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ARAB PERCEPTION OF TURKISH ARAB
RELATIONS IN RESPECT TO ARABIC
POLITICAL WRITINGS (THE CASE OF
EGYPT)

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by

146287

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September 2004

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For my wife Pınar who have showed infinite sincerity and tolerance to me all along my
university education



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September 2004

AUTHOR'S DECLARATIONS

1. The material included in this thesis has not been submitted wholly or in part for any academic award or qualification other than that for which it is now submitted.
2. The program of advanced study of which this thesis is part has consisted of:
 - i) Research Methods course during the undergraduate study
 - ii) Examination of Arabic literature and related articles about the subject.
 - iii) Special reports that I have made during my visit to the Middle East in order to collect material for this thesis.

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September 2004

ABSTRACT

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ARAB PERCEPTION OF TURKISH ARAB RELATIONS IN RESPECT TO ARABIC POLITICAL WRITINGS (CASE OF EGYPT)

This study is aiming to show the images of Turks in the Arab world. To understand the reasons of the images historical background and events are given in this study. It consists of three parts after the introduction that is included to answer the reasons that affect the images in history. The first part following it that is named "historical background" identifies the beginning of the relations and the development of the relations between the Turks and the Arabs. The second part is about the Middle East in general, that gives an importance of the Middle East in history. In this part the relations after the Ottoman Empire between Turks and the Arabs is studied. The image of Turkey among different countries in the Middle East is taken up. At the third part, case of Egypt is studied, because Turkey and Egypt have some similarities and Egypt has an important role in Middle East. The image in Egypt among the Turks can be seen clearly. The thesis ended by a part that comes after the third part. In this final part it is given the last image in the Middle East, also the solutions and discussions to re-establish a new positive image according to both sides.

All the study is to show the image that is created during long years in the history of Arab Turkish relations. Of course there exist several factors which are many thinks that have effected the relations but the most important of them are taken up.

Key words:

Images
Political writers
The Ottoman Empire
Egypt
Arabs

Polarization
Israel
Cyprus
Media
Press

Hejaz
Middle East
Islam

KISA ÖZET

MUAZ GÜNGÖREN

Eylül 2004

ARAP POLİTİK YAZARLARIN BAKIŞ AÇISIYLA TÜRK ARAP İLİŞKİLERİ (MISIR ÖZEL ÖRNEĞİ)

Bu çalışma Arap dünyasında, Türklere olan bakış açısını ele almaktadır. Arapların Türklere olan bakış açıları farklı nedenlerden dolayı zamanla değişiklikler geçirmiştir. Zaman zaman yüksek tansiyonlu, zaman zaman gerilimi az olan ilişkilerin kökü uzun bir geçmişe dayanmaktadır. Giriş bölümünde, ilişkilerin sonucunda ortaya çıkan imajların zaman ve olaylara bağlı olduğu anlatıldıktan sonra üç bölümün birincisi olan tarihi arka plan adı altındaki birinci bölüm başlar. Uzun yıllara dayanan Türk Arap ilişkilerinin temeli ilk tanışma günleri, ortak tarihleri anlatılmaktadır. Burada fazla detaya girmeden özet bir şekilde konu ele alınmıştır. Arkasından gelen ikinci bölümde genel olarak Orta Doğu ele alınmaktadır ve buradaki ülkelerin çoğunun halkının ve yazarlarının Türklere olan bakış açıları verilmiştir. Arkasından gelen Mısır bölümünde de Mısır özel örneği ele alınmaktadır ve neden Mısır özel örneğinin sorusuna cevap vermektedir. Sonucu da üçüncü bölümün sonuna kısaca yazarların Arab Türk ilişkilerindeki düşünceler ve kısaca çıkış yolları ve yeni formüllere yer verilmektedir.

Bu bağlamda bu tez çalışmasında zaman zaman Türklere olan pozitif imajların neden zedelendiği cevaplanmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın bütün amacı tarihi olayları gözler önüne sererek Ortadoğu daki Arapların Türklere olan bakış açılarını ve zamanla değişen imajı gözler önüne sermektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

İmaj
Politik yazar
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu
Mısır
Arap

Kutuplaşma
İsrail
Kıbrıs
Medya
Basın

Hicaz
Orta Doğu
İslam

LIST OF CONTENTS

Dedication Page	ii
Approval Page	iii
Author's Declarations	iv
Abstract	v
Kısa Özet	vi
List Of Contents	vii
List Of Abbreviations	x
Acknowledgements	xi
Preface	xii
INTRODUCTION	
1. CHAPTER : HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	5
1.1. The First Relations Between Turks And Arabs	5
1.2. Arab-Turk Relations After The Death of Prophet Mohammed	7
1.3. Relations During The Umayyad Era	8
1.4. Relations During The Abbasid Era	9
1.5. Relations After The Talas War And Spread Of Islam Among TheTurks	10
1.6. Causes Of Acceptance Of Islam As The New Religion Among The Turks	11
1.7. The Ottomans And The Arabs	13

2. CHAPTER : ARAB PERCEPTION OF TURKISH ARAB RELATIONS ACCORDING TO ARABIC POLITICAL WRITINGS	16
2.1. The Middle East During the Last Years of Ottoman Empire	16
2.2. The Structure of the Middle East and Perception of Arab Writers Concerning (Ottoman) Turkey	20
2.3. The Origins of Negative Images	23
2.3.1. The Mosul Problem	26
2.3.2. The Sanjak of Alexandratta and The Problem of Water	29
2.4. View of Turk In Arabic Writings	31
2.5. Images After the Second World War	34
2.6. The Relations During The Cold War and After The Cold War	36
3. CHAPTER : THE CASE OF EGYPT	41
3.1. The Importance of Egypt as an Exemplary Case	41
3.1.1. The Similarities Of Egypt and Turkey	42
3.2. Historical Background Till the End of the Cold War	45
3.2.1. Relations and Images After Ottoman Empire	45
3.2.2. Normalization Of Relations Between Egypt and Turkey	46
3.2.3. Recognition of Israel by Turkey	47
3.2.4. Relations During The Nasser Era	50
3.2.5. Sadat Era and Recognition of Israel By Egypt	54
3.2.6. Mubarek's Era and Normalization of Relations	57

3.3. The Recent Post Cold War Era and Egyptian Images on Turkey	59
3.3.1. Middle East After The Cold War According To Egyptian Press	59
3.3.2. The Place Of the Gulf Crises in Egyptian Press and Post War Relations Between Turkey and Egypt	61
3.3.3. Turkish Israeli Rapprochement and Its Reflections in Egyptian Press	72
3.3.4. Egyptian Press Coverage of the Problems Between Turkey and Syria	76
3.3.5. The Continuing Iraq Crises, Egyptian Attitude and A Last Attitude Towards Turkey	85
Conclusion	92
Bibliography	94



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AP	Associated Press
EU	European Union
G.A.P	Southern Anotolia Project
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
ME	Middle East
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OIC	Organization of Islamic Conference
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
P.K.K	Kurdish Workers' Party
SU	Soviet Union
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Comission

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PREFACE

Turks and Arabs are two cultures of single Islamic civilization. They have shared common goals and common enemies through the centuries of their coexistence. They have common points. Similarities in life get this two culture closer to each other.

Everybody at the first looking to everything creates an image about that. This image effects for second looking. The image is important because it reflects the feelings. So to make people feel positive among Turkey we must check our behaviors that effect to create their image.

In an effort to understand the sources of images and perceptions created by a group of people about another group, one must study the social and historical experiences of both image makers and that of the target people.

One of the most important common points, between Turks and Arabs is the religion of Islam. The religion of Islam has been the greatest unifying force for the political entities established in the Middle East since the advent of the religion in the seventh century.

But by years, polarization of relations created negative images among each other. These images are changed according to events and time..

Briefly this thesis studies the causes of the images and the type of images according to Arab politic writers.

INTRODUCTION

Turks and Arabs have common roots in the past. They are the two sides of the same archetypal coin: Islamic civilization. The two cultures have developed from the same Islamic foundations. They have shared common goals and common enemies throughout the centuries of their coexistence in the Middle East. There is already ground for expanding cultural relations. Similarities in popular and oriental model (fashion), music, decorative arts, human behavior and hospitality are the residue of the centuries of coexistence which is reflected in daily life today. The study of these peoples' common history based on documentary evidence will undoubtedly bring the Turkish and Arab nations closer to each other. From this standpoint, this work sets off to examine the relations between the Arabs, especially from the perspective of Egypt Case, and the Turks. Firstly, their common historical background and the genesis of the relations will be exposed. Then, the Turkish profile in the minds of Arab people will be drawn. The image of "Turk" in The Middle East is focused upon in this study.

With regard to Arab world, Egypt has more influenced governance background, not precisely but approximately, than her equals on the fields of military, cultural and sociological background, etc. Egypt is a country which bridges two continents, Asia and Africa with Suez Canal. Likewise, the Nile River, one of the longest rivers in the world, makes Egypt apparently an important state since water is vitally important for the Arab world. Recently launched Nile Basin Initiative(in 1999) all by itself shows the importance of water for the Arab world, even if the importance of the seaports of Egypt is excluded. The case of Egypt has

similarities with Turkey, as for the governance background of Turks. In shorts, Egypt and Turkey has common roots, basically in history, with their similarities.

Time and events have affected the relations of both sides. These relations originated images in the minds of people. These images have undergone a gradual change by years. In this study the changing of the images in time will be observed. We can classify these images into different categories but they will be divided into two broad sections: the first one is the opinion of the Arab people in Middle East and the second is the opinion of the rulers in the Middle East. Rulers always reserve their interest but the people that live in the Middle East can declare their views. These views have changed in different periods. These changes born in mind, the different points of view and the causes of these differences in the Middle East can be highlighted.

Historical experiences and geographic settings are important factors in the formation of intellectual and behavioral patterns of nations. Thus, both history and geography play an important part in the creation of perceptions and images of one's own nation and that of others. As it was pointed out, time and experience are important factors in the formation of relations; Gamal Abulnasser's speech is exemplary in this respect. He is an important leader in Middle East and the other thing that should have to be emphasized is; he is from Egypt. The importance of the second feature is due to the common points that Egypt and Turkey share and these points will be later underlined and now its time to return to Gamal Abdulnasser's speech. In his speech issued in 1954, he says: "...What ever happens, the Turks and the Arabs are brothers. Our common historical background is like a single book containing two chapters. The first chapter is for them and the second is for us. We

are close relatives with the Turks. Time has witnessed a racial harmonization and every inch of Arab lands has close Turkish relatives. However, when there are obstacles they are on our side and vice versa. Every time we are ready to do everything for the Turks and we know that Turkey will do everything to help us in every case. Just as it was in the past ...”¹

Mustafa Al-Faqi is a parliament member in Egypt, he summarizes the Arabs’ opinion of Turks as below: “To study Turkey we need a broad knowledge of history, we have to understand the social identity of Turkey, to differentiate the existence of new Turkey and its identity problems, and then we must try to understand the difference between the Turkey that came after The Ottoman Empire and the Turkey that emerged as a result of the pressure imposed by Europe in accordance with her geopolitical importance. At this point it can be added that Turkey preferred to stay at Europe’s backdoor instead of becoming a leading country in the Muslim World. Turkey has utmost importance in terms of geopolitical position in the world map. To be a conjunction point between Asia and Europe makes her more important and the Bosphorus is another important feature in Turkey’s geopolitical position and history. For a long time this geopolitical position gave Turkey an important mission. Accordingly, Turkey, for decades, has incessantly fluctuated between Asian identity and European desire”²

In order to understand the sources of images and perceptions created by a group of people about another group, one has to study the social and historical

¹ Abdulkarim Garayibe, “Nahnu we Atrak” , *Al Arab wel Etrak: Diraset at Tetawwur Al Alakat Beyn al Ummeteyn Hiala Alf Sanah*, (Cairo: Dimask University Press, 1961) p.1.

² Mustafa Al Faqi, *El Hayat newspaper*, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/?bl=yorumlar&alt=hn=30592>, (28/03/2004)

experiences of both the image makers and that of the target people. To understand them better we need basically historical knowledge of their intersections in the precede eras. Therefore, in the first chapter the historical background of relations between the Arabs and the Turks will be presented. Arabs and Turks have shared the same history for many years. This part will focus upon Turkey after Islam and how Turks learned Islam. The second chapter will depict the image of 'Turk' in the Middle East. This image has altered under the burden of events and time. Presently, the causes of these alterations will be demonstrated. We will observe the difficulty inherent in Turkey's attempt to maintain a balance in her relations with the West and the Arabs. The differentiation of images between the rulers and people will be focused upon in this chapter. Then the changing images of rulers according to their interests will be underlined. Then in the third chapter the Egyptian case will be focused upon. This case will help us to understand the relations following The Ottoman Empire and changing of images, most recent; post-cold war period of world affairs, more clearly. Then, in the conclusion part, an attempt for a concluding summary and retrospective analysis of what flows throughout the thesis will be made.

CHAPTER 1

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1.1. The First Relations Between Turks And Arabs

The Turks and the Arabs have shared common historical experiences. The religion of Islam was the greatest unifying force for the political entities established in the Middle East after the advent of the religion in the seventh century³. According to Muslim scholars Islam was a total way of life and a complete legal system.

Before the advent of Islam, Turks were living in a wide area in middle Asia. Before Islam they were under affect of different paganistic cultures like Shamanism, Manichaeism, etc... Due to wars and migrations Turks were occasionally changing their place. During these migrations they were naturally learning new cultures. All of these new cultures (for instance; Buddhism, Manichaeism, Christianity and Judaism...etc.) were affecting the Turkish beliefs. Most of these migrations were geared either by economic plight or wars. During this period Arabs were conquering new places to spread Islam.

An important turning point in the history of world is the adoption of Islam by Turks. It is also an important turning point in the history of Turks. Turks did not accept this new religion under the political dominion of an Islamic state; they adopted this new religion after a long and persistent acquaintance period. The first relations between the Turks and the Muslims appeared with the conquest of Iran after

³ Sylvia G. Haim. *Arab Nationalism*. (Berkeley: University of California press, 1976), p.15

the Nihavend War in 642 DC. It is interesting to see that: in the Age of Ignorance some of the Arabian poets praised the military characteristics and the heroism of Turks in their poems. They mentioned of Turks by the word of 'Turk'. We know that until that time Turks were known as Sakas or Huns but after VI. Century Thanks to Gokturks Turks began to be known in world history as 'Turks'. So it is claimed that the term 'Turk' was thrown out into world languages by Arabs⁴. Furthermore, we can find Turks that came from Yemen to Mecca and lived with Prophet Mohammad⁵. In order to shy away Turks from Islam many Arabs falsified Prophet's Sayings and said that: Turks are dangerous for the future of Islam, they will be leader in Muslim lands and then God will destroy them.

On the other hand, there are various sayings attributed to Prophet Mohammed dwelling upon the military characteristics of Turks, too. "Do not attack Turks unless they attack to you." and "I have my soldiers in the east that I call Turks"⁶. There are numerous other examples with the same gist of meaning. They are more or less similar sayings and with similar meanings. During the VIIth Century Turkish tent was used in Arab Lands and Iran. Furthermore, it has been claimed that Prophet Mohammed sat in a Turkish tent (Kubbat Al-Turkiye) while the Muslims prepared for the Hendek War which is the third war against non-Muslims. It is also known that the Prophet worshipped for religious service in a Turkish tent. The famous Arabian author Al-Jahiz has emphasized the military capabilities of Turks in his work titled 'Al-Atrak'. According to these sources, Arabians had become acquainted with the

⁴ For more information see Abdülkerim Özaydın, "Türklerin İslamiyeti Kabulü". *Genel Türk Tarihi*, ed. Hasan Celal Güzel, Ali Birinci (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), pp.615-616.

⁵ For more information see Zekeriya Kitapçı, "Orta Asyanın Müslüman Araplar Tarafından Fethi", *Genel Türk Tarihi*, ed. Hasan Celal Güzel, Ali Birinci, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), p. 656.

⁶ İbrahim Canan, *Kutubi Sitte* (CD) Encyclopedia, v: 13, p. 109.

Turks in the military fields in the beginning and this acquaintance was reflected in the Arabian literature”⁷.

1.2. Arab-Turk Relations After The Death Of Prophet Mohammed

After the death of The Prophet Mohammed, Abu Bakir became his successor. He maintained the strategy of Prophet Mohammed so new places were conquered. The Sasani Empire (ancestors of Iran) was a threat for them so with a pre-emptive attack they planned to conquer these lands before they had any chance to attack. Khalid b. Welid was charged against that Empire. Then during Omar’s period the conquests increased⁸. As it can be seen, during these years there were no active relations between Turks and Arabs. Wars were shaping the relations between two ethnic groups. Under Omar’s caliphate, Arabia was purged of infields, and became a vast recruiting ground for the standing armies of Islam⁹. The Arabian Peninsula became the core of Islamic civilization.

An article written in 1961 by a professor at Jeddah University says that; “The relations between Turks and Arabs started with Caucasus wars during the second Caliph Omar. Then Turks founded new states with Turkish rulers and Turkish armies. Their citizens were Persians and Arabs. Their aim was to protect Islam from

⁷ *Turks During Islam History*, see resource:

http://www.ozturkler.com/data_english/0002/0002_02.htm

⁸ For more: Köprülü Zade Mehmed Fuat, “Anadolu İstilasına Kadar Türkler” , *Türkiye Tarihi*. (İstanbul: Kanaat Kitaphanesi, 1923). V: 1, p. 62

⁹ Molly Izzard, *The Gulf: Arabia's Western Approachs*, (London : John Murray Publishers, 1979). p.35

foreign enemies. They infiltrated and conquered Africa, Europe and India to spread Islam. They played an important role in Middle Eastern history. The Ottomans tried to protect Arabs from Persian enemies. Its proof is Iraq. Without The Ottomans Iraq today would be a part of Iranian dominion...”¹⁰

1.3. Relations During The Umayyad Era

After a long time, Muawiye came to power and started a new conquest strategy. He charged Muhallab to fight against the Turks in 664 DC. Muhallab won new triumphs and Islam became dominant in these conquered lands.

