyla idare olduğu*). Departing from this point, it can be said that religious bonds were important indicators of defining relations of charity. Yet, the

role of religion should not be overemphasized, since inter-religious networks like neighborhood or occupational networks could have provided possibilities for exchange outside of religious borders.

### ***Peddling and Begging***

Although there are very few examples, peddling was among the tactics which the poor of Ankara adopted. It can be asked to what extent the activity of peddling can be regarded among tactics of survival. While peddling can be considered as a ‘normal’ way of earning a living, the categorization in the *temettuat* registers reveals the fact that the Ottoman administration did not perceive it as such. For instance son of Çerçi Refail who was living in Hocendi neighborhood – which sheltered one of the poorest community, the jews<sup>162</sup> – was selling peppers and cloves in the streets, with an annual income of 150 *guruş*.<sup>163</sup> There were two other Jews (both of whose names could not be read) in the same neighborhood who also had been selling pepper, cloves, gum, yarn and other things peddling in the streets.<sup>164</sup> No more than 30 peddlers were recorded with such a detail. The reason why peddling is considered here among the survival tactics is that, it is perceived outside of the borders of the officially recognized occupations. In all peddler registers, the peddling activity was written down somewhere different than the normal occupation line. The attitude towards peddlers was not unique to Ottoman state, since peddlers were mobile “rouges,

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<sup>162</sup> Leyla Neyzi, “Strong as Steel, Fragile as a Rose: A Turkish Jewish Witness to the Twentieth Century,” *Jewish Social Studies*, New Series, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Autumn 2005), p. 176.

<sup>163</sup> ML.VRD.TMT. 191. “[...] sokak sokak biber ve karanfil ve iplik ahz ve itadan dolayı [...]”

<sup>164</sup> ML.VRD. TMT. 144 “[...] sokak sokak biber ve karanfil ve [...] ve sakız [...] ticaretiyle me'luf olarak [...]”

thieves, a scourge to innocent customers,” and their emergence was highly linked with increasing vagrancy during times of crises.<sup>165</sup>

Begging can be found in the registers as another tactic for the survival of the poor. While the number of the households recorded as beggar (*sa'il*) is only 49, it can be assumed that more people survived by begging in the streets.<sup>166</sup> In many of the households recorded as beggars, one can find additional information about the health condition of household. Most of the beggars were either blind, lame or injured. Some others were recorded as unemployed (*amelimande*). It cannot be understood whether indication of health conditions of the beggars reflect a difference in the perception by the state; without further support, it can only be claimed that it is possible that those who had physical problems were regarded as more legitimate than the others. Thus the state has drawn the boundaries of legitimacy of begging, leaving the illegitimate ones to the surveillance mechanisms.

### ***Migration***

Examples reveal that, among the conjunctural poor mostly, migration has been used as a tactic. More than 270 out of 5512 households had migrated at the time (or before) the registers were prepared. Those who had a trade and fall into bankruptcy seem to have sought for opportunities in other towns and centers like Istanbul, Bursa, İzmir etc. The recording of their purpose in migrating to other cities, for instance for reasons of trade (*ticaret arzusuyla*), may legitimize the

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<sup>165</sup> Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism 15th-18th Century Vol. II The Wheels of Commerce*, Siân Reynolds (trans.), London: William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd., 1986, p. 79.

<sup>166</sup> Getting out of *temettuat* registers, a document mentions 600 beggars in miserable conditions in the streets of Ankara as a consequence of the famine, which will be dealt in the next part. A. MKT. 46-24. In Istanbul, beggars were an important problem of the city since the very beginning of 18th century and many measures and regulations were issued in order to prevent the possible danger that will be posed by them. For these regulations and the state's attitude towards the beggars, see Nadir Özbek, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Sosyal Devlet*, Part 3.

action, since as explained above, Ottoman state did not welcome migration movements, especially from provinces to centers. There are also examples of migration to smaller cities and other districts and counties (*kaza*) of Ankara.

What is more striking about the issue of migration and in terms of the legitimacy and acceptance of the population movement is the existence of records of fleeing (*fırar*). Inability to pay taxes, bankruptcy (... *senesinde iflasa çıkıp ...da olduğu*) or high amount of loans may have caused these households to flee, together with the possibility of better job opportunities and life quality. There are many fleeing cases within *temettuat* registers. For instance, with support of other documents, it can be understood that previously-mentioned Damad oğlu Andon, who was living in a catholic neighborhood called Seher, had bankrupted and fled to the district of Beypazarı. An important reason for his bankruptcy was most probably the loan he got from the merchant Bay oğlu Peter, in order to run his business as a *bohçacı*.<sup>167</sup>

Although it is not possible to determine nearly in all cases what these people did at the cities they have migrated to, in only 3 examples the registrar recorded the occupations of 3 Armenians from Mehriyar neighborhood. One of them, Hecator oğlu Agop, living in number 16, was a cloth dyer. Yet, he has fled to Istanbul 10 years before the preparation of the registers and from the register it can be learned that he was living as a chestnut seller (*kestaneci*) together with his neighbor, Zari oğlu Krabet, who had lived in number 17 as a servant and migrated to Istanbul. Çoban oğlu Sarkiz, a tailor, who lived in number 15, migrated to Istanbul 4 years later and he was working there as a salep seller (*sahlepçi*) in 1845.<sup>168</sup> There is no clear evidence to the relationship of these three men and their

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<sup>167</sup> ML.VRD.TMT. 76, p. 2 and A.MKT. 14-75.

<sup>168</sup> ML.VRD.TMT. 130.

families; yet the spatial proximity of them may imply that they could somehow help each other for fleeing and surviving.

Above given examples may reveal another important historical fact. It can be seen from the spatial proximity of the migrants that there had been a close relationship between migration and neighborhood, together with socio-economic condition. The concentration of half of the migration movements from Ankara in 6 neighborhoods, 5 of which were catholic, points to the existence of chain migrations. In that sense, being neighbors, relatives, or coreligionists may have fostered migration and may have played a detrimental role in where to migrate and when. Thus, not only the perception of relatively better job opportunities and life conditions directed inhabitants towards migrating mostly to Istanbul, Izmir and Bursa, but also the bonds they had with others who had already migrated could have played an important role.

While there had been a movement of chain migration, in many cases, the ones who migrated were the household heads, the father or the husband. For the ones who were left behind, the registers indicate miserable conditions (*perişan halde*) due to the migration of the husband or the father. Thus, it can be said that migration and fleeing had a two-dimensional agency: People migrated as a tactic and solution to their poverty and miserable conditions while migration itself has created poverty and miserable conditions for those who stayed.

### ***The Invisible***

While the *temettuat* registers tell the story of how different tactics were applied in order to survive, they do not include all the ways of survival against misery and poverty. As Braudel puts it, the archives usually tell the story of the ‘good paupers’, who somehow fit in the form of ‘worthy poor’ that the wealthy

ones wanted, while there were a great deal of ‘vagrants’ in much more miserable conditions.<sup>169</sup> While *temettuat* registers include some of these ‘unworthy poor’, still they exclude much more than they include.

Apart from them, there are always those who are partially visible in the registers and about whom it is not possible to get more information. The women and children are among them. Although the women were relatively visible in the registers, nearly in all cases their visibility was limited by their husbands’ non-existence – or their wealth of course. Widows without anybody (*dul ve bikes*) were mostly among the poor who relied on charity. The question of how poor women survived without charity is a very hard question to answer only by referring to *temettuat* registers. Also unlike the rich in the registers, the contribution of poorer women to household economy is obscure.

As demonstrated by Eyal Ginio, in Salonica in 18<sup>th</sup> century, the women had to work as servants and families had given their daughters as servants to wealthy families in order to survive and let them survive. In the case of Ankara, according to *temettuat* registers, there were not any examples of servant women. Yet one very exceptional example is revealing in the sense that women somehow could survive on their own, without resorting to charity. The wife of Ali who was deceased, living in Konurca neighborhood, number 17, earned 40 *guruş* from her occupation as a washerwoman (*çamaşır gaslı*). The poor women’s existence in economic activities was demonstrated also by the travelers who visited Ankara in 1840s. As Ainsworth has written in 1842, the women of Ankara knit gloves and

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<sup>169</sup> Braudel, Vol. II, p. 506-507.



socks to contribute to household economy. Also they bought the raw *tiftik* which was not sold, and spinned them with their hands in their houses.<sup>170</sup>

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<sup>170</sup> Ainsworth, "Personal Recollections of İzzet Mehemet Pasha, Now Grand Vizre of Turkish Empire," *Ainsworth's Magazine*, 1842, p. 161-163.



