

# **RUSSIAN CHALLENGES CONCERNING OTTOMAN BOGHDAN**

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History

By

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*To my family*

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## **AUTHOR DECLARATIONS**

1. The material included in this thesis has not been submitted wholly or in part for any academic award or qualification other than that for which it is now submitted.

2. The program of advanced study of which this thesis is part has consisted of:

i) Research Methods course during the undergraduate study

ii) Examination of several thesis guides of particular universities both in Turkey and abroad as well as a professional book on this subject.

Muhammet Ali Kılıç

September, 2008

## **ABSTRACT**

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**August 2008**

### **RUSSIAN CHALLENGES CONCERNING OTTOMAN BOGH DAN**

The Ottomans and the Russians have been in touch with each other since the fifteenth century. The mood of the relations had altered in accordance with the changing balance of powers. By the eighteenth century, Russian expansion at the expense of the Ottomans was to take place in Boghdan. For the principality, the eighteenth century was a time of occasional Russian invasions and propaganda against Ottoman rule.

In this research, first of all, the controversial status of Boghdan under Ottoman rule is introduced in the first chapter. Then, the second chapter will be dealing with the relations between the Ottoman Empire and the principality of Boghdan from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. Finally, the last chapter is about the challenges that the Russians posed to Ottoman existence in the region.

In doing so, the Archival materials, Ottoman chronicles, foreign travel accounts, and independent works, manuscripts, are employed and evaluated. Rather than suggestions concerning the region and the relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, this thesis will be a descriptive study of the principality of Boghdan and the challenges of Russia.

#### **Key Words:**

Ottoman, Russian, Boghdan, Challenges, Balance of Powers.

## KISA ÖZET

Muhammet Ali KILIÇ

AĞUSTOS 2008

### OSMANLI BOĞDAN'I ÜZERİNE RUS TEHDİTLERİ

Osmanlı Rus ilişkileri 15. yüzyıldan itibaren devam etmektedir. Değişen güç dengesi ile bu ilişkilerin şekli de değişmiştir. 18. yüzyıla gelindiğinde, Rusların artık Boğdan'da Osmanlıların aleyhine genişlemeye başladığı görülüyor. Boğdan beyliği için 18. yüzyıl Rus işgallerinin ve propagandalarının yaşandığı bir dönemdir.

Bu çalışmada, ilk önce, Boğdan'ın Osmanlı idaresindeki tartışmalı statüsü ele alınacaktır. İkinci bölümde ise, Osmanlıların bölgedeki 16. yüzyıldan 18. yüzyıla kadarki yönetimi incelenecektir. Son bölüm ise, Rusların Boğdan'da Osmanlılara karşı mücadeleleri hakkında olacaktır.

Bu çalışmada, Arşiv Malzemelerinin yanı sıra Osmanlı kronikleri yabancı seyahatnameler, yazma eserler kullanılıp değerlendirilmeleri yapılacaktır. Bu tez Osmanlı Rus ilişkileri ve bölge ile alakası bakımından önerilerde bulunmaktan ziyade tasviri bir çalışmadır.

#### **Anahtar Kelimeler:**

Osmanlı, Rus, Boğdan, Mücadele, Güç dengesi

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## INTRODUCTION

The Ottoman Empire and the Russian Tsardom had been among the great powers of Europe until the beginning of the previous century. Although the Ottoman Empire had reached its territorial limits before the rise of Russia, with the Romanov dynasty in the seventeenth century, particularly with the reformations of Peter the Great, the Russians rapidly developed and came to be a major threat to Ottoman existence in the Balkans. The Ottoman principalities of Boghdan and Wallachia were, as immediate neighbors of the Russians, under the sphere of influence of this rising power. The work at question was entitled as “Russian Challenges Concerning to Ottoman Boghdan” because of the fact that concerning to principality the Russians were attacking and the Ottomans were in defense. Because Boghdan was not a regular Ottoman province, it enjoyed a certain amount of autonomy. In the buffer zone the Russian challenges were aiming at power sharing with the Ottomans in the region thus, meddling in Ottoman business.

The present work is an attempt to provide a brief interpretation of the Romanian lands under Ottoman rule and the challenges of Russia there. To this end, first of all, it was attempted to comprehend the status of the Romanian principalities under Ottoman rule. Because of the lack of research in Turkish literature concerning the issue in question, the view that we usually had to depend on was that of English sources, and thanks to the efforts of Romanian historians like Aurel Decei, Viorel Panaite and Mihai Maxim, we have an idea about Ottoman rule in Boghdan. Particularly the book by Viorel Panaite entitled “The Ottoman Law of War and Peace the Ottoman Empire and the Tribute Payers” by Columbia University Press became very useful in this section. Concerning the *ahidnames* given to the voivodes of Boghdan, the copy of the one in a *münşeat* which was discovered by the late

Romanian Ottomanist Aurel Decei in Süleymaniye library was studied and added to the appendix. Besides, the Ottoman collection of diplomatic dispatches in this issue has also benefited in this research. In this way Feridun Bey's Münşeatü's-Selatîn became very useful for our study. After studying the various views concerning to the status of the principality under Ottoman rule, the conclusion was reached that, the abstract discussions are making the issue much more complicated and getting us further away from the reality. To avoid these, concrete relations were taken as the basis or the premises of the relations between the Porte and Boghdan. On the basis of these concrete relations through the book, an attempt was made to draw a picture of it.

The second chapter will be dealing with the history of the principality from its early contacts in early fifteenth century until the early eighteenth century. In this chapter we analyzed the principality and her relations with neighbors, particularly with the Poles, since the Russians were not yet a considerable power in the politics of Europe. In this chapter, the Ottoman chronicles by Selaniki Mehmed Efendi, edited by Mehmet İpşirli, Peçevi and some mühimme registers were used from the Ottoman sources. In this chapter of the thesis, we also examined some voivodes and their changing relations with the Porte. Also, important things concerning the Ottoman attitude to the semi-independent principalities was also studied. From example, the Ottoman intentions of changing these principalities and the reaction to that by the Moldavians and Wallachians were given particular emphasis. Besides the Ottoman policy, concerning the area to the north of Danube and the roles of Boghdan were also examined.

In the final chapter of the thesis, the Phanariot period and the beginning of the Russian challenges with Peter the Great were given particular attention. The importance of Phanariots as the “agents” of the Porte and their reception by the people and nobles of the principality and the changing attitudes of Phanariot princes between the Russians and Ottomans were also examined in this chapter. Besides the military challenges and their consequences for the people of Boghdan as well as the Porte were also studied. The religious tone that the Russians were using since the time of Peter in challenging to the principality was also given special attention. In this chapter, apart from modern sources like ones by Ragsdale Hugh, Akdes Nimet Kurat, and Nicola Iorga, primary sources from the Ottoman archives were used as well.

For studying the history of the Romanian principalities the works in the Turkish language are very insufficient. There is no monograph written on the Ottoman principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. That is why the Turkish language will not reach the expectations of one who wants to do research on this topic. Although the Ottoman archives and the chronicles provide us with very rich knowledge concerning principalities, the lack of an independent work, specifically on the Romanian principalities, makes research harder on this topic. One may only piece together works from different sources about Wallachia and Moldavia in Turkish literature.

In this way some of the valuable manuscripts were found in the Istanbul Nadir Eserler Kütüphanesi and the Süleymaniye Library. These are, “Memleketeyn yani Eflak ve Boghdan Tarihi” and “Vekayi-i Eflak.” Although the former is more about a general history of the memleketeyn, it gives particular emphasis on the relations with Russia. The latter tells us the time of Mihai Racovita of Boghdan in the early eighteenth century. A characteristic of these sources is that both are manuscripts but

translated books into the Ottoman language. Although the former one was cited by Ismail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı the latter has not been used yet.

## CHAPTER 1

### THE STATUS OF BOGH DAN UNDER OTTOMAN RULE

The question about the status of the Romanian principalities under the Ottoman rule has long been a matter of discussion by the historians of this area. It seems that the problem arises from the vagueness of the sources, both verbal and written ones, varying approaches to the primary texts with excessive stress on the conceptual framework, and anachronic assessments of the modern conceptions. The work that has been done on the issue so far endeavors to establish these principalities in a place which should be compatible with Islamic law. Some research even goes further in seeking conformity with *Hanafite* school of thought which the Ottomans followed. These abstract discussions are trying to place the principalities into a legal basis in the Ottoman system. However, *de facto* relations are much more important and definitive than the former ones. So in this section, in introducing the basic characteristics of the Islamic legal context I will go through the core of the relations and the premises they rested on each and try to reach a conclusion

The question of the status of the principalities under the Ottomans has mostly been asked by Romanian historians relying on Ottomans sources. *ahidnames* granted to local *voivodes* and the neighboring states like Poland, Austria etc. are some of the major sources employed exhaustively by the Romanian researchers. The pieces of information taken from the contemporary chronicles and *fetevas*, legal opinions of the *muftis*, are also among the sources used in the determination of the status of the Romanian Principalities. Even with all the abstract divergences in drawing a legal base for the principalities within the Ottoman system all the opinions converge at one point that the characteristics of Ottoman rule in the region was a distinct one contrary to the other parts of the empire. The things happening there about the judicial



position of the both *voivodes* and the people, such as the rights and duties towards the Porte in accordance with the changing circumstances throughout the history, is well-known by the historians. These concrete pieces of information provide much more useful information and therefore struggling in depth with the legal status of the principalities does not mean much for the historian of political relations, apart from the legal ones, since questioning the case laws of the jurists is the job of the latter.

Therefore, avoiding abstract discussions drawing on Islamic *fiqh*, cannon law, and *siyar* books to find a legal basis for the position of these principalities, I am going to deal with more about the solid relations between the suzerain Ottomans and dependent principalities referring to the premises of this relation.

The center of the controversies corresponds to the emergence of the Russians in the frontier as a substantial threat to the Ottoman presence in the area by the late eighteenth century. In the 1772 Focsani negotiations, during the war with the Russians, Romanian boyars in the buffer zone, in seeking more privileges and a better position, saw the victorious Russians as a better alternative to Ottoman rule and wanted to strengthen their position by negotiating with Russia for vassalage. In this case the Romanians anticipated more autonomy from the Russians, and wished existing and continual “old privileges” granted by the Ottomans to themselves.<sup>1</sup> So in settling of problem of their status, the changing balance of power between the Russians and the Ottomans at the expense of the latter had significance. Because the Ottomans were the undisputed major power in the region, Poland, Hungary and Austria could not pose a threat to the Ottoman rule until the rise of the Russians.

The reason why this topic is exhaustively studied by the Romanians has several aspects, one of which is the uncovering of their past position. Building a national

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<sup>1</sup> Sandor Papp, “Eflak ve Boğdan Voyvodalarının Ahidnâmeleri Üzerine Bir İnceleme: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Kuzeybatı Hududundaki Hıristiyan Vassal Ülkeleri”, *Türkler*, (Yeni Türkiye Yayınları: Ankara, 2002) 10: 744.

consciousness as well seems to be effective.<sup>2</sup> Because they were the only country in the Balkans that does not enter under the rule of Ottomans they deservedly take the pride of independence. However, this was not a full independence; rather there was a kind of vassalage relations between the Ottomans and themselves depending on the verbal or written promises. Nonetheless, it was an important phenomenon, for them not to come under the rule of another state and being architect of their own state.

So the question about the status of the Romanian lands under Ottoman rule, taking into consideration their subjugation to the Ottomans seems to be mainly the consequence of its comparison with the other Ottoman provinces both in the Balkans and Arabian African lands. The provinces like Wallachia Moldavia, Transylvania, and Ragusa were not independent from the Ottoman administration. The existence of some unbinding charters for the Ottomans, more precisely the unilateral relations between the parties, are not of so much importance and should not be exaggerated to the point which makes them almost equal partners. Throughout their history under Ottoman rule, excluding the insurmountable reign of the Stefan the Great we see a complete submission them to Ottoman rule.

Since Islamic practice is at the very foundation of the problem, we will take a glance at its application in early Islamic period. We see similar examples of this kind of relation even in the prophet's time. The agreement with the Christians of *Najran* in return for *haradj* has been interpreted as the premise of such application during Ottoman times. Not only had the people of *Najran* but also *Taima*, *Fadak* and *Aliah* submitted to the protection of the Muslim state during the time of the prophet.<sup>3</sup> The Byzantine emperors used to pay tribute to the rulers of the Abbasids, from Mansur and his successors down to Mu'tasim. During the time of Muawiyah the island of

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 745.

<sup>3</sup> Muhammad Hamidullah, *The Muslim Conduct of State* (Lahor: Ashraf Publication, 1953) 559.

Cyprus started to pay a yearly tribute to the Muslims.<sup>4</sup> However the fact that they before were a tributary to the Byzantines too, demonstrates the existence of such relations in the non-islamic state tradition as well. So this practice was not invented by the Ottomans, the similar cases existed during the time of prophet. Some of the characteristics of such states are as follows: they are usually located on the frontiers of Muslim empires, expensive and hard to be governed directly because of the remoteness of the region to the center and neighbors to the non-Muslim states. In the contract with Muawiyah, the people of Cyprus promised to supply information about foreign Byzantine affairs to the Umayyads<sup>5</sup> just as the *Boghdanian voivodes* served to the Ottomans in the same manner. In a hüküm dated 1545, sent to the voivode of Boghdan, the voivode was ordered to spy the surrounding and let it known to sultan.<sup>6</sup> This situation in Boghdan continued until the end of the ottoman rule in the principality.<sup>7</sup>

Throughout Islamic history there have been various systems of state administration and which could be placed in an Islamic context in terms of *sharia* law. Islamic law used to be very flexible and tended to be utilized by the jurists in accordance with the contemporary conditions. So, in terms of the Islamic legal perspective, the status of the principality has been questioned by the historians of this area in depth, and a few conclusions attained by them are as following ones: *Dariü'l-Ahd*, *haracgüzar* Tributary states, and Tributary protected principalities.

Legally the *ahidname* convention is a unilateral grant which has no binding side for the grantor in Ottoman practice. Rather it is binding for the grantees who were in this case the *Boghdanian voivodes*. What is more having a relation with the

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 188.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 100.

<sup>6</sup> Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi, *Mühimme Defteri* Nr.E- 12321, prepared by, Halil Sahillioğlu, (İstanbul: IRCICA, 2002) 357.

<sup>7</sup> Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, (BOA) Hatt-ı Hümayun, (HAT) 40944.

Ottomans based on *ahidname* is not more advantageous to the people of the principality in comparison with the other provinces. Although the Ottomans more often than not conformed with the conditions of the convention it is still a fact that the Ottomans saw these territories of their own as it is evident that they were fighting and loosing soldiers for the protection of them. Nonetheless they did not interfere in their internal affairs.

In terms of *sharia* law basically there are two kinds of lands: *Darü'l- Islam* (House of Islam) where Islam is sovereign and *Darü'l- harb* (House of Infidels) where the Islamic religion be prevailed. Another concept which is not as definite as the others *Daru'l Ahd* (land of the Covenant) is also accepted by some Muslim jurists like Shafii and Yahya b. Adam.<sup>8</sup> However the *hanafite* jurists did not admit such a model. According to *hanafite* scholars there could be no other territory than *Darü'l- Islam* and *Darü'l- harb* and the lands of this kind are the parts of *Darü'l Islam*.<sup>9</sup> *Darü'l-ahd* is a temporary and intermediate territory which entered under Muslim rule not by means of sword or war but in peaceful ways. As recompense of their peaceful submission they are granted an *ahidname* from where the concept *Daru'l- ahd* is inspired. This *ahidname* could be both verbal and written and guaranteed protection and let them take an oath to be loyal to their suzerain. If the people of these lands do not keep their words they were to be punished and be considered as rebels. These territories usually lie between *Daru'l- Islam* and *Daru'l-harb*, and the relations between the sovereign and itself is based on a treaty. We see similar cases throughout Islamic history and these kinds of states are usually located on the frontiers of Muslim states serving as a buffer zone between Muslims and their Christian neighbors. In exchange for their peaceful submission they are set free in

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<sup>8</sup> Halil İnalçık, "Dar al- Ahd", *Encyclopedia of Islam New Edition (EI<sup>2</sup>)* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960) 2:116.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

their internal affairs but are still dependent on their suzerain in return for the payment of *kharadj*.

In Ottoman usage *kharadj* is used for both the land tax and poll tax (*jizyah*).<sup>10</sup> Considering the obligation of *jizyah* paying of the non Muslims as *dhimmis* inside Muslim state this tax could be assumed as a communal *jizyah* tax taken from a certain area under the rule of Muslims. However, in terms of legal perspective, since it is abstruse and controversial among the jurists whether these places are within Muslim state or not it is not so consequential to make such a comment. Because jurists do not unanimously accept such a notion, each comment done on the issue is leftover. Ebu Suud, a prominent *Sheikhu'l-Islam*, scholar and jurist of Kanuni's time, upon the question of the nature of *arazi-i öşri* and *haradji* gives the following answer:

“Eğer hîn-i fetihde kefare elinde iken yerli yerinde mukarrer ediüp arazi kendilerinin mülki olmak üzere ibka ederse ol arazide vaz olunan elbette harac olur öşr almak imkanı yoktur zira öşrde ibadet manası vardır kafirde ona ehliyet yoktur”<sup>11</sup>

After making a distinction between the of *öşri* and *kharadji* lands in terms of *sharia* law he concludes with the statement that it is not *öşri* because in the payment of *öşr* there is a meaning of pray to god but the infidel is not worthy of it. Then he continues about the lands of the Balkans “*Rumelinin amme-i arazisi ne öşridir ne haracidir. Arz-ı memlekettir ki...*”<sup>12</sup> So the privileged positions of Boghdan does not distinguish itself from the other parts of the Balkans since their fief were also considered as their own by the Ottomans. Besides they were also taken as part of *memalik-i mahrusa*. However, it was different from the rest of the Balkan states in that, *timar* system was not applied in the principality. The *haradj* taken from these states during the Ottoman times were of an agreed amount of money paid every year,

<sup>10</sup> Cengiz Orhonlu, “Kharadj” *EF* 4:1054.

<sup>11</sup> Feridun Ahmed Bey, *Münşeatü's Selatin*, (İstanbul: Darü't-tubaati'l-Amire, 1858) II: 313.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 313.

called as *kharadj-ı maktu*. And in the 17<sup>th</sup> centuries over the dispute on the question of the borders, the Ottomans declared their proprietorship of these areas claiming they used to take from them *haradj* as the sultan as well used to call it as his inherited lands, *mülk-i mevrus*.<sup>13</sup>

As for our case, the relations between the Ottoman Empire and Boghdan, what *Daru'l-ahd* meant was not applicable. Although this template has been thought fit by some historians to the case of Boghdan in relation to the Ottoman Empire, we do not see any Ottoman usage of this word for the definition of the position of these principalities.<sup>14</sup> As a matter of fact the state administration in Ottoman times was built upon practical needs rather than in depth calculated sophisticated concepts. In fact the positions of the principalities in the eyes of the Ottomans were not this abstract. The main criterion in the determination of the status of the principalities was the way it was ruled. If it was ruled by a Muslim pasha then it is a regular province otherwise it is not. The only distinction seems to be that in Ottoman mind.

Another significant question has been the existence of an *ahidname* between the Ottomans and Romanian principalities. This question actually could not be solved in Romanian Historiography. According to Dimitri Cantemir this *ahidname* texts existed in the archives of Moldova up until the Karlowitz peace in 1699, when Jean Sobiesky of Poland came and tore down the supposed documents.<sup>15</sup> The only true document is the one which was found by the late Romanian Ottomanist Aurel Decei in Süleymaniye Library in a *münşeat mecmuası*, manuscript composition.<sup>16</sup> The title of the document indicates that it was a *sulhname* of Mehmed II

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<sup>13</sup> Orhonlu, op. cit., 1053.

<sup>14</sup> Viorel Panaite, *The Ottoman Law of War and Peace the Ottoman Empire and the Tribute Payers*, (New York-Boulder: Distributed by Columbia University Press, 2000) 489.

<sup>15</sup> Aurel Decei, "Boğdan" *İslam Ansiklopedisi (İA)* (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1979) 699.

<sup>16</sup> *Münşeat*, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Esad Efendi Bölümü, Nr. 3369.

*BâkaraBoghdan*<sup>17</sup> The document is mainly about the *harac* of Boghdan. Although what conditions prepared ground to this *sulh* is not clear, it is telling us upon the disobedience of the Moldavians, their *harac* was raised to 6.000 *sikke* from 3.000 and the voivode is warned in the traditional manner that they should stay obedient to the Porte by being “enemy of the enemy and friend to friend” (*dosta dost düşmana düşman olup*). Although at the end of the text the word *ahidname* is mentioned there are views that it does not have the features of an usual Ottoman *ahidname*.<sup>18</sup> However, as we mentioned above it is still a controversial issue, whether or not the contemporary understanding of the Ottoman *ahidnames* were binding.

This is the premise of the thesis of the researcher who claims an *ahidname* status for Boghdan. Judging from both sides it does not seem to be exact to say that, even though some of the researchers are favoring the validity of such document and some not, a relation based on *ahidname* had existed in history between the Ottomans and Moldavia. The late Romanian Turkologists like Mihail Guboğlu and Giurescu, although they acknowledged such a treaty relation with the Ottomans they were agreed that these were not bilateral diplomatic relations, but rather they were unilateral because this is what Islamic law requires, granted by the sultan’s favor to the people of the region. The contemporary researcher Mihai Maxim, who has completed thorough studies in the Ottoman archives and Beldiceanu, are in favor of the existence of *ahidnames*. Sandor Papp, in his article after a detailed critique of the issue drawing on both primary and modern sources, comes to the conclusion that there is an *ahidname* but it belongs to the early times and was valid only until the mid 16<sup>th</sup> centuries.<sup>19</sup> So these discussions as to the existence of an *ahidname* given to the voivode of Boghdan are not consequential, they are open to discussion but no

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., folio, 25a.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., folio, 25b.

