CHANGING UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 IN THE CONTEXT OF SECURITY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TURKEY

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
To my mom,

The dissertation of Tolga Burak Aksoy

is approved by:

Assoc. Prof. M. Lütfullah Karaman (Advisor)

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AUTHOR DECLARATIONS

1. The material included in this thesis has not been submitted wholly or in part for any academic award or qualification other than that for which it is now submitted.

2. The program of advanced study of which this thesis is part has consisted of:

i) Research Methods course during the undergraduate study

ii) Examination of several thesis guides of particular universities both in Turkey and abroad as well as professional book on this project.

Tolga Burak Aksoy

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ABSTRACT

TOLGA BURAK AKSOY   **June 2004**

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This thesis is aiming to examine the changes in the United States foreign policy respect to security after September 11 and determine the effects of the changes for Turkish-American relations. September 11, which is the most discussed and its influence continues for a long time, is the beginning of new developments in international arena; similar to the Pearl Harbor Raid that changed the faith of the World War II. The possible progresses framework are drawn by President Bush's address to the nation on 17 September 2002 as well as the new 'National Security Strategy' which was appeared after Bush's statement. In this respect, several scientific articles, published or unpublished periodicals, and electronic media are examined to comprehend and explain the 'National Security Strategy'. The Thesis starts with the raising of America in 19th century and the Turkish-American relations dating back to the Ottoman State to understand the impacts of the change that emerged by the new National Security Strategy (NSS) and possible effects of this new strategy to the Turkish-American relations better.

The thesis is divided into four chapters to explain the changing in the American foreign policy from past to present and its influence on the relations with Turkey. In the first chapter, the concept of security and the perception of security in the international system are examined. Second chapter focuses on the periods before and during Cold War. In the third part, the post-Cold War characteristics is examined, followed by the fourth and the last chapter, which starts with the definition of international system at the opening of the new century and then continues with the reasons and results of the 9/11. In the last part of the third chapter, changing American foreign policy is examined with respect to security and followed by possible impacts of these changes to the relations with Turkey. This thesis might help to the researchers to comprehend post-September 11 developments, which will have definite impacts on Turkish national interest.

Key Words

Flank Country	Security State	Electoral Democracy
Oligarchic Republic	Peace for Partnership	Frontline Country

KISA ÖZET

TOLGA BURAK AKSOY   **Haziran 2004**

11 EYLÜL SONRASI GÜVENLİK BAĞLAMINDA AMERİKA'NIN DEĞİŞEN DIŞ POLİTİKASI VE ÖZELDE TÜRKIYE'YE OLAN ETKISI

Bu tez 11 Eylül olayları ardından Amerika'nın değişen dış politikasını güvenlik bağlamında incelemek ve ortaya çıkan değişikliklerin özelde Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerine etkilerini belirleyebilmek amacıyla yazılmıştır. Tıpkı II. Dünya Savaşı sırasında yaşanan ve savaşın kaderine etki eden Pearl Harbor baskınının sonuçları gibi 11 Eylül olayları da bu yüzyılın en çok tartışılan ve etkisi daha uzun yıllar sürecek gelişmelerin başlangıcını oluşturmaktadır. ABD Başkanı Bush'un 17 Eylül 2002 tarihinde gerçekleştirdiği ulusa sesleniş ve ardından yayınlanan yeni 'Milli Güvenlik Stratejisi' bu yüzyılda yaşanması muhtemel olayların bir çerçevesini çizmektedir. Bu bağlamda, birçok bilimsel yayın, yazılı ve görsel basın taranarak Bush Doktrininin temelini oluşturan Milli Güvenlik Stratejisini anlamaya ve anlatılmaya çalışılmıştır.

Yeni Milli Güvenlik Stratejisi'nin getirdiği değişiklikleri ve Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerine muhtemel etkilerini daha iyi anlayabilmek için Amerika'nın dünya sahnesine çıktığı 19. yüzyılın başından başlanmış, Osmanlı Devleti ve Türkiye ile olan bu dönemdeki ilişkileri de değerlendirilmiştir. ABD'nin geçmişten günümüze değişen dış politikasını ve bu politikaların Türkiye ile olan ilişkilerine etkilerini daha iyi anlatabilmek için tez dört kısımda ele alınmıştır. Birinci kısımda güvenlik kavramı ve uluslararası sistemde güvenliğin nasıl algılandığı üzerinde durulmuştur. İkinci kısımda Soğuk Savaş öncesi ve Soğuk Savaş dönemi incelenmiştir. Üçüncü bölümde ise Soğuk Savaş sonrası ele alınmıştır. Tez de dördüncü ve son kısma 21. yüzyılda uluslararası sistemin tanımlanması ve 9/11 olaylarının neden ve sonuçları üzerinde durularak başlanmıştır.9/11 sonrası Amerikanın değişen dış politikası güvenlik bağlamında incelendikten sonra Türkiye ile olan ilişkilerine muhtemel etkisi üzerinde durulmuştur. Bu tez araştırmacılara Türkiye'nin ulusal çıkarlarını mutlaka etkileyecek 11 Eylül sonrası gelişmeleri anlamalarına yardımcı olabilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Kanat Ülkesi	Güvelik Devleti	Seçimsel Demokrasi
Oligarşik Cumhuriyet	Barış için Ortaklık	Cephe Ülkesi

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

US	The United States
NSS	National Security Strategy
9/11	September 11, 2001
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	National Security Council
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
CENTO	Central Cooperation Organization
DECA	Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement
WEU	Western European Union
UN	United Nations
NIS	Newly Independent States
PfP	Peace for Partnership
NTA	New Transatlantic Agenda
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

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INTRODUCTION

During Europe's middle ages, responsibilities were individual and traditional; dependent neither on common language nor culture.[1] The pressure of the Catholic Church over the feudal tribes diminished between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the reformation period. However, the result was anarchy, which led to the Thirty Years War during which almost thirty percent of Central Europe's population perished. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 resolved the chaos. Westphalian system based on a secular society of sovereign states and brought new principles as centrality of power, the equality of states, removing religion from international relations. The nature of the modern nation states and the international system has faced many challenges from the beginning. The two World Wars were the most destructive prior to the September 11th attacks. After 9/11 attacks, several politicians and journalists argued that the old political clichés lost their meaning and nothing will ever be the same again.[2] The terrorists targeted the World Trade Center that is the symbol of its global economic system and Pentagon, which also symbolized American hegemony. Fukuyama's peace and turmoil zones lost their validity because international terrorism removed the borders. One of his videocassettes, Osama bin Laden was seen saying "from now on, nobody is secure".

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[1] Henry Kissinger, *Amerika'nın Dış Politikaya İhtiyacı Var mı?* (Does America Need A Foreign Policy) (Ankara: METU Press, 2002), p.12.
[2] *Le Monde*, 13 September 2001, p.1.

The Cold War which dominated the international relations for nearly fifty years ended when the Berlin Wall, the symbol of the division between the East and the West, crumbled in November of 1989 leading the collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. The latest United States National Security Strategy starts with this statement: "The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom – and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise."[3] After the collapse of the Soviet Union, political scientists like John Mearsheimer defined the international system as multipolar, while others, like Joseph Nye, argued that the system type was not yet clear. Huntington put forth theory of a new type of system to define the post-Cold War period, uni-multipolar system, which has one superpower and many regional major actors. The United States, which controls oceans and continents with its military power and manages the world financial market, has a unique sovereignty that has never been seen before. Also, the United States has superiority over other nation states in the production and sale of all kinds of weapons, development of advanced technology, and with the dominance of its currency and popular culture. Moreover, during the post-Cold War, the United States insisted on and monitored standards for democracy, human rights, economy, and trade to other nation states. When nations could not meet their standards; the United States could put various kinds of pressure on them, from applying economic and military sanctions to cutting diplomatic relations to isolate the state or a group of states. The role of the United States as a superpower in the last decade of the

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[3] George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy*, White House, 17 September 2002.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss (12 February 2004)

Twentieth Century did not please regional actors, especially Muslim populated countries ruled by totalitarian regimes. The September 11th attacks may have been the international terrorist organizations' response to actions taken by the United States. Moreover, international terrorism hit the United States, but also its allies. Turkey is one of the states which has been attacked four times since September 11th. Although, there is an attitude disagreement between Turkey and the United States about the war on terrorism, decisiveness on defeating terrorism is the most important policy priority for both states.

In the aftermath of World War II, Turkey established close ties with the West, especially with the United States, in order to protect its national security. At the end of the Cold War, Turkish policymakers searched for a new strategy, which not only covered the goals of security but also covered non-security goals. Although a Communist regime was no longer Turkey's neighbor since the Soviet Union collapsed, threats to Turkey's national security and territorial integrity remain. Today, security concerns still play a vital role in Turkish policymaking as do economic concerns. Therefore, Turkey and the United States have maintained their military and economic cooperation against international terrorism.

Fundamental changes have taken place in the structure of the international system over the last three years. The Twentieth Century ended with destructive attacks on the symbols of the hegemony of the United States and its response will shape the new century. In this respect, the main aim of this thesis will be to point out the essential changes in the United States foreign policy, especially after the September

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11 attacks. Its relationship with Turkey within the context of security will be the case study. The main sources of this study cover American foreign and security policy and Turkish-American relations. Several books, journals, newspapers and web sites addressing political science, history, international relations, were examined for this thesis. Most of the books and articles used were published between 2000 and 2003. Also, newspapers and journals were used to find updated information, especially on the September 11th attacks. The complexity of the subject has forced the writer of the thesis to think from different perspectives and develop a comprehensive composition. Therefore, analysis of the United States foreign policy and its affect on bilateral relations begins with the Cold War. The period before the Cold War is mentioned briefly to understand essential changes in the United States policies and bilateral relations better. Also, the concept of security, the elements of the US foreign policy, and the perspectives of Turkish–American Relations are described to give the reader a general idea about the thesis. Unfortunately, changes in the structure of the international system following the September 11th attacks have not concluded. Only the new United States National Security Strategy and the developments made following its implementation hint at what the future may bring. As such, a descriptive study is the goal of this thesis rather than a theory-based study.

CHAPTER 1

THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY AND PRELIMINARY INFORMATION ABOUT US FOREIGN POLICY AND TURKISH–AMERICAN RELATIONS

1.1. The Concept of Security

Attempts to redefine the concept of the security have gained impetus since September 11 attacks.[4] The concept of security has been expanded from the beginning of the 20th century to the present. First, only '*high politics*', which refers military issues, were the subject of the security; in the course of time, however, '*low politics*' were added to that concept. Although many articles about the concept of security have been published, Arnold Wolfers' *National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol* is accepted as a classic work on defining the concept of security.[5] Wolfers defined security as "no threat directed at acquired values." In this definition, the concept of threat consisted only of military threat; it did not include any other possible harmful situations like earthquakes or disease. Richard H. Ullman later argued that earthquakes or disease like HIV/AIDS can threaten security, too.[6] Therefore, states should take precautions to prevent or lessen the effects of earthquakes or disease in the same way that they take precautions against a military

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[4] David A. Baldwin, "Güvenlik Kavramı" (The Concept of Security),translated by Çiğdem Şahin, *Avrasya Dosyası*, Vol.9, No. 2 (2003), p.5.
[5] *Ibid.* See Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.67 (1952).
[6] *Ibid.*, p.6. See Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security", *International Security*, Vol.8 (1983), pp.129-153.

threat. According to Ullman, the important thing is to focus on the protection of acquired values, not the existence of a threat.

That definition raised two questions: Whose security and which values are to be protected? A generally acceptable answer reads as follows: Security for the individual means upholding values like physical security, economic welfare, liberty, etc. The state deals with the concept of national security, which consists of the protection of sovereignty and integrity of the land. Finally, international security implies international peace, fair trade, etc. Politicians face with new conditions, have added new dimensions to the concept of the security. For example, former US Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown argued that the United States should continue its economic relations based on reasonable conditions with the world.[7] Traditionally, pre-globalization security concerns had mostly to do with foreign threats; since globalization, however, the concerns of security have become multi-dimensional.

American perception of security started to transform by the end of the Cold War. As a result of reduced influence of military threat in the post-Cold War era, *'low politics'* became the priority security concerns related to globalization. These concerns include inequity of justice, environmental pollution, human rights, economy, epidemic diseases (HIV/AIDS), and the traffic of narcotic substances. Furthermore, the changing perception of states' security affected states' bilateral relations in the post-Cold War period. Humanitarian interventions and human right violations were the most hotly contested issues in that period.

The war in Bosnia or in Somalia did not threaten the United States' interests directly; however the US perceived these events as a threat to international security and thus intervened in those regions. Similarly, during the Cold War, relations between Turkey and United States were mainly based on security concerns; however, after the Cold War, human rights issues gained importance in these two nations' bilateral relations. All US economic and military aid became connected to reports on human rights improvements in Turkey.

September 11 changed the perception of security of the United States once again. Bernard Brodie, who wrote on national security in the same decade as Wolfers, quoted General Jacop L. Devers' speech on national security. General Devers claimed, "National security is a situation that cannot be restricted. Either we are secured or not. We cannot have partial security. If we feel partly secure, that means we do not have any security".[8] Western nations have tried to provide this kind of security after the Cold War. Hence, the world is divided into two regions, which Fukuyama defines them as the peace zone, is the core, and the turmoil zone, is the periphery.[9] Today, the United States, as part of the peaceful core, is confronted with a greater threat – or at least a greater perception of threat - than it ever was during the Cold War.

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[7] *Ibid.*, p.17.
[8] *Ibid.*, p.18.
[9] P.M.Barnett, director of The New Rule Sets. Project, divided the world into two groups-functioning core, which mostly covers States and non-integrating gap, which is unstable regions in world today. Ergin Yıldızoğlu, "Pax-Americana: Sürekli Savaş" (Pax-Americana: A Continuing War), *Stratejik Analiz*, August 2003, p.55.

The September 11 attack, which was the biggest global terror event in history, globalized terror and destroyed the lines between the peace zones and the turmoil zones.[10] During the Cold War, Western nations could define the enemy and were also aware of the capacity and methods of the Communist Bloc. Today, however, neither the United States nor its allies can easily define or locate the enemy. Even worse, the capacity of the enemy is unknown. In 2002, the Bush Administration announced that terrorists are seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMD).[11] As a result, US citizens felt unsafe. Unsafe could not be free; thus, the Bush Administration claimed that they undertook a mission to provide not only its citizens but also people of the whole world with freedom and safety. In one of his statement in West Point on 1 June 2002, President Bush said that "Our nation's cause has always been larger than our Nation's defense".

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[10] Ersel Aydınlı, "Küreselleşme ve Güvenlik: Teorik Yaklaşımlar" (Globalization and Security: Theoretical Perspectives) , *Avrasya Dosyası*, Vol.9, No.2 (Summer 2003), p.39.

1.2. The Perception of National Security of States

Before and during the Cold War, the concept of national security included sovereignty and integrity. However, HIV/AIDS, environmental problems, and global terror (especially after September 11) became subjects of security. If we consider the theoretical background of the concept of national security, we see that neo-realism, which accepts security as the main motivation of the state, deals with security above all other trends.[12] In realism, one of the main aims of the state is to seek more power and security in order to gain control of other states.[13] All states should be aware of undefined dangers which surround the state. In this respect, states should be suspicious and stay alert to the activities of other states. However, in neo-realism, states cannot act entirely independently, because the international system, which always non-secure and uncertain, does not allow separate behaviors.[14] According to the neo-realists, states always try to establish their own security above all other things. John Mearsheimer, who is one of the pioneers of the neo-realism, defined international politics as a continual security struggle.[15] Neo-realists also define the threat of security as something objective. That means, security is defined only by military terms, not in terms of 'irrational elements' like identity, ideology and culture.

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[11] US President George W. Bush, *State of the Union Address*, Washington DC: White House, 17 September 2002. Transcript at http:www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html. (25 March 2003)

[12] David A. Baldwin, "Güvenlik Kavramı", p.27.

[13] For detailed information about realism, see Hans Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946).

[14] See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass: Wesley Pub. Co. 1979).

[15] Hasan T. Kösebalaban, "Ulusal Güvenlik Tartışmalarına Teorik Bir Yaklaşım" (A Theoretical Perspective to the National Security Discussions), *Liberal Düşünce*, 2003. http://www.liberal-dt.org. (15 April 2004)

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According to the liberals, the anarchic nature of the international system can be tamed by the influence of economic interdependence among institutions and states, since the security of the state usually increases with a rise in trade and economic power. Liberals also argue that today's global warming and mortal diseases pose a more serious threat to state security and than other states' military advances. Constructivism, one of the most popular movements after the Cold War and the most logical one, criticizes the realists' approach and argues that the perception of threat to states can vary according to some elements like identity and culture.[16] For instance, the United States views the so-called Iranian WMD as a threat to its national security; but, Israel's WMD do not disturb the US government in the same way. In fact, Iran is only a potential nuclear power; and ballistic missiles of Iran could never reach the soil of America.[17] In this respect, it is possible that separate policymaking institutions in the state act upon varying perceptions of other cultures. Turkey is one of the best examples of this kind of situation. In the beginning of the 21st century, after a statement made by Mesut Yılmaz, the former Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey, an important discussion of the national security policy-making arose.[18] Discussing the undemocratic nature of national security policy-making had been a taboo since the establishment of the Turkish state in 1923. Although the Turkish National Assembly is the only authority to determine issues of national security, different perceptions of national security were fostered among public institutions. For example, while Iran's Nuclear Program was viewed as a threat by some Turkish

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[16] *Ibid.*

[17] The owner of the thesis tries to show the differences of perception, knows that these missiles can threaten American military basis and the US allies in the Middle East, especially threaten the state of Israel.

[18] Kösebalaban, "Ulusal Güvenlik Tartışmalarına Teorik Bir Yaklaşım".

public institutions, especially military institutions, neither Erbakan's coalition government nor Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's government perceived Iran's Nuclear Program as a threat to Turkish national security. In short, varying perceptions of different identities and ideologies cause varying perceptions of security and threat.

1.3. The Development of US Foreign Policy

There is no doubt that the twentieth century is the American century. In that long century, the world came face to face with two World Wars, in which millions of people were killed and the rest, compelled to live with a balance of horror, where two superpowers shaped and controlled the international system. After the Cold War, the United States, as the only superpower, has a unique sovereignty based on its military power to control all oceans and all regions.[19] Using not only military power, but also economic and cultural power, American hegemony forms a sphere of influence that does not accept any borders. In American foreign policymaking, there are three elements which continue to play an instrumental role. Presidents or other American foreign policymakers, who attempt to realize their objectives successfully, mostly try to balance these elements in foreign policymaking. Veremis defined these elements as the liberalism of Locke, an evangelical missionary spirit and pragmatism.[20]

No one really knows how many ethnic groups live or how many languages are spoken in America today. However, everyone knows that only one ideology governs the state. This is John Locke's seventeenth century liberalism, which became the dominant political theory of the new state. The US did not accommodate as many ethnic groups in the 1830s as today; but, in Alexis de Tocqueville's famous book *Democracy in America*, Tocqueville stated, "There is only one society (in America).

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[19] It is the first time that a superpower takes the control of all oceans. Neither 19th century superpower, Britain nor any other state could control all oceans before. That shows the US's unique superpower role.

[20] Thanos Veremis, "Elements of American Foreign Policy: Reflections of a Present Day Traveler", *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vol.27, No.1 (Winter/Spring 2003), p.83.

It may be rich or poor, humble or brilliant, trading or agricultural; but it is composed everywhere of the same elements."[21]

In 19th century and 20th century, Christian Democratic and Conservative parties stood on the right, reflecting the traditional point of view; whereas Socialist, Social Democratic and Communist parties stood on the left, representing the working class in Europe. There were also Fascist parties, especially powerful in Germany, France and Italy. In sharp contrast, in the United States only two parties, which historically have not differed greatly in political view, compete in the elections. Veremis defined this situation as a "monopoly of liberalism depriving foreign policy makers in Washington DC of an understanding of political diversity in world affairs".[22] The United States cherishes multicultural policies abroad but is politically unicultural at home.

