

18TH CENTURY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF DUBROVNIK: 18TH CENTURY DUBROVNIK AND THE
CONTEMPORARY SURROUNDING WORLD

ZEYNEP ARSLAN

Student Number: 113671002

İSTANBUL BİLGİ UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

MA PROGRAMME IN HISTORY

Thesis Advisor: Suraiya Faroqhi

2016

18th Century Relations Between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Dubrovnik:

18th Century Dubrovnik and the Contemporary Surrounding World

Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Dubrovnik Cumhuriyeti Arasındaki İlişkilerin

18.Yüzyıldaki Seyri; Devletlerarası Sahnede 18.Yüzyıl Dubrovnik'i


ZEYNEP ARSLAN

113671002

Prof. Dr. Suraiya Faroqhi (Thesis Advisor)

Assoc. Prof. Aygül Ağır

Ass. Prof. Başak Tuğ Onaran



Approval Date: 09.06.2016

Number of Pages: 102

Anahtar Kelimeler

1. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu
2. Dubrovnik Cumhuriyeti
3. 18. Yüzyıl
4. Dubrovnikli Tüccarlar
5. Akdeniz bölgesi

Keywords

1. The Ottoman Empire
2. The Republic of Dubrovnik
3. The 18th century
4. Ragusan traders
5. The Mediterranean region

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would first like to thank my thesis advisor, Prof. Dr. Suraiya Faroqhi of the Graduate School of Social Sciences at Istanbul Bilgi University, for motivating me to pursue this study. She consistently encouraged me to write this paper to the best of my ability and served as an invaluable guide, never hesitating to assist me when I encountered issues with research and writing alike.

I would like to express my gratitude to Idris Bostan for his insightful comments, encouragement, and stimulating input about this thesis, as well as Prof. Dr. Andrea Zorzi and Assoc. Prof Isabella Gagliardi at the University of Florence. They helped me access the Italian State archives and discussed with me the possible MA thesis topics I could pursue, which facilitated my final decision to write about Ottoman-Dubrovnik relations.

I would also like to thank Mustafa Çakıcı, a dedicated Ottoman Turkish scholar who inspired me to learn more Ottoman Turkish. He helped me decipher some of the words I could not read in the archival documents sourced in this study. Without his passionate participation, the study would not have been conducted as successfully as it was. I would also like to acknowledge my editor and friend, Phaedra Corrente, who refined many of the English sentences that were challenging for me to translate. I also thank Ebtisam Al-Gerafi who, using her knowledge of Arabic, helped me read some difficult Ottoman Turkish words with Arabic origins that I encountered during my research in The Prime Minister's Ottoman Archives. My sincere thanks also goes to my dear friend Can Turan, who supported me with technical assistance. I am grateful and indebted to him for all the time he spent helping me.

Last but not the least, I would like to thank my family. My parents, my brother, and my sisters have supported me not just as I wrote this thesis, but throughout my entire life. Without their love and encouragement, this accomplishment would not have been possible. Thank you all.

Zeynep Arslan



TABLE OF CONTENTS

NOTE ON SPELLING AND TRANSCRIPTIONS	iv
ABSTRACT	v
CHAPTER 1:	
INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE, MOTIVATION, AND SCOPE OF THE WORK ...	1
CHAPTER 2:	
REVIEWING THE ERA: THE POLITICS OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE REPUBLIC OF DUBROVNIK IN THE 16TH AND 17TH CENTURIES	12
Dubrovnik's Role in Re-Characterizing the Mediterranean World	12
Assessing Political Relations between Ottoman and Ragusan Contacts in the 18th Century	20
CHAPTER 3:	
ANALYZING THE 18TH CENTURY ELEMENTS OF OTTOMAN-RAGUSAN RELATIONS (AS PER A.DVN.DVE.D 19/7 AND A.DVN.DVE.D 20/8)	28
Outside Criticism (Diş Tenkid) of A.DVN.DVE.D 19/7 and A.DVN.DVE.D 20/8	28
The Elements of 18th Century Ottoman-Ragusan Relations According to A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7 and A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8	30
CHAPTER 4:	
THE FINAL STATE OF OTTOMAN-RAGUSAN RELATIONS AND DUBROVNIK'S IMAGE IN THE 18TH CENTURY (ACCORDING TO A.DVN.DVE.D 19/7 AND A.DVN.DVE.D 20/8)	45
The Nature of Ottoman-Ragusan Relations in the 18th Century	45
Diplomacy Between the Two Polities.....	60
A Historiographical Review of Ragusa: Questioning the Decline Paradigm by Examining the Course of Ragusan Trade	65
Dubrovnik's Final Presence in Europe: A Spectacular Farewell	75
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION	80
BIBLIOGRAPHY	87

NOTE ON SPELLING AND TRANSCRIPTIONS

Ottoman Turkish words are spelled according to the Ottoman Turkish transliteration system and are italicized when appearing for the first time in this text. The modern names of locations, however, are not italicized. If a location's historical name is different from its modern one, both names are written, with the Ottoman Turkish one being in parenthesis. If necessary, related references are provided in the footnotes. English translations may be provided in parenthesis, as well.

Where Ottoman Turkish words or paragraphs have been cited from previously transcribed material, the original editor's transcription method has, in most cases, been preserved (such is the case, for example, with the citations from Evliya Çelebi's "Travelogue").

Abstract by Zeynep Arslan for the degree of Master of Arts in History,
to be taken from the Institute of Social Sciences in May 2016.

Title: 18th Century Relations Between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of
Dubrovnik: 18th Century Dubrovnik and the Contemporary Surrounding World

This study seeks to identify the political and economic relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Dubrovnik in the 18th century. Aside from other archival documents, the primary sources of this study are from the Registers of Foreign Affairs (Düvel-i Ecnebiye Defterleri), classified under the codes A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7 and 20/8. These registers, dated 1779-1806 and 1788-1806 respectively, are the last known records that the Ottoman Empire published regarding Ottoman-Dubrovnik relations throughout history.

Using data from A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7 and 20/8, we aim to shed light on all forms of Ottoman-Dubrovnik relations during the 18th century, and we will determine both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of said relations. Further on in this study, we will examine how the 18th century is often perceived as a declining period for Dubrovnik and question this stance in favor of the argument that Dubrovnik was always a lively port, even in the 18th century, where a plethora of goods and services were always provided. This period in Dubrovnik's history remains important to the region's fate, and even though it faced periodic troubles throughout its history, Dubrovnik remained a strong city-state.

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü'nde Tarih Yüksek Lisans derecesi için Zeynep Arslan tarafından Mayıs 2016'da teslim edilen tezin özeti.

Başlık: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Dubrovnik Cumhuriyeti arasındaki ilişkilerin

18.yüzyıldaki seyri; Devletlerarası sahnede 18.yüzyıl Dubrovnik'i

Bu çalışma Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Dubrovnik Cumhuriyeti arasındaki ilişkilerin 18.yüzyıl boyunca nasıl seyrettiğini ortaya koymak amacıyla yapılmıştır. Diğer arşiv malzemelerinin yanısıra, çalışmada kullanılan temel kaynaklar Düvel-i Ecnebiye Defterlerinden A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7 ve 20/8 katalog numaralı olanlardır. 1779-1806 ve 1788-1806 tarihli bu defterler Osmanlı Devleti ve Dubrovnik Cumhuriyeti arasındaki ilişkilere dair Osmanlı Devleti tarafında tarih boyunca düzenlenen son kayıtlardır ve iki taraf arasındaki ekonomik, siyasi ve askeri birçok meseleye atıfta bulunurlar.

Defterlerin incelenmesi sonucu elde edilen veriler geçmiş dönemlere dair mevcut bilgilerle bir bütün içerisinde ele alınarak iki devlet arasındaki ilişkilerin 18.yüzyıldaki seyri ortaya konulmuştur. Böylece söz konusu dönemdeki ilişkiler hem nitelik hem de nicelik bakımından incelenmiştir. Bu çalışmada ayrıca 18.yüzyıl Dubrovnik'i hakkında bu zamana kadar yazılıp söylenen ve yüzyılı şehrin tarihinde bir düşüş dönemi olarak kabul eden görüş, Dubrovnik'in tarihi boyunca olduğu gibi 18.yüzyılda da dünyanın birçok bölgesinden her türlü mal ve hizmetin üretim, alım ve satımının

yapıldığı canlı bir liman olmakla birlikte dönemin politik sahnesinde de önemli bir role haiz olduğu savı lehinde sorgulanmıştır.



CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Purpose, Motivation, and Scope of the Work

Many historians believe that the political, military, and trade relations between the Ottoman Empire and the European city-states reached their pinnacle throughout the 15th and 16th centuries. This consensus is likely the reason why in the historiography concerning Ottoman 18th century affairs Dubrovnik is so rarely discussed, but the affairs of the Ottoman Empire in the 18th century merit more study and review than one would believe. This era of Ottoman history witnessed not only drastic shifts in dynastic power, social changes, and cultural reform, but also a series of events that would radically alter human society.

Many academic works about European-Ottoman relations focus on major Italian city-states, such as Venice, Genoa, and Florence. However, the Ottoman Empire was also active in the Republic of Dubrovnik,¹ a small city-state whose prowess in trade and diplomacy kept it afloat, and even the documents that catalogue their relationship often neglect to mention significant aspects of their relations in the 18th century, instead focusing on the 15th and 16th century. Additionally, the conclusions drawn in these papers—especially ones originating from Turkey—are hardly in agreement with one another. It is thus pressing for modern academia to present more detailed, objective accounts of 18th century European-Ottoman relations such that reliable references can be available for those interested in the subject.

¹ Although modern literature often refers to Dubrovnik as “Ragusa,” its Latin name, this study will largely refer to the city as Dubrovnik and its former citizens as Ragusans. For more information on the origins of the city’s name, see Safvet, “Raguza (Dubrovnik) Cumhurluğu,” in *Tarihi Osmani Encümeni Mecmuası (TOEM)*, 111 /17 (İstanbul 1910), 1061-1070.

The historical literature written so far about 18th century Dubrovnik toted the era as a period of decline for the small city-state. However, the up-to-date chart below indicates no signs of financial decline throughout Dubrovnik's history.² In fact, the graph demonstrates a gradual increase in the city's wealth until the second half of the 18th century, followed by stability until the end of Dubrovnik's status as a republic.³ The city even underwent a strong revival period between 1750 and 1800, but academics have scarcely noted the Republic of Dubrovnik's prosperous final years for two main reasons: one, this portion of the city's political and economic revival is largely misunderstood, and two, Dubrovnik is no longer considered a noteworthy city within modern society. Even in the much-vaunted work of Francis W. Carter,⁴ Dubrovnik's revival period is limited to between 1800 and 1806, whereas the entirety of the 18th century is presented to the reader as a period of decline.

² Our argument is in correlation with what Frederick Chapin Lane has advocated about 18th century Venice in his *Venice, A Maritime Republic* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). See pages 423-427 in particular.

³ See Figure 1.

⁴ Carter's book, *Dubrovnik (Ragusa): A Classic City State*, is among the most laudable works written on the Dubrovnik issue. Thanks to its extensive content and lucid conclusions, it has become the most referenced source for many papers, including ours. However, we found his periodization regarding the decline of the city debatable. We will outline this in upcoming chapters.




Figure 1. Source: <http://www.hnb.hr/dub-konf/18-konferencija/havrylyshyn-srzentic.pdf>. Accessed December 5, 2015.

Although this inference—which has been supported by many studies up until this point—might be accepted in regards to Dubrovnik’s trade relations in the *first* half of the 18th century, we wish to offer a different analysis of the events that occurred both inside Dubrovnik and in its surrounding areas during the second half of the 18th century. Dubrovnik was remarkable in that it was different from most other city-states; as Stuard aptly says, it was “a state of deference.”⁵ Despite its relative decline in the 17th century, the city was prominent enough to make its mark within the minds of the century’s writers, allowing us to approach Dubrovnik’s purported periods of decline from numerous perspectives. Many English writers noted that Dubrovnik’s freight activities were not longshore, and the Ragusan ships navigating the coastal lines of

⁵ Susan Mosher Stuard, *A State of Deference: Ragusa/Dubrovnik in the Medieval Centuries* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992). In this work, Stuard presents a well-documented investigation of Ragusa’s noble families, women, households, economy, and fame.

Anatolia and Rumelia did not stay in the Mediterranean. They, instead, passed through Gibraltar to begin operations in French and English ports, sailing to the north, the south, and even to ports in India. Samuel Pepys, a 17th century English naval administrator and Member of Parliament, describes the greatness of Dubrovnik in his famous diary as “a State that is little, but more ancient, they say, than Venice, and is called the mother of Venice.”⁶

One of the two main concerns of this study is Dubrovnik’s economic activity in the 18th century. Dubrovnik would become a crucial player in the economic and political landscape of its surrounding areas, and despite the fact that 18th century Dubrovnik was a period of decline for the city-state according to many scholars, Dubrovnik experienced its most prosperous era during this time⁷. For this reason, 18th century Dubrovnik’s political events are referred to in the context of Ottoman involvement and attitudes, since the Ottoman Empire had a large impact on the Republic of Dubrovnik’s success. Contrary to popular belief, the 18th century was highly significant in regards to Ottoman-Dubrovnik relations; the peak number of Ragusan ambassadors in Ottoman lands during the 18th century⁸ supports this argument.

Examining the two polities’ 18th century relations in detail will not only overcome any ambiguities and falsehoods surrounding the issue, but also allow us to more accurately assess the political, economic, and social phenomena in Dubrovnik’s last century. It has stimulated my interest that nearly no Turkish historians have produced

⁶ Latham, Robert and William Matthews (ed.), *The Diary of Samuel Pepys: A Selection* (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 173.

⁷ Francis W Carter, *Dubrovnik (Ragusa): A Classic City State* (London, New York: Seminar Press), 439.

⁸ Mladen Glavina, *17. Yüzyıl Başında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile Dubrovnik Cumhuriyeti İlişkileri* (Hacettepe University Unpublished MA Thesis), Ankara 2009, 26.

any studies about 18th century relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Dubrovnik. Although this was initially a problem—given, of course, the lack of resources relevant to the topic—the issue was solved by retrieving foreign literature and Ottoman archival documents written about the history of Dubrovnik.

Since the beginning of the 20th century, Dubrovnik has been attracting historians from all over the world. This is presumably not only because it has managed to preserve its archives so effectively, but also thanks to the multilingualism of its archival documents. Greek is among those many languages. These Greek documents came about not only because of a large Greek settlement that existed near the city-state Epidaurus (present-day Cavtat) until its Slavic invasion in the 7th century⁹, but because Greek was used as a lingua franca in the Balkans during the 16th and 17th centuries, particularly by the Orthodox population. Educated Serbs, for example, wrote in Greek so often that they adapted their own Greek names for use in correspondence. It even became fashionable to speak and write in Greek, particularly classical Greek. When the Slavs settled in Dubrovnik and gradually Slavicized the town, Slavonic became another commonly encountered language while researching Dubrovnik's archives. Documents in Latin are also prevalent; Latin, in Roman times, was the primary language of trade and administration until Italian replaced it. This replacement occurred due to the strong Italian influence—primarily Venetian—in the region.

After the 1204 Venetian conquest of the Byzantine territories in Balkans, Dubrovnik remained under Venetian control for over half a century. Starting from this period, the Italian documents in the Dubrovnik archives began to grow. Although

⁹ Nicolas H. Beigman, *The Turco-Ragusan Relationship According to the Firmans of Murad III (1575-1595) Extant in the State Archives of Dubrovnik* (Paris: The Hague, 1967), 24.

Italian was widely used, it did not prevent the progress of Croatian literature.¹⁰ The number of archived Ottoman documents is also noteworthy. From the 14th century onward, Turkish presence in the Balkans fostered a relationship between the two polities that would last for a long while. The Ottoman portions of the archive therefore include numerous letters between the Ottoman lords and princes, treaties between the two sides, trade and travel permits, and charters. Although all official correspondence had been made in Ottoman Turkish since the time of Suleiman the Magnificent, Slavic was also used for over a century between the reigns of Murad II (1446-1451) and Selim I (1512-1520). In the 15th century, correspondence between Ottoman Sultans and Dubrovnik were even written in old Serbian. The charters of 1442 and 1458 were also written in Serbian in Cyrillic letters.¹¹

There is much to decipher from the Ottoman archives that detail Dubrovnik's issues. First, we should mention *'ahd-nâmes*. An *'ahd-nâme* is defined as a "treaty" or "agreement paper"; it is "an official paper signed by two sides which includes the terms of an agreement."¹² In the Ottomans' case, *'ahd-nâmes* are documents comprising peace treaties or trade concessions granted to foreign states.¹³ When the Ottomans and the Republic of Dubrovnik began their relations, there emerged a need to determine the course of their alliance,¹⁴ and *'ahd-nâmes* played a decisive role in this endeavor.

¹⁰ Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 25.

¹¹ Zdenko Zlatar, *Between the Double Eagle and the Crescent: The Republic of Dubrovnik and the Origins of the Eastern Question* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 30.

¹² Şemseddin Sami, *Kamus-ı Türki* (İstanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 2010), 906; Ferit Devellioğlu, *Osmanlıca-Türkçe Ansiklopedik Lugat* (Ankara, Aydın Kitabevi, 2010), 18; Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri sözlüğü* (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1983), 29; Midhat Sertoğlu, *Osmanlı Tarih Lügatı* (İstanbul: Kurtuba Kitap, 2015), 14.

¹³ *Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi*, Mübahat Kütükoğlu (İstanbul: Diyanet Vakfı, 1988), "Ahidname."

¹⁴ *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Halil İnalçık (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1913-), "İmtiyazat" and Hans Theunissen, *Ottoman-venetian Diplomats: The Ahd-names; the Historical Background and the Development of a Category of Political-commercial Instruments Together with an Annotated Edition of a Corpus of*

They provide scholars with extensive information on social context, enforced rules, and the progress of relations concerning the Ottoman Empire and Dubrovnik. They cover political and commercial issues, as well. In general, the political matters are brief and constitute the first part of the agreement. After stating the annual tribute amount that Dubrovnik was to pay to the Ottomans, a list of their political rights followed. The sections on trade, however, are far longer and more comprehensive, most likely because most of Dubrovnik's population were traders.

The exact date that the first 'ahd-nâme was granted to Dubrovnik is uncertain, but upon examination of the register A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, we encountered a suggestion that it occurred sometime during the reign of Orhan I (1326- 1361).¹⁵ However, we were unable to use this source as evidence for the beginnings of Ottoman-Dubrovnik relations, since many scholars state that they began in 1430 during Murad II's reign. Journal author Hazim Şabanoviç, in his article entitled "Dubrovnik Devlet Arşivindeki Türk Vesikaları," asserts that agreements between the Ottoman State and Dubrovnik during the terms of Orhan I and Murad I did not actually occur.¹⁶ Evliya Çelebi, on the other hand, asserts that Ottoman-Dubrovnik relations began a century prior to the date agreed upon by modern-day historians. Evliya's theory is dubious not only because

Relevant Documents, from https://www.academia.edu/16485339/Ottoman-Venetian_Diplomatics_the_Ahd-names_The_Historical_Background_and_the_Development_of_a_Category_of_Political-Commercial_Instruments_together_with_an_Annotated_Edition_of_a_Corpus_of_Relevant_Documents. Accessed November 11, 2015.