## **PART III: ... and the Hungry**

The first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century has been an era of misery and despair for the societies in Europe and elsewhere. Majority of populations suffered from the consequences of capitalism, becoming even wilder and inhumane. The inflation rates higher than ever and the scarcity of grain and bread were only two main sufferings that the poor had to experience. The long-term transformations in the capitalist mode of production since the 18<sup>th</sup> century caused the societies to suffer from any crises much more than they had before. Thus when the capricious climatic conditions came together with the structural changes through establishment of more violent capitalist structures, the subsistence crises during the first half of the century became unbearable. The ones who were affected from these developments most were of course the poorer sects of societies. The consequences of these structural changes were reflected in the workers' riots and upheavals of 1830's and 1840's. While the structural changes drove the societies into misery and poverty day by day, the effect of short-term crises like famines must be kept in mind as catalysts of desperation of lower classes.

Through the same vein, the story of Ottoman society and especially of Ankara in the first half of 19<sup>th</sup> century reflects the same pattern. Famines of 1820s, 30s and 40s have doubled the effects of socio-economic transformations that took place at the same time period. Although any resistance comparable to that of the European societies was not organized, the social relations were affected in a way that the social actors followed patterns of resistance and cooperation at the same time. In this part of the study, the famine of 1845 in Ankara will be reevaluated in a way that zooms into the social relations at a time of crisis, to see how the poor react and establish relations of survival. While the first part of the study dealt with more general numerical – maybe structural –

aspects of socio-economic conditions of inhabitants of urban Ankara, the following discussion contains a particular event, which must be thought within the context of the general picture that is tried to be drawn in the previous part. It is a must, since famines are not only natural disasters, but they also have their social roots, based on inequalities in terms of distribution of power and surplus. The changing relations between center and periphery, growth of social and spatial differentiation and, incorporation into capitalist economy and many other reasons may constitute the 'causal structure for hunger'. Yet, as Liz Young points out, when approaching famines through the historian's eyes, one should not lose sight of famine's distinctive characteristics, filled with political and cultural meaning that may quicken up or alter the direction of social change.<sup>171</sup>

According to Mehmet Yavuz Erler, two main waves of natural disasters can be located within 19<sup>th</sup> century Ottoman history: the first wave is the famine which had its roots starting from 1842 onwards and took place during 1845 and the second, in the middle of 1870's.<sup>172</sup> While the wave in 1870's affected Ottoman society more dramatically, the one in 1840's also reveal a great deal in order to see the power relations intrinsic in the social relations which were established and reestablished during famine and the position of the poor within them.

In 1845, the weather conditions and the climate suffered the Ottoman society by creating problems of water sources, resulting in drought in some parts of the empire. From the newspaper *Ceride-i Havadis*, it is possible to see that the weather conditions were unexpectedly different. The winter passed cold and it

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<sup>171</sup> Liz Young, "Spaces for Famine: A Comparative Geographical Analysis of Famine in Ireland and the Highlands in the 1840's," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, New Series, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1996), p. 676-677. For an example of the long-term political consequences of famine in Ireland, see Dale Knobel, "'Celtic Exodus': The Famine Irish, Ethnic Stereotypes, and the Cultivation of American Racial Nationalism," *Fleeing the Famine North America and Irish Refugees 1845-1851*, Margaret M. Mulrooney (ed.), London: Praeger, 2003, p. 79-96.

<sup>172</sup> Mehmet Yavuz Erler, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Kuraklık ve Kıtık Olayları (1800-1880)*, Istanbul: Libra Yayınları, 2010, p. 17.

rarely rained and snowed.<sup>173</sup> The authorities in Istanbul were afraid of failures in the harvest of the year. Even a drop of rain during the winter and spring made them hopeful. Yet, as the summer moved on, it proved that the water was not as abundant as expected and there were shortages and drought in many places around the empire. Examining the *temettuat* registers in detail, one can see that something went wrong for the year of 1845 in Ankara too. Thanks to the registers of incomes for those who possessed agricultural lands for production, it is possible to observe how the capricious climate of Ankara affected the production in a drastic way, compared to the income from the agricultural production in 1844. A general glance at the expected agricultural incomes for the year 1845 proves that the incomes have fallen dramatically, in most cases more than %50 of the 1844 income. The case of the climatic instability was not only unique to Ottoman realm. European societies and authorities were experiencing nearly the same problems that of the Ottomans. The examples of Ireland, Scotland, England, Belgium and others had to struggle the consequences of a capricious climate. The climatic instability was visible throughout the first half of the century, causing the whole Europe to suffer from famine in 1816-17.<sup>174</sup>

Following the line put forward by Young, it should be stated that relating famines only to climatic conditions would be to ignore the socio-economic agents and relations behind it. According to Amartya Sen, famine and hunger cannot be explained as a whole by referring only to climatic reasons or solely as a consequence of food shortages. For Sen, the ‘exchange entitlements’ which can

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<sup>173</sup> *Ceride-i Havadis*, no. 217.

<sup>174</sup> Còrmac Ó Gràda, *The Great Irish Famine*, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1989, p. 2. The subsistence crises caused by the famine, which had been one that Europe did not experience since 17th century, covered a huge area including United Kingdom, French, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, the Habsburg Empire and Balkans. See, John D. Post, “Famine, Mortality and Epidemic Disease in the Process of Modernization,” *The Economic History Review*, New Series, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Feb., 1976), p. 15.

be defined as one's ability in accessing the ownership relationships and food distribution mechanisms, according to his/her ever-changing socio-economic position, are determinant in terms of who eats what. Thus not only changes in the amount of food that a society produced, but also structural shifts in employment possibilities and wages/buying power, modes of production, of class or changes in market conditions may cause changes in one's access to food supplies.<sup>175</sup> While Sen's perspective is valuable in terms of understanding hunger, his critiques that accuse him of overemphasizing the role of market structures and individual rationality, which altogether underestimated the role of particularities are equally meaningful.<sup>176</sup>

The effect of industrial revolution in Europe played an important role on the existence of famines, by increasing the price of agricultural products. The wages of the landless peasants and industrial workers remained lower and increased the vulnerability of the poor to harvest failures.<sup>177</sup> Still, in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, lower-class households spent nearly three-quarters of their incomes on nourishment.<sup>178</sup> The rises in the prices during times of 'scarcity' caused the system to function in a way that deepened the conditions of scarcity for the dispossessed, by leaving monopoly of prices in the hands of those who possess scarce objects.<sup>179</sup> Poor harvests were followed by decreases in trade, falls in wages and unemployment, thus making the poor more vulnerable.

Commercialization of farming, the increase in the number of both rural and urban

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<sup>175</sup> Amartya Sen, *Poverty and Famines An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981, p. 3-5. Also see, John Walter and Keith Wrightson, "Dearth and the Social Order in Early Modern England," *Past&Present*, 1976, no. 71 (1), p. 30-31.

<sup>176</sup> For a summary of critiques of Sen see, Stephen Devereux, "Sen's Entitlement Approach: Critiques and Counter-critiques," *Oxford Development Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 3, (2001), 245-263.

<sup>177</sup> *Ò Gràda*, p. 20-21.

<sup>178</sup> Helge Berger and Mark Spoerer, "Economic Crises and the European Revolutions of 1848," *The Journal of Economic History*, v. 61, no. 2 (Jun., 2001), p. 296.

