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The Impact of Media
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in Turkey and Greece
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**The Impact of Media on the Formulation of Foreign Policy
in Turkey and Greece**

2004 - 2011

Türkiye ve Yunanistan Dış Politikası Formülasyonuna Medyanın Etkisi

2004 - 2011

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ABSTRACT

The present thesis aims to the examination of the relationship between the media and the foreign policy formulation in the bilateral relations of Greece and Turkey, beginning from 2004 until 2011. By analyzing the theoretical framework of media – state relations and conducting a research in the archives of two mainstream Greek and two mainstream Turkish newspapers in three different cases, which show different aspects of the bilateral relations of the two countries, this study seeks to find if influence on foreign policy formulation, regarding the relations of the two countries, can be traced and explained. The issues of pressure by the media, current situation of media companies in Greece and Turkey, and similarities, as well as differences between the functioning of these companies and their relation to the state, are also met.

Key Words: Greek – Turkish relations, foreign policy formulation, media, influence

Özet

Bu tez, medya ve dış politika yapımı arasındaki ilişki bağlamında 2004-2011 yılları arasındaki dönemde Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde dış politikanın oluşturulması sürecini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışma ana görüşü temsil eden iki Yunan ve iki Türk gazetesinin arşivlerinde ikili ilişkilerin farklı taraflarını öne çıkaran üç ayrı konuyu baz alan bir araştırma ile medyanın dış politika yapımı sürecindeki etkilerinin ortaya çıkarılıp, analiz edilerek açıklanabilmesinin olasılığını tartışmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, medya baskısı, Türkiye ve Yunanistan'daki medya şirketleri, bu şirketlerin işleyişlerindeki benzer yönler ve farklılıklar ile bu şirketlerin devletler ile olan ilişkileri incelenecektir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Türk-Yunan ilişkileri, dış politika yapımı, medya, etki

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PREFACE

Working on this dissertation has been a valuable experience for me. I have always been interested in both Greek – Turkish relations, as have most Greeks and Turks I suppose, and the way media function. In my mind, the media are an inseparable part of the everyday life of all citizens of a country – whether they like it, or not. They are our main source of information about the world, about the news, policies followed and reactions appearing in any part of the world. Thinking of those facts made me want to study this field more. If the media are our “window to the world”, they should have some relationship with the way we act and think; they must have some relationship with the way our society functions.

It was not easy going through literature I had never come across before, or work with news reports that are not always easy to be found. The difficulties I met had mainly to do with the electronic archives of the newspapers examined here – there was always a part missing, an article removed and so on – and my limited knowledge of the Turkish language, practically forcing me to become best friends with my dictionary for a long time. However, the subject of the influence of media on foreign policy formulation in the bilateral relations of Greece and Turkey, was chosen because of the questions raised on the matter in both countries and the limited literature existing on the field for the subject.

Even though I pursued to have the opinion of the media workers on the matter, my efforts were not met by the professionals of the field; I take it they were too busy, or that the matter of influence is one they do not easily and openly discuss. It is not easy for a journalist to admit that their workings are being influenced by someone else, if they are, nor for an official to admit that they keep in mind the media and their reactions when designing a policy, if they do.

This dissertation has been an effort to give insight on media – state relations in Greece and Turkey and to shed light on the aspect of the decision making process as far as the relations of the two countries are concerned. The literature reviewed was mainly provoked and written for the US or the UK, since such a literature is yet to be found in Greece and Turkey. The circumstances existing in the US and the Mediterranean area in general seem to share only a few common characteristics. This left me with no choice, but to adapt the theories I have studied to the realities of the two countries.

My hope is that this thesis will address the questions of others, as it has mine, and contribute to a different aspect in Greek – Turkish relation; an aspect that has been understudied. Keeping in mind that this is only a Master Thesis with its own inevitable flaws and shortcomings, I have tried to examine the subject in the most accurate possible way.

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Introduction

Greece and Turkey are two neighboring countries, in a region that has caused their people to have many differences in the past. Even though they share a common mentality in everyday life, and many common characteristics in the ways they live, think, react and express themselves, it would seem that in the past there was little, if any, effort to get to know the way the members of those countries think and act. It would almost always seem that somehow the two countries would find ways to show they had more to split than to share with their neighbor.

In the past two decades, Greece and Turkey have come across some serious chances to get bilateral relations completely cut or utterly improved. For instance, the 1996 Imia / Kardak crisis, which brought the two states very close to war; or the Öcalan crisis in the dawn of 1997, which was a very serious one. The change of heart on behalf of both countries during the earthquakes of 1999 was also experienced, when lots of lives got lost and disastrous damages had to be faced in both countries. There were waves of compassion and people helping their neighbors, their friends, the human beings across the Aegean, who, after all, had to face the same disaster as they did.

In all cases mentioned, there was a wide covering of the events by the media of both countries. In fact, the Imia / Kardak crisis is supposed to be an “artificial” one, created by the media in both countries, in an era when the bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey were more or less stagnant¹. The climate produced after the earthquakes, on the other hand, was completely different –

¹ Since the Imia / Kardak crisis will be referred to often in this thesis, a few words about what it was are in order. In December 1995, a Turkish ship under the name “Figen Agat” run aground to the Imia/ Kardak islet. In the announcement of the Greek navy that Greek boats would come to help, the Captain of the ship denies the help and claims that the islet is in Turkish territory. Two days later, the Turkish ship is rescued by Greek ship. Throughout the whole month there was an exchange of information between Athens, Ankara and their embassies in both countries and a dispute about the sovereignty of the islet. In January 1996, the Greek TV channel Antenna refers to the incident extensively, and it becomes a big issue in Greece. The following day, four residents of Kalimnos island put the Greek flag on the islet; following that, a helicopter with a crew from Turkish newspaper Hürriyet lands on the islet and raises the Turkish flag, after removing the Greek one. The event is being broadcast on Turkish television. The crisis was escalated after this incident, since army groups from both countries move towards the area of the islets. US government sends non-papers to both countries, the main idea of which is the prevention of concentration of more naval and army forces in the area. Turks occupy the smaller islet of Imia/Kardak, a Greek helicopter flying over the area is knocked down (three men died) and both administrations follow a step-by-step procedure for the

a climate of friendship and common fate, accompanied by a sentiment of sympathy and responsibility to help the suffering neighbor. And so the story went – through the media, to the people's conscience; or was it the other way round? Or was a third party involved, that of the ruling elite? In any case, those cases have been a clear media “show”; sometimes a “freak-show” (as in the Imia / Kardak crisis, or the Öcalan crisis), focusing on one scary aspect of the bilateral relations at a time, others a “soap opera”, keeping people's interest at high levels, informing and carrying out the service of calling them to help in any way they could – as in the cases of the earthquakes of 1999 in both countries.

The point being that media have always been where foreign policy formulates, this thesis deals with its role in the procedure of the formulation of foreign policy in Greece and Turkey. Even though the above mentioned cases are not to be examined thoroughly, since they have been examined by many in the past, they were only mentioned here for being valid examples of the strong messages media are able to send to those following them.

This thesis will focus on what happened after 2004, when Cyprus became full member of the EU; how the media were involved – if they were at all - in the foreign policy formulation concerning the bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey. Cyprus becoming a full member of the EU will be serving as the starting point of this research, since Cyprus, even though cannot be thought of as being a concern in bilateral relations of the two states, since it involves a third party, has, however, triggered conflict between the two countries many times in the past, because of its strategic importance to both Greece and Turkey.

withdrawal of their naval forces from the area. What should be kept in mind, is that it was not the incident of the Turkish ship refusing to get help by the Greek navy itself that created the tension in the first place, but the involvement of the media of both countries on the matter that escalated the crisis. In both countries, media reacted with strong disapproval (to say the least) towards the neighboring country, using a strong vocabulary (the words “treason” and “threat” were very commonly used by the media at the time), refusing basically to be a mean of resolution of the crisis. The media are described by most students of the crisis as the “trigger” that caused it in the first place.

The subject under study in this thesis is the media in the formulation of foreign policy when it comes to bilateral relations; especially regarding the case of Greece and Turkey. Media have become part of our daily lives everywhere in this world. It is our basic source of information about the world, along with education. How far the media have come to be part of our lives is a different matter. Media are obviously there to inform and entertain us, to set the public in motion about certain things upon which it might need to react, and to be a common platform for social issues, one upon which we shall all – at least theoretically – be able to take a stand on matters that concern us. But is there a different function of the media as well?

It has been suggested that the media serve as the Fourth Estate or the Fourth Branch of government²; both terms suggest that the media are there to make sure the other three branches of government are doing their job properly, keeping away from mischief and corruption. The media are also considered as the organ responsible to keep people informed about any malfunction in the political system³, so that they decide (to react, vote and so on) accordingly. The role of the media as “watchdog” has been largely acknowledged⁴. But is that all the media do?

This thesis is also an effort to give insight on certain aspects of media: how the media in both Greece and Turkey function when it comes to the bilateral relations of the two countries; the impact they might have on the foreign policy formulation; the information they share with the public and how they are found and investigated; their relationship with the governments of the countries within which they operate.

We are to be faced with a broader belief of the public and some journalists, which will be met in the

² Fourth Estate notion refers to the idea, developed by John Locke, that the best guarantee of good governance was that elected legislators should be scrutinized by an independent media – ie. the media should be regarded as an autonomous “fourth estate” within the political system, whose job it was to continually monitor the other estates so that bad policy making and corruption would be immediately exposed. The media therefore needed to be granted the right to access all the necessary information to make their monitoring task possible. Independent media and the right to uncensored flow of information is a central idea of functioning democracies.

³ When it comes to democratic societies at least.

⁴ See Chapter 1

following section when media theories will be examined, that the media have more to offer than just being there to inform us. In both countries, media are sometimes thought of as manipulative and organizing public life, or being directly involved in it, instead of being strictly informative organs. Being a medium through which people are informed of the world, and the moves of their state toward their neighbor, is one thing; being an actor in the decision-making process is another. Just like having media covering events taking place that affect the foreign policy designed by a country is rather different than having media instigating improvements or fall – backs in bilateral relations.

Since the media have been the main source of information, it is only natural that their impact on the policies designed to affect our lives should be studied. Such is not the case, however, in this part of the world, where there is a small, if any, bibliography to connect media with decision-making process. This dissertation will be an effort to contribute some insight on the Greek – Turkish relations, within a different framework, other than history or international relations.

In the first chapter a presentation of the main media theories concerning media and their relations to foreign policy making will be made; it shall not be focused in the Greek – Turkish relations alone, since the subject is, as already mentioned, understudied. Instead, this presentation shall focus on what the scholars have observed about media – foreign policy formulation around the world, especially in the USA, where most media theories were formed.

After presenting the existing general theoretical framework, the mass media situation in Greece and Turkey will be examined, while “mix and matching” the theories mentioned in the first chapter to make one that suits this case better; in other words, which characteristics of the theories apply to this case and which do not will be shown, in order to then make more accurate observations about the way the media influence, if they do, the foreign policy formulation in both countries.

The third chapter will focus on press reports, from both countries, on three, rather different to each other, situations: Cyprus becoming a full member of the EU, since May 1st, 2004; the “dogfight” over the Aegean that resulted in the collision of a Greek and a Turkish aircraft, that in turn led to a Greek pilot losing his life in May 2006; and the ongoing, since 2008, procedure of the conversations between Erdoğan – Papandreou, mainly focusing on the Papandreou visit in Erzurum in January 2011.

The reason why these three situations have been chosen to be examined is that they represent three different phases that are usually met in Greek – Turkish relations: the international organization notion, especially as far as the EU is concerned, is always in the picture. Since Greece is already a full member of the EU, while Turkey is not, even though it has been seeking to be one for many years, the EU 'backing up' Greece in every dispute concept is always there. The “dogfight” incidents have become a part of the everyday life in both countries; especially in the Greek society, since these “dogfights” have become a subject the media seem to be very fond of, more than in Turkey, where those incidents are mentioned only in the case of accidents or collisions; this 'distorted routine', and the media response, the official line on the matter, along with how the media and the state influence each other under this perspective should be examined. Last, the ongoing procedure of discussions on the level of state leaders and their denial, if not in all cases, then in most of them, to disclose to the media what is being said during those meetings, as well as the media's reactions and their outcome, are all to be examined in the third chapter.

The three aforementioned cases shall be examined within the framework drawn in the second chapter, and some conclusions about the way the media can be involved in the bilateral relation of Greece and Turkey, and whether they can influence the foreign policy being designed by the official states, will have been reached by the time this thesis reaches its final chapter.

It shall be observed by the reader that, throughout this research, the public opinion factor is not being examined. Even though the public is, at the end of the day, all the media and the foreign policy makers care about (since the audience is the receiver of the media's message, and the officials certainly seek for legitimization of their actions from it), it has, however, been thought of as not participating in policy formulation⁵ - as far as both internal and foreign affairs are considered. Moreover, putting one more factor under consideration in this already complex subject would, in my opinion, lead to the addition of more questions instead of being helpful to the effort of reaching a conclusion.

⁵ Barbrook, 1995, p. 5. The same concept of not participating audience appears also in Louw (2005, p. 18): The citizens / electorate are political “outsiders”, passive consumers of the myths, hype and images disseminated by the mass media. The public consumes what “semi-insiders” (such as journalists) and “insiders” (such as officials) construct.

I. Media Connection to Foreign Policy Formulation

Basic Theoretical Framework

Introduction

The relationship between the media and foreign policy formulation, especially in times of crises, has began being more thoroughly studied under new insight since the beginning of the 1990s onwards, after the end of the Cold War and the appearance of new technologies in mass media.

However, the question of influence -its existence as well as its direction- between the media and the government has been a subject under study for more than three centuries in the West.⁶ In the absence of an explicit theory about how this influence functions, the debate of the directionality of this influence -Who is pressuring whom? Media or government?- , and the question of whether it is a “bi-directional” or “mutually influential” game, is an ongoing one.

You are soon to realize that in this media and foreign policy equation, the result of which we seek to find, there is one factor missing, and that is the public, the audience, or the public opinion. This has on purpose been left out, for many reasons. First, the obvious lack of space and the complexity of the matter in question when one tries to apply more than two factors to it. Even though the media's immediate receiver is the public, and there have been too many people worrying about the “corrupting” impact a new media of mass communication might have on the audience⁷, the “lack of participation” by the public⁸, especially, it might be added, when it comes to foreign policy formulation (except, maybe, of the cases in which people feel they are being lied to, manipulated, or otherwise discredited), is rarely questioned within the temporary literature about media and foreign policy. Whereas, at the end of the day, journalists and policymakers check out the effect their

⁶ Even though the limited space of this essay does not leave room for thorough reference to such studies, for more information please see Miller's *Media Pressure on Foreign Policy – The Evolving Theoretical Framework*, New York: Palgrave – Macmillan, 2007.

⁷ Williams, Kevin, *Understanding Media Theory*, New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2003, p. 168

⁸ Barbrook, Richard, *Media Freedom: The Contradictions and Communications in the Age of Modernity*, London: Pluto Press, 1995, p. 4

practices have had on the public, the subject of this study is whether there is an interaction between media and foreign policy formulation, what that interaction means, how it functions – and this is why the public has been left out.

Returning back to media in relation to foreign policy formulation, two main structuring questions can be found in the literature concerning media and foreign policy making, in a literature which is not characterized by its implicit or well – standing theories. We cannot deny that some kind of relationship between the two entities does exist. Therefore, we have to set the question of the means, or tools, the media use to influence the decision making process. The other question we have to set is what proof do we have that the influence indeed exists and is working in the manner that many researchers of the field, as shall be seen as this chapter goes on, have suspected it to be working⁹. The questions the research been done in this field has evoked, and which will be come across, are connected to the aforementioned general questions and mostly have to do with whether the media affect the decision making process in a way that the government takes decisions reacting to this influence, whether the influence is mirrored in the decisions, whether the government's reaction to media influence indeed exists, and, if it does, how it can be traced, and, finally, what the definition of the pressure / influence by the media to the government is.

Even though those two questions seem to be quite important in examining the relationship between media and foreign policy, there seems to be a problem in defining the “pressure” and the causality of the influence. In between the public opinion research, which shall in this study only be mentioned, and agenda – setting theory, which tries to explain the kind of existing relationship between media and foreign policy making, and is one of the most respected ones, the current literature is yet to find direct linkage between the government and the media and how they interact.

Before proceeding to address some of the most well-known theories on media – foreign policy

⁹ Miller, 2007, p. 4

relation, we should first define what mass communication is, and how it functions, in order to begin with a clean slate and make sure the definitions are quite clear.

What Mass Communication is and How It Functions

According to Baran and Davis, Mass Communication occurs “when a source, typically an organization, employs a technology as a medium to communicate with a large audience”.¹⁰ For example, *Eleftherotipia*, which is a Greek organization, uses printing presses and the newspaper, which are technology and medium, to address to its readers, which is a large audience. Same philosophy exists in all kinds of media: television, radio, internet, film making, and so on. Media are all means of communication; differently put, they are communication channels promoting all kinds of information.

The classic four functions of the media are the following: First, surveillance of the environment, which refers to the media collecting and distributing information. The second classic function is the correlation of the parts of society in responding to the environment. This means that the media interpret or analyze the information we get. Then, there is the transmission of the social heritage from one generation to the next, relating to the mass media being able to communicate different values, social norms across different groups and throughout long periods of time. The last function of media is to entertain.¹¹

Having seen what the media “do”, some theories that have been trying to link media with foreign policy formulation should be mentioned.

¹⁰ Baran, Stanley and Dennis K. Davis, *Mass Communication Theory: Foundations, Ferment and Future*, California: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006, p. 6

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 265 - 266

Media Theories on Foreign Policy

Direct studies on the media effects on the decision making process are quite recent – beginning in the 1990s. Due to the increased involvement of peacekeeping forces in complex situations during the 1990s, as well as the developments in communication technologies, there has been a subsequent increase of interest in the field of the relation of media and foreign policy formulation relationship.¹²

Media soon became a part of the changing international environment by being the “eyes” for their audiences in every part of the planet. Under these circumstances, the first theory we are about to examine was born.

The CNN Effect

The theory of “CNN Effect”, supports that there is an impact of worldwide television news broadcasts on government decision making process, especially in crises and wars. The theory is advocating that the television pictures have a certain power on both the public watching them and the elites, that drives governments to make important decisions on military or political field, based more on the emotions the media manage to impose through those pictures, rather than well-reasoned policy considerations has been studied thoroughly.¹³ However, this theory supports that it is the media and the media alone are “showing the way” of action to the government, whereas it is the journalists themselves who claim that their main sources in such matters are government officials.

The CNN Effect theory was triggered in 1992, when the U.S.A intervened in Somalia with military personnel in Operation Restore Hope to help feeding starving people after the government collapsed and the state fell into anarchy. U.S.A. intervened right after the situation in Somalia had been vastly

¹² Miller, 2007, pp. 2 - 3

¹³ For more information, please see the First Chapter in Miller, 2007

exposed to the public by the media, and many thought that the immediate response by the U.S. had been an immediate response to what had been projected through the media. “Foreign policy 'experts' were dismayed by what they saw as unwarranted intrusion by the Fourth Estate into the policy process”¹⁴ - meaning that the officials involved in the decision – making process observed the media were affecting those decisions by what they chose to project (to the public). Supporting this exact point of view, George Kennan published an editorial in *The New York Times*, in September 1993, called, “Somalia, through a Glass Darkly”. In it he argued that American foreign policy was being led by the media, and, specifically, television.¹⁵ Not an actual supporter of the intervention itself, Kennan was very concerned of the idea that elite control of the foreign policy decision making process had been lost to the media.

Andrew Natsios argued that this so-called CNN Effect “suggests that policy-makers only respond when there are scenes of mass starvation on the evening news. It also suggests that policy-makers obtain most of their information about ongoing disasters from media reports.”¹⁶ Kennan's and Natsios's articles soon initiated a crowd of editorials and books arguing about the CNN Effect, especially regarding the “OOTWs” (Operations Other Than War) or humanitarian relief operations.¹⁷

The CNN Effect was supposedly and quite arguably a theory about media “taking over” and go on to set the agenda of American foreign policy; in other words, doing the government's “job”. Even though many supported that the press had historically been of assistance to the democratic government, they saw this CNN Effect Theory as something scarily plausible – the idea of media

¹⁴ Robinson, Piers, *The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention*, London: Routledge, 2002, p.10

¹⁵ Miller, 2007, p. 10

¹⁶ Cited in Miller, 2007, p. 10

¹⁷ OOTW or MOOTW: (Military) Operations Other Than War focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises. The phrase and acronym has been popularized by the USA military in the 1990s, but it has since fallen out of use and has been replaced by the equivalent term “Peace Support Operations” (PSO), by the UK military. Both MOOTW and PSO encompass peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peace building. For more information, please see: Segal, Hugh, (2004) *Geopolitical Integrity*, Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy and Morris Taw, Jennifer, “Planning for MOOTW: Lessons from US Army Efforts”, *Australian Defense Force Journal*, No. 134. Jan/Feb 1999, pp. 57 - 68

evolving in such a way that could initiate foreign policy strategies by undermining democratically selected officials, who were supposed to be planning the foreign policy themselves. “By the mid-1990s, it had become conventional wisdom, and hence axiomatic, to speak of media-inspired foreign policy initiatives”.¹⁸ It was not suggested that every aspect of foreign policy was driven by the media, but there were not many who would not believe that this could be the case, as Miller suggests.

Apart from the fact, which is dissolving this theory on its own, that no journalist ever came around to admit that they actually initiated the realization of a certain policy by what they had publicized, and that most journalists dealing with international affairs admit that their sources are members of the government¹⁹, the CNN effect theory seems to be applicable only in certain case studies, such as those initiating it, like the Somalia operation by the USA in 1992, and, even then, there cannot be proof that the course of the decision making process was changed because of the media. However, the CNN Effect theory caused a domino of research which gave ground to more theories that tried to explain the relationship between media and foreign policy decision making process and taking action, which wandered away from it. Such a theory is the “Indexing Hypothesis” theory, examined next.

Still the question of the causality and the direction of the influence remains unanswered.

The Indexing Hypothesis

It was no sooner than 1995 that Livingston and Eachus questioned the CNN effect theory, which was formulated in the beginning of the 1990s. They described the CNN effect as the theory of the loss of policy control by elite decision makers to the news media. Studying the CNN effect through the case study of Somalia, they come to find that it was not the pressure by the media about the

¹⁸ Miller, 2007, p. 3

¹⁹ This meaning that the information the journalists get come from officials, and thus cannot be initiating action on the behalf of the media, since the information had not been first met by the government after being publicized.

situation in the country that made the Bush Administration intervene. They concluded that the intervention was “a result of diplomatic and bureaucratic operations, with news coverage coming *in response* to those decisions”²⁰ They used the method of content analysis of news accounts in a wide selection of media that had been employed with the subject between 1991 and 1992, along with interviewing both officials and journalists connected with the events that took place, so that they could have a whole picture of both the information the journalists that were interviewed had access to and to what they did with it, and the officials initial plans and reaction to the Somalia crisis and the publicized materials.

The result of their research complied mainly with Bennett's theory of “News Indexing”, first met in his article in the *Journal of Communication* in 1990²¹, which suggests that news is "indexed" implicitly to the range and dynamics of governmental debate, but has little relation to expressed public opinion. In Bennett's words “*Mass media news professionals, from the boardroom to the beat, tend to 'index' the range of voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic. (...) This working hypothesis implies that 'other' (i.e. non – official) voices filling out the potential universe of news sources are included in news stories and editorials, when those voices express opinions already emerging in official circles*”²². Bennett also argues that indexing is the result of journalists' collecting the news, through “the collective structures of the newsroom as an organization, and business pressures on the boardroom”. The degree of indexing varies according to the issue, “depending on the degree to which the three different dynamics behind it (individual, organizational, and economic) coincide, and that it might be expected to be particularly important when it comes to military decisions, foreign affairs, trade, and macroeconomic policy-areas.”²³

²⁰ Miller, 2007, pp. 10 - 11

²¹ Bennett, Lance W., “Toward a Theory of Press – State Relations in the United States”, *Journal of Communication*, Vol. 40, Issue 2, June 1990, pp. 103 - 127

²² *Ibid.*, p. 106

²³The Media Research Hub: Social Science Research Council: <http://mediaresearchhub.ssrc.org/icdc-content-folder/indexing/> (accessed December 10, 2010)

One can meet the Indexing Hypothesis to almost every theory about media and their relation or their effects on foreign policy decision making process. To make it more clear, the indexing hypothesis suggests that the media coverage of an event is bonded with official information, or statements of officials about a current event concerning foreign (or other) policy and dominant assumptions about this very same event.²⁴ This theory mainly has been applied to cases that involve policies or initials taken by officials regarding international relations and different aspects of them (decisions for war or MOOTW) or economic policies (trade, economic transactions involving another party); in different words, it mainly builds itself upon cases which relate the policy making with a second party / country / economic factor.

If the indexing hypothesis seems to hold up, then what must be distinguished, and which generally appears overlooked, is whether indexing rules out the possibility of influence. It is understood that the media are being faced as “bonded” with official information. But in what ways it is not clear. Also, the question of pressure is not being addressed. Clearly, the government seems to be holding on and 'handing over' the information about crucial issues, hence having the “upper hand” in this relationship, but could it be that the influence is bi-directional? After all, the government might be giving the information, but who and why decides which of those information gets publicized?

Media – Policy Interaction Model

Another model involving media and foreign policy decision making process, presented among others, is Robinson's Media – Policy Interaction Model. In his study about the CNN effect, Robinson searches where the initiative that “triggered” action on behalf of the government came from, the media or the administration itself, and the answer supports Livingston and Eachus research's result. Robinson's article of 2000²⁵ provides us with a clarifying table of his paradigm:

²⁴ Miller, 2007, p. 11

²⁵ Robinson, Piers, “The Policy – Media Interaction Model: Measuring Media Power During Humanitarian Crisis”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 37, No. 5, September 2000, pp. 613-633

	Government Policy Line	Direction of Influence	News Media Coverage	Policy – Media Relationship
Media Influence	Uncertain	←	Extensive and critical	In this scenario media influence occurs. In the absence of a clear, well-articulated policy line, the government is vulnerable to critical and extensive media attention. If news reports are critically framed, advocating a particular course of action, the government is forced to do something or face a public relations disaster. Here, media can significantly influence the policy process.
No Media Influence	Certain	→	Indexed to “official agenda”	When the government has clear and well-articulated objectives it tends to set the news agenda. Coverage might become critical if there is elite dissensus. With the executive decided on a particular course of action, media coverage is unlikely to influence policy.

Robinson's analysis reaches the issue of media pressure itself by suggesting that certain arguments are “loose speculations about 'complex systems', 'fluid interplay' and a 'rich and diverse relationship' between media coverage and policy outcomes – all of which sounds reasonable enough but does little to clarify things or prove a direct casual relationship between media coverage and policy outcomes”²⁷.

However, there is no outcome in Robinson’s work answering to the question of what pressure is and how it is observed. So, without trying to avoid doing so, Robinson highlights the key epistemological problem of this field. “Unfortunately, influence cannot be observed in any obvious or straightforward fashion. We cannot see inside the minds of policy – makers and directly observe media influence at work”, he writes. However true that might be, there must be a way to see, identify and even measure pressure and influence, argues Miller – and suggests that indeed there is; “to do so however, requires that we build an assumptive base, offer a theory about media pressure, and then devise a coding system to make that theory testable. We can do all this by listening in a very particular way to what people say, and how it evidently affects others”.