¹⁵ "...'ahd-nâme-i mezkûr merhûm ve mağfûrun leh Sultân Orhan Gazi hazretlerinin zaman-ı saltanatlarından berü sūdde-i şeref bahşâ-yı sudur olub..." (meaning, in brief, "mentioned 'ahd-nâme granted in the reign of Orhan Gazi (Orhan I) is still valid"), A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 2 (fî evâsıt-ı Safer [1]217). Evliya Çelebi also dates the beginning of the relations back to the term of Osman I (Osman Gazi-1299-1326) and mentions an agreement containing 150 provisions of peace signed by Dubrovnik and Orhan I.

¹⁶ Hazım Şabanoviç, "Dubrovnik Devlet Arşivindeki Türk Vesikaları," in *Bellekten*, XXX/CXIX (Ankara 1966), 391, footnote No. 2.

Orhan I's activity took place nowhere near the Adriatic Sea, but also because Dubrovnik was under the auspices of a Hungarian king at that time.

Although the matter remains debatable, it may not be possible to find an 'ahd-nâme granted to Dubrovnik in the 18th century in any Ottoman archives simply because there is no specific contemporary 'ahd-nâme for this time period. As will be outlined in following chapters, the probable reason for this is that the text in question was the same as its predecessors and therefore indistinguishable from each other. The oldest available 'ahd-nâme was written by Murad II and dates back to 1430. There exists other 'ahd-nâmes dated in 1442, 1512, 1566, 1575 and 1662, but the texts from 1566 and 1662 were ever published. The 'ahd-nâme from 1662¹⁷ is of particular importance for this study—it would seem that the document has either been unknown or ignored by researchers until now, so we believe that delving into the particulars of this document will contribute highly to the originality of this study. Since it is supposedly the most recent document hailing from the era under examination, it is the most effective document with which to make data-related comparisons. For the sake of thoroughness, an upcoming section of this study will be dedicated to exploring this document.

Although it is not possible to find each of the 'ahd-nâmes granted to Dubrovnik in the Ottoman archives, one can confirm their existence through other relevant archival documents. Although no specific 'ahd-nâme granted to Dubrovnik may be

¹⁷ This document, dated December 1662 (Cemâziyelevvel [10]73) and made during the reign of Mehmet IV, was the latest 'ahd-nâme granted to Dubrovnik as a separate text in the Ottoman archives. Mladen Glavina's MA thesis entitled "17. Yüzyıl Başında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile Dubrovnik Cumhuriyeti İlişkileri," a source that we have referred to on occasion, makes no reference to this 'ahd-nâme despite our expectations.

found in the 18th century Ottoman archival documents, one can still refer to other documents that make clear mention of the ‘ahd-nâme in question. This includes many documents surviving from the resolution processes of disputes between subjects in Dubrovnik and the Ottoman Empire, since these conflicts were mostly solved based on ‘ahd-nâmes. It was also traditional to renew existing agreements after the accession of each new sultan; this process allowed for easy access of new and previous ‘ahd-nâmes alike, for each newly drafted ‘ahd-nâme would often refer to former ones in their introductions.¹⁸ There is no separate ‘ahd-nâme dated from the 18th century in The Prime Minister’s Ottoman Archives (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi: BOA), but there are numerous precepts in the two registers on which we have based this study such that it is feasible to determine the prevailing ‘ahd-nâme provisions in the 18th century.

Other documents in the 18th century Ottoman archives regarding Ottoman-Dubrovnik relations that one would expect to be indexed are, unfortunately, not logged. All the Dubrovnik-related 17th century documents were classified under the *Ecnebi Defterleri* catalog (Düvel-i Ecnebiye Defterleri) and mostly logged in the same registers as documents about Venice. However, these are merely the documents that are accessible by following the guides in the aforementioned catalogues, meaning it is

¹⁸ See the introductory section of BOA, TS.MA.d 7018 0001 (Cemâziye’l-evvel 1073), 31: “Bundan akdem Dubrovnik begleri ve knezleri merhumûn ecdadım zamanlarında sadâkat ve istikâmet ile ita’at gösterdikleri ecilden ellerine ‘ahd -nâme-i hümâyûn verilüb ba’dehu cedd-i emcedim merhum Sultan Ahmet Han tâbe serâhu zamanında ‘ahd-nâmeleri tecdîd olunmak ricâ eylediklerinde...”, meaning “For the reason that Dubrovnik lords and princes had always been loyal to previous pledges of safe conducts (‘ahd-nâmes) granted to them during the reigns of my venerable ancestor Sultans, they were previously given ‘ahd-nâmes, and when they requested a renewal for their current ‘ahd-nâme in the age of the deceased Sultan Ahmet Han...”)

still entirely possible that uncharted archival documents could emerge upon further research.

Documents containing a summary in the digital system can easily be searched using keywords, but if one knows that a specific document exists—whether digitally or on paper—and still cannot find it, one may have to rely on *Dosya Usulü*¹⁹ (a procedure of perusing physical files in folders that don't have digital copies). This process allows researchers to access hard-to-find yet valuable archives. While in the long run all documents in The Prime Minister's Ottoman Archives will be digitally organized for researchers' convenience, some have yet to be uploaded to an online database; until they are, they will remain on the physical shelves of the archives. Although using this method may require more work, it is worth doing if a large amount of material is required.

Researchers seeking particular 18th century documents ought to be aware that the catalogues may not list them as 'ahd-nâmes. Instead, they are combined with Venice's registers under the name of *Venedik-Dubrovnik Defteri* (Venice-Dubrovnik Register), which consists of two separate books. The first register is concerned with years 1779 through 1806, while the second one acts as a completely separate text detailing the events between 1788 and 1806.

While we initially only planned on analyzing Ottoman-Ragusan relations in the context of 18th century trade practices, we decided to examine all aspects of their relations to review them from both political and military perspectives. We hope to set a strong precedent for future studies regarding 18th century Ottoman-Dubrovnik

¹⁹ A term used in the Ottoman Archives that refers to the aforementioned research method.

relations by crafting a cohesive, multi-layered analysis of the issue by referencing a great deal of literature, including Ottoman archival materials, chronicles, and travelogues.

This study asserts that Dubrovnik always possessed a lively port in which all manner of items could be bought, sold, and ordered, even in the 18th century. Dubrovnik's trade prowess proved to be important to surrounding nations, even though the city faced occasional troubles. However, Dubrovnik's major trade activities—in its hinterland, Albania, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and its other surrounding areas—would be under the control of the Sublime Porte for 500 years, meaning that economic and political survival of the Republic would depend on its relations with the Ottomans. The Ottomans' arrival in Dubrovnik's vicinity, an event that greatly altered its fate, diminished Dubrovnik's interest neither in sea travel nor in trade. In fact, Dubrovnik's propensity towards sea navigation strengthened in the late 15th and 16th century onward, and the city thus boasted its most brilliant and intense contemporary naval industry.²⁰

²⁰ Antonio Di Vittorio, "Ragusa (Dubrovnik) e il Mare: aspetti e problemi (XIV-XVI secolo)," in *Dubrovnik: a Mediterranean Urban Society, 1300-1600*, ed. by Barisa Krekic (Los Angeles: University of California, 1997), 137.

CHAPTER 2: REVIEWING THE ERA: THE POLITICS OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE REPUBLIC OF DUBROVNIK IN THE 16TH AND 17TH CENTURIES

Dubrovnik's Role in Re-Characterizing the Mediterranean World

The Mediterranean region in the 16th century was the platform from which the world's first multilateral political system developed, and the Ottoman Empire and Dubrovnik alike underwent their fair share of these political changes. It would even appear that the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Dubrovnik simultaneously became involved in the multilateral political system rooted in the Mediterranean region.

The division of Mediterranean leadership, with the Ottoman Empire controlling the east and Spain the west, required Dubrovnik to divide its political alliances. The people of Dubrovnik always valued the rights that the Ottoman protectorate had granted them, but at the same time, the city did not refrain from assuming pro-Western attitudes. Appeasing both sides was therefore necessary; not only was Dubrovnik aware of the Ottoman Empire's sheer power and influence on the city, but of the possibility that Spain could become a commercial and political threat to Dubrovnik if it were angered by the Ragusans' favor of the Ottomans. After all, when the First Holy League fought against the Ottomans in 1539, Spain protected Dubrovnik when Venice threatened it.²¹ Having had great influence over the Mediterranean region and Europe on a whole,

²¹ Vesna Miovic, "Diplomatic Relations Between The Ottoman Empire and The Republic of Dubrovnik," in *The European Tributary States of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, ed. by Gabor Karman and Lovro Kuncevic, (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013), 190.

Spain could withdraw its support of Dubrovnik and even hinder Ragusan trade activities in the region if its rulers pleased to do so.

Although Dubrovnik yearned to be a neutral state at the beginning of the 16th century, it was unable to prevent warring parties from treating it like an allied force. Despite all efforts Dubrovnik made to seem neutral, its good relations with the regional powers prompted officials to insist that if Dubrovnik was indeed trustworthy, it would assist its allies with the war effort. The Republic of Dubrovnik's connection with France, Spain, and the Papacy prompted perennial mistrustfulness among the parties' main contacts, and this pattern also exists in the city's relations with the Ottomans. Evliya Çelebi's statement regarding Dubrovnik's role as a silent supporter of the Venetians²² provides insight into the period's Ottoman perception of Dubrovnik. Nevertheless, the Ottoman Empire mostly ignored Dubrovnik's contacts with enemy states since it relied on it as a powerful connection to other parts of the world.

With the exception of Venice, many nations in the Mediterranean accepted Dubrovnik's neutrality. Carter's statement that "Venetian jealousy was ever present in the life of Dubrovnik"²³ is observable upon inspection of Venice's treatment towards the city-state. Witnessing Dubrovnik under Ottoman protection caused Venice to sway the city-state into joining the Western countries' anti-Ottoman initiatives, and it tried to occupy Dubrovnik under various pretexts, disturbing its people—particularly the traders—at every possible opportunity. Venice even tried to block Ottoman trading activities through Dubrovnik. The Ottomans reciprocated this behavior, as many sultan

²² Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, vol 1, book 6 (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2011), 308: "...Özellikle hala hasmımız olan bu büyük Bundukani Venedik'ini yoldan çıkarıp gizliden zahire veren bu Dobra-Venedik kafiridir."

²³ Carter, *Dubrovnik (Ragusa): A Classic City State*, 332.

decrees relating to Venetian-Ragusan trade eventually came about. These decrees remained valid even the 18th century and onward, since similar rulings are present in A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7 and 20/8.²⁴

The Ottoman Empire frequently forbade the export of strategic merchandise, such as wheat, to Dubrovnik²⁵ on suspicion that Ragusan traders were selling them to Venice and other European states without the Ottomans' permission.²⁶ The Ottoman Empire's distrust of Dubrovnik, accompanied by some later crises, resulted in a short-lived deterioration of Ottoman-Ragusan relations. The most important of these crises took place in the first half of the 16th century during the First Holy League led by Spain and Venice, and the dispute was at its pinnacle just before the notion that Dubrovnik was providing Spain with logistical support was wholly refuted.²⁷

After the Battle of Preveza, the Ottoman Empire and Venice signed a peace treaty that divided the Holy League. Even though this achieved relative political stability following the war with the Holy League, the situation was aggravated by the new conflicts arising between Spain and France, which were the catalysts for the disintegration of the Western Mediterranean allies. The neighborly Ragusan-Ottoman relations, which were peaceful for a long while, also suffered from these conflicts. The second half of the 17th century was arguably the most difficult political and diplomatic period that the Republic of Dubrovnik experienced, for it would not only have

²⁴ See A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 50 (fî evâsıt-ı Ramazan 1194), 81 (fî evâil-i Recep 1195).

²⁵ For a better understanding of the Ottomans' import ban policies, see Mehmet Genç, *Osmanlı imparatorluğunda devlet ve ekonomi*, (İstanbul: Ötüken, 2000), 53-59.

²⁶ A certain amount of wheat was allowed to be consumed within the city itself.

²⁷ Carter, *Dubrovnik (Ragusa): A Classic City State*, 335.

problems with the Ottomans, but it would simultaneously be subjected to French and Venetian threats due to its image as the “henchman” of Spain.

By virtue of its neutral attitude towards the belligerents, Dubrovnik enjoyed newfound political attention that led to commercial gains for the city. However, the geographical discoveries that reoriented European and Middle Eastern trade routes interrupted Dubrovnik’s prosperity. This, in turn, led to competition for the role of trade mediator between East and West, which was the Ragusans’ responsibility prior to the conflict. Despite this, the city was lucky to possess such a convenient geographical location, and this good fortune would not elude the city in its future. In a strategic decision, the Ottoman government assigned Dubrovnik as not only a point of contact, but as an intelligence hub and spying field in the newly emerged multilateral Mediterranean political sphere. By virtue of the city’s geographical location and its skills in both diplomacy and espionage, the Ragusans would be one of the most important Ottoman tools despite being bi-directional at heart, sometimes favoring the Ottomans and sometimes the European states. There were even periods in which both sides were favored at the same time.²⁸ Nevertheless, Dubrovnik’s ability to grant parties advantageous information about their opponents would make it a crucial military asset. For instance, Dubrovnik provided crucial intelligence services to the Ottoman Empire before and during the famous battle of Lepanto.

In terms of receiving information from the outside world, Ragusan spies were so important to the Ottoman Empire that nearly every decree sent by Ottoman administration to Dubrovnik reminded Ragusan authorities to notify the Ottomans

²⁸ See Miovic, “Diplomatic Relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Dubrovnik,” 198- 204.

about any information they had.²⁹ Correspondence between the Kingdom of Naples and the Ragusan Government in the 1660s often included pseudonyms, since Dubrovnik was full of Ottoman spies at the time. Slovenian historian Zontar suggests that these spying relations continued intensely even throughout the end of the 17th century.³⁰

Besides the Ottoman Empire and Spain, Dubrovnik had to secure relations between the Popes and French kings. They mostly accomplished this by means of suaveness, precious gifts, confidential information sharing, a pious attitude toward the Pope as a Christian party, and building trust with the city's addressees. Keen Ragusan diplomatic skills were instrumental in fostering these relations; Evliya Çelebi's remark about the Ragusan government's successful diplomacy testifies to this by describing Dubrovnik as peaceful, humble, and cautious towards the contemporary kings.³¹ However—and this is likely because they were unaccustomed to having direct control of their spies—information leakage was a common problem for the city-state, and this issue caused serious interstate troubles for the Ragusan government. Dubrovnik, however, remedied this to an extent by focusing on counterespionage and implementing sanctions of imprisonment and prosecution for the spies they caught.

Dubrovnik was also important for supplying skilled laborers, who provided many material needs for the city-state's neighboring territories. The Ottoman Empire, for

²⁹ For instance, see A.DVNSMHM 007, 704 (fî 13 Receb 975); A.DVNSMHM 007, 1261 (fî 13 Şevvâl 975); A.DVNSMHM 009, 165 (fî 11 Şevvâl 975); A.DVNSMHM 012, 211 (fî 19 Şevvâl Şevvâl 978); A.DVNSMHM 012, 266 (fî 16 Zilkâde 978). These are just some decrees that one can find; many more lie in the *Mühimme* registers in the Ottoman archives.

³⁰ Mladen Glavina, *17. Yüzyıl Başında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile Dubrovnik Cumhuriyeti İlişkileri* (Hacettepe University Unpublished MA Thesis), Ankara 2009, 31, footnote No. 74.

³¹ "... Devletini korutmak için bütün krallara karşı alçakgönüllülük gösterip tüm krallar ile sulh etmiş tedbirli bir keferedir." Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, vol 1, book 6, 308.

instance, usually required trade specialists and specific materials from Dubrovnik. In a decree in the Ottoman Archives, master carpenters would be sent en masse from Dubrovnik to construct piers in Herzegovina if needed.³² Another register refers to the Ottomans' need for pickaxes, shovels, and master builders for repairing the Nova/Növe (present-day Herzegovina) castle from Dubrovnik with the expression of *kadimden geldüğünüz üzere*, meaning "customarily." The continuous inclusion of these types of decrees indicate that this was a long-term practice for the carpenters of Dubrovnik.³³

Dubrovnik had a significant role in the diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and the European States. Ambassadors from European states were to visit Dubrovnik before entering the Ottoman lands, but many of them chose to stop by on their way back home, as well. A decree addressed to Ragusan lords stated that because the French ambassador in Istanbul was to return to France with his attendants, Ragusans were, without question, responsible for their safe passage through Dubrovnik. The city was thus used frequently as a gateway for European representatives visiting Ottoman lands. Another decree from 1578 ordered Ragusans to assist the Spanish ambassador, who had been in Istanbul, in addressing important issues once he arrived in Dubrovnik.³⁴

Dubrovnik was often cooperative with the Ottomans regarding prisoner exchange. In times of conflict with European states, capturing traders of the enemy state within Ottoman lands was of utmost priority; in fact, the opponent employed the same

³² A.DVNSMHHM 007, 1218 (9 Şevvâl 975).

³³ A.DVNSMHHM 006, 1146 (14 Şevvâl 972).

³⁴ A.DVNSMHHM 033, 561 (fi Zilkâde 985).

practice. Once a conflict had ended, the Ottoman State would ask its opponent to send its own captive traders back to Dubrovnik; only after receiving news from Ragusans of their traders' safe return would they release the opponent's traders. On January 21, 1572, for instance, Ottoman administration released captive Venetian traders in Aleppo and Tripoli after being informed by the Ragusans that Venice already released their captive Ottoman traders.³⁵ However, Dubrovnik office holders were not enthusiastic about their involvement in this process, because if anything happened to the released prisoners during their stay in the city, Dubrovnik itself was supposedly responsible.³⁶

In the 16th century, the Mediterranean states that were in contact with the Ragusan Republic were ignorant of the fact that Dubrovnik's military neutrality was what ultimately caused it to be such a powerful political and economic asset. Yet, customs revenue data displayed sharp peaks in wartime eras suggesting that Ragusan neutrality allowed third parties to reap major benefits during war.³⁷ No matter under whose protection the Republic was, it always remained a free state by means of its wise diplomatic maneuvers. Dubrovnik thus found itself in a favorable and profitable position in terms of international affairs.

³⁵ A.DVNSMHM 010, 8 (fi 3 Safer 979).

³⁶ For detailed information, see Biegman, *The Turco-Ragusan Relationship: According to the Firmans of Murad III (1575-1595) Extant in the State Archives of Dubrovnik*, 130-131.

³⁷ See Figure 2.



Figure 2. Source: <http://www.hnb.hr/dub-konf/18-konferencija/havrylyshyn-srzentic.pdf>, by Carter, 397.

Accessed December 5, 2015.

Coupling this benefit with that of Dubrovnik's conveniently consecrated position, the Ragusan diplomats' incisiveness allowed the Republic to make the best of its political and economic opportunities. Evliya Çelebi would write a famous book detailing the Ragusans' sheer directness, describing how Ragusan ambassadors used to come to Istanbul before any other state's representatives simply to assert the Republic's commitment and loyalty to the Porte.³⁸ As a city-state that had survived conflict for 200 years, Dubrovnik invariably succeeded in adapting to its 18th century surroundings—by enduring natural disasters and poor economic conditions, overcoming decades-long political turmoil, having an advantageous geographical

³⁸ Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, vol 1, book 6, 308.

position, and possessing striking diplomatic abilities, Dubrovnik's social and military power was virtually guaranteed.

