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THE POLITICS OF FEAR ON EKŞİ SÖZLÜK
AFTER THE REİNA MASSACRE


Nazlı Güher BEYDEŞ BEYHAN
115611008

Assoc. Prof. Nazan HAYDARI PAKKAN

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The Politics of Fear on Ekşi Sözlük After the Reina Massacre
Reina Katliamından Sonra Ekşi Sözlükte Korku Politikaları

Nazlı Güher Beydeş Beyhan
115611008


Tez Danışmanı : **Doç. Dr. Nazan Haydari Pakkan**
İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi


Jüri Üyeleri : **Doç. Dr. Erkan Saka**
İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi


Doç. Dr. Selva Ersöz
İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi

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Foreword

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


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ABBREVIATIONS

AKP:	Justice and Development Party
ASALA:	Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
CDA:	Critical Discourse Analysis
CHP:	Republican People's Party
FETÖ:	Fethullah Terrorist Organization
GWOT:	Global War on Terrorism
HDP:	Peoples' Democratic Party
ISIS:	Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
MIT:	National Intelligence Organization
PKK:	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PTSD:	Post-traumatic Stress Disorder
TAK:	Kurdistan Freedom Hawks
UGC:	User-generated Content
YPG:	People's Protection Units

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Abstract

The politics of fear is a concept that refers to the political figures' exaggeration of threats, which has been discussed to have a considerable impact on citizens' perception of threats and support for policies. A vast majority of the studies have discussed the war on terror narrative as a way of implementing the politics of fear. In addition to the narratives of the political figures, media discourses have also been defined as significant tools for mediating fear. Thus far, a relatively small body of literature has been concerned with the role of the citizens and social media in the (re)production of the fear. By drawing from the Reina massacre, this study addresses the (re)production of the war on terror narrative by the citizens in the social media. As a social media example *Ekşi sözlük* was investigated for this study. Norman Fairclough's three-dimensional conception of critical discourse analysis was used to analyze 280 entries on *Ekşi Sözlük*. One significant finding of this study is that the implementation of the politics of fear was constructed as a threat. Results show that there are many factors behind for a threat to be constructed by individuals such as identity, national identity, and the political atmosphere of the country. Furthermore, this study shows that what the political figures present as threats are not always perceived as threats by the citizens.

Keywords: the politics of fear, the war on terror narrative, social media, *Ekşi Sözlük*, the Reina massacre, critical discourse analysis

Özet

Korku politikaları kavramı siyasi aktörlerin, vatandaşların tehditleri algılamasında ve politikalara destek vermesinde büyük bir etkisi olduğu söylenen, tehditleri şişirmesine işaret etmektedir. Çalışmaların büyük bir çoğunluğu teröre karşı savaş anlatısını korku politikalarını uygulama yolu olarak tartışmıştır. Siyasi aktörlerin söylemleri dışında, medyadaki söylemler de korkunun yayılmasında önemli bir araç olarak görülmüşlerdir. Şimdiye kadar vatandaşların ve sosyal medyanın korkunun yeniden üretimindeki rolü literatürde oldukça az yer bulmuştur. Bu çalışma Reina katliamını esas alarak teröre karşı savaş söyleminin vatandaşlar tarafından sosyal medyada yeniden üretilip üretilmediğini incelemektedir. Bu çalışma için sosyal medya örneği olarak *Ekşi Sözlük* incelenmiştir. Norman Fairclough'un üç boyutlu eleştirel söylem analizi *Ekşi Sözlük*'te yazılmış 28 başlıktaki 280 girdiyi analiz etmek için kullanılmıştır. Bu çalışma teröre karşı savaş söyleminden bazılarının yeniden üretildiği bazılarının ise değişim geçirdiği ikircikli bir tablo gözlemlemiştir. Çalışmanın dikkate değer sonuçlarından biri vatandaşların korku politikalarının uygulanmasını bir tehdit olarak inşa etmeleri olmuştur. Sonuçlar, tehdidin inşasında kimlik, ulusal kimlik, ve ülkedeki siyasi atmosfer gibi birçok faktör olduğunu göstermektedir. Bunun yanında, bu çalışma siyasi aktörlerin tehdit olarak sunduklarının vatandaşlar tarafından her zaman tehdit olarak algılanmayabileceğini ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: korku politikaları, teröre karşı savaş anlatısı, sosyal medya, *Ekşi Sözlük*, Reina katliamı, eleştirel söylem analizi

INTRODUCTION

In the literature, terror attacks have been widely mentioned as traumatic events with psychological consequences such as post-traumatic stress disorder. These traumatic events such as terror attacks remind us of possible other threats (Zara, 2017). A poll by Gallup suggests that the majority of the people living in the U.S. have a fear of being killed in a terrorist attack (as cited in Gardner, 2009, p. 297). Similarly, the research carried out by Türkiye Çalışmaları Merkezi (2016) in Turkey shows that 76.1% of the participants think ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham) poses a serious threat for Turkey. According to this poll, Turkey's biggest problem is terror for 35.0% of the participants in 2016, which is slightly less than 2015 with 39.7% (Türkiye Çalışmaları Merkezi, 2016, p. 10). Anxiety and fear are usually perceived as justified reactions after terror related events (Herman, 1997, p. 34). When people's fear of terrorism is used for other purposes such as political gain, we come upon the politics of fear. Aly (2013) argues "the politics of fear concerns the manipulation of widespread community anxieties about danger, risk, or threat by decision makers to achieve particular goals" (p. 162). The construction of the other is usually perceived as a key factor in manipulating the threats, hence implementing the politics of fear (Kellner, 2007).

The literature of the politics of fear is often related to the areas of health and terrorism. The health-focused approaches involve Ebola (Nunes, 2017; Towers et al., 2015), chemicals and cancer (Gardner, 2009), H1N1 (McCauley, Minsky & Viswanath, 2013), potential risks of nuclear energy (Koerner, 2014). However, the vast majority of studies are on terrorism. The use of the war on terror narrative by the politicians is often discussed within the framework of the politics of fear. The concept of the war on terror narrative has appeared after President Bush's declaration on "the war on terror" following the 9/11 attacks (Kellner, 2007). Bush's discourse on 9/11 has been described as polarizing of two opposites (Kellner, 2007). Recently, President Donald Trump's electoral campaign, which was built on restricting the Muslims' entrance to the U.S., has also been described as another example of the politics of fear (Zelizer, 2015).

The specific objective of this study is to look at the reproduction of the politics of fear by investigating the war on terror narrative on *Ekşi Sözlük*. Although the concept of the war on terror has been associated with Bush and 9/11, it is still present with the global fight against ISIS (Brands & Feaver, 2017, p. 1). Houtum and Lacy (2016) argue that the measures taken for the sake of security and the military operations of countries like France are now accepted as the norm (p. 88). To put it another way, Houtum and Lacy (2016) suggest that the politics of fear have been implemented in these countries. Turkey is one of the countries that have joined the war on terror against ISIS and has carried out military operations. However, Turkey's fight against ISIS has also been objected to criticism, which suggested that the motive behind the military operations has actually been to fight YPG (People's Protection Units) (Aydıntaşbaş, 2016; Bremmer 2015). Furthermore, Kanlı (2017) argues that the terrorism is used against the notion of "stability" in AKP's (Justice and Development Party) discourse during the election period, which refers to a politics of fear. Yaşlı (2016) argues that the government has inflated the security threats. 27 terror attacks were carried out in Turkey by different terrorist organizations in 2016 ("2016'daki Bombalı Saldırıları," 2016). One of them was the Reina massacre, occurred in the first hours of the New Year. For this study, The Reina massacre has been investigated to see what the citizens construct after frequent traumatic events and how they can be explained. Although the vast majority of the past research has been on leaders and the traditional media, this study aims to investigate what citizens construct on social media. The question of what constitutes the war on terror has been mostly approached in a similar fashion by various studies. By bringing the widely discussed dimensions together, De Castella and McGarthy (2013) identify five common themes of the war on terror narrative. First one is the construction of the "us" versus "them" that also attribute opposing qualities to these sides (De Castella & McGarthy, 2013, p. 87). Second one is suggesting that these attacks are actually a crime against what that society has been built on, such as particular "values" that the terrorists like to wipe out (De Castella & McGarthy, 2013, p. 88). Authors use the term "Western" in defining these values (De Castella &

McCarthy, 2013, p. 88). Third one is not giving clear information, and advocating for the intelligence services to operate covertly which inhibits people to have a good judgment about what is actually going on (De Castella & McCarthy, 2013, p. 88). Additionally, any action that has a possibility of inhibiting the terrorist threat is justified such as more “military spending” and “surveillance” (De Castella & McCarthy, 2013, p. 88-89). Furthermore, some acts of violence against the terrorists are also justified (De Castella & McCarthy, 2013, p. 89). Fourth one is about government and other officials’ refusal of taking responsibility for the failure of preventing terrorism while also justifying the present and future actions of the government for the sake of counterterrorism (De Castella & McCarthy, 2013, p. 89). Fifth one is actually from the “crime narrative” which de Castella and McCarthy (2013) explains as the idea that people are in constant danger (p. 90). As De Castella and McCarthy’s (2013) definition on the war on terror narrative takes the leaders’ discourse into account and this study aims to investigate citizen discourse, their themes have been adapted to this study with several modifications. Five themes are defined and some questions are attributed to them. First one is security/intelligence/surveillance. The questions are: what kinds of precautions are supported in order to enable security? Are more control, surveillance, death penalty etc. mentioned? Do people mention MİT (National Intelligence Organization) and suggest that the intelligence should not be transparent? What do people think about the presidency system? The last question is important as Yaşlı (2016) argues that security was associated with the presidency system in the government discourse after the elections while also making a reference to *Yeni Akit*’s headline “either presidency or chaos”. Second one is us vs. them. The questions are: Is there an othering in the text that people are divided into us and them? If there is, who are these two groups and what qualities are attributed to them? Who is blamed for the attack? Third one is secularism and Western values. The questions are: Do people perceive this attack as a way to destroy secular and Western lifestyle in Turkey? Because the attack had occurred during New Year celebrations and there have been discussions that the attack aimed at the secular lifestyle, what people suggest on secularism and

Western values should be taken into consideration. According to Gellner, Kemalist secularism requires the adoption of the Western lifestyle practices and “celebrating New Year” is one of them (as cited in Göle, 2017, p. 23). That’s why celebrating the New Year is described with secularism in this theme. Fourth one is Turkey being dangerous. The questions are: Do people think they are in constant danger and now see the world and Turkey as dangerous? Do people think the future is unpredictable? Fifth one is foreign policy/military intervention/other countries’ plots. The questions are: What is supported as a foreign policy? Do people support military action in Syria or Iraq? Do people think that other countries have planned this attack and suggest they are plotting for more? The notion and the question of other countries’ plots come from a long-standing discourse in Turkey. According to Göçek (2011) the habit in Turkish society that prevents people from perceiving the situations optimistically and encourages them to be alert as a necessity comes from the idea that the foreigners are plotting for something in Turkey (p. 35). Additionally, there was military operation against ISIS in Syria named Operation Euphrates Shield (“TSK’dan Fırat Kalkanı Açıklaması: ‘32 Köy Temizlendi,’” 2016). Whether people are supporting a military intervention or not is more meaningful in this context as there was already an ongoing operation.

While the vast majority of the studies show a common understanding of the politics of fear in the literature, as Cramer and Thrall (2009) suggest there are different approaches in evaluating the politics of fear. These are “realist, psychological, domestic political, and constructivist” approaches (Cramer & Thrall, 2009, p. 2). The differences between these approaches are about how and why the elites use the politics of fear and how the public responds to it (Cramer & Thrall, 2009). In this study, a constructivist approach is taken for investigating the war on terror narrative, which discusses the politics of fear in relation to individuals’ identity including the national identity while also taking the elites and the media into consideration (Cramer & Thrall, 2009, p. 9-11).

There are several reasons in this selection of the constructivist approach. First of all, the psychological approach is often not applicable to the textual

analysis as researchers with this approach are mostly concerned with people's mental processes, which cannot be accessed through the text. Realist approach might be ignoring a lot of factors and mostly explain why the leaders implement the politics of fear. Domestic political approach is actually what the vast majority of the studies take for granted. It assumes that the public is manipulated by the leaders and the media. Domestic political approach might be ignoring some factors by taking less attention to the differences in the society, such as identity. Conversely, the constructivist approach stress the importance of identity in the politics of fear as they think threat is a constructed concept (Cramer & Thrall, 2009, p. 9). Another reason for choosing constructivist approach is the political atmosphere in Turkey. Turkey has been frequently exposed to deadly terror attacks throughout 2016. Moreover, it is argued that the government implements the politics of fear by its polarizing discourse (Yaşlı, 2016). A study by German Marshall Fund (2016) suggests evidence that Turkey is a polarized country ("Turkey Growing Increasingly Polarized: German Marshall Fund Study," 2016). In a polarized country like Turkey where identities and partisanship have great importance, constructivist theory provides the best approach to discuss what and who is perceived as a threat and what is proposed to deal with it.

While leaders' discourses have been extensively criticized, data from several studies show that the media has also been criticized for mediating the war on terror narrative (Altheide, 2007; Kellner 2007; Evans, 2012, Nacos, Bloch-Elkon and Shapiro, 2011; Russ-Mohl, 2013; Entman, 2013; Simons, 2008, Nacos, 2013, Berkowitz, 2007). Traditionally, the media has been criticized for delivering terror attacks by specific framings. This criticism relies on the assumption of the constructive side of the media. Communication and media aspects of the war on terror and the politics of fear have often focused on newspapers, magazines, and TV programs. Surprisingly, there is a relatively small body of literature that is concerned with social media. Hinton and Hjorth (2013) argue that in Web 2.0, users are playing an active role rather than being a passive audience (p. 18). Social media has provided multiple sources for news and opinions. Lewis, Zamith and Hermida (2003) describe social media as a "newsroom". In his analysis of social

movements, Castells (2015) argues that they were successful because the social media became a meeting point of people from diverse backgrounds (p. 2). Conversely, Nohrstedt and Ottosen (2008) suggest that it is questionable that the digital spheres show any discussions differently than the traditional media (“New Media,” para. 4). Although it should be noted that authors are also discussing whether social media can produce a peace narrative. Cottle (2014) suggests that “new and old media increasingly enter into disasters, shaping them from the inside out, and outside in, reconfiguring disaster social relations, channeling forms of political control...” (p. 3). In the same vein, Seeck and Rantanen (2015) suggest that its participatory nature and the feature which allows one to react instantly, make social media more powerful in mediating the news than the traditional media while also making an influence how the traditional media constructs its news in certain situations (para. 3). These examples suggest investigating social media is important. Nitsch and Lichtenstein (2013) investigated the social media in comparison with traditional media in their study of the war on terror. For their research on Ebola, Towers et al. (2015) investigated Twitter and Google and argue that investigating online spheres is a recent trend (“Introduction,” para. 1). Although there is a limited research on the relationship between social media and fear, the increasing use of and attention to social media make it significant for exploring this relationship. Furthermore, according to Reuters Institute’s report, Turkey is one of the countries where social media is widely used (Doğramaci & Radcliffe, 2015). After the terror attacks in Turkey, a hospital in Turkey even suggested not using social media as a news source in order to cope with the fear of terrorism (“Terör Korkusuyla Nasıl Baş Edersiniz?,” n.d.). The studies on the politics of fear have traditionally investigated the discourses of the leaders and the media yet the citizens’ discourse often remained unexplored in the literature. Social media provides a huge platform to discuss the reactions of the public, as it is also a participatory space for the citizens.

This study takes *Ekşi Sözlük* as the base of the research. *Ekşi Sözlük* is a popular website in Turkey that authors write their subjective opinions on concepts, events, political figures etc. *Ekşi Sözlük* was selected over other social

media platforms, such as Facebook or Twitter to discuss the reactions of the public during the times of crisis for several reasons. Twitter and Facebook contain private pages with limited access. A major advantage of *Ekşi Sözlük* is that it is open to everyone. Twitter filters the results because its APIs are not open to everyone as Bruns and Burgess suggest (2016, p. 26). Furthermore, the presence of social media bots might take the study to a deadlock. Facebook and Twitter also introduce some ethical concerns as some users display their actual names. On *Ekşi Sözlük* users don't use their actual names but use nicknames. Wimmer and Dominick (2011) remind us that there are some considerations while carrying out a research online. Wimmer and Dominick (2011) suggest that it is not ethically wrong to use data from places that are accessible while also considering the permission of the administration of the website (p. 81). As acknowledged by *Ekşi Sözlük*, entries can be used as long as they don't involve commercial purposes (ekşisözlük, 2017a). *Ekşi Sözlük* is also a local website in Turkey and provide a significant platform to follow the local discussions in Turkish.

Several methods currently exist for digital media research such as using software programs to “visualize” the data, although it has been found problematic, (Brooker, Barnett, Cribbin & Sharma, 2016), ethnography (Striling, 2016). However, as this research aims to look at the narrative, digital methodologies were not found to be meaningful. Norman Fairclough's (1993) three-dimensional conception of CDA (critical discourse analysis) was applied to the entries on *Ekşi Sözlük* (p. 73). Fairclough (1993) developed a “three-dimensional conception of CDA” that explains texts, discursive practice and their relationship to the social practice (p. 73). According to Fairclough (2003) all three analyses are important and their relationships are in “a dialectical relation” (p. 28). A major advantage of Fairclough's CDA is that it is applicable to *Ekşi Sözlük* as it is designed to investigate what is written instead of visuals such as videos, pictures etc. that Fairclough usually concentrates on a social change in the society and investigates it in the leaders' discourses, political parties' brochures etc. Various changes take place in the society following the repetitive exposure to traumatic events and how does that turn out linguistically, is best observed by applying CDA.

The current study found that an ambivalent discourse, as some features of the war on terror narrative were present while some were transformed. The identity of the authors, Turkish national identity, and the political and religious polarization in Turkey help interpreting the results on *Ekşi Sözlük*. The findings of the study suggest that the politics of fear has many layers and considerations that it is not possible to talk about a direct relationship with leaders' and the media's discourse in some cases. Although, it should be noted that the study has limitations and it is not possible to generalize the results. However, it might thus be suggested that more research should be done on the citizens' discourse after such crisis times in order to have a better understanding of the subject.

Chapter One is a "Literature Review". General description of fear and anxiety, and terror as a traumatic event are discussed. What do terror attacks mean for the individuals and the society are discussed in the next section. Then, major studies on the politics of fear are introduced. First one is the psychological approach. Then, the politics of fear are discussed with health and terrorism issues. The politics of fear and media framing is discussed in the following section. This section introduces the past research and explains why the media has been criticized. Afterwards, the war on terror narrative is introduced as a way of implementing the politics of fear. Different approaches of the politics of fear are introduced in this section. The research questions are also given in this section. First chapter ends with the discussions on the social media as a research space for investigating the war on terror narrative. Chapter Two is "The Political Atmosphere in Turkey". In this chapter, at first, some information on the polarization and the politics of fear are given. Then the Reina massacre and the discussions in the media after the massacre are discussed. Finally, the involvement of the U.S. and the members of the European Union in the global war against ISIS is discussed. Turkey as one of the countries in GWOT (Global War on Terrorism) is discussed with the criticisms it has faced both internally and internationally. Chapter Three is "Ekşi Sözlük as a Social Media Site". First, the discussions on information and network society are given. Then, the concept of Web 2.0 and the social media are discussed. *Ekşi Sözlük* is introduced in the next

section. Then, past research on *Ekşi Sözlük* is discussed. Advantages of working on *Ekşi Sözlük* are also discussed in this section. Chapter Four is “Methodology”. First an introduction is presented to have a general look at the critical discourse analysis, followed by the description of Fairclough’s “three-dimensional conception of CDA”. What was investigated and what was not investigated for this study is discussed. In the next section, past research on social media that have used the critical discourse analysis is discussed. Benefits of using critical discourse analysis in social media texts is discussed in this section. How the sample is selected is described in the next section. The categorization that was made according to the grounded theory coding techniques and its results are presented. Chapter Five is “Discussion”. This chapter discusses the five themes that have been investigated in the study with its discussions in the Turkish context by using the constructivist approach. The study closes with conclusions on its limitations and discussions on future research.

CHAPTER ONE

LITERATURE REVIEW

This research aims to look if the citizens on social media reproduce the politics of fear or not. The politics of fear is investigated through the war on terror narrative by adopting a constructivist approach. This literature review starts with the basic definition of fear and gives information on disorders as PTSD (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder) that have a likelihood to occur after traumatic events like terror attacks. Then, the political usage of fear is introduced with the politics of fear and the war on terror narrative. Different approaches in the literature on the politics of fear are discussed. Discussions on the leaders' discourses and the media framings are presented. Discussions on social media as a research space for investigating the war on terror narrative are also presented in this chapter.

1.1. Fear and Anxiety

According to LaBar (2011) "Fear is a negatively valenced emotion elicited in response to an impending threat that motivates a defensive reaction to protect the organism" (p. 751). In the same sense, Plutchik (2003) argues that the physiological and psychological reactions that people give when they feel fear, aim at preventing one from dying (p. 322). What Plutchik (2003) and LaBar (2011) suggest implies that fear is a normal reaction that occurs when one is faced with a danger, and it is seen in all humans. LaBar (2011) suggests that because working on fear requires eliciting fear, research is not easily carried out (p. 751). Öhman (2008) argues that terrorism which is unexpected and capable of killing people while they go about their daily lives; turn fear into a part of our lives (p. 709).

According to LaBar (2011) anxiety and fear are intertwined emotions (p. 751). Anxiety is almost always explained with fear in textbooks and studies that deal with emotions. Plutchik (2003) argues that the difference between anxiety

and fear is that the former is more directed at the future (p. 315). Aly and Green (2010) argue that the difference is the uncertainty about the elicitor in anxiety (p. 269). Furthermore, Aly and Green (2010) suggest that fear is not always the first reaction when there is a threat yet anxiety is (p. 269). Conversely, according to LaBar (2011) anxiety comes after fear when one cannot overcome fear. (p. 751). Overall, these studies highlight that there are opposing views on fear and anxiety, some suggesting fear coming before anxiety and others vice versa. Considering LaBar's (2011) argument on the hardship of carrying out a research in this area (p. 751) scientists' definition of concepts might have been remained vague.

1.2. Terror Attacks, Fear, Anxiety and Societal Trauma

Terror is defined as “extreme fear”, “the use of extreme fear to intimidate people” and “terrorism” by Oxford Dictionaries (“Terror,” n.d.). Terrorism is defined as “the unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims” (“Terrorism,” n.d.). Rabinovitch (2017) discusses the emergence of terror and terrorism concepts in his work and suggests that both violent acts carried out by the state and other organizations, the former on the purpose of social control for their own sake and the latter to influence and construct fear in people, defined what terrorism was in France in earlier times (p. 21). The assassination attempt to Bonaparte by Catholic Chouans induced the definition of terrorism to be added to the dictionary and started being used academically (Rabinovitch, 2017, p. 21). Rapin (2013) however, criticizes the studies on terrorism due to the definition of terrorism varying from source to source. He also suggests that this vagueness causes these studies to have low reliability (p. 299). Hence, it is possible to suggest that the definition of terrorism is not universally agreed. It is also interesting to note that terror is also used for defining terrorism as seen in Oxford Dictionaries' definition given in this section. Aly and Green (2010) remind us that, feelings such as fear and terror coming to existence after terrorist attacks are the reason behind the frequent usage of the term terror for addressing terrorism in the language (p. 269).

Terror attacks are categorized as traumatic events in the literature (Zara, 2017). Furthermore, it is argued that terror attacks have consequences such as societal trauma (Aker, 2017). Traumatic events are described as both individual and societal events that challenge one's functionality and mental health (Zara, 2017). Herman (1997) discusses terror as an event that causes trauma and suggests that people think they are powerless when they are faced with a trauma that pushes them (p. 33). Moreover, Herman (1997) argues that people have psychological and physiological responses when they are faced with a hazard and none of them are atypical, including fear, and not being able to do anything causes trauma in these incidents (p. 34). PTSD is one of the possible reactions that are observed in people after terror attacks while it is also suggested that some people are more prone than others including many factors behind it ("Effects of Traumatic Stress after Mass Violence, Terror, or Disaster," n.d.). Hamblen and Slone (n.d.) suggest that the more you are close to a terrorist attack the more likely that you are going to have PTSD, while the relatives of the ones that were exposed to the attacks are not excluded. What's more, direct exposure to the attack is not a necessity for trauma as it can manifest itself as secondary traumatic stress by hearing the experiences of victims ("Secondary Traumatic Stress," n.d.). Discussions on secondary traumatic stress show that it is possible for people to be exposed to trauma by different sources. According to Zara (2017) psychologists, doctors, journalists, and the ones reading the news are exposed to secondary traumatic stress. Similarly, Paker (2017) suggests that people are exposed to trauma indirectly by printed, visual, and social media. Although they don't discuss trauma, Jaško, Kossowska and Sekerdej (2013) show that fear of terrorist attacks can be present in societies even when they are not exposed to terrorist attacks (p. 172). Similarly, Aly and Green (2010) argue that people are exposed to terrorist attacks through the media even when they have no geographical proximity (p. 269). In the same vein, Hamblen and Slone (n.d.) argue that being exposed to news of terrorist attacks increase the likelihood of having PTSD. These researchers indicate that people who experience trauma are not particularly


the ones present in the attack but also those who are presented with the trauma through media.

Trauma says that there is someone dangerous out there, the world is dangerous and humans are dangerous and the withdrawal from the social life is a normal reaction after traumatic events (Zara, 2017). While researches indicate that PTSD is a possible reaction after terrorist attacks, it is not the only reaction and not every traumatic event turns out as PTSD (Hamblen & Slone, n.d). A protection from the psychopathology includes preventing people from seeing traumatic scenery such as the removal of bodies (Aker, 2017). Expressing positive feelings to each other, which is crucial in pain and healing cycle, is given as one of the solutions to overcome the traumatic events (Zara, 2017).

1.3. Political Consequences of Fear According to Psychological Approach

There are different approaches in the literature concerning the politics of fear. There is a large number of published studies arguing that the leaders, or the media is responsible for creating fear and othering which have an effect on people's political decisions (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, & Shapiro, 2011; Russ-Mohl, 2013; Entman, 2013; Simons, 2008; Berkowitz, 2007; Evans, 2012; Kellner, 2007; Nacos, 2013; Altheide, 2006). Conversely, some researchers highlight that this relationship is not simple and there are some other factors that should be taken into account (Canetti, Rapaport, Wayne, Hall, & Hobfoll, 2013; Jaško, Kossowska, & Sekerdej, 2013; Rapin, 2013; Gadarian, 2013; Thrall, 2009, Aly, 2013). Psychological approach is one of them in the literature. Publications that concentrate on the psychological effects of terror attacks discuss the political consequences of having fear. In these studies, it is suggested that the media and other figures did not particularly intervene in people's decisions but there are personal factors. The Figure 1.1 by Canetti, Rapaport, Wayne, Hall, & Hobfoll (2013) show how political decisions are shaped by psychological distress (p. 204).

Figure 1.1 Stress-Based Model of Political Extremism



Source: Reprinted from *The Political Psychology of Terrorism Fears* (p. 204), by Canetti, Rapaport, Wayne, Hall, & Hobfoll 2013, New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Copyright (2013) by Oxford University Press. Reprinted with permission.

Gadarian (2013) remarks her suspicion of the relationship that has made between terrorism and media as she suggests that the reasons behind what people construct with those news is missing in most of the researches concentrating on this subject (p. 67). Gadarian (2013) suggests that support given to the policies after 9/11 was shaped by people's political tendencies (p. 67). According to Gadarian (2013) believing the news to be sincere about the dangers play a significant role in accepting or rejecting the messages (p. 68). In their investigation of the support for policies and their relationship with emotions, Wetherell, Weisz, Stolier, Beavers and Sadler (2013) suggest that supporting vindictive actions are more likely when one feels angry (p. 129), on the other hand, aggressive cross-border actions are rejected when one is fearful (p. 130).

In her analysis of Northern Ireland, Monaghan (2013) claims that protecting oneself by reducing contact with associates of the outgroup is one of the results, if a group is perceived to be spreading fear (p. 143). By saying that Monaghan (2013) expresses the importance of identity factor in societies like Northern Ireland as she argues that people are dividing each other in this specific context (p. 150). Aly (2013) argues that the reason behind people having fear is

not fully explained by the polls and surveys (p. 160). According to Aly (2013) the othering according to religious choices, restrictions of rights of citizens for the sake of being safe, anxiousness in the society, and the implementation of the politics of fear with a terrorist attack, the thoughts of dying and getting hurt describes best what constitutes fear and other negative emotions in Australian context (p. 163). By stating that Aly (2013) shows that for some societies, the possible emergence of politics of fear can be a fear factor itself. In their study in investigating right-wing authoritarianism in Italian context, Manzi, Roccato and Russo (2015) found that having a meaningful perception of oneself and one's life determine if one abstains from right-wing authoritarianism in times of crisis that disturbs people's sense of controlling events (p. 119). In their analysis of fear from terrorism in Polish context, Kossowska et al. suggest that how terrorists are perceived determines which of the counterterrorism actions people would support, as well as their likelihood of having fear (as cited in Jaško, Kossowsko, & Sekerdej, 2013, p. 176).

Evidence from these examples show that, when it comes to fear of terrorism and its political consequences, there are numerous factors including individual and psychological ones. Considering all this evidence, it seems that although the researchers suggest that the political consequences of fear depend upon many factors and they might be the result of a purely psychological defense mechanism without any impact from the media or political figures, they show that in times of disruptive events, there are examples of constructing the other and supporting retaliatory policies etc.

1.4. The Politics of Fear

Thus far, a number of studies discuss the concept the politics of fear. The politics of fear has taken place in the literature by several phrasings such as "culture of fear" by Furedi (2002), "discourse of fear" by Altheide (2006, p. 420), "threat inflation" by Cramer and Thrall (2009, p. 1), "threat society" by Nohrstedt and Ottosen (2008, "Introduction," para. 1). Taken together, studies support the

notion that the politics of fear emerge when fear is consciously and deliberately used in order to achieve political power, change policies, pass laws, start wars, etc. (Gardner, 2009; Altheide, 2006; Aly, 2013; Kellner, 2007; Evans, 2012). A great deal of research on the politics of fear is concerned with terror although health is another theme discussed in the literature.

The terror-focused research on the politics of fear is more likely to be discussed by sociologists and communication researchers, whereas health professionals usually conduct the health-focused research. Nunes (2017) discusses the hardship *Médecins Sans Frontières* faced during the Ebola crisis in his work and argues that the suffering of the victims managed to create no more than a little awareness on Ebola worldwide. In fact its threat for more developed countries due to the implementation of the politics of fear made Ebola a focus of interest (p. 8). Quantitative methods have been frequently used in the research concerning the fear for health and its relationship with the media. In a focus group study by McCauley, Minsky and Viswanath (2013) the othering of Latinos after H1N1 news was investigated and their research showed that media coverage made an effect on the participants of the study while also suggesting that the perception of threat varied due to racial and ethnical factors (“Discussion,” para. 1). In the same vein, relationship between news and fear for Ebola was studied by Towers et al., (2015) by comparing the news coverage with the search of Internet and tweets, and they found out that people were searching for Ebola after there were news coverage about it in the media, yet only a few of them included items associated with concern in their searches (p. 10). Similarly, Mesch, Schwirian and Kolobov (2012) investigated whether people’s concern over the news of swine flu had increased and their results showed that people who were more curious with the H1N1 news were more likely to be concerned, although it was given as a correlation (p. 330). In his content analysis, Koerner (2014) investigated the relationship between nuclear accidents and related news headlines and showed evidence that nuclear energy was framed negatively in most of the headlines (p. 244). Similarly, Gardner (2009) investigates fear of cancer in his work and suggests that the idea that chemicals are substances to be feared is disseminated

by the media in order to arouse interest, although he doesn't find the media as the only perpetrator (p. 277). In all studies presented here, fear has been discussed with its relationship with the media, including social media.

Apart from the health-focused researches in the literature, a great deal of the previous researches on the politics of fear had been on terrorism. The vast majority of studies on the politics of fear that focuses on terror are concerned with political figures, elites and the media. The Bush administration and its application of the politics of fear have been widely discussed in the literature. According to Nacos, Bloch-Elkon and Shapiro (2011) support for Bush administration's policies was achieved through the politics of fear after 9/11 (p. 55). Kellner (2007) suggests:

The Bush administration, aided and abetted by U.S. corporate media, manipulated a politics of fear to push through a right-wing agenda that included the Patriot Act, massive changes in the legal system, a dramatic expansion of the U.S. military, and U.S.-led military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. (p. 622)

Similarly, Evans (2012) argues that some policies such as torture were justified by constructing the other based on culture due to the Bush administration and the media being "constant reminders" of terrorism (p. 73). Conversely, when talking about the government's attitude after 9/11, Alterman (2004) maintains that it was not possible to make a generalization, and not all government officials were using the politics of fear as there were some who were not deceiving people (p. 1132). When talking about the Bush administration, Stern (2004) suggests that even though the politicians had used the politics of fear, that didn't mean there was nothing to fear from (p. 1145). Oates (2006) compared the electoral discourse of leaders and found that the politics of fear were used in both Kerry's and Bush's campaigns (p. 431). Social control has been a theme discussed in the literature, highly intertwined with the theme security. In his talk on the Bush administration, Arato (2004) argues that what was threatening was not the terrorist attacks themselves but "the secular increase of presidential power" (p. 1136). While discussing the media and the politics of fear, Altheide (2007) argues that the

depiction of rights such as “privacy” coded as unimportant, the stigmatization of people who were against the constructed discourse, the association that was made between being safe and being under control, constructed the politics of fear after 9/11 (p. 288). Similarly, Robin (2012) discusses the fear discourse in political communication and argues that violation of liberties was legitimized for the sake of being secure (p. 118). According to Altman (2017) Donald Trump has been using the politics of fear by using a discourse that suggests the country and the world are full of dangers. It is clear that Trump’s statements are implying some kind of a security problem. Shugerman (2017) suggests that the ban that prevents citizens of several countries to enter the U.S. has found justification by Donald Trump after the terrorist attacks in the world. Glassner (2016) argues that it is not new that politicians are using the politics of fear yet “Trump is especially effective”. Glassner (2016) maintains that the politics of fear has been used both by Clinton and Trump for the fears they both represent. Evidence shows that the ones using the politics of fear, mostly leaders in the literature, construct a discourse about the threats the citizens face and the safety they are going to provide for them, which justifies their actions such as policy changes and starting a war. The war in Iraq (Cramer & Thrall, 2009; Nacos Bloch-Elkon and Shapiro, 2011, p. 55; Kellner, 2007, p. 622), the invasion of Afghanistan (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, & Shapiro, 2011, p. 5; Kellner, 2007, p. 622), Kellner 2007), and the Patriot Act (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, & Shapiro, 2011, p. 5; Kellner 2007, p. 622; Evans, 2012, p. 74) are some of the related examples in the literature focusing on 9/11.

Right-wing discourse has been discussed in the literature as one of the features of the politics of fear. Gardner (2009) argues that the Democrats have failed because they did not concentrate on subjects related to terror, which helped the Republicans win (p. 321). Not concentrating solely on terrorism, Wodak (2015) suggests that the theme of the risk that some people pose for others is a feature of the politics of fear that parties with “right-wing populism” carry out (p. 1). Arato (2004) stresses the right-wing factor in the politics of fear and explains that what they do is a construction of a nonexistent threat (p. 1134).

Us and them divisiveness, or in other words, othering, has been another theme discussed with the politics of fear. In her work on analyzing the politics of fear implemented by Israel, Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2015) argues that othering Palestinians is accepted as a norm in Zionism (p. 25). Houtum and Lacy (2017) suggest that multiculturalism is one of the concepts that today's European countries are against which, hence, constructs a picture where the politics of fear is legitimized (p. 85). Similarly, in his analysis of Bush's discourse, Kellner (2007) suggests that the divisive discourse used for people and negative and positive features attributed to the particular sides, rendered it no different than the terrorists' or even Nazis' (627).

While the vast majority of the literature on the politics of fear has focused on the U.S. and especially the Bush administration after 9/11, the concept has also been discussed with other countries and political figures. Republican senator Joseph McCarthy's discourse and the atmosphere he had created by othering the communists was described as the politics of fear (Griffith, 1987). Gel'man (2015) suggests that suppressing the opposition of the administration is what constitutes the politics of fear in Russia (p. 7). Gel'man (2015) also suggests that a new law in Russia controls the money transfers as a counterterrorism policy (p. 18). The Brexit campaign in Britain has also been discussed with the politics of fear as Kirişçi and Ekim (2016) suggest that immigrants coming to the country have been a concern for people living in Britain, which was manipulated through the politics of fear by the Brexit campaigners. Jones (2012) argues that one of the reasons of the construction of the walls in the United States, India and Israel is due to the politics of fear implemented on security after the terrorist attacks (p. 6).