<sup>179</sup> Foucault, p. 51-52.

proletarians, who were basically wage-earners, caused populations to suffer more from increases in food prices and rates of unemployment – which usually followed each other.<sup>180</sup> As the economic structures grown wilder, distribution of food sources by markets turned not necessarily to those who were hungry, but to those with money to buy.<sup>181</sup>

Not only the fluctuations in prices but also in populations also affected the patterns of distribution of food; which was both a reason and a consequence in fluctuation of prices. According to Fernand Braudel, from fifteenth to eighteenth century, a rise and fall in the population caused rises and falls in many other things: the fields under cultivation increased, manufactures spread, villages and towns grew in size, new riches (*nouveaux riches*) emerged etc. Together with these ‘usual symptoms’, once the ‘critical thresholds’ were crossed, the structures started to dissolve. For Braudel, every increase in population in the past – and present – resulted with the exceeding of the capacity of the society to feed its members.<sup>182</sup> Although his perspective seems analogous to Malthusian logic of ‘too many people, too little food’, it puts more emphasis on extreme increases. The estimations before the Great Famine of Ireland reveal the same fact. Although the exact figures were unknown, the Irish population was growing fast during 1820s and 30s, and the travelers were noting members of underemployed peasantry begging in the streets with ragged clothes.<sup>183</sup> This population increase was also visible specifically in Belfast with a doubling of population between

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<sup>180</sup> Louise A. Tilly, “Food Entitlement, Famine and Conflict,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, vol. 14, No.2, Hunger and History: The Impact of Changing Food Production and Consumption Patterns on Society (Autumn, 1983), p. 341-343.

<sup>181</sup> Tilly, p. 349.

<sup>182</sup> Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism 15th-18th Century vol. I Structures of Everyday Life*, London: William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd., 1986, p. 32-33.

<sup>183</sup> Ó Gráda, p. 5.

1821-41.<sup>184</sup> The same was also true about the fluctuations in population in Ankara, as explained in the previous part. While during 1830s the population declined, by the end of the same period it started to increase and in 1844 it can be claimed that the ‘critical threshold’ was exceeded.

The complexity of reasons behind famine was demonstrated in a report on the famine of 1845 and following food shortages and scarcity in Ireland and England suggesting that there had been many factors other than failure in the harvests that were lying behind the famine. According to the writer of this report, although the warehouses were over-filled with stocks of food and the ‘bread-stuffs’ were waiting to be imported from America, contrary to the expectations of ‘peace and plenty’ of statesmen and farmers, the society was about to find itself in the midst of food riots and scarcity, due to a complex of relationships between changes in the diet of the society, in division of labor, in prices and the consumption of the cereals by animals.<sup>185</sup> Also in the Ottoman case, there are documents proving the fact that although there were failures in the harvests, in many regions, the warehouses were filled with cereals. Although belonging to late 1830’s, these documents prove the fact that while the populations of Anatolia and other parts of the empire were suffering from famine, the grain in the warehouses in Bozcaada and others were about to get rotten.<sup>186</sup>

### ***The Poor and the Famine of 1845 in Ankara***

It was the time for a normal harvest when mayor (*mutasarrıf*) of Ankara, Vasıf Bey complained about the scarcity of grain that the inhabitants of Ankara suffered in previous 4 months. The harvest of 1845 was insufficient since the

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<sup>184</sup> Christian Kinealy and Gerard Mac Atasney, *The Hidden Famine Hunger, Poverty and Sectarianism in Belfast*, London: Pluto Press, 2000, p. 24.

<sup>185</sup> *The Famine As Yet in its Infancy*, p. 12-19 and other places. Yet, a discussion on assumptions against that can be found in Ò Gràda, p. 55-56.

<sup>186</sup> MAD.d. 8589.



winter conditions were hard.<sup>187</sup> As aware of the miserable situation in and around of Ankara, the officials tried to establish different measures to cope with the ongoing famine conditions. The documents produced by the officials depict the story from the side of the state, which does not only tell the historian about the actions, but also their reasons, the intentions, perceptions and outputs of each action. All these include cooperative and conflictual aspects on each side of the actors involved; thus putting forward a complex set of social relations belonging to a time of crisis in Ankara, in 1845 and following years. In that sense, to understand the social relations during the famine, the agency of state should be reconsidered, seeing the state as a complex and heterogeneous entity, while the agency of those who were affected both by the famine and acts of state and reacted to both of them in unique ways.

### **State and Poor Relief during Famine**

As O Grada put it, the famine has its ‘hierarchies of suffering’. The first to have been affected by the famines have always been the destitute vagrants who lacked any kind of family support. Then followed the farmers and urban laborers.<sup>188</sup> While both urban and rural poor had their shares from the scarcity, it can be said that famines affected urban poor more than the peasant. Foucault claims in general that the towns were more vulnerable to the depressing effects of famines, and the scarcity as a result, than does the countryside.<sup>189</sup> It was the daily laborer who was one of the greatest victims of rises in bread prices.<sup>190</sup> That was

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<sup>187</sup> A.MKT. 24-81

<sup>188</sup> Ó Gràda, *Famine A Short History*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009, p. 85.

<sup>189</sup> Foucault, p. 52.

<sup>190</sup> Olwen Hufton, “Social Conflict and the Grain Supply in Eighteenth-Century France” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 14, No. 2, Hunger and History: The Impact of Changing Food Production and Consumption Patterns on Society (Autumn, 1983), p. 307.

also true according to a contemporary observer, who has written in 1780's for France:

*“Bad harvests and rising prices caused the purchasing power of a large social group to collapse. [T]he purchasing power of day labourers, who constituted the mass of agricultural consumers, collapsed because wages did not rise as fast as the cost of grain [...]”*<sup>191</sup>

The famine-time conditions especially in cities mobilized every socio-economic group in a different way. While famines and epidemics that followed them were more likely to affect the poor, the better-off sects of society were afraid of the suffering. Through that lens, the rich had more implications to care for the poor, especially during times of famine.<sup>192</sup> For the bourgeoisies and wealthier classes, the ‘aesthetics of society’ was among the priorities.<sup>193</sup> The workshops established by the states during times of famines can also be understood through that perspective. The poor and vagrants were brought to the workshops in order to be kept under control and surveillance, to prevent them from doing more harm to the existing social order that is in favor of the bourgeoisie. Those who were considered dangerous – negligent officials, coffeehouse-keepers, beggars, laborers etc. – to the social order that lost ground during the famine were tried to be put under efficient social control and remained at the edge of ‘hostility’, the ‘deserving poor’ were relieved locally.<sup>194</sup>

One of the most important historical actors that play a crucial role during times of crises like famine is the state institutions and its representatives.

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<sup>191</sup> Tilly, p. 337. By the end of the 18th century, the food prices in France rose by 65 percent while the wages rose 22 percent. The expenditure on bread only, formed 60 to 80 percent of the budget of a wage earner's family, composed of an average of 5 persons. See, Hufton, p. 304.

<sup>192</sup> Ò Gràda, *Famine: A Short History*, p. 86.

<sup>193</sup> Peter Brown, “Remembering the Poor and the Aesthetic of Society,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, xxxv:3 (Winter, 2005), p. 513–522.

<sup>194</sup> Walter and Wrightson, p. 38

Following a tradition that has been influential for long within historiography and literature of sociology in general, one can conclude that the role of the famines in the emergence of the modern mentality of governmentality, is of great importance. That is, in other words, the historical agency of the state in times of crises like famines or draughts in general, reached to a maximum in order to keep ‘the population’ in a milieu of security, especially after 17<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>195</sup> Following the Foucauldian tradition, many studies overemphasized the role of the modern state and the famines in the emergence of it. Such a perspective attributed great passivity to the real victims of the famine, while the historical agency attributed to the conditions of famine and the state created the main line of argument.<sup>196</sup> Given the state-centrism of the texts/sources mobilized in such studies, the emphasis on the state institutions can be regarded as understandable. That is also the case for the famine of 1845 in Ankara. One can find hundreds of pages of archival material about the famine, not only within the year 1845, but it can be seen that the state was busy with the consequences even years later.

The first appearance of the famine in the archival documents date back to 07 Cemaziyelahir 1261/13 June 1845. It seems that the local administration of Ankara did not take the climatic signs of winter as a sign of what was about to come. The mayor (*mutasarrıf*) of Ankara, Vasıf Bey, gives information about the existing condition of famine. According to his explanation, the lack of snow and rain during that winter prevented the growing of crops and the problem of scarcity of water was tried to be solved by digging canals where water was easier to find. Four months of spring were spent waiting with hope and getting by with the

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<sup>195</sup> An example of such a perspective in terms of Ottoman context is Mehmet Yavuz Erler’s previously mentioned, recently published study on famines in the Ottoman Empire.