<sup>19</sup> Papp, op. cit., 751.

attempt so far could satisfactorily answer the question at issue. So what has been done so far on the issues is the use of historical data in the way to establish and strengthen their thesis. It requires further research in the Ottoman Archives to prove something on this question, only the finding of the original document will resolve this problem. However a document in the Prime Ministry Archives tells us about the desire of the Wallachians to have an *ahidname* like the Boghdanians.<sup>20</sup> They were in this demand saying the following.

“*lakin Boğdan voyvodasının elinde ahidname olup bizim elimizde olmayup doğruluğumuz ve hizmetimiz mukabalesinde bize dahi ahidname inayet olunmak rica ederiz*”.<sup>21</sup>

However, it is clear that the ottomans did not see the *ahidname* as a binding deed. Because in the following lines when this demand was presented to the sultan, the vizier says that:

“*Eflak şimdi kemali ubudiyet üzeredir iltimas ettikleri ahidnamenin zararı yok ubudiyette sabit-i kadem olmağa bais olur. Eğer ki hilaf-ı emr-i şerif vaz ederlerse tebdil olunmağa mani olmaz*”.

It seems that although they were prudent in giving such documents they were not considering themselves obliged to or bound with the *ahidname*. However its continuation was on the condition to stay obedient to the sultan.

Concerning the issue, in the eyes of foreign travelers and diplomats this *ahidname* had existed in Ottoman Romanian relations. For example, William Wilkinson an English diplomat in Bucharest in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century depicts the granted privileges as a treaty and lists the articles of it.<sup>22</sup> Although he does not use the word *ahidname*, perhaps because he may not be acquainted with Ottoman terminology, what he says is that it is more than an agreement which is a treaty and binding for both sides, so he also seems to hold the opinion that there existed an

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<sup>20</sup> BOA, Cevdet Hariciye (C.HR) 1390.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> William Wilkinson, *An account of the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia: with various political observations relating to them* (London: Longman Hurst Rees Orme, 1820) 20.



*ahidname*. He said “the same privileges as those of Wallachia were granted to Moldavia” in 1536.<sup>23</sup> Another significant descriptive work on the history of the region belongs to Thomas Thornton. In “*The Present State of Turkey*” he devoted a separate chapter to Moldavia and Wallachia, and in there by referring to Dimitri Cantemir’s *Osman History*, he tells us the famous story of Stephan the great, who on his death bed advises his son to rely on the Ottomans on honorable terms rather than the Poles or the German in order to be able to survive.<sup>24</sup> And he seems not to be interested in the name of the relation between the Ottomans and Moldavia, since his perception was thus “to subject an enemy to the payment of a small sum of money under whatever name.”<sup>25</sup> Thus accurately the author considers the de facto relations much more important than the ones determined by the statue books. We mentioned these three examples as the reflection of historical Western view on the question. As a student of history, one must be cautious in reading and interpreting these documents because extra attention is required for making distinction between the knowledge and information. The reason is that it is a characteristic of the historical accounts of 19<sup>th</sup> century travelers and diplomats to insert their biases into their work. In the service of a state, a consuls work could have some deficiencies though providing very useful information at the same time. That is why we should not approach such documents as absolute sources.

So the articles of the alleged document given to the Boghdan princes are as follows, according to Mihai Maxim.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>24</sup> Thomas Thornton, *The Present State of Turkey; Or A Description of the Ottoman Empire Together with Moldavia and Wallachia* (London: Printed for Joseph Mawman, 1807) 312.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 313.

<sup>26</sup> Mihai Maxim, *Tarile Romane și inalta poarta cadrul juridic al relatiilor Romano-Otomane in evul mediu*, (Bucuresti: Editura Enciclopedica Romana, 1993) 281.

- 1) The preservation of a Christian prince, as ruler, instead of an Ottoman Muslim governor. The prince was to be elected by the country (actually the boyars) from amongst the native princely families who had a right to the throne. The sultan confirmed this election and invested the new prince with the symbols of power.
- 2) The full maintenance of the “rights and privileges” of the country, of the “laws and faith”, in accordance with the “old custom” briefly speaking in modern terms – self government and self administration without any Ottoman interference in internal affairs.
- 3) The payment of tribute and official gifts to the sultan and his dignitaries.
- 4) The prince must “be a friend to the friends and an enemy to the enemies” (*dosta dost düşmana düşman olub*) of the padishah, in other words he had to promote a concerted foreign policy with the Porte as its ally, and to supply intelligence and troops for the Ottoman campaigns in Europe. In return, the Porte had to “defend” and “protect “the principalities from any aggressor.
- 5) The reciprocal protection of merchants, extradition of fugitives and exchange of prisoners.
- 6) The usual local customs regime for Ottoman merchandise and preferential tariffs (a sort of “most favored nation” clause) for Romanian products exported to the Ottoman territories , i.e. 3-4 % *ad valorem*, compared with 5- 5.5% paid by the merchants coming from dar al-harb (Land of War)

These are the alleged privileges to be enjoyed by the Romanian countries in a distinct manner from the other provinces of the empire. So assuming the *ahidname* had really existed, one might think that, according to the conditions of it, the Ottomans and the Romanian principalities had reciprocal relations determined by an official treaty. However this was not so often the case. In the Ottoman documents, both archival and library sources, none mentions the existence of such document. Instead usually they refer to this land as the *mülk-i mevrus* (the land inherited by them) thus of their own, and so on. Putting aside the conceptual basis of the relations, if we examine the de facto relations we are going to see a different picture. So in

such a case there are two possibilities: one is the nonexistence of such a convention and the other one is the Ottoman ignorance or violation of it. Taking a glimpse at the other examples of the tributary principalities within the empire we may have a chance of comparing it and placing it in a better context so that we have a better idea of such kind of rule. From the very beginning of the Ottomans, states like Byzantium (though they did not come under Ottoman rule) (1372-1453), Serbia (1372-1459) Bosnia (1389-1463) Albania (1385-1478) Bulgarian Czarism, The Morean Despotate, North Aegean Islands, Dubrovnik (Ragusa) Transylvania used to pay tribute to the Sublime Port. These places, having both similarities and diversities, could be compared with each other. From among the ones counted above, it was only Dubrovnik and Transylvania that remained in their tributary status. The others, of course, either because of administrative necessities or geographical and strategic significance, were incorporated into the empire's lands or turned into the *pashaliks* (places to be ruled by a Muslim Pasha). However, it is also to be mentioned that the infringement of the *ahid* by the grantees is also a significant cause in their transformation into a *pashalik*. For example, Bulgaria upon the failure of performing its duties lost its status and ended up coming under direct Ottoman rule.<sup>27</sup> Conversely an important city-state on the Adriatic coast which had kept its status in the empire until the end, Dubrovnik, enjoyed a privileged place within the empire in many ways. For example, in business Dubrovnik had "free trade rights" within the empire and shared it with the Venetian and European merchants so that they had the chance to enter to the Ottoman sea carrying the Dubrovnik flag.<sup>28</sup> Relations with Dubrovnik were relatively peaceful and calm when compared to Boghdan. Regretfully we cannot examine the transformation of the each principality into a *pashalik* according

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<sup>27</sup> Panaite, op. cit., 149.

<sup>28</sup> Feridun Emecen, "Haracgüzar" Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi (*DİA*) (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1997) 91.

to the same criterion since each case is distinct and must be treated differently. However, during the time they were a tributary, no intervention took place from the Ottoman side as long as they paid tribute and stayed obedient to the Sublime Porte.

As for our case, Boghdan, we see different phases in terms of legal perspective. The first one is a period of some minor quarrels that occurred between the empire and the Boghdan. It starts from the beginning and ends in 1455. Among the quarrels two are worth of mentioning. The unsuccessful attempt of the Ottomans to besiege Catea Alba Castle (Akkerman) in 1426, which was actually the first confrontation of them, and Alexander Cel Bun's coalition with the Wallachians against Murad II. At this time the Wallachians had already accepted the tribute paying since the 1420s<sup>29</sup>. Both fights resulted in Boghdanian's victory. The second period starts in 1455. This date indicates the Boghdan's submission to Ottoman rule. All the sources unanimously accept that by this date Petru Aron of Boghdan accepted to pay yearly tribute to Mehmed II. This date also signifies the heated debate over the existence of the supposed charter which is lying at the bottom of the disagreement. It is significant to note that by this time Boghdan was simultaneously under Polish Subjugation. Although we see no change in their status there had been frequent battles with the Turks until Kanuni's time. The date 1538 constitutes the ultimate subjugation of the Boghdan to the Ottoman rule after the *sefer-i hümayun* of Kanuni. With a large number of troops he entered Suceva, the capital of Boghdan, with no resistance and took a collective homage paying from the people of Boghdan. Because it was a peaceful entrance, no rules of the conquest like pillaging, annexation and enslavement, were applied to the Boghdan. Instead the Ottomans tried to preserve the *status quo* by levying on them heavier obligations, such as increase in the amount of

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<sup>29</sup> Mihai Maxim, "The Romanian Principalities and the Ottoman Empire, 1400–1878." in Dinu G. Giurescu and S. Fischer-Galati (eds.), *Romania: A Historic Perspective*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) 107.

the *haradj*. After this time, the legal status did not change until the “treason” of Dimitri Cantemir to the Ottomans in 1711, upon which the local voivodes began to be replaced by the Phanariots who were directly appointed from Istanbul. The more centralist Phanariot regime continued until 1821, which marks the end of Phanariot period. Minor changes also took place during the 1774 Kuchuk Kainardji and the 1829 Adrianople treaty giving the Russians some rights over the principality of Boghdan. This system of governance continued until the 1878 Berlin treaty when an independent Romania had recognition by the European powers.

Even with the stable relations there have been some instances that the Ottomans tried to take *memleketeyn* under their direct control. In comparison with Wallachia, the province of Boghdan was somewhat more fortunate than Wallachia because of its remoteness from the center. However, these two usually shared the same destiny as the Sublime Porte implemented a single way of administration to the left bank of the Danube. It is evident from having the same status and obligations respectively. Taking all this into consideration it will not be wrong to point that the attempts of Grand Vizier Sinan Pasha in turning Wallachia into an Ottoman *Pashalık* would soon be prevailed to Boghdan as well. For example, in the year 1004 (1595) Sinan Pasha appointed a *Beylerbeyi* to the “vilayet” of Boghdan<sup>30</sup> which was ruled by the native *hospodars*. However this attempt resulted in disaster and thousands of Muslim soldiers were lost to death in the war, which caused also resulted with the dismissal of Sinan Pasha from tenure. Apart from this, we see some examples to the designs of the ottomans as to the administration of the principality. In and hüküm, dated 1571 the sublime Porte was warning the boyars of the principality not to admit the criminals against the Porte. Otherwise, it was definite that unless they conform to the

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<sup>30</sup> Selaniki Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selaniki* prepared by, Mehmet İpşirli. (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1989) 508.

rules of the Porte, the country would be taken over from them and a Muslim governor was going to be appointed to their rule.<sup>31</sup> So the long-established manner of the Ottoman administration continued in the North of the Danubian basin. However, in Ottoman practice the needs shape the state apparatus. Since it was more proper to rule these principalities it was preferred by the state elites to rule it from the center, giving them a certain degree of autonomy or vassalage. We do not know the exact reasons for choosing such a manner but judging retrospectively some factors might have been thought of by the Ottoman statesmen. It seems that, the first one of them is the economical factors. In the growth period of the empire when the idea of *ghaza* was an influential drive in the conquests the recognition of the enemy Islam's superiority and acceptance of paying tribute would end the war and make them reach one of their greatest aims. In doing so, the newly conquered places needed some state investment for proper administration, such as installation of a garrison and state officials and their provision etc. However, because it was much more costly for the Ottomans to take them under direct administration such a way would have been picked. To this end, for the ottomans, giving them the rights of the *dhimmi* people, in return extracting a yearly tribute, and homage paying to, was much more pleasant administration. Another important factor seems the geographical obstacles; their location in the Trans-Danubian region makes the intervention harder to the frequent rebels. Another important thing as to the preference of granting it a distinct status, is that these principalities posed no strategic significance to the Ottoman Empire in terms of military aims. Because the traditional Ottoman policy was westward, the strong garrisons and stricter administration were founded in the western frontier. By the time Boghdan was conquered there was no considerable threat to Ottoman

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<sup>31</sup> BOA, *Mühimme Defteri (978–979 /1570–1572)* (MHM) published by, Ankara: T.C Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, (Ankara: 1996) 12/246.

supremacy in the region apart from some minor Polish incursions. Austria and Russia did not pose any danger within the century it was taken over. In fact, the Ottomans were dealing with the Polish issue through Hotin castle where the Ottoman administration was strong. As a matter of fact the Ottomans took many important places under their direct rule from the Romanian countries like Dobrudga, Bender, Chilia, Akkerman etc. Another important thing is also the Ottoman intention of using this region in modern terminology, as a buffer zone between their enemies and the Sublime Porte. Such an approach would be a sign of the Ottoman reluctance to expand further north and their satisfaction with their northern border as the Danube. Furthermore, it does not seem correct because even if the Ottomans would not want to make investment in the area, Boghdan was crucial for the provision of the capital Istanbul. Because most of the foodstuffs, *asitane için iktiza eden zehairin ekserisi*, needed in Istanbul were coming from both Boghdan and Wallachia.<sup>32</sup> This continued from the very beginning of the consolidation of ottoman rule in the region until its loss. Even by 1544 the Porte was so much dependent on the provision of Boghdan that the principality had to send 100.000 sheeps to the ottoman capital.<sup>33</sup> With such a dependency over the principality the ottoman consideration of the area a zone half in their hands seem not correct. The claims saying that the Ottomans gave such a position to them because they were suspicious that they could endure their frequent revolts and could not handle their combatant character seems wrong since there were discussions in its full incorporation to the empire lands. Taking everything into account it seems that the form of Ottoman governance in the region was based on administrative needs rather than reciprocal or bilateral treaties. As for the definition of the status of the principality the term *haracgüzar* seems to be more accurate. This

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<sup>32</sup> BOA, Cevdet Belediye, (C.BLD) 417; BOA, Cevdet Askeriye, (C.AS) 18746.

<sup>33</sup> Sahillioğlu, op. cit., 319.

is because it is more comprehensive and gets rid of all the abstract controversies in seeking a legal basis to the principalities, since even if no legal context could be found the notion of administration would not be in practice. So to avoid all other terms *haracgüzar reaya*<sup>34</sup> best suits the purpose if we are to give a definition. As Viorel Panaite, who has done the broadest research on the issue so far expressly says concerning the principalities, the official Ottoman view after Kanuni is of the tribute payers as *haracgüzar* and the protected people as *dhimmi*. As a combination of both notions the term tributary-protected principalities is an appropriate label for the position of the Romanian countries, Wallachia and Moldavia.<sup>35</sup>

In having an idea of what the Ottoman view was about the position of Boghdan as well as Wallachia we should examine the Ottoman sources. In this sense the *vekayiname* literature is very important. Unfortunately, because the events of the years 1455-56 are not written in the published Ottoman chronicles<sup>36</sup> it is hard to find out the events that led to the first submission of the Moldavians to ottoman rule. This is also one of the reasons that why there is so much debate on the issue. Aşıkpaşazade, a contemporary chronicler provides us with valuable information concerning to the relations. According to him there was a relation based on the payment of tribute. In this sense he sees the reason of the imperial campaign conducted by Mehmed II to Boghdan in 1476 as the negligence of the latter in the payment of *haradj*.

Two important causes stand out for the initiation of a sefer-i Hümayun and the declaration of a war. One is the submission to the rule of the Ottomans, implicitly to the representatives of Islam, and the payment of tribute. Submission ensures them

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<sup>34</sup> Aşıkpaşaoğlu Tarihi , prepared by, Hüseyin Nihal Atsız (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1970) 138.

<sup>35</sup> Panaite, op. cit., 492.

<sup>36</sup> Panaite, op. cit., 164.



protection and the right to exist peacefully under the umbrella of Islam as *dhimmi* in return for paying the tribute and being a *haracgüzar*. Besides the tributary status is seen as a kind of proprietorship as the sultan says “*eflak gibi bizim olasun*”. Selaniki, for the late sixteenth century custom, explains that in the appointments of the voivodes conditions like being loyal and sending the tributes on time are among the essential qualities.<sup>37</sup>

Besides, the Ottoman documents concerning to Boghdan affairs could either be the ones directly sent to the native Voivodes or both to the khans of Crimea who are responsible for the security of the region towards the Porte and Poland who were supposed to be an ally with the Porte. In the documents sent to Boghdan the voivodes were referred to with the titles starting *kıdvetü-l ümera-i milletil mesihyye*<sup>38</sup> and go ahead which shows a treatment to the rulers or high officials of a non-Muslim state. In terms of the formula, the traditional pattern starting with prayer and continuing with titles basically emphasizing that the continuation of the good relations are up to their recognition of the superiority of sublime Porte, “*hulus-i fuad ile itaat-u inkıyad*” and the regular payment of the annual tribute. *Haradj*, the most important issue for the Ottomans, which by the seventeenth century rose to “*elli altı kere yüz bün akçe*”. It is interesting to note that the other “items” given to the Beglerbegi of Rumeli and the other state officials as *peskesh* becomes an integral part of the relations between them. Although the Ottomans were raising the amount of the *haradj* and the *peskesh* they were at the same time warning the voivodes not to overstep the lines against his *haracgüzar reayah*. At the end of this formula once again they are admonished to send the tribute on time without fault and be enemy of

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<sup>37</sup> Selaniki, op. cit., 541.

<sup>38</sup> Feridun Bey, op.cit., 13.

the enemy and friend to the friends “*dostuma dost ve düşmanıma düşman ola.*”<sup>39</sup> If he fails to do so he will have the punishment that he deserves. As it is seen in the document concerning to the issue of the legal framework, financial matters are of vital importance with respect to submission to the rule of the Ottomans. What was happening there is that, as long as they paid the tributes and the *peskeshs* on time to the empire and from time to time let it known that they are loyal to the Ottoman rule, the sublime porte did not care much about the issues and problems of this principality.

For the documents sent to the neighboring countries like Austria and particularly to Poland we see the emphasis that Boghdan is considered to be within the *memalik-i mahrusa*, a term usually used for the directly administered parts of the empire. So they are warned that in the case of any incursion or the violation of their rights the Ottomans will handle the situation. The matters in the *ahidnames* sent to the Poles usually cover topics like business, enslavement from the Polish lands, respect to the rights of the people of Boghdan and cooperation in any case if a voivode fled the country. The Poles are also warned like the Boghdaninas to “be enemy of the enemy and friend to the friends” in a similar way.<sup>40</sup> So, being in coalition with them and asking enmity with the enemies is also something sought with the other states as well. Because the Porte was somehow trying to consolidate its rule in the region and did not want any threat its rule in one way or another it aimed at subduing the entities either inside its system or outside of it, thus making sure to suppress any threat to its authority by the time it occurs.

In conclusion, we may say that the status of the principality of Boghdan under Ottoman rule has various aspects and each of these have different interpretations.

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 489.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 514.

Emphasizing the legal side of the formula as the premise of the relations, if there is any, which is yet a topic of discussion and carries a lot of deficiencies takes us further away from the factual circumstances which are much more important. So, avoiding the abstract discussions, but at the same time keeping them in mind in our assessments it is seen that even if there was a charter, whose binding affect is debated, the things which were actually occurring there gives us a better idea of the status of the Boghdan under the Ottoman administration. So the conclusion attained is that, although Boghdan was not ruled in the same manner in comparison with the other Balkan provinces it was considered an integral part of the empire and the people there were enjoying the same privileges with the *jizyah* paying subject. Thus, as they often referred in the Ottoman sources *haracgüzar reayah* under the protection of the Sublime Porte. As Panaite points the most appropriate term for the definition of their status is the tributary-protected principalities.

## CHAPTER 2

### OTTOMAN RULE IN BOGHDAN

#### 2.1 The Establishment of Ottoman Rule in the Principality

The Ottomans crossed Sea of Marmara and achieved the first conquests in the Balkans peninsula in the second half of the fourteenth century. With the victories of Nicopolis (1396) and Kosovo (1386) the Ottoman took control of the major fortifications in the Balkans and East Europe. After the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 the Ottoman presence in the Balkans became even stronger. That is why for the following century we see an increase in Ottoman concern towards the region and establishment of stricter authority. In such a rapid expansion of the Ottomans in the Balkans what had rescued the Romanian lands from Ottoman attacks could be explained by the fact that during the fourteenth century the Romanians had posed no threat to the Ottomans since they were not involved in any attacks against them. In this, the geography of the region seems to have played an important role because the river in the middle served as a natural barrier or natural border between the two sides. As Viorel Panaite argued, during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the river Danube was a border line which separated the house of Islam (*Daru'l- Islam*) from the house of War (*Daru'l-Harb*).<sup>41</sup> Since most of the conquests in the Balkans were realized on horseback and the Ottomans did not cross the river Danube both sides did not have any chance to encounter each other.

The initial contacts started through a conflict which occurred during the time towards the end of the reign of Mehmed I (Çelebi). After the eleven year of interregnum which halted the growth of the state and caused a partition in the lands among the heirs of the throne, Mehmed Çelebi succeeded in subjugating all of his

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<sup>41</sup> Panaite, op. cit., 84.

rivals. His term was a rebirth of the Ottomans and a turning point in course of becoming an empire. The political instability within the empire caused by the interregnum, the (Şehzades) like Musa Çelebi and False Mustafa, or the Sheikh Bedreddin events were backed by the neighboring province of Walachia.<sup>42</sup> Towards the end of his reign, he entered into the Wallachia and conquered some of the strong forts there. The strong fortifications of Giurgiu and Dobrudga, on the left bank of Danube, were taken under direct Ottoman control and a Muslim pasha was appointed as their ruler. One of the major consequences of this campaign is the beginning of the tradition which later turned into a rule in the relations with the Romanian principalities. That is the homage paying and yearly tribute payment.<sup>43</sup> This custom was first implemented in Wallachia, because of its geographical proximity to the Ottomans, and then Boghdan was also subjected to the same practice.