The adoption of Islam as a new religion among the Turks started first in the Turkish Communities that were dominated by the Islamic States. Transoxania, which was conquered by Quteybe b. Muslim, was the leading region. Quteybe tried to be the dominant power in the region so he took some precautions. He worked hard for the propagation of the religion of Islam in the region¹¹. A mosque was built by special personal efforts of Quteybe in the year of 713 DC. Then it was stipulated that any objection would not be allowed to be posed against the building of a mosque in Semerqand, which was the second big city of Transoxania in the course of the resolution of the conditions for the surrender of the city. Quteybe is said to have worked in the construction of the mosque personally in order to prevent any rebellion of the native people in the region.

¹⁰ Garayibe, op.cit., p.H-K.

¹¹ Abdülkerim Özyıldın, “Türklerin İslamiyeti Kabulü”, *Genel Türk Tarihi*, ed. Hasan Celal Güzel, Ali Birinci (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), p.620, and for more information about the Umayyad Era, see pp. 617-618-619

The leading factor that enabled these triumphs is known to be a combination of the leading capacity of the Haccac and the military capacity of Quteybe b. Muslim. During the Omar B. Abdulaziz era the Caliph invited the Turkish leaders for Islam by letters, most of them accepted this offer. After the death of the Omar B. Abulaziz the policies that governed the rights of Turks changed. The rulers gave tolerance to Arab people¹².

1.4. Relations During The Abbasid Era

During the Abbasid era the wars between Turks and Arabs decreased as compared with those in other periods. When Abbasid people seized the power new developments occurred in the east, and these fresh developments paved the way for the emergence of Arab-Turkish struggles. This new period of combat continued for centuries. In Transoxania the Turkish-Arabian clashes were widening. Therefore during these years some of Turk Beys petitioned help from China against this new enemy. China accepted this invitation in order to establish dominion over Turkestan. Consequently, China started to expand towards the West with a large army in the year of 747. "However, the severe stance of China and the murder of Bagatur Tudun who was the bey of Tashkent led the Turks to apply for the help to Abu Muslim who was the governor of Khorasan dominated by the Abbasid state"¹³. Abu Muslim accepted this offer and sent an army under the command of Ziyad b. Saleh to help Turks against the Chinese forces. In the year of 751 DC in the region near Alma-ata

¹² *ibid.* . p. 626

¹³ Barry Hoberman. "The Battle of Talas" ,Central Asian History from the University of Indiana. <http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/198205/the.battle.of.talas.htm>

of today on the place named Talas, Turkish-Muslim allied forces fought against Chinese forces. “In the severe war that continued for five days in July 751 DC, Chinese people suffered a lot of casualties and they retreated from the battlefield”¹⁴.

1.5. The Relations After The Talas War And Spread Of Islam Among The Turks

The Talas War is the turning point in history of world and the history of Turks. Also it is important for Turkish-Muslim relations. With this war, the wars that continued for centuries were substituted by a period of peace. From that date on, there were not severe wars between Turks and Arabs. Instead of wars, commercial relations developed and the religion of Islam as a by-product of commercial and cultural exchange began to be appreciated and adopted by Turks. Can be summarized consequences of the war as follows:

- 1- The aggression of Chinese against Turks at every opportunity was terminated.
- 2-The Population of Turks increased after the war in these areas.
- 3- Until the Omar period the relations between Turks and Arabs were based on belligerent causes but after this war friendly relations were developed. So the spread of Islam among Turks increased in a natural and peaceful way¹⁵.

In world history, Turks have founded numerous Muslim states. Almost all of them had an aim to spread Islam. Seljuk state too, was one of the significant states

¹⁴ Ibid..

¹⁵ Özeydin, op.cit., p. 628

founded by Turks in the history created by Turks. After the adoption of Islam, Turks geared their belligerent capacities towards the dissemination of Islam and, in this way they both enlarged their territory and created more Muslim subjects. The most lasting and exemplary applicant of this strategy in a peaceful way was undoubtedly The Ottoman Empire.

1.6. Causes Of Acceptance Of Islam As The New Religion Among The Turks

We can see clearly from history that Turks did not accept Islam under a threat. The Turks have shaped their way of life with Islam because Islam was similar to their ancient belief. The Muslim Turks of the first era became important in different fields of life such as music, philosophy and science. It is difficult to witness in the history of religions the adoption of a religion in such a short time and by such huge communities. The Turks accepted Islam without the presence of any threat and in a short period.

After the Umayyad dynasty, great changes occurred in internal and foreign policies of the Islamic state. During the Abbasid dynasty the policy that had been followed by the Umayyad dynasty was abandoned. That policy caused hatred among Arab and Muslim people. According to the Abbasid Dynasty every Muslim was entitled to equal rights. These rights are closer to Islamic mentality. As the number of

Turks in Abbasid Dynasty increased, their influence increased accordingly. Caliph Abu Ja'fer Al-Mansour was the first caliph to recruit Turks into the military troops¹⁶.

To summarize, the Turks started to be the dominant power in the Middle East. They started to form their own kingdoms in different parts of the Middle East. After the collapse of the Abbasid Empire in 1258 A.D., Turks emerged as the dominant military force in the Middle East. Under the leadership of Sultan Mahomet the Conqueror, Turks established the Ottoman Empire that ruled Middle East and North Africa for nearly four hundred years.

One of the reasons that Turks adopted Islam in a short time is that; Islam complements Turkish character and ideals. So Turks, after the adoption of Islam, served Islam in every field of life¹⁷.

During Ma'moun era when Turks became influential in military and ruling classes the adoption of Islam became more widespread. It was the first time in the Abbasid dynasty that Turks were fighting in Muslim troops. The most influential era of the Turks is called Samarra era (836-892 DC).

Turks capitalized upon the capacity of the ruling class during the period of Islam and they founded great empires (Kara-Hanlis, Gaznelis, Seljuks, Harzemshahs..) or states (Anatolian Seljuks, Kara-koyunlu, Akkoyunlu States..), tutoring Princedoms (Salgurlus, Il-Denizlis..), and bey principalities (Artuklu, Danismendli, Mengucuklu, Saltuklu..) in miscellaneous Muslim countries. Through

¹⁶ For more information see http://www.ozturkler.co.uk/data_english/0002/0002_02.htm

¹⁷ Özeydin, op.cit., p. 648

these foundations, they governed the future of the Islamic world and they oriented the history of the Middle East, Near East and the Eastern Europe for the period of the last thousand years Ottomans period included.

“Actually, the religion of Islam has had various motives that are akin to the ancient beliefs and considerations of Turks. Turks were acquainted with the Monotheism for a long time. They believed in the afterlife and the immortality of the soul and they gave sacrifices to God. Furthermore, the moral rules inspired by Islam were in compliance with the old Turkish understanding of “Alplik” (heroism) and particularly the thought of “holy war” supported the view of conquests of Turks. These must have been the reasons for the emergence of Turks as the flag bearer of Islam all over the world”¹⁸.

1.7. The Ottomans And The Arabs

The Ottomans had inherited good behaviours from Seljuks. Therefore they fought for Islam, and they become the flag bearer of Islam for centuries¹⁹.

Attemimi summarizes the Arabs and the Ottomans relations in history and underlines the success of Arabs as; “...Mahomet the Conqueror sent letters to Sheriff of Mecca. By years Ottomans expanded their territories, they invaded the Arab Lands. After having Arab Lands their land become valuable and strategic. Arabs attach importance to Turkish history. Sultan Osman the second, during 1618-1622

¹⁸ Zekeriya Kitapçı, “Orta Asyanın Müslüman Araplar Tarafından Fethi” , *Genel Türk Tarihi*. ed. Hasan Celal Güzel, Ali Birinci, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), p. 661.

¹⁹ For more information see Franz Babinger, *Anadolu'da İslamiyet: İslam tedkikatının yeni yolları*. translated by Ragıp Hulusi (İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 1387/1967) , pp. 196-197.

DC decided to go to Hejaz and came back with powerful Arab soldiers, because he was dissatisfied with his soldiers...²⁰ Arabs believe that The Ottoman Empire educated her elites in Egypt or Middle East. Since The Ottoman Empire highly admired Arab Culture²¹, The Ottoman culture was greatly influenced by Arabs. The author gave examples of Turkish names that educated in Cairo during those years: “Sheik Sharafaddin al-Kayseri (died in 1350), Sheik Badraddin Mahmoud (died in 1420), Sheik Hızır Bey (died in 1459), and Sheik Saleh Jalal Zade (died in 1565)”²². Turks and Arabs clothes, music, even kitchen utensils become very similar to each other. The Ottoman Empire did not make Turkish language obligatory in Arab Lands. Ottomans used Arabic words and letters during that era²³.

For nearly a millennium Turks and Arabs organized their political, economic and social affairs on Islamic principles. However with the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the main bulwark against European and Russian penetration of the Middle East, the political, social and economic borders of the region became more permeable. For hundreds of years, the Ottoman educational system was based on traditional Islamic methodologies. This system in eighteenth century could not cope with the new technological developments in Europe. Thus, it became necessary to seek Western educational systems that would equip the new generations with new technological concepts and practices.

²⁰ Abduljalil Attemimi, “Al-Alakat al ‘Arabiyye al Osmaniye B’ad Feth al Qostantiniyye senet: 1453”, *Al macalla al Arabiyya lil dirasat al Osmaniye*, (Zagwan: syrmedy press,1990), V: 1-2, p.43

²¹ Abduljalil Attemimi, *al-Alakatü'l-Arabiyyeti't-Turkiyye*, (Beirut: Merkezu Dirasati'l-Wahdeti'l-Arabiyye. 1995), p.46.

²² Ibid..

²³ Abduljalil Attemimi, “al Arab w'al Atrak fi itar al Dawle al Osmaniye”. (Tunisia: *historical moracco journal*, V: 17-18, 1980), pp.91-94

The new generation of Turks and Arabs who had received European education became the most influential group in mobilizing the masses in the early part of the twentieth century. The European educated elites had been greatly influenced by the liberal trend of the area and by European industrialization²⁴. They articulated and propagated such political concepts as nationalism, freedom, democracy, equality and secularism. Thus, the internal and external forces coalesced in creating conditions for the break up of the Ottoman Empire²⁵.



²⁴ Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and the Young Turks, Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918*, (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California press, 1997), p. 113

²⁵ Oya Akgönenç Mughissuddin, "Perceptions and Misconceptions in the Making of Foreign Diplomacy: a Study of Turkish-Arab Attitudes Until the End of 1970s", *Turkish Review of M.E. Studies*, (1993/7), p.156

CHAPTER 2

ARAB PERCEPTION OF TURKISH ARAB RELATIONS ACCORDING TO ARABIC POLITICAL WRITINGS

2.1. The Middle East During The Last Years Of The Ottoman Empire

During the last years of the Ottoman Empire Arabs fell under yoke of Western powers. Before the First World War, Algeria in 1830, and Tunisia in 1881 were subjugated by France; Egypt was occupied in 1882 by Britain, Libya came under Italian rule in 1912. At the end of the war, Britain and France occupied or established their dominion over the rest of The Ottoman Empire provinces such as Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon Palestine, and Hejaz²⁶...Etc.

The establishment of independent Arab states in chronological order are: Yemen 1918, Egypt 1922, Saudi Arabia 1924, Iraq 1927, Lebanon 1944, Syria 1944, Jordan 1946, Oman 1951, Libya 1951, Sudan 1956, Tunisia 1956, Morocco 1956, Mauritania 1960, Kuwait 1961, Algeria 1962, South Yemen 1967, Bahrain 1971, Qatar 1971, and United Arab Emirates 1972²⁷.

Sania Hamady says for Arabs in his book named as; “Temperament and Character of the Arabs”: “until now it has been believed that Arabs can not live together for a long time under discipline. They can come together and move around

²⁶ For more information see John Sabini, *Armies in the Sand, The struggle for Mecca and Medina, with 40 Illustrations*, (London:thames and Hudson Press, 1981).

²⁷ Muhammed Ali Kuzi, *Dirasat fi Tarih el-Arab el-Muasir* . (Beirut: Dar el-Nahda Press.), p. 7

all together but they fall in a short time. They can not remain an ally for a long time... They live in wild areas... Without thinking to go ahead they wait for their death...”²⁸ Lawrence says that: “I fancied making an ally of twenty million Arabs and creating a new world, but it was only a fantasy, because Arabs can not remain as an ally for a long time.”²⁹

It was, moreover, a matter of much difficulty for the Arab states, which seemed very much incapable of and unwilling for agreement, to establish new states during the early years of the twentieth century. The birth of new Arab states is similar in character in most cases, for example in Saudi Arabia the modern history began in the mid-eighteenth century with the alliance between Mohammad Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1787 DC) and Muhammad Ibn Sa’ud (d. 1765 DC). This alliance was cemented by the marriage of Abd al-Aziz to the daughter of Abd al-Wahhab³⁰. This alliance was important in the context of tribal politics. The alliance between the Al Saud and Abd al-Wahhab provided both elements. Religion and the sword, that fateful combination, were joined. When the Wahhabis found themselves over-extended and unable to defend their domains, the struggles began with The Ottoman Empire³¹. During those years The Ottoman Empire sent Ali Pasha from Egypt to check Arabian Peninsula. In 1838, Mohammed Ali again tried to impose his effective rule in central Arabia, but owing to British pressure he was forced to

²⁸ Edward Said, *Oryantalizm*, Translated by Nezih Uzel, (İstanbul:İrfan press., 1998) . P.419-420

²⁹ Mehmet Zeki. *Lawrence, İngiliz Arap ilişkilerinde Lawrence'nin gizli yüzü*, (İstanbul: IQ publications, 2001), p. 170

³⁰ Abdulmajid Dagistani, *Al Jaziretu'l Arabiyye Fi'l-Wesaiki'l-Britaniyye: Necd we'l-Hejaz 1914-1915*, (Riyadh: Ministry of Information, 1985), pp. 42-43.

³¹ Gray Troeller, *The Birth of Saudi Arabia, Britain and The Rise of The House of Sa'ud*, (London: Frank Cass press, 1976) p. 14

withdraw³². During those years The Ottoman Empire was forced to withdraw from most of other Arab Countries³³.

Hejaz was ruled by a Sheriff lineage that comes from Qatade b. Idris (1133-1220 DC). They ruled Mecca for 700 years, about the rulership of Mecca a Turkish press says; “The Ottoman Empire was in Muslim Countries for the honour of Islam, not for war or colonization”³⁴. The Arab movement started at the Arab lands when The Ottoman Empire began to weaken. When the Arab countries tried to be independent they fell under the dominion of European countries. The Ottoman Empire tried to prevent the Europeans from entering Muslim Lands but the Arabs invited the common enemy to their lands and subsequently colonized³⁵.

The source of the negative image that was created by Arabs among Turks is in the act of Sheriff Hussein of Mecca who made a secret agreement with the British to revolt against the Caliph. The Turks considered this act to be a stab in the back while The Ottoman Empire was fighting against a common enemy. Turks believed that they did not deserve this and did not expect such a move from the Arabs, especially when the Arabs always enjoyed equality of rights and good treatment under The Ottoman rule³⁶. Hicyilmaz says that: “the Arabs that were members of The Ottoman Parliament were agents. They sent secret letters to Sheriff Hussein to

³² İbid..

³³ For more information see Abdulqarim Rafiq, *Al-Arab wel Osmaniyyun (1516-1916)* , (Dimashk: Dimashk press. 1974) .

³⁴ Najdat Fathi Safwah, *Al-Ceziretül Arabiyye fi Wesaik al Britaniyye (Necd we Hicaz)*, Dar el Saki press..p.27

³⁵ Yılmaz Öztuna, *Türkler-Araplar-Yahudiler* , (İstanbul: Bogaziçi press. 1989), p.52.

³⁶ Mohammed Ali Kuzi, *Dirasat fi- tarih al- Arab al-Muasır* , Dar el-Nahda press., p. 10

revolt. They needed Sheriff Hussein's assistance to provoke Arabs against The Ottoman Empire."³⁷

According to Mahalli, "the provocateurs that instigated the Arabs to revolt against the Ottoman Empire were the Jews and Masons. Arabs were always in friendly terms with Turks in history. They never come to betray the Ottoman Empire. In Hejaz, the British forces destroyed the railways, then they provoke the Arabs to prevent the withdrawal of The Ottomans. Thus Arabs did not sign any agreement against The Ottoman Empire. Arabs were poor and alone during those years. They were provoked by British Agents.. We must not forget the Arabs who came for holy war to Turkey and to different fronts of wars. Arabs accompanied Turks during the last years of The Ottoman Empire. The number of people that came and died in Dardanelle's was more than thousand. They were from Baghdad, Beirut, Hejaz, Morocco, and Egypt ...Etc."³⁸. Another journalist Huwayde, if against Mahalli, believes that: "Britain promised Arabs that they would be given Arab lands if they revolted against The Ottomans. Then Arabs became an ally to Britain, and in 1916 the revolt was unavoidable... But at that time Britain signed an agreement with France, that they would divide the Ottoman lands. So Britain refused to keep her promises to Arabs"³⁹

³⁷ Ergun Hicyılmaz, *Belgelerle Teşkilatı Mahsusa ve Casusluk Örgütleri*, (İstanbul: Ünsal Yayınları, 1979) p.86.

