

ISLAMIST PERCEPTION OF TURKEY'S EU MEMBERSHIP IN HISTORICAL PROCESS

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This work is aimed at explaining Turkish Islamist movements' perception of Turkey's EU membership process, and the transformation of Islamist ideology and views about Turkey's EU membership process.

AUTHOR DECLARATIONS

1. The material included in this thesis has not been submitted wholly or in part for any academic award or qualification other than that for which it is now submitted.

2. This study will try to analyze the transformation of Turkish Islamists views about Turkey's EU membership process.

i) The thesis describes the historical background of the relations between Turkey and EU, how the Turkish Islamists look this process.

ii) In the thesis, we try to show the reasons of Turkish Islamists transformation.

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ABSTRACT

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This study is aiming at understanding Turkish Islamists' views on Turkey's EU membership process. It is intended here to answer the question "How do Turkish Islamists consider Turkey's EU membership process?" and to explore, in the historical development process of relations between Turkey and EU, what is the meaning of these relations for Turkish Islamists. It consists of three parts after the the introduction. The first part that is named "Turkey and EU: An Historical Perspective" identifies the historical background of Turkey and EU relations. The second part is about Turkish Islamists' Perception of Turkey- EU relations. This part shows the views of Turkish Islamists about EU and the integration. The study is finalized by the part on the transformation of the Turkish Islamists views on Turkey's membership process.

It is expected, through the framed context of the thesis, to depict that the Islamists' views on Turkey's EU membership process have undergone a transformation from largely negative to selectively positive ones, within the historical process of Turkey- EU relations.

Key Words :

EU

Turkey-EU Relations

Islamists (perception)

Turkey's(EU)membership

Turkey

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Nisan 2005

TARİHSEL SÜREÇ İÇERİSİNDE TÜRKİYE’NİN AB ADAYLIĞININ İSLAMCI İDRAKI

Bu çalışma Türk İslamcılar’ının Türkiye AB adaylık sürecine bakışlarını anlama amacı gütmektedir. Bu çalışma ‘Türk İslamcılar Türkiye AB sürecine nasıl bakıyorlar?’ sorusunun cevabını ve Türkiye ile AB arasındaki ilişkilerin nasıl geliştiğini, bu ilişkilerin Türk İslamcılar için ne anlama geldiğini araştırmaktadır. Çalışma giriş bölümünden sonra üç bölüme ayrılmıştır. Birinci bölüm, ‘Türkiye-AB’ adı altında Türkiye ve AB ilişkilerinin tarihsel arkaplanını açıklamaktadır. İkinci bölüm ise Türk İslamcılar’ının Türkiye AB ilişkilerinin idrakını içerir. Bu bölüm, Türk İslamcılar’ın Türkiye-AB ilişkilerine bakışını gösterir. Çalışma Türkiye’nin adaylık süreci üzerine Türk İslamcılar’ının bakışlarının transformasyonunu bölümüyle tamamlanmaktadır.

Bu çalışma bağlamında görülmüştür ki Türkiye-AB ilişkilerinin tarihsel süreci içinde İslamcılar’ın Türkiye’nin AB üyeliği sürecine bakışları genelde negatiften pozitif dönüşmüştür.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

AB

Türkiye-AB İlişkileri

İslamcılar (Algılamaları)

Türkiye’nin (AB)üyeliği

Türkiye

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List of Abbreviations

DLP:	Democratic Left Party
DP:	Democrat Party
EC:	European Community
EEC:	European Economic Community
EU:	European Union
FP:	Felicity Party
ICO:	Islamic Conferance Organization
IDP:	Islamic Democratic Party
IPP:	Islamic Protection Party
JDP:	Justice and Development Party
JP:	Justice Party
MP:	Motherland Party
NAP:	National Action Party
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NOP:	National Order Party
NP:	Nation Party
NSP:	National Savation Party
NSC:	National Security Council
RPP:	Republican Public Party
TAF:	Turkish Armed Forces
TGNA:	Turkish Grand National Assembly
TPP:	True Path Party
TWP:	Turkish Worker Party
UN:	United Nations
USA:	United States of America
VP:	Virtue Party
WP:	Welfare Party

PREFACE

What is expected from this study is to understand Turkish Islamist views about the relations between Turkey and EU, in the light of the historical background of the Turkey-EU relations. For that aim it tries to show how Turkish Islamists look to the West or EU. Which values, ideas or processes determine their views towards them. Do they support Turkey's membership process or not? If they are supporting this process, why are they doing so? If they are opposed to the process, in which perspective do they perceive it and what is the reason of this opposition? Is there any transformation on their views? If there is a transformation what is the reason of this transformation? In this study we will answer these questions.

INTRODUCTION

Relations between Turkey and Europe has continued to exist for centuries. This continuity is connected with the modernization/ westernization movements that have begun in the late Ottoman period. The main reason for this continuity is to presume the West as a model of Turkey and to accept it as a contemporary civilization that Turkey must achieve. These conditions were relevant especially for the early Turkish Republic, while the founders of the Republic were trying to form an official identity. The founders of the new Republic had radical reforms to form a modern and Western state. They did not aim only to reconstruct the state, they also tried to transform whole society. Accordingly, the founders acted with their will that aimed to break-off all values, traditions and morals which they found obsolete and thus inconvenient with a modern-Western state. However, the people did not fully realize this will. During those terms, people neither understood, nor accepted this modernization process. This difference between the state elites and people brought great gaps between them.

The founders of the new Turkish Republic not only founded a new Turkish state, they also determined state identity that different from national identity. For denying the official identity, Turkish Islamist movements used it as the “other” of their identification process. They differentiated themselves from the other groups in the society by convicting state and its official identity. They opposed to the state structure and rejected its fundamental principles. So, they opposed to Turkish modernization process and rejected Turkish westernization history by using their hostility towards the West and Western values. Thus, they strongly criticized state policy about EU membership process. Thus, Europe

was blamed by Islamist movements through policies of the secular regime. For denying the state project, the Turkish Islamist movements rejected the European civilization. Moreover, opposition of European civilization and EU symbolized their struggle against the secular state. Islamist movements, especially political Islamists represented oppositions to the Turkey's EU membership process in Turkey.

CHAPTER I

TURKEY AND EU: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

1. 1. The Historical Background

1. 1. 1. Historical Antecedents of Relations with Europe

From a broader perspective, the roots of Turkish and European relations date back to the times of the Otoman Empire. If the Otoman history is studied carefully, this can clearly be seen for the Ottoman state in the eighteenth century. The cause for this was the transformation of the Otomans' European policies. During the eighteenth century, the main goal of the Ottoman state was to control Europe under its hegemony in the name of being a world state. However, after the eighteenth century by modernization movements that goal had transformed into the aim of to understand and accept European superiority, unwillingly .

Towards the end of the seventeenth century, the power of the Ottoman began to shake because of the interior commotions and wars that came one after another. All the institutions of the state were destroyed and decadence reached to an unstoppable degree. For this reason some sultans and bureaucrats sought solutions that proved unusual for the society. Unlike in previous centuries, the state tried to solve its problems by adopting Western institutions, a desire which became more and more powerful. For this, it tried to understand new world system of the West. However, it was not successful in its attempts because of

the state structure and world system.

‘Islahat’ (reforms) movements were generally carried out on a military basis in the eighteenth century. Because, the main goal of the Ottoman Empire was to be a ‘cihat’ state, the military reforms had unquestionable priority. In this period the state had several reforms to adopt European military technical structures and methods. But, it could not get good results from “islahats” movements, and then modernization movements changed direction. The restoration of existent institutions did not bring good results, so more modern institutions were established besides old ones. For this aim, the state started to establish modern-Western style social order. Firstly, only sultans and the grand viziers developed modernization/Westernization movements, but then intellectuals who were educated in Europe became the carriers of these movements. The intellectuals tried to understand and apply Western modernization. Consequently, some circles, (not the whole society) especially elites appreciated Western values, and lifestyle. In this period, the dominant view was that the un-western societies and states, including the Ottoman state and society, were doomed unless they conformed to the new world conjuncture. The idea was modernization through Westernization. Thus, according to the elites in the Ottoman society, Ottoman Empire would be a modern only by Westernization.

Thus, we can say that modernization/Westernization movements which occurred as a result of necessities were made with utilitarian attitudes because several modernization movements had been made for political and military

benefits. And, there were not any theoretical preparations for these reform movements. Hence, the movements without not any theoretical bases proved unsuccessful. In European experience, modernization became as a result of people's demands, but in the Ottoman experience, the state demanded modernization, and modernization movements were not appreciated by people.

Finally, we can state that Turkish-European integration process started in the Otoman period with 'islahats' movements that were made to develop Ottoman military power by taking European military techniques and systems. Then, the dependent economical relations which occurred with the capitulations between the European states and the Otoman state and appreciations of European culture and life style developed the relations. Finally, after these militarial, economical and also socio-cultural closeness in the Ottoman period, political and judical adoptions by the new founded Turkish Republic increased integration process.

1. 1. 2. Europe: Changing Face

After the Second World War Europeans were beginning to think that only supranational unification on the continental level could provide continuous peace in Europe because the nation-state concept, which had established itself eventually consolidating different independent and sovereign states in Europe after the Renaissance and Reformation periods, brought only debates and chaos. According to them, such a unification was to be founded on the economical, political, social, as well as cultural basis. But, after the two world wars social,

political, economical and psychological conditions in these countries would not let them to establish socio-cultural, political, judicial and economical integration. They would reach this kind of integration with gradual steps later.

In the direction of this aim, they firstly established the OEEC in 1948.¹ The idea of founding a European Parliament came into question in 1947, but it was certified in 1948. The foundation of the European Parliament was delayed one year because of the opposition of England. Actually, these institutions were anything but cooperation like a coherent international organization. But, the reality of the Europe was in need of an integration besides these institutions. For this aim, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman offered to unify the French and Federal Germany's coal and steel industries under the common management programme. After the some European state's participation EURATOM was found. This foundation was the first step of the EU while Roma Treaty came in to the power in 1958 and EEC was legally founded. According to the Roma Treaty, EEC's basic goals were to find a common market and customs union for properties, common agricultural policies and transport policies with labour movements, and to find the common organizations for economical developments.²

1. 1. 3. Turkey and the West

According to Fay atomism (as an approach that is reinforced by a general ideology and by particular social conditions in the modern world) pictures the self as a monad, a hard integral entity radically different, and ultimately cutt off,

from others.³ He emphasized that when we think of our self we picture it as a subject of consciousness, as that which persists through time, and as the source of our activity. So, the self seems to be a single, coherent, persistent entity which as the perduring subject of our consciousness and behavior is the core of our being, in this way.⁴ However, according to him the self is essentially social. The presupposed certain social practices and even contractual, legal relationships are not possible without others. Consequently, he states that neither self nor the other is enclosed; their interaction is integral to who they are. Selves are not mere others to each other; they mutually help to define each other such that without others selves cannot have the capacity to be selves or the material to be the particular selves they are.⁵ J. Kristeva also states that other is an intrinsic thing rather than a transcendental and extrinsic thing. It is inside of us, and the complementary of our identification process.⁶

So, self is giving a meaning to the “other” to identify itself. In our case, in the light of this knowledge we can assume that Western civilization gives some meanings to the “others” for identify itself. It ‘inscribes itself onto the body and space of its others’. There were several others of the European identity formation process. And, in this identity process Turks were the most important “other” of European civilization because Turks were the most important threat to itself in the history.⁷ Europeans looked at Turks suspiciously, and they defined them as barbarian Muslims. This differentiation was also valid for Turks. Western civilization was the “other” of Turks.⁸ Differences in Europe, such as Enlightenment period, French Revolution, and Industrial Revolutions

brought about the modern Europe. While, Europe was continuing to develop in this period Turks declined against to this development process. Previously, Turks were looking superficially at Europe. But after the European development process, they had to accept European superiority. This acceptance led to an understanding process and then Turks took Europe as a model for new Turkey. This inclination even progressed in the new Republican period.

