

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARD TRANSCAUCASIA ON REGIONAL
CONFLICTS IN GEORGIA

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APPROVAL PAGE


I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.



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ABSTRACT

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The main objective of this study will be to examine the importance of regions and geography in foreign policy in regards to Transcaucasia and Georgia, resulting from the micro nationalism and independence movements in the aftermath of World War II, in terms of Turkey's foreign policy.

The first chapter will deal with the phases of Turkish foreign policy regarding Transcaucasia from the establishment of the Republic up to now. The second chapter will start with examining the process of independence of the states making up this region, continuing with the problems they have faced up to now, and then look at their present status. The last chapter will attempt to reach the root of the of Georgia's problems - the focus point of this study- and examine what this nation has gone through and evaluate the national and international actors that have had impact on the problem in this respect. The study will finally propose possible solutions to improve the relationship with this region in line with Turkish foreign policy interests.

Key Words

Turkey, Foreign Policy, Trans-Caucasia, International Interests, Regional Conflicts, Strategy

KISA ÖZET

ŞENGÜL ÇEBİ

MART 2006

Bu çalışmadaki temel hedef; bölgelerin ve coğrafyanın dış politikadaki önemini göz önünde bulundurarak, II. Dünya savaşının ardından ortaya çıkan mikronasyonalizm ve bağımsızlık hareketlerinin bir neticesi olan Transkafkasya'nın ve özellikle Gürcistan'ın, Türk dış politikası açısından ne ifade ettiğini incelemek olacaktır.

Çalışmanın ilk bölümünde, Cumhuriyetin kuruluşundan bugüne kadar Türk dış politikasının geçirdiği evreler, Transkafkasya eksenli olarak ele alınırken, ikinci bölümde, bu bölgeyi meydana getiren devletlerin bağımsızlık süreçlerinden bugüne kadar yaşadıkları sorunlar ve bugün gelinen nokta incelenecektir. Son bölümde ise, çalışmanın hedef noktasını oluşturan Gürcistan'ın yaşadığı problemlerin kaynağına inilmeye çalışılacak ve bu bağlamda probleme etki eden ulusal ve uluslararası aktörler değerlendirilecektir. Çalışmanın sonunda ise, Türk dış politikasının çıkarları doğrultusunda, bu bölgeyle ilişkilerin geliştirilmesi yönünde çözüm önerileri sunulacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Türkiye, Dış Politika, Transkafkasya, Uluslararası Çıkarlar, Bölgesel Çatışmalar, Strateji

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACFE	Agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe
ACP	Azerbaijan Communist Party
ANCA	The Armenian National Committee of America
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CMPC	Confederation of Mountainous People of Caucasus
EEC	European Economic Community
KGB	Soviet Russian Intelligence Agency
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
No	Number
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
P	page
PfP	Partnership for Peace
RF	Russian Federation
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

INTRODUCTION

Turkey has common borders with numerous states. With respect to international relations, it is possible to establish a direct relationship between a state's foreign policy, its application and number of the neighbors it has. Having common borders with many states is the basis for variations and alternatives in foreign policy; it may, however, create some difficulties such as the application of coherent politics, formulating countervailing strategies, and the imagining of compromise scenarios at the same time. If we add internal and regional balances to having many neighbors, the requirements of a sensitive foreign policy become obvious.

To state briefly the importance of the historical process as well the significance of geographical position: E. H Carr emphasizes the importance of 'big historians': "Big historian thinks widely or he is the one who asks the question about new events".¹ Therefore, history provides the background to establishing the causal relations between events and facts. Hence, history cannot be ignored in relation to the formulation and evaluation of foreign policy.

The constructing of world regions, although present earlier, began to intensify after WWII, and in the 90's this process attains significance at the level of the international community. After WWII, even though main block was the bi-polar world rivalry of the US and the former USSR, smaller regional organizations gained prominence because of military-economic and political reasons. In Asia, Africa and America, many organizations and agreements were brokered. During the Cold War, regional actions were closely aligned to one of the blocks and against to the other. The international organizations that have an economic, political and military aim and agreements have quickly spread.

¹ E. H. Carr, *Tarih Nedir?*, İletişim Publications, İstanbul, 1987, p: 115

Because of post-Cold War developments, the concepts of governance that determined nation-state borders started to change. A national border impinged upon ethnic minorities, human rights, regional economic connections, and security and defense concerns. In the world system the concept of the state is comprehended within the concept of dependence.²

After the collapse of USSR, new areas and relatively new states emerged. They are contiguous with the different areas.³ The concept of the independent region became highly significant with the collapse of USSR. In the international arena, actions enhancing regional cooperation commenced. While some of the nations collapsed, new nations emerged, the number of economically and politically defined regions have rapidly multiplied.

The collapse of USSR is a decisive turning point for international relations. Hence the world balance of power shifted. Undoubtedly, the heterogeneous nature of international relations affects Turkey. Within Turkey a debate commenced about different orientations and policies to adopt vis-à-vis this unfolding process. Turkey is one of the most important countries in the world because of its historical heritage and its neighbors. Upon this new stage of international relations Turkey can undertake new initiatives. Caucasus, one Middle Asian region that was inside the territory of the former USSR, now neighbors the Balkans and the Middle East. The regions, which have come into existence with recently independent nations, have an important role to play on the world stage in relation to Turkey because of this last's geopolitical location.

In the international connections and analysis of foreign policy, it is a sensitive subject to examine regions and the connections among them. Nowadays, communications between historical neighbors of the same region are vital to advancing a nation's domestic and foreign interests. Moreover, when Turkey is

² Ozan Erözden, "Ulus Devletin Geleceği", *Uluslararası Politikada Yeni Alanlar Yeni Bakışlar*, Der Publications, İstanbul, 1998, p: 15

³ Ian Bremmer and Alyson Bailes, "Sub-regionalism in the Newly Independent States", *International Affairs*, Volume: 74, No: 1, January 1998, p: 141

examined, we can observe Turkey's very important strategic geopolitical location and how this affects the nexus of international relations and regional approaches. The land of Turkey has hosted many civilizations; this phenomenon enabled Turkey to develop step by step. These regions and Turkey have common historical and cultural points; that situation is advantageous for Turkey. Moreover, after the Turkish Republic's foundation, Turkey started to create policies in order to become an important country especially in the Middle East, the Balkans and the Mediterranean. After the former USSR incorporated Turkic regions, however, Turkey kept its distance from the former super power, as not to interfere with the USSR's domestic policy. However, Turkey is very close to these nations. A new era begins for Turkey with the independence of Turkic nations especially the Caucasus.

The main aim in this research is to examine the importance of Transcaucasia that has come into existence with the recent independence of these Turkic countries. In addition to this, the aim is to study the meaning of Transcaucasia for Turkey's foreign policy. The Transcaucasia that was composed of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, is Turkey's neighbor. It has a very important location in the world. Every country has different views towards Transcaucasia. This research's objective is to detail the regional location of Transcaucasia and its connection with Turkish policy making. To facilitate this, I explain the meaning of Transcaucasia and Georgia with regard to Turkey's plans about this region and Turkish foreign policy. Finally I examine the strategic location of Turkey vis-à-vis this region, as reflected in Turkish foreign policy.

If it is necessary, Georgia may have a police force, which would be good for Turkey. Turkey could benefit from developments in Georgia. Also protecting Georgia's independence and its unity against Russia is essential for Turkey's regional security.

Georgia is Turkey's gateway to the Caucasus and to Middle Asian Turkic republics. Georgian routes connect the Caspian Sea oil and the natural gas of Turkmenistan to the outside world. Georgia also contains the route connecting the

Caucasus to the Black Sea. Because of these reasons, developing connections with Georgia is advantageous for Turkey.

Turkey has cultural and social bonds with Caucasus and therefore has a specific interest for making peace and connections with Caucasus. After the collapse of USSR, Turkey accepted the independence of the Southern Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia) without differentiating among them. Turkey's policy in Caucasus is evolving with input from these three Caucasus nations. For these reasons, Turkey considers the strengthening of these countries' independence and the development of their economic regional potential important.

Solving the problems in Naghorno Karabagh and Abkhazia is important for regional peace. Turkey emphasizes pacific policy to solve these problems. This orientation promotes political and economic peace and gives the country new enterprises encouraging regional connections.

Furthermore, Russia tries mightily to regain its former regional control in these lands. Russia exploits the region's ethnically mixed population and its historical clashes for that purpose. Russia uses the problems of Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia to regain control over Georgia. Moreover, Russia benefits from the problem of Karabagh for Azerbaijan.

Russia announced a closed regional doctrine, a Monroe Doctrine of Armenia, in effect, which would allow it to use military power when other processes have been exhausted. The basic function of this doctrine, like in the country of Chechen, is to serve as a rationale for installing a military infrastructure in Georgia and Armenia, and thus to counter ACFE centered regional power.

Nowadays, the world suffers from decreasing energy sources. Therefore, Russia wants to gain the control of Caspian Sea oil and natural gas. It also wants to continue its control of important routes, which connect it to the outside world.

It seems that Russia, which has military installations in Georgia and Armenia, has countered Turkey's power in this region. Russia controls Azerbaijan in the same way and will resolve regional problems in this way. Russia continues its policy of exerting pressure on Azerbaijan with Armenia's help.

Azerbaijan tries to make its relations with the USA the focus of its foreign policy. The reason for that is that Russia does not give any help to Azerbaijan in the problem of Armenia, and Turkey's political and military power is insufficient in these circumstances. Yet, Azerbaijan still tries to have good relations with Russia.

It is necessary to establish an Ankara – Tiflis - Baku connection. Turkey would benefit and regional security would increase. Turkey's cooperation with the Western Union would keep peace in the Caucasus and help the Caucasus to resist Russian pressure. Initiated by Turkey, these two policies promote regional peace.

Supported by the USA, Turkey's construction of the "east-west" connection highlights Turkey's progress in Transcaucasia. Georgia will be the weakest participant because of its problems. Georgia, supported by Azerbaijan, is important for Turkey's promotion of regional peace.

In the research's first part, Turkey's changing foreign policy with respect to international relations is explained. Turkey's Transcaucasian connections are explained in detail.

In the second part, I focus on the three important Transcaucasian countries. There I discuss the process of their independence, their political problems, contentions between political powers, connections with this region, and their view of Turkey and Turkey's policy towards this region.

In the third part, the factors which prevent Georgia's economic and political progress are examined. The matter, which is a problem for the two powerful countries in this region, is explained. In an addition to this, the policies of these

countries, their views, the implications of international policy, the progresses of peace for these countries, and Turkey's policy towards them are examined. I discuss the historical roots of the Abkhazia Georgia conflict towards Georgia, the situation after the collapse of USSR, war and the Armistices, the other international effects towards this region and today's situation. Southern Ossetia, the other problem in Georgia, is examined. The explanation is about the place of the region, for which it is a problem. I then discuss the last stage of the two situations and the meaning of it for the political powers. Then I discuss the kinds of actions that regional powers could take for making peace in Georgia.

CHAPTER - I

HISTORICAL LOOK AT TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND ITS TRANSCAUCASUS DIMENSION

1 – 1- TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY FROM THE INDEPENDENCE WAR UNTIL THE SECOND WORLD WAR

To examine the foreign policy of the Turkish Republic, the most suitable era is the period of the Liberation War. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the connections in the period of being a new republic, cooperations, and rival relations enlighten the periods after the war. In this period, Turkey started to determine its principles, borders and aims.⁴

Being victorious in the liberation war is the first stage for the birth of Republic and the second stage is the Lausanne Treaty.⁵ This treaty served a very important role in the foundation of the Turkish Republic, and impacted the making of Turkey's foreign policy and has been a reference document in many aspects. The most essential aspect of the Lausanne Treaty is that it is the only treaty, which had become signed with the allies in equal positions.⁶

⁴ Selahi R. Sonyel, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Dış Politika*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Press, Ankara, 1991; Faruk Sönmezoğlu, "Kurtuluş Savaşı Dönemi Diplomasisi" *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, Der Publications, İstanbul, 1994, p: 33-47

⁵ The text of Lausanne Treaty: Ismail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Anlaşmaları (1920-1945)*, Volume: 1, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Press, 1989, p: 67-242

⁶ Lord Kinross: (Translated by Ayhan Tezel), *Ataturk Bir Milletten Yeniden Doğuşu*, Volume: 1, Sander Bookstore, İstanbul, 1969, p: 541

While Turkey continued its development after the Lausanne Treaty, political balance in the world changed rapidly between the two world wars. At last, the economic crisis of 1929 was the last stage of the war. After the economic and political problems caused by the crises began, WWII broke out.⁷

Although, Turkey has been contentious against Western countries since it was established, it is contradictory that it has not given up the ideal of being “a western country”. Because of this ideal, Turkey has connections with the western nations and other neighbours. The connections of other regions are important for Turkey. In this respect, Turkey signed some treaties and managed some regional organizations.⁸

In this period Turkey is affected by two events: one is an economic crisis, the other is reconsidered policy. These two issues in foreign policy has a determining impact on the world's and Turkey's policy. Turkey selects status quo by not participating in the reconsidered group. The principle of state socialism strengthens itself against economic crises.

Turkey's Caucasus policy has had an important role in its foreign policy since the liberation war. In this period, the Ottoman Empire had not lost its function completely yet. The ministers and the high officials of the Ottoman Empire tried to regain the lands in the Caucasus and Middle Asia. One of the favorite high officials, Enver Pasha, made plans to reach this aim and organized an army.⁹ In this transition period both high officials of the Ottoman Empire and Mustafa Kemal continued their progress. In this short process, there was big amount of changes in Caucasus and it caused changes in Turkey's policy.

⁷ Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (1914-1980)*, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Publications, İstanbul, 1989; Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih, I. Dünya Savaşının Sonundan 1980' e Kadar*, İmge Bookstore, 1989; Murat Sarıca, *Birinci Dünya Savaşından Sonra Avrupa'da Barışı sürdürme Çabaları (1919-1920)*, İ. Ü. Siyasal Bilimler Fakültesi Publications, 1982

⁸ Turkey had an important role in the form of the regional organizations. Turkey participated in the League of Nations. February 9, 1934 Turkey had a role in the Balkans Treaty. Turkey solved all its problem with the Balkans. After that, Turkey signed the Sadabat Treaty. Turkey signed many treaties with countries. Turkey supported protocol of Peace. Before the war, Turkey supported the treaties which were against war. (Gönlübol 1990: 92)

⁹ About plans of Enver Pasha: Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Makedonya'dan Orta Asya'ya Enver Paşa*, Volume: 3, Remzi Press, İstanbul, 1972, p: 377

After WWI, the government of Turkey had a two-stage foreign policy for the Caucasus. In the first stage, the independence of countries against Bolsheviks in the Caucasus was encouraged by Turkey. In the second stage, because of an increasing necessity for the Bolsheviks, it is easily accepted that Bolsheviks supporters came into the power in these countries above.¹⁰

The revolution of 1917 starts a new period both in Russia and in the world. Russia declared that it ceased the war with the peace treaty of Brest Litovsk and it gave much importance to domestic affairs to complete the process of the revolution. The ambiguity, which was brought about by revolution, stirred desires of independence. Georgia, Azerbaijan, Dagestan and Armenia established “The republic of the socialist Pro-Caucasus union”. This organization could not survive because of internal problems and dispersed the same year. Firstly, Georgia declared its independence and then either Azerbaijan or Armenia did.¹¹

Socialist Russia has started to have a connection with the government of Ankara in 1919.¹² The Government of Ankara sent a delegation to socialist Russia in the administration of Sir Bekir Sami on 11 May 1920. On 24th of August 1920, there was an agreement about a treaty outline. However, this important treaty could be signed after 7 months because of the contentions in Caucasus.¹³

In this period, the position of the Caucasus is very essential for Turkey, Russia and other western countries. In this period, Turkey accomplished cooperation for its independence with Russia, against western countries. Undoubtedly, the policy of imperialism has a very serious threat for Russia.¹⁴ Therefore, the Soviet Union firstly clashed with Europe. In this negative situation, government of Ankara was

¹⁰ Kamuran Gürün, *Türk Sovyet İlişkileri (1920-1953)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Press, Ankara, 1991, p: 21

¹¹ Kamuran Gürün, 1991, p: 11

¹² Aptülahat Akşin, *Atatürk' ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Press, Ankara, 1991, p: 51

¹³ Mehmet Gönübol, 1990, p: 19

¹⁴ Sadı Irmak, *Atatürk Tarihi İdeoloji ve Tarih Açısından İnceleme*, Fatih Yayınevi, İstanbul, 1973, p: 213

very essential for Russia and Russia promoted Turkey's wishes of independence. The idea of being an effective state through the bridge of Caucasus influenced both countries.