Supporting traces of evidence can be found in the very actions of officials on a matter that has been publicized, or of journalists toward a certain policy. By that I mean that, if we can see a shift of position on a planned action of foreign affairs by the officials after a certain point of view or new

²⁶ Table taken from Robinson, 2000, p. 615

²⁷ Miller, 2007, p. 12

clues on the case have been publicized, we can assume, having no other action that would evoke such a shift, that this was an act of influence by the media towards the government. Robinson suggests that this model shows the possibility of media 'taking sides' during elite debates over policy formulation²⁸. Thus, the media can only play a significant role when the members of the government are on a debate or disagree about the policy that is being drawn. He suggests that by promoting one of the options suggested (by some officials) to be followed, the media can cause a shift in policy. We can only speculate that, of course, Miller argues, for there is no actual proof that any other initiatives have been taken on behalf of the government, that the media workers might have not been informed of.

The media – government interaction model has also been studied by Linsky and O'Heffernan. O'Heffernan's main argument is that whereas in the beginning the relationship between the (USA) government and the media used to be “symbiotic” or “mutually beneficial”, the relationship has now been changed into a relationship of “interdependent mutual exploitation”. So “from the policy – maker's perspective, a significant element of policy making involves using and influencing the media; policy making cannot be done without the media, nor can the media cover international affairs without government cooperation”. The logic of this theory results in a model of mutual exploitation. Thus, both the administration and the media affect one another, because they need each other to function. “This influence stems from policy – maker's perception of the media's importance and utility, especially of the importance of the broadcast media, and from the media's injection of certain biases into the policy – making process. The combination of these two media forces results in a new foreign policy that is media – influenced”, he claims. He also writes that “the media's power results from their ability to locate and reveal positive and negative information, which under certain circumstances, can severely damage policies and careers or increase the likelihood of success. Insiders perceive that both positive and negative information could increase the visibility -and thus the vulnerability- of policy officials, but that negative media coverage had

²⁸ Robinson, 2000, pp. 615 - 616

the strongest effect”.²⁹

The Positioning Theory

Miller, on the other hand, suggests that if in all above-mentioned theories using the term “pressure” to identify how the media affect the decision – making process, was to be replaced with the idea of threat to reputation (he does that by examining the seditious libel laws etc, from old days to ours), all the arguments become more explicit, he suggests, and maintain the logic of their outcomes.

Miller engages in formulating a Positioning Theory. He starts by giving media pressure and influence operational definitions, decides to examine communication itself under the prism of actual “dialogue” (verbal or not) between the media and the policymakers. Following Harré and Langenhove's work³⁰, he uses their words to define the positioning theory as: “*the study of local moral orders as ever – shifting patterns of mutual and contestable rights and obligations of speaking and acting*”³¹. Generally put, *positions* are “relational” - so, for one party to be “positioned” as, for instance, powerful, other parties must be “positioned” as powerless.³²

Miller presents his theory of media pressure, based on the Positioning Theory, calling it the Positioning Hypothesis, in two different parts. In *Part A*, Miller presents media pressure as “the perlocutionary impact of the media's communicative acts that demonstrably defame the reputation of the executive, or the executive's policy, as defined by the local moral order”³³. The significance of defamation is its function as an “instrument of faction”, which leads to difficulties in governing. Media pressure can, Miller suggests, actually be observed “in the executive acts of rhetorical re-description or repositioning in response to the media's communicative acts as they regard the

²⁹ Miller, 2007, pp. 17 -18

³⁰ For more information, please see Harré, Rom and Luk van Langenhove, *Positioning Theory*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1999

³¹ Ibid., p. 1

³² Ibid., pp. 1-2

³³ Miller, 2007, p. 43

reputation of the executive or the executive's policy"³⁴. In *Part B* of his theory, Miller suggests that influence itself is easily conceivable "by deliberate changes in executive policy intended to function as verbal or non – verbal forms of rhetorical re-description and/or repositioning, that defend or recover the executive's authority, so that superordinate strategic objectives can be maintained or advanced". The policy shifts observed aim to end rhetorical challenges by or through the media, thus potentially bringing threats to the executive's authority to a resolution³⁵.

In simpler terms, Miller's Positioning Hypothesis supports that the media can publish things that could hurt or damage the reputation of officials in the eyes of the public, whose support they need in order to design and follow a policy. The kind of damage the media are able to cause to an official depends on the moral and ethical values of the community interested on this very discourse (the official and the policies they follow). Reputation damage can cause an executive to lose their partners' support, and , consequently, their power.

Miller also suggests that we are actually able to observe when the reputation of an executive is under threat, by observing what the media has published and how the executive has responded to the published material. Hence, the media have, according to Positioning Theory, the power to influence, or even shift, policies, by defaming, or 'threatening' to do so, the executives designing those policies. By accepting this theory, he seems determined to come up with an answer on the two questions put before him – the questions raised are being mentioned in the beginning of this chapter – by examining the actual "conversations" between the two factors, verbal or written, and their actual effect on the formulation of policy.

As shall be observed in the second and third chapter of this thesis, this theory does not seem to be applicable to Greece and Turkey, since, even though the officials have been under the "media's

³⁴ Miller, 2007, p. 43

³⁵ Miller, 2007, p. 44

defamation capacity concept”, if it should be called, for years (in Greece more than in Turkey), the officials seem to be following their policies, not shifting away from them. What might be true and shall be examined further down this research, is that the executives tend to rephrase, reposition, or change the rhetoric followed in foreign policy matters, after the media have published something that could cause damage of reputation; by doing so, the executives avoid losing support.

The Agenda – Setting Theory

The agenda – setting theory refers to the idea that media do not tell people what or how to think, but they give them the stimulus on what to think.

The first to have come up with the idea of agenda – setting, without naming it as such though, was Lippmann, in his work *Public Opinion*, in 1922. He argued that people cannot possibly deal with the reality, their environments, but respond to “pictures” of the environments in their head – i.e. mental images of their environments. *“For the real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with so many subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and combinations. And although we have to act in that environment, we have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before we can manage with it”*.³⁶ He came to the result that everyday people cannot be left to make important political decisions based on simplified “pictures” and that they had to be protected, and the more important political decisions have to be made by “technocrats” who use better models to guide their actions.³⁷

Cohen refined Lippmann's ideas into theory, which survives up to our days, and with all the technological advancements, it seems to be totally current and up to date. *“The press is significantly more than a purveyor of information and opinion. It may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think*

³⁶ Lippmann, Walter, *Public Opinion*, New York: Macmillan, 1922, p. 16

³⁷ Baran and Davis, 2006, p. 316

about.”, he wrote, “*And it follows from this that the world looks different to different people, depending not only on their personal interests, but also on the map that is drawn for them by the writers, editors and publishers of the papers they read*”.³⁸

These writings are the basis of what has come to be known as the fifth function of the mass media, the agenda – setting function.³⁹

McCombs and Shaw empirically tested this theory, and the results of their research were published in 1972. They interpreted agenda – setting as such: “*In choosing and displaying news, editors, newsroom staff, and broadcasters play an important part in shaping political reality. Readers learn not only about a given issue, but how much importance to attach to that issue from the amount of information in a news story or its position... The mass media may well determine the important issues – that is the media may set the 'agenda' of the campaign*”.⁴⁰ That means that the spot where a piece of information is fit, for example, on a newspaper (is it headlines-front page news? Is it last page?) and the amount of words and the information it carries, is decisive for the people to think of it as crucial news or not. Same way with television or radio – the news that are being broadcast earliest on the news, are the most important. Media people are deciding, though, what comes first. Thus the media succeed in putting on the “picture” of our environments what we, after reading or viewing or listening to, think is more important than other news.

An example of the agenda – setting function of the media that is often seen in Greek – Turkish relations reality is the “dogfights” over the Aegean. While in Greece the “dogfight” can be presented as a major issue through the media, most Turks have no idea what a “dogfight” is, since the Turkish media do not attach the same important on that matter. Although in Greece the

³⁸ Cohen, Bernard C., *The Press and Foreign Policy*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 13

³⁹ Baran and Davis, 2006, p. 317

⁴⁰ McCombs, Maxwell and Donald Shaw, “The Agenda – Setting Function of the Media”, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 36, 1972, p. 176

“dogfights” are being reported on with much importance attached to them every time, in Turkey it takes an accident – a fatal one – for a “dogfight” to make an appearance on the news.

Iyengar and Kinder offered a testable “agenda – setting hypothesis: those problems that receive prominent attention on the national news become the problems the viewing public regards as the nation's most important”.⁴¹ They examined agenda – setting itself, as it had been interpreted by McCombs and Shaw, only to demonstrate causality. Like most early agenda – setting research, a direction of influence from the media to the audience is implied – causality is implied through this exact finding.⁴² They also examined vividness of presentation, and found out that dramatic news accounts undermined, rather than increased, television's agenda – setting power; position of a story – they showed that lead stories had a greater agenda – setting effect; finally, they inserted a new term in the literature and examined it: *Priming*. Priming, in agenda – setting theory, is the idea that media draw attention to some aspects of political life at the expense of others.⁴³

This research brought about a new term in media – foreign policy literature, agenda – building. Agenda – building is a collective process in which media, government and the citizenry reciprocally influence one another in areas of public policy.⁴⁴ This new term is no more than an attempt to explain what we empirically experience in everyday life. Government gives information which get publicized, through a procedure followed by media - you could even imagine it being a special filter (which pieces of information get excluded or why those which are included are making it to the first or to the last page is not a matter of inquiry of this essay), then affecting the citizens, who then promote or demand or press for the solution, by the government, of those certain issues they have in mind as being the most crucial. Agenda – building presumes cognitive effects, an active audience (which influences and is being influenced by the media and the government), and societal level –

⁴¹ Iyengar, Shanto and Donald Kinder, *News that Matter: Television and American Opinion*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987, p. 16

⁴² On the other hand, one could easily argue that the media are simply responding to what their audiences actually think is more important an issue, or what they want or like to read about or watch or listen to.

⁴³ Baran and Davis, 2006, p. 318

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 319

effects. Its basic premise can be found in the belief that media can profoundly affect how a society decides which are its concerns and is able to mobilize its various institutions toward meeting those concerns.

Propaganda

The term '*propaganda*' originally descends from the Roman Catholic 'Congregatio de Propaganda Fide' (Committee for the Propagation of the Faith), an order of the church established by a papal bull in 1622 in an effort to suppress the Protestant Reformation. The term has ever since come to mean the no-holds-barred use of communication to propagate specific beliefs and expectations. The objective of a propagandist is to alter the way people act and make them actually believe that their new behavior is a product of their own free thinking.⁴⁵ To manage this task, the propagandists try to change the way people conceive themselves and their social world.⁴⁶ Communication techniques are used for guiding and transforming those personal beliefs.

Fritz Hippler, head of Nazi Germany's film propaganda division, said that in order for propaganda to be effective, it needs to simplify a complex issue and repeat that simplification over and over again. The propagandist believes in the old saying "the end justifies the means". Therefore, half-truths and outright lies are put in use in order for people to be convinced to adopt the propaganda's manifesto.⁴⁷

In their 1994 book, *Manufacturing Consent*, Herman and Chomsky lay out the propaganda model to explain media's relationship with government and decision – making process.⁴⁸ According to them, the mass media serve as a system for communicating messages and symbols to a wide population.

Along with their other functions, lies the function of infusing "values, beliefs and codes of behavior

⁴⁵ Pratkanis, Anthony R. and Elliot Aronson, *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*, New York: W. H. Freedman, 1992, p. 9

⁴⁶ Baran and Davis, 2006, p. 74

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 75

⁴⁸ Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*, London: Vintage 1994, p.1

that will integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society” to individuals. Systematic propaganda is a prerequisite element for the individual's “fitting in” in a world of concentrated wealth and major conflicts of class interests.⁴⁹ Systematic propaganda can be easily identified in countries where the power is concentrated in state bureaucracy and the censorship is official – that is not the case, however, in a system of private media and no trace of official censorship to be found.

Hence, as society has come to be today, there are both government interests and mass – media interests projected through the media; searching for more power or money (in this model power and money are equal). The dominant class, consisting of not only the executive, but other powerful people of economics, media, and other fields, seeks to propagate its interests by spreading a certain “code” of behavior or beliefs to the wide public. “A propaganda model focuses on the equality of wealth and power and its multilevel effects on mass media interests and choices”, they claim.⁵⁰ In such an environment, the news are filtered to fit the effort of the privileged few get their message across to the unprivileged wide public. They analyze the essential ingredients, or “filters”, of the propaganda model.⁵¹

The “filters” Herman and Chomsky referred to are as such: First, there is the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth and profit orientation of the dominant mass media firms. The mass media firms have got implicated in business other than media as well, and non – media companies have now got interests in the media field. Thus, business interests are going to be communicated through propaganda, with the help of the business itself, the media. This is interrelated with the second “filter”, stating that advertising is the primary income source of the business of mass media. The third one is the reliance of the media on information provided by government, businesses and 'experts' funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of power. Since the mass media

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 2

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 12 - 28

and such sources of information are bound to a symbiotic relationship, due to economical and mutual interests, and since the media need a steady flow of information to survive, the “principle of bureaucratic affinity” prevails, which states that only other bureaucracies can satisfy the input needs of a news bureaucracy.⁵² Cooperating with recognizable and credible partners, such as the government or corporations is quite important for the news media, since they never run dry of information – their sources provide with them constantly. Moreover, the information coming from a credible factor can be thought of as presumptively accurate, helping the media to keep thinking of themselves as objective. However, Herman and Chomsky suggest that powerful sources are able to and easily and regularly do exploit media routines and their dependency, by the aforementioned factors, and they manipulate the media into following a special agenda – a propaganda. Another “filter” is the use of *'flak'* as a means of disciplining the media. A 'flak' is a negative response to a media statement or program. If 'flak' is produced on a large scale, or by individuals or groups with substantial resources, it can be uncomfortable and costly for the media and, therefore, probability of it being used can be a deterrent for the media to be objective. The final criterion for the existence of propaganda is the “anticommunism” as a national religion and control mechanism used by the government to keep the population monitored.

Theoreticians have focused on liberal states, especially the USA, UK or France, their administrations in different time periods and those administrations' relations with media. However, there is no literature for smaller or less “powerful” countries, and how the media affect the decision – making process when it comes to bilateral (troubled or not) relations. Having been in the past or being in the present a superpower, those states' relations with the media, and the media's effect and impact on the decision – making process seems to be a rather different situation. Given that one's decisions in the international arena might affect half the planet, or more, (when this decision is being made by the USA for example), it is only natural that one has to face the global mass media and be affected by their initiative on a matter or their reaction on a policy. Yes, the influence cannot

⁵² Fishman, Mark, *Manufacturing the News*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980, p. 143

be measured, or even observed, when we are talking about global “interests” or global mass media. However, how can one be sure that this very same thing happens with bilateral relations in countries, in which the decision – making process affects none other than their own population? This thesis focuses on the Greek and Turkish cases, how decision making process concerning their bilateral relations is taking place, and what the effect of the media is on the procedure under this scope.

Media Power

In order for the media to be in the position to have some kind of influence, there is the presupposition of them having some kind of power. What kind of power could that be, since no politician of our days can imagine getting elected, or designing a policy, without managing to gain support from the media? Before proceeding to the situation of the media in Greece and Turkey, it would be useful to think about media power, its sources and its expressions.

When examining the mass media as a power resource, Louw defines power as “the capacity to get one's own way when interacting with other human beings”.⁵³ “Media power”, Couldry says, “is generally too obvious to be articulated and criticized”.⁵⁴ However, when we ask ourselves what we know about media power, the answers that will come up shall be rather vague. It shall obviously have to do something with their ability to inform the public and make it react upon the information they gain, but put that aside, what else comes to mind?

The power of the media, this vague thing many have tried to give specific meaning to, has concerned this world since the birth of mass communication through the advances of technology – and with every new media being born, the same old questions and fears rise once more: what about

⁵³ Louw, *The Media and Political Process*, London: Sage Publications, 2005, p. 24

⁵⁴ Couldry, *The Place of Media Power: Pilgrims and Witnesses of the Media Age*, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 5

the “*corrupting influence (this medium) might have on the audience?*”⁵⁵

The media, through the functions analyzed earlier in this chapter, can act in many ways that show that they are powerful. For one, through the transmission of cultural legacy and ideas, they can act as “agencies of socialization”⁵⁶ for the society. They also assist, through the function of entertainment, Williams suggests, the maintenance the social order and the enforcement of social norms, while mobilizing the parts of society, the people, to participate in social development and change.⁵⁷

The power to push people into thinking about specific kind of issues became known as agenda – setting⁵⁸, a matter we have much talked about already, since it has become a main point in media theory. “*But*”, Williams claims, “*the media's agenda is being discussed to be shaped by others – interplay between interest groups, government officials, citizens and politicians amongst others in trying to influence what the media reports as important*”⁵⁹ – this in itself shows the power of the media. Thus, it is not only the profit the owner thinks of before acquiring a media company, but the power this media company will give them to transmit messages to a wide range of people, the public. Since most media companies, or, to put it differently, the income of most media companies (especially in Greece and Turkey) does not seem to be rather promising, there must be some other reason many are so eager to obtain a media company, or access to the media. The power of the media lies in their popularity, in society, as means of obtaining information. Those who manage to control them, manage to control a lot more than just them; and, to put this in terms of the ownership pattern followed in Greece and Turkey, where most media companies are owned by cross groups or conglomerates⁶⁰, a media company owner has the power to protect their interests and their other companies as well.

⁵⁵ Williams, 2003, p. 168

⁵⁶ Williams, 2003, p. 49

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 181

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ See chapter 2 of this thesis.

Power in every society can result to three outcomes: people either accept the workings of power as legitimate, or they resist them, or they think of themselves being powerless to do anything about them.⁶¹ The power of the media lies in their ability to pressure the government by making it acknowledge that they have the ability to legitimize the policies followed by the state in the eyes of the public opinion, or that they can make the public resist; in democracies, resistance to a certain policy can be a destructive force (for the policy itself) that might lead to it not being implemented. If we think about it more closely, the media have the power to “blackmail” politicians because of their ability to influence the public in such ways – in other words, they have the *power* to legitimize the official state's actions, or do the exact opposite, and make any policy, of which they might not be very fond, collapse.⁶²

Pluralism suggests that every member of the society has some amount and kind of power, but no one can have too much of it (too much however cannot be counted. Too much could be the power to alter someone else's power, to become the prevailing powerful group and so on). The competition between groups and interests makes power diffused, distributed among the members of society, the theory of pluralism goes on.

As Dahl puts it “*all the active and legitimate groups in the population can make themselves heard at some crucial stage in the process of decision – making*”⁶³; and media are there to ensure that the diversity of society, which needs to be maintained, is expressed through them.⁶⁴ But can those groups make themselves be heard indeed? The power of the media lies within this factor of diversity in societies as well. The media are supposed to be giving the chance to all members or groups or interests of society be heard. But maybe a group is not interested in being heard. Within the contemporary analytical framework of the media, the audiences' lack of participation “is rarely

⁶¹ Bennett in Curan and Park (eds), *De-Westernizing Media Studies*, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 204

⁶² So why do they not use that power? The answer must be the relations the media have with the official state itself. One way or the other, if the media come after a politician, who just so happens to be their source of information as well, or the policy that very person designs, guess who is not going to get any information next time they need it...

⁶³ Dahl quoted in Miliband, 1973, p. 4

⁶⁴ Williams, 2003, p. 50

questioned”⁶⁵; and what else could the audiences be characterized as, if not groups of the society?

Thus, then, the power of the media lies in their ability to *force*, through the information they choose to expose, those groups to speak up and claim their interests, or to *choose* which group's interests they are going to support by publishing its views and opinions. That is something directly linked with the agenda – setting function of the media, since the members of society will not react to a policy been drawn, when we speak of Greece and Turkey at least, unless they feel their interests are being threatened. Whether the media are thought of as able to do that, as having this power to influence the masses in such ways, or not, has been the question of the discussions about the media, ever since their appearance.

Another form of power the media have is that they have come to become parts of our lives, without which it is rather difficult for us to imagine the world nowadays. To ignore them is out of the question, both for us and for the foreign policy formulators. Besides especially for the governing elites of this world, which have been basing the legitimation of their actions on the media coverage, or, to put it differently, on how the media covered their actions and how the public interpreted them: “To have ignored them (the media) would have meant being left behind in a world that was developing new applications of the power of publicity and advertising thanks to advancements in the discipline of psychology, and therefore *new opportunities to use the media for political and diplomatic purposes*. Instead, therefore, of being reactive, there was a growing recognition for the need on the part of government for proactivity, which gave rise to ever – increasing state – sponsored media activity – press relations, information departments and the like – in an attempt to ensure that official versions of events prevailed over possible privatized media speculation. This resulted in the practice by government of, if not shaping the media's agenda, then influencing it rather than allowing the reverse to happen.”, Taylor writes.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Barbrook, *Media Freedom: The Contradictions of Communications in the Age of Modernity*, London: Pluto Press, 1995, p. 4

⁶⁶ Taylor, *Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media since 1945*, London: Routledge, 1997, p. 61

Leaving the agenda – setting and its complex relationship with both state and media for a minute, and examining more closely the statement mentioned right above, one can understand that the media and what they publish has become of great importance through the technological advancements of the past years, and has thus caused the media to gain more and more power over our daily lives day by day. The power of the media is the result of our inability to separate the realities of the world from the media themselves. Our dependence on them to obtain information, and the way we react to them, helps the foreign policy designers' programming their next move, and then announce, present and legitimize it through the media. The media have gained the power to be the inter-mediator between any policy being designed and then applied to reality.

Lukes proposes that it is easy to see how media are involved in the production and re-production of power in society, when power itself is viewed through the three-level perspective he suggests in the typology he offers us. The three levels of power in society are as such:

- organized coercion through which various agents force others to do things,
- level of the established regimes, rituals and institutions that shape public decisions (they define whose concerns about what issues matter),
- distribution of consciousness in society about the acceptability of naturalness of the first two levels.⁶⁷

Using Lukes's framework, Bennett states that media are involved in the production and reproduction of power in the three following ways: the first being, their ability to frame coercive power within societies in ways that can “encourage, discourage, hide or expose” power; secondly, the media “select and represent” political actors and policy problems in “formal political settings” (the media are able to, for instance, emphasize some actors and their workings, while they choose to assign less importance to others); and, last, they “transmit values, problem definitions, and images

⁶⁷ For more on the power in society, see Lukes, *Power, A Radical View*, London: Macmillan, 1974. This abstract has been taken from Bennett in Curran and Park (eds), 2000, pp. 204 - 205

of people in society that provide resources for people in thinking about their lives and their relations to government, politics, and society”.⁶⁸

What Bennett says, in different words, is that the power of the media is rooted in their functions; which is only normal, since the power of all factors lies within their actions, their abilities, what they are able to do. The media are in position to hide or show who has the power in society, emphasize or de-emphasize their workings, give meaning or comment on their actions, transmit their values or not, provoke the public into reacting to those in power or accepting it. Once more, this is an expression of media power which is strongly interrelated and is interacting with the influence it has over the public and the power the state has over the media.

Political power in contemporary democracies has a great deal to do with the legitimization of the actions of the government in the eyes of the public, their voters. And legitimization is the “dimension of the (political) process most obviously involving the media”, notes Louw.⁶⁹ He goes on stating that the “media's impact on political process has become much wider than simply a legitimization mechanism”.⁷⁰

Whereas their power has indeed expanded over other fields than that of influencing the way the public will react upon policies being realized by the government, the fact that the political elites perceive of media as being capable of providing legitimization for their actions, has made the media gain yet another power. This too originating mostly from the agenda – setting function of the media, thus embracing all the restrictions of this function, which we have already discussed, still remains a power of the media widely acknowledged, as seen by Louw's statement.

The elected representatives composing the government, or the parliament, are spending their time

⁶⁸ Bennett in Curran and Park (eds), 2000, p. 205

⁶⁹ Louw, 2005, p. 14

⁷⁰ Ibid.

giving interviews, monitoring the mass media to see what coverage they and their opponents get, which matters are being placed onto the public agenda, while deploying media to communicate with voters. Why they choose the media to defend their actions has been stated many times in this thesis: because of their power to influence the electorate. Most voters nowadays depend mostly upon the mass media to offer them information about the political process, the candidates and the political issues that they will or already have to face. Given their reliance on mass media for political information, Louw says, they become passive consumers of what journalists (semi – insiders⁷¹) choose to report⁷². And this passive characteristic of the society is what gives mass media the chance to become powerful in terms of both legitimization of the acts made by the political elites and their promotion in the eyes of the public during election periods, since the politicians spend considerable amounts of time and energy trying to influence mass media agendas to generate stories useful for their cause.

The mass media have been characterized as “sites of impression management” and “king makers” from the second half of the 20th century onwards⁷³; a label they have fought to gain. After all, being in a position to criticize, promote and interpret the state's workings, to influence and change people's minds is not a small thing. This is exactly the reason why media companies and institutions became such a desirable possession for those in seek of power – should that be power itself, or power to influence others in power. The ability to make or break leaders and to affect policies, to spread the ideas and information you choose would seem like a superpower coming out of a comic book. However, as the old saying goes, “with great power comes great responsibility”, so we might want to give our hero, the media, the chance to prove that they do not have that kind of power, so

⁷¹ Louw, 2005, pp. 17 – 18: suggests that people can relate to the (liberal) democratic process in 3 ways – as insiders, semi – insiders or outsiders. Insiders are engaged in all dimensions of the political game and include parliamentarians, policy – staffers, bureaucrats, political party insiders, advisers and so on. Semi – insiders are aware of the political game and the policy issues on the agenda; they are involved in “mass politics” as informed spectators of the political game. This group includes journalists, public opinion pollsters, analysts and the like. Outsiders are the citizens / electorate, passive consumers of the images disseminated by the media; they consume what the semi – insiders and insiders construct for them.

⁷² Ibid., p. 23

⁷³ Louw, 2005, p. 25

that they decline the responsibility as well.

In mass societies the circulation of information a central point in to “turning worldviews into a mass phenomenon, and / or making worldviews hegemonically dominant”⁷⁴. The mass media's capacity to work their way into doing that is not an outcome of their power to affect the public's views in a “stimulus – response way”⁷⁵. Many researchers have denied media's “directive” powers⁷⁶. Gerbner has tried to show that the media's power to influence has been the effect of “repeated, long-term exposure to media story – telling, because embedded in these stories are worldviews”, a phenomenon which he calls the “*cultivation effect*”⁷⁷. This slow process of influencing the public comes to an outcome after the public has been drawn into the worldviews the media have been presenting through their stories and the message has been absorbed⁷⁸. Obviously this effect of the media cannot be neglected by those in power; so the political players “necessarily must either find ways to develop symbiotic relationships with the media, or find other ways to influence or control media workers”⁷⁹. Nonetheless, it would seem again that the power to promote certain worldviews while they leave others behind, is one expression of media power as well.

Couldry used the term “symbolic power”⁸⁰, wanting to describe the media's “power of constructing reality”⁸¹. What or who gave them this power? People believe in the authority of the media discourse in many local contexts, Couldry supports; we believe “that most others believe the same, and because we act on the basis of these beliefs on countless specific occasions”⁸². And that is the basis of the media power; that people *believe* them, count on media to give them information upon

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 205

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Severin and Tankard, *Communication Theories: Origins, Methods and Uses*, White Plains, NY: Longman, 1988, pp. 323 - 324

⁷⁷ Gerbner et al., 1984, pp. 118 - 130

⁷⁸ Reep and Dambrot, “Effects of frequent television viewing on stereotypes: 'drip – drip' or 'drench'?”, *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol. 66 (3), 1989, p. 556

⁷⁹ Louw, 2005, p. 205

⁸⁰ Couldry, *The Place of Media Power: Pilgrims and Witnesses of the Media Age*, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 4

⁸¹ Bourdieu, translated by G. Raymond and M. Adamson, *Language and Symbolic Power*, Cambridge: Polity, 1991, p. 166

⁸² Couldry, 2000, p. 205

which they will discuss, act and react, within the framework the society provides us with. And the very same fact is what makes mass media powerful in the eyes of the governing elites, what makes them being unable to ignore them.

