

# FOREIGN POLICY OF THE US TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST AFTER SEPTEMBER THE 11<sup>TH</sup> 2001

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# ABSTRACT

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**June 2005**

**FOREIGN POLICY OF THE US TOWARDS THE MIDDLE**

**EAST AFTER SEPTEMBER THE 11<sup>TH</sup> 2001**

The purpose of this study is to discover, in the aftermath of September 11 2001 terrorist attacks, the dynamics of US policy towards the Middle East, underlying reasons behind the Bush administrations war in Iraq, and the nature of the Greater Middle East Initiative. The dynamics of US foreign policy in this context have been a new assertiveness to emphasize US power against real and supposed enemies in the name of war against terrorism, description of the states as enemies and friends in the new age of war against terrorism, implementation of Machiavellian policies, seeking for violent resolutions for international disputes, maximization of national, corporational and personal interests concerning the extraction, transportation and marketing of oil and natural gas resources and the using the NATO mechanisms in achieving these goals. The underlying reasons behind the Bush administration's war in Iraq were neo-conservatism in the administration at first and second the desire to control extraction, transportation and marketing of vast energy resources in the Middle East and Eurasia on the way to a global domination.

The Greater Middle East region has come to be regarded as a unique challenge and opportunity by the international community in general and the USA in particular. The Bush administration is executing a wide-ranging initiative, supposedly prepared towards the end of 2003 to promote political and economic reform in the region. It was premised on the claim that the growing pool of politically and economically alienated individuals in the region threatens the national interests of G-8 members by contributing to the global rise in terrorism, international crime, and illegal migration. But it is not easy to assure, on the part of the USA, that this initiative is not the political, economic and civilian step of becoming the dominant power in the Middle East, and therefrom the world in general, after the military step in Afghanistan and Iraq.

**Key words: US Policy, George W. Bush Administration, Neoconservatives, Middle East, Iraqi War, Oil and Greater Middle East Initiative.**

# KISA ÖZET

**Hakan Köni**

**Haziran 2005**

**11 EYLÜL 2001 SONRA ABD'İN ORTADOĞU POLİTİKASI**

Bu tez çalışmasının amacı 11 Eylül 2001 terör saldırılarından sonra ABD'nin Ortadoğu siyasetindeki dinamikleri, Irak savaşının altında yatan asıl nedenler, ve Geniş Orta Doğu Girişimi'nin mahiyetidir. Eylül saldırılarından sonra ABD'nin Ortadoğu siyasetindeki dinamik unsurları ABD'nin gücünü göstermeye yönelik yeni bir isteklilik, bu süreçte uluslararası aktörlerin basitçe dost veya düşman olarak kategorize edilmesi, olaylar karşısında Makyavelli tarzı siyasaların ve çözüm önerilerinin benimsenmesi, petrolün çıkarılması, taşınması ve uluslararası piyasalarda satılmasıyla ilgili olarak ulusal ve şahsi çıkarların en üst düzeye çıkartılmasına yönelik çabalar, ve bu amaçlar uğrunda NATO mekanizmalarının kullanılması şeklinde görülmektedir. Bush yönetiminin Irak savaşını başlatmasında yönetim içinde ağır basan neo-kon elit ve onların aşırı İsrail yanlısı siyasaları önemli bir etkendi. Fakat bunun yanı sıra, küresel bir egemenlik kurma yolunda, Ortadoğu ve Avrasya'daki enerji kaynaklarının çıkartılması, taşınması ve satılmasıyla ilgili hesapların da önmeli etkisi oldu.

Büyük Ortadoğu coğrafyası genelde Batı, özelde de ABD için eşi bulunmaz bir fırsatlar dünyası ve aynı zamanda da azami bir tehdit merkezi olma potansiyeli taşımaktadır. Bush yönetimi bu gerçekleri göz önünde bulundurarak, 2003'ün sonlarına doğru Ortadoğu'da siyasi ve ekonomik reformları teşvik etmek amacıyla çok geniş kapsamlı bir girişim başlattı. Büyük Ortadoğu Girişimi diye bilinen bu uygulamanın temelinde bölgede G-8 ülkelerinin ulusal çıkarlarını tehdit eden çok sayıda yabancılaştırılmış insanın bulunması, bu insanların terror, uluslararası suç ve kaçak göç olaylarına katkıda bulunacağı iddiası yer almaktaydı. Fakat Irak savaşının başlamasından sonra, insanları bu girişimi Ortadoğu'da ve oradan da bütün dünyada küresel bir egemenlik kurma mücadelesinin siyasi, ekonomik ve sivil kanadığını oluşturmadığına inandırabilmek pek kolay görünmüyor.

**Anahtar kelimeler: ABD Siyaseti, George W. Bush Yönetimi, Neokonzervatifler, Ortadoğu, Irak Savaşı, Petrol ve Büyük Ortadoğu Girişimi.**

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## INTRODUCTION

ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, nineteen individuals hijacked and commandeered four U.S. aircrafts, turned them into directed missiles and crashed them into the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington D.C., killing more than 3000 people. These terrific attacks against innocent people were soon widely condemned all around the world.<sup>1</sup> The world leaders hastened to do so with the fear to shun the measures taken against terrorists and the states which support them. Three weeks later from the attacks, the United States and the United Kingdom united in a major campaign in Afghanistan. In the meantime, the US Administration was preparing for a war in Iraq.

September 11 has not been much studied through an objective understanding of the roots of the attacks. On the part of the high ranking officials of the world states, though it was possible to establish some connections with the attacks and specific US foreign policies, what must have been done was not to situate their state against a superpower whose future measures might have destroyed their state. But the views of the free-thinkers

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<sup>1</sup> Thus Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat had said: "We are completely shocked. It's unbelievable. We completely condemn this very dangerous attack, and I convey my condolences to the American people, to the American president and to the American administration, not only in my name but on behalf of the Palestinian people," Rahul Mahajan, *The New Crusade: America's War on Terrorism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2002); Fidel Castro Ruz: "The human casualties and psychological trauma that is inflicted upon the people of America and surprised the entire world with unexpected and shocking death of so many innocent people is apperent." in Mehmet Ali Civelek, "11 Eylül Sonrasında Her Zamankinden Daha Kararlıyız," *Küreselleşme ve Terör: Second Book*, Ütopya Yayınevi (Ankara: 2001), pp. 35-8.

vacillate between two extremes, in one of which the US is regarded to be the victim of its own policies and in the other Islam is pointed out to be the main source of attacks.

According to the view of the first extreme, the USA and other victims of international terrorism have been victimized because of their particular economic, political and military policies. The people that suffered the death as a result of the attacks were innocent, but the target was the USA itself because terrorism has been an indispensable part of the US policy. In this view, September 11 is therefore a result; it must not be perceived and presented as a reason for a new war. It was the result of imperialist tyranny symbolized in World Trade Center and Pentagon as the "New World Order."<sup>2</sup>

And according to the view of the other extreme, these attacks with an Islamic center were the result of a unified attempt to recede the world back to the religious wars of medieval age and to replace the modern developed, secular, and democratic regimes with religious leaders and theocratic regimes.<sup>3</sup>

In this thesis, I will not adopt any of these stand-points but will try to explain the events following the terrorist attacks with a strategic perspective: The questions that I will attempt to answer will be how did the US react against attacks? What were the dynamics of US foreign policy that led to this reaction?

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<sup>2</sup> See for example Temel Demirer, "Tehlikeli bir Labirent," *Evrensel Gazetesi*, September 13 2001, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup> See for example Osman Özbek, *11 Eylül 2001'in Düşündürdükleri*, Cumhuriyet Kitapları, 2002, pp. 11-24.

How can we explain the war in Iraq according to these dynamics? And how is the Greater Middle East Initiative related to all this?

After the events in September 11, al-Qaeda was kept responsible for the attacks and Taliban is supposed to be its foremost sponsor. Since Usama bin Ladin-led al-Qaeda is well-known for its past attacks against various US targets in the world, the campaign against Al-Qaeda and Taliban was not refused by the world community. But the war in Iraq has no relevance with the things that occurred on September 11. It cannot be explained with reference to the doctrine of self-defense, UN conventions and regulations or non-proliferation of NBC weapons. The war in Iraq was more closely related with power politics, oil politics, Israeli security,<sup>4</sup> and with the idea to turn the Middle East into a potential area of opportunities rather than threats against the West.

To this end, the US Administration has made use of the attacks inflicted upon the Americans on September 11 by raising their sorrow and hatred.<sup>5</sup> Since terrified, Americans were inclined towards supporting the policies concerning war adopted by their government.<sup>6</sup> For strategic, military and economic reasons, the US Administration must assure its people to believe that on September 11 it

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<sup>4</sup> See Michael Albert Interviews Noam Chomsky, "Extending U.S. Dominance By Any Means Possible," *Znet*; Noam Chomsky, "Hegemony or Survival: Part One," July 3 2003, *Znet*; Ramzy Baroud, "US Middle East Policy: Heedless but Unequivocal," April 24 2005, *Znet*.

<sup>5</sup> Mehmet Ali Civelek (ed.), "Major Lies About the War: From the text of the Pittsburgh University Students' Solidarity Group against War," *Küreselleşme ve Terör: Second Book*, Ütopya Yayınevi (Ankara: 2001), p: 28.

<sup>6</sup> Noam Chomsky, "On the Bombings," *ZNet*, <http://www.zmag.org/chomnote.htm>.



was the freedom, democracy and American type of life style that was attacked.<sup>7</sup> While the feelings of pain, hatred and ambition have been prevailing in the country, this idea would be easily understood by the Americans.

For all these, if we briefly define the US foreign policy after the attacks, we can say that the US has assumed a highly assertive and dynamic orientation. We can easily understand this by looking at the war on terrorism. The US not only wages wars in various parts of the world, but it also actively engages in political, economic and social reforms. A striking feature of US foreign policy in post-September 11 era is that multilateral international support is no more a precondition for overseas policies. The US feels free to act unilaterally if it is necessary to do so according to the national interests.

These developments have also constructed a new strategic context for the foreign policy choices of other states, which have come across with difficult dilemmas about whether and how to support, oppose or shun the US-led war on terror. Notwithstanding Bush's announcement that 'Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists', most states are doubtful about US power in general and the conduct of the war on terrorism in particular. The dynamics of the US foreign policy in the aftermath of the September 11 2001 attacks is the subject of chapter two.