In the meantime the Moldavians were motivated against the Porte though there were no solid relations yet. So the beginning of relations was to be in a hostile manner. The Moldavians were forced into cooperation with their previous suzerains, the Hungarians and Poles. In the case of a Turkish incursion to their territories, which would more likely happen with the Hungarians, or the other way around, in both cases, the Moldavians would offer their best against the Turks.<sup>44</sup> Otherwise their homeland would be partitioned by their overlords. Under these conditions the Moldavians gave allegiance to the Poles by 1402.<sup>45</sup> Under pressure of the two rebutting major powers surrounding their homeland, the Moldavians had to demonstrate a hostile attitude towards the Ottomans. Meanwhile, already subduing the Wallachians, the Turkish advance further to the north continued and resulted in

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<sup>42</sup> Caroline Finkel, *Rüyadan imparatorluğa Osmanlı: Osmanlı imparatorluğunun öyküsü 1300–1923*, trans. Zülal Kılıç (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2007) 32.

<sup>44</sup> Decei, op. cit., 698.

<sup>45</sup> Charles King, *The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2000) 14.

the siege of the Akkerman (Catatea Alba) fortress which is on the right bank of the Dniester (Turla) river which was one of the most important harbor cities in the region, where commerce improved very much. The Ottoman siege of the city resulted in failure. The Moldavian Voivode Alexander el Bun successfully defended the castle and pushed the Ottoman troops back.<sup>46</sup> By 1430s again Alexander el Bun achieved another victory against the Ottomans in 1431. These two events were of no great significance for the Ottomans. The aim of the Ottoman campaign was just to explore the region and get acquainted with the Moldavians. At the same time the combatant character and ability of the Moldavians was well known to all. So, upon the two rebuffs, the Ottomans became more and more interested in this area.

During the reign of Mehmed II, (1451-1481) a substantial change took place in the relations with the Danubian principalities. After the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, Mehmed wished for a full submission from the Balkan states, most of which at the time at least partly accepted Ottoman suzerainty. The constant battles in the Balkans were aimed at bringing these states under firmer Ottoman control. The final evolution of the borders in the Balkans as well as in the northern Black Sea region was realized during his reign. In fact it was during his time that an Ottoman state policy concerning the Black Sea began to emerge.<sup>47</sup>

Mehmed II wanted the Black Sea to be a lake for his newly emerging empire and mostly realized this during his lifetime. To this end, first of all he aimed at the integration of the major forts into his empire. In doing so, he took over the key commercial and strategic centers on the Black Sea littoral from the Genoese, like the ones on the southern shores of Crimea, Kaffa and Azov. Kaffa was the most dynamic

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<sup>46</sup> Panaite, op.cit., 68.

<sup>47</sup> Karl Kortepeter, "The Black Sea Region in the Sixteenth Century", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 86 (2) (1966) 88.

commercial center in the region.<sup>48</sup> The gradual take over of these seaports on the northern shores was the first result of Mehmed II's Black Sea policy and the beginning of Ottoman presence in the region. Thus the Ottoman authority began to be felt closely in the neighboring places such as the Crimean Khanate, Poland and the Romanian Principalities. Taking full control of the Black Sea region under Ottoman control however would not be realized until Bayezid II's reign, with the conquest of Chilia and Akkerman in 1484.

In securing the Black Sea ports and Polish borders Mehmed II began to deal with the Moldavian affairs. The conquest of Constantinople played a significant role in the fate of this place because it gave him the chance to incorporate new lands into his empire and consolidate his power over the ones already in his hands. In this way one of the first targets to be achieved by Mehmed II was the capturing of the last Christian outpost left over in the Balkans, Moldavia. As we mentioned, the Principality above was under the strong influence of the Hungarians and the Poles. Particularly the Poles were claiming right over the Moldavians. That is why it was a source of conflict between the Ottomans and the Poles. However the Polish suzerainty over the principality dates back to an earlier age. In 1387 the Moldavian prince Peter I paid homage to the Poles, who one year before began to be ruled by the same dynasty as the Lithuanians, the Jagellions, and accepted their suzerainty.<sup>49</sup> Mehmed II, on his way to conquer the city of Belgrade, made the Moldavians pay tribute. So in 1455, Petru Aron of Moldavia accepted Ottoman suzerainty and paid yearly tribute to the Porte. The amount of the *haradj* (*haraciu* in Romanian language which is likely derived from Turkish) was 2000 thousand gold ducats to be paid each year. The Logofet Mihul (vice president) brought the *haradj* to the Sultan on behalf

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<sup>48</sup> Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations (15th-18th Century): An Annotated Edition of Ahidnames and other Documents* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000) 99.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 99.

of the Voivode Petru Aron. This event marks the beginning of Moldavia as a vassal state to the Porte as well as the conflict with the Poles over these territories. Because no other Voivode in history was involved in such a suzerain and vassal relation with the Ottomans, Petru Aron was not welcomed by the public. What the dilemma of this homage paying and the subsequent quarrels resulted in was that when coming to the throne Petru confirmed the old privileges given by his predecessors to the Poles by taking an oath of vassalage to King Kasimir IV of Poland. However, Petru justified his submission to the Ottoman sultan by stating that, “We were not in a position to defend ourselves and were helpless and lacked enough soldiers.”<sup>50</sup> The conditions that required this mutual contract have not yet been understood according to Aurel Decei, the late Roman Ottomanist.<sup>51</sup> One of the reasons, according to Viorel Panaite, for the darkness as to on which conditions the first payment of tribute happened could be that, “the events of 1455 and 1456 were not registered in the Ottoman chronicles, at least by those published so far.”<sup>52</sup> As for the autochthonous view the Moldavian chronicles did not pay much attention and considered it as a decisive political action and sufficed to note the payment of the *haradj*. In quotation of Grigore Ureche, “This Petru was the first who devised and began to pay tax to the Turks.”<sup>53</sup>

## **2.2 Stefan the Great and the Ottomans: A Period of Struggle**

With the enthronement of Stefan Çel Mare (1457-1504) the relations of the Moldavians with the Ottomans as well as other neighboring states totally changed. Stefan wanted independence for his country and tried to cut off all the binding arrangements with the other states. To this end he spent his life on battle fields taking

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<sup>50</sup> Decei, op. cit., 698.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Panaite, op. cit., 164.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 165.



part in 36 battles and being winner in most of them. Moldavian attitude towards the Ottomans at the beginning did not change. Invented by his uncle, the tribute continued to be paid regularly by Stefan el Mare and it was even increased to 3000 ducats in the early years of his reign.<sup>54</sup> After a fifteen year break, Mehmed asked him to bring the *haradj* personally. However, Stefan did not bring the tribute. Ottoman chronicler Aşıkpaşazade noted this event in the following lines:<sup>55</sup>

*“Padişah ki bütün kafir beğlerinin illerini ve kendilerini hak teala ona itaat ettirdi, Kara Buğdanın tekfiriniü kapıya çağırdılar: ‘Busefer haracın sen kendin getir. Netekim Eflak ili kendi getirir. Eflak gibi bizim olasın ve bizimle Münasebetin ne suretledir bilelim’ dediler. Bu söz ile kafire haber gönderdiler. Kafir gelmedi ve asla itibar dahi etmedi.*

The infidel refused to pay the tribute and did not even care about it. Some of the war prisoners who were taken from Kaffa on the way to Istanbul found refuge in Moldavia. When asked to deliver these prisoners to the Porte, Stefan did not accept it either. What is more, he entered in the Wallachian territories whose integration to the empire after the long rebel of Vlad Tepes (Impaler) became very difficult. The Wallachians were much more obedient to the Porte. This incursion into the rather peaceful places tightened relations. The Ottomans asked for an explanation of this and wanted reparations from Stefan. As he never cared the sultan, also the double suzerainty problem arose as well. Poland intervened in Ottoman affairs and put forward the idea of a joint commission to rate the compensation question in addition to advising him not intervene with her vassal on his own. The fact that, Mehmed saw himself as the absolute ruler of the Balkans and the Black Sea made him decide to take action and send his forces into Moldavia. Besieging the city of Işkodra in Albania, Hadım Suleiman Pasha and his troops were directed to Moldavia. Mehmed was to join him soon with his army, prepared in Istanbul. However, because of his

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Aşıkpaşaoğlu, op. cit., 137.

illness he could not depart from Istanbul. And already exhausted with the long siege of Işkodra, Hadım Suleiman had to fight with limited soldiers against Stefan. The Wallachians did not take an active part in the battle either. So, the encounter of Hadım Suleiman and Stefan Çel Mare in Rakovitza became a disaster for the Ottoman forces. Stefan with the help of Jagellonian and Hungarian troops routed the Turks that even Suleiman barely saved himself on the battlefield. The Turkish defeat was applauded in Europe and Stefan was given the title “Athleta Christi” by the pope. This victory over the Turks at the battle of Vaslui is considered to be the greatest victory ever secured by the Cross against Islam.<sup>56</sup> The reasons of this defeat were the coming winter, because the season was not suitable for a war, Mehmed’s not being able to take part in the battlefield with his soldiers, and the absence of the Wallachians in the fight.

After this decisive victory over the Turks, Stefan knew that Mehmed II would soon come personally to Moldavia for revenge. However, on the way to win independence he already broke ties with the Hungarians as well as the Poles, two protector states. After rising to power, being aware of Hungarian interests in Moldavia and Wallachia, Stefan made war with the Hungarians and took the Danubian forts of Chilia and Braila in 1467.<sup>57</sup> Proud of his victory over the Hungarians and not trusting the Poles, he wanted to benefit from the rich custom revenues from Chilia and Braila. However this interest was conflicting with that of Mehmed II.’s. In the meantime, completing his operation in Crimea, Mehmed decided to initiate an imperial campaign to Moldavia. On the way to Moldavia he met the Polish envoy who tried to dissuade the sultan, but Mehmed did not listen. He

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<sup>56</sup> Nevill Forbes, Arnold J. Toynbee, D. Mitrany, D.G. Hogarth. “The Balkans A History Of Bulgaria--Serbia--Greece--Rumania—Turkey,” *The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Balkans*, 03 June 2008 <<http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/11676>>

<sup>57</sup> Kortepeter, op. cit., 91.

was determined to accomplish his task on the western Black Sea. Although he could not get the expected help from the Crimeans at the head of his army he entered Moldavia with his army and chased Stefan the Great. Stefan did not dare to encounter Mehmed and ruined the places burnt the grain and food that Mehmed may have found and benefited from while chasing him.<sup>58</sup> This chase lasted a long time. Finally Mehmed caught his forces in Valea Alba (Akdere) and crushed the Moldavian army in 1476. Stefan fled the battlefield and could not be found. Suceva, the capital of the Moldavians, was sacked by the Turkish soldiers, but the Castle could not be taken.<sup>59</sup> As a matter of fact it was not the aim for this campaign, the real target which was the security of the Black Sea for Ottoman favor was achieved. Mehmed II had to leave Boghdan without accomplishing his ideas because of the newly emerging threat on the western front which was the Hungarian attack to Semendire. This defeat really shook the prestige of Stefan.

For the conquest of the Moldavian controlled cities Chilia and Akkerman, the Ottomans were to wait for Bayezit II. When he came to the throne, one of his first actions, actually his first imperial campaign was against the Moldavians. Stefan, making use of the change in the Ottoman throne, the Cem Sultan event, and the problems on the southern border with the Mamlukids, entered Wallachia and caused serious disturbances. Then, after passing through Danube he extended his raids into immediate Ottoman territories. Bayezit, who wanted to put an end to the struggle with Stefan, who had been in struggle with the Ottomans for a long time, decided to take an action. The territorial integrity with the Crimean khanate was also influential in launching this campaign. It was to be the second imperial campaign against Boghdan. In case of a possible Hungarian attack from west, as happened to Mehmed,

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<sup>58</sup> Selahattin Tansel, *Osmanlı kaynaklarına Göre Fatih Sultan Mehmed'in Siyasi ve Askeri Faaliyeti* (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1971) 225.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 227.

Bayezit fortified the castles on the Hungarian side, and gave orders to the Khan of Crimea, Mengli Giray to lead his army against Moldavia from the east. Bayezid, with his forces along the Black Sea coast, seized the most important stronghold on the Danube, the Chilia Fort. In the meantime, as he continued to march further north to take another important stronghold on the Black Sea littoral, the sultan gave orders to Mihaloğlu Ali beg and the Crimean khan to make incursions into the Moldavian capital, Suceva and find Stefan. Mengli Giray and his large number of troops plundered the city of Suceva and took lots of booty. Then they met with the Sultan on the siege of Akkerman. The joint Ottoman Crimean forces made the resistance impossible and took the castle. As a reward for the participation in the Ottoman campaign Mengli Giray managed to extend his rule to the Bessarabian towns of Balta, Kavshan and Tombasar and thus became much more tied to the Ottomans.<sup>60</sup> So the entire coast on the northwestern Black Sea was taken under Ottoman control and the Polish threat to the Black Sea was secured.

An important result of this campaign became the inclusion of two significant cities, one being at the mouth of the Danube and the other one on the Dniester river (Turla) into Ottoman system. The territorial connection with the Crimean khanate became easier. Unlike the other parts of the Romanian principalities the cities of Chilia and Akkerman, which were commercially very much developed and strategically situated at crucial places for the security of the western Black Sea, with this conquest, became an integral part of Ottoman administrative system. Departing from Istanbul upon a conflict with Stefan and directing his attention to a totally irrelevant place, Bayezit with this action proved the fact that he was thinking about the security of the Black Sea and of controlling the commercial activities of primary

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<sup>60</sup> Alan W. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, (California: Hoover Press, 1978) 15.

importance rather than the payment of tribute by Stefan el Mare. This fact is evident from the words of Bayezit II who by this victory claimed to have, “won the key of the door to all Moldavia and Hungary, the whole region of the Danube, Poland, Russia and Tatory and the entire coast of the Black Sea”.<sup>61</sup> A similar comment was grievously made by Stefan el Mare describing these two cities as equivalent to the entire Moldavia and a Moldavia united with these two cities as a wall for the security of Hungary and Poland.<sup>62</sup> So he tried to display how important their presence was there in terms of the security the Poles and Hungarians, thus the whole Christian world. In behaving so and using a religious jargon, knowing very well the wishes of the Hungarians and Poles and having no ally in the region to safeguard his territories, Stefan aimed at preventing any Christian assault into his territories. Finding no help from the Christian world and the attempts to take over these fortresses proved hopeless for Stefan and the cities remained in Ottoman hands.

The newly conquered Ottoman cities of Akkerman and Chilia, because they were commercial places, harbored several different ethnicities like Russians, Poles, Hungarians, Armenians etc. and had a great deal of wealth. The booties captured from these cities were made use of in the foundation of some religious and social complexes in Edirne.<sup>63</sup> And also some of the wealthy families from both cities were deported and sent to Anatolia. Particularly for Akkerman it has been said that some thousands of families<sup>64</sup> were taken as prisoners and sent to Istanbul to live there. The place they were given later came to be called the Akkerman quarter. Countless prisoners of war were taken from these cities, some of which were located in the anakkale, Biga district. Akkerman already having a Muslim neighborhood, if only a

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<sup>61</sup> Kortpeter, op. cit., 92.

<sup>62</sup> Decei, op. cit., 699.

<sup>63</sup> İsmail Hakkı Uzunarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi: XVIII. Yüzyıl* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 1959) 4: 182.

small one, by these population changes and conversions of the churches into mosques etc. underwent a demographic change and ended up becoming an Islamic Ottoman city.

A major consequence of this campaign for Moldavians became that, first of all, Stefan lost his rising charm as a leader who is challenging as well as successfully defending his homeland against his aggressive neighbors. After the route before Crimean and Turkish troops, he once again accepted the payment of tribute to the Porte and paid homage to Bayezit. Though remained on his throne, this time he lost the control and benefit of commercial revenue coming from two harbor cities Chilia and Akkerman. Besides losing the control of huge custom revenues, at the same time, by the loss of these cities because the Moldavian ties were cut off from Black Sea they were also deprived of having the benefits of easy access to the seas and became more dependent on the Ottomans. Also the Cossack raids which were a serious threat to Black Sea commerce were taken under control by these conquests.

Nevertheless, Stefan paid homage once again to the Poles as a reaction to the capture of these cities by the Ottomans. However King Kazimir of the Poles wanted to place his son John Albert to the throne of Moldavia. Taking advantage of this, the Poles contentedly became involved in the affairs on Moldavia and tried to negotiate with the sultan. Because the Ottomans were consolidating their presence in the region through several imperial campaigns and the Crimean khanate's military actions on behalf of them, such as the several incursions to the Polish territories and the turning of Ruthenia into shambles, the Poles did not dare to have a confrontation with them in the region, and they concluded a peace agreement in 1489. Nonetheless the Polish wishes over Moldavia did not diminish. With the enthronement of John Albert the same policies were followed as those of his father. Albert asked for

alliance from Stefan against the Ottomans but Stefan fearing that his country would be a battlefield in the middle between the Ottomans and Poles refused Albert's offer.<sup>65</sup> However, the Polish attack to the Ottomans in the region started in 1497. He was aware of his wishes for Moldavia. That is why in the beginning he pretended to be an ally to Albert against the Ottomans; however with the arrival of Ottoman forces he sided with the Ottomans and the Polish army in Suceva was routed by the joint attacks.<sup>66</sup> Having a big defeat in Moldavia, the Poles for a long time afterwards had to delay their plans concerning to the region. Until Bayezit's reign Boghdan remained loyal to the Ottoman Empire. However it was Stefan the Great that loomed large in the reigns of two successive Ottoman sultans, Mehmet II and Bayezit II.

Stefan el Mare, known to his people as the "Great", "Saint" "Athleta Christi" etc. is undoubtedly the most important figure in the entire Moldavian history, and also the one who resisted the belligerent neighbors heroically. He is also the one, contrary to the leaders of the other Balkan states became bothersome and a serious obstacle to further developments in the policies of the sultans likes Mehmed II and Bayezit II. For Mehmed II's time two figures stand out in the Balkans their resisting and not accepting Ottoman authority and succeeding so, Alexander the Castriot of the Albanians in the west and Stefan el Mare of Moldavians in the North. These two could be compared to each other for being on the frontiers of the empire and being in *Serhad boyu* the place over which the Ottoman authority to be prevailed. Except for a short period of time, Stefan did not paid homage to Mehmed II and ruled his country independently. An ambitious man, Stefan deposed Petru, who by killing his father captured the throne and became the first Moldavian voivode to accept Ottoman authority, and came to the throne with full support from both John

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<sup>65</sup> Standford Shaw, Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977) 74.

<sup>66</sup> Kolodziejczyk, op.cit., 111.

Hunyadi of Hungary and the Wallachian Voivode who was his cousin as well, the notorious Vlad Tepes, the Impaler.<sup>67</sup> Although Vlad's help in installing Stefan to the throne of Moldavia is undeniable, he did not come to his aid while he was imprisoned by the Hungarians and left him to die.<sup>68</sup> Full support from both sides at Ottoman expense brought him to the Moldavian throne. Stefan, contrary to his predecessor Petru, adopted a hostile attitude to the Ottomans and on every occasion aimed at preventing Ottoman extension further north. In doing so, he used to launch frequent incursion into the immediate Wallachian territories, particularly after the death of Vlad Tepes. What is more, he was most of the time collaborating with the Christian neighboring states like Poland and Hungary against the Ottomans. His victory over Hadım Süleyman Pasha in 1475 at Vaslui is well known, after which battle he was awarded by the Pope Sixtus IV with the title of "Athlete Christi". This crusade was organized with the leadership of the Papacy and joined by the states of Poland, Hungary and Venice. Stefan willingly joined this anti-Ottoman coalition and ruined a large number of Ottoman troops at Vaslui which caused an imperial campaign by Mehmed II. Although Stefan wanted to pursue this anti-Ottoman Christian coalition he could not find any help from his neighbors, Poland and Hungary, whose aim, on the contrary, was the annexation of Moldavia. Soon realizing that, Stefan demonstrated the same hostile attitude to Poland and Hungary as well. Among his crushing victories over Hungary could be counted the one against the Matthias Corvinus at the battle of Baia in 1467. This victory gave him a reputation in the region. As for the Poles he ruined John Albert's troops in 1497 and proved his power.

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<sup>67</sup> Randal H. Munsen, "Stephen the Great: Leadership and Patronage on the Fifteenth Century Ottoman Frontier," *East European Quarterly*, 39 (3) (2005) 273.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 275.



Being a saintly, figure in Moldavian history Stefan wanted to contribute to the religious lives of his people. In this respect he built many Monasteries all over the Moldavian territories. As for the monasteries, thirty-four out of Thirty six against the Islamic Ottomans, as well as for victories against the Christian Poles and the Hungarians, for each one he built one monastery, some of which are among the finest architectural monuments in Europe.<sup>69</sup> His patronage over these monasteries continued until the end of his life and this has caused him to be mentioned even today as the saint prince of Moldavia.

As for the relations with the bordering states Stefan was very cautious. First of all, already being traumatized with the homicide of his father who was a previous Moldavian Voivode, in the struggle for power at the hands of the Poles, he was aware of the fact that had should be very careful with the Poles. Although he paid homage to the Poles and let them to see himself sharing the same values and same religion, he was aware of the fact that the Poles actually were not friends, but the enemies like the Ottomans. In fact, the Poles were of Catholic faith and the Moldavians were of Orthodox. In relation with the Moldavians the Poles were interested in securing their southern border, exploiting huge custom revenues from the Moldavian harbors and applying authority to a certain extent. Another aim of the Poles was not to have a direct confrontation with the rapidly rising Ottomans. That is why they would be content with at least having the Moldavians in the middle preventing a direct encounter in the buffer zone.

