Integration problems of Dutch-Turkish Youngsters:

A Qualitative Research

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Integration Problems of Dutch-Turkish Youngsters:

A Qualitative Research

Türkiye Kökenli Hollandalı Gençlerin Yaşadıkları Entegrasyon Sorunları:

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Özet

Bu çalışmada üçüncü jenerasyon Türkiye kökenli Hollandali gençlerin entegrasyon problemleri sosyo-kültürel ve sosyo-ekonomik bağlamda incelenmiştir. Alan çalışmasından çıkan sonuçlar dört ana başlık altında toplanmıs ardında yatan sebepler iki farklı açıdan incelenmiştir. Dört ana başlık sırasıyla eğitim ve dil, işgücü piyasası, kültürel faktörler, ulus ve din'dir. Bu faktörler iki farklı bağlamda incelenmiştir. Birincisi Hollanda devletinin Türk Azınlık toplumunun üzerinde etkili olan sosyal ve ekonomik sebeplerdir. İkincisi ise Türk kültürünün yapısandan doğan ve değişmesi hayli güç olan sebeplerdir. Sonuç olarak yaşanan problemlerin sebepleri tek bir tarafa veya duruma bağlanmamış, çözüme yönelik tavsiyelerde bulunulmuştur.

Abstract

This study tries to find out the reasons for the integration problems of third generation Dutch-Turkish youngsters by particularly focusing on the socio-cultural and socio-economic situations of these people in the Netherlands. The results obtained from the field research are summed up under four sections. These four sections are education and language, labour market, cultural factors, religion and nationality. The underlying reasons of the integration problems are reflected from two different perspectives. The first one is the effects of social and economic enforcements implemented on the Turkish immigrant society. The second one is the traditional Turkish values that are quite different from Dutch values. The problems experienced by third generation Turkish origin Dutch youngsters are not one-sided. To conclude, solution-oriented advisements are asserted.

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ABBREVIATIONS

VVD	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy
HAVO	Higher General Continued Education
VWO	Preparatory Scholarly Education
ROC	Vocational School
CBS	Statistics Netherlands
APA	America Psychological Association

Introduction

The Netherlands has a large population of Turkish-origin immigrants. They make up one tenth of the entire population, so it is important to research to find out if these people are happy living in the Netherlands for four generations. The Netherlands accepted Turkish guest workers in the 1960s and since then, with their grandchildren and even the children of their grandchildren, Turkish origin people have been living in the Netherlands permanently. This study is aimed to focus on the third generation Dutch-Turkish youngsters in particular. To better understand the reasons why I chose to focus especially on the third generation is explained in the following sections of the introduction chapter.

To be able to find a way to analyse my hypothesis, I composed a research question first. Forming a research question is the root that encircles this study with the appropriate methodology. Before the field research, I investigated the related literature and I discovered that there is a great deal of literature discussing the challenges Turkish first comers have faced. Often overlooked are the struggles faced by their children and in this study, their grandchildren who are third generation immigrants.

With the help of a comprehensive literature review, as well as my own personal efforts and experiences throughout the years, I was able to compose this field research study with great

enthusiasm. Generally speaking I have always believed that even the third generation Turkish origin young generation cannot fully integrate into the social, political and economical norms of the Netherlands. With great effort and enthusiasm, and also with interviews, which will be conducted in the Netherlands, I will do my best to find out the answer to the research question stated below.

Research Question

The driving force of why I chose the bulk of Turkish migrants in the Netherlands is because of my timeless imminence to the socio-cultural and socio-economic experiences of minority groups and their never-ending role of 'Otherness' inside the majority community or culture. This research is investigated through the lens of the experiences of third generation Dutch-Turkish immigrants, particularly the ones who mostly live in the outskirts of the Netherlands and remain non-citizens at least psychologically. And of course the impacts of internal and international events that hinder their integration, as they can't shed their immigrant identity in the country of their birth, in the Netherlands are investigated thoroughly. Recently, international migration and migrants in Europe have been predominantly associated with the hot debate islamophobia which influences the position of Muslim populations since the landmark of 9/11, followed by other terrorist events such as the London and Madrid bombings, dominance of Islamic State (ISIS) in the Middle East and its brutal persecutions of Yezidis and its ubiquitous massacres in Kobani and Syria, the murder of charismatic right-wing Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn and the movie director Theo Van Gogh from the Netherlands, and recently the shooting of Charlie Hebdo in France.

Apart from these barbaric events, islamophobia is also nurtured by xenophobic and rightist parties that are on the rise not only in the Netherlands but also all around Europe. These all

led to the increase of obnoxious sentiments especially of European societies, as up to 4 million Turkish people live there and the majority of them are supposed to be Muslim. Living under these circumstances and the gazes, I address the following question based on the experiences of these Dutch-Turkish youth: "*What are the integration problems of Dutch-Turkish third generation youngsters in terms of socio-cultural and socio-economic context?"*

The central question is to be operationalized from the very beginning of the immigration story of Turks to internalize the problem and understand it deep inside. Over the past five decades, the Turkish community in the Netherlands has been living both in peace and alienation. However, my research question is based on third generation and their integration problems, hence I aim to start from the immigration story of Turkish labour workers initiated in the 1960s who moved to the Western European countries.

The Turks who live in the Netherlands went there by choice. It was an invitation by the Dutch government to fill a labour gap. Though they just intended to fill a labour gap and did not plan to stay there for long, their destiny had already been written. Returning home turned into a myth for the first comers, they have never been able to realize the dream of going back home. They actually did not want to. They were called guest workers, *gastarbeiders* in the Dutch language. Nowadays, most of them are very old and retired in the country without any command of the Dutch language or culture. They did not intend to learn the language and culture; actually they did not have time for learning the culture of the Netherlands because they were working, earning money, and sending remittances.

They are still referred to as immigrants or foreign workers despite the fact that they have Dutch citizenship for many years. Ogan (2001) delineates the issue by saying "I call these people a diasporic community, though technically that is not true". A diaspora is "the collective forced dispersion of a religious and/or ethnic group" (Cited in Ogan, 2001: 1), that is usually precipitated by a political or other disaster. As I stated above, it was a choice made

by the Turkish guest workers themselves, it was definitely not forced by the government or other persons.

As a consequence, almost all the Turkish origin migrants, for three generations, act in solidarity and retain their cultural heritage as a kind of war against the grain of Dutch culture, even today.

Turkish immigrants have been living in the Netherlands for more than 50 years. Actually not only in the Netherlands, they are spread all over the Western European countries during different times, under the roof of a guest worker. In this specific research, I intentionally focus on the case of the Netherlands and the third generation youth, as they were born there, grew up there and now most of them are working in Dutch companies as their grandparents did years before. To be able to answer my central research question, I first conducted an extensive review of the literature on the 1st generation and the migration policies of that time. I also did a research about the integration problems of the second generation as well as the third generation because the second generation is also relatively young and was mostly born and raised in the Netherlands as well. The Dutch youth, as well as the Turkish youth themselves, still identify Turkish people as foreigners or migrants. However; they don't fit into this description so, I will carve out the reasons behind this throughout the upcoming chapters.

To give a proper answer to the research question, I conducted interviews with 30 young Dutch-Turkish people in Overijssel, a province of the Netherlands in the central-eastern part of the country, over a 15-day period in June 2015.

The purpose of this study is to dig out the integration problems of third generation Dutch-Turkish youth by questioning their citizenship, socio-economic roles in the labour market, their social interaction with the indigenous Dutch people, their educational achievements and failures and the other socio-cultural issues regarding their current position in their home

country. I will try to answer why even the third generation Dutch-Turkish youth still cannot shed their foreign/ immigrant identity behind.

Literature Review

As my research is based on the international migration and its products, migrants, I reviewed primary, secondary and also tertiary sources to have a strong insight into the social and occupational structure of the immigrant population by reviewing social and cultural anxieties of immigrants' lives particularly of the third generation Dutch-Turkish youth as they have been experiencing some substantial changes characterized by cultural and economical disadvantages stemming from the first comers, the guest-workers, and the aura of the ubiquitous issue of islamophobia wandering around Europe. To this end, I benefited from a number of informative literature studies based on migration issues, integration and its importance on forming an identity, which helped me to be able to carry out this qualitative study, as these issues constitute the core values regarding the theoretical framework and the data I collected in the field.

There is a large body of research regarding guest workers and their challenges in the Netherlands, however there is a big gap to be fulfilled with the challenges and struggles the young generation of today face. Thus, I reviewed the current literature focusing on the second-generation people of Turkish origin and their struggles to find a link with my own study and to reflect the similarities and differences before doing a field research.

Migration

This research tries to find an answer and gain better insight into the integration problems of third generation Dutch-Turkish youngsters in terms of their socio-cultural and socio-economic position as *immigrants* in the very country they were born and bred in. To be able to underpin and solve my research question, I began reviewing the literature from the first comers of Turkish immigrants as the root of the migration process from Turkey to the Netherlands and to particularly dig out migration theories to present an overview of Dutch immigration with a labour motive.

Migration has always been a salient phenomenon. Since the very beginning of humanity, people have been migrating all over the world to find better living conditions. Migration is important as it shapes and reshapes societies, making them more diverse and complex but it also creates sharp divisions between those who accept the need for migrants and welcome the economic and cultural contributions they make, and those who oppose them (King, 2012:6).

The ones who leave their homeland to find better chances in life are called migrants or immigrants. Arthur Lewis' 1954 paper epitomized this drive for migration, arguing that disguised underemployment in agricultural sectors could provide a pool of cheap labour for more productive jobs in the urban economy of developing countries, to be exploited through rural to urban migration (Lewis, 1954). It is clearly seen that migrant and immigrant are used interchangeably. When the literature is reviewed in terms of people who migrate to Europe from somewhere outside Europe, the definition of the word migrants/immigrants can be viewed as EU nationals staying in an EU- 25 country, of which they are not nationals (citizens). From this perspective, people coming outside the EU-25 (non-EU or third country: a country that is not a member of the Union) are immigrants (Cox & Griffiths & Rial-Conzalez, 2000:4).

Migration is two folded: internal and international. In this study, I pay close attention to the International migration laws as this study focuses particularly on labour migration of Turks to Europe, so my review of literature on migration persists generally on the laws of Ravenstein and the theories of Russell King as appropriate to my research. In his book *Laws of Migration*, Ravenstein states that migrants proceeding long distances generally go by preference to one of the great centres of commerce or industry and the natives of towns are less migratory than those of the rural parts of the country (1885: 199), just like in the case of Turkish migrants, which will be elaborated in the following chapters, emigrated to long distances for the labour market and prosperity, at least earning enough money to buy a house. From which part of Turkey the first wave of Turks migrated from to Europe, especially to the Netherlands, will be explained in detail in later chapters but for now we can say that the majority of Turkish workers originated from the central Asian mainland of Turkey (Crul & Heering, 2008:45). Like most other European countries, the Netherlands has a long history of migration. The most significant periods of large-scale emigration occurred during the nineteenth century (1840s, 1860s, and 1880s), the early 1900s, and the years following World War II (Swierenga, 2000). King states that the main cause of migration is to have better economic conditions in the context of international migration. Russell King divides international migration into sections and expresses his ideas on it by saying: *"The roving instinct, it is said, is intrinsic to human nature: the need to search for food, pasture and resources: the desire to travel and explore: but also to conquer and possess."* (2012:4)

Desiring to possess, conquering, and exploring: these are the basis of migration, including many human beings who move from somewhere to another by following the roving instinct. With this philosophy in mind, very much the same as Ravenstein's ideas, King gives us a personalized overview of the theories of international migration: *push and pull theory* and the *neoclassical approach*: *migration and development transitions*: *historical-structural* and

political economy models (2012:3). Regarding these theories, I must note that they did not originate with King, but go further back.

For my research concern, the push-pull framework among the theories of King best articulates the migration of Turks to Europe as guest workers. In the 1960s, as with other Eastern European people and also some other Asian countries like Turkey, labour workers were driven by a set of push factors such as poverty, unemployment, landlessness, rapid population, political repression. Also, by a set of pull factors of more prosperous countries namely better income and job prospects, better education and welfare systems, land to settle and farm, good living conditions. (2012: 13). In that period, it was also the mechanization of agriculture and the accompanying problems of too little money to purchase the equipment and too little land to justify the purchase. King also articulates the issue by saying international migrations are connected with family reunion and childcare, marriage migration, student migration, retirement migration, high-skilled migration and brain drain - this is by no means a complete list.[1]

When the story of labour migration began in the 1960s, the objective of the Netherlands and other Western European countries; particularly Germany, Belgium, and France, was to alleviate the labour shortages, and as a result thousands of mainly uneducated people from less prosperous countries emigrated with a dream in their mind to reach well-paying jobs, earn enough money and return home later on. The reasons for European countries to receive migrant workers is war; actually the aftermath of WWII and the loss of young male workers in the war, displacement, business, and economic deprivation- all these led to a movement of people from one or more national and ethnic cultures into a completely different culture in Europe.

[1] For a useful recent survey of recent types of migration, with a European focus, see Martiniello and Rath (2012).

Literature on the labour migration to European Countries revealed that the first major migration wave to Europe occurred after World War II, however the Turkish migrants who are the subject of this study, came in the second phase of post-war migration (Ogan, 2001:23). In his influential book M.J. Piore (1979) also argues that international labour migration is mostly driven by pull, not push factors. I mostly agree with his idea by thinking about the conditions of European countries compared, to a lesser extent, to Turkey and the other sending countries in the 1960s. Of course, the Turkish workers had little information on the nature of the situation but they at least knew that they would be given jobs so that they would earn enough money to buy a house or establish a business on their return home.

Apart from all the pull factors, covering a process of about half a century, Turkish guest workers ended up in the Netherlands in 1964 due to the fact that native European workers of the receiving countries shunned the work of low-skill, low-wage, insecure and generally unpleasant jobs in factories, and this led the European labour market to look for migrant workers to come and work.

The literature shows that a huge number of Turkish workers were brought to the European countries during the early years of the agreement between European countries and Turkey. According to the Turkish employment service, about 650,000 workers were sent to Germany in the years from 1961 to 1974. During the same period, about 25,000 workers went to the Netherlands. (Penninx & Van Renselaar, 1975: 11). Their grandchildren are called third generation migrants, together with Moroccan descent; the third generation *immigrants* make up about half of the total non-western third generation (CBS 2001). As the definition of migrant shows above, migrants/ immigrants are the ones who leave their homeland for other countries to find better chances of work, education. However, the third generation Dutch-Turkish youth cannot be called immigrants, as they did not come to the Netherlands from their country of origin.

Regarding the relevant literature, it is evident that there is a lack of a proper explanation of why the grandchildren of that time's guest workers are still in the position of *guest*, and are today called as *immigrants*. Are they really not any different from their grandparents? Do they have no knowledge of Dutch language or culture? Or what should they do to be called native Dutch citizens instead of immigrants?

The answers of these questions are still left in suspense. The sole aim of this study is to find clear answers to the above questions. Apart from the statistics of the Netherlands, the policymakers, the politics call these youngsters' *immigrants or foreigners.* It was no shock when I heard that even the majority of my respondents call themselves foreigners too. The scholarship on this issue also mostly refers to these Dutch born people as Turkish immigrants, Dutch-Turkish immigrants. So the literature has limitations and does not reveal why Turkish youngsters are not still integrated but referred to as immigrants/foreigners/guests in the Netherlands. This study specifically tries to fill this gap in the literature by the revelations of the interviews. The recent secondary sources like Dutch journals, newspapers. are also quite helpful to unearth this issue as they reflect the news every day. In the next section, the literature will be narrowed down to the integration and the related issues.

Integration

The position of Dutch-Turkish youngsters in the Netherlands is at a disadvantage. Their long-term disadvantageous position has easily been proven when their social, educational and economical conditions are compared to their indigenous counterparts. This study specifically handles the disadvantageous positions of third generation Dutch-Turkish immigrant youngsters and questions the low level of their integration to the social and cultural components of the Netherlands. This study particularly focuses on the last two decades of the

history of Turkish immigration to the Netherlands, which encloses the childhood and adolescent years of the Dutch-Turkish immigrant youngsters, whose age range is 18-30 now.

At the end of this research, the probable results will show that there are various reasons why the majority of these youths don't feel at home and also why they still don't feel integrated with the lands they were born in and grew up in. By the way, when the literature was reviewed, the answers to these questions go further back than the last two decades. This is the reason why I initiated my studies from the migration theories: emigration of Turks to Europe, and then I specialized my topic towards the Turkish guest workers who migrated to the Netherlands. At the end of this, I wanted to be all ears for their grandchildren: the third generation and their problems in the Netherlands.