It is necessary for England and other Western countries to be cautious about the Caucasus. The Caucasus was evaluated as a region where Western countries could take an action in order to prevent Russia's imperialism. The dissemination of these ideas in Turkey may be very dangerous. The Caucasus is a good change to control the government of Turks except Russia. It is necessary to have control on the Caucasus in order to prevent Russia's probable help to the government of Ankara.¹⁵

The direct connection between Turkey and the countries in the Caucasus should be concerned except for the area where powerful countries clash with each other. Many different topics have a crucial role in the connection between Armenia and the government of Ankara. Although it is generally agreed in Turkey that the Armenian Genocide did not occur in Anatolia during WWI, Armenia believed the converse, which plays a crucial role in the connections between these two countries.¹⁶

Armenia caused many problems and they resulted in troubles in the relationship between Turkey and Russia. Not only Armenia wanted to our land but it also stated fighting with Turkey. Armenia tried to prevent Russia from helping. In fact, the real reason, which was hidden, is that the strategy of Western countries, including the Ottoman Empire had to sign the Treaty of Sevres.

Soviet Russia continued to have some control over Armenia. The day the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Sevres, Russia signed a treaty with Armenia. According to this treaty, Soviet Russia promised to give economic assistance to

¹⁵ Selahi R. Sonyel, 1994, p: 7

¹⁶ Esat Uras, *Tarihte Ermeniler Ve Ermeni Meselesi*, Belge Publications, 1987, p: 421; Kamuran Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası*, Bilgi Publications, 1988, p: 149; Sadi Koçaş, *Tarihte Ermeniler Ve Türk Ermenileri İlişkileri*, Kastaş Pres 1990, p: 113, Türkkaya Ataöv, *A British Source (1916) on The Armenian Questions*, Meteksan, Ankara, 1992

Armenia. Russia accomplished to have control of Noachian, and Armenia attacked Gulfa railway and the town of Şahtahti.¹⁷ It is possible to express that there were three expectations of Russia in this treaty. Firstly; to send a positive message to Europe, secondly, to use Armenia as a buffer zone between Turkey and Azerbaijan and finally, to compel Turkey to give Armenian land.¹⁸

In June 1920, with support of the treaty which was signed by Russia, Armenia started to behave cruelly towards Turks living in the Caucasus and then started to occupy northeastern Anatolia. Armenia continued the occupation in spite of all warnings from the government of Ankara. The 15th army corps took an action against them. Soviet Russia did not stay idle during this period and spent effort to make a way for the Bolsheviks to come in to power. In the end, Russia's ambitions came true. The Bolsheviks came into power in Armenia. On December 2nd - 3rd, 1920 Turkey signed the Peace Treaty of Gumru with the new Armenian government.

The treaty, which was signed by Kazım Karabekir, is the first treaty of the government of Turkey. According to the treaty, most of the territory which was left to Armenia in accordance with the Treaty of Sevres, signed by the government of İstanbul on August 10th 1920, was taken back from them and Turkey left Armenia the region of Gumru.¹⁹

After Turkish forces defeated Armenia, it had some problems with Georgia. Georgia had some domestic problems and clashed with Russia like other states in the Caucasus. Moreover, Georgia benefited from the withdrawal of England in Batumi and Georgia occupied Batumi. However, this occupation was in opposition to the Brest Litovsk Agreement that was signed between the Ottomans and Soviet Russia leaving Kars, Ardahan and Batumi to the reign of Ottoman Empire.²⁰

¹⁷ A. Suat Bilge, *Türkiye Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri 1920-1964 Güç Komşuluk*, Türkiye İş Bankası Publications, Ankara, 1992, p: 45

¹⁸ Hikmet Bayur, *Bellekten*, Vol: XX., Number: 80, p: 679

¹⁹ Mehmet Gönübol, 1990, p: 24

²⁰ Fahir Armaoğlu, 1989, p: 139

As for the government of Ankara's foreign policy regarding Georgia, we can summarize the situation as: to reign Batum, to solve problems on the border, to provide impartiality of Georgian in Turks – in regards to the Armenia conflict, to use Georgia as a buffer zone against Soviet Russia's thoughts on Anatolia, and to take the support of this country when it is necessary.²¹ The aim of Georgia was to make alliance with Turkey and constitute an organization against Russia. The Western countries preferred a relationship between Georgia and Turkey rather than a relationship between Bolsheviks.

On the 20th of February, 1921 Soviet Russia began to occupy Georgia. Upon this event, the government of Ankara delivered an ultimatum to Georgia and wanted Artvin and Ardahan back according to the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk. This proposal was accepted by Georgia and Georgia even proposed Turkey to occupy Batumi temporarily against Russia's threat.

The last country we should examine is Azerbaijan. There is a close and private relationship with this country and Turkey. M. Kemal hoped to take help from Soviet Russia by means of this country, which has common historical background with Turkey. Moreover, he thought since Azerbaijan established the first republic of Turkish people, they could help Turkey. Furthermore, by the help of the relationship with this country, Turkey would be more effective in this region. But these expectations would not come true.²² There are a lot of reasons for this. First of all, from the point of Azerbaijan different elements affected their policy since they had their independence. The first republic of Turks, "the nation of Azerbaijan" who was established by an Azerbaijani council began to be managed by a government of the coalition. Party of Musavat²³, an impartial democratic group, party of Himmət and Socialist Moslem Blocks are the parties constituting the coalition. The new Azerbaijan nation signed a treaty of help by the Ottoman Empire but this treaty was

²¹ Selahi R. Sonyel, 1994, p: 60

²² Selahi R. Sonyel, 1994, p: 59

²³ The party of Musavat means equality. It is an essential action for Azerbaijan's independence.

not permanent. This position was changed by the treaty of Mudros Armistice²⁴. The Ottoman Empire came to the stage of non-existence. The government in Azerbaijan turned to different policies.

After the treaty of Moscow that is of great importance for Turkey, on the 26th of September, the conference of Kars was begun by the attendance of Russia, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. On the 13th of October the Treaty of Kars was signed. This treaty renewed the issues of the treaty of Moscow on behalf of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the socialist republic of Georgia and provided the recognition of the Eastern and Misak-i Milli borderlines by these three Caucasus Federate Republics.²⁵

1 – 2 – TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR

WWII is a turning point in the history of the world. It is necessary to evaluate the reason for WWII. It was one of the most destructive wars in the world, the process of forming the alliances. Moreover it is necessary to evaluate its outcomes, effects and the crises which arose after WWII and the technological and strategical innovations, which came into being after the war.²⁶

First of all, America and USSR were the most powerful countries after the war. There were other countries, which were allies to these two different powers. Secondly, a different doctrine and ideology had a diagnostic effect in the international relations. The universal views of Communism and Liberalism were in

²⁴ Mehmet Saray, *Azerbaycan Türkleri Tarihi*, Nesil Publications, İstanbul, 1993, p: 30

²⁵ *Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası, 1919-1923*, Kültür Bakanlığı Atatürk Dizisi, Ankara, 1994, Volume: 2, p:555-579; *T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabıtları 17 Mart 1337 (1921)-25 Şubat 1337 (1922)*, Volume: 2, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Publications, Ankara, 1985, p: 229-243

²⁶ For the detailed information about WWI: Coşkun Üçok, *Siyasal Tarih*, Ajans Türk Press, Ankara, 1961, p: 361-380; Türkkaya Ataöv, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Neden Çıktı? Nasıl Sürdü? Asya ve Afrika'ya Nasıl Etkiledi?*, Birey ve Toplum Publications, Ankara, 1985

conflict in the new world system. Thirdly, actions arose to collapse colonialism. Therefore, actions of independence gained speed rapidly. Fourthly, countries gave up the European centered approaches in international relations and they had the idea of “extended borders”. Therefore, all countries in the world were included in the political area. Fifthly, one aspect of the 20th century and WWII is the comprehension of the efficiency of the international organizations and the extension of these organizations. Finally, economy has been regarded as a very effective factor in the world.²⁷

After Europe lost its effect in the international foreign policy in the world, the USSR and the USA became the powerful states in the world. Therefore, there were two powerful centers in the world. The war came to an end, but a new and harder war started which was named the “Cold War”. The term was originally used by the minister of finance, Bernard Baruch, in our century and it was published by the newsagent, Walter Lippmann.²⁸ According to Walter Lippmann, cold war is a result of the warm war.²⁹

Although the process, which lasted from the WWII to the 1990s, has two-centered trait, we can divide it into sub-stages in its own form. These sub-stages express the turning points of the international system and so, they affect all countries’ foreign policies and are affected by other countries.

In the period after the war, which we call the second stage, beginning from the second decades of the war, the system of the world was the same as before. There were different centers and powers in the world. The best example for this situation is the actions of the independent countries in the world. These countries, which are called the “third world”, took an action and formed the action of “Non-aligned

²⁷ Oral Sander, 1989, p: 161

²⁸ Fred Halliday: (Translated by İlker Özünlü), *Yeni Soğuk Savaş Sovyet-ABD İlişkileri*, Belge Publications, İstanbul, 1985, p: 11

²⁹ Roger Scruton, *A Dictionary of Political Thought*, McMillan, 1996, p: 79

Countries". The action of which population, number, and expansion are broad, but it is impoverished and powerless. It brought dynamism to the political zone.³⁰

The most important aspect in the 1960s, which covers the third stage, is the decrease of the power differences between the two powers in the world. Therefore, "the balance of terror" caused the countries not to act. It was difficult for countries to be organized. Eventually, there were separations among them. New power equation and centers appeared within the process. In response to America's powerful position, some other countries reacted against America. Moreover, the policy of China and Yugoslavia in the Communist Block is an perfect example of this situation.

The 1970s is defined by the fourth stage, there emerged the politics of "detente" between East and West. For Oral Sander, the cause is the conflict between the blocks, the decrease of the possibility of war, the increase of the number of the cultural, technological, economic, and political treaties between the communist and the noncommunist countries.³¹

The USA and the USSR thought the fight that occurs in the world will affect them. They worried about a big nuclear war, which might be caused by local conflicts (Escalation). As a result of this, they gave up the "brink of war policy."³² The superpower countries USA and USSR had the power of second attack that results in a dangerous position and using nuclear weapons was inevitable for them. Therefore, peace was beneficial for these countries. The aspect of this period is that the countries accepted the status quo. They did not intervene each other's policy. They showed a peaceful position. The Conference of Helsinki in 1975 is an important stage for this period. The 1980s indicates the new period of these years. These periods changed the world's position.

³⁰ Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Uluslararası Politika ve Dış Politika Analizi*, p: 269-272; Türkkaya Ataöv, *Afrika Ulusal Kurtuluş Mücadeleleri*, Ankara University Publications, Ankara, 1977

³¹ Oral Sander, 1989, p: 340

³² Oral Sander, 1989, p: 345

In the foreign policy of Turkey there was an action as a parallel of the world. The death of Atatürk was the beginning of a new period for Turkey. In the same period there was the danger of WWII, which was a difficulty for Turkey. İsmet İnönü became the “National Chief” of Turkey. He tried to keep Turkey out of the war. The axis of Rome-Berlin, which was constituted after 1936, brought about Turkey to establish a relationship between France and England due to Turkey’s search for security. On September 19th, 1939, there was an aid treaty between the two countries.³³ Turkey did not want to deteriorate the relationship with its neighbour Russia. Therefore, Turkey added the “second protocol”. Turkey gave importance to its relationship with Germany³⁴ and Turkey signed a nonaggression treaty with Germany in 1941. In conclusion, the “National Chief” apparently distinguishing him from several other Turkish statesmen and despite the pressure then exerted by England, Germany and the USSR, carried on Turkey’s policy of peace and Turkey overcame this war with a few losses.³⁵

After WWII, it was a new period for Turkey and the world. The world has been divided into two blocks. Turkey made its choice for the Western block. There are some reasons for Turkey’s choice in its foreign policy, which favors the west. Firstly, Turkey considered the West as a balancing element when compared to the USSR. Turkey thought that its trust in western politics could result in an action in Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey was seen at the same level with the West as well as her interests the same as the West’s interests. Moreover, Turkey financially needed credit for the new investment. All these were diagnostic factors. However, Turkey could not join NATO, which was established to enable the security of European countries.³⁶ This situation was very hard for Turkey then.

³³ İsmail Soysal, 1989, p: 605-609

³⁴ İsmail Soysal, 1989, p: 630

³⁵ The foreign policy of Turkey during WWI: Haluk Ülman, Türk “Dış Politikası’na Yön Veren Etkenler (1923-1968)”, *A.Ü.S.B.F. Journal*, Volume: XXIII, No: 3, 1968, p: 251-257; Faruk Sönmezoğlu, “II. Dünya Savaşı Döneminde Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası: Tarafsızlıktan NATO’ya”, *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, p: 79-85

³⁶ For detailed information about the relationship with Turkey and American: Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye’nin Düzeni (Dün-Bugün-Yarın)*, Bilgi Publications, Ankara, 1969, p: 256-280; Oral Sander, “Türkiye’nin Batı Bağlantısı A.B.D. ve Türkiye”, *A.Ü.S.B.F. Journal*, Volume: XXXIV, No: 1-4, January-December 1979, p: 63-65, Oral Sander, *Türk Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-1964*, A.Ü.S.B.F.

Depending on the rapid changes in international relationship Turkey's domestic policy began to change. There were some problems at that period which was a transition period, which would include multi parties. Firstly, the Democrat Party was in a conflict position. After the election it came into power. The foreign and economic policy, which supported the America, was dominant in this period. Sending military forces to the Korean War and joining NATO happened in this period. Turkey was one of the most faithful supporters of the West. Turkey showed this policy by the help of the relationship with Middle East and the Balkans. Not involving in the action of nonaligned was an important action to show Turkey's policy as a supporter of America. The problem of Cyprus starts in this period, which is still a problem of Turkey. It is an obstacle for the relationship of Turkey with the West.³⁷

In 1960, the coup detat of May 27th, started a difficult period for Turkey's domestic policy. Although, there were some problems with western countries, the coup detat did not create a great change in Turkey's general policy. In this period there was detent and the effects of third world countries in the international area affected Turkey, and it started to form new policies. Moreover, the world had a position, which allowed new powers in the policy. In this respect, Turkey considered its relationship with the East block and Turkey visited Russia's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister. Moreover, the isolation of Turkey in the crises of Cyprus had an essential role in Turkey's search for new relationships and alternatives.

In the 1970s, the Peace Operation of Cyprus created a big impact on the foreign policy of Turkey. The relationship with America deteriorated and the weapon embargo was also very bad for Turkey. In the respect of the relationship with Europe, especially the cooperation of EEC from the beginning of 1959 to 1963, there

Publications, Ankara, 1979; Fahir Armaoğlu, *Belgelerle Türk Amerikan Münasebetleri*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Publications, 1991

³⁷ Semih Günver, *Fatın Rüştü Zorlu'nun Öyküsü Z, "Zorro" Gibi*, Bilgi Publications, Ankara, 1985; Haluk Ülman ve Oral Sander, "Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler (1923-1968) II, *A.Ü.S.B.F. Journal*, p: 4-22; Hüseyin Bağcı, *Demokrat Parti Dönemi Dış Politikası*, İmge Bookstore, Ankara, 1990

was stagnation until the mid 1980s. A problem occurred with Greece over the Aegean Sea territorial waters, armament of islands, continental shelf, and line of FIR. In this period Turkey considered her Eastern relationship. There was a close relationship with the Western Block, moreover, Turkey started to get interested in the Middle East, Third World and Islamic countries. There were close relationships between them.³⁸

In the 1980s, on the 12th of September, there was again a military intervention and problems occurred in Turkey's democracy. Just as happened after the May 27th coup, crises occurred in the relationship with the west but Turkey's foreign policy did not change very much. Its position was the same as before. The war between Iraq and Iran was an interesting point all over the world. Turkey had an effective policy in this region during this period. In the same year, PKK terrorism occurred in Turkey and the problem of Fırat-Dicle was designated in the relationship with Syria. The Fırat-Dicle problem played an essential role in the relationship with the Middle East. In addition, the relationship with Iran was changeable during this period.

1 – 3 - TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DIMENSION AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION

The differences in the Soviet Union had a great effect on the new system of the world. A series of change, reform, and great innovations appeared gradually after the death of Brejnev. As it was explained by Brzezinski “from now on the term of

³⁸ Ercüment Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika*, Bilgi Publications, Ankara, 1996, p: 111; Haluk Gerger, *Mayınlı Tarla'da Dış Politika*, Hil Publications, İstanbul, 1983; Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *A.B.D'nin Türkiye Politikası 1964-1980*, Der Publications, İstanbul, 1995; Semih Vaner, *Türk-Yunan Uyuşmazlığı*, Metis Publications, İstanbul, 1990; Nihat Erim, *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs*, Ajans Türk Press, Ankara

Soviet was not the blue bead for the world, it is a term that the world should avoid from.”³⁹

The leader of USSR Mikhail Gorbachev was the architect of this change. To reach his aim, he applied the policies of “glasnost” and “perestroika” which means “reform”. Gorbachev defined the term “perestroika” for change in this way that “... create an effective and reliable mechanism to remove stoppage, speed up the social and economic processes and give them big dynamisms.”⁴⁰ The reforms that he wanted to make in the country required “perestroika” in the world. In 1986, he informed “New Political Idea” in the 27th congress of the Communist Party. According to this idea, there was mutual global dependence. They looked for the solution in relations in the international area. Moreover, Gorbachev emphasized that the ideological differences should not affect the relations between countries.