Because Stefan knew that he was not strong enough to survive on his own in the region he sometimes turned to the Polish side and sometimes to the Ottomans and Hungarians. For example, although he was formally dependent on the Poles as well

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid., 285.

as on the Ottomans in an Ottoman Polish quarrel in 1497 in Moldavia, contrary to his promise to the Polish king he cooperated with the Ottoman army against John Albert and caused a serious defeat of the Poles who broke their promise of help to Stefan many times. The religious differences and the same kind of wishes of the Hungarians were understood by Stefan the great as well. The Hungarians were also of Catholic religion and their aim was also to preserve Moldavia as a buffer state under their control. Finding no help from either side in his fight against the Turks, Stefan was stuck among the powers which more or less had the same aim; preserving the unity of the country and in part remotely controlling it in safeguarding their borders from the bigger threats. For the sake of prevention of bigger confrontation, all of the surrounding states wanted Moldavia as a buffer zone in between. That is why no big power struggle has been witnessed over these territories except the one in 1475, as a missile against the Ottoman domination of Black Sea. Since the big states of Europe had comparatively little concern to the region, Stefan could resist and challenges to them. This made him a great man in Moldavian history. This intervention so much bothered Stefan that through the end of his life he expressed his sorrow. As Georescu very well describes Stefan was aware of the designs of his Christian neighbors. “In times of need they always turned to Buda and Krakow for help, although often fearing that their allies only wanted to take the Turks’ place” and he goes ahead with the words of grief of Stefan the Great “In these parts only I am left, for on two sides there is deep paganism and on the other three sides are those who call themselves Christians but who treat me worse than pagans”.<sup>70</sup>

Having been treated in a hostile manner by his neighbors, Stefan had the best relations with the Russians who claimed to be the center of the Orthodox world after

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 277.

the fall of Constantinople and shared the same religion with the Moldavians. Whether this was influential in his approaching to the Russia or not, it was a fact that Russia was in no position to offer help to the Moldavians. The reason was that the scattered Russian principalities were very much disturbed by the Golden horde and the Poles. Even if the Russians were in a position to help the Moldavians just because of sharing same religion they would have probably preferred not to get involve in such an action because in this case they would come face to face with the Ottomans and the Poles. However Stefan through marriage alliances wanted to establish some connections with the Russians. For instance he had married a Kievan princess named Evdochia in 1463. The daughter that came out of this marriage, Helena, had also been engaged to the son of Ivan III,<sup>71</sup> who is known as Ivan the great of the Russians, since he gathered the small Russian principalities together and played an important role in the union of the Russians. Thus Stefan achieved the establishment of good relations with a growing empire in the north. However, as mentioned before, these all proved fruitless for his country because he could not obtain any considerable help in return. Stefan also wanted to strengthen his relations with the Russians by placing the Ukrainians on the surroundings of the Moldavian capital, Suceva. This settlement resulted in an increase of Russian cultural influence in the principality so that the Ukrainians came to represent two percent of the population of the capital.<sup>72</sup>

To sum up, Stefan (1457-1504) who reigned in Moldavia for forty seven years, ruled and defended his country from foreigners very successfully. He was unfortunate that his reign coincided with the conflicting interests of big powers over his country and more importantly with an enormous Ottoman expansion northward.

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 278.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

That is to say he had to stand up on the one hand to growing Ottoman expansionism and on the other hand to the Poles and Hungarians with limited means. However he managed to get rid of all the dangers coming from outside and in those times he understood that it was indispensable to escape from any domination. He chose to be a realist diplomat and paid homage to Poland and the Ottomans at some times and at other times crushed their forces on his own. That the fact he achieved big victories against foreign powers, winning thirty four of thirty six battles proves that he was a good warrior and unlike anyone else in Moldavian history, the fact that he managed to survive and rule over his country for forty seven years also proves how talented a diplomat he was. However through the end of his life he understood that his country would not survive on its own and on his deathbed called to his son, Boghdan, and told him the entire situation in detail and advised him to submit to the Turks on honorary terms.

“Hence on his deathbed Stephen instructed his son to come to terms with the neighboring power least likely to disturb the traditional social order of Moldavia.. with the Turks, whose religious tolerance and more egalitarian policy threatened Orthodoxy and patriarchal tribalism of Moldavia less than Catholic or Aristocratic Poland or Hungary would have done” (quoted from Spector, 1971 p. 52 in EEQ, p. 278.)

“Turkish people are more tactful and powerful, and he cannot rule his country with his sword”<sup>73</sup>

Although his advice was partly taken by his son, Boghdan, Stefan was right in his judgment to which he reached after forty-seven years of quarreling with each of these countries. The Turks truly had not made any intervention to the autonomous character of the country nor to their religion which is confirmed by leading Romanian Ottomanist like Nicola Jorga, Giurescu and others as well.

After Stefan’s death the relations went on smoothly until the reign of Petru Rareș (IV) He reigned in Moldavia in two separate periods. His first tenure was

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<sup>73</sup> Mihail Guboğlu, “Kanuni Sultan Süleyman’ın Boğdan Seferi ve Zaferi (1538 M.=945 H.),” *Bellekten*, 50 (198) (1986) 746.

between 1527 and 1538 when the relations were hostile with the Ottomans. In the second reign of Petru, which was between 1541 and 1546, we witness a totally different picture when he ascends to throne with the approval of *Kanuni*, Suleiman the Lawgiver and warms up the relations by recognizing Ottomans suzerainty. It was in this three year break of his rule when Petru was a fugitive in Transylvania that Stefan Locust was placed on the throne of Moldavia by Suleiman the Lawgiver and the final submission of the principality to the Ottoman rule was realized in 1538.

### **2.3 Consolidation of Ottoman Rule in the Principality**

Petru, an illegitimate son of Stefan Çel Mare, was a very ambitious and influential figure. He was involved in various actions independent from the Ottomans. He wanted to have his independence and rule his country on his own.<sup>74</sup> However this was a problem for the Ottomans who claimed suzerainty over the region. In this way, he had to manage well calculated relations with his neighbors who had expansionist policies over his country as well as with the Ottomans. On the one hand he tried not to anger the Porte, and on the other hand he acted in the manner that an independent ruler does. He was very careful with the Porte he used to pay the *haradj* in its exact amount, on time and tried to seem obedient. On the other hand, in securing the western border he annexed a part of Transylvania which had recognized Ottoman suzerainty after the crushing victory over the Hungarians in Mohac, in 1526, obviously with no permission from the Porte. What is more, even through these times when the Ottoman had better relations with the Poles, he collaborated with Muscovy to attack them and conquered Pokkutya, in southern Poland. His frequent incursions were contrary to the agreement with the Poles. His refusal of sending troops in helping Suleiman's army towards Bosnia and not paying the *haradj*

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 748.

after the campaign to Baghdad, and the arising rumors concerning his secret alliances with the Hungarians which were usually true, were unacceptable to a suzerain. Besides the *boyars* were not happy or content with his rule because of his toughness and cruelty and many times petitioned to Kanuni for his change.

All the things mentioned above and perhaps more, caused an imperial campaign to Moldavia. This was to be Suleiman's eighth imperial campaign, *sefer-i hümayun*, and later it came to be called "*Gazayı Kara Boghdan*". When he departed from Istanbul with his army it was very well understood that this was a serious campaign, but no one knew where they were going for war. The European states too were worried if the campaign was led against themselves. It was in Edirne that the Sultan announced that the campaign was against KaraBoghdan. This campaign could be depicted intending to be the final settling of the accounts with the Moldavians. Comparatively uncertain situation of the Moldavians within the Ottoman system and the varying level of the dependencies with the changes of the voivodes necessitated the establishment of stronger ties with the Moldavians and persuaded them to that they were a *tabi* of the Ottomans. Kanuni achieved that target. Prior to the campaign he sent orders to the khanate of Crimea to join with his troops and to the governors on his way to take the necessary measures. When Petru heard that this campaign was to be conducted against himself he immediately left Suceva and fled to Hungary. Kanuni with his large army had difficulties in passing the Danubian River and gave orders for the construction of a new bridge there. After visiting the tomb of the famous Turkish *sufi*, Sarı Saltuk and asking for help he entered Moldavia.<sup>75</sup>

It is controversial that whether Boghdan submitted to Ottoman rule voluntarily or by the force of sword. The importance of the way of submission is

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<sup>75</sup> Matrakçı Nasuh, *Fetihname-i Karaboğdan*, (Topkapı Sarayı Kütüphanesi Revan 1284/2'de kayıtlı nüshanın CD'sidir, 971/1564) folio 111b.

coming from *Sheriâ*, Islamic law according to Viorel Panaite. Because, for Islamic law the conquest by sword gives the right to the conqueror to determine the legal condition of the region and the population unilaterally, although Abu Hanifa objects to this and considers the way of submission not important. Because according to Abu Hanifa the reason for a war was to break the superiority and the resistance of enemy. If this could be achieved without war then no need to fight. In such cases there takes place some agreements with the enemy.<sup>76</sup> The different views in the Ottoman chronicles as to whether it was a willing submission or not was not taken into consideration in the organization of the affairs in the region unilaterally by the Ottomans. It seems that the differences in the texts do not mean difference in the opinions. One historian's different sayings in different works could either be the signs of carelessness or his giving no significance to the situation. So the arguments come to the point of whether the Ottomans had the right, clearly in terms of Islamic law, in imposing some regulations unilaterally to Boghdan or not. Assuming Boghdan surrendered without resistance it is still debatable if it was a willing submission or not since the presence of a very well equipped huge army ready for war in the middle of the capital. Not being able to challenge such an enormous army, does not mean a voluntary submission. This was not of significance for the Ottomans Sultans. It can be argued that they were bothering to think of such details in the rush to prepare for such big operations. Actually, as Islamic law is very flexible because it provides the *mujtahid* with a huge space for making comments and lets them to issue *fetwas*, the Sultan did not care so much while he was acting.

Suleiman came to the Moldavian capital Suceva, where he faced no resistance by the Moldavians. In the meantime Crimean forces after ruining another important

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<sup>76</sup> Ahmed Özel, *İslam Hukukunda Ülke Kavramı Darülislam Darulharb*, (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1998)

city, Jassy, came to the aid of Suleiman with a large amount of soldiers. No war happened in Suceva between the Ottoman and Moldavian forces. That is because the Moldavians with correct judgment did not dare to fight against such a devastating army. Matrakçı Nasuh, who accompanied the Sultan in the campaign, said that the castle was taken without war *sulh*, “*Dergâh-ı alempenahtan eman taleb ettiler şükânê-i kudret olduğuna binanen kaleye eman verildi*”<sup>77</sup> After the delivery of the keys and treasury of the castle by the boyars to Suleiman, he gave orders to find Petru, but he already escaped towards Transylvania and could not be found. Kanuni stayed there for five days and after settling the things he left the city and turned back to Istanbul.

As a result of this campaign the Ottomans had a lot of achievements from the region. The most important of them as mentioned above became the breaking up of a century long Moldavian resistance and recognition of continuous Ottoman suzerainty over their country. This was what could not be achieved since Mehmed II's times and bothered the empire. Another important thing was that the northern border of the empire became more definite with the annexation of strategically important places between Dniester and Prut. And a castle was built there both for the safety of Ottoman territories and its vassals in the south and for a possible campaign to further north, such as to Poland or the Ukrainian Cossacks. These include the fortified city of Bender, Tighinia, on right bank of the Dniester (Turla) River, and the southern Bessarabia, Bucak. Particularly with the annexation of Bucak the only connection of the Moldavians to the Black Sea was cut off and the entire western Black Sea littoral was added into Ottoman territories. Two important castles were built on these territories. Besides the measurement taken for the safety of the region, from then on, it was made a condition to the voviodes to bring the tribute every other year

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<sup>77</sup> Nasuh, op. cit., folio 118a.



personally to Istanbul. All of these things were ratified with a treaty and the problems on the northern vassals of the Ottomans even not finished to a certain extent were fixed and a tradition was established by Kanuni.<sup>78</sup> Finally it can be said that the most important fruit of this campaign to the Ottomans became the Moldavian admission of allegiance, and the realization that the Ottoman vassalage for them was inevitable.

Kanuni was very prudent in Boghdan in that he neither wanted to break the old custom which gave autonomy to the principality, nor let them continue in the same manner. In this way, he placed Stefan Locust to the throne, grandson of Stefan the Great, who was chosen by the boyars, but with a janissary guard consisting of 500 soldiers. Stefan Locust remained on the throne for three years, after then being replaced by the former escapee Voivode Petru Rareș. During these three years he was accused of dispersing the territories of the principality and being closer to the Ottoman administration. There was an invasion of locusts in Moldavia during his reign this was interpreted by the people as a divine punishment because of his being more closer to the Muslims rather than the Christians. As a result he was murdered by his people and replaced by another Voivode, Alexander Cornea who did not want to have ties with the Porte.<sup>79</sup> This time the escapee Petru was not happy in Transylvania and was treated badly by Jan Zapolyai and asked Kanuni to protect him and in return promised to be loyal to him. Upon Suleiman's request he came to Istanbul and paid homage to Suleiman. Then he was sent to Moldavia for his second tenure which lasted from 1541 to 1546. His second term was totally different from the previous one in that he usually remained loyal to the sultan because he was amazed with the clemency of Kanuni and lost his trust to the Hungarians etc.<sup>80</sup> He also left his older son Ilie Rareș in Istanbul as an assurance of his obedience. Ilie was

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid., folio 119a.

<sup>79</sup> Guboğlu, op. cit., 800.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 801.

impressed by Islamic culture during his stay in Istanbul. When Petru passed away he was brought to the throne of Boghdan and struggled with the Austrians over Erdel, Transylvania, in 1550. One year later he converted to Islam and was named Mehmed.<sup>81</sup> Upon his conversion he was not kept in Boghdan since the promise given to them was to have their own Christian rulers and sent to the district, *sancak* of Silistre a city which is on the left bank of Danube. After Ilie, Stefan Rareş came to throne and got along very well with the Ottomans. However, because of the rumors saying that he like his brother would also change his religion, he was killed by his people.<sup>82</sup> Before the turn of the first half of the sixteenth century the Ottomans consolidated their rule in the region by incorporating the most significant fortifications along the Danube which include Yergöğü, Giurgiu, Braila, Ibrail, which populated were by the Muslims and taken under the direct rule of the central administration.<sup>83</sup>

Besides Petru's ultimate acceptance of Ottoman suzerainty another important event affected the relations with Moldavia through end of the sixteenth century. It was the "long war" which lasted thirteen years from 1593 until 1606 with the Austrians that tightened the relations with Moldavia. With the encouragement of papacy these three principalities also joined to the holy league against the Turks. In fact it was the first time that all three Romanian principalities gathered together and took action against the Porte. The outbreak of revolt in the principalities brought up the question of turning them into regular Ottoman provinces. So the only concrete attempt which was envisaged by the Grand vizier Sinan Pasha were upon a strong

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<sup>81</sup> İsmail hakkı Uzunçarşılı, "Onaltıncı Yüzyıl Ortalarında İslamiyeti Kabul Etmiş Bir Boğdan Voyvodası," *Bellekten*, XVIII (69) (1954) 85.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>83</sup> Wilkinson, *op. cit.*, 23.

need, because of the frequent revolts. However this attempt resulted in failure in 1595.

The principalities from the older times, if asked, were in charge of supplying some military aid during the war times to the Ottomans which were to be cut off later from their *haradj*.<sup>84</sup> Sinan Pasha on a campaign against the Austrians asked for *haradj* and some equipment from the Wallachian Voivode Mihal, (Michael the Brave) but he was late in their delivery. Sinan pasha got very angry with that and declared the next campaign against the Wallachian by saying:

“ Bundan sonra ilk seferimiz Eflak üzerinedir padişah ülkesini bir iki ihmalciye bırakmaya ne gerek var”<sup>85</sup>

Moldavians and Walachians with the menace as well as back-up of the papacy were encouraged to be in league with the Austrians and to rebel against Ottoman rule.<sup>86</sup> This happened during the reign of Aron the Tyrant. He got into debts prior to his accession to throne. To recover his debts he levied new taxes on his subjects. In the course of time he got help from the Barthory family in Transylvania and rebelled against the Ottomans and refused to pay any of his debts. Most of the money lenders were either Greek or Turks. In every occasion new gifts presents and rising *haradj* were demanded from the principalities. As a result, of course with the influence of some other factors like the incentives of the Austrians, Transylvanians Papacy etc, the Moldavian Voivode Aron rebelled against the Ottomans and killed all of his creditors most of which were Turks and Greeks as mentioned above and entered to Dobrudja. Of course, immediately a new voivode was sent from Istanbul to replace him but the mutineer voivode pushed them back. He also crushed the

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<sup>84</sup> BOA, CA.S, 35489.

<sup>85</sup> İbrahim Peçevi, *Peçevi tarihi*, prepared by, Bekir Sıtkı Baykal (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1982) 141.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., 147.

Turkish forces which were to suppress the rebellion. Mustafa Pasha, a former *beylerbeyi* of Maraş, and many of his soldiers were killed by this voivode. The rebels in Moldavia were backed by the Muscovites, Poles, Hungarians and Transylvanians. Thousands of the looters ruined Boghdan. Worse things were happening in Wallachia. Michael the brave owed a great of money to the creditors as well. Peçevi in quotation from the *kadı* of Yergöğü, a small Turkish populated district on the left bank of the Danube, relates the story in detail. According to the story, these money lenders numbered maybe more than four thousand, most of whom were state officials, particularly the janissaries. They were frequently bothering the voivode throwing stones to his court, and kicking and injuring the people they found before his court. These things very much bothered him and finally he wanted to make a deal in the presence of this *kadı* with his creditors. However, he convinced them to settle for an amount an amount which was far lesser than the capital. Then, the city was in a rush and then the news comes from Yergöğü district that Michael's troops ruined the city, killing all of his people. It was only this *kadı* of Yergöğü and another man who saved their lives by crossing to the other side of the Danube by swimming.<sup>87</sup> This was the beginning of the open conflict with the Ottomans. About these events in the principalities, both of the voivodes were complaining about the situation thus

*“ kadimul eyyamdan ila hazel an selatin-i Ali osmana muti u munkad olup maktu cizyelerimiz ve peşkeşlerimiz iletüp şefkat ve merhametler umarduk. Şimdiki halde zulm-u teaddi ile ribahor (faizci) yeniçeri ve sair leşkeri üzerimize musallat oldular halimiz tebah oldu”*<sup>88</sup>

While these were happening in the periphery, high ranking officials of the state were in a struggle with themselves. On the one hand women were interfering with state affairs on the other hand there was the quarrel particularly between two grand

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<sup>87</sup> Ibid., 149.

<sup>88</sup> Selaniki, op. cit., 450.

Viziers: Sinan Pasha and Ferhat Pasha, and their supporters were seriously affected by the Ottoman disaster in this region. With the change of Sultan, Ferhat Pasha victorious commander of Persian campaign was ordered to fight against the principalities. However, before he arrived there, Sinan Pasha issued a *fatwa* from his close friend *Sheikhu'l-Islam* Bostanzade that he fell in *küfr* and became infidel.<sup>89</sup> The reason seems that, the Muslim subject of the empire was not content with his rule that during the time of trouble in the principalities although they were complaining about the frequent aggressions of Moldavians Ferhat Pasha never listened and even imprisoned them. Because according to Ferhat Pasha they lying.<sup>90</sup> The rumors on the Pasha's victimization the Muslim *reayah* in favor of the "infidels" led his death. Then, he was called back from the campaign and executed with the accusations of Sinan Pasha. In reading the important chronicles we see two different views about the grand viziers. While Selaniki sides with Sinan Pasha,<sup>91</sup> Peçevi, sides with Ferhat Pasha and harshly criticizes Sinan Pasha, about whose mistakes he opened a different chapter and made a critique of him.<sup>92</sup>

With the execution of Ferhat Pasha the ongoing struggle between the two viziers came to an end in 1595. However this time the empire fell into chaos. Sinan pasha once again became a grand vizier and was sent to fix Wallachian affairs. This campaign became a tragedy for the Ottomans. He launched the campaign with the intention of turning these principalities into regular Ottoman provinces (*pashalık*). This was meant to be a breaking of (*kanun-ı kadim*) the old custom. In doing so, he even nominated Satırcı Mehmet Pasha as *Beylerbeyi* to the principalities. Though he was confronted with a much more severe resistance in the Wallachian territories, he

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<sup>89</sup> Peçevi, op. cit., 157.

<sup>90</sup> Faris Çerçi, *Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali ve Künhü'l Ahbarında II. Selim, III. Murat ve III. Mehmet Devirleri* (Kayseri: Erciyes Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2000) 3:621.

<sup>91</sup> Selaniki, op. cit., 491.

<sup>92</sup> Peçevi, op. cit., 144.

marched until Bucharest and built some *palankas* there to carry out some attacks and to install the new *beylerbeyi* to the throne. Michael and his people forced him to leave Bucharest and when they came to Trigoviste and Yergöğü he killed most of the Muslim army. After the defeat of Sinan pasha and his troops he made some incursions to the Muslim lands beyond the Danube and plundered some cities in Bulgaria. This resulted with the dismissal of Sinan Pasha and continuation of a chaotic situation, not only in the principalities, but also through the eastern Balkans and caused a short break in the Ottoman rule of the region.

On the one hand, war with the Hapsburgs and the rebellion in three Romanian principalities and the intrigues within the state were continuing. On the other hand the Poles who were at peace with the Ottomans were trying to be effective in the affairs of Boghdan. In doing so, the murder of Stefan Razvan and the enthronement of Ieremia were realized, at least with the Polish influence.<sup>93</sup> However according to Selaniki, this change on the Moldavian throne was done by the Crimean khans and with the suretyship of the Poles. (*Leh Kralı dahi tekeffül eyleyip*)<sup>94</sup> The reason could be that because the Ottomans were in a state of big trouble they may not have been eager to confront the Poles on another front. That is why they remained quiet to the installation of a voivode backed by the Poles.