Assessing Political Relations Between Ottoman and Ragusan Contacts in the 18th Century

Another disturbance for Dubrovnik would be the Uskoks³⁹, who were initially Christian pirates seeking refuge from regions subjected to the Ottoman expansion. The Uskoks mostly resided in Dalmatian towns (some even lived in Dubrovnik), but Ferdinand of Austria also allowed them into his territory. By his decree, they were placed in a town surrounded by impassable mountains and large forests, Senj, from where they were in constant guerrilla warfare against the Ottomans. The Ragusans eventually suffered from this same predicament; the pirates forcibly used Ragusan galleys in their Ottoman raids, which resulted in serious conflicts with the Republic's Muslim protectorate in the east.⁴⁰ Eventually, though, the government persuaded the Uskoks to take a reasonable stance in exchange for a lucrative bribe.⁴¹

However, this problem would arise once again upon Venice and Spain's confrontation in the Adriatic Sea. After Austria, Venice, and Spain signed a peace treaty in 1617, Venice sailed down the Adriatic under the pretense of capturing Uskoks. The Spanish, disbelieving them, sent a squadron to the area in order to attack to the Venetian galleys, but this endeavor only managed to set Venice back from reaching the Adriatic. During this incident, Ottoman administration accused the

³⁹ Wendy Bracewell, *The Uskoks of Senj: Piracy, Banditry, and Holy War in the Sixteenth-Century Adriatic* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992) 2-15.

⁴⁰ Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, vol 1, book 6, 323.

⁴¹ Carter, *Dubrovnik (Ragusa): A Classic City State*, 335.

Ragusans of having allied with Spain to the Ottomans' detriment. In this case, Ragusa's diplomatic skill once again managed to avert a catastrophe. Following this event, the Ottoman Pashas of Bosnia officiously disturbed Ragusan trade by imposing prohibitory duties on merchandise from Dubrovnik and even took Ragusan traders in Bosnia captive. Valuable Ragusan gifts and heavy bribes would again be required to tame the anger of the Pashas.⁴²

The Ottoman Empire received continuous word of Dubrovnik's betrayal, including news of its supportive role in the Spanish Navy. However, The English Levant Company—the representatives of British interests in the Ottoman territories—greatly exaggerated the Ragusans' transgressions against the Ottomans, since the British felt that Dubrovnik was a threatening trade rival. France, on the other hand, strengthened its influence in the Mediterranean, but despite the efforts of French consuls in Istanbul to argue against the Ragusans, the poor Ottoman-French relations at the time essentially rendered either of their anti-Dubrovnik efforts fruitless. The Ottoman Empire was also reluctant to cooperate with England's incendiary plans because they did not want to risk sabotaging a potential long-term ceasefire with Spain.⁴³

In 1592 and after a century of war, the Ottoman administration and Venice, after being persuaded by elite Ottoman Jewish merchants, finally agreed to the foundation of a new commercial market in Split, a city on the eastern Adriatic coast. Supported by the Venetian trading fleet, Split would emerge as a strong trade rival to Dubrovnik. This development marked a major turning point in the bilateral relations between the

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı & Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988-1996), 218.

Ottoman Empire and Venice. Until then, Venice, who was the chief enemy of the Ottoman Empire, followed a policy that protected the status quo in Eastern Europe, particularly in the Balkans. This development severely affected Dubrovnik, as it was obliged to share its trade success in the region with Venice. From the date the Split market opened in 1592 to the War of Candia in 1645, the Ragusan government found itself in another diplomatic struggle to regain its trade privileges.

Witnessing the empire's catastrophic defeat in Lepanto, the people of Istanbul were on the verge of revolt due to their dissatisfaction with Ottoman rule.⁴⁴ Their issues with Venice had not yet been resolved, but with a destroyed navy, the Ottoman State had to temporarily cease nautical operations and avoid new navy expenses. Prospective operations in Poland or Russia were unrealistic, since Poland was at the apex of its power and a strong ruler had been in control of Russia. On the other hand, a campaign against a weakened and poorly governed Austria would not only be feasible, but profitable. Austria's incompetent Emperor Rudolf (1578-1612) had no help from his allies, the Spanish Habsburgs, who were busy fighting two battles: one in Netherlands against the rising Dutch and English powers, and the other in France to prevent Henri IV (1589-1610) from wearing the French crown.

On the basis of Austria's delayed annual tax payment and rising number of incidents on the border, Hasan Pasha, the governor of Bosnia, embarked on an expedition to Austria and returned with many spoils, which led the two parties' relations to deteriorate even more. Austria attacked Bosnia following this expedition, and at one point, an Ottoman troop under the command of Hasan Pasha was ambushed

⁴⁴ Zlatar, *Between the Double Eagle and the Crescent: The Republic of Dubrovnik and the Origins of the Eastern Question*, 80.

and nearly destroyed in Sisak-Moslavina. War then officially broke out between the Ottoman Empire and Austria with the support of almost all European states, largely united by Pope Clement VIII.

During these long years of war, Ragusan diplomacy was threatened—Venice, France, and England's efforts to remove Dubrovnik from the Ottoman market finally materialized. For the sake of maintaining Ottoman-Ragusan relations, Dubrovnik denied any accusations of their export of Ottoman grain to Europe. Ottoman administration asked Hasan Pasha to conduct an investigation on the case, but Ragusan diplomats tactfully handled the incident. Ottoman administration never wanted to question their relations with Dubrovnik to begin with—after all, damage to their relationship would not have been in the Ottoman Empire's favor. The charges against Dubrovnik by the British and French attendants in Istanbul would finally end after the signing of an agreement between England and Spain in 1604.

Venice, against all odds, sought to maintain its neutrality during the war between the Ottoman Empire and Austria (1593-1606) due to the market issue in Split. With the objective of reaching as many Ottoman markets as possible, Dubrovnik and Venice found themselves, for the first time, in the same position against the troublesome ideals of the European powers in the Balkans united by the Pope.⁴⁵ However, beginning from the second half of the 16th century, the domestic political events in Dubrovnik would be another blow to the city. In addition, the collapse of the patricians' economic productivity and their failure to make effective economic plans would lead to a period

⁴⁵ For a better understanding of potential adverse consequences of eventuating of these troublesome ideals of the European powers in the Balkans, it would be beneficial to see Zdenko, *Dubrovnik's Merchants and Capital in the Ottoman Empire (1520-1620) A Quantitative Study*, 173-184.

of crisis within the Republic. Much of the patrician capital in the city gradually shifted to commercial businesses that mostly yielded personal profit collected in western banks—the city-state itself was sorely disadvantaged at this time.

The majority of commercial businesses was passed down to the affluent non-noble Ragusan population. The decreasing number of Ragusan elite and the weakening of its financial strength led to a decline in the local elites' interest in local policy and damaged its public image. Despite the growth in their economic power, though, the non-elites of Dubrovnik could not guarantee political stability until the republic's collapse. Consequently, the crisis became apparent in the early 17th century, in which a secret agreement was concluded between the Ragusan non-elite population, the Pope, Spanish spies, and proxies in order to provoke the Christian population in the Balkans against Ottoman rule. The Ragusan territory was thus used as a logistic asset for the rebels.

Several western allies participated in the Christian uprising⁴⁶ in the Balkans, including Pope Clement VIII, the Serbian patriarch, the Serbian and Croatian clergy in Dubrovnik, the Duke of Wallachia, and the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox communities of Albania and France—England and Venice did not participate. However, poor planning, tactical weaknesses, and the 1606 Peace of Zsitvatorok ending the Ottoman-Austrian war prevented the initiative's success. Despite its failure, though, a second Christian uprising was sparked and led by the Duke of Mantua with the support of Charles Emanuel I, the Duke of Savoy. By 1612, this second attempt

⁴⁶ In the early modern period, the idea of subversing Ottoman Christians was a frequent suggestion in European courts; it was assumed, even by the allies of the Porte, that the Ottoman Empire was not a stable state. See Suraiya Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and The World Around It* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 42.

remained inconclusive due to the detainment of the operation's ringleaders by the Ragusan government, as well as the foreigners' declining interest in prompting an uprising in the Balkans.

When the Ragusan Republic became interested in trade again after the first quarter of the 16th century, it would realize that the economic landscape differed from what it had been 150 years prior. Atlantic and Indian trade became prominent under England and Holland's domination, and on top of this, Venice ended up monopolizing Mediterranean trade in place of Dubrovnik. The Ragusan navy ended up serving Spain, and the issue of piracy compelled Dubrovnik to trade with Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, trade with these states was less profitable than it was previously, since Balkan trade passed into Istanbul though Budapest, Belgrade, and Sofia instead of through Adriatic routes.⁴⁷ The Republic was thus perceived as a desperate state until the War of Candia in 1645 between the Ottoman Empire and Venice, in which Dubrovnik could once again prove its military usefulness.

In 1644, the Knights of Malta attacked an Ottoman fleet en route to Istanbul and returned to Candia with the loot. On those grounds, 60,000 Ottoman soldiers were deployed to Crete, the most important Venetian possession in the Eastern Mediterranean. Immediately after this deployment, other troops went to Dalmatia. Despite the Ottoman troops' initial success, Venice drove the Ottomans from Candia in 1647 by forcing warzones into Ottoman lands. This persisted for 22 years; constant battles were waged on land and at sea, although mostly at the Ottoman-Venetian border in Dalmatia. Ending in 1669 with Candia's surrender to the Ottomans, this war

⁴⁷ Carter, *Dubrovnik (Ragusa): A Classic City State*, 338.

adversely affected Venice while being a victory for the Ottoman Empire⁴⁸, and the Ottomans' aggressive stance towards the west was thus reborn.

Since they impacted Ottoman-Ragusan relations, the events in the Balkan Peninsula during the 18th century are also relevant. As we will later discuss in detail, the Ottomans' defeat in the second siege of Vienna in 1683 was an important milestone for the Ottomans, the Europeans, and the Balkan nations alike. After a series of arduous wars between the Ottoman Empire and its European allies (1683-1697), the Treaty of Karlowitz was created and agreed upon in 1699. This treaty was the first one in history to adversely affect the Ottomans, as it cost them ownership of much land in Central Europe. Henceforth, the Habsburg monarchy's influence in the Balkans increased, especially in the lands that the Ottoman Empire lost in the Balkans neighboring Austria and Hungary. Moreover, Tsarist Russia strengthened with the reforms carried out by Peter I, who was a major force in Eastern Europe

From the 18th century onward, seditionists, aforementioned powers, persuaded the people of the Balkans to rebel against the Ottoman rule in the region, and their efforts yielded results in the final decade of the 18th century. The "Kařdzhalı" or "Krdz'ali," also known as "mountain rebellions," were the most effective rebellions in the region and were active throughout the whole peninsula. The pioneers of these rebellions were exclusively Muslims or Christian bandits (*hayduks/hajduks* in Bulgarian, Macedonian and Serbian; *klephts* in Greek); their collective actions were perceived as threats against the 'Turkish yoke' by Balkan historiography.⁴⁹ Both registers outline the

⁴⁸ Ibid., 24.

⁴⁹ Tolga Esmer, *Economies of Violence, Banditry and Governance in the Ottoman Empire Around 1800*, from <http://past.oxfordjournals.org/content/224/1/163.full.pdf+html>. Accessed May 28, 2016, 6.

impact that the rebellions had on Ottoman-Ragusan relations; Ragusan merchants, who were forced to deal with the environment that the rebellions created, faced many troubles in the Balkans and were in constant communication with Porte regarding the issue.



CHAPTER 3: ANALYZING THE 18TH CENTURY ELEMENTS OF OTTOMAN-
RAGUSAN RELATIONS (AS PER A.DVN.DVE.D 19/7 AND A.DVN.DVE.D 20/8)

Outside Criticism (Diş Tenkid) of A.DVN.DVE.D 19/7 AND A.DVN.DVE.D 20/8

These archives are not the sole documents pertaining to 18th century Ottoman-Dubrovnik relations, but they are the last ones written by Ottoman administration. They provide insight into the latest era of the relations and refer to many economic, political, and military issues. The first noteworthy register is the one catalogued as A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, a 42x15 centimeter document of 69 pages (including blank ones) and comprising of 336 decrees, including 33 duplicated decrees (hüküm sureti). This register's decrees applied during the reigns of two Ottoman Sultans, Abdulhamid I and Selim III.

The first decree, dated October 20-30, 1779, is the supreme order of Abdülhamid I (fi evâhir-i Ramazan 1193). He wrote it approximately five years after taking the throne. His decrees were addressed to multiple parties: the Ottoman Mediterranean Navy Commander's deputy, the *Cadis* (Muslim Judges), the Regents of Chios and Nicosia, and pier constabularies and attendants. The latter group demanded that Ragusan captains trading in the Mediterranean be protected and exempted of any taxation, but this request defied existing 'ahd-nâme provisions. The register's final decree, dated March 27, 1806 (fi 7 Muharrem [1] 221) and from the reign of Selim III, is a consular charter addressed to the Cadi of Aleppo. It called for a new consul to be selected immediately upon the departure of the consul in office at the time.

The second register, catalogued as A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, contains 137 pages (also including blank ones) and totals 507 decrees—1008 if one were to include copies.⁵⁰ At 43x17 centimeters, this document is slightly larger than the first register. Like the previous register, the decrees in this volume were dated during the reigns of Abdulhamid I and Selim III. The register begins with a statement from June 10-20, 1802 (fî evâsıt-ı Safer [1] 217) requesting permission from the consulates in Istanbul and Dubrovnik for Ragusan ships to do business in the Black Sea. The following decree was a reply to the aforementioned request stating that capitulation or a treaty would be necessary for this to occur. The last decree in the book is an order of travel granted to the son of a Ragusan dragoman on November 18, 1806 (fî 7 Ramazan [1] 221).

Even though the first and last decrees in the register bear 19th century dates, many of the register's decrees were originally written well before the 18th century; the dating system is thus highly disorganized in the register's early pages. While pages 5-101 are chronologically accurate, the decrees' dates in the final portion of the register are not. In this section of the register, decrees are ordered regardless of chronology. For instance, the decree marked with the earliest date is the fourth decree, which corresponds to the last ten days of November in 1788.⁵¹ Thankfully, despite the register's disorganization, the 1008th and final decree was, in fact, the last one to be written and the last one that made its way into the register—based on this information, one can determine that the register encompasses eighteen years of decrees. Although

⁵⁰ A document referred to as 13/1 and 13/2 was eventually added to pages 53 and 54 in A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, which was separate from the 1008 enumerated decrees in the register.

⁵¹ A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 4 (fî evâhir-i Safer 1203).

some decrees in the register are from the last fourteen months of Abdulhamid I's reign, most decrees were written in Selim III's era.

Since the names of both registers are Venedik-Dubrovnik Defteri (Venice-Dubrovnik Register), we assumed that the registers would include decrees concerning these two polities. However, the term "Venice" appears in no more than eight decrees, two in the first and six in the second. Moreover, these rulings do not relate directly to Venice; rather, they only mention the city in the context of Dubrovnik affairs.⁵² It would thus not be far-fetched to state that the registers are entirely comprised of Dubrovnik-related affairs, and the decrees focus solely on issues regarding the Ragusan Republic and the Ragusan *rayah* (low-class taxpayers). The decrees possess either an exact date or an indication of representing a 10-day span. Many informative marginal notes are also present in the aforementioned registers, but they have not been included in the total number of decrees.

Almost all copies of the Registers of Foreign Affairs (Düvel-i Ecnebiye Defterleri) created throughout the 18th century were inscribed retrospectively, and all of them begin with a capitulation order.⁵³ The two main registers sourced in this study are not exceptions. Most decrees in both registers were simply renewals of old decrees, and due to their fine level of detail, these registers have proven to be valuable academic assets for the purposes of this study. The Venice-Dubrovnik Registers (Venedik-

⁵² See A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 50, 86; A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 234, 694.

⁵³ In *Düvel-i Ecnebiye Defterleri*, Glavina divides the registers as follows: new registers written between 1673 and 1700 that omitted old and outdated information, registers from the 1700s starting with capitulation decrees (concession charters), and the oldest Dubrovnik-Venice Registers (Dubrovnik-Venedik Defterleri), which are located in the Ecnebi collections. A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7 and A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8 were among the classified registers. For further information about the classification see Mladen Glavina, *17. Yüzyıl Başında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile Dubrovnik Cumhuriyeti İlişkileri* (Hacettepe University Unpublished MA Thesis), Ankara 2009, 50-61.

Dubrovnik Defterleri - A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7 and A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8) are therefore valuable archival materials in understanding of the relations between the Empire and Dubrovnik.

The Elements of 18th Century Ottoman-Ragusan Relations According to A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7 and A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8

‘Ahd-nâmes

A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7 and A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8 provide significant clues about the nature of 18th century Ottoman-Dubrovnik relations, and as the latest Ottoman archival records carrying relevant documents in bulk, they allowed us to follow the course of Ottoman-Dubrovnik relations throughout many centuries. We have already mentioned the political and trade relations between the two polities and the roles Dubrovnik assumed in the Mediterranean prior to the 18th century, and we have examined how the Ottomans benefited from Ragusans in various avenues. In this section, we aim to examine the determinants of 18th century Ottoman-Ragusan relations in the context of the aforementioned registers.

We have previously emphasized the crucial role of ‘ahd-nâmes in determining the course of relations between the two polities and mentioned ‘ahd-nâmes granted to Dubrovnik before the 18th century. According to the registers, ‘ahd-nâmes play the most significant role in establishing interstate relations. Although no new ‘ahd-nâmes were granted to Dubrovnik in the 18th century, older ‘ahd-nâmes were simply revised and edited to contain updated decrees and orders; new ‘ahd-nâmes were thus unnecessary. Another important issue is that the Ottomans did not classify their documents consistently, meaning that the same documents in the same text were

sometimes called different names.⁵⁴ Regarding this study, registers A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7 and A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8 greatly assisted us in recognizing decrees influenced by ‘ahd-nâmes. Although many of them had different titles, our prior knowledge of ‘ahd-nâmes allowed us to identify which decrees were in accordance with contemporary ‘ahd-nâme provisions. By pinpointing decrees with conspicuous ‘ahd-nâme features—which was facilitated by referring to the ‘ahd-nâme of 1662—we have not only gained a good understanding of fluctuations in Ottoman-Dubrovnik relations, but itemized the conditions between the Ottoman Empire and Dubrovnik in the 18th century. The ‘ahd-nâme provisions in the 18th century⁵⁵ are as follows:

1. The Republic of Dubrovnik, under favor of custom and law, shall send 12,500 pieces of gold to Istanbul as *jizya* (yearly tribute) by means of a loyal and dependent delegate. The Ragusans shall send 50,000 *akçe* (Ottoman silver coin) to the Ottoman State treasury every six months. They shall also pay 300,000 *akçe* of *mukata‘a* (a form of tax farming) every three years.
2. The Ragusan rayah shall not suffer by the hand of any Ottoman subject in any region under Ottoman control. This includes administrative officers, governors of *sanjaks*, *subashis*, *timarli sipahis*, janissaries, castle wardens, pier constabularies, *ayans*, and members of security. Ragusans are to be protected as though they are in their hometown.

⁵⁴ Besides ‘ahd-nâme and ‘ahd-nâme-i şerîf, nişân-i şerîf, nişân-i hümâyûn, mu‘ahede-i hümâyûn, hatt-ı hümâyûn, and fermân-ı âlişân were other names used to refer to the same documents. See Theunissen, *Ottoman-venetian Diplomats: The Ahd-names; the Historical Background and the Development of a Category of Political-commercial Instruments Together with an Annotated Edition of a Corpus of Relevant Documents*, 187-188.

⁵⁵ These provisions have been itemized based on the 1662 ‘ahd-nâme and have been confirmed as part of the registers A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7 and 20/8. A few of them are not explicitly from the aforementioned ‘ahd-nâme, but rather from either A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7 or A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8.