The second important element of US foreign policy is the evangelical spirit. In Europe, church interference in the state government was abolished by French revolution in the 18th century. From that time to present, the politics of nation-states has been secular. On the other hand, religion has an important place in US politics from the beginning. In the formation American national identity, New England Puritanism's role cannot be overlooked. The most important contribution of New England Puritanism to American national identity is the idea of exceptionalism.[23]

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[21] *Ibid.*, p.84.
[22] *Ibid.*, p.85.
[23] Vibeke S. Pedersen, "In Search of Monsters to Destroy? The Liberal American Security Paradox and a Republican Way Out", *International Relations*, Vol.17, No.2 (2003), p.214.

Toquevilla wrote in his book: "The whole destiny of America is contained in the first Puritan who landed on these shores".[24] New England colonies and their Puritan jeremiad vision of America were distinguishable from the rest of the world, and especially from Europe,[25] because of those colonies called their land *the promised land* and the United States, *a crusader state*.[26] President George W. Bush, like other presidents, makes reference to the religious sources in his statements fairly often just as former kings or sultans of empires, who were realized God's will. In fact, presidents of the United States put forward their intentions to spread American values, which they view as the only holy and straight path. The last element of US foreign policy is pragmatism. Policies are implemented and changed in order to maximize benefit. According to Albright, "Diplomacy requires vision and pragmatism".[27] This pragmatism is provided by the flexibility of American foreign policy. That means it is changeable and adaptable to every condition.[28] In this regard, American presidents have never hesitated to cooperate with authoritarian regimes and their head-of-states, some of whom are called tyrants by the US administration today.

Furthermore, there are four major schools of thought that affect foreign policymaking in America. These schools of thought are called by the name of their founders, which were all American presidents.

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[24] *Ibid.*, p.215.
[25] For more information, see R.W. Tucker and D.C. Hendrickson, "Thomas Jefferson and American Foreign Policy", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No.2 (1991), pp.137-139.
[26] *Ibid.*, p.214.
[27] Cenap Çakmak, "American Foreign Policy and September 11", *Perceptions*, Vol.8, No.1 (2003), p.1.
    http://www.mfa.gov. (15 November 2003)

The first school of thought is that of the Hamiltonians. President Hamilton, who was in favor of a close alliance between the Government and business, carved the plans to establish a national bank and sell secure bounties to domestic producers. Hamilton supported any attempts to establish commercial and political ties with Europe. However, Jefferson's vision of America was different from Hamilton's. Jefferson's foreign policy was isolationist and advocated acting separately from Europe.[29] Jefferson's most important objective was 'to conquer without war,' which meant that American economic relations with the European states gave no choice to Europeans, but rather, favored America.[30] This was a new diplomacy to accomplish the old world diplomacy.[31] The third major school of thought stems from President Wilson, whose ideas gave hope to the defeated nations of World War I. For instance, some representatives in the Turkish National Assembly and some journalists stated their intentions to accept the mandate of the US.[32] These politicians and journalists thought that it was the most reasonable mandate among several, especially when they compared the threat of the US with that of the United Kingdom. Intellectuals also preferred American values, especially freedom and democracy, and how the US put into practice in a mandate country, especially when again comparing it with a British colony like India. Today, Wilsonians focus on the construction of an international community, solving the disputes within legal international bodies and settling the rule of law to provide peace.[33] But today, for the first time, the United States is

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[28] *Ibid.*

[29] Tucker and Hendrickson, "Thomas Jefferson and American Foreign Policy", p.146.

[30] *Ibid.*, p.141.

[31] *Ibid.*, p.142.

[32] Zafer Bozkuş, *1980 Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası (1980-1991)* (Turkish Foreign Policy after 1980 (1980-1991), University of İstanbul (Unpublished Master Thesis), p.25.

[33] Cenap Çakmak, "American Foreign Policy and September 11", p.23.

leading a life of pleasure as a unique sovereignty.[34] Because of the international situation during the Clinton Administration period, America could not realize its hegemonic power. However, when Bush and his team consisting of the pioneers of Hawks, won the elections, it was not all that surprising to see essential changes in American foreign policy. The September 11 attack was only a catalyst in this respect. When we consider the three elements of US foreign policy, Bush and his team represent the polar, for non-flexibility is the tender bally of his policy.

In addition to the school of thought, there are some basic doctrines, which are declared immediately after an important event, like World War II or September 11. These doctrines will be examined in the following chapters.

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[34] Henry Kissinger, *Amerika'nın Dış Politikaya İhtiyacı Var mı?* (Does America Need A Foreign Policy) (Ankara: METU press, 2002), p.9.

1.4. General Perspectives of Turkish–American Relations with Special Emphasis on Security

Although the relation between modern Turkish State and the United States began with the historic visit of the battleship USS Missouri to İstanbul in 1946, the relations between the two nations back to two hundred years ago. The bilateral relation between Ottoman State and America was based on trade in the 18th century. Also American missionaries opened schools in İstanbul and other Ottoman providences. In 1880, 13,095 students were educated in 450 schools.[35] Modern Turkish State-US relations could not be established for a long time because the Senate of the United States did not approved 'Re-establishing Relations on Amity and Diplomatic' agreement, which was signed between Turkey and the US in Lausanne in 1923.[36] The dimension of bilateral relations increased and diversified after World War II.

Two superpowers divided the world into two blocs after the World War II. The Soviet Union, which was the neighbor of the new Turkish State, took the lead of the Communist Bloc. Also, the Soviet Union accommodated several Turkish ethnic groups. Despite assistance to the new Turkish State in independence war, Russian's long term ambition to reach the Mediterranean Sea and to control the Bosphorus were never abandoned.

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[35] Çağrı Erhan, "A Brief Glance at the History of Turkish -US Relations", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.4, No.1 (January/March 2002), p.104.

[36] The United States is not a signatory state of Lausanne Agreement; the Senate of the US discussed the agreement aforementioned in above. Also, the Senate could approve an international agreement only after the majority reaches two-third of the member of the Senate. In aforementioned agreement this majority could not be provided. (Çağrı Erhan, "Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri ve Kırılma Noktaları" (Turkish-American Relations and Breaking Points), *2023*, August 2003, p.8.

Moreover, religious Turks were accepted the Communism as the biggest threat to their belief. For these reasons, Turkish policymakers along with the Turkish public did not take place with the Communist Bloc after the end of the World War II. In the same way, some Turkish conservatives settled this Western state (the United States) to the same place with the Soviet Union. However, Turkish policymakers in the second half of the 1940s supported Western Bloc, which was the best for the new state's interests according to them.

The Truman Doctrine of 1947 and Marshall Economic Assistance are the starting point of the bilateral relations after the World War II. Military relations became dominant in relations after the Cold War. In 1950, Turkish government sent troops to the Korean War for being a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). From that time to present, security concerns are the dominant impetus in relations between these two states. Nevertheless, planting poppy issue, Cuban Missile Crises, and Cyprus problem were the turning points in the history of bilateral relations.[37] First shock in relations was the Cuban Missile Crisis. The United States and the Soviet Union agreed on mutually removing ballistic missiles from Cuba and Turkey before consulting to Turkish government.

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[37] Mehmet Ö. Alkan, "Türkiye'de Amerikan İmajının Değişimi (1945-1980)" (The Changes in American Image in Turkey), *Toplumsal Tarih*, Vol.118, October 2003, pp.54-55.

The second shock was the crisis of Johnson letter. President Johnson stated in his letter that if Turkey had intervened to the Cyprus, the United States could not have given any guarantee to Turkish Government to interfere to the appearing crisis between Turkey and the Soviet Union. In 1974, Turkish Government intervened Cyprus to establish the constitutional government after waiting for 10 years. The last crisis broke out after American military and economic sanctions to Turkey during the Cold War. Turkey could not easily throw off the confidence depression until mid-1980s. The normalization process took nearly 10 years. After the cold war, a discussion continued in Turkey among politicians and scholars to define Turkish position in US foreign policy. Two main approaches were put forward. There was a common concern that the importance of Turkey's location was decreasing in the eyes of Western states. However, Turkish policymakers did not wait for a along time to consider because of the Gulf War 1. Because, Commonwealth of Independent States, which have rich natural resources, governed by politicians that have Turkish ethnicity.

September 11 attacks carried the bilateral relations to a new dimension. The two states agreed on to cooperate on defeating international terrorism and supporting democratization process in the Middle East. The first step was taken by sending Turkish troops to Afghanistan and taking the command of the forces in this country. However, Turkish National Assembly allowed neither US forces to use Turkish territories to open a new gate to the Gulf War II nor using Turkish army in the so-called '*liberation of Iraq*' operation. Although the relations get strained with this

decision, interests of both countries were required to cooperate to defeat international terrorism.

In that period, the new national security strategy of the US consciously leaked to the American media aiming to open a discussion. The US administration called this new strategy as *'Greater Mideast Plan'*. Even though no one knows exactly how this strategy is going to apply, every one is sure what the plan is for. Turkish Government supported the plan on the condition that no military power is going to be used anymore to liberate any nations in the Middle East. In the end, the details of this strategy might be appeared in NATO summit in Istanbul in June 2004.

CHAPTER 2

US FOREIGN POLICY AND TURKISH–AMERICAN RELATIONS BEFORE AND DURING THE COLD WAR

2.1. US Foreign Policy and Turkish–American Relations before the Cold War

2.1.1. US Foreign Policy before the Cold War

The United States declared its independence after the war with the British in 1783. This new world had already established economic relations with the old continent. However, the British economic embargo was changed US foreign policy on Europe. Hamilton wanted to develop the US army beyond the constabulary functions.[38] In contrast, Jefferson believed that if the United States had tight economic relations with the European states that would mean the US conquered the old continent without war.[39] Jefferson, had an isolationist outlook, wanted to save the US markets from Britain's economic domination.[40] The United States presidents followed this policy to the early twentieth century. In this respect, the US declared non-intervention policy to European power game by Monroe Doctrine in 1823. The United States administrations were realized an enormous economic development aftermath of the American Civil War (1861-1865) to the Spanish-American War in 1898. American foreign relations in the twentieth century began with this war.

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[38] R.W. Tucker and D.C. Hendrickson, "Thomas Jefferson and American Foreign Policy", p.140.
[39] *Ibid.* p.141.
[40] *Ibid.*, p.148.

Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States in the beginning of the twentieth century, had a completely different American vision from Jefferson-isolationists. The President considered that the US had to play an important role in shaping international order when considering the US economic power and the collapsed European centered international relations. Roosevelt devised an '*international police power*' to cope with anarchic states which the US officials called them '*failed states*' today.[41] However, President Wilson thought different from Roosevelt about failed states. World War I opened a new era on American foreign policy. President Wilson, declared fourteen principles when the World War I, supported an outward foreign policy to spread American values of freedom, democracy and rule of law. Moreover, Wilson was the first President to take a serious step to put an international legal body into practice.[42] In the end of this effort, The League of Nations was established after World War I. The American presidents followed Wilson internationalist outlook, however, the peace vision of Wilson could not achieve to establish a safe world. Descent of Pearl Harbor was the first major turning point in American foreign policy. The United States territory was hit for the first time. Because of this attack, Isolationist outlook was abandoned from the American foreign policy to provide the security of the US interests.

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[41] James Holmes, "Police Power: Theodore Roosevelt, American Diplomacy, and World Order", *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vol.27, No.1 (Winter/Spring 2003), p.125.
[42] Gökhan Akşemsettinoğlu, *The Actors of International System and the New Transatlanticism*, Marmara University (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation), Istanbul, 2001, p.114.

2.1.2. Turkish (Ottoman State)-American Relations

The United States established economic relations with the Mediterranean region, especially with the Ottoman provinces of Algeria, Tunis, and Tripoli, which had semi-autonomies, in the last quarter of 18th century.[43] The cargo ships of the US were hit and the US citizens were taken hostage by pirates. Agreements, were all Turkish were signed between the US and Algiers in 1795, Tripoli in 1796 and Tunis in 1797. The US committed to pay annual tribute to these provinces in consideration of protecting American trade ships.[44] Despite the economic and political relations between the US and North African provinces, trade between American continent and Anatolia could be realized in the late 18th century. On the other hand, Ottoman State continued to lose territories and economically became more dependent on the European powers. Egypt, which was one of the most important trade centers that provided high revenue to the Ottoman State, was invaded by the British. Moreover, the Ottoman navy was destroyed by a common attack of French, Russians and British navies. Therefore, the Ottoman State changed the British centered foreign policy and established a relationship with the United States. The United States and the Ottoman State signed a bilateral agreement on trade that elevated the US to a privileged state situation in 1830. However, because of the distance, economic relations could not be improved until 1862, when the second bilateral agreement on trade signed.[45] In the early years of the twentieth century, the Ottoman State was an

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[43] Çağrı Erhan, "A Brief Glance at the History of Turkish-American Relations", p.101.
[44] *Ibid.*, p.102.
[45] Nurdan Şafak, *Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri* (Ottoman-American Relations) (Istanbul: OSAV,2003), p.12.

important customer of the weapons and munitions that remained from American Civil War.[46]

The situation of the Missionaries and their activities were the other significant issue in bilateral relations. Missioners came to the Ottoman State 10 years before the trade agreement.[47] Missionaries targeted non-Muslim population of the Ottoman State to convert them to Evangelic Protestantism that the rituals are very different from the Eastern Christianity.[48] In 1913, 25.992 students were educated in 450 Missionary schools.[49] However, Turkish-American relations broke down with the participation of both sides to the World War I in opposite sides.

In conclusion, the beginning of the bilateral relations could be started only after the US Senate's recognition of the new Turkish state in 1930. In fact, the delay in recognition of the new Turkish state might be accepted as the first breaking point in bilateral relations. Turkish-American relations continued on the lower level until the end of World War II.

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[46] G.E. Fuller, I.O Lesser ,*Türkiye'nin Yeni Jeopolitik Konumu* (New Geopolitics Situation of Turkey), translated by Yaşar Bülbül (İstanbul, Alfa, 2000), p.155.

[47] Esra Danacıoğlu, "Anadolu'da Birkaç Amerikalı Misyoner (1820-1850)" (A Few American Missionaries in Anatolia), *Toplumsal Tarih*, Vol.120, December 2003, p.76.

[48] In Protestantism, there are no rituals to pray for the Mother Mary and the Saints. See Esra Danacıoğlu, "Oryantalism ve Osmanlı'da Amerikan Misyonerleri" (Orientalism and the American Missionaries in the Ottoman State), *Toplumsal Tarih*, Vol.119, November 2003, p.90.

2.2. US Foreign Policy and Turkish–American Relations during the Cold War

2.2.1 The Establishment of the US Foreign Policy during the Cold War

The two superpowers appeared from the ashes of World War II. During the Cold War, the US foreign policy focused on the containment and the deterrence of the Soviet Union and the continuance of the status quo. All interferences of the US were aiming to promote democracy and free-market and to prevent the expansionism of the Communism. During that period, presidents and their doctrines played a vital role in shaping American foreign and security policy.

In the early years of the Cold War, the Truman Doctrine (1947) and the Marshall Plan provided economic assistance to the collapsed European states to confront the Communist expansionism. The Eisenhower Doctrine (1957) anticipated cooperation on military and economic issues for the development of the European and the Middle East countries. This doctrine also permitted an intervention against a clear attack to the Middle East states from the Communist States.[50] On the other hand, President Nixon, brought forward a new doctrine in 1970, stated that henceforth, the United States was not going to interfere directly to any regional disputes except providing economic and military aids to the region countries. Moreover, President Nixon declared that the United States would not undertake the prevention of all democratic

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[49] Çağrı Erhan, "A Brief Glance at the History of Turkish – American Relations", p.104.
[50] Tayyar Arı, *2000'li Yıllarda Basra Körfezinde Güç Dengesi* (Balance of Power in the Gulf Region in 2000s) (İstanbul: Alfa, 1999), p.71.

nations by itself anymore.[51] In this respect, United States weapon sale increased from $1.2 billion (1950-71) to $12 billion (1971-76). Iran was the biggest weapon importer when considering all US customers during Nixon Presidency.[52]

During the Cold War, some of presidents' secretaries and advisors took on responsibilities in realizing presidents' doctrines. In fact, some of them pioneered these doctrines when forming or adopting new policies more than presidents. During the Cold War, a few policymakers could successfully achieve to deter and contain the Soviet Union without stretching the relations. For example, John Foster Dulles, US Secretary of State, integrated Wilson's idealist approach and the American realism in international relations. Moreover, Dulles represented the elements of the American foreign policy, which are the evangelical spirit, pragmatism, and Lockean liberalism. Although Dulles encouraged the President to take risk in Korea and in Vietnam (Indochina), Dulles did not want America to be faced with a nuclear threat from Communist Bloc.[53] The other important personality in the Cold War was Hnery Kissinger, worked with two Presidents, Nixon and Ford, as a Secretary of State and as a National Security Advisor. Kissinger continued important negotiations with Russia, and China to provide détente in relations; with Vietnam to finish the war; and with the Middle East countries to remove the disputes. Kissinger used various diplomatic techniques in the negotiations such as the secret diplomacy, hard and friendly bargaining or in some situations used both of them to make concessions from both sides. President Nixon appointed Kissinger as the National Security

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[51] *Ibid.*, p.72.
[52] *Ibid.*, p.75.
[53] Thanos Veremis, "Elements of American Foreign Policy: ...", p.86.

Advisor and prepared National Security Legislation to increase the power of National Security Council (NSC) on foreign policy decision-making process. Thus, Nixon removed the authority of the State and Defense Departments in decision-making on foreign policy and settled down the NSC to the center of the foreign policy decision-making.[54] Nixon used Royal-Court Model, in which the President or the Head of State controls the all decision-making process with his secretary or advisor.[55] Neither Nixon nor Kissinger preferred to share the decision-making authority on foreign policy with other secretaries or institutions. Kissinger was the only policymaker in the first years of the President Ford who replaced Nixon after the Watergate Scandal.[56] According to Kissinger, world order based on power and sovereignty (supreme authority) of the nation states.[57] Kissinger, writer of the famous book on American foreign policy *Does America Need a Foreign Policy* (2001), always defends the superiority of realism in international politics as before in European diplomacy in the 19th century. Also, Kissinger argued that ideological blocs do not permit any necessary expansionism and it brings no gains but costs to the international actors. Because of that, Kissinger tried to remove the ideological struggle from the international relations by negotiation process with the Soviet Union and China, which is known as a triangular diplomacy.

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[54] Gültekin Sümer, *Henry Kissinger'ın Uluslararası Politikaya Yaklaşımı ve Amerikan Dış Politikasına Etkisi* (Henry Kissinger's Approach on International Politics and his Effect on American Foreign Policy), University of İstanbul (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation), 2001, pp.210-211.
[55] *Ibid.*, p.214.
[56] *Ibid.*, p.218.
[57] Henrikson, Alan K. "Henry Kissinger, Geopolitics and Globalization", *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vol.27, No.1 (Winter/Spring 2003), pp.100-101.

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[55] *Ibid.*, p.214.
[56] *Ibid.*, p.218.
[57] Henrikson, Alan K. "Henry Kissinger, Geopolitics and Globalization", *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vol.27, No.1 (Winter/Spring 2003), pp.100-101.