Conclusions

In this chapter the main theoretical framework about media – state relations, media pressure and media functioning has been given. The literature reviewed covers the main ideas that have evolved on the matter after it started drawing attention in the early 1990s. Partly because of the evolution of technology, which gave way to new media and new approaches as to how information were circulated; partly due to the general debate on communication evoked through the 1970s and 1980s, media and their relation to both the policies designed and followed, as well as their impact on their audience has been examined.

As far as Greek – Turkish relations are concerned, the formulation of foreign policy designed regarding the other party, and its relation with the media are concerned, the theories presented in this chapter provide the framework within which this research is conducted.

Most of the current literature on media – state relations was formed within the US political reality, which does not necessarily make it suitable for this part of the world as well. This is mainly because in Greece and Turkey the idea of *national interest*, the set of economic, military or cultural goals and ambitions of a country, plays an important part in the way the media are presenting news, especially when it comes to news on Greek – Turkish relations. The fact that the two countries have conflicting national interests in several matters, mainly as far as the Aegean is concerned, is prominent as to the way the news stories are reported. Such is not the case, as we saw, in the US pattern, which was the political and executive model taken under consideration for the formulation

of the theories linking media with the state, the pressure the media can bring upon the executive and the like – in none of the theories has national interest been mentioned. However, certain aspects of each theory mentioned seem to apply to the case under study on this thesis.

The media coverage of an event bonded with official information is one aspect of the indexing hypothesis that appears to be true for Greece and Turkey, so is the possibility of the media 'taking sides' on a matter of policy when the way that will be followed is still debatable, a part of the media – policy interaction model, or the concentrated ownership status of the propaganda model. Such elements of each theory shall be applied to the case of Greek – Turkish relations and the influence the media might have on them, but none of the theories discussed can be fully applied to this case, since the realities of Greece and Turkey are rather different than the ones of the US; since those theories were formulated to fit the US model, only some main aspects of them, mostly the ones fitting the media concept all around the world, can be applied here as well.

II. Media in Greece and Turkey

Introduction

Media as a concept include all means of communication; in other words all means that transfer information to the public. Media include newspaper, radio, television, magazines and a relatively new medium of transferring information, widely popular over the past fifteen years: internet; these communication channels promote information having to do with news, education and entertainment. Having already examined the functions of media as theoreticians have defined them in the First Chapter, we shall now proceed to another matter which has raised a whole conversation, of which the results are yet to be clarified: the function of media as an organ of influence in the foreign policy formulation.

When we speak of media, and especially about the influence they might have in – foreign, or internal - policy formulation, we must take several facts under consideration. First, we have to think of the kind of regime under which the media function. Speaking of regime in our days, one does not only mean the political framework under which the media function, but also the set of structuring factors in economy or law.⁸³ Second, we have to take under consideration the ownership status of the newspapers, magazines, television channels and so on. The first and second factors are of course interrelated in our societies, especially regarding the matter in question, since it is widely acknowledged that the media function not only under the political framework of the country they act within, but also within the framework of several interest groups as well.⁸⁴ Third, one must not forget the relationship between the media, their owners and the government.⁸⁵ Some might ask why this relationship is important enough to be examined; the answer shall be given if when examining a

⁸³ Miller, Derek, *Media Pressure on Foreign Policy: The Evolving Theoretical Framework*, New York: Palgrave – Macmillan, 2007, pp. 14 – 15

⁸⁴ Williams, Kevin, *Understanding Media Theory*, New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2003, p. 183

⁸⁵ Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*, London: Vintage 1994, p. 13

model of media ownership and media influence was to be born, regarding bilateral relations. This shall be more profoundly examined as we go along this thesis.

In this chapter the realities of the everyday function of the media in Greece and Turkey will be examined, such as the ownership patterns existing in both countries, the kind of power media obtain and their relation to the state. The examination of those patterns and their linkage to the theories presented on the first chapter shall be providing the framework for the case studies examined on the next stage.

Describing media in Greece and Turkey

GREECE

In Greece there are approximately 6.500 newspapers and magazines published⁸⁶. That is a vast number for a population of about 11 million people.

The composition of the Greek printed media is as follows: there are 94 national newspapers circulated. This total circulation can be categorized per genre; therefore, there are 10 morning, 12 evening, 22 Sunday, 19 weekly, 6 financial and 25 sports and Monday sports⁸⁷ newspapers.⁸⁸ The most popular newspapers are the free press *City Press* (271.000 readers), followed by *Metro* (250.000 readers). Among the daily newspapers, the market leaders are *Kathimerini* (47.700 copies), *To Vima* (44.140 copies), while the most popular in terms of readership seem to be *Ta Nea* (55.000 copies), *Eleftherotypia* (40.850 copies) and *Ethnos* (39.840 copies).⁸⁹

⁸⁶ See full list on the website: http://www.minpress.gr/minpress/index/mme_gr/list.htm and <http://www.minpress.gr/e-pasitheia/Default.aspx> (accessed March 10, 2011)

⁸⁷ 13 and 12 respectively

⁸⁸ Athens Daily Newspapers Publishers Association, 2010, website http://www.eihea.gr/default_en.htm (accessed March 10, 2011). Also, a comparison to the 2006 circulation of newspapers in Greece is available in Sunar, 2007, pp. 52 - 53

⁸⁹ For more information on the Greek media landscape, please visit the European Journalism Center Website: http://www.ejc.net/media_landscape/article/greece/#13 (accessed March 10, 2011)

Lambrakis Press S.A. is the largest publishing company in Greece. The Lambrakis Group owns *To Vima* (Sunday Edition), *Ta Nea* and *Ta Nea Sunday Edition*, as well as the sport newspaper *Exedra*. Lambrakis Group owned another newspaper, *To Vima* Daily Edition, which was shut down due to the existing, since 2009, economic crisis in Greece, and was turned to a news website. *To Vima*, as well as the majority of the Lambrakis Press SA publications, is considered to be expressing center – left political stance in Greece. Newspaper publication is only one field of Lambrakis Group's activities. It also deals with magazine publications (few of which are: *Tahidromos*, *Mommy*, *Vita*, *Marie Claire*, *Cosmopolitan* and others); with printing with Multimedia S.A. and Iris Printing S.A., the second being one of the biggest printing companies in Greece; with tourism agencies; with terrestrial television stations: again, one of the largest and most popular television channels of the country, MEGA Channel, and a radio station VIMA F.M. belong to the Group; with other activities, like production studios⁹⁰, press distribution agencies⁹¹, and internet portals – the www.in.gr website was the first news portal in Greece, as well as being the owner of a share of Papisotiriou Bookstores.⁹²

Another major publishing company of publishing is Pegasus Publishing S.A. The Pegasus Publishing Group publishes five newspapers, *Ethnos* Daily Edition, *Ethnos Sunday Edition*, *Aggelioforos* Daily Edition, *Imerisia* financial newspaper and *Goal News* sports newspaper. *Ethnos* is representing a center – left political tendency. It also publishes several magazines such as *Elle*, *Max*, *Astra ke Orama*, *Car and Driver*, *Idaniko Spiti*, and so on – the total of magazines published by this group is 14. Like the Lambrakis Group, the Pegasus group as well runs an internet portal: www.e-go.gr.⁹³ ,and has a share of stocks of MEGA TV channel. Under Pegasus Publishing SA publishing and printing companies function as well. The main stockholders of the company, the Bobolas family, run also corporations in different fields. The Attiki Odos SA, operating on a private

⁹⁰ Studio ATA S.A., which produces many TV series (among others) belongs to the Lambrakis Group S.A.

⁹¹ ARGOS S.A. is one of the two biggest distribution agencies in the country, this too belonging to the Group.

⁹² All information come from the official Lambrakis Group S.A. website: <http://www.dol.gr/group.htm> (accessed March 10, 2011)

⁹³ All information come from the official Pegasus Publishing S.A. website: <http://www.pegasus.gr> (accessed March 10, 2011)

road network in Greece, as well as AKTOR SA, which takes up the building of major road networks in Greece and in the Balkans (currently in Albania and Bulgaria).

Another publishing group in Greek media life is the Ch. K. Tegopoulos Publications S.A. publishing the daily *Eleftherotypia*, the *Eleftherotypia* Sunday edition (*Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia*), as well as some magazines (*Epsilon*, *9*, *Geotropio* and others). Even though *Eleftherotypia* editors adopt a social – democratic stance on a number of issues, more radical viewpoints are frequently represented on the newspaper. Under the Tegopoulos Group also operate the affiliated companies *PLANATECH Shipping Company* (with 86,91% participation), *Mediatel Telecommunications S.A.* (44% participation), *Argos S.A.* press distribution agency (24% participation), *Chrisi Efkeria Publications S.A.* (9% participation), *Fotoekdotiki Printing Company S.A.* (90% participation).⁹⁴ In other words, apart from the publication, the Tegopoulos Group deals with industrial printing sector covering all stages of printing with or without paper. It is also a strategic participant in companies of sectors as free-to-air television, book publishing and call centers.

The SKAI - Alafouzos Media Group consists of a television channel (SKAI TV), 3 radio stations (SKAI 100,3 , RED 96,3 , Freedom 88,9), news website www.skai.gr , a books publishing house and recently obtained⁹⁵ the *Kathimerini* daily and Sunday edition newspaper⁹⁶. *Kathimerini* follows a more conservative political line, mainly supporting the center – right wing in Greece. The Alafouzos Group runs also a shipping company.

The Eleftheros Typos Press Institution S.A., which owns the daily *Eleftheros Typos* and its Sunday edition *Typos tis Kyriakis*, politically affiliated with the center – right wing; the Apogevmatini Publishing Group, owning the daily *Apogevmatini* and its Sunday edition *Apogevmatini tis Kyriakis*,

⁹⁴ All information come from the Annual Financial Report 2010 of Ch. K. Tegopoulos Publications S.A., taken by <http://www.enet.gr/> (accessed March 10, 2011)

⁹⁵ Obtained *Kathimerini* in 2009.

⁹⁶ Information by <http://www.skai.gr/skai-group/> and <http://portal.kathimerini.gr> (accessed March 10, 2011)

also representing the center – right wing; the Real Media S.A., which has the *Real News Sunday* and the Real FM Radio, and Proto Thema S.A. which runs the *Proto Thema Sunday* newspaper are some of the other owners of newspapers in Greece.

In Greece, the press is considered to be the second most preferred source of information at present, the first being television.⁹⁷ Internet has also begun gaining ground as a source of information; especially after the economic crisis that has hit Greece after 2009, that lead to almost all newspapers have internet pages displaying the content of the newspaper itself, as well as readers' opinions and bloggers' websites.

TURKEY

In Turkey there are currently 2.459 currently circulating newspapers and magazines, a number rather low compared to the population of the country. Among these, the number of national ones is 55, the number of regional is 23 and the number of locals is 2.381.⁹⁸ The most popular daily newspapers with the highest circulation are: *Zaman* (800.000 copies), *Posta* (510.000 copies), *Hürriyet* (450.000 copies), *Sabah* (350.000 copies), *Milliyet* (250.000 copies) and *Habertürk* (210.000 copies)⁹⁹.

Major daily newspapers are owned by conglomerates or cross media groups in Turkey; as a result the mass media are considered to be monopolized in a large degree.¹⁰⁰

The Doğan Yayın Holding, Turkey's “leader in media”, as it is described in the official corporate profile, is the largest media group of the country. Apart from its activities in the sectors of energy,

⁹⁷ Sunar, Burcu, *Meanings Beyond Words: How Turkish Media Reflect the Greek Media – A Study of News Reports*, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2007, p. 53

⁹⁸ Sunar, 2007, p. 48

⁹⁹ For more information on circulation <http://dorduncukuvvetmedya.com> and http://www.ejc.net/media_landscape/article/turkey/#13 (accessed March 11, 2011)

¹⁰⁰ Sunar, 2007, p. 48

industry, trade, financial services and tourism, the Doğan Group deals also with the publication of many well – known and popular newspapers in Turkey, such as *Hürriyet*, *Hürriyet Daily News* (English edition), nationalist leaning, the liberal *Radikal*, *Posta*, *Fanatik* sports newspaper and has expanded its enterprise beyond Turkey, since it runs newspapers in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Hungary and Croatia. Doğan Burda Dergi Yayıncılık ve Pazarlama S.A., which belongs to the Group, plays a leading role in magazine publication since 25 magazines are being published under its umbrella. This company is not the only one acting at the magazine publication; there is also Doğan Egmont publishes magazines for children and the Doğan Kitap publishes books. Under its label, the Group owns national TV channels Kanal D and Star TV and has co-operated with Time Warner Group in a joint venture that founded CNN Türk, TNT and Cartoon Network. Moreover, the Group owns 4 radio stations: Radio D, CNN Türk Radyo, Slow Türk and Radyo Moda, produces television shows and music, runs a News Agency (Doğan Haber Ajansı), several websites, distribution and retail organizations and a printing company.¹⁰¹

Çukurova Group is another industrial and commercial conglomerate engaged in a wide range of sectors such as industry, construction, communications, energy, transportation, financial services and finally, media. This group manages its newspapers, magazines, TV channels and radio stations under its affiliated company TurkMedya. TurkMedya S.A. owns the nationalist *Akşam* and *Güneş* dailies¹⁰², several magazines, Alem FM and Lig Radyo radio stations, SkyTürk TV channel, as well as the Digtürk digital platform, production and media marketing companies.¹⁰³

Çalık Holding Group is yet another conglomerate dealing with media, among other sectors of activity, such as textile, energy, construction, finance, telecommunications and mining. Under Turkuvaz Medya Grubu four newspapers operate: *Sabah*, *Takvim*, *Yeni Asır* and the sports newspaper *Fotomaç*. Turkuvaz also manages the printing, publishing and distribution of about 25

¹⁰¹ DYH official website <http://www.doganholding.com.tr> (accessed March 11, 2011)

¹⁰² Used to own Tercüman daily newspaper, but it was closed in June 2010.

¹⁰³ TurkMedya official website www.turkmedya.com.tr (accessed March 11, 2011)

magazines. The Group also manages ATV channel. It provides digital and mobile services, production, distribution and promotion agencies and a news agency.¹⁰⁴

The next company group that has undertaken media sector along with its other activities is the Ciner Group. Just like the conglomerates mentioned before, this Group too deals with the sectors of energy, industry, finance and trade. Entering the media sector in 2002, it now manages the *Habertürk* newspaper, TV channel and radio station, magazines such as *Marie Claire* and *Süper Dergi*, owns the cable TV channel Bloomberg HT, a production company and a printing company.¹⁰⁵

The Ipek Medya Grubu owns *Bugün* daily newspaper, Bugün TV channel and recently obtained Kanaltürk TV channel, radio station and website from Ciner Group. It also runs a huge printing company.¹⁰⁶

After Demirören Company S.A., with activities in the sectors of industry, energy, construction and education, and Karacan's Number One Medya Grubu, mainly dealing with radio and internet media, joined forces, a new company emerged: DK Gazetecilik ve Yayıncılık S.A. This joint venture obtained Doğan Media Group's, nationalist leaning, *Vatan* and *Milliyet* daily newspapers in April 2011.¹⁰⁷

Ihlas Holding Medya – Ihlas Gazetecilik S.A. owns the pro-Islamic daily *Türkiye*, along with a news agency, Ihlas Haber Ajansı (IHA), TGRT News TV channel and publishes several magazines, while at the same time specializes in construction, education, packaging and trade.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ For more information on this group, please check <http://www.calik.com> and <http://www.turkuvazyayin.com.tr/> (accessed March 11, 2011)

¹⁰⁵ Information from the website <http://www.cinergroup.com.tr> (accessed March 11, 2011)

¹⁰⁶ For more information, check <http://ipekmedya.com.tr/> (accessed March 11, 2011)

¹⁰⁷ Information from the websites <http://www.demiroren.com.tr> and <http://www.numberone.com.tr/nr1> (accessed March 11, 2011)

¹⁰⁸ Taken from the website <http://www.ihlas.com.tr> (accessed March 11, 2011)

Feza Gazetecilik S.A. publishes the liberal / moderate Islamic *Zaman* and *Today's Zaman* newspapers¹⁰⁹; Samanyolu Yayın Grubu owns a news agency, three radio stations, a TV channel and a television program production company¹¹⁰. The two groups are interrelated thus creating a small cross media group standing for pro-Islamic tendencies.¹¹¹

As opposed to the aforementioned newspapers, which belong to either cross media groups or conglomerates, or even joint ventures, *Birgün* daily newspaper is supposed to have been founded by journalists opposing to the monopoly of the media by conglomerates.¹¹² Other newspapers are *Yeni Şafak*, *Yeni Akit* and *Milli Gazete*, *Cumhuriyet* – known as the voice of the Kemalists and *Özgür Gündem* – known to be the voice of the Kurdish nationalists of Turkey.¹¹³

But why are those facts important? Why is it important to whom the newspapers we gather our information from belong? As observed from the facts mentioned in this chapter, a new ownership pattern has occurred in both Greece and Turkey, as it has also occurred all around the world since the 1980s. This pattern, the concentration of the media companies on the hands that have or had little to do with media, affect both the quality and the way of presentation of the information the public has access to. Which, in turn, plays an important role in terms of influence. It should not be forgotten, and shall also be discussed later on, that the media gain their power by their capacity to influence the public opinion. The fact that people other than media professionals, protecting different kinds of interests (that are mostly connected to profit), have access to what and how is being published, can work as a leverage on behalf of the media owners towards the state officials. The same pattern, though in different terms, can be seen in the propaganda model of Herman and Chomsky. They proposed that concentrated ownership is the first “filter” of their model; the non-media companies having interests in the media field are propagating those interests, and the

¹⁰⁹ For more information, see <http://www.zaman.com.tr/> and <http://www.todayszaman.com> (accessed March 11, 2011)

¹¹⁰ See <http://www.samanyolu.com.tr> (accessed March 11, 2011)

¹¹¹ Sunar, 2007, pp. 48 - 49

¹¹² Baris, 2006 cited in Sunar, 2007, p.49 and official website of the newspaper <http://www.birgun.net/> (accessed March 11, 2011)

¹¹³ Sunar, 2007, p. 49

possibility of them actually being able to influence certain policies to the benefit of their non – media companies, is present.

The Impact of Media in Foreign Policy Formulation

A. The Ownership Pattern in Greece and Turkey

Ownership status of the mass media can really affect the way, as well as the kind of information the public gets to obtain. In any theory of mass media observed however, the ownership status of the mass media tends either to be neglected, or to be treated as the “bully” who shakes the government using its company and the influence it exercises to the public to get what they want, to turn the public's attention away from the real problems, or to be the “watchdog” the state must take into consideration or even fear, or even to propagate certain ideas that the public embraces after it has fallen in the propagandist “trap” the government and owners of the mass media have set for it.

Partly true, partly not, the fact is that the mass media are thought of influencing the public much, and even though the influence itself we cannot count, the mainstream belief of the mass media being able to shake the government, to change policies or to be the one “authority” politicians do not want to mess up with, unless it suits their purposes, remains. But when we talk of the power of the mass media to influence, we have to put a face to what we call mass media. In Greece and Turkey *what* is being published on the media is decided after a top-down procedure taking place, during which the suggestions of the owner of the communication channel are taken under serious consideration, then the chief – editor's or the ideas of other people strongly interrelated with the media organization, and then the rest of the stuff's (journalists') suggestions.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁴ Τίλις, Doğan, *Η Δημοσιογραφία στην Ελλάδα και στην Τουρκία “Ντρέπομαι, αλλά είμαι δημοσιογράφος”*, Μετάφραση Ηλίας Κολοβός, Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Παπαζήση, 2000, pp. 326 – 328 (Journalism in Greece and Turkey “I am embarrassed to be a journalist”)

Given that in Greece and Turkey the mass media organizations, or at least most of them, as we have seen in the first part of this chapter, are since the 1980s owned by conglomerates, the main financial source of which is not the media sector¹¹⁵, or by cross groups; and adding to that fact that most of Greek and Turkish journalists know that the medium they are working at follows a very specific political belief (usually the one the media owner embraces), the boundaries of which are not to be crossed by the journalists working for the medium¹¹⁶, it would seem that the force, upon which the influence the media might have on what is being published and what is not, can be ascribed to none other than the owner(s) of the medium.¹¹⁷

Whereas the agenda of every medium can be – but not necessarily is – influenced by its owner (among others – such as the chief – editor, the commercial department of the medium, or the journalists), we are yet to examine if the same thing happens to the agenda of the government of a country; and, more specifically, if the same thing could happen when we speak of foreign policy formulation in the bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey.

The mass media function in the four ways that have already been discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, that is, the three major social functions of the media: surveillance, through which the media give society the ability to observe changes happening around it and provides individuals with the opportunity to identify threats and opportunities; correlation, a function of interpretation of events and changes, bringing individuals of the society together to respond to the observed changes; and transmission, which leads to the passing from one generation to the next of cultural and social heritage¹¹⁸ – also known as the educational function of the media. Wright added the function of

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 387

¹¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 331 - 335

¹¹⁷ The owner's influence begins from within the media organization they run. For instance, a journalist that has discovered a scandal in one of the companies owned by the same owner of the medium they are working at, cannot publish it without facing the consequences. Tılıç, p. 331

¹¹⁸ See Lasswell, 1948, "The Structure and Function of Communication in Society" in Schramm and Roberts (eds.)

entertainment¹¹⁹. A fifth function has been added to those, the agenda – setting function of the media¹²⁰, which began as a theory, but was later generally accepted as a function of the media. It is also expected from the media to be functioning as “watchdogs” as well. This idea holds that the media work as a “safeguard” or the correct functioning of the policies in a state, revealing any mischief conducted by the executives, exposing them in such cases, thus 'making things right'. The “watchdog”, being the eyes of the public opinion, can work prohibitively for the members of the executive who might feel tempted by the power they gained when they came in office and might decide to manipulate this power.

In these functions lies the widespread belief that the media can influence the *public*, by presenting and interpreting news and facts which the individuals are called on to accept or react, by spreading common values to a society, while entertaining it and telling it “not what to think, but what to think about”¹²¹; and the *government*, mainly by setting the agenda and transmitting the reactions and opinions of the public, serving as a social platform for dialogue among the pressure groups and the government. We must not forget that the members of the government, or the parliament, or the opposition parties in Greece and Turkey should be conceived as the public as well, since they obtain a lot of the information they use by the media. This same group is the provider / source of the information the media share (or do not share) with the public.

But the media do not only serve as agenda – setters, do not just suggest to the public to what kind of news they need to attach importance to, they are not here to play merely the role of informing, entertaining and transmitting values, nor is the influence they might have directed only to the public. The media have become interrelated with both the way the designers of policy make their decisions and the way the public gets to know of them. It is not easy for a government official that

¹¹⁹ For more information check Wright, *Mass Communication: A Sociological Perspective*, New York: Random House, 1959

¹²⁰ McCombs and Shaw, “The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media”, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol.36, 1972

¹²¹ Lippman quoted in Cohen, 1963, *The Press and Foreign Policy*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 13

needs to make a decision to ignore the media; after all, they are whom he shall get help from to get re-elected. For instance, for a Greek or Turkish Prime Minister or Minister of Foreign Affairs to design a policy that would bring the two countries closer, while the media would choose to transmit stereotypes or opinions opposed to this policy, might actually jeopardize the realization of the policy, or, at least, the rhetoric followed by the administrative as the policy in question is concerned. In 2004, when the population of Cyprus had to vote for or against the Annan Plan, Prime Minister of Greece, Karamanlis, had at first declared his support to the Plan as a solution for the Cyprus issue. After the Greek – Cypriots voted against the Annan Plan, and while media had shown little, if any, support to the Prime Minister's decision to support the Plan, the executives utterly changed the rhetoric, stopped supporting the Annan Plan as a solution for the Cyprus issue and showed their respect to the decision of the Greek – Cypriots in any possible way, involving public declarations of support and the like. I am not suggesting of course that the media were the only factor playing a role on this shift in the Greek government's rhetoric, it was, however, a factor that should not be overlooked. Ever since the technology of the media started evolving, the politicians in every country understood the influence they might have on people. To ignore them would mean to lose any opportunity to use them for political and diplomatic purposes. The media can affect the public in many ways, especially by letting people know what goes on behind closed doors.

The owners of conglomerates understood the impact the control of the media could have on their businesses and, without having a clue about the media world, decided to enter the sector and managed it by acquiring large newspapers and television channels, radio stations and internet portals, thus managing to influence both the agenda, and the policies that could harm or give a boost to their other operations. Sönmez suggests that the entrance of conglomerates in the media sector cannot be explained, if we speak in financial terms alone, since the other sectors they are already employed in bring in more profit¹²²; thus, getting involved with a sector which brings solid profit, such as construction or shipping, makes sense; getting involved with a sector lacking this potential,

¹²² Sönmez, 1996, p. 79

such as media, cannot be out of concern for the financial upgrade of the firm. The owners of the corporations use the media to serve their best interests¹²³, by exercising pressure upon their antagonists or those who have the power to keep them from maximizing their profit.

This situation clearly has an effect on the media's relationship with the state. This is easily understood because when the government collaborates with, for the sake of argument, a construction company which is building a bridge for it, and after a while this same company enters the media sector, it is only normal that the construction company used as an example, will use the connections it might have in the government to retrieve information sources, or to put pressure on it to get a new project.

We shall now dive deeper into the relations between the media and the state, in order to understand better the relationship they have and how this serves our purpose to search for the influence the media might have in the foreign policy formulation, as far as the two neighboring countries of Greece and Turkey are concerned.

B. Relations of the media with the state

According to the research Tılıç conducted with interviews to members of the media in Greece and Turkey, in both countries the relationship of the media with the state seems to apply to “the carrot and the stick” policy.¹²⁴ Tılıç supports that ever since journalism was born, its representatives always had to connect with state officials, since the bureaucracy of the state is one of the most important sources of information for the media. Both Greeks and Turks agree, when they are asked to name few of their sources, that the state is their primary source of information.¹²⁵ This carrot and stick policy followed by the state can easily be identified: it comes in the form of cheap loans to the media, or by financial support, subventions and the like. The stick however, is a little less obvious,

¹²³ Tılıç, 2000, p. 360

¹²⁴ Ibid., chapter 10, pp. 394 - 442

¹²⁵ Ibid., pp. 394 - 395

in times of democratic rule anyway¹²⁶. It is easier to identify censorship, than it is to identify every single law that leaves out of the touch of media a category of news; as was for instance the law of Turkey which prevented journalists to write anything that could be thought of as “secessionist propaganda”¹²⁷.

Even though in Greece journalists do not feel threatened by the state at all (in fact, most of the journalists Tılıç interviewed supported that there is no form of state control on the media field), the “stick” can be conceived as the officials excluding journalists from the access on information.¹²⁸ In Turkey, the “stick” policy involves imprisonment, among other practices, especially during the 1990s.¹²⁹ As Turkish journalists suggest, there is also indirect pressure from the legislation regarding the media; direct recommendations by officials as to what shall be published and what should not; the communication channels supporting opposition are being silenced, basically by financial means and exclusion from the access to information.¹³⁰

The huge conglomerates which the most well-known media belong to (in Greece and Turkey), systematically support the political regime (or the opposition party, hoping that one day it shall come to power) and the system itself. Certainly, the political parties, once they rise to power, are to return the “favor”, to support their political friends by any means available to them – those being mainly financial support, cheap loans and the like.¹³¹ However, the relationship does not cease to exist, once the favor is returned. The access of information, or even the speed on access of information, is an evidence of this on-going relationship. For instance, the political party which was supported by a communication channel comes to power, and, even though it shares information

¹²⁶ Emphasizing this part “in times of democratic rule anyway”, due to the past of both Greek and Turkey political reality, since they both had to face juntas at some point of their history, when censorship was a common practice, as well as other “stick” policies – at times when the “carrot” policy seemed to be nowhere to be found.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 398

¹²⁸ Tılıç, 2000, p. 437

¹²⁹ In 1996 Turkey had 79 journalists imprisoned, while the total number for imprisoned journalists around the world was 185. According to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, at least 57 journalists are currently imprisoned in Turkey, while 10 more are awaiting trial. This is more jailed journalists than any other country at the moment.