After the foundation of the new Turkish Republic, several reforms were made 'to reach the level of contemporary civilization,' i.e. the Western civilization. The founders of the new Turkish Republic insistently emphasized this fact.⁹ The new Republic turned its face towards West with the symbolization of breaking off with old traditions, East and Eastern values.¹⁰ In short, while the founders of the Turkish Republic was willing to be a modern state, the new Turkey aimed to pick ties with old regime which defined darkness and tension according to them.

In his book 'Black Skin White Masks', Fanon used the other and not-self for the white views of blacks and for the resulting black view of themselves. The implication of this assertion of a white self as subject in discourse was to leave the black other as object.¹¹ In this book, Fanon is 'devoted to detailing the cultural and ideological processes and pressures which create the desire for acceptances and assimilation, as well as feelings of inadequacy, objection and trauma'.¹² In Black Skin White Masks, he analysed the psychology of black man who had a relation with white woman. According to this book, there was a desire, suddenly a desire to be a white in the darkest part of black man's soul

which was as black as his face... He wanted to be known as a white man, not black afterwards. And he asked if it was not a white woman who would affirm this kind of existential desires? With white womans' love, he was worthy of a whites' love. He was loved as a white man as by white woman. So, he was a white. He would not marry only white woman, he would marry also with white culture, with marvelous white, with whitness of white...in her pure white existence, he would has white civilization, white honnour and white self-respect.¹³

In our case, like black man's desire to be white Turkey desires to be modern/contemporary civilization . In book, black man thought that with a white woman he would achieve his desires. Like black man's question, Turkey also asks that which will affirm its aim to reach contemporary civilization. Turkey's policies from the very beginning of its foundation show Turkey's answer to its question that only the West especially Europe will affirm its desire contemporary civilization Hence, in here Turkey's white woman is EU. It also thinks that by the integration with EU it will be contemporary civilization.

1. 1. 4. Turkey- EU Relations

Although, it has not followed clear and effective foreign policy untill 1950s, Turkey has showing clear tendency towards Western organizations. This tendency towards West is not a restricted and provisional policy, it is a continuous foreign policy preference.¹⁴ Generally, Turkey's policy towards West does not influenced by its security issues. However, we can say that

security issues were forming Western policies towards Turkey. The Democrat Party which was in power in the multi-party period, drew Turkey more closer to the West. With DP's policies, Turkey, implementing economical integration economical of West Europe, had to choose one of the integration integration organization between EFTA and EEC, and it chose EEC that was considered to be more powerful than EFTA.¹⁵ In July 31, 1959, Turkey made its first application to EEC. In this period, Turkey was strategically important for Europe because of the conditions that occurred in the Cold War era. For this reason, the European states looked at the Turkish application in positively. On July 24, 1962, the official negotiations began with Turkey which paved the way for the relations between Turkey and European Community in the future. Then, on September 12, 1963 Ankara Treaty was signed by Turkey and EEC. With this Treaty the negotiations were concluded. The Association Agreement provided three stages that would eventually lead to Custom Union and full membership. These stages were; the preparatory stage; the transitional stage and the final stage.¹⁶ Although, there was another reason for European positive attitude towards Turkey.

This reason was the Greek application that occurred at same period with Turkish application. EEC accepted Greek application and signed Association Agreement (Atina Treaty) with Greece. After the acceptance of the Greek application, EEC which was trying to be impartial had to accept Turkish application on behalf of indiscriminate.¹⁷

There was a long time between the first application in 1959 and Ankara

Treaty that signed in 1963. However, for some negative reasons relations between Turkey and EEC damaged. These reasons were the bad economical conditions of Turkey noticed by EEC in the talking period which began after the 1959; EECs' disinclined manner because it envisioned relations with Turkey would be problematic; and the military coup in 1960. Because of these reasons negotiations were interrupted from time to time. In spite of these problems, Turkish diplomats of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided to sign Ankara Treaty.¹⁸ Actually, difficulties that began in the beginning of the relations would show the direction of the relations afterwards.

Ankara Treaty was considered as a symbol of achieving the contemporary civilization level that Ataturk had assigned as a target and supported by politicians, businessman and even by media.¹⁹ In this term, government, diplomats, bureaucrats and political parties except *Turkiye Isci Partisi* (TWP), were satisfied this step in the way of Westernization. In 1964, Preparatory stage that was planned to continue for five years after Ankara Treaty began. The main goal of this stage was to make the Turkish economy ready for the transitional stage. But, *Adalet partisi* (JP) which was in power did not do anything about this subject although it had promised to place real importance on applications at this stage. Thus, integration process was put aside, and it went out of the political agenda. In spite of these negative conditions, in the meeting of the Association Council in 1967, Turkish government demanded to start. Because of the force of Turkish government the Association Council decided to start negotiations towards conditions of transitional stage, despite unwillingness of

EEC.²⁰ The conditions of the transitional stage were concluded in 1970. Turkey signed the Additional Protocol that arranged the transition process for the Custom Union.²¹ This Protocol caused the reactions in the country because of the interior reasons. The opposition groups which occurred by the 1961 constitution opposed to the government decisions about integration process. They reacted to the government decisions about integration process by using Additional Protocol. The most important thing was that during this period some supporter groups were also against to this Protocol. They claimed that this Protocol had to transform because the period of the transitional stage was so short and Turkish industry would influence negatively from these conditions.²² This oppositions that against to Additional Protocol and also Turkish political and economical problems caused to suspend the relations between Turkey and EEC. In 1978, Turkey demanded to scrutinize the relations with Custom union and it demanded five years for the Additional period. After these demands, Turkey directed to freeze the Custom Union process. This decision that was taken by Turkish government effected the relations negatively.

On June 30, 1973, the Supplemental Protocol was signed by Turkey and EEC. However, EC completed this process in 1977, this Protocol fulfilled in 1986,²³ because of the political instability in Turkey. In the meeting of Association Council on February 5, 1980, Hayrettin Erkmen who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs during this period, demanded to resume the Associational process that was frozen before. He also claimed that Turkey would apply to EC for full membership.²⁴ This claim caused debates in Europe

and even in Turkey. After, this claimed Erkmén had to resign from the Ministry on September 5, 1980, because the interpellation that was came to the motion in the Parliamentary. Anti-democratic conditions of Turkey just after the 1980 military coup and identity problems caused debates in Europe. Frequently, EC expressed that this anti-democratical conditions in Turkey were disturbed it.

However, after the military coup in 1980, Turkish army stated that Turkey would continue its relations with EC in the direction of Atatürk's aim. It also claimed that Turkey had to apply for full membership.²⁵ So, with this explanations Turkey army tried to protect and guarantee the relationship. However, during this period alongside with economical problems, shutting down all political parties and sentencing some politicians and the other political problems effected the relations. Thus, relations was damaged by problems in spite of positive manner of the army.²⁶ The Community did not look at Turkey optimistically because of anti-democratical process.²⁷ In 1983, Turkey passed again to the democratical period with general elections however the Community did not change its attitude against Turkey. In spite of civil government, there was a continuity on the martial laws and the obstacles over media, labor union and associations were continuing so EC had a decision that democracy would not work in Turkey.²⁸ In this period the relations between Turkey and the EC were directed negatively in the context of the human rights and democracy. Although, on April 14, 1987, MP's government applied for full membership to EC. In spite of these negative conditions, Özal defended that Turkey would be more democrat. After the application, Özal made some adoptions that brought Turkey

more suitable for European standards. These adoptions were: acceptance of the rights of the individual application to the European Human Rights Commission in January 1987; get out the prohibitions over politicians; signed European and UN's agreements on tortures; accepted the authority of the European Human Rights Court.²⁹ With such adoptions, Turkey was trying to improve its image. But, Turkey did not get date for its application, despite these adoptions.³⁰ After the last decision that was taken by EU against to it, Turkey attempted to reconstruct, and to develop relations in 1991.³¹ After the meeting of Association Council in Brussels (on November 9, 1992) relations started to be a normal. In this period, the talking point of relations was the Custom Union, rather than the application for full membership. Turkey thought that it would take important steps on the Custom Union, however Custom Union agreement had not fulfilled until 1995. Even though there was a decision that taken on November 8, 1993, in the meeting of Association Council, Custom Union has realized until 1995. Finally, The Custom Union was accepted in the meeting of Association Council on March 6, 1995 and came to the power on January 1, 1996. In the Maastricht Summit, EU expound to the lists of the states for getting into Union in short or long term. But, Turkey kept out from this list. EU explained that Turkey could be a full member of EU as usual, although it emphasized that there was a need of determined strategy for Turkey different from other candidate states for full membership.

After the Luxembourg Summit, the dominant view in Turkey was that with some interior problems, like Cyprus and minority problem in Turkey, Turkey

kept out to the EU's enlargement process. The most reactionary matter was the implication of the Southern Cyprus entrance into the enlargement process as a whole Cyprus. Turkey had new decisions to scrutinize relations that also included to cut down political dialogue with EU.³³

Although, in 1999, application of Turkey for full membership accepted by EU, in Helsinki Summit. EU stated that Turkey would depend on same criteria with other candidate states, and would be ready to full membership. Although, EU decided that the relations would continue over the 'Accession Partnership' which was accepted in the Nice Summit in December 2000 by EC Commission.³⁴ 'Accession Partnership' would mobilize all forms of assistance for candidate states within a single framework for the implementation of national programs to prepare them for membership.

Thus, 'Accession Partnership' that called "yol haritasi" (road map) in Turkey, included political assistance that was determined with the Copenhagen criteria, and economical reforms that Turkey had to do. Turkey confirmed the national programme, and it promised to realize all legal removals in political, social economical context. In the direction of national programme, Turkey is trying to become in European standards with the adoptional laws.

1. 2. A Background for Turkish Politics and Islam

1. 2. 1. From Empire to Republic: the New Turkey

1. 2. 1. 1. From Empire to the Early Republic: Rise of a Western Secular Model

As we mentioned before, Turkish modernization process began in the late Otoman period. It started with some Otoman elites, and it grew up in the hands of the Republican elites. After the struggle for Independence, the Turkish Republican founders slowly began to base their imagined regime over the substructures of the Young Ottoman's constitutionalism, parliamentary and secular education ideas, and the Young Turks' modern nation state ideas. Thus, we can state that the critiques of their regime determined before by the Otoman intellectuals. However, it was a radical version of the Otoman intellectuals' ideas. Even, Ataturk and many other Republican founders were coming from the Young Turks' traditions. Like the Young Turks they also believed that they would not have political revolution before the social and economical revolutions. And they also took lessons from the failure of the Young Turks' revolution. The Young Turks came to the power for the aim of to save the Ottoman Empire from the destruction. But, the Young Turks political and social alternatives were limited. Because of the chaos, economical and social crisis in the Ottoman society, they would not certify their ideas, and they were obligated to come an settlement to the conservative powers. Thus, they established the constitutional monarchy that was based on Islam.³⁵ So, the Republican founders had more radical decisions because of the Young Turks' experience was the clear lesson for them. So, their regime expressed radical breaking off the old regime. Their regime had to be different from the structure Ottoman's regime in political, social and economical context. Because, Western modernization which was universally accepted was the model for the modern Turkey's state-building process.