³⁸ Husnu Mahalli, "Türk Arap İlişkilerinde Birileri Yalan Söylüyor", *Yenisafak Newspaper*, (11/2003), <http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/diziler/arap/>

³⁹ Fehmi Huveydi, Lebanon, *al-Safir Newspaper*, (17/02/2003)

2.2. The Structure Of The Middle East And Perception Of Arab Writers Concerning (Ottoman) Turkey

Middle East has always been a productive milieu in world history where very complex cases develop very rapidly. These rapid developments in the region, on the other hand, have always had an impact upon world history. Mughissuddin, in broad terms, depicts The Middle East in the following way : “The Middle East, like most other parts of world is in a state of flux and confusion due to rapid and relentless political social and economic changes that have occurred in the past several decades. The result of these changes are bewilderingly rapid and in most cases, profoundly disturbing for the people of traditional societies. The traditional societies have come under extraordinary pressures because the political, social, and economic changes have not evolved over a long period of time but they have been forced upon the societies by the indigenous and exogenous forces in a limited duration”⁴⁰.

The most important factor that kept Turks and Arabs live together for 400 years was Islam. Turks were the guardian of the Holy places. Until 20th century, for Arabs, the subject of “Islam” was more important than subject of “Turk”. But after the emergence of territorial nationalism the Arab rebellion emerged to create a new Arab world, without Turks⁴¹.

During the last decade of the ninetieth century, Turks and Arabs, for first time after long years of empathy, began to think and behave differently from each other. Territorial nationalism became the topic of many discussions among the Middle East

⁴⁰ Mughissuddin, op.cit., p. 149

⁴¹ Zaine N. Zaine. *Türk Arap ilişkileri; ve Arap milliyetçiliğinin doğuşu*. Translated by Emrah Akbaş. (İstanbul: Gelenek press., 2003), pp.22-24

elites. Arabs were the first to accept the notion of territorial nationalism and then Turks followed them. Later, during the critical years of First World War two ethnic groups separated their ways. At this crossroads, if we are to look for a crime, it has to be a crime committed collectively by all participants. The negative images and perceptions generated in both sides brought about this separation. Due to social developments which contributed to such an end Turks and Arabs have come apart in historical process. Undoubtedly, in this separation, misunderstandings by both sides contributed to antagonisms. The founder of the new Turkish Republic, Atatürk, to terminate these antagonisms and as a natural corollary of his foreign policy motto "Peace at home, peace in the world", in his parliamentary speech delivered in 1927 concerning Turkish Arab relations emphasizes the following point:

"For hundreds of years we used to share a common citizenship with our Moslem brothers who now live outside the borders we have traced. Everywhere, in Syria, in Iraq, in Yemen and in the East, they are struggling to defend their identities and achieve independence what a happiness it would be for all the Islamic Countries to attain independence. My belief in the ultimate success of the Moslem world fills me with a great joy"⁴². One generation later, Moslem political leaders such as Bourguiba, Nasser, Sadat, Suqrano and many other writers were to express the importance of Atatürk's impact.

As a result of the negative images that appeared during the antagonistic years between Arabs and Turks, some unsympathetic feelings began to emerge among Arabs about Turks. In this context, some Arab political writers thought that the

⁴² İsmail Soysal, "Seventy Years of Turkish Arab Relations and An Analysis of Turkish-Iraqi Relations 1920-1990", *Studies on Turkish Arab Relations Annual*, (6/1991),p.25.

success of Turks had connection with Arabic courage. They accepted the success of the Ottomans but the view that “The Ottomans were successful with the help of Arabs” was dominant. They say that The Ottomans, when conquering East Europe, had strong Arabic connections.⁴³

In an article written in Egypt in 1900 it is said that; “many people praise Turks and regard them as angels. Not as any angel, but the angel that is close to Allah. They say that Turks came to world to be gods or to be leaders. Many other, on the other hand, believe that Turks created the worse in the world. These two diametrically opposed views have their own deficiencies. The truth is that Turks were leaded for a period but they failed..” at the other paragraph of the article the author says that: “the famous scholar Cevdet Pasha, speaking of The Ottoman Empire says that The Ottoman Empire harmonized the religion and courage of Arabs with the ethnicity and power of Turks. So The Ottoman Empire became more powerful and protected Islam against foreign enemies...” In the same article the reasons of success are listed as follows; the first reason for success of Turkish feeling of Islam, the second reason is courage, the third one is the racial features that were harmonized with Arab qualities”⁴⁴. As it can be clearly seen, Arabs, while praising Turkish characteristics, attributed Turkish success to their own partnership.

In another article written during those years it is written that Arabs always liked Turks but Turks loathed Arabs. The word of Arab was used in Turkish literatures as a swearing. The writer continues: “a Cadi was sent to Syria during The Ottoman Empire. Many years later, when he returned to Turkey he said that: “Before

⁴³ Abduljalil Attemimi, *al-Alakati'l-Arabiyyeti't-Turkiyye* , (Beirut: Merkezu Dirasati'l-Vahdeti'l-arabiyye. 1995), p.43.

⁴⁴ “Al Turk w'al Arab”. *MANAR*. M. I. . (Egypt: M 1900, 21 muharrem sunday H 1315), V: 3, Part:8. p.170

coming here I was worried about Arabs, but I felt here that Arabs are not like the people we know them to be. They are good people. During my life here in Syria, I received all the goodness from Arabs”. Many Turkish people believe that Prophet Mohammed said that, “I’m Arab but Arabs are not from me...” This is totally wrong, this is a big lie. Turks hate Arabs and that is why they say these things for Arabs. We (Arabs) accepted Turks but Turkish people did not accept us in history... Turks use the word of Arab as a swearing. They called their black dogs as ‘Arab’ but we (the Arabs) call our beautiful Childs as Turk, the term ‘Turk’ means in our language ‘beauty’... ”⁴⁵ these are examples of negative images that were created by both sides. When the relations started to be refreshed during the Second World War the images also changed.

2.3. The Origins Of Negative Images

One of the factors that seem to have created a negative image of Turks among the Arabs was the allegation of mistreatment of the latter under the Ottoman rule during the incipient era of nationalism in the Middle East. Such allegations were first made by the Christian Arab writers (Lebanese and Syrians) who attempted to rewrite histories of Turkish-Arab relations from the nationalist perspective. More objective Arab writers, however, have rejected the allegation of mistreatment of the Arabs by the Ottomans. They have defended The Ottoman justice and rule until the end of the

⁴⁵ “Al Turk w’al Arab”, *MANAR*, M.I., (Egypt: Tuesday Safer Month H 1318, M.29 May 1900) V: 9, Part.3, p.195

nineteenth century. By this time, the Empire was in total disarray and almost every ethnic group-Turkish, Arabic and others- was beginning to be mistreated⁴⁶.

A journalist; Mahalli, makes these provocations clear. He claimed that: “The Jews and masons in the Ittihad and Terakki started to provoke the Ittihad and Terakki against Arabs, during the Balkan wars of The Ottoman Empire, which ended with failure. The Arab population in the Ottoman lands were more than Turkish population. Then the Arab nationalist provocateurs became more active⁴⁷ .

The other important factor that shaped the relations between Turkey and Arab states during the last decade of nineteenth century and at beginning of twentieth century is the Armenians. The Armenians living in the Arab countries did their best to create negative images about Turks. They were most active in Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. Through the use of mass media and the church, Armenians created nurtured and spread hatred against the Turks in the minds of the Arab masses. In this respect, the Armenians were supported and encouraged by Arab governments for their own geo-political interests. It is unfortunate that Armenian propaganda was allowed to disharmonize relations between the Turks and the Arabs⁴⁸ .

A series of events after the collapse of The Ottoman Empire conspired for the polarization of Arab-Turk relations. One of them was the Erzurum National Congress that was held in 1919. The congress demanded restoration of full sovereignty and independence of the territory constituting the Turkish main land and that of Arab provinces that were under occupation of French and British forces. This

⁴⁶ Hasan Saab, *The Arab Federalists of the Ottoman Empire*, (Amsterdam: Djanbatan, 1958), pp.109-120

⁴⁷ Husnu Mahalli, “Türk arap ilişkilerinde Birileri Yalan Söylüyor”, *Yenisafak Newspaper*, (11/2003) <http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/diziler/arap/>

⁴⁸ Mughissuddin, op.cit., pp. 158

declaration called for freedom, independence of all Arab Lands. It was a declaration of support for Arab sovereignty and independence. However, later on, some Arab nationalist writers claimed that the Erzurum declaration was a Turkish attempt to control over the Arab Lands... Thus, one might conclude that Arabs were being manipulated to serve foreign interests in the region⁴⁹.

After the creation of new republic in Turkey, Turks, in order to modernize the country and cut their ties with The Ottoman past, changed their policy toward Arabs. This generated negative feelings in the Arab world. The issue of secularism became a basic principle of Turkey in its new political doctrine. To create secular state Turkey abolished the caliphate and enacted a law that required the prayers to be recited in Turkish. Then with the alphabet law, the Quran was re-printed in the new roman script. This break from Islam and Arabs created a new model in The Middle East, away from Arabs, and confirmed the socio-political interactions of the two groups.

A member of parliament in Egypt says; “by the sharp secularism of the New Republic Turkey became more and more apart from Arab and Middle East. Prohibition of old dresses was not only symbolic. The introduction of Latin alphabet was to refuse its own history; it was a declaration of the end of The Ottoman Empire. Turkey’s leading status terminated and a new era commenced...”⁵⁰

One of the most important cases that have shaped Turkish Arab relations is Mosul problem. The Mosul problem, which was between Iraq and Turkey, was manipulated in Arab media and was used as propaganda material and aroused negative feelings towards Turkey. The other factor acting upon Turkish Arab

⁴⁹ Ibid..

⁵⁰ Mustafa Al Faqi. , *Al Hayat newspaper*, http://www.zaman.com.tr/?bi=yorumlar&alt=hn=30592_
(28/03/2004)

relations is Turkey's relations with Syria. Starting with Hatay (Alexandratta) problem, Turkey and Syria have now engaged in a water problem. Moreover, the allegation that Syria supported P.K.K. (Kurdish Workers Party) produced extremely tense relations between Turkey and Syria. Through Egyptian mediation the case was somewhat calmed down. In this chapter, after a brief exposition of the problems between Turkey and Syria, The opinions of the Egyptian journalists and writers will be given much more voice in the special section about Egypt.

2.3.1. The Mosul Problem

After Lausanne Peace Treaty between Turkey and The Allies, the two important territorial problems arose. The first was Mosul region of Iraq on which Britain hold a mandate. The second was the Sanjak of Alexandratta (Hatay) ruled by France. According to the national pact (Misak-ı Milli) adopted by last The Ottoman Parliament on 28 January 1920, both Mosul area and Sanjak of Alexandretta were to remain within the Turkish borders. A week after the inauguration of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk declared, on 1st May 1920, "our national boundaries will pass to the South of Hatay (Alexandretta), and extend to the east, to include Mosul, Suleymaniye and Kirkuk

According to Turkey; these places had the majority of Kurdish population so they had to be included in the Turkish borders. Philip Robins says that: "Turkey has economic problems and if Mosul was in their borders, maybe, these economic problems could be solved. Also to divide the Kurdish area in the region may cause

other problems in the long run. The other problem that is important today is the minority problems in that area: Turkey also pays attention to the Turkish minority that is living in Iraq...”⁵¹.

As for the Mosul problem, the treaty between Turkey, the United Kingdom and Iraq concerning the establishment of the borders between Turkey and Iraq was decisive, thus putting an end to the dispute over borders.

However, although it seemed as if the Mosul border problem had been solved, it is obvious both in Turkish and Arab medias that the sore is still bleeding even years later. In Arab media, Turkish announcements about Mosul are harshly criticized. The speech delivered by Suleyman Demirel during his presidency can be given as an example. Mr. Demirel’s speeches concerning Mosul problem was met with disapproval in The Middle East, especially in Iraq. In Arab media, Demirel’s speech went as follows: “In meeting, with newspaper columnists, Demirel pointed to a map of the current border area and elaborated: The border on those heights is wrong. Actually, that is the boundary of the oil region. Turkey begins where that boundary ends. Geologists drew that line. It is not Turkey’s national border. That is a matter that has to be rectified. I said some time ago that “the area will be infiltrated when we withdraw [from northern Iraq].” . . . The terrorists will return. We will be confronted with a similar situation in two or three months. So, let us correct the border line. Turkey cannot readjust its border with Iraq by itself. The border line on the heights has to be brought down to the lower areas. I only want to point out that

⁵¹ Philp Robins, *Turkiya w'al-Sharkul Awsat*, Translated by Michail Necm Hory. (Limasol: Dar Kurtuba press. , 1993), p.30

the border line is wrong. Had it been in the low areas at the foot of the mountains, the [P.K.K] militants would not have been able to assemble in that region."⁵²

The Arab reaction to these comments was harsh and not late. These comments roused immediate, strong reactions in the Middle East. A spokesman for Iraq's ruling Revolutionary Command Council said that "Iraq rejects any discussion of the issue and warns Turkey against any unilateral step that would breach the national border. Iraq will resist any act of this kind by all legitimate means." The Iraqi News Agency warned that "the Iraqi people, who are rallying around their leader, will resist any encroachment on Iraq's national borders and territorial integrity by all legitimate means. Mesopotamia will always remain united from the far north to the far south." A daily newspaper warned the Turks that they are "playing a dangerous game and endangering the security of both Iraq and Turkey." A columnist revived the "sick man" sobriquet for Turkey and warned of Iraqi retaliation ("We will cut off the hands of those who try to harm us"). Opposition forces agreed with Baghdad on this issue. The Iraqi National Congress denounced Demirel's statement, which, it said, "runs counter to . . . the UN Charter and violates the policy of good neighborliness and the history of Mosul"⁵³

⁵² Daniel Pipes, "Hot Spot: Turkey, Iraq, and Mosul", *Middle East Quarterly*, September 1995. volume : 2. number:3. <http://www.meforum.org/article/265>

⁵³ Ibid.,

2.3.2. The Sanjak Of Alexandratta And The Problem Of Water

Turkey failed to have the possession of Mosul, but as for the Sanjak of Alexandratta the case is different. After long protocols in 1936-1939 this area became part of Turkey. After a year of independence, Alexandretta became Turkish territory in 1939. But now this area is shown in Arabic maps and school books as part of Syria⁵⁴. Although technically the problems seem to be solved, it will take a long time to solve it in the minds of Arab people. Syrian press today shows this place in their maps as part of Syria. During those years the negative image that developed out of these relations was dominant. The relations were at minimal level with the Arab World.

During an opening at London in 1993 Syrians were distributing a Syrian map with Alexandretta region inside Syrian territory. Turkish was there and said that "Turkey is surrounded with enemies, but we know how to talk with them" this remark had a shocking effect in Arab press⁵⁵.

"During the cold war, the two countries were positioned on opposing sides- Turkey as a member of NATO and Syria as an ally of the U.S.S.R with the end of the bipolar division. However, Turkish-Syrian relations have become more focused on regional issues, particularly water. Antagonism between them heightened in the 1970s when the Turks began the construction of the South-eastern Anatolia Project, or G.A.P(Southern Anatolia Project), the large dam Project on the Euphrates River

⁵⁴ Robins, op.cit., p.33

⁵⁵ Ibrahim Dakuki, *Surat al Arab lede Al-Atrak*,(Beirut: Merkez Dirasat Vahdet el-A., 1996), p.143.

that, when completed in the mid-1980s, restricted the flow of water into Syria.”⁵⁶ That friction was compounded by Turkish claims that the Syrian government gives safe heaven to PKK members- something Syria has never acknowledged, though PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in those days was based in Syria.

In the Arab press Turkey is presented to be “against Islam”, Syrian water problem has also consolidated this view. Arabs tried to solve the water problem forging a connection with Turkish-Israel alliance. In a book named “the water fights in the Middle East” written by an Egyptian writer Adel Darwish and John Bulloch, it is stated that: “Turkey created the water problems, to make her neighbours afraid of her, to show Iraq and Syria that Turkey was not powerless to do something and to prevent Iraq and Syria from providing a base for PKK.”⁵⁷ Furthermore, in an article in El Tahwa, a newspaper published in Baghdad, (6/11/2001), it was alleged that: “Turkey refuses to share the water.”⁵⁸ When the tension increased between Turkey and Syria, Arab’s el- Jazire press said that: “If any war between Turkey and Syria happens, all the Arab countries will ally with Syria. Any war between Syria and Turkey means a war against Islam for Arabs.”⁵⁹ Another newspaper in Saudi Arabia named Al- Okaz (7/10/1998) claimed that: “king of the Dams, Demirel, threatens Syria. Why? Because Syria is a Muslim Country, any threat against Syria means a threat against the Arab World”⁶⁰ Briefly, it can be concluded that for the moderation of relations media in both sides side must act more considerately.

⁵⁶ Patricia Carley, “Turkey’s Place in the World”, *Reluctant Neighbor; Turkey’s Role in the Middle East*, ed. Henri J. Barkey, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p.11

⁵⁷ Yakup Savlarıcı, “Türkiye- Suriye İsrail İlişkileri, Su Sorunu ve Ortadoğu”. *Pax Aqualis*, (İstanbul: Zaman press., 2003), p.176

⁵⁸ *İbid.*, p. 177

⁵⁹ *İbid.*, p.178

⁶⁰ *İbid.*, p.178

2.4. View Of Turk In Arabic Writings

After hundreds of years of common life Arabs and Turks have developed close relations with each other. Consequently in numerous parts of the Middle Eastern people feel sympathy towards Turks. But the rulers do their best to preclude the formation of such feelings. They (rulers) destroyed all historic places of The Ottoman Empire. Today, it's difficult to see any Ottoman mosque or anything from the Ottoman history in Saudi Arabia and Gulf Emirates. Also in Saudi Arabian schools, Turks are reflected as non-Muslims to their new generation. They refuse the Ottoman kindness enjoyed by them and they believe that their lands had been occupied by Ottomans.