3. Ragusan traders may trade freely throughout the entire Ottoman land. The people, animals, and goods in their possession shall not be seized.
4. With some exceptions⁵⁶, Ragusans travelling on the road shall not be confronted with any tax demands, such as *bâc* (transit and market dues).
5. At the gate of Dubrovnik, the traders from other states (“...bunlardan gayrı Frenkler...”⁵⁷ The other *Franks*) shall pay a customs duty of 5% to the *emins* (Turkish customs officers) on merchandise they import. If the Ragusans fraudulently present the *Frank* traders’ merchandise as their own property to avoid taxes, their merchandise shall be seized.⁵⁸
6. Ragusans shall pay a 5% tax for any goods they sell in Istanbul, and 3% for those sold in Bursa and Edirne. The *gümrük* (customs duty) of these three cities shall be excluded from Dubrovnik’s *mukata’a*, which is 300,000 for three years. This will be collected separately and delivered directly to the *hazine-i amire* (imperial treasury).

⁵⁶ As mentioned in various decrees in the registers, the *gümrük* that Ottomans levied from the goods that Ragusans sold in their territories went from 2% to 5% at some point. However, upon the request of Ragusans, the *gümrük* dropped back to 2% akçe. Even though the tax amounts fluctuated over the years, A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7 and A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8 reveal the final tax load of Ragusan commerce in the Ottoman territories. Ragusans paid 2% *gümrük* for goods sold outside Istanbul, Bursa, and Edirne (Bilâd-ı selâse-Three Provisions). This amount would be collected by an *amil* (agent) elected by the Ragusans and delivered to the Ottoman state as 300,000 akçe every three years, along with 50,000 akçe as *iltizam* (a form of tax farm). Goods sold in Istanbul were subject to a 5% tax rate, whereas it was 3% for Bursa and Edirne. These provisions were mentioned in many decrees in the registers, especially A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 967 (fî evâil-i Cemâziye’l-âhir 1220), in which all of them are present. They can also all be found in the aforementioned ‘ahd-nâme. See TS.MA.d 7018 0001, (Cemâziye’l-evvel 1073), 31.

⁵⁷ TS.MA.d 7018 0001, (Cemâziye’l-evvel 1073), 31. For further information on the term “Frank,” see *Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi*, Mahmut H. Şakiroğlu, (İstanbul: Diyanet Vakfı, 1988), “Frenk.”

⁵⁸ TS.MA.d 7018 0001, (Cemâziye’l-evvel 1073), 31.

7. A 3% transit duty will be levied by the Ottoman administration on Ragusan commodities that pass through Ottoman territory.⁵⁹

8. If Ragusan traders fail to sell their merchandise and wish to bring them elsewhere, nobody can prevent this endeavor and the transport of this merchandise shall not be taxed.

9. Unless a deponent can prove it, no Ragusan shall be considered in debt or be disturbed for a conjectural debt.

10. The Ottoman estates of deceased Ragusans shall not be seized, even by the *Beytülmalcı* (the head of imperial treasury) and shall be granted to the heir of the deceased, provided that he shows up to claim the property.

11. If the court decides that a Ragusan is in debt, the outstanding balance shall be paid to the respective debtor. If one of the parties is Muslim, the trial shall be conducted by a Cadi.

12. As long as 2% akçe *gümrük* is paid, no one may prevent a Ragusan trader from shipping goods taken from Ottoman territories, whether in the piers in Istanbul, Tuna, or Rumelia.

13. The head of the Ragusan council shall summon a Ragusan consul for the Ottoman territories, and said consul must be Ragusan. Provided that the sultan approves of the choice, the consul will assume his office.

⁵⁹ A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 967 (fî evâil-i Cemâziye'l-âhir 1220).

Nearly all the decrees in the two registers were influenced by previous ‘ahd-nâmes, and these ‘ahd-nâmes maintained importance in the 18th century because they were such an effective precedent for future decrees.⁶⁰ Decrees that emphasized the Ragusans’ right to trade freely in Ottoman territories only did so by virtue of the ‘ahd-nâme on which they were based; this greatly reduced the decrees’ chances of being disregarded. For instance, a 1784 decree from Abdulhamid I ordered that Captain Hasan Pasha, Cadis in the Mediterranean, regents of Chios and Nicosia, pier constabularies, and security were to refrain from making monetary demands on Ragusan ships that had already paid *gümruk*. They were also commanded not to attack these Ragusan traders and ships, but rather to protect them as much as possible.⁶¹ Such orders were referenced in another decree for the same addressees dated in 1788 from Selim III’s era.⁶² One can infer from these decrees that either a previous ‘ahd-nâme, *firman* (an order or command about a certain issue), or *berat* (charter granting certain powers of privileges) was used as a base for the orders, and this is why they carried such weight. New decrees were written based not only on changes made to the ‘ahd-nâme, but on the ‘ahd-nâme’ enforced at the time of the decree’s writing. If a certain case already had a precedent in a decree within another ‘ahd-nâme, this extraneous decree could also be used as a basis for a decision.

The ‘ahd-nâmes granted to Dubrovnik were so comprehensive that their provisions (on which the decrees, orders, and charters of the two registers were based) dealt with matters besides Ragusan traders in the Ottoman territory. Because of these rulings,

⁶⁰ Almost all decrees in the registers are in agreement with our statement. However, we will occasionally refer to these decrees as examples.

⁶¹ A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 154 (fî evâsıt-ı Zilkâde [11]98).

⁶² A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 4 (fî evâhir-i Safer 1203).

Dubrovnik enjoyed protection from both internal and external threats. In a provision from 1803, we learned that Ragusans traders at sea were detained, harmed, and robbed by pirates—when they requested permission from the sultan to trade in the Black as a compensation for their lost, he replied affirmatively.⁶³

As evidenced by a decree written in 1790, the Ottoman Empire even exempted Dubrovnik from *kharâj* (land-tax on non-Muslims) when they failed to pay it.⁶⁴ In 1741, an attempt to operationalize a new trade port next to the Ragusan one was blocked, much like in 1789 when Ottoman rule prevented the construction of a trading port in a location that would rival Dubrovnik.⁶⁵ In another instance, the sultan charged the governor of Bosnia to cease the construction of a new pier, since its high level of competition would likely detriment the Ragusans. The Ottoman Empire's protective attitude is reflected in another *hatt-ı humayun* (official note decreed by the Sultan) from an Ottoman archive register dated June 14, 1789. According to this document, the Ottoman Empire wrote a missive to the French Consulate requesting that they never attack Ragusans at sea; after this, French ships on Dubrovnik waters never bothered the Ragusans, all of whom were grateful to the Ottoman administration for their protection.⁶⁶ To justify this protective attitude, the Ottomans had always stated in 'ahd-nâmes that they were the rightful protectors of Dubrovnik.

Many other 18th century documents in the Ottoman archives detail the Empire's protective nature when Dubrovnik had problems with other states. A document dated July 27, 1752 requested the Ottomans' help in coping with Venetian cruelty, and

⁶³ A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 2 (fî evâsıt-ı Safer [1]217).

⁶⁴ A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 295 (fî evâhir-i Cemâziye'l-evvel 1204).

⁶⁵ A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 72 (fî evâhir-i Muharrem 1204).

⁶⁶ HAT. 165/6909 (fî 29 Zi'l-hicce 1212).

Ottoman administration responded with a promise that the Venetians at fault would be punished. Any wrongdoings to Ragusans would be restituted.⁶⁷ On June 29, 1699, the sultan issued a decree ordering the Ottoman authorities to mediate reconciliation between Dubrovnik and Venice.⁶⁸ There was also a decree ordering Mustafa Pasha, Ottoman governor of Bosnia, to send off 2000 soldiers to Dubrovnik as a military reinforcement in the face of France's involvement in a plan to lay siege upon Dubrovnik.⁶⁹

As evidenced by their decrees, many sultans were able to easily predict and solve issues that would arise from the deaths of indebted merchants. Indeed, the Ottoman Empire never confiscated Ragusans' property as long as they adhered to the applicable 'ahd-nâmes, and Ottoman administration took their commitment to these rulings very seriously. Take, for instance, a 1784 decree in which a deceased Ragusan merchant previously residing in Thessaloniki was owed 4,000 *kuruş* (piaster). He was to have obtained this money from a *dhimmi* (a term used to describe non-Muslims who pay *jizya*)⁷⁰ in Syros who owed him money, but the *dhimmi* had instead fled with the funds rather than paying his debtor. The Cadi in Syros was notified of the situation and heard the trial for delivering the debt to the creditor.⁷¹

The registers offer key insights into the issues that arose from debt-related trading activities, and they explain how those issues were solved. According to a 1789 decree

⁶⁷ C.HR. 161/8007 (fî 15 Ramazan 1165).

⁶⁸ C.DH. 61/3028 (fî 29 Zi'l-hicce 1110). On the Ottomans' role as an arbitrator between the Ragusan Republic and Venice, see Suraiya Faroqhi, "The City State of Dubrovnik, Through the Ottoman Eyes" (email message to author, February 13, 2016), 20-23.

⁶⁹ C.HR. 153/7631 (fî 29 Rebîü'l-âhir 1213).

⁷⁰ For further information, see Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi, Mustafa Fayda, (İstanbul: Diyanet Vakfı, 1988), "Zimmî."

⁷¹ A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 182 (fî evâsıt-ı Cemâziyelâhir [1]197).

written from the sultan to the governor and Cadi of Bosnia, some Ragusans fell into debt while in Ottoman lands and fled to their hometown; the sultan not only ordered these cases to be inspected, but for the creditors to be immediately reimbursed.⁷² In such cases, disputes between creditors and the indebted were always reopened. Even so, unjust treatment of Ragusans in these cases was to be avoided as much as possible. Insulting a Ragusan on the grounds of being Ragusan was forbidden.⁷³

In the registers, we observe that the Ottoman Empire dealt closely with disputes between Ragusans and Jews. For example, a 1790 decree referring to the regent of Sofia states that several Jewish chief rabbis kept the 1500 diamond stones and several *miskal* pearls that a Ragusan merchant lost while trading in Sofia. The rabbis were commanded to deliver the goods back in full to the Ragusan merchant.⁷⁴

In accordance with the requirements of the ‘ahd-nâmes, Ragusan merchants also had the right to trade not only with Muslims, but *harbis* (non-Muslims who did not live by the statutes of the *dhimma*)⁷⁵ and dhimmis. As evidenced by a decree from 1797, sultans permitted Ragusans to buy Russian grain from Russian ships in Ottoman territories only if it was necessary to do so. In such cases, nobody could prevent the grain from being loaded to Ragusan ships and transported.⁷⁶ Another Ottoman archive from 1799 tells of the Ottomans’ personal involvement in cases about French pirates plundering Ragusan trading ships in France. They ensured that the manager

⁷² A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 73 (fî evâhir-i Muharrem 1204).

⁷³ A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 73 (fî evâhir-i Muharrem 1204).

⁷⁴ A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 40 (fî evâhir-i Zi’l-hicce 1204).

⁷⁵ For further information, see Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi, Ahmet Özel, (İstanbul: Diyanet Vakfı, 1988), “Harbî.”

⁷⁶ A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 490 (fî evâhir-i Receb [1] 211).

responsible for the conflict, Fransuva Nuvşatu (François Neufchateau), would be discharged from the French office.⁷⁷

The amount of *gümriük* that the Ragusans would pay—which was determined in the last available Ragusan ‘ahd-nâme—⁷⁸ was also confirmed by Ottoman rule, and the customs provisions in the ‘ahd-nâmes were frequently repeated in the register’s decrees. However, it appears that many Ottoman subjects often created financial troubles for Ragusans despite being warned not to demand more *gümriük* than previously determined from the Ragusans.⁷⁹ The registers also outline that these customs duties were collected in compliance with the ‘ahd-nâmes by the agents of the Ragusans’ choosing.⁸⁰

Throughout the 18th century, ‘ahd-nâmes as legal contracts were the most crucial means of documenting relations between the Ottoman Empire and Dubrovnik. We were unable to access new ‘ahd-nâmes from the 18th century, but the registers indicated that each decree they contained was still grounded on previous ‘ahd-nâmes. One can thus deduce that all of the decrees sought to renew certain provisions in the ‘ahd-nâmes. From this, we can infer that the oldest ‘ahd-nâme—which, according to the registers under examination, was granted in Orhan I’s era—maintained its significance in the 18th century as much as it had done in earlier years. Although it was traditional in Ottoman administration to invalidate ‘ahd-nâmes following the death of their issuing sultans, the decrees of the oldest ‘ahd-nâme were preserved with few changes

⁷⁷ HAT. 144/6022 (fî 9 Zi’l-hicce 1213).

⁷⁸ TS.MA.d 7018 0001, (Cemâziye’l-evvel 1073), 31.

⁷⁹ “...hilaf-ı ‘ahd-nâme-i humayun ziyade talebiyle teaddi olunmayub...” A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 1 (fî evâhir-i Ramazan 1193).

⁸⁰ A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 346 (fî evâsit-ı Cemâziye’l-evvel [1]209).

by later Sultans until the end of the 18th century. We are thus led to the conclusion that since ‘ahd-nâmes outlined political relations and trade rules, they continued to determine the limits of Ottoman-Ragusan relations in the 18th century, as well.

In this respect, another topic to consider is the functionality of these ‘ahd-nâmes and imperial rescripts. As indicated by the registers, these ‘ahd-nâme provisions— *berats* and *emirnames* (ordinances)—were constantly violated by both the Ragusan merchants and their contacts in the Ottoman territory. The Ragusan consuls consistently informed the sultan that Ottomans violated the ‘ahd-nâmes’ provisions and that the renewal orders were not obeyed, so they demanded new provisions that would enforce the obedience of these ordinances. However, they often named the Ragusan traders at issue so that personal decrees could be written, and even when they were successful in creating new provisions, obedience could hardly be enforced. In a decree from 1783, the envoy of the Ragusan council’s head reminded the sultan of a previous decree related to Ragusans traveling in the Ottoman territories. The old decree sought to protect Ragusans traders travelling with servants not only from bandits, but also from Ottoman attempts to take away property bought from Ottoman territory, obtain more taxes, or even confiscate animals travelling with them. The envoy gracefully requested that the Sultan renew this crucial ordinance, which he eventually did.⁸¹

Most complaints regarding the violations of ‘ahd-nâmes, decrees, and ordinances were directed towards customs officers, *voivodes* (rulers of a province handling administration, security, and tax collection), and sailors. A decree from 1790 addressed

⁸¹ A.DVN.DVE.d, 19/7, 123 (fî evâhir-i Rebîû’l-evvel [11]97).

to the Cadi and voivode of Smyrna was written after a Smyrnan voivode unduly demanded tax from a Ragusan consul and his servant.⁸² The decree prohibited this behavior, and this is just one of the many instances that exemplify the Ottoman Empire's readiness to rectify wrongdoings against Ragusans. According to the registers, Ragusan merchants often had to deal not only with extreme tax demands, but also with detentions of their merchant ships and the people inside them. For instance, a decree from 1797 informs us that the sultan told the *beylerbey* (senior provincial governor) of Tripolitania that he did not consent to the captivity of a Ragusan ship and crew by a Tripolitanian captain.⁸³ In events like these, Ragusans would consult the Cadis—those who were in charge of conducting the trials—and this is why decrees relating to legal issues in trade were addressed to the Cadis. For instance, a 1782 decree written to the Cadi proposed a solution to a particular case of dissension involving Ragusan priests and Ottoman authorities in Bosnia.⁸⁴

One should note, however, that Ottomans were not the only ones to violate 'ahd-nâmes—some senior Ragusan authorities failed to follow the rules, as well. At one point, the sultan halted the operations of the Ragusan consul and his proxy, demanded

⁸² A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 233 (fî evâsıt-ı Zilkâde [1]204).

⁸³ A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 432 (fî evâsıt-ı Rebîü'l-âhir 1211). This issue is related to North African piracy and is thus of great importance. Throughout the 17th and 18th century, piracy was a persistent problem. Pirates from Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripolitania attacked not only foreign traders, but also subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Pirates captured and sold many Ottoman subjects. See Nicolas Vatin's "Une affaire interne: le sort et la libération de personnes de condition libre illégalement retenues en esclavage" in *Turcica*, 33 (Paris, 2001), 149-190. The Porte attempted to correct the problem, but some Mediterranean fortress commanders supported piracy; they permitted pirates to sell both prisoners and goods that they plundered within the regions under their control. The pirates even engaged in commercial activities with people living in the commanders' jurisdictions. This was an unacceptable political situation, since the pirates' illegal merchandise was not taxable. There are many academic studies on the subject of North African piracy—Daniel Panzac's *Barbary Corsairs: The End of a Legend, 1800-1820*, which documents the end of piracy in North Africa, is among the most comprehensive (particularly in its introduction and first chapter). Daniel Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs: The End of a Legend, 1800-1820* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2005), 1-43.

⁸⁴ A.DVN.DVE.d, 19/7, 103 (fî evâsıt-ı Rebîü'l-evvel [11]96).

additional tax, and confiscated property from merchants coming into Smyrna under the premise of being *konsolata*.⁸⁵ ‘Ahd-nâmes by themselves were therefore not completely effective in regulating commercial and political activity regarding Ottoman-Ragusan relations, but required enforcement by powerful legal and political figures.

Trade Permissions

In addition to ‘ahd-nâmes, the Ottoman administration offered Ragusans trade permissions that facilitated their trade activities in Ottoman lands. Both registers examined in this study contain a great deal of valuable decrees about trade permissions.

In the event of the ‘ahd-nâmes’ violation, certain ordinances worked as trade permissions. However, even when violations had not yet occurred, Ragusans requested written trade orders that essentially consolidated writings from the ‘ahd-nâme. These permissions came in two types: ones written for specific Ragusan traders and those written for all of them. For instance, a decree from September 12th, 1780 reminded the *mullah* (Islamic cleric) of Sofia that a specific Ragusan merchant venturing into the region must be allowed to conduct business, and another one asserted that all Ragusan merchants’ security—in terms of both life and property—were to be preserved under all circumstances.⁸⁶ A decree from February 21, 1780 is a good example of personal

⁸⁵ A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 547 (fî evâil-i Zî'l-hicce 1212). *Konsolata* was a light tax collected by consuls from their own traders. This tax was used to finance consulates. In the Ottoman Empire, consuls usually earn their living by means of tax farming, and *Konsolata* would thus come into play. Consuls wanted to make earnings beyond tax farming and sometimes demanded additional tax from traders, even confiscating the property of those within or traveling to the region under the name of *Konsolata*. This practice often led to complaints from traders to the Porte, and this issue was prevented as much as possible by means of the aforementioned Sultan decrees.

⁸⁶ A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 56 (fî evâsıt-ı Şevvâl 1194).

trade permissions, as it was specifically written to allow a Ragusan merchant and his two servants to travel freely in Rumelia for business reasons.⁸⁷

In our assessment of the registers, the Ottoman Empire's inconsistency in naming their documents became apparent yet again; the names of certain trade permissions differed between various decrees. Trade permissions granted to merchants carrying out business on land were sometimes called "*emr-i şerif*" (imperial ordinances)⁸⁸, while other times they were referred to as "*ticaret emri*" (trade orders)⁸⁹. When trade permissions were granted to Ragusans trading at sea, they were called either "*kapudanlık emri*" (captainship orders)⁹⁰, "*izn-i sefine hükmü*" (sailing permissions for a ship), or "*izn-i sefine hükm-ü şerifi*" (a noble sailing permission for a ship). If these permissions were granted to more than one person or more than once to the same person, they were called "*izn-i sefine ahkamı*" (sailing permissions for a ship)⁹¹.