1.5. Terror Attacks, the Politics of Fear and Media Framing

In section 1.3 fear and political consequences of fear were described with the psychological approach that mostly ignores political figures or the media. However, the vast majority of studies that concentrate on the politics of fear have discussed it with its relationship with the media. While discussing texts,

Fairclough (2003) argues “...the capacity to influence or control processes of mediation is an important aspect of power in contemporary societies” (p. 31). This description is important to understand the approach of the researchers in the literature as most of the discussion is about the power the media has in influencing people. Evans (2012) discusses the media as being one of the “constant reminders... of the threat” after 9/11 (p. 73). Similarly, the repetition of the theme of war in TV channels is criticized by Kellner (2007, p. 625). Miller and Mills (2009) investigated terror experts in the media and showed that most of the experts were constituted of people who were going with the norms of the Bush administration (p. 422). Their research shows that a little voice was heard in the media that challenged the Bush administration’s policies for counterterrorism. In his work on investigating the fear and fear related concepts in several news sources, Altheide (2006) shows evidence that fear was correlated by the terror attacks in the news after 9/11 more than before (p. 426). In her focus group research, Oates (2006) investigated the news and electoral campaigns as well as citizens’ responses in the U.S., Russia, and Britain and provided evidence that in the U.S. and Russia, fear was adopted by people due to constantly being exposed to shallow usage of terrorism in the political communication and the media (p. 432). In her work on the coverage of PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) in the media, Baybars-Hawks (2010) investigated the headlines of *Hürriyet* in the time span of 13 years and found that news were mostly the ones inducing sentimentality that provided an environment to the production of fear (p. 116). According to Nacos, Bloch-Elkon and Shapiro (2011), most of the actions that Bush administration advocated after 9/11 also took place in the media by the exaggeration of threats and cues of war (p. 5). Also, the fact that the journalists who were working for the aims of the U.S. and Britain were the ones disseminating the news from the war zones after 9/11 is criticized by Kellner (2004, p. 332). In *Language Wars*, Jeff Lewis (2005) discusses the fact that terrorism is fed by the media as it is its’ place for communication (p. 28). Similarly, in his analysis of the war in Iraq and coverage of the media, Russ-Mohl (2013) argues that advocating for the Bush administration’s policies, setting the

war as the most important topic, portraying it in a specific way and thus lacking any critical voice made the American journalism unsuccessful in the Iraq War (p. 224). Entman (2013) suggests that American journalism was selective in their reporting not only by ignoring the reports that foreshadowed that the military action wouldn't be successful but also advocating for war and Bush's policies on the other hand (p. 209). Simons (2008) takes another approach and discusses the pressure the media had during its reporting of the war and argues that posing a danger for the "security and national stability" were some of the accusations of the government to the critical voices in the media (p. 87). Figenschou and Thorbjørnsrud (2016), in their in-depth interview with the editors after a terror attack in Oslo provided evidence that a significant number of editors used their power to mediate the conversation after the attack by inhibiting people to write comments in the online newspapers (Figenschou & Thorbjørnsrud, 2016, p. 6). The reason behind this action was given as the fear stemming from the possibility of the terrorists commenting in these spheres (Figenschou & Thorbjørnsrud, 2016, p. 7). According to their interview, this incident was a turning point that started more control being inserted to the sections where citizens leave their comments (Figenschou & Thorbjørnsrud, 2016, p. 7). The authors do not criticize this control that aims to have a more peaceful conversation.

While one of the issues with the media has been the lack of alternative voices concerning the terror attacks and news coverage, frames including stereotyping and othering have been other issues that the authors address. Steuter and Wills (2009) investigated the Canadian Media and found evidence that the American media's framings such as the depiction of the enemy as an animal were used in the news (p. 18). Gareeva, Bolshakov, Ivanov and Teryoshina (2016) investigated the coverage of one Russian and one U.S. news source and showed that there were differences between the Russian and the U.S. media in covering terrorism that by taking the side of the government, the Russian media made what was disseminated more ambiguous when compared to the U.S. media (p. 21). Altheide (2007) suggests that in the period of post-9/11, the lives of the Arabs were depicted as worthless by the dissemination of racism and stigmatization of

the U.S. media, which also took place for another community in the past (p. 292). Conversely, in their investigation of several news sources after 9/11, Nacos and Torres-Reyna (2003) argue that Muslims and Arabs living in the U.S. were represented well after 9/11 (p. 151). However it is important to note that their study was designed for Americans and did not include Muslims and Arabs abroad in general. In another study, Nacos (2013) criticizes the media's attitude on torture after 9/11 and argues that the advocates of torture took more space in the media than the ones against it (p. 338). Similarly, Berkowitz (2007) investigated the discourse of the U.S. news after 9/11 and provided evidence of the presence of an "us" and "them" division.

While the media has been found guilty for disseminating the leaders' discourse and stereotypes with a few critical voices, different writers suggest different reasons for it. Nossek (2007) argues that in the literature, terror and media relationship has been studied with three approaches and while some blame the media for the fear, others observe a political power over media and finally the media is suggested to be caring about earning a profit (p. 276- 277). Alterman (2004) suggests that media uses fear for money as "fear is a very saleable product" (p. 1132). In their analysis of the media after 9/11, Nacos, Bloch-Elkon and Shapiro (2011) suggest that due to the economic reasons, taking attention was more important for the media than informing the citizens and this resulted in a change in these most respected institutions (p. 9). According to Russ-Mohl (2013) how the coverage of "war and terrorism" brings money for the media wasn't mentioned enough (p. 226). Taken together, these studies support the notion that the media is making the impact by covering the terrorist attacks. The relationship between terror and the media takes another discussion with authors suggesting that they also feed each other. This view is mentioned by Nossek (2009), who discusses the relationship between terrorist attacks and the media in her work (p. 269). Weimann (2015) argues that the media benefits from terrorists by making them the news (p. 7). The danger of terrorists' usage of the social media has also been discussed in the literature. Weimann (2015) suggests that because deciphering the actual name isn't necessary and it is a public sphere open to

anyone and terrorists are frequently using digital spheres. (p. 8). In the same vein, Taştekin (2016) argues that ISIS frequently uses its own print and social media to spread its messages (p. 275-282). Hopkins (2017) criticizes the fact that digital spheres were exposed with contents of people who were, at least, ISIS exponents, if not its members.

Researches on the politics of fear and thus the war on terror narrative have been discussed with several countries with different contexts, yet its relationship with the media is generally theoretical, based on assumptions. There are studies that look at public opinion such as Oates' (2006) focus-group research, yet a considerable amount of literature on the politics of fear start with quotations as how news effect people, yet little empirical data has been put forward to actually show a relationship. Looking at the news coverage and the polls, researches investigate correlation, yet not actually causation. Furthermore, what people really construct has been surprisingly missing in the literature. In his work on investigating the researches in the literature, Ross (2007) finds out that research on how people are affected by the news has been ignored (p. 220). In a research by Demos (2017) it is suggested that there are different layers to consider if one wants to look at the politics of fear and unlike the literature focusing solely on leaders, their research includes what citizens construct among many other layers (p. 15-16).

In their analysis of the war on terror narrative in the media, Reese and Lewis (2009) discuss the lack of alternative discourses against the war discourse as problematic and suggest that not much has changed (p. 780). While the media has been criticized for mediating fear and touting war as an alternative, some have discussed peace journalism. According to Shinar (2007) peace journalism has some objectives such as “professional improvement”, “strengthening human, moral, and ethical values in the media”, “contribution to the public sphere”, as well as widening scholarly and professional media horizons (para. 6-8). Conversely, Loyn (2007) argues that by giving too much importance to the journalists, as the power of change, the advocates of peace journalism not only announce their practice as the norm but also give commitments to the journalists

that are not in their job description (p. 2). In her work on peace journalism and digital spheres, Aslam (2006) stresses the importance of the collaborated work of many professionals in different areas to start a change in the traditional media, which she finds more important than the presence of peace journalism in digital spheres (p. 76).

1.6. The Politics of Fear and the War on Terror Narrative

When talking about the politics of fear, the concept of the war on terror narrative needs to be looked at. Publications that concentrate on the politics of fear, frequently discuss it with the war on terror narrative. Health focused research in the literature shows that the politics of fear is not limited to the war on terror narrative, yet the war on terror narrative is seen as a way of applying the politics of fear. The vast majority of studies mentioned in the literature review use the politics of fear and the war on terror interchangeably. While talking about the politics of fear, Evans (2012) looks at Bush's war on terror narrative. Similarly, Kellner (2007) focuses on the war on terror and describe Bush's actions as the politics of fear.


The term "war on terror" takes after Bush administration's war on terrorism after 9/11 (Reese & Lewis, 2009, para. 1). Bush's post 9/11 speech on the war on terrorism consisted of expressions as how everything was different, the probability of losing lives in military action, the likelihood of some actions not being transparent ("Text of George Bush's Speech," 2001). Bush also declared that the war on terror was a global one, a "civilization's fight" ("Text of George Bush's Speech," 2001). By stating that, Bush attributed some qualities, such as civilized, to the U.S. and its potential allies joining the war with them. While looking at the narratives nations construct about themselves through the war on terror narrative, Soueif (2009) investigated the narratives of the U.S. and Israel and found that in these two cases they didn't always reflect the truth (p. 33). Although the term the war on terror has been discussed mostly with the Bush administration, literature shows that other political figures are also associated with

using the war on terror narrative and that neither the narrative nor the war is not new (Chomsky, 2001; Clarke, 2004). The concept is also not limited with the U.S. but also discussed in the literature with Russia (Simons, 2006), Israel, and India (Jones, 2012). It can be suggested that what is emphasized in Bush’s war on terror is that it is a global war on terrorism that requires the involvement of other countries as well (“War on Terrorism,” n.d.).

It needs to be noted that the authors criticizing the war on terror narrative do not object preventative measures against terrorism. Additionally, neither the authors working in the area suggest that there isn’t a terrorist threat nor do they justify the acts of terrorism and terrorists. Chomsky (2011) calls 9/11 a “horrendous atrocity” (p. 37). Some studies in the literature are dedicated to the lost lives of 9/11 (Clarke, 2004; Hodges, 2011). What are found problematic are the narrative, the policies, and othering it brings in the cover of fighting terrorism.

As Cramer and Thrall (2009) suggest, there are different approaches when it comes to the politics of fear: “realist, psychological, domestic political and constructivist” (p. 2), and each explain the threat inflation and the features of stages differently.

Figure 1.2 A Simple Model of Threat Inflation



Source: Reprinted from *American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear* (p. 3), by Cramer and Thrall (2009), Oxon: Routledge. Copyright (2009) by Routledge. Reprinted with permission.

Some examples of psychological approach have been explained in the section 1.3., “Political Consequences of Fear According to Psychological

Approach”. In addition, Cramer and Thrall (2009) suggest that it is hard to change what people think and when there is a disruptive event people react according to their strict codes (p. 5). Domestic political approach is basically what the researchers in the “The Politics of Fear” section suggest, that the threat inflation is a product of political manipulation (Cramer & Thrall, 2009, p. 7). However Cramer and Thrall (2009) also add that there is a minority of researchers who believe inflation of threats is actually necessary to produce awareness in citizens (p. 7). Realist approach suggests that going through every possibility and acting in accordance to it, is what leaders do when things get vague in disruptive events which sometimes induce misguided decisions (Cramer & Thrall, 2009, p. 4). Finally, constructive approach focuses on the identity factor. As Cramer and Thrall (2009) suggest:

Constructivist theories are a form of social-psychological argument and as such, have much in common with psychological theories. Constructivists argue that people’s unconscious categorization of self and other plays a critical role in threat perception, much like a cognitive bias. Likewise, constructivists also acknowledge the power of ideas to influence perception even in the face of contrary facts. (p. 10)

Thrall (2009) rejects the opinion that if people had been informed well about the truth after 9/11, things would have been different. Contrarily, Thrall (2009) suggests that even when there is information, whether people find it important or not relies in their values (p. 177). What’s more, values determine what citizens advocate as a policy in accordance to this information (p. 178). In addition, Thrall (2009) discusses the identity and partisanship factor and argues that Bush wasn’t able to actually persuade the Democrats yet the Republicans continue believing him even after his statements turned out to be false (p. 187). What Thrall (2009) basically suggests is what is true is irrelevant in people’s perceptions of threat.

For this research a constructivist approach was chosen to gain a detailed understanding of the results. One advantage of the constructivist approach is that it avoids the inadequacies of other approaches. As psychological approaches focus

on people's mental processes and consider factors such as one's proximity to the terror attack, it is not possible to have enough background information from a study conducted solely on texts. Realist approaches traditionally focus on leaders' reasons of using the threat inflation, which is not the object of this study. This study is to understand how citizens construct threats. Domestic political approach gives unnecessary attention to the leaders and the media that it portrays a picture of citizens that are not independent in their decisions. Another advantage of the constructivist approach is the fact that it focuses on identity, national identity, and values of the individuals. The identity politics, which has brought polarization in the country, is discussed in the section 2.1. In an atmosphere like Turkey where identity, partisanship, and religious differences take a significant role, applying the constructivist approach is more valid than other approaches. Constructivist approach would give the information that whether people's perceptions of threat are according to their identity or their support for the government or opposition parties has a role in what they construct.

What has been suggested in previous sections on the politics of fear is mostly what is accepted as the war on terror narrative in the literature: social control, constructing the other, security, the idea that people are under constant threat. There are numerous studies on the war on terror narrative and almost all of them are addressing to the same issues. For their research, De Castella and McGarthy (2013) define the present themes in the literature and suggest a complete picture of the war on terror narrative with five themes (p. 87-90). First one is the construction of the "us" versus "them" that also attributes opposing qualities to these sides (De Castella & McGarthy, 2013, p. 87). Second one is suggesting that these attacks are actually a crime against what that society has been built on, such as particular "values" that the terrorists like to wipe out (De Castella & McGarthy, 2013, p. 88). Authors use the word "Western" in defining these values (De Castella & McGarthy, 2013, p. 88). Third one is not giving clear information, and advocating for the intelligence services to operate covertly which inhibits people to have a good judgment about what is actually going on (De Castella & McGarthy, 2013, p. 88). Additionally, any action that has a possibility of inhibiting the

terrorist threat is justified such as more “military spending” and “surveillance” (De Castella & McGarthy, 2013, p. 88-89). What’s more, some acts of violence against the terrorists are also justified (De Castella & McGarthy, 2013, p. 89). Fourth one is about government and other officials’ refusal of taking responsibility for the failure of preventing terrorism while also justifying the present and future actions of the government for the sake of counterterrorism (De Castella & McGarthy, 2013, p. 89). Fifth one is actually from the “crime narrative” which De Castella and McGarthy (2013) explains as the idea that people are in constant danger (p. 90). As De Castella and McGarthy’s (2013) definition on the war on terror narrative is taking the leaders’ into account and this study aims to investigate citizen discourse, their themes are adapted to this study with several modifications. 5 themes are defined and some questions are attributed to them. First one is security/intelligence/surveillance. The questions are: what kinds of precautions are supported in order to enable security? Are more control, surveillance, death penalty etc. mentioned? Do people mention MİT and suggest that the intelligence should not be transparent? What do people think about the presidency system? The last question is important as Yaşlı (2016) argues that the security was associated with the presidency system in the government discourse after the elections while also making a reference to *Yeni Akit*’s headline “either presidency or chaos”. Second one is us vs. them. The questions are: Is there an othering in the text that people are divided into us and them? If there is, who are these two groups and what qualities are attributed to them? Who is blamed for the attack? Third one is secularism and Western values. The questions are: Do people perceive this attack as a way to destroy secular and Western lifestyle in Turkey? Because the attack had occurred during New Year celebrations and there have been discussions on lifestyle in the media, secularism and Western values are taken into consideration. According to Gellner, Kemalist secularism requires the adoption of the Western lifestyle practices and “celebrating New Year” is one of them (as cited in Göle, 2017, p. 23). That’s why celebrating New Year is described with secularism in this theme. Fourth one is Turkey being dangerous. The questions are: Do people think they are in constant danger and now see the world and Turkey as dangerous? Do

people think the future is unpredictable? Fifth one is foreign policy/military intervention/other countries' plots. The questions are: What is supported as a foreign policy? Do people support military action in Syria or Iraq? Do people think that other countries have planned this attack and suggest they are plotting for more? The notion and the question of other countries' plots come from a long-standing discourse in Turkey. According to Göçek (2011) the habit in Turkish society that prevents people from perceiving the situations optimistically and encourages them to be alert as a necessity comes from the idea that the foreigners are plotting for something in Turkey (p. 35). Additionally, there was been a military operation against ISIS in Syria named Operation Euphrates Shield ("TSK'dan Fırat Kalkanı açıklaması: '32 köy temizlendi,'" 2016). Whether people are supporting a military intervention or not is more meaningful in this context as there was already an ongoing operation.

1.7. The Politics of Fear and Social Media

Up to now, a number of studies also include the medium factor in media research on the politics of fear. While criticizing TV for its way of covering post 9/11, Kellner (2007) suggests that alternative voices were heard on other mediums (p. 631). In their discussion on the war narratives and digital spheres, Nohrstedt and Ottosen (2008) suggest that it is questionable that the digital spheres show any discussions different than the traditional media ("New Media," para. 4). Boyd-Barrett suggests that what is constructed in digital spheres are more likely to benefit the traditional media as their content is taken from the traditional media with a change in the framing, yet he also not completely ignores their power (as cited in Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2008, "New Media," para. 4). What is suggested is that social media is feeding from the traditional media, which makes no room for an actual alternative space. It is important to note that these discussions are discussing alternative narratives and suggest that it is not likely to find them in digital spheres, they don't argue that it is not meaningful to investigate digital spheres. Figenschou and Thorbjørnsrud (2016) argue that by the presence of

digital spheres, the traditional media is no longer the only owner of the throne in influencing people (p. 2). They suggest that their research is a contribution to the recent conversation on the importance of digital spheres during crisis times (Figenschou & Thorbjørnsrud, 2016, p. 2). In their discussion on crisis times and the media, Seeck and Rantanen (2015) suggest that its participatory nature and the feature which allows one to react instantly make the social media more powerful in mediating the news than the traditional media while also making an influence on how the traditional media constructs its news in certain situations (para. 3). Youngs (2009) suggests that researchers investigating the war on terror need to discuss what social media brings to the table different than the traditional media (p. 101). Youngs (2009) argues that how the terrorists are using the social media also needs to be noted (p. 100). In his analysis on the role of both the traditional and social media, Cottle (2014) argues that some features of traditional media such as excluding the ordinary, being hierarchical, being a part of an economic competition is defied by social media during crisis times according to some (p. 14). Furthermore, Cottle (2014) adds that with its heterogeneous nature, social media joins the conversation in directing the immediate aid during crisis times in addition to providing discourses refuting both the representatives and their statements (p. 17). These utterances prove that social media should also be investigated during crisis times. In their research on the media reflections of the Georgian War, Nitsch and Lichtenstein (2013) investigate the social media in comparison with the traditional media and their results show that the framing of the war is not different (Nitsch & Lichtenstein, 2013, p. 305). In their analysis of the coverage of media after 9/11, Nacos, Bloch-Elkon and Shapiro (2011) suggest that the deliberate choice of solely investigating the traditional media stems from the absence of social media at that time (p. 20). It can be inferred from Nacos, Bloch-Elkon and Shapiro (2011) that in today's world, it is meaningful to investigate social media as well as the traditional media after catastrophic events. Overall, there seems to be some evidence to indicate that a great deal of previous research investigates the traditional media on the politics of fear. The studies presented thus far in this section provide evidence that investigating social media

is important and meaningful. It both enables one to investigate emerging media communication during crisis times as well as providing information on how citizens react.



CHAPTER TWO

THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IN TURKEY

It is not hard to suggest that 2016 was the year of terrorist attacks for Turkey, and thus also the year of trauma, insecurities, and fear. 27 terror attacks were carried out by different terrorist organizations in different cities such as İstanbul, Diyarbakır, Ankara, Bursa, Gaziantep, Mardin, Bingöl, Van, Elazığ, Şırnak, Adana, and Kayseri (“2016’daki Bombalı Saldırıları,” 2016). After the terrorist attacks there was a campaign in Turkey by NGOs, starring the celebrities on the theme of moving on with life (“Hayatına Sahip Çık Kampanyası,” 2017). Nevertheless, Zara (2017) claims that the campaign was not enough; people needed to know what precautions were made for their safety. The focus of this study, the Reina massacre occurred in the first hours of 2017. By the time the Reina massacre occurred, Turkey had been on the state of emergency for 5 months, which was declared after the coup attempt on June 15th, 2016 (“15 Temmuz Darbe Girişimi: Türkiye’de 3 Ay Süreyle Olağanüstü Hal İlan Edildi,” 2016). While this study was carried out, Turkey was still on the state of emergency. Turkey’s frequent exposure to terror attacks and its participation with the global war against ISIS, as well as other terrorist organizations, makes it even more important to look at the war narrative of the citizens through social media sites.

2.1. Terror Attacks, Polarization and Fear

It is important to discuss the peace process, or the solution process, between the government and PKK and how it ended while talking about the terror attacks and the political atmosphere in Turkey. Çiçek (2017) argues that the peace process between the government and PKK was a first in history on many grounds such as being more open to the public and the usage of media to provide the communication, as well as the involvement of both sides and finally the involvement of Wise Men to enable the participation of the citizens in the process

(p. 162). Çiçek (2017) argues that both sides were influential in ending the peace process as well as external factors (p. 183). Çiçek (2017) maintains that the tension has risen even more than before due to the failure of the peace process (p 158) as he mentions the report of a NGO on curfew and terror attacks in metropolitans (p 174-175). A formation known as the Academics for Peace was founded as a result of the end of peace process. Although it is suggested that their formation dates back to 2012, it is suggested that the group's notice in 2016 "We will not be a party to this crime!" has attracted the most attention ("Hakkımızda/About Us," n.d., para. 3). An article by *T24* shows that some members of the Academics for Peace were taken into custody and the reason was given as the criticism made by the President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ("Barış İçin Akademisyenler'in 1128 İmzayla Açıkladığı Bildirinin Tam Metni," 2016). Grenier (2017) has criticized the treatment of the academics that are a part of Academics for Peace and artists as she uses the expression "repression" in the heading.

The government's discourse after the 2015 elections has also been severely criticized. There were two general elections in June and in November 2015. In his article that was written after the first general election, Kanlı (2015) discusses the frequent terrorist attacks in his article and refers to politics of fear that was implemented by the government by suggesting that "stability" is proposed against terrorism. Hughes (n.d.) argues that the second election campaign "saw an even greater use of rhetoric and language of polarization ("The general elections of 2015," para. 3). The second election ended with the rise of AKP's votes and the fall of HDP's (Peoples' Democratic Party) votes (Hughes, n.d., "The general elections of 2015," para. 4). Hughes (n.d.) argues that the "security concerns" of the citizens played an effective role in the rise of AKP's votes in the second election, which stemmed from terrorism according to some ("The general elections of 2015," para. 4). Apart from the general elections, the discourse on the presidency system has also been criticized. The newspaper *Yeni Akit* which can be suggested to have a pro-government discourse, had a headline "either presidency or chaos" before the referendum of 2017 ("Ya Başkanlık, Ya

Kaos!”, 2016), a statement which was also suggested by Burhan Kuzu who is a member of parliament from AKP (“Kuzu: Başkanlık Modeli Gelmezse Türkiye’de Kaos Olur,” 2014). This attitude on the presidency system discussed by Yaşlı (2016) implies a kind of politics of fear as he argues that the government aims for people to perceive itself as the “rescuer” due to bipolar representations and polarization as well as the inflation of security threats and the presence of oppressive ideologies (para. 5). The leader of main opposition party Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu also criticized the presidency system and discussed it as a system against democracy (“Kılıçdaroğlu: Başkanlık Rejim Tartışmasıdır,” 2016).

The state of emergency that was declared after the coup attempt also needs to be discussed when talking about the atmosphere of fear and insecurity. In his analysis of the peace process, Çiçek (2017) suggests that the sense of security was disturbed by the coup attempt yet the state of emergency worsened the democracy in Turkey (p. 175). Karan (2016) explains that some rights are under “derogation” during the state of emergency yet there are some rights identified by the constitution that are still protected during state of emergencies (“Ohal Döneminde Geçerli Olan Hukuki Güvenceler,” para. 1-4). Karan (2016) suggests that some rights that are protected under the state of emergency has been violated by some executive orders such as “the freedom of expression” which has come under question (“Ohal Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamelerinin İçeriğine Dair Sorunlar,” para.1-2). He also reminds us that ideally, the state of emergency needs to be short (Karan, 2016). The poll by Türkiye Çalışmaları Merkezi (2016) shows that 4.8% of people see “limiting on the rights and freedom” as the biggest problem in Turkey only starting from 2016 (p. 10).

The loss of trust in the institutions is also significant. The poll by Türkiye Çalışmaları Merkezi (2016) shows that trust in the institutions (the government, the judiciary, NGOs, universities, YÖK/ÖSYM, political parties and the media) has decreased (p. 18-19). It is 34.7% in 2016 while it was 43.9% in 2015 (p. 18). The media is the least trusted one with the percentage of 2.3% (Türkiye Çalışmaları Merkezi, 2016, p. 19). In a report by Freedom House (2007) it is suggested that since the coup attempt, the media has been under more oppression.

It has been argued that the discourse of the government has also had an effect on interpersonal relationships. Pitel (2017) discusses the incidents of people reporting their family and friends to the police for their opinions and suggests that the last places that have free speech such as social media are now invaded with informers while citing the Turkish government's discourse as the cause for this. The polarization is another subject that was discussed in this regard. The division between the exponents and opponents of the government's discourse is discussed by Paul and Seyrek (2015) and given as the reason behind the polarization in the country. The poll by Türkiye Çalışmaları Merkezi (2016) shows 53.6% of the participants voted for the AKP, 79.4% of the participants who voted for CHP (Republican People's Party) and 75.4% of the participants voted for HDP have stated that there is polarization in Turkey (p. 22). Overall 61.7% of the participants believe that there is polarization in Turkey (Türkiye Çalışmaları Merkezi, 2016, p. 22). 47.6% of them think that the polarization is between secular and Muslim groups (Türkiye Çalışmaları Merkezi, 2016, p. 23). Hintz (2015) suggests that the atmosphere in which anyone who opposes the government is answered with hostility, is taking Turkey's long history of identity issues to a far sophisticated level. According to some, this makes Turkey's future worrisome. Moreover, Hintz (2015) discusses the polarization in Turkey with the ISIS attacks and particularly the bombing in Ankara and suggests that as the victims of terrorist attacks are seen as the other because of their identities and political and religious tendencies, some citizens are not sad, actually even happy, for their death. This inevitable fear atmosphere, which stemmed from the terror attacks and the lack of trust in the institutions as well as polarization were taken into account when investigating the narrative of citizens.

2.2. January 1st, the Reina Massacre

A detailed work on terror attacks in Turkey shows that Turkey has been exposed to terror attacks since 1960 by different terrorist organizations such as PKK, ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia), and

Turkish Hezbollah (Mango, 2005). Some terrorist organizations have changed their names; some have disappeared or lost power over time (Mango, 2005). A new terrorist organization has appeared in this list when ISIS declared war against Turkey (Saymaz, 2017, p. 64). In an article on *CNN* Lister et al. (2017) show that ISIS attacks involve 29 countries by February 13th, 2017 and Turkey is one of them. The deadliest single terror attack in the history of Turkey was carried out in Ankara where 103 people lost their lives according to *NTV* (“Ankara’da Terör Saldırısı: 103 Ölü,” 2015). *NTV* shows that the perpetrator wasn’t identified after the attack (“Ankara’da Terör Saldırısı: 103 Ölü,” 2015) and this vagueness was discussed for a long time in the news and it is now known that ISIS has carried out the attack (Saymaz, 2017, p. 187). 2016 was a particular a year when there were frequent terror attacks carried out by different terrorist organizations. Most of the attacks were carried out by PKK and TAK (Kurdistan Freedom Hawks) while the rest were claimed by ISIS (“2016’daki Bombalı Saldırıları,” 2016). In their article on *CNN* Atassi, Botelho and Tuysuz (2017) discuss the frequent terror attacks in Turkey and use the phrase “Turkey’s bloody year”. There is a question on the travel advice page of *The Telegraph* on February 2017 about the potential safety issues of a vacation in Turkey, and Morris (2017) suggests that due to terrorism, the atmosphere in Turkey has been uneasy. The terror attacks and their economical consequences also made the news. In an article on IMF’s website it is suggested that one of the reasons of economic deterioration in Turkey is due to a drop in the number of tourists which is affected by the restless political atmosphere and terrorism (“Turkey’s Economy Hit by Declining Tourism,” 2017).

The case that was chosen for this research is the Reina massacre. According to news, the Reina nightclub in Ortaköy suffered from a terrorist attack that killed 39 and left 71 wounded and although the attacker had escaped, it was known that ISIS had carried out the attack (“Reina Saldırısı Hakkında Neler Biliniyor,” 2017). The Reina attacker was caught 17 days after the massacre by an enormous operation with the participation of numerous officers (“Reina Saldırısı Böyle Yakalandı,” 2017). The attack also brought some discussions

because it was aimed at New Year celebrations. In an article by Arango (2017) in *New York Times* it is suggested that the attack “targeted a symbol of a cosmopolitan Istanbul that is increasingly under threat” (para. 1). It has been argued by a deputy from the main opposition party that because it is attacking a particular, secular lifestyle, the Reina massacre was nothing but ordinary. (“CHP’li B ke’ye G re Reina Saldırısında Laik Yaşam Biçimi Hedef Alındı,” 2017). In the same vein, in an article in *Guardian*, Elif Şafak (2017) argues that the heterogeneous atmosphere of Reina that brings different people together was a subject of resentment for the Islamic extremists and the massacre served nothing but the polarization between the two main groups in Turkey as tolerance has already given its way to tyranny for some time. Conversely, Bardakçı (2017) suggests that one of the reasons some people had a discourse about a particular lifestyle was purely ideological, which makes them unable to say that it intended for Turkey. After the attack, there was a discourse on the social media celebrating the attack and an article in *Bloomberg* suggests that the praisers of the Reina massacre who don’t use their actual names in their social media accounts are under investigation (“Reina Katliamını  venlere Soruřturma Bařlatıldı,” 2017).

Considering the frequent terrorist attacks, it is not hard to tell 2016 was full of violence, fear, trauma, and insecurities for people living in Turkey. An announcement from the Turkish Psychological Association is named as a “call for solidary and help” and it is stated that people who are affected by the terror attacks can get help from them (T rk Psikologlar Derneęi, 2016).

2.3. The Global War on Terrorism Against ISIS

Most research on the global war on terrorism has been discussed with the narrative and policies of post-9/11 in the literature. However, Brands and Feaver (2017) argue that even though it has changed its shape by the Obama administration, the war on terror is still present against ISIS (p. 1). Brands and Feaver (2017) call today’s war “GWOT 3.0” (p. 3). Bergen (2017) discusses the presence of the U.S. soldiers in Niger and explains it with the changes in the U.S.

legislation after 9/11 and the globalization of the war. While suggesting that these kinds of operations can be beneficial, Bergen (2017) criticizes the fact that they have not been carried out transparent. Lister et al. (2017) show that ISIS has carried out attacks throughout the world from Europe to North America starting from 2014. Dworkin (2017) discusses the participation of European countries in the war on terror in his article and suggests that security issues identified by Europe which has become prominent with ISIS claiming its piece of land has given rise to Europe joining the war on terror, which wasn't the case in the first wave of the GWOT against Al-Qaeda. Dworkin (2017) also suggests that equilibrium on what is right or wrong during the war is disturbed by giving an example from France when an attack by a French was responded with taking measures in the Middle East. Turkey is one of the countries that have been participated in the GWOT against ISIS (Köylü, 2015). In his work Saymaz (2017) investigates the planning phase of the ISIS attacks and shows evidence of members of ISIS who are from Turkey and operating in Turkey. Saymaz (2017) suggests that people in Turkey are introduced with Salafî and Wahhabi ideology with the jihadists passing back and forth between Turkey and Syria, benefitting from the transition of immigrants (p. 20). Similarly, in his fieldwork in Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep and Adıyaman, Acarer (2017) shows evidence of the ISIS presence in Turkey. Saymaz (2017) argues that Turkey has been late in joining the war against ISIS, which had started after ISIS's attacks, even though the transition of jihadists had been observed for a long time (p. 260). In the same vein, Taştekin (2016) also suggests that Turkey has been late to join the war against ISIS (p. 306). Moreover, Saymaz (2017) discusses the organizational problem in the police force as one of the reasons that the attacks couldn't prevented. There have been discussions in the foreign and Turkish media that Turkey has joined the war for different reasons. Bremmer (2015) and Aydıntaşbaş (2016) suggest that the Turkish involvement to the war is more of a war against YPG. Additionally, Tayyip Erdoğan has criticized the U.S. on taking action solely for ISIS but not YPG ("Erdoğan'dan ABD'ye 'PYD' Tepkisi," 2016).

According to the poll made by Türkiye Çalışmaları Merkezi (Center for Turkish Studies) (2016) the biggest problem in Turkey is seen as terror with 35.0% in 2016, slightly less than 2015 with 39.7% (p. 10). 76.1 % of the participants think ISIS poses a threat against Turkey (Türkiye Çalışmaları Merkezi, 2016, p. 55). 66.5% of the participants have voted for military and political solutions for fighting against terror, 34.6 and 31.9 respectively (Türkiye Çalışmaları Merkezi, 2016, p. 49). Meanwhile 47.8% of the participants supported Turkey's Operation Euphrates Shield (Türkiye Çalışmaları Merkezi, 2016, p. 39).



CHAPTER THREE

EKŞİ SÖZLÜK AS A SOCIAL MEDIA SITE

The information society and the network society have been discussed in the literature with the technological advances, yet authors working on the subject do not see the advances as solely technological and suggest that other institutions in the society have also been affected by the change. The features attributed to these societies such as decentralization, giving more power to the citizens have also been discussed with social media. It has been suggested as a public sphere that is not under the control of politicians or institutions. However, in recent years, it has also been discussed as a place disseminating hate speech and fake news. *Ekşi Sözlük* is a popular social media site in Turkey that enables authors to create their definition of events, subjects, and people. The fact that it was used even by political figures shows that it has perceived as an important sphere to disseminate the discourse. *Ekşi Sözlük* has been used in research and most of the studies that have investigated *Ekşi Sözlük* are on hate speech produced at the site.

3.1. The Information Society/The Network Society/Social Media

The information society was the concept writers used in order to define and predict the upcoming technological changes; yet a common definition of the information society is missing in the literature. The information society was expected to bring not only individual changes but societal changes as well. In a 1990s article, Masuda (1990/2004) compared the at-that-time present industrial society with his predictions on information society and suggested that the latter diverged from the former in numerous ways as it gave more sovereignty and freedom to people and possess a more egalitarian structure (p. 17). Masuda's (1990/2004) thoughts on information society suggest that it was not perceived as solely a technological change but also a societal change. Dyson, Gilder, Keyworth and Toffler (1996/2004) suggested that the society had gone through a change where knowledge became more precious than materials (p. 31). In addition,

Dyson, Gilder, Keyworth and Toffler (1996/2004) saw a potential in “cyberspace” and suggested that it enabled people to become closer while not inhibiting differences but allowing them to coexist (p. 37). Leadbeater (1999/2004) discussed the changes as the emergence of “knowledge capitalism” and suggested that knowledge, as a saleable product whose presence could be observed in almost every sector, was the last work of modern economy that constantly updated what it offered (p. 25). Conversely, Winner (1996/2004) approached the situation with a suspicion and suggested that the sovereignty was not given to everyone as some didn’t have a say in this process (p. 51). Rozsak (1986/2004) criticized the wording and maintained that, the fact that anything was accepted as an information without any investigation was not only problematic but also made the information worthless (p. 59). After the information society, the usage of network society has appeared in the literature and the discussions are still referring to the present. In his work *The Network Society*, Van Dijk (2006) makes a comparison between the “mass society” and the “network society” (p. 32-41). Van Dijk (2006) argues that in the mass society, people are close to others around them such as their families yet they don’t have a relationship with people who are geographically far away (Van Dijk, 2006, p. 33). Conversely, people in “network society” are “glocal” (Van Dijk, 2006, p. 36). The reason behind this is given as advances in the “information and communication technology” that doesn’t require one to physically move to other places to connect with others (Van Dijk, 2006, p. 36).

There are a large number of published studies on social media. Castells (2015) has investigated social movements that took place in several countries in *Networks of Outrage and Hope*. According to Castells (2015) the social movements were successful because of social media where people are not inhibited for what they say and share, unlike spheres that are under oppression by people with political and economic power. These features of social media led to a communication of feelings, which brought people closer without questioning who they were (Castells, 2015, p. 2). Conversely, Fuchs (2014) questions the validity of social media being accepted as a public sphere and suggests that how much the

owners of social media giants are earning and how much do they give back remains like a state secret yet what users share and do online is violated in order to gain more money (“The Internet, Social Media and the Public Sphere,” para. 40).