The policy of change and withdrawal had not been limited by USSR, it also affected satellite states. The collapse of communism and new actions were clearly seen through the incidents in Poland. On June 18th, 1989 the Solidarity Action had a big triumph and as a result, a noncommunist government came into power in Poland for the first time. According to the “Domino Theory”, sequence of the incidents followed each other. The domino is Hungary after Poland. On the 9th of November the Berlin Wall collapsed and on the 10th of November Todor Jivkov, the president of Bulgaria, was removed from his official work. On 22nd of December Çavuşesku was removed from power and on the 29th of December, Václav Havel was elected as the president of the republic in Hungary.⁴¹ The collapse of the Berlin Wall reflected the end of the cold war.⁴²

³⁹ Zbigniew Brzezinski: (Translated by Gül Keskil), *Büyük Çöküş*, Gülsev Pakkan, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Publications, 1992, p: 44

⁴⁰ Mikhail Gorbachev: (Translated by Kasım Yargıcı), *Perestroika*, Güneş Publications, 1988, p: 35

⁴¹ Morisol Touraine: (Translated by Turhan Ilgaz), *Altüst Olan Dünya, 21. Yüzyılın Jeopolitiği*, Ümit Publications, Ankara, 1997, p: 35-36

⁴² Pascal Boniface: (Translated by Murat Tümertekin), *Güçsüzlük İsteği*, Yapı Kredi Publications, İstanbul, 1997, p: 39

After USSR lost its power, the USA became the most powerful country in the world. Although Germany and Japan have been economically powerful, they have not been powers of the world yet. The historical importance of France and England has been effective so far. Islam has gradually been important in international policy. According to Henry Kissinger, “the USA pressured its position as a super power after the cold war.” However, it is not enough to be the only military power. For him, the relationship between Europe and America is a key for the new system of the world. Although America was the most powerful country, it is not possible to call the power balance one-centered after the bipolar period.⁴³

In this period, there were clashes and tensions in geographic vicinity of Turkey. The most important of them was the second Gulf Crisis in the Middle East. In this event, Turkey became the most interesting country all over the world. The problems that were created due to Iraq have still continued. Turkey’s policies about Middle East are to have a good relationship with USA. Nevertheless, in this period the relationship deteriorated. The diplomatic problems with Iran, the water problems with Syria and Iraq, the problem of PKK and terror are well-known problems. Turkey has a changeable relationship with the Middle East and other Islamic countries. The east policy of Turkey has been reformed as it had earlier been in the period under Cold War bipolar world order. Therefore, Turkey had a difficult period when there were crises about these

⁴³ Haluk Ülman, (Edit): Sabahattin Şen, “Dünya Nereye Gidiyor?”, *Yeni Dünya Düzeni ve Türkiye*, Bağlam Publications, İstanbul, 1992, p: 40; Atilla Eralp, “Değişen Uluslararası Sistem, Globalleşme ve Parçalanma Eğilimleri”, *İktisat Journal*, No: 322-323, January- February 1992, p: 21; Robert L. Borosage, “Stony Point and the New World Order: A Reflection”, *Conditions of Peace: An Inquiry*, Edit: Michael Shuman- Julia Sweig, NewYork, Expro Press, 1991, p: 31

CHAPTER - II

THE MAIN STATES AND RELATED FACTORS, WHICH AFFECT TURKEYS FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSCAUASIA

2 – 1 – AZERBAIJAN

In respect of Turkish foreign policy, when we want to evaluate Transcaucasia, the regional factor that should be inspected initially is Azerbaijan. This country has a key role in the development of the region's new intra-structure and relations of Turkey within the region. After the collapse of the USSR up, one of the most important reasons in international relations is the petroleum Azerbaijan has. It has an important place in the world's petroleum supply. After it gained its independence, the states with borders with Azerbaijan, and Super Powers started to show a new interest in the country. Due to such a rich supply, the region has experienced much conflict, which often occurs after gaining independence and even wars have suddenly attracted the world to this region. Besides that, the pipeline that will transport petroleum and the natural gas of Azerbaijan and the Caspian increases the importance of this region.

Azerbaijan plays an important role, on account of its ethnic/religious structure, in the region. It is the only Islamic country in Transcaucasia which increases its importance for both Turkey and Iran. Moslem Azerbaijan has some advantages in

respect of foreign ties. Although Azerbaijan is Shi'i and much closer to Iran in accordance with the religious sect, it is likely to be much closer to Turkey as it does not adopt radical Islam and targets the secular model, taking Turkey as an example in relations between state and religion, as in this region, international relations interest comes first and religion is not always binding. As illustrated throughout history, Muslimism has affected Azerbaijan and other Muslim people in Caucasia. This condition mostly discomposes Russia where there is a significant Muslim population.

When evaluating its ethnic position, Azerbaijan has another advantage in its ties with Turkey and relations with Turkish states located in Central Asia. Turkey has a significant status in the spheres of economy, strategy and politics. The Azerbaijani population still lives on borders of Turkey and this population serves to establish and develop relations. Turkey also constitutes the western border of the region therefore Transcaucasia seems to be tightened between two Turk states. Azerbaijan, in perceiving that this factor is vital for its well being, uses the quality of being a Turk as a denominator. Having this factor of Turkish denomination in CIS, is assumed as a replacement of the former USSR and thus created a new alliance relation. In this regard, Turkish states headed by Turkey have tended to develop relations among them by summing every year.

2 – 1 – 1 - TURKEY- AZERBAIJAN RELATIONS FROM POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

2 - 1 – 1 – 1 - EVENTS AFTER U.S.S.R PERIOD

After the collapse of the USSR, the first region to be affected by independence movements, was Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is the state that declared its independence immediately. With the rush of independence, clashes occurred one after the other after on the artificial borders determined by former Russia. Azerbaijan was affected

by this too and experienced conflict with Armenia. This war is of great importance for the regions.

It is not possible to evaluate the foreign policy of Azerbaijan without examining its internal dynamics. When taking a look at events in this country, it is possible to determine similar and various approaches of leaders who have come to power so far. Internal crisis, economic troubles, party and leader competitions bring about such fast changes in the process causing Azerbaijan to experience troublesome international relations as a result. All world states follow closely matters concerning Azerbaijan, in terms of what foreign policy it will adopt, the strategies it will follow in regional and international politics and how internal stability will be provided.

In terms of Turkey's foreign policy with concern to, it is evident that Azerbaijan holds much importance in a lot of fields especially in terms of historical, cultural, ethnic and religious ties. Transcaucasia and Central Asia are important for Turkey in pursuing a regional power. According to Turkey, Azerbaijan more than others, appears to be the ideal country to be allied with. After petroleum and natural gas projects were realised, the importance and meaning of this country for Turkey increased.

Winds of change showed the effects of the dominoes theory in former Russia and all its republics started to declare their independence. In that period Ayaz Muttalibow who is in favor of Russia was in power. Since the increasing conflicts in the country could not be prevented in 1989, Muttalibov became the new leader of the Azerbaijan Communist Party (ACP) instead of Abdurrahman Vezirov with the help of the USSR Communist Party. After some time, High Soviet as president selected him in 1990. Even though he applied strict politics and opponents boycotted strictly him in 1991, he won 84 % of the following elections in accordance with official records. In this way, he remained in power again and maintained his power. Due to public pressure and opponents' pressure he declared the independence of Azerbaijan

in 18 October 1991 as soon as a coup d'état took place in former Russia.⁴⁴ Azerbaijan is first the Turkish state and Muslim republic that declared its independence in former Russia. Turkey thought that this development would have positive effects on the other four Republic. After Azerbaijan declared its independence, Turkey in considering the power balances in USSR and approaches of European countries, did not initially recognise Azerbaijan but later together with those other four countries also, it was recognized by Turkey.⁴⁵

To solve of the acceptance problem in Turkey, there were new events and it has started to discuss the politic of Turkey on Caucasia and Central Asia. It was the term of talking about a new Turkish world. Turkey must follow an active politic in this conjecture and must show its intention to become a regional power in the area to everyone. This subject has been discussed with its different facets. However some say that these events are fortunate for Turkey, whilst others say, "Turkey must not surpass itself." Also it has been noted that it must be cautious in its relations with the Russians. Although these discussions took place, it caused us much damage as Turkey did not follow a master plan for this region. Turkey according to conjectural needs pursued a foreign policy which is not appropriate in a master plan.⁴⁶

Muttalibov who was a supporter of old USSR and following its collapse, of new Russia, cared about the relations between Turkey. After his term of office was formally inaugurated, he visited Turkey between 5-10 January of 1990. When he visited Turkey, there emerged big troubles in Azerbaijan. The troubles followed each other in and out of Azerbaijan.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Elisabeth Fuller, "Azerbaijan's relations with Russia and the CIS", *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol: 1, No: 43, p: 52-55

⁴⁵ Azerbaijan government declared the intention of being recognized by Turkey. At the same time Azerbaijan advice Turkey to wait until the end of the negotiation related with the USSR. Azerbaijan was anxious about that an early recognition of Turkey would be harmful for Azerbaijan. *Milliyet*, 1 September 1991; Ertuğrul Özkök, "Türkiye Azerbaycan'ı Neden Tanımadı?", *Hürriyet* 4 September 1991; *Milliyet*, 5 September 1991;

⁴⁶ Süha Bölükbaşı, "Ankara's Bakü-Centred Transcaucasia Policy: Has it Failed?" *The Middle East Journal*, Vol: 51, No: 1, Winter 1997, p: 80-82; Altan Öymen, "Sorunlarımızdan Biri", *Milliyet*, 4 September 1991; Sami Kohen, "Dış Politikada Yeni Boyutlar", *Milliyet*, 5 September 1991

⁴⁷ Mehmet Saray, "Azerbaycan Türkleri Tarihi", *Nesil Publications*, 1993, p: 69-74

2 - 1 – 1 – 2 - THE PERIOD OF ELÇİBEY

The politics of Muttalibov were detached from the interests of the people and with the growth of ACP and unsuccessful results from Montenegro⁴⁸ the search for a new leader accelerated. Finally on 6th March 1992, after Muttalibov, High Soviet President Itibar Mehmedov became the new leader. A fight took place between a fan of Muttalibov and the ACP group which resulted in Muttalibov being forced out of government. Following this event, until the election in June, Isa Gambarov became the acting President instead of Mehmedov. On 7th June 1992, the elections took place and Ebulfeyz Elçibey took 64% of the votes and became President.

The politics of the ACP⁴⁹ was /is to create a free Azerbaijan, and promote the freedom of the people, to ban the communist party, to protect the ethnic peoples and to establish good relations with Iranian Azerbaijanies.⁵⁰

With the ACP Government, Azerbaijan took important steps towards democracy. Between July 1992 and 1993 it set up 24 political parties and published over 500 periodical publications. Besides these developments, various rigid attitudes were taken and the Government accepted the motto of “not being with us is against us”.⁵¹

During the period of Elçibey, relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan were at a very satisfactory level. Elçibey had very warm relations especially with the

⁴⁸ For more detail please look at: Nadir Devlet, “*Doğuştan Günümüze Büyük İslam Tarihi Türk Dünyası*”, Çağ Publications, 1993, İstanbul, p: 275-280, Stefanos Yerasimos: (Translated by Şirin Tekeli), “*Milliyetler ve Sınırlar Balkanlar, Kafkasya ve Ortadoğu*”, İletişim Publications, October 1994, İstanbul, p: 440-456

⁴⁹ One of the most powerful political parties in Azerbaijan is ACP, which was found on 16 July 1989. 15 members coming from 26 districts constituted the administrative board of ACP and Elçibey was selected as president.

⁵⁰ Jim Nichol, “Azerbaycan Temel Gerçekler”, *Kafkasya ve Azerbaycan'ın Dünü-Bugünü-Yarını*, Harp Akademileri Publications, 1995, İstanbul, p: 1-4

⁵¹ Aryeh Wasserman, (Edit.): Yaacov Roi, “A Year of Rule by The Popular Front of Azerbaijan”, *Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies*, London, Frank Cass Limited, 1995, p: 143-144

Motherland Party.⁵² He remained formal against Russia and Iran and limited relations with them. Many pacts were signed with these two countries in particular with concern to economy, politics and culture. Turkey had a special and significant role in assisting with the education of the Azerbaijan's military in Azerbaijan in its struggle with Armenia.⁵³

With regard to the lost places of Azerbaijan, he started to organize a regularly military in September of 1992. On this subject he took helps of Turkey. He tried to set up good relations with Europe and US, but he applied cool politics with Russia and Iran.⁵⁴

Turkism was quite affected by the ACP's politics. President Elçibey said "We are first Turks and then Muslims." To Elçibey the base of ACP was Atatürk's ideology. In Azerbaijan the biggest fan of Turkism was "The Union of Turanian Free Working Peoples' Party" the biggest anti-Turkism party was "The Social Democrat Party of Azerbaijan".

At that time the leader of Turkish nationalists; Alparslan Türkeş visited Baku. Elçibey met Türkeş and become very enthusiastic but he stated that they were not influenced or affected by the ideology of Turanism and that they would not organize a Turanian_state.⁵⁵ From this statement made by Elçibey, it is clear that Turkism has played a big role in connecting the two states.

The relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan are always positive and are being constantly developed. But sometimes there were problems with the Armenians. With the struggle against Armenia, Turkey has provided Azerbaijan with limited military,

⁵² Motherland Party, which came to the power after 1980, brought the understanding of pursuing active policies in foreign affairs. <http://www.anap.org.tr>; Murat Yetkin, "Ateş Hattında Aktif Politika", Alan Publications, 1993, İstanbul, p: 135

⁵³ *Milliyet*, 15 Haziran 1992; *Hürriyet*, 16 Haziran 1992; *Milliyet*, 17 Haziran 1992

⁵⁴ Yuri N. Zinnin and Alexei V. Maleshenko, "Azerbaijan", *Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union Domestic and International Dynamics*, Ed: Mohiaddin Mesbahi, University Press of Florida, p: 105-109

⁵⁵ Aryeh Wasserman, 1995, p: 150-151

support⁵⁶ but complete political support, but in spite of this success has not been achieved against Armenia.⁵⁷ At that time the President of Turkey, Turgut Özal visited 5 Turkish Republics and upon his visit to Azerbaijan he stated that Turkey would be by the side of Azerbaijan.⁵⁸

Elçibey emulated from Atatürk so much and he is a real Turkish friend. Because of his properties he started to take good relations with Turkey when he took the power he accelerated with the relations concerning economy, politics and culture. He took on the duty to act as a bridge for relations between Middle Asia and Turkey. The only approach outside of this however was his suggestion that Azerbaijan be annexed to Iran wherein there are more than 20 million Azerbaijanis. This political stance disturbed Iran. Eventually Azerbaijan succeeded in pushing the Russian soldiers from the country. According to most researchers this event prepared his downfall. He damaged the regional balance and took decisions in favor of Turkey. Naturally because of this Russia became very disagreeable. Such retaliation led to the Moscow government supporting Armenians in the Montenegro issue against Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijanis have started to return their homes in Armenia and Montenegro. War, immigration, new balances and new perspectives together with the interference of Moscow have caused the economic decline of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan was not able to establish a strong enough military presence against Armenia and therefore was able to succeed in their struggle against them. Elçibey always desired for Turkey's support in solving the Montenegro issue.⁵⁹ In its struggle with Armenia the fall of

⁵⁶ Like at the beginning of the 20th century (1918) Turkey again supported Azerbaijan to the formation of its army. Mehman Süleymanov, "Kafkas İslam Ordusu Bünyesinde Azerbaycan Milli Ordusu", *Azerbaycan Türk Kültür Journal*, p: 329, September-October 1999, Jim Nichol, 1995, p: 6-7

⁵⁷ *Hürriyet*, 4 April 1993; Nur Batur, "Türkiye Zorlanıyor", *Milliyet*, 4 April 1993; Sami Kohen, "Azeriler'e Düşen İş", *Milliyet*, 15 April 1993; Nur Batur, "Demirel'e Apo ve Elçibey Kışkacı", *Milliyet*, 15 April 1993

⁵⁸ Nur Batur, "Demirel'e Apo ve Elçibey Kışkacı", *Milliyet*, 15 April 1993; Sami Kohen, "Özal'ın Gezisi Amacına Ulaştı", *Milliyet*, 17 April 1993

⁵⁹ Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkey's New Geopolitics*, West Wiew Press, 1993, p: 77-78; Mehmet Ali Brand, "Türkiye Arabulucu Olsun", *Milliyet*, 4 November 1991

Kelbeçer after⁶⁰ Laçın was a great defeat for Azerbaijan and in this period Turkey was not able to send the necessary aid because of Armenian intervention.