¹³⁰ Tılıç, 2000, pp. 439 - 440

¹³¹ Tılıç, p. 404

with all other communication channels, it has the ability to pass on the information earlier to its supporters.

Herman and Chomsky suggest that in the world, as we know it today, the role of the media cannot be fulfilled, unless they work as organs of systematic propaganda, that serves the purposes of a dominant elite¹³². There is a structural relationship between the media companies and the state, which, we could say, supports the above statement: the media networks, stations, channels, press organizations need to acquire government licenses, thus being subjected to state control. This “technical legal dependency”, as Herman and Chomsky call it¹³³, can be used as a leverage in the agenda – setting function of the media and the revelation of “inconvenient” truth to the public. And this is how the state takes advantage of the media to create certain ideas about identity, the “enemy” of the country, and so on, thus propagating instead of being bearers of facts and events.

The constitutional basis of media ownership in Greece derives from paragraph no. 9 of Article 19. This paragraph outlines the obligations for media outlets to register ownership status and information regarding the financing of the outlet. Concentration of ownership is directly prohibited. Moreover, the National Council for Radio and Television (NCRTV) was established by law (1866/1989) as the main regulatory body in broadcast sector. The Council is involved in the procedure of granting licenses, making sure that license – holders respect relevant laws and imposing penalties for violations. In some cases, it even has the power to suspend / cancel licenses. Still, even after NCRTV was established, problems continued to emerge. For example, as far as television is concerned, 8 private national and 3 regional and local TV stations have official license, while another 123 have applied for it. Some of those 123 TV channels operate without license.¹³⁴ In Turkey, the situation is somewhat worse in that field. While an organ similar in function with the

¹³² Herman and Chomsky, 1994, p. 1

¹³³ Ibid., p. 13

¹³⁴ For more information please visit: <http://ejc.net/media> and http://ejc.net/media_landscape/article/greece/#I3 (accessed March 17, 2011)

NCRTV, the RTÜK (Radio Television Supreme Council) was established in Turkey in 1994¹³⁵, still all terrestrial radio and TV stations continue operating without licenses¹³⁶. Hence, in both cases, the state has the capacity to put pressure on the media on the grounds of them not having obtained the official license and are operating illegally, or can withdraw the license, or force the communication channels to seizing to exist by applying penalties.

On the other hand, the media need “a steady, reliable flow of raw material of news”¹³⁷ in order to survive. Having seen that the main body of information for the media comes from official (state) sources, the mass media are “drawn into a symbiotic relationship with powerful sources of information by economic necessity and reciprocity of interest”¹³⁸. Which brings us to the question of how the media acquire the information they publish, especially information that have to do with foreign policy.

C. Access to information

In both Greece and Turkey, the information on matters of foreign policy come mainly from the state; which is only normal, since the state itself is the one responsible for it. What is not, however, responding to what journalism in general, and functions of the media stand for, is the fact that in both countries, the journalists writing about “national matters” think it to be impossible to write something different than the official government position on a specific matter.¹³⁹ Examining the propaganda model, which is based on the relation between power and state, supporting that the media are being used by the dominant elite (in this case the state), to support its interests and get its messages across to the public¹⁴⁰, one can observe this pattern of identification of the sources of

¹³⁵ The responsibilities of RTÜK included assigning frequencies and issuing broadcasting permits and licenses to private companies, as well as giving penalties to the broadcasters.

¹³⁶ For more information please visit: <http://ejc.net/media> and http://ejc.net/media_landscape/article/turkey/#13 (accessed March 11, 2011)

¹³⁷ Herman and Chomsky, 1994, p. 18

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Tılıç, 2000, p. 415

¹⁴⁰ Herman and Chomsky, 1994, pp. 1-2

information with officials, who have the power to share the information they have access to, or even suppress them, when they believe it to be necessary. This leads to certain ideas reaching the public, and others not to, thus creating a specific climate, specific concepts in the minds of the people.¹⁴¹ For instance, the fact that Greeks and Turks perceive each other as an enemy, or did so in the not so distant past, is the result of years of them being “fed” this idea, through media and education. It is unimaginable for a Greek or a Turk journalist to follow a line different than the one that has been drawn from the main state ideology. Under these circumstances, the journalist seizes to speak out the truth, or even to search for it, and their job applies to the rules of propaganda.¹⁴²

According to Tılıç, the most important criterion to identify acts of propaganda taking place is to search if an effort to spread official ideas and official data, in a very systematic way, is taking place; so that certain concepts are created in the minds of people, their way of thinking is manipulated and the results from the propaganda are positive to the propagandist. Also, Tılıç suggests, in media the concept of propaganda means the production and transmission of news in a top – down procedure and within a patronizing relationship¹⁴³.

Within this “where do I get the information I need to have my news?” framework, the journalists do not only think of the official line they will not deviate from; they also have to think of the – sometimes rather vague - “national interest” concept they feel they have to defend, as well as the taboos existing in a society. The belief that “one must not write about an issue that would harm the national interests of their country, even if it is true” is rather common in Greece and Turkey.¹⁴⁴

In addition to all these, the contemporary debate on media – state relations and decision – making process commands that the media maintains the power to shape the agenda through the influence

¹⁴¹ Herman, *Beyond Hypocrisy – Decoding the News in an Age of Propaganda*, Boston, MA: South End Press, 1992, p. 5

¹⁴² Tılıç, 2000, p. 415 and p. 417

¹⁴³ Tılıç, 2000, p. 416

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 420

they sustain over the public opinion.¹⁴⁵

D. The Role of Media in the Formulation of Foreign Policy

After having presented the ownership status of the mass media in Greece and Turkey, their relations with the state and how they obtain information and create news, the time has come for the framework of the media's influence on the formulation of foreign policy to be examined, more appropriate for Greece and Turkey. Several models have been created to explain the influence the media can have upon foreign policy formulation, what it is, how it works and so on. Here, only few of them are presented, the ones whose application upon Greek and Turkish realities shall be examined in the following chapter.

Robinson has described media as “consent manufacturers”¹⁴⁶. The mass media are simply, he suggests, promoting government foreign policy. He goes on by stating that the extent to which the media have any effect on foreign policy formulation – or internal policy formulation, for that matter – depends upon three variables: how united the governing elite are; the extent of controversies within the policy elite; and the extent to which the executive has a firm policy¹⁴⁷. Consequently, if the governing elites are united over the policy that is being designed, the media show the tendency to help them “manufacture consent”, so that these policies be implemented. In such cases, the media do not have any influence on foreign policy formulation. If, on the other hand, controversies within the elite exist, the media will reflect these; but, should, as opposed to their differences, the elites come to the formulation of a policy, the media can, again, not influence the policy formulation¹⁴⁸.

¹⁴⁵ Miller, 2007, p. 21

¹⁴⁶ Robinson, 2002, p. 31. “Manufacturing consent” is a term firstly used by Walter Lippmann. This phrase was then taken to the title of Herman and Chomsky “Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media” (1998). Summing the argument being made, it refers to the media's serving to mobilize support for the special interests that dominate the state activity.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Bennett, “Towards a Theory of Press – State Relations in the United States”, *Journal of Communication*, Vol. 40 (2) 1990, pp. 103 – 125 – same opinion reflected on Hallin, *The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam.*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986

When these conditions apply, adds Louw, the media balance them by affirming government foreign policy directions, “largely because there exists a policy direction which the government promotes through its publicity machinery”¹⁴⁹. Therefore, this role of the media suggests that they are merely the helpers of the governing elites to “manufacture consent”.

The “carrot and stick” policy followed in Greece and Turkey, as far as media are concerned¹⁵⁰, along with the acknowledgment by journalists in both countries that they actually conceive it to be unthinkable to follow a line different from the one the state has drawn¹⁵¹, give out a hint about the media accepting their role as “consent manufacturers” in the foreign policy formulation framework in both countries. Having seen the complexity of their relationship with both the state and their owners though, we can also find some other ways that the media get involved in this procedure as well.

Another view of the media's role within foreign policy formulation is their being thought of as “lapdogs”; as tools of the ruling class (Marxist view)¹⁵². This statement suggests that every context has a “dominant class / class alliance”¹⁵³ and that dominant class have the power to develop mechanisms ensuring that the ideas and worldviews in circulation “are appropriate to the reproduction of the existing social order”¹⁵⁴.

This is also depicted in Herman and Chomsky's work. While presenting their propaganda model, they state that, by being used several ways, at times obvious (such as being the subject of censorship), at times less obvious (when the state bureaucracy uses news “filters”¹⁵⁵), “media serve the ends of a dominant elite”¹⁵⁶.

¹⁴⁹ Louw, 2005, p. 259

¹⁵⁰ Tılıç, 2000, p. 394

¹⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 404 and 415

¹⁵² Louw, 2005, p. 260

¹⁵³ Louw, 2005, p. 260

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Noam and Chomsky, 1994, p. 2

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 1

When Tılıç interviewed journalists from both sides of the Aegean, they revealed that, whereas they did not think of themselves as propagandists, they believed that many of their colleagues were.¹⁵⁷ However, Tılıç suggests, the people of the media have predefined views of the world, especially in matters of foreign policy; and that one of these predefined views is that they are not to write or publish anything that would harm the national interests of their country, even if what they have learned and decided not to publish is true.¹⁵⁸

Media can also undertake the role of the “watchdog”, not only in foreign policy formulation process, but in any form of political discourse. This role presupposes that journalists do not just accept what they are being told by government officials, but dig in deeper in search of the real circumstances, acting as “critical eyes and ears” of the masses¹⁵⁹. This independent watchdog notion, however often it might be met in liberal democracies, is often seen in Greece and Turkey under the circumstances of crises or wide public disapproval of the policy followed by the government. Liberal journalists usually believe that they can challenge the authority of the governing elites and become actors within the policy process, especially by placing the mass public's views onto the agenda and by making the decision – makers pay attention to public opinion¹⁶⁰.

In their search for truth, the journalists in Greece and Turkey do not forget that they cannot, or will not, make news any event -truthful as that may be- they come across. What makes it to the front page, or even what makes it to being published, has to do with what the public wants to or expects to see published and fits its beliefs and values¹⁶¹; and, as we saw earlier in this essay, with the lines that both the governing elites and the owners of the mass media have drawn, and are expected to be followed by the media workers. However, in times of crises or of controversial attitudes within the

¹⁵⁷ Tılıç, 2000, p. 416

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 419 - 420

¹⁵⁹ Louw, 2005, p. 261

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Tılıç, 2000, p. 529

governing elite, or in times of denial on behalf of the public to support the governing elite's policies, there lies a chance for the Greek and Turkish media to take a break from being “lapdogs” or “consent manufacturers”, and become what their workers appear to be having in mind about their occupations: reveal the truth¹⁶² and become “watchdogs”.

Media can also play the role of diplomatic channels in the rare cases -in Greek – Turkish relations framework at least- of interruption of diplomatic relations and communications. Even though being the replacement for the diplomatic channels themselves is a crucial and delicate role, the media could succeed in this role. In such cases “(the media) *become conduits for official exchanges, reluctant publicists for the actors, and valuable sources for information for governments*”¹⁶³. However, this proposal can work only in extraordinary cases, when all other means fail to produce an outcome, since this “megaphone diplomacy”¹⁶⁴ ignores the fact that diplomacy involves compromises the media are not in position to make.

Louw has described the next role of media in foreign policy formulation as “morality play”¹⁶⁵. This perspective role suggests that the media indeed have an effect in the procedure for two reasons; the first being that policy makers are personally influenced by emotive stories, and the second that the media assumed, due to the fact of the mass public being a part of democratic policy making, to be able to shift public opinion.¹⁶⁶

Media can also be seen as powerless in the formulation of foreign policy, as having no effect in the procedure at all. Since all the official information and considerations on foreign policy matters lie on the hands of the governing elites, and the media can only use the public's considerations on matters of foreign affairs, and so much as the information they have obtained by the state officials,

¹⁶² Ibid, p. 521

¹⁶³ Mowlana, “The Media and Foreign Policy: A Framework of Analysis”, in A. Malek (ed), *News Media and Foreign Relations. A Multifaceted Perspective*, Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1998, p. 36

¹⁶⁴ Louw, 2005, p. 262

¹⁶⁵ Louw, 2005, p. 262

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

their stories can only provoke “moral outcries”¹⁶⁷, upon which alone the design of foreign policy cannot be based. Mowlana suggests that policy elites, professional foreign policy makers, are the ones that lead on this “dance”¹⁶⁸, with the mass media following the path that has been paved for them. Ironically enough, they are also used as “convenient scapegoats”, with policy makers implying that the media influenced a policy that failed, adds Louw.¹⁶⁹

Within the framework of information sources examined earlier, this pattern seems to fall into place when we speak of Greek and Turkish media. It is a pattern we shall examine more thoroughly in the next chapter, among others.

A feature of the media we should not forget when examining their relation to foreign policy formulation, and the importance of which cannot be denied, is the fact that the media help the governing elites to keep the mass public in broad agreement with government foreign policy – should the foreign policy change, the media will shift the position, which they had up to that point supported, to fit the government's foreign relation agenda, thus enabling the government to implement a legitimized by the public foreign policy.¹⁷⁰ In other words, the government need the support of its population if it is to proceed to a foreign policy initiative. And it also needs the media coverage to be sympathetic towards this initiative, so as to gain the support it needs by the public to proceed with its workings.

The media can influence foreign policy formulation in all the above – mentioned ways. But the question remains: are the media *always* able of influencing the foreign policy formulation? Louw, adopting some of Robinson's criteria¹⁷¹, supports that in order for the media to have some kind of impact on the foreign policy formulation, the following criteria have to be met: firstly, policy

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 265 - 266

¹⁶⁸ Mowlana, 1998, p. 31

¹⁶⁹ Louw, 2005, pp. 265 - 266

¹⁷⁰ Louw, 2005, p. 269

¹⁷¹ Robinson, 2002, p. 31

makers have to gain in some way from “using” the stories of the media; secondly, policy makers have to be divided over a matter¹⁷².

Conclusions

In this chapter we have examined the way the media function, the mass media ownership pattern in Greece and Turkey, the relationship of the media with the state, the power of the media and its expressions and some models concerning the roles the media can have on foreign policy formulation.

After mixing and matching media theories with media realities in Greece and Turkey, it would be useful, I believe, to sum up some observations before proceeding to the next chapter, to avoid confusion in the matter in question.

The *mass media ownership* status follows a pretty much alike pattern in both Greece and Turkey, which is not change to the rest of the world either. After having seen in detail what the ownership situation of the mass media is like, the following have been observed:

1. media in both countries are basically owned by conglomerates or cross groups;
2. owners of the mass media are involved and have a saying on what is being published;
3. each media company follows a special pattern of ideas, a specific political line; usually that of the owner or the group's the interests of which the owner supports;
4. owners of conglomerates that have been involved in the media business, gain solid profit from activities other than the media; had formerly not any particular knowledge of how the media world works, and entered this sector for reasons other than profit, once they realized that media were capable to influence those in power.

As far as the *relationship of the media with the state* is concerned, we have to focus on the

¹⁷² Louw, 2005, pp. 262 - 263

following points:

- In Greece and Turkey the relationship of the media with the state applies to the “carrot and stick” policy;¹⁷³
- in both countries, at least as far as foreign policy is concerned, state officials are one of the primary sources of information for the media workers – a relationship of dependence of the state, on behalf of the media, is observed;
- usually the media support the system¹⁷⁴;
- generally there is a symbiotic relationship between mass media and the state, due to reciprocity of interests and economic necessity;
- media workers in both Greece and Turkey refuse to appear being opposed to the government's position in national matters.¹⁷⁵

In chapter 1, the ways in which *media power* is expressed have been examined:

- the media have the power to set the agenda. They can provoke people's thinking and discussing specific matters, while they can ignore or suppress other matters from being on the public agenda;
- power of the media lies in their popularity as means of obtaining information. They have become inseparable part of individuals' daily lives;
- the media have the power to help the state legitimize the policies followed by it, or to provoke de – legitimization in the eyes of the public, thus preventing a policy from being implemented – therefore, have the power to put pressure on the government;
- they have the power (and the responsibility) to express the diversity existing in society;

¹⁷³ Tiliç, 2000, see earlier in this chapter.

¹⁷⁴ As we have seen, generally the media company's owner supports a political party or ideology or view attached to the system. Since, however, they have the power to put pressure on the journalists / meaning makers working for them, they support the same view. This is not to say that they are forced, since most of them know that when working in, for instance, a newspaper supporting the opposition party, they are expected to report on how bad the government is doing. Most of the media workers indeed share the same political beliefs as the medium they work at supports.

¹⁷⁵ Tiliç, 2000, chapter 10

- media function as inter-mediators between the mass public and the governing elite;
- the media have the power to cultivate certain worldview's in audiences' ways of thinking and acting;
- they have the power of constructing reality;
- the power of the media is rooted in their functions and depends on whether the public believes what they publish.

Last, we have seen several models of the *role the media can play in the formulation of foreign policy*:

1. media as “consent manufacturers”;
2. media as “lapdogs”;
3. media as “watchdogs”;
4. media as diplomatic channels;
5. media as “morality play”;
6. media as powerless.

Keeping all those observations in mind, we shall proceed to the next step of the media's role in the formulation of foreign policy in Greece and Turkey, since 2004.

III. Greek – Turkish Relations

Formulation of Foreign Policy within the Media Framework

Introduction

Greeks and Turks share more similarities than differences. The members of the two nations look very much alike physically, share the same way of life, eat the same foods, entertain themselves with the same ways, share the same mentality and current culture. It is thus hard to imagine them criticizing each other; and yet they do¹⁷⁶. Historically, Greece and Turkey have perceived each other as enemies. Why that is, has been studied again and again; the issues they have to settle between them may not be much, yet they are not insignificant either.

This perception of the neighbor as a “historical and national enemy”¹⁷⁷ seems to be changing over the past 12 years. 1999 was the decisive point in the relations between Greece and Turkey. Following years of tension between the two countries in several occasions, such as the Imia / Kardak crisis or the veto on behalf of Greece on Turkey's running for candidate member in the EU, it ended up being the year mostly studied by all those interested in Greek – Turkish relations. After the disastrous earthquakes that struck both Turkey and Greece, the *neighbor* immediately responded by sending help to the *other*, the *enemy*. It was the beginning of what later came to be known as the “earthquake diplomacy”, and led the two governments to proceed towards cooperation and improvement of their relations. During the same year, the Greek government abandoned the veto to the candidacy of Turkey for full membership in the European Union¹⁷⁸, a veto that was blocking any positive development for Turkey – EU perspective, thus promoting the improvement both countries had sought to bring about to their relations.

¹⁷⁶ Sunar, *Meanings Beyond Words: How Turkish Media Reflect the Greek Media – A Study of News Reports*, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2007, pp. 36 - 37

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 1

¹⁷⁸ Keep in mind that in Greece the veto was always presented as a great achievement on behalf of the Greek government, while in Turkey was seen as the main problem in its accession in the EU.

Even though the rapprochement managed to be achieved in a political context, there are still some voices, in both sides of the Aegean, considering the other party as the “aggressor” and the “threat”, while at the same time, assuming itself to be “the positive, solution oriented, constructive side which is also too intrepid to shy off the aggressive or provocative moves of the other”¹⁷⁹.

For understanding whether the media can or cannot have an effect on the formulation of foreign policy concerning the bilateral relations of Greece and Turkey, news reports will be examined, in selected dates preceding and following the events chosen; the tone those reports were written under, the words and idioms used, as well as the official reaction to the events and to the news reports will be researched, in order to get to a logical explanation of the media role on the matter in question. The newspapers selected to be examined are Greek *Eleftherotypia* and *Kathimerini*, and Turkish *Hürriyet* and *Zaman*. Apart from being mainstream media, they are also very popular (in circulation and reading terms), and get published online as well. In addition, many of the journalists working for those newspapers also write on blogs, expressing more or less the same ideas they express when writing for the newspapers; thus, by checking the reports of those communication channels, another new medium will indirectly be examined: that of the internet.

Before proceeding to examine the media's role in foreign policy formulation, concerning their bilateral relations, we first need to know what the official positions Greece and Turkey stand upon as far as “the neighbor” is concerned.

Official stances of Greece and Turkey about each other

The official position of the two countries, concerning the neighbor, as this is displayed by official channels, such as the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of both parties shall now be examined.

¹⁷⁹ Sunar, 2007, p. 38

Greece

Greece's foreign policy is formulated based on a set of principles related with stability in the region, inviolability of the borders, peaceful settlement of disputes according to International Law, and respect of human rights. Greece's foreign policy towards Turkey is designed and implemented on the basis of this framework.

Greece recognizes the Cyprus issue as a great parameter in Greek – Turkish relations. It supports that the Cyprus issue and any progress or set-back concerning the matter always influences the bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey. It is its belief that a possible solution of the Cyprus issue would contribute to the improving of the relations between the two parties as well.

Greece identifies as points of friction between the two parties the following: Turkey has been contesting the sovereign rights of Greece in the Aegean; specifically Greece's sovereignty over a number of islands, islets and atolls in the Eastern Aegean, the Greek jurisdiction over the Athens FIR, Greek air space; it also questions Greece's right to extend its territorial waters and is seeking to achieve the general demilitarization of the islands of Eastern Aegean; and there is the issue of delimitation of the Continental Shelf, a dispute that Greece recognizes as the “only legal difference” between Greece and Turkey. On those matters, Greece's official stance is that the status of the Aegean is non – negotiable, since it has been clearly determined by International Law and International Agreements, and that the only matter that needs to be solved, according to International Law, is the delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Aegean.

As far as the EU prospects of Turkey are considered, Greece supports the prospect of Turkey becoming a full member of the EU, under the presupposition that all terms and conditions applying to all other members should have been met before Turkey's full accession to the EU. It is the strong belief of Greece that Turkey's adoption of the *acquis communautaire* as the procedure of its

accession moves along, and the Greek – Turkish rapprochement on issues of soft policy, will contribute to the improvement of bilateral relations.

Representatives of every aspect of society have managed to bring closer than ever the two countries, improving steadily their bilateral relations and widening the spectrum of collaboration between the two countries on issues of mutual interest that are not politically sensitive. Since the earthquakes that hit both countries in 1999, and the assistance provided by both nations to each other, there have been many contacts between the countries, not only in official / state level, but in so many other levels as well; contacts that led to the reduction of the information gap existing in public opinions in both countries.¹⁸⁰

Turkey

Turkey holds it that the relations between Greece and Turkey are fundamentally based on the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, and the balance of mutual rights and interests is set up by this Treaty.

After a long – lasting period of tension and mistrust between Greece and Turkey, Greek – Turkish relations entered a totally new era in July 1999. Regarding the rapprochement starting in 1999, Turkey, along with Greece have begun bilateral meetings and exchanges of views between the respective Prime Ministers and Foreign Affairs Ministers, laying down the political ground for promoting and reinforcing ongoing dialogue and cooperation process. High level contacts and visits have also been instrumental in keeping the momentum of this process.

The following mechanisms have been established in the course of dialogue and cooperation process: exchange of regular visits between Ministers of Foreign Affairs; exploratory contacts

¹⁸⁰ All data about Greek foreign policy have been retrieved by the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece <http://www.mfa.gr/> . (accessed April 1, 2011)

regarding the Aegean issues; regular political consultations; and talks on Confidence Building Measures (CBM). The establishment of this mechanism signals the beginning of a “structured” and “institutionalized” phase in Greek – Turkish relations, so that they could be upgraded from “rapprochement” to “partnership”.

The exploratory contacts, launched in May 2002, paved the way for the first time, for substantial talks on the whole range of Aegean issues and on possible means of their peaceful settlement. Political consultations enable Greece and Turkey to explore out each other's views and positions on various regional and international issues.

The prevailing constructive atmosphere has also positive implications on the development of closer ties and achievement of concrete results in various fields such as trade, energy and transportation.

The friendly relations between Greece and Turkey based upon mutual respect, understanding and trust are important, not only for the economic welfare and political stability of the two countries, but also for the enhancement of the peace, stability and security in the region.¹⁸¹

The official stance of Turkey as far as the Aegean is concerned, is that there are unresolved issues between Greece and Turkey in the area, involving the Continental Shelf, air space, jurisdiction of FIR operating in the area, disarmament of the islands and the jurisdiction over the islands, islets and atolls of the Aegean¹⁸².

¹⁸¹ All data for the Turkish Foreign Policy have been retrieved from the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey <http://www.mfa.gov.tr> (accessed April 2, 2011)

¹⁸² Davutoğlu, “Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2008 p. 268

The Media in the Formulation of Foreign Policy : 3 Cases

Cyprus as a full member of the EU, “Dogfight” over the Aegean, Papandreou's visit to Erzurum

Three cases have been chosen to be examined in this thesis, for an explanation about the role of the media and the influence they might have on the foreign policy of Greece and Turkey in their bilateral relations to be given: the EU accession of Cyprus, as the island has always been an important factor in the bilateral relations of the two countries; the “dogfight” of 2006, that took place over the Aegean, leading to a plane crash that caused a Greek pilot to lose his life; and the ongoing procedures of “secret” talks between Greece's and Turkey's officials (Prime Ministers and Foreign Affairs Ministers specifically).

These three cases have been chosen for several reasons. First, every situation is rather different from the next. Secondly, they are features included in the daily reality of Greek – Turkish bilateral relations.

The first case, although all the facts and parameters behind the event are not directly examined in this thesis, reflects an issue that has never left the minds of foreign policy makers in both sides of the Aegean. Officials of both countries have spent a great amount of time and effort for the Cyprus issue to be solved – what the solution should be, however, does not coincide in Greece and Turkey, since the views on the matter are different. In any case, the Cyprus issue has been a leverage to any effort for the two countries to approach each other up until 1999, and a ghost over their shoulders up until today – an issue which has not stopped bothering any Prime Ministers or Ministers of Foreign Affairs that ever came to office, a problem the solution of which is yet to be found. Both Greek and Turkish administrations have supported the Greek – Cypriot and Turkish – Cypriot populations respectively, on the grounds of being the “motherland” of those populations, and protecting their rights and their decisions. In Ahmet Davutoğlu's words: *“In keeping with its legal and moral rights and responsibilities stemming from the 1960 treaties on Cyprus, Turkey, as a*

guarantor power and motherland, has always stood by the Turkish-Cypriot people in their decades-long struggle to uphold their inherent rights on the island. It goes without saying that Turkey's unwavering solidarity and political, economical and moral support for the Turkish-Cypriot people shall continue in the future."¹⁸³ Same declarations exist in the Greek side as well, showing the important place Cyprus holds on their foreign policy agendas, and why, even though it is not an issue of bilateral relations, it is a problem that affects those relations.

The second case involves an incident that occurred under very common circumstances: the “dogfights” among aircraft of both Air Forces of Greece and Turkey, which, over the years, have become a usual and daily practice between the two countries, rather than threats, even at times when their relations are not in crisis. Moreover, this is not considered as big a problem by the Turkish side while it seems to be of high importance for the Greek side, and hence, there is a problem of definition of the problems this situation evokes. Even though in “dogfight” incidents officials avoid to make statements in general, in this case former Foreign Minister Bakoyannis showed the dissatisfaction of the Greek government, not only about the incident itself, that cost the country with the loss of a pilot, but also about the intensity and the commonness of such practices: “in situations like this the culprit is the mass military activity – beyond all reason – of our neighbor in the Aegean”¹⁸⁴.