So, the Republican founders aimed independent and modern nation-state system in spite of the traditional/Islamic state system which was seen the cause of the decadence. This modern-nation state had to have modern industry for its economy. For this, it had to have modern science and education for being a rationalist nation. Thus, by constructing a strong tradition of ideological positivism the Republican modernist elites have aimed toward secularization, rationalization and nation-building³⁶

The Republican elites changed the old constitution and established the Republic on October 29, 1923. The Republican elites were in the minority in the parliament. While their aim was becoming clear, differentiation between councillors became obvious in the parliament. The councillors who were in the majority stated that they had not done the independent struggle to change state structure, completely. Their aim was to revise the order of old state. They were against to the Republican elites, and they claimed that there was not any different alternative from constitutional monarchy that controlled by Otoman dynasty. They thought that the administration which was tried to occur by the Republican elites, was a different version of old absolute monarchy, but it would be absolute Republic.³⁷ They opposed to the new regime by using traditions, religion and symbols such as the dynasty and the caliphate. This oppositions caused the decision that abolished the caliphate, and departed the Otoman dynasty's members by the Republican founders. Although, these decisions also were taken for establish a secularist state which aimed by the Republican elites in the national-building process.

After the reactions in the country, by the Istiklal Mahkemeleri (the Independence Tribunals) which established with the Takrir-i Sukun Yasasi (Law on the Maintenance of Order) several reforms were made for to secularize, and also to modernize the society. These reforms included the abolition of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations, abolition of the fez, dissolution of the dervish orders, reform of the calendar, adoption of the Swiss Civil Code and such radical reforms like disestablishment of the state religion, adoption of the Latin alphabet and the use of the Turkish language in the Latin alphabet and the use of the Turkish language in the Islamic call to prayer.³⁸

According to Kadioglu, these reforms constituted an onslaught on the existing cultural practices. They opted for a general state of amnesia which would lead to a process of estrangement of the people from some of their own cultural practices.³⁹ Like Kadioglu, Feroz Ahmad also refers to the adoption of the Latin alphabet in place of the Arabic script as the most iconoclastic reform of the period. And he emphasizes that 'at a stroke, even the literate people were cut off from their past. Overnight, virtually the entire nation was made illiterate'⁴⁰

The Menemen incident which became in 1930, was the turning point of the reforms. It caused the centralization of the Republican regime. This incident showed that the effects of the past over society. whereas, the Republican elites aimed was to remove the effects of the old regime by their new regime and to make a modern Turkey. The Republican elites saw the gap

between society and themselves and secularist reforms had not taken root. Because of the incompetences of their reforms they went forward by to take new more radical reforms. They tried to establish a new state ideology for the reasure of society.⁴¹ This is the ideology of Kemalism that substituted for traditional policies and stuffed gaps between state and society. the ideology of Kemalism was launched in accordance with the six fundemantal and unchangeale principles. These principles are the Republicanism, Nationalism, Populsm, Statism, Secularism and reformism.⁴²

1. 2. 1. 2. The Emergence of Multi-party Rule: A New Balance

Turkish government and its leader Ismet Inonu who was in power after Ataturk, with straint policies, disgraced on the great part of the society. With its applications Inonu's government occured deep gap between the state and the people.

During this period, there were important developments in the world. People were observing and effecting this developments in Turkey. Especially, they were influenced by the capitalist/democratic system in USA which emerged as the sovereign power after the Second World War. With this influence the mass that was disapproving the existant system began to express their demands for democratic system. With these demands, but paticularly with Western force, Inonu stated that the primary lack of Turkish system was the lack of an opposition party, in his speech on November 1, 1945.

Then, government accepted to put an end to the only party system and pass to the multi-party system. Although, in April 1945, Turkey signed the UN charter that committed itself to democratic ideals in the San Francisco Conference.

On January 7, 1946 Democratic Party (DP) was founded by Celal Bayar, Refik Koraltan, Fuat Koprulu and Adnan Menderes. The government and so RPP was not against to this party in the beginning. Because, they thought that, like Free Republican Party, DP would be a docile opposition party which would keep them awake but would not challenge to them. Although, with emphasizing liberal democracy, the leaders of DP were old Kemalist who defended same main ideas like them. They also accepted six principle of Kemalism. This situation vindicated governments' thought. But, they also claimed that they would carry this principles more liberal line in accordance with time. So, their main goal was to change regime to a democratic structure. Also, they aimed decrease the interference state by political and economical liberalism and increase individual rights and freedoms.

DP was accepted by people, excitingly. This relevance provided RPP to see how their system did not adopt in society. Because of this situation, RPP took the necessary measurements that would liberalize itself and society. RPP had some measurements. According to them, Inonu would give up 'national leader' and 'permanent party chairman' status; and the party leader could come to the head of party by elections. The measurements that taken for society were; elections structure would transformed to the direct elections; the press law would be liberaed; and administrative autonomy would be given to the

universities. In spite of these measurements the twenty seven year old rule of the RPP came to the end in 1950. In May, 1950 elections DP overwhelming majority. DP had 408 seat against the RPPs' 69. And the success in 1954 general elections reinforced its increased its share of vote from 53.6 to 58.4 per cent while the RPP share dropped from 39.9 to 35.1 per cent. So, DP had 503 seats against the RPPs' 31. In the beginning DP which had the important majority in the Assembly and supported by people, especially by liberal intellectuals and business class, was following anti-state policies. But, it comprehended how its progress over slick basis.

Because, in the period of its administration, RPP provided to connect the party with state for to maintain the only party dictatorship. So, state civil and military bureaucracy was in the same mentality with government (RPP). DP hesitated to the bureaucrats, and for this hesitation DP practiced anti-democratic methods that like authoritarian structure of the only party period. The oppositions started in society -even supporter groups were against to its policies- after the anti-democratic applications like; to put pressure on press, universities and judicial powers. These applications and economical failure brought the military coup on May 27, 1960. This intervention was made in response to strong indications that the government's commitment to democratic procedures seriously declined. This was the first military coup of the Turkish Republic but not last.

1. 2. 2. The Revival of Islam in the Early Decades of Multi- party Period

In the one party period with radical reforms state elites tried to put Kemalist ideology in the place of religion (Islam). But, they did not succeed this. Kemalist ideology would not replace Islam in the public life. With the prohibitions of Islamist institutions, life styles and some traditional practices would not destroy it. Islamists would continue its existence underground during this period.

After passing democratic period, with its liberal, democratical structure DP took support of conservatives especially some groups like Nurettin and Naksibendi in society. These groups formed covert and overt alliances with the rule of DP. There were also different Islamist parties in this period. The first one was the Islamic Democratic Party (IDP). It was founded in 1951 by Cevat Rifat Atilhan as the first Islamist party in the Turkish Republic. After IDP, some Islamist parties, such as Islamic Protection Party and Nation Party were founded. However, they were shut down short time later from their formation, because they were blamed to be against secularism. In spite of these Islamist parties, Islamists supported DP. So, these Islamist parties were not supported by the public. Islamists preferred DP, because they were aware of such Islamist parties would not maintain their existences in the state's system. So, they preferred DP which was promising individual rights and freedom with the decreasing of government interference. Islamists felt more close with DP in spite of RPP.

However, as we mentioned above, DP's part programme did not much differ from RPP's. It also accepted general principles of Kemalism like secularism.

However, after came into power DP brought an end to the some prohibitions like the prohibition of the call to prayer (ezan) in its original Arabic language. According to the Zürcher DP accept the existence of autonomous religious organizations such as the brotherhoods and even legitimized them when it accepted the support of the Nurcu movement in the 1954 and 1957 elections. So, by the soften secularist policies under the DP, Islam much more prominent in everyday life in the cities.

The main importance of this period was that the Islamist groups were expressing themselves more strongly in the political arena. Then, with the 1961 constitution they began to operate legally but this legality did not meant to do anything that they aimed. Their activities were still technically banned.

In 1960, military shut down DP because of its anti-secularist policies with anti-democratic attitudes. After the military coup, with passing the new democratic system, Islamist groups founded a new refuge with the foundation of Justice Party (JP) that founded under the leadership of Suleyman Demirel. JP leader used Islam to gain support from some religious groups. With their support JP passed RPP and gathered the majority of votes, in 1965 general elections. So, came to the power in 1965.

The period between 1960 and 1970 was the term of unsuccessful coalition

governments, economic and political instability in Turkey. During this period the military gained more influence in the polity and took action against the ideological polarization in the politic. The 1971 military coup changed the course of Turkish politics again. The military held the Grand National Assembly and the government responsible for dragging the country into anarchy, economic and social instability. According to military the future of the Turkish Republic was seriously threatened and the parliament and government had caused the public to lose all hope of reaching the level of contemporary civilization.⁴³

However, 1971 military coup did not change the classic fundamental peculiarities of Turkish politics. Social, economic and political instability continued after the coup. In the late 1970s the clashes between groups on the left and the right wing and bloody terror caused another military intervention on 12 September 1980.

The primary aims of the 1980 coup were to depoliticize the society and to restructure political activity. For these aims the military junta tried to bring religion under their control and use it for their strategic objectives. They led to compliant Islam against to communism, facism and religious fundamentalism that were perceived as real threats for the regime. However, the regime's appeal to the Islamic discourse to create ideological unity caused the emergence of Islamic groups within both state and civil society and also within the Turkish political arena.

After 1980s, the ideology of Kemalism which was the official ideology of the Turkish state was softened. The principle of 'etatism' which was the one of the hard and closed dogma of Kemalism from the very beginning of the Republic was rejected. And the other principles of Kemalism such as nationalism and populism gained new meanings. In this period, the neo-liberal Motherland Party which won 1983 and 1987 elections came into the power. With its liberal and conservative attitude this party was supported by the conservative and religious oriented groups. Under the control of MP state intervention was directed toward the privatization and liberalization of the economy and the creation of new trade regime. MP with its export-oriented economic development model it gave birth to a new business class which had provincial background. This new model provided opportunities not only to the established business elite, but also to the small and medium businessman in Anatolian towns. These elite class represented the provincial identity and conservative and traditional values. Thus, we can say that this new model opened up the domestic market to Islamic capital.

In 1970 NOP as a nationalist and conservatist party was founded by Erbakan and his friends. As an Islamist party in its programme it carried conservatism and seriat in the social files and small bourgeoisie against to big one in the economical file. So, the NOP represented religiously conservative sunnis who were informal member of outloded religious orders and the small traders and artisans (esnaf) of the hinderland. They rejected Ataturk and his principles, obviously. Because, Ataturk's radical reforms from politics to daily

life almost intended to get rid of the Islamic motifs from the public sphere. Their main goals were to establish the celebrated religious state like the old Ottoman Empire and were to protect their religious identity against the modernizing secular regime. They formed their policy over criticism of Orientalism and Western modernization. As we mentioned above, the modernizing process was understood as to Westernization by the Republican elites and also by the Islamist movements. Thus, in the name of rejecting the Kemalist project, they rejected the Western civilization.