The practice of renewing trade permissions and 'ahd-nâmes following the replacement of deceased sultans continued throughout the 18th century. It was common for sultans to review, confirm, and renew prior permissions granted to Ragusan traders by reporting them to the appropriate authorities. For example, after his accession to throne, Selim III renewed a trade permission in August 1790⁹² that was initially

⁸⁷ A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 37 (fî evâsıt-ı Safer 1194).

⁸⁸ A.DVN.DVE.d, 19/7, 141 (fî evâhir-i Receb [11]97).

⁸⁹ A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 224 (fî evâil-i Şevval [1]203).

⁹⁰ A.DVN.DVE.d, 19/7, 264 (fî evâil-i Cemâziye'l-evvel 1201).

⁹¹ A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 53, 58, 44. Then again, not all *izn-i sefine* decrees were written for commercial purposes. Bostan's "*İzn-i Sefine Defterleri ve Karadeniz'de Rusya ile Ticaret Yapan Devlet-i Aliyye Tüccarları 1780-1846*" addresses the Russians' involvement in Black Sea trade and the nation's impact on international Black Sea trade and Ottoman traders, especially Greek Ottoman subjects. It is concerned with the *izn-i sefine defterleri* at the end of the 18th century that comprised *izn-i sefine ahkamı*. For further information on the content and format of *izn-i sefine ahkamı* (sailing permissions for a ship), see İdris Bostan, "*İzn-i Sefine Defterleri ve Karadeniz'de Rusya ile Ticaret Yapan Devlet-i Aliyye Tüccarları 1780-1846*": in *Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi*, XI (İstanbul 1991), 21-44.

⁹² A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 41 (fî evâhir-i Zi'l-hicce 1204).

granted by Abdulhamid I for the sake of ensuring Ragusans' security while trading in Rumelia.

Trade permissions, in this sense, were highly beneficial for Ragusans, but they were also significant for the Ottomans. The Ottoman Empire had always prohibited the trading of goods that they considered periodically necessary,⁹³ and their trade permissions procedure mandated revisions of these prohibitions. By means of their special trade permissions, Ottoman rule sought to cease the smuggling of these items and halt all other trade-related transgressions. Ottoman rulers advised their officers to employ any methods they deemed necessary to prevent these illegal activities, and only those with special permissions were able to pass through the Empire's checkpoints without issue; those passing through without these permissions were regarded with grave suspicion.⁹⁴

⁹³ In Ottoman export tradition, forbidden goods (*memnu meta*) were defined by period and region. For instance, cotton export was banned in the last quarter of the 16th century, yet this ban was gradually done away with in the 17th century; the allowance of cotton export was initially temporary, but it became permanent over time. Cotton export, which was the core livelihood of the large and prominent Ottoman Karaosmanoğulları family, was finally legal in Manisa by the 18th century. Zeki Arıkan, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda İhracı Yasak Mallar (Memnu Meta)," in Prof. Dr. Bekir Kütükoğlu'na armağan / İstanbul Üniversitesi Tarih Araştırma Merkezi (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1991), 279-306.

⁹⁴ That being said, there were several cross-border traders in the 18th century. Getting permission to cross checkpoints, then, was not a particularly challenging endeavor.

CHAPTER 4: THE FINAL STATE OF OTTOMAN-RAGUSAN RELATIONS
AND DUBROVNIK'S IMAGE IN THE 18TH CENTURY (ACCORDING TO
A.DVN.DVE.D 19/7 AND A.DVN.DVE.D 20/8)

The Nature of Ottoman-Ragusan Relations in the 18th Century

Based on the Ottoman trade laws highlighted in the archives, one can deduce that the Ottomans thought the Ragusans to be loyal and trustworthy. Ragusan merchants had been active in Ottoman territories for many years, and they were consistently on record of being respectful and obedient of Ottoman trade regulations.⁹⁵ Ottoman rule did not hesitate to emphasize Dubrovnik's respectability in 'ahd-nâmes and other documents.

Ragusan merchants were required to pay a certain amount of tax and *gümruk* determined by 'ahd-nâmes and later ordinances to carry on their business in Ottoman territories.⁹⁶ As long as Ragusans complied with the established trading conditions, Ottoman authorities aimed to treat them fairly and lawfully. The Ragusans, in turn, could buy any merchandise they needed. The Ottoman Empire ensured that the crew and cargo alike of Ragusan ships were protected, and their grounded ships were never seized. Any belongings that washed ashore, if known to be Ragusan property, would even be delivered back to their original owners.

As is apparent, most of the decrees in the registers are related to commercial matters—because of these two archives, one keep track of the methods through which

⁹⁵ "...asitane-i saadet-i aşyanem olan sadakat ve ihlas ve ubudiyet ve ihtisasınız muktezasınca (pursuant to your familiar sincerity, loyalty, servitude, and experience)..." (A.DVN.DVE.d, 19/7, 41 (fî evâsıt-ı Safer 1194).

⁹⁶ "...ticaret ve bey ve şıra eyledikleri emtianın gümrüğü gereği gibi ödedikten sonra (after paying the required taxes on their merchandise)..." A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 84 (fî evâsıt-ı Safer 1195).

the Ottoman Empire and Dubrovnik conducted their age-old trading activities in the 18th century. The registers also highlight Ragusan trading routes in the Ottoman territories.

Ragusan merchants transported and sold their merchandise—both those they produced themselves and those they bought outside Ottoman territory—within Ottoman lands. According to the registers, the types of items that Ragusan traders could sell in Ottoman territories were as follows: salt, grain, lumber, wax, various foods, and ships.⁹⁷

Many Ragusan traders concerned themselves with wax and ship trading. Based on a statement made by the Ragusan consul in Istanbul, wax, wool, and various skins were the only commodities of interest to the Ragusan traders in the first half of the 18th century.⁹⁸ However, in the archives we observe not only an increase in the variety of products they handled, but the disappearance of wool and skin trading throughout the last quarter of the century. The wax trade⁹⁹, on the other hand, remained important to the Ragusan traders in the Balkans, mostly in Wallachia and Moldavia. Ragusan wax trading had been ongoing for several years in the region, but Ottoman officials attempted to hinder the operations of Ragusan wax traders by making exorbitant tax demands. This situation persisted towards the end of the century and resulted in several decrees in the registers ordering the Ottoman authorities in charge to prohibit any

⁹⁷ Ragusan trade goods within Ottoman lands were not limited to these items. These are simply the ones that have been mentioned in A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7 and A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8. For detailed information on Ragusan merchandise, see Carter, *Dubrovnik (Ragusa): A Classic City State*, 223-267.

⁹⁸ Carter, *Dubrovnik (Ragusa): A Classic City State*, 417.

⁹⁹ Wax trade was important not only because candles were used by affluent citizens and for lighting streets (especially in European cities like Paris), but because churches frequently used them. Although it was possible to make cheap wax using domestic oil, churches and wealthy people refused to use these types of candles on account of their unsavory odor.

further demands of bâc on Ragusan wax exports. Ragusan wax trade was also not limited to the borders of Rumelia and expanded to the Mediterranean, including to some Aegean islands.¹⁰⁰

Many documents in the Prime Minister's Ottoman Archives detail the significance of ship trading for Dubrovnik in the 18th century. The registers outline that many Ragusan ships transported food to Istanbul,¹⁰¹ and Ottomans either bought or rented these ships for various purposes. For instance, according to a decree dated May 19, 1781, a Tunisian trader had hired a Ragusan boat to ship his wheat purchased from Akka to Tunisia.¹⁰² Not only that, but the wheat bought to supply Istanbul in 1795 was transported from the pier of Golos via a Ragusan ship captained by a Ragusan captain, who had been paid well for his service.¹⁰³ The Ottomans even used Ragusan ships for purposes other than shipping goods. A decree dating back to 19 November 1780 outlines the purchase of a Ragusan ship bought to carry the Malabar consul to Egypt.¹⁰⁴

Marketing and selling merchandise were not the only reasons for Ragusan traders to visit the Ottoman territories. Purchasing goods from certain Ottoman towns and harbors and selling them into other Ottoman markets—or even back in Dubrovnik—

¹⁰⁰ See A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, (fî evâil-i Cemâziyelâhir [1]194).

¹⁰¹ See A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 248 (fî evâhir-i Cemâziye'l-evvel [1]209).

¹⁰² A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 75 (fî evâhir-i Cemâziye'l-evvel 1195).

¹⁰³ C.BLD. 104/5160 (fî 12 Cemâziye'l-evvel 1795).

¹⁰⁴ C.HR. 176/8772 (fî 22 Zilkâde 1194). Malabar District was an administrative district of the Madras Presidency in British India, and it was also independent India's Madras State. Most of Malabar District was included among the territories ceded to the British East India Company in 1792 by Tipu Sultan of Mysore at the end of the Third Anglo-Mysore War. We believe that Tipu Sultan sent the aforementioned Malabar Consul to Sultan Abdülhamid in order to re-establish trading factories in the Ottoman domains, request Ottoman military aid against the English, handle a series of other rulers, and procure firearms, military supplies, and gun makers from the Ottomans in exchange for a foothold in a western Indian port. For further information on Ottoman-India relations at that period and about the ambassador Tipu Sultan sent to Abdülhamid I, see Muzaffar Alam & Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Indo-Persian travels in the age of discoveries, 1400-1800* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 313-327.

proved to be lucrative. A decree for trade permissions dated in 1788 was also written upon a request made by the Ragusan council head's proxy. He asked the Sultan to permit a Ragusan merchant to sell the goods he bought from the Ottoman territories wherever he wished.¹⁰⁵ In another decree, it was ordered that nobody was to impede the Ragusans when they visited to bring goods purchased from Rumelia back to Dubrovnik.¹⁰⁶

In the 18th century, doing commerce using credit continued to be the Ragusan merchants' preferred method of business, as evidenced by the many decrees in the two registers regarding debt owed to the Ragusans. However, the decrees about credit-based trade were primarily written to address special borrowing and lending cases opened in the name of deceased Ragusan merchants. Take, for example, the previously mentioned decree number 182 in A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7 involving the deceased Ragusan merchant who had a debt of 4,000 kuruş.¹⁰⁷ Cases like these set valuable precedents for Ottoman decrees that handled matters of debt and credit.

These registers shed light on much information about the regions and cities in which Ragusan merchants were active in trade throughout the century.¹⁰⁸ Apparently, Ragusan merchants conducted commercial activity in all regions (and nearly all cities) of the Ottoman Empire. They enjoyed their many economic rights and privileges and carried on intensive trade activity within Ottoman lands. The Ragusan merchants' area of activity in this epoch extended from the Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea—from Balkans and Rumelia to Syria—meaning from end to end of the Ottoman territories.

¹⁰⁵ A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 4 (fî evâhir-i Safer 1203).

¹⁰⁶ A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 131 (fî evâhir-i Rebî'ü'l-âhir 1197).

¹⁰⁷ A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 182 (fî evâsıt-ı Cemâziyelâhir [1]197).

¹⁰⁸ See Figure 3.

According to the frequency of their names in the registers' decrees, the regions in which Ragusan traders conducted business most intensively were as follows: Istanbul, Bursa, Edirne, Smyrna, Thessaloniki, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgrade, Shkodër¹⁰⁹, Sofia, Chios, Nicosia, Cyprus, Crete, Algeria, Tunisia, Tripolitania, Maghreb, Egyptian Alexandria, and Aleppo.

The registers indicate that Ragusan overland merchants often populated Rumelia and Balkans, although it is no secret that they had done business in this region for centuries prior.¹¹⁰ In these areas, Ragusan traders could buy goods for reasonable prices and profit a great deal by selling them in other markets, and these regions maintained their importance for Ragusan traders in the 18th century. Numerous *firman*s (royal rescripts) written about Ragusan merchants were also included in the registers;¹¹¹ since they address the authorities of Rumelia, Cadis, and the Ottoman Empire, these documents act as evidence that Ragusan traders consistently did business in these areas in the 18th century. A phrase in a decree written for the Cadi of Bosnia, stating that “cümle Rumeli vilayetlerinde Dubrovnik bezirganlarından nesne taleb olunmaya (nothing shall be demanded from the Ragusan traders in all provinces of Rumelia),” might be an indicator that Ragusan merchants stopped by nearly every province in Rumelia during those times.¹¹² Based on the registers, the Rumelian cities in which the Ragusans were mostly active at the end of the 18th century were Edirne,

¹⁰⁹ Although the registers refer to Shkodër as Alexandria, note that this Albanian city is not to be confused with Egyptian Alexandria. See *Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi*, Halil İnalçık (İstanbul: Diyanet Vakfı, 1988), “Rumeli.”

¹¹⁰ See Halil İnalçık & Donald Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 256-270.

¹¹¹ See A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 123 (fî evâhir-i Rebîü'l-evvel 1197), 131 (fî evâhir-i Rebîü'l-âhir 1197), 141 (fî evâhir-i Receb 1197), A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 37 (fî evâhir-i Zî'l-hicce 1204).

¹¹² A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 40 (fî evâsıt-ı Safer [1]194).

Sofia, Bosnia, Alexandria, and Belgrade. Narda, Bar, Herzegovina, Thessaloniki, Nikopol, Silistra, Vidin, Novipazar, Rodosto, Tinos, and Acre are less frequently mentioned places in which the Ragusans carried out commercial activities.

The registers also suggest that Edirne was the most important Rumelian point of trade for Dubrovnik by the end of the 18th century's. Since Ragusan commercial activities in Edirne, Bursa, and Istanbul were based on different grounds, these cities were taxed differently. Many decrees regarding the activities of the Ragusan merchants in Edirne are available in the registers, and these rulings highlight Istanbul-Edirne as the most important Ragusan trade route. In 1792, a Ragusan travelling from Istanbul to Edirne was protected with an order written to the Cadi of Edirne. It ruled that all Ottoman authorities he should encounter must ensure his safe travels.¹¹³ Another decree from May 16, 1805 commanded that the Ragusan merchant travelling from Edirne to Izmir was not to be faced with additional taxes.¹¹⁴ Such rulings in the registers indicate that Ragusan merchants made good use of Balkan provinces during their travels through Edirne.¹¹⁵

¹¹³ A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 271 (fî evâhir-i Rebîû'l-âhir [1]207).

¹¹⁴ A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 984 (fî evâsıt-ı Safer [1]220).

¹¹⁵ See A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, (fî evâil-i Cemâziye'l-evvel [1]222).

RAGUSAN TRADERS IN THE OTTOMAN LAND (1788-1806) ACCORDING TO A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7 AND 20/8




Figure 3.

Sofia had also been one of the most important trading centers for Ragusan merchants since the 15th century.¹¹⁶ Many Ragusan traders visited the city for its fairs and bazaars, but they also used it as a trading center, so much so that it was normal to come across Ragusan merchants still residing there in the 18th century. A decree from August 15, 1780¹¹⁷ mentions how a problem faced by a Ragusan trader living in Sofia was placed into the hands of Ottoman administration. It states that a Ragusan partaking in an annual fair in Sofia was charged with undue money and property demands; he was dispossessed of 20 kuruş in spite of his trade permissions. In this decree addressing the regent of Sofia, the Sultan ordered that the exact amount taken from the merchant be refunded to him, and that no one was to breach his ordinances from then onward.

During this period, Belgrade also became more of a venue for 18th century Ragusan merchants. General and personal decrees alike were written to Cadi and chaperons of Belgrade regarding the Ragusan merchants. Among these decrees lie an account of a specific trader who resolved to fix the problems of the Ragusan merchants in the area, as well as general firmans addressed to the Ottoman authorities in Belgrade about the treatment of Ragusan merchants within Ottoman territory.

The registers indicate that the Albanian province of Shkodër was been in the Ragusan traders' area of activity. The region is often associated with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Two decrees—one from 1789 and the other from 1792—command that the Ragusans would neither be prevented from doing business in these regions nor troubled while bringing their unsold merchandise back to their home provinces.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ Halil İnalçik, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600* (London: Phoenix, 1994), 136.

¹¹⁷ A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 56 (fî evâsıt-ı Şevvâl 1194).

¹¹⁸ See A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 75 (fî evâhir-ı Muharrem 1203) & A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 259 (fî evâsıt-ı Muharrem 1207).

Register A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8 also suggests that there were traces of Ragusan merchant activity in Rousse (Rusçuk), situated in today's Bulgaria. A decree dated in 1789 even orders a customs officer in Rousse to stop hindering a Ragusan merchant and let him carry on his business.¹¹⁹

Another decree from 1791 tells of a Ragusan captain transporting grain from Tekirdağ¹²⁰ (Rodosto) to Istanbul, which indicates that Tekirdağ was part of Ragusan traders' trading routes.¹²¹ Kyustendil was also likely part of the Ragusan merchants' trading routes in this era, since there are many decrees written to the Cadi of Kyustendil in the registers. Kyustendil and its surrounding areas were among the most troublesome places for Ragusan merchants to do business; this was due to the "Kařrdzhali" or "Krdz'ali" revolts in the Balkans in which bandits roamed the entire Balkan peninsula and disrupted the region. Thus, many decrees were concerned with the treatment of Ragusans in this region. For example, a decree from 1789 informs us of an incident in which 25 bandits overtook a Ragusan near Kyustendil—the thieves stole 6,500 kuruş cash and every one of the merchant's belongings.¹²²

Ragusa in the 18th century remained active as an important mercantile harbor, but according to many decrees, Ragusan sailors faced many problems in the Mediterranean and Adriatic Sea (decrees involving the Black Sea, which were written in the early 19th century, will be discussed later in this paper). Ottoman administration sent off frequent ordinances to the Kapudan Pasha and the Cadis of the Mediterranean region to protect

¹¹⁹ A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 568 (fî evâhir-i Rebîü'l-evvel [1]213).

¹²⁰ Tekirdağ, in this decree, is referred to as *Tekfurdağı*. A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 235 (fî evâhir-i Ramazan 1205).

¹²¹ İlber Ortaylı has already said this. See İlber Ortaylı "Rodostó (extension en Marmara de la Via Egnatia) au XVIe siècle" : in *The Via Egnatia under Ottoman rule (1380-1699)* (Rethymnon: Crete University Press, 1996), 193-202.

¹²² A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 39 (fî evâhir-i Zi'l-hicce 1203).

the Ragusan merchant ships there—they issued grave warnings to the Ottomans at sea to avoid disturbing the Ragusans, and even asked them to go out of their way to assist them. Following these warnings, Ottoman rule carefully handled such issues. The Ottoman Empire not only protected Ragusans staying in Ottoman land, but actively tried to prevent ships sailing to Ragusa from creating trouble. The ships and captains departing from Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripolitania were specifically warned not to harm Ragusan civilians or any ship in the city's harbor upon their arrival in the Gulf of Ragusa.¹²³

Ragusan merchants commonly bought and sold merchandise in the Aegean islands of the Mediterranean Sea, particularly Chios, Kos, Cyprus, Crete and Nicosia. In the registers, many decrees written to these cities' authorities specifically reminded them to heed Ragusan traders' privileges. These decrees strongly emphasized the necessity to be cautious in this regard—these decrees are what would classify as Dubrovnik's trade permissions.

It was also common for Ragusan ships to sail on the Peloponnese in this era. There are decrees in the registers mentioning Ragusan traders living in Peloponnese, as well as Ragusan ships that docked there. These decrees consist of charters for consul and dragoman appointments, who were tasked with facilitating the Ragusans' trading business. Reflecting an increasing demand for food in Dubrovnik, there are several decrees about Ragusan ships sailing to Peloponnese and buying foodstuffs from there towards the end of the 18th century.¹²⁴

¹²³ A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 66 (fî evâsî-tî Muharrem 1203).