Suret Huseyinov's⁶¹ military success in Gence resulted in the downfall of Elçibey. Huseyinov, who blamed Elçibey for the defeat, asked Elçibey to resign- at that time Turkey tried to ensure political stability in Azerbaijan by proposing a coalition among Aliyev, Elçibey and Mehmedov but failed. Despite Turkey and the USA's support, Elçibey had to come from Bakü as result of his continuous defeats. Elçibey lost the support of Azerbaijani people when Aliyev gained the government he appointed Huseyinov as a primeminister.⁶²

2 - 1 - 1 - 3 - THE ALIYEV PERIOD

Aliyev is one of the leading figures from the USSR era. He was the president of the KGB and also Primary Secretary to the Communist Party between 1969 and 1982, after which he was a member of Politburo in Moscow till 1988. He was very experienced in terms of politics and knew the bureaucratic mechanism and Russian government traditions. These guided Aliyev in pursuing appropriate policies. After obtaining power, he promoted people considering the domestic equilibriums. He promoted Gaziev to State Secretary, Hasan Hasanov, who was sympathetic to the ACP, to the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Nimet Penah to President Consultancy. Besides these, he promoted those who were close to him to key positions. The President's assistant Afiyeddin Celilov is like a member of Aliyev's family. Şamis Raigmov, who is a friend of Aliyev from the KGB, was promoted to a special division, which provides direct information to the President concerning economic and domestic political matters. The son of Aliyev was appointed as the President's Assistance of the National Petroleum Company.

⁶⁰ Hürriyet, 4 April 1993

⁶¹ As a result of his commercial activities USSR Huseyin was a rich person. He organized private to fight Armenians; He became a hero in Azerbaijan.

⁶² "Kafkasya ve Azerbaycan'ın Dünü-Bugünü-Yarını", *Harp Akademileri Publications*, 1995, İstanbul, p: 54 -56; Milliyet, 19 July 1993

As can be seen from his politics after being elected as the President, Mr. Aliyev used his potential perfectly. At that time, Azerbaijan was experiencing its most difficult period. There was chaos within the country; due to an increase in the demands of the minorities⁶³. Also the negative effects of the war doubled with the rebellion of the minorities with the leadership of Husseyinov. Within the various mutinies, the most dangerous one was the mutiny held by the Lezgi sub-group; one of the old Caucasian nations, which used to live around the Savur River. In the years of Soviet Order, they were divided between Daghestan and Azerbaijan. Moreover, Sunni Muslims fought against Russian Tsardom under the leadership of Seyh Samil.

Since 1989, Lezgians were trying to protect their national interests. Lezgians tried several times to become unified within the framework of Daghestan. On 23rd July of 1989, a man called Muhiddin Kahrmanov started the “National Lezgi (Sadval) Movement” in the city of Belici in Daghestan with the help of Lezgians that were living in Azerbaijan and south Daghestan. At that time, Muhiddin Kahrmanov defined their goals as maintaining the unity of the Lezgi nation. In the 1992 September Congress of Sadval, he declared that they would use all means possible way in order to found a Republic of Lezgi on north side of South Azerbaijan. All these events increased the tension between Azerbaijan and the Lezgians. In the end, a short conflict began between them in the Kusari region of Azerbaijan during March 1993. These disputes also reached a critical stage when the Azerbaijan Republic intended to force 1500 Lezgi men to enter the Azerbaijani army to be used in the war in Montenegro. After Mr. Aliyev was selected as President, the Russian Federation took the side of the Azerbaijani Republic and shut down the Lezgi’s Political Group located in Moscow. Furthermore it ceased putting pressure on the Azerbaijani Republic in accepting the rights of a Lezgi nation.⁶⁴

⁶³ Captain Ali İkrım Hübetoğlu who supports the Suret, declared the Talis Republic in Lenkeran. Also he wanted to establish an autonomous region for the Lezgians who were living in Azerbaijan and the southern part of Dagestan.

⁶⁴ Fahrettin Çiloğlu, “*The Ethnicity Conflicts in Russian Federation and Caucasia*”, Sinatle Publications İstanbul, 1998, p: 75-81; Nizami Kürevi, “The Lezgi Problem in Azerbaijan” *Kafkasya Yazıları*, Issue: 4, Number: 4, Summer 1998, p: 78-82; Moshe Gammer, (Edit.): Yaacov Roi, “Unity,

From this aspect, Aliyev showed the public that by trying to solve the problems inside the country, that stability could be provided, therefore he made Elçibey an outcast, by using a referendum.⁶⁵ Afgan mujahids who were brought in for the Mountainous Montenegro problem, the Russian support and developments that provided with Armenia's strategic mistakes made Aliyev stronger. At first, Aliyev was distant from Turkey and did not trust her since it had supported Elçibey during their struggle. Thus, in September 1993 he left aside postponed agreements and even wanted a visa requirement for the Turkish in entering Azerbaijan. He fired 1600 Turkish soldiers who were living in Azerbaijan. Aliyev changed the politics from the term of Elçibey by using all area and world states power according to Azerbaijan's interests. He demonstrated that mutual relations would be based on interests by stating whoever helps us to solve the Montenegro problem; we shall be closer to them.⁶⁶ Aliyev tried to advance relations with Russia in the ground of CIS and he also gave importance to relations with the EU.⁶⁷

In September 1994, soldiers under the Prime Minister Suret Huseyinov wanted to overthrow Aliyev like they did Elçibey. It is claimed that Russia was behind this movement because of the petroleum agreement of this century that was signed one month ago. But as an experienced leader, Aliyev took the leader of Omon power⁶⁸ Ruşen Cevadov from Huseyinov's side to his own side thus preventing Huseyinov's success.⁶⁹

Some Turkish and Azerbaijani people prepared another coup d'état against Aliyev on 12th March 1995. With Aliyev's political ability and support of the public,

Diversity and Conflict in the Northern Caucasus", *Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies*, London, Frank Cass, 1995, p:168-169

⁶⁵ Related with reference look at: *Milliyet*, 30 August 1993; *Milliyet*, 31 August 1993

⁶⁶ Svante E. Cornell, "Turkey and the Conflict in Nagorno Karabagh: A Delicate Balance", *Middle East Studies*, Vol: 34, No:1, London, Frank Cass, January 1998, p: 62; John Lloyd, Steve Levine, "Between Russia, Turkey and Asia", *Financial Times*, 7 March 1994, p: 11

⁶⁷ Stephen Blank, "Kafkasya Güvenliğinde Yeni Eğilimler", *Avrasya Etüdleri*, No: 13, Spring 1998, p: 4 -7; *Hürriyet*, 25 July 1993; *Milliyet*, 17 August 1993; *Hürriyet*, 8 September 1993

⁶⁸ Omons is an organization, which was formed to fight in the front and against terrorist activities. It is organized in Muttalibov period. Number of it member is predicted as 800.

⁶⁹ *Milliyet*, 7 October 1994

this coup d'état attempt was overcome but with the death of 45 people from among Azerbaijan National Power and Omons. This attempt in which some Turkish people were directly involved, affected Turkish - Azerbaijan relations severely for a while and created a security problem. After this event, President Demirel promised that Turkish people would return to Turkey and also expressed Turkey's feelings of friendship for Azerbaijan.⁷⁰

Tansu Çiller, Prime Minister of Turkey, visited a Turkish Republic for the first time in April 1995 a short time after the coup d'état. Çiller's Baku visit was accepted with two requirements. One of them was that the petroleum topic would not be the sole topic and secondly that Ayvaz Gokdemir who was considered by Aliyev as having a role in the coup d'état, would not participate in any formal group. The visit which was realised under such difficult conditions had very friendly atmosphere and mutual relations experienced an important development with the Çiller - Aliyev meeting, especially with the Montenegro topic, projects⁷¹ that were planned by Turkey, credits⁷² that were given by Turkey and petroleum way is spoken. The leader of Azerbaijan gave great value to express support expectations from Turkey.⁷³

On 12th November 1995, after the USSR collapsed, the first assembly elections took place and Aliyev became leader. During this election new laws were accepted. The Leader's party won the election by 70%. During the election, in addition to Aliyev's success, his politics to overcome his enemies and his limiting of the media became effective. Nationalist Musavat and the Communist Party, which was directed by an old assembly leader Isa Gamber, was prohibited from politics de facto. The Azerbaijan People's Front, which was in government between 92-93, was

⁷⁰ For more detail about attempt of the coup d'état see: İrfan Ülkü, "*Bağımsızlıktan Sonra Azerbaycan*", Doğan Bookstore, İstanbul, 2000, p: 235-262; *Yeni Yüzyıl*, 6 April 1995

⁷¹ During Tansu Çiller's visit these were presented as Turkey's project. Transportation company project for sea transportation, Nahçıvan- Turkey railway projects, Motorway project to Central Asia.

⁷² Eximbank credits with which Azerbaijan has repayment problems turned into repayment by oil.

⁷³ İrfan Ülkü, 2000, p: 262; *Milliyet*, 13 April 1995; *Sabah*, 14 April 1995; *Hürriyet*, 14 April 1995; *Turkish Daily News*, 14 April 1995

disassembled as a result of rejection of 64 candidates out of 84. That was a fact that made Aliyev more advantageous in the elections.⁷⁴

After Aliyev's success, President Demirel went to Azerbaijan. During this visit, Süleyman Demirel in the Parliament of Azerbaijan gave a speech that mentioned important points for the two countries. He said that the dialogues between the two countries should be improved and added that Montenegro and Bosnia Herzegovina problems were very important. Demirel wanted both sides to do what they could for peace.⁷⁵

Mesut Yılmaz's visit was less warmer than the previous one. The speeches about the Armenia and Alicantin gates in Turkey caused reaction. The most important topic within the dialogue between Aliyev and Yılmaz was the Montenegro problem, which would be topic for discussion in Moscow by Clinton and Yeltsin a week later. Yılmaz said that the dialogue between Armenia and Turkey would not improve before the Montenegro problem were solved and added that Turkey would do whatever was possible to ensure this.⁷⁶

The year 1997 was truly significant for Azerbaijan. There were a lot of developments in the former issues of concern during this year. The Montenegro problem was on the agenda once again, the peace was being disturbed and Turkey had done what was necessary. After the destruction of the peace, Haydar Aliyev visited Turkey from 5th to 9th May in 1997. This visit was crucial for the dialogue between the two countries, which were not good and the problems for that area. Aliyev wanted more economic support from Turkey and had explained the problems. On the other hand the Montenegro problem was the most important subject in

⁷⁴ 8 political parties entered the elections. They were: New Azerbaijan Party, Azerbaijan National Independence Party, Azerbaijan People's Front, Azerbaijan Democratic Party, Azerbaijan National Etatism Party, Motherland Party, Azerbaijan' Democratic Owners Party, Union Party for Azerbaijan, *Hürriyet*, 11 November 1995

⁷⁵ *Milliyet*, 8 December 1995

⁷⁶ Ferai Tınç, "Yılmaz'dan Aliyev'e Karabağ Güvencesi", *Hürriyet*, 15 April 1996; *Yeni Yüzyıl*, 16 April 1996

addition to Russia having sold some ammunition to Armenia which was the other important subject discussed during Aliyev's visit.⁷⁷

Aliyev signed 7 important documents when he was in Ankara.⁷⁸ The most important of them was the "Declaration of Strategic Cooperation". According to this, Turkey would not allow anyone to export anything to Armenia, Azerbaijan would sell the petrol from Turkey extracted from the Caspian Sea. The other topics were the Montenegro problem and blaming of Armenia.⁷⁹

Dialogue continued with the visits of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem and State Minister Ahad Andican in September 97. During that visit clear decisions were demanded for the petrol routes from Azerbaijan and said that Turks are very indisposed because the dialogs are only for petrol. Aliyev, who is a master about the politics of negotiation, wanted Turkey not to commerce with Armenia, to blame the military pact between Russia and Armenia. Turkey accepted not to commerce with Armenia but did not accept to blame Russia and Armenia as the dialogue between Russia and Turkey could deteriorate.⁸⁰ In 1997 for the last time Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz joined the program, which was organized by "International Oil Consortiums" to extract the petrol early. During this ceremony Mesut Yılmaz clearly declared that on the subject of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline he supported Aliyev and stated that support for companies was also needed.⁸¹

The most important event in Azerbaijan in 1998 was the presidency election that was followed with great interest both within and outside of the country. This was the most important item on the agenda at the time and big race for this election began but because of the politics which Aliyev followed for the election and propaganda,

⁷⁷ *Dış Basın ve Türkiye Bülteni*, 6 May 1997; *Dış Basın ve Türkiye Bülteni*, 7 May 1997

⁷⁸ In order to develop mutual Cooperation between Turkey-Azerbaijan 7 agreements were signed. According to the agreements both country will cooperate on the area of sport, social security, electricity, energy, industry, air and naval forces. "Türkiye ile Azerbaycan Arasında Yedi Anlaşma İmzalandı", *Dış Basın ve Türkiye Bülteni*, 8 May 1997; *Dış Basın ve Türkiye Bülteni*, 9 May 1997

⁷⁹ Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol: 43, No: 5, May 1997, p: 41660

⁸⁰ *Milliyet*, 9 September 1997; *Hürriyet*, 9 September 1997

⁸¹ *Hürriyet*, 13 November 1997; *Radikal*, 13 November 1997; Fikret Bila, "Bakü-Ceyhan Hattı", *Milliyet*, 13 November 1997

the most important opposition candidates rejected to enter this election since they believed that it would not be a democratic one. Hence except for Aliyev, İtibar Mehmedov for the National Independence Party and Nizami Slueymanov from the Independent Azerbaijan Party were the only two candidates to enter this election.

Aliyev began to soften his politics against the opposition when the time drew closer to the election. The most important example of this was allowing freedom of the press, but the opposition implied that it was not actual freedom.⁸² On 11th October 1998, Haydar Aliyev took 76.1% of the votes.⁸³

After Aliyev's success in the election, his position became stronger. The relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey became stronger too. On 29th October 1998, the Ankara declaration was accepted by these two countries, symbolising an very important step for them. Between 15th-17th February 1999, Tefik Zulfıyarov the Minister of Foreign Affairs for those years, visited Turkey and during this visit relationships were made stronger and the prevailing Declaration of Strategic Cooperation was reemphasized.⁸⁶

In September 1999, Aliyev came to Turkey and parallel to this Suleyman Demirel visited Baku on 18th October 1999. This visit was specific to the Baku - Ceyhan pipeline project. After motion April 2000 and finally in the same year the newly chosen President of Turkey Ahmet Necdet Sezer went to Azerbaijan on 11th July. During this visit Sezer implied that the relationship had to be stronger not only on a personal level but also as between the countries. The Baku - Ceyhan pipeline was one of the important subjects during that visit, besides this the two countries

⁸² *Yeni Yüzyıl*, 5 September 1998

⁸³ According to the official records İtibar Mehmedov collected 11.6 % of votes. Nizami Süleymanov collected 8.6 %. International watchers declared that the election was not held in fair conditions. Keesing's, Vol: 44, No: 10, October 1998, p: 42574; *Yeni Yüzyıl*, 13 October 1998

⁸⁶ *Sabah*, 8 September 1998; *Milliyet*, 8 September 1998; *Zaman*, 9 September 1998; "Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanı Tofiq Zulfıganov' un Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanı İsmail Cem' in Davetine İcabetle Türkiye'yi Ziyaretine İlişkin Açıklama", Press Release of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkish Republic, 17 February 1999

decided to begin the negotiation of the sale of the Şah Sea natural gas reservations to Turkey.⁸⁷

⁸⁷ Keesing's, Vol: 45, No: 10, October 1999, p: 43217; "Cumhurbaşkanı Ahmet Necdet Sezer'in Bakü'ye Yapacağı Resmi Ziyaretine İlişkin Açıklama", Press Release of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkish Republic, No: 118, 10 July 2000; Dış Basın ve Türkiye, 17 July 2000; www.byegm.gov.tr; TurkHaber, 14 April 2000; Milliyet 9 April 2000; Dış Basın ve Türkiye Bülteni, 10 April 2000; Milliyet, 12 July 2000; Hürriyet, 12 July 2000

2 – 2 – ARMENIA

Armenia bears the character of a Republic whose independence was doomed to remain restricted from birth. Its geographical surrounding has forced this country into isolation condition. Even the Armenia Diaspora has not been able to succeed in changing this condition.