There is a great deal of literature concerning the problems and challenges the first generation of these immigrants faced, even until today. We can exemplify these sources such as the works of Nermin Abadan-Unat and her work "Unending Migration: from Guest-worker to Transnational Citizen" (2002) which elaborately discusses the migration from Turkey and its impacts on Turkish society. Another work by the same author is "Turks in Europe" (2011) which analyses the Turkish migration to Western Europe that also allocates a chapter to the young women who have been highly neglected as part of the Turkish work force especially in Germany. Ahmet Akgündüz, with his book "Labour Migration from Turkey to Western Europe, 1960-1974" (2008) critically addresses the entire migration process of Turkish guest workers to Western Europe with particular emphasis on Germany and the Netherlands. With her book "Communication and Identity in the Diaspora: Turkish Migrants in Amsterdam and their use of Media" (2001), Christine L.Ogan describes the link between communication and identity, as media consumption is an important practice in migrant communities, particularly Turkish migrants in general. Ogan examined the use of media organs such as TV channels, and which channels have been mostly watched in Turkish houses to apprehend their level of

integration. Apart from these scholarly important books, there are a number of articles written on the issues of first generation labour workers, their specific problems in a new climate and their on-going cultural alienations. To illustrate this topic, in his article "Multiculturalism and Acculturation: Views of Dutch and Turkish-Dutch" Fons Van De Vijver (2013) states that:

> "*Problematic relationships may emerge and the majority group members only partly agree on the desirable acculturation orientation (e.g. migrant group members favour integration but majority group members prefer that migrants assimilate). Conflictual relationships can emerge when majority group members endorse segregation or when migrants endorse the separation strategy, because* in *these cases there is no positive communication at all between the two groups as the groups ignore each other"* (pg. 253).

As seen above, Fons in a way links the integration of minority members to the majority culture regarding the acculturation level of two distinct groups with each other. When there is cultural diversity, the majority group and minority groups share their cultural elements with each other.

In the same context, Berry states that multicultural ideology has been assessed using a bipolar one-dimensional scale with positive evaluation of cultural diversity and support of multiculturalism at one pole, and negative evaluation of cultural diversity segregation, assimilation, and exclusion at the other (as cited in Fons, 2003: 253). The Netherlands with its growing cultural diversity and its multiculturalist policy approach provides a good place for research on immigration issues (p.254). As the purpose of this study is to investigate the psychological level based on the integration problems of this young generation, preconditions of multiculturalism and the backlash of it in the last two decades are also important regarding the main reasons for choosing the third generation Dutch-Turkish group.

From the age range of adolescence and the on-going years passing into adulthood are the tumultuous years and during this time the basis of forming an identity and discovering

themselves as Turkish youths are presented in this study. To this end, the developmental process is highly complicated regarding the second and third generation immigrants, particularly Turkish origin youths in this study. As explained deeply in the theoretical framework, the psychological components of the immigrant youth group and the Dutch group are discussed on what extent both these groups of people chose to be acculturated with one another[2]. With this end, we can see that Dutch adults preferred assimilation above integration of Turkish immigrants in all domains of life.

Of the relevant literature, little attention has been given to the identity problems of the young migrant generations who live in the Netherlands. Whilst the scholarship may explain the cultural problems or the non-integration problems of the first generation immigrants as they have faced a lot of challenges because of their lack of language, and their never-ending plan of returning home. This discussion is limited to third generation immigrant youths. Therefore, I intentionally focus on the reasons of the difficulty of forming an identity regarding integration problems afterwards, thereby getting them away from crossing the divide to feel at home. I will do this by presenting the research findings based on the interviews conducted only with the third generation Turkish origin youths in the Netherlands.

To be able to have a result from the given research question of this study, apart from the interviews, the current literature on the issue of Dutch multiculturalism is fairly significant. However, traditionally researchers support that the Dutch country is molded by tolerance and multiculturalism traits for centuries; recently it is not a proper definition of the Dutch policy against the immigrants. Kymlicka is an important figure that digs into the issue of multiculturalism and the incoming problems by referring to the failing of it that creates highly traumatic states of minds around Europe.

[2] Acculturation level of the groups is explained in theoretical framework with the help of the relevant studies of John W. Berry in 2005.

He states that:

> "*The retreat from immigrant multiculturalism reflects a return to the traditional liberal and republican belief that ethnicity belongs in the private sphere, and that citizenship should be unitary and undifferentiated. On this view, the retreat from immigrant multiculturalism reflects a rejection of the whole idea of multiculturalism as citizenisation*" (2010:104)

In this regard, the Dutch system left the idea of providing separate rights to its ethnic minorities such as self-government powers, language rights, separate educational systems. One should not assume that the backlash of Multiculturalism is an old issue to discuss. It is a recent policy of the Dutch government as Kaya (2009) states, there was an air of multiculturalism in the Netherlands in the 1980s, which even prompted the Dutch government to give an emphasis on the recruitment of Imams, Muslim priests, in order to provide Muslims with religious services (p.122). However, things turned upside down when the immigrants did not opt for returning to the country of origin, at the same time they did not appear to be integrated and socialized with the native Dutch people.

Most historians agree that the first generation of Muslim immigrants as Turkish and Moroccans, did not intend to stay permanently in the Netherlands, neither did the Dutch government of that time understand the root of integration problems or the backlash of multiculturalism regarding the second and third generation of young Turkish and Moroccans in the last two decades and also in the Netherlands. It is important to examine whether or not they are integrated into the very country they were born; they are educated in Dutch schools. It may therefore not be logical to call them immigrants. To this end, it is significant to fill this neglected area and situate the integration problems of these youths regarding how they are still seen by the policymakers, the ones who conduct the statistics on ethnic communities, and native Dutch people in the Netherlands.

As the problems experienced are exclusive to each different generation, the current situation of the third generation Dutch-Turkish youngsters are having several problems completely

different on the basis of integration by pointing to the fact that they are somewhat made perceptible to be foreigners at school, at work, on the streets. There are several scholarly discourses germane to the theme of integration problems but regarding the third generation, as an exclusive group who has at least one parent born in the Netherlands, no statement/literature has been made based on distinct problem types faced particularly in the 21st century of how they are affected, reinforced or counteracted. So this study will be of value for those looking for the reasons of integration problems of Dutch-Turkish youngsters from not only the Turkish community's point of view in tandem with the Dutch governments and people's point of views against the Turkish immigrants.

Most of the young adults I interviewed indicated that they felt more Turkish than Dutch, however the higher educated third generation youngsters identify themselves both as Turkish and Dutch. What is striking is that the interviewees have feelings of being different both in the Netherlands and in Turkey. This is where the integration paradox begins. Their sense of being is mostly the product of their Turkish-origin parents, Turkish language and culture, Islam, Dutch country, Dutch language, and the Dutch way of life. These traits will be underpinned in the Field Chapter, however when the literature is reviewed it is seen that Scholten (2011) and Kaya (2009) made a sustainable contribution to the scholarship. In his book "Framing Immigration Integration" Scholten mostly focuses on the immigration policies the Netherlands implemented as the basis of integration problems of ethnic minorities in general. Kaya advanced Scholten's ideas by allocating Islam and the related problems Turkish immigrants have faced in general in his book "Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization" (2009). He also talks about the end of multiculturalism by grounding it on worldwide terror events made by some radical Muslim groups. In connection with these highly traumatic terrorist incidents, integration problems of the third generation Dutch-

Turkish are discussed against the backdrop of their social, cultural, and economic position in the Netherlands.

Rationale of the Research

This qualitative study is significant and also needed for a variety of reasons. First; there is a gap in the literature about third generation Turkish-Dutch youths and their daily life activities, their psychological and cultural dualities in the Netherlands. Another reason is that the majority of the scholarship has mainly been conducted by a quantitative method. Thus, the second aim of this study is to focus on qualitative findings to gain an in-depth understanding of how the descendants of the first generation live and find an identity in the Netherlands. One and the most important reasons for me to carry out this study is that when I researched the current studies of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands, I realized that the majority of the research basically dwelled on the initial problems of the first comers, also known as guest workers and family reunification happened afterwards. Even today, the second-generation Turkish origin people experience certain problems in the Dutch country and their situation in their homeland is not so satisfying. I have a circle of family members who have been in the Netherlands for three generations and they have visited us in Turkey every summer, I can say that we have grown up together even though they just come and visit us on their summer holidays. So, I observed their behaviors and characters, which led me to research about their complicated and unformed life styles and the incoming problems faced in the Netherlands.

At the end of this research, I will obtain in-depth knowledge of the psychology of these people, who have grown up in an environment that includes the traces of migration and the difficulties experienced by their parents or grandparents, which can be another thesis topic to

be carried out separately. This study will be an inspiration to the neglected area of the psychology and social lives of third generation Turkish-Dutch youths.

Thus, my aim with this research is to shed light on their identity and integration problems felt deep inside by this young generation. This is why the person-to-person interviews, focus group interviews and observations helped me to understand their inner lives through asking the right questions at the right time. Therefore I needed to take a bit of time to create a rapport with my interviewees to be able to get a better quality of interaction and result. Finally, this study will provide a platform for future researchers who wish to study migrant youngsters in the Netherlands.

Methodology

This section will explain the methodology of the data collection and the interview process for this study. The most common sources of data collection in qualitative research are interviews, observations, and review of documents (Thomas *et al.* 2015). On that ground, person-to-person interviews, focus groups and observations are supposed to be the primary sources to find adequate data. To reach the unambiguous results regarding this study, using qualitative research methodologies is an asset. The necessity of this method can be explained by a sentence of Creswell (2008) who defines qualitative research as an inquiry process of understanding based on distinct methodological traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem. The researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, analyses words, reports detailed views of informants and conducts the study in a natural setting (p.15).

To this end, using qualitative methodology techniques allows the researcher to closely dig out the integration problems of Dutch-Turkish youngsters in their own naturalistic setting. Morrow, Rakhsha and Castaneda (2001) provide an array of reasons for using qualitative

research to study multicultural issues namely; its methods provide the opportunity for voices that were previously silenced to be heard and lives that were marginalized to be brought to the centre. It is uniquely able to capture the meanings made by participants of their experiences (pp. 582-583). The methodology had already been planned and pilot-tested before the field research so that the researcher had a chance to gain some type of framework that guided the nature of the data collection. Most of the data collection took place by person-to-person interviews. Apart from the person-to-person interviews, focus group technique is also employed to gather information particularly for the ones who are good friends and want to be interviewed all together to remind each other of the specific cases they had already shared in groups. The groups I interviewed were heterogeneous groups such as students, a group of workers, or those who are mixed in terms of jobs and education. As another technique of qualitative research, observation involving the record of what is happening at the research site and in their natural sites. So, as the interviewer I went out with a couple of friends unplanned, and visited the towns of the Netherlands and Germany. The major drawback of observation is the limitation of recording field notes to remember what has occurred in the setting. Remembering later on helped me put the experiences in written form.

The interviewees were chosen from a random pool, be they from different circles of friends, different schools, different neighbourhoods of Overijssel or relatives of each other. The tone of the interview was kept conversational. Before starting the interview, I told a little bit of myself and also, superficially explained my research project. Before asking their consent, I assured them that their identities would be safeguarded but almost none of them considered this as a problem, a few of them wanted their names written in my study with the aim of showing their problems to everyone. Complete rapport was established through pre- interview questions by asking personal questions (name, school, work, the neighbourhoods they live). The questions were more open-ended and less structured so that the follow-up questions

would create a nice atmosphere which let me establish a friendly aura and a good rapport with my interviewees. I could easily deduce what they meant from their choice of words, but I asked them "Do you mean…" questions to make sure I understood the right meaning with the sentence. When I felt that the question might be too sensitive for that participant to answer (religious practices, political support, Dutch or Turkish spouse choice), switched the question naturally. I placed selecting interviewees to fit three criteria. They had to:

1. Be between the ages of 18-32.
2. Be a third generation immigrant in the Netherlands.
3. Have a Turkish heritage.

Apart from the above criteria, ethno-cultural background of my participants was quite significant on the road to detect the specific integration problems of the youngsters. Selecting the Overijssel province for this research is not accidental that's why a couple of questions were deliberately selected for a specific ethnic groups such as Alevi people, Kurdish people and ones who strictly follow the doctrines of ultra-nationalist movement in Turkey.

Before the reaching to the field, I had made a initial research so as to see the ethnical differences among the Turks in who settled in Overijssel decades ago. I asked to my Alevi interviewees how they feel themselves in the Netherlands as they belong to Alevi sect and the traits of Alevism are quite different from Sunni sect namely; Alevi Turks are known as more Kemalist and their way of life is closer to the European way of life. Majority of Alevi people do not follow Islamic doctrines and are away from religion in a lot ways. I asked them if they are happier in Europe, with the welfare of European system, equality etc. But the results have been quite contrary to why I believed before the field.

Apart from the Alevi groups, I came across mostly Sunni families that their parents or grandparents came mostly from Gaziantep, Karaman, Ankara and Sivas. I had a chance to visit them in their own houses and realized that they mostly support AKP government.

I tried to pay careful attention to find equal numbers of male and female participants however it was a bit more difficult to find male participants so the number of male participant I was able to interview was 12 as opposed to 18 female participants. I conducted my interviews starting with the starting date of 15th of June till 30th of June, nearly 2 weeks of duration. For this study, language was a challenge regarding the Turkish level of my participants. Especially the ones under the age of 22 who needed translators to answer my questions. Some of them had to be interviewed in English due to the fact that their English level was much better than their Turkish language. It was a bit strange to detect the fact that the more educated my participants were, the better their command of Turkish was. As will be seen in the data analysis, interview questions cover a wide range of topics. Of course, more complex issues were discussed as well, but they were mostly compressed under four areas of topics.

Scope of the Study

Covering a very wide time frame of half a century, I was obliged to choose a limited period of time and age group regarding Dutch-Turkish generations. Hence I selected the last 2 decades. Chapter one is divided into sub-sections starting with the research question so that it is the milestone of an MA thesis. With the research question, the history of Turkish migration to Europe is given without digging the details. Literature review is also segmented into sections to give a clear understanding of the migration theories, together with the definition of integration as a word and in the context. The underlying reasons of the integration problems are highlighted in context of the recent Islamic incidents happening around the world and the effect of Islamophobia, as this is a hot debate and can influence the mainstream thinking about the happiness level regarding the situation of the Dutch-Turkish youngsters in the

Netherlands. Methodology and the rationale of this study are given at the end of the introduction chapter.

Early in the first chapter, acculturation types are defined and connected according to the social identification of the Dutch-Turkish youngsters in the process of forming an identity in the Netherlands. As one of the acculturation processes, social segregation has particularly become prominent, given the current social identification of the Dutch-Turkish youth. Following the acculturation theory and the discussions on which the process of the acculturation the Dutch-Turkish youngsters have chosen to become; multiculturalism as a notion and policy is introduced and discussed with a certain framework so that the reader can comprehend multiculturalism initially, then can base the discussions given at the field chapter accordingly. Multiculturalism is exclusively chosen and placed in the Theoretical Framework chapter as it has been the governmental policy of the Netherlands for minorities back in the days and it shows how a constitution changes rapidly towards once secured and embraced minorities.

The second chapter sets out to explore the livelihood diversification of migration from different parts of the world to the Netherlands. The reasons and motivation for coming to the Netherlands even before the middle ages are questioned and resolved. Following the diversification of the migrated countries to the Netherlands, the details of the migration from Turkey is discussed in depth leading up to specification of the successive generations from the guest workers to the third generation youngsters.

As this research study is particularly conducted in the province of Overijssel, the third chapter establishes a background asset for the reader to the point that Turkish communities highly prefer to live there. The general information about Overijssel is connected to the residential segregation of the Turkish families in this city. The reasons and the motivation for doing this is given in the context of migration policies of the Netherlands which started from the guest

workers agreements till today and its effects on todays Dutch-Turkish youngsters who live in the Overijssel area is discussed under the effects of changing policies.

Data collected in the field is reflected with quotations and the comments follow these.

I separated the field chapter into four prevalent sections. Chapter four is a detailed report of the fieldwork that was carried out in June 2015. This chapter justifies the methodology that I appointed for this specific study. Some of the quotations from my participants are commented on outlining my activities in the field, such as observations and also the interviews I conducted. Since chapter four is the field and data chapter, the research question presented in the introduction was answered and justified.

Chapter 1

Theoretical Framework

In the following section, I will further explore the theoretical concepts respectively of Social identification in connection with the acculturation in the process of forming an identity on the course of integration of third generation Dutch-Turkish individuals. The effects of the Dutch culture on the Turkish community and also, the effects of the Turkish culture on the Dutch community will be analysed with regards to the acculturation theories but particularly the separation factor will be stressed over the other factors. So, within the acculturation framework, whether there is a positive integration of Dutch-Turkish third generation will be evaluated. The 2011 American Psychological Association (APA) was charged with developing an evidence-based report that addresses the psychological factors related to the experience of immigration, with particular attention to the mental and behavioural health needs of immigrants across the lifespan, and the effects of acculturation, prejudice/ discrimination and immigration policy on individuals, families and society (APA, 2011). Hence regardless of where one is born or comes from, the psychological factors on the road to reproduce an identity is non-negligible.