The discussions on the social movements as well as the ones suggesting social media as public sphere evolve around Web 2.0 in the literature. Hinton and Hjorth (2013) argue that changing the means of money making and playing an active role rather than being a passive audience are the features that diverge Web 2.0 from Web 1.0 (p. 18). Snee, Hine, Morey, Roberts and Watson (2016) maintain that there are few reasons that social networking sites and what they give to the researcher are meaningful (p. 13). Social media networks now constitute a part of our lives, they have presence from businesses to personal relationships and as past events, especially the disruptive ones, have proved, they are frequently used both for getting news and creating news (Snee, Hine, Morey, Roberts, & Watson 2016, p. 13). Lewis, Zamith and Hermida (2013) suggest that the constant flow of news is only one part of the conversation when it comes to Twitter, what is also present is a kind of editorial practice in which everyone takes a part that enable people to see what is right, important, and needs to be looked at (p. 40). According to Statista (2017), Facebook, Whatsapp, Facebook Messenger, QQ, and WeChat are the most widely used networking sites by September 2017. Hjorth and Hinton (2013) argue that the Internet as a place where people are in power is challenged by the unavoidable traces people leave, which are benefitted by several businesses (p. 25). In their interpretation of the report by Reuters Institute, Dođramaci and Radcliffe (2015) suggests that as people do not find the traditional media reliable, when compared to other countries, people living in Turkey are more frequently using social media as a news source.

While social media is praised by some in the literature, evidence from the literature suggests that in recent years it is also associated with negative concepts. Problems with the social media get ironic as Rainie, Anderson, and Albright (2017) argue that a feature of social media, freedom of not giving the actual name, allows users to act in threatening ways, yet the absence of this feature would also be threatening since it would give more authorization to the powerful ones in


hindering what people do and say. Kovach (2014) discusses social networking sites that do not require actual names in his work and suggests that this feature enables them to spread hate speech or explicit content effortlessly. In their article on *Telegraph* discussing “fake news”, Titcomb and Carson (2017) argue that, by giving people freedom to publish their content anonymously social media also enables the governments to spread “fake news” in a cheaper and easier way. Conversely, Rost, Stahel and Frey (2016) investigated the behavior of users in a social media site where tension was likely and found that people were acting more aggressively online (“Results,” para. 1) and not writing with one’s own name was not a factor in determining the level of aggression (“Results”, para. 4).

3.2. Ekşi Sözlük as an UGC Website

“*Ekşi Sözlük* is an UGC (user-generated content) website found by Sedat Kapanoğlu in 1999, which defines itself as the biggest Turkish reference source that is one of a kind, in its authentic format” (Bölükbaşı, personal communication, March 3, 2017). The website is actually in a format of dictionary in a very loose definition. *Ekşi Sözlük* requires authors to write original entries that are specifically about that heading which are in Turkish where making references in general and to other headings are also welcomed (ssg, 2008). Not following these rules causes one’s entry to be deleted (ssg, 2008). Headings differ from places, football games, celebrities, TV shows, political figures, aid campaigns, and events to personal issues such as love, friendship, and relationships. By adding weblinks, authors also share photos and videos. There is a moderation in the dictionary that starts after publishing the dictionary. In order to keep publishing entries without being deleted, the laws of the Turkish Republic must be followed and a frequent behavior of inducing hate and harm cause moderation to interfere and ban the account from the dictionary (ssg, 2012). Other reasons to get one’s account deleted are suggested as constantly publishing entries with poor quality and being disliked by other members (ssg, 2012). Authors whose accounts have been deleted are called *leyla*. It is possible for users to be friends with other users, which is called *badi* (buddy)

in the dictionary. The site also enables authors to message each other. The website has *bugün* (today) and *gündem* (hot agenda) sections. The today section shows the flow while the hot agenda basically shows the trending headlines of the website. The website also enables the author to see how many people has added an entry to their favorites yet it is not seen by the visitors. It is also possible to see the entries according to their votes; kind of a karma of likes and dislikes, named *şükela* (marvellous). An e-mail and a nickname are enough for an author to join *Ekşi Sözlük* (ekşisözlük, 2017b). The authors are considered as *çaylak* (noob) before becoming an author. Writing 10 entries are necessary for a *çaylak* to become a writer (ekşisözlük, 2017b). There are 345277 noobs and 76742 authors in the website (Bölükbaşı, personal communication, March 3, 2017). Entries written by noobs are not seen by the authors or public unless they become writers. One of the disadvantages of the website is that its credibility as a public sphere because of the moderation. Users usually resist this moderation by opening up new headlines about the deleted subject in several different names, even in Morse codes.

Figure 3.1 The Age and Gender Distribution of Ekşi Sözlük



Source: Bölükbaşı, personal communication, March 3, 2017.

As the Figure 3.1 shows, *Ekşi Sözlük*'s population is a young one, most of the authors being between 25-34. What's more, there are significantly more male authors. *Ekşi Sözlük* is the 16th most visited website in Turkey, whereas in the world it is the 728th according to Alexa (2017). Most of the visitors are from Turkey, followed by Germany, the United States, Azerbaijan and the United Kingdom (Alexa, 2017). When its popularity is concerned, *Ekşi Sözlük* serves as a great tool for scientific research as it is essentially more local than Twitter and Facebook. Evidence from the news suggests that *Ekşi Sözlük* has also been a source of news for the traditional media. The witnessing of an *Ekşi Sözlük* author who was at the Istanbul Atatürk Airport during a terrorist attack by ISIS is cited by *CNN Türk* ("Ekşi Sözlük Kullanıcısı Dehşet Anlarını Anlattı," 2017). The event when the *Ekşi Sözlük* authors were directly communicating with the main opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu by asking him questions on numerous subjects varying from a cat of CHP to personal relationships, was covered by *Hürriyet* ("CHP Lideri Kılıçdaroğlu, Ekşi Sözlük'te Soruları Yanıtladı," 2015). Emine Ülker Tarhan is another political figure that took part in an event answering the questions of *Ekşi Sözlük* authors and in his discussion on Kılıçdaroğlu and Tarhan's presence on *Ekşi Sözlük*, Yakın (2015) argues that social media have emerged as a place for politicians to reach the citizens and it enabled the citizens to be a part of the dialogue. The website also has been subjected to court cases where both the authors and its administrator gave testimony for their entries on religion ("Ekşi Sözlük Yazarlarına Da "Dini Değerleri Aşağılama" Davası", 2014).

3.3. Ekşi Sözlük as a Research Space

Ekşi Sözlük has been used in scientific research conducting case study (Akca, 2005), content analysis (Turan, 2013; Onbaşı, 2015), discourse analysis, (Oguz, 2011; Öztekin, 2015; Aslantürk & Turgut, 2015; Alp, 2016) and CDA (Yazıcı, 2016). The alternative nature of *Ekşi Sözlük* has also been the topic of a research by Gürel and Yakın (2007). Gürel and Yakın (2007) suggest that the

identity of the authors do not have an importance when they are on *Ekşi Sözlük* as they construct a whole new understanding of themselves by challenging the discourses and structures of the society and that's why they can be compared to the figures in *Fight Club* (p. 210). Gürel and Yakın (2007) also put forward the evidence that *Ekşi Sözlük* has an effect in real life as they suggest that people are using the specific sayings of *Ekşi Sözlük* in real life (p. 214). Hate speech has been one of the topics of research on *Ekşi Sözlük*. In her work, Yazıcı (2016) investigated the hate speech on *Ekşi Sözlük* directed at Syrian refugees as her sample showed that Syrians were conceived as a threat on many grounds (p. 129). However Yazıcı (2016) also presented evidence that *Ekşi Sözlük* had made efforts to hinder this hate speech by issuing moderation on it (p. 125), and that the majority of the authors were not performing hate speech (p. 127). Öztekin (2015) suggests that it is very likely to encounter with hate speech on online platforms (p. 926), and investigated the presence of hate speech against Jews on *Ekşi Sözlük* in her work. Similar to Yazıcı (2016), Öztekin (2015) discussed the moderation of *Ekşi Sözlük* against hate speech and proved evidence that on the ground of free speech, the authors did not welcome the moderation (p. 931). Öztekin's (2015) study found how intense hate speech was on *Ekşi Sözlük* against Jewish people that in some entries people were compared to animals (p. 933). Öztekin (2015) explained her results with the troubled relationship between Turkey and Israel and the discourse going around in public sphere (p. 931). Aslantürk and Turgut (2015) investigated sexist speech directed at women on *Ekşi Sözlük* and found that according to their results, authors of *Ekşi Sözlük* coded the dictionary as a male sphere where women were not welcomed (p. 71). Alp (2016) investigated hate speech on *Ekşi Sözlük* against gypsies and found that the majority of the entries constructed an unfavorable image of gypsies who were associated with crime and poor character traits (p. 161). Although rather small when compared to the negative ones, some entries constructed a favorable image of gypsies who were depicted as having a positive attitude about life (p. 164). Similar to Yazıcı (2016) and Öztekin (2015), Onbaşı (2015) discussed the moderation of *Ekşi Sözlük* against hate speech in her work. Onbaşı (2015) presented evidence that hate

speech was present on *Ekşi Sözlük* regarding the “Kurdish question” (p. 116). Onbaşı’s (2015) study found that Kurdish people were subjected to othering (p. 121), not considered as a nation (p. 122) and in an entry, compared to animals (p. 123). Oguz (2011) investigated how Arabs were perceived on *Ekşi Sözlük* and the results showed that they were described in unfavorable ways. Overall, there seems to be some evidence that *Ekşi Sözlük* has been used for research mostly to see how nations and genders are perceived, and it is possible to suggest that the alternative nature of *Ekşi Sözlük* has brought some negativities as hate speech.

Ethical issues to consider in the digital media research have been discussed in the literature by Wimmer and Dominick (2011, p. 64-85). Wimmer and Dominick (2011) suggest that it is not ethically wrong to use data from places that are accessible, without any conditions, by public (p 81). *Ekşi Sözlük*, being open to all readers using the Internet, do not contain with private pages/users as Facebook or Twitter. One of the advantages of being public is that the entries used in this study are given in the annexes as weblinks and are accessible by everyone who wishes to take a look. One of the advantages of using *Ekşi Sözlük* in scientific research is that the authors are not using their real names but nicknames when writing entries. Therefore, none of the real names are mentioned in this study. One of the ethical considerations of Wimmer and Dominick (2011) is the permission of the digital space being investigated (p. 81). According to *Ekşi Sözlük*, entries can be used as long as they don’t involve commercial purposes (ekşisözlük, 2017a). Apart from the ethical discussions another disadvantage of working on Twitter is the fact that it inhibits access to the data (Bruns & Burgess, 2016, p. 24; Brooker, Barnett, Cribbin & Sharma, 2016, p. 39). The fact that one needs to pay money to obtain Twitter APIs is criticized by Bruns and Burgess (2016, p. 26). On *Ekşi Sözlük*, it is possible to see all the comments on a subject.

CHAPTER FOUR

METHODOLOGY

Fairclough is one of the figures in the literature that has investigated the war on terror narrative, yet explained the narrative quite different than the others. In his book *Language and Globalization* Fairclough (2006) did not explain the emergence of the war on terror as a consequence of a single event but argues that it was due to a change: globalization (p. 7). According to Fairclough (2006) the war on terror was the result of the U.S. being a guardian of globalization for his own sake of pursuing dominance (p. 7). This example helps understanding what CDA aims and how CDA is applied. Fairclough (2006) starts with the problem of globalization, defines it, and then investigates the globalization in leaders' speeches using the war on terror narrative. According to Fairclough (2001) CDA investigates the presence of social problems in language (p. 230). This study applied Fairclough's (1993) "three-dimensional conceptualization of CDA" (p. 73), which sees the text, discursive practice, and social practice all related to each other. Some concepts of Fairclough were applied while some were excluded due to the lack of studies in Turkish language on those concepts.

4.1. Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis

Hodges (2011) discusses the discourse after 9/11 in his work and at the very beginning, he argues that the creation of meaning is made by language (p. 3). First it needs to be noted that, as evidence from the literature suggests, discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis are two distinct research methods (Weiss & Wodak, 2009, p. 4-6). Weiss and Wodak (2009) argue that while it is possible to suggest that Schutz's concept of "*Verstehen*" significantly influenced the discourse analysis and some other research methods (p. 4), identification of CDA with a founder or a philosophy is not possible (p. 6). Weiss and Wodak (2009) argue that one of the ways ideologies are conveyed is through language and by investigating language, critical discourse analysts are investigating how power is

distributed in society (p. 14). According to Van Dijk (1993) CDA is applied to investigate the discursive reflections of the issues the analyst sees in the society (p. 252). Van Dijk's view is supported by Fairclough (2001) while he also adds that what is investigated doesn't have to be a text in traditional meaning but a more inclusive concept which is "semiosis" (p. 229). Fairclough (2001) describes semiosis as "meaning-making through language, body language, visual images, or any other way of signifying" (p. 229). Furthermore, Fairclough (2003) does not describe CDA as the investigation of language but investigation of what is practiced through language, as he says, "... language is an irreducible part of social life, dialectically interconnected with other elements of social life, so that social analysis and research always has to take account of language" (p. 2). Moreover, what Van Dijk (1993) discusses as the "principle" of CDA suggest that the analysts are somewhat performing a subjective work as he maintains that they take the side of the powerless ones against the elites (p. 252).

It is also important to note that different contributors of CDA have different understandings of the concepts and methods for analysis (Weiss & Wodak, 2001, p. 12). Some important figures of CDA are Ruth Wodak, Norman Fairclough, Teun A. Van Dijk, Gunther Kress, and Bob Hodge. Some topics Fairclough has investigated are "the discourse of new labour" (2001, p. 229), "enterprise culture" (1993, p. 11) and "new capitalism" (2003, p. 8). Although researchers who are theorizing the CDA have different areas to focus, overall, what they take for granted is almost the same. Furthermore, the most important object of CDA, investigating the social problems through the language, is very applicable to the subject of "the politics of fear". How do the traumas that the people have been exposed to as well as the politics of fear that has been implemented end up affecting people, can be investigated through analyzing the language.

In order to look for the five themes of the war on terror narrative, Fairclough's approach of critical discourse analysis was applied. Fairclough's (1993) uses a "three-dimensional conception of discourse" in his analysis (p. 73). Along with the text itself, "three-dimensional conception of discourse"

investigates discursive practice and social practice of the text (Fairclough, 1993, p. 73). Fairclough (2003) sees these concepts as being diffused one another (p. 29). Evidence from the literature proves that Fairclough has made several changes in his terminology of CDA throughout the years. His understanding of CDA and its principles hasn't changed but he has made a different grouping as "action", "representation" and "identification" instead of text, discursive practice and social practice in *Analyzing Discourse* (Fairclough, 2003, p. 26). For this study a combination of Fairclough's tools for analysis in *Analyzing Discourse* (2003) and *Discourse of Social Change* (1993) were used. For the discursive approach, discourse, style, genre, antagonist-protagonist structure, intertextual chains, intertextuality, dialogicality, interdiscursivity, assumptions, and irony were investigated. Entries with ridiculing were also evaluated under the same roof or irony. What Fairclough (2003) suggests as a discourse here shouldn't be confused with the discursive practice that is more inclusive (p. 26). Fairclough (1993) adds more to what irony is and suggests that citing expressions can become ironic when they are irrelevant to the situation, which can be interpreted as a criticism to the owner of the expression (p. 123). Considering social actors, Fairclough (2003) suggests that there is an "antagonist-protagonist structuring" that are implicit in texts (p. 54). Therefore, in order to determine attributions given to the social actors, Fairclough (2003) investigates space that is given to the social actors, wording, and style (p. 53). Intertextuality gives us information if other's utterances are addresses in the text that is under investigation or not (Fairclough, 2003, p. 17). In order to reveal what is hidden, Fairclough (2013) discusses investigating assumptions: "existential assumptions", "propositional assumptions" and "value assumptions" (p. 55). Fairclough's (2003) understanding of assumption can be explained as investigating what is taken as true by the author of the text (p. 55). For the textual analysis agent, wording, metaphor, tense, modality are the features that were investigated. Fairclough's (2003) defines modality as "the relationship it sets up between author and representations" (p. 219). The fact that there are only few studies in the Turkish language on modality, suggests that the concept is still rather vague for the Turkish language. Seçkin

(2014) argues that there isn't a discussion in the studies on the Turkish grammar that are specifically on modality yet implies that it is started being studied recently ("Kip Ve Kiplik İlişkisi," para. 6). Furthermore, what Seçkin (2014) argues is that modality can be traced by looking at the meaning but not forms ("Kiplik," para. 1). The types of modality and their definition differ in the literature (Seçkin, 2014, "Kiplik," para. 5). For this study, Emeksiz's (2008) and Gül's (2008) interpretations of modality were used as a source. Their classification is based on Palmer's, which is compatible with what Fairclough (2003) suggests on modality. Wording is an important part of the analysis to see how the others and us, if available, are described both with the adjectives and verbs. The words and verbs to describe the other constitute a framing about the other to the viewers.

Fairclough (1993) uses Halliday's approach to linguistics in most of his conceptualizations. Unfortunately, in Turkish grammar textbooks there isn't this kind of classification. The functional grammar concept in Turkish language goes hand in hand with its English translations. Ercan and Bakırlı (2009), Sebzecioğlu and Oktar (2010), Musaoğlu (2003) are some of the researchers that have adapted the functional grammar in Turkish, taking Van Dijk's concepts. Musaoğlu's utterances (2003) on how it would be useful to adapt functional grammar to Turkish show that there hasn't been enough reference and discussion about the subject (p. 23). The cohesion and other features of systemic functional grammar which takes a great part in Fairclough's analysis was not found to be applicable due to lack of Turkish adaptations. Second reason is that the texts of *Ekşi Sözlük* are in social media genre. The sentences on *Ekşi Sözlük* are not made according to Turkish grammar rules, and it is not clear whether there are paragraphs or not. The linguistic part of the analysis is very important for CDA, which makes it impossible to exclude completely but needed to be adapted to Turkish language with some exclusions. What Fairclough (1993) finds very important in CDA is the analysis of agents, investigation of passivity and activity as he explains it with "responsibility" (p. 76). Fairclough (2001) gives an example of a commercial where no agent is detected and explains it with "the exploitation of 'Third World'

labour” (p. 243). Akcan (2008) is among the few researchers that have investigated the agency in Turkish.

The third dimension is social practice. It was investigated with orders of discourse, and ideological and political effects of discourse. Orders of discourse aims to understand what are the norms of doing the particular practice in question of the research (Fairclough, 2003, p. 24). Ideological and political effects of discourse is interested with how the particular text can contribute to change (Fairclough, 2003, p. 9).

4.2. Research on Social Media and Critical Discourse Analysis

Research in social media has been done in various websites with various methods. Twitter has been used in order to look for trends after various events (Towers et al., 2015). Stirling’s (2016) study was carried out on Facebook by “digital ethnography” (p. 53). After the researcher made sure that the participants gave permission to participate in the study she gave participants the freedom to sent her a friend request to start the study (Stirling, 2016, p. 56). Critical discourse analysis has been used in studies conducted on social media on several occasions. KhosraviNik and Zia (2014) investigated how Iranians perceived national identity by using CDA on Facebook in their study. In her study, Hamrita (2016) investigated Facebook pages of publicly known people to discuss how Islamism was perceived in Tunisia by applying CDA. Erol (2013) applied CDA in order to investigate the discussion on Twitter about Hrant Dink by looking at the retweets of Ahmet Hakan. Törnberg and Törnberg (2016) investigated the perception of Muslims on Swedish forums by applying CDA in their study.

One of the advantages of using CDA on *Ekşi Sözlük* is its structure, which is similar to a forum when compared to Twitter and Facebook. On Twitter, hashtags help to understand what the author talks about, yet in the absence of it meaning can get vague. On *Ekşi Sözlük*, users are able to publish videos and photos yet only through weblinks. That’s why most of the data consists of written texts that are applicable for CDA. Although Fairclough’s (2001) understanding

of CDA is not limited to these kinds of texts (p. 229) his methods do not include analysis of videos etc. Thus, the presence of images and videos would require another kind of analysis. Another advantage of *Ekşi Sözlük* is that authors are writing under the headings, therefore one can know that the entry is written about the heading and can evaluate according to it. Another advantage that needs to be mentioned is that authors are writing comments about headings but not chatting with each other in the headings which makes it easier to control where the conversation goes or more importantly comes from.

4.3. Applying Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis to Ekşi Sözlük

Just after it was found out that there had been a terrorist attack in Reina, *Ekşi Sözlük* authors started commenting on various headings. There were so many entries on Reina that a selection was necessary in order to apply CDA. Sampling was selected by time. Refining the search with time gives more contexts that might not be found when solely a theme is searched. Refining the phenomena by a theme might have ended up missing the data. As an example, searching solely for the Reina massacre might have caused missing what was written about MIT, security, ISIS and other topics and headings that might have been written in their relation to the Reina massacre. Another point in choosing time sampling is that headings on *Ekşi Sözlük* become very similar to each other once an event is occurred. Authors who are contributing to a heading with their entries may also create another heading as a reaction. Therefore, searching solely for the Reina massacre might have ended up missing relevant data. *Ekşi Sözlük* enables the visitors to select a timeline to see which topics are discussed through those dates and it was used in this study. As some changes in the dictionary may occur via deleting or changing the entries, the data that had been used was archived via <https://web.archive.org/>. The archived link of the entries is in Table A.1 in the Annexes.

The headings that most of the entries were written between 01.01.17 and 02.01.17 were investigated. There are 50 headings with each having at least 35

entries in the selected time period, the most written one, with 1600 entries, being “January 1st, 2017 Ortaköy Nightclub Attack”. From those 50 headings, 28 were found to be relevant to the subject being investigated for this research. Irrelevant headings were not included. 10 *şükela* entries in these 28 headings were collected. *Ekşi Sözlük* authors like and unlike other author’s entries and the most liked and the least disliked ones can be seen as *şükela* in the related heading’s page. Looking for *şükela*’s helped reducing the data as well as giving the information about the atmosphere of *Ekşi Sözlük*, the discourses that showed up and liked amongst others. The discourse in the entries were investigated to see if the five suggested themes of the war on terror, which were explained in previous chapters, were present in the discourse. Phillips and Jørgensen (2001) have criticized Fairclough for not investigating various texts before making a conclusion (p. 89). For this study, this limitation was overcome by investigating 280 texts. Fairclough (1993) gives freedom to do analysis by separating the text according to what is researched or what texts include etc. (p. 230). Before applying CDA, texts were categorized according to their themes. Grouping the data was an effective way to see how the texts were interrelated as well as how they constituted categories when they were put together. Categorizing the data has also been used in social media research, especially concerning *Ekşi Sözlük* (Yazıcı, 2013; Alp, 2016; Aslantürk & Turgut, 2015). After the categorization, the relationship between the texts was clearly seen and CDA was applied to all of the texts. It should be noted that CDA wasn’t applied according to this categorization. Texts were investigated one by one and distinguished according to some of their patterns. Fairclough (1993) advises to investigate what is common or uncommon in the texts (p. 218). Accordingly, in this study, texts were both distinguished according to the five themes under investigation and their linguistic features as tables A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5, A.6 in the Annexes show. Entries with common linguistic features are under same columns. CDA was applied to the original, Turkish version of texts but the analysis is in English. Therefore, some words were written in Turkish and their English translations were given in parentheses.

4.4. Categorization of the Data

For categorizing the texts of *Ekşi Sözlük*, the coding strategies of the grounded theory were used. Charmaz (2006) argues that the aim of grounded theory is to have a meaningful understanding of subjective experiences, events, and people's way of expressing them (p. 2). The categories were not made before the analysis or made according to the 5 themes this research originally aims to look for. One advantage of grounded theory given as an example is revealing researcher a fact that haven't seen before, changing the pre-accepted beliefs on the importance of a concept (Willig, 2013, p. 229). Charmaz (2006) prefers analyzing and understanding the text before looking what has been said in the literature (p. 151). Similarly, Corbin and Strauss (2008) advise not to limit oneself with literature review before the analysis (p. 128). For this study, literature review and preconceived theories were present, yet the categorization of the data was made without any biases. As grounded theory was solely used for its coding techniques, the presence of literature review was not important. Furthermore, using "theoretical sampling" which is advised by Corbin and Strauss (2008) wasn't possible for this study as the sample was already established (p. 392). There are different approaches in grounded theory and Corbin and Strauss' (2008) approach was used for this research.

All 280 entries on *Ekşi Sözlük* were uploaded to the 12th version of the qualitative analysis program, MAXQDA. Evidence from the literature suggests that MAXQDA has been used in scientific research made in various topics (Batdı, 2017; Batdı & Elaldı, 2016; Ünal, 2017). MAXQDA has also been used by Corbin and Strauss (2008) to introduce people to the grounded theory (p. 130). Using MAXQDA helped to see the relationship between the codes more clearly as the program enables the user to see the codes according to their color. The grounded theory approach was made by turning text into codes and categories. The text was turned into codes according to the techniques Corbin and Strauss (2008) suggest (p. 432-603). Corbin and Strauss advise to investigate what is common or uncommon between the data (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 519). The

process required reading the text numerous times, also including a lot of note taking. Some phrases, patterns and way of speaking were coded according to the context in Turkey and *Ekşi Sözlük*. Grounded theory helped the visualization of the data and enabled it to be viewed in categories, which made it more available for the critical discourse analysis. Using grounded theory in combination with CDA cultivated the information that was taken from the texts, as it wasn't made according to the themes of this study. It gave what the texts originally had constructed.

Table 4.1 Distribution of Ekşi Sözlük Entries According to Grounded Theory

Major categories	Subcategories
The government (Core category)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Not Performing its Duties 2) Security 3) Intelligence <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Surveillance 4) Supporters of the Government 5) Foreign Policy 6) Syrians 7) Economic Crisis
Discourse	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Pointing People as a Target 2) Lifestyle Choices 3) Polarization 4) Comments on the New Year Celebrations 5) Double Standard
Religion	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Islam and Islamists 2) Supporting Terrorism 3) Feeling Happy for the Reina 4) Praising Islam 5) Real Islam 6) Principles 7) Critics of Faith
Media	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Social Media 2) Newspapers/Journalists/Channels

Theories About the Attack	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Finding Theories Nonsense <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) M. Ali Alabora and Others b) CIA 2) Conspiracy Theories <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Foreign Powers b) Future Conspiracies 3) Theories on FETÖ
Other	
Justice	
Turkey	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Transformation of Turkey 2) Civil War 3) Turkey Being Dangerous
Ridiculing	
Feelings	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Anxiety 2) Fear 3) Sadness 4) Numbness 5) Sadness 6) Numbness

Grounded theory's categorization procedures were helpful for reading the texts numerous times, being familiar with the content and discourse in the entries. There are 10 main headings with associated subheadings. Headings and subheadings can be seen in the Table 4.1 organized in accordance with their occurrence. It needs to be noted that some of the subheadings are more coded than main headings in the text.

The most important part of the analysis is to solve core category and its relationship with other categories. "Core variable" is defined as "the main concern and its recurrent solution" ("What is grounded theory", n.d.). Corbin and Strauss' (2008) approach to the grounded theory also involves identifying a "core category" (p. 688). According to the coded entries on *Ekşi Sözlük*, the core category after the Reina massacre was "the government". The government was found guilty of the Reina attack on many different grounds.

The subcategories of "the government" constitute what government was accused of mainly, as it was the core category "the government" was applied to other categories and subcategories. The subcategories in "the government" were

highly related to each other, co-occurring at the same time in most of the entries. “Not performing its duties” was the most coded subcategory in this category. Most of the writers mentioned the tax they were paying in return for security. As the government had the executive power to provide the security, entries were put in this subcategory. The Reina massacre was seen as an attack happened due to a lack of security, which should have been provided by the government/officials or its institutions. Writers believed the intelligence and surveillance of the government and its institutions were not enough, or when they had the intelligence they didn’t take enough precautions. The foreign policy of the government was criticized for solely creating trouble, making Turkey lonelier than ever. Syrians were coded 4 times among 280 entries, showing that some writers perceived Syrians as potential terrorists that the government shouldn’t have accepted into the country. However, that number is too small to see it as significant. Economic crisis was the least coded subcategory. Writers predicted an upcoming economic crisis because of the government’s politics. However, again, it was coded in insignificant times. By not providing “security”, “intelligence”, and “surveillance” the government was criticized for “not performing its duties”.

Code relations browser in MAXQDA provides the co-occurrence of the categories. It shows that the category “the government” was in tight relationship with other categories, which made it the core variable. The government was related to the problems uttered in other categories: Religion, Media, Justice, and Discourse. “The government” category was mostly coded with subcategories of “not performing its duties”, “Islam”, “justice”, “ridiculing”, “security”, “intelligence”, “pointing people as a target”, lifestyle choices”, “double standard”, social media”, and “newspapers/journalists/channels”.

The “discourse” category consists of five associated subcategories. Writers’ comments on discrimination and nourishing hatred on others were put into this category. The subcategories in this category mostly co-occurred in the entries. “Islam and Islamists”, “the government”, and “social media” were the focal points in all of the subcategories in this category. “Pointing people as a target” was the most coded subcategory in this category, mostly co-coded with

“the government”, “social media”, “newspapers/journalists/channels”, “supporters of the government”. The discourse of the government officials and institutions were claimed to be making people targets for hate speech, usually by social media. A tweet from the Ministry of Internal Affairs was taken most of the code. It was believed that people convoking for secularism were being pointed as “terrorists” with the tweet.

A tweet by a journalist that was stated as the supporter of the government drew attention in the entries. His tweet suggested that Mehmet Ali Alabora and Amberin Zaman were the ones responsible for the attack. The responses by the writers were either ridiculing the situation or calling out for the judges to prosecute those who point people as targets. It was claimed that the opponents of the government were being labeled as “terrorists”. CHP, Alewis, and secularists were some of the targets labeled by the government. In the “discourse” category, “comments on new year celebrations” took an important part. Writers mentioned the *khutbah* that was given against the celebrations of New Year (“Diyanet'ten Yılbaşı Ve Piyangoyla İlgili Cuma Hutbesi: 'Gayrimeşru Davranışlar,’”2016). The Religious Affairs Administration was criticized for the *khutbat*. It was suggested that “claiming new year celebrations as a sin” was a product of Islamists, institutions of the government, and supporters of the government. Mehmet Görmez (Head of the Religious Affairs administration) and Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü (preacher) who suggested that the place of the terrorist attack had no importance were criticized for being inconsistent, former for the *khutbat*, latter for his previous tweets on New Year celebrations. Finding it as a discrimination against people’s “lifestyle choices” and “pointing people as a target”, writers see this discourse going about the New Year celebrations as the responsible of the massacre, inducing people (the believers) hate those who celebrate the New Year.

“Lifestyle choices” involved the authors’ criticism of interfering with others’ lifestyles. “Double standard” subcategory clashed merely with “the government”. Writers also claimed that all citizens and officials did not share the pain of the Reina victims. The martyr status was also discussed when the governor of Istanbul made a statement and declared that the victims were not

martyrs. The reason behind this decision was seen as people's lifestyles and alcohol consumption in the Reina. "Double standard" subcategory also included the unjust treatment of the opponents of the government. "Polarization" subcategory involved the claim that people in the country hated one another and didn't have anything common to share. Writers claimed that the ones who are aiming for polarization were responsible for this result. Overall, writers had the feeling that they are being targeted by the government, its supporters, and Islamists because of their lifestyle, their celebrations were attacked and interrupted, and they were not treated the same as when the supporters of the government or the Islamists were being attacked/killed. The "others" in the country didn't share their pain.

"Religion" constitutes another category with 7 associated subcategories. The most coded subcategory in "religion" was "Islam and Islamists". It was also the most coded after "the government". Writers associated Islamists with the government and its supporters. Because of the *khutbat* concerning the New Year, writers found the government's institutions as responsible for the attack. The Ministry of Interior was also found Islamist, for attacking the call for secularism as terrorism. Writers criticized Islamists for being disrespectful to the "lifestyle choices" and their "comments on the New Year celebrations", the most co-occurred subcategories in this category. Distributing brochures against the New Year celebrations were criticized severely. Comments on the New Year celebrations were perceived as an intervention to people's lifestyle choices as well as being the responsible for the attack, making the ones who celebrate, a target. Islamists were seen as the ones responsible for the deterioration of the country. A journalist's comment on TV after the Reina massacre was criticized severely for saying they were going to be against the New Year celebrations regardless of (people) being blown up. It seems that social media was given as a place where Islamists share their opinions and whose discourse that writers found as problematic. Authors were sharing screenshots in social media, showing people "feeling happy for Reina". In the screenshots, the ones feeling happy for the Reina

massacre explained it with their religion and faith in Islam. The ones being happy for the attack were seen as the majority of the country by the authors.

The “principals” were coded 5 times, claiming it is the fundamental law of Islam that those who are “other” than the believers should be killed. One entry suggests that Islamists have no respect for human life. “Supporting terrorism” was another subcategory in this category. In some occasions, Islamists were called sympathizers of ISIS and perceived as supporting terrorism. 5 entries suggested Turkey as being the supporter of the attackers. Ministry of Interior’s call for “seculars” and people “feeling happy for Reina” were considered as the ones who supported terrorism. There were 3 subcategories in this category that had positive attitude on Islam and praised by the authors.

A woman talking about the Prophet and God after the attack was praised as a believer. In the entries of that heading, people were talking about their faith in God and Islam. They were coded under “praising Islam”. One subcategory constituted the minority on *Ekşi Sözlük*, “real Islam”. It was suggested that the real Islam was not ISIS and its supporters, yet it was uttered in insignificant numbers when compared with the ones stating otherwise. There was only one entry that mocked the ones telling it was not real Islam. The subcategory “critics of believers” constituted the ones criticizing the abovementioned woman because of her expressions.

Media was one of the categories that has been co-occurred with “the government”, “supporters of the government”, and “Islam and Islamists”. The media channels mentioned in the entries was claimed to be a supporter of the government, being silent about the government’s responsibilities, blaming others for the attack, such as the owner and the security of Reina. Tweets in social media and entries on *Ekşi Sözlük* constituted the social media subcategory. The usage of social media was limited with negative aspects on *Ekşi Sözlük*. “Pointing as a target” is the most co-coded subcategory with “social media”. Government and its supporters were blamed for “pointing people as a target” by social media. Some were called “*Aktrolls*”.

Tweets by the supporters of the government were severely criticized. A journalist suggesting M. Ali Alabora as the responsible for the attack constituted a separate headline on *Ekşi Sözlük*. While some prefer “ridiculing” entries under this headline, some perceived it as branding him a target and would like the justice system to intervene and prosecute those who slander him. Ministry of Internal Affairs’ tweets were criticized as “pointing people as a target” on Twitter. “Islam and Islamist” and “lifestyle choices” were also apparent in this subcategory. Islamists were seen as attackers and invaders of other peoples’ lifestyles. Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü was criticized for his previous tweets on the New Year celebrations. Screenshots were shared by one entry, showing people claiming that celebrating the New Year as a sin and suggesting that it was good that those people had died. Some writers on *Ekşi Sözlük* were also criticized; it was a separate *Ekşi Sözlük* heading named “dictionary full of agents”.

“Theories about the attack” was another category in the entries. There were contradictory views that constituted different subcategories in this category. There were 3 categories and their subcategories. Some entries included “future conspiracies” after the release of a photograph of the front side view of Istanbul University by ISIS. Under the heading, people were discussing the meaning of the photo and a possible attack. “Foreign powers” subcategory included ISIS’s relationship with other countries. One entry suggested that Russia and ISIS had a relationship; another one supposed that the abovementioned photograph might have been used by the terrorists to communicate with Russia. Another entry showed a shared comment on social media suggesting Europe and the U.S. was afraid of Turkey being so powerful, which was criticized in the entry. United Kingdom was mentioned in several entries having a relationship with the terrorists. One entry suggested that the U.S. created ISIS. There was a subcategory named “finding theories nonsense”, which includes the most coded entries, branding the United Kingdom as the responsible party was found as nonsense and ridiculous for many. In the same vein, authors on *Ekşi Sözlük* found theories suggesting “Mehmet Ali Alabora and others” and “CIA” as the perpetrators nonsense and claimed Turkey (the government) as the responsible for the attack

instead. “Theories on FETÖ” were an ambivalent one, making it a separate subcategory. One entry mentioned the STV show where Santa Claus committed a massacre; one talked about agent *Ekşi Sözlük* writers supporting FETÖ (Fethullah Terrorist Organization). FETÖ was commonly acknowledged as a terrorist organization, yet entries suggest that government was using it to attack and blame people.

The category “other” was the 6th most coded category. However, the content of the “other” category included the ones that didn’t fit the major categories. In some *Ekşi Sözlük* headings, there were entries that were irrelevant, or not completely similar to the concern of other writers’. Most of the subcategories were coded only once. As an example, taxi drivers benefiting from the attack was the 2nd most coded one in the category. It was suggested that some taxi drivers asked for 5.000 TL from the customers in front of Reina after the attack. Writers reacted with curse words about the taxi drivers in the heading.

One of the important subcategory that needs to be noted was about Barbaros Şansal. After broadcasting a video on the situation of Turkey, stating it was “full of shit” and tweeting the Reina had been attacked because its owner was Alewi he had two separate headings on *Ekşi Sözlük*. “Barbaros Şansal being ridiculous” was the most coded subcategory in the category. Writers found his accusations and statements as being ridiculous, with a few supporting his statements but not his attitude. It was claimed that with his tweet he was pointing people as targets and discriminating people according to their religion. This is important, as he was clearly opposing the government which most of the entries on *Ekşi Sözlük* also had; yet he was not welcomed but criticized for his attitudes. Pointing people as targets and discrimination were found unacceptable for the writers.