In the last few years of the Cold War, Reagan was the President of the United States. Reagan divided the world into good and evil individuals, friendly or hostile states, allies and adversaries of the United States.[58] President Reagan also rejected the Nixon/Kissinger détente and adopted a tight policy to deter the Soviets by the superiority of American military technology. On the other hand, Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, determined the preconditions for the use of force in six principles known as the Winberger Doctrine. The first and the famous principle was that "US would not commit its forces to overseas combat unless its vital interests were at stake."[59]

During the Cold War, the perception of threat of the US mostly emphasized on nuclear weapons of the Communist Bloc. In this respect, the second turning point in the American foreign and security policy was the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) during the Cold War. The deterrence and containment policies were used against the Communist Bloc during the Cold War. Kissinger stated in his famous book that Nuclear age, in question of relations of the states, changed the importance and the role of the power. Before the Cold War, wars were made for territorial expansion, however in this modern age, nation-states territories lost their significance.

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[58] Thanos Veremis, "Elements of American Foreign Policy:...", p.88.
[59] *Ibid.*

According to Kissinger, technological progresses, especially on nuclear weapon tech. enhanced the power of states, which states struggled to obtain it during the Cold War.[60] The Soviets tested their first nuclear bomb in 1949. The United Kingdom in 1952, France in 1960, China in 1964 became nuclear powers.[61] In 1968, member states of the United Nations agreed on the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which authorizes the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor the nuclear activities of the member states that non-nuclear powers could not obtain any kind of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, there are five exceptional states. These states are the United States, the Soviet Union, China, France and the United Kingdom, who are the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Other nuclear powers committed eventually to eliminate their atomic arsenals (Article VI) and not to assist any non-nuclear weapon states (Article I). Moreover, the Treaty includes the norms of the international regime to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world. 181 member states have signed this agreement; except India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea.[62]

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[60] Henry Kissinger, *Amerika'nın Dış Politikaya İhtiyacı Var mı?*, p.14.
[61] The US used nuclear bombs twice in the Second World War
[62]George Bunn, "The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems", *Arms Control Today*, December 2003, p.4.

Figure 1 NPT Nuclear-Weapon States

State	Estimated Number of Nuclear Total Warheads
Russia	19,500
The United States	10,000
China	420
France	350
United Kingdom	Less than 200

Figure 2 Non-NPT Nuclear-Weapon States	
State	Estimated Number of Nuclear Total Warheads
Israel	75-200
India	45-95
Pakistan	30-50

Sources: Arms Control Association, IAEA, Institute for Science and International Security, Natural Resources Defense Council, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and US Department of State.[63]

In the course of time, several states abandoned their nuclear weapon programs like Argentina, Brazil, Iraq, South Korea, and Taiwan which was required by Article II and Article III of NPT.[64] However, the proliferation of nuclear weapons could not be stopped. Even, UN Security Council member states assisted their allies to develop nuclear weapon programs. The Soviets assisted Chinese program; French and British programs were assisted by the United States; French assisted Israel to improve a nuclear weapon program; Israel assisted South African program, which was abandoned later; Indian program was improved by the United States; Pakistani

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[63] *Ibid.*, p.7.

program was assisted by China and also, Russian's indirectly assisted Iranian nuclear program.[65] In sum, the United States and the other UN Security Council members did not take any precautions to stop the proliferation besides assisted their allies' nuclear weapon programs.

During the Cold War, American military power preferred to preserve the status quo and to manage the crisis. Certainly, the United States intervened some places like Dominican Republic, Grenada, Panama or Lebanon to alter the unfriendly regimes but US administration abstained from any interference to threat the whole international system.[66] On the other hand, Communist Bloc was incapable to answer the United States' interventions in the aforementioned regions because of its incomprehensible economic situation. In the end, *perestroika policy*, the Soviet Union's pledge of nonintervention in Western Europe, and German reunification in 1990 brought an end to the Cold War.

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[64] *Ibid.*, p.6.

[65] Leonard Weiss, "Nuclear-Weapon States and the Grand Bargain", *Arms Control Today*, December 2003, p.21.

[66] James F. Dobbins, "America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq", *Survival*, Vol.45, No.4 (Winter 2003-04), p.88.

2.2.2. Turkish-American Relations during the Cold War

2.2.2.1. Turkish-American Cooperation on Security

Turkish-American relations can be divided into three periods within the scope of the Cold War. The first period includes the beginning of bilateral relations after the end of World War II, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Cyprus Crisis. The second period covers the 1960s and 1970s, the break down in relations that took nearly 20 years to fix, and the anti-American years in Turkey. The last period is comprised of the normalization process in bilateral relations.

The new Turkish State and the US signed a *'Modus Vivendi'* to establish diplomatic and economic relations on the 17th of February, 1927 and the US Senate approved the *'Re-establishing Relations on Amity and Diplomacy'* agreement in 1930. Up to that time, bilateral relations remained at low intensity. The 1927 Trade Agreement and the problems of citizenship (a minority problem) were the only subjects of bilateral relations between the US and Turkey until World War II broke out.[67] During World War II, the British government used the Soviet threat against the Turkish government to get Turkey to participate in the War. Because of that, the Turkish government was sympathetic to the American administration rather than to the British. During the War, Turkish officials informed the US administration of their

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[67] Gül Barkay, "Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri: İki Adım İleri, Bir Adım Geri" (Turkish-American Relations: Two Steps Further, One Step Back), *Toplumsal Tarih*, Vol.120, December 2003, p.71.

security concerns about the Soviet Union. While the United States administration was defining the Turkish political system as an *'oligarchic republic'* during and after the War, the US administration shared the Turkish government's concerns on the expansionism of the Soviet Union.[68] Immediately following World War II, a visit to Istanbul by the Battleship Missouri to deliver the remains of Münir Ertegün, the Turkish Ambassador to Washington, was a symbol of America's support to Turkey against the Soviets at the time.

After World War II, the US abandoned its traditional isolation policy and adopted a containment policy to prevent the Soviet Union's expansion by finding allies from different regions in the world to cooperate on political, military and economic issues. In this respect, the US took on the responsibility for the reconstruction of post-war Europe in an aid plan known as the Marshall Plan. Moreover, the US immediately started to work on reforms in Germany and Japan, which were under occupation in the Second World War. The US undertook the social, political and economic reconstruction of these countries.

For the first time, the US found an opportunity to impose American values on rooted nations and demonstrated that other states could achieve a transformation to democracy.[69] Moreover, the US protected other democratic states by providing them with economic and military aid. On the other hand, the British government decided to cut military and economic aid programs to some countries, including Turkey, in

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[68] *Ibid.*, p.72.
[69] James F. Dobbins, "America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq", p.87.

the beginning of 1947. One of the reasons for this cut was the undemocratic performance of the Turkish government. The Turkish government achieved democratic progress like the permission to reopen political parties. In this way, not only Turkish citizens could obtain democratic development with a multi-party system and free elections; they could also benefit from the Marshall Plan even though Turkey refused to participate in World War II.

George F. Kennan advised President Truman to take over British responsibilities in the Middle East to prevent Soviet Union expansion, as the Soviets had transformed the region into an influence zone of communism.[70] Truman prepared draft legislation that contained economic and military aid to Turkey and Greece to strengthen their military power and to achieve economic stability. President Truman's aid legislation came into force on May 22, 1947. Although, the Truman Doctrine was one of the turning points in bilateral relations, it did not anticipate any military promise to defend Turkey against the Soviets.[71]

The Truman Doctrine and its aid program meant a lot to the Turkish government. First of all, the US confirmed Turkey's place in the Western Bloc and established a military and economic aid program to defeat the Soviet threat which had turned towards Turkey after the Second World War Also, the aid programs, which included grants and loans, provided the capital needed for the projects of the new Turkish State to succeed. Turkish policymakers cherished Western policies that paralleled the

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[70] Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar* (Turkish Foreign Policy in 1950s) (Ankara: METU press, 2001), p.3.
[71] *Ibid.*, p.5.

Truman Doctrine. The first concrete effect of this rose out of the Palestine issue. The Turkish government, which supported the Arab thesis before the Truman Doctrine, recognized the State of Israel after obtaining economic and military aid.[72] The second concrete change in Turkish foreign policy was with regard to the new independent states in Asia and Africa. In parallel to the policies of the West, the Turkish government did not recognize the independence of these new states or support their non-aligned policies.

The other turning point in Turkish-American relations during this period was the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on April 4, 1949. For America, two arguments can be put forth for Turkey's Membership in NATO.. The first is Turkey's strategic location that was considered convenient for American containment and deterrence policies that surrounded the Soviet Union. Turkey, Greece and Iran formed the 'Northern Tier.'[73]

The second argument is the Western attitude of the Turkish government. Turkey demonstrated its loyalty by sending troops to Korea. Turkish policymakers believed that Turkey's membership in NATO was like defeating the 'Kızıl Tehlike' (threat of Communism) and guaranteed Turkish national security. However, Turkish officials were shocked when they were not invited to the preparation meeting of the new organization. It was the first disappointment for Turkey in relations with the US.

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[72] *Ibid.*, p.9.
[73] Ramazan Gözen, *Amerikan Kıskacında Dış Politika: Körfez Savaşı, Turgut Özal ve Sonrası* (Foreign Policy under the Shadow of America: Gulf War, Turgut Özal and Hereafter) (Ankara: Liberte, 2000), p.8.

Turkish policymakers coerced the US and other member states to approve Turkish membership. In the same way, the Menderes administration suggested establishing a Mediterranean Pact among Turkey, Italy, and Greece against the Communist Bloc.[74] But the US then invited Italy to join NATO. This was a second shock to Turkish officials because US counterparts had said that since NATO dealt with the security of Northern Atlantic, only countries in this region could become members of the Organization. The US, meanwhile, was faced with changing conditions in the Middle East, where the Soviets were attempting to influence the region. The US and the UK agreed on a joint-initiative on Middle East defense. The initiatives of George McGhee, the US ambassador to Turkey in the 1950s, and the situation in the Middle East paved the way for Turkey's membership in 1952 alongside Greece.[75] Henceforth, cooperation on security became the most significant topic in bilateral relations up to the present.

The Middle East was the main concern in bilateral relations in this period. US policymakers formed a US Middle East Policy on Turkey. The Menderes administration abandoned Atatürk's neutrality policy and willingly undertook an active role as a member of the Western Bloc in the Middle East. For nearly a decade, the Middle East region was polarized and divided into blocs. Egypt, Iraq, Algeria and Syria were sympathetic to the Communist Bloc, while Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Gulf States, and Iran (until 1979) sided with the Western Bloc. The recognition of the State of Israel by the Western states played an important role in Arab nations'

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[74] *Ibid.*, p.17.

[75] See George McGhee, *ABD-Türkiye-NATO-Ortadoğu...* (USA-Turkey-NATO-The Middle East...) (Ankara: Bilgi, 1992).

decisions to side with the Soviets, who recognized the State of Israel in the beginning, but then cut off all diplomatic relations with Israel to pull the Arab states toward the Communist Bloc.[76] Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize the State of Israel. During that decade, the Turkish government acted like a '*Warrior of the Cold War*' by carrying on Western directed policies.[77] The establishment of the Baghdad Pact is a good example of this.[78] Turkey also came head to head with the Arab nations on the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 by Egypt. Turkish officials supported the British stance and displayed their support by joining a conference in London with the other 21 countries that most used the Suez Canal.[79] Immediately after the unsuccessful operation against Egypt by Britain and France, the US decided to take control of the Middle East region completely. In this respect, the aim of the Eisenhower Doctrine was to prevent any kind of cooperation between the Soviet Union and Syria, to fill the void forming after Britain failed in the region, and to create a balance of power against the Communist Bloc in the region. Turkish policymakers not only declared their support for the Doctrine, which was broadening the aid program to Middle East countries, but they also declared that Turkey was ready to help the Middle East Doctrine, known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, succeed.[80] Moreover, there is an assertion, although not well-known, that the US intended to establish an atom reactor in Turkey in return for transforming Robert College, the first American college to open aboard, into a university that would be

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[76] Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar*, p.39.
[77] Ramazan Gözen, *Amerikan Kıskacında Dış Politika:...*, p.5.
[78] Later transformed to Central Cooperation Organization (CENTO).
[79] Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar*, p.79.
[80] *Ibid.*, p.86.

given responsibility for the atom reactor.[81] When considering the initiatives that the US officials improved to help its allies to develop their nuclear programs, the story of Robert College is not very far fetched. In the end, Turkey perceived the US to be constant/strict ally and showed its intention, as a representative of the US, to be '*a small America*' in the Middle East.[82]

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[81] Zafer Toprak, "Demokrat Parti, Lozan ve Robert Kolej" (Democratic Party, Louzanne and Robert Collage), *Toplumsal Tarih*, Vol.120, December 2003, p.92.

2.2.2.2. Cuban Missile and Cyprus Crises - The Rise of Anti-Americanism

Turkish-American relations were based on military and economic concerns. The US officials considered Turkey to be a reliable ally that would protect American interests in the Middle East. Turkey's perception of the bilateral relation was a little bit different. First of all, relations with the US carried vital significance for Turkey's national security and economy. However, economic relations were limited to economic aid and when the US changed the ratio of loans to grants to favor loans, the Turkish government reacted to the re-arrangement negatively.[83] As Burcu Bostanoğlu stated, no one in the Turkish government could adopt an American Policy and so could only be content with either adapting or reacting to the policy.[84] In this respect, the Cuban Missiles Crisis should be examined. Turkey was pleased when the US settled Jupiter missiles in the Aegean Region (İzmir).[85] However, Turkish officials and the public were shocked when negotiations between the Americans and the Soviets on missiles, settled in Cuba, were revealed. Before long, another crisis broke out in Cyprus.

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[82] The term "a small America" belongs to Celal Bayar (1957); Mehmet Ö. Alkan, "Türkiye'de Amerikan İmjanın Değişimi (1945-1980)" (Changing American Image in Turkey), *Toplumsal Tarih*, 118, October 2003, p.54.

[83] For figures about military and economic assistance between 1946 and 1971, see George S. Harris, "Cyprus Crisis", *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1845-1971* (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute), pp.155-182.

[84] Burcu Bostanoğlu, "Uluslararası Politikada Kuramın Gerekliliği:Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerine Eleştirel Bakış" (The necessity of the theory in international politics: A Critical Approach to the Turkish-American Relations), *Türk Dış Politikasında Gelenek ve Değişim*, İ. Dağı (ed.) (Ankara: Siyasal, 1998), p.75.

[85] Nasuh Uslu, *Türk Amerikan İlişkilerinde Kıbrıs* (Cyprus in Turkish-American Relations) (Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl, 2000), p.352.

Hüseyin Bağcı lists the Turkish foreign policy priorities during the 1950s in his book, *'Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1950's:* preventing Soviet expansion, developing military and economic cooperation with the West, and dividing Cyprus in the 1950s.[86] In the early 1950s, Necmettin Sadak, Minister of Foreign Affairs, replied to a question on Cyprus by saying: "Gentlemen, there is no such thing as a *Cyprus Problem* because the island is governed under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom and we all know that they do not demonstrate any intention to transfer the sovereignty of the island."[87] Turkey was later invited to the London Conference in 1955 with Greece to discuss the problems of the East Mediterranean region, but Cyprus became the only discussion topic.[88] In 1963, the first instances of aggression broke out in Cyprus. Turkey immediately called on Western nations to intervene on the island. However, the British government did nothing but call for both sides to call a cease-fire and offered to negotiate the peace conditions. Washington remained silent and was unwilling to accept arguments from either side.[89] This so-called *'neutrality'* was unacceptable to both the Turkish government and its public. Moreover, President Johnson sent a letter to Turkish Prime Minister İnönü warning Turkey "...your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO Allies... the US cannot agree to the use of any US supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under the present circumstances".[90]

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[86] Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar,* p.38.
[87] *Ibid.,* p.103.
[88] *Ibid.,* p.109.
[89] George S. Harris, "Cyprus Crisis", *Troubled Alliance:...,* p.110.
[90] Yasemin Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy* (Westport: Praeger, 1999), p.13.

The US did not want the Cyprus problem to harm the détente that followed the Cuban Missile Crisis, thus support, intervention, and military supplies were non-existent. This was the second turning point in bilateral relations during the Cold War.

All of these events nurtured anti-American sentiment during the 1970s, which further challenged the Turkish-American alliance. In the 1950s, Turkey followed policies that paralleled those of the US on economic and security issues. These policies included the recognition of the State of Israel, action against Egypt for nationalization of the Suez Canal, and assuming a negative stance against new independent states in Asia and Africa at the Bandung Conference in 1955. Turkish officials interpreted the meaning of the move by these states to support Greece, who had maintained relations with the region's countries, against Turkey on the Cyprus issue. The Cyprus issue and the Cuban Missile Crisis opened the eyes of Turkish policymakers. The change in Turkish foreign policy against the US in the 1970s can be defined by three topics. The first is the '*Haşhaş Sorunu*' (the poppy problem), the second is Turkey's intervention in Cyprus, and the third is impartial/multi-dimensional Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. The support of the US during the 1967 crisis that helped Turkish-American relations develop somehow continued until 1969 in terms of formal relations.[91]

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[91] Nasuh Uslu, *Türk Amerikan İlişkilerinde Kıbrıs*, pp.354-355.

However, as a reaction to the unwillingness of the US and other western states to be involved in the Cyprus Problem or demonstrate to Middle East countries that Turkey can move independently from the Western Bloc, Turkey renewed permission for the planting of poppy in 1974. Immediately following that decision, Turkish intervention in Cyprus sharply divided bilateral relations. The US Senate approved military and economic sanctions against Turkey. In response, Turkey ended US activity on Turkish military bases. Military and economic sanctions continued until 1979. Also, when considering the economic relations (aid) between the two states, the ratio of grant/loan was adjusted in favor of loans. The Turkish government, in response, searched for economic resource alternatives to American economic aid, which had been reduced at the end of the 1950s.[92] This requirement increased in significance in the beginning of the 1970s with the global oil crisis in 1973-74. In response, Turkey attempted to establish new relations with Arab nations with rich oil resources. Ramazan Gözen called this period the 'restoration period' in their bilateral relations for which Turkey remained neutral in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars.[93] However, in the latter half of the 1970s, Turkey changed its neutrality policy and strived to improve trade and economic relations with Arab states. Moreover, Turkey recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1976 and permitted the PLO to open a bureau in Ankara. Turkish-Israeli relations dropped to 'low intensity' during this period as was the case with Turkish-American relations.

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[92] Menderes planned to visit the Soviet Union to improve economic relations before the military coup in 1960.
[93] Ramazan Gözen, *Amerikan Kıskacında Dış Politika:...*, p.10.

In conclusion, Turkish-American relations shifted with the Cuban Missile Crisis but especially broke down further with the problem of planting poppy, the intervention in Cyprus, and military and economic sanctions after the intervention. Not only were bilateral relations harmed, but America's image in Turkey collapsed. The Turkish people had such a high opinion of the US that they mourned for J. F. Kennedy after his assassination.[94] In fact, America's image started to change with the beginning of the Vietnam War. At that time, leftist Turkish students shouted the slogan: "Turkey is not going to be Vietnam".[95] In the end, the attitude of the US (military and economic sanctions) toward the Turkish intervention of Cyprus destroyed America's image in Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey abandoned its role as *the warrior of the Cold War* played out during the 1950s by carrying out Western sided policies without dealing with the heart of the problems.[96] On the other hand, the normalization process for bilateral relations took almost 20 years with the US.

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[94] Mehmet Ö. Alkan, "Türkiye'de Amerikan İmajının Değişimi (1945-1980)", p.55.
[95] *Ibid.*
[96] Ramazan Gözen, *Amerikan Kıskacında Dış Politika:...*, pp.8-9.