While seeming willing to carry on balanced relationships with its neighbors in the region, it carried out the Nagorno Karabagh War, which was not even declared. Despite the fact that it costs 40 % of the state budget, the embargo which Azerbaijan carries out, brings its economy into collapse. Furthermore the people are losing their homes because of migrations and earthquakes, reaching 30 % of the country's population but despite all these disastrous results it continues to fight the Karabagh War with obstinacy.⁸⁸

It has accepted Russia as a defender for ensuring its existence between two countries which it described as enemies; Turkey in the west and Azerbaijan in the East. Armenia which is technically at war, is a small and poor state. It follows politics which can show its ability to reconciling its own benefits sometimes with the USA and the EU, sometimes with Russia and Iran in Caucasus, on the fight, earth of global and regional forces. Such politics, which can be named as “the politics of hoping for help from enmities”, is aimed at providing a balance of international benefit power in the region. While following aggressive politics against Georgia and Azerbaijan in the region, it is in cooperation against Azerbaijan with Iran which shares a common border with the region. It also adopts an aggressive attitude against Turkey.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ *Rusya Federasyonu'ndaki Gelişmeler, Etkileri ve Türkiye*, Siyasi ve Sosyal araştırmalar Vakfı Publications, İstanbul, 1995, p: 40

⁸⁹ Nazmi Gül, Gökçen Ekici, “Azerbaycan ve Türkiye ile Bitmeyen Kan Davası Ekseninde Ermenistan'ın Dış Politikası”, *Avrasya Dosyası*, Spring 2001, Volume: 7, Number: 1, p: 372

2 – 2 – 1 - FACTORS THAT AFFECT ARMENIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Armenia, which has no outlet to sea and is insufficient from the point of natural resources, is strategically not important from that aspect. Its economic and political situation acquires a shape in the general geopolitics of the region. That is why regional integration carries vital importance for the Armenian economy. One of the obstacles plugging the foremost of the integration in the Caucasus however is Armenia. The embargo that Turkey and Azerbaijan carry out, has negative effects on Armenian economy causing risks for long term economic improvement in Armenia because of its rapidly decreasing population, human resources becoming degenerate, chronic energy problem, insufficient health and education services, damaged natural structure and the investments within and outside the country ready to.⁹⁰ Nonetheless despite this embargo, the aim is to implement a pragmatic peaceful policy for Armenia.

Russia is a country playing an important role in Armenian foreign policy. Ter Petrosyan and Koçaryan were not able to succeed in saving Armenia from dependence on Russia and Russia has preserved its central position in Armenian foreign policy. Also, the relations with the USA carry great importance from the point of Armenian economy. After Israel, Armenia has been the country, which receives the most USA aid in comparison with its population.⁹¹ For Armenia, in relation to its economic relations, another important country is Iran. Iran, especially during the conflict years in Karabagh, had a vital role in the Armenian economy.

While analyzing Armenian foreign policy, one of subjects needed to take into careful consideration is that “deep and continuous fear” Armenia has for its

⁹⁰ Mahmut Niyazi Sezgin, “Geçiş Sürecinde Ermenistan Ekonomisinin Değerlendirilmesi”, *Stratejik Analiz*, Volume. 3, Number: 28, August 2002, p: 52

⁹¹ Armenia took 350 million USD aids 1992 – 1996.
Svante O. Cornell, “Undeclared War”, *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Volume: 4, Autumn 1997, p: 7

neighbours. Armenian society and the state feel that, its neighbours are extremely important in the context of Armenian foreign policy. The other factors that affect Armenian foreign policy are; global improvements in the world, Russian politics toward the western democracies, close relationships of Turk Republics in the region and the relations of Turkey and Russia. Additional notable factors are Armenia's isolation from regional and international relations, political and economic diffusionism in the region, the threat of military solidification of the opposition.⁹²

Another poignant factor, which plays a role in Armenian foreign policy, is the Armenian Diaspora. The Diaspora, after the independence of Armenia, has been effective in Armenian political life by way of its organizations in other countries and Diaspora parties. It has also tried to impose its own agenda and understanding of foreign policy in Armenia.⁹³

Armenia is governed by the presidency system. The president can appoint and discharge the prime minister. Moreover he can dissolve the national assembly and by consulting with the president of the national assembly and prime minister he can decide on holding elections.⁹⁴ Due to this reason, we can conclude that Armenia has a powerful presidency system. In foreign policy, we see that the president is the most effective figure in the decision mechanism. Also there are forces, which are effective in the process of playing politics and limiting the actions of the president; the Armenian Diaspora and parties being the most important of these. These were some of the tensions existing during the presidency period of Ter – Petrosyan with Armenian Diaspora and the three Diaspora parties; Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Taşnak), Social Democrat Hınçak Party and Armenian Liberal Democrat Party. Taşnak especially wanted their own candidate to become the president. When

⁹² Nazmi Gül, Gökçen Ekici, 2001, p: 368

⁹³ Kamer Kasım, "Diasporanın Ermenistan Dış Politikasına Etkisi", *2023 Journal*, April 15, 2001, Number: 12, p: 43

⁹⁴ Stephan H. Astourian, "From Ter – Petrosyan to Kocharian: Leadership Change in Armenia", *Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series*, 2000-2001, p: 3

they then lost the election, they started a campaign against Ter – Petrosyan.⁹⁵ The Armenians, apart from the organized Diaspora groups, had an effective role in Armenia foreign policy especially when there was not enough expert personnel taking part in foreign policy. Gerard Liberidiyan was a Diaspora Armenian who was a USA citizen born in Beirut and was one of the architects of Armenian foreign policy in the Ter – Petrosyan period. Liberidiyan also had an important role in the peace talks of the Nagorno Karabagh problem in addition to this he was the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia to be a Diaspora Armenian.⁹⁶

2 – 2 – 2 – THE TER - PETROSYAN PERIOD

The first President of Armenia; Levon Ter – Petrosyan was elected as the President on 16th October 1991. Ter – Petrosyan graduated from The Department of Eastern Studies of the National University of Erivan and completed his post-graduate studies at Leningrad Eastern Studies Institute. In Armenia's political life, Ter – Petrosyan was known by his leadership of the Karabagh Committee, which tried to tie Nagorno Karabagh to the Armenian Government.

Ter – Petrosyan put forward three foreign policy aims; normalising the foreign relations of Armenia, decreasing dependence on Russia and solving the Karabagh problem.

It is accepted that occupancy of Azerbaijan is not possible without the support of the Karabagh Armenians despite the efforts of Ter – Petrosyan to show that

⁹⁵ Kasım Kamer, 2001, p: 45

⁹⁶ Hratch Tchilingirian, "Armenia's Foreign Relations", *Armenian News Network/Groong*, <http://groong.usc.edu./ro/ro-1997>

Armenia is no longer part of the conflict.⁹⁷ However the Armenian Government did not retract the decision that Naghorno Karabagh was a part of Armenia and Ter – Petrosyan appointed Serge Sarkisyon to the Ministry of Defense in August 1993. He was the deputy of Armenia and supposedly Karabagh Parliament.⁹⁸ This shows the connection between Armenia and Naghorno Karabagh.

On September 22, 1996, Ter – Petrosyan once again won the presidency election. The Diaspora campaigned against Ter – Petrosyan by claiming that there was trick in these elections. This affected the honor of Ter – Petrosyan in the USA.

The criticism by the Diaspora against Ter Petrosyan increased with the acceleration of the peace process for the Karabagh issue. During the peace process carried out by ESCO Minsk Group, an important step was taken in December 1996, in the ESCO Lizbon Summit. In this summit, some principles, which respected the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, were accepted. Following the summit, of the co-presidents of the Minsk Group they made a proposal that included the decision that Armenian forces were to withdraw from Naghorno Karabagh and Azerbaijan and that all refugees were to return to their houses.⁹⁹ The Lisbon Summit was interpreted as the failure of Ter – Petrosyan’s foreign policy by the opposition in 1997. The ESCO Minsk Group proposed to solve the Karabagh issue, the first step being that the forces would withdraw from the lands of Naghorno Karabagh which they occupied and then a new period would begin. Ter – Petrosyan gave the impression that he found this proposal acceptable.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ “Azerbaijan Seven Years of War”, *Human Rights Watch/Helsinki*, New York, 1994, p: 71

⁹⁸ Joseph R. Masih and Robert O. Krikorian, “Armenia at the Crossroads”, *Harwood Academic Publishers*, 1999, p: 49

⁹⁹ Paul Goble, “Caucasus: Analysis From Washington-Armenia-Azerbaijani Conflict Risks Recognition”, *RFE/RL*, 8 May 1998

¹⁰⁰ “Armenia Agrees in Principle to Karabakgh Peace Plan”, *RFE/RL News line 1*, 8 October 1997; “Ter Petrosyan Holds Press Conference”, *Asbarez*, 4 October, 1997

This caused the Diaspora press to put more pressure on Ter – Petrosyan. As a result, in 1998, Ter – Petrosyan was forced to resign.¹⁰¹

2 – 2 – 3 – THE KOÇARYAN PERIOD

In the election after the resignation of Ter – Petrosyan, Koçaryan became the Armenian President. Koçaryan was born in 1954 in Hankenti city of Karabagh. He has engineering diploma from the Erivan Polytechnic Institute. He was one of the founders of an organization called Mialsum in 1989 in Naghorno Karabagh. He was appointed to the Prime Ministry by the occupying government in Naghorno Karabagh in 1992. In 1997, he was appointed as Prime Minister and in April 1998 he became President of Armenia.

Koçaryan was the Prime Minister of the supposed Naghorno Karabagh Republic and he was known by his closeness to the politics of the Tasnaks. Koçaryan implemented a foreign policy, which included distanced relations with Turkey, by avoiding discussions on the Karabagh issue and decreasing the dependence on Russia.

Just like Ter – Petrosyan, Koçaryan tried to decrease the dependence of Armenia on Russia. He also thought that the relations with the USA would decrease the dependence on Russia. Koçaryan went to Washington to attend the 50th anniversary of NATO's foundation when the relations of Russia and the USA were tense and Kosovo operations were on-going.¹⁰² One of the biggest Diaspora organizations in the USA; The Armenian National Committee of America was the supporter of Koçaryan and believed that relations between Armenia and the USA should be improved. But the pressure of Russia on Armenia continued in the

¹⁰¹ Kasım Kamer, 2001, p: 46

¹⁰² Harry Tamrazian, Armenia Seeks Complementary in S. Caucasus”, Asia Times Online, <http://www.atimes.com>, April 2000

Koçaryan period. The main reason for this is not being able to find a solution for the Karabagh issue and the new national security doctrine of Russia. For the Karabagh issue, the unwilling manner of Armenia makes it more dependable on Russia and Russian military bases. The thought that the support of Russia for Armenia is essential, prevents the Armenian Government from trying to find other alternatives. The new security doctrine of Russia is Putin's strategy which is to increase the influence of Russia in the Caucasus and force Armenia to stay connected to Russia.¹⁰³

With Koçaryan's Presidency, the increasing effect of Taşnaks on Armenian politics is an obstruction for Armenia to take steps, which will assist finding regional peace. The radical elements, which dominate Armenian politics, become the source of inconsistency for the whole Caucasus.

2 – 2 – 4 - THE ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF ARMENIA

Upon the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Armenia could determine its independent foreign policy for the first time. It is a fact that from the start of its independence, Armenia faced security problems caused by the Karabagh issue and this forced Armenia to have to establish relations with all the neighboring countries, by considering their geopolitics and geo-economics roles, in addition to considering their main strategic benefits for Armenia.¹⁰⁴ The political behaviors which Armenia illustrated based on the Haydet doctrine was clear in its consideration of strategic benefits which are mainly different from other south Caucasus countries such as Georgia and Azerbaijan. While Azerbaijan and Georgia were taking important steps in the way of allowing for democratic construction by distancing themselves from the Soviet influence after their independence, Armenian foreign

¹⁰³ Jyotsna Bakshi, "Russia's National Security Concepts and Military Doctrines: Continuity and Change", *Strategic Analysis*, Volume: 7, p: 1279

¹⁰⁴ Manvel Sargsian, Alexander Gregorian, Gayane Novikova, "Armenia's National Policy", The Armenia Center for National and International Studies, <http://acnis.am/articles.htm>

policy, with the effect of Haydet, developed a substantial land demand from its neighbors. As a result of this, Armenia has focused its search for cooperation to achieve this balance.

According to Armenian analysts, in the Caucasus only Armenia sees harm in the integration of the region with the West and opposes this.¹⁰⁵ Based on this thought, Armenia, which is afraid of the integration of Georgia and Azerbaijan with the West, makes an effort to provide those regional forces as Russia and Iran to be present in the Caucasus because this strategy needs to be able to play with regional and global balances.

In 1999, when evaluating the foreign policy of Erivan, it seems that the efforts to balance the relations with the West and Russia become tenser, thus, the decision makers focused on the economy and security of the country being kept under the control of the relations with the regional forces and international organizations. In this period the attempt by Armenia to enter the UN and other international organizations has increased considerably¹⁰⁶. Moreover while Armenia was increasing its military and economic relations with Russia in 1999 it also continued to receive aid from the government of the USA.

In the Karabagh issue, its unwillingly manners made Armenia more dependable on Russia and a Russian military base. The thought that the support of Russia is indispensable obstructs the Armenian Government in trying to find alternatives. Also the new national security doctrine of Russia and Putin's strategy to increase his effect in Caucasus forced Armenia to establish nearby connections with

¹⁰⁵ Levon Kazarjan, the scientist of politics in Erivan National University, emphasize that he worries about the politics of west in the region and everyone follows USA but the politics of US are far away from combining Caucasus. Rick Swinson, "Caucasus Regional Security for the 21st Century"; 13 Match 1999 <http://geolinks.virtualave.net/caucasus/sia.htm>

¹⁰⁶ Robert Krikorian, "Armenia Under Fire", Armenian News Network/Gorng, August 2000, <http://xecutrix.usc.edu/news/msg19973.html>

Russia.¹⁰⁷ Besides, while Armenia is trying to obstruct the effect of Ankara on Turkish and Muslim communities within the older borders of the USSR, it continues to be at the forefront of the effect of Russia and Iran in South Caucasus.

¹⁰⁷ Jyotsna Bakshi, p: 1280

2 – 3 - GEORGIA

Georgia, which is situated on the foot of the Caucasus Mountains, has an important role for the region. This is a country whose neighbours are Russia from North, Turkey, and Armenia from South and Azerbaijan from east. This country supplies the sea connection of the Caucasus alone. Another factor that strengthens the geopolitics aspect of the country is its supplying the interrelationship between strategic partners, which occur at the region. Both Russia and Turkey lack of direct land connection with their strategic partners, Armenia and Azerbaijan.¹⁰⁸ Because of this, they have to use the land of Georgia.¹⁰⁹

Black sea is also another reason that increases the pressure over Georgia. Russia that shares the boundary of USSR with Black sea with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia has had the inefficient portion from the aspect of seamanship. The condition that the depth of sea is unavailable at the coast side of Russia with Black Sea causes only the Novorossiysk Harbour to be used.

2 – 3 – 1 - GEORGIA POLICY

After Soviet Union entered the process of dissolution with “glasnost” and “perestroika” movements, in Georgia independence movements started and in 1989 after the events that took place between citizens and Red Collar soldiers, again independence songs were sung. Georgia High Soviet agreed on invalidity of the agreements, which are respectively, Georgia- USSR agreement dated 1921, and Union Agreement dated 1922. On 31st march 1991, all over the country, a

¹⁰⁸ Turkey’s 11 km long land tie with Azerbaijan above Nahchivan is interrupted by Armenia.

¹⁰⁹ Kamil Ağacan, “Gürcistana Yönelik Artan Rus Baskıları ve Türkiye”, Stratejik Analiz Jurnal, Volume: 1, No: 4, August 2000

referendum was done and 98% of voters agreed on republic, on 9 April 1991. Georgia parliament announced the independence of the country and in the elections just followed in May, Gamsakhurdia, candidate of nationalists were elected a president with an 86,5 % vote ratio.

Despite the announcement of independence, the uneasiness in country did not come to an end, the political union could not be achieved, and there occurred a series of skirmishes among several groups owing to president's behaviours that destroyed the country wholeness. As a result of this, Gamsakhurdia and his family had to leave the country on 6 March 1992. Subsequently, the consultative committee and council established by soldiers invited Eduardo Shevardnadze who was assigned with many important duties like secretary of Communist Party and ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the time of USSR. Furthermore, in view of the fact that various ethnic minorities like Ossets and Abkhazias also wanted independence, there occurred new clashes within the country.

Georgian state, whose membership for UN had been accepted in July 1992, elected Shevardnadze as a president in September 1992 and in 1993 struggled with Gamsakhurdia supporters fight for taking power of the government again. On 24th August 1995, Georgia's new constitution was accepted and Shevardnadze was elected, as a president for the first time in November 1995, for the second time in 2000 and the elections would be done again in 2005.¹¹⁰

In Georgia, constitution was accepted by parliament on 17 October 1995. Georgia is a parliamentary democracy, which is governed with presidency system. In constitution, separation of powers principle has highly been accepted and parliament and president have been determined by elections. It is known that there is plans for getting the government structure resembled to France's, which has a semi-presidential system.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ <http://www.foreigntrade.gov.tr/pazaragiris/ulkeler/gur/gur-rap-dig-y12.doc>

¹¹¹ <http://www.foreigntrade.gov.tr/pazaragiris/ulkeler/gur/gur-rap-dig-y12.doc>

In Gamsakhurdia's period, Georgia determined that fundamental quality of the government was nationalist Unitary Government. This extreme nationalist manner made minorities whose population was about to approach 30% of country population, alarmed and revolted. Thus Georgia was dragged on inner war against Gamsakhurdia's supporters and on the other side they fight against rebellious minorities in the spring of 1992. In addition to these, government struggle having occurred between assigned President Shevardnadze and liberals who invited Shevardnadze to this duty increased the crisis that country had faced. In his early days, countless diplomats visited Tiflis to get in touch with Soviet Unions famous minister and to support him, but owing to the fact that The West did not react to Russia's policy "Near Abroad"¹¹² these visits were finished and there started a new era in which Russia interfered to inner fights.¹¹³

In this period, Russia did not want the Georgians in its country to be involved in the struggle of deviation in their motherland. For this reason, Russia ignored the volunteers being sent to Georgia for helping their rebellious relatives from countries like the North Caucasus autonomous republic. South Ossetia, Abkhazians, and Russia supported them without showing any evidence. In 1993 the country had shaken from the political aspect and was about to collapse also from social and economic aspects.