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<sup>7</sup> For a critic of the theme "hatred of the freedom" see for example Rahul Mahajan, *Yeni Haçlılar*, pp.19-25.

In chapter three, I will try to find out the reasons for the US governments war in Iraq. I will specifically focus on the legal status of the war in international law, neo-conservatism in the administration and US interests concerning the extraction, transportation and marketing of vast energy resources in the Middle East and Eurasia. The subject of the chapter four is the Greater Middle East Initiative. In this chapter, main questions that I will try to find answer will be what is the GMEI? Why is it needed? How has it come to the international agenda?

## CHAPTER 1

### DYNAMICS OF US POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE POST 9/11 ERA

According to Robert D. Kaplan, before the events on September 11, Bush had set out to presidential campaign with the purpose of cutting down on the intensity of transatlantic relations of the USA in order to focus better on a new military and technological age. He could not of course predict the terrorist attacks, but his foresight that the USA should have particularly cared for its real interests rather than engaging in uncertain third world politics and proxies proved right, since the terrorists that attacked the US on September 11 referred to these policies as the excuse of their attacks.<sup>8</sup>

Nonetheless, after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C., it was certain that September 11 2001 would become a watershed in US foreign policy in the Middle East. The immediate response of the US to the attacks was

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<sup>8</sup> Robert D. Kaplan, "Dış Politika İçer Dönmei," *Washington Post*, September 29, 2001 in Mehmet Alı Civelek, Temel Demirer and Sibel Özbudun, *Küreselleşme ve Terör: Second Book*, Ütopya Yayınevi (Ankara: 2001), p. 297-300; also Francis Fukuyama, "American İstılacılıđına Son," *Financial Times*, September 15, 2001 in *ibid.*, pp. 301-302. But there are some other views which take it for granted that the USA was preparing for a major economic, political and military campaign towards the Middle East and Eurasian heartland, see for example Francis A. Boyle, *Destroying World Order: U.S. Imperialism in the Middle East Before and After September 11*; Noam Chomsky, *11 Eylül*, (tr. Dost Köpre) Om Yayınevi, pp.49-58; and also Noam Chomsky, *What Uncle Sam Really Wants* (1992).

to assume a highly assertive stance in its foreign policy orientations. The war on terrorism, the associated struggle against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the effort to establish the democratic political culture have become the central elements determining the dynamics of the US foreign policy in the Middle East. This was held up by a new willingness to assert US power, with unilateral and multilateral means. The developments have also constructed a new strategic context for the foreign policy choices of other states, which have encountered with difficult dilemmas about whether and how to support, oppose or keep away from the US-led war on terror. Despite Bush's announcement that 'Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists', most states are likely to be doubtful about US power in general and the conduct of the war on terrorism in particular.

More precisely, the dynamics of US policy towards the Middle East in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001, have been a new assertiveness and readiness to assert US power, against real and supposed enemies in the name of war against terrorism, the perception of the states as enemies and friends in the new age of crusades, adaptation of neoconservative policies and violent resolutions for international disputes, maximization of interests concerning the extraction, transportation and marketing of oil and natural gas resources and the using of NATO mechanisms in achieving the goals.

## 1.1 Assertiveness in US Foreign Policy

The attacks have had a dramatic effect on US foreign policy. Given America's status as the world's only superpower in the post-Cold War era, these attacks must be responded immediately. The war on terrorism and the related struggle against the proliferation of WMD have thus become the determining features of US foreign policy. Within this context, there is a new readiness on the part of the US to assert its power internationally and unilaterally. US economic and military power relative to that of the rest of the world did not necessarily change on 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001, but America's willingness to employ that power in its foreign affairs did.

It might be useful to give some statistical information here: Though the US has only 4.7% of the world's population, it possess 31.2% of global gross domestic product (GDP) and 36.3% of global defense spending.<sup>9</sup> The only comparator with the United States in global power terms is the European Union. And although the EU possesses a broadly similar proportion of global GDP, the absence of a single centralized European foreign policy suggests that the EU is unlikely to assert itself internationally in the way the US does. The power gap between the US and the rest of the world is the greatest in the military sphere:

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<sup>9</sup> Bill Emmolt, "Measurements of Power" and "Present at the Creation: A Survey of America's World role," *The Economist*, June 29, 2002.

The US spends on its military more than the combined defense budgets of the next nine largest defense spenders. The legacy of six decades of global commitment since the Second World War provides the USA with a unique network of global political, economic and military ties and an incomparable capacity to venture military power across the world. With relatively high US spending on research and development and economies of scale, most observers suggest that the military gap between the US and the rest of the world is expected to widen further.

The US was, according to Richard Baass, the 'reluctant sheriff' for much of the 1990s. Though it was the world's only superpower, it was often reluctant to engage in world politics and cautious of the costs of engagement where its immediate interests were not apparent. But now, considering itself directly threatened, the US is asserting its power and mobilizing national resources in the war against terrorism. Obviously this has resulted in a new willingness to use military force, as seen in the intervention in Afghanistan and the current debate over Iraq. The US government had also requested major increases in defense spending, foreign aid budget, and the establishment of a new Department of Homeland Security with a budget of more than \$35 billion a year in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks; and the Congress approved all these demands.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> John. Spratt, "National Security vs. Social Security: Is the Defense Budget

At a diplomatic level, in bilateral relations with other states and in international organizations, the US has worked since September 2001 to enhance intelligence cooperation and related counter-terrorism efforts. In combination, all these measures unquestionably amount to a very fundamental re-orientation in US foreign policy towards the goal of countering terrorism.

Will the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq indicate a new era in US interventionism? First of all, the removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was a remarkable victory for the US, which achieved its core objective quickly, with very low costs for itself (especially with regard to human casualties) and by deploying fairly small numbers of ground troops. The state of affairs in Afghanistan, however, was unusual: the Taliban was militarily weak; moreover, the US had a ready made ground force in the Northern Alliance (armed with Russian weapons).

But Iraq has proved a much more significant and difficult test case. In the absence of an ally equivalent to the Afghan Northern Alliance, the US is obliged to deploy a larger ground occupation force. Though Shi'ite Iraqis agreed to cooperate with the US forces and joined in military operations, they are still weak compared to the resistance forces in Iraq. Saddam Hussein is successfully

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Sustained!' The Brookings Review, Vol. 20, No. 3, (Summer ;2002), The Brookings Institution <http://www.brook.edu/press/REVIEW/summer2002/spratt.htm>; and Michael E. O'Hanlon, "We Must Circle the Right Wagons", The Los Angeles Times, 16 July 2000, The Brookings Institution <http://www.brook.edu/views/op-ed/ohanlon/20020716.htm>.

overthrown, but the fact that the US military has occupied Iraq and turmoiled it to a great extent has become a source of instability, which in turn made it practically and politically difficult, if not impossible, for the US to withdraw rapidly. The war in Iraq has drawn the US into the complex longer-term tasks of peacekeeping and nation-building to a much greater degree than in Afghanistan.

#### **1.1.1. A New Trend towards Unilateralism**

The attacks of September 11 2001 have started a long-term trend in US foreign policy towards unilateralism. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Clinton administration advanced the concept of muscular multilateralism: using US power to support and reinforce multilateral institutions and policies. Driven by a Republican Congress, however, The US Administration now rejected quite a number of imperative international agreements: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Kyoto agreement on global warming, International Criminal Court (ICC), an international convention to regulate the trade in small arms, a verification Protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention, an international convention to regulate and reduce smoking, the World Conference Against Racism, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Treaty among many others. This reflects a general antipathy against multilateralism in US power, and a new willingness to act unilaterally. September 11 attacks have significantly



strengthened this trend. America has initially acted largely unilaterally in Afghanistan, but it accepted foreign military assistance later on.

The evident willingness of the US to intervene in Iraq despite the opposition of most of its allies and without the endorsement of the UN Security Council was the proof of American unilateralism in the post-September 11 era. The Bush administration's withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to build a national missile defense system and President Bush's refusal to attend the September 2002 UN Earth Summit in Johannesburg were other examples of this trend. To a certain extent, these steps reflect the natural inclination of the Bush administration. In the wake of 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001, there was a broad consensus within America that the country had faced a significant new threat to its national security and this consensus had created a new willingness to assert US power that extends far beyond the shift from one administration to another.

The attacks of 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001, by provoking decisively assertive American action, have not only highlighted the dramatic scale of America's global power but also triggered a new debate on America's role in the world. The US foreign policy presently appears to be dominated by unilateralism, especially owing to the hawks within the Bush administration, such as Vice-President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of

defense Donald Rumsfeld.<sup>11</sup> According to these neo-con hawks, US military power is highly necessary for international order, the US must be willing to use that power and limitations on American power and freedom of action should be removed, whereas the US should not engage in activities such as peacekeeping and nation-building that are not central to its interests. Pressure from these voices to maintain military action in Iraq despite strong opposition from America's allies and without authorization by the UN Security Council has, however, provoked renewed debate and strong criticism of the unilateralist hawks both domestically and internationally.

Persons like James Baker, Secretary of State in George Bush senior's administration at the time of 1990-91 Gulf War and a leading figure in the Republican foreign policy establishment, had argued that the US needs to build support amongst its allies, press for UN Security Council authority and develop plans for post-war nation-building before a military action in Iraq.<sup>12</sup> Given the actual outcome of the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, it has now been clearer that despite its enormous power, even the US cannot achieve its long

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<sup>11</sup> For a history of the careers of these hawks, see for example James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: History of Bush's War Cabinet*, tr. into Turkish by Hakan Köni, İlk Yayınları, 2004.

<sup>12</sup> Julian Borger; "Daggers Drawn In The House of Bush," *The Guardian*, 28 August 2002.

term goals alone and that by acting unilaterally it undermines political alliances and institutions that are vital to long term American security and prosperity.<sup>13</sup>

Critics of US unilateralism have taken to quoting Henry Kissinger, usually seen as the high sustainer of realpolitik, who stated that the US foreign policy must rest not only on power, but also on international 'moral consensus'.<sup>14</sup> While the aftermath of September 11 2001 has noticeably highlighted America's global power and produced a new willingness to use that power, it has also provoked the beginnings of a new and vitally important debate on how the US should use that power, and the outcome of this long-term debate remains to be seen.