2.2.2.3. Normalization of Bilateral Relations

Robert Strausz-Hupe, former American Ambassador to Ankara, stated in one of his interviews that "...some issues could never be solved in international relations, but you learn how to live with that. Cyprus is like that. You adjust your relations in such a way that the problem could not form a threat".[97] This statement symbolized American pragmatism and the flexibility of US foreign policy. Mr. Strausz-Hupe is right, international relations deal with interests and nothing more. American national interests require the existence of a country that can be a reliable ally to the US in the Middle East. This ally is Turkey. The instability of the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East most threatens Turkish security and American interests. As such, the US removed military and economic sanctions to achieve the necessary expansion in bilateral relations in 1979. Despite the military coupe, Turkey and the US signed the Turkish-American Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) on March 29, 1980. This agreement was the most important step in the normalization process that shaped the framework of short-term relations between the two nations.[98] Moreover, the Iranian Revolution, which immediately followed the Iraq-Iran war, and the success of the Rapid Deployment Force, which improved according to the Carter Doctrine, were reasons for the resumption of closer relations. Turkey tried to address the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which might have given hope to radical Islamic groups at home, and was concerned about the movement spreading towards Turkish borders.

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[97] Gül Barkay, "Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri: İki Adım İleri, Bir Adım Geri", p.73.
[98] Ramazan Gözen, *Amerikan Kıskacında Dış Politika:...*, p.19.

The US shared Turkey's concerns and increased the amount of economic and military aid it gave Turkey to protect it from a similar Islamic revolution and to support Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war indirectly or directly.

In spite of all these developments, relations still had some foggy areas which remained unresolved for a long time. These were insufficient American military and economic aid and the Armenian issue. Turkey had obtained American military and economic aid since 1946. The aid was distributed between Turkey and Greece at a ratio of 7/10. The ratio of 7/10 had no logical basis (not according to the territory or population), and it had always disturbed the Turkish government. American presidents, especially Reagan, tried to re-calculate the formula in favor of Turkey which could only be changed by the Senate.[99] Also, Turkey informed the US of their concerns about military and economic aid because the amount had changed almost every year via US Senate resolutions. The Senate put forward conditions or excuses to reduce the amount of aid citing the Cyprus issue and human rights violations while the US was tolerating human rights abuses by regimes like China, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea (before its transition to democracy).[100] Also, the Armenian issue became a major problem in bilateral relations in 1984. The starting point of the US-Armenian relationship dates backs to the Ottoman Empire. American missionaries were especially focused on Armenians during the 19th century and managed to form

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[99] Zafer Bozkuş, *"1980 Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası (1980-1991)"*, p.103.
[100] Joseph S. Nye, "Redefining the National Interest", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.78, No. 4 (July/August 1999), p.31.

a Protestant community.[101] In the beginning of the 20th century, missionaries established the Near East Relief Organization, which aimed to provide donations to exiled Armenians. That Organization spent $40 million to assist exiled Armenians in Turkey.[102] Armenians, who migrated to America after the banishment, formed a 'diaspora' to assist other Armenians living in other parts of the world. The Senate took the Diaspora's activities into consideration after the détente and put forward the issue as a condition of US military and economic aid to Turkey.

In conclusion, Turkish-American relations were based on economic and military issues during the Cold War. Both sides shared common security concerns and acted against the common threat of Communism. Turkey was the southeast keystone of NATO during the Cold War as a flank country. However, the differences in perception by the two countries caused a break down in relations. American interests were not stable; they changed according to the conditions. In detail, the US remembered the Turkish strategic position when a crisis broke out in the Middle East, which directly or indirectly affected American interests. From the 1950s to the beginning of the 1960s, the US settled Turkey as the center of its Middle East policies because of its need for a reliable state to prevent Soviets expansion in the region. Therefore, the US, who had not hesitated to upset its friends, pleased one so-called ally by providing military and economic aid during those years. The Turkish government, meanwhile, had two concerns during the Cold War. The first one was to survive the Soviet expansion and the other one was to obtain foreign aid to stabilize

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[101]Elçin Macar, "Ortadoğu Yardım Örgütü" (Middle East Relief Organization), *Toplumsal Tarih,* Vol.120, December 2003, p.80.
[102] *Ibid.*

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its economy. For these reasons, cooperation on economy and security were vitally significance for the Turkish government during the Cold War. Also, Turkey welcomed economic and military aid with pleasure. The neutral or unconcerned attitude of the US on the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cyprus issue, followed by the economic and military sanctions on Turkey were the breaking points in bilateral relations.

CHAPTER 3

US FOREIGN POLICY AND TURKISH–AMERICAN

RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

3.1. US Foreign Policy in the post-Cold War Period

3.1.1. New World Order/Disorder; Uncertainties of International System and Its Impact on American Foreign and Security Policy

The Soviet Union's non-intervention guarantee to the communist regimes of Eastern European countries in 1989 and German reunification in 1990 brought to an end to the Cold War, giving Western nations a sudden and completely unexpected victory against Communist Bloc that had threatened the west for almost four decades. Former Communist states, Poland, Hungary, East Germany (by reunification), Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania transformed their regime to liberal democracy and market economy in the same year. Soviet military power began to withdraw from Eastern Europe without a single shot fired by the Western pact countries. If the communism threat was really defeated, it means a major challenge to liberalism is gone and, if Fukuyama is right, this is the end of history.[103] Ironically, the event happened so suddenly that western governments were not ready to respond.

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[103]For detailed information, see Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

The public in the former Communist states and the Western states welcomed the end of the bipolar system with pleasure because these communities had reasons to be optimistic for the future of an international system. The Cold War ended without a single shot or the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). When leaders and foreign policymakers defined the Cold War, they used the expression *'peace impossible, war improbable'* but after the Cold War was over, leaders began to use the expression *'both peace and wars improbable'*. However, the United States and its allies announced before long that they were worried about the proliferation of WMD, as several Third World countries were seeking to acquire them and that would make the world unstable. In this new world, states would cooperate and act in solidarity with the help of international organizations. A unique economic growth that fosters liberal democracy would follow. According to Immanuel Kant, democratic and constitutional states promote cooperation and this reduces the possibility of war.[104]

Three years after the end of the Cold War, Huntington published his famous work titled "Clash of Civilizations"[105] and in the same year, Anthony Lake introduced his study on "Enlargement versus Containment" to the public.[106] Huntington anticipated that wars were going to happen between civilizations. Huntington divided the world into six civilizations: West, Tao-Confucius and Islam, Indians, Orthodox, Americas and maybe Africa.

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[104] Fred Halliday, *2000'lerde Dünya* (The World in 2000s) (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2002), p.63.

[105] See Samuel P. Huntington, "Clash of Civilizations", *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993.

[106] See Anthony Lake, *From Containment to Enlargement* (Washington DC: John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, 1993).

Huntington theorized that war was possible between East and West or North and South. Eastern states are underdeveloped and have largely undemocratic regimes. Some of them possess rich natural resources, which brings them power that can pose a threat to the West. In fact, the United States is accusing Saudi Arabia and some other Arab states of financing international terrorism today. China also seems to be a new rival to the West not only with its military power which includes WMD, but also with its economic power. In sharp contrast, two-thirds of the world's population perceived the US to be the single greatest threat to their societies and also to other parts of the world.[107] In fact, as Joxe asks and Huntington replies, the real problem is how the US has to divide the world to dominate in the post-Cold War period.[108] The Bush administration has succeeded in a Jewish-Protestant alliance, the framework of which was described by Huntington eight years before 9/11 attacks. Anthony Lake, former National Security Advisor to Bill Clinton, predicted the rise of enlargement, which brings the superiority of democracy over authoritarian regimes and of market economy over command economy.[109] Lake determined that the goals of the United States (US) are to strengthen the core (democratic states like the US, Canada, Japan, and those in Europe) to the newly democratic states in Latin America, Russia, South Africa and Nigeria; to adopt new sanctions and isolationist policies against Iran, Iraq and Cuba; and to use humanitarian efforts that strengthen market-democracies.[110]

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[107] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.78, No.2 (March/April 1999), pp.42-43.
[108] Alain Joxe, *Kaos İmparatorluğu* (Chaos Empire), translated by Işık Ergüden (İstanbul: İletişim, 2003), p.136.
[109] *Ibid.*, p.145.
[110] *Ibid.*, p.146.

In this way, the world was divided into barbaric and civilized groups. All these predictions somehow shaped American policymakers' behavior.There were three major elements that affected the formation of US policies during the post-Cold War. The first one was definitely the Soviet Union (Russia), as it still owns WMD and a great conventional army. The second one was Europe, which continues the unification process began in the 1950s. The reunification of Germany, and the introduction of newly independent states in Europe changed the security establishment of Europe. After defeating the Soviet threat, a more militarily and economically unified Europe might challenge the superiority and interests of the US. The final element was the US itself. After the last four decades of horror, the American public was confused about what was going to happen next. The US citizens were only sure about their unwillingness to take on the costs and risks associated with the US taking further unilateral action in the world and increasing the defense budget by identifying 'new' enemies.[111] President Clinton re-defined American interests and priorities in parallel with those arguments. According to American national interests, the maintenance of international order and the prevention of disorder (especially beyond US borders) are appropriate. Also, promoting democracy and market economy in the world are in the American national interests. After the Cold War, the American public became sensitive about human rights violations and equity in other nations. The US government used this to legitimize some of its interventions abroad. In this respect, William Perry and Ashton Carter argued that the US had to re-evaluate its risk map. In their risk map, the

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[111] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower", p.39. For more information, see Doug Bandow, "Keeping the Troops and the Money at Home", *Current History*, January 1994.

Russian threat was on the top-- the A List. North Korea and Iraq were on the B List, which means these states were imminent threats to the US. Perry and Carter determined the difference between the A and B List as the Russians threatened the survival of Americans, while Iraq and North Korea only threatened American interests in their regions. Finally, the C List covers indirect threats to US security in places like Kosovo, Somalia and Haiti.[112] The C List gained importance because of the information age which delivered live TV coverage of battle zones. In this case, the reasons for American intervention should include both self-interest and humanitarian concern as in the operations in Iraq, Kosovo, and Somalia. In sharp contrast, there was one more thought that had only a few supporters. Some politicians and scholars argued that the US wants to isolate itself from any of its acts abroad just like before in the beginning of the twentieth century. This isolation included the complete withdrawal of American military forces from Germany and Japan. However, as Nye stated, "There is even less room for neo-isolationism".[113] The Gulf Crisis broke out when American foreign policy was striving to adapt to the uncertainties of the new conditions of the international system and identify new enemies.

In one of his statements, former President Bush Sr. used the term 'new world order' in the context of the Gulf War: "...a new world order...new ways of working with other nations...peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced

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[112] Joseph S. Nye, "Redefining the National Interest", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.78, No. 4 (July/August 1999), p.26.
[113] Joseph S. Nye, "What New Order?", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.71, No.2 (Spring 1992), p.95.

and controlled arsenals and just treatment of all peoples".[114] Moreover, Bush argued that the "United States is still at the center of the new world order".[115] President Bush's vision of a 'new world order' replaced the conflicts of the Cold War with cooperation.[116] However, it was not the first time that an American president had used the term '*world order*'. For Nixon/Kissinger (realists), world order means the product of a stable distribution of power among the major states., For Jimmy Carter, a liberal, world order rises from values like democracy, human rights, and also international laws and institutions. However, Bush's new order consists of both interpretations. The Bush administration acted like Nixon/realists and also connected its actions to democracy, human rights and freedom at the same time, just as Bush Jr. tries to do today. Although the sources of international conflict would be diversity, for the first time in four decades, Americans and Russians could be on the same side against so-called tyrants. Also, that cooperation allowed the US to undertake military operations on a large scale in the Middle East after British transferred its superiority in the region to the US in the 1950s.[117]

In the new world order, America defined its foreign and security policy as promoting a liberal economy and democracy; establishing a new security structure in Europe to prevent Western states and also newly independent states from regional disputes; dealing with '*soft power*' issues, which gained significance in the minds of the

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[114] *Ibid.*, p.83.

[115] Lawrence Freedman, "Order and Disorder in the New World", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.71, No.1(1991-92), p.35.

[116] Gökhan Akşemsettinoğlu, *The Actors of International System and the New Transatlanticism*, p.140.

[117] Michael Mandelbaum, "The Bush Foreign Policy", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.70, No.1 (1991), p.11.

American public, like transitional drug trade, terrorism, the spread of AIDS, global warming and human rights violations, in parallel with '*hard power*' issues.[118]

In sum, the US perception of security risks would include ethnic and religious fundamentalism, the proliferation of WMD, international terrorism, organized crime, drug trade, and the destruction of the environment.[119] The promotion of democracy and market economy were welcomed by newly independent_ states, but some governments preferred not to accept both of them at the same time. China, for example, only supports the fostering of a market economy and has not made any democratic improvements to its system. In contrast, some other states abstained from a market economy because they believe that their economy was not ready to capitalize.

One of the foreign and security priorities for America is to establish a new security structure in Europe. Two allies put forward the European Union-United States Transatlantic Declaration in 1990. Then, to compliment it, the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) was signed in 1995 between the US and the European Union (EU). The NTA is a keystone in the post-Cold War security structure of Europe.[120] The NTA elevated relationships beyond the areas of trade and economy. For the first time, the US accepted the EU as a political partner with whom the US could work as an equal partner with shared responsibilities.[121]

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[118] Joseph S. Nye, "Redefining the National Interest", p.25.
[119] Alain Joxe, *Kaos İmparatorluğu*, p.175.
[120] Gökhan Akşemsettinoğlu, *The Actors of International System...*, p.136.
[121] *Ibid.*, p.137.

In this respect, the US supported the EU's efforts to form a European Security and Defense Identity. The two allies attached a *'Joint EU/US Action Plan'* to the NTA, which anticipated cooperation issues as supporting the Middle East Peace Process actively, taking responsibility in other regions of the world, coordinating and cooperating on humanitarian assistance, promoting human rights and democracy, preventing the proliferation of WMD, and most importantly, responding to global challenges, which could be drug trade, degradation of environment, or international crime and terrorism.[122]

In a bipolar system, like that of the Cold War, the two superpowers formed alliances (blocs) and a balance. However, a major change in the structure of the international system appeared at the end of the 1980s. In the post-Cold War era, the discussion focused on the international system. Is the system established a uni- or multi- polar system? Intellectuals who accepted that it was uni-polar said the US could be unilateral when acting in the international arena. In this respect, Brzezinski argued that "the US would be the first, last, and the only global superpower".[123] In sharp contrast, several major powers (China, EU members, and Russia) argued that there are many major and minor powers appeared after the collapse of the bipolar system. Because of that, the US should consider these major or minor actors when redistributing power and capabilities in the international system.[124]

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[122] *Ibid.*, pp.252-253.

[123] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Büyük Satranç Tahtası* (The Grand Chessboard), translated by E. Dikbaş and E. Kocabıyık (İstanbul: Sabah Kitapları, 1998), p.192.

[124] Stanley Hoffmann, "A New World and Its Troubles", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.69, No.4 (1991), p.121.

There were also different poles focusing on different issues such as power-military issues for the Russians, economic-financial for Japan and Germany, demographic for China and India (these states are also possible economic and military powers), and military-economic for the US. Moreover, Hoffmann stated in his article that "the fate of the new world would depend on the ability of the 'poles' to cooperate enough in order to prevent or moderate conflicts, including regional ones....".[125] Huntington argued, meanwhile, that none of the models are fit to define the post-Cold War era and put forward a new model that Huntington called the *'uni-multipolar'* system, in which international relations requires a single superpower but when action is warranted, the superpower always needs coalition with other major powers.[126] When the US strived to maximize its interests, other regional actors raced to extend their own interests in various parts of the world. Huntington defined these secondary level regional major powers as the German-French coalition in Europe, Russia in Eurasia, China in East Asia, India in South Asia, Iran in Southwest Asia, Brazil in Latin America, and South Africa and Nigeria in Africa.[127] There was also a third level that competed with these secondary level powers in their regions and consisted of Britain in Europe, Ukraine in Eurasia, Japan in East Asia, Pakistan in South Asia, Saudi Arabia in Southwest Asia, and Argentina in Latin America.[128] Moreover, Huntington argued that the US should assist 'third level' states in competing with 'second level' states that have interests that conflict with those of the US, for example the US should assist Britain against the French-German Coalition and assist Japan to balance

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[125] *Ibid.*, p.105.
[126] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower", pp.35-36.
[127] There is a little bit exaggeration on Iran.
[128] *Ibid.*, p.36.

out the Chinese military and economic power in the South East.[129] In a uni-multipolar system, President Clinton had six foreign policy priorities: establishing a peaceful twenty-first century, striving to add China and Russia to the world financial system by using the World Bank, preventing Western states from the proliferation of WMD, defeating the problems of drug trade and terrorism, establishing a strengthened financial system to share the benefit, and protecting the freedom of the citizens and free countries.[130] However, these foreign policy priorities did not have the same affect in different parts of the world. Several major and minor powers perceived these priorities as a tool to impose American values and standards on human rights, drugs, terrorism, and religious freedom. Furthermore, the US promoted American weapons or capitalist economic orders and institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as it did when it pushed for Russia and China to become members of the World Bank.[131] To summarize, the US is required to maintain and strengthen its military, economic, technological, and cultural dominance, which are the necessary elements of being a global power and to use economic sanctions and military interventions on states that cannot meet American standards, to assist its allies and friends on the *'third level'* to balance out *'second level'* states that challenge US interests in their.

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[129] *Ibid.*, p.47.

[130] Fred Halliday, *2000'lerde Dünya*, p.154.

[131] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower", p.38.

3.1.2. The Role of International Organizations in the International System

In the post-Cold War era, the role of international organizations has not been diminished but dramatically increased, especially organizations on security and economic cooperation. In a bi-polar system, the role of the United Nations is to establish a kind of balance between the two superpowers to maintain the status quo. Similarly, the five major powers (the US, Russia, France, England, and China) are the dominant powers in the UN Security Council, where the same balance is established. During the Cold War, because of the veto power of the UN Security Council's Permanent Members, the Security Council was not effective in solving regional disputes, other than the Korean War in 1950, as the Soviets boycotted the Security Council before and did not vote. The Soviets never repeated the same mistake again. However, the conditions and the structure of the international system changed. Many major and minor actors had suppressed ethnic and religious disputes flare up in different parts of the world in the post-Cold War period. That means the international system was faced with several regional conflicts like the one in Bosnia. For the first time since the establishment of the UN, the United States and Russia moved onto the same side to make a decision to intervene in the Gulf Crisis in 1991 and the Bosnian War in 1996. Members of the United Nations and the Security Council put forward some old and new methods to prevent and manage these conflicts like peacekeeping and peacemaking. During the Cold War, the United Nations adopted elasticity in formulating the functions of peacekeeping forces and

the Security Council used these forces in dealing with existing regional conflicts.[132] The functions of peacekeeping forces were mostly settling tension between hostile forces like in Cyprus; maintaining security and stability of an area like in Southern Lebanon, monitoring elections, providing humanitarian assistance, and disarming insurgents like in Nicaragua. The United Nations Security Council later adopted some limits in using these forces. In this way, operations could only be used when all parties consented and peacekeeping forces could only use force_in self-defense or enforcement by the Security Council as defined in the UN Charter Articles 39-46.[133] In Iraq and Korean Wars, the Security Council used this method to enforce an aggressive state to adopt the decision of the UN. Also, the UN used the peacemaking method to solve the Bosnian War through the Dayton Agreement.

Although, there were different thoughts, security institutions gained importance in providing collective security. NATO remained the most significant security organization after the collapse of the Warsaw pact. European states had strived to form a unified Europe, not only economically but also politically via a common foreign and security policy. In other words, Europe, whose security had been provided by the United States during the Cold War, had asked to take responsibility for its own security in parallel with its economic power.[134]

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[132] B. Russett, J. S. Sutterlin, "The UN in a New World Order", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.71, No.1 (1991), p.70.
[133] *Ibid.*, p.73.
[134] Bülent S. Ağır, "Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Avrupa Güvenlik Düzenine Kurumsal Bir Bakış" (An Institutional Approach to the European Security after the Cold War), *Avrasya Dosyası*, Vol.9, No.2 (Summer 2003), p.113.