USA has always mentioned its support to Georgia against Russia's pressure, which had been accepted as a threat for Georgia's unity and independence. USA has taken the responsibility to supply both security and stabilization in region and Georgia's independence and territorial integrity, because Georgia is a country where oil and natural gas lines will go through and land transportation corridor plays an important role.

USA has supported Georgia against Russia's military installation and had an important role in expelling this so-called installation. Although it came out in an

¹¹² Russian Security Doctrine, which is also known as "Close Environment".

¹¹³ Rusya Federasyonu'ndaki Gelişmeler, Etkileri ve Türkiye, p: 38

agreement in OSCE Istanbul Summit about this so-called Installation being expelling from Georgia, Russia resisted on this topic. USA, against Russia's military vehicle's being carried to Armenia from Georgia, mentioned that it was unsuitable for ACFE and they preferred the Russia's military equipments being sent to Russia and staying there.¹¹⁴

By supporting Georgia in Trifles Affairs after improving its relation with this country since 1996, Clinton administration mentioned that they were protectors of Georgia and they aimed to hamper the Russia's enterprise that was threatening for the independence of country.¹¹⁵

After ex USSR's collapse in so-called geography there occurred rivalry between global and regional forces. This rivalry has continued intensively between USA and Russia as a reflection of the passing bipolar international system. One of these important rivalry zones has been the Caucasus. In region among these existing three countries, while Armenia has given its strategic preference on the side of Russia, Georgia and Azerbaijan have accepted whole cooperation with west as a main strategic goal.

After independence, Georgia could not endure Russia's intensive pressure and Eduardo Shevardnadze who was assigned after Gamsahurdia's being taken away from power, started close relations with Russia, but this co-operation could not serve solution for problems that Georgia faced. Moreover, increasing desires of Russia became a threat for Georgia's independence.

While Georgian-Russian relations were being corrupted, USA, which abandoned its policy "Firstly Russia", supported this republic, which had a strategic importance for its profit in Caucasus, against hegemony of Russia. The Georgia-USA relations, that started in 1996, have reached to ally level because of Georgia's

¹¹⁴ Anadolu Ajansı, 27 October 2000

¹¹⁵ Kamil Ağacan, "Bağımsızlığının 10.Yılında Gürcistan. ABD'nin Kafkasya'daki Kalesi mi?", *Stratejik Analiz Jurnal*, Volume: 1, No: 11, March 201, p: 36

geopolitical location and its use of a strategy for whole co-operation with west. Today, USA-Georgia relations have developed in many aspects.

When Georgia-USA relations are considered together with Azerbaijan policy of whole co-operation with west, it has shown that Russia's existence in region will be limited by Armenia surrounded by Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan and it will not make sense for Russia's benefit in the region. Thus, power of Russia in Caucasus will be argued again.

CHAPTER - III

GEORGIA-RELATED REGIONAL CONFLICTS THREATENING SECURITY IN TRANSCAUCASUS

3 – 1 - FACTORS THAT PREVENT PROTECTION OF GEORGIA'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

The foremost factors which put a barrier to provide stability and to protect territorial integrity of Georgia are the problems of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the deficiency in the economy, and the domination of a solution which is far from achieving social income distribution of the whole country that will provide a living like its contemporaries dating back to USSR period as a wreck.

Under the light of this general evaluation, to say that there is a struggle between western world and Russia-Iran, behind the activities having occurred since 1991 in Georgia from the aspect of establishing stability and preventing protection of land wholeness will not be wrong. In this struggle, among countries, which try to establish their penetration, because of the nature of international relations in Georgia, there is not any established partner opposite of Georgia. For instance, Armenia pretends to be in axis of Russia- Armenia- Iran. When we consider Armenia's close relationships with USA and France, it is supposed that there occurred an axis of USA-Turkey-Georgia against Armenia's and it can be claimed that Turkey- Georgia- USA axis includes permeability, because of the USA- Armenia relationships and also

it includes lack of communication owing to political and historical problems between Georgia and Armenia.

Today, as it was Georgia's foundation period the greatest problem has been the continuation of the activities done by ethnic minorities who want to realize their idea of independence in the country and bound to this possibility of the land wholeness of country being destroyed. Among these, the most important one is Abkhazian problem.

At present, the main problem about Abkhazia is determining the future of Abkhazian, and also fostering the return of 250.000 refugees of Georgia origin to Abkhazia who had to leave Abkhazia in 1992 because of Abkhazia Skirmishes. In addition to Abkhazia problem while south Ossetia, Acara and Armenia region (Cavaheti) problems have not been solved completely yet, there is not in sight any possibility of these regions being separated from country.

As a solution, while Abkhazia was declaring that it could accept the condition that it could participate the confederation where Abkhazia and Georgia were equally represented, Georgia suggested a federate government structure which Abkhazia had a autonomy, at highest level and also become a management bound to Tiflis. Beside these, Georgia stated that, in Georgia it could approve the existence of Abkhazia, which had the right of foreign affairs, general economic structure, and defense on their own. In March 1999, Vladimir Ardzinba the leader of Abkhazia, made an offer to Georgia. According to this offer, he stated that he could allow refugees who wanted to return if first of all both Georgia and Abkhazia guarantee the security of refugees and secondly on condition that refugees who would return back would accept Abkhazia as an independent country and would become the citizens of Abkhazian. But Georgia did not allow so-called refugees to go Abkhazia region, because of the fact that Georgia accepted such a condition that its citizens returning Abkhazia to admit Abkhazia citizenship as an impact to country wholeness.

Turkey follows a policy implying that it wants to see a Georgia, which is powerful in its region and keeps its land wholeness, instead of separated one. In this frame, from the beginning of Abkhazia conflict Turkey has emphasized the importance of the principles requiring protection of Georgia's land wholeness and stability of borders, and it stated an idea that this conflict should be solved with dialog between the sides with the base of human rights. In the same way, Turkey consoled the sides to behave on earnest desire and helped the people who were damaged by the war without any discrimination.

Turkey's policy of interest with regard to the Caucasus with its ex-neighbor Russia requires an independent Georgia. Turkey has tried to get the sides of Abkhazia and Georgia to come together for a Georgia whose land will be whole and stable. Istanbul Summit in 1999, which can be evaluated because of these struggles, has shown positive signs in solving the existing problems between Abkhazians and Georgians.

The fact that there are many Turkish citizens of Abkhazian and Georgian origin in Turkey is an important factor to be taken into consideration. Groups who are lobbying in favor of struggle for Abkhazia have been suggested by Turkey not to raise their ethnic problems to Turkey that they do in abroad.

Turkey has supported the Abkhazian-Georgian peace agreement, which will be reached with negotiations to protect the wholeness of Georgia. Although it is in a shape of a flexible federation, Georgia's land wholeness being protected has had an importance, when either Georgia or Abkhazia's long term goals are considered.

On the other hand, Georgia agreed on blockading Abkhazia economically for negotiating with it. In the frame of this decision, Abkhazian Harbors were closed to marine traffic. Blockade decision was also supported by the CIS. In this frame, in April 1997, Abkhazia's communications canals with world, constructed over Russia, was cut off by Moscow according to Georgia's demand.

With premiership governmental degree numbered 328 and dated May 19 1999, Georgia announced that sea vehicles, which would get into Abkhazia's harbors were going to be controlled in exterior part of Poti harbor in designated coordination. This decision started to be applied.

In Abkhazia problem, on condition that Russian Federation pretends to be near either Georgia or Abkhazia the side near RF can be superior to another. Because of this in existing situation if Russia continues its willingness about solving the Abkhazia and South Ossetia problems in favor of Georgia, it will be impossible to see peace in the region. After USSR being disintegrated it is not denied that Abkhazia problem established convenient substructure for destabilization factors being used when Russia needs it (As it is in Primakov Doctrine's main matter). The war in Abkhazia, which ended with 35.000 people died in 1992 and 1993, caused Russia to settle in region with fait accompli. While this development provided Russia to have control in Black Sea along Abkhazia Boundary, on the other hand it caused Russia to guarantee Russian Harbors called Novorossiysk and Tuapse, also it caused Russia had situated close to Georgia's Harbors like Poti, Sups, and Batumi.¹¹⁶ Russia's such enterprises is for getting Georgia weaker, lessening the penetration of Turkey and the west in region and also controlling the participation to oil reservations.¹¹⁷

Russian federation government, which was partly unsuccessful in Chechnya, felt indisposed, because of the fact that Chechnya commands had trained in Abkhazia. Although Georgia gave a military installation to Russia in Georgia-Abkhazia conflict, Russia did not help the protection of Georgia's wholeness and continued to support Abkhazian against Georgians.

In the forth-coming years, it is believed that Russia, in a way, will go on supporting Abkhazian and South Ossetian leaders to continue its influence in South

¹¹⁶ A. Necdet Pamir, *Bakü- Ceyhan Boru Hattı, Orta Asya ve Kafkasya'da Bitmeyen Oyun*, Ankara, 1998, p: 36

¹¹⁷ Ariel Cohen, "Yeni Büyük Oyun: Avrasya Boru hattı Siyaseti", *Avrasya Etüdüleri*, Ankara, Volume: 3, No: 1, ASAM, Spring 1996, p:2

Caucasus. The deprivation of the negotiations between the leadership of Georgia-Abkhazia and Georgia- South Ossetia, are the signs that Russia will continue this policy.

The Ossetia country, which is in the most important strategically situation to keep an eye on the Caucasus's south and north transportation, to avoid other Caucasus communities to come together and also to continue Russian influence on Georgia, has always been an area that Russia will not give up and always want to have it under its control.

Russia is one of the governments, which has achieved the famous “divide and rule” management.¹¹⁸ The separation of south and north Ossetia, which is an example for this situation, continues its existence as a threat to the wholeness of Georgia by being an inheritance from the USSR Government. In addition, Russia will lose its one of the most important trumps against Georgia. Therefore, this subject goes on as a matter that links Georgia to Russia.

Ossets are divided into two and North Ossetia is a Republic inside RF. Although South and North de facto united, Russia does not want it. Russia has sufficient problems with the people of North Caucasus. Despite the fact that, Ossets are of the most obedient ethnic groups, a united Ossetia may request undesired rights from Russians. Moreover, Russia might lose its strength against Georgia. Therefore, this issue continues as a matter that keeps Georgia linked Russia.

¹¹⁸ To try to apply the formula “separate and govern” which was applied before hand, will lead the country into instability and delay Georgia's financial development.

3 – 1 – 1 - THE ISSUE OF ABKHAZIANS

One of the areas to have experienced the most conflict in the Caucasus is Abkhazia. It has a history of such conflict with Georgia. Abkhazians fought for their independence effectively and straight after the breakup of the USSR. One dimension affects Turkey; it is not a subject of its near geography, at the same time, Turks have a very near relations with Abkhazians and most people with Abkhazian origin live in Turkey as do many other Caucasians.

Abkhazians are Caucasians; they have been living in the north east of the Black Sea Region since the Archaic Era. If we look at its obsolete frontiers, it is in Georgia. The origin of these people's language belongs to the North Caucasus language west group like the Bask language. Abkhazians started to use the Russian alphabet at the end of 19th Century but they now use the Latin alphabet. Their religious background that of is the Sunni sect of Islam and the Catholic Church. They became Christians in the Justinyen era and they gained their independence in 800AD. With the influence of the Ottoman Empire, most of them, especially the villagers, chose to follow Islam. Abkhazia was under the rule of Turkey in 16th Century, then in 1810 under Russian protectorate. However it later became part of Russia. After the rebellion against Russia in 1866, most Muslims escaped to Turkey and many Georgians, Russians and Armenians inhabited their land. It had an important and direct effect because it resulted in Abkhazians becoming a minority in Abkhazia.

The Menshevik Georgian Government drew Abkhazia into her frontiers in 1918 but Abkhazians showed severe opposition to this. The Abkhazian rebellions between 1918 and 1921 were put down by the Georgian Government. After Menshevik's defeat to the Bolsheviks, Abkhazian's situation was again determined in 1921. It became a Soviet Socialist Republic and was bound to Georgia, becoming a federation between 1921 and 1930. The new Abkhazian Constitution, which was accepted in 1925, confirmed its federal state status. This Federation was in the Trans-

Caucasus unity from 1921 to 1931. After having the Abkhazian Constitution accepted, the government's situation changed.¹²⁰

With the break up of the Soviet, as experienced with the other former republics, there was a nationality movement in Abkhazia. With the Gamsahurdiyas in power, there were Georgian political movements in the entire country. In July 1988 Mikhail Gorbachev was governing the country and 58 Abkhazian communists stated that they were independent from Georgia and Abkhazia's situation between February 1921 and April 1930 should have been renewed.

Despite being a minority, the Abkhazians, living in the Independent Abkhazia Republic, were governed by local government because of the Soviet' quota system in countries which had notoriety. Georgians in Abkhazia wanted this policy changed and diplomacy submission adjusted with the population rate. Abkhazians normally rejected the opposing arguments made against them by the republic government.

Gamsakhurdia opposed the national Abkhazia (and Ossetia) movement, which was not in favour of supporting a Russian Federation. With this, Abkhazian directors quickly moved to find support and they especially wanted direct help from the Caucasus people. In 1989 the Abkhazia people ordered a conference bringing together 16 Northern Caucasus people in Suhumi.¹²¹ After that representatives of the Abkhazia, Adige, Abaza, Ingush, Kabard, Circasian and Chechen people organised the first "Confederation of Mountainous People of Caucasus" meeting. The aim was to set up a Caucasus Federation Republic, its capital being Suhumi and they wanted to develop their countries. At the same time, the Abkhazia Autonomous Republic Communist Party's first secretary Boris Adeibu became the national leader of Abkhazian and they declared the "Lykhny Letter" on 18th March in 1989. In this

¹²⁰ Elisabeth Fuller, "Abkhazia on the brink of civil war?", *RFE/RL Research Report*, 4 September 1992, p: 3

¹²¹ Robert Bruce Ware, "Conflict in the Caucasus: An Historical Context and a Prospect for Peace", *Central Asia Survey*, Volume: 17, Number: 2, 1998, p: 352

letter they wanted USSR to go restructure the government system and demanded that Abkhazia have status equal to the Republic of Georgia.

The Lykhny Letter had a detrimental effect on Georgians and there were protests in Tiflis but these protests were stopped by the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Internal Affairs. Georgians rejected the 17th March 1991 referendum; with the Lykhny Letter becoming the reason for armed conflict between the two sides. Gamsakhurdia accused the participants of the referendum in betraying the nation.¹²³

After the fall of Gamsakhurdia in 1992, a new term started for the Abkhazians just as it did for the Georgians. Gamsakhurdia tried to unite the Megrelye and Abkhazians, which were under his influence. The Abkhazian High Soviet rejected the 1978 Constitution and put into effect the 1925 Constitution and announced that they had become a sovereign state on 23rd July 1992. This decision created problems and opposition in Abkhazians. Vladislav Ardzinba explained that he accepted the agreement between Georgia and Abkhazia like Yeltsin did previously and that with a Russian Republic, he added that they could be a part of Russia.¹²⁴

Following this, the Abkhazia Georgia Government Council stated that the Soviet Constitution was invalid and on 14th August, forces under the commandment of Kitovani went into Suhumi. The Caucasus Mountain People Confederation explained that they would help them. President Shevardnadze wanted to solve the problem by negotiating and said that it required the withdrawal of 500 CMPC soldiers immediately before it would start such negotiations. Ardzinba declared that if Georgian forces did not withdraw, negotiation would not start. When Yeltsin stated to support Abkhazia, Allocation Societies Confederation, bound to Russia, proposed to mediate between Shevardnadze, as a Georgian president, and Ardzinba. Negotiations for peace were made and the two leaders decided to sign a cease-fire on

¹²³ L. Fuller, "Autonomous Formations Defy Georgian Referendum Boycott", *RFE/RL*, Number: 54, 18 March 1991

¹²⁴ C. Dale, "Abkhaz Supreme Soviet Chairmen Ardzinba States Terms for Conflict Resolution", *RFE/RL Research Report*, Number: 122, 30 June 1993

3rd September 1922. Russian forces were sent to the area to guarantee the peace. The truce did not last very long and Abkhazian residences and headquarters were bombed soon after by Georgian soldiers. Abkhazian forces proceeded to successfully counter-attack but because of re-negotiations and in October 2, 1922 Gagra was seized by the Abkhazians with assistance from North Caucasia. After Gagra was seized, relations between Georgia and Russia (which improved when Shevardnadze became president) were soon ruined with Georgian authorities accusing Russian forces of wanting to create instability and control over the area. Georgian forces managed to seize Soviet Military equipment, which has remained in the country since the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic.