## 1.2 Description of the actors as Friends and Enemies, and Responses Thereupon

Bush declared in his speech to the Joint Session of Congress on 20<sup>th</sup> September 2001 that in the new war on terror 'Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.'<sup>15</sup> By describing Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an 'axis of

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<sup>13</sup> Michael Tlirsh, "Bush and the World," *Foreign Affairs*, (September/October 2002), [http://www.foreignaffairs.org/search/printable\\_fulltext.asp?i=20020901FAEssay9731.xml](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/search/printable_fulltext.asp?i=20020901FAEssay9731.xml), and G. John Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambitions," *Foreign Affairs*, (September/October 2002), [http://www.foreignaffairs.org/search/printable\\_fulltext.asp?i=20020901FAEssay9732.xml](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/search/printable_fulltext.asp?i=20020901FAEssay9732.xml)

<sup>14</sup> "You Can Be Warriors Or Wimps; or So Say the Americans," *The Economist*, 10 August 2000, 25.

<sup>15</sup> George W Bush, Address to a joint Session of Congress and the American People,

evil,' President Bush reinforced his image of a world divided between good and evil. Soon after the shock of 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001, the vast majority of states – and not just long standing American allies, but also countries such as China, India, Iran and Russia – condemned the terrorist attacks and offered various forms of support to the US. In the words of a front-page editorial in *Le Monde*, support for the US was indicated with the title 'We are all Americans now.'<sup>16</sup> International support for the US had reflected genuine repulsion against the terrorist attacks, as well as the common experiences of 'terrorism' in a number of cases and more narrow calculations of national interest in building cooperation with the US. Such international support was instrumental in Afghanistan, where the vast majority of countries generally supported US military action to remove the Taliban regime and destroy al-Qaeda.

Nevertheless, one year after the war, the international consensus in support of the US began to fade away. Several reasons may be suggested for this. First, while many people and governments remained largely sympathetic to the US anti-terrorist struggle, they have differences with the US about how that struggle should be pursued. The appropriate balance between military action and other measures or the extent of military action taken by the US in places such as Afghanistan is compounded by a subsequent moral and political duty to

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United States Capitol Washington, DC, 20 September 2001, Whitehouse website <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.

<sup>16</sup> Quoted as "You Can Be Warriors Or Wimps; or So Say the Americans," *The Economist*, 10 August 2000, 25.

support nation-building. The debate over the war in Iraq has brought such differences more to the front. Second, many people and governments around the world have genuinely uncertain views of the US and its current preponderance of international power. Though they acknowledge the inevitability and necessity of US engagement, they are concerned about both the general implications of America's unfettered superpower status and specific US policies on issues ranging from missile defenses to global warming to the Middle East.

In short, despite President Bush's injunction that you are either with us or against us, the majority of countries are neither genuinely true believers in, nor radical critics of the US; but rather agnostics seeing both benefits and dangers, good and bad, in American power and foreign policy.<sup>17</sup> What has changed in this relationship is that after 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001, the rest of the world have witnessed a United States more conscious of and willing to assert its power, for which the war against terrorism and the struggle to prevent the proliferation of WMD are now essential to its foreign policy and its relations with all other states.

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<sup>17</sup> Some people find both the attackers in September 11 and The US Administration as radical and fundamentalist. Though the US government and people are certainly victimized and humiliated with the terrorist attacks, the US determination and eagerness to assume utmost aggressive policies against supposed enemies without paying attention to international conventions is totally unacceptable. See for example Arundhati Roy, "Savaş Barıştır," in Ahmet Demirhan (ed.), *ABD, Terör ve İslam*, pp. 43-53.

The US would like to maintain its successful overthrow of Saddam Hussein with the establishment of a democratic Iraq which will have good relations with the US. It is interesting that while the 15 of 19 September 11 2001 hijackers were supposed by the USA Saudi nationals, Saudi Arabia is one of the key allies of the US in the region. Given this fact, there is an intensifying criticism of the idea of supporting authoritarian regimes that sponsor terrorism.<sup>18</sup> A presentation to the US department of Defense's Defense Advisory Board by a Rand Corporation researcher, for example, described Saudi Arabia as the center of evil, the prime mover, and the most dangerous opponent, arguing that Saudis are active at every level of the terror chain.<sup>19</sup> That is a contradiction in US foreign policy. However, some argue that regime change in Iraq will both open Baghdad's oil fields to the West and provide a model of democracy in the Middle East, thereby allowing the US to abandon its dependence on Saudi oil and put pressure on Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern states to democratize. In the medium run, such a scenario can radically alter Middle Eastern politics and the US's relationship with the region and can allow the US and other Western states to overcome the historic charge that they put oil before democracy.

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<sup>18</sup> Thomas Friedman, "Bush Slices His Drive For Democracy," *The Guardian*, 22 August 2002.

<sup>19</sup> Tim Reid, "Saudi Arabia is now "kernel of evil", " *The Times*, 7 August 2002.  
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/newspaper/0172-376521.00.html>.

## 1.3 Framing a Response to September 11

### 1.3.1 Terrorism and the Law

After the September 11 attacks, Bush's first public statement characterized these terrible attacks as an act of terrorism. In the US domestic law there is a definition of terrorism, which clearly qualifies them as such. Under international law and practice, however, there is no generally accepted definition of terrorism, for the reason that "one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter."<sup>20</sup> Yet certainly under United States domestic law this amounts to an "act or acts of terrorism."

But later on, President Bush consulted with former Secretary of State Powell and they decided to change the rhetoric and characterization of these attacks. The attacks came to be nominated as "act of war." But given the fact that international law and practice define act of war as a military attack by one nation state upon another, the terrorist attacks in September 11 were not act of war. Though contrary to international law provisions, describing the attacks as war was important in shaping its foreign policy; it illustrated the Bush administration's unwillingness to utilize international conventions which might require the submission of American power to external restraints, and thereby constrain rather than facilitate the realization of overt or covert American

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<sup>20</sup> See Francis A. Boyle, *World Politics and International Law*, 75–167 (1985); and *The Future of International Law and American Foreign Policy*, 79–112 (1989).

objectives. They also raised the rhetoric of Pearl Harbor. It was an action to rise up the emotions and perceptions of the American people generated on September 11, and thus dramatically escalate the stakes, both internationally and domestically.

The implication of this attitude was that if this is an act of war, then it cannot be handled according to international treaties and negotiations: an act of war can be dealt by means of military force and by going to war. Thus a decision was made quite early in the process to ignore and abandon the entire framework of international treaties that had been established under the auspices of the United Nations Organization. In order to prevent the impetus towards war from being impeded, Bush issued an impossible ultimatum, refusing all negotiations with the Taliban government. The Taliban government's requests for proof and offers to surrender bin Laden to a third party were all decisively ignored.

Having failed to invite the U.N. Security Council for war, Bush then went to the United States Congress and exploited the emotions of this national tragedy to acquire a congressional authorization to use force. It appears that Bush wanted a formal declaration of war along the lines of what President Roosevelt got from Congress after Pearl Harbor.<sup>21</sup> The Congress did not give Bush that permission. If a formal declaration of war had been passed by Congress, it

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<sup>21</sup> See Adam Clymer, "Senator Byrd Scolds Colleagues for Lack of Debate After Attack," *N.Y. Times*, Oct. 2, 2001.



would have made Bush a constitutional dictator as a result of which Americans would all be living under marshal law. In addition, the Congress might have closed up for the rest of the duration of the Bush war against terrorism.

Instead of a formal declaration of war, the U.S. Congress gave Bush a War Powers Resolution Authorization. This War Powers Resolution authorization gave Bush an opportunity to use military force against any individual, organization, or state that was somehow involved in the attacks on September 11, or else harbored those who were. The number of potential targets has fluctuated between 30 to 60 nation states, most of which are U.N. members and thus protected from U.S. aggression by the U.N. Charter. In other words, Bush has received a blank check from the United States Congress to exert military force against any state he wants to despite the U.N. Charter. This was then followed by Congress granting Bush a \$20 billion fund as a cash payment in order to push military force against Afghanistan.

Over the past decade and increasingly under the Bush administration, open remarks about intended foreign assassinations, efforts to overthrow the leaders of other sovereign states, or invasions of some countries have reached the daily papers. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld can call for the apprehension of suspects "dead or alive" or even "preferably dead" – which would happily avoid all the legal difficulties of proving bin Laden guilty in evidential basis. Even the *International Herald Tribune*, in its effort to convince European leaderships of

the longstanding struggle of the U.S. to deal with Al Qaeda, revealed how the relatively temperate Clinton had signed three highly classified Memorandums of Notification authorizing killing instead of capturing bin Laden, and then added several of Al Qaeda's senior lieutenants to the list.<sup>22</sup>

It should not therefore come as surprise, in this onslaught of candid revelation of Realpolitik that the historically hidden intent of America's nuclear deterrence policy should come to light through almost spontaneous remarks such as those by the Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz appearing in the 9 January 2002 edition of the *New York Times*:

“We're looking at a transformation of our deterrence posture from an almost exclusive emphasis on offensive nuclear forces to a force that includes defenses as well as offenses, that includes conventional strike capabilities as well as nuclear strike capabilities, and includes a much reduced level of nuclear strike capability.”

Wolfowitz admitted that the current U.S. practice of so-called nuclear “deterrence” is in fact really based upon “an almost exclusive emphasis on offensive nuclear forces.” To reiterate: The U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense has publicly admitted and conceded that “almost” all U.S. nuclear forces are really offensive and not really defensive. This should be regarded as an ominous

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<sup>22</sup> International Herald Tribune, Online Edition, Dec. 9, 2001.

sign of Pentagon becoming so brazen that it is publicly admitting U.S. nuclear criminality to the entire world.

#### **1.4 The Use of NATO Mechanisms**

In order to legitimize its military measures, the US Administration went to NATO headquarter in Brussels to get a resolution of support for the use of force. But the article 5 of the NATO Pact can only be used in dealing with an armed attack by a nation state or states against a NATO member state or states. It is not intended to deal with a terrorist attack.