With the entrance of this party in the Turkish political arena Islam have become more visible in the society. Although, by this party several issues (like secularism, democracy, human rights, modernization/westernization...) and the relationship between those issues and Islam were questioned in public sphere. This party and the other Islamist movements clarified their positions and perceptions on several problems in Turkey. As we will see in the following chapter, selectively their perceptions will appear on Turkey's EU membership process.

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CHAPTER II

TURKISH ISLAMISTS AND EU

2. 1. Turkish State Identity and Foreign Policy

The founders of the Turkish Republic tried to unify the old states structure with whole society and tried all radical ways for the transformation. Because, the traditional structure of the old state was completely different from the ideal state structure. The main goal of the Republican founders was to have the same features of the contemporary civilization structure. So, the new state's "other" was the Ottoman. They tried to put modern system instead of traditional orders, also they tried to transform radical reforms into the society. In spite of heterogeneous structure of the society, they tried to form a homogeneous society and tried to create a suitable Turkish identity according to their ideology. They attempted to assimilate all different identities into the new state identity. They proceeded offensive attitudes to the conditions that would be a threat against their identity policies. This was also the same for religious groups in order not to be effective in the society. Moreover, they certified some 'Islamization' policies.

We must consider that, this official state identity was completely incomparable with Turkish national identity, there were huge differences between them. The state official identity was reflected on Turkish foreign

affairs.

As Saban Calis states that modern Turkish foreign policy is the reflection form of state official identity in the international relations.¹ M. K. Ataturk, who was the founder of the modern Turkey, formulated the principles of Turkish foreign policies while establishing the modern and the Western Turkey. Foreign policy's basis was by Ataturk's goal. Governments came and passed, several military interventions had been done but there were not any distraction about this foreign policy structure. It is unchangeable, because there is a 'permanent principle' and even a foreign policy in that state policy.

This condition inevitably increases among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which is an important actor in determining the foreign policies.² In some events Foreign Affairs bureaucracy came over the Minister of Foreign Affairs that was selected by government that it developed policies in the lights of Ataturk's principles. It did not act apart from these principle lines. Consequently, we can say that Foreign Affairs bureaucracy come over the Minister Affairs' bureaucracy by the guarantor of Ataturk's principles, after Turkish military.

From the standpoint of establishment, the relations with West were obligated as Westernization was supposed as an obligation of Kemalist ideology. Although, foreign policy that put into this formulation, the relations with EU and Turkey's EU membership policy were determined as an inalienable part for that it's a natural reality of Kemalist foreign policy mentality. As the most important guarantor of Kemalist principles Turkish military is both sensitive for this foreign policy and giving full support for

Turkey's EU membership policy³ that stated Turkey's EU membership policy as an inalienable extension of the Kemalist modernization process after the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Therefore, we can mention that in the concept of the integration process with EU, decisions were taken by limited groups in Turkey. These groups were the Ministers of foreign Affairs, upper-level bureaucrats and diplomats. For this, their decision making system and integration policies were an obligation for the governments whether they were willing or not willing to apply. These limited groups also had a decision making policy that especially with EU relations they applied. Despite, those relations were a vital policy according to them, neither political parties, civil society organizations nor intellectuals were informed. These groups did not have a total information about the relations. The decisions, made in the beginning of the relations, were neither reflected to the public nor informed.

We saw that, many different groups were not informed about EU and the relations with it, because of the Turkish Foreign Affairs structure and decision making system in Turkey. With the lack of information like other groups, Islamists also did not have so much information about EU and Turkish integration process. They tried to develop their views and stood straight against Turkey's EU policies with the lack of informations as what's the aim of it or for the process that it passed. For that, by the new situations and new conditions, their views changed about by time. We can give Hayreddin Karaman as good example, who is one of the Islamist intellectuals in Turkey. In a manner of getting apart from the usual Islamist perspective Karaman stated that Turkey's

entrence into EU would be fundamental advantage for Turkey, in 1987, an interview in Altınoluk Magazine.⁴ But, beginning of 1990's he changed his views about EU. According to him this transformation become in the result of the lack of informations.

2. 2. Opponent Perceptions on Europe/Integration by Different Political Groups, With Special Reference to the “National View” Movement

In line with the above-mentioned state identity and policy direction, on the behalf of “to reach to the contemporary civilization” each sorts of integration with West, meanwhile particularly with the EEC from 1959 on, have been perceived as a national action by state. In this direction, all executions that were made by state were seen as a necessities of this national action. But, public opinion would not taken into consider completely for this national action. Because of the fact that Turkish Republic and state's bureaucracy structure, public could not evaluate the policies in good conditions. Particularly, this condition was valid for the Turkey's EU membership process. Unfortunately, with the lack information, individuals, institutions, and the movements tried to determine their place within this integration process in Turkey. This ignorance caused important incoherences with European integration to Turkish society. In the beginning, European integration process was reflected only by its economical dimention in Turkey, on the contrary that this integration process aimed to be also a political integration. Turkish integration process with Europe was seenonly as an economical integration that public was in some views

supporting and the others criticizing the integration. Some political parties like TWP, NAP, and, NOP were opposite to states' EEC policies in the political arena. Also, TWP strongly criticized Turkish EEC policies.⁵

While the Ankara Treaty which was signed in 1963 was being questioned, by stating that this step was wrong, TWP expressed itself on this important period of Turkish foreign policy. In those dates RPP, as an important fortress of Turkish left, was giving full support on Turkish integration process with Europe. By realizing its policies according with its ideologies and with the founder M. K. Ataturk's ideas, RPP considered this integration process as a necessary for the modern Turkey. Actually, in the context of relations with the West, there were not any more Western political party in Turkey.⁶

Although, after the first application of DP in 1959, it provided Turkish membership of the western organizations, and also it maintained the relations with EEC under the leadership of Inonu. RPP signed the Ankara Treaty, while putting forward most of the parts of Ankara Treaty discussions. It demonstrated Ankara Treaty as an important step of Turkish Westernization history according to Ataturks' aims to reach to the level of contemporary civilizations.⁷

In spite of RPP, as a more radical part of Turkish left TWP's protest against to the relations with EEC, was so considerable. This Turkish leftist party was opposed to the integration in the context of ideology and even in economics, while it was called EC and then ECC as an imperialist states community.

The other political formation against the integration with EEC was NAP in

this period, while it was not seem to be so opposite to attempt on integration with West. NAP refused to the entry to common market, because it had effective critiques in public opinion as an opposing formation. It was opposed to the EEC, for its different culture and history and also, because of its framework of fixed nationalist ideas. According to NAP, this union meant the loss of Turkish nation's social, economical and political future and, it was the end of the state.⁸ Besides those political formations, other political groups that were formed under the name of "Milli Görüş" (National View) movement, were also against to Turkish integration movements with EEC.

Under the characteristic personality of Erbakan "National View" movement which is carried on it's social and political existence nowadays, was firstly instituted it's political progress under the name of Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party-NOP) in 1970 and after that Milli Selamet Partisi(National Salvation Party-NSP), Refah Partisi (Welfare Party-WP), Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party-VP) and Saadet Partisi (Fecility Party-FP) in sequence. The "East-West" differentiation is a considerable fact in the formation of this movement while identifying itself, also it used "East-West" concepts as binary oppositions. West is its opposite, namely 'West' is "the other". Thus "National View" movement defines itself over that; so it's trying to show the differentiation in this way. By glancing at West as, both the Crusaders within it's religious perspective and it's social and cultural values, this movement was against to West and all the values of it. So, anti-Westernism is the vital source of its identity and political ideology.

Despite “East-West” differentiation is a foreign policy issue, the interesting point is that this differentiation determines also its local identity. This movement centralized its foreign policy ideas to local policy by evaluating other individuals, parties or institutions according to where they stand with West. If they do not think as themselves, this movement would receive this party or institution as the others of it in domestic policy, and would call them “western imitators”.

This anti-western policy also indicate “National View” movement’s attitude in Turkey’s EU membership process. As a leader of this movement, Erdogan firstly, explained his ideas about European integration (to the public) by his speech in the Assembly.⁹ He stated that he did not suggest the cancellation of the Negotiations but he suggested the delay of the Transformation stage. In his second speech in the Assembly, he was opposed to all the relations with EC.¹⁰ As we have mentioned above, opposite groups from leftists to rightists or nationalists exposed their oppositions to the EEC similarly while EEC was questioning in the society. According to leftist groups, if Turkey entered into the common market it would be colonized by Western imperialist states. Like leftist groups, rightists also mentioned EEC as a “second sevır”.

Besides, the deny of European integration process with political dimensions and the lack of information about community, opposite political parties and social groups rejected the Turkish integration process only for the economical reasons. However, “National view” movement emphasized its

political-ideological dimensions while, it was proposed that European integration process was not only economical unity it would be a political unity, consequently.¹¹ According to Erbakan “our (Turkish) history is a history of the clash between European and Islamic culture, for about 1500 years”¹² so, to integrate into such as an organization that has different civilization, culture, identity would be unacceptable. He mentioned that if Turkey entered into the Community, Turks would lose their cultural values and believes.¹³ And also he claimed that the Community was a Christian union and if Turkey entered into this Community, Turkey would be a colony of the West.

Erbakan tried to strengthen his ideas by using Zionism while he was criticizing the integration process, as a fact that was an important place in “national view” movement policies. At first he claimed that EU was a Zionist plot to control the whole world.¹⁴ According to him the Community was a result of the compose of Jewish-Greek-Christian cultures, so, he thought that it was a Zionists game. Because, the Community was based on Zionist idea, however it seem as a Catholic union. Moreover, like Gobineau’s arguments over races, he assumed EC as a three floor building. According to this idea, Capitalist Zionists was living at the upper floor, Europeans who were providing survival of the Capitalist Zionists by helping them, was living at the second floor, lastly at the bottom they were looking for servants and labourers as a reply to their needs. They wanted Turkey into the Community as a result of those reasons. On the other hand Turkey could not have any place but the bottom floor.¹⁵ Erbakan, from time to time was stating these views. In the beginning of 1990’s he claimed his opposition to Turkey’s EU membership process by using the explanations on

Zionism as a belief that aimed to exploit whole humanity and to enslave it for itself also it was trying to set up the Great Israel. In this direction Zionism tried to control the Imperialist states and succeeded it. Eventually, he claimed Zionism would provide Turkey the entrance into the European Union.¹⁶

According to the Erbakan, if Turkey entered into the Union, it would be only a province not an independent state but it would be the loss of its sovereignty. Being a province and a satellite of the Federal European State was unacceptable. Turkey would be a leader of the new world. After these statements he was supporting the Islamic Common market against the European Common Market. Instead of being a second class country, Turkey should be the leader of Islamic Common market.¹⁷

2. 3. Islamist Intellectuals' Perceptions of EU: Representative Examples

After the 1970s, Turkey's EU membership process has been questioned by Islamist intellectuals. Some of the Islamist intellectuals criticized Turkish Westernization process that was aimed by the founders of the new Republic and its supporters for a long time. They were opposed to west and its modern world structure and saw Turkey's EU membership process as the most important goal for modernization movements, for this reason membership process was a reason of the critiques by Islamist intellectuals.