The third case is the Prime Minister of Greece having being invited and attended the “Visionary Diplomacy” conference, held in Erzurum on January 2011. This case can be seen as an example of the on-going procedure of meetings between Greek and Turkish officials, in an effort to build a strong and friendly relationship through exploratory talks. Even though it is this case that is

¹⁸³ This part has been taken from an interview of Foreign Minister of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoğlu, to Alexis Papachelas, for newspaper *Kathimerini*, 06 March 2011 and presented in the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey as well. You can read the full interview here: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/ENFORMASYON/Turkish%20FM%20sets%20out%20terms%20for%20Aegean.pdf> (accessed April 3, 2011)

¹⁸⁴ In her speech at the Meeting of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense and Foreign Affairs, 30 May 2006. You can read the whole speech at http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/31052006_McC1932.htm (accessed April 4, 2011)

examined on this thesis, one must not forget that this kind of procedures have been going on for years. As former Foreign Minister Bakoyannis put it¹⁸⁵ “*the so called 'low – policy' issues are being worked out steadily and effectively. But are they 'low policy' issues? Are economic cooperation, energy, tourism, and other kinds of cooperation between the two peoples – cooperation that is developing rapidly – 'low policy' issues? Do these not help effectively in our broader pursuit, which is none other than the improvement and normalization of our relations with Turkey?*”. It is within this framework that nowadays Greek and Turkish administration representatives of all fields come together and visit each other's country, and this has become an aspect of Greek – Turkish relations that cannot be ignored.

All three cases represent both the foreign policy agenda of the two countries, and the ups and downs their relationship have had. The Cyprus issue is a fundamental issue always taken under consideration in the formulation of foreign policy in Greece and Turkey, even though it is not an issue of their bilateral relations, since it involves a third party; the “dogfights” represent an every day reality, and a constant reminder of the situation in the Aegean; the rapprochement through talks and meetings and official or unofficial visits of state representatives shows the will of the two countries to resolve the issues between them and become more than just “neighbors”, to become “friends” - all three are expressions of the Greek – Turkish relations, as they have evolved through the years.

- ***Cyprus as a Full Member of the EU***

Cyprus became a full member of the EU in May 1st, 2004. The country joined the Union as a divided island.¹⁸⁶ Turkey was opposed to the idea of Cyprus becoming a full member of the EU

¹⁸⁵ In her speech at the Meeting of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense and Foreign Affairs, 30 May 2006. You can read the whole speech at http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/31052006_McC1932.htm (accessed April 4, 2011)

¹⁸⁶ For more information on Cyprus becoming full member of the EU and the situation on the divided island, visit http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/turkish_cypriot_community/index_en.htm (accessed April 4, 2011)

while the division of the island was still in place; Greece would definitely like to see Cyprus in the Union, even without the problem having been solved¹⁸⁷, and perhaps with the hope that the issue would be solved within the EU framework. The accession of Cyprus into the EU is the starting point of this research, which seeks to find media's influence in Greek – Turkish relations.

For this purpose, newspaper reports are going to be examined, starting from the day the Referendum in Cyprus was voted for, on the Turkish-Cypriot side, and against, on the Greek-Cypriot side, on the 1st of May 2004, and the week after the Cyprus becoming full member of the EU, along with the official visit of Prime Minister Erdoğan on 6-8 May 2004. Those reports will be examined in this chapter in order to realize if the media in both countries have associated the procedures taking place in Cyprus with the foreign policy designed by the two countries, and how much have their articles influenced or reflected the foreign policy followed by the representatives of Greece and Turkey.

On the 24th of April the populations of north and south Cyprus had to vote in a Referendum concerning the Annan Plan and its enforcement on the island before Cyprus entered the EU. The Annan Plan had been the hope of the UN and the EU for a solution that would reunite the island, so that Cyprus would enter the EU as a united island. Such a chance for union was not provided however, since the Greek – Cypriots voted an emphatic “No” to the Annan Plan, as opposed to the Turkish – Cypriot side, which voted for the Annan Plan to be enforced to the island. The “solution” was never applied and was left behind, as Cyprus entered the Union on the 1st of May, 2004.¹⁸⁸

The outcome of the Referendum in Cyprus was anticipated by Athens and Ankara; the Greek government of Karamanlis expected the Greek – Cypriots to vote “No”, even though at first

¹⁸⁷ Öztürk, Sertoğlu and Kaptan, “Cyprus – EU relations: Possible Scenarios for the Future”, *Pakistan Journal of Applied Sciences*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2002, p. 239 - 240

¹⁸⁸ All information taken from the newspapers “Kathimerini”, “Eleftherotypia” (Greece), “Hürriyet” and “Zaman”(Turkey). Please see Appendix for the articles used in this thesis.

supported the Annan Plan, and the Turkish government was certain that the Turkish – Cypriot side would vote “Yes”. The next morning found the media of the two countries commenting on the result of the Referendum, counting losses, wondering what would be the next step for Cyprus, what the EU and the UN would do about the Annan Plan, which never made it to being the solution that would reunite the divided island.

Kathimerini dealt with the issue in its articles “The first diplomatic moves of Athens”, “The next day demands bold solutions”, and many others; mainly supporting the decision made by the Greek – Cypriot population, while, at the same time, underlining the difficult position to which Greece had been put in the EU. The policy that the Greek government had followed the last days before the Referendum took place was that “Cyprus decided, Greece supports the decision”, as opposed to the support to the Annan Plan, before it was made clear that the Greek – Cypriot population would not accept the Plan¹⁸⁹. Other than the expressed satisfaction of Ankara about the way the Turkish – Cypriots had responded to the Annan Plan, Turkey was not further mentioned on the paper of 25 April 2004.

This can be explained by both countries' efforts to disconnect the Cyprus issue from the dimensions having to do with their bilateral relations, and connecting the issue with the EU itself. The press release of Turkey of May 1st, 2004, regarding the EU enlargement stated clearly and in a bitter tone that the Cyprus issue was now a problem of the EU: *“The Turkish Cypriot people have exercised their inherent constitutive power and expressed, through transparent and democratic process of referendum, their wishes for their political future within the EU as constituent partner of a united Cyprus. It is now incumbent on the EU to acknowledge and act upon the free and genuine expression of the will of the Turkish Cypriot people in this regard. (...). In view of these facts and circumstances, it is only the Greek Cypriots who will enter the EU on 1 May 2004 under the terms*

¹⁸⁹ *Kathimerini* 25/04/2004 – full article retrieved from http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_25/04/2004_101786 (accessed April 5, 2011)

of the Accession Treaty of 16 April 2003, which was based on a political and legal situation of a divided Island and consequently does not allow for accession of a united Cyprus to the EU. Thus, an international conflict is inevitably being imported into the European Union."¹⁹⁰ Thus, the Cyprus issue appeared to be disconnected from any influence from the Greek's administration policies (besides, Karamanlis seemed to be supportive of the Annan Plan before it was made clear that the Greek – Cypriots would not have agreed to it) in the eyes of the Turkish administration. It had become an issue involving only the two communities inhabiting the island, and the EU. Naturally, as seen before, the support of Turkey to the Turkish – Cypriot population is taken for granted.

Even though the same declaration of Cyprus issue now being the Union's problem was not made on behalf of Greece, at least not officially, it was not connected with Turkey and its bilateral issues with Greece either. In his speech "Principles and Priorities of Greek Foreign Policy", at the "Eighth Roundtable" organized by *The Economist*, Foreign Minister Molyviatis spoke of the Cyprus becoming a full member of the EU as such: "*The accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union is at once a milestone and a point of departure, a new starting point for a better tomorrow of stability and prosperity for all Cypriots, Greek - Cypriots and Turkish - Cypriots. The reunification of Cyprus remains, following the results of the recent referenda, our great and unwavering goal - that all, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, might enjoy the benefits of participation in Europe. To this end, all of us in Athens and Nicosia will continue to work and cooperate so as to sustain the intense interest of the international community - and Europe in particular - in a truly functional and viable solution in the environment of cooperation and stability provided by the European Union. Because it is a common future, and it must be won by all Cypriots. I have said recently, and I firmly believe, that there are no last chances in life. What may have seemed impossible yesterday, may have ripened in our hearts and minds, and, by extension, in the dynamic of things. In any case, the Cyprus issue remains at the core of our foreign policy.*"¹⁹¹;

¹⁹⁰ Press Release by the Turkish MFA, regarding the EU enlargement. For full text, see http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_73---press-release-regarding-the-eu-enlargement_-1-may-2004.en.mfa (accessed April 4, 2011)

¹⁹¹ Translation of the text of the speech of Foreign Minister Mr. Petros Molyviatis at the "Eighth Roundtable" organized

remains at the core of Greece's foreign policy, but has been completely disconnected from Turkey.

This official effort to put Greece and Turkey at a distance from what had happened to Cyprus could have affected the way media responded to the event itself, eventually. During the following days of the Referendum, however, Greek newspapers transmitted to the public the belief of Ankara that the Turkish – Cypriot “Yes” to the Annan Plan had been “the greatest diplomatic success of Turkey in the past 50 years”¹⁹²; of the responsibility for a solution to be found being now left to the governments of Cyprus (Greek administration) and Greece, and Ankara's belief that the situation that had developed in Cyprus was “unfair” to the Turkish – Cypriots, who had voted for the solution of the problem and of the government of Turkey having the desire to proceed to the further development of Greek – Turkish relations, since its goal was “to be a full member of the EU, and its relations with its neighbors is important to Turkey”¹⁹³.

What should be pointed out at this point is that, especially after the official visit of Erdoğan was announced, the majority of articles written on the Cyprus issue, the Referendum and its accession to the EU, mentioned the European track of Turkey, as well as Greece's support to this cause, without, many times, an obvious explanation as to why the writers were doing so. The same thing happened with official statements, such as the one Molyviatis made, mentioned earlier. Right before mentioning Greece's position on the accession of Cyprus in the EU, Molyviatis spoke of Greek – Turkish relations and their connection to the European track of Turkey: *“We are working towards the improvement of Greek-Turkish relations. It is the conviction and position of our foreign policy that the normalization of these relations will prove to be in the interests of both peoples. It will contribute to the creation of conditions of peace, stability and prosperity in the region. An integral*

by The Economist, entitled “Principles and Priorities of Greek Foreign Policy”. Full text can be found at <http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/oldNewsDetails.aspx?UICulture=en-US&articleID=2733> (accessed April 4, 2011)

¹⁹² Eleftherotypia 26/04/2004 <http://archive.enet.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=260&id=4572452> (accessed April 6, 2011)

¹⁹³ Eleftherotypia 26/04/2004 <http://archive.enet.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=260&id=4572452> (accessed April 6, 2011)

part of this policy is the sincere and active support of Turkey's European perspective."¹⁹⁴. So, indirectly, the Cyprus entering the EU and Turkey having been wanting to enter the EU became interrelated and appeared as the new point to which the media focused their attention. As this research proceeds, one can observe that instead of relating the Erdoğan visit to Greece, which was made right after Cyprus became full member to the EU, to the fact that the island entering the Union divided, it was primarily connected to Turkey's European track and certain bilateral issues.

The articles published in both Greek newspapers examined, *Eleftherotypia* and *Kathimerini* emphasized the importance of the decision of the two communities in Cyprus, as well as the next steps that should be taken by Greece and Cyprus from that moment on, and the impact its decision could have on the Greek – Cypriot population. They also transmitted the general feeling in Turkey and the Turkish – Cypriot community, as well as Turkey's hopes and wishes for its future in the EU. However, there was not a direct linkage between the Cyprus issue and Greek – Turkish relations. In every article studied, there were no “questions” or comments about what would the next day be like in Greek – Turkish relations, with the exception of some opinion pieces published, for which both newspapers mentioned that the writers were only expressing their own opinions.¹⁹⁵

Hürriyet and *Zaman's* articles spoke of “a unique opportunity that was lost” in Cyprus¹⁹⁶; they also mentioned the same idea of diplomatic success of Turkey, since it avoided being blamed once more by the international organizations as the one not wanting a solution to the Cyprus issue. Again, direct linkage to the Greek – Cypriot connection with the Greek government was avoided. A reference to possible future setbacks in Greek – Turkish relations, because of the situation in Cyprus, was also avoided.

¹⁹⁴ Translation of the text of the speech of Foreign Minister Mr. Petros Molyviatis at the “Eighth Roundtable” organized by *The Economist*, entitled “Principles and Priorities of Greek Foreign Policy”. Full text can be found at <http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/oldNewsDetails.aspx?UICulture=en-US&articleID=2733> (accessed April 4, 2011)

¹⁹⁵ See Appendix.

¹⁹⁶ *Hürriyet* 24/04/2004 <http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2004/04/24/448126.asp> (accessed April 8, 2011)

Thus, the issue of Cyprus not being able to have solved the problem existing there before it became a member of the EU got disconnected from the Greek – Turkish relations framework and was faced as a matter that had to be considered under the scopes of the EU, the communities on the island, and the relationship of the Turkish government with the northern side of the island, and of the Greek government with the southern.

It would seem that foreign policy makers in both countries had been wishing that the bilateral relations between the two countries would not be overshadowed by the Cyprus issue once more, and that the media either respected the officials' choice, or they themselves thought that the policy followed by Greece and Turkey had nothing to do with their bilateral relations, but strictly with their relations with the respective communities in Cyprus. In any case, the reports examined for this case showed that the line the media followed did not deviate much from the official line drawn by the two governments. In fact, one could say, since (apart from the occasional implied accusation of not wanting a solution towards the Greek – Cypriot population, and the efforts to justify the Greek – Cypriot side's choice) no obvious connection with the Greek and Turkish governments was made to the decision - making of both sides of the island respectively, the media tried, and succeeded through the avoidance of mentioning the relationship of the other party to the decision made in Cyprus, or of using any harsh or strong words, to balance the disappointment of the northern side of the island to the opposition of the southern, the EU accession of Cyprus to its being left with an unresolved problem – much like the officials of Greece and Turkey would do.

However, it was mentioned both in Greek and in Turkish media that the Turkish – Cypriot population's vote for the Annan Plan and the solution it proposed for the Cyprus issue, was benefiting Ankara's administration and that the climate created for Turkey within the EU was a positive one¹⁹⁷. Again, this can be considered as an indirect linkage of Turkey to the result of the Referendum, even though it did not seem to affect the Greek – Turkish relations. However, it

¹⁹⁷ See Appendix.

seemed to be consistent with the Greek policy of supporting Turkey within the EU framework.

Only six days after Cyprus became a full member of the EU, an official visit of Prime Minister Erdoğan to Athens took place. In the echo of the EU accession of Cyprus, the media of the two countries were, in their majority, supportive of this event. The media in Greece and Turkey saw this visit as a “crash test”; its importance was seen on the heads of the press before and after the visit was realized. Before Erdoğan's arrival in Athens, the press connected the visit to Turkey's European track; *Kathimerini* published an article under the title “The crucial December”¹⁹⁸, referring to the support Turkey needed from Greece in order to get accession date from EU in December; *Eleftherotypia* went down the same road with heads like “The difficult road towards December”¹⁹⁹.

In “The crucial December”, one of *Kathimerini*'s columnists praises the steps taken by the Karamanlis administration on the Cyprus issue, mentioning the friendly personal relationship of the Prime Ministers of the two countries, which “was not in the least disturbed by the complications of the Cyprus issue” and continues by explaining that the goal of Karamanlis administration is to support fully Turkey in the EU, and that Erdoğan might have to face internal crisis he came back from the Summit “empty handed”.²⁰⁰

Before it even took place, the media shared the belief that this visit was within Erdoğan's administration's gaining support for the EU framework, and Greek administration was ready to provide it. The meeting took place in Athens, on 6-8 May 2004, and it obviously went well. The two leaders left the impression to the media of both countries that this official visit to Athens – the first of a Prime Minister since 1952 – was a constructive procedure, something showed on the heads of the press in both Greece and Turkey.

¹⁹⁸ *Kathimerini*, 29/04/2004 http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_columns_2_29/04/2004_102116 (accessed April 7, 2011)

¹⁹⁹ *Eleftherotypia*, 04/05/2004, <http://archive.enet.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=100&id=8547828> (accessed April 6, 2011)

²⁰⁰ *Kathimerini*, 29/04/2004 http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_columns_2_29/04/2004_102116 (accessed April 6, 2011)

“Athens and Ankara in a new era – the two leaders spoke of 'stability oasis' and 'sea of peace' when they met”²⁰¹, “A loose agenda for serious matters”²⁰², “From Athens to Ankara: a suggestion for strategic cooperation”²⁰³, “A new page in Greek – Turkish relations”²⁰⁴, “Let's leave the past behind, Erdoğan said”²⁰⁵, are only few of the headlines published the day after Erdoğan arrived in Athens.

Once more the Greek government, as well as the Turkish, had spread the word that the visit in Athens would be friendly and productive, through the press conferences before the visit, and after. The common declaration of friendship and effort towards a new approach between the two countries was spread all over the media as well. For instance, when the Foreign Ministry spokesman was asked whether the visit of Erdoğan is attributed with a symbolic, positive characted, he answered: *“Let me say this. The Turkish Prime Minister's visit to Athens confirms that the course of Greek-Turkish relations has reached, and is continue towards, a climate of continually improved and strengthened bilateral relations.”*²⁰⁶ Only *Eleftherotypia*²⁰⁷ seemed to be suspicious of the event and claimed that the Greek government was only “friends” with the Turkish one because they both refused to speak of the “difficult issues” between the two countries.

The friendly climate and the personal relationship of Erdoğan and Karamanlis were highlighted, the hopes for a fruitful meeting were really high, the content of the dialogue between the two leaders was all over the news: “Eyes on the future – New dynamics by Karamanlis -

²⁰¹ Kathimerini, 07/05/2004, http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_07/05/2004_102931 (accessed April 7, 2011)

²⁰² Eleftherotypia, 07/05/2004, <http://archive.enet.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=60&id=7460828> (accessed April 6, 2011)

²⁰³ Hürriyet, 07/05/2004, <http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2004/05/07/455179.asp> (accessed April 8, 2011)

²⁰⁴ Zaman, 07/05/2004, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=45245> (accessed April 9, 2011)

²⁰⁵ Zaman, 07/05/2004, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=45267> (accessed April 9, 2011)

²⁰⁶ Briefing of diplomatic journalists by Foreign Ministry spokesman Mr. George Koumoutsakos, 04/05/04 <http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/oldNewsDetails.aspx?UICulture=en-US&articleID=2730> (accessed April 4, 2011)

²⁰⁷ Eleftherotypia, 07/05/2004, <http://archive.enet.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=60&id=7460828> (accessed April 6, 2011)

Erdoğan”²⁰⁸, “Without turbulence”²⁰⁹, “Erdoğan's historical meeting”²¹⁰, “Historical dialogue in Athens”²¹¹ are only some of the headlines met in the examined papers of the press of those days.

The positive words and expressions used by on the news reports and on official statements showed that both governments and the media shared an optimistic view of the visit, which was not at all connected to the Cyprus issue. The attention given to the personal relationship between Erdoğan and Karamanlis was almost as much as that the media gave to what they discussed. The “historical” dimension of the visit was met in all published articles; in most of them having a positive meaning.

Of course, the visit of Erdoğan in Eastern Thrace, where the Muslim minority exists in large numbers, and the way Erdoğan would approach those population, was met sceptically by the Greek media; even though the Greek government had no objections in Erdoğan's visit to Thrace (for personal reasons), the opposition party (PASOK) was against it. The Greek media expressed their belief that the Prime Minister of Turkey would not do anything to jeopardize the good relations between Greece and Turkey, which would guarantee the support of Greece in the EU track of the country. The media began to speak of the possibility that the Muslim minority of Thrace would be characterized as “Turkish” by certain circles, with the occasion of the Turkish Prime Minister visiting the area. Such a thing, however, never happened, and the Greek press, along with the Turkish, seemed to be rather satisfied with the overall outcome of the visit, even though distrust on the good will of the Turkish delegation was sometimes obvious. For example, it was mentioned that “the Prime Minister of Turkey has no reason to cause trouble (in Thrace) to his friend (Karamanlis). After all, Erdoğan needs him (Karamanlis) at least until December, when the EU will decide on the date of accession in the organization.”²¹²

²⁰⁸ Kathimerini, 08/05/2004, http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_08/05/2004_103083 (accessed April 7, 2011)

²⁰⁹ Eleftherotypia, 08/05/2004, <http://archive.enet.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=20&id=87781372> (accessed April 6, 2011)

²¹⁰ Hürriyet, 08/05/2004, <http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2004/05/08/455739.asp> (accessed April 8, 2011)

²¹¹ Hürriyet, 08/05/2004, <http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2004/05/08/455740.asp> (accessed April 8, 2011)

²¹² Eleftherotypia, 08/05/2004, <http://archive.enet.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=20&id=87781372> (accessed April 6, 2011)

The Turkish media applauded the visit of the Prime Minister of their country as well as his visit to Thrace. They wrote of “new dynamics”²¹³ in Greek – Turkish relations and “strategic cooperation”²¹⁴ between the two states, of the “historical meeting in Athens”²¹⁵. Emphasis was also given to the promise by the leaders of the two states to continue searching for a solution on the Cyprus issue, and their efforts to make Aegean a “sea of peace”; again the personal friendly relations between the two Prime Ministers was highlighted. Also, as Zaman exposed, Erdoğan “surprised”²¹⁶ the Greek government with his desire to go to Thrace – the Greek government then, in a move of good will gave its permission. Whereas no official comment was made on behalf of the Turkish administration before the visit in Thrace, Greek officials had to answer the questions of the media as to whether this visit of Erdoğan's to Thrace could be a provocative event; the officials kept stating that “the visit to Thrace is private” without further comment.²¹⁷

The general impression one can get from examining the reports of the media in Greece and Turkey at the time of Cyprus accession in the EU and shortly after, is that the media were trying to create a climate of balance – not between the two governments, since, as it was shown with the visit of Erdoğan in Athens they did not need it – but between the facts of the Cyprus accession and the responsibilities burdening each one of them. The Cyprus issue was not related with the Greek – Turkish relations, at least not on the press of the two countries; the only relation to it, that was mentioned on the Greek – Turkish media, was made by reports by the foreign (EU member countries') press, which were reproduced on the Greek and Turkish newspapers.

What was often mentioned was the European track of Turkey, after the Referendum in Cyprus had not become the solution of the Cyprus issue and Cyprus became a full member of the Union anyway. That Turkey wanted Greece to support it inside the EU was evident; Greece's support in the

²¹³ Zaman, 09/05/2004, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=45838> (accessed April 9, 2011)

²¹⁴ Hürriyet, 07/05/2004, <http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2004/05/07/455179.asp> (accessed April 8, 2011)

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Zaman, 04/05/2004, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=43955> (accessed April 9, 2011)

²¹⁷ For more information, visit <http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/oldNewsDetails.aspx?UICulture=en-US&articleID=2730> (accessed April 4, 2011)

same framework was thought of as granted. The Greek – Cypriot side of Cyprus voting against the Referendum had something to do with these positions – that the Turkish – Cypriot population had voted for the solution was thought to have given the “upper hand” for such discussions (concerning its European track) to Turkey. Besides, Turkey in the EU would have helped Greek – Turkish relations by granting them yet another option and framework to solve their issues; thus the support of Turkey within the EU had been on the foreign policy agenda of Greece ever since 1999²¹⁸. All those facts and notions were expressed by the media during April – May 2004.

Apart from a few voices showing mistrust towards the other side, as far as their motives for the two countries' to have a dialogue (with the occasion of the official visit of Erdoğan in Athens, after the invitation of Karamanlis) were concerned, there was a positive response on behalf of the media in both countries to this event. It is possible that some media workers were suspicious of the motives and outcomes of this visit. However, both governments *used the media* to express their enthusiasm for this meeting; the notion of “new dynamics in Greek – Turkish relations” was everywhere on the media, even before the visit took place.

2. “*Mortal Combat*”: *what happens when a common practice leads to death*

In both sides of the Aegean a common practice, as the Greek governments traditionally claim, is taking place ever since 1974²¹⁹; a “dogfight” tradition which involves virtual war (without real firearms) among aircraft from both Greek and Turkish air forces. Why this tradition has evolved into a daily part of the air forces of both countries will not be discussed here, since it is not important for the subject of this thesis; the implications following an accident, while this “tradition” was taking place, the media response to that accident and whether this response caused an effect on

²¹⁸ See official foreign position of Greece in the beginning of this chapter.

²¹⁹ Eleftherotypia, 24/05/2006, http://archive.enet.gr/online/online_text/c=110,dt=24.05.2006,id=95383388,13761692,74032556,79694636,21512732,35695516,43725084,57902748,65727516,72185244,86367004,94118044,7219548,13024988,28902492 (accessed April 11, 2011)

the foreign policy designed for the bilateral relations of the two states are examined.

On the 23rd of May 2006, during a “dogfight” taking place over the Aegean, a Greek and a Turkish fighter crashed. The “accident”, as it was characterized in Greece, or “incident” as it was mentioned in Turkey²²⁰, or episode, as it shall be called for the purposes of this research, caused the Greek pilot to lose his life, and the two countries to face one of the most serious incidents after the Imia / Kardak crisis in 1996, according to the media²²¹.

However, the crisis only lasted a few hours after the episode, as the Greek and Turkish governments decided not to let it evolve into a big conflict, since it would jeopardize their, up until then, friendly and balanced relations. The Foreign Ministers of both countries, Bakoyannis and Gül, released a report the same day of the episode, with which they stated that they had immediately after the episode (characterized by both as “incident”). Specifically, the Greek announcement “*The two Foreign Ministers expressed their regret at today's incident and agreed that this incident should not affect the pursuit by the two countries of improvement in their relations*”²²², and the Turkish one “*Acting Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Abdullah Gül called Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Ms. Dora Bakoyanni immediately after the incident and expressed our sorrow and extended his condolences. The two Foreign Ministers reached a common understanding to examine all aspects of the incident and that it should not effect bilateral relations between the two countries.*”²²³ are almost the same, not only in meaning, but also in expression. The intention of both administrations was clearly not to disturb the relations between the two states by this episode. Naturally, neither of the official statements refers to the episode or the circumstances under which it happened as “dogfight” (an unofficial, illegal and meaningless activity, the pronouncement of which would have brought more tension).

²²⁰ Zaman, 25/05/2006, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=288171> (accessed April 14, 2011)

²²¹ See Appendix.

²²² http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/230506_F1543.htm (accessed April 5, 2011)

²²³ http://www.mfa.gov.tr/_p_no_80--23-may-2006_-press-release-regarding-the-collision-of-turkish-and-greek-aircrafts-_unofficial-translation__p_en.mfa (accessed April 5, 2011)

The Greek media used headlines like the following: “Greek and Turkish fighter aircraft collide while on air”, “Reaction under fear of conflict”, “Lethal acquisition over the Aegean”, “Bakoyiannis and Gül agreed to prevent tension”, “Dangerous ally”²²⁴, and so on, not only clearly identifying Turkey as being responsible for the episode, but recognizing also the efforts made on behalf of both states to avoid an episode that had the potential to involving into a crisis – after all, it involved aircraft, a “dogfight” over the Aegean, and a dead pilot, put together were more than enough to initiate and escalate a crisis. The Greek media limited their references to the episode itself and dealt more with the reaction of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which passed the message to the public as well that the crisis was to be avoided, and that the steps which had been taken up until then were not to be forgotten. The journalists mentioned that Turkey had been acting in a “provocative and hostile” way and again raised the question of the Turkish claims in the Aegean²²⁵, but under no circumstances acted in a way that could invoke increase of tension.