¹²⁴ See A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 311 (fî evâhir-i Rebîû'l-âhir [1]208).

Tripoli was also an important harbor for Ragusan merchants. According to the registers, the Ragusans were highly active between Cyprus and Tripoli. A decree in A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7 from May 13, 1804 is a dragoman charter for Ragusan merchants residing in Cyprus seeking to visit Tripoli for commercial purposes.¹²⁵ The decree aimed to facilitate the business of Ragusan traders in the city. Another decree from 1777 appointed the Ragusan consul of Cypriot as the consul for Tripoli, which indicates that Cyprus and Tripoli were closely related commercial centers for Ragusan traders.¹²⁶

Ragusan merchants also frequently visited the Alexandrian harbor in Egypt. The Ottoman Empire assigned so much importance to the Ragusans' commercial activities in this region that several charters in the registers were dedicated to this topic. In these charters, Ottoman rule requested that Ragusan merchants carry on their business in the Ottoman territories without protest from anyone. With this goal in mind, they assisted the traders by assigning new consuls and dragomen immediately after preceding ones left office.

Considering the content of the registers, it is difficult to speak of the presence of Ragusan ships in the Black Sea until the end of 18th century.¹²⁷ However, in a *firman* from 1802 written upon the request of the Ragusan council's head, Ragusan ships were

¹²⁵ A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 323 (fî 2 Safer 1219).

¹²⁶ A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 291 (fî 23 Cemâziye'l-evvel [1]191).

¹²⁷ There is no sign of Ragusan Black Sea trade in the registers until their 18th century entries, but A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 2 (fî evâsıt-ı Safer [1] 217) was written with this in mind—this decree explicitly allows Ragusan traders to trade in the Black Sea. However, we know that Dubrovnik had close ties with other trade cities in the Black Sea at the end of the 16th century, as well. See İnalçık, in *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*, 133. Since the registers do not mention any 17th and early 18th century Ottoman Black Sea trade, they support Braudel's argument that Ragusan traders mysteriously abandoned doing business in the Black Sea during this time for reasons that remain unknown. See Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the age of Philip II* (London: Fontana Press, 1972), 111.

permitted to trade in the Black Sea. We also infer from this firman that in the previously granted 'ahd-nâmes, there was no provision explicitly permitting the Ragusans to pass through the Black Sea.¹²⁸ Another decree from 1805 suggests that Ragusans were doing business in the Black Sea in early 19th century. Addressed to the Cadi of Trabzon, this decree was written about a Trabzon customs officer demanding additional *gümrük* from a Ragusan merchant, which breached the conditions written in the firman.¹²⁹ The decree functioned as a good reminder of the Ragusans' right to trade in Ottoman territories.

Ragusan traders also frequented Istanbul, where they went to purchase goods and unloading their merchandise. The presence of decrees commanding that Ragusan merchants be protected by the fortress of the Bosphorus indicates that Istanbul was a significant beaten track for the Ragusans; after all, they had to pass through the Dardanelles in order to arrive in Istanbul. The Galata region in particular was important for Ragusan traders—a decree from 1789 addressing the Cadi of Galata commanded that Ragusan merchants loading Rumelian goods onto their ships were not to be persecuted.¹³⁰

In addition to these regions, Ragusans conducted much of their business in Anatolia, although we already acknowledged Smyrna's importance to the Ragusan merchants as a significant trading harbor. Considering the number of decrees

¹²⁸ "...Dubrovniklü gemilerinin Karadeniz'e amedşodu Cumhura ihsan buyrulan 'ahd-nâmede münderiç olmaması (...because the 'ahd-nâme granted to the Ragusan president does not allow the Ragusan trade ships to access the Black Sea)..." A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 2 (fî evâsıt-ı Safer [1]217). In the Prime Minisiter's Ottoman Archives, we have come upon a number of *hatt-ı humayun* and *izn-i sefine* dating to earlier times than this provision, thus pointing out that ships of the Ragusan Republic were permitted to trade in the Black sea even though they had no specific permissions in the 'ahd-nâme. See HAT. 1458/11 (fî 29 Zi'l-hicce 1209).

¹²⁹ A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 946 (fî evâhir-i Safer 1220).

¹³⁰ A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 222 (fî evâhir-i Cemâziye'l-evvel 1203).

reminding Ottoman authorities that Ragusans had ‘ahd-nâme rights to do business in the city, as well as decrees resolving any problems that arose from these commercial activities, one can conclude that Smyrna remained a crucial aspect of Ragusan trade in the late 18th century. This is unsurprising, since the period’s political and economic conditions facilitated trade in Smyrna by making the Ports of Livorno, Genoa, Messina, Trieste, and Ancona as entrepots in Western European trade with Smyrna.¹³¹ Elena Frangakis-Syrett also states that Dubrovnik’s marine merchants benefited from the wartime order, since they could easily access Eastern Mediterranean ports at the time.¹³² The register’s consul and dragoman charters written to Smyrna solidify this argument.

We can safely argue that Bursa, like Smyrna, was a significant trading center in the Ottoman Empire for centuries.¹³³ With the turn of the 18th century, Ottoman-Ragusan trading activities in this region remained intense—so much so that Ottoman rule differentiated the tax rates that Ragusans were to pay in Bursa, Istanbul, and Edirne from those in other Ottoman cities, which were higher than usual. In the registers, both Abdulhamid I and Selim III frequently wrote decrees addressing the authorities in Istanbul, Edirne, and Bursa asserting that Ragusan trade was to be facilitated and supported by any means necessary. Another decree regarding Ragusan merchants in Trabzon, encountered in A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, detailed how Ragusan merchants

¹³¹ For a better understanding, see Elena Frangakis-Syrett, *The Commerce of Smyrna in the Eighteenth Century (1700-1820)* (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1992), 155-187.

¹³¹Inalcik & Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, 218-255.
¹³², 1992), 155-187.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 183.

attempted to transport commodities from Trabzon to Erzurum, signaling that Ragusans went as far as northeastern Ottoman lands to do business.¹³⁴

However, despite how favored Ragusan merchants were, the trade permissions outlined in the registers did not simply denote the Ragusans' allowances in trade—they also outlined their prohibitions. In our research, we discovered a document on trade permissions that was qualitatively distinct from those in the registers. According to this document, Ragusans could not take goods to their hometown if the items in question were forbidden from trade,¹³⁵ although they could purchase limited quantities of wheat.¹³⁶

Most of the decrees in the registers relate to issues arising from Ottoman-Ragusan commercial relations, as indicated by the evidence we previously presented. However, the registers are exclusively concerned with commercial issues. The registers also highlighted the Ottomans' aim to protect Ragusan clergymen—in many Ottoman territories, a number of churches accepted Catholic Ragusan priests into their orders. The people of the Ragusan Republic, to a certain extent, met the Ottoman Empire's requirements for Catholic service, particularly in Rumelia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹³⁷ Emphasizing this role during negotiations with the Pope, asking him to consider its neutral stance during the times of turmoil by which it was often surrounded, the Ragusan government stressed the importance of regulating of Catholic religious life in the Ottoman land, much like it did during the previously mentioned War of Candia.

¹³⁴ A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 946 (fî evâhir-i Safer 1220).

¹³⁵ KK.d 0078, 70 (fî 4 Receb 978). The registers underexamination do not offer information on 18th century forbidden goods, but other archival documents do. See C.HR. 103/5147 (fî 21 Ramazan 1216).

¹³⁶ See Faroqhi, "The City State of Dubrovnik, Through the Ottoman Eyes."

¹³⁷ A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 13/1-2 (fî evâhir-i Muharrem 1204). This is the decree that we mentioned in footnote No. 48.

By this time, the diocese located in southeast Herzegovina was already subject to the Ragusan archbishopric. The Ragusan government thus acted as the unofficial protection of the bishops, priests, and Catholic population in the region. The registers also highlight the Ragusan contacts with the Ottoman administration, citing Ragusan ambassadors and consuls who ensured that bishops and priests would be able to fulfill their religious obligations without difficulty.

For example, according to a decree dated 1782, the Sultan was informed that Ragusan priests had been disturbed by some Ottoman officers while practicing their religious ceremonies in churches and in their homes.¹³⁸ Upon hearing this, the Sultan ordered that the issue be inspected and reported to him. However, the registers contain a decree about this issue written 6 years following the incident; apparently, the previous one had mysteriously disappeared.¹³⁹ The case was even pursued once the new sultan had claimed the throne. As suggested by a decree stated by Selim III in 1789, he had taken over the case from Abdulhamid I. We learn from the decree that he saw to the suit and ordered that the Ragusan priests were to be left in peace.¹⁴⁰ These decrees in the registers are significant in that they demonstrate Ottoman rule's willingness to handle even non-commercial problems relating to the Ragusans.

The Ragusan church had some difficulty organizing religious services because Ottoman officers usually demanded an extortionate tax, although they had no right to do so—the Serbian Orthodox Church simply wanted to make the Catholic rayah pay taxes. With the Ragusans' efforts and effective Ottoman administration, the Catholics

¹³⁸ A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 108 (fî evâsıt-ı Rebîü'l-evvel 1196).

¹³⁹ A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 117 (fî evâsıt-ı Zilkâde 1196).

¹⁴⁰ A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 573 (fî evâil-i Rebîü'l-evvel 1213).

in the Ottoman land were protected from any violence by the hand of both Ottoman authorities and ambassadors of the Eastern European Orthodox Church. At this time, the Ottoman Empire and the governor of Bosnia were also revising cases regarding the legal rights of Catholic priests and the restoration process of churches.

Diplomacy Between the Two Polities

A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7 and A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8 also provide us with information on the diplomatic systems adopted by the two polities during their relations. It is possible that Ragusan officials were largely involved in the fostering of these relations, but many ambassadors also acted as essential links between the Ottoman Empire and the Ragusan Republic. These ambassadors were either nobles or ordinary citizens, all of whom Ragusan lords elected, and their terms would end only upon completion of their duties.

The ambassador's most important task was to deliver Dubrovnik's yearly tribute of 12,500 jizya to the Ottoman imperial treasury. The decrees in the registers regarding jizya payment suggest that this custom continues in the 18th century. The ambassadors delivered jizya without exception over the centuries. For instance, a decree from 1786 stating "elçiler çıkıp cizyeniz olan on iki bin beşyüz altun götürüb teslim ve cizye-i amirem eylemek üzere," meaning that the ambassadors were to be in charge of delivering Dubrovnik's jizya to the Ottoman imperial treasury, suggests that this was a de facto practice.¹⁴¹ Another decree from 1780 appoints two officers responsible for the protection of Ragusan ambassadors carrying Dubrovnik's jizya. This indicates that

¹⁴¹ A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 251 (fî evâhir-i Zi'l-hicce 1200).

Ottoman administration paid much attention to the proper execution of this task—reasonably so, of course.¹⁴²

Uniting the Ragusans from Dubrovnik with those living in Ottoman territory was another important task for ambassadors, who personally met with Ottoman administration to petition the Sultan about these matters. Ambassadors were usually interviewed upon their arrival in Istanbul for their *jizya* payments, and trade matters were most often negotiated in these meetings. Their business was considered incomplete until they obtained general and private permission for Ragusans to trade in Ottoman lands.¹⁴³ The ambassador would personally handle business problems that Ragusans traders faced¹⁴⁴ as well as personal disputes between Ragusans and Ottomans.¹⁴⁵

There was never a permanent ambassador in Istanbul or any other Ottoman city. Ambassadors could return to their homelands after finishing certain tasks, whereupon competent Ragusan inhabitants of the Ottoman territories could take their place. The registers are full of decrees indicating that Ragusan proxies had contacts with Ottoman administration in the name of both the head of the Ragusan council and his ambassador.¹⁴⁶ Considering that the number of Ragusan ambassadors in the Ottoman land peaked in the 18th century, the Ragusan ambassadors' intensive relations with Ottoman administration created a basis for a fundamental argument in this study: that

¹⁴² A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 43 (fî evâhir-ı Safer 1194).

¹⁴³ A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 84 (fî evâsıt-ı Safer 1195).

¹⁴⁴ A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 82 (fî evâhir-i Recep 1195).

¹⁴⁵ A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 56 (fî evâsıt-ı Şevvâl [1]194).

¹⁴⁶ A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 134 (fî evâhir-i Rebîû'l- evvel 1204).

Ottoman-Ragusan relations persisted even at the end of the 18th century, and Dubrovnik was still highly active in the region.

Dubrovnik's consuls in the Ottoman lands also performed crucial tasks during the two parties' relations. The Ragusan consuls' fundamental duties were to look out for the interests of Ragusan shipping, improve trade relations, and acquaint the Ragusan Senate with changes in the Ottomans' political, military, and economic status. They took care of various businesses of the Ragusan traders, represented the Republic of Dubrovnik, and even acted on behalf of the Ragusan government without noticing the government. As the registers demonstrate, Ragusan traders became subjects of the consuls in the regions they did business. They paid their taxes to these consuls and conducted their business through them. The Ottoman cities mentioned in the registers in which the Ragusan consuls had been at the end of the 18th century were Istanbul, Smyrna, Thessaloniki, Morea, Chios, Cyprus, Khania, Alexandria of Egypt, Latakia and Aleppo. Consuls were also useful tools for the Ottoman state, administration regularly appointed consuls to vacant consulate offices in the aforementioned Ottoman cities. This is evidenced by a decree regarding consular assignment, stating "...kapudan tüccar vesair Dubrovniklünün umur ve maslahatların rü'yet eylemek için..." which roughly translates to "...[consuls will] conduct the business of the Ragusan traders, captains, and people in general..."¹⁴⁷ In addition, Ragusan consuls in the Ottoman territory increased in number by the 18th century and had grown significantly since earlier centuries.¹⁴⁸ This is likely because the public in the 16th

¹⁴⁷ A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 246 (fi 4 Ramazan 1200).

¹⁴⁸ For further information about 16th century Ragusan consuls in the Ottoman territory, see Biegman, *The Turco-Ragusan Relationship: According to the Firmans of Murad III (1575-1595) Extant in the State Archives of Dubrovnik*, 39.

century perceived Ragusan consuls' territory as being much smaller than they did in the 18th century.

Dragomans also possessed a great duty: to build and maintain healthy relations with other states.¹⁴⁹ In addition to the dragoman charters, there are many *yol emir* (travel orders) in the 18th century registers given to the dragomen ensuring their safe travels within Ottoman lands. Unlike ambassadors, there were many permanent dragomen in the Ottoman territory. A travel order dated September 21, 1790 was issued by a Ragusan consul in Smyrna calling for a new dragoman after the previous one vacated his position.¹⁵⁰

Dragomen were tasked with accompanying Ragusan ambassadors, consuls, and traders on their journeys abroad, and they bore the responsibility of venturing to regions with no consuls in order to do business. One decree from September 10, 1804 indicates that a dragoman was sent to Akka, which had no Ragusan consul at the time, to organize a trading system for Ragusans living there.¹⁵¹ The dragomen also had the authority to contact and do business with Ottoman administration in the absence of a higher Ragusan representative. For instance, according to a decree dated on February 28, 1782, a Ragusan dragoman reported to the sultan that Ottoman dignitaries were disturbing Ragusan priests.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁹ For a better understanding of the issue see Ali İhsan Bağış, *Osmanlı Ticaretinde Gayri Müslimler: Kapitülasyonlar-Beratlı Tüccarlar Avrupa ve Hayriyye Tüccarları (1750-1859)* (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1998), 17-38; Kemal Beydilli, III. *Selim Devrinde Verilen Bazı Muâf ve Müsellemlik Berâtları Hakkında: Foti Kalfa'nın Berâtı*, from https://www.academia.edu/16498988/III._Selim_Devrinde_Verilen_Baz%C4%B1_Mu%C3%A2f_ve_M%C3%BCsellemlik_Ber%C3%A2tlar%C4%B1_Hakk%C4%B1nda_Foti_Kalfan%C4%B1n_Ber%C3%A2t%C4%B1. Accessed May 24, 2016.

¹⁵⁰ A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 299 (fî 22 Muharrem [1]206).

¹⁵¹ A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7, 327 (fî 4 Cemâziyelâhir [12]19).

¹⁵² A.DVN.DVE.d, 19/7, 103 (fî evâsıt-ı Rebîü'l-evvel [11]96).

Additionally, Ragusan dragomen served both their hometowns and other states within the Ottoman authorities. This was put forth by a decree dated July 2nd, 1793 that mentioned a dragoman named Manyö Posiç, a Ragusan located in Istanbul serving the French.¹⁵³ It is also important to note that dragomen managing Ottoman-Ragusan relations did not necessarily have to be of Ragusan descent.¹⁵⁴ Even so, Dubrovnik's dragomen would consist almost exclusively of Ragusan merchants in the 17th century and onward.¹⁵⁵ Muslim dragomen were also a rarity, since the instruction of European languages only became widespread in the 19th century; few Muslims spoke any European languages at the time, save for educated Bosnians who spoke both Ottoman Turkish and Bosnian. Lastly, one should keep in mind Mioviç's argument stating that the dragomen only began to appear in the middle of the 16th century and that their numbers would not increase until the 18th century¹⁵⁶—this may indicate that they were heavily required in the 18th century as opposed to other centuries. This increase in dragomen also directly paralleled the improved relations between the two parties.

Throughout history, Ragusan intelligence services were extremely valuable to the Ottomans. However, our research of early 18th century archives indicate that in this period, Ragusan spies were not as important to Ottomans as they previously were. No early 18th century decrees in the registers make mention of Ragusan spies, and none of the other archives from this era did, either. Although the Ottoman Empire was still receiving information about Europe during the 18th century, they were uninterested in conducting espionage. The Ottoman Empire benefitted from Ragusan intelligence only

¹⁵³ C.HR. 28/1377 (fî 23 Zilkâde 1207).

¹⁵⁴ See for example A.DVNSMHM 031, 78 (fî 14 Rebîü'l-âhir 985).

¹⁵⁵ Mioviç, "Diplomatic Relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Dubrovnik," 193.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 192-193.

when the Ragusans and Ottomans had a common interest in spying on a given target, especially if the Ragusans thought they could procure valuable information for the Sultan.¹⁵⁷

A Historiographical Review of Ragusa: Questioning the Decline Paradigm by
Examining the Course of Ragusan Trade

Despite having occurred in the 17th century, we have chosen to treat the earthquake of 1667 as though it were an 18th century event. This is because the earthquake was instrumental in determining many events in 18th century Dubrovnik and led to periods of economic and political eclipse for the city. These troubles lasted nearly 100 years before Dubrovnik's revival in the late 18th century, just before its end in 1806.

We have often noted the convenience and benefits of Dubrovnik's geopolitical location, but one geological factor made Dubrovnik's physical position highly detrimental: its seismic activity. Before 1900, Dubrovnik and its surrounding areas were in the most seismically active part of Croatia, and the earthquake of April 6, 1667—followed by a fire that swept through the city—annihilated the city and killed around 5,000 Ragusans. The Republic recovered from this trauma slowly despite reconstructing the city immediately after the catastrophes, but Dubrovnik also received much aid from various parts of Christendom. While this assistance was helpful, it would not be enough to restore the city's appearance from before the calamity. Ragusan merchants in the navy would experience the worst long-term effects, since the tragedy diminished their trade activity both on land and at sea.

¹⁵⁷ See for example HAT. 171/7330 (fñ 23 Zilkâde 1218).