Islamic intellectuals, who were against to integration were putting forward

common views like Erbakan's views about the European Community and Turkish relations with it. For example, Sabahattin Zaim who is one of the Islamist intellectuals stated that the main goal of Common market was the establishment of the United State of Europe and its essence leaning on religious adoptions.¹⁸ He claimed that EEC established before Roma Treaty that signed in 1957 by three Catholic leader who came together in the Roman Catholic Council. This claim seems like Erbakan's views, such as he also claimed EEC as a "Catholic Unity". According to Zaim Turkey needed to multilateral, versatile and honourable foreign policy in international relations and there were two targets in front of Turkey; one of them was the Common Market that established by Christian West and the matter of Turkish entrance to this union; and the other one was Islamic world that Turkish culture depends on this world with the old ties and the matter of Turkish relations with it. After those determinations, Zaim was arguing on which union was Turkey had to incline towards. And finally he decided to be in favour of Islamic world. Because, Turkey would cooperate with Islamic world rather than to wait the admission of Turkey in the Common Market that was result of Christian world. For him, Turkey as in the past could establish its group by hadling the leadership of the Islamic and Turkish world.¹⁹ According to him this was not so diffucult because there were three permanent committee leader of Islam Conference Organization²⁰ that was the only unifying institution of Islamic world after Ottomans state. One of them was the president of Turkish Republic. Then, he carried arguments in cultural field to explain how wrong was the integration with West (EEC). It would be so wrong if Turkey integrated with EEC that had

a different and foreign culture. He emphasized that would be a unilateral integration, because Turkish muslim society could not get adopted to this foreign cultural system. If Turkey entered to EEC, Turkish society would lost its identity and would be assimilated into Christian culture. So, EEC and Turkish integration would be occurred by only in this way.

In economical field Zaim defended that form in the standpoint of obligations Turkey would be in an unstable condition when common Custom Tarifts put into pratice in the subsequent of Transition stage in accordance with Treaty. Because the Community would change the policies freely in concerning Common Customs tariffs while it would not consult to Turkey. And, it would limit Turkey's liberty of developed relations with third world.²¹

Consequently, Sabahattin Zaim stated that despite the Turkish integration process with EEC had a lot of objections, the establishment of the integration with Islamic world would be for the benefit of Turkey in every respect. He also claimed that in spite of these objections some grounds wanted integration. According to him these groups were the "cosmopolitan" who refused Islam and "perceived modernization only as to import western cultural values".²²

In this period, as other opposite Islamist intellectuals opposed to integration was Ali Bulac. According to him from 1950 to this period, disorderness shown itself almost in every occasion / especially the essence of relations between Turkey and the West. In the result of Stalin's demands over Turkish territory developed in time Turkey found salvation in entering to NATO. Bulac stated that these decisions that was taken under extraordinary and

unequal conditions, was a great mistake in the essence as a result of relations with USA and NATO.²³ Turkey estranged itself from its basic region and fell contrary to its interests even among the Islamic world.²⁴ According to him Turkey was the one of the important states that adopted Westernization and western political institutions with radical methods in the early dates; even it was counted as the only model in this area. New Republic tried to structuralize the Turkish society. Eventually, military and civil bureaucrats who were grown with westernization traditions in the Ottoman Palace, were the stuff who realized the brand-new structures in Turkey.²⁵ Then intellectuals took this role even under the worldship of military civil bureaucrats.²⁶

While Turkey was getting ready about this matter for full membership application to EEC, there would be essential debates in Turkey as in Europe. According to groups that demanded integration with West becoming a full member of EEC was perceived as the completion of this period with happy ending that had begun in the Ottoman period. For a long time they made a lot of preparations for this.²⁷ But this decision about the integration was not reflecting wholly the society's views. It was only a decision that was taken only by a group in society. According to Bulac this elite class acted as if the natural inheritor of the public and also without asking any questions took its own decisions on this issue. In a way, "despite the public for the public" this elite society continued its manner in the same way.²⁸

We mentioned above that the relations with West had begun the reasons that some of the groups supported the relations in the eighteenth century by Ottomans. That was a continuous process. Turkish Republic's founders who

shared the same views with the motivated westernization mission in ottoman state tired to adopt and develop this mission. Also, Bulac stated that there was a great similarity between the reasons that the groups' supporting the integration process with West and the groups that wanted to Westernise the Ottoman's from head to toe.²⁹

According to him these groups in the Ottoman period were Esraf and Ayan and the landowners who wanted to guarantee the transformence of their rights on the lands, to "private property" in the order of Ottoman, the intellectuals who were educated in Europe and the politicians and the administrators who saw their future in westernizing process around the Ottoman Palace, and for the last the non-muslims who were in the state.³⁰

As we mentione above, Turkish Republican elites, not only found and established new Turkish state, but also they determined the identity that was different from Turkish national identity. this new state identity determines people life in public sphere, up to the states policies. Consequently, the mentality that control the Turkish foreign policy and identity of this policy is not Turkish national identity, it is Turkish Republican state's identity.³¹

Like many people in Turkey, Ali Bulac said that Turkish national identity should give a direction to Turkish foreign policy. Then he state that Turkey was located in Western civilation for150 years while, it is belong to Muslim's, Orient and Islamic world.³²

According to him we should to answer some questions like "Was Turkey's place in Europe in the final context? What would have been our manner and foreign policy against Islamic world? Would have said 'yes' to all decisions that

was taken by ECC? And the most important question was, Where were Turkey belong to? He believed that the best answers to these questions should be given by the whole nation with referendum³³ such as the important decisions's like entering into ECC. It was not only these groups matter, it was the matter of wide mass that reach %95 of society. However, Turkish politicians claimed that integration process was supported by %95 of the society. According to Bulac 'if the profits and the losses were brought into the Community also argued openly in the society and the mass was informed sufficiently in referendum, we should see that the rates of the supporters would not be %95, it would be %5.³⁴ In his book he argued some leftist intellectuals and author in Turkey changing ideas about Community (EU). Before they were opposed to integration supported by Turkish elitist class, but after behaved more desirous from liberalist rights and conservatists. The reason of these changing was essential cultural awaking of Islamic that begun in Islamic world and consequently in Turkey. In response to this situation they believed that if Turkey entered to EU this awaking would be regress at least it would not be a 'treath' for Turkey.³⁵ Although, there were same views between some Islamist and supporters of full integration. Islamist movements which developed and express itself in the intellectual level, would come to the end. Some Muslims also supported integration process with different aims and ideas. They believed that melting in western civilization policies that began in last century would be completed if Turkey entered EU.³⁶ Ali Bulac did not accept this muslims views. According to Bulac muslims identity consciousness that perceived itself in some levels, would be more powerful if Turkey entered to EU. Because, states official identity that tried to

establish in Turkey would lose its power in such an organized and comprehensive integration structure for expressing themselves. And such a process would give an only opportunity to people. This was the 'religious feeling' that would not effect erosions of basic national features and this feeling should be considered important in establishment of more activist 'Islamic World'.³⁷ So, Bulac opposed to EU, because Turkey's location should be the Islamic world. He claimed that Turkey was a country that ready and sufficient for having a location in Islamic world as natural piece of it. According to him Turkey would turn to Islamic world one day, even if it entered into EU as a result of some political decisions that wouldn't exceed mechanics interference structure. Because, 'everything turns to its origin' as coherent to the valid cosmic laws in the universe. And so, Turkey belonged to Islamic World, not Europe.³⁸ He suggested a project for Islamic world. He used the Medina Agreement which was made between the Prophet Mohammed and the Jewish leaders of Medina.

Another opposite intellectual to the integration was Hayreddin Karaman who had been one of the supporters of EU integration process different from Islamists accustomed views about EU. He claimed that there would not be so much disadvantage, even though entering to EU would be benefit for Turkey and Turkish Muslims. However, in the beginning of 1990s, he stated that his ideas about Common Market had changed by new informations. Until 1987, he explained that he had evaluated his ideas about Common Market in the light of such informations in the formal declarations, news in the newspapers, and such

publications in favor or against.³⁹ Because of the restricted information he had seen EEC as an economical integration. Karaman had evaluated the relations between Turkey and EEC according to Islamic rules. And he had stated that entering into EEC would be benefits of Turkey according to Islamic informations and put justification Turkey would get profit materially and it would not lost morally, if it entered into EEC. Because, according to the Islam for the benefits Muslims could joining to economical relations with non-muslims but they had not damaged materially. In the moral case; there were even erosion in Turkey. And entering to EEC would not caused new erosion. Besides to this erosion Turkey would be more developed. Even, materially more powerfull Turkey would collect Islamic countries together that were ragged and in mess. With its moral and material power it would lead Islamic states together. Integrations between these states would realize step by step. Islamic Common market would be minimal step for this integration.⁴⁰

After 1987, European Community had an important transformations by 'the single European Act'. After then it is not only an economical integration. Under the name of EU, it is an economical, social, cultural, political and legal union. According to Karaman with these features entering to EU would not be admissible and Turkey should not join this Union.⁴¹ Because, Turkey would be in cooperations with non-muslim countries or integrations, and according to Islam, it would not be cooperations with them under their political, cultural, legal structure. For these reasons, he was opposed to integration process with

EU. He mentioned that religious people opposed to EU because they saw the danger. They saw that to be a member of EU would be the final step for the end. Consequently, he stated that he was also opposed to EU with the same ideas.⁴²

Endnotes

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CHAPTER III

THE TRANSFORMATION OF ISLAMIST VIEWS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TURKEY'S EU MEMBERSHIP

3. 1. Rising Visibility of Islam in Socio-Political Life with Changing Conditions before and after 1990s

From 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s, under the leadership of Turgut Ozal, Motherland Party (MP) was in power in Turkey. During this period, MP held the Islamist movements by its applications, and it allowed these movements to exist. In this period, Islamist movements received recognition in social, political, economical and legal areas. In this term, several problems of the Islamist movements were frozen, generally there was a restful atmosphere in Turkey. This atmosphere that surrounded whole country had continued until 1990s. However, the local election in 1994 changed the face of Turkish politics. WP won some big mayors such as Istanbul and Ankara. Different groups in the society shocked by the success of WP in 1994 local election.¹ Then, WP won general election in 1995 and established coalition government with True Path Party (TPP) in June 28 1996, and Erbakan became the prime minister of Turkey. Although, WP's victory caused a heated regime debates in Turkey. Particularly,

secularist groups were disturbed by the coalition government of Islamist party. Questions like “Is Turkey ruled by seriat (religious law) with WP’s coalition government?” were asked in the society. WP’s claims such as “Turkey is belong to the East, not to the West” and its applications which keen to remarke broken relations with the Muslim countries increased restlessness.² After he came into power, Erbakan’s first visit was to Iran. His visit to Iran provoked a hostile reaction from the secular groups. On the other hand, D-8 attempts and other internal and foreign policies and applications increased the disturbance. In this period, the relations between WP-TPP coalition government and the army were started to strained.³ Some applications of the coalition government were disturbing to TSK (Turkish Armed Forces-TAF).