Apart from the psychological factors, the policies of the Netherlands put onto the Turkish migrants are discussed in this chapter. In the last years, multiculturalism is highly contested as a policy all across Europe so the separation from the dominant society will be reified as it cannot be ignored within this unpleasant aura caused by so-called multiculturalist policy in the Netherlands. The theoretical frames will be reified soon after the interviews with the young generation Dutch-Turkish individuals. The Turkish community and their relationships with Dutch people becomes more of an issue which is anticipated to be dissolved with the help of interviews and data. The third generation Dutch-Turkish youth and their feelings on the host society and the difficulties, daily life problems and policies experienced inside and outside the Netherlands affect their integration are given within the framework.

1.1 Social Identity Theory

Social identity theory is broadly used as an explanatory tool across the discipline of social psychology (Brown, 2000). The roots of constructing a social identity stem from a collective of attitudes, behaviours, and common moralities of a group of individuals from within. This group of individuals must share the same social identity that manifests itself with a certain kind of national and social cohesiveness. In that certain group, people share certain norms that are the patterns of thoughts, feelings, and behaviours, and in groups, what people do and say communicates information about norms and is itself configured by norms and normative concerns (Hogg & Tindale, 2005).

People are predisposed to live with predetermined social values so it turns out that individuals need each other to compose groups to live with certain kinds of shared components, regardless of interventions of the other groups. However; social identity theory (SIT) states that threats from outside groups are important shaping factors. To illustrate, a

group of people who live away from their original country may be exposed to the possible threats as an intervention to their certain social norms in the form of integration. Thus, the process of defining themselves with some discrete norms keeps on elaborating in the host country insofar as they keep on living in a foreign environment. By doing so, they constantly redefine their own identity while subsequently differentiating themselves from other social groups (Hogg, 2000).

The main question is why do people need to identify /categorize themselves with a certain group? The short answer is that a social category (e.g., nationality, political affiliation, sport team) into which one falls, and to which one feels one belongs, provides a definition of who one is in terms of the defining characteristics of the category- a self-definition that is a part of the self-concept (Hogg &Terry & White, 1995: 259). According to Hogg & Reid, self-categorization causes our thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and behaviours to conform to our prototype of the in-group (2006:10). It depersonalizes self-perception in terms of the in-group prototype. Ashford & Mael elaborate the case by stating that social classification serves two distinct functions. Firstly, a person using social classification' cognitively segments and orders the social environment, providing the individual with a systematic means of defining others (1989: 20-21). As already stated, creating a social identity is to be explained in terms of psychological traits which fine-tune the identity processes that are always viewed in relation to someone else, it is always about identification with images, or like- others, located in particular socio-symbolic coordinates (Dashtipour, 2009).

To reiterate, it is the *big Other* who judges if a social identity is appropriate in terms of the rules implemented by that *big Other*. *Big Other* is sometimes the power of government, sometimes the President, or a kind of *father figure* who involves *himself* into every situation so as to alter or hinder the action. For some stances, Lacan's imaginary and symbolic identifications are significantly related to form a social identity, it is not in-group individuals

who vie for to compose an identity, but with the threats of out-group natives, in terms of the Dutch-Turkish youth's situation, they form a social identity which may not be complete in the host country. Imaginary identification is always identification 'on behalf of a certain gaze in the Other […] which gaze is considered when the subject identifies himself with a certain image? '(Žižek, 1989:53). So we see ourselves through the eyes of fantasized *Other*. Bhabba (1994: xvi) elaborates it by saying that for Fanon, like Lacan, the question of identification is never the affirmation of a pre-given identity, never a self-fulfilling prophecy- it is always the production of an *'image'* of identity and the transformation of the subject in assuming that image. In fact, composing an identity is not for the sake of identity but that is basically for the sake of *big Other*- gaining a representation of the self by differentiating order of the Otherness.

In the next section, we will go further in depth on how the Dutch community is the *big Other*, who with the latter immigration policies compose a kind of veiled threat against the Turkish community in the form of quasi-integration. The Dutch community has a strong commitment to their own Dutch culture so the discrepancies between Turkish moralities and Dutch ones are supposed to gain the role of a threat to the Dutch unity; their own moral values are privileged over the minorities' values especially over the Muslim minorities. The values of Islam and Turkishness are bound to be backward. For these reasons, creating a social identity for Turkish citizens is a kind of dilemma in terms of the current negative views on Islam and the Turkish immigrants.

Both the second and the third generation Dutch-Turkish communities desire to keep their Turkish heritage against the Dutch culture since these Turkish social groups may think that the resistance of native Dutch population is a kind of threat against their roots and social identity. From their point of view, the Dutch nation is perceived as a kind of discriminating group against the Turkish community and also other minority group members by its latter

policies implemented especially on Muslim immigrant groups. Although not restricted to ethnic groups, social identity theory and related frameworks (e.g., Moghaddam, 1988; Taylor & McKirman, 1984) have implications for understanding acculturation patterns because of their predictions regarding the reactions of minority group members to their relative status in society (Lalonde & Cameron, 1993). So it is clear that the dominant group has a feeling towards the immigrants that they can limit the way they live in the host society and constrain the attitudes of the minority group members in the name of integration of all, forging a face-saving pluralism in the host country.

The Turkish community in the Netherlands is associated with some certain social identification in which they form discrete norms that somewhat do not overlap with the benefits of the receiving country; however, the maintenance of the minority group culture is highly important in terms of their psychological, political and social well being. This strong commitment to its own norms causes the backlash of integration from the host country's point of view as the immigrant groups are expected to melt into certain norms of the Dutch society and adapt to them without questioning. How much stronger the commitment of the host country is, the stronger reaction they will confront from the immigrant groups. Ethnic minority group members are free to choose among four different attitudes on this issue. First, they may prefer to assimilate into the host country, as shedding their country of origin behind. Second, they may both hold their cultural heritage and melt into the host country's moralities, which is integration. They may prefer to keep their Turkish and Muslim identities without any contact with the host country, this is separation. The last choice is the marginalization whereby both of the cultures are rejected by the majority and minority cultures.

What is the choice of third generation Dutch-Turkish youth then? As already stated in the former chapters, first generation preferred to separate themselves from the host country. Second generation stayed in between majority and minority cultures; however with the help of

a good command of the Dutch language, they have been able to keep in contact with the Dutch community. In the meantime, the Dutch way of living, namely free-and-easy and egalitarian behaviour of the majority group make the first and second generation offensive towards them. The third generation youth have a strong emphasis on cultural maintenance. The Turkish moralities have been transmitted from their parents, which limit the third generations' ability to mingle into the very country they were born in, so this puts them into the bottom of a trauma. Verkuylen &Thijs (2002) found that Turkish youth strongly identify themselves with their national heritage and cultural roots. In consequence, it can be said that the third generation react to the perceived threats by turning their back on their cultural roots and background. Of course there are a lot of reasons why the Turkish ethnic youth do not prefer to keep a relationship with the majority group but shift their focus even more towards their own background culture. These are discussed in latter chapters. From the above discussion it seems that even the third generation feel alienated in the country of birth. In the next chapters, we will take a further look at the acculturation preferences of the Turkish communities, especially the choices of third generation youth.

1.2 The Concept of Acculturation

The term acculturation has been coined to describe the process of all changes that take place when individuals of different ethno-cultural groups come into prolonged contact with one another (Berry, 1992). Even though acculturation processes involve not only the immigrant groups but also the majority community, it is a well-known fact that the most changes happen to the migrant group members. These changes are mostly collective, and rarely individual. So, it is not something very awkward when we think about the herd psychology that literally makes sense in political life; however, it may denote the same meaning for the situations of

migrants in which people generally follow the majority even without questioning what is right or wrong. However, the expectations are of course leading the new comers to adapt to their new environment instead of expecting the natives to adapt to the customs of the new comers or immigrants. On the other hand, the process of adaptation does not necessarily refer to the people who are supposed to change to become more familiar in their new environment. People who migrated to another socio-cultural environment can also react to the change, that's why, adaptation may or may not be positive with regards to the migrants' cases, in other words, and it is multifaceted. From a contextual and interactive perspective on acculturation in European settings, divergence between dominant and minority acculturation orientations[3] and hence inter-group conflict, is most likely in the public domain, so these national and ethnic cultures are openly played out against each other in the political arena, in public debates and in the media (Phalet &Kosic, 2006: 337).

The process of acculturation is mostly investigated in terms of life experiences of the new comers, and in this paper, I will be investigating the life experiences of the third generation youth, or still called immigrants, in the country of settlement. Basically, acculturation is a mutual and continuous process that involves everyone who lives in culturally diverse societies. The examination of acculturation is significant and becomes a core issue in understanding intercultural relations in culturally plural societies (Berry, 2005). Acculturation is generally associated with assimilation, however not all groups and individuals undergo acculturation in the same way; there are large variations in how people seek to engage the process. These variations have been termed acculturation strategies (Berry, 1980). When individuals do not wish to maintain their cultural identity and seek daily interaction with other cultures, the assimilation strategy is defined. Here, individuals prefer to shed their heritage. That is what the first and second-generation Turkish immigrants have basically reacted to by

[3] e.g., in the case of Turks in the Netherlands, between dominant Dutch assimilationism and minority Turkish segregationism.

not giving up their Turkish customs and heritage in their new home. So, no assimilation has been realized in terms of Turkish first comers, their children, and even their grandchildren. Another acculturation strategy is integration in which the immigrant groups value their own heritage but at the same time wish to interact with other ethno-cultural groups who are especially the ones who hold the majority of the host country, and I assume that Turkish first and second generations are not in this cluster, as well. Turkish first comers always hoped to return to their original country, so they had no aim to have interaction with the members of the Dutch country and of course, Dutch people were not so different from the Turkish guest-workers so, they reciprocally didn't make any effort to introduce themselves to each other.

As time went on, the second generation came onto the scene, however, because of a lot of reasons that I will discuss in the next chapters, they did nothing to assimilate into the country they were born in. As a member of an ethno cultural group, second generation had basically no wish to integrate or had no interest in having relations with others, so separation alternative is realized depending on little mutual accommodation. These ideas are based on the assumptions that non-dominant groups are free to choose how they want to engage in their new environment and intercultural relations however, the situation is not that easy to identify. It is not only the non-dominant groups who separate themselves from the very country in which some of them were born or grew up in, but in my study, also the dominant Dutch society implemented and enforced certain kinds of assimilationist policies in the last two decades without giving any importance to the heritage or cultural identities of the minority groups (sometimes there can be a lot of cultural differences between the dominant and non-dominant societies). Some lip service was paid to the idea that integration should be two-sided and that the established population should also leave some space for the new-comers, but only a few concrete policy measures pointed in that direction (Entzinger, 2014:699).

Depending on the national institutions (education, health, labour) of the Netherlands, the Turkish third generation are not so wishful to engage in, maybe they have some expectations like meeting better the needs of those who are still seen as guests from the dominant society's point of view. The enforcements towards segregation lead the youngsters to turn their back on their original culture which is an another phase of acculturation apparently the separation phase is indispensable. In this study, separation is the very process Dutch-Turkish third generation youngsters are going through, so in the next chapter, I will discuss the subtleties of separation and segregation history of the Turkish immigrants, especially third generation youngsters.

1.3 Acculturation History of the Turkish Immigrants

Not everyone becomes a member of the new society in the same way: some jump in with both feet, seeking rapid absorption, while others are more hesitant, seeking to retain a clear sense of their own cultural heritage and identity, and thereby revealing different acculturation strategies (Sam & Berry, 2006: 28). In 1964, the first Turkish guest workers arrived in the Netherlands without their families. With the other foreign guest workers, they were mostly seen as temporary labour migrants who were expected to return home after the need of work power terminated. When the families of the guest workers joined them, Turkish immigrants became one of the largest ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. The process of acculturation commenced as soon as the family reunification occurred. After the arrival of the families, the Dutch government expected them to adapt to their new environment as in the acculturation process, groups of people and their individual members are expected to engage in intercultural contact (Berry, 2005). After the mid-1970s, local migrant policy was accepted which paved the way for an acceptance of the immigrants' permanent stay, and at least formally, of their

otherness between the dates of the 1980s-1990s. The interaction between the native Dutch community and the Turkish immigrants increased after the family reunification. The interactions occurred in various ways including attitudes, behaviours, and a sense of cultural identity (Berry, 1997; Ryder, Alden & Paulhus, 2000). In this section, acculturation is studied at the group level and associated with the ethnic dimensions of the Turkish-Dutch third generation. According to Berry, acculturation is a dual process of cultural and psychological change that takes place as a result of contact between changes in social structures and institutions and in cultural practices. (p.698). Acculturation entails a reciprocal interaction which not only includes learning each other's native languages, but also food preferences, and also the cultural characteristics of each other; namely the gestures, cultural moralities, body language. So, as I already stated above, not only the non-dominant groups but also the majority should prepare themselves to adopt their national institutions to fulfil the needs of the other ethno-cultural groups who are voluntarily there to compose a plural society. First generation Turkish immigrants have relatively resisted the effects of acculturation in the host country, they have not sought to adapt themselves to the Dutch culture as they had a returning myth on their minds. However, they stayed indifferent to the Dutch effects even though their permanence in the host country became definite. Contrary to expectations, at the time being, their affinity to their Turkish heritage increased, this is called separation according to the acculturation strategies. Berry articulates that acculturation can be reactive; that is, by rejecting the cultural influence from the dominant group and changing back towards a more ''traditional'' way of life (p.701). When that happened, it also caused increased attachment to Islam by 2nd and 3rd generations- despite the lack of religious attachment of the first generation.

The second generation Turkish community identify themselves as highly Turkish and connected to their Turkish heritage, yet their ideas are not as tough as their parents about

integration with Dutch culture and communing with it. Second generation Turkish people can speak the Dutch language better than their parents (as most of the first generation Turkish people still cannot speak the Dutch language as a result of their little interaction with the Dutch people since they settled in). According to a survey conducted by Phalet, van Lotringen and Entzinger (2000) it is proven that the second-generation minority group predominantly self-categorize themselves as Turkish or Muslim. Moreover, they self-identify almost exclusively with the Turkish identity while clearly dissociating themselves from the Dutch national identity. From a contextual approach to acculturation, they prefer separation in private life, while preferring a combination of ethnic and national cultural elements or integration in the public domain. As most of the second-generation Turkish people were born in the host country, the contact they have with the Dutch culture is of course more than their parents had but, their schools were mostly divided into black and white schools. Black school is a term meaning that children of foreigners occupy them and native Dutch people coined the name. The Dutch parents took their children from black schools to the extent that black schools are full of immigrants, thus lessening the impact of Dutch culture on their lives.

To reiterate, second generation as compared to their parents, are more likely to prefer integration in the public domain. As I deduce, second generation have experienced cultural dualities and a cultural in-betweenness. Now that their Turkish born parents chose not to integrate with the host culture, they also were not able to help their children integrate within the host country's socio-cultural norms, too. That's why, to be able to explain the process of acculturation at the cultural level, people's socio-cultural background should be studied after learning the conditions faced by individuals', the degree of voluntariness and their society of origin.

My research is on the third generation's cultural integration in the host country and the process of acculturation. I think that third generation Turkish youngsters and the host country

have accomplished this set up as an environment that is mutually supporting the continuation of cultural diversity and this position represents a positive multicultural ideology (Berry & Kalin, 1995) and correspond to an expectation that the integration strategy will be the appropriate way in which cultural communities engage each other. However, these young people are still segregated and not supposed to be native Dutch citizens. This can be justified by saying that the process of acculturation is mutual in a society, which has been built by immigration and immigrants over some decades or centuries. As a matter of fact, integration can be assessed providing that each group wishes to form and maintain a plural society by respecting each other's socio-cultural traits, which is called cultural relativism.

The Turkish community has been living in the Netherlands more than fifty years. According to my research, as both host country and the third generation Turkish-Dutch youth exhibit more pluralistic traits compared to their parents and grandparents. As reified by the field research, third generation Turkish youths rarely prefer to be integrated into the host country and hardly ever identify themselves as Dutch. Thus, there is still much progress to be made on the way to integration depending on reciprocal understanding. We can see that creating a mutual accommodation in a country involving diverse communities under its roof is quite difficult. Forming an environment welcoming diversity is intricately significant. In the next chapters, I will be discussing push and pull factors on why the Dutch-Turkish youngsters still follow the separation over integration.