“Justice” was another category that was apparent in the entries. “Justice” was co-occurred mostly with “the government”. The reason justice didn’t have any subcategories was that it was used rather in a general meaning, the belief that justice was not being served. First, it was suggested that the rule of law was not working in the country. As mentioned in the section “the government”, writers

claimed that the government was not performing its duties as providing security and collecting intelligence. In the entries it was suggested that the ones responsible for the security of the citizens had failed their jobs when this massacre had happened and they needed to take the responsibility and resign. It was suggested that whatever happens, the government and its officials never resign, which makes people think that justice was not served right. It was also suggested that the ones pointing people as targets, discriminating others, commenting on New Year as a sin, and sympathizing with ISIS, should have been noticed by the state's attorneys and subsequently accused/arrested. Second, writers demanded the terrorist to be caught. Sense of justice was disturbed by fact that the terrorist were on the run. Writers felt that justice was not served for those who made the attack. Writers also talked about the double standard that the Reina victims faced by not considered as martyrs.

Turkey was another category mentioned in the entries with 3 subcategories. It was suggested that Turkey was deteriorated and it's going to get worse with the government's policies. Under "transformation of Turkey" people remembered the "old Turkey" as not being occupied with today's concerns. The "civil war" constituted a subcategory and seen as a possible result of the polarization in the country. Another subcategory was on "Turkey being dangerous". Writers didn't feel safe; some stated their concern for the lack of security.

"Ridiculing" constituted a separate category, although it was apparent in most of other categories and subcategories. It constituted mostly entries with irony. It was mostly co-occurred with the category "the government" to mock the officials' statements. Prime Ministers' statement on "scaring the terror", Deputy Prime Minister's statement on "being cautious but not be scared", a journalist blaming Mehmet Ali Alabora for the attack were mocked numerous times. MİT was a separate heading on *Ekşi Sözlük*, where majority of the entries were ridiculing it as an institution. It shows that people's respect for the institution was gone. The government's construction projects were also mocked as Huqqa and

Beltur were mentioned in captions. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was mentioned in an entry as “Kılışdar”, ridiculing the government’s and its supporters’ discourse.

Feelings category was the 2nd least coded category among the entries. People were mostly sharing their anxiety, sadness, and fear of death; the humane fears of existence. There were also entries concerning numbness.

In sum, when categories were considered independently, the 5 most coded ones are respectively: the government, Islam and Islamists, social media, pointing people as targets, and lifestyle choices.



CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION

It has been argued that the politics of fear is used for manipulating people in order to have political gains. The concept has been discussed with leaders' discourses and media framings yet both social media and what citizens construct have been missing. Some of the studies have mentioned the polls, some have solely based their arguments on assumptions, but majority of them have not investigated the citizens. By looking at *Ekşi Sözlük*, the aim was to investigate both the social media and citizens' discourse. For this study, five themes of the war on terror narrative were selected. These were, Security/Intelligence/Surveillance, Us vs. Them, Secularism and Western Values, Foreign Policy/Military Intervention/Other Countries' Plots, and Turkey Being Dangerous. *Ekşi Sözlük* entries showed that it was possible to separate entries according to these five themes. In discussion, a summary of what was traced in the five entries were given and discussed how compatible they were with the war on terror narrative. Most of the results were discussed with the Turkish national identity, the identity of the authors, and the political atmosphere in Turkey.

5.1. Genre, Discourse, Intertextuality, and Dialogicality of Ekşi Sözlük

When talking about genres, Fairclough (2003) mentions websites and discusses the emergence of the format as: "The format brings together genres which are taken from other technologies..." (p. 77). *Ekşi Sözlük*, an user-generated content but a website in the bigger picture has a format. On *Ekşi Sözlük*, entries may contain interviews (interview genre), screenshots, videos, statements of the officials (political genre), comments, comments about other authors' statements, giving news about the events (journalist genre), and weblinks. Hence, the genre of *Ekşi Sözlük* and its entries are a mixed one and it is not possible to talk about a specific genre. Entries on Reina include many genres together. There are local sayings in the dictionary that are used by most of the authors, yet there

isn't a generic structure of the text. The only rule in the dictionary concerning genre is that an entry must be given as a description, yet there is a very loose understanding of the definition.

One interesting fact in *Ekşi Sözlük* entries after the Reina massacre, is that most of the entries are comments on other people's, officials', and journalists' statements. It means entries are highly intertextual. According to Fairclough (2003) intertextuality is an important aspect of texts as it brings "dialogicality" (p. 41). Most of the entries on *Ekşi Sözlük* are intertextual, having the utterance of others in the text. Some headings are after some of the officials such as the Governor Vasip Şahin, Head of the Religious Affairs Administration Mehmet Görmez, the Government Spokesman Numan Kurtulmuş, the Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, and other known figures such as Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü, Serdar Arseven, Turgay Güler, and Barbaros Şansal. The statements of these people are directly the name of some headings. In the entries, their statements are given by both direct and indirect references. Entries constitute intertextual chains when authors comment on each other's entries and the government officials, celebrities etc. This way, authors are referencing others, hence have other people's voices in their entries. When the entry owner deletes the entry or has been banned from dictionary it is not possible to understand whom the authors address to, as these are more covert than direct references. The heading "January 1st, 2017 the Country Behind the Reina Attack" has this problem. In the heading, authors are addressing to someone but it is not possible to know. One author is mentioning another author who has been taken out of the dictionary and it is not possible to know what that writer has had written. Apart from direct references, there are some covert references of the officials' statements such as the President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Parliament Member Burhan Kuzu, former Deputy Secretary of MİT Afet Güneş, and the newspaper *Yeni Akit*. The dense intertextuality of the texts show those others' statements make a great impact on *Ekşi Sözlük*. In the case of the Reina massacre the statements are discussed more than the attack itself. It crosschecks the grounded theory results as the discourse of others has a great impact on the authors on *Ekşi*

Sözlük concerning the Reina massacre. There are also linguistic intertextual chains. Authors not only give responses to each other but are also a part of the linguistic chain while writing in the same linguistic style in some of the headings and about some issues. Entries on MİT, Reina's closing, government's duty to provide security, Numan Kurtulmuş's statement for being cautious, Binali Yıldırım's statement on scaring the terror are the examples that authors use the same linguistic style. Entries in the headings are written as if authors are also answering to and copying each other's linguistic style.

Another important concept to mention is dialogicality. Fairclough's (2003) "dialogicality" refers to "an openness to, acceptance of, recognition of difference..." (p. 41). Concerning dialogicality, most of the texts are mixed. There are direct references of others' words in the texts, which make the texts intertextual as mentioned before. The fact that Fairclough (2003) sees intertextuality as a key factor for dialogicality (p. 41) is mentioned in the previous paragraph. However in *Ekşi Sözlük* entries they are used not for accepting difference but mostly for constructing polemic. They are what Fairclough (2003) calls them "an accentuation of difference, conflict, polemic, a struggle over meaning, norms, power" (p. 42). Authors are mentioning different groups such as Syrians, supporters of the government, Islamists, and religious people which may look like an openness to difference at first but they are given as others and in some cases as enemies, which can't be suggested as an openness and dialogue but rather polemic. While expressing feelings such as fear or discussing the transformation of the country, by using the subjective modality "we", authors make a "consensus, a normalization and acceptance of differences" (Fairclough, 2003, p. 42). By doing that, authors talk about other people's private feelings such as fear, which is first of all not possible to be known by the authors and also make their text far from dialogicality, giving no room for others' opinions in reality. There are also generalizations with the plural "you" that serves for covering differences. Assumptions take a lot of part in the texts, which is an obstacle for "dialogicality" according to Fairclough (2003, p. 41). Subjective modality with "I" is not densely used in the texts, apparent used mostly in expressing fear. The

lack of subjective modality “I” suggests that authors have high “affinity” with their statements (Fairclough, 1993, p. 159). It also suggests that the statements are given as the truth. Most of the sentences are in the form of objective modality, used with the “-dır” copula, which has different purposes in Turkish. According to Aksan (2001), “-dır” copula is used in Turkish for “determination, detection and official statements”, “stating probability or prediction”, “identifying an event or a situation that was lived frequently in the past”, “reinforcing the meaning of necessity”, and “stating a prediction that was expected to be accomplished in the past” (p. 96-97). In most of the texts the copula -dır is used for determination. Besides, modals as “may be”, “might be” are used only on some occasions. Fairclough (1993) argues that using objective modality makes the source vague and portrays the owner of the statement as powerful (p. 159). There are no references or evidences for the readers to see if the statements have solid foundations, reflect the truth, and whose truth is given. For that reason, texts can be accepted as neither dialogical nor monological but a mixed one.

Concerning discourse there are only some apparent ones. First of all, what the authors construct can be considered as citizen discourse. Authors are commenting on events, statements of the officials as citizens of this country. When pronouns “we” and “us” are used they are mostly used for all the citizens of the country. By using deontic modality, citizens are making demands from the state/government, such as security measures. By criticizing and mocking the institutions and officials they are commenting on as citizens of the country. When talking about civil war, they are citizens of the country who write their concerns and fears. When talking about agents, they are the citizens of the country who are either mocking the theories or trying to understand the “enemies” on *Ekşi Sözlük*.

Second apparent discourse is the secular discourse. It is apparent that people are accepting secularism as a desirable value assumption. The discussion on the Reina victims not being declared as martyrs is an example of that. Authors suggest that the state is acting according to the religion and therefore, they oppose that decision. Authors suggest being a martyr shouldn't be determined according to lifestyle of the victims and the religion of the officials. Similarly, secular

discourse is apparent in the heading on the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Halkevleri (People's houses). Authors take the side of Halkevleri for convoking secularism. They criticize the attitude of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and suggest the institution does not act according to secularism. There are also some texts that suggest the government does not act according to secularism. The Religious Affairs Administration's *fatwa* against the New Year celebrations are criticized severely. All these are undesirable value assumptions in the texts.

There are some distinct Kemalist discourses in the text. There is only one author that mentions Atatürk and suggests that secularism is owed to him. Another one is the entry that starts with "*Efendiler...*" (Gentlemen). It is a direct expression that Kemal Atatürk used in his speeches. In his/her entry, the author also discusses informing the *halk* (the people), which shows traces of Kemalist discourse. By mentioning the regime and the republic, there are two other entries that have traces of Kemalist discourse. There is one entry belonging to a leftist discourse. In the entry, the author discusses the foreign capitals and code them as undesirable value assumptions. While there are traces of explicit Kemalist discourse, descriptions of Halkevleri are also important. Çeçen (1990) discusses Halkevleri as a part of social movements (p. 87) and argues that one of the reasons Halkevleri came to existence was to make sure people were sharing the same values with the Kemalist revolution (p. 90). Özdemir and Aktaş (2011) give a detailed description of the activities of Halkevleri and discuss that in Halkevleri mostly cultural and sports activities were carried out (p. 250). Today's Halkevleri describes itself with the first Halkevleri ("82 Yıllık Bir Halk Örgütü," n.d.) yet now it is actually a NGO. While, Halkevleri doesn't mention Kemalism in their website where they tell their history and objectives ("82 Yıllık Bir Halk Örgütü", n.d.), their guideline suggests that members should act according to Kemalism ("Yeni Halkevleri Tüzüğü," 2010). Although people in Halkevleri constitute the protagonists in the entries for their call for secularism, the youth in Halkevleri are also praised in other ways and it is possible to see those entries belonging to a Kemalist discourse.

Apart from the state and the government's attitude, authors are also expressing an attitude against Islam interfering in authors' and others' lives. Authors find people distributing brochures against the New Year celebrations as undesirable. An author criticizes people in the streets who distribute magazines, make interviews. The author talks about kicking them out of the city. There are entries where religion is coded as undesirable but in major the political Islam, the political activity of distributing brochures against the New Year, Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü tweeting against the New Year, Serdar Arseven being against New Year are severely criticized. The word Islamist is also always negatively used. The main issue the authors criticize is how these people act instead of Islam itself. How people act in public sphere and commenting on others lifestyles based on religion is seen as the problem. In his analysis of different discourses in Turkish society, Kanra (2009) suggests, "the idea that religion is a purely private matter and should remain within the private sphere has been the single most important line of the Kemalist tradition" (p. 74). In his study, Kanra (2009) found that people who were classified as having Kemalist discourse didn't exclude religion from their lives (p. 74). Similarly, most of the authors do not mention religious activities as undesirable yet they don't want them to be "that" visible and have an effect on their lives either.

Fifth discourse is the anti-government discourse. Most of the authors criticize the government and its supporters. A detail is important to note here in the matter of anti-government discourse. In the heading concerning Mehmet Ali Alabora, a journalists' statement is harshly criticized and the authors think that the statement is making Alabora a target. Mehmet Ali Alabora has been constructed as the protagonist in these texts and the heading is on his name. However, the journalist also mentions Amberin Zaman in his statement but entries do not address that. Mehmet Ali Alabora is known for his anti-government and secular discourse. He has been active especially during the Occupy Gezi movement with his political activities. He was defended in all of the entries. It shows how identity of the other has importance when texts are constructed, as Amberin Zaman was also the subject of "being a target". Conversely, it is not that clear when it comes

to Barbaros Şansal. He is known for having an anti-government discourse but authors suggest that he is making other people as targets in his tweet. His tweet on the owner of Reina being an Alewi was severely criticized. It shows values, such as avoiding making people a target, is also important; yet it still doesn't explain the exclusion of Amberin Zaman's case.

5.2. Security/Intelligence/Surveillance

The categorization of the entries of this section is in Table A.2 in the Annexes. Concerning security, authors use different discursive and linguistic tools such as deontic modality, irony/ridiculing, assumptions and epistemic modality. Throughout the texts on *Ekşi Sözlük*, both deontic modality and epistemic modality are used. However, when it comes to the theme security, usage of deontic modality has gone sky high. In deontic modality, the addresser requires the addressee to do something. Gül (2008) discusses deontic modality in Turkish with Papafragou's concepts and what is apparent in *Ekşi Sözlük* entries is the emphasis of "regulatory domains" (p. 102). The authors assert that the state is required to protect its citizens according to the contract they have. There are discussions in the dictionary on Reina's security. Authors on *Ekşi Sözlük* assert that it is the state/government's duty to provide security, not Reina's. Not solely in the heading on Reina but also in other headings, by using deontic modality, authors state the necessity that it is the government/state/responsible ones's duty to provide security to protect its citizens' right to live. They look like statements of truth, yet actually authors hold a kind of power, the power to make the state/government do something, which is defined by the law. In the heading where the terrorist being at large is discussed, an author suggests that there should be records in the police and the state should catch the terrorists before they carry out an attack. In the same vein with the state's duties, authors demand the resignation of state and MİT officials. Authors usually use the *-dir* copula to reinforce the meaning of necessity and the imperative mood to demand. There are also no expressions as "I think" and "may be" which means authors have high affinity

with their statements. In addition, authors use objective modality to make their source vague. One author uses deontic modality to demand the government to stop saying “either presidency or chaos”.

The majority of the entries with irony are about MİT. People working in MİT are ridiculed and portrayed as playing backgammon and doing their job as a hobby; they are addressed as sleeping in an entry as the author informs them with the massacre. An author addresses them as *abi* (dude). They are considered as nonexistent by an author. The intelligence in Turkey is mocked with the expression “taking the intelligence from the brother-in-law” in two entries. It also makes a reference to Tayyip Erdoğan. An author mocks MİT and the Minister of the Interior and hope that there is no Turkey in afterlife. An author mocks MİT by suggesting that Reina doesn’t have money for intelligence. Head of MİT, Hakan Fidan is suggested to be sleeping and addressed as solely Hakan in an entry. Using solely Hakan is not abnormal for *Ekşi Sözlük* but still implies some sort of humiliation. Dense usage of irony shows that MİT is not only unreliable but also, more importantly, not respected. This is not surprising after the frequent terror attacks in Turkey. Apart from MİT, an author mocks the police by comparing the situation to GTA, a video game that positions the player as the thief who is chased by the police. Another author mocks for not caring about the intelligence. An author gives an intertextual reference from Tayyip Erdoğan by saying, “aren’t your intelligence services working?”. It is from a speech of Erdoğan who addresses the intelligence service of France. It is very suitable to what Fairclough suggests irony is, explained in Chapter Four. In this example not only the institution but also owner of the statement is criticized. Same author also uses scare quotes with “jobs” people in MİT have, suggesting that they are not working. One of the authors suggests that Turkey is the practice center for terrorists and another suggests that the police do not to care about people. An author uses an ironic tone to criticize people who are blaming Reina’s security. An author gives 17 examples of terrorist attacks from the past 2 years and by doing that, mocks Binali Yıldırım’s statement of making the terror scared. Two authors criticize solely condemning the attacks and by doing that, criticize Binali

Yıldırım, Numan Kurtulmuş, and others in the government. An author suggests resigning from citizenship to criticize the state officials for not resigning. Entries on Numan Kurtulmuş's statement that calls for being cautious also have a ridiculing tone. It is the heading where the rhetorical questions and irony are frequently used together. Authors are asking rhetorical questions for citizens to carry a Kalashnikov, a rocket launcher, suicide bomb detection devices, wear steel vests, dig trenches, frisk, find intelligence agencies, find courts, and find security organizations. It is obvious that they are not the citizens' duty and also it is not possible to carry the suggested items in real life. Just what Fairclough suggests these entries use irony not only to assert the negative but a criticism to the owner of the statement. It is achieved both by asking it rhetorically and using irony.

Most of the authors make the propositional assumption that when there is intelligence, terrorist attacks are prevented. Therefore, intelligence is a desirable value assumption in the texts. The surveillance on the other hand, has made little place in the texts, solely when talking about the British surveillance system. There are two authors that make a propositional assumption that surveillance prevents terrorist attacks and code it as a desirable value assumption. One author makes a propositional assumption that city surveillance cameras enable catching terrorists and thus codes it as a desirable value assumption. Two of the authors code uncovering the intelligence as an undesirable value assumption. Whether authors support the secrecy of the security and collecting intelligence was one of the questions of this study. Authors don't share any concern for the intelligence intervening in their lives or see it as surrendering their privacy. One of the reasons might be that while they find collecting intelligence beneficial, they also do not propose new measures to be taken as more surveillance such as CCTV or listening to people. In the heading "Security of the Reina Nightclub" and the one after *Yeni Akit's* question "why the party wasn't cancelled" authors are taking Reina's side. Most of the authors make the propositional assumption that the state "couldn't" protect its citizens while one author uses "didn't" which hints a deliberation in the act. Some propositional assumptions are as follows; the state runs the country poorly, it is the government's policies that have caused the terror attacks. Authors

are also discussing the terrorist's flight after the massacre; an author makes a propositional assumption that the police force is exhausted, has a sloppy rescue operation, and couldn't get organized which resulted in the escape of the terrorist. One author make the propositional assumption that not enough care is given to the intelligence while another assumes that there is no intelligence net in the country. Hintz (2015) argues that the responsible ones in Turkey are not taking responsibility after the attacks. In this example, by stating that the state couldn't protect its citizens, couldn't catch the terrorist, and MİT is not working, the authors think the responsible ones in this attack are the state and its institutions. Their discourse is an objection to the practices of the officials in Turkey. There are also assumptions about the presidency system as; saying "either presidency or chaos" is touting civil war, the presidency system is not going prevent a civil war, while also finding being against the presidency system as a desirable value assumption.

Authors also use epistemic modality where they are giving information. One author gives reference to the government' discourse, including *Yeni Akit*, for saying that the terror would end if the presidency system would come, author uses the word "shamelessly" for this statement. Another author suggests that the presidency system will bring more authoritarianism. Two of the authors suggest that the perpetrator of the attack is the state/the ones with the intelligence. These authors use copula –dır to express determination. One author who also uses the copula –dır, suggests that the perpetrator of the attack is the media, the undercover policemen, and the bigots. There are two authors who use "I guess" and "probably" that means the author has low affinity with his/her expression. There are some statements as MİT didn't care about the attack, MİT has taken things too far, and the intelligence net isn't used. The author who suggests the intelligence net isn't used gives an intertextual reference from Afet Güneş, "We see that you have piled up the bombs in the cities". One author suggests it is due to lack of Reina's security that people had died, which is the only example that sees Reina as responsible. Conversely, an author suggests if high security measures are taken, no one would go to those places with their loved ones. The authors are using the

indicative mood. The lack of subjective modality and the presence of the expressions of determination refer to a picture that is portrayed as the truth.

5.3. Us vs. Them

The categorization of the entries of this section is in Table A.3 in the Annexes. In order to understand “us” and “them” it is important to look at the antagonists and protagonists. Wording, verbs, and associations that are used with the agents were taken into account. It is meaningful to look at the antagonists and protagonists to see whom the authors find guilty for the attack and other events. While Fairclough’s (2013) investigation aims to bring out the implicit (p. 54), on *Ekşi Sözlük* entries concerning the Reina massacre, the usage of curse words and negative associations make the antagonists and protagonists overt.

There are several layers in the construction of the responsible ones in the attack. Syrians or people coming from the border of Syria are assumed as terrorists in some entries and constructed as the antagonists. They are associated with being unsafe and terror in the entries. The terrorist who carried out the attack is another antagonist in the entries. Most of the authors use plural when talking about the terrorist. As most of the entries were written just after the attack it is possible to suggest that authors don’t have the information that there was only one terrorist at the site. However, they may also be making generalizations. ISIS is also addressed in the entries as a terrorist organization. Some of the words used for terrorist(s) are “murderer”, “head-choppers”, “creatures with rabies”, “sons of bitches”, “animals”, yet there are also neutral words as “man” and the “attacker”. The metaphors of animals are a common feature of the war on terror narrative as mentioned in Steuter and Wills’s (2009) study in section 1.5. ISIS and terrorists are associated with violence in some entries. ISIS becomes the implicit antagonist in some of the entries where people who support ISIS are the antagonists. ISIS and the terrorist are seen as the perpetrators by the words and associations however, in the heading where the perpetrator of the attack is discussed, none of the entries suggest ISIS but the state, the Islamists, especially the ones having a

discourse against New Year celebrations. There is also one that suggests FETÖ, and another the police and the media as the perpetrator. While using the word Islamists, authors are referring to the citizens of the country while one of them also includes the government as the Islamist. What has been discussed in the previous section also needs to be repeated here. Authors suggest that the state/government has the duty to protect its citizens, the police force has the duty to take measures, and MİT has the duty to collect intelligence to prevent attacks and they all have failed their duties. Discussion on the responsible ones such as the government takes more space than the terrorist(s). For the authors, the main point is how the responsible ones have failed to protect the right to live. One author gives names and suggests that the perpetrators of the attack are Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Ahmet Davutoğlu. Authors constructing Syrians as the antagonists are blaming the government for the attack as they have welcomed Syrians in the country. There are entries that suggest the government has fed ISIS. The discourse against the New Year celebrations is the second layer that constructs the responsible ones in the texts. Some authors suggest that people distributing brochures against the New Year celebrations, people who have a discourse against New Year, the Religious Affairs Administration and Mehmet Görmez for giving the *fatwa* against New Year celebrations, and Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü for tweeting against New Year, are responsible for the attack. Authors criticize Mehmet Görmez and Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü for their statements after the Reina massacre. Authors find them inconsistent with their previous acts and statements. Some authors clearly suggest that Ünlü and the Religious Affairs Administration are the perpetrators while some imply a relationship of their discourse and the attack with the expressions “too late”. The entries on Görmez are more vague than Ünlü’s to suggest a relationship. An author suggests that social media trolls and the partisan media are responsible for the attack. An author suggests that political Islam is responsible for this attack while another mentions jihadists and religious people. There are two authors who suggest another country or organization is the perpetrator of this attack. There are two things that can be suggested. First, authors think the discourse has an effect on others and can be

dangerous. However more importantly, by seeing the Religious Affairs Administration, people distributing brochures, and Islamists as the antagonists, and in some cases also as the perpetrators or as ISIS supporters, authors probably make identification between ISIS and them. While ISIS carries out the attack against New Year celebrations, the others have the discourse of it. Some authors make a generalization by mentioning people who have a discourse against the New Year celebrations and Islamists/religious people together.

What needs to be noted that not only the Reina massacre and terrorism but also other issues were discussed in the entries. Authors do not construct the government as the antagonist solely for this attack but also for the problems that the country faces. The polarization, the threat of civil war, making people as targets, deficiencies in the rule of law in the country, not taking action, blaming others for the incidents, the presidency system, maltreatment of the opposition, and the transformation of Turkey are some of those problems. An author suggests that Turkey is in “a dead end” because of the government. Most of the entries suggest a propositional assumption that the government and its supporters have polarized the country by their discourse. Serdar Arseven and Turgay Güler have been accused of making people as targets with their statements. Authors also address to the government in the entries concerning them. *Yeni Akit*'s heading is discussed as the government's in the entries. What is apparent in the entries is that there is one antagonist-protagonist structure that is constructed by most of the writers. It is the construction of people in Halkevleri as the protagonists and the Ministry of Internal Affairs as the antagonist. Apart from that, there aren't many antagonist-protagonist structures but solely the presence of the antagonists. The Ministry of Internal Affairs has been accused of acting against secularism while people in Halkevleri are described as people convoking secularism. There is only one entry with the antagonist-protagonist structure other than the Internal Affairs and Halkevleri. It is Mehmet Ali Alabora versus Turgay Güler and others, supposedly the government and its supporters. He is described as a patriot, educated, a fighter, who make a point, who hold his head high, and who is

associated with democracy and civilization where others are called *badem bıyıklı* (having almond shaped moustache) and care only about the Muslims.

There are also others constructed as the antagonists for different reasons. Barbaros Şansal, conservatives, people who are happy for the attack, taxi drivers, social media agents, *Aktrolls*, Islamic partisan media, agents on *Ekşi Sözlük*, other countries as the UK, the media, people who criticize a Reina victim's faith, and people who think Reina should be closed are some of them. People who are happy for the attack are severely criticized and constitute the antagonists. An author suggests the 40% of the country is happy for the attack, another suggest $\frac{3}{4}$ of the country is happy and another suggest that those who are happy are a lot in number. It is not clear where the authors take their references from but an author gives screenshots of the people in social media sharing their happiness after the attack. In some entries it is suggested that they are Muslims and one entry implies as being a supporter of the government. People who are happy for the attack are called "people who want you to die", "uneducated merciless flock of bigots", "sick", "filled with dirt" and "sons of bitches" in the entries. In one entry they are called "ISIS sympathizers".

There is a pattern in the texts that make identification of the agents and antagonists difficult. Most of the sentences are in active voice and they have agents. Fairclough (2001) investigates agents in his analyses and show evidence that using passive voice is a deliberate act and makes the agent implicit (p. 243). However, in these texts the agents are present, yet vague. The pronouns as "we", "they", and "you" are expressed without giving actual names. Another interesting point is, when talking about an official's statement authors tend to use plural "you" instead of "he/she" or the name. In some instances authors start with addressing the owner of the statement but switches to a plural "you". By doing that, authors make generalizations. Most of the generalizations are constructed in entries concerning the government, although it is also apparent in the entries concerning taxi drivers and the terrorist(s). When Turgay Güler makes a statement, authors are addressing to an ambiguous "you". In some cases it is possible to suggest that they are talking about the government, yet there are more

ambiguous cases where it is not possible to differentiate if the author is addressing to the government or Islamists/conservatists. By doing that, authors are suggesting three things: First one is that the concept of *AKPlilik* means more than being a member of or supporting a political party. It is being responsible for what the government and the members of AKP do. It is a group that is perceived as having no heterogeneity. Second one is that the Islam is associated with the government and its supporters. The last one is about fear. Authors might have been used *AKPliler* instead of “you” but they refrain from giving names. In some entries, Tayyip Erdoğan is addressed as the “tall man” and “certain party”. It might stem from the fear of being kicked out of *Ekşi Sözlük* or more importantly getting sued. Some of the *Ekşi Sözlük* authors were sued with a defamation case in the past (“Nihal Bengisu Karaca’dan 72 Ekşi Sözlük Yazarına Hakaret Davası,” 2014).

Concerning “us” versus “them”, there aren’t many uses of “us” and “them”. When using “we” the authors are mostly referring to the citizens of the country. However, by making the government and its supporters the antagonists by the plural “you”, authors position them as the other. By doing that, authors are positioning themselves as the opponents. It is not clear who these opponents are and whom they support but “secularism” is the value that is found desirable in most of the entries. However, “us” versus “them” is partially produced by seeing the Islamists, religious people as the antagonists and the perpetrators, and associating The Ministry of Internal Affairs with ISIS for acting against Halkevleri. Therefore “being against the secularism” is associated with supporting or being ISIS. Although what the Ministry of Internal Affairs did, reporting people for their discourse on secularism and being against the presidency system, is not just, the association with ISIS is also not just and it is a dichotomous way to think. In some entries, opponents are portrayed as victims whom no one hears and who has kept silence in order to avoid being arrested. It is not surprising as the dominant discourse in the society that belongs to AKP is suggested to be targeting the opponents of the government (Pitel, 2016). In an entry, two sides of the civil war are discussed, first they are given as AKP and its opponents and then the opponents are referred as moderns. In the entries concerning being martyrs,

authors depict the Reina victims' situation as being ignored by the government because of religion. Considering it with the discussions on "people who are happy for the attack" people feel that others do not share their pain. There are some explanations for the construction of some antagonists. According to Paker (2017) psycho-political context of terror attacks in Turkey can be explained in 4 layers. First layer is the chance of dying and getting hurt, second layer is dying or getting hurt by a sudden and tragic attack, third layer is mistrust for those who are charged with preventing these risks, fourth layer is the layer that are not seen in every society but is apparent in Turkish society, the question that whether these attacks are regarded by the whole society as a common pain/mourning (Paker, 2017). By saying that, Paker (2007) makes a propositional assumption that people are polarized in Turkey. Paker's explanation explains the picture on *Ekşi Sözlük*, as all the layers are present. People feel that institutions don't work, they have not been protected by their state, and their pain is not shared by others.

5.4. Secularism and Western Values

The categorization of the entries of this section is in Table A.4 in the Annexes. On secularism, three linguistic and discursive tools are apparent. Assumptions, irony/ridiculing, deontic modality, and epistemic modality. Authors are not worried about ISIS destroying the secular and Western values, but show assumptions on Turkey doing so. Apart from two entries by the same author and one by another, authors are not discussing why ISIS chose Reina and if it has anything to do with the New Year celebrations or a certain lifestyle. Only one author makes a propositional assumption that ISIS tries to break off Turkey from Europe.

There are several propositional assumptions. The governor's and the government's attitude towards the victims of Reina, as not calling them martyrs, is severely criticized. Authors make the propositional assumption that it is correlated with lifestyle choices of Reina victims such as having fun in a place that sells alcohol. One author calls it discrimination while another uses the word

“average bedouin sense”. Authors also criticize institutions such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Religious Affairs Administration. Reporting Halkevleri is coded undesirable by almost all authors that commented in the headings on the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Halkevleri. Some propositional assumptions are that; the Ministry of Internal Affairs is making Halkevleri a target for reporting them to the police, reporting Halkevleri is calling ISIS sympathizers to work, people in Halkevleri have been reported for praising the regime of Turkey, reporting them means being a supporter of ISIS. An author compares the Ministry of Internal Affairs with the bearded man distributing brochures against New Year celebrations. By saying that, he/she states that the institution is acting according to the religion. The Friday *khutbah* that the Religious Affairs Administration delivered in mosques is coded as undesirable value assumption. One author uses the verb “daubing” while talking about Mehmet Görmez, Head of the Religious Affairs Administration. By using the verb author makes a propositional assumption that Görmez is guilty. Authors criticize the government for not being secular in some entries. Some propositional assumptions with the government are that; the political Islam is legitimized, the government is political Islamist, more attention is given to the religion as the Religious Affairs Administration has more budget than MIT, more attention is given to the religion as the police is protecting the mosques, the regime of Turkey has been changed, and the government has fed ISIS. The passive voice is used for the example with the regime, which makes the agent vague yet author talks about the government in other sentences. An author makes an existential assumption that the country is governed by “one man” in a religious way. Some propositional assumptions are that the president is interfering with others’ lifestyles and point them according to their religion, that he is dividing people by calling them leftist, atheist, and terrorist, that he and others impose their lifestyle on others, and they also have a goal to create a religious and vindictive generation. However, as the passive tense is used, it is not clear if the author talks about the government in the example of the vindictive generation. By stating there are two sides of the polarization as AKP versus the moderns, an author makes a propositional assumption that AKP is not modern. One of the

authors makes a propositional assumption that there is an Islamist partisan media that makes people a target. Authors not only criticize the institutions but also individuals. They make the propositional assumption that there are exponents and sympathizers of ISIS in the country. Distributing brochures against the New Year celebrations are also coded as undesirable. Authors also talk about Islamists and conservatives. The propositional assumptions with Islamists are that; they are radical Islamist dogs who have head chopping mentality, Islamists threaten people, Islamists have no love for this country, conservatives bear hostility to others who are not like them, Islamists laid blame on others for the attack, Islamists assholes are doing Islamism, and religious people don't like atheists and want to kill those who want to have fun. Doing Islamism isn't a verb but used in this sentence for the activities that Islamists do. Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü and Serdar Arseven are also severely criticized both for their discourse against the New Year celebrations. One author makes a propositional assumption that Serdar Arseven and others are clappers of internal conflict, users of hate speech and has "fucked up" and taken the country backwards with a project while another author calls him a "reactionary bigot". An author puts the screenshots of people who are happy for the attack. In the screenshots people are explaining their behavior with Islam and by using them, the author hints that they are religious without saying much. There are instances where religion is coded as undesirable but mostly it not has been the case. An author mentions ISIS as a so-called Muslim. Islamism and religion that intervene with other lifestyles are seen as the problem. However, it is not clear if by using the term Islamist, authors are referring to the political Islam or if they are referring to the religious people in general.

Some authors use irony, which is mostly apparent in the heading where authors discuss if Reina should be closed. Authors mock Reina becoming Huqqa, Beltur, and *imam hatip* and *külliye*. Huqqa is known to have been a non-alcoholic place situated very near to Reina. The neighbourhood is loaded with alcoholic places for entertainment therefore Huqqa has been a first in that part of Ortaköy. Cinmen (2013) calls Huqqa "Reina of the conservative bourgeois". Beltur is known as places of the municipality of Istanbul that serve food and non-alcoholic

beverages. According to Yalın, (2011) most of the places in Istanbul were operated by Turing until Beltur took over them and there was a transition from serving alcohol to not serving alcohol. Becoming *imam hatip* and *külliye* are references to the government who has been building them. With all of these examples of irony, authors not only criticize getting conservative but also criticize the responsible ones in this process. Beltur, *imam hatip* and *külliye* are given to criticize the government. An author uses an ironic tone; the tone that wants to close Reina, and suggest Reina's closing will lead to the closure of other places and then end up with the country becoming another Iran. Author uses "let them win" as if there is a war between some groups in the country. An author ironically suggests the government may call people gaiour. Author uses "gevur" instead of the proper version "gavur" and also mocks their way of talking. An author suggests that what Arseven does is a message for unity and solidarity. Author asserts the opposite of the statement and mocks the government by using "unity and solidarity", as the expression has been used in the discourse of government officials. An author uses *tecahül-i arif* mixing with irony. He/she gives intertextual reference from Tayyip Erdoğan calling people "they are atheists, leftists, and terrorists" which has been mentioned in the assumptions. By doing that, author not only criticizes the president but *Ekşi Sözlük* for deleting his/her entry.

Few authors use deontic modality concerning secularism and Western lifestyle. Some authors suggest that people who are happy for the attack should be arrested. An author discusses becoming martyrs and uses deontic modality to show that the government can't differentiate between people according to their lifestyle. Other three authors suggest that Serdar Arseven has to be arrested. An author demands Serdar Arseven to not intervene with others lifestyle. An author wishes people to unite against the jihadists and religious people. One of the author's utterances needs to be noted. An author demands people who live in Istanbul to kick out people who sell anti-new year magazines, walk around with turban and beard, and make interviews. Author correlates their presence with the terrorist attacks. This shows that the author believes that he/she and others have

the power to kick them out of the city, or maybe the country. It also shows that author sees himself/herself and others like him/her as the owners of the country.

Authors also use epistemic modality. While talking about the people who are happy for the Reina attack, an author suggests that there are many of them..An author calls them an “uneducated merciless flock of bigots” and suggests that “unfortunately”, they are $\frac{3}{4}$ of the country. Another author also suggests 40% of the country are happy for the attack. It is not clear where these percentages come from as authors are giving no clues or references. However, these percentages are important as the authors think these people are not a minority.

5.5. Turkey Being Dangerous

The categorization of the entries of this section is in Table A.5 in the Annexes. Apart from 2 entries by the same author who suggests there is a global jihadist terror, it is not suggested that the world is now a dangerous place. Rather, Turkey is suggested as a dangerous place. Turkey’s lack of security in the Reina massacre is mentioned in the Security/Intelligence/Surveillance section therefore not mentioned in this section again. This section includes feelings and assumptions and statements that are more future oriented.