Welfare’s Islamist sytle, rhetoric and its policies were too much for the military and generals which clearly voiced their displeasure. This displeasure shown firstly by the speach of Cevik Bir who was the second leader of General Staff, at the meeting of Turkish American Council in Washington.⁴ TAF pressurized the government by using MGK (The National Security Council NSC). NSC, as the body through which the army exercises its power, seeing itself as the guarantor of the secular Republic. As a guarantor, TAF, and so NSC would draw it’s sword towards threaten components, if it saw any threat against secular Republic. In 1997, TAF which perceived WP’s applications as a threaten compenents, made a new military coup that was different from the others. It did not come off its barracks. It certified hidden intervention that called “post –modern” by NSC for the reason of prevention on deviations in

secularist Kemalist identity that indoctrinated by hierarchy for protection and foreign policy.⁵ NSC as the highest institution that makes policies in national security issues, forced the government to admit a specified measures package with 18 articles.⁶ These 18 articles was the list of measures desmed to clamp down to “irtica” (reactionary Islamist movements). It forced for resignation of government while it was vetoing decisions of the coalition government in the “restricted government” period that began after the NSC meeting on February 28, 1997. Although, the TAF’s increased political activism and autonomy was currently connected with its redefinition of national security from external to internal threats. The Ministry of National Defence’s (MND) While Papers for 1998 and 2000 specified the nature and sources of the threats to internal security as “threats to Turkey’s unitary state quality” and to “the principle of secularism guaranteed in Article 2 and 4 of the Constitution”.⁷ Secularism, which is the inviolable principle of the republic, was defined as the independence of the state from religious rules⁸ and claimed to be the “issue of great significance in terms of our (Turkish) internal security”.⁹ Internal and external threats were combined together and ‘irtica’ become the most important threat. The Kurdish terrorist acts was the foremost security threat for the state. After 1997, in order of priority, Islamic activism and Kurdish separatism were the greater threats than all others. The military establishment through its influence in government and judicial institution has initiated measures to minimize radical Islamist threat. After the ‘post-modern’ coup, social and political structures of Turkey were changed. In the direction of the coups’ perceptions on threats prohibitions and

closures came on. Islamic elements from the public service and the military were purged by the military. Finally, RP was shut down on the ground of conducting anti-secular activities on February 22, 1998. Erbakan was banned from politics for five years. And, the rights of expressing religious and political views were hindered. The headscarf issue which was frozen in MP period again came into question.

3. 2. Transformation of the Islamists' View

After the “post-modern” coup and its prohibitory attitudes, Islamist movements changed their structures, ideas, policies and developments. From the political Islamists to the Islamist intellectuals, Muslims have caught to great transformation wind. However, Islamists did not come into this position eagerly. This was a transformation that was brought by obligations. According to Cakir, from some points Islamists who were under the illusion that they were rising, were resembling previous Turkish leftists. How 1980 military coup was the new birth of left wing, “February 28 process” would be the new birth of Islamist. They also had to face with the realities. Unquestionably, how the left had accepted that it defeated in all areas after “September 12”, Islamists also were realizing that they were defeated by the “February 28 process”.¹⁰

After the ‘post-modern coup’, WP was closed down in February 1998, however, the National View movement survived in the political arena under the name of Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party). Recai Kutan was the leader of this party because Erbakan was banned. However, he controlled this new party from

outside. VP attempted to decrease the Islamic tone of its politics. Old Welfarists changed thier views about such an issues like the human rights and democracy. This transformation arose from their experiences which brought about a complete change in their views. Their previous political strategies had led them to demand certain rights for their own members while they were not supporting the rights of other groups. Although, the WP's views about human rights was directly transposed from the reasons for the existence of religion given in Islam. These were; the right to life; the right to protection of descendants and of chastity and honor; the right to own property; the right to protection of the intellect; the right to protection of belief.¹¹ However, VP has shown considerable flexibility in defining rights. A universalist defination of human rights more closly aligned to principles of democracy and puluralism. The five lines of the VP's marking was the parties five basic principles: democracy, human rights, liberties, the superiority of law, and sustainable economic development.¹²

It was obvious that Turkish political Islamists had a great tranformation on their views about human rights and democracy in comparision with their previous views on these subjects. However, talking about human rights and democracy in thier speech didn not find real by some groups. These groups thought that Islamists would found religious state if they came in power. But, Abdullah Gul put it;

“There is no desire for a religious state...what this country religious people want is to demand their lifestlys. They want an end

to the discrimination shown against them and to gain their individual rights. In Turkey, freedom of religion is very constrained”¹³

According to Cakir, political Islamists is trying to hold the flag of democracy, human rights and civil society which the Turkish left had started to keep it after 1980s. He states that previously political Islamists were classifying people into two groups like “who are supporting us and who are not”. In spite of dialogue, they had demanded to its “others” be all ears. In the context of democracy and human rights they were thinking that the priority of the people was the duty of man towards God and according to them as a product of modern (unlightened) period democracy was a human ideology.¹⁴ Cakir states that political Islamists have transformed their views, because they were worried. Despite to rise and increase, they wanted to protect what they had in their hands. Also they saw even how was hard to do this and that they can not do it alone.¹⁵

After 1997, Turkish political Islamist transformed their views also about EU and Turkey’s EU membership process. However, before they had opposed to the integration movements and proposed Islamic Union in spite of EU. In the context of the militarization of politics in Turkey that intensified after the February 28 process (the post-modern coup), the Islamic opposition revised its stance and has begun to give full support to Turkey’s EU membership process.¹⁶ For example, Recai Kutan stated that they were supporting Turkish entrance into EU in every occasion. He emphasized that for the sake of integration, they were working very hard.¹⁷ Even, in its 1998 elections programme VP stated that ‘the successful completion of Turkey’s EU accession process was characterised

as fundamental objective of Turkey's foreign policy'.¹⁸ Despite its flexible policies, VP was also followed the fate of WP and shut down on June 25, 2001 with the same legal files. Felicity Party (FP) which was founded in spite of VP is trying to progress at the same line with VP. Like its other policies, it also supports membership process. In its party programme FP states that the relations between Turkey and EU are 'important for the implementation of human rights and democratic rules and the further development of those together with Europe.'

3. 3. Political Islamists Divided: the Moderates and Their Approach

However, it has shown more flexible and different tone from WP, Virtue Party was shut down in June 2001 by Turkish Constitutional Court, besides VP's affirmative attitudes.. VP was accused because of two transgressions. First of them was being a political reincarnation of the old WP, and the other one was its Islamist activities. Therefore, it was found illegal according to 1982 Turkish Constitution by the Constitutional Court. Although, Merve Kavakci who wanted to swear in the TGNA while she was wearing a headscarf, and VP's supportive manner on this fact deeply effected this decision. Afterwards the closure of VP, Islamist politicians who were coming from the National View movement traditions divided into two groups. These groups were called traditionalists and moderate Islamist. Traditionalists found Felicity Party (FP) under the leadership of Recai Kutan in July 2001, and modernists found Justice and Development

Party (JDP). In spite of rising from the ashes of WP or VP, these new two parties started different motions in the political arena. However, FP is described as being another National View movements party.

3. 3. 1. The Rise of Moderate Islamists under JDP

After the closure of Virture Party, political Islamists divided into two groups. Actually, this division was not so amazing event. Because, during the period of VP, modernists in this party had showed signs of this division, and that they would found a new formation. First sign of this fact was the Abdullah Gul's candidate for the part leadership against to Recai Kutan who was the successor of Erbakan, in the party congress in the May 2000. Finally, Gul lost this election by small margin. After this fact, the polarization became visible in the party. Although, there were two reasons of Gul's candidate, one of them was to show that they would found a new formation and the other was to test their power in the party before to found new formation. That is to say that they held reform flag against to National View movement and Erbakan (as the leader of this movement). Finally, modernists who had differentiated themselves from FP, found (Justice and Development Party-JDP) under the leadership of R.T. Erdogan. Erdogan who was grown up under the tradition of "national view" movement was the WP's old Istanbul mayor. He was shown the mayor candidate by his party in March 27 elections on 1994. Erdogan gained elections by a decisive margin and became mayor of Istanbul.

However, Erdogan stated that Istanbul would not be forbidden city while he was explaining their target just after he was a mayor. He added that they would shut down brothel in Karakoy, they would not interfere municipal officers dress, they would not offer alcoholic drinks in the municipal meetings and they would try to build mosque in 'Taksim Square'¹⁹ in his first speech after he was a mayor. These words were enough for the reactions of secularist groups. Especially, the idea of building a mosque in the Taksim Square caused great reaction by these groups. Because, Taksim has a different meaning from other districts, it symbolized the modern (post-ottoman/post-Islamic) phase of the country's history in contrast the other parts of Istanbul.²⁰ And, building mosque in such a place was perceived an essential threat to the secular and modern face of country. Because of these reactions Erdogan gave up that kind of the radical explanations or applications and aimed more coherent achievements.

To recite a poem in his speech on September 23 ,1993, was the turning point of Erdogan's political life. Although the poem that he read, was widely known and printed freely, it found sufficient for sentenced Erdogan to a 10-Month prison and banned him from politics for life by Turkish Security Court this decision was interrogated for process democracy for it was showed violation of the freedom of expression in Turkey. It caused demonstration in the society, and EU claimed its worries about this event.²¹

After the 1999 elections, the three-party coalition government which was including Nationalist Action Party (NAP), Motherland Party (MP), and Democratic Left Party (DLP) was founded. In this coalition government period, Turkey had the biggest economic crisis in its history after the foundation of

Turkish Republic. This crisis in February 2001 caused early election decision that was taken by coalition government. In general elections on November 3, 2002, Justice and Development party while showing great skill of benefits from bad governnig²² has been in power alone. It gathered 34,4% of the votes and it has almost two –thirds of the seats in the parliament,²³ only five seats short of the majority needed to amend the constitution single-handed. So, JDP is the first party to have a clear majority since 1987. Also, it is the first only party government after DP.

3. 3. 2. How Moderate Islamists Define Themselves: Conservative Democracy

Moderate Islamists who aim to disassociate and differentiate themselves from “national view” movements identity are trying to define and clarify their political identity from the beginning of JDP. In spite of their efforts, their transformation has been argued in public, if it is true or not. According to some groups moderate Islamists has learned much from the fate of its Islamist forerunner, so their tranformation process could be real. On the other hand some groups also believe that their moderate face is not real, and there is no change in their views.