In the beginning the new voivode and Michael had good relations, as was the case in Transylvania. However, Michael, realizing that they turned away from him, first turned his attention to Erdel in 1599, and one year later to Moldavia. The Ieremia voivode fled to Poland. Michael took the control of both Erdel and Moldavia. This was for the first time three Romanian principalities were united under one ruler. We do not know for sure whether it was so, in the Romanian National

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<sup>93</sup>Kolodziejczyk, op. cit., 126.

<sup>94</sup>Selaniki, op.cit., 541.

awakening he was a hero that succeeded to liberate and unite the Romanian lands under one umbrella. However this unity did not last long. His aggressiveness was not much appreciated by the Austrians either. That is why he searched for ways to reach an agreement with the Ottomans and offered an amount of tax twice more than the existing one in return for granting three principalities to himself. The Porte rejected that offer and let him struggle with the Austrians. Soon after he was assassinated by the Austrians and the tension was eased in the principalities.

Seventeenth century Moldavia witnessed the consolidation of Ottoman Rule in the region. There were no more large scale riots against the Ottomans. The principalities now well understood that an Ottoman domination was inevitable for them, as was recommended by Stefan the Great a century ago. This century also is defined as the Boyar's century and there was intense settlement of the Greeks in the principalities as well. These factors actually are interrelated to each other. With the coming of the Greeks (actually the people from the Phanar quarter of Istanbul who were not necessarily of Greek origin)<sup>95</sup> to the region things changed in the principalities. Being educated people and fluent in a few languages, they became interested in the affairs of the principalities. Although we are not sure of what reason drew the attention of a considerable amount of the Greeks to the region, we know well that the commerce was very much developed in the region, especially in the ports of Black Sea. That is why the first Greek settlers in the region are estimated to be these merchants who later intermingled with the local people and in the course of time obtained some administrative posts through marriages and other connection with the boyars. Being rich merchants and of same religion with the local people, they established good relations with the churches as well. During this time the church

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<sup>95</sup> Zeynep Sözen, *Fenerli beyler 110 yılın öyküsü (1711–1821)* (İstanbul: Aybay Yayıncılık, 2000) 6.

was the holder of huge lands. According to a chronicle two-thirds of the whole Moldavia was owned by the church.<sup>96</sup> So they took their place in the struggle of ascendancy. All the relations in the upper class were developing at the expense of the peasants. It was in this century that the peasantry turned into serfdom in the principalities. The reason is that the Boyars, in order to be able to increase their wealth, were supporting their candidate to the throne of Moldavia. And the candidates to the throne that were chosen by the Porte were increasing the amount of the *haradj* as well as more importantly the presents to be offered to the high ranking officials of the Porte. So the interest based relations between the upper class under an absolute ruler which was the Ottomans, who could not be gotten rid of anymore, led the members of these classes to have their own share from the wealth of the country. This, however, later became resulted with the deprivation of the peasants.

However, at the same time, the arrival of the Greeks became useful in that a rapid improvement in intellectual activities had appeared. Many of the Greek ecclesiastics came to these principalities with the merchants. What they aimed at was to implement their language in the rites in a country which had hundreds of monasteries. Adding that to the activities by protestant missionaries and their growing strength in the vicinities of the principalities, they would not counter with the archaic church language of the Greeks. To counter these missionary activities as well as to apply their own understanding, they decided to use the Romanian language in the scriptures.<sup>97</sup> To this end the first printing press was established in 1634 in Wallachia. With this printing press, firstly a cannon law was pressed and then some religious pamphlets as well as philosophical and historical treatises. In Moldavia as

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<sup>96</sup> *Memleketeyn Yani Eflak ve Boğdan Tarihi* (İstanbul Üniversitesi Nadir Eserler Kütüphanesi, Nr. 2479) folio 12a.

<sup>97</sup> Peter F. Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman rule, 1354–1804: A History of East Central Europe* (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1977) 129.



well, Vasile Lupu published the first written law 1646. Also some significant chronicles came up during this term.<sup>98</sup>

In seventeenth century Moldavia, the power of the boyars was an undeniable fact. Already acquiring most of the princely lands, the boyars became influential in the administration because now they owed a great deal of peasantry and wealth. That is why apart from a few exceptions we see no voivode effective in the relations as well as with the Porte and other surrounding states. The outstanding voivode Vasile Lupu could be an exception to that who reigned nineteen years (1634-1653). He was also interested in ruling over Wallachia as well. But even he could not change the situation in the Moldavia for some reasons.<sup>99</sup> The Boyars sometimes were acting independently from the voivodes. They were usually in touch with the neighboring states. On the other hand, the voivodes were interested in saving more money in their limited reigns. This situation was very much in favor of the Ottomans. Thus the Ottoman administration in the region was completely like they wished. The result of these conditions was that there was not a wholesale insurrection nor an open war directed against the Ottomans which had used to take place very often in the previous centuries.

For the political situation of this century, the relations with the Poles were settled with the treaty of Hotin (1621) after an unsuccessful campaign of Osman II. By this treaty they recognized the permanent suzerainty of the Ottomans over Boghdan and laid down their claims to the principality. The Cossack raids as well were to be stopped by the Poles. In return, the Porte would prevent the incursion by Crimean tartars and the Moldavians. Independent Zaporozhian and Don Cossacks most of whom were not religious at all and siding either with Moscow or the Poles

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

<sup>99</sup> Sugar, op. cit., 120.

were usually impeding the commercial activities in the region. Particularly the former one was a problem in relation to the Ottomans. They were settled in the lower Dnieper River and adopted a way of life dependent on plundering. They were the most worrisome people for the empire because they lived in an uncontrollable frontier, according to Charles King.<sup>100</sup> Good in navigation, they were sailing down to Dnieper, and constituting a major threat to Ottoman commerce. Usually backed by the Poles they were plundering almost all the cities on the Black Sea, like Trabzon, Samsun, Sinop, Braila, Varna, Kefe and even Constantinople.<sup>101</sup> Even as late as 1637 they captured the Ottoman commercial city of Azov (Azak). Although Osman II with this campaign got rid of the danger of the Poles over Boghdan, this problem remained unresolved. However with this campaign the northern border of the empire was secured for a period of time.

It seems that the Ottomans were in favor of the continuation of the *status quo* concerning to its northern border. Because they were more interested in expanding towards Europe, they wanted to fix the affairs on their northern borders. This was important for the safety of the Black Sea trade. Starting with the Don-Volga channel project and leaving the principalities on their own, of course as soon as they were obedient to the Sultan, as a buffer zone between the Poles and the Russians, the Sublime Porte wanted not to be bothered with the northern affairs and usually ignored the seriousness of the situation with momentary measures temporized the growing danger coming from north. This meant that the Ottomans were always to be in defense in the north contrary to the western frontier. However this defense was not in the actual sense but a usual deployment of a certain amount of troops. These small garrisons and the Crimean khanate were held responsible for the safety of the region.

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<sup>100</sup> Charles King, *The Black Sea: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 130.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*

The major policy of the Crimean khanate was to make incursions inside the lands of Poland and Moscow and return with booties taking regular gifts from the principalities and Moscow tsars. Furthermore, the internal and external struggles of the northern neighbors have never been exploited by the Ottomans to extend their authority at their expense. For example, the frequent military struggle of the Poles with the Russians, be it over the question of Estonia and Latvia, Livonia and the Polish muscovite war in the beginning of the seventeenth century and as well as the repeated Swedish Russian wars had never been seen as an advantage to be exploited. For example, even for the early eighteenth century, when Swedish king Charles XII came into the Russian territories and fought with Peter, the Ottomans, for the preservation of *status quo* and in order not to waste their efforts on the north, did not get involved. Even during the crushing victory over the Russians on the Pruth Campaign it was not seen as advantageous to destroy the Russians and take Peter captive while they could. Instead, on moderate terms a treaty was signed and the Russians were set free. This was also a result of the Porte's indifference to the region. So they let the things happen in a manner which used to happen *kanun-i kadim*.

According to Metin Kunt, two important developments had affected the Ottomans to direct their attention towards the region. One, in the western frontier, was the growing influence of Erdel over the Romanian principalities as well as its loosening the dependency ties with the Ottomans. Prince Rakoczi of Erdel tried to spread his influence over both of the Romanian principalities and even carried negotiations independent from the sublime Porte during the thirty years wars in Europe 1618-1648. In this case they even had an agreement on collaboration with Sweden. The other one being in the northern frontier, was the Cossack problem and

the possibility that Rakoczi would take Poland under its own control and later would prevail at the expense of Wallachia and Boghdan which would destroy the Trans-Danubian Ottoman defense line and severely harm to Ottoman interests in the region.<sup>102</sup> These driving factors led the Ottomans, after settling the accounts with the Persians in 1639 and the completion of the conquest of Crete (which lasted 28 years), to safeguard its northern border by extending its influence further to the west for the surrounding of Erdel and further north for the surrounding of Boghdan. Thus, these two provinces were taken more inside and in the course of time would be turned into regular Ottoman provinces. In doing so, for the restriction and pressuring of Erdel in the west, Ineu, Yanova castle was taken under direct Ottoman control by Köprülü in 1658. To subdue the Cossacks as well as Rakoczi's claims over Boghdan and secure the northern border on the Polish side, in 1672 the southeastern province of Poland's Podolia (Kamaniçe) was taken under direct Ottoman control. These actions were done in order to incorporate the Romanian principalities and turn them into regular provinces, according to him. However, this hypothesis would be backed by a further research in the Ottomans archives according to him.<sup>103</sup>

However, the Ottoman attempt to strengthen the line extending from western Erdel to western Ukraine lasted only until the end of the century. By the treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, both Erdel and Kamaniçe were lost to Austrians and to the Poles respectively. Therefore the Ottoman defense line and the so called intention of turning the principalities into regular provinces fell through. By the turn of the eighteenth century, with the withdrawal of the Ottomans from the north and the loss of Erdel in the west, Boghdan came to be very much open to the challenges from all frontiers.

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<sup>102</sup> Metin Kunt, "17. yy de Osmanlı Kuzey Politikası Üzerine bir Yorum," *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi*, 4-5 (1977) 114.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, 116.

## CHAPTER 3

### RUSSIAN CHALLENGES TO THE PRINCIPALITY

The eighteenth century marks the beginning of a considerable transformation of the principality, both in its relations with the Ottomans, and its internal affairs. The enormous changes in her domestic affairs, such as the abolition of serfdom, the breaking of the power of the boyars, and the prevalence of intellectual activities took place in this century. It was the century in which the form of Ottoman government in the principality had changed with the new rulers coming from the Phanar quarter of Istanbul. It is also the century that Boghdan began to attract more attention and came to the international arena. The conflicting interests of the great powers of Europe made the country a region of long lasting quarrels and battles. Apart from the Poles and Austrians, by the turn of the eighteenth century, the Russians, who later turned their attention to the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, came to be a major power in the region. Therefore, in a sense, the Russians, on challenging to Boghdan, by this century replaced the Poles. In fact, the Russians, who later even annexed some parts of the Poland in 1772, in the course of this century, by virtue of the substantial reforms of Peter the Great, became a major factor in the political calculations of European powers. The growth of Russia in the region as a major power instead of the Poles was not in favor of the neighboring principality, Boghdan. The reason is that, Russia was much stronger than the former threat, Poland, and adopted a more aggressive policy towards the regions. The emergence of the Russians in the region, which turned the balance of powers upside down and heavily damaged the *status quo* about which the Ottomans were concerned, badly affected the principality. Throughout the eighteenth century the principality became a scene to four major wars between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. So it was during this

century that the intensive Russian threats were felt in the principalities, and Boghdan became a problematic area of Ottoman Russian relations. In avoiding the threats and bringing the principality under a firmer rule, the Ottomans changed the form of administration in the principality; instead of appointing the candidates of the boyars, they decided to nominate the voivodes from the Phanar quarter of Istanbul. Known as the Phanariot period, this term started in 1711 and continued until 1821. Because early on, there were challenges between the Ottomans and Russians, it is essential to understand this era. In this part, first of all, I will give the characteristics of Phanariot rule and then continue with the Ottoman-Russian conflict over the principality throughout the century.

An old quarter of Istanbul during Ottoman times, Phanar was predominantly populated by non-Muslim subjects, who were experienced in state affairs and obedient to the sultan. Even though they generally tended to be of Greek descent and Orthodox people, there are claims as well that they were of different ethnicities settled in Phanar quarter of Istanbul.<sup>104</sup> These people were speaking the Greek language and were usually educated and working as dragomans in the translation office and wealthy people. As mentioned before, a vast amount of these people went to Wallachia and Moldavia in the seventeenth century. They preserved their status in the Boghdan as well. Being wealthy merchants in Istanbul, they managed to preserve themselves and continue in the same manner in the principalities as well. They were involved in commercial activities with more advantageous conditions than Istanbul in Boghdan and soon came to be the prominent families in the region. As the seventeenth century was the century of the boyars in the principality, the Greeks obtained these posts by virtue of their wealth as well as good relations including

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<sup>104</sup> Zeynep Sözen, *op. cit.*, 7.

marriage alliances etc. Thus soon they came to be intermingled by the native boyars. However this situation was not welcomed by most of the eminent people of the principality and in 1672, the date Ottomans were at war in Podolia with the Poles, some of the noblemen, as a reaction to their growing influence, entered the capital, Jassy, with their guns.<sup>105</sup>

Among the factors that led them to the head of the principality, the most effective one could be what mentioned in the previous chapter; its being the boyar century. In the sixteenth century and before, because the rule was solely in the hands of the voivodes, who had absolute authority over the affairs of the principality, except the financial affairs, we witness the outstanding and often great figures of Romanian historiography with titles like great, brave etc. Yet these titles were won through rebellion against their suzerain, the Ottomans. In a way, although until the seventeenth century the problem for the Porte was the voivodes, whose actions as well as dealings with their neighbors could be deemed more individual. This problem was fixed with the enthronement of another voivode, by the seventeenth century the situation in the principalities was reversed. This time Sublime Porte to break the effectiveness of the voivodes in their foreign affairs as well as with the Ottomans reduced their tenure. However the frequent changes in Moldavians throne brought extra levies upon the reayah. In avoiding the trouble for the subject Sublime Porte in 1749 once again extended the tenure of the voivodes to three years.<sup>106</sup> The situation also caused to the decline of the influence of the voivodes in the principality. The diminishing influence of the voivodes in favor of the boyars made the control of the principality harder for the sublime Porte. In the face of the continuous wars against the holy league, which was formed of Habsburg, Poland, Venetia and Russia in 1686,

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<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>106</sup> BOA, C.MTZ, 4.

and ended with the Karlowitz treaty in 1699, the Porte could not be involved with the affairs of the principality whose boyars, in accordance with their interest, were getting closer with the adversaries of the Ottoman Empire. These were usually the Austrians, the Russians, and even the Poles.

### **3.1 Initial Contacts with Russia in the Principality**

The influence of the Russians in the change of the politics of the principality is an undeniable fact. The immediate cause became the flight of the Dimitri Cantemir to Russia. However, prior to this, the happenings between Russia and the Ottoman Empire inside and in the vicinity of the principality were leading to this substantial change. By the eternal peace concluded with the Poland in 1686 Russia joined to the anti-Ottoman Holy League.<sup>107</sup> This was also the first Russian involvement in European affairs.<sup>108</sup> It was during these times that Dimitri's father, Constantine Cantemir, a reliable man of the sultan, was named as the voivode of Boghdan by the Sublime Porte. The Porte was very cautious in selecting voivodes to Boghdan. Since Constantine remained loyal to the Porte during the time of the rebellion against the voivode of Wallachia he succeeded in being appointed as a ruler in his 70s. In fact, loyalty was the most important criterion in the elections of the voivodes for the semi-independent principalities on the northern Danube. To assure their "*istikamet*", the Porte was continuing the old tradition that keeping the sons of the voivodes in Istanbul<sup>109</sup> where the *kapı kethudas* and the voivodes used to stay, which is located in Phanar quarter of Istanbul.<sup>110</sup> Dimitri was living in this palace during his father's

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<sup>107</sup> Geoffrey Hosking, *Russia and the Russians A History*, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Pres, 2001) 181.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> Sahillioğlu, op. cit., 168.

<sup>110</sup> Dimitri Cantemir, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Yükseliş Ve Çöküş Tarihi*, trans. Özdemir Çobanoğlu (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitap Kulübü, 1998) 3: 96.



reign in Boghdan with his brother Antioch Cantemir. In his history, “History of Growth and Decay of Ottoman Empire” Cantemir relates the secret dealings of his father with the adversaries of the Porte in the name of Christianity. These included the dealings with the Poles and encouraged them to occupy Podolia, which was previously possessed by the Poles. Although Dimitri Cantemir relates the story to show his father’s sincerity in his religion, this could also be interpreted within the context that Constantine could have tried to avoid any Polish incursion into his lands by directing his attention somewhere else. And he expresses his sincerity to Jean Sobieski, saying that he never refrained himself from the things which will help Christianity.<sup>111</sup> After his death, his two sons Antioch and Dimitri ascended to the Moldavian throne. His first rule did not last long, just three weeks. In the meantime until 1710 he stayed in the Boghdan Sarayı, where the representatives of the voivodes lived in İstanbul, and his palace in Ortaköy with the hope of obtaining the Moldavian throne.<sup>112</sup>

Eventually conditions became very appropriate for his election to the throne of Moldavia. It was about the same time that the Russians in the north were struggling with the vigorous king of Sweden, Charles XII. Charles entered into the Russian territories to face Peter, and finally in 1709 in Poltava, Peter achieved a decisive victory over the Charles XII. A great deal of Charles’s army was destroyed in this battle. The battle of Poltava indicates a very important event because afterwards the balance of powers in Eastern Europe completely changed in favor of the Russians.<sup>113</sup> Until this time, the major powers in the region that would prevent Russian expansionism were Sweden in the north, and the Ottomans in the south. With this, the Swedish lost their superiority over the Russians and Peter eliminated a

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<sup>111</sup> Ibid., 119.

<sup>112</sup> Semavi Eyice, “Boğdan Sarayı”, *DİA*.

<sup>113</sup> Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Prut Seferi ve Barışı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih kurumu Basımevi, 1953) 104.

considerable threat in the North and went on building naval docks in the Baltic Sea. Wounded in the battlefield, Charles XII, with about 1000 people fled to Ottoman territories. The Governor of Ocakov, Özi, lead him to stay in Bender, an Ottoman city along the Dniester River which was before part of Boghdan. The reflections of this battle in Jassy were not in favor of the Porte. The emergence of such a power in the north which was also of Orthodox faith was pleasantly met by the Moldavians.<sup>114</sup> The anniversaries of this victory even came to be celebrated in the capital of the principality.<sup>115</sup> Besides, the voivode Mihai Racovita of Boghdan offered his best to the Tsar. Racovita promised to deliver the principality to the Russians in the case of an Ottoman demand concerning the provision of Charles XII and his troops.<sup>116</sup> However, what they afraid about Charles happened. He and his suite was kept and protected in Bender.<sup>117</sup> On the other hand, upon the news coming from the voivode of Wallachia with regard to his secret dealings with the Russians, Racovita was deposed. While fleeing to Russia, he was caught and sent to Istanbul. He was replaced by Nicholas (İskerletzade) Mavrocordatos in 1710. Nicholas now was in charge of the protection and provision of the Swedish King. On the other hand the Russian activities were bothering the Ottomans. These included the building up of fortresses near the borders of the Ukraine, the Crimea and Boghdan, as well as some incursions of the Russians into the territories of Bogdan. These meant the infringement of the Peace treaty of 1700 according to the Ottomans.<sup>118</sup> Apart from building new castles, they were also taking over the existing ones from the Crimeans. All of these contributed to the growth of tension between the two powers.

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<sup>114</sup> Ibid., 131.

<sup>115</sup> Nicolae Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, trans. Nilüfer Epçeli, (İstanbul: Yeditepe, 2005) 4: 260

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., 4:250.

<sup>117</sup> BOA, C.HR, 1542.

<sup>118</sup> BOA, C.HR, 4765.

Making use of the tension, on the one hand Charles XII and the French ambassador in Istanbul and on the other hand the Crimean khan was encouraging the sultan to wage a war against the Russians. The reason as to why the Crimeans wanted war was that the weakening khans were aware of the fact that the rapidly growing Russians would soon be a serious threat to their existence in the region. The French as well did not want the Russians to advance southward for the liberation of southern coreligionist. Incidentally the Peter's campaign against the ottomans was the time that the idea of Pan-Slavism was formulated as a politico-military doctrine.<sup>119</sup> So to avoid the Russian expanse and maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire France was also in favor of *status quo*.<sup>120</sup> Nevertheless, the Porte did not want to get involved in any hostile action against Russia for the sake of preservation of the existing order.<sup>121</sup> Even in such a situation where the Crimeans and the Russians were fighting on the borderline, they tried to reach an agreement to renew the peace treaty. Tolstoy, the Russian envoy in Istanbul, had three conditions for the renewal of the peace in 1710.<sup>122</sup> One was concerning the principality, that the Swedish king would not make any incursions into the Russian territories. So he was supposed to be taken under a stricter control by the Porte. The second condition was the delivery of Mazeppa and his Cossack troops to the Russians who were in alliance with Charles XII in the battle of Poltava and found refuge in the Ottoman Empire. Together with the Swedish king he was also living in Bender and the Ottomans were meeting all of their expenses.<sup>123</sup> And the third condition was the delivery of the keys of Kamame church in Palestine to the Greek orthodox priests instead of the French

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<sup>119</sup> Ariel Cohen, *Russian Imperialism: Development and Crisis*, (Connecticut: Preager Publishing, 1996) 46.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> BOA, HAT, 7765.