These views are shared in general by most of the Saudi Arabia and Gulf States. The highly educated people of Arabia that had their education in west share this negative feeling about Turkey and The Ottoman Empire. They say that The Ottoman Empire occupied their lands and destroyed their culture for centuries. The old people that live in this area always talk about the kindness of The Ottoman Empire, because they have seen the Ottomans. They are not like the other educated people that read The Ottoman Empire from western books. An academic writer, Ramadan Abd ul'Azim, believes that: "The Ottoman Empire caused troubles in the region because they prevented The West to be influential in Arab regions. Arab world, therefore, was in pace with western technology, just as Ottomans were ignorant of the western developments and improvements. So European economy and

philosophy covered the world and Arabs were poor and most of them were uneducated”⁶¹

In a study named Surat Al-Arab le de-Atrak (Turkish view of the Arabs) the writer says that: “In Turkish school’s the new generations are growing with the course books that say that Arabs are against Turks. They usually say that Arabs did not defend Turks; Arabs killed the Turks in Yemen and Hejaz so it is impossible to create new positive relations with Turkey. Because they indoctrinate their new generations with hatred of Arab neighbours...”⁶²

Also in Arab schools the teacher’s are nurturing hatred among Arabs, by describing the Turks as enemy. This also creates a negative image according to both sides⁶³.

As for the positive side, in terms of Arab-Turkish perception: after the border problems with Iraq in 1926, friendly relations between Turkey and Iraq gradually started to improve. In 1928 both sides opened legations in each other’s capitols. After the Second World War, in Ankara on 29 March 1946 Turkish- Iraqi friendship and good neighbourly hood treaty was accepted conclusively. Thus Turkish-Iraqi relations were put on a firmer footing for the development of cooperation.

On 26 may 1931, King Faisal of Iraq spoke to Turkish journalist Tahir Lutfi of his desire to pay a visit to Turkey:

“I admire Mustafa Kemal. He is the person most worthy of respect in all the orient. Our political direction has been influenced already by Turkish policy. We are

⁶¹ Abd ul’Azim Ramadan, *Attethira Al Hadari lil Feth al Osmany fil Mashriha al Arabi: fil Wilayat al Arabiyya we Masadir Wehaikiha fi Al ahd al-Osmani*, (Tunisia : Elmecelle Ettarihiyye Elmagribiyye press, 1984), p:209

⁶² Dakuki, op.cit., p.78-79.

⁶³ Ibid., p.217.

two brothers living in two parts of the same house. Turkey is our guide”⁶⁴. During those years Iraq was in every way and in all fields looking for political support from Turkey. So it is natural enough to find this kind of image during that era presented by the King of Iraq. As it is evident, rulers change their images according to their interests; events and time participate to create new images. While Turkey’s relations were improving rapidly with Iraq, Turkey signed a neutrality and good neighbourly relations treaty with Iran in 1931. Meanwhile, she had concluded a treaty of non-aggression with Saudi Arabia in April 1936.

During the First World War, the Yemen had remained faithful to the Ottoman Empire and had attained independence when Turkish forces withdrew from the territories after the end of the war. The rulers in Yemen did not destroy the history of The Ottoman Empire from their lands. When I asked Professor Dr. Dawood A. Al-Hidabi about the relations between Turkey and Yemen, he said; “Yemen and Turkey shared always positive images for a long time after The Ottoman Empire. Also, today the relations are developing in different fields. We have big graveyards of Turkish brothers that came to help us during the last years of The Ottoman Empire...” There were practically speaking no relations between Turkey and the Yemen during the interwar years. Turkish-Saudi relations also developed as follows: when Abd ul’ Aziz al-Saud Malik of Najd becomes King of Hejaz on 8 January 1926, Mustafa Kemal sent him a message of congratulations. Thus Ankara was the first to recognise this state.

⁶⁴ Ismail Soysal, “Seventy Years of Turkish Arab Relations and An Analysis of Turkish-Iraqi Relations 1920-1990”, *Studies on Turkish Arab relations Annual*, (6/1991), p.41.

As to the relations with Jordan we can briefly say that, after the Iraqi king and foreign minister of Saudi Arabia, the third Arab statesman to visit Turkey was Amir Abdullah of Transjordan, which was still under British mandate. There appear to be no documents pertaining to the Atatürk- Abdullah talks in Turkish archives. In the memories of the Amir, he mentions only that the visit passed in a very friendly atmosphere.

2.5. Images After The Second World War

During the Second World War almost all Arab countries had been kept under control. Only Libya, Egypt and Tunisia had been battle fields. Turkey maintained her non-belligerent status until the end of the war. So there had been no important events or developments in Turkish-Arab relations.

After the second world war in 1945, Arab League was established by seven Arab States; Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Turkey always supported the freedom of Arab states. In October 1946 the first Secretary General of Arab League Azzam Pasha spoke warmly of the Turkish Arab friendship. After the Second World War relations improved rapidly with Iraq and she become Turkey's closest friend among the Arab Countries. In 1947, a treaty of friendship was signed with Jordan at Ankara. Then in 1952, a treaty of friendship was signed with North Yemen.

To defend the Middle East and to provide support from Britain and USA in a case of communist attack it thought to sign a treaty. A deepening of the rift between

the Turks and the Arabs was in the interest of the European powers. It helped the European powers to colonize the Middle East with the assistance of some Arab leaders. Ironically, the Western powers, the United States and the Britain made unsuccessful attempts in the 1950s to bridge the chasm between the Arabs and the Turks by bringing them under the umbrella of a Western Military Pact such as the Baghdad⁶⁵.

“A power struggle between the United States and the U.S.S.R for influence in the Middle East polarized the region. Turkey and its Arab neighbours pursued two different foreign policy paths. This led to disagreement and misunderstandings between Turkey and its Arab neighbours”⁶⁶.

When I was in Saudi Arabia, I visited the old statesman Sayyid Hasan el-Kutbi, he was the adviser of King Faisal, I asked his idea about The Ottoman Empire and Turkey. His idea was important for me because he is a ruler in Saudi Arabia. Saudi rulers' image was sharp as it was mentioned before. But Al-Qoutbi said that: “I admire The Ottoman Empire... There were different ethnic groups in The Ottoman Empire, they were living friendly...”. The developing relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia paved the way for positive images in 1990s. A good example for this was el-Qoutbi's words.

After 1970s the relations with Arab countries mostly developed. Cooperation in different fields started with Saudi Arabia and Gulf States. Turkish contractors have undertaken projects in Libya, Iraq and Gulf Countries. Turkey kept its neutrality during the first Gulf war between Iran and Iraq.

⁶⁵ For this pact see: İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Uluslar Arası Siyasal Bağlıları 1945-1990*, V: 2, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu press, 1991) pp. 489-497

⁶⁶ J.C.hurewitz (e.d.). *Soviet American Rivalry in the Middle East*, (Newyork: Praeger, 1969) pp.1-17.

After Baath Regime in Syria during 1963-1990, Syria aroused a negative image in foreign relations. Baath regime's aim was Arab unity and socialism. Syria introduced a policy of cooperation with the U.S.S.R. Soviets started to provide Syria with arms but in Arab Israel war Syria lost the Golan Heights to Israel. When Hafez al-Assad came to rule, he tried to avoid creating tensions with Turkey and has occasionally shown flexibility in his actions.

Syria's opening of her doors to Turkish anarchists during the 1970s, created a very strong negative image in Turkish side. In the same way the discontent felt by Esad regime because of The G.A.P Project caused negative images in the Arab world.. Then, after catching the P.K.K leader Abdullah Ocalan, the relations normalized. Now we have good cooperation in different fields.

2.6. The Relations During The Cold War And After The Cold War

During the cold war era, although industrialization was developing in Turkey; the economy was confronting some chaos. To solve these economic problems, new developments in relations were established such as oil agreements with Iraq⁶⁷. Turkish contractors started new projects in Middle East. These relations continued until the second gulf crisis⁶⁸. Dr. Muavvad underlines the economic troubles of Turkey and adds that: "these economic crises pushed Turkey to develop her

⁶⁷ Report of Seyyid Yasini, "Politic and Strategic Research Center", *Ahram newspaper*, (Cairo: 1994) p. 130.

⁶⁸ *Turkey Monthly Economic Newspaper*, İstanbul: June 1995, vol. 14, 179, p.5

economic relations with Israel, and then they signed the free trade treaty... And other treaties with Israel...”⁶⁹

The nineties was a decade of change in the world. The change deeply affected both The Middle East region and Turkey’s policy towards the region. While it was declared that The Cold War was over, the political and military elites of Turkey set out now to claim that the country was facing new threats coming from The Middle East region.⁷⁰

During the second Gulf war, which started with Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait, Turkey ended its oil import from Iraq so the second gulf war rocked the Turkish Economy.

Perhaps the biggest concern for Turkey was the fact that, after the end of the Gulf War in 1991, P.K.K had begun to be more powerful. The damage only to the Turkish Economy caused by the embargo imposed upon Iraq was 30 billion Dollars in the end of 1996.

In 1994, the Minister of Domestic affairs and the head of the Police department visited Syria. At their return, the head of the Police Department, who spoke in the press conference, declared that the relations with Syria were developing in a highly positive atmosphere and that all the previously closed doors had been opened. Some Turkish newspapers reported that Syria had arrested 400 hundred P.K.K members. Both countries were concerned about the developments in Iraq after the Gulf War. Therefore, beginning with November 1992 with Turkish initiative,

⁶⁹ Jalal Abdullah Muavvez, “al Mushkilat al Iktisadiye we Ictimaiyye Atturkiyye we Atharuha Fil Alakat Atturkiyye al-Arabiyye”, *Sina’at al Karar fi Turkiya We Alakat al-Arabiyye-al-Turkiyye*, (Beirut: Diraset Merkez al Vahdet al.A. , 1998), p. 137

⁷⁰ Meliha B. Altunışık, “Güvenlik Kışkacında Türkiye Ortadoğu İlişkileri” , *En Uzun On Yıl: Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar*, . edited by Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut, (İstanbul: Bouyt Press, 1998), pp.329-330.

three countries, Turkey, Iran and Syria began to have trilateral negotiations to discuss regional developments, especially the situation in Iraq. The elections held in Northern Iraq for the national council in May 1992, increased the apprehension of these countries that a process of founding a Kurdish state there was going on. At that time Turkey was already trying to find ways to get closer with the region states, including Iraq⁷¹.

To summarize the Arab perception of Turkish people, it can be said that, in the Middle East, the images of the rulers are changing according to their interests. But there are many factors that shape a citizen's image: education is one of the factors. Western educated Arabs do their best to blacken The Ottoman Empire. The other factor can be seen as the pressure of the rulers. Rulers are making the citizens away from the Ottoman history. They present The Ottomans in their schools as an occupation power. Media also used to create negative images about Turkey and The Ottoman Empire. For example in Saudi Arabia during 1990s, there were only two public channels and it was forbidden to use internet. Later, when it was inevitable to preclude the intrusion of the internet into the country, a limited access to the net was permitted, that is to say, only the pages that were permitted by the Saudi government were accessible, others totally banned. Thus, the government was trying to preclude the people to reach to other unwanted propaganda and source material. People were highly discontented, but the economic wealth precluded any revolt.

The Gulf War had enormously damaged the economies of Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia. I was living then in Saudi Arabia. Before the Gulf War,

⁷¹ Altunışık. op.cit.. p.333

electricity and water consumption were free. Intra-state telephone calls were also free. After the crisis, however, there occurred considerable economic stagnation.

The stagnating economies of both Turkey and Arab countries pushed these countries into closer relations. After these developments, smooth relations created new positive images in the minds of rulers and accordingly in the minds of citizens and because of the complementary economic structure of Turkey and Arab Countries, cooperation in this field has shown rapid progress since the 1990 's, to the benefit of both sides. Furthermore, Arab people, who were having problems in getting into The U.S after September the eleventh, preferred Turkey as their commercial and vocational address. The most important factor preparing this development was the refusal by the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan's government to allow American free access to Iraq through Turkish territories. This move had an enormous impact in the Arab media.

The Arab newspapers shined with such headings as "the revival of the old Ottoman ". Most of the Arab leaders considered this move as a Turkish move to strengthen her relations with the Arabs. Since this subject will be more broadly covered in the example of Egypt, it will be left unfinished now.

One of the Arab leaders, Muammar Qaddafi, in conjunction with The Turkish Arab relations and in the context of Turkish attempts to enter The E.U., delivered a speech in 2004. Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi says that: "the entrance of Turkey into the European Union is important for her but this is impossible due to many reasons, the first is that, if we cut a part of our body, we can not make this lost part live in the body of another human being. Compatibility is the key to a healthy organism. There is no biological compatibility of Europe with Turkey. Turkey has

Asian roots. Turkey must continue the positive relations with the eastern neighbours”⁷² As a result of the Turkey’s growing importance in the Middle East and the fact that Arabs began to see Turkey as a bridge, there is a dominant positive Turkish image in the Arab world recently. While the panoramic picture in the Arab world is like this, the Egyptian perception, as it will be seen, of Turkish Arab relations presents more the case clearly.



⁷² Qaddafi. “Turkiya, Awrubba w’al Binladiniyyun”, 9/sept/2004. <http://www.algathafi.org/turkey-issue/>

CHAPTER 3

THE CASE OF EGYPT

3.1. The Importance Of Egypt As An Exemplary Case

Egypt's geo-political importance is basically understood by considering not merely the Nile River's vitalizing property which makes Egypt one of the most important land of the Middle East, but also the incrementally issued opportunity which provides the hinterland of Egypt's seaports, as well as the historical property of the River which have caused the establishment of civilization. As marking a path to social and political affairs, by these perspectives, it should be taken into consideration. What is to emphasize is not only to show the important situation of the Nile River, but also to express that Egypt is a state whose centrality in the Arab world is unquestioned.

“Egypt is situated in African continent but its history takes place in Asian continent”⁷³. A number of objective and permanent factors underpin this leadership role. It has been, and continues to be, the most important Arab country. Egypt has, in Cairo and Alexandria, the largest city and the largest seaport in the Arab world; and because of its strategic location it has developed extensive contacts with the three continents of Africa, Asia and Europe⁷⁴.

⁷³ Cengiz Çandar, *Ortadoğu Çıkması*, (İstanbul: Seçkim , 1988) p. 151

⁷⁴ Adecid Dawisha, *The Cold War and the Middle East*, (Oxford: Clarendon press. 1997) . p.27

As for the importance of Egypt, Dawisha says, "Supplementing its geographical location, Egypt has the largest population in the Arab world, which elevates her to the forefront of military potential. It was accepted throughout the Arab world that no Arab country, nor any constellation of Arab countries, could wage war against Israel without Egypt. The Israelis agreed with this assessment. Short of a comprehensive peace with all the Arabs, neutralizing Egypt was the next best thing for the Israelis"⁷⁵. Also Egypt has huge middle class that helps him for cultural domination in the region⁷⁶. Egyptian teachers were conspicuous in every part of the Arab world. Egyptian books, journals, magazines, and newspapers are flooded with Arab cities. Because of all this, Egypt has traditionally behaved as the leader of the Arab world. According to Boutros Ghali, "Egypt, like all Third World countries, has welcomed this positive development, since it seems to promise a rebirth of international relations and the prevalence of world peace. This is, after all, the main guarantee for the advancement and development hoped for by our peoples."⁷⁷

3.1.1. The Similarities Of Egypt And Turkey

There are similarities between Turkey and Egypt in modern history. Their modernization process started at the end of 18th century, in Turkey the modernization started with Sultan Selim the 3rd (1789-1808). In Egyptian case the modernization started with the 1798 expedition of Bonaparte to Egypt. The

⁷⁵ Ibid., p.28

⁷⁶ Paul Starkey, "Modern Egyptian Culture in the Arab World", *The Cambridge History of Egypt ; Modern Egypt from 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century*, ed. M.W. Daly (Cambridge: University press, 1998), p.426

⁷⁷ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Egyptian diplomacy: East-West Detente and North-South Dialogue", *Contemporary Egypt from Egyptian Eyes*, (London: Poutledge and Kegan Paul press, 1993), p.143

emergence of modern Turkey was realized in the period 1920-1923 dates, while Egypt's independence was recognized in 1922 and completed in 1936. Egypt was occupied in 1882 by Britain who imposed protectorate status there in 1914. Both countries have an important control over waterways: the Bosphorus for Turkey and the Suez Canal for Egypt. Both countries are located on strategic key positions between continents: Turkey between Asia and Europe, Egypt is between Africa and Asia. Both countries have populations over 55 million and the majority of their population is Muslim.