NATO was originally organized as a collective self-defense pact pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, recognizing the right of individual and collective self-defense in the event of an armed attack by one nation state against another. In theory, the NATO Pact was supposed to deal with an armed attack upon a NATO member state or states by a member or members of the Warsaw Pact, especially the Soviet Union. But with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there was no real justification or excuse anymore for the continued existence of NATO. NATO had lost its supposed grounds. But, in an effort to keep NATO alive, Bush Sr. then tried to transform its nature in order to serve two additional purposes: (1) policing Eastern Europe; and (2) military intervention into the Middle East in order to secure the oil and gas fields. The main legal problem here is that the NATO Pact provides

no authorization to do this at all and needs amendment by the parliaments of the NATO member states to justify an interventionary force against the Middle East. Furthermore, any such offensive mission for NATO would also have required the express authorization of the U.N. Security Council as clearly required by U.N. Charter Article 53(1). After 11 September 2001, Bush simply wanted a useful tool for collective, offensive military intervention under the predominant control of the United States. This was expected to provide a legitimate multilateralism for domestic and international propaganda purposes, while at the same time avoiding the supervisory jurisdiction of the U.N. Security Council in accordance with the requirements of the U.N. Charter. The same was true for the abuse of the NATO. This seeming paradox can be resolved by understanding that the real reason why the United States set up NATO in the first place was to secure American control and domination of the European Continent.<sup>23</sup>

### 1.5 A Clash of Civilizations?

The “clash of civilizations” forecast by Samuel Huntington has received intensive discussion in the West,<sup>24</sup> while the Iranian reply calling for “a dialogue between civilizations” has gone unnoticed. Can we construe the sufferings that

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<sup>23</sup> See Noam Chomsky, *What Uncle Sam Really Wants* (1992).

<sup>24</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996).

the Muslim world has been witnessing in Bosnia, Chechnya, Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, and in Afghanistan as the operationalization of this theory? In fact, there is a widespread notion that Bush's New World Order is inspired by Huntington's clash of civilizations.<sup>25</sup>

The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Negroponte, who was selected by the US Administration to inform the entire world at the U.N. about international terrorism, a person who has actually had a bad humanitarian record concerning his dealings in the South America, had sent a letter to the U.N. Security Council stressing Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It is said in this letter that the United States reserved its right to use force in self-defense against any state that the US Administration felt that it is necessary, in order to fight their war against international terrorism as determined by themselves. But as we know, a state cannot apply the self-defense doctrine by attacking the territories of other states, and especially when there is not any clear evidence about the origins of attack. Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Taliban's Afghanistan have been selected as hypothetical enemies and the USA set out to its war engagement on its own accord.

The Taliban had repeatedly offered to negotiate a solution to the dispute over bin Laden with the United States. Even before the tragic events of September 11, negotiations were going on between the United States and the

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<sup>25</sup> See, for example, Francis A. Boyle, *Destroying World Order: U.S. Imperialism in the Middle East Before and After September 11*.

Taliban government over the disposition of bin Laden – as well as over the UNOCAL oil pipeline.<sup>26</sup> The Taliban government had offered to have bin Laden tried in a neutral Islamic court by Muslim judges applying the laws of Sharia. Later on, their proposal was modified to simply have him tried before some type of neutral court, which would exclude handing him over to the United States government. The Taliban government eventually offered that bin Laden is tried by the US provided that it gave them some credible evidence of his involvement in the 11 September attacks, to which Bush never gave an answer.<sup>27</sup>

But Bush responded to their offers for negotiation in his 20 September 2001 Address before the U.S. Congress by ruling out any type of negotiations and instead issuing the Taliban government an impossible ultimatum.<sup>28</sup>

Indeed, if we read the ultimatum that President Bush publicly gave to the Taliban government of Afghanistan, no self-respecting government in the world could have complied with that ultimatum. Quite obviously the Bush ultimatum was specifically drafted and publicly uttered so that it could not be complied by the Taliban government of Afghanistan.

There are striking similarities between the Bush public ultimatum to Afghanistan and the ultimatum given in private by U.S. Secretary of State Jim

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<sup>26</sup> Francis A. Boyle, *Destroying World Order: U.S. Imperialism in the Middle East Before and After September 11*, p. 132.

<sup>27</sup> See Bush's 20 September 2001 Address before the U.S. Congress, available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

Baker on behalf of Bush Sr. to Tariq Aziz on the eve of the Bush Sr. war against Iraq. That Bush Sr. ultimatum was deliberately designed so as not to be acceptable? The Bush Sr. administration had already made the decision to go to war against Iraq no matter what response was given by Iraq. Bush thus once again, following his predecessors, opted for the path of Realpolitik when he issued his public ultimatum to the Taliban government of Afghanistan.

It appears that the US Administration is basically following the same script and scenario that had already been written and successfully carried out over a decade ago by the Bush Sr. when they went to war against Iraq for the purpose of establishing direct American military control and domination over the Persian Gulf oil and gas fields. Only this time the Bushes were putting a move on the vast energy resources of Central Asia. As is well known, the Bush Family has extensive investments in the Oil and Gas Business, as does Vice President Cheney, who earlier served as Bush Sr.'s Minister of War.

Today the U.S. Central Command is executing the Pentagon's outstanding war plan against Afghanistan and deploying U.S. military forces to build U.S. military bases in Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. There is more than enough evidence in the public record that the U.S. war against Afghanistan had been planned and prepared well before 11 September 2001.<sup>29</sup> Clearly since at least 11 September 2001, the world has been witnessing

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<sup>29</sup> See, e.g., BBC Online Edition, Sept. 18, 2001.

the formal execution of a Pentagon war plan that had been in the works for about four years.

Why does the US want military bases in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan? Because of the oil and natural gas resources of Central Asia, reported to be the second largest deposits in the world after the Persian Gulf. Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ascent to independence of its constituent states in 1991, U.S. think-tanks and their respective “thinkers” produced all sorts of studies about how a U.S. presence in Central Asia had suddenly become a “vital national security interest” of the United States because of its vast energy resources.<sup>30</sup>

Since Central Asia is landlocked, the United States government wanted to find a way to get the oil and natural gas out, while avoiding Iran, Russia, and China. The easiest way to do that was to construct a pipeline south through Afghanistan, into Pakistan and right out to the Arabian Sea. UNOCAL had been negotiating to do this with the Taliban government of Afghanistan for quite some time, with the full support of the United States government into the summer of 2001, but their negotiations had failed. The U.S. government then tendered a proverbial offer that could not be refused by the Taliban government.

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<sup>30</sup> Francis A. Boyle, *Destroying World Order: U.S. Imperialism in the Middle East Before and After September 11*, p. 135.



Just as the Persian Gulf War against Iraq was mostly about oil and natural gas, this war against Afghanistan too is mostly about oil and natural gas – as well as about strategically outflanking Russia, China, Iran, and India by establishing U.S. military bases throughout Central Asia. The United States is going to be there for quite some time – at least until all that oil and natural gas reserves have been sucked out of Central Asia. This move into Central Asia under the rubric of waging a non-limited holy war against international terrorism represents another major expansion of the American Empire into the sphere of influence of a former super-power, and showing up against distant emerging world powers such as China and India, none of which can be counted on as friendly to America.

## CHAPTER 2

### IRAQI WAR

In this chapter, I will try to discover the main reasons behind the Bush administrations war in Iraq. The war still continues with all its speed and it seems that nobody observes any use in talking about the legal aspect of this war anymore, probably because it will not change much the things. But in order to present a comprehensive account of the war, we need to expound on the real and alleged reasons for the war since its inception.

The USA had primarily alleged that Saddam Hussein had given assistance to al-Qaeda and that Iraq possessed secret WMDs. Before the war, there was no clear evidence about that, and it is now clearer since US officials failed to prove these allegations. Yet there is one dramatic thing that though al-Qaeda was not active in Iraq before the war, the people who were against the invasion of Iraq come to call themselves as members of al-Qaeda and to fight with the US forces. Many people joined into al-Qaeda affiliations in Iraq while they had not even heard about its name before.

Based on the documents supplied by the most effective intelligence service in the World, CIA, the US officials argued in front of the Security Council that Saddam Hussein and his Iraq had posed a great danger for international peace

and security.<sup>31</sup> When the claims appeared to be wrong, it resulted with the increase of international community's distrust against the USA, for the USA already possessed a bad reputation with its denial of many international conventions necessary for the peace and security of the world. But all wrong claims brought against Iraq were necessary because the USA had its own reasons and motivations for a military action in the Middle East.

I argue that the major motivations behind this war was firstly Bush's and his cabinets neo-conservatism and secondly their ambition to control extraction, transportation and marketing of vast energy resources in the Middle East and Eurasia to complete the process of becoming the unchallengeable superpower of the world.

In this chapter, I will thus discuss and analyze the ongoing war in Iraq with reference to Neo-conservatism in Bush administration, the role of natural energy resources in the Middle East, the doctrine of preventive warfare as an excuse and the legal determination of guilt for war as described by the UN Charter.

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<sup>31</sup> The Text of the Powell's Talk in the Security Council is available in *Security Council Press Releases*, PR/7658, "US Secretary of State Powell Presents Evidence of Iraq's Failure to Disarm," <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7658.doc.htm>

## 2.1 Neo-Conservatism in the US Administration and Its Role in the Iraq War

Immediately after being inaugurated as the president in January 2001, George W Bush, Vice-President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and his Deputy Paul Wolfowitz began to plan a war against Iraq. Later on, the tragic events of September 11 have been used to serve as a pretext for the plan.<sup>32</sup> The fact that Iraq had nothing at all to do with September 11 or shoring up Al-Qaeda – as the CIA itself suggested – made no difference to Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, their Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of State John Bolton, and the numerous other pro-Israeli Neo-Cons within the Bush administration.<sup>33</sup>

These pro-Israeli Neo-Cons had been educated in the Machiavellian theories of Professor Leo Strauss, who taught political philosophy at the University of Chicago in the department of Political Science. An excellent description of Strauss's theories on law, politics, government, for elitism, and against democracy can be found in two scholarly books by a Canadian Professor of Political Philosophy, Shadia B. Drury. He wrote:

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<sup>32</sup> See, for example, Rahul Mahajan, *Full Spectrum Dominance* 108 (2003).

<sup>33</sup> Francis A. Boyle, *Destroying World Order: U.S. Imperialism in the Middle East Before and After September 11*, Clarity Press: Atlanta, 2004.