<sup>122</sup> Jorga, op. cit., 132.

<sup>123</sup> BOA, C.HR, 7109.

clergy.<sup>124</sup> These conditions were unacceptable for the Porte. On the other hand, the anger and the enmity against the Russians among the officials of the palace in Istanbul and the exhortations of the Swedish envoy, were leading the empire into a war. Since the Porte came to be in a position that it was unable against the Russians. Apart from accepting all the Russian demands and passing over his actions in Boghdan, the Porte was not even able to send Charles XII into his country. Ahmed III, to get a better idea of the situation, sent some Ottoman officials to the region. Upon their investigation, it had been discovered that the Russians, contrary to the information supplied by Çorlulu Ali Pasha, were deploying along Özi, building up a navy in the Azov Sea, and prevailing over Poland.<sup>125</sup> Particularly the latter was very important with regard to the safeguarding of Boghdan. Because they were of the same faith, the Russians would easily take these principalities.<sup>126</sup> With the confirmations of the Russian actions in the region, Çorlulu Ali Pasha was dismissed from office and later executed. Since he was on the side of the supporters of a war against Russia, with the accession of him to the vizierate, the war became inevitable with the Russians. Sultan Ahmed III invited the Crimean khan Devlet Giray to Istanbul. The Crimeans, in the eyes of the palace official, were very much inclined to raids and booties. Being aware of this the Crimeans, tried to persuade the Sultan as to the necessity of a war. Devlet Giray Khan explained the situation to the sultan in the following manner, the Russians would assault to Crimea. If Crimea falls, all the Balkan countries one by one will be taken over by the Russians and their ultimate aim was the capture of Istanbul.<sup>127</sup> Seeing the threat to Ottoman lands, the sultan became convinced that it was necessary to wage a war against the Russians. As the

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<sup>124</sup> Kurat, *op. cit.*, 132.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, 153.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, 175.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, 164.

khan was welcomed, depending on his knowledge and experience, the sultan did whatever he asked. In this way the dismissal and imprisonment of the custodian of Bender took place. Also he succeeded to lay off the voivode of Boghdan, İskerletzade (Mavrocordatos), Nicola. These were the measures to be taken according to the khan. Since, in the case of a possible campaign against Russia there should have existed a loyal voivode on the Moldavian throne. For Wallachia, the situation was not different. The rumors as to betrayal of Brancoveanu were rising. The Porte wanted to fix the situation with the voivode who would be sent to Boghdan. Finally, upon the advice of Crimean khan the “reliable” Dimitri Cantemir was given the voivodeship of Boghdan, on the condition that he would, one way or another catch the Wallachian voivode on his throne, and either alive or dead, would send him to Istanbul. He was a much respected man in the circles of Istanbul. He was gathering people in his mansion and giving them lessons on Turkish *musiki*. Breaking the tradition, *kanun-ı kadim*, the Ottomans, on the third day of the religious festival, gathered the *divan*, Imperial council, and awarded him with the symbols of rule. After giving him the signs of rule “*Hilat, Kuka ve Süpürge*” he was sent to Moldavia to get rid of the possible dangers against the Porte and particularly to depose the Wallachian voivode Brancoveanu, who was in a constant correspondence with the tsar and seeking collaboration against the Ottomans as well as with Venice and Austria.

According to Cantemir, in the case that he achieved this target and became useful to the Porte in the time of troubles, he would have stayed on the throne until the end of his life, and afterwards the voivodes were to be appointed from among his descendants. However, what happened was the reverse; instead of capturing the Wallachian voivode, Cantemir, he started negotiations with the Russian and sought

help from them against the Ottomans. According to his history, he was right in his attitude against the Porte since they did not keep their promise to him. He relates the events in the following way: the Porte did not keep his promise and a few days after his accession to the throne a letter came and asked from him the payment of the usual presents to the Sultan and Grand Vizier, and the provision of Charles XII who was living in Bender, and the preparation of some equipment for the army and some other “unbearable” things.<sup>128</sup> After seeing this, Cantemir; “*Mısırın baştan çıkaran hazinelerine bel bağlamaktansa İsa uğrunda acı çekmeyi yeğler*” and sent his emissaries to the more “religious” ruler, Peter the Great of Russia, and expressed his loyalty. Besides, Cantemir invited the Tsar to Boghdan. At the same time, the Wallachian voivode as well, was expressing his courtesy to Peter and promising him help if he launched a campaign against the Ottomans which was known by Cantemir. So they were calculating a joint uprising against the Ottomans. However, as Brancoveanu understood how dangerous this action could be for him, he regretted and broke his promise to the Tsar and Dimitri Cantemir. That is why he is depicted as a traitor by Cantemir.<sup>129</sup> Upon the invitation of voivode Cantemir, Tsar Peter the Great arrived in Boghdan and was welcomed by Dimitri Cantemir. The Tsar promised many things to him and the Moldavians. For example, Cantemir would remain on the throne forever which was promised by the Ottomans as well, and the dynasty would be hereditary to his family. Besides, Russia would always help her coreligionists and if they accepted Russian rule, the privileges of the boyars and clergy would be enhanced, and for the territories which were owned by the Moldavians, such as Chilia and Akkerman, etc. they would be taken back from the

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<sup>128</sup> Cantemir, op. cit., 3: 333.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., 334.

Turks.<sup>130</sup> According to Cantemir the tsar had proved his piousness by going to the monasteries and cathedrals in Boghdan.<sup>131</sup> And this alliance was for the liberation of the Christians.<sup>132</sup> Beside that, Peter created an atmosphere in the principality where he was the ruler and the Moldavians were his subject, not of the Ottomans.<sup>133</sup> Thereupon, the Ottomans put the Russian ambassador Tolstoy, in the Yedikule dungeons (seven towers), and declared war against Russia. In fact, he was the first Russian ambassador in the Ottoman Empire. After the 1700 peace treaty with the Russians, they got the right of keeping a permanent ambassador in Istanbul. Pyotr Andreveyic Tolstoy was in charge of drawing reports about the Ottomans. His embassy ended in imprisonment in 1710.<sup>134</sup> However this imprisonment was a symbolic one, because he and his household consisting of about thirty people were never oppressed or deprived of anything. Their assets in the embassy was recorded and given to their use in the prison. They were even given a certain amount of money from the imperial treasury.<sup>135</sup> Moldavians and Wallachian *kethudas* were also financially aiding the Russian ambassador and his household.

Under these conditions war broke out between the Russians and the Ottomans in 1711. Tsar Peter as the savior of Christianity relied on both the Wallachians and the Moldavians. For Moldavia, he already concluded a secret alliance with Dimitri Cantemir who was supplying him with information concerning Ottoman moves. Peter had been in touch with the Wallachian voivode as well for a long time. His designs were the following: when the Ottoman army passed the Danube, the Wallachians would not provide the army with food, instead the provisions were to be

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<sup>130</sup> Jorga, op. cit., 4: 261.

<sup>131</sup> Cantemir, op. cit., 3:334.

<sup>132</sup> Hosking, op. cit., 194

<sup>133</sup> Jorga, op. cit., 4: 260.

<sup>134</sup> Svetlana F. Oreshkova, "1683-1737 Yılları arasında Türk Rus İlişkileri", in *Türk-Rus İlişkilerinde 500 Yıl 1491-1992* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1999) 122.

<sup>135</sup> Kurat, op. cit., 182.

sent Peter, and mutiny against the Ottomans, and the same things were to happen in Moldavia as well. Thus Peter would easily defeat the Ottoman forces. However this did not happen. The Ottoman army crossed Danube with a huge army under the command of grand vizier Baltaci Mehmet Pasha and met the tsar. The Wallachians did not keep their promise of help to the tsar and the Ottomans won a crushing victory over the Russian near the Prut River, Stanilești in 1711.<sup>136</sup> The reason as to why the Wallachians and the Moldavians failed to provide the Russians with food and other necessary stuff seems that the people of *memlekteyn* were not content with the attitudes of the Russian army.<sup>137</sup> That is why they preferred to carry their all provisions to the Ottomans. Although the Ottomans, according to sources, would destroy the Russian army, which was surrounded on each side, they chose to conclude a treaty with them. Baltaci Mehmet and other Ottoman officials were warned by the sultan to carry out the campaign and to do the things in accordance with the approval of the Crimean khan,<sup>138</sup> who was the forerunner of this campaign and familiar with the region. When Peter asked for *sulh*, peace, Devlet Giray insistently refused it and asked Baltaci not to conclude a peace with them because in the eyes of Devlet Giray, Peter was an unreliable person and the Ottomans should take this advantage and crush the Russians. By doing so, they would prevent a considerable future threat. He told Baltaci Mehmed that it was not legitimate to believe in any of his words.<sup>139</sup> However, Baltaci did not listen to him and started the negotiations with the Russians. The reason seems to be that, Baltaci Mehmed was satisfied with what he achieved on the battlefield in his first campaign in his career.

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<sup>136</sup> Ibid., 495.

<sup>137</sup> M. De Voltaire, *The History of Charles XII King of Sweden*, (Paris: R. Morison, 1801) 63.

<sup>138</sup> Kurat, op. cit., 500.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid., 502.



Before the campaign was opened, the Ottomans did not aim at destroying the Russians. Even the decision was hardly taken in fighting against the Russians with the encouragements of Charles XII and Devlet Giray because the Ottomans did not want to get involve in any action after the long wars on various fronts. However, the war became indispensable and for this reason, the voivodes of both principalities made secret alliances with the tsar and the latter organized plots against the Ottomans by evoking the Christian subject on the Balkans. The issue of refugee king to Bender, Charles XII of Sweden, also turned out to be a diplomatic crisis between the Porte and the Russians. Peter did not want the king to go to his homeland, passing through Poland. The situation, not being able to offer security to a refugee king on his way to his homeland, was in a sense incapability for the Ottomans because as long as Charles stayed in Ottoman lands, he was causing domestic and international problems, such as his role, in the dismissal of Çorlulu Ali Pasha and his frequent attempts to wage war against the Russians. The reason the Ottomans felt themselves responsible for the security of the King Charles XII was mainly because of Islamic law. It is evident from the fact that, when the problems that he caused inside the empire became the major agenda, the Porte tried to get rid of this problem, even trying to issue a fatwa from Sheikh'ul- Islam for his exclusion of him from the empire.<sup>140</sup> But, this did not happen. However, Charles did not want to leave Ottomans lands either. If he wanted he could have gone through Austria. According to his calculations, it was only the Ottoman Empire that could overpower the Peter. In fact, he was right, because the Prut campaign was the only defeat of Peter in his career. That is why he was trying to persuade the sultan on the necessity of a war against the Russians. This became quite clear on his mind after the defeat of Poltava,

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<sup>140</sup> Jorga, op. cit., 4: 266.

in 1709. Another reason was to put an end to Russian expansionism in the frontiers. In securing the Crimean borders and the Black Sea trade, the hold of Azov castle in the city, which was in the hands of the Russians since 1696 and where they were building a naval force, was very important. It was a serious threat to the existence of the Crimeans as well. Also the castles along the Özi would have been a point for the Russians to jump into the Balkans. On the east Azov and on the west the big and little mixed together castles was surrounding the Crimeans. That is why Devlet Giray was very persistent on his demand of crushing the Russians on due course. Besides, because it was very near to Crimea, they would see Russian designs in a clearer way. For example, the Russians were very inferior to Crimea as well as Sweden in terms of armed power. However, it became evident that by the battle of Poltava, in 1709 and the capture of Azov in 1696, that the Russians were no more an insignificant power. Accordingly, the Porte was obviously less acquainted with the region than either the Crimean khan or the Swedish king. Therefore the Porte was not disturbed with the existence of a non antagonist power on the north.

Having a peace with the Russians which would recover all the Ottoman losses so far was seen as advantageous by Baltaci, rather than continuing the war, even though the conditions were very suitable for the Ottomans. Baltaci Mehmed, under the pressure of Devlet Giray, who wanted to continue the war, in 1711 they concluded a treaty with the Russians. The treaty was briefly about bringing back the ottoman superiority in the region. The significant articles of this treaty were as follows; by this treaty the Russians will withdraw from the Azov and the city will be delivered to the Ottomans. The castles, built by the Russians, along the Özi River would be torn down and the tsar would be no more involved in Polish affairs. The tsar would let the king of Sweden go to his home without interference. No longer

would the Russian ambassador stay in Istanbul.<sup>141</sup> After the ratification of the treaty, tsar and his troops were accompanied to his country under the protection of Ottoman soldiers against a possible assault. In terms of the application of the treaty, even before a year, Peter, justifying the claims put forth by Devlet Giray and Charles XII, did not keep his word. He neither retreated from Azov nor destroyed the castles along the Ottoman borders.<sup>142</sup> He continued to intervene in Polish affairs and continued to keep an army in Poland.<sup>143</sup> The only article which was put into practice was the abolition of the Russian embassy in Istanbul. As for Charles XII he was sent to his homeland safely by following the way from the Austrian side in 1714 and continued to rule his country.<sup>144</sup>

It is certain that the Ottomans did not want to be bothered in the north, so they did not have a consistent policy with regard to their northern neighbor, Russia. That is why the cyclical factor was determining their northern policy. From the very beginning of the campaign, the Porte had a firm attitude towards the Russians. Concerning the region, they were relying on two sources of information; the Moldavian voivodes and the Crimean khans. Although the former had usually been in contact with her neighbors at the expense of the Porte, as was the case with Cantemir in the recent war, the latter had an image in the circles of the Porte as keen on taking booties. It was perhaps mostly for these reasons that the Porte did not have a stable policy towards the Russians. Although we do not know how far Baltaci Mehmed was representative of this attitude or informed about the area, we know for certain that the beginning of the war was with the pressure of the khan, but the end not. Because the khan was not taken seriously by Baltaci, the war ended with

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<sup>141</sup> Kurat, *op. cit.*, 526.

<sup>142</sup> BOA, C. AS, 4660.

<sup>143</sup> BOA, C.HR, 4719.

<sup>144</sup> Voltaire, *op. cit.*, 265.

fruitless terms for the Ottomans. This caused the immediate dismissal and banishment of Baltaci Mehmed pasha in 1711 over which the influence of Devlet Giray and Charles XII was undeniable.<sup>145</sup>

The Moldavians helped the Russians during the war by supplying them with food and taking the injured soldiers into their hospitals and even giving them soldiers.<sup>146</sup> Dimitri Cantemir had already been in Russia among Peter's suite. His "History of Growth and Decay of Ottoman Empire" ends with a chapter on the Prut campaign. The concluding lines were dedicated to the virtues of Peter the great. He talks about Peter with compliments and presents him as an example to all the Christian rulers. The reason behind that was his sincerity. The first demand of Baltaci in the negotiations was the delivery of himself to the Ottomans, according to Cantemir. However Peter refused this by saying that he could give his whole country, but not the person who had left his country for himself.<sup>147</sup> Then, Cantemir spent rest of his life in Russia as the advisor of Peter the Great.<sup>148</sup> However, the Wallachian voivode was not as lucky as Cantemir. Constantine Brancoveanu, after 26 years of rule (1688-1714) was called to Istanbul and executed for his betrayal to the Porte.<sup>149</sup>

### **3.2. Russian Challenges to Boghdan during the Phanariot Regime**

The Sublime Porte, in securing and protecting her *haracgüzars*, accordingly its northern border, in conformity with *kanun-ı kadim*, decided to make a significant change on the administration of the Romanian principalities in 1711. From then on, the Ottomans began to appoint the voivodes from among her Christian orthodox subjects in the Phanar quarter of Istanbul. Because it was promised to the Moldavians and they enjoyed a privileged status of ruling their own, the Porte since

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<sup>145</sup> Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, op. cit., 4: 86.

<sup>146</sup> Memleketyen, op. cit., folio 14a.

<sup>147</sup> Cantemir, op. cit., 3: 339.

<sup>148</sup> Sözen, op. cit., 30.

<sup>149</sup> Jorga, 4: 272.

the very beginning of the relations let them rule themselves. This continued until the outbreak of the 1821 revolution by Tudor Vlademirescu. After this date the Porte stopped appoints the voivodes directly from Phanar quarter of İstanbul since their “treason” of the Phanariots to the sultan became evident.<sup>150</sup> In fact *memleketeyn* were the only vassal states after the Byzantine Empire that did not enter under the direct rule of the Ottomans.<sup>151</sup> However, since it became very clear that these voivodes were doing secret alliances with either the Austrians or the Russians at the expense of the Porte, it turned out to be a necessity for the latter to take them under a more controllable rule. Because the Phanariots used to serve the Ottoman state faithfully, knew several European languages very well, and particularly, shared the same religion with the people of *memleketeyn*, they began to be sent to these principalities as the trustees of the sultan. Through their knowledge of the language, apart from getting to know western manners and customs, they also became wealthy merchants. In the course of time, moneyed nobility emerged in the region. Through their knowledge of languages and the western world, most of the Greek nobility in Phanar were sending their children to Europe for education; they monopolized the translation office as the dragomans.<sup>152</sup> Thereupon, the Porte started the practice of sending them to rule over the *haracgüzars* subject.

The question of whether the Phanariot princes were the representatives of the Porte or not always attracted attention. Because they were not chosen from among the boyars, they came to be seen in the Romanian historiography as the outsiders. In other words, it could be interpreted that this form of government was another type of

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<sup>150</sup> BOA, C.HR, 5020.

<sup>151</sup> Steven Runciman, *The Great Church In Captivity: A Study of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from the Eve of the Turkish Conquest to the Greek War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 365.

<sup>152</sup> Panayotis A. Papachristou, *The Three Faces of the Phanariots: An Inquiry into the Role and Motivations of the Greek Nobility under Ottoman Rule, 1683–1821* (MA Dissertation Simon Fraser University 1992) 7.

direct rule, just as any other Ottoman *pashalık*, and it does not conform to the conditions of vassalage. Although it is not clear whether the Ottomans were considering this action as a violation of vassalage relation or not, it is certain that the Ottomans had to deviate from *kanun-ı kadim* because of the circumstances. The growing influence of the voivodes at the expense of the Porte was the main reason for that. However, the Phanariot voivodes were not less controlled by the Porte. It was obvious that the new voivodes would rule under stricter circumstances. Even before, because ruling in an area where the relations should be very delicate with the neighbors, the voivodes were responsible for their every action against the Porte. For example, in a *hüküm* dated 1570, the Moldavian voivode who was probably Bogdan IV, was asking permission from the sultan to marry his sister to the Polish side. Upon the permission from Istanbul, the marriage took place.<sup>153</sup> The situation now was much more delicate because they were not only Poles but also Russians and Austrians as well. So they had some obligations no different than the previous voivodes towards the Porte. As the loyalty was in the first place, they were also in charge of supplying the Porte with correct information concerning to the affairs of the European matters.<sup>154</sup> We see long reports given by the voivodes to the Ottoman sultans.<sup>155</sup> Most of the eighteenth century reports are about the actions of the Russians in the region. The voivodes were also in charge of following the events in Poland. Particularly the actions of the Russians in the country were of significance for the Porte. That is why the voivode of Boghdan was collecting intelligence in Poland.<sup>156</sup> The voivodes of Boghdan was furnishing the Porte with information

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<sup>153</sup> BOA, *MHM 12* op cit., 628.

<sup>154</sup> Sahillioğlu, op.cit., 1357.

<sup>155</sup> BOA, HAT, 40847.

<sup>156</sup> BOA, HAT, 327.

concerning to the matters of, Spain Portugal and even Brazil.<sup>157</sup> This also shows us that the Ottoman interest to the world and the how significant the voivodeship of Boghdan under the Ottoman rule. Because the voivodes were chosen among the language knowing Greek people of the empire, the job of informing the Porte concerning to world affairs was assigned to them.

Concerning the rule of the voivodes in the principalities, there are different views. While some of historians are regarding this period as a time of oppression, intellectual bankruptcy, and exploitation, some have contrary views. The domination of these ideas in the literature seems to result from the scarcity of the sources and its being rather in odd concerns. And the few works about the Phanariots were either written by the travelers to exotic lands or by the state officials to raise the concern of their state. This negative literature was very much exploited until after the Crimean war.<sup>158</sup> However there are also anti-theses that the Phanariot term was not the time of collapse for the principalities which were supported by the famous historian Nicola Jorga as well.<sup>159</sup> The reason behind this idea is mostly coming from the fact that this century was a time of trouble and four major wars took place in the principalities. Particularly the Boghdan being in the north was very much open to the challenges from either sides. The cost of these wars to Boghdan was very much. Apart from the psychical damages of the war they also were loosing their corps during the war times. Although sometimes they were in collaboration with the invaders, sometimes there were the times that they involuntarily had to supply the invading forces with food and equipment. The frequent raids by the *Budjak Tatars* into their lands also became influential in the weakening of the country. Adding to that, the regular *jizyah* to be paid by the voivode made the situation unbearable for the people of Boghdan.

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<sup>157</sup> BOA, 40847.

<sup>158</sup> Panayotis, op. cit., 10.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid., 11.