Other than these general, historical similarities, there exist also more specific aspects of common points between Egypt and Turkey such as the military strength of the both countries, which are well elaborated by a western scholar: "In Turkey, the military-secular alliance appears strong enough to counteract the Islamic trend. In Egypt, the power of the state epitomizes by the bureaucracy, the military, and the economic elite do not appear to be mortally threatened by the Islamist opposition for the time being at least. The regimes of both countries, to be sure, cannot be complacent and will have to accelerate their policies promoting economic development. Whether or not this has to entail a postponement of greater political liberalization until a later stage--along the East Asian model--is an open question."⁷⁸

As for the Arab(Egyptian) writers on the points mentioned, an Egyptian writer, from a different angle, connection with the importance of Turkey, says, "The Arab World has long been characterized by tensions in its relations with bordering

⁷⁸ Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "Middle East states and the Approaching 21st Century" . *MERLA Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal*, Volume 1, Number 4 - December 1997, <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue4/jv1n4a7.html>

countries. Indeed some Arabs, largely out of ideological and political considerations, have refused to view bordering states as anything but hostile. It is, though, time to reassess such relations, realizing that, as mature states, it is only through peaceful coexistence and cooperation that the legitimate interests of both sides can be realized. This applies particularly to Arab-Turkish relations. Turkey's historical roots, both in south-eastern Europe and western Asia, and its location at a strategic juncture between two continents, make the reassessment of relations urgent.”⁷⁹ The same writer, in connection with the depth of the Turkish Arab relations says, “More importantly, the sensitivities and mentality of the Turkish people are very similar to those of the Arabs, largely as a result of similar historical experiences. Both the Arabs and the Turks have a legacy of a great civilization that spanned centuries as well as continents. The influence of the Ottomans extended deep into Europe, Asia and North Africa, making Istanbul the hub of one of the world's most powerful empires.”⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Ibrahim Nafia. “Common interests, common ends”, *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, 10 - 16 December 1998. Issue No.407. <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/407/op1.htm>

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*.

3.2. Historical Background Till The End Of The Cold War

3.2.1. Relations And Images After The Ottoman Empire

After the establishment of new states some misunderstandings created a negative image in both countries. The new reforms in Turkey such as the abolition of Caliphate led to unhappiness in Islamist circles in Egypt, so Egypt afforded protection to some opponents of new Turkish régime, and this was regarded by Ankara as an unfriendly attitude. The period 1925-1936 can be considered as a kind of transition in the improvement of the relations. Because of the strategic location of both countries and as a result of Italy's attack to Abyssinia in 1935, both countries developed their friendly relations with each other. The security of Egypt was assured by Great Britain.

British Middle East policy in the mid-1930s was to reinforce the security of the Mediterranean against Italy's expansionist aims. For this reason, she supported Turkey's demand during the Montreux Conference in July 1936 for the re-militarization of the Straits, and she also accepted to withdraw the restrictions she had imposed on Egyptian sovereignty in 1922 and to this end concluded the August 1936 treaty. Thus, for the first time Turkey and Egypt had mutually complementary strategic interests as far as potential threats to the security of the Mediterranean were

concerned. This reality was to come to the fore again during the Nasser era with the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian treaty on the Suez Canal⁸¹.

The first binding political document that is still in force today between two brother nations is the treaty that was signed in Ankara on 7 April 1937. It was about diplomatic consular representatives and maintaining peace and friendship between both states.

3.2.2. Normalization Of Relations Between Egypt And Turkey

The conclusion of Saadabad Pact between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan in July 1937 created a positive image in Egyptian press. From the comments of certain Egyptian newspapers, it is clear that this initiative, bringing together some sixty million people in these four independent states of the Middle East in an atmosphere of brotherly relations, was well received. This created a positive image in most Arab countries⁸². Arab-Turk friendship reappeared and it was obvious that they needed each other, and Turkey should solve the problem of Alexandretta with the help of these brotherly relations.

King Faruk's short visit to Turkey in September 1946 can be said to be important considering the relations of both sides after the Second World War. But no political exchange of views took place. He spoke to the journalists of the brotherly relations between the two countries and upon his return to Cairo in November; he

⁸¹ İsmail Soysal, "Seventy Years of Turkish Arab Relations and An Analysis of Turkish-Iraqi Relations 1920-1990", *Studies on Turkish Arab Relations Annual*, (6/1991), p.39.

⁸² Ibid.,

expressed publicly his happiness for having visited a Turkish port and the value of the Egypt-Turkish friendship⁸³

3.2.3. Recognition Of Israel By Turkey

By considering the perspective of Israel's and Turkey's intersection as historical case; the Ottoman period in Palestine, Turks did not allow Jews to set up any kind of organization in the Holy Lands, but allowed them to live freely anywhere in the Empire⁸⁴ The Ottoman Empire's policy toward to Jews was approvable by the Arab people until the collapse of The Ottoman Empire and during the period of the new government of Turks under the new regime of Turkey Republic. But the relations between Turkey and Arab states had been negatively affected by the recognition of Israel by Turkey in 1948.

Turkey's recognition of Israel became a major point of controversy between the Arab States and Turkey, after the process of good relations until last decade of The Ottoman Empire. The Arab States considered the Turkish recognition of Israel as an act of treason, as last Turk Government of Empire take situation in Araps betrayal by the agency of Allied during the WWI. So Turkey's relations with the Arab countries have been deeply affected by the Arab-Israel conflict. Palestine became the core point of this conflict⁸⁵

⁸³ Ibid., p.49.

⁸⁴ Jacob C. Hurewitz, *Studies on Paletsine During the Ottoman Period*; "Britain and Ottoman Paletsine: An impressionistic Retrospect", (Jerusalem: Magnes press, 1975), p. 409

⁸⁵ For more information see M. Lutfullah Karaman, *Filistin Sorunu: Uluslar Arası İlişkiler Çıkmazında*, (İstanbul: İz .1991).

After foundation Jewish state (Israel) and its general policy toward to the Arabs causes incrementally dissatisfaction among the Arab people against Turkey, because in the eyes of Arabs, Turks are mostly Muslim. But the center of the dissatisfaction for Turkey was the recognition of Israel, especially after the Israel's policy toward to Palestine. An Arab writer summarizes this policy toward to Palestine: "Israeli policy since 1948 has, explicitly or implicitly, been designed to force the Palestinians into exile. Sometimes this has taken the form of war, sometimes of measures designed to make daily life for the Arab population as difficult as possible. Its single aim, however, has always been Palestinian "sociocide".⁸⁶

But on the side of Turkey; Turkey was a new founded state by new regime, new revolutions have been made, and Turkey nationalism has problems inside and outside of the borders, besides Turkey strategic place between US and SU during the cold war perilous atmosphere, because of the potential rebellion of the ethnic groups (especially their affiliated outside borders such as Kurds) its and especially possible threats from border neighbors (from the view of regimes such as communism in Soviet Russia). Turkey security problems were characterized as ethnic population lives in her neighbor's borders and as regimes threat in Russia. Russia's aims over Turkey led Turkey to seek for defense back up from the West. For these reasons Turkey was in need of cooperation to protect of itself against socialist imperialism in Russia and soviet influence in some Arabs Country after the WWII. So that turkey underwent to cooperate with Israel and joined NATO. The cooperation with NATO

⁸⁶ Saleh Abdel-Jawad . "War by Other Means", *el- Ahram weekly*, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/1948/359_salh.htm

and Israel can be considered from this standpoint. However, it had a great impact upon the Arab world. An article dealing with this subject commented, "In the meantime, the confluence of Turkish and Israeli interests pose new challenges to the Arab world, particularly Syria. Whether such an alliance will ultimately moderate or exacerbate regional tensions remains to be seen."⁸⁷

Inescapably, Turkey's relations with the Arab countries have been deeply deteriorated by the Arab-Israel conflict. When Egypt prevented the passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal in the summer of 1951 Turkey sided with the West. As a result, a deep negative image was nourished by Turkey in Egypt.

After the Second World War, the main source of friction between Turkey and the major Arab States was their divergent views of regional and world affairs. The danger was different for Turkey and for the Arab States. Soviet expansion was a fear for Turkey so this pushed Turkey to be closer to western powers. For Arabs it was different, the main source of danger was Israel. The Turkish recognition of Israel affected her relation with Egypt because the problems between Egypt and Israel and Egypt were part on the side of Soviet Union.

Turkey's recognition of Israel and the fact that Egypt and Israel had had great wars in the past caused unfavorable feelings for Turkey in Egypt. Egyptian journalist Matar, summarizes the war days, and then underlines the cooperation of Israel with US. So the Turkey's being the member of NATO also creates negative image in Egypt. Especially, "It is well known now that the years preceding the 1967 war were marked by numerous attempts to impose an economic and political embargo on

⁸⁷ Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "Middle East states and the Approaching 21st Century" , *MERLA Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal*, Volume 1, Number 4 - December 1997, <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue4/jv1n4a7.html>

Egypt. It was the perhaps the worst phase in the history of inter-Arab relations. American diplomacy then was actively engaged in putting down independence struggles throughout the Third World. This is not to say the US lit the first fuse in 1967. It means that America was psychologically and politically ready to back any attempt to cut the Arabs down to size in general, and inflict a major defeat on Egypt specifically. All American activities before and during the war were undertaken to support the mobilization campaign for Israel, and to serve Israeli objectives after the war. Ultimately, the US exploited the Arab defeat to complete its hegemony over the entire region, thereby forcing it to accept the new status quo. This is evident in the US's refusal, to this date, to designate the aggressor. It refuses to recognize that Israel fired the first shot, or even that it had been preparing for war several months prior to its outbreak. It will not admit that coordination between Israel and the US preceded the beginning of active hostilities.”⁸⁸ After all, with regard to mentioned events above the placement of Turkey in NATO like United State bring about the negative image over some Arab countries as in the case of Egypt.

3.2.4. Relations During Nasser Era

When Turkey's adhesion to NATO was finally agreed in 1951, the USA, Britain, France, and Turkey proposed to Egypt in October of the same year, the forming of a Middle East Command to be attached to NATO; Egypt rejected the proposal. Turkey's stand on the side of the west once again provoked Cairo. The Turkish Consulate in Alexandria and Turkish journalists in Cairo were subjected to

⁸⁸ Gamil Matar, "A Defeat Stronger Than Victory?", *al-Ahram weekly*, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/archives/67-97/sup15.htm>

mob attacks. Egypt later also rejected the altered form of the Middle East Command, which was called the Middle East Defense Organization⁸⁹.

In 1952, Egyptian monarchy was replaced by a military junta as a result of the Free Officers coup. In 1954, Vice President Nasser declared Turkish Ambassador Hulusi Fuat Togay, *persona non grata*. Thus the relations suffered a new set back.

In June 1954, Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes remarked during his United States visit that “Arabs should recognize Israel’s right to survive” which obviously did not please Nasser, who said in speech in August, “Turkey, because of its Israeli policy, is disliked in the Arab world”⁹⁰

Deterioration of Turkish-Egyptian relations coincided with the submission of the Cyprus question to the UN General Assembly by Greece, causing this issue to take on international dimensions. Nasser, in an interview with the Athens daily “Kathimerini” on 6 may 1954 said he was in favor of the annexation of Cyprus by Greece and that he would support Greece on the matter. Nasser’s attitude of bypassing Turkish Cypriots and Turkey cannot be explained solely by Greek-Egyptian friendship or by the Greek majority in Cyprus. He was probably worried by the interest which Turkey, an ally of the west, took in this strategically important island whatever the reasons, Egypt defended the Greek case in every international forum where the Cyprus question was taken up. Furthermore, in the period 1963-64, when Cypriot Turks were brutally repressed in the island, Nasser even sent some Soviet

⁸⁹ İsmail Soysal. “Seventy Years of Turkish Arab Relations and An Analysis of Turkish-Iraqi Relations 1920-1990”. *Studies on Turkish Arab Relations Annual*, (6/1991). p.51.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.51

made arms to the Makarios administration. This stand of Nasser's intensified Turkey's mistrust of him⁹¹.

In 1960s, Cairo was doing all it could to create and nurture anti-western sentiments in the Arab world. At the regional level, Turkey, by association with the west, became a target of Egyptian and Syrian propaganda and activities. Thus, the Cyprus issue brought the Turkish Arab relations once again at the same low level as they were in the 1920s⁹². In the United Nations, most Arab States voted in favor of Greece and Makarios. This created a negative image in Turkish block.

As for the Arabs, it was a policy of reprisal against Turkey which had developed close ties with Western powers in 1950s and which had recognized the state of Israel as well. For the Turks, the Arab States attitude towards the Cypriot Turks was a repetition of what had happened in 1916 and during the First World War. This was a reconfirmation of their belief of not trusting the Arabs.

A journalist Mahalli asks, "Why does Israel not help Turkey? The people who support Turkey's Israel relations show effort of Israel lobbies in USA. If these lobbies are so effective why don't they help Turkey for European Union? Why these lobbies did not prevent the Armenian problems? Are these lobbies keeping Turkey always need to them"⁹³ Koni answers these questions briefly. He says, "The aim of the relations between Turkey and Israel is the west. Turkey entered NATO because

⁹¹ Ibid., p.57.

⁹² Muğhissuddin, op.cit., p. 167.

⁹³ Husnu Mahalli, "Türk arap ilişkilerinde Birileri Yalan Söylüyor", *Yenisafak Newspaper*, (11/2003). <http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/diziler/arap/>

of the threat from the U.S.S.R; the Arab world should understand that The U.S.S.R was a threat for Turkey during cold war era.”⁹⁴

The coup in Iraq on 14 July 1958 affected Lebanon and Jordan. They asked for and obtained assistance from respectively the United States and Britain against a possible move of the United Arab Republic. On 15 July, upon the request of the Lebanese Government, the USA intervened into Lebanon. During the American intervention, Turkey’s permission to the United States to use Incirlik base at Adana aroused indignation in Egypt. Then the following years Nasser’s growing ties with Soviet Union and the quantities of arms he obtained from that country embittered Turkey.

When Turkey was preparing an army to put an end to the Cyprus problem, President Johnson of USA warned against such an intervention by a letter addressed to Prime Minister İnönü. Meanwhile in Egypt, President Nasser was also confronting difficulties. Egypt’s economy was worsening and causing social turmoil. Under these circumstances, normalization of relations between Turkey and Egypt would serve to the benefits of both sides. So the normalization process began with a visit of Foreign Minister of Turkey to Egypt. During these years Nasser said: “What ever happens, Turks and Arabs are brothers. Our common historical background is like a single book containing two chapters. The first chapter is for them and the second is for us. We are close relatives with Turks. Time has witnessed a racial harmonization and every inch of Arab lands has close Turkish relatives. However, when there are obstacles they are on our side and vice versa. Every time we are ready to do everything for Turks and we know that Turkey will do everything to help us in every

⁹⁴ A Report With Koni: Bilici, Abdulhamit, “Türkiye İsrail İlişkileri” . www.zaman.com.tr.

case. Just as it was in the past”⁹⁵ Time and events are important in shaping of the images. Nasser was a ruler, and in accordance with Egypt’s interests his views about Turkey changed.

According to Egypt press, “Nasser's death on 28 September 1970 brought millions of mourners into the streets in an unprecedented demonstration of popular grief, and closed an entire era as a new decade began.”⁹⁶.

3.2.5. Sadat Era And Recognition Of Israel By Egypt

The third Middle East war turned out to be disastrous for Egypt and Nasser. After the war, Turkey supported the Arabs openly. This stand won acclaim in all the Arab Countries and mostly in Egypt. And consequently Turkey’s Arab policy radically changed.

During Sadat era in Egypt, he closed down the Soviet military facilities; he was trying to balance its non-aligned policy by cooperation with the west. Turkish foreign policy regarding Egypt continued in a friendly atmosphere. In the fourth Arab-Israel war, Turkey supported the Arabs in the war not only by preventing the use of NATO bases in Adana by the USA, but also by letting the Soviet planes carrying supplies fly over Turkey in accordance with the regime of passage through the straits. Turkey reduced her diplomatic ties with Israel to the lowest level.

After breaking his military cooperation with the U.S.S.R, Sadat changed his course toward the United States, and agreed to make peace with Israel. As a result all

⁹⁵ Abdulkerim Garayibe, *Al Arab w'al Etrak: Diraset At tatawwur al Alakat Beynael Ummeteyn Hiala alf Sanah*, “Nahnu we Atrak”, (Cairo: Dimask University press, 1961), p.1.

⁹⁶ *Al-Ahram weekly*: <http://weckly.ahram.org.eg/1999/462/1900.htm>

Arab states except Sudan and Oman broke diplomatic relations with Egypt. Egypt's membership of the Arab League was suspended and the headquarters of the League were transferred from Cairo to Tunis. Both the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the 1974 Turkish "peace operation" in Cyprus proved to be milestones in the betterment of Turkish-Arab relations.

An Egyptian journalist writes that day, "On 9 November 1977, Sadat announced to the People's Assembly that he was willing to go to Israel. A few weeks later, he was in Jerusalem, addressing the Knesset in a move that shocked the Arab world. On 26 March 1978, Sadat signed the Camp David Accords, shaking hands with Menachem Begin on the White House Lawn and ensuring the return of Sinai to Egypt. The agreement was widely criticized as a "sell-out" of the Arab cause for Egypt's sole benefit. During these years, too, international relations also swung away from Nasser's more radical liberationist and anti-imperial stands. Sadat gave a heroic reception to Richard Nixon, whose Cairo visit was a welcome respite from the Watergate scandal back home; and established a close friendship with the Shah of Iran, who later took refuge and received medical treatment in Cairo after the Islamic Revolution of 1979."⁹⁷.