“... According to Strauss, ancient philosophers (such as Plato) were wise and wily, but modern philosophers (such as Locke and other liberals) were foolish and vulgar. The wise ancients thought that the unwashed masses were not fit for either truth or liberty; and giving them these sublime treasures was like throwing pearls before swine... They believed that society needs an elite of philosophers or intellectuals to manufacture “noble lies” for its consumption by the masses. Not surprisingly, the ancients had no use for democracy.”<sup>34</sup>

In Strauss’s estimation, they were right in thinking that there is only one natural right – the right of the superior to rule over the inferior – the master over the slave, the husband over the wife, and the wise few over the vulgar.

Another excellent work on Strauss school is by Francis Boyle, who entered the University of Chicago in September of 1968 shortly after Strauss had retired. But he was trained in Chicago’s Political Science Department by Strauss’s foremost protégé, co-author, and later literary executor, Joseph Cropsey. Based upon his personal experience as an alumnus of Chicago’s Political Science Department, he concurs completely with Professor Drury’s critique of Strauss, in

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<sup>34</sup> Shadia B. Drury, “Saving America,” Evatt Foundation Paper, Sept. 10, 2003; *The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss* (1988); *Leo Strauss and the American Right* (1999). See also Alain Frachon & Daniel Vernet, *The Strategist and the Philosopher: Leo Strauss and Albert Wohlstetter*, *Le Monde*, April 16, 2003, translated into English by Norman Madarasz on Counterpunch.org., June 2, 2003; Khurram Husain, *Neocoons*, *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, Nov./Dec. 2003, at 62.

addition to her penetrating analysis of the degradation of the American political process that has been inflicted by Chicago's Straussian Neo-Con group.<sup>35</sup>

The University of Chicago trained him and innumerable other students to become ruthless and unprincipled Machiavellians, though ironically some of its students have been highly respected and pious Muslims in the Islamic world such as Fadl er-Rahman graduates were there were. But it was especially due to this feature of the university that so many novice Neo-Con students approached towards the University of Chicago or towards Chicago Alumni at other universities. Years later, the University of Chicago became the "brains" behind the Bush Administration and John Ashcroft's police state. The concept of police state may seem irrelevant to our subject in international politics at first sight, but I think it is not, because it imminently affects the condition of foreigners in the USA, especially that of Muslims. Attorney General John Ashcroft took his law degree from the University of Chicago in 1967. Many of his lawyers at the Bush's Department of Justice are members of the right-wing, reactionary and totalitarian Federalist Society, which originated in some measure at the University of Chicago. Federalist Society wrote the USA Patriot Act (USAPA) I and the draft for USAPA II, which constitute the blueprint for establishing an American police state. Meanwhile, the Department of Justice's own F.B.I. tried

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<sup>35</sup> Francis A. Boyle, *Destroying World Order: U.S. Imperialism in the Middle East Before and After September 11*, Clarity Press: Atlanta, 2004; *ibid.*, chapter 7, pp. 140-3; see also David Brock, *Blinded by the Right* (2002).

to cover up the U.S. governmental origins of the post September 11, 2001 anthrax attack on Washington, D.C. that enabled Ashcroft and his Federalist Society to hurry the U.S. Congress into passing USAPA I into law in the first place.

Integrally related to and overlapping with the Federalist Society are members of the University of Chicago "School" of Law and Economics, which was founded upon the market fundamentalism of Milton Friedman, a long-time Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago, who is now retired. Friedman and his Chicago group provided the academic cover for right-wing economic policies that have robbed and plundered domestic and world economies and their respective peoples all over the developing world.<sup>36</sup> These Chicago academic neo-cons recede to the Nazi Doctrine of "useless eaters," the idea that human beings with physical, mental, or emotional handicaps are not worth expending the resources necessary to keep them alive. In accordance with Friedman's philosophy of market fundamentalism, the "privatization" of Iraq and its oil industry is already in progress for the primary benefit of the U.S. energy companies (e.g., Halliburton, formerly under Vice President Dick Cheney) which, along with Enron, had already penetrated into the Bush administration.

The Neo-Cons formed a "holy alliance" in support of Bush for their own different reasons, and they also worked together to hold up Israeli Prime

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<sup>36</sup> See Greg Palast, *The Best Democracy Money Can Buy* (2003), p 5.

Minister Ariel Sharon, who is an internationally acknowledged war criminal.<sup>37</sup> According to his own public estimate before the American Enterprise Institute, President Bush hired about 20 Straussians to be appointed to key positions in his administration.<sup>38</sup> They deliberately took offices where they could push American foreign policy in favor of Israel and against its chosen enemies such as Iraq, Iran, Syria, and the Palestinians. Most of the Straussian Neo-Cons in the US Administration and elsewhere are Israel-firsters: what is good for Israel is by definition good for the United States.

It was the Chicago Straussian group of pro-Israeli Neo-Cons who set up a special intelligence unit within the Pentagon to take up the new American policy line to be disseminated to the U.S. news media in order to generate public support for a war against Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>39</sup> To paraphrase the advice Machiavelli once rendered to his Prince in Chapter XVIII of that book: those who want to deceive will always find those willing to be deceived.<sup>40</sup> There is a certain influence of Machiavelli's *The Prince*.

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<sup>37</sup> Francis A. Boyle, *Take Sharon to The Hague*, Counterpunch.org, June 6, 2002.

<sup>38</sup> White House Press Release, *President Discusses the Future of Iraq*, Washington Hilton Hotel, Feb. 26, 2003.

<sup>39</sup> Norman Solomon, *The Habits of Highly Deceptive Media* (1999); Noam Chomsky, *Media Control* (1997); Seymour M. Hersh, *Selective Intelligence*, New Yorker, May 8, 2003; Michael Lind, *The Weird Men Behind George W. Bush's War*, New Statesman, London, April 7, 2003; Julian Borger, *The Spies Who Pushed for War*, The Guardian, July 17, 2003.

<sup>40</sup> Machiavelli, *The Prince* 147 (M. Musa trans. & ed. 1964): "... and men are so simple-minded and so dominated by their present needs that one who deceives will always find one who will allow himself to be deceived."



The University of Chicago officially celebrates Bush's Straussian Neo-Con cabal, stressing Wolfowitz Ph.D. '72, Ahmad Chalabi (neo-con,s man in Iraq), Ph.D. '69, Abram Shulsky, M.A. '68, Ph.D. '72 (head of the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans "intelligence" unit), Zalmay Khalilzad, Ph.D. '79 (Bush's roving proconsul for Afghanistan and then Iraq), as well as faculty members Bellow, Bloom and Strauss.<sup>41</sup> According to the *University of Chicago Magazine*, Allan Bloom's *The Closing of the American Mind* "helped popularize Straussian ideals of democracy."<sup>42</sup> It is accurate to assert that Bloom's book helped to popularize Straussian "ideas," but those ideas were mostly antidemocratic, Machiavellian, and elitist inter alia. Only the University of Chicago would have the unmitigated enthusiasm to publicly stress that Strauss and Bloom cared a small amount about democracy, let alone comprehended the ideals of democracy.

Given the main orientation of Leo Strauss indicated above, it should be difficult for anyone to seriously believe that a pro-Israeli Chicago/Strauss/ Bloom product such as Wolfowitz could care a little about democracy in Iraq. Or for that matter, anyone in the Bush administration, after stealing the 2000 presidential election in Florida.<sup>43</sup> As a measure of the extent of Straussian infiltration, at the behest of its Straussian Neo-Con Political Science Department, in 1979 the entire University of Chicago set out to its way to grant the "first

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<sup>41</sup> Francis A. Boyle, *Destroying World Order: U.S. Imperialism in the Middle East Before and After September 11*, Clarity Press: Atlanta, 2004.

<sup>42</sup> "Between the Lines," *University of Chicago Magazine*, June 2003, at 54.

<sup>43</sup> Greg Palast, *The Best Democracy Money Can Buy* 11–81 (2003).

Albert Pick Jr. Award for Outstanding Contributions to International Understanding” to Robert McNamara, in an effort to rehabilitate his commitments against humanity in the post-World War II era.<sup>44</sup>

## 2.2 Oil and Gas as the Key to Global Dominance

There were undoubtedly multiple reasons for this Bush war of aggression against Iraq in addition to ensuring the well being of Israel. Noteworthy among them is the Bush Family blood feud against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and his family, which now have got rid of Saddam’s two sons and a teenage grandson.

But these reasons apart, there is no doubt that oil was at the top of the Bush’s priority list considering the fact that Iraq possesses about 11% of the world’s oil reserves. It is highly probable that, prior to the war, it was the thirst for oil and natural gas by the American power elite that really drove the Bush administration’s war against Afghanistan: It was the need to gain direct access to the rich oil and natural gas fields of Central Asia, which marked the first exploitation of the terrible tragedy of September 11 as public justification for a pre-planned war of aggression under the pretext of combating international terrorism.<sup>45</sup> Although according to the Bush administration’s version of events

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<sup>44</sup> Noam Chomsky, *Rethinking Camelot* (1993); Robert S. McNamara, *In Retrospect* (1995).

<sup>45</sup> See, e.g., Jean-Charles Brisard & Guillaume Dasqué, *Forbidden Truth* (2002).

15 of the 19 hijackers on September 11 were from Saudi Arabia, which is a highly suspectful claim that is not proved by evidence (except by CIA!), for some unexplained reasons America had to attack, invade, and occupy Iraq and Afghanistan. Bush deputies continue to cover up, and obstruct investigations into who was ultimately responsible for the terrible tragedy of September 11, and why no one in the US Administration tried to prevent it despite numerous, repeated, and widespread warnings beforehand from American as well as European diplomats and agencies.

Bush's wars of aggression against Afghanistan and Iraq must be understood as part of a major plan by the United States government for global energy resources and the corresponding power to be derived from controlling about two-thirds of the world's oil and natural gas supplies located around this Eurasian heartland. Such an attack had been carefully thought and planned by the U.S. power elite for quite some time, dating back to the Kissinger threat and plan to steal the Arab oil fields in reaction to the 1973 Arab oil embargo of the West for their assistance to Israel in its war to hold on to the Arab lands which Israel had illegally stolen in its 1967 aggressions against the surrounding Arab states and people.<sup>46</sup> The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union provided the U.S. power elite with the opportunity to put their scheme of world economic hegemony into operation.