It is not possible to say that concerning the dangers in the country, authors have similar linguistic and discursive tools. Authors are using assumptions, objective and subjective modality, and irony. As the presupposition of the dangers of the country given with objective modality suggests everyone is in danger, it is meaningful to look while investigating the war on terror narrative. Throughout the different headings, objective modality is frequently used on *Ekşi Sözlük*. Authors’ statements are given as the truth, reality. However, authors use the subjective modality and the pronoun “I” while talking about their fears only apparent in this theme. However, while authors are talking about fear, they are also using “we”. According to Fairclough (2013) using we refers to “the power of making statements in behalf of others...is a power” (p. 171). Authors also prefer using “we” when talking about the transformation. There is a propositional assumption

that Turkey has gone through a transformation and authors suggest different reasons for this transformation. Some authors talk about the terrorist attacks, some talk about the government, an author discusses Numan Kurtulmuş's statement, while some authors suggest nothing is said against ISIS but only to the opposition, an author mentions the broadcasting ban. It seems that not taking responsibility and not having a discourse against ISIS are seen as a transformation. Apart from terrorist threats, the transformation is associated with the government. Some authors associate Syrians with being unsafe and suggest that the government brought them in the country. There are statements as well as propositional assumptions that a civil war will break out in Turkey. Civil war is also associated with the government. There are two intertextual references that are given as an example of past events both from Turkey and another country. Some metaphors are used with Turkey such as *dingonun ahır* (a three ring circus), *yol geçen han* (a place where passengers frequently stop by), having dark clouds over it, has turned into hell, becoming Peshawar, and becoming a mixture of Pakistan, Syria, and Iran.

There are few instances of irony where Binali Yıldırım's statement of scaring the terror is mocked. Most of the entries under that heading use irony/ridiculing in a way, which shows both the statement, and the owner of the statement are mocked.

5.6. Foreign Policy/Military Intervention/Other Countries' Plots

The categorization of the entries of this section is in Table A.6 in the Annexes. Concerning foreign policy, there are assumptions, irony, and deontic modality. Turkey's foreign policy is not favored. The decisions on Syria are severely criticized. An author calls Ahmet Davutoğlu a "shallow Syrian strategist". The acceptance of Syrians into the country is severely criticized. There isn't a single utterance about a military operation that can be launched in other countries. There are some suggesting other countries' plots against Turkey yet the majority of the authors don't believe that. It is due to this fact that the majority of

the entries are under the “irony” heading. Other *Ekşi Sözlük* authors’ statements on other countries’ plots and Turgay Güler’s statement on Mehmet Ali Alabora are commented on ironically. Similarly, an author talks about Jamaica being the perpetrator, another one discusses seeing the big picture and painting pictures better than Goya. The author created the heading “January 1st, 2017 the Country Behind the Reina Attack” is called *Aktroll* and Islamist in some entries and has been kicked out of the dictionary, therefore it is not possible to see the entries. Agents in the dictionary, on the other hand, have been seriously discussed. Some authors agree that there are agents in the dictionary and some do not. Only one author uses deontic modality to address another author who suggests there is a country behind the Reina attack.

5.7. Reproduction of the War on Terror Narrative and Social Practice

What *Ekşi Sözlük* entries suggest is an ambivalent picture. The war on terror narrative against ISIS is reproduced partially. It is unlike the war on terror narrative that the authors are reminding the government, the police, MİT their duties to protect citizens. While people believe that intelligence is desirable, they do not propose new measures such as surveillance, which is found desirable by only two authors. It may partly be explained by not willing to be blacklisted. The authors believe the responsible authorities have failed to provide security. What needs to be noted here is that the authors are also criticizing these institutions for not taking the responsibility. As mentioned before, in her article on Ankara massacre, Hintz (2015) suggests that the officials are not taking responsibility after the attacks. The authors are objecting to the dominant discourse and practice that no responsibility is taken. Therefore, it is not surprising that the authors believe Turkey is dangerous where they think no measures are taken. The presidency system is not frequently addressed but when it is mentioned it is always coded as undesirable value assumption and discussed mostly under the heading on civil war. Authors associate the presidency system with civil war and authoritarianism; one author calls the statement “either presidency or chaos” as

“shameless”. It shows that the politics of fear that is implemented by the leaders is not always effective in persuading the citizens. Contrarily, the discourse of “either presidency or chaos” is found to be a fear factor. Having an anti-government identity, authors reject the statements, but more importantly they make objections to the practices the presidency system represents, as it is not compatible with their values. The fear and othering are also reproduced in the texts. It seems that a massacre by ISIS has brought identity, narratives embedded in history, and political atmosphere all together into the conversation. People who are happy for the attack are implied or suggested to be religious and are perceived as a threat which is not surprising, yet they are suggested to be the majority of the country without giving any reference where that information comes from. These statements are an exaggeration of threats and produce fear. However, it is possible to say that these statements have taken place in insignificant times. Islamists are seen as a threat on *Ekşi Sözlük* after the Reina massacre. People who were having a discourse against the New Year celebrations are called “political Islamists”, “bigots”, “religious and jihadists”, and suggested as the perpetrators. Authors might have chosen an expression as “people who were having a discourse against the New Year” without generalizing the religion or Islam. Because they are probably perceived as having the same mentality, these people are associated with ISIS and suggested as the perpetrators. Furthermore, on other occasions where Islamists are mentioned, they are always “the other” and associated with terrorism and ISIS. They are also called with negative adjectives. The “us” versus “them” is maintained through seeing secularism on the one side and being a supporter or a member of ISIS on the other side. Seeing discourses against the New Year celebrations as the perpetrator also needs to be noted. Although discourses against the New Year celebrations can be dangerous for inducing hate towards one another suggesting that they are perpetrators, serves for this bipolar representation. The poll by Türkiye Çalışmaları Merkezi (2016) shows that people believe the greatest polarization is between the secularists and the Muslims (p. 23). Therefore, the results reflect the atmosphere of Turkey. It is not possible to explain this result with the effect of the media and the elites. There isn't a

dominant conversation in the public sphere, neither from the ruling party nor the opposition party that construct Islamists as a threat. If it had been another terrorist organizations' attack would the authors have addressed to the Islamists as a threat either? The answer is probably no. It seems that the identity of ISIS is associated with the Islamists in the country and they are constructed as the threat. Not only the identity of ISIS, but identity of the authors also has a role. The Islamic identity cannot be a threat to everyone. It is clear that the authors have a secular discourse in this sample. Other people that have different identities would have seen the Reina massacre as a terrorist attack without constructing Islamists as a threat. Therefore, first of all, the results can be explained with the identities of the individuals. However, this construction of threat can also be grounded in history. Constructivist theories stress "national identity" as a factor in constructing what needs to be scared (Cramer & Thrall, 2009, p. 3). In explaining the "narrative" of the Turkish Republic, Göçek (2011) argues that secularism and religion are constructed as two opposites where religion is discredited for not being able to keep up with the values of the contemporary (p. 24). Similarly, Kanra (2009) uses the expression "divided society" as the heading of his book that Kemalist discourse and Islamic discourse are discussed. These examples show that seeing Islamists or Islamism as a threat is not new but constituted the dominant discourse through the foundation of the Turkish Republic. However, it hasn't been the dominant discourse for some time. One author advises to kick Islamists out of Istanbul. By saying that, it is clear that the author believes it is not the Islamists' country but theirs. In one entry, an author suggests a war between the moderns and the Islamists by using the verb "win". What is important to note in this picture can be given with two examples. In two headings the first author of the entry is criticized where in one occasion we have no access to the entry as its author is now out of *Ekşi Sözlük*. The entries written in response to these entries use the word Islamists although there is one person. Therefore, the authors distort the truth and tell the audience that there are more. On one occasion, it is not possible to understand why the author is called an Islamist, as his profile doesn't show any traces of that. Not only the descriptions of Islamists, but also this generalization

and distortion constructs the other and fear on *Ekşi Sözlük* after the Reina massacre.

Although the government is officially at war against ISIS and launched military operations against it, authors do not believe that the government is really fighting ISIS. It may be due to what Taştekin (2016), Saymaz (2017) and Acarer (2017) discuss in their work that are mentioned in section 2.3; that Turkish citizens are joining ISIS from Turkey who go to Syria to be trained and then they cross the border again and live among people in Turkey. Authors may have the opinion that Turkey is late for joining the war against ISIS as suggested by Saymaz (2017). It might also stem from the treatment of the victims of ISIS attacks. People who had died in Ankara massacre are not considered as martyrs and a report by *Diken* suggests that victims are taking less financial help from the state when compared to the victims of other terrorist attacks (“Statü Farkı: Ankara Katliamı’nda Ölen Yurttaşın Babasına 110,75 Lira Maaş Bağlandı,” 2017). Some authors have the assumption that Turkey is feeding ISIS. These are given as assumptions, which means that authors already take them as true and not even make a statement about it. It has never been proved that Turkey has fed ISIS yet it has appeared in the some sources. Bülent Tezcan, Vice-chairman of CHP, is one of the figures that made statements about feeding ISIS, which appeared on *Cumhuriyet* (“CHP Tutanakları Açıkladı: O Tırlardan Onlarca Füze Çıktı,” 2014). Authors’ assumptions must be coming from these sources and their acceptance can be explained with identity. Secular and anti-government discourses are apparent in the texts. These are identities that are associated with these news sources, both Tezcan and *Cumhuriyet*. An author makes the propositional assumption that Turkish soldiers were burned in military operations. An article by *Mynet* suggested that the videos of burned soldiers circulated the social media (“İŞİD’in Türk Askerlerini Yaktığı’ İddia Edilen Videodaki Sefter Taş Detayı,” 2016). The incident was announced as true in October 2017, 9 months after these entries were written (“TSK, İŞİD’in Yaktığı Asker Sefter Taş için Anıt Yapacak,” 2017). Davutoğlu’s statement calling ISIS angry kids are also criticized and can be another reason people believe nothing is done to ISIS. Davutoğlu’s statement

on ISIS was asked to the audience of *Cumhuriyet* and results show that the majority believes Davutoğlu called ISIS angry kids (“Davutoğlu IŞİD İçin ‘Öfkeli Çocuklar Dedi Mi’?,” 2016). Furthermore, an article on *Cumhuriyet* covered Kılıçdaroğlu’s questions to Binali Yıldırım and Kılıçdaroğlu criticized the government for not taking measures and more importantly for not having a discourse against ISIS (“Kılıçdaroğlu’ndan Çok Çarpıcı IŞİD İddiası: Emri Veren Türkiye’de Tedavi Edildi,” 2016). Kılıçdaroğlu also suggested that wounded ISIS terrorists were treated in Turkey (“Kılıçdaroğlu’ndan Çok Çarpıcı IŞİD İddiası: Emri Veren Türkiye’de Tedavi Edildi,” 2016). The idea that the government is not fighting ISIS might be coming from the opposition. Furthermore, statements on ISIS have taken less space in the government’s discourse and authors might be referring to the lack of “us” vs. “them” discourse against ISIS. One author uses the saying “becoming Peshawar” which was used both by Kılıçdaroğlu (Demirel, 2016) and Taştekin (2012). What is missing here is although ISIS is given as a threat by the main opposition party CHP, it is perceived as a threat solely in a particular heading. The government is criticized for not fighting against ISIS, yet ISIS is not seen as the biggest problem or even a great threat in the entries except the heading about ISIS making Istanbul University a target. The theories and likelihood of an ISIS attack is discussed in the heading with a photograph ISIS had published featuring Istanbul University. Although all of the entries discussed ISIS as a threat, it is the only heading where ISIS is discussed as a threat. This study has failed to explain why ISIS has taken the least space among everything after the massacre. Seeing Islamism as the real problem and seeing Islamist in the country as the biggest issue can be one of the reasons. The exclusion of military operations and foreign policy is not surprising with these results. As authors suggest that the actual threats, the Islamists and the government, are inside the country, foreign policy and military operations become irrelevant.

What constitute the greatest threat according to the authors are the government and its supporters. The fact that the government is perceived as a threat can be explained with the political atmosphere in Turkey as well as with identity. As Islamists are seen as a threat and it is also associated with the

government, the literature shows that the concern isn't new. Göçek (2011) discusses Kemalist suspicion of AKP in terms of religion (p. 36). However it seems that there has been a change in the public discourse that gives more space to religious discourse. In an article by *DW* that focuses on the statements that intervenes with women's clothing and behavior, Selda Tuncer argues that these discourses take their power from the state (as cited in Karakaş, 2017). 140 Journos' (2017) video of "secular emigration" shows people who have left or planning to leave the country for not seeing themselves as part of the country while also mentioning the religious presence in the public discourse and issues in the educational and judicial system. In the same vein, what *Ekşi Sözlük* authors suggest is not solely an Islamist treat that comes with the government. The presidency system, the opposition being silenced, being a target, deficiencies in the rule of law in the country, and touting for civil war is some of the other threats. The atmosphere where journalists and academics are under arrest (Grenier, 2017), people are reporting each other, including their family, for their thoughts (Pitel, 2017), and the hostility that the opponents face (Hintz, 2015) can explain this. Authors take the side of Ahmet Şık who is in prison and Mehmet Ali Alabora who left the country. People on *Ekşi Sözlük* have a fear of being a target and being under arrest for their opinions. The identity of *Ekşi Sözlük* authors, secular and anti-government, are not compatible with the governments' identity and it is not hard to explain their fear of becoming a target. Furthermore, the fact that people are abstaining from giving the name of the members of the government even in social media where they are anonymous, shows how fear has been implemented. However, the discourse on "either presidency or chaos" and exclusion of some citizens in the government discourse are not reproduced but challenged by defining it as polarization. Therefore, the discourse of the government, described as the politics of fear in the literature, is both rejected and succeeded as the authors recognize the implementation of the politics of fear. What is important is that the authors see the government and its supporters as the same. A study conducted in Turkey by German Marshall Fund shows that people abstain from others in their personal and business relationships according to their

political preferences, and it has been discussed as polarization (“Turkey Growing Increasingly Polarized: German Marshall Fund Study,” 2016). This poll explains this study’s results that show the polarization between the government supporters and opponents. It seems that the authors make their comments according to people’s identities as most of the people that are discussed in the entries are grouped according to their identity. The discourse in the entries may stem from the polarization implemented by the government, yet what should be noted that while the authors are criticizing the polarization they are also serving it. The authors construct the supporters of the government as a threat. The metaphors of animals are used in some entries while mentioning the supporters of the government that dehumanizes “the other”. One author on *Ekşi Sözlük* explains what all other authors suggest, “What we have is not people with different opinions who support a political movement, what we have is an organized evil”. In an entry they are portrayed as uneducated, in another, two metaphors of animals are used. In one entry, an author suggests that they can kill their neighbors one day. These examples produce fear and give the idea that people should be afraid of the supporters of the government even when they are their neighbors. Although, it should be noted that constructing the supporters of the government as a threat has not taken the majority of the discussion. Concerning the discourse on Islamists and the supporters of the government, they are not solely criticisms made with “I think”, “maybe”, “probably” but statements made by using objective modality and the copula -dır. The dense usage of assumptions also makes the authors assertions close to openness, as they are already taken as true. The linguistics used in the entries that are close to the dialogue does not portray a peace narrative or a solution.

Suggestions on the ideological and political effects of the discourse on *Ekşi Sözlük* is difficult due to Fairclough’s (1993) understanding of their relationship with the orders of discourse. Social practice of this text is commenting on social media. Authors are the audience of the traditional media and reframe the news they have about the Reina massacre by their statements and assumptions on events. Considering Fairclough’s orders of discourse, it is not

possible to talk about an order of discourse in social media. Similar to *Ekşi Sözlük* not having a specific genre it also doesn't have an order of discourse. There are different ways on *Ekşi Sözlük* to describe an event and there is no dominant way. Therefore, it is not possible to tell if authors are resisting the norms or not. None of the entries are pro-government or against secularism. Two of the authors, one of them calling victims of the Reina as “bastards”, and the other who probably suggests there are other countries behind the attack are now out of the dictionary as *leyla*. The latter is called an Islamist and an *Aktroll* in its own heading in the dictionary. The administration of *Ekşi Sözlük*, as well as the authors who unlike the entries have a role in that. In this study, it seems that the dominant discourse is a secular and anti-government one in the dictionary yet it should be noted that the entries that were under investigation were limited with time sampling, *şükelas* and most importantly the Reina massacre. Furthermore, as *Ekşi Sözlük* doesn't have an order of discourse, it is hard to investigate ideological and political effects of discourse. If Fairclough's definition of the order of discourse is ignored, some suggestions can be made. Fairclough and other theorists of CDA usually investigate the power relationships in their works. In this sample, the authors were once powerful now the powerless in the society due to the change of power relations and discourse in the society. A secular discourse was once dominant in the public discourse yet it lost its power. It is possible to suggest that the opponents of the government are also the powerless in the society and the authors are objecting to the dominant discourse in the society both by their content and their usage of powerful linguistic tools. According to Castells (2015), power in the society is determined by what people believe, which also brings the change if they are not in minority. However, it is hard to suggest that the authors represent the majority of Turkey while also considering it is a small sample. However, it might have an influence on *Ekşi Sözlük* readers as it is a popular website.

CONCLUSION

Traditionally, the politics of fear has taken place in the literature as the leaders' manipulation of threats in order to have political gain and the vast majority of the publications have discussed it with the media. The narrative has been found problematic for opening ways for the justification of the bad treatment of the others as well as giving more control to the states. Surprisingly, what citizens construct has been missing in the literature. Frequent terror attacks made 2016 a tough and traumatizing year for Turkey. The implementation of the politics of fear was discussed by some in the literature, stressing the security and stability that was proposed by the government (Kanlı, 2015; Yaşlı 2016). Furthermore, the atmosphere of fear is discussed by Pitel (2016) by giving examples from people reporting each other, which is argued as taking the power from the government's discourse. The purpose of this study was to see if the politics of fear was reproduced on the social media by the citizens through the construction of the war on terror narrative. The global war on terrorism against ISIS and Turkey's involvement with the war was taken into consideration. First of all, the Reina massacre was selected as the case. Five themes of the war on terror narrative that De Castella and McGarthy (2013) defined were selected for this study. First one is the construction of the "us" versus "them" that also attribute opposing qualities to these sides (De Castella & McGarthy, 2013, p. 87). Second one is suggesting that these attacks are actually a crime against what that society has been built on, such as particular "values" that the terrorists like to wipe out (De Castella & McGarthy, 2013, p. 88). Authors use the word "Western" in defining these values (De Castella & McGarthy, 2013, p. 88). Third one is not giving clear information, and advocating for the intelligence services to operate covertly which inhibits people to have a good judgment about what is actually going on (De Castella & McGarthy, 2013, p. 88). In addition, any action that has a possibility to inhibit the terrorist threat is justified such as more "military spending" and "surveillance" (De Castella & McGarthy, 2013, p. 88-89). What's more, some acts of violence against the terrorists are justified (De Castella &

McCarthy, 2013, p. 89). Fourth one is about the government and other officials not taking responsibility for not preventing terrorism while also justifying the present and future actions of the government for the sake of counterterrorism (De Castella & McCarthy, 2013, p. 89). Fifth one is actually from the “crime narrative” which De Castella and McCarthy (2013) explains as the idea that people are in constant danger (p. 90). These themes were adapted to the Turkish context and citizen discourse for this study. Five themes were defined and some questions were attributed to them. First one was security/intelligence/surveillance. The questions were: what kinds of precautions were supported in order to enable security? Were more control, surveillance, death penalty etc. mentioned? Did people mention MIT and suggest that the intelligence should not be transparent? What did people think about the presidency system? Second one was us vs. them. The questions were: Was there an othering in the text that people were divided into us and them. If there was, who were these two groups and what qualities were attributed to them? Who was blamed for the attack? Third one was secularism and Western values. The questions were: Did people perceive this attack as a way to destroy secular and Western lifestyle in Turkey? Fourth one was Turkey being dangerous. The questions were: Did people think they were in constant danger and started seeing the world and Turkey as dangerous? Did people think the future was unpredictable? Fifth one was foreign policy/military intervention/other countries’ plots. The questions were: What was supported as a foreign policy? Did people support military action in Syria or Iraq? Did people think this attack had been planned by other countries and suggest they were plotting for more?

In order to investigate the citizen discourse, *Ekşi Sözlük* was selected as a research space. *Ekşi Sözlük* is a popular website that authors write their subjective definitions under the headings, or create new headings. A categorization was made by the coding techniques of the grounded theory. The results show that the government was the core category. All other categories were explained with the government. Categorization was helpful to see what was constructed before applying CDA. It also helped what was constructed originally without looking at the five themes of this study. However, CDA helped to have an in-depth

understanding of the themes in question as some considerations as the presence of an agent in a sentence were important for the research questions. Fairclough's (1993) "three-dimensional conception of discourse" was applied to the texts. Textual tools, the apparent discourses, the dialogicality of the texts, the modality, antagonists and protagonists were some of the textual and discursive tools in consideration. There was an ambivalent and unexpected picture on *Ekşi Sözlük*. Concerning Turkey as a dangerous place; the results show that according to the authors Turkey was perceived as a dangerous place yet not only for the terrorist attacks but also because of the civil war threat that was associated with the government. A new Turkey was suggested in the entries. Since, no responsibility is taken by the responsible authorities, it is not surprising that people think Turkey is dangerous. Concerning security/intelligence/surveillance, the intelligence was found to be important in preventing terrorist attacks and the necessity for the government/state/the police to protect its citizens were emphasized. The failure of providing security was discussed. However, no new measures were introduced and also there were only few discussions on the importance of secrecy. Similarly, there were few utterances on the necessity of surveillance such as CCTV cameras. The absence of it was discussed as not willing to be blacklisted by the government and its institutions. Furthermore, the results showed that MİT became an institution that was perceived disreputable. Concerning secularism and Western values, the terrorist attack was not perceived against the values such as secularism. However, the Religious Affairs Administration, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Islamists, and some people in the country were severely criticized for having a discourse against the New Year celebrations. Islamism was always negatively coded and the government was perceived as Islamist. An exaggeration of the threats that produce fear is present in two entries that correlates closing of Reina to becoming Iran and being more conservative. Although it should be noted that they are insignificant in number. Concerning foreign policy/military operation/other countries' plots, a likely military intervention or a change in the foreign policy were not uttered. Turkey's foreign policy was not favored. Other countries' plots were mostly mocked. As ISIS

wasn't perceived as the biggest threat the country faces, it is not surprising that no military operation was suggested. Concerning us versus them, the perpetrator of the attack was perceived as the state/government, Islamists, people or institutions who had statements against the New Year celebrations in general. "Others" and antagonists were mostly members of the government, the supporters of the government, people who were happy for the attack, and Islamists. People who were happy for the attack created a massive anger on *Ekşi Sözlük*. It also proves what Paker (2017) discusses about the psychopolitical side of the terror attacks in Turkey, the feeling that the pain of some is not shared by all. While most of the themes of the war on terror narrative were missing, authors constructed an "us" versus "them" by perceiving supporting secularism and being a supporter of or being ISIS as two sides. An association was made between ISIS and people who were against the New Year Celebrations as the latter were given as the perpetrators. Furthermore, it was maintained by both perceiving the acts against Halkevleri as supporting ISIS and generalizing the Islamists. Authors produce fear by presenting Islamists and the supporters of the government as a threat, although the latter did not take place in significant times. The polarization between Islamists and seculars has been suggested by a poll (Türkiye Çalışmaları Merkezi, 2017, p. 23). Perceiving Islamists as a threat was explained by the secular and anti-government identity of the authors, Turkish national identity that perceived the Islamists as a threat starting from the foundation of the Turkish Republic and the religious discourse being more present in recent years. The political atmosphere in Turkey that people have been polarized by the government's discourse explains perceiving the supporters of the government as a threat. Both representations of threat produces fear and serve for the polarization of the country. Furthermore, the lack of dialogicality and the powerful use of linguistics also serve for presenting everything in black or white instead of gray. What was constructed as a threat besides the Islamists, was the government itself. The civil war threat, making people targets, silencing the opposition, deficiencies in the judicial system, and the polarizing discourse were some of the issues that took place. The political atmosphere in Turkey and the discourse of the government

was discussed as the reason behind this perception and as the authors had an anti government identity it is not surprising that they felt threatened. Surprisingly, ISIS didn't take much space in the entries. It was discussed as a threat in one heading where a possible attack on Istanbul University was discussed and people expressed their fear. The authors of the heading were sure that an attack would come, yet overall the government and Islamists were discussed more in the entries. The result of the categorization of the grounded theory, which showed the government as the core category, was also observed after the critical discourse analysis. In the coding the government was co-occurred with other categories such as the media, discourse, religion, and justice. Most of the discussion was on the government and the statements of people who are close to the government. One of the reasons that ISIS took less space might have been seeing Islamism as the reason for this attack. Yet, it still doesn't explain the lack of ISIS in the entries. Considering both the government's involvement in the GWOT, the global war on terrorism that was launched by the U.S. and the European countries, and CHP's warnings on ISIS, the authors should have mentioned more about ISIS. One of the reasons might be that much of the discussion by the opposition also included the government's attitude on ISIS. Overall, the authors were objecting to the dominant discourse in the society by having anti-government and secular discourses and using powerful linguistic tools yet it is not possible to tell if this will create change in the society. As the literature on the politics of fear has discussed the construction of the other as dangerous, the owners of the statements were the powerless in the society in this case and it is not possible to discuss a change in the society. However, it may have an influence on the personal relationships as the readers of *Ekşi Sözlük* may be influenced by the discourse. Furthermore, it should be noted that the homogeneous discourse on *Ekşi Sözlük* might be creating a bubble and not reach everyone in the society.

This ambivalent result makes the study significant. It shows that when there is a terrorist attack, people can bring the conversation about the government's and other officials' responsibilities in some instances. Although the authors showed that they were afraid by not giving names and used ambiguous

pronouns such as the plural “you” when referring to the members of the government, and constructed the government as the threat, this study shows that the implementation of the politics of fear is not always successful as people on *Ekşi Sözlük* were aware that the politics of fear had been implemented. The presidency system and the polarizing discourse were severely criticized in the entries. This study shows that both the manipulation of threats and identity factors, thus the domestic political approach and constructivist approach are meaningful for investigating the war on terror narrative, especially in societies like Turkey where the polarization is high. Furthermore, this study shows that although a democratic attitude is taken in the entries while criticizing the government, stereotypes are reproduced in the construction of “the others” as well as in other themes that produce fear. The frequent usages of curse words that are highly sexist also serve for the reproduction of the stereotypes. The vast majority of the researches about the politics of fear have discussed the citizens as individuals being manipulated by the leaders. This perception leaves no room for perceiving the citizens as free individuals making their own decisions or the considerations as individuals may act according to their identities and values. This study shows that it is significant to have further research on social media to see what citizens construct to have a deeper understanding of the politics of fear without limiting it with solely one approach.

The study has several limitations. The major limitation of this study is that it was not investigated thoroughly if the war on terror narrative was present against ISIS in the traditional Turkish media or not. The discourse of the politicians’ on ISIS was also not taken into a detailed investigation. There are also limitations with the method. The lack of Turkish adaptation of functional linguistics that Fairclough (1993) uses in his analysis is one of the limitations. There is also a limitation with the CDA itself. Because CDA originally investigates the politicians’ and other dominant figures’ discourses and embrace standing with the powerless ones in the society its’ whole analysis is made according to this understanding. Fairclough sees a certain type of grammar and language use, as exerting power and it is meaningful when leaders’ discourses are

taken into account. However, when the same is observed in citizens and the powerless ones in the society, it is confusing. The social practice that Fairclough (1993) investigates was also couldn't have been investigated. As *Ekşi Sözlük* is a social media site, there is no dominant way to pursue a conversation. It is not possible to say that the results are an alternative to the norm on *Ekşi Sözlük*. One of the limitations is with the results. The sample is from *Ekşi Sözlük* and it is not representative of Turkey. The sample is also not representative of *Ekşi Sözlük* either as solely *şikela* entries that had been written between two days were investigated. It is hard to suggest that *Ekşi Sözlük* generally has a secular discourse or supporters of the government don't use it. For this reason, the results and their explanations with identity, Turkish national identity, and manipulation of threats only refer to this sample. There are also limitations with the texts. In some entries it was impossible to know if the author was using irony or making a serious remark. These entries were not taken into consideration. Furthermore, as *Ekşi Sözlük* has a moderation that deletes entries and accounts, it also inhibits one to see what is actually discussed. The screenshots that one author shared that shows the praisers of the Reina massacre were from Twitter. If Twitter was chosen as the research space, it would have enabled a more diverse discussion on the Reina massacre. Thus, further research might be made on Twitter. The politics of fear has been discussed with the U.S. and Europe as mentioned in section 1.4 hence, further research might also include other countries as well to understand the difference between the reactions of the public.

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ANNEXES

Table A.1 Headings of Ekşi Sözlük and Their Archived Weblinks

Headings of Ekşi Sözlük	Archived Weblinks
January 1 st , 2017 Ortaköy Nightclub Attack	https://web.archive.org/web/20170505143137/https://eksisozluk.com/1-ocak-2017-ortakoy-gece-kulubu-saldirisi--5266368?a=nice
Citizens who are Happy for the Attack in Ortaköy	https://web.archive.org/web/20170505143430/https://eksisozluk.com/ortakoydeki-kulup-saldirisina-sevinen-vatandaslar--5266448?a=nice
How Authors Feel on January 1 st , 2017	https://web.archive.org/web/20170505143542/https://eksisozluk.com/1-ocak-2017-sabahi-hissedilenler--5266495?a=nice
The Perpetrator of the Attack on January 1 st , 2017	https://web.archive.org/web/20170505151209/https://eksisozluk.com/1-ocak-2017-reina-saldirisinin-faili--5266401?a=nice
People Died in Reina not Becoming Martyrs	https://web.archive.org/web/20170505151456/https://eksisozluk.com/reina-da-olen-35-kisinin-sehit-olmaması--5266430?a=nice
We are Against the New Year Whoever Blows up	https://web.archive.org/web/20170505151746/https://eksisozluk.com/yilba-sina-karsiyiz-kim-havaya-ucurursa-ucursun--5266929?a=nice
The Power the Woman who Survived the Reina Attack Take Shelter	https://web.archive.org/web/20170505151618/https://eksisozluk.com/reina-saldirisindan-kurtulan-kadinin-sigindigi-guc--5266945?a=nice

ISIS Not Attacking to the UK Ever	https://web.archive.org/web/20170505151950/https://eksisozluk.com/isidi-n-ingiltereye-hic-saldirmamasi--5266645?a=nice
The Planner of the Reina Massacre is Mehmet Ali Alabora	https://web.archive.org/web/20170505152305/https://eksisozluk.com/reina-katlaminin-planlayicisi-m-ali-alaboradir--5266716?a=nice
The Tweet by the Ministry of Internal Affairs Calling for Secularism	https://web.archive.org/web/20170505152145/https://eksisozluk.com/icisleri-bakanliginin-laiklik-cagrisi-tweeti--5267893?a=nice
Security of the Reina Nightclub	https://web.archive.org/web/20170505152512/https://eksisozluk.com/reina-gece-kulubu-guvenligi--5269142?a=nice
Why the Party Wasn't Cancelled	https://web.archive.org/web/20170505152627/https://eksisozluk.com/eglenince-neden-iptal-edilmedi--5266476?a=nice
Mehmet Görmez's Statement on the Ortaköy Attack	https://web.archive.org/web/20170505152742/https://eksisozluk.com/mehmet-gormeizin-ortakoy-saldirisi-aciklamasi--5266580?a=nice
January 1 st , 2017 the Country Behind the Reina Attack	https://web.archive.org/web/20170505152930/https://eksisozluk.com/1-ocak-2017-reina-saldirisinin-arkasindaki-ulke--5266524?a=nice
Taxi Drivers that Request 5.000 Liras During the Reina Attack	https://web.archive.org/web/20170505153121/https://eksisozluk.com/reina-saldirisinde-5-bin-tl-isteyen-taksiciler--5266851?a=nice
Barbaros Şansal's Tweet on the Reina Attack	https://web.archive.org/web/20170505153237/https://eksisozluk.com/barbaros-sansalin-reina-saldirisi-tweeti--5266450?a=nice

January 1 st , the Video of Barbaros Şansal	https://web.archive.org/web/20170505153351/https://eksisozluk.com/1-ocak-2017-barbaros-sansal-videosu--5266899?a=nice
January 1 st , Strange Provocators Roaming the Streets	https://web.archive.org/web/20170505153520/https://eksisozluk.com/1-ocak-2017-ilginc-provokatorlerin-sokaga-cikmasi--5266958?a=nice
The Fact that the Reina Attacker has Escaped	https://web.archive.org/web/20170505154025/https://eksisozluk.com/reina-ya-saldiran-teroristin-kacmasi--5266551?a=nice
Turkish Civil War	https://web.archive.org/web/20170505153640/https://eksisozluk.com/turki-ye-ic-savasi--1739700?a=nice (4 th entry) https://web.archive.org/web/20170505153802/https://eksisozluk.com/turki-ye-ic-savasi--1739700?a=nice&p=2 (3 rd entry) https://web.archive.org/web/20170505153908/https://eksisozluk.com/turki-ye-ic-savasi--1739700?a=nice&p=3 (3 rd entry)
Terror Can't Scare Us, We Scare the Terror	https://web.archive.org/web/20170505154148/https://eksisozluk.com/teror-bizi-korkutamaz-biz-teroru-korkuturuz--5266823?a=nice
National Intelligence Organization	https://web.archive.org/web/20170505154259/https://eksisozluk.com/milli-istihbarat-teskilati--254593?a=nice (1 st entry) https://web.archive.org/web/20170505154418/https://eksisozluk.com/milli-istihbarat-teskilati--254593?a=nice&p=2 (1 st entry)

	<p>https://web.archive.org/web/20170505154659/https://eksisozluk.com/milli-istihbarat-teskilati--254593?a=nice&p=5 (1st entry)</p> <p>https://web.archive.org/web/20170505154800/https://eksisozluk.com/milli-istihbarat-teskilati--254593?a=nice&p=6 (3rd entry)</p> <p>https://web.archive.org/web/20170505154916/https://eksisozluk.com/milli-istihbarat-teskilati--254593?a=nice&p=8 (1st entry)</p> <p>https://web.archive.org/web/20170505155025/https://eksisozluk.com/milli-istihbarat-teskilati--254593?a=nice&p=10 (1st entry)</p> <p>https://web.archive.org/web/20170505155124/https://eksisozluk.com/milli-istihbarat-teskilati--254593?a=nice&p=11 (2nd entry)</p>
ISIS Making Istanbul University its Target	<p>https://web.archive.org/web/20170505155547/https://eksisozluk.com/isidi-n-istanbul-universitesini-hedef-almasi--5267032?a=nice</p>
Reina Being Closed	<p>https://web.archive.org/web/20170505155704/https://eksisozluk.com/reina-nin-kapanmasi--5266950?a=nice</p>
Our Citizens May be Cautious but Not Scared	<p>https://web.archive.org/web/20170505155814/https://eksisozluk.com/insan-larimiz-tedbirli-olsunlar-ama-korkmasinlar--5266732?a=nice</p>
January 1 st , the Tweet of Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü	<p>https://web.archive.org/web/20170505155913/https://eksisozluk.com/1-ocak-2017-ahmet-mahmut-unlunun-attigi-tweet--5266747?a=nice</p>

Dictionary Full of Agents	https://web.archive.org/web/20170505160012/https://eksisozluk.com/sozlu-gun-ajan-kaynamasi--5266757?a=nice
The Probability of the Reina Attacker Being an Agent	https://web.archive.org/web/20170505160221/https://eksisozluk.com/reina-saldirganinin-ajan-olma-ihimali--5266597?a=nice

Table A.2 Security/Intelligence/Surveillance

Deontic Modality	Irony/ Ridiculing	Assumptions	Epistemic Modality
irregular suggests that the responsible ones have the duty to protect their people.	zott has an intertextual tone. Author ironically tries to state that Binali Yildirim is solely condemning the terrorists.	sen de git sen de unut makes a propositional assumption that when there is intelligence the attacks are prevented. It also makes intelligence a desirable value assumption.	sen de git sen de unut explicitly suggests that there has been intelligence taken for the attack and the police forces couldn't prevent it. Author uses indicative mood, the past tense that has been seen. Author also asks what MIT is doing.
voltranin sag kolu argues it is necessary for the government to take action, save people.	goz yaslarini tutamayan adam ridicules the situation of himself/herself by wishing there is no Turkey in afterlife. The author criticizes MIT and minister	oktay dogangunung betidikleri makes the propositional assumptions that the police has the intelligence and couldn't prevent the attack, and the intelligence can prevent terrorist	klaine explicitly suggests that MIT didn't care about the attack and it happens in every attack. Copula -dir is used for determination.