1.4 Alone in the crowd: Social Segregation over Integration

Children in Turkey are mostly raised to be respectful to others namely by kissing hands of elderly people as an indication of having a decent family or holding affinity to the Turkish moral elements. In Turkey, apart from kissing an elder's hand, there are many other

stereotypic moralities, which are intentionally transmitted from father to son throughout the centuries. These moralities or norms have been basically compromised in tandem with secular Turkishness and also Islamic doctrines. To illustrate, it is important to have dinner altogether for a Turkish family and wait for the eldest one to begin eating, or it is still a myth to accept gay people as ordinary for the majority of Turkish people. Another typical Turkish habit, which is still a problem for today's parents, is that their children, especially girls, cannot move from their parents' homes without marrying. Meanwhile in the Netherlands, let's say all over the European countries in general, the aura about individuality wanders around and blurs the aforementioned radical moralities happening outside of Europe. Generally in Europe, if you are over eighteen, you can move from your home without getting married, or if you are gay, you can readily bring it out into the open. As is known, the Netherlands is one of the most liberal and tolerant countries in Europe. Being gay is not a big deal, even, it is something appreciated and an element of honour, which shows how much freedom the native Dutch community support, compared to other countries. The abovementioned tolerance is upside down when we scrutinize the immigration policies of the Dutch government respectively; other is made subordinate and inferior. The Netherlands' government implemented drastically different contextual policies on its immigrants. In the 1960s there were no policies and in the 1970s, there were integration policies on the stage especially after the family reunification occurred. First implementations and traits applied to immigrants and their families were mostly on the aim of blending cultures and creating a kind of mosaic. As time passed by, the permanency of the immigrants and their families ascertained, at that very point, switches on the immigrant policies began occurring, I mean some kind of assimilationist policies, which are discussed in depth in later chapters, were implemented. As mentioned before, it has been difficult to merge into this country of free as a bird, for a community who had grown up with strict national and religious doctrines in their country of origin. Thus, Turkish first and even

second generation Turkish communities still cannot put up with the idea of having a gay child in this country of freedom, on the opposite side, they cling to their Turkish norms more than ever, even though the first generation have been living in this country more than forty years. From the Turkish immigrants' point of view, not being able to blend these disparate cultural elements led not only first generation but also second and third generation Dutch-Turkish generations into stronger insight to their Turkish heritage. However holding a deep affinity to their Turkish heritage, the third generation youngsters cannot elude from the effects of living in the Dutch land with its highly different moralities as explained in depth through incoming chapters. The ethnic inequalities between orientalist Turkish culture and predominant Dutch culture pave the way for getting away from the Dutch living style even if they were born and grew up there. From the dominant society's point of view, the Dutch-Turkish third generation youngsters are not Dutch yet/ enough, even if they study in Dutch schools, work in Dutch companies and even have Dutch citizenships, they are not / cannot be fully assimilated into the host country's norms. There is a debate on what terms citizen, foreigner, national, ethnic, minority, and immigrant stand for in the context of Eastern Europe (Kymlicka, 1995). This discussion is also notable in terms of Western European countries. As the Turkish ethnic-based youngsters do not feel themselves as fully Dutch citizens. The cultural disparities between Turkish and Dutch culture pose the most critical problems against the backdrop of intersecting these two different ethnic and national cultures. At the end of the interviews, the subtleties of particular anxieties of the third generation will be endorsed in the context of the research I plan to conduct, however, the hypothesis I testify in this study is on the separation of third generation Dutch-Turkish youth from their country of birth which encounters an important crossroad in the context of assimilation policy of the Netherlands towards its immigrants. In the next section, I will try to ramp up the reasons why the Dutch society has

not been able to knit up even with the third generation Dutch-Turkish youngsters in its own environment.

1.6 Multiculturalism

A multicultural society nestles more than one cultural community inside, fosters it regardless of the fact that they hold mutually distinct cultural traits. Some countries cherish with its cultural diversity, thereby gaining more insight and empathy of the differences they may face in time, making it central to its self-understanding, and respecting the cultural demands of its constituent communities, some do not accept this diversity as a kind of cultural richness. However most contemporary societies are culturally diverse, only some of them are multicultural or culturally plural (Parekh, 2002: 6). To call it a multicultural community, it should purify its soul from pride and national anxieties and embrace the diversity by seeing it as a kind of richness in the society. Embracing the difference is not a brand new topic. In pre-modern societies too, minority communities, by accepting their subordinate position in society, lived nested in the given geographical area. To illustrate, Turkey under the Ottoman Empire had fairly large Christian and Jewish communities and granted them far greater autonomy than the most contemporary western societies, however, it never saw itself as a multicultural society. It followed Islamic doctrines and ruled the country under its ideals so, the Muslims only possessed full rights of citizenships, the rest enjoying extensive cultural but few political rights (2002: 7). As a nation of immigrants, the United States has long insisted on the 'swift assimilation of aliens' into the 'language and culture that has come down to us from the builders of this republic' as Theodore Roosevelt put it (Ridge, 1981: 37). As best articulated by Roosevelt, the USA was dominated by the idea of a single American identity against the backdrop of creating a melting pot model, which implies that there is a consensus

culture that each distinct ethnic enclave must melt in it, and the people under this melting pot roof are responsible for learning that single culture, adapt to it and subscribe to it, as well. Shortly, it is an ethnocentric concept that is followed by mainstream America, and it is a concept against forming a multicultural society. So, what kind of traits should a country follow to be labelled as a multicultural society?

The multicultural model is a mosaic of ethno cultural groups; this mosaic is both politically and ideologically a significant movement as it rejects the assimilation and supports melting of the subgroups inside the dominant society. It is totally away from one single culture, in contrast, cultural equality and cultural relativism are made meaningful in this context. In this multicultural society, different cultures that live inside a dominant culture share common norms such as; legal, economic, political, thereby retaining their cultural continuity, to a greater extent, they participate in the wider society. In this pluralist society, all of diverse societies share certain norms, moralities, and customs. That means that if a country supports multiculturalism, it cannot carry a national character whereby the immigrants are expected to adapt to, in contrast, it should allow all its distinct cultures to live as they wish by providing equal treatment to all of its distinct ethnic groups without being assimilated into the host society. The success of multiculturalism as an ideology dealing with cultural differences depends on the level of support for multiculturalism by both minority and majority members of the society.

As this study predominantly focuses on the Netherlands and its multicultural traits implemented between the dates of the 1980s and 1990s, it provides an interesting case on the basis of being renowned for its tolerance to its minority cultures throughout these given decades. Recently this image of being tolerant to immigrants and their distinct cultural traits has been shaken vis-à-vis its former manner towards them. In their study, Duyvendak *et al.* offer an insight into the model of multiculturalism in the Netherlands, which offers minorities

the chance to achieve a better life: however; the implemented policies related to the integration of minorities, as mentioned in the latter chapters in detail, have never been practiced in the Netherlands for various reasons. To reiterate, integration policies have not been well planned instead only *ad hoc* decisions are made (Duyvendak & Pels & Rijkschroeff, 2009). In the 1960s, Turkish first comers, mostly men, were recruited as guest workers to fill a labour need and though their home country still exists, they chose not to leave the host country even after they were not needed anymore. In the first decade after the recruitment occurred, the Netherlands' government was in the opinion that, guest workers, especially the ones coming from Muslim countries, would 'one day' return home and as this returning myth was highly presumed, the socially kind and tolerant country did not initiate Dutch language courses or permanent housing to its immigrants, hence no proper integration policy was implemented granting them some rights in the host society. Apart from that, there is another reason responsible for why a suitable immigration policy was not initiated, which is the Dutch system of compartmentalization. In this system, all groups have been compartmentalized along social- political and religious lines and have consequently gained governmental support to establish separate institutions, such as schools, broadcasting and welfare organizations. This system is often called 'Pillarization' which is largely responsible for the segregation of migrants, mostly Muslims (Pettigrew & Meertens in Stone & Dennis, 2003). Pillarization system led the immigrants to live in concentration districts to compose their own pillars such as Islamic primary schools, though some of them did not meet Dutch standards of quality, which led them to be segregated more from the native population.

The myth of return gradually faded away right after the spouses of the guest workers were imported which led the government of the Netherlands to establish some sort of immigrant policy which was expected to lead them to adapt themselves to their new environment but it was a little bit late as both the Turkish guest workers and natives had never attempted to have

mutual contact up to that time, because of these reasons, no or scarce contact between natives and Turkish guest workers made the mutual judgments manifold. Lately, migration has been presented in the western public space as a security threat that must be dealt with and this tendency is reinforced by the use of racist and xenophobic terminology that dehumanizes migrants. One can see this racist tone in the terms such as "influx", invasion, flood and intrusion, which are used to mean large numbers of migrants (Kaya, 2012:403). As this racist tone rises, today's Dutch-Turkish youths keep on alienating themselves from the very society they were raised in. As seen by the aforementioned roots of the failure of multiculturalism, the gap between the fact and discourse rises, provoked by the ceaseless policy changes in the Dutch society. As this study mostly scrutinizes the third generation and the effects of recent multicultural ideals of the Dutch country on the integration of third generation Dutch-Turkish youngsters, we have to figure out some very important events in the beginning of 21st century and which highly affected the position and the integration of Dutch-Turkish third generation youth.

Since the aforementioned myth of returning was never realized, there have been great changes in the context of immigration policies. However, the beginning of public dissatisfaction with policy or migrants as occurring in 2000 when a publicist & former member of the Scientific Bureau of the Labour Party, Paul Scheffer, wrote a critical essay in a national newspaper that criticized Multiculturalism (Ogan, 2007: 258). Some of Scheffer's ideas are based on the fact that there is huge influx of people from diverse cultural backgrounds, in combination with multiculturalism, resulting in ethnic segregation and also, these people exacerbate the situation by talking in their own native language, reverting more to their own cultures which led to adaptation problems such as school drop-outs, unemployment, and high crime rates. So the effects of the current policy shifts, of course, have had visible negative influences on the adaptation process of Dutch-Turkish youths in Dutch society.

As the Dutch history of integration process has varied a lot, openly seen in the previous chapters, this current section presents the attitude of the Dutch community and another reason for its discrepancies between the dates of 1999 to 2007, a period in which various national and international events happened, such as the terrorist attacks on New York (2001), and the assassinations of popular politician Fortuyn (2002), controversial movie director Van Gogh (2004), Madrid (2004), and London (2005) (Breugelmans & Vijver & Schalk-Soekar, 2009). [4]Apart from these tragic events, in the last few decades, the victories of right-wing parties have stood out, which too has a pernicious effect on the multicultural dreams of the country. However the first generation guest workers and their children were not exposed to the harsh assimilationist implementation by the Dutch government, they were not given the basics of Dutch culture, either. Today the third generation Dutch-Turkish youngsters are substantially supposed to be native Dutch as they were born there and they have hardly any connection with Turkey and Turkish culture except for their summer holidays, their families, and the media. They were never migrants but have Dutch citizenship. However, the views of the Dutch native society are getting more and more exacerbated towards the third generation Dutch- Turkish youth because of the events inside and outside of the Netherlands that have occurred and the shifting political balances. In this climate of mistrust, Ogan and d'Haenens state that the government enacted tougher immigration laws and new requirements for immigrants already living in the country. Immigrants under the age of fifty are now required to attend Dutch language classes and to pay for them; welfare payments may be cut for non-compliance (2012: 928). Abovementioned events have negatively influenced the ideological climate in the Netherlands with regard to the multicultural ideals (Breugelmans *et al.* 1997: 654). According to Kaya (2012), the anxieties associated with parallel lives and self-segregation of Muslim have become very visible in European countries, accusing Muslims of

[4] See the latter chapters for details.

not integrating into the western way of life. There is a spectre who wanders all over Europe in the 21st century, it can be called the backlash of multiculturalism, by not recognizing the legitimacy of their differences triggered by the current anti-Islamic events and the rise of right-wing extremism.

From the Dutch government' and politics' point of view, Dutch-Turkish youngsters are responsible for the gap belonging to and supporting Islam and refraining from integration. In particular, Turks born in the Netherlands are getting more and more alienated even if there is a wave of multiculturalism around Europe, which is supposed to support solidarity for natives and ethnic minorities, but to no avail in the case of the Netherlands particularly in the 21st century.

Chapter 2

Migration From Turkey to the Netherlands

The story of constant migration of Turkish nationals to Europe was initiated after the 1950s. More than 60 years on, Turks have been living in all corners of Europe. Turkey is one of the few countries that has experienced such intense levels of human mobility, as huge numbers of its citizens, first through official encouragement, and later as a result of preference, family pressure, or encouragement by the experiences of friends and fellow citizens, left Turkey to start new lives and create new communities abroad (Abadan-Unat, 2011:xxii).

Turkey in the first half of the 20th century was an agricultural country. Yet, in the 1930s and afterwards, the mechanization in agriculture took on the role of booster which caused the unemployment of rural populations and resulted in migration to urban areas/centres. In other words, there was not enough money to buy the technological devices to plow their lands, but the money coming in return did not confront both the effort and also the money spent on the electronics. The military coup of 1960 in Turkey coincides with the manpower need of Western European countries so the interim government of Turkey decided to solve economic problems and the shortage of foreign currency by introducing a 'demographic' solution, briefly defined as the "export of excessive manpower" (2011:xxii). As articulated clearly, the

most crucial factor that led a number of guest workers to flee from their homeland to more developed countries was solely economical on the side of Turkey. The initial wave of migration consisted almost exclusively of males (p.145) and Germany was the first European country with which the first labour agreement was stipulated. Why Germany was the first country to start the deal that goes further back in the history of labour migration to Europe will be discussed. As it is known, a lot of Ottoman statesmen had sympathy (or need) for Germany which led both sides to establish political and military relationships with each other and moreover, some officers were sent to Germany for education before the Turkish republic was set up (Atun & Aya, 2013:115). Germany was Turkey's alliance during World War I so the ties discussed above was the juncture point for both Turkish and German sides as one needed to solve the employment problems and the other was in massive need of labour workers to reconstruct its razed industry. During the 1960s, not only Germany, but also various other European countries imported Turkish labour. Panayi labels this the "Age of Labour Migration" in Europe, the longest lasting period of migration to Europe and the one likely affecting the largest number of people (as cited in Ogan, 2001). One of the receiving countries that lacked man power was also the Netherlands. In the next section, the issues including first recruited guest workers, called first generation, the second and third generation immigrants are also delineated in the context of the Netherlands' migration history.

2.1 Migration History of the Netherlands

Until 1949 the Dutch ruled the third largest empire in the World. They made their money from trading goods in Asia and the Caribbean. Amsterdam became one of the world's leading ports. It has experienced substantial immigration for over 400 years, attracting and profiting from an influx of people fleeing from religious persecution, political instability or poverty.

Since the Middle Ages, the relative freedom, wealth, and the tolerance to the diversity of the Netherlands have drawn a significant number of immigrants. In the late 16th century, particularly religious refugees, be they Jews from Spain, Portugal and also the French Huguenots, flooded into the Netherlands. So the estimated foreign-born population between 1590 and 1800 in the Netherlands was never less than 5% (Lucassen & Penninx, 1997). By the mid 17th Century Amsterdam was a veritable "city of outsiders", with over half its population born elsewhere (Mak, 2010:100). During the colonial period most of the trade in goods from Asia came through the East India Company, which also obtained a monopoly in slave trade, transporting people from Africa to the Americas (Horst, 2001:184).

The Netherlands was a trading nation with important colonies in the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia), and six islands in the Caribbean and Surinam (then called Dutch Guyana). The percentage of immigrants was higher in the 17th and 18th century than in the 1990s (Lucassen and Penninx, 1997:29). Lucassen and Penninx (1997) estimate that foreign-born people composed more than 6% of the Dutch Population between 1585 and 1780. They argue the change in the share of foreigners, which I closely correlated, with the relative prosperity of the Netherlands (cited in Zorlu and Hartog, 2001). The Dutch colonial empire began to fall when Indonesia claimed its independence in 1945, which led to immigration of two larger groups of persons: Dutch-Indonesian repatriates and Moluccans[5].

Another category of immigrants who came to the Netherlands were the World War I victims, namely the Belgian refugees who fled Belgium to find a safer place but, even before the War ended, they returned home. However, in 1918, between 50,000 and 100,000 Belgian refugees stayed sheltered and also nearly 35,000 interned soldiers from diverse nationalities came to the Netherlands but right after the War and hostilities terminated, they left the Netherlands. In 1931, another group of Jewish refugees came to the Netherlands fleeing from Nazi

[5] Moluccans are one of Indonesia's many ethnic groups. They live on the Moluccan Islands in western Indonesia. Moluccan soldiers fought with the Dutch army against Indonesian independence.

prosecution. In tandem with Jewish people, a number of German and Austrian people too fled from Nazi-territory because of political reasons (Bouras & Hilali).

After World War II, as there was a shortage of housing and also economic distress, the government of the Netherlands encouraged its community to emigrate, most of them chose to move to Victoria, Australia. Especially the gold rushes in Victoria drew a number of settlers even before World War II. So it was an attractive settlement both for travellers and settlers. In this regard, the Dutch community in Victoria doubled particularly after the 1960s.