In Maastricht Agreement, these states demonstrated a common will to strengthen the Western European Union's (WEU) security establishment in Europe after the withdrawal of the Soviet military power from Eastern Europe. Members of the European Union determined the role of the WEU to not only be focused on the security of Europe but also to be a part of NATO in Europe.[135] The US security vision is global and not restricted to Europe as in the European region states. However, the European states did not want to take responsibility for any other regions, especially when considering a military intervention in other part of the world. In this respect, EU member nations requested a free movement area independent from the United States. Forming a European Security and Defense Identity for the European Union might provide re-nationalization of the member states.[136] On the other hand, NATO faced the problem of defining itself: Was it a collective defense or a security organization in the post-Cold War period? The member states of NATO arranged a summit to respond to these questions and to determine the function of the organization related to the new conditions in 1991 in Rome. The member states added a new strategic approach, *'partnership for peace'*, and confirmed the old ones, dialogue and defense. Moreover, the UN's new struggle methods to solve the disputes, peacekeeping and peacemaking were accepted as a mission of NATO.[137] Furthermore, the member states put forward new principles of security like increasing flexibility and speed, providing participation of multinational forces, and reducing conventional and nuclear stocks.[138] The most important

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[135] Ömür M. Esmer, *Yeni Dünya Düzeni* (New World Order), Gazi University (Unpublished Master Thesis), Ankara, 1994, p.122.
[136] Bülent S. Ağır, "Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Avrupa Güvenlik Düzenine Kurumsal Bir Bakış", p.109.
[137] *Ibid.*, p.113.
[138] *Ibid.*, p.114.

improvement of the Rome Summit was the active participation of Russia as a *'partnership for peace'*. This means Russia would be a part of European security for the first time after the last four decades.[139] In this respect, Russian military forces war in Bosnia on the Western states sides. Nevertheless, the cooperation between the US and Russia on military issues started with the détente in the Cold War. In 1980s, two superpowers discussed and agreed on the end to proliferation of WMD and a reduction of the amount of nuclear missiles stocks and conventional forces. The bilateral agreements on disarmament are Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF), the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). SALT is one of the most important agreements because it anticipated the establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission to discuss assertions and misunderstandings which reduced the possibility of war.[140] The most valuable contribution to reaching a détente on the nuclear challenge belongs to Mikhail Gorbachev who declared unilateral cuts in Soviet conventional forces which were costing the Soviet economy a fortune. The Soviet Union also could not maintain its military expenditures after the early 1980s.[141]

In conclusion, the United States and its allies declared theirs sudden, unexpected victory over Communism in the early 1990s. The collapse of the Communist Bloc announced not only a victory for Western military superiority but also a victory for the values of the Western states: liberalism, democracy, and a free market economy. On the other hand, this new world brought many uncertainties for security. Defining

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[139] Alain Joxe, *Kaos İmparatorluğu*, p.179.
[140] Joseph S. Nye, "Arms Control after the Cold War", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.68, No.1 (1990), p.45.
[141] *Ibid.*, pp.47-48.

foreign and security priorities would not be as easy for American policymakers as it was in the Cold War. However, the Gulf Crisis and the Bosnian War helped policymakers to define and shape the US foreign and security policy. Cooperation on the proliferation of WMD and terrorism, the post-Cold War challenges, are the right choices when considering today's situation as examined in the following chapter. Also, international security organizations gained significance in post-Cold War era. NATO is one of them. At the end of NATO's enlargement process that allowed newly independent states to apply for membership, it had three new members in 1999 and seven in 2002. Also, NATO played a significant role in improving Russian relations with the West. Preventing the proliferation of WMD and reducing nuclear missiles and conventional forces were the most important security cooperation issues. In the end, Russia participated in the establishment of the European Security Structure by signing an agreement with NATO in May of 1997. The post-Cold War era provided an opportunity to elevate collective security and international rule of law that de-legitimized war, to the top of the international system as a value. Also, promoting democracy around the world served to bring peace because free nations adhere to the principles of pluralism, human rights and equal opportunity, which make the world safer.[142] This serves the interests of all nations, not just American interests.

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[142] Thedore C. Sorensen, "Rethinking National Security", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.69, No.3 (1991),p.12.

3.2. Turkish-American Relations in the post-Cold War Period

3.2.1. General Aspects of Turkish-American Relations

After the last four decades, the bipolarity of the world system collapsed and the US and its allies began to celebrate this sudden and unexpected event. At the same time, on the other side of the Atlantic, nearby US allies, an eastern flank country silently celebrated the collapse of the most significant threat to its security. Before long, the US, the only superpower in the post-Cold War period, defined and declared its new foreign and security policy that included a statement of new threats and opportunities according to the new conditions. Similarly the rest of the world shaped their foreign policy. At first, the US consolidated the European security structure by cooperating with former-Communist states, some of them are the members of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Other efforts were made to target the new major threats, which were found in the Middle East. The Gulf Crisis broke out soon, which unified old enemies for the first time to intervene on an issue on the same side. This event demonstrated two important developments. One of them is that a global war seems out of sight and the second one is that there is an increasing ratio of ethnic and religious conflicts being observed in the triangle of the Middle East, the Balkans and Caucasia. To protect the stability of the international system, major and regional actors required strategic cooperation. In this respect, the cooperation between Turkey and the US played a vital role in the new era.[143]

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[143] For more information, see Yasemin Çelik, "A New Era in Relations with the United States", *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy* (Westport: Praeger, 1999), pp.76-95.

In the post-Cold War period, the priority in American foreign policy was promoting and improving democracy in the world, especially for the newly independent states. The politicians and scholars also defined the threats as overpopulation, migration, environmental degradation, ethnic conflict, and economic instability. American foreign policymakers required strategic alliances in strategic locations to prevent these threats. In this respect, Turkey has one of the most important strategic location in the region. US authorities consider it to be "an influential and active pivotal state because of its strategic location, physical size and large population, and also its economic potential and capacity to affect regional and international stability".[144] After the Cold War, the US defined new enemies and most of them exist in the Middle East region, namely Iraq, Iran and Syria. Especially with the Gulf War, the world focused on this region, where the US had transferred its military power. In this respect, Turkey, a country that played a main strategic role in NATO's southern flank, was increasingly accepted in the European context during the Cold War and began to be considered for the Middle East security structure.[145] The US requested Turkey's cooperation in protecting American interests in the region. In this context, Turkey supported NATO's new capability which includes intervention in regions outside of Europe by opening its military bases to American forces for necessary operations. Also, the Turkish-Israeli strategic alliance served American interests in the Middle East while at the same time containing Iran, Iraq and Syria. Moreover, Turkey was one of the most significant pivotal countries in the Black Sea region for

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[144] Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relations Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distance Alliance* (New York: Nova Science Publishers,2000), p.304.

[145] Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.71, No.1 (1992), p.34.

balancing out the Russians in Caucasia, controlling transportation from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and preventing the expansion of Iran's radical Islam in Central Asia.[146] In the post-Cold War period, US contributions to Turkey included the defeat of Saddam Hussein, supported Turkey in its war on terrorism (which ironically found free movement zone in Northern Iraq after the first Gulf War), supported Turkey's membership in the EU, and financed and made possible the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project, which was approved at the İstanbul Summit of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1999.

In the Cold War, President Eisenhower and Nixon put forward the 'domino theory' which said a country that succumbed to Communism might be affecting other countries in the region just as dominos topple one another. The US, the core, therefore supported pivotal states to prevent them and their neighbors from falling into Communism.[147] After the Cold War, another theory was introduced called the 'pivotal states theory', in which the US focused on pivotal states rather than spreading its attention and resources all over the globe. The goal was to prevent selected countries and their neighbors from the domino effect of a different threat.[148] US policymakers determined that a pivotal state must have the capacity to affect regional and international stability. Chase and Hill determined the pivotal states to be Mexico and Brazil in the Americas, Algeria, Egypt and South Africa in Africa, Turkey in the Middle East, India and Pakistan in Asia and Indonesia in the Pacific.[149]

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[146] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Büyük Satranç Tahtası* p.46.
[147] R.S. Chase, E.B. Hill, P. Kennedy, "Pivotal States and US Strategy", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.75, No.1 (Jan/Feb 1996), p.34.
[148] *Ibid.*
[149] *Ibid.*, p.37.

Turkey was chosen as a pivotal state because of its strategic importance especially after the appearance of newly independent republics (members of Commonwealth of Independent States) in Central Asia with Turkish ethnicity. Nevertheless, Turkey tried to resist significant problems such as population, severe ethnic minority challenges (particularly around the Kurds), and the economy, which had never achieved stability in the history of the new state. Also, Turkey faced long-term disputes with neighbors like Greece in the Aegean Sea, Cyprus (Turkey's gangrenous problem) in the Mediterranean, Syria (border and terrorism problems) in Southern Turkey, Iraq over terrorism, Iran over its support of radical Islamic groups, and Armenia over the invaded territories of Azerbaijan. Despite all the conflicts with its neighbors, however, Turkey is the only nation in the region with security, democracy, a nearly stable economy, and a national policy to become a Western state. For this, US military and economic aid increased from $553.4 million to $635.4 million in 1991.[150] In sum, Turkey is the most important major power in the region for its economic and military status and it is the most indispensable state in the region as bilateral relations were still based on security concerns in post-Cold War period.

But Turkey faced uncertainties and opportunities at the same time. Unlike many other European states after the Cold War, however, Turkey could not reach enhanced security because of its geopolitical and geostrategic position in the most unstable region of the world.[151] Moreover, Turkey was transformed from NATO's flank

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[150] Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship...*, p. 359.
[151] Malik Mufti, "Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Middle East Journal*, Vol.52, No.1 (Winter1998), p.33.

country into a frontline country, which means a lot to American policymakers. It meant that Turkey's security cooperation with the West maintained its importance after the Cold War. Meanwhile, Turkey tried to identify potential threats and foreign and security priorities for Turkish interests. Instability in Iraq and the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles mostly threatened Turkey because US officials argued that many countries, including Turkey's neighbors of Iraq, Iran and Syria, strived to obtain these kinds of weapons. Some of them, in fact, already have long-range ballistic missiles. Furthermore, a foreseeable decrease in Turkey's strategic importance was causing panic among Turkish policymakers after the end of the Cold War. In this way, the Turkish political elite were concerned that the end of the Cold War might be a reason to exclude Turkey form Western political, economic, cultural, and security structures. Therefore, the Turkish policymakers watched for an opportunity to highlight Turkey's strategic location and its importance in establishing the European Security Structure at any moment. Turkey applied to several economic and security organizations in the Western club with its case of strategic importance. The Turkish government had been also anxious about the reduction of military and economic assistance, as grants were already reduced in loan/grant ratio during the Cold War, year by year.[152] In the post-Cold War period, there were two reasons that the US Senate reduced military and economic aid of the US Senate.

The first one was, Turkey's record of human right violations, in particular systematic torture, and second one was the Turkish governments' unwillingness attitude to solve

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[152] For more information, see Thomas R. Stauffer, "The Cost of Middle East Conflict, 1956-2002: What the US Has Spent", *Middle East Policy*, Vol.10, No.1 (Spring 2003), pp.45-99.

the Cyprus problem.[153] Moreover, the Turkish government worried about discussions of the uncertain future of NATO and the strengthened Western European Union (WEU), of which Turkey was not a member. As a member of NATO, Turkish policymakers thought that NATO guaranteed Turkey's security, but the Turkish government had some doubts as to whether or not the other member states would adopt Article 5 or not if Turkey was under attack by a third country. In parallel, when European Union member states were shaping the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), and determining foreign and security priorities, Turkey could not take an active role as it was only a candidate state. The only consolation was the European dependency on NATO and a plan to configure the Western European Union as the European part of the NATO. On the other hand, Turkish policymakers were pleased with Russian participation of NATO as a 'partnership for peace' (PfP) for two reasons. First, Russia was not going to be a direct threat to Turkey and second, Turkey could establish relations with Commonwealth of Independent States without any restrictions thereby expecting to benefit from the region's rich oil and natural gas resources.

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[153] Mahmut B. Aykan, "Turkish Perspectives on Turkish-US Relations Concerning Persian Gulf Security in the post-Cold War Era: 1989-1995", *Middle East Journal*, Vol.50, No.3 (Summer 1996), p.346.

3.2.2. Events that Shaped Turkish-American Relations in the post-Cold War Period

The collapse of the Communist Bloc removed the possibility of an imminent threat of a global war. However, this event brought instability and uncertainty to the international system. In the bipolar world, several regional conflicts were cooled down, but when nationalist movements and regional disputes re-appeared, wars broke out like those in the Gulf and Bosnia. One of the reasons for these wars was that the US was slow to take control of the regions once dominated by the Soviet Union. These regions became unstable zones when the influence of the Soviet Union ended in the beginning of the 1990s. In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait after attacking Iran after the revolution in 1980. United Nation Coalition Forces, dominated by the US army, rapidly intervened and forced Saddam to withdraw Iraqi military power from Kuwait. However, even though the War lasted only a short time, it continued to affect the region for the last decade. The War held two important consequences for the United States. First and most importantly, "the war gave the US policymakers an opportunity to demonstrate its own determination to create a 'new world order'".[154] The US military force settled on the periphery of the Gulf in large numbers to contain Iraq, Iran, and Syria. The other important consequence was US President Bush Senior's decision not to overthrow Saddam Hussein, who later turned out to be the reason to the second Gulf War. Also, the War affected countries in the region,

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[154] Ö.B. Buyruk, *Costs and Benefits to Turkey in its Relations with the US: The Cold War and After*, University of Bilkent (Unpublished Master Thesis), Ankara 2003, p.95.

particularly Turkey, as they continue to struggle with the uncertainties and terrorism brought about by the first Gulf War.

Before the Gulf War, the US requested to use Turkish military bases for an active air attack, to settle Turkish troops on the Turkish-Iraqi border to prevent the Iraqi Army from building in Southern Iraq, and to send a troop to join coalition forces in Saudi Arabia.[155] During the first Gulf War, Turgut Özal, former President of the Republic of Turkey, was the dominant personality that shaped Turkish foreign and security policy.[156] Turgut Özal transformed traditional Turkish foreign policy, which was known as passive, non-reacting and neutral after the mid-1960s except for the Cyprus intervention in 1974. Many civil and military leaders interested in maintaining a traditional balanced and neutral policy did not support the active policy of Özal in the War. President Özal supported coalition forces by giving them permission to use Turkish bases and to settle Operation Provide Comfort in Turkey after the War.[157] But despite the decision of the National Assembly in 1991 that "Turkish armed forces and foreign forces based in Turkey could participate in military actions against Iraq", Turkish armed forces did not participate in Desert Storm Operation.[158] Moreover, Özal gave the order to cut off the oil flow from the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline, a decision with vital economic importance to the Turkish economy, in support of the UN decision to place sanctions on Iraq.

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[155] Morton Abramowitz, "The Complexities of American Policymaking on Turkey", *Turkey's Transformation and American Policy*, Morton Abramowitz (ed.) (Ankara: Liberte, 2001), p.155.
[156] For more information, see Ramazan Gözen, *Amerikan Kıskacında Dış Politika: Körfez Savaşı, Turgut Özal ve Sonrası* (Foreign Policy under the Shadow of America: Gulf War, Turgut Özal and Hereafter) (Ankara: Liberte, 2000).
[157] Burcu Bostanoğlu, "Uluslararası Politikada Kuramın Gerekliliği:....", p.75.
[158] Ö.B. Buyruk, "Costs and Benefits to Turkey in its Relations with the US...", p.98.

The first Gulf War had both economic and military costs to Turkey and the US. Although the economic amounts documented vary, Turkey's loss is approximately $9 billion from the pipeline and border trade in the following years.[159] Turkey lost $700 million every year because of the closed pipeline which has the capacity of 70.9 million tons a year.[160] Furthermore, Turkey's export to Iraq was $2.5 billion that was equaled to 10% of total export of Turkey in a year.[161] When considering the decreased tourism revenues, increased military spending, and the price of oil (15.6 b/d rises to 37 b/d) with other war related expenditures, Turkey's losses increased.[162] On the other hand, the US worked to raise international support for Turkey's losses. In this respect, American economic and military aid increased from $553.4 million to $635.4 million and Turkey received $1.6 billion in assistance from Saudi Arabia. However, the amounts could only cover Turkey's losses so far.[163] Moreover, the US doubled the quota number on Turkish textile goods. The costs of the Gulf War to the US had two dimensions: first, increasing expenditures and budget of the US military force and second, increasing economic and military assistance to its allies and the rebuilding of a defeated country. However, the net cost to the US of the first Gulf War I was minimal because major contributions were made by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Germany and Japan contributed to cover the expenditures as well. Thomas R. Stauffer argued that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait could easily regain what they contributed by rising oil prices because of the War.[164]

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[159]Please compare the cost figures of the War to Turkey, see Fuller, p.160; Buyruk, p.99; Gözen, pp.277-285.

[160] Ramazan Gözen, *Amerikan Kıskacında Dış Politika:....*, p.282.

[161] Ö.B. Buyruk, "Costs and Benefits to Turkey in its Relations with the US...", p.99.

[162] For more information, see Ramazan Gözen, *Amerikan Kıskacında Dış Politika:....*, pp.277-305.

[163] *Ibid.*, p.285.

[164] Thomas R. Stauffer, "The Cost of Middle East Conflict, p.58.

Figure 3 Total Costs with Contributions. (Billions)

Gross expenditures	$55
Contributions of other allies	$6
Quasi-cash US cost	$49
Major Contributions	$45
Germany	$6
Japan	$3
Kuwait	$13.5
Saudi Arabia	$13.5
UAE	$3

Source: Stauffer, 2003:58

After the first Gulf War, Iraq was divided into three administration areas. Saddam Hussein lost control of the area north of the 36th parallel and the south of Iraq which was mostly populated by Shiites. This situation was unacceptable to Turkey and the other countries of the region, particularly to Syria and Iran as they also possess a Kurdish minority. These states focused on Iraq's territorial integrity and declared that they would not recognize a *de facto* Kurdish state in Northern Iraq because, just like in the domino theory, this new formation might lead to nationalist movements elsewhere in the region. Dramatically, Turkey's concern was realized and separatist terrorism grew and spread beyond the control of the Iraqi authorities after 1991. Separatist movements became the most important threat to Turkey's national interests, Turkish territorial integrity, and its national unity.[165]

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[165] Mahmut B. Aykan, "Turkish Perspectives on Turkish-US Relations....", p.349.

Furthermore, Operation Provide Comfort, an international force charged with protecting the population in the mostly Kurdish regions of Northern Iraq, sent humanitarian assistance and caused some damage to Turkish-American relations during the last decade.[166] First of all, Operation Provide Comfort internationalized the Kurdish problem. In other words, an international force informed major powers and international institutions about what was happening in the region. The US and the European Union reacted to Turkish military intervention when they observed human rights violations. Because of that, Turkish Army's movement zone was restricted.[167] Turkish foreign policymakers were obliged to face all these challenges abroad.[168] The US Congress cited human rights violations in the region (including the Cyprus question) and reduced its $453 million in economic and military aid to Turkey by 10% in 1995.[169]

After the defeating of the Soviet Union threat, Islamic fundamentalism was defined as the new threat by the US.[170] In this respect, the struggle against Islamic fundamentalism would become one of the new missions of NATO in addition to preventing regional conflicts. In this context, Iran was accepted as a threat to the administration of US.