<sup>196</sup> Liz Young points the dangers posed by giving so much emphasis on the selected event and period. Young, p. 676-677.

produce collected from anyone who had it. Also, suffering of inhabitants was tried to be prevented by consuming previous year's harvest and after it had exhausted, they had to rely on the provisions provided by the barracks that was situated in Ankara.<sup>197</sup> Yet, as strong winds started to blow by the end of May, all the surviving water sources dried and the crops died away. The poor were complaining that they could not even get access to daily food in order to live. The attempts at finding provisions from nearby regions, like Konya and Yozgad, were unsatisfactory. Due to the voluminous population of Ankara, the need was greater. As a result Vasıf Bey demanded plentiful of crops from Istanbul.<sup>198</sup> Thus the first and most important problem was feeding the population which was in serious danger of hunger. Yet, embedded in the story of feeding the hungry was a story of conflict, rather than cooperation.

Necessary grain for provisioning was not completely demanded from the nearby regions. Further away, docks of Eskişehir and İzmid on the west and to the south the dock of Anamur was considered as important stations for supplying the city with grain and foodstuff. The state tried to regulate how the city was to be provisioned by these docks and regions. The necessary ties with the traders of the region and the logistics were important issues.<sup>199</sup>

Two weeks after the demanding of provisions from Istanbul, the sheikh of Mevlevi lodge, Hüsameddin Efendi and a notable, Hüseyin Efendi were sent to Konya and Bozok, about which it was heard that the harvest has been abundant.<sup>200</sup> Yet, there was no inhabitant in Ankara who had enough capital to support the

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<sup>197</sup> C.BLD. 54-39 p.1 and many other documents related.

<sup>198</sup> A.MKT.24-81.

<sup>199</sup> C.BLD. 54-39, p. 1.

<sup>200</sup> İ.DH. 105-5873

state. The necessary money, a total amount of 250000 *guruş*,<sup>201</sup> was to be provided by assets of Konya, Bozok and Ankara. Compared to approximately 380000 *guruş* of tax income from Ankara of the same year,<sup>202</sup> the amount given for the partial fulfillment of provisioning of the city demonstrates how the authorities cared about the famine.

On the very next day, the decision for building a horse mill revealed another fact behind the reasons for famine. It is stated that since it was holiday, the mills were not working and the inhabitants could not grind the grain.<sup>203</sup> This proves how the only reason for famine was not the climate, and how state tried to find as many ways as possible to overcome consequences of famine. By the beginning of next month, it was decided to move the existing army to Istanbul due to shortage of food in the city.<sup>204</sup> While such short-term solutions were decided, there had been some attempts at providing long-term solutions. One of them was building a dyke on one of the rivers on the eastern part of Ankara, on the Yozgad road, in order to prevent the water to be wasted.<sup>205</sup>

As another long-term consideration the state considered the fluctuations in agricultural production, climatic conditions and trade patterns altogether.<sup>206</sup> The officials tried to prevent exportation of grain to Europe, in order to avoid a possible food shortage due to an incoming draught.<sup>207</sup> From that, it can be derived that the Ottoman state by the end of 1840s had an economic structure which was

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<sup>201</sup> C.BLD. 54-39, p. 2.

<sup>202</sup> A.MKT. 27-63, p.3. According to the estimations made after the completion of *temettuat* registers of Ankara, the exact income expected from the taxes of all households was 379647 *guruş*.

<sup>203</sup> A.MKT. 25-34, p. 1.

<sup>204</sup> C.AS. 37042, p. 2.

<sup>205</sup> A.MKT. 26-16.

<sup>206</sup> Erler, p. 17.

<sup>207</sup> A.MKT.MHM. 2-25.

dynamic and included actions and measurements taken against the principle of free-trade it started to imply recently.<sup>208</sup>

While these were attempted, it was understood that the grain stocks in Bolu were no more than the needs of the city itself and price of grain (13.5 guruş) and of barley (9.5 guruş) will exceed the normal prices in Ankara region, if they were to be bought from Akçaşehir. Although the existing supplies were not considered enough for supporting other regions, the necessary support was considered to be provided from Bolu. 10000 keyl of grain was to be bought with a price of 10 guruş a kile. The risk of scarcity for Bolu was left to god's will, while the state wanted to prevent the hoarders to sell grain with high prices in Ankara.<sup>209</sup>

Meanwhile, while the support from Bolu and other places were considered, the Sheikh Hüsameddin Efendi must have come back from Konya; but without being satisfied. As the similarly miserable condition of Konya and its districts were seen – the existing provisions could hardly survive the city only for a few months – the expected grain and barley amounting 500 *kise* of money could not have been bought. Instead, the Sheikh turned back to Ankara only with produce that amounts to 12000 *guruş*.<sup>210</sup>

While grain was sought during a few months, until Receb, about 1200 inhabitants of Ankara received free bread.<sup>211</sup> Yet, by the end of 1845, it was stated that it was impossible to help everybody in need; since for helping them in 15 districts of Ankara, 25000 *kile* (about 600 tons) of grain was needed and officials were sent to collect this amount from Amasya, Zile and İzmir.

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<sup>208</sup> Ö Gràda, p. 53-54. For exceptions of trust on free-trade see, *idem*, *Famine a Short History*, p.128.

<sup>209</sup> MVL. 2-52, p. 1-6.

<sup>210</sup> MVL. 3-5.

<sup>211</sup> A.MKT. 44-93.

Apart from food to the inhabitants, local administrators seem to have dealt with certain social groups differently. As Vasif Bey explains in detail, children aged 7 to 12, who were left alone in the streets, begging, were collected and some girls and little ones were grouped and given to some dervish lodges, while others, in total about 80 children were brought to the inner-castle and were put into different rooms. Their clothes and themselves were washed and cleaned in public baths, each were given daily bread and soup. They also received new trousers, shirts, fez and shoes. Those who did not have elementary education were thought reading. And in the end they were decided to be given out as servants to recover from their miserable condition.<sup>212</sup>

While the state, mobilizing much of its resources, has been an important agent in provisioning, the process has not been as easy as it can be expected. Many regions tried to hide their harvests, or some of them tried to sell grain and barley for higher prices than normal. The attitude of the local administrators of Yozgad proves that the famine-time relationships were not as cooperational as expected. Salih Ağa, who has been responsible for getting the necessary provision for Ankara from Yozgad, was sent back his hands empty. He was told that the price of grain and barley increased and the mentioned provisions were already sold. After that he was sent there for the second time, with the claim that none of the officials can say anything according to *sharia* and law. This time nobody took care of the situation. Furthermore, the local assembly of Yozgad issued a letter demanding some amount of provisions from Sivas; since Yozgad and its districts had stocks only for a few months.<sup>213</sup> The scribe complains about this situation and accuses the officials and local notables of Yozgad with

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<sup>212</sup> A.MKT. 46-24.

<sup>213</sup> A.MKT. 34-8.

organizing a secret fraud.<sup>214</sup> A similar case is also visible in Amasya, in which the conflicts within the local assembly and the attempts of Halim Efendi – a member of assembly – at forcing the poor for selling their grain with cheaper prices and ignoring the hoarders, resulted with rumors about the prices and the governor of Ankara, Vasıf Bey, gave up the idea of demanding provisions from Amasya.<sup>215</sup>

The conflict between central and local elites was not the only one that took place during the famine. The clashes existing between the authorities and the inhabitants of Ankara demonstrate a story of resistance on both sides; the state and the society. Also these conflicts and clashes reveal how the line between state and society was blurred through conflicts and cooperations – which were detrimental in decision-making processes – and that it was not as strict as the modern historian expects it to be.

While these two examples tell the story of how conflicts between local elites played an important role in the deepening of crisis, other examples shed light upon conflicts that took place in the intra-local level. In that case, it is more striking to see how local notables, regardless of the poor and miserable conditions of which they were a part, tried to profit from the ongoing crisis. One of the members of local assembly of Ankara, Sarıkadızaade Hüseyin Halim Efendi was dismissed since he unjustly earned more than 27000 *guruş* through involving into grain trade.<sup>216</sup>

While all of the previous stories of conflict were told from the side of the elites, the story of the bakers (*ekmekçiyan*) of Ankara demonstrates an interesting

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<sup>214</sup> “[...] Ankara tarafına gidecek zehairin adem-i itasına bir desise-i hafıye demek olacağı [...]”

<sup>215</sup> A.MKT. 48-6. “[zahire-i] mezkurenin adem-i mübayası fiyatça olan bazı kıl-ü kaldan neş’et etmiş [...]” The following month, the decision and order for dismissal of Halim Efendi from the assembly was written. MVL. 8-1.