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<sup>46</sup> Robert Dreyfuss, *The Thirty-Year Itch*, MotherJones.com, March 1, 2003.

But the Bush's wars of aggression against Afghanistan and Iraq must be seen as more than the seizure of oil for domestic consumption. On the contrary, they are components of a longstanding American plan to control the oil and natural gas supplies of Europe, Japan, and Asia, and thus the future of the world's economy – a project which Hans Morgenthau once identified as “unlimited imperialism” in his classic work *Politics Among Nations*.<sup>47</sup> Tied into this was the subsidiary objective of making sure that oil continues to be paid for in dollars instead of Euros on the open market.

The Bush Sr. 1991 war against Iraq for oil was the first battle in the U.S. expedition for world economic control. These subsequent events can be seen through the same light: the Bush Sr. invasion of Somalia;<sup>48</sup> the Clinton/ Bush military intervention into Colombia;<sup>49</sup> Bush's support for the anti-Chavez failed coup in oil-rich Venezuela;<sup>50</sup> the post-9/11 U.S. military intervention into and occupation of Djibouti in order to control the Suez Canal/ Persian Gulf oil route to Europe, and also to obtain direct military access to the oil and natural gas resources around the Horn of Africa; the August 2003 U.S. military intervention into Liberia, once again to have direct military access to the oil and natural gas

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<sup>47</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* pp. 52-3 (4<sup>th</sup> ed. 1967).

<sup>48</sup> William Blum, *Rogue State* 158 (2000); John Pilger, *The New Rulers of the World* 127–29 (2003).

<sup>49</sup> Noam Chomsky, *Rogue States* 62–81 (2000).

<sup>50</sup> Greg Palast, *The Best Democracy Money Can Buy* 192–99 (2003).

resources located off and on the West Coast of Africa<sup>51</sup> and so on and so fort. Whatever the public rhetoric or justification could be, the fact of the matter is that if the researcher looks at a map of the world, he will notice that the United States government has its military, paramilitary, and covert forces touching upon and/or threatening almost every country in the world which possesses significant quantities of oil or natural gas, as well as their transportation supply-lines.

Many of these energy-resource-rich countries are typically Muslim. That exposes what Huntington's infamous "Clash of Civilizations" was really all about.<sup>52</sup> After September 11, Bush himself proudly boasted that he was going on a Crusade. That is the way at least most of the Muslim world sees it: an American fundamentalist duty to remake "world order" in America's imperialist image – not as democracies, but as client or even failed states – while provoking world disorder meanwhile.

In this inexorable search and insatiable lust for oil and gas around the world, the United States power elite is now in the process of destroying the whole of the international legal order that had been established by a preceding elitist generation running the United States government in the aftermath of and in reaction to the genocidal horrors of the Second World War. Most particularly

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<sup>51</sup> Roger Morris, *Hurtful Hand on Liberia*, L.A. Times, Aug. 31, 2003.

<sup>52</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996). *But See* Edward W. Said, *Afterword* (1994) to *Orientalism* (1978).

and especially, this includes, inter alia, the United Nations Charter, as well as the Nuremberg Charter, Judgment, and Principles, all of which had from then on been the basis upon which the entirety of the post-World War II international legal order rested.<sup>53</sup>

### 2.3 Preventive Warfare

Iraq had been bombed by the United States and the United Kingdom since the end of the Bush Sr.'s Gulf War in 1991 under the allegation of enforcing unauthorized and clearly illegal no-fly zones. But in order to achieve their objective of seizing Iraq outright, the Bush warmongers had to articulate another operational rationale for a war of aggression that they could then use to persuade the American people and Congress that was apart from their immature "war against international terrorism."<sup>54</sup> Therefore, they brought the famous doctrine of "preventive warfare" to the fore, once again using the terrible tragedy of 11 September 2001 as a pretext for doing so.

The first explicit step in this plan was Bush's aggressive threat to Iraq addressed during the course of his State of the Union Address to the United States Congress on 29 January 2002, in which he branded Iraq as part of a so-called "axis of evil" along with Iran and North Korea. By means of employing

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<sup>53</sup> Francis A. Boyle, *Foundations of World Order* 155–68 (1999).

<sup>54</sup> Francis A. Boyle, *Palestine, Palestinians and International Law* 132–52 (2003).

this provocative language going back to the World War II "axis" of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan, the US Administration was preparing the ground for false claims to launch preventive wars against all three of these U.N. member states. Iraq was at the top of the Bush's priority list. Having been materially and psychologically weakened by over a decade of economic sanctions imposed upon its people by the United Nations Security Council acting at the command of the United States and the United Kingdom, Iraq and its oil fields were finally ready for the exploitation by Bush and Tony Blair. By contrast, North Korea and Iran could be expected to defend themselves by wreaking enormous casualties.

The doctrine of preventive warfare was publicly addressed by the US President Bush in his 1 June 2002 commencement address at the West Point Military Academy.<sup>55</sup> Then in late August of 2002, Vice President Cheney signaled the formal beginning of the war against Iraq by giving two public speeches before the Veterans of Foreign Wars (Aug. 26) and the Korean War Veterans (Aug. 29) in which he too publicly referred to the doctrine of preventive warfare against Iraq.<sup>56</sup> The U.S. news media were too obeisant to observe that warmongering for a war against Iraq in front of these former soldiers who had

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<sup>55</sup> You can listen to the speech by Bush at <http://www.usma.edu/Class/2002/> , The United States Military Academy at West Point, 1 June 2002.

<sup>56</sup> Speech by Dick Cheney, "Vice President Honors Veterans of Korean War," *The White House Press Releases*, at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020829-5.html>

actually gone to war. Cheney and Bush had also fought in the Vietnam War; when Wolfowitz and the rest of the Bush administration's Straussian Neo-Con cabal were too busy studying Machiavelli and Nietzsche with Strauss, Bloom, and their friends from the University of Chicago.<sup>57</sup> The contemporary American power elite now prefers to send the children of poor blacks, Latin Americans, and whites to kill and be killed in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, as did their predecessors a generation ago in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

Lastly, in September 2002 the US Administration formally approved and adopted the "National Security Strategy of the United States," fully taking up this doctrine of preventive warfare, and sent it to the U.S. Congress as a declaration of official policy by the United States of America.<sup>58</sup> I will not waste time here by analyzing this document extensively, but its most repulsive language is certainly: "... we recognize that our best defense is a good offense..." In other words, the United States government has openly admitted in an official government document that it is now prepared to wage offensive warfare against enemies of that it chose around the world irrespective of the requirements of international law. This official U.S. government document can be brought in front of the international community against the United States government which wages illegal wars of aggression against other U.N. member

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<sup>57</sup> On the course of their careers see James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: History of Bush's War Cabinet*, (tr. into Turkish by Hakan Köni as *Şahinlerin Yükselişi: Bush'un Savaş Kabinesinin Tarihi*) 2004.

<sup>58</sup> See Full Text: *Bush's National Security Strategy*, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 2002.



states in opposition to the most basic principles of the contemporary international legal order.

Even more terrifying, while it was publicly agitating for a war of aggression against Iraq, the US Administration released its so-called “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction” in December 2002, which was published on the web-page for the White House. This supplementary war plan demands the first use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – chemical, biological, and nuclear – by the United States government under the excuse of waging a preventive or preemptive war. This doctrine of preventive warfare is nothing more than waging a war of aggression. So the US Administration authoritatively indicated that it is fully prepared to be the first to use WMD. It would do so against its chosen enemies around the world as part of an offensive military operation, or even launch a full-scale war, thereby bringing to mind shades of Hiroshima and Nagasaki!<sup>59</sup> North Korea took notice and responded accordingly to defend itself.<sup>60</sup>

## 2.4 Self-Defense as an Excuse for Warfare in Iraq

Today the basic employment of self-defense recognized by the international legal order is set forth in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter: “Nothing in

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<sup>59</sup> Francis A. Boyle, *The Criminality of Nuclear Deterrence* 55–91 (2002).

<sup>60</sup> Leon V. Sigal, *Negotiating with the North*, *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, Nov./ Dec. 2003, at 19.

the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” In contrast to conventional wisdom and the framing of this event, constructed by The US Administration officials and reinforced by pervasive propaganda through the mainstream media, it was the US Administration and the Tony Blair government which propelled an armed attack against Iraq, and thus triggered Iraq’s inherent right of individual and collective self-defense under U.N. Charter Article 51. In spite of the fact that Iraq was the victim, and had a legitimate right under international law both to self-defense and to search for U.N. assistance in deterring aggression against it, no U.N. Member State attempted to defend Iraq. Rather, Iraq became the first victim of this Doctrine of Preventive Warfare put forward by Bush and Tony Blair.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE

The Middle East region undoubtedly possesses the potentials of becoming a unique threat and opportunity for the world in general and the USA in particular. According to the Arab authors of the 2002 and 2003 United Nations Arab Human Development Reports (AHDR), the potential threat to the national interests of all G-8 members originates from what they defined as three “deficits” that prevail all through the Middle East, i.e., the lack of freedom, knowledge, and women’s empowerment.<sup>61</sup>

While the US-led war in Iraq continues, the US Administration is executing a wide-ranging initiative, supposedly planned for starting transitions to democratization in the greater Middle East. Senior White House and State Department officials have been meeting with key European allies about “a master plan” to endorse major political, economic and social reforms in Arab and South Asian countries, though the specifics of the plan are a source of disagreement.<sup>62</sup> The “Greater Middle East Initiative” was scheduled to be

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<sup>61</sup> The entire 2002 report is available at [http://www.rbas.undp.org/ahdr/press\\_kits2002/EnglishPressKit.pdf](http://www.rbas.undp.org/ahdr/press_kits2002/EnglishPressKit.pdf) and the details of 2003 report can be reached at <http://cfapp2.undp.org/rbas/ahdr2.cfm?menu=3&submenu=2&subsubmenu=1> .

<sup>62</sup> As the wars proceed in Iraq and Afghanistan, disagreement on the nature of the master plan becomes clearer. While the USA is in favor of following a security and treath sensitive orientation, the EU member states are more in favor of supporting the

announced at the G-8 summit, which was hosted by President Bush at Sea Island in Georgia in June 2004. The US is also bringing up the initiative in EU and NATO summits with new agendas as new developments occur.