At the beginning of the 1960s, alongside other European countries, the Netherlands decided to recruit "Guest-Workers". Guest workers migration was being launched due to the rapid post-war economic boom and the increasing shortage of unskilled or semi-skilled Dutch native workers. Guest workers were brought first from Southern Europe and then Eastern Mediterranean countries, particularly from Morocco and Turkey; to fill a labour shortage and mostly semi- skilled or low-skilled migrant workers were received by labour agreements in the Netherlands (the details of Turkish first arrivals are given in previous chapters). First generation Turkish guest workers mainly originate from five provinces located in the centre of Turkey: Kayseri Karaman, Sivas, Ankara and Yozgat (Beets *et al.* 2008:37).

They left their homeland and families behind to seek employment, which allowed them to save money to buy a house or set up a business on their return home. In fact, migrant workers who came from Southern Europe returned home especially after their countries were joined to the EU and their conditions got better at home but Turkish and Moroccan origin workers stayed permanently as opposed to the rotation[6] plans of Dutch authorities.

[6] Agreements were based on a principle of rotation: a worker was expected to return home after one's year employment abroad (Abadan-Unat, 2011)



Map 1.1 *Main areas of origin of Turkish guest workers are coloured dark grey.*

> *"At that time, the immigrants themselves as well as the Dutch government expected that they would only be in the Netherlands on a temporary basis but, contrary to any initial intention, many stayed in the Netherlands permanently. Return migration by Turks and Moroccans was limited, despite government programmes to stimulate the process and only the Italians and Spanish returned home in relatively large numbers, often shortly after immigration. Such variance in the rate of return migration among different immigrant groups was partly due to the economic situation in the country of origin, which could make return an attractive or unattractive option" (Heerin et al. 2002: 252).*

In 1975 the left-wing Den Uyl government decided to grant independence to another Dutch colony: Surinamese. This decision as well led to a sizeable migration (Ersanilli, 2007: 2). Family reunification migration both from Turkey and Morocco began after 1974 and since then, Turkish origin populations have increased tenfold. On the other hand, given Ersanili's (2007) recent study, we can end up on the statistics that there is an overall decrease in migration to the Netherlands. The cause of declining is pretty hard to explicate, but the stricter migration policies implemented in 2001 may be presented as the cause. The switched migration policies and the in-depth reasons are given in Chapter 3.

Currently almost 20% of the Dutch population are immigrants or children of immigrant parents. The number of residents with 'non-western origins', as official Dutch statistics calls them, stands at around 1.6 million, one-tenth of the population. Among these, Turkish and Moroccan people stand out as the ones that have the largest populations in the Netherlands. According to the recent forecast, the total population size of the Netherlands is expected to grow from 16 million now to 18 million around 2040 (Alders, 2001). In the next section, the concentration of Turkish guest workers from first generation till the third generation is probed.

2.2 First Generation

Migration of Turkish citizens to Europe can be separated into three phases. The first phase is labour migration. Bilateral labour exchange agreement between Turkey and Western European countries started to be signed firstly with Germany in 1960 and subsequently- with Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium in 1964; with France in 1965; and with Sweden in 1967. Particularly the 1970s saw the start of "follow-up migration". It was on August 19, 1964 that Turkey and the Netherlands signed a formal treaty due to the rapid post-war economic growth and the shortage of semi or low-skilled Dutch workers in the Netherlands. Turkey was not the first option for the Dutch government as clearly seen from its formerly received guest workers coming from Southern European countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia and Greece. A few years later, the Dutch government headed to recruit from southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, notably Morocco and Turkey. In the following years, the proportion of Turkish guest workers did not become higher than those who came from Southern Europe, their numbers constituted the majority of all the migrants in the 1970s. It was in the 1960s that Turkish citizens began to avail themselves of new

opportunities in Europe as these years were years of high unemployment, and many Turks looked to go abroad as a means of economic improvement (Abadan-Unat, 2011:11).

Bilateral Labor and Social Security Agreements between Turkey and European states

Countries	*Labor Agreements*	*Social Security Agreements*
West Germany	30 Sept. 1961*	30 April 1964
Austria	15 May 1964	12 October 1966
Belgium	15 July 1964	4 July 1966
Holland	19 August 1964	5 April 1966
Switzerland	—	1 May 1969
France	8 April 1965	20 Jan. 1972
Sweden	10 March 1967	2 Sept. 1977
Denmark	—	13 Nov. 1970

(*) extended on 30 Sept. 1964

Source: Ahmet Y. Gökdere, 1978. *Yabancı Ülkelere İşgücü Akımı ve Türk Ekonomisi Üzerine Etkileri,* Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, s.275.

Under the agreements signed with Germany, Belgium, Holland, France, and Sweden, applications by Turks for vacancies in these countries were entered on a waiting list with the Turkish Employment Bureau and evaluated anonymously. As the jobs shared for migrant workers were low paid with poor working conditions and undesirable social status, native workers declined working in those positions. Consequently, the European governments turned their face to labour sending countries.

Recruitment in its old nominal form continued to exist, however, until 1973 (2011:11). As already stated, it was exclusively a temporary situation for mostly male workers and their duration of stay was determined on the basis of a completion period of the workload. However, the scenario was not that smooth to play out. Especially the Turkish and Moroccan workers were aware of the fact that if they returned home, it would be quite hard to cross the divide again. Without regard to the relatively better conditions in the Netherlands, so many guest workers went back/ had to go back home to the extent that only a small portion of workers were hired by the same company for a different project. Most of the migrant workers were retired around the age of 50, and they preferred self-employment upon their return

(Ebiri, 1985). However a number of migrants from Turkey and Morocco returned back home, the majority of them reified their settlement from guest worker figures to citizens. Their position shifted from temporary guest workers into a more permanent settlement. The fact that most migrant workers from Turkey were men without their families had strong effects on families and households back in Turkey. Having a traditional family structure, Turks were not accustomed to having split families. Many of these families experienced troubled marriages. Problems in the families increased if the separation resulted in divorce (Barisik & Eraydin & Gedik, 1990). As a result, the solution was to bring their families to the Netherlands.

As is well known, the economic recession prevailed in the countries of Western Europe from the aftermath of the oil-crisis and the labour recruitment stopped in 1974. The Netherlands was one of these Western countries, which was highly affected. However labour migration stopped, another phase of migration began. This second period of migration ran from 1974-1981 and was the initiation of family reunification, where spouses and their children joined the workers to make their homes in the Netherlands.

The last period was characterized by efforts to terminate further migration and European encouragement of remigration to the homeland between the dates of 1982 to 1992. The Centre for Turkish studies publicized (cited in Ogan, 2001) that since 1992, most countries have been experiencing migration in terms of 'family formation', where second and third generation Turks born/or raised in Europe return to Turkey to find a spouse and bring the husband or wife back to Europe to live. This last period also has included the migration of refugees, mostly of Kurdish ethnicity, who fled Turkey for political reasons and seek asylum in European Union countries in the hopes of finding jobs and securing permanent resident status (pg.27). Rinus Penninx and his colleagues (1993) state that the Netherlands can divide the Dutch policy-governing immigrants into two periods- before and after 1980. So the next

section describes times and experiences after family unification, the second period of immigration.

2.3 Second Generation

From 1971 onwards, according to CBS, labour migration transformed into a family-based migration. The CBS statistics do not classify guest workers separately according to their position in 1973 and 1974. However, the age structure of the migration of foreign nationals suggests that the change in the composition of the Turkish migration continued in both years (Akgündüz, 2008:83). After the oil crisis in 1973, the economy of the Netherlands was upside down and it pushed its immigrants back home. Since the oil crisis affected the country between the dates of 1973-1979, Dutch employers planned to set the qualified and semi-qualified job positions aside for the Dutch natives. In this regard, the majority of the guest workers were vacated from their on-going jobs. Even after these bad living conditions in which they worked hard in a strange land side by side with people who spoke a language they were not familiar with, they still preferred to bring their spouses/husbands and their children for various reasons.

Years passed by and they were still seen and treated as strange and other- outsider. They were still immigrants and instead of going home, they were getting more and more crowded as a strange community from the Dutch natives' point of view. The men, when they first arrived as guest workers, required housing. But the government did not bat an eyelid for this issue since their situation in this country was to be temporary from the Dutch authorities and companies' perspective. Therefore, they passed their years under barracks, rented rooms or boarding houses that were overcrowded and lacked necessary comforts of a home. After the families of

labour immigrants arrived, they were supplied with necessary accommodation and the desirable houses they had lacked for years.

Guest workers in a way succeeded in bringing their families to their new home. But there were a lot of problems awaiting them to be solved especially, the problems regarding their small children, as some of them were school-age. So a program known as Immigrant Minority Language Instruction was introduced in elementary schools in 1974. This program called for providing schooling for the migrants in their mother tongues (Ogan, 2001:31). This program was conducted in regular class hours when the minority of students were removed from the classroom to be instructed in their mother language. Apart from teaching their mother language, there were also Quran courses for the children of religious Turkish families. The second generation was treated with the idea of multiculturalism; they were supported to learn their mother tongue and religion by bringing teachers and imams from Turkey exclusively for them. Dutch authorities were of the idea that immigrant children should not stay away from their national language and moral values as a consequence of their temporary stay in the Netherlands. In this regard, Turkish courses and the construction of mosques was in a way the product of a multiculturalist aura. Yes, there was an undeniable aura of tolerance and freedom. Even the Dutch government was fighting for discrimination, causing Turkish migrants having unequal chances, compared to their Dutch counterparts.

This time coincides with the concerns of Turkish workers who couldn't practice their Islamic faith in the land in which Christianity is the national religion. As a result, Muslim immigrants were enabled a hospital policy, however it was not exclusive to the Muslim community, but it is an act, which deals with the religious issues in the Netherlands. It is called Church Construction (Subsidies) Act (1962-82) and allows mosques to be built. At this point, it is worthwhile to say that the Dutch government treated its minority groups in a good manner, as it was the time when multiculturalism was at its peak and the Dutch authorities vastly

supported it. However, this county had no recent tradition of permanent immigration and it considered itself full immediately after the families of guest workers joined them, so welfare measures were implemented against this backdrop that their accommodation is temporary. They should be isolated from the native population so as to keep their children away from the children of immigrants. Although, in those days, the Dutch authorities may have acted with the best intentions, their approach can best be qualified as exclusionist (Castles and Miller, 2009).

Being a second-generation immigrant was the most pathetic phase of Turkish immigration. Most of them were born in Turkey and they came to the Netherlands at the very early age of their childhood and some of them were born in the Netherlands. Their parents lacked the Dutch language and culture so they tried to discover a sense of self in a strange land with two different types of people around. They were in a way feeling lost in between two exceedingly different cultures and systems.

Second generation Turkish immigrants were the first respondents exposed to the economical, cultural and social challenges, especially the challenge of forming an identity in a land where you are treated as a sort of stranger. They were much further away from their parents' culture, and also they were physically different from the majority people. At the same time, they were not fluent in the language of their parents or of Dutch. But at least, they had interaction with the Dutch community through school, social activities when compared to their parents. One of the most challenging experiences the second generation underwent was the issue of translation based on the idea that the second generation was the first Turkish-origin group who was taught the Dutch language and also the system of the Dutch way of life. As their parents did not have any command of the Dutch language, second generation children/ young people had to carry that burden on their shoulders. They escorted their parents when they

needed to visit the doctor or to go shopping. At this point, they were made aware of the fact that they felt so much pressure to understand adult Dutch work at these young ages.

Their young adult ages mostly corresponded to the years between 1985. Therefore, the Dutch authorities were aware of the fact that Turkish immigrants were going to be permanent. They do not intend to leave their new home and order. The second generation was the borderline generation who has gotten stuck in between Dutch and Turkish cultures. In the next chapter, third generation Dutch-Turkish youngsters are discussed in connection with the experiences of their parents, the second generation.

2.4 Third Generation

As this study is specifically conducted for third generation Dutch-Turkish youngsters, I will deliberately leave some blanks by not elaborating on each of these people's experiences or problems in this section. In this study, the third generation refers to the youths aged between 18 and 30. Merging the resources and my personal experiences and ideas regarding first and second generation Turkish people helped me to compose the above sections (first and second generation) but, the collected date and the review of literature germane to the experiences, problems, life styles of the third generation were the basis of my research, and are discussed under the field section.

Third generation Dutch-Turkish youngsters are supposed to be Dutch since the moment of their birth in the Netherlands. If I ask a third generation Dutch-born Turkish whether 's/he feels Dutch', this is totally an unfair question. Is it really possible to accept your grandparents' country as your own? If it is the country you have just visited on your summer holidays, how can you identify yourself with it? What is the background of this feeling? It is pretty logical for first and second generation as being viewed as Turkish immigrants or foreigners as they

themselves deny identifying themselves with Dutchness but the third generation still has a hard time to form an identity even if they were born and raised in Dutch lands.

Some of them have never visited Turkey and only worked /working in Dutch companies, having Dutch friends and they only speak Dutch so I had to interview them in English. But when asked, they identify themselves only with Turkishness. That's the main problem debated in this study. I question why they unceasingly abide by the country they just travel to for vacations. Within the survey, age range of 18-30, the youngsters mostly see themselves as Turks. When questioned, I realized that some of them identified themselves with Dutchness in younger ages but then they realized that they have been mainly seen as outsiders by the majority society they happily identified themselves with. As a consequence, they isolate themselves by returning more to their heritage.

As is known, the Dutch society was erected on ethnicity and religion and it separates the communities it shelters on the basis of their social roots and religion. It means that a life-long Dutch resident or citizen is not Dutch enough and will never be. You are Dutch if you are descended from a Dutch ancestor. In fact, this paper presents some of these challenges and their reasons unique to third-generation Dutch-Turkish youngsters. Their identity is destabilized, they are not complete and they are still in search of who they really are. The social upbringing of Turkish third generation youngsters is quite different from the Dutch way. However there are a lot of background problems ranging from severe language problems to Dutch native society's treating of Turkish peers in a bad way, there are also some particular problems caused by the narrow-minded first generation first arrivals and their continuous wish to raise their children completely the same as their upbringing in Turkey before the1960s. Living in a Turkish way and even raising their children as totally against the Dutch norms may be another reason why the Dutch-Turkish youngsters still lag far behind the

average level of total Dutch population in various terms, which are explicated in-depth in Chapter 4.

Chapter 3

Universe of Research

This chapter begins with 400 years migration history of the Netherlands, then keeps going with the changing policies regarding migration focusing on Muslim migrants. Additionally the societal, economical and political characteristics of the Netherlands are discussed by putting more emphasis on the province Overijssel as I conducted my interviews with those who were born or raised in Overijssel. Later on, I give an in-depth evaluation of Dutch thinking and Dutch-policy making regarding immigration integration from the 1960s until 2010, thinking of the overall guest-worker migration and the mutual effect of it on the Dutch society and on the successive migration generations by focusing on Third generation Turkish youngsters and their integration process. I separated immigration integration process into three sections: Multiculturalism, Integration, and Assimilation with their specific roots and the underlying anxieties of the Dutch government and the Dutch society by questioning the identities of the third generation Dutch-Turkish youngsters.

3.1 Overijssel, the Netherlands

The Netherlands is the 64th most populated country in the world with a population of 16,923,880 (CBS, 2015). It has the sixteenth largest economy in the world and the sixth largest in the European Union. Compared to many EU Member States, the Netherlands has a highly open economy, which is why the country was hit hard by the sharp downturn in world trade in 2008 and 2009 (NL EVD International). The Netherlands has a large population of non-Western ethnic groups. With a population of approximately 17 million, almost 20 per cent of it is non-indigenous. Turkish and Moroccan immigrants each represents approximately one tenth of the entire population, together accounting for one fifth of the immigrant population. The largest group, with almost 400 thousands people, are immigrants of Turkish origin (CBS, 2010). The Netherlands geographically consists of twelve provinces these are; Drenthe, Flevoland, Friesland, Gelderland, Groningen, Limburg, North Brabant, North Holland, Overijssel, South Holland, Utrecht and Zeeland. As this study is proposed to focus on third generation Turkish origin youngsters who live in the Overijssel area, I also describe the demographics and cultural traits of Overijssel here. Overijssel has a 1,137,668 population and 3% per cent of its population has non-EU background (CBS, 2008). The capital city of Overijssel is Zwolle and the largest towns are: Enschede, Almelo, Hengelo, Oldenzaal, and Deventer (Hoitink, 2005). The biggest town is Enschede in which a large number of localized Turkish families live. Actually, Turkish ethnic minority is the largest non-western ethnic minority in Enschede (Velde, 2008). During the 15-day period of my stay in the Netherlands, I lived in Hengelo whereby I came across various Turkish origin people ranging from children to old ones.