<sup>216</sup> A.MKT. 3-10. The document is torn in many places, so it is impossible to demonstrate the whole story coherently.



example of how the relationship between state and society were formed and how different social groups responded to different situations. Right after the famine, with the rises in the price of 24 kilograms of grain from 80 to 90 *guruş* while the price of 400 grams of bread remained at 1 *guruş*, the muslim and non-muslim bakers of Ankara having approached the assembly, demanded the price of grain to be reduced. As the price was not regulated days after their first approach, their second visit to the assembly lasted with threats of not letting them do their trade.<sup>217</sup> Their attempts at having their voice heard at the assembly went on until they had a fight in the assembly.<sup>218</sup> As a result, in 1847, they had to write a petition to Istanbul, demanding those responsible in their situation be tried. Whatever the result, what is important here is the attitude of the authorities in treating the bakers.

The petition and other documents also talk about the violation of a contract between the bakers and the assembly which was agreed during one of the bakers' visit to the assembly. According to that contract, the price of bread remained at 1 *guruş*, while 80 *kıyye* of grain (32 kilograms) were to be bought at 90 *guruş*, instead of buying 1 *kile* (24 kilograms) of grain for 80 *guruş*. Yet, the bakers complained that the chief of storehouse (*anbar emini*), Kazım Efendi, gave 3 *kıyye* less in each 80 *kıyye*. Also, he sometimes mixed oat, corn and barley. As a result the bakers claimed that they started to sell their houses away in order to afford the loans that they have run into; they, in sum, had a deficit of more than 30000 *guruş*. Although they went to the assembly for complaining about Kazım

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<sup>217</sup> The petition was signed by 27 bakers, 4 of whom were non-muslims and 1 *kile* in Ankara amounted approximately to 24 kilograms, 1 *kıyye* equaled to 400 grams. MVL. 21-48. “[H]ınta bahası doksan *guruşa* çıkartılır nan-ı aziz *kıyyesi* yine bir *guruşt*a kalıp esnaf kulları meclise varıp aman efendim heder ediyoruz deyu ifade etmeleriyle [...] tekrar meclise varılıp el-aman efendim hal ve tohumlarımız kalmadı deyu ifade-i hal eylediklerinde meclisden esnaf kullarına dükkanınızı ve gediklerinizi bırakın sizleri işletmeyeceğiz deyu cevap vermeleriyle [...]”

<sup>218</sup> “[...] el-aman çağrışıp her birlerimizi bir arz bulup meydan yerinde harb etmeleriyle yine def edip [...]”

Efendi's misbehavior, they were thrown out and avoided being said only that Kazım Efendi would not do it again.

The reason why members of the assembly avoided these demands reveals itself in the complaints and accusations about 4 assembly members.<sup>219</sup> The more than 3000 *guruş*, that was to be paid daily to the bakers as an endowment due to the famine, was not given to the bakers, but instead to the chief of artisans (*esnaf kethüdası*) Seyid Ahmed, as a bribe to keep him silent about what was going on in the storehouse.<sup>220</sup>

It can be said that not everyone was willing to help and assist the poor and do justice. From the establishment composed of assembly members, custodians of storehouse and artisans, it can be said that the beneficent and the protector state could get into 'unjust' treatment to its inhabitants. Through the examples one can easily demonstrate hoarding – as in the case of famines in other parts of the world – as an important reason and catalyzer behind hunger in Ankara in 1845. While the reason of famine is indicated as the bad weather conditions in all the documents, it is possible to see the effects of discrimination by officials who cooperated with hoarders in order to make more *guruş* out of the crises. The existence of hoarders could not have been possible without any cooperation with officials and notables, as can be seen from the examples.

While the above-given examples do not talk about hoarding activities directly, it is possible to get detailed picture of them from other incidents. According to the British consul in Bursa, hoarders bought 400 grams of copper to 4 *guruş* and sold 24 kilograms of grain up to 100 *guruş*, while those impoverished inhabitants of Ankara and other cities brought anything they possessed and sold

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<sup>219</sup> Most probably Esad Efendi, Hacı Osman Efendi, Seyid Mehmed Efendi and one other person.

<sup>220</sup> MVL. 21-48 and A.MKT. 143-12.

them with any price they could in order to buy grain.<sup>221</sup> It has also been seen during the famine of 1845 that the former governor of Konya and some local notables hoarded huge amounts of grain and sold it with high prices during the famine.<sup>222</sup> Although it was ordered by the beginning of 1846 (Rebiülevvel, 1262) that hoarding should be prohibited,<sup>223</sup> the examples given above took place months after the order has been issued.

Thought with the example of bakers, the relationship between society/social groups and the state reveals itself in a different way. State's role as beneficent and supplier during the famine does not seem as explicit as it seems, through re-reading of these conflicts. This fact drives the historian also to think once more about the concept of 'state' as a total unity. Through the conflicts analyzed above, it can be said that the 'Ottoman state' reflected a heterogeneous structure, in an era for which 'centralization' has been perceived as a keynote.

While many conflicts took place on local-central axis, the religious discrepancies have also been determinant in the emergence of conflicts among officials. Two letters, one written by the English consul in Kayseri and the other by the English consul in Bursa draw the picture of misery and suffering through the eyes of foreigners in the Ottoman territories. The indications in the letters about the miserable condition, especially of Muslims, were denied by the local officials of Ankara and other regions affected by the famine, claiming that there was no such miserable condition.<sup>224</sup> With the inclusion of central authorities into the picture, criticizing the stance of the local administrators' perspective to the

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<sup>221</sup> İ.MVL. 78-1519, p. 3-4.

<sup>222</sup> Erler, p. 222.

<sup>223</sup> A.DVN.MHM. 2-45.

<sup>224</sup> İ.MVL. 78-1519, p. 2-3 contains the letters from consuls, while in the next 2 pages the documentation on the discussion about the issue that took place in the general assembly.

issue by comparing it with that of the consuls through a religious discourse,<sup>225</sup> the conflictual state of affairs becomes much more complicated. This supports the claim that the state had a multi-dimensional structure. This aspect can be attributed to the famine-time state structure, since it was a time in which what is rule became exceptional and what is exceptional became the rule.

## Social Control during Famine

While administrators could not control each other and establish security for the relief and well-being of all, they tried to provide ‘security’ by controlling and to some extent suppressing the society. In other words, state also aimed at ‘controlling’ the ever-growing fluidity of the society. It can be said that times of scarcity, famine and plague, created a milieu in which activities that were considered ‘abnormal’ increased in parallel relation to bad harvests, food shortages and rising prices.<sup>226</sup> Famine-time social-relations create a unique atmosphere in which the effects of the disaster have been lowered while all the laws ‘both human and divine’ had been silenced and all hierarchical limits inverted.<sup>227</sup>

The authorities can be claimed to have tended to increase social control over the poor, since the existing social relations were due to change in times of famine, as explained above. Since “[...] in a society in which inequalities were marked, poverty endemic and powers of repression limited, any outbreak of disorder was potentially dangerous.”<sup>228</sup> The regulation of the society was related

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<sup>225</sup> “[...] bu müşüllü şeyleri vaktiyle yazmaktan zühul ve gafletle saltanat-ı seniyyenin ecnebi memurları vasıtasıyla istıla-i ahval-i ahali ve tebaa etmesi layık olmadığına binaen [...]”

<sup>226</sup> Arun Mukherjee, “Scarcity and Crime: A Study of 19th Century Bengal,” *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 28, no. 6 (Feb. 6, 1993), p. 237-238. Also see, Walter and Wrightson, p. 71. “[D]earth bred a hungry temptation to both petty crime and popular disorder.”

<sup>227</sup> Mikhael Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*, Helené Iswolsky (trans.), Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984, p. 272-273.

<sup>228</sup> Walter and Wrightson, p. 27.

to the level of scarcity; the deeper the scarcity was, the more the state tried to control the society and regulate norms.<sup>229</sup>

While for the case of Ankara, to what extent the famine brought about dissolution of social norms and values is obscure, some instances give clues about unwanted changes within social relations. Although no direct connection with famine was mentioned, the local assembly's observation was that call for prayers were not recited and the Muslims did not go to mosques for praying. More than that, girls were wandering around almost naked and some were getting married without the permission of their parents.<sup>230</sup> The observations and warnings may very well be due to the fact that Ramazan had come and it created a 'liberal' environment as Georgeon claimed for Istanbul, but they can also reflect the fear that due to the famine conditions, norms and together with them, authorities were loosening. Since another document also mentions girls wandering around naked in the streets and marketplaces, as a unique famine-time situation,<sup>231</sup> the latter also seems possible.