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[166] Ramazan Gözen, *Amerikan Kıskacında Dış Politika:....*, p.344.
[167] Mahmut B. Aykan, "Turkish Perspectives on Turkish-US Relations...", p.353.
[168] Kemal Kirişçi, "Provide Comfort or Trouble: Operation Provide Comfort and its Impact on Turkish Foreign Policy", *Turkish Review of Middle East Studies*, Vol.8, 1994-95, p.45.
[169] Mahmut B. Aykan, "Turkish Perspectives on Turkish-US Relations...", p.351.
[170] Ramazan Gözen, "Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri ve Türk Demokrasisi: Realist Bağlantı" (Turkish-American Relations and Turkish Democracy: A Realist Connection), *Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Gündemi*, (Turkish Foreign Policy Agenda), Şaban H. Çalış and İhsan Dağı (eds.) (Ankara: Liberte, 2001), p.95.

Turkish-American relations began to normalize with the removal of sanctions and the signing of the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) after the Iran Revolution. The US worried about the spread of the Islamic revolution to neighboring countries (the domino affect) and supported Turkey as a pivotal country. Moreover, US officials claimed that the government in Iran was trying to acquire nuclear weapons which would threaten Turkey and others in the region. Although some Turkish politicians accepted Iran as a threat to Turkish national interests, both politically and militarily, Turkish policymakers has abstained from applying economic sanctions on this country and never supported the completely isolationist policy of the US. In contrast, a bilateral agreement was signed on natural gas trade in 1996. In sum, the perception of Iran as a threat was different for the two allies. Even though, the Turkish government was concerned about Iran's ballistic missiles program, it was still seeking out new ways to cooperate on trade or energy sources.

Meanwhile, bilateral relations between Turkey and Israel began to develop in the 1990s, which pleased the US. Turkey is the only Muslim country that recognized the Israel in the 1950s. The Menderes government wanted to participate in the Western club and their economic and security organizations, especially to NATO, by recognizing Israel. Menderes government shaped Turkish security and foreign policy in parallel with US policies. However, in the early 1970s, Turkey worked to normalize bilateral relations with Arab states because of rising oil prices.

Therefore, the Turkish government cut its relations with Israel down to a low level for almost two decades. The normalization process started with the Madrid Peace

Conference in 1991. In 1993, Hikmet Çetin, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced that neither Turkey nor Israel would tolerate any terrorist groups or their activities and both countries warned Syria to stop accommodating terrorist groups.[171] In 1994, former Prime Minister Çiller signed an agreement to build cooperation on anti-terrorism efforts, especially against Islamic fundamentalists and Kurdish separatist movements.[172]

This strategic cooperation diversified with other cooperation issues like the Manavgat Water Project, the Free Trade Agreement (1996), joint military maneuvers and modernization projects for Turkish military equipment. Cooperation on military issues dissolved with Arab States, especially after the military education agreement in 1996, which allowed Israeli pilots to be educated in Turkey and join maneuvers with the US in the Mediterranean. Again, any relations between Israel and Turkey pleased the US because these two states were two reliable US allies among the so-called 'rogue states' in the Middle East.[173]

The newly independent states in Central Asia that are ethnically Turkic were immediately recognized by the Turkish government. In fact, Turkish policymakers were concerned about Turkey's decreasing strategic importance after the end of the Cold War. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union provided a new era of opportunity to Turkey. In this respect, Süleyman Demirel, the former President of the

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[171] Süha Bölükbaşı, "Türkiye ve İsrail: Mesafeli Yakınlıktan Stratejik Ortaklığa" (Turkey and Israel: A Strategic Partnership), *Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Gündemi* (Turkish Foreign Policy Agenda), Şaban H. Çalış and İhsan Dağı (eds.) (Ankara: Liberte, 2001), p.263.
[172] *Ibid.*
[173] The description belonged to US officials.

Republic of Turkey following Turgut Özal, shared a vision of "a large unified area of Turkic world, stretching from the Chinese Wall to the Adriatic" to define the new possible area of influence for Turkey. Also, the Turkish government, a secular democratic state, presented itself as a model for the Commonwealth of Independent States in Central Asia and wanted to share the Turkish experience of democracy and free market economy with these new republics. In the beginning of the relations, nationalist politicians and scholars brought forward a utopia that established a strong Turkic union that emphasized economic and security cooperation, as an alternative to the European Union.[174] However, Turkish policymakers realized that these states were unstable and required a great amount of economic and military aid that the Turkish government could not afford.[175] Moreover, Turkey's relations with the Turkic states might not be an alternative to relations with the West. Therefore, both sides (Turkey and the Central Asian states) began to use each other to maximize their interests. Turkey put forward its close relations with the Central Asian states to consolidate its position in the Western Bloc, which was shaken with the end of the Cold War. Similarly, the newly independent states considered Turkey to be a gate to the Western capital, and its economic and security organizations. The US supported Turkish attempts at being a model to the Turkic states as they were shaping their new regimes. Also, Turkey could prevent Central Asian states form the influence of the Russians and Iranians.

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[174] Some of the nationalists go forward to offer a United Turkic State.
[175] Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship Between 1947 and 2003...*, p.286.

Another significant issue for Turkey and the US was the Caspian regions rich oil and gas reserves. When considering oil, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have 25 billion of barrels of proven oil reserves, more than the US owns and 50 percent more than what exists in the North Sea.[176] Central Asia and Caucasia have 253-270 billion of barrels (BBL) in oil reserves in total (proven and estimated), and 571-576 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) in gas reserves.[177] Turkey was striving to convince major oil firms and the US administration to transport the oil and gas through Turkish territories. To summarize, although the Cold War ended in the beginning of the 1990s, continuing Turkish-American relations were based on security cooperation in the post-Cold War period. The most important consequence of the end of the Cold War was the strategic importance as Turkey transfers from the European security structure to the Middle East security structure, which means Turkey, became a frontline country for the US. After the first Gulf War, the Turkish government's decision to accept the US request to settle Operation Provide Comfort in Turkey would be one of the major events to shape Turkish-American relations during the post-Cold War period.[178] Even though the Turkish strategic position weakened after the defeat of the Soviet threat, Turkey remained an indispensable state to American interests and the European security structure as a frontline country. Also, Commonwealth of Independent States in Central Asia strengthened the Turkish strategic position in the West and provided a new era in relations with the US. Moreover, the strategic partnership between the US and Turkey gained a new vision when Central Asian natural resources were

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[176] Steven R. Mann, "Caspian Sea Energy Resources: A US Perspective", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.4, No.1 (January-March 2002), p.4.
[177] For more information, see Yiğit Şengül, *The US Towards the Caspian Region in the 1990s and Turkey's Place*, University of Hacettepe (Unpublished Master Thesis), Ankara 2002, p.94.
[178] Morton Abramowitz, "The Complexities of American Policymaking on Turkey", p.226.

discovered, which added an economic dimension to the bilateral relations. In the end,

Turkish-American relations reached a high level for the first time since the 1950s.

CHAPTER 4

US FOREIGN POLICY AND TURKISH–AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE POST- SEPTEMBER 11 PERIOD

4.1. The International System and the United States at the Beginning of the Twenty First Century

In the last decade, the world has become more unstable because of regional conflicts, rising ethnic nationalism, religious fundamentalism and conflicting economic and military interests. The United Nations Security Council put forward new concepts of peacekeeping and peacemaking to address these threats. In this way, humanitarian interventions can be realized. United States (US) officials adopted an American foreign policy with new conditions. In the uni-multipolar system, the US expands its zone of influence to Central Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Caspian region to control energy resources. The Soviet Union is still an important regional actor but has lost its super power role. In this respect, a comparison of Cold War and post-Cold War times is presented to show the changes in the perspectives of the US in the following figure.

Figure 4 Changes in the US Perception

	Cold War	**Post-Cold War**
Security System	Bipolar	Unipolar
Strategic Goal	Contain Soviet Union	Preserve Pax-Americana
Main Military Mission	Deter Soviet expansion	Secure and expand zones of democratic peace; deter rise of new great power competitor; defend key exploit transformation of war
Main Military Threat(s)	Potential global war across many theaters	Potential theater wars spread across globe
Focus of Strategic Competition	Europe	East Asia

Source: Kagan, D., Schmitt, G., Donnelly, T., Rebuilding America's Defenses, Washington DC:Project for New American Century

The US intended to promote global security by transforming NATO from a defense alliance into a growing security alliance.[179] The first step was the participation of former-Communist states (Commonwealth of Independent States) in the Western security structure. The second and most important step was the participation of Russia under an agreement of *'peace for partnership'* (PfP) in the security structure of Europe. After the Cold War that had dominated world affairs for almost half a century came to an end, the US and Russia were finally on the same side in the intervention of Bosnia and Iraq. After demolishing its old enemy, US policymakers determined the new priorities of the US to be promoting American values of

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[179]Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Hegemonic Quicksand", *The National Interest*, Winter 2003/04, pp.5-6.

democracy and a free market economy, preventing the proliferation of WMD (especially Russia's ballistic missiles and the assistance of unemployed Russian nuclear physicians to third world countries' nuclear programs like North Korea and Iraq), and fighting the 'soft power' problems of HIV/AIDS and global warming.[180]

According to Kissinger and Brzezinski, the US is the only superpower, which has superior capital (economic power), military power, diplomatic hegemony, and technology.[181] Newsweek published a report comparing the superpower with other major powers in several categories in the beginning of 2004. The US came in first on annual military spending $340 billion, followed by Japan at $46,7, England at $36, France at $34, and China at $31 (in billion). The US alone spend more than the total amount of all other states military expenditures. For nuclear weapons, the US has the most at 10,600 followed by Russia which has 8,600 warheads. No other countries come close to these numbers. Russia came in first place for military equipment sales of $5.9 billion. The US followed with $3.9 billion. In a measure of economic power considering GDP, competition levels, and export capacity, the US came in first again. The US' GDP is $10 trillion (40 times Turkey's GDP), followed by China, $6 trillion. The EU's GDP is slightly higher than that of the US, but one must remember that it includes fifteen member states and ten new member states.[182] The US, the EU, and China are the major economic powers producing $26 trillion value added of the

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[180] Unfortunately, the US Presidents have not signed the Kyoto Protocol, which is to prevent global warming.

[181] Eser Karakaş, "Dünyanın Çatısı ve Türkiye-1" (Developed Countries and Turkey-1), *Zaman*, 01 January 2004.
http://www.zaman.com.tr/?bl=yorumlar&trh=20040121&hn=2092 (02 January 2004)

[182] In the report, the term '*quasi state*' is used to define the European Union, which means nearly a state.

world's $40 trillion. This point is so significant for challengers to the US, that after the Cold War, *'soft power'* gained importance and the only competition field with the US is the economy. In a few years, China will have the biggest economy in the world and Chinese corporations have already developed monopolies in industries like toy manufacturing. Still, its enemies find ways to challenge the US with terrorism, which will be mentioned later. In the end, an important figure that determines the superpower is a nation's export capacity. US annual export capacity is $740 billion which is the highest for today, followed by Germany at $608 billion and Japan at $384 billion.[183] In summary, part of the report identifies the top two countries for military power (the US and France), for economic power (the US and Germany), for technologic power (the US and Switzerland), and for diplomatic hegemony, (the US followed by France and Germany).[184] All these figures mean is that no single state or groups of states can challenge the US on military power today or in the near future.[185] On the other hand, there is no economic superpower and, as a matter of fact, Chinese and European economic figures are almost equal to those of the US which produced more than 50% of the added value by itself after the end of World War II.[186] In the end, this report verifies Huntington's theory that the world system has only one superpower and several major powers, which Huntington called *'uni-multipolar'* in his famous article "The Lonely Superpower" on the post-Cold War period.

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[183] Turkish annual export capacity was $48 billion in the same period.

[184] Eser Karakaş, "Dünyanın Çatısı ve Türkiye-2" (Developed Countries and Turkey-2), *Zaman*, 29 January 2004.
http://www.zaman.com.tr/?bl=yorumlar&_alt&trh=20040129&hn=5061 (30 January 2004)

[185] Henry Kissinger, *Amerika'nın Dış Politikaya İhtiyacı Var mı?*, p.270.

4.2. September 11 Attacks: The Reasons and Reactions

4.2.1. The Reasons of the 9/11 Attacks

Promoting democracy, human rights and a free market economy to former-Communist and other totalitarian states were the priorities of the US foreign policy after the collapse of the Communist bloc. Most of the _members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) found these Western values appropriate, however, some totalitarian regimes refused to adopt American values despite US presidents' argument that these values belong to humanity.[187] The US classified states/regimes according to their level of obedience of American standards on human rights, terrorism, religious freedom, and nuclear proliferation. Moreover, US officials applied military and economic sanctions to punish states that could not or did not meet their standards and referred to them as 'rogue' or 'failed' states.[188]

Fukuyama argued that liberalism is the best and only system that man can reach or improve. In this respect, American values have been marketed to every state by the US which acts as a *'big brother'* when promoting these values. This insistence seems antipathetic to other states, even to other Western states. Mandela, former-Head of State of South of Africa, called it "the arrogance to tell us where we should go or which countries should be our friends".[189]

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[186] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Büyük Satranç Tahtası*, p.23.
[187] *Ibid.*, p.38.
[188] Henry Kissinger, *Amerika'nın Dış Politikaya İhtiyacı Var mı?*, pp.9-10.
[189] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Büyük Satranç Tahtası* p. 43.

In fact, for almost two decades, the number of democratic regimes has increased to 118 countries by the end of the 20th century. However, only seventy nine of these states have liberal democracies or a rule of law. In other words, the citizens of seventy nine states have complete freedom while the other democracies, including Turkey, are *'electoral democracies'* that provides only partial freedom.[190] Some political scientists argue that economic development fosters the democratization process in non-democratic or electoral democracy states.[191] Therefore, the US increased economic assistance to these kinds of states. The Commonwealth of Independent States welcomed these aids with pleasure. But the US has not acted sincerely in promoting American values since the beginning of the Cold War. Two examples are given here for consideration. The first one is the Turkish democratization process and the other is Saudi Arabia's totalitarian consolidation process. Ramazan Gözen successfully demonstrated the realist side of American foreign policy in his article "Turkish-American Relations and Turkish Democracy: A Realist Connection".[192] The US supported stability and democracy on the condition that the Turkish National Assembly and its government desired the westernization process in Turkey and wanted to continue good relations with Western states in 1980s.[193]

In this respect, when anti-Americanism was in demanded of both the government and its opposition parties in the 1960s and 1970s, US policymakers defined the situation

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[190] Samuel P. Huntington, "After Twenty Years: The Future of the Third Wave", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.8, No.4 (October 1997), p.7.

[191] *Ibid.*, p.5.

[192] Ramazan Gözen, "Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri ve Türk Demokrasisi: ...", p.95.

[193] *Ibid.*, p.92.

as unstable. For Paul Henze, National Security Council advisor to Jimmy Carter, anti-American sentiment threaded American interests in Turkey and damaged Turkish-American relations.[194] If the US was faced with a dilemma between democracy and stability, US administrations would preferred stability to protect the status quo and pretended not to see the violations of human rights as US officials did in the military coup period in Turkey in the early 1980s. The US also supported the Saudi royalty's interests, turned a blind eye to human rights violations and pretended not to hear the demands for democracy. US governments did this because if relations broke down, it would affect the cost of oil to the US, like it did in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Also, US officials were not prepared to sacrifice millions of dollars of Saudi investments in the US.

The US actions were gathering reactions not only from western societies and their member nations, but also from the Muslim community. Edward Said published many critiques in journals and daily newspapers on Israeli-American relations. Said argued that the US gave clear support to the State of Israel, always used its veto power in favor of the State of Israel, and prevented anti-Israeli decisions from being made at the UN Security Council. Therefore, Arab states began to show their reactions to US officials for their application of double standards on Israeli, where US policymakers were turning a blind eye on clear human rights violations.[195] Moreover, the Arab community was angry about the Gulf War; the bombing of Sudan, where more than half of nation's medical supplies were destroyed and the number of deaths is

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[194] *Ibid.*

[195] The State of Israel benefits from US economic and military aid between 1956-2002 totaling almost $247 billion. Thomas R. Stauffer, "The Cost of Middle East Conflict,...", p.61.

unknown because the US prevented the United Nations from investigating; and the Chechnya problem, where the US took no action against Russia. Moreover, many other communities such as the Russians, Chinese, Hindus and more did not approve of American financial imperialism--so called *'neo-colonialism'*. According to a survey reported in 1997 at Harvard, at least two-thirds of the people, most of them were the citizens of countries that did not belong to the Western bloc, viewed the US as the single greatest threat to their societies.[196] Also, L. K. Johnson and Kiki Caruson defined the seven sins of American foreign policy as: ignorance (which could be the main reason for terrorists to plan the 9/11 attacks because of the attitude of American foreign policymakers on the Israel-Palestine conflict), lack of empathy, isolationism (by maximizing American interests and constructing a *'fortress America'* that protects Americans from chaos), unilateralism (which means acting alone and being alone),[197] pre-emptive military actions, presidential imperialism, and finally, arrogance.[198]

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[196]Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower", p.43.
[197] *Ibid.*, p.49.

4.2.2. September 11 Attacks and the Reactions

On September 11, 2001, four passenger planes were high jacked. Two of them attacked the World Trade Center, one attacked the Department of Defense known as the Pentagon, and the last one was most likely targeted the White House but was probably hit by the US Air Force before it reached its target. More than 3,000 civilians died in the attacks. An external enemy attacked the US continent for the first time.[199] In a global world, everyone, even Osama bin Laden might be watched the World Trade Center attack live, like watching an American film. This was a global event that happened in a global world established mostly by the US. That day, in the days that followed, in the weeks that followed, people continued to watch what happened on 9/11 and discuss possible scenarios about who did it and what the response will be. Intellectuals and journalists wrote of possible reasons for the 9/11 attacks and the probable responses to the new enemy. These arguments will be examined in the following paragraphs. First of all, Phil Gordon stated the dramatic truth that "Nothing will be the same again".[200] Gordon anticipated that aspects of the US political system, public administration and foreign policy should be changed. Moreover, Gordon argued that intelligence will gain importance and that the US has to increase the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) budget which was reduced after the Cold War.[201]

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[198] L. K. Johnson and K. Caruson, "The Seven Sins of American Foreign Policy", *PS*, January 2003, p.5.

[199] The British Army burned the White House in mid-1850s and Pearl Harbor is in Hawaii, where is far from the continent.

[200] Phil H. Gordon, "Nothing Will Be the Same Again", *Le Monde*, 13 September 2001.

[201] *Ibid.*

Francis Fukuyama published one of the most noted article on the subject on October 8, 2001 in the Wall Street Journal. Fukuyama argued, "We are still at the end of history", where the liberal and democratic Western system is the only system that can be dominant over world politics. Also, Fukuyama answered Huntington's question of whether non-Western states could have their own modern political system by adopting the values of the existing modern political system. Fukuyama's response was in the affirmative with reference to Latin American, Eastern European and South Asian states and the third world immigrants that have lived in Western nations. Fukuyama anticipated that in Islam, something or someone is encouraging Muslims to resist modernity and people like Osama bin Laden have grown to be completely against modernity only in Islam.[202] Fukuyama reaches this argument by observing that there is no democratic Muslim state in the world, aside from Turkey. Fukuyama is partly right about the Muslim world's resistance to modernity. First of all, there is no unified Muslim world. Fukuyama, like other 'orientalist' intellectuals, supposes that all Muslims have an Arabic identity, but there are Turkish (Turkic), African, South Eastern and Iranian Muslims, too. Also, there is no consensus between Arabs on modernization. From past to present, Arabs have taken several steps to liberalize their economies. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is one example. These states are not enemies of the West. On the contrary, these states are part of the Western financial system because of their investments in several Western states.