I visited every town of Overijssel where ethnic residential segregation is pretty much between Native Dutch families and Turkish ethnic families. At a city level, segregation of the Turkish families is important to mention against the backdrop of summarizing the overall phenomena of segregation in the study area even though there are a few Turkish ethnic families who may experience very different situations regarding their residential cluster. In the Overijssel area, residential segregation of Turkish ethnic families is measured to analyse the effect of ethnic concentration on the integration problems of Turkish youngsters. Some streets only include Turkish families with one or two Dutch families as an exception. As I guess, they intentionally located close to the Turkish families to create small Turkish clusters in different sides of the town. Within my 15-day stay; I can easily conclude that Turkish youngsters who live in Overijssel prefer to go out across the border into Germany. This tradition of visiting Germany by Turkish youngsters continues throughout the years, and which is a pretty popular activity regarding the hangouts of Turkish young generations.

As the province Overijssel borders Germany in the east, it is easier and better to have a day trip to Germany rather than the major cities of the Netherlands. Apart from the closeness between the area of Overijssel and the country Germany, the predominance of a Turkish population in Germany can account for another reason for these one-day trips to Germany due to the fact that they feel relatively connected to home. In Germany, nearly 3 million Turkish people live; therefore it is a country where Dutch-Turkish youngsters mostly visit for different reasons. By visiting two random cities of Germany together with five Turkish youngsters, I experienced that they are far more familiar with the nearest cities of Germany than the cities of the Netherlands and they have a lot of friends who work in Kebab houses or *Nargile* (Hookah) cafes, that made me prove my ideas about the unspoken connection between Turkish youngsters who live in the Netherlands and in Germany. They feel less overrepresented and act more freely than they do in Overijssel, even if they are home. While I

was with them observing their manners, I concluded that Dutch-Turkish youngsters in a way fulfil their longings to be in their country of origin.

3.2 Migration Policies of the Netherlands

The Netherlands provides one of the best examples of how integration models as developed and pursued by politicians and policy makers may change over years (Entzinger, 2014:694). As the Netherlands were supposed to be a country of tolerance but switched its philosophy from tolerance to bigotry throughout the years, the migration policies it implemented on its migrants for five decades are worth examining. Regarding the Turks and their migration history and also the onward positions of the young generations in the Netherlands, it is easily said that the same peaceful environment cannot be achieved these days. I tie the integration problems of Turkish society, particularly youngsters in this study, both to the stated-sponsored discrimination elements and to the heritage of Turkish families. Both sides seem impure on the way of the integration problems Dutch-Turkish youth face even today. In this section I separate the immigration integration policies into three phases to see the changes better. I describe the development of immigration integration policies in detail by focusing particularly on the radical policy shifts and the effects of them on Turkish migrants, particularly young Dutch-Turks, in the Netherlands.

3.2.1 Multiculturalism in the Netherlands

In the early 1980s, the Netherlands was presented as one of the ultimate examples of Multicultural countries. This is based on the belief that cultural emancipation of immigrant minorities is the key to their integration into Dutch society (see e.g. Duyvenyak &Scholten,

2009). Before the 1980s, the Dutch government and general public were convinced that immigration was a temporary phenomenon and guest workers would return home as soon as their responsibilities terminated in the Netherlands. The country never implemented any policy based on the fact that the Netherlands had ever been a migration country. On the eve that the multicultural idea prevailed in the Dutch parliament, migrants were isolated from the native Dutch society in anticipation of preserving mutual cultural identities. Bringing native Turkish teachers from the country of origin for the second-generation Turkish persons should be understood in this context. However this approach seems pretty much innocent and although it was implemented with good intentions, it was another name of exclusion. The sense of exclusion regarding the minority groups was mostly felt after the train hijacking by Moluccan youngsters, which led to a number of deaths. This event was the turning point regarding the temporariness of the migrants and the same event caused the abandonment of the idea of temporariness of the migrants in the 1980s. The first official immigration integration policy in the Netherlands was developed in the early 1980s (Scholten, 2011:73). From that day on, the migrants were accepted as the permanent settlers in the Netherlands. However, it was not still acceptable to call the country as an immigration country, by framing the previous migrants as historically necessary for the sake of the Dutch country. In this decade, multiculturalist traits were its peak and assimilationist statements were explicitly rejected. Migrant communities were free to experience their specific cultures as if they are home. As Scholten states that the 1980s corresponded to days of tolerance with a policy discourse stressed "mutual adaptation" in the context of the Netherlands as a "multi-ethnic" or "multicultural society". This aura of multicultural tradition can be explained with a reference to the Dutch tradition of *verzuiling* or "pillarization" [7]. This is a form of institutional pluralism since the late 19th century, which gave each of the major religious and ideological

[7] An in-depth definition is given in the following chapters.

communities original to the country of their own institutional arrangements (Lijphart 1975, Entzinger 2006). The migrant communities benefitted from the conventional pillarization system of Dutch culture for a decade, which particularly enabled Muslim migrants, a chance to open their own schools with a religious curriculum and gave them a chance to vote in local elections in 1985. In addition, they were able to take advantage of provisions under the Church Construction (Subsidies) Act (1962-82) to build mosques (cited in Ogan, 2001). Though the act was written to target Christian churches, the Social Democrats added an amendment to allow it to apply to non-Christian religions, which was again the benefit of pillarization. The importance of the system of pillarization declined since 1960 as the secularization and individualization, as well as rising school levels, had made the followers less obedient towards the leaders of the "pillars" (Entzinger, 2014: 696) but when the Dutch realized that immigrants had come to stay, they applied the 1983 *Ethnic Minorities Policy* to Turks, Moroccans, Southern Europeans, Moluccans, Surinamese, Antilleans, refugees, Roma and Sinti and caravan dwellers (Vermeullen &Penninx, 2000:20). So the ideology of pillarization granted equal opportunities in social and economic life for these targeted groups. In the domain of culture, language and education, migrants were left to themselves to develop their own cultural, religious, and linguistic institutions (Vasta, 2007:717). Meanwhile, many of the low-skilled jobs disappeared, which were employed by migrants in the second half of 1980. However, the migrants' families had already gained their right to stay permanently in the Netherlands, so they could not be invited to return home thereafter. Entzinger (2014) describes the years following the end of 1980s by saying unemployment among Turkish and Moroccan communities had reached levels of around 40% and the minorities' policy did not achieve what it had aimed for the social and cultural level. The values of migrants (especially the Muslim migrants) prevailed that of Dutch values, so the council decided to discontinue its multiculturalist approach by emphasising the integration more strongly.

3.2.2 Integration

The effectiveness of the Multicultural model, ethnic minority policies and leaving the migrants on their own began to be debated in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. As the time passed, it became clear that immigrants and their children were in a disadvantageous position compared to their Dutch counterparts. As Ersanilli states (2007) in an e-article that in the 1990s the focus of integration policy shifted from cultural preservation to labor market integration and equal opportunities, as the socio-economic position of the four main immigrant groups (Turks, Surinamese, Moroccans and Antilleans) remained disadvantaged and the minority youth were overrepresented in crime statistics. Economic depression and the following unemployment, particularly among minorities, paved the way for searching for another migrant integration policy that would mean migrants could not integrate into the labour market. Also at this time, the educational achievement of immigrant children was low and housing segregation was an emerging problem from the Dutch native society's viewpoint (Vasta, 2007: 717). Turkish and Moroccan children were having language problems as they were exposed to two quite different languages at young ages, their parents had almost no language skills of which led their children to deal with both their own cultural and educational integration problems among native Dutch children and also they had to handle the translation problems of their parents. Muslim immigrant families were having the worst problems to deal with. They had to deal with economical problems and a language problem but there was a more ambiguous issue to handle in those days: Islam. When the Dutch society faced the reality that Moroccan and Turkish families did not have any intention to return to their country of origins where they would have had to deal with different issues such as politically chaotic environments or bad economy, they in a way segregated themselves from the Muslim

communities on the idea that Islam was a threat to their liberal democracy. With these concerns in their minds, the Dutch government gradually distanced themselves from the idea of leaving the Muslim migrants to their own pillar but of trying to adapt them to the liberal Dutch society. As Vasta (2007) elaborates the idea of multiculturalism by stating that a new *Integration Policy* was introduced in 1994 based on the idea of "mainstreaming"- i.e. improving the inclusion of immigrants in mainstream services in order to move away from the ethno-specific provision popularly associated with a policy of multiculturalism. It was in a way necessary because otherwise the overall society would distance themselves from each other and the gap would keep on growing among the ethnic groups and the native Dutch society. The new Integration policy placed more demands on immigrants. Teaching in native languages of immigrants was withdrawn and immigrants were required to learn the Dutch language. As Ogan states (2001), regarding the importance placed on the Dutch language of improving the quality of education for migrant children was focused on, but while this was happening, Dutch parents were removing their children from schools where minority children predominated and enrolling them in schools largely attended by Dutch (p.35). In addition, the government took a harder approach to the immigrants who ignored the Dutch values or when they disobeyed Dutch laws. On these grounds, the main objective of the new integration policy had begun to foster the immigrants' participation in Dutch society, primarily through employment and education and also through providing mandatory language and integration courses that would help new comers to become good citizens (Entzinger, 2006). It is remarkable to say that the difference is not along economical and educational with Muslim migrants and Native Dutch community, but the cultural and moral differences paved the way for composing another policy to bridge the gap between two quite different communities. In the beginning of the 1990s, the over-representation of young Turkish and Moroccan youngsters who started in the labour market, school, or social life can be explained by their

personal characteristics such as sex, skin colour, family background and experience. On the ground of these reasons, the 1990s and 2000s were attributed to the fact that some part of the immigrants did not made any effort to be socially and culturally integrated to their new homeland.

3.2.3 Assimilation

After the attacks of September 11th 2001 and onwards, a new political climate emerged in the scope of pervasive negative stereotypes about Islam and Muslim migrant families. Good intentions such as integration to Dutch culture by retention of their own heritage, or teaching the mother tongue, or having equal rights for Natives and minorities were upside down when the agenda was presented at the turn of the millennium. By this new style of integration policy, the previously given rights and the subsidies to the immigrants were narrowed. The restrictions were particularly amended for the asylum seekers, family reunion and marriage migration. At that time, a new politician entered in to the public arena: Pim Fortuyn. Fortuyn was a well-known politician who was famous for his right-wing column in the magazine *Elsevier*, which he used to agitate immigrants and what he regarded as lenient government policies. He had been active in several political parties before becoming the leader of the *Leefbaar Nederland* (Liveable Holland). He boldly expressed his political line by calling Islam a "backward religion". He continued and said that the "left-wing church" had pampered immigrants at the expense of native Dutch (Ersanilli, 2007). Later on he founded his own party called: the *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* or *LPF*. Fortuyn was murdered tragically on 6th May 2002, one week prior to the general elections. The shooter was, contrary to many biases, a white environmental activist. 9/11 and the assassination of the charismatic politician Pim Fortuyn brought a broader national debate on immigration integration. The integration of the

immigrants was supported strictly with a so-called integration policy "new style", which involved a turn from integration by retention of their own culture to assimilationism (Scholten, 2007:78). Paul Scheffer, a publicist and a prominent member of the Labour Party- initially one of the "champions" of multiculturalism- was among the first voice who boldly stated in a much-debated article called *Multicultural Tragedy* that Dutch Multiculturalism had failed. Scheffer mentioned about the immigrants and their integration levels by stating that the immigrant families abided by their cultural heritage and raised strong commitment to their own social group by getting away from the native Dutch society leading them to identify themselves more with their country of origin. On the other hand, especially the Muslim youngsters were unwilling to integrate. With his article, *Multicultural Tragedy,* Scheffer became the voice of his nation, as there is a growing fear against Muslim communities in the Netherlands.

Most of the Dutch natives believed that the presence of Muslim youngsters and their supposedly illiberal ideas, by not being able to integrate into their homeland society, has been damaging the function of the liberal Democratic state of the Netherlands. 9/11 and the negative incidents happening afterwards, such as the Madrid and London bombings, led the fear against Muslim minorities to be felt too much. Between 2004 and 2007, the country's migration balance was even negative for the first time in four decades (CBS, 2012). It was time to blame the migrants for their slow integration, which was supported as the cause of the Dutch government's implementation of a harsher model of policy that headed towards a more assimilative direction. For the new comers, a lot of new measures were taken such as passing the compulsory integration test. More than implementing an integration test for newly coming immigrants the syllabus of the integration test was highly debated as it included a topless woman on the beach, and gay men who are kissing in a meadow. Dutch officials denied that the basis of integration test was to stop the flow of immigrants from Muslim countries,

claiming that they were merely wanted all applicants to consider whether or not they would fit into a permissive society (Fekete, 2007: 51). This test has been considerably controversial among Muslim residents and the Muslim candidates who are the candidates to come in to the Netherlands. From the Dutch government's point of views, the minority groups have been expected to renounce their old-fashioned /backward pre-migration cultures leaving them behind to embrace their homeland values. Vasta (2007) explains the major reasons of this transformation by saying that this cannot be explained solely by low human capital attributes of the original immigrants but by the causes, which also have to be sought in pervasive institutional discrimination and the persistence of a culture of racism in the Netherlands. Islam is the major cause of many integration problems, although only less than one third of all immigrants in the Netherlands are Muslims. Many native Dutch people consider Islam and Muslim migrants as the reason for all the crimes and oppressiveness. The assassination of the Dutch film maker Theo Van Gogh in 2004 also provoked strong reactions among the large segments of the native population, who tended to turn a blind eye to the fact that the vast majority of Muslims in the Netherlands also were strongly unhappy with the killing (Buruma, 2006). Recently, the Charlie Hebdo shooting caused a debate as eleven people were killed by an extremist Islamic group called Al-Qaeda, which caused heated debates all around Europe. This affected the situation of Muslim groups who probably have felt the heat of a fierce backlash of integration problems of Muslim communities all around Western Europe.

In conclusion, the gap between immigrant groups especially the Muslim ones and the native Dutch society widens, however the educational level or the Dutch language level of the Muslim immigrant groups is high. The progress of immigrant integration is highly tied to the political events happening around the world, which mostly affect the position of Turkish and Moroccan youngsters who plan to set up their future in the very land they were born.

Chapter 4

Field

Interviews with third generation Dutch-Turkish immigrant youth, as well as using academic research, revealed a number of interesting facts. According to the data I collected, Turkish origin youngsters have a limited interaction with Dutch culture and they seem to choose living in their segregated areas, which is what makes them feel better with their compatriots in their concentrated space, Overijssel. To this end, having minimal interaction with the Dutch culture and almost exclusively interacting with the Turkish culture causes the Dutch-Turkish youngsters' disconnection with the majority culture. Most of my participants feel alienated when they are surrounded by Dutch people and in some cases, especially when they were at younger ages, they feel racially stereotyped as backward or outsiders. It would be presumed that third generation Turkish background youngsters have had enough time to form a unique identity in a country of birth, when the initial multiculturalist policies are taken for granted from the 1960s till 2000s. Unfortunately, just because you are a life-long Dutch resident and citizen does not make you feel Dutch. The reasons are in a way manifested with the help of interviews, observations and focus groups in this chapter. I give a detail summary of the data

by separating them into sections. In these sections, I reflect on the reasons of why positive integration could not be realized; given the participants' own sayings regarding the cases from educational life, work life, social life and religious life.

4.1 Education and Language

School is the first environment for children to have an initial interaction with one another, leading to explore cultural and social resemblances and also differences. Exploring and learning the difference is particularly important if the country harbours culturally diverse communities inside. However, even though the Netherlands has never accepted its position as an immigration country, with various ethnic-communities, it actually is. In the literature review, it is literally stated that migration from one country to another is a stressful process regarding its impact on the incoming generations and their psychological development. Immigrants are exposed to considerable changes in their social and cultural environment, they have to learn a new language and have to conform to new moral values and standards (Pawliuk *et al.* 1996). Today over 10 per cent of the Dutch population is of non-western origin, and they are still called immigrants. Education is the starting point to explore the issues of tolerance, psychological and sociological development, multiculturalism and the reality of these ethnic minorities in the Dutch society. Appreciating diversity starts with younger ages at school. With respect to education, unofficial segregation of ethnic minorities from native Dutch pupils even starts from kindergarten to university implying that the Netherlands has not been able to accept the reality of their fast growing multicultural society. Selin is a 19-year-old young woman who uttered how she and her Turkish origin friends were segregated at school:

"I was studying in middle school, which included almost 70% migrant students. One native Dutch student slapped one of my best friends, a Turkish friend. As you guess, not the native Dutch one, my friend was expelled from school without any reasonable explanation. The school principle was laughing at us whenever he saw us and when this incident happened, he told us "one more Turkish student was kicked out of school, finally."