In spite of that, there were also writers who believed that Sadat was a president in conflict his public's opinion and Darwish was one of them. In an article published in MERIA Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal, he comments, "When President Anwar Sadat started his liberal political and economic reforms by ending the one-party "Socialist Union" dominance over all aspects of

⁹⁷ *Al-Ahram weekly*: <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1999/462/1900.htm>

Egyptian life and making peace with Israel, he could not win the state-controlled media to his side. Ironically, the tyranny of the left pushed Sadat into a paradox. Although genuine in his reforms to restore the multi-party liberal system which existed around an elected parliament before the 1952 Nasser coup, Sadat was so frustrated by Nasserites' and Marxists' control of the media that he resorted to undemocratic measures such as purging the media of some prominent figures and rounding up others for several weeks just to be able to mobilize enough public support to implement the final stage of the peace treaty with Israel. Still, despite the obvious long-term national benefits to be gained from liberal reforms, Egypt's media oligarchy was so entrenched in their position that Sadat could not influence a permanent change in the editorial line that was institutionally anti-American, anti-peace, and anti-Israel."⁹⁸

Both the Arabs and Israelis agreed to end their conflict peacefully, through negotiations or arbitration... and denounced the use of force or the threat of force, but the experts in Egypt believed that the war will continue in different fields. A writer in Egypt wrote about this in his column that : "Hassan Al-Karamani, a defense expert, said the eruption of a full-scale war was now unlikely not only in the Middle East but anywhere in the world. The reason, he said, is the high cost, both financial and psychological. Weapons and military equipment have become very expensive, costing hundreds of millions of dollars, and very destructive, he explained. Moreover, the notion of war has become universally unacceptable. Now at the beginning of a new century and with the advance of mass media coverage, the notion

⁹⁸ Adel Darwish. "Anti-Americanism in the Arabic Language Media" . *MERLA Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal*, Volume 7, No. 4 - December 2003.
<http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2003/issuc4/jv7n4a4.html>

of man killing his fellow man is unacceptable to public opinion. The world now is for diplomatic solutions. An economic war can achieve results that cannot be achieved by military hostilities, he said. As an example, he cited the collapse of the Soviet Union which, in his opinion, was the result of the collapse of Soviet economy.”⁹⁹

3.2.6. Mubarek’s Era And Normalization Of Relations

Following the murder of Sadat in 1981, Husni Mubarek was elected to replace him and under his presidency, relations with Turkey continued to improve. In May 1985, the visit of President Mubarek to Turkey was a turning point in Turkish-Egyptian relations. After that, Turkish president Kenan Evren went to Egypt at the beginning of the next year. Thus events were sign of good relation by two sides.

Unlike other Middle East leaders, Mubarek, in an Egyptian newspaper, in the context of Middle East peace process, expresses briefly his view about Israel. Mubarak argued that the Arab world should be pragmatic in dealing with Israel, saying that the idea of isolating or ignoring it "will only allow Israel to rove unchecked in the political arena"¹⁰⁰. Thus, the wrath against Turkey was indirectly pacified.

⁹⁹ Rasha Saad, "The last war?", *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*
<http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/398/oct03.htm>

¹⁰⁰ Nevine Khalil, 'Time is running out', *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, 6 - 12 August 1998. Issue No.389.
<http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/389/eg1.htm>

According to some Egyptian writers, Husni Mubarek has always maintained serious relations with Turkey and has emphasized the point that, in order to establish stability and peace in the region, both countries had to work together. Ibrahim Nafia is one of them and in one of his articles he says, "President Mubarak's drive to enhance relations with Turkey is founded upon very real geo-strategic factors and informed by a comprehensive vision of the shape of the Middle East in the near future. There can be no doubt that regional peace and stability depend upon the development of a strategic understanding, security arrangements and a high degree of cooperation among the major powers in the region. And Egypt and Turkey are undoubtedly two of the most important players in any such regional configuration."¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ Ibrahim Nafia, "Common Interests, Common Ends", *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, 10 - 16 December 1998, Issue No. 407, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/407/op1.htm>

3.3. The Recent Post-Cold War Era And Egyptian Images On Turkey

3.3.1. Changing Middle East After The Cold War And Its Relevance To Egypt: An Introduction

The Middle East was deeply affected by the earlier two wars of the 20th Century. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, a war brought about the process of decolonization over the Middle East was called World War II and more than that the collapse of the U.S.S.R made remarkable change about the international system of the Middle East. But the utmost event that changes the international system of the Middle East was the Iraq invasion of Kuwait and after that United States' Middle East approach with International Community after the first Iraq war. The extinction of the rivalry of Soviet Union and United States after the Cold War caused new determinations to the shape of the Middle East. After the end of the cold war middle east faced vise versa with international system. Besides that, the event of American struggle against Iraq had caused the two brothers (Turk and Arabs) countries to get separated from each other. It was a new sing of change of Middle East political system as had been before the World War I.

After the Cold War years, Turkey's security strategy had to be revised. Kalaycioglu, in connection with the shifting of strategies in history and post-Cold-War era, says, "The core values of Turkish political culture have been shaped by the nationalist, secularizing cultural reforms of the 1920s and the 1930s, the Soviet threat of the 1940s (which culminated in closer ties with Western Europe), the

democratization drive and the social mobilization of the post1950 period. However, by the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, dramatic changes in international relations ushered in a new series of challenges for Turkey. The Pan-Arabist leader of Iraq, Saddam Hussein moved first in seizing Kuwait in 1990. The subsequent war and crisis showed that the threat for Turkey was shifting from a superpower to her north to other revisionist neighbors on her south.”¹⁰²

Dwelling upon the rapidly changing face of the Middle East, especially after the Cold War era, Barry Rubin comments, “the Cold War's end, collapse of the radical states' Soviet superpower ally, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and defeat by a U.S. led coalition with many Arab states participating, the Israel-PLO agreement, and Israel-Jordan peace treaty. Other trends include declining Arab state activism in the Arab-Israeli conflict; threats from Islamic revolutionary groups, Iran, and Iraq in the Gulf; and the governing ideologies' and regimes' failure to develop quickly, achieve inter-Arab unity, expel Western influence, or destroy Israel. In many states, radical rule wasted huge resources in war and doctrinaire domestic policies. Decades of struggle and agitation left Arabs weak and deeply divided. There were civil wars in Yemen, Algeria, Lebanon, and Iraq (whose Kurdish north became autonomous). Libya and Iraq face international sanctions.”¹⁰³

Another subject vehemently discussed in Egyptian Media concerning the changing world order after the Cold War era was whether, after the bipolar period,

¹⁰² Ersin Kalaycioglu. “The Logic of Contemporary Turkish Politics”, *MERLA Middle East Reveiw of International Affairs Journal*, Volume 1, No. 3 - September 1997.

<http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue3/jv1n3a6.html>

¹⁰³ Barry Rubin. “The Politics of the New Middle East”. *MERLA Middle East Reveiw of International Affairs Journal*, Volume 1, No. 3 - September 1997.

<http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue3/jv1n3a8.html>

there could be another super power more effective than America in the Middle East. Deducing from what is emphasized in the Egyptian press, concerning Europe's potential to replace America in the Middle East, we can say that Egypt is on the American side: "Fresh from talks with Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad in the Mediterranean city of Alexandria, President Husni Mubarak said on Sunday that Europe cannot replace the United States as the principal sponsor of the Middle East peace process. Mubarak described the US as the cornerstone of regional peacemaking and rejected the assumption that Washington might have reached the end of its tether. Mubarak was asked whether the US was walking out on the peace process and whether a European role could be activated to take its place. "I cannot say that the US is withdrawing from the peace process because it is the cornerstone of this process," Mubarak responded. He cited a statement by President Bill Clinton that the US has not yet "thrown in the towel," adding that "we cannot make the rhetorical assumption that the US has walked out on the process. Activating the European role may help the US but is not a substitute." »¹⁰⁴

3.3.2. The Place Of The Gulf Crisis In Egyptian Press And Post-War Relations Between Turkey And Egypt

The first impact of the termination of the bipolar international system upon the Middle East was the Gulf War. The crisis, which started with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, ended with defeat of Iraq by the U.S. led international

¹⁰⁴ Nevine Khalil, "Mubarak and Assad Consult on Response", *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, 30 July - 5 August 1998, Issue No.388, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/388/eg2.htm>

coalition forces. An Egyptian writer analyzing America's entrance from a bipolar into a mono-polar world says, "Two years after the collapse of Soviet bloc, the first attempt was made to define the features of the "post-bipolar order". Perhaps it was not an explicit aim of the Gulf War, but certainly the war to liberate Kuwait proved an ideal occasion to declare the end of the old international order and the emergence of the new. In fact, the US did not take full advantage of the occasion. Perhaps it did not fully comprehend it, or was not fully prepared for it. At any rate, when Bush announced the establishment of a new world order, he did not openly declare the US's sole presence at the peak, and the concomitant obligations and rights this would entail. The prevalent opinion at the time was that the US had begun to exercise sole command without having declared its new status; in fact, however, the US foreign policy establishment was far more flustered than many imagine. The US administration had not expected the Soviet Union's collapse to reverberate so deafeningly. It was not prepared to suddenly assume world leadership by itself."¹⁰⁵

Now the power balance in the Middle East was shifting and the countries in the region were expressing fresh opinions about fledgling security problems. It is worthwhile noting that at this point no serious attempt was made to get closer with Turkey. During the first years of the Gulf War, there were neither positive nor negative comments about Turkey in Egyptian media. The basic discussion was going over the question, "Who will maintain the power policy in the region?" In this context, Mattar, in connection with America's growing power in the changing world order, says, "Furthermore, while the US did not turn to NATO to legitimize its

¹⁰⁵ Gamil Mattar. "After the New World Order", *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, 31 Dec. 1998 - 6 Jan. 1999. Issue No.410. <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/410/op5.htm>

intervention in Iraq, this does not, as some imagine, imply the organization's imminent demise, or even a significant increase in internal disputes. It merely means that the US's role within NATO is being reassessed. The US intervened in both world wars only after ascertaining that the conflicting European parties had substantially weakened one another. Following World War II, it withdrew most of its forces from Europe, bringing them back only when it felt that European weakness might provoke Russian expansionist tendencies. For a time, America's leadership forestalled potentially debilitating rivalries within the pact, while continuing to prevent Soviet expansion westward. Now, however, circumstances have changed. The Soviet enemy is no more; Europe itself is moving toward unification. The old rivalries that have frequently bred conflict may disappear, and so too will the need for the US. ...Or is NATO gradually losing its *raison d'être*, as indicated by its absence from the recent Iraqi crisis? As for the Arabs, how long will they continue to play a role they have not chosen? The Arabs are neither a potential threat to US security nor the priceless quarry they were a decade ago. Their only use is that they are still playing the game the Europeans used to play -- which is to so debilitate them by infighting that they must turn to the US for help."¹⁰⁶

The Gulf Crisis caused serious economic setbacks for the region, especially for Turkey and Jordan. Another writer studying the Gulf War, after noting that the Jordanian economy was one of the most seriously affected economies in the region, mentions about the polarization caused by the war: "Early in the morning on August 2, 1990, more than 100,000 Iraqi troops crossed the border and invaded Kuwait. Few

¹⁰⁶ Gamil Mattar, "After the New World Order", *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, 31 Dec. 1998 -6 Jan. 1999. Issue No. 410. <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/410/op5.htm>

people expected that their relations would reach this bloody end. The Gulf War divided the Arab world into two camps, with a small group supporting Iraq (Jordan, PLO, Sudan, and Yemen), and the rest supporting Kuwait.”¹⁰⁷

Similarly, the War had caused serious regression in the Turkish economy. In respect to this point, Kemal Kirişçi says, “The Gulf crisis's economic consequences affected Turkey and especially the south-eastern provinces. As a result of the economic embargo on Iraq laid by UN, Turkey lost a great deal of trade. Turkish exports to the Middle East dropped from 23 percent of overall exports in 1989 to 16 percent in 1994. Turkey also lost the revenue from the Kirkouk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline. In December 1996, the government put the loss at approximately \$30 billion. A fleet of more than 40.000 trucks fall idle, also reducing employment in southeastern Turkey. On the other side, this situation indirectly aggravated problems which contributed to Turkey cruel nationalist and terrorist Kurdish rebellion”¹⁰⁸. It has been one of crucial problem as a threat for Turkey integrity in connection with economic problems as a result of the Iraq embargo as had been a threat during the cold war such as communism after the end of ideology.

In connection with Turkish security problems and the unfavorable smells emanate from the end of Cold War, Kirişçi says, “The Cold War's end engendered insecurity among Turkish decision makers as Turkey's strategic importance for the West seemed to diminish. This concern coincided with the rejection of Turkey's

¹⁰⁷ Ziad Swaidan and Mihai Nica. “The 1991 Gulf War and Jordan’s Economy”, *MERLA Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal*, Volume 6, No. 2 - June 2002, 2002

<http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue2/jv6n2a7.html>

¹⁰⁸ Kemal Kirisci. “Post Cold-War Turkish Security and the Middle East”, *MERLA Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal*, Volume 1, No. 2 - July 1997,

<http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue2/jv1n2a6.html>

application for membership to the European Union and was aggravated by Iraq's increasingly belligerent behaviors towards Turkey over sharing waters of the Euphrates River. The Turkish decision to support UN sanctions against Iraq and shut down the Kirkouk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait raised questions about potential Iraqi aggression toward Turkey and whether NATO would be committed to defend Turkey.”¹⁰⁹

An author dwelling upon the Gulf Crisis, mentioning U.S policy in the region summarizes the consequences of the war: “U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf is once again in a period of transition. During the 1960s and 1970s, the United States sided with Iran, in part to contain Iraq. In the 1980s, the United States sided with Iraq in order to contain Iran. In the 1990s, the United States implemented a policy of "dual containment "to try to contain both countries... Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of troops from the United States, Europe and the Arab world flooded into the Gulf to roll back the invasion. By the end of the build- up, Iraq had succeeded in making unlikely allies of a disparate group of more than 29 countries, including Afghanistan, Syria, Niger and Spain. American forces shouldered much of the burden, with assists in some areas from major European and Arab allies.”¹¹⁰. As it can be recollected, America has not totally abandoned the places she resided then in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. She has continued to be the guardian of the wealthy Arab sheiks.

Barry Rubin, in the article dealing with the lessons to be taken from the Gulf War, underlines the point that the War was a turning point for that time and goes on

¹⁰⁹ Ibid..

¹¹⁰ Jon B. Alterman, “The Gulf States and the American Umbrella”. *MERLA Middle East Reveiw of International Affairs Journal*, Volume 4, No. 4 - December 2000, <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2000/issue4/jv4n4a8.html>

to say, "For a long time after the 1991 war over Kuwait, that event seemed to mark a turning point in the region, along with such contemporary developments as the Soviet Union's collapse, the Cold War's end, and the Madrid conference's commencement of direct Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. A decade after the fighting, however, the changes seem to have been more limited or perhaps relatively temporary ones."¹¹¹

According to some Egyptian writers, Egypt was caught unprepared for the Gulf War. An Egyptian writer proposes cooperation with America to be well prepared for the possible post war chaotic conditions and says, "The exercise was also intended to provide training in the strategic transport of troops and equipment over long distances, the source said. This was one of the lessons drawn from the 1991 Gulf War in which both Egypt and the United States, as part of an international coalition, sent large numbers of troops and equipment to Kuwait to drive out Iraqi troops from the Gulf state, the source added. Since 1981, Egypt and the United States have conducted joint exercises called "Bright Star" every two years. Since 1995, other countries, including Britain, France, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, have taken part. Egypt and the United States also stage annual naval exercises, code-named Eagle Salute, in the Red Sea."¹¹²

Rubin, in another article, while analyzing the consequences of the Gulf War, stresses the point that America invigorated her activities in the region and says,

¹¹¹ Barry Rubin, "An Essay on Arab Lessons from the 1991 Kuwait Crises and War", *MERIA Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal*, Volume 5, No. 2 - June 2001.
<http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2001/issue2/jv5n2a3.html>

¹¹² Jalal Nassar, "Gulf War Lessons", *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, 13 - 19 August 1998, Issue No.390.
<http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/390/eg7.htm>

“America's role and influence as the world's sole superpower was recognized and further consolidated in the Kuwait crisis. Thereafter, moderate Arab states continued efforts to maintain good relations with the United States and to use it as a protector, no matter how their public posture differed from that image. Even Syria tried to give the impression that it was showing cooperation with U.S. efforts to further the Arab-Israeli peace process”¹¹³. Complimenting this consequence, it has been possible to talk about a peace between Israel and Jordan. In the same article, Rubin comments, “Of course, the achievements of the post-war decade should not be neglected. Kuwait gained real peace and sovereignty. The U.S. role in the Middle East in general, and the Gulf in particular, was strengthened. Gulf stability was put on a stronger footing. Israel and Jordan signed a peace treaty and the Arab-Israeli peace process was given its best chance in history, moving further from international conflict if not actually arriving at a negotiated solution.”¹¹⁴.