That was also visible through the letters written by consuls, previously mentioned. 300 muslim families on the road to Istanbul, migrating from Ankara, had to shelter in non-muslim neighborhoods in Bursa, Gemlik and other places. The problem was that they were wandering around almost naked day and night and picking the grain that was scattered around the streets.<sup>232</sup> The discourse is constructed in a way that puts an equal emphasis on the nakedness of the immigrants with that of their hunger.

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<sup>229</sup> Walter and Wrigtson, p. 38.

<sup>230</sup> A.MKT. 28-62.

<sup>231</sup> A.MKT. 26-24.

<sup>232</sup> İ.MVL. 78-1519, p.1.

In connection with this, the state perceived mobilization of society as a threat to existing social order. As explained in the previous part, by the first half of the 19th century, Ottoman state wanted to see its ‘population’ within strictly defined borders; thus the inhabitants in general and the peasants/farmers in particular were forced to stay where they lived and produced.

Although the inhabitants started fleeing from Ankara with their children and families long before, it was the first week of October (Şevval) when the mobilization started to be considered as an important problem. Now the state and local administration of Ankara had to cope with the migration issue, together with provisioning. According to mayor of Sivas, due to the carelessness of the registrars, people fled from Ankara to Sivas – and also to Bozok and Zile – without an internal passport.<sup>233</sup>

Apart from establishing ‘security’, in the context mentioned in the previous chapter, the state had more practical aims, like securing the taxes it expected to collect. In that sense, it can be seen that, in many cases, the costs of the foodstuffs given as ‘charity’ were to be taken back as taxes. An amount of 7400 guruş, given as a part of aid in the time of famine to distribute bread and to pay the wages of officials to Kapucubaşı Emin Bey when he was a *kaza müdürü*, was to be subsidized – only for the time being – as part of the tax.<sup>234</sup> Also in the rural areas of Ankara, the charity, in total 186180 guruş, given to the farmers of 7 districts, for the condition of buying seeds (*meblağ-ı mezbur ile tohumluk zahire tedarik edeceği*), was given with a monthly 2,5 guruş (%6) interest, for 6

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<sup>233</sup> A.MKT. 28-86.

<sup>234</sup> A.AMD. 1-43.

months.<sup>235</sup> Thus, it can be seen that bureaucratized charity bestowed by the state aimed also at securing the income of the state at the same time.<sup>236</sup>

It can be said that this part of the story was not unknown to the inhabitants of Ankara since there are many documents and petitions for the settlement of the taxes. A petition from 1847, signed by 91 muslims and 18 non-muslims demands the year's taxes to be re-estimated and the unpaid amounts of the previous years to be abolished due to the miserable condition caused by the famine. It depicts how the well-off inhabitants became poor and how the poor had been wasted and scattered around to other cities.<sup>237</sup> The discourse of the petition proves that the attitude of the local authorities was ignorant of the miserable condition of the inhabitants. Another petition which also demands the taxes to be abolished, gives details of how the poor did not even have the power to flee from the city and how they moved into *medrese* rooms and to the castle and started begging in the streets. The city altogether was not able to pay the tax due from previous years, which amounted to 600000 *guruş*. It also mentions the previous re-estimation and decrease in the taxes was not found enough to be paid.<sup>238</sup> While these petitions were written in 1847, in 1849, it was told that the local administrators and tax collectors did not follow the instructions about the abolishment and re-estimation of taxes and collected taxes with their own initiative. Under the conditions of

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<sup>235</sup> A.DVN.MHM. 2-25. The charity given to the farmers of the districts of Murtazaabad, Yörük, Çubukabad, Bala and one other were recorded in different registers. ML.MSF. 7455, ML.MSF. 74-58, ML.MSF. 74-19, and others.

<sup>236</sup> As Post demonstrates, during 1815-17 famine in Europe, in which european governments did not import grain supplies just for distributing them among the poor, but aimed at selling them to local bakers with more favorable prices in order to provide cheaper bread; only those who were employed were lucky enough to have access to the cheap bread. The distribution of free bread has fallen far short of the needs. Post, p. 26.

<sup>237</sup> A.MKT. 167-13, A.MKT. 76-79

<sup>238</sup> İ.DH. 151-7855.

famine, many of these could not be handed out to the financial authorities and remained at the hands of those who collected them.<sup>239</sup>

Although examples are so few, the general discourse of the state can be said to reflect a fear of the dissolution of social norms and especially through a more political-economic perspective it was afraid of the losses in financial capital, since the state was well aware that a loosening in social norms may result with the impossibility of controlling the social capital, which was the basis for the financial one.

### **Self Help during Famine**

While the Ottoman state and local officials in Ankara worked ‘hard’ on eliminating the miserable conditions, as explained above, there was another story going on down below the level of the peasants and the poor. As seen above, the officials and notables, and to some extent those who held the power, tried to help the poor, yet always looking from a political economic perspective, each time calculating the profits that will come out of their action. While ‘profiting’ from the action was their main goal, rather than feeding the hungry, the hungry were trying to survive on their own; in some cases to the extent that denied and resisted the encroachment of officials and others. Yet this did not include active resistance like riots or rebellions, containing in many cases very symbolic and discursive elements.

The reason why the poor and the peasants in Ankara did not rebel against the hoarding middlemen who has taken local grain to supply urban markets in times of harvest failure, compared to the lower classes in Europe<sup>240</sup> may be explained with the existence of a subsistence ethic, in other words a moral

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<sup>239</sup> A.MKT. 167-13.

<sup>240</sup> Walter and Wrightson, p. 31-32, Tilly, p. 339-340, and 344, Walter and Wrightson, p. 33.



economy. The establishment of redistribution mechanisms, which operated outside of the borders of the homo-economicus, provided the peasants and poor with at least a minimum of subsistence insurance.<sup>241</sup> This insurance – of sharing the risks – created the difference from the growing market economy in the sense that it prevented individual starvation.<sup>242</sup> The moral economic mentality worked to minimize the probability of a disaster rather than maximizing the profits during times of stability.<sup>243</sup> This implied a clash between the modernizing state as an entity which spent all its administrative effort to record and write down its subjects as tax-payers, since any crisis meant the increase of taxes which burdened the lower classes more.<sup>244</sup> Within the context of moral economy, the labor is the most important wealth and for the survival, it is mobilized in a very flexible way, both in quality and quantity. Thus the lower classes could work as hard as they can, while at times if it is possible, they established tactics that eased the suffering of suppression and exploitation, and which often resulted with the loss of status or autonomy.<sup>245</sup>

At a time the European societies were shaken by the riots both by industrial workers/peasants and famine riots,<sup>246</sup> how the inhabitants of Ankara responded to famine is an important question. That is a question that should be asked on multiple levels. How did the inhabitants of Ankara respond to the activities of state and its representatives, and how did they respond to their fellow

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<sup>241</sup> James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*, London: Yale University Press, 1976, p. 5. Although Thompson's departure point is the riots and their functions within the early-modern English crowd, his main thesis points out to the socio-political agency of the crowd, through the establishment of a moral economic perspective. E. P. Thompson, "Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," *Past & Present*, No. 50 (Feb., 1971), pp. 76-136.

<sup>242</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>245</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5 and 13.

<sup>246</sup> Ò Gràda, p. 36, and others.

neighbors' and artisans' from whom they normally bought their needs? In that sense it should be mentioned that the social relations that are subject to change, transformation and dissolution during famine period, makes it harder to understand the functioning of society. In some instances, distinction between the victims of the nature and acts of state become blurred and it can be said that victims of victims appear. In that sense, the poor has not only been suppressed by the natural conditions but they were also subject to suppression from the other inhabitants of Ankara. This means the only conflict did not emerge between central and local elites, or between local elites themselves, but it emerged also within the society among different social groups. Yet, the limits of the study does not permit going into details of this side of this story; thus here only a little visible part will be considered, while the main focus will be on how the poor responded to above-given state activities, charities and regulations and how they adopted self-help activities in order to survive.