<p>macecik isteyen teyzenin eczacısı suggests that the states' biggest duty is to protect its' citizens right to live. Author uses copula -dir to express determination.</p>	<p>for internal affairs for not having information about the attacker.</p>	<p>attacks. Intelligence is a desirable value assumption. Author uses the metaphor of house and thief when describing the situation.</p>	
<p>nerveone obliges the state to provide the security and strengthen the security forces and to blow up the terrorists. Author demands the state to resign and not say "either presidency or chaos".</p>	<p>art saves compares Turkish police/security forces to the ones in the video game GTA. The ridiculing tone is used to show how the police force is not working.</p>	<p>ikiyilimbosamigeptekiyleolsu n makes a propositional assumption that when intelligence, security, migrant policy, politics, and business do work on the basis of merit, there aren't any terrorist attacks. Author hints that Turkey doesn't have these on the basis of merit.</p>	<p>malheiros suggests that if high security measures are taken with the police and the army no one takes their loved ones to these places. Author uses indicative mood, present tense.</p>
<p>akiaki suggests that it is the state's duty to provide the safety of life and property, and to fight terrorism. Copula -dir is used to express determination.</p>	<p>kapp ridicules Turkey and the security forces by stating, "the terrorist who doesn't carry out a terrorist attack is stupid."</p>	<p>klaine makes propositional assumptions that the U.S. has warned for the attack, and uncovering the intelligence is a gap.</p>	<p>order from chaos suggests that the ones that have taken the intelligence and didn't prevent it are the perpetrators of the attack. Author uses -dir copula to express determination.</p>
	<p>tatar ramazan addresses to Hakan Fidan as Hakan and tells him to wake up. The ridiculing tone suggests that the head of MIT is sleeping, hence doesn't know anything about the attack.</p>	<p>xeuszt codes uncovering intelligence as an undesirable value assumption.</p>	<p>akiaki suggests that the state is the perpetrator of the attack for not providing its citizens' right to live and to fight with terrorism. Copula -dir is used to express determination.</p>

ghergedan demands <i>Yeni Akit</i> to accept that there is a security gap and also not to blame others. Author uses imperative mood.	eksi peace talks about the police force and mocks them for not taking action.	teknolojik makes a propositional assumption that the state can't ensure security, expects the defence from him/her and don't resign. Also makes the assumption that when state fails to ensure these it needs to resign.	neither living nor dead suggests that no one sees himself/herself responsible in the country. Author uses indicative mood, present continuous tense.
yga states it is state's duty to provide security and right to live. Plus, he/she states these are the main points states are obliged to do and it is state's reason for being. Author uses copula -dir to express determination.	defansi olmayan takimin kalecisi addresses MIT by "dude". Author suggests that they don't know about the attack and take information from citizens.	kerevizyon makes the propositional assumptions that <i>Yeni Akit</i> legitimizes terrorism by asking the question and it is not meaningful not to go out.	goz yaslarini tutamayan adam states that MIT probably doesn't know about the attack yet and the minister for internal affairs don't have enough or right information. Author uses copula -dir to express determination.
It is not clear whom the edebiyatt addresses (government, police force, university) but obliges measures to be taken. Author uses imperative mood.	giventofly uses the figure of speech <i>tecahül-i arif</i> . Author acts unaware of MIT as if it is nonexistent. Therefore, stresses that the institution acts like nonexistent.	inlimbo makes a propositional assumption that terrorist attacks happen frequently in Turkey and surveillance and CCTV prevent the terrorist attacks. Surveillance and CCTV are desirable a value assumptions. Author hints at Turkey not having enough surveillance.	kirkhammet ³⁴ suggests that people got harmed because of the lack of security Reina.
hahahahha obliges the government to be cautious instead of the citizens. Plus,	asosyal vurdumduymaz utangac usengec suggests that MIT doesn't know the	order from chaos makes the propositional assumptions that intelligence can prevent terrorist	xeuszt suggests that the perpetrator of the attack is the media, the undercover

the author gives a demand on resignation (if they govern the country poorly). Author uses imperative mood.	attack and is sleeping.	attacks, intelligence has been taken for this attack and" those" didn't prevent it. The scare quotes hint that the attack is deliberately not prevented.	policemen and the bigots. Author uses copula -dir to express determination.
btyel suggests that the state is responsible to provide the safety of people.	scienceisinteresting suggests that MIT doesn't take care of intelligence.	macecik isteyen teyzenin eczacisi makes a propositional assumption that intelligence prevents the attacks. Intelligence is a desirable value assumption.	mambakobe suggests that MIT has taken things too far. Author uses indicative mood, the past tense that has been known.
quricco suggests that the state needs to resign for not being able to provide security.	novalis88 ridicules people working in MIT, suggesting they are not working at all but playing backgammon and drinking tea in their shift.	nereveone makes a propositional assumption that the state can't ensure the safety of the country.	biyolojik saat tamircisi suggests the state has failed to perform its duties that are written in the constitution and its components. Author uses indicative mood, present continuous tense.
eksi sozlugu degistirecek insan demands the government to pay a price. Author uses desiderative mood. Author also suggests that in return for taxes that are millions of liras the state has to protect its citizens. Author asks it in the form of a rhetorical question.	fancia has an intertextual voice in this entry that addresses Tayyip Erdoğan for taking the intelligence from his brother-in-law. Author ridicules the Turkish intelligence, comparing it to Russian intelligence. Author suggests that intelligence is not working in Turkey.	regina phalange makes a propositional assumption that intelligence and surveillance prevent terrorist attacks. Author hints that both are not enough in Turkey. Surveillance and intelligence are desirable value assumptions.	eksi peace suggests that they have institutions that work like "we had an intelligence but may be it won't happen" and there is no police force to take take measures. Author suggests that there have been few police at the place and other might have been be protecting the mosques. Author uses "I guess" and

<p>biyolojik saat tamircisi suggests that the state needs to provide the duties that are written in constitution and its components.</p>	<p>ivory black makes an intertextual reference to Tayyip Erdoğan, taking intelligence from his brother-in-law. Then ridicules the situation with mentioning sister-in law etc. Author suggests that intelligence is not working in Turkey.</p>	<p>mambakobe makes a propositional assumption that intelligence can prevent attacks; MIT is not working and responsible for the deaths. Intelligence is a desirable value assumption.</p>	<p>"probably". edrf suggests that the police only arrest people giving gillyflower and throw litter at the street. Author uses indicative mood, present continuous tense. Author also suggests that the police are as guilty as the ones who carried out the attack.</p>
<p>sen de git sen de unut uses deontic modality to suggest that there are people responsible to have the intelligence and prevent the attacks. Author asks rhetorical question.</p>	<p>mambakobe uses jobs in scare quotes to emphasize that heads of MIT are actually not working. The intertextual reference is put to mock the president's statement on intelligence services when intelligence is not working in Turkey.</p>	<p>biyolojik saat tamircisi makes a propositional assumption that the state does not take responsibility, the intelligence and security and courts can prevent the attacks, make people safe. Intelligence, security and courts are desirable value assumptions.</p>	<p>ear quessir suggests that the intelligence net isn't used. He/she gives an intertextual reference from Afet Güneş to back his/her statement. Author uses indicative mood, present continuous tense.</p>
<p>sekersiz turk kahvesi uses deontic modality that the government needs to resign.</p>	<p>evrensel yazar gives 17 examples from the terrorist attacks from the past 2 years. By stating the terrorist organization is afraid, author mocks the statement as he/she already shows terror</p>	<p>birazfasistbirazkomunist makes a propositional assumption that the state didn't protect its citizens, and intelligence can prevent the terrorist attacks. Intelligence is a desirable value assumption.</p>	<p>oo yalnız kafasi simdi geldi suggests that the budget of MIT is 1/4 of the Religious Affairs Administrations' and 1/75 of the CIA's. Author uses copula -dir to express determination.</p>

<p>teknolojik uses deontic modality that the state needs to resign.</p>	<p>attacks happen frequently.</p>	<p>nemesisdurdem has an intertextual tone in his/her utterance addressing Numan Kurtulmuş and the government.</p>	<p>r2d2r3d3 gives a reference from the government discourse on the presidency system. Author uses the word "shamelessly".</p>
<p>herkonudabilgisiolanadam asks rhetorical questions. Author suggests that there should be records in the police and the state should be catching the terrorists before they carry out an attack.</p>	<p>edrf's "Never mind, count the dead" has an ironic and intertextual tone. Author talks from the police's perspective, how she /he imagines it to be.</p>	<p>ivory black makes propositional assumptions that intelligence can prevent the terrorist attacks, it has been stated the New Year was going to be safe, and in times of state of emergency these attacks do not happen and the attacker can't flee. The intelligence is a desirable value assumption.</p>	<p>gImaster suggests that the presidency system will bring more authoritarianism. Author uses "probably" which shows low affinity.</p>
<p>mambakobe suggests that people working MIT need to resign.</p>	<p>btyel suggests the opposite of his/her utterances. Author suggests that the state don't work. The reason author chooses to be ironic is also to imitate people who suggest that the attack is Reina's fault.</p>	<p>makabiyasi makes a propositional assumption that the intelligence, city surveillance cameras, security measures ensure catching the terrorist. The intelligence, surveillance and security measures are desirable value assumptions. There is an exclamation mark in "security</p>	

<p>inlombo suggests that it is necessary to think why there are so many terrorist attacks in Turkey. Author uses rhetorical question.</p>	<p>manzarada bir frankofon suggests that the opposite of his/her utterances. There is an ironic tone and an exclamation mark. Author talks about state's responsibilities in return of tax taken from people. The ironic tone is mocking those who are suggesting that Reina should be providing security.</p>	<p>measures" which suggests that there haven't been intensive security measures.</p>	<p>ear quessir makes a propositional assumption that there isn't intelligence net, nothing is done and intelligence can bring the feeling of safety. Intelligence is a desirable value assumption.</p>
<p>klaine suggests that it is the government's job to take precautions.</p>	<p>teknolojik talks about resigning from citizenship to mock the state for not resigning.</p>	<p>oo yalniz kafasi simdi geldi makes a propositional assumption that the budget given to MIT shows that not enough attention is given to it and it is not effective because of it. Intelligence is a desirable value assumption.</p>	<p>irregular makes a propositional assumption that those who are responsible for protecting their people don't resign when they have fault and the intelligence</p>
<p>manzarada bir frankofon suggests that the state should provide intelligence.</p>	<p>dalsiz zerdali asks wearing steel vest and digging trenches rhetorically. It is clear that a citizen can't live wearing steel vest and</p>	<p>irregular makes a propositional assumption that those who are responsible for protecting their people don't resign when they have fault and the intelligence</p>	<p>irregular makes a propositional assumption that those who are responsible for protecting their people don't resign when they have fault and the intelligence</p>

	digging trenches.	bureau is 300 mt. away from the parliament.	
hahahahha rhetorically ask frisking and wearing steel vest. Author suggests that the impossibility of Numan Kurtulmuş's statement by the rhetorical questions.	no avalon shows how impossible it is for citizens to protect themselves, as it is clear that no one can carry rocket launcher with them. The rocket launcher is an exaggerated version of steel vests mentioned in the previous entries.	macecik isteyen teyzenin eczacisi makes a propositional assumption that closing places can't prevent terror attacks, and the state couldn't protect its citizens' right to live.	
ben bilirim beyim de bilir rhetorically asks roaming around with steel vests.		akiaki makes a propositional assumption that the state couldn't perform its duty to provide the safety of life and property, and fight with terrorism.	
		ghergedan makes an existential assumption that there is a security gap in the country. There are propositional assumptions that there has been intelligence, Turkish state couldn't protect its citizens and the intelligence can prevent the attacks. Intelligence is a desirable value assumption.	

	<p>80 li yıllari çok özluyorum lan gives an example from going to a mall and try to be cautious as walking strange. By asking rhetorical questions the author shows how funny it would be if people were to take precautions in real life by giving exaggerated examples.</p>	<p>yga codes intelligence and security as desirable value assumptions. Author makes a propositional assumption that when there is intelligence the attack can be prevented.</p>	
	<p>The rhetorical questions by the biyolojik saat tamircisi, people carrying a kalashnikov, suicide bomb detection devices, finding an intelligence agency and courts, security organizations, are impossible and absurd in real life.</p>	<p>quicco makes a propositional assumption that the state can't provide security and needs to resign.</p>	
	<p>madman rhetorically asks anti-plane and plant for anti-staff in front of Reina. The exaggerated examples are given in order to suggest that it is not ordinary people's job or capability to protect them</p>	<p>eksi sozluđu degistirecek insan makes propositional assumptions that it is necessary to have intelligence as well as physical measures to prevent terrorist attacks and the citizens take the responsibilities of the</p>	

	from an attack.	state. Intelligence is a desirable value assumption.
	sen de git sen de unut uses irony to talk like people who think Reina should be closed after taking the intelligence.	zott makes the propositional assumptions that officials solely condemn and terror can't be solved solely with condemning.
	macecik isteyen teyzenin eczacisi mocks MIT by comparing it to mi5 and mi6 and suggests that changing the number in mi5 and mi6 and seeing why attacks are happening. Author suggests that MIT is responsible for the attacks.	goz yaslarini tutamayan adam makes a propositional assumption that the country's situation is contemptible and the author correlates it with MIT and the minister for internal affairs not having information.
	klaine suggests that it is their (citizens') duty to take precaution while mocks the owner of the statement and assert he opposite. Author also uses <i>tecahil-i arif</i> to suggest that it is the government's policies that caused the attacks.	klaine makes existential assumption that there is a security gap in the country and the propositional assumption that billions of people died from the terror attacks the government's policies caused.
		edrf makes a propositional assumption that the police force has a sloppy rescue operation, couldn't get organized and make

			the terrorist flee, and they are exhausted.	
			nemesisdurdem hints that officials solely condemn when people die in terrorist attacks.	
			btyel makes a propositional assumption that the state is guilty in this attack for not working to providing security, and taking millions of money for tax.	
			neither living nor dead makes a propositional assumption that the responsible one couldn't catch the murderer.	
			manzarada bir frankofon makes a propositional assumption that intelligence is necessary for preventing terrorist attacks.	
			hahahahha makes a propositional assumption that the state can't administrate.	
			herkonudabiligiolanadam makes a propositional assumption that the state can't catch the professional terrorists.	

			<p>Tekke deresi makes a propositional assumption that saying “either presidency or chaos” and suggesting that people chose chaos is touting for civil war. The presidency system is coded as undesirable value assumption.</p>
			<p>quadra makes a propositional assumption that the presidency system (change in the regime) won't enable the country to be together.</p>
			<p>order from chaos finds being against the presidency system a desirable value assumption.</p>

Table A.3 Us vs. Them

<p>In ivory black's entry the antagonist is the attacker. Triggered by the idiom "disappear in a puff of smoke". Word "terrorist" is used. It is vague who is blamed other than the terrorist. Author talks about state of emergency, intelligence and <i>Huzur Operasyonu</i> made by the police but make no comment other than "what then". An inference can be made that author blames the police yet it is not clear.</p>
<p>In bilimiyosambelkidekonusmayadegmez's entry antagonists are the attackers and an <i>Eksi Sözlük</i> author. The former triggered by the verb defending and the word "murderers". The latter triggered by suggesting that the state should take a look and that the author is defending the murderers.</p>
<p>In hakan03's entry antagonists are attackers and taxi drivers. Triggered by taxi drivers being called opportunist and despicable.</p>

Expression “those who carried out the attack” is used.
In mysteronss' entry antagonists are the attackers. Triggered by being the killers of compassion, love, and faith for goodness. Protagonist is Kenan Abi who possesses what the attackers killed..
In marsli gocmen's entry the antagonists is ISIS. Triggered by the expression "hiding behind Islam" and "one to be put in the ground". Word “hypocrites that hide behind Islam” is used. The protagonist is the woman in the video and us, triggered by their relationship with the God.
In ikiyilimbosamigeckioleolsun's entry the antagonists is ISIS. Triggered by the expressions “no brain”, “head chopper mentality”. Word” radical Islamist terrorist dogs” is used. Other antagonists are people who suggest that the UK is behind ISIS. Triggered by the statement on supporting ISIS. Author calls them “terrorist”, “radical Islamist terrorist dogs’ sympathizers”, “head chopping mentality” and “brainless”.
In alitheterrible's entry the antagonist is the attacker. Triggered by the words "raking" and the verb" prevent". He is called “attacker”.
In malheiros's entry the antagonist is ISIS. Triggered by the expression" they might attack". Word “perpetrators of the attack” is used.
In sen de git sen de unut's entry antagonists are attackers. Triggered with the verb "prevent". They are called “men”. Other antagonists are police, security forces. Triggered by the not performing their duties. Third antagonists are the authors who suggest that Reina is guilty.
In herkonudabilgisolanadam's entry the antagonist is the attacker. Triggered by the verbs "kill", "carry out an attack", "lose track", "catch". Words as “man” and “professional terrorist” are used.
In makabiyasi's entry the antagonist is the attacker. Triggered by the words "slaughter", "massacre". Words as “terrorist” and “treacher” are used.
In kurukafakarafaruk's entry the antagonist is the attacker. Triggered by the word "massacre". He is called “suspect”
In golgem var iyi ki golgem var's entry the antagonist: ISIS. Triggered by its association with jihad, fear, trembling with fear, anxiety, can't breathe, and die.
In damizlikmanda's entry the antagonist is ISIS. Triggered by the expressions villainy, attack, under threat, watch out. Word “men with no honour” is used.
In hassasterazitunanablagesin's entry the antagonist is ISIS. Triggered by the expressions blow up a bomb, "I hope nothing bad will happen". They are called solely “ISIS”.

In solakkedi's entry the antagonist is ISIS. Triggered by the words "explode", "risky", "terror expert". "Sons of a bitch" is used twice.
In fanci'a's entry the antagonist is ISIS. triggered by expressions of conquering Istanbul, separating it from gaiour Europe, being against secular education, using detonator, filling everywhere with fire, preventing people from walking as-sirāt, infernal, can't see one's hand in front of one's face, tawhid, fire fallen at the sea, the hand pulling the pin, propaganda, bloody terror, fear, dread, panic, rake through, kill, blow up with bombs, running away, bridge being exploded. Words as "jihadist pimp", "ISIS", "jihadist guard", "jihadist bastard", "hired killer", "jihadist", "terrorist organization", "the suicide bomber", "militants with kalashnikov", "puppets", "production lover man with no honour", "militants" are used. Although much of the expressions are negative author finds ISIS think-tank intelligent, graduates of good universities, people who are expert in their profession.
In irrimi's entry the antagonist is an ISIS member. Triggered by the expressions as explosion of a bomb, broken flag, fear, "don't die". He is called "man". The protagonists are students of Istanbul University. Triggered by "being needed". It is not clear whom the author means by "we", it is left vague.
In kocgiri's entry the antagonist is ISIS (and terrorist organizations as well). Triggered by the word "massacre". Word "sons of a bitch terrorists" is used.
In skocax's entry the antagonist is ISIS. Triggered by the expressions global jihad, attacking Reina, death, <i>fatwa</i> on killing people, hired. Words as "terrorists" and "executioner" are used. Other antagonist is A. Mahmut Ünlü. Triggered by the link of his Facebook page on the death of infidels and also by following <i>sunnah</i> .
In nizamulmuluk's entry the antagonist is ISIS. Triggered by "clashing", "slaughtering", "flee". Words as "terrorist" and "animal" are used.
In rev d wayne love's entry the antagonist is the attacker. Triggered by the word "punishment". He is called "attacker", "criminal".
In skocax's entry the antagonist: ISIS and many countries. Triggered by expressions of "killing people", "executioner", and "global jihad". Other antagonists are some "Muslims" on <i>Ekşi Sözlük</i> that suggest theories about the UK. They are called "sharp" and "mastermind". Triggered by killing infidels if Turkey hasn't been secular and the expressions solving the big picture better than Goya and great capability for reasoning.
In tylor's entry antagonists are Syrians. Triggered by being the perpetrator. They are called "3 million potential terrorists". Other antagonists are implicit but refers to the government, for taking Syrians into the country.
In mambakobe's entry antagonists are Syrians, terrorist organizations. Triggered by authors way of mentioning, making the

country unsafe. Syrians are called “neither fish nor fowl”, “terrorist organizations”. Other antagonist is MIT. Triggered by being responsible for the catastrophes, and expression that they should have been resigned, and they have gone too far. There is an intertextual utterance from Tayyip Erdoğan’s statement after the terrorist attacks in France, which makes him an implicit antagonist.
In beni bana veremeyen beni neyleyim's entry antagonists are taxi drivers. Triggered by giving caption of other heading about taxi drivers who calls them opportunist.
In kbsy's entry antagonists are taxi drivers. Triggered with the expressions "didn't allow" and "people escaping". Protagonists are people escaping after Reina attack. Triggered by being victims.
In ego sum qui sum's entry antagonists are the taxi drivers and indirectly officials warning them. Triggered by taking advantage of people that have escaped a danger, the expression complain and other heading saying "son of a bitch taxi driver".
In ben smyrna's entry antagonists are the taxi drivers. Triggered by the expressions in the headings given as an example such as "son of a bitch" etc.
In gundelikyasaminhickiriklari's entry antagonists are taxi drivers. Triggered by the expressions of "are we surprised" and "son of a bitch". People who are making fun of the authors are called "cowherds" and constitute the other antagonists.
In stratlover's entry protagonists are the survivors of the attack. Antagonists are the taxi drivers. Triggered by the expression "attempt for exploitation" and being grown up in <i>Çomarland</i> (Dogsland).
In tetteh's entry antagonists are the taxi drivers. Triggered by being called <i>çomar</i> , people who got their asses fucked for 3 bucks of change.
In notr's entry antagonists are the president and the prime minister. It is expressed as a determination, with the usage of -dir at the end. Triggered by making wrong political decisions (the president), having shallow Syrian strategies (prime minister) and being a dreamer of the Ottoman (prime minister), taking Arabic dogs into the country, educating armed groups in the country and sending them to the neighbour, making the border <i>yol geçen hanı</i> (a place where passengers frequently stop by), and the expression about the country becoming Peshawar. Other antagonists are Syrians. Triggered by the expressions "raking", "dozens of dead", "ak-47s", "hand grenades", "becoming Peshawar", " <i>yol geçen hanı</i> ", "neither fish nor fowl". They are called “3 million Arabic <i>çomar</i> ” (dogs).
In sekersiz turk kahvesi's entry the antagonist is the government. Triggered by bringing enemies with foreign policy, creating dirt (where dirt is used as a metaphor), not giving up their position because it puts their lives at risk, being in a dead end. Words and

<p>expressions as “inexperienced” and “withdrawn party” are used. The government is also associated with the death risk, terror attacks, economic crisis, embargos, being isolated, getting poor, being insecure, chaos, civil war and revolution. Author uses –dir copulation in expressing a determination but also and gives the manner of an official statement. Numbering the statements also give the official statement manner in this entry.</p>
<p>In voltranin sağ kolu's entry antagonists are hired social media trolls and partisan media. Author expresses it in certainty using the adverb definitely, makes no room for other options. Triggered by making agitation on Aleppo, and discourse on new year celebrations wind people up which turn out as terror. Plus expressions as fucking douchebags, assholes, and associations with attack, massacre, creating terror. Author not only blames them for Reina attack but also the murder of Russian ambassador. In the last sentence, another antagonist is mentioned, the state. Triggered by being nonexistent.</p>
<p>c2vkxq uses parataxis and depicts a clear and precise picture about what the governor has done or hasn't done in his/her entry. Therefore, gives the impression of behaving robotlike, without feelings. Hence, this is what the author actually criticizes. Antagonist: the governor. Triggered by the expressions "not condemning", "not imprecating", "take a note" and "don't forget it".</p>
<p>In fly 84's entry antagonists are people distributing brochures and others defending them. Triggered by being (bigots) responsible for the attack. Words and expression as “bigots” and “pink assed humanists” are used.</p>
<p>In ideoloji karmasasi yasayan cocuk's entry antagonists are people who are happy after Reina attack. They are called “son of a bitch”.</p>
<p>In isolde's entry antagonists are people who are happy for the attack, ones differentiating between Christmas and New Year. Former triggered by using the deontic modality to be awake which hints a danger, the latter by the propositional assumptions that these people are legitimizing the murder of those who celebrate Christmas and everything happened to "us" is because of them. Words as “imbeciles”, “fucking underdeveloped cortex”, “stupidity” are used. "Us" is not clear in this text.</p>
<p>In order from chaos's entry antagonists are people in the screenshots who are happy for the attack. In the screenshots people are stating that the ones died are the lovers of Santa Claus, people believing in Islam doesn't celebrate new year, they are infidels, they wear mini skirts, take alcohol and have sex, including paid sex and escorts, they have been under foreign guys, they are not sad about the one died in Reina, they are non-Muslims, they take alcohol, they are not martyrs, they are there for their asses to be fucked up and it did.</p>
<p>In sipesyaliti's entry antagonists are people who are happy for Reina attack. Triggered by the verb "arrest".</p>
<p>In order from chaos' entry antagonists are people who are happy for Reina attack. Triggered by expressions "social polarization",</p>

<p>and "ways of struggle", ways of communication". They are called "people who want you to die". It is not clear who "you" is in the text. Author uses a certain expressions, -dir, in the first two sentences yet uses probability in the following ones. Usage of copulation is made for expressing determination.</p>
<p>In sessiz yeni masumiyet benim's entry the antagonists are people who are happy for the attack. Triggered by the expression "should be arrested" and "no shared value". They are called "idiot". Usage of the -dir copula which gives the necessity meaning in this sentence. There is an expression that it is not the first time people are happy for an attack.</p>
<p>all magic comes with a price's entry. Antagonists: people who are happy for the attack. Word: sons of a bitch.</p>
<p>In feylo's entry antagonists are people who are happy for Reina attack. Words and expressions as "those filled with dirt inside", "claiming they are Muslims" are used. By mentioning <i>Yeni Akit</i>'s Facebook page, there is an implication that these people are also supporters of the government.</p>
<p>In eucarya's entry antagonists are people who are happy for the attack. Triggered by the expression "unfortunately". It is stated with a certain manner, in present tense that makes no room for other options. Word as "intolerant for others happiness", "uneducated", "merciless flock of bigots" are used. There is a metaphor of flock as if they are some kind of animals.</p>
<p>In shirazmerlot's entry antagonists are people who stayed silent after the attack Triggered by the words anger and rage. There is an implication that these people are Muslims. Antagonists are triggered by the words anger and rage. The protagonist is the doctor who hasn't questioned the religion of their patients.</p>
<p>In nomadicc's entry antagonist is FETÖ Triggered by a STV show, being the perpetrator. The word "unusual" is used for them.</p>
<p>In driss's entry antagonists are political Islamists (bearded ones, the government, ISIS, people that are happy for the attack in France, people booing the ones died in an attack). Triggered by "being the perpetrators of the attack" and with the assumption that the government fed ISIS. Statements are made expressing determination, using -dir copulation. People booing are called "dogs" with a metaphor.</p>
<p>In xeuszt's entry the antagonists are people having a discourse against New Year celebrations, media, undercover policemen. Media triggered by covering the intelligence, undercover policemen by arresting security staff and the others for being against celebration. Author's statement is certain, using the copula -dir. There is an intertextual utterance in mentioning FETÖ, a criticizing tone for the government. People who are against New Year are called "bigot". It is also not clear who they are and might be including the Religious Affairs Administration.</p>
<p>In stnmb's entry antagonists are religious people and jihadists. Triggered by saying there is no unity and solidarity in the country,</p>

<p>desiring to kill people who like to have fun, do not show respect to human rights, and don't like atheists. Plus, the expression that some groups got rid of religious people. By using plural author suggests that there is more than one group of people who are tired of religious people. Author suggests that religious people have no respect for human life and differences and those they are propagandising for this attack for 1 month. Enemy is used for them. Enemy is important, as enemies exist in games or wars. The statement is certain, making no room for other options. Protagonists are the theists and people who got rid of religious people. Triggered by the expression "having fun".</p>
<p>In xspace's entry antagonists are people ideologically and religiously supporting ISIS. Triggered by being the perpetrator of the attack. Author states they are 20% of the population yet it is not known where this percentage comes from. It is not certain whom the author talks about but religion must be Islam.</p>
<p>In ttraykn's entry protagonists are people living in Izmir. Antagonists are people in Istanbul, terrorist organizations, people distributing magazines to others, people doing interviews, people that walk with turban and beard, people selling religion. Triggered by the assumption that terror attacks happen because of them, being the perpetrators. They have been compared to <i>it</i> (meaner word for dogs) by using metaphor. By making a call to people to kick these people out, author expresses they don't belong here. Whom he makes the call is not clear but can be seculars according to the context.</p>
<p>In order from chaos's entry antagonists are people who didn't prevent the attack. It is not clear whom the author talks about, must be government/security forces/MIT. Triggered by being counted as the perpetrator and not preventing the attack deliberately. Author uses scare quotes.</p>
<p>In akiaki's entry the antagonist is the state. Triggered by not being able to provide the safety of life and property and fight with terrorism. The author states the state is the perpetrator of the Reina attack. The statement is an expression of determination, made by the copula -dir.</p>
<p>In sari kanarya's entry antagonists are the governor and others. Triggered by the associations not calling people martyr, discrimination, doing calculations, not allowing people to suffer, feeling sick, not being human. The metaphor dirt is used. Author makes a generalization and what you refer to is ambiguous. It may be referring to AKP but also the Islamists as it is on being martyr.</p>
<p>In emrngz's entry antagonists are them. Triggered by calling people <i>gaiour</i> instead of martyr. It is not clear who they are but might be the government officials as the governor is discussed in the heading for not calling people martyr. It is also intertextual, as some people in the government have made the news calling people <i>gaiour</i>.</p>
<p>In mamulikce's entry the antagonists are plural you. Triggered by the expressions double-dealing, eager for being martyr, "hope</p>

<p>you will become martyrs", not having brain, discriminating. Although author addresses one person, someone in the screenshot who talks about atheists being eager for becoming martyrs, she/he uses the plural pronoun "you". People in the screenshot are a religious one and author might be addressing to people similar. "Us" is also vague, might be atheists or seculars etc.</p>
<p>In mtb's entry the antagonists are "them". Although not named author must be talking about the government/state as it gives the martyr status. Triggered by the feeding ISIS (the government) and being responsible (the state) for people died in Reina attack. Plus also with the expressions slaughter, not listening to people, not calling people martyr, come to a sticky end. Although it is not named some people are clearly the government/state as the entry is on giving the martyr status. Author uses "for me" while making the statement which is not seen in the previous texts. It is clear that the statement is author's and not given as the truth. Protagonists are "us" and Reina victims. It is vague who "us" is in the text. "Us" is trying to make its voiced heard by the government/state; therefore it might be the citizens in the country. Second antagonists are the attackers and ISIS in general. Triggered by the word "creatures with rabies".</p>
<p>In knipeos' entry the antagonists is you. Triggered by the expressions "don't give a fuck about your religion's or your definition", "tough life", "fuck you", "necessities of being a human", "teaching life lessons". Expression "average bedoin sense is used". Although vague he must be talking about the government officials as he/she is addressing to a singular you but then expresses that state should not define martyrs according to these individuals' beliefs. By using bedouin author expresses the religious side of the government. Author also uses plurals and makes generalizations when talking about the government.</p>
<p>In nereveone's entry antagonists are them (Serdar Arseven and others). Triggered by the expressions "blow up", "explode". Author mentions using "reactionary bigot" then deleting it, not certain if it has been for Arseven. Author uses plural "them" when talking to Arseven and it is vague who is addressed, might be the government as Arseven is a supporter or might also be religious people who are against the new year celebrations. Author talks about the government/state in the second part of the entry and they are the other antagonists. Triggered by couldn't providing safety. There is also an intertextual utterance of "either presidency or chaos", <i>Yeni Akit's</i> heading. <i>Yeni Akit's</i> heading is not differentiated but counted as the state's words.</p>
<p>order from chaos' entry doesn't express much. Antagonists are implicitly AKP and Arseven. Triggered by making the statement.</p>
<p>In ear quessir's entry the antagonist is Serdar Arseven. Triggered by inducing people with hatred and hostility, and what he does is an offence. The expression about the jail shows that there are many people like him.</p>
<p>In sombrefloe's entry antagonist is Serdar Arseven. Triggered by doing a hate crime and the word "hostile".</p>
<p>In madambozari's entry antagonist is Arseven. Triggered by the word "confession" and also calling the state's attorney's for him.</p>

In tetteh's entry antagonist is Arseven. Triggered by conforming to the "one man". Arseven is the antagonist. He is called "bigot who supports terror". There is an implicit antagonist, the government, triggered by the expression on the country being governed by a "one man" in a religious way. Ahmet Şık is the protagonist, triggered by the implication that he isn't guilty.
In bogdan yazarovsky's entry antagonist is Arseven. He is called "fucking dark minded bigot", "jealous", "envy hypocrite bigot". Triggered by the propositional assumptions of being the planter of internal conflict, having hate speech, taking the country backwards, being jealous. Author addresses to Arseven in the first part but uses plural "you" at the end of the entry. By using that, author sees Arseven and others as a whole. It is known that Arseven supports the government therefore "you" might be the government. Arseven is also a conservative; therefore the author might also be addressing the conservatives. It is left vague.
In garen's entry antagonist is Arseven. Triggered by doing terror propaganda and author's call for state's attorneys.
In evelemegeveleme's entry Arseven is the antagonist. Triggered by doing provocation. Author calls Arseven heartless and countless and without 46 chromosomes.
gellobar implicitly states that the protagonist is the woman in the video. Triggered by worshipping God's Muhammad.
In cizmedin ki kesesin's entry the antagonist is the criticsizers. Triggered by the word dishonourable. The protagonist is the woman in the video, triggered by stillness and patience associated with her.
In endless bliss' entry the protagonists are the woman and others in this soil. Triggered by the expressions "noble" and "divine".
In benbiravareyim's entry the antagonist is the media that interviewed with the woman, triggered by the expressions as losing their human feeling, doing the interview for money, position and subserviency, without shame, feign an excuse, (no) respect for people. The protagonist is the woman in the video, triggered by the words smiling and suffers.
In sultanahmetli's entry antagonist is the "you". Author must be talking about the government with the plural you. Triggered by giving arms aid to the terrorists, hiring terrorists in the municipalities, enabling (terrorists) to kill people, creating terrorists, finding an excuse for rapist clergymen. Author calls them dishonourable, <i>çomar</i> (dogs), pervert, and not Muslims. Second antagonist is the clergyman, triggered by the adjective rapist. The protagonist is the woman in the video. Triggered by the expressions "put somebody to shame" and "pack a wallop". Other antagonists are the attackers. Triggered by the words attack and arm aid. Words "villain" and "terrorists" are used for them.
In tekeru's entry the antagonists are the ones trying to differentiate people. Triggered by the expression discrimination. The protagonist is the woman. Triggered by the expressions lady and concise.
In asaf halet celeb'i's entry the protagonist who is the woman in the video. Triggered by finding the depth of her soul, meeting with

Allah again, redesigning her life, and making judgment.
In basso continuo's entry protagonist is the woman. Triggered by the expressions lady and "tear everyone's heart out". The antagonist is ISIS. Triggered by the associations slaughter, distorting Islam, killing all humanity. They are called "so-called Muslims originally Satanists".
In irregular's entry antagonists are Islamists. Triggered by being cause for the terrorist attacks. Plus, they are called "dickheads" and although there isn't a verb like this in Turkish the verb doing Islamism is created for the activities of Islamists. There is also an intertextual reference to Davutoğlu, calling ISIS angry kids. There is an expression that people responsible for the safety of the citizens doesn't serve their duties and don't resign either. The author doesn't clearly say who they are and left it implicit. They must be government/MIT/security force. Author also criticizes some people for not arresting Islamists; it must be the police force. Author also criticizes MIT's location for being unsafe. Other antagonists are Davutoğlu, responsables (government/MIT/security force), and police force.
In laodikya's entry antagonists are "they" (Güler and political Islamists). Plural pronoun "they" is used when talking about Turgay Güler and identifies them as political Islamists. Triggered by seen as the reason behind the deterioration of the country expressed as shit hole, seeing opposition parties and individuals as responsible and the propositional assumption that they don't say a word to ISIS.
In skolastikretikulum's entry antagonists are <i>Akitter</i> , people who suggest that Turgay Güler is associated with FETÖ. Triggered by the expression "fuck off".
In zebukucu's entry antagonists are the ones who are going to believe Güler. Triggered by the expression "smoulder". Considering the Güler's position the author must be talking about the supporters of the government although it is not given explicitly.
In fenahyulupazo's entry antagonists are Turgay Güler and Burhan Kuzu. Triggered by their behavior in Twitter and expressions as acting idiot, shut up, shut up for God's sake, I'll pay twice for you to shut up, quit social media if you can't use it.
In tepedeninne's entry antagonist is Güler. Triggered by making people target and it is an offence.
In pul's entry antagonists are "you" (Turgay Güler and others). Triggered by only caring about the unjust treatment of the believers and also by the expressions <i>badem bryikular</i> (almond shaped moustashed), revengeful dirt, people who don't forget and want Alabora to die or rot in jail. It is not explicitly said who others are but must be the supporters of the government. Protagonist is Mehmet Ali Alabora. Triggered by the words "educated", "someone loving his country", "fighter", "standing upright", "making a point", and associated with civilization and democracy.