It is not a brand new event among the minority groups in schools. The problem of education among ethnic minorities and Dutch natives goes further back than the third generation immigrant youths. But the idea of "concentration schools" originates largely in the last decade. The concept "concentration schools" is examined in terms of multiculturalism and toleration towards diversity in education. As is known, when the early arrivals came in the 1960s, they mostly lacked higher education. They were uneducated and unskilled immigrants. The linguistic and cultural backgrounds of them were quite different from that of the native Dutch population. In the middle of the 1970s, family reunification occurred and the second-generation immigrant children were brought to the Netherlands or were born right there. Alongside with other guest workers, the Turkish community was also supposed to turn back home when their limited jobs terminated. To this end, professional Turkish language teachers were brought to the Netherlands due to the fact that when the second generation Turkish origin children returned back home, they shouldn't feel alienated from the Turkish language and culture. As their parents came from a less-developed country, Turkey in my case, tended to have substantially lower educational attainment or qualifications than do their respective majority groups (Heath & Rothon & Kilpi, 2008: 216). When the dream of sending the guest workers and their families back to their country of origin did not occur, the Dutch government switched their policy for immigrants, as already mentioned, teaching the mother language and Turkish culture were cancelled as the immigrant children and the youths were expected to be integrated to their new home by learning the Dutch language and culture to bridge the gap

between their family culture and Dutch culture. When the families first arrived, the native Dutch families started moving out of their homes to draw their children away from the migrant pupils. As this no-holds-barred running away from immigrant families was quite intentional, as a result, the concept of black school was not accidental all around the Netherlands. The history of "black" and "white" schools stems from this spatial segregation of ethnic minority communities that coincided with family reunification in the 1970s. Currently there are more than 500 black schools in the Netherlands (Arts & Nabha, 2001).

Black is used to describe not only the children of Turkish community but also Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean descent inside a majority Dutch community. The adults of these minority groups are associated with blackness, too. In this regard, Blackness is related with backwardness from Native Dutch people's point of view. The very segregation in education starts via this darker skin colour of ethnically different groups in the Netherlands. So, the first social segregation embarks on the schools, at childhood ages. Even today, the third generation Turkish origin youngsters have been experiencing problems beginning from kindergarten to higher education years. More than 20 of my participants complained about the racist statements towards them, which led them to have particular anxieties in their school lives. Bihter, a 23-year-old Dutch-Turkish girl, and worries about the lack of respect she feels by stating:

> *"When I was in middle school, there were two Dutch boys in my class, they were always listening to hard-core music and staring at us as if we were aliens. I was chatting with my Turkish friends in Turkish at lesson breaks. These two Dutch boys approached and asked us "why do you speak in Turkish all the time?" and they added, "You are here only for benefiting from this country's tolerance and social rights', that's why you don't work here."*

Many of the participants share the view that they were discriminated in one or another way while they were studying. These kinds of accusations have a great impact on the integration and academic performance of third generation Turkish origin youngsters in the Netherlands. Hasret, a young woman in her early twenties, who left school after getting her degree from ROC, expressed her dislikes of her Dutch peers when she was in middle school:

> *"Sometimes our teachers wanted us to work in groups, but they did not prefer to mingle with us according to their personal choices. One day my teacher again wanted us to work in groups and I unconsciously wanted to join the group which was full of Dutch students, they directly told me that they did not want to work in the same group with me, which was a pain for me as I was just a child."*

Apart from the colour of their skin and their status of being immigrants, their low command of the Dutch language and lack of reinforcement are the other key contributing factors of their bad performance in school. Merve, in her early twenties, has finished ROC too, and has been working for 2 years in a shop, which sells baby dresses. She constantly weighs the advantages of having a good command of the Dutch language:

> *"My father was born here so, he always supported me to learn and improve my Dutch language. He always talked to me in Dutch. Even if my mother did not speak the Dutch language, she encouraged me to watch Dutch channels when I was in kindergarten."*

As the second generation had a lot of language problems both in school and in their social life such as performing the role of translator for their parents, they predominantly supported their own children- regarding the data collected by my participants- by talking to them only in the Dutch language and sending them particularly to white schools regardless of their religious missions. Of course there are participants who were intentionally sent to black schools so as

not to lose Turkish moral values and, in consequence, the majority of them dropped out of school even without any diploma. The same participants feel 100% Turkish and most of them uttered their dislike towards Dutch people. In conclusion, they do not have a qualified job. Burcu, 19 years old, is of the example figures who feels 100% Turkish. When I asked her why, she said:

> *"My parents never pushed me to improve my Dutch language skills. I speak Dutch neither at home nor outside. I left the school but when I was studying I anyhow was not speaking Dutch so I have always had Turkish friends. As my parents did not help me improve my Dutch language, I failed the class once in high school."*

Although the overall educational level and socio economic positions of the second and third generation of Turks have generally improved, there is still a difference in comparison to the native population (Leeman & Ledoux, 2003). Despite all the measures taken, research results highlight slow social integration of Turkish origin youths due to language problems, lack of adaptation, being behind in education and some specific ethnic causes (van Der Veer, 2003). In the last 10 years, the Dutch society has become less tolerant to the immigrants so, the children of especially Muslim migrant societies leave school as they don't feel comfortable to air their opinion both academically and socially. I only interviewed the people from a small province, but their feelings towards education, in other words, to academic life are quite negative. Teachers' perceptions of Turkish adolescents seem biased by prejudices caused by mostly islamophobia so, they are seen more and more as a problem for Dutch society. It was Ramadan when I was in the Netherlands, so I had a chance to hear quite pathetic statements made by my participants who were interviewed at their school. Melek is one of the students who studies in ROC, she is a young woman who wears a headscarf. She told me of an incident she had experienced a few days ago:

"I had forgotten to get my name written on the examination list so I came by my teacher's room to ask if I was allowed to attend the exam. She did not let me first; I had to beg her for being attended, as I knew that if I had been a native Dutch student, I would not have to beg for taking my exam. She let me take it at last but told me "I guess you did not eat enough at suhoor (meal before dawn during Ramadan), I was frustrated but I could not do anything, all in all, It is my school and she is my teacher."

There are other Turkish students who share the same accusations at school but they seemed like they got used to it. I also interviewed students who have a more Western approach to life- in education, dress, and religion. They told me that they understand the importance of having a good command of Dutch and speaking only Dutch when there are Dutch people around. To those who would equate the importance of Turkish with Dutch, I would describe Cansu, who works in a jewellery shop in Enschede:

"There are 4 Turkish girls who work in the same shop with me. We as 4 Turkish girls unwillingly produced our own peculiar language made up of Dutch and Turkish. Two of my Dutch colleagues had complained against us to our directors about our speaking Turkish among us. We later on find their complaint proper and changed our manners while we are working next to our Dutch colleagues."

As clearly seen from different lives and cases, third generation Turkish origin youngsters still struggle to study in Dutch schools by being challenged both with language and accusation together. They seek out ways to feel peaceful in their country of birth. That's why; they prefer to be together in their communal enclaves with the people they can be themselves. Most of my participants dropped out of school, as they did not socially feel at peace. They would be quite successful if they stayed strong and got used to the manners of Dutch people in general.

Existing xenophobia was usually implied under a layer of common sense in the Netherlands, they still see themselves as a tolerant people. The slogan "The Netherlands is full" is often used as a justification (Baumgartl & Favell, 1995: 242). On the other hand, learning and preferring to speak in Dutch is not a strange request from the Dutch point of view. It is something usual to learn and speak the language of the country in which you were born, educated, employed. The wish of understanding what a person talks about in a certain environment such as school or work is not accepted as something too odd.

4.2 Labour Market

The global financial and economic crisis has hit especially young generations all around Europe. The Netherlands is not an exception to the extent that it faces a sharp unemployment rise of 75% in the last few years. As a result of this, young people, especially young migrant generations, face great difficulties in entering the labour market in the Netherlands. According to the Statistics Netherlands, the integration process is an uphill struggle to the extent that young people with non-western backgrounds still are lagging behind in socio-economic terms compared to their native Dutch counterparts (CBS, 2014). On average, it is already harder to find their way in the labour market for migrant youth, which not only alienates them from their country of birth but also contributes to their lack of a sense of being at home in the Netherlands. They feel "put under the microscope", pressured to perform three times better than the native Dutch employee in order to prove their capacities. However the third generation Turkish origin youngsters constitute a better position compared to their Moroccan peers, they still lag far behind compared to their native Dutch peers. They struggle to climb above their social strata, and employment figures demonstrate that it is difficult for this group to find a job at their (educational) level (Andriessen & Nievers & Dagevos, 2010: 408). As

seen clearly from the collected data, however even if you have academic success in the Netherlands, if you belong to a Muslim minority group, you are at a disadvantaged position in comparison to your Dutch peers. Hazal related her attempts to warrant her position in her previous job by saying:

> *"I'm working in a dentist clinic as a summer internship. Every foundation, shopping mall, and clinic closes at 5 pm here in the Netherlands. This never ever changes due to the fact that these Dutch people are fond of discipline and order. Even if they have works to be done after 5 pm, they stop it and go home. But I don't prefer to leave the clinic if I have to do something else. Sometimes I finish my things to do at 5, but I don't leave and keep on working because this is the only way of gaining appreciation for us, Turks."*

When I asked how they could overcome the unemployment problems they face most of the time, their response was diploma. The third generation Dutch-Turks work in better positions relative to the second generation. The improvement is largely due to the improvement in educational attainment and language proficiency of the third generation in comparison to their parents. Education is the essential factor in this respect. The average education level attained by young people with a non-western background is lower than that of young native Dutch people and they leave school more often without having graduated. Non-Western young people more often leave school prematurely compared to their native Dutch counterparts (CBS, 2014). As a result, finding a job for Dutch-Turkish youngsters is lower, which decreases the welfare level to the greater extent than that of Dutch native youngsters. Due to the lack of adequate diploma, Third generation Dutch-Turkish youngsters encounter various difficulties on the basis of employment and salary. However if they find a job, they are not given permanent employment contracts. This temporary employment implies a risk of losing the job and becoming economically dependent (Euwals *et al.,* 2007:23). One of my

participants, Burcu, who works in a bag-manufacturing factory in Oldenzaal, describes the overall situation she faces all the time:

> *"I work so hard here so that my contract is prolonged a year more. If I am fired, it may take my one-year to find another job as I don't have a HAVO or VWO diploma. The other problem is age. As I am 23 years old, it is much more difficult for me to find a job. I mean- I have to be given more salary as I have 6 years of experience. Thus, employers prefer a much younger native Dutch worker than the same-aged minority background employee. That's why most of my friends (Turkish) stay at home and take subsidies from government. Other than this, Polish workers have come to find employments a couple of years before; they work for 2 euros or something like that for an hour. In either case, we Turkish youngsters are not the first choice for employers."*

Many polish workers, mainly young men, are not officially recorded in the population register. They often work in agriculture or as temporary workers. They are relatively employed more compared to Turkish origin Dutch ones. As my participants told me: Polish workers work for 2 euros for an hour. Limited duration contracts are so common among Turkish origin youngsters in Overijssel, as most of the participants don't have higher degrees and Dutch language proficiency, which keep them away from both the labour market and the Dutch society. They, mostly the female of my participants, either find jobs in Turkish companies or prefer to stay at home till they get married. I find that there is evidence for a positive effect of educational attainment on the employment rate of Turkish youngsters but it is not always an exact solution regarding the economic crisis the Netherlands is going through corresponding with the other Western countries. Ercan who lives in Hengelo and has 10 years working experience thinks this is a problem:

> *"Turkish people can only find lower average jobs and their place is on the lower level of the income ladder. However educated you are, as the Netherlands has plunged into*

economic recession they prefer to employ native Dutch rather than non-Westerners when their companies have employee gap. For example I applied for another position from within my own company but they did not accept my application by saying as a justification that I had not worked there enough. By the way I was working there for 3 years but they employed a native Dutch who was completely strange to the conditions of my company."

When I asked him if his and the accepted employee's educational attainments are equal he said:

"Yes we have approximately the same level of educational attainments with each other. But he is native Dutch so…"

With a lot more examples collected in the Netherlands, it is evident to say that the Dutch-Turkish young generation goes through quite turbulent experiences regarding their careers in the Netherlands. They are almost lost in the labour market in a quite similar way in their school life and they constitute the largest unemployed group following immediately after Moroccan youths. They cannot put their abilities into effect as they feel themselves backwards due to the feedbacks they get from their Dutch employers or native Dutch colleagues, and even from the clients they serve in their work, the customers sometimes treat Turkish or Moroccan workers as an outsider and don't want to be served by them. One of my participants Alparslan uttered a racist story he experienced in Deppenbroek, Enschede. He tried to describe what happened:

"You can also find the incident that I will tell you now on the social media news. I live in Deppenbroek and there is a pharmacy there. A migrant origin headscarf-wearing woman has been working there for a long period of time. A native Dutch customer enters the pharmacy, the headscarf-wearing worker wants to help her but at every turn she is ignored, some native Dutch customers does not want to be served by a migrant

origin headscarf-wearing worker. It was not one and only racist story she experienced as I heard so she sued one of these customers."

This case is just one of the racist examples, but not very unique, though. These types of attitudes happen to the Turkish origin people almost everyday of life. To some extent, Turkish youngsters, as well as adults and children, may experience a feeling that their Turkish or Islamic moral values are formed as a kind of reaction to the Dutch attitudes. They strive to live in between two severely different cultures, which sometimes stands out at school or on the streets, and when looking for a job. Just when they think that they are getting used to living in this country, they may hear a few derogatory remarks by their Dutch peers referring to their Turkish values namely that they are uneducated, backward people who practice Islam and who wear headscarves. These kind of racist statements or manners like the last example above, profoundly affects the Turkish people deep inside. So as seen in the example, Turkish minorities are the targets of discrimination in the job market.

4.3 Cultural Factors

I can't say that I am Dutch. I feel 100% Turkish. I have more Turkish friends than Dutch friends; I think blood pulls ("kan çekiyor"), (it is an idiom that describes how our characters often resemble that of our families even if we are separated from each other geographically). Yes, I was born here but everything is still foreign- the lifestyle, social relations, and the customs. When I have a problem, I can comfortably drop by my Turkish friend's home, but if I do the same thing to my Dutch friend's, s/he most probably asks me why I did not call before I drop by."

Bihter Özbalaban, 23 years old.

Differences in ethno cultural standards of what constitutes appropriate child behaviour could explain the differences in Dutch and Turkish parents' and their children' interaction level with each other. As usual, Turkish and Dutch parents may have different standards with respect to appropriate child behaviour (Stevens *et al.*, 2003: 583). Since 1964, Turkish families have lived in the Netherlands and they are content with the system and the discipline, but uneasy with Dutch moral values. Since they arrived in the Netherlands, they strive to keep on living

in a Turkish way regarding the life style, moral values, and religion. As the myth of return was always there as an idea for the first generation guest workers, they did not strive to adapt to the Netherlands in either way. They raised their children (second generation) as if they were still in Turkey, which was quite turbulent for the second-generation Turkish people in the following years of their lives. As is known, guest workers mostly came from the rural side of Turkey, and they could not turn their mentality into a more modernist one, they culturally remained the same, therefore they could not confront the particular needs in this alien culture. The first generation could not bridge the gap between the Turkish way of life and Dutch values. They could not enhance their understanding of integrating so as to be treated equally. Having not stepped further mentally the first generation Turkish migrants deterred the second generation from getting closer to the Dutch culture in terms of social relationship and being less alienated and segregated. Failure in social adaptation has left this younger generation isolated and withdrawn from the larger society, and inclined towards living a ghettoized life dependent on networks of friendship and family relationships (Abadan-Unat, 2011: 12). What Abadan-Unat describes is prevailing for both second and third generation Turkish origin communities, as the integration rate between these two generations is not far apart. In many ways, my participants perceive both visible and invisible barriers on the way of entering one another's cultures in the Netherlands. This is a big problem when the birth rate of Turkish and other minorities are taken into account. It is quite difficult to cross the divide when thinking about the differences between Turkish and Dutch cultures. Turkish families prefer to speak Turkish at home, and with each other. When they go outside, they relatively prefer to be with their Turkish relatives or peers. They say they feel in themselves much better when they are with their Turkish acquaintances. Regarding the culture, they feel particular anxieties according to the fact that they were born in the Dutch society and adapted themselves to their system and discipline. When I was conducting my research I realized that they feel

approximately 20% Dutch while 80% Turkish, on the other hand they are absolutely content with the Dutch system and discipline, but that's all for the contentment. But as for the culture, the Turkish origin youngsters wander in a discursive maze, which is best articulated by Damla, she lives in Oldenzaal and dreams about returning to Turkey one day:

> *"We as Turkish families never leave each other here. We in a way stick together and still preserve our Turkish traditions at home. We talk about politics of Turkey, life in Turkey or watch Turkish news on TV. Dutch culture is absolutely different in comparison to ours. Their children can easily move their house under the age of 18 if they want. My parents never allow me to move without marrying. Actually I don't prefer to do it myself, too. Dutch girls can kiss their boyfriends even if their father is around. Fathers never get angry with them."*

Regarding Turkish moral values, a father figure cannot help but show his discomfort if the case Damla describes happens. Turkish culture has a very different set of enduring values. The young generation has a strong commitment of Turkish values even if they only visit Turkey during their holiday breaks. Perhaps it is because their country of origin is so close to the Netherlands. It may also be the summertime climate, which may make Turkey an ideal spot as an escape from the rain and lack of sunshine in the Netherlands (Ogan, 68: 2001). Not all of the third generation youngsters are less likely to be integrated to their country of birth regarding the cultural orientation. The ones who are better educated, have good jobs, higher income and have a good command of the Dutch language are more likely to be integrated into this country's life style. Aral is a young man who is getting his masters degree in the Netherlands describes his feelings in this country as:

> *"I can say that I am a Turk culturally. However I feel closer to the mentality of Holland. When compared to the Turks, Dutch people live more systematically and reasonably. They can easily abandon their feelings in some serious situations, and*

take their decisions in that way. We Turks can easily be affected but they never accept emotions in serious cases. I like it because they give you the reason why they act like that in a special situation. Everything comes with a reason."