In the same context, the most important way of survival especially for the poor of Ankara had been migrating to other cities. Konya and Sivas had been important regions, due to their geographical proximity; while Bursa and Istanbul with the abundance of food and job opportunities had been other centers that those who fled from the conditions of famine chose to flee.<sup>247</sup> Yet it can also be seen that all these actions were tried to be controlled and some of them were resisted by the locals. The *müşir* of Sivas ordered the immigrants coming from Ankara to have permission to stay there, while the animals of the tribes were not going to be permitted in any case.<sup>248</sup> Thus, the tactical movement of the population should

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<sup>247</sup> İ.MVL. 74-1545 contains names of those who migrated from Ankara to Istanbul as a result of the famine.

<sup>248</sup> MVL. 3-44.

also be regarded in terms of the possible clashes it may have caused not only with the authorities but also the inhabitants of the city that they have migrated to.

During famine and crises societies tended to develop new modes of producing and consuming foods,<sup>249</sup> lowering the standards of the food consumed, like eating bread with less quality and vegetable roots. The poor could only eat what they can, rather than developing new tastes. The hungry had to pick up the grain scattered around the streets and eat inedible things. It was mentioned that there had been 10 deaths per-day due to hunger and illnesses caused by eating grass and bones that were found around.<sup>250</sup> The changes in diet were also visible in urban Ankara, since due to the problems in finding grain in the markets of Ankara, the price of the bread doubled by the beginning of 1846 and the inhabitants started eating bread made from oat.<sup>251</sup>

Another way of coping with the miserable conditions without rising up against the state and the suppression of the rich was to petition the state against the discrimination and misery caused by acts of human. For Donald Quataert the workers in the Empire mobilized two main mechanisms to fight a class war. They did not resort to 'violent' action until 1908, and until that period, they used the language of the state to achieve their goals and to protect themselves. That mobilization could only be achieved through writing petitions to the central administration not only to let them know about the miserable conditions, but also to 'warn' them about their economic and social interests through the language of the state.<sup>252</sup> In that sense the very few petitions examined within the scope of this

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<sup>249</sup> Erler, p. 22.

<sup>250</sup> İ.MVL. 78-1519 “Şehir içinde açlıktan bazı otlak ve kemük yedikleri cihetle hasıl olan hastalıktan kül-yevm on kişi vefat etmektedir.”

<sup>251</sup> A.MKT.MHM. 2-25.

<sup>252</sup> Donald Quataert, “Ottoman Workers and the State, 1826-1914,” *Workers and Working Classes in the Middle East Struggles, Histories, Historiographies*, New York: SUNY, 1994, p. 23-27.

study can be read from that perspective. The bakers, the local elite and the inhabitants of Ankara have written petitions with the language of the central administration not only to ask for help but also to convince and force the state to do justice.

Through using the language of the state, it can be said that the inhabitants of Ankara established a discursive weapon against what was believed as unjust. While the case for Ankara needs more research, which is far beyond the scope of this study, it can be said that Ottoman society mobilized poems and songs as discursive weapons. Erler's study on the mobilization of literature and poems demonstrates how the society coped with the unbearable conditions of famine or the miserable conditions of earthquake, at the same time emphasizing the unjust rule and discrimination of the pashas or local elites and the state in between the lines.<sup>253</sup>

Apart from the discursive enforcement of the state by the petitions and poems and songs, another active way of resistance and self-help was denying the encroachment of state directly. According to a document concerning the immigrants, composed mostly of the poor and peasants that migrated from cities that were affected by the famine, it can be understood that the immigrants could survive by establishing 'social arrangements'<sup>254</sup> networks and groups and working as sharecropper (*ortakçı*); while those who did not attach themselves into such groups relied on begging. Ottoman administration's knowledge of the fact that these immigrants would not will to go back to their homelands due to their ability

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<sup>253</sup> The study conducted by Erler about literature and disasters gives examples of popular literature blaming the rich for their impoverished and miserable conditions. An example can be given about the locust in Cyprus in 1845. Mehmet Yavuz Erler, "Tarihi Perspektiften Edebiyata bir Bakış (A Glance at the Literature, from the Perspective of History)," *Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi/The Journal of International Social Research*, vol. 1/1 (Fall, 2007), p. 104-105 and other places.

<sup>254</sup> Scott, p. 3.

to cope with their miserable condition reveals the existing clash between state support and self help.<sup>255</sup> This fact is again visible in a previously mentioned document, concerning the children who were left begging in the streets of Ankara. While the 80 children were tried to be taken care of in an effective way, the parents of 30 children has come to take their children away. They were made promise that they would not put the children on begging and they would not let them wander around in the streets and marketplaces naked, miserably and vagrantly.<sup>256</sup> The discourse implies the parents' consciousness about children's behavior. If this was the fact, then their attempt at going to take their children back may mean that the parents found unofficial charity more favorable than state support.

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<sup>255</sup> “[bazısı dahi] bahçelerde sığınıp birer suretle birleşmiş ve ortaklık ve yandaşlık edenler oldukça ta’yiş etmekte ve o makule işlere ilişmeyenler sa’illik eylemekte bulunmuş olduklarından pek de kendi gönülleriyle avdet etmek istemeyecekleri [...]” İ.MVL. 79-1545 p. 1.

<sup>256</sup> “[...] bunlardan otuz kadarını peder ve maderi zuhur [...] etmiş olmalarıyla fi-mab’ad cer-i sa’ile gönderilmemek ve esvak ve zokaklarda üryan ve sefil ve sergerdan gezdirmemek şartıyla peder ve maderleri taraflarından ba-el-teslim [...]” A.MKT. 26-24.

## CONCLUSION

This study has set out to do a number of things. First of all it focused on the functioning of a middle-sized city through the prism of social differentiation and social stratification, at a time Ottoman elites sought for ‘modernization’ and ‘centralization.. Whether such attempts at centralization or the larger processes of incorporation into a capitalist world-economy had direct impacts on the social relations or not is a hard question to answer through such a limited study; yet, by emphasizing some points here, the goal of this study will be achieved; namely proposing a critical view on poverty and related social relations.

Firstly, this study on poverty did not stick itself on the relations of charity. Conversely, the main argument is that charity is only one form of social relation among many others. Generally studies concerned with poverty located the poor into a social relation in which they remained passive receivers, while the only historical agency was attributed to the beneficent. In that sense, charity relations were seen in a way that the beneficiaries did not have any agency.<sup>257</sup> Yet, as the case of Ankara demonstrated here, the poor invented other tactical ways for survival, be it begging or migrating, thus creating a unique milieu of social relations which attached an historical agency to the poor. Of course, the poor were not willing to get involved in these tactics; they were forced to do so. But, they also had their say in choosing what to do. A reality that remains obscure under the shadow of the activities of state, in the case of Ankara. It was very interesting that charity was never demanded from the state or any other institutions. The examined petitions all tried to force the state to settle the taxes to a favorable

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<sup>257</sup> Singer, p. 147.

level, rather than asking for direct assistance. This meant that the poor regarded official charity and assistance not as favorable as unofficial charity.

This seems in parallelity with what Braudel suggested. According to him, there has always been a clash between the daily, simple, routine and normal exchange activities and a complex and superior economic structure.<sup>258</sup> To these activities must be added a unique mixed economy of poverty and survival, which located itself both inside institutional and non-institutional charity mechanisms and structures, while other non-charitable tactics were sought as a response to the more complex economic structures.

This mixed economy of survival can also be read as the moral economy as Scott put it. In that sense, the moral economy of the poor was in a conflict with the larger structures, in which state and other institutions were involved. This conflict did not only happen in content of the tactics, but also in the form of what is done.

In a milieu in which modernization, centralization and incorporation into capitalist mode of production and trade, and also social relations, was supposed to be inclusive of all the structures, the mixed economy of survival based itself still on forms and values that can be considered as 'pre-modern' or 'pre-capitalist'. In that sense, the perspective which put all the emphasis on institutionalization of charity mechanisms and the growing importance of state in both assisting and controlling the poor. As Bronislaw Geremek put it, by the very first decades of the modern-capitalist era, the policies of 'measures of the rich' dominated the poor with a widespread support that no considerable reaction was made by the poor.<sup>259</sup> As for the case of Ottoman, a similar story was told. By the very beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the acts of charities were impersonalized and the Ottoman

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<sup>258</sup> Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism*, vol. 2, p. 134-137.