The Turkish media kept a moderate position during the first hours the news was spread, only giving out information about the “incident”. Indicatively, a few heads that appeared on *Hürriyet* and *Zaman* are the following: “Turkish and Greek aircraft crash in 'dogfight'”²²⁶, “Turkish and Greek fighters crash over the Aegean”²²⁷, “Gül communicated with Bakoyiannis”²²⁸, “Search for the Greek pilot”²²⁹, “This time the 'dogfight' over the Aegean ended with death”²³⁰.

On the days that followed the episode, even though the government officials had decided that they would not let the episode evolve into a crisis, had stated so to the media, and had undertaken all actions towards the direction of relieving the crisis, while expressing their grief for the lost pilot, the

²²⁴ Data taken from Eleftherotipia and Kathimerini archives.

²²⁵ Kathimerini, 24/05/2006, http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_24/05/2006_185064 (accessed April 12, 2011)

²²⁶ Hürriyet, 23/05/2006, <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=4459697&tarih=2006-05-23> (accessed April 13, 2011)

²²⁷ Zaman, 23/05/2006, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=287639> (accessed April 14, 2011)

²²⁸ Zaman, 23/05/2006, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=287676> (accessed April 14, 2011)

²²⁹ Zaman, 23/05/2006, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=287700> (accessed April 14, 2011)

²³⁰ Zaman, 24/05/2006, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=287795> (accessed April 14, 2011)

media went into a different kind of “incident”. Of course they had let the public know that their representatives had no intention of letting the episode reach a point that would remind the Imia / Kardak crisis; they however started raising questions about who was responsible for the episode, the circumstances under which it took place; the sovereign rights of both countries, who is provoking whom, and so on. For example, *Hürriyet* used the headline “A New Crisis Risk in the Aegean”. But the media did all these, while at the same time showing the governments' position and explaining why the reaction after the episode had been so calm. For instance, media in both countries decided to report on the calmer attitudes of the neighboring country²³¹.

It was a difficult situation in both countries, that raised questions about the status of the Aegean and the common “dogfight” practice that has been in place for a long time. It was also a matter which seemed at first that could put at risk the good relations that had evolved between Greece and Turkey over the past seven years. The danger was only avoided because the media 'dropped' the case once they realized that both governments had a common line on the matter. The episode was being mentioned on the press for less than a week.

The fact that the political front of Greece and Turkey appeared immediately united on the matter prevented conflict of the Greek and Turkish media as well. Had the political front been divided, throwing accusations to each other, showing that they validated less their cooperation, the media would have started a “whose fault was it” campaign, which would end a lot later, as has happened in the past. In this case, the fact that the administrations of both Greece and Turkey decided to be united in the face of the media, and stayed that way, concluded the 'media circus' early and the media showed no intention, through the published material examined, to put pressure towards a

²³¹ Except *Hürriyet*, as Sunar, 2007, pp. 92 – 93, suggests: “*Hürriyet* stated that Greek press mostly accused the Turkish side while some reported that Greek and Turkish authorities acted calmly. *Hürriyet* carried the reports of the Greek press, some of which were critical toward Turkey (...). *Hürriyet* also cited news from the Greek press which can be viewed as examples of a calm attitude in Greek – Turkish relations (...). Nevertheless, the hostile Greek reports were announced more readily by *Hürriyet*, rather than the calmer ones. In addition, concerning news texts cited from the media of third countries, *Hürriyet* preferred to cover those which implied that the dog-fight crisis between Turkey and Greece was serious and it might have even turned into a clash.”

different reaction.

- ***Papandreou attends the “Visionary Diplomacy” Conference in Erzurum***

Papandreou was invited by Erdoğan to the Conference of the Ambassadors taking place in Erzurum on January 2011 within the framework of the improvement of Greek – Turkish relations, an effort on behalf of both countries that has been going on for years.

The invitation and the possibility that Papandreou would attend the Conference was firstly met on the Greek media at the end of November 2010, along with suspicions that Papandreou has been having “secret discussions”²³² with Erdoğan, during which they would come up with a solution for the issues on the Aegean – what many media were afraid of was that Papandreou would retreat under the Turkish government's pressure to a solution that would hurt the sovereign rights of Greece in the area.

Some of the Greek media, like *Eleftherotypia*, would spend pages and ink explaining their fears and low expectations of this meeting in Erzurum, and asking the Prime Minister for inside information on what was being discussed during the unofficial meetings between the two Prime Ministers. Both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece have repeatedly denied that there are “secret negotiations” between the officials of Greece and Turkey; in turn, a proportion of the Greek press would carry on emphasizing on the “Dangerous suspensions”²³³ left in the Aegean. Those worries expressed by the Greek press, about any kind of agreement on the Aegean that might have “stolen” Greek sovereignty, were mounted after officials of Turkey and the Foreign Affairs Minister Davutoğlu himself stated that “we (Turkey) are already in business with the Greeks in the Aegean”²³⁴.

²³² Eleftherotypia, 30/12/2010, <http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=237271> (accessed April 15, 2011)

²³³ Eleftherotypia, 31/12/2010, <http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=237373> (accessed April 15, 2011)

²³⁴ Eleftherotypia, 31/12/2010, <http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=237373> (accessed April 15, 2011)

But this worried stance was not the only one met on the media reports. The two newspapers examined, *Eleftherotypia* and *Kathimerini*, show, through their reports, the division existing in the media as to whether Papandreou should attend the meeting or not, and under what circumstances. *Kathimerini*, even though it shared the same “low expectations” belief with *Eleftherotypia*, was more positive as to why Papandreou should and would attend the conference: “The choice of Papandreou to attend the annual Conference of Ambassadors in Erzurum is indicative of the decision he has made to proceed into smoothing Greek – Turkish relations”²³⁵.

The interesting part of comparing the way media covered this story in Greece and Turkey, is that while in Greece the press was swarming with speculations about what Papandreou would say or do in the Conference, or what the ulterior motives of Erdoğan were, for about a month before he actually got to Erzurum, the Turkish media found the visit of Papandreou not worth mentioning before the Conference. The first reference to his imminent arrival was made on January 3rd on *Zaman*²³⁶, mainly emphasizing the symbolic meaning of a Greek Prime Minister attending the Conference being held in the place where Atatürk had started to rise in power in 1919.

After Papandreou had reached Erzurum, he attended the inauguration of the city's new sports facilities, where his speech was observed to be “full of messages of unity and friendship”²³⁷, as Erdoğan mentioned. Papandreou spoke of the “prejudice of the past” that “must be left behind, we must forget the antagonism of the past. I am looking today and I am optimistic, (...) the next generation is embracing the same values on this matter (ie. The matter of respect to emulation, unity)”²³⁸. Which is nothing but normal, since he had been invited for this exact same reason: to show the progress made in the relation of the two countries.

²³⁵ *Kathimerini*, 06/01/2011, http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_columns_2_06/01/2011_427708 (accessed April 16, 2011)

²³⁶ *Zaman*, 03/01/2011, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1073651> (accessed April 18, 2011)

²³⁷ *Hürriyet*, 07/01/2011, <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16708282> (accessed April 17, 2011)

²³⁸ *Hürriyet*, 07/01/2011, <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16708282> (accessed April 17, 2011)

Right before the inauguration of the stadium, Papandreou and Erdoğan met in a working breakfast, during which a lot of bilateral issues were discussed. The meeting was later attended by the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the two countries, and it lasted four hours. What was said in this meeting was not exposed to the media, however Erdoğan described it as “fruitful”.²³⁹

No matter how fruitful the meeting between the two leaders had been, Papandreou's address to the ambassadors “sent some unexpected shock waves to many diplomats in the room”²⁴⁰. His speech created many reactions and discontent in Turkey. The Prime Minister of Greece, while participating the Conference, spoke of almost all issues of bilateral relations. Papandreou called Turkey an occupier in northern Cyprus, while speaking of the EU track of Turkey, and added that the EU will never embrace as a member an “occupier” state. He also criticized Ankara for violating Greek airspace, and underlined that “peace comes under specific preconditions, trust is built in a difficult way”. It should be stated here that two days before Papandreou's visit to Erzurum, Athens and Ankara had to be faced with an episode over the Aegean, involving overflights of eight Turkish fighters over Greek islands. Papandreou even thought of not attending the Conference because of this episode, but Davutoğlu intervened and the crisis was relieved²⁴¹.

This incident, however, seemed enough for the Greek Prime Minister to take a more firm stance on the situation over the Aegean in the Conference, calling the Turkish government to stop those kinds of actions, since they will not change the status in the Aegean. He also mentioned that the continental shelf issue cannot remain unresolved for long; he saluted the progress made during the exploratory talks between the two countries, but suggested that the matter be resolved by the International Court of Hague, if the talks produce no result in reasonable time.

²³⁹ Eleftherotypia, 11/01/2011, <http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=239780> (accessed April 15, 2011)

²⁴⁰ Zaman Daily News, 09/01/2011, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey8217s-visionary-diplomats-shape-visionary-diplomacy-2011-01-09> (accessed April 18, 2011)

²⁴¹ Kathimerini, 08/01/2011, http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_08/01/2011_427979 (accessed April 16, 2011)

Papandreou also referred to the need for a solution on the Cyprus issue, the Ecumenical Patriarchate, underlined the need for cooperation of the two countries on the matter of illegal immigration; he finished his speech by once more declaring the support of Greece to the European track of Turkey and by inviting Erdoğan to making decisions and acting in a way that would promote the substantial progress of Greek – Turkish relations.

Naturally, Papandreou's speech left the audience in surprise. And Erdoğan later said that “our private discussion was very fruitful, the speech he (Papandreou) gave during the inauguration was full of messages of unity and friendship; however, his speech to the ambassadors was not what I had expected, but he claimed that he had no intention of his words to be interpreted the way they did. And as you saw, he corrected it during the press conference”²⁴².

Prime Minister Erdoğan, dodged the bullet of answering to what Papandreou had said in front of the 180 participants of the Conference; he later mentioned that “some things should not have been said”, referring to Papandreou's use of the word “invasion” in Cyprus.

A few headlines and leads presented on the Greek media, showing the tendencies prevailing in the media world, as far as the participation of Papandreou to the Erzurum Conference is concerned, are the following: “Overflights and casus belli posed by Giorgos (Papandreou) to Ankara”²⁴³, “3 – hour meeting of Papandreou with Erdoğan in Erzurum – ‘we either find a solution (for the Aegean), or go to Hague”²⁴⁴, “Erzurum is far away from Hague”²⁴⁵, “Turkish Media Surprised”²⁴⁶, “Erdoğan: ‘fruitful discussion, ungraceful speech”²⁴⁷. *Kathimerini* showed a more optimistic view of Papandreou's visit: “Smiles in Erzurum”²⁴⁸, “Expostulation for the overflights – those acts will not

²⁴² Eleftherotypia, 11/01/2011, <http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=239780> (accessed April 15, 2011)

²⁴³ Eleftherotypia, 07/01/2011, <http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=238899> (accessed April 15, 2011)

²⁴⁴ Eleftherotypia, 08/01/2011, <http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=238979> (accessed April 15, 2011)

²⁴⁵ Eleftherotypia, 09/01/2011, <http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=239138> (accessed April 15, 2011)

²⁴⁶ Eleftherotypia, 10/01/2011, <http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=239416> (accessed April 15, 2011)

²⁴⁷ Eleftherotypia, 11/01/2011, <http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=239780> (accessed April 15, 2011)

²⁴⁸ *Kathimerini*, 08/01/2011, http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_08/01/2011_427976 (accessed April 16, 2011)

change the status in the Aegean”²⁴⁹, “The differences remain, only the 'climate' changes”²⁵⁰, “Erdoğan's late disturbance”²⁵¹.

Some of the heads the Turkish media used, are as such: “EU friction in Erzurum”²⁵², “Meeting (caused) skipping Friday prayer”²⁵³, “Papandreou's message in Turkish”²⁵⁴, “Erdoğan and Papandreou's common press conference”²⁵⁵, “8 showed aggression before Papandreou's visit”²⁵⁶, “Greek Foreign Minister: The status in the Aegean will not change”²⁵⁷, “The Greek government is happy about the visit in Erzurum”²⁵⁸, “Papandreou changed the text of his speech”²⁵⁹. The headlines presented here are indicative of the surprise Papandreou provoked with the tough language he used. Before the arrival of the Greek Prime Minister in Erzurum, they are full of optimism about the event; an optimism which gradually falls after he touched the issue of the Aegean.

If we take a closer look at the texts of the reports about Erzurum in Greece, a mistrust about the motives of both the Erdoğan government's invitation made to Papandreou and the Greek Prime Minister's decision to attend the Conference. The reason why is that throughout 2010 the Greek and Turkish sides have been thought of as having preparing “secret agreements” concerning the status of the Aegean and common operations on it. There has been this notion of this government being ready to give up on the sovereign rights of the country, and of the Turkish side being ready to take over in the Aegean.

²⁴⁹ Kathimerini, 08/01/2011, http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_08/01/2011_427979 (accessed April 16, 2011).

²⁵⁰ Kathimerini, 09/01/2011, http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_09/01/2011_428125 (accessed April 16, 2011).

²⁵¹ Kathimerini, 11/01/2011, http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_11/01/2011_428258 (accessed April 16, 2011).

²⁵² Hürriyet, 07/01/2011, <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=16709762&tarih=2011-01-07> (accessed April 17, 2011).

²⁵³ Hürriyet, 07/01/2011, <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16704889> (accessed April 17, 2011).

²⁵⁴ Hürriyet, 07/01/2011, <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16708282> (accessed April 17, 2011).

²⁵⁵ Hürriyet, 07/01/2011, <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16711406> (accessed April 17, 2011).

²⁵⁶ Hürriyet, 08/01/2011, <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16711824> (accessed April 17, 2011).

²⁵⁷ Hürriyet, 09/01/2011, <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16720848> (accessed April 17, 2011).

²⁵⁸ Zaman, 08/01/2011, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1076133> (accessed April 18, 2011).

²⁵⁹ Zaman, 10/01/2011, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1076661> (accessed April 18, 2011).

When Papandreou finally got to Erzurum and used a language stricter than usual about Greek – Turkish relations, he also defended the stance of Greece on the Aegean, and asked from the Turkish government to join forces with him towards a common future of mutual trust, in which there is not space for actions that would jeopardize this trust (ie. Overflights). Such a position was not expected by the Greek media.

The Greek media also reported mainly on the reactions of their colleagues on the other side of the Aegean as to what the Greek Prime Minister had said. Obviously the Turkish media were not happy about what Papandreou had said – they felt “threatened” and offended, as were the officials of the country. The feeling that Papandreou had arrived to the Conference spreading words of peace and friendship, which ended up in a speech that was perceived as a “threat”, was only soothed by the assurances of Erdoğan after the Conference had finished its workings that Papandreou “had not meant what he had said the way it was heard” - which, in turn, was perceived in Greece as a part of Erdoğan's efforts not to lose the upcoming elections of July 2011.

The one thing one can say is that the friendly approach of the two countries has not been destructed by what Papandreou said to the Erzurum Conference. The rhetoric of Erdoğan became slightly different to reassure the media and the public that the relations between the two countries were still friendly; other than that no obvious shift in policy was observed. The perspective of Greek – Turkish collaboration and friendly relations is still there; and the media, even though at times might find ways to challenge it and its motives or outcomes, most of the time follow the pattern of the states' will to work out their problems.

Conclusions

This thesis's aim is to search for a framework under which the media and their relation to foreign policy formulation in Greece and Turkey can be better understood.

After the literature review on the theoretical framework of media relations to foreign policy and decision making process was provided, and a more “local color” was given to the features of these theories, so that they could be applied in the realities of Greece, Turkey and the media operating in their territories. In this manner, a relationship between the way the news coverage in the two countries and the foreign policy formulation in their bilateral relations was searched for. The realities of the Greek and Turkish media companies were revealed, in order for a more explicit pattern to be in place, so that the way the media work in the two neighboring countries would give a hint about the influence they can have on foreign policy and decision making process.

The observed influence the media can have on foreign policy is that they are capable of influencing the *rhetoric* of the followed foreign policy by the state. This influence they might have derives from the power they have over the public opinion, which, for the purposes of this study, has been left unexamined, even though it is the reason why the media are taken so much under consideration in foreign policy matters.

The three cases examined in the third chapter have represented three different, yet constantly met, features of Greek – Turkish bilateral relations. What has been observed, as far as media influence on the foreign policy formulation is considered, is that, generally, there is a pattern in both countries of not challenging the foreign policy designed by the government officials. This does not mean that the foreign policy formulation process is not being evaluated or commented upon by the media – on the contrary, both Greek and Turkish media (perhaps this evaluation pattern is more often met in the

Greek media rather than the Turkish) evaluate the foreign policy designed and followed by the state officials.

Cyprus becoming a full member of the EU, even after the Annan Plan was not voted for by the Greek – Cypriots, while it was voted for by the Turkish – Cypriots, was faced with strong disappointment by the Turkish media – the disappointment expressed by the media focusing on the outcome of the Referendum, not on the policy Turkey followed on the matter; while the Greek media presented it as the result they had been waiting for. In both countries, media did not make direct comments on the Greek or Turkish parties, but more on the relationship of the parties with the Greek – Cypriots and the Turkish – Cypriots respectively; and the matter they focused upon, as far as their bilateral relations are concerned, was the European track of Turkey. At some point, the Greek media workers seemed to be believing, and presented it that way, that Turkey was exploiting Greece to gain its support within the EU; a belief which soon afterward changed and was referred to as a relationship of, one could say, mutual exploitation by Greece and Turkey of each other. In any case, the decisive position of Greece and Turkey on the matter of the preservation of their good relations has worked here, as in all cases examined, as a uniting factor and the media have not sought to provoke a shift of policy.

The fact that the media in both countries have the capacity to evaluate and share their writers' (and, at times, their owners') beliefs with the wide public, though it makes them powerful, does not necessarily make them influential in the foreign policy formulation, as the examination of the cases has shown.

For instance, the second case examined in this thesis, the “dogfight” over the Aegean, during which a pilot lost his life, shows clearly a situation that did not grow into a crisis because the governments of the two countries did not want it to. Should it have left just on the hands of the media people, the

episode could have evolved in a second Imia – Kardak crisis. However, the media stopped paying attention to the subject the moment they realized that the Greek and Turkish administrations had decided to follow a common line on the issue, and that the objective of Greece and Turkey sharing good relations was more important. They did continue seeking and commenting upon the relationship, the objectives of the two governments, as well as the reasons why this specific policy had been chosen, but only for a short period of time, and by analyzing the facts within the peaceful framework both administrations had provided the media with (which was expressed by their commonly decided actions).

Papandreou was “strongly advised” by the Greek media not to go to Erzurum when his decision to attend the meeting was first announced. Then, he was expected “to give the Aegean up to the Turks”. Neither happened. Though it is suspected that the reaction of the Greek media to the overflights of Turkish aircraft over the Aegean could be what changed the, up until then, calm rhetoric of Papandreou regarding issues of bilateral relations of Greece and Turkey, the media coverage did not actually influence the Greek – Turkish relations foreign policy formulation. Same applies to the Turkish media as well.

Thus, an overall conclusion of this thesis is that the media *alone* cannot influence foreign policy formulation, but they can influence the way this foreign policy is explained and supported by state officials executing it, to the public. A shift of the foreign policy according to the material published on the media has not been observed; however, revising the presentation of a policy according to this published material, or in a way that would not raise questions or reactions by the media, has been a common practice in both countries.

Appendix

Published material on the case studies

*the translation of the titles of articles and the content of the texts have been done by me, and I bear responsibility for any mistakes or misinterpretations.

2. Cyprus becoming a full member of the EU and Erdoğan's visit in Athens

Eleftherotypia – Greek newspaper					
Date	Title of article	Translation	Key words	Translation	Source
26/04/04	<i>'Αγκυρα: Στοπ στην απομόνωση</i>	Ankara: Stop to isolation	<i>Επιτυχία της Τουρκίας στο διπλωματικό τομέα, Κυπριακό, άρση πολιτικής απομόνωσης της ΤΔΒΚ, Γκιούλ, Ερντογάν, υπέρ της λύσης, ελληνοτουρκικά</i>	Diplomatic success of Turkey, Cyprus issue, arsis of the political isolation of TRNC, Gül, Erdoğan, pro-resolution, Greek-Turkish relations	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=260&id=4572452
26/04/04	<i>Ορθώς “μίλησαν” στην Κύπρο και οι δύο κάλπες</i>	Both ballots “spoke” correctly in Cyprus	<i>Καλύτερα δυνατά αποτελέσματα, κλίμα (...) εκβιασμών (...) απειλών και πιέσεων, εκτρωματική λύση, ορθώς οι Τουρκοκύπριοι υπερψήφισαν “ναι”, συγκλονιστικό “όχι”, ενδοτική Αθήνα, τα δύσκολα αρχίζουν τώρα</i>	Best possible outcome, climate of (...) blackmail (...) threats and pressure, monstrous solution, Turkish-Cypriots rightly voted for “yes”, sensational “no”, yielding Athens, the difficult part begins now	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=260&id=63019236
27/04/04	<i>Το γενναίο “ΟΧΙ” του Κυπριακού Ελληνισμού</i>	Greek – Cypriots' brave “NO”	<i>Απώτερες επιδιώξεις Τουρκίας, ορθή τοποθέτηση ελληνικής κυβέρνησης για αποδέσμευση Κυπριακού από το πλέγμα ελληνοτουρκικών προβλημάτων, Τουρκία, όχι περιθώρια για νεοσουλτανικές επιδιώξεις, γεφύρωση χάσματος με Τουρκοκυπρίους</i>	Ultior intentions of Turkey, correct position of Greek government for disconnection of the Cyprus issue from Greek – Turkish problems, Turkey, no room for new-sultan intentions, bridge differences with Turkish-Cypriots	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=240&id=92333220
27/04/04	<i>Οι ευθύνες τώρα στις κυβερνήσεις Ελλάδας και Κύπρου για μια άλλη λύση</i>	The responsibility is now in the hands of the governments of Greece and Cyprus for another solution	<i>Νέα δεδομένα, διεθνής κοινότητα, δυσφορία, δυσαρέσκεια, συμπάθεια προς τους Τουρκοκύπριους, ΕΕ δυσφορεί, άμεση εμπλοκή της Τουρκίας (στο Κυπριακό), Αγκυρα σε πλεονεκτική θέση, διχαστική αντιπαράθεση προ του δημοψηφίσματος</i>	New facts, international community, discomfort, discontent, empathy towards Turkish – Cypriots, direct engagement of Turkey (in Cyprus issue), Ankara in advantageous position, divisive debate before the Referandum	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=240&id=10967012

27/04/04	<i>Για άδικη κατάσταση μιλάει η Άγκυρα</i>	Ankara speaks of unfair situation	<i>Τουρκία, στρατηγικός στόχος η ένταξη στην ΕΕ, σημασία στη σχέση με τους γείτονες, άρση των περιορισμών στην ΤΑΒΚ</i>	Turkey, the EU accession is a strategic objective , attention to the relations with the neighbors, arsis of the restriction towards TRNC	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=240&id=48462436
27/04/04	<i>Προς νέα δεδομένα</i>	Towards new Facts	<i>Απόρριψη του σχεδίου Ανάν, γήφισαν “όχι” επειδή φοβούνται για την ασφάλειά τους</i>	Rejection of the Annan Plan, they voted “no” because they are afraid for their security (the Greek - Cypriots)	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=240&id=67364740
27/04/04	<i>Οι Τουρκοκύπριοι σηκώνουν κεφάλι</i>	Turkish – Cypriots lifted	<i>Τουρκοκύπριοι, διεκδικούν επιβράβευση, περιμένουν ανταμοιβή, αμηχανία</i>	Turkish-Cypriots, claim for reward, waiting for gratification, awkwardness	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=220&id=98230628
28/04/04	<i>Όλα στον Ερντογάν από Σρέντερ</i>	All (said) to Erdoğan by Schreder	<i>Η Γερμανία θα είναι στο πλευρό της Τουρκίας, Τουρκική κυβέρνηση βελτιώνει συνεχώς τη θέση της, ειρηνική μουσουλμανική κοινωνία</i>	Germany will be on the side of Turkey, Turkish government improving its position constantly, peaceful Muslim society	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=200&id=62230628
28/04/04	<i>Ικανοποίηση δηλώνουν και οι Τούρκοι στρατηγοί</i>	Turk generals state (their) satisfaction	<i>Κατάσταση εξασφαλίζει στην τουρκική πλευρά διπλωματική υπεροχή, αποτέλεσμα των δημοψηφισμάτων «πιο ευνοϊκή περίπτωση»</i>	The situation provides Turkey with diplomatic advantage, the outcome of the Referendum “the most favorable case”	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=180&id=25321444
03/05/04	<i>Μετάωρη η προσέγγιση με την Τουρκία</i>	Approach with Turkey pending	<i>Πρόθεση κυβερνήσεων Ελλάδας – Τουρκίας να μη διαταραχθούν οι σχέσεις (...) από το “όχι”, ευρωπαϊκή πορεία Τουρκίας,</i>	Intention of the Greek and Turkish governments for the relations not to be disturbed (...) by “no”, Turkey's	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1

			κινητήρια δύναμη ελληνοτουρκικής προσέγγισης	European track, driving force of Greek-Turkish approach	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=120&id=3017012
04/05/04	<i>Ο δύσκολος δρόμος προς τον Δεκέμβριο (γνώμη)</i>	The difficult road towards December (opinion piece)	<i>Ελλάδα, Δεκέμβριος, η απόφαση για την έναρξη διαπραγματεύσεων ένταξης με την Τουρκία</i>	Greece, December, decision about Turkey's EU accession	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=100&id=8547828
05/05/04	<i>Εξετάζει εναλλακτικές σε πιθανό ευρω-όχι</i>	Examining alternatives to possible “no” from EU	<i>Εκδημοκρατισμός της χώρας, στήριξη στις φιλοδοξίες από ΗΠΑ</i>	Democratization of the country (Turkey), ambitions supported by the USA	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=100&id=37555932
05/05/04	<i>Μεταξύ Κύπρου, ημερομηνίας και υφαλοκρηπίδας- Η συνάντηση</i>	In between Cyprus, date and continental shelf – The meeting	<i>Επανεξέταση λύσης Κυπριακού, όχι εμπόδια για ένταξη Τουρκίας, συστηματικές επαφές</i>	Re-examination of a solution for Cyprus issue, no obstacles to Turkey's EU accession, systematic contacts	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=80&id=69830204
06/05/04	<i>Κυπριακό “τόσο κοντά”, Τουρκία “τόσο μακριά”</i>	Cyprus issue “so close”, Turkey “so far”	<i>Τουρκία, ένταξη στην ΕΕ, Σιράκ, ένταξη βραχυπρόθεσμα δεν είναι εφικτή</i>	Turkey, EU accession, Chirac, accession not possible in the short-run	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=80&id=35426460
06/05/04	<i>Στη Ραφήνα, οι δυο τους</i>	At Rafina, just the two of them	<i>Κρίσιμες συνομιλίες, ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις, προοπτική Κυπριακού, “ιδιωτική” επίσκεψη στη Θράκη</i>	Crucial discussions, Greek – Turkish relations, “private” visit to Thrace	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=60&id=88366428