In an article in *Ahram weekly* published in Egypt, the part played by America after the Gulf War is discussed and it says, “...at the end of 1998 it is clear that, even without the legitimizing framework of the Cold War, American interventionism is alive and thriving. With the exception of Britain's symbolic participation, the United States has committed this aggression alone, as it did when Clinton ordered the missile attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan. Clearly, the United States has arrogated to itself the right to police the world, at will and without accountability. There in lies a great danger to world peace and to the sovereignty of nations...” The same writer emphasizes the point that although Islam could be

¹¹³ Barry Rubin, “An Essay on Arab Lessons from the 1991 Kuwait Crises and War”. *MERLA Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal*, Volume 5, No. 2 - June 2001, <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2001/issue2/jv5n2a3.html>

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*,

enough to establish a peaceful atmosphere in the region, it was never fore grounded and finishes the article with the following comment: “During and after the Gulf War, I had argued that Islamic movements are likely to find fresh opportunities in the post-war Middle Eastern environment. The argument was that the political culture of the Middle East is message-oriented. In the region where three great religions were born, the success and failure of dynasties, leaders and movements have been defined often by their links to a legitimizing ideology. For many centuries, the struggles for power revolved around differing interpretations of Islam. In the 19th and 20th centuries, secular nationalism gained hegemony. Secular nationalist movements led the founding of most nation-states and, until the Iranian Revolution, dominated every state except Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikhdoms.”¹¹⁵

The Egyptian writer, after saying that Egypt saw once again how cooperation with Turkey was important for the region after the Gulf War, goes on, “It is in such a light that we should view developments in Turkish-Egyptian relations. Strategically, the Middle East is the natural extension of the southern wing of NATO as well as of the troublesome Balkan region. It is no coincidence, therefore, that NATO has recently begun to prioritize future relations with the countries bordering the Mediterranean. Turkey, as the NATO member bordering the Arab World, the Balkans and the Mediterranean, will naturally occupy a central role in reformulating such relations. The development of Turkish-Egyptian relations, within the context of a new strategic vision for the Middle East, is intended, above all, to further Egyptian interests. President Mubarak's vision of foreign policy is guided by a clear perception

¹¹⁵ Eqbal Ahmad. “After the Winter Bombs”, *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, 24 - 30 December 1998, Issue No.409, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/409/op5.htm>

of the higher interests of the Egyptian and Arab peoples and by his profound faith in the principle of peaceful coexistence and the capacity of peoples to rise above past resentments in order to realize mutual dignity, security, and prosperity. He has long realized that regional cooperation is the only way to achieve sustained and lasting prosperity. Egypt's conduct of its regional relations translates such a vision into practice, and in doing so cannot ignore Turkey.”¹¹⁶

In the 1998, Egyptian writers dissatisfied, too, with the volume of the commercial relations between two countries. They believed that developing these relations would also bring about political unity. In this context, an Egyptian writer said, “Egypt is Turkey's largest trading partner in the Middle East and North Africa, with the trade volume soaring to \$704 million last year. During the first nine months of 1998, Egyptian exports to Turkey amounted to \$305 million, and its imports to \$284. Sources say that the two sides are working to increase the trade volume to \$1 billion in the near future. The Turkish side is pressing for a free trade agreement with Egypt, similar to that signed by Turkey and Israel, to bolster trade relations further... The two countries, however, still have to iron out differences on the possibility of Egypt exporting natural gas to Turkey, a project which could cost as much as \$4 billion. According to Ankara, the price of Egyptian gas is too high compared to other possible suppliers such as Algeria, Qatar and Nigeria. For political reasons, however, Turkey, the largest gas market in the region, prefers Egypt as a partner in such an endeavor. Both sides have shown interest in cooperation on the production of automotive components and the feeding industry for local and export markets. At the

¹¹⁶ Ibrahim Nafia. “Common Interests. Common Ends”. *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, 10 - 16 December 1998. Issue No.407. <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/407/op1.htm>

same time, both countries have large consumer markets, significant access to other markets and economic links with the European Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Middle East and North Africa as well as the Economic Community of Eastern and Southern African states.”¹¹⁷

In 1990s, after the Cold War era, Turkey and the Middle East got into closer contact and the political writers there were beginning to have positive feelings about Turkey. Especially, during Ozal period, the more Turkey had economic cooperation with Middle East countries, the more Egyptian writers were satisfied. Although economic cooperation was growing, it had not reached to the desired level. In this context, in an article published in Arabic View were to be seen such comments: “Of the Muslim political leaders who came to the fore from the 1980s, two stand out: the late Turkish President Turgut Ozal and Malaysia’s retiring Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed. The two stand out both for their character and their political vision. Neither used power to amass personal fortune or pave the way for relatives and cronies. Both managed not to become the subject of a cult of personality, a disease that has destroyed many Muslim leaders. At the same time they were arguably the only senior Muslim politicians to rise above the day-to-day management of affairs and to develop a strategic political vision. Ozal’s reforms, introduced without fanfare, changed that. The army’s role was defined and limited in the context of a constitutional amendment. The economy was opened up to domestic and foreign investment and competition. A massive privatization program ended almost all state monopolies. Changes of government through elections, rather than military coups,

¹¹⁷ Nevine Khalil. “Cairo-Ankara Draw Closer”. *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*. 3 - 9 December 1998, Issue No.406 <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/406/fr1.htm>

became the norm. Despite some shortcomings, notably in the case of its Kurdish minority, Turkey is now acknowledged as a mature democracy, with the credentials to become part of the European Union. Also, Turkey is one of only three or four Muslim nations that are richer today in real terms compared to 1980”¹¹⁸

Turkish writer Kirişçi, in his article, discusses Ozal’s attempts to create warmer relations with The Middle East countries and says, “The 1980s brought significant changes. Prime Minister and President Turgut Ozal developed an increasingly activist approach to relations with the Middle East. In the early 1980s, he enhanced bilateral relations with conservative Arab countries of the Gulf as well as radical Middle Eastern states such as Libya, Iraq and Iran. He helped mobilize Turkish business interest in the region while attracting Arab capital to Turkey. Turkey's economic relations with the Middle East grew quickly. As the Southeast Anatolia Project advanced he tried to allay Syrian fears and improve relations by promising Syria in 1987 a minimum water flow 500 cubic meters per second from the Euphrates.”¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸ Amir Taheri, “Two Models for Muslims”, *Arabic View Articles*,
<http://www.arabview.com/articles.asp?article=247>

¹¹⁹ Kemal Kirisci, “Post Cold-War Turkish Security and the Middle East”, *MERL Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal*, Volume 1, No. 2 - July 1997,
<http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue2/jv1n2a6.html>

3.3.3. Turkish Israeli Rapprochement And Its Reflections In Egyptian Press

Egyptian press was discontented with the Turkish Israeli cooperation. In an article written during those days about Turkey's importance for Israel, it is stated that: "the former Israeli ambassador to Turkey, Raphe al-Baleigh, has described cooperation relations between Turkey and Israel as of a very great importance for Israel and that without Turkey, Israel will be a small island in the region."¹²⁰.

A daily newspaper's headline was "Turkey-Israël alliance and Arab policy towards Turkey", and it continued as: "Turkey, an Islamic country and member of the Organization of Islamic Conference, has always been of two minds, the ruling class and the military; has always aspired to be a Western country, as opposed to the eastern reality that governed Turkey's past..."¹²¹. Then the writer adds that: "A carrot and stick approach is best adopted, with the carrot being the large and growing Arab market that Turkey can access, versus the small Israeli market, and the stick being the large enemies that Turkey will develop and the other regional ramifications."¹²².

Egyptian writers, who believe that Turkish Israeli cooperation has strengthened Israel, express, also, that if Turkey, as a Muslim country, had refused Israeli expectations, it would benefit both Arabs and Turks. An Egyptian writer exemplifies the attitude in the following way: "Military cooperation between Turkey

¹²⁰ "Turkey and the Syrian-Israeli Closeness, Syria-Turkey, Politics".

<http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/991228/1999122804.html> , 12/28/1999

¹²¹ "Turkey-Israel Alliance and Arab Policy Towards Turkey, Regional Analysis", *Arabic View Articles*, 9/15/1998, <http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/daily/day/98091528.html>

¹²² Ibid..

and Israel has deeply troubled Arab and Islamic countries since 1996, when the two countries signed a joint defense and training agreement. This concern is not so much that the cooperation benefits Turkey, but that more importantly it benefits Israel against its Arab and Islamic enemies, namely Syria and Iran... Israel's serious threats to Syria and its close ally Iran have led member countries of the Arab League and of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to take a firm stand against the Turkish-Israeli military alliance. Tensions between Turkey and Syria have intensified because of Ankara's growing fears that it might be isolated by the Arab world.”¹²³

The Arab world expected Erbakan to change Turkey's policy towards Israel, but during Erbakan's governing period, the relations with Israel developed in military and commercial fields. This also created a negative image in Arab media. A journalist says, “Erbakan, during his visit to Egypt said that: “the cause of the relations with Israel is to learn how to use the new weapons. We have deep-rooted relations with the Arab world; our relations with Israel should not worry the Arab world.” Why can't Turkey learn how to use the weapons with the help of the USA although they both are members of NATO”¹²⁴ Another Egyptian journalist, who was researching the Turkish media during those days to understand Turkish image in Israel, says, “All media is glad with Turkish-Israeli relations. But as a country with a huge Muslim population, Turkey is in need of developing its relations with Arab countries.”¹²⁵

Another writer, while dwelling upon Erbakan's governing period and Turkish Israeli relations, says: “Most Arabs dislike the Turkish-Israeli relationship. They

¹²³ Atef Saqr, “Turkish War Fever”, *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, 8 - 14 October 1998, Issue No.398, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/398/re1.htm>

¹²⁴ Mohammed Abd'ul munim. “Alğaz Min Turkiya”. (1/9/1996). *al-Ahram Newspaper*, p.10

¹²⁵ Mohammed Harb. “al Israil Min Turkiya”. (1/6/1996). *al-Ahram Newspaper*.

regard the two countries as Middle Eastern subsidiaries of Western civilization. A troubled historical legacy (colonial in Turkey's case) leaves its mark on the Arab world's relations with both Turkey and Israel. The Arabs famously lost Palestine to Israel; less well known but also rankling is their loss in 1939 of Alexandretta to Turkey. In the Arab view, Israel's security zone in southern Lebanon and its Turkish counterpart in northern Iraq are outright conquests. Arabs see the Turkish-Israeli relations as a renewed Baghdad Pact in which they brandish the water weapon, advanced military technology, and key territories. At other times, Arab sources blame the Turkish-Israeli ties on Turkey's Jews, it being easier to take them on than the Turkish government. Indeed, when Refah took office, a change did become evident. Refah representatives did not boycott Israel. On the contrary, at the governmental, parliamentary, and municipal levels, Refah ministers, members of parliament, and mayors acted to reassure the Jewish community; they also had open contacts with resident Israeli diplomats. The Islamic press even underwent a process of soul-searching, concluding that Refah was to blame for the predicament wherein Israel was Turkey's sole friend; were it not for Refah's enmity towards the West, Europe and the European Union (EU), Turkey would not have been left with no ally but Israel."¹²⁶

The writer, in the article in which he expresses his astonishment at witnessing a rapidly and relatively more vigorously developing Turkish Israeli relationship during Erbakan's governing period, also says that Refah government is the one to be

¹²⁶ Amikam Nachmani. "The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Tie". *The Middle East Quarterly*, June 1998, V:5, Number: 2. <http://www.meforum.org/article/394>

blamed: “Amazingly, when Erbakan's term of office came to an end, his government found itself praised for its policy of rapprochement with Israel. A writer in one of Refah's coalition partners' newspapers noted that Israel would miss Erbakan; his government's demise prompted Israelis to remark, “we were more comfortable and our relations were more mature during the Refah government.” Even Ambassador Elpeleg commented that: There are numerous advantages to Erbakan being in power—first and foremost from the viewpoint of the grave socio-economic difficulties afflicting Turkey. Erbakan's party is presently the only party to take heed of the tribulations of the millions deserting the villages in the East and streaming into the large cities, the only party attempting to combat retardation”¹²⁷. Thus, these hot blooded remarks about Turkey clearly show that Turkish Israeli cooperation has engendered serious discontent in the Arab world.

On the other hand, according to Turkish press there were four reasons for Turkey to be close to Israel. The first is to create a positive image among the Jewish lobby in U.S.A. The second is to prove that Turkey is a democratic State and the third, to create new relations against Syrian aids to Kurdish rebels in the East. The fourth one is to benefit from Israel in terms of military and technical developments¹²⁸. Moreover, Saudi Arabian prince Khalid B. Sultan in his speech in Al- Hayat newspaper said that; “Arabs have long missed Turks, I recommend to the

¹²⁷ Ibid..

¹²⁸ M. Hakan Yavuz. “Dışlanmışların Aşkı: Türk- İsrail ilişkileri”, *Zaman Newspaper*. Strategy pages. 21/07/1998. p.4

Arab world that we must develop our relations with Turkey, because we had important relations in the past and we can build new relations.”¹²⁹

3.3.4. Egyptian Press Coverage Of The Problems Between Turkey And Syria

The fluctuated relations between Arabs and Turks after WWI, commonly the Hatay Problem was in the point of regression which has minus propensity. With general expectation, we notice an explicit dominant Egyptian tendency to side with Syria in the case of Hatay Problem between Turkey and Syria. As in other Arab countries, in Egypt too, there is a dominant view that Hatay is part of Syrian territory. In this context an article by an Egyptian writer is very illuminating: “When I arrived in the city of Iskendarona, coming from southern city of Turkey, Adana, the Syrian Arab characteristics of the region were immediately apparent. Alexandretta is the second city of the disputed region known as Iskenderona to the Syrians and Hatay to the Turks, after Antakya which is another southern city of Turkey. The region as a whole, in heritage, culture, and language, remains more Arab in nature than Turkish. In the streets and markets, Arabic is the primary spoken language. However, with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, in 1921 France, with the approval of the League of Nations, was given a mandate over all of Syria. Turkey agreed to allow France to control the Alexandretta region, as being part of Syria. Following the Lausanne Agreement of 1936, in which the borders of modern Turkey were defined, Turkey agreed to give up all claim to the areas south of its borders, among them the Alexandretta region. However, the French soon

¹²⁹ Salvarci, op.cit., p. 184

suggested granting Syria total independence, and when the country was divided into nine governorates later the same year, the Alexandretta region became one of them. This led Ankara to protest and declare that the region fell under its sovereignty. The dispute was taken to the League of Nations in 1937, which ruled that the region's special status should be lifted and that henceforward its internal affairs should be under Syrian jurisdiction. Both Turkey and France appeared to agree to this outcome. "130. The Hatay Problem had affected both sides inevitable; both sides' people thought was bringing about the dissatisfaction and potential of conflict, and another observation of the writer is;" I then asked them whether they considered themselves to be Turkish or Syrian. Their immediate reply was that they considered themselves to be Arabs, but that they are Turkish citizens. One man, named Mahmoud, said: "The Iskenderona region has witnessed separatist rebellions from time to time, and Syria brought down a Turkish monitoring plane in 1989. But in general the situation is calm." Mahmoud went on, "The Arabs of Antakya, in spite of their Arabic lifestyle, are fortunate to live in a country like Turkey, where there is a general freedom of religion and life-style, in comparison to their relatives across the border."131.

Few decades later, Egypt's recognition of Israel, the peaked line of dissatisfaction between Turks and Arabs especially included Syria, declined though

¹³⁰ Reda Hilal, "Talking Arabic, Feeling Turkish", *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, 12 - 18 November 1998, Issue No.403. <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/403/re5.htm>

¹³¹ Reda Hilal, "Talking Arabic, feeling Turkish". *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, 12 - 18 November 1998, Issue No.403. <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/403/re5.htm>

little conflicts because of sometimes water, sometimes oil markets till the first Iraq War.

As it has become apparent the show of challenge between Turkey and Syria ended through Egyptian mediation. However, the articles published in Egyptian newspapers against Turkey are the result of the negative images prevalent in Egypt which is in return a result of Turkish Israeli collaboration. Although Egypt and Israel are in friendly terms with each other, Turkish collaboration with Israel is enough to provoke all the Arab countries, Egypt being the first.

After the Gulf War, Turkey found herself at once face to face with the problem with Syria which had intensified in time. Turkish cooperation with Israel had created a negative atmosphere in all the Middle East countries. In this context, Kirişçi says, "The February 1996 Turkey-Israel military cooperation agreement caused a major uproar in the Arab public opinion and drew strong criticisms from governments, especially Egypt as well as Iran. The Syrian government accused Turkey of inciting disturbances in Syria in May and saw a major strategic threat from Israeli-Turkish military cooperation. Tension between the two countries led to troop build-ups along the frontier during June 1996. The situation was further aggravated when Iran offered to Syria a military pact similar to the one between Turkey and Israel (Turkish Daily News (TDN), 21 June 1996). The situation somewhat eased

after formation of a coalition government between the Islamic Refah and conservative True Path Party.”¹³².

Egyptian writers stress the point that Egypt is actively engaged in creating peace in the region and add that including the problem between Turkey and Syria, Egypt has established stability in the region through her active role in peace making. In this context, an Egyptian writer says, “Although Egypt was only involved in the peace process by proxy during 1998; it took centre stage in defusing the Syrian-Turkish stand-off in October. During the week Egypt was celebrating the 25th anniversary of its military victory over Israel, Mubarak had his hands full trying to avert a possible war between Syria and Turkey. Traditionally strained relations between neighbors Damascus and Ankara deteriorated sharply when Turkey began massing some 10,000 troops on the Turkish-Syrian border in protest against alleged Syrian support of separatist Kurdish guerrillas. Syria, along with most of the Arab world, is suspicious about expanding military cooperation between Ankara and Tel Aviv which began in 1996. Damascus also feels threatened by Turkey's large-scale dam projects on the Euphrates River, which could reduce or block water supplies downstream in Syria. Mubarak's sudden shuttle diplomacy reflected the seriousness of the situation on the Turkish-Syrian border where any fighting was likely to further disrupt an already volatile Middle East. Cairo, with a full mandate from Damascus, contained the crisis and the two sides signed an agreement on 20 October whereby Damascus promised to cease all support for rebels of the Kurdish Workers' Party, and expelled their leader Abdullah Ocalan. Bringing the two sides to the negotiating

¹³² Kemal Kirisci, “Post Cold-War Turkish Security and the Middle East”, *MERIA Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal*, Volume 1, No. 2 - July 1997, <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue2/jv1n2a6.html>

table was as far as Egypt's "confidence building" efforts went. "We are not interfering in the details of the negotiations because they are the responsibility of the two sides," Mubarak said soon after the breakthrough."¹³³ The writer in other parts of his article underlines the point that Egypt is an important actor in the region for peace making by the fact that she has consolidated her dialogue with other non-Arab countries like Iran. He adds that the gate of the Arab world to these countries will be Egypt.¹³⁴

Another writer who stresses Egyptian mediation in the normalization of the relations between Syria and Turkey says, "The recent Syrian-Turkish crisis, defused largely as a result of Egypt's diplomatic efforts, epitomizes the potential dangers of ignoring the question regional security arrangements. At the same time, the Turkish-Israeli military pact, regardless of how one might characterizes it, underscores the need to pay closer attention to an overall framework of regional security arrangements if we are to avert any slide into the kinds of alliances and counter-alliances that inevitably lead to conflict."¹³⁵

On the Turkish side, on the other hand, The Syrian matter was harshly criticized and even the possibility of war was considered. Turkish Syrian relations from the Turkish stand point are handled briefly by Kemal Kirişçi. In his article he says, "Turkey's relations with Syria has also been adversely affected by accusations of Syrian support for the P.K.K; a dispute over sharing Euphrates water and Syrian

¹³³ Nevine Khalil. "Acting Regionally", *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, 31 Dec. 1998 - 6 Jan. 1999, Issue No.410, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/410/eg2.htm>

¹³⁴ Ibid.,

¹³⁵ Ibrahim Nafia. "Common Interests. Common Ends", *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, 10 - 16 December 1998, Issue No.407, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/407/op1.htm>

opposition to building dams on the river as part of the Southeast Anatolia Project. Further, Syrian irredentist claims over Hatay province in 1995 became an additional source of tension. Reports of close Greek-Syrian defense cooperation, accompanied by Syria granting Greece landing rights for its military planes, attracted heated criticism from Turkish officials. Concern over this cooperation led a prominent retired Turkish diplomat, Sukru Elekdag, to argue that Turkey should base national defense strategy on an ability to fight two and a half wars: against Greece, Syria, and the P.K.K.”¹³⁶.