<sup>259</sup> Bronislaw Geremek, *Poverty: A History*, Agnieszka Kolakowska (trans.), Cambridge Mass.: Blackwell, 1994, p. 251.

administration attempted at assisting the poor in a more bureaucratized way.<sup>260</sup> This was true since many new measures were established to financially assist the poor while controlling the fluidity. This was also visible in Egypt as the Khedive tried to establish a bureaucratized charity system that aimed also at controlling the public space by the first decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>261</sup> As documentation and studies on them prove, it was a fact that the newly modernizing state tried to modernize poor relief mechanisms also. Yet, as late as 1845, it can be seen that by mobilizing a variety of tactics, which are in nature loose and borderless ways of operating, many of the poor chose to not to conform with the norms and standards that were due to a great change within the process of so-called modernization. This non-conformity was visible in Egypt by 1830's, both in the case of the establishment of 'Dabtiyya' as a depersonalized institution for assisting and at the same time controlling the poor, and the Takiyat Tulun, which was a poorhouse both for sheltering and imprisoning the vagrants and the beggars. According to Ener, in both cases, the poor on the one hand tried to profit from these institutions, on the other they never gave up mobilizing other 'pre-modern' ways of survival.<sup>262</sup>

The superstructures and infrastructures were in constant interaction as capitalism extended its effects;<sup>263</sup> although for the poor, the interaction appeared in a conflictual form; the resistance of the daily routine was not that strong. This is visible in the labor profile of urban Ankara as examined. The transformations in the superstructure profited the wealthiest members of the population, belonging to

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<sup>260</sup> Özbek, p. 46-49.

<sup>261</sup> Mine Ener, "The Charity of the Khedive," *Poverty and Charity in Middle Eastern Contexts*, Michael Bonner, Mine Ener and Amy Singer (eds.), New York: SUNY, 2003, p.186-191.

<sup>262</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 189 and 196-197; *idem.*, "Getting into the Shelter of Takiyyat Tulun," *Outside In On the Margins of the Modern Middle East*, Eugene Rogan (ed.), New York: I.B. Tauris, 2002, p. 69-70.

<sup>263</sup> Fernand Braudel, *Vol. II*, 135-136.



the novel bureaucrat-bourgeoisie class, whose positions as bureaucrats allowed them to control the existing production relations, while allowing them to profit from the changing trade patterns with their utilization of the opportunities as a result of flow of more goods and money.<sup>264</sup> The expansion of the volume of trade profited those who controlled the trade relations, mainly the bureaucrat and the merchant. Yet, it also created an era of inflation, having its effects more in the urban centers, on the urban poor.<sup>265</sup>

As examined in Part II, by the first half of the century, Ankara was about to become a peripheral source of raw materials, especially of mohair. A city, whose economy was based mainly on exportation of raw materials, was doomed to fall into significant crises. In that sense, the incorporation affected many other things, apart from composition of higher classes. One concrete consequence has been the specialization of labor, which appeared as the distinction of agricultural and non-agricultural production from each other. The emergence of the so-called *malikane*, together with the shift from exportation of goods to raw materials, especially after 1830's, caused many crafts to disappear and led the craftsmen to become a workforce in the production of agricultural commodities.<sup>266</sup>

Although the signing of Baltalimanı Treaty in 1838, has not changed the volume of export significantly, its effects were observable even in Ankara in 1845. British merchants could easily reach into western and central Anatolian markets. Yet, they often preferred to do their trade via intermediaries, who were

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<sup>264</sup> Çağlar Keyder, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Ticari Tarım Var mıydı?" *Osmanlı'da Toprak Mülkiyeti ve Ticari Tarım*, p. 5-10.

<sup>265</sup> Tabak, *ibid.*, p. 146-147; Halil İnalçık, "Çiftliklerin Doğuşu: Devlet, Toprak Sahipleri ve Kiracılar," *Osmanlı'da Toprak Mülkiyeti ve Ticari Tarım.*, p. 24.

<sup>266</sup> Şevket Pamuk, *Osmanlı Eknomisinde Bağımlılık ve Büyüme 1820-1913*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2005, p. 11-16 and Kasaba, p. 128-129.

most of the time non-muslims.<sup>267</sup> Henri Lakonten who bought a considerable amount of mohair and animals from Ankara, relied on his agents, a muslim and two non-muslims.<sup>268</sup> Although the treaty must have had considerable effects, according to Pamuk, the rush of cheap European goods into Ottoman markets did start a decade before it was signed. But it was also true that the flow of raw materials outside of the Empire was a direct result of the treaty.<sup>269</sup> As one contemporary observer stated,

*The hair of the Tiftik goat is exported from its native districts raw, in yarn, and in the delicate stuffs for which Angora has long been famous. The last are now chiefly consumed in Turkey; a little yarn, and a large quantity of the raw material, goes to Europe.*<sup>270</sup>

To the effects of the treaty, one must add the triumph of cotton. Since cotton has become an important trade commodity and the local consumption was also growing, even around central Anatolia,<sup>271</sup> the popularity of mohair was fading away. It can be said that the only opportunity for the mohair industry was the demand coming from state institutions. Throughout the first half of the century, mohair fabrics were mostly demanded by the state, especially for the navy, for canvases. Also, it was ordered that the workers of state institutions should wear clothes made only from mohair fabric.<sup>272</sup>

From the story told above and from the sources like *temettuat* registers or the accounts of travelers, the urban disappearance of the industry may be

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<sup>267</sup> Elena Frangakis-Syrett, "İzmir'de Pamuk ve Kumaş Ticareti (18. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısından 19. Yüzyılın Başlarına)," *Osmanlı'da Toprak Mülkiyeti ve Ticari Tarım*, p. 119.

<sup>268</sup> A.MKT. 38-59.

<sup>269</sup> Pamuk, 30.

<sup>270</sup> Connoly, p. 161.

<sup>271</sup> Frangakis-Syrett, p. 102-106.

<sup>272</sup> HAT. 114-1604.

understood as a complete disappearance. Yet, from another point of view, it can be said that the mohair industry in particular and textile industry in general did not disappear but transformed itself into a different mode of production, in order for the survival of both the industry and the craftsmen in general.

The so-called ‘ruralization’, which started by the 17<sup>th</sup> century crises and still remained in middle-sized cities by the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, provided a ‘providential refuge from poverty’ for the rural inhabitants of Mediterranean,<sup>273</sup> making the production processes more invisible. The change was part of a general shift in the pattern of manufacturing toward new draperies that forced cities to transfer their wealth to smaller towns and the countryside.<sup>274</sup> The process of ruralization involved the establishment of a loose but strong network of merchants and rural producers through putting-out systems. For the case of Ankara, this can be demonstrated through the warnings that the raw mohair, produced in rural districts of Ankara were not sent to the urban mohair weavers, and as a result, the weavers were in a miserable condition.<sup>275</sup> While a deeper research on the mohair industry and ruralization is needed in order to say more words, it can be said that the so-called disappearance of crafts must also be thought again.<sup>276</sup>

All these imply the fact that while the macro processes were bringing capitalist mode of social relations more into the picture, the societies did not adopt these relations without resistance. To some extent, they, especially those who were poor, insisted on the moral-economic perspective as against the market-led operation of daily life. This meant that there were at least two different cycles of

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<sup>273</sup> Faruk Tabak, *The Waning of the Mediterranean 1550-1870 A Geohistorical Approach*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008, p. 140-141.

<sup>274</sup> Tabak, *ibid.*, p. 157-160.

<sup>275</sup> C.İKTS. 78-2.

<sup>276</sup> From the perspective of the critique of de-industrialization debates, see Şevket Pamuk and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Ottoman De-Industrialization 1800-1913: Assessing the Shock, Its Impact and Response,” *National Bureau of Working Papers*, Working Paper 14763, March 2009, <http://www.nber.org/papers/w14763>.

exchange, which created different contexts of social relations at the same time. The same applied for the state also. The Ottoman state reflected a heterogeneous structure in which cooperation and conflict existed at the same time, which slowed down the efficacy of state regulation and encroachment. From the perspective of economy, while the 'liberal' effects of recently signed treaties were operating, the famine-time conditions proved that in times, it could have been possible for the state to regulate and define the limits of the 'liberality' of trade and exchange relations. In that sense, the concepts of systems like 'state' or 'capitalism', or even poverty should not be thought within strictly defined modern borders. It should not be forgotten that they are historical concepts which had different forms and different contents that even existed coevally.

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