On October 6th 1922, Yeltsin gave instructions to his military to capture the strategic railways going through to the Abkhazian Gulf. On December 3rd 1922, Shevardnadze, met with the OSCE delegation and accused the Russian forces of supporting the Abkhazians¹²⁵ and obstructing the Georgian military power of suppressing the Abkhazian resistance. The event, which had started as an ethnic dispute managed to progress to the international sphere.

The main objective of Shevardnadze was to avoid war with Russia while the dispute between the Abkhazian and the Georgian was on-going. The two governments started to meet for cooperation purposes and amicable negotiations but when the negotiations were based on the withdrawal of Georgian forces from Abkhazia, Georgia refused take a step back. On the other hand, Russia did not want to withdraw her forces from Abkhazia because of its desire to control the railroads in Abkhazian. However the Security Council stressed that the Georgian country as a whole and its sovereignty wanted to work towards peace immediately. The UN General Secretary sent A-Bruner as a special representative and on 27th July 1993, a cease-fire was signed just as it was in 1992 in Sochi.

¹²⁵ February 1993, the president of Russia, Yeltsin, expressed that it was necessary to give Russia special power to guarantee peace in its land, the idea that Russia wanted its old power again. March 1993, Abkhazians started attack to take Suhumi back by the help of the plains of Russia. Then 75 people were killed in these attacks. After some days, March 19, the plane of Russia was destroyed by the Georgian. So it was declared that Russia had begun the war. (Sentinel: 238)

In the spring of 1993, the disputes started again. On September 16th, the Abkhazians attacked Suhumi and Oshomshira and captured these areas within 11 days. Abkhazian forces were successful in controlling Suhumi on September 20th 1993 after many months of struggle. About 120.000 Georgians in the city emigrated through the security corridor. The USA, on 29th September, stated that she did not approve of the Abkhazians having seized certain areas and supported the Georgian government in this war. Towards 30th September, Abkhazia captured Oshomshira on the shore of the Black Sea too.¹²⁶

After this defeat, in October 1993, Shevardnadze, had to join the Independent States Community and Russian Army managed to remain in Georgia indefinitely. The Georgia-Abkhazian War¹²⁷ could have been stopped with the help of International Peace Power soldiers formed by the UN and the Russian Federation. 270.000¹²⁸ Georgians escaped from Abkhazia and the problem that they had to live in their country as refugee appeared. Whereas Abkhazia's future and what the Abkhazia's statutes would be were put on the agenda. As a result, Russia changed its politics towards Georgia and in order to wanting to be close in relations to Georgia; she did not want to support Abkhazia. Hence first, she accepted the economic sanction against Abkhazia and then in October 1993 she no longer followed her former politics and declared that no ethnic cleansing had taken place in Abkhazia.

¹²⁶ The main reason for the success of Abkhazia was the powers, which supported Abkhazia against Georgia. Rutskoy expressed the bombardment of Tiflis some months ago; Hasbulatov was the initiator of the decisions that were against Georgia. Moreover, Minister of Defense expressed Russia's future aims for Georgia in a television program that "the Military Service is in Abkhazia so it necessitates war or we will lose Black Sea."

¹²⁷ L. Fuller, "Russia Calls on Abkhaz to Stop Ethnic Cleansing", *RFE/RL Research Report*, Number: 199, 15 October 1993

¹²⁸ The war between Abkhaz-Georgia causes complaints about human rights. The reason of the support of ethnic of Abkhaz 270.000 people who have origin of Georgia gave up their upper class and begun new lives in poor conditions. In 1994, it was declared a peaceful life for these people far from danger by the help of Russia, Georgia, Abkhazia, and UNHCR. But the government of Abkhaz didn't accept this decision and prevented these people's returns. 30-35.000 refugees settled the region of Southern Gali until 1999. Although there are operations of Abkhazia and Georgia Military organization, the action of return continues.

Under the supervision of the UN on December 1st 1993, meetings in Geneva between Georgia and Abkhazia resulted positively. The two countries accepted there would be cease-fire in the area, that they would accept the international peace power and that it would exchange prisoners of war mutually and enable refugees to return to their homes.

Where Russians were the most in January 13, 1994, Georgians and Abkhazians reached an agreement to locate peace power. Meetings took 5 months and reached an agreement with the negotiation signed in May 14, 1994. And it was decided to locate CIS peace power in the two 12 km. wide sides of Inquri River between Georgia and Abkhazia, though the Georgian protested Shevardnadze declared that if he had rejected this negotiation, he would have accepted war. As result, in April 4, 1994, four negotiations¹²⁹ Abkhazia and Georgia and the declaration about criteria is very important improvement for the solution of the problem. The early of July, before Russian Peace Power finished the mission, The Georgian and the Abkhazian explained not to use power to each other.

The UN, many states and international organization were interested in the subject closely. The USA is one of these. In April 8, 1997, in Strasbourg, she made a meeting with the states about Transcaucasia attacks. Russia and Turkey, interested in closely, joined this meeting too. Abkhazia and Karabagh took in the meeting place special. It was demanded that 1976 Helsinki Voucher and 1990 Paris Condition were interviewed about political order and supported a huge autonomy.

In 23-25 June 1998, in Geneva under the leadership the UN, as a result of second meeting between the two sides, dated the Tiflis declaration August 14, 1997, was accepted and it should stopped to attack obstructed peace and divide country. It should be obtained confidence, good intention environment and stability. Power should not be used to solve problems. Russia joined the negotiations as a facilitator in The UN General Secretary's Friends Group. These group members were the USA,

¹²⁹ An agreement that allows refugees and people to return their homeland, which were taken apart from their land, is signed.

France, England and Germany.¹³⁰ Upon this, the Representative of the UN General Secretariat convened the 6th Corporation Meeting of Abkhazia and Georgia as an extraordinary meeting on 17.12.1998 in order to restart the peace negotiations. The refugee issue had created a problem as well.

The Friends of the UN General Secretariat Group organized a meeting in which Abkhaz and Georgian authorities participated in Istanbul between 7-9 June 1999. In this meeting, which was convened by the initiative and invitation of Turkey, efforts were made with regards to dealing with the measures that may increase mutual reliance between the countrys' delegations and these studies were executed within the framework of three working groups. The first group discussed the political and security issues while the second group discussed the return of refuges and economical matters while the third group discussed the social and humanitarian issues.¹³¹

Turkey wanted to reflect its interest in this issue and the positive views of the parties towards Turkey to the world public opinion by organizing the Istanbul Meeting. The positive responses of both Georgian and Abkhaz parties are the best indicators of this. Turkey approaches the issue from both views. Firstly, that this problem in Georgia should be amicably be solved in a way that acceptable to both parties through dialogue which will resolve an important conflict in its neighboring country. Secondly, it is the fact that the solution of every problem in the Caucasus, which is a country faced wars because of ethical or other reasons, will be a good example for others.

Today, Abkhazia still stresses its will for independence and continues in its struggle for this despite not being recognized as a State. Even though Shevardnadze, has much critics, he is seen as "the best of the worst" by the Abkhazians and it is thought that the experienced leader is following positive and constructive politics.

¹³⁰ "Abhazya İhtilafı Konusunda Not", *Dışişleri Güncesi*, July 1999, p: 32

¹³¹ "Abhazya Sorununun Çözümü Yolunda İstanbul' da Düzenlenen Toplantıyla İlgili Bilgi Notu", *Dışişleri Güncesi*, July 1999, p: 47

Moreover, Abkhazians think that peace can only be achieved when Shevardnadze is in power. Armenians, living in Abkhazia, who were in a mode against the Abkhazians before, Armenia, then called the Armenians in Abkhazia to defend their territory.

Where the present Abkhazia issue stands, an important part of the Georgian public is grieving inside when they see that the cited territory nearly falls into “lost” territory by tearing it away from Georgia and observe the situation of Abkhazian refugees. Thus they believe that a large second military operation shall be carried out in order to seize Abkhazia for their national pride. If Shevardnadze, the Georgian leader, foresees that Russia will not support the Abkhazians and there may be success in such military action, he certainly will not hold back from such military action by inciting the ashes of the war of 1992. The administrators of the country do not believe that the Abkhazia issue will be solved without solving the economical problems and establishing equal relations with Russia and their endeavors for the continuance of the foreign support which would only be for their favor. Furthermore, it is a known fact that they work for to continue the existence of RF in the region, as the benefits of Abkhazians and RF are matched and to continue the dissented the Abkhaz activities.

Russia, which keeps the Caucasus in its hand by the “divide and control” policy for years, thus, determines the political geography of Caucasus again in accordance to its will. Abkhazians, willingly or unwillingly, were used as instruments in the realization of the big wills of Russia regarding Trans-Caucasus. Therefore, it is required to think the issue not only as “Georgian-Abkhazian” conflict but also within the frame of the “expansion” policy of Russia. Such preference will not be appropriate, when taking into account that the citizens of both nations are living in Turkey. The coastal line between the Ukraine and Abkhazia does not satisfy Russia; therefore Abkhazia becomes strategically important for it.¹³²

¹³² Çandar, Cengiz, *Sabah Newspaper*, 02.10.1993, İstanbul

Russia, aims to regain a status for its benefit in Caucasus after the collapse of the Soviet, therefore the politically depressed Azerbaijan and Georgia, as two rebellious countries of the Caucasus, with respective strategic points in Caucasus; Karabagh and Abkhazia were its point for control which paralleled its benefits. When taking the demographical facts into account, it is impossible for the Abkhazians to keep Abkhazia in their control without exterior assistance. Anyhow, most of the Abkhaz administrators who are conscious of that fact, want to join Russia in that sense.¹³³

The effect of the Armenians and Russians whom each almost have the same population rate with Abkhazia should not be ignored. Moreover, the Russian and Armenian components may pacify the Abkhazians, like Russia and Armenia, which are allies as States. As far as is understood, the ethnic element in Abkhazia is a cover that Russia uses to tear Abkhazia away from Georgia. It is obvious from the past, that the Russians are not “friends of the Abkhazians”. It is open to discussion whether Abkhazians will achieve “cultural, economical and political independence”, while under the effect of Russian.

Historically, the material separation of Abkhazia, which belongs to the Abkhazians but which is currently undergoing some conflicts with regards to the demographical structure today with Georgia and the shunning of Russian influence by Abkhazia, has caused the political weakening of Georgia and has not guaranteed the future of the Abkhazians in Abkhazia. When considering the issue globally, the Abkhazians and the Georgians were seriously damaged by the war but Russia gained a strategic stronghold in the end.

The Abkhazia issue, which still remains unsolved, is a problem that Georgia shall deal with by with priority in the near future. The solution of this issue will determine the political future and position of both Georgia and the Southern

¹³³ Kohen, Sami, *Milliyet Newspaper*, 29.10.1993, İstanbul

Caucasus. For the future, the Georgian-Abkhazian political population fields in Caucasus are indexed mostly on the Abkhazia issue.

The war in Abkhazia was the indicator of official and semi-official politics of Turkey with regards to the Caucasus. Although Georgian-Turkish relations are important for Turkey with regards to many sides, Turkey was closely interested in the Abkhazia issue, which Georgia is very sensitive to. The existence of Abkhazian citizens in Turkey, besides the citizens of other Caucasus nations, caused Turkey to immediately and very carefully follow the events taking place in Abkhazia and apart from the official approach of Turkey different reactions were observed in the public. There is an aim to support the independence struggle of Abkhazia on the one hand and to advance the relations with the Georgian Government on the other. The first of these practices was carried out officially and semi-officially and the latterer was pursued officially. Therefore the Abkhazia issue becomes an important subject for Turkey in a strategical sense.

It was necessary to consider the Trans-Caucasus as a whole with regards to the Turkish foreign policy. The economical and political relations with Georgia are very important for our relations for the region, although Abkhazia is also important in the relations with Georgia. Turkey wants to advance its relations with Georgia in every aspect and Georgia wants to use an opening apart from Russia and act as a bridge to West. Despite its importance, in its negotiation with Georgia, Turkey emphasizes that it approaches the Abkhazia issue sensitively and wants to solve the issue with peace and satisfy both sides within the frame of territorial unification. To begin with, Turkey may perhaps not have been able to implement this active policy as expected. However, the indefiniteness in Georgia and other developments in the region have played a role, besides the careful and cautious policy of Turkey. Turkey, has experienced the fruits of its cautious policy and both parties have now accepted Turkey as a country that they can trust.

3 – 1 – 2 THE ISSUE OF SOUTH OSSETIA

The region, which is known as Samhret Ossetia in the Georgian language, covers an area of 3900 km² at the south foot of the Great Caucasus Mountains and its capital is Şinvali. South Ossetia, which is dependent upon Georgia as an autonomous region, has a population of 125000 whose 66.4 % is formed by Ossetias and 28.8 % by ¹³⁴ Russians.¹³⁵

The ancestors of Ossetians are Alons who were exiled from Don Basin to the Caucasus in 2nd century A.D. joining Iber – Caucasus there. After the Hun’s raids, Alans scattered to different places. Alans, who were living between the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea, became Christian with the effect of the Byzantine Empire in 10th century. Arabs and other historians talk about Ossetias in much of their works. As a race, Ossetians belong to the Iranian race group, so Russians call them “Yasi”.

Ossetians, who speak the Hint – Europe language of the North Caucasus Nations and who are mostly Christian, have strategic importance because they control the Daryal Pass, on the Caucasus Mountings Range. Although Islam was powerful in 17th century, Ossetians kept their Christian faith and religion was an important way to become close especially with Georgians. Close relationships between Georgians and Ossetians continued for a long time From XVIII century onwards, they began to move south. In 1774, the Küçük Kaynarca Agreement was the turning point for Ossets – Russia who took control of the region, began to control the Caucasus ways by building Vladikaukaz. In 19th century, it went under the control of Russia and after this period Ossetias became the most reliable all of Russia in the region. On June 8th 1920, in South Ossetia, Soviet dominance was announced.

¹³⁴ Keesing’s, Volume: 45, No: October 1999; *Dışişleri Güncesi*, October 1999, p: 217

¹³⁵ *Rusya Federasyonu’ndaki Gelişmeler, Etkileri ve Türkiye*, p: 180

After the confusing period between 1918 and 1922, South Ossetia gained its independence in Georgia in 1922.¹³⁶

During the Soviet period, between South and North Ossetia a planned distinction was made. First of all, both Ossetia regions gave up the Latin alphabet and North Ossetia began to use the Kirilic alphabet. In such a situation, Georgia wanted to control South Ossetia strictly.

Under the pressure of the Soviet period, Ossetians began to be involved with “Perestroika” which Gorbacov had initiated and in 1986 “Citizen Forum” was formed there. In the period of Alan Sosiev who was the first General Secretary of the Forum, not anticommunist the on Anti Georgian approach was shown, so first sign of separation was given, with those efforts: organized activities gained speed and in the spring of 1989 the “Ossetia Citizen Side” was founded. This activity explained to have supported the Abkhaz motion despite the reaction Georgia would give.

In the same year, Georgia followed harsh politics to obstruct separatist activities and for this it was accepted that the only official language was the Georgian language in the country. This decision meant to illustrate that Russian was of secondary importance. Naturally after this event ethnic groups protested in the whole of Georgia. After the Abkhazians, Ossets also protested in the capital, Şinvali. Ossetia demanded their regional independence statue to change into independence republic from Georgian Parliament, but this wish was rejected because it was contrary to the constitution.¹³⁷

The Georgian Parliament in 1990 announced that the laws accepted during the Soviet term from 1921 were not valid. For Ossetia this meant that their

¹³⁶ Stefanos Yerasimos: (Translated by Şirin Tekeli), “*Milliyetler ve Sınırlar Balkanlar, Kafkasya ve Ortadoğu*”, İletişim Publications, October 1994, İstanbul p: 433; Yvonne Bangert, “Güney Osetya Anlaşmazlığı”, *Kafkasya Yazıları*, Volume: 4, Summer 1998, p: 77

¹³⁷ Yavuz Gökalp Yıldız, “Kafkas Toplularının Siyasi ve Ekonomik Yapıları ve Gelişmeleri ile Bunlar Üzerinde Güç ve Rekabet Mücadeleleri ve Türkiye’nin İzlemesi Öngörülen Politikalar ve Etkinlikler”, *Kafkaslar, Ortadoğu ve Avrasya Perspektifinde Türkiye’nin Önemi Sempozyumu 28-29 Nisan 1998*, İstanbul, Harp Akademileri Basımevi, 1998, p: 141

autonomous status would be endangered. After this decision, they worked towards becoming an autonomous republic dependent on Russia. In September 1990 the South Ossetia Democrat Soviet Republic was announced and Torez Kulumbekov won the election held in December 9, 1990. After the election the autonomous status of Ossetia was abolished and the region was divided into two as Şinvali and Cava. This event meant announcement of war against Ossetia. Gorbacov, who did not interfere much, before informed that the decision of Georgia was not right and it had to be corrected.¹³⁸

6 January 1991 was the beginning of the war when Georgian forces with 6000 persons entered Şinval. Gomsahurdiya wanted to take the region under his control but he could not succeed in this. Ossetia, then became organized and formed some kind of militia forces. The Ossetia leader Kulumbekov was jailed by trickery of Georgian but this did not stop Ossetia¹³⁹ and Kociev took his place. They rejected the proposals of Ossetia for solution, as they were illegal and illogical. Ossetia, during Gorbacov's period, wanted their constitutional rights to be preserved, however they did get a result. After Boris Yeltsin became the President, Ossetia demanded again that South Ossetia be bound to Russia. Ossetia went to a referendum in 1992 for their wishes to be legal, but Georgian did not care about this.