<p>In the woman who loves sunny days's entry, the antagonist is Turgay Güler. Triggered by making people a target and turning people against Mehmet Ali Alabora and the expressions as "who are you", "carelessness", "what kind of mind". Author starts the entry by addressing Güler then switches to the plural pronoun "they". By doing that, the author might also be addressing the supporters of the government.</p>
<p>In r2d2d2d's entry, the antagonist is the government and its supporters (including Turgay Güler). Entry starts with addressing Güler and then others. It is not stated explicitly but as the author talks about the rule of law, the presidency system and economic crisis, he/she must be talking about the government. Triggered by the words "stupid", "organized evil" and "<i>çarıklı erkan-i harp</i>", and statements as they blamed people who are opposed to the resolution process, arrest people who fought with FETÖ, blamed people who came with solutions to the economic crisis, coming up with <i>Pasolig</i>, suggest that terror would finish if the presidency system comes, blame others for the fire in the dormitory. On subjects like the presidency system and fire in the dormitory, the author uses intertextual references. Former is a statement of Numan Kurtulmuş and the latter is Ahmet Keser's, presenter of <i>Akit TV</i>. Protagonists are the ones trying to fix the problems in the country suggested as: opponents of the solution process, the ones who fought with FETÖ, people suggesting solutions for economic crisis, people going to the arenas, people that are sad for the fire in the dormitory.</p>
<p>In order from chaos's entry, the antagonist is the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Triggered by making people a target and not doing anything to the people praising the Reina massacre. People praising the Reina massacre are the second antagonists. Protagonists are people in Halkevleri, triggered by stressing the importance of secularism and also "calling for secularism", "fighting with ISIS", "opposing the presidency" and "saying thank you".</p>
<p>In Kasar Yaza's entry, the antagonist is the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Triggered by supporting ISIS. Protagonists are people in Halkevleri. Triggered by giving a statement against ISIS.</p>
<p>In order from chaos' entry, the antagonists are the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu, people who are propagandising for ISIS. The first trigger is by (the Ministry of Internal Affairs) threatening people, the secularism becomes terrorism, and the expressions shameless and unlawful supporters of ISIS. Author has an intertextual reference of Davutoğlu calling ISIS "angry children" and also associated with what the Ministry of Internal Affairs does. That makes also ISIS the antagonist.</p>
<p>In Zerdeşt's entry, the antagonist is the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Triggered by being responsible for the terrorist attacks and dead people, not doing anything for the accounts that love ISIS, making people a target, also by the expressions "sinking", "troll". Author starts with the singular "you" and ends with "them". An inference can be made that "them" consists of the government. Other antagonists are the government triggered by the expression "sinking", and people who are praising ISIS. That makes also ISIS the</p>

antagonist.
In secilmemis cocuk's entry antagonists are the government and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The former triggered by blaming Halkevleri for civil war, and also being against the speech against ISIS which is for secularism. The latter triggered by starting civil war. Protagonists are people in Halkevleri. Triggered having a statement for secularism and opposing ISIS.
In nikator81's entry antagonist is the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Triggered by not acting according to the state's regime and considering opponents as terrorists. The protagonist is Halkevleri, triggered by praising the secularism.
In aberkall's entry antagonists here are bearded man distributing brochures and Ministry of Internal Affairs. Antagonists are triggered by the relationship made between them and the hint that the Ministry of Internal Affairs is religious/Islamist.
In obturator's entry antagonists are people the Ministry of Internal Affairs and talking against Halkevleri. Former triggered not acting according to the constitution. The latter triggered by the expression "let alone".
In borisyeltmesin's entry the antagonist is the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Triggered by opposing to the statement made by Halkevleri the Ministry of Internal Affairs is acting like supporting ISIS. The protagonists are people in Halkevleri, triggered by the expression that shows author supports their speech. ISIS is also antagonist in this entry.
In ekşi sozlugu degistirecek insan's entry antagonist is the state. Triggered by not providing security and the expression "paying a price". Here, "us" is not clear but must be referring to the citizens of the country. Other antagonist is the author of the first entry in the heading. Triggered by the words "fucking argument" and "manhole cover mindless" and also for expecting everything from the citizens as in case of terrorism, coup, mine accident.
In birlesmis milletler genel telesekreteri's entry the antagonist is the government. Triggered by not performing its duties. By stating it is the government's duty to fight with terrorism author hints that the government failed to do it.
In btyell's entry the antagonist is the government. Triggered by being guilty for the attack for not providing security.
In manzarada bir frankofon's entry the antagonist is not explicit but must be the government. Triggered by taking tax in return of intelligence and security.
In teknolojik's entry the antagonist is the state. Triggered by not providing the safety and not resigning.
In macecik isteyey teyzenin eczacisi's entry the antagonist is the state. Triggered by failing to provide its citizens their right to life. Second antagonists are the authors who suggest that Reina is guilty. Triggered by the word "douchebag". Other antagonist is the terrorist. Triggered by the word "attacking". Word "man" is used for him.
In oktay dogangunung betidikleri's entry the antagonist is the police. Triggered by failing to prevent the attack.

In ghergedan's entry the antagonist is the state. Triggered by failing to protect its citizens. In the second part of the entry author addresses to a "you". Because the heading is after <i>Yeni Akit</i> 's heading author must be addressing <i>Yeni Akit</i> . <i>Yeni Akit</i> is the other antagonist. Triggered by blaming others, not accepting the security gap, and expressions as "don't talk", "say nothing", "enough is enough". Other antagonist is the attacker. Triggered by the expression "citizens should be protected of". Word "attacker is used for him.
In kerevizyon's entry the antagonist is <i>Yeni Akit</i> . Triggered by legitimizing terrorism and the expression "common", "surely".
In yga's entry the antagonist is <i>Yeni Akit</i> . Triggered by being called a worthless institution. Second antagonist is the state. Triggered by not performing its duties as providing security measures, right to live.
In birazfasistbirazkomunist's entry the antagonist is <i>Yeni Akit</i> . Triggered by accusing CHP for events and not asking questions to the government. Second antagonist is the state. Triggered by failing to protect its citizens.
In ekşi peace's entry antagonists are the institutions, especially police force for the attack. Triggered by not performing their duties.
In sagligniz icin's entry the antagonist is "us". Triggered by not taking responsibility for the attack. Author must be addressing to people who support AKP. It shows the author sees the government and <i>Yeni Akit</i> inseparably, asking <i>Yeni Akit</i> to admit their fault.
In 260611's entry the antagonist is the plural "you" (Mehmet Görmez and others). Triggered by the <i>fatwa</i> for new year celebrations and the expression "too late". Although it is on Görmez's statement, author may be referring to the Religious Affairs Administration.
In makabiyasi's entry the protagonist is Mehmet Görmez. Triggered by making the statement. Antagonists are those who are happy for the attack. Triggered by the words "vile dogs" and expression of supporting terrorism which is an offence.
In macheseigrullo's entry the protagonist is Görmez. Triggered by making a statement that has been needed.
In rakirikirealdo's entry antagonist is Mehmet Görmez. Triggered by making a perception about Christmas all together and the expression "not sincere".
In thechosen1's entry the antagonists are people who are happy for Reina attack. Triggered by tweeting to polarize the society, inducing hatred and feud and also the word "son of a bitch". Görmez is the other antagonist. Triggered by solely giving the statement as his duty.
In diye cevap verdi nanu's entry antagonists are <i>imam</i> and Görmez. Former triggered by the <i>khutbah</i> called "nonsensical", the latter for the adjectives "insincere" and "hypocrite" and being the head of <i>imam</i> .

<p>In rezzanzeren's entry the antagonist is Görmez and the plural "you". Triggered by living in glory and rides Mercedes, solely talking "car car car, vidi vidi vidi, dir dir dir", not opposing to the Friday <i>khutbah</i>. He is described as "not respected" among others. While talking about Görmez author goes to plural "you". It is not explicitly expressed who is "you", but must be the government as he/she was talking about the position of Görmez. They are the second antagonists. Triggered by being associated with the deterioration of the country including Görmez.</p>
<p>In launchpad's entry antagonist is Görmez. Triggered by being guilty (by usage of the verb "daubing") and author's expression "armoured car lover". There are also other antagonists, the ones giving their vote to the government although the government is not uttered. Triggered by the propositional assumption that they don't feel sad for Reina and the word "ignorant". It also makes the government the third antagonist.</p>
<p>In labuenauida's entry antagonist is Görmez. Triggered by considered guilty and the expression "meaningful".</p>
<p>In meyhannede sabahlayan adam's entry the antagonist is those who are discussing about the perpetrator of the attack. Triggered by the word "fucked".</p>
<p>In darbeye kalkisan astegmen's entry the antagonist is the government. Triggered by using a polarizing political discourse, intervening people's living spaces, makes statements for unity and solidarity after terror attacks and also its association with civil war. Other antagonist is the "Islamic partizan media" such as <i>Yeni Şafak</i> and <i>Akit</i>. Triggered by making people target. The last antagonists are the supporters of the government. Triggered by being compared to "cattles" and the verb "taming" as if they are animals.</p>
<p>In yumrukmezesi's entry the antagonists are the ones talking about other countries' plots. Triggered by the word "fuck".</p>
<p>In gercekgibiyalanruyagorenadam's entry the antagonists are the ones talking about other countries' plots. Triggered by the word "fucking douchebags".</p>
<p>In kikin's entry the antaonists are Islamists. Triggered by accusing others for the attack.</p>
<p>In irregular's entry the antagonist is another writer, dudayeva. Triggered by the words "son of a bitch", "troll", "vile Islamist who is the enemy of its own nation" and being compared to the murderer. Other antagonist is the terrorist. Triggered by the word "murderer".</p>
<p>In cloudyrainyday the antagonist is Barbaros Şansal. Triggered by his action defined as "nonsense".</p>
<p>In lilmoreflatun's entry antagonist are people. It must be Barbaros Şansal and others. Triggered by discriminating people, living with feud, hate and prejudice with no understanding and toleration and also that terror issue is not solved because of their discrimination.</p>

In penguent's entry antagonists are Barbaros Şansal and others. Triggered by doing provocation. Author expresses that it is an offence, and this provocations may lead to civil war. Plus, Şansal is called "ignorant".
In fenahuyly spazo's entry antagonists are they. They must be Şansal and others. Triggered by doing provocation and the expressions "no one gives a fuck about people's sects", "God damnnd you" and the word "sons of bitches".
In fakatsureyyabuderinbirtutku's entry the antagonist is Şansal. Triggered by doing provocation and it is an offence. Plus, the expression on "being arrested".
In heiglot's entry the antagonists are several. First one is Şansal. Triggered by doing provocation. Second one is Tayyip Erdoğan. Triggered polarizing the society by his discourse. Last antagonist is the Religious Affairs Administration. Triggered by ignoring Christians, Jewish, atheists, deists by giving <i>fatwa</i> and distributing brochures. Author believes the ones giving <i>fatwa</i> and distributing brochures are the same people. All of the antagonists are not uttered in the text but inferred by the intertextual references.
In eaglebunker's entry antagonist is Barbaros Şansal. Triggered doing provocation, having obsession, trying to look cute to some, with some being ambiguous. Other antagonists are <i>Ekşi Sözlük</i> writers blaming Sunnis. Triggered by the expression "talking nonsense and the word "troubled".
In edwardscissorhand's entry antagonist is Barbaros Şansal. Triggered by doing discrimination and words "son of a bitch" and "so-called intellectual".
In negrocan's entry the antagonist is Şansal. Triggered by the propositional assumption that he is doing discrimination and is gay. Plus, he is called <i>herif</i> (a meaner word for man).
In blackbad's entry the antagonist is Şansal. Triggered by the expression "fuck him".
In pisdusunceliadam's entry the protagonist is Şansal. Triggered by stating the truth according to the author but not in proper manner.
In kolaicindekiizmarit's entry the antagonists are Barbaros Şansal and the terrorists. The former triggered by the ironic voice of being the kind of leader this country wants and the latter by the metaphor shit and the word "people who kill us". Other antagonists are citizens of the country. Triggered by the expressions "understanding to kill and being killed".
In e186833's entry the antagonist is Barbaros Şansal. Triggered by the expression "messed up".
In sentenza's entry the antagonist is Barbaros Şansal. Triggered by his tone and the expression "crazy".
In raskolnikov baltasi's entry the antagonist is Barbaros Şansal. Triggered by the words "crazy" and "unhealthy".

In hokage's entry the protagonist is Barbaros Şansal. Triggered by the expression "reasonable". Antagonists are the rulers and people of the country. Triggered by the expression "vile". It is not certain whom the author is talking about on making this country hell. It may be the rulers and people but can also be ISIS, Muslims, and Islamists.
In dahafazlasi's entry the antagonist is Şansal. Triggered by not being sad for the country or people, deserves insult and curse.
In gaccashiro's entry the protagonist is Şansal. Triggered by the author agreeing with him.
In tirnagimbatiyor's entry antagonists are the supporters of the government although they are not named explicitly. Triggered by beating Şansal. Şansal is the protagonist. Triggered by going crazy for right reasons.
In tucek's entry the antagonists are people with choppers. Triggered by the word "son of a bitch" and the expression of not being civilized. There is an ambiguity about people with choppers who are called son of a bitch. Protagonists are people in Halkevleri. Triggered by the word "civilized".
In woodenwriter's entry protagonists are people in Halkevleri. Triggered by demanding justice, seek a proper life and create awareness in the society for these purposes. Antagonists are those who call people in Halkevleri provocators. Triggered by calling people provocators and the expression "great". It is not clear who they are.
In svart's entry antagonists are some people we don't know. Triggered by having games and they are ignoring the attack and the expressions "laziness", "distain to listen others", "don't need to talk".
In pano's entry the former antagonists are the "dictatorlover amoebas". Triggered by the expression "subject of amusement" and the verb "disgrace". It not certain since the passive voice is used. It may be inferred that the writer is talking about the supporters of the government. Author indirectly makes "the dictator" the other antagonist. It is not named who is the dictator. Protagonists are people in Halkevleri. Triggered by being rational, honest and brave.
In mrquartz's entry antagonists are "children of Erdoğan" and the terrorist. The former triggered by blaming Halkevleri and the latter by being called "the killer" and the expression "not preventing". Protagonists are people in Halkevleri. Triggered by are investigating the reason behind the attack. Author also indirectly makes Tayyip Erdoğan an antagonist.
In avagiderkenhavlankopek's entry the antagonist is the media. Triggered by the expression "not getting any favor from". Protagonists are people in Halkevleri. Triggered by being rational and have done what have been needed. Other protagonists are leftists. Triggered by making a change in <i>halk</i> (people) and the expression "get somewhere". The author clearly sees himself belonging to a group, leftists. It is not clear who is addressed by "we", might be solely leftists, as the author differentiates leftists and <i>halk</i> (people).

In endlo' entry the protagonists are people in Halkevleri. Triggered by stating that coffeehouses are a great place to start the change. It is not certain if the author also agrees with statements of Halkevleri or not.
In risington's entry the antagonist is Turgay Bakırtaş. Triggered by the word "real provocator" and being one of the provocators in Kabataş event.
In elitas' entry antagonists are people in Halkevleri. Triggered by the expressions "screaming", "yelling in raucous voice" and "making the atmosphere worse". The protagonists are people sitting in the coffeehouse. Triggered by the word "well mannered".
In meluun's entry antagonists are "they". Triggered by the verb "barking". It is not certain in the text that "they" are. Protagonists are people in Halkevleri. Triggered by defending right to live, doing politics in coffeehouses, which are great places for politics, and making these people angry.
In art saves' entry the antagonists are those who are authorized to catch the terrorist. Triggered by the expression "disgrace". It is not clear whom the author talks about.
In herkonudabilgisolanadam's entry antagonists are the state and the police. Former triggered by not catching before the attack the latter by not keeping track.
In goz yaslarini tutamayan adam's entry antagonists are the Ministry of Internal Affairs directorate and MIT. Triggered by not having enough information and the assumption that they are correlated with the disgrace in the country. Other antagonist is the attacker. Triggered by the expressions "attack", "run away". Word "man with no honour" is used for him.
In makabiyasi's entry antagonists are people who are responsible for the security measures. Triggered by the scare quote suggesting that there aren't enough security measures. Author must be talking about the police but it is vague.
In kapp's entry antagonists are indirectly those who are responsible for catching the terrorists. Triggered by expressing that it is not possible to escape that kind of an attack.
In erhanmartin's entry antagonists are, indirectly those who are responsible for catching terrorists. Triggered by expressing that in times of state of emergency terrorists don't escape. Author must be talking about the police.
In neither living nor dead's entry the antagonist is the one who is responsible for catching the terrorist. Triggered by failing to do it and not taking responsibility. Author must be talking about the police commissioner. Author also suggests that there are others who don't take responsibility but it is vague and he/she can be talking about anyone. Other antagonist is the terrorist. Triggered by the verb "not catching" and the word "murderer".
In edrf's entry antagonists are Davutoğlu and the police. Triggered by the past statement of Davutoğlu, being disorganized, not

<p>catching the terrorist, having a sloppy rescue operation, arresting people who give gillyflower (people in Gezi), not having sentiment, going to Reina as if to collect garbage and by the expressions "exhausted", "if you wouldn't mind", "get tired", "boo", "nonsense", "shame on you" and "you are as guilty as the terrorists". Author talks about the police and Davutoğlu as if they are the same, mentions Davutoğlu's words in indirect quotation and continue talking about the police, and ending with a plural "you". Davutoğlu is not explicitly stated but intertextual reference is given. It is not clear if the author addresses more than these two. "We" in the text must be referring to the citizens. Other antagonist is the attacker. Triggered by the verbs "catch", "lose", "kill", "massacre". Words and expressions as "man", "perpetrator", "terrorist who killed dozens of people", "serial killer", "those who carried out the massacre" are used.</p>
<p>In xspace's entry antagonists are people who want to put others to jail for their discourse on civil war. Triggered by the verb "locking people". It is not clear whom the author addresses to as plural "you" and it is not possible to make suggestions.</p>
<p>In negatix's entry antagonists are people who are calling for others to "report the provocators". Triggered by the word "son of a bitch" and authors suggestion that their mentality is preparing for civil war. The state is also the other antagonist. Triggered by preparing for civil war.</p>
<p>In tekdederesi's entry antagonists are plural "you. Triggered by shedding blood, running over people, touting for civil war. There are statements as the regime of the country has changed; all the settings of the country have changed. They are given in passive voice, which is not apparent in the entries at all. Their agents are missing. The author must be talking about the government but in a passive voice. The author might be addressing to the supporters of the government as she/he is addressing to those being silent to what has been done. The author might be generalizing the government and its supporters, counting them as a whole. The heading of <i>Yeni Akit</i> "either presidency or chaos" is also given with Burhan Kuzu's tweet saying, "people chose chaos". They are given without any differentiation as if everyone in the government, supporting the government is the same. The antagonists are the government and its supporters, also triggered by the expressions as "crappy", "chaos", "this head", "evil-minded".</p>
<p>In atlantistengelencekiye's entry antagonists are people talking about civil war. Triggered by talking about the civil war the propositional assumption that they are "shitting where they eat" and "don't love this country".</p>
<p>In beni bana vermeyen beni neyleyim's entry antagonists are the supporters of the government. Triggered by calling what others do as provocation and separatism, and call people the enemy of the state and the word "imbeciles". Other antagonists are Ahmet Davutoğlu and Tayyip Erdoğan. Triggered by the not fighting with ISIS, (Erdoğan) dividing the country into half and doesn't consider the state's best.</p>
<p>In joglet's entry antagonists are some people on <i>Eksi Sözlük</i>. Triggered by not criticizing the government, police, and the army.</p>

Some others in the dictionary are also called "troll" and "being happy for terror". Second antagonist is the state. Triggered by betraying people. Other antagonists are Syrians or others who enter the country. Triggered by being the perpetrator. They are called "terrorists".
In glmaster's entry the antagonist is AKP. Triggered by being authoritarian, and also by expressions" telling lies", "creating imaginary enemies", "not taking responsibilities", "no turning back", "nightmare", "becoming Pakistan, Syria, Iran". Other antagonists are people who support AKP. Triggered by the expressions "living in a world of dreams", "killing their neighbours", "believing in lies", "blaming CHP".
In xspace's entry antagonist are <i>Aktrolls</i> . Triggered by saying whatever the man who governs the state says and the expression "fuck". Other antagonist is the ones who govern the country. Triggered by managing the state poorly, stirring the civil war, building up its militia by arms and helicopters, also mentioning Sadat, creating trouble in Syria and hoped for a Sunni- Alewi separation. Plus, there is an expression as "sticked up into your butt". Author talks about "some" trying to demolish the republic but it is vague who is addressed. The author may still be talking about the government.
In entarstial's entry antagonists are Binali Yıldırım and those who support him. Triggered by having a mentality, both Yıldırım and who supports him have. Plus there are words as "hypocritical" and "two faced" and the expression "beat". Beating is a strange word choice as people their enemies in games or wars. Other antagonists are <i>Eksi Sözlük</i> writers. Triggered by not seeing the danger, ignoring and making fun of this mentality.
In ear quessir's entry the antagonist is Binali Yıldırım. Triggered by not being scared because he is protected well with his bodyguards. An interesting word choice <i>tebaa</i> (citizens in the Ottoman Empire) is used for describing those who support the government as if we are not in Turkish Republic anymore and they are counted with Yıldırım. They might constitute other antagonists. Author makes a line between herself/himself and them. Other antagonist is MIT. Triggered by the lack of intelligence, Afet Güneş' statement and the expression "living by luck"
In oo yalniz kafasi simdi geldi's entry antagonist are those those who give more budgets to the religious affairs in comparison with MIT. Triggered by the expression "waste" and the propositional assumption that MIT is not working effectively because of the budget. Second antagonists are Islamists. Triggered by not loving the country.
In novalis 88's entry the antagonist is MIT. Triggered by being compared to the police station.
In pidsunceli adam's entry the antagonist is MIT. Triggered by the expression" still hoping for help".
In scienceisinterestin's entry the antagonist is MIT. Triggered by not working.

In klaine's entry the antagonist is MIT. Triggered by giving information to the media about the security measures is a mistake, a gap. Other antagonist is ISIS. Triggered by the expressions "benefitting from the gap", "attack", "warning", "protect". Word "terrorist organization" is used for ISIS.
In organikmetronom's entry antagonists are people who gathered ISIS supporters in school who are also expressed as being against the student collectives and left fractions. Triggered by the word "bigot" and the expression "going too far". Second antagonist is the Istanbul University administration. Triggered by the statement on ISIS supporters are under the protection of the administration and opened a stand. Third one is the ISIS sympathizer. Triggered by being described as people with "terrifying discourse". Other antagonists are, indirectly, those who have arrested the "patriotic youth". Protagonists are some people protesting ISIS. Triggered by the word "patriotic youth". It is not clear who the author addresses by the plural "you". It may be the administration of the school, the government, writers on <i>Ekşi Sözlük</i> .
In kirkhammet 34's entry the antagonist is Reina. Triggered by the propositional assumption that it has failed to take security measures.
In en guzel din olmayan din's entry the antagonist is "you". Triggered by trying to close Reina. It is not clear whom the author talks about while saying "them" and "you". In the heading this entry is written there is someone suggesting that "Reina should be closed" but it is not clear if the author addresses to that author or someone else as the author uses plurals. It is also not clear who is going to win, ISIS, conservatives, Islamists or any others.
In quirico's entry antagonists are people who think Reina should be closed including one writer of <i>Ekşi Sözlük</i> . Triggered by the words "aluminium mentality", being "brazen-faced", " <i>çomar</i> " (dogs) and the expression "I hate". Author uses plural as if there are more then one people to suggest closing Reina. The state is indirectly the other antagonist. Triggered by failing to provide the security.
In hakikanzuk's entry antagonists are some people. Triggered by claiming this country to be theirs and the words "schizophrenic and psychopathic lives", "numb brained". Author expresses it is important to tell loudly that the country is not theirs. Firstly it is not clear whom the author addresses to. At first glance, it seems like ISIS but people who are mentioning is suggested to live between us and can make an impact in our lives. Author might be talking about conservatives, Islamists etc.
In biyolojik saat tamircisi's entry antagonists are Numan Kurtulmuş and the government. Triggered by not doing its job, not taking responsibility, and not resigning. Author calls Kurtulmuş, Kurtulmuş Efendi (Gentlemen). Kurtulmuş becomes the plural "you" in the upcoming sentences. Author addresses the state as "you" and sees Kurtulmuş a part of it. The author places herself /himself amongst <i>halk</i> (people). Protagonists are people. Triggered by the propositional assumptions that they can't protect themselves.

In nemesisdurdem's entry antagonists are Numan Kurtulmuş and others. Triggered by only condemning the terror. The sentence is in plural; author must be referring to other officials in the government.
In klaine's entry antagonists are "you" (Numan Kurtulmuş and others). Triggered statement that thousands of people have died because of the terror attacks their policies have caused. They are also associated with the is a security gap in the country. Author might be addressing to the government. It is not clear who "we" are but can be citizens of the country.
In dalsiz zerdali's entry antagonists are the president, conservatives, the Religious Affairs Administration and Numan Kurtulmuş. Triggered by discriminating people as "we" and "you", taking a goal to raise religious and malevolent generation, (conservatives) bear hostility for those who are not like them, people <i>hönkürmek</i> (made a statement but like an animal) in the Friday <i>khutbah</i> that celebrating new year is illicit, and there is no trust in law and police force. It is not clear who demands people their lifestyle. Kurtulmuş is refuted with rhetorical questions that it is state's duty to be cautious. Most of the sentences are in passive clause, which makes their agents and subjects covert. Some of the agents are known by background information, such as the Religious Affairs Administration that gave the Friday <i>khutbat</i> and the "religious and malevolent generation" from president's speech.
In 29 mayis 1453 gunu hasta olan yeniceri's entry the antagonist is Numan Kurtulmuş. Triggered by caring about to money.
In no avalon's entry the antagonist is Numan Kurtulmuş. Triggered by the word "fuck".
In ben bilirim beyim de bilir's entry antagonists are "they"(Numan Kurtulmuş and others). It must be the government she/he is talking about. Triggered by not liking people to drink but for the taxes, and the expression "nonsense". It is not clear if the author places herself/herself in "some".
In 80li yillari cok ozluyorum lan's entry the antagonist is "they" (Numan Kurtulmuş and others). Triggered by the rhetorical questions and the expression "reckless". Author turns his/her addressee to a plural "they" after mentioning Kurtulmuş as "Mr. Spokesman". They must be the government.
In hahahaha's entry antagonists are "you". Triggered by not being able to manage the country, it is not possible for citizens to be cautious, and the expression "his mentality". Author must be addressing the government. It is not clear who "us" is addressing to but must be citizens.
In golden crab's entry antagonist is A. Mahmut Ünlü. Triggered by not being a Muslim, ISIS and that head-choppers have been created by his malignment in language by deceiving conservatives, he makes secular and modern people a target, despise other people's lifestyles and cultures as infidel and gaiour traditions. Protagonists are secular and modern people. Triggered by depicted

<p>as victims. Other antagonists are indirectly conservatives triggered by treating people like enemies. Other antagonist is ISIS. Triggered by the expressions “deceive”, “head choppers”, “radicalization”, “turn against others”.</p>
<p>In freudun hayaleti's entry the antagonist is A. Mahmut Ünlü. Triggered by the a link given to Ünlü's Twitter page, where he demands not to celebrate new year like infidels. Author believes calling people infidel is dangerous. He is also mocked with his past behaviour with a slipper. Other antagonists are other writers on <i>Ekski Sözlük</i>. Triggered by not knowing the difference between being an infidel and a sinner.</p>
<p>In sapple's entry the antagonist is A. Mahmut Ünlü. Triggered by being the instigator of the terror attack.</p>
<p>In sedatbeg's entry the antagonist is A. Mahmut Ünlü. Triggered by the making opposite statements in the past.</p>
<p>In juppderwall's entry antagonists are A. Mahmut Ünlü and others. Triggered by the calling people infidel and shameless and the expression "two-faced". It is not clear who the author addresses as “you”, might be people calling infidels as Ünlü, conservatives, Islamists etc.</p>
<p>In karterkele44's entry antagonists are A. Mahmut Ünlü and others. Triggered by the expression that they are the "enemies of mankind" and should be charged by independence courts. It may be to suggest that they should be charged with treason. Although the statement is Ünlü's the author addresses to a “them”. It might be, might be Islamists, conservatives, people talk against new year celebrations etc. It is also suggested that the law is not working which makes the government indirectly the other antagonist.</p>
<p>In madambozari's entry antagonists is A. Mahmut Ünlü and others with negative statements on New Year celebrations. Triggered by being the perpetrators and the word "sin". There is an explicit remark that people who make negative statements on new year celebrations are the perpetrator of this massacre.</p>
<p>In kayser soze's entry the antagonist is A. Mahmut Ünlü. Triggered by the discriminating people and encouraging them for feud, also by his past behaviour with about a slipper.</p>
<p>In deggial's entry antagonists is A. Mahmut Ünlü and those who call him a follower of <i>sunnah</i>. The former triggered by the statements as Ünlü is not loving his country, making discrimination, followers of <i>sunnah</i> shouldn't be using German cars and digital machines, therefore Ünlü is not a follower of <i>sunnah</i>. The latter triggered by the expression "retards", and claiming that they deceive people, and for making money people out of poor, making people slaves by religion, and the expression "may the soil not accept their body". At the start the author is addressing to a person defending Ünlü but chooses to use plural pronoun “you”. By doing that the author is making the addressee vague and also making generalizations about people who like and are like Ünlü.</p>

In cormisan's entry antagonists are PKK, FETÖ, ISIS, and some others. Author does not explicitly utter others but must be the government and its agents.
In relabluess' entry the antagonist is "someone". With background information we understand that she/he talks about Tayyip Erdoğan. Triggered by trying to set people against each other, interfere with people's lifestyles, point people as Alewi, zoroaster, Israel offspring, and atheist. The author makes it explicit that the discourse is her/his main concern but not the political preferences. Other antagonist is someone stating there are agents on <i>Eksi Sözlük</i> . Triggered by the expression "talking nonsense".
In temir's entry antagonists are agents. Triggered by finding caveman's statements to serve radical jihadism to confuse average Muslim's mind. They are described as "opponents" Other antagonists are people who are happy for Reina attack. Triggered by the word "caveman".
In deephallow's entry antagonists are agents. Triggered by not doing constructive criticism, which may lead to treason and provocation to polarize people. The expression "being the enemy" is used for them. It is not clear whom the author talks about.
In herzamankigibi's entry antagonists are the supporters of the government. Triggered by living in Fatih and central Anatolia and the expression in inverted commas suggest that they can't speak proper Turkish. It is not explicitly told who the "certain party" is but must be Tayyip Erdoğan as the author talks about the government. Expressions as "hated" and "admit it" are used for Erdoğan and the supporters. Protagonists are the opponents. Triggered by the word "swallow" and the expression on the fear of taken into custody. It is clear that the author also sees himself/herself as an opponent.
In matu's entry antagonists are <i>Aktrolls</i> . Triggered by blaming others and the expression "it is forbidden to express critical opinion". First, it is not clear whom the author addresses. It is not explicitly stated who are gave rise to the Reina massacre. It may be the government. Other antagonist is indirectly the government. Triggered by causing the Reina attack. The perpetrator of the Reina attack is given very implicitly. Other antagonist is the attacker. Triggered by the word "massacre" and the expression "those giving rise to this". Word "man" is used for him.
In workingclass hero's entry antagonists are people supporting PKK triggered by the word bastards, social media agents tweeting about the government by pressing people's buttons, Turkey's enemies by the word psychological war, and the state by being asleep.
In osenebusene's entry antagonists are people who suggest that CIA is responsible for the Reina attack. Triggered by the expressions as "knowledge on politics", "intelligence", "knowing everything". There is only one writer in the heading suggesting CIA before this entry but author uses plural "you".

In oci's entry antagonists are rightists. Triggered by administering the country for 60 years, are doing privatization, preventing the production and the reason for the exporters being foreign. One of the rightists is assumed to be AKP constitutes other antagonists. Triggered by not having an enterprise against the foreign capital, taking too many debt, selling banks to the foreigners, citizens using the cards from foreign banks, and its relationship with the current account deficit. The author doesn't use Tayyip Erdoğan's name but refer to him as *uzun adam* (tall man). He is another antagonist. Triggered by doing favour to the foreign capital. Author uses passive voice, which makes the agent behind the actions covert. Final atagonists are people talking about agents. Triggered by the expressions "have a fucking brain".

In red d wayne's entry antagonist is a mentality. Triggered by causing this attack, polarized the country, legitimized the political Islam, say Muslims don't celebrate new year, sold its principles for profit, use law to punish the journalists instead of Islamists that threaten people, hasn't think about consequences of what it says or does, blames others in every wrongdoing. Plus, there are words as "bigot", "people with no honour", "self-interested people". It is not clear whom the author is addressing. It might be the government but also others. Author also makes Islamists antagonists. Triggered by threatening people. Final antagonists are people who discuss the attacker are an agent. Triggered by the expressions "jackass", "misdirect", "fighting their corner".

In barton smiley's entry the antagonist is the government (the president, MIT) and its supporters. The former triggered by the probability of being the perpetrator of the attack and the latter by claiming the attack as FETÖ's. FETÖ is the other antagonist. Triggered by leaking everywhere. Author doesn't use certain expressions but modality such as "may be".

In donmeyerparaustu's entry antagonists are plural "you". Author talks about people coming with theories of agents but we don't know what kind of group these people belong. Antagonists are the government triggered by being compared to a tumor and not resigning, people looking for agents triggered by the expressions "well done", "your mentality", "missing the essence", and people that talk about new year celebrations triggered by the metaphor of killing the body.

In zott's entry the antagonist is Binali Yıldırım and others. Triggered by solely condemning and not being effective in finishing terror also by the expression "nato kafa nato mermer". Author addresses to a plural "you" who might be government officials.

Table A.4 Secularism and Western Values

Assumptions	Ridiculing/Irony	Deontic modality	Epistemic modality
order from chaos shows screenshots of people who are happy for the attacks. People in the screenshots are explaining their behavior with Islam. By showing that author hints that those who are happy for Reina explain it with Islam.	boris yeltmesin mocks the possibility of an entertainment venue like Reina becoming Beltur. By mocking it also mocks those who are responsible for these changes.	knipeos uses deontic modality to suggest that it is by law that the government can't differentiate between people becoming martyr.	kikina suggests the perpetrator of the attack is close as Islamists laid the blame on others
darbeve kalkisan astegmen makes an existential assumption that there is an Islamist partisan media and the propositional assumption that they make people target.	By ridiculing the closing Reina with mentioning Huqqa, antik sozluk ridicules that the neighbourhood is getting conservative.	madabozari uses deontic modality to suggest that the state's attorneys need to do something for Serdar Arseven. Author uses the copula -dir.	irregular suggests that dudayeva and the murderer have no difference and he/she thinks dudayeva is a despicable Islamist character that is against his/her own people. Author uses "I think" and the indicative mood, present continuous tense.
kikina makes a propositional assumption that Islamists laid the blame on others.	sapple makes a resemblance to the utterance of A. Mahmut Ünlü after the attack. There is a propositional assumption that Ünlü is the instigator of the attack.	garen asks rhetorical questions to state's attorneys need to do something for Serdar Arseven.	order from chaos suggests that the ones propagandising for ISIS have free hand. Author has an intertextual voice of Davutoğlu and uses the copula -dir.