With his interesting arguments, Erbakan is also joining these opposite groups. He emphasized that his old friends confused their ways, and they removed their “national view” shirts, while he is calling them back in every opportunity. In his speech on second anniversary of the foundation he stated

that who removed “national view” shirts, would be in bad position.²⁴ Although, in different speech, while he expounded that old National Viewists have a “flocesera” sickness (flocsea, is a kind of insect which dry indigenous vine roots). He stated that flocesera is such a sickness that symptom of grape. For him, under the National View movement their tastes were like grape but now their tastes like “vinegar”. He claims that there are only two ways in Turkish political life. These are the National View way and the way of “collaboranists”. He also explains the reasons of their criticism on JDP which is their demand. He states that they are criticizing them “because they were confused their ways. They threw out their National Viewists shirts. We are warning them because we are the real mother of child... They are fascinated.”²⁵ Besides these critiques, JDP is trying to clarify its political identity while it is passing an important process to be an institutionalized. It is determining itself as a central and mass party. According to Erdogan, the political line of his party is conservative democracy. When he was the president of Turkey, like Erdogan Gul, was also explaining that JDP was a conservative democratic party. Although, he stated that they wanted to implement EU standards; and they were pushing for EU membership. And, they wanted to demonstrate that a country with a Muslim majority can be comfortable with the modern world.²⁶

At the International Symposium on Conservatism and Democracy, in his speech Erdogan classified all Turkish political parties in two groups. First group was formed by such parties which had closed ideology that aimed radical politics, and the other group was formed by parties that liked such a political

company. He separated JDP from those groups, and he determined that JDP against to these two mentalities. He stated that,

“we consider conservative democracy is an important mentality... JDP is the mass party in the basis of conservation. JDP reconstructs political central by its power that is taken from social centre, and it is an only power of the central right”.²⁷

He also explained the concept of conservatism which his party based on. According to his explanation, JDP deliberates modern conservatism rather than old conservatism that exists over status quo. Hence, JDP defends the term of change in the meaning of progress and it resists on decadence and degeneration, not on change. However, JDP uses the terms of conservatism and democracy together, some political scientists state that there is not such an definition in the political science literature. There will be a conservative democrat identity but this is not used to define conservative democracy.

Against to these ideas, Yalcın Akdoğan who is the chief advisor of Erdogan, emphasizes that such a term would not be in West, but this is not means that the term of conservative democracy will not be somewhere in the world. Akdoğan also explains “conservatist democracy” as a political line which is a result of debates around the concepts like; religion-democracy; religion-modernism; religion-state in the society. According to him, conservative democracy mentality of JDP would carry some common features with conservation which aims to synthesize of universal values. But, its essential feature is that it bases on Turkish social and cultural accumulations.²⁸

In the contrast with his views before 2000, Erdogan uses some terms for to

define his ideas and also JDP policies. He determines his party identity on the conservative democracy, and he also declares that he had changed his ideas about democracy, secularism, west, economy...ie. He states that majority of Turkish community is willing modernity that is not against to tradition universality and that accepts localness, rationalism.

3. 3. 2. 1. Views About Democracy

In an interview, in 1996, Erdogan stated that Islam was the basis of his party (in that term WP) and democracy would only be a tool. He said that:

“there has been no party that understands, lives, and attempts to preserve democracy as much as we do. But is democracy a tool or a goal? We have a difference here. We say that democracy is a tool. Democracy is not a goal.”²⁹

During the WP period, Erdogan’s views about democracy were influenced by “national views” movements views about democracy. According to “national view” movement democracy would not be enough for welfare and welfare would be search in religion (Islam). However on interview in 2001 we see that his ideas about democracy is changed. In this interview he emphasized that democracy is the political basis of his party.³⁰ In different speech he defines;

“democracy is a dialogue and conventional regime. Ideally, democracy must spread among the administrations, social and political areas and organics. It is not include only elections,

institutions, or mechanics”³¹

3. 3. 2. 2. Views About Secularism

However, moderate Islamists were against secularism with the argument like “Islam does not separate religion and state affairs like Christianity”. During the period of JDP, they are stating that their views about secularism have transformed like democracy. Gul’s explanation clearly shows this situation. According to him their (JDP’s) link with religion is on an individual basis. Like other rights secularism is an essential right, and they do not want to impose religious rules. He also emphasized JDP’s views about secularism. He said that:

“we want a truly secular system in Turkey, but would like to see it defined in the European sense, with a clear distinction between religion and state, preferably on the Anglo-Saxon model.”³²

Like Gul, Erdogan is also emphasizes the conventional environment when he is talking about religion. According to him religion is an important social value, but transforming state as an ideological one and organizing it with religious symbols is so wrong.³³ He also defines secularism as a way to hold social variety together freely, and to remove it from clash on strained area. Thus, Moderate Islamists put forwards a new understanding term of secularism. According to this understanding religion will be the participation in the democratic process. When Erdogan was asked his words “democracy is a too”,

he stated that:

“For the aim of the happiness of the people, all systems are tools. Everything is sentenced to chance. You will chance also. This is the demand of progress... to put religion in front of democracy seems to me like to make politics over religion. Our party is not a Muslim democratic party, it is a conservative democratic party...”³⁴

3 .3. 3. Moderate Islamists’ Affirmative Approach to EU

We can clearly see that moderate Islamists views have transformed directly, while they are using modern Western values such as democracy, human rights, secularism...in their speeches. Hence, they turned their more moderate faces to the West. During the elections on November 3, 2002, they promised a flexible foreign policy and after the election they gave immediate priority to European Union. Erdogan’s first explanation was that the EU membership is the first aim of his party. Thus, moderate Islamist is the most strongest advocate of the Turkey’s EU membership process in Turkey. After he become the president of Turkey, Erdogan as a leader of ruling party visited EU states to demand a formal date for the start of accession talks.³⁵ With their views about EU membership process moderate Islamists differentiate themselves from traditional version of Turkish political Islamists. In party programme they summarize their views like;

“Turkey have a close relations with Eurape from the historical and even geographical stonpoints. The relationship with European countries will continue to be in the highest level in Turkish foreign affairs agenda, henceforth. Turkey will provide commitments and contitions that Union demands even from other candidate states for membership. It will try to protect aganda from occupations with artificial matters...”³⁶

As they mention in their party programme, moderate Islamists are taking important steps on the way of EU membership process. In the direction of national programme, they fixed on several “adaption packages” in TGNA’s General Committee with the power of being an only party government. According to Erdogan, adaptations which they have done in the way of integration with EU are the indicators of their decisiveness in the direction to get Turkish justified place in the contemporary world. And this is the mentality of revolution.³⁷ Several applications that were seems unquestionable and unpractical have discussed by goverment, and the government has determined politics in the direction of these discussions. Moderate Islamists have developed their actions with flexible politics, and have paid attention to reactions of opposite groups. Hence, with new laws and several adaption package they have aimed and done important but these reformes have not brought institutional transformations or limited structural transformations.³⁸ Moderate Islamists are trying to improve the relations between Turkey and Islamic world in a balonced manner. Erdogan emphasizes that Muslim identity, as a common point, is the affiliation feature between ICO states. He states that;

“if we will search global resolutions to our global issues, borders between our countries must not be distances...passing borders, property, capital, information and individual movements between our countries will be the first step on entering global development effort.”³⁹

Moderate Islamists aim to develop the relations with Islamic states however, this aim stay on limited level. So, they are seem far away from old National View's imagination about Islamic world. The reason of this transformation is that the Islamic world fell behind of world conjuncture, and it can not catch developments in the world. Erdogan calling the Islamic world for changing process, he also offers them a “solution package”.⁴⁰ Therefore we could say that Islamic world getting out of being an alternative for JDP. Although, in his visit to Syria Abdullah Gul stated that there was not any different meaning of his visit. He stated that “Our way is determined. This is the integration with EU; main aim of us is the beginnig to acesion talk with EU and full membership”.⁴¹

JDD has tried to apply several reforms in the direction of Copenhagen Criterias. Frequently, it reapeated that Turkey's real expectation from EU is to take accession talk date determently and Turkey will not consent to the different result from it's commitments and concessions.⁴²

Even, on the December 17, in the submit meeting EU had a decision about Turkey's membership. Before, the date of Decembred 17, govenment declared that Turkey would leave off integration process, and it would continue its way if the result of this meeting unsatisfied it.⁴³ Erdogan states that EU is not only alternative to reach Turkey's aim, but there would not any apportunity for EU

from to receive Turkey's wills. EU must accept Turkey to prove its greatness as a values system.⁴⁴ So, in the event of unexpended conditions, Turkey will continue to its way. It will complete its deficiencies, and it will change Copenhagen Criteria as an Ankara Criteria.⁴⁵ According to Erdoğan, Turkey which is open to developments and has decisiveness on integration with West, has adopted all values of democracy, human rights and scientific developments. It has turned its face to West. Turkey's entrance would be historical opportunity for Turkey and European states. Because there would be profits both for Turkey and European states.⁴⁶ Erdogan emphasizes civilizations clash thesis and states that, "Turkey is a country which has a Muslim populace, will express civilization unification, not civilization clash in EU".⁴⁷ Finally, in the submit meeting on December 17, EU decided on the favour of Turkey. On October 3, 2003 the accessional talk will start. JDP declared that this is a success of Turkey and them.

3. 4. Islamist Intellectuals' New Perception of EU

Like some of the Turkish political Islamists, some Islamists intellectuals also seem to change their views about West. They are up-holding western-values of democracy human rights and the rule of laws as well as secularism.

As we saw above, Turkish Islamists who survived underground because of the system that accrued by closed and strict state ideology that has waken up and started to exist by DP's liberal policies after the 1950s. Particularly, by the 1961 Constitution which accepted more liberal than previous constitutions.

After 1961 constitution, parallel with the participation of different groups to political process, Turkish political Islamists started to get their places in the political arena. The efforts of restoration the system in several directions to counteract opposite powers were not sufficient for eliminate Islamists. They have important development process. After the 1980s, by activation of civil society in Turkey,⁴⁸ Islam become more visible in socio-politic arena. Islamists intellectuals also applied to this process. Before 1950, Turkish Islamists misunderstanding had continued about democracy, West, and state system, but after this years, with their progress, their misunderstandings transformed to hope and development strategies against to system.⁴⁹ While, they opposed West and it's modern world system with features like secularism, democracy, positivism they were rejecting state system which claimed to modernize society. They wanted to fulfill their religious demands, and they wished to live their beliefs in the public sphere freely. And, Islamists who wanted to change the state system in according to their views, were defeated against system. This defeat and disappointment caused the transformation of their perceptions of West and EU, paradoxically.⁵⁰ EU opposition transformed to protection of EU criterias and Turkey's EU membership process. In this period, social purification that came from 1920s to 1990s with its pure and main direction leave off new purifications. This situation even is shocking Muslim-self.⁵¹ Supporters and apponents of integration process changed their sides. And, this new purification is not seems incidental and tactical.

Not only new conjuncture, but also influences of February 28 process

effected Islamists transformation. They gave up their utopias which includes the Islamic Union. According to them, Turkey can not solve its material and moral problems itself. Consequently, they claim that Turkey must cooperate with alternative powers in the world. And, there is not so much obstacle for Turkey different from EU membership. If there will not be an Islamic Union and even if Turkey will not establish powerfull unification with Islamic world, thus it will be a member of EU. Although, to be a member of democrat and secular EU will be an advantage for Turkey which has problems with democracy and secularism. Islamists who have no rest by strict state ideology, especially with their experiences from February 28 process, are thinking that with adoptions Turkey will reach several rights like human rights, democracy freedom of speech... that would not product in internal conditions. With those rights they will take a breath awhile.