Robert Kaplan wrote the most pretentious article in Washington Post on September 29, 2001. Kaplan argued that the US has to abandon idealism from American foreign

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[202] Francis Fukuyama, *Wall Street Journal* , 8 October 2001.

policy and adopt traditional foreign policies like diplomacy of national security, because the US has to protect its land from its enemies. Just after that, promoting American values can be a priority for American interests. Kaplan supported President Bush's foreign policy and emphasized the efficient use of foreign policy resources and adopting American military power in facing new threats.[203] On the other hand, Kaplan criticized President Clinton's foreign policy priorities. During the Clinton period, economic figures were more important than American security policy, especially 'hard power' ones. Actually, US citizens were in favor of Clinton's economic policies, which closed the budget deficit after a long period of American history. Also, Clinton reduced military expenditures and the intelligence budget and added these resources to close the budget deficit. However, Kaplan argued that the perception that economic power is superior to military power is wrong in the global world. Actually, a state's military power requirements are directly dependent on how much economic power that the state has.

On September 16, 2001, Die Zeit published an interview with Huntington on the clash of civilizations argument which is used by some intellectuals to explain the 9/11 attacks. In this interview, Huntington clearly stated that this is not a war between civilizations. Huntington added that the attitudes of Muslim countries demonstrate the future of this war. Huntington meant that if Muslim countries do not take side with the US, a clash of civilizations might occur. Huntington also stated

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[203] Robert Kaplan, *Washington Post*, 29 September 2001.

that the US could not achieved anything by acting unilaterally and that US policymakers need a coalition that includes Muslim states.[204]

[204] Samuel Huntington, *Die Zeit*, 16 September 2001.

4.3. Changes in the US Foreign Policy in the post-September 11 Period

4.3.1. Bush Doctrine

Bryan Mabee defined security as "a relationship between state and society where the state provides insurance against the impact of 'external' contingencies".[205] In this respect, the Bill of Rights of the US Constitution guarantees the security of American citizens and the president is charged with protecting the security of those citizens. President Bush failed in this number one duty and so President required new precautions to protect US Citizens.

President Bush issued a response to the 9/11 attacks in a West Point statement on June 1, 2002 and announced a new National Security Strategy on September 17, 2002 that draws the framework of the Bush Doctrine and defines the changes in US foreign and security policy after the September 11 attacks. The aim of this doctrine is not only to make the world safer but also to make it better for everyone.[206] Bush started his speech repeating the victory of Liberalism, which is the only 'sustainable' model for national success according to the President. Thus, Bush is ending the history, too.[207] Then, the President listed the characteristics of free communities that are true and right for everybody in every society.[208]

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[205] Bryan Mabee, "Security Studies and the Security State: Security Provision in Historical Context", *International Relations*, Vol.17, No.2 (2003), p.143.

[206] US President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 29 January 2002. Transcript at http:www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html. (25 March 2003)

[207] Please remember Fukuyama's famous book *End of History and the Last Man*.

[208] From the President Bush's West Point statement: "Moral truth is the same in every culture, in every time, and in every place...", *White House Press Releases*, 1 June 2002. http:www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06.html (22 March 2003)

Also, Bush called on all democratic communities to protect and promote these values. In fact, President Bush called upon US allies and friends to participate the war on terrorism. The President defined the changing methods of US enemies as using modern technology and non-military equipment which could be found anywhere or could be anything.[209] As stated before, no single state or group of states could challenge the US army today or in the near future. However, international terrorists improved upon simple methods to challenge the US and its allies. Furthermore, the President argued that state sponsored terrorists were seeking WMD to cause greater damage to the West. President Bush also defined the new enemy as radicalism, which strengthens its power with getting modern technology like WMD. Bush used the example of Afghanistan, which is weak, poor and unstable but could be a threat to American national security. President Bush divided the states into two groups: those that cooperate with terrorists against US interests and those that cooperate with the US in combating terrorism. President Bush had already compiled a list of states that Bush called *'axis of evil'* composed of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. In this respect, Bush sent a message to democratic nations that for the first time in a Westphalian state-system, which established a realist international system where every state competes, clashes and coalesces with the others, major powers are on the same side sharing common values and common interests.[210] It is a chance for these states to struggle with global terrorism, so-called rogue/failed states, and chaos to

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[209] *Ibid.*
[210] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower", p.49.

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build liberal states.[211] Bush also loaded the responsibility of fighting terrorism to establish a peaceful world onto the cooperation of regional powers.

The changes in the American foreign policy after September 11th attacks can be examined under two main topics. First, the US is going to expand its influence over world affairs like never before. Second, if this influence is indispensable, the US can act unilaterally to achieve to demolish global terror. In one of his interviews, Richard Perle stated "the US did not need any coalitions to win the war against terrorism".[212]

The Bush doctrine could be evaluated by the following points:

- To raise 'the honor of man' by giving him political and economic freedoms

- To provide the security of free nations by preventing the proliferation of WMD

- To intervene to unstable regions with the US' allies and friends

The history of American foreign policy comes through in the doctrines, which are called by the names of presidents like Monroe, Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, Bush, and etc. The aim of these doctrines is to guide American foreign policy (address the enemies and determine the struggle methods). During the Cold War, some of the Presidents' doctrines consisted pre-emptive strikes. That means the Presidents used pre-emptive strikes as a method to prevent the threats, on the other hand, preemption

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[211] Edward Rhodes, "The Imperial Logic of Bush's Liberal Agenda", *Survival*, Vol.45, No.1 (Spring 2003), p.132.
[212] Richard Perle, *BBC World*, 8 October 2001.

was not a reliable option for nuclear self-defense.[213] For instance, deployment of forces to Lebanon during Eisenhower's presidency, Johnson's military intervention in the Dominican Republic, Reagan's attack on Libya, Kennedy's blockade of Cuba, Nixon's bombing of Cambodia and Laos, and then after the Cold War, Clinton's bombing of Sudan, all reflect unilateral action. Condoleezza Rice, National Security Council Advisor of the President, stated that "pre-emptive is not a new concept".[214] Bush Doctrine also anticipated an offensive foreign policy by using preemption rather than defense. Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, argued that the US can not win the war against terrorism with a defense policy; on the contrary, the US can win the war on terrorism only by an offensive foreign policy.[215]

The Bush doctrine has four elements. First, common values can be promoted by using force against tyrants, if necessary. Second, in this century, threats are coming from weak states or groups which do not have an army, can only be defeated with new and flexible policies such as pre-emptive strikes and the US has to be willing to act unilaterally when necessary. Third, this is a historic opportunity to transform the international system. President Bush first introduced this aim a week after September 11th when he said "We have an opportunity to restructure the world toward freedom, and we have to get it right". The last element is to cooperate with major or regional powers to defeat the enemy. President Bush stressed the importance of sharing responsibility among free societies one or two times, but did did not mention the

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[213] John Steinbruner, "Confusing Ends and Means: The Doctrine of Coercive Pre-emption", *Arms Control Today*, January/February 2003, p.4.
[214] M.P. Leffler, "9/11 and the Past and the Future of American Foreign Policy", *International Affairs*, Vol.79, No.5 (2003), p.1053.
[215] *Ibid.*

United Nations (UN) at all. This implied that the United Nations might be not the top decision making center. As with the operation in Iraq, the Bush administration intends to legitimize its actions by establishing multi-national coalitions and using the term 'liberation'. The Iraqi operation as therefore referred to as the 'liberation of Iraq' in American media, but in several countries this operation is recalled as the 'invading operation in Iraq'.[216] The Bush doctrine anticipated that more democracies will bring stability, peaceful neighbors and less terrorism, which could not be achieved by a single democratic state. The so-called 'liberation of Iraq' operation was designed to reach the aim of making a democratic model to Middle East countries and might encouraged democratic movements in these states.[217] Also, the Bush administration foresaw that a democratic Iraq would not threaten neighbor states, especially the State of Israel. Moreover, peace in the Middle East might not raise oil prices precipitately like it did during the first Gulf War, when oil prices fluctuated from $14.50, the lowest level after the end of World War II, to $35 per barrel at the end of the Gulf War II .[218] That costs the US $36 billion in imports.[219] Oil prices has continued to rise since the end of Gulf War II because of the terrorist attacks to the oil companies and reach to $50 psychological limit. The changes in American foreign policy can be understood when one considers the concept of preventive war. The Bush doctrine anticipated an offensive strategy in foreign and security policy.

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[216] Media and published periodicals has used this expression in Turkey, in many other European countries, and in the Middle East.

[217] Robert Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.118, No.3 (2003), p.367.

[218] Thomas R. Stauffer, "The Cost of Middle East Conflict,...", p.57.

[219] *Ibid.*

The war on terrorism, Bush gave other nations an ultimatum: "you are either with us or against us". This meant that the US is going to pressure other countries, especially in the regions where the US officials plan to attack, in order to get participation in its coalition forces or access to their bases for the US army. This was one of the reasons Pakistan and other regional countries participated in the operation in Afghanistan.[220] On the other hand, France presented one of the toughest faces of opposition to the operations because French policymakers argued that these operations would consolidate the hegemony of the US. President Chirac declared, "We are no longer in an era where one or two countries control the fate of another country"[221] which complemented Mandela's statement mentioned earlier.[222] But US policymakers continued to support an offensive defense policy as mentioned before. President Bush announced that these new threats could not be defeated by known methods of deterrence. The new strategy was that offense is the best defense, i.e. pre-emptive strikes. However, pre-emptive operations are based on intelligence from organizations whose budgets were reduced after the end of the Cold War. The Bush Administration supported the sharing of intelligence on terrorism between nations, specifically the names and financial activities of terrorists after September 11th.

In the end, an examination of the Bush Doctrine reveals two significant characteristics of the new American foreign policy: unilateralism and (brings) hegemony. Pre-emptive action requires a willingness to use unilateral force.

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[220] The other reason is to provide economic and military assistance from the US to defeat radical movements that threatens regional stability.

[221] Robert Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine", p.374.

[222] Jervis quoted in Karen De Young, "Chirac Moves to Repair United States Ties", *Washington Post*, 16 April 2003.

Unilateral action requires a hegemony which is provided by military and economic power. The US hegemony is based on its army of almost 280,000 abroad and more than one million soldiers at home.[223]

Figure 5 Distribution of the United States Army

Location	Number of troops
Continent (USA)	1,100,000
South America and Canada	14,000
Europe (Includes 7,000 in former Yugoslavia)	120,000
Middle East	45,000[224]
Afghanistan	10,000
South East Asia	45,000
Japan and South Korea	80,000
Africa	1,000

Source: 2023 Magazine, Vol.19 (November)

The last and the most significant element of the Bush Doctrine is American hegemony as it brings together all the other elements. The September 11th attacks consolidated American hegemony over Europe and the Middle East and broadened American hegemony in Central Asia and Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia, whose population is mostly Muslim. However, for the first time after the Suez Crisis of 1956, European nations defined their foreign policy against American hegemony. In this respect, major European nations such as France and Germany, defined as 'old

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[223] "Amerika Dünyaya Karşı" (America against World), *2023*, December 2002, pp.8-9.
[224] Before American operation on Iraq.

Europe', have challenged America's monopoly in the Middle East region.[225] On the

other hand, the Bush administration needs the support of major European nations to

manage the chaos and military operations that followed in Iraq. In this respect, the

use of NATO capabilities in Iraq has critical significance for America.[226] Colin

Powell underlined the importance of cooperation between major powers against

international terrorism[227] and asks for cooperation not only in Iraq, but in also other

so-called tyrannical and undemocratic states in the world like Syria, Cuba, and

Iran.[228] Transforming undemocratic regimes in the world and cooperation between

major powers are the key points of the new National Security Strategy of the Bush

administration and will be examined in the next section.

[225] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Hegemonic Quicksand", p.12.

[226] The US Army used NATO capabilities in Afghanistan according to the Article V.

[227] Colin L. Powell, "Hedef Ortaklık Stratejisi" (Target: Strategic Partnership), *Radikal*, 12 January 2004.
     http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=102141 (12 January 2004)

[228] Colin L Powell, "Amerika'nın 2004 Planları" (American Plans for 2004), *Radikal*, 02 January 2004. http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=100967 (02 January 2004)

4.3.2. Transforming National Security Strategy of the United States

Condoleezza Rice said in one of her statement that "It is not a good strategy to do good things".[229] In this respect, the second response to the 9/11 attacks was the announcement of a new *National Security Strategy of the US* on 17 September 2001. Former presidents published similar strategies when faced with sudden and unexpected events such as the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.[230] The new National Security Strategy (NSS) emphasized what national security means for the US in the early twenty-first century. The new NSS starts out with a mental image of the world like the former NSS.[231] It defines the international system in the 20th century as a world divided into totalitarian regimes (evil) and free societies.[232] The aim of the strategy is to "make the world not just safer, but better". Bush listed the goals of the strategy as promoting political and economic freedom, which builds a peaceful international system; peaceful relations with other states, with the assumption that democratic governments do not threaten their neighbors; and respect for human dignity. Bush defined the tasks as strengthening alliances to defeat international terrorism which threatens the US and its allies and friends with WMD; settling regional disputes that cause instability in regions where terrorism could emerge or organize; promoting economic growth through free markets and free trade around the world, which prevents terrorism from emerge in weak and poor countries and

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[229] Fred Halliday, *2000'lerde Dünya*, p.152.
[230] Cenap Çakmak, "American Foreign Policy and September 11", p.25.
[231] Philip Zelikow, "The Transformation of National Security", *The National Interest*, Spring 2003, p.17.
[232] Please remember the expression of evil empire that used during the Cold War.

territories such as Afghanistan; and promoting democracy as mentioned before.[233] This strategy brings new definitions to national policies. One of them is a new geography of national security. In the former national security strategies, stopping the enemy or threat from entering US borders was sufficient. In fact, US policymakers achieved this for more than a century.[234] However, terrorists were seeking out WMD or anything else that could be used as a weapon like the airplanes on 9/11 attacks. Terrorists removed the national borders so the US had to struggle with an unknown enemy with unknown capacity everywhere. This geographical redefinition also affects the vision of American foreign policy. The Bush administration found a bridge between power and principles. The Bush doctrine is integrating universal principles into great power politics.[235] Before 9/11, power politics was a competition between major powers, but today, as Bush argued, these powers are on the same side.

The US has used its power to defend and promote common values referred to as American values, which are the rule of law, respect for women, private property, free speech, equal justice, and religious tolerance.[236] To promote and protect these values is the responsibility of the US which can use its economic or military power.

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[233] Please remember Huntington's article on economic growth and democracy relation.
[234] Terrorists or states attacked American facilities before, but no one had attempted anything like 9/11 attacks.
[235] Philip Zelikow, "The Transformation of National Security", p.23.
[236] *Ibid.*, p.21.

In this respect, cooperation with Russia, India and China on economic growth and the global war on terrorism is included in the new NSS.[237] The US encouraged both Russia and China to be part of the world economy by participating to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Also, China was warned in the NSS that it should obey the World Trade Organization's requirements for transparency and accountability. Both Russia and China are also close to unstable regions, and both of them argue that they are struggling with radical Islamic movements in their countries. At the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) İstanbul Summit, Clinton warned his colleague, Boris Yeltsin, about human rights violations in Chechnya in 1999. However today, Putin, the President of Russia, is using this opportunity to struggle with Chechens.[238] Moreover, the January 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, which is Congressionally mandated and built on the recommendations of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), removed Russia as a principal strategic threat to the US.[239] On the other hand, aforementioned heads of state and other political leaders started to accuse the Bush government for establishing hegemony, acting unilaterally, dictating a system, and maximizing US national interests after the Operation in Afghanistan. Bush claimed that the US policy is multilateral and defended his administration's actions by saying "you want to talk about resentment, just listen to the word unilateralism. I mean, that is resentment…if somebody say something ugly about us like "Bush is a unilateralist, America is unilateral.' You

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[237] Also, the US President George W. Bush point out in the new National Security Strategy of the US that "America and Russia are no longer strategic adversaries". White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington DC: September 2002).
    http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html. (15 Mart 2004)
[238] The US administration is no longer mentioned about human rights violations in Chechnya and this may be caused the same effect on Chechen fighters within the terrorists in the Middle East.
[239] Ilan Berman, "The Bush Strategy at War", *The National Interest*, Winter 2003/04, p.52.

know, I find it amusing".[240] Zelikow successfully determined that there is a variety of

multilateral styles and different ways to earn resentment.[241] Another redefinition is

about timing. Before the 9/11 attacks, US national strategies improved on methods to

resist or defeat the threat. However, these methods, like deterrence, take time.

Today's threats emerge quickly and unexpectedly. Also in the past, challenging

powers had much to lose, as the Soviet Union in the Cold War, but today, terrorists

or tyrants do not think of the future of their public or even of themselves as in the

case of suicide bombers or the pilots of the planes that attacked the World Trade

Center. The last redefinition is about transforming national security institutions to

meet new challenges.[242] Bush stated in the last NSS that "the threats and enemies we

must confront have changed, and so must our forces" and "we know from history

that deterrence can fail; and also some enemies cannot be deterred". Schoomaker, a

general in the US Army works with Rumsfeld and argued that in the near future,

there is going to be less war, and more conflict in the world. Because of that, the US

Army must adapt itself to the new conditions. Also, the most noteworthy argument

Schoomaker made was that American generals should be educated as diplomats.[243]

That means the US continues to govern other states to liberate their nations and

stiffen its hegemony. The US made a decision to apply economic sanctions on Syria

when the need was gone; when Syria had to adopt some principles of democracy and

declare their good intentions about the war on terrorism.

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[240] Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), p.44.

[241] Philip Zelikow, "The Transformation of National Security", p.24.

[242] For more information, see D. Kagan, G. Schmitt, T. Donnelly, *Rebuilding America's Defenses* (Washington DC: Project for New American Century).

[243]Ergin Yıldızoğlu, "Pax-Americana: Sürekli Savaş" (Pax-Americana: Continuing War), *Stratejik Analiz*, August 2003, p.53.

However, US officials have maintained to threaten Syrian government. In this respect, political leaders, intellectuals, and even ordinary people discussed this new strategy, what it will bring that is new, and how it will affect their nations' national interests.

Building free societies, pre-emptive war, unilateral action, cooperation with regional actors, and transforming national security institutions are the most attractive characteristics of the new National Security Strategy. Nevertheless, several questions and concerns keep minds busy. Building free societies requires knowledge of the intentions of the non-free societies. That means the Bush Administration might consider all non-democratic governments to be tyrannical and attempt to change their regimes. Bush stated, "There is a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise" and "...these principles are right and true for all people everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them".[244] One of the reasons for the Afghanistan and Iraq Operations is to liberate these countries and the strategy anticipates new operations in other authoritarian states. Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, even names one or two states in the Middle East—one of them is Syria. However, no one knows how the US is going to use military force to transform these countries. The new NSS anticipates two reasons for war. The first reason is to liberalize a non-democratic county and the second one is to protect US interest before a terrorist attack occurs with preventive strikes. After the 9/11 attacks, many people, especially those in the West,

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[244] White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States.*

acknowledge the right to respond to these attacks, however, no one knows the limits to this response as international law as set the limit at the rights to self-defense thus far.[245] Moreover, the new NSS defines pre-emption operations as the anticipatory use of force in the face of an imminent attack, which has long been accepted as legitimate and appropriate under international law.[246] The Bush administration, however brings new meaning to the term pre-emption.[247]

According to international law, preventive operations are only legitimate on the condition that certain evidence is obtained about an enemies' imminent attack via intelligence.[248] That means a state could only make preventive strikes when state officials has definite intelligence. However, the new NSS allows the use of force without evidence of an imminent attack. Furthermore, the new strategy labels pre-emption as a tool in the US foreign policy toolbox.[249] Daniel Webster, Secretary of State in the 1840s, defined the conditions for preventive war like this: "a nation has a right to act first where the necessity of self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaves no choice of means, no moment for deliberation".[250] The US will use preemption not only against terrorists but also on host states.