<p>irregular codes Islamism as an undesirable value assumption while he talks about an <i>Ekşi Sözlük</i> author dudayeva.</p>	<p>kayser soze tries to show Ünlü isn't a follower of <i>sunah</i> by his behaviour and mocks him by mentioning A. Mahmut Ünlü trying to sell slippers suggesting they have magical powers.</p>	<p>ear quessir uses deontic modality to suggest that Serdar Arseven needs to be arrested. Author uses the copula -dir.</p>	<p>tetteh suggests that nothing will happen to Serdar Arseven unless he acts contrary to the “one man” and the religious way of governing. Indicative mood with present tense is used.</p>
<p>order from chaos makes the propositional assumptions that there are shameless and lawless exponents of ISIS who are criticizing Halkevleri, Halkevleri represents secularism, the Ministry of Internal Affairs does is to threaten some, and there are some propogandising for ISIS, secularism is terrorism and ISIS is angry kids.</p>	<p>jogolet suggests that the opposite of his/her sentence. Author suggests that Serdar Arseven's words on New Year celebrations are a danger to unity and solidarity.</p>	<p>stmb wishes people to unite against religious people and jihadists.</p>	<p>fly 84 makes a propositional assumption that “those bigots” are the ones attacking Reina. Author uses imperative mood.</p>
<p>sari kanarya makes propositional assumptions that by not calling Reina victims as martyrs, the governor and others are making discrimination, and by doing that they don't let people suffer.</p>	<p>en guzel din olmayan din uses an ironic tone, a tone of those who want to close Reina. Author talks about becoming Iran by closing places and may be suggesting that some people are aiming and fighting for becoming Iran.</p>	<p>skocax suggests that according to Islam (actually followers of <i>sunnah</i>), killing those who abandon religion is an obligation.</p>	<p>isolde suggests that people who are happy for the Reina attack are 40% of the country. Author uses the indicative mood, the past tense that was seen.</p>


<p>tetteh makes an existential assumption that the country is governed by “one man” in a religious way, which is coded as an undesirable value assumption. There is a propositional assumption that Serdar Arseven is a bigot who supports terrorism and acts according to the “one man” and the religious way of governing the country.</p>	<p>emrngz makes an intertextual comment and use the discourse of the government officials calling people gaiour. By saying gezur instead of gavur author also mocks their way of talking. Also suggests the possibility of people in Reina being called gaiour.</p>	<p>bogdan yazarovsky demands S. Arseven to fight for his own family (but not others). Author uses imperative mood.</p>	<p>stnmb suggests that the enemy is the jihadists and religious people. They have no respect for human life, you can't make up to them by differences, they intend to kill and they have been propagandising for this attack for months.</p>
<p>fly84 codes distributing brochures against New Year celebrations as undesirable value assumption and people who have done that are called "bigot". There is a propositional assumption that the New Year celebrations have been called Christian tradition.</p>	<p>zinaedenzidan has an intertextual voice suggesting Reina should be <i>imam hatip</i> or <i>küllüye</i>. These words have the utterance of the government. This is not real Islam is also used by the government. Author not mocks of the process of becoming imam hatip and küllüye.</p>	<p>sultanahmetli wishes the <i>çomars</i> to be squashed and paralysed for what the Reina victim said. Author uses imperative mood.</p>	<p>skocax makes a propositional assumption that the reason Ünlü can't kill him is because Turkey is a secular country thanks to Atatürk. Author uses the copula -dir. ISIS kills people in Reina to apply sharia law throughout the world as it considers itself the only legal state in the world. Author uses inductive mood, present continuous tense.</p>
<p>isolde codes being against New Year celebrations as an undesirable value assumption. There is a propositional assumption that the ones</p>	<p>heiglot uses <i>tecahül-i arif</i> mixing it with irony. The author makes an intertextual reference from Tayyip Erdoğan. The</p>	<p>mumulikce damns the <i>Ekşi Sözlük</i> author by using imperative mood. Author also wishes them to become martyr and uses desiderative mood.</p>	<p>diye cevap verdi nanu states M. Görmez is insincere and a hypocrite unless he fires the imams who give nonsensical <i>khutbahs</i>. Author uses the</p>


<p>differentiating between Christmas and New Year are legitimizing the murder of those who celebrate Christmas, and those who are against the New Year celebrations are happy for the Reina attack.</p>	<p>author makes a propositional assumption that calling people “they are leftists, they are terrorists” is dividing people, and the <i>khutbah</i> and the brochure against the New Year celebrations is a provocation.</p>	<p>copula -dir.</p>
<p>stmb makes the propositional assumptions that the country has little unity and solidarity, religious people don't like atheists and want to kill those who want to have fun, and there are people who got rid of religious people. There are existential assumptions of enemy: religious people and jihadists. Religion is coded as an undesirable value assumption.</p>	<p>traykn demands people living in Istanbul to kick out people distribute magazines and etc. Author uses imperative mood.</p>	<p>order from chaos states the Ministry of Internal Affairs doesn't make anything with people who are praising the Reina massacre. Author uses copula -dir to express determination.</p>
<p>matu codes "saying Allahu Akbar" as an undesirable value assumption as the author gives the detail although there is no need to. It also hints finding religion undesirable.</p>	<p>skocax suggests that the Abu Hanifa obliged its followers to kill infidels. Author uses indicative mood, the past tense that was heard.</p>	<p>bogdan yazarovsky addresses S. Arseven and others that they will stick what they have done up to their butt. Author uses objective modality, indicative mood, and future tense.</p>

<p>skocax codes religion undesirable whereas secularism is coded as a desirable value assumption. Existential assumption of global jihad is present. There is a propositional assumption that killing people in Reina benefits global jihad.</p>		<p>oo yalniz kafasi simdi geldi suggests that it is necessary for Islamists to oppose the waste. Author uses imperative mood.</p>	<p>fancia suggests that ISIS aims for Turkey to break off from non-Muslim elements and aims to attack places that are non-sharia as Istanbul University. Author uses indicative mood, both past tense that was seen and past tense that was heard.</p>
<p>goldencrab makes a propositional assumption that A. Mahmut Ünlü vicariously makes modern and secular people target, belittles people's cultures and lifestyles as infidel and gaiour, tell people they committed adultery in Gölcük and say the earthquake serves you right, conservative people are listening to Ünlü, and he radicalizes them and make them enemies to other people. Author gives examples from past behaviour of Ünlü. There is a propositional assumption that discourse turns out in action; that head choppers of ISIS are those radicalized by discourses of people like Ünlü, and being</p>		<p>deggial wishes Ünlü's followers and others to burn, that the soil won't accept their body, God damn them. Author uses desiderative mood.</p>	<p>zerdest suggests that the Ministry of Internal Affairs is making Halkevleri target. Author uses indicative mood, present continuous mood. Author suggests that Halkevleri is a bigger threat than ISIS for the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Author suggests that if the Ministry of Internal Affairs had that tweeted this for ISIS loving accounts thousands of people wouldn't have died. Author uses compound tense.</p>


<p>Muslim isn't what Ünlü does. Discourse of radicalization, making people target are coded as undesirable value assumptions. Religion isn't coded as undesirable.</p>			
<p>hokage makes a propositional assumption that those who want to go to heaven turn the country into hell. Religion is coded as an undesirable value assumption. It is not clear whom the author talks about, may be ISIS or religious people in general.</p>		<p>all magic comes with a price wishes to talk people who are happy for the attack. He/she calls them son of a bitch.</p>	<p>mtb states the definition of martyr is clear by using the copula -dir. Plus, states it doesn't change according to who state calls martyr. Author uses indicative mood, present tense. Author says some people can't communicate with the government by using subjective modality "we" and indicative mood, present continuous tense.</p>
<p>launchpad makes propositional assumptions that Mehmet Görmez is guilty because of the <i>khutbah</i>, by the word daubing, and the country is divided into 50-50. First group is those who are ignorant and don't feel sad for Reina victims. Second group is those who are not voting for AKP. Author's other assumption</p>		<p>sessiz yeni masumiyet benim suggests that that people who are happy for the attack should be arrested.</p>	<p>xspace e states that ISIS sympathizers are 20% of Turkey. Author uses indicative mood, present continuous tense. Author finds this ideology and these people as the perpetrators of the attack.</p>



<p>is that people who support AKP are ignorant and not sad for Reina victims. The <i>khutbah</i> is coded as an undesirable value assumption.</p>			
<p>diye cevap verdi nanu makes a propositional assumption that there are several <i>imams</i> that talk nonsensically on New Year celebrations, and the implication <i>khutbah</i> and Görmez's statements are in opposite. <i>Khutbah</i> is coded as undesirable value assumption.</p>		<p>order from chaos suggests that it is necessary to think about people who are happy for the attack.</p>	<p>driss suggests that the government, the bearded ones distributing brochures against New Year celebrations, the ones happy for the attacks in France, the ones booing people who died in Ankara, thus the political Islamists are the perpetrators of this attack. Author uses copula -dir.</p>
<p>order from chaos makes a propositional assumption that Halkevleri are stressing the importance of secularism, and some people are praising Reina massacre and this is an offence. There is an existential assumption that what the Ministry of Internal Affairs did was making Halkevleri a target. Struggle with terrorism, calling for secularism, being against the presidency system and thanking people are coded as desirable value</p>		<p>sipesiyalist suggests that people who are happy for the attack should be arrested.</p>	<p>garen suggests that Serdar th Arseven is doing terror propaganda. Author uses indicative mood, present continuous tense.</p>

<p>assumptions.</p> <p>bogdan yazarovsky makes propositional assumptions that Serdar Arseven and others are clappers of internal conflict, subject of hate speech, has fucked up and taken the country back with a project with others. Author codes fighting with "special pleasures" as an undesirable value assumption. He/She uses the verb "bark" and "hypocrite bigot". There is a propositional assumption that the author waits for these days to come to an end.</p>			<p>laodikya suggests that political Islamists they take the country to a shithole. Plus, he/she suggests that political Islamists who don't say a word to ISIS blame the opponent journalists and parties in every incident. Indicative mood is used with present continuous tense.</p>
<p>260611 codes <i>khutbah</i> against New Year celebrations as undesirable value assumption. Author asks rhetorical questions. Author implies that what has happened in Reina has a relationship with the <i>khutbah</i>.</p>			<p>evelemeveleme states that he/she doubts S. Arseven has 46 chromosomes. Author uses the subjective modality "we".</p>
<p>rakirikirealso makes a propositional assumption that a Christmas perception has been made by all including Görmez. Author hints that this perception has a relationship with the attack.</p>			<p>madambozari suggests that anyone who has made statements against New Year are responsible for the massacre. Copula -dir is used to express determination.</p>

<p>malheiros makes a propositional assumption that the attack has been made because people have been celebrating New Year and ISIS attacks according to a particular lifestyle, meeting with girlfriends and eating during Ramadan are some of them.</p>			<p>degial suggests that Ünlü's supporters and others have made people slaves with religion. Author uses indicative mood, past tense that was seen.</p>
<p>zerdast makes a propositional assumption that there are accounts that love ISIS and thousands of people are praising Reina massacre, trolls are administering the Twitter account of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and reporting Halkevleri means calling ISIS sympathizers to work. Author uses rhetorical questions to assert his/her beliefs. Secularism is coded as a desirable value assumption.</p>			<p>nikator81 suggests that every opponent will taste terrorism when talking about the minister for internal affairs. Author uses the indicative mood, future tense but also the copula -dir.</p>
<p>kasar yaza makes a propositional assumption that what Halkevleri does is making statements against ISIS and reporting Halkevleri means supporting ISIS.</p>			<p>organik metronom suggests that bigots have gathered ISIS sympathizers to Istanbul University to disturb the presence of leftists. Author uses indicative mood, present continuous tense. Author also</p>

			<p>suggests that the patriotic youth made a sound against ISIS. Author uses the indicative mood, the past tense that was learned. Author also suggests that youth is arrested. Plus states that people don't hear their voice by using indicative mood, past tense that was seen.</p>
<p>sultanahmetli makes several propositional assumptions that the government has made arms aid to the terrorists, given jobs to the terrorists in the municipalities, has seeked an excuse to the rapist clergyman, has made a room for villians to kill people, has made the terrorists while a Muslim doesn't do any of them and ISIS is co called Muslim satanist in real. Being Muslim is coded as a desirable value assumption.</p>			<p>eucarya suggests that people who are happy for the Reina attack have no tolerance for others' happiness. They are called uneducated flock of bigots. Author suggests that they take 3/4 of the country.</p>
<p>knipeos' makes propositional assumptions that the government has an "average bedouin sense", double standard for being martyr, Turkish state doesn't represent the</p>			<p>order from chaos suggests that Serdar Arseven supports AKP. It hints that AKP has discourses like Arseven's. Author uses the copula -dir.</p>

<p>values it was founded upon, when the state is secular being martyr can't be differentiated according to religion, the government is far from what it needs to be human, and there is a polarization in the country such as conservatives and others (Rum orthodox, people consuming alcohol and deists).</p>			
<p>mtb makes propositional assumptions that the government gives martyr status according to its agenda and people they find suitable, the government has fed ISIS, people died in Reina are not considered martyrs by the government because they died in an entertainment venue that sells alcohol, and the state is responsible for their death. Author emphasizes people have been celebrating New Year, not Christmas by saying that makes a differentiation between them.</p>			<p>goldencrab suggests that A. Mahmut Ünlü pulls off by saying ISIS is bad and it is a sin to kill people after what he has done. Author uses the indicative mood, the present tense.</p>
<p>mumulike makes the propositional assumptions are that people are called martyr according to their lifestyle, some</p>			<p>sessiz yeni masumiyet benim suggests that the country has no shared value left while talking about people being</p>

<p>people are longing for becoming martyr and they are hypocrites.</p>			<p>happy for the attack.</p>
<p>traykñ makes propositional assumptions that terror attacks are caused by terrorist organizations that call for militants, people who are distributing magazines, doing interviews with beards and turban, selling religion and if these people are kicked out there wouldn't be any terrorist attacks.</p>			<p>order from chaos suggests that people who are happy for the attack are high in numbers. Author uses the copula -dir. People might have wrong communication techniques with them. If the polarization is observed fighting against it might put on the right track.</p>
<p>driss makes propositional assumptions that the government is feeding ISIS. The government, the bearded ones distributing brochures against New Year celebrations, the ones happy for the attacks in France, the ones booing people who died in Ankara are political Islamists.</p>			<p>ideoloji karmasasi yasayan cocuk suggests that people who are happy for the attack are son of a bitch.</p>
<p>shirazmerlot makes propositional assumptions the attack has made a distinction between being Muslim or not and some people are silent about the attack because they don't count people died in Reina as Muslims.</p>			
<p>notr's value assumption is Arabic</p>			

<p>slogans being undesirable. Author uses it although it wasn't necessary, hints religion also being undesirable.</p>			
<p>garen codes talking against new year is a undesirable value assumption.</p>			
<p>ear quessir makes propositional assumptions that Serdar Arseven is encouraging people for feud and hostility and it is an offence. Talking against New Year is an undesirable value assumption. Author also makes a propositional assumption that he/she expects these days will come to an end.</p>			
<p>sombrefloe makes propositional assumptions that Serdar Arseven shows hostility for anything not belonging to his culture, and what he does is hate crime. Talking against New Year celebrations are undesirable value assumptions.</p>			
<p>madambozari makes propositional assumption that Arseven makes a confession and what he does is an offence. Talking against New Year</p>			

<p>celebrations are undesirable value assumptions.</p>	<p>feylo makes propositional assumption that people who are happy for the attack are calling themselves Muslims and are filled with dirt. By stating they are commenting on <i>Yeni Akit</i> author also hints that they are the supporters of the government. Being Muslim is coded as a desirable value assumption.</p>	<p>irregular has an intertextual voice in this entry. Davutoğlu's words on ISIS are put as a hypothetical example for Queen of the UK. One of the causes of terror attacks are then associated to Davutoğlu's manners. There is a propositional assumption that "Islamist assholes" are doing Islamism. These are given some of the reasons that there are terrorist attacks in Turkey.</p>	<p>skocax makes propositional assumptions that global jihadists and Islamic terrorism have caused trouble to the world, there are</p>
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<p>several countries and organizations are approving and supporting global jihad, some people suggest that the real and peaceful Islam is those Turkish Muslims who take after Abu Hanifa, ISIS and global jihadists are doing what Abu Hanifa, Imam Bukhari and Al-Tabari say, modern Turks who celebrate new year in Reina are those abandoned religion, and what ISIS does is what Islam obliges to, some authors would kill people if Turkey wasn't secular. Islam is coded as undesirable whereas secularism is coded as undesirable value assumptions. Author makes a propositional assumption that <i>Ekşi Sözlük</i> author likes to kill infidels.</p>		
<p>sedatbeg makes a propositional assumption that A. Mahmut Ünlü has been talking against New Year celebrations.</p>		
<p>laodikya makes a propositional assumption that political Islamists don't say a word to ISIS.</p>		

<p>eksi peace makes a propositional assumption that that more attention is given to the religion (mosques) as the he/she suggests that mosques is probably protected more than Reina in New Year.</p>			
<p>oo yalniz kafasi simdi geldi makes a propositional assumption that the Religious Affairs Administration is cared more than MIT, the budget is a waste, and Islamists have no love for the country.</p>			
<p>freudun hayaleti makes a propositional assumption that calling people infidel has consequences. Author suggests that taking alcohol does not make a person infidel.</p>			
<p>nereveone addresses Serdar Arseven and makes a propositional assumption that the real problem is not the New Year. He might have been called" reactionary bigot" .</p>			
<p>evelemeveleme makes a propositional assumption that</p>			

<p>what Arseven does is a presumptuous provocation.</p>	<p>tekke deresi makes a propositional assumption that some has changed the regime of Turkey.</p>	<p>ikiyilimbosamigeptekiyoileolsun makes a propositional assumption that people who suggest that the UK is behind ISIS are radical Islamist terrorist dogs have head chopping terrorist mentality. Author hints that they Turkey doesn't have those according to merit.</p>	<p>hejlot makes a propositional assumption that calling people leftist, atheist, terrorist is dividing people and distributing brochures against New Year and Friday <i>khutbah</i> is provocation while there are millions of Christians, Jewish, atheists and deists.</p>	<p>dalsiz zerdali makes propositional assumption that the president (and others) impose their lifestyle, the conservatives bear hostility, a goal is taken for religious and</p>
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<p>vindictive generation and on Friday <i>khuibah</i> it is said that the New Year is illicit. They are associated with fear. Some of the sentences are passive and have no agents.</p>		
<p>madambozari makes a propositional assumption that Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü is guilty for his discourse against New Year celebrations</p>		
<p>deggial addresses people defending Ünlü and makes propositional assumption that they have taken money from the poor, deceive people, being a follower of <i>sunnah</i> means not using technology and if the country becomes hell the reason will be a religious jihadist group like ISIS.</p>		
<p>rev d wayne love makes a propositional assumption that radical Islam have been legitimized, there are discourse for Muslims not to celebrate New Year and there are clear threats coming from Islamists. Author</p>		

<p>associates them with a bigot mentality. Author hints at the government.</p>			
<p>glmaster makes a propositional assumption that there are two sides of polarization in the country: AKP versus opponents (moderns)</p>			
<p>boris yeltmesin makes a propositional assumption that reporting Halkevleri means supporting ISIS.</p>			
<p>nikator81 makes a propositional assumption that Halkevleri have been reported to the police because they have been praising the regime of Turkey.</p>			
<p>organik metronom makes a propositional assumption that leftists and ISIS are two groups that are against each other; ISIS and its sympathizers who have terrifying discourse had a stand at Istanbul University.</p>			
<p>aberkal makes a propositional assumption that the Ministry of Internal Affairs are acting according to religion like the</p>			

<p>bearded man. Author uses objective modality "I guess" and indicative mood, present continuous tense.</p>			
<p>relabluess makes a propositional assumption that someone (the president) is interfering with others lifestyle and point people as Alewi, zoroaster, Israel soil and atheist.</p>			
<p>pink chick makes a propositional assumption that people who are happy are the minority of the country. They are called sick.</p>			
<p>sessiz yeni masumiyet benim makes a propositional assumption that it is not the first time people are happy after an attack.</p>			
<p>order from chaos makes a propositional assumption that there is a polarizaton in the country while talking about people who are happy for the attack.</p>			

Table A.5 Turkey Being Dangerous

Subjective and Objective Modality	Assumptions	Irony/ Ridiculing
<p>gokgogoz uses both "we " and "I". Author's usage of the expression "the only expectation she/he has is not becoming statistics" shows how common terror attacks are happening in Turkey and also hints people's life's are not worthy. Author suggests that they are sliding into the emptiness, they don't have a leg to stand on and choose just to live and whatever they say is empty.</p>	<p>joglet sees accepting Syrians as a factor for being unsafe as he/she sees them as terrorists. There is a propositional assumption that Turkey has gone through a change and it is not desirable as the author calls it "treachery".</p>	<p>klaine addresses the Reina attack and shows how impossible for people to not fear. Author asks, "why should we be afraid". Author uses "we" instead of "I". Author associates the fear with terror attacks and the security gap.</p>
<p>edrf addresses the police's sloppy operation to find the Reina attacker. Author asks "what are we going to do, how are we going to run away from dying?" Author uses "we" instead of "I".</p>	<p>oral sefalosperin makes a propositional assumption that the country has taken a transformation. The author uses "15 years ago" as the starting point, which refers to AKP coming to power. Author uses objective modality "look how the country has become"</p>	<p>evrensel yazar gives examples from the attacks happened in Turkey from 2015 to 2017. Author doesn't say a word to show Turkey has been objected to a lot of terrorist attacks in the last 2 years.</p>
<p>dalsiz zerdali is addressing Numan Kurtulmuş's statement of being cautious. Author asks, "how are we not going to be afraid?" What author suggests as the reason of fear is not Reina attacks but imposition of a certain lifestyle, goal of vindictive and devout generation, discourse on new year</p>	<p>Rumelian makes a propositional assumption that there is a "New Turkey". The old Turkey is associated with good things like "newborn babies" and "the lottery". Subjective modality is used with the pronoun "we". Author says "the news we..."</p>	<p>can simidini caya batirdim mocks Binali's comments by giving a quote from one of Zeki Müren's movies.</p>

<p>celebrations, conservatives' hostility towards others, president discriminating people as "you" and "us" and lack of trust in law and security forces. The author uses "we" instead of "I".</p>	<p>herkonudabilgisiolanadam addresses the lack of security and criticizes the police for letting this attack happen and not catching the attacker. He/she asks "we are living by luck". Uses "we" instead of "I".</p>	<p>habemus kakam mocks Binali Yildirim by saying "böö".</p>
<p>klaine talks about feelings after the attack but doesn't use subjective or objective modality either. He/she talks about "stomach pain, nausea, not being able to sleep, suffering, hopelessness, search for solution and other terrible feelings circulating".</p>	<p>nickver makes a propositional assumption that Turkey has gone through a transformation that now people look at news channels at first in the morning. The tense "used to" refers to the transformation. Subjective modality "we" is used. Good days are associated with seeing Casper and Tom and Jerry in dreams.</p>	<p>endlos suggests that the opposite of his/her utterances.</p>
<p>golgem var iyi ki golgem var's fear stems from the Reina attack and uses the pronoun "I" in expressing it. He says he is afraid, goes to work trembling, doesn't go out and will go to school with anxiety.</p>	<p>venustekilimonagaci makes an intertextual reference from his/her Arabic teacher. It is given as an example to show that people in Turkey are now in the same situation. The hint is that there might be a civil war.</p>	<p>cassius chaerea mocks Binali Yildirim by suggesting "steel mirror".</p>
<p>sakurita talks about the fear for other people</p>	<p>fancia talks hypothetically about the</p>	<p>zott mocks Binali Yildirim's statement</p>

<p>in the country. It is vague what if the author talks about Reina massacre or the atmosphere in Turkey. Author uses "I" in expressing fear. Author says he/she can't sleep, can't breathe, is happy and is afraid. Author suggests that there is no light and hope with objective modality.</p>	<p>upcoming attacks in the entry. There is a propositional assumption that it hasn't been like this before. Author says "our lives have turned into Mission Impossible films." Subjective modality is used with the plural pronoun "we".</p>	<p>by stating officials only condemn.</p>
<p>ear quessir uses both objective and subjective modality. He/she says, "I am afraid". Author says they know the intelligence isn't used and they are living by luck.</p>	<p>qokalıptus uses the idiom <i>dingonun ahırı</i> (a three ring circus) to suggest that everyone can get into the country that no one knows who other is. There is a propositional assumption that it hasn't been like this before, triggered by using "as". Author uses objective modality.</p>	<p>bu nick kullanımda olmayaydı iyiydi suggests that what Binali Yıldırım aims and happens are opposite.</p>
<p>sekersiz turk kahvesi uses subjective modality "we" to suggest that all citizens are in danger of death in the country. He/she says, "we are in a dead end". Then, switches to objective modality to assert there will be terror attacks, economic crisis and embargo. Finally, goes back to subjective modality "we" and say "we are either going to revolution or chaos and civil war, and "we are going to be isolated from the world, get poor, have no security".</p>	<p>frankiegestohollywood makes a reference to Pink Floyd's Comfortably Numb. None of the modalities are used but author tries to suggest that he/she has become numb.</p>	<p>kurukafafaruk mocks Binali Yıldırım's by stating that the terrorist is also scared.</p>
<p>damizlikmanda talks about hypothetical attacks of ISIS after the release of a photograph in front of Istanbul University.</p>	<p>order from chaos makes a propositional assumption that Turkey hasn't been like "this" before. Author suggests that</p>	

<p>The author suggests that all Turkey is under danger and it is necessary to be cautious. The usage of objective modality makes the source vague.</p>	<p>secularism has become terrorism and ISIS are kids. The transformation, then is associated with the government and its relationship with secularism. Subjective modality is used with the plural pronoun "we". Author says, "this is the point we have come."</p>	
<p>glmaster uses subjective modality when addressing civil war and issues with AKP. Author says, "the nightmare we are living in". Then says, "we are turning into a country which is a mix of Pakistan/Syria/Iran". The last sentence is with "I" and author says, "I don't see a way out".</p>	<p>laodikya makes a propositional assumption that Turkey has changed and these people (Turgay Güler and others) can't say a word to ISIS. The author addresses the treatment opponents have. The transformation of Turkey is associated with political Islamists and the author says "Political Islamists are taking the country to a shithole like a flash". Objective modality is used with them.</p>	
<p>karakeman uses objective modality that nothing is felt after Reina attack. Then, uses subjective modality and say "they have queered our pitch". Author suggests that might have hopes before the attack. At the last sentence he/she uses subjective modality and says "I feel like shit".</p>	<p>Apart from other authors, quadra uses subjective modality when expressing his/her opinion yet only in this sentence but not in the whole entry. Author suggests that this will be the last year of Turkish Republic. The sentence starts with "I think". Reason for this assumption is given as no shared value left in this geography. Author says there is nothing left to give hope and uses</p>	

<p>zerdest talks about Ministry of Internal Affairs' attitude on secularism and associates the country's deterioration with it. Subjective modality is used with the plural pronoun "we". Author says "they are sinking and they take us with themselves."</p>	<p>objective modality in the sentence. refleksif 24 makes a propositional assumption that Turkey has become something else. Author's remark is on broadcasting ban that has become a common practice in Turkey. There is a subjective modality used with the plural noun "we". Author says "we have become suspicious and oppose that the broadcasting ban hasn't come. what have we become"</p>	
<p>golgem var iyi ki golgem var uses objective modality to suggest that some are talking the new home of jihad is Turkey.</p>	<p>irminti makes a propositional assumption that people can die because of going out. Subjective modality is used with the plural pronoun "we". The author wishes people not to go to university. Author says "dude don't die we need you." Wording "now" suggests starting from this point people are at risk.</p>	
<p>al baraka ver baraka uses subjective modality and says "I can't feel."</p>	<p>solak kedi talks about hypothetical upcoming terrorist threats. Author uses "I think" when talking about touristic places being more dangerous. There is a propositional assumption with the word <i>ne ara</i> (when) that Turkey has changed and Turkey didn't have problem with terror in the past.</p>	

	<p>Subjective modality is used with the plural pronoun “we”. Author says, "they have made all of us terror experts....".</p>	
<p>tekkederesi talks about civil war in Turkey, stemming from the policies of the government. Author uses subjective modality "we have..." when talking about civil war.</p>	<p>secilmemis cocuk makes a propositional assumption that by reporting Halkevleri the government aims for a civil war. Author hints provocation made by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.</p>	
<p>kolaicindekiizmarit subjective modality "we" and says people in the country are drowning. Author associates it with "people who kill us".</p>	<p>notr suggests that Turkey is not safe because of its foreign policy with Syrians and Syria. There is a propositional assumption that Turkey has become <i>vol geçen hani</i> (a place where passengers frequently stop by) used as a metaphor for Turkey. Becoming Peshawar is also used as a metaphor for Turkey as a propositional assumption. Peshawar is used to show how unsafe the country is. Author uses objective modality.</p>	
<p>skocax suggests that the world is ISIS's space of war. Therefore, he suggests that Istanbul and New York belong to them. Author uses objective modality.</p>	<p>matu talks about terror attacks and makes a propositional assumption that dark clouds have been circulating Turkey. Dark clouds are used as a metaphor for concern and troubles the country is facing including terror.</p>	
<p>xspace uses objective modality and suggests that there is a possibility of civil war.</p>	<p>degjal makes a prediction/assumption that it is possible for Turkey to become</p>	

<p>Author suggests that civil war threat stems from and fueled by the government. The author suggests that police force has been provided with helicopters and arms.</p>	<p>like Iraq and hints at ISIS or at least a radical religious group coming into the country. The hypothetical situation is compared to hell. Author uses subjective modality "I hope".</p>	
<p>dalsiz zerdali asks rhetorical question with subjective modality "we", and say "how are we going to be not afraid?"</p>	<p>ben smyrna gives an intertextual reference from an Armenian who flew Turkey. Author tries to hint that people are now living the same scenario again, the threat of civil war.</p>	
<p>klaine uses both subjective and objective modality in the entry. He/she says "I couldn't go out today because of my fear."</p>	<p>hokage makes a propositional assumption with a metaphor that the country is now hell. It is associated with "those who want to go to hell". Author uses subjective modality "we".</p>	
<p>rezzanzenen suggests that the country is lost. Subjective modality is used with the plural pronoun "we".</p>	<p>darbeye kalkisan astegmen makes propositional assumption that the unity and the solidarity of the country have failed and the government talks about civil war. Author suggests that government is the reason behind the civil war possibility but not the terror attacks. Author uses objective modality.</p>	
	<p>pis dusunceli adam makes a propositional assumption that there is dirt, disgrace, misery and terror in the country while agreeing with Barbaros Şansal.</p>	

	<p>mambakobe makes a propositional assumption that Turkey is dangerous because of Syrians and terrorist organizations.</p>	
	<p>jogolet makes a propositional assumption that terrorists have entered the country from Syria. The expression “in crowds” show they are a lot in number and suggest that the country is not safe because of them.</p>	
	<p>taylor makes a propositional assumption that Syrians are potential terrorists.</p>	
	<p>Skocax makes an existential assumption that there is global jihad.</p>	
	<p>xspace makes a propositional assumption that people have been voicing their worries about civil war and there is a discourse going on about making those people to put in jail. Author also makes an existential assumption of civil war. Author uses objective modality.</p>	
	<p>penugent makes a propositional assumption that making provocation may end up in civil war while talking about Barbaros Şansal. Author uses exclamation marks with the statement.</p>	
	<p>negatifx makes an existential</p>	

	<p>assumption that Turkey has a Syrian issue and the propositional assumption that Syrian issue is related to the civil war in Turkey. Author suggests that the state and a mentality are preparing for civil war.</p>	
	<p>bogdan yazarovsky makes a propositional assumption that these people (Arseven and others) have the project to fuck up and take the country years back.</p>	

Table A.6 Foreign Policy/Military Intervention/Other Countries' Plots

Assumptions	Irony/Ridiculing	Deontic modality	Epistemic modality
<p>rev d wayne love calls those who are talking if the attacker is an agent or not" pricks". Big picture is also associated with Yiğit Bulut. Yiğit Bulut and people addressed in the entry are called opinion readers mockingly. There is a propositional assumption that calling the attacker as a FETÖ agent is fighting one's corner, and calling him a CIA agent is</p>	<p>donmeyen para ustü ridicules other authors who suggest that the attacker of Reina is an agent. By calling them lions, and expressions as "well done" author ridicules the other authors' intelligence.</p>	<p>mehyanede sabahlayan adam demands someone who talks about the country behind the Reina attack to shut the fuck up.</p>	<p>nizamulumk suggests that the terrorist who has carried out the attack in Reina is not an agent.</p>

<p>misleading for foreign powers. Author clearly doesn't see foreign powers or FETÖ as the perpetrator and address to those who are saying so.</p>	<p>gerçekgibiyalanruyagorenada m takes a saying from an advertorial and adapts it into this context. The original of the advertorial is "Baran is 14 years old and his friends call him Einstein". The author uses "fucking douchebag" instead of Einstein. By doing that, makes an implication that people suggesting that Reina attack is other countries' plots are stupid.</p>	<p>cornisan suggests that there are agents in the dictionary hinting at being the supporter of the government. Author uses the copula -dir.</p>
<p>jogolet criticizes welcoming the Syrians and makes a propositional assumption that people must be asking why Syrians have been taken into the country.</p>	<p>r2d2r2d3 makes a ridiculing approach. The expression "big picture" is used on <i>Ekşi Sözlük</i> to mock others that constantly show other countries as responsible. It has been used in this entry to mock people who are talking about agents and plots.</p>	<p>madderwish suggests that it is not possible to know if the terrorist who carried out the attack in Reina is an agent or not.</p>
<p>tylor makes a propositional</p>	<p>meyhanede sabahlayan adam</p>	

<p>assumption that the government/state has taken 3 million Syrian potential terrorists. By making this assumption author criticizes the government's foreign policy.</p>	<p>both ridicules and belittles people who talk about other countries' plots by calling them "fucked".</p>		
<p>zedulovski doesn't say much but gives a saying "If two fish fight in the Tigris, the British are behind it. By mentioning the saying the author, in a way makes a propositional assumption that British are behind ISIS and almost everything.</p>	<p>cimidalli not only has a ridiculing manner but also combines it with irony. Kılışdar is used for Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu by people supporting AKP with the expression used in this entry: he doesn't have qualification for leadership By saying that not only he/she opposes other countries' plots but also mocks supporters of AKP.</p>		
<p>anarax doesn't say much but gives an example of a joke on British people. The joke is on British people's "cunningness". By writing that joke, the author hints that British are behind ISIS.</p>	<p>donmeyerparaustu ridicules those who are talking about other countries' plots. Author compares Turkey to a sick man's body. In the comparison, although none of its organs are working effectively sickness is linked with germs. Author compares</p>		

<p>notr makes a propositional assumption that the Syrian strategies of Ahmet Davutoğlu are shallow. Accepting the Syrians is given as an example. One of the reason of the attack is suggested as Davutoğlu for his “unsuccessful” Syrian policy.</p>	<p>the speculation about other countries’ plots to this scenario.</p>		
<p>osenebusene makes a propositional assumption that some people claimed that CIA is behind the Reina attack. Author uses irony to mock those suggesting this claim. Actually he/she suggests that they have no information on politics and no intelligence. There is also a propositional assumption that people are writing who they hate in the heading.</p>	<p>osenebusene makes a propositional assumption that some people claimed that CIA is behind the Reina attack. Author uses irony to mock those suggesting this claim. Actually he/she suggests that they have no information on politics and no intelligence. There is also a propositional assumption that people are writing who they hate in the heading.</p>		
<p>sekersiz turk kahvesi makes existential assumption that the AKP government has a new kind of foreign policy, and propositional assumptions that Turkey is a 3rd world country and its enemies are really significant and ruthless. Author criticizes the foreign policy of Turkey for making enemies.</p>	<p>dusuncentize saygilyim ama sikimde degil gives the coordinates of Turkey. By using coordinates author uses a ridiculing tone to suggest that Turkey is behind Reina attack.</p>		
<p>workingclasshero makes a</p>	<p>zulfakr doesn’t say much but</p>		

<p>propositional assumption that someone has been trying to be trending with the hashtag aksilahanma. There is a propositional assumption that people who look like conservatives are tweeting things to press people's buttons, and "PKK bastards" are writing entries in turn to provoke and confuse people. There is an existential assumption that Turkey has eternal and periodic enemies of secret services and a propositional assumption that the Internet is served for these purposes.</p>	<p>mocks Turkey's attitude to blame others towards events by saying "local powers" and "15th July Martyrs nightclub".</p>	
<p>benbiravareyim makes a propositional assumption that ISIS has burned some soldiers. By saying that, author in a way criticizes the results of the military operations of Turkey.</p>	<p>awakening of faith in mahayana talks about other countries' plots and suggest that Jamaica who doesn't want Turkey to be a global power. It is ironic in a way that it is intertextual. It is a discourse of the government in Turkey. By saying that the author not only mocks those writing about</p>	

<p>negatix makes an existential assumption that there is a Syrian issue, which is correlated to the civil war in Turkey.</p>	<p>other countries plots’ but also the government. kocax uses the ironic tone. By doing that the author not only makes fun of the ones suggesting the UK is responsible for the attacks but also gives the statements that he believes to be true by rhetorical questions. The author tries to explain that it is the fundamentals of Islam, global jihad and Islamist terror, that makes people kill and it doesn’t need other countries to plot anything. Expression big picture is also used here to mock those who are talking about the UK.</p>	
<p>xspace makes a propositional assumption that the government stirred the pot in Syria, aimed the Alevi-Sunni partition. Author states Syrian policy of the government has been unsuccessful with the expression “sticked your plans up your ass” .</p>	<p>xeuszt gives intertextual reference in the entry. The author mocks government’s policies on FETÖ. There is an implication that according to the author FETÖ is used to blame people.</p>	

relableness makes a propositional assumption that talking about agents is misdirecting.	n8 mocks Turgay Güler for stating M. Ali Alabora is behind the Reina attack. Author mocks Güler's statement by giving an example from one of the TV series by Mehmet Ali Alabora. There is an explicit expression that the author doesn't find Güler's situation in sane.		
temir makes a propositional assumption that talking about caveman's comments on New Year celebrations means being agent and serving religious fundamentalism.	olen kurgu karakteri mocks Turgay Güler by giving a name of <i>Yılan Hikayesi</i> , one of Mehmet Ali Alabora's TV series.		
deephallow makes a propositional assumption that agents are doing treason.			
herzamanki gibi makes a propositional assumption that people who suggest that there are agents on <i>Ekşi Sözlük</i> are writing them for the opponents' entries.			
matu makes a propositional assumption that people are writing what			

<p><i>Aktrolls</i> doesn't like and then they have been accused of being agents.</p>			
<p>oci makes a propositional assumption that the attacker of Reina might be an agent.</p>			
<p>qokaliptus makes a propositional assumption that a country or an organization has planned this attack.</p>			
<p>barton smiley makes a propositional assumption that people who are close to the government are pointing STV show to blame FETÖ.</p>			
<p>nomadicc hints that FETÖ is behind this attack.</p>			