Another writer, while expressing similar opinion, stresses the point that The problem between Turkey And Syria was solved through Egyptian mediation and that the region re-gained stability. He adds, “Mubarak shuttled between Ankara and Damascus in early October to defuse a possible military confrontation over Syria's alleged backing of the rebel Kurdistan Workers Party. Egypt, while aware of Syria's concern over Turkey's antagonistic policies, was nevertheless sympathetic to Turkey's firm stand against terrorism. Mubarak's shuttle diplomacy paid off and the confrontation was defused. PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was expelled from Syria and is currently under house arrest in Italy, which has refused to hand him over to Turkey. Syria and Turkey, furthermore, signed an agreement on 20 October under which Damascus pledged to halt all assistance to Ocalan and his PKK. Last week, Mubarak said in Paris that "progress between Syria and Turkey is very promising".

¹³⁶ Kemal Kirisci. “Post Cold-War Turkish Security and the Middle East”. *MERIA Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal*, Volume 1, No. 2 - July 1997.
<http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue2/jv1n2a6.html>

He expressed hope that the two sides will continue their talks on solving bilateral problems "through peaceful means rather than bloodshed".¹³⁷

Again, from Egyptian writers' articles about the crisis between Turkey and Syria we get Syrian experts' interpretation of the case. "Syrian analysts have constantly linked the latest escalation of tension with Turkey to its strong alliance with Israel. Getting involved in a war with Turkey would only benefit Israel by forcing Syria to divert its attention from its main struggle: liberating the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Therefore, the Syrian officials who took part in the talks did not only hand over a list of the PKK members arrested in Syria, but have reportedly agreed to allow Turkish officials to meet these prisoners. Informed sources also revealed that Lebanon, in coordination with Syria, allowed a group of Turkish officials to visit the areas in the Beqaa Valley where PKK military bases were allegedly located, to make sure they no longer exist. Aware that a war with Turkey at this stage would not serve its interests, Syria also agreed to postpone its demands regarding sharing the water of the Euphrates, which is currently controlled by Turkey. Turkish officials have insisted since Egypt started its mediation effort between Turkey and Syria that talks should concentrate exclusively on security issues." The writer, after claiming that the war was a reflection of the internal problems of Turkey says, "Syrian officials also believe that the latest war of words launched by Turkey was a reflection of domestic problems in Turkey. Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz is trying to show the public that his government remains firm

¹³⁷ Nevine Khalil, "Cairo-Ankara Draw Closer", *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, 3 - 9 December 1998. Issue No. 406 <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/406/fr1.htm>

on the issue of the Kurds ahead of parliamentary elections due to be held early next year.”¹³⁸

According to a group of Arab writers, Syria, receiving support from Middle East countries, believes that she has managed to deter Turkey. Otherwise a huge War would be inevitable. The following exemplify this: “In an attempt to ease tension with Turkey, Syria has looked to Arab and Islamic countries, mainly Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran, for support. Officials here believe this was important in order to impress upon Turkey the dangers of attacking Syria. A few Arab countries, including Libya, have gone as far as to remind Turkey of its joint economic interests with the Arab world. Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi has even threatened to expel the Turkish companies working in his country and replace them with Greek firms if Ankara decides to attack Syria.”¹³⁹ Another writer expresses similar attitude towards the subject: “The possibility of a military conflict between Turkey's armed forces, the second largest in NATO, and Syria has alarmed Arab capitals which fear any conflict might spill over into the rest of region. The Arab League described Turkish troop deployment along the Syrian border as a "clear threat to peace and security in the region," and urged Ankara to enter into a "serious dialogue" with Damascus. Saudi Arabia, other Gulf States, Lebanon and Jordan urged a peaceful solution. Iran asked Turkey to exercise "self-restraint" and pledged "steadfast" support for Syria. Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi warned Turkey that "any aggression against Syria is an aggression against Libya, according to the joint Arab defense pact." He also

¹³⁸ Atef Saqr and Amberin Zaman, “All Quiet on the Turkish Front”, *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, 22 - 28 October 1998, Issue No.400, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/400/re3.htm>

¹³⁹ Atef Saqr, “Damascus stresses Dialogue”, *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, 15 - 21 October 1998, Issue No.399, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/399/re1.htm>

threatened to invite Greece, Turkey's arch-enemy, to step into the shoes of dozens of Turkish companies doing business with Libya.”¹⁴⁰

As it can be clearly seen, Egyptian press was generally siding with Syria in this case. An Egyptian writer claims that the deterioration of the relations dates back farther in the past and has less to do with the Syrian support to the P.K.K. members. The article goes as follows, “Turkey accuses Syria of backing P.K.K leader Abdullah Ocalan. But relations have deteriorated further recently, with Syria condemning Turkey's growing military alliance with Israel and accusing Ankara of taking more than its share of water from the Euphrates River.”¹⁴¹

Along with the rising tension due to the P.K.K. problem, another problem which had been bureaucratically solved years ago but socially unresolved became obvious, that is, the Hatay Problem. There is an expression in an article in *Ahram* which says that the lands that were part of Syrian territory in history is now displayed inside Turkish territory. This, again, reflects Egyptian perception of the matter: “Turkey also wants Syria to renounce its territorial claims on the province of Hatay, known among Arabs as Al-Iskindarona region.

¹⁴⁰ Nevine Khalil. “In Egypt's Hands”, *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, 15 - 21 October 1998, Issue No.399, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/399/eg1.htm>

¹⁴¹ Atef Saqr. “Turkish War Fever”, *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, 8 - 14 October 1998, Issue No.398, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/398/re1.htm>

3.3.5. The Continuing Iraq Crisis, Egyptian Attitude, And A Last Attitude Towards Turkey

The termination of the rivalry of Soviet Union and United States after the Cold War, the Globalization notion was deeply affected. An increasing propensity has emerged over the notions of democracy, economic development, and welfare of nations. The concept of the globalization and democracy were evolving but the terrorism and dictatorship pacing in its place negatively. The last Iraq crisis was one the crucial events of human race for the last decade.

One of the outcomes of the instability following the Gulf War was the Iraq crisis in 1998. An Egyptian writer in his article in *Ahram Weekly* says, "Last week's strike against Iraq was not the first of its kind and is unlikely to be the last. It was the result of the ambiguous outcome of the Gulf War which saw Iraq subjected to the harshest sanctions imposed since World War II while, at the same time, preserving the Iraqi regime in tact. The end of the Gulf War, as a consequence, has witnessed crisis after crisis, as Iraq sought an end to crippling economic sanctions while the US looked for opportunities to complete the unfinished business of the Gulf War, i.e. the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. But both the regime in Baghdad and the American administration, whatever the rhetoric, have failed. And the tragedy is that the main victims of these policies have been the Iraqi people."¹⁴²

The attitudes of the Gulf countries towards the Iraq crisis in 1998 were interpreted favorably by the Egyptian writers. In an article one of them says, "The six-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) -- which comprises Saudi Arabia,

¹⁴² Ibrahim Nafia, "Out of isolation", *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, 24 - 30 December 1998, Issue No.409. <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/409/op1.htm>

Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Bahrain and Oman -- is currently suffering a sharp market depression, inflation of prices and limited employment opportunities for its own nationals. Furthermore, oil prices have been steadily dropping over the past few years, forcing governments to cut expenditure. Most monarchies in the region have enjoyed a relatively stable political atmosphere because of the services and facilities they have been able to offer. But as most of the states continue to pay the high costs of the 1991 Gulf War, the luxurious lifestyles enjoyed by well-off Gulf nationals has been markedly affected. In Kuwait, several officials were recently quoted as saying that their country was not "a party to the dispute between the United Nations and Iraq." Abdullah Bishara, former secretary-general of the GCC and a Kuwaiti national, said that "it is in our [Gulf countries] interest that peace reigns in this region and that there is serious cooperation between Iraq and the United Nations." Qatari, Bahraini and Omani newspapers were also critical of the reported plans by the US to deal strongly with the Iraqi leader. They said that Washington's previous action against Iraq has only increased the suffering of the Iraqi people."¹⁴³

Egyptian writers, in general, stressed the point that Egypt played an enormously important and active role in the region towards peace and were in agreement in a peaceful solution for the Iraq crisis. In this context an Egyptian writer says, "Initiating a strategic dialogue with the US, defusing a volatile crisis between Syria and Turkey and assisting in resolving inter-African conflicts, Cairo had its hands full in 1998 even without playing a high-profile role in the peace process.

¹⁴³ Merwat Diab. "A Gulf of Opinion Over Iraq", *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*. 12 - 18 November 1998. Issue No.403. <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/403/re3.htm>

Egypt believes that the Iraqi question should be solved diplomatically and that the use of force against Baghdad only undermines the Arab position and serves Israeli aims in the region.”¹⁴⁴

The *Ahram* newspaper foregrounding the Egyptian President who was working hard to establish peace in the region wrote, in connection with the 1998 Iraq crisis: “A few hours before the end of the US-British strikes President Hosni Mubarak sent President Bill Clinton a message calling on the US to “immediately halt all actions against Iraq” and adding that the attacks were “seriously harming the Iraqi people and the region.” Mubarak also spoke by telephone with Clinton as well as with French President Jacques Chirac and US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright last Thursday, shortly after the commencement of the strikes. Mubarak advised Clinton to show “self-restraint” and urged him to “contain the situation to avoid further deterioration and instability in the region.” On the same day Mubarak issued a statement expressing “regret” at developments “since the withdrawal of the UNSCOM team from Iraq.” He called for “effective action by all concerned parties to contain the situation, to protect our brothers the Iraqi people and maintain stability in the region.” Earlier, he chaired a meeting of cabinet members to discuss the crisis. In his statement, Mubarak also emphasized Egypt's position that “peaceful means should be sought to resolve the crisis in order to avoid the consequences of the use of

¹⁴⁴ Nevine Khalil, “Acting Regionally”, *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, 31 Dec. 1998 - 6 Jan. 1999. Issue No. 410, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/410/eg2.htm>

force." He also renewed his call on Iraq to adhere to international law and to implement Security Council resolutions for the sake of the Iraqi people."¹⁴⁵

These years were the end days of the Twentieth Century, and the World was seemed as in way of great evolution. All the governments were stating their discontent with terrorism, poverty and human rights. These years were the dates of understanding, more explicitly, the death of ideologies. After visiting of President Demirel to Egypt, economic relations were established, the more particular notion for this event was the "partnership relations", not brothership nor friendship. Egyptian Minister of Economy Yousef Butros Ghali said that "There are 3 main points that contribute in achieving a start in the economical relations in Egypt and turkey which are encouraging trade between the 2 countries, cooperation in technology transfer and developing the human resources"¹⁴⁶

The other event that shows the new period relations was the Energy Conference hosted by Turkey in Istanbul an the Egyptian press held the event: "Egypt was chosen to represent countries of the Mediterranean Sea, Azerbaijan to represent countries of the Caspian Sea and Georgia to represent the countries of the Black Sea to participate in this conference which will opened by Turkish President Suleiman Demirel. El-Banbi is expected to hold a series of bilateral meetings on the conference's margin with the Turkish minister of energy and natural resources, during which he will review the developments that have been achieved regarding

¹⁴⁵ *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, "Mubarak Urges Restraint", 24 - 30 December 1998, Issue No.409, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/409/ir12.htm>

¹⁴⁶ *Arabic Views Articles*, "Egypt-Turkey, Economics", 17/11/1999, <http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/991117/1999111748.html>

With new millenium the world has met the new understanding of the site of the turning point history from Europe to Middle East. Rebuilding American Defences Project reissued in the fall 2000 before George W. Bush’s first election than signed by many Republican Counsellors which are called commonly conservatives. The 9/11 attacks provided the earlier report which has issued in 1997. The 9/11 attacks have shifted the United States’s security strategy, and more generally to the Islamic world. And so on, Iraq had been determining as the Terror State. President Bush in the covering letter in September 2002 was introducing the National Security Strategy of the United States, “ The great struggles between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom-and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. In the twenty-first century only nations that share a commitment to protecting basic human rights and guaranteeing political and economic freedom will be able to unleash the potential of their future prosperity” And so on, Middle East region will determine the shape of the world.

United States was pretentious about her grand strategy; however, Turkey’s refusal in 2003 to of American desires for the Iraq intervention was highly praised in Arab media. Fore grounding such headings as “The revival of the Ottoman”, and “The pride of the Middle east”, the Arab media include the following comments: “Surely the antiwar demonstrations are an encouraging sign and Turkey’s actions

¹⁴⁷*Arabic Views Articles*, “Egypt-Turkey, Economics”. 19/6/1999.
<http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/990619/1999061903.html>

should serve as an example to be echoed everywhere in the Muslim world. Sadly, the exception is the Arab world itself. It has proven that there is no limit to the lengths it will go to avoid standing up for its rights. How sad to see Turkey suffering for people who refuse to help themselves and to know that Turkey will pay a higher price — while the Arabs refuse to pay a much lower one — to save their Iraqi brothers. ... If Iraqis are killed, it will be the fault of no one but the people of the Arab world, for it is they and only they who have the power to stop it. Instead, they have been silent from the beginning, petrified to offer any kind of resistance whether political or social. They have sat back and watched as the entire world rallied to protest a war and the machinations of a regime intent on dominating the world. ... People have gone out to protest in Chile, Italy and Japan, in every land — except the Arab world. While everywhere people try to stop war, we and the American regime are the only ones talking about post-Saddam Iraq!”¹⁴⁸. Thus, in this context, positive images began to emerge in Arab minds.

The new era bring about to human race new thoughts; all the processes are much faster than yesterday, all of the innovations are working like a multiplier. New era’s technology is collapsing the borders. The continuing innovation on the world order is much faster. And so the relations across the countries are more volatile. Financial movements and transactions are more rapid just like international relations.

The volatile positive images of Arabs (Egypt) are shifting right now with the new agenda of Greater Middle East Project “There is something peculiar about

¹⁴⁸ Reem Al Faisal, “Turkish Surprise”, *Arabic View Articles*, <http://www.arabview.com/articles.asp?article=287>

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish prime minister. His country is a NATO member. It is trying to join the EU. We often accuse it of distancing itself from Islam and the Arabs and currying favour with the West. And it has strong and well-publicised ties, military and political, with Israel. Yet over the past few days, Recep has voiced strong-worded criticism -- unreported in our official media -- of Israel's barbaric acts in Palestine and the current US administration's attempt to pose one model for the Greater Middle East, even if that model is Turkey"¹⁴⁹



¹⁴⁹ Nader Fergany , "More Arab than the Arabs", *Al-Ahram Weekly*.
<http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/694/op3.htm>

CONCLUSION

This work has consequently managed to give that “the relations between two states within the 21st Century” do not depend only on historical background but also any social background. The good relations between two states can be volatile or vice versa. The fluctuated relations between Egypt and Turkey have shown that, (especially after the Cold War) the 21st Century’s International Relations do not depend on ideologies or brothership, or eternal friendship, but on partnership.

This thesis has summarized that Arabic perception of Turkey which has sometimes been conditioned by social developments, is fluctuated, positively or negatively. There were many factors that caused to create a negative image for both sides after The Ottoman Empire, such as the declaration of the new reforms in Turkey, recognition of Israel by Turkey, Syrian Turkish border problems, entering the NATO, etc. All of these factors led to rigid relations with the Arab world. The Arab media was highly disconcerted by these episodes and they caused development of negative images against Turkey, and contrasting with all this negative images, there were too many positive images that have been established.

Why Egypt?

The most important reason is that, Egypt can be said to be the heart of Middle East. Besides, as a matter of fact, Turkey and Egypt has too many similarities. However, the more considerable than that; Turkey and Egypt has a historical background, a relationship, and especially a brothership between two states which had been established through centuries. But the globalization notion brings about too many evolutions. State borders get closer. And lately 9/11 is a turning point of the

future. The relations between Egypt and Turkey are an exemplary case of evolutionary international relations through history, after Cold War, and after 9/11.



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