In a November 2003 speech, US President George W. Bush declared that the United States has adopted a new “forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East” because of its belief that Western nations’ sixty years of excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East had failed to remove security threats coming from the region.<sup>63</sup> Accordingly, American policymaking elite deliberated a plan, the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI), to start political and economic reforms in the region in accordance with the recommendations of G-8 countries.

In February 2004, shortly after the US Administration sent the proposal to other G-8 governments for comment, the London-based Arabic daily news *al-Hayat* obtained a version (reportedly from the Germans) and published the document entirely. Arab government leaders were very outraged with the content of the draft. “Whoever imagines that it is possible to impose solutions or reform from abroad on any society or region is delusional,” said Egyptian

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development of human rights, democracy, more freedom for the women, economic development etc., which are the conditions for a long term peace process in the region and therefore more acceptable for regional states.

<sup>63</sup> Transcript of Remarks by President George W. Bush at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, Washington DC, 6 November 2003.

President Hosni Mubarak.<sup>64</sup> In March, Mubarak and Jordan's King Abdullah traveled to Europe in hopes of persuading other G-8 governments not to support elements of the American proposal.

GMEI was eventually mitigated as a result of US officials' meetings with the leaders in the Middle Eastern countries and European allies. The declaration eventually issued at the G-8 Sea Island summit was changed to a great extent compared to the original plan. But not surprisingly, the Bush administration's initiative seems to be destined to end up with failure because violence in Iraq among the rival groups will probably render transition to democracy highly difficult.

The GMEI working paper was also premised on the claim that the growing pool of politically and economically alienated individuals in the region threatens the national interests of G-8 members by contributing to the global rise in terrorism, international crime, and illegal migration. Statistics from the 2002 and 2003 UN Arab Human Development Reports (AHDR) were cited to highlight the magnitude of the problem. The GMEI draft strongly urged G-8 member states to initiate a coordinated response to promote political, economic and social reform

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<sup>64</sup> "U.S. Plan for Mideast Reform Draws Ire of Arab Leaders," *The New York Times*, 27 February 2004.

in the region and build a long-term partnership with the Greater Middle East's reform leaders.<sup>65</sup>

Some statistical descriptions which are indicated in the working paper of the US as the sources of instability in the region and towards the G8 countries, which are published in *al-Hayat*, are as follows:

“1- The combined GDP of the 22 Arab League countries is less than that of Spain.

2- Approximately 40% of adult Arabs - 65 million people - are illiterate, two thirds of whom are women.

3- Over 50 million young people will enter the labor market by 2010, 100 million will enter by 2020 - a minimum of 6 million new jobs need to be created each year to absorb these new entrants.

4- If current unemployment rates persist, regional unemployment will reach 25 million by 2010.

5- One-third of the region lives on less than two dollars a day. To improve standards of living, economic growth in the region must more than double from below 3 percent currently to at least 6 percent.

6- Only 1.6 percent of the population has access to the Internet, a figure lower than that in any other region of the world, including sub-Saharan Africa.

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<sup>65</sup> Gary C. Gambill, “Jumpstarting Arab Reform: The Bush Administration's Greater Middle East Initiative,” *Middle East Forum*, Vol. 6, June/July 2004

7- Women occupy just 3.5 percent of parliamentary seats in Arab countries, compared with, for example, 8.4 percent in sub-Saharan Africa.

8- Fifty-one percent of older Arab youths expressed a desire to immigrate to other countries, according to the 2002 AHDR, with European countries the favorite destination."<sup>66</sup>

These statistics are taken for granted by the USA as reflecting a region with the potential to inflict devastating harms to industrially developed G8 states in general and to the USA in particular. Accordingly, allowing the GME to continue on the same path will certainly add up to the problems. The amount of underemployed, undereducated, and politically disenfranchised people will increase and pose greater threats to the stability of the region, and to the common interests of the G-8 members. The alternative to this is to introduce reforms wily-nily.

The USA suggests with the draft that the 'liberation' of Afghanistan and Iraq from oppressive regimes and the emergence of democratic traditions throughout the region will present the G-8 with a historic opportunity. At Sea Island, the G-8 tempted to forge a long-term partnership with the Greater Middle East's reformist leaders and instigate a coordinated response to facilitate political, economic, and social reforms in the region. Accordingly, the G-8 could have agreed on common reform priorities that would address the AHDR deficits

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<sup>66</sup> "G-8 Greater Middle East Partnership Working Paper," *Al-Hayat*, 13 February 2004

by “promoting democracy and good governance,” “building a knowledge society;” and “expanding economic opportunities.”

These reform priorities were considered as the key to the region's development: it was expected that democracy would emerge as a byproduct of democracy and good governance, and that well-educated individuals would become its agents, and that enterprise would serve as the engine of development.

This initiative is modeled on the 1975 Helsinki accords, which were meant to settle post-World War II border disputes and were signed by 35 nations, including the United States, the Soviet Union and almost all European countries. The Helsinki accords, which also involved human rights issues, were ultimately used by the West to promote and protect nonconformist groups in the Soviet bloc. Some experts consider the Helsinki accords to be a key factor in the demise of communism in the Eastern Bloc.<sup>67</sup>

United States' Vice President Dick Cheney had first hinted at the Greater Middle East Initiative during the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. Although Cheney is one of the foremost architects of the US doctrine of pre-emptive warfare, he declared, “Our forward strategy for freedom commits us to support those who work and sacrifice for reform across the greater Middle East.

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid.



We call upon our democratic friends and allies everywhere and in Europe in particular, to join us in this effort.”<sup>68</sup>

During the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Washington in January 2004, the US administration had given Prime Minister Erdogan the green light to sponsor the initiative in the Middle East. Despite the fact that the exact details of the ambitious initiative are still being developed, some sources self-evidently point out that the US wishes to export Turkey’s secular model to the entire Middle East, and to establish a system of separation of religion and state in the region. Turkey can start up by sending Muslim scholars to the rest of the Islamic world with the acknowledged aim of limiting Islamic teachings to prayer and fasting. Moreover, those scholars will encourage civil marriages involving members of different religions, and will work to belittle Islamic principles that contradict the Western liberal model – issues such as jihad, polygamy, and hijab will all be shunned.

The new initiative is indeed the latest in a series of pro-democracy declarations by high-ranking officials in the US administration. On November 2003, President Bush stated his adoption of what he called a “forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East,” explaining that “sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe, because in the long run stability cannot be purchased at the

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<sup>68</sup> Transcript of Vice President Dick Cheney's Address to the Davos World Economic Summit is available at <http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/uscn/wh/2004/012401.htm> .

expense of liberty.” Then, on December 12, 2003, US Secretary of State Colin Powell spoke about the “US-Middle East Partnership Initiative,” according to which the US would endeavor to promote regional economic growth, female emancipation, and greater participation of citizens in government.<sup>69</sup>

Visionary talk of a greater Middle East for a few months during an election year might have carried the hope of convincing the US electorate that the Bush administration’s efforts were genuine. However, in light of the mounting problems that the US is facing in the region, the new “Greater Middle East Initiative” is probable to fail. The reasons for this probable failure have to do not only with the conflicting and irreconcilable objectives that US foreign policy has pursued since September 11, but also with perceptions of the US in the Middle East on the part of its inhabitants, perceptions created by America’s long history of supporting “friendly tyrants” in the region.

The US’ failure to find an adequate solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, its long-lasting support for Israel’s expansionist policies and the absence of a consistent policy for Iraqi independence or state-building leave the US with little or no credibility as a sincere proponent for change in a region long troubled by dictatorship and militarism.

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<sup>69</sup> For a detailed account of the Middle East Partnership Initiative (Its history, goals, pillars, partners, events etc.) see the specific corner at web site of the US Department of State in <http://mepi.state.gov/mepi/>

### 3.1 The Manufacture of Insecurity

Since September 11, the US government has insisted that its war on terror will inevitably make the world a safer place, and that the Middle East will be observing, for the first time in its turbulent history, the benefits of freedom and democracy.

The reason for this state of affairs is that the US Administration is encountering two conflicting imperatives. The first is the necessity to fight Islamic fundamentalism worldwide, which entail that the US set aside its democratic rhetoric and search for closer cooperation with authoritarian regimes all through the Middle East and Asia. The second is the recognition on the part of many US decision-makers that it is in particular the lack of democracy in Muslim countries combined with the US' alliances with oppressive autocratic regimes that fuel the cause of the Islamists.<sup>70</sup>

Since September 11, it has become clear that concepts such as human rights, democracy, peace, freedom, accountability and economic opportunities were used to follow strategic interests and serve the purpose of imposing Western control. Regimes in the Middle East immediately get the most out of the moment and used the expedient excuse of "fighting terrorism" to constrict their control on power; they continued to arrest, detain and torture thousands

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<sup>70</sup> Thomas Carothers, "Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror," *Foreign Affairs* January/February 2003

of members of opposition groups in their own countries. Many of those regimes were encouraged by the US' severing of its own domestic civil liberties after September 11 through the large-scale arresting of immigrants, closed deportation hearings, and the declaration of some US citizens as enemy combatants with no right given to counsel or to refuse the designation.<sup>71</sup>

In addition, as a an example of extreme interpretation which makes sense in some parts of the Muslim World, the US' arbitrary imprisonment, torture and illegal killing of captives in Guantanamo and Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan represented a precedent to pro-US regimes that such practices are indeed acceptable.<sup>72</sup> To alleviate itself from possible legal problems or public protests, the US transferred terror suspects to allied governments in the Muslim World (the same countries criticized in the US State Department's annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices).<sup>73</sup> Many terror suspects are even held at overseas CIA interrogation centers which are entirely unreachable for reporters, lawyers and outside agencies, and are regularly beaten, tortured and deprived of sleep by US Army Special Forces and local security officials before interrogation.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Yamin Zakaria, "The Axis of Hypocrisy," *Jihad Unspun* November 8<sup>th</sup>, 2003

<sup>73</sup> Slavoj Zizek, " Iraq 's False Promises," *Foreign Policy* January/February 2004 733  
Robin Wright and Glenn Kessler, "Bush Aims for 'Greater Mideast ' Plan," *Washington Post* February 9<sup>th</sup>, 2004

<sup>74</sup> Eyal Press, "In Torture We Trust?" *Nation* March 31<sup>st</sup>, 2003

While the US lectured democracy and freedom, it not only went through with an aggressive doctrine of pre-emptive warfare, but also worked to cultivate closer ties with tyrants in the Middle East and Central Asia. The most evident case of US security interests overruling its calls for democracy lies in Pakistan, where President Pervez Musharraf seized power in a 1999 military coup, constricted his authoritarian grip on power, and instituted a series of antidemocratic constitutional amendments. In response for the Pakistani leader's critical supporting role in the war on terrorism, the US Administration rewarded Musharraf with praise and attention, relinquished various economic sanctions that had been imposed on Pakistan, assembled a good amount of aid package that exceeded \$600 million in 2002, and restarted US-Pakistani military cooperation.<sup>75</sup>

Given Kaddafi's decision to cease his country's WMD program and open his country up to Western interests, the Libyan leader was also gently praised; all calls for reform within Libya seemed to have faded as US security interests were fully met.