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[245] Ramazan Gözen, "ABD'nin Terör Karşıtı Politikası Uluslararası Hukuka Dayanmalı" (US Policy Against Terrorism Should Based on Internationsl Law), *Liberal Düşünce*, 2001.
http://www. liberal-dt.org.tr/guncel/Gozen/rg_abd1.htm (05.10.2003)
[246] White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States.*
[247] M.E. O'Hanlon, S.E. Rice, J.B. Steinberg, "The New National Security Strategy and Preemption", *Brookings Institution*, Vol.20, No.3, (Summer 2002), The Brookings Institution.
http://www. brook.edu/press/Review/summer2002/ohanlon.htm.
[248] For more information, see Berdal Aral, *Uluslararası Hukukta Meşru Müdafaa Hakkı* (Self Defense Right in International Law) (Ankara: Siyasal, 1999).
[249] M.E. O'Hanlon, S.E. Rice, J.B. Steinberg, "The New National Security Strategy and Preemption".
[250] Walter B. Slocombe, "Force, Preemption and Legitimacy", *Survival*, Vol.45, No.1 (Spring 2003), p.125.

The Bush government declared war on global terrorism, especially if supported by rogue states or other states, although the citizens finance global terrorism anyway. In this respect, the US government asked the Saudi Royalty to obstruct the financial flow to terrorists from Saudis. The US has taken some other precautions in dealing with imminent attacks such as improving intelligence, especially human intelligence; working closely with allies to share terrorists' information, specifically their names, locations, and affiliated causes; and transforming the army into a more rapid, precise and dominant force.[251]

Condoleezza Rice stated that pre-emptive war is not a new concept in American foreign policy, as is mentioned earlier. Several presidents used pre-emptive war to defeat threats in the traditional meaning, for instance, the invasion of Grenada in 1983, the invasion of the Bay of Pigs of Cuba in 1961 (the most famous example), and the bombing of Sudan during Clinton's presidency. Also, other states, like Israel, have used preventive strikes before. Israel used pre-emptive strikes against Iraq's nuclear program in 1981.[252] In this respect, the Bush administration faces the danger of legitimizing preventive war, especially as defined in the NSS, which removes the definite evidence condition setting precedence for it to be spread and used by other states. That brings instability and chaos. An example of a potential dispute where preventive war could be used today under the new definition is the Indian-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir. The Russians could also justify a preventive strike against Georgia over Chechen dispute.

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[251] *Ibid.*, p.125.
[252] Robert Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine", p.370.

On the other hand, deterrence has not been completely removed from US foreign policy. Because deterrence is still a significant tool in America's foreign policy for nuclear threat like that of North Korea. Moreover, the threat of WMD (nuclear, biological, and chemical) is one of the greatest security challenges to the US administration.[253] Several countries, including rogue states, possess chemical weapons today. In contrast to nuclear weapons, chemical weapons can be made of chemical substances that found anywhere and because of that, no state has the capability to designate or destroy these kinds of weapons. Moreover, it is possible that global terrorism could obtain WMD by buying or stealing them from a supplier state. In this respect, the new challenge of the Bush government is to deter rogue states from transferring nuclear devices to terrorist groups.[254]

In summary, the new National Security Strategy is based on Pax-Americana and continual war.[255] The National Security Strategy (NSS) brings nothing else that is new to American foreign policy contrary to many claims.[256] Rather, the Bush administration redefines some of the elements of national security and legitimizes its actions with universal values.[257] Also, Republicans argue that this NSS shows the way to American foreign policy, which was wayward in the post-Cold War period.

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[253] White House, *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of MASS Destruction* (Washington DC: September 2002) borrowed from *Arms Control Today*, January/February 2002, pp.35-38.
[254] Anthony J. Blinken, "From Preemption to Engagement", *Survival*, Vol.45 , No.4 (Winter 2003/04), p.43.
[255] Ergin Yıldızoğlu, "Pax-Americana: Sürekli Savaş", p.55.
[256] Reference to Dr. Rice's statement on pre-emption mentioned earlier.

4.4. Turkish-American Relations in the post-September 11 Period

For the last five decades, weapons have not stopped for a moment in the Middle East. Instability started with the establishment of the State of Israel, followed by many wars between Arab states and Israel in the late 1960s and 1970s. In addition, the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War, which lasted almost nine years and ended without peace, have contributed to instability and chaos in the region. In the post-Cold War era, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The US and its allies intervened in Iraq. The US army took control of the region by settling its military force in Saudi Arabia and Qatar after the first Gulf War. After September 11th, the importance of the region increased again. Today, the American war on terrorism focuses on Middle East states. In January of 2004, President Bush announced the 'Greater Middle East Plan', to promote democracy in the Middle East during a State of the Union address. The first liberation operation was targeted at Iraq but many other authoritarian states are mentioned in the 'Greater Middle East Plan'.

The history of Turkish-American relations dates backs to the 19th century. However, the isolationist policies of the US and the distance prevented both sides from improving economic relations. Only after World War II did Turkish-American relations gain new dimensions. The Turkish government cooperated with the US on security and received economic and military aid in return. However, anti-American sentiment increased after the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cyprus Crisis in the 1960s

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[257] Halliday defines this situation as "sometimes it is very difficult to differentiate the globalization, which has many various and Americanism. (Fred Halliday, *2000'lerde Dünya*, pp.138-139).

and 1970s. During this period, Turkish-American relations were carried out at the lowest level since World War II. Bilateral relations began to improve only with an agreement on Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) in 1980. Moreover, the Özal administration strived to add economic relations as a new dimension to the bilateral relations, found economic restrictions could not be removed by any of the US presidents after the Cold War, when Turkish strategic importance grew unexpectedly. Two reasons can be given for the increase in Turkey's strategic position: the Gulf Wars and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Central Asia. Moreover, the Turkish governments used every opportunity to strengthen Turkey's position in Europe. First, Turkish governments supported the first Gulf War, then signed the Agreement of Custom Union with the European Union, and finally, sent troops to Eastern Europe (Balkan Region) as a member of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR), the Stabilization Force of Reconciliation (SFOR), and the Kosovo Force of Reconciliation (KFOR).[258] Turkey also sent troops to Somalia in 1998 after a UN decision to provide humanitarian intervention. After September 11th, the Turkish government informed US policymakers of their intention to support the fight against terrorism. In fact, the Turkish government has been fighting terrorism for more than fifteen years and in the end, the 9/11 attacks provided Western states with a new perspective on terror.[259]

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[258] Selma Stern, "Turning towards Turkey: Its Importance as an Energy Distributor and Ally in Post-9/11 Stabilization", *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vol.28, No.1 (Winter 2004), p.203.

[259] The Turkish government argued that some European States support illegal organizations or permit them to organize in their countries.

Also, in Turkey, some official circles have portrayed the so-called Islamic fundamentalists, including the militant '*hizbullah*', to constitute a threat to the Turkish regime. Moreover, Turkey actively supported the decision of Article V of the NATO Agreement, which declares 'an attack on one is an attack on all'.[260] However, Turkish-American relations on security began to affect Turkey's relations with its neighbor states, because the US cited Syria and Iraq for their assistance in global terrorism. Also, some American intellectuals supported Turkish-American cooperation on the fight against terrorism by maintaining an active relationship that benefits US interests in the region.[261] Some even suggested that the US could divide Muslim states by using Turkey like China was used against Russia in the Cold War. Also, these intellectuals argue, Turkey could benefit from Iraqi oil and could solve the Kurdish problem.[262] In this respect, the Bush administration asked to use Turkish military bases in the Iraq Operation. The Turkish National Assembly, however, did not give the Turkish government permission to use Turkish bases for foreign military operations. This is the first turning point in Turkish-American relations in the new century. Turkish-American interests clashed over the Middle East, so 'strategic cooperation' did not benefit bilateral relations.[263] In the post-September 11th period, the fight against international terrorism and the transformation of undemocratic regimes, which are accepted as a source of terrorism in the world according to the Bush administration, are the two main concerns of American foreign policy.

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[260] Borrowed from Alan Makovsky, "Turkey's Unfinished Role in the War on Terrorism", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.4, No.1 (January/March 2002), p.41.

[261] Selma Stern, "Turning Towards Turkey:...", p.203.

[262] William Safire, "ABD Türk Kartını Oynasın" (US Should Play Turkish Card), *The New York Times,* 15 November 2001.

[263] Bülent Aras, "Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri ve AK Parti" (Turkish-American Relations and Justice and Development Party), *Zaman,* 27 January 2004.

In this respect, the Bush administration improved the *'Greater Middle East Plan'* to transform the Middle East region. Moreover, the frontier of the Middle East is broadening from the Atlantic (North Africa) to Central Asia, where the populations are predominantly Muslim (aside from Israel) and where important energy sources exist. Human Development Report for Arabs and the Helsinki Process for newly independent states were used as a reference in the preparation of the *'Greater Middle East Plan'*. The Human Development Report for Arabs was prepared by Arab intellectuals and consists of some information about Arab states. For example, the Report cited that Arab Union states' have a total GDP that is less than Spain; the literacy rate of Arab states is 60% (that means 40% of the population is illiterate and most are women); twenty-five million Arabs will be unemployed by 2010. These figures activated the US government which had declared the Middle East states to be a source of threat to American interests.[264] The other source is the Helsinki Process, in which Western states supported the democratization process of ex-Communist states in the mid-1970s. That process caused the collapse of communism and the establishment of new democratic states in East Europe.[265] The Bush administration plans a similar scenario for Arab states, which includes the marketing of the Turkish political model to the region nations. The Bush administration made some changes when forming the *'Greater Middle East Plan'*. For example, the Human Development Report for Arabs anticipates the State of Israel as the most important

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[264] Bülent Aras, "Büyük Ortadoğu Projesinde Türkiye ve AB"(EU and Turkey in Greater Mideast Project), *Zaman*, 14 February 2004, p.18.
[265] Zeynep Taha, "ABD'nin Büyük Ortadoğu Girişimi" (Gretaer Mideast Initiative of US), *ntvmsnbc.com*, 02 March 2004.
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/259581.asp (02 March 2004)

obstacle to the development of Arab states and put the end of Israel occupation as the only solution.[266] However, the Bush administration's plan does not mention freedom for Palestinians. Moreover, the plan brings forward only one model for all Arab states and accepts that all Arab states will have similar political systems. The first achievement of US policy in post-September period emerged in Libya when Kaddafi announced that Libya had purged itself of WMD and agreed to compensate the victims of the Lockerbie tragedy.[267]

Think-tank organizations have published reports on the Middle East in the post-September 11 period. In this respect, "Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century" report has a section titled 'Sources of Conflict in Greater Middle East'. In this report, American interests in the region are listed as the security of Israel, security of energy sources, development of regional stability, and the fight against terrorism.[268] Also, the Pax-Americana and the Middle East Report of the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies defined the interests of America in the Middle East as to support a Palestinian state which does not threaten the security of Israel, to attack Iran's nuclear facilities which is the biggest threat in the Middle East to the American interests, and to change the regime in Syria.[269]

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[266] In Leftist thought, the Israel occupation caused the spread of totalitarian regimes in the region, which gained their legitimacy by struggling against Israel, not from elections.

[267] Zeynep Taha, "Libya ve Kaddafi" (Algeria and Kaddafi), *ntvmsnbc.com*, 26 December 2003. http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/250047.asp (*12 April 2004*)

[268] Nejat Eslen, "Türkiye'ye 'Kilit Ülke' Rolü" (A Strategic Role of Turkey), *Radikal*, 25 March 2004.
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=110779 (26 March 2004)

[269] *Ibid.*

According to the CSIS Report on Energy Developments, the world consumption of oil was 39% in year 2000 and also, nearly the same ratio will be for the year 2030.[270] In this respect, annual demand for energy increases 1.7% in each year. The consumption of oil is 66 million barrels per day in the world, but it will be up to 119 million barrels in 2020.[271] North American imports of MENA oil will increase 85% by 2025 (from 3.3 MMBD in 2001 to 6.1 MMBD in 2025). Similarly, European states consumption will increase 57%, Japan's 50%, and China's 500% until 2025.[272] All figures show that oil as a primary energy source maintains its significance. The Middle East is the most economic supplier and so the biggest exporter of global energy sources.[273] Oil reserves in the Middle East are at 685.6 billions of barrels. This is equal to 65.4% of the total reserves in the world.[274] *'Greater Middle East Plan'* increases this ratio to 69.6% when considering North African oil reserves (total MENA has 728.3 billions of barrels). Moreover, the United States oil remaining reserves is 32 billion barrels and the production of the US oil companies is 171 billion barrels in total and was 7.7 million barrels per day in year 2001. When considering the Saudi Arabian reserves (221 billion barrels) and the production figures of its companies (73 billion barrels in total and 8.5 million barrels per day in 2001), the US, which has the only 2.9% of the world total oil reserves, is one of the biggest oil production country in the world and so increases its revenues from rising oil prices. As a result, the US needs to take control of the Middle East to direct the

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[270] A. H. Cordesman, A. A. Burke, *Energy Developments in the Middle East*, CSIS, Washington DC, 15 March 2004, p.8.
http://www.csis.org/burke/meep/meep_fullreport.pdf. (22 April 2004)
[271] Nejat Eslen, "Türkiye'ye 'Kilit Ülke' Rolü".
[272] *Ibid.*
[273] A. H. Cordesman, A. A. Burke, *Energy Developments in the Middle East*, p.36.
[274] *Ibid.*, p.15.

energy policies of European states, Japan and China. That means, the US will achieve a global hegemony by controlling the economies of these states.

The US is trying to transform the region states to control energy sources and to end global terrorism. In this respect, cooperation with major powers in relevant regions needed to transform these states gained importance. Turkey, which is defined as a pivotal, flank country at different times by different powers, is a major player in the Middle East. Also, Turkey is the only secular, democratic Muslim populated state in the region. Like the Menderes administration, the Erdoğan government is seen as trying to support American policies in the Middle East by promoting democracy and a liberal economy. However, the Erdoğan administration is faces with pros and cons in supporting the Plan. First of all, Turkey appeared to be an American puppet to Arab states when the Menderes administration accepted that the US was dictating the Turkish model to other nations in the region. In this respect, Egypt and Saudi Arabia present the main obstacles and challenges to the Turkish government's actions.[275] Moreover, the Turkish government has some doubts about implementing the model in Arab States. Turkey abstains from any action that would cause instability in the region. The Kurdish problem is a major concern when considering the transformation of the region state, because a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq could threaten Turkish interests by activating separatist movements in Turkey. Democratic states and liberal economies bring stability to the MENA region. Because of that, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs inculcate democracy in the region. Also, the US

is actively supporting Turkish membership in the European Union. In this respect, Secretary of State Colin Powell has met with ministers of European Union member states to gain support for Turkey's membership in the European Union. European states and the US government anticipates that any exclusion of Turkey from the Western camp can transform Turkey into a theocratic Islamic state, which may be affect European Security. European nations accept Turkey as a buffer state that between European states and undemocratic region states. Because of that, the European Union has reservations about accepting Turkey's membership bid. These states do not want to confront with the region's threat. On the other hand, for the last decade, the Islamic movement which has increased its share of votes in each election, ironically, has supported democratic growth in Turkey. The Justice and Development Party, which was victorious in the last two general elections, is pioneering democratic progress in Turkey and striving to achieve Turkish membership in the European Union. In this respect, if US support cannot help Turkey achieve membership, Turkey's disappointment will cause a break down in the domestic democratization process and the nationalist-strict secularist movement will gained strength on the contrary of a general thought.

Turkey and the US established a cooperation on Central Asia after the Cold War. The interests of both states are similar except for the Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute. The US Congress is pressuring Turkey to open its border with Armenia. However, the Turkish government insists it will open the border only when the dispute has ended.

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[275] For more information, see William A. Rugh, "Perceptions in the Arab World and Debates in Washington: Analyzing US Mideast Policy After September 11", *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vol.27, Winter/Spring 2003.

When considering Central Asian states, Turkey and the US support the Baku-Tbilis-Ceyhan (BTC) Oil Pipeline project which provides the marketing of Central Asian oils to world markets. However, Central Asia and the Caspian region would import only 4 MMBD in contrast to the Middle East region of 46 MMBD (76% of world total) in 2030.[276] In the end, Turkish-American relations after September 11th period continue to be based on security. Turkey is presented as a *model state* to undemocratic Middle East nations as part of the 'Greater Middle East Plan', which were announced in detail at the G-8 Summit in the USA and İstanbul NATO Summit in June 2004.

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[276] A. H. Cordesman, A. A. Burke, *Energy Developments in the Middle East*, p.40.

CONCLUSION

The collapse of the Communist Bloc brought an end of the hostile competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States has tried to expand its influence over regions that have become more unstable since the beginning of the 1990s. In this respect, the United States army settled down in several Gulf states including United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia. The military and economic sanctions placed on Iraq and the Palestinian-Israeli dispute made this region unstable. The September 11th attacks might have been a response to the actions of the US administration in the region. Ironically, the United States' interference in unstable regions like Afghanistan and Iraq during and after the Cold War has deepened the instability and maintained and encouraged international terrorism. Today, therefore, defeating international terrorism is the number one concern of the nation-states. After the September 11th attacks, fundamental changes took place in the perceptions of American foreign policy. In this respect, President Bush announced a new National Security Strategy for the United States, which focused on essential redefinitions of what national security means for the United States in the 21st century. The new NSS redefined the geography of national security, the structure of international security, multilateralism, and possible threats that could be defeated only by new and vigorous policies (especially preventive war). The new NSS also expressed a willingness to act unilaterally when necessary and reorganized the National Security Council and the Department of Defense. The Department of Homeland Security was also established to coordinate and appraise intelligence work.

United States foreign policy has been greatly affected by the September 11th attacks. The most significant change in US foreign policy is that the US government adopted an offensive foreign policy to defeat the enemy as determined in the new National Security Strategy. The September 11th attacks not only hit US interests, but also hit symbols of capitalism and American hegemony. According to United States officials, war has been declared on the enemies of freedom, democracy and liberal economy. On the other hand, the way the war has been carried out has concerned not only US allies, but also other regional actors, including Turkey. The relationship between Turkey and the United States has mostly been focused on security. The development of the relationship depends on what the Turkish strategic position means to US interests in that period. The Western foreign policies adopted by Turkish policymakers following World War II had stabilized during the Cold War. Throughout this era, Turkey's role was to prevent Soviet expansionism as the southeastern flank of NATO. After the end of the Cold War, Turkish policymakers became concerned about reduced Turkish strategic significance position the front line against the Soviet Union. Because of that, Turkey began to become involved in Middle East politics. This was a shift from the Foreign Affairs Ministry's neutral policy. In order to reaffirm Turkey's commitment to bilateral relations and to highlight Turkey's importance to US strategic interests, the Turkish government supported coalition forces in the first Gulf War. Today, Turkey is on the front line once again after the September 11th attacks. In sum, the United States has viewed Turkey as "an influential and active pivotal state because of the strategic location, physical size and large population, economic potential and capacity of Turkey to

affect regional and international stability." In this respect, Turkey is crucial to the success of America's policies.

In the end, Turkish-American relations in the post-September 11th period are still based on security. Turkey is being presented as a *'model state'* to Middle East nations within the framework of the 'Greater Middle East Plan,' will be announced at NATO's İstanbul Summit in June of 2004 in detail.[277]

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[277] The owner of the thesis does not mention about *'Greater Mideast Plan'* in detail, because no one knows yet what this plan includes. Scholars, journalists are just discussing possible scenarios on this plan. After İstanbul Summit, properly evaluations will be made.

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