Male participants are relatively more positive compared to the female participants. I think it is because girls are not allowed to go out whenever they want or because they have to return home before midnight. Turkish families still raise their children appropriate to the Turkish norms but they are stricter compared to families who live in Turkey. They told me that "You guys are more modern than us in Turkey, we are still living as if we are in the 1960s, our families couldn't orient their perceptions according to European norms even on the contrary, they turn their backs more on their original background and choose to identify themselves with Turkishness and Turkish norms. For some of my participants, there is an unspoken pressure on them, so they prefer to get married as soon as possible as a kind of escape. In marriage too, they do not prefer Dutch partners. Hulya is 26 years old and is married to a Turkish man:

"I never thought about marrying a Dutch man. We are different in terms of perception and culture. How can our families interact? We don't have common grounds between our cultures and life styles. For example my husband protects me when I am in a jam, but Dutch couples don't care each other's ideas as much as we Turks do. Each of the spouses can leave house without any explanation. I can't say that marriages are perfect for Turkish couples, because they aren't. Turkish girls get married at early ages to escape from the pressure of their families that's why, divorce rate rises here for Turkish couples, but whatever it is I prefer to marry a Turkish man"

Minority groups are too stigmatized in the press. They take some Moroccan groups and say the minorities cause problems (Ogan, 2001: 43). From the literature and the data, I can see that Dutch media targeted Turkish youngsters. Mert is 19 years old and follows the news of

the Netherlands, Turkey and recently ISIS via TV and Facebook. He expressed his feelings on the Dutch media by saying:

> *"Two or three ISIS terrorists barged in a French factory and killed some of the workers also some of the other workers were left with non life-threatening injuries. It happened today. If you want we can log in to my Facebook account, you will see that my Dutch friends had already started accusing us, Turks and Moroccans. They easily believe in whatever they hear and even if the killer is not Turk, the news is reflected as if it is Turk or Muslim. For example if a native Dutch commits a crime, we don't hear it or hear it from social media not via TV. However if a Turk or Moroccans commits a crime, the news is forecasted as "24 years of Muslim..."*

The perceptions of Turks and Dutch youngsters to each other must be switched for the sake of cohabitation. Dutch will have to face the reality of problems and figure it out to achieve real integration. It is not enough to lay down minority policies if they are not carried out. Hence, Turkish youngsters also should accept the reality that they were born in the Netherlands and it is their homeland.

4.4 Religion and Nationality

Before the postcolonial era, Europe was only for Europeans. However, the immigration of Muslims into Europe as Guest workers, residents, and citizens have posed new challenges and possibilities of identity formation. Muslims, the citizens of Europe's nation-states and Europe itself now have the opportunity to rethink their identities and mold new ones, it can be a chance to form a brand new identity purifying from the edges of Muslim moralities and evolving through a more Western ideal to make the formation process more efficient and convenient (Sayyal & Castells, 2002). Dutch society between 1945 and 1965 was

characterized by tightly organized subcultures of minorities called *Pillars.* Three religious pillars existed, corresponding to Catholicism, Protestantism, and secularism. The Catholics constituted the largest of these groups- as approximately 40 per cent of the population- and the Protestants made up about 30 per cent (Abadan-Unat, 163: 2011). Bound up with the practice of tolerance is the concept of pillarization. The word "pillarization" was used to describe social institutions in the Netherlands between 1917 and 1970 (Hiemstra, 1997:4). Hooker views the pillars as the building blocks of society, where everything was separate but equal. He said "the pillars kept society compartmentalized into small groups, in which the pressure of the group could maintain a certain order" (Hooker, 1999: 144). Though the Pillarization system is no longer active in the Netherlands, the effects and some ideas keep coming up in political parties, schools and broadcasting.

Muslim communities built their own pillars in the Netherlands and they get funding for their schools so that Muslim families are able to send their children to the Islam-oriented schools, which include religious norms in the curriculum. According to the most recent estimate by Statistics Netherlands, there are around 825,000 Muslims living in the Netherlands (CBS, 2009). Most of the Muslims have a migrant background: either themselves or their parents were not born in the Netherlands. They originate from countries where the Islamic faith plays a central role in the life style of society and now find themselves living in a relatively secular environment. The vast majority of Muslims in the Netherlands are of Turkish or Moroccan origin. The Turkish young generation and their relationship with Islamic life style is the central focus in this section (Maliepaard & Gijsberts, 2012: 177). First generation Turkish guest workers mostly define themselves religio-national terms, second and third generation young people mostly constructed their identities exclusively on religion. Yunas Samad (2007) claims that there have been processes of identity constructions based on the "new ethnicities" emerging from marginalization in the Western European countries where integration policies

have failed (pp.164-166). This change derives from the "ethnicization of Islam in Muslim diaspora" in parallel to re-ethnicization of European people (Tibi, 2010:127). This is due to the fact that Islam has lost its ties with territory so its context has been deconstructed which paves the way for forming a new Muslim identity in a new territory and context. Regarding the young Turkish origin Dutch youngsters, Islam is a wider concept to affiliate themselves with. They feel closer to be identified with their religion than their nationality. In the Netherlands, further away from Turkish cultural elements, Dutch-Turks deconstruct the Turkishness and remain firmly attached to Islam as a means of identification. When I asked a young man, Mert, he is also a member of *Ükücü* association (the ultranationalist political group) if he identifies himself with his country of origin and Islam he says:

> *"I hang out mostly with my Turkish friends. I everyday visit the mosque. I am also a member of Ülkücü association wherein we talk about Turkish solidarity and cooperation. Mosques are also another meeting spots for us; we don't associate it only with praying. We sometimes organize kermesses*
> *there (a kind of bazaar where anyone may bring their second hand stuff to sell or buy another person's stuff). I myself spend most of my time at mosque even if I don't pray; it makes me feel like I am home."*

Following the realization that they are no longer able to return to Turkey after they set up their lives according to the Dutch system, the awareness to be identified with Islam and its ethnicization has sprung up which was the turning point of Turkish origin Dutch people who have been stigmatized from Dutch norms and this public opinion is justified with the idea that they are not integrated into their homeland culture. From the 1980s and afterwards, The Muslim identity was based on "being immigrant and being outsider" and a specific image of Islam (passive, anti-modern, articulated with rural habits) dominated public discourse as an explanatory factor in terms of economic and social problems they had (Sunier, 2005: 322-

323). Particularly after the rise of the right-wing political movement called VVD, the multicultural policies put under effect particularly for minorities began to be questioned. The sequential incidents coming thereafter such as 9/11 in the USA, the murder of politician Pim Fortuyn in 2002, and the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh by an Islamic fundamentalist in Amsterdam in November 2004, signified a turning point both for the Netherlands and Turkish origin Dutch youngsters. They have been Islamic representatives of the Netherlands, as if they had never been born and bred in the Netherlands. One of my participants, Hazar, views the radical Islamist incidents happening both in Europe and around the world in connection with his own personal experiences as:

> *"I have a lot of Dutch friends and I get along with them. In these days, they are no longer that friendly, I mean, as much as we were before. They began to see us, I mean Turkish people, hostilely. I started confronting bizarre discussions while I was with my Dutch friends; they necessarily started to ask me weird questions and generalize all of us as if we Turks belong to ISIS, too. They start doubting whether we Turks murder any of them. Most of the Turks tend to be more religious these days maybe that's why they ask us about Islam, ISIS, and Islamic practices or directly personal questions whether I go to mosque. I get sick and tired of these bizarre questions. They often forget that I was born here. I am not a good Muslim representative here. In these days they'd better ask them to Syrian refugees."*

Not only Hazar, but also many others complained about the questions coming from their Dutch peers. The rising attacks of ISIS mostly in Syrian's north and the news coming via social media thereafter lead the Dutch society to feel at stake among Muslim minorities. The view of Islam seems one of the main sources of conflict between "Dutch culture" and "Turkish youngsters". The majority of Dutch natives do not think that Islam fits their values and norms. Regarding Turkish origin female youngsters who wear headscarves are in a more disadvantageous position due to the fact that the headscarf signifies Islam. My participants

that wear headscarves mostly identify themselves with their religion and their headscarves are quite important to the letter, which exceeds both their Dutch and Turkish identities. However, they feel the bad gazes everywhere and all the time. Melek is a headscarved Turkish origin young woman and is studying in ROC, aired her opinion on the headscarf issue:

> *"Though we are 5 Turkish friends studying at the same class, my Dutch classmates lead their questions about Islam necessarily to me, as I am headscarved. They ask me whether I am getting hotter in summer or what is the aim of the scarf. I somehow answer them even if I am not an expert on Islam. They can ask me as long as they don't see me as a terrorist or something. I want to share a bad experience happened yesterday. We were done with the class and we were chatting with our teacher randomly. She suddenly made a weird joke and said, "don't say that or I sink the needle inside your head" yes I didn't laugh. Nobody actually."*

Even if they are religious or not, Turkish origin youngsters face discrimination and also feel stereotyped regarding their religion. Although most of my interviewees don't accept the accusations, they know that they are portrayed in the context where Muslims are uneducated or backward people. This perception seems to bring the Dutch-Turkish youngsters one step back. From the data I collected I can infer that the level of the education for Turkish youngsters should be seen as kind of ladder to deal with the strange questions coming from native Dutch people. Getting used to the environment, having higher education, modifying their lives according to Dutch culture can be a solution on the way to feel more integrated to the Dutch culture and answering the questions about Islam better. But whatever they face for the upcoming years regarding their integration process in this country, Islam has been by far seen as the most important mark of identity though there are other marks of belonging in the Dutch-Turkish immigrant community.

Conclusion

Surveying something from the edges, without approaching and zooming in, can easily misguide us and lead us to see it as something that is completely different from what it really is. Living in the Netherlands as a Turkish origin young person is completely different than it looks from afar. Being a European citizen looks pretty cool and the rights seem like heaven from the perspective of a Turkish young person who lives in Turkey. I, for this research study, gained the role of a medium as a Turkish young citizen who acts as a bridge between the real world of Turkish origin Dutch youngsters and the fantasized world looking from afar. There must be a question as a starting point, which must be quite narrow to pave the way for understanding the broader sides of the situation of these youngsters.

Digging into the concept of migration is a systematic start to be able to answer the research question from the top on down. Grandparents of these young people are the starting point of this study that led me to figure out the subtleties of their reasons for migration based on the fact that understanding their position of being a life-long visitor to the Netherlands guided me

to find a more concrete answer on the way of finding answers to the current position of the Dutch-Turkish youngsters and also to the research question. I was always curious about the inner peace of these young people, which was the biggest factor that encouraged me to ask certain questions and then set out to figure out the answers of the distinct research question of this study. Before conducting this research study, with the help of my personal interactions, I had been feeling that Dutch-Turkish youngsters had been experiencing identity problems. The experimental data supported my hypothesis, indicating a direct relation between the identity problems and the integration problems of these young people. The more they consider themselves purely Turkish and Muslim, the greater they get away from the norms of the Netherlands. The reasons are arranged in a certain way and the data confirmed my instincts that integration problems are clear and dwell right there for Turkish origin Dutch youngsters.

Through my field research as well as my personal experience, I discovered that the integration problems of these people are not one-sided and the assimilating minority policies of the Netherlands are not the sole factor that paved the way for integration problems and challenges. Turkish families and their parochial manners throw their children into a full trite way of life relict since the 1950s Turkey which inhibit todays' young Turkish origin generation to form an identity and adapt to the Western norms.

In terms of education and language, they are still lagging behind that of their Dutch native peers, which hinders their full adaptation to the host country. Educational disparities start early in childhood resulting in dropouts, low graduation rates, and low enrolment in higher education that ends up with them being disciplined, suspended, and expelled from schools. Perceptibly absenteeism and dropout rates are high among Turkish students and their poor educational performance can be explained by their low-level of integration to get through the Dutch schools, low socio-economic position of their parents which is a barrier on the way to help their children to succeed in their all-round education. By reviewing the data and the

literature, I concluded that school aged youngsters face discrimination, however they love the country they live in. The schools they go to are often called a black school, which is already a sign of racism against the minorities especially to the Muslims. By identifying Muslim minorities with blackness, it is clear to finalize that ethnic minorities in the Netherlands are not Dutch, they have never been. Thus the minority students, particularly the Turkish ones, tend to shorten their educational careers compared to their Dutch counterparts as they academically underperform relative to their Dutch peers. They face struggles even in childhood but some of them are not daunted by the derogatory remarks, they keep on studying till they feel they are strong enough to deal with the segregation. The perception of regarding Muslim origin minority youngsters as backward, segregation even at school seems quite stable and difficult to stir regardless of their ethnic background. It also has a probable impact on the youngsters' or children's self-awareness as they grow up in an environment where their families' cultural heritage and language play an important role but they go to the schools in which Dutch values are privileged without showing any delicacy to their low-level of Dutch language and completely different moral values of the Turkish origin students.

However the Netherlands has been reflected as a country of tolerance before the 2000s, it is clear that the native Dutch society still cannot internalize and accept migrants as one of them. At this end, the level of social interaction is quite low between two clusters. This finalizes that some of the Turkish families who live in the Netherlands for three generations have never made a friend among the Dutch. Regarding the Turkish origin youngsters, I can say that the way they are raised in terms of culture and moral values is quite different from Dutch people, so some of the young people cannot even go one step further than their parents did. To this end, they feel alienated during the early ages, which cause them to segregate themselves from the majority. Social structure, the level of integration, and their income position are also the key factors on non-Western immigrants who do better or worse on the labour market. The

relationship between integration and labour market performance is both a complex and difficult issue to detect and elaborate. In the labour market, Turkish young generations have relatively low employment rates compared to their native counterparts. They know that they are not in the privileged cluster that is favoured by Dutch companies. They are not equal with the Dutch even if they are in terms of academic success. Some of them plan to return to Turkey permanently. Regarding this, they should face and ponder the problems they may experience when they return to Turkey as Turkey and the Netherlands have a lot of systematical differences. Instead of giving in, they should educate themselves by standing up to the struggles they face and try to adapt themselves to the Dutch way of life a little bit harder due to the fact that the daunting terrorist incidents caused by radical Islamic groups for the last decade may have prompted the Dutch society to think that they will experience the same attacks if their country keeps on harbouring Muslim minority groups. According to my personal research study and individual opinion, the dualities of two clashing cultures can be solved if opponents are willing to figure them out. We should accept that in a foreign country, particularly in a culture that includes quite opposite norms, it is a bit bizarre to desire to live a life like the one at home. Accepting the valid norms of the homeland, living a life without longing for another life away from the mother country can be another solution on the road to be better integrated to the Dutch norms.

As this project was mainly conducted and concentrated under four sub-sections in the field chapter, I think that there is much more research and literature needed on this subject. I hope that my research study will make someone else interested in continuing to investigate other factors in detail.

Ideas for future experiments would be to determine the different reasons behind the disintegration and segregation problems of the Dutch-Turkish youngsters. Moreover, researchers need to continue conducting empirical research to ascertain the factors that

contribute to the disintegration of the Turkish origin families in the Netherlands, by not only focusing on the youngsters. First, apart from conducting a general research, researchers can also separate males and females due to the fact that different sexes experience different problems and they react to the negative situations divergently. Overall the impact of the negative cases may cause different reactions among males and females regarding the Turkish community. Second, researchers should detect the specific problems among the third generation Dutch-Turkish female youngsters who wear a headscarf, as I was unconsciously exposed to their peculiar cases in the field which made me think thoroughly that their stories and experiences can be distinct and deeper compared to their uncovered peers. Finally, as I observed in the field, the divorce rate among Turkish married couples is on the increase. The reasons behind this should be conducted in the Overijssel province in particular.

Appendix 1

Background Information of the Participant

1.Your name:

2.Your surname:

3.When were you born?

_____

4.Gender: male ☐ female ☐

5. Where were you born? Country:_____

City:_____

6.What is your nationality? Turkish ☐ Turkish&Dutch ☐ Dutch ☐

Other: _____

7.What is the highest level of education you have completed?

_____

8.Have you ever lived in Turkey more than a year? If yes, how old were you?

_____

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