The “oppression” literature mostly derives from the voivode’s way of life. As moneyed people, they were very much proud of exhibiting their wealth openly which was not possible in Istanbul. It is also claimed that they were also aiming at reviving old Byzantine and that is why they were emulating the old kings,<sup>160</sup> some of the more ambitious ones even calling themselves Basileus.<sup>161</sup> What made them feel so strong and sure is mostly the fact that they saw themselves as the trustees of the Sublime Porte. Although they were very keen on to the voivodeship of the principalities their reign was fixed to 3 years<sup>162</sup> and many of them were destined to execution. So what made them so enthusiastic for the rule of the principality, apart from collecting wealth and for a short term rule which however would end with death seems obscure. A nineteenth century anonymous manuscript “Memleketeyn Yani Eflak ve Boghdan Tarihi” tells us the role of Phanariot voivodes in the principalities in relation with the Sublime Porte and Russia by the following words:<sup>163</sup>

*“Fenerliler ecnebi olmalarıyla ahali-i merkume-i mersumelere mültezim nazarı ile bakılmakda ... hallerinden naşı mefasid ve teaddiyat-ı mümkünenin icrası ile bir kaç sen zarfında kesb-i servet etmeye çalışmakta boyarların kimisini kendilerine muayyen ve .... Ederek ve kimisini dahi taziyik ve tazib eyleyerek maiyyetlerinde bulunan kaffe-i alet-i ittihaz ile tervic-i merama sa’y eylemekde idiler. Ancak zulm ve teaddilerine dair Devlet-i aliyeye edna mertebe bir şübhe arz oldukta giriftar-ı seyf-i ukubet olacaklarına vakıf olduklarından kenilerine evvelce melceü’-t-dar eylemelerini muktazı görüb ve rusyalunun dahi merkumları ve ekseriya tekrar voyvodalığı tahsil eylemeleri hususuna kendilerine iane eylemesi ciheti ile fenerlilerin rusya devletinin tedabir-i vakıasını icarya mecbur oldukları aşikardır”*

Very briefly this passage is about the Phanariots, who were not welcomed by the indigenous population as they were persecuting the people to collect more wealth within their limited tenure. At the same time they were aware of the fact that if the Porte was suspected of their misgovernment, they would certainly loose their lives. That is why, in trying to find a shelter in the case of a danger against their lives or to be reappointed to the throne they were collaborating with the Russians.

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<sup>160</sup> Sözen, op. cit., 9.

<sup>161</sup> Runciman, op. cit., 365.

<sup>162</sup> Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, op. cit., 4: 79.

<sup>163</sup> *Memleketeyn*, op. cit., folio 15a.



There is no doubt that the voivodes were not appreciated by the people and were seen as the agents of the Porte. However, it is not possible to generalize “treason” to all of the voivodes. For example, Constantine Mavrocordatos died in captivity and was injured in the war with the Russians in 1769. One of the major aims of the Porte in sending them to the principalities was to break the influence of the boyars who held considerable amounts of land and serfs and were exempt from many levies. To this end the voivodes created their own aristocracy by trying to dissolve the former one. They were making sizeable changes in the administrative structure of the country. According to the same author, these were all by the incitements of the Russians.<sup>164</sup> However, the Hapsburg influence was also very effective on these reformatations.<sup>165</sup> The reforms were undertaken by Constantine Mavrocordatos. He ruled in both Wallachia and Moldavia. He tried to centralize the administration and first of all restricted the rights of the boyars. The population was censused, and the serfdom was abolished. These were at the expense of the boyars since they lost a considerable amount of manpower.<sup>166</sup> Instead, the voivodes were collecting the taxes in their treasury; that is why they were attacked by the people and the boyars. The abolition of the indigenous army and its replacement with the soldiers coming from Serbia, Bulgaria, and Albania was regarded also an attitude against themselves.<sup>167</sup> For these kinds of reasons the voivodes were not welcomed by the Moldavians. They were not very much trusted either by the Moldavians or the Ottomans; however they remained in power for 110 years in the principality.

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<sup>164</sup> Ibid., 16.

<sup>165</sup> Barbara Jelavich, *Balkan Tarihi*, trans. İhsan Durdu, Haşim Koç, Gülçin Koç. (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2006) 118.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid., 116.

<sup>167</sup> *Memleketeyn*, op.cit., folio 15b.

For the administration of the principalities, the system of government was a limited monarchy, according to Thornton.<sup>168</sup> Although the prince was the absolute authority, his power was controllable only in the financial affairs by the members of *Divan*. The divan was composed of twelve members and was presided over by the voivode. It was usually held every day, but if not at least twice a week, and the member of it was directly appointed by the voivode each year.<sup>169</sup> The *divan efendisi* a Muslim agent of the Porte was present also in *divan*. He was in charge of writing the official dispatches to the Porte and taking his salary from the voivode.<sup>170</sup> In a way they were supposed to follow what was happening in the country and control the acts of voivode. Besides *Logofats*, are the head of the office of chancery. They keep the registers, issue diplomas, etc. The chief *logofat* is the keeper of the great seal.<sup>171</sup>

Concerning to the Muslim people living in the principality apart from *divan efendisi* there were, *tüfengçis*, *mataracıs* twelve *kapıcı başı* and twelve *tatar ağası*. The question of whether there was Turkish garrison in Boghdan or not is a controversial issue. There were a small number of Turkish soldiers responsible of protecting the borders of the principality against the brigands from surroundings part. Because from five houses only one person was recruited for this mission these soldiers came to be called as *beşli* whose precise number has been in dispute.<sup>172</sup> The chief of these troops were called as *beşli ağası*. However, because these *beşli neferat* were deployed in the boundaries they became a matter of discussion in the region with the neighboring states like Austria and Russia.<sup>173</sup> As for the janissaries, the sources have contradicting views but mostly they tell us the absence of a janissary

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<sup>168</sup> Thornton, op. cit., 408.

<sup>169</sup> Wilkinson op. cit, 48.

<sup>170</sup> Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, op. cit., 4: 113.

<sup>171</sup> Thornton, op. cit., 421.

<sup>172</sup> Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, op. cit., 4: 84.

<sup>173</sup> BOA, HAT, 45396.

garrison in either principality. However, the implications from the ottoman sources the idea on the existence of a janissary garrison in the principalities is gaining strength. As we have seen in the previous chapter that the events that caused to an Ottoman campaign to Wallachia in 1595, was mainly because of the pecuniary causes of the voivodes with the janissaries. It was the time that the Ottomans was thinking about the turning the principality into regular ottoman provinces. If they were in such a relation with each other it means they were not in a distant place and likely to be inside the principality. On the other hand these janissaries could have been also the janissaries of the surrounding cities such as Bender Chilia and Akkerman. Yet, the salaries of Bender janissaries were also paid from the jizyah of Bogdan.<sup>174</sup> Or there were a small number of janissaries which are not powerful enough to suppress even the uprisings. Evliya Çelebi when counting the offices of Boghdan in his forty-day stay in the principality, although he tells the *müslüman divan efendisi* he does not mention the janissaries. So it is not clear that the existence of janissaries in the region. The importance of this issue is coming from also the given promises “privileges” in the time of submission to ottoman rule. In a hüküm in *mühimme defteri* we see a phrase talking about the janissaries of “Boghdan” and the payment of their salaries from the *jizyah* of the principality in 1566.<sup>175</sup> The existence of such a hüküm about in *mühimme* registers strengthens the idea that there janissaries in the principality. It is also mentioned in the documents of the Prime Ministry Archive that the surrounding places which were formerly owned by Boghdan, but now under the direct rule of Ottomans were protected by the janissaries and their salaries were taken from the *jizyah* of Boghdan.<sup>176</sup> In this sense the

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<sup>174</sup> BOA, C.AS, 51196.

<sup>175</sup> BOA, *MHM* published by, Ankara: T.C Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, (Ankara: 1994) 5/1581.

<sup>176</sup> BOA, C.AS, 51196.

ottomans city of Bender which is situated on the northern part of the principality was defended by the janissaries and the salaries of them were given by the principality. However, another document proves the existence of the janissaries inside the principality.<sup>177</sup> The janissaries were even in the capital of the principality, Jassy. They were also in charge of the protection of the principality and paid by the voivode of Boghdan.<sup>178</sup> This is because they were in a way in charge of the protection of the principality. Whether there was a janissary garrison or not it was certain that there was a not considerable Turkish armed existence in the region.

During Phanariot period, among the European powers it was the Russia which first established a contact with the Romanian principalities.<sup>179</sup> They were also continuing their diplomatic activities in Istanbul. It was a great achievement for the Russians to establish the tradition of having an ambassador in Istanbul.<sup>180</sup> Before, Peter was using the Dutch officials as agent in Istanbul. However the Russian interest to the region also attracted the attention of the Austrians as well. Already capturing Erdel with the influence of the boyars, Austrians started a war (1716-1718) against the Ottoman Empire. Austrians wanted to take active role in the politics of the region as well as polish question. Although the war was carried out mainly in Wallachia, as was the Wallachian voivode was taken as prisoner of war, the Moldavian were also badly affected by the war. We learn from a manuscript that in this war the Austrians also damaged to the grains and other foodstuff in Moldavia and the Austrian general asked tribute from the Moldavians. Although this was refused by the voivode, Mihai Racovita, with a letter having religious connotations this request was repeated and

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<sup>177</sup> BOA, C.AS, 31477.

<sup>178</sup> BOA, C.AS, 51196.

<sup>179</sup> Ferdinand Schevill, *The History of the Balkan Peninsula from the Earliest Times to the Present Day* (New York: Brace and Company, 1922) 386.

<sup>180</sup> İlber Ortaylı, "XVIII. Yüzyıl Türk Rus İlişkileri" in *Türk-Rus İlişkilerinde 500 Yıl 1492-1992* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1999) 130.

the voivode was threatened.<sup>181</sup> The Austrian influence was triggered by the first Russian challenges to the region. The competition between the Russians and the Austrian for the hold of the principalities continued until the end of the century.<sup>182</sup> This was also caused by the nobility who were holding different views as to an alternative to the Ottomans.

### 3.3. Ottoman Russian Encounter in Boghdan

The conflicting interest of the Austrians and the Russians on the region somehow brought them together against the Ottomans. After a joint military action in Poland and placing their own candidate to the throne, the Russians and the Austrians waged war against the Ottomans.<sup>183</sup> Even the Russian statesman prepared a partition project for the Ottoman Empire as early as 1730s.<sup>184</sup> Russians contrary to the terms of Prut treaty began to be involved in the polish affairs. When sublime Porte was struggling with the Persians in the east the Russians declared a war against the Ottomans over the reason that the Crimeans on their way to Iran violated the Russian border. With a quick attack they captured the Azov castle. The Ottomans did not want to have a war in the Balkans after the recent insurgence in Montenegro. On the other hand, although Austrians in the early days of the war promised to the sultan that they were going to mediate between them, upon the successes of the Russian troops under the command of general Munich they also warred with the Ottomans. General after invading Azov, entered Crimea, ruined Bahçesaray and then directed his attention to the principalities. In this war also the Austrians and the Russians were

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<sup>181</sup> *Vekayi-i Eflak*, (İstanbul: Millet Kütüphanesi, Nr. 80) folio 4a.

<sup>182</sup> Gheorghe Paton, "The Romanians Caught Between the Turkish, Austrian and Russian Empires" in Dinu G. Giurescu and S. Fischer-Galati (eds.), *Romania: A Historic Perspective*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) 150.

<sup>183</sup> Alexandr B. Kameneskii, *The Russian Empire in the Eighteenth Century: Searching for a Place in the World* trans. David Griffiths (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997) 154.

<sup>184</sup> Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türkiye ve Rusya* (Ankara: TTK, 1987) 22.

in competition for the partition of the ottoman Balkans. Already having a foothold in Wallachia the Austrians wanted the southern Bosnia and Serbia. However, their demand ended with a decisive victory of the Ottomans in Belgrade. The French were also skeptical about the Russians and asked the Austrians to have peace otherwise and expansionist Russia would be at their expense too.<sup>185</sup> As a result the Austrian concluded a treaty with the Ottomans in 1739 with the treaty of Belgrade they lost their all acquisitions in 1718. The Austrians were already aware of this fact but they were aiming at having their share from the Balkans which was to be left by the Russians. On the other hand the Russian demands before the exclusion of the Austrian from the war were the followings. All treaties between two sides must be renewed, Crimea must be left to the Russians, the Russian tsars were no more to be called as mere tsar but as an emperor in diplomatic dispatches, and the most important condition for our case was that Wallachia and Moldavia were to be independent principalities under the protection of the Russians.<sup>186</sup> It was for the first time the Russian demands concerning to the principality was expressly said in an international meeting, the congress at Nemirov in 1736.<sup>187</sup> The Austrians deserted the Russians by signing the treaty of Belgrade with the Ottomans. Since they remained helpless and another threat appeared on the north with Sweden they had to retreat and concluded a peace agreement with the Ottomans in 1739. The most important article of this treaty was concerning to the Russian policies on Black Sea. Although it was not recognized by the treaty they achieved to win a foothold on the Black Sea. Azov castle was to be demolished and the city was to belong neither side.

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<sup>185</sup> Reşat Ekrem Koçu, *Osmanlı Muahedeleri ve Kapitülasyonlar: 1300-1920 ve Lozan Muahedesi 24 Temmuz 1923* (İstanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitaphanesi, 1934) 94.

<sup>186</sup> Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, op. cit., 4: 262.

<sup>187</sup> Paton, op. cit., 250.

In other words Azov was supposedly no man's land.<sup>188</sup> However the situation was different. Azov step by step was taken under the control of Russian and constituting an important harbor for the Russian navy. Another important result of this treaty in favor of the Russians they once again had the right of having an ambassador in Istanbul.<sup>189</sup> This practice was started during Peter and continued by his successors and helped a lot to the Russians because they were to be provided with the first hand information by their own emissaries rather than depending on different representatives. The impact of the war on Boghdan is also important. As Hotin is the last outpost on the north for the defense of the principality, it was very much damaged during the war by the Russians. Then the Russian forces entered to Jassy, the capital of Boghdan. They were welcomed with the people who did not want the Ottomans administration or the Phanariot princes.<sup>190</sup> This displeasure against the Porte and the Phanariot princes seems to be organized usually by the boyars. because, the former century was called as the age of boyars, as mentioned in the previous chapter, with a more centralized administration the balance between the voivodes and the boyar changed at the expense of the latter they tried to involve in any action that may help get rid of the so-called Ottoman Phanariot coalition. Jewsbury tells us, the attitude of boyars as captured by the French consul in Jassy in 1806, in a representative conversation between a "foreigner" and a "young boyar."<sup>191</sup>

*Foreigner:* But how can you so openly show yourselves to be Russian partisans?

*Young Boyar:* Russia has been good to us. It is to her that we owe our political emancipation, our limited duties and our part in the country's administration.

*Foreigner:* That is very good for the past. But in Constantinople, the system has changes and you who pretend to conduct yourselves along calculated political lines actually see no further than the ends of your noses.

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<sup>188</sup> Reşat Ekrem, op. cit., 96.

<sup>189</sup> Kurat, *Türkiye Rusya*, op. cit., 23.

<sup>190</sup> Jelavich, op. cit., 2: 116.

<sup>191</sup> G. F. Jewsbury, *The Russian Annexation of Bessarabia 1774–1828: A Study of Imperial Expansion* (New York: East European Quarterly, 1976) 9.

*Young boyar:* Russia protects us, and her armies are there...

*Foreigner:* Suppose you saw the arrival of the French troops?

*Young boyar:* They are so far away.

*Foreigner:* But yet, how would you justify your conduct?

*Young boyar:* Then we would be for Napoleon, just as we now are for Alexander, and Napoleon wouldn't find that so bad.

Although this conversation took place in the beginning of the following century it is very meaningful that we see their place in the administration of the principality. They were conjectural, according to circumstances trying to find patron from outside, which was usually the Russians, thus a place in the administration. Taking into consideration the fact that the boyars were divergent among themselves as some were getting closer with the Russians and the others with the Austrians, the situation was becoming worse for the people of the principality. Boyars survived in this way from the eighteenth century onwards. Voivodes are also influential in the boyar affairs since they were granting these posts to the incapable people.<sup>192</sup> These boyars were backed by the Russians and encouraged to rise against the Ottomans. In this way while some of them were having the protection of the Russia some were encouraged to immigrate to Russia by the Russian government. Those who accept to live in Russia was to be granted lands and other privileges in Ukraine.<sup>193</sup> On the other hand the Austrians after taking Bukovina were annexing some territories from the ottoman lands in Boghdan through co operations with the church fathers.<sup>194</sup> Both the Russians and the Austrians were distributing to the people, "patenta" or *sivids* so that they were having a kind of protection of the relevant state.<sup>195</sup> In a way the people who hold these *sivids* were seeking their rights in the consulates of the

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<sup>192</sup> BOA, C.HR, 5119.

<sup>193</sup> BOA, HAT, 12932.

<sup>194</sup> BOA, HAT, 881.

<sup>195</sup> BOA, CHR, 4876.



related countries. Ottomans were also struggling with this issue after the treaty of Kucuk Kainardji.

Apart from these minor challenges, the major challenge against the Porte was in the second half of the eighteenth century there were also military challenges to the ottoman existence in the region. There is no doubt that the most important of these was the long lasting of 1768-1774 between Russia and Turkey which ended with the treaty of Kucuk Kainardji. Both the war and the treaty was the heaviest defeat of the Ottomans. Apart from marking the beginning of “Eastern Question” Kucuk Kainardji and the war had profound impacts on the Romanian principalities. The relations between the Russian and the Ottomans were comparatively peaceful after the treaty of Belgrade in 1739. As it was mentioned before, the Russian expansion was mainly against Sweden in the north and the Ottomans in the south.<sup>196</sup> Russians, after settling accounts with the Sweden concentrated on southward expansion. This was obviously going to be at the expense of the Ottomans. Russians for a long time were in struggle with the poles and doing plans for the partition of it as well. However this situation was bothering the Ottomans. Because in doing so they would easily prevail over the Balkans, particularly to their immediate neighbor Romanian principalities, which had been an aim of Russia since the time of Peter the Great. Boghdan, in terms of its geopolitical place was open to the challenges from each side. The Porte was considering this place, although never incorporated it as an integral part of the empire. If we remember the wars with the poles before the rise of Russia, the reason was usually the over the affairs of Boghdan. Because the provision of the empire was mainly depending on the foodstuff coming from these territories and for other reasons as well, Porte considered the security of the principality important. The

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<sup>196</sup> Kurat, *Türkiye Rusya*, op. cit., 25.

Russian interference in Polish affairs by the Ottomans came to be interpreted as a threat against his own lands as was the principality depicted as the *mülki mevru* of the Sultan. Besides, if the Russians had the principalities they would cut the territorial ties between Constantinople and the Crimean Khanate and would have a strategic place to further advancement to Constantinople. The violation of the treaty by the Russians, concerning Poland is interpreted as ostensible reason for the Porte in declaring war against Russia while the real cause was the Crimean affairs.<sup>197</sup> Russians for a long time had been intervening to the affairs of Crimea and. In fact according to Akdes Nimet Kurat, the Russians were in the hope of destroying the Ottoman Empire.<sup>198</sup> In this way, the first thing that they could do was the annexation of Crimean Khanate. Being aware of a future Russian threat the Ottoman Sultan Mustafa III declared a war against the Russians.

Although in the beginning the Ottomans were hopeful, the rapid advancement of the Russians in all front made the Ottomans desperate. The reformation which was started by Peter the Great was giving its fruits during the war. The Russian army was well equipped commanded by vigorous and young commanders whereas the Ottoman army was vice versa.<sup>199</sup> In the beginning of the war the major Turkish castles were taken over one by one in the Balkans. The first one was Hotin which was a fortification to Boghdan. After its fall, the second target was obviously Boghdan. In 1769 the Russian general with a small number of troops entered to Jassy. Russians in the principality appealed their Christian coreligionists to rise against their masters.<sup>200</sup> It is evident that the people of Moldavia did not resist to the Russian

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<sup>197</sup> Ortaylı, op. cit., 132.

<sup>198</sup> Kurat, *Türkiye Rusya*, op. cit., 25.

<sup>199</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>200</sup> Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 265.

advancement instead welcomed them.<sup>201</sup> If they had not aided to the Russians the entry of a small numbers of troops consisting of 400 soldiers would not be possible that easy to the principality.<sup>202</sup> In the course of the war, a council from both of the principalities which was consisting of boyars and clergymen went to Tsarina Catherine and asked her to save their homeland from the Turks.<sup>203</sup> After the capture of Moldavia, Catherine II began to call herself as the princess of Moldavia.<sup>204</sup> The defeat of the Turks was not limited to these. The following year, a Russian fleet, by the aid of the British, sailing all the way from the Baltic Sea came to Mediterranean. Though the Ottomans were surprised of seeing the Russian fleet, the Ottoman navy was annihilated by the sudden attacks of Russia in 1770.<sup>205</sup> Next year witnessed to the occupation of Crimea. The Ottomans were loosing in all fronts against their northern adversary. And finally in 1774 on the right bank of Danube in a village of what is known today Bulgaria, in Kucuk Kainardji village the treaty was signed between the Russians and the Ottomans.<sup>206</sup>

Kucuk Kainardji treaty was a turning point in Ottoman Russian relations. It was by this treaty that the Ottomans apart from loosing their superiority over the Russians they lost their effectiveness in European politics and began to be a “question” of Europe. Both the war and its aftermath was a total disaster for the Ottomans. In the beginning of the war the Russians were calculating to achieve a few objectives which were the acquisition of a suitable foothold in the Black Sea, recognition of her right for free navigation in the Black Sea and establishment of a

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<sup>201</sup> BOA, C.HR, 5562.

<sup>202</sup> Osman Köse, *1774 Küçük Kaynarca Antlaşması Oluşumu-Tahlili-Tatbiki* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2006) 27.

<sup>203</sup> Jorga, op. cit., 4: 408.

<sup>204</sup> Kamenskii, op.cit., 249.

<sup>205</sup> Riasanovsky, op.cit., 265.

<sup>206</sup> Osman Köse, op.cit., 112.

secure border with Poland.<sup>207</sup> What they achieved however at the end of the war was more than they imagined and it became very helpful in realizing their aims. First of all, the Russians even before concluding the war with the Ottomans solved their problem with Poland by partitioning it with Prussians and Austrians, in 1772. It was also the date that the Austrians and the Russians were negotiating the destiny of the empire. Whereas Austria wanted the foundation of an independent state Cathrine wanted there a neutral place. However none of the ideas were implemented.<sup>208</sup> The Austrians were aiming to have a say in the destiny of the principality. By the treaty Russian had the advantage over Austria.<sup>209</sup> On the other hand the Porte was for the first time in her history was that much desperate and far from deciding over her destiny. The immediate cause for the outbreak of war was the Russian involvement with the Polish affairs. That is why Porte waged a war against Russia. However, apart from loosing her authority over Poland, the Porte had to relinquish many of his designs over the region as well.