07/05/04	<i>“test event” η επίσκεψη στη Θράκη</i>	Visit to Thrace – a “test event”	<i>Προώθηση ελληνοτουρκικής προσέγγισης</i>	Promotion of Greek – Turkish approach	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=60&id=31102172
07/05/04	<i>Χαλαρή ατζέντα βαρέων θεμάτων</i>	Loose agenda for important issues	<i>Επίσκεψη καλής θέλησης, να μετατραπεί το Αιγαίο σε λίμνη ειρήνης (Ερντογάν), ειλικρινής σχέση συνεργασίας (Καραμανλής), “αμηχανία” στο Κυπριακό</i>	Good will visit, Aegean should turn into a peace lake (Erdoğan), honest relation of cooperation (Karamanlis), “awkwardness” for the Cyprus issue	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=60&id=7460828
08/05/04	<i>Καρντάσια, αλλά στα εύκολα</i>	Brothers, but only on the easy parts	<i>Απέφυγαν να θίξουν Κυπριακό και Αιγαίο, συμφώνησαν σε τουρισμό, ναυτιλία, κατασκευές, Ελλάδα υπέρ Ευρωπαϊκής προοπτικής Τουρκίας</i>	Avoided Cyprus and Aegean, agreed in tourism, shipping, infrastructure, Greece pro EU accession of Turkey	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=20&id=1014204
08/05/04	<i>Χωρίς αναταράξεις</i>	Without turbulence	<i>Επίσκεψη στη Θράκη</i>	Visit to Thrace	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=20&id=87781372
08/05/04	<i>Γιαβάς Γιαβάς</i>	Slowly	<i>Αμοιβαία κατανόηση, θετικό αποτέλεσμα, προσεκτικά διατυπωμένες δηλώσεις, “δύσκολα” θέματα το Κυπριακό και το Αιγαίο, θα δοκιμαστεί ο Ερντογάν στην επίσκεψη στη Θράκη</i>	Mutual understanding, statements carefully chosen, Cyprus and Aegean: “difficult” issues, Erdoğan will be tested in the visit to Thrace	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=20&id=65646844
08/05/04	<i>Προσέγγιση ουσίας...</i>	Approach of essence...	<i>Φιλική και ειρηνική συνύπαρξη, ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις</i>	Friendly and peaceful co-existence, Greek – Turkish relations	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1

					http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=20&id=50289020
10/05/04	“Δουλέψτε για ισχυρή Ελλάδα”	“Work for a powerful Greece”	Νέα κατάσταση, δεν προκάλεσε ο Ερντογάν με τη στάση του, Θράκη	New situation, Erdoğan was not provocative, Thrace	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=20&id=54006476
10/05/04	Ο Τ. Ερντογάν και ο “χαλβάς της ειρήνης”	T. Erdoğan and the “candy of peace”	Επίσκεψη στην Αθήνα, ειρηνική συνύπαρξη και δημιουργική συνεργασία, επιτάχυνση πολιτικής προσέγγισης από τότε που ανέλαβε Καραμανλής, ειδυλλιακό κλίμα	Visit to Athens, peaceful co-existence and productive cooperation, acceleration of political approach procedure ever since Karamanlis came to office, idyllic climate	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=0&id=79735500
10/05/04	“Πρώτα η φιλία, μετά τα ντέρτια”	“Friendship first, then the troubles”	Σε σωστό δρόμο για το Αιγαίο (Ερντογάν), θερμή υποδοχή (στη Θράκη)	On the right track on the Aegean (Erdoğan), warm welcome (Thrace)	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=0&id=67879372
Kathimerini – Greek newspaper					
25/04/04	Τολμηρές λύσεις θέλει η επόμενη μέρα	The next day needs bold solutions	Κυπριακό, Σχέδιο Ανάν, αναγκαία η αλλαγή πολιτικής	Cyprus issue, Annan Plan, change of policy needed	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_25/04/2004_101788
25/04/04	Οι πρώτες διπλωματικές κινήσεις από την Αθήνα	The first diplomatic moves of Athens	Η Κύπρος αποφασίζει, η Ελλάδα συμπαρίσταται, μέτρα πολιτικής υπέρ Τουρκοκυπρίων, βελτίωση ελληνοτουρκικών σχέσεων	Cyprus decides, Greece supports, pro Turkish – Cypriots political measures, improvement of Greek – Turkish relations	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_25/04/2004_101786
25/04/04	Καταλυτικό “όχι” Ελληνοκυπρίων	Greek – Cypriots' “no” catalytic	Ελληνοκύπριοι, Τουρκοκύπριοι, ψύχραιμη η Αθήνα, λύπη ΗΠΑ και ΕΕ	Greek – Cypriots, Turkish – Cypriots, calm Athens, USA and EU sad	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_25/04/2004_101787
25/04/04	Η διαχείριση	The	Δημοψήφισμα,	Referendum, results,	http://news.kathi

	του “όχι”	management of “no”	αποτέλεσμα, λύπη εκφράζουν ΗΠΑ και ΕΕ	USA and EU sad	merini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_25/04/2004_101795
25/04/05	Όταν οι “ανθέλληνες” πληθύνονται	When the “anti-Greeks” become more	Δημοψήφισμα, ΗΠΑ, δεξιά, αριστερά	Referendum, USA, right-wing, left-wing	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_columns_2_25/04/2004_101763
25/04/05	Νέα στρατηγική για την Κύπρο	New strategy for Cyprus	Ελλάδα, Κύπρος, μετά το δημοψήφισμα, στόχοι να είναι ειρηνικοί και δίκαιοι	Greece, Cyprus, post-Referendum, peaceful and fair objectives	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_columns_2_25/04/2004_101790
27/04/05	Ζωντανή η ελπίδα λύσης	Hope for solution still exists	Ήπια στάση ΕΕ, Λευκωσία, Τουρκοκύπριοι, επανενοποίηση του νησιού	Mild EU position, Lefkosia, Turkish-Cypriots, reunification of the island	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_27/04/2004_101923
27/04/04	Η Τουρκία στέκει απορημένη μετά τις εξελίξεις (Burak Bekdil)	Turkey surprised after the events	Τουρκία, Κύπρος, ΕΕ, ευθύνες για διχοτόμηση	Turkey, Cyprus, EU, responsibility for the partition of Cyprus	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_27/04/2004_101908
28/04/04	Η Τουρκία δεν θα πρέπει να αγνοεί τον Παπαδόπουλο (Mehmet Ali Birand)	Turkey must not ignore Papadopoulos	Κύπρος, πολιτικές ηγετών, Τουρκία, Σχέδιο Ανάν, Παπαδόπουλος	Cyprus, leaders' policies, Turkey, Annan Plan, Papadopoulos	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_28/04/2004_102027
29/04/05	Ο κρίσιμος Δεκέμβριος	The crucial December	Κύπρος, ΕΕ, Τουρκία, συνεργασία Αθήνας με Κύπρο, ΗΠΑ, Ερντογάν	Cyprus, EU, Turkey, Athens-Cyprus cooperation, USA, Erdoğan	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_columns_2_29/04/2004_102116
30/04/04	Χωρίς αντίρρηση η επίσκεψη	No objections to the visit	Ερντογάν, Θράκη	Erdoğan, Thrace	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_30/04/2004_102318
30/04/04	Θα περιμένει πολύ η Τουρκία για την ένταξη, λέει ο Σιράκ	Turkey will have to wait for EU accession, says Chirac	ΕΕ, δηλώσεις Σιράκ	EU, Chirac's statements for Turkey	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_world_2_30/04/2004_102293
02/05/04	Ευρωπαϊκές Συμπληγάδες Τουρκίας	Turkey's European obstacles	Τουρκία, ΕΕ, Κύπρος, σχέση Τουρκίας με ΗΠΑ	Turkey, EU, Cyprus, Turkey-USA relationship	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_02/05/2004_

					102426
02/05/04	<i>Καραμανλής – Ερντογάν “σαν δυο φίλοι που γνωρίζονταν από παλιά”</i>	Karamanlis-Erdoğan “like two old friends”	<i>Προσδοκίες Αθήνας, επίσκεψη, ΕΕ, μειονότητα, βελτίωση επικοινωνίας</i>	Athens' expectations, visit, EU, minority, improvement of communication	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_02/05/2004_102427
02/05/04	<i>Στρατηγική “εξημέρωσης του θηρίου”</i>	“domestication of the beast” policy	<i>Διπλωματικό παζλ, Θράκη, απόφαση Ελσίνκι</i>	Diplomatic puzzle, Thrace, Helsinki's decision	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_02/05/2004_102428
04/05/04	<i>Συζήτηση για όλα με τον Ερντογάν</i>	Conversation about everything with Erdoğan	<i>Επίσκεψη, συζήτηση διμερών θεμάτων, υποστήριξη Ελλάδας στην ευρωπαϊκή πορεία της Τουρκίας, ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις</i>	Visit, discussion about bilateral issues, Greece's support to Turkey's European track, Greek – Turkish relations	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_04/05/2004_102547
05/05/04	<i>Ευρεία ατζέντα με Ερντογάν</i>	Wide agenda with Erdoğan	<i>Επίσκεψη, πρόγραμμα, αντίδραση ΠΑΣΟΚ στην επίσκεψη στη Θράκη</i>	Visit, program, PASOK's reaction to the visit to Thrace	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_05/05/2004_102659
06/05/04	<i>Με ιδιωτικό δείπνο στη Ραφήνα αρχίζει η επίσκεψη Ερντογάν</i>	Erdoğan's visit begins with private dinner at Rafina	<i>Επίσκεψη Ερντογάν, θετικό κλίμα, φιλικές διαθέσεις, πρόγραμμα επίσκεψης</i>	Erdoğan's visit, positive climate, friendly mood, program of the visit	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_06/05/2004_102779
07/05/04	<i>Αφετηρία για μια νέα εποχή η επίσκεψη</i>	The visit as a starting point for a new era	<i>Νέα εποχή στις ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις, ειρήνη, σταθερότητα, ασφάλεια, στόχοι</i>	New era in Greek – Turkish relations, peace, stability, security, objectives	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_07/05/2004_102931
07/05/04	<i>Αθήνα και Άγκυρα σε νέα εποχή</i>	Athens and Ankara enter a new era	<i>Νέα εποχή, σχέσεις Αθήνας – Άγκυρας, επίσκεψη Ερντογάν</i>	New era, Athens-Ankara relations, Erdoğan's visit	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_07/05/2004_102950
08/05/04	<i>Πολύ καλό κλίμα, θετική δυναμική</i>	Very good climate, positive dynamics	<i>Ενίσχυση συνεργασίας, θέματα συζήτησης, δηλώσεις πρωθυπουργών, Κυπριακό</i>	Cooperation enhancement, issues of discussion, Prime Minister's statements, Cyprus issue	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_08/05/2004_103068
08/05/04	<i>Κανένα χρονικό όριο προσφυγής για την υφαλοκρηπίδα</i>	No time limit for appeal for the continental shelf	<i>Επίσκεψη Ερντογάν, συνομιλίες, Αιγαίο, αισιοδοξία</i>	Erdoğan's visit, discussions, Aegean, optimism	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_08/05/2004_103069
08/05/04	<i>Με το βλέμμα</i>	<i>Eyes on the</i>	<i>Επίσκεψη Ερντογάν, νέα</i>	Erdoğan's visit, new	http://news.kathi

	<i>στραμμένο στο μέλλον</i>	<i>future</i>	<i>δυναμική, Καραμανλής, Χάλκη, Χάγη, στήριξη σε Τουρκία για ΕΕ, συνεργασία στη μεταφορά πετρελαίου</i>	dynamic, Karamanlis, Chalki, Hague, (Greece's) support to Turkey in the EU, cooperation in transferring oil	merini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_08/05/2004_103083
08/05/04	<i>Μετρημένες στα δάχτυλα οι επισκέψεις τα τελευταία 50 χρόνια</i>	Only a few visits over the last 50 years	<i>Επισκέψεις Τούρκων επισήμων, Ερντογάν στη Θράκη</i>	Visits of Turkish officials, Erdoğan in Thrace	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_08/05/2004_103070
08/05/04	<i>Τα δύο κρίσιμα 90λεπτα στην Κομοτηνή</i>	<i>(article referring to the private parts of Erdoğan's visit in Thrace)</i>	<i>Επίσκεψη Ερντογάν στη Θράκη, ελεύθερος χρόνος του</i>	Erdoğan's visit to Thrace, his free time	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_08/05/2004_103067
08/05/04	<i>Τί συζητήσαν στο παρασκήνιο οι δύο ηγέτες</i>	The two leaders lobbying	<i>Θέμα παραβιάσεων από Καραμανλή, ΕΕ, Ερντογάν</i>	Karamanlis set issue of transgression, EU, Erdoğan	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_08/05/2004_103073
09/05/04	<i>Οι προσδοκίες της Αθήνας και το εσωτερικό ρίσκο Ερντογάν</i>	The expectations of Athens and Erdoğan's internal risk	<i>Επίσκεψη, Τουρκία, ΕΕ</i>	Visit, Turkey, EU	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_09/05/2004_103189
09/05/04	<i>Όσα έγιναν μακριά από τους προβολείς</i>	What happened away from the lights	<i>Επίσκεψη, επιβεβαίωση θετικής ατμόσφαιρας</i>	Visit, confirmation of positive atmosphere	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_09/05/2004_103182
09/05/04	<i>Τώρα το καλό κλίμα, τα δύσκολα αργότερα...</i>	Good climate now, difficulties later...	<i>Επίσκεψη, ΕΕ, Αιγαίο, υφαλοκρηπίδα, Χάγη</i>	Visit, EU, Aegean, continental shelf, Hague	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_09/05/2004_103183
09/05/04	<i>“Εργαστείτε για μια ισχυρή Ελλάδα”</i>	“Work for a powerful Greece”	<i>Δηλώσεις Ερντογάν, επίσκεψη στη Θράκη</i>	Erdoğan's statements, visit to Thrace	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_09/05/2004_103181
Hürriyet and Hürriyet Daily News – Turkish newspapers					
<i>*in the parts of Hürriyet Daily News, there is no translation, since they were published in English</i>					
24/04/04	<i>Greek Cypriot voted No, Turks Yes</i>	-	<i>Cyprus, Annan Plan, Referendum, Results</i>	-	http://webarsiv.hu rriyet.com.tr/2004/04/24/448237.asp
24/04/04	<i>Historical Seal</i>	-	<i>Cyprus, Referendum,</i>	-	http://webarsiv.hu

			<i>Annan Plan</i>		rriyet.com.tr/2004/04/24/448238.asp
24/04/04	<i>Rumlar 'Hayır', Türkler 'Evet' dedi</i>	Greek – Cypriots “No”, Turkish-Cypriots “Yes”	<i>Kıbrıs, çözüm planı, kesin sonuçlar, referandum, Avrupa Birliği</i>	Cyprus, solution plan, elections results, referendum, EU	http://webarsiv.hu/rriyet.com.tr/2004/04/24/448121.asp
24/04/04	<i>Muhtemel senaryolar</i>	Possible scenarios	<i>Kıbrıs, Türklerin Annan Planına dayalı çözümünü desteklediğini gösteriyor, AB, Kimse de Türkiye'yi işgalci olarak suçlayamaz, Amerika, Ege sorunları</i>	Cyprus, Turks show their support to a solution by supporting the Annan Plan, EU, no one can blame Turkey for being an invader, America, Aegean issues	http://webarsiv.hu/rriyet.com.tr/2004/04/24/448123.asp
24/04/04	<i>Referandum sonrası senaryo</i>	Post – Referendum scenario	<i>Kıbrıs</i>	Cyprus	http://webarsiv.hu/rriyet.com.tr/2004/04/24/448124.asp
24/04/04	<i>Gül: KKTC'ye ambargo sona ermeli</i>	Gül: the embargo to TRNC must come to an end	<i>Dışişleri Bakanı Abdullah Gül, Kıbrıs, ambargo kaldırılmalıdır</i>	Foreign Minister Gül, Cyprus, embargo must be lifted	http://webarsiv.hu/rriyet.com.tr/2004/04/24/448125.asp
24/04/04	<i>AB: Ada'daki tek fırsat kaçırıldı</i>	EU: the only chance (for a solution) on the island was lost	<i>Avrupa Birliği, "Rum halkı çözüm yolundaki tek fırsatı kaçırdı", Türkler çözüm konusunda iyi bir çaba gösterdi</i>	EU, “the Greek-Turkish people lost the only chance towards a solution”, the Turks showed a good effort towards a solution	http://webarsiv.hu/rriyet.com.tr/2004/04/24/448126.asp
24/04/04	<i>Rum Yönetimi Sözcüsü: Çözüm istiyoruz</i>	Greek-Cypriot administration's representative: we want a solution	<i>Kıbrıs, Rum, Çözüm</i>	Cyprus, Greek – Cypriots, solution	http://webarsiv.hu/rriyet.com.tr/2004/04/24/448127.asp
24/04/04	<i>Erdoğan: Güney Kıbrıs kaybetti</i>	Erdoğan: North Cyprus lost	<i>Referandumların sonuçları, "TAVRIMIZ AYNI ŞEKİLDE DEVAM EDECEKTİR"</i>	Referendum results, “our attitude will continue in the same way”	http://webarsiv.hu/rriyet.com.tr/2004/04/24/448134.asp
24/04/04	<i>Papadopoulos: Çözüme karşı değiliz</i>	Papadopoulos: we are not opposed to a solution	<i>Kıbrıs'ta çözüme karşı olmadıklarını, Annan planının bu versiyonuna karşı olduklarını söyledi.</i>	(Papadopoulos) said they are not opposed to a solution in Cyprus, they are opposed to this version of the Annan Plan	http://webarsiv.hu/rriyet.com.tr/2004/04/24/448135.asp
25/04/04	<i>'Rumlar barışı torpiledi'</i>	Greek-Cypriots wrecked peace	<i>Kıbrıs, referandum</i>	Cyprus, referendum	http://webarsiv.hu/rriyet.com.tr/2004/04/25/448586.asp

25/04/04	<i>Papadopoulos: Çözüm için çabalar sürecektir</i>	Papadopoulos: the efforts towards a solution will go on	<i>KIBRISLI TÜRKLER İÇİN 'AB İMKANLARI', Kıbrıs Rum, AB</i>	Turkish-Cypriots' 'EU potential', Greek-Cypriots, EU	http://webarsiv.hu/riyet.com.tr/2004/04/25/448587.asp
25/04/04	<i>KKTC tanınmayacak ama ambargo kalkacak</i>	TRNC will not be recognized, but the embargo will be lifted	<i>Kıbrıs</i>	Cyprus	http://webarsiv.hu/riyet.com.tr/2004/04/25/448590.asp
25/04/04	<i>Yeni Kıbrıs için Evet</i>	Yes to a new Cyprus	<i>Kıbrıs'ta referandumda beklenen oldu</i>	The expected happened in Cyprus referendum	http://webarsiv.hu/riyet.com.tr/2004/04/25/448594.asp
26/04/04	<i>İlk karar AB'den</i>	The first decision from EU	<i>Avrupa Birliği, ekonomik yardım</i>	EU, economic aid	http://webarsiv.hu/riyet.com.tr/2004/04/26/449090.asp
28/04/04	<i>Karamanlis'ten Papadopoulos'a tam destek</i>	Karamanlis supports Papadopoulos completely	<i>Yunanistan, Karamanlis, aldığı karara saygı, desteğini tüm gücüyle sürdüreceği</i>	Greece, Karamanlis, respect to the decision made (by Greek -Cypriots), support will continue with all their power	http://webarsiv.hu/riyet.com.tr/2004/04/28/450292.asp
29/04/04	<i>Annan'dan Türklere övgü Rumlara yergi</i>	Turkish-Cypriots praised by Annan	<i>Annan, Kıbrıs Türkleri'ni kutladı</i>	Annan congratulated Turkish-Cypriots	http://webarsiv.hu/riyet.com.tr/2004/04/29/450896.asp
01/05/04	<i>"Biz tanımıyoruz anlamsız"</i>	'we're not recognizing' does not make sense	<i>AB, Rum kesimin sonuçları</i>	EU, results of Greek-Cypriots' elections	http://webarsiv.hu/riyet.com.tr/2004/05/01/452030.asp
01/05/04	<i>Rum basını: Günaydın Avrupa</i>	Greek-Cypriots' headlines: Goodmorning Europe	<i>AB, Kıbrıs Rum basını</i>	EU, Greek-Turkish headlines	http://webarsiv.hu/riyet.com.tr/2004/05/01/452023.asp
03/05/04	<i>Atina'dan Ege'de taciz iddiası</i>	Athens' claims harassment in the Aegean	<i>Ege, Türk savaş uçakları</i>	Aegean, Athens, Turkish aircraft	http://webarsiv.hu/riyet.com.tr/2004/05/03/452894.asp
06/05/04	<i>Erdoğan Atina'da</i>	Erdoğan in Athens	<i>Erdoğan, Karamanlis'in davetlisi olarak, Atina ve Batı Trakya'yı ziyaret ediyor</i>	Erdoğan, invited by Karamanlis, visiting Athens and Eastern Thrace	http://webarsiv.hu/riyet.com.tr/2004/05/06/454628.asp
07/05/04	<i>Atina'dan Ankara'ya stratejik ortaklık önerisi</i>	The suggestion for strategic cooperation from Athens to Ankara	<i>Yunanistan, Türkiye, stratejik ortaklık, AB, Kıbrıs</i>	Greece, Turkey, strategic cooperation, EU, Cyprus	http://webarsiv.hu/riyet.com.tr/2004/05/07/455179.asp
07/05/04	<i>'Küçük</i>	The future of	<i>Erdoğan, Ege Denizi'nin</i>	Erdoğan, the Aegean	http://webarsiv.hu/riyet.com.tr/2004/05/07/455179.asp

	<i>hesaplarla 2 ülkenin geleceği kararmasın'</i>	the 2 countries shall not be overshadowed by small disputes	<i>barış denizi haline getirilmesi gerektiğini kaydetti, Karamanlis</i>	must be brought to be a peace sea, Karamanlis	rriyet.com.tr/2004/05/07/455181.asp
07/05/04	<i>Erdoğan'ın ziyareti dünya basınında yankı buldu</i>	The visit of Erdoğan on the international press	<i>Ziyaret, Daily Telegraph, Le Monde, YUNAN BASINI: İLİŞKİLERDE YENİ BİR SAYFA</i>	Visit, Daily Telegraph, Le Monde, Greek headlines: new page in the relations	http://webarsiv.hu rriyet.com.tr/2004/05/07/455181.asp
08/05/04	<i>Erdoğan'a tarihi karşılama</i>	The historic welcome to Erdoğan	<i>Yunanistan, ziyaret, Gümülcine'de Batı Trakyalı Türkler</i>	Greece, visit, Komotini, Turks of East Thrace	http://webarsiv.hu rriyet.com.tr/2004/05/08/455739.asp
08/05/04	<i>Atina'da tarihi diyalog</i>	The historic dialogue in Athens	<i>Erdoğan: Geçmişe bırakıp geleceğe bakalım, Karamanlis: Stratejik ortaklık</i>	Erdoğan: Let's leave the past behind, look towards the future, Karamanlis: strategic cooperation	http://webarsiv.hu rriyet.com.tr/2004/05/08/455740.asp
08/05/04	<i>Yunan basını: İkili ilişkilerde yeni dönem</i>	Greek headlines: the new era in bilateral relations	<i>Erdoğan'ın Atina ziyareti, Türk-Yunan ilişkilerine yeni bir dinamizm</i>	The visit of Erdoğan, new dynamics in Greek-Turkish relations	http://webarsiv.hu rriyet.com.tr/2004/05/08/455741.asp

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25/04/04	<i>Rumlar Kıbrıs'ı böldü</i>	The Greek-Cypriots divided Cyprus	<i>Kıbrıs, referandum, Annan Planı, Rumlar, Avrupa Birliği, Amerika</i>	Cyprus, referendum, Annan Plan, Greek-Cypriots, EU, America	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=40862
25/04/04	<i>Sonuçtan 'derin üzüntü' duyan AB, tutum belirliyor</i>	The “deep regret” of EU for the result, define the procedure	<i>AB, Türk tarafını 'sıcak' bir şekilde tebrik etti</i>	EU 'warmly' congratulated Turkish-Cypriot side	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=40864
25/04/04	<i>Yunanistan tepkilerden endişeli</i>	Greece stressed by the reactions	<i>Referandum, Kıbrıs, Atina'nın çabalarına devam edeceğini</i>	Referendum, Cyprus, the efforts of Athens will go on	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=40866
25/04/04	<i>Erdoğan: Kıbrıs Türklerine tecrit politikası artık bitmeli</i>	Erdoğan: the isolation of Turkish-Cypriots must end	<i>Erdoğan, Kıbrıs, referandumların sonuçları, farklı bir dönem, AB</i>	Erdoğan, Cyprus, results of referendum, different era, EU	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=40871
25/04/04	<i>Bakan Gül: Annan Planı öldü barış istemeyen taraf belli oldu</i>	Minister Gül: the Annan Plan died, the side which does not want peace was exposed	<i>Dışişleri Bakanı Abdullah Gül, Rum Kesimi, referandum, hayır</i>	Foreign Minister Gül, Greek-Cypriots' elections, referendum, no	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=40870
25/04/04	<i>Rumlar 'hayır' dedi Türkler kurtuldu!</i>	Greek-Cypriots said 'no' the Turks were saved!	<i>Annan Planı, sonuç, "işgalci"</i>	Annan Plan, result, “invader”	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=40872