In Central Asia, the US' need for military bases and other forms of security arrangements led the US to establish closer relations with the despotic leaders of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.<sup>76</sup> Even the Turkmenbashi

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<sup>75</sup> Thomas Carothers, "Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror," *Foreign Affairs* January/February 2003

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

Saparmurat Niyazov received a pleasant visit from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in April 2002. Given Kazakhstan's significant oil and gas reserves and President Nursultan Nazarbayev's close cooperation with the US on security and economic matters, there was no US pressure of any kind on Kazakhstan's president to launch democratic reforms.

## **3.2 The dilemma of Palestine and Iraq:**

### **3.2.1 The US Fails Its First Test**

A closer look at the strategic underpinnings behind the "Greater Middle East Initiative" suggests that the US Administration and its neo-conservative masterminds are eager to go back to Cold War politics. In essence, they seem to regard the Middle East as the legitimate heir to the former Soviet Union – a new "pole" threatening the United States. In turn, political Islam has become, in their worldview, the 21<sup>st</sup> century's communism, even if certain interpretations of political Islam resonate closely with the aspirations of a significant segment of Muslim public opinion. The result has been an increase in militancy and extremism in Muslim civil society and a blatant rejection of any message emanating from the neo-conservative, pro-Zionist administration currently holding the reigns of power in Washington.

In fact, UN envoy to Iraq, Lakhdar Brahimi, warned of the imminent danger of civil war in Iraq if demands for elections and transfer of power are not met.<sup>77</sup> Indeed the country is being torn apart between Kurdish demands for independence in the north and the nationalist tendencies of Iraqi Arabs. Moreover, Sunnis will most likely resist any Shiite control of political power.

Even if circumstances miraculously changed and Iraq developed into a fully-functional independent and democratic state, this would probably result in more pressing demands for an early withdrawal of all US forces from the country – clearly an unacceptable demand from Washington, given Iraq's geo-strategic importance.<sup>78</sup> One has only to note how American military officials were quick to point out that approximately 100,000 US troops would be needed in Iraq long after a sovereign government is restored.<sup>79</sup>

### 3.3. Conclusion

In the midst of major change in the strategic landscape of the region, Arabs and other Muslims are typically faced with a new initiative, plan or project devoted to promote freedom, prosperity and regional development. The

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<sup>77</sup> Tony Karon, "Iraq: Anybody Got a Plan?" *Time.com* February 18<sup>th</sup>, 2004

<sup>78</sup> Paul Rogers, "The 'Greater Middle East Initiative': Vision or Mirage?" *Open Democracy* February 12<sup>th</sup>, 2004

<sup>79</sup> Robert Burns, "US Expects Troops In Iraq for Years," *Associated Press* February 20<sup>th</sup>, 2004.

“Greater Middle East Initiative” is nothing but the latest in a series of US and Israeli initiatives serving to the goal to maintain their control.

Shimon Perez’s “New Middle East Initiative” is noteworthy in this respect, which was presented after the Arab system was devastated in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. Perez promised the Arabs prosperity if they chose to entirely normalize their relations with Israel and include his country in all regional arrangements. Before that, an international coalition had been forged to force Saddam to leave Kuwait, while Israel refused to withdraw from occupied territories in Lebanon and Syria. Eventually, Israel only agreed to engage the Palestinians in long-term negotiations, which gradually became known as the Oslo process. The result was catastrophic: while Israel gave the Palestinian Authority all the symbols of sovereignty, it maintained actual political, economic and military control over the Palestinians during the ill-fated decade of negotiations in the 1990s.

As the Arabs are defeated and demoralized once again, a new initiative is being developed by outside powers with an agenda for change, but which is completely different from that of mainstream Middle Eastern society.<sup>80</sup> Finally, after the Tenet Plan, the Mitchell Report, the roadmap, and Bush’s recent forward strategy for freedom, the fate of the Greater Middle East Initiative is a matter of wonder.

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<sup>80</sup> Karem M. Kamel, “The Greater Middle East: Imperial Illusions of Change,” *Islam Online*, 14/03/2004.



## CONCLUSION

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2005 were the inception of a human tragedy when we consider the number of human casualties on that day and in its afterwards in Afghanistan and Iraq, which have far exceeded 100.000, notwithstanding the material costs, which can be pronounced in billions of dollars. The terrorists had selected their targets intentionally: The attacks on WTC were directed against the hearth of the US economy, which, according to the attackers, had caused to the death of more than a half million children in Iraq, innumerable civilians in Palestinian and many others in South America and Africa. And also from the point of the view of the terrorist attackers, it was directed against the hearth of the US military, Pentagon, from where military attacks have been organized, supported and sponsored against Vietnam 1961-73, Cambodia 1969-70, Guatemala 1967-69, Grenada 1983, Lubnan 1983-84, Iran 1987, Panama 1989, Iraq 1991--, Kuwait 1991, Somalia 1993, Sudan 1998, Afghanistan 1998 --, and about a centurial actions against Palestine in support of Israel.<sup>81</sup> But the attacks were also out of range in the sense that thousands of people died as a result who had nothing to do with official state policies. But the

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<sup>81</sup> See for example Mehmet Ali Civelek (ed.), "Önsöz: Dokuz Nokta..." by Mehmet Ali Civelek, Temel Demirer and Sibel Özbudun, *Küreselleşme ve Terör: Second Book*, Ütopya Yayınevi (Ankara: 2001), p: 10; or Edward S. Herman, "Terörizm İçin Bir Örtü Olarak Terörizm ile Savaş," in Ahmet Demirhan, *ABD, Terör ve İslam*, Vadi Yayınları, 2001, pp. 24-8.

fact that the victims of September 11 have been so tragically advertised and mourned while the victims of the chronic struggles in the Middle East in Palestine and elsewhere are easily forgotten is incomprehensible. Why are the lives of Israelis, Americans and Brits more valuable than those of Palestinians, Iraqis, Afghanis, Africans and Americans?

However, it was certain, soon after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C., that September 11 2001 attacks would become a watershed in the US policy orientation towards the Middle East. After four years, it is now more suitable to analyze the developments and assess their effects on US foreign policy. The US immediately responded to the attacks by assuming a highly assertive foreign policy orientation. The war on terrorism, the associated struggle against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the effort to establish the democratic political culture have become the central elements determining the dynamics of the US foreign policy towards the Middle East. This was augmented by a new willingness to assert US power, unilaterally if necessary. The developments have also constructed a new strategic context for the foreign policy choices of other states, which have encountered difficult dilemmas about whether and how to assist, deny or shun the US-led war on international terrorism. Though the US president Bush announced that 'Either you are with us, or you are with the

terrorists', most states are unlikely to give real assistance to the US in general and the conduct of the war on terrorism in particular.

A new assertiveness to emphasize US power against real and supposed enemies in the name of war against terrorism, the description of the states as enemies and friends in the new age of crusades, applying Machiavellian policies and violent resolutions in international disputes, maximization of national, corporational and personal interests concerning the extraction, transportation and marketing of oil and natural gas resources and the using of NATO mechanisms in achieving the goals have constituted the dynamics of US policy towards the Middle East in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks.

As the war continues since 2003, it seems that the legal status of Bush administrations declaration of war against Iraq is no more questioned. It was illegal under the provisions of international law: The allegations brought against the former leader of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, that he had given support to al-Qaeda, that Iraq was hiding its WMDs were not testified by evidence. Based on the documents supplied (or forged more properly) by the CIA, it was argued that Saddam Hussein and his Iraq had posed an imminent danger against international peace and order. But what is clear out of all these is that the USA deceived the international community in front of the Security Council.

In chapter three, I tried to explain that the most prominent motivations and reasons behind the US-led war against Iraq and international terrorism were

Bush's and his cabinets' neo-conservatism at first and the desire to take the extraction, transportation and marketing of vast energy resources in the Middle East and Eurasia under control for the realization of US global control. Bush tried to use the doctrine of self-defense as an excuse for the war, but since Iraq neither attacked nor assisted any attack against the USA, US reference to self-defense is not in accordance with international law.

The Middle East region is perceived by the world and the USA in particular as carrying the potential of big threats and opportunities at the same time. The three deficits recognized as the absence of freedom, knowledge and women's empowerment are considered as potential sources of threat that can emanate from the region. These deficits will most probably mislead to immigration, terrorism, maintenance of economic backwardness etc. if measures are not taken. But if the region is introduced with democratic and liberal reforms, it is argued that this will replace authoritarianism with popular participation in government, and will also assure a more equal distribution of money, the Middle East region has become a part of a plan to become a source of peace and development in the world.

This is a very simplistic understanding and evaluation of the conditions in the Middle East, and also not far from orientalist thinking. While the western powers try to establish a democratic tradition in the Middle East, the question whether the religious and cultural values of the region are congruent with modern

western values is not properly answered and understood. The path going to modernity is not a single one and as long as the west and particularly the USA maintain their support for Israel and other non-democratic regimes in the world for their own interests, it seems unlikely to assure the people in the region to trust in westernization.

In this thesis, I tried to explain the main goals of the US towards the Middle East in the aftermath of September 11 2001 with specific reference to the dynamics of US foreign policy in the area, the illegal war in Iraq and its underlying reasons and motivations, and the Greater Middle East Initiative including its origins, motivations lying behind and its limits.

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