Referring to North Ossetia, they followed very cautious politics. They stated that the connection of South and North Ossetia was a matter for Georgia and Russia, the border was recognized and both of the countries were members of the EU. With the continuing of this Utterance, North Ossetia followed a politics suited with the conjecture. They connected with Georgia, observed the balances of Russia and cared for a regional relationship.

After the Gamsahurdiya term, Shevardnadze became leader and this become a positive step, in finding a solution. However, the inner balance of Georgia, the

¹³⁸ Stefanos Yerasimos, 1994, p: 89

¹³⁹ Kulumbekov was taken as a slave after he accepted Georgian's demand of peace treat.

wishes of the people supporting the army for protect their status and other political reasons obstructed the solution and the fighting continued.

While discussions between the sides were continuing at different levels, Ossetia declared its independence on 29th May 1992. In the end, it made a decisions about cease fires under the supervision of Russia and it formed a peace corps consisting of three countries. This Peace Corps consisted of Russia, Georgia, and North Ossetia.¹⁴⁰ The former Soviet Union president Ludwig Chibirov, who showed a biased moderate policy in relations with Georgia, won the relations being held in South Ossetia in 1996 and became the president, the government of Georgia refused to acknowledge these elections by declarating them illegal.¹⁴¹

On 9th of January 1999, the Minister Vazha Lortkipanidze, on behalf of Georgia negotiated with the South Ossetia Prime Minister Çibirov and in that negotiation;an ideal exchange for economic cooperation possibilities was created in order to strengthen the memorandum in 1996 between Georgia and South Ossetia. After the negotiation, Shevardnadze defined it as advantageous. After such a positive step, an election period was experienced just like the election period in 1996, and Parliament elections took place in South Ossetia on 12th May 1999. After this kind of election, the Communist Party won the election taking 39 % of the votes.

Nowadays, the South Ossetia problem is still seen as faraway from a solution. The southern Ossetians have claimed that Georgia provokes the clash with an aggressive nationalist policy. However, Georgians have sustained their insistent attitude that the southern Ossetians have no historical and legal principle to have a status in Georgia. Georgians remind the Soviet Government on order to break the authority of Georgian government over its landforms South Ossetia autonomy constituted in Kartli being historical Georgian lands.

¹⁴⁰ Felix Corley, "South Ossetia between Gamsahurdia and Gorbachev: three documents", *Central Asian Survey*, No: 16, 1997, p: 270

¹⁴¹ Svante E. Cornell, "Religion as a factor in Caucasian Conflicts", *Civil Wars*, Vol.: 1, No: 3, Autumn 1998, p: 53; Yvonne Bangert, "Güney Osetya Anlaşmazlığı", *Kafkasya Yazıları*, Vol.: 4, Summer 1998, p: 63

The Georgian government states that the southern Ossetians biggest privilege, will be its cultural autonomy. South Ossetia insists on its demands for its autonomy. The peace atmosphere, which was provided by the Peace Corps works in south Ossetia, still continue. While the Georgian government accepts that total freedom was given in economic and cultural points and much electricity has been provided, South Ossetia authorities demand insistently that the Confederation of Caucasian Mountain People should participate in negotiations and the agreement should be guaranteed by Turkey, Iran, and the Russian federation. In addition to this the negotiations between Russia and Georgia about determining new borders in a way that the sides related to the region will accept, have still continued for years and there is no hope of any solution in the near future.. So many answers to questions have still sustained their uncertainty such as how to provide an improvement after the lost situation in Ossetia, whether there will be a peace treaty between the sides or not, what will be the Ossetia's statue, how to sustain the relations between the sides.¹⁴²

Ossetians in Georgia outside South Ossetia, who intensify from this region to Tiflis, maybe dragged in an adventure most of them did not want to be part of. In this context, Russians desire to take Georgia under their control according to its benefits in the region and its geo-strategic aims and after this making use of South Ossetia card against the Georgian government, were effective. Russia's biased approached in its interference in Georgia's internal affairs although it is an independent country and its audacity to have an opinion in South Ossetia, have important roles in events going out of control and reaching the state of civil war.

South Ossetia going under the control of Russia in the state of unity with the north, in contrast to breaking and weakening of the unity of Georgia, will cause to increase of Russia's efficiency in the Caucasians. Yet it is impossible, this situation will cause new problems in Caucasia. In addition, South Ossetia cannot dismiss the Georgian population, which is 29 % in its territories because today Georgians also

¹⁴² Keesing's, Volume: 45, No: 1, January 1999, p: 42952

have the right to ask for the same rights that Ossetians wanted from Georgians in the Ossetia Republic likely to be established.

When the union, that the southern Ossetia has desired for a long time with North Ossetia, becomes realised let us see what the situation will be:

The area of united Ossetia is 11 000 km², also its population is 731.428. However, the most impressive feature is that the proportion of the Ossetians will be 56 % in this population and in the future Ossetians have to give the rights that they want from others to the other nations living in their republic. Additionally, it has been forgotten that there is not a complete similarity between the Northland Southern Ossetian in views of cultural aspect. A complete similarity can not be expected from the nations where there are Caucasian mountains in between. So the Ossetia Union, which they dream about, is far from being a political unit because of both its locality and its geographical and anthropological aspects.

Caucasians complicated ethnic origin threaten Caucasian countries from the political unity point of view. However, when we look at the recent history, we see that a divided Caucasia is under the effect and the control of Russia. Therefore, a union with minimum cooperation in Caucasia, intensifies the political independence on Georgia just like in other countries. It is impossible to form a country having ethnic stability in Caucasian political unity having looked for a democratic government type by giving cultural freedom to the present minority.

A probable border variation will be an important danger for Georgia although silence is dominant in South Ossetia, that continues to cause serious problems, which need to be solved. But it should not be forgotten that Georgia's north border is the least altered one along with the history and this border is drawn almost naturally with the Caucasia mountains chains.

3 – 2 - ASSUMING STABILITY IN GEORGIA

Georgia, being one of the three independent South Caucasus countries, has the characteristic of a door or a bridge between the east and the west since it has borders with the Black sea, Turkey, Russia, Azerbaijan, and The Republic of Armenia. Besides, it is located where the Christian and Muslim worlds intersect. After Georgia gained its freedom, the Abkhazia and South Ossetia problems were the sensitive issues of this country's security and its independence. However, the border zone with Chechnya and southwest Georgia, which Armenians are densely populated in, have been the sensitive issues of the country since 1999.

Georgia, which has assured its political stability, with a powerful economy and whose foreign trade with Turkey shows continual progress, gives equal living rights especially to those citizens whose ethnic origins are Turkish as with other Georgians citizens. It is capable of fulfilling its duty as a bridge in providing a constant connection with Turkey, Azerbaijan and Middle Asia governments for eastern countries by playing the buffer zone between Russia and Turkey. Based on this foundation by supporting Georgia's existence in south Caucasia and giving priority to this country in bilateral relations in the fields of politics, military and economy, it can reinforce Turkey's regional security policy about Caucasia.

Georgia with its geo-strategic location and with an attitude of the Western supporter forms the most important ring of the "Strategic Obstruction" chain which extends from Russia to Iran and can be used to hinder the influence of the West over Caucasia and Middle Asia as Turkey does and which can be constituted by the Iran-Armenia-Russia Federation.

Georgia is important for Turkey not only for dissembling the strategic obstruction but also for pushing Russia with it features as a buffer region to the north of Caucasia and the support of a policy which renounces an enemy against Turkey by isolating the Armenian region.

It is thought that Georgia, by getting rid of the effect of the Russian government, by becoming independent and taking place in the eastern system may be fundamental in Turkey's benefits realization in Caucasia and in providing regional influence with Azerbaijan.

While Georgia, very important for the stability in Caucasian, is considering Turkey as its door opening to the east, Turkey is considering Georgia as its door opening to the Middle Asia. In the comments about Georgia, forming of a stable construction in Georgia, conserving its country integrity because of regional security and providing the security of its borders face us very elements about this country's permanence.

When Georgia is examined without considering this evaluation, this picture is formed: When the politics and economy are considered together, in Republics crime rate declines but investment increase. In light of these parameters, Georgia is the healthiest of the three Caucasia countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia) and it is clear that it can deal with the natural role of being the region's activity center.

When Georgia's present situation and its potential are regarded, although there are positive signs that the country will be the center for activities in South Caucasia in future, it can be said that the Georgian government is in difficulty in protecting the unity of the land of the country against the separatist actions which are against the country's unity and which are the extension of the instable structure from the foundation of Georgia till present. Therefore, the future of Georgia has been formed according to the assuring stability, which is a basic for the peoples' solidarity and unity and taking positive steps to protect the country's unity. In this context, for reinforcing Georgia's freedom and dominance, Turkey's support and help could be appropriate.

CONCLUSION

Turkish foreign policy has a two-fold character: 1) it has a variety of approaches towards different regions, governments, organizations, events and people; and 2) its practices sometimes resemble, sometimes are different and sometimes completely against each other. It is important to pay attention to Turkey's politics in regions like the Balkans, Middle East, Europe USA, middle Asia, or Transcaucasia; to the structure of these regions, to their inner dynamics, to the situation of conjecture, and to possible relations those regions can have with Turkey. However, any success or failure of Turkish policy towards a region affects all its other relations and politics.

Turkey's Transcaucasia politics and middle Asia politics that had thought with Transcaucasia politics are applications towards new areas occurring after the breaking up the USSR make Turkey gain a big right ascension opportunity. Turkey, having a effective position in the Balkans, in Middle East and in Islam world, is becoming a powerful and an accepted government also in the new regions, the Turks and Muslims take place Turkey's politics against these regions consisting of countries that newly come out to the international arena and Turkey's relation with these regions had really related with so many dimensions of its foreign politics and can be determinative.

While Transcaucasia is being evaluated, regarding Turkish foreign politics, it should be known that; political, economic, and strategic benefits are uneasy. Because of that, big forces that fight for being dominant, must not be ignored.

So, if we evaluate this subject in terms of Turkey- the USA relationship, while Turkey is trying to strengthen the idea of "vital country" towards the USA and

come to a more important situation, the USA is trying to strengthen its power and its existence in this region by using Turkey, to weaken the countries that are against it or that are enemies in its own region, to use one of the region, which has the richest energy resources of the world, according to its benefits.

Another important dimension that should be considered is undoubtedly the relation with Europe. In terms of Europe, one of the regions seen uncertain is Transcaucasia. European countries and organizations closely deal with developments in this country. They supply investment opportunities to regional countries for progress; support them to pass to a democratic system, make important negotiations about politics and economy. In such a situation, Turkey's importance in terms of regional point is understood by European governments. Turkey's accepted existence in Transcaucasia undoubtedly makes a difference in European countries' thoughts towards Turkey, Turkey can have a role as a bridge, from the European point of view, in the relations with the region that become an important bazaar in trade and investment. Oil and natural gas richness cause European companies, like the US' counterparts, to take part on this region and to make investments.

Turkey, which is powerful in its region, effective, and enhances the stability, cannot be ignored by Europe. For the 21st century Silk Road, Turkey is the door to Europe and the starting point of this road. A Silk Road without Turkey or relations with the region rejecting Turkey will never be easy. As in the relations with USA, Transcaucasia-region also creates new dimensions and approaches to the point of views of each other.

It is understood that relations with the region in terms of Turkey's foreign politics are important not only for general foreign politics but also in view of mutual relations. Transcaucasia is not only a new but also an important opportunity for Turkey. This region, which has historical, cultural, and religious relations, caused new things. Future of a region with this kind of location is extremely important for Turkey in terms of strategic point. In this situation, creating scenarios about futures of external and internal actors dealing with this region and adapting attitude

according to this, will be the important things that should be observed. Future situations of countries of region, political inclinations and regional and international relations are essential topics that should be considered in determining Turkey's foreign policy.

Georgia, which has the most colorful mosaic in terms of ethnicity, faces really important political and economic problems. Aliyev, in Azerbaijan as Shevardnadze in Georgia, works very hard to solve problems in the country by the help of his experience. A lot of ethnic groups, which Georgia clashes with, defend that solution can only be achieved in the Shevardnadze period. After Shevardnadze, sustaining present structure in Georgia will be really difficult. What kind of a government model can be sustained in the future, whether there will be separation or not, whether a federal or nonfederal structure can be chosen or not in Georgia which has separated regions such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Acaria are the questions that everyone wonders about as well as their answers.

Georgia has a key role in Transcaucasia peace and stability and it is impossible to assure the stability in the region without solving the problems in the country. Turkey-Transcaucasia relations are very important not only in view of regional politics but also in view of general foreign politics.

Therefore, the politics that Turkey can apply towards Georgia and South Caucasia, can be carried out systematically by considering all probabilities and regional balance. In addition, it should be done according to Turkey's regional right and benefits.

In Transcaucasia which is Turkey's door to Middle Asia, a strategy, based on applying peace and stability, making those permanent by economic development and ease, strengthening these countries' sovereignty and independence, helping to be assumed democracy and free marketing economy and developing the relations based on equality, should be followed.

- ❖ Struggling for creating “mutual dependence” in a view of economy, communication networks, energy lines and transportation ways between countries of the region and between Turkey and these countries,
- ❖ Struggling for establishing regional cooperation by preventing polarizations because of regional disagreements,
- ❖ Supporting solutions of problems at first unity of lands which prevent the stability of region such as Upper Montenegrin, Abkhazia, South Ossetia in the frame of basic criteria which are dominant in international relations and with the usage of international platforms which Turkey will also take part in,
- ❖ Decreasing the military presence and effectiveness of Russian federation in this region as far as possible and making this region emulate to cooperation for stability and ease,
- ❖ Widening and Strengthening the cultural existence of Turkey in Transcaucasia

Basic policies to be followed;

- ❖ Supplying the continuity of Turkey’s initiative in Caucasian Stability Pact, which aims Transcaucasian regional peace, contributing to its improvement and prosperity,
- ❖ Providing political support to Azerbaijan and Georgia in international field,
- ❖ Taking care of Azerbaijan’s legal benefits in the solution of Karabagh problem,
- ❖ Helping Trancaucasia countries to make their presence accepted in international organizations and platforms,
- ❖ Following Russia and Iran as two important countries of region closely in order to affect Transcaucasia, taking care of Turkey’s cooperation opportunities and also trying to decrease these countries politics and military effects on Caucasia to minimum,

- ❖ Keeping away from military enterprises that would provoke Russia while at the same time helping Georgia and Azerbaijan to reach military efficiency to provide their security,
- ❖ Running the present bilateral political information mechanisms, as well as developing such mechanism trilaterally between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia,
- ❖ Keeping enterprises that strengthen their regime continue without interfering Azerbaijan's and Georgia's internal affairs,
- ❖ Realization of Kars-Tiflis railway that facilities Turkey's taking part in Eurasia transportation and communication passages modernization of Batum airport, Sarp-Hopo-Trabzon highway, running the Childir Aktash bordergate projects.
- ❖ Causing Armenia to try to imitate Russia for getting rid of its political and military dependence.
- ❖ Developing foreign relations of the regional countries with NATO and sustain active role that Turkey has in participation of Partnership for Peace's activities,
- ❖ Causing Georgian governments to try to provide easy turning back of Meskhetian Turks who had forced to move from Georgia in Stalin period.
- ❖ Benefiting from cooperation opportunities in the frame of Black sea Economic Cooperation Organization for strengthening Turkey's economic relations,
- ❖ Regarding Armenia as an alternative that occur to be depending on long term developments in view of Turkey's expansion to Middle Asia,

Transcaucasia region provided an extremely important expansion for Turkey although it had serious problems, there was the possibility of new conflicts, it was difficult to assure the stability in short term and regions internal and external balances are difficult. Turkey has to do serious research into this region which has both opportunities and dangers and evaluate relations between Turkey and Georgia

under the light of all these developments and evaluations. Mustafa Kemal's historical sayings, which are basic for the relations of two countries, will be enough: "The thing that connects us with Georgia is not only sympathy but also having aims at the same time. We have a powerful Caucasia and we need Georgia, which is the most important nation to be powerful in Caucasia. We need a powerful and independent Georgia. We should struggle with Georgia for independence of other countries in Caucasia." Obligation of cooperation stemming from this geopolitical location goes on today's and words mentioned in 1921 has not lost their validity.

Whereas, international politics is a struggle for power after all international relations are not the issue that discipline does not take regard initially and they are not the relations that are between equal and dominant governments, it is the relations between big governments. It can be said that the future of relations between Turkey and Georgia will be determined by the relations formed between Russia and Turkey in a large scale but not by Georgia.

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