Treaty of Kucuk Kainardji is consisting of 28 articles all of which were envisaged in favor of the Russian as the victorious power. The most important of these articles obviously was the third one.<sup>210</sup> By this article the Ottomans were loosing their authority over Crimea and a Muslim land for the first time was separated from the empire. Article seven and fourteen which were related to alleged rights of the Russians over the Christian subjects of the empire always became a disputable matter between the Russian and the Ottomans and the cause for the subsequent Russian intervention to the affairs of Ottoman Empire. However, the most detailed article in this treaty was the one which was related to Wallachia and

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<sup>207</sup> Kamenskii, op. cit., 249.

<sup>208</sup> Keith Hitchens, *The Romanians 1774-1866*, (New York: Clarendon Press, 1996) 44.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid.

<sup>210</sup> Köse, op. cit., 112.

Moldavia. This shows the importance given to the principality by the Russian. Article sixteen contains ten subheadings differently from the other ones. Very briefly the outstanding articles concerning to *memleketeyn* in the treaty were the following things.

First of all the crimes in both principalities would be forgiven by sublime Porte. This was already the case however, because during the time of war the Ottomans forgave many of the collaborators with the Russians as soon as they stop aiding to Russia and regret.<sup>211</sup> However, this was put in the treaty to protect the proponents of Russia in Boghdan and Wallachia. Secondly, the principalities should be independent in their religious matters from sublime Porte. This had been the case also since its first conquest by the Ottomans. Thirdly, the principality would be exempt from any taxes since they were tired of war and had a lot of damages. And the most important one was that, the Russian ambassadors could have discussed the matters concerning to the principalities on behalf of them with the Porte and the Porte was going to take the Russians into consideration. By this article the Russians was gaining a right of representation on behalf of both principalities. And also the controversial articles of seven and fourteen were interpreted by the Russians as the “protectorship” over the Christian subject of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>212</sup> These were strengthening the Russian impact on orthodox Boghdan. Russians were so much enthusiastic that they even saw themselves as the owner of the principalities. This idea of the Russians even was employed in diplomatic dispatches with the Austrians.<sup>213</sup> This could be because of the fact that, the Russians and the Austrians were in alliance against the Porte and they were trying to dissuade the Austrians from

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<sup>211</sup> BOA, C.HR, 5562.

<sup>212</sup> Roderic Davison, “Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecilliity”: The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered”, *Slavic Review*, 35 (3) (1976): 463.

<sup>213</sup> BOA, HAT, 52626.

their hopes concerning to principalities. The designs of Peter was realizing in the principality through the achievement of representation right by sublime Porte. This turned out to be the first Russian concrete achievement over the principality. The religious challenges of the Russians continued with the incorporation of Moldavian church into the Russian ecclesiastical structure. Even if it was reverted to its original status in the Ottoman Empire the Russian by the treaty had already won the right of representation on their behalf.<sup>214</sup>

After this date there are instances that the Russian started a full scale religious propaganda in the region. In fact, as mentioned before this started during the time of Peter. As early as 1713 the Russian involvement in the affairs of the empire in terms of its orthodox subject starts. In the famous campaign of Peter against Moldavia apart from galvanizing the people of Boghdan all over the empire the Russian agents were in an intensive religious campaign. In this sense the Russian priest Varlam Şermetoğlu's journey to arouse the people from İstanbul until Jerusalem and his final capture with 200 crosses, for propaganda, in his bag in Cyprus is an indication.<sup>215</sup> Apart from these we see some petitions presented to Russian government. These petitions were usually sent by the boyars of the principality and calling for help from the Russians. Because the Russians had the right of representation in their favor, this situation was also troublesome for the Porte. In a survey of the petition sent to abroad between 1769-1830, we see striking numbers. 93 of the petitions were sent to Russia 14 to the Austrians 2 to the Prussians 5 to French and 36 to the Ottomans.<sup>216</sup> These petitions were usually sent by the boyars of the country to be able to find a place in the administration. Russians were appreciating the presented petitions to St.

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<sup>214</sup> Jewsbury, op. cit., 20.

<sup>215</sup> BOA, C.HR, 77.

<sup>216</sup> Jewsbury, op. cit., 20.

Petersburg. Yet, as soon as they were sent they were gaining more strength to intervene to Ottoman affairs.

However, the Moldavians were not in search of a full scale Russian protection, rather they were demanding more independence and in this way the Russians were seen as the liberator of her coreligionists. Although the Russians were enthusiastic on applying an influence on the principality on the basis of religion either the boyars or the people were not much eager to that. The religion could be a bond between them but the Moldavians in their petitions to tsar rarely asked for unity with the Russians or total independence from the Ottoman rule. Since, it was evident that they would not enjoy more independence under Russian rule. What they preferred was rather to have loose relations with the Turks<sup>217</sup> Even though, the people did not ask for unity from the tsar, it was an excellent opportunity for the Russians to get involved in Ottomans business. Most of these actions were carried out by the consulates of the Russians in Jassy. To avoid or at least to minimize the Russian challenges in the principalities the Porte was restricting the entrances to the principality.<sup>218</sup> Even one has to hold a *ferman* to be able to enter to the principalities.<sup>219</sup>

Catherine II also had some other projects concerning to Ottoman Empire. The most famous of these projects was the premature Greek project.<sup>220</sup> When she came to state council with this project Russian ministry without exception disapproved that. It was only Catherine and Potemkin stood for this project. The project was anticipating the establishment of Greek State in the territories of Ottoman Empire including the capital of Ottoman state. However first of all the disintegration of the Turkish

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<sup>217</sup> Ibid, 21.

<sup>218</sup> BOA, HAT, 45588..

<sup>219</sup> BOA, Cevdet Eyalet-i Mümtaze (*C.MTZ*) 806.

<sup>220</sup> Riasanovsky, op. cit., 266.

Empire should be rendered in Europe. The establishment of Dacia State in the Romanian principalities was a fine alternative for the disintegration of the Turks in Europe. Dacia was going to be ruled by one of her favorites, Potemkin. Unlike the testament of Peter this project was quite real according to Ragsdale Hugh and many historians as well.<sup>221</sup> Even Catherine discussed this project with Joseph II of Austrians and they formed an alliance. She named her second grandson as Constantine and minted coins on his name and Bosphorus and made him raised with Greek tutors and nurses.<sup>222</sup>

In fact the religious bond had been used by the Russians since the beginning of the century. Among the orthodox subject of Ottoman Empire, Russia embarked on a campaign over their immediate neighbor, Moldavia since the time of Peter. The Russians was expecting adherence from the people of the principality since they were sharing the same religion with the Romanians. Their approach was like a liberator. Although the Russian had more imperial purposes and expansionist ideals in this rapprochement to the Romanians they also had long been seen themselves as the protector of the orthodox Christianity. The Third Rome idea became very popular among the Russians by the fall of Constantinople.<sup>223</sup> This idea is clearly seen in the letter of Pilothouse of Pskov (a monk) to Vasili III of Russia in 1510

“... most pious tsar, that all the Christian empires unite with thine own. For two Romes have fallen, bu the third stands, and a fourth there will not be; for thy christian tsardom will not pass to any other, according to mighty word of God”<sup>224</sup>

From then on, the ideology of the third Rome, and emulating to be the representative of Christianity was exploited in the politics of Russia. In this sense, according to Jorga, the efforts of the tsar in Boghdan were not welcomed by the people. Although Peter could not find any one other than Cantemir and a few rulers

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<sup>221</sup> Kurat, *Türkiye Rusya*, op. cit., 32.

<sup>222</sup> Ibid., 82.

<sup>223</sup> Runciman, op. cit., 324.

<sup>224</sup> Ibid., 324.



that would support him in the beginning in the following decades the situation was reverse. In the course of time Russian propaganda found a profound response in the principality. During the war with the Russians (1768-1774) there were people among the Moldavians who were helping to their coreligionist, as we have seen the Russians. Although it is also possible that part of the help offered to the Russians were reluctantly given because they were under extreme pressure. In using the religion at the expense of the Turks, the emissaries of tsar was carrying out a systematic propaganda in Boghdan. These include the handing out pamphlets which were describing the Russian tsar as the Jesus Christ or a holy figure as the savior of the Christians.<sup>225</sup> The employment of anti-Turkish elements in their propaganda was usually aiming at a wholesale mutiny against the Porte to “lift the Turkish yoke.” However, according to George Jewsbury, this campaign in essence was masked under the call of religious unity.<sup>226</sup> To cite an example of Russian religious propaganda, the author of *Memleketeyn Tarihi*, relates the story in the following meaning: a foreteller who was backed by the Russians put forth a claim that in his treatise

*“Konstantiniyyeyi diđer konstantin bina etdi anı diđer sanayi edecek ise de Konstantin isminde bir zat tecdit eyeleycektir,”*

The obscure sentence basically says us that Constantinople and it is founded Constantine, and a Constantine and will finally renovate it.

After the long discussion among the people as to the meaning of the sentence, different views emerged out. Who was the Constantine in the prophesy of foreteller. Finally the ideas converged on the point that it was supposed to be the Russian tsar or at least a “man” of him,<sup>227</sup> perhaps the grandson of Catherine II.

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<sup>225</sup> *Memleketeyn*, op.cit., 19b.

<sup>226</sup> Jewsbury, op. cit., 7.

<sup>227</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

Although the challenges to the region by the Russians, the principality continued to remain in the hands of the Ottomans. However, Boghdan became one of the first places that where the Ottoman decline started and its domestic affairs was intervened. In the 18<sup>th</sup> century, rising Russia since the time of Peter the Great, who had his only defeat in Boghdan by the Ottomans in his career, realized most of his designs during the reign of Catherine. With the impact of the big wars in the region and the Russian intervention the Ottoman influence was seriously shaken in the principality.

## CONCLUSION

In the course of this work an explanation was attempted of the position of the Romanian principalities between the Russian Tsardom and the Ottoman Empire. Moldavia was a buffer zone, not only between the Ottomans and the Russians, but also between the Austrians and the Poles as well. This is because it was located in the immediate sphere of influence of the expansionist powers. Until the rise of the Russians, the principality, which was already taken under Ottoman rule by Kanuni in 1538, was frequently disturbed by the raids of the Poles. The Polish incursion and attempts of intervention into the politics of the Boghdan was not so much bothering the Porte. However, with the rise of the Russians, the politics totally changed in the region. The reason is that the Poles were comparatively peaceful and less expansionist. However, with the rise of Russia in the early eighteenth century, we see an extremely strong and expansionist empire. Russia had eliminated all the major powers surrounding her country. After getting rid of the dangers from Sweden in the north and Poland in the west, the Russians turned their attention into the Ottoman Empire. In this way, the major target of the Russian was to take the Moldavians on her side. Contrary to the Polish challenges to Moldavia, the Russians were advantageous because they had the same faith with the Moldavians. Using religion as a tool constituted the major Russian policy towards the principalities for more than a century. In every occasion the Russians tried stirring up trouble in the region. They were pretending to be the protector of Orthodox Christianity and were going to Moldavia to free them from the "Turkish yoke." Finally, the Russians managed to obtain some rights from the Porte, and they would act as representatives on behalf of their coreligionists with the Treaty of Kucuk Kainardji in 1774.

The Sublime Porte, in the beginning of the Russian challenges to Moldavia, by using its military power was becoming successful. This was the case in the Prut campaign of Peter the Great in 1711. However, in the course of time the Porte could not endure against the rapidly developing Russia. Another response by the sublime Porte to the challenges of Russia was to change the form of government in the principality. After the betrayal of Dmitri Cantemir, the Ottomans decided to appoint voivodes from the Phanar quarter of Istanbul. These voivodes were outsiders to the Moldavians and were seen as the agents of the Sultan. That is why these voivodes were not appreciated by their subjects. On the other hand the boyars, feeling their power in danger, also opposed the policies of Phanariot princes. This caused resentment between the voivodes and the boyars. The result was that no one was content with each other in the principality and all parties began to seek collaborators from outside. In this way, some of the voivodes as well as boyars were trying to get closer, particularly with the Russians, against each other as well as to the Porte. In the course of time the situation came to be that the people of Moldavia occasionally were cooperating with the adversaries of the Porte and the Porte was insistently trying to protect them. Even with the challenges of the Russians, both religiously and militarily to the Romanian principalities, the Ottomans succeeded in keeping the principality in their hands.



**APPENDIX A: Sulhname between Mehmed II and Stefan Çel Mare, prince of Boghdan 1479.**

و متعاقبة عن حسن التوضيف وغير قابلة للانقطاع والرفوه  
 ولا محل للفتار والركن ذبل طالبه الخيل المنقضية الى المعاد  
 والمراقة ومقتضى عن الزمير الى المؤثر الى  
 المواقفة فالمرحوم الملك العلام وخصته المأمور المأمور  
 ان يصير عن ايم القلب المينر والحاظ الحظير عما ذكره تيسر  
 تلك المتي والمهام على لعن الحاي والطيب انما هو تيسر الامال  
 ولا يخفى علاقتنا بالخطير ان هذا الدعوى الغير لما سيج  
 من السيلر ان السرة العظمى والحضرة العليا وضد كرمه  
 الكافر وكطفه السرة ان يجعل عهده المخلص وتحت المخصصه  
 محتسبا باراب من عنائته ومختصنا في اجنحة عمارته  
 و ملحوظا بعين عينايتة ومحفوظا بحصص كفايتة آيتوى  
 عليه سروزه غير فوف المجرى و امتلاء في حضور توفيقه  
 في صدر الحلك باعث ان كتاب هذا التصديق والاسماء  
 والتصديق الى مثلا التي ضره الاطباء كوز المطلوب  
 اصفاة الجسود الى الخطاب كذا في ذكر المولى  
 الخطير في الامتقاة الى مثل هذه الفقه الحقة  
 فالسور كرمك العام وحكمه الامام ان يستر هذا القصف

24  
 ذبح الله معالجه عظيمة في يوم النجم  
 ذبل العفو والقبول والامور من اهل الفضل ان يستر لنا  
 وكلهم جميع الامام على وجه التمام والتمام والتمام  
**سلطان محمد طاب ثراه باقره بخدا**  
 نشان عالی نشان واجبلا عان خاتون و طغرائ  
 غرای جهان آرای سلطان ابدان دفعه نفاذ  
 بحیمة اسبج المناق اصدار اولغا عه باعش بودرلم  
 قوه بخدان كم قدیم الا زمانه آستان خلافت  
 آستان آل عثمانی خصوصاً بهم سده كرد و در خفا  
 آستان جلا التوم حقه وار و بندر سعاد و طایف  
 خذ متكارى و رسوم فرمان نبرد اری ده و دفعه  
 اتمام التیوی و اوجهم اشتراك و صنع اندو كبر خواجه  
 و قندهای اتمام ایدردی بعضی حیانه و سده  
 سلطان عناد جماعته بجز و وفاء ابقا المخلد ایدر  
 آداب عبودیتدر طبره قدم بصوم صورت غی  
 آرزو معنای غمزد و طریق اطاعتدر تعسف طهار  
 اندو كجیشتیدن عزت دین الهی و محبت نشان ای باد  
 حوكتة كلوب مهیبت حو صر غضبتم دن تجوم تند باد

ذبل العفو

اجناد آسا و نژاد معوره مملکتی مانند بلاد ثور و غلا  
 قلوب دست فرمان متر فدر كوستای بركا ك و بركا  
 بوسه و بلبه فدر جهالتدر او بونیوف تا بیا و آیتا  
 مقام انابنده صدقها در قنده و انواع نذله زمین خفته  
 یوز سور بودر كاه جهادی پنا همه التی ایدر سكر  
 عبودیتى برقرار سابق رفیقز قیتت تسلیم ایدر بن  
 و بریدن اوزریمه و صنع اولسان حو ایدر ك برسل او  
 بیدر كاه افرا بجز فلور ك ایدی مضاعف ایدر ب تهر بیدر  
 التی بیدر ك ایدر بن دوسته دوست و دوسته  
 اولوب و ابق ایا مده كی كی سبیل استقامته بر قدم فوف  
 آما یونیا بو آستان كرون نشین و آستان دفعه كاتا  
 عن حد خدمتكار لر ندر دیو بیلور ب صحر مطا و تدر  
 كره شنا عین دفعه انكی بچین آب دریا نه باب دیدر  
 سبلا قلوب عفو طلب ایدر كی جهند در مای خرقه  
 و بجز عاطفتم كجوش ایدر ب صو چند كجدم و عقده  
 عهدی كجید قلدیم والله اكبرم الود و الذى قال  
 او فو بالعهده ان العهد كان مسئولاً ما دام كی بو

25  
 شرایط انونه مذكوره اوزره آستان سلطنت آستان  
 طغز و لغد منتمی و ملتسك لانفسه و ماكنه و مملكتنه  
 و سجا فدرم بكار ندر و سبایر قوالدر حدس تعرض و بلی  
 انذرا نار استقامت كرن كی غیر عنایت نشان غامه  
 ملحوظ و عواطف خسرو اندر محفوظ اولوب و عهد  
 نامه بیلر سرافراز قلدیم كه انزه جهت اعتقاد و سب  
 اعتمادی اولوالعنه تا بجز اده سلطان محمد حو  
 با آستان آستان رفت و سلیمان سوكت از بن خای مور  
 معوض بننده كی انست كه از جانب كندر روزگار و سلطان  
 جم اقدار با بن بنده مخلص و دولت خواه مخصص  
 طوا كی در برفی بینك جهان مطاع رسید بیلین از خون  
 سواد من كی بنیش جیم جهالتت این جیم عیار  
 آستان دولت را سودم و بهزار اكرام اهتمام  
 واعزاز احترام غمزه بزین كسودم و صفوم و صفوم  
 با نفا و شرم منوم كشت كه حد رفیع صبر جام كیتی نما را  
 ان بربای روز ضار و كشی بهشت تارا و حوضه نعمت  
 بخش جنت الماوی چندین سهر و ما مقصود شده

شرایط



APPENDIX B: C. HR. 4876

موضوع قولیدر لکه  
 بانته و همایه ماده لری بالکلیه وضع و الفنا اولغش اولدیفنه نای مملکت بغدادیه متکلمه اباحه حد دون عینیه ایدی ایروام رعایا سنده اولدی  
 بر تقرب ابله دول نصاری قونسلوسلری طرفلریدن بانته کاغدی اخلدیله مستانک داعیه سنده اولد فدی کیفیتی شروط و عهود  
 و مقوم و مؤخر صادر اولان او امر کجه نای خلاقی اولدیفندن بو سادک کلباسنغ و لعی خصوصه اراده سینه نعلمه ایدینی معلومه تیریش  
 صدور اولان فرمانه کالبستانه و ایه برای نفی اولدی عقیبنده بر مطوق امالی قیابجه عهدنامه سنده مطلوب بر سنه مدینه و باش  
 معاهده سنده مندرج اوبه دفع ای طرفده نایک وطنه و ایدلکی فروض و قطع عهده برله روسیه دیارینه عزیمت ایدوب بده برای  
 تجارت و عینی طریق المسافره بو طرفده بو نایه مملکت بغدادیه اقامت اوردن اولان فرانسه و اوستریا سویدلریدن ماعدا سکره دبه بانته  
 کدالت لاجل التجاره و عینی طریق المسافره مملکت بغدادیه اقامت اوردن اولان فرانسه و اوستریا سویدلریدن ماعدا سکره دبه بانته  
 المشی اولدیرک کجه رعینیه نایکلی ایدوب بر زماندن بر و بعدله مملکتده یونان کجه نایک بولون دول نصاری سوید و مستانک  
 بیدرینه بونایه بانته لرینه نظر ابله مال و کفیلرینی تحفه اربینه مزید اهتمام و رفتن قنوب دون عینیه دایمی القرار ابله روسیه اولدی  
 بینه مؤخر تحفه اونایه مصالحه عهدنامه سی تاریخدن بر و روسیه مطلوب بر طرفده بانته کاغدی اخلدیله سویدلریک  
 و مستانک داعیه سنده اولدیرک کجه رعینیه نایکلی خصوصه تقدیم اولغنه لازمه دن اولدیفنه نایک دیگر سویدلریک نظام  
 یوزن قدر تأخیر اولغش ایدوبه خصوصه مذکور دجه قریبا دخواه ولی التلی اوزره نایک اولغنه مطلوب جازمدر قالدیکه بغدادیه مملکتی  
 و ممالک محوسه شانیه رعایا سنده لاجل المصلحه کجه دیارینه واروب اول طرفده و کانه و خانیه و یاغوز و براق ارشون عرصه عالییه  
 ممالک اولغش اولدیرک باش قصیه سنده مقیم اوستریا قونسلوسی کجه ممالکی اهل بسند اعتبار و اوستقوله لریک سویدلرک  
 صلواتیلری بقوبنه قطع سنه دائر کجه لویه اعطا اولان عهدنامه مشروطیدر دبه لریک همانلرنده اصدار ایدوب  
 عهدنامه مذکوره نایک شروط و عهودی معلوم خاکرازم اولدیفندن سالف الدر عهدنامه نایک بر قطع صورتی سدی  
 بیدی به ارسال بولورله خصوصه محاب و اسیانه خدیو لاری منقول بوردی منفرع جازم ایدوبی انه نایک الله تعالی محظ علیهم  
 عالم ارای اهدفا نلری ببولد فده اولیاده و هر مالدیه امر و فرمانه عرض مسله الامر کور و



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C. AS, Cevdet Askeriye

C. BLD, Cevdet Belediye

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