Political conditions were also working against the Ragusans during this time. In 1683, the Ottoman Empire completed unfinished business from a century prior in Vienna; their attack on the city, however, resulted in a strong Habsburg retaliation. This error led to many future disasters for the Empire, and their failure in Vienna reinforced the ending of the Ottomans' advance in the Balkans, which ceased around 1606. Feeling encouraged by this development, Austria, Poland, the Pope, and Venice united against the Ottomans under the name of the Holy Alliance. They did this to establish dominance in Hungary and Dalmatia, the latter of which the Ragusan Republic was a part. A mere year following this alliance, Austria gained a large part of Hungary. The two parties signed an agreement in 1684 to make this official, although it would only last until Herzegovina was conquered. During the war, Dubrovnik patiently endured many difficulties, specifically those stemming from the Venetians, who conquered more than half of the Morea, Athens, and a number of islands. Venice also occupied Nova and Boka and assumed several positions in Herzegovina during raids targeting the Ottomans.

Venetian piracy was a serious issue for the Ragusan navy, and since earthquakes and fires had already adversely affected it, the Ragusan government appealed to its new protector, the Austrian Emperor, who persuaded Venice to let the city be. The Ottoman Empire was driven out of Hungary, but the Austrian annexation of the region remained impossible. Dubrovnik then sent its accrued liability to the Porte in 1684 to express its desire to renew their protectorate contract with Austria. After observing Russia capture Azov, successful Venetian conquests in the Adriatic, and Austria's victory in the battle of Zenta, the Ottomans surrendered and asked for peace. With the Karlovitz treaty, the Ottomans would evacuate all of Hungary (excepting Temeswar),

Transylvania, Slavonia, and Croatia. Podolia and Ukraine were given to Poland while Venice secured the Morea, albeit not for long, its surrounding islands, and several fortresses in Dalmatia. Dubrovnik, on the other hand, was once again a tributary state to the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans regarded the city with good grace for fear of the city coming under Venetian domination, and this period of peace for Dubrovnik is what led to its trade's short-lived revival.¹⁵⁸

Political events within the Ottoman Empire had always determined affairs in the Ragusan Republic, but by the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire was in a period of great internal transformation and was less influential on other states than usual. The conflict with Austria, Poland, and Venice resulted in the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, which directly weakened the Ottomans' power. The struggle continued to affect Dubrovnik, and its outcome grew increasingly unpredictable overtime. This was the case for two reasons: one, because Venice opened new harbors to serve Balkan markets, and two, because the Ottomans were unprepared to fight a war against both Venice and Austria after having lost a war against Venice already. The Ottoman Empire temporarily lost Belgrade to Austria, and it had yet to accomplish its main goals: recapturing the Morea, the Corinthian region, islands in the Gulf of Egina, the Ionian Islands, the St. Mavra Islands, and three piers in Crete once the Treaty of Passarowitz ended the war in 1718.

Ragusan land trade then faced serious issues—trading on land decreased significantly, and this invariably led to economic decline for the Republic. The market losses in the Levant and Bulgaria, in addition to the ones in Serbia, worsened the

¹⁵⁸ Carter, *Dubrovnik (Ragusa): A Classic City State*, 346.

situation. Furthermore, the Ottoman Empire improved their relations with its enemies, which resulted in the Ragusan traders' loss of significance as intermediators. The situation was somewhat different at sea, though—a considerable number of Ragusan vessels sailed outside the Adriatic during the second half of the 18th century. They were at the forefront of Adriatic Sea transport on behalf of other states, and the war also boosted their trade activity. After the Seven Years' War, there was a remarkable increase in Ragusan maritime service in the Levant, specifically in North Africa.¹⁵⁹ We have already mentioned the Ottoman use of Ragusan ships and captains for various purposes in the last quarter of the century, but this pattern continued and founded Dubrovnik's relations with many other states during this time—Ragusan sailors and officers even hired foreign powers to assist them with this initiative. The Venetians' decline in shipping activities, especially after the 17th century, also played a major role in this issue—Venice's classic role as a bridge between east and west was gravely shaken and challenged by the Ragusans since the 16th century. This period was also the last stage of Venetian involvement in the important maritime trading routes of the term.¹⁶⁰ In the 18th century and onward, many Ragusan Dalmatian sailors ended up replacing Venetian sailors.

As he did in the Austrian Succession War, Prussian King Frederick II laid the groundwork for the next European war with the desire to seize Silesia's rich territory. He made preemptive strike on the state, since Frederick predicted that Maria Theresa would decisively attempt to recover the region. Pared with France and England's colonial ambitions, the war between Austria and Prussia for the hegemony of central

¹⁵⁹ Carter, *Dubrovnik (Ragusa): A Classic City State*, 429.

¹⁶⁰ Alberto Tenenti, *Piracy and the Decline of Venice* (London: Longmans, 1967), 90.

Europe would trigger the famous Seven Years' War, which ended in 1763 with Paris' final peace treaty.

There would also be changes in ownership of the so-called patchwork quilt of Italy. Besides Spain's control over two strategic bases, Gibraltar and Minorca, Britain would become the conquerors of many Italian states. France and Austria, led by the Bourbon and Habsburg dynasties, were chief rivals in Europe for almost two centuries, both being formidable competition for one another. Maria Theresa of Austria and her chancellor, Von Kaunitz, had a strong desire to end this competition and win France over. In May 1756, against all odds, they would finally form a defense alliance in Versailles after their years-long rivalry.

The Black Sea, on the other hand, pitted Russia against the Ottoman Empire. Having been placed in the middle of the conflict, a weakened Poland was caught in the crossfire of this conflict; the nation was devastated in a three-stage process for which hostile powers colluded to achieve. Russia and Austria would fight twice between 1740 and 1763, just as Russia and the Ottoman Empire did between 1768 and 1791.

Meanwhile, another important development completely altered the trade balance in the region: the recovery of the Port of Trieste in 1719. The rise of the Habsburgs and the emergence of the Russian Empire were instrumental in establishing the means by which 18th century political and economic Ottoman-Ragusan relations progressed. The Habsburgs annexed the entire Kingdom of Hungary, extending from the Drava to the Danube, in 1699. In 1718, a trade treaty and proper navigation guidelines within the Habsburg regions were also agreed upon. In 1719, the Habsburg Empire recovered

Trieste, an important commercial port that lost its position to Venice and Dubrovnik immediately after the Imperial Privileged Eastern Company formed. Charles VI announced Trieste as a free imperial city and legalized trade hub where foreign traders were exempt from military service. He also claimed that traders had full rights to purchase property or products of all sorts and enjoy the tax breaks and rights of moorage from being residents of the city.¹⁶¹ A new era of trade relations was thus forged between Trieste and the Levant. From 1720 onward, the aforementioned Company's freighters sailed from Trieste to Smyrna and Constantinople to do trade.

The war of the Austrian-Russian coalition waged against the Ottoman Empire, however, and interrupted the first trade agreements between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburgs, which ultimately led Maria Theresa of Austria to adopt protectionist measures. Considering the need for experienced capitalist merchants and specialist artisans for the empire's nascent industrial production, Maria Theresa welcomed the increase of Ottoman subjects arriving from the south to Transylvania and to Hungarian regions until the 1780s.¹⁶² Around this time, poor living conditions for Ottomans in the south drove them to immigrate to northern areas. By 1715, Venetian overseas territories were reduced to the Ionian Islands, and, in some places, the Ottoman land system altered from the *timar* system—which was not hereditary and provided life assurance and fiefdom for the peasants—to a system called *chiflik*, which reduced the peasants to serfs. Under this system, the citizens were under hereditary ownership and

¹⁶¹ Olga Katsiardi-Hering, "Greek Merchant Colonies in Central and South-Eastern in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries," in *Merchant Colonies in the Early Modern Period*, ed. by Victor N. Zakharov, Gelina Harlaftis and Olga Katsiardi-Hering (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2012), 134.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 133.

forced to pay remarkably high taxes.¹⁶³ Successive wars, however, would eventually destroy many cities in this problematic southern region.

The next event that brought hope to Dubrovnik was the Ottoman-Russian-Austrian War, which broke out in 1736 upon Russia's occupation of the Ottoman fortresses of Azov and Kilburn. This conflict lasted for three years. Austria made an alliance agreement with Russia and sent a support unit through the Balkans and Wallachia, all the while invading Bosnia. Trade activities in Bosnia had almost come to a full stop; this was a perfect opportunity for Dubrovnik to enforce their own trade activity, but because France caused political trouble for Ragusans on the pretense of their supposed cooperation with Austria, they were unable to do so. The Ragusan port was interfered by a French blockade, shifting the merchandise's export route from the Balkans hinterland from Dubrovnik to Herzegovina. At this time, the French-Ottoman fellowship that lasted almost 300 years continued to grow at the expense of the Ragusan republic. Frenchmen blazed a proverbial trail in commerce by engaging in Balkan trade with western European traders, which ended the Ragusan monopoly there.

Meanwhile, Ragusan trade revived in 1727. Ragusan ships sailed beyond the Adriatic shores and to Smyrna for the first time in many years. The conflicts between England, Spain, and France deteriorated between 1739-1750 and 1756-1763, which furthered Dubrovnik's commercial improvement. However, the Seven Years' War between 1756 and 1763 was a financial boon to Dubrovnik, since the city profited by assisting countries like France and England in their efforts to capture American

¹⁶³ Olga Katsiardi-Hering, "L'area Balcanica nei Secoli XVI-XVIII" (email message to author, February 15, 2016).

colonies. The port of Livorno was one of two main ports through which maritime trade was conducted at this time—France, boasting control of the port, created obstacles for England’s trade activities. This caused Alexandria, the other prominent Mediterranean port, to gain importance. The neutral Ragusan fleet, however, allowed many belligerents to continue trading throughout the region. Offering its shipping services to warring factions, Dubrovnik rekindled its role as a mediator and assisted the city-state in maintaining its Mediterranean trade monopoly. Even so, Ragusan hinterland trade was in a depressed situation, and Ragusa’s continuous efforts to avert disruption to Dubrovnik’s affairs achieved little success, despite spanning from 1699 to 1740.

At this point, we shall mention the emergence of Russians in the Mediterranean and the Greeks’ impact on trade in the region. At the end of the 17th century, Russia began fought hard to pursue its ambitions in the south. With the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739, it won the right to trade with Ottoman ships in the Black Sea.¹⁶⁴ After nearly a century-long struggle, Russia would completely obtain the right to trade freely. This would be the second most decisive event in the Ragusan Republic’s fate.

As agreed in Hubertusburg between Prussia and Austria on 15 February 1763, central Europe’s status quo was restored. The conclusion of the Hubertusburg treaty would not only increase the Prussian influence on Germany, but also reduce that of Habsburg Austria. These powers greatly affected Poland, as well. Prussia accompanied Russia, with whom the nation had formed an alliance during the war in 1762. This development would not herald good fortune for Poland. Austria’s attendance sparked a new European war, the Ottoman-Russian War of 1768-1774. Russia defeated the

¹⁶⁴ Bostan, *İzn-i Sefine Defterleri ve Karadeniz’de Rusya ile Ticaret Yapan Devlet-i Aliyye Tüccarları 1780-1846*, 21.

Ottoman Empire and its two allies, Austria and Prussia, and signed an agreement in 1774 called the *Kuchuk Kainarji Antlaşması* (The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca).¹⁶⁵ Its provisions resulted in significant developments in Ragusan trade affairs. Bulgaria soon became more welcoming of foreign traders besides the Ragusans, and the Black Sea would cease to be an Ottoman inland sea; their lack of this asset would continue for centuries. In addition to attaining navigation rights on the Black Sea, Russian diplomats became able to make the Crimea independent.¹⁶⁶

From that point forward, Russian ships passed through the Mediterranean from the Black Sea. The 1779 Aynalıkavak bond of arbitration attempted to restrict the Russians' rights to travel there, but Russia's occupation of lands north of the Black Sea was a major asset—Russians eventually seized the region between the Dniester and Bug rivers with The Treaty of Jassy in 1792. While Russia's ownership of land north of the Black Sea grew, the Ottoman Empire had to accept that the Ottoman rayah would purchase grain from Russian-owned ports that previously belonged to the Ottomans.¹⁶⁷ Russia built various harbors in the region, reconstructed the port of Odessa, and even allowed other states to trade there.¹⁶⁸ The improvement of Russian trade in the Black Sea was thus tied to the Black Sea's transformation into an open sea.

¹⁶⁵ For information about the established Ottoman-Russian border, see Map #1.

¹⁶⁶ Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and The World Around It*, 67.

¹⁶⁷ For the 18th century trade procedures of the Ottoman rayah (particularly the Greeks) with Russia in the Black Sea, see İdris Bostan, "İzn-i Sefine Defterleri ve Karadeniz'de Rusya ile Ticaret Yapan Devlet-i Aliyye Tüccarları 1780-1846": in *Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi*, XI (İstanbul 1991), 21-44; Harlaftis, Gelina and Sophia Laiou. "Ottoman State Policy in Mediterranean Trade Shipping, c. 1780-c.1820: The Rise of the Greek-Owned Ottoman Merchant Fleet." In *Networks of Power in Modern Greece*, ed. by Mark Mazower (London: HURST Publishers Ltd., 2008).

¹⁶⁸ Russia was not the only nation to develop international trade in the Black Sea. The Habsburg Empire in 1783, France and England in 1802, and then Hamburg, Denmark, and Spain obtained the rights to trade with Ottoman administration, which led to the complete opening of the Black Sea to international trade. Following this, Ottoman and Ragusan trade improved significantly in the late 18th century and early 19th century.



Map 1.

Economic competition steadily increased in the Black Sea, which minimized the Ragusans' privileged trade position. The wealthy Greek and Armenian subjects of the Sultan would assume a mediating role in trade between the Ottoman Empire and Europe, and, overtime, supersede the Western traders in the region. Although the opening of the Black Sea to international trade caused some detriments to Ragusan trade overall, the end of the Ottoman monopoly in the Black Sea, the Russian annexation of Azov, and the Kuchuk Kainarji were of great help to the city-state. Ragusan traders enjoyed this development and still survived under Ottoman hegemony.

Struggles over the Danubian frontier, paired with subsequent plague outbreaks in Eastern Europe and Rumelia (including Istanbul), devastated the major Ragusan colony of Rouse. The effects of the war were obvious from the entries in the registers, which included only one decree¹⁶⁹ regarding Ragusan trade activity in Rouse. Ragusan presence had apparently become scarce in Rouse following these events, and in their aftermath, Russia would expand its influence in the eastern Mediterranean region more than ever.

Dubrovnik's Final Presence in Europe: A Spectacular Farewell

For the purposes of this study, Katsiardi-Hering has drawn a useful geographic and factual typology summarizing contemporary perceptions of the 18th century Levant with the Anatolia and Balkans peninsulas, which were still undeveloped at the time. The Adriatic connected the Western and Eastern Mediterranean which was Ottoman sea, until the early nineteenth century when it became co-dominated by other

¹⁶⁹ A.DVN.DVE.d 20/8, 568 (fī evâhir-i Rebîû'l-evvel [1]213).

powers: Venice in the northernmost recess of the Adriatic, with its gradual loss of the possessions of islands and city-ports, until the late eighteenth century. An ongoing rivalry ensued between the naval powers of France, England, and Holland from the sixteenth century onward, and Greek naval power, almost simultaneously with the Habsburgs, emerged as an influential commercial force on land and sea alike in the mid-eighteenth century, which it accomplished by taking advantage of a network of interdependent commercial routes in the region.¹⁷⁰ The liberation of the Black Sea after the treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji (1774) and Venice's decline at the end of the century marked an end to the century's previous patterns.

The growing French-English rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean, along with France's eastern policy that marked the Ragusan Republic's impending end, are the most important matters to discuss first. The goal of the French in the Eastern Mediterranean was to maintain good relations with the Ottoman Empire in order to protect its commercial business in the East and to prevent French trade blocs from narrowing. In the 18th century, during the term of Nevşehirli Grand Vizier Damat Ibrahim Pasha (1718-1730), Ottoman-French relations were stable. France had two main objectives: the maintenance of the Catholic sect and increasing French trade in the east. Mahmud I (1730-1754) further enhanced Ottoman-French relations during his reign, but at this time, France struggled to prevent Russian advancements towards the Black Sea since their involvement would harm France's own success in the region. They then broke their terms in the Treaty of Belgrade by partaking in the war between the Ottoman Empire, Russia, and Austria. In response to the French war initiative,

¹⁷⁰ Olga Katsiardi-Hering, "City-ports in the Eastern and Central Mediterranean from the mid-sixteenth to the nineteenth century: urban and social aspects" (email message to author, February 15, 2016).

Mahmud I allowed the French some new concessions. When the Ottomans' loss of power in the 18th century became thoroughly clear, France supported the preservation and reinforcement of Ottoman rule, an act that the Empire reciprocated by supporting France.

Although the turmoil of this era left a profound impact on Europe (and even America), it was a blessing for the Ragusan Republic. Every Mediterranean state other than the Ragusan Republic was involved in the conflict, and their neutrality led to both an astounding public image and a rebirth of the city's trade monopoly.¹⁷¹ According to Bilici, the only ships sent to the Black Sea in the first decade of the 19th century were those from the neutral states: France, Austria, and Dubrovnik.¹⁷² However, the Ragusan vessels were more secure than the others, since French and English boats constantly attempted to sully one another's operations. When Bonaparte seized Venice and the Venetians were no longer of any commercial importance, Ottoman sailors plundered all its Christian vessels—with the exception of the Ragusan ones, of course.¹⁷³

Crimea was also among the areas of interest in the 18th century. The opening up of the Black Sea with Kuchuk Kainarji in 1774, which initially seemed against Dubrovnik, would boost the Mediterranean markets. This attracted many Ragusan merchants shipping goods there during the first five years of the 19th century, which also happened to be the final years of Ragusa's status as a republic. The surplus of Russian products tempted Ragusan traders, and many of them would do business at ports in

¹⁷¹ Carter, *Dubrovnik (Ragusa): A Classic City State*, 439.

¹⁷² Faruk Bilici, *XIX. Yüzyılın Başında Trabzon'daki Fransız Konsolosluğu: Paris'in Asya Kapısı*, 45.

¹⁷³ Carter, *Dubrovnik (Ragusa): A Classic City State*, 439.

Taganrog, Odessa, and Sebastopol. During this time, Ottoman administration also granted special permissions to Ragusan sailors to sail into the Black Sea, and the Sultan's decrees in A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7 and 20/8 regarding Ragusan trade in the Black Sea were written in those years.¹⁷⁴

In 1750, there was a considerable improvement in both Dubrovnik's GDP (gross domestic product) and in the size of its fleet, although it comprised of smaller-capacity ships.¹⁷⁵ In fact, the demand for durable ships was at its peak in this era, making the Ragusan shipbuilding industry most conducive to the growth of the city's economy. In fact, 2,380 Ragusan seamen—that is, 9.52% of the republic's population at the time—were part of the Ragusan mercantile marine.¹⁷⁶




Figure 4. Source: <http://www.hnb.hr/dub-konf/18-konferencija/havrylyshyn-srzentic.pdf>.

Accessed December 5, 2015.

¹⁷⁴ See page 58 in this thesis.

¹⁷⁵ See Figure 4.

¹⁷⁶ Carter, *Dubrovnik (Ragusa): A Classic City State*, 433.

The long-lasting wars between England, France, and America would not only affect maritime trade in the Mediterranean, but also the western traders involved in the region's trade. Their activities in the Balkans were also disrupted, which allowed Ragusan traders to flourish there instead. With the full-scale turmoil in Europe causing a production shortage, a great demand for cotton¹⁷⁷ and corn emerged, and Dubrovnik took the mantle on trading these goods. The Ragusan port would also become an important marine trade center along with other Dalmatian ones. These conditions, of course, were not simply laid out for Dubrovnik. The city overcame a number of difficulties during the period, like in 1792 when Vienna accused Dubrovnik of supplying grain to France. Despite being a hurdle, this charge did not ultimately present a significant problem for the Ragusans.