26/04/04	<i>Karamanlis kısıkaçta</i>	Karamanlis under pressure	<i>Yunanistan, anamuhalefet partisi PASOK, Avrupa</i>	Greece, opposition party PASOK, Europe	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=41007
26/04/04	<i>Annan Planı öldü; ama 'ruhu' yaşayacak</i>	Annan Plan died; but its 'spirit' will live	<i>Referandum sonucu, Denktaş</i>	Results of the Referendum, Denktaş	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=41012
28/04/04	<i>Erdoğan, Batı Trakya'ya giden ilk başbakan olacak</i>	Erdoğan will be the first Prime Minister to visit Eastern Thrace	<i>Erdoğan, Yunanistan'a resmi ziyaret, Batı Trakya</i>	Erdoğan, the official visit to Greece, Eastern Thrace	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=41776
29/04/04	<i>Karamanlis ve Papadopulos tek yürek: Plan masada</i>	Karamanlis and Papadopoulos one heart: the Plan on table	<i>Saygı, Karamanlis, Papadopulos</i>	Respect, Karamanlis, Papadopoulos	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=42252
30/04/04	<i>Erdoğan'dan 'birlik' mesajı</i>	Erdoğan's message of 'unity'	<i>Talat, Denktaş, Gül, Erdoğan</i>	Talat, Denktaş, Gül, Erdoğan	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=42585
01/05/04	<i>'Türkiye'nin AB üyeliği güvenliğimiz için kazanç'</i>	'Turkey earned our trust for EU membership'	<i>Schröder, Fischer</i>	Schröder, Fischer	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=43041
02/05/04	<i>Erdoğan: Rumları tanımıyorum demek çare değil</i>	Erdoğan: to say 'I do not recognize Greek-Cypriots is not going to make things better'	<i>Erdoğan, Avrupa Birliği, Rumlar AB'de Türkleri temsil edemez</i>	Erdoğan, EU, the Greek-Cypriots cannot represent the Turkish-Cypriots in the EU	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=43357
03/05/04	<i>Rumlar AB'de Türkleri temsil edemez</i>	The Greek-Cypriots cannot represent the Turkish-Cypriots in the EU	<i>Ege, Kıbrıs, AB</i>	Aegean, Cyprus, EU	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=43898
04/05/04	<i>'Erdoğan gafil avladı'</i>	'Erdoğan surprised'	<i>Yunanistan, Erdoğan'ın Batı Trakya ziyareti</i>	Greece, Erdoğan's visit to Eastern Thrace	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=43955
04/05/04	<i>"Erdoğan'ın Yunanistan ziyareti ilişkilerin kalıcılığı mesajını verir"</i>	"Erdoğan's visit to Greece passes the message of stability in the relations"	<i>Erdoğan: iki ülke arasındaki iyi ilişkilerin kalıcı olduğu mesajını, Erdoğan'ın Yunanistan ziyaretinin resmi ve özel olmak</i>	Erdoğan: there are good and stable relations between the two countries, the official and private parts of the visit	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=44152
04/05/04	<i>Türk-Yunan dostluk ilişkileri tarımsal alana taşındı</i>	The friendly Greek-Turkish relations transferred to the	<i>Türkiye, Yunanistan, son yıllarda artan dostluk ilişkileri</i>	Turkey, Greece, over the last years the friendly relations grow	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=44167

		agricultural sector			
06/05/04	<i>Erdoğan ve Karamanlis, Atina'da 'kazan-kazan' düğmesine basıyor</i>	Erdoğan ve Karamanlis a 'win-win' situation in Athens	<i>Erdoğan: üç günlük tarihi Yunanistan ziyareti, Atina, Karamanlis</i>	Erdoğan: 3-days visit to Greece, Athens, Karamanlis	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=44734
06/05/04	<i>Rusopulos: Gündemde, ikili ilişkiler, Kıbrıs, AB ve Ortadoğu var</i>	Rousopoulos: bilateral relations, Cyprus, EU and Middle East on the agenda	<i>Yunanistan ziyaretinin gündeminde ikili ilişkiler ve uluslararası konular</i>	Bilateral relations and international issues on the agenda of the visit to Greece	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=44987
07/05/04	<i>Özal'dan sonra Atina'da ilk Türk başbakan</i>	The first PM after Özal to visit Athens	<i>Erdoğan, ziyaret, Batı Trakya Türkleri</i>	Erdoğan, visit, Turks of Eastern Thrace	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=45127
07/05/04	<i>'Kapı komşumla dost olmazsam yolda kalırım'</i>	'if I cannot be friends with my neighbor I will stay on the street' (old saying)	<i>Erdoğan, Yunanistan, Yunanistan ve Türkiye arasındaki ilişkilerin geliştirilmesi</i>	Erdoğan, Greece, bilateral relations evolving	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=45128
07/05/04	<i>Yunan basını: İlişkilerde yeni bir sayfa açıldı</i>	Greek headlines: a new page to the relations	<i>Erdoğan, ziyaret, gazeteler</i>	Erdoğan, visit, newspapers	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=45245
07/05/04	<i>Başbakan Erdoğan: Geçmişini bırakalım</i>	PM Erdoğan: let's leave the past behind	<i>Erdoğan, Karamanlis, açıklama</i>	Erdoğan, Karamanlis, statement	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=45267
07/05/04	<i>Karamanlis: Erdoğan ile yapıcı bir görüşme yaptık</i>	Karamanlis: a fruitful meeting with Erdoğan	<i>Yunanistan, Karamanlis, Erdoğan, görüşme</i>	Greece, Karamanlis, Erdoğan, meeting	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=45268
07/05/04	<i>Erdoğan, Yunanistan Cumhurbaşkanı tarafından kabul edildi</i>	Greek President of Democracy received Erdoğan	<i>Ziyaret, Türk-Yunan ilişkilerini geliştirme, Stefanopoulos</i>	Visit, Greek-Turkish relations evolving, Stefanopoulos	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=45272
07/05/04	<i>Erdoğan: Yunanistan ile ilişkileri geliştirmeye çalışıyoruz</i>	Erdoğan: we are trying to improve our relations with Greece	<i>Erdoğan, Yunanistan, ikili ilişkileri, işbirlik</i>	Erdoğan, Greece, bilateral relations, unity	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=45294
07/05/04	<i>Erdoğan: Ege sorununun çözümlü süreci olumlu devam ediyor</i>	Erdoğan: the procedure towards a solution to the Aegean issue continues	<i>Erdoğan, Ege sorununun çözümü konusu</i>	Erdoğan, solution to Aegean issue	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=45344

		positively			
08/05/04	<i>İki lider eski hesapları bıraktı stratejik ortaklığa adım attı</i>	The two leaders left the old issues behind and spoke of strategic cooperation	<i>Erdoğan, Atina, Karamanlis, tarihi ziyaret, güvenli ortak</i>	Erdoğan, Athens, Karamanlis, historical visit, strong cooperation	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=45460
08/05/04	<i>Erdoğan, Batı Trakya'ya hareket etti</i>	Erdoğan towards Eastern Thrace	<i>Erdoğan, Batı Trakya</i>	Erdoğan, Eastern Thrace	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=45650
09/05/04	<i>52 yıl sonra Batı Trakya'da duygu yüklü buluşma</i>	The visit in Eastern Thrace after 52 years was full of emotions	<i>Yunanistan ziyareti, Batı Trakya</i>	Visit to Greece, Eastern Thrace	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=45836
09/05/04	<i>Türkler, Erdoğan için Gümülcine kentine akın etti</i>	Turks filled Komotini for Erdoğan	<i>Batı Trakyalı Türkler, Gümülcine, ziyaret</i>	Turks of Eastern Thrace, Komotini, visit	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=45837
09/05/04	<i>Yunan basını: İki ülke ilişkilerinde yeni dinamik</i>	Greek headlines: new dynamic of the bilateral relations	<i>Yunan basını, Erdoğan'ın Atina ziyareti</i>	Greek headlines, the visit of Erdoğan to Athens	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=45838

• The “Dogfight” of 2006

<i>Eleftherotypia</i>					
23/05/06	<i>Σύγκρουση στον αέρα</i>	Collision in the sky	<i>Παραβίαση, εθνικός εναέριος χώρος</i>	Transgression, national airspace	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/online_text/c=112,dt=23.05.2006,id=30508956
24/05/06	<i>Ο μοιραίος ελιγμός και η διάσωση - θρίλερ</i>	The fatal manoeuvre and the rescue-thriller	<i>Αυστόχημα στο Αιγαίο, ήταν μαθηματικά βέβαιο</i>	Accident over the Aegean, was going to happen at some point	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/online_text/c=110,dt=24.05.2006,id=95383388,13761692,74032556,79694636,21512732,35695516,43725084,57902748,65727516,72185244,86367004,94118044,7219548,13024988,28902492
24/05/06	<i>Αναψαν τα τηλέφωνα, Αθήνα - Παρίσι</i>	Telephones ringing, Athens – Paris - Helsinki	<i>Ψυχραιμία, Τούρκοι, τηλεφώνημα Γκιουλ στην Ντόρα</i>	Cool, Turks, Gül called Dora	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/online_text/c=110,dt=24.05.2006,id=95383388,13761692,74032556,79694636,21512732,35695516,43725084,57902748,65727516,72185244,86367004,94118044,7219548,13024988,28902492

	- <i>Ελσίνκι</i>				4.05.2006.id=95383388,13761692,74032556,79694636,21512732,35695516,43725084,57902748,65727516,72185244,86367004,94118044,7219548,13024988,28902492
24/05/06	<i>ΗΠΑ: Μην το ξανακάνετε...</i>	USA: "Don't do it again..."	<i>«λύπη», κρατώντας αποστάσεις, αποφυγή παρόμοιων μελλοντικών επεισοδίων</i>	"sadness", keeping distance, avoid similar incidents in the future	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/online_text/c=110,dt=24.05.2006,id=95383388,13761692,74032556,79694636,21512732,35695516,43725084,57902748,65727516,72185244,86367004,94118044,7219548,13024988,28902492
24/05/06	<i>Πολύ χαμηλοί τόνοι στο ΝΑΤΟ</i>	Low tones within NATO	<i>Ηπια στάση, ΝΑΤΟ, Αιγαίο, χαμηλοί τόνοι</i>	Mild position, NATO, Aegean, low tones	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/online_text/c=110,dt=24.05.2006,id=95383388,13761692,74032556,79694636,21512732,35695516,43725084,57902748,65727516,72185244,86367004,94118044,7219548,13024988,28902492
24/05/06	<i>Αγκυρα: Νομικό το θέμα, ήταν ενήμερο το ΝΑΤΟ</i>	Ankara: legal matter, NATO was informed	Τουρκία, ΝΑΤΟ Αιγαίο	Turkey, NATO, Aegean	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/online_text/c=110,dt=24.05.2006,id=95383388,13761692,74032556,79694636,21512732,35695516,43725084,57902748,65727516,72185244,86367004,94118044,7219548,13024988,28902492
24/05/06	<i>«Διενέξεις»</i>	BBC, CNN predict	<i>Διένεξη στο Αιγαίο, CNN, BBC</i>	Conflict, Aegean, CNN, BBC	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/online_text/c=110,dt=24.05.2006,id=95383388,13761692,74032556,79694636,21512732,35695516,43725084,57902748,65727516,72185244,86367004,94118044,7219548,13024988,28902492

	<i>βλέπουν BBC, CNN</i>	“conflict”			t.gr/online/online_text/c=110,dt=24.05.2006,id=95383388,13761692,74032556,79694636,21512732,35695516,43725084,57902748,65727516,72185244,86367004,94118044,7219548,13024988,28902492
24/05/06	<i>Γιώργος κατά Αγκυρας και κυβέρνησης</i>	Giorgos against Ankara and government	<i>Παπανδρέου, Κατηγόρησε την κυβέρνηση, προκλήσεις της Τουρκίας</i>	Papandreou, blamed the government, challenges by Turkey	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/online_text/c=110,dt=24.05.2006,id=95383388,13761692,74032556,79694636,21512732,35695516,43725084,57902748,65727516,72185244,86367004,94118044,7219548,13024988,28902492
24/05/06	<i>Μισή ώρα πετούσε ο Αρης στο Αιγαίο</i>	Mars was flying over the Aegean for half an hour	<i>Στα πρόθυρα σύγκρουσης, για περίπου μισή ώρα</i>	Brink of conflict for about half an hour	http://archive.ene.t.gr/online/online_text/c=110,dt=24.05.2006,id=95383388,13761692,74032556,79694636,21512732,35695516,43725084,57902748,65727516,72185244,86367004,94118044,7219548,13024988,28902492
<i>Kathimerini</i>					
24/05/06	<i>«Παιχνίδι ποντικού και γάτας», βλέπουν τα ξένα ΜΜΕ</i>	Foreign media “cat-mouse game”	<i>Αιγαίο, διεθνής Τύπος</i>	Aegean, foreign press	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_24/05/2006_185081
24/05/06	<i>Αντίδραση υπό τον φόβο «θερμού επεισοδίου»</i>	Fear of “hot episode” caused reaction	<i>Εμπλοκή, Πολεμική Αεροπορία, πολιτικές παρενέργειες, ένταση</i>	Engagement, Air force, political implications, tension	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_24/05/2006_185064

24/05/06	<i>Η έκρηξη ακούστηκε μέχρι την Κάρπαθο</i>	The explosion was heard in Karpathos	<i>Έλληνας πιλότος, αγανάκτηση των κατοίκων</i>	Greek pilot, residents' indignation	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_24/05/2006_185062
24/05/06	<i>Μπακογιάννη - Γκιουλ συμφώνησαν σε αποτροπή έντασης</i>	Bakoyannis-Gül agreed on prevention of tension	<i>γεγονός στο Αιγαίο, αντιδράσεις Ελλάδας - Τουρκίας</i>	Incident in the Aegean, reaction of Greece and Turkey	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_24/05/2006_185083
24/05/06	<i>Στα άκρα οδηγεί ο «επικίνδυνος σύμμαχος»</i>	The “dangerous ally” pushes to the limits	<i>Σύγκρουση ελληνικού και τουρκικού F-16 εντός του FIR Αθηνών</i>	Greek and Turkish F-16 collide within Athens FIR	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_24/05/2006_185065
24/05/06	<i>«Κόκκινη γραμμή» Χηνοφώτη-Οζκιοκ</i>	“Hotline” between Chinofotis – Özkök	<i>Ελλάδα, Τουρκία, πολύ κοντά σε μια κρίση, άμεση επικοινωνία των δύο αρχηγών</i>	Greece, Turkey, very close to crisis, immediate communication between the two leaders	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_24/05/2006_185085
24/05/06	<i>Φονική εμπλοκή στο Αιγαίο</i>	Lethal engagement over the Aegean	<i>Απέφυγαν τη μεγάλη κρίση Αθήνα και Αγκυρα</i>	Athens and Ankara avoided major crisis	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_24/05/2006_185094
24/05/06	<i>Χαμηλοί τόνοι από την Άγκυρα</i>	Low tones from Ankara	<i>Χαμηλοί τόνοι, τουρκικά μέσα ενημέρωσης</i>	Low tones, Turkish media	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_24/05/2006_185084
25/05/06	<i>Προκλητικές τουρκικές ερμηνείες ενοχοποιούν την Αθήνα</i>	Provocative Turkish interpretations blame Athens	<i>Δυστύχημα, ευθύνη της μοιραίας σύγκρουσης στην Ελλάδα, τουρκικές εφημερίδες</i>	Accident, responsibility of the fatal collision on Greece, Turkish newspapers	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_25/05/2006_185217
25/05/06	<i>Τέλος στις αυταπάτες</i>	No more illusions	<i>Τουρκία, ανοχή της ελληνικής κυβέρνησης, πλαίσιο ΕΕ</i>	Turkey, Greek government's tolerance, EU framework	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_columns_2_25/05/2006_185230
Hürriyet and Hürriyet Daily News					
23/05/06	<i>Türk ve Yunan savaş uçakları it dalaşında çarpıştı</i>	Greek and Turkish aircraft collided during dogfight	<i>Ege Denizi, NATO'ya bildirilmiş bir uçuştu</i>	Aegean, NATO was informed about the flight	http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=4459697&tarih=2006-05-23
24/05/06	<i>Hava kuvvetleri:</i>	Air forces: the Greek aircraft	<i>Kaza, Türk Hava Kuvvetleri, Açıklama</i>	Accident, Turkish Air Force, statement	http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/gost

	<i>Yunan uçakları uçaklarımızı taciz etmiştir</i>	annoyed our aircraft			er/haber.aspx?id=4467585&tarih=2006-05-24
24/05/06	<i>Ege Denizi'nde yeni kriz riski</i>	Risk of new crisis in the Aegean	<i>Kardak krizinden sonra 'en ciddi' çatışma, Yabancı basın</i>	The most serious conflict after the Kardak crisis, foreign press	http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=4465695&tarih=2006-05-24
25/05/06	<i>Uluşlararası sahada oldu</i>	It happened in international territory	<i>Ege, çarpışma, NATO raporu</i>	Aegean, collision, NATO report	http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=4469889&tarih=2006-05-25
25/05/06	<i>Türk pilot tabanca çekti mi ?</i>	Did the Turkish pilot draw a gun?	<i>Yunan gazeteleri, Yunan kurtarma ekibi</i>	Greek newspapers, Greek rescue team	http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=4469890&tarih=2006-05-25
26/05/06	<i>Çarpışma kaydı NATO'ya gönderildi</i>	The paper about the collision is sent to NATO	<i>Çarpışma, NATO</i>	Collision, NATO	http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=4475710&tarih=2006-05-26
27/05/06	<i>Karamanlis, Türkiye'ye yüklendi</i>	Karamanlis blamed Turkey	<i>Karamanlis, Ege, F-16'larının çarpışması</i>	Karamanlis, Aegean, collision of F-16	http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=4482092&tarih=2006-05-27
Zaman and Today's Zaman					
23/05/06	<i>Türk ve Yunan savaş uçakları Ege'de çarpıştı</i>	Greek and Turkish aircraft collided	<i>Ege Denizi, 'it dalaşı'</i>	Aegean, 'dogfight'	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=287639
23/05/06	<i>Gül, Bakoyanni ile telefon görüşmesi yaptı</i>	Gül had a phone meeting with Bakoyannis	<i>Gül, Bakoyannis, Ege'de çarpışma, telefon görüşmesi</i>	Gül, Bakoyannis, the collision over the Aegean, phone meeting	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=287676
23/05/06	<i>Düşen Yunan savaş uçağının pilotu aranıyor</i>	In search for the pilot of the Greek aircraft	<i>uluslararası hava sahası, Türk Hava Kuvvetleri, Yunan Hava Kuvvetleri</i>	International airspace, Turkish Air Forces, Greek Air Forces	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=287700
23/05/06	<i>Yunan Savunma Bakanlığı'ndan Türkiye'ye suçlama</i>	Greek Defense Ministry blames Turkey	<i>Açıklama, Atina FIR, Uçuş planı, NATO</i>	Statement, Athens FIR, Flight Plan, NATO	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=287722
24/05/06	<i>Ege'de 'it</i>	This time the 'dogfight' in	<i>Ege Denizi, it dalaşı</i>	Aegean, dogfight	http://www.zama

	<i>dalaşı' bu kez ölümlle bitti</i>	the Aegean ended with death			n.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=287795
24/05/06	<i>Yunan basını. Havada çarpışma yerde serinkanlılık</i>	Greek headlines. Collision in the air, calmness on the ground	<i>Yunan basın, ciddi olay</i>	Greek headlines, serious incident	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=287947
24/05/06	<i>Karamanlis Türk-Yunan uçağı çarpışmasını değerlendirdi</i>	Karamanlis evaluated the collision of the Greek-Turkish aircraft	<i>Karamanlis, Ege, savaş uçaklarının çarpışması, komşuluk ve dostluk, AB</i>	Karamanlis, Aegean, aircraft collision, neighborhood and friendship, EU	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=288077
24/05/06	<i>Bakoyanni: iyi ilişkiler krizin büyümesini engelledi</i>	Bakoyannis: the good relations restrained crisis	<i>Bakoyannis, iyi atmosfer</i>	Bakoyannis, good atmosphere	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=288213
25/05/06	<i>İt dalaşı değil, Yunan uçağı arkadan çarpmış</i>	Not a dogfight, the Greek plane crashed behind (the Turkish)	<i>Ege sorunu, Çarpışma, Ankara, Karamanlis</i>	Aegean issue, collision, Ankara, Karamanlis	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=288171

• **Papandreou Attends the “Visionary Diplomacy” Conference in Erzurum**

<i>Eleftherotypia</i>					
29/11/10	<i>Στο Ερζερούμ καλεί ο Ερντογάν τον Παπανδρέου</i>	Erdoğan invites Papandreou to Erzurum	<i>Πρόσκληση, Παπανδρέου, Ερντογάν</i>	Invitation, Papandreou, Erdoğan	http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=227182
30/12/10	<i>Το σιωπηλό 2010 Το ανελέητο 2011</i>	The silent 2010, the merciless 2011	<i>ελληνοτουρκικά θέματα, Ερζερούμ, ελληνική εξωτερική πολιτική</i>	Greek-Turkish issues, Erzurum, Greek foreign policy	http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=237271
31/12/10	<i>Αιγείο: Επικίνδυνες εκκρεμότητες</i>	Aegean: dangerous suspenses	<i>Παπανδρέου, Ερζερούμ, θαλάσσιες ζώνες, Κύπρος, Ισραήλ</i>	Papandreou, Erzurum, sea zones, Cyprus, Israel	http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=237373

04/01/11	<i>Με το βλέμμα στο Αιγαίο η συνάντησή στο Ερζερούμ</i>	Meeting in Erzurum, eyes on the Aegean	<i>Αιγαίο, Παπανδρέου δέχτηκε την πρόσκληση, Τουρκία</i>	Aegean, Papandreou accepted invitation, Turkey	http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=237922
07/01/11	<i>Στην Τουρκία ο Γ. Παπανδρέου για την «Οραματική Διπλωματία»</i>	Papandreou in Turkey for the “Visionary Diplomacy”	<i>Ενδειξη βελτίωσης των ελληνοτουρκικών σχέσεων</i>	Sign of the improvement of Greek – Turkish relations	http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=238648
07/01/11	<i>Υπερπτήσεις και casus belli έθεσε ο Γιώργος στην Άγκυρα</i>	Giorgos put overflights and casus belli on the table	<i>Παπανδρέου, διπλωματία, Συνάντηση</i>	Papandreou, diplomacy, meeting	http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=238899
08/01/11	<i>Ο τουρκικός Τύπος για την επίσκεψη του Έλληνα πρωθυπουργού</i>	The Turkish press on Greek PM's visit	<i>Αντιδράσεις, τουρκικός τύπος</i>	Reactions, Turkish press	http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=239296
08/01/11	<i>ΤΡΙΩΡΗ ΣΥΝΑΝΤΗΣΗ ΠΑΠΑΝΔΡΕΟΥ-ΕΡΝΤΟΓΑΝ ΣΤΟ ΕΡΖΕΡΟΥΜ</i>	3-hour meeting of Papandreou -Erdoğan in Erzurum	<i>Χάγη, Παπανδρέου, καθεστώς στο Αιγαίο</i>	Hague, Papandreou, status in the Aegean	http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=238979
09/01/11	<i>Το Ερζερούμ είναι μακριά απ' τη Χάγη</i>	Erzurum is far from Hague	<i>Φιλικό κλίμα στις δηλώσεις, σχεδόν μηδενική πρόοδος στις συζητήσεις</i>	Friendly climate on the statements, zero progress during discussion	http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=239138
10/01/11	<i>Στροφή προς το Κυπριακό επιχειρεί ο</i>	Davutoğlu turns to the Cyprus issue	<i>Έκπληξη, τουρκικά ΜΜΕ, Ερζερούμ, δηλώσεις Παπανδρέου</i>	Surprise, Turkish media, Erzurum, Papandreou's statements	http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=239416

	<i>Νταβούτο γλου</i>				
11/01/11	«Αποδοτική η συνομιλία, άκομμη η ομιλία»	Fruitful discussion, impolite speech	<i>Παπανδρέου, Ερντογάν, συνομιλία, αντιδράσεις</i>	Papandreou, Erdoğan, discussion, reactions	http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=239780
Kathimerini					
05/01/11	<i>Χωρίς υψηλές προσδοκίες στο Ερζερούμ</i>	Without high expectations in Erzurum	<i>Παπανδρέου, Ερζερούμ, Ερντογάν, ελληνο-τουρκικές σχέσεις</i>	Papandreou, Erzurum, Erdoğan, Greek-Turkish relations	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_05/01/2011_427629
06/01/11	<i>Ο κ. Παπανδρέου στο Ερζερούμ</i>	Mr. Papandreou in Erzurum	<i>Παπανδρέου, ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις</i>	Papandreou, Greek – Turkish relations	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_columns_2_06/01/2011_427708
08/01/11	<i>Χαμόγελα περίσσευαν παντού στο Ερζερούμ</i>	Smiles in Erzurum	<i>Ερζερούμ, αλλαγή κλίματος</i>	Erzurum, change of climate	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_08/01/2011_427976
08/01/11	<i>Διάβημα από Παπανδρέου για τουρκικές υπερπτήσεις</i>	Papandreou's step for Turkish overflights	<i>καθεστώς στο Αιγαίο, Παπανδρέου, τουρκικές υπερπτήσεις στο Αιγαίο</i>	Aegean status, Papandreou, overflights in the Aegean	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_08/01/2011_427979
08/01/11	<i>Δημόσια αιχμή Παπανδρέου για τις υπερπτήσεις</i>	Public comment by Papandreou on overflights	<i>Αιγαίο, υπερπτήσεις</i>	Aegean, Overflights	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_08/01/2011_427998
09/01/11	<i>Οι διαφορές παραμένουν, το «κλίμα» μόνο αλλάζει</i>	The differences remain, the “climate” changes	<i>Συμπεράσματα, συνάντηση Παπανδρέου – Ερντογάν</i>	Conclusions, Papandreou – Erdoğan meeting	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_09/01/2011_428125
11/01/11	<i>Ετεροχρονισμένη η «όχληση» από τον Ερντογάν</i>	Erdoğan's late “disturbance”	<i>ομιλία του Παπανδρέου, Ερζερούμ, αντίδραση Ερντογάν</i>	Papandreou's speech, Erdoğan's reaction	http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_11/01/2011_428258
Hürriyet and Hürriyet Daily News					
07/01/11	<i>Erzurum'da AB</i>	EU conflict in Erzurum	<i>sert mesajlar veren Yunanistan Başbakanı</i>	PM Papandreou gave harsh messages	http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/gost

	<i>atışması</i>		<i>Papandreu</i>		er/haber.aspx?id=16709762&tarih=2011-01-07
07/01/11	<i>Cuma namazını kaçırılan görüşme</i>	The meeting (for which Erdoğan) skipped the Friday prayer	<i>Erdoğan, Papandreu, görüşme</i>	Erdoğan, Papandreou, meeting	http://www.hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16704889
07/01/11	<i>Papandreu'dan Türkçe mesaj</i>	Papandreou's message in Turkish	<i>Papandreu, ziyaret</i>	Papandreou, visit	http://www.hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16708282
07/01/11	<i>Erdoğan ile Papandreu'da ortak basın toplantısı</i>	Erdoğan and Papandreou's common press conference	<i>Erdoğan, Papandreu, Basın toplantısı</i>	Erdoğan, Papandreou, press conference	http://www.hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16711406
08/01/11	<i>Yorgo'ya 'Dadaş'lı AB uyarısı</i>		<i>Erdoğan, Papandreu, AB, Kıbrıs</i>	Erdoğan, Papandreou, EU, Cyprus	http://www.hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16711823
08/01/11	<i>Papandreu'nun ziyaretine 8 sorti</i>	Papandreou's visit – 8 raids	<i>Papandreu'nun ziyareti öncesinde Ankara-Atina arasında ciddi bir kriz yaşandı</i>	Before Papandreou's visit, there was a serious crisis between Ankara and Athens	http://www.hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16711824
09/01/11	<i>O konuşurken helikopterinde 5 ihlal</i>	While he was speaking 5 of their helicopters violated (airspace)	<i>Papandreu, Erzurum</i>	Papandreou, Erzurum	http://www.hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16718495
09/01/11	<i>Yunan Dışişleri Bakanı: Ege'deki statü değişmez</i>	Greek FM: the status in the Aegean does not change	<i>Ege, Yunanistan Dışişleri Bakanı, Türk-Yunan ilişkileri</i>	Aegean, Greece, Foreign Minister, Greek – Turkish Relations	http://www.hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16720848
Zaman and Today's Zaman					
03/01/11	<i>Papandreu'nun Erzurum ziyareti Rum basınında</i>	Papandreou's visit to Erzurum on the Greek headlines	<i>Papandreu, Erzurum, Rum basın, güçlü sembolik önemi</i>	Papandreou, Erzurum, Greek headlines, strong symbolic meaning	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1073651
06/01/11	<i>Atina'dan ihlal iddiası</i>	Claims of violations from Athens	<i>Atina, Türk savaş uçaklarının Yunan hava sahası</i>	Athens, Turkish aircraft in Greek airspace	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=107509

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07/01/11	<i>Muhalefet, Papandreu'yu, Türkiye ile "gizli diplomasi yapmakla" suçladı</i>	The opposition accused Papandreou for "secret diplomacy" with Turkey	<i>Papandreu, Erzurum, konuşma, muhalefet</i>	Papandreou, Erzurum, speech, opposition	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=107591
08/01/11	<i>Yunan hükümeti, Erzurum ziyaretinden memnun</i>	Greek government pleased with Erzurum visit	<i>Yunan televizyonları , Papandreu , Erzurum</i>	Greek television, Papandreou, Erzurum	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=107613
10/01/11	<i>Papandreu'nun Erzurum ziyaretinin yankıları sürüyor</i>	The impression of Papandreou in Erzurum continues	<i>Papandreu, Erzurum , ziyaret</i>	Papandreou, Erzurum, visit	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=107646
10/01/11	<i>'Papandreu, konuşma metnini değiştirdi'</i>	'Papandreou changed the text of his speech'	<i>Papandreu, Erdoğan, Erzurum, görüşme, konuşma</i>	Papandreou, Erdoğan, Erzurum, meeting, speech	http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=107666

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