Hayreddin Karaman emphasizes that state should not has an ideology, even if we must determine such a ideology to state, it would only be a of democratic constitutional state the service to people to protecct the principle.⁵² According to him, as a result of state ideology and it's applications in Turkey, Muslims can not live their beliefs freely. So, they are thinking that if Turkey be a member of EU, they will live more freely in Turkey. According to Islamists in Turkey Muslims who live in Europe have more free life. So, this transformation is emerged by necessities.⁵³ Karaman emphasized that there are several civilizations. Two of them are West and Islam civilization which have philosophical, historical, dynamical differences and with those differences they can not get together as a one civilization. But, people (nations, states...) of these

different civilizations can be cooperate on goodness, justice, and welfare... with the intention of those concepts they can also find institutions and unions.⁵⁴ According to him these two civilizations have different secular mentality. Compromising secular-republic with Islam and to defence one of them with another will be wrong. There are great differences between secular-democratic republics which are the product of the Western civilization, and the Caliphate which is the product of Islam civilization.⁵⁵ Because, in the contemporary Western civilization there is nothing over human being and rights and liberties is determined according to this basis. While, in Islam believer is a man (kul) of God, and his/her rights, duties, liberties put in a frame according to this basis. Consequently, we can not unify Islam and secular republic. The right way is to answer how will people live their life in peace, welfare, justice, together or separately.⁵⁶ We must find models and formulas for this question and apply them. Thus, according to him EU relations should be discussed in this framework.

Karaman says that unconditional entrance into EU is unacceptable. Positive or negative sides of integration must be argued. Incomes and outcomes must be estimated and if the result is acceptable, then Turkey will take steps. He is not opposite to EU, absolutely. Unwillingly, he support membership process because of the result of necessities. Turkey has not got any opportunity with effects of interior and external factor.⁵⁷ He also states that:

“Islam aims to protect life, intellect, generation, property, and religion. If you can not protect those things – while can not join EU – you can be a member of it. If you can, you should not. If you can protect those things it will not be permissible. All estimations and determinations must accept according to these baseses.”⁵⁸

For him, nowadays, Islam lives its third meeting with other civilizations, especially with Western civilization. These periods are; Emevian era, Enlightenment period, and today. Islam had important results from first two periods, and it can carry out the last one successfully.⁵⁹

Alı Bulac is also clearly emphasizes that he is not against to integration process.⁶⁰ Bulac had opposed to EU, and he had claimed that Turkey would strengthen relations with Islamic world and should establish Islamic Union, in spite of EU. And, he stated that Turkey was not belong to West historically, geographically, and culturally. But, he is supporting Turkey’s EU membership process, recently.

According to him, EU is imperative for everyone, because there are pressures, prohibitions and determinations over religious life in Turkey.⁶¹ For using fundamental rights such as religious right, Turkey can join into EU. However, he also claimed that Turkey is not belongs to Europe on historical and geographical context. But, this condition does not disqualify Turkey’s entrance. He says that:

“Turkey belongs to Asia and East with its history, identity, religion,

cultural values, and even its geographical mass. But what is the meaning of this? It has historically close, strict, and usually clashing relations with West. It is neither enough for to make it European, nor pickes it from East. It seems seems Eastern when you look it from the West, although, it seems Western when you look it from East... In long term, Turkey will play it's effective and real role in the Islamic world. But, in existing period neither Turkey, nor other parts of Islamic world does not seem ready for this role."⁶²

Bulac finds membership process necessary for Turkey, because of its conditions. He supports and distills JDP government for trying hard to get into EU.⁶³ But, he emphasizes that it is so diffucult for EU to accept Turkey. Because, Islam is the 'other' in the the Western subconscious. According to.⁶⁴ He is questioning USA and some Europeans who were support Turkey for enterence, sincerities.⁶⁵ Because, Muslims can live in Europe in the legal frame. But, it is not so for opposite side.⁶⁶ Finally, he states that USA and some Europeans support Turkish membership because of their benefits.⁶⁷

He says that Christian world and directly West does not accept Islam as an 'aporcryphal' religion, according to it Islam is not in the three celestial religion. This situation means to Islam is not implicated to Western social and political ideals.¹¹⁰ So, in the frame of EU process, main problem is not Muslims acceptions or unacceptations of living with them in the Christian West. The main problem is that even Christian Europe will take or not take Muslim Turkey. The main problem is originate from EU, not Turkey.⁶⁹

3. 5. Gulen's Movement: Perceptions of EU

Gulen movement established by Fethullah Gulen who left the Yeni Asya (New Asia) group for the reason of its political activities that was damaged main action.⁷⁰ According to Huseyin Gulerce, Gulen movement is a most widespread and effective social movement.⁷¹ It occurs a collective identity in the direction of a Said-i Nursi doctrine. But, there is not any 'otherness' that seen in the identity formation of social movement in its identity formation. While identities defines themselves on the differentiation as the "self" and "other", this movements collective identity do not use such a differentiation. It has not any absolute and clear "other".⁷² This situation explain its calls to all societies, civilizations and regions for dialogue over the basis of 'tolerance'.

This movement dedicates itself to explaining "beliefs reality", and its active opposition elements is so weak. Different from other movements, Gulen's movement does not exist against to injustice in social sphere. So, it is not determined over debates. With these conditions we can not define it as a new contemporary social movement. This movement takes its power from informal institutions networks.⁷³ While it is creating a socialization field by assetism it is gathering human sources and organizes them. Its message is not the political, but religious, it keeps away from politics. Clearly, it does not state a particular opinions about politics.

Different from political movements, it aims bottom-up transformation of the society while it attaches to education and other socio-cultural services, and

transmission of faith. At the end of the 1980s, the Gulen movement started to be institutionalized opening build of foundation, and founded international education, bussiness and a media network.

While it discredited to the West, after 1990s Gulen movement articulates pro-western ideas. In an interview in 1995, he opposed anti-western feeling and stated that ‘Anti-westernism would force us out of the civilization’⁷⁴In spite of Islamist groups oppositions and rejections, Gülen has started to pro-democratic spechs after the end of 1980s, In 1994 he stressed that it was impossible to bactrak the democracy⁷⁵ and after he continued to emphasize the importance of democracy. According to him democracy does not conflict with Islamic principles⁷⁶ and he points out that ‘the standards of justice and democracy must be elevated to the level of our contemporaries in the West’⁷⁷

Gulen continues to emphasize the importance of democracy tolerance and dialogue. He supports the Turkish integration process with Europe from the very beginning of relations. He also acknowledge that Muslims had learned many things from the West. Diffrent from other Islamist movement in Turkey according to Gulen movement, Turkey’s EU membership will not result in a cultural assimilation for the Turkish society.⁷⁸On the interview with Nevval Sevindi, Gulen states that Turkey has roots both with Islamic world and Europe and if Turkey wants to be a leader of Islamic world, to be a member of EU will faciliate this aim.⁷⁹He also claims that there will not be any unification in Islamic world. Because, ‘there is not such a world. There are some places that muslims live. In some place more and some few. There is only a cultural Islam

where Muslims established Islam according to their ideas...⁸⁰

Gulen states that if there will be a real unity in future, Turkey must enter it with planes and programmes. If compulsory directions forced Turks, they will be pushed planless, and this will be wrong.⁸¹ According to him if Turkey put forward its conditions and can argue these conditions with EU, there will be a great integration. In this direction, actually, there is not any problem for Europeanization. But, if Turkey rejects its own identity and runs after European identity, it will gain only clashes and debasement.

Gulen claims that Central Asia is so important for Turkey but it cannot use it. Central Asia would facilitate Turkey's competitions with the world. It will provide some alternatives for Turkey in relations with Europe. Because, different alternatives will provide Turkey bargaining in a wider basis.⁸² In his message that he sent to the meeting of Abant Platform on the culture, identity and religion and he supports Turkey's EU membership process. According to his message contemporary civilization that aimed by M.K. Atatürk has come to a new point. All efforts of the institutions will be remembered in this way that has started from the establishment of the Republic. He adds that EU membership will strengthen Turkey's role as a 'Place Island' in the heart of Eurasia. And Turkey's entry into EU, will be certified functions to build a bridge between the Islamic world and the West.⁸³

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CONCLUSION

During the Cold War era, Turkey gained strategic importance towards West. Because the new world conditions that were occurred over distrustfulness and fear brought to search West for the containment policy. Thus, Turkey which was under the pressure of Soviet Union was the one of the important corner stone of Western containment policy. This policy was a great opportunity for Turkey for entering into the Western organizations, particularly EU. By the end of the Cold War, according to some authorities Turkey would lose its strategic importance for the West and EU.

However, in recent years Turkey's strategic position has begun to gain new great dimensions. Division between world powers that begun afterwards the Cold War and deepen with accupation of Iraq and the other developments in the Middle East effect Turkey's position in the world. Europe is giving existential struggle against to USA which become an global leader after the Cold War. Hence, Turkey is strategically important for Europe while it tries to reach natural reasources such as oil and natural gas in the Middle East and Central Asia. Although, for being a new great power Turkey is important for Europe. There are much instability exists on its borders. As a regional power Turkey can help Europe for providing the stability of the region. Thus, EU has started to look Turkey's membership positively, however it was keeping it in waiting room for a long time.

From the beginning of the Turkish Republic, Turkey has turned its face to the West. For being a modern and civilized there was not another model such as

Europe. Thus, from the very beginning to recent years EU is the Turkey's utopia for being a civilized. Last developments about Turkey's EU membership process show that Turkey's utopia is not unrealizable. In recent years Turkey has taken big steps in the way of membership process. An interesting point in there is that the pro-Islamist government has brought Turkey much near to EU. That is the significant transformation because they opposed to EU until the end of 1990s.

The traditional Islamist political identity is constructed by a hostility towards the West and all Western values, in Turkey. Anti-westernism is the main element of Turkish Islamist identity formation. The "national view" movement which is the founder of the several Islamist party in Turkey after the 1970s differentiated itself from the other political parties or groups with its hostility towards West and Western values. Actually, its anti-Westernism was the hostility towards the Turkish modernization/westernization history.

However, in recent years, Turkish Islamist movements are breaking away from their previous views about Turkey's EU membership. The political Islamist as well as Islamist intellectual movements are rethinking the Western issue and EU membership process. They have expressed their support for Turkey's EU membership. Although, there are several different reasons behind this transformation. Historical developments and the Turkish political conditions have transformed political Islamists to a more pragmatic and systematic line. Their views have changed with the world agenda. With the end of the Cold War, Cold War version ideologies have come to an end. In spite of this, political Islamists have more flexible policies towards the integration with

modern world and its values. Such an issues like democracy and human rights are bbecoming more widespread in the Islamist circles. This transformation in their comprehension is clearly seen on the Turkey's EU membership process. Thus, the democracy problem in Turkey is another factor of their transformation. Anti-democratic measures that taken for suppress Islamist movements by Turkish state directed Islamists to search for different alternatives. They think that if Turkey joins EU they will more free like the people living in Europe. According to them, with EU membership Turkish state ougt to accept democratic reforms that protect basis civil liberties such as freedom of speech, press, expression and religion. And the other point is that political Islamists thought that in the concrete relations with Europe that have started untill 1970s, Turks would lost their identity and religion and would assimilate in the European society. On the contrary to their fears, Turks in Europe have not lost anything from their identity or their religion. Hence, they have realized that they can protect their identity, religion and culture in Europe.

Finally, Turkish Islamists have changed their tune with new world conjuncture. This transformation of Turkish Islamist self is seen particularly in the process of Turkey's EU membership. However there are some exeptional Islamists group, generally Turkish Islamists turned their face towards West and support Turkey's EU membership process. And, it seems that they will continue to support the membership in the long term.

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