Due to the registers' extensive content, we have been able to place the peak number of Ragusan ambassadors and representatives in Ottoman lands during the 18th century in a better context. The improvement of Ragusan trade and shipping practices after the first quarter of the 18th century prompted the Ragusan government to expand the republic's political network, especially with the Ottoman-ruled Levant and northern African states. However, despite its diplomatic and economic growth, Dubrovnik could not resist the French's occupation of the city in 1806. The progression of the most prosperous period in Dubrovnik's entire history had, at this point, ended.

¹⁷⁷ For further information on the production and trade of cotton textiles, see Halil İnalçık, "When and How British Cotton Goods Invaded the Levant Markets," in *The Ottoman Empire and The World Economy*, ed. by İslamoğlu İnan, Huri (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 374-383.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

Many scholars have referred to the 18th century as a declining period for the Republic of Dubrovnik, and this stance has faced negligible criticism by modern historiography until now. Since this notion significantly influenced the Republic of Dubrovnik's historiography, this paper seeks to challenge this idea by studying the relations between the Republic of Dubrovnik and the Ottoman Empire, whose major political and economic involvement in Dubrovnik spanned throughout the city-state's lifespan. Through analyzing their relations, we have not only been able to better understand the historical processes—whether detrimental or beneficial—that made Dubrovnik unique and important, but draw novel conclusions about its state in the 18th century.

The primary sources for this study consist of two archives among the Registers of Foreign Affairs (Düvel-i Ecnebiye Defterleri) classified as A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7 and 20/8, which detail the years 1779-1806 and 1788-1806 respectively. These registers have informed us not only of Ottoman-Dubrovnik relations in the Republic of Dubrovnik's final term, but provided key clues about Dubrovnik's economic and political status in the context of their relations with the Ottoman Empire. With the support of these documents and of other relevant archival sources and literature, the scope of our examination grew wider, enabling us to construct an effective argument contesting the decline paradigm concerning 18th century Dubrovnik.

The analysis of these registers yielded the discovery of pertinent and dubious information alike. In the registers, for instance, the establishment of the first 'ahd-nâme between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Dubrovnik dates back to the reign

of Orhan I (1326- 1361). Although these registers have confirmed Evliya Çelebi's allegations, the writings of whom historians seldom respect, we believe that Çelebi's claims should also be regarded with skepticism due to not only the physical distance between the two polities at that time, but the contemporary political conditions surrounding them. That being said, the notion commonly accepted by historians that Ottoman-Dubrovnik relations began in 1430 during Murad II's reign is still valid—more so than the date suggested in the registers, that is.

The registers also shed light on the last 'ahd-nâme granted to Dubrovnik, which had been arranged as a separate text and referred to as one of the only valid decrees by the end of the 18th century. We found this document in The Prime Minister's Ottoman Archives, which led us to examine nearly 500 years' worth of history concerning Ottoman-Dubrovnik relations, the starting date of which remains uncertain. However, it *is* certain that although the quality of their relations fluctuated, they remained intact until Dubrovnik's end as a republic.

During our literature review, we had the chance to study the tasks that Dubrovnik performed for its commercial and political partners through the centuries and determined the nature of Dubrovnik's relations with the rest of the world. When examining the registers, we also developed a good understanding of changes in Dubrovnik's political customs throughout its history. Most of all, we learned of Dubrovnik's role as a neutral zone between eastern and western nations that were, most of the time, hostile towards one another. While this arrangement caused some trouble for Dubrovnik, it was mostly beneficial and conducive to the city's growth.

Particularly in times of war, Dubrovnik became very effective both politically and economically since its allies provided it with so many benefits. However, it appears that Dubrovnik lost its political influence by the end of the 18th century and was no longer a mediator between the Orient and Occident. However, the city-state was still prosperous in the region thanks to its neutral stance, which it maintained until its very end; in fact, the end of the 18th century was when the republic profited the most in its history. From the 16th century onward, the Eastern Mediterranean witnessed the growth of a novel multilateral political system, and geographical discoveries reoriented main trade routes that ended the Ragusans' privileged position on trade between the East and the West. England had also completed their industrial revolution, and they became an important economic and political power by establishing their eastern colonies. Russia also strengthened its economic status at the time and wished to trade in the south to further increase the nation's cash flow. After France overcame its internal conflicts, it became another claimant to the regions under Ottoman rule. At the end of the 18th century, economic competition between nations reached its apex, and Ragusan trade would thus re-emerge as a loyal servant of the Sublime Port among the Christian enemies.

Although it is extremely likely that Dubrovnik was an intelligence hub for the polities in its surrounding areas, we could find no mention of Ragusan spy activities in the registers, whether for the Ottoman Empire or for other states. No other 18th century archives indicated this, either. It would thus be wise to avoid making assertions about the topic, but since it is not this thesis' primary concern, making speculations is harmless; given that Ragusan diplomacy was so advanced and Dubrovnik had a vast array of connections, it was likely that they conducted espionage for their 18th century

allies. Even so, this topic has yet to be researched at length and conclusive arguments about it cannot yet be made.

The Ragusans also tactfully supplied skilled laborers and material goods for Dubrovnik's surroundings prior to the 18th century, but from the 18th century onward, Dubrovnik did not provide goods and services to its addressees as frequently as it had before. It is likely for this reason that the only 18th century decree regarding this issue refers to the Ottomans' request for Ragusan ships and skilled captains. Apparently, Ragusan fleets were used for transporting both cargo and passengers in the 18th century; when high-ranking government officials had to venture to Ottoman lands, Ragusan vessels were used and the sailing of these ships was entrusted to Ragusans, as well.

Although Ottoman traders charged Ragusan captains to move their goods by sea at some points during the 18th century, the Republic of Ragusa did not heed the Ottomans as they might have in years prior. Dubrovnik maintained its neutrality, but the city did not require a mediator since states in the Eastern Mediterranean had already integrated—moreover, they had extensive diplomatic networks with these states. By the end of 18th century, the Republic of Dubrovnik was not as active in its relations with other states, but it continued to be commercially effective in the Eastern Mediterranean. In return for this trade activity, Dubrovnik's wealth increased more than it ever had before. This increase in trade towards the end of the century was reflected in A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7 and 20/8—nearly all the decrees in these documents are related to commerce, including what to do in commercial disputes and how to make trade more efficient.

The registers A.DVN.DVE.d 19/7 and 20/8 provide us with detailed information about the locations in which Ragusan traders conducted their business. The registers also highlight that the Ragusan merchants' activity extended from the Mediterranean Sea to the Aegean islands—from Balkans and Rumelia to the Black Sea and Syria—meaning they traveled everywhere in the sultan's lands. The high number of decrees addressed to these regions also suggests that Ragusan trade was as intense in the early 19th century as it was during the end of the 18th century. Although Ragusan traders were absent from the Black Sea during the 17th and 18th centuries, a specific decree from the end of the 18th century marked their return to the region.

Information about non-commercial matters regarding 18th century Ottoman-Ragusan relations are also accessible through the registers. According to them, the Ottoman Administration was interested in the religious affairs of the Ragusans residing in Ottoman land. The Empire sought to protect Ragusan religious living in Ottoman territory through various decrees, most of which were issued after events that targeted or disadvantaged Ragusan religious in the Empire. The sultan even swore to guarantee the lives, security, and property of his Ragusan subject, despite this promise being fundamentally unfeasible. As we mentioned before, many decrees in the registers handle inheritance rights, as well as special rights that pertained specifically to Ragusan traders doing business in Ottoman lands. Thanks to the sultan's decrees, Ragusans were also protected from those who would commit fraud, theft, and other similar injustices against them, and anyone found responsible of these wrongdoings suffered grave punishment.

Examining the registers enabled us to learn about Dubrovnik's bureaucratic process, as well as about the officials who pioneered political relations in the 18th

century. The most senior Ragusan official on the Ottomans' side was the ambassador, whose most significant task was delivering Dubrovnik's yearly tribute to the Ottoman imperial treasury. Ragusan plenipotentiaries, who had full power to take administrative action on behalf the state, were also very important to the Ragusan Republic. The Ragusan officials with the second highest level of authority in Ottoman lands were the consuls, who oversaw the various businesses of Ragusan traders and represented the Republic of Dubrovnik from wherever they found themselves. Through analyzing the *yol emri* (trade orders) in the registers, we have also determined that the dragomen were instrumental in maintaining healthy relationships with other states.

At the beginning of the 17th century, Dubrovnik changed once again. Ragusa's political and economic climates heavily affected the city, and both factors were subject to great volatility. However, the city's economy drastically worsened in the last quarter of the 17th century. An earthquake in 1667 wrought heavy damage upon the city and yielded a challenging 100-year-long reconstruction of Dubrovnik; all the while, the city had to be wary of their political tensions in the wider environment. This depressed situation would continue until the last quarter of the 18th century with some minor revivals.

Contrastingly, the last three decades of the century saw an increase in Ragusan trade that caused considerable economic growth; this led to the republic's prosperity in the years before its Napoleonic seizure. For historiographic purposes only, we added the years 1667 to 1699 in our references to 18th century Dubrovnik to highlight the impact of those years on the city's future economic conditions (specifically the earthquake of 1667). Despite this period of weakness, Dubrovnik's gross national product achieved

a high in the late 18th century. Although certain times within 18th century Dubrovnik are technically periods of “decline,” these declines laid a solid foundation for which Dubrovnik’s affluence gradually increased.

Despite the many questions that can still be asked about this matter, this study has not only cohesively reconsidered the history of 18th century Dubrovnik based on specialized archived information, but it has come to deduce that the difficulties the Republic of Dubrovnik experienced during the 18th century were, in fact, not the signs of social or political decline. The Republic of Dubrovnik itself may have ended, but this was not due to the city’s political or economic failure. Instead, Dubrovnik was strong enough to use its tribulations as agents of growth; rather than steadily declining at the first sign of trouble, the city managed to enjoy great prosperity at the end of the 18th century and, in turn, end in a manner that was far from catastrophic. The Republic of Dubrovnik’s end, against all odds, was quite spectacular.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival Documents

Ottoman Prime Minister's Archives (*Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, BOA*), Istanbul

Bab-ı Asafi Divan-ı Humayun Sicilleri Mühimme Defterleri (A.DVNSMHM): 006, 007, 009, 010, 012, 031, 033.

Cevdet Belediye (C.BLD.): 104/5160.

Cevdet Dahiliye (C.DH.): 61/3028.

Cevdet Hariciye (C.HR.): 28/1377, 103/5147, 151/ 7523, 153/7631, 161/8007, 176/8772.

Düvel-i Ecnebiye Defterleri (A.DVN.DVE.): 19/7, 20/8.

Hatt-ı Humayun (HAT): 144/6022, 165/6909, 171/7330, 1458/11.

Kamil Kepeci (KK.d): 0078.

Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi (TS.MA.d): 7018 0001

Books and Articles

Alam, Muzaffar & Subrahmanyam, Sanjay. *Indo-Persian travels in the age of discoveries, 1400-1800*. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Arıkan, Zeki. "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda İhracı Yasak Mallar (Memnu Meta)". In *Prof. Dr. Bekir Kütükoğlu'na armağan / İstanbul Üniversitesi Tarih Araştırma Merkezi*. İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1991.

Bağış, Ali İhsan. *Osmanlı Ticaretinde Gayri Müslimler: Kapitülasyonlar-Berathlı Tüccarlar Avrupa ve Hayriyye Tüccarları (1750-1859)*. Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1998.

Bal, Faruk. *Osmanlı-İspanya İktisadi İlişkileri (XVI. - XVIII. Yüzyıllar)*. From http://www.bisav.org.tr/yayinlar.aspx?module=makale&menuID=3_3&yayintipid=3&yayinid=176&makaleid=1058. Accessed December 11, 2015.

Beydilli, Kemal. *III. Selim Devrinde Verilen Bazı Muâf ve Müsellemlik Berâtları Hakkında: Foti Kalfa'nın Berâtı*. From https://www.academia.edu/16498988/III._Selim_Devrinde_Verilen_Baz%C4%B1_Mu%C3%A2f_ve_M%C3%BCsellemlik_Ber%C3%A2tlar%C4%B1_Hakk%C4%B1nda_Foti_Kalfan%C4%B1n_Ber%C3%A2t%C4%B1. Accessed May 24, 2016.

Biegman, Nicolas H. *The Turco-Ragusan Relationship: According to the Firmans of Murad III (1575-1595) Extant in the State Archives of Dubrovnik*. Paris: Mouton 1967.

Bilici, Faruk. *XIX. Yüzyılın Başında Trabzon'daki Fransız Konsolosluğu: Paris'in Asya Kapısı*. From <http://dergipark.ulakbim.gov.tr/kid/article/view/5000124475/5000114611>. Accessed February 19, 2015.

Bostan, İdris. "İzn-i Sefine Defterleri ve Karadeniz'de Rusya ile Ticaret Yapan Devlet-i Aliyye Tüccarları 1780-1846." In *Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Vol. XI. İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1990.

Bracewell, Wendy. *The Uskoks of Senj: Piracy, Banditry, and Holy War in the Sixteenth-Century Adriatic*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992.

Braudel, Fernand. *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the age of Philip II*. London: Fontana Press, 1972.

Carter, Francis W. *Dubrovnik (Ragusa): A Classic City State*. London: New York: Seminar Press, 1972.

Evliya Çelebi. *Seyahatname*, vol 1, book 6. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2011.

Devellioğlu, Ferit. *Osmanlıca-Türkçe Ansiklopedik Lugat*, 18. Ankara: Aydın Kitabevi, 2010.

Di Vittorio, Antonio. "Ragusa (Dubrovnik) e il Mare: aspetti e problemi (XIV-XVI secolo)." From *Dubrovnik: a Mediterranean Urban Society, 1300-1600*, ed. by Barisa Krekic, 131-151. Los Angeles: University of California, 1997.

Diyamet İslam Ansiklopedisi. Ahmet Özel. Vol. XVI. İstanbul: Diyanet Vakfı, 1988.

Diyamet İslam Ansiklopedisi. Halil İnalçık. Vol. XXXV. İstanbul: Diyanet Vakfı, 1988.

Diyamet İslam Ansiklopedisi. Mahmut H. Şakiroğlu. Vol. XIII. İstanbul: Diyanet Vakfı, 1988.

Diyamet İslam Ansiklopedisi. Mustafa Fayda. Vol. XLIV. İstanbul: Diyanet Vakfı, 1988.

Diyamet İslam Ansiklopedisi. Mübahat Kütükoğlu. Vol. II. İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1988.

Diyamet İslam Ansiklopedisi. Turan Şerafettin. Vol. IX. İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1993.

Diyanet Islam Ansiklopedisi. Turan Şerafettin. Vol. IX. İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1998.

Esmer, Tolga. *Economies of Violence, Banditry and Governance in the Ottoman Empire Around 1800*. From <http://past.oxfordjournals.org/content/224/1/163.full.pdf+html> . Accessed May 28, 2016.

Faroqhi, Suraiya. *The Ottoman Empire and The World Around It*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2004.

Faroqhi, Suraiya. "The City State of Dubrovnik, Through the Ottoman Eyes." Email message to author, February 13, 2016.

Frangakis-Syrett, Elena. *The Commerce of Smyrna in the Eighteenth Century (1700-1820)*. Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1992.

Genç, Mehmet. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi*. İstanbul: Ötüken, 2000.

Glavina, Mladen. *17. Yüzyıl Başında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile Dubrovnik Cumhuriyeti İlişkileri*. Master's thesis, Hacettepe University, 2009.

Harlaftis, Gelina and Sophia Laiou. "Ottoman State Policy in Mediterranean Trade Shipping, c. 1780-c.1820: The Rise of the Greek-Owned Ottoman Merchant Fleet." In *Networks of Power in Modern Greece*, ed.by Mark Mazower. London: HURST Publishers Ltd., 2008.

İnalçık, Halil and Donald Quataert. *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

İnalçık, Halil. *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*. London: Phoenix, 1994.

İslamoğlu İnan, Huri. *The Ottoman Empire and The World Economy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Jelavich, Barbara. *History of the Balkans Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Katsiardi-Hering, Olga. "Greek Merchant Colonies in Central and South-Eastern in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries." In *Merchant Colonies in the Early Modern Period*, ed. Victor N. Zakharov, Gelina Harlaftis and Olga Katsiardi-Hering, 127-139. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2012.

Katsiardi-Hering, Olga. "L'area Balcanica nei Secoli XVI-XVIII." Email message to author, February 15, 2016.

Katsiardi-Hering, Olga. "City-ports in the Eastern and Central Mediterranean from the mid-sixteenth to the nineteenth century: urban and social aspects." Email message to author, February 15, 2016.

Lane, Frederick Chapin. *Venice, a Maritime Republic*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.

Latham, Robert and William Matthews (ed.). *The Diary of Samuel Pepys: A Selection*. London: Penguin Books, 2003.

Miović, Vesna. "Diplomatic Relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Dubrovnik." In *The European Tributary States of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, ed. by Gabor Karman and Lovro Kuncevic, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013.

Ortaylı, İlber. "Rodostó (extension en Marmara de la Via Egnatia) au XVIe siècle". In *The Via Egnatia under Ottoman rule (1380-1699)*. Rethymnon: Crete University Press, 1996.

Pakalın, Mehmet Zeki. *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri sözlüğü*, 29. İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1983.

Panzac, Daniel. *Barbary Corsairs: the end of a legend, 1800-1820*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2005.

Safvet, "Raguza (Dubrovnik) Cumhuriyeti". In *Tarihi Osmani Encümeni Mecmuası (TOEM)*, 111 /17 (1331). İstanbul: Ahmed İhsan ve Şürekası, 1326 - [1910-].

Sami, Şemseddin. *Kamus-ı Türki*, 906. İstanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 2010.

Sertoğlu, Midhat. *Osmanlı Tarih Lügati*, 14. İstanbul: Kurtuba Kitap, 2015.

Stuard, Susan Mosher. *A State of Deference: Ragusa/Dubrovnik in the Medieval Centuries*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992.

Şabanoviç, Hazım. "Dubrovnik Devlet Arşivindeki Türk Vesikaları." In *Belleten*, Vol. XXX/CXIX, Ankara: 1966.

Tenenti, Alberto. *Piracy and the Decline of Venice*. London: Longmans, 1967.

Theunissen, Hans. *Ottoman-venetian Diplomatics: The Ahd-names; the Historical Background and the Development of a Category of Political-commercial Instruments Together with an Annotated Edition of a Corpus of Relevant Documents*. From https://www.academia.edu/16485339/Ottoman-Venetian_Diplomatics_the_Ahd-names_The_Historical_Background_and_the_Development_of_a_Category_of_Political-Commercial_Instruments_together_with_an_Annotated_Edition_of_a_Corpus_of_Relevant_Documents. Accessed November 11, 2015.

Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hakkı and Karal, Enver Ziya. *Osmanlı Tarihi*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988-1996.

Vatin, Nicolas. “Une affaire interne: le sort et la libération de personnes de condition libre illégalement retenues en esclavage”. In *Turcica*. 33. Paris: 2001.

Zlatar, Zdenko. *Between The Double Eagle and the Crescent: The Republic of Dubrovnik and the Origins of the Eastern Question*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992.

Zlatar, Zdenko. *Dubrovnik's Merchants and Capital in the Ottoman Empire (1520-1620) A Quantitative Study*. Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2011.